Freedom Not Yet: Liberation and the Next World Order (New Slant: Religion, Politics, Ontology)

FREEDOM NOT YET

NEW SLANT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND ONTOLOGY

A series

rditcd by

CreJf(m IJnl'is, Philip Goodchild,

fllld KCIIIII:th S"rill

Kenneth Surin

NOTYEr Liberation and the Next World Order

DUKE: UNIVERSITY PRESS

Durhalll lind LOlld(J1I

© 2009 Duke University Press All rights rescrvl-d Printed in the. United States of America on acid-free paper @ Designed by Amy Typeset in Carter

Ruth Buchanan

+

Cone GalJiard

by Tseng lnformation Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Caraloging-in1\lbJication dara and republication acknowledgments appear on the last printed page of this book. Frontispiece: James Baker Hall, 7!Jor1l5. Courtesy of the James Baker Hall Archive.

For Andrcll' Mac/chosc

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments

IX

Introduction 1

PART I 1.

-nle Complementary Deaths of the -nlinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject 21

2.

Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation H

3.

l'ostpolitical Politics and Global Capitalism 65

4. The Exacerbation of Uneven Development: Analysis of the Current Regime of Accumulation 94

5.

-nle Possibility of a New State I: Ddinking 125

PART II 6.

Models of Liberation I: "flle Politics of Identity 141

7.

Models of Liberation II: The Politi c s of the Place of the Subject 165

8.

Models of Liberation II I: The Politics of the Event 197

9.

Models of Liberation IV: -The Religious Transcendent 226

10. Models of Liberation V: Nomad Politics 241

PART III 11. 111e Possibility of a New State II: Heterotopia 265 12. Prospects for the New Political Subject and Liberation 285

Conclusion 295 Notes 299 Bibliography 371 Index 407

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Jandl Watson for much hdp given in countless ways while this book was written. Reynolds Smith, my editor at Duke University Press, was exemplary. Andrew Madehose was my first teacher in economics and philosophy. He will not agree with many of my arguments, but my debt to him has been immense.

Dem an' dem economical plan Still can't find solution &orro\\�n' money fe lend World Bank a nuh wi fr'en

Is life an' debt all wi a fret Life an' debt freedom not yet

MUTABARUKA, Lift alld Debr We shed blood all rhc.se years in ordcr to buy land at market price.l�

USULUTAN camptJillo, 199.!, quoted in Elisabeth Jane Wood, Forging

Drnwmuyfrom Below

"kn of good fortune often cause empires lOU ItEIlD,

to fall.

Berlin

Selbst in dem sagenhaften Atlantis Briillten doch in der Nachr, wo das Meeres verschlang, Die Ers.lllfendcn nach ihren Sidaven (Even in fabled Atlantis lhe night the ocean engulfed it cnle drowning still screamed for their slaves) BERTOLT BRECHT, �Questions Irom a

Worker Who RCJds�

Introduction

l'eriodizations (not to be confused with chronologies, which merely indicate the dates of events), no matter how rough and ready, are indispensable for any lUlderstanding, at the systemic level, of the emergence and consolida­ tion of political systems and instirutions and their lUlderlying structllres of economic production and accumulation. \.Vhere pcriodi7.ation is concerned, the argument of this book is framed by two emblematic or symbolic dates, 1989 and 2001. At the time of writing it is possible rilat 2008 may be added to these symbolic dates at some futllre time, given the fact that there is a growing body of economically informed opinion coalescing arOlUld the view that the bank liquidity crisis which started in 2008 represents the most critical moment for modern capitalism since the great crash of 1929. I t is, however, much too early to fasten ourselves to dlis judgment; sullice to say rhat the ar­ gument of this bOClk, which has been in the process of formulation since the mid-1990S, is that dle current financial crisis, like its predecessor economic crises, is broadly explicable in terms of a marxist (or nl""O-marxist) model of the inherently problematic structure of capitalist development. That is to say, the financial crisis which emerged in 2008 is the product of deep and postponed tensions and impasses in dle capitalist system of accumulation, pressures, and deadlocks which are constitutive of the system itself, so dlat their removal will require a supersession of the system itself.!

The year 1989, invariably associated with dle fall of Soviet-style communism, coincides in the minds of many with the apogee of the JXllitical project as­ sociated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This JXllitical project

was trumpeted by its proponents as an American or British "renaissance" in

the world order of that time. It was "morning again in America," said the ever-smiling Reagan (probably mindful of the need to create as much "media separation" between the now-famous images of his beaming optimism on America's behalf and the vote-losing sepulchral earnestness of his predeces­ sor, Jimmy Carter). -lllatcher in

film

repeatedly invoked the reputed Victo­

rian zenith of Britain's imperial supremacy in her pronowlCements about her government's policies: "\Ve must return to Victorian values," she brayed on such occasions. The Reagan-Thatcher project was of course premised on a staunch anti-Sovietism in particular, and a repudiation of any kind of "left" collective politics in general. -llle Reagan-11latcher project was in turn a resJXlnse to the growing eco­ nomic sclerosis which led to the downfall of the so-called Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist development, an era of relative overall prosperity which e.x­ tended from 1945 to 1975 and which involved a protracted boom in mass pro­ duction and mass consumption, to which the French gave the felicitous term

lcs trmusgloriruses.2 The economic complement of the JXllitical dimensions of the Reagan-Thatcher venture was neoliberalism, dlat is, the "free market" ideology which viewed dle 1970S collapse of the long JXlstwar economic expansion as the outcome of allegedly systemic, as opposed to inadvertent or merely contingent, impediments to the operation of markets and mar­ ket forces. -This neoliberal contention was in turn buttressed by declarations about so-called labor market rigidities (invariably attributed by Reagan and Thatcher to the "excessive" bargaining JXlwer of labor unions), "crippling" government regulation and intervention, "e.xorbitanr" tax bllfdens placed by "big government" on heroic bur somehow still hapless "entreprenellfs" (apparently some things never change; this, after all, was dle overwhelming refrain of

101m McCain s 2008 presidential campaign, with its mindless and '

repeated salutations at campaign rallies of the tax-phobic "Joe the plumber"), as well as the allegedly paralyzing effects of a costly welfare system said to be laden with "disincentives" for the working force (one recalls here the moral pa ni c generated by Reagan and his handlers around the fa ntas y figure of the "welfare queen," typically depicted as a black single mother who drove a Cadillac to pick up her welfare check).3 -llle 1970S economic disintegration associated with the demise of dIe Golden Age was therefore to be addressed by a simple policy prescription, according to the soon to be ascendant neoliberals: to make things better, said the followers of Reagan and Thatcher, governments should remove or ame-

2

INTRODUCTION

liorate all these restrictive policies and their pointless rigidities in order to give markets and market forces a much freer hand. Governments, especially, had no business trying to control markets.

DC1"cglllntWII

and p1"il'atizatum

were thus adopted as key guiding principles, and monetarism and attention to the supply side became the favored governmental financial policy tools; this was the essence of the Reagan-Thatcher ideology (though as Jacques Mazier, Maurice Basic, and jcan-FranS"ois Vidal point om, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

[OECD] did temper dlis neo­

liberal approach with some elements of Keynesianism in its policy frame­ works, and Reagan's overstuJl"ed defense budgets, and his administration's willingness to run massive budget deficits, did amount to a kind of "military Keynesianism").4 TIlls contrived evacuation of the political sphere in dIe somewhat disin­ genuous name of "small government" (TIlatcher, after all, gready augmented centralized government in Britain by virmally dissolving all of its subnational municipal strucmres, and George vV. Bush dangerously, and some say lUl­ constitutionally, advanced dIe prerogatives of the executive branch of gov­ ernment after September 11), along with the cod wisdom that "everydling should be left to the market because dIe market knows best," helped create a political void, especially now dlat the collapse of dIe Eastern bloc has left the United States and its close allies in an uncontested globally hegemonic position. With the gutting of the substantive political formations and their asso­ ciated practices and strategies put in place by dIe regulated capitalism of the Euro-American postwar era, politics in dIe post-1970S \Nest was increasingly degraded into the mere management of voter opinion, involving primarily the mass media-focused orchestration of ""hot button" issues capablc of mo­ bilizing largely docile electorates. (Examples of such issues come easily to mind: the anxieties of American "security moms" after September 11; gay marriage and gun rights in dIe United States; the antisocial behavior of lUl­ mly iIm er-city youth, called "lager louts" and "racaille"

[scum] by Tony Blair

and Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively; campaigns to repatriate undocumented immigrants and radical Islamic clerics in London allegedly hell-bent on re­ placing British law withsharm; the frowned-upon but titillatingly publicized sexual practices of polygamist sects in the American \Vest; and so on.) In the course of such events, the traditional dividing lines between "left" and "right" came to be blurred or erased, as politics in the \Vest became more and more a matter of occupying a palpably mythical "center," this being the

INTRODUCTION

3

presumed location where electoral majorities, no matter how ad hoc, could most easily be put together by the constant trumpeting of such hot-button issues, at least in dleory or psephological fantasy.5 -nle nodal point of this by now epochal shift was subsequently located in the political movements associated with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, whose basic dlOugh unstated function was to underwrite and consolidate dIe trans­ formations brought about by Thatcher and Reagan and thcir acolytes. Blair's "-Third Way" and the American president's "Clintonomics" involved the fur­ ther "de-social democratization" (the term used by Gerassimos Moschonas) of society as dIe neoliberalism instituted by their predecessors, far from being tempered, came to be even more fully entrenched by Blair and Clinton.blbe political void created by today's ubiquitous economic managerialism in the West (hence dIe mantra "What is g<Xld for "Vall Street is good for all of us;' admittedly not heard so much during the economic meltdown of 2008-9) and dIe accompanying deracination of civil society, have been compensated for ideologically by a spurious politics of human rights and the taking of the society of the spectacle to levels undreamed of by Guy Debord and his colleagues in the Situationist movement. "Human rights" interventions (of the kind wldertaken in the past decade or so in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Liberia, and Darfur) were designed to show that the "new" politics espoused by Blair and Clinton (and it should be emphasized that such human rights interventions were nO[ disavowed by the 2008 American presidential candidates, Jolm ,\-lcCain and Barack Obama) was premised on what gave the appearance of being a resolute and sincere ethical core. However, the vapidity of such appeals to human rights was quickly revealed by the West's failure

to

do anything during the terrible Rwandan genocide, its silence in

the face of Russian atrocities in Chechnya (Russia, like Israel, said it was merely fighting "Islamic terrorism" in its own land), the well-documented abuses perpetrated by the pro-\Vestern Sri Lankan government against its Tamil minority population, and the unending passivity of Europe and the United States in the face of Israel's brutal dispossession of the Palestinian people? Meanwhile political spectacles continue to proliferate. One recalls the British Conservative agriculture minister John Selwyn Glimmer force­ feeding beef burgers

to

his yOlmg daughters in front of television cameras

at dIe peak of Britain's "mad cow" crisis in dIe 1980S in a piteous attempt to convince viewers that eating British beef at dlat time was safe, and Blair's artful manipulation of dIe Princess Diana effect at the time of her death. It is also hard not to notice the incessant pandering to second-rate film actors, 4

INTRODUCTION

elderly roek musicians, sports personalities, "celcbrity" journalists, and media performers (hence dle obligatory appearances on Sawrday NightLi!'! and the shows hosted by Oprah Winfrey and Jon Stewart in the United States and by Sir Michael Parki n son and Sir David Frost in the United Kingdom), evinced by Clinton, Blair, Sarkozy, and their followers, as well as the circus perfor­ mances that now pass for summit meetings (the mandatory group photos of leaders dad in identical batik shirts or some other "native" costume of the host colUmy). Many will recall George W. BLl�h's grotesquely staged "Mis­ sion Accomplished" aircraft-carrier landing, as well as his much publicized cycle ride with Lance Armstrong Sexln after the latter won the Tourde France for a record sevendl time. -nlere is also the seeming need at some stage during an election campaign for nearly every (white) American politician to be tele­ vised in a cowboy hat riding a horse or toting a rille while wearing hwning camouflage.s Ille list can be extended nearly to infinity. At the same time, the neoliberal economic agenda has been prosecuted with unre mitting fervor by its sponsors in the advanced industrialized coun­ tries, and despite dle back-slapping televised appearances dlat American and European government ministers make with co-opted celebrities such as Bono and Bob Gcldof and the much trumpeted but largely cosmetic "initiatives" on global poverty announced every few years at G8 sununits, the income gap between rich and poor cowltries continues to grow.1> The ncoliberal eco­ nomic credo (emblematically associated here with 1989), while it has come under increasing criticism in recent years, especially after the spectacular collapses accompanying dle 2000 dot-com and the 2008 U.S. credit market bubbles and the regionwide economic failure of the East Asian economies in dle late 1990S, nonedleless shows no signs of running out of steam at the idcologic al levcl. Nor does it give any indication that those who manage the world economic system wil l alter its course to take this planet's dispossessed masses significantly into account. In light of the spectacular economic failures just mentioned,

all of which

were initially publicized as ncoliberal success stories, the advocates of the ncoliberal prospectus have had to be much more judiciously understated in their support for it. But the ensuing subterfuges and disguises used by tllCSC advocates of ncoliberalism do not diminish its wlderlying hold on the m inds of those shaping public policy across the globe. Hence in the 2008 U.S. presi­ dential election campaign, the same old strident advocacy of trickle-down tax

cuts was made by the Republican Party candidate, John McCain, and

the dogma that "only privatization can save tlle U.S. social security system" is voiced repeatedly, while the regulator of the United Kingdom's postal INTRODUCTION

5

service (rhe Ropl Mail) re.'ce.'ntJy issued a call for its partial priV;}ti7.arion.1o It is Olle.' thing to discredit nooliix'ralism as all imdlccmal project (and tllis is increasingly being done.'); it is another to unfix its grip on thc minru of decision-making clites in Europe 3.nd North America in W3yS that could bring about an epochal transformation of our current system of production and accumulation.

