From Confrontation to Cooperation: The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr (Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought)

FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION

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FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION The Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army + by the Bundeswehr + FREDERICK ZILIAN, JR. Foreword by Werner von Scheven

Praeger Studies in Diplomacy and Strategic Thought B.J.C. McKercher, Series Editor

PMEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Zilian, Frederick, 1948From confrontation to cooperation : the takeover of the National People's (East German) Army by the Bundeswehr / Frederick Zilian, Jr. : foreword by Werner von Scheven. p. cm.—(Praeger studies in diplomacy and strategic thought, ISSN 1076-1543) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-96546-5 (alk. paper) 1. Germany (East). NationaleVolksarmee—Demobilization. 2. Germany—Armed Forces—Reorganization. 3. Germany—History— Unification, 1990. I. Title. II. Series. UA719.3.Z55 1999 355.3'09431—dc21 98-47816 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright © 1999 by Frederick Zilian, Jr. All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 98-47816 ISBN: 0-275-96546-5 ISSN: 1076-1543 First published in 1999 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America

<~r The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-1984). 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents Illustrations

vii

Foreword by LTG (Ret.) Werner von Scheven

ix

Preface

xvii

Abbreviations

xix

Introduction

1

1. Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory

11

2. The Political Setting

21

3. The Military Setting

31

4. Organization and Political Control

59

5. Management and Force Structure Decisions

85

6. Personnel Decisions

95

7. Training and Education Decisions

137

8. Equipment and Facilities Decisions

159

9. The Takeover and the "New Tasks" of the Bundeswehr

175

vi

Contents

10. Conclusion

185

Appendix A: Key Figures in the Takeover

201

Appendix B: Army Structure 5

203

Appendix C: Peacetime Organization of the German Army (in 1994)

207

Selected Bibliography

209

Index

225

Illustrations FIGURES Figure 3.1 Organization of the National People's Army (Land Forces)

33

Figure 3.2 Control of the NVA by the Socialist Unity Party (SED)

38

Figure 3.3 Organization of the German Army (1986)

46

Figure 4.1 MOD/Army Staff Steering Committee Structure for the Takeover of the NVA

61

Figure 4.2 Organizational Structure of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command on October 3, 1990

65

Figure 4.3 Staff Structure of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command

66

Figure 4.4 Army Organization within Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (October 1990)

67

Figure 6.1 Transition of NVA Officers into the German Army, October 1990 to January 1993

106

Figure 8.1 CFE Treaty Limitations for the United Germany

162

Figure 10.1 Planned Personnel Structure of the Bundeswehr by Rank

189

viii

Illustrations

Figure 10.2 Planned Personnel Strength of the Service Branches (End 1994)

190

TABLES Table 4.1 Allocation of Command and Support Groups to

64

Former NVA Units

Table 5.1 Unit Partnerships (Field Army) Between Units in the East and West

91

Table 5.2 Unit Partnerships (Territorial Army) Between Units in the East and West

91

Table 7.1 Course Overview: Supplemental Training Course for Former NVA in the Grade of Captain

144

Table 8.1 Major NVA Weapon Systems (Land Forces) Taken Over by the German Army at Unification

161

Table B. 1 Army Structure 4 vs. Army Structure 5

204

Foreword For close to ten years now Fred Zilian and I have known one another and have kept in close contact. At that time I headed the Command and General Staff College of the Bundeswehr in Hamburg, a college that sits at the pinnacle of the German military education system. For forty years U.S. officers, as well as officers of numerous other states have visited the College to participate in courses up to two years in length that deal with the art of command and control in war in the tradition of the German General Staff. At the college we discussed without restriction all subjects dealing with the international system. High-ranking military officers and noted experts from the world over were available to us. Only a single theme was off limits: For West German professional officers to speak on German soil in an official setting about the unification of the two Germanys was to enter into a forbidden zone, something typical for all of democratic, postwar Germany. The theme of German unity played a role in the Sunday afternoon speeches of politicians; however, whoever wanted to deal with this subject on a practical level—be he civilian or military—brought upon himself inevitably very loud denunciations. From the left came the accusation of an "insufficient acceptance of guilt for the consequences of World War II." From the right came the claim that such actions "endangered the delicate stability of the Cold War." From East Germany came the cries of "revanchism and imperialism." Germans in fact held a strong inhibition on this subject—and not only those who pondered the practical paths to unification between the two Germanys. I had seen many corners of the globe and had spent a good year of my life in the United States; however, as a West German professional soldier, I was restricted from East Germany. How I envied my American colleagues who could travel there and how I wished also to go, at the least into East Berlin, the capital

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Foreword

city. Born in 1937,1 had been a young boy in Berlin for the first twelve years of my life. I had gone into the cellar with my mother and siblings during the air raids until we were evacuated to the surrounding area. I had endured the Soviet attack on the imperial capital and then the occupation regime there, and finally I had gone hungry during the Berlin Blockade until we were flown out. I could then conclude my schooling in Hesse before I became a soldier in the new German armed forces. As an officer with access to classified material, I constantly made trips to West Berlin on allied airlines. Also, in the Defense Ministry in Bonn where I worked for a total of nine years, there was no discussion or even a tentative blueprint for the possibility of a unification of the two German states. Both armies in Germany never had contact. One would only see the other side if one had an assignment as an observer of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Not even once, for example, did a military band visit the other side. From our perspective the National People's Army (NVA) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was a reliable alliance partner of the Soviet Union. We knew that it was devoted to a massive threat picture, in which the Bundeswehr played a central role. Contact with visitors from the West was as forbidden to members of the East German army as listening to communications from the West. Offenses were punished and also damaged careers. Units were kept at an exceptionally high state of operational readiness—something done not for professional, military but rather political, ideological reasons. This readiness had been dictated by the Soviet general staff uniformly for the Warsaw Pact and remained so until the end. So believed this world of ideological self-certainty, that had to guard itself against disturbing outside influences, surely not a sign of strength. This world of ideological self-certainty in the GDR experienced its first shocks since 1953 when the Communist leadership in the GDR resisted the reform efforts of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and the economic downturn of the entire East Bloc could no longer be swept under the rug. The world of the trusted Communist satellites began to collapse, however, when Poland and Hungary decided to take the path of freedom, democracy, and market economy, and people in the GDR took to the streets in waves to demand a change. When massive demonstrations erupted in the GDR, the NVA was not employed against its own population. In November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and the people now called for the unity of all Germans and for the use of the West German mark as the common currency. The borders to West Germany were opened. In the National People's Army a military reform was attempted, however much too late. New uniforms were fashioned. I had taken up contacts in the summer of 1990 with the Friedrich Engels Military College in Dresden. This college with over 1000 officers and soldiers engaged in desperate efforts to come up with some useful revision of their mission through a program of "conversion" (privitization of military institutes and facilities). For professional soldiers the question was now literally one of existence. The atmosphere was gloomy. Hopes

Foreword

XI

were awakened by the East German Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmann, that the two armies in a united Germany would play a security role in middle Europe for five more years. This however was all in vain. In March 1990 democratic elections were held in the GDR, and after July 1 the West German mark became valid for all Germans. The GDR left the Warsaw Pact on September 30, 1990, and came itself to end on October 3 with its accession to the Federal Republic of Germany. In this same moment the army of the GDR joined with the Bundeswehr. It became a part of the Bundeswehr, stationed on the land of the former GDR. The soldiers of the former NVA donned Bundeswehr uniforms, a case without precedent in modern history. The National People's Army experienced "die Wende" (the turning) in the GDR as a shock and difficult challenge to their loyalty. In its structure, training, and equipment, the NVA essentially corresponded to the Soviet example. The NVA had long imitated the Soviet Army, propagandized with the saying: "To learn from the Soviet Union is to learn how to win." This was often displayed at many military posts of the NVA. The decades of long imitation of the Soviet model made professional cooperation between the soldiers of east and west Germany more difficult than many people had expected. Both German armed forces belonged to different, indeed antagonistic, social systems. Two contrasting and entirely different military cultures existed on German soil. In order not to disrupt the 2 + 4 negotiations over Germany, professional communications between the armies began very late. The intelligence services of both countries had never investigated the possibility of a peaceful joining of a communist army to a larger democratic army of the same nation. What the approximate 1500 West German soldiers of all ranks had necessarily to know as they went from West to East Germany and got down to work, they thus had to learn essentially on the job. And here they depended on the loyalty and cooperation of their East German comrades. Whether and how this has worked or not is the subject of this book. I will only offer an example from my own experiences to illustrate the process. In late summer 1990, the first rumors surfaced in the Bundeswehr about a unification with the NVA. Were the professional soldiers of the NVA to find a place in the Bundeswehr? A storm of indignation arose at the Command and General Staff College in Hamburg. This took on such force that I decided one day to gather all officers in the main auditorium, so that they could conduct a free and open debate on the pro's and con's of the takeover of the NVA professional soldiers. I moderated the discussion from the podium. After three hours I ended the debate and then offered a final word the sense of which follows. We may not betray the values whose defense we guarantee. These values include a view of human beings that forbids any generalized judgments about our fellow men. Such we have also held about the earlier soldiers of the German Wehrmacht [Army in World War II], although the Wehrmacht is no example for the Bundeswehr. The suitability of an NVA officer or non-commissioned officer for service in the Bundeswehr must be

Xll

Foreword

examined on an individual basis. The imminent joining of all Germans has, given the current situation, a West-East slope; however, it is no one-way street. We should be happy to live on this side of the Iron Curtain, something that occurred without our own conscious acts. Integration will indeed be a very difficult exercise, but one that we must resolve together.

Not before August 1990 Defense Minister Stoltenberg made his intention known that he would station the Bundeswehr, reduced to 370,000 active soldiers, as a common armed force on the expanded territory of the united Germany and that he would integrate up to 25,000 professional soldiers of the National People's Army. On October 1, 1990, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact began with the exit of the German Democratic Republic. In the same time period the [East German] Minister for Disarmament and Defense discharged all generals and admirals of the NVA, all officers 55 and older, as well as female officer-candidates who did not belong to the Medical Service Corps. He admitted the remainder into civil service. Officers of the military justice corps and political officers had been discharged earlier. At the same time about 1500 officers and non-commissioned officers of the West German army, navy, and air force were brought together for a final time at three locations in West Germany. They were to assume in two days command authority over the "joined" NVA. The next morning they were expected to be sent on their way over the border of the GDR that would soon cease to exist. That afternoon I took a helicopter to Hannover with Lieutenant General Jorg Schonbohm, the Director of the Planning Staff under Minister Stoltenberg. Gathered there at the Army Officers School were approximately 700 army officers and non-commissioned officers. It had been determined that two days later Schonbohm would organize under him a newly created Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command in Strausberg from the remains of the GDR Ministries and from all Bundeswehr soldiers in the east and take command of the approximate 1500 troop units and agencies of the NVA. For the first time in the history of the Bundeswehr, a single general was given command of a national, joint service command, if only for nine months. I was designated for the first six months to be his deputy and also was entrusted with the mission of dissolving special units under the centralized command of the NVA Headquarters. Afterward I was to assume command of the East German Territorial Command in Potsdam near Berlin and to activate a new IV Corps of the German Army. At the end of the long day during which the West German Army leadership answered numerous questions, Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Henning von Ondarza suddenly ended the discussion and sent the 700 officers and NCOs on their way with the following exhortation (paraphrased). Gentlemen, we have told you what we know. Much today we do not know; many questions therefore must go unanswered. Go to your destinations early tomorrow. See who is

Foreword

Xlll

there. Check things out. Give the NVA leaders you find there your trust. Leave any selfrighteousness at home and win their loyalty. You are now aware of the sense of my intentions and that of the Defense Minister. Use your own initiative accordingly. You have learned to size up a situation, even when this is an unusual situation and includes many uncertainties. You have learned to decide. Decide on location what is necessary and keep us informed. Then softly he added, "In this sense it is no different than in battle where uncertainty is the rule and friction is unavoidable."

And thus it was. Our people did not have to hear those words again! With this statement they experienced a tremendous feeling of emancipation. The words of the Chief of Staff set free such a power of action and initiative, that had never been believed ever again possible by many. And so with this unification the Bundeswehr experienced the remarkable blossoming of Auftragstaktik, a tradition as well as a training goal of the German Army, but something in danger of atrophy after 35 years of operating in the bureaucratic routines of peacetime. Fred Zilian has given the proper weight to the meaning of this leadership principle for the success of this unusual operation for "German Unity." The importance of this principle cannot at all be overestimated. It was the conditio sine qua non. On October 2, 1990, the Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmarm, dissolved the National People's Army. He arranged for ceremonies in order "to retire the existing symbols that were tied to the traditions of the GDR." He directed the uninterrupted guarding of the military "objects" (weapons, equipment, and facilities) as well as the maintenance of the required functions and forces for the preservation of air sovereignty. With an Order of the Day he discharged finally the 92,000 (from the previous 170,000) soldiers and the 47,000 civilian employees from their obligations to the GDR, to take effect midnight, October 2. For the last time the national colors of the GDR were lowered. At the same time I departed the Command and Staff College in Hamburg with a charge to all its members. I pointed out the remarkable Renaissance of the right to self-determination for peoples in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Helsinki Final Act, something that now also had reached the German nation. The both parts of Germany were released from their roles as front-line states. With the right to self-determination came also to Germans the duty of responsibility. The Germans in west and east had long agreed that on either side of the Iron Curtain they were responsible for insuring that war never again occurred about Germany or by Germany. I expressed the feeling of thanks, that moved me on this day. Special thanks I paid to the United States and Canada, because these two allies—from a sense of transatlantic responsibility for peace in Europe—wisely and without second thoughts supported the German unification process. Above all the Germans in the GDR had to be thanked, because they provided a unique example of perse-

XIV

Foreword

verance, prudence, and imagination in German history, and by this served as a symbol for all of Europe. Then I cast an eye on the huge task of completing the unity of the German people in freedom. The forty-five year division and imprisonment of Germans in the east had caused devastating consequences. Fifty-seven years of "might makes right" in the eastern part of the Fatherland had made the people there, already in the third generation, accustomed to a state power dealing cynically with right and truth. This by and large had led to their adaptation to the system as a means of mental survival, and to their adaptation to a life with two faces, one for official use and one for the private sphere. We had no reason therefore for self-righteousness, rather we had fully a duty to know ourselves, to recognize our own limitations, and to have patience. I then addressed the situation of the Bundeswehr in the process of unification, and said the Western Group of Soviet Forces on the soil of the joined section of Germany will enjoy during the period of its departure "guest rights" stemming from the treaty. The Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command had the mission to support its return to its homeland. The Soviet soldiers would have to come to terms with the fact that their "enemy" now appeared on the TV screen in full military display as a peaceful neighbor. Our motto would be: "Soviet soldiers, go home with our help—and go as friends of Germany." Concerning the soldiers of the National People's Army I explained: "Because our Soldiers' Law as of tomorrow is also valid for them, they are then our comrades." I described the situation and additionally called on all of them to treat our new comrades with sincerity, not to isolate them, to give them responsibility for our new common task, and reveal to them what the countrymen behind the innerGerman border and the Berlin Wall had experienced—how they thought about it then. I spoke of the great chance of the Bundeswehr as a draft army to provide a meaningful contribution to unity. And then I could not help but make them aware that we had lived our last day of service in the old familiar Federal Republic, in the old, familiar Bundeswehr, in the old, familiar Command and Staff College, and soon nothing more would be the same as it had been for decades. It would be several years until this realization had spread throughout West Germany. Fred Zilian had a unique opportunity, when he experienced the unification of Germany with the soldiers and had constant access throughout the chain of command, as high as the level of the Defense Ministry. With great expertise and noteworthy sympathetic understanding, he has used his numerous contacts in the officer corps of the German Army in order to produce a unique publication. For example, by his use of my own statements, I can see how conscientious he handles quotes from eyewitnesses. Zilian does not restrict himself to the role of a chronicler. He examines systematically key questions and organizes these questions according to the interests of those who were not present for the Unification. Some questions are genuinely sensitive. With great skill and persistence he judges the wealth of documents and

Foreword

xv

personal sources from all leadership levels and assembles the findings in a profound and critical discourse, impressive also to German eyewitnesses. He goes into detail without losing sight of the larger picture. In his conclusion he delves into future issues and also, on a theoretical level, presents observations and propositions that can be applied to other case studies. The book has a notable scientific quality, but still it is exciting to read. Zilian constructs a bridge of understanding for all American readers, who still today ask, how the Germans have overcome such an unexpected and for so long unimaginable, historic challenge, and how they did it this time without damage to themselves and their neighbors, but rather with benefit. Werner von Scheven Lieutenant General (Ret.) German Army

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Preface As an army officer I departed the United States in 1989 for a second tour of duty in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Eighteen years before, I had departed for Germany on my first tour as a newly commissioned officer and had spent more than three years in the Eighth Infantry Division in Mainz, wrestling with the many problems the U.S. Army faced as its involvement in the Vietnam War was ending. As I left for my second tour, I had mixed feelings. In the midst of finishing my doctoral comprehensive exams, I had initially resisted the assignment. And yet my German blood and love of German culture drew me. The Army rescued me from my confusion and with ease settled the matter. Off I went to the land of Goethe and Beethoven with wife, three children, and dog in tow. We arrived in August 1989; the Berlin Wall fell in November. When a few months later I began contemplating my dissertation, I needed to expend only little effort to isolate a topic at once exciting, interesting, topical, and ripe with potential: Germany's Unification. Only a slight nudge from my advisor, Professor Eliot Cohen, was needed to redirect me to the more suitable and manageable chunk of that profound event: the unification of the two armies. For once my timing was propitious. Not only was I in Germany at the right moment, but I was also serving as a liaison officer from the U.S. Training and Doctrine Command to the German Army. Not only was I—living in a German village near Bonn—immersed in German society, but daily I worked in the language at the German Army Office in Cologne, a major military command that in 1990 became involved in the planning for the Takeover of the National People's (East German) Army. I was thus afforded the opportunity to establish a wide net of German military colleagues who became involved in planning and executing the takeover and without whose cooperation my dissertation—and now this book—would not have been possible.

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Preface

I thank the many people who made this study possible. The greatest thanks go to my advisor and friend, Eliot Cohen, whose faith, support, and guidance were crucial, and also to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Werner von Scheven who read the entire manuscript, offered many suggestions, and kindly agreed to write the foreword. Thanks to Andrew Bacevich, Andrew Krepinevich, Jeffrey Simon, and Stephen Szabo for reading an early version of it. Thomas-Durell Young and John Maurer provided unique moral support, advice, and encouragement at key places. Many thanks to all the German officers and noncommissioned officers who gave of their time to be interviewed and to assist in other ways, especially the following general officers: Andreas Broicher, Ruprecht Haasler, Wilko Hartmann, Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Ekkehard Richter, and Andreas Wittenberg. Other officers, Wolfgang Gulich, Dietmar Klenner, Axel Hecht, and Werner Klingenberg were especially kind, interested in this study, and free with their time. A special thanks to Herwig Scheffler who played a crucial role in assembling key documents for me. On the former East German side, Werner AblaB, Giinther Bormann, and Hans-Georg Loffler were especially helpful because of their key positions. Thanks to Jtirgen Forster, Wolfgang Eisert, HansJoachim Harder, and the other members of the German Military History Research Office who assisted me. I would like to thank the Strategic Studies Program of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, for providing sufficient funding for me to conduct the research for this study, to Portsmouth Abbey School for its additional financial and administrative support, and to the wonderful staff of the Naval War College Library who always offered me efficient and good-natured support. Thanks to the many editors at Greenwood Publishing who assisted me, to Robin Weisberg and Roberta Stevens for their meticulous work on the manuscript, and to Tom Kennedy for his faithful assistance in helping me fathom German idioms. For their warm friendship and logistical support during my research trips, thanks to Monika and Sarandis Roditis, and to Ken and Monika Weinberg. Finally, I thank my family—my wife, Geri, and our children, Nicole, Thomas, and James—for the unwavering net of love and support that through time we together have weaved. It kept me well through all the years of bringing this project to fruition.

Abbreviations ORGANIZATIONS EDC FttH FttS MDD or MAV

MOD or BMVg NVA SED Stasi

European Defense Community Fuhrungstab des Heeres (Army Staff) Fuhrungstab der Streitkrafte (Joint Staff) Ministry of Disarmament and Defense or Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung (East Germany) Ministry of Defense or Bundesministerium fiir Verteidigung (West Germany) Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army) Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist Unity Party) (East Germany) Staatsicherheits Dienst (State Security Service) (East Germany)

MILITARY RANK NCO SGT SSG SFC 1LT CPT MAJ LTC COL BG

noncommissioned officer Sergeant Staff Sergeant Sergeant First Class First Lieutenant Captain Major Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Brigadier General (one star)

Abbreviations

XX

MG LTG GEN

Major General (two star) Lieutenant General (three star) General (four star)

OTHER AS 5 BRD CFE DDR DM EK FRG GDR INF SaZ-2

Army Structure 5 Bundesrepublik Deutschland (West Germany) Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty) Deutsche Demokratische Republik (East Germany) Deutsch Mark Entlassungskandidat Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) German Democratic Republic (East Germany) Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces SoldataufZeit-2 (longer term volunteer—two years)

FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION

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Introduction On October 3, 1990, Germany's Unification Day, Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, the German Minister of Defense, described in his Order of the Day the task facing the armed forces of the former East and West Germanys. "The division of our land has been overcome. Now it is important also to remove the division of thinking and feeling. Soldiers in this regard face a special challenge: they must switch from confrontation to cooperation."1 On this day, the National People's Army (Nationale Volksarmee—N VA) of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) was officially dissolved. The Federal Armed Forces of Germany—the Bundeswehr—began in earnest the weighty task of assuming control over a former enemy armed force made up of ethnically common people, a task virtually unique in history.2 To launch into this task, the Bundeswehr established the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (Bundeswehrkommando Osi), headed by Lieutenant General (LTG) Jorg Schonbohm, formerly the Director of the Planning Staff in the Ministry of Defense (MOD). Shortly after assuming his post, he clarified the principal tasks of his command: to dissolve the former People's Army and, without delay, organize the new armed forces according to the democratic rule of law.3 This command served its functions until July 1, 1991, when it was dissolved and the individual branches of service of the Bundeswehr—the German Army, Navy, and Air Force—assumed responsibility for their respective units in the former East Germany. Formidable indeed was this undertaking, which German military officers initially described as an "integration" (Integration) but later as a "Takeover" (Ubernahme). Just prior to Unification, the NVA consisted of approximately 90,000 men. Next to this were 19,000 members of the Border Guards (Grenztruppe) and 40,000 defense civilians, which together with the army com-

2

From Confrontation to Cooperation

prised some 1,400 military and civilian organizations. This raised the total strength of the Bundeswehr to 590,000 men and 210,000 defense civilians.4 Beyond personnel, the Bundeswehr assumed control of the arsenal of the former People's Army, Border Guards, and paramilitary organizations, including 2,300 main battle tanks, 7,800 armored vehicles, 2,500 artillery pieces, 400 combat aircraft, 90 combatant vessels, 50 attack helicopters, 300 surface-to-surface missiles, 12,000 ground-to-air missiles, 43,000 antitank rockets, 100,000 wheeled vehicles, and 300,000 tons of ammunition.5 Despite the magnitude of the additional personnel, equipment, material, and property that the Bundeswehr now had to control and manage, perhaps the greatest challenge was noted by the Defense Minister in his Order of the Day—"to remove the division of thinking and feeling."6 Although the mechanical aspects of the Takeover were largely completed by the end of 1992, many German officers believed that the "takeover of the minds" would probably take a generation. As if the Takeover were not enough, the Bundeswehr was faced simultaneously with several other major issues stemming from the changed security conditions and new international agreements, all of which combined with the Takeover to present a fivefold challenge. As a consequence of the Kohl-Gorbachev agreements in July 1990, the Bundeswehr had to reduce its strength by 1995 from approximately 580,000 after assuming control of the NVA to 370,000, a reduction of about 36 percent. Second, the Takeover came as the Bundeswehr was reconfiguring itself into a new army structure, Army Structure 5 (AS 5), no meager undertaking for an army even without other preoccupations. Third, to aid in the allied war effort against Iraq, the German military, beginning shortly after Unification, assembled, organized, displayed for inspection, transported to port, and dispatched to the Gulf, a multitude of former East German military equipment. Fourth, adjusting to changed domestic as well as international security conditions, the Bundeswehr was called on by Defense Minister Stoltenberg in the spring of 1991, to initiate planning to accomplish "new missions," collective security operations outside the NATO area.7 This, of course, was not the first time that Prussian-German armies—in peacetime—had been called on to meet high challenges. Since the first days of what can be called a German Army in the early eighteenth century, it has risen to face numerous tasks. At that time, Frederick William I not only succeeded in increasing its size from 38,000 to 76,000 but also in mobilizing the sons of the Prussian aristocracy and engendering a spirit of service to the state, an ethic not previously existing. His son, Frederick II (the Great), took this instrument, increased its size, improved its efficiency and fighting power, and in the Seven Years War (1756-1763) propelled Prussia into the ranks of the major European powers. During the peace following the military disasters at the hands of Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 to the resumption of the struggle for liberation in 1813, what the Prussian Army achieved in its reform was described by Herbert Rosinski, the eminent scholar of German armies, "as perhaps the proudest page in its history and one of the most memorable instances of the triumph of

Introduction

3

the spirit over all material obstacles as well as human malice and indolence."8 It was during this time that a relatively small group of men—such as Baron vom Stein, Scharnhorst, and Gneisenau—not only forged important organizational reforms, such as the establishment of the general staff system, but integrated important new ideas into the Prussian Army. Corporal punishment was eliminated; service to the nation was honored. Military service was not a wretched occupation for foreign mercenaries and the lowest orders but rather a noble, honorable occupation for every citizen. In the early 1860's under von Manteuffel, the Prussian Army underwent another round of reforms transforming itself into the army that with Moltke's organizational and operational mastery became after the three wars of German unification the international standard. Finally, in this century, numerous problems and obstacles had to be overcome in the 1950's to establish the modern Bundeswehr given the excesses and failures of the German military under both the Weimar Republic and the reign of Hitler. The magnitude of these earlier challenges notwithstanding, the combined challenges that the modern German armed forces, and especially the German Army, faced after the Unification of East Germany and West Germany in October 1990, was—in the sweep of the three centuries of the history of the Prussian-German militaries—daunting. SCOPE This study focuses on the Takeover of the land forces of the NVA. Although the West German Navy and Air Force also had sizable challenges, the German Army had by far the greatest. This study gives necessary coverage to the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, the all-service command established at Unification to manage the initial nine months of the Takeover, but focuses primarily on Eastern Army Command, the army component of that command, and Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, the command that assumed responsibility for all army units after the dissolution of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command in July 1991. Aside from some brief discussion on the liaison mechanism established, the state of their garrisons in the east, and their departure in 1994, there is no significant coverage of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, due to the tangential relation of the subject matter to the purposes of this study and to the understandable sensitivity of the West Germans in providing information.9 The principal time period of the study is from July 1990 to the summer of 1993. The initial date marks the commencement of detailed planning by the Bundeswehr for the Takeover, following the major political decisions reached by Chancellor Kohl and Secretary Gorbachev in their July 1990 meeting in the Caucasus. It was only after these major political decisions had been made that the German military could initiate detailed planning for the Takeover. The main analysis ends in the summer of 1993, at which point all applications of former NVA officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) wishing to continue service as professional soldiers in the German Army had been processed and deci-

4

From Confrontation to Cooperation

sions had been reached. As background, this study gives appropriate coverage to the events preceding Unification Day (October 3, 1990) and, in analyzing future implications, peers into the second half of this decade. One problem in trying to focus solely on the German Army and not the entire Bundeswehr is the tendency of some to use the terms Bundeswehr and Armee interchangeably.10 An effort is made in this study to identify as clearly as possible material dealing with each, respectively. CENTRAL ISSUES AND FINDINGS This study focuses on five central questions. The first concerns the organization and the nature of political control: How did the West German MOD and Armed Forces organize themselves for the Takeover and what was the extent of the control exerted by the political sector over the military? The second and third are the driving questions that deal with the who, what, when, and why of the Takeover: What were the key decisions that were made by the FRG, the Bundeswehr, and the German Army concerning the Takeover? The third question amplifies the second by examining the main considerations in the key decisions: Were military factors—tactical, operational, or strategic—most important? Or were political (foreign or domestic), economic, social, or other factors more important? For example, was the garrison at Eggesin, which housed the NVA's Ninth Armored Division, selected as the location of a new home defense brigade primarily because of its location near the Polish border or because of the importance of the garrison to the economy of the local community? Fourth, what was the relation of the Takeover to the new German Army organization—AS 5? This structure was being implemented as the Unification took place with all units expected to be converted to it by the end of 1994. Did AS 5 affect the way the Takeover was accomplished, or was it this new army structure that was adapted to the new conditions stemming from the Takeover of the NVA and Unification of the two countries? Fifth, what effect did the Takeover have on the overall operational readiness of the German Army? A special concern here was the effect that the Takeover had on the ability of the German Army to accomplish its "new tasks" (neue Aufgaben) as described by the Minister of Defense Stoltenberg in the spring of 1991. These tasks stepped beyond the traditional Cold War missions of national and NATO defense and included such things as NATO out-of-area missions and United Nations (UN; Blauhelm) peacekeeping missions. By the summer of 1992, the German Army had adopted the phrase "expanded task spectrum" (erweiteres Aufgabenspektrum) to refer to these new tasks. With the benefit of the answers to these questions, this study seeks, on a more general level, two purposes: first, to arrive at an overall assessment of the conduct of the Takeover. If considered in its entire purpose, process, and effect, can it be rated a success, and if so why? Second, it hopes to contribute to a

Introduction

5

theoretical foundation for the study of such takeovers and amalgamations of armies, a field somewhat malnourished at present. These questions and the research conducted led to a substantial harvest of insights and observations. The German MOD and Bundeswehr organized themselves in a logical efficient manner to effect the Takeover. Politicians gave little detailed direction over the actual execution of the Takeover. They gave general guidelines to military leaders who were for the most part left to come up with their own solutions to novel problems. Most officers referred to this as a fine example of Auftragstaktik or "mission-type orders." Politicians were concerned about and exerted pressure to ensure a quick tempo for the deactivation of former NVA units as this had financial implications: The longer unneeded former NVA personnel and units remained on active duty, the more money it cost. Guidance was also given concerning personnel strength and social welfare issues. Also, it is clear that politicians were prepared to intervene decisively on key issues, such as when Defense Minister Stoltenberg overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all NVA MIG-29 combat aircraft. Political control was ever present. In examining an undertaking of such magnitude as the Takeover of one army by another, scores of decisions could be identified as "critical." This study attempts to strike a balance between breadth and depth of coverage. The criteria used in determining which decisions to analyze included, first, the apparent extent of impact of the decision and, second, the number of times it was indicated as key by the sources consulted, especially the interviews. Based on these criteria, the study focuses on eleven important decisions in the Takeover made by the German government, the Bundeswehr, and the German Army. These decisions can be organized into four groups: four concerning management and force structure, four concerning personnel issues, one relating to training and education, and two dealing with equipment and real property. Within the area of management and force structure, there were four decisions: 1. The government decision that after Unification there would be one German military force—not two as the East Germans had wanted. 2. The German Army decision to organize the new units in the east in accordance with the new AS 5 and to superimpose this structure on the existing NVA structure. 3. The German Army decision to dissolve the National People's Army and simultaneously activate the new units of the German Army. 4. The German Army decision to establish partnership units between new German Army units in the east and units in the west to facilitate the Takeover. Within the area of personnel affairs, there were four critical decisions: 5. The government's decision to allow former NVA to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr after Unification. 6. The decision by the FRG Ministry of Defense to allow, on the acceptance of an application, remaining former NVA officers and NCOs to continue to serve in the German military beyond December 31, 1990, as "extenders" (Weiterverwender)

6

From Confrontation to Cooperation up to the end of 1991, or as "Soldiers of Two Years" (Soldat auf Zeit-2) [SaZ-2] for a trial period (Probezeit) until the end of 1992, and beyond this, to allow a segment of them to become longer serving volunteer soldiers or professional soldiers (Berufsoldat). 7. To reduce in rank according to certain criteria officers and NCOs of the former NVA who continued to serve in the Bundeswehr after Unification. 8. To allow none of the traditions of the NVA to be integrated into the German military (e.g., the wearing of NVA awards or badges).

Within the area of training and education, there was one key decision. The decision of the Bundeswehr and German Army: 9. To give former NVA officers and NCOs who continued to serve a series of supplemental political and military training and education courses. In the final area of equipment, materiel, and real property, there were two overarching sets of decisions consisting of numerous individual decisions: 10. The set of decisions as to what equipment the German Army should take over for the long term. 11. The set of decisions concerning what property (facilities and installations) the German Army should take over. Concerning the third research question, the major considerations influencing these eleven key decisions were generally something other than military factors: domestic-political, economic, social, or psychological (e.g., psychological in terms of impact on the attitudes of former NVA soldiers or the former East German public). Which factors were critical depended on the nature of the issue. In only three instances did military considerations seem to predominate: first, the German Army's decision to organize the new units in the east in accordance with AS 5; second, the German Army's decision to establish partnership relationships between units in eastern and western Germany; and third, the German Army's set of decisions on the takeover of NVA equipment and munitions. In the latter, military safety considerations played a large role in many of the decisions made on individual items, especially major combat systems and munitions. As might be expected in such complex issues, there were multiple factors in many cases that all played major roles in the decisions, with the precise weight of each factor—or even the clear identification of the primary one—difficult to calculate. Concerning the fourth research question, the relation of the Takeover of the NVA to AS 5 is clear. The decision to adopt AS 5 had already been made when the detailed planning for the Takeover began. The units activated in the east after Unification were organized in accordance with this new structure and hence were the first German Army units so structured. These units, however, were not charged with serving as a "test bed" for this structure and then providing feedback to planners; no such "feedback loop" was established. The logic was simple and compelling. Activating new units with the old structure—Army Structure 4—would have meant that at some date in the future these units would have been

Introduction

7

forced to undergo a reorganization into AS 5. It was more logical and practical to impose AS 5 on the new units in the east. Concerning the fifth and final research question, the Takeover had a clear and dramatically negative effect on the operational readiness of the German Army, as the Army threw almost its entire energy into the Takeover. However, the relation of the Takeover to the new "extended task spectrum" of the German Army is not fully clear. Most West German interviewees seemed puzzled at the suggestion of a possible connection. They did not seem to have considered that the Takeover might have some effect on the German Army's ability to conduct missions outside national and NATO borders. In terms of the German Army's ability to accomplish missions beyond the traditional ones of the defense of Germany and of NATO, the Takeover has been a significant factor in retarding its ability to be fully prepared for such missions. Given a clear domestic consensus on the use of the Bundeswehr for such missions—something yet to exist despite the July 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court—the German Army would have been better prepared earlier for such missions had it not had to accomplish such a huge undertaking as the Takeover of the NVA. These new missions were not to be given to the new units activated in the east until 1995. By this time, it was judged that these units would have experienced no significant negative consequences resulting from the Takeover in accomplishing the new missions. By 1995, the many new company-level officers from the east were to have been fully trained in the Bundeswehr school system. This added to the fact that only the top former NVA officers—in terms of character, potential, and demonstrated performance—were accepted at the end of 1992 into the German Army as professional soldiers, would fairly well assure that the Takeover had no detrimental effects on the ability of the German Army—specifically, units with personnel from the former East Germany—to perform its new missions. The research showed that if anything, the Takeover enhanced the Army's ability because the former NVA evinced a highly positive and professional attitude toward such missions. Former NVA valued highly service to one's country. That this country was now their former nemesis mattered not. In light of the numerous military and nonmilitary goals it accomplished, including the spearheading of the process of social integration between eastern and western Germany, and based on the decidedly positive comments of not only former West but also former East German professional officers and NCOs, the central conclusion of this study is that the Takeover of the NVA (Land Forces) was a success. It was a success principally because in its decision making the Bundeswehr gave primary weight not to military-organizational or even financial considerations, but rather to psychological and social factors, psychological in the sense of the effect a decision would have on the minds of the NVA and the eastern Germans, and social in the sense of the effect a decision would have on the social welfare of the NVA and on the social stability of the NVA (avoidance of violent conflict). In this enormous undertaking, the Bundeswehr anchored its

8

From Confrontation to Cooperation

policies on a number of key principles and concepts that in the end proved their worth, including those comprising Innere Fiihrung (civic education and moral leadership), the principle of "fair chance" for the majority of the former NVA professionals to continue service in the Bundeswehr if they so chose, the principle of equal treatment of the former NVA with that of other eastern Germans who continued to be employed by the German government after Unification, the idea that the westerners went to the east "as Germans to Germans, and not as victors to vanquished," and finally that the end of the Takeover was for easterners and westerners to create an all-German force together. As for the second general goal relating to theory-building, this study attempts to make some modest contributions in the concluding chapter. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY Before the analysis of the central research questions, this study accomplishes some preliminary tasks. In chapter 1, some comparative analysis is accomplished by examining several case studies that involve the amalgamation of armies. The setting for the Takeover is sketched in the two subsequent chapters. Chapter 2 covers the international and domestic political settings, and chapter 3 reviews the status of the NVA and the Bundeswehr in the time period preceding the Unification. Chapters 4 through 8 represent the heart of the study and address the first four research questions. Chapter 4 examines the organizations established for the Takeover and the extent of political control exerted on the military during the Takeover. Description and analysis of the key decisions are undertaken in chapters 5 through 8 including the consideration of the major factors affecting each decision and the evaluation of each decision. Chapter 5 views the four management and force structure decisions, one of which addresses research Question 4 dealing with the relation of the Takeover to AS 5. Chapter 6 examines personnel decisions; chapter 7 considers training and education decisions; and chapter 8 analyzes decisions concerning equipment and facilities. Chapter 9 addresses the final research question: What effect did the Takeover have on the overall operational readiness of the German Army, with special concern for the ability of the German Army to accomplish its "new tasks?" In chapter 10, the conclusion, the study ends with a look at the international, domestic, and military challenges Germany faced in the years between 1993 and 1995, a summing up of the main findings and their wider implications, a discussion of the challenges that remained for the former NVA and the German Army after the selected former NVA were integrated as professionals or longer serving volunteers, and finally a look at some theoretical formulations based on the case studies in chapter 1 together with this study of the NVA Takeover. (All interviews were taped and are held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All referenced, unpublished government and military orders, letters, statements, briefings, and other documents are either original copies or photocopies held by the author. Ranks

Introduction

9

of East German and Soviet military have been converted to their U.S. military equivalents.)

NOTES 1. Literally, "from against each other to with each other." Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "sie miissen vom Gegeneinander zum Miteinander finden," "Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung," Dr. Gerhard Stoltenberg, 3 October 1990; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, "Die Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte," "Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik," October 1990, 12-14. 2. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992): 165. This point was also made in the author's discussion with a number of members of the German Military History Research Office, Freiburg, 5 November 1991. On the uniqueness of the mission, see also Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Landern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 15. 3. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/90,4. 4. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfugen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die Hinterlassenschaft der NVA," Truppenpraxis (1/1991): 19; von Scheven, "Merger," 164. The most common figure cited is 90,000. See, for example, von Scheven, "Merger," 164. LTG Jorg Schonbohm, the senior commander in the east for the Takeover, gave the figure 103,000. Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 46. For a comprehensive look at the entire spectrum of armed components of the GDR, see Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Rudiger Wenzke, eds., Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1998). 5. von Scheven, "Merger," 170; Horst-Dieter Buhrmeister, "Das Erbe: Eingliederung der NVA in die Bundeswehr," Wehrtechnik, 10/1991, 20. 6. President Richard von Weizacker used this same wording in his speech before the Commander's Conference in the east on April 29, 1991. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 222. 7. Ulrich Weisser, "Die Weichen sind gestellt: Rahmenbedingungen und Grundentscheidungen zur Bundeswehrgesamtplanung," Soldat und Technik, 3/1991, 159. 8. Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), 53. 9. For such discussion see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 96-98, 135, 145, 174-175, 193, 196, 208, 247-248; Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 49-50; Thomas-Durell Young, Securing Eastern Germany and the Disposition of the Soviet Western Group of Forces (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 29 August 1991); Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 109-122. 10. For example, see Karl Feldmeyer, "Nun Mufi die Regierung entscheiden." Truppenpraxis (6/1994): 465; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weifibuch 1994 (Bonn, 1994), ix.

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1

Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory This chapter reflects a search for case studies comparable to the Takeover and, also, theoretical works on the amalgamations of armies, examining three nonGerman and one German case studies. In the first group are the Union and Confederate armies at the conclusion of the U.S. Civil War, the formation of the Italian Army during the Italian Unification of the 1860's, and finally the example of the French Army after the liberation of France in World War II. To conclude this section, the formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950's is also considered to lay a foundation for comparison to the Takeover of the NVA. THE POST-CIVIL WAR U.S. ARMY At least two significant factors are apparent in this case study. First, the United States faced no hostile international environment after the Civil War. Although there were voices within the United States who pushed for direct action against France's Maximilian in Mexico, no U.S. forces intervened. Aside from this, the U.S. Army was needed to meet the threat posed by the Indians and the tasks of occupation duty in the defeated South, neither of which appreciably affected the second important factor influencing policy on the Army: the intent of both the army volunteers as well as the Congress to demobilize rapidly and dramatically.1 This case study represents the "null" example of a potential amalgamation in which virtually no soldiers of the defeated army were taken over by the opposing army. After the surrender of Lee's Army in April 1865, the Confederate military was allowed to return home—something that represented the wish of most—under what they considered generous conditions negotiated between Generals Lee and Grant at Appomatox and subsequently endorsed by President

12

From Confrontation to Cooperation

Lincoln. They were treated as paroled prisoners and allowed to retain their horses, mules, and sidearms. Grant also made it clear that there would be no witch hunt: Each man was allowed to return home "not to be disturbed by the U.S. Authority so long as they observe their parole and the laws in force where they may reside."2 Because of the French threat in Mexico, the challenge from the Indians, and the tasks involved with occupation duty in the south, the demobilization of the army was spread over 18 instead of three months, as initially conceived. On May 1, 1865, there were 1,034,064 volunteers in the Army; by November 15 about 800,000 had been mustered out. A year later only 11,043 volunteers remained in the service, belonging mostly to the Colored Troops who were by October 1867, practically all discharged. Against the desires of General Grant for an 80,000man Regular Army, Congress authorized in July, 1866, a strength of only 54,302. The actual strength reached about 57,000, the highest strength the Army had until 1898.3 THE ITALIAN ARMY DURING ITALIAN UNIFICATION An important difference in this case study in comparison to the first is the precarious international situation that the Italian states faced in the late 1860's as it was completing its unification. Italy had been dominated by primarily two major powers (France and Austria) and now after its unification joined these two, along with Great Britain and Russia, at the table of major European powers, with all the accompanying competition and rivalry. As Italy was achieving its own Unification, Prussia to its north was forging German unity at the expense of Austria, the erstwhile preeminent Germanic power, and France. The scramble for Africa was beginning, and the Ottoman Empire—its northern reaches only a short distance across the Adriatic—continued in its decline. In such an international environment, Italy did not have the luxury, as the United States did, of rapidly and dramatically demobilizing. Like Germany in this same period, Italy was a geographical expression and not a unified political entity, with its various states headed by petty princes loyal to Austria or France. The Unification of these states had been sought by Italian nationalists since the Congress of Vienna and had met repeated failure. Serious movement began with the assumption of power in 1849 of Victor Emmanuel II in the Kingdom of Sardinia and his appointment of Camillo Benso di Cavour as the Prime Minister, the conservative realist from a noble Piedmontese family. After laying the domestic groundwork and concluding an alliance with France, Cavour succeeded in 1859 in provoking Austria into war from which Sardinia obtained Lombardy. More importantly, the war heightened Italian nationalism and shook irrevocably the legitimacy of the non-Italian petty princes. As the Italian states of northern and central Italy rallied to join the Kingdom of Sardinia, their forces joined the Sardinian Army, the Armata Sardi, and were designated with successive numbers as if they formed a part of this army. Thus at

Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory

13

least a degree of military integration preceded the actual formal political integration of the states.4 Over the next two years, General Manfredo Fanti was placed in control of these forces in central Italy whose states were joining the Kingdom, including all the states of central Italy except those under papal control. The army division from Tuscany served as the heart of the force, a division that was ultimately led by Garibaldi, the fervent nationalist leader who envisioned a revolutionary republican Italian Army, something entirely different from Fanti's vision. At times, Fanti had to rely on veterans of the revolutions of 1848 who had questionable political and professional backgrounds. To improve the professionalism and competence of the officer corps, he established a six-month course for officers at a new military school in Modena.5 In addition to being commander of these forces, Fanti, in January 1860, became the War Minister in Cavour's new cabinet. Within months, the central Italian states achieved political union with Piedmont, and the Army of central Italy was integrated into the Sardinian Army. From its original five divisions, the Sardinian Army now consisted of thirteen divisions divided into five military commands, and Fanti began his program not simply to add units to the Sardinian Army, as he had previously, but rather to convert the force to a truly Italian Army (Escerito Italiano). He initiated the controversial process of forming brigades by mixing men from different regions, not only to make a more effective force but also to advance Italian unification (italianitd).6 Because of the lack of qualified officers, he took a step beyond establishing the officer's school in Modena: He made force structure changes reducing the number of larger units that lessened the need for senior officers.7 In October of 1860, after Cavour and Fanti had outmaneuvered Garibaldi's attempts to march north through Italy and rally forces and people to him, Fanti made it clear that Garibaldi's Southern Army was to be dissolved and that there would be only one Italian Army with the Sardinian Army serving as its core and model.8 This phase of the construction of the united Italian Army constitutes a good case for comparison with the Takeover of the NVA as it involves the Sardinian Army—by this time, much enlarged from its original size of five divisions by the addition of the forces of the Italian states which had joined Piedmont—taking over an army of fellow Italians with a different, if not alien, ideology. The Sardinian Army, with Fanti at its helm, was a regular army representing a conservative political ideology, while Garibaldi's Southern Army was a revolutionary, people's army of volunteers representing a republican creed. In contrast to the National People's Army of the GDR, however, the Southern Army was not the armed force of a legally constituted and recognized state. Fanti was opposed to Garibaldi's scheme of transforming his volunteers into five divisions of the Italian Army. In contrast, it was decided that his troops could choose to enlist in the Royal Sardinian Army for two years or return home with six month's pay. A commission of officers drawn from the Royal Army and Garibaldi's forces was established to decide the fate of 7,000 officers of the

14

From Confrontation to Cooperation

Southern Army, about 2,000 of whom proved satisfactory. This entire episode proved particularly galling to Garibaldi as the French Bourbon troops who had served under the King of Naples were encouraged to join the Italian Army, allowed to keep their rank, and treated better than Garibaldi's men.9 In the end, under Fanti's direction, the Italian Army, formally established in May 1861, consisted of seventeen divisions with one reserve cavalry division and embraced a quarter of a million men from all regions of Italy, serving in Fanti's mind as a vast melting pot where men came in as Lombards, Sicilians, or Tuscans, and left as true Italians.10 THE POST-WORLD WAR II FRENCH ARMY An important distinguishing factor in this case study is the ideological, political, and—at the general officer level—personal hatred generated by the different decisions made by individual French professional soldiers who all faced the dilemma of what to do after the dramatic Nazi military defeat of France in the spring of 1940. The Nazis first occupied the northern section of the country, allowing a French government to control the remainder of the country from Vichy with World War I hero Marshal Petain at its head. Eventually, after the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, the Nazis took possession of the entire country. This case is a particularly complex one, first, because of the multiple groups into which the French Army separated after its defeat, groups that evolved as the war progressed and that viewed each other in some cases with suspicion, distrust, and arrogance. Second, there is disagreement among the sources on the specifics of the process of amalgamation that took place after the liberation began in June 1944 with the Allied landings.11 In the wake of the disastrous defeat of the French Army in June 1940, the fighting forces of France separated into several groupings, some on mainland France and others overseas in the United Kingdom or the French Empire. The forces on the mainland and in the colonies, including the 120,000 French Army of North Africa, which followed government orders and honored the armistice, constituted the Armistice Army. After the Allied landings in North Africa, the German forces occupied the remainder of France, controlled nominally until then by the Vichy government, and by its order of November 27, 1942, dissolved the Armistice Army.12 The Army Resistance Organization developed from these forces and was led by military leaders who had accepted the armistice but considered it invalid once the Germans occupied all of France.13 Brigadier General (BG) Charles de Gaulle initiated the Free French, the second major grouping, with his dramatic radio appeal from London on June 18, 1940, to French soldiers to join him in England. This act of disobedience against the legally constituted authority of France, for which de Gaulle was sentenced to death in absentia, tore the unity of the French military.14 At the outset, relatively few soldiers, a group of junior officers, and only seven senior officers (three general officers, one admiral, and three colonels) joined de Gaulle, totaling

Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory

15

about 7,000 by the end of July 1940. A year later, the Free French numbered 70,000 including 3,600 in the Navy.15 Beyond these two major groupings, there were some who chose to collaborate with the Germans and those who simply did nothing at all.16 Finally, there was a small group of French officers who accepted neither de Gaulle, leading the Free French, nor Marshal Petain, leading the Vichy government, but rather chose to form an air squadron in the Soviet Union and fight on the Russian front for the rest of the war.17 Concerning other military or paramilitary groups fighting the Germans, the combined Resistance forces (Forces Frangaises de Vlnterieur) were made up primarily of civilians who simply wished to see their country free, not of French military who might have defected from the Armistice Army. The Francs Tireurs and Partisans existed as part of the Resistance and comprised the military arm of the National Front, the French Communist organization.18 These groups are represented in the distribution of the 35,000 officers of the French Army after the outbreak of the war. At the French surrender in June 1940, there were 1,200 dead, 800 missing, and 10,000 POWs; 1,000 officers joined the Free French. The 22,000 officers remaining who served the Vichy government were split evenly, half on the mainland and the other half in the colonies in Africa and Madagascar. Of the 11,000 on the mainland, 4200 served in the Armistice Army, 2,500 in the civil corps, and 4,800 had armistice leave. After the Germans took over France's southern zone in November 1942, 4,000 officers joined the Resistance, 1,100 went to North Africa, 1,000 retired, and 5,000 did essentially nothing.19 By a decree of the Provisional French Government in September 1944, the Commission for the Purging and Reintegration of Military Personnel was established, composed entirely of officers. Of the 253 general officers whom the Commission reviewed only 40 were kept on active duty, with one being demoted to colonel. The rest, if not already sentenced to prison, were issued such sanctions as loss of pension or forced retirement. By the end of 1946, the Commission had examined 10,270 officers of all ranks, returning 6630 officers to duty, retiring 650, and dismissing 2,570. It also examined 6,160 files of former POWs and issued various sanctions in 173 cases.20 The postwar French Army was headed by General de Lattre de Tassigny who had been a member of the Armistice Army on the mainland and had fled to North Africa after it had been dissolved by the Germans in 1942.21 The core of the postwar Army came from the Armistice Army of North Africa, the First French Army of some 250,000 men, into which was incorporated the 137,000 men of the Resistance, demobilized as a fighting unit at the end of the war.22 Enlightening as this information is, especially the data on the results of the Purge and Reintegration Commission, it does not provide the degree of detail desired for this study; specifically, it does indicate what precisely distinguished the officers accepted from those not accepted into the postwar army. Although the sources explain what divided the groups, they do not explain the criteria used

16

From Confrontation to Cooperation

in the screening process. The sources do develop the biases and prejudices of these groups stemming from professional, social, and ideological differences that the different groups and organizations held toward each other: for example the tenuous relationship between the Free French and the French African Army,23 the opportunities lost between the Army Resistance Organization and the Resistance,24 and the mutual distrust between the Free French and Resistance.25 Additionally there was the distrust and prejudice that characterized the attitude of many officers in the national and service general staffs toward those officers on the Purge Commission.26 Beyond this, however, the specific "reintegration criteria" are not provided.27 Adding to this unclear picture is the disagreement among the sources in their overall assessment of the degree to which the purge and reintegration process served the interests of the Army and of France. For example, La Gorce is upbeat: the "old-established Army" was the base of the Army of the postwar Fourth Republic, the "amalgam bringing together all segments of the Army." In this way, the "continuity of military organization" was effected.28 Home in contrast states: "All the rancour and divisions that swept over France in the aftermath of war pervaded the Army too, causing new chasms within it."29 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BUNDESWEHR The discussion of the establishment of the Bundeswehr focuses on several areas that are particularly relevant to this study: the personnel selection process, the formulation of the concept of Innere Fuhrung, the approach adopted with regard to tradition in the German Army in light of German history, and finally a brief word about the uniform adopted.30 In contrast to the case study on Italy, the FRG emerged from a country that was decisively defeated and whose military was discredited for its alleged role in Nazi atrocities. The impetus for the reconstruction of its armed forces stemmed not so much from internal forces, as in the Italian case, but from foreign powers—especially the United States and the United Kingdom—who wished succor in the burgeoning Cold War with the Soviets. In the process of the establishment of the Bundeswehr, a Personnel Screening Board was formed in 1955 to review applications. Because of the number of applicants, a second complementary agency, the Acceptance Organization had to be established. While the Personnel Screening Board focused on applicants with the rank of colonel and general, the later organization handled all other applications.31 Criteria were established, some rather vague, for the selection of officers for the new army. Among the more significant were the following: The board was charged with considering what the applicant was at the time and what he was likely to become. The applicant had to have an appreciation of lasting values and a recognition of obsolete values and a recognition of German history when political considerations were set aside for purely military ones. Applicants with previous service had to show that their actions were "unobjectionable in terms of

Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory

17

military and human behavior." Former members of the Waffen-SS (Armed SS) in the rank of colonel or higher were excluded from consideration; the lower ranking Waffen-SS could be accepted only after a special investigation, including an appearance before a special screening board. Such an individual had to reject categorically all concepts of National Socialism and the Waffen-SS. One final requirement was added: The applicant had to make a statement on the July 20, 1944, attempt on Hitler's life.32 By the end of 1956, about 265,000 applicants had been received, about 235,000 of these were given consideration, 75,000 of which had no previous service. The screening boards reviewed about 170,000 applicants who were separated into the following categories: • 117,000 (53,000 without prior service): fit for service • 11,000 (600 without prior service): fit for service in an emergency • 42,000 (3,400 without prior service): unfit for service.33 There was no general prohibition against the enlistment of former members of the Waffen-SS as this would have been a violation of the guarantee of "equality before the law." There were 4,386 personnel with prior service in this organization who applied, including 1,475 officers. Only 1,072 (24 percent) were accepted for service, including a mere 45 officers (3 percent of the officers who applied).34 By the end of 1957, the Personnel Screening Board had reviewed 600 applications from colonels and general officers and had recommended 468 for acceptance, 14 for acceptance with reservations, and had not endorsed 53. 35 In light of the history of German civil-military relations, especially during the Weimar Republic, reflecting the involvement of the military in the politics of state and in the extreme of being a "state within a state," it was imperative for the founders of the Bundeswehr to formulate an entirely new concept of the soldier, one that would correct the abuses and tragedies of the past stemming from blind obedience and excessive Prussian militarism. This evolved into the set of principles and concepts under the overarching concept of Innere Fuhrung. The German soldier was no longer to be apart from but rather apart of society. His rights as a citizen were to be abridged only to the extent necessary to be effective as a soldier. He was to be a thinking, informed "citizen in uniform" (Staatsbilrger in Uniform) a phrase that grew to be the guiding image of the new German soldier. (This concept, which continues to be a vital element of the ethos of the Bundeswehr, is given fuller coverage elsewhere.) On the broad question of military tradition, the Bundeswehr began with a concept of tradition that had been under development since the initial confidential planning meeting in October 1950 and that carried on through the first half of that decade. By the time the initial personnel were being inducted into the Bundeswehr in 1955, the general policy in this area of what constituted a valid heritage for the German military was one of "let the Army grow its own tradition." This overall policy, endorsed by the Chief of Staff Adolf Heusinger, took a

18

From Confrontation to Cooperation

definitive stand neither in rejecting all past traditions nor in affirming positively what new traditions to adopt.36 Heusinger's concept was opposed by an alternate conception of tradition articulated by Wolf Count Baudissin, the chief staff officer for the inner psychological mood of the new military. Taking a more affirmative stance, his concept essentially rejected the traditions of the Wehrmacht and emphasized the role of traditional military ideals and values, refined in light of the past German abuses and the values of its current constitutional order such as a desire for peace, humanity, loyalty, a sense of moral responsibility for one's fellow man, the defensive nature of German forces, the imperative of due process of law, comradeship, truthfulness, and the limits of military obedience.37 This uneasy and dynamic struggle to reach a consensus on a clear conceptualization of a valid heritage for the Bundeswehr has continued from its founding through several iterations to the present, and will probably last at least until the professional soldiers of the Wehrmacht have passed away. As a final point, the uniform that the planners designed for the new force bore no resemblance to that of the Wehrmacht, again underlining in a very fundamental way the break with the past.38 If manned in part by members of the past German military, the Bundeswehr launched in 1955 was nonetheless in multiple ways without anchorage in past German military tradition, ethos and appearance. TOWARD SOME THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS From these case studies, a number of theoretical propositions can be drawn. First, the brief Civil War case study suggests that after a long and bloody war in which one side was attempting to cede from a union, with the losing side expressing no strong desire to continue in the service of the victorious army, and in. an environment with an insignificant external threat, the victorious side may simply reject the members of the opposing army, perhaps allowing them to keep their horses and sidearms as a sign of compassion and conciliation. Second, on a procedural level, all three of the other case studies contained the establishment of some type of screening board to make the selections of who continued to serve in the armed forces and who did not. In the Italian and French cases, virtually all the members of the boards were military officers while in the Bundeswehr case, in an atmosphere in which a closer union between soldier and society was sought, it was composed of both officers and civilians. No rigorous comparative analysis of the sets of selection criteria for continued military service is possible as insufficient information existed in two of the case studies. Third, General Fanti, the architect of the amalgamation of the Italian armies, was clearly driven by a desire for the armed forces to serve as a melting pot and thus as a force for Italian unity. In the French case the divisions within French society existing before the war or caused by the war were apparently reflected in

Amalgamation Case Studies and Theory

19

the process of shaping the postliberation army. Militaries tend to reflect the societies that they defend. Fourth, in the Bundeswehr case, the struggle to "select" the appropriate traditions from a discredited military past appeared to be more difficult and divisive than the selection of personnel to man the new force. A military faced with a dramatic change in the ideology of its state, in this case from a Nazi totalitarian regime to a constitutional democracy, will face an enormous challenge in identifying a valid heritage. These then are some factors and propositions that are to be kept in mind in this study's analysis of the Takeover of the NVA (Land Forces) by the Bundeswehr,an exercise to which this study will turn after it first considers th political and then the military setting in which the Takeover took place. NOTES 1. Maurice Matloff, ed., American Military History (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, 1969), 281-282. 2. Brooks D. Simpson, Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1991), 84. For a comprehensive discussion of pardon and amnesty during the War, see Jonathan Truman Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1953). For a comparably rigorous analysis of the role of the U.S. Army in the reconstruction of the South see James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). 3. Matloff, American Military History, 282; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army Q&\oom\n&on\ Indiana University Press, 1984), 266-267. 4. John Whittam, The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861-1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), 58. 5. Ibid., 59. 6. Ibid., 60-61. Whittam pointed out that Fanti and others probably exaggerated the effect it had on Italian unity, but he failed to develop this point well. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid., 65. 9. Ibid., 66-67. 10. Ibid., 67. 11. Herbert R. Lottman's The Purge (New York: William Morrow, 1986) appears to be the most reliable because of his hard data and his access to sources for his study of 1986, sources that had been to that time classified. 12. John Steward Ambler, The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962 (n.p.: Ohio State University Press, 1966), 76. 13. Paul-Marie de La Gorce, The French Army: A Military-Political History, trans. Kenneth Douglas (New York: George Braziller, 1963), 335. La Gorce concluded that active resistance by former Army cadres does not appear to have taken place on a large scale (p. 336). 14. Ambler, French Army, 65; La Gorce, French Army, 333. 15. Ambler, French Army, 65; La Gorce, French Army, 341-342. 16. Lottman, Purge, 205.

