From the Act of Judging to the Sentence

FROM THE ACT OF JUDGING TO THE SENTENCE SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY O...

Author: Rojszczak Artur

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FROM THE ACT OF JUDGING TO THE SENTENCE

SYNTHESE LIBRARY STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY, LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Editor-in-Chief:

VINCENT F. HENDRICKS, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark JOHN SYMONS, University of Texas at El Paso, U.S.A.

Honorary Editor: JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Boston University, U.S.A.

Editors: DIRK VAN DALEN, University of Utrecht, The Netherlands THEO A.F. KUIPERS, University of Groningen, The Netherlands TEDDY SEIDENFELD, Carnegie Mellon University, U.S.A. PATRICK SUPPES, Stanford University, California, U.S.A. JAN WOLEN´SKI, Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

VOLUME 328

FROM THE ACT OF JUDGING TO THE SENTENCE The Problem of Truth Bearers from Bolzano to Tarski

b by †

ARTUR ROJSZCZAK

Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

Edited by

JAN WOLEēSKI Jagiellonian University, Kraków, Poland

A C.I.P. P Catalogue record fo f r this book is available fr f om the Library r of Congress.

ISBN-10 1-4020-3396-6 (HB) Springer Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York ISBN-10 1-4020-3397-4 (e-book) Springer Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3396-4 (HB) Springer Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York ISBN-13 978-1-4020-3397-1 (e-book) Springer Dordrecht, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York

Published by Springer, P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, The Netherlands. P

Printed on acid-free paper

All Rights Reserved © 2005 Springer No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work.

Printed in the Netherlands.

Summary Contents

Preface

vii

1. INTRODUCTION: ALFRED TARSKI’S PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS 1933 DEFINITION OF TRUTH

1

2. THE NOTION OF THE TRUTH BEARER

23

3. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT AS THE THEORY OF COGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE

33

4. JUDGEMENT, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE

57

5. THE ONTOLOGY OF JUDGEMENT

83

6. REISM

103

7. THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH

111

8. ONTOLOGISM, ABSTRACT OBJECTS AND NOMINALISM

161

9. BRENTANISM AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE SEMANTICS OF THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL

171

10. JUDGMENT, BELIEF, AND SENTENCES: REMARKS ON THE TRUTH BEARER IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL

191

11. FINAL COMMENTS

213

References Appendices: Publications of Artur Rojszczak Index

221 235 239

v

Contents

Preface

xiii

1. INTRODUCTION: ALFRED TARSKI’S PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS 1933 DEFINITION OF TRUTH 1 The Question of the Truth Bearer in Tarski’s Theory of Truth? 2 The Ambiguity of Tarski’s Concept of a Sentence 3 Alfred Tarski as Philosopher? 3.1 Tarski’s Philosophical Background 3.2 Some Facts and Genetic Connections 3.3 Brentanism in Tarski’s Philosophical Background? 3.4 Tarski and the Vienna Circle 3.5 Tarski and Brentano? 4 The Content of this Study and what is not Included in Previous Studies on this Topic 4.1 The Wole´n´ ski-Simons Thesis 4.2 The Content of the Study

1 1 4 5 5 6 7 8 11 14 14 16

2. THE NOTION OF THE TRUTH BEARER 1 The Place of the Notion of the Truth Bearer in the Theory of Truth 2 The Problem of the Truth Bearer 3 The Deﬁnition of the Truth Bearer 4 The Variety of Truth Bearers

23 25 26 27

3. DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT AS THE THEORY OF COGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE 1 Franz Brentano (I): The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer 1.1 The Variety of Entities Related to the Act of Judging

33 33 33

vii

23

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1.2

2

3

4

5

The Primacy of the Notion of Knowledge in Relation to the Notion of Truth 1.3 An Argument Based on the Gnoseological Concept of Truth 1.4 An Argument Based on the Idiogenetic Theory of Judgement 1.5 The Deﬁnition of the Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer Kazimierz Twardowski (I): Act-Content-Object 2.1 Presentation 2.2 The Judgment 2.3 The Truth of the Object of Presenting Alexius Meinong (I): Thinking and True Objectives 3.1 Thinking 3.2 The Object of Thinking 3.3 Cognition and Knowledge 3.4 A True Objective and a True Act of Judging Anton Marty (I): The Adequate Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer 4.1 The Ambiguity of the Notion of the Primary Truth Bearer 4.2 An Argument Based on the Epistemological Notion of Truth 4.3 The Content of a Judgment Summary of Chapter 3: the Epistemic Notion of Truth

4. JUDGEMENT, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 1 Franz Brentano (II): Linguistic Analysis 1.1 Language and Thinking 1.2 The Use of Linguistic Expressions 1.3 ‘Truth’ as a Syncategorematical Expression 1.4 A Note on Brentano’s Theory of Meaning and Reference 1.5 An Argument from the Reducibility of Sentences 2 Kazimierz Twardowski (II): Determining and Modifying Adjectives 2.1 The Meaning and Function of Names 2.2 Attributing and Modifying Predicates 2.3 The Logic of Adjectives 3 Alexius Meinong (II): Truth-Predicates in Ordinary Use 3.1 An Expression and Its Meaning 3.2 Communication

34 36 36 38 41 42 43 44 45 45 46 47 48 49 49 50 51 53 57 57 57 59 59 60 61 61 62 62 64 65 65 68

ix

Contents

3.3

4

5

Meinong’s Argument from the Ordinary Usage of Epistemic Operators 3.4 An Argument from True Hypothesis Anton Marty (II): Speech Acts 4.1 Autosemantic Expressions and the Basic Types of Mental Phenomena 4.2 Linguistic Forms and their Basic Functions 4.3 Communication of Content 4.4 The Truth of Objects 4.5 The Truth-Predicate in Expressions of Direct and Indirect Judging Acts 4.6 On Arguments from the Natural Use of Adjectives Summary of Chapter 4

69 71 72 72 73 74 76 77 78 78

5. THE ONTOLOGY OF JUDGEMENT 1 What is the Ontology of Judgement? 1.1 The Link Between Psychology and Language 1.2 Where Are Objects of Judgement? 1.3 The Immanentistic Reading of Brentano’s Doctrine of Intentionality 2 Carl Stumpf (I): On Act and Content 3 Kazimierz Twardowski (III): On the Object of Judgement 4 Edmund Husserl (I): The Psycho-Linguistic Content of Judgement 4.1 Formal Ontology 4.2 The Theory of Meaning 4.3 The Theory of the Cognition of Meaning 4.4 Truth as Species 5 Anton Marty (III): The Temporal Ontology of the Content of Judgements 6 Adolf Reinach (I): A Platonistic Ontology of Judgement 7 Summary of Chapter 5

83 83 83 84

95 99 100

6. REISM 1 Franz Brentano (III): The Judger as the Truth Bearer 1.1 What is Presentable? 1.2 The Reistic Theory of Meaning 1.3 What is Presented from the Point of View of Reism? 1.4 The Judger 2 Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski (I) 2.1 Ontological and Semantical Reism 2.2 The Sentence from the Reistic Standpoint

103 103 103 104 105 105 106 106 106

85 85 87 88 88 89 91 93

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FROM THE ACT OF JUDGING TO THE SENTENCE

2.3

3

Candidates for the Truth Bearer from the Point of View of Reism 2.4 The Sentence as the Bearer of Truth Summary of Chapter 6

7. THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH 1 Bernard Bolzano (I): Sentences in Themselves 1.1 What Are Sentences in Themselves? 1.2 The Meanings of ‘Truth’: Ordinary Language Analysis 1.3 The Cognition of Truth 1.4 The Objective Truth Bearer as a Guarantee of Objective Truth 2 Franz Brentano (IV): Identity and Evidence 2.1 The Theory of Evident Judgement 2.2 Brentano’s Extensional, Evidentional and Criteriological Deﬁnition of Truth 2.3 The Evidence as Mental Phenomenon 2.4 The Evidence of Factual Judgements 2.5 The Evidence of Axioms 2.6 Indirect Evident Judgements 2.7 Assertive and Apodictic Evidence 2.8 The Objectivity of Truth and of Evidence 3 Edmund Husserl (II): Evidence of Species 3.1 Knowledge and Evidence 3.2 The Extra-Temporality of Relations Between Meanings 3.3 Factual Truths 4 Kazimierz Twardowski (IV): The Eternal Truth of Temporal Truth-Bearers 4.1 So-called Relative Truths 4.2 Acts of Judging as Bearers of Eternal Truths 5 Kazimierz Twardowski (V) and Jan Łukasiewicz (I): On Psychologism, Acts and Their Products 5.1 Logic and Psychology 5.2 Acts and Products 5.3 Types of Acts and Products 5.4 Language as a Product 6 Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski (II) and Stanisław Les´niewski (I): The Absoluteness of Truth 6.1 Free Creation and the Sempiternity of Truth 6.2 The Notion of Existence

108 109 109 111 111 112 112 114 115 116 116 116 117 117 118 118 119 119 121 121 122 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 134 134 136

xi

Contents

6.3

7

8

Note on Truth with a Beginning and on the Principle of the Excluded Middle 6.4 Le´s´niewski’s Response 6.5 The Eternity of Truth and the Principle of the Excluded Middle 6.6 What Does ‘Absolute Truth’ Mean? Maria Kokoszy´n´ ska (I): The Relativity of the Semantic Notion of Truth 7.1 The Absoluteness of the Classical Conception of Truth 7.2 Relativization to Language Summary of Chapter 7: Objective Truth and Objective Knowledge 8.1 Objective Knowledge 8.2 How Knowledge Becomes Objectivized 8.3 The Objectivization of Truth 8.4 Concluding Remarks

8. ONTOLOGISM, ABSTRACT OBJECTS AND NOMINALISM 1 The Choice of Truth Bearers and Ontological Preferences 2 Ontologism and Nominalism in Poland 2.1 Ontologism as the Brentanian Heritage? 2.2 Nominalism as a Special Case of Ontologism 2.3 Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski (III) and Stanisław Le´s´niewski (II) on General Objects 2.4 Stanisław Le´s´niewski (III): Constructive Nominalism 3 Summary of Chapter 8 9. BRENTANISM AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE SEMANTICS OF THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL 1 Stanisław Le´s´niewski (IV): On the Sense of Inscription 1.1 Ontologism as the Primacy of Semantics 1.2 Language and Metalanguage 1.3 Existential Sentences 2 Maria Ossowska (I): Expressing and Semantics 2.1 The Notion of Expression 2.2 The Presentational Function of the Sentence and the Expressing Function of the Sentence 2.3 Expressing and the Meaning-Intention 3 Stanisław Ossowski (I): On Semantic Products 3.1 Semantic Products and the Function of Expressing 3.2 Linguistic Products

138 138 139 141 142 143 143 144 144 146 150 153 161 161 162 162 162 163 166 168

171 171 171 173 176 177 178 180 181 183 183 185

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FROM THE ACT OF JUDGING TO THE SENTENCE

4

3.3 Truth and the Property of Sentences Summary of Chapter 9

187 188

10. JUDGMENT, BELIEF, AND SENTENCES: REMARKS ON THE TRUTH BEARER IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL 1 Kazimierz Twardowski (VI) and Tadeusz Czez˙ owski (I): The Product of the Judging Act 1.1 The Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Cognition 1.2 Elementary Judgments as Truth Bearers 2 Jan Łukasiewicz (II): The Sentence in the Logical Sense 2.1 Judgment and Belief 2.2 The Truth of Judgments: An Argument from the Judgment’s Function of Reconstructing 3 Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski (IV): The Judgment and the Sentence 3.1 The Judgment and States of Affairs 3.2 The Sentence: Another Semantic-Reistic Argument 4 Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (I): The Picturing Sentence 4.1 The Motives of True Belief 4.2 An Argument from the Possibility of Describing a Judgment 5 Alfred Tarski on the Truth Bearer 5.1 The Sentence and Syntax 5.2 The Sentence as a Function without Variables 5.3 The Sentence as a Product 5.4 The Sentence as a Physical Body 5.5 The Sentence as an Inscription 5.6 The Sentence-Type and a Sentence-Name of a Type 5.7 Summary of Chapter 10

202 205 205 206 206 208 209 210 210

11. FINAL COMMENTS 1 The Weakened Thesis 2 The Heritage of Brentano 3 The Truth Bearers

213 213 216 217

References Appendices: Publications of Artur Rojszczak Index

221 235 239

191 191 191 192 193 193 195 197 197 198 199 200

Preface

IN MEMORIAM OF ARTUR ROJSZCZAK For a teacher, the opportunity to write the Foreword to a student’s work gives rise to a sense of fulﬁlment and pride. In this case, however, although the latter remains, the former has been effaced. In a well-ordered world Artur Rojszczak would have perhaps one day written tributes to ourselves. It is a poignant paradox when teachers are called upon to comment posthumously on the work of one of their students. This is a terrible task which falls to us—who have been not only mentors and colleagues to Artur, but also simply friends—of eulogizing someone who has died so soon, and so tragically. Artur was killed, together with his father, by an aggressive neighbour on September 27, 2001. Artur’s wife was severely injured in the same attack. Artur was born on March 12, 1968 in Słubice (close to the Polish-German border). He studied in the Electronics College in Zielona Góra, graduating in 1987. But from very early on his dream was to study philosophy, and to do so at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow; no other place was considered by him seriously. He entered the university in 1988. Artur ﬁrst appeared in JW’s seminar in 1990. The seminar was devoted to Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. Artur found some unclarity in those parts of Kripke’s treatment of deﬁnite descriptions which turn on the problems raised by disjunctive and conjunctive properties. JW advised that he should write up his criticism and the resultant essay served as the genesis of Artur’s ﬁrst published paper. At that time, BS was working at the International Academy of Philosophy in Schaan (Liechtenstein), which then offered grants to wellqualiﬁed students from various countries, including Poland. JW recommended to Artur that he should apply and his application was successful. During his time in Liechtenstein Artur not only contributed much to making the Academy the place for lively philosophical discussions which it then was, but also worked in a range of part-time jobs in order to save up the money to buy an

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apartment in Poland. He also wrote a Masters Thesis, entitled Wahrheit und Urteilsevidenz bei Franz Brentano. Still as a student Artur participated in the First Congress of GAP (the German Gesellschaft für analytische Philosophie) in Saarbrücken in 1991 and his paper on the correspondence theory of truth appeared in the Proceedings of that meeting (details of Artur’s publications are given in the enclosed bibliography). Artur returned to Poland in 1992, where he submitted an extended version of his Liechtenstein thesis and graduated in philosophy summa cum laude in 1993. Immediately after graduating, Artur began studying for his doctorate, working on the topic of bearers of truth under the supervision of JW. He spent some time in Salzburg working on the project ‘Psychologismus und Ontologismus in der Logik und in der Philosophie vom Bolzano zu Tarski’. His dissertation, written in German under the title: Vom Urteil zum Satz. Das Wahrheitsträgerproblem von Bolzano zu Tarski, was ﬁnished and defended in 1997, exactly four years after Artur had begun his doctoral studies (a remarkable achievement, given that ﬁnishing one’s studies in the required period of four years is rather rare in Poland). On the strength of his dissertation, the Foundation for Polish Science awarded Artur a special grant, one of 100 given each year to the most promising young Polish scientists. Artur had also by this stage solved his extra-philosophical problems. He had married and bought an apartment. Dominika, the daughter of Artur and Agnieszka, was born in 1994. Work on his dissertation did not interrupt Artur’s other scientiﬁc activities. He published several papers, in Polish, English and German, and he participated in many philosophical conferences. In particular, he delivered invited papers at the conferences Ungarn und die Brentano Schule (Budapest 1993), where Artur spoke on Polish descriptive psychology, The Legacy of Brentano (Cracow 1993), speaking on the theory of objects in Polish descriptive psychology, and Tarski and the Vienna Circle (Vienna 1997), a paper on physical objects as truth-bearers. He also contributed to many other conferences and symposia, including the Wittgenstein Symposia in Kirchberg and meetings on Austrian and Polish philosophy held in various places of the world, including Poland, Austria, Switzerland, Ukraine and the USA. Artur also showed his organizational gifts in organizing a successful international conference on the topic of ’The Brentano Heritage’ in Cracow in 1994. He also co-edited (with JW) its Proceedings, published as Brentano Studien 8. Every year, the Foundation for Polish Science awards three or four grants to young scientists to enable them to study abroad. Artur received such a grant in 1998 and decided to go to Buffalo, where BS had in the meantime become professor. Artur’s main task was to work on an English translation of his PhD and to take the ﬁrst steps toward habilitation. For the latter he decided to work on the borderline of psychology, philosophy and cognitive science, more speciﬁcally on the problem of intentionality. His aim was to combine several philosophical traditions in a new and original way, incorporating ideas

PREFACE

xv

taken over from Brentano and from cognitive psychology with a methodology derived from analytic philosophy. He also worked together with BS on ontology, in particular on the problem of truthmakers. Their three joint papers on theories of judgment, states of affairs and objective truth are the result of this cooperation. Artur and JW also planned to work together on the topic of truth-makers. Artur returned to Poland at the beginning of 1999. His parents sold their house in Rzepin and moved to Cracow and bought an apartment in the same house in which Artur and his family lived. In the same year Artur once again demonstrated his organizational skills as a member of the team preparing the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science which was held in Cracow in August 1999. Artur contributed in a number of crucial ways to the success of this remarkable event. He was also appointed editor-in-chief of the journal Reports on Philosophy, published by the Jagiellonian University Press. His classes, too, were among the most popular among students of philosophy in Cracow. In May 2001 Artur delivered a talk at the Tarski Centenary Conference in Warsaw, where a constellation of leading mathematicians and philosophers celebrated the hundredth anniversary of the birth of one of the great logicians of the twentieth century. Thus, by the time he was still not much older than 30 years of age, Artur already enjoyed an established position in national and international philosophical life. Everything seemed to point towards a brilliant career and a happy personal life for this extremely gifted philosopher, until an absurd death annihilated these great hopes. Artur left behind an English translation of his PhD dissertation. This work is the culmination of Artur’s thinking on topics already dealt with, both historically and systematically, in his earlier writings, and it reﬂects his philosophical interests in Austrian philosophy from Bolzano to the present day and in particular in the Polish wing of the Austrian tradition established by Kazimierz Twardowski. The present book is the ﬁrst monograph in the literature of philosophy entirely devoted to the problem of truth-bearers. It focuses primarily on ontological, rather than on semantic and logical, problems, and perhaps its main virtue lies in its careful and detailed investigation of the issue of whether a physicalist conception of truth-bearers is possible. BARRY S MITH ´ JAN W OLE NSKI

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION: ALFRED TARSKI’S PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS 1933 DEFINITION OF TRUTH 1.

The Question of the Truth Bearer in Tarski’s Theory of Truth?

Alfred Tarski’s work on the theory of truth published in 1933 entitled Poj˛e˛ cie prawdy w j˛e˛ zykach nauk dedukcyjnych [The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages] belongs, no doubt, to the canon of philosophical thought.1 Since its appearance, the semantic theory of truth has been mentioned in almost every discussion on truth, even if only to criticize it. The important position occupied by Tarski’s theory in the history of philosophy seems to justify its inclusion in a study on the theory of truth. In Tarski’s conception of truth, the predicate ‘is true’ is a metalinguistic afﬁrmation which is applied to sentences expressed in an object language, i.e. in the language in which we speak about things. There are misinterpretations or reinterpretations of Tarski’s theory which consider him to have held that propositions or statements are the bearers of truth, that is, the objects of which the truth-predicate is afﬁrmed. Nevertheless, when we examine Tarski’s semantic notion of truth more closely, it becomes evident that the entities that play the role of truth bearers are sentences or sentence-types. Hence it would appear at ﬁrst glance that a reconsideration of the issue of what functions as the truth bearer in Tarski’s work is superﬂuous. However, if one looks at the original 1933 work, in which the existence of a univocal notion of sentence is called into question, it is quite difﬁcult to give an unambiguous answer. I believe that the metalinguistic expressions which describe sentences in Tarski’s 1933 work do not univocally deﬁne the notion of sentence; this is an issue which has never hitherto been the subject of dispute. In the next section I shall point out various formulations of the notion of sentence in an attempt to evoke in the reader some doubts as regards the unique deﬁnition of a sentence in Tarski’s 1933 paper on truth.

1

2

CHAPTER ONE

I believe, however, that the answer to the question of whether Tarski believes that sentences, sentence-types or something else are the bearers of truth is ambigous unless we include the deﬁnitions of sentences found in Tarski’s 1933 paper in a more general philosophical framework within which they come to be consistent. A justiﬁcation of this statement requires that we turn to the Tarski’s original work. In the course of this study I shall provide the evidence needed for a justiﬁcation of the statement that the various formulations of sentences given by Tarski can be put into a conceptual framework where they became more comprehensive. Before I build a framework for explaining different ways of understanding sentences in Tarski’s paper, I shall seek to answer a genetic question which can be asked in this context: Why has Tarski chosen sentences as the bearers of truth? This sort of question is based on the assumption, of whose truth I am convinced, that Tarski’s choice of sentences was philosophically motivated. More precisely, I assume that Tarski’s philosophical background played an important role in the preparation of his theory of truth. I therefore think that the logician and mathematician Alfred Tarski was also a philosopher sensu stricto. The relevant question here is what ought to be considered as philosophical background? In other words, in which philosophical tradition should we include Tarski in order to answer the question about his philosophical motivation regarding the choice of sentences as truth bearers? I think that the philosophical tradition usually mentioned when speaking about inﬂuences on Tarski in the context of his theory of truth, i.e. the tradition of the Vienna Circle, is not necessarily the most important tradition in this respect. For example, I doubt whether the physicalism of the sort presented in the Vienna Circle played an important role as far as Tarski’s choice of sentences for truth bearers is concerned: this thesis is stated, among others, by Tarski commentators such as Hartrey Field.2 I, however, shall argue that the tradition to which Tarski’s philosophical background belongs is the School of Franz Brentano. Hereafter I shall refer to it as the Brentanian tradition.3 This study is throughout principally historical. It presents, however, not only a possible philosophical motivation for Alfred Tarski’s choice of sentences as truth bearers, based on his motivation of the conceptual framework in which various notions of sentence come to be consistent. Under the pretext of a historical analysis of Tarski’s philosophical background as placed in the Brentanian tradition, I also attempt to answer questions which are of general philosophical interest: How far does the choice of the truth bearer affect the conceptual framework of the theory of truth? Is it, for example, the case that a theory of truth such as Tarski’s semantic theory is completely independent of what serves as the truth bearer? Can we switch from sentences to statements or to propositions as bearers of truth without making important changes within the theory of truth itself? Does the choice of a truth bearer exclude some possibilities in developing a theory of truth? Furthermore, in the context of Tarski’s

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

3

theory of truth, why should sentences and not, for example, judgments take on the role of truth bearers? In other words, why should sentences play the role of truth bearers better than judgments? These kinds of philosophical questions are also at issue in this study. They will not usually be answered directly, but they will be considered in the context of corresponding questions asked from a historical perspective. The latter questions include, for example, the most important one: ‘Why did the sentences, instead of acts of judging, assume the role of the truth bearer in the ﬁrst three decades of this century?’ Historical discussions of the issue of the bearers of semantic properties are of importance not only to historians. Analytical philosophy in the last sixty years has focused almost exclusively on propositions and propositional attitudes as bearers of truth and of other semantic features. In light of this study, however, this fact becomes less understandable. Interest in language and semantics does not directly imply the acceptance of entities and states such as propositions and propositional attitudes. A clear example here is the LvovWarsaw School where Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth came to light. Nowadays, and mostly due to the fashionableness of cognitive science, we know that there are several ways of explaining the ‘propositional attitude’ other than the explanation commonly employed by philosophers of language who use entities such as ideal meanings. Thus, there can be another lesson from this study which seems of importance for contemporary discussions. The period of the history of philosophy which this study embraces anticipates a number of problems considered today within the framework of the theory of speech acts and of cognitive science. The latter never paid much attention to the history of philosophy. I would risk saying that they did not pay enough attention. The trail of cognitive science is marked by forgotten ideas such as Twardowski’s distinction between act, content, and object, Reinach’s theory of speech acts, or Husserl’s psycholinguistic theory of meaning. These ideas originated in Austria and Poland, when experimental psychology was still in the cradle. In what follows I shall not repeat contemporary discussions of ideas that are nowadays considered to be ‘orthodox.’ Here I can only say to those who do not care much about the history of ideas that some of the ideas which have come from the Brentanian tradition are worth mentioning not only because they are anticipations of what followed, but also because they can be inspirations for future investigations concerning the bearers of semantic properties. A good example here is the problem of the relationship between acts of cognition and their linguistic expressions, something that was called ‘pragmatics’ by certain semanticalists who employed propositions, and which I shall call the problem of inheriting intentionality. Generally speaking, it is interesting to note how far changes in what is considered to be the bearer of truth affect the understanding of truth and vice versa. I hope that this study will make it clear that the choice of the truth bearer is not

4

CHAPTER ONE

neutral since it involves philosophical decisions which later must necessarily be reﬂected in the theory of truth. Such choices always have a price.

2.

The Ambiguity of Tarski’s Concept of a Sentence

We have already said that the metalinguistic expressions which describe sentences in Tarski´s 1933 work do not offer a unique notion of sentence which might serve as the bearer of truth. In order to understand this, we should take a look at the formulations that describe the notion of a sentence in this work. The following are taken from The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages: (i) A sentence as a concrete inscription or an inscription-type: Statements (sentences) are always treated here as a particular kind of expression, and thus as linguistic entities. Nevertheless, when the terms ‘expression’, ‘statement’, etc., are interpreted as names of concrete series or printed signs, various formulations which occur in this work do not appear to be quite correct, and give the appearance of a widespread error which consists in identifying expressions of like shape. (. . .) It is convenient to stipulate that terms like ‘word’, ‘expression’, ‘sentence’, etc., do not denote concrete series of signs but the whole class of such series which are of like shape with the series given; only in this sense shall we regard quotation-mark names as individual names of expressions. (Tarski 1933, p. 5 [1983, p. 156]) (ii) A sentence in the context of the grammar of a given language: Among all possible expressions which can be formed with these signs those called sentences are distinguished by means of purely structural properties. (Tarski 1933, p. 16 [1983, p. 166]) (iii) A sentence as a (psycho-physical) product or as a class of (psychophysical) products: Normally expressions are regarded as the products of human activity (or as classes of such products). (Tarski 1933, p. 25 [1983, p. 174]) (iv) A sentence as a physical body: But another possible interpretation of the term ‘expression’ presents itself: we could consider all physical bodies of a particular form and size as expressions. (Tarski 1933, p. 25 [1983, p. 174]) (v) A sentence as a sentence-function without free variables: x is a sentence (or a meaningful sentence)—in symbols x ∈ S—if and only if x is a sentential function and no variable vk is a free variable of the function x. (Tarski 1933, p. 29 [1983, p. 178]) As one can see, Tarski used at least four different concepts of a sentence: a sentence can be understood as an expression of a speciﬁed syntactical category, as

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

5

a psycho-physical product, as a physical body or, last but not least, as a function without free variables (as an expression of a logical category). If one assumes that each of the sentences can be understood either as a concrete entity or as a type or a class (something which Tarski himself also said explicitly), one can obtain more than ten different notions of a sentence. I think that this requires explanation.

3. 3.1

Alfred Tarski as Philosopher? Tarski’s Philosophical Background

Alfred Tarski’s greatness is evident in his work as a logician and as a mathematician. However, one can object that it is an abuse to speak about a logician and mathematician as if he were a philosopher. My assumption is that Alfred Tarski was conscious of the philosophical consequences of his work, even of the consequences of the choice of the truth bearer. This statement, however, is not beyond reproach. On the one hand, if I see Tarski as a mathematician and a logician who worked through all of the philosophical consequences of his logico-semantic work on truth, I will probably come into conﬂict with some of the facts of his biography. During his stay in the United States Tarski associated with mathematicians rather than with philosophers. Yet on the other hand, as it was repeatedly said,4 it is important to keep in mind that even in his later period of scholarly activity, Tarski more than once assumed the role of philosopher. Regardless of whether Tarski considered himself to be a philosopher and of how often he expressed his philosophical beliefs, there is no doubt that Tarski was educated in philosophy. It is reasonable, then, to speak about his philosophical background. Moreover, the 1933 paper on truth unambiguously states his philosophical inspirations and aspirations. Later, on several occasions, Tarski also expressed the philosophical basis of his semantic conception of truth.5 There are, therefore, reasons for believing that the choice of sentences as truth bearers lies not in a mere theory of meaning, which is called sometimes ‘the reference theory of meaning’ where a sentence is deﬁned as a referential linguistic expression together with its meaning.6 I would rather look for reasons for the referential theory of meaning. It is reasonable to suppose that the explanation may be found elsewhere, in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. This is the school which was responsible for shaping Tarski’s philosophical views and, therefore, the sense of his philosophical background. As we shall see, the state of the discussion about truth and true sentences in this school is reﬂected in some of the philosophical beliefs expressed in his writings.

6

3.2

CHAPTER ONE

Some Facts and Genetic Connections

Alfred Tarski (1902–1983) was a pupil of Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Le´s´niewski and Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski. Łukasiewicz and Les´niewski were his teachers in logic. The latter was the director of Tarski’s doctoral dissertation. The very strong connection between them was broken in 1923, but until this time Tarski worked on the problems of Le´s´niewski’s system of protothetics. After 1923 Tarski focused on issues connected with set theory, and at the end of the twenties he began to work with Jan Łukasiewicz on the topic of logical calculi. As is reported by Tarski himself, the semantic deﬁnition of truth was prepared by him in 1929 and delivered at the session of the Philosophical Society in 1930.7 The publication, however, did not appear until 1933. In the very ﬁrst section of the postponed publication Tarski acknowledges Stanisław Le´s´niewski’s strong inﬂuence on his work on truth. In this respect he refers directly to Le´s´niewski’s lectures in the 1919/1920 academic year, as well as to their private academic disputes. From a historical point of view it still remains unclear which part of this section of The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages comes from whom. It seems that for Tarski, the crucial point in this part of his study was Le´s´niewski’s views on language. In the same section of Tarski’s famous book of 1933, he also mentions his philosophy teacher—Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski. It is crucial from a historical point of view to point out that for the most part Tarski adopted Kotarbi´n´ ski’s views concerning truth. For example, the so-called classical formulation of the deﬁnition of truth that appears in the 1933 book comes from the latter.8 It is worth noting that among the few remarks on the notion of a sentence, Tarski refers to Kotarbi´n´ ski’s Elementy logiki formalnej i metodologii nauk [Elements of Formal Logic and Methodology of Science].9 It is also remarkable that Tarski’s collection of papers from 1956, very well known in English speaking philosophical circles, was dedicated to Kotarbi´n´ ski alone.10 The inﬂuence of Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski on Tarski is not surprising if we consider that their discussion about the objectivity of truth took place prior to Tarski’s enrollment at the university in 1918.11 In the context of the deﬁnition of truth advanced by Tarski in 1933, it is also important to mention Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. His papers are included in the short bibliography that appears at the very beginning of Tarski’s work on truth in formalized languages. When Tarski, motivated by Gödel’s theorems, was rewriting his work on truth, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz had prepared two important papers on language and meaning.12 Both of Ajdukiewicz’s papers were inﬂuenced by the same philosophical problems regarding the problem of truth and the truth bearer which affected Tarski’s work. Ajdukiewicz admits to this in his lectures on the theory of knowledge he held in the academic year 1930/1931.13

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

7

Both of Tarski’s teachers, Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski, together with Łukasiewicz, belong to the ﬁrst generation of students of Kazimierz Twardowski, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The historical question is how far Twardowski is responsible for the state of the philosophical discussions (especially about truth) that took place among his students? In other words, how many of Twardowski’s ideas were taken as axioms by his followers? Furthermore, continuing along this historical line, how many of Twardowski’s philosophical ideas are to be found in Tarski’s own thought? Can we ﬁnd evidence of the inﬂuence of Twardowski on Tarski’s concept of truth and the truth bearer? Is there a causal link between Twardowski’s and Tarski’s notions of linguistic expression? Is it possible to interpret Tarski’s notion of a sentence from Twardowski’s terminological point of view?14 We shall examine the answers to these questions on several occasions in the course of this study. At this stage I would like to mention only that persons like Twardowski, Łukasiewicz, Le´s´niewski, Kotarbin´ ski and Ajdukiewicz are of great importance in the development of the Lvov-Warsaw School, the school of modern Polish philosophy that only in the last two decades attained a prominent and deserved position in the history of philosophical ideas. One can argue, and rightly so, that these thinkers had a decisive inﬂuence on both the approach and the topics of philosophical discussions on truth within the Lvov-Warsaw School. Their philosophical investigations, therefore, shaped Tarski’s philosophical background. Tarski himself was very clear about Twardowski’s heritage: Almost all researchers, who pursue the philosophy of exact sciences in Poland, are indirectly or directly the disciples of Twardowski, although his own works could hardly be counted within this domain. (From the letter to Otto Neurath dated April 25, 1930, Tarski 1992, p. 20)

In the same letter to Otto Neurath from which the above citation comes, Tarski describes the general condition of Polish philosophy around 1930. In view of the pieces of information the letter includes, it is reasonable to assume that Tarski was very well acquainted with almost every aspect of the philosophical activity in Poland at this time, and not only in Warsaw where he worked, but also in Lvov, Krakow and Vilnius.

3.3

Brentanism in Tarski’s Philosophical Background?

In recent years the phenomenon of the Lvov-Warsaw School has been the topic of philosophical inquiry in the works of Skolimowski, Szaniawski, Wole´n´ ski, Simons and Smith.15 As a result of these works, not only views concerning the roots of this school, but also its image have changed. Until the 1980’s the school was more or less famous for its achievements in logic. Polish logic was the standard label for the contributions of Polish philosophy. At best, the philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School was associated with a kind of neopositivism, a philosophy informed by the logical positivism of the Vienna Cir-

8

CHAPTER ONE

cle. Although it may be true that the Polish school from the late nineteenth century to the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century owes its place in the world of philosophy to its contributions in logic, it was not merely a logical movement but a ‘philosophical school’ in the full sense of this expression. It is, perhaps, above all a philosophical school. According to the ﬁrst historical monograph devoted to this school, which has became the standard text on the Lvov-Warsaw School and has helped to establish the school as a separate category in the history of philosophical ideas ‘the Lvov-Warsaw School was not positivistic but rather analytic.’16 The connection between the Lvov-Warsaw School and the Vienna Circle is indisputable.17 First, however, it is important to mention another great tradition that inﬂuenced the Lvov-Warsaw School. This is the School of Franz Brentano, above all because of the central ﬁgure of Polish philosophy, Kazimierz Twardowski. The latter seems to have been even more inﬂuential philosophically on the Lvov-Warsaw School than was the Vienna Circle.18 As regards our interests in the bearers of truth in particular, clear connections between the School of Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School have already been mentioned by Simons and Wole´n´ ski in their ‘The Veritate. . .’19 In this study I shall attempt to develop further the connections as described in their paper. Secondly, in order to justify the thesis that it is the Brentanian side of the Austrian philosophical tradition which was much more inﬂuential on the Polish school than the Vienna Circle, it is worth noting the time when the connections between the Polish school and the Vienna Circle and the exchange of their philosophical ideas took place. The next two parts of this section will focus on some examples of the mutual inﬂuences between the Lvov-Warsaw School (including Tarski himself), the Vienna Circle and the Brentano School. The analysis will, however, restrict itself to the contexts of the notion of a sentence, or, more generally, of the notion of the truth bearer.

3.4

Tarski and the Vienna Circle

For purposes of this text, I shall divide the period in which the exchange of philosophical ideas between the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School took place into two parts: The ﬁrst part is between 1929, the date of the ‘Wissenschaftliche Weltanschauung’ manifesto and 1933, the publication date of Tarski’s original work on truth. The second part starts in 1934. The precise date can be ﬁxed as November 22, 1934. This is when Moritz Schlick opened the ﬁrst meeting of the Vienna Circle after a one-year break and Maria Kokoszy´n´ ska, another of Twardowski students, having been sent by him to Vienna, began to attend the meetings regularly. As far as the ﬁrst part is concerned, the offensive of logical empiricism went together with Tarski’s main work on truth. The personal connections between the Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School were established in 1930, when Tarski visited Vienna and, at the end of

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

9

the same year, when Carnap visited Warsaw. Otto Neurath’s report sheds light on the opinion in Vienna of the Lvov-Warsaw School: The Warsaw Circle, with Le´s´niewski, Łukasiewicz, Tarski, Kotarbin´ ski, and others was inﬂuenced by Brentano, above all through Twardowski; there are also still some connections with the theory of objects and phenomenology. Mach and Avenarius had an inﬂuence, above all, through Cornelius. On the part of the logicians the strongest inﬂuence was that of Frege, Schröder and Russell. The most important areas of investigation of the Varsovians are logistic and metamathematics. (O. Neurath, ‘Historische Anmerkungen. Zum Bericht über die 1.’ Tagung für Erkenntnislehre der exakten Wissenschaften in Prag, 15.–17. September 1929’—my translation)

In his original 1933 work Tarski refers to Carnap’s Abriss der Logistik, but he does it only in order to explain some notions of the theory of types, i.e. the language in which he gives the deﬁnition of truth, and almost always in relation to the Whitehead-Russell work.20 Tarski’s references to other members of the Vienna Circle are limited to Gödel. There is no evidence for assuming any philosophical inﬂuence on Tarski from the Vienna Circle before his 1933 book. However, there are noteworthy inﬂuences in the sphere of logic, especially that of Gödel. For example, the fact that Tarski postponed the publication of his book because of Gödel’s theorems is well known. It is also worth remarking that, even if we look at the work of Ajdukiewicz, who was under the spell of the Vienna Circle during a long period of his philosophical activity, there is no evidence of any such inﬂuence before 1934.21 As for the inﬂuences of the Viennese thinkers on Polish philosophers before 1934, I would like to mention Maria Kokoszy´n´ ska’s reports to Twardowski. From these it can be concluded that the philosophy of the Vienna Circle was not as well known in Lvov as it is assumed by historians of philosophy. Kokoszy´n´ ska’s letters include a great number of details such as, for instance, the fact that she was surprised by Moritz Schlick’s assertion that a statement such as ‘The world is will’ could be interpreted as meaningful. As she pointed out, the theory of meaning embraced by the Vienna Circle in the way in which it was presented in Lvov differed completely from the original view of the members of the meetings she attended.22 In the period in which, I believe, only the inﬂuences of Vienna on the LvovWarsaw School in the sphere of logic can be taken into account, the philosophical inﬂuence of the Polish School on the Vienna Circle seems to be much more remarkable. The letters which Tarski wrote in 1936 to Neurath include, for example, the following remarks: And now Carnap was of the opinion, that just the liberation from this hindering inﬂuence of W.[ittgenstein] is due to the Varsovians (and especially to my Vienna lectures. . .) Herr Neurath spoke in a comprehensive way about the inﬂuence of the Varsovians on the Vienna Circle and especially about the inﬂuence of Tarski’s lectures, about the discussions which these lectures provoked (. . .). This agrees also with what Gödel told me in Vienna a year ago; he told me namely about the general mistrust which all investi-

10

CHAPTER ONE gations and considerations concerning language encounters before my lectures. (Tarski 1992, pp. 25–26.)

However, it is not to be assumed that the Viennese took the idea of languages of different levels as ﬁxed. In the letters to Twardowski mentioned above Maria Kokoszy´n´ ska reported, inter alia: First things ﬁrst, there blooms here on a great scale a confusion between statements and statements about those statements, that is, between language and metalanguage. (Letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from December 14, 1934—my translation)

The fact is that the character of the mutual inﬂuence between the Varsovians and the Viennese changed completely in 1934. The members of the Lvov-Warsaw School often discussed the philosophical problems of logical empiricism. This began with the 1934 congress in Prague, and lasted through the Paris and Krakow congresses in 1936. ‘To discuss’ does not automatically mean ‘to adopt’, but this is not the place for a discussion of this issue.23 As far as the problem of the truth bearer is concerned, in the letter to Otto Neurath, Tarski refers to his relation to the Vienna Circle as follows: You maintain, as far as I see, that the admissibility of sentences about sentences, the possibility of speaking about a language in a fault-free manner, was accepted in the Vienna Circle to a wide extent still before my lectures (1930), you even want to look at the recognition that sentences about sentences are legitimate, as a Viennese own attainment, and you admit only this much, that in Warsaw this recognition came to light simultaneously—around 1928/1929—and in an independent way. I regret to say in reply, that me recollections and impressions on this point deviate completely from yours. In the ﬁrst place, this recognition on the grounds of Warsaw dates back not to the years 1928/1929, but to a period at least 10 years earlier. (Tarski 1992, p. 25)

Later he continues: You write in your letter that the thesis, according to which sentences, punctuation marks, etc., are physical pictures, was debated in the Vienna Circle still before my coming to Vienna and met in part a positive judgment. I certainly have no right to contest this. I only want to observe, that this thesis has been prevailing in Warsaw for years (and to be sure, at least since the year 1918) and is adopted by all, that it found its expression in several publications (not only in the Polish language) before the year 1928/1929 also it appears to me that the characterization of pictures of sentences as ‘ornaments’ is not an original Viennese formulation: among us, we spoke of ﬁgures of speech as ‘arabesques’ (is there such a word as ‘Arabesken’ in German?); Łukasiewicz gave a lecture (around 1925), in which he endeavored to show just this, that one can look upon pictures of sentences simply as ‘ornaments’: he brought along to his lecture a large number of differently coloured squares, trapezoids, etc., and developed a system of sentential calculus, in which he employed these ‘ornaments’ as logical variables and constants. (Tarski 1992, p. 26)

We can add to this picture described by Tarski the pieces of information which he included in his historical remarks at the end of the English version of his original 1933 work (1936 and 1955 editions).24 Thus, in Tarski’s opinion was no inﬂuence of the Vienna Circle on the Lvov-Warsaw School insofar as the

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

11

nature of language and the way of speaking about language are concerned. Moreover, it is important to note that in 1937 Otto Neurath also accepted Tarski’s opinion in that he characterized the Lvov-Warsaw School (speaking about the Polish School) as an important school, of great signiﬁcance in the area of logic, with an empirical tinge which, via Twardowski (Lvov), goes back to Brentano.25

3.5

Tarski and Brentano?

It is clear, then, that the inﬂuence of Austrian philosophical thought on the Lvov-Warsaw School prior to 1934 was limited to the School of Brentano. It was only in this year that the Vienna Circle also began philosophicaly to exert an inﬂuence. Since Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth was published in 1933 and the present work is devoted to the philosophical background of his notion of the truth bearer, I shall therefore follow Otto Neurath and examine the Polish school from the Brentanian standpoint. The focus of this examination will be the problem of truth bearers. Thus, the evidence presented below shall examine only selected materials. The aforementioned letter of Tarski to Otto Neurath states that the view that sentences are physical pictures was accepted by Poles since at least 1918. I must admit that I am not in a position to explain why Tarski believes that the year 1918 marks the beginning of the Poles’ acceptance of sentences as physical pictures. Twardowski’s paper ‘O czynno´s´ciach i wytworach’ [On Acts and Products],26 where he explicitly interprets sentences as physical products, appeared in 1912. Either Tarski made a mistake about the year of publication of this paper, or 1918 refers to the year in which he enrolled at the university and began to attend Le´s´niewski’s lectures. I think one should look for the roots of the concept of a sentence before 1918. As we shall see, the view that Twardowski expressed in his ‘On Acts and Products’ is deeply rooted in the Brentanian tradition. Beside Twardowski, the direct inﬂuence on the part of the Brentanians is seen quite clearly also in Jan Łukasiewicz, one of Twardowski’s pupils and Tarski’s teacher. It was one of the most important problems for the Brentanian tradition, i.e. the problem of psychologism in logic, which was of interest to Łukasiewicz in his early philosophical activity. His paper ‘Logika a psychologia’ [Logic and Psychology] of 1907 shows a strong inﬂuence of Brentano’s pupils Alexius Meinong and Edmund Husserl.27 Two years later Łukasiewicz went to Graz to meet Meinong. Łukasiewicz attended his seminars in 1908 and 1909. In the 1909 he lectured on Meinong’s views in Lvov.28 In Meinong’s Nachlass there is evidence of correspondence between both philosophers.29 In his book on Aristotle Łukasiewicz refers to Meinong on several occasions.30 The book also allows us to formulate a judgment about other philosophical works of Łukasiewicz, such as studies on Husserl and Trendelenburg (the latter was

12

CHAPTER ONE

Brentano’s teacher in Berlin).31 The book also contains direct remarks about problems discussed in the Brentanian tradition, such as the critique of the concept of evidence as the criterion of truth32 or the critique of psychologism.33 On this basis and on the basis of other facts, Peter Simons goes so far as to propose that Łukasiewicz’s idea of many-valued logic and his theory of probability follow the main lines of Meinong’s thought.34 Moreover, it was Łukasiewicz’s work on the law of contradiction in Aristotle which triggered the discussion about truth between Kotarbi´n´ ski and Les´niewski. In 1961 Kotarbi´n´ ski wrote: Devoured by a passion for an absolute exactness of statement, he looked for inspiration to Hans Cornelius, who was at the same time close to both empirio-criticism and Kantianism, to the writings on general grammar and the philosophy of the Brentanist Marty, ´ 1967, p. 4–5)35 and to the semantic chapters of Mill’s System of Logic. (Kotarbinski

There are good reasons claiming that one of the people who most inﬂuenced Le´s´niewski was Anton Marty. Even though Marty’s Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie [Investigations to the Foundation of General Grammar and Philosophy of Language]36 presented Le´s´niewski with a picture which was far from possessing the exactness he expected in philosophical writings, Marty was the philosopher that inﬂuenced Le´s´niewski view’s on language. Les´niewski believed that the problems of the philosophy of language included in Marty’s book were the most important questions of philosophy.37 Le´s´niewski’s very ﬁrst papers often refer to Marty, Husserl, and Meinong. Brentano and Twardowski were not mentioned even once. Le´s´niewski took Husserl, Meinong, and—it may be worth emphasizing—Łukasiewicz to be the partners of his discussion on general objects.38 The inﬂuence of Austrian philosophy on Le´s´niewski seems to be clear. Le´s´niewski was at home with the problems of the Austrian School (as he called the tradition) and he engaged in polemics within the conceptual framework proposed by this school. As for Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski, the inﬂuence of the Brentanian School is also indisputable. There are many places in Kotarbi´n´ ski’s writings where he refers to Brentano, Bolzano, Husserl, and other Austrian philosophers. Moreover, the characteristic problems of Austrian philosophy, such as, for instance, the problem of the interplay of logic and psychology39 or the problem of inner perception40 are problems which Kotarbi´n´ ski discussed. Furthermore, the dispute with Le´s´niewski about eternal truth shows the Brentanian conceptual framework.41 One of the most remarkable phenomena is that Kotarbi´n´ ski’s view called ‘reism’, quite similar to the reistic view of the late Brentano, came into being independently of the latter. It can be seen as a sign of the peculiar philosophical situation in Poland that prevailed in Twardowski’s school in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century: a sign of Brentano’s heritage in its spirit. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz studied in Göttingen with Husserl and Hilbert. Two of Ajdukiewicz’s ﬁrst papers, ‘O znaczeniu wyraz˙ e´n´ ’ [On the Meaning of Ex-

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

13

pression] and ‘Sprache und Sinn’ [Language and Sense],42 refer directly to Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen [Logical Investigations].43 Moreover, ‘On the Meaning of Expression’ is reminiscent in its construction of Husserl’s ﬁrst logical investigation ‘Ausdruck und Bedeutung.’44 In the same paper Ajdukiewicz refers also to Marty’s Untersuchungen.45 Furthermore, even in the 1934 paper ‘Language and Meaning’ where Ajdukiewicz develops his own theory of meaning, he calls his own considerations ‘semasiology’, which is Marty’s term for what later was replaced by ‘semantics.’ It is not quite clear whether Husserl inspired Ajdukiewicz’s interests in Göttingen, but Ajdukiewicz’s ‘Language and Meaning’ includes a sharp critique of Husserl. In this paper Ajdukiewicz also discusses another Brentanian concept, i.e. that of acceptance ( (Annerkennens ).46 To give one other example: in the early 1921 paper entitled ‘O poj˛e˛ ciu dowodu w znaczeniu logicznym’ [The Logical Notion of Proof],47 Ajdukiewicz describes the notion of a pre-axiomatic period of the deductive sciences. Although he does not ascribe the notion to any concrete person, the terms he uses, as well as the views he mentions, recall the Brentano-Husserlian understanding of the deductive science.48 It would be surprising if Tarski’s teachers had not been able to transfer any of their Brentanian ideas to their most capable student. The aforementioned examples provide sufﬁcient evidence to establish at least the possibility that some of the theories concerning language, judgment and truth in the Brentanian heritage are to be found in Tarski’s philosophical background. I shall offer a justiﬁcation for the above view in what follows.

A Remark about a Possible Misinterpretation. I do not want to give the impression that everything which is at issue in this study was known and considered by Tarski. By having a philosophical background inﬂuenced by the Brentanian heritage I do not mean here the conscious consideration of, for example, the descriptive-psychological problem of general presentations. In this respect by ‘conscious’ I mean the outcome of discussions in which Tarski afﬁrmed the nominalistic theses presented by Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski. I do not want give the reader the impression that Tarski possessed complete knowledge about everything I shall present in the course of this study. I do not want to write a text about all that Tarski might have learned and did in fact learn about the Brentanians and about others. Secondly, I do not want to represent Tarski’s education and philosophical development as due only to the teachers and colleagues mentioned in reference to the tradition of Austrian philosophy, including Brentano and even the Vienna Circle. One should not forget two other groups of thinkers that strongly inﬂuenced Tarski. The ﬁrst consists of the mathematicians whom Tarski met in Warsaw, i.e. Wacław Sierpi´n´ ski, Kazimierz Kuratowski, Zygmunt Janiszewski and Stefan Mazurkiewicz. The second group includes Bertrand Russell and

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CHAPTER ONE

Alfred North Whitehead, as known from the Principia Mathematica, as well as Leon Chwistek and Kurt Gödel. Although there might be a connection between the second group and the problem of truth bearers, I am not able to judge it in this study. As for Gödel, the answer is partly included in what I have said about Tarski’s philosophical connections with the Vienna Circle. As for the mathematicians, I would say that there is no reason to assume a philosophical inﬂuence of any kind with regard to the problem at hand.

A Remark about other Brentanian Figures in Polish Philosophy. There are several other scholars in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School who, in addition to Łukasiewicz, Kotarbi´n´ ski, Les´niewski, Ajdukiewicz and, through them, Tarski, could serve as even better examples of the Brentanian inﬂuence upon this school. Among these are Leopold Blaustein, Adam Stögbauer, Marian Borowski and others who worked more or less in the framework of descriptive psychology.49 There is another ﬁgure in the Lvov-Warsaw School to whom we shall devote some attention: Tadeusz Czez˙ owski. I have not mentioned him previously since there is no evidence of direct intellectual connections between him and Tarski. Nonetheless, Czez˙ owski can serve as a model sensu stricto for the statement that the heritage of Brentano in the Lvov-Warsaw School should be taken seriously. The most interesting fact distinguishing him from the descriptive psychologists is that he belongs to the logical branch of the Lvov-Warsaw School, i.e., to the ﬁgures whose main interest lay in the realm of mathematical logic. As Ajdukiewicz reported, Czez˙ owski focused ‘mainly on particular problems of logic.’50 His logical writings show a strong inﬂuence of Brentano throughout. Czez˙ owski’s book Klasyczna nauka o sadzie ˛ ´ i wniosku w swietle logiki współczesnej [The Classical View on Judgment and Proof in the Light of Modern Logic]51 presents an attempted interpretation of the reform of logic made by Brentano and Hillebrand in terms of modern logic. Another example is ‘The History of the Theory of Classes,’ which is the ﬁrst part of his dissertation Teoria klas [The Class-Theory]52 and where he draws upon the work of Husserl.53 The later activity of Czez˙ owski also clearly shows that he defended views shared in common with Brentano, such as the idiogenetic theory of judgment or the axiology and psychology of knowledge, among others.54

4. 4.1

The Content of this Study and what is not Included in Previous Studies on this Topic ´ The Wolenski-Simons Thesis

Jan Wole´n´ ski states that the Brentanian tradition laid the foundation for the establishment of a context for the development of semantics in Poland.55 In this respect he sees the concept of intentionality as what led to the natural assumption of semantics that every language has to be about something. The

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

15

thesis was earlier formulated in an extended but roughly expressed form by Simons and Wole´n´ ski in the aforementioned paper on truth in the Austro-Polish tradition entitled ‘The Veritate. . .’56 The broadening of the thesis took into consideration interests in Aristotle (and the Scholastics) as well as interests in the correspondence theory of truth shared by Brentano and the Polish philosophers Twardowski and Łukasiewicz. As the background for Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth Simons and Wole´n´ ski also refer to the issue of the objectivity of truth (Twardowski, Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski), to Les´niewski’s conception of language, as well as to the connections between Marty, Le´s´niewski, Meinong and Łukasiewicz. My study might be seen in this respect as the next and more systematized extension of the Simons-Wole´n´ ski thesis. However, my attempt differs in three respects. First, I concentrate on the notion of the truth bearer. This notion is, of course, deeply ingrained in the context of the theory of truth. Yet since the notion of the truth bearer involves such notions as judgment, sentence and meaning, it can be seen also in broader contexts, such as, for example, that of the theory of judgment and the theory of linguistic expressions. Secondly, I want to learn from this study a little about how far the choice of the truth bearer is independent of the general conception of truth. Thirdly, I shall attempt to explain the turn from acts of judging to sentences as bearers of truth-value without reference to the standard Frege and Russell tradition, and thereby, without using the terms ‘proposition’ and ‘propositional attitude’ that are usually used in this context. The standard explanation is as follows. Due to a so-called ‘linguistic turn,’ the psychological distinction between an act, its content, and its object was replaced by the distinction between a sign, its sense, and its reference in Frege’s sense. In particular, the distinction between assertion, content of judgment, and state of affairs is replaced by the distinction between sentences, propositions, and truth-values. The problem of cognition and communication is solved, in this account, by the adoption of a propositional attitude.57 My attempt is to explain the turn from speaking about judgments to speaking about sentences without using the thesis of the linguistic turn and without introducing the propositional attitude. For example, instead of replacing contents by meanings, I would prefer, following Wole´n´ ski, to speak about replacing intentions by reference wherever this is possible. Similarly, instead of referring to ideal propositions, I would prefer to speak in terms of a kind of folk psychology, i.e., about the cognition of judgments which are (or could be) expressed in the language. In order to approach the last two tasks I shall attempt to embrace the turn from the judging act to the sentence in the historical context of the Brentanian tradition as inﬂuencing the Lvov-Warsaw School. Thus, for the purpose of this study, I assume the following reformulation of the Wole´n´ ski-Simons thesis: the Brentanian tradition presents an essential context for the development of the truth bearer in the Lvov-Warsaw School. It will be clear in what follows how essential the Brentanian tradition was in this respect. It would be more essential

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if the explanation of the turn from judgment to sentence did not demand the explanation given by the Anglo-American tradition of analytical philosophy, which is usually associated with the names of Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein. Again, however, I believe that this study presents not only a part of the history of the notion of the truth bearer. My purpose is not purely historical in the sense of presenting an attempt to write a chapter of that history by carrying out an analysis of sources that are important in this respect, with a clear accent on the School of Brentano (including tracing Tarski’s concept of a sentence based on his 1933 work on truth to the school of Brentano). I shall try to draw upon history in a systematic way, collecting and ordering arguments for and against the various the candidates for the bearer for truth. In doing so, I will ask some important questions regarding the topic, such as, for example, how to make truth objective by the means of a truth bearer. Therefore, the arguments shall sometimes be ordered in a logical sequence of argumentation relevant to the topic, instead of in a historical sequence. One might argue that in such an attempt to systematize I cross the line of admissible historical speculation. Even if this is sometimes unintentionally the case (I tried to be both—historically correct and rational) I would say that the background of my analysis consists, above all, of questions such as: Which truth bearer best guarantees the objectivity of truth?; Do sentences serve as truth bearers better than judgments?; Is the change of the bearer of truth connected with the theory of meaning or with other factors?; How far is the notion of truth independent of the choice of its bearer?; Do we need the notion of a truth bearer at all? Unfortunately, a historical study cannot give direct and ultimate answers to all of these questions. I think, however, that a brief look at the history of the direction taken during the period when semantics became a part of philosophical investigations will shed light on these questions. This is important because Tarski’s work remains one of the most important attempts to advance a theory of truth.

4.2

The Content of the Study

In expanding the Simons-Wole´n´ ski list of connections between the Polish and Austrian schools, I shall consider the following topics as important for the problem of the truth bearer: (i) Theories of descriptive psychology, and in particular, the theories of judgments and the development of the contrast between the object and the content of a judgment. (ii) Views on language and, especially, cognitive theories of meaning, as well as theories of the relation between language and thinking. (iii) The ontology of judgment, as the problem of the connection between the investigation of the special objects of judging acts and the linguistic counterparts of judging.

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(iv) Other ontological problems rooted in descriptive psychology, such as the problem of general objects. (v) The problem of the objectivity of knowledge and of truth. (vi) General theories of truth and remarks concerning the problem of truth. (vii) Semantic investigations in the Lvov-Warsaw School rooted in the Brentanian tradition. To some extent I shall investigate all of these topics below in the context of the problem of the truth bearer. The latter already appeared with Alfred Tarski’s 1933 paper on truth. Because of the possibility of a consistent explanation of the concept of the truth bearer in Tarski’s book that I see in the context of the Brentanian tradition, I shall trace the problem of the truth bearer from Brentano to Tarski. As far as the title of this study is concerned, we need only add that the name of Bolzano appears because of his inﬂuential ideas in Wissenschaftslehre [Theory of Science],58 rediscovered for the Brentanian tradition by Twardowski. Thus the investigation will not cover the entire period promised in the title, i.e., between Bolzano’s Theory of Science and Brentano’s Psychologie vom empirischen Stanpunkt [Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint]59 (i.e. from 1837 to 1874). In the next chapter I shall deﬁne the notion of the truth bearer and attempt to situate it in the general theory of truth. In Chapter Three, I concentrate on the theory of judgment in the realm of descriptive psychology. Section by section, I present the arguments of Franz Brentano, Kazimierz Twardowski, Anton Marty and Alexius Meinong concerning truth bearers. I shall show that the starting point of those conceptions are epistemological questions treated as parts of descriptive psychology. In the corresponding sections of Chapter Four I try to deal with problems presented in the previous chapter in their linguistic formulations in the way in which they were historically presented by the philosophers who have been already mentioned. I present their views as regards their theories of the functions of expression, meaning, and reference, and as regards the relation between language and the mind. I argue that what they share are: a clear distinction between the logical structure of an act of judging and the grammatical structure of its expression; the view of a sign as a convention in speech acts; and the treatment of the functions of linguistic signs with respect to the results of descriptive psychology. Chapter Five presents a link between descriptive psychology and linguistic attempts to formulate and solve its problems. Thus, I refer to the views of Husserl, Marty, and Reinach, who provided such a link by making the notion of a state of affairs a central category of the theory of judgment. In Chapter Six I ﬁrst brieﬂy present the reistic positions of Franz Brentano and Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski. Next, I formulate semantic-reistic arguments for the choice of the sentence and judging persons as truth bearers.

18

CHAPTER ONE

Chapter Seven considers theories of truth from the point of view of the objectivity of truth along the lines drawn by Bolzano, i.e. with respect to the time, to the subject and to the circumstances. It takes into account also the notion of objective truth as result of the ontology of judgment invesigated in the ﬁfth chapter. The analysis of the views of Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, Twardowski, together with the dispute on the objectivity of truth provided by Kotarbi´n´ ski, Le´s´niewski and Kokoszyn´ ska, leads me to the presentation of various reasons for the acceptance as truth bearers of such entities as inscriptions, sentences in themselves, evident acts of judging or their species. The investigations I undertake lead to the conclusion that the choice of the truth bearer decides above all about the way in which truth and knowledge remain objective. This chapter also contains a brief sketch of the anti-psychologistic turn in the Lvov-Warsaw School. In this respect I focus ﬁrst and foremost on Twardowski’s theory of acts and their products. The reason for this is that this theory, treating the language as a permanent product of an act of consciousness, presents the relevant step in the direction where the semantic function of language is described without reference to acts of consciousness. In Chapter Eight I argue for the thesis that ontological disputes constituted a permanent element of the philosophical tradition of the school of Brentano and the Lvov-Warsaw School. I also argue that the view shared by Tarski’s teachers called ‘nominalism’ was rooted in the Brentanian tradition, as a result of discussions about language and about general objects. In Chapter Nine I consider the semantic conceptions which could decide about the choice of the sentence as the truth bearer. These conceptions are, again, rooted in the Brentanian tradition. After analyzing papers written by Le´s´niewski, Ossowski and Ossowska, I arrive at the following conceptions: the conventional understanding of interpreted formalized languages; the separation of the semantic function of a sign from its function of expression; the meaningintention conception; the conception of semantic products; and the semantic understanding of the predicate ‘true.’ Chapter Ten consists of arguments for the choice of a given truth bearer, arguments which were explicitly expressed by the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. These are arguments for the choice of the psychological act of judging as the truth bearer (Twardowski and Czez˙ owski), for the choice of judgments in the logical sense as the truth bearer (Łukasiewicz), as well as arguments for the choice of sentences as the truth bearer (Kotarbi´n´ ski, Ajdukiewicz and Tarski). I also argue that in the light of my former investigations, all of Tarski’s descriptions of the notion of the sentence quoted in previous section are equivalent. The last chapter repeats once again that the thesis about the Brentanian heritage with respect to some of the semantic ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School is correct. It includes a weakened thesis as far as the heritage in the context of semantic deﬁnition of truth is concerned. I establish also a rather long list of

Tarski’s Philosophical Background and his 1933 Deﬁnition of Truth

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entities that served as truth bearers in philosophical discourse in the period that I considered in my study. The list allows me to draw a number of conclusions, such as, for example, that the notion of the semantic attitude is vague.

A Remark on Sources. In the course of this study, I shall rely almost exclusively upon selected primary sources. The principal reason for limiting sources almost exclusively to primary sources is that the secondary bibliography for the topics treated here would take more than half of the space of this study, not to mention half of my life, and it would still not guarantee that the results would be more interesting. Those studies do not refer directly to the problem of the truth bearer. Thus, in order to limit the secondary literature I decided, ﬁrst, to refer to those prior to 1933, i.e., to sources which appeared prior to the publication of Tarski’s conception of truth in formalized languages. The choice of the literature from the period until 1933 is, I think, quite obvious considering the fact that I attempt to explain Tarski’s acceptance of sentences as truth bearers. Secondly, I restrict myself in the secondary literature after the year 1933 to texts which are relatively new. By ‘relatively new’ I mean texts published after the Brentanian inﬂuences on the Lvov-Warsaw School were recognized by historians of philosophy. The secondary literature comes, therefore, almost exclusively from the period that begins in the 1980’s. It limits this kind of literature signiﬁcantly, giving a warranty that I shall not state the obvious. Yet even these primary sources are limited. I refer above all to the most relevant or representative primary literature from the point of view of this study. One of the criteria here was the accessibility of texts. For example, aside from their importance, I have chosen papers published by Ossowski and Ossowska, accessible to me because of my knowledge of Polish, but inaccessible in general because they have not been translated. Another criterion was the extent to which primary sources have been the subject of recent literature. I have also omitted those works which have been thoroughly and deeply discussed, such as, for example, the important writings of Husserl, since the reader can easily ﬁnd for much deeper analyses than it would be possible for me to offer in the few pages of this text. A Remark on Method and Reading. Since I do not use all of the sources which can be found relevant to the discussions I present, i.e., to the context of the truth bearer with regard to mutual Austro-Polish inﬂuences, I am unable (with some exceptions and only when necessary) to investigate the phases of the philosophical activity of a given philosopher. I am therefore unable in every case to explain the nuances of meaning in the notions used by individual writers, which might show their development in the course of time. I do try to give a coherent and comprehensive interpretation of the views of a given philosopher on a given topic. When giving such interpretations in many places in this study, I shall rather recall the system of concepts and arguments of

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a philosopher than fully explain his or her conceptual framework. I do not usually argue for the chosen framework. This is partly due to the fact that the views recalled present rather basic philosophical knowledge that is demanded by an argument for or against a given truth bearer. Only when my interpretation differs from standard views with regard to a given philosopher shall I offer an argument. In places where my views are opposed to the standard interpretation and, where I do not present any argument against the standard view, the reader may assume that I have taken an attitude which can be described as common sense attitude. It is common in a sense along the lines of folk psychology, in that I want to speak about concrete mental acts or uttered sentences rather than about meanings, types, representations, and similar abstract entities. However, even if the study requires some basic knowledge, I think that it can and should be read as an introduction to parts of the philosophy of the members of the Austrian and Polish schools. The study can be read also according to names (Twardowski (I), Twardowski (II), and so on). Although it changes the plot, it might offer information needed for other purposes.