9/U/.1001 While Ile.'oliberalism has held sway for ove.r tlUCl' decades as an economic and political ideology, it has to bc acknowledged that the.' evcnts now placcd unde.'r the.' titk "'9/U/"l.OOln have also had a very considcrabh.' impact on dl'­ veloped, den-loping, and nondeveloped countries alikc, main.!}' bc'-'"a.use of thc way these cvcnts have becn used to mobilize American public opinion in an avowedl)' nationalist and exceplionalist dircction. TI1C political catechism idcntified with thc American neoconserv:l.live movcment-t"O Wit, Ameri­ can execplionalism, the adamant subordination of the rest of the world to America's interests.AmeriC"J.'s pursuit of unilater3.l and preemptive war in the.' namc of"the struggle against terror" (as the formcr "'war on terror" is now called in U.S. gove.'rnment circles during these morc chastened, post-Iraq occupation, timcs)-has been gin-n a frec rein since thc Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Wasllington.11 If llcolibcralism is the teO/lOlllic regime.' lUlashamedly favored by America and its allies, thell ncoconservatism is h t. e political complement str.uegka.lly linked to this ncoliix'ral popular religion. And if 1989 is t.hl' year m.arking the elear ascendancy of neoliberalism, then 9/11/2001 signifies Ihe apot.heosis of power for its ncoconservative coullterparl. l1 There is of course no such thing as a "pure" politiCS existing only by and for itself. E\'Cry kind of politics is a politics motivated and driven by some regnant idcologic;}1 norion of tile nature and scope of till' political. Hen . ce for most of the sevel\l"eelllh century lhe prcvailing polith.'"al framework in Europe was defined by tile histork compromise between European aristoc­ racies and a powerfully emergent mercanrill' bourgeoisie.; as;} result of this conciliation

3.

politics marked by a del'p ;}nd defining interest in questions

of sovcreignry .and the rights of lhe (individual) citizen came t"O prc\'ail. The political wridngs of GrotiWi, Hobbes, i'ufendorf, Locke, and Spinoza arl' concl'rned overwhelmingly with such questions ofinJividu.a1 rights ;}nd t.heir COIUlCCtiOIl with sovereignty, questions which could not have ix'en posed by their predecessors in the Middle Ages}J 6

INTIlODUCTION

Similarly, in the eighteenth century a vision of politics highlighting the issue of the artificiality or mere conventionality of the political and social could b e g i n to be addressed, now that Grotius, Hobbes, and others had al­ ready posed the key question of what came to be known as "constinuion­ ality." Exemplary in thsi regard are ROllSscau, Hume, and Kant, for whom the polti ical is fundamentally a matter of contrivance or arrangement, so that constimtionality itself had an irreducibly factitious character. Perhaps the most radical acknowledgment of the sheer contingency that pervades social and political structures is I-hune's statement (which is almost an uncanny prefiguration of later theories of ideology), "As Force is always on the side of the governed [for the many are governed by the few], the governors have nothing to support diem but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and d il s maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as the most free and popular." 14 -This i-hunean appreciation of the artificiality dlat pervades

all political

and moral orders extends, with a number of significant differences, to Rous­ seau and Kant. Germane in dlis context is Rousseau's pr inciple that civil society is the primary source of the ev ils dlat aflli ct its members, dlat people are what their government makes them into, and that the realm of the po­ litical dlerefore affords the only means that humans have of remedying these afflictions.l s While it may seem implausible and even egregious to lump Kant with l-lume and ROllSscau, rhe commonality among these thinkers arises from Kant's insistence that all action can ultimately be reduced to the work­ ing of the human will and that the unconstrained capaeity

to

exercise one's

will (albeit n i accordance widl the law) is the basis of freedom, nilminating in the insight that the ideal polity is olle which enables die freedom (or "spon­ taneity") of one being to be reconciled with the freedom (or "spomancities") of other beings according to a unv i ersal Iaw.16 For l-iume, Rousscau, and Kant, politics is dms essentially a set of in ­ stitutional practices designed for rhe ordering of die human will, the pri­ macy of dIe ullimpeded will (except, where Kant is concerned, when the law is breached) reflecting the complete ascendancy and self-confidence of the bourgeoisie in cighteenth-cenmry Europe. The problem of die political which preoccupied GrotitlS, Hobbes, Spinoza, and odlers-their primary goal being to produce a figure of the (early modern) citz i en that could be rec­ onciled with the ontology and explanatory schemas of the mechanist physi­ cal science of die time, as well as the outer limits of any prevailing Christa i n orthodoxy-was by the time of l-iume, Rousseau, and Kant supplanted by a conception of die political in which the figures of the citizen and civil society INTRODUCTION

7

could be taken for granted (at least philosophically). It was now possible, in tllis period of a by now fully anchored mercantile capitalism, [0 install the image of a "free" and entirely factitious civil society in which citizens could begin [0 be at home in tllC laissez-faire mentaljti of tllC burgeoning capitalist markets.17 By rhe beginning of the nincteemh century, with the emergence of the main elements of what was to become the fully fledged modern European state system (as opposed to the early modern Westphalian dispensation of 16+8), tile several strands of Romantic nationalism began to permeate visions of the political. The Romantic repudiation of rhe legacy of the Enlighten­ ment of tile seventeenth and eighteenth cenmries was manifested most di­ rectly in tile linking of the state form to conceptions of etlmicity. Civil so­ ciety itsclf was subsumed by the stmctures of the nation-state, as tile notion of sovereignty was yet again transformed: where once sovereignty reposed in the people's assembly based on the active participation of citizens, now the people were disaggregated and only their representatives assembled. The people thus had

[0

be lmified by another principle, based this time on the

nation-state defined, tribally, on the basis o f ethnic and thus ultimately lin­ guistic affiliation.ls Martin Thom quotes Madame dc Stad from her work Des

circoIIStnllccs actuelles on this powerful historical shift: according to Madame de Stad, while in bygone epochs liberty "consisted of whatever ensured the citizens the greatest possible share in tile c.,ercise of powerl,] liberty in mod­ ern times consists of whatever guarantees the independence of citizens from governments."I? -This paradigm

of the political underwent a furtller transformation in the

second half of the nineteenth cenmry, when industrial capitalism superseded its mercantilist precursor, making i t necessary for tile paradigm's ethnically oriented nationalism to find ways of accommodating the industrial working classes of most Western European nations, as well as North America. In this period, electoral franchises were broadened, albeit gmdgingly and unevenly (women were c.,e1uded even as the franchise was being extended; in most "'estern industrial nations women were denied the vote until after "'orld "'ar I). -The altered parJdigm managed to retain its laissez-Caire economic orientation, though it was now adjusted for the ethnically bounded nation­ state, with its growing population of proletarianized labor.20 After \.Vorld War I the industrial capitalism of the previous period had to contend with the growing need to bring about a compromise between labor and capital, mainly as a consequence of the urgent requirement tllat the dev­ astating economic consequences of the Great War of 1914-18 be addressed. 8

INTRODUCTION

And so the first slow steps leading somewhat unevenly to the welfare capi­ talism of the Golden Age after World War

II

were taken_ This compromise

between labor and capital received a further and vital impetus from the Great Depression and World

War II,

and from these events came the enhanced

institutionalization of the social democratic docnines that occurred in most Western European COlUltries during this period. (The New Deal was viewed as the American correlate of European social democracy, t o the extent that i t too required American capital to compromise with labor.) The vision of the JXllitical that prevailed in this historical phase (the time from dle Great Depression onward) still favored the nation-state as dle pri­ mary locus of social and economic activity. But this notion was augmented by the principle dlat dle individual political subject was entitled to a wide range of social rights: universal health care and education; subsidized housing, child care, and public transportation; employment and wage protections; state provision for old-age pensions; and a relatively capacious overall so­ cial safety net. 1he compromise between capital and labor notwithstanding, there still existed

an

effective dividing line between left and right; while in

Europe during World War

II

the parties of rhe right tended to be Christian

Democrat and mildly nationalist, their rival Social Democratic parties often had e1ectorally viable communist parries to their left, which meant that redis­ tributionist economic programs, no matter how cautious and mild, always had a viable political constituency. Hence the situation obtaining in Britain today, where dle "new" Labour of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown is aligned with the Conservative Party as dle two comending parties of rhe identifi­ able center-right, leaving the more or less centrist Liberal Democrats and the \.Velsh and Scottish nationalist parties to be the

more radical

parliamen­

tary bloc, would have been simply undlinkable during the postwar Golden Age.11 As

I

mentioned earlier, this substantive political demarcation between

left and right started to disappear when neoliberalism became hegemonic from the 1970S onward, and this loss became pervasive after the collapse of "actually existing communism" in 1989. A market zealotry which views JXllitics solely in terms of positioning conformist citizens in front of the mar­ ket, and which insists dlat economic equality can be presented to "realistic" voters only as an abstract "equality of opJXlrtunity" (as opposed to requiring even a minimal degree of actual income redisniburion)-thcsc convictions being this market fundamentalism's main propellant-had dovetailed with the wholesale incorporJtion of electoral politics into the society of the spec­ tacle from the 1980S onward. INTRODUCTION

9

In the process, politics in Western Europe and North America has been put in the service of a sometimes bullying, sometimes cajoling populism (which is what the hugely revamped post-9/11 American nationalism really amount.� to in domestic terms) that has effectively eviscerated the politi­ cal by turning it into the mere business of manipulating and dragooning voters according to the largely fictitious rhythms of election cycles. In this "'postpolitical" politics (not to be conflated with the "apolitical" annihilation of anything to do with politics), politicians and their attendant logos and slogam are advertised and marketed to their somewhat bemused and docile constituencies like tile hard-to-differentiate fizzy beverages typically found in American and European vending machines. Politicians in America and Britain today havc to f)()SSCSS a "brand" in order to succeed; hence in the 2008 U.S. presidential ekction, the McCain "j'vLlVerick" brand apparently flopped with tile electorate, while Obama's "Mr. ('.001" brand was deemed to have been a success. There is no other way to account for the influence wielded in the name of the prevailing market fundamentalism by such advisers as Karl Rove and Alistair Campbell on George W. Bush and Tony Blair, respectively. Indeed in the 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections the category of the "low-information voter"-who knows almost nothing of a political platform o r prospectus, but who can be relied on to be enticed by tile media-conveyed "brand" of this or that politician with an appealing "personality," typically re­ flected in the ability to speak with a sympy voice (Ronald Reagan), or having an alluring smile (Bil l Clinton), or posscssing a folksy demeanor (George W. Bush before his catastrophic decline i n popularity helped e.xpose this pre­ tense for what it was), being blessed with "good hair" (John Edwards before his fall from grace), tile ability to drop at will an upper-class accent for the more declasse "Mockney" crony Blair), or having tile abii l ty to wink sugges­ tively at an audience (Sarah Palin)-became cnlcial for the pollsters, focus groups, and public relations comultants of the major political parties.22 Hand in hand with this marketization of the liberal-democratic politi­ cal sphere has been the full-scale conversion of political parties into post­ ideological vote-harvesting machines mn by profcs.sional cadres primarily attuned to rhe desires of corporate interests. Ross McKibbin describes this development thus: -nle typical politician today, whe.ther minister, shadow minister or "ad­ viser," proceeds from student politics (often with a politics degree), to political consultancy or a think-tank, to "research" or the staff of an active politician. He or she is "good at politics"-which means being good at 10

INTRODUCTION

the nU"eh,1nics of politicS, not neccss.lfily its ideas. The consequence is that the mechanics drives OUi thl' ideas, and (he immedhl.le expels the long-term. l'oliti(S is what the Dil l i y A1iIiI [3 right-wing British t'J.bloid] says today; the long-term is what the Dnily Alnil might say tomorrow_ The crucial relationship now is Ix>tween the politician, the journalist and the '"ad"iser,�1.1 Looking :'lt this from :'lIlother :1ngle, it could be s:1id th3t modern politicS (that is, the politics of the West since 1776 or 1789), until the past couple of decades at le:1St, has always Ix>en about thc st'rugglc to position or reposition so\'Creigmy in some institutional formation or strategic mode of political agency (or both, more ofren than not). However, in today's "low-intensity democracy" so\'crcignry reposes mostly, if not entirely, in the market, and gh'en thc centrality of the self-serving internal apparatuses of the present­ day politiC".l1 part)' (which, b)' being almost exclusively media-focused and driven by the systemkJ.lly induced compl1l�ion to g:lfller \'otes for thcsake of being at the top of the electoral COUIlt no matter what, ends up operating to the detrimcm of an adl'quatcly fUllctioning public sphere), the "dcllIocratic citizen" of today h:1S been left to dangle in the resultant \'oid.1" As McKibbin puts ii, "The political elite is now probably more divorced from sodety, and from any wider organising principles or ideology,

than al any other timc ill

the laSt 150 years:' lS 'Vhat is desperately needed tOOa)', therefore, is a new sociopolitiC".l1 settle­ menr, al once practical and thcorel'iC".lI, thai will reclaim the polilical for the projcct ofa democracy tim will always place the inrerests of the dispos.�esscd at' irs heart. Given the present tarnished stJre of the political (to wit, the "media-theatricali7.cd" politics referred

t'O

b)' Jacques Dcrrida) in Western

Europe and the Uniled States, this democratic project can advance itself only as a projce! of liberation, a libel'ation from the dispossession that is thc r.lle of tlte overwhelming majority of children, women, and men on this planet. This book asks what, if anything, marxism has to sa)' about this putative project ofliberation, lhe bank credit crisis of 2008 and 2009 h:1S prO\'ided a massive iml>ctUS to

commentary, some of it bordering on the imbecilic, evcn though the likely tl'ajectories of this crisis have yer to reach a pOill! of dear discemmem, TIle aim of this book is not to dc1h'er prognoslic.uions on evems such as this, mo­ mentous though they ma)' be, bur to anal)'7x the economic structure which proVides enabling conditions for such economic crises

as

the 111ird World

debt crisis of the 1980s {from which some developing economies ha\'c never

INTROf)UCT(ON

U

truly recovered), the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financial collapse n i 1997, the dot-com failure in 2001, and now the credit market upheavals. As long as this capitalist structure continues to exist, it is likely that such crises will be chronically recurrent. My argument focuses on this capitalist struc­ ture, and while I advert to some of these crises for what they reveal about tilis underlying economic configuration, I proceed on the premise that the occurrence of an economic crisis is always contingent on the possibilities and capacitics inherent n i this structure. An analytic primacy thus has to be accorded to this structure, as opposed to the descriptions (however accurate and helpful they may be) of this or tilat specific crisis.

Marxism Today For marxism it s i a commonplace, enjoined by the mutual permeation of theory and prJctice, that things occur in specific and determinate ways, and possibilities in some situations are unavoidably conjoined witil their absence in otiler circumstances, so that material limits invariably coexist with open­ ings and opportunities. It is a truism also that liberation n i the face of a massive dispossession must involve change. Marxism is first and foremost a theory and a practice of historical and poitical l change, involving the fol­ lowing levels: - A description and analysis of the cyeles of capitalist accumulation and consumption - A political theory and practice of liberation premised above all on the supersession of capitalist relations of production, it being understood rhat the space of rhe political is opened up by capitalist relations of production - A reading of the history of philosophy, since philosophy is the science of the categories of the virmal, the possible, and the real, these cate­ gories being integral to any depiction and analysis of social being - An analysis of sociocultural formations and subjects, since society and culture are the context in which such subjects act Each of these levels develops in different and specific ways. However, the insight that breaks and continuities at one level are usually reflected at other levels is central to marxism. So, all else being equal, the existence or absence of an oppormniry to engage n i a quest for social and political liberation is likely to be accompanied by the existence or absence of a parallel crisis of production and accumulation at the economic level, and vice versa. 12

INTRODUCTION

Any hisrorical and political crisis is thus just as likely ro be a crisis of categories, and the current crisis (the one that has e:dsted since the demise of the Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist expansion in the

1970S) is also a crisis

of the category of social class and the accompanying notion of a socioJXlliti­ cal struggle. 11le material failure of a previous kind of instimtional politics, something palpably evident after

1989 (our emblematic date), is reflected in

the failure or problematization of these key categories, in particular dle cate­ gory of class struggle and its attendant political aspirations. \,Vith dle collapse of a politics enjoining a substantive separation between right and left and the emergence of a "postpolitical" politics based on media-oriented populist spectacles, the categories of social class and class struggle, of militancy n i the broadest sense, were jeopardized or pushed to one side, as politics and JXlstpolitics-in late capitalism this is a politics rhat is one and dle same time populist alld authoritarian-have become more and more a matter of getting the right media-friendly faS"ade for dle hypocritical and gleaming-eyed pro­ fessional politician.2tt Innovation and change at the level of the political is therefore absolutely crucial, and so has an undoubted ontological primacy for marxism. Bm just as important for marx ism s i dle innovation or renovation of its categories, especially those that bear on the notion of liberation. If this is a time when real political iIUlOvation has become more unexpected dlan ever, dlen this is also likely

ro

be a time that is ripe for unc.xpected innovation at the level

of (marxist) theory and philosophy. This book addresses the question of this categoreal n i novation. This bexlk has three main sections. The first deals with the current regime

of accumulation, where I argue that financialization on a largely global scale is now the chief instnunent of subordination and dependency on rile part of the poorer nations, and that our conceptions of a globalized political econ­ omy must be modified

ro

take account of dlis momentous shift roward a

highly mobile financial capital. -n10se, me included, who started to make this argument in the