20

From Confrontation to Cooperation

17. Alistair Home, The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970 (New York: Peter Bedrick, 1984), 68-69. 18. La Gorce, French Army, 346-347, 349. 19. Lottman, Purge, 206. 20. Ibid., 207. Quoting French government documents, Ambler presented the following data: 658 army officers were purged and 12,679 were separated between 1945 and 1948; of the latter, 2,299 were released "as a result of the work of the purge commission." [The total purged appears to have been 2,957.] In the same years, 28 air officers and 50 navy officers were purged and 892 air officers and 808 navy officers were separated. Ambler, French Army, 89, fn 119. La Gorce stated that after the Liberation when officers who had remained in France had asked for reinstatement, 5,000 were excluded. La Gorce, French A rmy, 336. 21. Home, French Army, 71. 22. Ibid., La Gorce, French Army, 344, 347; Ambler, French Army, 82. Ambler states that the Armistice Army of North Africa was only 120,000. p. 82. 23. La Gorce, French Army, 342. 24. Ibid., 346-347; Ambler, French Army, 80. 25. Ambler, French Army, 79-80. 26. La Gorce, French Army, 348-350. 27. Home, for example, simply referred to the "arbitrary unfairness in the choice of who should be offered a career in the post-Liberation Army, and who rejected." French Army, 72. 28. La Gorce, French Army, 337. 29. Home, French Army, 72-73. 30. In addition to the works cited, for an overview of the establishment of the Bundeswehr see John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 56-75. For more in depth analysis, see Catherine M. Kelleher, "Fundamentals of German Security: The Creation of the Bundeswehr—Continuity and Change," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, Stephen F. Szabo, ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1990). 31. Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 138. 32. Ibid., 140; Eric Waldman, The Goose Step Is Verboten: The German Army Today (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 52-57. 33. Waldman, Goose Step, 56. 34. Ibid., Goose Step, 57. 35. Abenheim, Iron Cross, 146. 36. Ibid., 139, 178-184. 37. Ibid., 148-162. 38. Ibid., 153.

2

The Political Setting Beginning in the early 1980's, I gave numerous lectures on the European political and military landscape. During the discussion period following these lectures, an often asked question dealt with the likelihood of German Unification. The answer, echoing the commonly held views of most observers of European affairs at the time, was always the same: "Not in my lifetime." In erring, I had some notable company. In the summer of 1989, Michael Howard, the noted British historian, indicated that East Germany would continue to remain detached from West Germany.1 In September 1989, Theo Sommer, the respected editor of Die Zeit, stated: "The stream of refugees moves the nation. The people demand an assertive reunification policy. But there is no way; the German question is not on the agenda right now!"2 Shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, Gerhard Herder, the East German Ambassador to Washington, replied in a similar vein to a question on Unification, "In my dreams, yes, but being a politician and standing with both my feet on the earth, I don't see a possibility in the foreseeable future."3 All such observers, analysts, and commentators were wrong. As Konrad Jarausch expressed it, "Within one year two competing states with different systems of government, opposing military alliances, contradictory economic systems, incompatible social structures, and conflicting ideologies merged into one."4 To set the stage for the analysis of the Takeover of the NVA by the Bundeswehr, this chapter presents the major events that led to the German Unification. The first section sketches the important events, people, and factors in the international political dimension followed by a discussion of the domestic political scenes of East and West Germany.5 Chapter 3 takes up the military dimension of the setting.

22

From Confrontation to Cooperation

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL DIMENSION There is general agreement that of all the factors that contributed to German Unification, the most significant was Mikhail Gorbachev and the domestic and foreign policy changes he initiated in the Soviet Union. Out of Pandora's box came glasnost and perestroika and out the window flew the Brezhnev Doctrine. In December 1988, Gorbachev announced "freedom of choice" for socialist states in his UN speech, as well as the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 soldiers from central and eastern Europe. This signaled clearly that the Soviet imperial center would no longer ensure the longevity of communist power in the imperial provinces of eastern Europe, East Germany the most crucial. And these regimes surely took notice—as did opposition forces—of the Soviets' acceptance of the first free elections in Poland in 1989.6 Erich Honecker's ossified regime, adept at protecting the GDR from insidious influences, moved to keep at bay heretical policies from the east. East Germany's chief ideologist, Kurt Hager, asked rhetorically in an interview with Stern magazine in April 1987, "Would you feel obliged to install new wallpaper just because your neighbor installed new wallpaper?"7 Elizabeth Pond argued that in the fall of that year came the final point where "top-down reforms might have preempted bottom-up revolution in East Germany." This was on the occasion of Honecker's September visit to West Germany during which he was accorded full honorary protocol, including the flying of the GDR flag and the playing of its anthem. Ignoring the admonitions and urgings of Herbert Wehner, an old comrade who had risen in the ranks of the Social Democrats in West Germany, Honecker returned to East Germany unconvinced about the need for reform. It was the beginning of the end.8 The forces of change unleashed by Gorbachev worked their mischief throughout eastern Europe. For four decades, a critical premise of Soviet foreign policy had been the need for ideological conformity both within the Soviet Union and throughout the satellite countries of eastern Europe. This premise now evaporated in the late 1980's and freed these states to gravitate toward the West economically and politically.9 After Gorbachev's policy changes that set the groundwork, the first critical event outside of the Germanys came in Hungary. Hoping to secure western support for its economic reforms and to highlight its own democratic progress, the Hungarians made the decision in August 1989 no longer to honor the 1969 mutual assistance treaty among communist states that required them to capture and return individuals seeking to flee their countries. On September 10, the border between Austria and Hungary was opened. A thousand Trabants (the common East German car) and 126 buses rushed to the border; the exodus had begun.10 An event as momentous as the Unification of Germany could not have occurred without bloodshed but for the extraordinary statecraft of unusually competent men. Karl Kaiser characterized the "constellation of leaders" as "truly exceptional men" who cooperated in "the most intensive phase of bilateral and

The Political Setting

23

multilateral diplomacy in European history."11 In his study of the diplomacy of the Unification, Stephen Szabo highlighted the work of eleven men who were the chief executives, foreign ministers, and aides of West Germany, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The Germans included Chancellor Helmut Kohl and advisor Horst Teltschik, and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and his aides, Frank Elbe and Dieter Kastrup. On the U.S. side were George Bush, James Baker, and aide Robert Zoellick, and on the Soviet side Mikhail Gorbachev, Eduard Schevardnadze, and aide Sergei Tarasenko.12 On the occasion of President Bush's visit to West Germany in May 1989, the United States had made the offer to Germany to be "partners in leadership."13 Witnessing in its Cold War partner the inchoate stages of a European superpower, the United States gave early and unwavering support to German Unification and mustered its diplomatic resources to secure the support of other states.14 With some hesitations and initial qualifications, both Britain and France came to endorse Germany's right to unify.15 The position of the Soviet Union on German Unification, perhaps the greatest challenge to Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era, evolved over the course of 1989 to 1990. No other actor besides the Soviet Union faced the dilemma of reconciling a retreat from the now untenable Cold War frontiers with the need for maintaining political and economic interests and salving domestic pressures and anxieties.16 During Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow in October 1988, Gorbachev made it clear that a solution to the German problem was in the distant future. By the time Gorbachev visited Bonn in June 1989 after six months of negotiations, change was implied in the joint declaration that expressed "respect for the right of peoples to self-determination."17 With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the ever accelerating disintegration of the legitimacy of the East German Communist regime, Gorbachev felt comfortable during his meeting with President Mitterand on December 6, 1989, in stating that Germany had the right to unity and that this process had to be accommodated.18 A political breakthrough came on January 30, 1990, when East German Prime Minister Hans Modrow visited Moscow. At the press conference after the conclusion of the talks, Gorbachev announced to the press, "Among the Germans in East and West as well as the four power representatives, there is a certain agreement that German unification has never been doubted by anyone."19 When Kohl and Genscher visited Gorbachev on February 10 and 11, not only did he agree to unity but he also indicated the willingness of the Soviet Union to withdraw all its troops from central Europe depending on the talks on Conventional Forces in Europe and satisfactory arrangements for the stationing of troops in both parts of Germany.20 By the end of January, the United States had concluded that the GDR was disintegrating and that German Unification would indeed occur. Wrestling with the challenge of managing the external dimension of the process, aides within the Bush Administration drafted the plan that would become known as "2 + 4" (the two Germanys plus the Four Powers). It included the precondition that all parties

24

From Confrontation to Cooperation

would agree to German unity and among other things was viewed by the Administration as a "means of managing Soviet concerns."21 This was the plan to which the Four Powers agreed at the Open Skies Conference in Ottawa in February.22 The 2 + 4 Talks got underway at the ministerial level in Bonn in May 1990. For the West the continued membership of Germany in NATO was a critical component of its negotiating position with the Soviets. Among the various arguments that the Unites States used was that the NATO framework would inhibit the renationalization of defense policies and that this was a better alternative than the nonaligned status of the interwar period. It was also clear that Germany's sovereign right to choose its alliance was at stake.23 The final breakthrough came at a meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev in the Caucasus on July 15 and 16, 1990. The Soviets relinquished all remaining claims from World War II and any restrictions on German sovereignty, including Germany's right to choose its alliance. The Germans agreed that the Soviets would withdraw their 380,000 troops and 220,000 civilians from the GDR during a three-to-four year period and that they would compensate the Soviets for the introduction of the Deutsch Mark (DM) into the GDR, a sum that would amount to some 13.5 billion DM. Non-NATO German forces from the territorial army would be allowed in eastern Germany until the Soviet departure had been completed. Thereafter, German forces under NATO command could be deployed into the eastern sector but neither foreign troops nor nuclear weapons would ever be stationed there. Finally, the Bundeswehr would be reduced from its current size of 480,000 and limited to 370,000, including any additions from the NVA after Unification.24 The Gordian knot had been cut. After this historic meeting, the remaining events at the international level paled in significance. The final meetings of the 2 + 4 Talks took place in Paris on July 17 and in Moscow on September 12. At the final meeting, six states signed the "Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany." The path was paved for German Unification. THE DOMESTIC-POLITICAL DIMENSION On August 13, 1961, the Berlin Wall was constructed, evidence of the economic weakness and illegitimacy of the East German Communist regime. From this point to the time the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Guyla Horn, and the other Hungarian leaders had decided to open the border with Austria in September 1989, some 3.5 million registered refugees had fled from East Germany.25 By the time the Wall came down 27 years later, 408 people had died trying to cross it and the other parts of the inter-German border.26 The German population had grown more restless as the 1980's progressed, especially in the reform climate set by President Gorbachev. This restlessness exploded into a mass exodus when the Iron Curtain rusted through, first in Hungary then in Czechoslovakia. In June alone, about 12,500 East Germans arrived in West Germany, of which 2,000

The Political Setting

25

were illegal.27 Throughout the summer and fall, the initial trickle developed into a river of refugees. During 1989, upwards of 340,000 East Germans left East Germany (more than 2 percent of the population), confirming the widespread disenchantment. Cries from leftists like Christa Wolf to remain and find a "third way" (between the old Communist way and the capitalist way) went unheeded. In the streets of Leipzig and other cities, the revolution from below—the civic movement (Burgerbewegung)—began in September, energized by a small loose-knit opposition. Initially responding with force, the Communist party (SED) leadership and instruments of control (the Stasi, police and military) eventually became paralyzed by the size and peacefiilness of the demonstrations. Tensions grew high in Leipzig and East Berlin at the beginning of October on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the GDR as crowds were now swelling into the tens of thousands. This celebration included a visit by Mikhail Gorbachev. Instead of the normal pleasantries and compliments that he expected, Erich Honecker and the Politburo were exhorted by Gorbachev to make changes: "Life punishes those who come too late" (Wer zu spat kommt, den bestraft das Leben).2S The crowds in Leipzig grew larger and spawned demonstrations in other cities. In Leipzig, the crowd on October 9 was 70,000, on October 16, 110,000, on October 23, 225,000, and on October 30, 350,000. When the SED drafted a restrictive travel law in early November, 450,000 demonstrated on November 6 against the party's failure to provide foreign currency. Thousands called for the dismantling of the Wall and were joined by a new chant: "Germany, fatherland. Germany, fatherland."29 It was this outpouring of frustration with the old regime, the desire for easier travel, and the preparedness to state openly and for the most part peacefully that the emperor—the East German political and economic systems—simply had no clothes—were illegitimate and bankrupt—which forced Honecker to step down on October 17 after eighteen years of rule. He was replaced as General Secretary by Egon Krenz who during the next few weeks sought to convince the population that things would change. On the very next day he admitted to the economic problems such as "irregularity of production," the lack of technological innovation and "inefficiency of exporting." He rejected talk on reunification and maintained that "socialism on German soil is not up for grabs."30 Throughout the succeeding weeks, the successor regime faced the difficult dilemma of maintaining some sense of its socialist ideology and of party cohesion while responding genuinely to the democratic yearnings of the increasingly bolder population, whose expectations were on the rise. The leadership crisis deepened. On November 3, Krenz announced the replacement of a number of older party leaders including five from the Politburo. He outlined a new SED action program calling for political reform, truthful information, human rights, economic restructuring, and education reform.31 On November 9, the leadership decided to take a gamble and open the Berlin Wall. Konrad Jarausch characterized it as a "desperate bid to regain credi-

26

From Confrontation to Cooperation

bility."32 Some 5.2 million easterners visited the West in the first four days, 9 million in the first week, virtually all returning home to the east.33 Although the people were euphoric, the gambit failed to stabilize the social situation. Instead of easing the drive for emigration, it simply multiplied it. The opening of the Wall brought about a sea change in thinking about the future. Once so many easterners experienced the West, opinion in the last few weeks of November began to build for Unification. Most visitors to the West wanted only to satisfy their curiosity, buy a few bananas or a small appliance from the well-stocked stores, or embrace a lost relative. But it all proved too great. Overwhelmed, the poet Thomas Rosenlocher stated: "The GDR's only chance is to be swallowed up by this country."34 Meanwhile, in West Germany by November 20, 70 percent of the public opinion supported Unification whereas only 15 percent remained opposed.35 Coming only several weeks after the opening of Wall, Chancellor Kohl on November 28 announced his Ten-Point Plan for German Unification. The "emotional floodgates" of the easterners were opened. This plan provided a phased blueprint for achieving unity that respected the rights of the East Germans and addressed the concerns of the outside powers. It "turned unification from a topic of debate into a subject of practical politics." By early December, GDR public opinion had swung toward Unification.36 After these heady events of 1989, the events of 1990 rapidly became foregone conclusions. The SED, after a name change to SED-PDS in December 1989, faced a crisis of legitimacy in mid-January 1990. On February 5, Prime Minister Hans Modrow presented to the Volkskammer the new cabinet composed of thirteen different groups and parties. But even such actions were not able to salvage any genuine semblance of legitimacy for the old order. Jarausch summarized this: In the first two months of 1990, the East German state collapsed. . . . The bankruptcy of the planned economy . . . rendered attempts to democratize socialism pointless. . . . The struggle between reform Communists and civic opposition led to power sharing, but prevented the solution of mounting problems. Hence the effort to reform the GDR started losing the race to the rising sentiment in favor of union with the FRG. Economic collapse and political disarray changed the democratization movement into a stampede towards unity.37 In the parliamentary elections on March 18, 1990, the verdict for unity was clear. In an election where nine out often voters exercised their vote, the conservative Alliance for Germany gained more than 48 percent of the vote and 192 seats, the Social Democrats received 22 percent and 88 seats, the PDS (former SED) gained 16 percent and 66 seats. It was clear that the East Germans no longer wanted experimentation; they wished to embrace unity, wash away the years of frustration, and eliminate their status as second-class German citizens. The election capped the transformation of the civic movement into a national revolution.38

The Political Setting

27

After these elections, the next significant event was the economic union, which took place on July 1, 1990. Just as frustrated with the worthless GDR currency as with the corrupt political system, the people demanded the merger of the two economies. The East German economy was floundering and the treasury was bankrupt. The weekly exodus of up to 4,000 refugees—many young and skilled—had to be relieved. Politicians wagered that the introduction of the DM would establish "the economic precondition for growing together into a united Germany."39 On July 6, 1990 the first negotiating session began between the two Germanys on the Unification treaty. Interior Minister Wolfgang Schauble headed the western delegation, and Parliamentary State Secretary Gtinter Krause headed the eastern. Through several sets of sessions, the groups found common ground with remarkable ease and quickness.40 Abortion, property rights, and the Stasi legacy proved to be the final hurdles. The treaty, which grew to more than 1,000 pages in its final form, was signed on August 31 in the Crown Prince Palace in East Berlin. Schauble called it a "day of joy and confidence" that would bring unity in an orderly fashion. "We have created a solid and stable foundation for our community." Capping a process in the GDR characterized alternately as a policy "reversal" (Wende), an "implosion," and a popular "revolution," the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany at midnight, October 2, 1990.41 Unified through force in the nineteenth century, Germany was unified for the second time, this time without war. NOTES 1. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to GermanUnity(New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4. 2. Peter Neckermann, The Unification of Germany (Boulder: East European Mon graphs, 1991), fn 7, 89. 3. Walter Isaacson, "Is One Germany Better Than Two?" Time,20 November 1989, 23. By the 1970's, reunification had dropped in opinion polls as the "most important question" from more than 40 percent to 1 percent. Two-thirds of West Germans in the 1980's considered unification "impossible." Jarausch, German Unity, 202-203. 4. Jarausch, German Unity, 4. 5. The material for this chapter was based on the many interviews of West and East German officers and NCOs and supplemented by numerous written primary and secondary sources. The best book on the events of 1989-1990 leading up to the Unification is Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to GermanUnity(New York: Oxford University Pre 1994). For documents on the events leading to the Unification and the Unification itself, see Volker Gransow and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds., Die deutsche Vereinigung: Dokumente zu Burgerbewegung, Anndherung und Beitritt (Koln: Verlag Wissens und Politik Berend von Nottbeck, 1991). The best article on these events is Elizabeth Pond's "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR," International Security 15 (Fall, 1990): 35-66. The best book on the international aspects of the Unification is Stephen F. Szabo's The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). The best article on the Unification is Karl Kaiser's "Germany's Unifica-

28

From Confrontation to Cooperation

tion," Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1990/91 70, 179-205. A brief overview of the entire postwar division of Germany and the process of unification is provided by the editor of the magazine Soldat und Technik, retired COL Gerhard Hubatschek in "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," Ein Staat—Fine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 12-29. 6. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 182-183. 7. "Jedes Land wahlt seine Losung," April 9, 1987, quoted in Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 40. For a short overview of the Soviet-East German relations in the postwar era, see Norman M. Naimark, Soviet-GDR Relations: An Historical Overview (Cologne: Bundesinstitut fiir ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, 1989). 8. Pond, "A Wall Destroyed," 35-36. 9. Christoph Bertram, "The German Question," Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring 1990) 46. 10. Jarausch, German Unity, 15-16. Neckermann, Unification of Germany, 9. An interesting question is why the East Germans and not the Hungarians decided to flee. The answer evidently lies in the fact that the East Germans possessed "German" passports, whereas the Hungarians—or citizens from any other Communist state for that matter—did not. By the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, all Germans—both East and West—had German passports and therefore could live in whichever state they preferred. Ibid. 11. "German Unification . . . represents one of the greatest triumphs of leadership and diplomatic professionalism in the postwar period." Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 179. 12. Szabo, German Unification, 17. He maintained that France, the United Kingdom, East Germany, and Poland played supporting roles. The memoirs of Horst Teltschik, National Security Advisor to Chancellor Kohl from the opening of the Wall to Unification Day, are contained in 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991). 13. Christopher Daase and Michael Jochum, '"Partners in Leadership'? United Germany in the Eyes of the USA," Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (HI/1992): 237. 14. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 188-189. For overviews of the positions of all important parties, see also Gordon Smith, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padgett, eds., Developments in German Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 16-17. 15. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 192-193. 16. Ibid., 191. 17. Ibid., 183. 18. Ibid., 191. 19. Quoted in Jarausch, German Unity, 108. 20. Szabo, German Unification, 62-63; Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 192. 21. Szabo, German Unification, 58-59. 22. Ibid., 64-65; Smith et al., German Politics, 15. 23. Kaiser, "Germany's Unification," 194-195. 24. Szabo, German Unification, 95-105; Kaiser, Germany's Unification, 196; "Gorbachev Agrees to United Germany in NATO," International Herald Tribune, 17 July 1990; John Keep, "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship," East European Quarterly 26 (January, 1993): 431-446. 25. Jarausch, German Unity, 8.

The Political Setting

29

26. Craig Whitney, "There's a Wall in the New Berlin; You Just Can't See It," New York Times, 13 November 1994, E5. 27. Jarausch, German Unity, 19. For a incisive, succinct discussion of the underlying problems of socialism written by a former NVA officer see Herbert Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA—vor und nach ihrer Ubernahme in die Bundeswehr," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 488. 28. Jarausch, German Unity, 53. See also Reiner Tetzner, Leipziger Ring (Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand, 1990). 29. Jarausch, German Unity, 46. For a discussion of the use of NVA units for riot control during this period, see Werner E. Ablass, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 19-21. A total of 179 Hundertschaften (riot control formations of 100 men) were on call from the beginning of October through November 11, mainly in Dresden, Leipzig, and East Berlin. Aside from some minor action in Dresden, they were not employed against East German civilians. See also Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—Eindrucke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fur Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 208-209, 216-218. Koop argued that a "bloodbath" was prevented by local commanders on the scene and not by any wisdom from higher leaders. 30. Jarausch, German Unity, 59 31. Ibid., 61 32. Ibid., 62. 33. Ibid., 62, 65. 34. Ibid., 65-66. 35. Ibid., 66. Elizabeth Pond maintained: "By midnight of November 9, political unification was inevitable." "A Wall Destroyed," 49. 36. Jarausch, German Unity, 69-70. 37. Ibid., 112. 38. Ibid., 127, 128, 134. 39. Ibid., 137. 40. Schauble provided description and analysis not only of the treaty negotiations but also of the entire revolution in East Germany and events leading to the Unification in his book, Der Vertrag: Wie ich uber die deutsche Einheit verhandelte (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1991). 41. Jarausch, German Unity, 6, 70-72.

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3

The Military Setting With the political setting established, this chapter presents the military setting by offering an overview of the National People's Army (NVA) in the period preceding the Unification, including its mission, size, structure, readiness, and relationship to the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED) and the civilian population.1 The second section of the chapter offers a similar overview of the Bundeswehr and German Army. OVERVIEW OF THE NVA Mission The mission of the NVA was stated at the outset of its Basic Military Handbook. The military class mission of the National People's Army, shoulder to shoulder in close military brotherhood with the glorious Soviet army and the other fraternal socialistic armies, consists of: • to guard reliably the socialistic order and the free life of the citizens of the German Democratic Republic and all states of the socialistic community against all attacks from aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction • to guarantee the inviolability of the state's borders, territory, airspace and territorial waters of the German Democratic Republic as well as the protection of its continental base • to be constantly ready and able to defend against imperialistic aggression and to defeat the opponent decisively through great battle strength and a The basis of this mission was found in the Basic Law of the GDR, Articles 7 and 23, which stated that the NVA guarded the socialistic achievements of the

32

From Confrontation to Cooperation

people against all attacks and that the protection of peace and the achievements of the socialistic Fatherland was the proper obligation of the citizens of the GDR.3 Proud indeed were the professional cadres of this Army, proud of their frontline position guarding the frontiers of socialism and proud of their state, clearly a leading one in the socialist bloc in terms of economic performance. In May 1990, as Unification approached, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, the new chief of the NVA, explained at a meeting between eastern and western German defense officials: "The Warsaw Pact belongs to the security structures which have formed in Europe. It stands for peace and security in Europe. That is, the NVA had a firm place in these structures and can be proud that we have made a great contribution to the maintenance of peace."4 Organization Established in 1956, the NVA consisted of an Army, Air Force, and Navy with a peacetime strength of 170,000 service personnel and 47,000 civilian employees (wartime strength: 350,000). Perhaps the best military of the Warsaw Pact next to the Soviets, its draftees served for 18 months. The land forces (Landstreitkrafte) had their headquarters in Potsdam outside of Berlin and consisted of six active divisions (two armored and four motorized rifle) and five reserve divisions that would conduct yearly mobilization exercises. All the divisions were subordinate to two military districts—District 3 in Leipzig and District 5 in Neubrandenburg—which had dual responsibility for field as well as territorial units.5 (See Figure 3.1.) Before the revolution of 1989 had begun, the GDR had decided on a number of disarmament measures, and so had adjusted its force structure. The changes included a reduction in strength by 10,000 men, the deactivation of six tank regiments and one fighter squadron, and the decommissioning of 600 tanks, 50 attack helicopters, and 50 combat aircraft.6 The Character of the NVA The NVA was closely patterned after the Soviet military, including its conceptual foundations, training exercises, and principles for political, military, and moral education. Until 1949 the NVA had patterned its training on the regulations of the German Army in World War II (Wehrmacht). Thereafter, its training was based on Soviet training regulations that were obtained from the Soviets, translated, and implemented. By the end of the 1970's, the East Germans were less prone to accept all things Soviet and began to formulate more of their own concepts. At division and higher levels were Soviet generals who served as advisors (Berater) or specialists (Spezialisten), technically without any command authority but nevertheless exerting a major controlling influence.7 They communicated their desires through the established liaison net or requested that the appropriate NVA commanders visit them. They had two primary roles. First,

The Military Setting

33

Figure 3.1 Organization of the National People's Army (Land Forces)

Source: Chart provided by Army Staff, Division IV; also Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army, trans. Deryck Viney, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980, 116, 119.

they ensured that the NVA operated according to Soviet doctrine and was able to accomplish its military tasks. Second, they monitored the political reliability and loyalty of the units to the Warsaw Pact.8 There were few combined exercises between the two militaries and, although on appropriate holidays there were lofty acclamations of socialist fraternity, in fact the relationship in general was not a close one of respect and mutual admiration. BG (Ret.) Loffler, a former NVA division commander, said that the NVA tried to be very diplomatic and obliging (kulant) about the relationship; however, they simply did need the Soviets.9 Beyond the relationship of the two armies, the East German population has been characterized as viewing the Soviet military simply as an occupation army.10 Readiness rates were exceptionally high: 75 to 85 percent of the personnel were on hand in the units or could be present on very short notice in case of an alarm.11 The rationale for this included being prepared to attack; being prepared to defend against an attack from the West, which could come at any-time; and in

34

From Confrontation to Cooperation

case of crisis being able to isolate 85 percent of the personnel from enemy propaganda.12 Former NVA LTG BaarB indicated that he had lived in a situation in which there was no day—even Sundays and holidays—during which he was not available. When he was actually in the garrison, he had to be prepared to be at his place of command within 20 minutes.13 Former NVA BG Loffler stated that the readiness rates were much too high. Certainly, after the mid-1970's with all the international agreements, it should have been lowered at least to 50 percent.14 Personnel readiness rates were matched by comparably high equipment readiness rates. About one third of the equipment was used for training purposes. The remainder was uploaded with ammunition and ready to go to war at short notice. BG (Ret.) Bormann indicated that units had about 50 minutes in the summer to leave the garrison.15 Captain (CPT) Horst Reddemann, former NVA commander of the Eighteenth Motorized Rifle Regiment, stated that twenty minutes after an alert was called all six of his battalions had exited the garrison through six different gates. After sixty minutes, the kaserne was empty and the entire regiment was on the march, equipped with eight days of ammunition and supplies for twelve days.16 Life in the NVA was not easy; the hours were much longer than in the Bundeswehr. Normally beginning with athletics, the usual workday stretched from 6:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. The day might extend as late as 8:00 P.M. if political indoctrination training was held after dinner. Saturday duty generally ran from 6:00 or 7:00 A.M. to noon.17 Discipline was strict; could be dispensed arbitrarily by commanders; and included pay decrements, personal restrictions, reduction in rank, and ultimately arrest. The basis of disciplinary action could be ludicrous compared to Western standards. For example, an officer was disciplined for towing a West German civilian who had had an accident in Czechoslovakia. An individual might also be disciplined for not showing enough class-consciousness and knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, or for forming individual opinions and not submitting his will sufficiently to that of "the Collective."18 Beyond this was the informal EK (Entlassungskandidat) system in which older conscripts harassed younger ones who were forced to do such things as clean rooms with razor blades, play games with chemical protective clothing on, and clean weapons all night long.19 The NVA was a military machine oriented strictly to operational effectiveness on the battlefield at the expense of human beings. Little effort was made to provide decent living conditions or equipment considered minimally safe by Western standards.20 BG (Ret.) Bormann expressed that "naturally combat readiness stood above all else. Combat readiness was the measure of things. . . . Next to loyalty to the SED [Communist Party] this question of combat readiness was the second factor which determined all." He admitted that the requirements were entirely too exaggerated, but these were orders and orders had to be obeyed. The tremendously high readiness rates and alert postures were made

The Military Setting

35

possible because the entire training system and the staffs were "entirely fixed on the objective without regard to human beings."21 Beyond readiness rates, other measures show how imbued the NVA was with a war mentality. Various sets of medals for bravery in combat as well as field marshal epaulets for Communist Party Chief Honecker, Stasi Chief Mielke, and the Defense Minister had already been produced and stored. Materials for the building of eighty to one hundred kilometers of railroad track, hundreds of traffic signs, five hundred aluminum containers, thousands of beds, hammers, and shovels had been produced and stored at depots.22 The costs and impact on human beings of these inordinately high readiness rates and war fixation was clear, but—BG (Ret.) Bormann and others maintained—the NVA was a very well-drilled and well-trained force.23 A dramatically visible cost of this fixation on combat readiness was the deficient living conditions under which the common NVA soldier lived. The soldiers lived in eight- to ten-man rooms, each soldier having a small wardrobe and a stool (without back). Generally, there was only cold water in the wash rooms, and there were no functioning showers. In the 1970's, "shower houses" were built containing fifty to seventy showers, that could be used if the units requested well enough in advance so that sufficient warm water could be generated, something that could not always be counted on especially in cold winters. Kitchen facilities were miserably filthy, and after a meal, soldiers washed their own plates without hot water or cleansing materials. These living conditions for the common NVA soldiers, gravely deficient by Western standards, stood in stark contrast to the excellent conditions under which the NVA combat equipment and systems were kept and maintained.24 BG Dieter Farwick, Chief of Intelligence for the Bundeswehr, indicated that "the tank stood in a heated hall, the soldier slept in a cold bedroom."25 Werner AblaB, State Secretary in Ministry for Disarmament and Defense during the last phase of existence for the GDR, pointed out the irony in the fact that the NVA gave more human dignity to pieces of equipment than to human beings.26 The active duty component of the NVA was extremely top heavy. The ratio of enlisted to officer was approximately three to one, compared to twelve to one in the Bundeswehr. Personnel management was very decentralized—much more was being done at the division level compared to the Bundeswehr. Officers were promoted earlier than their Bundeswehr contemporaries and given only narrow latitude in their career paths. Officer education was highly specialized, and individual officers marked for senior command were sent to the Command and General Staff College in Moscow.27 Approximately one fifth of the training time in the officer's basic course (Hochschule) was devoted to socialistic, ideological training.28 Finally, the duration of officer assignments could be much longer than in the Bundeswehr.29 There existed in the NVA no genuine NCO corps comparable to that in the Bundeswehr. A soldier would become an NCO generally because he was interested in obtaining some education or a good training location, something a sol-

36

From Confrontation to Cooperation

dier could attain only if he was an NCO for three years. If a soldier really wanted to make the military a career, he would try to become a Fahnrich or an officer. Failing this, he might settle for a position as an NCO. 30 Just about all young men served in the NVA for an eighteenth-month term, with only a very few claiming conscientious-objector status.31 This time in the military served as a rite of passage for East German young men and subsequently was a common bond among them. The mentality existed that if a man had not served, then he was not really a man. As youths, boys learned from school and state propaganda what was expected of them: protection of the freedom of the GDR, of the political system, and of the world. These visions of military service were quite idealistic and inflated; however, life in actual service as a soldier could be remarkably tedious.32 Part of the socialization process of the NVA soldier consisted of the nurturing of a hate mentality toward the West (Erziehung zum Hafi). Every soldier was provided the small book, "On the Sense of Being a Soldier" (Vom Sinn des Soldatseins). This book instructed soldiers to hate all those who would threaten their lives. "We hate imperialism, because it threatens the existence of humanity, of our life, and the happiness and future of our children. As soldiers we oppose this mortal enemy of humanity directly at the dividing line of the two social systems." Describing the tremendous NATO forces massed in West Germany against them, the book continued by saying that these forces were raised in the anti-Communist spirit to be unscrupulous and brutal and were prepared for the unconditional battle with socialism.33 In some units, this indoctrination extended to "stress" and "enemy image" cells (Psycho-Kabinett) constructed by political officers for "political and psychological preparation" for war, including flashing lights, combat sounds, realistic battle scenes, and images of the enemy.34 Although West German soldiers struggled with the thought of having to fight fellow Germans if war came, the NVA apparently had no such qualms. They were German in the west and spoke the same language; however, they were still not viewed as a common people.35 A fundamental difference between the two armies existed in the method of leadership in executing a mission or task. The Bundeswehr used mission-type or goal-oriented principles (Auftragstaktik), whereas the NVA used highly directed principles (Befehlstaktik). In brief—as is covered in more detail later in this chapter—the former involves setting the goal and allowing the subordinate to decide on the specific methods and tactics to be used to attain the goal. In the NVA, not only was the goal—the what—given, but also the how, with few if any deviations permitted.36 A former NVA officer pointed out that the goal of both training systems was the same: the combat readiness of the soldier. In the Bundeswehr, the mission was given; one then had to decide the how. In the NVA, all direction came from above.37 Because of this difference in leadership style, the NVA lacked to a large degree the ability to think freely and imaginatively. BG Andreas Wittenberg, who took over one of the NVA divisions at unification, indicated that NVA leaders

The Military Setting

37

lacked the capability to compare and weigh different possibilities and to formulate their own opinions. "They believed all that came from above was correct." The NVA had difficulty, for example, in reading conflicting opinion pieces in the west as Unification approached. They were unable to analyze and evaluate on their own. "Intellectually they were always afloat (am schwimmen)."3^ The possibilities for the formation of their own opinions were constrained by the Communist system. Many officers simply submitted themselves to this system and engaged in a kind of selfcensorship.39 Relationship to the East German Communist Party (SED) First above all, the NVA was a military that served the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party (SED). Approximately 95 percent of all officers and 50 percent of all NCOs were party members.40 The party sought the membership of not only those in leadership positions but all longer serving and professional soldiers serving longer than three years.41 Membership at first might be of a rather passive nature; however, an important step came when the individual officer became accustomed to the omnipresence and power of the party. Because party work took place directly in the units and because just about every officer was a party member, there was no clear division between duty and party, something that deepened "party consciousness." Although party work in a very literal sense was important, for the most part individuals excelled in "party work" through exemplary performance of duty.42 Like the Soviet system, the military was infused with "political" officers dedicated to ensuring that the party maintained control. Figure 3.2 indicates the presence of these officers at the various levels of command. This entire political infrastructure was responsible for the implementation of SED policy and the "political-moral" education of the NVA personnel—from general down to the individual soldier. In each unit down to the companies with more than one hundred fifty men, there existed a deputy commander (Stellvertreter) responsible for political affairs, who had essentially the same military qualifications as his contemporaries.43 Major General (MG) Ekkehard Richter, who took over theThird NVA Military District in Leipzig at Unification, indicated that in the Bundeswehr there is a "qualified order," whereas in the NVA "you had to obey your commander—period!"—because of belonging to the Communist Party, and the Communist Party did not make any mistakes.44 Former NVA officers in Neubrandenburg recognized the benefit of being a member of an army in a democracy. When asked what they liked about the Bundeswehr, they responded that in addition to having the party, they also had a constitution.45 The individual officer saw the NVA's mission as legitimate and the state as the genuine alternative to the imperialistic FRG. The GDR was the part of Germany in which the true ideals of humanity would be realized. In their oath of allegiance, the NVA swore not to the SED (East German Communist Party) but to

38

From Confrontation to Cooperation

the Fatherland. It was fully accepted, however, that the SED stood behind the "class" mission of the NVA and took on itself the role of defending the interests of the working people. The SED's leadership role was seen as necessary and unFigure 3.2 Control of the NVA by the Socialist Unity Party (SED)

Source: ZentrumfiirInnere Fuhrung derstood; NVA officers were proud to be a part of it.46 For many individuals in the free democratic West, it is inconceivable that human beings would live under a totalitarian regime, as in the GDR, without taking some type of action or at least being conscious of the deception and injustice. West Germans commonly asked of East Germans: "But you must have known? How could you go along with it for so long?"47 A comprehensive answer concerning why the typical East German or the typical NVA officer did not is difficult to formulate; however, several factors contributed: the fear of repercussions if some type of provocative action were taken, the desire to protect one's advantages and position in the system, and the counterpressure against subversive action because of one's upbringing in the system.48 The typical NVA officer believed that in the battle between the two political, economic, and social systems, the GDR was on the right side, the side that would ultimately prevail. He normally supported this cause more through his deeds—superior duty performance—rather than the politically correct words. It

The Military Setting

39

was felt that the party and government leaders had the state on the correct economic track. There were indeed hard times and burdens to bear; however, these were necessary and justified given the young, still immature state of socialism. Until the revolution of 1989, the average NVA officer hardly knew that the system was so deficient in civil rights and due process of law.49 One is reminded of Plato's Allegory of the Cave: One cannot miss what one has never experienced. Role in the Economy and Relationship to the Civilian Population As the economy of the GDR deteriorated throughout the 1980's, the NVA was directed to provide personnel—normally battalion-size units—to assist in such areas as coal-mining, chemical production, railroad and traffic operations, and heavy industry, and forced to sleep at times in schools or sports facilities. In some of these areas, civilians had refused to work because of the danger. Officers who tried to receive extra pay for this work were punished. A remarkably high number of military personnel (55,000) was estimated to be performing such work after 1988, and despite the strain this placed on units, the 85 percent alert requirement remained in force.50 The NVA was not well liked by the general population, who perceived the Army as a segment of the SED's security and control structure and as a privileged, arrogant group.51 So estranged from the people it was sworn to defend, the NVA was characterized by some as a "state within a state."52 Land for garrisons or training areas was simply expropriated with only little compensation for the actual owners. The isolated nature of the living areas of the NVA officers added to the distance between these two segments of East German society and nurtured suspicions and prejudices of the population.53 Former NVA officer Herbert Konig stated that despite the proclaimed inseparable unity of the Army and people, the reality was something else. Over the course of time a gap had arisen that the NVA could not really explain. Nonetheless, NVA professional soldiers still believed they were there for their state and people, although often embittered because of the unjust criticism. He attributed this bad relationship between the NVA and the people to several factors: the secretive and closed nature of the NVA establishment and its continued isolation throughout its existence, the ideological nature of its traditions, and most important its close connection with the SED, which thoroughly penetrated it and exacted such a heavy toll on its members, many of whom returned to the civilian sector and brought these negative perceptions with them.54 West Germans were quick to characterize the feeling of East Germans toward the NVA as one of "hate," whereas East Germans used much less dramatic words and made important qualifications to their statements.55 Commander Wichert (former NVA) explained that it was called "People's Army," but over time its affinity to the people kept decreasing. Military service was perceived as decreasing in importance, and the NVA became increasingly

40

From Confrontation to Cooperation

isolated.56 Several former NVA officers in Dresden explained that the NVA suffered in its image because it failed to explain well enough to the population both its role and how hard it worked.57 Civilians from East Germany maintained that "hate" was too strong a word to describe their feelings toward the NVA; "anger" was more apt. One civilian described the feeling as one of indifference. Several factors alleviated the negative image. First, NVA units were confined to certain areas, rather isolated from the general population. Second, everyone had to serve in the NVA, so it was important to draw a distinction between the general population's view of the professional soldier and the draftee, the latter of whom were not held in any negative light.58

OVERVIEW OF THE BUNDESWEHR This study now turns to the West German side to present a brief description of its founding and an overview of its status in the last half of the 1980's, including its mission, force structure, the changing security environment it faced, and ending with issues on which it was focusing as the fateful events of the summer and fall of 1989 approached. Establishment Postwar West German rearmament took place in the context of a sharpening of the Cold War between the NATO allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its puppet regimes of eastern Europe, on the other. The latter bloc formed the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 in response to the western call during the same month for German rearmament and ultimately its entrance into NATO. The initial planning for the West German armed forces began in 1950 under the newly appointed Federal Commissioner of Security, Theodor Blank, who assembled a small group of former officers and civil servants into the Federal Security Office, Dienststelle Blank, with a view toward shaping a German contribution to the European Defense Community, a vision that evaporated in 1954 with the rejection of the Community by the French National Assembly. The concept then shifted to organizing forces that would serve under the NATO integrated military command.59 The role that the Prussian and German militaries had played in the state for centuries, but most importantly in the twentieth century, presented the creators of the Bundeswehr with three formidable challenges which Catherine Kelleher explained "reflected the contradictory goals and contradictory requirements of every German security system since perhaps 1648."60 The first challenge, elementary and common to all militaries, was that of military security, protecting German people and land from outside intrusion. The second was international security, that is, the protection of other states from the past excesses of German security policy, certainly not the main but indeed one of the reasons for the

The Military Setting

41

founding of the NATO alliance. The final challenge was civic security—the protection of German society from the past excesses of the German military and vice versa.61 After much domestic and international debate in the first several years of the decade, the first legal step toward the creation of the Bundeswehr was taken by the FRG in February 1954 with the first military amendment to the Basic Law (German Constitution). Over the next three years, numerous pieces of legislation were passed to provide the legal basis for the Bundeswehr and to shape its character and structure, including the Volunteers' Law, Law Concerning Suitability, Soldiers' Law, and the Universal Compulsory Military Service Law, among others. 62 Article 87a, allowing for "the buildup of Armed forces for defence purposes" and clarifying that they "may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law," was added to the Basic Law on March 19, 1956.63 The initial 101 soldiers of the Bundeswehr were inducted on October 10, 1955, by Federal President Theodor Heuss and included two generals, eighteen lieutenant colonels, thirty majors, forty captains, fifteen first lieutenants, one master sergeant, and five staff sergeants. The first training company was organized on January 1, 1956, and on January 20, a day considered the Bundeswehr'* birthday, Chancellor Adenauer greeted the first 1,500 volunteers and called them in union with Germany's allies to ensure the peace: "The single goal of German rearmament is to contribute to the maintenance of peace."64 That very same year, German officers were assigned to NATO offices, assuming important positions in the integrated command staffs.65 From its inception, the German Army, the land forces component of the Bundeswehr, envisioned a target force structure of twelve divisions, initially to be integrated into the military structure of the European Defense Community (EDC) and, after its failure, into the integrated military structure of the NATO. 66 Organizationally, the military planners initially faced the challenge of establishing conditions that would allow for the induction of the first draftees on April 1, 1957. Therefore, the first military organizations were instructional battalions, officer schools, and the Army Academy, forerunner of the Bundeswehr'* Command and General Staff Academy in Hamburg. From its initial strength of about 1,000 men in January 1956, it grew within one year to 55,000; 100,000 in 1958; 159,000 in 1960; and 252,000 in 1962.67 By 1965, the activation and outfitting of the twelve German divisions were complete and the units were assigned to the NATO.68 Before addressing the mission and force structure of the Bundeswehr and German Army, it is important to develop two core concepts in the military culture of the Bundeswehr. The first, Innere Fuhrung, was developed in the postwar period, whereas the second, Auftragstaktik, has its roots much deeper in German military history.

42

From Confrontation to Cooperation Innere Fuhrung

The first core concept that must be addressed to understand present German military culture, one that played a key role in the Takeover, is Innere Fuhrung, a concept that eludes precise definition in English. In his major study of tradition within the Bundeswehr after World War II, Donald Abenheim explained that it has been called "inner command," "inner leadership," "moral leadership," and "civic education."69 He chose not to define it but rather to describe it as "military leadership appropriate to the modern world, which enables the soldier to carry out his mission while assuring his rights as a citizen."70 The concept of Innere Fuhrung was developed in response to the excesses of militarism in German history, especially its involvement in the politics of the Weimar Republic and its role in Nazi Germany. The passing of the Basic Law in 1949 ushered in an entirely different system of values than those that had existed from 1933 to 1945. Supreme among these was the dignity of the individual, to be respected and guarded with the full power of the state. In this respect, it drew on a key idea of the great Prussian military reformers of the early nineteenth century who, in their drive to modernize the Army so that it might successfully confront Napoleon's, believed likewise in the individual dignity of the soldier. With the establishment of the Bundeswehr in 1955, it was recognized that a break with the past military tradition was necessary and that the new military had to correspond to the new parliamentary democracy of the FRG. The guiding image of the soldier became the "citizen in uniform," who was now to experience the very rights he was sworn to defend.71 The foundation of Innere Fuhrung is closely connected to key elements of the free democratic state of Germany. The first is the image of the human being as put forth in the Basic Law, encompassing the personal worth and dignity of the individual, unique and never to be renounced, capable of freedom and responsibility to himself and to society, and capable of shaping himself and his environment freely and responsibly. Two other key elements are, first, the premise that all the power of the state flows from rights and laws and, second, the existence of a pluralistic German society. The foundation itself of the concept comprises the system of values as expressed in the Basic Law, the incorporation of the Bundeswehr in the FRG, a state governed by law, and the position of the Bundeswehr in German society.72 The concept is implemented throughout the Bundeswehr by two means: (a) the laws governing the Bundeswehr such as Soldiers' Act, the military disciplinary code, and the procedures for registering complaints; and (b) a number of key leadership and conduct principles. These principles are to characterize the daily life of the soldier in peace, crisis, and war. In all areas, the model of the "citizen in uniform," combining personal freedom with responsible citizenship and operational readiness as a soldier, is to prevail. The key principles include the capability to perform despite the tension existing between individual interests and the exigencies of the military, the recognition of the need for the

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Bundeswehr and willingness to contribute to its mission on the soldier's own volition, the generation and maintenance of a climate of trust and camaraderie that serves as a basis for the operational readiness of the armed forces, the opportunity to exert maximum individual initiative for the accomplishment of the mission (related to Auftragstaktik), and the recognition of the need for open and continuous information exchange within the military and between the military and the civilian sector.73 Innere Fuhrung then is a key trademark of the Bundeswehr, something that distinguishes it from all past German militaries. It attempts to address the tension that exists between the needs, rights, and safety of the individual and the imperatives of a military force. The Bundeswehr maintains that this tension can be effectively addressed when both superior and subordinate operate under the same principles within this concept. The Bundeswehr thus asks not for the soldier's blind obedience, something connected with the excesses of the past, but rather his critically minded obedience.74 Auftragstaktik The second major concept that is necessary in order to understand the Bundeswehr and that played an important role in the Takeover is Auftragstaktik. Simply translated, this means "mission tactics," but it has also been translated as "mission orders,"75 and "mission-oriented command system."76 It has been called "an artificial, after-the-fact construct whose meaning has never been defined with any precision,"77 and conversely, a "clearly defined doctrine understandable to and understood by all officers in the [German] Army."78 There is no question that the concept in its present understanding developed over many years of German military history; however, like the differences on its precise meaning, there is no agreement on its beginnings. One author stated that it began to take shape in the final decades of the 19th Century during the German military's assessment of the Wars of German Unification,79 whereas another author maintained its roots stretch back to the eighteenth century Prussian king, Frederick the Great.80 Although its elements were long in developing, the actual term only came into use after World War II.81 The term, Auftragstaktik, can be viewed on at least two levels: a tactical level and a more general level. On a purely tactical level, the concept has several important elements. First, the combat mission issued must express clearly the intent of the commander. Second, the objective, course of action, and constraints must also be clear, restricting as little as possible the subordinate's freedom of action. Third, the limits on the methods of execution are held to a minimum.82 More generally, it has a number of important elements. First, there is great emphasis placed on the subordinate's freedom of action and the direct relationship of this with initiative, all tempered with good judgment honed ideally by training, experience, and the guiding influence of the superior commander. The officer is expected not only to exert initiative; it is in fact his duty. The emphasis,

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From Confrontation to Cooperation

therefore, is that the subordinate is told what to do and not how to do it.83 The officer is expected also to exhibit a capacity to think independently and to be prepared to assume risks.84 Second, there is great emphasis placed on the integrity and judgment of the individual leader on the scene in a presumably fastmoving, ever-changing situation. He is presumed best able to evaluate the situation, with the commander's intent in mind, and decide on the best course of action, even disobeying orders if the situation warrants it. The legendary story on this point relates an exchange around 1860 between Prince Frederick Charles and a major who had committed a tactical error. Upbraided by the prince, the officer reminded the prince that he had been taught that an order from a superior was to be treated as an order from the king. The prince responded: "His Majesty made you a major because he believed you would know when not to obey his orders."85 Third, great emphasis is placed on senior-subordinate relationships. Commanders are charged with nurturing their subordinates, serving as mentors, and developing in them good leadership qualities, a capability to think on their feet, and to formulate a good, if not perfect, plan of action quickly and to execute it aggressively. Over time, then, the optimal result is anticipated: They come to understand how each other thinks, vitally important if the subordinate is to understand the commander's intent amidst the fog of war.86 The Bundeswehr continues to use this concept in the late 1990's, although at times an alternate phrase is used, "mission-type orders" or "leading by mission"(Fuhren mit Auftrag)P Auftragstaktik, in its most sophisticated, comprehensive sense, is more than simply a method of issuing orders. It was and continues to be, as Nelsen argued, "an extraordinarily broad concept, holistically embracing aspects of what today would be called a theory of the nature of war, character and leadership traits, tactics, command and control, senior-subordinate relationships, and training and education."88

Mission of the Bundeswehr The White Paper 1985 published by the MOD, the last White Paper to be published until 1994, coupled with other sources is helpful in gaining a sense of the mission, structure and status of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1980's. The mission of the Bundeswehr is drawn from and controlled by Article 87a of the Basic Law. Together with the other instruments of the state and society, it is charged with guaranteeing the security of the FRG, maintaining its political freedom of action and defending with NATO the basic free order of the state against every attack. Beyond this, and in accordance with the Basic Law, it can also be employed in case of domestic emergency or catastrophe. It is the military instrument of German security policy and its mission is the expression of the security policy of the FRG. Legal regulations ensure the primacy of politics, that is, the primacy of political leaders, over the military.89

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The Bundeswehr conceives of itself as an army in alliance, "not as an instrument for the independent, military development of the Federal Republic of Germany. It can fulfill its mission only in the context of the [NATO] Alliance." Thus, except for the Home Defense units, all combat forces are under the operational command of NATO. Through its operational readiness in peacetime it contributes to the maintenance of peace through deterrence. The main activities of the military in peacetime are training and education of military personnel and units to develop the necessary character and capabilities to accomplish their mission in war. Special emphasis is placed on civic (politisch) education so that the soldier understands that military duties must be subordinate to and serve the fundamental democratic values of the state.90 In the mid-1980's the Bundeswehr was charged, together with the other organs of state and allied armies, to maintain the security of the FRG or to reestablish it. The purpose of its employment was for it to end, as quickly as possible, the war on favorable political terms and to reestablish deterrence. Operational missions would flow from the basic conditions that Germany faced. Through forward defense as little space as possible was to be sacrificed and damage was to be limited. The geographical situation and the military preparations of the Warsaw Pact left only little room for action; speed and flexibility therefore were critical, as was coordination of operations plans of the various NATO nations in central Europe. NATO reserved the right to employ the first use of nuclear weapons, the launchers for which Germany controlled in part. Finally, the survivability of conventional forces was decisive for the effectiveness of NATO strategy of deterrence.91 Force Structure In the mid-1980's the Bundeswehr'* overall personnel strength amounted to 495,000, of which 489,000 were active duty and 6,000 were reservists on active duty. In war, the force would grow to 1,270,000; however, planning was in progress for increased support of the U.S. forces reinforcing Europe in the event of war (Wartime Host Nation Support) which was to bring the wartime strength after 1987 to 1,340,000. The active duty strength was comprised of 345,000 army (70 percent), 111,000 air force (22 percent), and 39,000 navy personnel (8 percent). Of the 489,000 active duty military personnel, 270,000 were professional or longer serving volunteers (55 percent), whereas 219,000 (44 percent) were draftees.92 Drafts were held quarterly and annual turnover amounted to 170,000. Additionally, about 180,000 reservists underwent advanced training in reserve training periods during any given year.93 At this time, the German Army was organized according to AS 4, which had been implemented in 1980. The Army consisted of the Field Army, Territorial Army, the Army Office, and the Army Staff in Bonn. (See Figure 3.3.) The Field Army contained the combat forces and consisted of three corps with six armored, four mechanized, one mountain, and one air assault division, deployed across

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four combat sectors of NATO's defense line. Each division was comprised of three combat brigades; two divisions also had a Home Defense Brigade from the Figure 3.3 Organization of the German Army (1986)

Source: U.S. Army Training Board, "Allied Army Training Study of the Federal Republic of Germany," Ft. Monroe, VA, 28 August 1986, Tab A.

Territorial Army, amounting to thirty-six fighting brigades. The Territorial Army had the mission of protecting important facilities in the rear area, supporting the deployment of allied forces arriving in Europe, and accomplishing other tasks to allow for the buildup and free maneuver of NATO forces in the FRG. It consisted of three territorial commands that contained five military district commands, twenty-nine regional military commands, and eighty subregional military commands. Twelve home defense brigades served in the Territorial Army.94 Threat Picture While Gorbachev had been in power for years promoting his alternate paradigms of glasnost and perestroika and had already offered unilateral cuts in Soviet conventional forces, and despite the signing of the INF (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty in December 1987 and the initiation of conventional arms talks, the threat picture on which Bundeswehr force planning had been based in 1988 and early 1989 remained essentially unchanged. It retained its

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focus on the Soviets' "significant military advantage in major offensive conventional capability" and their "capacity for mounting a large-scale offensive against NATO."95 Resource Challenges In the early 1980's, Bundeswehr planners realized they faced an acute personnel problem in the coming decade. Because of a declining birthrate, the available pool of eighteen- to nineteen-year-old German men would decrease by about 50 percent and drop below 250,000, the number needed to maintain the Bundeswehr at full strength for both active and reserve forces. In 1989, the ratio of men available to needed was three to one; in 1995 it was projected that the ratio would fall to one and one third to one. If nothing was done, this would result in a reduction of the force to 300,000. In light of these projections, three decisions were made to confront the problem. First, the compulsory term of service beginning in 1989 would be extended from fifteen to eighteen months. Second, the number of professional and longer serving volunteers in the force was to increase by approximately 10 percent. Finally, there was to be increased reliance on reserve manpower. With these steps, the force would shrink to 456,000 (active), a reduction of 7 percent. (In April 1989, the government chose to postpone the extension of service time until 1992.)96 Limited budgetary resources served as a second factor constraining Bundeswehr force planning. Since the late 1970's, West German defense spending succeeded in outpacing inflation on average only by about .9 percent per year, with the growth in defense spending from 1983 to 1987 averaging about 1 percent a year.97 Faced with increased competition for scarce manpower, planners called for increased budget allocations in part to make the service more attractive to young men. Unfortunately, the prediction was for steady but only modest growth for the mid-term.98 Bundeswehr 2000 Based on the continuing threat, German and NATO strategy, the advances in technology, and these resourcing challenges, military planners formulated a new defense plan for the military forces, Bundeswehr 2000, which was approved by the Minister of Defense in February 1988, and which foresaw two major changes. First, there was to be an increased effort on joint solutions in a number of fields: command, control, and intelligence; logistics; medical services; air transport; and training. Second, although only minor organizational changes were seen for the Air Force and Navy, it offered a major restructuring of the Army, a plan called Army Structure 2000. The Army had three major intentions with this new structure:

48

From Confrontation to Cooperation 1. The number of major units (corps and division) were to remain unchanged. The Federal Republic would continue to provide 12 divisions to the NATO military structure. 2. The attractiveness of the Army had to be improved, and its potential for force augmentation in times of crisis had to be assured. 3. The capabilities of the Territorial Army had to be enhanced.

To accomplish these objectives, the German Army decided on a number of measures, including a higher density of officers at the company level, better training and education for senior NCOs, a "high effective [personnel] strength" in companies to ensure quality mission-oriented training of conscripts, and a significantly higher number of active duty personnel assigned to nonactive units. In terms of force structure, the plan called for the establishment of brigade and division airmobile units, the concentration of all combat brigades in the Field Army, and the addition of new combat support capabilities at both corps and division level. The Home Defense brigades, to that time in the Territorial Army, were to be switched and fifteen Home Defense regiments would be partly activated. Overall, there was increased reliance placed on mobilization and less on fully operational ready combat units.99 The Rush of International Political Events From December 1987 through the summer of 1989 when the revolutions throughout eastern Europe began, the rush of international political events, especially within the areas of German-Soviet relations and of arms control and disarmament, eroded the very basis on which military planners had attempted systematically and logically to plan force structure changes. In the first area, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and General Secretary Gorbachev conducted two historic summit meetings in October 1988 and June 1989, opening up in Soviet words a "new chapter" in relations. Eleven agreements were concluded on a wide range of subjects, as well as the "Joint Declaration," an expression of the "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. In the Declaration, the Soviet Union gave problems of humankind precedence over political confrontation and class warfare, emphasized the right of all peoples and states to self-determination and adherence to international law, and promoted the fostering of a consciousness of European identity and a "European system of peace."100 Concerning the second field, the United States and Soviet Union in December 1987 signed the INF Agreement eliminating two classes of intermediate-range nuclear forces. In July 1988, Soviet military Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Akhromeyev visited the United States with Secretary of Defense Carlucci returning the visit in August. That same month, in the first, joint, nuclear test conducted by the United States and the Soviet Union, forty-three Soviet scientists attended a detonation of a 150-kiloton nuclear devise in Nevada. In December 1988, in an address to the UN General Assembly, Gorbachev announced plans to reduce Soviet military forces by 500,000 men

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and reduce Soviet forces in Europe by 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft, asserting that Soviet military doctrine would be transformed to a defensive orientation. Several days later, the Soviet Union informed the State Department that it was dismantling two radar sites that had been the subject of much controversy. In March 1989, the new Conventional Forces in Europe talks began with an impressively realistic, opening negotiating position presented by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, that offered deep cuts in Soviet forces. In April, 1,000 Soviet tanks withdrew from Hungary in the first stage of Gorbachev's promised unilateral force reductions. This was followed by the Soviet announcement on May 5 that 1,000 tanks had already been withdrawn from East Germany. On May 10, in a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker, Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce nuclear forces in eastern Europe by 500 warheads; he also accepted the principle of asymmetrical reductions for conventional forces in Europe to achieve parity by 1997. Two days later, President Bush in response indicated that it was "time to move beyond containment." In July, Gorbachev, during a visit to France, stated that the Soviet Union was prepared to reduce short-range nuclear missiles "without delay" if NATO agreed to enter negotiations and offered to remove all Soviet nuclear weapons from the territory of Warsaw Pact states, if the United States did the same in NATO states. In October—one month before the fall of the Berlin Wall—Baker indicated that the United States wished to see perestroika succeed and offered advisors to that end. Finally, in yet another sign of how genuinely the Soviet Union seemed to be evolving, Shevardnadze admitted in the same month that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 "violated the norms of proper behavior . . . [and] general human values."101 THE WORLD OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN 1989 BEFORE THE FALL OF THE BERLIN WALL Before die Wende (the turning) of November 1989, the Bundeswehr continued to march on with fairly familiar premises: a fairly fixed and clear threat picture despite Gorbachev's words and actions, a good idea of the future personnel structure changes, an increase in the compulsory term of service from fifteen to eighteen months, an adequate reserve concept, and sufficient material outfitting. Military leaders and planners, however, were trying to implement new force structure plans while the political foundation, on which these plans were based, was shifting. Military planners continued attempts to plan and implement changes in their military sphere, while the more fundamental and determining political sphere was undergoing dramatic changes. This was, to use the words of one Army planner, like "trying to build a snowman during a thaw."102 In implementing Bundeswehr 2000 and AS 2000, which flowed from it, the German Army was grappling with a number of its implications, for example, the lengthening of the term of compulsory service. Having draftees for three months longer meant that it could achieve higher training standards. It was planning for a

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higher density of officers in company-size units and working on a revised training concept for NCOs compelled by increased requirements for NCOs as leaders and trainers, the coming greater dependency on mobilization, and the need to make the NCO profession more attractive. Also in the area of training, the German Army was working closely with the U.S. Army to integrate more simulators and simulations to save money and decrease maneuver damage caused by traditional field exercises. While negotiating the number of days the German Army could train at U.S. training facilities in Germany, it was laying plans to "test run" the first German battalion through the U.S. Army's high-tech Combat Maneuver Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany. It was also working with a new concept for field training exercises. In September 1989, it conducted its annual exercise, called "Open Visor," involving 39,000 troops, 2,000 tanks, and 10,000 wheeled vehicles, the first time the new type of exercise was conducted: an exercise in which mainly headquarters elements participated (Command Post Exercise) with some units in the field at full strength. Bundeswehr 2000 called for heavier reliance on the mobilization of reserves. In addition to the changes in training this required, the Bundeswehr was dealing with the excessive latitude given to reservists in their participation in mobilization exercises, the uneven burden the mobilization concept placed on the population of the eastern federal states, and greater fairness in compensation for reservists. Finally, German Army officers were involved in the debate over the modernization of short-range nuclear forces in Germany (with ranges below five hundred kilometers), specifically the implementation of the 1983 Montebello decision and the modernization of the Lance land-based missile.103 The Bundeswehr and German Army, therefore, were quite surprised and essentially unprepared for the rush of events from the fall of the Berlin Wall, November 9, 1989, to German Unification, October 3, 1990, when the Bundeswehr took over not only the NVA but also the other East German paramilitary forces and equipment.104

NOTES 1. Excellent sources from the NVA literature include Handbuch Militdrisches Grundwissen,9th ed. (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1980); Armee fur Frieden und Sozialismus: Geschichte der Rationale Volksarmee der DDR, 2d ed. (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987); Die Militdr- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED 1945 bis 1988: Dokumente und Materialen (Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989). A recently published source is: Wolfgang Wunsche, ed., Rilhrt euchl Zur Geschichte der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR (Berlin: Edition Ost, 1998). An excellent source on the individual NVA soldier is "Der Soldat der NVA: Hilfen zum Verstandnis und zum Umgang" "Arbeitspapier" (Koblenz: Zentrum Innere Fuhrung, September 1990). The most comprehensive source on the NVA is Thomas M. Forster, The East German Army: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact, trans. Deryck Viney (London: George Allen & Unwin,

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1980). A brief overview is contained in Mark E. Victorson, "Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport Paper #7 (Newport: Naval War College, June 1994), 9-17. For a comprehensive look at the entire spectrum of armed components of the GDR, see Torsten Diedrich, Hans Ehlert, and Riidiger Wenzke, eds., Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1998). 2. Handbuch Militdrisches Grundwissen, 19. 3. Herbert Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA—vor und nach ihrer Ubernahme in die Bundeswehr," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 487. 4. Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 13, 80, 214. Quote on p. 25. Schonbohm has an entire section on the NVA before Unification, 41-46. 5. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik A3 (II, 1992): 164-165; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 43. Brigadier General (Ret.) Guenther Bormann, former Chief of Artillery and Rocket Forces until 1987, indicated that there were actually six reserve divisions that in peacetime were based at NCO schools. Interview, Potsdam, 26 June 1992. Jeffrey McCausland suggested that the NVA was "perhaps the best trained and equipped member of the Warsaw Pact outside of the Soviet Union." "East German Army-Spearpoint or Weakness?" Military Review (February, 1990): 13. 6. Hans Einhorn, "Panzer zu Traktoren: Konversion in den Neuen Bundeslandern," Information fur die Truppe (4/1991): 27. 7. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. 8. Interview, BG (Ret.) Hans-Georg Loffler, (former NVA) former Division Commander, First Motorized Rifle Division (Potsdam) and Chief of Staff, Fifth Military District/Army (Neubrandenburg), Berlin, 19 June 1998. 9. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 13. Also see pp. 43 & 243. Concerning the relationship between the Soviet and East German military, former NVA LTC Herbert Konig wrote that on assignment to Moscow "the continuously sworn brotherhood [between the two] proved a farce." Herbert Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," Truppenpraxis (3/1992): 236. See also Forster, East German Army, 72-104; William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (Cambridge: McGraw Hill, 1982), 180-187. For a scholarly analysis of East Germany's reliability to the Warsaw Pact, see Henry Krisch, "German Democratic Republic," in Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability, ed. Daniel N. Nelson (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), 143-183. 10. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 172. 11. Ibid., 100; interview, MG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992; interview, BG (Ret.) Loffler, 19 June 1998; Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236; Dirk Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen: Viele Angehorigen der ehemaligen NVA flihlen sich als Soldaten zweiter Klasse," Truppenpraxis (3/1991): 302. 12. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 494. 13. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben: Interview mit Generalleutnant Klaus Jurgen BaarC." Truppenpraxis (5/1990): 438. 14. Interview, BG Loffler, 19 June 1998.

