FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
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FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
Recent Titles in Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939 Scot Robertson The Outbreak of the First World War: Strategic Planning, Crisis Decision Making, and Deterrence Failure John H. Maurer Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972 Michael A. Hennessy American Diplomats in Russia: Case Studies in Orphan Diplomacy, 1916-1919 William Allison American National Security and Economic Relations with Canada, 1945-1954 Lawrence Robert Aronsen Alternative to Appeasement: Sir Robert Vansittart and Alliance Diplomacy, 1934-1937 Michael L. Roi British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900-1936 Phillips Payson O'Brien Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961-1965 Orrin Schwab Paths Not Taken: Speculations on American Foreign Policy and Diplomatic History, Interests, Ideals, and Power Jonathan M. Neilson, editor
FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army + by the Bundeswehr + FREDERICK ZILIAN, JR. Foreword by Werner von Scheven
Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought B.J.C. McKercher, Series Editor
PMEGER
Westport, Connecticut London
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zilian, Frederick, 1948From confrontation to cooperation : the takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr / Frederick Zilian, Jr. : foreword by Werner von Scheven. p. cm.—(Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought, ISSN 1076-1543) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96546-5 (alk. paper) 1. Germany (East). NationaleVolksarmee—Demobilization. 2. Germany—Armed Forces—Reorganization. 3. Germany—History— Unification, 1990. I. Title. II. Series. UA719.3.Z55 1999 355.3'09431—dc21 98-47816 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1999 by Frederick Zilian, Jr. All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98-47816 ISBN: 0-275-96546-5 ISSN: 1076-1543 First published in 1999 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America
<~r The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Contents Illustrations
vii
Foreword by LTG (Ret.) Werner von Scheven
ix
Preface
xvii
Abbreviations
xix
Introduction
1
1. Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory
11
2. The Political Setting
21
3. The Military Setting
31
4. Organization and Political Control
59
5. Management and Force Structure Decisions
85
6. Personnel Decisions
95
7. Training and Education Decisions
137
8. Equipment and Facilities Decisions
159
9. The Takeover and the "New Tasks" of the Bundeswehr
175
vi
Contents
10. Conclusion
185
Appendix A: Key Figures in the Takeover
201
Appendix B: Army Structure 5
203
Appendix C: Peacetime Organization of the German Army (in 1994)
207
Selected Bibliography
209
Index
225
Illustrations FIGURES Figure 3.1 Organization of the National People's Army (Land Forces)
33
Figure 3.2 Control of the NVA by the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
38
Figure 3.3 Organization of the German Army (1986)
46
Figure 4.1 MOD/Army Staff Steering Committee Structure for the Takeover of the NVA
61
Figure 4.2 Organizational Structure of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command on October 3, 1990
65
Figure 4.3 Staff Structure of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command
66
Figure 4.4 Army Organization within Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (October 1990)
67
Figure 6.1 Transition of NVA Officers into the German Army, October 1990 to January 1993
106
Figure 8.1 CFE Treaty Limitations for the United Germany
162
Figure 10.1 Planned Personnel Structure of the Bundeswehr by Rank
189
viii
Illustrations
Figure 10.2 Planned Personnel Strength of the Service Branches (End 1994)
190
TABLES Table 4.1 Allocation of Command and Support Groups to
64
Former NVA Units
Table 5.1 Unit Partnerships (Field Army) Between Units in the East and West
91
Table 5.2 Unit Partnerships (Territorial Army) Between Units in the East and West
91
Table 7.1 Course Overview: Supplemental Training Course for Former NVA in the Grade of Captain
144
Table 8.1 Major NVA Weapon Systems (Land Forces) Taken Over by the German Army at Unification
161
Table B. 1 Army Structure 4 vs. Army Structure 5
204
Foreword For close to ten years now Fred Zilian and I have known one another and have kept in close contact. At that time I headed the Command and General Staff College of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, a college that sits at the pinnacle of the German military education system. For forty years U.S. officers, as well as officers of numerous other states have visited the College to participate in courses up to two years in length that deal with the art of command and control in war in the tradition of the German General Staff. At the college we discussed without restriction all subjects dealing with the international system. High-ranking military officers and noted experts from the world over were available to us. Only a single theme was off limits: For West German professional officers to speak on German soil in an official setting about the unification of the two Germanys was to enter into a forbidden zone, something typical for all of democratic, postwar Germany. The theme of German unity played a role in the Sunday afternoon speeches of politicians; however, whoever wanted to deal with this subject on a practical level—be he civilian or military—brought upon himself inevitably very loud denunciations. From the left came the accusation of an "insufficient acceptance of guilt for the consequences of World War II." From the right came the claim that such actions "endangered the delicate stability of the Cold War." From East Germany came the cries of "revanchism and imperialism." Germans in fact held a strong inhibition on this subject—and not only those who pondered the practical paths to unification between the two Germanys. I had seen many corners of the globe and had spent a good year of my life in the United States; however, as a West German professional soldier, I was restricted from East Germany. How I envied my American colleagues who could travel there and how I wished also to go, at the least into East Berlin, the capital
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city. Born in 1937,1 had been a young boy in Berlin for the first twelve years of my life. I had gone into the cellar with my mother and siblings during the air raids until we were evacuated to the surrounding area. I had endured the Soviet attack on the imperial capital and then the occupation regime there, and finally I had gone hungry during the Berlin Blockade until we were flown out. I could then conclude my schooling in Hesse before I became a soldier in the new German armed forces. As an officer with access to classified material, I constantly made trips to West Berlin on allied airlines. Also, in the Defense Ministry in Bonn where I worked for a total of nine years, there was no discussion or even a tentative blueprint for the possibility of a unification of the two German states. Both armies in Germany never had contact. One would only see the other side if one had an assignment as an observer of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not even once, for example, did a military band visit the other side. From our perspective the National People's Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was a reliable alliance partner of the Soviet Union. We knew that it was devoted to a massive threat picture, in which the Bundeswehr played a central role. Contact with visitors from the West was as forbidden to members of the East German army as listening to communications from the West. Offenses were punished and also damaged careers. Units were kept at an exceptionally high state of operational readiness—something done not for professional, military but rather political, ideological reasons. This readiness had been dictated by the Soviet general staff uniformly for the Warsaw Pact and remained so until the end. So believed this world of ideological self-certainty, that had to guard itself against disturbing outside influences, surely not a sign of strength. This world of ideological self-certainty in the GDR experienced its first shocks since 1953 when the Communist leadership in the GDR resisted the reform efforts of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the economic downturn of the entire East Bloc could no longer be swept under the rug. The world of the trusted Communist satellites began to collapse, however, when Poland and Hungary decided to take the path of freedom, democracy, and market economy, and people in the GDR took to the streets in waves to demand a change. When massive demonstrations erupted in the GDR, the NVA was not employed against its own population. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and the people now called for the unity of all Germans and for the use of the West German mark as the common currency. The borders to West Germany were opened. In the National People's Army a military reform was attempted, however much too late. New uniforms were fashioned. I had taken up contacts in the summer of 1990 with the Friedrich Engels Military College in Dresden. This college with over 1000 officers and soldiers engaged in desperate efforts to come up with some useful revision of their mission through a program of "conversion" (privitization of military institutes and facilities). For professional soldiers the question was now literally one of existence. The atmosphere was gloomy. Hopes
Foreword
XI
were awakened by the East German Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmann, that the two armies in a united Germany would play a security role in middle Europe for five more years. This however was all in vain. In March 1990 democratic elections were held in the GDR, and after July 1 the West German mark became valid for all Germans. The GDR left the Warsaw Pact on September 30, 1990, and came itself to end on October 3 with its accession to the Federal Republic of Germany. In this same moment the army of the GDR joined with the Bundeswehr. It became a part of the Bundeswehr, stationed on the land of the former GDR. The soldiers of the former NVA donned Bundeswehr uniforms, a case without precedent in modern history. The National People's Army experienced "die Wende" (the turning) in the GDR as a shock and difficult challenge to their loyalty. In its structure, training, and equipment, the NVA essentially corresponded to the Soviet example. The NVA had long imitated the Soviet Army, propagandized with the saying: "To learn from the Soviet Union is to learn how to win." This was often displayed at many military posts of the NVA. The decades of long imitation of the Soviet model made professional cooperation between the soldiers of east and west Germany more difficult than many people had expected. Both German armed forces belonged to different, indeed antagonistic, social systems. Two contrasting and entirely different military cultures existed on German soil. In order not to disrupt the 2 + 4 negotiations over Germany, professional communications between the armies began very late. The intelligence services of both countries had never investigated the possibility of a peaceful joining of a communist army to a larger democratic army of the same nation. What the approximate 1500 West German soldiers of all ranks had necessarily to know as they went from West to East Germany and got down to work, they thus had to learn essentially on the job. And here they depended on the loyalty and cooperation of their East German comrades. Whether and how this has worked or not is the subject of this book. I will only offer an example from my own experiences to illustrate the process. In late summer 1990, the first rumors surfaced in the Bundeswehr about a unification with the NVA. Were the professional soldiers of the NVA to find a place in the Bundeswehr? A storm of indignation arose at the Command and General Staff College in Hamburg. This took on such force that I decided one day to gather all officers in the main auditorium, so that they could conduct a free and open debate on the pro's and con's of the takeover of the NVA professional soldiers. I moderated the discussion from the podium. After three hours I ended the debate and then offered a final word the sense of which follows. We may not betray the values whose defense we guarantee. These values include a view of human beings that forbids any generalized judgments about our fellow men. Such we have also held about the earlier soldiers of the German Wehrmacht [Army in World War II], although the Wehrmacht is no example for the Bundeswehr. The suitability of an NVA officer or non-commissioned officer for service in the Bundeswehr must be
Xll
Foreword
examined on an individual basis. The imminent joining of all Germans has, given the current situation, a West-East slope; however, it is no one-way street. We should be happy to live on this side of the Iron Curtain, something that occurred without our own conscious acts. Integration will indeed be a very difficult exercise, but one that we must resolve together.
Not before August 1990 Defense Minister Stoltenberg made his intention known that he would station the Bundeswehr, reduced to 370,000 active soldiers, as a common armed force on the expanded territory of the united Germany and that he would integrate up to 25,000 professional soldiers of the National People's Army. On October 1, 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact began with the exit of the German Democratic Republic. In the same time period the [East German] Minister for Disarmament and Defense discharged all generals and admirals of the NVA, all officers 55 and older, as well as female officer-candidates who did not belong to the Medical Service Corps. He admitted the remainder into civil service. Officers of the military justice corps and political officers had been discharged earlier. At the same time about 1500 officers and non-commissioned officers of the West German army, navy, and air force were brought together for a final time at three locations in West Germany. They were to assume in two days command authority over the "joined" NVA. The next morning they were expected to be sent on their way over the border of the GDR that would soon cease to exist. That afternoon I took a helicopter to Hannover with Lieutenant General Jorg Schonbohm, the Director of the Planning Staff under Minister Stoltenberg. Gathered there at the Army Officers School were approximately 700 army officers and non-commissioned officers. It had been determined that two days later Schonbohm would organize under him a newly created Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command in Strausberg from the remains of the GDR Ministries and from all Bundeswehr soldiers in the east and take command of the approximate 1500 troop units and agencies of the NVA. For the first time in the history of the Bundeswehr, a single general was given command of a national, joint service command, if only for nine months. I was designated for the first six months to be his deputy and also was entrusted with the mission of dissolving special units under the centralized command of the NVA Headquarters. Afterward I was to assume command of the East German Territorial Command in Potsdam near Berlin and to activate a new IV Corps of the German Army. At the end of the long day during which the West German Army leadership answered numerous questions, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza suddenly ended the discussion and sent the 700 officers and NCOs on their way with the following exhortation (paraphrased). Gentlemen, we have told you what we know. Much today we do not know; many questions therefore must go unanswered. Go to your destinations early tomorrow. See who is
Foreword
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there. Check things out. Give the NVA leaders you find there your trust. Leave any selfrighteousness at home and win their loyalty. You are now aware of the sense of my intentions and that of the Defense Minister. Use your own initiative accordingly. You have learned to size up a situation, even when this is an unusual situation and includes many uncertainties. You have learned to decide. Decide on location what is necessary and keep us informed. Then softly he added, "In this sense it is no different than in battle where uncertainty is the rule and friction is unavoidable."
And thus it was. Our people did not have to hear those words again! With this statement they experienced a tremendous feeling of emancipation. The words of the Chief of Staff set free such a power of action and initiative, that had never been believed ever again possible by many. And so with this unification the Bundeswehr experienced the remarkable blossoming of Auftragstaktik, a tradition as well as a training goal of the German Army, but something in danger of atrophy after 35 years of operating in the bureaucratic routines of peacetime. Fred Zilian has given the proper weight to the meaning of this leadership principle for the success of this unusual operation for "German Unity." The importance of this principle cannot at all be overestimated. It was the conditio sine qua non. On October 2, 1990, the Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmarm, dissolved the National People's Army. He arranged for ceremonies in order "to retire the existing symbols that were tied to the traditions of the GDR." He directed the uninterrupted guarding of the military "objects" (weapons, equipment, and facilities) as well as the maintenance of the required functions and forces for the preservation of air sovereignty. With an Order of the Day he discharged finally the 92,000 (from the previous 170,000) soldiers and the 47,000 civilian employees from their obligations to the GDR, to take effect midnight, October 2. For the last time the national colors of the GDR were lowered. At the same time I departed the Command and Staff College in Hamburg with a charge to all its members. I pointed out the remarkable Renaissance of the right to self-determination for peoples in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Helsinki Final Act, something that now also had reached the German nation. The both parts of Germany were released from their roles as front-line states. With the right to self-determination came also to Germans the duty of responsibility. The Germans in west and east had long agreed that on either side of the Iron Curtain they were responsible for insuring that war never again occurred about Germany or by Germany. I expressed the feeling of thanks, that moved me on this day. Special thanks I paid to the United States and Canada, because these two allies—from a sense of transatlantic responsibility for peace in Europe—wisely and without second thoughts supported the German unification process. Above all the Germans in the GDR had to be thanked, because they provided a unique example of perse-
XIV
Foreword
verance, prudence, and imagination in German history, and by this served as a symbol for all of Europe. Then I cast an eye on the huge task of completing the unity of the German people in freedom. The forty-five year division and imprisonment of Germans in the east had caused devastating consequences. Fifty-seven years of "might makes right" in the eastern part of the Fatherland had made the people there, already in the third generation, accustomed to a state power dealing cynically with right and truth. This by and large had led to their adaptation to the system as a means of mental survival, and to their adaptation to a life with two faces, one for official use and one for the private sphere. We had no reason therefore for self-righteousness, rather we had fully a duty to know ourselves, to recognize our own limitations, and to have patience. I then addressed the situation of the Bundeswehr in the process of unification, and said the Western Group of Soviet Forces on the soil of the joined section of Germany will enjoy during the period of its departure "guest rights" stemming from the treaty. The Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command had the mission to support its return to its homeland. The Soviet soldiers would have to come to terms with the fact that their "enemy" now appeared on the TV screen in full military display as a peaceful neighbor. Our motto would be: "Soviet soldiers, go home with our help—and go as friends of Germany." Concerning the soldiers of the National People's Army I explained: "Because our Soldiers' Law as of tomorrow is also valid for them, they are then our comrades." I described the situation and additionally called on all of them to treat our new comrades with sincerity, not to isolate them, to give them responsibility for our new common task, and reveal to them what the countrymen behind the innerGerman border and the Berlin Wall had experienced—how they thought about it then. I spoke of the great chance of the Bundeswehr as a draft army to provide a meaningful contribution to unity. And then I could not help but make them aware that we had lived our last day of service in the old familiar Federal Republic, in the old, familiar Bundeswehr, in the old, familiar Command and Staff College, and soon nothing more would be the same as it had been for decades. It would be several years until this realization had spread throughout West Germany. Fred Zilian had a unique opportunity, when he experienced the unification of Germany with the soldiers and had constant access throughout the chain of command, as high as the level of the Defense Ministry. With great expertise and noteworthy sympathetic understanding, he has used his numerous contacts in the officer corps of the German Army in order to produce a unique publication. For example, by his use of my own statements, I can see how conscientious he handles quotes from eyewitnesses. Zilian does not restrict himself to the role of a chronicler. He examines systematically key questions and organizes these questions according to the interests of those who were not present for the Unification. Some questions are genuinely sensitive. With great skill and persistence he judges the wealth of documents and
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personal sources from all leadership levels and assembles the findings in a profound and critical discourse, impressive also to German eyewitnesses. He goes into detail without losing sight of the larger picture. In his conclusion he delves into future issues and also, on a theoretical level, presents observations and propositions that can be applied to other case studies. The book has a notable scientific quality, but still it is exciting to read. Zilian constructs a bridge of understanding for all American readers, who still today ask, how the Germans have overcome such an unexpected and for so long unimaginable, historic challenge, and how they did it this time without damage to themselves and their neighbors, but rather with benefit. Werner von Scheven Lieutenant General (Ret.) German Army
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Preface As an army officer I departed the United States in 1989 for a second tour of duty in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Eighteen years before, I had departed for Germany on my first tour as a newly commissioned officer and had spent more than three years in the Eighth Infantry Division in Mainz, wrestling with the many problems the U.S. Army faced as its involvement in the Vietnam War was ending. As I left for my second tour, I had mixed feelings. In the midst of finishing my doctoral comprehensive exams, I had initially resisted the assignment. And yet my German blood and love of German culture drew me. The Army rescued me from my confusion and with ease settled the matter. Off I went to the land of Goethe and Beethoven with wife, three children, and dog in tow. We arrived in August 1989; the Berlin Wall fell in November. When a few months later I began contemplating my dissertation, I needed to expend only little effort to isolate a topic at once exciting, interesting, topical, and ripe with potential: Germany's Unification. Only a slight nudge from my advisor, Professor Eliot Cohen, was needed to redirect me to the more suitable and manageable chunk of that profound event: the unification of the two armies. For once my timing was propitious. Not only was I in Germany at the right moment, but I was also serving as a liaison officer from the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command to the German Army. Not only was I—living in a German village near Bonn—immersed in German society, but daily I worked in the language at the German Army Office in Cologne, a major military command that in 1990 became involved in the planning for the Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army. I was thus afforded the opportunity to establish a wide net of German military colleagues who became involved in planning and executing the takeover and without whose cooperation my dissertation—and now this book—would not have been possible.
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I thank the many people who made this study possible. The greatest thanks go to my advisor and friend, Eliot Cohen, whose faith, support, and guidance were crucial, and also to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Werner von Scheven who read the entire manuscript, offered many suggestions, and kindly agreed to write the foreword. Thanks to Andrew Bacevich, Andrew Krepinevich, Jeffrey Simon, and Stephen Szabo for reading an early version of it. Thomas-Durell Young and John Maurer provided unique moral support, advice, and encouragement at key places. Many thanks to all the German officers and noncommissioned officers who gave of their time to be interviewed and to assist in other ways, especially the following general officers: Andreas Broicher, Ruprecht Haasler, Wilko Hartmann, Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Ekkehard Richter, and Andreas Wittenberg. Other officers, Wolfgang Gulich, Dietmar Klenner, Axel Hecht, and Werner Klingenberg were especially kind, interested in this study, and free with their time. A special thanks to Herwig Scheffler who played a crucial role in assembling key documents for me. On the former East German side, Werner AblaB, Giinther Bormann, and Hans-Georg Loffler were especially helpful because of their key positions. Thanks to Jtirgen Forster, Wolfgang Eisert, HansJoachim Harder, and the other members of the German Military History Research Office who assisted me. I would like to thank the Strategic Studies Program of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, for providing sufficient funding for me to conduct the research for this study, to Portsmouth Abbey School for its additional financial and administrative support, and to the wonderful staff of the Naval War College Library who always offered me efficient and good-natured support. Thanks to the many editors at Greenwood Publishing who assisted me, to Robin Weisberg and Roberta Stevens for their meticulous work on the manuscript, and to Tom Kennedy for his faithful assistance in helping me fathom German idioms. For their warm friendship and logistical support during my research trips, thanks to Monika and Sarandis Roditis, and to Ken and Monika Weinberg. Finally, I thank my family—my wife, Geri, and our children, Nicole, Thomas, and James—for the unwavering net of love and support that through time we together have weaved. It kept me well through all the years of bringing this project to fruition.