1990S, and who were greeted widl some skepticism then,

now (at the end of

2008) n i variably find ourselves talking to the converted

when advancing this claim. The second section deals widl the constimtion of subjectivity, since sub­ jectivity is one of the key arenas in which dle struggles against dispossession take place. Subjectivity, or dle realm of culmre more generally, is conceived here as the reJXlsitory of the forces and drives that enable human beings ro be produced and reproduced

as

social beings. It is a truism rilat without

this production and reproduction of social and subjective being dlere can be INTRODUCTION

13

no flUlCtioning economic order. "nle discussion in dlis section focuses on a number of key dleorizations of subjectivity, and dle emphasis here is phi l o­ sophical, as opposed to the focus, inspired by social science, on international political economy in the first section. Ibe dlird section takes up the theme ofliberation, and its key geopolitical proposition is the notion of an economic dclinking on the part of the poorer nations. Where subjectivity is concerned, 1 argue that the precepts of a tired humanism need to be replaced by alternative conceptions of subjectivity and agency which do not require dlis jaded humanism as a premise; like liberal democracy, this concomitant Illunanism has failed in decisive ways to live up to what it promised, at least as a set of options materiali7.cd in a viable institutional politics. Is it possible to conceptualize (necessarily and unavoid­ ably in theory but also necessarily for practice) somedling emancipatory that can potentially move the majority of human beings, disenfranchised and de­ prived as they are, beyond the reach of dlese increasingly evident systemic failures? The following pages deal widl the enabling conditions for these economic, political, and social failures. As I have indicated, my argument is avowedly marxist, and my motivating impulse is supplied by the conviction that the governing institutions and forces of our society are owned and managed by powerful clites, planetary in scale, paying lip service (if at all) to dle veneer of accountability demanded by raday's "thin" democracies. But the longing for somedling better, or less bad at any rate, cannot suffice by itself when it comes to launching an emancipatory project. Likewise dle mere analysis of the fundamental stmcrural m i passes of "actually existing capitalism" is also not sufficient on it.� own. Ibis analysis and the longing for a better world, ndispensable i dlOUgh they are, need to be buttressed by a careful sense of where beyond "actually existing capitalism" dle myriad forms of a creative and perhaps still to be imagined activism can take us. The failures of"acrually existing socialism" associated here with the year

1989 mean that there can be

no wholesale returll to its previous forms and arrangements. ·nle bureau­ cratically centralized state is dead, whedler in its Soviet or milder corporatist forms. \Vhich is not to say that there is no need for any kind of bureaucratic organization; after all, it is a commonplace dlat complex societies calUlOt flUlCtion satisfactori l y without at least a modicum of administrative scaf­ folding. Vhat , we must aim for and at the same time experiment with, n i myvicw, is something considerably to the political left of the nowadays skin-and-bone and barely living remnants of the previous social-democratic or New Deal 14

INTRODUCTION

consensus (some would say this consensus n i fal..""t expired some time ago), while eschewing any longing for the shapes of a Soviet-style state socialism. Hut simply arguing for this vision will not advance us toward its implemen­ tation unless we also scrutinize rigorously the possible ways of realizing this vision, and have as well an adequate grasp of the obstacles likely to stand in the way of any concened attempt to n i stitute such a project of liberation. \Vhere do we begin to make a start on this undertaking? There has to be a vigorous democratization of our economic and political i.nstitutions; it is imperative that we find ways to create vastly strengthened mechanisms of accowltability that cannot be kicked to the side so effortlessly by those with the power and influence gained without too much dilliculty in our society by just about anyone with a fat bank balance and bulky invest­ ment portfolio. As part of this process of redemocratization it will also be necessary to weaken the hold of the professionalized oligarchies who today nUl the major European and American political parties (the kind of "no ide­ ology please, only the electoral count matters" oligarchy basically contemp­ tuous of the elecwrare) and to replace it with a poitical l system with parties once again committed to substantive ideological positions (and thus at least embodying a real difference between right and left), in this way becoming a little more reflective of the ramified and often contradictory wishes of the electorate. The sitllation prevalent in Hritain and tlle United States today, where the mechanisms of political represemation arc in the hands of two virtually indistinguishable center-right parties, will therefore have to be rec­ tified quite radically. Any form of democracy heedful of tllese imperatives would already be much less "thin" than the neutered versions being paraded today. In addition, the amply documented weakening of the bonds of commu­ nal solidarity in the United States and in Western Europe (tllOugh let

lIS

not become enamored of romantic notions of the "organic commwlities" of bygone ages) has had as one of its concomitants a perceptible decline in the level of political engagement (the big rufilout in the U.S. presidential elec­ tion of 2008 notwitllstanding)P The upshot is tllat a strengthening of these communal bonds is probably a necessary condition for enhancing participa­ tion in democratic arrangemenL� potentially more substantive than those currently sanctioned by today's "thin" or "low-intensity" democracies. 111e reinvention of such forms of collective solidarity (involving what Raymond Williams aptly called "resources for a journey of hope") is thus a cnlcial task for those invested in the project of liberation. -nlere can be no guarantee that this reinvention will acrually take place or succeed in the longer term-there INTRODUCTION

15

arc no teleologically certified outcomes or "iron laws of history" here! -bur that something like tllis reinvention is needed if the lives of the majority of human beings arc to be bettered is a proposition that cannot really be gain­ said. In some cases, these fom1s of collective solidarity and agency will have to be enacted at the national level (whid1 is not to imply tl1at they calUmt also be ratified at a subnational or paranational lcvel). In some countries there is also a vit"ally important place for a detribalized and popular civic nationalism, which may not be attainable in the mmediate i future or on a large enough initial scale, bur which could nonetheless be indispensable for a project of liberation. (There are importam lessons to be learned from the work of Tom Nairn on a civic as opposed to an etlmic nationalism.) ·n1is possibility will be discussed later, as will several other proposals concerning this project of lib­ eration, once tl1e conceptual scaffolding for tl1em is set up in tl1e subsequent chapters.The revolution I advert to should not be confused with something similar n i the popular consciousness, namely, the stereotyped characteriza­ tiom of "insurrection" or "rebellion." Insurrections and rebellions will occur as long as there arc people who can no longer acquiesce in living conditions they find absolutely intolerable. lbere will certainly be times when such in­ surrections will help advance the course of liberation, and some when they will not. Only an abstract dogmatism will insist from the begiIming that the lot of the downtrodden will never be improved by allY recourse to an n i sur­ rectional violence. But by "revolution" I mean a fundamenr-al and lasting transformation of the capitalist mode of production and aCClunulation and its accompanying stmctures of social relations, and a revolution of this kind may take many generations to bring to fmition (if indeed it were to succeed). Or a revolution may come about in a relatively short time, as was the case with the collapse of tl1e former Eastern bloc in 1989-91. But ci1e likelihood that ci1is revolution will be long, involving as it docs the fundamental super­ session of the capit"alist system, for now seems a less implausible seenario tllan tllat of a spcrtacular and rapid overmrning of the present system. The revolution may also be long because for the foreseeable future its eventual lineaments may be gleaned only indirectly, as opposed to being part of an explicit and quickly m i plemenrable political prospecms.28 11le ex­ emplary militant in this simation will thus have to be not only active and engaged, but patient and persistent, and also alert to the possible emergence of hitherto undetectable modes of political and cultural c.xpressivity. As Raymond \Villiams put it, "Everything that 1 wlderstand of the his­ tory of cile long revolution leads me to tile belief that we are still n i its early 16

INTRODUCTION

stages."19 Or maybe, just maybe, the movemem toward revolution could be at a somewhat later stage? vVe have no way of knowing, but what cannot be gainsaid is dlat dlOse massively disadvantaged by this system have Iitde or no choice but to engage in an economic and social stmggle in which the beneficiaries of this system will not surrender their positions of advantage willingly and quickly.

INTRODUCTION

17

CHAPTER 1 The Complementary Deaths of the Thinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject

The concept of the subject is one of philosophy's pree minent topoi, and like all philosophical concepts it operates in a field of thought defined by one or more internal variables. -nICSC internal variables are conjoined in diverse re­ lationships with such external variables as historical cJXlchs and political and economic processes and events, as well as functions which allow the concept and its associated variables to produce a morc or less specific range of tmth­ effects.] -nle trajectory taken by the concept of the subject in dIe history of philosophy affords considerable insight into how tillS concept is produced, and as a result this philosophic-historical trajectory merits examination by a nyone interested in this concept's creation.

7lJe Classical Citizen Subject There is a convemional wisdom in the history of philosophy regarding the more or less intrinsic connection between the metaphysical-epistemological project that seeks an absolute ground for thought or reason (What is it that enables reason to serve its legislative functions?) and the philosophico­ political project of finding a ground in reason for the modus operandi of a moral and political subject (On what basis is reason able to legislate for the good life or right action?). According to the lineaments of what is by now a thoroughly well-seasoned narrative, the essential congruence between the rational subject of thought and the complementary subject of morality and politics was first posited by Plato and Aristotle. -nlis unity between the two

kinds of subject then found its suitably differentiated way nto i dIe thought of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, I-Iume, Kant, and Hegel (and a host of their successors). The core of this narrative is expressed by thc somewhat Kantian proposition, characteristic of the Enlightenment n i general, that reason provides dIe vital and indispensable criterion by which all judgments concerning belief, morality, politics, and art are to be appraised, so that rea­ son is dlC faculty dlat regulates dIe thinking being's activity. This activity is in turn the essential means for reason's deployment in any legitimate thinking about dIe world, dlat is, for the thinking being's capacity to describe and explain dIe world in ways that accord fundamentally with reason's precepts. And this precisely because reason s i dIe irreducibly prior and enabling con­ dition of any use of dlis capacity on the part of the subject.2 Reason, in other words, constitutes the thinking being, and the activity of dlis being in mm enables reason to unfold dyn:unically (to provide a somewhat Hegelian gloss on this initially Kamian proposition). In the topography of dlis unfolding of reason, both rational thought and politics :Uld ethics are deemed to find their dovetailing foundation. -nle philosophical tradition provides another way of delineating this con­ nection between dIe rJtional subject of thought and the moral-JXllitical sub­ ject, one that also derives its focal point from Kant. Using dIe distinction between asubjectlllll (i.e., the thing that serves as the bearer ofsomething, be it consciousnc.�s or some other property of the self) and a slIbjcctJlJ (i.e., the thing that is subjected to something else), the tradition has includl-d among its repertoire of concepts a figure of dlought taken from medieval philosophy dlat hinges on dIe relation between the subjectum and the subjectlls. Etienne Balibar, n i his fascinating essay "Citizen Subject," uses dlis distinction

urge that we not identify Descartes's

dlinking thing

(res cogitans)

to

with the

transcendental subject of thought that very quickly became an ineliminable feature of Enlightenment epistemology. Nothing could be further from the truth, says Halibar, because dIe human being is for Descartes the lUlity of a soul and a body, and this wlity, which marks the essence of the human being, cannot be represented in terms of the subjecmm (presumably because the subjecmm, qua intellecmal simple nature, can exist logically without requir­ ing the presupposition of a unity between soul and body).3 As the unity of a soul and a body, the human individual is not a mere intellecmal simple nature, a subjectum, but is, rather, a subject in anodler, quite different sense. In this very differem sense, dIe human individual is a subject transitively related to an other, a "something else," and for Descartes this "somedling else" s i precisely the divine sovereignty. In other words, for Descartes the 22

CHAPTER 1

human individual is really a subjecrus and never the subjecrum of modern epistemology, the latter in

any case owing its discovery

to Locke and not

to Descartes. For Balibar, therefore, it is important to remember dlat Des­ cartes, who s i palpably a late scholastic philosopher, was profoundly engaged with a range of s i sues dlat had been central for his precursors in the medi­ eval period, in particular the question of the relation of lesser beings to the supreme divine being. This was a question which both Descartes and dIe medieval phi l osophers broached, albeit n i different ways, under the ntbric of the divine sovereignty. The Cartesian subject is thus a subjecrus, ont� who submits, and this in at least two ways significam for both Descartes and medieval political dle­ ology:

(1) dIe subject submits to the Sovereign who is dIe Lord God, and

(2) the subject also yields to the earthly authority of dIe prince, who is God's representative on earth. As Descartes put it n i his letter to Mersenne (15 April

1630), "Do not hesitate I tell you, to avow and proclaim everywhere, that it is God who has established the laws of nature, as a King establishes laws n i his Kingdom."4 From dlis passage, and from his odler writings, it is clear dlat the notion of sovereignty was at once poitical l and theological for Descartes, as

it had been for the earlier scholastic philosophers. This is not dIe place for a detailed discllSsion of Balibar's essay, or dIe

magisterial work of Ernst Kantorowicz on this topic; the former, in addi­ tion to being a litde brief (the section on Descartes is only n i tended to be an overview), is also not entirely new n i what it proposes, since Leibniz, Arnauld, and Malebranche had long ago viewed Descartes, roughly their contemporary, as a follower of Augustine, who fmUld philosophy's raison d'ctre in the soul's contemplation of its relation to God, and who therefore took the dependence of lesser beings on dIe divine cminence as philosophy's primary concern. 5 Blit f i Locke is the tnte inventor of the modern concept of the self, as Bali­ bar maintains, who thcn is the real author of the fully fledged concept of the transcendental subject, if Balibar is indeed right to n i sist that it is not Des­ cartes? 1he true culprit here, says Balibar, is not Descartes, but Kant, who needed the concept of the transcendental subject to account for dIe "syn­ thetic uniry" that provides the necessary conditions for objective c.'pcrience. Kant in effect foisted onto Descartes a philosopheme that was really his own "discovery," with Heidegger as his more than willing subsequent accomplice in this dubious undertaking. The omcome ofthis grievous misattribution has been momentous for our understanding, or lack thereof, of the course taken by dlis branch of the history of philosophy.6 THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

23

Kant, however, was about more than just the "discovery" of the transcen­ dental subject. -nle Kantian subject also had [0 prescribe duties for itself in the name of the categorical imperative, and in so doing carve out a realm of freedom in nature that would enable this subject to free itself from a "self­ inflicted tutelage" that arises when we can't make judgments without the supervision of an other; this of course includes the tutelage of the king. The condition for realizing any such ideal on the part of the enlightened subject is the ability to submit to nothing but the m le of reason in making judgments, and so freedom from the power of the despot when making one's judgments necessarily involves a critical repositioning of the place from which sover­ eignty is exercised. Kant declared that no more is the locus of sovereignty the body of the king, since this "tutelage" is stoppable only if the subject is able to owe its allegiance to a republican polity constituted by the rule of reason and nothing but the m le of reason. Whatever criticism Balibar levels at Kant for the (supposed) historical mistake he made with regard to Descartes, the philosopher from east Prussia nonetheless emerges as a very considerJble figure in Balibar's account. For Kant also created the concept of a certain kind of practical subject, one who operates in the realm of freedom, and this practical subject, whose telos is the ultimate abolition of any kind of "self-inflicted tutelage," had to cease to be the "subject" of the king (i.e., the subjectus of Descartes and medieval political theology) in order to become a "self-legislating" rational being? Kant's great achievement therefore lay in his simultaneous creation of the transcendental subject (i.e., the subjectum of modern epistemology) and the philosophical discrediting of the subjectus of the previous theologico­ philosophical and political dispensation. The concomitant of Kant's philo­ sophical glltting of the "subject" who owed his fealty t o the king was dllls the political emergence of the republican citizcn who from 1789 onward (though a good case can be made for including