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15. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. Several sources say the personnelon-hand rate was 85 percent, for example, LTG von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; Major General Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991, 4. BG (Ret.) Bormann maintained that the real figure was 75 percent: Fifteen percent were allowed on pass and 10 percent on vacation. (These figures relate to weekends.) 16. Interview, CPT Horst Reddeman (former NVA) Staff Officer, Division VIII (Infantry), German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992. Also interviews with CPT Burghard Belitz, CPT Fred Kuther, and CPT Siegfried Stange (former NVA) Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden, 24 June 1992; and CPT Roald Biedermann, First Lieutenant (1LT) Brandt, and CPT Monecke (former NVA) Military Region 84, Potsdam, 22 June 1992. 17. Interview with 1LT Hans-Walter Matthies (former NVA) Staff Officer, Command and Control (G-6) Section, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992, Also interview with CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. For political indoctrination training, see also Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. He contrasted it in the view of the typical NVA officer with combat training that held high importance and describes it as "a necessary evil and duty." 18. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 130, 151. 19. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, "Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces: the Eggesin Garrison as an Example for the Unification of Two Armies" (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 14 February 1992), 9; Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 136-137. 20. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 5. 21. Interview, June 26, 1992; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 101; Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 239-244. For the exaggerated readiness rates, see also Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236-237. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Herbert Danzer indicated that the NVA oriented its resources toward optimizing operational readiness and not for such things as maintaining kasernes. Interview, Assistant Operations Officer, Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 92. See also Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300. 22. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 100, 101, 153, 244; Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 125-126. For the bunker systems to be used in war see pp. 114-116, 215-216, 222-224. For civil defense preparations, see Zwei Armeen, 198. 23. For example, Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300. 24. This description is a summary of observations made by LTG Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 71, 72, 84-85, 87, 93, 180. See also Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 120-123. 25. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 244. 26. Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 31. 27. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 43. Interview, COL Dietmar Klenner, Operations Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East, Potsdam, 12 November 91. Two individuals who had served in the NVA as draftees indi-

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cated that "there was a number of dumb officers [in the NVA] because the selection criteria were not especially good." Interview, Daniel Kuchenmeister, Historical Commission (Berlin) and Gerd-Rudiger Stephan, Institute for Historical Youth Research (Berlin) Con way, New Hampshire, 26 June 1993. Former NVA LTC Herbert Konig wrote that the most disillusioning thing about time spent in Moscow was that Russians generally drew no distinction between East and West Germans. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236. 28. Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 651. For an overview of the typical NVA officer career, see Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 236. For an overview of the basic and advanced training received by NVA officers, officer-candidates, and NCOs see Gerhard Cramer, "Auch dieses Kapitel ist zu Ende: Aus- und Weiterbildung von Offizieren, Fahnrichen und Unteroffizieren der ehemaligen NVA," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 574-578. 29. The Commander of the Forty-Third Air Defense Missile Brigade, for example, had been in command from 1981 through 1990. Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik, 9/1990, 668. 30. Interview, MG Ekkehard G. Richter, Commander, Seventh Division & Military Region, Leipzig, 14 November 91. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 137, 191. BG (Ret.) Loffler admitted that the NVA NCO Corps had weaknesses but defended it and maintained that West German officers had observed these NCOs closely only during the unusual and difficult post-Unification period. Interview, 19 June 1998. Regarding the NVA rank of Fdhnrich, there really is no comparable rank in the Bundeswehr or U.S. armies. Sometimes it is translated as "cadet," "officer candidate," or "ensign." 31. After the revolution in the fall of 1989, the basic term of service had been reduced to twelve months. Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?" 666. 32. Interview with Stephan and Kuchenmeister, June 26, 1993. For the old oath taken by the soldier before the reforms of spring 1990 as well as the revised oath, see Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 492. 33. Quoted in Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 493. See also Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 35, 42. 34. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 20-24; Victorson, "Mission in the East," 12. 35. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 171. 36. Interview, COL Klenner, November 12, 1991. 37. Interview, BG (Ret.) Loffler (former NVA), 19 June 1998. Interview, MAJ Erhard Titze (former NVA), Staff Officer, Division II (Training), German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992. 38. Interview with BG Andreas F. Wittenberg, Director of Engineers and NBC Defense, German Army Office, Cologne (former Brigade Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden), Cologne, 11 June 1992. Also, interview, COL Eckard Jantzen, Commander, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 11 November 1991. 39. Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 651. 40. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 42. In an interview with former NVA, they indicated that virtually all officers were party members, about 80 percent to 90 percent of the ensigns (Fdhnriche), and about 60 percent of the NCOs. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, CPT Stange, 24 June 1992. Klaus-Jurgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb stated that about 98 percent of the officers were party members. "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 651. For the best and most succinct discussion of the relationship be-

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From Confrontation to Cooperation

tween the East German Communist Party and the NVA officers, see Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 235-236. 41. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487. 42. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 235. 43. Interview, BG (Ret.) Bormann, 26 June 1992. When asked about the relationship between the political officers and their regular officer colleagues, BG Bormann maintained that it was generally harmonious. Commanders on the whole were reliable party members and basically there were no great problems between them. This assessment is likely an overly positive one. See also Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 180-181. 44. Interview, November 14, 1991. 45. Interview, 1LT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert, 29 June 1992. 46. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487. 47. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. 48. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 494. 49. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 237. 50. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 166-167; "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 337; interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 44, 135, 145. In describing NVA working in the economy, LTG Schonbohm quoted one former NVA officer, "We were anybody's for anything" (Wir waren Mddchenfur alles). 51. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 165; Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du— Kamerad?" 653; interview, Colonel Dr. Bernd Ullrich (former NVA), Specialist for Physiology, German Air Force (former NVA), Hamburg, 23 October 1991; interview, Commander Hans-Joachim Wichert, Operations Officer and Deputy Commander, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 23 June 1992. For a discussion of the privileges of the highranking military leaders, see Ablass, Zapfenstreich, 29. 52. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 11. This book also discusses the privileges of the high-ranking officers, 100-101. 53. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 63, 71, 138, 147, 239. 54. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487-488; Victorson, "Mission in the East," 26. Former NVA BG (Ret.) Loffler gave a much more upbeat view of the relationship between the NVA and the population. Interview, 19 June 1998. 55. For a published source see, for example, Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 147-148. 56. Interview, Commander Wichert, 23 June 1992. See also Ablass, Zapfenstreich, 9. In the fall of 1991, LTG von Scheven wrote that the army in the east should evolve as quickly as possible so that there would be no essential difference between it and the army in the west. Then it would be a true "people's army" in the sense of Gerhard von Scharnhorst. Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608. 57. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 58. Interviews, Professor Gero Neugebauer, Free University of Berlin, Conway, New Hampshire, 26 June 1993, and Professor Peter Wicke, Humboldt University, Berlin, Conway, New Hampshire, 24 June 1993. Notes held by author.

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55

59. John A. Reed, Jr., Germany and NATO (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1987), 58-59. For a comprehensive discussion see Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), Ch. 3-5. 60. "Fundamentals of German Security: The Creation of the Bundeswehr—Continuity and Change," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 15. 61. Ibid., 15-28. 62. Eric Waldman, The Goose Step Is Verboten: The German Army Today (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), 62-96; Reed, 60-67. 63. "The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany," Federal Press and Information Office, Bonn, 1981, 54. 64. Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt, 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-1985: Friedenssicherung im Biindnis (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1985), 54; Waldman, 97. 65. Waldman, 98. 66. For a discussion of German defense planning in the context of the EDC, see Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, Ch. 5. 67. 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 82-86. 68. Reed, 61. See Kelleher, 14, and Waldman, 96, for chronologies of major events in German rearmament and the buildup of the Bundeswehr. 69. Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 44, fn 50. 70. Ibid., 45. In a later work he stated that "[p]erhaps the phrase 'leadership and participation' bests conveys what the Bundeswehr means by Innere Fuhrung." "The Citizen in Uniform: Reform and Its Critics in the Bundeswehr," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 32. 71. "Die Innere Fuhrung der Bundeswehr," Lehrunterlage (8/91) (Koblenz: Zentrum Fur Innere Fuhrung, October, 1991), 3. For the connection with the military reform movement of the nineteenth century, see Herbert Rosinski, The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966), 67-68; and Gordon C. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945 (London: Oxford, 1955), 38-42. 72. "Die Innere Fuhrung der Bundeswehr," 3-7. 73. Ibid., 7-11. Also see "Innere Fuhrung: Unterlagen zum Selbststudium," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Fu S I 4, Az 35-01-00, January 1991. 74. "Bundeswehr Heute," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Informations- und Pressestab, n.d., 9. This publication for general public consumption gives a good overview of Innere Fuhrung and the concept of the "Citizen in Uniform." See also HansJoachim Reeb, "Das Vorbid wirkt: Innere Fuhrung und Ansatze einer Militarreform in der ehemaligen NVA," Information fur die Truppe, 11/1990, 14-27; Carl-Gero von Ilseman, "Streitkrafte in der Demokratie: Innere Fuhrung gestern und heute," in 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-1985: Friedenssicherung im Biindnis, Militargeschichtlichen Forschungsamt (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1985), 313-342. 75. Antulio J. Echevarria, "Auftragstaktik: In Its Proper Perspective," Military Review (October, 1986): 49. 76. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 36. 77. John T. Nelsen, "Auftragstaktik: A Case for Decentralized Battle," Military Review (September, 1987): 21.

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78. Trevor T.N. Dupuy, A Genius for War: The German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 116. An excellent German source for this concept is Dirk W. Oetting, Auftragstaktik: Geschichte und Gegenwart einer Fiihrungskonzeption (Bonn: Report Verlag, 1994). 79. Dupuy, 116. 80. Franz Uhle-Wettler, "Auftragstaktik: Was ist das? Konnen wir sie wiederbeleben?" Truppenpraxis (2/1992): 132. 81.Ibid.;Nelsen, 121. 82. This is a summary of Bundeswehr General von Lossow's explanation in van Creveld, 36. For the importance of the commander's intent, see also Uhle-Wettler, 134, and Nelsen, 25. 83. Echevarria, 51; Nelsen, 22-23. 84. Uhle-Wettler, 135. 85. Dupuy, 116; Uhle-Wettler, 133-135. 86. Nelsen, 25-26; Uhle-Wettler, 135; Echevarria, 54-55. 87. Echevarria, 55-56. 88. Nelsen, 27. 89. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weifibuch 1985: Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr (Bonn, 1985), 72. For a concise presentation of the Bundeswehr mission as of 1992, see extract in Rainer Winkler, "Krisenreaktionskrafte—und was sonst noch? Nationale Verteidigung zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit," Truppenpraxis (4/1993): 415. Also, Michael Vollstedt, "Wofur? Wogegen? Wieviel wovon? Die Bundeswehr vor neuen Herausforderungen und Aufgaben, oder: Die Schwierigkeit, von den kiinftigen Streitkraften ein klares Bild der Ziele, Moglichkeiten und Grenzen zu zeichnen," Truppenpraxis (3/1992): 230-233. For a good overall perspective on the Bundeswehr in early 1988, see the interview of the German Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Wellershof, in "ACQ Interview: Admiral Dieter Wellershoff," Atlantic Community Quarterly (Spring, 1988): 3-8. 90. Weifibuch 1985,13-1 A. 91. Ibid., 77-78. For a concise overview of the German strategic setting in 1987 including strategy, threat, and arms control as seen by German BG Klaus Naumann, Deputy Chief of Staff for Politico-Military Affairs and Operations, Joint Staff, see "The Forces and the Future," in The Bundeswehr and Western Security, ed. Stephen F. Szabo (New York: St. Martin's, 1990), 173-177. 92. Weifibuch 1985, 238. 93. Ruprecht Haasler, "The German Army: The Present and the Future," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October, 1988, 32; U.S. Army Training Board, "Allied Army Training Study of the Federal Republic of Germany," Ft. Monroe, Virginia, 28 August 1986, 1. The IISS Military Balance, 1989-1990, reported the following figures: Bundeswehr active forces: 494,300; reserves: 852,000; Army (active): 340,700 (p. 63). 94. Ibid., Weifibuch 1985, 194-196. 95. Klaus Naumann, "The Restructured Bundeswehr," NATO's Sixteen Nations, October, 1989, 32; Haasler, "The German Army," 33; "ACQ Interview: Admiral Dieter Wellershoff," 5. For a more extensive discussion, see Weifibuch 1985, 41-65. For an analysis of the INF Treaty, see Lynn E Davis, "Lessons of the INF Treaty," Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 720-734, and Jeffrey Record and David B. Rivkin, Jr., "Defending Post-INF Europe," Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 735-754.

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96. Naumann, "Forces and the Future," 179; Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 32-33; Weifibuch 1985, 239. An additional planning factor used by the Bundeswehr was that about 12 percent of each year group would be conscientious objectors. 97. Brenton C. Fischmann, "West German Defense Planning for the 1990s: Strategic Consequences for NATO" (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 14 March 1988), 3-4. 98. Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 33. 99. Naumann, "Restructured Bundeswehr," 34; Naumann, "Forces and the Future," 184-186; Haasler, "The German Army," 35. For an overview and critique of Bundeswehr 2000, see Fischmann, "West German Defense Planning for the 1990s: Strategic Consequences for NATO." Fischmann offered a well-documented analysis and pointed out that "German defense planning and budget realities are . . . on a collision course" (p. 15). He ended with policy recommendations. 100. Horst Teltschik, "Gorbachev's Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations," Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 40 (HI/1989): 211-212. 101. This summary of events is drawn from the "East-West Relations" Chronology in Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1988/89 and Foreign Affairs, America and the World, 1989/90. 102. Axel Burgener, "Sisyphus laBt griissen: Sicherheitspolitische Rahmenbedingungen der Heeresplanung," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 586. 103. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies"; 167; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992. These observations are also based on notes from my assignment as a U.S. Army Liaison Officer to the German Army Office, Cologne, which began in July 1989. For an analysis of nuclear issues in German security policy in 1988, see Ronald D. Asmus, "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization," Survival 30 (November/December 1988): 499-514. 104. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 167; Gerhard Hubatschek, "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," in Ein Staat—Fine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 27; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. For an example of a German Army Planner who was looking to the future at this point in time, see Btirgener, "Sisyphus laBt grussen," 586-587.

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4

Organization and Political Control There were a number of ways in which the Bundeswehr could have organized itself to execute the Takeover. First, this chapter considers not only the way in which it chose to organize but also the structures established at the MOD to oversee and coordinate this undertaking. Second, the chapter explores the area of civil-military relations: the degree to which government civilians exerted control over the military as well as the manner in which this control was exerted. The German MOD and Bundeswehr organized themselves in a logical, efficient manner to effect the Takeover. The importance of democratic ideals, such as the dignity and worth of the individual, and of the principles of Innere Fuhrung in the Takeover is underlined by their inclusion in the very first of the formal goals given to Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, an emphasis repeated in the succeeding statements of Bundeswehr leaders. Politicians gave little detailed direction over the actual execution of the Takeover. Rather, they provided as a rule general guidelines to military leaders who were for the most part left to formulate their own solutions to novel problems. Most officers referred to this as a fine example of Auftragstaktik or "mission-type orders." However, politicians were concerned about and exerted pressure to ensure a quick tempo for the deactivation of former NVA units as this had financial implications: The longer unneeded former NVA personnel and units remained on active duty, the more money it cost. Guidance was also given on such issues as personnel strength and social welfare. It is clear, however, that politicians were prepared when necessary to intervene decisively on key issues, such as when the Defense Minister overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all NVA MIG-29 combat aircraft.

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From Confrontation to Cooperation

ORGANIZATION AND MISSIONS Even before the momentous Kohl-Gorbachev Caucasus meeting in July 1990, the MOD in Bonn organized itself so that it could coordinate all activities with the Ministry for Disarmament and Defense (MDD) in Strausberg (outside of Berlin). On June 1, 1990, the MOD directed that Steering Groups (Lenkungsgruppen) be established at the State Secretary level to effect such coordination.1 The organization depicted in Figure 4.1 was established reflecting not only the coordinating bodies in the MOD but also their relationship to the Army's Steering Committee. The areas of responsibility were divided under the two respective State Secretaries under Dr. Stoltenberg. Dr. Pfahls headed the Group for "Armaments Control, Armaments Planning, Security and Military Policy," handling issues relating to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2 + 4 Talks, disarmament verification, armed forces planning, armed forces structure, equipment and armament, and military attaches. Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl headed the Group for "Armed Forces and Administration," responsible for the "entire complex of administrative issues," including personnel, budget, organization, and legal and social affairs. The members of these groups included the directors of the major departments in MOD and the Joint Staff {Fithrungsstab der Streitkrdfte). Numerous work groups functioned underneath the Steering Groups to discuss issues in detail, devise solutions, and make recommendations. A Coordination Panel (Abstimmungsgremium) was established to prevent redundancies, ensure uniformity of goals and requirements, and prepare issues for decision. Because of problems in information flow, an Information and Situation Center (Info- und Lagezentrum) was also established as of August 1, 1990. Within the Army Staff, a Steering Group was established on August 7, 1990, to coordinate all actions within the Army Staff on issues relating to the NVA.2 Until December 1, 1990, this was headed by MG Willman, the Director of Army Staff Department IV (Organization), included representatives from all staff departments, and met about every two weeks. On its dissolution, its responsibilities were assumed by Army Staff Section IV l. 3 Corresponding to its Joint Staff counterpart, an Army Staff Information and Situation Center was established on August 15.4 A comparable "German/German" Steering Group was established toward the end of August and met weekly at the German Army Office in Cologne, a headquarters that corresponds roughly to the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command in Ft. Monroe, Virginia.5 Field operating agencies (Aufienstelle) for both the MOD and the Federal Office of Technology and Procurement were established in Strausberg, east of Berlin, at the location of the former East German MDD to take over and coordinate all affairs in the east falling within the responsibilities of these organizations. Collocated with these was a new Defense District Administration (VII), which had no counterpart in the NVA.6

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Figure 4.1 MOD/Army Staff Steering Committee Structure for the Takeover of the NVA

Source: BMVg, "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Staatssekretar, Org 1 AZ 10-02-05, Bonn, 20 June 1990; Fu H, "Eingliederung der NVAHeeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung in Fu H," Chefstab Fu H, Bonn, 7 August 1990.

Planning for the Takeover As the spring of 1990 progressed, the Ministers of Defense of both the FRG and GDR, recognizing the increasing informal individual and group contacts occurring between the two armies but wishing also to remain sensitive to Soviet anxieties, issued in early June regulations governing contact between the two armies.'

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Detailed planning for the military Takeover began on August 14, 1990, when the MOD in Bonn directed the Bundeswehr to examine issues relating to Unification. Before this point, MG Klaus Reinhardt, then the Director of Department VI of the Joint Staff (Planning), stated that planners were not really allowed—in an official sense—to consider these issues. It was only at this time that the mission was given to create the organizational preconditions for joining the two armies. The preparation time therefore was "extremely short."8 He and the director of Army Staff Department IV, Organization, BG Willman, realized quickly that an advance group/liaison detachment was needed at the MDD in the east to facilitate information flow and to ensure the East Germans understood what was required.9 On August 20, 1990, the MOD-Bundeswehr liaison detachment began its work at Strausberg. Including nine officers and nine defense civilians, it was headed by BG Ekkehard G. Richter (Army), who at Unification became the Commander of Division/Military District Command VII in Leipzig.10 COL Wolfgang Gulich (Army) was the officer in the detachment responsible for all army matters. (In April 1991 he would assume command of the Home Defense Brigade 37 in Dresden.) While serving on this joint service team, he ensured that he kept the Army Staff in Bonn informed.11 Also, several weeks before Unification Day (October 3), small advance parties were sent to the locations of the two future Divisions/Military District Commands, Neubrandenburg and Leipzig.12 In the month preceding the Takeover, two significant events took place. First, on September 1 the NVA inducted against the desires of the Bundeswehr a new group of draftees, something that further complicated the planning of the Bundeswehr. Second, it was during the first several weeks of September that small reconnaissance teams of officers were dispatched to East Germany to collect information on the status of NVA units, equipment, and installations so that the best possible plans could be formulated for the Takeover.13 Dispatch of Commander Groups and Support Groups The next key step in the management of the Takeover was the dispatch on or near Unification Day of a major contingent of Bundeswehr officers and NCOs to assume key leadership and training positions in the new structure imposed on the NVA which at midnight, October 2, ceased to exist. Within a few days of October 3, between 1,200 and 2,000 of these personnel—the exact number is unclear—found their way to their new positions in the former East Germany.14 LTG Schonbohm, Commander of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, and LTG von Ondarza, the Chief of Staff of the German Army, wanted only the best, highly motivated people to go east, and therefore they required that all be volunteers.15 Shortly before the Takeover, LTG Schonbohm assembled all the commanders and general staff officers in the group and addressed them on the challenges ahead. At a one-day seminar at the Officer School of the Army in

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Hannover on October 1, he and LTG von Ondarza addressed the approximately eight hundred and fifty officers and NCOs of the army who were proceeding east, clarifying that they had no regulations governing what they were being asked to do and exhorting them. "You have lots of room to play with, so use it!"16 "The Unification is not covered in the regulations!"17 These military personnel took up key positions at the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command Headquarters in Strausberg and—for the Army—at the Eastern Army Command Detachment in Potsdam, at the headquarters of the Division/Military District Commands VII and VIII in Leipzig and Neubrandenburg, and at the subordinate levels down to battalion level. A Commander Group (Kommandeur Gruppe) or a Support Group (Unterstutzungsgruppe) was sent to each unit in the East beginning with Land Forces Headquarters in Potsdam through the battalion level. A typical group at the battalion level included a commander, personnel officer, logistical officer, and perhaps a company NCO. 18 A number of factors governed the allocation of these groups. All commanding general (Befehlshaber) and commander positions down to division level were filled with Bundeswehr officers. There was mixed filling with both Bundeswehr and former NVA officers from regimental level downward. Other considerations included whether the former NVA troop unit fit into the plans for the build up of the new army structure, second, the initial stationing concepts for AS 5, and, third, the inflow of new recruits in September 1990.19 Toward the end of September, Army Staff Section IV (Organization) enumerated the tasks of these groups. For the Commander Groups the tasks included commanding all agencies and other facilities that were directly under the former NVA commanders, establishing and guaranteeing military security, building up the new command and control organization, activating the new units based on AS 5 and deactivating those not in the new structure, and controlling units as much as possible in accordance with directives. Support Groups were to advise their unit commanders, all of whom were former NVA, in all affairs, with priority to legal affairs, in the application of the principles of Innere Fuhrung and personnel management, logistics and—as long as officials from the Federal Administration Office were lacking—general administration questions.20 Colonel Andreas Wittenberg, who assumed command of the former NVA Seventh Armored Division in Dresden, stated that it was not fully clear at the outset why in one unit a Bundeswehr officer was installed as a commander but not in the next.21 It became clear that as a rule, Commander Groups were sent to units that would not be immediately dissolved while Support Groups were sent to those units that would continue to exist for a short period of time and then be deativated.22 On September 17, the requirement to fill these teams was given by Army Staff Section I 1 (Personnel, Basic Requirements) to the principle commands of the German Army: the three corps, the three territorial commands, and the German Army Office (a major army staff in Cologne).23 About one hundred twenty Commander Groups and fifty-eight Support Groups were sent east (See Table

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4.1). About twenty-three Commander Groups took over the key commands of the former NVA from the Land Forces Headquarters down to NVA Division/Defense Region level. Fifty former NVA units did not receive any group because they had essentially vanished before Unification Day.24 MG Haasler, who took over the Fifth NVA Military District Command, indicated that on October 4 he had from the "western Bundeswehr" 279 officers, 116 NCOs and 26 enlisted men.25 BG von Kirchbach, who took over the former Ninth Armored Division at Eggesin, attributed to Minister of Defense Stoltenberg this decision to send a large contingent of Bundeswehr officers and NCOs and identified it as one of the two most important decisions that Stoltenberg made. This made the Bundeswehr a spearhead for the Unification unique among all government sectors.26 BG Wolfgang Beltermann, the Chief of Staff of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, believed the decision to take over command on October 3 to be the correct one despite the misgivings of certain political forces in Bonn. He recounted a story of how one month after the Unification, civilians in the east praised the Bundeswehr to him for arriving so quickly in contrast to other government sectors. He also quoted the Federal President who stated that: "The unity of the forces promotes the unity of the Germans."27 This initial wave of personnel for the most part remained until April 1, 1991, when the former NVA divisions were officially dissolved and six German Army Home Defense Brigades were established. At this time, there was a substantial turnover of personnel, a second shift that served for an extended period. LTG Table 4.1 Allocation of Command and Support Groups to Former NVA Units Former NVA Unit Level Land Forces Headquarters Military District Division Defense District Regiment Battalion NCO School Totals

Command Groups 1 2 6 14 17 80

Support Groups

*Neither

16 41

50

JL 120

58

50

* These units received neither because their personnel strength had essentially dropped to zero by Unification Day. Source: Fu H, "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (Bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Fu H IV 1, Az 10-01-03, Bonn, 17 September 1990, Annex 1. (Table was prepared 17 July 1990, Fu H IV 1)

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Schonbohm hoped that the officers and NCOs, returning to their original units in the west, took back the message that the Bundeswehr would succeed only if easterners and westerners applied themselves together to the tasks.28 Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command On October 3, 1990, Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, with LTG Jorg Schonbohm at its head, assumed control of the former NVA that ceased to exist at midnight, October 2. In his "Order No. 1," LTG Schonbohm detailed its organizational structure and missions.29 Its major subordinate units are presented in Figure 4.2 and organizational staff structure in Figure 4.3. This headquarters consisted of approximately 600 soldiers, 360 of whom were former NVA.30 Figure 4.2 Organizational Structure of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command on October 3,1990

Sources: "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fiir Fuhrung, Ausbildung, und Organisation," Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando Ost, Az 32-01-08, Strausberg, 3 Oktober 1990, Annex 1; "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 777.

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Its major subordinate commands included the central units and facilities which had been subordinate to the MDD; former Military Districts (Militarbezirke) III and V—now Military District Commands (Wehrbereichs-kommandos) VII and VIII; the former headquarters of the NVA's Land Forces, Air Force, and Navy; and the initial staffs of the Army (Heereskommando), Air Force (5 LuftwaffenFigure 4.3 Staff Structure of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command

Source: Friedrich Steinseifer, "Streitkrafte im Vereinten Deutschland," Wehrtechnik (11/1990): 74. division), and Navy (Marineabschnitts-kommando). As of October 4, all army units not within Military District Commands VII and VIII came under the authority of Eastern Army Command in Potsdam, at the former location of the NVA's Land Forces Headquarters.31 Under this command were fifteen defense regional commands (Verteidigungsbezirks-kommandos) and forty-five defense sub-regional commands (Verteidigungs-kreiskommandos)^2 (see Figure 4.4). The order enumerated the Eastern Command's numerous and formidable missions, totaling nine. The five central missions, appearing in the official order, are worth quoting at length. • Command and Control of the subordinate areas, especially personnel leadership in cooperation with the Eastern Field Operating Agency (Aufienstelle) of MOD (Strausberg), thereby monitoring of the maintenance of democratic legal principles, defense legal rights, and the principles of Innere Fuhrung in leading and training of the personnel; coordination accomplished by the regional defense commands of the interests and requirements of military defense of the federal states with the state governments and other civilian authorities. • Directing the dissolution of the units, offices, and facilities of the former NVA.

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Figure 4.4 Army Organization within Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command (October 1990)

Source: "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 779. • Accomplishment of logistical and medical command and control and of tasks concerning supply responsibility, especially material management with emphasis on the directing of the Takeover and collection of materials of the former NVA and its possible further use and disposition—especially of the treaty-determined major end items in coordination with the organizational area, thereby fulfilling the duty for custody of material. • Directing of the build-up and assumption of the decentralized command and control organization, . . . assuming command over selected troop bodies/ organizational units within the responsibilities of the organizational areas of the

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From Confrontation to Cooperation Army, Air Force, Navy, ZMilDBw (Central Military Federal Armed Forces Office), and ZSanDBw (Central Medical Federal Armed Forces Office). • Support for the departure of Soviet forces from Germany.33

In other sources, Schonbohm gave shape to several other important goals and stressed certain principles not fully clear in the order: the safekeeping and inventorying of all the weapons, munitions, and other important items that came into the Bundeswehr's care; and the controlled transitioning of the military units to AS 5. 34 Although the above order implies the first, the second is not really expressed, although it was one of the key tasks accomplished. At the outset of his command as he addressed his major subordinate units on October 4, Schonbohm underlined a fundamental principle: "We . . . come not as victors to vanquished. We come as Germans to Germans."35 In his final report as the Eastern Command was being deactivated in June 1991, he underscored a related goal: "This has been the paramount objective that we always had in mind: To establish allGerman [italics added] military forces."36 Noteworthy is the substance of the first mission that appeared in the Order. One might have expected the dissolution of the NVA to come first. It was, however, second to the mission of assuming command and control of the personnel of the former NVA and insuring the protection of legal rights and the principles of Innere Fuhrung. In placing this first before the organizational or administrative missions, the Bundeswehr struck a genuinely liberal democratic tone. Appearing in an official order—its first no less—and not a publication for wide public consumption, one can infer that this emphasis on individual rights and principles was in fact genuine. In an interview, Schonbohm amplified on the psychological requirements for educating the new members of the Bundeswehr. For me the critical issue is to carry through the idea of the citizen in uniform (Staatsburger in Uniform) to effect a change in consciousness. This involves not simply providing an explanation of but more so of providing the example of and our common participation in the proven fundamental values of our society.37 MG Haasler, Commander of Division/Military District Command VIII, also underlined the importance of ensuring from the outset that former NVA soldiers were commanded and led by Bundeswehr ideas (Vorstellungeri)?* Commanders and senior staff officers who served in the east gave further insights and points of emphasis. MG Werner von Scheven, Schonbohm's deputy at the beginning of the Takeover, who in April 1991, became the Commander of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, stated that the Takeover of the remains of the NVA only partly described the task. It also involved "all that is accomplished by the Federal Defense Administration (Bundeswehrverwaltung). It involved everything left by the military and para-military organs of the GDR, including border troops, combat troops, police and state security services, civil defense, GST, Spitzensport, and so on."39 In an article published in Aufienpolitik in the spring of 1992, von Scheven also pointed out the additional challenge that

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the Gulf War presented. Within two months of the Takeover, the Bundeswehr— especially Eastern Command—executed "the most comprehensive shipping/ haulage operations in the history of the Bundeswehr.,"40 The Eastern Command faced a host of problems during its existence, which LTG Schonbohm addressed in his book. Several deserve highlight. First was the understandable uncertainty, skepticism, and sometimes anger of the former NVA, a daily challenge for commanders from the outset of the Takeover.41 Second, a significant problem that was really beyond his control was the lack of sufficient defense civilians in the east, finance officials to administer properly the pay system and legal advisors for instruction and legal advice. Only five of the latter existed in the entire command.42 Third, the command faced a very difficult dilemma in meeting the pressure to dissolve units and reduce personnel strength while at the same time guarding and disposing of the former NVA equipment and weapons. In his six-week report he indicated that troop units were at about 50 percent strength but possessed virtually all their weapons and munitions, a problem relieved when higher headquarters in Bonn relented on its requirements.43 Fourth and related, there existed communication and coordination problems between the command and higher headquarters in Bonn, understandable given the novelty of the command and its mission. Not specific just to military personnel, the people in the west in general had trouble truly understanding the nature and scope of the problems faced in the east. Beyond this, coordination problems surfaced with perhaps over eager staff officers in Bonn issuing directives to eastern units without proper coordination with Eastern Command Headquarters.44 Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command was never intended to be an enduring organization. Rather, in the planning for its establishment before the Unification, it was envisioned that the command would deactivate some time in "mid1991," a date that came to be July 1, 1991.45 On this date, authority for all units and agencies passed to the individual services (Army, Air Force, Navy). The Army components came under the authority of Eastern Corps/Territorial Command (Korps/Territorial Kommando Ost). During the period from October 1, 1990 through July 1, 1991, Eastern Army Command, headed by BG Gottelmann, existed subordinate to Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command. As with other commands, the Army sent an advanced party east before October 1 to prepare the way. The mission of Eastern Army Command, which included a staff of about seventy personnel from the West, was to build the staff for what became Eastern Corps and Territorial Command on July 1, 1991, to maintain control over designated former NVA units, and to dissolve certain others. Several months prior on April 1, the six former NVA divisions were formally changed to home defense brigades.46

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Eastern Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command executed it missions for nine months until July 1, 1991, when it was deactivated and command was passed to the separate services. In his summary report to LTG Siegfried Storbeck, the Deputy Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to whom he reported, LTG Schonbohm indicated that the Eastern Command had accomplished its mission. "The Takeover of the National People's Army . . . with its structures, personnel, and materiel has been successful and there has been no friction noticeable externally."47 Command and control had been ensured and personnel had been drastically reduced. Among the two-year volunteers for service in the German Army, there was still a considerable shortage of NCOs while an excess of officers. He identified several tasks that were still in the process of being completed: the deactivation of all former NVA units and agencies no longer required, the surrender of real estate no longer needed by the Bundeswehr, and the concentration and disposal of former NVA material no longer needed.48 In his final speech before his command, Schonbohm took stock. The command had brought an enormous amount of weapons and munitions into safekeeping, reduced the size of the former NVA from 90,000 to about 56,000 soldiers, dissolved about 350 troop units and activated about 250 new units.49 In an interview during this period, he reflected on the main tasks ahead for the Bundeswehr and concluded: "It must be our goal to achieve common German armed forces, in which everyone knows: We serve the same fatherland, the system of law, and we are guided by the same mission."50 Understandably proud of the accomplishments of his command in its unique and time-constrained mission, LTG Schonbohm, during a visit to the Home Defense Brigade 40 in Schwerin, listened to an astonished journalist say of the soldiers, "They indeed look like soldiers of the Federal Republic!" Schonbohm responded: "They don't look like them; they are them."51 In the many interviews conducted for this study, there was only one individual who truly contested the establishment of the joint service Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command—Colonel Alfred Lassonczyk, who assumed the position of Logistics Officer (G-4) of the Eastern Corps/Territorial Command in March 1991. When asked about the key decisions made in the Takeover, Lassonczyk identified first this decision to establish a temporary joint service headquarters overseeing all activities (ein Bundeswehrkommando auf Zeit aufzustellen). This decision meant, for example, that a communication from an army element in the east had to travel through Eastern Command and the Joint Staff in Bonn before it arived at the proper office in the Army Staff. This had caused problems. Second, after the deactivation of Eastern Command and the individual services had assumed control, Army Headquarters posed questions on the policy decisions that had been made. Often, he said, there was no one present to answer a question; only files. Consequently, a number of decisions had to be revisited and remade. At times, this led to friction between Eastern Corps/

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Territorial Command and higher headquarters in Bonn. Thus, he was not convinced that this had been the best management structure. It had its benefits and shortcomings: "It cut both ways" (eine zweischneidige Sache).52 In his final report, Schonbohm defended the decision, emphasizing the value of the standardization the Command had achieved. In retrospect, the decision to place the entire former East German Army (EGA) [that is, NVA] under a unified command . . . was appropriate. This was the only way to make sure that the same standards were applied to all three Services and the central military command authorities of the former EGA; standards that take the situation prevailing in Eastern Germany into account and which have unanimously been supported vis-a-vis MOD.53 Eastern Corps and Territorial Command On April 16, 1991, LTG Schonbohm gave over command of all army units to MG Werner von Scheven, his deputy to that point, who took command of the newly activated Eastern Corps and Territorial Command (Korps und Territorialkommando Ost), formerly Eastern Army Command, located in the former headquarters of the NVA land forces in Potsdam-Geltow.54 Its missions were comparable to its predecessor's and included: • Activating command authorities, troop units, and agencies. • Reaching a level of operational readiness allowing units to accomplish defense tasks at the country's borders and at sensitive facilities. • Performing territorial defense tasks, especially civil-military cooperation with local and federal civilian authorities for preparation to fulfill "defense at the borders." • Supporting the stay and departure of Soviet forces, as well as arms control and disarmament measures. • Contributing to the protection of the environment and to disaster relief.55 With this discussion of the major organizational structures complete, it is time to address the first truly analytical issue of this study: the extent and nature of the political control and guidance exerted over the military in its execution of the Takeover. POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE BUNDESWEHR While liberal, democratic principles have served as the foundation of the German Army for two generations, monarchical, conservative, illiberal principles have served to define the relationship of Prussian-German armies to the civilian polity and of political to military leaders for centuries.56 Under Frederick the Great the Prussian Army became not only an object of pride and admiration of the Prussian people, but in the absence of any substantial and politically active middle class a force giving direction and structure to the state itself. In the nine-

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teenth-century struggle between liberals and conservatives for control of the Prussian Army, it was the conservatives who won, a veritable certainty after the magnificent victories of the Prussian-German armies in the three wars of German Unification (1864-1871). As victory proved increasingly elusive in World War I, the German nation, led by the hapless William II, who by no means possessed the strategic acumen of his grandfather, turned ever more frequently for salvation to Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff, the military leaders who had distinguished themselves at Tannenberg on the Eastern Front. Unfortunately, both had little appreciation for the civilian perspective, most immediately in the form of Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg who was self-admittedly incompetent in military affairs. If politicians did press their point, the generals simply threatened to resign. With the two most important civilians—the Kaiser and the Chancellor—essentially abdicating their roles, Hindenburg and Ludendorff effectively established a military dictatorship behind the facade of the German Constitution. After World War I, as the fledgling Weimar Republic attempted to implant its democratic institutions on the increasingly chaotic, political landscape of postwar Germany, now stripped of empire and forced to swallow the restrictions and war guilt clause in the Versailles Treaty, GEN Hans von Seeckt entered. The critical support that he rendered to the Republic was, however, only superficial and temporary. A soldier, believed von Seeckt, gave his allegiance to a man—a monarch—not to abstract words on a piece of paper.57 In the late 1920's after von Seeckt had passed from the scene, the overbearing role of the army had become so great that Wilhelm Groener, the Minister of War, said: "In the political structure of Germany, no stone may be moved without the Reichswehr casting the decisive vote."58 In the final years of the Weimar Republic before Hitler assumed power in 1933, Chancellor Heinrich B riming's best efforts to establish a genuinely healthy and functioning parliamentary democracy were sabotaged by GEN Kurt von Schleicher, whose key positions within and ultimately at the head of the Ministry of War helped him to undermine systematically Bruning while at the same time build up support for his own personal political goals. It ultimately took Hitler and his Nazis to put Reichswehr leaders in a role truly subordinate to civilian authority, a process beginning with the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936— which the generals opposed—and culminating in February 1938 with the decisive clash between Hitler and the generals, and the subsequent housecleaning. Despite the categorical changes made to the ethos of the German Army in the postwar period—the provisions of the Basic Law (German Constitution) of 1949, the care taken in establishing the democratic basis of the Bundeswehr in 1955, the difficult and lengthy process of clarifying the traditions of the Bundeswehr, the reliance on a conscript and not a volunteer army, the formulation of and enduring emphasis given to the concepts of Innere Fuhrung—this study took it as a question and not simply a given that genuine and effective political control of the military in this Takeover of the NVA would exist.

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Beyond the principles of Innere Fuhrung, the relationship of the military to the civilian society in the FRG is further defined by the concept of the primacy of politics.59 In this study, this concept is taken to mean at least two things: first, that political leaders have a higher authority than military leaders and hence can always override military decisions and, second, that political considerations may always carry more weight than other considerations, such as military ones.60 In such an important undertaking as the Takeover, did the political leaders—Chancellor Kohl, Minister of Defense Stoltenberg, and other cabinet leaders, and members of the Bundestag—exert close and continuous control over the military? After all, there were points in time when the stability within the NVA—still some 100,000 men at Unification and still controlling tremendous means of violence—was precarious. Did the civilians trust the Bundeswehr to effect the Takeover with only general political guidance and nominal supervision? Was the political guidance possibly variable: Was there much at the outset, for example, that diminished over time, or vice versa? Perhaps the most consistent statement heard in the research for this study was that there was little political guidance received and little political control exerted. The military was given goals and general guidance, and then for the most part left to execute the Takeover. Auftragstaktik predominated: Mission type instructions and orders in which goals and general guidance are given but all else is left to the subordinate. These were common threads in virtually all discussions conducted that dealt with this subject. Repeatedly, the interviewees at all levels characterized the process as one with little or no political guidance. Dr. Carl, State Secretary and chief negotiator for the West German side for the Defense Sections of the Unification Treaty, stated that the organizational execution (Umsetzung) was left to the military and that Auftragstaktik principles prevailed.61 LTG von Scheven, Deputy Commander of the Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command and, after July 1, 1991, Commander of Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, stated minimal political control was exerted and that Auftragstaktik was the rule. The military was issued very few directives and regulations. The problems that military leaders confronted in the east after Unification were generally not covered by regulations, and solutions had to be found under great time pressure.62 He expanded this point in an article in Truppenpraxis in 1992. One of the seventeen propositions he offered in reviewing the first two years of the Takeover was: "Auftragstaktik proved itself gloriously; it is a critical lesson learned for the new team members from the former NVA." Developing this proposition he stated: "Most of the situations requiring a decision, which the commanders and agency directors faced in the army of the east, were without precedent. No regulation was easily applied."63 MG Haasler, Commander of Division/Military Area Command VIII, stated that basically there was not much political guidance, following the old German principle of Auftragstaktik. He explained that before he assumed his position in the east on October 3, 1990, he was the Director of Army Staff Department VI

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(Planning) and, as such, had much contact with top politicians. Except for a communication from the Defense Ministry making him Commanding General, he received hardly any political guidance. This naturally pleased LTG Schonbohm, MG Richter (the other division/military area commander), and him. What they did receive, he said, was "tempo," that is, a pace or time schedule to try to maintain in dissolving certain units of the NVA in the first six months. "I believe this was the single piece of political guidance: the tempo of the dissolution of the NVA." The politicians wanted this because soldiers cost money. The faster the dissolution; the more money saved. As it turned out, the German Army often could not meet this tempo.64 MG Reinhardt, the Director of Joint Staff Department VI (Planning), was even more categorical in his answer. "There was no political control (Kontrolle) and no political guidelines (Richtlinien) which the Ministry [of Defense] gave. On the contrary, the guidance was to treat and lead the officers and NCOs there [in the east] as those in the west are treated and led." There was only a short directive (Anweisung) for commanders. The presumption was that the military leaders had much military and organizational experience and understood democracy. The politicians felt that the military leaders would do the correct thing following the principles of Auftragstaktik.^Reinhardt also echoed the comments of Haasler concerning tempo. There were no political requirements except that of dissolving units as quickly as possible. Tempo was important because "the longer we had units remain active in the east, the faster we had to deactivate units in the west." Because of the lack of any additional funding for these units, personnel costs had to be controlled. Although the military received some additional funding for the period from October to December 1990, no additional funds were provided for 1991. On the contrary, the 1991 budget was reduced 1.5 billion DMs from the 1990 budget. This, Reinhardt stressed, was "our tremendous problem."66 As Haasler, Reinhardt indicated that the military leadership was happy with receiving no political guidance. Given so much time pressure, it simply would not have worked if the military was made to operate within strict bounds. Also singing the praises of Auftragstaktik, he indicated, "If ever there was a time in the postwar period in the Bundeswehr when Auftragstaktik proved itself, then it was here in the east. In the east in the period of reorganization has been for me the best example of how outstanding Auftragstaktik can work."67 Similar comments were made by other key officers. BG Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, who took over the former Ninth Armored Division in Eggesin, said, "I myself have received almost no commands." It was Auftragstaktik in the best sense. During the nine-month period from October 3, 1990 to June 3, 1991, he received instructions from higher headquarters only "seldom," and it was generally in terms of goals, not specific instructions on how to accomplish things.68 As an example, he described his arrival at Eggesin with thirteen West German Army personnel (eight officers, two senior NCOs, two junior NCOs and a private first class). He found about two hundred officers in the remains of the

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former NVA division headquarters, and within one day he had reorganized them into a staff. In the subordinate units the personnel status varied depending on the unit. Some units had close to their full complement of personnel, whereas others were only fragments of what they had once been. For example, the Medical Battalion had only about ten soldiers and the Chemical Defense Battalion had about twenty. From the beginning, he tried to compose units capable of functioning. Concerning the role of politicians specifically, von Kirchbach stated that politicians might have exerted pressure on the military to take over one or another NVA unit but in general they did not play a large role.69 COL Wolfgang Gulich, a senior army staff officer in the advance party to the MDD who assumed command of the Home Defense Brigade 37 (Dresden) in April 1991, stated that the MOD "permitted the military leaders much freedom of action," freedom that the leaders used well. Auftragstaktik was the rule. He remembered receiving only two directives from the MOD, directives which dealt with the performance evaluation process for the former NVA.70 COL Eckard Jantzen, who assumed command of Military District Command 84 (Territorial) in Potsdam, stated that he received not a single written document and very few instructions. He tried to recognize problems, search for solutions, and obtain whatever information was needed. Auftragstaktik, he said, truly showed its full worth.71 Political guidance was not totally absent. In addition to guidance about the pace or tempo the Bundeswehr should maintain in dissolving NVA units, several officers highlighted the fact that the political leaders gave instructions about personnel strength and social welfare issues. As an example, LTG von Scheven referred to Minister of Defense Stoltenberg who in early August announced that there would be only one German military—not two as the East Germans wanted—and that within the 370,000 strength military, 50,000 would be former NVA, 50 percent professional soldiers and 50 percent recruits. In discussing the successive personnel targets for former NVA, von Scheven stated that "these were the quantitative political requirements (Vorgaberi)."12 LTG von Scheven also addressed a political factor that the politicians did not have to force on or even express to the military as it was self-evident —a virtual given. This was the concept of the "citizen in uniform" (Staatsburger in Uniform), the guiding image of the German soldier in the democratic state of the FRG, a concept that has been important since the beginning of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950's as a fundamental component of its comprehensive concept for moral leadership and civic education (Innere Fuhrung). He emphasized that those former NVA who wished to become professional soldiers in the Bundeswehr had to prove they could internalize this concept. "This is a political requirement which no politician had to utter," he indicated.73 This then was an example of the military considering and acting on a self-generated or understood political factor. COL Dietmar Klenner, Chief of Staff for the advance party of the Eastern Army Command and then its Operations and Training Officer (G-3), made simi-

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lar comments to the others about the importance of Auftragstaktik. Asked whether things changed after the first six months, he stated that the political leadership provided a framework for the Bundeswehr, setting goals and in the area of social welfare and finance clarifying the validity of various regulations. Such things as pay and social welfare insurance stemmed from the Unification treaties; the army had nothing to do with them. Such things as the budget, personnel strength, and the recruits to be enlisted flowed from political decisions in Bonn.74 Finally, LTG Schonbohm portrays a mixed picture on this issue of political guidance. First, his descriptions complement other comments on the pressure for "tempo." Always in the background was the treaty requirement to reduce by the end of 1994 the size of the Bundeswehr to 370,000. Also, the Bundestag wanted the fastest pace for the deactivation of units in the east so that the most discharges could take place as quickly as possible and operating costs could be held to a minimum. Schonbohm fought against this in September 1990 even before he assumed command of Eastern Command mainly, it appears, because of a social factor—the possibility of unrest among unhappy, uncertain former NVA, whose sense of identity was evaporating and whose future was unclear. With the help of Defense Minister Stoltenberg, he achieved success in forestalling hasty discharges while bearing the brunt of criticism for being overly sensitive and concerned about possible unrest.75 He was forced to continue the struggle against this pressure for rapid dissolution and discharge in later months because of a dilemma he faced. Higher headquarters and the government in Bonn wanted rapid deactivations; however, higher headquarters could not formulate a clear concept for the assembling and disposing of the tremendous amount of NVA equipment, weapons, and property. On the one hand, Schonbohm sought to comply with guidance for the rapid dissolution of units; however, he needed on the other hand manpower to guard, maintain, and ultimately dispose of this equipment.76 Schonbohm could not accept the government's Budget Committee's decision in October 1990, which gave firm guidance on the pace of dissolution. He argued his point with Minister Stoltenberg and three days later received from him more freedom of action.77 Even after greater clarity for the disposition of NVA equipment and property was achieved, transportation and logistics problems played havoc with the planned time schedules, forcing delays.78 Second, like LTG von Scheven and COL Klenner, he provided evidence that there was political guidance and control beyond the tempo of dissolution. Defense Minister Stoltenberg overrode the Air Force in its plans to scrap all the NVA's MIG-29 combat aircraft in Schonbohm's words "because the scrapping of the most modern fighter would have led without a doubt to a lack of understanding and substantial public turbulence."79 Minister Stoltenberg also intervened decisively in late 1990 by issuing firm guidance on the equality of treatment of recruits in the east and west. In November 1990, eastern draftees complained that their Christmas, vacation, and discharge pays were less than that of their

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western peers. Stoltenberg then made the decision that as of January 1, 1991, all recruits from the east and west were to be treated equally.80 These then are clear examples of the exercising of the principle of civilian supremacy—der Primat der Politik as the Germans often express it—and also, in the first case, an example of a domestic political factor predominating over the military view. Beyond executive control, formal parliamentary oversight was effected by the formation of a special subcommittee of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag to oversee military affairs in the eastern area. Established in October 1990 and continuing through 1994, it met approximately every six weeks, and before it appeared administrative and military officials serving in the east. It does not appear that any genuine controversy ever manifested itself in this committee. Even the opposition party appeared content with simply remaining informed of, rather than challenging, what was taking place in the east.81 A final point is that not all official political guidance came from Bonn; there were other sources of unofficial guidance. From Schonbohm's discussions with local and regional politicians, for example, it was clear that the Berlin Wall had to be completely dismantled by December 1, 1990.82 In summary, the picture that emerges on the West German side is one in which political leadership certainly did not abdicate or surrender responsibility for the Takeover, but rather gave guidance, exerted oversight of, and at discrete points intervened and even overrode the military leadership when it felt necessary. It is necessary then to distinguish between political control and political guidance, the former is a condition and the latter is an act. It is clear that the condition of political control always existed even if acts of political guidance occurred only seldom. It is to the credit of the military leaders that, unlike many of their predecessors of generations past, they did not reject the principle of civilian supremacy in this vast and unique undertaking, but rather exemplified it.

POLITICAL CONTROL OF THE NVA PRIOR TO THE TAKEOVER Political control of the NVA centered in the hands of one man, Werner E. AblaB, who on July 5, 1990, became the single deputy under Rainer Eppelmann, the Minister for Disarmament and Defense since the March 1990 elections.83 Asked about the role of East German politicians and military during the period from August to September 1990, AblaB stated, "To a man, none. Neither the Minister President [Lothar de Maiziere] nor the Minister of Defense was especially interested in the Unification of these two armies. . . . The Minister President and I spoke twice briefly about it." "He give me a free hand."84 AblaB expressed understanding for the many other issues that consumed the time of de Maiziere, economic problems in particular, but regretted this situation. AblaB led the negotiations on the defense sections of the Unification Treaty with his West German counterpart, Dr. Karl Heinz Carl. AblaB maintained, "I was in complete agreement with the West German politicians [on the major issues]. And because, indeed, in the Federal Republic the primacy of politics

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(Primat der Politik) prevails, I had no problems with the military."85 In this statement, he clearly provided a high compliment to the vitality of the principle of civilian control of the military in the Bundeswehr. On the East German side he said that in conducting the negotiations he had sought to bring the NVA into the discussions "to make things compatible." Decisions, however, were made on the political level, implying that he himself always had the dominant role. NVA leaders, he indicated, were very friendly to their new East German civilian leaders after the March 1990 elections. The military leaders stated they would work with the civilian leaders loyally and in a constructive manner. Such pronouncements were credible to Defense Minister Eppelmann but not to AblaB. Several weeks after assuming his duties, AblaB wished to discharge a great portion of the NVA generals, perhaps 90 percent, as he believed that these generals were Stalinists and had to go. There were good people behind them who could have occupied their positions, and he regretted that Eppelmann did not approve this step. "Eppelmann said, 'We need them.' I said, "We don't need them. They are old Stalinists. They can go." 86 AblaB believed that the generals would have "boycotted" this step, defending their claims for social welfare (Absicherung). As it was, the generals did disrupt plans, by sometimes only partially implementing instructions issued to them. Several days before the Unification on September 28, 1990, he discharged the final twenty-four NVA generals.87 NOTES 1. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BMVg), "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Bonn, 1 June 1991; BMVg, "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR," Staatssekretar, Org 1 Az 10-02-05, Bonn, 20 June 1990. 2. Ftihrungsstab des Heeres (Fu H), "Eingleiderung der NVA-Heeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung im Fii H," [Memo] ChefStab Fu H. Bonn, 7 August, 1990. 3. Interview with COL Herwig Scheffler, Section Chief, Review Group, Army Staff, Bonn, 4 October and November 6, 1991. COL Scheffler was the secretary of the Army Steering Group. 4. "Eingleiderung der NVA-Heeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung im Fii H." 5. Heeresamt, "Befehl Nr. 1 fiir die Arbeiten im Heeresamt zur Integration der NVALandstreitkrafte in das Heer," Abteilung I 1 (2) Az 02-06. Cologne, 23 August 1990. 6. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfligen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die HinterlassenschaftderNVA," Truppenpraxis (11'1991): 19. 7. MAV, "Ordnung Nr. 010/9/025 des Ministers fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung iiber dienstliche und aufterdienstliche Kontakte zwischen Angehorigen der Nationalen Volksarmee und Soldaten der Bundeswehr,u Rainer Eppelmann, 28 May 1990. 8. Letter to the author, October 5, 1992; Briefing by MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Commander, German Command and Staff College, November 1992, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. Notes held by author. For shortness of time, see also Ulrich A.

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Hundt, "Innere Fuhrung—eine gute Mitgift fiir Bundeswehr Ost," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 186; Gerhard Hubatschek, "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 28. 9. Interview, MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Newport, RI, 24 November 1992. 10. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992); interview, COL Wolfgang Gulich, Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden, 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Volker Neeb, Section Chief, Information Center, Joint Staff, Bonn, October 11, 1991. 11. Interview with COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 12. Interview with COL Joachim Steinhaus, Command and Control Officer (G-6 Section Leader), Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. 13. The reconnaissance is discussed at greater length in the chapter on equipment and facilities. 14. MG Richter stated 1,300 in Fii H, "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaiMich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990." Fu H/InfoLZ, Bonn, 17 September 1990. BG von Kirchbach indicated 1,500. Interview, BG Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Director, Division I (Innere Fuhrung, Personnel, Training) Army Staff (former commander of Home Defense Brigade 41, Eggesin), Bonn, 16 June 92. However in his book, he used the figure 1,200. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 14. LTC Lahmann stated that 1,200 officers and 800 NCOs went. Interview LTC Lahmann, Personnel Officer, Seventh Division and Military Region, Leipzig, 18 June 1992. Time magazine put the numbers at 1,200 officers and 300 NCOs. "Victory without a Battlefield," 1 July 1991, 26. 15. Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 34; interview, COL Jan Jorg Oerding, Division Chief, Division III 1 (Fundamentals of Operational C & C, Contributions to Pol-Mil Strategy) Army Staff, Bonn, 15 June 1992. LTG Schonbohm addressed other factors in a western officer's decision to go east: desiring to return to his home region and being filled with a pioneering spirit (p. 196). For polling data on western Bundeswehr views concerning assignments in the east, see Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke ausihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 38. 16. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 51, 53. Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 491. Bross continued with the missions that were given to them. 17. Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 42—ein Tagebuch," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 54. 18. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 52; interview, COL Scheffler, 6 November 1991. 19. Fii H, "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Fu H IV 1, Az 10-01-03, Bonn, 17 September 1990: 1; interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992. 20. Fii H, "Vorlaufige organisatorische Bestimmungen fiir Kommandobehorden, Stabe und Truppenteile des Heeres im beigetretenen Teil Deutschland," Fii H IV, Bonn, 27 September 1990. 21. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992.

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22. Letter to the author from MG Reinhardt, October 5, 1992. Also, interviews, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992, and BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; von Kirchbach, Meyers, and Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit, 13. 23. Fii H, "Ubernahme der Befehls- und Kommandogewalt iiber die Streitkrafte des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands durch den Bundesminster der Verteidigung: Personalabstellung Heer," Message, Fii H I 1, Bonn, 171646 September 1990. 24. "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte," Annex 1; interview, COL Scheffler, 6 November 1991. 25. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)" Cologne, 18 March 1991. 26. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 27. Interview, BG Wolfgang Beltermann, Chief of Staff, Corps/Territorial CommandEast, Potsdam, 12 November 1991. 28. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 19 November 1991; Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 195, 197, 198. For a diary of a West German officer who went east to assume command of the Third Motorized Rifle Regiment in Brandenburg, see Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 421—ein Tagebuch," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 54-58; and also Hartmut Neumann, "Markischer Heide, markischer Sand: vom Motschtzrgt 3 zum PzGrenBtl 421—ein Tagebuch (Teil II)," Truppenpraxis (2/1992): 165-170. 29. Bundeswehrkommando Ost, "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fur Fiihrung, Ausbildung und Organisation," Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando Ost, Az 32-01-08. Strausberg, 3 Oktober 1990, 1. 30. Steinseifer, "Zusammenfiigen und verkleinern," 20; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 33. 31. Ibid., 1-2. 32. "Die Bundeswehr im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 777-779. 33. "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fiir Fiihrung, Ausbildung und Organisation," 3-4. Also see interview with Schonbohm, "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutenant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/1990, 4; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 32; and Fu H, "Vorlaufige Dienstanweisung fiir die Befehlshaber in den Wehrbereichen VII and VIII," Fii H IV 1, Az 10-32-91, Bonn, 24 September 1990. 34. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 4. 35. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 61. 36. Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command, "Report to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces," Subject: "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," Commander, Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command, Strausberg, June 26, 1991. 37. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 4. See also Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 43.