Abbreviations ORGANIZATIONS EDC FttH FttS MDD or MAV
MOD or BMVg NVA SED Stasi
European Defense Community Fuhrungstab des Heeres (Army Staff) Fuhrungstab der Streitkrafte (Joint Staff) Ministry of Disarmament and Defense or Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung (East Germany) Ministry of Defense or Bundesministerium fiir Verteidigung (West Germany) Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army) Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party) (East Germany) Staatsicherheits Dienst (State Security Service) (East Germany)
MILITARY RANK NCO SGT SSG SFC 1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL BG
noncommissioned officer Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant First Class First Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Brigadier General (one star)
Abbreviations
XX
MG LTG GEN
Major General (two star) Lieutenant General (three star) General (four star)
OTHER AS 5 BRD CFE DDR DM EK FRG GDR INF SaZ-2
Army Structure 5 Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Germany) Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty) Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany) Deutsch Mark Entlassungskandidat Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces SoldataufZeit-2 (longer term volunteer—two years)
FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION
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Introduction On October 3, 1990, Germany's Unification Day, Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Defense, described in his Order of the Day the task facing the armed forces of the former East and West Germanys. "The division of our land has been overcome. Now it is important also to remove the division of thinking and feeling. Soldiers in this regard face a special challenge: they must switch from confrontation to cooperation."1 On this day, the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee—N VA) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was officially dissolved. The Federal Armed Forces of Germany—the Bundeswehr—began in earnest the weighty task of assuming control over a former enemy armed force made up of ethnically common people, a task virtually unique in history.2 To launch into this task, the Bundeswehr established the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (Bundeswehrkommando Osi), headed by Lieutenant General (LTG) Jorg Schonbohm, formerly the Director of the Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Shortly after assuming his post, he clarified the principal tasks of his command: to dissolve the former People's Army and, without delay, organize the new armed forces according to the democratic rule of law.3 This command served its functions until July 1, 1991, when it was dissolved and the individual branches of service of the Bundeswehr—the German Army, Navy, and Air Force—assumed responsibility for their respective units in the former East Germany. Formidable indeed was this undertaking, which German military officers initially described as an "integration" (Integration) but later as a "Takeover" (Ubernahme). Just prior to Unification, the NVA consisted of approximately 90,000 men. Next to this were 19,000 members of the Border Guards (Grenztruppe) and 40,000 defense civilians, which together with the army com-
2
From Confrontation to Cooperation
prised some 1,400 military and civilian organizations. This raised the total strength of the Bundeswehr to 590,000 men and 210,000 defense civilians.4 Beyond personnel, the Bundeswehr assumed control of the arsenal of the former People's Army, Border Guards, and paramilitary organizations, including 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 400 combat aircraft, 90 combatant vessels, 50 attack helicopters, 300 surface-to-surface missiles, 12,000 ground-to-air missiles, 43,000 antitank rockets, 100,000 wheeled vehicles, and 300,000 tons of ammunition.5 Despite the magnitude of the additional personnel, equipment, material, and property that the Bundeswehr now had to control and manage, perhaps the greatest challenge was noted by the Defense Minister in his Order of the Day—"to remove the division of thinking and feeling."6 Although the mechanical aspects of the Takeover were largely completed by the end of 1992, many German officers believed that the "takeover of the minds" would probably take a generation. As if the Takeover were not enough, the Bundeswehr was faced simultaneously with several other major issues stemming from the changed security conditions and new international agreements, all of which combined with the Takeover to present a fivefold challenge. As a consequence of the Kohl-Gorbachev agreements in July 1990, the Bundeswehr had to reduce its strength by 1995 from approximately 580,000 after assuming control of the NVA to 370,000, a reduction of about 36 percent. Second, the Takeover came as the Bundeswehr was reconfiguring itself into a new army structure, Army Structure 5 (AS 5), no meager undertaking for an army even without other preoccupations. Third, to aid in the allied war effort against Iraq, the German military, beginning shortly after Unification, assembled, organized, displayed for inspection, transported to port, and dispatched to the Gulf, a multitude of former East German military equipment. Fourth, adjusting to changed domestic as well as international security conditions, the Bundeswehr was called on by Defense Minister Stoltenberg in the spring of 1991, to initiate planning to accomplish "new missions," collective security operations outside the NATO area.7 This, of course, was not the first time that Prussian-German armies—in peacetime—had been called on to meet high challenges. Since the first days of what can be called a German Army in the early eighteenth century, it has risen to face numerous tasks. At that time, Frederick William I not only succeeded in increasing its size from 38,000 to 76,000 but also in mobilizing the sons of the Prussian aristocracy and engendering a spirit of service to the state, an ethic not previously existing. His son, Frederick II (the Great), took this instrument, increased its size, improved its efficiency and fighting power, and in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) propelled Prussia into the ranks of the major European powers. During the peace following the military disasters at the hands of Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 to the resumption of the struggle for liberation in 1813, what the Prussian Army achieved in its reform was described by Herbert Rosinski, the eminent scholar of German armies, "as perhaps the proudest page in its history and one of the most memorable instances of the triumph of
Introduction
3
the spirit over all material obstacles as well as human malice and indolence."8 It was during this time that a relatively small group of men—such as Baron vom Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau—not only forged important organizational reforms, such as the establishment of the general staff system, but integrated important new ideas into the Prussian Army. Corporal punishment was eliminated; service to the nation was honored. Military service was not a wretched occupation for foreign mercenaries and the lowest orders but rather a noble, honorable occupation for every citizen. In the early 1860's under von Manteuffel, the Prussian Army underwent another round of reforms transforming itself into the army that with Moltke's organizational and operational mastery became after the three wars of German unification the international standard. Finally, in this century, numerous problems and obstacles had to be overcome in the 1950's to establish the modern Bundeswehr given the excesses and failures of the German military under both the Weimar Republic and the reign of Hitler. The magnitude of these earlier challenges notwithstanding, the combined challenges that the modern German armed forces, and especially the German Army, faced after the Unification of East Germany and West Germany in October 1990, was—in the sweep of the three centuries of the history of the Prussian-German militaries—daunting. SCOPE This study focuses on the Takeover of the land forces of the NVA. Although the West German Navy and Air Force also had sizable challenges, the German Army had by far the greatest. This study gives necessary coverage to the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, the all-service command established at Unification to manage the initial nine months of the Takeover, but focuses primarily on Eastern Army Command, the army component of that command, and Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, the command that assumed responsibility for all army units after the dissolution of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command in July 1991. Aside from some brief discussion on the liaison mechanism established, the state of their garrisons in the east, and their departure in 1994, there is no significant coverage of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, due to the tangential relation of the subject matter to the purposes of this study and to the understandable sensitivity of the West Germans in providing information.9 The principal time period of the study is from July 1990 to the summer of 1993. The initial date marks the commencement of detailed planning by the Bundeswehr for the Takeover, following the major political decisions reached by Chancellor Kohl and Secretary Gorbachev in their July 1990 meeting in the Caucasus. It was only after these major political decisions had been made that the German military could initiate detailed planning for the Takeover. The main analysis ends in the summer of 1993, at which point all applications of former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) wishing to continue service as professional soldiers in the German Army had been processed and deci-
4
From Confrontation to Cooperation
sions had been reached. As background, this study gives appropriate coverage to the events preceding Unification Day (October 3, 1990) and, in analyzing future implications, peers into the second half of this decade. One problem in trying to focus solely on the German Army and not the entire Bundeswehr is the tendency of some to use the terms Bundeswehr and Armee interchangeably.10 An effort is made in this study to identify as clearly as possible material dealing with each, respectively. CENTRAL ISSUES AND FINDINGS This study focuses on five central questions. The first concerns the organization and the nature of political control: How did the West German MOD and Armed Forces organize themselves for the Takeover and what was the extent of the control exerted by the political sector over the military? The second and third are the driving questions that deal with the who, what, when, and why of the Takeover: What were the key decisions that were made by the FRG, the Bundeswehr, and the German Army concerning the Takeover? The third question amplifies the second by examining the main considerations in the key decisions: Were military factors—tactical, operational, or strategic—most important? Or were political (foreign or domestic), economic, social, or other factors more important? For example, was the garrison at Eggesin, which housed the NVA's Ninth Armored Division, selected as the location of a new home defense brigade primarily because of its location near the Polish border or because of the importance of the garrison to the economy of the local community? Fourth, what was the relation of the Takeover to the new German Army organization—AS 5? This structure was being implemented as the Unification took place with all units expected to be converted to it by the end of 1994. Did AS 5 affect the way the Takeover was accomplished, or was it this new army structure that was adapted to the new conditions stemming from the Takeover of the NVA and Unification of the two countries? Fifth, what effect did the Takeover have on the overall operational readiness of the German Army? A special concern here was the effect that the Takeover had on the ability of the German Army to accomplish its "new tasks" (neue Aufgaben) as described by the Minister of Defense Stoltenberg in the spring of 1991. These tasks stepped beyond the traditional Cold War missions of national and NATO defense and included such things as NATO out-of-area missions and United Nations (UN; Blauhelm) peacekeeping missions. By the summer of 1992, the German Army had adopted the phrase "expanded task spectrum" (erweiteres Aufgabenspektrum) to refer to these new tasks. With the benefit of the answers to these questions, this study seeks, on a more general level, two purposes: first, to arrive at an overall assessment of the conduct of the Takeover. If considered in its entire purpose, process, and effect, can it be rated a success, and if so why? Second, it hopes to contribute to a
Introduction
5
theoretical foundation for the study of such takeovers and amalgamations of armies, a field somewhat malnourished at present. These questions and the research conducted led to a substantial harvest of insights and observations. The German MOD and Bundeswehr organized themselves in a logical efficient manner to effect the Takeover. Politicians gave little detailed direction over the actual execution of the Takeover. They gave general guidelines to military leaders who were for the most part left to come up with their own solutions to novel problems. Most officers referred to this as a fine example of Auftragstaktik or "mission-type orders." Politicians were concerned about and exerted pressure to ensure a quick tempo for the deactivation of former NVA units as this had financial implications: The longer unneeded former NVA personnel and units remained on active duty, the more money it cost. Guidance was also given concerning personnel strength and social welfare issues. Also, it is clear that politicians were prepared to intervene decisively on key issues, such as when Defense Minister Stoltenberg overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all NVA MIG-29 combat aircraft. Political control was ever present. In examining an undertaking of such magnitude as the Takeover of one army by another, scores of decisions could be identified as "critical." This study attempts to strike a balance between breadth and depth of coverage. The criteria used in determining which decisions to analyze included, first, the apparent extent of impact of the decision and, second, the number of times it was indicated as key by the sources consulted, especially the interviews. Based on these criteria, the study focuses on eleven important decisions in the Takeover made by the German government, the Bundeswehr, and the German Army. These decisions can be organized into four groups: four concerning management and force structure, four concerning personnel issues, one relating to training and education, and two dealing with equipment and real property. Within the area of management and force structure, there were four decisions: 1. The government decision that after Unification there would be one German military force—not two as the East Germans had wanted. 2. The German Army decision to organize the new units in the east in accordance with the new AS 5 and to superimpose this structure on the existing NVA structure. 3. The German Army decision to dissolve the National People's Army and simultaneously activate the new units of the German Army. 4. The German Army decision to establish partnership units between new German Army units in the east and units in the west to facilitate the Takeover. Within the area of personnel affairs, there were four critical decisions: 5. The government's decision to allow former NVA to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr after Unification. 6. The decision by the FRG Ministry of Defense to allow, on the acceptance of an application, remaining former NVA officers and NCOs to continue to serve in the German military beyond December 31, 1990, as "extenders" (Weiterverwender)
6
From Confrontation to Cooperation up to the end of 1991, or as "Soldiers of Two Years" (Soldat auf Zeit-2) [SaZ-2] for a trial period (Probezeit) until the end of 1992, and beyond this, to allow a segment of them to become longer serving volunteer soldiers or professional soldiers (Berufsoldat). 7. To reduce in rank according to certain criteria officers and NCOs of the former NVA who continued to serve in the Bundeswehr after Unification. 8. To allow none of the traditions of the NVA to be integrated into the German military (e.g., the wearing of NVA awards or badges).
Within the area of training and education, there was one key decision. The decision of the Bundeswehr and German Army: 9. To give former NVA officers and NCOs who continued to serve a series of supplemental political and military training and education courses. In the final area of equipment, materiel, and real property, there were two overarching sets of decisions consisting of numerous individual decisions: 10. The set of decisions as to what equipment the German Army should take over for the long term. 11. The set of decisions concerning what property (facilities and installations) the German Army should take over. Concerning the third research question, the major considerations influencing these eleven key decisions were generally something other than military factors: domestic-political, economic, social, or psychological (e.g., psychological in terms of impact on the attitudes of former NVA soldiers or the former East German public). Which factors were critical depended on the nature of the issue. In only three instances did military considerations seem to predominate: first, the German Army's decision to organize the new units in the east in accordance with AS 5; second, the German Army's decision to establish partnership relationships between units in eastern and western Germany; and third, the German Army's set of decisions on the takeover of NVA equipment and munitions. In the latter, military safety considerations played a large role in many of the decisions made on individual items, especially major combat systems and munitions. As might be expected in such complex issues, there were multiple factors in many cases that all played major roles in the decisions, with the precise weight of each factor—or even the clear identification of the primary one—difficult to calculate. Concerning the fourth research question, the relation of the Takeover of the NVA to AS 5 is clear. The decision to adopt AS 5 had already been made when the detailed planning for the Takeover began. The units activated in the east after Unification were organized in accordance with this new structure and hence were the first German Army units so structured. These units, however, were not charged with serving as a "test bed" for this structure and then providing feedback to planners; no such "feedback loop" was established. The logic was simple and compelling. Activating new units with the old structure—Army Structure 4—would have meant that at some date in the future these units would have been
Introduction
7
forced to undergo a reorganization into AS 5. It was more logical and practical to impose AS 5 on the new units in the east. Concerning the fifth and final research question, the Takeover had a clear and dramatically negative effect on the operational readiness of the German Army, as the Army threw almost its entire energy into the Takeover. However, the relation of the Takeover to the new "extended task spectrum" of the German Army is not fully clear. Most West German interviewees seemed puzzled at the suggestion of a possible connection. They did not seem to have considered that the Takeover might have some effect on the German Army's ability to conduct missions outside national and NATO borders. In terms of the German Army's ability to accomplish missions beyond the traditional ones of the defense of Germany and of NATO, the Takeover has been a significant factor in retarding its ability to be fully prepared for such missions. Given a clear domestic consensus on the use of the Bundeswehr for such missions—something yet to exist despite the July 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court—the German Army would have been better prepared earlier for such missions had it not had to accomplish such a huge undertaking as the Takeover of the NVA. These new missions were not to be given to the new units activated in the east until 1995. By this time, it was judged that these units would have experienced no significant negative consequences resulting from the Takeover in accomplishing the new missions. By 1995, the many new company-level officers from the east were to have been fully trained in the Bundeswehr school system. This added to the fact that only the top former NVA officers—in terms of character, potential, and demonstrated performance—were accepted at the end of 1992 into the German Army as professional soldiers, would fairly well assure that the Takeover had no detrimental effects on the ability of the German Army—specifically, units with personnel from the former East Germany—to perform its new missions. The research showed that if anything, the Takeover enhanced the Army's ability because the former NVA evinced a highly positive and professional attitude toward such missions. Former NVA valued highly service to one's country. That this country was now their former nemesis mattered not. In light of the numerous military and nonmilitary goals it accomplished, including the spearheading of the process of social integration between eastern and western Germany, and based on the decidedly positive comments of not only former West but also former East German professional officers and NCOs, the central conclusion of this study is that the Takeover of the NVA (Land Forces) was a success. It was a success principally because in its decision making the Bundeswehr gave primary weight not to military-organizational or even financial considerations, but rather to psychological and social factors, psychological in the sense of the effect a decision would have on the minds of the NVA and the eastern Germans, and social in the sense of the effect a decision would have on the social welfare of the NVA and on the social stability of the NVA (avoidance of violent conflict). In this enormous undertaking, the Bundeswehr anchored its
8
From Confrontation to Cooperation
policies on a number of key principles and concepts that in the end proved their worth, including those comprising Innere Fiihrung (civic education and moral leadership), the principle of "fair chance" for the majority of the former NVA professionals to continue service in the Bundeswehr if they so chose, the principle of equal treatment of the former NVA with that of other eastern Germans who continued to be employed by the German government after Unification, the idea that the westerners went to the east "as Germans to Germans, and not as victors to vanquished," and finally that the end of the Takeover was for easterners and westerners to create an all-German force together. As for the second general goal relating to theory-building, this study attempts to make some modest contributions in the concluding chapter. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY Before the analysis of the central research questions, this study accomplishes some preliminary tasks. In chapter 1, some comparative analysis is accomplished by examining several case studies that involve the amalgamation of armies. The setting for the Takeover is sketched in the two subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 covers the international and domestic political settings, and chapter 3 reviews the status of the NVA and the Bundeswehr in the time period preceding the Unification. Chapters 4 through 8 represent the heart of the study and address the first four research questions. Chapter 4 examines the organizations established for the Takeover and the extent of political control exerted on the military during the Takeover. Description and analysis of the key decisions are undertaken in chapters 5 through 8 including the consideration of the major factors affecting each decision and the evaluation of each decision. Chapter 5 views the four management and force structure decisions, one of which addresses research Question 4 dealing with the relation of the Takeover to AS 5. Chapter 6 examines personnel decisions; chapter 7 considers training and education decisions; and chapter 8 analyzes decisions concerning equipment and facilities. Chapter 9 addresses the final research question: What effect did the Takeover have on the overall operational readiness of the German Army, with special concern for the ability of the German Army to accomplish its "new tasks?" In chapter 10, the conclusion, the study ends with a look at the international, domestic, and military challenges Germany faced in the years between 1993 and 1995, a summing up of the main findings and their wider implications, a discussion of the challenges that remained for the former NVA and the German Army after the selected former NVA were integrated as professionals or longer serving volunteers, and finally a look at some theoretical formulations based on the case studies in chapter 1 together with this study of the NVA Takeover. (All interviews were taped and are held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All referenced, unpublished government and military orders, letters, statements, briefings, and other documents are either original copies or photocopies held by the author. Ranks
Introduction
9
of East German and Soviet military have been converted to their U.S. military equivalents.)
NOTES 1. Literally, "from against each other to with each other." Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "sie miissen vom Gegeneinander zum Miteinander finden," "Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung," Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, 3 October 1990; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Die Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte," "Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik," October 1990, 12-14. 2. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992): 165. This point was also made in the author's discussion with a number of members of the German Military History Research Office, Freiburg, 5 November 1991. On the uniqueness of the mission, see also Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Landern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 15. 3. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/90,4. 4. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfugen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die Hinterlassenschaft der NVA," Truppenpraxis (1/1991): 19; von Scheven, "Merger," 164. The most common figure cited is 90,000. See, for example, von Scheven, "Merger," 164. LTG Jorg Schonbohm, the senior commander in the east for the Takeover, gave the figure 103,000. Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 46. For a comprehensive look at the entire spectrum of armed components of the GDR, see Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Rudiger Wenzke, eds., Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1998). 5. von Scheven, "Merger," 170; Horst-Dieter Buhrmeister, "Das Erbe: Eingliederung der NVA in die Bundeswehr," Wehrtechnik, 10/1991, 20. 6. President Richard von Weizacker used this same wording in his speech before the Commander's Conference in the east on April 29, 1991. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 222. 7. Ulrich Weisser, "Die Weichen sind gestellt: Rahmenbedingungen und Grundentscheidungen zur Bundeswehrgesamtplanung," Soldat und Technik, 3/1991, 159. 8. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), 53. 9. For such discussion see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 96-98, 135, 145, 174-175, 193, 196, 208, 247-248; Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 49-50; Thomas-Durell Young, Securing Eastern Germany and the Disposition of the Soviet Western Group of Forces (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 August 1991); Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 109-122. 10. For example, see Karl Feldmeyer, "Nun Mufi die Regierung entscheiden." Truppenpraxis (6/1994): 465; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weifibuch 1994 (Bonn, 1994), ix.
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1
Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory This chapter reflects a search for case studies comparable to the Takeover and, also, theoretical works on the amalgamations of armies, examining three nonGerman and one German case studies. In the first group are the Union and Confederate armies at the conclusion of the U.S. Civil War, the formation of the Italian Army during the Italian Unification of the 1860's, and finally the example of the French Army after the liberation of France in World War II. To conclude this section, the formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950's is also considered to lay a foundation for comparison to the Takeover of the NVA. THE POST-CIVIL WAR U.S. ARMY At least two significant factors are apparent in this case study. First, the United States faced no hostile international environment after the Civil War. Although there were voices within the United States who pushed for direct action against France's Maximilian in Mexico, no U.S. forces intervened. Aside from this, the U.S. Army was needed to meet the threat posed by the Indians and the tasks of occupation duty in the defeated South, neither of which appreciably affected the second important factor influencing policy on the Army: the intent of both the army volunteers as well as the Congress to demobilize rapidly and dramatically.1 This case study represents the "null" example of a potential amalgamation in which virtually no soldiers of the defeated army were taken over by the opposing army. After the surrender of Lee's Army in April 1865, the Confederate military was allowed to return home—something that represented the wish of most—under what they considered generous conditions negotiated between Generals Lee and Grant at Appomatox and subsequently endorsed by President
12
From Confrontation to Cooperation
Lincoln. They were treated as paroled prisoners and allowed to retain their horses, mules, and sidearms. Grant also made it clear that there would be no witch hunt: Each man was allowed to return home "not to be disturbed by the U.S. Authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside."2 Because of the French threat in Mexico, the challenge from the Indians, and the tasks involved with occupation duty in the south, the demobilization of the army was spread over 18 instead of three months, as initially conceived. On May 1, 1865, there were 1,034,064 volunteers in the Army; by November 15 about 800,000 had been mustered out. A year later only 11,043 volunteers remained in the service, belonging mostly to the Colored Troops who were by October 1867, practically all discharged. Against the desires of General Grant for an 80,000man Regular Army, Congress authorized in July, 1866, a strength of only 54,302. The actual strength reached about 57,000, the highest strength the Army had until 1898.3 THE ITALIAN ARMY DURING ITALIAN UNIFICATION An important difference in this case study in comparison to the first is the precarious international situation that the Italian states faced in the late 1860's as it was completing its unification. Italy had been dominated by primarily two major powers (France and Austria) and now after its unification joined these two, along with Great Britain and Russia, at the table of major European powers, with all the accompanying competition and rivalry. As Italy was achieving its own Unification, Prussia to its north was forging German unity at the expense of Austria, the erstwhile preeminent Germanic power, and France. The scramble for Africa was beginning, and the Ottoman Empire—its northern reaches only a short distance across the Adriatic—continued in its decline. In such an international environment, Italy did not have the luxury, as the United States did, of rapidly and dramatically demobilizing. Like Germany in this same period, Italy was a geographical expression and not a unified political entity, with its various states headed by petty princes loyal to Austria or France. The Unification of these states had been sought by Italian nationalists since the Congress of Vienna and had met repeated failure. Serious movement began with the assumption of power in 1849 of Victor Emmanuel II in the Kingdom of Sardinia and his appointment of Camillo Benso di Cavour as the Prime Minister, the conservative realist from a noble Piedmontese family. After laying the domestic groundwork and concluding an alliance with France, Cavour succeeded in 1859 in provoking Austria into war from which Sardinia obtained Lombardy. More importantly, the war heightened Italian nationalism and shook irrevocably the legitimacy of the non-Italian petty princes. As the Italian states of northern and central Italy rallied to join the Kingdom of Sardinia, their forces joined the Sardinian Army, the Armata Sardi, and were designated with successive numbers as if they formed a part of this army. Thus at
Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory
13
least a degree of military integration preceded the actual formal political integration of the states.4 Over the next two years, General Manfredo Fanti was placed in control of these forces in central Italy whose states were joining the Kingdom, including all the states of central Italy except those under papal control. The army division from Tuscany served as the heart of the force, a division that was ultimately led by Garibaldi, the fervent nationalist leader who envisioned a revolutionary republican Italian Army, something entirely different from Fanti's vision. At times, Fanti had to rely on veterans of the revolutions of 1848 who had questionable political and professional backgrounds. To improve the professionalism and competence of the officer corps, he established a six-month course for officers at a new military school in Modena.5 In addition to being commander of these forces, Fanti, in January 1860, became the War Minister in Cavour's new cabinet. Within months, the central Italian states achieved political union with Piedmont, and the Army of central Italy was integrated into the Sardinian Army. From its original five divisions, the Sardinian Army now consisted of thirteen divisions divided into five military commands, and Fanti began his program not simply to add units to the Sardinian Army, as he had previously, but rather to convert the force to a truly Italian Army (Escerito Italiano). He initiated the controversial process of forming brigades by mixing men from different regions, not only to make a more effective force but also to advance Italian unification (italianitd).6 Because of the lack of qualified officers, he took a step beyond establishing the officer's school in Modena: He made force structure changes reducing the number of larger units that lessened the need for senior officers.7 In October of 1860, after Cavour and Fanti had outmaneuvered Garibaldi's attempts to march north through Italy and rally forces and people to him, Fanti made it clear that Garibaldi's Southern Army was to be dissolved and that there would be only one Italian Army with the Sardinian Army serving as its core and model.8 This phase of the construction of the united Italian Army constitutes a good case for comparison with the Takeover of the NVA as it involves the Sardinian Army—by this time, much enlarged from its original size of five divisions by the addition of the forces of the Italian states which had joined Piedmont—taking over an army of fellow Italians with a different, if not alien, ideology. The Sardinian Army, with Fanti at its helm, was a regular army representing a conservative political ideology, while Garibaldi's Southern Army was a revolutionary, people's army of volunteers representing a republican creed. In contrast to the National People's Army of the GDR, however, the Southern Army was not the armed force of a legally constituted and recognized state. Fanti was opposed to Garibaldi's scheme of transforming his volunteers into five divisions of the Italian Army. In contrast, it was decided that his troops could choose to enlist in the Royal Sardinian Army for two years or return home with six month's pay. A commission of officers drawn from the Royal Army and Garibaldi's forces was established to decide the fate of 7,000 officers of the
14
From Confrontation to Cooperation
Southern Army, about 2,000 of whom proved satisfactory. This entire episode proved particularly galling to Garibaldi as the French Bourbon troops who had served under the King of Naples were encouraged to join the Italian Army, allowed to keep their rank, and treated better than Garibaldi's men.9 In the end, under Fanti's direction, the Italian Army, formally established in May 1861, consisted of seventeen divisions with one reserve cavalry division and embraced a quarter of a million men from all regions of Italy, serving in Fanti's mind as a vast melting pot where men came in as Lombards, Sicilians, or Tuscans, and left as true Italians.10 THE POST-WORLD WAR II FRENCH ARMY An important distinguishing factor in this case study is the ideological, political, and—at the general officer level—personal hatred generated by the different decisions made by individual French professional soldiers who all faced the dilemma of what to do after the dramatic Nazi military defeat of France in the spring of 1940. The Nazis first occupied the northern section of the country, allowing a French government to control the remainder of the country from Vichy with World War I hero Marshal Petain at its head. Eventually, after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, the Nazis took possession of the entire country. This case is a particularly complex one, first, because of the multiple groups into which the French Army separated after its defeat, groups that evolved as the war progressed and that viewed each other in some cases with suspicion, distrust, and arrogance. Second, there is disagreement among the sources on the specifics of the process of amalgamation that took place after the liberation began in June 1944 with the Allied landings.11 In the wake of the disastrous defeat of the French Army in June 1940, the fighting forces of France separated into several groupings, some on mainland France and others overseas in the United Kingdom or the French Empire. The forces on the mainland and in the colonies, including the 120,000 French Army of North Africa, which followed government orders and honored the armistice, constituted the Armistice Army. After the Allied landings in North Africa, the German forces occupied the remainder of France, controlled nominally until then by the Vichy government, and by its order of November 27, 1942, dissolved the Armistice Army.12 The Army Resistance Organization developed from these forces and was led by military leaders who had accepted the armistice but considered it invalid once the Germans occupied all of France.13 Brigadier General (BG) Charles de Gaulle initiated the Free French, the second major grouping, with his dramatic radio appeal from London on June 18, 1940, to French soldiers to join him in England. This act of disobedience against the legally constituted authority of France, for which de Gaulle was sentenced to death in absentia, tore the unity of the French military.14 At the outset, relatively few soldiers, a group of junior officers, and only seven senior officers (three general officers, one admiral, and three colonels) joined de Gaulle, totaling
Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory
15
about 7,000 by the end of July 1940. A year later, the Free French numbered 70,000 including 3,600 in the Navy.15 Beyond these two major groupings, there were some who chose to collaborate with the Germans and those who simply did nothing at all.16 Finally, there was a small group of French officers who accepted neither de Gaulle, leading the Free French, nor Marshal Petain, leading the Vichy government, but rather chose to form an air squadron in the Soviet Union and fight on the Russian front for the rest of the war.17 Concerning other military or paramilitary groups fighting the Germans, the combined Resistance forces (Forces Frangaises de Vlnterieur) were made up primarily of civilians who simply wished to see their country free, not of French military who might have defected from the Armistice Army. The Francs Tireurs and Partisans existed as part of the Resistance and comprised the military arm of the National Front, the French Communist organization.18 These groups are represented in the distribution of the 35,000 officers of the French Army after the outbreak of the war. At the French surrender in June 1940, there were 1,200 dead, 800 missing, and 10,000 POWs; 1,000 officers joined the Free French. The 22,000 officers remaining who served the Vichy government were split evenly, half on the mainland and the other half in the colonies in Africa and Madagascar. Of the 11,000 on the mainland, 4200 served in the Armistice Army, 2,500 in the civil corps, and 4,800 had armistice leave. After the Germans took over France's southern zone in November 1942, 4,000 officers joined the Resistance, 1,100 went to North Africa, 1,000 retired, and 5,000 did essentially nothing.19 By a decree of the Provisional French Government in September 1944, the Commission for the Purging and Reintegration of Military Personnel was established, composed entirely of officers. Of the 253 general officers whom the Commission reviewed only 40 were kept on active duty, with one being demoted to colonel. The rest, if not already sentenced to prison, were issued such sanctions as loss of pension or forced retirement. By the end of 1946, the Commission had examined 10,270 officers of all ranks, returning 6630 officers to duty, retiring 650, and dismissing 2,570. It also examined 6,160 files of former POWs and issued various sanctions in 173 cases.20 The postwar French Army was headed by General de Lattre de Tassigny who had been a member of the Armistice Army on the mainland and had fled to North Africa after it had been dissolved by the Germans in 1942.21 The core of the postwar Army came from the Armistice Army of North Africa, the First French Army of some 250,000 men, into which was incorporated the 137,000 men of the Resistance, demobilized as a fighting unit at the end of the war.22 Enlightening as this information is, especially the data on the results of the Purge and Reintegration Commission, it does not provide the degree of detail desired for this study; specifically, it does indicate what precisely distinguished the officers accepted from those not accepted into the postwar army. Although the sources explain what divided the groups, they do not explain the criteria used
16
From Confrontation to Cooperation
in the screening process. The sources do develop the biases and prejudices of these groups stemming from professional, social, and ideological differences that the different groups and organizations held toward each other: for example the tenuous relationship between the Free French and the French African Army,23 the opportunities lost between the Army Resistance Organization and the Resistance,24 and the mutual distrust between the Free French and Resistance.25 Additionally there was the distrust and prejudice that characterized the attitude of many officers in the national and service general staffs toward those officers on the Purge Commission.26 Beyond this, however, the specific "reintegration criteria" are not provided.27 Adding to this unclear picture is the disagreement among the sources in their overall assessment of the degree to which the purge and reintegration process served the interests of the Army and of France. For example, La Gorce is upbeat: the "old-established Army" was the base of the Army of the postwar Fourth Republic, the "amalgam bringing together all segments of the Army." In this way, the "continuity of military organization" was effected.28 Home in contrast states: "All the rancour and divisions that swept over France in the aftermath of war pervaded the Army too, causing new chasms within it."29 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR The discussion of the establishment of the Bundeswehr focuses on several areas that are particularly relevant to this study: the personnel selection process, the formulation of the concept of Innere Fuhrung, the approach adopted with regard to tradition in the German Army in light of German history, and finally a brief word about the uniform adopted.30 In contrast to the case study on Italy, the FRG emerged from a country that was decisively defeated and whose military was discredited for its alleged role in Nazi atrocities. The impetus for the reconstruction of its armed forces stemmed not so much from internal forces, as in the Italian case, but from foreign powers—especially the United States and the United Kingdom—who wished succor in the burgeoning Cold War with the Soviets. In the process of the establishment of the Bundeswehr, a Personnel Screening Board was formed in 1955 to review applications. Because of the number of applicants, a second complementary agency, the Acceptance Organization had to be established. While the Personnel Screening Board focused on applicants with the rank of colonel and general, the later organization handled all other applications.31 Criteria were established, some rather vague, for the selection of officers for the new army. Among the more significant were the following: The board was charged with considering what the applicant was at the time and what he was likely to become. The applicant had to have an appreciation of lasting values and a recognition of obsolete values and a recognition of German history when political considerations were set aside for purely military ones. Applicants with previous service had to show that their actions were "unobjectionable in terms of
Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory
17
military and human behavior." Former members of the Waffen-SS (Armed SS) in the rank of colonel or higher were excluded from consideration; the lower ranking Waffen-SS could be accepted only after a special investigation, including an appearance before a special screening board. Such an individual had to reject categorically all concepts of National Socialism and the Waffen-SS. One final requirement was added: The applicant had to make a statement on the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life.32 By the end of 1956, about 265,000 applicants had been received, about 235,000 of these were given consideration, 75,000 of which had no previous service. The screening boards reviewed about 170,000 applicants who were separated into the following categories: • 117,000 (53,000 without prior service): fit for service • 11,000 (600 without prior service): fit for service in an emergency • 42,000 (3,400 without prior service): unfit for service.33 There was no general prohibition against the enlistment of former members of the Waffen-SS as this would have been a violation of the guarantee of "equality before the law." There were 4,386 personnel with prior service in this organization who applied, including 1,475 officers. Only 1,072 (24 percent) were accepted for service, including a mere 45 officers (3 percent of the officers who applied).34 By the end of 1957, the Personnel Screening Board had reviewed 600 applications from colonels and general officers and had recommended 468 for acceptance, 14 for acceptance with reservations, and had not endorsed 53. 35 In light of the history of German civil-military relations, especially during the Weimar Republic, reflecting the involvement of the military in the politics of state and in the extreme of being a "state within a state," it was imperative for the founders of the Bundeswehr to formulate an entirely new concept of the soldier, one that would correct the abuses and tragedies of the past stemming from blind obedience and excessive Prussian militarism. This evolved into the set of principles and concepts under the overarching concept of Innere Fuhrung. The German soldier was no longer to be apart from but rather apart of society. His rights as a citizen were to be abridged only to the extent necessary to be effective as a soldier. He was to be a thinking, informed "citizen in uniform" (Staatsbilrger in Uniform) a phrase that grew to be the guiding image of the new German soldier. (This concept, which continues to be a vital element of the ethos of the Bundeswehr, is given fuller coverage elsewhere.) On the broad question of military tradition, the Bundeswehr began with a concept of tradition that had been under development since the initial confidential planning meeting in October 1950 and that carried on through the first half of that decade. By the time the initial personnel were being inducted into the Bundeswehr in 1955, the general policy in this area of what constituted a valid heritage for the German military was one of "let the Army grow its own tradition." This overall policy, endorsed by the Chief of Staff Adolf Heusinger, took a
18
From Confrontation to Cooperation
definitive stand neither in rejecting all past traditions nor in affirming positively what new traditions to adopt.36 Heusinger's concept was opposed by an alternate conception of tradition articulated by Wolf Count Baudissin, the chief staff officer for the inner psychological mood of the new military. Taking a more affirmative stance, his concept essentially rejected the traditions of the Wehrmacht and emphasized the role of traditional military ideals and values, refined in light of the past German abuses and the values of its current constitutional order such as a desire for peace, humanity, loyalty, a sense of moral responsibility for one's fellow man, the defensive nature of German forces, the imperative of due process of law, comradeship, truthfulness, and the limits of military obedience.37 This uneasy and dynamic struggle to reach a consensus on a clear conceptualization of a valid heritage for the Bundeswehr has continued from its founding through several iterations to the present, and will probably last at least until the professional soldiers of the Wehrmacht have passed away. As a final point, the uniform that the planners designed for the new force bore no resemblance to that of the Wehrmacht, again underlining in a very fundamental way the break with the past.38 If manned in part by members of the past German military, the Bundeswehr launched in 1955 was nonetheless in multiple ways without anchorage in past German military tradition, ethos and appearance. TOWARD SOME THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS From these case studies, a number of theoretical propositions can be drawn. First, the brief Civil War case study suggests that after a long and bloody war in which one side was attempting to cede from a union, with the losing side expressing no strong desire to continue in the service of the victorious army, and in. an environment with an insignificant external threat, the victorious side may simply reject the members of the opposing army, perhaps allowing them to keep their horses and sidearms as a sign of compassion and conciliation. Second, on a procedural level, all three of the other case studies contained the establishment of some type of screening board to make the selections of who continued to serve in the armed forces and who did not. In the Italian and French cases, virtually all the members of the boards were military officers while in the Bundeswehr case, in an atmosphere in which a closer union between soldier and society was sought, it was composed of both officers and civilians. No rigorous comparative analysis of the sets of selection criteria for continued military service is possible as insufficient information existed in two of the case studies. Third, General Fanti, the architect of the amalgamation of the Italian armies, was clearly driven by a desire for the armed forces to serve as a melting pot and thus as a force for Italian unity. In the French case the divisions within French society existing before the war or caused by the war were apparently reflected in
Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory
19
the process of shaping the postliberation army. Militaries tend to reflect the societies that they defend. Fourth, in the Bundeswehr case, the struggle to "select" the appropriate traditions from a discredited military past appeared to be more difficult and divisive than the selection of personnel to man the new force. A military faced with a dramatic change in the ideology of its state, in this case from a Nazi totalitarian regime to a constitutional democracy, will face an enormous challenge in identifying a valid heritage. These then are some factors and propositions that are to be kept in mind in this study's analysis of the Takeover of the NVA (Land Forces) by the Bundeswehr,an exercise to which this study will turn after it first considers th political and then the military setting in which the Takeover took place. NOTES 1. Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969), 281-282. 2. Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1991), 84. For a comprehensive discussion of pardon and amnesty during the War, see Jonathan Truman Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1953). For a comparably rigorous analysis of the role of the U.S. Army in the reconstruction of the South see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). 3. Matloff, American Military History, 282; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army Q&\oom\n&on\ Indiana University Press, 1984), 266-267. 4. John Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861-1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 58. 5. Ibid., 59. 6. Ibid., 60-61. Whittam pointed out that Fanti and others probably exaggerated the effect it had on Italian unity, but he failed to develop this point well. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 65. 9. Ibid., 66-67. 10. Ibid., 67. 11. Herbert R. Lottman's The Purge (New York: William Morrow, 1986) appears to be the most reliable because of his hard data and his access to sources for his study of 1986, sources that had been to that time classified. 12. John Steward Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (n.p.: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 76. 13. Paul-Marie de La Gorce, The French Army: A Military-Political History, trans. Kenneth Douglas (New York: George Braziller, 1963), 335. La Gorce concluded that active resistance by former Army cadres does not appear to have taken place on a large scale (p. 336). 14. Ambler, French Army, 65; La Gorce, French Army, 333. 15. Ambler, French Army, 65; La Gorce, French Army, 341-342. 16. Lottman, Purge, 205.
20
From Confrontation to Cooperation
17. Alistair Home, The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970 (New York: Peter Bedrick, 1984), 68-69. 18. La Gorce, French Army, 346-347, 349. 19. Lottman, Purge, 206. 20. Ibid., 207. Quoting French government documents, Ambler presented the following data: 658 army officers were purged and 12,679 were separated between 1945 and 1948; of the latter, 2,299 were released "as a result of the work of the purge commission." [The total purged appears to have been 2,957.] In the same years, 28 air officers and 50 navy officers were purged and 892 air officers and 808 navy officers were separated. Ambler, French Army, 89, fn 119. La Gorce stated that after the Liberation when officers who had remained in France had asked for reinstatement, 5,000 were excluded. La Gorce, French A rmy, 336. 21. Home, French Army, 71. 22. Ibid., La Gorce, French Army, 344, 347; Ambler, French Army, 82. Ambler states that the Armistice Army of North Africa was only 120,000. p. 82. 23. La Gorce, French Army, 342. 24. Ibid., 346-347; Ambler, French Army, 80. 25. Ambler, French Army, 79-80. 26. La Gorce, French Army, 348-350. 27. Home, for example, simply referred to the "arbitrary unfairness in the choice of who should be offered a career in the post-Liberation Army, and who rejected." French Army, 72. 28. La Gorce, French Army, 337. 29. Home, French Army, 72-73. 30. In addition to the works cited, for an overview of the establishment of the Bundeswehr see John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 56-75. For more in depth analysis, see Catherine M. Kelleher, "Fundamentals of German Security: The Creation of the Bundeswehr—Continuity and Change," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, Stephen F. Szabo, ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990). 31. Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 138. 32. Ibid., 140; Eric Waldman, The Goose Step Is Verboten: The German Army Today (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 52-57. 33. Waldman, Goose Step, 56. 34. Ibid., Goose Step, 57. 35. Abenheim, Iron Cross, 146. 36. Ibid., 139, 178-184. 37. Ibid., 148-162. 38. Ibid., 153.
2
The Political Setting Beginning in the early 1980's, I gave numerous lectures on the European political and military landscape. During the discussion period following these lectures, an often asked question dealt with the likelihood of German Unification. The answer, echoing the commonly held views of most observers of European affairs at the time, was always the same: "Not in my lifetime." In erring, I had some notable company. In the summer of 1989, Michael Howard, the noted British historian, indicated that East Germany would continue to remain detached from West Germany.1 In September 1989, Theo Sommer, the respected editor of Die Zeit, stated: "The stream of refugees moves the nation. The people demand an assertive reunification policy. But there is no way; the German question is not on the agenda right now!"2 Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Gerhard Herder, the East German Ambassador to Washington, replied in a similar vein to a question on Unification, "In my dreams, yes, but being a politician and standing with both my feet on the earth, I don't see a possibility in the foreseeable future."3 All such observers, analysts, and commentators were wrong. As Konrad Jarausch expressed it, "Within one year two competing states with different systems of government, opposing military alliances, contradictory economic systems, incompatible social structures, and conflicting ideologies merged into one."4 To set the stage for the analysis of the Takeover of the NVA by the Bundeswehr, this chapter presents the major events that led to the German Unification. The first section sketches the important events, people, and factors in the international political dimension followed by a discussion of the domestic political scenes of East and West Germany.5 Chapter 3 takes up the military dimension of the setting.
22
From Confrontation to Cooperation
THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DIMENSION There is general agreement that of all the factors that contributed to German Unification, the most significant was Mikhail Gorbachev and the domestic and foreign policy changes he initiated in the Soviet Union. Out of Pandora's box came glasnost and perestroika and out the window flew the Brezhnev Doctrine. In December 1988, Gorbachev announced "freedom of choice" for socialist states in his UN speech, as well as the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 soldiers from central and eastern Europe. This signaled clearly that the Soviet imperial center would no longer ensure the longevity of communist power in the imperial provinces of eastern Europe, East Germany the most crucial. And these regimes surely took notice—as did opposition forces—of the Soviets' acceptance of the first free elections in Poland in 1989.6 Erich Honecker's ossified regime, adept at protecting the GDR from insidious influences, moved to keep at bay heretical policies from the east. East Germany's chief ideologist, Kurt Hager, asked rhetorically in an interview with Stern magazine in April 1987, "Would you feel obliged to install new wallpaper just because your neighbor installed new wallpaper?"7 Elizabeth Pond argued that in the fall of that year came the final point where "top-down reforms might have preempted bottom-up revolution in East Germany." This was on the occasion of Honecker's September visit to West Germany during which he was accorded full honorary protocol, including the flying of the GDR flag and the playing of its anthem. Ignoring the admonitions and urgings of Herbert Wehner, an old comrade who had risen in the ranks of the Social Democrats in West Germany, Honecker returned to East Germany unconvinced about the need for reform. It was the beginning of the end.8 The forces of change unleashed by Gorbachev worked their mischief throughout eastern Europe. For four decades, a critical premise of Soviet foreign policy had been the need for ideological conformity both within the Soviet Union and throughout the satellite countries of eastern Europe. This premise now evaporated in the late 1980's and freed these states to gravitate toward the West economically and politically.9 After Gorbachev's policy changes that set the groundwork, the first critical event outside of the Germanys came in Hungary. Hoping to secure western support for its economic reforms and to highlight its own democratic progress, the Hungarians made the decision in August 1989 no longer to honor the 1969 mutual assistance treaty among communist states that required them to capture and return individuals seeking to flee their countries. On September 10, the border between Austria and Hungary was opened. A thousand Trabants (the common East German car) and 126 buses rushed to the border; the exodus had begun.10 An event as momentous as the Unification of Germany could not have occurred without bloodshed but for the extraordinary statecraft of unusually competent men. Karl Kaiser characterized the "constellation of leaders" as "truly exceptional men" who cooperated in "the most intensive phase of bilateral and
The Political Setting
23
multilateral diplomacy in European history."11 In his study of the diplomacy of the Unification, Stephen Szabo highlighted the work of eleven men who were the chief executives, foreign ministers, and aides of West Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Germans included Chancellor Helmut Kohl and advisor Horst Teltschik, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his aides, Frank Elbe and Dieter Kastrup. On the U.S. side were George Bush, James Baker, and aide Robert Zoellick, and on the Soviet side Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Schevardnadze, and aide Sergei Tarasenko.12 On the occasion of President Bush's visit to West Germany in May 1989, the United States had made the offer to Germany to be "partners in leadership."13 Witnessing in its Cold War partner the inchoate stages of a European superpower, the United States gave early and unwavering support to German Unification and mustered its diplomatic resources to secure the support of other states.14 With some hesitations and initial qualifications, both Britain and France came to endorse Germany's right to unify.15 The position of the Soviet Union on German Unification, perhaps the greatest challenge to Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era, evolved over the course of 1989 to 1990. No other actor besides the Soviet Union faced the dilemma of reconciling a retreat from the now untenable Cold War frontiers with the need for maintaining political and economic interests and salving domestic pressures and anxieties.16 During Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in October 1988, Gorbachev made it clear that a solution to the German problem was in the distant future. By the time Gorbachev visited Bonn in June 1989 after six months of negotiations, change was implied in the joint declaration that expressed "respect for the right of peoples to self-determination."17 With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the ever accelerating disintegration of the legitimacy of the East German Communist regime, Gorbachev felt comfortable during his meeting with President Mitterand on December 6, 1989, in stating that Germany had the right to unity and that this process had to be accommodated.18 A political breakthrough came on January 30, 1990, when East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow visited Moscow. At the press conference after the conclusion of the talks, Gorbachev announced to the press, "Among the Germans in East and West as well as the four power representatives, there is a certain agreement that German unification has never been doubted by anyone."19 When Kohl and Genscher visited Gorbachev on February 10 and 11, not only did he agree to unity but he also indicated the willingness of the Soviet Union to withdraw all its troops from central Europe depending on the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe and satisfactory arrangements for the stationing of troops in both parts of Germany.20 By the end of January, the United States had concluded that the GDR was disintegrating and that German Unification would indeed occur. Wrestling with the challenge of managing the external dimension of the process, aides within the Bush Administration drafted the plan that would become known as "2 + 4" (the two Germanys plus the Four Powers). It included the precondition that all parties