1776 in this periodization) would

supplant the subject/subjecms of rhe previous historical and philosophical epoch. In the process, Descartes's philosophical world of subjects who sub­ mit, albeit "irrationally" from the Kantian standpoint, to the laws of God and king was dislodged by Kant's world of "self-legislating" mtional subjects who engage in this legislation precisely by adverting to dle rational and non­ theological notions of right and duty. This new subject is dle embodiment of right (Recht) and of dle operation of practical reason (right being for Kant dle outcome that can be guamn­ teed only by the proper

usc

of practical reason). Furthermore dle subject is

considered a citizcn to dle extent that he or she embodies the general will, 24

CHAPTER 1

in which case dle only laws worthy of the name arc dlOse which "come only from rhe general, lUlited will of the people."s Sovereignty is thus glossed by Kant duough a recasting of the Rousseauan social contract. Laws arc rationally promulgatl-d only when they exemplify the general will, and this exemplification of dIe general will is possible only f i there is a perfectly just civil constitution. As Kant put it in his "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," "The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in whichfrctdom under e.xter­

na/ laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent widl irresistible force, in mher words, of establishing a perfectlyjust cil'if constitution."9 -nle outcome, as the philosophy textbooks tell us, was a crucial separation of the eardlly from the heavenly city, of earthly sovereignty from divine sover­ eignty. However, if Kant is the tme n i augurator of the Citizen Subject, then for Balibar, Michel Foucault is the great theorist of the transition from the world of monarchical and divine sovereignty to the world of rights and duties determined by the state and its apparatuses. Salibar concludes his essay widl the following observation: "As to whedler dlis figure lthe Citizen Subject,] like a face of sand at the edge of the sea, is abom to be effaced with the nc.\:t great sea change, that is another question. Perhaps it is !lodling more tilan Foucault's own utopia, a necessary support for that mopia's facticiry."10 I would like now to address the Foucauldian question left by Salibar for future consideration and pose the question of the current destination or fate of the Citizen Subject. 10 do tilis we have to look again at Kant. The reason that constitutes the subject is perforce a Transcendental Rea­ son. -nle obvious Kantian inflection here is not accidental, because the reason that grounds the subject is not a reason that can be specified within the terms of rhe activity of the subject: this reason is dle basis of dlis subject's very possibility qua subject, and by virtue of that, reason is necessarily exterior to the "activity" of dle thinking subject. Reason in dlis kind of employment is thus the activity of a single and universal quintessence whose object is reason itself, so that reason has necessarily to seek its ground within itself, as Hegel noted.11 Reason, by virtue of its self-grOlUlding, is perforce the writing of the Absolute.11 lbe subject's ground, which has to reside n i Reason itself, is therefore emirely and properly metaphysical, and any crisis of Transcen­ dental Reason unavoidably becomes a philosophical crisis of the thinking subject. Kant himself was the first to realize tilis, dlough it was left to his philosophical successors in the movement known as "early Romanticism"

(FnilJrolllalltik) to m:l.ke the acknowledgment of this crisis ofTranscendental Reason into a starting point for philosophical reflection.13 THINKING SUBJEct AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

25

Vith \ Nietzsche, however, the hitherto radical figllfe of the transcenden­ tal subject is propelled into a crisis, and with this ostensibly terminal crisis the fundamental convergence between the rational-epistemological subject and the moral-political subject is denied any plausibility. We know from the te....tbooks of the history of philosophy that reason, insofar as it operates on both the understanding and the will, is placed by Nietzsche entirely within the ambit of the

iVille Zllr Macht,

so that power or desire becomes the en­

abling basis of any epistemological or moral and political subject, thereby irretrievably undemlining or dislocating both kinds of subject. The "will to knowledge" for this Nietzschean-Foucauldian school of thought depends on a logically and psychologically antecedent "will to power." As a result of the n i tervention represented by Nietzsche, tmdl, goodness, and beauty, that is, the guiding transcendental norions for the constitution of this episte­ mological and moral-political subject, are henceforth to be regarded merely as the functions and ciphers of this supervening will to power. The same conventional wisdom also assures us that Marx and Freud likewise "undid" the two kinds of subject and thus wldermined even further any basis for their essential congruence. The constellation formed by Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud (and dleir successors) shows bodl the transcendental subject and the ethicopolitical subject of action to be mere conceptual functions, lacking any substa.ntial being (Kant having already argued in the

Critique of Pure

Reason that the subject of thought is nor a substance). -nlis hackneyed narrative about the collective impact of the great "masters of suspicion" is fine as far it goes; what is far more nteresting, i. however, is the story of what had to come after Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, ofwh:u it is that was going to be done with the mins of the epistemological and moral and po­ litical subject who ostensibly had reigned from Plato to Hegel before being dethroned in the late nineteenth century.14 It is interesting that Balibar, who is as resolute a marxist as anyone could be in these supposedly post-marxist days, appears not to take on board in "Citizen Subject" Marx's well-known critique of bollfgeois democracy, but instead regards Foucault as the thinker who more than any other registered the crisis of this bourgeois Subject. Be that as it may, it is hard to deny that the transcendental subject of modern epistemology suffered calamitously at the hands of Nietzsche (and of Hei­ degger and Foucault after Nietzsche), and that political and philosophical developments n i the twentieth century have cast the Citizen Subject adrift in a rickety lifeboat headed in the direction of the treacherous philosophical reefs mapped by Foucault.

26

CHAPTER 1

But can the course of this stricken lifeboat be altered, and the fWlCtions and modes of expression typically associated with the Citizen Subject be reconstituted in some more productive way, so that this Subject, or its suc­ cessor (but who would that putative successor be?), would be able to meet the political and philosophical demands generated by the prescntlyemerging conjuncmre? Here one senses a certain ambivalence at dIe end of Balibar's essay, a wish that Foucault was perhaps not going to be right when it came to a final reckoning of the fate of the Citizen Subjt.'Ct, and dlat new and better times would somehow come to await a radically transformed Citizen Sub­ ject. But what could be the shape and character of this new life for the Citizen Subject? Balibar has an emphatic proposal: the Citizen Subject will live only by becoming a revolutionary actor. I want to take Balibar's proposal as the start­ n i g point for the discussion that will occupy the rest of this dlapter. There is also the question of dIe theoretical "space" that was once occupied by the transcendental subject of epistemology. \.Vhile we may not quarrel widl Halibar's suggestion that dIe (modem) Citizen Subject supplanted dIe (medi­ eval) subjectlls who owed its fealty to the sovereign monarch and sovereign deity (this now being something of a philosophical commonplace), it has also to be acknowledged, and Halibar himself is certainly aware of this, dIal Kant placed under the category of Right not merely action, bur also knowledge: the Kantian subject is both the Citizen Subject who acts and the epistemo­ logical subject who reflects in accordance widl dIe principles of Reason. This subject may have been displaced or finally extinguished in the second half of the twentiedl century, but the question of the "right use" of Reason remains, or at any rate, the question of the place of a hoped-for right usc of Reason still poses itself. We camlOt accept dlat Reason has "died" simply because its previous philosophic embodiments have been subjected to a concerted critique, no matter how devastating that critique may seem to be. TIus issue is therefore one that demands to be addressed, as a prolep­ sis

to

dealing with the question dlat s i this book's central concern, namely,

that of a potentially enduring transformation of collective political practice, one capable of supporting a project of liberation adequate to dIe challenges posed by today's strucmral and conjuncmral conditions. TIlese conditions, as we saw in the introduction, are those of a globalizing neoliberalism that

has been the dominant regime of accumulation since the end of dle postwar boom in the 1970S (even if dlis economic nt.""Oliberalism appears to be on its knees as a result of the 2008 subprime lending crisis) and a neoconservatism

THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

27

that has bolstered the American poitical l hegemony of the period since 1989. An adequate liberation would therefore be one dlat produced political sub­ jects capable of surmounting the depredations associated with this globaliz­ ing neoliberalism and it.� complementary American neoconservatism.1S

The Demise of{he Clnssicni Citizen Subject \Vhatever Foucault may have said about the supersession of rhe posrclassical

epstime, i and dle death of dle Man-Citizen that accompanied this superses­ sion (I take. Foucault's Man-Citizen to be coextensive with Balibar's Citi­ zen Subject), it is obvious dlat dle subsequent political mutation of classical liberalism n i to a globalizing neoliberalism, as wcll as the disappearance of a viable socialism, have both served to form the basis of what is palpably a new conjuncture. This conjuncture, which some (including me) have called the "postpolitical" politics of the time after 1968, represents an added burden to the already harsh philosophical fate meted out to this Citizen Subject or Man-Citizen by dle "masters of suspicion" n i the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. The rulmination of this trajectory in the postpolitical poli­ tics of the past few decades (as described in the n i troduction) seems to reduce the force of the critique embodied in he t writings of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud; the subjcrt's appareiU superfluity n i this postpolitical dispensation lmdermines the very need for its critique. With the effacement of the focus (i.e., the Citizen Subject) of this critique, critique also finds itself fading into insignificance. At the same time, the apparent superfluity of the classical Citi­ zen

Subject makes more urgent the question of the ontological status of its

pmative successor, dlat is, dlt' subjcrt of tillS postpolitical politics. Is the subject of this postpolitical politics still some kind of vestigially effective subject, a ba.rdy breathing renmant of the Man-Citizen of Foucault's mod­ ern episteme or Balibar's Citizen Subject of the time after 1776 or 1789? And if dlls is tmly so, there comes dle question of what powers, if any, reside n i this seemingly obsolescent renmant of dle classical Citizen Subject. Have we been left with nothing for the metaphysical constinuion of dle possibility of politics bm dle sheer acknowledgment of the power of dle body, dle power of bare life (as proposed by dle thinkers of the "inoperative" comnumity and the community to come), or the appeal to some kind of undeconstmctable justice (as proposed by Derrida and his epigoni)? We don't have to spend too much time dlinking abom such suggestions to recognize that the practices and orders of thought associated with the "societies of control" limned by Dcleuze, and dlOse of dle domain of the biopolitical identified by FOllcault 28

CHAPTER 1

bur also developed by Agamben and Hardt and Negri, derive their saliency from this postpolitical conjuncmre. The centrality of the problematic of the postpolitical, arising as it does from the effacement ofthe Citizen Subject, for any putative project of liberation can therefore hardly be gainsaid. By dIe 1960s and 1970S it had become dear, or dear enough, that the politics of the past two hundred years was no longer able to manage the com­ plex and uneven movements of force that had been unleashed by dIe newest regimes of capitalist accumulation. AldlOugh many periodizations rake 1776 or 1789 to be dIe emblematic starting point for dlis politics of dIe "classical" Citizen Subject (a politics which by the 1970S and 1980S had become more and more clearly perceptible as a "previous politics"), by "classical" politics I mean both a politics based on a centrally planned economy of the party-state (i.e., the system of government that e:dsted n i the former Eastern bloc) and one predicated on the market-oriented liberal-democratic state (associated in a complementary way with what is still called "the West"). 111e citizens of the former Soviet bloc, and of the vVest adversarially simated in relation to the Soviet Union, were both members of dynamic political dispensations requiring visible and even intransigent distinctions between left and right, in ways that are becoming increasingly difficult to imagine in an epoch marked by such solecisms as "compassionate conservatism," "a socialism compat­ ible with the requirements of the capitalist market," "we're all middle-class today," and so forth. No matter how one assesses this previous politics, with its somewhat rigid ideological demarcations between left and right, it was always, even in countries of the former Soviet bloc, the politics of a particu­ lar phase of capitalist development. As indicated, this classical politics lasted from 1776 or 1789 until the lirst unravelings of its supporting international system in dIe early 1970S.16 It has already been noted that he t metaphysical heart of this classical poli­ tics was a particular conception of sovereignty and of the political subject ideally subsumed under the benison of this sovereignty through the principle of representation. Only those vested with sovereignty by those who qualify as members of the polity can tntly represent those who qualify as members of the polity! Sovercignty is thus vested by a polity which in turn is deemed by the sovereign to be the body politic instimted to confer sovereignty, in an unending loop of murual affirmation. Such is the delining, and circular (in the practical and not just the logical sense), formula of this model of liberal democracy. With the new capitalist dispensation that came into being in the 1960s and early 1970S, a dispensation now described and analyzed wIder several THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

29

familiar titles ("post-Fordism," "disorganized capitalism," "flex ible accumu­ lation," "worldwide integrated capitalism," " late capitalism," "empire after the age of imperial empires," " the domain of the biopolitical," and so forth), such notions ofsovereignty were progressivdy eviscerated or circumvented. Ille unprecedented transformations in the capitalist order of the past fOllf decades or so were accompanied by a deracination of the classical political subject, that is, tile Citizen Subject who up to now had been at once enabled and constrained by the principles of sovereignty embodied in the previous political dispensation.lo put it somewhat schematically, if Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault wldid this classical epistemological and political sub­ ject, and n i he r process undermined irs philosophical rationales, then tile move to a postpolitical politics associated with the latest stage of capitalist development has had, ostensibly, the effect ofdoing away with the very need for such a classical Citizen Subject as well as tile accompanying phi l osophical rationales provided on its behalf.17 The thing rendered equivocal and otiose by Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault, but still needed by the politics that lasted from 1776 or 1789 up to the 1970s, had by the 1970s started to become something of a rdie. Today's regime of capitalist accumulation and tile neoliberal and neo­ conservative ideologies identified with its current ascendancy simply have no need for the classical Citizen Subject, just as they have no need for the ideology of modemization that was an intrinsic component of the first or classical liberalism and the various socialisms and communisms whic h rivaled tillS liberalism in tile period from 1870 llntil 1989.lH -nle disciples of Milton Friedman and Leo Strauss who today control tile U.S. government's elite do not give a hoot about substantive notions of an informed and involved citizenry (however mythicized these notions have tended to be in the sdf­ exculpatory or self-congratulatory versions of America's special "destiny"). All rhat matters for Palll Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John McCain, and Sarah Palin (and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom a couple of decades or so before, in her own version of English e.xceptionalism) is that you and I toe the line set down by those who widd power. One docs not have to be Naomi Klein or George Monbiot to acknowledge that, however complex the processes art� which led to the emer­ gence of the current phase of capitalist devdopment, it is virtually undeni­ able, especially in a time which is seeing the beginnings of an economic crisis whose scale is becoming comparable to the great crash of 1929, that corpora­ tions and markets have gained hugdy n i legitimacy and power at tile expense