Notes 1 Tarski 1933 (1983). 2 Field 1972. See also McDowell 1978. 3 I shall use the names ‘the School of Brentano’, ‘the Brentanian tradition’, ‘Brentanian philosophy’ and ‘Austrian Philosophy’ synonymously. However, the standard use of these terms in the philosophical literature is quite different in that the term ‘Austrian Philosophy’ covers both ‘the School of Brentano’ and ‘the Vienna Circle.’ It should be clear from the context in which I shall use these terms that both the Vienna Circle and Brentanian Philosophy are proper parts of Austrian Philosophy. Thus, I sometimes contrast the Vienna Circle with the School of Brentano, and in those cases I shall not use the term ‘Austrian Philosophy’ synonymously with complex terms having ‘Brentano’ as their part. I leave this ambiguity of the term ‘Austrian Philosophy’, since it seems that Polish philosophers used this term, and more precisely the term ‘Austrian School’, before the Vienna Circle came into existence. See Le´s´niewski 1911. ´ 1993, 1995. 4 See, for example, Wolenski 5 See his 1944, translation of 1933 in 1956, and 1968 papers as examples. 6 We shall see that this is, in fact, a transmuted deﬁnition of what Łukasiewicz (one of Tarski’s teachers) took for a sentence. See below sections on Łukasiewicz. 7 Tarski 1933, p. 3 [1983, p. 152] 8 Compare also Tarski’s T convention and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s deﬁnitions of truth in Kotarbin´ ski 1926. 9 Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929, English translation with different title as Kotarbin´ ski 1966; see also Tarski 1933, p. 6, 1983, p. 156. 10 Tarski 1956/1983. 11 Kotarbi´n´ ski 1913, Les´niewski 1913 and chapter 7 below. 12 Ajdukiewicz 1931, 1934. 13 Ajdukiewicz 1988, 1993. 14 For such an interpretation see Rojszczak 1993. ´ 15 Skolimowski 1967, Szaniawski (ed.) 1989, Wole´n´ ski and Simons 1989, Wolenski 1985, 1988, Smith 1994, Wole´n´ ski and Köhler (eds.) 1999. ´ 16 Wolenski 1985, p. 317. 17 Szaniawski (ed.) 1989, Wole´n´ ski and Köhler (eds.) 1999. 18 See Dambska ˛ 1978, Dambska ˛ 1979, Simons 1992, Smith 1994, Wolen´ ski 1994. 19 Simons and Wole´n´ ski 1989.

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20 See Tarski 1933, pp. 11, 21, 67, 69; 1983, pp. 161, 170, 216, 218. 21 See his paper from 1931, for example. 22 A good example for this is her letter to Kazimierz Twardowski from November 1934, written two days after her arrival to Vienna. The letter comes from the correspondence of Kazimierz Twardowski as head of the Polish Philosophical Society, archived in the Library of Institute of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw. I would like to thank Professor Jacek J. Jadacki for his permission to use this material. 23 See the papers from the congresses and other articles discussing logical empiricism, such as: Sztejnbarg 1934, Ajdukiewicz 1934a, Łukasiewicz 1936, Zawirski 1936, 1937, 1938, Kokoszy´n´ ska 1936, 1937–38, 1938, Hosiasson 1937–38. 24 Tarski 1992, p. 227. 25 Otto Neurath 1937, pp. 309–312. 26 Twardowski 1912. 27 Łukasiewicz 1907, Husserl 1900, Meinong 1904. 28 Łukasiewicz 1909. 29 For some transcriptions and translations see Simons 1992, pp. 219–223. 30 Łukasiewicz 1910, pp. 13–14, 28, 42, 110–113. 31 Łukasiewicz 1910, p. 14 (Meinong 1907), pp. 28, 42 (Höﬂer, Meinong 1890), pp. 32, 149 (Husserl 1900), p. 41 (Trendelenburg 1840). 32 Łukasiewicz 1910, pp. 102–105. 33 Łukasiewicz 1910, p. 149. 34 ‘Łukasiewicz, Meinong and many-valued logic’ in Simons 1992. 35 Kotarbi´n´ ski also conﬁrmed the inﬂuence of Marty and Husserl on Les´niewski in other places, like Kotarbi´n´ ski 1933 and Kotarbin´ ski 1959. 36 Marty 1908. 37 Le´s´niewski 1912. Les´niewski was even planning to translate Marty’s book into Polish, a project that was never fulﬁlled. 38 Le´s´niewski 1913a, p. 329. 39 See, for example, Kotarbi´n´ ski 1933. 40 E.g. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1922. 41 Kotarbi´n´ ski 1913, Kotarbin´ ski 1921. 42 Ajdukiewicz 1931, 1934. 43 Ajdukiewicz 1931, pp. 103, 116, 136; Ajdukiewicz 1934, p. 147. All references are according to Ajdukiewicz 1960. 44 Ajdukiewicz ﬁrst discusses the ambiguity of the concept of meaning, then presents a critique of associationism and of J. S. Mill. 45 Ajdukiewicz 1931, p. 103. 46 Ajdukiewicz 1934, pp. 147–148. 47 Ajdukiewicz 1921. 48 Ajdukiewicz 1921, pp. 1–3. 49 See Rojszczak 1994, 1998/1999. 50 Ajdukiewicz 1935, p. 159. 51 Cze˙z˙ owski 1927. 52 Cze˙z˙ owski 1918. 53 Cze˙z˙ owski 1918, p. 12. 54 For more on this topic see Dambska ˛ 1979a. 55 Wole´n´ ski 1994, p. 85. 56 Simons and Wole´n´ ski 1989. 57 Dummett 1988 [1993]. 58 Bolzano 1837 [1972]. 59 Brentano 1874 [1973].

Chapter 2 THE NOTION OF THE TRUTH BEARER

1.

The Place of the Notion of the Truth Bearer in the Theory of Truth

Critics of the analytic position in philosophy state that when one does not know how to begin an issue, one begins with an analysis of the usage of a term in ordinary language. I am not, however, in a position to begin such an analysis, for the term I am interested in, the ‘truth bearer’, does not belong to ordinary language. It is one of those terms that are introduced for a special purpose in a given theory: the ‘truth bearer’ is a term introduced for the purposes of a general philosophical theory of truth. Thus, in order to verify whether the term is useful for such a theory, one should take a look at the general framework of such a theory. Recent philosophers commonly include under the notion of a ‘theory of truth’ such general topics as the deﬁnition of truth, the criteria for truth, and the question of the bearers of truth. Each of these topics receives separate treatment in Bertrand Russell’s writings on truth.1 Thus, one can claim that the tradition in which the theory of truth consists of those parts is as old as analytic philosophy itself. When we examine the literature on truth in the history of philosophy it seems that there is also a fourth part of a general theory of truth which should be taken into account, namely the theory of truthmakers. The view according to which the truth of a judgment or a sentence (or of whatever is true) depends on circumstances in the world is as old as the juridical and rhetorical uses of terms such as ‘status rerum’ in the ancient world. The philosophical statement that truth has an objective correlate on the side of the world goes back as far as Aristotle.2 The classical correspondence theory of truth is taken by some philosophers to support the view that such worldly correlates of truth demand more theoretical attention than is usually given to them. In the twentieth century, the theory of truthmakers found support among

23

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such prominent philosophers as Edmund Husserl, and it is presented even in the work of Russell, although in those parts of his writing that are today commonly neglected. I would insist that we need to seriously consider each of the four parts of a general theory of truth mentioned above if we are to do justice to the subject matter. However, a considerable number of theories of truth ignore some of these parts. Tarski’s theory of truth for formalized languages, for instance, ignores the question of a criterion for truth, and since his theory presents an extensional deﬁnition of truth, according to some critics it does not deal with the issue of an explanation of the concept of truth either. Similarly, but in another respect, some of the so-called ‘criteriological theories of truth’, such as pragmatic theories or theories based on the concept of evidence, do not pay much attention to the problem of a formally correct deﬁnition of truth. The part of a general theory of truth that focuses on the issue of the truth bearer is very often not treated seriously. Lorenz Puntel, for example, makes the following attempt to contribute to reﬂections on truth that try to avoid the issue of the truth bearer: The expression ‘truth bearer’ (. . .) should be used here only with the remark that, because of connotations that lead to apparent questions, it would be better to avoid it altogether. (Puntel 1987, pp. 14–15—my translation)

The purpose of Puntel’s theory is to offer an exhaustive explanation of the notion of truth as it has appeared in the history of philosophy. He wants to do this without raising the question of truth bearers. Yet not only explanational theories of truth deny the importance of the notion of the truth bearer. Some proponents of the theory of truthmakers also claim the right to ignore other areas in looking at truth: they propose a theory of truth without truth bearers.3 A malicious response to a truthmaking theory without truth bearers would be to ask what in this case is supposed to be made true? At this stage, however, I would only like to mention that this is what Puntel sees as a semi-problem and what Armstrong wants to avoid completely, i.e. the question of the truth bearer, which, in my view, involves important philosophical issues. That this is the case is sufﬁciently clear when we consider the Brentanian tradition with respect to the theories of truth and its bearers. I think that the choices made with respect to the entities that may serve as truth bearers are linked to, or are even the plain results of, a considerable number of philosophical investigations. For Kazimierz Twardowski, for example, ‘a deﬁnition of truth assumes a view concerning the essence of the judgment.’4 In the Brentanian tradition the topic of the truth bearer was also quite strongly connected with the problem of the ‘reality’ which makes them true. The issue of the objects of judgments as presented in theories such as the theory of objectives or the theory of states of affairs not only implied a deﬁnite view on truth but was also connected with special investigations concerning truthmakers. Generally speaking, I am of the

The Notion of the Truth Bearer

25

opinion that the theory of the truth bearer played and still plays an important philosophical role in the theory of truth. The subsequent chapters of the present work are an attempt to show to what extent this is the case.

2.

The Problem of the Truth Bearer

What then is the ‘problem of the truth bearer’? I cannot turn to its usage in ordinary language; I can, however, look at how people use the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’, respectively, in ordinary usage. This shows us a path to the issue which I call here the problem of the truth bearer. Since I am going to concentrate upon a selected philosophical tradition, i.e. the tradition of Brentanian philosophy, I shall take the liberty of using the words of Franz Brentano who superbly described the situation of the usage of the words ‘true’ and ’false’ in German: We call many thoughts, ideas, or presentations true, and we call others false (hallucinations, for example, we call false); we call concepts true or false, we call judgments true or false; we call conjectures, hopes, and anxieties true or false; we call a heart, a mind, true or false (un esprit faux); we call external things true or false; we call sayings true or false; we call conduct true or false; we call expressions, letters of the alphabet, and many other signs, true or false; we call a friend, we call gold, true or false. We speak of true happiness and of false happiness, and the latter locution, in turn, may be used for very different purposes, sometimes because we only seem to be happy, and sometimes because the happiness we have had has treacherously forsaken us. Similarly, we say on occasion: a false woman, namely when she is a ﬂirtatious girl teasing us; but in another sense a false woman would be a man posing as a woman, as in the case of a thief who was wearing women’s clothes when he was arrested; and still in another sense a false woman would be a man who has no thought of pretending to be a woman but nevertheless is taken for one, a thing that actually happened to me at dawn one morning in the entrance to the Würzburg fortress. At the time I was wearing a cassock, and the horror and bafﬂement of the man was all the greater, and the more comic. (Brentano 1930 [1966, p. 5])

Hence, the problem of the truth bearer relies here on the standard formulation of examples as far as the ambiguity of the notion of truth is concerned. However, I am not primarily interested in these ambiguities, but rather in what truth is predicated of. Thus, given the examples described by Brentano, it is predicated of the following entities: thoughts, ideas, presentations, concepts, conjectures, hopes, anxieties, the heart, the mind, things, sayings, behavior, letters of the alphabet, signs, friends, gold, happiness and so on. As one can easily see, the situations that Brentano originally describes in German also take place in other languages, such as English or Polish. The variety of uses of the words ‘true’ and ’false’ leads philosophers like Brentano to consider the shades of meaning of these words and to ask questions such as the following: Is there one or more correct ways of using these words? Why can we predicate the same word ‘true’ of different entities? This is what I call here ‘the problem of the truth bearer.’ These and similar questions arise not only regarding the ad-

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jectives ‘true’ and ‘false’, but also with respect to their adverbial forms, ‘truly’ and ‘falsely.’ One can truly or falsely predict the weather, truly or falsely answer a question, truly and falsely judge, etc. Saying that ‘truth’ is ambiguous does not exhaustively answer such questions.

3.

The Deﬁnition of the Truth Bearer

The entities of which the words ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘truly’ and ‘falsely’ are afﬁrmed can be named ‘truth bearers.’ Thus, we can formulate a deﬁnition of the truth bearer that I would like to call the linguistic deﬁnition of the truth bearer (LDTB): (LDTB) The truth bearer is that of which one afﬁrms that it is true (of which the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is truly’ are afﬁrmed).5 Therefore, everything of which we are accustomed to say that it is true, false, truly or falsely is a truth bearer. Alternatively, one can formulate another deﬁnition of the truth bearer, which I shall call the ontological deﬁnition of the truth bearer (ODTB): (ODTB) The truth bearer is an entity that can possess the attribute of being true or of being false.6 Because of the standards of contemporary semantics such attributes are today very often called ‘truth values.’ The deﬁnitions LDTB and ODTB, however, are not equivalent. For instance, the truly judging person in Brentano’s theory of (der wahr Urteilende) satisﬁes the linguistic deﬁnition of the truth bearer without satisfying the ontological deﬁnition of the truth bearer. We say about people that they are truly or falsely judging persons. Yet in saying this we do not, according to Brentano, refer to any special property of being a truly or falsely judging person. In other words the truly judging person is not different from the merely judging person. Thus, truly or falsely judging persons are not truth bearers according to the ODTB. Using Twardowski’s distinction between determining and modifying uses of adjectives, one can predicate truth of an entity in a non-determining way, i.e. in a way that does not ascribe any attribute to it.7 The Brentanian act of judging is thus not true in an attributive sense, i.e. ‘being true’ is not the name of a property of a mental act of judging as it is in the case of such expressions as ‘being evident’ or ‘being apodictic.’ When considering the non-equivalence of these two deﬁnitions I shall use the following hybrid deﬁnition of the truth bearer, which I believe is also the implicitly accepted deﬁnition of the truth bearer in the Lvov-Warsaw School:

The Notion of the Truth Bearer

27

(HDTB) The truth bearer is an entity of which the predicate ‘is true’ can be afﬁrmed in a determining way. The deﬁnition is a hybrid since it combines the linguistic and ontological deﬁnitions into one. The HDTB is useful when one wants to exclude as truth bearers entities where predication using ‘true’ or ‘false (‘truly’ and ‘falsely’) does not refer to a special property of theirs. Now, if one looks at various analogies between the problems of knowledge and truth (such as, for example, the problem of the objectivity of knowledge and the objectivity of truth)8 one can propose another deﬁnition of the truth bearer which I shall call the epistemic deﬁnition of the truth bearer: (EDTB) The truth bearer is an epistemological tool of which we can attribute the epistemic evaluation of being true. Here the expression ‘epistemological tool’ should be understood broadly, so as to include all that can be useful for an act of cognition. An additional assumption is that not the truth but true (or correct) knowledge is understood here as the primary notion. The epistemological notion of the truth bearer usually relies on such bearers as the judging thing (Brentano and Kotarbi´n´ ski), the act of judging (Brentano and Twardowski), the sentence (Le´s´niewski and Tarski), the proposition or other ideal meanings (the standard view on what knowledge consists of in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon philosophical world).

4.

The Variety of Truth Bearers

One can inquire what we are to do with the fact that the range of applicability of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ in ordinary language is quite broad? One of the solutions can be the following: One can judge that the variety of the entities which serve as truth bearers, especially when truth bearers are understood according to the linguistic deﬁnition of the truth bearer, lead to the recognition of the notion of the truth bearer as vague. Continuing this line of thought, it might at ﬁrst glance appear that we are dealing with a mere ambiguity of the term ‘truth bearer.’ Therefore, speaking of truth bearers means raising problems that cannot contribute anything to the notion of truth. Moreover, and this would be a second solution to the problem of the truth bearer, one can use the hybrid deﬁnition of the truth bearer and add to the previous solution the modiﬁcation that the occurrence of the variety of the uses of the predicates ‘true’ and ’false’ in ordinary language has nothing to do with their semantic function. This means that the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ refer to nothing when used as predicates. Thus, the variety of their uses and the vagueness of the notion of the truth bearer show only an expressive function of language with its unlimited possibilities of decorating sentences with the help of

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words such as ‘true’ and ’false’, a decorating which for unknown reasons still remains an object of philosophical interest. As a matter of fact, according to this view the usage of the predicate ‘true’ is not different from drawing a heart in a diary, which is a way of expressing our feelings about the objects to which our registration refers. Since the predicate ‘true’ has no semantic function, one can fully omit the problem of the truth bearer, unless one is interested in the expression of our feelings by using words like ‘true’ and ‘false’ under a variety of circumstances. I call both of these views, in accordance with the history of the notion of truth, the ‘nihilistic’ approach to the problem of the truth bearer. In fact, for such views, the problem of truth bearer never comes into existence. A contrary view is the position that I call a ‘pluralistic’ approach to the notion of truth bearers. A pluralist would claim, following the LDTB, that all entities of which the word ‘true’ can be afﬁrmed, provided they satisfy the grammatical constraints of a given language, are truth bearers. According to this view we should not limit the scope of expressions in which the predicate ‘is true’ occurs. We cannot pass over any of these expressions in silence, since all of them can contribute to the understanding of the notion of truth. This pluralistic attitude, whose point of departure is the opposite to that of the nihilistic approach, leads to very similar conclusions: it seems to guarantee that the problem of the truth bearer never appears. Thus, I call both of these approaches, the nihilistic and the pluralistic, ‘redundant’ approaches to the problem of the truth bearer. For these theories the problem of the truth bearer is redundant. A redundant approach to the problem of the truth bearer therefore includes every deﬂationary theory of truth, for example, such as those proposed by Ramsey, Austin, Belnap and Strawson. Moreover, it also includes theories where ‘anything goes’, i.e. theories where every entity can serve as the truth bearer provided it fulﬁlls the grammatical constraints of a given language. This kind of attitude is represented by heuristic investigations of truth (such as that of Puntel) and every kind of linguistic classiﬁcation of ordinary usage (such as, to some extent, that of Austin). The problem of the truth bearer becomes a philosophical problem only if one accepts that the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ (and, respectively, ‘truly’ and ‘falsely’) fulﬁll various functions in the expressions in which they appear. Moreover, it should be recognized that some of these functions are more worthy of attention than others. Do we not have something different in mind when we predicate about a coquette after an unsuccessful ﬂirtation that she is a false woman and when we say ‘false woman’ in trying to learn whether a female witness’s testimony has any value in a trial? Thus, one can try to determine the ways in which the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is false’ are afﬁrmed of different entities. If one is interested in the ordering of the uses of truth-predicates, then one can carry this out in at least two ways. First, the goal of one’s investigation concerning truth bearers would be a classiﬁcation of the functions of the words ‘true’ and ’false’ in the expres-

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29

sions in which they occur. The task seems to be difﬁcult for philosophers. At Quine’s insistence I would prefer to leave it to linguists, whose methods for analyzing contexts and ﬁnding synonyms are more appropriate here. I am afraid, however, that the use of their taxonomy proposals would again lead us to a pluralistic approach to the problem of truth bearers, i.e. to pluralism at all costs with regard to the entities serving as truth bearers in order to perfect an explanation of the notion of truth. Secondly, one can deal with the phenomenon of ordinary language, looking for the ‘correct’, ‘right’, ‘proper’ or ‘genuine’ use (or uses) of truth-predicates, and not only from the grammatical point of view. The pluralistic view claims that every grammatically correct expression in which truth-predicates occur is a correct use of these words. Nihilistic views claim that the correct use of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ is any expression in which these words occur in the function of a heart in a diary. Yet there are also other descriptions of the correct use of these predicates. These are, as we shall see, partly the issue of this study. Roughly speaking, the following ways of dealing with the choice of the correct bearer of truth exist: the reductionistic approach, the selective approach, and the selective-reductionistic approach. The reductionist claims that there is only one correct use of the predicate ‘is true.’ A reductionist chooses one correct truth bearer and all other bearers of truth are seen as secondary (but not redundant) bearers with regard to this correct one. For example, the act of judging can be seen as the primary truth bearer of which the predicate ‘true’ is correctly afﬁrmed. Sentences, utterances, or persons can be true, in this example, only with respect to the true act of judging. The relation of the latter to the former, however, demands explanation: how are the truth-values of sentences, utterances, and persons related to the truth of an act of judging? One answer could be, for instance, that the judger is a truly judging person because he or she makes a true judgment; an utterance or a sentence is true because it expresses a true judgment, and so on. Thus the reductionist is also obligated to explain (to reduce) all other uses of truth-predicates in terms of the proper one. In the example of a correct act of judging and secondary bearers of truth such as sentences, utterances and persons, it means that a reductionist has to answer such questions as why the predicate ‘is false’ is afﬁrmed both of gold and of women. (One possible answer is to say that the expression ‘false woman’ is to be used when a female witness makes false statements under oath and ‘false gold’ when we make false judgments about the real market value of a yellow piece of metal.) Brentano, for example, held this kind of reductionistic view.9 The selective approach is the view according to which only one entity, such as, for example, the act of judging, can serve as the bearer of truth in the proper sense. To say about any other entity that it is true is a kind of mistake or, at most, an unimportant phenomenon of everyday language without signiﬁcance

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for a theory of truth. Thus, there are no secondary truth bearers in this account. Selectivists such as Quine and Horwich choose only one entity (the former sentences and the latter propositions) of which we can predicate that ‘it is true’ and, therefore claim that ‘it is the truth bearer.’ Finally, the selective-reductionistic approach to the problem of the truth bearer presents an account where there is one correct way of afﬁrming truthpredicates of an entity, but there are also secondary truth bearers. What distinguishes this account from pure reductionism is that there are incorrect ways of using these predicates. As an example of such a view we can take, following the previous example, the act of judging as the genuine bearer of truth. Sentences and persons then are secondary bearers, and predications like ‘true woman’ or ‘false gold’ are incorrect uses of truth-predicates. (This is, according to the hybrid deﬁnition of the truth bearer, because in these cases they are not used in a determining way.) In fact, the selective-reductionistic account is nowadays a standard view in dealing with the problem of the truth bearer. When speaking about truth, contemporary philosophers committed to English as a philosophical language must choose one of the following truth bearers: assertions, statements, sentences or propositions. In choosing one of them as the genuine entity serving as the truth bearer, for instance propositions, the remaining entities, statements and assertions, are treated as secondary truth bearers. This is because propositions are the meanings of sentences, and propositions are what is stated in statements and asserted in assertions, understood within the context of the propositional attitude. An entirely different problem is to seek the entity that is to serve as the correct, genuine, or primary truth bearer. The reasons for choosing such an entity do not always rely only on a linguistic description of the usage of truthpredicates. Despite the ambiguity of the uses of ‘true’ and ‘false’, several other issues are involved in this kind of choice. Those who propound reductionistic or reductionistic-selective approaches are therefore obligated not only to present a way of reducing the variety of bearers for truth to one correct way of saying that something is true; they are also obligated to give a reason for the choice of the correct or primary truth bearer. This also seems to be the case with regard to the selective attitude to the problem of truth bearers. Some of the reasons for choosing the correct truth bearer are described in the chapters that follow.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

See Russell 1912, especially the chapter on truth and falsity. Categories 14b, 14–22. Armstrong 1998, p. 5. Twardowski 1975, p. 254. Compare with Nuchelmans 1973. Compare with: Morscher, Simons 1982.

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7 I shall use the helpful distinction between determining and modiﬁcational uses of adjectives in the way deﬁned by Kazimierz Twardowski (Twardowski, 1894, 1927). ‘An adjective is called determining, if it completes, enlarges—be it in a positive or in a negative direction—the meaning of the expression to which it is attached. An adjective is modifying if it completely changes the original meaning of the name to which it is attached.’ (Twardowski 1894 [1972, p. 11]). The word ‘ﬁrm’ in ‘a ﬁrm handshake’ is used determinatively, whereas the word ‘declined’ in ‘a declined handshake’ is used as a modifying adjective. For more information also see chapter 4 below. 8 See chapter 7 below. 9 See more on this topic in chapter 3.

Chapter 3 DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY: THE THEORY OF JUDGEMENT AS THE THEORY OF COGNITION AND KNOWLEDGE

1.

Franz Brentano (I): The Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer

Franz Brentano was conscious of the problem of the truth bearer in that he was able to describe it in the way cited in the previous chapter. He also gave general reasons for choosing acts of judging as the entities serving as truth bearers. In what follows I shall present some of these reasons. Since Brentano’s arguments can be seen as a part of the science of descriptive psychology that he founded, as well as a part of what we would nowadays call linguistic investigations, I shall divide his argumentation into two parts. In the ﬁrst section of this chapter I shall present the descriptive-psychological part of Brentano’s argumentation. I shall brieﬂy describe their linguistic counterparts at the beginning of the next chapter. It is quite difﬁcult to make unambiguous statements about Brentano’s philosophical views. This is because he belongs to the group of philosophers who have changed their views more than once in the course of their philosophical activity. Moreover, since most of Brentano’s writings are given in statu nascendi, it is difﬁcult to give an ultimate interpretation. I shall try to distinguish as clearly as possible Brentano’s reistic philosophy from his earlier period (or periods—as Brentanian interpreters hold). Hence the previously mentioned two sections introducing two different chapters concerning Brentano’s view on the truth bearer in his earlier period of philosophical activity. His reistic arguments as to the truth bearers are included in another chapter (Chapter 6) which focuses exclusively on this much stronger philosophical position.

1.1

The Variety of Entities Related to the Act of Judging

In order to understand Brentano’s ﬁrst argument regarding the choice of the act of judging as the truth bearer, we can use his own words:

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CHAPTER THREE It is with reference to the truth or falsity of judgment that the other things which bear these names may properly be said to be true or false: some things because they express a true or a false judgment, such as a false assertion, or a false utterance; some things because they produce a true or false judgment, as in the case of hallucination, or a slip in uttering or in writing word, or a metal which is taken for gold because of similarity in colour; some things because they are intended to produce a true or false judgment, as for instance a true spirit or a false mannerism; and some things because one who considers them real judges truly or falsely—for example, a true god, or a true stone in contrast to one that is painted. Some concepts are called true or false with respect to that which coincides, or fails to coincide, with their content, since here a true or erroneous judgment turns upon a discovery about this content; thus we may speak of rectangular ﬁgure as not being the true notion of square, and so forth. (Brentano 1930, p. 6 [1971, p. 6])

The observation in the passage cited in the previous chapter regarding the diagnosis of the problem of the truth bearer, i.e. that there are several linguistic uses of the words ‘true’ and false’, is not exhaustive for Brentano. Following Aristotle, he seeks a unique usage for these words. He ﬁnds that all expressions of ordinary language in which the words ‘true’ and ‘truth’ occur possess a unique relation to the act of judging at the cognitive level. All mental acts that we say to be true and all objects of which we can say that they are true, are so because of their relation to an act of judging. In other words, all entities of which we predicate ‘true’ rely, according to Brentano, on acts of judging, and they are reducible to these acts in the way described above by him. Judging on the basis of the usage of truth-predicates in ordinary language Brentano presents, therefore, a reductive account as to the problem of the variety of entities that seem to serve as bearers of truth.

1.2

The Primacy of the Notion of Knowledge in Relation to the Notion of Truth

It seems, however, that the main philosophical issue with which Brentano is concerned is not the notion of truth, but rather general epistemological questions. One of those questions is how we come to know something without falling into error. Since, for Brentano, knowledge is inseparable from acts of knowing in the sense in which we nowadays distinguish acts of cognition and their products, knowledge is for him equivalent to a certain set of acts of judging. Hence, the above question can be reformulated in the following manner: how is cognition without error possible? The description of acts of knowing and their classiﬁcations are the subject of descriptive psychology. For Brentano the latter was a new branch of empirical science devised to carry out research on mental acts in general, a part of which consists of acts of knowing. The statements concerning the methodology of this science may be found in the ﬁrst volume of Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint.1 The concept of knowledge as used by Brentano, however, is ambiguous. For him ‘knowledge’ means ‘acts of knowing.’ In the ﬁrst sense knowledge

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consists of a class of judgments to which there belong two different types of acts of knowing: directly evident judgments (for example, judgments about our mental activity such as ‘I judge that x’ or ‘I see y’) and indirectly evident judgments (such as, for example, judgments of the form ‘If Socrates is a man and all men are mortal then Socrates is mortal’). In the second sense, Brentano takes ‘knowledge’ (also as an act of knowing) to mean only directly evident judgments. These two different senses of what Brentano refers to as ‘knowledge’ are distinguished with respect to the judgments which Brentano calls indirectly evident judgments, i.e. with regard to the judgments which are derived from directly evident judgments with the use of logic and probabilistic rules (such as, for instance, ‘Given x and y it is possible that z’). These are judgments that do not belong to knowledge in the second sense of ‘knowledge.’ In both cases, however, the class of acts of knowing is that of judgments. Moreover, in both senses of ‘knowledge’, the different classes of acts of knowing rely on one single type of judgment, i.e. on directly evident judgments. (Thus, for example, the syllogism with Socrates is based on the logical scheme ‘If S is P and P is Q then S is Q’; and the x’s and y’s above must be directly evident judgment.) Since directly evident judgments also play a crucial role as regards the concept of truth (true judgments, as we shall see later, are deﬁned by Brentano with the help of the notion of directly evident judgments in the sense that truths are directly evident judgments and judgments that would correspond to the directly evident judgments), one can ask about the primacy of the two notions of truth and of knowledge. On the one hand, according to Brentano all acts of knowing are true. On the other hand, however, not all true judgments can be properly called ‘knowledge.’ There are, namely, true judgments which are blind, i.e. made without evidence and whose truth, since it is not guaranteed by evidence, is accidental. Therefore, it is not surprising that Brentano, in concentrating on the notion of evidence and directly evident judgment, was primarily interested in knowledge and not in truth. This comes out quite clearly when one looks at Brentano’s classiﬁcations of judgments. Judgements, according to him, possess various epistemic qualities: they can be correct or incorrect, probable or certain, evident or non-evident, a priori or a posteriori, afﬁrmative or negative, and assertoric or apodictic. Brentano holds that each of these dual characteristics represents an actual difference in the acts of judgment themselves. The epistemic qualiﬁcations on which Brentano’s classiﬁcation of judgments relies refer to a real difference in the act of judgment, i.e. to some property of such an act. These properties can be objects of descriptive psychology. Thus, these epistemic qualiﬁcations are more worthy of attention than predications of judgments that reﬂect no real property of judging acts. As we shall see later this is the case with the classiﬁcation of judgments into true and false judgments. The latter do not refer to something that could be an object of descriptive psychology. ‘Is true’ does

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not refer to a property of an act of judging, such as ‘being true.’ This lack of a real difference between true and false judgments on the level of descriptive psychology has, in Brentano’s account, its explanation on the level of linguistic analysis. Brentano characterizes the words ‘true’ and ’false’ as syncategorematic words.2

1.3

An Argument Based on the Gnoseological Concept of Truth

Brentano insists that the classical correspondence theory of truth that comes from Aristotle and was later held by Scholastics is in this respect indefensible.3 Alfred Kastil, one of Brentano’s students whose views are very close to those of his teacher, describes the result of Brentano’s rejection of correspondence theory of truth as follows: Thus, this ‘ontological concept of truth’ should be rejected as ﬁctitious. If there is to be a concept of the truth, then it can be only a gnoseological one, i.e. a concept which can be obtained, as all other concepts of the differences of judgment, from the perception of our judging attitude. (Kastil 1934, p. 6—my translation)

The only way to explain the concept of truth, then, is by means of a careful descriptive-psychological analysis of differences in judging acts which make them such that they are true in the proper sense. The expression ‘in the proper sense’ means that the class of judgments which are to be identiﬁed as true should coincide exactly with the class of the directly evident judgments, a notion which relies on the empirical notion of evidence.

1.4

An Argument Based on the Idiogenetic Theory of Judgement

Descriptive psychology as carried out by Brentano offers another crucial argument for the choice of the act of judging as the truth bearer. This argument refers to the so-called idiogenetic theory of judgment. The idiogenetic theory of judgment states that judgments present a speciﬁc and basic type of mental phenomenon. However, before any classiﬁcation of mental phenomena is carried out, we need a clear demarcation of the mental acts that present the objects of descriptive psychology. In order to identify mental phenomena, Brentano claims that we need some unique property which would distinguish the mental from other types of phenomena. Hence Brentano’s much-mooted principle of the intentionality of the mental states that a mental act (which, for Brentano, means a mental event) is always an act of or about something. A presentation is always a presenting of something, a judgment is always a judging of something and a phenomenon of love, and hate is always a loving or hating of something. Then, using the distinction between different types of intentional attitudes, Brentano identiﬁes three basic types of mental or intentional phenomena: presenting, judging, and the phenomena of love and hate. Each of

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these three types of mental phenomena is determined by its own characteristic intentional relation or intentional directedness. A presentation is an act in which the subject is conscious of an object without taking up any position concerning it. ‘To be present’ means simply ‘to be conscious of’, and such an act may be either intuitive or conceptual. That is, we can have an object before our mind either in sensory experience (and in variant forms thereof in imagination), or conceptually—for example when we think of the concepts of color or pain in general. Presentations may be also either (relatively) simple or (relatively) complex, a distinction which recalls the British empiricists’ doctrine of simple and complex ideas. A simple presentation, for example, is that of a red sensum, while a complex presentation is that of an array of differently coloured squares.4 On the basis of a presentation, now, new sorts of intentionality can take place. Above all, the objects given in presentations can be either accepted (in positive judgments) or rejected (in negative judgments). In other words, one of two diametrically opposed modes of being related to this object, which we may call ‘acceptance’ and ‘rejection’, respectively, may be added to the simple manner of being related to an object in presentation. Both are, for Brentano, speciﬁc events of consciousness. Brentano did not distinguish clearly enough between states of belief, on the one hand, and the acts thereof, on the other. This is because every act takes place only at a certain point in time. Brentano’s concept of acceptance comes close to that which is expressed by the English term belief, f which means that Brentano also did not distinguish judging from believing. A judgment is, somewhat crudely put, either a belief or a disbelief in the existence of an object. Hence all judgments have one of two canonical forms: ‘A exists’ and ‘A does not exist.’ This is Brentano’s famous existential theory of judgment. Its importance consists, among other things, in the fact that it is the ﬁrst inﬂuential alternative to the combination theory of judgment, a theory that had long remained unchallenged. The combination theory of judgment was strictly connected with an atomistic view of the construction of concepts held by the British empiricists, on the one hand, and with the subject-predicate form of judgments as described by Aristotle’s syllogisms, on the other. For the purpose of this study, however, it is fairly important to see Brentano’s idiogenetic and existential theory of judgment in its relation to the concept of truth and its bearer: what can be true, then, is believing or disbelieving in the existence of an object. Taking Brentano’s view on judgment as a speciﬁc basic existential mental phenomenon which serves as the genuine bearer of truth, it is also possible to explain theories of truth in the sense of being (or, what here amounts to the same thing, the theories of being in the sense of truth). Brentano sees the moment of acceptance (and, respectively, the moment of rejection) as a certain way of the intentional taking of an object [intentionale Aufnahme eines Gegenstandes], which determines judging acts as constituting a speciﬁc class

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of mental phenomena. Each accepting judging act is, according to this view, a certain way of holding something as true. ‘To accept something’ means, thus, ‘to hold something as true’ or ‘to accept something as truth’ (and respectively, ‘to reject something as false’). Hence the judging act presents an intention in which something is stated as true or false. This, according to Brentano, is the only way in which the notion of being in the sense of truth can be correctly understood.

1.5

The Deﬁnition of the Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer

In the early period of his philosophical activity Brentano held the act of judging to be the primary bearer of truth. The act of judging is a mental act that is either the accepting or the rejecting of something. We must now determine what exactly this ‘something’ which is rejected or accepted in a judging act is. Brentano calls what he sees as rejected or accepted in the judging act the matter of the judgment. The mode in which the matter is judged (accepted or rejected) he calls the judgment’s quality. Each judgment has an underlying (simple or complex) presentation, and the matter of a judgment is that which is presented. Now, the next question is what the notion ‘that which is presented’ means? There are, I think, at least two ways of answering this question. The ﬁrst way, using Twardowski’s terms, is to determine whether that which is presented is the content of a judgment or the object of a judgment.5 In other words, is the accepted or rejected matter of a judging act an object immanent to the mind or is it, so to speak, a target of a judging activity external to the mind? This kind of interpretation of Brentano’s notion of the matter of a judgment has, however, its difﬁculties for at least two reasons. First of all, Twardowski’s distinction between content and object was made in the middle of Brentano’s philosophical activity (around 1894), i.e. between the two periods that I have roughly split into the early period and the period of reism. Secondly, it is hard to determine whether Brentano’s notion of the matter of a judgment taken as an external object would be the same as the object of a presentation in Twardowski’s terms. This is because even the latter can be interpreted as an immanent object.6 The second way of explaining the notion of ‘that which is presented’ is one which makes use of the concept of intentionality. Unfortunately, the famous passage from Brentano’s Psychology leaves room for a variety of possible interpretations of precisely this concept.7 Here again, the interpretation of this passage possesses at least two dimensions. The ﬁrst concerns the relational and non-relational interpretations of the property of ‘being directed towards an object’, as a gloss on the phrase ‘being intentional.’ The second has to do with

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questions such as what the object of each type of mental act is and how they depend on each other. Let us consider the ﬁrst dimension of the interpretation of intentionality. The relational interpretation of intentionality sees all mental acts as directed towards objects as their transcendent targets. That this interpretation is somewhat problematical can be seen by reﬂecting on the acts involved in reading ﬁction or on those cases where our acts rest on mistaken presuppositions of existence. What, then, are the objects to which we are related intentionally in our mental activity? The thesis that all mental acts are directed towards objects in the relational sense, to objects external to the mind, seems to be clearly false, unless, with Meinong, we presuppose another mode of existence of objects.8 However, a careful reading of Brentano forces a non-relational interpretation, which sees intentionality as property of mental acts, the property of their being directed. Somehow, the immanent ‘object’ in this context is to be understood simply as the ‘correlate of presentation’, a notion embracing simple and complex data of sense in particular. Thus, when Brentano speaks of ‘objects’, he is not referring to putative transcendent targets of mental acts. He is referring, rather, to immanent ‘objects of thought’, and in fact no distinction is drawn in Brentano’s treatment in the Psychology between ‘content’ and ‘object’ in the sense in which Twardowski does this in his later work. Brentano insists that what is thought of has a merely derivative being. The act of thought is something real (a real event or process), but the object of thought has being only to the extent that the act which thinks it has being. The object of thought is according to its nature something non-real which dwells in [innewohnt] a thinker.9 While Brentano’s statement of the intentionality principle in the often quoted passage from the Psychology is not entirely clear, he himself appends a footnote to this in which he states explicitly that for him the intentionality relation always holds between an act and an object immanent to the mind. He points out that the speech of mental in-existence is to be found in Aristotle, and he goes on to elaborate Aristotle’s theory according to which ‘the object that is thought is in the thinking intellect.’ Brentano’s more detailed formulations of the same thesis may also be found in his Descriptive Psychology [Descriptive Psychology] where ‘immanent objects’ are explicitly assigned to what Brentano calls the ‘parts of the soul in the strict or literal sense.’10 Occasionally Brentano gives grounds for accepting the ﬁrst, relational interpretation. In the second edition of his Psychology Brentano rejects his earlier assumption that the objects of mental acts exist immanently. He uses the term ‘content’, which used to be understood by his successors in the manner of an immanent object. As he points out, the term ‘content’ should not stand for something immanent to the subject, and he himself used to use this term to signify the object of mental phenomena. He therefore shares the later distinction between object and content as described by Twardowski.

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For the purposes of this study I have chosen this last interpretation of the notion of ‘that which is presented.’ I have chosen this interpretation of Brentano’s ‘intentionality’ for the following reasons. First, I have no doubts that this interpretation should be taken into account in the reistic phase of Brentano’s philosophy. Thus, I shall not change Brentano’s notion of intentionality in the course of this study. Secondly, this interpretation is consistent with Twardowski’s distinction between the content and the object of presenting acts, which I can therefore use without any ambiguity for the purposes of this study. Despite these methodological motivations there are also general philosophical reasons to share this interpretation of intentionality as far as the early period of Brentano’s philosophical activity is concerned. Thus, thirdly, an immanentistic reading of Brentano’s concept of intentionality leads to the following problem: If the objects of the judging act were taken as immanent objects (as the content of presentations in Twardowski’s terminology), then it would be possible to judge only about mental phenomena (about concepts). This would be equivalent to the statement that our perception is limited only to inner perception, which is not the case even in Brentano’s introspective psychology. For example, the sentence ‘The red rose exists’ is not about concepts such as rose and redness but about the rose as a transcendent target. According to Brentano, we also judge about the external world in external perception. Fourthly, we cannot exclude external perception from our acts since it plays a crucial role in the genesis of all general presentations (concepts). Brentano states, and in this respect he follows his predecessors, the British empiricists and Kant, that all concepts which he considers to be general presentations come from external perception. The contents of presentations are in this sense secondary. They are secondary as regards the external object of presentation. Fifthly, an immanentistic reading of Brentano’s concept of intentionality, and therefore of ‘that which is presented’, faces other difﬁculties, especially in dealing with negative existential judgments such as ‘God does not exist.’ Such a judgment seems, on the face of it, both to have and to lack an object. These difﬁculties were in part the reason why Brentano and his immediate successors began to reconsider the original thesis that acts of judgment get their external objects (contents, matters) from underlying acts of presentation. This leads us to an additional argument for using Twardowski’s distinction between object and content when referring to the early Brentano. This argument has to do with the aforementioned second dimension of interpretations of the notion of intentionality, which is related to the three basic types of mental phenomena, i.e. to the presentations, judgments, and the phenomena of love and hate. Interpretations of Brentano’s concept of intentionality also differ with respect to the assertion that all acts are directed towards (immanent or transcendent) objects in their own right. In one interpretation some acts borrow their directedness from other acts, on which they are founded. According to this interpretation, it is presentation that does the job of securing directed-

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ness toward objects in every case. Judgements, emotions, and acts of the will are then intentional only because of the underlying intentionality of presentation. A second interpretation sees ‘being directed towards an object’ as an independent property of all mental acts.11 The intentional relation involved in judgment and in phenomena of love and hate differs here from that involved in acts of presentation, although—on Brentano’s own account—the object of a judgment or of the phenomena of love and hate remain the object of presentation. Confusion here is due to the co-existence in Brentano’s account of these matters of the thesis that judgments and phenomena of love and hate are dependent upon presentations in the sense that there is no judgment without presentation and of the thesis that loving or hating something cannot take place without both presentation and judgment. We cannot love or hate red roses without their being presented and without judging them ﬁrst. Now, taking Brentano’s notion of ‘that which is presented’ as standing for the external target and understood in the sense of Twardowski’s object of presentation, we can formulate a more adequate deﬁnition of the truth bearer as seen by Brentano: the truth bearer is an act of judging, i.e. a mental act which is an acceptance or a rejection of the object of presentation on which this judgment relies.

2.

Kazimierz Twardowski (I): Act-Content-Object

I have introduced into my discussion of Brentano’s notion of the truth bearer the distinction between the content and the object of a mental act, a distinction that comes from Kazimierz Twardowski. His Habilitation from 1894, published under the title Vom Gegenstand und Inhalt der Vorstellungen [On the Object and Content of Presentations]12 belongs to the most important works in the ﬁeld of descriptive psychology. On the one hand, it is a book that is only indirectly related to the problem of the truth bearer upon which I am focusing here. This is due to the fact that, apart from some notes which I shall mention below, it does not include Twardowski’s theory of truth. However, the study from 1894 seems to be crucial for Twardowski’s own theory of judgment in general. It is also indispensable for the understanding of several philosophical solutions presented in the tradition upon which I focus. Twardowski’s study is important not only in the context of intentionality or the theory of judgment but also in other respects, such as, for example, the problem of psychologism. It is also this work which is responsible for the rediscovery of Bolzano’s philosophy in the Brentanian tradition. Bolzano’s Theory of Science, together with his On the Object and Content of Presentations, strongly inﬂuenced Edmund Husserl and Alexius Meinong. Twardowski’s act/content/object distinction occupied an important place in the vocabulary of descriptive psychology for the next few decades.

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2.1

Presentation

In his study Twardowski observes ambiguities in the term ‘presentation’ and in the expression ‘that which is presented.’ ‘Presentation’, remarks Twardowski, at times stands for an act (i.e. for an act of presenting); at other times it stands for ‘that which is presented’ (i.e. for the content given in an act of presenting, which is understood by Twardowski as an immanent object). A similar ambiguity appears in the expression ‘that which is presented.’ At times it stands for the immanent object of the presenting act (i.e. its content, a mental picture of something external to the presenting subject); at other times it stands for something which is external to and independent of the presenting subject. Thus, holds Twardowski, what we need are precise distinctions that will avoid these ambiguities. Following Brentano, the act of presenting is, for Twardowski, a mental event or process which is related to an object. Hence, he insists that for every act of presenting there is an object and, in consequence, that there are no presentings without objects. Twardowski described the object of presentation as follows: Everything which is, is an object of a possible presentation; everything which is, is something. (Twardowski 1894 [1977] p. 34)

Whether an object exists or not is undecided in Twardowski’s account.13 It is, however, problematic how to understand Twardowski’s notion of an object. As Twardowski himself pointed out, an object is not understood as if it were a thing in itself in the Kantian sense; Twardowski’s ‘object’ in Kantian terms would be, rather, a phenomenon. On the other hand, however, Twardowski compares his notion of an object to the Aristotelico-Scholastic term Ens.14 There is no doubt that an object should be not understood as if it were a thing in an ordinary sense of this word, i.e. as a ‘reistic’ object of the external world. Twardowski deﬁnes an object as follows: Everything that is presented through a presentation, that is afﬁrmed or denied through a judgment, that is desired or detested through an emotion, we call an object. Objects are either real or not real; they are either possible or impossible; they exist or do not exist. What is common to them all is that they are or they can be the object (not the intentional one) of mental acts, that their linguistic designation is the name (. . .) Everything which is in the widest sense ‘something’ is called ‘object’, ﬁrst of all in regard to a subject, but then also regardless of this relationship. (Twardowski 1894 [1972], p. 37)

In order to avoid an immanentistic reading of his notion of an object, Twardowski gives a number of reasons for emphasizing the difference between the content of the presenting act and its object. Above all there are properties that we attribute to the objects of acts of presenting which are not properties of its contents. This, for example, is the case with entities like colors. A red rose is red, but the redness of the rose is not a property of the content of the presenting act which presents it. Contents cannot have any colors. Secondly, the difference between an object and a content can be seen in the fact that the object can

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be real or unreal, while the content is always unreal and dependent on the mind. The next argument for the differentiation comes from the phenomenon of the variation of a presentation: the same object can be presented in different acts of presentation with different contents. The same building, for example, although it can be seen from different sides remains the same building. Fourthly, it is possible to present different objects with the same content. For example, the same imagined tree can be used to refer to other trees. The ﬁfth argument has to do with judgments: Twardowski observes that we can judge truly about a non-existent object (for example that Pegasus has wings). Hence, if the content were not really different from the object, it would be impossible for there to be content where the object does not exist. Twardowski describes the content itself as: . . .that link between the act and the object of a presentation by means of which an act intends this particular and no other object. (Twardowski 1894 [1972] p. 28–29)

2.2

The Judgment

The distinction between an act, its content, and its object is also valid as far as judgments are concerned. Twardowski considers judgments along Brentano’s lines, i.e. as acts of judging. In On the Content and Object of Presentations Twardowski sees the act of judgment as having a special content of its own, but as inheriting its object from the relevant underlying presentation. For Twardowski, as for Brentano, therefore, the content of the judgment is the existence of the object in question. Judgement-objects are the same objects that are objects of presentations: the same object can be presented and judged. This is because Twardowski, following Brentano, sees an act of judging as an act of acceptance or rejection. In the acceptance of an object the statement of the existence of the underlying object is included; likewise, the rejection of an object includes the rejection of the existence of that object: . . .likewise that which is afﬁrmed or denied through a judgment, without being the object of the judging behaviour, is the content of the judgment. The content of the judgment is thus the existence of an object, with which every judgment is concerned; for whoever makes a judgment, asserts something about the existence of an object. (Twardowski 1894 [1977, p. 7])

However, this becomes problematic when one tries to take seriously the analogy between the content of a presentation and the content of a judgment. The content of a presentation is strongly dependent on the act of presentation. This is not the case as regards the content of the judging act. The existence of the object of an act of judging is not dependent on its underlying act: the judged object exists or does not exist independently of the act of judging. Thus, either the analogy between the content of a presentation and the content of a judgment cannot be taken to be as strong as it seems to be at ﬁrst glance, or one has to solve this problem in another way. An alternative seems to be either to look for

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another kind of theory for the content/object distinction regarding judgments or try to solve the problem by accepting another kind of judgment-object. In fact, this problem was the object of consideration of many of Twardowski’s commentators including Daniela Tenner and Elz˙ bieta Paczkowska-Łagowska. On the one hand, Tenner saw the content of the judging act in the judgment, which she understood as an ideal or abstract object that is the product of a judging act (and which later was often called ‘a judgment in the logical sense’). On the other hand, Paczkowska-Łagowska saw the content of a judgment in its judgment.15 Three years after publishing his habilitation, however, in a letter to Meinong, Twardowski suggests that one should also recognize a special object of the judging act, in addition to the judgment-content.16 He thereby effected a generalization of the content-object distinction to the sphere of judging acts, thus yielding a special kind of judgmental object and opening the way for exclusive investigations of that type of entity.

2.3

The Truth of the Object of Presenting

As was mentioned above, in On the Object and Content of Presentation Twardowski also includes several remarks regarding the notion of truth. Those are remarks that consider the notion of truth as related to the notion of object, i.e. the problem of being in the sense of truth (or truth in the sense of being). Twardowski above all argues against the view which claims that an object of mental activity can be named by the term ‘truth.’ According to the criticized view ‘truth’ is interchangeable with ‘object’ because an object can be judged in a true judgment. This thesis would mean, Twardowski claims, that the truth of an object depends upon the truth of a judgment. This, however, is not the case; it is rather the case that a positive or negative judgment is true because its underlying object exists or does not exist. According to Twardowski, saying that ‘an object is true’ is derived from the sentence ‘an object can be the object of true judgment’ is the result of a misunderstanding of the scholastic view on the truth of an object. For Twardowski, the scholastic notion of truth in the sense of being (which he calls also ‘the metaphysical notion of truth’) claims rather that an object can be called ‘truth’ because it can be the object of a judgment. The truth of an object is then derived from a judgment (regardless of whether it is true or false) and not from a true judgment. Therefore, according to the metaphysical theory of truth, it is the ability to be judged, i.e. the intelligibility of an object, that makes the object be capable of being called a truth, even if nobody judges truly about this object. The primary bearers of truth are, then, acts of judging, while truth in the sense of being is truth in a secondary sense. Twardowski then relates this problem, also known as the scholastic theory of transcendentals, to the theory of judgment: This version of the doctrine amounts to nothing else but that an object is called true in that it is intended by a judgment and that it is called good in that it is intended by a feeling. And since every object can be subjected to a judgment, to a desire or

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an abhorrence, truth and goodness belong to every object of a presentation, and the scholastic doctrine proves correct in the sense that every ens is verum as well as bonum. (Twardowski 1894 [1977, p. 36])

3. 3.1

Alexius Meinong (I): Thinking and True Objectives Thinking

Judgements, for Brentano, were purely mental phenomena. The judging act is an act of consciousness in which an object of presentation is accepted or rejected. For Brentano ‘judgment’ and ‘belief’ are synonymous terms, which means that Brentano was unable to explain complex hypothetical judgments, phenomena which appear in logic and epistemology such as, for example, conditionals. It was Alexius Meinong who drew attention to this problem.17 In reworking Brentano’s classiﬁcation of the types of mental phenomena, Meinong changes the basic types. According to him there are four classes of mental activities: presenting, thinking, feeling (das Fülen) and desiring (das Begehren).18 The notion of presenting is similar to the notion used by Brentano. Thinking includes phenomena that Brentano called acts of judging, and which are characterized by Meinong in the same way as by his teacher. Yet thinking also includes phenomena that Meinong wants to treat as a separate class of mental activity, which he calls ‘suppositions.’ There are several reasons for seeing underlying suppositions as an independent class of mental phenomena. These are the topic of Meinong’s Über Annahmen [On Assumptions]19 —a book written to argue for the new class of mental phenomena in the Brentanian tradition. Some of them remain important as regards the theory of judgment in its relation to the problem of the bearer of truth. As in the case of Brentano and Twardowski, Meinong also considers linguistic arguments that should correspond to their descriptive-psychological counterparts. I shall consider this in the next chapter. Remaining on the level of psychological investigations Meinong urged, ﬁrst, that there are mental phenomena which, while bearing some resemblances to acts of presenting, on the one hands and to acts of judging, on the other hand, are in fact different from both. An example is supposing that something is such and such (like supposing that there are dinosaurs in the twentieth century). In a supposition we consider a possibility that some such and such exists. We need not, however, believe that this such and such exists. The moment of belief (or, as it is called by Meinong, beliefness [Überzeugheit]) is precisely this singled out moment which differentiates an act of supposing from an act of judging.20 Moreover, supposition also differs from presenting because it is afﬁrmative or negative, and this kind of polarization does not exist in the case of presenting. The quality (yes or no) of a supposition is highly visible in the negative suppositions, such as the supposition that something is not the case.21 A negative supposition cannot be claimed to be a negative presentation. The

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latter lacks a quality—we can present ourselves a negative object of a higher order, but we cannot predicate any positive or negative quality of the act of presenting itself. Meinong also claims that acts of presentation are in a sense passive, unlike acts of judgment and supposition. The latter are more ‘active’ in comparison to passive impressions. Therefore, given their active character, acts of supposition and judgment are called ‘thinking’ by Meinong.22 Thus, suppositions present a certain basic class of psychic phenomena that can be placed between the phenomena of presenting and those of judging. Since they belong to the class of thinking and because of their lack of a moment of belief they are also called ‘semi-judgments’ by Meinong (Urteilssurogate).23

3.2

The Object of Thinking

Meinong was aware of Twardowski’s distinction between act, content, and object in the case of mental acts.24 In a mental act we grasp objects, where ‘grasping’ [Erfassung] is, for Meinong, a neutral term which refers to all mental functions.25 For the grasping of an object, it is irrelevant whether or not this object exists. According to Meinong, there are several ways of being of an object, such as existence, subsistence (das Bestehen) and external-being ( (Ausserseein ).26 In distinguishing four basic types of mental acts (presenting, thinking, feeling and desiring), Meinong claims that all types of acts have their own types of objects. He names these types of objects as follows: objects (das Objekt), objectives (die Objektive), digitatives, and desideratives. It is quite interesting that Meinong’s crucial reason for placing judging and supposing into the same category of thinking is that they are directed to the same type of objects, i.e. to objectives. The objectives, however, are not objects in the ordinary sense of this term, such as trees, people, or books. They are objects of a higher order, i.e. they are objects constructed of and dependent on other objects. The objects out of which objectives are built are, according to Meinong, ‘that of which we judge’ [das beurteilte Objekt] or ‘that of which we suppose.’27 For example, in the sentence ‘The tree is without leaves’ we judge about a tree and its leaves. In this example, the tree and the leaves are objects, and the being without leaves of the tree is an objective that is built upon the tree and its leaves. The objective can also be an object, namely, an object of thinking. The objective as the object of thinking is called by Meinong ‘that which is judged’ (das, was geurteilt wird) or ‘that which is supposed.’28 Thus, for example, in the judgment expressed in the sentence ‘The rose is red’, that which we judge about is the red rose, and the objective of the judgment (that which is judged) is the state of affairs that the rose is red. Similarly, to take another example, when we judge about Pegasus that it does not exist, Pegasus is the object of this judgment and the objective is the state of affairs that Pegasus does not exist. In

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respect to that which is judged we can say, as Meinong put it, that the object of judgment is the fact that something takes place. The object of supposition is that something can take place.29

3.3

Cognition and Knowledge

It was said that it [the evidence—AR] may be predicated not only of judgment but also of objective: more natural and pleasant is to say that true is an objective which is cognized in an evident justiﬁed judgment, and probable is an objective which is cognized in an evident unjustiﬁed judgment. The reason why so long one has looked at the object of which truth (cum grano salis also probability) could be predicated correctly in a real and strong sense is that the objective was left outside the investigations. As regards the single word ‘knowledge’ it arises to me an important question whether it really means the evident judgment or rather the objective which is cognized in this judgment: in the last case the theory of knowledge is etymologicaly nothing else as the theory of some objects. (Meinong 1902, p. 192—my translation)30

The theory of knowledge considers, among other things, such notions as truth, necessity, reason, and conclusion. Meinong, unlike his predecessors and his teacher Brentano, considers that all these epistemic terms are predicates that are predicated in a natural way of objectives rather than of mental acts, and in particular of acts of judging. Thus, one can ask about the proper object of the theory of knowledge: does the object of epistemology consist of judgmental activity, as Brentano and Twardowski hold, or might the proper object of epistemology be seen in the correlates of these judgments, i.e. in objectives? For Meinong, a theory of knowledge should also consider objectives among its objects. This is because we should make a distinction between cognition (an act of cognition and, in particular, an act of knowing) and knowledge. For Meinong, a complete theory of knowledge should focus on both types of investigations. The theory of knowledge includes as its proper part a theory of cognition as a theory of acts of knowing, on the one hand, and a theory of their objects, on the other hand. The former part of the theory should be based on psychological investigations. The latter part of theory of knowledge should be, continues Meinong, a theory of objects as a theory of the domain of objectives. The ontology of epistemology is part and parcel of the latter. According to Meinong, however, objects of thinking are logically prior to the acts of their cognition. For him objectives have to exist independently of judging subjects. Thus, the objective which is judged in an evident judging act is in that sense prior to the act of judging. Like Brentano, Meinong considers evident judgment to be the way we come to know something, i.e. the cognitive act that leads us to knowledge. Unlike Brentano, however, Meinong argues that the predicate ‘is true’ should be predicated of the objects of mental acts. This is because the latter are prior to the acts that are directed to them. In the primary sense objectives are true. Only in a secondary sense are acts of judging also true. As we shall see, this is not Meinong’s only argument defending the view that we should predicate ‘true’ of objectives rather than of the acts

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which consider them. Also unlike Brentano, but in agreement with Twardowski, Meinong treats ‘true’ as a determining adjective, i.e. he sees truth as a real attribute of objectives.31

3.4

A True Objective and a True Act of Judging

Another of Meinong’s arguments for the primacy of the truth of objectives (or of true objectives) with regard to the truth of mental acts can be formulated as follows. Suppose that we have some objective that something exists. Now, how should one express the true judgment in which this objective is judged? The answer is ambiguous. According to Meinong, this objective can be judged in two different judgments with regard to their content. It can be judged either in an evident judgment which is expressed in the form ‘A exists’, i.e. it can be evidently accepted that A; or it can be judged in the evident judgment expressed in the sentence ‘It is true that A exists’, i.e. in an evident acceptance of the objective that A exists. Thus, we are dealing with two different true judgments in which we judge about two different objects. In the ﬁrst case we judge about A. In the second case we judge about A’s existence. Meinong, however, sees both judgments as directed to the same objective, i.e. to the existence of A. The latter is the objective to which both judgments are directed. If this is the case how can these two judgments with different contents about the same state of affairs be true? Suppose, now, that the objective the existence of A does not obtain. In this case the objective must be judged in a negative evident judgment of the form ‘A does not exist.’ However, Meinong seems to claim a difﬁculty here, since But it is hardly understandable why this, which actually refers to the objective ‘that A does not exist’, is predicated of the objective ‘that A exists’ which is contrary to the former as regards its quality. (Meinong 1902, p. 192—my translation)32

For Meinong there is another judgment whose sentential linguistic form would be more appropriate in this case: ‘It is not the case that A exists.’ Once again, we repeat our question: In this clearer example, how is it possible for two judgments that are different in content to be true with regard to the same state of affairs? (About the non-obtaining of the existence of A) Meinong’s answer is that we must assume states of affairs before we make judgments about them. If states of affairs were not prior to the judgments in which they are judged, the above would not be a satisfactory answer to the question. That they are indeed prior can be seen from the fact that when the underlying objective obtains, its ‘truth’ can guarantee the truth of several possible judgments in which it is judged.

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Anton Marty (I): The Adequate Act of Judging as the Truth Bearer

4.1

The Ambiguity of the Notion of the Primary Truth Bearer

49

When one takes a look at the argumentation concerning the true judgment (Brentano) or the true objective (Meinong) as the entities of which truth should be predicated, one ﬁnds solutions which rely on the concept of primacy. These are, in the examples given above, the primacy of knowledge in relation to truth in Brentano’s theory of truth, the primacy of true objectives in relation to the true judgments in which they are judged in Meinong’s view, in short, the primacy of one truth bearer with regard to another. Anton Marty, another of Brentano’s students, noticed that the solution of the problem of the ambiguity of the notion of the truth bearer that makes use of the notion of primacy itself relies on an ambiguity. For him the notion of the primacy of truth and, respectively, the notion of secondary truths as notions connected with mental acts and their objects are themselves ambiguous. Moreover, there are at least two levels on which these notions lose their clarity. What exactly does it mean to say that something is true in a primary sense? The ﬁrst level of saying that something is true in a primary sense is, according to Marty, the level of things (sachlicher Sinn). On this level the primacy either of a true act or of true being depends upon an answer to the question of what decides the correctness of our judgments, i.e. of our knowledge.33 According to Marty, among the possible answers to the question of what decides the correctness of a judgment is the reply that what decides is that which makes the judgment true. Thus, in the ﬁrst sense of ‘primacy’, something is primary when it decides about the truth of a judgment. In other words, what decides the truth of a judgment is its truthmaker.34 Since, as we shall see below, in Marty’s view ‘truthmaker’ has rather clear ontological connotations, primacy would be a kind of primacy of truth in an ontological context. Now, on one occasion, says Marty, primacy as related to the notion of a truthmaker is stated of true judging acts. True cognition should be true primarily with regard to other entities such as, for example, (true) being. This, however, can mean several things. First, it can mean that what decides about the truth of an act of judging is the cognitive act itself. This extreme view, according to which something is true if, for example, we believe that it is true (if we hold it to be true) recalls, claims Marty, the ancient saying that man is the measure of all things. According to such a view something is true or even exists as long as someone accepts it in a true judgment or, even worse, as long as it is believed to be true or is believed to exist. This conclusion is unacceptable for Marty: something exists or is true not because we believe that it is so. A truthmaker is, rather, a transcendent correlate of an act of judging.