24
From Confrontation to Cooperation
would agree to German unity and among other things was viewed by the Administration as a "means of managing Soviet concerns."21 This was the plan to which the Four Powers agreed at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February.22 The 2 + 4 Talks got underway at the ministerial level in Bonn in May 1990. For the West the continued membership of Germany in NATO was a critical component of its negotiating position with the Soviets. Among the various arguments that the Unites States used was that the NATO framework would inhibit the renationalization of defense policies and that this was a better alternative than the nonaligned status of the interwar period. It was also clear that Germany's sovereign right to choose its alliance was at stake.23 The final breakthrough came at a meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in the Caucasus on July 15 and 16, 1990. The Soviets relinquished all remaining claims from World War II and any restrictions on German sovereignty, including Germany's right to choose its alliance. The Germans agreed that the Soviets would withdraw their 380,000 troops and 220,000 civilians from the GDR during a three-to-four year period and that they would compensate the Soviets for the introduction of the Deutsch Mark (DM) into the GDR, a sum that would amount to some 13.5 billion DM. Non-NATO German forces from the territorial army would be allowed in eastern Germany until the Soviet departure had been completed. Thereafter, German forces under NATO command could be deployed into the eastern sector but neither foreign troops nor nuclear weapons would ever be stationed there. Finally, the Bundeswehr would be reduced from its current size of 480,000 and limited to 370,000, including any additions from the NVA after Unification.24 The Gordian knot had been cut. After this historic meeting, the remaining events at the international level paled in significance. The final meetings of the 2 + 4 Talks took place in Paris on July 17 and in Moscow on September 12. At the final meeting, six states signed the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." The path was paved for German Unification. THE DOMESTIC-POLITICAL DIMENSION On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was constructed, evidence of the economic weakness and illegitimacy of the East German Communist regime. From this point to the time the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Guyla Horn, and the other Hungarian leaders had decided to open the border with Austria in September 1989, some 3.5 million registered refugees had fled from East Germany.25 By the time the Wall came down 27 years later, 408 people had died trying to cross it and the other parts of the inter-German border.26 The German population had grown more restless as the 1980's progressed, especially in the reform climate set by President Gorbachev. This restlessness exploded into a mass exodus when the Iron Curtain rusted through, first in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia. In June alone, about 12,500 East Germans arrived in West Germany, of which 2,000
The Political Setting
25
were illegal.27 Throughout the summer and fall, the initial trickle developed into a river of refugees. During 1989, upwards of 340,000 East Germans left East Germany (more than 2 percent of the population), confirming the widespread disenchantment. Cries from leftists like Christa Wolf to remain and find a "third way" (between the old Communist way and the capitalist way) went unheeded. In the streets of Leipzig and other cities, the revolution from below—the civic movement (Burgerbewegung)—began in September, energized by a small loose-knit opposition. Initially responding with force, the Communist party (SED) leadership and instruments of control (the Stasi, police and military) eventually became paralyzed by the size and peacefiilness of the demonstrations. Tensions grew high in Leipzig and East Berlin at the beginning of October on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the GDR as crowds were now swelling into the tens of thousands. This celebration included a visit by Mikhail Gorbachev. Instead of the normal pleasantries and compliments that he expected, Erich Honecker and the Politburo were exhorted by Gorbachev to make changes: "Life punishes those who come too late" (Wer zu spat kommt, den bestraft das Leben).2S The crowds in Leipzig grew larger and spawned demonstrations in other cities. In Leipzig, the crowd on October 9 was 70,000, on October 16, 110,000, on October 23, 225,000, and on October 30, 350,000. When the SED drafted a restrictive travel law in early November, 450,000 demonstrated on November 6 against the party's failure to provide foreign currency. Thousands called for the dismantling of the Wall and were joined by a new chant: "Germany, fatherland. Germany, fatherland."29 It was this outpouring of frustration with the old regime, the desire for easier travel, and the preparedness to state openly and for the most part peacefully that the emperor—the East German political and economic systems—simply had no clothes—were illegitimate and bankrupt—which forced Honecker to step down on October 17 after eighteen years of rule. He was replaced as General Secretary by Egon Krenz who during the next few weeks sought to convince the population that things would change. On the very next day he admitted to the economic problems such as "irregularity of production," the lack of technological innovation and "inefficiency of exporting." He rejected talk on reunification and maintained that "socialism on German soil is not up for grabs."30 Throughout the succeeding weeks, the successor regime faced the difficult dilemma of maintaining some sense of its socialist ideology and of party cohesion while responding genuinely to the democratic yearnings of the increasingly bolder population, whose expectations were on the rise. The leadership crisis deepened. On November 3, Krenz announced the replacement of a number of older party leaders including five from the Politburo. He outlined a new SED action program calling for political reform, truthful information, human rights, economic restructuring, and education reform.31 On November 9, the leadership decided to take a gamble and open the Berlin Wall. Konrad Jarausch characterized it as a "desperate bid to regain credi-
26
From Confrontation to Cooperation
bility."32 Some 5.2 million easterners visited the West in the first four days, 9 million in the first week, virtually all returning home to the east.33 Although the people were euphoric, the gambit failed to stabilize the social situation. Instead of easing the drive for emigration, it simply multiplied it. The opening of the Wall brought about a sea change in thinking about the future. Once so many easterners experienced the West, opinion in the last few weeks of November began to build for Unification. Most visitors to the West wanted only to satisfy their curiosity, buy a few bananas or a small appliance from the well-stocked stores, or embrace a lost relative. But it all proved too great. Overwhelmed, the poet Thomas Rosenlocher stated: "The GDR's only chance is to be swallowed up by this country."34 Meanwhile, in West Germany by November 20, 70 percent of the public opinion supported Unification whereas only 15 percent remained opposed.35 Coming only several weeks after the opening of Wall, Chancellor Kohl on November 28 announced his Ten-Point Plan for German Unification. The "emotional floodgates" of the easterners were opened. This plan provided a phased blueprint for achieving unity that respected the rights of the East Germans and addressed the concerns of the outside powers. It "turned unification from a topic of debate into a subject of practical politics." By early December, GDR public opinion had swung toward Unification.36 After these heady events of 1989, the events of 1990 rapidly became foregone conclusions. The SED, after a name change to SED-PDS in December 1989, faced a crisis of legitimacy in mid-January 1990. On February 5, Prime Minister Hans Modrow presented to the Volkskammer the new cabinet composed of thirteen different groups and parties. But even such actions were not able to salvage any genuine semblance of legitimacy for the old order. Jarausch summarized this: In the first two months of 1990, the East German state collapsed. . . . The bankruptcy of the planned economy . . . rendered attempts to democratize socialism pointless. . . . The struggle between reform Communists and civic opposition led to power sharing, but prevented the solution of mounting problems. Hence the effort to reform the GDR started losing the race to the rising sentiment in favor of union with the FRG. Economic collapse and political disarray changed the democratization movement into a stampede towards unity.37 In the parliamentary elections on March 18, 1990, the verdict for unity was clear. In an election where nine out often voters exercised their vote, the conservative Alliance for Germany gained more than 48 percent of the vote and 192 seats, the Social Democrats received 22 percent and 88 seats, the PDS (former SED) gained 16 percent and 66 seats. It was clear that the East Germans no longer wanted experimentation; they wished to embrace unity, wash away the years of frustration, and eliminate their status as second-class German citizens. The election capped the transformation of the civic movement into a national revolution.38
The Political Setting
27
After these elections, the next significant event was the economic union, which took place on July 1, 1990. Just as frustrated with the worthless GDR currency as with the corrupt political system, the people demanded the merger of the two economies. The East German economy was floundering and the treasury was bankrupt. The weekly exodus of up to 4,000 refugees—many young and skilled—had to be relieved. Politicians wagered that the introduction of the DM would establish "the economic precondition for growing together into a united Germany."39 On July 6, 1990 the first negotiating session began between the two Germanys on the Unification treaty. Interior Minister Wolfgang Schauble headed the western delegation, and Parliamentary State Secretary Gtinter Krause headed the eastern. Through several sets of sessions, the groups found common ground with remarkable ease and quickness.40 Abortion, property rights, and the Stasi legacy proved to be the final hurdles. The treaty, which grew to more than 1,000 pages in its final form, was signed on August 31 in the Crown Prince Palace in East Berlin. Schauble called it a "day of joy and confidence" that would bring unity in an orderly fashion. "We have created a solid and stable foundation for our community." Capping a process in the GDR characterized alternately as a policy "reversal" (Wende), an "implosion," and a popular "revolution," the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany at midnight, October 2, 1990.41 Unified through force in the nineteenth century, Germany was unified for the second time, this time without war. NOTES 1. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to GermanUnity(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. 2. Peter Neckermann, The Unification of Germany (Boulder: East European Mon graphs, 1991), fn 7, 89. 3. Walter Isaacson, "Is One Germany Better Than Two?" Time,20 November 1989, 23. By the 1970's, reunification had dropped in opinion polls as the "most important question" from more than 40 percent to 1 percent. Two-thirds of West Germans in the 1980's considered unification "impossible." Jarausch, German Unity, 202-203. 4. Jarausch, German Unity, 4. 5. The material for this chapter was based on the many interviews of West and East German officers and NCOs and supplemented by numerous written primary and secondary sources. The best book on the events of 1989-1990 leading up to the Unification is Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to GermanUnity(New York: Oxford University Pre 1994). For documents on the events leading to the Unification and the Unification itself, see Volker Gransow and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds., Die deutsche Vereinigung: Dokumente zu Burgerbewegung, Anndherung und Beitritt (Koln: Verlag Wissens und Politik Berend von Nottbeck, 1991). The best article on these events is Elizabeth Pond's "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR," International Security 15 (Fall, 1990): 35-66. The best book on the international aspects of the Unification is Stephen F. Szabo's The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). The best article on the Unification is Karl Kaiser's "Germany's Unifica-
28
From Confrontation to Cooperation
tion," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1990/91 70, 179-205. A brief overview of the entire postwar division of Germany and the process of unification is provided by the editor of the magazine Soldat und Technik, retired COL Gerhard Hubatschek in "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," Ein Staat—Fine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 12-29. 6. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 182-183. 7. "Jedes Land wahlt seine Losung," April 9, 1987, quoted in Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 40. For a short overview of the Soviet-East German relations in the postwar era, see Norman M. Naimark, Soviet-GDR Relations: An Historical Overview (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1989). 8. Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 35-36. 9. Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring 1990) 46. 10. Jarausch, German Unity, 15-16. Neckermann, Unification of Germany, 9. An interesting question is why the East Germans and not the Hungarians decided to flee. The answer evidently lies in the fact that the East Germans possessed "German" passports, whereas the Hungarians—or citizens from any other Communist state for that matter—did not. By the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, all Germans—both East and West—had German passports and therefore could live in whichever state they preferred. Ibid. 11. "German Unification . . . represents one of the greatest triumphs of leadership and diplomatic professionalism in the postwar period." Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 179. 12. Szabo, German Unification, 17. He maintained that France, the United Kingdom, East Germany, and Poland played supporting roles. The memoirs of Horst Teltschik, National Security Advisor to Chancellor Kohl from the opening of the Wall to Unification Day, are contained in 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991). 13. Christopher Daase and Michael Jochum, '"Partners in Leadership'? United Germany in the Eyes of the USA," Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (HI/1992): 237. 14. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 188-189. For overviews of the positions of all important parties, see also Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padgett, eds., Developments in German Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 16-17. 15. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 192-193. 16. Ibid., 191. 17. Ibid., 183. 18. Ibid., 191. 19. Quoted in Jarausch, German Unity, 108. 20. Szabo, German Unification, 62-63; Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 192. 21. Szabo, German Unification, 58-59. 22. Ibid., 64-65; Smith et al., German Politics, 15. 23. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 194-195. 24. Szabo, German Unification, 95-105; Kaiser, Germany's Unification, 196; "Gorbachev Agrees to United Germany in NATO," International Herald Tribune, 17 July 1990; John Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship," East European Quarterly 26 (January, 1993): 431-446. 25. Jarausch, German Unity, 8.
The Political Setting
29
26. Craig Whitney, "There's a Wall in the New Berlin; You Just Can't See It," New York Times, 13 November 1994, E5. 27. Jarausch, German Unity, 19. For a incisive, succinct discussion of the underlying problems of socialism written by a former NVA officer see Herbert Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA—vor und nach ihrer Ubernahme in die Bundeswehr," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 488. 28. Jarausch, German Unity, 53. See also Reiner Tetzner, Leipziger Ring (Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand, 1990). 29. Jarausch, German Unity, 46. For a discussion of the use of NVA units for riot control during this period, see Werner E. Ablass, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 19-21. A total of 179 Hundertschaften (riot control formations of 100 men) were on call from the beginning of October through November 11, mainly in Dresden, Leipzig, and East Berlin. Aside from some minor action in Dresden, they were not employed against East German civilians. See also Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—Eindrucke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fur Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 208-209, 216-218. Koop argued that a "bloodbath" was prevented by local commanders on the scene and not by any wisdom from higher leaders. 30. Jarausch, German Unity, 59 31. Ibid., 61 32. Ibid., 62. 33. Ibid., 62, 65. 34. Ibid., 65-66. 35. Ibid., 66. Elizabeth Pond maintained: "By midnight of November 9, political unification was inevitable." "A Wall Destroyed," 49. 36. Jarausch, German Unity, 69-70. 37. Ibid., 112. 38. Ibid., 127, 128, 134. 39. Ibid., 137. 40. Schauble provided description and analysis not only of the treaty negotiations but also of the entire revolution in East Germany and events leading to the Unification in his book, Der Vertrag: Wie ich uber die deutsche Einheit verhandelte (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1991). 41. Jarausch, German Unity, 6, 70-72.
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3
The Military Setting With the political setting established, this chapter presents the military setting by offering an overview of the National People's Army (NVA) in the period preceding the Unification, including its mission, size, structure, readiness, and relationship to the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED) and the civilian population.1 The second section of the chapter offers a similar overview of the Bundeswehr and German Army. OVERVIEW OF THE NVA Mission The mission of the NVA was stated at the outset of its Basic Military Handbook. The military class mission of the National People's Army, shoulder to shoulder in close military brotherhood with the glorious Soviet army and the other fraternal socialistic armies, consists of: • to guard reliably the socialistic order and the free life of the citizens of the German Democratic Republic and all states of the socialistic community against all attacks from aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction • to guarantee the inviolability of the state's borders, territory, airspace and territorial waters of the German Democratic Republic as well as the protection of its continental base • to be constantly ready and able to defend against imperialistic aggression and to defeat the opponent decisively through great battle strength and a The basis of this mission was found in the Basic Law of the GDR, Articles 7 and 23, which stated that the NVA guarded the socialistic achievements of the
32
From Confrontation to Cooperation
people against all attacks and that the protection of peace and the achievements of the socialistic Fatherland was the proper obligation of the citizens of the GDR.3 Proud indeed were the professional cadres of this Army, proud of their frontline position guarding the frontiers of socialism and proud of their state, clearly a leading one in the socialist bloc in terms of economic performance. In May 1990, as Unification approached, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, the new chief of the NVA, explained at a meeting between eastern and western German defense officials: "The Warsaw Pact belongs to the security structures which have formed in Europe. It stands for peace and security in Europe. That is, the NVA had a firm place in these structures and can be proud that we have made a great contribution to the maintenance of peace."4 Organization Established in 1956, the NVA consisted of an Army, Air Force, and Navy with a peacetime strength of 170,000 service personnel and 47,000 civilian employees (wartime strength: 350,000). Perhaps the best military of the Warsaw Pact next to the Soviets, its draftees served for 18 months. The land forces (Landstreitkrafte) had their headquarters in Potsdam outside of Berlin and consisted of six active divisions (two armored and four motorized rifle) and five reserve divisions that would conduct yearly mobilization exercises. All the divisions were subordinate to two military districts—District 3 in Leipzig and District 5 in Neubrandenburg—which had dual responsibility for field as well as territorial units.5 (See Figure 3.1.) Before the revolution of 1989 had begun, the GDR had decided on a number of disarmament measures, and so had adjusted its force structure. The changes included a reduction in strength by 10,000 men, the deactivation of six tank regiments and one fighter squadron, and the decommissioning of 600 tanks, 50 attack helicopters, and 50 combat aircraft.6 The Character of the NVA The NVA was closely patterned after the Soviet military, including its conceptual foundations, training exercises, and principles for political, military, and moral education. Until 1949 the NVA had patterned its training on the regulations of the German Army in World War II (Wehrmacht). Thereafter, its training was based on Soviet training regulations that were obtained from the Soviets, translated, and implemented. By the end of the 1970's, the East Germans were less prone to accept all things Soviet and began to formulate more of their own concepts. At division and higher levels were Soviet generals who served as advisors (Berater) or specialists (Spezialisten), technically without any command authority but nevertheless exerting a major controlling influence.7 They communicated their desires through the established liaison net or requested that the appropriate NVA commanders visit them. They had two primary roles. First,
The Military Setting
33
Figure 3.1 Organization of the National People's Army (Land Forces)
Source: Chart provided by Army Staff, Division IV; also Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army, trans. Deryck Viney, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980, 116, 119.
they ensured that the NVA operated according to Soviet doctrine and was able to accomplish its military tasks. Second, they monitored the political reliability and loyalty of the units to the Warsaw Pact.8 There were few combined exercises between the two militaries and, although on appropriate holidays there were lofty acclamations of socialist fraternity, in fact the relationship in general was not a close one of respect and mutual admiration. BG (Ret.) Loffler, a former NVA division commander, said that the NVA tried to be very diplomatic and obliging (kulant) about the relationship; however, they simply did need the Soviets.9 Beyond the relationship of the two armies, the East German population has been characterized as viewing the Soviet military simply as an occupation army.10 Readiness rates were exceptionally high: 75 to 85 percent of the personnel were on hand in the units or could be present on very short notice in case of an alarm.11 The rationale for this included being prepared to attack; being prepared to defend against an attack from the West, which could come at any-time; and in
34
From Confrontation to Cooperation
case of crisis being able to isolate 85 percent of the personnel from enemy propaganda.12 Former NVA LTG BaarB indicated that he had lived in a situation in which there was no day—even Sundays and holidays—during which he was not available. When he was actually in the garrison, he had to be prepared to be at his place of command within 20 minutes.13 Former NVA BG Loffler stated that the readiness rates were much too high. Certainly, after the mid-1970's with all the international agreements, it should have been lowered at least to 50 percent.14 Personnel readiness rates were matched by comparably high equipment readiness rates. About one third of the equipment was used for training purposes. The remainder was uploaded with ammunition and ready to go to war at short notice. BG (Ret.) Bormann indicated that units had about 50 minutes in the summer to leave the garrison.15 Captain (CPT) Horst Reddemann, former NVA commander of the Eighteenth Motorized Rifle Regiment, stated that twenty minutes after an alert was called all six of his battalions had exited the garrison through six different gates. After sixty minutes, the kaserne was empty and the entire regiment was on the march, equipped with eight days of ammunition and supplies for twelve days.16 Life in the NVA was not easy; the hours were much longer than in the Bundeswehr. Normally beginning with athletics, the usual workday stretched from 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. The day might extend as late as 8:00 P.M. if political indoctrination training was held after dinner. Saturday duty generally ran from 6:00 or 7:00 A.M. to noon.17 Discipline was strict; could be dispensed arbitrarily by commanders; and included pay decrements, personal restrictions, reduction in rank, and ultimately arrest. The basis of disciplinary action could be ludicrous compared to Western standards. For example, an officer was disciplined for towing a West German civilian who had had an accident in Czechoslovakia. An individual might also be disciplined for not showing enough class-consciousness and knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, or for forming individual opinions and not submitting his will sufficiently to that of "the Collective."18 Beyond this was the informal EK (Entlassungskandidat) system in which older conscripts harassed younger ones who were forced to do such things as clean rooms with razor blades, play games with chemical protective clothing on, and clean weapons all night long.19 The NVA was a military machine oriented strictly to operational effectiveness on the battlefield at the expense of human beings. Little effort was made to provide decent living conditions or equipment considered minimally safe by Western standards.20 BG (Ret.) Bormann expressed that "naturally combat readiness stood above all else. Combat readiness was the measure of things. . . . Next to loyalty to the SED [Communist Party] this question of combat readiness was the second factor which determined all." He admitted that the requirements were entirely too exaggerated, but these were orders and orders had to be obeyed. The tremendously high readiness rates and alert postures were made
The Military Setting
35
possible because the entire training system and the staffs were "entirely fixed on the objective without regard to human beings."21 Beyond readiness rates, other measures show how imbued the NVA was with a war mentality. Various sets of medals for bravery in combat as well as field marshal epaulets for Communist Party Chief Honecker, Stasi Chief Mielke, and the Defense Minister had already been produced and stored. Materials for the building of eighty to one hundred kilometers of railroad track, hundreds of traffic signs, five hundred aluminum containers, thousands of beds, hammers, and shovels had been produced and stored at depots.22 The costs and impact on human beings of these inordinately high readiness rates and war fixation was clear, but—BG (Ret.) Bormann and others maintained—the NVA was a very well-drilled and well-trained force.23 A dramatically visible cost of this fixation on combat readiness was the deficient living conditions under which the common NVA soldier lived. The soldiers lived in eight- to ten-man rooms, each soldier having a small wardrobe and a stool (without back). Generally, there was only cold water in the wash rooms, and there were no functioning showers. In the 1970's, "shower houses" were built containing fifty to seventy showers, that could be used if the units requested well enough in advance so that sufficient warm water could be generated, something that could not always be counted on especially in cold winters. Kitchen facilities were miserably filthy, and after a meal, soldiers washed their own plates without hot water or cleansing materials. These living conditions for the common NVA soldiers, gravely deficient by Western standards, stood in stark contrast to the excellent conditions under which the NVA combat equipment and systems were kept and maintained.24 BG Dieter Farwick, Chief of Intelligence for the Bundeswehr, indicated that "the tank stood in a heated hall, the soldier slept in a cold bedroom."25 Werner AblaB, State Secretary in Ministry for Disarmament and Defense during the last phase of existence for the GDR, pointed out the irony in the fact that the NVA gave more human dignity to pieces of equipment than to human beings.26 The active duty component of the NVA was extremely top heavy. The ratio of enlisted to officer was approximately three to one, compared to twelve to one in the Bundeswehr. Personnel management was very decentralized—much more was being done at the division level compared to the Bundeswehr. Officers were promoted earlier than their Bundeswehr contemporaries and given only narrow latitude in their career paths. Officer education was highly specialized, and individual officers marked for senior command were sent to the Command and General Staff College in Moscow.27 Approximately one fifth of the training time in the officer's basic course (Hochschule) was devoted to socialistic, ideological training.28 Finally, the duration of officer assignments could be much longer than in the Bundeswehr.29 There existed in the NVA no genuine NCO corps comparable to that in the Bundeswehr. A soldier would become an NCO generally because he was interested in obtaining some education or a good training location, something a sol-
36
From Confrontation to Cooperation