30

CHAPTER 1

of the now deracinated Citizen Subject. At the same time, the accompanying notion (however much pervaded by the several myths th,1t buttress the ideol­ ogy of liberal democracy) of a sovereignty lodged wlconditionally in a state that, as a matter of principled necessity, placed its administrative fWlCtions at the disposal of its "people;' has also sucClunbed completely to the dictates of corporations and the dogma of the market.11l The historical and social conditions rhat served to legitimize rhe liberal democratic state and its activities, as well as the figure of this now bygone Citizen Subject, were severely lUldermined in the episteme instituted by transnational late capitalism, whose influential proponents in the overdevel­ oped economies of the North see it as their right [0 administer everything in the name of capitalist (over)accumulation. Thus, for instance, anyone who is moderately well-informed is likely to know (albeit without necessarily being dismayed by such knowledge) that a coterie of energy company executives, including those of Enron until its demise, effectively policed the Bush ad­ ministration's energy policy; that Italy's government is in the pocket of one of its richest men (who bought his way n i to the prime ministership of his country); that Tony Blair's entourage at the JohalUlesburg Earth Summit in­ cluded the boss of one of Britain's biggest corporate polluters; rhat weapons manufacturers, as a result of brazen revolving-door hiring policies, arc so completely in league with departments of defense in the advanced industrial countries that this is no longer reckoned a scandal; and so forth. In the place of rhe Citizen Subject posited as an ideal by rhe Iiberal­ democratic political systems of the past two centuries by and large now stands a new kind of ideal subject, to wit, a consumer subject cajoled and tutored in this country by Disney, Fox News, and USA Tonny. In place of the ideal of the sovereign state whose raison d'ctrc was the representation of its "people" there now exists a state formation that has been transformed over the course of rhe past few decades nto i a much more loosely amalgamated bundle of functions and apparatuses (economic, political, ideological, mili­ tary, and so fordl), with some functions and apparamses demanding very high concentrations of state power for their operation, and others little or none. I-icnce, to take an example very much in die news as I write, spying on American citizens without recourse to judicial warrants is deemed an absolutely necessary c:l:ercise of state power by President George \V. Bush and his handlers, while the functions of the Internal Revenue Service and the govenunent-run social security system are considered superfluous enough by some Republican politicians to warrant the wholesale privatization of

THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT

31

America's tax collection and social security systems.20 The various compo­ nents of this highly selective ideology of"market choice," "market flexibi l ity and efficiency," and "the free mobility of capital" operate whenever the func­ tions of the state can be abrog:lted in favor of the private interests rhat serve mling elites, bur are quickly suspended when they do not happen to advance the interests of these elites. I-ience the pathos of rhe sentiment expressed n i a bumper sticker sometimes seen on the vehicles of those likely to be typecast in he t United States

as

"liberals": "It will be a great day when our schools

get all the money and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber." The cry behind this slogan is plaintive but tmthful, insofar as it is true dlat for many, if nO[ most, Americans it s i simply inconceivable that privately organized sales of baked goads by schoolchildren and their parents be used to fund the production of air force bombers designed to create " shock and awe" in refractory Third \Vorld countries.21 -nle prevailing system of capitalist production and accumulation, and the state formations associated with it, constimte the external variables for the operation of the deboned political subject of today. Just as important for the argument of this book, the emergence or consolidation, at the level of the subject's activity, of political practices capablc of overturning the regnant capitalist order will hinge cmcially on the possibility of supplanting, at the systemic or stmctural level, this globalized system of production and accu­ mulation. -The theoretical armature for a project of liberation capable of creating a postcapitalist society will dIercfore ncorporate i a critique of raday's world­ integrated capitalist system and its underlying conditions. To the extent dlat marxism (albeit one that s i exploratory and not schematic and unilinear in the way that some previous versions were) has shown itself to be the only "theory" genuinely ntended i to furnish a comprehensive critique of this kind, the project of liberation can usefully employ marxism's distinctive practico-theoretical lexicon when approaching the question of dlis project's conditions of possibility. It is thus a tmism for dlis undertaking dlat those who wish to be free first have to produce knowledge of the things dlat stand in the way of their freedom. This in fact is dle acid test for such a project of

liberation: Does it furnish such knowledge, or docs it sweep it more or less gently to one side? Of course events can and do overtake those who form and steer public opinion. TIllis even dle most polished spin doctors were hard-pressed to serve up blandishmcnrs that could diminish what Hurri­ cane Katrina revealed about rhe all too visibly racialized social and economic

32

CHAPTER 1

structures of New Orleans (in particular) and dIe United States (in general). The same state of affairs is also evident in the current financial crisis, when any campaigning American politician, of no matter what persuasion, has to join in the rimal condemnations of dIe "c.xccsscs" on \Vall Street, while having done all he or she could to create a political framework dIal abetted these excesses.

THINKING SUBJECT AN D CITIZEN SUBJECT

H

CHAPTER 2 Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation

The fKllitico-historical and philosophical demise of the "classical" Citizcn Subjcct, the primary features of which were sketched in chapter 1, was ac­ companied by a momentous modification of state sovereignty. The changes associated with this rcconsritution of state sovcrcigmy involved a powerful mlltation of the capitalist system, and it will be possible to determine what is entailed by the shift from the Citizen Subjcrr to his or her ostensible suc­ cessor (i.e., the kind of subject sponsored by today's world-integrated capi­ talism and its complementary political formations) only by providing dlC mdiments of a description and analysis of hi t s latest phase of capitalist de­ velopment. Marxism has so far shown itself to be the only school of thought whose raison d'e:tre is this overall critique of capitalism, and this chapter broaches the question of what predsely is involved in producing a marxist concept of liberation'! -The motivation for producing this concept ofliberation s i supplied by the conviction that liberated political and social subjects will emerge only when capitalism, which has failed comprehensively to improve the economic and sodal conditions of the majority of humankind, is supplanted, and that the critique of capitalism is therefore essential for any real insight into the con­ ditions that will have to be rcmediated as a precondition for the emergence of such fully liberated subjects. In the begiIming was stmggle. If there s i , or has to be, something like a "posmlate of reason'"' for the ensemble of theoretico-practicai propositions that s i marx ism, it is perhaps this one. -The srmggies of countless women, children, and men for a bener world have taken place over the ages in very

diverse settings of theory and practice (and this is

to state a commonplace!).

This diversity is of such amplirude that it cannar be encompassed, theoreti­ cally or otherwise, within a single movement, even one as powerful and com­ prehensive as marxism. Many have engaged in differcnt and not always nec­ essarily congruent ways in such struggles. These struggles have never owed their "relevance" to marxism. Rather, it is marxism, n i whatever form, that

has owed its "relevance" to them. As long as people struggle for Iiberarion­ and this in the end is a collective and collaborative. project imeparable from the quest for happiness- it will be possible for marxism to be, or to continue to be, "relevant." Broaching the question of marxism's hmdamental because comtiruting relation to the project ofliberation, and acknowledging that marxism derives its saliency from dIe latter (and not vice versa), n i turn poses dIe question of marxism's position n i regard to the supersession of capitalism, since it is an axiom for all schools of marxism that liberation inextricably involves a countervailing action directed at rhe capitalist system of production and accumulation. But doesn't capitalism c.xercise its dominance in many modes and at many levels, not all of which give the appearance of being directed by the forces and agents of capitalism? Can't it plausibly be presumed, more­ over, that specifically anticapitalist struggles are not the only ones germane for those seeking radical and permanent changes n i their way of life? At­ tempts to address these questioIl.s can proceed on two fronts. First, there are those who will argue rhat ascribing an overwhelming normativity of this kind

to

anticapitalist struggle n i evitably de-emphasizes

struggles in orhercontexts not usually asrociated with the forces and arrange­ ments integral to capitalism, such as struggles for gender and racial equality and campaigm against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second, there arc those who will argue, in a way that seemingly parallels the argument' about marx ism in the previous paragraph, that mass mOVClnel}[.� with an emancipatory intent c.x isted long before the emergence of the capitalist sys­ tem. The implication is that marxism, whose rairon d'ctre is overwhelmingly the critique of capitalist political economy, is not sufliciClltiy encompassing as

a result of tilis singular focus to do real justice to tilese precapitalist radical

alternatives and the movements that were their vehicles. The argument canvassed in this book does not require a detailed response to tilese hesitations over marxism's putative scope as a tilcory of liberation. Suffice it to say that the perspective c.�poused here on the emergence and devclopmCllt of capitalism departs from more standard marxist or marxisant accounts by proposing that marxism does not have to underwrite what s i in A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

35

esscnce a developmelltalisr conception of the growth and consolidation of C'Jpiralism. According to this developmcnralisr conccption, capitalism as a fully fledged mode of production was :lble ro emerge only when it had supplanted its predecessor feudal mode of production, just as the feudal mode of pro· duction had n i

film

to dispbce a preceding sbve-based mode of produc­

tion in order to attain primacy. It is widely accepted, even in marxist circles, that tltis devdopment'Jlist scheme is llnsatisfactory.2 The position taken n i this book escilews the conceptual underpinnings of this devdopmelltalist scheme. Instead, it takes the core ofanycapit'Jlist system to be constituted by practices and formations involving the employment of formally frec bbor by the owners of the means of production in order to enable the appropriation of surplus value through the operltion of markets. In clpitllisll), bbor :lnd :III other factors of production h:lvc the form of commodities, though it s i of course not nccessary for all socbl formltions in an actually existing capi­ talist socicty to be subsumed under the conunodiry principle (after lll, Trap­ pist monasteries coexist with Goldman Sachs in contemporary America). Moreover, ownersltip of tile means of production need not be confined

(Q

private individuals and comp;mics, since owner-operators, consortia, banks, investment truStS, cooperatives, pension and mumal funds, ;1IId the state can :Ill exercise the various forms of such oWllership, even in a full-blown capital­ ist system.3 In addition, formally frec I:ll>or Clll exist alongside sla\'cry, V:lS­ s:llage, debt·peomge, and flmily work in l capit".llist system. All that m:mers in determining whether or not:l mock of production is capitalist s i for "free" wlge bbor to l>c the economy's prim:lr)' means of rellizing surplus vllue. 111e capit".llist mode ofproflucrioll therefore hlS two components:

(1) a pro­

duction process thlt organizes the socill rd:ltions of production and their patterns of imeraction with the rcgnant technological plmdigm, and

(2) all

accumulation regime which lIses a range of macroeconomic instmmenrs to promote capitalist production and consumption (figures I lnd In :lddition to comprising necess:lrily

l

2).

mode of production, capitalism

:lIsa requires for its proper functioning :l system of regubrion or domin:ltion with tWO constituent modes. The first is l socia/ III/Kit: of (amomi, regll/atioll, which superintends the social conditions of possil>iliry for the various pro­ cesses of production lnd accumubtioll th:lt ill concert m:lke up the c:lpit".llist system. 11le social mode of economic regulation, as its name implies, governs roles :lnd functions inhercnt in manuflcturing and otllcr production pro­ cesses, oversces labor prlcticcs, and man:lgcs thc social l>asis of distribmion nctworks. Hencc, and this is JUSt one c.'\ample, in many Europc;\11 countries 36

CIIAPTER 2

,\IOOe of Production Sites ofPrOOurtion Social Relations of Production

[Material and Immaterial

1-

/ H

I

"

'rodu([ion I Pnxe,"

Technolngies ... Forms ofTedlllological

"- /

'\r---

ProductionJ

A,""unlu larion

"hcroccouomic

Rcginl<'

Instruments ,

1-

Sires of ('..onslllllption

OrganiLuion

1. The mode of production

System ofRcgulation

'-; Social '\-lode of Ecouomie

�

� -

cgulJtion

Sit�s of

0

Modc o

SocicraJ Regulation

)--

APPARATUSES

""

FAiucJtion

I

Familr Structure

l'roducrion

!

Social ('.condi[ions

Religion

L:gal SI'stem Media Medic.1 S)�tem

Sites of

Ac[ors illd Subject!;

Military

('.onsumption

2. The system of regulation

a post office clerk often serves

as

a bank teller, since n i these countrics post

offices arc also commercial banks; this is a simation an American post office clerk docs not have to deal with since the U.S. postal system is not a banking system in the way that the post office is in many European countries. The difference n i job specification between a European post office clerk and his or her American eow!terpart is due to two quite different social modes of economic regulation (at least with regard to having the post office function as

a bank). The second dement in the capitalist system of regulation is a mode ofsoci­

etal regulatwn, which, while not directly commanding the stmctllfcs and forA ,\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

37

mations that subtend capitalist production and accwnulation (this being the task of the social mode of economic regulation), is nonetheless needed to mobilize an integrated system of appararuses (education, the legal system, rcligiollS instirutions, media and communications networks, and so forth) that create the agents and the stmcmres of desire essential for continued capitalist production and consumption. A high school home economics class that teaches smdents to balance their checkbooks is making its contribution to maintaining this system of production and consumption, though more often than not teaching this skill is likely to be called "enabling students to deal with the real world." Ihese apparamses arc harnessed to create a doxa or common sense in which any seriollS expectations regarding alternatives to capitalL�m arc discounted from the outset, so that the accumulation of capi­ tal seems an entirely norma! state of affairs for the overwhelming majority of citizens. In the parlance of the typical American local bar or pool hall habitue, or the dTcctively mythicized "Joe the plumber" or "Joe Sixpack" of the 2008 U.S. Republican election campaign, "Hey, what's wrong with making a buck (or two)?" or "Why the heck should I have to spread the wealdl around?" -The two modes of the capitalist system of regulation therefore encompass a vast array of subsystems of control and regulation dlat enabk this "regu­ larization" of capitalism's modus operandi

to take place. -nlis doxa-forming

assemblage includes organizations, general social mles and prescriptions, rituals, conventions, social roles, culrura! dispositions with their attendant identities, collective outlooks, and modes of calculation,

all of which coa­

lesce to "regularize" or "normalize" (and not just to "regulate") the processes associated with capitalist accumulation.4 -nle social processes which make possible dle creation and distribution ofsurplus value operate through a class system (about which more will be said later) which is effectual in both the social mode of economic regulation and the mode of societalization. It is important to note dlat the mode of regulation in its most basic fonn ncorporates i systemic constraints whose modus operandi is sitllationally defined. llle circumscriptions embodied n i this modus operandi are always specific to particular times and places, they encompass definable groups of agents, and their operation always involves a specific social strategy or set of social strategies. Especially helpful here is Bob Jessop's distinction be­ tween the " stmcmral" and dle "conjunctural" moments that are integral to the functioning of any field of social practices and collectively held beliefs. Stmcrural moments arc relatively n i variam and cannot be changed merely by dlis or dlat agent or group of agems embarked on a given strategic course of 38

CHAPTER 2

action in that particular place and time. By contrast, conjuncmral moments are those n i volving eourses of action whose strategic basis is modifiable in principle. Jessop's distinction has the mcrit of acknowledging that what may be a constraint for a particular agent or group of agents can without any real or apparent change represent a "conjuncrural oppormnity" that can be used more or less productively by other agents. This accOlUlt alro suggests that a systemic constraint for a particular agent or set of agents can with the passage of time become a conjunctural opporrunity for that individual or group of individuals should the latter have recourse to a different social strategy. By choosing different rocial strategies, provided of course that these happen to be available, agents can affect in varying ways and degrees the course and oU[comes of the systemic constraints and opportunities inherenr in the mode of regulation.5 It goes without saying that the stmctural constraints embodied in dIe mode of regulation are sometimes overwhelming, and that in such cases the ability of agents to obviatc or bypass these stricrures is inevitably going to be limited or nonexistent. But the possibility of change in regard to this or that component of the mode of regulation cannot be ruled out from dIe outset: constraints and opportunities are necessarily context-dependent, and any possibility of a change of rocial and political context carries with it the likelihood ofsocial and political transformations that are potentially real and Iasting.6 The overall logic of dIe mode of societal regulation need not be liberal­ democratic, even if this has generally been the case historically where capi­ talism is concerned. As thinkers as diverse as those of the Ecole Regulation, Resnick and \-\lolff, and W. G. Runciman have indicated, the capitalist mode of production s i alro compatible with a quasi-feudal mode of rocietal regu­ lation (as in latter-day Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates), a communist rocial mode of economic regulation (as in dIe "state capitalism" of the former USSR), or even a putatively communist mode of rocietal regulation com­ bined with a capitalist mode of economic regulation (as in China today)? Hence, for insta.nce, challenges to a quasi-feudal mode of rocietal regula­ tion that happens to be coupled with a capitalist mode of production could still be salient for anticapitalist stmggles even if the motivations of dlOse contesting the quasi-feudal social formation in question in no way involve an animus directed toward capitalism per se. A case in point is the stmgglc for women's rights in the Gulf Emirates, which is clearly not anticapitalist in regard to its formative tendencies, but which, depending on the context, can nonetheless be encompassed, strategically, in an anticapitalist stmggle which A .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