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Secondly, the primacy of true judging acts with respect to the truthmaker can be connected with a view called the correspondence theory of truth. The adequation theory of truth—this is Marty’s name for such a theory—denies that what decides about the truth of a judgment belongs exclusively to the sphere of the judging subject. In this theory intellectus is not the measure of the truth of a judgment. Judgments are sometimes directed toward something outside the subject, upon an external existent object. The correctness of such judgments depends upon what they are directed towards. The truthmaker, according to adequation theory of truth, is something external to the cognitive subject, on the part of the world. ‘Transcendent’ correlates of acts of judging exist independently before we make judgments. An object can exist before obtaining a true judgment. The independence of the existence of the judged object, i.e. its primacy in the order of existence, still does not, of course, mean its primacy in the order of truth. However, saying that a judged object is a true being is actually derived from saying of judgments that they are true. Such a concept [of true being] can be obtained only with regard to the concept [of truth] and only in this sense would it be the meaning of ‘truth’ as predicated of objects when mediated by the meaning of ‘truth’ as predicated under certain circumstances of the judging act. (Marty 1908, p. 312—my translation)

On other occasions, the primacy of truth with regard to the truthmaker is stated of being. In opposition to the former case, here a judgment is said to be true only with regard to a true being. This would mean, however, claims Marty, that we would have to get to know a true being before judging it in a true judgment, and this is not the case. In other words, we would have to know of the existence of an object before accepting its existence in an act of judging. Knowledge consists of (correct) judging acts.

4.2

An Argument Based on the Epistemological Notion of Truth

This leads to the second level on which, according to Marty, one can talk about the primacy of truth, the epistemic level. Here, along the lines of Brentano, one assumes that knowledge of what exists is based on the psychological experience of judging acts and their evidence. Therefore, the direct issue on this level is no longer the truthmaker, but, rather, the mental phenomenon of a correct act of judging which can serve as a true judgment. However, Marty’s notion of knowledge (and of the act of knowing, respectively) is not based only on the notion of evidence as it was considered by Brentano. According to the latter knowledge is a certain class of correct, i.e. (direct and/or indirect) evident judging acts. Brentano’s evidence is to be understood as a certain co-experience that comes into being with certain judging acts under certain circumstances. Now for Marty, the experience of evidence that the judging act accomplishes presents only a part of the experience of

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knowledge (of an act of knowing). The act of knowing consists, he continues, of at least two different accomplishing co-experienced moments: the moment of the co-experience of evidence and the co-experience of the adequation of what is judged (or, as it is called by Marty, of the adequation of the content of a judgment). More precisely, the act of knowing is, according to Marty, a mental act of judging which is accomplished by both co-experiences, of the evidence and of the grasping [Erfassen] of the adequation of its content. In his philosophical jargon, which is somewhat difﬁcult, Marty says that in the act of knowing the adequate content is grasped as adequate together with the experience of evidence. This co-experienced grasping of the adequate content in a judging act Marty also calls co-perception [Komperzeption]. Now, Marty explains the primacy of a true judging act with respect to the secondary notion of true being in the following way: And since we grasp the being [das Sein] or the existence [das Existieren] only in and by means of an (accepting) judging act, the rightness of which ﬂows to us from it itself [sich uns kundgibt], the concept of being [das Seiende] can also not be obtained in a way other than through a reﬂection on such judging. Being and existence mean, as we repeatedly emphasize, that which can rightly be accepted. (Marty 1908, p. 314—my translation)

The bearer of truth in the primary sense is thus, for Marty, the mental act of judging. The class of true acts of judging consists of acts of knowing, i.e. correct (evident and adequate) acts of judging. What is new here, however, is Marty’s notion of adequation and, above all, his notion of the content of a judgment, which differs from that presented by Twardowski.

4.3

The Content of a Judgment

The notion of a correct judgment as presented by Marty is understandable only when we consider the notion of judgment-content. I cannot focus on all the aspects of the notion of the content in Marty’s theory of judgment. What is of principal importance here is the relation between the content of a judgment and its correctness. As we have already seen, for Marty the entities that are the primary truth bearers are acts of judging. True acts of judging are those acts of knowing of which correctness can be predicated. For Brentano, the condition of the predication of correctness was a co-experience of evidence. Marty, as it has also been mentioned, adds another condition for the possible correctness of a judging act, adequation. Now, a correct judging act is one that is evident and is adequate to its content. Marty’s judgment-content serves here as a standard or measure to which an actual act of judging must conform, i.e. it plays the role of the truthmaker. This is, ﬁrst of all, because the content of a judgment constitutes a necessary condition of its correctness: In other words, the natural description of the concept of the content of a judgment seems to me to be that which objectively grounds the correctness of our judgings. More

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The content of a judgment thus constitutes a necessary condition of its correctness in the sense in which it represents the condition of the adequation of a judgment. The judgment-content consists, furthermore, of moments that are the counterparts of the moments that belong to an act of judging. Along the lines of Brentano Marty includes the following among the latter moments: a) the matter of an act of judging, b) its quality (i.e. acceptance or rejection), c) its mode, assertion or apodicticity, d) its certainty or uncertainty, and e) its evidence or non-evidence. The counterparts of the last four of the above in the content of a judgment are, respectively, b) being or non-being, c) contingency or necessity, d) probability or impossibility, and e) evidence or non-evidence. Now according to Marty, the act of judging is correct if it is adequate to its content with respect to all of these moments. For example, if someone making a judgment accepts apodictically that a red rose exists, he does it in a way that is not correct. This is because the being of the red rose is not necessary. In other words, it is not necessary that a red rose exists. It is a contingent fact, just as the fact that it is red and not, for example, yellow is also contingent. This judging act, however, need not be false. It is not false when the red rose about which we have judged actually exists. The act of judging is in this case true but blind and, therefore, not correct. Furthermore, the content of a judgment is, according to Marty, independent of the judging subject. He recalls here, for example, Brentano’s notion of the inexistence of an object (Marty interprets Brentano’s object of a judging act as an object immanent to the mind). Brentano’s matter of judgment (i.e. the object to which we are intentionally directed) is dependent on the judging subject. Unlike Brentano’s matter of judgment, Marty’s content of a judging act does not demand the assumption of the existence of a judging subject.35 In this respect Marty’s judgment-content is similar to Meinong’s objectives in that both entities mediate between judgments, on the one hand, and their objects, on the other. A judgment-content is, however, dependent on the judging subject in the sense that it takes place only when a judging act occurs. Generally we can say that whereas the existence of judgment-contents is dependent on judging subjects, they are, however, not determined by judging activities. Marty’s judgment-contents, not determined by judging subjects and existent in time are, however, not real. They are not real in the sense that they do not suffer effects, i.e. they do not belong to a causal realm either within the mind or within the physical world. A more precise description of the notion of the adequation of a judgment to its content must refer to descriptions which cross the borders of descriptive psychology along the lines drawn by Brentano and must go in directions which are the subject of the next two chapters: the linguistic counterparts of

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the descriptive-psychological analysis and the ontology of judgment. I shall thus return to Marty’s notion of judgment-content below.

5.

Summary of Chapter 3: the Epistemic Notion of Truth

In the Brentanian tradition the notion of truth was strongly related to the notion of knowledge. Since epistemology at this time was commonly embraced as a proper part of psychology, the basic notions of epistemology were those of thinking and judging. Moreover, the rejection of the classical formulation of the adequation theory of truth developed by Brentano was stimulated by investigations in the area of descriptive psychology. The basic conditions for the conception of truth of Brentano and his followers led to epistemological questions. The characteristic feature of the Brentanian tradition in this respect is the primacy of the notion of knowledge in relation to the notion of truth. Among all the acts of judging present in the domain of descriptive psychology, Brentanians distinguished the subclass that usually consisted of acts of knowing. By means of them Brentanians later deﬁne the notion of truth. Despite some exceptions (such as Meinong), and despite the existence of various differences among the Brentanian theories of truth, one can state that acts of knowing, above all, served as bearers of truth. The latter were described variously as ‘correct’ or ‘adequate’ judgments and deﬁned in terms of descriptive psychology as a theory of cognition. Investigations concerning the entities that serve as the bearers of truth are part of the theory of knowledge, even in Meinong’s account of objectives as truth bearers.

Remark. As was already mentioned in Chapter 2, the deﬁnition of the truth bearer often appears in either its ontological or linguistic form. Concerning the primacy of the notion of knowledge as related to the notion of truth in Brentano’s, Twardowski’s, Meinong’s and Marty’s views, the epistemological deﬁnition of the truth bearer deﬁned in the previous chapter ﬁnds its justiﬁcation. To the ‘epistemic qualiﬁcations’ predicated of epistemic instruments we can add, among other things, the experience of evidence or the adequation of the content of a judgment. Remark. Given the epistemological notion of truth, the choice of the truth bearer requires at least two crucial decisions. First, we have to choose the instrument of knowledge that serves best for cognition. In the case of descriptive psychology, the best epistemic instrument is the act of judging, for it, above all, can be the object of psychological investigation. Secondly, we have to decide what epistemic characteristics the chosen epistemic instrument should have as its properties in order to guarantee its desired epistemic value in a system of knowledge. In this respect Brentano’s descriptive psychology looks

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to co-experiences such as evidence and the experience of adequation which accompany judgmental activities.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25

26 27 28 29

Brentano 1874 [1973]. See the next chapter for more about this. Brentano 1930, pp. 7–29. 1971, pp. 6–25. See Brentano 1874 [1973] pp. 79f., 88f. As regards the distinction between the object and the content of a mental act see Twardowski 1894 and next section of this chapter. See, for example, Blaustein 1928, pp. 11–18, 22. Brentano 1874 [1973], pp. 88f. See, for instance, section 3.2. of this chapter. Brentano 1930 [1961], p. 27. Brentano 1982, esp. pp. 10–27. This volume consists of Brentano’s notes to lectures given by him in Vienna around 1890, i.e. before his subsequent turn to ‘reism.’ Recently this view has been defended very strongly by Dieter Münch in his ‘Intention und Zeichen’ (Münch 1993). x is independent of y iff x can exist without the existence of y. x is dependent on y iff x is not independent of y. Twardowski 1894/1982 [1977]. This remark was later transformed by Alexius Meinong and Ernst Mally into the principle of the independence of the ‘being-so’ and the ‘being’ of an object. Some Twardowski’s interpreters even see the Scholastics as the key to understanding his object/content distinction. See Cavalin 1997. See Tenner 1914, Paczkowska-Łagowska 1980, pp. 202–208. Meinong 1965, pp. 143f. As he himself states, he owes his assistant Mila Radakovic his interest in a special type of mental event or process that was later called a ‘supposition.’ She directed his investigations to this problem around 1899. See Meinong 1902 [1983], Vorwort. It is perhaps worth mentioning that Meinong ﬁrst divided Brentano’s phenomena of love and hate into two types: feeling and desiring. Secondly, he includes in the class of the phenomena of thinking two different types of activities, supposing and judging. In virtue of these classiﬁcations there are, in fact, according to Meinong, ﬁve classes of mental phenomena: presenting, supposing, judging, feeling and desiring. It is also worth adding that Meinong’s notion of thinking is narrower than the notion of thinking described by Brentano. The latter called all mental activities thinking, whereas Meinong includes in this class only certain types of cognitive mental acts, such as supposing and judging. Meinong 1902. Meinong 1902, pp. 1–5, 1976, pp. 1–8. Meinong 1902, pp. 6–15, 1976, pp. 9–21. Meinong 1902, p. 278. 1976, p. 263. Meinong, 1902, p. 270, 1976, p. 256. See, for example, Meinong 1899, Meinong 1902, Haller 1979. It is beyond the scope of this study to describe in detail Meinong’s notion of object, as well as its various classiﬁcations. In order to do this it would be necessary to probe deeply into Meinong’s ontology; this study is not devoted to such an analysis. It is well to mention, however, that the term ‘object’ as it appears in Meinong’s writing is similar to that of Twardowski, especially in that its scope is very broad, for everything thinkable is an object. See, among others, Findlay 1963, Haller 1979, Chisholm 1982 and Pa´s´niczek 1998. In the English translation of Meinong’s On Assumption these are objects of judgments-of. See, for instance, pp. 252f. In the translation mentioned above, objectives would be objects of judgments-about. Meinong 1902, pp. 150–212, 1976, pp. 144–206.

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30 These lines are not included in the second edition of Meinong’s Annahmen that serves for English translation. 31 Meinong 1902, pp. 195–197. 32 Here, again, it is the passage which is not included in the second edition of Meinong’s Annahmen. 33 For Marty ‘correct judgment’ can be replaced by ‘true judgment’, and a ‘true being’ (das Wahre) should rather be named simply a ‘being’ or an ’existent object.’ 34 Here a truthmaker is that in virtue of which a judgment is true. For more about this notion, see Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984. 35 Marty 1908, p. 295.

Chapter 4 JUDGEMENT, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE

1.

Franz Brentano (II): Linguistic Analysis

Very often in his writings the argumentation given by Brentano in his descriptive-psychological investigations concerning the truth of judgments has its counterparts in linguistic analysis. The growing interest in the linguistic justiﬁcation of the thesis of descriptive psychology in the late phase of Brentano’s philosophy is usually seen as an outcome of the already mentioned1908 work of his pupil Anton Marty Untersuchungen . . . However, it is quite difﬁcult to state how far Marty alone is responsible for Brentano’s growing interests in language and how important such an analysis was for him before Marty’s texts about language appeared. Brentano’s early linguistic analyses are included, among other places, in his lectures on logic,1 in the paper ‘On the concept of truth’,2 and in the text ‘Miklosich on Subjectless Propositions.’3 All of them were worked out in the 1880’s, i.e. after Marty published his Über die Ursprung der Sprache [On the Origin of Language].4 The fact is that the linguistic part of Brentano’s philosophy became even more important during his later activity. A linguistic analysis presents above all an important part of Brentano’s later period of reism. However, since in Brentano’s account reism is fundamentally a metaphysical view on mind, I shall present Brentano’s reistic arguments about truth and its bearer in Chapter 6 below.

1.1

Language and Thinking

For Brentano, the connection between acts of thinking and their expressions in language cannot be a one-to-one relation. If there were a strong correlation between language and acts of thinking one would have to make clear why there are so many different languages within which one can ﬁnd different expressions (different phonetically as well as in their grammatical form) for the same mental acts, whereas the classes of mental acts are, Brentano insists, the

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same for all human beings. Brentano remarks that even within one language there are different expressions that refer to the same act of thinking. In the end, if the relation between language and thoughts were strong, one would have to afﬁrm that creatures which do not use language cannot think. In consequence one would have to deny that deaf-mutes possess the ability to think. On the one hand, Brentano attributes an incidental role to linguistic expression in his complete theory of judgment, a view that is in accord with the standard view of the nineteenth century. Acts of presentation, on such a view, are expressed by the names that occur in our language. Acts of judging can be expressed by means of more complex linguistic expressions whose meanings depend on the meanings of the constituent names and on the function of the copula. These linguistic phenomena were, however, of interest only insofar as they shed light on the underlying cognition and not in themselves. A judgment can be brought to expression, but the act is primary, its expression secondary. The only purpose of the speaker is the communication of his mental acts. The act need not have been brought to expression if the judging subject had remained content to think for himself. It is not ultimately important what you say; it is important what you think. However, Brentano does not want to deny that language is associated with thinking. Yet the association between the grammar of a language and mental acts is built conventionally and without planning. Language presents, on the one hand, a helpful tool for thinking. On the other hand, however, language as a tool brings with it disadvantages which have a negative inﬂuence on our thinking, such as the ambiguity of linguistic expressions, to mention only one. Thus, it is clear to Brentano that the logical or deeper structure of an act of judging can differ from its linguistic or surface structure as determined by the grammar of a given language. For Brentano, however, this difference is of a twofold sort. First, the structure of the underlying mental act can be misapprehended when judged on the basis of its linguistic expression. It is not always the case, for example, that when one utters the sentence ‘There was no winter this year’ one judges that it never snowed and the temperature never fell below zero. Secondly, the logical structure of a linguistic expression can itself be different from its surface grammar. The aforementioned sentence has, according to Brentano’s existential theory of judgment, a form which should rather be expressed as ‘There was no snow this year’ or ‘There was no day when the temperature fell below zero’ or something similar. Fundamentally, however, we can say that for Brentano there is no difference between the logical structure of a mental act and the logical structure of its concomitant expression. For the latter, as mentioned, is what it is only because of the former. Therefore the analysis of the logical structure of judgments ultimately belongs to the sphere of descriptive psychology. The linguistic counterparts of that analysis can still be helpful and the importance of linguistic analysis in the work of Brentano and his followers is remarkable. Brentano seeks, for example, a lin-

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guistic justiﬁcation for his existential theory of judgment. In this connection he discusses the phenomenon of subjectless sentences, especially the meteorological expressions ‘It’s raining’, ‘It’s snowing’, and other families of examples studied by linguists such as Miklosich. As to the theory of truth and its bearers Brentano used linguistic arguments similar to those described in what follows.

1.2

The Use of Linguistic Expressions

In the passages which consider the descriptive-psychological part of Brentano’s theory of true judgment I pointed out his observation of the different uses of the word ‘true’ in ordinary language. The ways in which this word can be used, however, refer to one usage singled out by Brentano, which he calls the ‘proper’ or ‘primary’ usage of the word ‘true.’ Thus, he can say that: Truth and falsity in the strict or proper sense, therefore, are found in judgment. And every judgment is either true or false. (Brentano 1930 [1966, p. 6])

The bearer of truth is, for Brentano, primarily the act of judging and the variety of ordinary uses of the word ‘true’ as applied to different types of entities in principle mirrors the variety of relations of different mental acts to the act of judging. For Brentano, a linguistic observation serves as a sign of this variety on the psychological level. Thus, what is reﬂected by language is Brentano’s idea that all mental acts of which we say that they are true are, in fact, reducible to acts of judging. Some things [bear names of truth and falsity] because they express a true or false judgment, such as a false assertion, or a false utterance; some things because they produce a true or false judgment, as in the case of hallucination, or a slip in uttering or in writing a word, or a metal which is taken for gold because of a similarity in colour; some things because they are intended to produce a true or false judgment, as for instance a true spirit or a false mannerism. (Brentano 1930 [1966, p. 6])

Every linguistic phenomenon, according to Brentano’s view regarding the connection between language and thinking, seeks a descriptive-psychological justiﬁcation that is to be found in the aforementioned variety of the relations of different mental acts to the act of judging.

1.3

‘Truth’ as a Syncategorematical Expression

A crucial distinction for Brentano’s analysis of linguistic expressions is the distinction between categorematical and syncategorematical phrases. Syncategorematicals are words that have meaning only in association with other words within some given context. The simplest examples of syncategorematicals are such expressions as ‘and’, ‘when’ and so on. They refer to nothing unless they are put into the broader context of a sentence or into a sentential expression. Brentano, however, also includes among syncategorematicals a number of expressions which in ordinary usage seem to have their own meanings. As regards the notion upon which this study is focused, i.e. the notion of truth,

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this is very remarkable, for according to Brentano the word ‘true’ is a syncategorematical. This means, among other things, that there is also nothing real in virtue of which a true judgment differs from a mere judgment. In other words, there is no property of judging acts to which the predicate ‘true’ refers. Once again, this linguistic phenomenon must be justiﬁed on the level of descriptive psychology. The thesis that there is no property that differentiates a mere judgment from a true judgment is a thesis which comes out as a result of descriptive psychology, but it has also further repercussions for linguistic analysis. For instance, once the word ‘true’ is taken as a syncategorematical it is impossible to state that there is a sense in which we can understand truth as something real in the sense used by the Scholastics. The role of truth as a transcendental is excluded when truth is taken as a syncategorematical predicate. In such a view there is only something of which we can predicate that it is true. Furthermore, for Brentano, it is exclusively of the act of judging that we can properly predicate that it is true.

Remark. It is worth noting that Brentano’s successors applied this same kind of analysis using the distinction between syncategorematical and categorematical expressions to other examples. Kazimierz Twardowski, for example, applied it to the word ‘nothing.’ It is also worth noting that linguistic analysis in Brentano’s school usually begins with an analysis of the linguistic expressions for presentations, i.e. with an analysis of nouns, and not with an analysis of sentences. Thus, the basic bearers of meanings for the Brentanians were words.

1.4

A Note on Brentano’s Theory of Meaning and Reference

All linguistic expressions that are expressions of presentations belong, according to Brentano, to the grammatical category of names. For Brentano, the difference between what we call sense and reference, following Frege, is the difference between ‘to mean’ [bedeuten] and ‘to name’ [nennen]. What a name names is the object of presenting. What names mean are concepts, i.e. contents of presenting. For Brentano, it is sentences ((Aussage) that express judging activities. A sentence, according to Brentano, is a judging act expressed in words. It is not clear whether in Brentano’s account a sentence, as a complex of words, is a collection of sounds (utterances), inscriptions, or both. It seems that ‘uttering’ and ‘writing’ would be good words for sentences as expressions of judging activities in Brentano’s sense.5 It is important that on the level of the sentence the difference between the matter and the quality of a judging act appears: By matter we understand that which is judged as such, something that is named by a name included in some sentence. By form we understand the way in which one

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judges. The form is not a linguistic layout, but refers to the moment that makes the judgment a judgment. (Brentano 1956, p. 103—my translation)

1.5

An Argument from the Reducibility of Sentences

On the linguistic level, sentences in which a judging act comes to light have different forms. Sentences, for example, may have a categoric form (‘This rose is red’) or a hypothetic form (‘If you look at this rose, then it will be perceived as red’) and so on. The judging act itself, however, has only two possible qualities: the judging can be afﬁrmative or negative.6 The proper form of judging acts on a linguistic level would then be the existential form, for example, ‘x is’ or ‘x is not’ (or, respectively, ‘x exists’ and ‘x does not exist’; where x stands for names.) These forms present, Brentano claims, the simplest form of a sentence which is sufﬁcient to express the act of judging. What, then, is the relation between the aforementioned categorical or hypothetical forms of linguistic sentences and the existential form of such sentences? Once again Brentano’s explanation of the occurrence of different forms of expressions of judging acts on a linguistic level recalls his general view regarding the connections between language and thinking. As far as the act of judging is concerned, its linguistic layout is not crucial. There is no difference, Brentano urges, between the different forms of sentences (existential, categorical, hypothetical, disjunctive, etc.) with regard to the underlying mental phenomenon of judging. According to Brentano’s existential theory, the judgment expressed in the sentence ‘Franz sees a beautiful autumn leaf that is wet and has the color of red lacquer’ ought properly to be expressed as follows: ‘The lacquer-red, wet, and beautiful, autumn leaf seen by Franz is.’ One should proceed similarly with every other sentence. Using Brentano’s own example, a hypothetical normative sentence such as ‘If a man behaves badly, he harms himself’ can ﬁrst be transformed into the categorical form: ‘All men who behave badly harm themselves.’ Thus, the sentence should be reduced to an existential form that would sound something like: ‘There is no such thing as a man who behaves badly and does not harm himself.’ As Brentano puts it: The reducibility of categorical sentences, indeed the reducibility of all sentences which express a judgment, to existential sentences is therefore indubitable. (Brentano 1874/ 1924 [1973, p. 218])7

This new existential reading of every judging act, a reading which will be later called the ‘existential (logical) form of judgment’, led to one of the ﬁrst attempts to reform traditional logic as known from Aristotle’s syllogistic.8

2.

Kazimierz Twardowski (II): Determining and Modifying Adjectives

Twardowski also makes an attempt to offer a linguistic explanation of the results that he obtained on the level of descriptive psychology. In this respect

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he follows his teacher Brentano. Similarly, Twardowski adopted Brentano’s views that there is no strong parallelism between thinking and language, on the one hand, and that linguistic analysis can help in diagnosing and understanding psychological investigations, on the other hand. It must, however, be mentioned that Twardowski argued for a much stronger dependence between thinking and language. Clear thought has, according to him, its counterpart in clear linguistic expression. Thus, clarity of thinking affects the clarity of philosophical writings.9 I shall return to this problem when speaking about Twardowski’s theory of acts and products, which is crucial in this respect. Here I shall concentrate exclusively on the parallel linguistic investigations of Twardowski which support the descriptive-psychological issues in his Habilitationsschrift.

2.1

The Meaning and Function of Names

When one looks at the terminology used in psychological investigations concerning the object of presentation, one will recognize the way in which language disguises thoughts. It is to be expected that, on the one hand, the lack of a strong parallelism between thinking and its linguistic expression will lead to numerous misunderstandings and ambiguities, as in the case of the expression ‘what is presented’ (either a content or an object). On the other hand, Twardowski’s distinction between an act, its content, and its object becomes its linguistic support, which he infers from his theory of names. For Twardowski a name is a categorematic sign of a given language. The categorematic sign is described by him as an entity in virtue of which we refer to (name or assign) something and, in order to narrow the category only to noncomplex words, which is not an expression of a judgment or of a phenomena of love or hate. Judgments and phenomena of love or hate are mental correlates of written or uttered sentences as a combination of signs. The function of names is triple: communication, meaning and naming. First of all, a speaker communicates to a receiver his mental event or process of presentation, i.e. he communicates the fact that he presents something to himself. This is the basic function of a name: the communication of an act of presenting. Furthermore, according to Twardowski’s view, the speaker evokes in a receiver a mental content. This content Twardowski calls the ‘meaning of the name.’ Thus, the meaning of a linguistic sign is a mental content evoked in the hearer of a speech act. Finally, in its third function (that of naming), a name names or assigns an object which is the object of the act of presenting.

2.2

Attributing and Modifying Predicates

As we have seen, in his On the Content and Object of Presentations of 1894, Twardowski puts forward a series of arguments in defense of the distinction between the contents of presenting acts on the one hand, and their objects, on

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the other. His whole investigation begins with an analysis of the linguistic usage of the terms ‘presentation’ [Vorstellung] and ‘that which is presented’ [das Vorgestellte] in the way in which these terms were used by the earlier Brentanians. Twardowski found both terms ambiguous. At times, ‘presentation’ refers to an act of presenting; at other times, however, the same term refers to the content or immanent object of this act (understood by Twardowski roughly as the image of the real thing). ‘What is presented’, in turn, sometimes refers to the immanent object; at other times it refers to the real thing as it exists independently of the judging act. On the linguistic level of his analysis Twardowski remarks that, depending on what is understood by ‘what is presented’ (the real object or the content), when one utters a complex expression which consists of a predicate (adjective) and of a name, one can change the function of the adjectives in the uttered expression. Thus, for instance, if one says ‘the painted view’ the adjective ‘painted’ can function in two ways: as a determining or as a modifying adjective. It functions as a determining adjective when, in the sentence in which the expression ‘the painted view’ occurs, one refers to the object of the judgment. That is, ‘painted’ is a determining adjective if one refers in the expression ‘the painted view’ to that part of reality which was presented to the painter when he painted the view. When the adjective ‘painted’ is predicated of this part of reality, then it functions in a determining way. On the other hand, when one refers to the picture in which the part of reality named ‘view’ is presented, then the adjective ‘painted’ functions as a modifying adjective. It modiﬁes the meaning of the word ‘view’, since the view is no longer the view that is part of the mind-independent real world. A similar situation takes place when we predicate about the content of our presentations or of other mental contents, for instance, when we say ‘colorful garden’, referring to the mental content of the presentation of a colorful garden, which we are looking at. The predicate ‘colorful’ then modiﬁes the meaning of the word ‘garden’ as referring to the content which would normally stand for the garden we see. This is because the content of the presentation of the garden cannot be colorful at all. A determination is called attributive or determining if it completes, enlarges—be it in a positive or in a negative direction—the meaning of the expression to which it is attached. A determination is modifying if it completely changes the original meaning of the name to which it is attached. (Twardowski 1894 [1977, p. [11])

For the purposes of this study a very important example of the ambiguity of the function of adjectives is the case of the word ‘true.’ In expressions like ‘false friend’, ‘false gold’ the adjective ‘true’ appears as a modifying adjective—it changes the meaning of the predicated words since a false friend is not friend at all and false gold is not gold at all. Twardowski therefore offers a linguistic explanation of why the multiplicity of predications of the

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word ‘true’ of entities other than judgments should be treated as secondary by saying that a judgment is true in the primary sense. This is because Twardowski, unlike Brentano, claims that ‘true’ as predicated of judgments functions as a determining adjective. Thus, for Twardowski, the bearer of truth in the primary sense is the judgment, which he understood at that time as a mental event, along lines drawn by Brentano.

2.3

The Logic of Adjectives

Twardowski returns once again in 1927 to the determining and modifying functions of adjectives.10 This time, however, he refers to the widest group of linguistic categories, adding to adjectives both adverbs and adverbial phrases. The function of determining is, according to Twardowski in 1927, a simple function which adds to the content of a presentation (which is expressed by the subject in an expression) either a positive or a negative property. The modifying function of an adjective is a complex function that consists of two moments: ﬁrst, it is the function of removing one of the parts of the content and, secondly, it is the function of replacing it by another positive or negative characteristic. Recalling the difference between both functions of adjectives as known from On the Content and Object of Presentation, Twardowski remarks that the division of the functions of predicative expressions into determining and modifying is not exhaustive: they are not parallel in the sense that determining is a simple function and modifying is a complex function. Thus, when describing other ways in which these groups of grammatical categories can function, he now speaks of four types of functions. The ﬁrst type presents the aforementioned complex function of modifying which Twardowski calls now the ‘removal-determining function.’ An example of modifying in the manner of a removal-determining function is the adjective ‘former’ in the expression ‘former minister’: it removes a part of the content of ‘minister’ (since the person is no longer a minister), but it also adds a new characteristic which is attributed only to former ministers. The second type of function is a simple function of determining, as in the case of the adjective ‘young’ in the expression ‘young person.’ It adds simply the new characteristic of being young. The third type of function is the simple modifying function of removing a part of the content. An example of this, which Twardowski called the ‘abolishing adjective’, is the adjective ‘alleged’ in the expression ‘alleged Gestalt.’ Finally, the fourth type of function is the conﬁrmation of the characteristic of a content. In this function there is no removal or addition of any properties of the content nor does it change the meaning of the noun. Examples of such ‘restitutive adjectives’ are ‘real’ and ‘true’ as they occur in expressions like ‘real fact’ and ‘true friendship.’

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For Twardowski, the proper use of the predicate ‘true’ is the usage in which this predicate functions in a determining way, i.e. when ‘true’ is predicated of acts of judging. However, it is worth noting in this context that the word ‘true’ can also belong to the fourth group of adjectives, which function as restitutive, conﬁrming or preserving adjectives. This would be the case of Franz Brentano, who treated this predicate as syncategorematic. Using Twardowski’s analysis of the functions of adjectives, we can answer the question of why Brentano could speak about the proper contexts in which the predicate ‘true’ can occur on the linguistic level. Using the new characterization of the functions of adjectives given by Twardowski in 1927, Brentano maintains that the context in which ‘true’ is used in the proper sense is when the predicate occurs in its conﬁrmative function. These contexts are, for Brentano, the contexts in which the predicate ‘true’ is predicated of acts of judging, even if this predicate refers to none of the properties of the judging act.

3. 3.1

Alexius Meinong (II): Truth-Predicates in Ordinary Use An Expression and Its Meaning

For Alexius Meinong there are two major functions of language when the latter is taken as a sign. In the ﬁrst, similar to the standard view of language at this time, language expresses our mental acts. In this sense the noises of language are expressions. In the second, the meanings (Bedeutung) of linguistic expressions are objects of our thinking.11 Although all signs that have meanings are, in Meinong’s view, expressions, not all expressions have meanings. A word means [‘signiﬁes’ in the standard translation—AR] only as far as it expresses. (Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 25])

There are meaningless expressions such as, for instance, ‘Oh’ or ‘Yes’ (or ‘No’). They are meaningless since we do not know anything about the objects of thinking expressed by them. This view is somehow surprising when one considers the fact which follows from Brentano’s principle of intentionality, accepted by Meinong, that all mental acts have their objects. Along these lines all expressions of mental acts should have meanings. Surely the existence of meaningless expressions must be considered from the point of view of their receiver in their function of communication rather than from the point of the functions played by linguistic phrases as signs. I shall come to the point in a moment. Here it is worth mentioning that the meaninglessness of expressions seems to be, in Meinong’s view, an epistemic notion. As regards meaningful expressions, however, their meanings are connected with (or, in other words, ascribed to) certain linguistic expressions which are not without ambiguities. This is because the ascription of a sign to an object always takes into account the circumstances in which the meaningful expression appears such as time, place, society, family or even the individuals who

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utter the expression.12 Thus, the same object of thinking can be signiﬁed by different expressions (there are, however, several ways of naming objects or of saying that something is the case) and the same expression under various circumstances can mean something different (such as, for instance, the already used expression ‘Today it is snowing’). However, despite its indexical nature there are regularities in the functioning of language as expressions and in the ascription of linguistic sounds to their meanings. Words or complexes of words are usually expressions of acts of presenting. Words such as ‘rose’ or ‘Meinong’s teacher’ are in Meinong’s view expressions of acts of presenting. Their meanings are, according to him, objects of presentations. Thus, ‘the rose’ means a concrete rose and ‘Meinong’s teacher’ means Franz Brentano. Whereas words and their complexes stand for objects of presentations, Meinong also distinguishes another class of complex linguistic phrases, sentences. Sentences, as well as words, are considered by Meinong to be either complex sounds (utterances) or inscriptions. Whether we talk about utterances or inscriptions depends on what we prefer to speak about, i.e. whether about a speaker (who makes sounds or, simply, utters something) or about an author (who usually writes on paper, even if only destined for his desk drawer). Sentences, when considered as signs from the point of view of their function, are expressions of mental acts such as thinking (judgments and assumptions), but they are also expressions of wishes, orders, hating and so on. Here, however, one can ask the following questions: First, what is the difference between a complex of words that expresses presenting and a complex of words that expresses thinking, wishing or hating? Is the complex of words ‘Red rose’ an expression of the presentation of a red rose or it is an expression of the judgment that a rose is red (a shorthand for ‘The rose is red’)? Secondly, how can we differentiate between expressions that express thinking, wishing, or hating when they have the same syntactic structure? Does a complex of words such as ‘This rose isn’t purple’ express thinking of the color of a rose (in the sense of excluding other colors), or does it express the wish that the rose have a purple color, or the fact that the person who is uttering or writing this sentence hates roses which are not purple? Here the reason for distinguishing sentences as a separate class of linguistic phrases is not, as one might expect from Meinong’s psychological investigations, only their different syntactical structure, but, as we shall see, also different kinds of objects which are their meanings. Indeed, Meinong answers the ﬁrst question by assuming the existence of special types of objects, which are the meanings of sentences, i.e. by the assumption of higher-order objects. Complexes of words differ in the types of meanings they have: they mean either simple objects that are the objects of our presentations or they mean complex objects that are judged, assumed, wished,

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or hated. Thus, the complex of words ‘red rose’ can mean either a simple object or the higher-order object that a rose is red. In the ﬁrst case it is an expression of presenting, in the second it is an expression of thinking. Now, by assuming different kinds of higher-order objects, i.e. by further distinguishing between objectives, digitatives and desideratives, Meinong is able to speak about sentences as expressing a different kind of mental phenomenon and therefore is also able to distinguish expressions of thinking from other kinds of expressions possessing the same syntactic structure as sentences. Here, for example, ‘This rose isn’t purple’ either expresses a thought of the objective that the color of a rose is not red (a negative fact), or it expresses a wish of the desiderative that a rose have a purple color, or it expresses a digitative that the person whose mental act it expressed hates roses which are not purple. But here, as in the case of meaningless expressions, we can distinguish between the question ‘how would we know that a sentence which is an expression of thinking, such as judging, is not an expression of, for example, assuming, wishing or hating?’ and the question ‘when does an expression express thinking, wishing or hating when it has the same structure?’ The latter question, however, relates linguistic noises to a receiver rather than to the speaker. But, even if we distinguish sentential expressions of thinking from sentential expressions of other mental phenomena, the answer to the question of when an expression expresses thinking, wishing or hating when it has the same structure remains incomplete. We also need explain how to distinguish an expression of assumption from an expression of judgment? Both acts of thinking, i.e. supposing and judging, refer to a similar type of object, i.e. to objectives. Thus, the latter are meanings of linguistic expressions of both supposition and judgment. Expressions of both types of thinking cannot, therefore, be distinguished by means of their meanings. The same grammatical structure of the form ‘The rose is red’ can mean the same objective that the rose is red, but it can also express both a judgment and an assumption which differ from each other. As far as judgment is concerned, every expression of a judgment is, in Meinong’s view, a sentence. On the other hand, however, not every sentence is an expression of a judgment. The class of sentences includes many subclasses. Expressions of judgments, statements ((Aussage), are only one of them. Thus, it is the name ‘Aussage’ (translated here as ‘statement’) which is properly used for expressions of judgments (even if Meinong himself very often calls sentences ‘expressions of judgment’). On the level of descriptive psychology, what differentiates judgments from other types of mental phenomena are the moments of assertion or of rejection. However, how are these moments pictured in the language if not in the grammar? When there is a failure to distinguish expressions of judgment from sentential expressions of supposition by means of either their syntax or their meanings, is there, perhaps, a method for identifying expressions of supposition? As we saw when we spoke about Meinong’s theory of hypothetical judgments,

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assumptions are placed by Meinong between acts of presenting and acts of judging. Thus, assumptions can be expressed by both expressions of presentations (i.e. in words and their complexes) and expressions of judgments (i.e. in sentences). Therefore, the test of what is expressed in a sentence—an assumption or a judgment—relies on the transformation of a sentence into a nounphrase. However, properly expressed assumptions are so-called ‘that-clauses’ (daß-Sätze), i.e. clauses that are dependent (or subordinate) from a grammatical point of view. Meinong’s distinction between expressions of judgment and expressions of assumption seems to refer back to syntactical methods. Meinong’s distinction between expressions of acts of presenting and expressions of other types of mental phenomena, made with the help of distinct meanings (objects of expressed phenomena), is possible because of his strong assumptions. Meinong assumes that there are no meaningless sentences. This statement relies on the principle, known later as the ‘principle of compositionality’, which states, roughly, that higher-order objects are made up of lowerlevel objects, which in Meinong’s theory can be transformed into the thesis that the meaning of a sentence is made up of the meanings of its parts (words). To be sure, there is normally never a lack of meanings [translation: signiﬁcations] where there is a sentence. These meanings [translation: signiﬁcations] seem to consist in the meanings [translation: signiﬁcations] of words, the words united into a complex in the sentence, and to consist in the objects of higher order that are based on these wordmeanings [translation: signiﬁcations] and which have them as their inferiora. (Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 29])

3.2

Communication

The above description of functioning linguistic phrases considers language to be a system of signs. However, Meinong was conscious of the limitations of seeing language as subsumed under the notion of sign. The meaninglessness of expressions, for example, would be inexplicable without considering other functions of linguistic phrases. One of the most important functions played by language, in this respect, is its communicative function. This function of language is excluded from an analysis of language only from the perspective of signs. Because language plays the role of a tool of communication, Meinong distinguishes between the linguistic function of expressions (which is related to a speaker or to a writer) and the pragmatic function of language, which relates linguistic phrases to their receivers.13 The pragmatic function of language is in this respect an evocation of a mental act such as, for example, a thought in the receiver of a sign. This is, as put by Meinong, an understanding (Verstehen) of the speaker on the side of the receiver, which plays the crucial role in an act of communication. This act of understanding relies on an act of grasping (Erfassen) the meaning of a spoken or a written expression, i.e. on an act of judging or at least on an act of assuming of an objective.14 Thus, once again, Meinong’s theory of special types

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of objects for different types of mental phenomena plays a crucial role in his theory of communication. It is the object which I mean when uttering an expression of my mental act and which is the most important factor in the act of communication: A receiver of my speech understands me when he or she is directed towards the same object that I am directed towards.15 I communicate simple objects (when uttering single words or their complexes) and objectives (when uttering sentences) and not, respectively, my act of presenting (or its content) or an act of thinking (or its content). But, this communication of an object cannot take place when one utters a meaningless expressions such as ‘Oh’ or ‘Yes’ which, when taken alone, without a context, cannot direct any receiver to a communicated object. It is, thus, unclear in Meinong’s view what are the conditions for directing a receiver to a communicated object. How are we to decide, then, whether I have communicated an object in a proper way, i.e. that I have not uttered something meaningless (to the receiver)?

3.3

Meinong’s Argument from the Ordinary Usage of Epistemic Operators

For Meinong neither sentences nor acts of judging are bearers of truth. This is because mental events and processes and their expressions play, in Meinong’s view, only an incidental role in acts of cognition and communication. The crucial role is reserved, in these respects, for objectives. Similarly, Meinong chooses objectives as the entities of which we should predicate truth and falsehood in the proper sense. This statement of Meinong is supported by two further assumptions which he makes: that the notion of truth is, as it was for Brentano, an epistemic notion, and that ordinary language can be decisive as far as some philosophical statements are concerned. An ordinary (inner) experience is helpful when considered prior to an investigation on the level of descriptive psychology, claims Meinong. It is ordinary inner experience that constitutes the basis of the science of psychology. Similarly, ordinary language can be considered at least as helpful in a proper evaluation of some phenomena, and it constitutes the basis for constructing linguistic theories, and thereby artiﬁcial languages. On the other hand, an ordinary language, however, can be improved by means of artiﬁcial languages. An analysis of language, and especially its ordinary uses, presents therefore a preliminary step to an analysis which uses, for example, the technical language of descriptive psychology.16 In this valuation of common sense experience and language, Meinong follows his master Brentano. Meinong distinguishes, roughly speaking, three types of sentential expressions: primary sentences, that-clauses and secondary sentences. Meinong holds that all secondary expressions of judgments can be divided into two classes. Thus the sentence a) ‘The man is sick’ is a primary sentence in the sense that it expresses a judgment. But, ‘The man is sick’, which for Brentano

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means that the sick man exists, can mean, for Meinong, two different objectives as expressed in two different sentential expressions: b) ‘The sick man is’ and c) ‘The man is sick.’ Here, b) and c) have different meanings: the fact that the sick man exists is here different from the fact that the man is sick. I do not think, as it is along the lines of Brentano, that the whole meaning or even the primary meaning of the sentence ‘This man is ill’ can be pictured by the sentence ‘The ill-man exists.’ Ununderstandable seems to me, however, that in the sequence of words ‘the ill-man’, which does not even make a sentence, there is included in the strong sense the whole objectual material which is included in the sentence ‘The man is ill.’ (Meinong 1902, p. 25—my translation)17

Thus, for Meinong both sentences, b) and c), since they are expressions of someone’s thoughts, can be expressed in sentences such as ‘I think that the sick man is’ and ‘I think that the man is sick.’ These are secondary sentences of my thought. In these secondary sentences the sentences b) and c) are transformed into that-clauses ‘that the sick man exists’ and ‘that the man is sick.’ That-clauses are, according to Meinong, no more than expressions of judgments. They are proper expressions for assumptions and, actually, in the secondary sentences they are names of objectives (complexes of words whose meanings are objectives).18 The ﬁrst class consists of sentences (‘Aussagen’), which state something direct about mental phenomena, i.e. sentences which begin with such phrases as ‘I know that . . .’, ‘I believe that. . .’, or ‘I assume that. . .’, and which are nowadays called ‘psychological’ or ‘intensional’ sentences. The second class of expressions of judgments consists of sentences about properties of these phenomena, such as, for example, expressions that begin with the phrases ‘It is obvious to me that. . .’, ‘It is evident to me that. . .’ Unlike the former group, the second group of sentences is capable of being transformed from a personal form into a non-personal form. In our example, the sentence that begins with the phrase ‘It is obvious to me that. . .’ can be transmuted into a sentence that begins with a following phrase: ’It is obvious that. . .’ Similarly the sentence which begins with the phrase ‘It is evident to me that. . .’ can be transformed into ‘It is evident that . . .’ In virtue of this ability to be reformulated in a way which relies, as it were, on the depersoniﬁcation of a sentence, the property of one’s judgment comes to be a property of the object of this judgment, i.e. of an objective. In the second example, when speaking about evidence, it seems to be even more natural to say that ‘It is evident that. . .’ And, indeed, for Meinong, this is the natural way of saying that something is evident.19 I have used examples of mental acts which Meinong names ‘thinking.’ Thus, all predications of these mental phenomena are epistemic. It follows that Meinong sees epistemic predications of objectives and not of mental acts as more natural from the point of view of ordinary language. They become modal properties of objectives. (The modes of judgments that are objects of the descriptive-psychological theory of judgment can therefore be expressed

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in language by referring to modalities of objectives). Epistemic predications of judgments or assumptions are, according to Meinong, an outcome of the construction of artiﬁcial languages for the purpose of philosophical theories of knowledge: Evidence is surely as much a matter of the judgment as, say, certainty is; nevertheless, it is more natural—if not for a theorist, then certainly for a layman, at least—to say, ‘It is evident that 3 is greater than 2’ rather than, e.g., ‘The judgment on this matter is evident.’ (Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 63])

Meinong’s notion of truth seems to be not far from Brentano’s epistemic notion of correct (evident) judgment. Thus, the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ are, in the end, similar to other epistemic operators predicated of mental acts, such as ‘obvious’ and ‘evident.’ The latter appear in sentences about the properties of mental acts such as ‘It is obvious to me that. . .’ and ‘It is evident to me that . . .’ and can be transformed into sentences about objectives: ‘It is obvious that. . .’ and ‘It is evident that. . .’ Meinong treats the translation into sentences about objectives as natural from the point of view of ordinary language. ‘True’ and ‘false’ are, therefore, also naturally predicated of objectives from the point of view of natural or ordinary language: expressions such as ‘It is true of my judgment that. . .’ or ‘It is true for me that. . .’ should be transformed in favor of sentences of the form ‘It is true that . . .’ Yet it seems to me that upon further consideration it is impossible to doubt for a moment that the locution ‘It is true that a exists’ or ‘It is false that. . .’ is a far more natural manner of speaking, and in the ﬁnal analysis the only really natural one. [‘True’ and ‘false’ are, strictly speaking, attributes of objectives.] (Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 63]—my translation)20

3.4

An Argument from True Hypothesis

We can also present another argument that supports the view presented above, which refers to the ordinary use of language. What is to be predicated as true in the case of the following expression: ‘If A is B and B is C then A is C’? It is an expression of a hypothetical judgment. According to Meinong, it is in fact the expression of a conditional that does not rely on judgments but rather on assumptions. Can, therefore, assumptions be called true and false? Even if so, it is unclear how to decide which are true and which false: that A is B and that B is C and that A is C or, maybe, the whole constituted with the help of the connectors ‘If. . . then. . .’ and ‘and.’ Can complexes of assumptions make up a whole of which ‘true’ or ‘false’ could be predicated? It seems that negative answers are appropriate here. Meinong proposes the choice of objectives as truth bearers in this case. They can be combined into higher-level objects when we have to do with several objectives which are the meanings of the parts of the sentence ‘If A is B and B is C then A is C.’ The whole sentence, expressing more than one assumption, expresses only one collection of objectives. This is because there exists an

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operation on objectives which forms unities out of them, and it can be naturally predicated in a proper sense of the objective that it is true that if A is B and B is C then A is C.21

4.

Anton Marty (II): Speech Acts

When Marty published his Untersuchungen. . . in 1908 the book was designed to be a presentation of Brentano’s ideas applied to the linguistic domain rather than a systematic overview of the results of descriptive psychology.22 Marty’s book is known for its inﬂuence on his teacher Brentano as far as latter’s interests in linguistic investigations are concerned. But Marty’s Investigations were, in fact, very inﬂuential not only on Brentano’s own views on language but also on such philosophers as Karl Bühler, Roman Jakobson and, what is important for this study, Stanisław Le´s´niewski. It also presents the ﬁrst attempt to explain in a systematic and complete way the relations between cognitive activities (or mental activities in general) and language, even if, in most of its parts, it contained ideas which had long been well grounded among Brentanians. It is interesting from a contemporary point of view that Marty’s name for his investigations, i.e. ‘semasiology’, was in use until the thirties in Poland as the term for investigations that are nowadays called ‘semantics.’

4.1

Autosemantic Expressions and the Basic Types of Mental Phenomena

Following Brentano, Marty divides psychological phenomena into the three basic classes of presentation, judgments and phenomena of love and hate. Their characteristics, as well as their relations to each other, are for Marty sufﬁcient and taken for granted in the way in which they were described by Brentano. Like Brentano, Marty does not suppose that the basis for this fundamental division is to be found in language. Marty even considers the view that psychology is dependent on language to be a dogma of vulgar psychology.23 The nature of the language should not decide about the characteristics of mental phenomena. It is rather, he holds, that the basic classes of linguistic forms are themselves dependent on the basic types of mental phenomena. Moreover, in order to express the results of descriptive psychology properly, we should use an adequate language. Such a language should unambiguously describe the relation between linguistic forms, on the one hand, and suitable mental phenomena, on the other.24 In language the basic classes of linguistic forms should be the counterparts of basic classes of mental phenomena. Marty calls a linguistic entity which, when taken by itself, fully expresses a communicable mental experience, an ‘autosemantic linguistic entity’ [autosemantisches Sprachmittel]. The language that, as we would say nowadays, would present an appropriate apparatus for the science of descriptive psychology should consist of autosemantic linguistic noises. The construction of such a language

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demands an improvement of ordinary language, and only an account of the latter based on a descriptive-psychological analysis can make this possible.

4.2

Linguistic Forms and their Basic Functions

Marty explains the relation between a sign and experience by means of an account of what he calls the ‘communicative functions of language.’ First of all, given the notion of intentionality of the mental, a linguistic entity can be used unintentionally. In such a case one says that a linguistic instrument manifests [äußern] one’s mental life. Here the linguistic entity is properly called a ‘manifestation.’ [das Anzeichen].25 It is the manifestation of a mental experience. However, if one judges by the manifestation itself, one rarely knows what sort of experience it manifests. A linguistic entity can, furthermore, be used with an intention, with a purpose, as it is in most cases in ordinary life when we perform acts of communication. This function of linguistic entities is twofold: on the one hand they are expressions (their function is to express something [[Ausdrucksfunktion]), on the other hand they are meaningful entities (they mean something [Bedeutungsfunktion]). A spoken linguistic entity is an expression if and only if it is used purposely in order to communicate a mental experience. Such an expression is, so-to-speak, an intentional manifestation, and that which is expressed is the mental experience of a speaker. A spoken linguistic entity is also used to evoke [Erlebnissugestive] an analogous mental experience on the part of the hearer. Marty calls the evoked mental experience on the part of the hearer ‘the meaning.’ The meaning of Marty’s term ‘meaning’ is, as we shall see, ambiguous (the meaning is, according to Marty, not only the actually evoked mental experience, i.e. what we have communicated, but also what is intended by the speaker, i.e. what we want to communicate.), and at this stage I will call it ‘meaning I’ or a ‘suggestion.’ When speaking about the twofold function of the intended use of a linguistic entity, Marty recalls the scholastic distinction between primary and secondary intentions. On the one hand, Marty sees in the suggestion of a mental experience, i.e. in the evoking of an experience in the receiver, the primary intention of our speech. The secondary intention of our speech is then the expressed mental experience. On the other hand, however, because of the order in which these mental experiences occur in time, the expressed mental experience is actually primary, whereas the suggested experience (meaning I) is secondary. An intentionally used, autosemantic linguistic entity which functions in the ways described above has different grammatical forms. Above all, it has the form of a name. Names, roughly speaking, properly express and suggest presentations. The proper linguistic entity for the expression and suggestion of judgments is an utterance [[Aussage]. The phenomena of love and hate are expressed and suggested by what Marty calls ‘emotives’ (for example ‘I am

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hungry’). Marty also includes among emotives questions, wishes, orders, and so on. According to above description the function of names is twofold: to express (to communicate) a presentation on the part of the speaker and to suggest the same presentation on the part of the receiver. Names are words, says Marty, which can stand as subject or as predicate in a sentence. Thus ‘red’ and ‘rose’ are names because we can say both ‘The rose is red’ and ‘Something red is a rose.’26 Similarly, the function of emotives is expressing and suggesting phenomena of love or hate. There is, however, a problem with the function of suggestion as regards emotives, since it is hard to believe that when I intentionally express in a phrase the pain that was caused, for instance, by a campﬁre, I want to evoke the same or a similar experience in someone with whom I spend the time at a camp. (In fact, I would not wish anybody skin burns, something which, apart from psychiatric cases, seems rather normal to me.) This, however, is a marginal problem for the purposes of this study. Here I only wish to note that every emotive is implicitly also a sign of a presentation and of a judgment. This is clearly connected, I think, with the one-sided relation of dependence between the basic classes of mental phenomena as known from Brentano. The most important kind of linguistic entity for our purposes is an utterance ((Aussage): its function leads us directly to the problem of the notion of judgment-content. At ﬁrst glance it seems that, as in the case of names, the function of utterances is also double: on the one hand, an utterance expresses the occurrence of a judgment on the part of the speaker, and, on the other hand, it suggests a judgment on the part of the receiver of the speech. The meaning I of the utterance is thus, according to Marty, the judgment evoked in the receiver. When I say ‘This rose is red’ I express my judgment and suggest the same judgment to the hearer.

4.3

Communication of Content

Therefore, what I can communicate when uttering the sentence ‘This rose is red’ is only the matter of the expressed judgment and its quality. For Marty, who in this respect also follows Brentano, the matter of the judgment is what is judged, i.e. the object which is judged. The quality of the judgment is, as we recall in Brentano, the character of the judging attitude, i.e. acceptance or rejection. Hence, when I say ‘The rose is red’ I communicate only the matter of the judgment (a red rose) and its quality (my acceptance of the red rose). The judgment evoked on the part of my hearer can be, thus, determined by my expression only as to the object (what is judged in this judgment, i.e. the red rose in the example) and as to the mode in which it is judged (assertion or rejection, i.e. assertion in the example of the rose). My judgment, however, has several other moments that are not pictured in the expression I uttered. It

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follows that, taking a sentence only in its functions of expressing and suggesting, one cannot communicate a number of other properties of judgments such as being evident or not being evident, being assertive or being apodictic and so on.27 All of those properties or moments of judgments, as Marty puts it, are included in the content of a judgment. Therefore, Marty also adds to the functions of an utterance given above an additional function, which he calls the ’communication of the content of the judgment.’28 When one says ‘The rose is red’ one expresses, claims Marty, one’s afﬁrmative judgment about the red rose and at the same time one suggests that the hearer make ‘the same’ afﬁrmative judgment. In some sense, then, what we want to communicate is the existence of this red rose, which, in turn, may be described as the content of the judgment. In this sense Marty calls the being red of the rose the meaning of the utterance, which can be distinguished from the meaning I which was, according to the descriptions given above, the suggested mental experience. Thus, a third function of utterances is the function of the communication of judgment-content: We have heard that the meaning-function of an utterance is not only the suggestion of a judgment on the part of the hearer, but that what the utterance also means is the being and non-being and, respectively, the being such and such of something, i.e. also that which is called the content of a judging act. (Marty 1908, p. 360—my translation)

We have also seen that the content of a judgment also includes moments for which a sentence has no related signs by means of which it can communicate them. What can be communicated in language very often tells us nothing about the properties of our mental experiences. In particular, we do not know the modes in which the speaker made his judgments. Whether the judgment was made with apodicticity, certainty, or evidence is normally unexpressed. Moreover, the content of a judgment also contains the moments of its object, not only the communicable existence or non-existence of something, but also, for instance, its necessity or impossibility. What I can directly suggest to someone with the help of language is only that one accepts something as existent or non-existent, as past or as future, as A or as B, but not that one judges it apodictically (or with a priori evidence). This limited content is therefore called, perhaps appropriately, the content of a judgment, which is simultaneously the content of an utterance; in opposition to this every broader content is called the content of the judgment itself without reference to its linguistic communication. (Marty 1908, pp. 360–361—my translation)

As we have already seen, Marty introduced the content of a judgment in order to explain its correctness. Now, from a linguistic point of view, what Brentano sees as the matter and quality of a judgment is only a part of the judgment-content: it is precisely that part of the judgment-content which can be communicated by means of language. The content of an act of judging, taken apart from its linguistic function of communication, is rather a state of affairs. This state of affairs can be seen as a condition for the correctness of the

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act of a judging subject: the judgment-content must obtain for a judgment to be correct. Now, the notion of adequation decides not only about the correctness of a judgment but also about whether the utterance of a judgment communicates its content: If a judgment is correct then it conforms in a peculiar way to the content, i.e. there is some content that is adequate to it. In this case the utterance [Aussage] of this judgment communicates its content in the proper sense of a sign (similar to a scream due to pain). In the case where the manifested judgment is incorrect, the utterance is in the proper sense not a sign of judgment-content, but (usually) only a sign of that the speaker judges in this way and that he has the intention of evoking an analogous judgment in the hearer, and eventually, that he intends to communicate the judgment-content. (Marty 1908, pp. 293–294—my translation)

4.4

The Truth of Objects

As was already mentioned, Marty’s term ‘the content of a judgment’ is in some ways similar to Meinong’s ‘objective.’ While acknowledging the similarity between Marty and Meinong as far as their notions of content and objective are concerned we should, however, remember that they differ in views as to their expressions. In particular, Meinong and Marty see different functions of that-clauses as parts of sentences. According to Meinong, truth should be predicated of objectives. Thus, in Meinong’s view, the attribute of being true or of being false should be primarily a property of things, and only secondarily an attribute of judgments. Meinong teaches us that in the sentence ‘It is true that A exists’ the that-clause (‘that A exists’) stands for an objective. On this account the whole sentence expresses this objective’s property of being true (or of obtaining). For Marty, on the contrary, the phrase ‘that A exists’ is not a name. It would be a name if and only if it were the name of the judgment ‘A exists’ which is not the case: the judgment expressed in ‘It is true that A exists’ differs from the judgment expressed in ‘A exists.’ Yet the expression ‘that A exists’ is also not a sentence. Thus, it cannot express a judgment and, therefore, it also does not mean any judgment-content, Marty claims. A full sentence which includes a that-clause should have the form of an expression of indirect judgment such as ‘I know that x exists’, and especially, ‘It is true that x exists.’ In this sentence, however, the that-clause refers to the object to which the whole sentence in which this that-clause appears refers. The object, in this case, is not an objective but a presentation of the content of the judgment, claims Marty. It follows from this that if there is a way of speaking about objectives as if they were true or false, it is by using the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ as referring to objects. ‘True’ and ‘false’ as predicated of objects are, in Marty’s view, synonymous with one of the following words: ‘real’, ‘existent’, ‘being’, ‘subsistent’, ‘positive’, etc.29 Yet how can we come to know whether the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ or nouns the ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are predicated

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of objects in the same way in which we use words ‘being’ or ‘existence’, i.e. when can we replace them without a change of meaning? Marty solves this problem by giving us a kind of instruction for translating phrases that consist of the truth-predicate predicated of nominative expression:

In this linguistic respect it can be said with some certainty that the words ‘true’ and ‘truth of’. . . usually are connected with names which are understood as predicates— the words ‘being’ and ‘being of’, on the contrary, are connected with names of which this is not valid. (Marty 1908, p. 309—my translation)

Thus, one can ask whether the nouns in expressions like ‘false gold’ and ‘a true friend of mine’ are thought of as predicates. For Marty, they are synonymous with the expressions: ‘something which is falsely gold’, and ‘someone who is truly my friend.’ Hence, while ‘gold’ and ‘friend’ function clearly as predicates, truth-predicates can be replaced by one of their synonyms, as in the expressions: ‘something which is really gold’ or ‘someone who is actually a friend of mine.’ When the noun cannot be transformed into a predicate we usually use terms like ‘real’ or ‘existent’ or similar terms, e.g. when uttering ‘God exists’ or ‘God is real’ (unless we are skeptical or atheists asking whether there is someone like God among beings: ‘Is there someone who is truly God?’)

4.5

The Truth-Predicate in Expressions of Direct and Indirect Judging Acts

For Marty, the difference in the functioning of the predicate ‘true’ in sentences such as ‘It is evident that a exists’ and ‘a exists’, which was described above, can also be explained using the notions of direct and indirect judging. When we predicate ‘true’ of the subject of a sentence such as ‘a exists’, which is an expression of direct judging, i.e. when we utter ‘a is true’, then we in fact predicate truth of the objects of this sentence. In such a case the predicate ‘true’ appears as synonymous with such words as ‘existent’ or ‘being.’ We have a different situation when the expression of an indirect judgment has a form such as ‘It is evident that a exists’, i.e. when truth-predicate occurs in the following way: ‘It is true that a exists.’ Here, claims Marty, where we are dealing with the expression of an indirect judging act, the predicate ‘true’ is predicated of the content of this indirect judgment. The judgment of which ‘true’ is predicated is, however, different from the judgment that is expressed in this sentence. For Marty, it is incorrect to say that the sentence ‘It is true that a exists’ expresses a judgment about a judgment. This sentence expresses a judging about the content of an act of judging, i.e. it expresses a judging act about the content that a exists.

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4.6

CHAPTER FOUR

On Arguments from the Natural Use of Adjectives

The former sections presented Marty’s view on the functioning of the adjectives ‘true’ and ‘false.’ First, they function differently, Marty observes, depending upon the function of the noun in the sentence in which they appear, i.e. depending on whether the noun functions as a name or as a predicate. Secondly, their function depends on the expression in which they occur, i.e. on whether it is an expression of a direct or an indirect judging act. Both observations lead Marty to conclude that the function of the truth-predicates depends on the grammar and the stylistic elements of a given language. In light of this, however, Marty rejects the view that the study of ordinary language, especially of the usage of predicates, leads to crucial conclusions that can be of use in epistemology. He is, therefore, opposed to Meinong’s statement that the most natural way to use the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ is when they are predicated of objects. In Meinong’s view, it was natural to say that something (real) is true and it was unnatural to say that this or that judgment is true. Moreover, Marty is opposed to the more general statement that the study of natural language is decisive for philosophy. Marty draws upon the fact that the usage of words in a certain language depends on its grammar and the stylistic elements of this language. On the one hand, both of these elements of a language are very important for the purposes of philosophical investigations, as it show examples of changes in the function of truth-predicates. However, one should remember that grammar and stylistic elements are secondary, and they should not press us to eliminate psychological investigations. This is because epistemology should not be based only on linguistic analysis of ordinary language. These analyses are important provided that the analyzed details on the boundary of grammar or stylistics do not lead us to wrong epistemological assumptions such as the ‘natural’ way of using truth-predicates.

5.