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38. MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 7. 39. LTG Werner von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fiihrungsakademie der Bundeswehr aus AnlaB der erstmaligen Teilnahme von ehemaligen NVA-Berufsoffizieren am Grundlehrgang der Fortbildungs Stufe C" [Lecture at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College on the Occasion of the First Participation of Previous NVA Career Officers in the Basic Course of Advanced Officer Education Level C], Hamburg, 4 March 1993, 12. 40. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 170. See the chapter on equipment and facilities for further discussion of the Gulf War effort by the Bundeswehr to ship NVA equipment to allied and friendly states fighting Iraq. 41. Zwei Armeen, for example, 126, 218. 42. Ibid., 96, 131. 43. Ibid., 86-87, 90-91, 128, 134, 191, 201, 225. 44. Ibid., 106-107, 128, 134, 149, 152. 45. Fiihrungstab der Streitkrafte (Fii S), "Dienststellen im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands: Organisationsbereich Zentrale Militarische Bundeswehrdienst." Fii S IV 3. 12 September 1990. For a comprehensive interview of Schonbohm as he completed his command, see "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 332-338. He provides some summary statistics on personnel strengths in this article (p. 338) and also in his "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 44-45. 46. Interview with COL Klenner, 25 June 1992; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 216. 47. "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," 1-2. 48. Ibid., 2. Also see his speech of 1 July, Zwei Armeen, 249-252. 49. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 250. 50. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm." Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 338. 51. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 246. 52. Interview, COL Alfred Lassoncyzk, Logistics Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East, Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 53. "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation," 24. He also explained this rationale in his book, Zwei Armeen, 28. 54. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 201. For a good overview of the Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, see von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 608. 55. Ibid., 609. 56. The following analysis is based on Herbert Rosinski's sweeping treatment of the history of Prussian-German armies in The German Army (New York: Praeger, 1966). The most authoritative, scholarly analysis of this subject is Gordon A. Craig's The Poltics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955). 57. Ibid., 173. 58. Ibid., 174. 59. For example, see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 73, 79; Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 56; Axel Biirgener, "Sisyphus laBt griissen: Sicherheitspolitische Rahmenbedingungen der Heeresplanung," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 586; Young, "The 'Normalization' of The Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures," 18-19,26.

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60. When asked about the nature and extent of "political control and guidance," most interviewees took this to mean control and guidance given by politicians and civilians in government positions. This, of course, is not the only meaning of the phrase. In a more abstract sense it can mean control and guidance of a political nature—as compared to a social, economic, military, or technological nature, for example. In the second context such control and guidance deals with issues of a political nature, a phrase that is likewise subject to various meanings. In this study, it refers to issues on which individuals, groups of individuals, organizations, parties, states, disagree and engage in a process to resolve the disagreement. A social issue is taken to be one simply that deals with or has an impact on a group or groups of people. An economic or financial issue deals with some aspect of economics—for example, the production of goods and services, employment, fiscal, or monetary policy. Certainly, these general descriptors are not mutually exclusive. An issue can be for example both political and social, political and military, or economic and political. 61. Interview, Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl, former State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Bonn, 4 July 1992. Notes of interview held by author. 62. Interview, LTG Werner von Scheven, Commanding General, Eastern Corps/Territorial Command, Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 63. Werner von Scheven, "Die wunderbare Auferstehung der Auftragtaktik—Zwei Jahre nach der deutschen Vereinigung zieht das Korps/Territorialkommando Ost Bilanz," Truppenpraxis (611992): 53 3. 64. Interview MG Ruprecht Haasler, Commander, Eighth Division and Military Region, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. 65. Interview, MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, Commander, German Command and Staff Academy, Newport, Rhode Island, 24 November 1992. 66. Ibid. 67.Ibid. 68. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 69. Ibid. 70. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 71. Interview, COL Jantzen, 11 November 1991. In addition, the following officers in interviews made similar comments on this subject: COL Freiherr Friedrich von Senden, Commander, Home Defense Brigade 42, Potsdam, 26 June 1992, notes from interview held by author; COL Dieter H. E. Wolff, Deputy Director of Training, German Army Office, Cologne, 11 June 1992; LTC Herbert Danzer, Assistant Operations Officer, Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 92; LT Kuhl, Assistant Personnel Officer, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. LTC Kiihl had the most succinct way of stating it. He described the process of political guidance as "goals, framework, just do it" (Ziele, Rahmen, macht mal). 72. Interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992. LTC Danzer also referred to the quantitative requirements from the politicians. Interview, 18 June 1992. 73. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. 74. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 75. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 47. 76. Ibid., 86-87, 90-91, 128, 169. 77. Ibid., 90-91, 93. This was a tentative decision by the Committee, but Schonbohm indicated that the Defense Ministry would act on it as if it were official.

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78. Ibid., 182. 79. Ibid., 94. Schonbohm also indicated that from the outset the various political parties were very interested in supporting the Takeover, but provides little detail beyond this. "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 32. 80. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 102. 81. Interview with LTG a.D. Werner von Scheven, 18 June 1998, Potsdam. 82. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 99. 83. Material for this section was drawn from an interview with Werner E. AblaB, Director, Field Office, MOD (Former Deputy Defense Minister, MDD, GDR), Strausberg, 26 June 1992. He also published a book on the dissolution of the NVA, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992). 84.Ibid. 85. Ibid. Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb define this as the "subordination of the military under democratic, legitimate political responsibility:" the military is subordinate to the political leaders. "Wer bist Du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 650. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid. Concerning the influence of West German politicians, AblaB indicated that they had no influence in this area during the months leading up to Unification. Things eventually changed as Unification came increasingly closer.

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5

Management and Force Structure Decisions With the first research question addressed, the groundwork is now laid for the subsequent questions which comprise the heart of this study: What were the key decisions made and what were the important factors in these decisions? More specifically, in this Takeover of one military by another, did military factors or other "nonmilitary" factors—political, financial, social, psychological, or other—predominate? Concerning political factors, the study found in the previous chapter that there was only minimal guidance from political leaders. Nonetheless, military leaders can still consider and be influenced by political factors, domestic-political as well as international. Were the military leaders still informed and motivated by political factors? In the social area, to what extent were the decisions motivated by genuine humanitarian concerns about the welfare of the former NVA and what role did the possibility of social unrest play in decision making? These issues are all important and relevant. Within this first area of management and force structure, four decisions were most important and deserving of serious analysis: 1. Following Unification, only one German military force would exist—not two, as the East Germans had wanted. 2. The organization of the new units of the German Army activated in the former East Germany according to AS 5 and superimposing this structure on the NVA land forces structure remaining after the Takeover. 3. Building the new army structure at the same time that unneeded former NVA units were dissolved. 4. Assigning to the newly activated units in the east partnership units from the west to assist them in accomplishing their missions.

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DECISION 1: ONE ARMY The Minister of Disarmament and Defense, Rainer Eppelmann, had maintained throughout the spring and much of the summer of 1990 that after Unification the NVA would continue to exist. At a Commander's Conference of the NVA on May 2, 1990, he asserted: After the Unification there will also be a second German Army on the territory of the German Democratic Republic, not integrated into any alliance, to exercise here its own territorial security functions, that must be trained and equipped. This is also a result of the arrangements with Minister Stoltenberg.1 The NVA saw itself serving a bridging function (Bruckenfunktion) to the armed forces of the eastern European states—especially Soviet forces—during a transition phase, lasting presumably until the final departure of the Soviet forces in 1994. This would be their independent contribution to the security structure of Europe.2 In terms of the NVA's future size in relation to the Bundeswehr, one NVA general estimated it would make up one sixth of the Bundeswehr after Unification.3 As of mid-June, Minister Stoltenberg still talked publicly in terms of a "transition period" (Ubergangszeit) following Unification, after which there would be one unified military.4 The MOD changed its position some time in midsummer after the mid-July Kohl-Gorbachev meeting. Minister Stoltenberg conferred with other defense ministers, the state secretaries under him, and the Bundeswehr military leaders and made the decision that there would be only one Army after Unification.5 By early August, Minister Stoltenberg announced that all German forces would be Bundeswehr, not two separate armed forces.6 At this time he also indicated that of the 370,000 personnel ceiling agreed to by Gorbachev and Kohl in the Caucasus, 50,000 would come from the former NVA, with half being professional soldiers and half being recruits.7 For the key political-military issues between the FRG and the GDR, the midJuly 1990 Kohl-Gorbachev meeting proved decisive. West Germany could join with East Germany, and although no NATO forces could be stationed in former GDR territory, the FRG could continue to be a member of NATO. GDR Minister Eppelmann relented on his desire for two separate armies. On September 21, 1990, in one of his final orders as the Minister for Disarmament and Defense, Eppelmann stated: "At 12 A.M., October 2, 1990, the command authority of the central leadership of the NVA ends and is transferred at 12 A.M. to the Minister of Defense [FRG]."8 LTG Schonbohm characterized the undertaking as "not the leading together of two German armies but the constructing of new armed forces with the members of the Bundeswehr and the former NVA." An important factor in the decision can be seen in his emphasis on unity. "If we want Germany to grow together and as rapidly as possible to become one nation and one army, in feeling and in action, than the Bundeswehr has an important task."9

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MG Richter, who headed the MOD Advance Party to the East German MDD and who later assumed command of the Military District VII, stated that through the staffing of the issue at MOD the number of NVA personnel to be taken over became clear. It was neither a political nor military requirement, rather it became clear that the Takeover had to be done this way to achieve unity. This was the decisive point.10 His counterpart in the Military District VIII, MG Haasler in discussing the large number of western personnel sent east, provided another factor in this decision. He stated it was very important that from the beginning the NVA were led and controlled by the concepts (Vorstellungen) of the Bundeswehr. *1 Financial considerations must have also played a role in the decision to maintain only one Army. This can be inferred from comments made by West German officers cited earlier related to the political pressure to maintain a certain tempo for the dissolution of NVA, pressure driven primarily by the desire to husband scare funds. DECISION 2: USE ARMY STRUCTURE 5 The second critical decision in the Takeover was to organize the new units established from the remains of NVA after Unification according to the new AS 5 and to superimpose this structure on the old NVA structure.12 Recognizing the risk in imposing a new structure not yet introduced into the Bundeswehr in the west, the Army might have alternately decided on a more conservative approach, organizing in the east according to the structure then in use—AS 4—and, once the new structure had been implemented in the west and any problems had been solved, to reorganize those units in the east. A third option open to the German Army was simply to assume command of the existing NVA land forces structure (see Figure 3.1). Although these alternatives were available, there did not appear to be any significant controversy on this decision. This decision was made at the Army Staff level at the turn of the year 1990-1991. A transition structure was first employed until 1994, followed by the implementation of AS 5. 13 The second aspect of this decision was to use the existing NVA organizations and superimpose the transitional structure on them. The German Army did not completely ignore or disregard the existing NVA structure they found in the east; rather, it put this to use to achieve the Takeover as easily as possible. Time constraints also played an important role. MG Reinhardt, a principal staff officer on the Joint Staff at the time, indicated that the question of the correct structure was one of the central problems that the Army faced under great pressure of time. Because of this pressure, there were some mistakes made, but there was no question that imposing AS 5, not AS 4, was the correct decision.14 COL Klenner, Operations Officer of Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, explained that the Army, in facing this issue, simply asked itself how it could organize in the easiest, most expedient way. The planners decided to use

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the existing structure of the NVA as a basis for the building of the new structure. That is, at the former NVA Land Forces Headquarters in Potsdam, the future German Army Eastern Corps and Territorial Command would be established. At the next lower NVA level of command (Militarbezirke in Neubrandenburg and Leipzig), future German Army divisions/military district commands would be built. At the six former NVA divisional headquarters, six German Army Home Defense Brigades would be organized (so called because of the 2 + 4 Treaty but always intended to be regular Army brigades after 1994). "So we used the infrastructure, the basic organization, the personnel in the staffs, and simply dropped one level down."15 He stated that both decisions to use AS 5 and to use the existing NVA organization were correct. On the former decision he said any other would have been nonsense.16 COL Alfred Lassonczyk, the Eastern Corps and Territorial Command Logistics Officer (G-4), also identified this decision as one of the most important decisions. Although it brought some major problems, he indicated it was the correct decision. He added that the units in the west who had not yet organized under AS 5 were able to observe how the new structure was functioning in the east.17 COL Wolfgang Gulich, Commander of Home Defense Brigade 37 in Dresden, explained the role that time pressure had played. He indicated that originally the Army had assumed that the Unification would occur after the December 1990 elections. Had this happened, the Army might have completely dissolved NVA staffs and built up new ones. Because the Unification was advanced to October 3, it was decided to use the existing NVA structure. It was key, he said, to ensure that continuous command and control was exercised. It also made sense to use the existing infrastructure, especially the communications network. He highlighted the importance of the decision to impose AS 5 and not AS 4, which saved the Army the expense and time of restructuring again in two or three years.18 COL Oerding, a Division Chief within the Army Staff Department III (Command and Control), was the only officer who spoke guardedly about the decision to impose AS 5. Asked whether it was the right decision, he replied: "One cannot yet say as the time is too early . . . however the fusion of the Field Army with the Territorial Army I maintain was correct politically and militarily under the existing conditions."19 DECISION 3: DISSOLVE AND ACTIVATE SIMULTANEOUSLY By mid-July 1990, Bundeswehr planners had already proposed to take over units of the NVA into the Bundeswehr at Unification, dissolve them step-bystep, and then establish new units with a mix of former NVA and Bundeswehr personnel. Among the early August decisions that Minister Stoltenberg announced, was the decision to dissolve the NVA step-by-step (Zug urn Zug).20 The third key decision made in the area of management and force structure for

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the Takeover concerned the sequencing of the dissolution of the former NVA units and the activation of the new units of the German Army in the east. The key question was whether the Army should do these two extensive and complex activities sequentially or simultaneously. The Bundeswehr chose the latter course of action.21 Differing opinions existed within the Bundeswehr on the wisdom of the option taken. Most opinions on the decision were favorable, with officers citing various factors that went into this decision. LTG von Scheven maintained that time constraints allowed really no alternative.22 BG Wilko Hartmann, Deputy Commander, Division/Military District Command VII, stated that it would have been nice to separate the dissolution of the NVA from the build up of the new army, but this was not possible.23 At least one reason has already been covered—the desire at the political level to control the cost of the Takeover. The longer that former NVA units—and therefore former NVA personnel—were kept on active duty, the longer they had to be paid.24 LTC Herbert Danzer, Assistant Operations Officer for Division/Military Area Command VII, indicated another side of the political dimension of the decision: sending a signal to both former East Germans and Soviets. The Germans wanted to say that the Bundeswehr existed on eastern German soil, an interest that could not be understated.25 LTC Gunter Weblus, Assistant Operations Officer (G-3) of Division/Military Area Command VIII, spoke in a similar vein. It was a consequence of the political decision that it must go quickly. . . . It was not simply a question of not having the NVA exist after October 3. Politically it was also a question of documenting as quickly as possible the German claim to sovereignty also in this part of Germany by having the German Army present here [in the eastern sector] among other things. That was a very essential political requirement that we simply forced: do everything at once in a very short time 2 ° He added that it was believed important to avoid a gap in time between the dissolution of the NVA units and the arrival of the Bundeswehr. This might have caused difficulties in a psychological sense with the East German population. Finally, there might have been problems with a sequential approach from a physical security standpoint. Stressing the problem of vandalism, he stated that if the German Army had not executed the dissolution and build up sequentially, it "would not have found one stone upon the other." When questioned about the target audience for such a signal, Weblus indicated that it was more the East German population rather than the Soviets. Overall, executing these actions simultaneously was urgently necessary (zwingend erforderlich)?1 The alternative was certainly considered, said MG Reinhardt, but one serious consequence of this would have been that the German Army could not have enlisted new recruits from the east until the build up began. This was politically unacceptable because it violated the principle of equality: of maintaining equally for all young men the chance to be drafted (Wehrgerectigkeit). This was a

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political requirement by the Defense Minister who had said that as of January 1, 1991 recruits from the east and west were to be equal. Reinhardt felt this was correct judgment, a requirement he fully accepted.28 COL Klenner described the two tasks as an enormous burden but believed that the decision to dissolve and activate simultaneously was fundamentally correct, "otherwise there would have been a gap of some two years for the NVA personnel." During these two years, the German Army would not have been able to evaluate former NVA personnel. Because new units were immediately established, former NVA could be given work and observed. Also he stressed that the business of dissolving units and deactivating was a "psychologically negative exercise." No recruits would have been enlisted and the civilian population would have seen no progress—all negative things. "In the course of action taken, one saw that the NVA was dissolved but one saw always the new contours of the future Bundeswehr." These were positive things.29 This psychological factor seemed decisive in LTG Schonbohm's view. He referred in his book to those in the MOD who wanted to perform the tasks sequentially: dissolve the NVA and then build new Bundeswehr units. He argued that this was wrong because "an army cannot only liquidate (abwickeln) and dissolve. We must show goals to the soldiers if we want to use and preserve the start up momentum (Anfangsschwung)."-*® Next to these supportive statements, stand other critical statements from officers who spoke hesitatingly about this decision. LTC Danzer, for example, said that it was not necessary to build up the units so quickly; more time might have been given to accomplish the many complex tasks involving people's lives.31 Off the record one colonel seriously questioned the wisdom of this decision, speculating whether it would have been better to dissolve the NVA, correct the severe infrastructure problems and then activate AS 5. 32 DECISION 4: ESTABLISH PARTNERSHIP UNITS The fourth major decision in this area was to establish partnerships between units in the east and west (Couleurverhaltnisse)?^ This decision was made in September 1990 by the Army Chief of Staff. The specific relationships, reflected in Table 5.1 for the Field Army and in Table 5.2 for the Territorial Army, were specified on September 19, 1990. Former NVA divisions, soon to become home defense brigades, were matched with West German divisions, and former NVA military districts were aligned with West German corps. Relationships were based on geographical proximity.34 The system, existing from September 1990 to June 1993, functioned in the following manner. A unit in the east needed vehicles, ammunition, personnel, or perhaps some on-the-job training (Ausbildung am Arbeitsplatz) for its former NVA. Outside the normal chain of command, it made this request directly to its partnership unit in the west, making the request as specific as possible in time,

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quantity, and purpose. The unit in the west would then fulfill the request to the best of its ability.35 Table 5.1 Unit Partnerships (Field Army) Between Units in the East and West

Western Unit Sixth Mechanized Division Third Armored Division First Mechanized Division Second Mechanized Division Twelfth Armored Division Fourth Mechanized Division First Corps Third Corps

Eastern Unit (former NVA) Eighth Motorized Rifle Division Schwerin) Ninth Armored Division (Eggesin) First Motorized Rifle Division (Potsdam) Fourth Motorized Rifle Division (Erfurt) Eleventh Motorized Rifle Division (Halle) Seventh Armored Division (Dresden) Military District VIII (Neubrandenburg) Military District VII (Leipzig)

Source: Fu H, "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (FeldHeer)," Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, Bonn, 19 September 1990. Table 5.2 Unit Partnerships (Territorial Army) Between Units in the East and West

Western Unit Territorial Command (Schleswig-Holstein) Territorial Command (North) Territorial Command (South)

Eastern Unit (formerly NVA) Military District Command VIII (Neubrandenburg) Military District Command VIII (Neubrandenburg) Military District Command VII (Leipzig)

Source: Fu H, "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (TerrKdoBeh)," Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, Bonn, 19 September 1990.

Without the support of these partnership units, LTG Schonbohm asserted that Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command could not have accomplished its tasks.36 MG Haasler highlighted the program's key role in training new recruits. Eleven teams from the partnership units were used in his command to train the new recruits enlisted from the east. "The preparation and conduct of the training . . . would be unthinkable without the energetic assistance especially of I Corps and Northern and Schleswig-Holstein Territorial Commands." 3 7 COL Klenner explained that because it was a separate channel outside the normal chain, problems occurred at times for the leadership. Also, as time went on units in the east had to rely increasingly on normal channels because units in the west began their restructuring into AS 5. Overall, he asserted that it "had

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proven itself very well" and was one of the reasons why the Takeover was succeeding so well.38 Both Division Assistant Operations Officers, LTC Danzer and LTC Weblus, sung high praises for the program. Danzer stated that without this help, they could not managed. It was supported by all units without reservation.39 Weblus indicated: "It was clear that the build-up of the Bundeswehr . . . in the east would not have been possible without the support of troop units in the west." Like COL Klenner, he noted that as time past the units in the west became busy with their own reorganization.40 Another officer noted the understandable friction that sometime developed. Eventually, a point was reached when the supporting unit simply no longer wished to speak to the eastern unit.41 Similarly favorable views were voiced by former NVA officers and NCOs who highlighted the importance of these partnership arrangements. In addition to the value of the training they received, it allowed them to get a first-hand glimpse of not only the German Army but also society in the west.42 NOTES 1. '"Es wird auch nach der Vereinigung eine zweite deutsche Armee geben': Ausziige aus der Rede von Rainer Eppelmann," Truppenpraxis (4/1990): 348. In an interview for Truppenpraxis on 11 July 1990, LTG BaarB, the NVA general in charge of military reform, spoke in terms of the NVA being a component (Bestandteil) of the total German armed forces, presumably until the Soviets departed eastern Germany. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben: Interview mit Generalleutnant Klaus Jiirgen BaarB," Truppenpraxis (5/1990): 437. 2. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben," 437; Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 25-26. See also Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dtisseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 80-81. 3. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben," 437. 4. "Wehrpflicht auch fiir Berliner," Berliner Morgenpost, 17 June 1990. In his book Schonbohm indicated that Stoltenberg at a Bundeswehr Commander's Conference on 13 June 1990 said "a short transition period." "Stoltenberg's requirements left no doubt that the NVA could no longer continue to exist in the unified Germany." Zwei Armeen, 27. 5. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 31. 6. "Bundeswehr-General soil die Nationale Volksarmee integrieren," General Anzeiger (Bonn), 28 August 1990. In contrast, State Secretary for the East German MDD AblaB stated that the presumption of two armies after Unification lasted only until about mid-June. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. 7. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. These two decisions are analyzed because of the dramatic impact they clearly had as one examines their consequences and because a number of Bundeswehr officers expressed their pivotal nature. 8. Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung (MAV), "Befehl Nr.48/90 des Ministers fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung iiber die Aufgaben der Nationalen Volksarmee im Zusammenhang mit der Bildung gesamtdeutscher Streitkrafte vom 21.09.1990," MAV, Strausberg, 21 September 1990, 5. In addition to those opinions expressed in the

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following analysis, COL Rieke, Deputy Commander of Home Defense Brigade 42, interviewed with COL von Senden, Potsdam, 26 June 1992, and LTC Giinter Weblus, Assistant Operations Officer, 8th Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992, maintained the centrality of dissolving the NVA and making one Army. Weblus held the decision for one Army to be the most important decision made in the Takeover. 9. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutenant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/1990, 4. 10. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. 11. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991, 7. COL Rieke also pointed out that the NVA lived under a different system and this could not continue after Unification. The Bundeswehr needed to ensure the loyalty of the units. Interview, COL von Senden and COL Rieke, 26 June 1992. 12. For a full explanation of AS 5, see Appendix B. 13. Interview with COL Oerding, 15 June 1992; Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608. This decision was selected for analysis mainly because of the important impact it had. Also, at least eight key German Army commanders and staff officers identified this as one of the critical decisions. 14. Interview with MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. 15. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 16.Ibid. 17. Interview, COL Lassonczyk, 25 June 1992. 18. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 19. Interview, COL Oerding, 15 June 1992. 20. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 28, 31. 21. This decision was selected for analysis not only for its significance but also because it was one about which there was substantial controversy. 22. Interview, 19 June 1998. 23. Interview, BG Wilko Hartmann, Deputy Commander, Seventh Division & Military Region, Leipzig, 14 November 1991. 24. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992; Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. 25. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 26. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 27. Ibid. LTG Schonbohm also provided information on vandalism at former Soviet garrisons left vacant. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 83. 28. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. Also this is another example of the political control exerted over the military during the Takeover. 29. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 30. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 157. 31. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 32. By the end of June 1991, 304 of the 503 unneeded units and agencies of the former NVA had been deactivated; the remainder were to be dissolved by the end of the year, von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 608. In his address to the Commander's Conference on March 11, 1991, LTG Schonbohm stated that at this point

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the emphasis must be placed more and more on the build up of new units. "This will be the central task for 1991." Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 192. 33. This was selected because of its extraordinary significance that so many officers highlighted. 34. Fii H, "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (Feldheer/Erganzung nach Fiihrungsbesprechung am 12.06.1990)" [sic 12.09.1990] Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, Bonn, 19 September 1990; Fu H, "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (TerrKdoBeh)," Fii H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, Bonn, 19 September 1990. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. It is interesting to note that a comparable system was established between eastern and western federal states. See Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 190. 35. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. For a brief description of a specific partnership and interviews of NVA in the former Fourth Motorized Rifle Division in Erfurt, see Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 299-303. 36. "Wir dienen dem selben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 337 37. Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 18 March 1991. 38. Ibid. 39. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. COL von Senden made a similar comment. Interview, 26 June 1992. 40. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 41. Interview, LTC Liitz Wollweber, Assistant Personnel Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East, Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 42. Interview, Sergeant Christian Czajka, Sergeant First Class Siegfried Ortmann, and SFC Gernot Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992; interview, Staff Sergeant Uwe Haake, CPT Walter Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Class Klaus-Gunter Mantey, CPT Reiner Moeller, CPT Harald Schulenburg (former NVA), Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 1992.

6

Personnel Decisions Of the four groups of decisions examined in this study, those within the area of personnel and administration were clearly considered most important by the former NVA, as indicated by the number of NVA that identified these decisions as important and the frequency with which they were mentioned. The personnel area is significant also because it holds what was the most fundamental and therefore the most important decision of all those examined in depth in this study: the decision to allow former NVA to continue to serve. This is the first decision that is analyzed in this chapter. There were a mix of factors that resulted in this important decision—psychological, social, and military. The critical factor was psychological: The Bundeswehr could not have pretended to be a truly German (all-German) army had it not allowed a portion of the NVA to continue to serve. Socially, on one humanitarian level, it would have been unfair simply to throw that many people onto the streets into such a poor, unstable economy. On a second more practical, realistic level, the Bundeswehr was concerned with the very real possibility that the NVA might take to the streets if an option to continue to serve had not been offered. On what might be called a military level, military planners recognized the need for NVA to accomplish all the military tasks that lay ahead (e.g., inventorying, guarding, maintaining, operating, and disposing of all the NVA equipment that was to come under the control of the Bundeswehr on October 3). There were many issues in this area that the study could have analyzed in depth, more than any of the other areas. After briefly examining several background decisions, this chapter examines the following four decisions that emerged above the rest:

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From Confrontation to Cooperation 1. Allow NVA to continue to serve. 2. Allow selected NVA to remain in service as longer serving volunteers (Soldaten aufZeit) for two years (1991-1992) and allow a segment of these to become beyond 1992 longer serving volunteers or professional soldiers. 3. Demote former NVA soldiers in accordance with certain criteria to bring them in line with their Bundeswehr contemporaries and the German Army personnel structure. 4. Do not permit any transfer of NVA tradition to the German Army.

Overall, about 44 percent of the 25,500 officers of the NVA who were taken over by the Bundeswehr on October 3, 1990, applied for the two-year trial period and about 26 percent (6,732) of the original figure was accepted. In the end 2,507 former NVA were accepted into the Bundeswehr as professionals or longer serving volunteers, representing 37 percent of those who had undergone the two-year trial period and 10 percent of the original number taken over in October 1990. Two key ideas that the Germans used in the Takeover emerge in this chapter. First, in the analysis of the decision to allow former NVA to continue to serve is the idea that the West Germans came as "Germans to Germans, not as victors to vanquished," something that came to serve as a motto for the West Germans serving in the east. A second key idea was that the West Germans promised the former NVA that they would be given a "fair chance" to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr, a promise that they fulfilled. There are a number of lesser decisions and subjects that deserve attention to provide a comprehensive picture of the complexity of this area, subjects such as pay and as the lack of qualified NCOs in the former NVA. These subjects are given coverage with the decision to which they most closely relate. The chapter ends with a discussion of the promise to offer the former NVA a "fair chance." PERSONNEL DECISIONS PRIOR TO UNIFICATION Important personnel decisions were made before Unification Day, several by the MDD and one by Chancellor Kohl. Minister Eppelmann made the first key decision in discharging all political officers, loyal party members who served a unique role in the NVA. In addition to the normal military chain of command, these officers comprised a subsidiary chain of command to maintain party control and direction of the military.1 All officers of what was called the Main Political Administration were discharged. The military intelligence service and the propaganda units were deactivated, and military prosecutors were discharged. Female personnel in the NVA were also discharged or transferred to a civilian status.2 Following the dissolution of the Main Political Administration, the NVA established in January 1990 a new organization, "Citizens' Work" (Staatsburgerliche Arbeit), in an attempt to respond to the tremendous changes that were occurring in the political and societal sectors. Many of the former political officers found their way into this new

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organization, which ultimately was overcome by events as Unification neared. It was dissolved by Minister Eppelmann on August 6, 1990.3 A second step that Eppelmann took in the summer of 1990 was to decide that on October 3, Unification Day, all NVA officers older than fifty-five would be discharged.4 During the summer of 1990, many NVA general officers were also discharged with relatively favorable benefits.5 Also, during this summer as an incentive to stay, the two Defense Ministers made the important decision to award 7,500 DM to all NVA officers and NCOs who remained until the end of 1990.6 The West German government followed these events with two decisions. The first in September 1990 was that on December 31, 1990, all NVA personnel over fifty years old were to be discharged.7 Second, about two weeks prior to Unification Day, Chancellor Kohl decided to discharge all remaining generals and admirals,8 a decision executed by State Secretary AblaB (East German) on September 28. Even though there were those who believed some should be allowed to remain in the Bundeswehr, the predominant opinion was that the generals were too imbued with socialism to make a genuine transition to an army of a democracy. Second, there was concern that both eastern draftees and the civilian population in the east would never understand such a decision.10 The decision to discharge them caused problems for about twenty-two generals who were not yet fifty years old and therefore could not by law receive pensions. MG Richter pointed out that these generals were understandably concerned about their social welfare (Absicherung). The German Army, however, focused on a different level: how to bring a former enemy and Communist army into the Bundeswehr. He indicated that there was really no disagreement on this question among the MOD, Bonn; MDD, Strausberg; and the Bundeswehr.u After their retirement, four generals and one admiral were kept as advisors to Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command. They were needed because information in the NVA was so controlled that only at the highest levels did one have a truly comprehensive picture. Advising LTG Schonbohm until the dissolution of the NVA was completed were MG Berger to advise on the Air Force; MG Engelhardt, former Chief of the NVA (Land Forces), to advise on Army matters and to serve in liaison to the Soviets; MG Schlothauer, to advise the Chief of Staff of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command; LTG BaarB, to advise on general military affairs and training; and Admiral Born to advise on the Navy.12 Asked about the mistakes that were made during the period before Unification, AblaB reflected on the way he and Eppelmann had handled the NVA generals. Had he to do it again, he said, "I would have been more brutal." The generals were discharged too late. "I would have discharged them on the very first day. Not all, but many. . . . Some of these generals were sand in the works. They held us back."13 Understandably, the few months preceding Unification were exceedingly uncertain and uneasy times for the individual officers and NCOs of the NVA who continued to remain in service. Even if their superiors wished to provide clear answers to the very basic questions they asked, they often could not because

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political issues had not yet been resolved. Who had a place in this future army? What kind of life would those have who were to be discharged?14 DECISION 5: FORMER NVA COULD CONTINUE TO SERVE The most important and most controversial decision made by the FRG in the Takeover was that former NVA military personnel could continue to serve in the Bundeswehr.15 It was decided that about 50,000 soldiers would be stationed in the former GDR, and this meant that about this many professional soldiers and recruits were allowed to continue to serve.16 In the following analysis, both West and East German views are combined to give a comprehensive picture of the reasons why this decision was made. This decision was made at the political level, although it is not fully clear who made it. By one interpretation, it was Chancellor Kohl;17 by another interpretation Minister Stoltenberg made the decision and publicly announced it on August 4 along with his concept for the new Bundeswehr,18 As summarized by LTG von Scheven: "Up to 50,000 of the peacetime strength of 370,000 were to be formed by former GDR staff, 50 percent of whom were to be former NVA regulars."19 BG von Kirchbach, who took over the remains of the Ninth NVA Armored Division at Eggesin, stated that Dr. Stoltenberg had visited him for two days, a visit that allowed many occasions for a sharing of views. From these discussions, von Kirchbach was convinced that this was the most fundamental decision that the Minister made. BG von Kirchbach characterized Stoltenberg's driving idea as: "We make the attempt to do this [the Takeover] together with people from both parts [of Germany]."20 This decision occasioned a heated debate that stretched from the officers of the Bundeswehr throughout the defense sector into the media. One author described the "discussions as controversial, in part irreconcilable (unversohnlich)."21 Several officers interviewed discussed the clearest alternative—that of not taking any NVA—and the implications of both options. Many officers believed that the NVA should have been totally dissolved, with no allowance for NVA personnel to enter the Bundeswehr. One personnel officer, for example, stated that the decision to allow NVA to continue to serve was political and he felt that such a decision was to him "impossible" and "unthinkable."22 West German officers held this position not only out of ideological reasons but also pragmatic: Would not the former NVA burden the further development of the Bundeswehr as it underwent the difficult process of reducing in size?23 Such views were also held by segments of the media.24 LTG Schonbohm believed, however, that this would make the Bundeswehr appear to be an Army of occupation, as the Soviet Army had been, and that this would reinforce the division of east and west. A key idea he repeated and one that came to serve as a motto for the Takeover was: "We have come as Germans to Germans, not as victors to vanquished; we want to approach the solutions of

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the problems together." He clearly rejected the extreme solutions of taking no one and incorporating the entire NVA and argued that the correct path was chosen.25 As late as April 1991, LTG Schonbohm found himself defending the decision.26 Michael J. Inacker, writing in Aufienpolitik in early 1991, argued the same point. He said it was good that the former NVA were given a chance to prove their worth in the Bundeswehr. "This is good for the overall all-German awareness, since it would be unwise to sustain the feeling of a two-class society comprising West and East Germans in the Bundeswehr as an all-German army."27 Writing in the officers' journal, Truppenpraxis, MAJ Hans-Joachim Reeb argued: "Only with them [the former NVA] will we succeed in forming cohesive and democratically dependable common-German armed forces which will endure."28 COL Ditte, Personnel Officer for Division/Military District Command VIII, and his assistant LTC Kuhl, both asserted a similar perspective. Ditte said the German Army had made the right choice "to bring together the both parts of Germany and also to generate an inner unity." Kuhl argued that had the German Army decided otherwise, it would have appeared as an occupation Army. "We would have created a two-class society." We had to give them a chance, he indicated, and they proved themselves. It was very important that the West Germans come not as conquerors, he said, "that we build something here [in the east] together."29 LTC Kuhl also elucidated another purely military reason for taking over former NVA personnel—the tremendous amount of NVA material and equipment for which the Bundeswehr suddenly became responsible. The West Germans did not know where the equipment was and how it functioned. The Bundeswehr needed specialists "to inventory, to examine, to collect and to dispose of."30 Several former NVA voiced the same argument. First Lieutenant HansWalter Matthies, former NVA lieutenant colonel, spoke in a similar vein about the overall functions of security of the munitions, equipment, and garrisons. If the Bundeswehr had decided not to allow NVA to continue to serve, it would have been "a catastrophe." "The Bundeswehr was not at all capable of guarding everything." He also referred to the variety of NVA equipment (Technik): the Bundeswehr lacked sufficient personnel, such as specialists and drivers who were knowledgeable on it.31 MAJ Hans-Jiirgen Ulfert, former NVA lieutenant colonel and battalion commander, stated that specialists were needed by the Bundeswehr for the dissolution of the NVA and the activation of new units who had knowledge of things on location. Otherwise, the Takeover could not have been accomplished.32 MG Reinhardt discussed the analysis that was done of the issue. Do we wish to take over a part of the NVA or to destroy it totally? Do we want to have no Army at all in the east at first and perhaps, in the longer term, send units from the west to the east? He said that a prominent journalist, Karl Feldmeyer of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, made an alternative proposal: build battalions using two companies from the east and two companies from the west.33

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Another option open to the Bundeswehr, said Reinhardt, was to move entire western units to the east, especially for security concerns. "We said: First, destroy everything. First, dissolve everything and then build-up relatively quickly, so quickly that after January 1, 1991, one could bring in recruits from the new federal states so that there would be no gap." (The Bundeswehr enlists new recruits quarterly. The NVA had inducted new recruits on September 1, 1990, one month before the normal Bundeswehr induction.) "This was actually the decisive issue for us: We want the draftees there [in the east]. We do not want to make any value distinctions according to the principle: there are only draftees from the west. That cannot be." 34 Former State Secretary Werner AblaB spoke in a similar vein. If the Bundeswehr had come only from the west, then it would not be "a common German Army" (gesamte deutsche Armee). "The people in the east must also have the chance to make their contribution to defense."35 Former NVA officers made the same point. MAJ Wensdorf, a former NVA lieutenant colonel who served in the mechanized infantry, stated that in order to organize common German armed forces, the eastern soldiers could not all be removed.36 MAJ Seppelt, a former lieutenant colonel intelligence officer of the Land Forces Headquarters, argued that if one considered that the former GDR made up about one third of the unified Germany and that in this area the NVA once existed, it is hard to imagine that the Bundeswehr would suddenly decide that all these officers—with all their experience, competence, and education—should be discharged. It was difficult for him to imagine the Bundeswehr saying "no more military" and building up an Army in the east solely with personnel from the west. He presumed that the final decision resulted from compromise. "The Bundeswehr said, 'We shall give the people [in the east] a chance considering their performance, their capabilities, and their entire behavior.' Yes, it was a good decision."37 Former NVA officers wished to be given the opportunity to continue to serve not simply for economic reasons but because of a conviction that in light of their professionalism they could compete with West German officers in a common force.38 Former NVA officers in Dresden suggested that ultimately it was a political decision and maintained that it could not be any other way if one sought a unified (einheitliches) Germany.39 BG von Kirchbach considered the issue from the standpoint of the NVA on a very personal, human level. An alternative approach could be justified only if it could be said that it was the individual's fault that he was a member of the NVA. But, he argued, this was not the case. "You must ask yourself the question: 'Where would you have been if you had grown up for forty years in a political system which stretched out its fingers into every facet of human [life]?' And so a lot of people did what they did in good faith."40 Thus, the Bundeswehr reasoned that the average officer and NCO should be given a chance—a fair chance—to serve. It should perform the Takeover with them.41 NVA officers and NCOs were not only proud that they had served their country and proud of their armaments, weapons, combat training, and discipline,

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but they believed they had maintained the peace in Europe and that they had contributed to the stability of relationships. This pride extended to the excellent condition in which they kept their materials and systems. The NVA reasoned that they should not be handled worse than those who served under the Nazis for this would degrade the honor and dignity of the NVA soldiers.42 COL Dietmar Klenner, Operations Officer for Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, continued in explaining the decision through this social perspective. The Bundeswehr had decided to integrate parts of the NVA and to build a new corps.43 It was an entirely correct decision, he argued. The Bundeswehr simply could not dissolve the larger part of the NVA and put all the soldiers on the street. This was socially impossible. The German Army had to integrate them in accordance with its personnel requirements. The concept was correct, he said, and the NVA were "fully marching along" (ziehen voll mit).** It is clear that another sociopolitical factor was the West German concern that the former NVA might have taken to the streets if they had been discharged in mass. The Bundeswehr could have sent the NVA all home, said MG Haasler, the senior Army Planner in Bonn before the Unification and subsequently a commanding general in the east, but this would have caused a great tremor.45 MG Reinhardt, the senior Joint Staff Planner before the Unification, also indicated that the Bundeswehr was very concerned with the potential anger of the NVA and the possibility of it taking to the streets.46 LTG Schonbohm's account, especially of the atmosphere and events in September 1990, affirms the fears of possible NVA action even after the decision had been made to allow a portion of the NVA to continue to serve. Although the NVA leaders were making their best efforts to make the transition to Unification in an ordered, stable fashion, they were concerned that events could get out of hand, a concern that at least some communicated to Bundeswehr leaders.47 Schonbohm and other military leaders discussed various scenarios in which the NVA—or even Red Army Faction or former Stasi—might take action.48 He expressed his fears. The major concern during the transition of the NVA to the Bundeswehr was to prevent the danger of chaos. I feared a breakdown of discipline could spread, that entire troop units would break apart and that weapons and munitions could no longer be sufficiently guarded.49

These fears and the recognized need for greater clarity over the future of the NVA prompted a meeting between Ministers Stoltenberg and Eppelmann on September 11 at which this clarity was achieved. Defense Minister Eppelmann and the leader of the Bundeswehr's Advance Party, MG Richter, disseminated this information at the final NVA Commander's Conference on September 12, which helped to allay the uncertainty, although rumors of possible action by regimental commanders persisted.50 Werner AblaB, State Secretary in the east, as well as former NVA interviewed, indicated that this was a real possibility. AblaB stated that if the chance

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to continue to serve had not been given, the danger existed until the middle of September that a clash (Streit) would have occurred. "As the Unification Treaty became public in September, if the NVA had said, we cannot accept the treaty, and had gone to the streets with their tanks, then the situation would have read like a novel." His concern and main task during the last eight weeks preceding Unification, he said, was to keep this Army disciplined and calm.51 Although not uniform, a number of former NVA officers and NCOs registered the possibility of NVA armed action. A former NVA NCO interviewed in Leipzig summarized the manpower and weapons that the NVA had at its disposal in the months preceding the Unification. A solution, therefore, had to be found for the incorporation (Eingliederung) of the NVA. The FRG had to give at least some chance to serve in the Bundeswehr, "otherwise it would have come to action." He finished by noting that there were some strikes in units.52 Three NCOs in Potsdam offered a similar view. If the NVA had all been thrown out, "then all hell would have broken loose" (dann ist der Teufel los).53 MAJ Wolfgang Leesing, former NVA colonel and regimental commander, believed that security was the most important reason why the decision had been made. Had no members of the NVA been allowed to continue in service, there would have been armed resistance and chaos.54 It appears that the September 24 pronouncement of the Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Dieter Wellershof finalized the decision and represented the official position of the military leadership of the Bundeswehr. He concluded his Commander's Brief for Units by stating: "Only together can we effect the transition in structure and make the change."55 AblaB expressed a certain pride that the GDR leaders had served the NVA well on this issue. "As the GDR we promised the NVA that a part of you—a reduced part—will have the chance to serve in a common German army. And we kept this promise."56 NVA Views on Decision 5 In general, both the NVA officers and NCOs interviewed, highlighted in very positive terms the decision by the FRG that at least a segment of them would be allowed to serve in the Bundeswehr. There was, however, a range of comments, both praising and criticizing certain aspects of this decision. It is first interesting to consider some of the reasons they provided for wanting to continue to serve. The military lifestyle in general, the military culture of the Bundeswehr compared to the NVA, and economic motives all served to motivate former NVA personnel to apply for continued service in the Bundeswehr. Officers in Dresden stated that there was more order, "more lines," in the military than in the civilian world. Also the Bundeswehr's Auftragstaktik (mission-type orders) was much better than the Befehlstaktik (highly directive orders) of the NVA.57 First Lieutenant Klaus-Dieter Triebel, a former NVA major, stated he had always wanted

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to be a soldier, so it was easy to make the transition to the Bundeswehr. Economic reasons, of course, were important.58 In general, the former NVA officers were understandably very positive about the West German decision, although there were criticisms. MAJ Erhard Titze, former NVA lieutenant colonel staff officer for training in GDR's MOD, expressed criticism that the Bundeswehr released too many specialists and therefore expertise was lacking after Unification to accomplish the necessary tasks. On the other hand, he said that he was pleasantly surprised at the positive way the Bundeswehr officers treated him when they arrived in the east at Unification.59 CPT Andreas Pohl, former NVA lieutenant colonel engineer, made the same point about the Bundeswehr discharging many good leaders, suggesting that decisions were made too much in haste.60 Lower Order Personnel Decisions Once the major political issues had been resolved at the mid-July Caucasus meeting between Kohl and Gorbachev, military and civilian defense planners could flesh out the details of the Takeover. At that meeting, the overall future strength of the Bundeswehr—including the remains of the former NVA—was negotiated to be 370,000. The next question then was how many of these would be stationed in the former GDR. State Secretary Dr. Carl explained that the military recommended the figure and that he and Stoltenberg approved it.61 MG Haasler and MG Richter confirmed that the politicians never told the military how many NVA it should bring into the Bundeswehr (only that no generals would continue to serve). Haasler stated that the number 50,000 as a percentage of the figure 370,000 was roughly in line with the percentage of the population of the GDR relative to the FRG. (Note: These figures compare only very roughly.) The services then conferred and decided that a "good 40,000" soldiers would be Army; the rest would be Navy and Air Force.62 Of the 50,000, it was decided that 25,000 would be longer serving volunteers and professional soldiers, while the remaining 25,000 would be draftees.63 MG Richter explained to the NVA leadership at the final Commanders Conference on September 12, 1990, the rough breakdown of the 25,000 regulars: about 4,000 line and specialist officers, 19,000 professional and longer serving NCOs, and about 2,000 longer serving (two years) soldiers (Soldat auf Zeit-2).64 These numbers corresponded with the personnel structure of the Bundeswehr, but because the NVA had a different structure, difficulties arose. The NVA was a very "top-heavy" (kopflastig) force, with a much greater proportion of officers and sergeants aspiring to be officers compared to the Bundeswehr. This meant that the Bundeswehr could take only a small part of the officers in the NVA, a number that stood at about 25,000 on Unification Day.65 On the Bundeswehr side, a further problem which complicated the integration of personnel was that the Bundeswehr had many older professional soldiers:

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field-grade officers and senior NCOs. This constrained the number of older NVA professionals who could be incorporated.66 Initially, through MG Richter's briefing on September 12 and through a letter from GDR Defense Minister Eppelmann on September 6, but subsequently through various means, the NVA professional military and civilian personnel were informed of their options. Both Richter and Eppelmann indicated that these options flowed from the provisions of the Unification Treaty. Richter stated: "The Unification Treaty provides the answers on the duty relationship [of former NVA personnel], from the possibilities for duty termination and discharge to procedures for further services."67 In his letter Eppelmann stated: "We concerned ourselves with achieving in the Unification Treaty provisions which took into consideration the legitimate interests of the members of the NVA."68 The Phases of the Personnel Integration The management of the personnel of the NVA can be viewed in four phases. The first phase included all the discharges that took place before Unification Day, as already discussed. All generals, political officers, and soldiers over the age of fifty-five were discharged. All NVA personnel who wished to remain on active duty on Unification Day were allowed to do so. 69 The second phase ran from Unification Day (October 3) to the end of the year. During this phase, all soldiers over the age of fifty could be discharged. If they had more than twenty years of service, they had the possibility of obtaining early retirement (vorgezogener Ruhestand). Almost all soldiers over the age of fifty were retired during this period, as well as soldiers who simply were ideologically incompatible with the Bundeswehr principles.70 If a soldier found a civilian job, he could submit his discharge application on short notice.71 Retirement during this period was done in accordance with NVA regulations, that is, former NVA could count on some type of pension. Pensions, however, were not given to those former NVA who took their chances in being selected for longer service in the Bundeswehr. A former NVA officer in Dresden interviewed in 1992 indicated that he would probably not be taken as a professional officer because he was too old and therefore would receive no pension. Had he retired in December 1990, he would have received a pension of 497 DM per month in accordance with GDR regulations.72 After the Unification, a former NVA officer or NCO had three options. The first option was to leave the service. The second was to do nothing in which case he might be asked to remain for a certain length of time to perform certain tasks, normally not beyond December 31, 1991. The third option was to apply to be a special "soldier for time" or "volunteer" for two years (Soldat auf Zeit-2). There were two categories of those kept during the third phase that ran from January 1, 1991 to December 31, 1992. The first were longer serving former NVA (Weiterverwender), mostly officers, who had occupied a special position or had special qualifications. The primary tasks accomplished by these personnel

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included the removal of unneeded NVA equipment and ammunition, the deactivation of units and facilities, and the guarding of large weapons and ammunition storage sites. The vast majority of these were discharged by the end of 1991. The majority of those remaining, however, were "volunteers" serving for two years. The decision by the West to allow this option is considered to be a primary one, and therefore it is considered later at some length. This was a period of two years, roughly 1991 and 1992, when a former NVA soldier could decide whether he wished to apply for status as a professional soldier or longer serving volunteer (three to fifteen years). This trial period (Probezeit) also afforded the Bundeswehr the opportunity to examine the applicant to determine whether he was suitable for such service. The last phase, roughly from November 1992 to June 1993, involved the announcement and notification of those former NVA who had been approved as professionals or longer serving volunteers. Some sense of the numbers involved is helpful. The Advance Party reported on September 10, 1990 (three weeks before Unification) that there existed 102,820 personnel in the NVA including 32,210 officers and 19,785 NCOs. By October 10, these figures had changed to 23,900 officers and 23,764 NCOs. The number of NCOs had actually increased. By the end of June 1991, when Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command was deactivated, there were 10,646 officers and 14,960 NCOs.73 Figure 6.1 depicts the first three phases of this process for all officers of the former NVA. Approximately 25,500 NVA officers were taken over into the Bundeswehr on October 3, 1990. About 13,300 became longer serving officers, 10,500 of whom were discharged by January 1991. The remaining officers were discharged incrementally throughout 1991 as their duties were fulfilled. About 12,000 applied for the two-year temporary career duty. Of these, 6,732 were accepted, 1,600 became members of the Defense Administration, 600 became NCOs, and 4,458 were not accepted.74 Important Supplementary Personnel Subjects At this point it is necessary to examine a number of issues that flowed directly from this very fundamental decision to accept former NVA into the Bundeswehr. The uniform to be worn on Unification Day is the first. This was naturally a question laden with emotion for many Bundeswehr officers who did not want their former enemies donning the Bundeswehr uniform. These officers said: "That is our opponent, our enemy, who insulted us. He will not wear our uniform."75 Planners considered having those NVA units to be dissolved after Unification wear NVA uniforms, but with little delay the Bundeswehr leadership came to the realization that a distinction could not be made. This had to be decided very quickly, as most issues were during the late summer 1990, and MG Reinhardt argued that it was decided correctly.76 In his September 6 letter to NVA personnel, Rainer Eppelmann directed that

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Figure 6.1 Transition of NVA Officers into the German Army, October 1990 to January 1993

the Bundeswehr uniform would be worn as of October 3, 1990.77 When that day came, LTG Schonbohm was proud that all Bundeswehr soldiers—new and old—in his new command wore the olive drab field uniform, a step that he viewed as symbolically and psychologically important to help forge an all-German united Army. He wrote: "Of decisive psychological meaning was . . . that in unified Germany the soldiers of one army wore the same uniform.78 A second area is the treatment afforded former NVA female personnel. In his letter of September 6, Eppelmann indicated that female NVA in accordance with the Basic Law of the FRG could be used only in the Bundeswehr's Medical Corps and Music Corps. Therefore, the duty service of female NVA personnel was to end on September 30, 1990. If they desired, they could be transferred to a civilian sector job. 79 Only three female former NVA were interviewed, and all

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felt that females had been mistreated. They maintained that the East Germans had forgotten them in their negotiations on the Unification Treaty. Personally, they felt that they had been lucky because all had obtained secretarial jobs at the Division/Military District Command Headquarters in Neubrandenburg. Others whom they knew had not been so lucky.80 A third area is the programs established for lending assistance to those former NVA who resigned or were discharged. The Professional Advancement Service (BerufsForderungsdienst) was the agency to which former NVA could go to obtain news on retraining programs to prepare for the civilian sector. Posters were published quarterly by the Federal Defense Administration providing information on what was available. The decision to provide such programs was identified as one of the Bundeswehr's key decisions by BG Wilko Hartmann, Deputy Commanding General, Division/Military District Command VII, and COL Dietmar Klenner, G-3, Eastern Corps and Territorial Command. COL Klenner posed the issue as such: "How does the Bundeswehr organize a socially comfortable environment for those soldiers leaving the service? How does it construct socially acceptable solutions?"81 MG Richter, Commanding General, Seventh Division/MDC, placed such emphasis on it that he had a work group established to oversee its management. Many of the officers being discharged were fathers over age forty. With the economy in the east as bleak as it was, they needed all the help they could get.82 As he ended his command of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, LTG Schonbohm gave this program special praise, indicating that sixty to seventy percent of the officers being discharged were availing themselves of the service, engaging in training programs giving them professional qualifications.83 Despite the Bundeswehr's best intentions, former NVA interviewed who spoke on this program had little positive to say. One group of NCOs in Neubrandenburg criticized the training for being too short, usually no more than one week, not really "training" but refresher or enhancement training. They felt that because they were all near forty years old, they had to learn an entirely new trade. One indicated that he had been looking for a civilian job for nine months without any luck; generally the key issue was his age (fifty-one). He would leave the military with nothing but a handshake.84 LTC Wollweber, the Assistant Personnel Officer for Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, explained that participation was very low and expressed astonishment that more former NVA did not take advantage of this service.85 A fourth related subject area was the sufficiency and quality of the information that the former NVA received from the Bundeswehr. Both West and East German views on this were mixed. LTG Schonbohm clearly recognized this as a problem area, gave this subject much emphasis, but added that the individual NVA had to show some initiative in this area. Supplementing the chain of command, there were many written information sources available to the NVA if they chose to use them.86 However, several West German Army officers touched on this as a problem. Asked about mistakes made, MG Haasler suggested that

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perhaps insufficient information was given to the NVA soldiers concerning such things as pay, rank reductions, and financial assistance on being discharged. He felt this was mainly the responsibility of West German civilians who had not presented enough clear information to the NVA.87 From the NVA perspective, there was a range of views on this issue of information sufficiency. LTC Hans-Joachim Jung, former NVA lieutenant colonel translator and protocol officer, stated that it was hard to generalize. He could speak only from his experience.88 MAJ Titze stated bluntly that there was not enough information provided on what would happen to the NVA.89 There were those former NVA who had a generally positive assessment but who qualified it. In discussing the criteria established by the Bundeswehr for their ultimate takeover as professional soldiers, a former NVA NCO stated that the general ones were given but the individual weights of each criteria were not.90 A former NVA officer echoed the comment: "Yes, we have many points but how are they weighted?" For example, how would his political—meaning Stasi-connected—activities be weighted? They were all involved in such activities, he argued, and this was no secret. How the review committees would weigh these things was not made clear, he said.91 In contrast, some former NVA gave unqualified praise to the West Germans in this area. CPT Horst Reddemann, former NVA lieutenant colonel and commander of a motorized rifle regiment, stated that the information flow was constant.92 Former NVA MAJ Wensdorf asserted that the process for the integration of individual soldiers was made known and that it "was not played with hidden cards." "We knew from the beginning how the process evolved and how it could evolve for us. There was so much information that anyone who had an interest knew what was happening to him."93 CPT Pohl, former NVA lieutenant colonel engineer, characterized the Takeover as a process "which showed a great amount of work and a great amount of information." There were no contradictions. Everyone had to be instructed in the process and sign a document that they understood.94 Role of the Former NVA in the Takeover To conclude this section on this first and most fundamental decision that the FRG made in the Takeover, it is appropriate to assess the role that the former NVA played in the Takeover, from both the West and East German perspectives. Virtually all the personnel interviewed who spoke on this subject indicated the importance of the former NVA in the process of the German Army Takeover. Noting that there were no mutinies or crimes, MG Haasler was able to state in March 1991, that "the mass of former NVA officers had behaved in a loyal and cooperative fashion. Without this an almost frictionless transition on October 3 would not have been possible."95 LTC Giinter Weblus stated that they "showed a very high readiness to bring themselves in and to cooperate positively." "The numskulls [Betonkopfe] were already gone." The ones that remained after Octo-

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ber 3 were not Communist ideologues; they were above all "soldiers." They wanted to remain in the Bundeswehr and had a very positive attitude.96 LTG von Scheven maintained that former NVA came to the Bundeswehr not simply for survival. While noting their shortcomings, he stated that many of them enjoyed the military profession and showed a notable readiness to engage and develop themselves and also showed a strong duty consciousness.97 Three German Army logistics officers all asserted the same point about the vital role that the former NVA played in the material/equipment area. The former NVA were deeply involved with the process of inventorying, processing, and disposing of the former NVA equipment. The German Army needed them for such things as the servicing and maintenance of NVA equipment, the safety evaluations conducted on the equipment, and the disposition of the huge amounts of NVA ammunition. The West German Army personnel simply did not have the technical expertise on the NVA systems.98 Not surprisingly, numerous former NVA asserted the same view of their very important role in the Takeover. They knew the equipment, the material, the communications systems, not only of the NVA but also of the border troops and the state security forces. Moreover, the Bundeswehr had no established communications with the East German civilian sector or the Soviets. CPT Roald Biedermann, former NVA captain and traffic management specialist, summarized the situation. The NVA had to be dissolved, and they knew the NVA. The new German Army had to be built. With whom? The former NVA. Finally, they were needed to handle the departure of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, an area in which many problems surfaced. The former NVA knew the Soviet mentality, the important points of contact, and had no fears of interaction with them (Beriihrungsangste).99 Former NVA LTC Herbert Konig highlighted the many capabilities that the former NVA brought with them. Their service in the NVA demanded high achievement, an ability to perform and duty consciousness. The NVA had brought with them solid professional ability and had practiced leadership in battle and traditional military affairs. He also underlined their general military bearing and attitude toward the military profession.100 All these positive military assets they brought to the Bundeswehr. Writing over eighteen months after the integration of NVA personnel, LTC Konig maintained that the predominant view of the integration and the NVA's work was positive and highlighted their industriousness, duty consciousness, and ability.101 BG Hartmann underlined the special role of the eastern draftees. Indicating that the Bundeswehr was ahead of other sectors of society in promoting unity, he underlined the important role that the draftee from the former GDR had in this process. The Bundeswehr was taking these young people and showing them the values of the West, such things as initiative, responsibility, and readiness to take risks. The draftee was therefore a catalyst for unity in German society.102 The important role of the longer serving former NVA (Weiterverwendere) was also stressed by the German Army officers. These were generally older,

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higher ranking, field-grade officers who had specialized skills needed by the German Army in the Takeover. They continued on active duty until discharged some time in 1991. LTG von Scheven praised their full participation "in the successful conduct of [the] complex tasks under very difficult conditions."103 COL Wolfgang Gulich, Commander of Home Defense Brigade 37 in Dresden, explained that it was a good decision to keep these former NVA as Weiterverwendere but psychologically difficult. These people had to dissolve units that had been their homes for thirty years. Nonetheless, he said, they were very obedient and disciplined. "I can only speak with great respect about how they fulfilled their tasks." He continued by regretting the treatment they received. For the most part, they were discharged by the end of 1991 and received nothing, not even the authorization to bear a retired rank. They received no recognition of their service before or after Unification, not even a certificate or document (Urkunde), something normally done for Bundeswehr soldiers. He lamented: "I have a bad feeling about how we have discharged them. Very bureaucratic. Not with much finesse" (Fingerspitzengefuhl).10* DECISION 6: TWO-YEAR TRIAL PERIOD Made also at the political level, the second important decision provided the next step for those NVA who wished to remain in the Bundeswehr after the end of 1990: They could apply for a special status of "soldier on time—two years" (Soldat auf Zeit-2) (longer term volunteer—two years) and during this two-year trial period (Probezeit), apply to become subsequently a longer term volunteer (three to fifteen years), or a professional soldier.105 The Two-Year Trial Period The top West German negotiator for the Defense Section of the Unification Treaty, State Secretary Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl, took credit for this decision—specifically, its two year duration—stating that the military leaders raised no objections.106 This decision was written into the Treaty, whose provisions MG Richter referenced in his briefing at the final NVA Commander's Conference on September 12, 1990. He indicated that beginning on Unification Day former NVA could apply for Soldat auf Zeit-2 (SaZ-2) status and that decisions on their applications could be expected within six months. Decisions on applications to be professional or longer term volunteers beyond this two-year trial period would be made over the succeeding two years.107 The Personnel Department of MOD explained the policy and procedures in its "Guidelines" of September 17, 1990. In accordance with the Unification Treaty Section 8, Paragraph 1, a former NVA could apply to be an SaZ-2. Only in this status could he later apply to be a longer term volunteer or professional soldier. Several important stipulations were identified. Need: The possibilities for service depended on the "personnel structural needs of the Bundeswehr and

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the available planned and budgeted spaces." Second, age limits existed. Third, assignments, with some exceptions, would be in the former GDR. Fourth, selection criteria included suitability, capability, and performance (Eignung, Befdhigung, und Leistung). Priority would be given to applicants who would come into consideration for service beyond the two-year trial period.108 "Personal suitability" included German citizenship. The applicant also "had to guarantee that he at all times stood for the free democratic basic order prescribed in the Basic Law and had the character, and mental and physical suitability which is necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks of the soldier." Governing "military suitability" was the foreseeable use of the individual in the Bundeswehr, not such things as the rank an applicant had in the NVA. 109 Section 7 of the Treaty identified grounds for rejection: crimes against the principles of humanity and activity for the state security agency (Stasi).110 The first decisions on SaZ-2 applications were made early in 1991 to fill pressing needs for leadership personnel for the dissolution of former NVA units and for specialists on technical systems. LTG Schonbohm made an initial decision on about 2,000 applicants, which brought a much needed measure of stability into the situation.111 Officer applications were reviewed by the Personnel Department in the MOD whereas NCO applicants were reviewed by the Army Enlisted Personnel Office (Stammdienststelle des Heeres), both of which had field agencies in Strausberg outside of Berlin. BG von Kirchbach indicated that the system allowed for commanders to bring some influence to bear on the acceptance process.112 It was decided to overfill units by about one third, a decision that LTG Schonbohm had recommended to Defense Minister Stoltenberg. In addition to the social stability this effected, it was also wise on a purely military-organizational level as there was plenty of work for these extra personnel. Any extra time they had, could be used if desired to explore job opportunities in the civilian sector. 113 BG von Kirchbach indicated that LTG Schonbohm also did not want any differentiation between SaZ-2 applicants, for example, that one group would solely guard equipment while others trained. This was in line with the principle of even-handedness and fairness.114 By April 1991, some 8,000 applicants had been accepted, while some 9,000 were rejected primarily because the Bundeswehr had no spaces for them.115 In March 1991, MG Haasler provided the following details on Division/Military District Command VIII, one of the two divisions organized in the east. About 56 percent of the approximate 4,500 former NVA officers remaining in service on October 3 in his unit applied for SaZ-2. As of March 1991, 1,436 had been approved, a little more than half of those who applied. About 2,850 NCOs had submitted applications, about 55 percent of the total.116 In October 1991, LTG von Scheven, the Commander of Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, reported the following personnel figures: 26,200 enlisted men, 9,100 NCOs (of which 7,859 were former NVA, 1,358 were "further serving" NVA [Weiterverwender] and 7,500 two-year volunteers), 5,818 officers (of

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which 4,931 were former NVA, 1,839 "further serving" officers, and 4,042 twoyear volunteers), and 13,665 defense civilians. Personnel transferred from west to east included 887 officers and 1,252 NCOs. 117 LTG Schonbohm provided the following statistics for the Army as of the end of 1,991: 4,031 officers, 5,144 senior NCOs, and 2,371 junior NCOs were taken as SaZ-2. These actual figures stood in contrast to actual requirements: 2,671 officers, 5,988 senior NCOs and 5,019 junior NCOs. 118 Views of West Germans West German officers interviewed spoke generally in positive terms about the decision to accept a portion of the NVA for two years. LTG Schonbohm maintained it was the correct decision, indicating that in two to three years the economic situation in the east would improve. Former NVA could avail themselves of the training afforded by the Professional Advancement Service established to prepare them for the civilian sector. These factors would help those not accepted into professional service to find jobs in the civilian economy.119 COL Friedrich von Senden, Commander of Home Defense Brigade 42 in Potsdam, explained that it served to accomplish the dissolution of the NVA and allowed time to evaluate individual former NVA. He also added that it afforded the former NVA a breathing space during which they could search for jobs if they did not believe they would continue in the Bundeswehr.120 Views of Former NVA Understandably, many of the former NVA interviewed highlighted this as a key decision and had for the most part positive comments regarding it. Several groups of officers and NCOs in Potsdam and Leipzig had unqualified praise for the decision. One said the two years was "a chance," whereas another expressed that it allowed them to see whether they wanted to remain in the Bundeswehr. It served also as a kind of transition period to see how the economy in the east developed, an economy that at that time (June 1992) was doing very poorly.121 CPT Horst Reddemann underlined this decision as the most important made by the West Germans. He added: Had the tables been turned, I am convinced that no officer of the Bundeswehr would have been taken over into the NVA. . . . This is because they are all capitalistic officers who had only one thing in mind—the destruction of socialism. He [the West German officer] was an officer of a malicious (bosartig), capitalistic army of aggression. He was incapable of playing a role in the construction of socialism. This would have been the mindset of the [GDR] state.122 One former NVA officer in Home Defense Brigade 42 (Potsdam) did offer criticism of the process, asserting that the individual decisions on whom to take over as SaZ-2 were done too much by computer. Consequently, the Bundeswehr

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had lost many good specialists who could have helped in the inventory and disposal of equipment.123 Final Integration as Professional Soldiers The second dimension of Decision 6 was to allow former NVA, taken as two-year volunteers (SaZ-2), to apply further to become longer term volunteers (three to fifteen years) or professional soldiers. As with the first dimension of this decision, numerous interviewees—both from the east and west—highlighted this decision as critical. First, the steps in the process are described, and then the relevant data. After a former NVA had been accepted as an SaZ-2, he could apply for further service and hope to become a regular member of the Bundeswehr. Applications were submitted in the last quarter of 1991. In February and March 1992, a written performance evaluation was prepared on each SaZ-2 by his leaders and submitted through channels to Bonn. Between April and August 1992, these applications were reviewed in Bonn by personnel offices, the Gauck Commission (Gauck Behorde), the Military Counterintelligence Service (Militdrische Abschirmdienst), and the Independent Committee for Fitness Review (Unabhdngige Ausschufi Eignungsprufung). Finally, the applicant had to undergo a medical examination. The announcement of decisions on the applications began in the fall of 1992. Rejected applicants were discharged from the Army between November 1992 and June 1993. MG Richter described this entire process as one that sought to ensure that former NVA taken over for longer service were fit in terms of character and intellect and that they had shown that they wanted to be and could be officers and NCOs in a democratic army. Finally, the process was to ensure that appropriate security checks were completed.124 The written evaluation was the only part of this process that took part in the individual units. It consisted of an evaluation (Beurteilung) and a career evaluation (Laufbahnbeurteilung), the normal reports used in the performance evaluation system of the German Army. In that system, an officer or NCO must be counseled yearly and a written report must be prepared every two years. As part of the evaluation process for each former NVA applicant, he had to be counseled by his military supervisor and be given a chance to comment on the written reports prepared on him. The former NVA did not expect such a procedure as nothing like this occurred in the NVA. 125 The criteria that the officers used in evaluating the former NVA were made clear by Bonn. These, of course, could not be exactly the same ones used to evaluate Bundeswehr officers. First was the assessment of his character; second was his potential. One had to look beyond and see the individual's capability for development. Finally was performance, designated as third priority because some former NVA had the luck to obtain positions during the two-year trial period better than others. In the first written document prepared, the integrity of the

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individual was judged, including character, technical competence, intelligence, and potential. In the second career evaluation form, the evaluator recommended possible future jobs for the individual. The same forms were used for both officers and NCOs. 126 The requirement to prepare a performance report (Beurteilung) on every former NVA engaged in the trial period weighed heavily on the German Army officers, time wise as well as psychologically. Spending about thirty minutes with each applicant, LTG von Scheven indicated that he had to prepare about one hundred fifty reports in February and March 1992, and that this was one of the most stressful things he had ever done. His Chief of Staff had to prepare some two hundred fifty comments. BG Hartmann, the Assistant Division Commander for Division/Military District Command VII, stated that he had more than two hundred forty comments to write. Hardly anything else of significance could be done by these officers during this time frame. He viewed the preparation of these reports as a step in building faith with the former NVA, and as an attempt to fulfill the FRG's pledge to give each individual a "fair chance."127 LTC Herbert Danzer pointed out that once the performance evaluation was done, the leaders of an applicant had very little control over who was retained. The matter then switched to Bonn with the Personnel Office and other agencies involved.128 A total of 8,280 special evaluations were prepared on former NVA officers and NCOs in all branches of service. The results of the performance evaluations for former NVA Army officers were as follows: 81.6 percent of the applicants were endorsed without qualification, 11.1 percent were endorsed with qualifications, and 7.3 percent were not endorsed.129 In November 1992, the Personnel Office of the MOD announced the results of its review of applications. It listed the Takeover quotas that had been established: 1150 professional line officers, 700 officer volunteers, and 600 officer specialists. These were approximate figures that represented ceilings. The Personnel Office indicated: "The issue was not to achieve these numbers, but rather to take over the qualified officers."130 A total of 2,507 former NVA officers were accepted into the Bundeswehr as professional or longer term volunteers. Concerning line officers, 2,380 of the 2,812 SaZ-2 line officers applied to be longer serving SaZ or professional officers. Of these 1,067 were taken as professional officers and 1,193, about one half, were not. Of the latter, 576 were made longer serving volunteers. Twentythree were switched to become officer specialists (MilitdrfachDienst). From the 928 former NVA officer-specialists who applied for professional status, 864 were accepted as professional officers.131 Once the file left the Personnel Office, the assessment of the applicant's quality on a purely military level had been essentially concluded. Beyond this office, however, there were other "gates" through which the application had to pass. The German Army clearly did not want to take over into a professional status any individuals who had been involved with state security activities.