39

makes gender equality one of its primary concerns. A marxist or marxisant conception of liberation will therefore acknowledge that opposition move­ ments which do nor direaly contest capitalism and its appurtenances are not by virme of tbat fact necessarily tangential or epiphenomenal [0 ostensibly "real," because c.xplicidy anticapitalist, struggles. Capitalism, as the nexus of a production process and an accumulation regime (these constituting the mode of production) and a social mode of economic regulation and a mode of societalizarion (these making up the mode of regulation), is after all a diverse ensemble of parts, each managed by a sublogic which need not cor­ respond directly or immediately widl the sublogics dlat control the function­ .ng i of other parts of dIe system.8 The various component parts of dIe capitalist system have an overdeter­ mined relationship to each other, and challenges [0 capitalism can therefore occur potentially at many points (culmre, legal institutions, etc.). As a result, there can be no preemption ofa particular form ofopposition simply because. it does not possess rhe face of an overtly anticapitalist struggle. Revolution­ ary change in such a system, f i it occurs, can n i volve a range of very diverse transformations, some of which may lack an inunediate connection or con­ gruence with movements whose raison d'ctre is the quest for an explicitly postcapitalist order. Challenges to the capitalist system dlercfore nel-d not bear directly on the mode of production or the social mode of economic regulation, though it is much more li kely that an unconcealed anticapitalist struggle will affect these two modes in directly visible ways. But struggles conducted at the level of the mode of social regulation can affect the pre­ vailing form of capitalism even if they do not appear on the face of things to alter any existing arrangements in the mode of production and the mode of societalization. It is polities, militancy, understood n i the broadest terms, therefore, dlat makes it possible for marxism still to be germane, indeed central. But tllls is a politics which has to acknowledge that the dispositions of power in our cur­ rem

social and economic realitics, and the irreducibly complex and uneven

movements of force aligned widl these dispositions, are too varied and un­ stable to be managed by a politics of dIe kind that has existed for the past two hundred years (dIe era of the Citizen Subject that prevailed from 1776 or 1789 to 1989, if not a decade or two earlier). As it has done for previous epochs, marxism provides a practical-theoretical armature for addressing some of the more decisive questions for a politics after 1989, that is, a politics that is in­ herently of the twenty-first century.

¥l

CHAPTER 2

However, as we have seen, a marxism capable of encompassing this poli­ tics will have to be premised on the insight that the possible defeat of capi­ talism will necessari l y involve a variety of stmggles, not all of which will be manifestly anticapitalist. The mutations lUldergone by capitalism since the time of Marx and Engels, and tlle modes of resistance to which these muta­ tions are a response, may have to be matched by parallel transformations of (marxist) theory itself. As a political materialism, marxism has

to

register the m i port of these

metamorphoses of capital in tlle very deptll and scope of its conceptual operations where this happens to be appropriate. Consequently, the asser­ tion made by some of its schools of marxism's character as a ".science" is best understood not as an attempt to confer a stultifying incontrovertibility on its axioms (as happened in Stalins i t Russia), but ratller as the recognition of a "systemic" demand on the part of marxism for these principles to be revised in the light of changed historical circumstances. Capitalism's ceaseless dyna­ mism is thus to be matched and complemented by the tlll""Oretico-practical dynamism of marxism itself. One recalls here that Lenin, when confronted with some new situation, used to say, "About this, Marx and Engels said not a word." \> The cmcial question here is the one sometimes implied in the charge that the marxist parJdigm is n i crisis becau.se capitalism is no longer (if indeed it ever was, as some diehard anti-marxists would insist) congment witll the a.xi­ omatic frJmework proposed for its analysis by what is basically an "outdated nineteenth-century idl""Ology," as tllese critics of marxism allege it to be. In responding to such anti-marxist objections,

I must note that this congru­

ence between the field of capitalism and the axioms of marxist theory can be accounted for only by a principle, a second-order principle, tllat is not itself "marxist." This is necessarily so because tile applicability of marxism to the field constiruted by capitalism can be specified only metatlleoretically. This metatlleoretical or "transcendental" specification, which, to repeat, is not something that marxism itself can furnish, will pinpoint the conditions and principles that enable this particular field (viz., capitalism) to be governed by ths i particular a.xiomatic (viz., marxism). -The appicability l of a tlleory or paradigm (any theory or paradigm, not just marxism)

to

a field cannot, on

logical grounds, be certified by tllat theory itself, since the norms and axioms for the connection of the theory in question to its field calUlOt be determined inrratlleoretically. This is occanse the relation of the theory in question to its putative field, which has the typical logical form aRb (object a is in relation R

A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

41

b), cannot be specified by a or b, since the relation R is external, logically, to both a and b, and its character can therefore be specified only by to object

some other theory which has as its (own) object the emire logical frame of the relation between the two n i itial objects n i volved, in this case [aRh[.lO

Marxst i Metatheory The project of a new and transformed human collectivity, essential

to

the

realization of the emancipatory potentials that are a buill-in requirement for a political materialism like marxism, is likely to have two primary com­ ponents. The first s i a politico-philosophical tlK'Ory specifying the forms of, and rhe acmal and potential practical trajectories taken by, this sought-for radical transformation of our current social and economic orders. The second is a critique of tile circuits of economic and political power that impede those forces conducing to this radical transformation. This marxist project has been pursued in recent years, albeit with a variety of cmcial modifications, primarily by Althusser and rhe other thinkers who followed on from tile Althusscrian "moment," most notably Deleuze and Guattari, Antonio Negri (with his collaborators Guattari and Michael Hardt in

Commullists Like Us and Empire,

respectively), Etienne Balibar, Jacques

Ranciere, Fredric Jameson, and Alain Badiou. Marx of course created dIe essential lexicon used by these and other tllinkers to formulate the theoreti­ cal hub of tllis emancipatory project; some of tile leading items featured in this Marxist glossary are "c..'ploitation," "revolution," "accumulation," "com­ modity," "mode of production," "class," and other, somewhat more techni­ cal notions such as "surplus value," "commodity fetishism," "falling rate of profit," and "real subsumption." This concepmal repertoire has becn augmented n i more recent times by these successors of j\1arx. Among a great many other things, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari added "desiring production" and a fascinating and ex­ panded concepmal rendition of tile "mode of production" to this lexicon; Badiou has theorized afresh the notion of revolutionary possibility from d1e standpoint of tile "tnuh-event" and its ramifications for political sub­ jectivity; Althusser provided a rigorous, yet in some ways imprecise expan­ sion of the concept of "ideology" to designate the very thing tllal Foucault would later put at the heart of his disquisitions on "governmentality"; Ne­ gri has elaborated j\1arx's own somewhat wlderdeveloped concept of "real subsumplion" in order to make it the cornerstone of a theory of globalized capitalism; in a brilliant and original way Negri also substituted Spinoza's .p.

CHAPTER

�

norion of "rhe multimde" (Illuititudw) for notions of "masses" and "classes" that for some marxislS have become less applicable to rhe realities of this current phase of capitalist expansion; Jameson has used marxist categories for an immensely creative explorJtion of the current conjuncture's symbolic and culmral forms; and Balibar has used this Marxian framework in his more recent work to produce some remarkable analyses of the JXllitics of racism and edmonationalism. The elaborations provided by dlese writers caIUlOt be regarded as a simple stretching of dle marxian conceptual bungee cord to this or dlat limit. Marx­ ism is perforce an "incomplete project" because capitalism has nor yet reached a discernible point of total exhaustion or retreat. Each one of these represen­ tative thinkers has amplified dle marxist project while acknowledging fully the hugely ramified and challenging task set by dlis incompletion. As I n i di­ cated earlier, at another, more ontological or logical level the incompleteness of the marxist enterprise s i an incompleteness that is inherently constim­ tive, because marxism CalUlOt deliver to itself its own metatheory; it cannot, that is, give lIS a logically required higher-order theory capacious enough to supply the overarching \varrants for its own theory of the capitalist field. The sought-for project of radical transformation, constmed here as an appication l of the principles of an always exploratory political materialism, is the very heart of this metathcory. -nle logic or axioms dlat govern the notion of a collective hwnan liberation therefore oversee ally attempt to sketch the skeletal oudines of this metadleory. So what is the proper form of this meta­ theory heedful of the requirement of a collective liberation.> How is a concept of the appropriateness of the marxist paradigm to be produced? Producing the concept of dle appropriateness of the marxist paradigm re­ quires the producer of dlese concepts to begin by distinguishing adequately between the following: 1. Those concepts that cons[itLJ[e a theory of X or Y or Z. 2.

Those concepts that belong to a particular mrmifmatioll ofX or Yor Z and which constinne the "exprcssivit)''' ofX or Y or Z, and whic h can become the objects described and analy;':ed by the aforementioned theory of X or Y or Z. These eoncepts

can appropriately be design:ncd X- or Y' or Z­

(the superscript asterisks indicate that X' or y. or Z- arc. manifestations ofXor Y or Z). 3. The state or

cOlldition

that is X or Y or Z

as

such, a condition which

o\'erdcrcrmincs the cxpressivities yidded b y this statt" or condition (sec figure 3).

A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

43

Tbtury ofX (X ocing an cxprrss;vitr)

t Concepts belonging to l l'lnicuilr manifestation ofX, md which constitute the ex{Jresf;,'ity ofX.

TIlc s" conceptual nllnifcsr:uions aIT ,ksignatcd as X'

t TI,e State Or flmdition ofX ", such (indcpcndl"dy of an)' of its manifestations X")

3- Theory, cxprcssivity, and condition per sc In the case of marxism, the application of 1-3 would yield the following rcsults. lhe category (a) would be the marxist theory whose object could be a particular phase of capitalist development, a process within such a phase, a specific institution or set of institutions associated with rhe phase in ques­ tion, the decisions of individuals and groups of individuals, and so OIl. Under (b) hc t objccrs in (a) receive expression through the words and texts of a very diverse mnge of agents and organizations (workers, immigrants, dIe unem­ ployed, old-age pensioners, trade unionists, company managers, federations of bosses, local councils, members of dIe legislature, dIe output of think tanks (Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, etc.), the news media, national governments, international organizations

(UN, IMF, \Vorld Bank, Il u, WTO,

OileD, etc.), NGOS, dIe writings of academics, novelists, pla)"vrights (Ques­ nay's

Tablrall ieollollliqllc, Adam Smidl's TIfe Wralth ofNlltiollS, Polanyi's The Grellt TmllSjorlllltion, l the Han'llrd Business Rel'ielV, Martin Amis's MOlley, Conrad's Nostrolllo, Arthur Miller's Death of II Sa/csman, etc.), films (Ken Loadl's Kes, Sam Mendes's American Beauty, Elia Kazan's On the �Vllt"front, etc.), all these constituting the c.xpressivitics thal are, or can be, "dleorizcd" by this or that application of marxist theory (i.e., a). But (c) the expressivitics

n i (b) have as their basis a diffuse array of material conditions whose overall effect is to overdetermine the expressivitics in question. A currently ex isting conceptualization is always provisional and can therefore be superseded by a newer one; no conceptualization expresses or determines n i a way that is completely exhaustive of the condition or situation dlat it brings to expres44

CHAPTER �

sion. An expressiviry works by naming things, but the thing named is never the rhing itself; it is instead rhe panoply of eflects associatcd with the thing in question.

(Tltis is the basis for the famous Alrhllsserian refrain ""llle concept

of sugar is not sweet;' "TIle concept of water is not wet," etc.) Spinoza was the first to turn this insight

("An expressivity is rhe effect of a thing') into a

plti l osophical axiom, and Althusser and Delellze (Deleuzc admittedly some" what later than Althusser)

are

to be credited with rhe systematization of this

insight. TIle " thing," n i this scheme, is a concrescence of its effects (it is the event of this concrescence), and the effects in question vary with the totality of interactions that have that particular thing as thcir point of focus. It should be stressed that the process of experiencing an effect gives rise to an "affect," so dlat there is a close causal link between "effect" and "affect." For example, rhe horse that races is a very different "thing" (especially for its jockey and horse"racing fans) from the horse that drags a plow (especially for the peasant farmer using dIe horse for dlis purpose).!! TIle "thing" being an assemblage of effects and affects, and there being in principle a huge vari­ ability in the way these assemblages can be organized, no c.xpressiviry (qua the tide of the assemblage in question) can eliminate ab initio its competitor names and the assemblages designated by them. For instance, dIe collapse of the giant U.S. energy trading company Enron (with ties to dlree dozen or

so

senior officials n i the Bush adntinistration) has been placed by busi­

nc.�s conUllentators and analysts into a number of such assemblages. Enron's downfall has been characterized as "a resultant of an energy market collapse," "a classic nUl on rhe bank," "a hedging structure collapse causing a liquidity drop," " the American spl""Cies of crony capitalism at work," "dIe bursting of the 1990S U.S. speculative bubble," "the result of inadequate business regu­ lation," "the outcome of the greed and venality of top management," and more. A theory of capitalism, as marxism of course is, is not therefore about capitalism per se but about dIe concepts dlat are generated by capitalism and its denizens and even its critics, or indeed by anyone through which the effectivity of capitalism s i bespoken. These concepts are in turn related in a variety of ways to other assemblages of practices. Hence the concepts generated by the conditions associated with capitalism can, in dIe relevant context, be related by an appropriate theory to the concepts or expressivirics associated widl dIe assemblage of practices named "Protestantism" (in the classic manner formulated by Max Weber in 71Je ProtestantEthic and thc Spirit

of Capitalism) or "modernist art"

(in dIe way understood by T. J. Oark and

others). A theory of capitalism does not bear directly on capitalist formations as such, bur ratller on the concepts of tllis or that manifestation of capitalism A MARX!st CONCEPT OF lIBERATlON

45

and its associated agents and figures, and these concepts (what I have called "exprcssivities") arc just as acmal and effective as the condition or set of con­ ditions that is capitalism itself.l2 Tlll'Orics operate on expressivities, and expressivities n i turn arc connected with the conditions that enable them. -nle correlations established between expressivities and dleir enabling conditions depend for their cffectivencs.� on always specific, because contingently ordained, distributions and orderings of power. Iheories arc thus the outcome of a productive process, namely no more and no less dIan the putative object of this process, the expressivities that mediate the conditions which they express even as they arc enabled by the conditions in question. A theory is a practice, just as the conditions me­ diated by an expressivity are always provisional multilinear assemblages of practices stmcmred by arrangements of income, assets, stams, power, and so on. A theory, in short, is a practice of concepts located in a macrosocial field with its own practical possibilities and outcomes from dlese possibilities. Capitalism's concepts are not given in the ensembles of practices that constimte it, and yet they arc capitalism's concepts, not theories about capi­ talism. Hence dle formulations of a Rosa Luxemburg or Enrique Dussel constimte a theory "about" capitalism, while the concepts of capitalism arc likely to include the notions (which may be inchoate or half-formed) of the ownership of private property, bank lending strategies, dle place of the peas­ antry in mral social orders,