Summary of Chapter 4

In the Brentanian tradition the linguistic standpoint regarding the choice of the bearer of truth presents an analysis of speech acts and of the usage of the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false.’ However, the arguments that rely on observations of ordinary language are rather vague. Arguments based on the usage of those predicates seem to build an argumentation only when they refer to other psychological and linguistic presuppositions. The linguistic presuppositions include, among other things, ﬁrst, the relation between language and thinking, and secondly, the view of the function of a linguistic sign. As far as the relation between thought and language is concerned, all ﬁgures of Brentano’s school introduced a quite clear separation between thinking and language. The view that the way in which thought is expressed is conventional was common in this school. The strongest position in this respect was taken by Kazimierz Twardowski, whose view on a strong dependence between the clarity of think-

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ing and the clarity of language seems to be exceptional. On the one hand, the common view includes the belief that language can be more or less adequately related to thinking. On the other hand, however, language disguises thoughts. How far this disguising takes place is explained by various theories of the functions of language. Thus, as far as these theories are concerned, their basic investigations belong to the ﬁeld of descriptive psychology. Since descriptive psychology is the basic science even with regard to linguistic theory, it is quite obvious that language was penetrated by Bretanians especially in its functions of the expression and communication of thoughts (or, more precisely, of thinking). What we nowadays call semantic relations was of interest to Brentanians only insofar as it stands in a signiﬁcant relation to ontological and descriptive-psychological distinctions and preferences. From the contemporary point of view, Marty’s work is closest to what we might today call the semantics of speech acts. Furthermore, from the historical point of view the most inﬂuential work in its linguistic respect was that of Anton Marty which, on the one hand, was not new and original in the sense that it contained a number of views taken for granted for a long time by Brentanians. On the other hand, most of the concepts and distinctions formulated by Marty became standards for the subsequent development of the Brentanian tradition.

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FIGURE 1. (The functions of linguistic entities (L) in general and of sentences (S)) LANGUAGE

THINKING

OBJECT

HEARER (READER)

BRENTANO: L ——————— thinking expression

L ——————— content meaning

L —————————————– object naming

TWARDOWSKI: L ——————— thinking (with regard to the hearer) communication

L ————————————————————- content meaning

L —————————————– object naming

MEINONG: S as sign ————- thinking expression

Sign in the narrow sense ————- object/objective meaning

Sign in the narrow sense ————- object/objective ————- thinking communication

by evoking (e.g. grasping of meaning = understanding)

MARTY: L ——————— thinking manifestation

L as a sign ———- thinking —————————————— thinking direct expression

suggestion (meaning I)

S ——————— communicable judgment-content meaning II

(with regard to the hearer)

S —————————————– content of an utterance meaning III

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Notes 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9 10

11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20

Published in Brentano 1956. The lectures were published by Franziska Meyer Hillebrand and the important fragments come from Franz Hillebrand’s notes from Brentano’s lectures. Brentano 1930. Brentano 1883/1889. Marty 1875. I am therefore opposed to the usual translation of the German terms ‘Aussage’ and ‘Satz’ in Brentano’s writings as ‘proposition’ in English. It is entirely unclear to me why one should speak about propositions in Brentano’s philosophy. In his early period he often refers to uses of language such as uttering and writing. See, for example, Brentano 1930. Moreover, the argument against a strong association between thinking and language when Brentano refers to deaf-mutes becomes understandable only if language is understood as consisting of utterances as complex sounds. (See above, section 1.1). During Brentano’s last, i.e. reistic, period of philosophical activity, such entities as propositions are completely excluded from his vocabulary. Thus, if one insists on using the terminology of propositions, then in some interpretations ‘Aussage’ would have to be translated as ‘propositional attitude’ rather than ‘proposition.’ Brentano 1956, p. 104. Unlike in the English translation of 1973 I use ‘sentence’ instead of ‘proposition.’ See Hillebrand 1891 and Simons 1992. See his ‘On Clear and Obscure Styles of Philosophical Writings’ of 1919. Twardowski 1927. ’Issues on the Logic of Adjectives’ presents a summary of the lectures that Twardowski gave in 1923 during the ﬁrst Polish philosophical meeting in Lvov. It is noteworthy that Tadeusz Cze˙z˙ owski and Alfred Tarski took part in the discussion. Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, pp. 22f.] Translators of Meinong’s On Assumptions used the term ‘signiﬁcation’ here to translate ‘Bedeutung.’ This choice is dictated, as far as I can see, by the fact that in the English-speaking philosophical world the term ‘meaning’ is reserved usually for Frege’s ‘Sinn.’ It also preserves Meinong’s wish that ‘what I mean by an «objective» then, does not belong to psychology, and there will be even less reason to give up the name «objective» in favor of «state of affairs» or «proposition in itself», if I cannot be sure that I would not also have to reinterpret these latter terms in order to give them the signiﬁcation that seems to me to be demanded by the facts.’ Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 77] I, however, have chosen the terms ‘to mean’ and ‘meaning’ for, respectively, ‘bedeuten’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in order to preserve the unity of translation of these terms from German into English in the case of all of the philosophers I consider in this study, and not only in order to be consistent with Meinong’s translation. Thus, for example, the term ‘meaning’ used in this study refers to the same German term ‘Bedeutung’ in Brentano and Meinong, even if it should be understood in different ways. I also think that reading Meinong along these lines enables one to understand why the reader of Meinong has a problem with the clariﬁcation of his ‘objectives’ as to whether they are propositions or states of affairs, i.e. whether they are meaning- or object-entities. The term ‘meaning’ used by me, similar to Meinong’s ‘Bedeutung’, allows for both interpretations. I must, however, to admit that I prefer the reading in which the objectual correlates of expressions are meanings rather than an interpretation of Meinong’s higher-order objects in terms of propositions. Meinong 1902, p. 20. Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, pp. 22f., 33f.]. It is well to note that, despite the fact that Meinong uses such notions as ‘understanding’ or ‘grasping’, they are not basic notions as related to ‘judgment’ or ‘assumption.’ The notion of understanding relies on the notion of grasping. ‘Grasping’ seems to play the role of a neutral term for both ‘judging’ and ‘assuming’, and, hence, it seems to be a term that can be replaced by ‘thinking.’ I therefore also use the term ‘meaning’ which, we may recall, refers to objects of mental phenomena as expressed in linguistic phrases and not to a kind of content of these phrases or their meaning in the sense of Frege’s ‘Sinn.’ Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, pp. 33f.]. See Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, p. 21]. The passage is absent in the English translation based on the second edition of Meinong’s Annahmen. Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, pp. 44f.]. See, for example, Meinong 1902/1910 [1983, pp. 63f., 67–68]. The last sentence is absent in the English translation based on the second edition of Meinong’s Annahmen.

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Meinong 1902/1910 [1983. pp. 150f.]. Marty 1908. Marty 1908, p. 239. Marty 1908, p. 226. Marty 1908, p. 280. The view taken later by Poles, by Kotarbi´n´ ski and Les´niewski in particular. It is worth noting that Marty, unlike Meinong, does not want to consider that-clusters in complex sentences (as, for example, in the sentence ‘He said that she does not want to go out with him’) to be names. Therefore, for Marty, that-clusters are not names of objects of presentations: ‘That she does not want to go out with him’ is not the name of an object in the way in which it is the name of an objective (the object of an assumption) that she does not want to go out with him in Meinong’s view. The view of Meinong was also, along the lines of Marty, criticized by Ossowski. See Ossowski 1926 and sections on him in this study. 27 Marty 1908, p. 298f. 28 Marty 1908, pp. 291–292. 29 Marty 1908, pp. 307–309.

Chapter 5 THE ONTOLOGY OF JUDGEMENT

1. 1.1

What is the Ontology of Judgement? The Link Between Psychology and Language

What I shall call here the ontology of judgment constitutes a link between the theory of judgment as investigated on the level of descriptive psychology and the theory of the linguistic counterparts of judgments, i.e. a theory focusing primarily on the functions of speech acts. The ontology of judgment investigates the mental act of judging and its expression in relation to their objects. More particularly, the ontology of judgment investigates the relation between objects of judging acts, on the one hand, and the objects to which we refer in the speech acts in which the corresponding judgments are expressed, on the other. In what follows, I shall brieﬂy present three theories of truth (bearers) based on the investigations of the ontology of judgment of Edmund Husserl, Anton Marty and Adolf Reinach. In these theories, a special kind of object called ‘a state of affairs’ is introduced. States of affairs are, on the one hand, objects of mental acts, and, on the other hand, objects of the linguistic expressions of the underlying acts. I think that these theories deserve to be dealt with in a separate chapter not only because they span the divide between descriptive-psychological and speech-act based theories, but also because they present a new way of looking at truth within the framework of the correspondence theory of truth. Furthermore, it would be hard to explain them only in the context of the (descriptive) psychology of judgment and of the relation between thinking and language presented in those earlier chapters. The ontology of judgment is, fundamentally, an ontology of Sachverhalt. The realistic attitude toward states of affairs defended by Husserl, Marty and Reinach allows them to deﬁne a new link between psychological and linguistic analyses of judgment. Their analyses culminate in sophisticated theories of what is judged in an act of judging and, as its counterpart, of what we mean and

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what we refer to in speech. However, before their psycho-linguistic theories were able to accept the central role played by the concept of a state of affairs, the theory of judgment had to develop a theory of special objects of judging acts and of their expressions.

1.2

Where Are Objects of Judgement?

The problem of what is judged arises in the context of Brentano’s theory of intentionality, and especially in its immanentistic interpretation. It was brought to the fore among other things by the fact that Brentano conceived judgments as forming one of the basic classes of mental phenomena. The theories of judgments which existed prior to Brentano differed in views as to the objects of judgments falling, roughly speaking, into three basic types. The ﬁrst type theory is based on the Aristotelian view according to which judgment is a matter of a conceptual complex reﬂecting parallel combination of objects in the world, a view which we ﬁnd already in Aristotle’s Categories [14b] and Metaphysics [1051b]. Theories of judgments such as those embraced by Leibniz or Locke, following Aristotle, assumed that the phenomenon of judgment could be properly understood only within a framework within which a kind of wider background of ontology is taken into account. Thus, a theory based on this assumption claims that we should assume transcendental correlates of the mind-immanent phenomenon of judgment in combinations of objects in the world. A second type of theory of the objects of judgment became dominant in the nineteenth century with the German idealist movement. On this view the process of judging is to be understood entirely from the perspective of what takes place within the mind or consciousness of the judging subject. The more usual sort of idealism in Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century conceived the objects of knowledge as being quite literally located in the mind of the knowing subject.1 It was, in fact, German idealism to which the Brentanian School stood in opposition, as did parallel movements in the English speaking world. A third account of the objects of judgment are views such as those represented by Bernard Bolzano in his Wissenschaftslehre [Theory of Science]2 , and later by Hermann Lotze3 and Frege.4 These theories distinguished between the sentence expressed in the words on the one hand and an object which from a contemporary point of view can be called the meaning of the sentence, on the other. The latter is called the ‘sentence in itself’ (Bolzano) or ‘thought’ (Frege). These are ideal entities which exist neither in our minds nor in the real world outside the mind, but rather (perhaps) in some sort of Platonic realm. A judgment is, according to these theories, the thinking of a sentence in itself or the thinking of a thought. Nowadays we would say that in such a view the judg-

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ment is the propositional attitude, i.e. the attitude of a judging subject to these ideal entities. Since the latter theory of judgment was in fact also very inﬂuential with respect to other aspects of the history of the choice of the truth bearer in the period in question, I shall provide more details about Bolzano’s view on judgment and truth in a later part of this study, when I shall speak about the problem of the objectivity of knowledge and about the objectivity of truth. Here I shall turn to the problem of the objects of judgments as this arises on the basis of the immanentistic reading of Brentano’s concept of intentionality.

1.3

The Immanentistic Reading of Brentano’s Doctrine of Intentionality

The immanentistic reading of Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality faces difﬁculties especially in dealing with negative existential judgments. For example, the judgment expressed in the sentence ‘God does not exist’, seems, on the strength of the principle of intentionality, both to have and to lack an object. If I deny the existence of God, how can it be that the object about which I judge does not exist? If the object does not exist then there is no such object. How then, can I make a judgment about it? According to the principle of intentionality after all, I can only judge about something. But, if so, my judgment is false, since God must exist when I judge about Him in a negative judgment. Thus, either every negative judgment must be false or the principle of intentionality is false. It was as part of an attempt to solve these difﬁculties, known better as ‘Plato’s beard’, that Brentano and his immediate successors began to reconsider one of Brentano’s original theses to the effect that acts of judgment get their objects (contents, matters) from underlying acts of presentation.

2.

Carl Stumpf (I): On Act and Content

The problem arises in virtue of the fact that the ontological correlates of judgment, in Brentano’s view, are simply the objects accepted or rejected, respectively, in positive and negative judgments. In 1888 Carl Stumpf, another student of Brentano, suggested a solution of this and other similar problems via the assumption of what he called a ‘special content of a judging act’. The content of a judgment, according to Stumpf, should be different from the content of a presentation. Thus, Stumpf writes: From the matter of the judgment we distinguish its content, the Sachverhalt that is expressed in the judgment. For example ‘God is’ has for its matter God, for its content: the existence of God. ‘There is no God’ has the same matter but its content is: nonexistence of God. (Stumpf notes to his logic lecture of 1888, Husserl Archive, Louvain, MS Q 13, p. 4)

Thus, when speaking about a judgment and what this judgment is about we have to take into account at least two correlates of the judging act: its

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matter, which is the object of the judgment borrowed from the underlying act of presentation (Brentano’s ‘matter of judgment’) and the speciﬁc content of the judging act itself. It is also worth noting that what makes this passage very important is the use of the term ‘Sachverhalt’, due to the role it played in the later history of the problems in question. In 1907 Stumpf, inspired most probably by Meinong, pointed out that the content of a judgment is at the same time expressed by that-clauses, in sentences such as ‘that John loves Mary’, or by substantivized inﬁnitives, such as ‘John loving Mary’.5 However, twenty years earlier, the ontology of the Sachverhalt was for Stumpf still a branch of descriptive psychology rather than something connected with language. States of affairs as correlates of judging acts were for him formations [Gebilde]. The latter, together with functions and appearances [Erscheinung], were conceived by Stumpf as three ontological categories which can include everything which belongs to the domain investigated by descriptive psychology.6 Functions are just mental acts (events or processes). Appearances are, roughly speaking, sense data. Formations include not only states of affairs but also, for example, concepts, values and Gestalt qualities.7 In contrast to appearances, formations do not exist somewhere in the world as independent entities; rather, they are the contents of the corresponding functions—only as such can they be described and investigated. States of affairs are then the contents of judging acts and do not exist without the acts (functions) which are their hosts. Formations are thus immanent to the knowing subject, i.e. they exist only ‘in the context of the living being of the mind’.8 However, in the course of time, the same technical philosophical term, ‘state of affairs’, which was used by Stumpf for the immanent part of a mental act of judging came to stand for something independent of the knowing subject, for something which is mind-independent and which exists on the side of the things outside the mind. This philosophical usage of the term required another step in the development of a theory of the object of a judgment, which was made by Kazimierz Twardowski in his On the Content and Object of Presentations of 1894.

Remark. In fact, the idea that there are special objects of judgment was not original with Stumpf. He was merely the ﬁrst to use it in the framework of the Brentanian theory of judgment. In 1880 Hermann Lotze in his Logic introduced his treatment of judgment by distinguishing relations between presentations and material relations, which he also calls the ‘content’ of a judgment. He argues that whenever we judge, then we presuppose that a kind of material relation obtains independently of us. We then picture it in a sentence. The idea of such a target of judging as an entity transcendent to the mind of the judging subject culminates in a Platonistic view of objects of judgment. The term ‘Sachverhalt’ itself was used earlier in a similar manner by Julius Bergmann in his General Logic of 1879.9

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Remark. From a historical point of view it is important to know that Hermann Lotze played the role of an éminence grise in the philosophical life of late nineteenth-century Germany. The idea that there were different kinds of relations in which the judging act stands was developed by several students under the inﬂuence of Lotze’s writings or lectures. These include Gottlob Frege in Germany, who especially emphasized the Platonistic side of Lotze’s ideas, as well as Lotze’s idea of assertive force; George Friderik Stout in England, who introduced the theory of special objects of judgment (nowadays called ‘propositions’) into the English speaking world; as well as two Brentanists, Carl Stumpf and Anton Marty.10

3.

Kazimierz Twardowski (III): On the Object of Judgement

It is Kazimierz Twardowski who made the crucial break with the immanentistic position as concerns the object of judgment. I shall not repeat once again the object/content distinction introduced above in its descriptive-psychological and linguistic dimensions.11 It is, however, worth recalling one of Twardowski’s theses to the effect that an object and a content should be distinguished in the case of every mental act. Thus, in the case of judgment, too, the distinction must be valid. For Twardowski, whose view remains along the lines of Brentano, the content of a judgment is the existence of the object in question. However, as has been noted, while the judged object exists or does not exist independently of the judgment, its content cannot be strictly dependent upon this underlying act. Among the solutions of this problem there is one which I have not yet mentioned. This is the interpretation of Twardowski which assumes that the act of judging has not only a special content of its own but also a special object. According to this interpretation, the act of judging does not take its object from the relevant underlying presentation. Rather, there is a special judgment-object in addition to the special judgment-content. The justiﬁcation for this interpretation is given in the letter to Alexius Meinong which Twardowski wrote three years after his On the Content and Object of Presentations.12 In this letter he suggests a generalization of the content/object distinction to the sphere of judging acts. In relation to judgments, too, we should recognize that they have special objects. By making the object/content distinction valid for judgments, Twardowski moves Stumpf’s Sachverhalt from the domain of actdependent contents to the domain of act-intending transcendent objects. The schema given by this interpretation has thus the following form: Act:

Content:

Object:

Presentation:

the awarness of a tree

the image of a tree

a tree

Judging:

the acceptance/ rejection of the tree

the tree exists

the existence of the tree

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Once the distinction between an act, its content and its object has been granted, a new type of investigation of special objects of judgment becomes possible. This, in turn, inﬂuenced the investigations of truth (and, thereby, of its bearers) on the part of Brentanians, changing the directions in which truth had until then been explored.

4. 4.1

Edmund Husserl (I): The Psycho-Linguistic Content of Judgement Formal Ontology

It was Edmund Husserl who placed the accent on Twardowski’s idea of a theory of objects. The objects to which Husserl pays principal attention are the states of affairs which arise as new objects of judging acts. The notion of a state of affairs, Husserl claims, should be seen as a formal notion. ‘Formal’ here means that it is a notion which applies to all domains without any restriction. The science which focuses on investigating such notions as states of affairs is called ‘formal ontology’ by Husserl. Formal ontology is rooted in psychology, and it becomes a part of descriptive psychology, especially when investigating objects of mental activities, and more speciﬁcally, when investigating states of affairs. Husserl argues for a view of states of affairs as the correlates of judging acts in a way which is analogous to the way in which objects serve as transcendental targets of presentations. For Husserl, however, states of affairs serve as correlates not only of acts of judging but also of other non-judgmental acts of wishing, questioning, doubting, and so on.13 Since I am interested in the bearers of truth, I shall concentrate only on the correlates of acts of judging. Yet Husserl adds new elements to his account of states of affairs as objects of judgments. For Husserl, states of affairs are above all connected with acts of using language, i.e. they cannot be targeted without using language. As regards language, there are also other reasons for the acceptance of special objects of judging activities (which then become part of the subject-matter of formal ontology). What was quite unclear among Brentanians before Husserl was how to conceive properly the form, or as we would say today, the logical syntax of mental acts. It is not clear how far (and whether at all), when introducing his idiogenetic and existential theory of judgment, Brentano was conscious of the syntactical difference between acts of presenting and acts of judging as this becomes visible on the level of their linguistic counterparts, in the syntactical differences between names and sentences. Should we accept the interpretation according to which Brentano’s psychological moment of assertion or rejection distinguishes judgment from presentation also in the sense of mental grammar, i.e. that they change the form of the mental act? It seems that Brentano’s principle of reducing all linguistic expressions of judgment to their existential forms meant that Brentano distinguished between the (deep) logical and the

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(superﬁcial) grammatical form of language, where the logical form of the linguistic phrase depends upon the form of the underlying judgment. If this is so, then why do we assume that only acceptance and rejection and not also other moments of judging acts inﬂuence the form of their superﬁcial linguistic expression? Why, for example, cannot negation or implication be expressions of a kind of judgment-form? Brentano’s view is that the only moment which can inﬂuence the form of a judgment is the moment which is connected with intentionality. He speaks as if new and special types of intentionality (with respect to presentation) took place in a judging act, and these are rejection and acceptance. Despite the relation between the form of a judging act and its linguistic garb, however, in Brentano’s view the judging act refers to the matter of a judgment, i.e. to the object of presentation. In opposition to Brentano, Husserl conceives the objects of judging acts as states of affairs. Only in this way, according to Husserl, can the complexity of the ontological objective correlates of judgments reﬂect the complexity of an act of judging—a complexity expressed in a linguistic manner in the form of a sentence.

4.2

The Theory of Meaning

The new dimension to the distinction between an act, its content and its object which Husserl adds in comparison to the work of earlier Brentanians is thus his theory of meaning. On the one hand, Husserl’s theory of the linguistic counterparts of mental acts is rooted in an analysis of the function of language and of the relations between language and thinking. On the other hand, the theory of meaning as presented by Husserl is grounded in an ontology of judgment that is part and parcel of a descriptive psychology. The postulate of formal ontology is, in fact, only one of the results of Husserl’s theory of meaning, alongside such ideas as that of categorial grammar or that of the theory of the science of sciences. For Husserl, as for all Brentanians, a speech act is an act of meaning (a meaning-bestowing act): we express our mental acts in language and these acts, in accordance with the thesis of intentionality, refer to objects. We use language only when we have an object given in our perception or in our thought. This is the sense in which Husserl speaks about giving meaning to expressions and in which, for him, speech acts are meaning-bestowing acts.14 Since the objects of presenting acts are different from the objects of judging acts, there are, for Husserl, two different types of uses of language—those in which we use names, and those in which we use sentences. The use of a name is connected with an act of presenting whereas the use of a sentence is associated with an act of judgment. Furthermore, the use of a name is possible without the use of a sentence; thus the act of nominal meaning is independent of that of propositional meaning. The meaning itself of this nominal meaning-

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act is, according to Husserl, a presentation in specie (a concept). The meaning of a complex (nowadays we call it ‘propositional’) meaning act, such as the expression of a judgment, is a species of acts of judgment. Thus, every act of (nominal or propositional) meaning is an instantiation of the meaning (of the species of presentations or of the species of judging acts). However, when considering meaning acts we are dealing with the speech acts involved. Thus, if we consider the theories of meaning sketched in Chapter 4 above, where meanings almost always played a role in association with individual mental acts (of the speaker or of the hearer), we can see that Husserl’s theory of meaning as a species of mental acts is a continuation of those theories. Marty and others notoriously had problems with the identiﬁcation of acts fulﬁlled by a speaker and his or her receiver. For Husserl the identity of meaning is the identity of the species of mental acts. This solves, in Husserl’s view, the problem of the identity of meanings in particular acts of communication. His account also changes the view of the relation between speech or language and their meaning: uttered names or sentences are not only the ‘media’ which are needed to transfer meanings in the sense, for example, that they ‘transfer’ acts of presentations or acts of judgments from the speaker to the hearer. In Husserl’s view meanings are strongly connected with these utterances. These utterances are in a sense the ‘creators’ of those meanings. There is no need for meanings without acts of communication. The latter, however, not only present them, but also create them. It is common nowadays in philosophy, in particular in that of language, to make the meaning of a sentence (a proposition) the object of our attitude. The latter is called the ‘propositional attitude’. The theory of meaning presented by Twardowski and that of Husserl in Logical Investigations are similar in that meaning is not the object to which we are directed in mental acts. It is not the attitude (such as the propositional attitude) that decides about the grasping of a meaning. For Husserl meaning is a mental event or process taken in specie: it is not their object. The clear difference between the Brentano-Twardowski theory of meaning and that of Husserl, however, is the fact that in the case of the latter acts of judging refer to objects different than those to which the underlying acts of presenting refer. Furthermore, in Husserl’s account the complexity of these objects (i.e. the complexity of states of affairs) is expressed in the act of meaning, i.e. in the utterance of a sentence taken in specie. Thus, the meaning (as a species) of a sentence expresses the complexity of the state of affairs to which an underlying mental act of judgment refers. That is why we can concentrate on a meaning itself in order to see how things (states of affairs) can be. Thus, a kind of propositional attitude is needed only when we concentrate on the meaning itself and not in the nominal act of communication. In order to judge how things are and to communicate this we do not need to make meanings the objects of our reﬂection. Only when we are interested primarily

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in the possibilities of the complexity of the state of affairs in question do we employ meanings.15 However, expressing the complexity of the correlates of judgments constitutes only one of the functions of meanings in a language (as a species), just as it presents only one of the functions of a general theory of meaning (as a species). In this context it is worth keeping in mind the quite obvious difference between the function of meanings (as a species) and the function of a general theory of meaning (as a species). We can build a general theory of meaning (as a species), as Husserl does, making these meanings (as a species) the objects of our reﬂection. Now, the function of such a theory of meaning can vary, depending on what the indirect object of our theory is; the direct object of a theory of meaning here are these meanings themselves. In other words, having an ontology of meanings we can put them into different contexts, for various purposes, trying to explain different phenomena. First, for example, we can look at meanings (as a species) in order to see the complexity of the objects to which acts refer via the sentences expressing them. To look at the sphere of meanings is, as it was stated above, to look at the possibilities of obtaining states of affairs in the world. Secondly, since science consists, according to Husserl, of a set of acts of cognition which are related to each other, the theory of meaning which takes meanings as idealized structures of simple and complex cognitive acts of various sorts is a descriptive theory of science. Thirdly, such a theory of meaning as the theory of science in its normative sense investigates the conditions under which a certain group of simple and complex cognitive acts of various sorts count as a science: this is what Husserl calls logic. Fourth, a part of logic is the theory of meaning categories, i.e. the theory of the highest species in the realm of meanings. Thus, it is worth noting that every theory of meaning (in specie) is, in Husserl’s view, a theory of both the underlying mental acts which are instantiations of those meanings and of the objects to which these acts refer. What is most important, however, is that act-species are idealizations made not from particular mental acts (of the speaker or of the hearer) but from their linguistic instantiations, i.e. from the particular acts of meaning given in speech. In particular, the theory of the meanings of sentences (i.e. the theory of the species of expressed acts of judging) is a theory of judging acts and a theory of their correlates, i.e. states of affairs. The species of judgment acts are idealizations taken from the particular acts of utterance made in a special act of ideation.

4.3

The Theory of the Cognition of Meaning

It would appear that the species of an act is determined by the particular speech act. Why do we not assume that they are there anyway? The problem which arises here is thus whether species exist even if no one apprehends them theoretically? Are the questions ‘how do we idealize meanings?’ and ‘how do we

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empirically know about the sphere of meanings as species?’ one and the same? Husserl writes: Every time we fulﬁll acts of conceptual presentation we also have concepts; presentations have their ‘contents’, their ideal meanings which we can abstractively grasp (bemächtigen) in an idealization by abstraction (ideirende Abstraction). (Husserl 1900/ 1901, p. 187––my translation)

and, As one species has ideal identity over against its manifold possible cases (which are not themselves colours, but instances of one colour), so meanings or concepts have identity in relation to the conceptions of which they are the ‘contents’. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 128])

If the content of a presentation is identiﬁed with the meaning of its expression, then the question arises whether in the act of ideation we grasp (apprehend) the species or whether we rather create them? In other words, are our particular mental acts strictly referential, whereas their contents are what we create with the help of an accomplishing act of ideation (what we later, using language, call ‘meaning’)? Or are contents, so to speak, given in the mental act itself, whereas in the act of ideation we can only grasp (apprehend) them? The alternatives are either that we assume that act-species are our suppositions, i.e. products of our act of ideation, or that act-species exist independently of our cognition of them. The same questions and alternatives arise both for acts of judging and their contents and for the meanings of the sentences which are the expressions of these acts. The basic question is whether ideal objects of thought are––to use the prevailing jargon– –mere pointers to ‘thought-economies’, verbal abbreviations whose true content merely reduces to individual, singular experiences, mere presentations and judgments concerning individual facts, or whether the idealist is right in holding that (. . .) all attempts to reduce ideal unities to real singulars are involved in hopeless absurdities. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 193])

Husserl gives us two different answers to this question, afﬁrming both of the alternatives in different places of his Logical Investigations. In the Prolegomena he clearly opts for the Platonic version of meanings as species even if they are dependent of our acts of ideation. Even so, on no account are they only theoretically supposed, since a supposition of something does not entail, for Husserl, its existence. It is not a mere hypothesis which should be justiﬁed by its explanational power, but we take it for granted as the immediate grasped truth following in this respect the last authority in all questions of epistemology––the evidence. I have an insight that in the repeated acts of presentations and of judgments I cognize and I am able to cognize the same concept and the same sentence. (Husserl 1900/1901, I, pp. 128–129––my translation)16

In the second volume of the Logical Investigations, in ‘Ausdruck und Bedeutung’, however, Husserl clearly differentiates between species and meanings, the former existing independently of a speaking subject. One could say

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with some justiﬁcation that this view is not necessarily in opposition to the view from the ﬁrst volume of his work, since the Platonistic view as far as species are concerned does not involve apprehending them as meanings only when functioning in acts of meaning. In other words an empirical knowledge of meanings is independent of their existence in a Platonistic fashion. On this interpretation being a species is something different from being a meaningspecies, in that a Platonistic species can be viewed in a linguistic act. This can be seen, however, in another way. The fact is that being an instantiation of a species is an ontological fact, while being the meaning of an expressed mental act is a linguistic fact. But in Aristotelian fashion this ontological relation of instantiation cannot take place without an instantiation which is linguistic. Thus, as I understand it, we create meanings only in the sense that by means of language we make instantiations of a species. It is therefore something different to recognize species as meanings in an act of ideation. In this sense Husserl shares the view of Aristotle rather than, as is explained in many commentaries on Husserl, the view of Plato.17 It seems that an empirical state of affairs which is the object of a judging act can also be taken in specie in an act of ideation and become a species. What then distinguishes this species when expressed in language (i.e. in the speaking of a sentence) from the species which is the act-species expressed in the same sentence and which is a meaning? In other words, what distinguishes meaning-entities from object-entities where both happen to be species expressed in language? It seems to be the case that object-entities are not expressible unless they become meanings. Meaning-entities are species of which particular acts of speech are instantiations. This ontological relation between an act and an act-species as meaning is ‘brought into relief’ in an speech act. The object-entities as species instantiate particular empirical states of affairs. This relation of species-instantiation is ‘brought into relief’ by an ontological fact. However, when expressed by means of language it becomes a meaning. Now, opting for the correspondence theory of truth, as Husserl does, there exists the possibility of mistaking a state of affairs for a species in a linguistic sense: namely, that the species of a state of affairs we mean can be different from the state of affairs which actually obtains: It is not a chance fact that a propositional thought [act in specie—AR], occurring here and now, agrees with a given state of affairs: the agreement rather holds between a selfidentical propositional meaning, and a self-identical state of affairs. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 195])

4.4

Truth as Species

I think that, in this respect, Husserl’s view becomes more understandable in relation to empirical truth. Actually, Husserl was not very interested in this kind of truth. He was interested rather in truths which are, as he eagerly called them, a priori. For Husserl, the latter, as well as all truth, belong to the sphere

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of meanings. They are objective, and it seems that the problem of the objectivity of both truth and knowledge were crucial for Husserl in the Logical Investigations.18 Both empirical and a priori truths should be considered in specie. Thus, for Husserl, to grasp (or to experience or to apprehend) a truth has the same sense in which we grasp other species, i.e. it is an act of ideation. So, when speaking, we grasp the object of our act of meaning, the meaning is just there (as a species of this instance, which is a speech act) and the truth of this act can be grasped, if at all, by a theorist such as the logician. Yet here again Husserl shows his ambiguous answer to the question of species universals: On the one hand, Husserl’s truth is an idea (a species) that is independent of the knowing (or speaking) subject in the same sense as any other species—it need not be recognized by anyone: Each truth, however, remains in itself what it is, it retains its ideal being: it does not hang somewhere in the void, but is a case of validity in the timeless realm of Ideas. (Husserl 1900/1901, [1970, p. 149])

On the other hand, truth is, as Husserl put is, an ideal possibility which is instantiated in particular truths, i.e. in acts of evident judging. And just as, in other cases, the being or ‘holding’ of something general amounts to an ideal possibility––i.e. a possibility in regard to the being of empirical cases falling under the general Idea––so too in this case: the statements ‘It is the truth that. . .’ and ‘There could have been thinking beings having insight into judgments to the effect that. . .’, are equivalent. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 149])

What is important here, however, is that in both cases it is not the act of judging which serves as the bearer of truth, i.e. it is not of act of judging that ‘true’ or ‘truth’ are predicated. Truths that instantiate truth in specie are not judging acts: One should likewise not confuse the true judgment, as the correct judgment in accordance with truth, with the truth of this judgment or with the true content of judgment. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 142])

Particular truths are thus not concrete acts of judging, but rather these judging acts taken in specie, i.e. meanings. But these meanings can be, again, instantiations of a species of truth: We do not ‘apprehend’ truth as we apprehend some empirical content which comes up, and again vanishes, in the stream of mental experiences: truth is not a phenomenon among phenomena, but is an experience in that totally different sense in which a universal, an Idea, is an experience. We are conscious of truth, as we are in general conscious of a Species, e.g. of ‘the’ Colour Red. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 148])

If we are conscious of truth, then the instantiations of truth as species are act-species (contents of judgments or meanings). How, then, can particular truth be the agreement between the judging act and what the judging act is about? In other words, is truth a relation in specie or a judging act in specie?

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It seems that there are several kinds of species which are to be called ‘truth’. The ﬁrst kind of truth-species is the act-species, of which particular mental acts are instantiations. But there is also a species truth (the species of species), which is the species of which truth-species understood as act-species are instantiations. The next kind of truth is the relation in specie between a judging act and what this judging act is about. But there is also the species of such species, the truth which is the species of those species. Independently of what the right meaning of truth in Husserl’s view is, i.e. of whether truth is an act-species or a relation-species, it is unclear what the primary notion in specie is: truth in specie (of which act-species are instantiations), or relations in specie; or, maybe the instantiation thereof, i.e. act-species or relations-species? In other words, is it the case that making act-species we ‘bring into relief’ the species truth? Or, rather, is there truth of which the sentences we utter or write happened to be instantiations? The answer to this question depends on whether we make nominalistic or realistic assumptions concerning the universal ‘truth’. Nevertheless, the predicate ‘true’, if it can be predicated of anything at all, should, on Husserl’s account, be predicated of the act-species. This is so because the epistemic notions of ideation and of the cognition of truth are connected with these acts. Otherwise, from the pure point of view of the species-instantiation relation, the notion of truth would remain only an ontological notion. But, in a literal, ontological sense, despite the problem of the cognition of truth, it is possible that in Husserl’s view there are no bearers of truth, but only truth in specie which can be instantiated by species of cognitive acts. The issue of truth and its bearers is then an issue of the choice between the epistemic and the ontological notions of truth. If we are interested only in the species-instantiation relation as far as truths are concerned, there is no need for any truth-bearers. Only if we want to link the notion of truth to its cognition, i.e. when we opt for an epistemic notion of truth, does the problem of the truthbearer arise. It should also be noted that the problem of truth-bearers appears, in Husserl’s view, only for theorists and not for all language users. The problem of the bearers of semantic properties such as meaning and truth is connected with theorizing reﬂections on normal, communicative speech acts. Thus, once again, contrasting this view with the contemporary notion of the ‘propositional attitude’, there would be no bearers of meanings (in specie) to which we can have an attitude, unless we take a theorizing and epistemic attitude, which is not the attitude of everyday language users.

5.

Anton Marty (III): The Temporal Ontology of the Content of Judgements

As we have seen, Anton Marty’s judgment-contents are similar in many ways to the objectives described by Meinong in his On Assumptions.19 Both the

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content of judgments and objectives are entities intermediate between judgments on the one hand and objects as presented in acts of presenting on the other. However, unlike Meinong, who seeks a descriptive-psychological explanation of hypothetical thinking, Marty, who in this respect remains faithful to Brentano, associates his theory of judgment rather with the concept of truth. Moreover, as we have seen in previous chapters, Marty’s theory of truth relies on the concept of correct judgment. In this respect Marty’s judgmentcontents are comparable to Bolzano’s truths in themselves in that both serve as the standard to which an actual judging act, if it is to be true, must conform. However, whereas Bolzano’s truths in themselves are ideal or extra-temporal, Marty’s judgment-contents exist in time. Moreover, even when Marty refers to Brentano’s epistemological concept of truth which, roughly speaking, relies on the notion of right or correct judgment, and even when his theory of truth shows some similarities to Bolzano’s account of measurement for truth, Marty, following Husserl, goes back to the classical correspondence theory of truth. Unlike Husserl, however, Marty was primarily interested in the truth of empirical judgments which occurs, for Marty, at a given moment of time. Thus, his theory of truth goes in a somewhat different direction than that developed by Husserl. Yet what kinds of entities are to stand in the relation of correspondence about which Marty speaks when talking about truth? We must remember that, ﬁrst of all, this correspondence is to be the standard to which an actual act of judging must conform, and secondly, the correspondence is to be experienced. Besides the experience of evidence, the adequation between these entities should also be grasped. As regards the ﬁrst requirement it is clear, at least for Marty, that these entities cannot be extra-temporal entities, for we have to make an actual act of judging in which we refer to an existent or non-existent object in time. A judgment is true, from this point of view, when there obtains an adequation in the sense of an actual correlation. The elements between which the adequation should obtain in a true judgment are, for Marty, a particular judging act and a particular state of affairs. In adopting the descriptive-psychological point of view, Marty also calls the latter a ‘judgment-content’, and it is an entity which exists in time in the same way as Stumpf’s content of judgment, though it is not, as in the case of the latter, immanent to the act. Instead, judging-contents are, to put it on the linguistic level, entities which are the literal meaning III20 of the expression through which we communicate our judging acts. It follows that, as far as the theory of adequation goes, Marty uses the expression ‘communicated content of judgment’ in at least two different senses, in a way similar to his use of the notion of meaning as meaning II and meaning III in two different senses. On the one hand, ‘content of judgment’ stands for all the moments which are included in a real act of judging (e.g. assertion, certainty and so on) and whose counterpart on the linguistic level is only its communicable part as the meaning

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II of the expression of the underlying judgment. On the other hand, ‘content of judgment’ refers to an intended state of affairs. Its counterpart presents the content of the utterance to which I have referred above as the meaning III. Thus Marty seems to accept two different contents: the psychological content of an act of judging and the state of affairs as the meaning of the uttered sentence, and he asserts that the correspondence should take place between these two contents. We may omit this ambiguity by introducing a distinction between meaning-entities and object-entities. The impression that Marty was confused on this matter is a result of the fact that on the linguistic level the difference is describable only in the above way. This is because both meaning-entities and object-entities can be, as it was in the case of Husserl, expressed, or intended, or communicated by means of language. By making the meaning- and objectentities separate on the level of the ontology of judgment we avoid such an impression. As regards the second requirement the answer is somewhat unclear but it might go as follows: In cases when the correlation is realized, we might say that truth itself is experienced (‘lived through’). The correspondence between an act of judging and a state of affairs produces the experience which is required in order to call a judgment true. The assumption of the experience of an act of judging and its content understood as the meaning of its utterance seems to be reasonable, since the nature of what has to be experienced is dependent upon mental acts: both the content of a judging act and the content of an uttered sentence are subject-dependent in the sense that both exist only when judging occurs. But, then, it is problematic not only how the experience of evidence and adequation as required in true judgment is caused by the obtained correspondence. It is also problematic that in the view described above both the psychological content of judgment and the state of affairs are, to some degree, dependent upon the judgment. Yet Marty defends the view that states of affairs or judgment-contents are that which objectively grounds the correctness of our judging. For Marty, therefore, states of affairs must be something whose existence is independent of consciousness. Otherwise, how could Marty speak about his view as a defense of the classical correspondence theory of truth? Perhaps the rei in the relation of adequatio must not be something completely independent of mind. Is it not the case that in Marty’s view the correspondence obtains between what we think and what we speak about, i.e. a correspondence which can obtain between a psychological content of judgment and the meaning of what we actually uttered? Marty’s answer is that just as the act of judging itself relies on an act of presenting, so a state of affairs relies on an object of presentation. The content of an utterance (a state of affairs) is based on an object of presenting which underlies the act of judging of which it is an expression. A state of affairs, thus, is not an object completely determined in

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the act of judging; rather, it is determined by the fact of expressing this judging act. But what is most important in the account of truth given by Marty is the concept of truth itself. In Marty’s account truth is, as for Husserl, a species. It is, however, clearly a species of relation of correspondence. Yet the existence of this species is, as in Husserl’s view, intermittent; it exists only in the instances of the correspondence relation which are associated with the existence of judging acts taking place at certain point in time. Unlike in Husserl’s account, however, they must not be associated with an act of language use. Furthermore, the necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the existence of such instances is the co-existence of a process of judging and a corresponding state of affairs. This is Marty’s ontological point as far as truth is concerned: for him a world without judging acts is a world without truth. Now it is clear why Marty claims that the ‘true’ should be predicated of judging acts rather than, for example, of objectives or act species. The latter are objects ‘created’ in judgments. Thus, Marty argues further, the states of affairs can play the role of truthmakers rather than that of truth bearers (both roles are played, for example, by Bolzano’s sentences in themselves). Truth bearers are judging acts. Moreover, ‘true’ can be predicated of them not only in an indirect sense, for the basic notions here are those of evidence and adequation. It seems that Marty saw a difference between the two accounts regarding the deﬁnition of truth, i.e. a difference between an explanation of the concept of truth and the extensional deﬁnition of truth in which one attempts to deﬁne the set of what is true. Marty explains the notion of truth in the same way as Husserl does, i.e. by referring to species. However, he deﬁnes truth extensionally along the lines of Brentano, i.e. by referring to the epistemic qualiﬁcations of judging acts such as evidence and adequation. Marty’s theory of judgment in terms of assimilation to actual states of affairs is not, of course, without its difﬁculties. Problems for such a theory arise above all with regards to false judgments, such as ‘The lines on this page are written in German’. Since Marty’s conception of truth presupposes the simultaneous existence of both judgment and judgment-content, in a false judgment the correspondence could take place only between an act of judging and a state of affairs which does not exist. But the non-obtaining states of affairs have no place in Marty’s ontology of judgment.21 There are only states of affairs to which true judgments conform. Does this also mean that expressions of false judgments do not have meaning III (understood on the ground of the ontology of judgment as object-entities)? Marty’s theory of correspondence faces similar problems with regards to judgments about the past and judgments which are general. The former problem arises when we refer to non-obtaining states of affairs, such as yesterday’s snow blizzard. The latter problem arises when we refer to states of affairs such as the meaning III of the sentence ‘There are beavers’, or, what is even more

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problematic ‘There are no unicorns’. Marty’s solutions to such problems rely on his assumption of a distinction between ‘to exist’ and ‘to be real’, as known from Twardowski and Meinong. Both real entities and non-real entities can exist. Thus, non-real past and non-real general states of affairs can exist as correlates of an actual judging act.

6.

Adolf Reinach (I): A Platonistic Ontology of Judgement

In contrast to the theories of Husserl and Marty, Adolf Reinach defends a Platonistic approach in the ontology of states of affairs. There is no doubt that he was inspired in this account by Meinong’s objectives and Bernard Bolzano’s sentences in themselves. However, the new sort of sophistication Reinach reached consists of the fact that he clearly distinguishes between what we today call propositional meaning and the state of affairs (and what we approached above when introducing the distinction between meaning-entities and objectentities). The anticipation of this difference in the work of Husserl and Marty was unclear in that they could not clearly separate the content of a judging act and the (objectual) content of its expression (Marty) and between objects of a judging act and the content of an act-species (Husserl). Reinach also introduces the totality of states of affairs, a realm in which not only every actual, but also every possible judgment and its expression, ﬁnd their correlates. The realm of states of affairs includes the correlates not only of the rejection or assertion of something but also every modal judgment, not only true, but also false, and not only simple judgments but also judgments of any complexity. States of affairs are, in Reinach’s account, extra-temporal and unchangeable. Their role is similar to the role which they played in the theories of Husserl and Marty: they are the truthmakers of every past, present and future judging act. Reinach, however, in contrast to Husserl and Marty, looks neither to species nor to expressions of meanings in language, but (as he saw it) out into the world, to the objectual correlates of judging acts. Reinach solves the problem of the cognition of meanings such as act-species or contents by arguing that states of affairs are accessible in ordinary acts. We see that the rose is red, we hear that this or that tone are a part of this melody and so on. This unproblematic access to states of affairs seems to be troublesome when they are considered as objects of logic. Are objects of logic accessible in the same sense in which tones and roses are? Here, on the one hand, Platonism as predicated of the Reinachian realm of state of affairs also means that states of affairs are not only outside of and independent of the mind but also that they are not in the spatio-temporal world. Therefore, in the Reinachian account, logical relations obtain among these state of affairs themselves. On the other hand, they are higher order objects in the sense of Meinong, i.e. they are for

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the most part built up out of ordinary objects. Therefore, the cognition of state of affairs involves the cognition of the ordinary objects of experience. What is worth noting is that the domain of states of affairs in Reinach’s account is complete, which means that there are already given existent states of affairs for every possible judgment and for every possible expression of it. The reason for the assumption of completeness for the realm of states of affairs was that Reinach here wanted to hold the correspondence theory of truth for every kind of judgment, even those that are problematic in other theories, such as negative judgments or judgments about impossible objects. Among states of affairs in such a reach realm there are truthmakers for every judgment. Unlike the theories of Husserl and Marty, which we can call psycho-linguistic theories in the sense that content- and object-entities are dependent upon psychological acts of judgments and their linguistic expressions, Reinach’s theory of states of affairs is not strictly connected with his theory of language. The opposite is rather the case. From a contemporary point of view it would be very interesting to see how Reinach’s ontology decided about his account of speech acts. Reinach’s theory of speech acts is in several respects similar to theories later proposed by Austin and Searle. Besides assertion, Reinach is also able to explain several other propositional attitudes such as promising, asking, requesting and so on. However, since judgment as a spontaneous act (as opposed to non-spontaneous passive experiences) does not require the fulﬁllment of any linguistic performances, Reinach’s speech-acts theory does not affect the theory of true judgments. Yet this does hold for other spontaneous acts which are by their nature social acts and therefore are dependent on linguistic usage.22

7.

Summary of Chapter 5

Descriptive psychology and theories of the linguistic counterparts of mental acts exerted an ever greater inﬂuence on one another during the course of investigations concerning the object of judgment. After the distinction between an act, its content and its object became clear, a new sort of correlate for judging acts was established. Brentano’s immediate followers, such as Twardowski, saw these ontological correlates as still being in harmony with Brentano’s existential theory of judgment. The correlate of the positive judgment ‘A exists’ became the existence of A; the correlate of the corresponding negative judgment, the non-existence of A. Other types of judgment-correlates were also recognized, especially later by Meinong: the subsistence of A (as the object of judgment about ﬁctions), the possibility of A, the necessity of A (as the objects of modal judgments), the probability of A (as the object of probabilistic judgments), and so on. Later, however, together with the turn back to the correspondence theory of truth, the complexity of states of affairs no longer corresponded exclusively to the existential theory of judgment.

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In the philosophy of Husserl, Marty and Reinach there took place a change, not only in the objects of judging activities but also in the concept of truth. Nevertheless, truth was still related to acts of judgment and to the concepts of evidence. Even when all three philosophers added new conditions for speaking about truth, namely adequation or correspondence, they all assumed some kind of cognition of it. Thus, the theories of truth are still criteriological in the sense that, following Brentano, they are supposed to give a psychological criterion of truth which, in order to produce the objectivized criterion, rely upon non-psychological conditions. Truth was also conceived as a species which has its instances in another species (as in the case of Husserl’s act-species) or in concrete acts of judging (as it was in Marty’s view.) What is important is that in both cases truth was related in a new way to language. The instantiations of truth such as Husserl’s act-species and Marty’s judgment-contents are grasped only with contemporaneously uttered sentences. This is not the case with Reinach, however, who, defending his Platonistic view on states of affairs, relies on the ordinary experience of ordinary objects rather than on linguistic mediations in their cognition and in the cognition of truth. On these accounts, there are truth bearers only in a certain secondary sense in which we predicate ‘true’ of the instantiations of truth in specie. Thus, truth is neither a property of an entity nor a syncategorematical term which might be predicated of an entity instead of another term that directly refers to a property possessed by the entity. There are rather truths in specie, instantiations of truth and experiences of truth which, as we can guess, are co-experiences given in the act of judging. This sort of co-experience includes the experiences of evidence and of adequation. The conditions under which they occur are, however, made independent of the knowing subject, and their formulations rely on the concept of states of affairs.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Among others such theories were developed by Gustav Biedermann, Franz Biese, Eduard Erdmann, Kuno Fischer, Karl Prantl and Hermann Schwarz. Bolzano 1837. Lotze 1880. Frege 1892, 1918. Stumpf 1907, pp. 29ff. As we shall see in chapter 7 below, this distinction was crucial for Twardowski’s theory of acts and products. On the theory of the Gestalt see Ehrenfels 1890. Stumpf 1907, p. 11, 32. Bergmann 1879, pp. 2–5, 19, 38. For this and more historical details see Smith 1992. For more details on Frege and Lotze see Sluga, H. 1980; on Stout see van der Schaar, M. 1991. See sections on Twardowski in chapters 3 and 4. Meinong 1965, pp. 143f. See Smith 1990.

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14 I use here the expression ‘the use of language’ in the sense in which it refers to every use of a linguistic entity by a knowing subject, such as uttering a name or a sentence, writing a name or a sentence. I do not think that it is right to assume that Husserl had any concept of language in the modern sense, i.e. as a recursively deﬁned system of meaningful signs. Thus, I do not refer to the modern sense of the expression ‘the use of language’ which suggests that there is no such thing as private language. Husserl, like all Brentanians, would claim that we speak in a language and not that a language speaks us. We create language rather than use it. 15 How radical is the contrast to the standard propositional attitude theory and based on this a theory of intentionality see Hintikka 1975 as example. 16 Not included in 2nd edition and in translation thereof. 17 In regard to this statement I agree with the interpretations held, among others, by B. Smith in that the natural and historically grounded interpretation conceives Husserl’s Sachverhalt as the creature of a naturalistic ontology: the state of affairs is a truth-making segment of reality that is ‘thrown into relief’ through an act of judgment. This issue turns on meaning as species. Therefore, the ideal species of the contents of acts which use sentences can be interpreted in a non-Platonistic way. A reading of Husserl’s theory along these lines was later developed by Johannes Daubert, Anton Marty and Adolf Reinach. See Schuhmann and Smith 1987. See also: Smith 1989b. 18 See Willard 1984. At this point I shall talk only about truth as species and not about the reason for taking truth as species. I shall address the latter point below in the Chapter 7, when speaking about the relation between knowledge and truth with respect to their objectivity. I shall then also develop in more detail the reasons for Husserl’s interest in a priori truth. 19 See sections on Meinong in chapters 3 and 4. 20 See Figure 1 above. 21 See Marty 1908, p. 295. 22 See, above all, Reinach’s monograph The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law (Reinach 1913 [1983]).

Chapter 6 REISM

In the present part of this study I shall sketch the choice of the truth bearer in the framework of two theories which are included under the name of ‘reism’. Both theories express their authors’ metaphysical beliefs regarding what exists in the world; both, however, being ontologies, have different reasons for those beliefs: Brentano’s theory can be seen as a result of his mereological ontology of mind,1 whereas Kotarbi´n´ ski’s theory can be seen as a metaphysical interpretation of Le´s´niewski’s ontology.2 Brentano adopted reism around 1908 and Kotarbi´n´ ski in the second half of the 1920’s. Yet both reisms arose independently of one another. This is an interesting fact since both belong to the same philosophical tradition which comes from the so-called ‘early Brentano’. It is even more interesting that, considering the different concepts of truth (Brentano’s criteriological conception of truth and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s correspondence theory of truth), their results as far as truth bearers are concerned are similar in many respects. What is also worth mentioning in the light of the previous investigation is that both reisms can be seen as ontologies of judgment. From this point of view Brentano’s reism would be a theory of judgers which relies on the ontology of mind. Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism would be, from this perspective, a theory of judgers which is based rather on a semantic analysis of the judger’s expression.3

1. 1.1

Franz Brentano (III): The Judger as the Truth Bearer What is Presentable?

According to Brentano’s principle of the intentionality of the mental, every judgment, as well as every mental act in general, is a judgment about something. Brentano’s object of judgment, as we have seen above, can be understood as the object of presentation in Twardowski’s terminology. The new answer to the question of what can be an object of presentation is, according

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to Brentano’s reism, a thing.4 The argument for things as the only objects of presentation goes roughly as follows: A presentation is always a presentation of something. If the concept of presenting is unambiguous, then ‘something’ cannot sometimes refer to something real (a thing), and at other times to something which is not real (a non-thing). Therefore, taking realistic attitude, things are what can be presented.

1.2

The Reistic Theory of Meaning

Given the new, unambiguous term introduced for every object of thinking (and not only of presenting), i.e. ‘thing’, we can also expect that it is an object about which we speak in language. Therefore, we should reformulate Brentano’s theory of linguistic expressions as discussed in Chapter 3 above, adapting it to the new theory of reism. All linguistic expressions of presenting are, as was already mentioned, names. Even if the names have different grammatical forms, for example, descriptions or subordinate clauses, they are still, according to Brentano, names. Names, as was the case with presentations, can be divided. They can, for example, be split into proper names (such as ‘Franz Brentano’) and general names (such as ‘philosopher’). There are also other divisions of names, such as the division into real and ﬁctional.5 Among the former we should include such names as ‘Franz Brentano’ or ‘The teacher of Alexander the Great’, whereas to the latter names like ‘Zeus’ and ‘truth’. Real proper names and real general names name (which in Brentano’s language means ‘refer to’) things. Thus, ‘Franz Brentano’ names Franz Brentano and ‘the rose’ names this or that particular rose from the world and so on. Brentano claims that ﬁctional names name an object, only insofar as this object is an object of actual particular thinking. There are no Zeuses. But there are people thinking about them. This means, for example, that Zeus is an object of presenting only if there is someone who presents Zeus, i.e. if there is a presenter of Zeus. This is because: The object need not exist. The person thinking may have something as the object of his thought even though that thing does not exist. (Brentano 1930, p. 88, [1971, p. 78])

Since thinking of an object does not necessarily mean that this object exists, then, strictly speaking, in the case of ﬁctional names there is only the person thinking of an object. Now, if we once again recall Brentano’s theory of expressions, what names mean is the content of the presentation, i.e. the concept. The meanings of the names (concepts) are always general, since we cannot present any object (i.e. any thing) with all of its individual properties.6 In Brentano’s reistic account since all concepts are universal, they are ﬁctitious. What contents have in common with objects is that they exist not in the proper sense of the term but only in the sense in which one says that something exists in the mind. They exist only insofar as an adequately thinking person exists; they begin to exist together

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with a thinker who thinks in this way and cease to exist when the person who thinks in this way ends his existence. (Brentano 1956, p. 58—my translation)

Therefore, there are no concepts, but only the persons presenting concepts. Strictly speaking, then, names mean a person presenting a concept.

1.3

What is Presented from the Point of View of Reism?

In Brentano’s descriptive psychology ‘that which is presented’ is, as it was shown by Twardowski, at least ambiguous. ‘That which is presented’ remains also ambiguous on the ground of his reistic approach. On the one hand, ‘that which is presented’ can be understood as referring to the object of presentation, i.e. to a thing from the world (including the presenting person himself). On the other hand, ‘that which is presented’ can be understood as the content of presentation. The latter, according to Brentano’s reistic standpoint, can be exclusively the presenting person, since actually there are no contents.7 On the grounds of the primacy of external perception in our cognition, as well as on the grounds of the possibility of a (blind) true judgment about the external world, we can assume that ‘that which is presented’ is to be understood as the object of the presenting act (since both theses were held by Brentano). In the language of reism, it means that what we can present to ourselves are things from the external world and ourselves as mental active subjects.

Remark. This does not, of course, change the problem of judgment about ﬁctions. In Brentano’s reism a name names someone who presents himself something ﬁctional. If the object of such a judgment is the object of presenting, how are we, then, to accept or reject a ﬁctional object? Assuming that we judge that there are no Zeuses, what is the object of this judging act? Is it Zeus or myself as a Zeus-presenting-person? Brentano says that I am the object of this judgment and Zeus is an object only in modo obliquo. But, again, what does the expression ‘Zeus’ presented in modo obliquo refer to?

1.4

The Judger

According to the descriptive-psychological investigations of the judging activity, as well as on the grounds of their linguistic counterparts, the entity which served as the bearer of truth for Brentano was the act of judging. Given Brentano’s reistic ontology of mind, however, there are no judging acts, only judging persons. In the reistic view, therefore, the bearer of truth is someone who judges, i.e. the judger [der Urteilende], and the judger can judge truly and falsely. Thus, in the proper sense, the word ‘true’ should be predicated of a judger. Therefore, we have to deal with the truly and falsely judging person and not with true or false judgments. Since in Brentano’s view mental phenomena possess an active character, it is not surprising that truth-predicates

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are adverbs in this respect. The bearer of truth is, thus, a subject S who in the act of consciousness asserts or rejects an object of presenting.

2. 2.1

´ Tadeusz Kotarbinski (I) Ontological and Semantical Reism

As already mentioned, Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski came to his reistic view independently of Brentano. In the period in which Kotarbi´n´ ski developed his idea of reism, the view developed earlier by Brentano was unknown to him. It was only Twardowski’s remarks regarding the similarities between the views of Brentano in his later period of philosophical activity and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism that aroused the latter’s interest in the Brentano’s work. The ﬁrst fundamental ideas of reism were included in Kotarbi´n´ ski’s book, brieﬂy entitled Elements.8 The two later kinds of reism espoused by Kotarbi´n´ ski, ‘ontological’ reism and ‘semantical’ reism, were not clearly distinguished in that work. The distinction between semantical and ontological reism arose only after Ajdukiewicz’s critique of Kotarbi´n´ ski’s view in the year 1930.9 Kotarbi´n´ ski’s ontological reism asks which and only which objects exist. This question differs from the question asked by Brentano, i.e. which objects can be presented? Kotarbi´n´ ski’s answer to the question about what exists was answered in 1929 as follows: ﬁrst, every object is a thing, and, second, no object is a property, a relation or an event. This means that a thing is, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski’s deﬁnition, either a body or a soul, where the latter is a body which has sensual experiences. It is also worth noting that both theses of ontological reism are interpretations of Le´s´niewski’s ontology rather than plain metaphysical statements of folk metaphysics abstracted from ordinary life.10 Kotarbi´n´ ski’s semantical reism states that names like ‘property’, ‘relation’, ‘event’ and many others are so-called ‘apparent names’, in opposition to ‘real names’, which name things. Apparent names do not have an object to which they refer. Thus, every sentence in which such apparent names occur, should be seen as a kind of substitute sentence. Namely, they substitute sentences which refer directly to the things, i.e. in which all names occur as real names. It follows that for every sentence with one or more apparent names, if the sentence is meaningful, then it is reducible to a sentence in which only real names occur. For example, the sentence ‘The color of this rose is an instantiation of redness’, if it is meaningful, should be reduced to the sentence such as ‘This rose is red’. Similarly, the sentence ‘Redness is a property’ should fulﬁl the condition of reducibility to a sentence, as put by Kotarbi´n´ ski, with literal meaning. If it is not the case, the sentence should be considered as meaningless.

2.2

The Sentence from the Reistic Standpoint

Reism is thus, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, both the proper view about what kinds of objects exist in the world and a view about what the literal way of speak-

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ing about things is. He acknowledges that the actual way of speaking about things uses abstract terms. But this takes place because abstract terms are shortcuts for our real thinking; shortcuts which we use in order to make our acts of communication as convenient as possible. It is reasonable to expect that such a view will also change the way in which Kotarbi´n´ ski understands other linguistic entities, and especially the way of understanding the notion of sentence. The term ‘sentence’ is, for Kotarbi´n´ ski, equivalent to ‘the utterance of ´ ). According to him, in reistic language it should a thought.’ (wypowied´ d mysli sound as follows: ‘the utterance of a thinker who thinks that it is so and so’.11 There are two important remarks made by Kotarbi´n´ ski regarding this deﬁnition of a sentence. First, the notion of a sentence is strongly connected with its truth-values: every sentence is either true or false. One of the reasons why Kotarbi´n´ ski makes this connection is that he wants to distinguish a subclass of sentences which are sentences in the sense of the grammar of a given language. Sentences which are true or false are, namely, indicative sentences (as opposed to interrogative sentences, for example). In order to distinguish this type of sentence, Kotarbi´n´ ski takes advantage of their semantic property of being true or false instead of taking the results of the analysis of a theory of speech acts. It seems that the semantic property of being true and false are for him more basic than assertive force or other illocutions. Secondly, in order to clarify the distinction made among sentences, he recalls the Latin word ‘propositio’. This is because he wants to underscore that indicative sentences are statements, or, as Kotarbi´n´ ski puts it, they are theses. In this respect, he also acknowledges illocutionary accounts for the deﬁnition of a sentence. Now, Kotarbi´n´ ski says that the terms ‘sentence’ or ‘propositio’ or ‘thesis’ can be understood in three ways: ﬁrst, they are used in an idealistic sense in which they are ideal objects. Under this kind of reading of ‘propositio’ he includes Husserl’s ‘Satz’, the English word ‘proposition’, Frege’s ‘Sinn’ and, the term ‘judgment in the logical sense’, widely used at this time in Poland. Secondly, ‘propositio’ is used in a psychological sense in order to refer to a judging act or to the content of a judging act. Thirdly, the term has its nominalistic reading in which ‘propositio’ stands for a linguistic sign, such as an utterance or inscription. From the point of view of reism, there is no judgment in the logical sense. Accordingly, there are also no sentences in the idealistic sense described above. Therefore, no judgment in the logical sense can be either true or false. If psychological judgments were understood as events, then there would also be no sentences in the psychological sense. Thus, no sentence in the psychological sense can be true or false either. However, according to semantical reism, the sentence ‘His judgment is true’ can be interpreted as a meaningful substitutive judgment, if it is reducible to a sentence with literal meaning. And

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it seems that the sentence ‘He judges truly’ can serve as such a translation. Thus, the truth-predicate occurs as an adverb predicated of a judger. In the end, sentences in a nominalistic sense are non-problematic from the standpoint of Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism, since inscriptions and utterances are things, and Kotarbi´n´ ski accepts this use of the term ‘sentence’.

2.3

Candidates for the Truth Bearer from the Point of View of Reism

Now, there are two ways of correctly predicating truth of two different kinds of things, i.e. of a judger and of linguistic things such as utterances or inscriptions. A true sentence is the utterance of a truly judging person. Are these two ways of speaking about truth both valid and interchangeable? First, from the point of view of ordinary language, it is quite natural to say that a person judges truly or falsely. Instead of saying ‘He judges truly’, it is even more natural, remarks Kotarbi´n´ ski, to use (meaningful) substitutive sentences like ‘His judgment is true.’ Secondly, on the one hand, the predication of the truth of sentences understood as utterances and inscriptions is, in a certain sense of this word, secondary.12 We say of sentences that they are true or false with regard to their relation to the truth and falsity of the judgments of which they are expressions, i.e., actually, due to their relations to the judger. On the other hand, when predicated of sentences, the adjectives ‘true’ and ‘false’ function as determining (in Twardowski’s sense) predicates, i.e. they occur in these cases in their literal senses. It is possible, Kotarbi´n´ ski claims further, to say in an attributive way and without any metaphorical sense (i.e. without the use of substitutive sentences) that sentences are true or false. When referred to a sentence, ‘true’ means the same as ‘being a statement [an utterance— AR] of a true thought’, or, more strictly, ‘being a statement [an utterance—AR] (direct or indirect) of a person thinking truly’; ‘false’ means the same as ‘being a statement [an utterance—AR] (direct or indirect) of a person thinking falsely’. (Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966, p. 105–106])

Thus, along the lines of Kotarbi´n´ ski, the sentence ‘The sentence written by him is true’ should be translated as ‘The sentence written by him is his utterance of him thinking truly’. With reference to acts of judging it is not the case that the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’ or, rather, the adverbs ‘truly’ and ‘falsely’ are to be interpreted as determining predicates. Kotarbi´n´ ski suggests that instead of speaking about judgments as true and false we should speak about judgments which are correct and incorrect. The conservative function of truth-predicates as predicated of judgments would then not be disguised by us and, therefore, we would have a non-ambiguous use of the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’.