dier could attain only if he was an NCO for three years. If a soldier really wanted to make the military a career, he would try to become a Fahnrich or an officer. Failing this, he might settle for a position as an NCO. 30 Just about all young men served in the NVA for an eighteenth-month term, with only a very few claiming conscientious-objector status.31 This time in the military served as a rite of passage for East German young men and subsequently was a common bond among them. The mentality existed that if a man had not served, then he was not really a man. As youths, boys learned from school and state propaganda what was expected of them: protection of the freedom of the GDR, of the political system, and of the world. These visions of military service were quite idealistic and inflated; however, life in actual service as a soldier could be remarkably tedious.32 Part of the socialization process of the NVA soldier consisted of the nurturing of a hate mentality toward the West (Erziehung zum Hafi). Every soldier was provided the small book, "On the Sense of Being a Soldier" (Vom Sinn des Soldatseins). This book instructed soldiers to hate all those who would threaten their lives. "We hate imperialism, because it threatens the existence of humanity, of our life, and the happiness and future of our children. As soldiers we oppose this mortal enemy of humanity directly at the dividing line of the two social systems." Describing the tremendous NATO forces massed in West Germany against them, the book continued by saying that these forces were raised in the anti-Communist spirit to be unscrupulous and brutal and were prepared for the unconditional battle with socialism.33 In some units, this indoctrination extended to "stress" and "enemy image" cells (Psycho-Kabinett) constructed by political officers for "political and psychological preparation" for war, including flashing lights, combat sounds, realistic battle scenes, and images of the enemy.34 Although West German soldiers struggled with the thought of having to fight fellow Germans if war came, the NVA apparently had no such qualms. They were German in the west and spoke the same language; however, they were still not viewed as a common people.35 A fundamental difference between the two armies existed in the method of leadership in executing a mission or task. The Bundeswehr used mission-type or goal-oriented principles (Auftragstaktik), whereas the NVA used highly directed principles (Befehlstaktik). In brief—as is covered in more detail later in this chapter—the former involves setting the goal and allowing the subordinate to decide on the specific methods and tactics to be used to attain the goal. In the NVA, not only was the goal—the what—given, but also the how, with few if any deviations permitted.36 A former NVA officer pointed out that the goal of both training systems was the same: the combat readiness of the soldier. In the Bundeswehr, the mission was given; one then had to decide the how. In the NVA, all direction came from above.37 Because of this difference in leadership style, the NVA lacked to a large degree the ability to think freely and imaginatively. BG Andreas Wittenberg, who took over one of the NVA divisions at unification, indicated that NVA leaders
The Military Setting
37
lacked the capability to compare and weigh different possibilities and to formulate their own opinions. "They believed all that came from above was correct." The NVA had difficulty, for example, in reading conflicting opinion pieces in the west as Unification approached. They were unable to analyze and evaluate on their own. "Intellectually they were always afloat (am schwimmen)."3^ The possibilities for the formation of their own opinions were constrained by the Communist system. Many officers simply submitted themselves to this system and engaged in a kind of selfcensorship.39 Relationship to the East German Communist Party (SED) First above all, the NVA was a military that served the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED). Approximately 95 percent of all officers and 50 percent of all NCOs were party members.40 The party sought the membership of not only those in leadership positions but all longer serving and professional soldiers serving longer than three years.41 Membership at first might be of a rather passive nature; however, an important step came when the individual officer became accustomed to the omnipresence and power of the party. Because party work took place directly in the units and because just about every officer was a party member, there was no clear division between duty and party, something that deepened "party consciousness." Although party work in a very literal sense was important, for the most part individuals excelled in "party work" through exemplary performance of duty.42 Like the Soviet system, the military was infused with "political" officers dedicated to ensuring that the party maintained control. Figure 3.2 indicates the presence of these officers at the various levels of command. This entire political infrastructure was responsible for the implementation of SED policy and the "political-moral" education of the NVA personnel—from general down to the individual soldier. In each unit down to the companies with more than one hundred fifty men, there existed a deputy commander (Stellvertreter) responsible for political affairs, who had essentially the same military qualifications as his contemporaries.43 Major General (MG) Ekkehard Richter, who took over theThird NVA Military District in Leipzig at Unification, indicated that in the Bundeswehr there is a "qualified order," whereas in the NVA "you had to obey your commander—period!"—because of belonging to the Communist Party, and the Communist Party did not make any mistakes.44 Former NVA officers in Neubrandenburg recognized the benefit of being a member of an army in a democracy. When asked what they liked about the Bundeswehr, they responded that in addition to having the party, they also had a constitution.45 The individual officer saw the NVA's mission as legitimate and the state as the genuine alternative to the imperialistic FRG. The GDR was the part of Germany in which the true ideals of humanity would be realized. In their oath of allegiance, the NVA swore not to the SED (East German Communist Party) but to
38
From Confrontation to Cooperation
the Fatherland. It was fully accepted, however, that the SED stood behind the "class" mission of the NVA and took on itself the role of defending the interests of the working people. The SED's leadership role was seen as necessary and unFigure 3.2 Control of the NVA by the Socialist Unity Party (SED)
Source: ZentrumfiirInnere Fuhrung derstood; NVA officers were proud to be a part of it.46 For many individuals in the free democratic West, it is inconceivable that human beings would live under a totalitarian regime, as in the GDR, without taking some type of action or at least being conscious of the deception and injustice. West Germans commonly asked of East Germans: "But you must have known? How could you go along with it for so long?"47 A comprehensive answer concerning why the typical East German or the typical NVA officer did not is difficult to formulate; however, several factors contributed: the fear of repercussions if some type of provocative action were taken, the desire to protect one's advantages and position in the system, and the counterpressure against subversive action because of one's upbringing in the system.48 The typical NVA officer believed that in the battle between the two political, economic, and social systems, the GDR was on the right side, the side that would ultimately prevail. He normally supported this cause more through his deeds—superior duty performance—rather than the politically correct words. It
The Military Setting
39
was felt that the party and government leaders had the state on the correct economic track. There were indeed hard times and burdens to bear; however, these were necessary and justified given the young, still immature state of socialism. Until the revolution of 1989, the average NVA officer hardly knew that the system was so deficient in civil rights and due process of law.49 One is reminded of Plato's Allegory of the Cave: One cannot miss what one has never experienced. Role in the Economy and Relationship to the Civilian Population As the economy of the GDR deteriorated throughout the 1980's, the NVA was directed to provide personnel—normally battalion-size units—to assist in such areas as coal-mining, chemical production, railroad and traffic operations, and heavy industry, and forced to sleep at times in schools or sports facilities. In some of these areas, civilians had refused to work because of the danger. Officers who tried to receive extra pay for this work were punished. A remarkably high number of military personnel (55,000) was estimated to be performing such work after 1988, and despite the strain this placed on units, the 85 percent alert requirement remained in force.50 The NVA was not well liked by the general population, who perceived the Army as a segment of the SED's security and control structure and as a privileged, arrogant group.51 So estranged from the people it was sworn to defend, the NVA was characterized by some as a "state within a state."52 Land for garrisons or training areas was simply expropriated with only little compensation for the actual owners. The isolated nature of the living areas of the NVA officers added to the distance between these two segments of East German society and nurtured suspicions and prejudices of the population.53 Former NVA officer Herbert Konig stated that despite the proclaimed inseparable unity of the Army and people, the reality was something else. Over the course of time a gap had arisen that the NVA could not really explain. Nonetheless, NVA professional soldiers still believed they were there for their state and people, although often embittered because of the unjust criticism. He attributed this bad relationship between the NVA and the people to several factors: the secretive and closed nature of the NVA establishment and its continued isolation throughout its existence, the ideological nature of its traditions, and most important its close connection with the SED, which thoroughly penetrated it and exacted such a heavy toll on its members, many of whom returned to the civilian sector and brought these negative perceptions with them.54 West Germans were quick to characterize the feeling of East Germans toward the NVA as one of "hate," whereas East Germans used much less dramatic words and made important qualifications to their statements.55 Commander Wichert (former NVA) explained that it was called "People's Army," but over time its affinity to the people kept decreasing. Military service was perceived as decreasing in importance, and the NVA became increasingly
40
From Confrontation to Cooperation
isolated.56 Several former NVA officers in Dresden explained that the NVA suffered in its image because it failed to explain well enough to the population both its role and how hard it worked.57 Civilians from East Germany maintained that "hate" was too strong a word to describe their feelings toward the NVA; "anger" was more apt. One civilian described the feeling as one of indifference. Several factors alleviated the negative image. First, NVA units were confined to certain areas, rather isolated from the general population. Second, everyone had to serve in the NVA, so it was important to draw a distinction between the general population's view of the professional soldier and the draftee, the latter of whom were not held in any negative light.58
OVERVIEW OF THE BUNDESWEHR This study now turns to the West German side to present a brief description of its founding and an overview of its status in the last half of the 1980's, including its mission, force structure, the changing security environment it faced, and ending with issues on which it was focusing as the fateful events of the summer and fall of 1989 approached. Establishment Postwar West German rearmament took place in the context of a sharpening of the Cold War between the NATO allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its puppet regimes of eastern Europe, on the other. The latter bloc formed the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 in response to the western call during the same month for German rearmament and ultimately its entrance into NATO. The initial planning for the West German armed forces began in 1950 under the newly appointed Federal Commissioner of Security, Theodor Blank, who assembled a small group of former officers and civil servants into the Federal Security Office, Dienststelle Blank, with a view toward shaping a German contribution to the European Defense Community, a vision that evaporated in 1954 with the rejection of the Community by the French National Assembly. The concept then shifted to organizing forces that would serve under the NATO integrated military command.59 The role that the Prussian and German militaries had played in the state for centuries, but most importantly in the twentieth century, presented the creators of the Bundeswehr with three formidable challenges which Catherine Kelleher explained "reflected the contradictory goals and contradictory requirements of every German security system since perhaps 1648."60 The first challenge, elementary and common to all militaries, was that of military security, protecting German people and land from outside intrusion. The second was international security, that is, the protection of other states from the past excesses of German security policy, certainly not the main but indeed one of the reasons for the
The Military Setting
41
founding of the NATO alliance. The final challenge was civic security—the protection of German society from the past excesses of the German military and vice versa.61 After much domestic and international debate in the first several years of the decade, the first legal step toward the creation of the Bundeswehr was taken by the FRG in February 1954 with the first military amendment to the Basic Law (German Constitution). Over the next three years, numerous pieces of legislation were passed to provide the legal basis for the Bundeswehr and to shape its character and structure, including the Volunteers' Law, Law Concerning Suitability, Soldiers' Law, and the Universal Compulsory Military Service Law, among others. 62 Article 87a, allowing for "the buildup of Armed forces for defence purposes" and clarifying that they "may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law," was added to the Basic Law on March 19, 1956.63 The initial 101 soldiers of the Bundeswehr were inducted on October 10, 1955, by Federal President Theodor Heuss and included two generals, eighteen lieutenant colonels, thirty majors, forty captains, fifteen first lieutenants, one master sergeant, and five staff sergeants. The first training company was organized on January 1, 1956, and on January 20, a day considered the Bundeswehr'* birthday, Chancellor Adenauer greeted the first 1,500 volunteers and called them in union with Germany's allies to ensure the peace: "The single goal of German rearmament is to contribute to the maintenance of peace."64 That very same year, German officers were assigned to NATO offices, assuming important positions in the integrated command staffs.65 From its inception, the German Army, the land forces component of the Bundeswehr, envisioned a target force structure of twelve divisions, initially to be integrated into the military structure of the European Defense Community (EDC) and, after its failure, into the integrated military structure of the NATO. 66 Organizationally, the military planners initially faced the challenge of establishing conditions that would allow for the induction of the first draftees on April 1, 1957. Therefore, the first military organizations were instructional battalions, officer schools, and the Army Academy, forerunner of the Bundeswehr'* Command and General Staff Academy in Hamburg. From its initial strength of about 1,000 men in January 1956, it grew within one year to 55,000; 100,000 in 1958; 159,000 in 1960; and 252,000 in 1962.67 By 1965, the activation and outfitting of the twelve German divisions were complete and the units were assigned to the NATO.68 Before addressing the mission and force structure of the Bundeswehr and German Army, it is important to develop two core concepts in the military culture of the Bundeswehr. The first, Innere Fuhrung, was developed in the postwar period, whereas the second, Auftragstaktik, has its roots much deeper in German military history.
42
From Confrontation to Cooperation Innere Fuhrung
The first core concept that must be addressed to understand present German military culture, one that played a key role in the Takeover, is Innere Fuhrung, a concept that eludes precise definition in English. In his major study of tradition within the Bundeswehr after World War II, Donald Abenheim explained that it has been called "inner command," "inner leadership," "moral leadership," and "civic education."69 He chose not to define it but rather to describe it as "military leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen."70 The concept of Innere Fuhrung was developed in response to the excesses of militarism in German history, especially its involvement in the politics of the Weimar Republic and its role in Nazi Germany. The passing of the Basic Law in 1949 ushered in an entirely different system of values than those that had existed from 1933 to 1945. Supreme among these was the dignity of the individual, to be respected and guarded with the full power of the state. In this respect, it drew on a key idea of the great Prussian military reformers of the early nineteenth century who, in their drive to modernize the Army so that it might successfully confront Napoleon's, believed likewise in the individual dignity of the soldier. With the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955, it was recognized that a break with the past military tradition was necessary and that the new military had to correspond to the new parliamentary democracy of the FRG. The guiding image of the soldier became the "citizen in uniform," who was now to experience the very rights he was sworn to defend.71 The foundation of Innere Fuhrung is closely connected to key elements of the free democratic state of Germany. The first is the image of the human being as put forth in the Basic Law, encompassing the personal worth and dignity of the individual, unique and never to be renounced, capable of freedom and responsibility to himself and to society, and capable of shaping himself and his environment freely and responsibly. Two other key elements are, first, the premise that all the power of the state flows from rights and laws and, second, the existence of a pluralistic German society. The foundation itself of the concept comprises the system of values as expressed in the Basic Law, the incorporation of the Bundeswehr in the FRG, a state governed by law, and the position of the Bundeswehr in German society.72 The concept is implemented throughout the Bundeswehr by two means: (a) the laws governing the Bundeswehr such as Soldiers' Act, the military disciplinary code, and the procedures for registering complaints; and (b) a number of key leadership and conduct principles. These principles are to characterize the daily life of the soldier in peace, crisis, and war. In all areas, the model of the "citizen in uniform," combining personal freedom with responsible citizenship and operational readiness as a soldier, is to prevail. The key principles include the capability to perform despite the tension existing between individual interests and the exigencies of the military, the recognition of the need for the
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43
Bundeswehr and willingness to contribute to its mission on the soldier's own volition, the generation and maintenance of a climate of trust and camaraderie that serves as a basis for the operational readiness of the armed forces, the opportunity to exert maximum individual initiative for the accomplishment of the mission (related to Auftragstaktik), and the recognition of the need for open and continuous information exchange within the military and between the military and the civilian sector.73 Innere Fuhrung then is a key trademark of the Bundeswehr, something that distinguishes it from all past German militaries. It attempts to address the tension that exists between the needs, rights, and safety of the individual and the imperatives of a military force. The Bundeswehr maintains that this tension can be effectively addressed when both superior and subordinate operate under the same principles within this concept. The Bundeswehr thus asks not for the soldier's blind obedience, something connected with the excesses of the past, but rather his critically minded obedience.74 Auftragstaktik The second major concept that is necessary in order to understand the Bundeswehr and that played an important role in the Takeover is Auftragstaktik. Simply translated, this means "mission tactics," but it has also been translated as "mission orders,"75 and "mission-oriented command system."76 It has been called "an artificial, after-the-fact construct whose meaning has never been defined with any precision,"77 and conversely, a "clearly defined doctrine understandable to and understood by all officers in the [German] Army."78 There is no question that the concept in its present understanding developed over many years of German military history; however, like the differences on its precise meaning, there is no agreement on its beginnings. One author stated that it began to take shape in the final decades of the 19th Century during the German military's assessment of the Wars of German Unification,79 whereas another author maintained its roots stretch back to the eighteenth century Prussian king, Frederick the Great.80 Although its elements were long in developing, the actual term only came into use after World War II.81 The term, Auftragstaktik, can be viewed on at least two levels: a tactical level and a more general level. On a purely tactical level, the concept has several important elements. First, the combat mission issued must express clearly the intent of the commander. Second, the objective, course of action, and constraints must also be clear, restricting as little as possible the subordinate's freedom of action. Third, the limits on the methods of execution are held to a minimum.82 More generally, it has a number of important elements. First, there is great emphasis placed on the subordinate's freedom of action and the direct relationship of this with initiative, all tempered with good judgment honed ideally by training, experience, and the guiding influence of the superior commander. The officer is expected not only to exert initiative; it is in fact his duty. The emphasis,
44
From Confrontation to Cooperation
therefore, is that the subordinate is told what to do and not how to do it.83 The officer is expected also to exhibit a capacity to think independently and to be prepared to assume risks.84 Second, there is great emphasis placed on the integrity and judgment of the individual leader on the scene in a presumably fastmoving, ever-changing situation. He is presumed best able to evaluate the situation, with the commander's intent in mind, and decide on the best course of action, even disobeying orders if the situation warrants it. The legendary story on this point relates an exchange around 1860 between Prince Frederick Charles and a major who had committed a tactical error. Upbraided by the prince, the officer reminded the prince that he had been taught that an order from a superior was to be treated as an order from the king. The prince responded: "His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders."85 Third, great emphasis is placed on senior-subordinate relationships. Commanders are charged with nurturing their subordinates, serving as mentors, and developing in them good leadership qualities, a capability to think on their feet, and to formulate a good, if not perfect, plan of action quickly and to execute it aggressively. Over time, then, the optimal result is anticipated: They come to understand how each other thinks, vitally important if the subordinate is to understand the commander's intent amidst the fog of war.86 The Bundeswehr continues to use this concept in the late 1990's, although at times an alternate phrase is used, "mission-type orders" or "leading by mission"(Fuhren mit Auftrag)P Auftragstaktik, in its most sophisticated, comprehensive sense, is more than simply a method of issuing orders. It was and continues to be, as Nelsen argued, "an extraordinarily broad concept, holistically embracing aspects of what today would be called a theory of the nature of war, character and leadership traits, tactics, command and control, senior-subordinate relationships, and training and education."88
Mission of the Bundeswehr The White Paper 1985 published by the MOD, the last White Paper to be published until 1994, coupled with other sources is helpful in gaining a sense of the mission, structure and status of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1980's. The mission of the Bundeswehr is drawn from and controlled by Article 87a of the Basic Law. Together with the other instruments of the state and society, it is charged with guaranteeing the security of the FRG, maintaining its political freedom of action and defending with NATO the basic free order of the state against every attack. Beyond this, and in accordance with the Basic Law, it can also be employed in case of domestic emergency or catastrophe. It is the military instrument of German security policy and its mission is the expression of the security policy of the FRG. Legal regulations ensure the primacy of politics, that is, the primacy of political leaders, over the military.89
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The Bundeswehr conceives of itself as an army in alliance, "not as an instrument for the independent, military development of the Federal Republic of Germany. It can fulfill its mission only in the context of the [NATO] Alliance." Thus, except for the Home Defense units, all combat forces are under the operational command of NATO. Through its operational readiness in peacetime it contributes to the maintenance of peace through deterrence. The main activities of the military in peacetime are training and education of military personnel and units to develop the necessary character and capabilities to accomplish their mission in war. Special emphasis is placed on civic (politisch) education so that the soldier understands that military duties must be subordinate to and serve the fundamental democratic values of the state.90 In the mid-1980's the Bundeswehr was charged, together with the other organs of state and allied armies, to maintain the security of the FRG or to reestablish it. The purpose of its employment was for it to end, as quickly as possible, the war on favorable political terms and to reestablish deterrence. Operational missions would flow from the basic conditions that Germany faced. Through forward defense as little space as possible was to be sacrificed and damage was to be limited. The geographical situation and the military preparations of the Warsaw Pact left only little room for action; speed and flexibility therefore were critical, as was coordination of operations plans of the various NATO nations in central Europe. NATO reserved the right to employ the first use of nuclear weapons, the launchers for which Germany controlled in part. Finally, the survivability of conventional forces was decisive for the effectiveness of NATO strategy of deterrence.91 Force Structure In the mid-1980's the Bundeswehr'* overall personnel strength amounted to 495,000, of which 489,000 were active duty and 6,000 were reservists on active duty. In war, the force would grow to 1,270,000; however, planning was in progress for increased support of the U.S. forces reinforcing Europe in the event of war (Wartime Host Nation Support) which was to bring the wartime strength after 1987 to 1,340,000. The active duty strength was comprised of 345,000 army (70 percent), 111,000 air force (22 percent), and 39,000 navy personnel (8 percent). Of the 489,000 active duty military personnel, 270,000 were professional or longer serving volunteers (55 percent), whereas 219,000 (44 percent) were draftees.92 Drafts were held quarterly and annual turnover amounted to 170,000. Additionally, about 180,000 reservists underwent advanced training in reserve training periods during any given year.93 At this time, the German Army was organized according to AS 4, which had been implemented in 1980. The Army consisted of the Field Army, Territorial Army, the Army Office, and the Army Staff in Bonn. (See Figure 3.3.) The Field Army contained the combat forces and consisted of three corps with six armored, four mechanized, one mountain, and one air assault division, deployed across
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
four combat sectors of NATO's defense line. Each division was comprised of three combat brigades; two divisions also had a Home Defense Brigade from the Figure 3.3 Organization of the German Army (1986)
Source: U.S. Army Training Board, "Allied Army Training Study of the Federal Republic of Germany," Ft. Monroe, VA, 28 August 1986, Tab A.
Territorial Army, amounting to thirty-six fighting brigades. The Territorial Army had the mission of protecting important facilities in the rear area, supporting the deployment of allied forces arriving in Europe, and accomplishing other tasks to allow for the buildup and free maneuver of NATO forces in the FRG. It consisted of three territorial commands that contained five military district commands, twenty-nine regional military commands, and eighty subregional military commands. Twelve home defense brigades served in the Territorial Army.94 Threat Picture While Gorbachev had been in power for years promoting his alternate paradigms of glasnost and perestroika and had already offered unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces, and despite the signing of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in December 1987 and the initiation of conventional arms talks, the threat picture on which Bundeswehr force planning had been based in 1988 and early 1989 remained essentially unchanged. It retained its
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focus on the Soviets' "significant military advantage in major offensive conventional capability" and their "capacity for mounting a large-scale offensive against NATO."95 Resource Challenges In the early 1980's, Bundeswehr planners realized they faced an acute personnel problem in the coming decade. Because of a declining birthrate, the available pool of eighteen- to nineteen-year-old German men would decrease by about 50 percent and drop below 250,000, the number needed to maintain the Bundeswehr at full strength for both active and reserve forces. In 1989, the ratio of men available to needed was three to one; in 1995 it was projected that the ratio would fall to one and one third to one. If nothing was done, this would result in a reduction of the force to 300,000. In light of these projections, three decisions were made to confront the problem. First, the compulsory term of service beginning in 1989 would be extended from fifteen to eighteen months. Second, the number of professional and longer serving volunteers in the force was to increase by approximately 10 percent. Finally, there was to be increased reliance on reserve manpower. With these steps, the force would shrink to 456,000 (active), a reduction of 7 percent. (In April 1989, the government chose to postpone the extension of service time until 1992.)96 Limited budgetary resources served as a second factor constraining Bundeswehr force planning. Since the late 1970's, West German defense spending succeeded in outpacing inflation on average only by about .9 percent per year, with the growth in defense spending from 1983 to 1987 averaging about 1 percent a year.97 Faced with increased competition for scarce manpower, planners called for increased budget allocations in part to make the service more attractive to young men. Unfortunately, the prediction was for steady but only modest growth for the mid-term.98 Bundeswehr 2000 Based on the continuing threat, German and NATO strategy, the advances in technology, and these resourcing challenges, military planners formulated a new defense plan for the military forces, Bundeswehr 2000, which was approved by the Minister of Defense in February 1988, and which foresaw two major changes. First, there was to be an increased effort on joint solutions in a number of fields: command, control, and intelligence; logistics; medical services; air transport; and training. Second, although only minor organizational changes were seen for the Air Force and Navy, it offered a major restructuring of the Army, a plan called Army Structure 2000. The Army had three major intentions with this new structure:
48
From Confrontation to Cooperation 1. The number of major units (corps and division) were to remain unchanged. The Federal Republic would continue to provide 12 divisions to the NATO military structure. 2. The attractiveness of the Army had to be improved, and its potential for force augmentation in times of crisis had to be assured. 3. The capabilities of the Territorial Army had to be enhanced.