GM crop technologies and their role in agribusi­

ness, that acmally arc operative in, say, the thought and practice of a banker in pre-World War 1 Germany or a Mexican rural smallholder in the 1990S. Every concrete rendering of capitalism generates for itself its own "think­ ability" (and concurrently its own "unthinkability" as thc. obverse of thi.� very thinkability), even f i this or that capitalist condition is not taken to be such by those whose condition it happens in fact to be. TIllis the Mexi­ can smallholder (of today) or the German banker (in dle time before World War I) in their respective historical and social conjuncmres, the former (say) by owing deference to dle rich landowner and dle latter (say) by assuming that he

is n i vesting wisely on behalf of his customers by putting money in

the pre-World War I German munitions industry, contribute to the think­ ability of a particular instantiation of capitalism, even f i dIe individuals in question arc unable to acknowledge that this owing of deference (in dle case of the Mexican smallholder) or blind thinking about the supposed virtlles of investment in the pre-vVorld \Var I German armaments industry (in the case of dle German banker) are precisely the kind of conduct that enables a

46

CHAPTER 2

particular recension of capitalism to remain a viable system of production and accumulation, in the shorter term at any rate. It is this smallholder's or this banker's concepts or c.xprc.ssivities that constitute the thinkability of the condition n i which he or she is inserted, even though he or she may be unable to perform the requisite operation of transcoding that renders a particular piece of deferential behavior or routine thinking about the seeming benefits of certain investment strategies n i to an explicit marker or symptom (in something like the Lacanian sense) of a par­ ticular capitalist system of production and accumulation. Another way of making this point would be to say that a particular capi­ talist dispensation, like each and every social and cultural condition, has to secrete its multiple expressivities precisely in order to be what it is, and that its concepts, in ways that arc n i escapably selective, confining, and even arbi­ trary, are rhematizations or representations of these expressivities and thdr attendant conditions. Or more briefly, that the concepts of a particular capi­ talist order arc its exprc.ssivities limned n i the form of that order's think­

ability. Theories ofcapitalism, by contrast, arc the olitcome of a theoretical opera­ tion whose object is the natures and functions of these expressivities. ·nleo­ ries of capitalism operate on a particular capitalist order's thinkability and involve a kind of transcoding. It is JXlssible to ask the question "'What is the form of capitalism operating n i cllis dispensation?;' but there is anocller kind of question, involving quite another kind of theoretical operation, that can be asked as well, in cllis case: "What is (a) clleory (of capitalism) ?" Capital­ ism, qua order or dispensation, is a prodigiously varied and complex prac­ tice of signs and images with an accompanying orchestrJtion of affectivity, whose theory clunkers such as Joan Robinson and Karl Polanyi and Samir Antin must produce, but produce precisely as conceptual practice, in this case a practice that generates, always in a metalanguage, concepts that reflect upon the concepts and c.xpressivities of capitalism's denizens, expressivities which therefore constitute what is n i e/Iect a basal or first-order language that comes subsequently to be transcoded. No clleoretical intervention, no matter how refined or dlOroughgoing it may be, can on its own constitute clle concepts of cllis or cllat capitalist order; the concepts of the denizen of capitalism are expressed in advance and ndependencly i of the personage, invariably an academic, who reflects on the concepts of those whose situations are typically those of the peasant, banker, hctory worker or manager, homemaker, retiree, refugee or asylum seeker,

A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

-1-7

billionaire ilwestor, and others.lbeorists and intellcrmals, qua theorists and intellcrruals, can traffic only in theories ofcapitalism (or culture or collective fantasy or whatever). The

concepts that theorists produce can be operative n i more than one

field ofthought, and even ill a single field it is always possible for a concept to

fulfill more than one function. An obvious example is the concept of "value," which

features promn i ently in the discourses associated with economics,

sociology, ethics, psychology, and aestlletics. Each domaill of thought is defined by its own n i ternal variables, variables to

that have a comple.x relation

their counterpart external variables, such as historical epochs, political

and social conditions and processes, and even tile bmte physical character of things.13 It is an implication of this accowlt of conceptual practice tllat a con­ cept comes into being or ceases [0

be operative only when there is a change

offunction or field. Functions for concepts must be created or n i validated for

the concepts n i question to be generated or abolished, and new fields must be brought into being n i order for tllese concepts to be rendered inapplicable or illegitimate. 10 see this, we have only to consider the accounts of twentieth­ century American capitalism provided n i a well-known semipopular text like

John Kennetll Galbraith's The NelV Inn/lStril11 State or Michel Aglictta's now

egulati n C{ crises nu cnpitalisllle.

classic R

o

Galbraitll follows Thorstcn Veblen's pioneering n i sights into the emer­ gence of a teclmocratic class and uses tile notion of a

"technostrucmre" as

a master concept to characterize tile course taken by American capitalism in the twentieth century, basing his argument regarding tile centrality of this tedmostmcrure for the dynamism of the American system of accumula­ tion since World \.Var I on an analysis of a number of textbooks on business organization and information provided Robert j\1cNamara,

by company executives (n i cludn i g

then an e.xecutive at Ford), as well as more theoreti­

cal works in economics by Kennetll Arrow, Joseph Schwnpcter, and others. These sources can be mined to provide

a panoply of "stylized facts" that

fWlCtion as expressivities, which can then be used as the basis for theoretical formulation on the pan of the cronomist, in this case the autilOr of "Ill/! NelV

Indwtril11 Stl1te.i4 Likewise Michel Aglietta's more technical work uses detailed evidence drawn from key U.S. economic indicators to delineate Fordism's structure as

a regime of accumulation and to show that falls in productivity anddcrlining profitability, which had appeared first in the United States in tile late 1960s,

prior to spreading to other advanced n i dustrial economies, were tile harbin­ ger of a more signi ficant decline

48

CHAPTER 1.

that marked the beginning of the end of

this Fordist regime of accumularion. Under Fordism, according to Agliena, production and consmnprion were both characterized by the use of mass standards. Production was based on large-scale, standardized conveyor-belt production of medium-size consumption goods (cars and the larger domes­ tic appliances). Swift productivity gains ensued that were reflected in rising income and the emergence of mass markets. Aglictta highlights rhe wage relation as it impacted productivity and profit levels, as well as connecting production with the domain of consumption. He also emphasizes the labor process, and several sections of lUglllatwlI

et crses i dll capitnlismt deal with

the tasks that workers characteristically undertake as well as the tedmologies employed in these undertakings. Fordism, in Aglierra's account, hinged cru­ cially on dIe deployment of mass technologies by a trisectioned workforce of highly specialized, semiskilled, and unskilled workers who provided this regime of accumulation with its dynamism. Riglllatioll et crises dll capita/isme is therefore replete with "stylized facts" drawn from a welter of statistical sources: he t National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U. S. Uureal! of Labor Statistics, the Office of Business Economics, and rhe Federal Reserve Board. Agliena also refers to histories of American labor and consults Fortullt maga7jne and reports of congressional committees and subcommittees. These sources, which delineate the external field of a certain phase of capitalist development, constitute c.xpressivitics that Agliena can then work into a dleory of the Fordist regime of accumula­ tion and dIe first stages of its demise.ls Neither Aglictta nor Galbraith would be able to formulate rheir theories of capitalism without the expressivities that were lodged in such (nonthl""Oretical) documents as Furtllnt or dIe rec­ ollections of Robert McNamara when he was president of the Ford Motor Company. At a more general level, the concepts dlat are "expressive" of capitalism follow niles that govern dleir appearance and perpetuation. It may be the case, however, that capitalism s i more plausibly viewed as an order of orders, that is, as an order that brings together and orchestrates rules for an amalgam or network of practices, practices having n i more or less complex ways to do with everything from the establishment of the labor process and its repro­ duction, to the constitution of the production process (in some cases widl a special emphasis on the role of technology), the distribution and redistri­ bution of incomes, and rhe creation of patterns of consumption. The term "capitalism" is bestowed on the strategic logic dlat orchestrates these niles. However, focusing on dIe writings of economists such as Galbraith and Aglictta makes possible a depiction of this logic only at a relatively high level A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

4-9

of abstraction, as much as these economists make recourse to more concrete expressivities that are perforce presented in the form of "stylized facts." To get to the more tangible dimensions of this logic's application one perhaps needs to resort to the irreducible specificity of historical or ethnographic description, that is, by rurning to a form of characterization that studies ex­ pressivities in all their context-bound specificity. There are many well-known srudies of one or more facets of capitalism by anthropologists writing as ethnographers; examples that come to mind are Michael Taussig's 71fe Dept!

and Gmlllwdity Fetishism ill SO'llth Amerca i and Shamanism, OJlollialislII alld the WildMall: A Study ill Terror alld Henling, and Aihwa Oag's Spirits O'f1{£­ sistallee alld Capitalist Discipline: FactO'ry WO'mm ill Malaysa i . It calUlOt be de­ nied that works such as these involve descriptions of cultural and economic phenomena, and therefore involve willy-nilly an element of abstraction. Bur the task of description as undertaken by edmographers involves a defining proximity to those who happen to confront the same phenomena in directly self-involving ways (dlese being the "participants" of the standard ethno­ graphic schema). Ethnography's fundamental nearness to its putative object (ofdescription) gives it a concreteness not typically possessed by odler logics of description, though dlis in no way suggests dlat such ethnographic objects are raw data or brute facts wh ich can then serve as dle grOlUld for subsequent (and proper) dleoretical formulation.16 For an ethnography is itself a species of description, and dlerefore operates at one remove on the expressivities of those who participate in the cultural or social formation being described by the etlmographer or local historian. It is thus a truism worth repeating over and over again that marxism is a theory, one belonging to a domain of thought whose basic n i tellectual disposition is tllat of a political materialism (and n i this sense marxism is therefore also a kind of practice), whose field is capitalism. This field is con­ sriruted by an immense range of c.xpressivities, and these c.xpressivities serve as an irremovable exteriority to the enterprise of theoretical fonnulation. "ille question of dle namre of the field from which the concepts of marxism derive their saliency is obviously one dla[ is especially crucial, since this field is the location of the external variables that are marxism's fundamental en­ abling condition. It follows from dlis that if the field that is capitalism did not c.xist, dlere would be no need for marxism. Bur before I discuss some of the primary external variables of the field in which the concepts belonging to a marxist theory are generated, somedling needs to be said about the mecha­ nisms underlying the constinuion of dle lived world that s i the contc.xt from

50

CHAPTER 2

which the perceptions, desires, thoughts, and actions of (capitalist) social and political agents are orchestrated. "flle daily round of life for the social subject is complexly mediated by ensembles of images and affects; images and affects n i tum are distributions of temporal and spatial relationsP TIllis the lived world of, say, the newly unemployed Appalachian coal miner who leaves the town of \Vheeling, West Virginia, to work as a loader in an air-cargo dispatching center in Newark, New Jersey, will be established by an ensemble of sign-images constituting the "'new" world of the city of Newark, a similar ensemble constituting the "old" world of the Appalachian mining town, the sign-images prevalent in the new world that is Newark which designate the West Virginia mining town that used to be home for the ex-miner ("Tllis is how the typical inhabi­ tant of Newark thinks of the place I came from"), the sign-images designat­ ing Newark that prevailed in dle old world of the small coal-mining town ("Tllis is how the people of \'Vheeling typically view Newark"), and dtis be­ cause the semiotic registers of dle movements between different life-worlds have themselves to be incorporated into dle constimtion of the worlds n i question. -flle ex-miner's concepmal rendition of the Appalachian world left behind is now inflected by the ex-miner's insertion into the new semiotic ensemble. that is Newark, just as the currently n i stantiated semiotic ensemble that is Newark is always itself constituted by the semiotic ensemble that is the ex-miner's previous lived world, in this case the Appalachian town n i the mountains of West Virginia. ·flle West Virginia mining town is always prehended in terms of the New Jersey ciry and vice versa, and dle world I have left behind is prehended n i terms of the world I have moved into, just as the world I have moved into is always prehended (if not entirely, then certainly partially) in terms of the world or worlds I previously inhabited. In dlis way a whole range of multiply linked sign-image assemblages under­ lies one's prehensions of dle temporal and spatial relations embodied in the antecedents and ptoximities that enable a life-world (tbat ex-miner's world, but still a public world) to be constituted out of the flux that is composed of these antecedents and proximitics. Tllese semiotic assemblages-designating Newark, the Appalachian town that the ex-miner has left be.hind, the ensemble regulating the. transition from dle one to the other, and so on and so forth-are crisscrossed by yet odler as­ semblages (each with an associated affective component) dlat designate such formations as family, job, education, circle of friends and associates, race, regional accent and speech patterns, and of course class position. -flle notion

A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

51

of being a protagonist in any kind of social or political order, therefore, is an abstraction denoting a particular kind of relationship between these assem­ blages; the notion of bcing such a protagonist is inevitably mischaracterized when it is viewed as an object that is directly denoted by, for example, the concepts "capitalist subject," "Appalachian miner," "unemployed worker;' and dlcir various cognates. For the object itself is already an abstraction from rhis nexus of assemblages and dIe inherently unstable linkages between them. The expressivities of the capitalist subject have dIe subject's insertion n i to {hs i matrix of assemblages as dlcir condition of possibility; to not be embedded n i dIem is perforce to be somedling other than a capitalist subject.l6 At the same time, a considerable variation can exist n i the kinds of assem­ blages that go into the constitution of dIe life-world of dIe capitalist subject. 1he assemblages that constitute the lived world of dIe London-based media tycoon who is a Russian citizen, or rhe Italian telephone operator working for a German multinational pharmaceutical company based in Milan, or dIe rice-growing peasant in nlral Malaysia (so vividly depicted n i dIe etlmogra­ phy of James C. Scott's now classic

Pmsall{ Resistancc)

-

Weapons of (he Weak: E!'erydiiy Forms of

these are just as much assemblages of capitalist subjects

as is dIe life-world of tile ex-miner from Appalachia. Marxism, as a thl.'ory of liberation, has no alternative but to present itself as a theory of the transfor­ mation of dIe life-world of capitalist subjects. It is not sufficient for marxists merely to posit a tramformation of the mode of production and to regard this focus on the mode of production as tile sole and c.xclusive rationale for those projects of liberation sanctioned by marxism. The transformation of the mode of production is of course an essential element of dlis sought-for liberation, but for marxism taking dIe project of liberation to its point of culmination will demand dIe transformation of the life-world (and its en­ compassing forms of subjectivity) of capitalism's denizens. Liberation, if it is to be effective, has to operate at the level of our subjectivity or life-world. Hence the need for a dlOrough description and analysis of these life-worlds, conducted at the olltologicallevel in the manner just specified.l9 The primary external variables of the field n i which the concept of a capi­ talist subject is to be generated today will be identified through an account of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of dIe assemblages th:lt create the personage of this subject and the exprcssivities that define this personage. It would take an extended and complex narrative to enumerate the full range of these c.xtemal variables, and dIe account developed here is unavoidably schematic. To tell this story properly is, after all, to have to tell a fairly com­ plete story about the course of modern capitalism. 11le theoretical and pracP

CHAPTER 2

tical bedrock of the applicability and intelligibility of the concept of the capi­ talist subject is a particular stntcmre of exploitation positioned in relation to specific historical and social stntcmres and their associated conjunctures; the theoretical operation involved n i producing the concept of the capitalist subject makes it a:domatic that he or she is this subject precisely because he or she happens to be exploited in some appreciable way, and this because he or she is subjected to the particularity of (capitalist) n i terests in ways that re­ flect fundamental asymmetries of power and the capabilities enabled by such power. The effect of these asymmetries of power is to place this subject n i exactly thnt stmcture of c."ploitation.2o Illere are many strands in the overall stmcture of c."ploitarion, and it is a commonplace dlat the stmcture which subtends the lived world of the rice-growing peasant in Malaysia is perforce different from die lived world of the Milanese telephone operator. In sununary, die capitalist structure of exploitation at its highest level of

generality has two axes: the mode of production and he r regime of acnl­ mulation (with the latter always functioning wIder capitalism as a mode of domination). Stmggles against capitalist exploitation, if they occur, have to occur along both these axes. Stfllggles regarding the mode of domination are primarily stntggles for greater social visibility and more effective social agency; stntgglcs regarding the mode of production have die reallocation of value as their primary (though not necessarily exclusive) focus. Abolishing the stmcture of exploitation is a necessary precondition for any pursuit of a project of liberation aspiring to be decisive and significant. Efforts directed at the abolition of die capitalist stmcture of exploitation can operate on one or both of dlese axes, and no effort expended a.Iong one axis is to be discounted in principle at rhe c."pense of dIe other. Stmggle can n i volve innumerable paths, and the avenues to liberation are likewise uncOlUltable. Since marxism is either a project of liberation or nothing, the surmounting of any com­ ponent of capitalism's stmctures of exploitation is n i absolute accord with marxism's raison d'ctre.