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2.4

The Sentence as the Bearer of Truth

Kotarbi´n´ ski’s analysis of the notion of sentence and of the uses of truth-predicates shows two groups of candidates for the bearers of truth: the sentence in the nominalistic sense and the judger. From the point of view of ontological reism, both candidates seem to have an equal claim, since both groups consist of things. From the standpoint of semantical reism, however, sentences seem to better serve as truth bearers, since ‘true’ and ‘false’, when predicated of sentences function as determining predicates; they are literal. But Kotarbi´n´ ski points out another reason for his choice of sentences as truth bearers, and this is an easy application of such things as sentences for the purposes of logic. The sentence- terminology as used in logic does not imply or even suggest that someone is believing in what he judges. It is better, states Kotarbi´n´ ski, to investigate such notions as, for example, the notion of logical consequence or logical truth as related to sentences, than to relate these notions to someone’s mental activity, illocutions or meanings.13

3.

Summary of Chapter 6

The strong assumption of two different types of reism claimed by Brentano and Kotarbi´n´ ski led them to the choice of the judger and of the sentence as bearers of truth. Both Brentano and Kotarbi´n´ ski were inﬂuenced by metaphysical beliefs. Brentano’s theory of categories was rooted in the psychological description of the thinking subject. The choice of the judger as the bearer of truth made by Brentano was a result of approaching his theory of categories in the part of descriptive psychology which was devoted to the theory of knowledge. Kotarbi´n´ ski gave an interpretation of Les´niewski’s system of ontology. Both philosophers, however, supported their choice by linguistic analysis. Brentano’s main point in this respect was his condition for the non-ambiguous notion of presentation. Kotarbi´n´ ski focused instead on a linguistic analysis of names. Kotarbi´n´ ski’s semantic directives of reism, together with Twardowski’s theory of the determining and modifying function of adjectives, led him to the choice of sentences as utterances and inscriptions serving as truth bearers.

Notes 1 See Smith 1994. 2 See Wole´n´ ski 1990, Wolen´ ski (ed.) 1990. For an interpretation which shows the similarities in the starting points of both ontologies see Simons 1992. 3 Important information concerning Brentano’s and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism can be found, among other places, in Brentano 1933, Chisholm 1978, Simons 1988, Smith 1987, Smith 1988 and Wole´n´ ski (ed.) 1990. 4 Brentano 1956, pp. 38–46, Brentano 1930, pp. 88, 92, 106–113 (Brentano 1971, pp. 78, 82–83, 94–101). 5 Real names are, in Brentano’s language, the self-meaning [selbstbedeutende] names, see Brentano 1956, p. 47. For different types of divisions of linguistic categories and concepts see Brentano 1956, pp. 48– 85. 6 Brentano 1956, pp. 43, 47, 49–50.

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7 Once again I use here Twardowski’s distinction between content and object presented from Twardowski 1894, sketched above. Undoubtedly, Brentano was conscious of this distinction in his reistic phase. In a letter to Oskar Kraus, for example, Brentano writes: ‘I have never doubted that every thought or idea has a content and (with the exception of absurd ideas) a range of extension.’ (Brentano 1930, p. 103, [1971, p. 93]). See also the passage about the function of names in Brentano 1956, p. 47. 8 Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966]. 9 Ajdukiewicz 1930. For the presentations of Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism see Wolen´ ski 1990, Wolen´ ski (ed.) 1990, Smith 1994. 10 See Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966] (especially part 3 chapter 3), Kotarbin´ ski 1930 and Wolen´ ski 1990. 11 Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966], p. 103. In fact, the existing English translation uses the term ‘statement’ instead of ‘utterance’. However, I think that the term ‘utterance’ is closer to Kotarbi´n´ ski’s idea. ´ 12 Kotarbinski 1929 [1966], p. 105. ´ 13 Kotarbinski 1951 [1993], p. 312.

Chapter 7 THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH

1.

Bernard Bolzano (I): Sentences in Themselves

The inﬂuence of Bernard Bolzano upon the further history of philosophy, especially in Brentano’s School, cannot be overestimated. Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre [Theory of Science] of 1837 belongs to the most important and inﬂuential works in the Brentanian tradition. The rediscovery of Bolzano’s work in this tradition is connected with Twardowski’s Habilitationschrift of 1894. I shall not go into the details of the multiplicity of Bolzano’s ideas and their particular inﬂuence on the history of semantics. I shall, as I have tried to do with respect to every issue in this study, concentrate on his ideas within the theory of science as it is related to the problem of the truth bearer. In the context of the theory of truth, it is worth noting that Bolzano’s position during his times, i.e. in the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth century, was quite unusual. Bolzano’s inﬂuence on this century was provided by his notion of the objectivity of truth in a way that also remained standard for the next century. Furthermore, the theory which should guarantee the objectivity of truth was, for Bolzano, his theory of sentences in themselves. Only the semantics of the twentieth century sees Bolzano’s theory of sentences in themselves as an anticipation of the contemporary notion of proposition. I shall, however, refer to his Fundamentallehre [Theory of Fundamentals], i.e. to the ﬁrst sections of his Theory of Science, which deals with the existence of objective truth and with the possibility of its cognition. I shall omit some elements of this theory that are irrelevant to my purposes; for example, Bolzano’s proof of the existence of truth, his proof of the existence of inﬁnitely many truths or the argument for the cognition of truths. In this part of Bolzano’s argumentation, he focuses on the problem of skepticism, making an attempt to prove the fundamentalist position in epistemology.1 I shall take the liberty of presenting Bolzano’s ideas as far as truth bearers are concerned as contrasted with the views of Brentano

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and Twardowski on the objectivity of truth which I shall present in the next sections.

1.1

What Are Sentences in Themselves?

In the ﬁrst part of his theory of fundamentals, which is supposed to be an introduction to theories of science, Bolzano introduces a distinction between the sentence in itself and the thought sentence or, as he also contrasts it, the verbally expressed sentence. A sentence as expressed in words is, according to Bolzano, a speech act in which something is expressed and can be valuable as true or false (or correct or incorrect).2 The thought sentence is a statement (assertion) which is not expressed in words, but rather is a pure thought in the sense of a mental act which, like the former, must also be either true or false. That which may be thought or expressed in words is the sentence in itself. In other words, by proposition in itself [sentence in itself—AR] I mean any assertion [statement—AR] that something is or is not the case, regardless whether or not somebody has put it into words, and regardless even whether or not it has been thought. (Bolzano 1937, §19 [1972, p. 20–21])3

Thus, the thought sentence is in the proper sense called ‘the thought of a sentence’ or ‘a judgment’. The sentence in itself, in turn, forms the content (or, as it puts Bolzano, ‘the stuff’) of the thought or of the judgment. According to these formulations of the three types of sentences (i.e. thought, uttered and in themselves) it seems that all of them have the semantic property of being true or false. It would seem that possessing of one of these properties belongs, so to speak, to the ‘nature’ of sentences, and that these properties constitute a part of the real deﬁnition of sentences, but this is not the case. As Bolzano puts it, the formulation of the notion of sentence as related to its being true or false, a formulation which comes from Aristotle, should be taken only as an instrument by means of which we can understand the notion of the sentence. There is no nominal deﬁnition of the sentence, argues Bolzano, and the notion of the sentence can only be clariﬁed more or less in a descriptive way.

1.2

The Meanings of ‘Truth’: Ordinary Language Analysis

In his explanation of the notion of truth, Bolzano follows ordinary language, i.e. the usage of linguistic phrases in which the adjective ‘true’ occurs. He analyzes its different functions and shades of meanings.4 In this respect he takes the position of a reductive attitude as to the different uses of these words in that he distinguishes their proper and fundamental use. Bolzano sees the primary use of truth-predicates in the fact that truth is understood as an attribute of sentences in themselves, independently of whether they are thought or expressed in words by an epistemic subject. Being true is a property of sentences in them-

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selves, Bolzano argues––one of the two contradictory sentences in themselves must be true.5 It follows from this, argues Bolzano, that a true sentence says that something is the case. In other words, the attribute of being true of a sentence in itself makes it possible that something can be expressed in the way it is. Besides the basic and primary meaning of ‘truth’, Bolzano distinguishes a secondary meaning of that word which is also related to sentences in themselves. Sentences in themselves can also be understood as truths: true sentences in themselves, i.e. those possessing the property of being true are sometimes called ‘truths’. This explains, according to Bolzano, the sense in which we speak about the cognition of truth: true sentences in themselves that are named ‘truths’ are intelligible, i.e. they are able to be thought of or expressed in words. Only in analogy to sentences in themselves can ‘true’ be predicated of judgments. To be true is an attribute of judgments if these judgments have true sentences in themselves as their contents. Similarly, in analogy to sentences in themselves, judgments which have true sentences in themselves as their contents can be named ‘truths’. But there is a difference between the attributive understanding of ‘true’ as predicated of sentences in themselves and as predicated of judgments. A true sentence in itself which is contradictory to another sentence in itself is, in fact, a false sentence in itself and can be also called a ‘falsity’. A judgment which is contradictory to another judgment whose content constitutes a true sentence in itself is, however, called a ‘wrong’ rather than a ‘false’ judgment. Thus, a wrong judgment is called a ‘mistake’ or an ‘error’ instead of a ‘falsity’. This reason, which, in Bolzano’s view, relies on ordinary language, supposes a speech of ‘wrongness’ and ‘correctness’ of judgments rather than the predication of truth-predicates of them, thus assuming their properties of being true or of being false. Truth and falsity are ontological notions only with regard to sentences in themselves. They should remain epistemic when related to judgments. The next meaning of ‘truth’ comes to light when we predicate it of the class of truths, i.e. in situations when in using ‘truth’ we speak about the set of all true sentences in themselves. In this sense we can speak about an extensional concept of truth in Bolzano’s philosophy. By analogy, this extensional concept of truth also refers to a class of judgments: those of which, in taking one of the senses of ‘truth’ in analogy to the sentences in themselves, we can also say that they are truths. In the end, Bolzano sees the possibility of predicating truth of objects. To speak about objects as if they are true is, for Bolzano, tantamount to saying that objects are actual or genuine or real. This use of the word ‘truth’ is, however, improper. Moreover, the fact that we use this kind of predication is a result of demands connected with acts of communication by language. Speech about

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the truth of objects is related to the shortcuts which we use in our languages in order to economize our speech. Bolzano himself distinguishes ﬁve different concepts of truth. However, with regard to the above description of Bolzano’s view it is actually possible to distinguish at least seven shades of truth: These are: 1) truth as an attribute of sentences in themselves (the abstract-objective concept of truth);6 2) truth as a true sentence in itself (the concrete-objective concept of truth); 3) truth as an attribute of judgments (the abstract-subjective concept of truth); 4) truth as a true judgment (the concrete-subjective concept of truth); 5) truth as the class of true sentences in themselves (the collective-objective concept of truth); 6) truth as the class of true judgments (the collective-subjective concept of truth); and, 7) truth as an attribute of objects (the improper concept of truth). Bolzano considers the ﬁrst concept of truth to be the genuine use of the adjective ‘true’, i.e. when truth is understood as an abstract-objective notion. The role of the bearer of truth-values is played here by the sentence in itself. Interestingly, Bolzano’s whole analysis based on ordinary language does not imply that the sense in which we usually use the word ‘truth’ is its basic and proper use. So the second notion of truth, not the ﬁrst, represents that which we most commonly use and which Bolzano himself wants to apply in his investigations to the theory of science: Thus, to state it again, I shall mean by truth in itself any proposition [sentence] which states something as it is, where I leave it undetermined whether or not this proposition has in fact been thought or spoken by anybody. In either case I shall give the name of a truth in itself to the proposition [sentence in itself—AR], whenever that which it asserts is as it asserts it. In other words, I shall give it the name of a truth in itself whenever the object with which it deals really has the properties that it ascribes to it. (Bolzano 1837, §25 [1972, p. 32])

1.3

The Cognition of Truth

As we have seen, according to Bolzano the words ‘true’ and ‘false’, when predicated of judgments, can be replaced by the words ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ (or ‘wrong’) respectively. Now, in ordinary language (that of philosophers?) we speak of judgments as knowledge [Erkenntnisse]. Bolzano, however, wants to make a strong distinction between truth and knowledge. The reason for this is simple: Truth in itself does not demand its own cognition or, as we also say, does not require its own knowledge.7 On the one hand, a true sentence in itself remains a truth even if it is an unknown truth. On the other hand, in ordinary language the term ‘knowledge’ refers to a known truth. On one occasion, ‘known truth’ can refer to a known sentence in itself, while on another occasion to a judgment whose content constitutes a true sentence in itself.8 Thus, ‘known truth’ is, in Bolzano’s view, at least ambiguous: it means either a correct judgment (i.e. the thought sentence) or it means a sentence in itself which

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has been known through an act of cognition. This ambiguity, however, should not misguide us as to the relation between truth and the knowledge of it.9

1.4

The Objective Truth Bearer as a Guarantee of Objective Truth

Truths are, for Bolzano, not only independent of their cognition by knowing subjects, but also independent in other ways. The objectivity of truth should be understood, according to Bolzano, in three ways: First, truth is independent of the knowing subject, i.e. it is independent of whether it is known or not known to be truth. The truth that a square has four sides is independent of the knowledge of geometry. Secondly, truth is independent of time, i.e. truth is absolute. This means that truth has the property of being eternal. The truth that the sun was shining today does not change in the course of time. Thirdly, truth is independent of the circumstances in the world, i.e. it does not change itself into a false sentence in itself (it does not change its truth-value, putting it into modern language) when circumstances in the world change. Even if the sun stays behind the clouds tomorrow, the truth that the sun was shining today still remains a truth. Because of this threefold independence, sentences in themselves are the best candidates for the bearer of truth. The independence of the knowing subject, of time and of circumstances, is guaranteed by the manner of existence of the sentences in themselves. They do not have actual [real] existence, i.e. they are not something that exists in some location, or at a some time, or as some other kind of real thing. (Bolzano 1837, §25b [1972, p. 32])

If someone says that a sentence changes its truth-value in the course of time or according to the changes in circumstances in the world, then one says it about the sentences which are expressed in the words and not about the sentence in itself. In order to be correct, the sentence expressed in the words needs its indices of time and space. A phrase like ‘It is raining’, for example, does not change its truth-value depending on the points of time and circumstances in which it is raining or not. These kinds of phrases which include indexicals are incorrect expressions of sentences in themselves. To be a correct expression of a sentence in itself, such a phrase needs indices that are related to time and space, as for example, ‘On January the second, 1999, in Williamsville, State NY, U.S.A. between Union Road and California Street, it is raining’. Even though the additional demand of indices may make the expression objective, objectivity in the proper sense is to be predicated of the underlying sentence in itself. But if we consider only sentences in themselves to be truths, the objectivity of truth is guaranteed by its bearer, since the attribute of being true or false is a necessary property of a sentence in itself in an objective way.10

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2. 2.1

CHAPTER SEVEN

Franz Brentano (IV): Identity and Evidence The Theory of Evident Judgement

Brentano’s theory of judgment can be seen as subjective in two senses. First, according to some interpretations it is immanentistic as far as the objects of judging are concerned. Secondly, judgments are real events, they are mental episodes, a view which leaves no room for any view of truth and falsity as timeless properties of judgments as it was guaranteed by the realm of sentences in themselves in Bolzano’s Theory of Science. Brentano takes this conclusion to imply that God, too, if he is omniscient, must exist in time, since the knowledge of which judgments are true and false must change from one moment to another.11 As mentioned above, for Brentano ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are not properties of the act of judging because they are not real differentiations of it. Here the notion of evidence plays the crucial role with regard to the notion of truth. This is because Brentano gave up the traditional concept of truth as correspondence which, according to him, does not yield a criterion of truth.12 Brentano found such a criterion in the experience of evidence. Furthermore, since descriptive psychology helped Brentano to ﬁnd such a criterion for at least a large domain of judging acts, namely acts pertaining to the sphere of what he called inner perception, Brentano moved to the so-called ‘epistemological conception of truth’.

2.2

Brentano’s Extensional, Evidentional and Criteriological Deﬁnition of Truth

Let us assume that there are at least two different types of formulations of the deﬁnition of truth: an explicational deﬁnition of truth and an extensional deﬁnition of truth. The former would be a deﬁnition of the concept of truth, such as, for example, that given by the scholastics in the formula ‘adequatio rei et intellectus‘ which answers the question ‘what is truth?’ or ‘What does “truth” mean?’. The latter would be a kind of deﬁnition which does not explicate the notion of truth but rather determines the set of true entities which serve as truth bearers. Thus, the extensional deﬁnition answers the question of when something belongs to the set of truths. Tarski’s semantic deﬁnitions of truth certainly belong to this kind of deﬁnition. The meaning of ‘truth’ is determined here by its extension and not by an explicational deﬁnition. Brentano’s deﬁnition of truth should be treated as an extensional deﬁnition of truth. For Brentano, there cannot be an explicational deﬁnition of truth since ‘truth’ is not even a name. It is a syncategorematic word, whose meaning is not an independent concept. The notion of truth is explicable only in terms of evidence. Brentano in fact builds an extensional deﬁnition of truth in which he determines the set of true judgments. In his theory of truth, he answers the question of which judgments among all judging acts are true judgments.

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As already mentioned, in Brentano’s explanation of when a given truth bearer (an act of judging) is entitled to be predicated as ‘true’, the concept of evidence plays a crucial role. In this sense the deﬁnition of truth given by Brentano is evidence-theoretical. The main motive for introducing the notion of evidence was for Brentano the need of a criterion of truth in order to distinguish true and false acts of judging. Evidence can play this role of the criterion of truth. Thus in this sense Brentano’s deﬁnition of truth is a criteriological deﬁnition of truth.

2.3

The Evidence as Mental Phenomenon

As mentioned above, for Brentano evident judgment differs from mere judgment. In other words, ‘evident’, as opposed to ‘true’, is a determining adjective when predicated of acts of judgment. Therefore, the evidence has to be, in Brentano’s mind, a mental phenomenon, i.e. an experience which really distinguishes the psychological subject.13 In Brentano’s basic types of mental phenomena, however, the phenomenon of evidence has no independent place. This is so because evidence is an experience which appears only in conjunction with other mental phenomena. In this sense, evidence is a co-experience. In particular, as applied to acts of cognition, evidence can appear together with an act of judging. In this sense it is judgment-evidence.

2.4

The Evidence of Factual Judgements

Along the lines of Descartes and Leibniz, Brentano divides judgments into judgments of facts and axioms (or judgments of necessity). The former are of two types: judgments of inner perception (for example when I judge that I am thinking, that my present thinking exists), and judgments of external perception (when I judge that there is something red, that a red thing exists). Brentano also calls acts of inner perception ‘secondary consciousness’ and, since they are judgments, he also gives them the properties of being afﬁrmative, assertive and indirect judgments. Brentano often calls acts of external perception ‘falsereports’ [Falschnehmung], and these judgments are afﬁrmative, assertive and direct. Given these basic classes of judgments and the fact that evidence can be attached to our judgments, one can wonder how these classes and the appearance of evidence are related to one another? According to Brentano, the judgments of inner perception are always evident: That what appears in our inner consciousness is actually such as it appears. (Brentano 1956, p. 154—my translation)

How, then, is it possible that every act of inner perception be evident? In other words, what makes the evidence of secondary consciousness possible? Brentano says:

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The certainty of judgments of inner perception relies on the fact that the judger’s relation to his object is not merely causal but real. (Brentano 1956, p. 154—my translation)

The condition of the possibility of attaching the co-experience of evidence to judgments relies, then, on the identity of the judging subject with what is judged. This condition is, according to Brentano, always fulﬁlled in the case of judgments of inner perception. In the case of judgments of external perception, however, such identity is ruled out. Brentano holds that evidence can never occur as co-experience in external judgments. To generalize: judgmentevidence is a co-experience which can only attach those acts of judging in which an identity of judging subject and judged object takes place. It is hard, however, to treat this formulation as a kind of deﬁnition of evidence, since Brentano states: Here it is a matter of such an elementary experience that it can be clariﬁed only, so to speak, ‘ostensively’, in one’s own experience. (Brentano, 1970, p. 150—my translation)

2.5

The Evidence of Axioms

Axioms are described by Brentano as negative, apodictic and indirect judgments. Moreover, axioms, or judgments of necessity, have conceptual relations as their objects. They are such that their validity ﬂows a priori from concepts.14 They are ‘a priori’ in the sense that they do not rely on perception (they are not judgments of facts) and they are not dependent upon whether their objects exist.15 All axioms, Brentano now insists, are negative. His favorite examples of objects of axioms are: a green red, a round square, a simultaneously correctly accepting and rejecting judger, and so on. Each axiom is then of the form ‘An A which is B does not exist’, ‘An A which is B and C does not exist’, and so on. As in the case of the factual judgment of inner perception, Brentano claims that axioms are always evident.16 The condition which makes this also possible here is that the judging subject is identical with that which is judged. In an axiom, the judger denies himself as someone who is a presenter of a contradictory concept. Or in other words: he apprehends himself as impossible insofar as he thinks a contradictory concept.17

2.6

Indirect Evident Judgements

In addition to direct evident judgments, i.e. the judgments of inner perception and axioms, Brentano also uses the notion of indirect evident judgment. This is a distinction between evident judgments in the above sense and judgments which are inferred from evident judgments. Every judgment which is logically derived from other evident judgments is an indirect evident judgment. More precisely, if among the premises of an inferred judgment one can ﬁnd only evident judgments, then the former is an indirect evident judgment. Thus, for

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example, the general judgment expressed in the sentence ‘I present myself as always presenting an object’ is an indirect evident complex judgment because it is based on evident judgments among which one can ﬁnd such evident judgments as expressed in the sentences ‘Every presentation is a presentation of something’ (the principle of intentionality applied to the act of presentation), ‘I am presenting’ (a judgment of inner perception), ‘I present myself as presenting’ (the judgment of inner perception about me as presenting) and so on. Brentano’s distinction between direct and indirect evident judgments goes together with another distinction between direct and indirect knowledge. Analogously, indirect knowledge is at bottom also inferred from direct evident judgments.18

2.7

Assertive and Apodictic Evidence

With regard to judgments, Brentano makes another distinction as far as evidence is concerned. This distinction relies on the types of experience of evidence, and this is the distinction between assertive and apodictic evidence. For the sake of clariﬁcation let me emphasize that it does not sufﬁce for direct factual knowledge that that which is known is identical with the knower. We must also know that the knower and that which is known are identical. (Brentano 1928 §9, [1981, p. 6])

In the case of inner perception, we can experience the evidence because, in that kind of perception, the object of judgment is identical with the judger. The evidence, however, appears here in the way in which the required identity is grasped. Therefore Brentano calls this kind of co-experience of evidence ‘assertive evidence’. Assertive judgment-evidence is, then, co-experience which appears in inner perception and which is the grasping of the identity of the judger with the judged object. In analogy to this, we can formulate the following description of apodictic evidence: apodictic evidence is the co-experience which appears with axioms and which is the grasping of the impossibility of the identity of the judger with the judged object.

2.8

The Objectivity of Truth and of Evidence

As we have seen, for Brentano the bearer of truth is the act of judging. A true act of judging is, according to him, an evident act of judging. However, the extension of evident judging acts (i.e. that of inner perception and axioms) excludes the possibility of true judgments about the external world, i.e. excludes, for example, almost all judgments which rely on sensory experience and which refer to the objects beyond the judger’s mind. In addition to this, Brentano holds that we can judge truly about the external world. These judgments, however, will remain ‘blind’ in the sense that we have no experience of evidence when judging about the external world. Therefore, these judgments do not belong to our knowledge.

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Thus, in order to call some non-evident judgments ‘true’, such as judgments about chairs and trees, Brentano’s extensional concept of true judgment must be extended. In fact, Brentano expands the extension of true judgments to judgments which are not evident for us, but which would be evident if someone could judge the same object, in the same way with the experience of evidence (like, for example, God). Therefore, assuming the extensional conception of truth proposed by Brentano, truth is a sum of two classes of judgments: the evident judgments and the judgments which would be evident if someone could make them with the experience of evidence. Now, what if we apply the Bolzanian concept of objectivity to truth in the philosophy of Brentano? It seems that truth, in Brentano’s epistemological theory, is fully subjective. It must be subjective at least in the sense in which evidence depends upon subjective experience. The evidence, as related to the concept of truth, is merely a mental co-experience which accomplishes judgments. At bottom, however, this co-experience has a condition of its appearance which is independent of any particular act of judging. The subjective experience of evidence can arise only in regard to certain judgments, namely those which involve an identity between judger and that which is judged. In this sense, truth in Brentano’s view can be treated as objective. For Brentano, the required condition of the identity by evidence is necessary. What can be changed is the range of applicability of the experience of evidence, which is different for different living species. Similarly, at ﬁrst glance, it seems that for Brentano truth is not absolute either. What is true at one point in time need not be true at another. Indeed, a true judger is so only for a certain time.19 However, truth does not thereby change from time to time or from subject to subject. It is rather that judging subjects sometimes judge with evidence and sometimes without it. The problematic issue here, however, are truths such as logical truths. How can logical laws enjoy an atemporal validity in Brentano’s account? This is what has come to be called the issue of psychologism. Since the problem of psychologism has as long a history as the history of logic itself, in this study I shall not consider this issue in detail. I will not focus on the philosophy of logic and mathematics, which would require a great deal of space and additional studies of the very rich literature on this topic. I cannot, however, deny the importance of the issue of psychologism to the problem of truth-bearers. I shall, therefore, mention some issues connected with psychologism in the course of this study concerning such points which seem to me to be necessary, like, for example, when speaking of Twardowski’s and Łukasiewicz’s solutions to this problem. Here we can mention that Brentano’s solution was that the objectivity of logic should be guaranteed by evidence exactly in the same way in which the evidence is held to guarantee the objectivity of truth. But the concept of truth can be reasonably held to be related to single cognitive acts which, as cognitive, are still related to the judging subject. Logic, however, as

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a normative system of rules according to which every process of thinking is called upon to satisfy, should not depend on a knowing subject.

3.

Edmund Husserl (II): Evidence of Species

The statement in Chapter 5 that Husserl’s ontology of judgment presents a link between descriptive psychology, on the one hand, and the linguistic analysis of mental phenomena as carried out by Brentanians, on the other hand can also be understood in a different way. By means of his theory of state of affairs and of his theory of meaning, Husserl also associated two contradictory views on the warranty of the objectivity of truth as conceived earlier by Brentano and Bolzano. In this respect, the ontology of Sachverhalt connects the experience of evidence as related to particular cognitive acts with the conditions for objective truth given by Bolzano in his Theory of Science. In order to see to what extent this took place, we need some further remarks.20

3.1

Knowledge and Evidence

In the sixth section of his Prolegomena, Husserl introduces two notions of knowledge: objective knowledge and actual knowledge: Science exists objectively only in its literature, only in written work has it a rich relational being limited to men and their intellectual activities: in this form it is propagated down the millennia, and survives individuals, generations and nations. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 60])

Now, objective knowledge can become an object of actual knowledge in that it can be an object of correct judgment. We have to note, however, that the notion of correct judgment as used by Husserl is different from the notion as used by Brentano. The extension of the term ‘correct judgment’ includes, according to Husserl, all judgments that conform to truths, i.e. which conform to act-species as instantiations of the species truth. As we have seen, Brentano refers to the term ‘correct judgment’ only as a subclass of the judgments which Husserl considers as correct, i.e. to (direct) evident judgments. Thus, Brentano counts as actual knowledge only evident judgments of inner perception and axioms. Husserl himself is conscious of the limited extension of evident judgments; he writes: Knowledge in the narrowest sense of the word is the being inwardly evident that a certain state of affairs is or is not, e.g. that S is P or that it is not P . (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 61])

Brentano extends the boundary of our knowledge only by means of the assumption that it is possible that there exists someone else who can judge with evidence to an extent which is inaccessible to us, human beings. Husserl chooses another method. In order to extend the realm of knowledge beyond what can be judged with evidence, Husserl seeks a unique and systematic method.

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That is the case, that we need grounded validations in order to pass beyond what, in knowledge, is immediately and therefore trivially evident, not only makes the sciences possible and necessary, but with these also a theory of science, a logic. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 63])

First and most importantly, it seems that for Husserl both types of evident judgments as described by Brentano, i.e. inner perception and axioms, must be considered to be judgments about facts. Yet, it is the judger himself who constitutes the object of both types of judgments. However, if one would like to treat Brentano’s axioms as non-factual judgments, one has to explain their normative character. This leads to the problem known as the problem of psychologism. Thus, for Husserl, Brentano’s axioms are either factual judgments or they lead to a psychologistic account of logic. Now, in order to overcome our ‘disabilities’ with regard to the domain of objects of evident judgments we should consider not only our particular acts of judging, but rather we should look at them as if they were species, i.e. we should look at meanings. This would offer us several ways of looking at meanings and the relations between them. One of the ways in which we can investigate relations between meanings is the normative science of all sciences: logic. Therefore, in looking at how things are, we must not restrict ourselves to the evident judgments of facts.

3.2

The Extra-Temporality of Relations Between Meanings

It is clear that as far as Brentano’s notion of evidence is concerned Husserl refers not only to the problem of the expansion of our knowledge, but also to the problem of how our subjective cognitive acts become objective in Bolzano’s sense? In this respect, Husserl develops a theory of absoluteness of relations between act-species. As we have seen, the act-species can be called ‘truths’. This enables Husserl to relate the problem of ‘how the objective knowledge of an empirical knowing subject is possible’ to the problem of the objectivity of truth. Thus, an answer to the question of the objective knowledge of an empirically knowing subject is that there are knowable relations between truths. Husserl calls these relations ‘laws’ [Gesetze], and these are act-species of which objects are other (true) act-species. To these laws Husserl adds, for example, the principles of logic (such as the principle of the excluded middle or the principle of contradiction), and the logical rules of inference (reasoningrelations in Husserl’s language). According to him laws cannot be empirical in the same sense in which inner perception is empirical. Otherwise, the laws would be obtained by means of induction and, therefore, they would be merely probable. Since they are universally valid, they must be extra-empirical. This is because their objects (truths) are extra-temporal. In this sense, pure logical laws assume an ideal content of knowledge (or ideal meanings or ideal unities in Husserl’s language). However, according to the above ‘naturalistic’

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interpretation of Husserl’s meanings, they are not ideal in the sense of being in Plato’s heaven. They are ideal as species which we grasp through acts of ideation of speech (or writing). If, now, one were to speak about Husserl’s philosophy as a fusion of the views of Bolzano and Brentano, one would think that Husserl took over Bolzano’s heaven of sentences in themselves, combining them with their evident cognition (in Brentano’s sense).21 According to the interpretation given here, this is not the case. As a matter of fact we are dealing with the cognition of species and, moreover, with the evident cognition of species, but both the notion of species and the notion of evidence are different from species and evidence as described by Bolzano and Brentano. On the one hand, meanings (act-species, truths) are, for Husserl, absolute and in this sense ideal. On the other hand, they are absolute not because of their existence in a heaven as with Bolzano, but rather because of their being as species. Similarly, the evidence which can be attached to special kinds of mental phenomena is co-experience. The identity of species, which we grasp with evidence in an act of ideation is not the same as the identity of the knowing subject and his object as understood by Brentano. It is, however, difﬁcult to ﬁnd a unique condition for the occurence of evidence in Husserl’s views. The much-mooted notion of insight as used in place of the notion of evidence by different types of phenomenologists with reference to Husserl, remains unclear in this respect. It seems that Husserl reduces the problem of objectivity as formulated by Bolzano to the problem of the atemporality of truth-bearers. Changes of the knowing subject and of circumstances in the world are changes given in time (which, for Husserl, also means that they belong to the sphere of facts). The extra-temporality of truth will guarantee its independence of minds and of the factual changes in the world. This property of truth as being beyond time will be assured if objects of truths are themselves extra-temporal. Thus, the extra-temporality of the relations between meanings is guaranteed by the extratemporality of meanings. This kind of solution to the problem of the objectivity of truth was connected with the main issue in Husserl’s Prolegomena, i.e. with the problem of psychologism. Finally, the connections between the concept of objective truth and its absoluteness seem to conﬁrm an earlier statement that Husserl was interested in non-empirical truth rather than other kinds of truths (which is quite clear in the context of psychologism, which required special interest in logical truths). Truths of which we have just spoken are logical truths. For example, Husserl argues that truth cannot be a fact. This is because facts have the property of being in time and, therefore, they are involved in causal relations. Logical truths, in opposition to this, cannot stand in causal relations. Moreover, they cannot be thought of as being in causal relations. When we speak about truth in a causal relation we mean that this is a true act of judging in which a certain fact is judged. The truth of the act of judging depends, then, upon reality.

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According to Husserl, however, the true act of judging should not be confused with the truth of its meaning.22 In this sense, the objectivity of logical truth in Husserl’s view consists in its extra-empirical idealization; a solution which, as mentioned above, is different from the solution proposed by Bolzano.23

Remark. As regards later discussions on truth and its objectivity it is interesting to note how Husserl connects the bivalence principle with the classical notion of truth. As far as the principle of bivalence is concerned, Husserl claims, somehow metaphorically, that the mere sense of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ is strongly connected with the principles of excluded middle and of contradiction. I think that this statement, together with the passage cited below, can be read as suggesting a strong connection between the notion of truth and the principle of bivalence: If the relativist says that there could be beings not bound by these principles (. . .) he either means that there could be propositions or truths, in the judgments of such beings, which do not conform to these principles, or he thinks that the course of judgment of such beings is not psychologically regulated by these principles. If he means the latter, his doctrine is not at all peculiar, since we ourselves are such beings. But if he means the former (. . .) We should never dream of calling anything true or false, that was at variance with them. Alternatively, such beings use the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ in some different sense, and the whole dispute is then one of words. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 141])

3.3

Factual Truths

But what about objectivity of factual truths? Here we encounter another stream in Husserl’s thinking connected with the ontology of judgment that I recalled as a link between descriptive psychology and its linguistic counterpart analysis. One of the problems of standard immanentistic analysis of intentionality principle is that it does not recognize some objective standard for truth that is somehow independent of, and thus transcendent to the judging subject. In other words, it does not recognize that truth of judgment must also involve something objective against which truth is to be measured. Brentano’s solution by means of the concept of evidence was adopted by Husserl to logical truths. But this solution does not account for the relation between the truth bearer and the real world of which we empirically judge, and which is nowadays called truthmaker. Bolzano’s theory provides a similar problem since sentences in themselves serve as both: truth bearers and truthmakers. Despite the problem of cognitive access of the sentences in themselves there must be, in Bolzano’s theory, sentences in themselves related to every situation in the world of which we can judge, whether it is actual or possible, in-time or extra-temporal, and so on. Hence the history of the world is, in Bolzano’s view, twofold: on the one hand it is in the form of the objective (in Bolzano’s sense) sentences in themselves, while on the other it consists of actual events experienced to some extent by cognitive judging subjects such as human beings.

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In this respect the investigations to the states of affairs as described in Chapter 5 can be seen exactly as an attempt to solve these problems. The ontology of Sachverhalte draws upon the Aristotelian tradition of regarding the phenomenon of judgment also from the perspective of ontology, i.e. of what the judgment is about. Theories of Husserl, Marty and Reinach recalled there are in this respect developements of theories of judgment assuming transcendent correlates of the act of judgment on the side of the object in the world, as a condition for objective truth. So, as regards the problem of the objective truth, Brentano’s and Bolzano’s succesors adressed this problem via investigations of objectual correlates to which judgment, in order to be true, must conform. Thus, the investigations to the states of affairs as truthmakers are in this respect an outcome of the non-Bolzanian condition of objective truth in Aristotelian correspondence sense. This explains inter alia the fact that Husserl’s notion of truth stands in opposition to any kind of relativism: What is true is absolutely, intrinsically (an sich) true: truth is one and the same, whether men or non-men, angels or gods apprehend and judge it. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 140])

But, as has already been mentioned, Husserl rejects any treatment of truth as relative, not only in a Bolzanian sense. He connects, for example, the objectivity of truth with metaphysical and epistemological realism. As regards the latter, Husserl claims that the assumption of the relativity of truth would imply that there are no objects independent of knowing subjects. One cannot subjectivize truth, and allow its object (which only exists as long as truth subsists) to count as absolutely existent, or as existent ‘in itself’. There would therefore be no world ‘in itself’, but only a world for us, or for any other chance species of being. (Husserl 1900/1901 [1970, p. 143])

4.

Kazimierz Twardowski (IV): The Eternal Truth of Temporal Truth-Bearers

Having the concept of the objectivity of truth in both, Bolzanian and Aristotelian (or Husserlian-Martian-Reinachian) sense it seems that further investigations as regards the objective truth, especially in Poland, undertook the Bolzanian notion of objectivity as more troublemaking. The classical, Aristotelian sense of the objective truth as correspondence was granted the status of an axiom. It was only semantic investigations that the problem of how linguistic entities reﬂect the complexity of objects in the world was undertaken anew. So the investigations to truthmakers remained for a period of time the domain of Austrians rather than Poles. The latter concentrated on the problem of truth bearers and, as far as the objectivity of truth is concerned, on the interrelations between the ways in which truth can be objectivized by means of the truth bearer.

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So-called Relative Truths

In 1900, Twardowski published one of his most important and inﬂuential papers, ‘On the So-Called Relative Truths’.24 In this paper Twardowski, following Bolzano, argues in favor of a conception of truth as something objective, a conception which would rule out the possibility that the truth of a judgment might change from one occasion to another or from one subject to another. Unlike Bolzano, however, Twardowski shows how to preserve the objectivity of truth without the assumption of any ideal or Platonistic entia rationis. Instead he tries to preserve the objectivity of true judgments, understood as mental events or processes occurring in a space and time and made by cognitive subjects. Twardowski divides the general relativistic thesis of truth into two other theses. The ﬁrst states that the bearer of truth can change its truth-value depending on time, the knowing subject and circumstances in the world. The second relativistic thesis states that the bearer of truth that changes its truth-value only changes the property of being true or false and does not change any of its other properties. Under ‘truth’ we should, according to Twardowski, understand true judgment. The latter, as we have seen above, is a mere act of judging.25 ‘Judgement’ should not be taken in the sense of Bolzano’s sentence in itself, nor as any other kind of ‘ideal’ entity such as (in later terminology) judgment in the logical sense or proposition. Judgement is a mere mental judging act. Truths are, thereby, acts of judging which have the property of being true. The thesis of the relativity of truth states, thus, that an act of judging has the property of being true on one occasion and does not have this property on another occasion depending upon time, the judging subject, and the circumstances in which the judgment is made. However, in the second thesis of the relativistic account of truth in Twardowski’s formulation, the act of judging itself remains unchanged.26 Twardowski argues that the acceptance of the thesis that the truth-value of a judgment can change while the judgment remains the same follows, above all, from a confusion between judgments on the one hand and their statements or expressions on the other. In such cases confusion occurs because relativists do not recognize the difference between the act of judging and its expression when they speak about changing the property of being true. As a matter of fact, a sentence as an utterance or inscription is the expression of a judging act. The same grammatical form of a sentence can express different judging acts such as, for example, in the case of the sentence ‘It is raining’. It can express the fact that it is raining in a particular way, in a particular place, at a particular point in time, and so on. It seems that neither of the relativist theses is fulﬁlled. The fact that a sentence can be true or false on two different occasions is, according to Twardowski, only a sign of the existence of two different judgments which

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are expressed on these two different occasions. It is not that the same judgment has different attributes at different points of time; it is rather that we have to deal with two different judgments, one of which is true and the other false. Hence the ﬁrst relativistic thesis is not valid. In order to fully understand the invalidity of the second thesis, we should consider another fact which leads people to assume a relativistic thesis. Confusion as to the relativity of truth arises in virtue of the contextual nature of language in its practical function. As Twardowski remarks, for speech to play its communicative role successfully we must restrict ourselves in our utterances to the indispensable words which, together with the text in which they are spoken, lead to a sufﬁcient understanding of a judgment. This elliptical manner of speech is a central feature of our everyday language. When I say ‘It is raining’, I express the judgment that, for example, ‘On September 5, 1998, at seven o’clock p.m., in Williamsville, NY, USA, in the area between Union Road and Cayuga Road close to Main Street, it is raining.’ Hence an argument for the relativity of truth fails if it claims that a sentence such as ‘It is raining’ is both true and false because its truth-values change at different times and places, and if we can make a strong distinction between a sentence and a judgment, for the judgment that is expressed by the sentence on a given occasion includes all pertinent indices within it. Thus, the act of judgment as expressed in the sentence ‘It is raining’ cannot change its truth-value without changing its ‘nature’ (or, in descriptive-psychological language, without changing its content).

4.2

Acts of Judging as Bearers of Eternal Truths

Twardowski’s solution to the problem of the objectivity of truth is thus distinct from those solutions in which timeless truth requires a timeless bearer. He thereby rejected the assumption of entities such as the proposition in itself of Bolzano and even Husserl’s act-specie as assumptions needed to ensure the objectivity demanded. This is possible, since, in Twardowski’s mind, an act of judging includes indices which, for the above reasons, are not always apparent on the surface of language. Often it happens that the indices that belong, so to speak, to the nature of judgment are invisible in the sentence or are expressed by means of indexicals. The only way to avoid confusion would be, some kind of artiﬁcial, permanent process of de-contextualization of the uttered or written sentences. After the clariﬁcation of the contexts in which judgments are expressed and because the bearers of truth are, for Twardowski, acts of judging with their nature as described, there are, in consequence, no relative truths. Furthermore, every act of judging is either true or false. If there is any way to predicate relativity of truths, then such predication refers to sentences. Such predication makes sense if we assume that the same sentence can express a true act of

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judging on one occasion and a false act of judging on another occasion. The sentence is then true if it expresses a true judgment and false in the opposite case. This is the only way, says Twardowski, in which the property of being true can be a relative property of an entity depending upon who utters it, when it is uttered and under which circumstances. However, since there are also sentences which do not include any indexicals and which express every speciﬁcation which can be found in the act of judging we have to admit that there are also sentences which can be true in the absolute sense, i.e. that they will never change their truth-value without changing their contents. Twardowski’s argument here is to be found in different forms in the later works of distinguished philosophers in the analytical movement such as Ludwig Wittgenstein.27 However, the problem of how far the linguistic surface disguises thought was considered by Brentanians in a quite different way. True to the Brentano heritage, Twardowski’s efforts are directed to the things and processes that are involved in actual judgings, and not to the construction of abstract models or surrogates thereof. Instead of being attracted by the ambitious task of building an ideal or artiﬁcial language in which thought and its expression would coincide, Twardowski’s formulation of the problem as related to the objectivity of truth is part of an attempt to come to an understanding of the mental acts involved in judging.

5.

Kazimierz Twardowski (V) and Jan Łukasiewicz (I): On Psychologism, Acts and Their Products

If there is another place other than Husserl’s Prolegomena in which the problem of psychologism remains a most important issue for the history of truth bearers from Bolzano to Tarski, it is one of the ﬁrst papers of Jan Łukasiewicz of 1907, as well as a text of Kazimierz Twardowski from 1912.28 I am not denying that the models regarding how to free logic from psychology, at least for the tradition I focus on here, were investigated by Husserl in Logical Investigations and by Meinong when he discusses his notion of the antipsychological. I shall, however, concentrate only on the anti-psychologistic turn in Poland. The main reason for this is that both the writings of Twardowski and those of Łukasiewicz belong to the set of works which present a key to the understanding of the change of truth-bearing entities from the judging act to the sentence, a change which took place in Poland in the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century. In 1907 Jan Łukasiewicz, inspired by Husserl’s work and the problem of psychologism, published his ‘Logika a psychologia’ [Logic and Psychology] where he presents himself as an anti-psychologist. The paper is the ﬁrst in which a Polish thinker explicitly distances himself from the psychologistic depiction of logic. Because of Łukasiewicz’s distinguished position in the philo-

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sophical world in Poland, we can assume that his paper grounded for good the anti-psychologistic turn in this country. While Twardowski established his answer to the relativity of true judgments in his paper from 1900, now, in his paper ‘O czynno´s´ciach i wytworach’ [On Acts and Products] of 1912 he concentrates more on the processes of the objectivization of acts of cognition, as well as on the objectivization of knowledge. So, on the one hand, he focuses on the question of how it is possible to have access to the then much mooted issue of the meanings of linguistic entities? On the other hand, Twardowski seeks for an explanation of why linguistic entities are intentional. In other words in his ‘On Acts and Products’ he proposes a causal theory of inheriting intentional relation by linguistic entities. The solution was one of the most important and inﬂuential theories concerning the relation between a judgment and its linguistic expression in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Even though the theory of acts and products is devoted primarily to this relation, it is also very important in the context of the anti-psychologistic turn in Poland, since it is an attempt to explain how meanings are objectivized.

5.1

Logic and Psychology

In the 1907 paper, Łukasiewicz takes logic as a normative theory of correct thinking, following the Brentanians. For Łukasiewicz, however, this theory is not only not part and parcel of the science of psychology, but is not even an object of psychological investigation. In the ﬁrst two arguments for this view, Łukasiewicz clearly follows Husserl. Above all, psychological laws cannot constitute the ground of logical laws, otherwise the latter would be only probable, and probabilistic laws cannot become the basis for the certainty which characterizes logical laws. Secondly, the content of psychological laws are different from those of the laws of logic. The content of psychological laws present mental phenomena, whereas the content of logic present relations between truths. Thus, for example, the principle of contradiction from a psychological point of view is different from the same principle from the point of view of logic: The statement about a mental phenomenon that there cannot exist two contradictory beliefs in one person at the same time is thoroughly different from the statement that of two contradictory judgments one has to be false. Thus, in the same sense in which mental phenomena do not belong to the sphere of logic, concepts of truth and falsity do not belong to the sphere of psychology. Łukasiewicz generalizes Husserl’s arguments in the way in which he describes the functions and objects of logic and psychology. Psychology, and especially the psychology of cognition, concerns mental events and processes, including those which obtain during logical thinking. The task of logic is different: it points to objective laws which rule the relations between the truth and falsity of judgments. The lack of a clear distinction between the functions and

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objects of these two disciplines is caused, according to Łukasiewicz, by the ambiguity of the expressions used as basic terms in both logic and psychology, which include, above all, such terms as ‘judgment’, ‘reasoning’ and ‘concluding’. Thus, in order to keep both disciplines separate, we should clear up the meanings of these words as they are used in logic and in psychology. ‘Judgement’ in the province of psychology means the same as ‘belief’, i.e. it is a mental act, state or attitude of a psychological subject. While Łukasiewicz includes mental processes involved in logical inference under psychology, it is the task of logic to point out the objective laws governing the connections between truth and falsehood. This refers to what Łukasiewicz calls ‘judgment in the logical sense’. Judgement in the logical sense is rather the correlation of mental acts of judging. More precisely—and here we encounter another Brentanian theme in Łukasiewicz’s thinking—he takes the correlates of judging acts as facts that something exists or does not exist in such and such a way. In a sense, Łukasiewicz’s judgment in the logical sense is comparable to Meinong’s objective. However, Łukasiewicz indicates in a footnote to his paper that his concept of the correlate of belief came into being independently of Meinong’s notion of objective. It is important that Łukasiewicz understands logical judgments as states of affairs which are expressed in words. He insists that there are no judgments in the logical sense without language in which they are expressed. Thus, Łukasiewicz connects the correlates of mental acts of judging with the linguistic expressions of the latter in a way similar to the way in which Husserl forms the meaning of psycho-linguistic phenomena. Moreover, since these belong to the sphere of logic, they serve as bearers of truth truth-value of which depends on the relations between what constitutes their objects.29

5.2

Acts and Products

The distinction between acts and products introduced by Twardowski in his ‘On Acts and Products’ of 1912 goes back to Stumpf’s distinction between functions and formations. Twardowski himself, however, also mentions Bolzano, Bergmann and Witasek as his predecessors in this respect.30 Twardowski deﬁnes the mental fact as a whole made up of a function (from an act or an action—we can use these interchangeably) and a product. Functions can be further divided into mental processes (such as passive sensations) and mental activities (such as judging acts). What is produced by a mental function is a mental product. Such mental facts as judgment, for example, consist, according to this theory, of a function of judging and its product, i.e. a judgment. The latter is a product of the mental action of judging. How can one, then, know what is the product and what is the action? For Twardowski, the easiest way to differentiate between an act and its product

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is by looking at language: The simple criterion provided to us by ordinary language is the so-called etymological ﬁgure, i.e. constructions in which a noun, formed from the same stem as a given verb, functions as its complement, or object. . . (Twardowski 1912 [1979, p. 14])

Such pairs in our language are: ‘to judge—the judgment’, ‘to present—the presentation’, ‘to sing—(the) song’, ‘to lie—the lie’, and so on. Mental life, for Twardowski, includes not only mental facts but also dispositions. Dispositions, as deﬁned by him, are conditions upon which properties of mental facts are dependent as well as the conditions upon which the appearance of those facts depends. What is important here is that dispositions constitute the objects of sciences such as anatomy, biology or neurophysiology rather than of psychology. Thus, the brain and its processes, as well as, for instance, innate universal structures understood as conditions of mental facts, are considered in Twardowski’s account to be dispositions which should be the objects of investigations of the aforementioned sciences.

5.3

Types of Acts and Products

Two classiﬁcations of functions and their products are described by Twardowski. First of all, acts and their products can be divided into three basic types: mental (for example, thinking and thought), physical (jumping and jump) and psycho-physical (an assertive utterance). This kind of classiﬁcation refers to both functions and products. Mental functions and products are parts of pure mental facts. A product which arose in conjunction with a mental function is psycho-physical. A physical action is psycho-physical if and only if it is accompanied by a mental function which has an inﬂuence on its product. A good example of this is the term ‘statement’. On the one hand, a statement is a mental function of a judging activity. On the other hand, a statement can be the psycho-physical function of the uttering (expressing) of a judgment in words. Furthermore, the waves which produce sounds in speech are psycho-physical since they are the result of the mental action of judging by the person who is making the sounds. Nevertheless, sounds also can be considered as pure physical waves, i.e. as physical products. The second classiﬁcation of importance for our purposes is Twardowski’s distinction between the durability and non-durability of the product. Since functions always occur at some point in time, they are not durable. The act of presenting is non-durable. The mental product of this act, i.e. a presentation, also is not durable. The non-durable products are always accompanied by a function and they are events, phenomena and processes. Unlike acts, however, products can become durable. It can happen that a non-durable product can be ﬁxed in a durable product. My presentation, as caused by an act of presenting, can be ﬁxed, for example, in a picture. The durable products then become independent of functions and are physical or psycho-physical things.

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My presentation of a sight can become durable if I paint a picture. The possibility of ﬁxing mental facts in durable products enables us, in Twardowski’s view, to go out of our mental lives as people.

5.4

Language as a Product

Now, we can include such objects as linguistic expressions into Twardowski’s network of the theory of acts and products. First, according to Twardowski’s theory of acts and products, the word ‘judgment’ has at least three meanings: Judgement can be seen as an act of judging (or a function or action of judging). Judgement can also be understood as the product of a judging activity. Judgement as a product of a judging act was also often called a judgment in the logical sense by Polish philosophers (for example, by Łukasiewicz). Finally, judgment can be seen as a disposition to judge, as it is understood for instance, in a sentence of the form ‘He always judges correctly’. Judgment in the logical sense exists only when there is someone who is judging. Thus, judgment in the logical sense is non-durable. This non-durable mental product of judging can, however, be ﬁxed in a nondurable psycho-physical product like an utterance, i.e. in the waves which are received as sounds. Further, this non-durable psycho-physical product of an act of judging (utterance) can be ﬁxed in a durable psycho-physical product such as writing, i.e. in an inscription which consists of the marks made by a ballpoint pen or another tool. Thus, the process of ﬁxing non-durable thoughts as products of thinking is as follows: thinking-thought-speech-writing. Twardowski, by means of the distinction between act and product, is trying not only to explain how it is possible to go out of the mental life of a given subject, but also to give us a linguistic interpretation of the psycho-physical processes of ﬁxing our mental lives. First, the psycho-physical product can be a symptom or manifestation of a mental action. For a psycho-physical product to be a manifestation of an act the following two conditions must be fulﬁlled: the mental fact must cause the product, and the psycho-physical product must be accessible in a sensual experience. Now, if this psycho-physical product which manifests the underlying mental product to us causes similar mental facts in different subjects, then it expresses this mental fact. When a psychophysical product expresses a mental fact, we call the ﬁrst a sign of the second, and we call the expressed fact its meaning. Now, a sentence (written or uttered) can be a symptom of a fact such as a judgment which consists of an act and its product. This is the case, according to Twardowski, when the sentence is caused by the mental fact of judging in the way in which the process of ﬁxing it as described above takes place. If the sentence (written or uttered) causes mental facts in different subjects which are similar to the mental fact of which the sentence is a symptom, then the sentence is an expression of this underlying mental fact of judging. When a sentence

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expresses a judgment, the sentence is a sign of the judgment. If the sentence invokes the same judgment in the receivers of the speech or in the readers of the inscription, then the judgment is the meaning of the sentence. One of the consequences of such a view is Twardowski’s strong position regarding the clarity of thought: clarity in judging has its counterpart in clear sentences; thus, clarity in philosophical writing reﬂects clarity in thinking.31 Twardowski’s theory of the meaning of sentences includes as a proper part the notion of the objectivization of judgments. It would seem that people have the same judgments as products of judging acts. Yet this is not the case, since, according to Twardowski, there are as many different judgments as judging people. In speaking of the meaning of a sentence, we abstract from these differences. Judgements, however, can become objective in the sense in which they are ﬁxed in durable writings. Judgements ﬁxed in sentences then appear to us not only as enduring, but also as independent of functions. For Twardowski, a higher level of independence of writings with regard to actual mental functions is present in the case of logic. Here, artiﬁcial logical products express, not judgments, but only presentations of judgments, which are entirely independent of the psychological moments of belief or conviction. According to Twardowski, this is the sense in which they deserve Bolzano’s name of ‘sentences in themselves’. Written or printed sentences, such as those on this page, can be read in two ways: First, as a sequence of linguistic signs which are psycho-physical products in which a mental fact of judgment is ﬁxed. Secondly, a printed sentence on this sheet of paper can remain uninterpreted, i.e. we can see it as a pure physical product. Thus, Twardowski’s theory of acts and products as applied to sentences, like Łukasiewicz’s deﬁnition of utterance, constitutes a transition from a pure psychological theory of mental acts of judging to concern with language and with judgments expressed in language. It constitutes a direction which, some years earlier, was made possible by Husserl’s psycho-linguistic theory of meaning. However, even if Twardowski was now able to translate every speech about mental activities into a speech about language, he never rejected the view according to which the judgment was the proper truth-bearer. Moreover, he thought that the theory of truth must include a good theory of judgment.32 The importance of Twardowski’s theory of acts and products can also be seen in that it presents an early attempt at an epistemology without an empirical subject, as it was called sixty years later by K.R. Popper, in the clear framework of Brentanian tradition.33 Twardowski’s theory of acts and their products became, in fact, a foundation for the methodology of the humanities in Poland for a long period of time. For the purposes of this study one of the main points is that the theory of acts and products serves as a causal explanation of how linguistic entities inherit intentional relations, which, together with the realis-

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tic attitude towards the object of intentional acts, guarantee the objective truth in Aristotelian sense.

´ Tadeusz Kotarbinski (II) and Stanisław Les´niewski (I): The Absoluteness of Truth

6.

The problem of the objectivity of truth was under discussion more than once in the history the Lvov-Warsaw School. One of those discussions took place around 1912. Tadeusz Kotarbi´n´ ski and Stanisław Les´niewski refer to the thesis stated by Twardowski in 1900 about the objectivity of true judgment. In fact, this discussion concerns only one aspect of what, after Bolzano, was called the objectivity of truth, i.e. the problem of the absoluteness of truth. First, Kotarbi´n´ ski was stimulated by Łukasiewicz’s book on Aristotle.34 Kotarbi´n´ ski discovered an inconsistency between objective, true judgment and free creativity. Then Le´s´niewski responded to Kotarbin´ ski, defending the BolzanoTwardowski view on objective truth. How important and widespread the thesis of the absoluteness of truth was among Polish philosophers is shown by the following line from Le´s´niewski’s paper: Slowly, truth begins to become ‘created’ even by the representatives of that camp which has gathered at the Lvov University around Professor Kazimierz Twardowski, that is the camp whose members have for such a long time believed that a judgment is always, ‘absolutely’ true, i.e. that it is true independently of whether it is useful or damaging; whether it helps to forecast the future or not; whether a scholar felt like ‘creating’ the given truth and he did, or refrained from such ‘creation’, etc. (Le´s´niewski 1913 [1992, p. 104])

On the one hand, both Kotarbi´n´ ski and Les´niewski discussed the problem in the framework outlined earlier by Brentanians. They discussed, as we shall see, the problem of the actual existence of judging objects in the correspondence theory of truth, the same problem which arose in Marty’s theory of truth. On the other hand, they used a kind of argumentation that, as Le´s´niewski pointed out, remains valid without any changes for different theories of judgment. The arguments presented by them focus on principles of classical logic rather than on a description of our mental life.

6.1

Free Creation and the Sempiternity of Truth

In 1913 Kotarbi´n´ ski, recognizing a tension between the free creativity of human beings and the absoluteness of truth challenged the thesis of the objectivity of truth. From everyday experience, Kotarbi´n´ ski argues, we know that there is free creation.35 Consider the variety of possibilities as far as my activity tomorrow goes. Hence, if we assume free creation, then we have to exclude any kind of strong determinism of the future, says Kotarbi´n´ ski. If I am able to decide that tomorrow I will send a software registration letter to Microsoft’s Customer Service, it cannot be determined already today, since I can change my mind, change the software in my computer and give the trouble-making Windows

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back to the retailer. (I assume that nobody will take this example as one given by Kotarbi´n´ ski.) To clarify the problem of pre-determinism and indeterminism regarding the future, Kotarbi´n´ ski relates them to the problem of absolute truth, asking about the truth-value of judgments about the future. Thus, the problem of freedom in creativity is considered in the light of the truth or falsehood of judgments about the future rather than in the classical framework of the cause-effect relation. Therefore it follows that creativity and hence freedom do not end precisely where cause and effect begins, but they already end where truth begins. (Kotarbi´n´ ski 1913, p. 82— my translation)

Now, the problem of the relation between truth and creation seems to be as follows: If truth is independent of time, then this implies a kind of determinism. But the thesis of the absoluteness of truth can be split, as it was later by Le´s´niewski, into two different theses, i.e. into the thesis of the eternity of truth and the thesis of its sempiternity. The thesis of the eternity of truth (or of true ‘for ever’) can be formulated in the following manner: TET (Thesis of the eternity of truth:) If a judgment J is true at a point of time t1 , then it is also true at every point of time t2 which is later than t1 (‘t2 > t1 ’). The thesis of the sempiternity of truth (or of true without a beginning or of truth ‘since ever’) can be formulated, analogously, as follows: TST (Thesis of the sempiternity of truth:) If a judgment J is true at a point of time t1 , then it is also true at every point of time t2 which is earlier than t1 (‘t2 < t1’). Now, the conjunction of both theses is what was called by Bolzano the absoluteness of truth. Now, consider the example of my judgment that tomorrow I will send the registration card for my software. If truth is without a beginning, then this judgment was true already, not only today, but also one hundred years ago. But how is it possible that judgments about non-existent objects can be true? (For my action of sending the registration card did not exist today; likewise, I was non-existent one hundred years ago, not to mention the software.) But, the given judgment cannot be false, either. For otherwise, because of the eternity of truth, it would be false forever. Then what happens if I do send the registration card tomorrow? On the other hand, it seems that I can decide about the sending of the registration card, so that I have a role in determining whether the judgment about my action will be true or false. Thus, Kotarbi´n´ ski holds only one of these theses. He held, namely, that TET is valid whereas TST is not, i.e. that truth is eternal but not sempiternal. Every

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truth has its beginning, but then stays truth forever. The assumption of the thesis of the sempiternity of truth leads, according to him, to the pre-determinism of our free creation. If the sentence about my action which takes place tomorrow is true today, I cannot behave in another way than the way which is stated in this sentence, otherwise the sentence would be false tomorrow. Thus, the sentence about my actions tomorrow cannot be true today. Kotarbi´n´ ski’s general argument for this is as follows: There exists an object O if and only if there is a true judgment J about the existence of this object O. Now, if I am able to create an object O, this means that the judgment J about the existence of the object O is not true. Otherwise, I could not create something which already exists. However, perhaps the judgment J about my action tomorrow can be false today and will be true tomorrow if I will do it in the way stated in this judgment? Here, Kotarbi´n´ ski also denies that judgments about the future can be false. Let us assume that today’s judgment J about my behavior tomorrow as to the Microsoft software is false, i.e. I will not send the registration card to Microsoft. But how can the judgment J be false today when it is about an object which will exist only tomorrow? In other words, Kotarbi´n´ ski sees a problem in the fact that something can exist in some way, even when I judge falsely about its existence. Moreover, tomorrow I may decide keep Windows in the hope that my friend, a computer scientist, can do something with it. According to Kotarbi´n´ ski, my action tomorrow will make the judgment J true. Thus, since a judgment about the future cannot be true or false, there must be at least some judgments which are neither true nor false at a given point in time. According to Kotarbi´n´ ski, a sufﬁcient argument for the assumption of judgments which are neither true nor false is that we could not create an object about which a judgment is already false or true. Therefore, if neither that about which the assertive judgment is true nor that about which the assertive judgment is false can be created, then there is a condition of the possibility of the free creation of something, in the sense that the assertive judgment about this something is neither true nor false. (Kotarbi´n´ ski 1913, pp. 80–81—my translation)

It seems that both arguments of Kotarbi´n´ ski, i.e. about the impossibility of truth and falsehood without a beginning, use the thesis of the eternity of truth which, in fact, he holds as valid without argumentation. Thus, whereas all truths are eternal, not every truth is sempiternal. There are judgments which begin to be true. If they begin to be true, however, they will stay true forever.