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Shortly after Unification, the former NVA remaining in service had to complete a questionnaire indicating whether they had any connection with the Stasi—the GDR state security organization. (An individual who had worked indirectly for Stasi was called an IM [Informelle Mitarbeiter] or informal co-worker. Some 10 percent of the personnel in any regiment were informal co-workers.132) This was checked by the Gauck Commission, which at Unification took control of all Stasi files from the former GDR. If it was found that the applicant had lied, the application for professional status was rejected. A similar security check was conducted by the Military Counterintelligence Service.133 In addition to a medical evaluation, the final step for all officer applicants for professional status (not longer term volunteer status) consisted of a review by the Independent Fitness Review Committee, which began its work on June 30, 1992. On a selective basis, it also interviewed applicants to evaluate their suitability for further service. Prescribed in the Unification Treaty, this committee was chaired by Agnes Hiirland-Blining, Bundestag Representative, and was comprised of fifteen individuals from various professions including retired military officers, politicians and clergy from across Germany. In each of the applications it reviewed, it had the benefit of the military evaluations and results of the security checks. With its focus on suitability of the officer for service in the armed forces of the democratic FRG, it looked for evidence that the applicant could continue to serve effectively. In its interviews it asked such questions as: "What were your motives for entering the NVA?" "Did you ever consider why membership in the East German Communist Party was required for essentially all professional officers?" "Did it ever occur to you that the actual economic situation in GDR was entirely different than as portrayed by the Communist Party?"134 As of early 1993, the Committee had reviewed 1,967 applications, had made decisions on 1,525 based on a review of files, and had conducted 442 interviews. It had voted approval of 1,949 and rejected only 18. By law it was required that an applicant be notified of the decision no later than two months before the end of his two-year trial period.135 As of February 25, 1993, the Committee had rejected about 30 applicants, including 16 army applicants. Also by this date, the Gauck Commission had rejected (red-flagged) 498 applicants (all-service) whereas the Counterintelligence Service had rejected 213. 136 This entire personnel melting-down process, culminating in the integration of selected former NVA personnel into the German Army, was completed in the spring of 1993, when the final SaZ-2 were discharged. Another key step occurred on April 1, 1993 when the first former NVA officers—230 of them—were given assignments in the western part of Germany, the beginning of the mixing of all staffs the troop units, something which LTG von Scheven considered "extraordinarily important."137 Referring to former NVA officers being brought into the Bundeswehr, BG Hartmann was very upbeat and stated that they were bringing in "fresh blood," a new understanding of basic democratic values. Up to the age of thirty, former NVA could be very good, he added, and noted

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that many were first in their courses of instruction, something that increased the overall motivation and positive competition in the east.138 Former NVA had generally positive things to say about the procedures that the FRG used to select professional and longer term volunteers, acknowledging that it was an understandably stressful period for former NVA. MAJ Wensdorf believed that the procedures and criteria for selection were clear: fitness, needs of the armed forces, and written evaluation. Under fitness were included qualifications, age, health, and loyalty. Every former NVA had to have a written evaluation and be counseled on it. He then had the opportunity to write something if he so chose.139 In a critical vein, 1LT Hans-Walter Matthies regretted that the written evaluation did not carry more weight in the decision process on the individual applicant.140 Shortage of Quality NCOs It is fitting here to address an area that repeatedly surfaced in discussions with West German officers—the shortage of quality NCOs in the ranks of the former NVA taken over as SaZ-2. COL Dietmar Klenner identified this as the first problem with the Takeover. This was a significant problem because the German Army placed great emphasis on leading from the front: "The leader in front is very important." He also explained that the team leader (Gruppenfuhrer) was the immediate leader of the draftee and, therefore, made a very deep impression for the entire German Army. These small unit leaders were important for stability, order, and security at the platoon, company, and battalion level, all of which were desired so that soldiers could look to the future with a sense of surety. When one had poor leaders in the front, it affected the psychological mood (Inneres Gefuge) and spirit of the unit.141 On the same subject, BG Wilko Hartmann added that the problem was aggravated by the requirement for the Army to reduce its size, something that intensified the need for high-quality NCOs. 142 MG Richter stated bluntly: "There was no genuine NCO Corps in the NVA." NVA NCOs were really just specialists, not leaders and trainers as in the German Army. A genuine NCO Corps had to be created by the German Army with great difficulty, a process BG Hartmann believed would take three to five years. 143 LTG von Scheven explained that actually there existed more spaces than qualified former NVA NCO applicants. NCOs in the NVA had few genuine leadership qualities and were a minority, while in the German Army they were a majority, a situation that had led to a quality gap. The problem was initially treated by transferring NCOs from the west to the east, a program started in December 1991, with about 850 NCOs. 144 As he left command in June 1991, LTG Schonbohm sought a greater proportion of senior NCOs from the west to be transferred to the east to help correct this problem.145 To address this need, the German Army by the end of 1991 had obtained almost 1,200 NCOs from the west volunteering for service in the east.146

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A Time of Uncertainty

The entire two-year trial period, especially the last three quarters of 1992, represented an understandably uncertain time for former NVA seeking long-term positions in the German Army, a subject that surfaced repeatedly in the interviews of Germans from both east and west (conducted primarily in June 1992). The former NVA spoke about the great uncertainty, the uneasiness, the various checks and procedures that could disqualify them, and the hope that they would make it through.147 It was not only uncertainty about their future but also their unfamiliarity with Bundeswehr regulations and legal and administrative rules that magnified this uneasiness.148 One officer in Dresden explained that, on the one hand, one had to learn many new things in the German Army. However, because one was not yet assured a long-term position, one could not concentrate fully on this. Job opportunities outside the Army also had to be explored, and this was a whole new world.149 A number of them also revealed that they felt like second-class soldiers in the new Bundeswehr. LTG Schonbohm drew attention to this at a Bundeswehr Commanders Conference in March 1991 in saying, "Especially because of the different financial regulations [governing pay and allowances between soldiers of east and west] the soldiers of Bundeswehr East feel frequently like second-class soldiers."150 As the two-year trial period wore on, with two or three of them occupying the same duty position, former NVA felt increased tension and continued to ask the decisive question: "What will happen?" (Wie wird es weitergehen).151 Something that aggravated this uncertainty of former NVA officers was the different treatment that eastern conscripts showed them compared to western officers. BG von Kirchbach related a story of how eastern soldiers demanding "to talk to a 'superior West' because they had confidence in his understanding and his influence" to address their problems.152 Many West German Army officers noted this problem of uncertainty and looked forward to the time when the Takeover decisions would be announced.153 Morale would improve and the leadership climate would be much better. "The citizen in the new federal states battles time with priority to questions of survival of his family," said COL Dietmar Klenner. The prices for gas, heat, and groceries had risen but income had not. The former NVA peered continuously into the civilian sector and saw economic uncertainly. Subjects like security policy, military strategy, and operational-level issues played only a subordinate role to them.154 LTC Wollweber stated the pressure on former NVA was great; they felt like they were being watched every minute. Once these personnel decisions were made, then the real integration could begin.155 Commander Joachim Schulze, Deputy Commander of Military Region Command 84 in Potsdam and one of the few Navy personnel interviewed, suggested that perhaps the Bundeswehr had made its security threshold too high. After all, the seventeen million people of the former GDR were hunters and the hunted. Can

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one really judge these people, he asked, as it was their way of life? Even the Prime Minister of Brandenburg had been implicated with the Stasi.156 The final completion of all these individual personnel decisions brought with it a great sense of relief. LTG von Scheven noted: "It is a freeing feeling for all [former NVA] officers that now they are incorporated into the normal personnel management system and career paths and have lost there special status [in the two-year trial period]."157 DECISION 7: RANK REDUCTION The third critical decision made in the area of personnel management and administration was to reduce former NVA in grade on being accepted as volunteers for two years (SaZ-2), in accordance with the grade structure of the Bundeswehr. This decision was made by the Personnel Office of MOD with the agreement of the services. Although not at all controversial on the West German side, former NVA were understandably critical.158 The basis for the decision is found in the differences in rank and age structure, training, and activities between the Bundeswehr and the NVA, factors that MG Richter explained to the NVA leaders at the final NVA Commander's Conference. In the Bundeswehr, there is a relationship between the nature of the tasks and responsibilities of a position, on the one hand, and the rank associated with it, on the other. Also, a position must be established in a table of organization that exists within the government budget. In principle, an officer with a certain rank cannot occupy a position that calls for an officer of lower rank. There are clearly fewer officers, especially staff officers, in the Bundeswehr than there were in the NVA. 159 Rank in the NVA was determined primarily by time in service, not necessarily by qualifications. Also, one could be promoted very rapidly as evidenced by the many officers in the NVA who were young relative to their Bundeswehr counterparts. There were, for example, lieutenant colonel regimental commanders in the NVA who were thirty-two years old. Werner AblaB pointed out that in the NVA "when an officer had the right party mark of distinction [Abzeichen], he could be a general at 38." 160 An officer of this age in the Bundeswehr was normally a captain company commander. Certain positions, occupied by lieutenant colonels in the NVA, were filled by senior NCOs in the Bundeswehr. COL Wolfgang Gulich stated that all former NVA officers in his brigade were reduced in rank at least one and maybe two grades. He indicated that this was difficult for former NVA but that they had come to accept it after going to German Army schools and units in the west and seeing the qualifications of comparable officers. 161 LTG von Scheven explained that as a whole, the former NVA could be reduced in rank one, two, or three rar *:s to adapt them to the rank structure and assignment positions (Verwendungsaufbau) of the Bundeswehr. He noted that this policy was also part of the "fair chance," in this case a fair chance for the

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soldiers of the "old German Army" so that they could not accuse the former NVA of having a rank simply because they had achieved it in the NVA. 162 West German officers uniformly saw this as a necessary and correct decision.163 NVA Views on Decision 7 The opinions on this decision among the former NVA were about evenly split between those who understood and accepted it, and those who criticized it. A good number indicated that they did not like the decision perhaps because it was difficult psychologically but accepted it as necessary.164 An NCO in Neubrandenburg explained that he had accepted his reduction because he realized that NCOs of his reduced rank in the Bundeswehr were his age. A second added that the reductions were justified because "the training of a Bundeswehr NCO is much greater than in the NVA." After a certain point, an NCO in the NVA underwent relatively few training courses; he then obtained his increased qualifications through on-the-job training.165 Finally, an officer in Dresden stated: "I don't know how one could have done it differently."166 There were also criticisms. Having been downgraded two levels, one NCO indicated that he had counted on the reduction but not the extent of it. 167 An officer who had been reduced three levels stated that the criteria for the reductions were not clear.168 Several NCOs and officers in Leipzig referred to the differences in the promotion systems of the two militaries, that in the NVA one could stay in the same position and receive promotions, but in the Bundeswehr it was related to the funds appropriated by the Bundestag. Because there was not enough money, the former NVA had to accept reductions. This was a bad decision and had been done in too general a fashion.169 MAJ Seppelt and 1LT Hans-Walter Matthies, former NVA lieutenant colonels, addressed the differences in the leadership systems. The Bundeswehr used Auftragstaktik whereas the NVA employed Befehlstaktik. In the Bundeswehr, the commanders were outstanding individuals in comparison to staff officers or officer specialists. This was not the case in the NVA. The staff officer, for example, in the NVA had more rights and power than in the Bundeswehr, especially at the battalion level. First Lieutenant Matthies also perceived differences between staff officers and officer specialists in the Bundeswehr in which there were distinctions made, for example, concerning who could perform certain tasks or attend certain lectures. MAJ Seppelt said: "The Bundeswehr misunderstood [all] this at the beginning." It made the reductions purely on the basis of money.170 Pay Differences Two issues related to this decision deserve attention at this point: the payment of former NVA and the decision that their previous service in the NVA would not count for pay purposes while on active duty.171 Concerning the former, the fundamental principle was stated in the Unification Treaty: that the

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same rules would apply to the NVA as to other civil servants. This meant that the former NVA, once accepted as volunteers for two years in a certain pay grade, would receive only 60 percent of pay received by their western counterpart with the same pay grade, a figure connected to the lower labor costs and lower productivity in the general economy of the east. Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl indicated that he made this decision with State Secretary Kartersted of the Interior Ministry. Dr. Carl, Werner AblaB (his East German counterpart), and several German Army officers indicated that the critical factor in this decision was psychological: to ensure equal treatment of all former East Germans. As has been discussed, the NVA was viewed as privileged by the East German population. By not treating them in accordance with rules established for East German civil servants, it would have appeared that this privileged status was being perpetuated. AblaB stated that everyone would be treated equally; all would receive 60 percent of the pay of the West Germans, even him.172 This was explained to the former NVA as early as September 12, 1990, by MG Richter at the last Commander's Conference. "The professional and longerterm volunteer soldiers are handled in accordance with the Unification Treaty exactly like all other citizens, who served in the civil service of the GDR. It cannot be any other way if one group is not to be treated better of worse than another."173 Concerning draftees, it had already been decided that there should be no differences in treatment of draftees enlisted from both east and west. Therefore, this pay differential did not apply to draftees. A draftee from the east after Unification received the same pay, with some differences in compensation in special cases. 174 The pay differential was not a controversial issue among the West German officers; however, they did note that it provoked problems. BG Wittenberg noted that this meant in the eyes of the former NVA unequal pay for equal work. The platoon leader from the west who was transferred to the east for the first few years after Unification received almost double the pay (including allowances) of the former NVA platoon leader who might be leading the next platoon.175 At various social events, such as an "Officer's Call" (Herrenabend), the pay differential raised the issue of the appropriate fees for eastern and western officers. First Lieutenant Korn explained that former NVA were split on this issue. Some, who wanted the pay differential considered, said that they should not have to pay the same as the western soldiers, whereas others wanted no distinctions drawn.176 BG Hartmann indicated that the decision also hindered a speedier integration of the two armies from the standpoint that it meant that the former NVA who happened to obtain a special assignment in the west did not really receive enough money to live there. 177 Finally, COL Gulich held that there were many mistakes in this area because the civilian authorities responsible for pay were slow in establishing themselves.178 Over time, this pay differential was closed as the pay scales of former NVA were raised incrementally to match westerners. In December 1992, easterners re-

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ceived about 74 percent of the pay of the westerners; in July 1993, they received about 80 percent.179 Comments by former NVA confirmed much of what had been said by the West German officers. Overall, former NVA had mixed comments on this subject. CPT Reddeman highlighted this as one of the mistakes made by the Bundeswehr, describing it as "a large minus, . . . an injustice." He did the same work as the Bundeswehr major who sat at the same table. 180 An officer in Dresden stated that there was a lack of clarity on this issue.181 SSG Dirk Rudolph in Potsdam stated it was a bad decision and added that the German Army did not really examine and use well the talents of the former NVA personnel.182 NCOs in Neubrandenburg and Leipzig gave the decision mixed reviews. One said he had two children and was still waiting to see how things would work out. Overall, he had no great problem with the decision, but he thought it did seem unfair that the West Germans received more pay and allowances. A second NCO said he had mixed feelings but was basically satisfied.183 He understood, but still found it hard to accept the decision. He was reduced in rank and earned less than an NCO from the west who worked under his supervision. "For these two years one can say okay, fine. Trial period. We are trained; reduced in rank. But actually with the decision for Takeover as professional soldier or not, there can be only one army. One federal army."184 There were also officers and NCOs who were quite positive about the decision. MAJ Wolfgang Leesing and CPT Ingolf both recognized that this was done for all government employees.185 It would have been great if they received the same pay, said Commander Hans-Joachim Wichert but he understood the background and had no problem with it. Parity would come soon, and he noted that in other segments of society things progressed much more slowly.186 An officer in Leipzig recognized that in fairness former NVA could not earn more than former GDR civil servants.187 Finally, several NCOs in Potsdam indicated that they had no complaints especially when they looked into the civilian sector. SGT Torsten Scherzer stated that he earned more now than he did in the NVA and that he had sustained no reduction in rank at all. 188 Previous Service of the Former NVA Another subject that deserves brief treatment is the decision not to count the previous service of NVA personnel for pay purposes while on active duty in the Bundeswehr but rather only for retirement pay. Several West German officers spoke of this decision with some unease. LTC Herbert Danzer believed that it would be overturned because there seemed to be inconsistency in treatment with other civil servants.189 First Lieutenant Korn felt it was a bad decision, made for purely financial reasons.190 The several former NVA who raised this subject were uniformly critical of it. MAJ Wolfgang Leesing regretted this decision which seemed to say that all their years in the NVA counted for nothing.191 An officer in Dresden told about a

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woman who had worked for the state insurance system in the GDR. His voice cracking, he said, "I have served for years in the NVA with much sacrifice. If I am now discharged, I receive no settlement money [Abfindung]. [I am on] the street. But she receives a lump-sum settlement of 30,000 DM." He also noted that former Stasi agents had jobs all over the west now and had received a money settlement. Asked what he thought would account for this, he said that he was too near the "system"—every officer had been a member of the Communist Party. In further describing the apparent discrimination against former NVA, he stated that the federal state of Saxony had decided not to permit any former NVA to be employed in civil service.192 DECISION 8: NO TRANSFER OF NVA TRADITION In this area of personnel management and administration, the final decision examined is the one by the MOD not to allow any NVA tradition to be taken over into the Bundeswehr.193 Shortly after Unification, Dr. Stoltenberg explained that "Unity assumed reconciliation" [Einheit setzt Versohnung vorraus]. Reconciliation does not mean to simply gloss over the problems stemming from the different traditions of the German armed forces in the east and west. The task is to work together on these in a convincing manner [uberzeugend]."^9* Tradition in the NVA has been described as adhering to: the view of the East German Communist Party in its historical role in the revolutionary struggle of the German working class under the leadership of its revolutionary party. Correspondingly the NVA and the Border Troops should be "those who continue the revolutionary and progressive traditions and those bearers of the socialistic military tradition."195 The decision not to allow the transfer of any NVA traditions had its roots in State Secretary Karl-Heinz Carl's decision that on October 3, 1990, the identity of NVA would vanish: "On October 3, one Bundeswehr."196 BG Andreas Wittenberg added that at the end of September 1990, Admiral Wellershof, the Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, indicated that NVA traditions would not be perpetuated. "The NVA is history," said Wittenberg, explaining the psychological and ideological rationale. The former NVA would be able to look back at the NVA and recognize that there was a better way, "a way that honors human dignity." He indicated that they had already realized: "We have been deceived by the leadership of the GDR."197 The issue of a valid tradition for the Bundeswehr itself has been, since the Bundeswehr's establishment, a contentious one, as discussed elsewhere. It was to be expected that Bundeswehr leaders would take a very close and critical look at the assimilation of any traditions of an Army that, although composed of ethnic brothers, was based on a fundamentally opposed belief system, one that did not—at least in Bundeswehr eyes—respect human dignity. It is not surprising then that as the founders of the Bundeswehr realized in the 1950's that a fiinda-

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mental break with the past was necessary, so too a categorical break with the past was also imperative for former NVA, a break in part embodied in this decision on tradition. It was this psychological-ideological factor that most explains this decision. MG Klaus Reinhardt amplified on an organizational decision flowing from the basic decision on tradition. Two thirds of the NVA units were completely disbanded in the first three months after Unification. Bundeswehr military leaders did not want any NVA units to come to the Bundeswehr intact because of this goal of avoiding any transfer of tradition.198 Dr. Carl expressed it as: The basic consideration was that no single former NVA unit would be taken over, rather all should be dissolved first over different time axes. We succeeded and this was a prerequisite for not allowing any wrong traditions from the NVA to come to the new Bundeswehr in the newly joined section of Germany.199 First Lieutenant Dietmar Korn expanded on the rationale for the decision. First, on a military-organizational level, the German Army was moving to AS 5 and the former qualifications of the individual—presumably reflected by the badges on his uniform—might not be needed. Second, and more significantly, the NVA possessed a totally different value system, a different ideology. "It was a totally contrary ideology. He cannot walk around wearing these badges." German Army regulations dictated that badges could be worn. Former NVA could apply to wear a certain badge, as he himself had applied to wear US Army marksmanship badges. For example, if a former NVA had an East German parachutist badge, he would be able to wear the German Army badge after a brief training period.200 The specifics for the implementation of this decision were detailed by a Joint Staff directive on September 25, 1990. This explained that with the takeover of command authority by MOD on October 3, 1990, all regulations, decrees, and directives of the FRG would now apply to the joined area. In the takeover of the units on October 3, no GDR or NVA flags would be hoisted or lowered. All NVA unit colors and documents were to be sent to the Military History Museum in Dresden. As directed in the order of the MDD (GDR), the national markings and names of the military equipment were to be removed by October 2, and they were to be marked "Bundeswehr." All GDR, NVA, or Warsaw Pact medals and awards were not to be worn or displayed.201 On the NVA side the basics of these changes had been disseminated to the NVA four days prior to Unification by the MDD in Command Number 48/90. It directed that all unit colors, streamers (Fahnenschleifen), orders of the day, documents that conferred names of facilities and garrison signs were to be sent to the Military History Museum in Dresden by October 20. Nationality markings and names were to be removed from equipment, buildings and facilities by October 2. 202 Although understanding and compassion were shown for the desire of the former NVA for a sense of identity, there were no strong voices among the

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West German military against this decision. After the NVA engaged in its military reform process as part of the revolution in the GDR in 1989/90, MAJ HansJoachim Reeb praised the distance that the NVA had come in democratizing itself. Noting that great differences would remain in how the Bundeswehr and NVA understood tradition, Reeb stated that for an understanding in a common German Army, the emphasis now had to be on illuminating the historical role of the NVA and its professional cadre. He did not endorse, however, the takeover of any NVA traditions.203 On the NVA side, the several who surfaced this issue were uniformly critical and indicated that this was a poor decision.204 A "FAIR CHANCE" These then were the major issues and subject areas concerning personnel and administrative matters. There is one final issue within this area that was an object of this study. Did the NVA in fact receive a "fair chance," as they were promised by the FRG? This goal had its origins in the Unification Treaty. Referring to the many special regulations on soldier's rights prepared for the Unification, information sheets prepared by the MOD stated that "they give the people, who with the joining of the current GDR will be transferred to the MOD area of jurisdiction, a fair chance to show their fitness for the military profession in a democracy or for civil service in the Bundeswehr."1^ MG Richter expressed the point at the NVA Commander's Conference on September 12, 1990: "Something fundamental: The Unification Treaty as well as the leadership of the Bundeswehr pursue the goal of treating all soldiers fairly and justly." 206 LTG Jorg Schonbohm also underlined this point in asserting: "we know: we can only grow together, if everyone receives a fair chance."207 Many of the West German military leaders referred to this concept and goal, and all said that it was indeed offered. When asked about the most important decisions made in the Takeover, LTG von Scheven highlighted first this decision by the MOD. He described it more as a program than a single decision, a program including many of the issues and subjects addressed in this chapter. He gave special emphasis to the performance evaluations completed from February through March 1992, on all former NVA accepted as two-year volunteers as a measure that he believed helped fulfill that pledge. He also highlighted the fact that more former NVA professional soldiers were accepted into service then were needed.208 A large majority of those former NVA interviewed on this question believed that they had received a fair chance. In noting this, State Secretary AblaB referred to the number of officers taken over as SaZ-2 and their chances at that time (June 1992) for becoming professional officers or longer term volunteers, concluding that former NVA had received this fair chance.209 The majority of former NVA officers and NCOs interviewed agreed,210 only three said they had

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not,211 and several had mixed feelings on the subject or simply did not know. An officer in Home Defense Brigade 42 stated that he did not think a fair chance was given for becoming an SaZ-2; however, if this gate was passed, then one did have a fair chance.212 MAJ Seppelt said that, yes, there was a written evaluation done that one could see, but there were also other factors involved over which the NVA had no control: Bundeswehr structural requirements, age group, and rank structure.213 An NCO in Potsdam stated that they were expected to say yes to this question but that this was difficult because the Bundeswehr had not yet said yes to them.214 The overall positive comments that the former NVA offered on the question of "fair chance" mirror the general view of the former NVA on how they were treated by the Bundeswehr officers and NCOs. MAJ Titze stated: "They came as comrades and were very jovial." They did not simply give orders but also explained the background for the orders, something new for him.215 Seven months after the Takeover, LTC Herbert Konig wrote: "Impartiality, openness and a courteous way of interacting on the part of the Bundeswehr officers characterize the common army and promotes the process of integration."216 One and a half years after the Takeover, he continued by saying the most convincing thing to him showing the goodness of the Bundeswehr was how Bundeswehr soldiers had proven almost without exception to be sensitive, understanding, and honest comrades, who were committed to the FRG yet were capable of criticism. They thus did not correspond to the picture that NVA had of them 2 1 7 The conclusion justified by this analysis is that the Bundeswehr, not only in word but also in deed, afforded the former NVA the fair chance it had promised. This principle must be considered as among the most important guiding the Bundeswehr in its Takeover of the NVA. Overall, the West German MOD, the Bundeswehr, and the German Army must be given high marks for the decisions made in this area of personnel and administration. To be expected, this area drew the most comments from former NVA. There were no areas in which the former NVA soldiers were uniformly critical and in most areas—even something so central as pay—there existed substantial understanding and acceptance, however grudgingly, for the West German decisions and policies. MAJ Wensdorf, an especially thoughtful and articulate former NVA officer, gave the following characterization of the critical problem the Bundeswehr faced in this area of personnel and also a pointed asesssment: "How will the Bundeswehr handle all the human problems? How will it handle the problems of human existence for these people [former NVA]? Here one must say that this process was conducted by the Bundeswehr with greater honesty than in other sectors." In such sectors as the police or in administration, "there was much confusion, much more lack of clarity in the organization of this process." The Bundeswehr strove early for clarity. The process was difficult "but . . . in the Bundeswehr this process was mastered better than in other areas of the society." 218

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NOTES 1. One former NVA officer, COL Dr. (medical) Bernd Ullrich, stated that the party controlled the military through two means. The first was through the "political apparatus," made up of these officers, who were specially selected for this duty. The second was through the "party apparatus." Most officers were party members, whether enthusiastically loyal or not. One would be chosen, for example, to be the party secretary for the regiment or battalion for two or three years. Interview, COL Ullrich (former NVA), Specialist for Physiology, German Air Force, Hamburg, 23 October 1991. 2. Jorg Schonbohm, "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," NATO's Sixteen Nations, November 1991, 124. See also Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 651. LTG Schonbohm said that the SED party machinery within the NVA "disintegrated." "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," 124. See also Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 180. 3. For a good overview of the history of this organization see Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 183-185. 4. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 45. 5. Interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992. 6. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 7. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 8. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1992. Eppelmann had recommended to the West Germans that about fifteen generals be retained. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 34. 9. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. AblaB indicated that the number was twenty-four generals and admirals. See also, Werner E. AblaB, Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Dtisseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992), 172-173. 10. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 34. 11. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1992. 12. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 63, 65-66. 13. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. Ablass gave a different and somewhat contradictory view in his book, defending the decision to retain the NVA generals until shortly before Unification. Zapfenstreich, 186. 14. "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben: Interview mit Generalleutnant Klaus Jiirgen BaarB." Truppenpraxis (5/1990): 437. See also Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik (9/1990): 667. 15. In the explanation of the personnel decisions, this study relies heavily on interviews of key personnel. Excellent published sources for these decisions include the IAPDienst Sicherheitspolitik series of publications especially editions 19-20/1990 "Eine Faire Chance", 21/1990 "Bundeswehr Ost—Aufbau gemeinsamer Streitkrafte," and 8-9/1991 "Der Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Landern." 16. The importance of this decision stems from the number of people who identified this as a key, the significance of the decision for the nature of the German Army and the lives of former NVA, and the potential consequences if the West Germans had decided alternately, that is, that no NVA personnel would be taken over. 17. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992.

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18. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. MG Haasler indicated simply that this decision was made by the politicians. Interview, 29 June 1992. 19. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik A3 (II, 1992): 168. 20. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 21. BG Dieter Farwick laid out the controversy in the initial chapter of the book he edited, "Viele Fragen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 7-8. See also Gerhard Hubatschek, "Der Steinige Weg zur Wiedervereinigung," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 27. 22. Interview, LTC Wollweber, 25 June 1992; for pro and con arguments see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 35-40. 23. Ulrich A. Hundt, "Innere Fuhrung," 186. 24. For example, LTG von Scheven referred in his article, "Merger of Two Armies," p. 169, to the Gillessen article, "Complete disbandment—what else?" in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 1990. 25. "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 332; Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 33; Bruce W. Nelan, "A Victory without a Battlefield," Time, 1 July 1991, 26. LTG von Scheven described the words used by Schonbohm as the Bundeswehr's "motto": "We have come not as victor to vanquished, but as German to German." Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 608. Further showing this idea's importance, BG von Kirchbach highlighted it on the reverse side of the title page and pages 45-46 of his book, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Landern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992). 26. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 206. 27. Michael J. Inacker, "A Real People's Army After Six Months? Legends and Truths about the National People's Army After the Upheaval in the GDR," Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (I/1991):31. 28. Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 185. 29. Interview, COL Ditte and LTC Kuhl, 29 June 1992. 30. Ibid. 31. Interview with 1LT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 32. Ibid., MAJ Ulfert. 33. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November, 1992. 34. Ibid. 35. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. 36. Interview, LTC Hans-Joachim Jung, LTC Dr. Wolfgang Knigge, CPT Andreas Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA officers), Berlin, 12 November 1991. 37. Interview, 1LT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 38. Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik (911990): 667. 39. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992.

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40. Interview with BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, "Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces: The Eggesin Garrison as an Example for the Unification of Two Armies," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 14 February 1992), 22. BG Dieter Farwick speaks in the same vein when he writes about his discussions with the NVA and their wives before and after the Takeover: from this collective, named the NVA, came individuals and individual destinies. Farwick, "Viele Fragen," Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 8. 41.Ibid. 42. See "Ab Oktober wird es keine NVA mehr geben," 438; Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?" 667; Hundt "Innere Fiihrung," 187; Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 299; In February 1991, LTG Schonbohm witnessed an exchange between recruits from eastern and western Germany in which an easterner asserted: "My father was as hardworking as yours, only you had the luck of living in the West." Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 181. 43. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 44.Ibid. 45. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992. 46. Presentation by MG Dr. Klaus Reinhardt at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 24 November 1992, notes held by author. 47. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 29, 30. The Chief of the People's Navy was concerned about rumors that NVA ships might be sunk, p. 47. 48. Ibid., 31. 49. Ibid., 33. Elsewhere he listed this as the first of three major issues that faced the Bundeswehr as it assumed authority over the NVA. "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 42. 50. Ibid., 54. 51. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. 52. Interview, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Haake, CPT Knoch, Sergeant First Class (SFC) Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992. An officer interviewed in Potsdam indicated that there were some "crazies" in Eggesin who wanted to march on Berlin with their tanks. He said that thoughts of a putsch were there in 1989. Interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 53. Interview, SFC Peter Blanke, SSG Rainer Kaps, and SFC Koch (former NVA), Potsdam, 25 June 1992. 54. Interview, MAJ Wolfgang Leesing, Department Head, Defense District 76, Dresden, and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), Bonn, 16 June 1992. 55. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 40. 56. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. 57. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, CPT Stange, June 24, 1992. 58. Author's interview with LTC Henning, CPT Uwe Losch, and ILT Klaus-Dieter Triebel (former NVA), Home Defense Brigade 42, 26 June 1992, Potsdam, notes of interview held by author. 59. Interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 60. Interview, LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. 6.1. Interview, Dr. Karl-Heinz Carl, Former State Secretary, MOD, Bonn, 4 July 1992. Notes of interview held by author.

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62. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992 and interview, MG Richter, 14 November 91. At one point MG Haasler said that he thought that the 50,000 figure had come from the Kohl-Gorbachev meeting, but other sources say nothing of this. See, for example, Horst Teltschik, 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung (Berlin: Siedler, 1991), 337-342; and Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). 63. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. 64. "Erlauterungen zu den soldatenrechtlichen Bestimmungen des Einigungsvertrages." Briefing given by BG Richter to NVA on 12 September 1990 (photocopy), p. 8. 65. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. MG Richter and LTG von Scheven put the figure at 25,000. MG Reinhardt placed it at 35,500 officers. Presentation by MG Reinhardt Naval War College, 24 November 1992. LTG von Scheven stated that 24,000 officers actually put on the Bundeswehr uniform on October 3. Interview, June 25, 1992. 66. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 67. "Erlauterungen zu den soldatenrechtlichen Bestimmungen des Einigungsvertrages," BG Richter, 5. 68. Letter from Rainer Eppelmann, Minister fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung, Strausberg (photocopy), 6 September 1990, 1. 69. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 70. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991; interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 71. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 72. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 73. Briefing chart (photocopy) 7 March 1991, provided by LTC Wollweber, Assistant G-l, Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, 25 June 1992. Schonbohm gave the following numbers for mid-1991: 9,500 officers and about 18,000 NCOs and longer serving volunteers. "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," 129. 74. LTG Werner von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fiihrungsakademie der Bundeswehr aus AnIaB der erstmaligen Teilnahme von ehemaligen NVA-Berufsoffizieren am Grundlehrgang der Fortbildungs Stufe C" [Lecture at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College on the Occasion of the First Participation of Previous NVA Career Officers in the Basic Course of Advanced Officer Education Level C] Hamburg (photocopy), 4 March 1993, 14-15 & Chart 3. 75. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. 76. Ibid. 77. Letter from Rainer Eppelmann, Minister fur Abrustung und Verteidigung, Strausberg, September 6, 1990, 1. 78. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 33-34, 124. 79. Ibid., 3; Ablass, Zapfenstreich, 159-160. 80. They also took the occasion to point out that in the GDR if a female had one or two children—and no husband—she could manage. They did not feel this was the case in the FRG. Interview, Dorte Neumann, Gabriele Riitz, and Christina Topler (former NVA NCOs), civilian administrative assistants, 8th Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. See also Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik (9/1990): 668. East German women in general complained about being victimized by the Unification, pointing to things such as free kindergarten (day care) in the GDR that was unavail-

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able in the FRG. Free kindergarten had allowed them greater freedom to enter the workforce than was possible after Unification. Peter Neckermann, The Unification of Germany or the Anatomy of a Peaceful Revolution (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1991), 71. A related area is the treatment of defense civilians. The Bundeswehr was unable to announce the numbers of these personnel who would be taken over as it was very unclear how many the Bundeswehr actually needed. A segment of the NVA officer and NCO corps entered the Federal Defense Administration because they had in the NVA duties normally performed by this agency, such as lodging, military apparel, and finance. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 91, 191, 195. 81. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992; interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 11, 144, 178. 82. Interview with LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. BG Wilko Hartmann, the Assistant Division Commander, also placed emphasis on this requirement. Interview with BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 83. "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 332. 84. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 85. Interview, LTC Wollweber, 25 June 1992. 86. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 88, 126-127; "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 336-337. 87. MG Haasler followed by saying there was, of course, much that was not clear in the beginning. For example, because there were on October 3 so many civilians in his command in Neubrandenburg, Bonn directed him to discharge a certain number by year's end, allowing only 4,000 civilians workers. He refused, explaining that he needed this many simply to operate the heating facilities. The people in Bonn did not realize that the technology in the east was vintage 1950's not 1990's. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992. 88. Interview, LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. 89. Interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 90. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 91. Interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 92. Interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 93. Interview, LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. 94. Ibid. 95. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen aus der Uberfuhrung der NVA in die Bundeswehr" (photocopy), 28 January 1991, Hanover, 9. 96. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 97. von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 610-611. 98. Interview, LTC Alfred Schiele, Assistant Logistics Officer, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992; interview, LTC Diethard Vogt, Logistics Officer, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 22 June 1992; interview, MAJ Martin Fahlbusch, Assistant Logistics Officer, Seventh Division, Leipzig, 18 June 1992. Also, interview, COL Ditte, Personnel Officer, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992.

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99. Interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 100. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489. 101. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 234. 102. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. Also MG Reinhardt emphasized the importance of continuity in drafting, preventing any gap, and ensuring eastern and western draftees would have equal status. Interview, 24 November 1992. 103. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 4 March 1993, 14. 104. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 105. This decision was selected because of the number of people interviewed, both from the east and west, who indicated it was a major decision, and the clear significance of it to the former NVA. For example, COL Eckard Jantzen, Commander of Defense Region Command 84, Potsdam, identified this as the most important decision. Interview, 11 November 1991. 106. Interview, Dr. Carl, 4 July 1992. 107. Fu H, "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaBlich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990," Fu H/InfoLZ, Bonn, 17 September 1990, 9. LTG von Scheven stated in contrast that the SaZ-2 offer was first made in November 1990. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 4 March 1993, 13. 108. BMVg, "Richtlinien fiir die Berufung von Angehorigen der ehemaligen Nationalen Volksarmee in das Dienstverhaltnis eines Soldat auf Zeit fiir die Dauer von 2 Jahren," P II 1, Az 02-06-00/3, Bonn, 17 September 1990, 2-4. 109. Ibid., p. 4 110. Ibid., p. 5. This document contains numerous annexes including information sheets, forms, sample letters commanders were to use, and the Statement of the Applicant in Support of the Basic Law. Former NVA LTC Konig maintained that the decisive measure for the evaluation of the individual NVA would be his allegiance to democracy (demokratische Grundhaltung). Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489. 111. Interview, MG Richter, 14November 1991. 112. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 113. Ibid. Also see MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, 18 March 1991, 10. 114. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 115. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. 116. MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 9. 117. von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 609. There are some discrepancies in these figures. Later in this article, von Scheven stated the number of soldiers out of the west on duty in the east as 1,650, 612. 118. "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 45. 119. "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 338; "Alle bekommen eine faire Chance." (Interview mit General Jorg Schonbohm) Der Spiegel, 1 July 1991, 78. 120. Interview, COL von Senden, 26 June 1992. 121. Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 302. For a downbeat former NVA view of the economy and the former NVA's chances at civilian employment, see Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489. 122. Interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992.

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123. Interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992. 124. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. 125. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992. 126. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 127. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992; interview BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. See also von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 610. 128. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 129. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 4 March 1993, 17 and Chart 5. 130. BMVg, "Verwendungsplanung [of former NVA personnel]," PHI 1, Bonn, November 1992, 1. 131. Ibid., 1-2. Victorson gave the following statistics for the Army: 1,067 career commissioned officers, 598 career warrant officers, and 576 officers with six- to twelveyear commitments, for a total of 2,241 officers. Mark E. Victorson, "Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport Paper 7 (Newport: Naval War College, June 1994), 47, fn 103. 132. Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 39-40. For further information on the Stasi in the NVA, see pp. 123-125, 127-129. 133. Joachim Gauck is a Lutheran clergyman who was given custodial responsibilities for the files of the East German secret police. See his article: "Dealing with the Stasi Past," Daedalus 123 (Winter, 1994): 277-284. For a brief discussion of the Stasi legacy, see Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," 114-117. At the time the majority of the interviews for this study were being completed (June 1992), the names of applicants who had lied were coming to light. In fact, one former NVA officer who was designated as my guide at one Army command was discharged for this reason soon after I met him. In another case, Major General Reinhardt described how he had received in his position as Commander of the German Command and General Staff College (Fuhrungsakademie) a former NVA lieutenant colonel computer specialist who had been reduced in rank to first lieutenant. He had signed a document stating that he had not been Stasi. MG Reinhardt explained that the officer had recently been discharged as he had lied. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. It was pointed out that no information classified higher than confidential was present in the east during the first several years of the Takeover. Also only national confidential not NATO classified information was allowed. This condition ended in 1994. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991; interview, LTC Fritz Korff, Intelligence and Security Officer, Eighth Division, Neubrandenburg, 29 June 1992. 134. "So Siebte Die Bundeswehr," Loyal, 2/1993, 12-13. 135. Ibid. 136. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," Charts 6 and 7. 137. Interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992; von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 17. 138. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992. Victorson praises the Bundeswehr leaders for taking over any former NVA officers given the military downsizing and the

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NVA legacy and gives great credit to the Bundeswehr's use of Innere Fuhrung. "Mission in the East," 31-32. 139. Interview with LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel were also very positive about the procedures. Interview, 26 June 1992. 140. Interview, ILT Matthies, 29 June 1992. 141. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. LTG Schonbohm made a similar point in Schonbohm, "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," 130. 142. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 143. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 91. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992. On the poor quality of the NVA NCO Corps, see also "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 334; Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300; von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 610. 144. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992; von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies, 171; interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991; interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June, 1992; Haasler, in "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," also emphasized the NCO problem. 145. "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 334. 146. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 47. 147. For example, interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992, and interview, SFC Blanke, SSG Kaps, and SFC Koch (former NVA), 25 June 1992. 148. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 488. 149. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 150. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 190; Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 299, 302. See also von Kirchbach, "Reflections," 13; Victorson, "Mission in the East," 34. 151. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489; Kirchbach, "Reflections," 17. 152. von Kirchbach, "Reflections," 9. 153. For published sources, see Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 653; Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 299-303; "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 337; Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 494; von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 611. 154. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. 155. Interview, LTC Wollweber, 25 June 1992. Also, interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June, 1992; interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992; author's interview, ILT Dietmar Korn, 22 June 1992; interview, LTC Kuhl, 29 June 1992. Also, Engelien and Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" 653. 156. Author's interview with Commander Joachim Schulze, Deputy Commander, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 22 June 1992. 157. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 25. 158. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. This decision was selected to be analyzed because of the number of former NVA who identified it as controversial. 159. "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaBlich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.9.1990," 8. See also Theodor Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last: Die Soldaten der ehemaligen NVA brauchen Hilfe—von Mensch zu Mensch," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 490. 160. Interview, 26 June 1992.

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161. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992, and interview, LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. 162. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. 163. Numerous interviews; also Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 490. 164. Interview, MAJ Leesing and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), 16 June 1992; interview, Commander Hans-Joachim Wichert, Operations Officer, Military Region 84, Potsdam, 22 June 92; interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992; interview, SFC Blanke, SSG Kaps, and SFC Koch (former NVA), 25 June 1992; interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 165. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 166. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 167. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 168. Interview, ILT Matthies, 29 June 1992. 169. Interview, SSG Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992. 170. Interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 171. Although this service did not affect pay while the individual was on active duty, it was considered for their pensions. 172. Interview, Dr. Carl, 4 July 1992. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991 and 18 June 1992; Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. See also "Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 336. 173. "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaBlich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990." 174. Interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992; and interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 175. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June, 1992. Also interview, ILT Korn, 22 June 1992. 176. Interview, ILT Korn, 22 June 1992. 177. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 178. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 179. Interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992. 180. Interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 181. Interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992. 182. Interview, SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992. For critical NVA views on pay, see also Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 302. 183. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 184. Interview, Staff Sergeant Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992. 185. Interview, MAJ Leesing and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), 16 June 1992. 186. Interview, CDR Wichert, 22 June 92.

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187. Interview, SSG Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992. 188. Interview with SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 189. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 190. Interview, ILT Korn, 22 June 1992. 191. Interview, MAJ Leesing and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), 16 June 1992. NCOs in Neubrandenburg also criticized the decision. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 192. His explanation about being too close to the "system" is a weak one as former Stasi officials were certainly as "close" if not closer. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992. 193. There were a good number of interviewees who raised this subject—mainly West German—however, this decision was selected primarily because of the important psychological and symbolic significance it carried. 194. Quoted in Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wandel durch Annaherung," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 179. 195. Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Das Vorbid wirkt: Innere Fuhrung und Ansatze einer Militarreform in der ehemaligen NVA," Information fur die Truppe (11/1990): 21. 196. Interview, Dr. Carl, 4 July 1992. This led immediately to the challenge of placing all NVA into Bundeswehr uniforms on Unification Day. (See section on "Supplementary Personnel Subjects" earlier in this chapter.) 197. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 19 November 1991. 198. Presentation by MG Reinhardt Naval War College, 24 November 1992. 199. Letter to the author from MG Reinhardt, 5 October 1992. 200. Interview, ILT Korn, 22 June 1992. For the rationale that the NVA was tied too closely to the East German Communist Party and that the Bundeswehr was radically different, see also Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 491. 201. Fu S, "Ubernahme der Befehls- und Kommandogewalt liber die Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands am 03.10.90: MaBnahmen der Soldatischen Ordnung," Fu S I 4, Az 35-08-00, Bonn, 25 September 1990, 1-3. Also see Fii S, "Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr: MaBnahmen in den Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fu S I 4, Az 35-08-07, Bonn, 25 September 1990. 202. MAV, "Befehl Nr. 48/90 des Ministers fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung iiber die Aufgaben der Nationalen Volksarmee im Zusammenhang mit der Bildung gesamteutscher Streitkrafte vom 21.09.1990," Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung, Strausberg, 21 September 1990, 2. 203. Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Das Vorbid wirkt: Innere Fuhrung und Ansatze einer Militarreform in der ehemaligen NVA." Information fur die Truppe (11/1990): 22. 204. Interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992. 205. "Erlauterungen zu den soldatenrechtlichen Bestimmungen des Einigungsvertrages," BG Richter. 206. "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaBlich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990," 6. 207. "Alle bekommen eine faire Chance" (Interview mit General Jorg Schonbohm), 79. See also von Kirchbach, "Reflections," 17. 208. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992 and 18 June 1998. 209. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992.

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210. Interview, SSG Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992; interview, CDR Wichert, 22 June 92; SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992; CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992; SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 211. Interview, MAJ Leesing and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), 16 June 1992; interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 212. Interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992. 213. Interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 214. Interview, SFC Blanke, SSG Kaps, and SFC Koch (former NVA), 25 June 1992. 215. Interview, MAJ Titze, 11 June 1992. 216. Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 487. 217. Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 234. 218. Interview with LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991.