To accomplish these objectives, the German Army decided on a number of measures, including a higher density of officers at the company level, better training and education for senior NCOs, a "high effective [personnel] strength" in companies to ensure quality mission-oriented training of conscripts, and a significantly higher number of active duty personnel assigned to nonactive units. In terms of force structure, the plan called for the establishment of brigade and division airmobile units, the concentration of all combat brigades in the Field Army, and the addition of new combat support capabilities at both corps and division level. The Home Defense brigades, to that time in the Territorial Army, were to be switched and fifteen Home Defense regiments would be partly activated. Overall, there was increased reliance placed on mobilization and less on fully operational ready combat units.99 The Rush of International Political Events From December 1987 through the summer of 1989 when the revolutions throughout eastern Europe began, the rush of international political events, especially within the areas of German-Soviet relations and of arms control and disarmament, eroded the very basis on which military planners had attempted systematically and logically to plan force structure changes. In the first area, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and General Secretary Gorbachev conducted two historic summit meetings in October 1988 and June 1989, opening up in Soviet words a "new chapter" in relations. Eleven agreements were concluded on a wide range of subjects, as well as the "Joint Declaration," an expression of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. In the Declaration, the Soviet Union gave problems of humankind precedence over political confrontation and class warfare, emphasized the right of all peoples and states to self-determination and adherence to international law, and promoted the fostering of a consciousness of European identity and a "European system of peace."100 Concerning the second field, the United States and Soviet Union in December 1987 signed the INF Agreement eliminating two classes of intermediate-range nuclear forces. In July 1988, Soviet military Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Akhromeyev visited the United States with Secretary of Defense Carlucci returning the visit in August. That same month, in the first, joint, nuclear test conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, forty-three Soviet scientists attended a detonation of a 150-kiloton nuclear devise in Nevada. In December 1988, in an address to the UN General Assembly, Gorbachev announced plans to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000 men
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and reduce Soviet forces in Europe by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft, asserting that Soviet military doctrine would be transformed to a defensive orientation. Several days later, the Soviet Union informed the State Department that it was dismantling two radar sites that had been the subject of much controversy. In March 1989, the new Conventional Forces in Europe talks began with an impressively realistic, opening negotiating position presented by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, that offered deep cuts in Soviet forces. In April, 1,000 Soviet tanks withdrew from Hungary in the first stage of Gorbachev's promised unilateral force reductions. This was followed by the Soviet announcement on May 5 that 1,000 tanks had already been withdrawn from East Germany. On May 10, in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce nuclear forces in eastern Europe by 500 warheads; he also accepted the principle of asymmetrical reductions for conventional forces in Europe to achieve parity by 1997. Two days later, President Bush in response indicated that it was "time to move beyond containment." In July, Gorbachev, during a visit to France, stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce short-range nuclear missiles "without delay" if NATO agreed to enter negotiations and offered to remove all Soviet nuclear weapons from the territory of Warsaw Pact states, if the United States did the same in NATO states. In October—one month before the fall of the Berlin Wall—Baker indicated that the United States wished to see perestroika succeed and offered advisors to that end. Finally, in yet another sign of how genuinely the Soviet Union seemed to be evolving, Shevardnadze admitted in the same month that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 "violated the norms of proper behavior . . . [and] general human values."101 THE WORLD OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN 1989 BEFORE THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL Before die Wende (the turning) of November 1989, the Bundeswehr continued to march on with fairly familiar premises: a fairly fixed and clear threat picture despite Gorbachev's words and actions, a good idea of the future personnel structure changes, an increase in the compulsory term of service from fifteen to eighteen months, an adequate reserve concept, and sufficient material outfitting. Military leaders and planners, however, were trying to implement new force structure plans while the political foundation, on which these plans were based, was shifting. Military planners continued attempts to plan and implement changes in their military sphere, while the more fundamental and determining political sphere was undergoing dramatic changes. This was, to use the words of one Army planner, like "trying to build a snowman during a thaw."102 In implementing Bundeswehr 2000 and AS 2000, which flowed from it, the German Army was grappling with a number of its implications, for example, the lengthening of the term of compulsory service. Having draftees for three months longer meant that it could achieve higher training standards. It was planning for a
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
higher density of officers in company-size units and working on a revised training concept for NCOs compelled by increased requirements for NCOs as leaders and trainers, the coming greater dependency on mobilization, and the need to make the NCO profession more attractive. Also in the area of training, the German Army was working closely with the U.S. Army to integrate more simulators and simulations to save money and decrease maneuver damage caused by traditional field exercises. While negotiating the number of days the German Army could train at U.S. training facilities in Germany, it was laying plans to "test run" the first German battalion through the U.S. Army's high-tech Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany. It was also working with a new concept for field training exercises. In September 1989, it conducted its annual exercise, called "Open Visor," involving 39,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, and 10,000 wheeled vehicles, the first time the new type of exercise was conducted: an exercise in which mainly headquarters elements participated (Command Post Exercise) with some units in the field at full strength. Bundeswehr 2000 called for heavier reliance on the mobilization of reserves. In addition to the changes in training this required, the Bundeswehr was dealing with the excessive latitude given to reservists in their participation in mobilization exercises, the uneven burden the mobilization concept placed on the population of the eastern federal states, and greater fairness in compensation for reservists. Finally, German Army officers were involved in the debate over the modernization of short-range nuclear forces in Germany (with ranges below five hundred kilometers), specifically the implementation of the 1983 Montebello decision and the modernization of the Lance land-based missile.103 The Bundeswehr and German Army, therefore, were quite surprised and essentially unprepared for the rush of events from the fall of the Berlin Wall, November 9, 1989, to German Unification, October 3, 1990, when the Bundeswehr took over not only the NVA but also the other East German paramilitary forces and equipment.104
NOTES 1. Excellent sources from the NVA literature include Handbuch Militdrisches Grundwissen,9th ed. (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1980); Armee fur Frieden und Sozialismus: Geschichte der Rationale Volksarmee der DDR, 2d ed. (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987); Die Militdr- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED 1945 bis 1988: Dokumente und Materialen (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989). A recently published source is: Wolfgang Wunsche, ed., Rilhrt euchl Zur Geschichte der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1998). An excellent source on the individual NVA soldier is "Der Soldat der NVA: Hilfen zum Verstandnis und zum Umgang" "Arbeitspapier" (Koblenz: Zentrum Innere Fuhrung, September 1990). The most comprehensive source on the NVA is Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact, trans. Deryck Viney (London: George Allen & Unwin,
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1980). A brief overview is contained in Mark E. Victorson, "Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport Paper #7 (Newport: Naval War College, June 1994), 9-17. For a comprehensive look at the entire spectrum of armed components of the GDR, see Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Riidiger Wenzke, eds., Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1998). 2. Handbuch Militdrisches Grundwissen, 19. 3. Herbert Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA—vor und nach ihrer Ubernahme in die Bundeswehr," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 487. 4. Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 13, 80, 214. Quote on p. 25. Schonbohm has an entire section on the NVA before Unification, 41-46. 5. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik A3 (II, 1992): 164-165; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 43. Brigadier General (Ret.) Guenther Bormann, former Chief of Artillery and Rocket Forces until 1987, indicated that there were actually six reserve divisions that in peacetime were based at NCO schools. Interview, Potsdam, 26 June 1992. Jeffrey McCausland suggested that the NVA was "perhaps the best trained and equipped member of the Warsaw Pact outside of the Soviet Union." "East German Army-Spearpoint or Weakness?" Military Review (February, 1990): 13. 6. Hans Einhorn, "Panzer zu Traktoren: Konversion in den Neuen Bundeslandern," Information fur die Truppe (4/1991): 27. 7. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. 8. Interview, BG (Ret.) Hans-Georg Loffler, (former NVA) former Division Commander, First Motorized Rifle Division (Potsdam) and Chief of Staff, Fifth Military District/Army (Neubrandenburg), Berlin, 19 June 1998. 9. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 13. Also see pp. 43 & 243. Concerning the relationship between the Soviet and East German military, former NVA LTC Herbert Konig wrote that on assignment to Moscow "the continuously sworn brotherhood [between the two] proved a farce." Herbert Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," Truppenpraxis (3/1992): 236. See also Forster, East German Army, 72-104; William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (Cambridge: McGraw Hill, 1982), 180-187. For a scholarly analysis of East Germany's reliability to the Warsaw Pact, see Henry Krisch, "German Democratic Republic," in Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 143-183. 10. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 172. 11. Ibid., 100; interview, MG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992; interview, BG (Ret.) Loffler, 19 June 1998; Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236; Dirk Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen: Viele Angehorigen der ehemaligen NVA flihlen sich als Soldaten zweiter Klasse," Truppenpraxis (3/1991): 302. 12. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 494. 13. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben: Interview mit Generalleutnant Klaus Jurgen BaarC." Truppenpraxis (5/1990): 438. 14. Interview, BG Loffler, 19 June 1998.
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
15. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. Several sources say the personnelon-hand rate was 85 percent, for example, LTG von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; Major General Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991, 4. BG (Ret.) Bormann maintained that the real figure was 75 percent: Fifteen percent were allowed on pass and 10 percent on vacation. (These figures relate to weekends.) 16. Interview, CPT Horst Reddeman (former NVA) Staff Officer, Division VIII (Infantry), German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992. Also interviews with CPT Burghard Belitz, CPT Fred Kuther, and CPT Siegfried Stange (former NVA) Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden, 24 June 1992; and CPT Roald Biedermann, First Lieutenant (1LT) Brandt, and CPT Monecke (former NVA) Military Region 84, Potsdam, 22 June 1992. 17. Interview with 1LT Hans-Walter Matthies (former NVA) Staff Officer, Command and Control (G-6) Section, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992, Also interview with CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. For political indoctrination training, see also Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. He contrasted it in the view of the typical NVA officer with combat training that held high importance and describes it as "a necessary evil and duty." 18. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 130, 151. 19. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, "Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces: the Eggesin Garrison as an Example for the Unification of Two Armies" (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 14 February 1992), 9; Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 136-137. 20. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 5. 21. Interview, June 26, 1992; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 101; Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 239-244. For the exaggerated readiness rates, see also Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236-237. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Herbert Danzer indicated that the NVA oriented its resources toward optimizing operational readiness and not for such things as maintaining kasernes. Interview, Assistant Operations Officer, Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 92. See also Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300. 22. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 100, 101, 153, 244; Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 125-126. For the bunker systems to be used in war see pp. 114-116, 215-216, 222-224. For civil defense preparations, see Zwei Armeen, 198. 23. For example, Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300. 24. This description is a summary of observations made by LTG Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 71, 72, 84-85, 87, 93, 180. See also Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 120-123. 25. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 244. 26. Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 31. 27. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 43. Interview, COL Dietmar Klenner, Operations Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East, Potsdam, 12 November 91. Two individuals who had served in the NVA as draftees indi-
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cated that "there was a number of dumb officers [in the NVA] because the selection criteria were not especially good." Interview, Daniel Kuchenmeister, Historical Commission (Berlin) and Gerd-Rudiger Stephan, Institute for Historical Youth Research (Berlin) Con way, New Hampshire, 26 June 1993. Former NVA LTC Herbert Konig wrote that the most disillusioning thing about time spent in Moscow was that Russians generally drew no distinction between East and West Germans. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236. 28. Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 651. For an overview of the typical NVA officer career, see Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236. For an overview of the basic and advanced training received by NVA officers, officer-candidates, and NCOs see Gerhard Cramer, "Auch dieses Kapitel ist zu Ende: Aus- und Weiterbildung von Offizieren, Fahnrichen und Unteroffizieren der ehemaligen NVA," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 574-578. 29. The Commander of the Forty-Third Air Defense Missile Brigade, for example, had been in command from 1981 through 1990. Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik, 9/1990, 668. 30. Interview, MG Ekkehard G. Richter, Commander, Seventh Division & Military Region, Leipzig, 14 November 91. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 137, 191. BG (Ret.) Loffler admitted that the NVA NCO Corps had weaknesses but defended it and maintained that West German officers had observed these NCOs closely only during the unusual and difficult post-Unification period. Interview, 19 June 1998. Regarding the NVA rank of Fdhnrich, there really is no comparable rank in the Bundeswehr or U.S. armies. Sometimes it is translated as "cadet," "officer candidate," or "ensign." 31. After the revolution in the fall of 1989, the basic term of service had been reduced to twelve months. Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?" 666. 32. Interview with Stephan and Kuchenmeister, June 26, 1993. For the old oath taken by the soldier before the reforms of spring 1990 as well as the revised oath, see Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 492. 33. Quoted in Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 493. See also Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 35, 42. 34. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 20-24; Victorson, "Mission in the East," 12. 35. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 171. 36. Interview, COL Klenner, November 12, 1991. 37. Interview, BG (Ret.) Loffler (former NVA), 19 June 1998. Interview, MAJ Erhard Titze (former NVA), Staff Officer, Division II (Training), German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992. 38. Interview with BG Andreas F. Wittenberg, Director of Engineers and NBC Defense, German Army Office, Cologne (former Brigade Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden), Cologne, 11 June 1992. Also, interview, COL Eckard Jantzen, Commander, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 11 November 1991. 39. Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 651. 40. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 42. In an interview with former NVA, they indicated that virtually all officers were party members, about 80 percent to 90 percent of the ensigns (Fdhnriche), and about 60 percent of the NCOs. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, CPT Stange, 24 June 1992. Klaus-Jurgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb stated that about 98 percent of the officers were party members. "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 651. For the best and most succinct discussion of the relationship be-
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
tween the East German Communist Party and the NVA officers, see Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 235-236. 41. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487. 42. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 235. 43. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. When asked about the relationship between the political officers and their regular officer colleagues, BG Bormann maintained that it was generally harmonious. Commanders on the whole were reliable party members and basically there were no great problems between them. This assessment is likely an overly positive one. See also Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 180-181. 44. Interview, November 14, 1991. 45. Interview, 1LT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert, 29 June 1992. 46. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487. 47. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. 48. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 494. 49. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. 50. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166-167; "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 337; interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 44, 135, 145. In describing NVA working in the economy, LTG Schonbohm quoted one former NVA officer, "We were anybody's for anything" (Wir waren Mddchenfur alles). 51. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 165; Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du— Kamerad?" 653; interview, Colonel Dr. Bernd Ullrich (former NVA), Specialist for Physiology, German Air Force (former NVA), Hamburg, 23 October 1991; interview, Commander Hans-Joachim Wichert, Operations Officer and Deputy Commander, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 23 June 1992. For a discussion of the privileges of the highranking military leaders, see Ablass, Zapfenstreich, 29. 52. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 11. This book also discusses the privileges of the high-ranking officers, 100-101. 53. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 63, 71, 138, 147, 239. 54. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487-488; Victorson, "Mission in the East," 26. Former NVA BG (Ret.) Loffler gave a much more upbeat view of the relationship between the NVA and the population. Interview, 19 June 1998. 55. For a published source see, for example, Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 147-148. 56. Interview, Commander Wichert, 23 June 1992. See also Ablass, Zapfenstreich, 9. In the fall of 1991, LTG von Scheven wrote that the army in the east should evolve as quickly as possible so that there would be no essential difference between it and the army in the west. Then it would be a true "people's army" in the sense of Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608. 57. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 58. Interviews, Professor Gero Neugebauer, Free University of Berlin, Conway, New Hampshire, 26 June 1993, and Professor Peter Wicke, Humboldt University, Berlin, Conway, New Hampshire, 24 June 1993. Notes held by author.
The Military Setting
55
59. John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 58-59. For a comprehensive discussion see Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), Ch. 3-5. 60. "Fundamentals of German Security: The Creation of the Bundeswehr—Continuity and Change," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 15. 61. Ibid., 15-28. 62. Eric Waldman, The Goose Step Is Verboten: The German Army Today (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 62-96; Reed, 60-67. 63. "The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany," Federal Press and Information Office, Bonn, 1981, 54. 64. Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-1985: Friedenssicherung im Biindnis (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1985), 54; Waldman, 97. 65. Waldman, 98. 66. For a discussion of German defense planning in the context of the EDC, see Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, Ch. 5. 67. 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 82-86. 68. Reed, 61. See Kelleher, 14, and Waldman, 96, for chronologies of major events in German rearmament and the buildup of the Bundeswehr. 69. Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 44, fn 50. 70. Ibid., 45. In a later work he stated that "[p]erhaps the phrase 'leadership and participation' bests conveys what the Bundeswehr means by Innere Fuhrung." "The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and Its Critics in the Bundeswehr," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 32. 71. "Die Innere Fuhrung der Bundeswehr," Lehrunterlage (8/91) (Koblenz: Zentrum Fur Innere Fuhrung, October, 1991), 3. For the connection with the military reform movement of the nineteenth century, see Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), 67-68; and Gordon C. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London: Oxford, 1955), 38-42. 72. "Die Innere Fuhrung der Bundeswehr," 3-7. 73. Ibid., 7-11. Also see "Innere Fuhrung: Unterlagen zum Selbststudium," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fu S I 4, Az 35-01-00, January 1991. 74. "Bundeswehr Heute," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Informations- und Pressestab, n.d., 9. This publication for general public consumption gives a good overview of Innere Fuhrung and the concept of the "Citizen in Uniform." See also HansJoachim Reeb, "Das Vorbid wirkt: Innere Fuhrung und Ansatze einer Militarreform in der ehemaligen NVA," Information fur die Truppe, 11/1990, 14-27; Carl-Gero von Ilseman, "Streitkrafte in der Demokratie: Innere Fuhrung gestern und heute," in 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-1985: Friedenssicherung im Biindnis, Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1985), 313-342. 75. Antulio J. Echevarria, "Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective," Military Review (October, 1986): 49. 76. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 36. 77. John T. Nelsen, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," Military Review (September, 1987): 21.
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
78. Trevor T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 116. An excellent German source for this concept is Dirk W. Oetting, Auftragstaktik: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Fiihrungskonzeption (Bonn: Report Verlag, 1994). 79. Dupuy, 116. 80. Franz Uhle-Wettler, "Auftragstaktik: Was ist das? Konnen wir sie wiederbeleben?" Truppenpraxis (2/1992): 132. 81.Ibid.;Nelsen, 121. 82. This is a summary of Bundeswehr General von Lossow's explanation in van Creveld, 36. For the importance of the commander's intent, see also Uhle-Wettler, 134, and Nelsen, 25. 83. Echevarria, 51; Nelsen, 22-23. 84. Uhle-Wettler, 135. 85. Dupuy, 116; Uhle-Wettler, 133-135. 86. Nelsen, 25-26; Uhle-Wettler, 135; Echevarria, 54-55. 87. Echevarria, 55-56. 88. Nelsen, 27. 89. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weifibuch 1985: Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn, 1985), 72. For a concise presentation of the Bundeswehr mission as of 1992, see extract in Rainer Winkler, "Krisenreaktionskrafte—und was sonst noch? Nationale Verteidigung zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit," Truppenpraxis (4/1993): 415. Also, Michael Vollstedt, "Wofur? Wogegen? Wieviel wovon? Die Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen und Aufgaben, oder: Die Schwierigkeit, von den kiinftigen Streitkraften ein klares Bild der Ziele, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen zu zeichnen," Truppenpraxis (3/1992): 230-233. For a good overall perspective on the Bundeswehr in early 1988, see the interview of the German Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Wellershof, in "ACQ Interview: Admiral Dieter Wellershoff," Atlantic Community Quarterly (Spring, 1988): 3-8. 90. Weifibuch 1985,13-1 A. 91. Ibid., 77-78. For a concise overview of the German strategic setting in 1987 including strategy, threat, and arms control as seen by German BG Klaus Naumann, Deputy Chief of Staff for Politico-Military Affairs and Operations, Joint Staff, see "The Forces and the Future," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 173-177. 92. Weifibuch 1985, 238. 93. Ruprecht Haasler, "The German Army: The Present and the Future," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October, 1988, 32; U.S. Army Training Board, "Allied Army Training Study of the Federal Republic of Germany," Ft. Monroe, Virginia, 28 August 1986, 1. The IISS Military Balance, 1989-1990, reported the following figures: Bundeswehr active forces: 494,300; reserves: 852,000; Army (active): 340,700 (p. 63). 94. Ibid., Weifibuch 1985, 194-196. 95. Klaus Naumann, "The Restructured Bundeswehr," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October, 1989, 32; Haasler, "The German Army," 33; "ACQ Interview: Admiral Dieter Wellershoff," 5. For a more extensive discussion, see Weifibuch 1985, 41-65. For an analysis of the INF Treaty, see Lynn E Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 720-734, and Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 735-754.
The Military Setting
57
96. Naumann, "Forces and the Future," 179; Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 32-33; Weifibuch 1985, 239. An additional planning factor used by the Bundeswehr was that about 12 percent of each year group would be conscientious objectors. 97. Brenton C. Fischmann, "West German Defense Planning for the 1990s: Strategic Consequences for NATO" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 March 1988), 3-4. 98. Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 33. 99. Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 34; Naumann, "Forces and the Future," 184-186; Haasler, "The German Army," 35. For an overview and critique of Bundeswehr 2000, see Fischmann, "West German Defense Planning for the 1990s: Strategic Consequences for NATO." Fischmann offered a well-documented analysis and pointed out that "German defense planning and budget realities are . . . on a collision course" (p. 15). He ended with policy recommendations. 100. Horst Teltschik, "Gorbachev's Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations," Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 40 (HI/1989): 211-212. 101. This summary of events is drawn from the "East-West Relations" Chronology in Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1988/89 and Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1989/90. 102. Axel Burgener, "Sisyphus laBt griissen: Sicherheitspolitische Rahmenbedingungen der Heeresplanung," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 586. 103. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies"; 167; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992. These observations are also based on notes from my assignment as a U.S. Army Liaison Officer to the German Army Office, Cologne, which began in July 1989. For an analysis of nuclear issues in German security policy in 1988, see Ronald D. Asmus, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," Survival 30 (November/December 1988): 499-514. 104. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 167; Gerhard Hubatschek, "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," in Ein Staat—Fine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 27; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. For an example of a German Army Planner who was looking to the future at this point in time, see Btirgener, "Sisyphus laBt grussen," 586-587.
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4
Organization and Political Control There were a number of ways in which the Bundeswehr could have organized itself to execute the Takeover. First, this chapter considers not only the way in which it chose to organize but also the structures established at the MOD to oversee and coordinate this undertaking. Second, the chapter explores the area of civil-military relations: the degree to which government civilians exerted control over the military as well as the manner in which this control was exerted. The German MOD and Bundeswehr organized themselves in a logical, efficient manner to effect the Takeover. The importance of democratic ideals, such as the dignity and worth of the individual, and of the principles of Innere Fuhrung in the Takeover is underlined by their inclusion in the very first of the formal goals given to Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, an emphasis repeated in the succeeding statements of Bundeswehr leaders. Politicians gave little detailed direction over the actual execution of the Takeover. Rather, they provided as a rule general guidelines to military leaders who were for the most part left to formulate their own solutions to novel problems. Most officers referred to this as a fine example of Auftragstaktik or "mission-type orders." However, politicians were concerned about and exerted pressure to ensure a quick tempo for the deactivation of former NVA units as this had financial implications: The longer unneeded former NVA personnel and units remained on active duty, the more money it cost. Guidance was also given on such issues as personnel strength and social welfare. It is clear, however, that politicians were prepared when necessary to intervene decisively on key issues, such as when the Defense Minister overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all NVA MIG-29 combat aircraft.
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
ORGANIZATION AND MISSIONS Even before the momentous Kohl-Gorbachev Caucasus meeting in July 1990, the MOD in Bonn organized itself so that it could coordinate all activities with the Ministry for Disarmament and Defense (MDD) in Strausberg (outside of Berlin). On June 1, 1990, the MOD directed that Steering Groups (Lenkungsgruppen) be established at the State Secretary level to effect such coordination.1 The organization depicted in Figure 4.1 was established reflecting not only the coordinating bodies in the MOD but also their relationship to the Army's Steering Committee. The areas of responsibility were divided under the two respective State Secretaries under Dr. Stoltenberg. Dr. Pfahls headed the Group for "Armaments Control, Armaments Planning, Security and Military Policy," handling issues relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2 + 4 Talks, disarmament verification, armed forces planning, armed forces structure, equipment and armament, and military attaches. Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl headed the Group for "Armed Forces and Administration," responsible for the "entire complex of administrative issues," including personnel, budget, organization, and legal and social affairs. The members of these groups included the directors of the major departments in MOD and the Joint Staff {Fithrungsstab der Streitkrdfte). Numerous work groups functioned underneath the Steering Groups to discuss issues in detail, devise solutions, and make recommendations. A Coordination Panel (Abstimmungsgremium) was established to prevent redundancies, ensure uniformity of goals and requirements, and prepare issues for decision. Because of problems in information flow, an Information and Situation Center (Info- und Lagezentrum) was also established as of August 1, 1990. Within the Army Staff, a Steering Group was established on August 7, 1990, to coordinate all actions within the Army Staff on issues relating to the NVA.2 Until December 1, 1990, this was headed by MG Willman, the Director of Army Staff Department IV (Organization), included representatives from all staff departments, and met about every two weeks. On its dissolution, its responsibilities were assumed by Army Staff Section IV l. 3 Corresponding to its Joint Staff counterpart, an Army Staff Information and Situation Center was established on August 15.4 A comparable "German/German" Steering Group was established toward the end of August and met weekly at the German Army Office in Cologne, a headquarters that corresponds roughly to the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command in Ft. Monroe, Virginia.5 Field operating agencies (Aufienstelle) for both the MOD and the Federal Office of Technology and Procurement were established in Strausberg, east of Berlin, at the location of the former East German MDD to take over and coordinate all affairs in the east falling within the responsibilities of these organizations. Collocated with these was a new Defense District Administration (VII), which had no counterpart in the NVA.6
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Figure 4.1 MOD/Army Staff Steering Committee Structure for the Takeover of the NVA
Source: BMVg, "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Staatssekretar, Org 1 AZ 10-02-05, Bonn, 20 June 1990; Fu H, "Eingliederung der NVAHeeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung in Fu H," Chefstab Fu H, Bonn, 7 August 1990.
Planning for the Takeover As the spring of 1990 progressed, the Ministers of Defense of both the FRG and GDR, recognizing the increasing informal individual and group contacts occurring between the two armies but wishing also to remain sensitive to Soviet anxieties, issued in early June regulations governing contact between the two armies.'