6.2

The Notion of Existence

As one can suppose in examining the argument given by Kotarbi´n´ ski, the crucial point in this argument is his notion of existence. Kotarbi´n´ ski in fact considers the term ‘existence’ to be ambiguous and makes a distinction between

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the everyday understanding of this notion and the way in which he uses this notion in his argument for truths with a beginning. The everyday usage of the term ‘existence’ refers to the presence of a thing, Kotarbi´n´ ski claims. In order to avoid a confusion of the everyday notion with the notion he uses, he deﬁnes the notion of existence in a way already mentioned above: DE An object O exists iff a judgment J about this object is true. Kotarbi´n´ ski chooses the second meaning of ‘existence’ for it is, as he claims, the sense in which people speak about existence when speaking about the past, the present and the future.36 As regards the ordinary usage of ‘existence’, Kotarbi´n´ ski gives us the way in which the presence of an object can be understood so as to remain consistent with his notion of existence as given in DE. He proposes to interpret the presence as a property of things. Instead of saying ‘The rose which I saw in July is red’ it would be more proper, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, to say ‘The July-rose is red’. He thereby suggests treating predications of space and of time as properties of things in the same way in which we predicate of them shape or color. All predications are, in this respect, expressions of properties, and a general scheme for such sentences in which we predicate about things would be as follows: ‘An object O with a time-property t and with a space-property x is P ’. It is very clear that Kotarbi´n´ ski locates space-time properties, properties whose expressions appear on the surface of language as indexicals, as properties of things and not as properties of judgments, as was the case with Twardowski. Thus, for Kotarbi´n´ ski ‘to exist’ means the same as ‘to have a property P when having the property of being at the point of time t and in the space x’ (i.e. ‘P (t, x)’). Moreover, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, this having a property P (t, x) is predominantly the object of assertive judgments. If one says that something is such and such, one thinks that it has such and such a property; we judge about having a property by an object. This is an interesting point in Kotarbi´n´ ski’s analysis, not only because he transfers the time-space properties from being properties of judgments to being properties of objects, but also because he interprets Brentano’s existential theory of judgment. It seems that Kotarbi´n´ ski adopts Brentano’s view according to which all assertive judgments are existential judgments, i.e. they are judgments about the existence of an object. However, given the interpretation of the notion of existence, i.e. since the existence of an object is having a property P together with the properties of being in a given time and space, judgments have a much more complicated logical form than that considered by Brentano. This represents, I think, a ﬁrst attempt in the tradition of analytical philosophy to resign from the notion of existence as a primitive notion. From a historical point of view it was signiﬁcant for two reasons. On the one hand, it has not changed the view of the validity of the idiogenetic, existential theory of

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judgment as formulated ﬁrst by Brentano on the level of descriptive psychology. On the other hand, it shows that the notion of existence must not be taken as primitive and can be interpreted in a manner that is more accurate for the purposes of modern mathematical logic. Thus, when one speaks of changing the logical form of judgment in opposition to the existential form defended by orthodox Brentanians, this does not automatically mean that we do not have an existential theory of judgment. The existential theory of judgment only took on a different meaning, as in the case of Kotarbi´n´ ski.

6.3

Note on Truth with a Beginning and on the Principle of the Excluded Middle

Kotarbi´n´ ski’s paper is very rich in other respects, among which I shall mention his reformulation of the principle of the excluded middle. On the one hand, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski’s theory of eternal but not sempiternal truth, we have judgments which are neither true nor false. Thus, we have two classes of judgments which he calls deﬁnite and indeﬁnite with regard to their having or not having truth-values. Indeﬁnite judgments are those whose truth or falsehood is undetermined until they will become true or false. On the other hand, however, Kotarbi´n´ ski claims that the principle of the excluded middle is universally valid, but only when we apply this principle so as to obtain the following sentences: ‘For every judgment J, J is either true or false’ or ‘For every judgment J, either J or non-J is true’. It seems, however, that in contradiction with the above statement there exists a class of indeﬁnite judgments. Therefore, in order to retain the principle of classical logic, Kotarbi´n´ ski restricts the range of applicability of these principles to deﬁnite judgments only. Moreover, as far as the universal validity of the principle of the excluded middle is concerned, Kotarbi´n´ ski reformulates it in the following manner: ‘For every judgment J, if the judgment is true, then the judgment non-J is false’. From a historical point of view it is worth noting that, at this point, strong differentiation between the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of bivalence would not have led to this difﬁculty. In fact, it is another reason why the distinction should be considered meaningful.

6.4

Le´s´niewski’s Response

In the same year in which Kotarbi´n´ ski paper appeared, Les´niewski published an article in ‘Nowe Tory’ with the signiﬁcant title ‘Is all Truth only True Eternally or Is it also True Without a Beginning?’.37 In his response to Kotarbi´nski’s argument, Le´s´niewski defends the absolute view on truth defended by Bolzano and Twardowski, i.e. the view in which truth is not only eternal but also sempiternal. One of the main bones of contention between both philosophers in this paper was the notion of existence and its relation to time and space.

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Above all, Le´s´niewski does not accept the notion of existence as deﬁned by Kotarbi´n´ ski. Existence is, according to Kotarbin´ ski, the possession of a property. However, argues Le´s´niewski, if this possession of a property is the object of an assertive judgment, then according to the deﬁnition of existence given by Kotarbi´n´ ski, the only object which exists is the possession of a property. Hence, the property itself, as well as the object which possesses it, do not exist. In consequence, if one accepts Kotarbi´n´ ski’s account of the notion of existence, one must admit that if the judgment that the paper written by Kotarbi´n´ ski is short is true (if it is true that the paper possesses the property of being short), then the paper, as well as its author, do not exist. Moreover, Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski do not agree as to what can exist. Whereas Kotarbi´n´ ski’s objects of judgment are seen as past, present and future objects, Le´s´niewski refers to the past, present and future existence of an object. Le´s´niewski can therefore defend the view that an afﬁrmative judgment which refers to an object can be true even if the underlying object does not exist simultaneously with the judgment. I can judge about my future action, just as I am able to judge tomorrow about my writing of these lines. Thus, for Le´s´niewski, existence is not a property and it is atemporal: . . . an afﬁrmative judgment referring to an object is sometimes true not only when in ´ time that object exists. (Lesniewski 1913 [1992, pp. 95–96])

In an assertive judgment about the past or the future, I make a statement about some object as existent in the past or in the future, and not about the past or future object. Otherwise, in Le´s´niewski’s mind, we have to accept the consequences of Kotarbi´n´ ski’s view on existence which leads to difﬁculties similar to those with which Marty had to deal earlier in his actualistic theory of judgment, i.e. that objects would exist if and only if we judge truly about them, which is not the case. Thus, in order to avoid such consequences, Le´s´niewski adopts a solution which in this respect is similar to Marty’s distinction between ‘to be real’ and ‘to exist’. Objects are real at speciﬁc points of time, but they exist at all times and not only when they are truly judged. Both realia and non-realia can exist. . . . an object exists not only then in time when an afﬁrmative judgment referring to it is ´ true. (Lesniewski 1913 [1992, p. 95])

Thus, if my computer, for instance, deletes these lines of the text, tomorrow still I am able to judge truly that the lines were written by me today, even if they are no longer real.

6.5

The Eternity of Truth and the Principle of the Excluded Middle

As we have seen, Kotarbi´n´ ski, accepting the TET (thesis about the eternity of truth), had to change the formulation of the principle of the excluded middle

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into a conditional in order to guarantee its universal validity. Now, accepting the same thesis about truth ‘for ever’, Le´s´niewski uses the principle of the excluded middle to prove that there are absolute true judgments in both an eternal sense and without a beginning, i.e. if one accepts TET, then one must also accept TST. The argument goes roughly as follows: Le´s´niewski reformulates the thesis of the sempiternity of truth into the question of whether there was ever a point in time t1 at which a judgment J was not true, whereas the same judgment J is true at the point in time t2 which is later than t1 . Let us ﬁrst assume indirectly, proposes Le´s´niewski, that there was some point in time t1 at which the judgment J was not true, i.e. (1) (Jη(V er)t1 , and, secondly, that there is some point in time t2 (later than t1 ) at which the judgment J is true: (2) (non-Jτ (V er)t2 . Using the principle of the excluded middle (and, in fact, both the principle of the excluded middle and the principle of bivalence) from (1) we obtain: (3) (non-Jτ (V er)t1 and, similarly, from (2): (4) (non-Jη(V er)t2 . Now we can apply the thesis of the eternity of truth TET to which both Kotarbi´n´ ski and Les´niewski agree. From TET and (3) we have: (5) If (non-Jτ (V er)t1 , then non-J is true at every point in time which is later than t1 . Given assumptions (1) and (2), where t2 is a later point in time with regard to t1 , and (5) we have: (6) If (non-Jτ (V er)t1 , then (non-Jτ (V er)t2 which, after the reduction of (6) using (3), is in contradiction with (4). Similarly, applying the thesis of the eternity of truth TET to (1) we obtain: (7) If (non-Jη(V er)t1 , then non-J is not true at every point in time which is later than t1 . In particular: (8) If (non-Jη(V er)t1 , then (non-Jη(V er)t2 . which is in contradiction with (2). Le´s´niewski’s original proof goes somewhat differently, but the crucial idea of using the thesis of the eternity of truth, combined with the principles of the excluded middle and of bivalence in order to prove sempiternity of truth, is similar.38 I shall not evaluate this proof nor shall I evaluate Le´s´niewski’s proof of the eternity of truth that is given in the same paper. Both attempts are

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clearly ballasted with several philosophical assumptions. What is important and, I hope also clear, is that these philosophical assumptions are deeply rooted in the Brentanian tradition and they can be found in different forms in the writings of Twardowski, Husserl and Marty. What is also interesting from a historical point of view is that both debaters agreed unanimously on the fact that truth must be at least eternal. The common conviction among Polish philosophers that truth should preserve objectivity, valid to this day, undoubtedly ﬁnds its conﬁrmation in their great predecessors, Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski, as well as in other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School who accepted the axiom of objective truth.

6.6

What Does ‘Absolute Truth’ Mean?

Le´s´niewski’s discussion with Kotarbin´ ski is not only a debate about the objectivity of truth that is somehow indirectly related to the problem of the truth bearer, but it is also indirectly important with regard to this problem. Namely, on this occasion Le´s´niewski made some remarks about judgments as absolutely bearing truth-values. The discussion itself between both philosophers takes place either on the level of the mental acts of judging (when arguing about true or false judgments) or it takes place on the level of their linguistic expressions (i.e. when speaking about true and false sentences). Le´s´niewski himself, however, prefers to speak about sentences. But even for him, the choice of the level of discussion does not change the main points of argumentation: I say ‘I utter a judgment’; but should someone prefer that ‘judgments’ were ‘written down’ or ‘experienced’, ‘felt’ or ‘lived through’—it would in no way affect the result ´ of my discussion. (Lesniewski 1913 [1992, p. 95])

In spite of this statement, Le´s´niewski makes some remarks regarding the nature of judgment. For him, the basic notion in this respect is that of the uttered judgment. Expressions of judgments, however, are infected with an ambiguity along the lines pointed out by Twardowski. Uttered judgments, like the mental acts of which they are the expressions, are episodic only. Yet we speak about the same judgment when we in fact have numerically different judgments. When different people at different points in time utter (in the same sense) the judgment ‘The rose is red’ we tend to take these utterances as if they were expressing one and the same judgment. In such situations, however, we speak about the same judgment only in some metaphorical sense, Le´s´niewski claims. Furthermore, Le´s´niewski continues, we also attribute duration to a judgment in a metaphorical sense. An act of judging is episodic and its utterance is also a non-durable process; at those points in time when nobody utters such a judgment, we should deny any duration to this judgment. Thus, if one says that something is eternal in the sense that it never ceases, this certainly cannot

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be said about judgments. A judgment begins to have duration when it is uttered for the ﬁrst time and, with pauses, it ends when it is uttered for the last time. One can speak about eternal judgments only in the sense in which can one speak about the eternity of truth: No true judgment, in other words no truth, is eternal in this sense if the human race that utters judgments is eternal. (Le´s´niewski 1913 [1992, p. 96])

In fact, no truth can ever be claimed to be eternal. Therefore, according to Le´s´niewski, the thesis about the absoluteness of truth states only that there will not occur a point in time at which a judgment that was true at some point in time could change its truth-value when uttered at another point in time. It is along these lines that one should read the thesis about truth ‘since ever’: there was never in the past a point in time at which a given true act of judgment was not true when uttered. This is one of the earliest expressions of Le´s´niewski’s nominalism and it seems to be rooted in Marty’s actualism in the theory of judgment and truth. It is, however, a remarkable fact that the very same problem of the object of judgment led to two completely different solutions: to rich ontologies like those of Meinong in Austria and Reinach in Germany, on the one hand, and to the nominalistic positions accepted by philosophers in Poland, on the other.39

7.

´ Maria Kokoszynska (I): The Relativity of the Semantic Notion of Truth

Issues dealing with the objectivity of truth were discussed in Poland not only before Tarski’s formulation of the deﬁnition of truth in 1933, but later as well. Moreover, the discussion grew in strength in the light of this new deﬁnition and its new opponents. One of the distinguished attempts to formulate the problem of the objectivity of truth with regard to Tarski’s semantic deﬁnition of truth was made by Maria Kokoszy´n´ ska. As a matter of fact, her description of the problem goes beyond the time which I consider in this study, i.e. until 1933. However, it is worth referring to Kokoszy´n´ ska’s papers published after this date for at least two reasons: For one thing, they present the ﬁrst clariﬁcation of the problem of objectivity of the semantic conception of truth. Secondly, they show how the problem of objective truth was important in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Thirdly, they show that for the investigations of the objectivity of semantic truth both Bolzanian and Aristotelian notions of objective truth still played an important role. Furthermore, we can assume that the papers mentioned below were an outcome of discussions which took place immediately around the time when Tarski’s results appeared, i.e. around 1929.

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143

The Absoluteness of the Classical Conception of Truth

In a speech given on the occasion of the Third Polish Philosophical Conference in Krakow in 1936.40 Kokoszy´n´ ska distinguishes two types of questions which should be asked in the context of the semantic deﬁnition of truth. The ﬁrst question is: ‘Is the term «true» in this deﬁnition relative or absolute?’ The second question is: ‘Is it possible in a system in which theses of the form «p is true» appear that these theses are not relative with regard to the assumptions of this system?’ (where p stands for the sentences.) The answer to the ﬁrst question depends, according to Kokoszy´n´ ska, entirely on what ‘true’ means. If one takes, for example, concepts of truth other than the semantic deﬁnition, concepts in which ‘true’ would be equivalent to ‘consistent’ or ‘commonly accepted’, the notion of truth would be relative. As far as the semantic notion of truth is concerned, if this formulation preserves the intuitions connected with the classical concept of truth the term ‘truth’ should be understood as non-relative. ‘Truth’ is a non-relative term in the semantic conception of truth under the following condition: the meanings of the sentences of the language for which the deﬁnition is formulated are ﬁxed. The sentences cannot change their contents depending on the time, circumstances and epistemic subjects who read these sentences.

7.2

Relativization to Language

Kokoszy´n´ ska notes, of course, that utterances of the same sound or inscriptions of the same shape can have different meanings. It depends upon which rules of inference are assumed in the language to which these utterances or inscriptions belong. The assumption which must be made in order to retain the absoluteness of the classical conception of truth is that the meanings of utterances and inscriptions are ﬁxed. When we treat sentences and utterances with regard to their truth without ﬁxing their meanings, we make the notion of truth relative. This assumption also decides the answer to the second question asked above, i.e. about the relativeness of the metalinguistic thesis ‘p is true’. It is clear that whether the notion of truth is given an absolutistic or a non-absolutistic interpretation is related here to the notion of meaning. More speciﬁcally, truth as deﬁned for a given language, is relative to the meaning of the sentences of that language. Kokoszy´n´ ska in turn describes the sense or meaning of the utterances and sentences in a certain language using Ajdukiewicz’s notion of directives of the language. Roughly speaking, the sense or the meaning of a sentence S in a language L is the relation in which the sentence S stands to every other sentence in the language L.41 It is remarkable how the speech given by Kokoszy´n´ ska was discussed by Tarski himself. He presupposes that the notion of sense or meaning is much more complicated than the notion of language. Thus, the notion of truth, since

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it is relative, should be relative to the concept of (formalized) language.42 This is because the latter does not produce any technical troubles; it is more clear and less complicated than the notion of its sense or meaning. Hence, in order to become absolute the classical notion of truth should be relative to a given (formalized) language. The absoluteness of truth therefore presents another motive for the theory of truth in which ‘true’ is predicated of sentences or utterances.

Remark. I have not paid much attention to a modern aspect of objectivity (dating from the 1930’s), having to do with the problem of intersubjectivity. This problem has several levels, such as the problem of intersubjective meaning, or, something which is important from the point of view of the choice of the truth bearer, the problem of psychologism. I have almost exclusively relied on the concept of objectivity as described by Bolzano, as well as by Husserl and others, following Aristotelians. I think that other notions of objectivity have not had a direct impact on the understanding of the objectivity of truth and these can be put in other contexts. These contexts are, respectively to the problems mentioned, the problem of the cognition of the meanings of uttered sentences, the problem of the cognition of someone’s thought, or the problem of their individuation.

8.

Summary of Chapter 7: Objective Truth and Objective Knowledge 8.1 Objective Knowledge The notion of objectivity used in the course of this chapter is consistent with Bolzano in his Theory of Science. However, the same notion of objectivity can be used not only regarding truth, but also when predicated of knowledge. Objective knowledge bears a resemblance to objective truth in both respects, as regards the ways in which they are objective and as regards the method of making them objective. This should not be surprising if we consider the fact that according to the epistemic deﬁnition of the truth bearer as given in Chapter 2 above, it is very often the case that these are the epistemic tools which serve as the bearers of truth. Since the notion of the objectivity of truth and knowledge remains Bolzanian here, it is therefore worth seeing how truth and knowledge can be objectivized. Since the notion of objective truth was explained at the beginning of this chapter, it is now appropriate to make some remarks regarding the notion of objective knowledge. Above all, when speaking about objectivity in Bolzano’s sense, objective knowledge is to be understood in a narrow sense as knowledge independent of a subject (i.e. consciousness). Thus, ﬁrst, if one speaks about the objectivity of knowledge, one thinks about the objectivity of the products (results) of certain knowing acts whereby the knowing act is to be understood

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as a mental event or process which depends on the subject (i.e. the act is an act of some subject and it stands in a real causal relation to this psychological subject). A product of knowledge is objective if the product is independent of each and every subject (and, respectively, from each and every consciousness). This means either (a) that different subjects with cognitive dispositions have access to the objective products of cognition (this is what is supposed by K.R. Popper in his concept of the 3rd world and by B. Bolzano in his account of the world of sentences in themselves).43 The above could also mean (b) that the products of cognitive acts become independent, i.e. they begin to live independently with reference to consciousness (as in Popper’s third world). Secondly, and this is the view of Brentano and others, in order to guarantee the objectivity of an act of knowledge (as contrasted with the product of the act) one needs some objective condition of knowledge. In Brentano’s view the role of such an objective condition is played by the identity of the knowing subject with the object of knowledge (at least, to avoid some objections, in the case of the empirical knowledge). Thirdly, objectivity in the sense of subject independence may also be called intersubjectivity. With reference to the act of cognition, this means that different subjects can repeat in exactly the same fashion similar acts of cognition and in such a way as to yield the same or similar results. Moreover, they should be in a position to give a recipe for the given kind of act and to give information about the results. An example in this regard is provided by Brentano’s experience of evidence or by Husserl’s notion of insight [Einsicht]. In reference to the results of knowledge, we can understand objectivity as equal-accessibility of the products for all relevantly situated knowing subjects. In the broadest sense, then, we can understand the concept of objectivity as meaning absoluteness (as independence from time). In regard to the products of acts of cognition, absolute knowledge is either timeless (like Bolzano’s sentences in themselves) or unchangeable in the course of the time. Although absolute acts of knowledge are usually considered to be the attributes of a god or of some other ‘objective’ or ‘transcendental’ consciousness, the demand that the products of cognitive acts be absolute seems more plausible to us.44 These kinds of understanding of objectivity refer, as mentioned above, to both knowledge and truth. It needs to be mentioned, however, that the notion objective knowledge in the above senses is not always or perhaps even never the same as the notion of true knowledge in the works of the authors mentioned. On the one hand, not every case of objective knowledge is a case of true knowledge. In Bolzano’s philosophy, for example, there are also absolute false sentences [Falschheiten an sich]. They are objective in the same sense in which true sentences in themselves are objective. Moreover, we have cognitive access to both objectively false and objectively true sentences. Objective falsehoods are not to be found in Popper’s 3rd world, but some objective hypotheses and theories in this world are false. On the other hand, not every case

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of true knowledge is a case of objective knowledge. Brentano assumes that there can be judgments about the external world which are true, but which are such that they will never be correct, i.e. capable of being proven by deduction or by experience of evidence. The condition for the appearance of the latter is the identity of subject with object and this cannot take place in the context of our cognition of the external world. Thus, judgments about the world outside of the mind will never be a part of our knowledge. In the aforementioned senses the notion of objectivity is opposed to that of relativity, i.e. relativity with respect either to the knowing subject or to the time. With regard to this opposition and to the philosophical tradition, we might also mention the issue of independence regarding space or circumstances. It is difﬁcult to deﬁne such a metaphor, but one can demand that our knowledge and the corresponding truths remain unchangeable not only with respect to a subject of cognition and a point in time, but also under ‘different (spatial) circumstances’. Thus, the following metaphorical expression: ‘independently of circumstances’ will at the moment give us an explanation of space-independence. It could be, on the one hand, that space-independence is less relevant to our concerns than are the other kinds of independence. For example, if we take mental acts to be truth bearers, then these acts are always described as non-spatial. On the other hand, however, some philosophers like Twardowski, insisted upon the spatial indexicality of judgments. (‘I think its raining in Kraków today.’)45

Remark. A short note on the objective knowledge in the Aristotelian sense is required. What does it mean that knowledge can be measured according to the things in the world of which it is the knowledge? There seem to be two general answers to this question. Firstly, knowledge, if it should be objective in this sense, must be empirical. Secondly, there must be an object of knowledge independent of cognitive subject. The latter answer claims epistemological realism. The former answer claims strong empiricism. It is worth noting that both claims were propounded by Brentanians. Even if an object of knowledge were not empirical, it would demand an empirical explanation of its access and cognition.

8.2

How Knowledge Becomes Objectivized

How, then, does knowledge become objectivized? By the ‘objectivization of knowledge’ in a given case, I understand the fulﬁllment of one or more of the conditions speciﬁed above. Similarly, by the objectivization of truth I will understand the assumption of any condition which refers to the knowing subject, the truth bearer, truth-maker and other conditions which give us the reasons to describe the truth of a given theory of truth as objective in one of the above given senses.

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Now, the objectivization of knowledge can be accomplished assuming one or more of the following conditions (see Table 1): 1. Objectivization as making knowledge independent of time (i.e. absolutization): 1.1. With regard to the subject of knowledge: (i) The assumption of a timeless subject such as (one which does not exist in time), for instance, god or some transcendental consciousness (later Husserl), whose knowledge (in the form of acts or the results of such acts) is beyond time. This is a less interesting possibility of the objectivization of knowledge for someone who is interested especially in empirical subjects and their empirical knowledge. (ii) The assumption that we do not need any knowing subject at all to perform an act at a particular point in time, because knowledge exists without any empirical subject (Popper, Bolzano). 1.2. Absolutization of knowledge with regard to the act of knowledge: (i) The assumption of timeless media of knowledge (tools). These may be the ideal contents of judgment, meanings, senses or logical laws: tools which, from the beginning of the act of cognition, guarantee its independence with regard to time. Thus, the media of knowledge which, by nature, are in time here express something which exists beyond time. (For example, Husserl’s written or spoken sentences can be interpreted as uses of ideal meanings which are tools of knowledge and communication.) (ii) Another assumption made by such a conception of the media of knowledge is that of being temporarily instantiated counterparts of timeless media. Despite the fact that we use judgments and language which exist in time, they exemplify something outside of time (their ideal contents or meanings, for example). (iii) One can also assume that we have at our disposal permanent or eternal products of the act of knowledge such as sentence-types, propositions or other ideal meanings, theories and so on. These exist in time, but we can recognize them and use them at each point of time.46 1.3. Assumptions for the absolutization of knowledge made with regard to the object of knowledge: (i) The assumption of timeless objects of knowledge such as numbers, objects of logic, sentences in themselves and others. If we ‘really’ know such objects, then it is impossible that at another point in time

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they could be cognized in a different way. Even if they were never to be known, their cognition is guaranteed to be time-independent. (ii) The assumption that our knowledge has validity at any point in time (a kind of a priori knowledge, such as Brentano’s axiomatic judging). 1.4. Assumptions for the absolutization of knowledge made with regard to special conditions for knowledge: (i) The assumption of the timeless condition of knowledge, such as Brentano’s identity of the cognitive subject and the object of cognition. (ii) The assumption of a condition or a special kind of cognitive act which is valid at any point in time, such as a Cartesian or Husserlian insight, insofar as this is seen as being involved in our knowledge of mathematical inferences. (iii) The assumption of intersubjectivity, understood in such a way that at any point in time there exists the possibility of repeating the act of knowledge in such a way that the result is the same product. 1.5. The objectivization of knowledge regarding time is also made by a combination of assumptions 1.1. through 1.4.47 2. As in the case of the possibilities mentioned above for making knowledge objective with regard to time, one can also order the assumptions for making knowledge objective with regard to space: 2.1. One can make assumptions with regard to the subject of knowledge. This possibility can be seen, however, as less interesting because the subject of knowledge is always described as non-spatial. (Especially by descriptive psychologists.) 2.2. One can make assumptions about the objectivity of knowledge as to circumstances with regard to the act of knowledge in the following ways: (i) By assuming the timelessness of the media of knowledge. It should be mentioned that we can include here among the tools of knowledge such entities as mental acts which are always described as non-spatial by their very nature, as well as entities like Bolzano’s sentences in themselves, logical laws and so on. (ii) The assumption of instances of timeless entities (as in the case of absolutization—see 1.2.(ii) above), and (iii) The assumption of permanent products as media of knowledge, such as theories and type-sentences. 2.3. The assumptions for the objectivity of knowledge as to circumstances regarding objects of knowledge are the following:

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(i) The assumption of objects which are beyond space, such as numbers, sentences in themselves and––what seems to be important– –the mind or psyche. (ii) The assumption of some kind of a priori knowledge, which is valid for any object under any circumstances. 2.4. Another group, assumptions with regard to the conditions of knowledge consists of the following: (i) The assumption of timeless conditions of knowledge, such as psychological conditions characterized in terms of evidence (e.g. the statement that the presence of evidence makes an act of knowledge objective), insight and so on. (ii) The assumption of the condition of intersubjectivity in the sense given above. 2.5. It is also, of course, possible to make combinations of assumptions 2.1. through 2.4. 3. Finally, objectivization in the narrow sense, i.e. making knowledge independent of a subject (or of a consciousness), takes place by means of the following assumptions: 3.1. With regard to the subject of knowledge: (i) The assumption that there is no empirical subject (but only a transcendental one, or something similar). (ii) An assumption which is more interesting than the former because it refers to an empirical subject: the monistic assumption that there is only one consciousness. (iii) The assumption of solipsism. Then the problem of the independence of knowledge from a subject does not exist at all. 3.2. Objectivization of knowledge as independent of a subject (or of consciousness) with regard to the object of knowledge consists of the following: (i) The introduction of entities which can be used as epistemic tools and which do not depend on any sort of consciousness for their existence. Examples are Bolzano’s sentences in themselves, logical laws and so on. (ii) The assumption of epistemic tools which are products of acts of knowledge and which continue to exist without any subject, such as sentence-types or theories. 3.3. Objectivization (of knowledge regarding the subject) with respect to the objects of knowledge is made by the help of the following:

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(i) The assumption of objects which are independent of consciousness or which are entirely outside the realm of consciousness. It should be mentioned here that in making such an assumption we should decide the problem of mental objects, since images, representations and so on are mind-dependent. (ii) The assumption of the intelligibility of the object of knowledge. Here these objects are cognizable for any subject. It may be worth mentioning that this is one of the most commonly held assumptions in theories of knowledge. 3.4. Objectivization (of knowledge regarding the subject) with regard to other conditions of knowledge can be made by introducing: (i) A condition which is independent of any consciousness, such as Brentano’s identity of the subject and the object of knowledge (hence, for Brentano, for any species which has the ability to make a judgment, there exists a class of judgments which fulﬁl this condition) or such as Husserl’s epoche. This kind of condition is very often accompanied by the assumption of ‘privileged cognition’, as formulated in what follows: (ii) The assumption that every individual of a species with the ability to gain knowledge has the same abilities, such as, for instance, Husserl’s assumption that each of us might, after appropriate training, be capable of achieving phenomenological insight.48 3.5. Combinations of assumptions 3.1. through 3.4.

8.3

The Objectivization of Truth

The objectivization of truth, which in many ways is similar to the objectivization of knowledge, can be achieved with the help of the following assumptions (see Table 2): 1. The absolutization of truth: 1.1. With respect to the subject, this takes place by: (i) The assumption of a timeless subject which cognizes a given truth (Again, this is uninteresting if we are interested in cases where an empirical subject is involved). (ii) The assumption that truth can exist even without any epistemological subject or the assumption of truths which can be grasped by any subject (sentences themselves or true products of cognitive acts, such as those which belong to Popper’s 3rd world, for example). 1.2. The absolutization of truth with regard to the truth bearer takes place by means of:

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(i) The timelessness of the truth bearer (e.g. sentences in themselves in Bolzano’s theory); (ii) The assumption that at any point in time we can exemplify timeless truth bearers by means of an act of knowledge. (iii) The assumption of the existence of permanent products such as, for example, sentence-types, which can be exempliﬁed at any point in time. (iv) The de-contextualization of the truth bearer with respect to time (by its indexicalization: ‘The sentence written by me on January the 20th, 1999 according to the Gregorian calendar and so on’). 1.3. The absolutization of truth with respect to truth-makers can be achieved by: (i) The assumption of the timelessness of that in the world which decides the truth-value of the truth bearer (e.g. numbers, objects of logic in Husserl and Frege or sentences in themselves in Bolzano, when conceived as truth-makers). (ii) The thesis to the effect that that which decides the truth-value of the truth bearer is unchangeable, although it is in time (such as, for example, physical laws-—the view held by Brentano and Marty).49 (iii) The assumption that there are no truth-makers of whatever truthbearers one likes. This includes assumptions such as that the truthvalue of analytical sentences is independent of the world, or, taking another example, that if something is true at some point in time, then regardless of what might happen, it will remain true. (iv) Time-indexicality (time de-contextualization) of the truth-maker (‘Today, January the 5th 1999 according to the Gregorian calendar something is the case’). 1.4. Other conditions undertaken in order to retain the time-independence of truth are, for example: (i) The assumption of time-independence of the criteria of truth (such as the principle of non-contradiction), or (ii) criteria which are valid at any point in time (such as the aforementioned identity of subject and object in Brentano’s view.) 1.5. Finally, of course, combinations of assumptions formulated in 1.1. through 1.4. 2. The possibilities of making truth independent of space or circumstances rely on the following assumptions: 2.1. The assumption in which the subject is considered as a non-spatial subject (e.g. the Brentanian psyche).

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2.2. Assumptions with respect to the truth-bearer: (i) The assumption that the truth-bearer is beyond space (because it belongs to the domain of what is mental in a Cartesian sense, or because the truth bearer is something ideal like a sentence in itself in Bolzano’s sense). (ii) The assumption of the possibility of exemplifying a timeless truth bearer. For example, an act of judging which exempliﬁes a sentence in itself as its content. (iii) The assumption of products which are independent of space, such as, for example, sentence-types. (iv) Space indexicality (space de-contextualization) of the truth bearer. 2.3. With respect to the truth-maker: (i) The assumption of truth-makers which are beyond space (numbers, sentences in themselves, objects of logic, mental acts, states of affairs). (ii) The assumption of any truth-maker for a given truth bearer. (Examples here can be Husserl’s idea of variation or the idea of fulﬁllment with any sequence of objects from the universe); (iii) The space indexicality of the truth-maker (e.g. by means of quantiﬁcation). (iv) The assumption of a truth-maker which ﬁlls all space (such as, for example, maximal situations). 2.4. Other conditions of making truth independent of space or circumstances: (i) A criterion of truth which is independent of space, or (ii) a criterion which is valid under any circumstances (identity, consistency, coherence and so on). 2.5. As with the other cases, it is possible to combine the assumptions given above in 2.1.–2.4.50 3. Objectivization of truth as independence of the knowing subject takes place by means of the following assumptions: 3.1. Assumptions with respect to the subject: (i) The assumption of a transcendental subject (uninteresting for those interested in empirical cognitive subjects). (ii) The assumption that we do not need any subject of knowledge at all (that truth exists in and of itself). (iii) The assumption of monism (there exists only one subject and therefore there cannot be any problem of his knowing or even of the existence of a difference between subject and object).

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(iv) Solipsism. 3.2. Objectivization of truth by making truth independent of the knowing subject also takes place by means of assumptions with regard to the truth bearer. These are: (i) The assumption that the truth bearer is independent of consciousness (that it is a matter of ideal contents, sentences in themselves and so on). (ii) The assumption of the exempliﬁcation of truth bearers which are independent of the subject (act of judging—ideal content, utterancetoken—its meaning and so on). (iii) The assumption of permanent product-like sentence-types. (iv) The process of ascribing of an epistemic subject to a given truth bearer, i.e. an indexicalization of the relation of the truth bearer to the epistemic subject (‘John Smith’s mother’s utterance is true’). 3.3. Objectivization (as independence of a subject) with regard to the truthmaker is accomplished by means of: (i) The assumption that the truth-maker is independent of consciousness (here we have not only objects like sentences in themselves or numbers, but above all objects from the so-to-speak external world, which is one of the most commonly held assumptions in classical theories of truth). (ii) The assumption of the intelligibility of the truth maker (this is quite a strong assumption in which what decides the truth-value of the truth bearer is capable of being known by everyone). (iii) The indexicality of the truth-maker with regard to the subject (‘the utterance of John Smith’s mother about what she sees is true’). 3.4. Objectivization (as independence of a subject) with regard to the truthmaker is also made by means of other objectifying conditions such as, for example: (i) A criterion for truth which is subject independent, or (ii) a criterion of truth which would remain valid for any subject (coherence, correspondence and so on). 3.5. Combinations of the assumptions described above in 3.1.-–3.4. are also very often the case.

8.4

Concluding Remarks

From what we have seen above, one can conclude that the epistemological problem of the objectivization of knowledge and of truth has (or has had in the Brentanian tradition) more metaphysical answers than epistemological ones. Most of the ways described for objectivizing truth are metaphysical solutions.

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Only by assuming indexicality, intelligibility, a priori knowledge and different kinds of criteria, do we come close to proposing an epistemological answer to the problem of the objectivization of truth. Our answers are either directly metaphysical (where they deal, for instance, with sentences in themselves), or refer to metaphysical problems in an indirect way, i.e. where they deal with ideal meanings, type-sentences, propositions and the like. Since the ways of objectivizing knowledge and truth are very analogous to one another, one might expect that the attempts to objectivize knowledge will have their expressions in the area of truth theory. We now have another reason for making an epistemological deﬁnition of the truth bearer as described above in Chapter 2. Therefore, it is also easier to see why the epistemological notion of the truth bearer dictates the choice of entities such as the following as the truth bearer: a judging thing (Brentano, Kotarbi´n´ ski), an act of judging (early Brentano), a judgment as the product of an act of judging (a statement), an utterance as the psycho-physical product of an act of judging (Łukasiewicz), a sentence as psycho-physical product which expresses a judgment (Twardowski), a sentence as psycho-physical product which expresses the content of a judgment (Ajdukiewicz), a proposition or other ideal meanings as psychophysical products which are ﬁxed or as something which is exempliﬁed in such products. In selecting a truth bearer in the sense of the epistemic deﬁnition of the truth bearer, one chooses, on the one hand, the tools of knowledge (those, which can serve best for acquiring knowledge by empirical subjects) and, on the other hand, the way to objectivize it (i.e. which tool of knowledge serving as the truth bearer guarantees the greatest independence from time, circumstances and subject). It seems that the choices are seen or, at least, were seen in the past, as contradictory: At the turn of 19th century, what was seen as the proper tool of knowledge (e.g. judgings or their contents) does not offer many possibilities for the objectivization of truth. With respect to this contradictory choice, it seems that there is a ‘golden mean’. This regards expressions of language as truth bearers: On the one hand, one chooses language because it can be a good and sufﬁcient tool for acquiring knowledge or for expressing knowledge acquired by other means, such as acts. On the other hand, one chooses language because language makes it possible to objectivize truth in many ways.

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TABLE 1

of knowledge objectivization/ assumptions

time absolutization

timelessness

with regard to the subject S

for any t

knowledge timeless S

without S of knowledge

space absolutization outside of space

S outside of space

for any x1 , x 2 , x 3

each S

objectivization in the narrow sense without a subject of knowledge

transcendental S

for any subject knowledge without a subject of knowledge monism solipsism

with regard to media timeless MK of knowledge MK

presentation

presentation

of timeless MK

of MK outside of space

permanent products

MK outside of space

as MK with regard to the objects of knowledge timeless OK OK

each OK

with regard to

valid CK for any t

CK

combinations combinations

OK outside of space

each OK

→ ···

independent of subject OK

intelligible OK

cognitive

circumstances independent of subject CK intersubjectivity

→ ···

permanent products as MK

valid CK for any

intersubjectivity

→ ···

independent of subject MK

as MK

CK outside of space

the conditions timeless CK of knowledge

permanent products

presentation of MK independent of subject

→ ···

abilities

intersubjectivity

→ ···

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TABLE 2

of truth objectivization/ assumptions

time absolutization

timelessness

for any t

space absolutization outside of space

for any x1 , x 2 , x 3

objectivization in the narrow sense without an empirical subject

for any subject truth without S of knowledge

with regard to the subject S

timeless S

truth without S S outside space of knowledge

any S

transcendental S

monism

solipsism presentation of timeless TB with regard to the truth bearer TB

timeless TB

permanent products as TB

TB outside space

presentation of TB outside of space permanent products as TB indexicality

presentation of ideal TB TB independent of subject

permanent products

of TB indexicality of TB

psyche as TB

TM unchangeable in time

TM which ‘ﬁlls all of space’

with regard to the truthmaker TM

other conditions

timeless TM

timeless criteria

any TM

TM outside of space

indexicality

indexicality

of TM

of TM

criteria valid for any t identity of

criteria outside of space

TB with TM combinations combinations

any TM

→ ···

indexicality

intelligibility TM independent of subject

indexicality of TM

criteria valid criteria for any independent circumstances of S identity of

of TM

identity of

criteria valid for any S identity of

TB with TM TB with TM TB with TM → ···

→ ···

→ ···

→ ···

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Notes 1 2 3

4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

Bolzano 1837, par. 40–43. For general presentations of Bolzano’s theories see Bergmann 1909, Berg 1962, Morscher 1973. Bolzano 1837, §19. I prefer to use the term ‘sentence’ instead of ‘proposition’ since the former does not suggest directly the use of terms of modern semantics in an interpretation of Bolzano. Therefore, I put literal translations into brackets. In the quoted passage a similar problem concerning the established translation refers to the term ‘assertion’, which is supposed to be the translation of the German term ‘Aussage’ and which should be translated as ‘statement’ or ‘sentence’. ‘Mit anderen Worten also: unter einem Satze an sich verstehe ich nur irgendeine Aussage, daß etwas ist oder nicht ist; gleichviel, ob diese Aussage wahr oder falsch ist; ob sie von irgend jemand in Worte gefaßt oder nicht gefaßt, ja auch im Geiste nur gedacht oder nicht gedacht worden ist.’ (Bolzano 1837, §19) Bolzano 1837, §23, 125. He thus clearly assumes the ontological law of the excluded middle. For the distinction between the psychological, the ontological and the logical law of the excluded middle see Łukasiewicz 1910/1987. The names given in parentheses are Bolzano’s. See Bolzano 1837, par. 24. Bolzano 1837, §25c, §26.1. Bolzano 1837, par. 36. Bolzano 1837, par. 129. Compare: Bolzano 1837, sect. 25, 125; Morscher and Simons 1982; Morscher 1986. See Brentano 1987, pp. 87f. See Brentano 1889 ‘Über Begriff der Wahrheit’ in: Brentano 1930, pp. 3–29. Brentano 1933, p. 148. Brentano 1956, pp. 162–165, 173; 1933, p. 88. Brentano 1970, p. 151. Brentano 1956, p. 141 ff. This is debatable with regard to the arguments of Brentano to which I refer in order to develop my interpretation of the identity of the axiomatic judger and the objects of axioms. Since the Theory of Categories (Brentano 1933) is rather an ontology of mind, I refer to the Theory of Correct Judgement (Brentano 1956), a work which was edited by Franziska Meyer-Hillebrand. The content of this book relies, for the most part, on manuscripts of her husband from the time he was Brentano’s student. One of the students of Meyer-Hillebrand in Insbruck, Paul Weingartner, drew my attention to the fact that she often emphasized that the Theory of Correct Judgement should not be taken in a literal sense as a view presented by Brentano himself. However, in order to present a unique theory of identity as required by the experience of evidence, I risk giving the above interpretation which relies on the views described in the book edited by Meyer-Hillebrand. Brentano 1956, pp. 199–202ff. Brentano 1956, p. 195. In what follows most references are to the ﬁrst volume of the Logical Investigations, i.e. to the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. The reasons for this choice are the following. First, in order to present Husserl’s theory of truth in its entirety I would have to explain most of his other concepts, which are not directly related to his theory of truth. Ironically, in order to take into account all of what Husserl wrote to explain those concepts, several monographs would be necessary, and not a brief sketch. Moreover, since most of these concepts are quite vague (for this see, above all, Blaustein 1928), the task is even more difﬁcult. Secondly, and more seriously, in this study I place Husserl in two contexts: in the context of the ontology of judgment and in that of the objectivity of truth. For those purposes I do not need a hermeneutics of the whole work of Husserl. Thirdly, since in my choice of sources I refer to those writings which have had or may have had an inﬂuence on Polish philosophers, the signiﬁcance of particular works of Husserl should be taken into account. It can be argued, as far as Polish philosophers are concerned, that not the second part of the Logical Investigations, but its ﬁrst volume, i.e. the Prolegomena, played the most important role. It is the part of Husserl’s Logical Investigations which was most inﬂuential and highly valued, especially that part of the work where, as it was put by Łukasiewicz, Husserl speaks ‘in the name of Frege’. (This is how Jan Łukasiewicz referred to Husserl’s ‘Prolegomena’ in his diary.) In what follows, maintaining what I wrote about Husserl earlier in this study, I would like to give a non-Platonic interpretation of what Husserl says in the name of Frege.

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21 See Morscher and Simons 1982. 22 ‘Man vermenge auch nicht das wahre Urtheil als den richtigen, wahrheitsgemäßen Urtheilsact, mit der W a h r h e i t dieses Urtheils oder mit dem wahren Urtheilsinhalt.’ (Husserl 1900/1901, p. 119). 23 See also Twardowski 1900 [1965, p. 327]. 24 Twardowski 1900. 25 See also Twardowski 1900 [1965, p. 327]. 26 With the interpretation of the judgment as a particular act of judging comes the problem of whether the act of judging, when fulﬁlled at different points of time, can remain unchanged at all. As a matter of fact, it is numerically another mental event when given at different points of time. The problem of the individualization of acts of judging leads to solutions in which one speaks about a type of act of judging or about species of acts, as was in case when Husserl tried to solve the problem of the individualization of the contents of judging acts. 27 See Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, 4.002. 28 Łukasiewicz 1907 and Twardowski 1912. 29 It is worth noting that the paper which was originally presented as a lecture by Łukasiewicz on July 23, 1907 at the philosophical section of the 10th session of Polish Physicians and Scientists was discussed, among others, by Twardowski. According to the records from this session, Łukasiewicz’s presentation did not encounter any opposition on the part of the participants. Even on the point of logic as a theoretical discipline, as seen by Łukasiewicz, met no opposition. From a historical point of view, since Twardowski did not turn to the anti-psychologistic camp until 1912, it is interesting to ask how close Twardowski was to the anti-psychologistic view on logic in 1907. I think that a reasonable answer is that even though Twardowski held logic to be a theoretical discipline independent of psychology, he still saw the theory of knowledge, or at least some of its parts, as belonging to psychology. Thus, his theory of acts and products represents the ﬁnal step of his move in the direction where the theory of knowledge frees itself from the theory of cognition, i.e. in the direction which was the mainstream of epistemology almost exclusively until the 1980’s. 30 Bolzano 1837, Bergmann 1879, Witasek 1908. 31 See Twardowski 1919/1920 ‘On Clear and Obscure styles of Philosophical Writings’. 32 See Twardowski 1975. 33 Popper 1972. 34 Łukasiewicz 1910. It is clear that Kotarbi´n´ ski was inﬂuenced especially by the problem of determinism in its relation to the principle of the excluded middle. This is, no doubt, the motive for both texts. 35 Among other things, Kotarbi´n´ ski calls inner perception as a witness here! ´ 36 Kotarbinski 1913, p. 75. In fact the Polish word which Kotarbin´ ski uses for what I translate here by ‘existence’, namely the word ‘istnieje’, is more elastic as regards the distinction between ‘to exist’ in the ordinary sense and the way of existence which is often expressed in such terms as ‘there is’, ‘there are’ or ‘to be’ are concerned. Yet this does not change the heart of the matter and the exact terminology in this case could lead only to grammatically more complicated expressions. 37 Original in Polish as Le´s´niewski 1913. ´ 38 Lesniewski 1913, p. 514. 39 More to this topic below in chapter 8. 40 Kokoszy´n´ ska 1936, 1936a. 41 See for this Ajdukiewicz 1934. 42 It is important that Tarski’s notion of formalized language refers not only to languages commonly accepted as ‘formal’, i.e. to the languages of logic and mathematics. For Tarski, a language L is formal when it fulﬁlls the following conditions: (1) it has a complete vocabulary, (2) there are explicitly given (purely) syntactical rules to built expressions, functions and sentences in L, (3) the function of the meanings of expressions in L depend on their form (L should be extensional), (4) L does not include indexicals, (5) L is not closed (does not include its metalanguage). Thus, some parts of natural languages, when fulﬁlling these conditions, can be formalized languages as well. In particular, to make it more ‘Brentanian’, it is possible to improve a fragment of a natural language in such a way that it becomes a formalized language.

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43 The appearance of the name of K.R. Popper seems to be in violation of my earlier statement that this study refers to the period from 1837 (ﬁrst edition of Wissenschaftslehre of Bernard Bolzano) to 1933 (the year of the ﬁrst edition of Alfred Tarski‘s work). Yet in spite of this I decided, for the sake of greater clarity, to mention Popper’s ideas (Popper 1972) here due to the large number of convergences in interpretations of the so-called 3rd world of Popper with Bolzano’s world of the sentences themselves and due to the fact that Popper’s theory is more well-known in English speaking world than Bolzano’s theory. 44 It is possible, of course, to reject the thesis that Bolzano’s sentences in themselves can be interpreted as products of cognitive acts. However, this possibility, and the possibility of rejecting other theses as well does not change the kernel of our problem. Usually, in a discussion about the theory of truth, one asks whether the truths are absolute or changeable in the course of time according to the theory. Yet when we are considering the cognition of truth or true knowledge, we ask for absolute products of cognitive acts. 45 Twardowski 1900. 46 See Smith 1989. 47 It should be mentioned here that I do not claim that the list given above is complete. It does not mention which of the assumptions can refer only to acts of knowledge and which refers only to the products of these acts. Moreover, not all of the various combinations are possible. Some solutions of the problem of objectivity may be seen nowadays as archaic. However, this does not change the fact that such treatments were arrived at in the past. In any case, one can at least see that they were accepted. 48 If I do not see what a phenomenologist sees, it means that I have not received sufﬁcient training. Since it seems that not only most people but also most philosophers have not had, according to this phenomenological criterion, sufﬁcient training, I call this view ‘privileged cognition’. 49 See Smith 1994, especially chapter 4. 50 Some of the expressions used are very clearly metaphorical such as, for instance, ‘a truth-maker which ﬁlls all of space’; however, I think that if they were reformulated into expressions of a theory in which they would be more understandable, expressions such as ‘maximal situation’ or ‘each inﬁnite sequence of objects from a given domain’, then they could be defended.

Chapter 8 ONTOLOGISM, ABSTRACT OBJECTS AND NOMINALISM

1.

The Choice of Truth Bearers and Ontological Preferences

Edgar Morscher sees the distinctive property of continental philosophy after Bolzano in that this philosophy continuously considered the problem of Sachverhalte and propositions.1 From the topics which again and again became the objects of philosophical investigation Morscher points out what is the special unifying feature of the Austrian philosophical tradition: What uniﬁes and distinguishes Austrian philosophy is not a set of common answers to questions and solutions to problems offered by most Austrian philosophers, but rather a central core of topics and the methods and attitudes brought to them. One such topic is that of propositions and states of affairs. (Morscher 1986, p. 75)

This is what in rough formulation I call here the thesis of ontologism. Thus, by ‘ontologism’ I understand the view according to which the introduction of an entity into the framework of logical, linguistic, or philosophical investigation, providing a solution to some problem, also demands ontological argumentation. Morscher’s thesis is that ontologism is fundamental in Austrian Philosophy, with underlying of states of affairs and propositions as the entities around which argumentation takes place. Since the Brentanian Tradition on which I focus on in this study presents a proper part of the tradition of Austrian Philosophy, Morscher’s thesis, if it is true, should also be valid as far as this study is concerned.2 This is also conﬁrmed in monographs devoted to this tradition which focus almost exclusively on its ontological side.3 This study differs in that the ontology of judgment and other ontological topics present only part of the written history. In order to be historically correct, despite the fact of whether and how much I would like it, I cannot, however, to avoid the context of ontology as far as the choice of truth bearer is concerned. The motives for and against the claim that certain kinds of entities, such as states of

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affairs or propositions, may serve, for instance, as truthmakers, must be considered when we are considering the bearers of truth. One such motive was an attempt to combine the linguistic and psychological sides of the theory of judgment within the framework of what I earlier called the ‘ontology of judgment.’ Another motive has already been mentioned by me in the previous chapter, devoted to the problem of the objectivity of truth. Here I can quote Morscher once again: As far as I can see, in most cases the dominant aim in introducing propositions and/or states of affairs is to guarantee the independence from time, space, change, mind and language, of truth and falsity and of logical properties and relations like (in)validity, logical consequence, (in)compatibility and so on. The independence (or aspects of it) are sometimes referred to by the word ‘objectivity’. . . (Morscher 1986, p. 80)

The topic of this chapter are remarks regarding the ontological preferences and motives of the members of the Lvov-Warsaw School as regards the acceptance or rejection of entities which can serve as bearers of truth.4

2. 2.1

Ontologism and Nominalism in Poland Ontologism as the Brentanian Heritage?

Morscher’s thesis states that ontologism is the distinguished feature of the Brentanian tradition. In the sense in which ontologism presents a requirement of ontological argumentation for the introduction of an entity into the conceptual framework of philosophical consideration, it also represents the characteristic feature of the Lvov-Warsaw School. This is especially the case since in the school choice of the bearer of truth was also an outcome of ontological or metaphysical views. For example, Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism as described above led to the choice of inscriptions as bearers of truth.5 Taking another example, the ontology of acts as presented by Twardowski was of great importance for him in epistemological considerations.6 It is also interesting that in the LvovWarsaw School ontological decisions go hand in hand with linguistic and logical investigations.

2.2

Nominalism as a Special Case of Ontologism

The commonly known fact about the ontological preferences of Poles is that most Polish philosophers of the Lvov-Warsaw School were nominalists. As Peter Simons pointed out, Kotarbi´n´ ski, Les´niewski, and Tarski defended nominalistic positions in a particular sense of the term ‘nominalism.’7 In the framework of Simons’ concepts Kotarbi´n´ ski’s nominalism can be called ’concretism’, whereas Le´s´niewski’s nominalism ‘particularism.’ As far as Tarski is concerned his nominalistic position is not subject to discussion. However, the precise description of his position presents problems. Especially problematic seems to be Tarski’s view on abstract objects such as classes or types. On the one hand, as Simons reports, Henryk Hiz˙ believes that Tarski was a reist.8 On

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the other hand, Wole´n´ ski urged for the existence of a difference in this respect between Tarski and his teacher Kotarbi´n´ ski.9 I shall return to the problem of classes or types in Tarski’s account in chapter 10 below. Here I shall focus rather on the early discussion between Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski on universals, a discussion which, I believe, represents the key to understanding the nominalistic positions taken later by both of them, as well as by their successors, including Tarski. This discussion, like their discussion on truth, clearly shows its Brentanian roots and conﬁrms the attribution of the thesis of ontologism to that part of the continental philosophical tradition represented by the Lvov-Warsaw School. In this context there is an interesting anecdote about Mostowski who after his return (already after the Second World War) from a conference devoted to set theory said: ‘There, in America, I missed reism.’ At the conference, among other things, the theory of sets of (great) power was considered. (Wole´n´ ski 1987a, p. 104—my translation)

2.3

´ Tadeusz Kotarbinski (III) and Stanisław Le´s´niewski (II) on General Objects

The fact that the reistic attitude assumed by the Lvov-Warsaw School is also an outcome of discussions about the existence of general objects is often passed over in silence. The discussion took place between Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski, as well as among others. Indeed, the discussion about general objects in the Lvov-Warsaw School was evoked by Twardowski’s habilitation and it also took place, for example, among students of Twardowski with clear psychological inclinations, such as Adam Stögbauer or Salomon Igel. Roughly speaking, the descriptive-psychological argumentation of these latter refers to the possibility of presenting of general objects and to the problem of abstraction.10 The arguments against the existence of general objects presented by Le´s´niewski and Kotarbi´n´ ski in their discussion on general objects represent, however, a completely new standard of argumentation on this topic. Because of their important consequences (to mention only Le´s´niewski’s mereology and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s reism), it is worth sketching them here brieﬂy. Le´s´niewski’s critique of the existence of general objects is included, among other things, in his 1913 paper about the logical principle of the excluded middle.11 In this paper he states that every general object had to be inconsistent. Using an analogy to Russell’s paradox Le´s´niewski’s argument goes as follows: A general object is, by deﬁnition, an object which has only those properties which belong to every particular object which is its instantiation (or belongs to its extension). Thus, according to Le´s´niewski, the assumption of the existence of general objects goes together with the assumption that it is possible to have an object that contains only properties shared by the particular objects which are instantiations of this general object. As opposed to this general object, each of its instantiation, i.e. every particular object, has at least one property, say P , which is not shared by every other particular object. This

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property P of a particular cannot be a property of the general object, for the latter has only properties which are shared by all particulars. If a particular has a property P not shared by all other particulars, then it also does not have the property of not-having the property P . But this property of not-having the property P is, Le´s´niewski argues further, also not shared by every particular object. Thus, the general object also cannot have the property of not-having the property P . Therefore, since the general object does not have the property P and does not have the property of not-having of the property P , then, in fact, the general object violates the ontological law of contradiction. The general object must, therefore be an inconsistent object. The general object neither has nor does not have the property P which is not shared by all particular objects. And by applying the ontological principle of the excluded middle and the ontological principle of contradiction, when the general object has P then it does not have P , and when the general object does not have P then it has P .12 As a matter of fact, fourteen years later Le´s´niewski wrote about his early attempt to show the inconsistency of the idea of general objects in the following way: At the time I wrote that passage I believed that there are in existence in this world so called features and so called relations, as two special kinds of objects, and I felt no scruples about using the expressions ‘feature’ and ‘relations.’ It is a long time since I believed in the existence of objects which are features, or in the existence of objects which are relations and now nothing induces me to believe in the existence of such objects . . . (Le´s´niewski 1913a [1992, p. 198])

Yet even after Le´s´niewski changed his views on the notions and terms used in 1913 (especially that of the ‘property of an object’), he still maintains as valid the informal proof that in the realm of two existent particular objects, the object which is general with regard to these two does not exist.13 It is worth adding that in 1927 Le´s´niewski modiﬁed his scheme of the argument against abstract objects in the mode of Kotarbi´n´ ski, who joined the discussion and who added new arguments to Le´s´niewski’s.14 Above all, Kotarbi´n´ ski modiﬁes the arguments of his colleague. Let us assume that we have an object G which is general with respect to the objects A, B and C. According to the deﬁnition of general objects, the object G has those and only those properties which are shared by particular objects A, B and C. Thus, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, especially every particular object A, B and C is general with respect to itself, since it has only those properties which are common to it, i.e. those and only those properties which it has. Furthermore, every object A, B and C, being general with respect to itself, has the property of being general with respect to itself. As objects having the property of being general with respect to themselves, particulars are objects which are identical to each other; they are general objects. Moreover, the general object G, which is general with regard to the objects A, B and C, also has the property of being general. But if the object G has the property of being general, then the partic-

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ular objects A, B and C also have to have this property of being general, for the general object has only those properties which are shared by all particulars. Thus, Kotarbi´n´ ski argues, it is not only the case that these particulars A, B and C are general objects with respect to themselves and thereby identical to each other, they are also, through the property of being general, identical with the general object G.15 Despite their logical structure I believe that the differences between Le´sniewski’s and Kotarbi´n´ ski’s argumentations are more understandable when one uses notion of abstraction as a tool by means of which one creates general objects on the cognitive psychological level. Namely they use quite different notions of abstraction, by means of which we ‘produce’ abstract objects. Whereas Le´s´niewski clearly refers to the general object as produced in an abstraction by skipping individual differences of objects (i.e. abstraction as understood by Twardowski in his descriptive psychology where, for example, we skip individual properties such as the color, shape, and size of a triangle presented in our imagination when creating a general triangle), Kotarbi´n´ ski refers to abstraction in a sense which is closer to Husserl’s notion of abstraction by specifying (we focus either on color, or on size, or on shape in our imagination rather than skipping them all). The latter is, therefore, closest to the class of abstraction as known from logic. With regard to this I believe that Kotarbi´n´ ski’s and Le´s´niewski’s arguments against general objects mirror the same problem as investigated earlier on the level of descriptive psychology. The reference to the possible descriptive-psychological interpretation of general objects by means of abstraction in the views of Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski seems reasonable, especially when one looks at the latter’s paper. This paper is very rich in arguments against the assumption of every kind of ideal objects which appeared in the Brentanian Tradition and was later brought to the Polish philosophical world by Twardowski. Kotarbi´n´ ski treats here against the following form of ideal objects: 1. He argues against the idealization of mathematical objects and treats them instead in a materialistic manner. 2. He rejects the notions of class and numbers as objects which are atemporal and out-of-space. He urged that if they arose in a mental act by means of a process of abstraction, then they would have a beginning and an end. 3. Kotarbi´n´ ski rejects the existence of any kind of relations. The assumption of their existence is based on a mistake, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, based on the fact that languages have nouns and noun-clauses which seem to be names of such objects; noun and noun-phrases which can be eliminated from these languages. 4. Kotarbi´nski argues against purely intentional (in the sense of purely imaginary) general objects. The assumption of the existence of such kinds of general objects is based, he argues, especially on the following two mistakes: The ﬁrst one consists in the belief that such objects are thinkable. This kind of mistake arises, again, because of the misleading character of some of the linguistic expres-

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sions just described. Moreover, even aside from this linguistic misdirection, it is possible to think of only a ﬁnite number of particular objects with regard to which we can abstract a general object, whereas there are inﬁnitely many objects which instantiate the general object, as in the case of inﬁnitely many red objects. The second basic mistake in presupposing pure intentional objects consists, holds Kotarbi´n´ ski, in that it is assumed that when something has been thought, then it exists. Similarly to the ﬁrst kind of mistake, this assumption is also deeply rooted in the misunderstanding of the linguistic expressions of intentional mental acts such as ‘I think of an object O’, where O stands sometimes for apparent names. This is not a complete list of what Kotarbi´n´ ski took into account in his critique of general objects. However, two things included in his paper and in what we have said about his argumentations stand out. First, it is sufﬁciently clear that Kotarbi´n´ ski refers to arguments, notions and principles used and discussed earlier in the Brentanian Tradition, including Twardowski and his psychology students, especially when he considers inconsistent and thought objects, the presentation and imagination of general objects, intentionality, the principle of the independence of being from being-so, and so on. Secondly, the analysis provided by Kotarbi´n´ ski links those arguments with linguistic analysis, such as the analysis of apparent names, a conception used later in his semantical reism. In this respect, having in mind the subsequent sections of this study, it is very interesting to see how, for example, the principle of the primacy of intentionality (with regard to language) is replaced in Kotarbi´n´ ski’s view by the primacy of language in its function of communication: ‘I present myself an object’ means as much as ‘I understand a name’ and vice versa —nothing more. I can then also say that ‘I have a thought in mind’ (if I only do not put too much into this statement). However, I do not have to stand in any intentional relation to the object. (Kotarbi´n´ ski 1921 [1993, p. 111]—my translation)

2.4

Stanisław Le´s´niewski (III): Constructive Nominalism

Le´s´niewski remained a consequent nominalist not only in the ontology of the ‘world’ ´ but also in the ontology of ‘language.’ (Wolenski 1985, p. 141—my translation)

Since languages constitute a proper part of the world they too should be interpreted in a nominalistic manner. Thus, for Le´s´niewski, a linguistic expression, as well as its all parts, consist of concrete entities such as inscriptions or sounds. A ﬁnite sequence of inscriptions (and, respectively, sounds) constitute an expression. Two different sequences of inscriptions (sounds) are two different expressions. This is true not only of expressions which consist of different sounds or inscriptions, but also to expressions of different shapes such as ‘The rose is red’, ‘The Rose Is Red’, and ‘THE ROSE IS RED’, which sometimes cannot be distinguished on the level of sounds, and which are usually taken as ‘the same’ expression. Moreover, according to Le´s´niewski, the expression ‘The rose is red’ printed on this line is different from the expression of the same

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shape printed above. Similarly, two sequences of sounds spoken by the same person and in the same manner on two different occasions (two utterances) are two different linguistic expressions. Along the lines of his theory, sequences of linguistic sounds made by a tape player or by some sources would also be different expressions. (The arrangement of bipolar particles on the magnetic tape, which Le´s´niewski could not even consider would in his theory be particular durable expressions, just as arrangements of ink-dots printed on paper are expressions.) Language, thus, consists of concrete inscriptions or utterances (or even other noises) which have to be written or uttered (or recorded in some way). The number of linguistic expressions in a language depends upon how many inscriptions can be written down or utterances can be made. There are no, so-tospeak, potential expressions in languages in the sense that they have not been written down or uttered. A new inscription or utterance can be constructed by using the directives or rules of a given language. The latter are rules which are used for deriving new inscriptions from existent inscriptions. Hence, if Le´s´niewski speaks about a sentence, the term ‘sentence’ means an inscription in the sense given above and is neither something which exists potentially nor (even worse) something which exists somewhere other (like in the domain of Bolzano’s sentences in themselves) than in that part of our real world which also consists of utterances and inscriptions. This is why Le´s´niewski’s view on language is often called ‘constructive nominalism’ or ‘inscriptional syntax.’16 In his early papers Le´s´niewski assumed also types of expressions, in addition to tokens. An expression-type is formed by all sequences of inscriptions of the same shape (or, respectively, all utterances of the same sounds.) Both of them, sequences of inscriptions and sequences of sounds, are physical objects. As regards judgments in the psychological sense, Le´s´niewski never changed his view that they are concrete and different from each other, a view held by him even before he had taken a clear nominalistic position in ontology and which is in conformity with the views of the Brentanians. If bearers of truth are entities such as judgments or inscriptions-sentences or utterances, then they all should be considered clearly as concrete and particular mental or physical entities.

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Summary of Chapter 8

One of the distinguishing features of the Brentanian Tradition was interest in ontological investigations. Its representatives especially liked to consider problems concerning such things as states of affairs and other objects of higher order, among which abstract and general objects may also be found. Ontological arguments were required to introduce a kind of entity into the framework of concepts used in any of the philosophical disciplines of this tradition, including logical and linguistic investigations. The ontological commitment was not an outcome of a choice of a given formalized, meaningful language, but, rather, it was a result of ontological discussion and argumentation. In the LvovWarsaw School, on the other hand, nominalistic preferences were widespread and explicit. In this movement, Le´s´niewski and Kotarbin´ ski were the ﬁrst to act as strong nominalists, arguing against any kind of ideal, abstract, or general objects. The nominalistic attitude of the latter culminates in reism and concretism. Therefore, Polish philosophers inspired by the same Brentanian problems, chose a solution completely different from the rich ‘pure Austrian’ ontologies, such as those formulated by Meinong and Reinach. The objects serving as truth bearers, as well as every other kind of objects, were thus given a nominalistic account. Le´s´niewski’s nominalism, for example, led him to the account of language as a constructive and expanding system of physical objects. This must also imply that linguistic bearers of truth are concrete physical objects. Generally speaking, the ontologism represented by the Lvov-Warsaw School restricted the domain over which the entities that could serve as truth bearers range to objects which could satisfy the nominalistic preferences of its members.