7

Training and Education Decisions The necessity of providing supplementary training and education for former NVA continuing service in the Bundeswehr was beyond question to West German military leaders. Not so obvious were the principles and objectives that should guide this training: How much of it should be military as opposed to political instruction? How much time should be devoted to the instruction—given the other pressing requirements on the units in the east—and where should it take place? Of special significance was the requirement to seek a change in the mentality of the former NVA. A dose of military instruction could acquaint a former NVA tank driver with the differences between the T-72 and the Leopard II, another dose—of political instruction—could clarify his rights under the Basic Law, rights he did not genuinely have in the GDR. But how did one attempt to change his mindset with regard to initiative, risk-taking, and leadership style? These were not simply pieces of information to be mastered but rather attributes and attitudes. Although not a principal focus of this study, the research inevitably explored this very challenging dimension of the Takeover. Several points are clear. In the supplemental instruction the former NVA received, political education in such things as Innere Fuhrung and legal rights was as important as military training. That is, the goal of socialization into the Bundeswehr and West German culture was just as important as the goal of military and technical competence. This chapter—along with the chapters on organization and political control, and personnel decisions—shows the important role that Innere Fuhrung played and how Bundeswehr leaders did much more than simply make lofty references to it in their speeches and writings. Second, in this area as in the discussion of the lack of detailed guidance by West German political leaders, the analysis supports the proposition that the German Army has in-

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deed internalized democratic principles of civil-military relations, a subject that occupied so much time in the postwar debate in and after the establishment of the Bundeswehr in the mid-1950's. This chapter is organized into several sections. The first examines the main decision to provide the former NVA supplemental political and military training after their Takeover as two-year volunteers. In the second section, the main components of this military and political training and education are reviewed. The third and fourth sections address the two secondary decisions, including the decision to continue inducting and training new draftees from the east without any break and the decision not to recognize any previous training and education of the former NVA. Finally, the major challenges and problems that existed in this entire subject area are addressed. DECISION 9: SUPPLEMENTAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION The fundamental decision discussed in this chapter is that made by the Bundeswehr to provide supplemental military and political training and education to those former NVA taken over for the two-year trial period. After the other elemental questions had been answered, this issue of supplemental instruction surfaced in logical sequence.1 It appears that the basic decision to have such instruction—political as well as military—and the more specific decisions on the nature and extent of the instruction, were made totally within the military.2 The concept for the training of former NVA was explained in the "Directive for the Training of the Armed Forces in the Joined Section of Germany," signed by Admiral Dieter Wellershof, the Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, on August 30, 1990.3 MG Richter outlined the concept at the final NVA Commander's Conference, September 12, 1990. Starting immediately, he said, key personnel of the NVA—such as company commanders and first sergeants—would be trained in short courses in the Bundeswehr, training that was labeled preliminary training (Vorlaufausbildung). These leaders and subordinates would then implement their knowledge in unit training and in this manner ensure that laws and regulations of the FRG and Bundeswehr were adhered to. Commanders would be trained above all in the areas of Innere Fuhrung and legal rights at either the Center for Innere Fuhrung or the Command and General Staff College, starting on October 15, 1990 and running through December 1990, in courses lasting approximately three weeks. Additionally, soldiers taken over as SaZ-2 would receive additional training for up to six months.4 The Army then fleshed out this general concept that every officer and NCO would undergo supplemental training (Erganzungsausbildung), at once a very important as well as expensive decision. Officers would attend a short course at the Army Officer School in Hannover and the Center for Innere Fuhrung, a course at the respective branch school, and have on-the-job training in the partnership unit in the West. In principle, the NCOs would undergo the same program; however, for the most part they received their institutional instruction at

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the branch schools. The priority in the military training was given to leader training, not to such things as communications training, tactics, or combined operations.5 The decision to have the former NVA undergo political instruction in such subjects as legal rights, civic education, democracy, and Innere Fuhrung was hardly a decision at all as this instruction was part of normal training and education in the Bundeswehr. Once the decision had been made to give supplemental training, there really was no question that a component of it would be political instruction.6 In the West, the focus of this instruction normally is the right to register complaints (Beschwerderecht), instruction that is given to officers who then give similar instruction to NCOs and enlisted men. Rudi Pallokat and Arnold Eiben, legal advisors to Division/Military District Command VII in Leipzig, explained that the instruction they gave in the east was basically the same except that they had to "begin at zero," that is, they could not assume the NVA had any basic knowledge in this area.7 The lack of understanding among NVA was so great that a decision was eventually made in 1993 that a more formal course in legal affairs was necessary for former NVA. Legal advisors were imported from western Germany and taught a two-week course in two- to three-day segments.8 Objectives The Bundeswehr had a number of objectives that it sought to achieve through this training and education of the former NVA. In the Directive on Training from the Army Chief of Staff, it was stated that the Supplemental Training for leaders was to improve the training status of those former NVA taken as SaZ-2 to Bundeswehr standards. A second objective was to prepare former NVA to fulfill responsibilities in military personnel management for the planning and conduct of training and the organization.9 In this area of leader training, there was special concern given to bringing the former NVA officers and NCOs up to the level of the Bundeswehr leaders.10 The Chief of Staff s Directive on Training stated this as the first principle of the training to be conducted. The training of the military leaders was to stand in the midpoint of the efforts of the next time period (after Unification).11 LTG Schonbohm placed special emphasis on the NCOs. "We must succeed in implementing the Bundeswehr-type image and behaviour of NCOs in the Eastern units. This is the only way in which our conscripts can experience the changes in training and leadership."12 Innere Fuhrung Although these were important objectives, the preeminent one was to reach a capability for leadership according to the principles of Innere Fuhrung. Military leaders repeatedly underlined the importance of the principles within this umbrella concept of Innere Fuhrung. In his address at a Commanders Con-

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ference on June 13, 1990, Minister of Defense Stoltenberg referred to these principles as the guiding ideas for the buildup of the future all German forces.13 Admiral Dieter Wellershof referred to these principles in his "Directive for the Training of the Armed Forces in the Joined Section of Germany," of August 30, 1990. "In the conduct of the service of the German Armed Forces in the joined section of Germany, it is first a matter of perceiving the validity of the primacy of politics, of military rights [Wehrrecht], and the principles of Innere Fiihrung."1* LTG Henning von Ondarza, the Army Chief of Staff, spoke in the same vein in describing the German Army's concept for training given in "Directive Number 1 for the Training of Officers and NCOs of the Land Forces of the NVA [Eastern Army Command]," dated August 30, 1990. In the brief introductory section, he states that "the real challenge lies in the integration of the soldiers of the joined section into a common army [Gesamt-Heer] based on our proven values of freedom and democracy."15 In word and deed, LTG Schonbohm underscored the importance of the concept of Innere Fuhrung. In an interview at the outset of his command of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, he stated: The critical point for me is to carry through the idea of the citizen in uniform and engage in a process of changing consciousness. To this belongs not only the imparting but rather still more the setting of the example and common working together of our proven set of values from our fundamental laws. . . . The soldiers in the area of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command must understand that they serve in a democratic state based on law [Rechtstaat]—with all rights, but also all duties.16 He also emphasized that the former NVA must discover that the democratic principles and rules remain in force in the everyday life of a troop unit, that their rights and human dignity are recognized and protected.17 Beyond words, he also made efforts to demonstrate to the former NVA as well as the East German population that the German military was a radically different military compared to the NVA. He stressed the importance of the connection between how the Bundeswehr acted in handling former NVA in the application process to become longer term volunteers and the credibility of the democratic principles of the FRG, something that had to be kept foremost in mind.18 He held swearing-in ceremonies in public areas, opened them completely to the public, and encouraged public attendance.19 He also placed great emphasis on getting the Catholic and Evangelical churches involved with his troop units in the east, comparable to the relationship that existed in the west. Such efforts to foster the formation of a moral framework and consciousness directly relate to the concept of Innere Fiihrung?® The Bundeswehr did other things such as make sports facilities available to the East German public when not in use by the military.21 Bundeswehr officers also strove to be as open as possible with their soldiers, actions that reflect the application of the principles of Innere Fiihrung?1 Asked about the critical parts of his mission, LTG Schonbohm included that the "training according to the principles of Innere Fuhrung must be insured

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smoothly."23 LTG von Scheven also placed paramount emphasis on this. "The most challenging part of training includes the task of educating the commanding and instructor personnel of the former NVA according to the Bundeswehr's democratic principles of leadership and civic education [Innere Fiihrung]." These principles were not simply to be learned, but had to be "made one's own, too." 24 The Division legal advisors indicated that this was a very important area, that related to all: "How we view human beings. How we treat soldiers."25 In general, said LTG von Scheven, the Bundeswehr had to teach the former NVA about West German society, to inform them and to attempt to "equalize" them.26 Great emphasis was placed on the initiation of the concept of the "citizen in uniform" (Staatsbiirger in Uniform). As one Bundeswehr officer articulated: "The conception of Innere Fuhrung personalizes itself in the Citizen in Uniform."27 Expressing the same ideals, LTG von Scheven stated that from the very beginning, the FRG's rule of law was imposed on the east. This meant that the soldier was a citizen in uniform. A former NVA who wanted to remain in service in the Bundeswehr had to guarantee that he could become a citizen of the FRG. The selection process for choosing who would serve beyond SaZ-2 was designed in part to do this.28 Significant is that LTG von Scheven stated that this was a political requirement (Vorgabe) that no politician had to utter. This evidence supports the proposition that the Bundeswehr has truly matured as a military force grounded in liberal, democratic principles. It indicates that in the span of about two generations since the end of World War II the ideals of liberal democracy have indeed taken root and have been internalized by German military leaders. The ideal of the citizen in uniform was assumed and acted on, not forced on them and monitored by political leaders. Writing in Aussenpolitik, LTG von Scheven added that the Bundeswehr could "only accept service personnel who correspond to the dual concept of a soldier and a citizen in uniform." Correcting deficiencies in this area would take much time and effort, for example, to get the former NVA to "assume the same attitude toward conscripts that Bundeswehr members are supposed to have. . . . " Also, the former NVA lacked the "courage of their own convictions" and the "courage to take the initiative." "Those who come from a world of ideological certainties will find it difficult to stand open situations in a free world."29 MG Richter, Commander of the Seventh Division, addressed this issue at length. Very important to the Bundeswehr was the question of how one develops an officer and NCO in a democracy. German military leaders had to consider that for more than forty years the entire leader corps of the NVA was strongly directed and isolated, especially the officer corps. Only toward the end did officers begin to obtain information from the west, and if caught obtaining this information, their fate was sealed. Because of this isolation and the one-sided nature of the information they received, NVA officers were convinced of the aggressive intentions of the capitalistic West. They believed that among NATO forces at least the Bundeswehr and U.S. forces were in a continuous readiness posture of more than 80 percent in order to attack on some weekend. The former

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NVA—except perhaps for the intelligence officers in key places—were greatly astonished therefore to discover in 1990 that they had been fed lies. They were also surprised at the extent of their very own equipment and mobilization capacity, previously unknown to them. Only after these experiences and discussions with Bundeswehr officers did they realize that they had been deceived. This marked, at the latest, the beginning of their rejection of communism and the GDR system.30 Concerning political instruction in particular, the challenge was to try to negate the years of indoctrination in socialism. The Division legal advisors voiced special pride in the role they played in transmitting Western democratic values to the former NVA, whose thought processes (Denkansdtze) were based on socialist ideology and thus entirely different. Socialism presented an image of the human being entirely different than democracy. During the forty years of the GDR, socialism had subdued human beings.31 For their part, the NVA at times reacted strongly against this instruction, maintaining that they had essentially what amounted to Innere Fuhrung in the NVA and that all was in order. They believed it a part of what they called: "Work with the Human Being."32 BG von Kirchbach relates how former NVA of Home Defense Brigade 41, the unit he commanded, tried to assure him that the principles of Innere Fuhrung were indeed applied in the NVA. He did his best to disabuse them of this view by pointing to such things as the poor living conditions and the "EK system."33 Description of Training and Education Programs With these goals in mind, the Bundeswehr and German Army developed concepts and programs for the supplemental training of leaders of the former NVA. The overall concept included the following components. First, each branch of service would prepare materials so that former NVA officers and NCOs could engage in a self-study (Selbststudium). Second, they would engage in a practical period of work in a unit (Truppenpraktikum) lasting about four weeks. Third, they would attend a course of about two weeks on Innere Fuhrung at the Center for Innere Fuhrung or the Federal Command and Staff College. Fourth, they were to undergo a supplemental training course (Ergdnzungslehrgang) lasting about twelve weeks. The final component was instruction at the future place of duty (Einweisung am zukUnftigen Arbeitsplatz)?4 The German Army Program The German Army provided detail to this overall concept. In his "Directive Number 1 for the Training of Officers and NCOs of the Land Forces of the NVA" (Eastern Army Command), dated August 30, 1990, LTG von Ondarza, the Army Chief, provided guidance to the Army. He indicated that, beginning

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September 17, 1990, the greater portion of the former NVA officers and NCOs would be trained and re-educated at Army schools and in Army troop units. He explained that this task would demand from the officer corps ability (Konnen), the power to convince, but especially tact and attention to the feeling of selfworth of those who were prepared for a common new beginning (i. e., the former NVA). 35 The directive continued by giving planning guidance for "Preliminary Training," "Supplemental Training, Part I," Supplemental Training, Part II," Supplemental Training, Part III," "Training for Trainers in General Basic Training," and "Regeneration Training." These courses were from two weeks to three months in length and took place at various Army and unit schools, including the Center for Innere Fuhrung in Koblenz, the Federal Command and Staff College in Hamburg, the Army Officer School in Hannover, the Army NCO Schools, and the branch schools such as the Infantry School in Hammelburg.36 Preliminary Training. The Program of Instruction for the Preliminary Instruction of former NVA who were continuing as company commanders was prepared and distributed by the German Army Office in August 1990, and included four sections. The initial "General" section stated that the goal of the course was the "aptitude to know the duties and rights of a military senior [Vorgesetzte] as well as to apply disciplinary authority properly." Beyond this, the leader was expected to train his subordinates for guard duty and properly supervise them. "A particular point of attention is to impart to the participants concepts of modern leadership."37 The two-week course included sixty-nine hours of training time, organized into three blocks. By far the largest block was Innere Fuhrung (fifty-nine hours), which included twenty-one hours of "Leadership in the Armed Forces," three hours of "Soldier Order," two hours of "Care and Welfare," and thirty-three hours of "Military Justice" (Wehrrecht). Two other small blocks included four hours of "Rights/Constitutional Rights" and six hours of special instruction in personnel matters.38 A comparable program was formulated and distributed at the same time for company first sergeants.39 All former NVA were given instruction on Innere Fuhrung in this preliminary training course; staff officers were given additional training for two weeks during the period from April to December 1991, with the purpose of enabling "the staff officers of the former NVA to understand, accept, and put in practice the principles of Innere Fuhrung." Seven courses were planned.40 "Supplemental Training" Courses. The longest component of the supplemental training received by the former NVA was detailed in two documents prepared and distributed by the German Army Office in 1991. The "Instruction for Leader Training of Officers of the former NVA (Land Forces) in Officer Supplemental Training (2 Months) at the Army Officer School for the Pay Grade of Captain," dated February 20, 1991, provided the detailed program for captains. It included

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thirty-nine training days with the goal of "enabling the participants to accomplish the general leader tasks of a line officer in the Army." The course was to build on the officers' previous experience in the NVA and in the German Army. Critical aspects of the course included providing "the sense of the officer profession that derives from service to the German people in a common free fatherland" and in developing "a professional understanding as a soldier in a democratic state governed by law and the behavior that stems from this."41 Concerning Innere FUhrung, the officer was to learn the central role of the leader in a unit. The component dealing with political affairs was designed to have the participant deal with the foundations and current questions of security policy and the defense mission. It also included military justice, the law of war (Geneva Convention), leadership in battle, and military history. The breakdown of the course in hours by major area is given in Table 7.1. 42 Table 7.1 Course Overview: Supplemental Training Course for Former NVA in the Grade of Captain Location: Army Officer School, Hannover Total Training Days: 39 Total Training Hours: 281 (+ 38 miscellaneous hours) Subject Sport Religious instruction Innere FUhrung Special staff service Leadership in battle Logistics Army command & control system Military history Environmental protection in the Bundeswehr General requirements

Training Hours 10 4 99 5 118 7 6 30 2 38

Source: Heeresamt, "Anweisung fur die Fuhrerausbildung der offiziere der ehemaligen NVALandstreitkrafte im Offiziererganzungslehrgang (2 Monate) fur die Dienstgradgruppe der Hauptleute," Heeresamt, Abteilung II, Cologne, 20 February 1991.

A comparable program of instruction was prepared for lieutenants. This program was quite similar to the program for captains, varying only in the number of hours allotted to Innere FUhrung and "Leadership in Battle." The course for lieutenants also contained several hours on "Training Methods."43 Noteworthy is the amount of time spent on Innere FUhrung: Thirty-five percent of the training hours in the captains' course and 39 percent in the lieutenants' course.44 LTG Schonbohm maintained proudly that the Bundeswehr

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had been the single institution in the east after Unification that had provided political education and had integrated the FRG's democratic values into the daily life of the soldier.45 LTG Schonbohm provided the following data covering the time period from 3 October 3, 1990 through December 31, 1991: • 1,300 officers and 1,600 NCOs trained at the eight Army branch schools; • 2,800 officers and 3,900 NCOs received on-the-job training in partnership units in the west; and • 1,916 senior NCOs and 1,016 junior NCOs were trained at the NCO Schools in the west.46 LTG von Scheven provided summary statistics on the training completed (entire Bundeswehr) as of March 1993. Only 165 officers were able to undergo the fourteen-day Phase 1 Supplemental Training. A much greater number, 2,228 officers, took part in the eight-week Phase 2 Supplemental Training. In 1992, only 405 officers underwent the four- to six-week Phase 3 course on leadership. As of that date, 40 officers had taken part in the three-week Phase 4 course at four different Army schools. Almost 2,000 officers had concluded practical instruction in western units from four to six weeks long.47 On the negative side, the training and education that the former NVA underwent added another dimension of turbulence to units already taxed with many organizational requirements. At the outset of the reorganization that accompanied the Takeover in October 1990, anywhere from 10 percent to 20 percent of the former NVA officers and NCOs were on temporary duty training in the west. In 1992, it reached 25 percent and then leveled off.48 Evaluation The comments of the former NVA interviewed indicate that the training and education conducted by the Bundeswehr and the German Army were highly successful. Virtually all of the former NVA officers and NCOs interviewed gave very positive evaluations of the training and education that they received by the Bundeswehr, highlighting such things as Innere FUhrung, Auftragstaktik, and their manner of reception by the West Germans. They felt the instruction in the Army Schools was good, and they received much from the on-the-job training. Some indicated that the training on the equipment was repetitious at times when the NVA equipment was very similar to the German Army equipment. The training "made sense," "was expedient," and represented "a good mix of the theoretical and the practical."49 For the most part, the West Germans interacted with them without reservation, accepted them, and did not ignore their military experience. One NCO in Neubrandenburg said that he was the only easterner in a course he underwent. He was fully integrated, was never made to feel different, and perceived no arrogance.50 Another NCO in Potsdam commented that the Germans in the west tried to show the former NVA not only the military but also

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the social and political dimensions of German democracy, not only the positive but also the negative side of German society. It was too bad, he mused, that the same thing had not taken place in the civilian sector.51 CONTINUED DRAFTING OF RECRUITS FROM THE EAST The first of two important but subsidiary decisions in this area of training and education was the decision made at some point in 1990 to continue the normal drafting of soldiers in the east.52 It was believed important politically not to have any break in the drafting of young men in the east. On a military level, these draftees were needed to accomplish the tasks in the east, mainly the guarding and disposing of equipment and material. The German Army realized that basic training, according to Bundeswehr regulations and procedures, could not be accomplished in the east because of the poor infrastructure and personnel factors, and so it chose initially to train them entirely in the west. (On April 1, 1991, the first eastern draftees to complete their training in the west returned to units in the east.53) Another factor in this decision was the desire to introduce the eastern draftees to the west and begin the socialization process. Therefore, in 1990 and 1991, most draftees were given their basic training (three months) and their advanced individual training (two to three months) in the west and then returned to units in the east. In July 1991, basic training was begun in the east for some draftees. By the spring of 1992, all recruits were being trained in the east in their respective units.54 By the end of 1991, some 21,000 recruits from the east had been trained under the Bundeswehr and the first recruits from the west had been integrated into units in the east.55 NO RECOGNITION OF FORMER MILITARY AND ACADEMIC TRAINING AND EDUCATION A second supplementary but still significant decision in this area was the Bundeswehr's decision not to recognize any previous military or academic training that a former NVA may have undergone before Unification. Not surprisingly, this decision came under harsh criticism by selected NVA, as might be expected mostly from those who had received significant training and education while in the NVA. West German officers made little if any reference to this decision. Several former NVA officers, however, criticized the decision. One officer in Leipzig, CPT Reiner Moeller, had received an engineering degree from the Soviet Academy in Leningrad. This, along with his courses in the NVA, had not been officially recognized by the Bundeswehr?6CPT Horst Reddemann and a second officer in Potsdam were also very critical of this decision.57

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MAJOR CHALLENGES THE BUNDESWEHR CONTINUED TO FACE Having addressed the major decisions made and the main components of the training and education programs that the Bundeswehr and German Army gave the former NVA officers and NCOs, this study now turns to the major issues, challenges, and problems that the Bundeswehr continued to face in this area in 1993 as the formal Takeover ended. Mentality and Identity Although the research did not specifically aim at probing the psychological level of the Takeover, the issue of changing the mentality of the former NVA surfaced often, a mentality that needed adaptation on various levels, to include ideological, social, and military. (The importance placed on transmitting to them the fundamental values embodied in the concepts of the citizen in uniform and Innere FUhrung has already been treated.) GEN Klaus D. Naumann, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, indicated in November 1991, that the mechanical incorporation of the NVA had been essentially accomplished. "The transformation of mentalities, however, will take some time."58 After discussing the nature of the education and development process (Erziehung) in the DDR and NVA, Theodor Bross said this question of the "thinking" (Denken) was the most difficult to answer.59 He continued by calling for patience in dealing with former NVA. Decades of indoctrination are not eliminated in weeks or months. Human beings must be allowed to grow; that takes time. . . . When today's ten-year olds have themselves tenyear-old children, it will be done. The way to a new view of the world is possible, but it needs time.60 Former NVA also raised this problem of mentality. In addressing the process of rethinking that they had to undergo, former NVA LTC Konig stated: "Naturally the rethinking process is difficult and painful for us and the 'good all days' come back to mind sometimes when faced with the new worries." His prescription was for the NVA who wished to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr to focus on the future and not the past. He felt confident that many former NVA felt like this and, for this reason, felt that a full integration was possible and—in the interests of the common development of the country—necessary.61 GEN Schonbohm addressed the subject of mentality as he concluded in June 1991 his nine-month command of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command. The question now was how to reflect the already achieved political unity of Germany in the Bundeswehr, enabling it to evolve into an armed force of the common German state, a state ruled by law. His command had achieved much but the greater challenge lay ahead. "As outside the armed forces [in society], something must change in the heads of the soldiers."62 COL Dietmar Klenner spoke about the exceedingly high operational readiness rates of the former NVA; its mobilization alert system was remarkable. But

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the NVA were specialized and had a very narrow view (abgeschottet). A division commander did not know what was happening to his left or right. The challenge for the German Army was through its training program to break this method of thinking. He continued in discussing the socioeconomic framework ingrained in the minds of the former NVA. They may have heard that the West German welfare system was the best in the world, but they continued to dwell on the old system in the GDR, a system in which every East German had a job and a minimum wage and in which they were relatively secure. They were overmanned (at times three men to a position); they were busy and relatively happy. They could not travel, had no car, but they were protected from kindergarten until old age. They were "happy to be commanded" (glUcklich auf Befehl). In the new Germany, he said, they were in a social market economy, meaning that they were forced to take risks and make decisions, something that was difficult.63 Division legal advisors also addressed the mentality and behavior of former NVA in their classes. They had never before had students, who wrote down everything that was said. They lacked independence in the sense that when one of them wanted to say something, he would often look to someone of higher rank, proceeding only when that person had nodded permission. Formalities of behavior were very important.64 A closely allied psychological problem was the loss of identity by the former NVA. They had faith in and served a system that proved in the end to have lied and deceived them. LTG von Scheven explained that the NVA were shocked after Unification by the revelations of the media and prosecutors about the actions of the Communist leadership of the GDR and the military leaders of the NVA. "It was hard for them to cope with the loss of their status, the loss of identity and the invalidation of private and professional-orientational knowledge."65 The failure of the Bundeswehr to accept much NVA equipment for long-term use only contributed to their loss of identity.66 Von Scheven, in a presentation at the Federal Command and General Staff College developed this further: "The loss of orientation in private and professional life is also a loss of identity. For every person this loss amounts to a life crisis. It makes one uncertain and cautious in all that is said." He continued by suggesting that the development of a new orientation for the NVA would take longer than three years.67 Other general officers also discussed the difficulty that the NVA faced in overcoming the past (Vergangenheitsbewdltigung). The NVA had seen the total crash of their system in which the state had been supreme. They now had to "wrestle" (ringen) with this past.68 This was a continuing problem—"the struggle [Auseinandersetzung] of the individual person with his past."69 The NVA recognized these issues. A central issue that MAJ Wensdorf highlighted for all former NVA who had applied to become an SaZ-2 was the question: "Can one identify himself with the mission of this army?" Every individual would answer this differently.70 It was not easy after twenty-eight years in the NVA to do this, said LTC Dr. Wolfgang Knigge.71 CPT Horst Reddemann explained that it took much time to change the way one thinks. Comparisons were

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always being made between the Bundeswehr and the NVA. Those who said they did not compare the two were liars, concerned only with money. He predicted that the mechanical aspects of the Takeover would last only until 1993 or 1994. Considering all of German society, he said he would differentiate between the military and civilian society. It would take five or six years to conclude the Takeover in the military sector, perhaps ten years quicker than the civilian sector. As for "the head [mentality]—[it will take] generations," he maintained.72 Werner AblaB offered a civilian perspective on this issue. For forty years the NVA had the Communist Party doctrine in their heads—they had an enemy image.73 "He [the NVA officer] must now rethink and that is painful. . . . He must be conscious of his responsibility for Germany's NATO obligation. He must change from a [Communist] party soldier to a soldier in a democracy." And this he said was difficult.74 In responding to an interviewer's question, LTG Schonbohm related the answer that one former NVA provided to him on this issue. We ourselves must deal with [aufarbeiten] our past. We must do this in our families, with our children, with our friends. It is a process that you [West Germans] can help to influence by this or that measure by the manner and method through which you interact with us, but fundamentally we must do this ourselves.75 Semantics Problems regarding mentality even stemmed from semantics. Beyond the different manner of speaking,76 the differences in conceptual worlds of the West and East German military often surfaced although they spoke the same language. For example, they had differing conceptions of "peace," one in the socialistic sense and one in the sense of Western freedom.77 Former NVA used "object" (Objekt) for "garrison" (kaserne), "battle park" (Gefechtspark) for the motor pool in which their up loaded combat vehicles were stored, and "organizational replenishment" (organisatorisch Auffullung) for personnel affairs (Personalweseri)?* Division-level legal advisors explained that in their instruction they might use a word that was used often in the West but to which the former NVA could not relate or for which they gave another meaning. For example, "command and control forces" (FUhrungskrdfte) meant military and party leadership to the former NVA in contrast to the strictly operational and tactical meaning it had in the West. Another difference in understanding concerned the significance and authority of law. In the east, there were of course laws that had force, but they did not carry the weight they had in the west because the party directives existing alongside them were more important in the Army. What the Communist party said and the military commanded were more important than laws. Legal advisors characterized their task of re-educating as actually going further than simply "starting at zero." They first had to remove the old thinking before they could lay the foun-

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dation for the new.79 Because of lingering problems in this area, the Bundeswehr initiated in 1993 a two-week "crash course" in legal afffairs.80 Challenges from Inherent Differences Between the Bundeswehr and NVA These problems are easy to understand given the differences between the Bundeswehr and the NVA. LTG Schonbohm stated that it had to be made clear to the former NVA that the Bundeswehr "differs radically from the former East German Army."81 Many of the former NVA, said BG Hartmann, did not realize just how different the Bundeswehr was, for example, in the area of leadership.82 In the area of training it was clear that the training of the former NVA was much narrower than in the Bundeswehr, which had much broader training and education programs and broader career paths.83 MG Richter explained that the German Army, in the Takeover of the NVA, was engaged in an education, training, and development process of teaching a discipline different from that existing in the NVA. Concerning leadership, certainly there were officers who showed compassion to their soldiers, but such behavior was oriented on efficiency, not on a conception of the soldier as another human being whose dignity had to be recognized. The leader's values and motivation were entirely different, a difference that the German Army was challenged to demonstrate and inculcate in the former NVA.84 During the supplemental training, LTC Danzer explained that former NVA at a certain point in the instruction had often said, "Yes, that's the same as our system." However, because it clearly was not the same, he had to spend extra time to insure that they understood the differences.85 One very important difference between the Bundeswehr and NVA that repeatedly surfaced in interviews with soldiers from both east and west was the difference between the Auftragstaktik of the Bundeswehr and the Befehlstaktik of the NVA. LTG von Scheven referred to this and explained that the former NVA still wanted to plan ahead too much. "Still today [March, 1993] it is recognizable that the former NVA officers want to plan ahead excessively and want to regulate too much themselves."86 MG Reinhardt indicated that the big problems were the "head problems" and the key "head" difference was that the Bundeswehr lives by Auftragstaktik and the former NVA wait for orders.87 MG Richter stated that it was a learning process for the entire Germany society but one especially important to the military, that had to do it immediately. A factory worker, he said, need not know about the German value system, but an officer must know and internalize it quickly.88 COL Dietmar Klenner maintained that this difference in leadership style was the greatest difference between the two armies. Connected with this was a highly specialized officer corps that was promoted early and given only narrow latitude. The Bundeswehr, however, used mission-oriented tactics, meaning that goals are set and the subordinate has much freedom of action. These differing concepts

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had significant implications psychologically, on the human level, and on leadership.89 The division legal advisors added to this that another dimension of the uncertainty of the former NVA centered on their disciplinary authority under the Bundeswehr justice system. In the NVA, everything was "tough, tight, strict" (straff, stramm, streng). Especially at the outset of the Takeover, there was much fear among the former NVA officers and NCOs about behaving improperly and being rejected for future service. They felt like they were "sitting in the ejection seat."90 Discussions on the subject of differences between the Bundeswehr and NVA evolved even to religion, another dimension of the different "coordinate net" of values. LTG von Scheven explained that former NVA really had no concept or grasp of religion; it was a "nothing" to them. When they received religious instruction after Unification, they tended to compare it to political instruction in the NVA. This was yet another component in the Bundeswehr's education and development of the former NVA.91 Military-Organizational Challenges The training and education process was impeded by these psychological, social, and semantic problems. There were also some practical military and organizational factors. The first was the tremendous burdens of guard duty and of disposing of the NVA material and equipment no longer desired. Concerning the former, certainly the NVA performed its fair share of guard duty before the Unification; however, this was aided by the electric fences, that on Unification were eliminated.92 Guard duty proved to be a substantial burden, at times occupying up to two thirds of a battalion's personnel.93 MG Haasler summarized this and the other major factors that hindered training. Because of the "great burden of guard, reorganization, the reduction of the draft period to 12 months, etc., the required training hours are not available to the companies for the methodical, plan-oriented conduct of training according to training regulations."94 COL Klenner raised the public relations dimension of the problem—the German Army wanted to show that Army life was attractive. Guard duty drew time away from other more attractive training activities, such as exercises and weapons firing.95 Two final factors affected the conduct of training. First, training facilities did not enjoy a high priority in the budget for the improvement of the infrastructure in the east. In the face of such pressing and extensive needs for infrastructure renovation in the east, such things as ranges, ammunition depots, and sports fields unfortunately did not enjoy a high priority.96 Second, not only was time needed to train the soldiers, it was also needed to train the trainers. This was another detraction from efforts to achieve a standard training cycle.97 The area of training and education and of changing the mentality of the former NVA held tasks and challenges just as formidable for the Bundeswehr and

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the German Army as the other areas of the Takeover. It was an area that proved, however, to be less controversial than the others. There were no really controversial issues from the perspective of the Bundeswehr. From the standpoint of the former NVA, a minority criticized the decision not to recognize their military and academic credentials, one that clearly was based on the same factors as the decision that no NVA traditions were allowed into the Bundeswehr. In evaluating the decisions made in this area, therefore, the Bundeswehr and German Army should receive high marks, certainly from the standpoint of the paucity of NVA criticisms. In the area of Innere FUhrung, the analysis in this chapter shows that Bundeswehr directives prescribed the use of its principles and Bundeswehr education and training taught these principles to the NVA. Finally and most importantly, the Bundeswehr in great measure showed the former NVA the principles by the manner in which they conducted themselves and treated not only the former NVA but also the East German population.98 Data comparing former NVA and Bundeswehr performance in courses of instruction was not available. There were no evaluations conducted in many of the courses that the former NVA underwent; therefore, data was not available on how well they compared to their western colleagues. If any were, it would have been unwise to publish results that might have added to feelings of inferiority by former NVA. On-the-job training was a very critical component of their supplemental training, and there was no evaluation data on this either. Perhaps one good source of data to judge the quality of the training given, in schools and in units, was in the performance evaluations written on the former NVA taken over beyond two years, data that was not accessible. MG Reinhardt offered that the real test was to come when the first former NVA commanded a battalion in the west.99 Speaking in the same vein, BG von Kirchbach offered as one his "lessons learned" after a year in command: "We must achieve an 'exchange of blood' as quickly as possible from the West to the East and vice versa [emphasis added]. This is the only way to avoid establishing two different armies within the Bundeswehr."^® NOTES 1. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. 2. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 3. Fii S, "Weisung fur die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," Fu S I 7, Az 32-01, Bonn, 30 August 1990. 4. Fu H, "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlafllich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990." Fii H/InfoLZ, Bonn, 17 September 1990, 10-11. 5. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 6. Interview, Rudi Pallokat and Arnold Eiben, Legal Advisors, Seventh Division & Military Region, Leipzig, 14 November 1991. Only five legal advisors were available initially in the east for the almost 50,000 soldiers. Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von

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der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 611. 7. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. 8. Interview, LTG (Ret.) von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 9. Fii S, "Weisung fiir die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands," 5. 10. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. 11. Fu S, "Weisung fiir die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte," 3. 12. Jorg Schonbohm, "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," NATO's Sixteen Nations, November 1991, 130. 13. Jorg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 27. 14. Fu S, "Weisung fur die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte," 2. 15. Fu H, "Weisung Nr 1 fiir die Ausbildung von Offizieren und Unteroffizieren der Landstreitkrafte der NVA (Heereskommando Ost)," Az 32-01-06, Inspekteur des Heeres, FtiH 16, 30 August 1990, 1. 16. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Heer, 10/90,4. 17. Ibid.; Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 60-61, 79, 159, 177, 190. 18. Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 46. 19. Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 69-70. 20. Ibid., 142-143. For another Western Commander's efforts to engage the church, see Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, "Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces: The Eggesin Garrison as an Example for the Unification of Two Armies," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 14 February 1992), 25. At the conclusion of his command of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command on July 1, 1991, LTG Schonbohm maintained that Innere Fuhrung had proven itself, p. 250. The Bundeswehr put emphasis not simply on instructing former NVA on Innere Fuhrung but on West Germans exemplifying it in their leadership of the former NVA. See, for example, Fu H, "Vorlaufige organisatorische Bestimmungen fur Kommandobehorden, Stabe und Truppenteile des Heeres im beigetretenen Teil Deutschland," Fu H IV, Bonn, 27 September 90, 1; Fu S, "Weisung fiir die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte," 2. 21. Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 253. 22. For example, see Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 59. 23. "Deutschlands Einigung mitgestalten. Interview mit Generalleutenant Jorg Schonbohm," 4; also Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 189. 24. Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992): 172. Klaus-Jiirgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb indicated that the Bundeswehr placed a very high value on the presentation of Innere Fuhrung. "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 652. The very important positive role that Innere Fuhrung played in the Takeover is the subject of a major study

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by Mark E. Victorson, "Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport Paper 7 (Newport: Naval War College, June 1994). 25. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. 26. Interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992. 27. Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Das Vorbid wirkt: Innere Fuhrung und Ansatze einer Militarreform in der ehemaligen NVA," Information fur die Truppe (11/1990): 18. See also Dieter Franke and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Soldat in einer veranderten Welt: Acht Thesen zur Legitimation von Streitkraften," Truppenpraxis (1/1991): 88. 28. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 25 June 1992. 29. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 172-173. 30. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. 31. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. 32. Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 301. 33. Kirchbach, "Reflections," 19. 34. Fii S, "Weisung fiir die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte," 4-6. 35. Fu H, "Weisung Nr 1 fiir die Ausbildung von Offizieren und Unteroffizieren der Landstreitkrafte der NVA," 1-2. 36. Ibid. 37. Heeresamt, "Befehl fiir die Ausbildung: Vorlaufsausbildung von Kompaniechefs der 'Nationalen Volksarmee' an Schulen des Heeres," Heeresamt, Abteilung II, Cologne, 30 August 1990. 38. Ibid. 39. Heeresamt, "Befehl fiir die Ausbildung: Vorlaufsausbildung von Unteroffizieren mit Kompaniefeldwebelaufgaben der 'Nationalen Volksarmee' an Schulen des Heeres," Heeresamt, Abteilung II, Cologne, 30 August 1990. 40. Fii S, "Ausbildungsweisung Nr. 110 427 fiir den Lehrgang 'Innere Fuhrung fur Stabsoffiziere der ehem. NVA'," Fu S I 4, Az 33-02-01, 8 May 1991, 2. 41. Heeresamt, "Anweisung fiir die Fuhrerausbildung: Ausbildung der Offiziere der ehemaligen NVA - Landstreitkrafte—im Offiziererganzungslehrganng (2 Monate) fur die Dienstgradgruppe der Hauptleute," Heeresamt, Abteilung II, Cologne, 20 February 1991. 42. Ibid. 43. Heeresamt, "Anweisung fur die Fuhrerausbildung: Ausbildung der Offiziere der ehemaligen NVA - Landstreitkrafte—im Offiziererganzungslehrganng (2 Monate) fiir die Dienstgradgruppe der Leutnante." Heeresamt, Abteilung II, Cologne, 5 November 1991. 44. In the 4th Quarter, 1992, the German Army began an additional training course for selected former NVA captains who wished to become staff officers, that is, to reach the grade of major. This corresponded to Advanced Training, Phase C, at the Federal Command and General Staff College and included three weeks at this College and fourteen days tactical training in units. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 45. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 53. 46. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 51-52. 47. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 16. 48. These figures refer to Division/MDC VII and are considered representative of all units in the east. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 49. Interview, Staff Sergeant Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA) 18 June 1992; interview, SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992; interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and

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CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992; interview, Captain Belitz, Captain Kiither, Captain Stange, 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992; interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992; interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 50. Interview, SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA), 29 June 1992. 51. Interview, SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 52. Despite the impending Unification, the NVA continued its routine procedure by enlisting 15,000 draftees on September 1, 1990. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfiigen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die Hinterlassenschaft der NVA," Truppenpraxis (1/1991): 19. 53. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 334. 54. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Lahmann, 18 June 1992. 55. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 52; interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 56. Interview, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA) 18 June 1992. 57. Interview, CPT Reddemann (former NVA), 11 June 1992; interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 58. Klaus D. Naumann, "Mission and Structure of the Bundeswehr—The Role of the Bundeswehr in a Changing Security Environment," NATO's Sixteen Nations, November 1991,70. 59. Bross, "Einer trage des anderen Last," 494. 60. Ibid., 495. For a similar view by a former NVA see Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 238. 61. Konig, "Einschwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489. 62. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm." 332. 63. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. 64. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. 65. von Scheven, "Merger of Two Armies," 172. See also "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 332-333. For a discussion of this in eastern German society in general, see Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," 113. 66. Hundt, "Innere Fuhrung," 187. 67. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," March 4, 1993, 26. See also von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 610. 68. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 69. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992. See also Klaus-Jurgen Engelien and Hans-Joachim Reeb, "Wer bist du—Kamerad?" Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 651. Engelien and Reeb identified the major justifications that the former NVA used to make sense out of their devotion to a state and system that in the end proved corrupt. 70. Interview, LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991.

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71. Ibid. 72. Interview, CPT Reddemann (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 73. At this juncture AblaB dramatized by pointing to me (I had served twenty-one years in the U.S. military), and said I had been the enemy. Interview, AblaB, 26 June 1992. 74.Ibid. 75. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 333. 76. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 48. 77. Ulrich A. Hundt, "Innere Fiihrung—eine gute Mitgift fiir Bundeswehr Ost," Truppenpraxis (2/1991): 186. 78. Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 300. See also Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 58-59. 79. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. For semantic problems, see also Peter Preylowski, "Armee im Wandel?—Armee ohne Zukunft?" Soldat und Technik (9/1990): 666. 80. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 81. Schonbohm, "Bundeswehrkommando-Ost," 124. 82. Interview, BG Hartmann, 14 November 1991. 83. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 84. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. For contrasting views see Sommer, "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen," 302; and (former NVA) Konig, "Bericht aus einer anderen Welt," 238. 85. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 86. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 29. 87. Presentation by MG Reinhardt Naval War College, 24 November 1992. 88. Interview, MG Richter, 14 November 1991. 89. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. MAJ Seppelt of the NVA addressed this difference but continued discussing the differences in quality of German Army versus NVA commanders and staff officers. He asserted that the NVA staff officer had more power than his German Army counterpart. Interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992. During the two-year trial period, this subject was of great concern to the former NVA. Both officers and NCOs were not sure whether they were adjusting quickly enough. 90. Interview, Pallokat and Eiben, 14 November 1991. 91. Interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992; Reinhard Gramm, '"Sie wollen doch nicht etwa missionieren?': Problemfelder der Militarseelsorge in Ost und West," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 94. 92. Presentation by MG Reinhardt Naval War College, 24 November 1992. 93. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June, 1992. Also see Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen, 66, 75, 93, 96, 127; Kirchbach, "Reflections," 4. 94. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991,21. 95. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991.

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96. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992. 97. Interview, COL Steinhaus, 29 June 1992. 98. In this area then, this study complements the work of Mark Victorson, "Mission in the East," 27-35. 99. Presentation by MG Reinhardt, Naval War College, 24 November 1992. This view is also noted in Konig, "Ein schwerer und schmerzhafter ProzeB," 489. 100. Kirchbach, "Reflections," 27.

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8

Equipment and Facilities Decisions Had the Takeover of the NVA dealt solely with its personnel—the selection process, the process of conducting military training and of re-educating its members in democracy and the free enterprise system, and the integrating of its members into the Bundeswehr and the larger German society—it would have been a fully formidable challenge in itself. The Bundeswehr, however, had to deal with more. In addition to assuming control over its soldiers and civil servants, the Bundeswehr assumed control on October 3, 1990, over the mass of equipment, material, and property, not only controlled formerly by the NVA, but also by the Border Troops, the State Security Organization (Stasi), and the other paramilitary organizations. Aside from the enormous quantity of NVA equipment and facilities over which the Bundeswehr had to assume control, this area was especially complex because of the inefficiency of the NVA logistics system, the limitations placed on the Bundeswehr by the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the Gulf War. Criteria used in evaluating the NVA equipment included need, maintenance requirements, safety, and operating efficiency. Of the major equipment systems of the NVA, only its armored personnel carriers (BMP), MI-8 transport helicopters, and wheeled vehicles were in the end taken over for a period of time. Criteria for the evaluation of former NVA facilities included the condition of the infrastructure, quality of the training facilities nearby, and environmental safety. Because of the potential economic impact and domestic political implications, these decisions on facilities were made at the political level. This chapter maintains the approach used previously, organizing the analysis around the two key sets of decisions that had to be made in this area: first, what equipment would the German Army take over and second, what property (facilities and installations) would it take over?1 After presenting necessary

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background, the chapter addresses each of these decisions, offering both West German and former NVA evaluations. A number of related subjects are also covered including, with the first decision, the procedures established to dispose of the great amount of equipment not accepted into the Bundeswehr and the receiving of new equipment from the west and, with the second decision, some sense of the magnitude of the renovations necessary to bring the accepted facilities up to the standards of the Bundeswehr. On October 3, 1990, the Bundeswehr—but particularly the German Army—was faced with the host of issues that stemmed from assuming control of such a tremendous amount of equipment and property. The major Army weapons are presented in Table 8.1. In addition to this material, the Bundeswehr assumed control over hundreds of facilities and installations. COMPLICATING FACTORS There were a number of factors that complicated this area. First, the NVA equipment and logistics system was entirely different than and incompatible with the Bundeswehr system. The NVA had some nineteen different logistical services, each one oriented to its particular service, such as armor (Panzerdienst), artillery (Artilleriedienst), and intelligence (Nachrichtendienst). Each service ran essentially its own system, making for great complexity and inefficiency. A hammer, for example, had different serial numbers in different services. This meant that for a time the German Army had to administer both NVA and German Army logistics systems simultaneously.2 A second complicating factor was the limitations on the Bundeswehr stemming from the Kohl-Gorbachev agreements in July 1990, and the equipment limitations from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. Limitations on equipment did not flow directly from the former agreements; however, limitations on the Bundeswehr's overall personnel strength did. The cap on the overall active end-strength (370,000) had direct implications for force structure, the number and types of units in the force, which affected equipment requirements. More direct and definitive were the limits placed on the Bundeswehr by the CFE Treaty, none of which were adjusted because of the Unification and Takeover of the NVA. Figure 8.1 shows the CFE limitations on the Bundeswehr equipment of the united Germany and the quantity of each item that had to be destroyed. These limitations resulted in Germany shouldering next to the Soviet Union the greatest requirement for the destruction of major weapons systems, some 11,000.3 A final complicating factor was the outbreak of the Gulf War. During the winter of 1990-1991, Germany provided an enormous amount of Bundeswehr and NVA equipment to the allies fighting Iraq.4 In the midst of the many and complex tasks required for the complete Takeover of the NVA, namely the reduction of the strength to the levels prescribed by the international agreements

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Table 8.1 Major NVA Weapon Systems (Land Forces) Taken Over by the German Army at Unification

Weapon System Schutzenpanzerwagen SPW 70 (Armored Personnel Carrier) BMP 1 (Armored Personnel Carrier) Selbstfahrlafette 122 mm 2 S 1 (Self-Propelled Artillery) Haubitze 122 mm D 30 (Self-Propelled Artillery) Artillerie-Raketenwerfer RM-70 (Multiple Rocket Launcher) Morser 120 mm (Mortar) Flak-Zwilling 23 mm (Anti-Aircraft Gun) Spahfahrzeug SPW 40 P2 (Armored Recon Vehicle) Leichte Panzer Buchse RPG 18 (Light armored gun) Maschinepistole AK-74 (Assault rifle) Panzerabwehrlenkungsrakette Fagott (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) Panzerabwehrlenkungsrakette Metis (Anti-tank guided missile launcher) Panzerzugmaschinen T55T (Armored vehicle) Bergepanzer T55TK (Armored mountain vehicle) Panzer T 72 (Tank) Panzer T 55 A Panzer T 55 Panzer T54 A

Number 1,266 1,112 374 395 265 291 924 1,579 26,526 163,039 419 31 243 119 549 1,219 261 193

Source: Fu H, "Vortrag STAL Fu H V bei erweitertem Fiihrungskreis Heer am 12.09.1990: Integration von Material der NVA," Fii H V, Bonn, 11 September 1990; Friedrich Steinseifer, "Streitkrafte im vereinten Deutschland," Wehrtechnik (11/1990): 78.

and the reduction of the length of basic service from fifteen to twelve months, the additional task of sorting out the material desired by allied or friendly states for the Gulf War, transporting it to the port of Bremerhaven, and training personnel to use the equipment, proved very onerous.5

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Figure 8.1 CFE Treaty Limitations for the United Germany

Source: Klaus D. Naumann, "Mission and Structure of the Bundeswehr," NATO's Sixteen Nations (Special Issue—The Bundeswehr) (November 1991): 67; Jiirgen Erbe, "Entsorgung von Wehrmaterial," Soldat und Technik (6/1991): 412-413; Ulrich Weisser, "Die Zukunft unserer Sicherheit: Europaische Sicherheitstrukturen und deutsche Streitkrafte," Informatioan fur die Truppe (6/1991): 10. DECISION 10: EQUIPMENT TAKEOVER The basic questions concerning the takeover of NVA equipment and property were asked early after the Kohl-Gorbachev meeting in July 1990. What equipment is there and where is it? What facilities and installations are there and in what type condition are they? Concerning equipment, State Secretary Carl, at a meeting with GDR State Secretary AblaB, agreed on the approach to be used in inventorying the logistical system of the NVA.6 Minister Stoltenberg directed State Secretary Dr. Pfahls to assume the task of inventorying the weapons and equipment of the NVA and to present to him proposals for the further use of equipment, considering the personnel and equipment ceilings and requirements from the relevant agreements and treaties.7 In late August, the Joint Staff disseminated guidance to the services for the material operational readiness of the armed forces in the area of the GDR. It addressed general responsibilities for the material to be taken over and principles that would guide the takeover of NVA material into the Bundeswehr? At the Army level, teams were organized to perform a reconnaissance (Erkundung) to begin to answer these questions. For the German Army, BG (Ret.) Heinz Prange was brought on active duty and asked to organize and conduct this reconnaissance under the Army Staff in Bonn. Two critical questions were posed: "What portion of the former organization of the NVA can be taken over for the build up of command and control and force structure of the Army on

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the territory of the GDR?" "What material and what real property and other facilities can be used for the Army?"9 Army Staff departments were tasked to collect specific information related to their respective areas. For example, Fii H V (Logistics and Medical Service) was tasked in the following areas: • Logistics and medical service command and control structure. • Organization and facilities of the logistical and medical service units. • Logistics and medical service personnel and training procedures. • Military material of the NVA from the standpoint of possible Takeover. • Environmental protection. In coordination with the GDR's MDD, approximately two dozen reconnaissance teams, consisting generally of four to five officers, fanned out into the GDR in the first two weeks of September 1990 to conduct the best possible reconnaissance they could to obtain information on which important future decisions concerning equipment and property would be made. The NVA leadership directed its units to prepare reports for these teams and have equipment and facilities ready for their inspection.10 A similar reconnaissance was done from September 17 to 21 of the NVA reserve units by fifty-one teams from the German Army's Territorial Command.11 On September 21, the Joint Staff notified the Minister of Defense that the inventories had been completed and that the following requirements should be presumed. The troop units in the joined area were to be converted step by step to Bundeswehr material with the goal of long-term uniform material outfitting. NVA material that was capable of functioning and of being supplied adequately, for whose use a need existed, was in individual cases to be used further, minimizing as much as possible dependence on the Soviet Union. Every use of NVA military material had to fulfill the requirement of being cost effective relative to Bundeswehr material in stock or to be procured. Troop units that could not or should not be dissolved had to be kept in existence (lebensfdhig). A temporary reduction in the operational readiness and the training readiness was accepted. Proposals for material had to conform to the structural and organizational planning for Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command and the future structures. The decision over a munition of a particular weapon would be decided in conjunction with the decision on the respective weapon system. Finally, the operation of the material had to conform, for the transition period as well as the long term, to prescribed safety and legal requirements.12 These guidelines contained criteria for the selection of material for further use; however, over time these criteria were refined. The Army articulated four. First, a need had to exist. The needs of the German Army were changing because of the impending reduction to 370,000 men and also because of treaty requirements stemming form the negotiations on CFE. Second, the material had to be able to be maintained (versorgbar) over a longer period of time without creating "special" dependencies. This factor affected the Bundeswehr's decision not to use the 550 T-72 tanks that would have created an unacceptable reliance on the

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Soviet Union for spare parts. Third, it had to comply with the German federal functioning and operating safety standards or be able to be adapted to these without great expense. This was a major reason why the 370 NVA mechanized Howitzers (artillery) were not accepted. Finally, its operating efficiency had to be sensible. Much NVA equipment had higher operating costs in comparison to Bundeswehr equipment. Therefore, in every case, a cost-use analysis was required,13 Three categories of equipment were established. Category I included material that was to be used either temporarily or for the long run. Material in this category such as the MI 8 Attack Helicopter was called AMO (anrechnenbaren Modelle Ost)^ Category II included material that was needed for the maintenance of operations as well as support for actions in the restructuring and afterward would be sorted out and disposed of, or whose possible further use could only be decided after further evaluation. (It appears that Category II was eventually split into two separate ones, making four categories. Material designated as simply needing further evaluation made up a new Category II.15) Category III included material that would not be used after Unification and that was to be separated and disposed of as quickly as possible.16 The process of deciding which Army equipment was to be taken over was long and complicated, because there were so many items to review and test, because every Army branch had to review its needs and decide on whether the equipment could meet these needs, and because of the ever-changing planning factors—specifically budget cuts. Testing and trials, performed by the Federal Office of Defense Technology and Procurement were required in this process that altogether lasted approximately eighteen months. This was especially difficult for the artillery. After the entire process was completed, the only major end-item taken over for an extended period of time was the BMP armored personnel carrier, 746 of which were kept until the German Army Marder II could replace it. A number of MI-8 transport helicopters and wheeled vehicles were also kept during the transition period. The latter remained until the units in the west were deactivated, freeing up western vehicles for transfer to the east.17 Beyond the criteria just stated, there were other factors that played into these equipment decisions. LTG Schonbohm commented on the importance of making decisions as quickly as possible because of the financial and personnel costs of keeping the equipment operational and of guarding it.18 LTC Diethard Vogt, Logistics Officer for Defense Region 84 in Potsdam, listed a number of factors. Spare parts for the NVA equipment were difficult to get from the Soviet Union. Second, one strove for standardization of procedures and, related to this, one also wanted standardization of training, something that standardization of equipment assisted. Third, in general the quality of the western equipment was better, and this equipment was to come available to the eastern units as the restructuring of the Army into AS 5 progressed. Until that time, the units in the east had to be patient and accomplish their missions with the NVA equipment.19

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MG Haasler spoke candidly about the various political levels of this issue. He indicated that the politicians hardly became involved and when they did it was a long process. For example, the NVA had the MI-24 Attack Helicopter; the Bundeswehr had no such platform, only light helicopters with rockets attached. As of June 1992, the decision concerning the takeover of the MI-24 had not been made. The Aviation Branch of the Army did not want it perhaps, he speculated, because it wanted the PA-2 (Panzerabwehrhubschrauber-2). He acknowledged there was indeed politics in the army and reflected on what might occur. The German Army might not get the PA-2 because it was so expensive and in a few years the MI-24 would be nonoperational. He indicated that one could have a "biological solution": The pilots would leave or retire from the service.20 Disposal of NVA Equipment Two important topics related to these decisions on equipment were, first, the process of disposal of NVA equipment and munitions not needed by the German Army and, second, the receiving of replacement equipment from the west. The Army faced the unusual task after Unification of building an entire system for disposing of equipment not needed.21 This in fact proved to be a critical burden on the units in the east as it required much time and personnel.22 At first, all the equipment had to be inventoried and lists prepared, a task accomplished by December 1991. 23 The material that was not needed was transported to some one hundred collection depots (Verdictungslage/depots). The material of a particular Army branch in the NVA was collected at a particular depot(s). Former NVA depots or airports that the Air Force did not want were used as collection depots. Once the material reached the depots, the VEBEG, a civilian corporation that dealt with demilitarizing and disposing of military material, assumed responsibility for it.24 In addition to the unneeded equipment, between 250,000 and 270,000 tons of munitions also had to be transferred to collection points and disposed of.25 Receiving Replacement Equipment All Army units (battalions and separate companies) were eventually to receive western equipment when the equipment became available and after the units had met certain criteria. First, a battalion had to have the necessary trained personnel: a trained logistics officer, drivers, and maintenance and supply personnel. Second, it had to have the necessary infrastructure. For example, motor parks and maintenance bays had to be available to receive and maintain the equipment. When he felt ready, a unit commander reported through channels that his unit had "full readiness" or "restricted readiness" for receiving equipment. If it was the latter, the unit received only selected items.26 MG Reinhardt stated that by November 1992 the material problems were essentially solved. The German Army had essentially one logistical system and had approximately

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11,000 treaty-limited items to dispose of.27 In 1993, a civilian firm, MDSG, assumed control over the entire disposal operation.28 Evaluation Both West German military and former NVA had considerable comment on various aspects of the decisions related to the takeover of NVA material and equipment, especially the reconnaissance conducted at the outset of the process and the speed of the discharge of NVA specialists. Numerous criticisms were made of the reconnaissance. The time allotted for this was very short—only about ten days—and so it had to be conducted hurriedly. The officers making up the teams were not from troop units but from the high-level staffs—the federal ministries and offices, the Army Staff (Bonn), and the Army Office (Cologne). The established criteria were used in evaluating former NVA facilities and installations; however, in many cases the presumption was made that if a facility had been used by an NVA tank regiment, then it was suitable for a German Army tank battalion, something that was not necessarily true. 29 One logistics officer stated: "Because it happened so quickly and superficially, we have today [June 1992] serious problems with the infrastructure because the infrastructure in many garrisons is lousy [krach] and just does not fit."30 Other problems surfaced. MG Haasler pointed out that the disposal process was hindered at times because of the slowness in the months after Unification of identifying locations that could be used for the collection. He added that "unnecessary restrictions on the use of NVA material impeded the transition to a standard training cycle."31 A second was the slow pace at times of the arrival of replacement equipment from the west.32 BG von Kirchbach was not sure whether it was wise to reject so much of the NVA equipment, but pointed to Germany's treaty obligations and to the fact that much of what the Soviets built had been done without regard for the individual. It was designed for combat and not for human safety, let alone comfort.33 Both LTC Schiele and LTC Vogt spoke of the insufficiency of trained logistics personnel in the east. LTC Vogt asserted that more of these, especially maintenance, supply, and medical service personnel, should have been sent from the west to the east. This was especially true of the active units, but also the territorial units. In territorial units he said the ratio of west to east personnel in general was 1:3 to 1:5, whereas in active units it could be 1:30 to 1:50.34 He was at a loss to explain this difference. LTC Schiele indicated that it was politically understandable but still a great mistake that certain "structures" (of personnel) were consciously not taken over. "This meant that at the outset personnel who were there to that point, suddenly were no longer available to direct further this great quantity of material in a sensible fashion." As a result the material was not maintained and available for further use.35

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COL Lassonczyk, the logistics officer for the Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, spoke directly to the problems in inventorying such a great mass of equipment under the unusual circumstances that the German Army faced. The extent of what the Army had assumed control over was never fully clear in the beginning. He offered that it never really had an accurate inventory of the NVA equipment and could not really say whether this was avoidable. He did point out, however, that "the NVA were also German" and had the "same mentality." "The same spirit prevailed here [in the east]." Only the structures were different, with the German Army following the U.S. Army's model and the NVA following the Soviet model.36 His discussion then moved to the issue of qualified personnel. The West Germans came and many NVA were quickly discharged. When the German Army began to ask questions, there was no one who really knew how the NVA logistics system functioned. The NVA said, "Oh, Colonel, so and so always did that." However, this colonel was gone. This, he said, was really the critical problem. The German Army really never secured and maintained a grasp on the NVA material. This proved especially difficult during the Gulf War when questions on the NVA material had to be answered.37 When Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command was deactivated on July 1, 1991, and the Army assumed direct control of the units in the east, Army Headquarters asked about inventories. The Eastern Corps and Territorial Command said, "Here are the lists." The Army said, "Count." Eastern Command retorted, "We are not counting." This battle endured until September when the Army Chief of Staff directed that another inventory be taken at great expense. This was conducted throughout October and November 1991 and cleared up much confusion, at least on the major items.38 Aside from these comments and criticisms of the West Germans, the former NVA raised a great number of objections in this area of equipment takeover, relating to the equipment itself as well as the former NVA specialists on the equipment. The first criticism was that too much good equipment and material were thrown away, and too many decisions were made without good information. The evaluation process should have been done in a more careful, measured fashion. For example, the German Army, said one former NVA, lumped NVA reserve and active duty equipment together, something that should have been avoided. Another officer speculated that perhaps the Bundeswehr's rejection of so much NVA equipment was political—the Bundeswehr simply could not validate the notion that NVA equipment was of good quality.39 CPT Reddemann said that in about 90 percent of the cases, the Bundeswehr rejected equipment outright. The contradiction, he pointed out, was that this same equipment was sent to the Gulf War for use by the allies. "The Bundeswehr did not take over much but it delivered it to the Gulf."40 The second criticism by the former NVA, echoed by several West German officers, was that too many specialists were discharged too quickly. They could have provided valuable service at a critical time to accomplish the mission of

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inventorying, sorting out, evaluating, selecting, and disposing of equipment. Because of the dramatically rapid discharge of so many specialists, necessary expertise was lacking.41 DECISION 11: FACILITIES TAKEOVER The second critical set of decisions addressed the question of which garrisons and facilities should be taken over. These were difficult decisions made with the best information available at the time. The basic information for the decisions flowed from the reconnaissance performed in September 1990 described earlier. Because these decisions involved political interests of the individual federal states, they were made at the level of the MOD and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.42 Important criteria included the condition of the infrastructure within the garrison, the nature of the training facilities near the garrison, and the condition of the garrison with regard to environmental safety 43 In some locations, for example in Dresden, the decisions resulted in a drastic reduction of the military presence. COL Gulich, the brigade commander in this area, estimated that by 1995 because of the reduction of the Bundeswehr presence as well as the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, the military presence would be only 20 percent of what it once was. Plans called for his brigade to move, for the Defense District Command (VBK) to remain, and for part of an officer's school in Munich to transfer to Dresden.44 Because of the complexity and number of decisions that were required and because of their political impact, interim solutions were used in certain cases. At times, there were competing occupancy demands and limitations on construction that could be accomplished. One brigade, for example, was stationed in the city of Halle until its garrison in Weissenfels was complete.45 An aspect of this overall decision was that no Soviet garrisons would be used, a decision for which several reasons were offered. The Germans were not exactly sure of the Soviets' departure schedule, where and when they would leave. Second, based on the reconnaissance made it was clear that the Soviet garrisons in general were in worse shape than the NVA's. There would be a tremendous amount of environmentally dangerous material that the Soviets would leave in their wake. The Germans also presumed that the Soviets would totally disembowel their garrisons of any usable material.46 The factors affecting the decisions on the garrisons to be taken over were multidimensional. They included not simply military factors, but economic and political as well. MG Reinhardt stated an important general economic question that was asked: "What type of economic factor is the Bundeswehr in this area? Can we take away everything in a large area that is already poor?"47 BG von Kirchbach raised this factor concerning the remote location of his brigade in Eggesin. He indicated that the army's presence was very important economically to the livelihood of the people.48 As the NVA, the Bundeswehr presence would clearly be important to the economy in East Germany. The Military District

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Administration VII in Strausberg estimated that after the Bundeswehr had completed its unit activations in the eastern sector, it would contribute approximately DM 4 billion to the economy.49 Another officer referred to a second type of economic factor—the need to make good use of resources available, in one case, the continued use of a tank maintenance facility.50 Political factors were also cited. LTG von Scheven described a situation across the former border between East and West Germany where there were two garrisons about fifty kilometers apart. The one in the west was in excellent condition but the decision was made to return it to the civilians and renovate the one in the east. This had a political motivation in the sense that a relatively balanced presence of the Bundeswehr was desired in the new eastern federal states compared to the west. There was a desire to publicize such balancing efforts.51 BG Wittenberg, the initial brigade commander for Home Defense Brigade 37 in Dresden, spoke at length about the lack of any international political/strategic basis for the decisions made. "The [international] political situation never necessitated . . . that we keep or not keep certain garrisons for strategic/operational reasons."52 That really had no influence at all. The German Army really did not consider the changing European political-strategic landscape in its decision making on stationing. "That was not an issue." Army leaders were fixed on the more practical questions. Where and when could they rid themselves of the unwanted, burdensome NVA material so that the draftees would not have to perform so much guard and they could feel like normal soldiers.53 Evaluation West Germans had much more to say than former NVA in commenting on this decision area. On the NVA side, an NVA officer in Dresden made the general statement that concerning garrisons "mistakes were made,"54 and a second former NVA officer in Potsdam criticized the long decision process and pointed out that as time goes by the facilities deteriorate.55 On the West German side COL Gulich explained the Army's hope that the infrastructure could be improved quickly, and how it eventually realized that double the time was needed because of limited funding. This delay was having an effect on the units.56 LTC Danzer expressed his misgivings about the decisions on the infrastructure, indicating that perhaps different criteria should have been used. Inventories were not comprehensive enough and also there was the question of the Soviet departure. What facilities might they have that the German Army could use? 57 MG Haasler emphasized the catastrophic underestimation of the resources needed for the renovation of the living areas in the east. The estimates had been raised to DM 15 billion for the entire renovation. He also pointed out that the Federal Defense Administration, the agency that handled this area, had sent too few officials to the east and had taken too long to get organized. As others had, he also indicated that the early reconnaissance of the garrisons and installations

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was done very hurriedly, and so the decisions on future stationing were made on a very tentative basis. This produced a situation where the German Army could eventually see that units should be stationed elsewhere or should go into other facilities, for example, into facilities still occupied by the Soviets. However, by that time in 1991 the Defense Minister had already made public the original plan. The military then resurfaced individual decisions and wanted to change them; for example, the Army asked for the Olympic Village in Berlin. These issues had to be resolved at the political level again in 1992 because they involved the interests of the federal states, and Minister Stoltenberg delayed decisions because of their complexity.58 To amplify on the costs of renovating in the East, DM 550 million was spent in 1991 59 and the estimates in mid-1992 had risen to DM 16-20 billion to bring military facilities in the east up to the level of the west. This was necessary to meet legal (safety and security) requirements, and the intention was to spend about DM 1 billion per year with the first priorities being: "living, eating, sleeping and the technical area." For 1992, the entire infrastructure budget of the Bundeswehr allocated for construction and renovation in the east.60 Logistical Support in the East Some brief coverage of the logistical support system in the east is needed to conclude this chapter. In the second week of September 1991, the Army Staff issued instructions on this important subject. "The joining together of the German armed forces required quick and effective measures in logistics for the Army." After the Takeover, the logistical support of the army units in the east had to be insured. The German Army Office in Cologne in cooperation with the Material Office of the Army, was tasked to accomplish this in line with appropriate regulations.61 At least two aspects of the system deserve mentioning. First, along with the other types of support, the partnership units provided logistical support as well. Second, material management was enhanced by the creation of additional maintenance and supply control centers (Leitstellen) in the east. These centers were supplied with expert personnel to assist the units in these matters and were to be dissolved at the end of 1992.62 NOTES 1. These two sets of decisions were chosen for analysis because in the interviews they repeatedly surfaced as being critical to the Takeover. 2. Interview, COL Lassonczyk, 25 June 1992; interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992; interview, LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992. 3. Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," inEin Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr,ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 49.