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
Detailed planning for the military Takeover began on August 14, 1990, when the MOD in Bonn directed the Bundeswehr to examine issues relating to Unification. Before this point, MG Klaus Reinhardt, then the Director of Department VI of the Joint Staff (Planning), stated that planners were not really allowed—in an official sense—to consider these issues. It was only at this time that the mission was given to create the organizational preconditions for joining the two armies. The preparation time therefore was "extremely short."8 He and the director of Army Staff Department IV, Organization, BG Willman, realized quickly that an advance group/liaison detachment was needed at the MDD in the east to facilitate information flow and to ensure the East Germans understood what was required.9 On August 20, 1990, the MOD-Bundeswehr liaison detachment began its work at Strausberg. Including nine officers and nine defense civilians, it was headed by BG Ekkehard G. Richter (Army), who at Unification became the Commander of Division/Military District Command VII in Leipzig.10 COL Wolfgang Gulich (Army) was the officer in the detachment responsible for all army matters. (In April 1991 he would assume command of the Home Defense Brigade 37 in Dresden.) While serving on this joint service team, he ensured that he kept the Army Staff in Bonn informed.11 Also, several weeks before Unification Day (October 3), small advance parties were sent to the locations of the two future Divisions/Military District Commands, Neubrandenburg and Leipzig.12 In the month preceding the Takeover, two significant events took place. First, on September 1 the NVA inducted against the desires of the Bundeswehr a new group of draftees, something that further complicated the planning of the Bundeswehr. Second, it was during the first several weeks of September that small reconnaissance teams of officers were dispatched to East Germany to collect information on the status of NVA units, equipment, and installations so that the best possible plans could be formulated for the Takeover.13 Dispatch of Commander Groups and Support Groups The next key step in the management of the Takeover was the dispatch on or near Unification Day of a major contingent of Bundeswehr officers and NCOs to assume key leadership and training positions in the new structure imposed on the NVA which at midnight, October 2, ceased to exist. Within a few days of October 3, between 1,200 and 2,000 of these personnel—the exact number is unclear—found their way to their new positions in the former East Germany.14 LTG Schonbohm, Commander of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, and LTG von Ondarza, the Chief of Staff of the German Army, wanted only the best, highly motivated people to go east, and therefore they required that all be volunteers.15 Shortly before the Takeover, LTG Schonbohm assembled all the commanders and general staff officers in the group and addressed them on the challenges ahead. At a one-day seminar at the Officer School of the Army in
Organization and Political Control
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Hannover on October 1, he and LTG von Ondarza addressed the approximately eight hundred and fifty officers and NCOs of the army who were proceeding east, clarifying that they had no regulations governing what they were being asked to do and exhorting them. "You have lots of room to play with, so use it!"16 "The Unification is not covered in the regulations!"17 These military personnel took up key positions at the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command Headquarters in Strausberg and—for the Army—at the Eastern Army Command Detachment in Potsdam, at the headquarters of the Division/Military District Commands VII and VIII in Leipzig and Neubrandenburg, and at the subordinate levels down to battalion level. A Commander Group (Kommandeur Gruppe) or a Support Group (Unterstutzungsgruppe) was sent to each unit in the East beginning with Land Forces Headquarters in Potsdam through the battalion level. A typical group at the battalion level included a commander, personnel officer, logistical officer, and perhaps a company NCO. 18 A number of factors governed the allocation of these groups. All commanding general (Befehlshaber) and commander positions down to division level were filled with Bundeswehr officers. There was mixed filling with both Bundeswehr and former NVA officers from regimental level downward. Other considerations included whether the former NVA troop unit fit into the plans for the build up of the new army structure, second, the initial stationing concepts for AS 5, and, third, the inflow of new recruits in September 1990.19 Toward the end of September, Army Staff Section IV (Organization) enumerated the tasks of these groups. For the Commander Groups the tasks included commanding all agencies and other facilities that were directly under the former NVA commanders, establishing and guaranteeing military security, building up the new command and control organization, activating the new units based on AS 5 and deactivating those not in the new structure, and controlling units as much as possible in accordance with directives. Support Groups were to advise their unit commanders, all of whom were former NVA, in all affairs, with priority to legal affairs, in the application of the principles of Innere Fuhrung and personnel management, logistics and—as long as officials from the Federal Administration Office were lacking—general administration questions.20 Colonel Andreas Wittenberg, who assumed command of the former NVA Seventh Armored Division in Dresden, stated that it was not fully clear at the outset why in one unit a Bundeswehr officer was installed as a commander but not in the next.21 It became clear that as a rule, Commander Groups were sent to units that would not be immediately dissolved while Support Groups were sent to those units that would continue to exist for a short period of time and then be deativated.22 On September 17, the requirement to fill these teams was given by Army Staff Section I 1 (Personnel, Basic Requirements) to the principle commands of the German Army: the three corps, the three territorial commands, and the German Army Office (a major army staff in Cologne).23 About one hundred twenty Commander Groups and fifty-eight Support Groups were sent east (See Table
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From Confrontation to Cooperation
4.1). About twenty-three Commander Groups took over the key commands of the former NVA from the Land Forces Headquarters down to NVA Division/Defense Region level. Fifty former NVA units did not receive any group because they had essentially vanished before Unification Day.24 MG Haasler, who took over the Fifth NVA Military District Command, indicated that on October 4 he had from the "western Bundeswehr" 279 officers, 116 NCOs and 26 enlisted men.25 BG von Kirchbach, who took over the former Ninth Armored Division at Eggesin, attributed to Minister of Defense Stoltenberg this decision to send a large contingent of Bundeswehr officers and NCOs and identified it as one of the two most important decisions that Stoltenberg made. This made the Bundeswehr a spearhead for the Unification unique among all government sectors.26 BG Wolfgang Beltermann, the Chief of Staff of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, believed the decision to take over command on October 3 to be the correct one despite the misgivings of certain political forces in Bonn. He recounted a story of how one month after the Unification, civilians in the east praised the Bundeswehr to him for arriving so quickly in contrast to other government sectors. He also quoted the Federal President who stated that: "The unity of the forces promotes the unity of the Germans."27 This initial wave of personnel for the most part remained until April 1, 1991, when the former NVA divisions were officially dissolved and six German Army Home Defense Brigades were established. At this time, there was a substantial turnover of personnel, a second shift that served for an extended period. LTG Table 4.1 Allocation of Command and Support Groups to Former NVA Units Former NVA Unit Level Land Forces Headquarters Military District Division Defense District Regiment Battalion NCO School Totals
Command Groups 1 2 6 14 17 80
Support Groups
*Neither
16 41
50
JL 120
58
50
* These units received neither because their personnel strength had essentially dropped to zero by Unification Day. Source: Fu H, "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (Bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Fu H IV 1, Az 10-01-03, Bonn, 17 September 1990, Annex 1. (Table was prepared 17 July 1990, Fu H IV 1)
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Schonbohm hoped that the officers and NCOs, returning to their original units in the west, took back the message that the Bundeswehr would succeed only if easterners and westerners applied themselves together to the tasks.28 Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command On October 3, 1990, Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, with LTG Jorg Schonbohm at its head, assumed control of the former NVA that ceased to exist at midnight, October 2. In his "Order No. 1," LTG Schonbohm detailed its organizational structure and missions.29 Its major subordinate units are presented in Figure 4.2 and organizational staff structure in Figure 4.3. This headquarters consisted of approximately 600 soldiers, 360 of whom were former NVA.30 Figure 4.2 Organizational Structure of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command on October 3,1990
Sources: "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fiir Fuhrung, Ausbildung, und Organisation," Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando Ost, Az 32-01-08, Strausberg, 3 Oktober 1990, Annex 1; "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 777.
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Its major subordinate commands included the central units and facilities which had been subordinate to the MDD; former Military Districts (Militarbezirke) III and V—now Military District Commands (Wehrbereichs-kommandos) VII and VIII; the former headquarters of the NVA's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy; and the initial staffs of the Army (Heereskommando), Air Force (5 LuftwaffenFigure 4.3 Staff Structure of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command
Source: Friedrich Steinseifer, "Streitkrafte im Vereinten Deutschland," Wehrtechnik (11/1990): 74. division), and Navy (Marineabschnitts-kommando). As of October 4, all army units not within Military District Commands VII and VIII came under the authority of Eastern Army Command in Potsdam, at the former location of the NVA's Land Forces Headquarters.31 Under this command were fifteen defense regional commands (Verteidigungsbezirks-kommandos) and forty-five defense sub-regional commands (Verteidigungs-kreiskommandos)^2 (see Figure 4.4). The order enumerated the Eastern Command's numerous and formidable missions, totaling nine. The five central missions, appearing in the official order, are worth quoting at length. • Command and Control of the subordinate areas, especially personnel leadership in cooperation with the Eastern Field Operating Agency (Aufienstelle) of MOD (Strausberg), thereby monitoring of the maintenance of democratic legal principles, defense legal rights, and the principles of Innere Fuhrung in leading and training of the personnel; coordination accomplished by the regional defense commands of the interests and requirements of military defense of the federal states with the state governments and other civilian authorities. • Directing the dissolution of the units, offices, and facilities of the former NVA.
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Figure 4.4 Army Organization within Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (October 1990)
Source: "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 779. • Accomplishment of logistical and medical command and control and of tasks concerning supply responsibility, especially material management with emphasis on the directing of the Takeover and collection of materials of the former NVA and its possible further use and disposition—especially of the treaty-determined major end items in coordination with the organizational area, thereby fulfilling the duty for custody of material. • Directing of the build-up and assumption of the decentralized command and control organization, . . . assuming command over selected troop bodies/ organizational units within the responsibilities of the organizational areas of the
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From Confrontation to Cooperation Army, Air Force, Navy, ZMilDBw (Central Military Federal Armed Forces Office), and ZSanDBw (Central Medical Federal Armed Forces Office). • Support for the departure of Soviet forces from Germany.33
In other sources, Schonbohm gave shape to several other important goals and stressed certain principles not fully clear in the order: the safekeeping and inventorying of all the weapons, munitions, and other important items that came into the Bundeswehr's care; and the controlled transitioning of the military units to AS 5. 34 Although the above order implies the first, the second is not really expressed, although it was one of the key tasks accomplished. At the outset of his command as he addressed his major subordinate units on October 4, Schonbohm underlined a fundamental principle: "We . . . come not as victors to vanquished. We come as Germans to Germans."35 In his final report as the Eastern Command was being deactivated in June 1991, he underscored a related goal: "This has been the paramount objective that we always had in mind: To establish allGerman [italics added] military forces."36 Noteworthy is the substance of the first mission that appeared in the Order. One might have expected the dissolution of the NVA to come first. It was, however, second to the mission of assuming command and control of the personnel of the former NVA and insuring the protection of legal rights and the principles of Innere Fuhrung. In placing this first before the organizational or administrative missions, the Bundeswehr struck a genuinely liberal democratic tone. Appearing in an official order—its first no less—and not a publication for wide public consumption, one can infer that this emphasis on individual rights and principles was in fact genuine. In an interview, Schonbohm amplified on the psychological requirements for educating the new members of the Bundeswehr. For me the critical issue is to carry through the idea of the citizen in uniform (Staatsburger in Uniform) to effect a change in consciousness. This involves not simply providing an explanation of but more so of providing the example of and our common participation in the proven fundamental values of our society.37 MG Haasler, Commander of Division/Military District Command VIII, also underlined the importance of ensuring from the outset that former NVA soldiers were commanded and led by Bundeswehr ideas (Vorstellungeri)?* Commanders and senior staff officers who served in the east gave further insights and points of emphasis. MG Werner von Scheven, Schonbohm's deputy at the beginning of the Takeover, who in April 1991, became the Commander of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, stated that the Takeover of the remains of the NVA only partly described the task. It also involved "all that is accomplished by the Federal Defense Administration (Bundeswehrverwaltung). It involved everything left by the military and para-military organs of the GDR, including border troops, combat troops, police and state security services, civil defense, GST, Spitzensport, and so on."39 In an article published in Aufienpolitik in the spring of 1992, von Scheven also pointed out the additional challenge that
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the Gulf War presented. Within two months of the Takeover, the Bundeswehr— especially Eastern Command—executed "the most comprehensive shipping/ haulage operations in the history of the Bundeswehr.,"40 The Eastern Command faced a host of problems during its existence, which LTG Schonbohm addressed in his book. Several deserve highlight. First was the understandable uncertainty, skepticism, and sometimes anger of the former NVA, a daily challenge for commanders from the outset of the Takeover.41 Second, a significant problem that was really beyond his control was the lack of sufficient defense civilians in the east, finance officials to administer properly the pay system and legal advisors for instruction and legal advice. Only five of the latter existed in the entire command.42 Third, the command faced a very difficult dilemma in meeting the pressure to dissolve units and reduce personnel strength while at the same time guarding and disposing of the former NVA equipment and weapons. In his six-week report he indicated that troop units were at about 50 percent strength but possessed virtually all their weapons and munitions, a problem relieved when higher headquarters in Bonn relented on its requirements.43 Fourth and related, there existed communication and coordination problems between the command and higher headquarters in Bonn, understandable given the novelty of the command and its mission. Not specific just to military personnel, the people in the west in general had trouble truly understanding the nature and scope of the problems faced in the east. Beyond this, coordination problems surfaced with perhaps over eager staff officers in Bonn issuing directives to eastern units without proper coordination with Eastern Command Headquarters.44 Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command was never intended to be an enduring organization. Rather, in the planning for its establishment before the Unification, it was envisioned that the command would deactivate some time in "mid1991," a date that came to be July 1, 1991.45 On this date, authority for all units and agencies passed to the individual services (Army, Air Force, Navy). The Army components came under the authority of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command (Korps/Territorial Kommando Ost). During the period from October 1, 1990 through July 1, 1991, Eastern Army Command, headed by BG Gottelmann, existed subordinate to Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command. As with other commands, the Army sent an advanced party east before October 1 to prepare the way. The mission of Eastern Army Command, which included a staff of about seventy personnel from the West, was to build the staff for what became Eastern Corps and Territorial Command on July 1, 1991, to maintain control over designated former NVA units, and to dissolve certain others. Several months prior on April 1, the six former NVA divisions were formally changed to home defense brigades.46
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From Confrontation to Cooperation Deactivation of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command
Eastern Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command executed it missions for nine months until July 1, 1991, when it was deactivated and command was passed to the separate services. In his summary report to LTG Siegfried Storbeck, the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to whom he reported, LTG Schonbohm indicated that the Eastern Command had accomplished its mission. "The Takeover of the National People's Army . . . with its structures, personnel, and materiel has been successful and there has been no friction noticeable externally."47 Command and control had been ensured and personnel had been drastically reduced. Among the two-year volunteers for service in the German Army, there was still a considerable shortage of NCOs while an excess of officers. He identified several tasks that were still in the process of being completed: the deactivation of all former NVA units and agencies no longer required, the surrender of real estate no longer needed by the Bundeswehr, and the concentration and disposal of former NVA material no longer needed.48 In his final speech before his command, Schonbohm took stock. The command had brought an enormous amount of weapons and munitions into safekeeping, reduced the size of the former NVA from 90,000 to about 56,000 soldiers, dissolved about 350 troop units and activated about 250 new units.49 In an interview during this period, he reflected on the main tasks ahead for the Bundeswehr and concluded: "It must be our goal to achieve common German armed forces, in which everyone knows: We serve the same fatherland, the system of law, and we are guided by the same mission."50 Understandably proud of the accomplishments of his command in its unique and time-constrained mission, LTG Schonbohm, during a visit to the Home Defense Brigade 40 in Schwerin, listened to an astonished journalist say of the soldiers, "They indeed look like soldiers of the Federal Republic!" Schonbohm responded: "They don't look like them; they are them."51 In the many interviews conducted for this study, there was only one individual who truly contested the establishment of the joint service Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command—Colonel Alfred Lassonczyk, who assumed the position of Logistics Officer (G-4) of the Eastern Corps/Territorial Command in March 1991. When asked about the key decisions made in the Takeover, Lassonczyk identified first this decision to establish a temporary joint service headquarters overseeing all activities (ein Bundeswehrkommando auf Zeit aufzustellen). This decision meant, for example, that a communication from an army element in the east had to travel through Eastern Command and the Joint Staff in Bonn before it arived at the proper office in the Army Staff. This had caused problems. Second, after the deactivation of Eastern Command and the individual services had assumed control, Army Headquarters posed questions on the policy decisions that had been made. Often, he said, there was no one present to answer a question; only files. Consequently, a number of decisions had to be revisited and remade. At times, this led to friction between Eastern Corps/
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Territorial Command and higher headquarters in Bonn. Thus, he was not convinced that this had been the best management structure. It had its benefits and shortcomings: "It cut both ways" (eine zweischneidige Sache).52 In his final report, Schonbohm defended the decision, emphasizing the value of the standardization the Command had achieved. In retrospect, the decision to place the entire former East German Army (EGA) [that is, NVA] under a unified command . . . was appropriate. This was the only way to make sure that the same standards were applied to all three Services and the central military command authorities of the former EGA; standards that take the situation prevailing in Eastern Germany into account and which have unanimously been supported vis-a-vis MOD.53 Eastern Corps and Territorial Command On April 16, 1991, LTG Schonbohm gave over command of all army units to MG Werner von Scheven, his deputy to that point, who took command of the newly activated Eastern Corps and Territorial Command (Korps und Territorialkommando Ost), formerly Eastern Army Command, located in the former headquarters of the NVA land forces in Potsdam-Geltow.54 Its missions were comparable to its predecessor's and included: • Activating command authorities, troop units, and agencies. • Reaching a level of operational readiness allowing units to accomplish defense tasks at the country's borders and at sensitive facilities. • Performing territorial defense tasks, especially civil-military cooperation with local and federal civilian authorities for preparation to fulfill "defense at the borders." • Supporting the stay and departure of Soviet forces, as well as arms control and disarmament measures. • Contributing to the protection of the environment and to disaster relief.55 With this discussion of the major organizational structures complete, it is time to address the first truly analytical issue of this study: the extent and nature of the political control and guidance exerted over the military in its execution of the Takeover. POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE BUNDESWEHR While liberal, democratic principles have served as the foundation of the German Army for two generations, monarchical, conservative, illiberal principles have served to define the relationship of Prussian-German armies to the civilian polity and of political to military leaders for centuries.56 Under Frederick the Great the Prussian Army became not only an object of pride and admiration of the Prussian people, but in the absence of any substantial and politically active middle class a force giving direction and structure to the state itself. In the nine-
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teenth-century struggle between liberals and conservatives for control of the Prussian Army, it was the conservatives who won, a veritable certainty after the magnificent victories of the Prussian-German armies in the three wars of German Unification (1864-1871). As victory proved increasingly elusive in World War I, the German nation, led by the hapless William II, who by no means possessed the strategic acumen of his grandfather, turned ever more frequently for salvation to Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the military leaders who had distinguished themselves at Tannenberg on the Eastern Front. Unfortunately, both had little appreciation for the civilian perspective, most immediately in the form of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg who was self-admittedly incompetent in military affairs. If politicians did press their point, the generals simply threatened to resign. With the two most important civilians—the Kaiser and the Chancellor—essentially abdicating their roles, Hindenburg and Ludendorff effectively established a military dictatorship behind the facade of the German Constitution. After World War I, as the fledgling Weimar Republic attempted to implant its democratic institutions on the increasingly chaotic, political landscape of postwar Germany, now stripped of empire and forced to swallow the restrictions and war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty, GEN Hans von Seeckt entered. The critical support that he rendered to the Republic was, however, only superficial and temporary. A soldier, believed von Seeckt, gave his allegiance to a man—a monarch—not to abstract words on a piece of paper.57 In the late 1920's after von Seeckt had passed from the scene, the overbearing role of the army had become so great that Wilhelm Groener, the Minister of War, said: "In the political structure of Germany, no stone may be moved without the Reichswehr casting the decisive vote."58 In the final years of the Weimar Republic before Hitler assumed power in 1933, Chancellor Heinrich B riming's best efforts to establish a genuinely healthy and functioning parliamentary democracy were sabotaged by GEN Kurt von Schleicher, whose key positions within and ultimately at the head of the Ministry of War helped him to undermine systematically Bruning while at the same time build up support for his own personal political goals. It ultimately took Hitler and his Nazis to put Reichswehr leaders in a role truly subordinate to civilian authority, a process beginning with the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936— which the generals opposed—and culminating in February 1938 with the decisive clash between Hitler and the generals, and the subsequent housecleaning. Despite the categorical changes made to the ethos of the German Army in the postwar period—the provisions of the Basic Law (German Constitution) of 1949, the care taken in establishing the democratic basis of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the difficult and lengthy process of clarifying the traditions of the Bundeswehr, the reliance on a conscript and not a volunteer army, the formulation of and enduring emphasis given to the concepts of Innere Fuhrung—this study took it as a question and not simply a given that genuine and effective political control of the military in this Takeover of the NVA would exist.