Notes 1 Morscher 1986. It ought to be mentioned that ‘continental philosophy’ refers here not only that part of philosophy on the continent which is usually associated with this term in the English speaking world, i.e. with French and German philosophy and philosophers, but also, for example, to Austrian, Polish, and other streams of philosophying which are attributed to European countries. 2 Philosophers such as Bolzano, Brentano, Husserl, Meinong, Marty, and Twardowski who are under consideration in this study undoubtedly belong to the tradition which is called ‘Austrian Philosophy.’ However, as has already mentioned in one of the previous notes, since the concept ‘Austrian Philosophy’ is encumbered with a certain vagueness (see Haller 1979, Nyiri (ed.) 1981, Nyiri (ed.) 1986, and Smith 1994) I prefer the term ‘Brentanian Tradition’, which points directly to the elements of Franz Brentano’s philosophy and covers almost all the investigations of the above authors. I prefer this other term because a part of Austrian Philosophy includes, for example, the Vienna Circle which, as I pointed out at the beginning, in my opinion had much less inﬂuence on Polish philosophers before the twenties or thirties of twentieth century than is commonly believed. 3 See Smith 1994, Albertazzi et all (ed.) 1996. 4 Concerning the Austrians see Morscher 1986, Simons 1982, Smith 1987a, and Smith 1988a. 5 See chapter 6 above. 6 See chapter 5 above. 7 Simons 1993. 8 Simons 1993, p. 225. 9 Wole´n´ ski 1987a, 1990a.

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See Rojszczak 1994, 1998/1999. Le´s´niewski 1913a. Le´s´niewski 1913a, pp. 318–319. Le´s´niewski 1927. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1921. Kotarbi´n´ ski clearly does not acknowledge in his argument the Leibnizian deﬁnition of identity in which two objects are identical when they have the same properties. ´ 1985, 1987a, 1988 and Simons 1993. It should be mentioned that the Les´niewski’s 16 See to this: Wolenski nominalistic preferences were of special importance for his logical systems, especially in his formulation of classes. As regards nominalism in relation to Le´s´niewski’s logical systems see Les´niewski 1927, ´ 1928, 1929, Küng 1963, Simons 1992a, 1993, and Wolenski 1985, 1988.

Chapter 9 BRENTANISM AND THE BACKGROUND OF THE SEMANTICS OF THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL

In this part of my study I am going to track the ideas of the Lvov-Warsaw School which are unanimously considered to be purely semantic, but whose roots, I think, may clearly be found in the tradition of Brentano’s philosophy. It does not directly present investigations on truth bearers, which are the topic of the next chapter; instead, it presents steps in the philosophical development of the Lvov-Warsaw School that are of greatest importance for Tarski’s later choice of the truth bearers.

1. 1.1

Stanisław Le´s´niewski (IV): On the Sense of Inscription Ontologism as the Primacy of Semantics

Steeped in the inﬂuence of John Stuart Mill in which I mainly grew up, and ‘conditioned’ by the problems of ‘universal-grammar’ and of logico-semantics in the style of Edmund Husserl and by the exponents of the so-called Austrian School, I ineffectually attacked the foundations of ‘logistic’ from this point of view. (. . .) The decidedly skeptical dominant note of the position I occupied for a number of years in relation to ‘symbolic logic’, stemmed from the fact that I was not able to become conscious of the real ‘sense’ of the axioms and theorems of that theory,—‘of what’ and ‘what’, respectively, it was desired to ‘assert’ by means of the axioms and theorems. (Le´s´niewski 1927 [1992, pp. 181–182])

This passage from Le´s´niewski’s 1927 paper ‘O podstawach matematyki’ [On the Foundations of Mathematics], most important for its contribution to the history of philosophy, the author presents a forceful example of how deep semantic ideas were of interests in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Above all, in this paper Le´s´niewski gives us several pieces of information about his philosophical development, and especially about the motives of the development of his systems of mereology, ontology, and protothetic. It is a commonly known fact that one of the motives were difﬁculties in reading the Principia Mathematica of Russell and Whitehead. The whole ﬁrst chap-

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ter of Le´s´niewski’s paper focuses on his doubts about the semantics of this milestone work. The ambiguities of the terms and the vagueness of the notions contained in this work, which overturned a great part of philosophy in the twentieth century, lead Le´s´niewski to a years-long study of mathematical logic. His difﬁculties led him to concentrate on the meanings of the symbol of assertion, logical connectives, and the well-formed formulas of the system of Principia Mathematica. As Le´s´niewski himself states, the symbol of assertion itself as used in Principia took four years of study, which can be taken as somewhat caustic remark and is commonly interpreted as an expression of Le´sniewski’s perfectionism.1 In any case, difﬁculties and suspicions concerning the semantic interpretation of the logical system of Russell and Whitehead induced him to state explicitly that semantics should present the most important part of contemporary logic at the time. These suspicions were, as Le´s´niewski himself acknowledges, due to his Brentanian heritage. Thus, taking into account the notion of ontologism as described in the previous chapter, one can also speak about another type of ontologism with regard to language. It is not only that language, depicted as a set of physical objects (inscriptions and utterances) which changes in the course of time, was an outcome of ontological discussions and nominalistic preferences announced in the Brentanian framework. From the ontological point of view it is not only important what language consists of, but also what language is about. The ‘ontology of language’ does not even sound very strong when compared to the ontology of judgment. Language, however, consists inter alia of expressions of judgments. Thus, we can formulate a thesis of ontologism with regard to language: every language, including formalized languages such as the languages of logic or mathematics, are languages about something, about objects. In other words, there are no objectless languages. This thesis is one of the most important presuppositions of the Lvov-Warsaw School. It follows from several statements of Tarski, the founder of modern logical semantics, that the very ﬁrst semantic ideas were clear formulated by Le´s´niewski. And there is nothing surprising here. Everyone who believes that language of formal system is a description of the world must consider the matter of semantic problems; and this is the ´ 1985, pp. 139–140—my translation) case of Le´s´niewski. (Wolenski

I just called the thesis of the non-existence of objectless languages the thesis of the ontologism with respect to language. This is because it could be also formulated as the thesis that every interest in language should be connected (or even cannot be considered as not connected) with a clear ontology of this language, an ontology which is given in a semantic interpretation. If it is true that this thesis was commonly taken for granted in the Lvov-Warsaw School, there is no other way of explaining it, I believe, that through a tradition which goes back to Brentano, a tradition suggested by me throughout this study. The ontology of language is indispensable in the same sense in which the ontology of judgment was indispensable for Husserl or Marty. Once

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thoughts were connected with language in the work of Twardowski and Łukasiewicz, language—as it was in the case of mental acts—cannot loose its connection to the world. In a very rough formulation, the thesis that language is always about something seems to be obvious when one considers language as an expression of thinking or as a medium for the communication of thinking, i.e. an expression or medium of something of which the thesis of intentionality is valid. It is true even in the case of formal languages, since any formal language is only an improvement of the natural way of speaking, a thesis-refrain among Brentanians. In another formulation, the problem of the ontology of language has its counterpart in the problem of the inheritance of intentionality by linguistic entities. The view that linguistic entities which are expressions of intentional acts must preserve the relations in which the latter stand was causally explained inter alia by Twardowski in his theory of acts and products. In order to make a move from a theory of the intentionality of linguistic entities to semantics, or even to free semantics from intentional idioms, an explanation of how language functions and what it is about is needed. It is worth noting that the thesis of ontologism with regard to language in the Lvov-Warsaw School is not as different from the ﬁrst thesis of ontologism stated in the previous chapter as might appear at ﬁrst glance. Ontologism, which relies on the ontological argumentation for the introduction of an entity into the philosophical framework (the latter thesis), is transformed into semantics (the former thesis) when one recognizes that language is the tool of any discussion. This is because language can picture or represent both thoughts and the world. The only task left is to formalize ordinary language in a way which would enable both functions.

1.2

Language and Metalanguage

One of the most famous semantic ideas originally invented by the Lvov-Warsaw School, whose fame is due to Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, is the distinction between language and metalanguage. Almost to the same extent as the idea itself, it is known that this distinction was ﬁrst introduced by Le´sniewski. Wole´n´ ski sees the distinction between language and metalanguage as an outcome of Le´s´niewski’s reading of the Russell-Whitehead Principia Mathematica.2 I think, however, that the idea of metalanguage is already present in the 1913 paper ‘Krytyka logicznej zasady wyłaczonego ˛ s´rodka’ [A Critique of the Logical Principle of the Excluded Middle].3 Since the paper was published before Le´s´niewski’s study of Russell’s and Whitehead’s work, which took place around 1914, one may assume that this distinction was not inspired by their work. I shall give some reasons for believing that it is rather the Brentanian context for some logical problems that induced Le´s´niewski to consider such a distinction.4

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In the aforementioned paper Le´s´niewski focuses on the deﬁnition of logic as a part of science. The task of the latter in Le´s´niewski’s view is to separate true and false sentences.5 It seems that he refers thereby to the view on logic depicted as a part of the general theory of knowledge as known from the Brentanians and Bolzano. Yet the main problem which can arise here for Le´sniewski is not whether logic is or is not a part of a theory of knowledge. The problem consists in some misinterpretation of the formulation of the task of logic as stated in the deﬁnition, i.e. in what exactly is meant in such a deﬁnition by the separation of true and false sentences? For one can consider that according to this deﬁnition almost every scientiﬁc problem is nothing other than a problem of logic. If one asks ‘Is it true that all bodies are heavy?’ one seems to ask a clearly logical question, since one is asking about the truth of this statement. In analogy to this example, every kind of question asked by scientists would be a logical question. For Le´s´niewski that kind of argumentation is wrong. The question about the truth of a thesis is indeed a logical question. The problem of truth and falsity of a thesis is, according to him, a logical problem. The sentence ‘The thesis that all bodies are heavy is true’ or the sentence ‘The thesis that all bodies are heavy is false’ are logical sentences. Both are possible answers as to the question asked above. However, they should be distinguished from sentences like ‘All bodies are heavy’ and ‘All bodies are not heavy.’ These sentences are not sentences of logic: they belong to science, in this case to physics. They are both possible answers as to the physical problem ‘Are all bodies heavy?’ The difference between these sentences and the logical sentences above is that the two groups of sentences refer to different objects. The physical sentences refer to bodies, whereas the logical sentences refer to theses. Moreover, the theses to which the logical sentences refer to are, in this case, the physical sentences about bodies. A logical sentence, therefore, is not every sentence in which the term ‘true’ appears—as one might think looking at the deﬁnition of logic as a part of science—but only those sentences which are about another sentence or sentences. In fact, a logical sentence is one which states about another sentence (or sentences) whether it is (or they are) true or false. For every true sentence A, continues Le´s´niewski, there is a logical sentence ‘The sentence A is true.’ And, respectively, for every false sentence B there is a logical sentence ‘The sentence B is false.’ As regards the latter, if it is true, there is another logical sentence ‘The sentence «The sentence A is false» is true.’ Now, it is quite clear, I believe, that already in the year 1913 Le´s´niewski treated the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ as metalinguistic predicates predicated of sentences; this idea clearly comes to light in Tarski’s 1933 paper. Le´s´niewski’s study includes a remark that could be seen as a generalization of the difference between object-linguistic and meta-linguistic signs. In the

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fourth remark to the third section of his paper Le´s´niewski deﬁnes the symbolic function of an expression in the following way: DSA The connoting expression ‘W ’ represents [symbolizes] any object possessing the properties connoted by the expression ‘W ’—with the exception of the expression ‘W ’ itself together with those expressions which have at least one element in common with the expression ‘W .’ (Le´s´niewski 1913a [1992, p. 64]) Thus, the expression ‘English expression’ printed on this line represents all English expressions with the exception of the one written above and with the exception of every English expression which contains the above expression as its part. An example of the latter is the former sentence printed on this page (i.e. ‘Thus, the expression ‘English expression’ printed on this line represents all English expressions with the exception of the one written above and with the exception of every English expression which contains the above expression as its part.’), as well as the expression ‘the above English expression «English expression».’ As we would say nowadays, the expression ‘English expression’ refers to all English expressions except expressions in metalanguage (and languages of higher order) in which this expression occurs. It cannot be selfreferring. The deﬁnition DSA can serve as an early version of the distinction between inscriptions in language and metalanguage. For Le´s´niewski the deﬁnition DSA served to solve paradoxes. The paradoxes solved with the help of DSA include, among other things, Meinong’s paradox of contradictory objects and the paradox of Epimenides, known better as the liar paradox, the same with which Tarski began his study on the deﬁnition of truth.6

Remark. Le´s´niewski expresses also an important aspect of the idea of improving ordinary languages by introducing such distinctions as language and metalanguage. The decision to make a deﬁnition in such and such a way has, according to Le´s´niewski, a conventional character. The goal of conventional deﬁnitions is to eliminate inconsistencies included in everyday languages. Thus, the task of the improving natural languages with the help of conventional deﬁnitions is not a goal in itself but helps us in the elimination of paradoxes to which ordinary language can or will otherwise lead us in our analysis. In this case the ‘scientiﬁc’ language can eliminate various contradictions by the way in which it departs from some schemes of ‘everyday’ language; its value depends exactly upon its ability to achieve such eliminations. (Le´s´niewski 1913a, p. 349—my translation)7

The idea of improving natural languages rather than the ambitious task of creating new artiﬁcial languages clearly goes back to Twardowski and others Brentanians.

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Existential Sentences

I have tried to show (1) that the reformulated thesis of ontologism is valid as far as Le´s´niewski’s philosophical views are concerned, and (2) that Les´niewski’s distinction between language and metalanguage, commonly seen as important for Tarski’s semantic deﬁnition of truth, arose very early and independently of the Principia Mathematica. The Brentanian contexts in which Le´s´niewski’s investigations took place, including that of the deﬁnition of logic, shows that the inﬂuences came from a direction other than that of Russell-Frege.8 Le´sniewski’s paper on the principle of the excluded middle also deals with other problems which undoubtedly are rooted in the tradition which goes back to Brentano: the problem of general objects already discussed above, the problem of inconsistent objects,9 the problem of sentences about non-existent objects,10 the problem of negative sentences,11 and existential sentences. All of this together provides sufﬁcient evidence that at least some of Le´s´niewski’s ideas which are of importance for the future history of the Lvov-Warsaw School and, especially, for the future history of semantics reside in Brentanian tradition rather than in another. The issue of existential sentences was also considered by Le´s´niewski in his earliest paper from 1911. This article too shows a very clearly Brentanian inclination and contexts in which Le´s´niewski’s philosophical investigations took place. Above all, it shows distinctively the inﬂuences of Anton Marty and Edmund Husserl on Le´s´niewski’s thought. Moreover, the 1911 paper refers to and discusses directly Brentano’s thesis of the primacy of existential sentences as a representation of existential theory of judgment. For the purposes of his analysis of existential sentences in 1911, Le´s´niewski assumes a theory of the symbolic (presentational) function of language. The symbolic (presentational) function of language consists in the fact that linguistic expressions symbolize objects. It is to be noted that at this time, when Le´s´niewski also believed in the existence of objects that are not concrete, linguistic expressions could also symbolize contents. The symbolic (presentational) function of a simple expression is, in Le´s´niewski’s view, the function of reference (Bedeutung in Frege’s sense). The symbolic function of complex expressions such as sentences depends upon the presentational function of their components, i.e. upon the functions of the words that occur in the sentence (the principle of compositionality). By ‘sentence’ Le´s´niewski understands either utterance or inscription. The symbolizing (presenting) expressions can, however, be inadequate. According to Le´s´niewski, existential sentences belong to such a class of inadequately symbolizing expressions. They symbolize (present) contents. Yet the contents to which they refer, in order to be adequate, should not be understand as existential. Le´s´niewski proposes a translation which goes exactly opposite to Brentano’s way of translation all of the forms of sentences into an existential form. Hence, for Le´s´niewski, also a sentence

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of the form ‘The object A exists’ should rather be read in a non-existential way such as ‘Some beings are objects A.’12 This is because for Le´s´niewski, who in this respect follows J.S. Mill, a sentence in every case symbolizes (presents) the possession of a property by an object rather than its existence; the object is symbolized by the subject of the underlying sentence and the property is the connotation of the predicate appearing in this sentence. When this possession of a property by an object is not the intention of the speaker the symbolizing (presentation) is not adequate.13 The semiotic analysis of the adequacy or inadequacy of certain propositions [sentences—AR] in relation to the contents which they represent is then ultimately based on a phenomenological analysis of speaker’s representational intentions. (Le´s´niewski 1913a [1992, p. 17])14

According to Le´s´niewski, in the case of negative existential sentences we are faced with a certain important inconsistency. The predicates in such sentences connote (once again Mill’s terminology) the property of non-existence and, hence, they are synonymous with ‘non-being’ and ‘non-beings’ (the latter is a plural noun). Now, let us assume that the deﬁnition of the object symbolized by the subject of a negative existential sentence is as follows: ‘the being that has properties A, B, C etc.’ Since the predicate which appears in a negative existential sentence connotes the property of ‘non-being’, it is inconsistent with the object as symbolized by the subject of this sentence. Therefore, the sentences ‘The round square does not exist’ and ‘Paris-which-is-in-China does not exist’ are, in Le´s´niewski’s view, inconsistent, and as such they cannot be true. This is the case even though the categorical form of the latter sentence, i.e. ‘Paris is not in China’, is true. In the light of this, claims Le´s´niewski, Brentano’s thesis about the reducibility of every categorial sentence to an existential one must be false.15 Using the notion of the presentational function of language Le´s´niewski formulates general semantic conditions for truth of sentences. First, a true sentence has to have a subject which presents something. This statement is equivalent to the statement that every sentence whose subject does not refer to (‘presents’ or ‘symbolizes’ in Le´s´niewski’s language) an object is false. Secondly, a true sentence always has a connotative predicate. This is equivalent to the statement that every sentence whose predicate is not connotative is false.16

2.

Maria Ossowska (I): Expressing and Semantics

The second part of twenties of twentieth century introduces into Polish philosophical literature a number of papers which belong to semantics in the current sense of the term. Wole´n´ ski, for example, would prefer to speak about the period prior to Tarski’s works on semantics as a period of the philosophy of language or of the theory of meaning rather than about a period of pre-semantic investigations.17 However, as he also underlines, the term ‘semantics’ was un-

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derstood in the Lvov-Warsaw School in a rather broad sense. In fact, the term ‘semantics’ replaced ‘semasiology’, the term introduced by Marty and also frequently used by Poles. As Maria Ossowska’s 1926 paper shows, the investigations treated at this time as semantic, would today rather be called semiotic: Even if the word ‘semantics’ acquired its citizenship not long ago and even if it is not used in a great number of circles, it was able to be encumbered by so many ambiguities that if one uses it, one is obliged to use it with care. Despite the way in which one apprehends this word, everyone who becomes acquainted with this word will agree that by semantic problems we mean such problems as: what is the meaning of words?; what is naming?; what is the expressing of thought in the words? (Ossowska 1928a, p. 392—my translation)

The last of the aforementioned ﬁelds, that of semantics, seems especially to be of importance when considered together with the problem of how sentences, instead of judgments, took the role of the bearers of truth. The features of a sign in relation to language represent the object of Maria Ossowska’s investigations.

2.1

The Notion of Expression

First of all, Ossowska tries to categorize the ways in which the words ‘expression’ and ’expressing’ are used. The starting point of her investigation includes the following formulation: (1) A sentence S expresses a thought T in the language L. Thus, the ﬁrst point which distinguishes Ossowska from most Brentanians is that not every linguistic expression but only the sentence is the primary meaningful linguistic entity. The reason for this is simple: what is expressed in a sentence (which is an expression) is a thought. The latter, according to Ossowska, is an experience that is either a belief, a supposition, or the presentation of a judgment.18 Yet thoughts are the primary complex experiences of which true or false are predicated. It is also the case, continues Ossowska, that the function of expressing should be, above all, distinguished from the descriptive or presentational function of a linguistic sign. . . . such a property of presenting is the same property which Russell and others call the transparency of a linguistic sign, and which should consist in the fact that an uttered or a written (. . .) linguistic phrase redirects our thought to something else: with its help of mediation one thinks about something different. . . (Ossowska 1931, p. 204—my translation)

Now, the ambiguity of the sentence (A) is effected by four different conceptions of expressing a thought by a linguistic sign. The ﬁrst version of the meaning of ‘expressing of a thought’ is that the sentence pictures a thought. ‘Picturing’, however, can be also understood in different ways. First it can mean the structural similarity of the parts of a sentence (i.e. of the parts of an utterance or an inscription) with the parts of presented sentences (of the presented parts of an utterance or of an inscription). This

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conception of the picture theory of expressing thought, however, supposes very strong assumptions. One of them is the (literal) assumption of thinking in the words in which ‘thinking in the words’ means as much as ‘presenting words or sounds.’ Despite this assumption Ossowska draws attention to homonyms and indexicals which create difﬁculties in this conception. Secondly, however, the picturing of thought in the sentence can have another sense. It can be understood as the identity between the content of the expressing sentence and the expressed thought. The main problem here, as pointed out by Ossowska, is that the picturing takes place in different kinds of ethnic languages. Sentences on language L1 could then picture thoughts which would consist of the presentation of words in another language L2. Thirdly, one might like to combine the above two senses of picturing into one type of picture theory of sentences in which a sentence and a thought are characterized by structural similarity and identity of content.19 According to Ossowska the picture-theoretical interpretation of a sentence A poses an impersonal (non-subjectivistic) and atemporal version of this sentence. This is because, according to this theory, the sentence ‘A is B’ expresses not only the thought of a subject who has uttered or written the sentence, but it also expresses every experienced thought that A is B at every point of time and experienced by anybody. Since the picture theory of expression refers to the relation between the content of the sentence and the content of the judgment, it is proper to say that it is a theory of meaning.20 She thus differentiates between the theory of meaning and the theory of speech acts. The main difference is that the latter is always related to a given moment and to a given person under given circumstances. Both, however, can be understood as a theory of expressing. The second interpretation of the sentence (A) advocates that the sentence S or, more precisely, the perception of the sentence S, suggests a thought to someone who is a competent user of the language of which the sentence A is a part. ‘To express a thought’ means here ‘to have the property of suggesting (of evoking) a thought.’ Therefore, the function of expressing is the property of an utterance or an inscription. According to Ossowska, a sentence such as ‘The sentence expresses the thought that A is B’ can be replaced by the following sentence: ‘The sentence means that A is B.’ This is because the function of expressing can be replaced here by the function of presentation, where the evoked thought is the psychological meaning of this sentence. This replacement presents a trick in which this interpretation of the sentence (A) can become impersonal and atemporal.21 The third conception of the notion of expression takes the function of expressing as the property of the manifestation or betrayal of a thought. The sentence (A) is in need of a restriction. The thought which is manifested by a sentence is the thought of a speaker or of a writer. This version of the notion of expression has the following quite complicated formulation:

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DA The sentence S expresses the thought T in the language L if: (1) S is uttered or written by the person X, and (2) the utterance or writing of the sentence S by X is made not earlier than the thought T , and (3) S is of the same form as the sentences which under normal situations are uttered or written in L when one wants to inform someone else about T .22 From this we can conclude that, in opposition to both of the interpretations described above, the third interpretation of (A) relates the function of expressing to the subject, i.e. it is ‘personal.’ Moreover, it is related to a given temporal relation between the thought and the uttered or written sentence. The temporal relation replaces the requirement of causal connection between the thought and its expression as known from Twardowski’s theory of acts and products applied to sentences. The third condition of (DA) gives us an interesting piece of information. According to this condition the sentence S and the experience T are empirically related to each other. As we would say today, it requires a competent user of the language L. In order to be a competent user of a language, empirically observed situations in which other competent users utter and write sentences are required.23 Finally, according to Ossowska, the fourth interpretation of the sentence A supposes looking at a thought expressed not only as the thought of some speaker, but also as if the thought was such that, in accordance with linguistic usage, a linguistic expression is equivalent to it. This is a theory of sentences and thoughts as counterparts. The counterpart-relation consists in an empirical relation between an experience of a thought T and the utterance of a sentence S. It can also be understood in the sense of picturing, i.e. in the sense in which the relation is understood in the ﬁrst interpretation of sentence A described above. It is, however, obvious that not every counterpart-relation could be picturing in the given sense. It should be added that most Brentanians embraced more or less this conception of expression, explaining thereby the problem of how linguistic entities inherit the intentional relation to an object in which thought is expressed.24

2.2

The Presentational Function of the Sentence and the Expressing Function of the Sentence

Ossowska, however, chooses the third of the above interpretations of the sentence (A) as the proper understanding of the word ‘expression’ and of the phrase ‘the expression of thought.’ It is in the sense in which, according to DA, the expression is a manifestation (betrayal) of thought. And in this sense, she claims, the notion of expression should be used in semantics. Therefore, Ossowska’s proposal to narrow the sense in which we speak about express-

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ing and expressions is very close to the notion of Anzeichen as described by Husserl in its function of communication. However, as Ossowska also claims, we should make an additional assumption: that the sentence S which manifests a thought should not refer directly to the thought of which it is the expression. ‘I think that this rose is red’ is here an expression of my thought that the rose is red but not of the fact that the rose is red. It means that on Ossowska’s account, if the sentence S expresses a thought T , then it should not present us the same thought T . In other words, sentences that are nowadays called intentional or psychological should be distinguished from sentences which are transparent.25 This should prevent us from confusing the two functions of sentences: that of expressing and that of presenting. Thus, the notion of expression of a sentence as interpreted by DA should be formulated as follows: DA’ A sentence S manifests a thought T in the sense of DA and the sentence S does not present the thought T . Hence, Ossowska distinguishes strongly between expressing and presenting. ‘The function of presenting’ is a psychological term. It stands for both the psychological function of designation or naming as well as for the psychological meaning (like the content of thought). By means of this condition Ossowska wants to exclude from DA’ cases in which what is expressed would be the same as what is named or is referred to in a sentence. Only in this somehow most ordinary sense does the phrase ‘The sentence S expresses the thought T ’ speak about a new function of sentences which would complete those already distinguished and whose consideration would be necessary in order to explain the mechanism of language. (Ossowska 1931, p. 239—my translation)

2.3

Expressing and the Meaning-Intention

However, what is precisely that which is expressed by a sentence in the sense given by DA’? This is, above all, the mental acts which Husserl called ‘acts of meaning-bestowal intention’ [verleihende Intention]. In other words, using Ossowska’s language, a sentence expresses, above all, presented judgments, as it was understood by Twardowski. This is because the experience of presenting of a judgment constitutes a necessary condition for understanding a sentence. The last statement relies on several further assumptions made by Ossowska; some of them are the following: The ﬁrst assumption is that there are, at least, three ways of seeing an uttered or written sentence. First, one can take a sentence as a purely physical object. Second, one can see a sentence as a manifestation of something else. The second assumption consists in the fact that one can see a meaningful sentence, i.e. a sentence which expresses an act of meaning-giving intention, in either of its two functions: in its function of expressing or in its function of presenting. Thirdly and lastly, one can see a sentence as a meaningful utterance or inscription behind which there is hidden an

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intention of meaning. This third assumption claims that one can see a linguistic sign in its function of presenting only if one assumes that this linguistic sign is intentional, i.e. one assumes that the linguistic sign is an expression of a meaning-intention. The assumption of a meaning-intention hidden in meaningful sentences seems to be another of widely spread axioms in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Kotarbi´n´ ski, for example, on some occasions defended the view that the function of expressing (which he understood in a way similar to that presented by Ossowska and DA’ above) is the primary function of the sentence with regard to its presentational function: To put it brieﬂy, reference to the intention to communicate something, reference to the fact that a given phrase is adequately used to communicate something—for example, to predicate something by means of a given term—belongs to the essence of meaning. The fact that a given content of an image associates with a given word does not in the least prove that we want to communicate that content by means of that word. . . (Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966, p. 93])

Kotarbi´n´ ski also deﬁnes a statement or utterance (wypowied´ d´ ) as an expression whose intention is to communicate something, where ‘something’ refers to a mental experience. A sentence is thus deﬁned by him as a statement of thought.26 Yet it is important to note that Ossowska argues against the primacy of the function of expressing in its relations to the other functions of language. This does not contradict what was already said above, since she proposes a solution to the problem of ‘Is something meaningful because it expresses or it expresses something because it is meaningful?’ as follows: She suggests that we should distinguish two domains, one in which ‘true’ is the statement of the primacy of the meaning, the other in which ‘true’ is the statement of the primacy of expressing. In the process of learning a language, says Ossowska, expressing is undoubtedly primary. However, starting from the point where we master a language to some extent, it seems that the opposite thesis is valid, i.e. the thesis of the primacy of meaning.27 There are various arguments for this. I shall brieﬂy mention three of them—the speech act argument, the argument from the intersubjectivity and an empirical argument. Let us take the case of hearing the utterance ‘It is raining.’ Firstly, upon hearing such an utterance, we understand that what is intended it is not the judgment of the speaker that it is raining, but rather the fact that it is raining. What is presented by the utterance is primary with respect to what it expresses. Secondly, argues Ossowska, only the speaker in inner perception can decide whether the sentence expresses his intention or not. Expressing is not intersubjective. Thirdly, the argument claims that there are contexts in which speech takes place without any intentional moments at all. Examples here are the recital of a rhyme or the locutions of two persons which take place one after

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the other, but in which no true exchange of thought takes place between the persons, and no discussion in the normal sense of this word is expected.28 Thus, since the presentational function and the function of expressing can be separated, Ossowska argues against every theory of meaning or reference based on the notion of expression. Even if both of these functions appear together in the linguistic praxis, they should in fact be distinguished, especially for the purposes of semantics. Ossowska’s views, brieﬂy sketched here, are clearly inspired not only by Brentanians but also, or perhaps even above all, by such philosophers as Russell and Wittgenstein. Ossowska’s interests in the philosophy of logical positivism and logical atomism are quite clear and remarkable, judging by her papers. This, however, does not affect my claim that her investigations are rooted in the Brentanian contexts. In fact, as I urged at the beginning of this study when speaking about the interconnections between Tarski and the Vienna Circle, Ossowska visited Vienna three years after the last paper of hers that I consider here. By this time her philosophical work in Lvov, as well as the framework she used for philosophical investigations, was under the strong inﬂuence of Twardowski (due to whom she later traveled to Vienna). Thus, even if the inspiration and vocabulary of Ossowska’s investigations until 1934 come from Cambridge, the polemics in which she engaged took place within a framework determined by Brentanians. In order to be historically correct, it is very important to emphasize that, unlike most of the papers referred to in this study, Ossowska’s were not very inﬂuential. They represent a description of the consequences of the views held in the Lvov-Warsaw School at the time but did not inspire further discussions. The same can be said about Maria Ossowska’s husband’s papers which are topic of the next sections. However, the sketch of the situation in the ﬁrst decades of twentieth century in Poland as regards semantic explanation of the inheritance of some of the properties of intentional relations by linguistic entities seems to be very important from the point of view of the contexts investigated in this study. Ossowski’s papers are the best examples of it.

3. 3.1

Stanisław Ossowski (I): On Semantic Products Semantic Products and the Function of Expressing

In 1926 Stanisław Ossowski came back to the act/product distinction as made by Twardowski fourteen years earlier. Ossowski deﬁnes semantic products as physical objects correlated with one of the semantic functions. Semantic functions include, according to Ossowski, the function of designating (of naming or of referring), the function of picturing, and the function of meaning. It is important to note that the correlation between a physical object and its semantic function depends upon the intention of the ‘user’ of this object: ‘If an object is a semantic product, it is one only for some person.’29 In other words, there

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must be a person P who has an attitude toward an object as a semantic product. Ossowski calls this attitude toward an object as a semantic product the ‘semantic attitude’ and deﬁnes it as follows: SA In order to say that a person P has a semantic attitude, the following conditions must be fulﬁlled : (1) if person P predicates something of an object x, then P does not have a semantic attitude toward the object x, (2) if P predicates something of an object x, then P has a semantic attitude toward another object O, and (3) if P has a semantic attitude toward an object O, then P has this attitude with regard to another relation which P establishes between the object O and the other object.30 Thus, for example, in the case where John predicates of a rose that it is red, he cannot have a semantic attitude toward the rose. If he predicates redness of the rose, then he can have a semantic attitude toward an entity, for instance to the sequence of sounds which he utters when predicating of the rose. Yet John’s semantic attitude toward this sequence of sounds is semantic only when John makes a connection between the sequence of sounds and the rose about which he predicates that it is red. Furthermore, in order to be in the semantic attitude toward the sequence of sounds, John must not make the connection between the sequence of sounds and the rose, though he can make a connection between the rose and his mental act (or another object) which articulates the sequences of sounds. (This is because of the third condition above, which refers to a connection between the object O and another object which can be any object being in a relation to the object to which P has the semantic attitude.) From the point of view of psychology, Ossowski continues, the semantic product redirects the thought of a person who understands this product to another object.31 Now, Ossowski claims that every system of semantic concepts is a relative system, as everything in this domain, where the eventual criterion is always somebody’s intention, is relative. (Ossowski 1926, p. 54—my translation)

This, I believe, justiﬁes the translation of the Polish word ‘utwór’ by the English word ‘product’ when speaking about semantic products in Ossowski’s view. In everyday language the Polish term means a work, a result, a composition, a creation, etc. I think that Ossowski’s notion of a product is very similar to Twardowski’s notion of a durable (material in Ossowski’s case) psychophysical product. However, a very important difference between these two notions of product must be mentioned. Twardowski’s psycho-physical product demands that the product be made with a meaning-giving intention (in fact, even be caused by the intentional act). Ossowski’s semantic product, on the other hand, will remain psycho-physical (in Twardowski’s sense) even if there

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should be someone who has only a semantic attitude toward the product, independently of the fact whether the product was made with a meaning-giving intention or not. One of the consequences of Ossowski’s view is that everything material can be a semantic product.32 Semantic products as described by Ossowski can still be seen, however, in a double way. Firstly, they can be treated with regard to the objects to which they refer in their semantic functions. Secondly, they can be treated as related to the mental acts of subjects who have a semantic attitude toward them. When seen according to the second possibility semantic products are treated in their function of expressing. The function itself belongs, in Ossowski’s view, to the objects of the psychology of speech acts. Here the function of expressing semantic products consists in the fact that semantic products direct the thoughts of a subject to the objects to which the semantic products refer in their other semantic functions. More precisely, the function of expressing consists in the fact that the material object to which we take the semantic attitude directs our thought to the objects to which this semantic product refers (or means or pictures). Thus, if John, traveling on a train from Berlin to Kraków sees the sign ‘stacja Rzepin’, if John understands Polish, and if he takes the semantic attitude toward this sign, then the function of expressing this sign leads John to think about the rail station building on which the sign is located. This is because the referent of this sign in Polish is a building in the town named Rzepin (according to the rules of Polish language and according to the habit that signs painted in this way are usually placed on rail stations buildings).33

3.2

Linguistic Products

The semantic attitude toward the above written text leads our thoughts to the notion of language in Ossowski’s theory. For him language is a system of conventional semantic products which by means of conventional rules creates a new complex of semantic products with a new independent function of their own.34 The functions of complex products are new in the sense in which their function is not included in the basic conventional rules which are possessed by simple semantic products. The complex product ‘The rose is red’ has a semantic function that is different from those of ‘rose’ and ‘red.’ Its function is new with respect to these single words. The conventional rule which enables us to create such complex semantic products is the rule according to which we can create sentences by the means of the copula ‘is’ in English. Yet not only rules are conventional. The semantic product itself is also conventional in the sense that its semantic function does not depend on its outer physical shape. The class of conventional semantic products can generally be split into two categories. The ﬁrst category of semantic products includes symbols. The latter are understood by Ossowski as semantic products whose semantic function consists in assigning these semantic products to objects. The assigning,

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however, is possible only with respect to someone’s intention. Ossowski calls the objects to which semantic products are assigned ‘that which is assigned’ or ‘designation.’ The semantic function of these conventional products is here one of designating or naming. The second category of conventional semantic products consists of all products which mean something. Their semantic function is not that of designation but of meaning (in Frege’s sense). The relation between the two categories of conventional semantic products is quite interesting. On the one hand, when he says that ‘[the object] dependent on someone’s attitude can change one of its semantic function into another’,35 Ossowski claims that the function of a semantic product depends on a psychological attitude taken toward it. On the other hand, semantic products of the second category, i.e. those with meanings, are always signs of speech acts. (In fact, Ossowski divided signs which are meaningful into those known from Brentanian classes of sentences, nominal phrases and syncategorematic phrases.) Symbols, however, are not necessarily signs of speech. Thus, linguistic signs, i.e. the signs of speech acts, do not always have their designations. Moreover, a similar linguistic semantic product can have a designation on one occasion, and not have it on another, depending on how it functions, which, again, depends upon the semantic attitude of the subject. Thus, in intentionally making a meaningful sign from a symbol, we can lose, for example, its designation. A simple example of this, I think, would be that of making a name from a sentence. Let us assume that we have the following symbol ‘The present king of France is bald.’ This is a name which designates the sentence written in Bertrand Russell’s 1905 paper.36 We are able, however, to make this name a sentence which would be a meaningful sign of a speech act. The normal way to do this is by omitting the quotation marks. But then the sentence designates nothing, since at present there is no king of France. The quotation marks here are clearly marks of a semantic function. Now, linguistic products can occur as single signs or as complexes. Ossowski, as most of his colleagues in the Lvov-Warsaw School, accepts Frege’s principle of compositionality in that he accepts that the semantic function of a complex depends on the semantic function of its parts. Ossowski calls such a complex a semantic product of the second order. Semantic products of the ﬁrst order consist of parts of semantic products of the second order. Thus, language is a system of semantic products in which it is possible to built semantic products of the second order. Sentences are, in Ossowski’s account, semantic products of the second order. This means that for him the basic semantic units are simple signs. However, only the ability to form sentences decides about a system of semantic products as a language.

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187

Truth and the Property of Sentences

The distinction between designating and meaning grows in importance when Ossowski considers the notion of truth. An expression is meaningful, claims Ossowski, under the following conditions: (1) an expression can be part of true or false expressions, and (2) all parts of an expression have their normal semantic function in a given language.37 Logical sentences constitute a special class of meaningful expressions. They are special in that they do not need to occur in another expression, for logical sentences are true or false in themselves. Logical sentences are semantic products which are independent with regard to meaning. (An expression is independent iff it does not need any product of a higher order in order to explain its semantic function.) This means that logical sentences are basic units of meaning. What we have already said about the basic semantic units implies that basic semantic units are different from basic meaningful units. This fact does not need further explanation, for the function of meaning is only one of the functions of semantic products. Yet not only sentences, but also nominal expressions, are independent products. The latter, however, are independent not only with respect to the meaning but also with regard to the function of designating. This is because their semantic function can be explained by showing what they designate. The two classes of independent semantic products distinguished by Ossowski cannot be reduced to one unique class. The attempt to unify those products by putting them into one group is a mistake which was common to both Frege and Meinong. Both held the view that sentences must be taken in their function of designating. For Meinong nominal expressions designate objects. Sentences, according to Meinong, designate objectives. According to Meinong, if a nominal expression that occurs in its function of designation (Meinong’s function of meaning in Figure 1 above) communicates something about an object (Meinong’s function of communication), then the sentence which communicates to us something about the object must also designate the same object. Meinong identiﬁes the semantic function of sentences with the semantic function of nominal expressions. The assumption made by him was that a sign is an object which communicates something about another object (about what is designated). What Meinong calls ‘objectives’ is, Ossowski argues, assigned to the nominal expression of the form ‘that which. . .’ The latter, however, is not a logical sentence. Frege assignes Truth and Falsity as the objects of sentences. According to Ossowski’s view, even though we say about a sentence that it is a truth or true, this does not in the least prove that the sentence designates the Truth. Properly understood, Ossowski holds that when we say ‘this is true’, then we mean that a sentence has the property of being true. Thus, a relation of assignment between A and B, such as Frege’s assignment of the sentence and Truth can-

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not be properly expressed in the sentence ‘A is B.’ Yet the opposite is the case: if an expression designates the Truth, then one cannot infer from this that the expression is true. Ossowski claims that Frege confuses the function of designation with the property of being true. Ossowski explains as follows: When we want to assign that which should correspond to the concept of truth and we do not want to use the mere name ‘truth’, we resort not to true sentences but to nominal expressions such as, for example, ‘the truth-value which the sentence has is the negation of the false sentence.’ (Ossowski 1926, p. 40—my translation)

He adds that: He who states that the sentence designates, clearly understands the term ‘to designate’ in a somehow different way. (. . .) Sentences have exclusively properties of truth and falsity. The properties of truth and falsity do not belong to our investigations. Neither the fact that an expression is true, nor the fact that it is false is a semantic property. Yet the fact that an expression is either true or false is a semantic property. I used this property in order to distinguish among linguistic products. (Ossowski 1926, p. 41—my translation)

With regard to Ossowski’s last statement, we would nowadays say that the ontic property of being true is quite different from the semantic property of a sentence as expressed in the principle of bivalence, i.e. that every sentence is either true or false.

4.

Summary of Chapter 9

Ontologism, together with the principle of intentionality in that part of Austrian Philosophy which I have in mind when speaking about Brentanian tradition, led representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School to the view that every language is meaningful. The belief that there are only interpreted languages was one of the most widespread and accepted assumptions in the Polish philosophical school. Therefore, formal languages, which rapidly developed in the ﬁrst decades of the twentieth century, were also understood here as interpreted languages. As far as the bearer of truth is concerned, the most important ideas in the area of semantics prior to the year 1933 include: 1. The view that formal languages are improvements of ordinary languages and they are conventional and consistent models (interpreted systems) for everyday languages. Interest in ordinary language and in the conventionality of linguistic signs are also characteristic of the Brentanian tradition. 2. The distinction between language and metalanguage formulated by Le´sniewski. The distinction was rooted in the discussion of the view that the task of logic was the demarcation of true and false sentences. 3. The connection between logic and truth. As we would say today, the semantic approach of logical systems presented a natural way for deﬁning

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logic and explaining the usage of the adjective ‘logical.’ Thus, for example, Ossowski’s logical sentences were logical because of their having property of truth or falsity. 4. The conception of truth as a semantic predicate which is predicated of sentences. 5. The conception of inheriting some of the properties of intentional relations, such as being about an object, in a way which breaks with causal theories of inheriting intentionality in the style of Twardowski. The clear distinction between expressing and other semantic functions of language are decisive here. Furthermore, the proposal of narrowing the term ‘expression’ to the manifestation (betrayal) of a concrete mental experience also enabled the treatment of language without its relation to the sphere of the mental. Husserl’s Logical Investigations played an important role in this demarcation, made clearly on the part of the Lvov-Warsaw School and described explicitly by Maria Ossowska. 6. The conception of the meaning-intention as a basic notion in explaining linguistic behavior. The meaning-intention, on the one hand, was identiﬁed with the meanings-bestowing acts of the speaker (or of the writer) in Husserl’s sense. On the other hand, however, in Ossowski’s semiotics it was narrowed to the semantic attitude of the receiver of a sign. 7. The notion of a semantic product which goes hand in hand with the notion of meaning-intention. Even if not inspired directly only by Brentanians, all of these ideas were situated within the Brentanian framework or drew upon discussions about notions which originated in this framework.

Notes 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8

Le´s´niewski 1927, p. 181. ´ Wolenski 1985, pp. 139–140. Le´s´niewski 1913a. As I have already mentioned, Le´s´niewski distances from his early views. However, as we have also seen, this does not mean, ﬁrst, that all the views he held changed, or, secondly, that all his early arguments loose their value. On the contrary, some results which he obtained during his philosophico-grammatical period, as well as most of the arguments for these results, after some modiﬁcations, were still taken for granted by Le´s´niewski (only the discussed thesis of non-existence of general objects is here to mention). Le´s´niewski 1913a, pp. 317, 321. In fact, in order to solve the paradox, Le´s´niewski needed also another notion of the symbolic function of the subject of the sentence. I shall refer to this notion below. It is interesting that precisely this passage is lacking in the English translation of the paper. I refer to the topics investigated by Le´s´niewski which are mentioned during this study and do not want to deny the later inﬂuence of the Principia Mathematica, the lack of understanding of which inspired him in developing his system of ontology. But even the latter facts conﬁrm only the thesis of ontologism as valid for Le´s´niewski.

190 9 10 11 12 13 14

15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

32 33 34 35 36

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Le´s´niewski 1913a, p. 329. Le´s´niewski 1913a, pp. 326–327. Le´s´niewski 1913a, pp. 327–329. Le´s´niewski 1911, p. 342. Le´s´niewski 1911, p. 343, Les´niewski 1913a, p. 324. It should be added that the translation provides a clear interpretation of Le´s´niewski in that it uses the term ‘semiotic’ instead of ‘semasiology’, which is used in the original version and which was introduced by Anton Marty. Similarly, the term ‘proposition’ used in translation is inadequate, since Le´s´niewski uses the term ‘sentence’, which refers to utterances and inscription rather than to propositions. Moreover, ‘representational intention’ is clearly a contemporary interpretation of ‘symbolizing intention’ or a ‘presented intention’ in the text of Le´s´niewski, terms which I would prefer in this context. Le´s´niewski 1911, pp. 340–341. ´ Lesniewski 1913a, pp. 325–327. For more information as to the issue of how the analysis of existential sentences could effect a development of systems in Le´s´niewski’s style see Simons 1992b. ´ Wolenski 1985, p. 232. Ossowska’s concept of thought (or thinking) is similar to the concept of thinking as described by Meinong: see chapter 3 above. Ossowska 1931, pp. 207, 210–212, 238–239. Ossowska 1928, p. 148. Ossowska 1931, pp. 207, 212–214. Compare with Ossowska 1928, p. 146. See Ossowska 1931, pp. 208, 214–235, 238–241. It is most important to note that the parts of Ossowska’s paper which focus on the issue of expressing include reviews of the concepts of expressions which are described by Meinong and Husserl and were presented above in chapter 4. In particular, Ossowska refers to the theory of Husserl’s Anzeige, which she sees as a model of what she later assumed as the proper sense of the word ‘expressing’ and ‘expression.’ Ossowska 1931, pp. 208–209, 235–239. Ossowska refers here to the problem of secondary expressions as investigated by Meinong. See Ossowska 1928, p. 147, Ossowska 1931, pp. 224, 227–228; Meinong 1902, pp. 16–35. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1929 [1966, p. 103.]. Ossowska 1931, pp. 233–234. Ossowska 1931, pp. 251–254. Ossowski 1926, p. 30. Compare Ossowski 1926, p. 31. It is worth noting that this kind of association between semantic products and thought is not a mere association of imaginations with a semantic product, as it was usually understood in the psychological combination theory of judgment. Moreover, according to Ossowski, the psychologically complicated character of the association can also be described in terms of psychological reactions. In fact, it was Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz who derived one of his basic classes of meaning-directives of language, i.e. empirical meaning-directives, from behaviorist explanations of association such as that described by Ossowski. See Ajdukiewicz 1931, 1934. An interesting and grotesque example of this was shown by Witold Gombrowicz in his novel Pornograﬁa [Pornography], where everything is related to everything with the intention of the ﬁgures of the novel. Ossowski 1926, pp. 31, 56. Ossowski 1926, p. 35. Ossowski 1926, p. 34—my translation. In order to make the relation a little bit more complicated we can refer to every sentence of a similar form or to the class of such sentences—see also Ossowski when referring to Husserl’s notion of the species in Ossowski 1926, p. 32. It is an interesting fact that an expression in quotation marks does not fulﬁll the second condition. Thus, the name of a meaningful expression is not itself meaningful. This is because the function of syllables is not normal when the expression in which they occur is given in quotation marks.

Chapter 10 JUDGMENT, BELIEF, AND SENTENCES: REMARKS ON THE TRUTH BEARER IN THE LVOV-WARSAW SCHOOL

1.

1.1

Kazimierz Twardowski (VI) and Tadeusz Cze˙z˙ owski (I): The Product of the Judging Act The Theory of Knowledge and the Theory of Cognition

Twardowski’s anti-psychologistic turn found its expression in his 1912 paper about acts and products, already mentioned above. Even though Twardowski did not change his views on the bearer of truth in that the judgment was still seen as the proper entity which serves as the truth bearer, after this antipsychologistic turn he did, however, change his view on judgments as the objects of the theory of knowledge. The mental function of the judging act that served as the bearer of truth in 1900 (in the paper ‘On So-Called Relative Truths’) now no longer belongs to the domain of epistemological investigations but exclusively and unambiguously to the domain of descriptive psychology. The main difference between the psychology of thinking and the theory of knowledge consists in that the latter considers products of mental activities rather than mental functions. Mental functions remain under the consideration of psychology. Hence, Twardowski clearly separated the two domains, i.e. the theory of cognition and the theory of knowledge. The separation became possible because a thought, considered as the product of a function of thinking, might have counter-properties related to the properties of the function. Among those properties are those of being true or of being false. They are, according to Twardowski, counterparts of the properties of acts of thinking such as ‘to be correct’ or ‘to be incorrect’, predicates investigated by Brentano and his pupils. Thus, more precisely, the theory of knowledge should be a theory of

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true products of judging acts or, as Twardowski also puts it, a theory of truth of products of judging activities.1 When using the words ‘truth’, ‘true’, or ‘truth-value’ in various kinds of phrases and when speaking about various types of truth, one sometimes uses these words univocally and sometimes equivocally. Among the various meanings of these words one might note their primary epistemological meaning in that truth is a property of judgments, namely a property of those judgments which afﬁrm what exists and reject what does not exist. (Twardowski 1922, p. 37b—my translation)

Moreover, according to Twardowski all parts and questions of the theory of knowledge can be characterized according to the conditions for the truth of products of judging acts. For example, the problem of the origins of knowledge can be conceived as a problem of the origins of true judgments, for the view on the nature of judgment decides about its truth. Similarly, the issue of the limits of our knowledge can be formulated in the question: which objects are or can be the objects of true judgments? Moreover, both of these topics, that of the origin and that of the limits of knowledge are generalized in the question concerning the possibility of knowledge. ‘What is knowledge?’ can be reformulate here as: . . .what is truth due to which certain judgments are knowledge, i.e. [as] the problem of the essence of truth. This is the main issue. (Twardowski 1975, p. 250—my translation)

1.2

Elementary Judgments as Truth Bearers

A view similar to Twardowski’s was held by Tadeusz Czez˙ owski, one of his students. In the latter’s book The Classical View on Judgment and Proof in the Light of Modern Logic of 1927, he gives an interpretation of classical calculus and of ﬁrst order logic as calculi of judgments. The terms of these logical systems are interpreted by Czez˙ owski in the following manner: Propositional variables stand for judgments and the values of truth-functions are also judgments. Thus, the domain which is nowadays usually considered to be one of propositions is held by him to be a set of judgments. The judgment is understood here as the elementary propositional function of which extension is only one object.2 This is what Czez˙ owski calls ’elementary judgment’ or ‘judgment about facts.’ Judgments are called here elementary because, according to this interpretation, they are on the one hand logical objects, while on the other hand, since they are judgments about facts, they are elements of our knowledge. Thus, every judgment has its truth-value. Which one of the two truthvalues it has depends upon the empirical fact to which the judgment refers. The explanation of the notion of truth belongs, therefore, to the theory of knowledge. Czez˙ owski writes: Contemporary Polish logicians use the term ‘sentence’ more often than the term ‘judgment’; the term ‘judgment’ seems to me more adequate with regard to the need to differentiate between a judgment and its symbol, a declarative sentence. At the same time,

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however, a judgment is different from the act of judging. (Czez˙ owski 1927, p. 6—my translation)

This passage states clearly that, according to Czez˙ owski, the elementary judgments are products of judging acts rather than those acts themselves. The interpretation of judgment along these lines also came to be expressed many years later in Czez˙ owski’s Main Principles of the Philosophical Sciences of 1946.3 A product is depicted here as the outcome of human activity. In particular, a judgment is the product of an activity of judging. Moreover, Czez˙ owski declares the judgment-product to be the content of belief. It is thus clear that the notions of judgment and of belief are conceived by him in the same way as they were conceived by Brentano, to the effect that every act of judging is strongly connected with the moment of belief or assertion. A belief is considered by Czez˙ owski to be a mental fact that consists of an activity and its product, a judgment.

2. 2.1

Jan Łukasiewicz (II): The Sentence in the Logical Sense Judgment and Belief

As mentioned in chapter 7, the strong separation of logic from psychology made by Łukasiewicz in 1907 affects his later work, On the Principle of Contradiction in Aristotle of 1910, where he writes: I emphasize the difference that exists between a judgment as a logical fact and a belief as a psychological phenomenon. (Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, p. 13—my translation)

‘The act of judging’ means, according to Łukasiewicz, the same as ‘belief.’ In consequence, he uses the term ‘belief’ or ‘conviction’ rather than ‘the act of judging.’ Despite the way in which the term ‘belief’ was used in descriptivepsychological investigations prior to Łukasiewicz, i.e. whether it was considered as a mental act, state, or process, belief has, in Łukasiewicz’s view, a correlate in what he refers to as a ‘judgment.’ A judgment is deﬁned by Łukasiewicz as: A sequence of words or other signs indicating that an object has or does not have some property. (Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, p. 12—my translation)

Łukasiewicz also calls the judgment as described by this formulation a ‘logical sentence’ or a ‘sentence in the logical sense.’ Every belief, therefore, has its correlate in a sentence in the logical sense that is either an assertive or a negative judgment expressed in a sequence of words. As we have already seen in the previous section on Łukasiewicz, to make his account of judgment (i.e. of a sentence in the logical sense) clearer, Łukasiewicz refers to Meinong and to his notion of an objective. The notion of the logical sentence in Łukasiewicz’s view differs from that objectives in that, as Łukasiewicz himself underlines, in the case of Meinong’s objectives

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it is rather a fact that is the object of an act of judging (i.e. of belief in Łukasiewicz’s terms). Here, however, Łukasiewicz is not clear as to whether he takes Meinong’s objectives as states of affairs or as propositions (i.e. as objectentities or as meaning-entities). For the reasons mentioned below it seems that Łukasiewicz himself wishes to consider objectives as object-entities. His judgments, when using Meinong’s terms, would rather be objectives (in the sense of object-entities) expressed in words or by means of other signs; they are strongly connected with language.4 The comparison between Łukasiewicz’s judgment and Meinong’s objectives brings to the light two important facts: Firstly, the objective is an object of belief, and, secondly, this object can be expressed in a judgment (or as Łukasiewicz puts it, in a sentence in the logical sense). This points out that entities like states of affairs, ideal meanings, and other abstract or higher-order object-entities (or whatever can be understood by Meinong’s term ‘objective’), when placed somewhere between mental acts and their material linguistic expressions, were, in the Lvov-Warsaw School, very strongly tied either to mental activities or to their linguistic expressions. Thus, for Łukasiewicz, A judgment is a sentence uttered in words or by means of other signs, and it is a sentence that means something. (Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, p. 14—my translation)

Taking this formulation of Łukasiewicz’s notion of judgment, however, a ‘judgment’ or a ‘logical sentence’ that mean something can have, I think, two meanings. The ﬁrst meaning of a ‘judgment’ or a ‘sentence in the logical sense’ would above all emphasize an ideal meaning of indicative sentences that might have been conceived as sentences in itself in Bolzano’s sense, or in the sense of Meinong’s objective (where the latter is taken as a meaning-entity rather than as an object-entity). However, this ideal meaning would have been, along Łukasiewicz’s lines, always ﬁxed in words, and there would have been no other sense in which we could speak about it. There were no meanings apart from linguistic entities in this interpretation. Yet again, this dependence relation between meanings and the sequence of words or other signs might still be understood in a twofold way: (1) It can mean that a judgment or a logical sentence is a species in Husserl’s sense, i.e. that it is graspable only when we are dealing with its linguistic form and that we grasp it in specie in an act of ideation. This would be an epistemic or cognitive relation between the sequence of words and their meanings. Furthermore, for this reason a sentence in the logical sense could be naturalized by means of a statement of its accessibility or even of its creativity in an epistemic act of ideation such as abstraction. This seems, however, to be a mistaken interpretation of Łukasiewicz’s notion of a meaningful judgment, for in his account, meanings should also be objects of belief, and belief, accompanied by certainty, is not an act of ideation in Łukasiewicz’s view.

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(2) The dependence relation between a sequence of words and its meaning can also be conceived as a two-sided dependence relation: A relation in which not only are there no meanings if they are not expressed in an appropriate way in a sequence of words, but even a sequence of words is meaningful only if it expresses an already existent meaning. Thus, on this account, an uttered or written sentence refers to some objective or to some sentence in itself. This interpretation seems to be justiﬁed also with regard to another term which Łukasiewicz uses instead of ‘judgment’, ‘logical sentence’, or ‘sentence in the logical sense’, i.e. with regard to the term ‘logical fact.’5 The same objective or, using this term, logical fact can, on this interpretation, be an object of a belief and can serve as the meaning of a written or uttered sentence. In other words, an objective as an object of belief would be understood here as state of affairs, whereas the same objective when taken as the meaning of a sentence would be a proposition. Thus, the same entity is taken as object-entity when referring to belief and as meaning-entity when referring to sentences. Yet a second interpretation of ‘judgment’ or ‘sentence in the logical sense’ in the above passage is also possible, one which would emphasize the linguistic entity rather than its meaning. The relation between a sequence of words and a judgment can be conceived here as that between a particular judgment and a sequence of meaningful words, i.e. the relation between a sequence of words and its meaning is one of a whole to its part. Thus, this interpretation gives priority to the sequence of words. In this respect, Meinong’s objective as an object of belief would rather be a proposition whereas an objective with a connection to a judgment (i.e. a sequence of words understood mere as a written or uttered sequence of signs which are meaningful) would be the fact to which the judgment refers. This second interpretation is justiﬁed with regard to some of Łukasiewicz’s other remarks concerning the notion of a judgment. Firstly, it is closer to the view presented by Aristotle, whom Łukasiewicz recalls when speaking about his understanding of judgment. Following Aristotle, he distinguishes between a mental state of belief (or state of conviction) immanent to the mind on the one hand, and its counterpart in the sounds of speech on the other hand. Łukasiewicz refers to this counterpart as the meaningful sentence which is an assertive or negative judgment uttered in words.

2.2

The Truth of Judgments: An Argument from the Judgment’s Function of Reconstructing

Łukasiewicz’s view on truth also supports this last interpretation of his notion of a judgment as a meaningful sentence that is an assertive or negative judgment uttered in words. According to Łukasiewicz, not every sequence of words which from a grammatical point of view counts as sentence in a given language presents a judgment. For it is not the grammar but the fact of being meaningful that decides when a written sign is a judgment. Only sentences that are mean-

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ingful can be called judgments. ‘Abracadabra is a bed’ cannot, according to Łukasiewicz, be a judgment in everyday English. Thus, there are sequences of words of the sentence-form which are not endowed in meaning. Moreover, continuing along these lines, not every meaningful sentence is a judgment, for not every meaningful sentence can be true or false. What, then, are the entities to which truth and falsity are attributed? Łukasiewicz claims that it is the attributes of entities that are meaningful.6 Yet, as Aristotle puts it, only a meaningful sentence which indicates that something is the case can be true or false.7 Thus, judgments are those sentences which, in accord with the grammar of given language, are indicative (stating that something is the case) and meaningful. Next, there arises the question of whether truth and falsity can be attributes only of judgments (sentences in the logical sense, logical sentences) or also of mental beliefs. On the one hand, both beliefs and judgments are about something. On the other hand, however, along the lines of the already mentioned view of Aristotle, not only the fact that an entity is meaningful decides about its ability to serve as a truth bearer. Łukasiewicz also follows Aristotle in analyzing what it would mean to have the property of being true or of being false. According to Łukasiewicz the property of being true or of being false is relative. It is relative in the sense that it is an attribute of meaningful entities with regard to their relations of concordance or non-concordance with the facts. Truth or falsity, in other words, is a property of meaningful entities, which means that an object has or does not have a certain feature, i.e. it is a property relative to the relation of concordance between these meaningful entities and the fact that an object has or does not have the given feature. The question of the truth bearer thus has to do not only with which entities are meaningful, but also with which entities are in a relation of concordance or non-concordance with the fact of an object’s having or not having some feature. Meaningful sentences are indicative when they are in such a relation. Judgments or sentences in the logical sense are meaningful. According to Łukasiewicz, they also stand in a relation of concordance or non-concordance to the facts. This is because, as a sequence of words or other signs, they reconstruct such facts. Only in this way can they be true or false. Yet, to repeat the question, what about our beliefs? According to Łukasiewicz mental acts (or states or processes) do not indicate that something is the case, for they do not reconstruct facts. Thus, mental acts do not stand in a relation of concordance or non-concordance to these facts. They do not reconstruct facts since the relation between a belief and a fact is an intentional relation. A belief is directed towards an object; it has intentional object. The intentional relation obtains between a mental act and a state of affairs, and Łukasiewicz understands the latter in a manner similar to Meinong’s objective as a meaning-entity. Thus objects of belief are, as Łukasiewicz puts it, imaginary states of affairs. Only when an objective is expressed in words or by means of other linguistic signs

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do we have a judgment that can be true or false, since a judgment reconstructs the underlying state of affairs as an object-entity. An objective expressed in words, then, is not any more imaginary in the same sense in which the objective towards which we are directed intentionally in a mental act is imaginary. This is, concludes Łukasiewicz, the main difference between mental acts and judgments: the relation in which they stand to states of affairs.8 Thus, according to Łukasiewicz the judgment is the truth bearer, i.e. the sentence in the logical sense, which should be understood as a perceptually accessible sequence of words or other signs that reconstruct reality. When a judgment reconstructs the existing state of affairs, then it is true.9

3.

´ Tadeusz Kotarbinski (IV): The Judgment and the Sentence

In what follows I shall refer to Kotarbi´n´ ski’s so-called Pre-Elements, which are authorized notes published by his students in 1926, three years before his Elements. . ., which was object of my consideration in the previous part of this study.10 The notes contain several remarks referring to such terms as ‘judgment’, ‘judging’ and ‘sentence.’ In fact, the notes were the basis for his later work of 1929, but in the latter study the certain sections were shortened and depicted by Kotarbi´n´ ski from a purely reistic standpoint, something visible but not decisive in the Pre-elements. For these reasons and because of the fact that the notes are almost unknown within philosophical circles, I shall return for a moment to this earliest work of Kotarbi´n´ ski. It is worth mentioning once again that it is this work that includes prototypes of the T convention, of which Tarski took advantage in order to formulate the material condition of correctness of his semantic deﬁnition of truth in 1933.