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4. See U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, "German Equipment Support Desert Shield/Storm," Liaison Office, German Army Office, Cologne, 18 March 1991. 5. Interview, LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992. Major Martin Fahlbusch, Assistant Logistics Officer for Division/MDC VII, characterized the time and work in this operation, amidst the other tasks, as an "elephant." See also Werner von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt: Was Offiziere der Bundeswehr erwartet, die aus dem Westen in den Osten Deutschlands versetzt werden," Truppenpraxis (6/1991): 609, fn #3. LTG von Scheven added that former NVA equipment was also provided to humanitarian agencies in eastern Europe and Scandanavia, all under the pressure of the CFE deadlines. Interview, 18 June 1998. 6. Fu S, "Grundsatze zur Sicherstellung der materiellen Einsatzbereitschaft fiir die Streitkrafte im Gebiet des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands," Fii S V 1, Az 10-20-01, Bonn, 20 August 1990. 7. State Secretary Dr. Pfahls, "Waffen und Gerat der ehemaligen NVA (Ausgangsdaten und Uberlegungen)," Vortrag in der Abteilungsleiterkonferenz, Fii S VI 6, Bonn, October 25, 1990,4. 8. "Grundsatze zur Sicherstellung," 20 August 1990. 9. Fii H, "Auftrage der Stabsabteilungen des Fu H zur Bestandsaufnahme vor Ort in der DDR," Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, Bonn, 24 August 1990, 1. 10. Ibid.; "Anordnung Nr. 13/90 des Chefs der Landstreitkrafte iiber die Sicherstellung der Besichtigung von Objekten der Landstreitkrafte durch Erkundigungsgruppen des Bundesheeres," Signed by Generalleutnant Skerra, 28 August 1990. 11. Fu H, "Verbindungsaufnahme zu den Wehrkommandos der NVA: Erstes Ergebnis," Fu H III 3, Az 02-06-02, Bonn, 26 September 1990. 12. Fu S, "Bestandsaufnahme und weitere Nutzung von Waffen und Gerat der ehemaligen Streitkrafte des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands," Fu S VI 6, Bonn, 21 September 1990, 2-3. 13. Fii H, "Vortrag Stabsabteilungleiter Fii H V bei erweitertem Fiihrungskreis Heer am 12.09.1990: Integration von Material der NVA." Fu H V. Bonn, 11 September 1990, 2-3; Wolfgang Flume, "Was geschieht mit dem NVA-Material?" Soldat und Technik (11/1990): 781-782. 14. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992. 15. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Streitkrafte im vereinten Deutschlands: Integration der NVA," Wehrtechnik (11/1990): 73. 16. "Vortrag Stabsabteilungleiter Fu H V," 3; Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenfiigen und verkleinern: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die Hinterlassenschaft der NVA," Truppenpraxis (1/1991): 23. 17. Interview with COL Lassonczyk, 25 June 1992; interview with LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992; interview with COL Klenner, 12 November 1991; von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 609. 18. "Alle bekommen eine faire Chance," Spiegel, 1 July 1991, 80. 19. Interview, LTC Vogt, 22 June 1992. 20. He continued that if this occurred, one would have nothing to think about. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992. BG von Kirchbach also stated that the politicians played only a marginal role in the equipment takeover. "They might push us to one piece or another," but overall no great role. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992.

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21. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 608. 22. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992; interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. 23. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992. 24. Interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991; interview, COL Lassonczyk, 25 June 1992; interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. For discussions of the disposal and conversion processes, see Wolf-Riidiger Konitzki, "Wohin mit der UberfluB?—Die Aufgaben des Heeres bei der Verwahrung und Verwertung des ehemaligen NVA-Materials," Truppenpraxis (5/1992): 443-447; Hans Einhorn, "Panzer zu Traktoren: Konversion in den Neuen Bundeslandem," Information fiir die Truppe (4/1991): 24-33; Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fur Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 205-207. 25. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 49; Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 73-7'4, 159-162. 26. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992. 27. Presentation by MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. He also indicated that the Poles and Hungarians had asked Germany for NVA end-items. 28. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 29. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992; interview, LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992; interview, COL Klenner, 12 November 1991. 30. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 31. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991. 32. Interview, COL Steinhaus, 29 June 1992. 33. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992. 34. Interview, LTC Vogt, 22 June 1992. LTG von Scheven pointed out that the main combat brigades in the east were labeled territorial because of the Unification Treaty; however, they were in reality active units. Interview, 18 June 1998. 35. Interview, LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992. 36. Interview, COL Lassonczyk, 25 June 1992. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992; interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992; interview, MAJ Leesing and CPT Ingolf (former NVA), 16 June 1992; interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 40. Interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992. LTG (Ret.) von Scheven felt that this was an unfair criticism. German laws dictated certain prohibitions and requirements; however, this did not mean that the equipment could not be sold or given away to other countries. Interview, June 18, 1998. 41. Interview, LTC Henning, CPT Losch, and ILT Triebel (former NVA), 26 June 1992, and interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992. West German officers emphasized how important the NVA specialists were to the mission. Interview, LTC Kuhl, 29 June 1992. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992. Also COL Lassonczyk's

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explanation implies that the West Germans erred in releasing too many NVA too quickly. Interview, 25 June 1992. 42. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992; interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 43. MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 15; Steinseifer, "Zusammenfugen und verkleinern," 22. 44. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 45. Interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992; MG Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt," 46. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992; interview, MAJ Fahlbusch, 18 June 1992. Realizing the poverty to which they were returning, MG Matvei Burlakov, the Commander of Russian forces in Germany, told his departing soldiers to take home whatever they wished. Even a concrete pole might buy five pigs. The soldiers removed window frames, toilet fixtures, electrical outlets, and in one case they even disassembled a concrete airport runway. Stephen Kinzer, "Russian Troops Bid 'Wiedersehen' to Germany," New York Times, 1 September 1994, A3. 47. Interview, MG Reinhardt, 24 November 1992. 48. Interview, BG von Kirchbach, 16 June 1992; Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt, Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 13. Dirk Sommer also referred to the economic catastrophe that would result if the Second Mechanized Division were moved from its location near Kassel. "Zwischen Hoffen und Zagen: Viele Angehorigen der ehemaligen NVA ftihlen sich als Soldaten zweiter Klasse," Truppenpraxis (3/1991): 299. 49. Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 11-12, 129-130, 158. 50. This officer, hesitant about speaking on the record, said this on a nonattribution basis. 51. Interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992; von Scheven, "Abschied von der heilen Welt," 608. 52. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June, 1992. 53. Ibid. A second issue that occupied him as a brigade commander was the welfare and future of the former NVA in his unit who had applied for future service. 54. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992, Dresden. 55. Interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 56. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 57. Interview, LTC Danzer, 18 June 1992. 58. Interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992. 59. Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," 47. 60. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992; interview, LTG von Scheven, June 25, 1992. 61. Fii H, "Vorbereitende MaBnahmen zur Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte: MaBnahmen der Logistik des Herres," Fu H V 1, Az 02-06, Bonn, 12 September 1990, 1. LTC Schiele praised the partnership system for its role in providing logistical support. Interview, 29 June 1992. 62. Interview, LTC Schiele, 29 June 1992.

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9

The Takeover and the "New Tasks" of the Bundeswehr Up to this point this study has been concerned mainly with the eleven critical decisions made in the Takeover of the NVA, the most important considerations affecting those decisions, and the evaluation of those decisions by West and East German officers and NCOs. This chapter extends the analysis by asking questions about the implications of the Takeover for the ability of the German Army to accomplish its "new tasks" (Neue Aufgaben), new mission requirements impelled by the new security conditions in Europe, including Germany's rise to major power status. The Takeover had a clear and dramatically negative effect on the operational readiness of the German Army, as the Army threw its entire energy into the Takeover. However, the relationship of the Takeover to the new "extended task spectrum" of the German Army was not fully clear. Most West German interviewees seemed puzzled at the suggestion of a possible connection. They did not seem to have considered that the Takeover might have some effect on the German Army's ability to conduct missions outside national and NATO borders. In terms of the German Army's ability to accomplish missions beyond the traditional ones of the defense of Germany and of NATO, the Takeover was a significant factor in retarding its ability to be fully prepared for such missions. Given a clear domestic consensus on the use of the Bundeswehr for such missions—something yet to exist despite the July 1994 decision by the Federal Constitutional Court—the German Army would have been better prepared earlier for such missions had it not had to accomplish such a huge undertaking as the Takeover of the NVA. These new missions were not to be given to the new units activated in the east until 1995. It was felt that by this time these units should have experienced no significant negative consequences resulting from the Takeover in accomplish-

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ing the new missions. By 1995, the many new company-level officers from the east were to have been fully trained in the Bundeswehr school system. This added to the fact that only the top former NVA officers—in terms of character, potential, and demonstrated performance—were accepted at the end of 1992 into the German Army as professional soldiers, would fairly well assure, it was hoped, that the Takeover had no detrimental effects on the ability of the German Army—specifically, units with personnel from the former East Germany—to perform its new missions. If anything the Takeover seemed to have enhanced the Army's ability because the former NVA evinced a highly positive and professional attitude toward such missions. Former NVA valued highly service to one's country. That this country was now their former nemesis mattered not. After a brief look at combat readiness in the new units, the study looks at the Bundeswehr's new tasks. One objective of this study was to examine potential problems that the Takeover might create for the accomplishment of the Bundeswehr's new missions. Would the former NVA prove to be a help or a hindrance to the Army's role in these new tasks? The views of West German officers and former NVA are analyzed on this subject. Finally, a summary of the history of the debate and ruling on the constitutionality of out-of-area missions is provided. READINESS OF THE NEW UNITS IN THE EAST As expected, the combat readiness of the new units activated in the east was very low. The new units were burdened with the tasks of guarding and disposing of tremendous quantities of NVA equipment and, for a time, with preparing and transporting selected equipment to the port of Bremerhaven for shipment to the allied Gulf War effort. The territorial units were also charged with assisting in the withdrawal of the Western Group of Soviet Forces, some 380,000 military personnel. Until the spring of 1993, the missions were performed in the midst of great personnel instability and insecurity within the units caused by the initial waves of discharges on Unification, the gradual release of longer serving soldiers (Weiterverwender) up until the end of 1991 when the German Army no longer needed them, the discharges mainly in 1992 of those former NVA whose Stasi connections were uncovered, and finally the discharge of those former NVA whose applications to become professional soldiers or longer term volunteers had been denied. Adding to the complicated personnel situation was the substantial share of former NVA officers and NCOs who were at any given time absent from their units because of supplemental training—either in military schools or in partnership units in the west. Not surprising then was the picture painted by the West German officers. In March 1991, MG Haasler pointed out that a normal troop schedule had to be attained as quickly as possible so that operationally units could exist also in the east.1 In the summer of 1991, LTG Schonbohm stated that the first units should be operationally ready by the end of 1991.2 In mid-1992, BG Hartmann indi-

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cated that the combat readiness was very poor and that it would take three to four years to correct this.3 Noting that this subject involved classified material, LTC Weblus stated that the general goal was to try to achieve operational readiness at the company level in 1992, at the battalion level in 1993, and at the higher levels in 1994.4 NEW TASKS The tremendous changes taking place in the Germanys from the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 to Unification in October 1990 were rivaled by the changes in the European security system, all of which combined with the Unification and Takeover of the NVA to present to the Bundeswehr a dramatically new basis for planning. The most prominent factors were the London Declaration (July 6, 1990) from the NATO summit meeting, announcing the changes in NATO structure and strategy, and the CFE Treaty (November 19, 1990), eliminating the capability for surprise attacks and laying the foundation for greater stability on the continent.5 Although these factors visibly added to the long-term security of Germany, they required revisions to the Bundeswehr's structure and strategy. In 1990, the Bundeswehr began to appply different concepts of combat readiness to its forces and developed a "crisis training program" for them.6 Added to this already unsettled military planning environment came the announcement of "new tasks" for the Bundeswehr. Just three months after the Unification, the euphoria that the Germans were enjoying was interrupted by the Gulf War. It was shortly after this war at the Bundeswehr's 32nd Commander's Conference that Defense Minister Stoltenberg introduced the idea that the Bundeswehr had to be prepared for tasks greater than it had been accustomed to during the Cold War. He indicated that the Bundeswehr had three missions above all. The first two involved its traditional missions of national and NATO defense and, beyond that, of contributing to the European security structures. With the third, however, he cast the Bundeswehr into new and uncharted waters. After the appropriate constitutional conditions had been fulfilled, he said the Bundeswehr had to be prepared for collective security operations outside the NATO area.7 Germany had contributed money and material to the allied effort in the Gulf War and had also sent forces to Turkey to protect this NATO ally. These actions and other similar statements from defense officials initiated the debate within German society on the proper roles of the Bundeswehr in a world now changed by the eastern European and Soviet revolutions of the previous years.8 Two important political steps in the process of redefining the Bundeswehr's mission and restructuring forces came in 1992. On February 19, the Federal Cabinet issued a policy statement and on November 26, "Defense Policy Guidelines" were disseminated.9 These contained the Bundeswehr's new mission statement:

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The Bundeswehr has the mission, in cooperation with other state, societal, and economic forces of Germany: • to guard the German national area and its citizens not only through national means but also together with the armed forces of allies against the threat or application of force • to accomplish in accordance with its constitutional mission sovereign tasks as part of the executive authority • to make a contribution with regard to Germany's alliance obligations • to make a contribution to the political and allied capability of Germany through preparedness of appropriate military instruments • to make a contribution to the formation of common European stability through the protection of a balance of power, deepened cooperation with the allies and close cooperation with all European partners • to be prepared, after a supplement to the Basic Law in consideration of differing concepts of the meaning of Article 87a of the Basic Law, for employment in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.10 Klaus Naumann, the Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, later summarized these in the following manner. The Bundeswehr. • protects Germany and its citizens against political extortion and external danger • furthers the military stability and the integration of Europe • defends Germany and its allies • serves world freedom and international security in agreement with the United Nations Charter • helps with catastrophes, saves in emergencies, and supports humanitarian actions.11 In the summer of 1992, Army Chief of Staff Helge Hansen underscored the importance of Germany fulfilling the new component of its mission. Germany had expected during the Cold War that its allies would come to its aid if necessary. Its allies now expected that Germany would recognize the obligation "to assist in areas where crises or instabilities could arise, above all on the flanks of the alliance area." Therefore, he said, the issue was not about "out-of-area" but rather about Germany fulfilling its obligations under fully changed security conditions "in area."12 With this statement, it appears he was actually attempting to redefine the actual, if not the legal or theoretical, meaning of the NATO area. By the summer of 1992, the expression expanded tasks spectrum (Erweiteres Aufgabenspektrum) had been coined to refer to the range of missions that the German Army was now pondering. COL Jan Jorg Oerding, Division Chief, Division III 1 (Fundamentals of Operational C & C/Political-Military) explained that the new NATO strategy—with its emphasis on mobility and multinational forces and with its trifold concept for forces of main defense, augmentation, and rapid reaction forces—had really been the original impetus for this conceptual change. In 1992, the German Army was busy trying to judge how its AS 5, de-

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veloped principally because of sparse resources, would have to be adjusted to meet the requirements of the new NATO strategy. The spectrum could be seen as national as well as supranational in scope. Once the constitutional issues had been resolved, it was to include not only crises within the NATO area but operations under the UN and the Western European Union.13 IMPACT OF TAKEOVER The final research question of this study deals with the impact of the Takeover on this new spectrum of missions: whether the West German officers and the former NVA believed that the former NVA would help or hinder the German Army in these new missions. Defending a reunited fatherland or even defending another NATO ally's territory was one thing, but would the former NVA be prepared to participate in out-of-area operations as part of a NATO force or in other collective security operations under UN auspices? When questioned on this issue, the majority of the Bundeswehr officers interviewed appeared never to have considered the question seriously. COL Oerding stated the "expanded task spectrum had nothing to do with the armed forces in the new federal states. . . . Both [subjects] had to be separated from one another."14 By the German-Soviet agreement, no NATO forces could be stationed in the former GDR. The forces in the east were solely under national, not NATO, command. Therefore, they could not serve as components of NATO Rapid Reaction Forces.15 Both MG Haasler and COL Klenner spoke similarly and added that it was planned to give units in the east their fair share of the new tasks after 1994 when the Russians had departed and the treaty obligations had been met. How it was to be achieved was an open question.16 This was all part of the concept of the Army of Unity (Heer der Einheit). After 1994, the work was to be spread equally among the corps.17 BG Wittenberg also saw no relation between the Takeover and the expanded tasks. Clearly, he said, there was a relation between the tasks and international events, such as the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. He pointed out that at that time (June 1992) former NVA were clearing minefields in Angola and would also be going to Cambodia.18 LTG von Scheven indicated that "the officers of the earlier NVA said 'yes' to an employment of the Bundeswehr for the protection of German security interests also when it is out of the country without asking when or indicating qualifications."19 The several West German officers who chose to address the subject directly were mostly positive about the former NVA's potential contributions to the accomplishment of the new tasks. LTC Weblus explained that the westerners knew the NATO countries and the easterners knew the countries and languages of the Warsaw Pact. "The contribution [of the former NVA] is not at all to be underestimated."20 COL Klenner had no reservations at all about sending after 1994 former NVA on a mission such as support of the Gulf War. He argued that those former NVA whom the German Army would retain in service would be the top quality

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officers and NCOs, both intellectually and technically. Second, by that time the German Army itself would have recruited and trained the majority of the young NCOs and officers from the east. They would never have been a part of the NVA. "And all of these [would not have been] influenced by that which existed for 40 years."21 They would have grown in a new, democratic Germany. As for the older former NVA—by that time Klenner was reasonably sure that they would have been fully integrated. By 1995, former NVA would have received much training and education in an army of a democracy and would be assigned to NATO staffs. "We will have than concluded the integration."22 COL Gulich, on the other hand, voiced some reservations concerning the former NVA's dedication to the new tasks. He believed that they had no problems with the traditional Bundeswehr missions of defense of Germany and NATO. Concerning NATO he felt that they were quite curious to make contact with the allies because the relations among the Warsaw Pact states were so different than among the NATO states. One could not speak really of "partnership" within the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets dominated, and there was only very limited input from the other armies. Integrated staffs, existing in NATO, were not found in the Warsaw Pact. Concerning the wider missions, he felt the attitude of the former NVA was different. Although they had no problems with the humanitarian missions, they held no unified view on the "peace-enforcing" missions, not just peacekeeping. When the Bundestag debate had come to a conclusion and the politicians had clearly articulated the policy as the will of the Bundestag, then he felt the NVA would have no problems with these missions.23 The interviews of the former NVA did not lend support to COL Giilich's analysis and skepticism because, with one exception, the former NVA were uniform in their support of the Bundeswehr's new tasks, explaining that this was part of their profession. NCOs in Neubrandenburg indicated that as soldiers they must go on the new missions; that was their profession. Perhaps one can understand, they said, that a draftee would raise a question whether he should go on such missions, but not a professional soldier.24 Officers in Potsdam, Cologne, and Neubrandenburg spoke similarly. Participating in such missions was part of being a soldier and presented no problem.25 First Lieutenant Matthies was ready to go, stating: "That [would be] an order." He could not understand Bundeswehr officers who had reservations.26 MAJ Erhard Titze stated that if it were a UN or Persian Gulf type mission, than the politicians would have to decide. But Germany must take more responsibility in world affairs. "Why not?" he asked.27 MAJ Seppelt expanded on this point. This issue was much more of a problem, he said, in the west than in the east. "In the east one is raised with stronger discipline. The whole question of UN missions and 'out-of-area' is not an issue for us. Everyone [in the military] is a soldier. When the necessity exists, then . . . it is also dealt with, or I am not a soldier."28 He maintained that the domestic debate in Germany at the time (summer 1992) over this issue was not meaningful to former NVA. The domestic consternation over the decision to send German

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forces to Turkey during the Gulf War in 1991 also was difficult for them to understand. This was a decision by the Bundestag, by the government, and thus there should be no question.29 CPT Reddemann noted, first, that there was not yet any official document clarifying the legality of such new missions. But beyond that he said, referring to the Gulf War, "the entire affair was unclear to me as a former NVA, because I also swore at the time to defend the interests of the GDR. And if I am an officer of a state, than I go where my country sends me." Therefore he was perplexed by the discussion of the westerners. During peacetime the state had paid these Western officers well. When things became a bit rough, these same officers said: "Me to the Gulf? What would I be doing there? My interests are not involved. That's those Americans and their interests. Why would I go?" CPT Reddemann simply could not understand how western German professional soldiers could raise objections.30 THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE The question of the attitude of the former NVA toward missions outside of NATO became significant when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait on August 2, 1990, two months before the German Unification. This led to the Persian Gulf War in January and February, 1991, displacing Germany's Unification from the center of the international stage. A number of German leaders wished for active military involvement in the coalition effort but said that the German Constitution forbade it.31 The war ignited a domestic debate on the allowable roles of the Bundeswehr outside of NATO territory. Since the mid-1950s when the Bundeswehr had been established, politicians had argued that the 1949 Basic Law did not allow German military forces outside of NATO territory. Article 87 provides that "except for defense, the armed forces can only be deployed as the Constitution permits;" however, there is little amplification of the meaning of this. A few other articles establish rules for the way the armed forces would be used in defense of German territory. Article 24 permits Germany to join a collective security organization; Article 26 forbids the preparation of wars of aggression.32 Chancellor Kohl's coalition government argued that the international community was criticizing Germany—rich and now united—for standing on the sidelines while other states carried the burdens of international peace. During the debate of Germany's participation in the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia in the summer of 1992, Werner Hoyer, a member of the Bundestag's defense committee, said, "we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. If we do nothing, the world will say, 'Look at those Germans, they are rich and now united, and now they are buying their way out of their obligations, and others have to spill the blood.'"33 In the wake of the government's decision to send 1,500 soldiers to Somalia to help the US-led international humanitarian relief effort, Chancellor Kohl asserted that this "is extremely important for Germany's world reputation."

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"I will personally insist on a rapid clarification by the coalition of how we proceed on a decisive question for our country's reputation and effectiveness."34 The following month, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel warned that Germany would "lose its international credibility" unless the prohibition was lifted.35 This clarification was given impetus by a visit from UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali, in January 1993, who underlined the power of Germany and called for an increased role in world affairs. He stated: "After all, you are the third most important country in the world." He called for Germany's "full participation" in "peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcing, and peace-building operations if we want a strong United Nations."36 Two days later, the government coalition agreed on a constitutional amendment that for the first time would allow the Bundeswehr to participate in international peacekeeping operations approved by the UN and other organizations.37 It was not until July 1994, some three and a half years after it began, that the debate over the constitutionality of the use of the Bundeswehr on such wider missions was settled by the Federal Constitutional Court. The Court ruled that the "Constitution obliges the Federal Government to seek enabling agreement by the German Bundestag, as a rule in advance, before committing the armed forces to action."38 This means that with a simple majority vote of approval in the Bundestag the German government could deploy the Bundeswehr beyond its borders. Chancellor Kohl announced: "What I have always wanted has become clear in this ruling." Foreign Minister Kinkel indicated, "The brake that was holding us back is gone." Craig Whitney of the New York Times asserted that the decision also eliminated "a psychological barrier that has inhibited Germany ever since the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945."39 Since this legal ruling, whether the Bundeswehr conducts out-of-area missions is no longer a constitutional question but rather one of military capability, political will, and perhaps one other factor suggested by Donald Abenheim's analysis of the Bundeswehr's postwar search for a valid military tradition in his book, Reforging the Iron Cross. With the constitutional question answered by the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of July 1994, the revised, enhanced mission statement of the Bundeswehr, and Bundeswehr planners brainstorming modifications in the mid-1990's to its force structure to give the Bundeswehr power projection and intervention capabilities, must its tradition once again be "reforged" to incorporate these expanded missions? NOTES 1. MG Ruprecht Haasler, "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)," Cologne, March 18, 1991,29. 2. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant JOrg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 334. 3. Interview, BG Hartmann, 18 June 1992. 4. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992.

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5. Ulrich Weisser, "Die Weichen sind gestellt: Rahmenbedingungen und Grundentscheidungen zur Bundeswehrgesamtplanung," Soldat und Technik (3/1991): 159. 6. Interview, LTG von Scheven, 18 June 1998. 7. "32. Kommandeurtagung der Bundeswehr in Bonn . . . Der Verteidigungsminister: Ganze Bandbreite," Bundeswehr Aktuell, 14 March 1991, 1. See also "'Mut, das Ungewohnliche zu denken und zu tun!': 100 Tage im Amt: Interview mit General Klaus Naumann," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 4-5. 8. For a good overview of the German security environment in the summer of 1991, and a description of the positions of the main German political parties on the out-of-area issue, see Wulf Lapins, "Mehr Mut zur UNO," Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 453-460. For an overview by the Minister of Defense of the European security environment as 1991 closed, see Gerhard Stoltenberg, "Europaische Sicherheitspolitik und transatlantisches Verhaltnis in einer Zeit des Wandels," Soldat und Technik (6/1991): 373-376. For a review by a Joint Staff planner of the security environment and the need for the restructuring of the Bundeswehr to provide for interventionary forces, see Ulrich Weisser, "Die Zukunft unserer Sicherheit: Europaische Sicherheitstrukturen und deutsche Streitkrafte," Information fur die Truppe (6/1991): 4-12. 9. Klaus Naumann, '"Wir betreten alle gemeinsam Neuland,"' Truppenpraxis (5/1993): 444. 10. Quoted in Rainer Winkler, "Krisenreaktionskrafte—und was sonst noch? National Verteidigung zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit," Truppenpraxis (4/1993): 415. 11. Ibid. 12. Helge Hansen, "Das deutsche Heer vor neuen Herausforderungen: Konsequenzen der neuen sicherheits- und militarpolitischen Rahmenbedingungen," Truppenpraxis (4/1992): 329. 13. Interview, COL Oerding, 15 June 1992. 14.Ibid. 15.Ibid. 16. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992; interview, MG Haasler, 29 June 1992. 17. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 18. Interview, BG Wittenberg, 11 June 1992. BG Von Kirchbach also saw no relationship between the expanded tasks and the Takeover. 19. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 23. 20. Interview, LTC Weblus, 29 June 1992. 21. Interview, COL Klenner, 25 June 1992. 22.Ibid. 23. Interview, COL Gulich, 24 June 1992. 24. Interview with SGT Czajka, SFC Ortmann, and SFC Zepernik (former NVA NCOs), 29 June 1992. 25. Interview, CPT Biedermann, CPT Monecke, and ILT Brandt (former NVA), 22 June 1992. 26. Interview, ILT Matthies, 29 June 1992. 27. Interview, MAJ Titze (former NVA), 11 June 1992. 28. Interview, ILT Matthies, MAJ Seppelt, and MAJ Ulfert (former NVA), 29 June 1992.

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29.Ibid. 30. Interview, CPT Reddeman (former NVA), 11 June 1992. The single reservation of the former NVA interviewed was by MAJ Wensdorf who said that the Bundeswehr's noninvolvement in the Gulf War showed that it was not "imperialistic." This had a very positive impact on him. Interview with LTC Jung, LTC Knigge, CPT Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), 12 November 1991. 31. Stephen Kinzer, "Germany to Send Force to the Balkans," New York Times, 16 July 1992, A9. 32. Craig R. Whitney, "Kohl May Send 1,500 Troops to Somalia," New York Times, 18 December 1992, A3. 33. Kinzer, "Germany to Send Force to the Balkans." 34. Whitney, "Kohl May Send 1,500 Troops to Somalia." 35. Craig R. Whitney, "UN. Chief Asks Bonn for Troops, Underlining Constitutional Issue," New York Times, 12 January 1993, Al 1. 36. Ibid. 37. Craig R. Whitney, "Kohl and Partners in Accord on Peacekeeping," New York Times, 14 January 1993, A7. 38. Craig R. Whitney, "Court Permits German Troops a Foreign Role," New York Times, 13 July 1994, Al/13. 39. Ibid.

10

Conclusion On August 31, 1994, MG Matvei Burlakov, commander of the Russian troops in Germany, reported in Berlin to Chancellor Kohl and President Yeltsin, "All personnel have been withdrawn to Russia and are prepared to carry out further orders."1 Several thousand Russian soldiers marched down avenues in the heart of the city signifying the end of Soviet occupation of the city and of Germany that had begun forty-nine years earlier. Only three years before there had been 546,000 Soviet troops and dependents in eastern Germany. This withdrawal was described by historians as the largest ever in history by an army not defeated in battle, and it concluded a five-year withdrawal of forces from eastern Europe in which 700,000 Russian soldiers and 500,000 civilians were returned home.2 Despite this dream having come true—unimaginable only a few years earlier—there was really no time for Germany to savor the moment. In the mid1990's there was no lack of other major issues, foreign and domestic, with which Germany had to grapple. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES The international security setting had been in flux since the revolutions of 1989. As the Soviet Union was expiring at the end of 1991, Germany's defense leaders characterized the fundamentally altered security environment. Defense Minister Stoltenberg pointed to such major factors as the existence of democratic states as Germany's eastern neighbors for the first time in history, Germany's increased international responsibilities, the requirement for Germany to view the concepts of "threat" and "security" in more comprehensive terms, and the required reduction of the Bundeswehr to 370,000. He concluded this survey by stating: "All this implies that the German armed forces are now confronting the

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greatest challenges they have ever faced since they were first established 35 years ago."3 At the same time, Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Naumann reviewed many of the same factors and indicated: Compared to the previous years, the German Armed Forces are facing a totally different security environment. Almost all of the factors that determined our defence policy and the structure of the Bundeswehr for decades are changing simultaneously.4 In its survey of the overarching factors affecting Germany security, the German White Paper 1994 (Weifibuch 1994) highlighted and expanded many of the same factors. The threat of aggression has gone but the meaning of "global risks and negative developments" (Fehlentwicklungen) has grown. "The security situation is from now on marked by dynamic developments, that emanate from the tense situation [Spannungsfeld] of far-reaching chances and complex risks."5 In its section on "Germany in a New Time," it indicated that "today Europe stands at the beginning of a new epoch." The Cold War has ended, causing a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons. "Germany has profited the most from the revolutionary political change in Europe." It has achieved unity and is now bordered by democratic states, friends, and partners. Although all this has fundamentally improved the strategic situation of Germany, the White Paper indicated, Germany has new responsibilities because, "by virtue of its political and economic strength, it plays a key role in the advancement of European structures and is called to contribute to the solution of worldwide future tasks."6 DOMESTIC CHALLENGES On the domestic scene, Germany continued to deal with such problems as policy over immigration and the right wing violence it provoked. Chancellor Kohl maintained that Germany was not an immigrant country and German law failed to recognize most foreigners as immigrants though they constituted more than 7 percent of the population and 10 percent of marriages were between a German and a foreigner.7 More deep-seated and intangible was the problem of national identity—of its internal nature and external role. Konrad Jarausch explained that although the Unification provided a definitive answer to the territorial dimension of this question, other dimensions remained open. The Right was overjoyed by the Unification and called for a "new patriotism," with only an extremist fringe having reactionary dreams of past glories. Moderates blessed their powerful and successful social market economy and parliamentary democracy. Progressives desired a more civil society and a more moral internationalism. Pointing to the lingering problems of Unification, Leftists claimed vindication and argued that they were justified in their fears of a new nationalism. Interested only in the "cultural nation"—not political nationalism—Giinter Grass, the novelist and assertive SPD (Social Democratic Party) member, held that Nazi atrocities forever

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precluded the restoration of a national state. It was this state that had produced Auschwitz.8 BG Andreas Broicher, the Director of Army Training and keen observer of German history, commented that the German spiritual-moral dimension has long been dominated by those—especially the Protestant Church—who believe that "one must learn from history." With Unification the Germans now had the chance to start fresh. Much of the German elite argued that human rights should come first, that peace was to be valued more than freedom. It said that never again should anything emanate from German soil that could endanger peace. Peace was paramount. National identity was viewed by this elite as a transition stage, something to be overcome. It argued that unified Germany could be an example of how a state could exist without this unnecessary nationalistic binding, a state where the individual held center stage. Unfortunately, BG Broicher argued, the man on the street did not grasp these ideas and so the social-liberal elite was not sure what to do. He believed that Germans had to be led back to a normal understanding of identification with their ancestors (Elternhaus), their community, and their country and state, and made to understand "that this is not nationalism [in a negative sense], rather that this is a primordial need [Urbediirfnis] of a human being."9 Despite the notable progress in eastern Germany, the economic, social, and psychological problems stemming from Unification persisted and compounded the problems in shaping a national identity.10 Economic disparities persisted. The official unemployment rate in the east was 14.6 percent compared with 8.8 percent in the west, and easterners with jobs earned only approximately 65 percent of what westerners did for comparable work. Although experts pointed out that these lower labor costs promoted investment, politically the point was lost. Not counting the costs of the Soviet withdrawal, Westerners had poured into the east between $80 and $100 billion per year since Unification. The government announced that the 7.5 percent tax surcharge—initiated in 1991 and supposedly lasting only one year—was to continue at least another five years. The Treuhand agency, established to privatize companies owned by the state, continued its notoriety as the agency that had caused widespread unemployment and forced welfare rolls to swell, including many people over age fifty who had little hope of finding new jobs. Finally on the economic scene, the conflicts and uncertainties over property rights continued to impede economic development. Potential investors were intimidated by the maze of claims on real estate. They did not wish to take the chance of building on property that might eventually be awarded to some previous owner. Beyond the economic dimension of Unification was the psychological dimension. Despite the years of political and economic unity the Germans in the mid-1990's remained psychologically divided. Politicians and commentators agreed that the Germans had failed to tear down "the wall in our heads." Referring to the inequalities in power, wealth, experience, and assertiveness, Fritz Stern in 1993 expressed that on "some deep psychological level the unified

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Germany is more divided than before; the physical wall has been internalized."11 Lothar de Maziere, East Germany's first and last prime minister in 1990, stated that "the psychological gap between eastern and western Germany will last for at least a generation, or perhaps until the last person born under Communism passes away."12 In addition to the continuing challenges of Unification, the German political landscape entered a period of potential instability and uncertainty.13 After twelve years of rule, the CDU/CSU-Free Democrat coalition once again prevailed in the federal elections on October 16, 1994, but just barely. The coalition managed to hold a bare ten-seat majority, down from a 134-seat majority it had held since the last federal election in 1990. The popular vote for both coalition parties decreased significantly from the last election with the Free Democrats achieving barely enough to retain a presence in the Bundestag. In the new Bundestag they occupied forty-seven seats, down from the seventy-nine they held earlier. In the subsequent election for Chancellor on November 5, Kohl received only a single vote majority.14 The former Communists, under their new party name of the Party of Democratic Socialism, surprised conservatives by gaining thirty seats. This followed good showings in two state elections in the east. In September 1994, the Democratic Socialists took 17 percent of the vote in Saxony and 19 percent of the vote in Brandenburg, increases of more than one third over the results of four years earlier. They now justifiably claimed to be the third strongest party in eastern Germany.15 The weakening strength of the Christian Democrats, the trend toward the marginalization of the Free Democrats, and the return to legitimacy of the former Communists, all made for an uncertain political scene and raised questions such as: How long could the CDU-FDP coalition last? Would the former Communists continue to increase their power in eastern Germany and with what effect? What impact would a new left of center coalition government have on the Bundeswehr—even tighter budgets or an even lower end-strength? MILITARY CHALLENGES Next to these domestic political issues there existed military ones. The German military faced the continuing "acceptance" problem in trying to justify its existence, especially to the more liberal segments of German society.16 As he ended his command of Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command in June 1991 and surveyed the major tasks lying ahead for the Bundeswehr, LTG Schonbohm highlighted this challenge: "We must make it clear to our young people, this sovereign state [Germany] needs the Bundeswehr and the Bundeswehr needs good recruitment [Nachwuchs]."17 The entire issue of the Bundeswehr image in the public eyes had again emerged full force in the fall of 1994 because of a court pronouncement that the bumper sticker "Soldiers are Murderers" was an acceptable expression of an opinion and did not necessarily slander the

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Bundeswehr.18 This pronouncement by the Federal Constitutional Court understandably shook the professional German soldier. The 1994 White Paper published by the MOD provided the following data for overall personnel structure of the Bundeswehr (Figure 10.1) and personnel strength of each service branch based on a total end strength of 370,000 (Figure 10.2). Figure 10.1 Planned Personnel Structure of the Bundeswehr by Rank

Source: Weifibuch 1994: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 1994, 97.

In a commentary in a late 1994 issue of the German officers' magazine, Karl Feldmeyer, a member of the editorial staff of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, sketched the uncertain environment in which the Bundeswehr found itself as 1995 opened. "Since the Unification the Bundeswehr finds itself on the retreat. Less money, fewer soldiers, lesser planning security—at the same time additional tasks." Given the uncertain domestic political situation since the October elections, the "Bundeswehr is well-advised not to consider any possession or agreement as certain." He indicated that the current limit for the reduction lies at 340,000 (not 370,000) with a budget of DM 47.5 billion. He then reviewed some of the pressing questions: The most important was the length of the basic term of enlistment (at ten months in 1998). How many military posts

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Figure 10.2 Planned Personnel Strength of the Service Branches (End 1994)

Source: Facts about Germany, Arno Kappler and Adriane Grevel, eds., Gerard Finan, trans. (Frankfurt/Main: Societats, 1993): 204. Note: Klaus D. Naumann gave the following figures in 1991: Army: 255,400; Air Force: 82,400; Navy: 32,200 "Mission and Structure of the Bundeswehr," NATO's Sixteen Nations (Special Issue—The Bundeswehr) (November 1991): 68.

(garrisons, schools, and training areas) will remain? How much money will be available to the Bundeswehr to keep its equipment up to date? If the draft army continues, how can the "Army of Unity" be maintained in light of the intended difference in quality of the crisis reaction and main defense forces? Finally, the very fundamental question: "What kind of an army does this state [Germany] want and the [political] forces that carry it?" A small army of intervention or a draft army whose raison d'etre is national defense?19 At the strictly military-operational level, the Bundeswehr faced a host of challenges including implementation of the Defense Policy Guidelines issued in November 1992,20 wrestling with the many implications of its new "Extended Task Spectrum,"21 the implementation of a new national command and control structure,22 and the implementation a new concept for the reserves issued by Minister of Defense Volker Ruhe on September 2, 1994.23 The German Army had its own specific challenges in this environment including the full realization of AS 5, the effective operation of the new Army Operations Command established in Koblenz in October 1994,24 and the revised training exercise concept.25

A SUMMING UP OF THE TAKEOVER With so many challenges facing the German nation, state, government, military, and Army in 1995, it is some small comfort that the major challenges of the

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Takeover of the NVA (Land Forces) had been met and, on the whole, met well.26 Based on the eleven key decisions that the government, the military, and the German Army made in this Takeover, high marks must be given for achieving the goals that were established for the Takeover. A portion of the former NVA land force was successfully integrated into the German Army; the NVA was not simply thrown onto the streets, something that might have caused a volatile social situation. Those who desired to remain were evaluated using clearly established criteria over a two-year trial period. The officers and NCOs found worthy were permitted to become longer term volunteers for three to fifteen years or professional soldiers. In the end, about 10 percent of the original number of NVA officers taken over in October 1990 were ultimately integrated into the Bundeswehr. An all-German army was created that included the most qualified officers and NCOs from eastern Germany. A fair chance was rendered by the West Germans and utilized by many East Germans. The NVA equipment and installations were evaluated and those that filled needs and met established criteria were incorporated into the German Army. The Takeover of NVA equipment and installations, in particular, could not have been accomplished as it was without the full cooperation and professionalism of the former NVA who remained in service beyond Unification Day.27 Moreover, the Bundeswehr led the other segments of society in forging unity—in establishing an early and sizable presence in the east, in fulfilling its responsibilities, and creating a positive climate for the integration of eastern and western Germany. As early as April 1991, President von Weizsacker stated: "The unity of the troops promotes the unity of the German people."28 Likewise Chancellor Kohl in his foreword to the White Paper 1994 stated: "The Bundeswehr deserves our special appreciation for the achievements of the last few years. The building of the Bundeswehr in eastern Germany is an enormous contribution to the consolidation of the inner unity of our fatherland."29 Minister of Defense Riihe added, "As the Army of Unity, it has become an example of the growing together of our fatherland."30 Gerhard Hubatschek argued that in no other sector of society did the execution of the Unification succeed so quickly and so frictionless despite enormous problems.31 These high marks are justified despite the limitations of this study. Many of the interviews were conducted with western German officers who had an interest in placing the Takeover in the best possible light. However, these officers showed a healthy capability to criticize decisions made when they felt such criticism was justified, for example, on the decision to dissolve the NVA and build simultaneously AS 5. A second limitation was that I had little control over the specific eastern Germans interviewed, who were selected by commanding officers or principal staff officers. Here again, however, the eastern officers and NCOs interviewed never revealed any sense that they were trying to provide the politically correct answers. As the analysis shows, they had ample criticism on a number of issues, such as the rank demotions and the prohibition against wearing NVA badges and emblems.

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Of the eleven decisions, the most fundamental and significant was the decision to allow NVA to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr after the Unification. This decision along with the decision to dissolve the NVA and build up new units simultaneously were probably the two most controversial decisions for the Bundeswehr and German Army. The most controversial decision for the NVA was the rank demotions, although even in this case many NVA expressed understanding. On a military level, the least controversial decision with the greatest impact was the decision to establish partnership units between eastern and western units, a decision that drew universal praise. Not surprisingly, factors on multiple levels—domestic political, psychological, economic-financial, sociological, and military—all fed into many of the decisions with the precise weight of each impossible to calculate. Decisions in which purely military factors predominated included the decision to impose AS 5, to establish partnership units, and to adopt the NVA equipment it did. In many cases, psychological or sociological factors played major roles. The desire to avoid uprisings by a totally disenfranchised NVA clearly played a major role in the decision to allow a portion of them to continue to serve in the Bundeswehr. Practically speaking, the NVA still had control over a tremendous amount of weaponry while this decision was being made. The requirement to insure a psychological break with the past, as it had in the formation of the Bundeswehr in the 1950's, clearly played heavily in the decision not to permit any NVA traditions to be transferred into the Bundeswehr. Finally, economicfinancial as well as domestic-political factors played heavily in the decisions on which military posts to keep open. Which posts had the best infrastructure sometimes collided with political requirements—the need for balance between eastern and western Germany and pressure from local/regional politicians. Central to the Bundeswehr's success were guiding principles—enlightened, liberal, democratic principles—that informed not only the speeches of West German military leaders but also their actions. Among the most important were the principles of Innere Fiihrung, the principle that the German military came as Germans to Germans and not as victors to vanquished, the principle that former NVA must be given a fair chance to continue to serve, and the idea that the end was an all-German force that easterners and westerners were building together. CHALLENGES THAT REMAINED What of the challenges and issues that remained for the German Army and the former NVA? By their own measure as well as the western officers, the former NVA who continued to serve in the Bundeswehr faced a number. In comparing what they were in the NVA and what they had now become, former NVA provided mixed responses but in general referred to such things as Auftragstaktik in the Bundeswehr compared to Befehlstaktik in the NVA. Initiative was more important. Many indicated that they had greater responsibility in the German Army. At a more general level, they indicated that they had to

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learn how democracy works in other countries and about division of political power. One stated that this was how dictatorship can be prevented; too much concentration of power led to the system that existed in the GDR. Former NVA, said another, had to learn to accept and live within a society of differing opinions.32 In a speech at the German Command and General Staff Academy in March 1993, LTG von Scheven reviewed a number of challenges that the NVA continued to face. Among other things, he pointed out that many were still uncomfortable in their dealings with the ordinary draftee; they needed to conduct themselves more in line with the leadership principles of the Bundeswehr. Second, they had to become more comfortable in operating in a pluralistic society and become more self-confident. Related to this was the requirement for them to increase their capability to formulate their own evaluations and to resist the desire to plan ahead and control everything as they might have done in the past. Third, they still suffered from an understandable loss of identity, something that, he indicated, would take certainly longer than three years to correct.33 In addition to the challenges peculiar to the former NVA, the Bundeswehr faced a further challenge of convincing the eastern population that it was not simply old wine in new bottles—an old NVA in new uniforms. As he ended his command in the spring of 1991, Schonbohm stressed this point and expressed pride in the progress made. The western commanders had conducted courtesy visits to the local mayors, political authorities, and religious leaders; opened the doors of the garrisons to the local people; and in many cases served as the "experts" for the local areas. He continued: We must reach the point where the question is no longer asked [by the people], are you Bundeswehr or were you once NVA? We must make it clear to the people that we are a radically different army compared to the NVA, although the majority of our officers and NCOs belonged earlier to the NVA. We still have some work cut out for us here. 34

Perhaps it is not surprising that this study indicates that the Takeover, if anything, added to the capability of the German Army to accomplish its new missions. Former NVA were generally very dedicated to the traditional military virtues of discipline, devotion to state, and honor. They were prepared to go where their new government and state dispatched them, unlike some of their western colleagues who had hesitations and misgivings. Many former NVA expressed a lack of understanding and disdain for their new colleagues who were prepared to collect their military paychecks but not prepared to fight. Rather than impede, this new NVA blood aided the German Army in its efforts to meet its new obligations including peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, and collective security operations. A fortuitous benefit of this study was the surfacing of evidence supporting the proposition that Germany has indeed reached a healthy stage of democratic political maturity. This should at least help to convince skeptical observers of Germany who continue to fear a reversion to past hyper-nationalism and

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unbounded hegemonic ambition.35 Politicians did not micro-manage the Takeover, but rather left the execution to the military. Nonetheless the German military—specifically the Army—gave high prominence in its speeches and literature, in the supplemental training and education crafted for the former NVA, and in its selection criteria of former NVA to serve beyond the two-year trial period, to key principles of a military in a liberal democracy: the soldier as a citizen in uniform, the German soldier serving in a state governed by law (Rechtstaat) (including civilian control of the military), and the principles of Innere Fuhrung. This conclusion supports the contentions of others who have argued the same point. Christoph Bertram was certainly alluding to this when he said, "the FRG has had almost forty years of Western experience; it has become a Western political society."36 Joachim Gauck, the eastern Lutheran clergyman, also stated: Germany has been a sick society... . After 12 years of Nazism, the Allies arrived in West Germany, and they were the doctors who slowly cured people of their sickness by introducing democracy and free enterprise. Western Germany has recovered and it is now healthy.37 Rather than Germany having too much imperialistic drive, just the opposite may be the case. Assuming it succeeds in refashioning the Bundeswehr to accomplish military missions beyond NATO, Germany may not have the requisite national will to fulfill the responsibilities the leading nations of the free world wish it to shoulder. In discussing the future tasks of the Bundeswehr, MG Friedrich Steinseifer stated that the first requirement was for the German public to be prepared for the fulfillment of such tasks.38 The problem may be not too much nationalism but too little.39 TAKEOVER/AMALGAMATION THEORY The case studies examined earlier together with this study of the Takeover of the NVA provide much raw material from which may be drawn at least some elementary theoretical formulations on takeovers and amalgamations: key variables, factors, considerations and perhaps even some relationships and propositions. The following are only the more salient. First, as the Civil War case study illustrates, after a long shooting war if the proper international and domestic conditions obtain and if there is no desire by the members of the secondary army to continue service, there may be no takeover at all. After the Civil War there was no significant external threat—neither from Mexico or the Indians—and no substantial domestic pressure for a large standing army. Indeed the prevailing mood was just the opposite—to slash the size of the army. Second, the political background to a takeover is critical. In the French and Italian examples, the primary and secondary armies stood for the same cause: in the Italian case, for Italian unity; in the French, for the full restoration of French

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sovereignty and territorial integrity. In the case of the NVA, however, the takeover was the result not of a shooting war but rather of political victory in a cold war. Although the members of the primary (Bundeswehr) and secondary (NVA) armies were ethnically and culturally the same, they had been political, ideological, and military foes. This situation raised the very contentious issue of whether any members of the secondary army should be accepted into the ranks, an issue over which many conscientious Bundeswehr members bitterly disagreed. The takeover may still proceed for either political, social, or military reasons, but not because of a common original purpose. This in fact may be a good criterion with which to differentiate "takeovers" (NVA) from "amalgamations" (France and Italy). A further point here is that if the members of the secondary army wish to continue in service, but the primary army has rejected them, instability and even violent conflict may result, a possibility that in the case of the NVA was clearly at hand. Third, the precise objectives of the takeover or amalgamation are also central. An amalgamation can be simply a screening exercise to produce a resultant force that falls within guidelines and constraints of political authorities or it can have multiple political (domestic as well as international), social, psychological, and economic as well as simply military-organizational objectives. The French case appears to be more of the former whereas the Italian and NVA cases were of the latter type with multiple nonmilitary objectives. In the case of the U.S. Civil War, it is a question whether U.S. leaders should have tried to use the postwar army for such objectives as political and social integration. If the process has political and social integrative goals, it is important that the Army perform the action as ethnic comrades and not conquerors, a guiding principle of the Bundeswehr in its takeover of the NVA. And if the secondary army was viewed negatively by the population of its own country—as the NVA was—it is important that the soldiers of the secondary army not be afforded privileged treatment. A final proposition is that these objectives most likely will affect not simply the future social composition of the force but may also likely influence the regional composition. In both the cases of Italy and the NVA, regional mixing was used to promote social integration. General Fanti in Italy first simply incorporated whole units of the armies of central Italy into the Sardinian Army, but eventually mixed men from different regions. Fourth, to understand amalgamations it is important to recognize the dominant military culture and determine its relationship to the political ideology of the state. In the French case, the traditional, conservative outlook of the Armistice Army evidently prevailed in shaping the postliberation army, despite DeGaulle and the Free French, on the one hand, and the Resistance irregulars on the other. In the Italian case Fanti's traditional and conservative views on the army prevailed over Garibaldi's view. With the NVA this factor probably does not apply as there were no comparable fissures in perspective among the leaders of the Bundeswehr. As a further point, if the dominant army has an ideological

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belief system radically different from the secondary as in the NVA case, then the members of the secondary army will probably receive not only military but political re-education. Fifth, by way of procedure, screening boards will likely be established in takeovers and amalgamations in which less than all the personnel from the secondary army are entering the primary army. The specific board or commission leader, the nature and composition of the board—specifically if it is entirely military as (French and Italian cases) or a mix of civilians and military (NVA)—and of course the specific evaluation criteria established all have an effect on the nature of the personnel selected. Military members will tend to select in accordance with the dominant military culture. Boards including civilians will help to ensure societal values and interests are integrated into the selection process. Finally, the greater the distance between the cultures of the primary and secondary army and between the political ideologies they serve respectively, the lesser the likelihood that any of the tradition of the secondary army will be taken over. This was clearly the case with the NVA—an Army that gave higher priority to combat efficiency and the machines of war than to human safety, comfort, and dignity, compared to the Bundeswehr. It also appears to be the case with the Sardinian Army compared to Garibaldi's forces. AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY This study suggests several areas for future study of the NVA and German Army. As the former NVA become more socialized into Germany's liberal democracy, will they become less devoted to traditional military values—less Prussian? Second, for two generations the NVA identified primarily with a party, not a society or constitution. Now that the uncertainties that pressed them during the two-year trial period have passed, are the former NVA in fact identifying with the country, state, and society, not just with military virtue? Third, much emphasis has been placed on Innere Fuhrung in the supplemental training that the former NVA received. Do they fully understand and accept it? Fourth, beyond the Takeover of the NVA, has Germany—its recent military accomplishments in Bosnia notwithstanding—become too democratic, too liberal to meet its new international responsibilities? If Germany can succeed in mustering the force structure, hardware, and command and control systems, can it muster the will? The Takeover of the NVA was part of and gave impetus to the unification of two ethnically common people with starkly contrasting political, legal, social, and economic orders who had been separated by an iron curtain for two generations. Unlike the first German Unification in 1871, it occurred without "blood and iron" and not against but rather with the support of other countries.40

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Candid comments by former NVA indicate how it might have been if the tables had been turned. Former NVA officers admitted to LTG Schonbohm that they would have remained true to their ideology.41 And in my presence, a former NVA NCO reflected on how it might have been had the Unification come at the hands of the Soviets. He said that we should be happy this did not happen, for if it had, "Germany indeed would have been one big concentration camp."42 NOTES 1. Material on the Soviet withdrawal is taken from Stephen Kinzer's articles, "Bitter Goodbye: Russians Leave Germany," New York Times, 4 March 1994, Al, and "Russian Troops Bid 'Wiedersehen' to Germany," New York Times, 1 September 1994, A3. 2. Germany bore much of the cost of this withdrawal including helping to pay the salaries of departing officers, building homes for them in the Soviet Union, and retraining them for the civilian sector. In all, Germany appropriated $9 billion in grants and $2 billion in interest-free loans. Kinzer, "Bitter Goodbye," Al. Schonbohm related a dramatic story of Soviet military wives demonstrating in the summer of 1991 against their imminent return to the Soviet Union until assurances had been given that they would not have to spend the coming winter in tents. JOrg Schonbohm, Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee (Berlin: Siedler, 1992), 247. 3. Gerhard Stoltenberg, "German Security Policy: Foundations and Objectives," NATO's Sixteen Nations (November 1991): 17-31. 4. "Mission and Structure of the Bundeswehr—The Role of the Bundeswehr in a Changing Security Environment," NATO's Sixteen Nations (November 1991): 68. 5. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weifibuch 1994 (Bonn, 1994), 23. 6. Ibid., 24. 7. Craig R. Whitney, "German Aide Faults Policy on Foreigners," New York Times, 29 May 1994, 9. Also see Craig R. Whitney, "Germans Begin to Recognize Danger in Neo-Nazi Upsurge," New York Times, 21 October 1993, 1; Stephen Kinzer, "AntiForeigner Riot Hits German Town," New York Times, 13 May 1994, 6; Stephen Kinzer, "Rights Groups Attack German Plan on Refugees," New York Times, 1 February 1993, 11. 8. Konrad H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 93, 113, 208. Also see Peter H. Merkl, "A New German Identity," in Gordon Smith et al., eds., Developments in German Politics, 327-347. 9. Interview, 3 July 1992. 10. This material drawn from Stephen Kinzer, "A Wall of Resentment Now Divides Germany," New York Times, 14 October 1994, Al, 14. Also see Craig Whitney, "Germans Find Unity May Mean Long-Term Change and Sacrifice," New York Times, 26 December 1993, Al; Stephen Kinzer, "Where Is Optimism in Germany? Among the Bedraggled Easterners," New York Times, 27 December 1993, Al. 11. Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," 121. 12. Kinzer, "Wall of Resentment," A14. 13. The following articles were used in this section on the current domestic political scene: Stephen Kinzer, "State Voting in Germany Reveals Shift," New York Times, 15 September 1994, A5; Craig R. Whitney, "Prospects for Kohl As German Leader Hazy as Vote Nears, New York Times, 11 October 1994, Al; Craig R. Whitney, "Kohl's Slate

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Slips as Germans Vote; Keeps Small Edge," New York Times, 17 October 1994, 1; Stephen Kinzer, "Germany's Ex-Communists Promise to Behave in Parliament," New York Times, 19 October 1994, A5; Craig R. Whitney, "Kohl's Narrow Majority Is Giving His Opponents Hope," New York Times, 6 November 1994, 20; Stephen Kinzer, "Kohl Elected to 4th Term as German Chancellor, but by a Hair," New York Times, 16 November 1994, A5. 14. Kinzer, "Kohl Elected to 4th Term." 15. Kinzer, "State Voting in Germany Reveals Shift." 16. For discussions of the image problem see Ekkehard Lippert, "Die Bundeswehr im Wertespagat: Vom Dilemma einer Armee, deren Tugenden in der Gesellschaft nicht mehr gefragt sind." Truppenpraxis (2/1992): 206-210; Ekkehard Lippert, "Beruhrungsangste—Ingesamt befindet sich die Militarsoziologie in einem mangelhaften Zustand." Truppenpraxis (4/1993): 368-370; "Die Armee—offentlich-rechtlich im Abseits? Interview mit WDR-Intendant Friedrich Nowotny zu Bundeswehr und Medien," Truppenpraxis (4/1993): 371-374. For a defense of the need for the Bundeswehr and of the soldier, see '"Mut, das Ungewohnliche zu denken und zu tun!': 100 Tage im Amt: Interview mit General Klaus Naumann," Truppenpraxis (1/1992): 4-6; and Reinhard Gramm, "Soldat—Schutzmann fiir den Frieden: Weil der Mensch so ist wie er ist: Auch nach Ende des Ost-West Konflikts haben Streitkrafte einen Sinn," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 661-667. The latter also gives an analysis of the roles of the soldier. 17. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 338. For discussion of changing values and expectations of German youth and the increased need for education and development of German military leaders, see Siegfried Pacholke, "Das Ende aller soldatischer Werte?" Truppenpraxis (5/1991): 498. For an overview of the most important challenges faced by the Bundeswehr as 1991 closed, see also '"Mut, das Ungewohnliche zu denken und zu tun!': 100 Tage im Amt: Interview mit General Klaus Naumann," 4-7. 18. Rudiger Moniac, "Ein Wort: Wie Eine Bombe," Loyal (November 1994): 8. For a reference book published by the Evangelical Church Office of the Bundeswehr that addresses the moral basis for service as a soldier, see Evangelischen Kirchenamt fur die Bundeswehr, Streitkrafte im Wandel: Soldat—Schutzmann fiir den Frieden (Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1990). For a brief discussion of civil-military problems, see Young, "The 'Normalization' of Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures," 17-19. 19. Karl Feldmeyer, "Nun MuB die Regierung entscheiden." Truppenpraxis (6/1994): 465. By spring 1995, the overall end strength figure appeared to be 338,000 with the Army at 233,400. Rolf Clement, "Mit dem Rotstift Gestaltet," Loyal (4/1995), 8-10. The DM 47.50 billion defense budget figure was approved for 1994, down from DM 52.13 billion in 1992 and DM 50.80 billion in 1993; Young, "Trends in German Defense Policy," 3. For information on budget uncertainties and demographic problems see Karl Feldmeyer, "Taten statt Worten," Truppenpraxis (1/1994): 1; Volker Glatt, "Uberm Berg?—Ein Sachstandsbericht zur Nachwuchsgewinnung," Truppenpraxis (2/1993): 203-207. For a discussion of the resources-requirements problem early in the Takeover process, see Ulrich Weisser, "Die Weichen sind gestellt: Rahmenbedingungen und Grundentscheidungen zur Bundeswehrgesamtplanung," Soldat und Technik (3/1991): 162. 20. Young, "Trends in German Defense Policy," 4-11.

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21. See Manfred Ertl, "Draufgestellt—Neue Aufgaben—neue Strukturen: Mit dem Heeresfuhrungskommando erhalt das Heer erstmals eine Kommandobehorde oberhalb der Korpsebene," Truppenpraxis (2/1994): 130-133; Josef Gerner, "Das wirksamste militarische Instrument deutscher Sicherheitspolitik—Gedanken zur zuktinftigen Bedeutung und Rolle des Heeres." Truppenpraxis (1/1994): 48-52. 22. See Thomas-Durell Young, The "Normalization" of The Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures Carlisle, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 1 September 1992. 23. Andreas Golk, "Reserve hat Zukunft—Die neue Reservistenkonzeption tragt den neuen Zeitlauften Rechnung," Truppenpraxis (6/1990): 482-485; Peter Kurt Wurzbach, ". . . Aber Fragen Bleiben," Loyal (10/1994): 8-11. 24. Ertl, "Draufgestellt—Neue Aufgaben—neue Strukturen;" Young, "Normalization" of Germany's Defense Structures" 19-27. 25. Hubertus Muhlig, "Im Herbst kein Schlachtenlarm mehr," Truppenpraxis (3/1994): 235-241. 26. For an overall summary of the Takeover, see Weifibuch 1994, Chapter 1, and BMVg, "Offentlichkeitsarbeit: Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik," "Fiinf Jahre Armee der Einheit—eine Bilanz," BMVg, Bonn, 3 October 1995. For other overall positive assessments, see Mark E. Victorson, "Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States," Newport Paper 7 (Newport: Naval War College, June 1994), 31-32, 38; Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr, ed. Dieter Farwick (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 44-45. 27. For an official overview of the Takeover on its fifth anniversary, see BMVg, "Offentlichkeitsarbeit: Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik." "Fiinf Jahre Armee der Einheit—eine Bilanz." Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 3 October 1995. 28. "Truppe fordert Einheit der Deutschen," Siiddeutsche Zeitung," 3 May 1991; Werner von Scheven, "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies," Aussenpolitik 43 (II, 1992): 173. 29. Weifibuch 1994, vii. 30. Ibid., ix. Also CDR Wichert (former NVA) highlighted the leading role which the Bundeswehr played in the integration of the two societies. Interview, 23 June 1992. 31. "Der Steinige Weg," Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 28. See also Volker Koop and Dietmar Schossler, Erbe NVA—EindrUcke ausihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende (Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992), 10. 32. Interview, CPT Belitz, CPT Kuther, and CPT Stange (former NVA), 24 June 1992; interview, SSG Scherzer and SSG Rudolph (former NVA), 22 June 1992; interview, SSG Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992. 33. von Scheven, "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr," 4 March 1993. Werner AblaB, former State Secretary in the GDR, highlighted the challenge to the former NVA of changing from a Communist "Party soldier" to a soldier in a democracy. Interview, 26 June 1992. Also see Hans Peter von Kirchbach, "Offizier im Heer der Einheit," Truppenpraxis (4/1992): 332-338. 34. "Wir dienen demselben Vaterland: Interview mit Generalleutnant Jorg Schonbohm," 336. See also his "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Ein Staat—Eine Armee, 43, 53; Koop and Schossler, Erbe NVA, 85; and Victorson, "Mission in the East," 29-30.