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Beyond the principles of Innere Fuhrung, the relationship of the military to the civilian society in the FRG is further defined by the concept of the primacy of politics.59 In this study, this concept is taken to mean at least two things: first, that political leaders have a higher authority than military leaders and hence can always override military decisions and, second, that political considerations may always carry more weight than other considerations, such as military ones.60 In such an important undertaking as the Takeover, did the political leaders—Chancellor Kohl, Minister of Defense Stoltenberg, and other cabinet leaders, and members of the Bundestag—exert close and continuous control over the military? After all, there were points in time when the stability within the NVA—still some 100,000 men at Unification and still controlling tremendous means of violence—was precarious. Did the civilians trust the Bundeswehr to effect the Takeover with only general political guidance and nominal supervision? Was the political guidance possibly variable: Was there much at the outset, for example, that diminished over time, or vice versa? Perhaps the most consistent statement heard in the research for this study was that there was little political guidance received and little political control exerted. The military was given goals and general guidance, and then for the most part left to execute the Takeover. Auftragstaktik predominated: Mission type instructions and orders in which goals and general guidance are given but all else is left to the subordinate. These were common threads in virtually all discussions conducted that dealt with this subject. Repeatedly, the interviewees at all levels characterized the process as one with little or no political guidance. Dr. Carl, State Secretary and chief negotiator for the West German side for the Defense Sections of the Unification Treaty, stated that the organizational execution (Umsetzung) was left to the military and that Auftragstaktik principles prevailed.61 LTG von Scheven, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command and, after July 1, 1991, Commander of Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, stated minimal political control was exerted and that Auftragstaktik was the rule. The military was issued very few directives and regulations. The problems that military leaders confronted in the east after Unification were generally not covered by regulations, and solutions had to be found under great time pressure.62 He expanded this point in an article in Truppenpraxis in 1992. One of the seventeen propositions he offered in reviewing the first two years of the Takeover was: "Auftragstaktik proved itself gloriously; it is a critical lesson learned for the new team members from the former NVA." Developing this proposition he stated: "Most of the situations requiring a decision, which the commanders and agency directors faced in the army of the east, were without precedent. No regulation was easily applied."63 MG Haasler, Commander of Division/Military Area Command VIII, stated that basically there was not much political guidance, following the old German principle of Auftragstaktik. He explained that before he assumed his position in the east on October 3, 1990, he was the Director of Army Staff Department VI
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(Planning) and, as such, had much contact with top politicians. Except for a communication from the Defense Ministry making him Commanding General, he received hardly any political guidance. This naturally pleased LTG Schonbohm, MG Richter (the other division/military area commander), and him. What they did receive, he said, was "tempo," that is, a pace or time schedule to try to maintain in dissolving certain units of the NVA in the first six months. "I believe this was the single piece of political guidance: the tempo of the dissolution of the NVA." The politicians wanted this because soldiers cost money. The faster the dissolution; the more money saved. As it turned out, the German Army often could not meet this tempo.64 MG Reinhardt, the Director of Joint Staff Department VI (Planning), was even more categorical in his answer. "There was no political control (Kontrolle) and no political guidelines (Richtlinien) which the Ministry [of Defense] gave. On the contrary, the guidance was to treat and lead the officers and NCOs there [in the east] as those in the west are treated and led." There was only a short directive (Anweisung) for commanders. The presumption was that the military leaders had much military and organizational experience and understood democracy. The politicians felt that the military leaders would do the correct thing following the principles of Auftragstaktik.^Reinhardt also echoed the comments of Haasler concerning tempo. There were no political requirements except that of dissolving units as quickly as possible. Tempo was important because "the longer we had units remain active in the east, the faster we had to deactivate units in the west." Because of the lack of any additional funding for these units, personnel costs had to be controlled. Although the military received some additional funding for the period from October to December 1990, no additional funds were provided for 1991. On the contrary, the 1991 budget was reduced 1.5 billion DMs from the 1990 budget. This, Reinhardt stressed, was "our tremendous problem."66 As Haasler, Reinhardt indicated that the military leadership was happy with receiving no political guidance. Given so much time pressure, it simply would not have worked if the military was made to operate within strict bounds. Also singing the praises of Auftragstaktik, he indicated, "If ever there was a time in the postwar period in the Bundeswehr when Auftragstaktik proved itself, then it was here in the east. In the east in the period of reorganization has been for me the best example of how outstanding Auftragstaktik can work."67 Similar comments were made by other key officers. BG Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, who took over the former Ninth Armored Division in Eggesin, said, "I myself have received almost no commands." It was Auftragstaktik in the best sense. During the nine-month period from October 3, 1990 to June 3, 1991, he received instructions from higher headquarters only "seldom," and it was generally in terms of goals, not specific instructions on how to accomplish things.68 As an example, he described his arrival at Eggesin with thirteen West German Army personnel (eight officers, two senior NCOs, two junior NCOs and a private first class). He found about two hundred officers in the remains of the
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former NVA division headquarters, and within one day he had reorganized them into a staff. In the subordinate units the personnel status varied depending on the unit. Some units had close to their full complement of personnel, whereas others were only fragments of what they had once been. For example, the Medical Battalion had only about ten soldiers and the Chemical Defense Battalion had about twenty. From the beginning, he tried to compose units capable of functioning. Concerning the role of politicians specifically, von Kirchbach stated that politicians might have exerted pressure on the military to take over one or another NVA unit but in general they did not play a large role.69 COL Wolfgang Gulich, a senior army staff officer in the advance party to the MDD who assumed command of the Home Defense Brigade 37 (Dresden) in April 1991, stated that the MOD "permitted the military leaders much freedom of action," freedom that the leaders used well. Auftragstaktik was the rule. He remembered receiving only two directives from the MOD, directives which dealt with the performance evaluation process for the former NVA.70 COL Eckard Jantzen, who assumed command of Military District Command 84 (Territorial) in Potsdam, stated that he received not a single written document and very few instructions. He tried to recognize problems, search for solutions, and obtain whatever information was needed. Auftragstaktik, he said, truly showed its full worth.71 Political guidance was not totally absent. In addition to guidance about the pace or tempo the Bundeswehr should maintain in dissolving NVA units, several officers highlighted the fact that the political leaders gave instructions about personnel strength and social welfare issues. As an example, LTG von Scheven referred to Minister of Defense Stoltenberg who in early August announced that there would be only one German military—not two as the East Germans wanted—and that within the 370,000 strength military, 50,000 would be former NVA, 50 percent professional soldiers and 50 percent recruits. In discussing the successive personnel targets for former NVA, von Scheven stated that "these were the quantitative political requirements (Vorgaberi)."12 LTG von Scheven also addressed a political factor that the politicians did not have to force on or even express to the military as it was self-evident —a virtual given. This was the concept of the "citizen in uniform" (Staatsburger in Uniform), the guiding image of the German soldier in the democratic state of the FRG, a concept that has been important since the beginning of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950's as a fundamental component of its comprehensive concept for moral leadership and civic education (Innere Fuhrung). He emphasized that those former NVA who wished to become professional soldiers in the Bundeswehr had to prove they could internalize this concept. "This is a political requirement which no politician had to utter," he indicated.73 This then was an example of the military considering and acting on a self-generated or understood political factor. COL Dietmar Klenner, Chief of Staff for the advance party of the Eastern Army Command and then its Operations and Training Officer (G-3), made simi-
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lar comments to the others about the importance of Auftragstaktik. Asked whether things changed after the first six months, he stated that the political leadership provided a framework for the Bundeswehr, setting goals and in the area of social welfare and finance clarifying the validity of various regulations. Such things as pay and social welfare insurance stemmed from the Unification treaties; the army had nothing to do with them. Such things as the budget, personnel strength, and the recruits to be enlisted flowed from political decisions in Bonn.74 Finally, LTG Schonbohm portrays a mixed picture on this issue of political guidance. First, his descriptions complement other comments on the pressure for "tempo." Always in the background was the treaty requirement to reduce by the end of 1994 the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000. Also, the Bundestag wanted the fastest pace for the deactivation of units in the east so that the most discharges could take place as quickly as possible and operating costs could be held to a minimum. Schonbohm fought against this in September 1990 even before he assumed command of Eastern Command mainly, it appears, because of a social factor—the possibility of unrest among unhappy, uncertain former NVA, whose sense of identity was evaporating and whose future was unclear. With the help of Defense Minister Stoltenberg, he achieved success in forestalling hasty discharges while bearing the brunt of criticism for being overly sensitive and concerned about possible unrest.75 He was forced to continue the struggle against this pressure for rapid dissolution and discharge in later months because of a dilemma he faced. Higher headquarters and the government in Bonn wanted rapid deactivations; however, higher headquarters could not formulate a clear concept for the assembling and disposing of the tremendous amount of NVA equipment, weapons, and property. On the one hand, Schonbohm sought to comply with guidance for the rapid dissolution of units; however, he needed on the other hand manpower to guard, maintain, and ultimately dispose of this equipment.76 Schonbohm could not accept the government's Budget Committee's decision in October 1990, which gave firm guidance on the pace of dissolution. He argued his point with Minister Stoltenberg and three days later received from him more freedom of action.77 Even after greater clarity for the disposition of NVA equipment and property was achieved, transportation and logistics problems played havoc with the planned time schedules, forcing delays.78 Second, like LTG von Scheven and COL Klenner, he provided evidence that there was political guidance and control beyond the tempo of dissolution. Defense Minister Stoltenberg overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all the NVA's MIG-29 combat aircraft in Schonbohm's words "because the scrapping of the most modern fighter would have led without a doubt to a lack of understanding and substantial public turbulence."79 Minister Stoltenberg also intervened decisively in late 1990 by issuing firm guidance on the equality of treatment of recruits in the east and west. In November 1990, eastern draftees complained that their Christmas, vacation, and discharge pays were less than that of their
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western peers. Stoltenberg then made the decision that as of January 1, 1991, all recruits from the east and west were to be treated equally.80 These then are clear examples of the exercising of the principle of civilian supremacy—der Primat der Politik as the Germans often express it—and also, in the first case, an example of a domestic political factor predominating over the military view. Beyond executive control, formal parliamentary oversight was effected by the formation of a special subcommittee of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag to oversee military affairs in the eastern area. Established in October 1990 and continuing through 1994, it met approximately every six weeks, and before it appeared administrative and military officials serving in the east. It does not appear that any genuine controversy ever manifested itself in this committee. Even the opposition party appeared content with simply remaining informed of, rather than challenging, what was taking place in the east.81 A final point is that not all official political guidance came from Bonn; there were other sources of unofficial guidance. From Schonbohm's discussions with local and regional politicians, for example, it was clear that the Berlin Wall had to be completely dismantled by December 1, 1990.82 In summary, the picture that emerges on the West German side is one in which political leadership certainly did not abdicate or surrender responsibility for the Takeover, but rather gave guidance, exerted oversight of, and at discrete points intervened and even overrode the military leadership when it felt necessary. It is necessary then to distinguish between political control and political guidance, the former is a condition and the latter is an act. It is clear that the condition of political control always existed even if acts of political guidance occurred only seldom. It is to the credit of the military leaders that, unlike many of their predecessors of generations past, they did not reject the principle of civilian supremacy in this vast and unique undertaking, but rather exemplified it.
POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE NVA PRIOR TO THE TAKEOVER Political control of the NVA centered in the hands of one man, Werner E. AblaB, who on July 5, 1990, became the single deputy under Rainer Eppelmann, the Minister for Disarmament and Defense since the March 1990 elections.83 Asked about the role of East German politicians and military during the period from August to September 1990, AblaB stated, "To a man, none. Neither the Minister President [Lothar de Maiziere] nor the Minister of Defense was especially interested in the Unification of these two armies. . . . The Minister President and I spoke twice briefly about it." "He give me a free hand."84 AblaB expressed understanding for the many other issues that consumed the time of de Maiziere, economic problems in particular, but regretted this situation. AblaB led the negotiations on the defense sections of the Unification Treaty with his West German counterpart, Dr. Karl Heinz Carl. AblaB maintained, "I was in complete agreement with the West German politicians [on the major issues]. And because, indeed, in the Federal Republic the primacy of politics
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(Primat der Politik) prevails, I had no problems with the military."85 In this statement, he clearly provided a high compliment to the vitality of the principle of civilian control of the military in the Bundeswehr. On the East German side he said that in conducting the negotiations he had sought to bring the NVA into the discussions "to make things compatible." Decisions, however, were made on the political level, implying that he himself always had the dominant role. NVA leaders, he indicated, were very friendly to their new East German civilian leaders after the March 1990 elections. The military leaders stated they would work with the civilian leaders loyally and in a constructive manner. Such pronouncements were credible to Defense Minister Eppelmann but not to AblaB. Several weeks after assuming his duties, AblaB wished to discharge a great portion of the NVA generals, perhaps 90 percent, as he believed that these generals were Stalinists and had to go. There were good people behind them who could have occupied their positions, and he regretted that Eppelmann did not approve this step. "Eppelmann said, 'We need them.' I said, "We don't need them. They are old Stalinists. They can go." 86 AblaB believed that the generals would have "boycotted" this step, defending their claims for social welfare (Absicherung). As it was, the generals did disrupt plans, by sometimes only partially implementing instructions issued to them. Several days before the Unification on September 28, 1990, he discharged the final twenty-four NVA generals.87 NOTES 1. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Bonn, 1 June 1991; BMVg, "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Staatssekretar, Org 1 Az 10-02-05, Bonn, 20 June 1990. 2. Ftihrungsstab des Heeres (Fu H), "Eingleiderung der NVA-Heeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung im Fii H," [Memo] ChefStab Fu H. Bonn, 7 August, 1990. 3. Interview with COL Herwig Scheffler, Section Chief, Review Group, Army Staff, Bonn, 4 October and November 6, 1991. COL Scheffler was the secretary of the Army Steering Group. 4. "Eingleiderung der NVA-Heeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung im Fii H." 5. Heeresamt, "Befehl Nr. 1 fiir die Arbeiten im Heeresamt zur Integration der NVALandstreitkrafte in das Heer," Abteilung I 1 (2) Az 02-06. Cologne, 23 August 1990. 6. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfligen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die HinterlassenschaftderNVA," Truppenpraxis (11'1991): 19. 7. MAV, "Ordnung Nr. 010/9/025 des Ministers fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung iiber dienstliche und aufterdienstliche Kontakte zwischen Angehorigen der Nationalen Volksarmee und Soldaten der Bundeswehr,u Rainer Eppelmann, 28 May 1990. 8. Letter to the author, October 5, 1992; Briefing by MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Commander, German Command and Staff College, November 1992, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Notes held by author. For shortness of time, see also Ulrich A.
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Hundt, "Innere Fuhrung—eine gute Mitgift fiir Bundeswehr Ost," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 186; Gerhard Hubatschek, "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 28. 9. Interview, MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Newport, RI, 24 November 1992. 10. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992); interview, COL Wolfgang Gulich, Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden, 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Volker Neeb, Section Chief, Information Center, Joint Staff, Bonn, October 11, 1991. 11. Interview with COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 12. Interview with COL Joachim Steinhaus, Command and Control Officer (G-6 Section Leader), Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. 13. The reconnaissance is discussed at greater length in the chapter on equipment and facilities. 14. MG Richter stated 1,300 in Fii H, "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaiMich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990." Fu H/InfoLZ, Bonn, 17 September 1990. BG von Kirchbach indicated 1,500. Interview, BG Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Director, Division I (Innere Fuhrung, Personnel, Training) Army Staff (former commander of Home Defense Brigade 41, Eggesin), Bonn, 16 June 92. However in his book, he used the figure 1,200. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 14. LTC Lahmann stated that 1,200 officers and 800 NCOs went. Interview LTC Lahmann, Personnel Officer, Seventh Division and Military Region, Leipzig, 18 June 1992. Time magazine put the numbers at 1,200 officers and 300 NCOs. "Victory without a Battlefield," 1 July 1991, 26. 15. Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 34; interview, COL Jan Jorg Oerding, Division Chief, Division III 1 (Fundamentals of Operational C & C, Contributions to Pol-Mil Strategy) Army Staff, Bonn, 15 June 1992. LTG Schonbohm addressed other factors in a western officer's decision to go east: desiring to return to his home region and being filled with a pioneering spirit (p. 196). For polling data on western Bundeswehr views concerning assignments in the east, see Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke ausihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 38. 16. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 51, 53. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 491. Bross continued with the missions that were given to them. 17. Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 42—ein Tagebuch," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 54. 18. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 52; interview, COL Scheffler, 6 November 1991. 19. Fii H, "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Fu H IV 1, Az 10-01-03, Bonn, 17 September 1990: 1; interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992. 20. Fii H, "Vorlaufige organisatorische Bestimmungen fiir Kommandobehorden, Stabe und Truppenteile des Heeres im beigetretenen Teil Deutschland," Fii H IV, Bonn, 27 September 1990. 21. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992.
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22. Letter to the author from MG Reinhardt, October 5, 1992. Also, interviews, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992, and BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit, 13. 23. Fii H, "Ubernahme der Befehls- und Kommandogewalt iiber die Streitkrafte des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands durch den Bundesminster der Verteidigung: Personalabstellung Heer," Message, Fii H I 1, Bonn, 171646 September 1990. 24. "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Annex 1; interview, COL Scheffler, 6 November 1991. 25. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)" Cologne, 18 March 1991. 26. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 27. Interview, BG Wolfgang Beltermann, Chief of Staff, Corps/Territorial CommandEast, Potsdam, 12 November 1991. 28. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 19 November 1991; Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 195, 197, 198. For a diary of a West German officer who went east to assume command of the Third Motorized Rifle Regiment in Brandenburg, see Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 421—ein Tagebuch," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 54-58; and also Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 421—ein Tagebuch (Teil II)," Truppenpraxis (2/1992): 165-170. 29. Bundeswehrkommando Ost, "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fur Fiihrung, Ausbildung und Organisation," Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando Ost, Az 32-01-08. Strausberg, 3 Oktober 1990, 1. 30. Steinseifer, "Zusammenfiigen und verkleinern," 20; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 33. 31. Ibid., 1-2. 32. "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 777-779. 33. "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fiir Fiihrung, Ausbildung und Organisation," 3-4. Also see interview with Schonbohm, "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutenant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/1990, 4; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 32; and Fu H, "Vorlaufige Dienstanweisung fiir die Befehlshaber in den Wehrbereichen VII and VIII," Fii H IV 1, Az 10-32-91, Bonn, 24 September 1990. 34. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 4. 35. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 61. 36. Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command, "Report to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces," Subject: "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," Commander, Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command, Strausberg, June 26, 1991. 37. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 4. See also Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 43.
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38. MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 7. 39. LTG Werner von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fiihrungsakademie der Bundeswehr aus AnlaB der erstmaligen Teilnahme von ehemaligen NVA-Berufsoffizieren am Grundlehrgang der Fortbildungs Stufe C" [Lecture at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College on the Occasion of the First Participation of Previous NVA Career Officers in the Basic Course of Advanced Officer Education Level C], Hamburg, 4 March 1993, 12. 40. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 170. See the chapter on equipment and facilities for further discussion of the Gulf War effort by the Bundeswehr to ship NVA equipment to allied and friendly states fighting Iraq. 41. Zwei Armeen, for example, 126, 218. 42. Ibid., 96, 131. 43. Ibid., 86-87, 90-91, 128, 134, 191, 201, 225. 44. Ibid., 106-107, 128, 134, 149, 152. 45. Fiihrungstab der Streitkrafte (Fii S), "Dienststellen im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands: Organisationsbereich Zentrale Militarische Bundeswehrdienst." Fii S IV 3. 12 September 1990. For a comprehensive interview of Schonbohm as he completed his command, see "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 332-338. He provides some summary statistics on personnel strengths in this article (p. 338) and also in his "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 44-45. 46. Interview with COL Klenner, 25 June 1992; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 216. 47. "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," 1-2. 48. Ibid., 2. Also see his speech of 1 July, Zwei Armeen, 249-252. 49. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 250. 50. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm." Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 338. 51. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 246. 52. Interview, COL Alfred Lassoncyzk, Logistics Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East, Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 53. "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," 24. He also explained this rationale in his book, Zwei Armeen, 28. 54. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 201. For a good overview of the Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, see von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 608. 55. Ibid., 609. 56. The following analysis is based on Herbert Rosinski's sweeping treatment of the history of Prussian-German armies in The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966). The most authoritative, scholarly analysis of this subject is Gordon A. Craig's The Poltics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). 57. Ibid., 173. 58. Ibid., 174. 59. For example, see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 73, 79; Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 56; Axel Biirgener, "Sisyphus laBt griissen: Sicherheitspolitische Rahmenbedingungen der Heeresplanung," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 586; Young, "The 'Normalization' of The Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures," 18-19,26.
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60. When asked about the nature and extent of "political control and guidance," most interviewees took this to mean control and guidance given by politicians and civilians in government positions. This, of course, is not the only meaning of the phrase. In a more abstract sense it can mean control and guidance of a political nature—as compared to a social, economic, military, or technological nature, for example. In the second context such control and guidance deals with issues of a political nature, a phrase that is likewise subject to various meanings. In this study, it refers to issues on which individuals, groups of individuals, organizations, parties, states, disagree and engage in a process to resolve the disagreement. A social issue is taken to be one simply that deals with or has an impact on a group or groups of people. An economic or financial issue deals with some aspect of economics—for example, the production of goods and services, employment, fiscal, or monetary policy. Certainly, these general descriptors are not mutually exclusive. An issue can be for example both political and social, political and military, or economic and political. 61. Interview, Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl, former State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 4 July 1992. Notes of interview held by author. 62. Interview, LTG Werner von Scheven, Commanding General, Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 63. Werner von Scheven, "Die wunderbare Auferstehung der Auftragtaktik—Zwei Jahre nach der deutschen Vereinigung zieht das Korps/Territorialkommando Ost Bilanz," Truppenpraxis (611992): 53 3. 64. Interview MG Ruprecht Haasler, Commander, Eighth Division and Military Region, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. 65. Interview, MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Commander, German Command and Staff Academy, Newport, Rhode Island, 24 November 1992. 66. Ibid. 67.Ibid. 68. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 69. Ibid. 70. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 71. Interview, COL Jantzen, 11 November 1991. In addition, the following officers in interviews made similar comments on this subject: COL Freiherr Friedrich von Senden, Commander, Home Defense Brigade 42, Potsdam, 26 June 1992, notes from interview held by author; COL Dieter H. E. Wolff, Deputy Director of Training, German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992; LTC Herbert Danzer, Assistant Operations Officer, Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 92; LT Kuhl, Assistant Personnel Officer, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. LTC Kiihl had the most succinct way of stating it. He described the process of political guidance as "goals, framework, just do it" (Ziele, Rahmen, macht mal). 72. Interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992. LTC Danzer also referred to the quantitative requirements from the politicians. Interview, 18 June 1992. 73. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. 74. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 75. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 47. 76. Ibid., 86-87, 90-91, 128, 169. 77. Ibid., 90-91, 93. This was a tentative decision by the Committee, but Schonbohm indicated that the Defense Ministry would act on it as if it were official.
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78. Ibid., 182. 79. Ibid., 94. Schonbohm also indicated that from the outset the various political parties were very interested in supporting the Takeover, but provides little detail beyond this. "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 32. 80. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 102. 81. Interview with LTG a.D. Werner von Scheven, 18 June 1998, Potsdam. 82. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 99. 83. Material for this section was drawn from an interview with Werner E. AblaB, Director, Field Office, MOD (Former Deputy Defense Minister, MDD, GDR), Strausberg, 26 June 1992. He also published a book on the dissolution of the NVA, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992). 84.Ibid. 85. Ibid. Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb define this as the "subordination of the military under democratic, legitimate political responsibility:" the military is subordinate to the political leaders. "Wer bist Du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 650. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid. Concerning the influence of West German politicians, AblaB indicated that they had no influence in this area during the months leading up to Unification. Things eventually changed as Unification came increasingly closer.
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5
Management and Force Structure Decisions With the first research question addressed, the groundwork is now laid for the subsequent questions which comprise the heart of this study: What were the key decisions made and what were the important factors in these decisions? More specifically, in this Takeover of one military by another, did military factors or other "nonmilitary" factors—political, financial, social, psychological, or other—predominate? Concerning political factors, the study found in the previous chapter that there was only minimal guidance from political leaders. Nonetheless, military leaders can still consider and be influenced by political factors, domestic-political as well as international. Were the military leaders still informed and motivated by political factors? In the social area, to what extent were the decisions motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns about the welfare of the former NVA and what role did the possibility of social unrest play in decision making? These issues are all important and relevant. Within this first area of management and force structure, four decisions were most important and deserving of serious analysis: 1. Following Unification, only one German military force would exist—not two, as the East Germans had wanted. 2. The organization of the new units of the German Army activated in the former East Germany according to AS 5 and superimposing this structure on the NVA land forces structure remaining after the Takeover. 3. Building the new army structure at the same time that unneeded former NVA units were dissolved. 4. Assigning to the newly activated units in the east partnership units from the west to assist them in accomplishing their missions.
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DECISION 1: ONE ARMY The Minister of Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmann, had maintained throughout the spring and much of the summer of 1990 that after Unification the NVA would continue to exist. At a Commander's Conference of the NVA on May 2, 1990, he asserted: After the Unification there will also be a second German Army on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, not integrated into any alliance, to exercise here its own territorial security functions, that must be trained and equipped. This is also a result of the arrangements with Minister Stoltenberg.1 The NVA saw itself serving a bridging function (Bruckenfunktion) to the armed forces of the eastern European states—especially Soviet forces—during a transition phase, lasting presumably until the final departure of the Soviet forces in 1994. This would be their independent contribution to the security structure of Europe.2 In terms of the NVA's future size in relation to the Bundeswehr, one NVA general estimated it would make up one sixth of the Bundeswehr after Unification.3 As of mid-June, Minister Stoltenberg still talked publicly in terms of a "transition period" (Ubergangszeit) following Unification, after which there would be one unified military.4 The MOD changed its position some time in midsummer after the mid-July Kohl-Gorbachev meeting. Minister Stoltenberg conferred with other defense ministers, the state secretaries under him, and the Bundeswehr military leaders and made the decision that there would be only one Army after Unification.5 By early August, Minister Stoltenberg announced that all German forces would be Bundeswehr, not two separate armed forces.6 At this time he also indicated that of the 370,000 personnel ceiling agreed to by Gorbachev and Kohl in the Caucasus, 50,000 would come from the former NVA, with half being professional soldiers and half being recruits.7 For the key political-military issues between the FRG and the GDR, the midJuly 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev meeting proved decisive. West Germany could join with East Germany, and although no NATO forces could be stationed in former GDR territory, the FRG could continue to be a member of NATO. GDR Minister Eppelmann relented on his desire for two separate armies. On September 21, 1990, in one of his final orders as the Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Eppelmann stated: "At 12 A.M., October 2, 1990, the command authority of the central leadership of the NVA ends and is transferred at 12 A.M. to the Minister of Defense [FRG]."8 LTG Schonbohm characterized the undertaking as "not the leading together of two German armies but the constructing of new armed forces with the members of the Bundeswehr and the former NVA." An important factor in the decision can be seen in his emphasis on unity. "If we want Germany to grow together and as rapidly as possible to become one nation and one army, in feeling and in action, than the Bundeswehr has an important task."9
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MG Richter, who headed the MOD Advance Party to the East German MDD and who later assumed command of the Military District VII, stated that through the staffing of the issue at MOD the number of NVA personnel to be taken over became clear. It was neither a political nor military requirement, rather it became clear that the Takeover had to be done this way to achieve unity. This was the decisive point.10 His counterpart in the Military District VIII, MG Haasler in discussing the large number of western personnel sent east, provided another factor in this decision. He stated it was very important that from the beginning the NVA were led and controlled by the concepts (Vorstellungen) of the Bundeswehr. *1 Financial considerations must have also played a role in the decision to maintain only one Army. This can be inferred from comments made by West German officers cited earlier related to the political pressure to maintain a certain tempo for the dissolution of NVA, pressure driven primarily by the desire to husband scare funds. DECISION 2: USE ARMY STRUCTURE 5 The second critical decision in the Takeover was to organize the new units established from the remains of NVA after Unification according to the new AS 5 and to superimpose this structure on the