3.1

The Judgment and States of Affairs

Since the term ‘judgment’ is ambiguous, says Kotarbi´n´ ski in the Pre-Elements, it is therefore worth looking once again at its uses, taking the perspectives of descriptive psychology, as well as that of the everyday use of language. The usual usage of the term ‘judgment’ is known from both everyday language and from the science of descriptive psychology, and the latter is the sense in which it refers to an act of judging. On the one hand, for empirical reasons (empirical in the sense of psychological experience of inner perception), Kotarbi´n´ ski rejects the strong opposition between acts of presenting and acts of judging which was maintained by Brentano and his students. For Kotarbi´n´ ski the appropriate opposition would rather be that between judging and imagining. This is because mental presentations of concepts and acts of judging are not clearly separable in inner experience. In particular, Kotarbi´n´ ski considers the presentation of a concept to already involve an act of judging. There are no general presentations that could serve as mental entities called ‘concepts.’11

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Concepts arise in acts of judging. On the other hand, there is a sense in which judging should be treated as a separate class of mental acts of thinking, for the act of judging itself presents a special case of thinking. This is because one can think either with the moment of conviction or without it. Moreover, only when it is accompanied by the moment of conviction, i.e. by the belief that such and such is the case, is thinking an act of judging. Thus, Kotarbi´n´ ski does not argue against the idiogenic theory of judgment as known from Brentano and his pupils. However—and still on the basis of the empirical experience of inner perception—Kotarbi´n´ ski remarks that a clear demarcation between the thinking with the moment of conviction and the thinking without this moment is impossible. This is because an act of thinking admits of grades of conviction. Yet for Kotarbi´n´ ski there is no danger in using of such terms as ‘thinking’ and ‘judging’ interchangeably in the area of logic, since for the purposes of logic the psychological moment of conviction is redundant. Moreover, these terms are in fact apparent names. Indeed, instead using these terms, one should use correct, literal expressions such as ‘he/she thinks that. . .’ or ‘he/she judges that. . .’12 When the terms like ‘judgment’, ‘judging’, ‘thinking’, and ‘thought’ are used literally they can lead to various mistakes and misinterpretations. A standard example of such a mistake consists, for Kotarbi´n´ ski, in distinguishing between acts or functions and their products or formations, as was done by Stumpf and Twardowski.13 Such metaphors, claims Kotarbi´n´ ski, led to the assumption of ideal objects such as judgments in the logical sense. According to such views a judgment is not thinking with the moment of conviction that such and such is the case, but it is something which is designated by phrases of the form ‘that which. . .’ or, even worse, by Meinong’s ‘das Sosein.’ Kotarbi´n´ ski does not want to accept any such referents which come from the literal uses of apparent names. However, even with regard to a judgment in the psychological sense there are examples of the assumption of non-existent entities. For instance, Kotarbi´n´ ski claims that some philosophers say that a judgment in the logical sense is the same as the content of an act of judging. Moreover, one makes an object of an act of judging from the referent of the phrase scheme ‘that which. . .’ where Meinong’s objective is here, again, a good example. The same phrase, therefore, designates both the object and the content of a judging act: in one case it is an ideal object, in the other it is the state of affairs to which the phrase refers.14

3.2

The Sentence: Another Semantic-Reistic Argument

The term ‘judgment’ can be used unambiguously as referring to the act of judging in the sense given by descriptive psychology. Yet in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the type already described, we should, according to Kotarbi´n´ ski, use the sentence-terminology, i.e. terminology that uses the no-

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tion of sentence instead of the notion of judgment. Sentences are something real; the term ‘sentence’ is a real name and can be taken literally, whereas not only judgment-contents and judgment-objects are ﬁctitious objects, but even the existence of the act of judging itself is questionable. The latter is dubious since we in fact speak about someone who judges when speaking about judgments or judging activities. For Kotarbi´n´ ski the problem of the contents and the objects of the act of judging presents an apparent problem, especially when formulated in terms of the relation between a judgment in the logical sense and states of affairs. We do not need to introduce any entities such as judgments in the logical sense when we want to contrast logical and psychological problems. In order to distinguish logic from psychology all we need are the following assumptions: that sentences of the form (PS) X thinks (correctly, quickly. . . and so on). are psychological sentences and that the sentences obtained from the scheme (LS) X when thinking that such and such is the case, thinks truly. are logical sentences. Both kinds of sentences, logical and psychological, are sentences about someone who judges.15 A sentence is thus contrasted by Kotarbi´n´ ski with a judgment. A sentence is an ordered sequence of letters, sounds, or gestures. Indicative sentences, i.e. statements understood as utterances [wypowiedzi], constitute a sub-class of sentences. Only the latter can be true or false; more precisely, only of the latter can ‘true’ or ‘false’ be predicated. A sentence is also conceived by Kotarbi´n´ ski as a phrase that can be an indication (i.e. a statement) of a thought. Here, the notion of the function of a sentence that consists in the expression of thought is conceived by him in a very broad sense, as already known from Ossowski. An ordered sequence of signs can intentionally be the expression of a thought, i.e. it can be created as an expression with an act of meaning-giving intention. The same ordered sequence of signs, however, can also be taken as only an expression of a thought, i.e. it can be taken with the semantic attitude.16 Thus, Kotarbi´n´ ski deﬁnes a sentence as a phrase that can be an indication (statement) of thinking that such and such is the case. This is equivalent, claims Kotarbi´n´ ski, to the deﬁnition of a sentence as a true or false expression.17 Finally, Kotarbi´n´ ski contrasts a sentence and a sentence-function. The latter has the same form as a sentence; it cannot, however, be true or false.18

4.

Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz (I): The Picturing Sentence

Let us recall the problem of the distinction between imaginations and judging activities, on the one hand, and between judging and thinking, on the other,

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as presented by Kotarbi´n´ ski, which led him to the revision of Brentano’s view as regards the classiﬁcation of mental phenomena. In the light of this, why could it not be said that inner experience does not provide enough evidence for the claim that ‘truth’ can also be predicated, for instance, of presentations? Some remarks as far as this problem is concerned were made, for example, by Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz in his lectures ‘Principal Issues in the Theory of Knowledge’ that he gave at the University of Lvov in the 1930–31 academic year.19 The lectures were devoted for the most part to the notion of truth, beginning with the problem of true imaginations. It is interesting to see at least an outline of Ajdukiewicz’s argumentation with regard to the problems mentioned in the previous sections. It is above all important to mention that the problem of true imaginary presentations is, for Ajdukiewicz, strongly related to such topics as perception and (immanent and transcendent) objects of imagination. In this respect he discusses, among other things, the views of Russell, Moore, Mach, and, what is important here, of the Brentanians.20 Roughly speaking, according to Ajdukiewicz the issue of the truth of imaginary presentations can be transformed into the question about the truth of judgments, convictions, or beliefs (following Kotarbi´n´ ski, he considers these terms to be synonymous). Ajdukiewicz’s argument, when drawn into a Brentanian framework, can be presented as follows.

4.1

The Motives of True Belief

In saying that an imaginary presentation is true, one claims that something which is real, has all the properties which the immanent object of the presentation in question possesses. Despite various interpretations of the notion of an immanent object, and despite other notions involved in the quasi-deﬁnition of a true imaginary presentation given above, it is correct, according to Ajdukiewicz, to say that an imaginary presentation is true if the transcendent object of this presentation (i.e. the object of presentation in Twardowski’s sense) does in fact have all of the properties that appear in one’s imagination as properties of this object. In other words, an imaginary presentation is true if on its basis it seems to one that there is an object having such and such properties and this object actually exists. But now, the whole issue of true imaginations can be moved to the issue not of true acts of imagination but true acts of judgment. My imagination is true when the judgment which relies on this imagination is true. (Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 460—my translation)

Thus, the truth of imagination is a type of secondary truth. For Ajdukiewicz, judgments are true in the primary sense. The relation between the truth of imaginations and the truth of judgment can, however, be presented in various ways. Firstly, this relation can be treated as a causal relation, i.e. the imagination might causally evoke the judgment based on it. For example, the imagination of a map of Austria reminds me about my

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belief that Salzburg is a beautiful city. Yet this type of causal association is, according to Ajdukiewicz, not representative as far as the relation between the truth of imagination and the truth of judgments is concerned. Thus, secondly, a judgment can be motivated by an imagination. An example here would be a sensual imagination of a rose, an imagination that motivates my statement that the rose is red. On several occasions ‘motivation’ means the same thing as ‘warranty’ for Ajdukiewicz. This is because an imagination might give a warranty for a true judgment. If this is the case, then the imagination motivates this judgment. However, Ajdukiewicz considers this somewhat unfortunate comparison to be only as a metaphor that helps to describe the fact of motivation. In fact, motivational relations are objects of psychological experience rather than objects of description. Now, an imaginary presentation is true in a secondary sense if the judgments that are motivated by it are also true. Moreover, in that case not only one but all judgments motivated by the underlying imaginary presentations must be true. As Ajdukiewicz puts it, we are dealing with such a case if the underlying imaginary presentation wholly motivates these judgments (as opposed to partial motivation). Thus, if my presentation of a handful of red roses of a given shape motivates my judgments, then every judgment based on this presentation is true. If, for example, a judgment about the number of roses, e.g. that there are eleven red roses, is false because there is a dozen, then this presentation does not motivate my judgment. Thus, it seems that Ajdukiewicz’s notion of motivation is based on the notion of true judgments but does not explain why some judgments, when motivated by imaginary presentations, are true. It also seems that discussions about the topic of true imaginary presentations took place not only during Ajdukiewicz’s lectures in epistemology provided in the Lvov-Warsaw School. Twardowski, for example, in his lectures on the theory of knowledge, formulated the issue in the following way: The relation between presentations and their objects is a relation of faithfulness and not of truth. As long as there is in me only a picture, there is neither truth nor falsity. (Twardowski 1975, p. 254—my translation)

In fact, Ajdukiewicz’s view is similar to that of Twardowski insofar as we can ﬁnd a secondary sense in which imaginary presentations are true. Yet the descriptive-psychological level of the discussion on truth in Ajdukiewicz’s lectures is in this respect not his last word about truth bearers. This level, however, shows Ajdukiewicz’s empirical tinge in his argumentation, and this not only in the sense in which he used the term ‘empirical’ when he was concentrated on the empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Like the above remarks on judgments by Twardowski, Kotarbi´n´ ski, and others, it expresses the view, commonly acknowledged among Poles at this time, of the importance and validity of the experience of inner perception (introspection) which, as empirical, could also be used to support an argumentation relying on empirical evidence.

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An Argument from the Possibility of Describing a Judgment

As a matter of fact Ajdukiewicz considers in his lectures the notion of truth above all in its relation to judgments, sentences, and beliefs. The main object of his investigations of truth is truth as predicated of these entities.21 The terms ‘judgment’, ‘sentence’, and ‘belief’ which appear in his lecture notes are, however, not deﬁned. On one occasion, for example, the term ‘judgment’ is used by Ajdukiewicz as referring to acts of judging and, in this respect, it is synonymous to ‘belief.’ On another occasion, the term is conceived by Ajdukiewicz as referring to expressed judgments, i.e. as synonymous to the phrase ‘the judgment expressed in a sentence.’ The latter might mean a judgment in the logical sense as it was deﬁned, for instance, by Łukasiewicz. This vagueness of the notion of judgment, however, does not effect the most important distinction needed by Ajdukiewicz with regard to our problem, that between the act of judging with the moment of conviction and the judgment expressed in an uttered or written sequence of words. Truth is predicated most frequently of judgments which are accompanied by the moment of conviction, holds Ajdukiewicz. As an empirical fact, he emphasizes that we are speaking about truth not only when we deal with judgments which are our beliefs: . . . everyone is ready to say that a judgment in which we believe is true. Furthermore, we believe that there are true judgments in which we do not believe. (Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 467—my translation)

From the psychological point of view it is somewhat extraordinary that there be true judgments that are be not beliefs. Ajdukiewicz rejects any possibility of such judgments, for he claims that it is psychologically impossible to make a judgment without the moment of conviction. From the psychological perspective, a judging act is always a belief. Judgments without the moment of conviction, therefore, cannot be the subjects of expressions. However, even though they cannot be expressed (in the sense in which ‘expressing’ is understood in the previous sections and chapters of this study), they can be named.22 There undoubtedly exist true sentences in which we do not believe. If there were no such sentences, we would know every truth. When I say that I do not believe in a truth then it does not mean that I reject it, but only that I do not believe in it because I do not know it. It seems, however, that it is psychologically impossible to give an example of a true sentence in which I do not believe. Such a giving is possible only in some cases. It is possible, namely, to quote or describe such a sentence. (Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 469–470—my translation)

The naming of judgments takes place on the level of language and it can be done in two ways: It can be obtained by means of description, or by means of quotation. Ajdukiewicz sees the quotation of a judgment in the usage of that-clauses when uttering or writing sentences. Thus, for example, the sentence ‘The judgment that the rose is red’ includes as its part a quotation of the

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name of a judgment. Naming as describing is, according to Ajdukiewicz, the construction of a name as occurs in the following phrase: ‘The ﬁrst judgment written in quotation marks in the section about Ajdukiewicz’s argument about the possibility of describing judgments in Artur Rojszczak’s study on bearers of truth.’ Thus, by being able to name judgments which are not beliefs, we can express all truths in language. This is one of the reasons why we should predicate ‘true’ or ‘false’ of sentences rather than of judgments or beliefs. This argument is, so to speak, abstracted from Ajdukiewicz’s lectures. As already mentioned, he uses the words ‘judgment’ and ‘sentence’ ambiguously. He also argues against the predication of ‘truth’ of descriptive judgments since this very often leads to paradoxes. However, it is important to note here that Ajdukiewicz’s predication of ‘true’ and ‘false’ is not metalinguistic. He has an approach to the words ‘true’ and ‘false’ in which they function as one-place functions (operators) that make sentences having sentences as their arguments, and this does not lead to paradoxes such as the liar paradox. Thus, on the one hand, my argumentation is not faithful to the argumentation presented by Ajdukiewicz in that mine refers to the metalinguistic understanding of the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false.’ On the other hand, however, Ajdukiewicz himself saw the advantages of a metalinguistic approach of these words. It enables us, for example, to make such statements as ‘All of the arguments in this study are weak.’ It is also worth mentioning that after 1936 Ajdukiewicz accepted both Tarski’s semantic theory of truth, in which predicates ‘truth’ and ‘false’ are metalinguistic predicates, as well as the distinction between language and metalanguage. From the point of view of this study it is interesting to see how Ajdukiewicz later argues for the translation of speech about judgments and concepts into speech about sentences. This is important because he formulated the program of the theory of knowledge as a semantic analysis of language, thereby contrasting the theory of knowledge with the theory of cognition.23 Epistemology is, according to Ajdukiewicz, partly psychology and partly logic. Every sentence about a judgment has its correlate in an equivalent assertion about a sentence whose meaning consists of the underlying judgment: every sentence about judgments and concepts has a correlate in a sentence about sentences and terms. Thus, the semantic theory of knowledge replaces speech about judgments and concepts by plain speech about their linguistic correlates, i.e. sentences having these judgments as their meaning and terms whose meanings are concepts. Thus, we can obtain equivalents of sentences about judgments in sentences about sentences. The semantic theory of truth considers issues of the theory of knowledge explicitly from the point of view of language, which is conceived as a system of expressions with ﬁxed meanings. The theses of the semantic theory of knowledge refer to sentences and terms, but they always do this with regard to the sentences and terms of some language, which possess a deﬁnite meaning. There is no pure theory of knowl-

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edge: if someone conﬁnes himself to the syntax of language, eliminating descriptive terms, then he will not ﬁnd any road leading to the world of real things, Ajdukiewicz claims. There is no pure theory of knowledge which eliminates concepts of things. Why we should speak about language rather than about concepts can be seen from the following example: Let us take the expressions: ‘the father of John’, ‘the concept of triangle’, and ‘the concept of trilateral.’ At the ﬁrst glance it would seem that we can speak about objects such as John’s father and the concept of triangle or trilateral omitting speech about the language we used. ‘The concept of triangle’, for example, seems to be clearly about the concept of triangle. Yet this is not the case, claims Ajdukiewicz. We do not name concepts using such expressions as ‘the concept of triangle.’ First of all, the term ‘triangle’ is not used in this expression in its normal way, i.e. in the way in which names occur, for it is used in suppositio materialis, i.e. it is a name of itself. Consider the expression ‘the father of John’: It refers to an object which is in a relation to the object to which ‘John’ refers. The father of John is the only object whose relation to John is that of being father. Thus, if ‘the concept of triangle’ is similar to the expression ‘the father of John’, then it should refer to the single object which is in a relation to triangle which is the relation of being the concept of this triangle. Similarly, if ‘trilateral’ in ‘the concept of trilateral’ functions as ‘John’ in ‘the father of John,’ then the concept of trilateral should be the only object whose relation to trilateral is that of being its concept. Now, the triangle is the same as the trilateral. According to the previous investigation, the only object having the relation to triangle of being its concept is the concept of triangle, and the only object having the relation to trilateral of being its concept is the concept of trilateral. But then, the concept of triangle is the same as the concept of trilateral, which is not the case: The concept of triangle is not the same as the concept of trilateral if the term ‘concept of. . .’ is a name, and if it is not an extension of the term. It follows that we cannot take the nouns ‘triangle’ and ‘trilateral’ in the expressions such as ‘the concept of triangle’ and ‘the concept of trilateral’ in the normal way (in suppositio formalis) but only as names of themselves. Thus, the correct way of reading such expressions are ‘the concept which is the meaning of the name «triangle»’ or ‘the concept of «triangle».’ We can, of course, use the expressions in the way in which they are usually used, i.e. without quotation marks, but then we always should remember that they are used in suppositio materialis, holds Ajdukiewicz. Thus, the best way to guarantee correctness in this respect is to speak about sentences and terms instead of about meanings and concepts, i.e. to speak in such a way that all terms and sentences occur in their normal way.

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5.

205

Alfred Tarski on the Truth Bearer

The bearer of truth, according to Tarski’s deﬁnition of truth as given in his 1933 work, is the sentence. It is of a sentence in a given language of which the metalinguistic predicate ‘true’ is afﬁrmed. This does not in the least prove, as I mentioned at the very beginning of this study and as I have tried to underline throughout this study, that the notion of the sentence is unambiguous. I stated that the answer to the question of a unique notion of sentence in Tarski’s semantic conception of truth is negative, unless one takes it into a broad philosophical framework. Now, I believe, we are able to make Tarski’s choice of sentences as bearers of truth-values more consistent. In order to do this I shall recall once again those passages from his 1933 work on truth that can be seen as deﬁnitions or, at least, as descriptions of the notion of sentence, and on this occasion reformulate and analyze them.

5.1

The Sentence and Syntax

The very ﬁrst deﬁnition of the sentence would be the following: (DSS) SDSS is a sentence of the language L if it is an expression of L and S satisﬁes the constraints determined by the grammar of L. According to the DSS a sentence is a linguistic expression in the sense of the grammar of a given language. Among all possible expressions which can be formed with these signs, those called sentences are distinguished by means of purely structural properties. (Tarski 1933, p. 16; 1983, p. 166. See also pp. 12–13 of 1933)

The deﬁnition DSS has a general character since the structure of a sentence is prescribed differently in different languages, and not only in scientiﬁc or deductive languages, but also in colloquial or ordinary languages. Both types of languages, however, if they are able to identify sentences in the sense of the DSS, must be formalized languages. Among the properties of the latter there are, for Tarski, inter alia the following: A formalized language is an extensional language in which the meaning of an expression is determined unambiguously by its form. The vocabulary of such a language consists of all demonstrated or written signs by means of which all expressions of this language are recursively built. It is highly important to underline that all signs of formalized languages in Tarski’s sense have at least intuitive deﬁnite meanings. This means that the sentences of formalized languages still remain sentences when translated into ordinary languages. The heritage of Le´s´niewski with regard to this fact is indisputable. The thesis of Tarski’s teacher that expressions of formal languages should be endowed with certain meanings was adopted by his student in its entirety.24

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The Sentence as a Function without Variables

A second deﬁnition of the sentence that is to be found in Tarski’s 1933 work is related to formalized languages which contain signs called ‘variables’ in their vocabulary. Such, according to Tarski, are the languages of most deductive systems. The sentence is then deﬁned as a sentential function without free variables: (DSSV) SDSSV is a sentence of the language L if S is a sentential function SF and none of the variables occurring in SF is a free variable.25 The deﬁnition DSSV assumes, of course, a deﬁnition of the sentence-function which is very easy to obtain by means of syntactic methods for that type of language.26 It seems that both deﬁnitions are equivalent, i.e. the extension of the DSS and the extension of the DSSV are equivalent, unless L which is formalized in the sense of Tarski does not contain variables, and thereby, has no sentencefunctions but only sentences. In this case the set of sentential-functions which are not sentences is empty. However, the sentential-function might be still deﬁned as an expression which contains free variables, and it might be deﬁned as being capable of being transformed into a sentence by the substitution of variables by names or by bounding the variables by means of quantiﬁcation.

5.3

The Sentence as a Product

A third deﬁnition of the sentence given by Tarski relies on the intentional notion of product: Normally expressions are regarded as the products of human activity (or classes of such products). (Tarski 1933, p. 25; Tarski 1983, p. 174)

Thus: (DSP1) SDSP 1 is a sentence in the language L if it is a product (or a class of products) of human activity. In this formulation of a sentence Tarski refers to the theory of acts and products as presented by Twardowski. It was Twardowski who depicted language and their expressions, and thus sentences, as a set of psycho-physical products or as a set of classes of such products. The word ‘normally’ might also be conceived as referring to the ordinary usage of the notion of sentence in everyday language. As far as the origin of psycho-physical products is concerned, a linguistic expression is a product of a function of thinking. Thus, a sentence is in this respect a product of a judging act or, as it was in the case of Twardowski, a product of the presentation of a judgment. With regard to the various ways in which such products might exist, a sentence can be a transient physical product,

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such as an utterance or it can be durable physical product like an inscription. Regarding the function of the expression of a linguistic sign a sentence would be an expression of a judgment (or of the function of a judging act or of a transient product of the latter), or it would be an expression of a presentation of a judgment (or of the function of presenting a judgment or of a product of the latter, such as a presentation of a judgment). Generally speaking, an expression S can be conceived as a sentence of a given language L if and only if S expresses a judgment (a function or a presentation of a judging activity). Thus, as regards its function of expressing, a sentence is psycho-physical product in that mental functions became ﬁxed in a physical product: (DSP2) SDSP 2 is a sentence in a given language L if it is a transient or durable psycho-physical product. DSP2 refers to utterances as sequences of sounds as well as to inscriptions, i.e. to things which have been written down. DSP2 is also coherent with the concept of formalized languages. We can read this along the following lines: Sentences are expressions of mental products and the latter are dependent on mental functions. Since in the tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School, as well as in the Brentanian tradition, mental functions are characterized as intentional, every sentence in the sense of SDP2, i.e. one which is an expression of a mental function that is always directed towards an object, is a sentence about something. As already mentioned, a sentence in the sense of DSP2 can also be taken as a class of products. This can be understood in a twofold manner. On one interpretation, a sentence would be an abstract object that is a class of utterances or inscriptions. Thus, the sentence ‘The rose is red’ and the sentence ‘THE ROSE IS RED’ are products belonging to the same class of sentences. On the second interpretation, a sentence is a concrete utterance or a concrete inscription, which is a product not of a single judging act or of a single mental product of this act, but it is a product of a class of such mental products. The second interpretation might, for example, lead to the assumption of abstract objects such as act-species, of which the particular utterance or inscription is the next product. It is also possible, however, to present an interpretation of the DSP1 different from that given by the DSP2. It would be an interpretation which, instead of using the concept of a product in Twardowski’s sense, takes into account the theory of semantic products as presented by Ossowski. (DSP3) SDSP 3 is a sentence in a given language L if it is a semantic product that can be true or false. The phrase ‘semantic product’ that occurs in this deﬁnition means that the sentence should be taken by someone in his or her semantic attitude in the

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sense described by Ossowski. The second condition included in the SDP3 is connected with the deﬁnition of a sentence which is usually seen as the semantic deﬁnition: (DSSE) SDSSE is a sentence in language L if it has a truth-value. The deﬁnition already called the semantic deﬁnition of a sentence was in fact the deﬁnition which Ossowski and other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School connected with Aristotle’s view. The phrase ‘having a truth-value’ can suggest that there are objects such as Frege’s Truth and Falsity that are denotations of sentences. However, when considering Ossowski’s critique of Frege in this respect, mentioned in the section on Ossowski, the deﬁnition DSSE should instead be reformulated in the following manner: (DSSE’) SDSSE is a sentence in language L if it has the property of being true or false. DSP2 and DSP3 present two different interpretations of DSP1. They must not, however, be considered equivalent. This depends upon whether all sentences which are products in Twardowski’s sense (i.e. intentional transient utterances or intentionally written durable inscriptions) are also products in Ossowski’s sense. The latter include linguistic entities that might be conceived as semantic only on the part of the hearer or of the reader, i.e. they include also entities towards which one takes the semantic attitude and which are not necessarily intentional products of their creators (if there are any). According to this view, a plain physical product can be seen with the semantic attitude. One can, however, doubt whether expressions of the formalized languages in Tarski’s sense include sentences that can fulﬁll their semantic functions without being created intentionally. The DSP1 is coherent with deﬁnitions DSS and DSSV given in the previous section. The difference between them consists in the fact that the DSS and DSSV depict sentences from a purely syntactical point of view, whereas DSP1 also takes into account their function of expression, as well as their semantic function in Ossowski’s sense, i.e. it takes into account the pragmatic point of view. Generally speaking, a sentence in DSP1 is deﬁned with regard to the meaning-giving intention either of its maker or of its reader or hearer. Thus, the extensions of DSP1, DSS and DSSV might also be conceived as equivalent.

5.4

The Sentence as a Physical Body

Deﬁnitions DSP1 through DSP3 consider an intention on the part of the writer and of the speaker, as well as on the part of the reader or of the hearer of the sentence. However, metalogical axioms demand inﬁnitely many expressions.27 It would be a quite strong assumption to suppose that human beings can create an inﬁnite number of meaningful expressions in a ﬁnite period of time.

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Thus, deﬁnitions which consider sentences from the point of view of intentional meaning-giving acts seem to be insufﬁcient for metalogical purposes which require an inﬁnite multiplication of sentences. There is, therefore, a tension between the inﬁnity required by metalogic and the empirical subject who is capable of taking the semantic attitude. Hence Tarski writes: But another possible interpretation of the term ‘expression’ presents itself: we could consider all physical bodies of a particular form and size as expressions. (Tarski 1933, p. 25, Tarski 1983, p. 174)

According to this passage the view that considers an inﬁnite number of expressions, where the latter are physical bodies, seems not to contain the tension which was present in the case of entities endowed with meanings by means of intentional acts. Recalling the previous deﬁnitions of a sentence, we can formulate another one: (DSB) SDSB is a sentence in a given language L if it is a physical body whose shape and quantity satisﬁes the constraints determined by the grammar of L. The deﬁnition DSB and deﬁnitions of the type DSP, for example, are at the ﬁrst glance inconsistent. We can, however, attempt to make them coherent by taking the DSB and, for example, the DSP3 together, treating linguistic entities as physical bodies toward which one can take the semantic attitude in Ossowski’s sense. The extension of the DSP3 would then be a sub-class of the extension given by the DSB.

5.5

The Sentence as an Inscription

Another of Tarski’s deﬁnitions of a sentence relates it to the notion of a linguistic sign: Statements (sentences) are always treated here as a particular kind of expression, and, thus, as linguistic entities. (Tarski 1933, p. 5; Tarski 1983, p. 156)

Here sentences are expressions in the sense that they are sequences built up of units belonging to the vocabulary of a given language, i.e. they are its phrases. The latter are to be understood, according to what was said previously, as sounds or inscriptions. Yet considering the previous deﬁnition of sentences as physical bodies, it would be better to depict them as if they were inscriptions. The class of sentences as a subset of the class of all expressions of a given language L can be determined by a syntactical deﬁnition of the sort given by DSS or DSSV. Thus, the fusion of deﬁnitions DSS and DSB can be formulated as follows: (DSE) SDSE is a sentence in a given language L if it is a concrete inscription in the sense of a physical body whose shape and quantity satisfy the constraints determined by the grammar of L.

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CHAPTER TEN

The Sentence-Type and a Sentence-Name of a Type

For a plain formal reason that is similar to the requirement of an inﬁnite number of expressions in the case of the problem of the multiplicity of expressions in a given language L, Tarski supposes another formulation of the notion of a sentence. This is because his formulation of convention (T) demands multiple expressions of the same shape: Nevertheless, when the terms ‘expression’, ‘statement’ etc., are interpreted as names of concrete series of printed signs, various formulations which occur in this work do not appear to be quite correct, and give the appearance of a widespread error which consists in identifying expressions of like shape. (. . .) It is convenient to stipulate that terms like ‘word’, ‘expression’, ‘sentence’, etc., do not denote concrete series of signs but the whole class of such series which are of like shape with the series given; only in this sense shall we regard quotation-mark names as individual names of expressions. (Tarski 1933, p. 5, Tarski 1983, p. 156)

This fragment of Tarski’s work on truth very often leads to the interpretation of his sentences (as well as other linguistic inscriptions given in his study) as types, in contrast with concrete inscriptions (commonly known as the typetoken distinction). From this passage, however, can also be pointed out that Tarski argues against the view that sentences are types. This, I believe, is because sentences of the same shape (‘The rose is red’ and ‘The rose is red’) or of like shape (‘The rose is red’ and ‘THE ROSE IS RED’) cannot be identiﬁed with one another. In accordance with the intuitive function of quotation-marks in everyday language, in which they are operators that make sentences into names, one can also claim that some concrete written or printed inscription is an individual name, one that refers not to a single inscription, but to a class of inscriptions of like shape. Thus, a sentence of which the predicate ‘true’ is afﬁrmed is not a sentence-type itself, but the name of a class. The expression ‘sentence’ or the following sentence in quotation marks, ‘Snow is white’, as they occur in the metalanguage in which convention (T) should be written, being themselves physical bodies, refer to the class of sentences of the same shape.

5.7

Summary of Chapter 10

One can assume that in Tarski’s 1933 semantic deﬁnition of truth, it is the sentence that is the bearer of truth, in the sense given by the deﬁnitions DSS, DSSV, DSSP3, DSB and DSE. All of these deﬁnitions may be conceived as being equivalent. They present various standpoints from which a sentence can be described. Thus, a sentence in a given language is an entity that is syntactically determined by deﬁnitions DSS and DSSV. Following Tarski, we can call these ‘structural deﬁnitions of a sentence.’ According to deﬁnition DSSP3, a sentence is a semantic product. Since this deﬁnition refers to a semantic intention of an empirical subject, it can be called, following habits of semiotic jargon, a ‘pragmatic deﬁnition of a sentence.’ Deﬁnition DSB takes the sentence as

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a physical body determined with regard to its shape and quantity. It therefore presents what we might call the ‘ontological deﬁnition of a sentence.’ Deﬁnition DSE, in which a sentence is viewed as an inscription, might be conceived as an ‘ontological-structural’ or ‘linguistic’ deﬁnition of a sentence. By unifying these various deﬁnitions into a single deﬁnition of a sentence we can obtain the following formulation, which can serve as Tarski’s coherent deﬁnition of a sentence assumed in his 1933 work on truth: (TDS) ST DS is a sentence of language L iff it is a concrete ﬁnite inscription (in the sense of a physical body) and S satisﬁes the constraints determined by the grammar of L with regard to what can be treated from the semantic attitude.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27

Twardowski 1975, pp. 246–247. Cze˙z˙ owski 1927, pp. 7, 9, 21. Cze˙z˙ owski 1946/1957. Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, p. 14. Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, pp. 12–14. Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, p. 29. Hermeneutics, 1, 16a. Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, pp. 28–30. Łukasiewicz 1910/1987, pp. 106–109. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1926. See also discussions about general objects in chapter 8 above. As regards literal meaning and apparent names see chapter 6 above. ´ Kotarbinski 1926, pp. 101–105. ´ Kotarbinski 1926, pp. 101–105. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1926, p. 104. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1926, pp. 106–107. See also above chapter 9. Compare to Kotarbi´n´ ski 1926, p. 107. Kotarbi´n´ ski 1926, pp. 107–109. Ajdukiewicz 1988. Ajdukiewicz 1988, pp. 448–460. Ajdukiewicz 1988, p. 466. Ajdukiewicz 1988, pp. 466–468. Ajdukiewicz 1988. Tarski 1933, pp. 16–17, 62–63; Tarski 1983, pp. 166–167. Compare: Tarski 1933, p. 29; Tarski 1983, p. 178. See Tarski 1933, pp. 27–29, 63, 65. Tarski 1933, pp. 24–25; Tarski 1983, pp. 173–174.

Chapter 11 FINAL COMMENTS

1.

The Weakened Thesis

Although the historical contexts presented in this study in which the move from the act of judging to the sentence-inscription as the entities that serve as truth bearers took place may be seen as drawn into a consistent history of ideas, one still can be skeptical about attributing these contexts to the philosophical background of Alfred Tarski’s choice of truth bearer. Despite the facts which I mentioned at the beginning of this study, i.e. despite the fact of what Tarski himself points out as the tradition he belongs to and the genetic connections between him and other members of the Lvov-Warsaw School that were described, one can assume these matters too weak in order to state the thesis I made at the beginning of this study. Moreover, I also remarked that I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that Tarski himself considered every issue which appears in this study, especially those which arose in the area of descriptive psychology. Therefore, for those who remain unconvinced, I would like to weaken the main thesis in the following way: If the semantic conception of truth given by Tarski in his 1933 paper on truth can be seen as the explication (explicatum) of the classical correspondence theory of truth (explicandum) with regard to the goal of the introduction of the notion of truth into formalized languages (languages of deductive sciences), then the Brentanian tradition serves as the best explanation of the choice of the sentences of a meaningful language as the bearers of objective semantical truth.1 As far as the ﬁrst part of the conditional is concerned, the very ﬁrst paragraphs of Tarski’s work should not leave any doubts as to its truth. Moreover, it seems to be the standard way in which Tarski’s semantic notion of truth is presented in both his own presentations of the result obtained and in contemporary studies on truth. The explicative character of his work also remains one of the main points of dispute as regards Tarski’s success in this respect. Thus,

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having the three-step scheme of the process of explication, the choice of the explicandum would end with the classical notion of truth, the introductory explanation would be the formulation of T-scheme together with the conception of a partial deﬁnition of truth based on T-equivalences, and ﬁnally, the explicatum whose goal is the incorporation of the notion of truth into the languages of the deductive sciences would be the well-known deﬁnition of truth, by means of the notion of satisfaction by an inﬁnite sequence of objects in a given domain. The question is what can be meant by ‘the classical correspondence theory of truth’, or, more generally, what notion of truth is to be explicated? In his 1944 and 1968 papers Tarski suggests that what serves as the explicatum for his semantic notion of truth is the usage of the predicate ‘true’ in ordinary language. In the usual situations of ordinary life we predicate truth, according to Tarski, of someone’s utterances. First, this statement comes from later and rather popularized texts on the semantic conception of truth written by Tarski, while I have tried to stay with the 1933 paper throughout this study. Second, Tarski’s argument is in this respect quite weak, for on the ground of the same fact (or, rather, assumption) that it is the usual way of predicating truth of sentences or utterances, there arose several deﬂationary theories of truth, such as redundant or prosentential of Kotarbi´n´ ski, Glover, or Belnap. It would be more reasonable, I think, to ﬁnd a philosophical tradition along the lines of which the explicandum could be found. Thus, on the one hand, the tradition of the correspondence (classical) conception of truth goes so far back as to Aristotle. And it is the tradition in question. Yet, it would be the same kind of strong assumption as that made with respect to the Brentanian tradition that Tarski made a historical analysis of the classical theories of Aristotle, Leibniz, or Thomas Aquinas. On the other hand, as it was already stated, the so-called classical correspondence theory of truth as formulated by Tarski in his writings comes, in fact, in the formulations of Kotarbi´n´ ski. Moreover, Tarski’s T-scheme is a merely formal correct version of Kotarbi´n´ ski’s proposals of several of such schemes for understanding the ways in which truth can be predicated, which Kotarbi´n´ ski gave in his ﬁrst version of Elements called the Pre-elements. Thus, the classical Aristotelian correspondence notion of truth in fact comes to Tarski through the formulations and ﬁlters of his teacher. As it was in case of a heuristic analyses of historical studies on the correspondence theory of truth, we can eliminate another philosophical tradition within which we could look for the explicandum. It is the Vienna Circle tradition of logical empiricism. Despite the facts described in the ﬁrst chapter of this study, one must note that the Vienna Circle did not propose any correspondence or classical theory of truth in a sense which could be seen as the explicandum for the semantic deﬁnition of truth.

Final Comments

215

As for the second part of the conditional, it was the task of this study to show that the Lvov-Warsaw School in its relation to Brentano’s School can serve as the best explanation of the bearer of truth chosen by Tarski in his explicatum given in the 1933 work. Moreover, given the explicative character of his deﬁnition, the philosophical discussions around the semantic deﬁnition of truth, such as the notion of the sentence, the conception of meaningful language, the concept of correspondence, and the objectivity of truth can be seen in a twofold manner. On the one hand, the discussions can be about the consequences of this deﬁnition with respect to the goal of the explanation. On the other hand, the discussions may take the perspective of its explicational function. Thus, some of the discussions are in fact about the reason for the choice of the explicandum, and about what the reason for the choice of explicatum is (with respect to the goal of this explication, i.e. to incorporate semantic notions into deductive languages). Let me give an example of the discussion about the meaningfulness of the language in which we formulate a deﬁnition of truth, i.e. about whether the language in question has ﬁxed meanings or not. The discussion depends, in fact, on whether we treat Tarski’s deﬁnition as an explicatum of the notion of truth developed within Brentanian tradition or whether we try to ﬁnd the consequences of this deﬁnition without taking into account its philosophical background, but having in mind the purpose of the explication. From the perspective of the explicandum, the sentences of a language are capable of being depicted as inscriptions determined by the syntax of this language, i.e. by physical bodies toward which we can take the semantic attitude (by ascribing to them a referential function, for example). Such objects are, among having other properties, easily objectivized in the sense explained in Chapter 7; they are meaningful, i.e. they can be related to objects which are the objects of thought and which can play the role of truthmakers; they can make possible the distinction between intentional and correspondence relations and can be incorporated within the framework of a causal theory of the inheriting of intentional relation by the products of intentional acts. From the point of view of the project of the incorporation of the notion of truth into deductive systems we can, and even probably should, eliminate pragmatic and other kinds of notions which cannot be deﬁned syntactically. In this respect, then, the sentences understood in the sense just given are linguistic objects. They are objects which can be described syntactically, to which we can ascribe semantic functions (such as reference or representation), and which can, moreover, be even incorporated into physicalistic worldview presented by the Vienna Circle.

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The Heritage of Brentano

Throughout this study I investigated the following contexts which determine the explanatory power of the Brentanian tradition with regard an explaination of the choice of the truth bearer in Tarski’s semantic deﬁnition of truth: 1. The change of the concept of truth, i.e. the turn from an epistemological and criteriological attitude to the problem of truth to the classical concept of truth as correspondence. This turn was at least partly caused by investigations of Brentano’s pupils carried out in the domain of descriptive psychology, especially with regard to the ontology of judgment. 2. The turn from the primacy of descriptive-psychological investigations in logic and in the theory of knowledge to an anti-psychologistic attitude in these disciplines. The move from the judgment to the sentence might be considered here as a turn from the theory of cognition (i.e. the psychology of cognition) to the theory of knowledge (i.e. the theory of the products of cognition). 3. Linguistic analysis of the ordinary usage of linguistic expressions, and, especially, of the words ‘true’ and ‘false. Such analysis is present as a very important topic of both epistemological and classical theories of truth as carried out in both descriptive-psychological and logico-semantical investigations. 4. The turn in the treatment of the semantical functions of linguistic expressions. This is a move from the primacy of the communicative function of language in Brentano’s School to the primacy of the semantical functions of language in the Lvov-Warsaw School. The move from the judgment to the sentence was, in fact, a turn from the primacy of the expressive function to the primacy of the presentational function of linguistic signs. In other words, it presents the turn from intentionality to the presentational function of the language. 5. The theory of meaning-intentions. The turn from meaning-giving intentions to the semantical attitude represented an important moment in the formulation of the conditions for the meaningfulness of linguistic signs. 6. Ontological investigations with regard to the object of judgment. This is a turn from the distinguished place of psychological investigations with regard to judgment to the ontology of judgment. 7. Ontological investigations concerning theory of objects. One of the results of what in this study was called ‘ontologism’ were the nominalistic preferences of Polish philosophers that led them to the choice of the truth bearer in the ontological realm admitted by nominalism. 8. The problem of the objectivity of truth and knowledge. The problem of the objectivization of truth represents one of the most evident inﬂuences of Brentano’s tradition as regards the turn from the judgment to the sentence as the truth bearer. Language seems to be in this respect a golden middle, at least in the sense in which it offers a number of possibilities for objectivizing truth.

Final Comments

217

After taking some of the above distinguished contexts into consideration it would be not an exaggeration to say that the development of scientiﬁc semantics in the Lvov-Warsaw School was possible directly because of Brentano’s heritage in the background of this school, which led to discussions and argumentation within the framework outlined by the Brentanians. In other words, in order to explain at least some of the semantic ideas which appeared in the ﬁrst three decades of the twentieth century it is insufﬁcient to recall only the rapid at this time development of mathematical logic.

3.

The Truth Bearers

Before I make a survey of the truth bearer in the Brentanian tradition I would like to note that the deﬁnition of the truth bearer which was in general implicitly assumed in the Lvov-Warsaw school was the hybrid deﬁnition of the truth bearer, formulated in the second chapter of this study, where the truth bearer is an entity of which the predicate ‘is true’ can be attributively afﬁrmed in a determining way. Now, the candidates for the bearer of truth which appeared throughout this study, those which came from Brentano’s School and from the Lvov-Warsaw School, can be listed as follows: concrete mental entities: 1. an act of judging (Brentano, Twardowski, Czez˙ owski) 2. a belief (Brentano) 3. a supposition or assumption (Meinong) 4. a presentation of the act of judging (Twardowski) 5. someone who makes a judgment (der Urteilende, a judger—Brentano) abstract mental entities: 6. the mental product of an act of judging (Twardowski, Czez˙ owski) 7. the content of an act of judging (Marty) 8. an act-species (Husserl) concrete psycho-physical entities: 9. a sequence of sounds taken with the semantical attitude (Ossowski) 10. a sequence of signs taken with the semantical attitude (Ossowski) 11. an utterance as a psycho-physical product (Twardowski, Kotarbi´n´ ski, Tarski) 12. an inscription as a psycho-physical product (Twardowski, Kotarbi´n´ ski, Tarski) concrete linguistic entities: 13. a sequence of sounds with a ﬁxed meaning (Łukasiewicz) 14. a sequence of signs with a ﬁxed meaning (Łukasiewicz) 15. an inscription as a general name (Kotarbi´n´ ski, Tarski) 16. an inscription as an individual name (Tarski)

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abstract psycho-physical entities: 17. an utterance-type as a psycho-physical product (Tarski) 18. an inscription-type as a psycho-physical product (Tarski) abstract linguistic entities: 19. an inscription-type as a general name (Tarski) 20. an inscription-type as an individual name (Tarski) physical entities: 21. an utterance as a physical object (Tarski) 22. an inscription as a physical object (Tarski) 23. a judging person (Kotarbi´n´ ski) abstractions from physical entities: 24. an utterance as a judgment in the logical sense (Łukasiewicz) 25. an inscription as a judgment in the logical sense (Łukasiewicz) ideal entities: 26. a sentence in itself (Satz an sich – Bolzano) 27. an ideal meaning (Husserl) 28. a judgment-content (Marty) 29. an objective as an ideal meaning (Meinong) 30. an objective as a state of affairs (Meinong) 31. a state of affairs (Reinach) The order of truth bearers in this list leads from mental entities, through psycho-physical and physical, to ideal entities. Abstract entities here are dependent entities in the sense that they cannot exist without existence of another entity. In all cases abstract entities depend upon one of the entities found prior in the listing. For example, a judgment as a psychological product (6) cannot exist without the existence of an act of judging (1). Similarly, expressed objectives (24, 25) cannot exist without the existence of the linguistic entities in which they are expressed (9–22). The classiﬁcation of judgers (5, 23) can evoke some objections. They appear in two different places: Brentano’s judging subject is placed within the group of concrete mental entities, whereas Kotarbi´n´ ski’s judger belongs, according to the list, to concrete physical objects. This is because, according to Brentano, the judging subject is a mental event, whereas, for Kotarbi´n´ ski, the judging person should be interpreted rather as a physical body. In this respect all of the entities which serve as truth bearers on the list can be ascribed to such ontological categories as events, processes, bodies, states of affairs or ideal objects. Abstract entities are treated here as species, on one occasion, and as types, on another occasion. Such an ontological taxonomy makes it possible, for example, to determine whether the entities that serve as truth bearers are durable or not in Twardowski’s (and in the ordinary) sense of this word.

Final Comments

219

An interesting fact is that all entities included in the list are, according to philosophers who claimed their existence, capable of being expressed by means of the linguistic entities which are to be found in the middle part of the list, i.e. they are able to be ‘brought into existence’ with the help of sentences and utterances of different sorts. The taxonomy on which the list is based is, unfortunately, not unique in a logical sense. This is because there are several different overlapping divisions among the entities that appear on this list. The same entity as seen from different standpoints can be written down on the list in various places. In particular, this study shows that every sequence of ink-dots of a given shape (determined by English grammar and habits) can be listed in many places, depending of how we treat them: as concretes or as species, as names or as types, as individual names or as general names, as physical bodies or as psycho-physical products, as intentionally produced or as capable of being intentionally read, as expressing acts or as ﬁxing meanings, as having contents or as referring, and so on.

Notes 1

I use here the notion of explication as deﬁned by R. Carnap in Carnap 1950 and, with some changes, by T. Pawłowski in Pawłowski 1986.

References

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Tenner Daniela, 1914, ‘Istnienie jako «tre´sc´ » sadzenia ˛ i sadu’, ˛ [Existence as the ’Content’ of Judging Act and of Judgement], in: Kwartalnik Filozoﬁczny 17, pp. 465–483. Twardowski Kazimierz, 1894, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Eine psychologische Untersuchung, Wien: Hölder. Eng. transl. Twardowski 1972. 1900, ‘O tak zwanych prawdach wzgl˛e˛ dnych’ [On So-Called Relative Truths], in: Ksi˛e˛ga Pamiatkowa ˛ Uniwersytetu lwowskiego ku uczczeniu pi˛e˛csetnej ´ rocznicy fundacji Jagiello´nskiej Uniwersytetu krakowskiego [Commemoration Book of the Lvov University Celebrating the 500-th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków], Lwów: Senat Akademicki Uniwersytetu lwowskiego, pp. 1–25. Eng. transl. in: Twardowski 1999. 1912, ‘O czynno´s´ciach i wytworach’ [Actions and Products], in: Ksiega ˛ Pamiatkowa ˛ ku uczczeniu 250-tej rocznicy zało˙z˙enia Uniwersytetu Lwowskiego przez króla Jana Kazimierza. [Commemoration Book Celebrating the 250-th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Lvov University by the King Jan Kazimierz], Lwów: Uniwersytet lwowski, pp. 1–33. pp. 1–33. Partly transl. 1979 O. Wojtasiewicz ‘Actions and Products’ in: Pelc, J. (ed.) Semiotics in Poland 1894–1969, Dordrecht/Warsaw: Reidel/PWN, pp. 13–27. Full eng. transl. in: Twardowski 1999. 1920, ‘O jasnym i niejasnym stylu ﬁlozoﬁcznym’, [On Clear and Unclear Philosophical Style], Ruch Filozoﬁczny 5, pp. 25–27. Eng. transl. in: Twardowski 1999. 1922, ‘O prawdzie formalnej’ [On Formal Truth], Ruch Filozoﬁczny 7. 1927, ‘Z logiki przymiotników’ [On the Logic of Adjectives], Kwartalnik Filozoﬁczny 30, pp. 292–294. Eng. transl. in: Twardowski 1999. 1975, ‘Teoria poznania. Wykład czterogodzinny lato 1924–1925’ [Epistemology. Four-hours ´ Społecznej 21, pp. 246– lectures summer 1934–1925], Archiwum Historii Filozoﬁi i Mysli 250. 1977, On the Content and Object of Presentations, transl. by R. Grossmann, The Hague: Nijhoff. 1982, Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen. Mit einer Einleitung von Rudolf Haller, München: Philosophia. 1999, On Actions, Products and Other Topics in Philosophy, ed. by J. Brandl and J. Wole´n´ ski, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Willard Dallas, 1984, Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, Athens, Ohio: University of Ohio Press. Witasek Stefan, 1908, Grundlinien der Psychologie, Leipzig: Meiner. Wittgenstein L., 1921, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, New ed. with Eng. transl. by Pears, D. F. and McGuinness, B. F., 1961, London: Routledge. Wole´n´ ski Jan, 1985, Filozoﬁczna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska, Warszawa: PWN. Eng. version: Wole´n´ ski 1988. 1988, Logic and Philosophy in the Lvov-Warsaw School, Dordrecht: Kluwer. 1989, ‘Brentano’s Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski’s Semantic Theory’, Topoi 8, pp. 105–110. 1990, Kotarbinski ´ , Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna. 1993, ‘Alfred Tarski as a Philosopher’, in: F. Cognilione F, R. Poli and J. Wole´n´ ski (eds.), Polish Scientiﬁc Philosophy: The Lvov-Warsaw School, Boston: Rodopi.

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1994, ‘Szkoła lwowsko-warszawska: miedzy ˛ brentanizmem a pozytywizmem’ [The LvovWarsaw School: Between Brentanism and Positivism], in: T. Lubowiecki and A. Rojszczak (eds.), Filozoﬁa Austriacka [Austrian Philosophy], Kraków: UJ (=Principia 8–9, pp. 69–90. 1994a, ‘Contributions to the History of Classical Truth-Deﬁnition’, D. Prawitz, B. Skyrms and D. Westerstahl (eds.), Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science IX, Elsevier Science B.V., pp. 481–495. 1995, ‘On Tarski’s Background’, in: Jaakko Hintikka (ed.), From Dedekind to Goedel. Essays in the Development of the Foundations of Mathematics, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 331–341. 1996, ‘Reism in the Brentanist Tradition’, in: Albertazzi, Libardi and Poli (ed.) 1996, pp. 357–375. 1997, Szkoła Lwowsko-Warszawska w polemikach [The Lvov-Warsaw School in Polemics], Warszawa: Scholar. 1998/1999, ‘Twardowski and the Distinction Between Content and Object’, Brentano Studien 8, pp. 15–36. 1999, Essays in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press. Wole´n´ ski Jan (ed.), 1990, Kotarbinski: ´ Logic, Semantics, and Ontology, Dordrecht: Kluwer. Zawirski Zygmunt, 1936, ‘W sprawie syntezy naukowej’, Kwartalnik Filozoﬁczny 39, pp. 347–350. 1938, ‘Science et philosophie’, Organon 2, pp. 1–16. ˙ Zegle´ n´ Urszula (ed.), 1994, Philosophy of Mind in the Lvov-Warsaw School, As Axiomathes No. 1 (VI).

Appendix A Publications of Artur Rojszczak

1.

Edited Volumes Filozoﬁa Austriacka [Austrian Philosophy], Kraków 1994, Uniwersytet Jagiello´n´ ski (= Principia 8–9); together with T. Lubowiecki. The Legacy of Brentano, Würzburg 1998/1999, Röll Verlag (= Brentano Studien 8); together with W. Baumgartner, A. Kraus, and J. Wole´n´ ski. Philosophical Dimensions of the Unity of Science. Contributed Papers of the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Dordrecht 2003, Kluwer; together with J. Cachro and G. Kurczewski. Logic and Philosophy. In Search of Polish Tradition. Essays in Honour of Jan Wole´n´ ski on the Occasion of his 60 th Birthday, Dordrecht 2004, Kluwer; together with J. Hintikka, T. Czarnecki, K. Kijania-Placek and T. Placek.

2.

Articles O pewnej krytyce teorii deskrypcji [On a Certain Critique of the Theory of Description], Principia 2 (1990), 65–69. Polnische deskriptive Psychologie. Die Geschichte und Untersuchungen zu den anschaulichen Vorstellungen, Brentano Studien 5 (1994), 129–147. Wahrheit und Evidenz bei Franz Brentano, Brentano Studien 5 (1994), 187–218. Prawda i oczywisto´sc´ w ﬁlozoﬁi Franciszka Brentany [Truth and Evidence in the Philosophy of Franz Brentano], in Filozoﬁa Austriacka [Austrian Philosophy], ed. by T. Lubowiecki and A. Rojszczak, Kraków 1994, Aureus (= Principia 8–9), 137–169. Od sadów ˛ do zdan´ . Nos´nik prawdy a obiektywizacja wiedzy [From the Act of Judging to the Sentence. Truth-bearers and the Objectivisation of Knowledge], Filozoﬁa Nauki [Philosophy of Science] 2(1997), Warszawa, UW, 93–106. The Problem of Truth-Bearers from Twardowski to Tarski, in The Lvov-Warsaw School and the Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by K. Kijania-Placek and J. Wole´n´ ski, Dordrecht 1998, Kluwer, 73–84. Dlaczego za no´s´niki prawdy uwaz˙ a sie˛ obiekty ﬁzyczne? [Why Physical Objects Are Taken To Be Truth-Bearers?], Filozoﬁa Nauki [Philosophy of Science] 1 (1998), Warszawa, UW, 65–79.

235

236

APPENDIX A

Die Gegenstandstheorie in der polnischen deskriptiven Psychologie, in The Legacy of Brentano, ed. by W. Baumgartner, A. Kraus, A. Rojszczak and J. Wole´n´ ski, Würzburg 1998/ 1999, Röll Verlag = Brentano Studien 8, 67–80. Why Should a Physical Object Take on the Role of Truth Bearers?, in Alfred Tarski and the ´ Vienna Circle, ed. by E. Köhler and J. Wolenski, Dordrecht 1999, Kluwer, 115–125. Uwagi o intencjonalno´s´ci w programie epistemologii tradycyjnej [Some Remarks on Intentionality in the Traditional Epistemology], in Filozoﬁa i logika. W stron˛e˛ Jana Wolenskiego ´ [Philosophy and Logic. Around the Philosophy of Jan Wole´n´ ski], ed. by J. Hartman, Kraków 2000, Aureus, 314–333. Wstep. ˛ Sylwetka Profesora Jana Wolen´ skiego [An Introduction. The Figure of Professor Jan Wole´n´ ski], in Filozoﬁa i logika. W stron˛e˛ Jana Wolenskiego ´ [Philosophy and Logic. ´ Around the Philosophy of Jan Wolenski], ed. by J. Hartman, Kraków 2000, Aureus, 8–15; together with T. Placek. Urteilstheorien und Sachverhalte, in Satz und Sachverhalt, ed. by O. Neumayer, Salzburg 2001, Sankt Augustin Academia Verlag, 9–74; together with B. Smith. Mentalizm, psychologizm, intencjonalno´sc´ i semantyka referencjalna [Mentalism, Psychologism, Intentionality and Referential Semantics], in Psychologizm i antypsychologizm [Psychologism and Anti-Psychologism], ed. by A. Olech. Kraków 2001, Aureus, 97–122. Philosophical Background and Philosophical Content of Semantic Deﬁnition of Truth, Erkenntnis 56(1) (2002), 29–62. Ekstensjonalno´sc´ / intensjonalnos´c´ [Extentionality / Intensionality], in J. Bobryk, Teoria działania K. Twardowskiego [K. Twardowski’s Theory of Action], Warszawa 2001, Prószy´n´ ski i S-ka, 128–141. Theories of Judgement, in The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1914, ed. by T. Baldwin, Cambridge 2003, Cambridge University Press, 157–173; together with B. Smith. Uwagi o ﬁlozoﬁcznym tle semantycznej deﬁnicji Tarskiego [Remarks on the Philosophical Background of Tarski’s Semantic Deﬁnition], in Alfred Tarski: Dedukcja i semantyka [Alfred Tarski: Deduction and Semantics], ed. by J.J. Jadacki, Warszawa 2003, Semper, 85–89. Objective Truth before Tarski, in Logic and Philosophy. In Search of Polish Tradition, ed. by T. Czarnecki, J. Hintikka, K. Kijania-Placek, T. Placek, A. Rojszczak, Dordrecht 2004, Kluwer, 229–268; together with B. Smith. From the Judging to the Sentence. Truth-Bearers and the Objectivisation of Knowledge, submitted to The Lvov-Warsaw School. The Third Generation, ed. by J.J. Jadacki and J. Pa´s´niczek, Amsterdam, Rodopi (forthcoming).

3.

Conference Papers Wahrheitsträger, Urteile und Sätze, in Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Papers of the 16th international Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. by R. Casati, G. White, Kirchberg am Wechsel 1993, The Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, 455–458. Über die Korrespondenz von Tarskis Deﬁnition der Wahrheit. In: ANALYOMEN I. Proceedings of the 1st Conference ‘Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy’, ed. by G. Meggle, U. Wessels, Berlin, New York 1994, de Gruyter, 539–543. Some remarks on Semanticalistic Representation of Intentionality, in Rationality and Irrationality. Contributed papers to the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. B. Brogaard, Kirchberg am Wechsel 2000, The Austrian L. Wittgenstein Society, 115–121.

INDEX

4.

237

Reviews and Abstracts Über die Korrespondenz von Tarskis Deﬁnition der Wahrheit, in Analyomen I (Abstracts), Saarbruecken, 9–12 Oktober 1991. Review of Ryszard Jadczak, Człowiek szukajacy ˛ etyki. Filozoﬁa moralna Kazimierza Twardowskiego [Review of Ryszard Jadczak, The Man in Search of Ethics. Moral Philosophy of Kazimierz Twardowski], Reports on Philosophy 15 (1995), 163–166 (in German). Intentionality—Orthodox and Modern Approaches. In: 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science—Volume of Abstracts, ed. by J. Cachro, K. Kijania-Placek, Kraków 1999, IF UJ, p. 368. On Philosophical Background of Semantic Deﬁnition of Truth, in Alfred Tarski Centenary Conference (Abstracts), 28 May – 1 June 2001, Technical Report, Institute of Informatics, Warsaw University, p. 44.

5.

Varia (translations, editions, polemics) Franz Brentano: W kwestii metaﬁzyki [On Metaphysics], in Filozoﬁa Austriacka [Austrian Philosophy], ed. by T. Lubowiecki and A. Rojszczak, Kraków 1994, Aureus (= Principia 8–9), 101–136. Translation of the manuscript from German into Polish. (1994): Kazimierz Twardowski: Wykład wst˛e˛ pny na Uniwersytecie Lwowskim (z 15. listopada 1895 roku) [The Inaugurational Lecture at the Lvov University (from 15th November 1895)], in Filozoﬁa Austriacka [Austrian Philosophy], ed. by T. Lubowiecki, and A. Rojszczak, Kraków 1994, Aureus (= Principia 8–9), 225–236; edition of Twardowski’s handwriting manuscript.

Index

Hosiasson, J., 21 Husserl, E., 3, 11–14, 17–19, 21, 24, 41, 83, 85, 88–101, 102, 107, 121–125, 127– 130, 133, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150–152, 157, 158, 165, 168, 171, 172, 176, 181, 189, 190, 194, 217, 218

Ajdukiewicz, K., 6, 7, 9, 12–14, 18, 20, 21, 106, 110, 143, 154, 158, 190, 199–204, 211 Armstrong, D., 24, 30 Berg, J., 86, 101, 130, 157, 158 Blaustein, L., 14, 54, 157 Bolzano, B., 12, 17, 18, 21, 41, 84, 85, 96, 98, 99, 101, 111–116, 121–128, 130, 133–135, 138, 144, 145, 147–149, 151, 152, 157–159, 161, 167, 168, 174, 194, 212, 218 Brentano, F., 2, 8, 9, 11–18, 20, 21, 25–27, 29, 33–43, 45, 47–53, 54, 57–62, 64–66, 69–72, 74, 75, 78, 81, 84– 90, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103–106, 109, 109, 110, 111, 116–125, 128, 137, 138, 145, 146, 148, 150, 151, 154, 157, 168, 171, 172, 176, 177, 191, 193, 197, 198, 200, 215–218

Jadacki, J., 21 Köhler, E., 20 Kastil, A., 36 Kokoszy´n´ ska, M., 8–10, 18, 21, 142, 143, 158 Kotarbi´n´ ski, T., 6, 7, 9, 12–15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 27, 82, 103, 106–109, 109, 110, 134–141, 154, 158, 162–166, 168, 169, 182, 190, 197–201, 211, 214, 217, 218 Kraus, O., 110 ´ St., 6, 7, 9, 11–15, 18, 20, 21, 27, Lesniewski, 72, 82, 103, 106, 109, 134, 135, 138–142, 158, 162–168, 169, 171– 177, 188, 189, 190, 205 Lotze, H., 84, 86, 87, 101

Carnap, R., 9, 219 Cavalin, J., 54 Chisholm, R., 54, 109 Cze˙z˙ owski, T., 14, 18, 21, 81, 191–193, 211, 217

Łukasiewicz, J., 6, 7, 9–12, 14, 15, 18, 20, 21, 120, 128–130, 132–134, 154, 157, 158, 173, 193–197, 202, 211, 217, 218

Dambska, ˛ I., 20, 21 Dummett, M., 21 Ehrenfels, Ch. von, 101

Münch, D., 54 Mally, E., 54 Marty, A., 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 49–53, 55, 57, 72– 79, 81, 82, 83, 87, 90, 95–101, 102, 125, 134, 139, 141, 142, 151, 168, 172, 176, 178, 190, 217, 218 McDowell, J., 20 Meinong, A., 11, 12, 15, 17, 21, 39, 41, 44– 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 65–71, 76, 78,

Field, H., 2, 20 Findlay, J.N., 54 Fodor, J., 212 Frege, G., 9, 15, 16, 60, 81, 84, 87, 101, 107, 151, 157, 176, 186–188, 208 Haller, R., 54, 168 Hillebrand, F., 14, 81, 157 Hintikka, J., 102

239

240 81, 82, 86, 87, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 128, 130, 142, 168, 168, 175, 187, 190, 193–196, 198, 217, 218 Morscher, E., 30, 157, 158, 161, 162, 168 Mulligan, K., 55 Neurath, O., 7, 9–11, 21 Nuchelmans, G., 30 Nyiri, J.C., 168 Ossowska, M., 18, 19, 177–183, 189, 190 Ossowski, St., 18, 19, 82, 183–189, 190, 199, 207–209, 217 Pa´s´niczek, J., 54 Paczkowska-Łagowska, E., 44, 54 Pawłowski, T., 219 Popper, K.R., 133, 145, 147, 150, 158, 159 Puntel, L.B., 24, 28 Reinach, A., 3, 17, 83, 99–101, 102, 125, 142, 168, 218 Rojszczak, A., 20, 21, 169, 203 Russell, B., 9, 13, 15, 16, 23, 24, 30, 163, 171– 173, 176, 178, 183, 186, 200 Schaar, M. van der, 101 Schuhmann, K., 102 Simons, P., 7, 8, 12, 14–16, 20, 21, 30, 55, 81, 109, 157, 158, 162, 168, 169, 190 Skolimowski, H., 7, 20 Sluga, H., 101

INDEX Smith, B., 7, 20, 55, 101, 102, 109, 110, 153, 159, 168 Stout, G.F., 87, 101 Stumpf, C., 85–87, 96, 101, 130, 198 Szaniawski, K., 7, 20 Sztejnbarg, D., 21 Tarski, A., 1–11, 13–19, 20, 21, 24, 27, 81, 116, 128, 142, 143, 158, 159, 162, 163, 171–177, 183, 197, 203, 205, 206, 208–211, 211, 212, 213–218 Tenner, D., 44, 54 Twardowski, K., 3, 7–12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 38–48, 51, 53, 54, 60–65, 78, 81, 86–88, 90, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 120, 125–134, 137, 138, 141, 146, 154, 158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168, 173, 175, 180, 181, 183, 184, 189, 191, 192, 198, 200, 201, 206–208, 211, 217, 218 Weingartner, P., 157 Willard, D., 102 Witasek, S., 130, 158 Wittgenstein, L., 16, 128, 158, 183 Wole´n´ ski, J., 7, 8, 14–16, 20, 21, 109, 110, 163, 166, 168, 169, 172, 173, 177, 189, 190 Zawirski, Z., 21