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BG von Kirchbach also presented an upbeat picture of the budding relationship between the civil sector of Eggesin and the Bundeswehr leaders of the Ninth Armored Divison which he commanded. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, "Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces: The Eggesin Garrison as an Example for the Unification of Two Armies," (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 14 February 1992), 23-24. For his efforts with church leaders, see p. 25. 35. Stephen Szabo quoted George Kennan on the skepticism of the German character and stated: "So long as Germany was not a mature liberal democracy it would be distrusted by the Americans." The Diplomacy of German Unification (New York: St. Martin's, 1992): 5. 36. Bertram, "The German Question," 51. 37. Kinzer, "A Wall of Resentment," October 14, 1994, A14. 38. Friedrich Steinseifer, "Zusammenftigen und verkleinem: Die Bundeswehr im Wandel—Konsequenzen aus dem radikalen politischen Umbruch in Europa—Die HinterlassenschaftderNVA." Truppenpraxis (11'1991): 19. 39. A similar point was made by Thomas-Durell Young, "The 'Normalization' of The Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures," 29-30. 40. Kaiser, "German Unification," 182. 41. Schrinbohm, Zwei Armeen, 138. 42. Interview, SSG Haake, CPT Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Mantey, CPT Moeller, CPT Schulenburg (former NVA), 18 June 1992.

Appendix A

Key Figures in the Takeover Name AblaB, Werner E.

Position(s) State Secretary in MDD 3/90-10/90; from 10/90, Director, Field Operating Agency (Strausberg), MOD

Carl, Dr. Karl-Heinz

State Secretary, MOD, Headed the Steering Group for Armed Forces and Administration Group

Eppelmann, Rainer

Minister for Disarmament and Defense, GDR, 3/90-10/90

Haasler, Ruprecht, Major General

Commanding General, Division, Military District Command VIII, Neubrandenburg

Klenner, Dietmar, Colonel

Chief of Staff, Army Eastern Command, 10/90-4/91; Operations Officer, Eastern Corps and Territorial Command

Naumann, Klaus, Major General promoted to General

Principal Staff Officer, Political-Military Affairs, Joint Staff; later Chairman, Joint Chiefs

Ondarza, Henning von, Lieutenant General

Army Chief of Staff

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Key Figures in the Takeover

Reinhardt, Klaus, Major General

Director of Department VI of the Joint Staff (Planning); Commander Federal Command and Staff College

Richter, Ekkehard, Major General

Commanding General, Division/Military District Command VII, Leipzig

Scheven, Werner von, Lieutenant General

Deputy Commander, Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command 10/90-4/91; Commanding General, Eastern Corps and Territorial Command 4/9-10/94.

Schonbohm, Jorg, Lieutenant General

Commanding General, Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command 10/90-7/91; Army Chief of Staff; State Secretary, MOD

Stoltenberg, Dr. Gerhard

Minister of Defense, FRG

Storbeck, Siegfried, Lieutenant General

Deputy Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Wellershoff, Dieter, Admiral

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Appendix B

Army Structure 5 Many factors provided the impetus for the Army to construct a new organization, several years in the making, including the negative demographic trends in the FRG, budget pressures to reduce expenses, and finally the tremendous politicalmilitary changes of the late 1980's. The starting point was in December 1985, when the services were directed by the Bundeswehr Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to study their organizations. The Army was to prepare for a decrease in peacetime end-strength from the 345,000 to 322,600.l It first devised a future organization—AS 2000—based on several new concepts including: Cadreing and Rapid Build-Up of Forces (KURA) and Limited Use of Major Equipment for Training (ENGA). These concepts tried to deal with the demographic and fiscal realities as well as possible, while still maintaining the German Army's capability to accomplish its missions.2 This structure was approved in February 1988 but was soon overcome by the dramatic political developments in 1989. In June 1989, MOD directed several significant changes in planning factors. The peacetime end-strength of the Army would be reduced to 297,000 active soldiers and the command structure, as well as the number, equipment, and presence of brigade and higher units, were put into question. This new guidance was staffed, and in March 1990 the Army Chief of Staff approved the "Army Structure 2000 Revised" (Weiterentwickelte). Military planning, however, can never be definitive until key political determinants stabilize. Thus, it was not until the summer of 1990 when important political lines had been laid—the most important being that Germany would be unified and that there would be one German Army—that a reasonably conclusive army structure could be finalized.3 By the Unification on October 3, the Army had been given the following political guidance requiring further changes: the basic enlistment time was to be

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Army Structure 5

reduced from fifteen to tweleve months (instead of increasing to eighteen months as had been planned); it was to reduce to a peacetime active end-strength of 255,400 by the end of 1994—its portion of the 370,000 figure agreed on by Kohl and Gorbachev, and with these reduced forces it would be defending an enlarged, unified Germany.4 The final structure settled upon, AS 5, contained important changes from the structure actually in use at the time, AS 4. Perhaps the most fundamental change in AS 5 was the merging of the Field Army and Territorial Army at the Corps and Division levels.5 The Army maintained that this was possible under the changed security situation and necessary given the imperative for reducing the number and size of commands. While joined in peacetime, both levels of command retained their capability to split in wartime into separate commands to accomplish their respective missions. Second, two of the three corps/territorial commands obtained an additional divisional staff for planning and conducting quick reaction missions. The major force structure changes are reflected in the following figure. Corps and Division Headquarters were reduced from twenty-three to eleven. Maneuver brigades dropped from forty-eight to twenty-eight and active or partly active battalions dropped from three hundred eighty-five to two hundred seventy.6 Table B.l Army Structure 4 vs. Army Structure 5 Corps Territorial commands Military district commands Divisions Maneuver brigades Battalions (active/partly active) Battalions (skeletonized)

Army Structure 4 3 3 5 12 48 385 515

Army Structure 5

28 270 349

Source: Fu H, "Briefing: Command Structure and Organization of the Future All-German Army," Fu H VI 3, Az 09-10, 14 July 1991.

Overall AS 5 resulted in forty-five activations, eighty-five reorganizations (including sixty battalions), one hundred forty deactivations (including fifty battalions and twenty companies), five units transfers, and the closing of sixty-four garrisons.7

Army Structure 5

205

NOTES 1. Erhard Drews, Ludwig Jacob, Peter Krieter, Franz-Joseph Paulus, Hans-Jiirgen Tzschaschel, "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption und Elemente der Heeresstuktur 5," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 356. 2. Heeresamt, "Briefing on Field Trials," Abteilung VII, Heeresamt, Cologne, 29 July 1991. 3. For a discussion of the chaotic impact changing political factors had on Bundeswehr defense planning in the 1990's, see Thomas-Durell Young, "Trends in German Defense Policy" (Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 14 June 1994). Young stated at one point: "That the Bundeswehr is in upheaval is an understatment" (p. 3). 4. Erhard Drews, Ludwig Jacob, Peter Krieter, Franz-Joseph Paulus,Hans-Jurgen Tzschaschel, "Das neue deutsche Heer: Zielsetzung, Konzeption und Elemente der Heeresstuktur 5," Truppenpraxis (4/1991): 357. 5. This summary is drawn from Fu H, "Command Structure and the Organization of the Future All-German Army: Army Structure 5," Fu H VI 3, Az 09-10, Bonn, 14 July 1991. For a complete package of detailed organizational charts, see Fii H, "Planungshandbuch: Teil 'Stabe/StFmVerb,' Heeresstruktur 5," Fu H VI, Az 09-10, Bonn, 26 April 1990. 6. Ibid. For a good overview of the changed planning factors and subsequent strategy and force structure changes for the entire Bundeswehr, see Ulrich Weisser, "Die Weichen sind gestellt: Rahmenbedingungen und Grundentscheidungen zur Bundeswehrgesamtplanung," Soldat und Technik (3/1991): 159-162. For the implications of AS 5 on equipment, see Karl-Theodor Dingier, "Heeresstruktur 5: Konsequenzen fiir die Ausrustung," Wehrtechnik (9/1991): 27-32. 7. Jorg Schonbohm, "Deutsche kommen zu Deutschen," in Dieter Farwick, ed., Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr (Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992), 54-55. Thomas-Durell Young indicated that in 1993 the decision was made not to fuse the three territorial army headqaurters with the three corps headquarters, but to place them under the new Army Operations Command. "Trends in German Defense Policy," 18.

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Appendix C

Peacetime Organization of the German Army (in 1994)

19 mechanized brigades 4 light brigades 1 German-French brigade 1 aviation brigade 3 logistics brigades

3 medical brigades 8 engineer brigades 1 signal recon brigade 4 C & C support brigades 45 defense regions

•Army Material Office Source: Weifibuch 1994, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 1994, 114.

Selected Bibliography All interviews were taped and are held by the author, unless otherwise noted. All referenced, unpublished government and military orders, letters, statements, briefing, and documents are either original copies or photocopies held by the author. Ranks of East German and Soviet military have been converted to their U.S. military equivalent. BOOKS Abenheim, Donald. Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. Ablass, Werner E. Zapfenstreich: von der NVA zur Bundeswehr. Dusseldorf: Kommunal Verlag, 1992. Ambler, John Steward. The French Army in Politics, 1945-1962. N.p: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Armee fiir Frieden und Sozialismus: Geschichte der Nationale Volksarmee der DDR. 2d ed. Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987. Craig, Gordon A. The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945. London: Oxford University Press, 1955. Creveld, Martin van. Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982. de La Gorce, Paul-Marie. The French Army: A Military-Political History. Translated by Kenneth Douglas. New York: George Braziller, 1963. Diedrich, Torsten, Hans Ehlert, and Riidiger Wenzke, eds. Im Dienste der Partei: Handbuch der bewaffneten Organe der DDR. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1998. Dorris, Jonathan Truman. Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977. Dupuy, Trevor T. N. A Genius for War: the German Army and General Staff, 1807-1945. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.

210

Selected Bibliography

Evangelischen Kirchenamt fiir die Bundeswehr. Streitkrafte im Wandel: Soldat—Schutzmann fur den Frieden. Hannover: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1990. Facts about Germany. Frankfurt am Main: Societats-Verlag, 1993. Farwick, Dieter, ed. Ein Staat—Eine Armee: Von der NVA zur Bundeswehr. Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992. Forster, Thomas M. The East German Army: The Second Power in the Warsaw Pact. Translated by Deryck Viney. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1980. Fulbrook, Mary. The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Gransow, Volker and Konrad H. Jarausch, eds. Die deutsche Vereinigung: Dokumente zu Burgerbewegung, Annaherung und Beitritt. Koln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik Berend von Nottbeck, 1991. Handbuch Militarisches Grundwissen. 9th ed. Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1980. Home, Alistair. The French Army and Politics, 1870-1970. New York: Peter Bedrick, 1984. Jarausch, Konrad H. The Rush to German Unity. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. Kaiser, Karl, Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die Internationale Aspekte. Bergisch Gladbach: GustavLubbe, 1991. Kirchbach, Hans-Peter von, Manfred Meyers, and Victor Vogt. Abenteuer Einheit: Zum Aufbau der Bundeswehr in den neuen Ldndern. Frankfurt am Main: Report, 1992. Klein, Paul, ed. Soldatsein in Deutschland. N.p.: Karl-Theodor-Molinari-Stiftung & Deutscher Bundeswehr Verband (Papers from a seminar, March, 1990), n.d. Koop, Volker and Dietmar Schossler. Erbe NVA—EindrUcke aus ihrer Geschichte und den Tagen der Wende. N.p.: Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Information und Kommunikation, 1992. Le Gloannec, Anne-Marie. Die Deutsche-Deutsche Nation: Anmerkungen auf einer revolutiondren Entwicklung. Munich: Printul, 1991. Lewis, William J. The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy. Cambridge, MA: McGrawHill, 1982. Lottman, Herbert R. The Purge. New York: William Morrow, 1986. Matloff, Maurice, ed. American Military History. Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1969. Militargeschichtliches Forschungsamt. 30 Jahre Bundeswehr, 1955-1985: Friedenssicherung im Biindnis. Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1985. Die Militdr- und Sicherheitspolitik der SED 1945 bis 1988: Dokumente und Materialen. Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989. Naumann, Klaus, ed. NVA: Anspruch und Wirklichkeit nach ausgewdhlten Dokumenten. Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1993. Neckermann, Peter. The Unification of Germany or the Anatomy of a Peaceful Revolution. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1991. Nelson, Daniel N., ed. Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984. Reed, John A., Jr. Germany and NATO. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987.

Selected Bibliography

211

Schauble, Wolfgang. Der Vertrag: Wie ich uber die deutsche Einheit verhandelte. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlag-Anstalt, 1991. Schonbohm, Jorg. Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland: Das Ende der Nationalen Volksarmee. Berlin: Siedler, 1992. Sefton, James E. The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1967. Simpson, Brooks D. Let Us Have Peace: Ulysses S. Grant and the Politics of War and Reconstruction, 1861-1868. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1991. Smith, Gordon, William E. Paterson, Peter H. Merkl, and Stephen Padgett, eds. Developments in German Politics. Durham: Duke University Press, 1992. Szabo, Stephen F. The Diplomacy of German Unification. New York: St. Martin's, 1992. . The Changing Politics of German Security. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. , ed. The Bundeswehr and Western Security. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. Teltschik, Horst. 329 Tage: Innenansichten der Einigung. Berlin: Siedler, 1991. Tetzner, Reiner. Leipziger Ring. Frankfurt am Main: Luchterhand, 1990. Waldman, Eric. The Goose Step Is Verboten: The German Army Today. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. Wallach, H. G., Peter Francisco and Ronald A. Fransisco. United Germany: The Past, Politics, and Prospects. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992. Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Whittam, John. The Politics of the Italian Army, 1861-1918. London: Croom Helm, 1977. Wickert, Ulrich, ed. Angst vor Deutschland. Hamburg: Hoffmann and Campe, 1990. Wunsche, Wolfgang, ed. RUhrt euchl Zur Geschichte der Nationalen Volksarmeeder DDR. Berlin: Edition Ost, 1998. Zeittafel zur Militdrgeschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1949 bis 988. 2d ed. Berlin: Militarverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1989. MONOGRAPHS, PAMPHLETS, AND WORKING PAPERS Dalton, Russell J. Two German Electorates? Center for German and European Studies, University of California, April, 1992. Die Innere FUhrung der Bundeswehr. Lehrunterlage (8/91) Koblenz: Zentrum Fur Innere Fuhrung, October, 1991. Fischmann, Brenton C. West German Defense Planning for the 1990s: Strategic Consequences for NATO. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 14, 1988. Hancock, M. Donald. The Bundeswehr and the National People's Army: A Comparative Study of German Civil-Military Polity. The Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, Volume 10, Monograph No. 2, 1972-1973. Kirchbach, Hans-Peter von. Reflections of the Growing Together of the German Armed Forces. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 14, 1992. Koch, Burkhard. Germany's New Assertiveness in International Relations: Between Reality and Misperception. Hoover Institution, 1992.

212

Selected Bibliography

Korps und Territorialkommando Ost. eine Bilanz. N.p., n.d. (Pamphlet published approximately fall 1992). Merkl, Peter H. German Nationalism, National Identity, and the Generations. Center for German and European Studies, University of California, November 1992. Millotat, Christian O. E. Understanding the Prussian-German General Staff System. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 20, 1992. U.S. Army Training Board. Allied Army Training Study of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ft. Monroe, VA, August 28, 1986. Victorson, Mark E. Mission in the East: The Building of an Army in a Democracy in the New German States. Newport Paper 7. Newport, RI: Naval War College, June 1994. Young, Thomas-Durell. Bundeswehr Plans for a National Command and Control Structure. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 24, 1992. . Emerging German National Command and Operational Control Structures. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 26, 1992. . The "Normalization" of The Federal Republic of Germany's Defense Structures. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 1, 1992. . Securing Eastern Germany and the Disposition of the Soviet Western Group of Forces. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 29, 1991. . Trends in German Defense Policy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 14, 1994. PUBLISHED GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Innere FUhrung: Unterlagen zum Selbststudium. Fu S I 4, Az 35-01-00, January 1991. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Weifibuch 1985: Zur Lage und Entwicklung der Bundeswehr. 1985. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Weifibuch 1994: Weifibuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage und der Zukunft der Bundeswehr. 1994. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Informations- und Pressestab. Bundeswehr Heute. n.d. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Offentlichkeitsarbeit. Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik: Die Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte. October 1990. Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Offentlichkeitsarbeit. Ein Jahr deutsche Einheit: Eine Leistungsbilanz der Bundeswehr. 3 October 1991. Deutscher Bundestag. Jahresbericht 1990. Unterrrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten. Drucksache 12/230, 12. Wahlperiode, Bonn, 12 March 1991. Die Entschiedung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts Uber den Antrag der Bundestagsfraktionen der FDP und SPD aufErlafi einer Einstweiligen Anordnung gegen den Beschlufi der Bundesregierung, an der Uberwachung und Durchsetzung der Flugverbots Uber Bosnien-Herzegowina durch den NATO-AWACS-Verband deutsche Soldaten teilnehmen zu lassen [Extract]. Truppenpraxis (3/1993): 336-337. Documents of German Unity: A German Tribune Supplement. The German Tribune, n.d. Federal Ministry of Defence. White Paper 1983: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany. 1983.

Selected Bibliography

213

Federal Press and Information Office. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Bonn. 1981. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundersregierung. Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Regierung der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken Uber einige uber einige uberleitende Mafinahmen. Bulletin Nr. 123/S.1281, 17 October 1990. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung. Besuch des Prdsidenten der Sowjetunion vom 9. bis 10. November 1990 and Vertrag Uber gute Nachbarschaft, Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken. Bulletin Nr. 133/S.1373, 15 November 1990. Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundersregierung. Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik uber die Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands. Bulletin Nr. 104/S. 877, 6 September 1990. U.S. Department of State. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and a Related Agreed Minute, 5 September 1990. CIVILIAN JOURNAL ARTICLES "ACQ Interview: Admiral Dieter Wellershoff." Atlantic Community Quarterly 26 (Spring, 1988): 3-8. Arnold, Eckart. "German Foreign Policy and Unification." International Affairs 67 (3,1991): 453-471. Ash, Timothy Garton. "Germany's Choice." Foreign Affairs 73 (July/August 1994): 65-81. Asmus, Ronald D. "A United Germany." Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring, 1990): 63-76. . "West Germany Faces Nuclear Modernization." Survival 30 (November/December, 1988): 499-514. Bertram, Christoph. "The German Question." Foreign Affairs 69 (Spring, 1990): 45-62. Brandenburg, Ulrich. "The 'Friends' Are Leaving: Soviet and Post-Soviet Troops in Germany." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 44 (1/1993): 77-88. Daase, Christopher and Michael Jochum. '"Partners in Leadership'? United Germany in the Eyes of the USA." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (HI/1992): 237-245. Davis, Lynn E. "Lessons of the INF Treaty." Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 720-734. Garten, Jeffrey E. "Japan and Germany: America's Concerns." Foreign Affairs 68 (Winter 1989/90): 84-101. Gauck, Joachim. "Dealing with the Stasi Past." Daedalus 123 (Winter, 1994): 277-284. "Germany in Transition." Daedalus 123 (Winter, 1994). (Entire edition devoted to Germany.) Germroth, David S. and Rebecca J. Hudson. "German-American Relations and the Post Cold War World." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (I, 1992): 33-42. Gorning, Gilbert. "The Contractual Settlement of the External Problems of the German Unification." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (1/1991): 312-322. Hamilton, Daniel. "Germany after Unification." Problems of Communism 41 (May-June, 1992): 1-18. Horn, Hannelore. "The Revolution in the GDR in 1989: Prototype or Special Case?" Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 44 (I, 1993): 56-66.

214

Selected Bibliography

Inacker, Michael J. "A Real People's Army After Six Months? Legends and Truths about the National People's Army After the Upheaval in the GDR." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (1/1991): 31-36. Joffe, Josef. "The New Europe: Yesterday's Ghosts." Foreign Affairs, America and the World 12 (1993): 29-43. Kaiser, Karl. "German Unification." Foreign Affairs, America and the World 70 (1990/91): 179-205. Keep, John. "Zheleznovodsk and After: Towards a New Russo-German Relationship." East European Quarterly 26 (January, 1993): 431-446. Kielinger, Thomas. "The Gulf War and the Consequences from a German Point of View." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (HI/1991): 241-250. Koch, Burkhard. "American and German Approaches to East Central Europe: A Comparison." World Affairs 156 (Fall, 1993): 86-96. . "Post-Totalitarianism in Eastern Germany and German Democracy." World Affairs 156 (Summer, 1993): 26-34. Maull, Hanns W. "Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers." Foreign Affairs 69 (Winter, 1990/91): 91-106. Meier-Walser, Reinhard. "Germany, France, and Britain on the Threshold to a New Europe." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (IV, 1992): 334-342. Minkenberg, Michhael. "The Wall after the Wall: On the Continuing Division of Germany and the Remaking of Political Culture." Comparative Politics 26 (October, 1993): 53-68. Moisi, Dominique and Michael Mertes. "Europe's Map, Compass, and Horizon." Foreign Affairs 74 (January/February 1995): 122-134. Neckermann, Peter. "What Went Wrong in Germany after the Unification?" East European Quarterly 26 (January, 1993): 447^469. Pond, Elizabeth. "A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR." International Security 15 (Fall, 1990): 35-66. . "Germany in the New Europe." Foreign Affairs 71 (Spring, 1992): 114-130. Record, Jeffrey and David B. Rivkin, Jr. "Defending Post-INF Europe." Foreign Affairs 67 (Spring, 1988): 735-754. Scheven, Werner von. "The Merger of Two Formerly Hostile German Armies." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 43 (11/1992): 164-173. Schmidt, Manfred G. "Political Consequences of German Unification." West European Politics 15 (October, 1992): 1-15. Sperling, James. "German Foreign Policy after Unification: The End of Cheque Book Diplomacy?" West European Politics 17 (June, 1994): 73-97. Stern, Fritz. "Freedom and its Discontents." Foreign Affairs 72 (September/October, 1993): 108-125. Stuth, Reinhard. "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe." Aussenpolitik 43 (English Edition)(I/1992): 22-32. Teltschik, Horst. "Gorbachev's Reform Policy and the Outlook for East-West Relations." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 40 (HI/1989): 201-214. Treverton, Gregory F. "The Year of European (Dis)Unification." Current History 91 (November, 1992): 353-358. . "The New Europe." Foreign Affairs: America and the World (1991/92): 94-112. Treverton, Gregory F. and Barbara Bicksler. "Germany and the New Europe." Society 29 (January/February, 1992): 48-56.

Selected Bibliography

215

Turner, George. "The Unification of Germany—Background and Facts Beyond Statistics." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (11/1991): 194-199. Walker, David B. "Germany: Confronting the Aftermath of Reunification." Current History 91 (November, 1992): 359-363 Wettig, Gerhard. "German Unification and European Security." Aussenpolitik (English Edition) 42 (1/1991): 13-19. MILITARY JOURNAL AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES (Numerous military journal and magazine articles were used from the following publications, primarily from the years 1990 to 1994: Truppenpraxis, Military Review, Loyal, Soldat und Technik, Wehrtechnik, NATO's Sixteen Nations, Heer,mid Information fur die Truppe. Complete citations are provided in the references notes.) UNPUBLISHED MILITARY DOCUMENTS, DIRECTIVES, AND ORDERS (Arranged chronologically by organization. Photocopies held by the author.) Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command "Befehl Nr. 1 des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost fiir Fuhrung, Ausbildung und Organisation." Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando Ost, Az 32-01-08, 3 October 1990. "Innere Lage im Bereich Bundeswehrkommando OST, Stand: Februar 1991." Befehlshaber, Bundeswehrkommando OST an Stellvertreter des Generalinspekteurs der Bundeswehr, 14 March 1991. "Situation within Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command Area at the Time of Its Deactivation. Report to the Deputy Chief of Staff, Federal Armed Forces from Commander, Federal Armed Forces Eastern Command." 26 June 1991. Ministry of Defense, Bonn "The Psychological Service of the Federal Armed Forces of Germany: A Survey of the Tasks and Organisation." P II 4, May 1985. "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR." [Memo signed by Staatssekretar Dr. Carl] Org 1, Az 10-02-05, 20 June 1990. "Einrichtung einer AuBenstelle des Bundesministerium der Verteidigung in Strausberg." Org 1, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Az 10-02-05/00, September 1990. "Zahlung der Bezuge an ehemalige Angehorige des Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung (GDR) und der NVA." VR III 3, Az 67-01-00, 6 September 1990. "Richtlinien fur die Berufung von Angehorigen der ehemaligen Nationalen Volksarmee in das Dienstverhaltnis eines Soldat auf Zeit fur die Dauer von 2 Jahren." P II 1, Az 02-06-00/3, 17 September 1990. "Merkblatt uber die personalrechtlichen Bestimmungen des Einigungsvertrages fur Angehorige der NVA." P II 1, 17 September 1990.

216

Selected Bibliography

"Vertrag zur Herstellung der Einheit Deutschlands: Bundeswehr und Nationale Volksarmee." Signed: Dr. Dau, VRII 2, Az 02-06, 18 September 1990. "Zusammenarbeit mit dem Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung der DDR." 1 June 1991. "Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa." January 1992. (English) "Verwendungsplanung" [of former NVA personnel]. PHI 1, November 1992. Army Staff, Bonn, and Army Office, Cologne "Planungshandbuch: Teil "Stabe/StFmVerb," Heeresstruktur 5." Fu H VI, Az 09-10, 26 April 1990. "Eingleiderung der NVA-Heeresanteile in ein gesamtdeutsches Heer: Arbeitsghederung im Fii H." ChefStab Fii H, 7 August 1990. "Befehl Nr. 1 fur die Arbeiten im Heeresamt zur Integration der NVA-Landstreitkrafte in das Heer." Heeresamt I 1 (2), Az 02-06, 23 August 1990. "Auftrage der Stabsabteilungen des Fu H zur Bestandsaufnahme vor Ort in der DDR." Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D. Az 02-06. Bonn, 24 August 1990. "Befehl fiir die Ausbildung: Vorlaufsausbildung von Kompaniechefs der 'Nationalen Volksarmee' an Schulen des Heeres." Heeresamt II, 30 August 1990. "Befehl fur die Ausbildung: Vorlaufsausbildung von Unteroffizieren mit Kompaniefeldwebelaufgaben der 'Nationalen Volksarmee' an Schulen des Heeres." Heeresamt II, 30 August 1990. "Einplanung von Wehrmaterial der bisherigen NVA in die deutschen Streitkrafte." Fu H V 5, Az 09-50-30/01, 30 August 1990. "Weisung Nr 1 fiir die Ausbildung von Offizieren und Unteroffizieren der Landstreitkrafte der NVA (Heereskommando Ost)." Inspekteur des Heeres, Fu H I 6, Az 32-01-06, 30 August 1990. "Ubergangsstruktur OST 1994: Grobstruktur der Logistik und des Sanit&tsdientes des Heeres." Fu H V 1, Az 09-10, 31 August 1990. "Bestandaufnahme: Umweltschutz, Naturschutz, Arbeitsschutz, Brandschutz und technische Uberwachung in der NVA." Fu H V 6, Az 02-06, 4 September 1990. "Personalfuhrung ehemaliger NVA-Soldaten nach Vereinigung: Unteroffiziere/Mannschaften SaZ." Fu H I 1, Az 16-26-00, 6 September 1990. "Einplanung von Sanitats Material der bisherigen NVA." Fu H V 2, Az 09-50-30, 10 September 1990. "Stationierungsuntersuchung: Heer-Ost." Fu H IV 4, Az 10-30-10-60, 11 September 1990. "Vorlagenotiz: Umrustung der NVA auf Bekleidung der Bundeswehr." Fii H V 3, Az 4901-00, 11 September 1990. "Vorbereitende MaBnahmen zur Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte: MaBnahmen der Logistik des Herres." Fu H V 1, Az 02-06, 12 September 1990. "Weisung fur den Wachdienst im Heer." Fii HII 2, 12 September 1991. "Weisung Nr. 1 fiir die Grundausbildung im Heereskommando Ost vom 08.10.bis 21.12.1990." Heeresamt, II 2, Az 32-01-01, 12 September 1990. "Einplanung von Wehrmaterial der NVA in die deutschen Streitkrafte: Erste Wirtschaftlichkeitsberechnung." (Anlage 3 zu Fu S VI 6 vom 21 Sept 90) Fu H V 5, Az 09-50-30, 14 September 1990.

Selected Bibliography

217

"Ubernahme der Befehls- und Kommandogewalt uber die Streitkrafte des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands durch den Bundesminister der Verteidigung: Personalabstellung Heer." Fernschreiben, Fii H I 1, 17 September 1990. "Zuordnung der Kdr- und UnterstUtzungsgruppen (bw) zu Truppenteile der NVA Landstreitkrafte." Fii H IV 1, Az 10-01-03, 17 September 1990. "Umweltschutz in der NVA." Fu H V 6, Az 63-25-00, 19 September 1990. "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (Feldheer/Erganzung nach Fuhrungsbesprechung am 12.06.1990." Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, 19 September 1990. "Zusammenfuhrung der deutsch/deutschen Streitkrafte: Couleurverhaltnisse (TerrKdoBeh)." Fu H IV/Steuergruppe D/D, Az 02-06, 19 September 1990. "Feststellung /Verleihung von Disziplinargewalt im Bereich des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost: Stellvertretende Befehlshaber in den Wehrbereichen VII (Leipzig) und VIII (Neubrandenburg)." Fii H IV 1, Az 25-01-04, 21 September, 1990. "Vorlaufausbildung fiir Regiments- und Bataillonskommandeure sowie vergleichbarer Dienstposteninhaber (ehem. LaSk-NVA) der Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fu H I 6, Az 33-02-01, 25 September 1990. "Vorlaufige organisatorische Bestimmungen fur KommandobehCrden, Stabe und Truppenteile des Heeres im beigetretenen Teil Deutschland." Fu H IV, 27 September 1990. "Stationierung der Territorialen Kommandobehorden des Heeres im beigetretenen Teil Deutschland." Fu H III 3, Az 02-06-02, 28 September 1990. "Bildung einer Arbeitsgruppe fiir die Aufstellung von Truppenteilen und Dienststellen im Bereich Heereskommando Ost." Fu H IV 1, Az 10-30-20-60, 11 December 1990. "Stationierungsplanung Heer/Ost (Ubergangsstruktur) Stand: Dezember 90." Fii H IV 4, Az 10-30-20-30, 7 January 1991. "Anweisung fur die Fuhrerausbildung: Ausbildung der Offiziere der ehemaligen NVA-Landstreitkrafte—im Offiziererganzungslehrgang (2 Monate) fur die Dienstgradgruppe der Hauptleute." Heeresamt, Abteilung II, 20 February 1991. "Erganzungsausbildung—Teil II and III—fur Offiziere und Unteroffiziere der ehemaligen NVA." Heeresamt II 3, Az 32-09-00, 3 May 1991. "Command Structure and the Organization of the Future All-German Army: Army Structure 5." Fu H VI 3, Az 09-10, 14 July 1991. "Jahresweisung, 1992." Signed by Generalleutnant Klaffus, Heeresamt, 23 September 1991. "Befristeter Aufenhalt der sowjetischen Streitkrafte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Hinweise zu Reisen, Besuchen und besonderen Vorhaben: Erganzung." Fu H II 1, Az 02-25-25, 23 September 1991. "Anweisung fiir die Fuhrerausbildung: Ausbildung der Offiziere der ehemaligen NVALandstreitkrafte—im Offiziererganzungslehrgang (2 Monate) fiir die Dienstgradgruppe der Leutnante." Heeresamt II, 5 November 1991. "Protokoll der 3. Koordinierungskonferenz AbtLtr HA mit KdoBeh OST und West beim Heeresamt, Koln am 08. November." Heeresamt 11 (3) Az 02-06, 26 November 1991. "Bundeswehr und NVA: Truppenausbildung." Fii H I 5, Az 32-01, N.d.

218

Selected Bibliography Joint Staff, Bonn

"Dienstliche und auBerdienstliche Kontakte zwischen Angehorigen der Bundeswehr und der Nationalen Volksarmee: Rahmenrichtlinie." Auszugsabschrift vom Fernschreiben (271553Z April 1990), Signed by Generalinspekteur Wellershof, Fu S III, 27 April 1990. "Grundsatze zur Sicherstellung der materiellen Einsatzbereitschaft fur die Streitkrafte im Gebiet des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands." Fu S V 1, Az 10-20-01, 20 August 1990. "Zusammenfuhrung der deutschen Streitkrafte." Fu S VI 3, 23 August 1990. "Einplanung von Wehrmaterial der bisherigen NVA in die deutschen Streitkrafte." Fti S VI 6, Az 09-50-30, 28 August 1990. "Weisung fiir die Ausbildung der deutschen Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fu S I 7, Az 32-01, 30 August 1990. "MaBnahmen zur Ubernahme der militarischen Verantwortung fiir den beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fu S IV/InfoLZ, 5 September 1990. "Rahmenbedingungen fur die Verwendung von militarischem Personal der derzeitigen Bundeswehr in den deutschen Streitkraften in beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fii S I 1, Az 02-06-00, 7 September 1990. "Dienststellen im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands: Organisationsbereich Zentrale Militarische Bundeswehrdienst." Fii S IV 3, 12 September 1990. "MaBnahmen der Betriebssicherheit von NVA-Gerat, Ausstattung mit Bw-Kennzeichen." Fu S V 3, Az 80-05, 12 September 1990. "Vortragsnotiz fiir Herm Generalinspektur zur Information: Strukturvorstellungen 'Ost' der TSK/OrgBereiche." Fu S VI 3, Az 10-01, 12 September 1990. "Bestandsaufnahme und weitere Nutzung von Waffen und Gerat der ehemaligen Streitkrafte des beigetretenen Teils Deutschlands [Memo to Herrn Minister]." Fii S VI 6, 21 September 1990. "Hinweise zur Betreuung in Bereich Bw Ost." Fii H I 3, 21 September 1990. "Organisationsbefehl fur die Aufstellung des Bundeswehrkommandos Ost: Entscheidung Bundesminster im Kollegium am 31.08.1990." Fii S IV 1, Az 10-87-25, 25 September 1990. "Traditionspflege in der Bundeswehr: MaBnahmen in den Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands." Fu S I 4, Az 35-08-07, 25 September 1990. "Ubernahme der Befehls- und Kommandogewalt uber die Streitkrafte im beigetretenen Teil Deutschlands am 03.10.90: MaBnahmen der Soldatischen Ordnung." Fu S I 4, Az 35-08-00, 25 September 1990. "Ausbildungsweisung Nr. 110 427 fur den Lehrgang 'Innere Fuhrung fiir Stabsofffiziere der ehem. NVA'." Fu S I 4, Az 33-02-01, 8 May 1991. "Ressortkonzept fiir die Stationierung der Bundeswehr." Fii S IV 2, Az 45-10-00, 23 May 1991. MINISTRY FOR DISARMAMENT AND DEFENSE, STRAUSBERG, AND THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S ARMY, POTSDAM "Plan der Vorbereitung und Durchfuhrung der zentralen militarwissenschaftlichen Konferenz der NVA, der Grenztruppen der DDR und der Zivilverteidigung

Selected Bibliography

219

anlaBlichdes 40. Jahrestages der Griindung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," 28 February 1989. "Konzeption zur Fuhrung der kulturell-aethetischen Erziehung und Ausbildung an der Militarpolitischen Hochschule 'Wilhelm Pieck."' Nationale Volksarmee Militarpolitische Hochschule Wilhelm Pieck, 1 March 1982. "Befehl Nr. 1/90 des Ministers fiir Nationale Verteidigung uber die Militarreform in der DDR." Admiral Theodor Hoffmann, 4 January 1990. "Ordnung Nr. 010/9/025 des Ministers fur Abrustung und Verteidigung uber dienstliche und auBerdienstliche Kontakte zwischen Angehorigen der Nationalen Volksarmee und Soldaten der Bundeswehr." Rainer Eppelmann, 28 May 1990. "Befehl Nr. 26/90 des Ministers fur Abrustung und Verteidigung tiber die Auflosung der Organe der Staatsburgerlichen Arbeit." Rainer Eppelmann, 8 August 1990. "Auskunftbericht." Chef, Kraftfahrzeugdienst, Ministerium fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung (DDR), 10 August 1990. "Anordnung Nr. 13/90 des Chefs der Landstreitkrafte uber die Sicherstellung der Besichtigung von Objekten der Landstreitkrafte durch Erkundigungsgruppen des Bundesheeres." Generalleutnant Skerra, 28 August, 1990. Letter from Rainer Eppelmann, Minister fur Abrustung und Verteidigung, 6 September 1990. "Befehl Nr. 48/90 des Ministers fiir Abrustung und Verteidigung uber die Aufgaben der Nationalen Volksarmee im Zusammenhang mit der Bildung gesamtdeutscher Streitkrafte vom 21.09.1990." Ministerium fur Abrustung und Verteidigung, 21 September 1990. MISCELLANEOUS Akademie der Bundeswehr fiir Psychologische Verteidigung. Wissen OP Dr. Schirrmeister. "Aktuelles Stichwort 1/90: Streitkrafte der DDR: Reform oder Umbruch." Bereich II, Az: 35-20-17, Waldbrol, 22 January 1990. Reeb, Hans-Joachim. "Deutsche Armeen in Ost und West: Betrachtungen zur Militarreform der Nationalen Volksarmee im Vergleich zur Inneren Fiihrung der Bundeswehr anhand ausgewahlter Dokumente." Zentrum Innere Fuhrung, June 1990. "Der Soldat der NVA: Hilfen zum Verstandnis und zum Umgang." Zentrum Innere Fuhrung, September 1990. "Catalog of German Army Equipment Support—Desert Shield/Storm." U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Liaison Office, FRG. 18 March 1991.

UNPUBLISHED GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY BRIEFINGS, LETTERS, AND STATEMENTS (Arranged chronologically. Photocopies held by the author.) Richter, Ekkehard G., Major General. "Analyse einiger Grundsatzlicher Unterschiede im Wertebezug zwischen der Bundeswehr und der Nationalen Volksarmee." n. d. Hoffman, Theodor, Admiral. [Letter from Chef der Nationalen Volksarmee to all military and civilian employees.] Strausberg, 6 August 1990. "The Current Military-Political Situation in the Federal Republic of Germany." Heeresamt V 5 (1), 15 August 1990.

220

Selected Bibliography

"Sachstand der militarischen Vorbereitungen fur die Vereinigung Deutschlands." Fu S IV 1, Bonn, September 1990. "Vortrag Stabsabteilungleiter Fu H V bei erweitertem Fuhrungskreis Heer am 12.09.1990: Integration von Material der NVA." Fu H V, 11 September 1990. Richter, Ekkehard, Major General. "Erlauterungen zu den soldatenrechtlichen Bestimmungen des Einigungsvertrages." Briefing to NVA on 12 September 1990. Richter, Ekkehard, Major General. "Vortrag Brigadegeneral Richter anlaBlich der Kommandeurtagung NVA, 12.09.1990." Fu H/InfoLZ, 17 September 1990. Hundt, Ulrich A., Vice Admiral. "Soldaten in Ost und West auf den Weg zur Einheit." Vortrag an der Friedrich-Engels Akademie, Dresden, 21 September 1990. "Ansprache, anlaBlich der Auflosung der Nationalen Volksarmee." Division Kommandeur, 7 Panzerdivision (NVA), Dresden, 1 October 1993. Pfahls, Staatsekretar. Dr. "Waffen und Gerat der ehemaligen NVA (Ausgangsdaten und Uberlegungen)." Vortrag in der Abteilungsleiterkonferenz, Fu S VI 6, Bonn, 25 October, 1990. Stoltenberg, Dr. Gerhard. "Bundesverteidigungsminister Dr.Gerhard Stoltenberg erklart am 12 Nov. 1990 zu Fragen der Bundeswehrplanung, der Bundeswehr Ost und zur Freigabe von Liegenschaften in den beigetretenen Landern." 12 November 1990. "The Federal Armed Forces in United Germany." Fii S, December, 1990. Steinseifer, Friedrich, Major General. "The Unification of Two Armies—Logistic Experiences of the New German Army." Briefing given at the International Symposium, "Logistics in NATO," Luxembourg, 16 January 1991. Haasler, Ruprecht, Major General. "Erlebnisse und Erfahrungen aus der Uberflihrung der NVA in die Bundeswehr." Hanover, 28 January 1991. Steinaecker, Brigadier General Dr. Gunter von. "Nationale Volksarmee und Warschauer Pakt in der schriftlichen und gegenstandlichen historischen Darstellung und ihre Bedeutung fur die Traditionspflege der Bundeswehr." Strausberg, 21 February 1991. Hirsch, Hans, Lieutenant Colonel. "Ausbildung und Ausbildingseinrichtungen der ehemaligen NVA." Heeresamt II 1 (1), Az 04-04/US, 15 March 1991. Haasler, Ruprecht, Major General. "Vortrag vor Heeresamt (Inspizienten)" Koln, 18 March 1991. Klaffus, Ernst, Lieutenant General, "Opening Address by the Commander of the Army Office on the Occasion of the GE/US Steering Committee Meeting at Ft. Rucker." Heeresamt, 24 March 1991. Hundt, Ulrich A., Vice Admiral. "Armee im Gleichschritt? Die Integration von Soldaten zweier ehemals verfeindeter Streitkrafte." Vortrag auf der Dreilandertagung der verwaltungswissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft, St. Gallen, Switzerland, 25 October 1991. Gulich, Wolfgang, Colonel. "Der ProzeB der deutsch-deutsch militarischen Vereinigung aus der Sicht eines Brigade Kommandeur in den neuen Bundeslandem—Versuch einer ersten Bewertung." Vortrag bei Jahrestagung 1992 des Arbeitskreises Militar und Sozialwissenschaften. Oberwiesenthal, 9 May 1992. Scheven, Werner von, Lieutenant General. "Vortrag vor der Fuhrungsakademie der Bundeswehr aus AnlaB der erstmaligen Teilnahme von ehemaligen NVABerufsoffizieren am Grundlehrgang der Fortbildungs Stufe C." [Lecture at the Federal Armed Forces Command and Staff College on the Occasion of the First Participation of Previous NVA Career Officers in the Basic Course of Advanced Officer Education Level C], Hamburg, 4 March 1993.

Selected Bibliography

221

PRINCIPAL INTERVIEWS (Complete citations for interviews are provided in the reference notes. Interviews conducted with multiple interviewees are so listed. Former members of the NVA are so noted.) Ablass, Werner E. Director, Field Office, MOD (Former Deputy Defense Minister, MDD, German Democratic Republic). Belitz, Burghard, Captain, CPT Fred Kuther, and CPT Siegfried Stange (former NVA) Home Defense Brigade 37. Beltermann, Wolfgang, Brigadier General. Chief of Staff, Corps/Territorial, Command-East. Biedermann, Roald, Captain, ILT Brandt, and CPT Monecke (former NVA) Military Region 84. Blanke, Peter, Sergeant First Class, SSG Rainer Kaps, and SFC Koch (former NVA) Potsdam. Bormann, Giinther, Brigadier General-Ret. (former NVA) former Chief, Artillery and Rocket Forces, NVA. Broicher, Andreas, Brigadier General, Director of Training, German Army Office. Burkhardt, Harry, Commander. Instructor, Center for Innere Fuhrung, Koblenz. Carl, Dr. Karl-Heinz. Former State Secretary, MOD (phone interview). Czajka, Christian, Sergeant, SFC Siegfried Ortmann, and SFC Gernot Zepernik (former NVA) Eighth Division. Danzer, Herbert Lieutenant Colonel. Assistant Operations Officer, Seventh Division. Eisert, Wolgang, Dr. Historian, Military History Research Office, Potsdam. Engelmann, Gerd. Deputy Director (Personnel), Field Office, MOD (former staff officer, MDD, GDR). Eulig, Udo, Brigadier General. Director, Division I (General Policy) German Army Office. Fahlbusch, Martin, Major. Assistant Logistics Officer, Seventh Divison. Gebhardt, Birgit. German Institute for International Pedagogical Research, Berlin. GUlich, Wolfgang, Colonel. Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37. Haake, Uwe, Staff Sergeant, CPT Walter Knoch, SFC Knoechel, SFC Klaus-Gunter Mantey, CPT Reiner Moeller, CPT Harald Schulenburg (former NVA) Seventh Division. Haasler, Ruprecht, Major General. Commander, Eighth Division and Military Region. Hannig, Thorsten, Staff Sergeant. Staff NCO, G-3 Section, Corps/Territorial Command-East. Hans-Joachim Wichert, Commander (former NVA) Operations Officer, Military Region 84. Harder, Hans-Joachim, Colonel Dr. Military History Research Office, Potsdam. Hartmann, Wilko, Brigadier General. Deputy Commander, Seventh Division & Region. Hecht, Axel, Colonel. Personnel Officer, IV Corps, Potsdam. Henning, Lieutenant Colonel, CPT Uwe Losch, and ILT Klaus-Dieter Triebel (former NVA) Home Defense Brigade 42. Huffmann, Jurgen, Lieutenant Colonel. Commander, Army NCO School II. Huttel, Rolf, Lieutenant General. German Representative to NATO Military Committee. Ickenroth, Bernhard, Lieutenant Colonel. Instructor, Center for Innere FUhrung.

222

Selected Bibliography

Jantzen, Eckard, Colonel. Commander, Military Region 84. Jung, Hans-Joachim, Lieutenant Colonel, LTC, Dr. Wolfgang Knigge, CPT Andreas Pohl, MAJ Wensdorf (former NVA), Berlin. Kirchbach, Hans-Peter von, Brigadier General. Director, Division I (Innere FUhrung, Personnel, Training) Army Staff. Klenner, Dietmar, Colonel. Operations Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East. Klingenberg, Werner, Lieutenant Colonel. Operations Officer, Fifth Armored Divsion. Korff, Fritz von, Lieutenant Colonel. Intelligence and Security Officer, Eighth Division. Korn, Dietmar, First Lieutenant. Assistant Personnel Officer, Military Region 84. Kuchenmeister, Daniel. Historical Commission, Berlin, and Gerd-Riidiger Stephan, Institute for Historical Youth Research, Berlin. Kiihe, Lieutenant. Assistant Personnel Officer, Eighth Division. Lahmann, Axel J. Lieutenant Colonel. Personnel Officer, Seventh Division and Military Region. Lassoncyzk, Alfred, Colonel. Logistics Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East. Leesing, Wolfgang, Major. Department Head, Defense District 76, Dresden, and Captain Ingolf (former NVA). Loffler, Hans-Georg, Brigadier General (Ret.) (former NVA) Division Commander, First Motorized Rifle Division (Potsdam); Chief of Staff, Fifth Military District/Army (Neubrandenburg). Loy, Heinrich, Lieutenant Colonel. Staff Officer, Division II (Training), German Army Office. Matthies, Hans-Walter, First Lieutenant (former NVA) Staff Officer, Command and Control (G-6) Section, Eighth Division. Neeb, Volker, Lieutenant Colonel. Section Chief, Information Center, Joint Staff. Neugebauer, Gero, Professor. Free University of Berlin. Neumann, Dorte, Gabriele Rtitz, and Christina Topler (former NVA NCOs) civilian administrative assistants, Eighth Division. Oerding, Jan Jorg, Colonel. Division Chief, Division III 1 (Fundamentals of Operational C & C, Contributions to Pol-Mil Strategy) Army Staff. Ostermeier, Wolfgang, Sergeant Major. Army Representative, German Armed Forces Association. Pallokat, Rudi and Arnold Eiben. Legal Advisors, Seventh Divsion & Military Region. Reddemann, Horst, Captain (former NVA) Staff Officer, Division VIII (Infantry), German Army Office. Reinhardt, Klaus, Major General, Dr. Commander, German Command and Staff Academy. Richter, Ekkehard G, Major General. Commander, Seventh Divison & Military Region. Scheffler, Herwig, Colonel. Section Chief, Review Group, Army Staff. Scherzer, Torsten, Staff Sergeant, and Staff Sergeant Dirk Rudolph (former NVA) Military Region 84. Scheven, Werner von, Lieutenant General. Commanding General, Corps/Territorial Command-East. Schiele, Alfred, Lieutenant Colonel. Assistant Logistics Officer, Eighth Division. Schulze, Joachim, Commander. Deputy Commander, Defense District 84. Schulze-Buttger, Jobst, Lieutenant Colonel. Stammdienststelle des Heeres. Senden, Friedrich von, Colonel Freiherr. Commander, Home Defense Brigade 42.

Selected Bibliography

223

Steinhaus, Joachim, Colonel. Command and Control Officer (G-6 Section Leader), Eighth Division. Titze, Erhard, Major (former NVA) Staff Officer, Division II (Training), German Army Office. Ullrich, Bernd, Colonel Dr. (former NVA) Specialist for Physiology, German Air Force. Vogt, Diethard, Lieutenant Colonel. Logistics Officer, Military Region 84. Wallatis, Reinhard, Lieutenant Colonel. Staff Officer, Division IV 4 (Activation/Stationing - Current Units), Army Staff. Weblus, Gunter, Lieutenant Colonel. Assistant Operations Officer, Eighth Division. Wenzke, Riidiger, Dr. Historian, Military History Research Office, Potsdam. Wichert, Hans-Joachim, Commander. Operations Officer and Deputy Commander, Military Region 84. Wicke, Peter, Professor. Humboldt University, Berlin. Wittenberg, Andreas F., Brigadier General. Director of Engineers and NBC Defense, German Army Office, Cologne (former Brigade Commander, Home Defense Brigade 37, Dresden). Wolff, Dieter H., Colonel. Deputy Director of Training, German Army Office. Wollweber, Liitz, Lieutenant Colonel. Assistant Personnel Officer, Corps/Territorial Command-East.

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Index Abenheim, Donald, 42, 182. Work: Reforging the Iron Cross, 182 AblaB, Werner E., 31, 59, 59, 77-78, 97, 100, 101, 102, 118, 120, 124, 135, 149, 159, 162 Air Force, Bundeswehr, 3; Stoltenberg overriding its decision on MIG-29's, 76 Army Amalgamations: French Army after WW II, 14-16; Italian Army (1860's), 12-13; theory, 18-19, 194-96; U.S. Civil War, 11-12 Army Structure 4, 87 Army Structure 5, 87, 88, 90, 91, 164, 178, 190,203-205 Auftragstaktik, 36, 43-44, 59, 73-76, 145, 150, 192 BaarB, LTG, 34, 97 Baker, James, 23, 49 Basic Law, 72, 111, 137; and out-ofarea question, 181-82 Baudissin, Wolf Count, 18 Befehlstaktik, 36, 150,192 Beltermann, BG Wolfgang, 64 Berger, MG, 97 Berlin Wall, 24, 25, 26, 49, 50 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von, 72

Bormann, BG Gtinther, 34, 35 Born, Admiral, 97 Brezhnev Doctrine, 22 Broicher, BG Andreas, 187 Briining, Heinrich, 72 Bundestag, 115, 180, 181; Defense Committee of, 77 Bundeswehr: constitutional debate over deployment, 181-82; Defense Policy Guidelines (1992), 190; differences between the NVA and, 150-5 ^establishment of, 16-18,40, 41; force structure, 45-46; many tasks faced at Unification, 2; mission, 44-45; new tasks, 177-79; overview, 40-49; personnel strength (1994), 189, 190; political control of, 71-77; resource challenges in late 1980s, 47, 49-50; threat picture in late 1980's, 46-47; 2000, 47-48 BUrgerbewegung, 25 Burkalov, MG Matvei, 185 Bush, George, 23, 49 Carl, Dr. Karl-Heinz, 60, 73, 77, 110, 120, 122, 123, 162 Cavour, Camillio Benso di, 12, 13

226 CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe), 23,49, 159, 160, 162, 177 Civil War (U.S.), 11-12 Couleurverhaltnisse, 90-92 de Gaulle, Charles, 14 de Maiziere, Lothar, 77, 188 de Tassigny, GEN de Lattre, 15 Ditte, COL, 99 Eastern Army Command, 3, 69, 142 Eastern Corps and Territorial Command, 71 Eastern Federal Armed Forces Command, 1, 3, 62, 63, 65-69, 66-68, 70-71 EK (Entlassungskandidat) system, 34 Elbe, Frank, 23 Engelhardt, MG, 97 Eppelmann, Rainer, 77, 78, 86, 96, 97, 101, 104, 105, 106 Erweiteres Aufgabenspektrum, 178, 190 Erziehung zum Haft, 36 "Fair Chance," for former NVA, 118-19, 124-25 Farwick, Dieter, 35 Feldmeyer, Karl, 189 Frederick the Great, 2, 43, 71 French Army, after WW II, 14-16 Fuhrungsakademie (Federal Command and Staff College), 142, 148 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 13, 14 Gauck Commission, 113, 115 Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, 23 German Army: Combat Maneuver Training Center, 50; early history, 2-3; organization (1986), 45-46; organization (1994), 207-8; problems it faced in mid-1990's, 185-88 German Unification: domestic political setting, 24-27; international political setting, 22-24

Index Germany, Federal Republic of: Unification Day, 1; unification with East Germany, 1, 24-27 Gneisenau, August Count Neithardt von, 3 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 22, 23, 24, 25, 46, 48, 49; meetings with Kohl, 2, 3, 48, 23,24,48,86, 103, 162 Gottelmann, BG, 69 Grant, GEN Ulysses S., 11, 12 Grass, Giinter, 186 Groener, Wilhelm, 72 Gulf War, 2, 159, 160-61, 167, 176, 177, 179, 181 Gulich, COL Wolfgang, 62, 75, 88, 118,120, 168,180 Haasler, MG Ruprecht, 64, 68, 73, 74, 87,91, 101, 107, 108, 111, 151, 165, 166, 169, 176, 179 Hager, Kurt, 22 Hansen, LTG Helge, 178 Hartmann, BG Wilko, 89, 107, 109, 114, 115, 116, 120, 150, 176 Herder, Gerhard, 21 Heusinger, Adolf, 17, 18 Hindenburg, GEN Paul von, 72 Hitler, Adolf, 3, 72 Hoffmann, Admiral Theodor, 32 Honecker, Erich, 22, 25, 35 Horn Guyla, 24 Home, Alistair, 16 Howard, Michael, 21 Hungary, decision to open border, 22 Hurland-Biining, Agnes, 115 IM (Informelle Mitarbeiter), 115 Independent Fitness Review Commission, 115 INF (intermediate range nuclear forces) Treaty, 46, 48 Innere FUhrung, 16, 17, 42-43, 63, 68, 72, 75, 137, 138, 139-42, 143, 144, 145, 152 Iron Curtain, 24 Italian Army, formation of, 12-14 Jantzen, COL Eckard, 75

Index Jarausch, Konrad, 21, 25, 26, 186 Kaiser, Karl, 22 Kastrup, Dieter, 23 Kinkel, Klaus, 182 Kirchbach, BG Hans-Peter von, 64, 74, 98, 100, 111, 117, 142, 152, 166, 168 Klenner, COL Dietmar, 75-76, 87, 90, 91,92, 101, 107, 116, 117, 147-48, 150, 151, 179, 180 Kohl, Helmut, 22, 23, 26, 96, 97, 98, 181, 186, 188; meetings with Gorbachev, 23, 24, 48, 86, 103, 162 Krause, Giinter, 27 Krenz, Egon, 25 La Gorce, Paul-Marie de. Work: The French Army, 16 Lassonczyk, COL Alfred, 70-71, 88, 167 Lee, GEN Robert E., 11 Leipzig, demonstrations in, 25 Lincoln, Abraham, 12 Loffler, BG Hans-Georg, 33 Ludendorff, GEN Erich, 72

227 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), 177, 178, 179 Naumann, GEN Klaus, 147, 178, 186 Navy, Bundeswehr, 3 Nazis, 16, 19, 186 Oerding, COL Jan Jorg, 88, 178, 179 Ondarza, LTG Henning von, 62, 63, 140, 142 Order of the Day (Unification Day), 1, 2 Out-of-area question, constitutional debate, 181-82 Partnership units, 90-92 Petain, Marshal, 14, 15 Pfahls, Dr., 60, 162 Poland, free elections in, 22 Pond, Elizabeth, 22 Prange, BG Heinz, 162 Professional Advancement Service, 107 Prussian militarism, 17 Prussian-German Armies, 2, 71-72

Manteuffel, Edwin von, 3 Mielke, Erich, 35 Ministry of Defense, West German: organization for Takeover, 60-62; planning for Takeover, 61-62 Modrow, Hans, 23, 26 Moltke, GEN Helmuth von, 3

Refugees, East German, 24-25, 27 Reichswehr, 72 Reinhardt, MG Klaus, 62, 74, 87, 89-90,99, 123, 152, 165, 168 Richter, MG Ekkehard, 37, 62, 74, 87, 97, 101, 104, 107, 113, 116, 118, 120, 125, 141, 150 Rosenlocher, Thomas, 26 Rosinski, Herbert, 2 Ruhe, Volker, 190, 191

National People's Army: character of, 32-37; females in, 96, 106-7; final integration as professional soldiers, 113-16; mission, 31, 32; NCO Corps, 35-36; organization, 32, 33; political control of before Takeover, 77-78; relationship to population, 39, 40; relationship to SED, 37-39, 149-50; relationship with Soviet military, 32-33; role in economy, 39; role in Takeover, 108-10; uniform to be worn on Unification Day, 105-6

Sardinian Army, 12 Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von, 3 Schauble, Wolfgang, 27 Schevardnadze, Eduard, 23, 49 Scheven, LTG Werner von, 68, 73, 75, 76,89,98, 109, 110, 111, 114, 116, 118, 125, 141, 145, 148, 151, 169, 179, 193 Schlothauer, MG, 97 Schonbohm, LTG Jorg, 62, 65-71, 74, 75,86,90,91,97,98, 101, 106, 107, 111, 112, 117, 125, 139, 140,

228 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 164, 176, 188, 193, 197 SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands), 25, 26, 37-39 Seeckt, Colonel-General Hans von, 72 Senden, COL Friedrich von, 112 Sommer, Theo, 21 Soviet Union: departure of its military forces from East Germany, 168, 176, 185; facing challenge of united Germany, 23 StaatsbUrger in Uniform, 141 Stasi (Staatsicherheits Dienst), 25, 27, 115, 118, 122, 159 Stein, Baron vom, 3 Steinseifer, MG Friedrich, 194 Stern, Fritz, 187 Stoltenberg, Gerhard, 1, 2, 60, 64, 64, 73,75,76,77,86,98,99,101,111, 122, 140, 162, 170, 177, 185 Storbeck, LTG Siegfried, 70 Szabo, Stephen, 23 Takeover: CFE limitations affecting, 160, 162; continued drafting of recruits from the east, 146; decision, dissolve and activate simultaneously, 88-90; decision, establish partnership units, 90-92; decision, female personnel, 106-7; decision, former NVA could continue to serve, 98-103; decision, no transfer of NVA tradition, 122-24; decision, NVA equipment, 162-68; decision, NVA facilities, 168-70; decision, one army, 86-87; decisions, prior to Takeover, 96-98; decision, rank reduction, 118-19; decision, sup plemental training and education, 138-46; decision, two-year trial period, 108-13; decision, uniform to wear, 105-6; decision, use AS 5, 87-88; different logistics systems (Bundeswehr-NV A), 160; dispatch of command and support groups, 62-65; disposal of NVA equipment, 165; 'Tair chance" given to former NVA, 124-25; fear of

Index social unrest, 101-2; final integration as professional soldiers, 113-16; key figures in, 201-2; major challenges the Bundeswehr continued to face after, 147-52; nonrecognition of previous training and education of former NVA, 146; pay differences between former NVA and Bundeswehr, 119-21; phases of personnel integration, 104-5; planning for, 61-62; previous service of former NVA, 121-22; readiness of new units in east, 176-77; receiving replacement equipment, 165; reconnaissance teams initially sent east, 162-63; roleofformerNVAin, 108-10; shortage of quality NVA NCOs, 116; sufficiency of information available to former NVA, 107; summing up of, 190-92; uncertainty in the lives of NVA, 117-18; use of word "Takeover," 1 Taransenko, Sergei, 23 Teltschik, Horst, 23 Trabant, 22 Treuhand Agency, 187 2 + 4 Talks, 23-24, 88 Unification Treaty, 27 United States, policy to support the Unification, 23 U.S. Army: after the Civil War, 11-12; Training and Doctrine Command, 60 USSR. See Soviet Union Vichy government, 15 Vergangenheitsbewdltigung, 148 Waffen-SS, 17 Warsaw Pact, 32 Wartime Host Nation Support, 45 Wehner, Herbert, 22 Wehrmacht, 18,32 Weimar Republic, 3, 17, 72 Weizsacker, Richard von, 191

Index Wellershoff, Admiral Dieter, 102, 122, 138, 140 West Germany. See Germany, Federal Republic of William II, 72 Willmann, MG, 60, 62 Wittenberg, BG Andreas, 36, 63, 120, 122, 169, 179 Wolf, Christa, 25 Yeltsin, Boris, 186 Zoellick, Robert, 23

229

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About the Author FREDERICK ZILIAN, JR. is the chair of the History Department at Portsmouth Abbey School in Portsmouth, Rhode Island, where he teaches German, European History, and U.S. History. A 1970 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, the author served in various command, staff, and teaching positions throughout a 21-year Army career as an infantry officer including tours in Germany, Korea, at the Pentagon, and teaching assignments at both the U.S. Military Academy (Department of Social Sciences) and the Naval War College (Strategy Department).