'nle Desire 'flmt Is the Ontological Grollnd ofLiberation and Truth Liberation in its essence involves a strategic lUldertaking designed to over­ come conditions enabling a stmcture of exploitation to hold onto its reach and effectiveness. The stmcture of exploitation therefore represents a critical mpediment i posed for die (marxist) project of liberation. The heart of any marxist project of liberation s i the emancipation of subjects from some unA MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

53

acceptable state of the world or condition attendant upon their being in the (capitalist) world; this recognition is accompanied, for marxism, by the allied realization that capitalism is the primary (though not the only) causal factor rcsJXlnsible for the existence of this state or condition. Liberation, then, s i in its marxist manifestation a dynamism impelled by desire, n i this case he t desire to overcome, circumvent, or ameliorJte an Wlac­ ceptable state of being associated widl a specific disJXlsition of the capitalist system.l1 Liberation for marxism is thus a concept internally related to the desire for capitalism's abrogation. As such, liberation has to be approached through an analysis of the conditions and functions of this (for marxism) primal desire, and this desire's names, its situations, its outcomes, its pro­ ductions. Desire has a role that is evell more primary than this, however, since the production of the world begins widl desire. The philosophical ac­ knowledgment of this all-important proposition came from Spinoza, who said n i his Ethics, " V \ e do not endeavour, will, seek after, or desire somedling because we judge it to be good, bm on the contrary we judge something to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after, or desire it." 21 Spinoza's proJXlsition can be said

to

be an axiom for marxism, since the notion dlat

the production of dIe world can begin only widl desire requires marxism to acknowledge that the cornerstone of the project of liberation is a prior on­ tology of human constitutive power or desire.l3 This ontology of constirutive power charts the various trajectories of human desire, and in so doing allows the project of liberation to have

as

its "knowledge" rhe dlcorems delivered by this ontological charting of the lineaments of desire (dlis in a nutshell being Spinoza's own program). 1be ontology of human constitutive JXlwer will delineate what it is that the en­ sembles of desire going by the name "human" are capable of, and what their aversions and attractions are. -nle ontology of human constitutive power is thus a necessary prolepsis to any specification of dle dleoretical core of the project of liberation. -nlis ontology has to be accorded priority in a marxist marking out of liberation as a concept, if only because a project of IiberJtion is above all a system of truth-efTects, and any truth-effect (or fusion of tmth-effects) can, depending on historical and social circumstances (and the mdiments of these are always political), be prevented from displaying itself. A tmdl-effect does not produce automatically, and hence cannot guarantee, its own processes of acrualization; it cannot of itself banish dle matetial conditions, whatever they may be, dlat could in principle dismpt its realization as a truth-efTect. (This is tme of any system ofthought, including the ontology ofconstinuive 54

CHAPTER 2

power being canvassed here; as a regime of tmth-effects it too calUlOt insti­ tute by fiat its own modes of realization, and it too can always be prevented from realizing its truth-effects.)24 A truth-dlcct, Oil this account, is the resultant ofactive desire, often having the force and character of a "project," in this case a project motivated by a particular arrangement of this constitutive desire or striving. For instance, Nelson Mandela's desiring his freedom (and dms the abolition of apartheid)

is a truth-effect because dns desire functions as an enabling (though not in itself sufficient) condition for the removal of all dlat stands n i the way of the realization of that desire. We could call this a "truism" of dle logic of desire, inasmuch as to desire X is to aim, no matter how ambivalcntly, to make true what it is that conduces to the attainment ofX. But what is it to desire X in ways that aim to make tme what it is that conduces to the attainment ofX? -nle relation between truth and falsity becomes significant at this point. Falsity emerges when a fundamental undecidability s i introduced between the real and the unreal. It is mportant i to note here that falsity is not mere error or confusion, but the capacity, the sheer power that makes a JXlten­ rial event of truth succumb to the forces of nondecidability.15 Truth is tims the force dlat cOllnters the constitutive nondecidability lying at the heart of falsity, a falsity coextensive widl the diminution of tile possibilities for a real and sustainable liberation. If this nondccidability prevails on a decisive enough scale, timse engaged n i the pursuit of trudl and liberation would not know which processes, constitutive of this pursuit, they would have

to

be

involved n i precisely as a condition of living liberated lives. As such, truth is the sine qua non of any materialization of the principles of liberation. To live n i truth is

to live under the name of liberation and all dlat conduces to

it, and vice versa. In the case of the apartheid regime in Soudl Africa, Nelson Mandcla's quest for his country's IiberJtion required him and his allies n i this struggle to find ways of rendering decidable the questions of what had to be done in order to destroy apartheid:

to fight against apartheid, Mandela and

his associates had to place themselves in, and in the process create, specific truth-effects about dle nature of white South African racism.16 But liberation and its attainment are not the ever-so-visible physiognomy of an abstract ideal order. To elaborate: bringing any principles of liberation to their point of real­ ization reqnires-and this watchword bears frequent repeating-dlat atten­ tion always be given to concrete political circumstances, since rhe JXllitical

is an insuperJblc condition for liberation's constitution as dlis or that spe­ cific event of liberation. For the truth of liberation, if it s i to be achieved in A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

55

material form, can be manifested only in a context indelibly marked by the particularities of power (including its abuse), and these particularities are perforce always political. Ibe truth of liberation is therefore irreducibly the possible truth of a political standpointP It is unimaginable that Mandela, AlUlg San Suu Kyi, Albertina Sisulu, Steve Biko, "nlOmaS Sankara, Martin Luther King Jr., Lenin, Emmeline Pankhurst, Bolivar, Garibaldi, and a host of others be the protagonists on behalf of liberation that they are without a protracted m i mersion in the political. Tmth is inseparable from politics. However, when truth is applied to a political standpoint it must always be qualified by the word "possible." For tmth is what breaks n i to and n i terrupts the seemingly undifferentiated continuity of life (a continuity permeated by the nondec idability that is falsity's defining mark, and which a fortiori con­ ducc.� to the absence ofliberation), just as it dismprs the fantasies that under­ lie and make possible the seamless continuity of everyday life ("God bless America," "It's great to be a Bmmmie [a native of Birmingham, England]," "lexas is one special place," "\Ne live n i a part of Virginia that is the real Virginia and the real America," and so on). An adequate politics always calls for decidability, regardless of whether this insight is purveyed by those on the right

(Carl Schmitt comes to mind here) or the left (Badiou and Zuek)

or in some more substantive versions of liberalism (Max Weber and HaIUlah Arendt). "nle tmth, as the event of this dismption of the (politically inaugurated) continuity of life's everyday course, as the power that counters life's (politi­ cally sustained) nondecidability, is always a "point of exception" (the phrase

is Hadiou's). Tmth is an always specific series of operations on quotidian reality's fundamental propensity to nondecidability, or where the question of liberation is involved, on this reality's predisposition to render undecidable any basis for distinguishing adequately between liberation and those forces that militate against it.28 111e quality that defines tmth-and dlis is a quality that eo ipso also characterizes justice-is thus the quality of a singularity or exception, a singularity that does not cohere with the (politically instituted) continuity of Iifc.29 Ibis s i thl� kind of singularity or exception in which a specific operation or amalgam of operations establishes the basis for an event of liberation by bringing to the point of absolute decidability a particular historical or political process that hitherto had eluded, or been bypassed by, the political forces that make effective the various stmctures of decidability. Politics dlUS establishes the "bcingness" of tmdl and liberation, if one wants to put this in a Hcideggerian idiom. "nlis operation or set of operations, whose name is tmth, does not pro56

CHAPTER 2

duce automatically, and hence cannot guarantee, its own mode of acrualiza­ tion; dlat is, it cannot ofitself banish the historical and political conditions, whatever they may be, that serve to preempt its realization as a tnldl opera­ tor. When this happens, and these preemptive political and historical con­ ditions are active, nondecidability necessarily prevails. In this way untrudl holds sway and the possibility ofliberation is diminished. The tnldl operator and its encompassing regime therefore require a politics capable of activating and sustaining them; quite simply, there is liberation only when there s i a politics able to banish the forces of nondecidability. Again, this is precisely why liberation is inseparable ftom politics. Only political practice can annul the nondecidability or lUltnith of all that counters liberation. It is dear from this that any elaboration of liberation as a concept has to place an inarguable centrality on dlt� conditions underlying dle production of the tmdl-effects belonging to the system of liberation in question. No prac­ tice of liberation, nor any theoretical principles stemming from that practice, can portray those actively seeking liberation as individuals or groups who lUust "settle for life just as it is." Liberation's logic is irreducibly transforma­ tive. Even those conceptions of liberation that profess, or perhaps promote in slightly more vigorous ways, an "acceptance" of the social and political order or world as it is (as in some versions of stoicism) n i variably aftirm the need, whedler real or merely felt, for dIe protagonists involved actively to come to the point of such an acceptance. Ibis acceptance has to be worked for. That is, inherent in dlese more quietistic conceptions of liberation is the presumption t1lat such individuals or collectivities have to change, practically and in the end decisively, at least thcir dispositions toward the world (i.e., thcir own "subjectivity") even if not the world itself. This is precisely he t point at which the question of dIe conditions that subtend the production (or dle dissolution) of trudl effects arises in all its force, for the diftcrence made to the life-world by any practice conducing to liberation hinges crucially on the emergence of conditions that eft·ecmate truth by creating an evem of tnldl. It goes virtually without saying that the event of truth can also be forestalled by countervailing forces that obviate its emergence, and that dIe project of liberation invariably takes the form of a struggle widl those countervailing forces directed against the surfacing of the event of truth. Also important for any "thematics" ofliberation is the insight that dlere is a perceived need for liberation only because something about the lived world is distorted, because dlat world is for m:UlY of its subjects a place of misfor­ nUle and even catastrophe. ·TIlis basic distorted quality of the life-world, or A .\IARX[ST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

57

one's being in this world, which for this thematics is the driving force behind the quest for liberation, can have another consequence: for some of these subjects, the realities of a catastrophic world are the obvious starting point for battling the distortions and calamities that serve to underline the need for liberation. For these individuals or groups it may be the case that hope for the potential for change can survive or become effective only if the figures of liberation become figures of redemption rooted n i some kind of transcen­ dence-and these figures are hidden, or expressed indirectly by other means. 11lis is especially true of many apocalyptic or messianic traditions. These concealed or partly shrouded figures can then be retrieved only through the use of rituals or interpretive resources that have been refined and attwled n i suitably complex ways. 11le exemplary n i stance of this strand of messianic thinking is provided by Walter Benjamin, who in his ""flleses on tile History of Philosophy" used thc code of a historical materialism to express, alle­ gorically, utopian and messianic (and therefore "theological") impulses that for him were forced om of sight by a history that had succumbed to barba­ rism. For Benjamin the truth-effects of these hidden utopian propensities are marked by lUltimeliness and discontinuity, and thus can be registered only allegorically.30 A more complicated form of attention then needs to be paid to these characteristic discont inuities and their associated untimeliness, since a bro­ ken history discredits all conceptions of inexorable progress and teleology and ensures that any transcodings of potential m i ages of liberation (and the tmth-effects that go with these. images) will be unfamiliar and hard to retrieve. The argument of this book does not require the support of these messianic or utopian traditions, though it acknowledges their saliency for the constitution of the life-worlds of many who are dispossessed or m3.rgin­ alized. A glance at rhe anthropological texts of Michael laussig or Jean and John Comaroff will indicate tile significance of messianic religious traditions and figures for such individuals and groups, and insof:tr as the ensuing con­ victions are JXlwerful motivating forces for those seeking political change it is important for any theory of liberation to take these religious motivations into accowlt.3! It is virtually axiom3.tic that the implcment3.tion of tmth-efTects depends cmciallyon the 3.ctive presence of the conditions of possibility for a project of liberation. Tltis s i something of a conceptual requirement, since tmth has value only because we first deem it valuable to become involved in the con­ stitution of a particular tmth-event, to continue to seek this event of tmth, to 3.void self-deception in regard to wh3.t is considered to be a tmth-event, 58

CHAPTER 2

to heed those who

are

in the best position to discern this tmth-evem, and

so forth. TIlLIS, for n i stance, there may be someone who, contrary

[0

the

available evidence and contrary to the convictions of everyone else, hap­ pens to believe that her child survived rhe tswlamL She happens to be right, because it is tme that her child survived the tsunami, and it is a good thing that this belief is tme, that is, that her child's surviving has the character of a truth-event. But what makes it a gexld thing that this belief is tme is simply that it is good that the child survived. Here the value of truth (its effects, in other words) is clearly dependent on the sheer value of material survival.32 It is the reality of the child's survival that brings decidabiliry to the event of the mother having the conviction that her child has survived the tsunamL If truth-effects, and indeed the value of truth as such, arc n i extricably oound up with the value attached [0 the relations that we have to the material con­ ditions which wlderlie these efr..."t"C s, then the value of the truth-ell"ccts asso­ ciated with any presumptive project of liberation will depend crucially on the conditions, always but not soldy political, that subtend these projects. The tmth-cffects generated by this or that project of liberation depend for their decidability on the "making true" of this event of liberation by political practice; n i the absence of such practice, the effects of tmth are not likely to be compelling or far-reaching. Identifying and characteri7ing these conditions of possibility for a par­ rk-ular guest of liberation will reguire the kind of dense specificity that only . an ethnographic (or in some cases, microhistoricaI) description can aspire to provide; phi l osophy or theory (as we have seen) aims at something morc general and in a sense more problematic, that is, conditions given in advance of their appearance in he t realm of phenomena or material events. Neverthe­ less, it can be said that a "logic" of these conditions, of the kind being sought here, will contain a number of features intrinsic to the concept of liberation. TIlese include the axiom that those engaged in a quest for liberation have to be possessed of at least a desire for the new or difl"crent, inasmuch as for these protagonists there s i necessarily a contrast betwccn a prevalent state of affairs (one held [0 be in need of liberation, Le., "the old") and one which represents a supersession of this state (liberation itself, Le., that which sup­ plants "the old"). Ihis "desire for the new" is thus the primary, though not the exclusive, defining characteristic of liberation. (It should be mentioned here that there are religious traditions which provide an apparent exception to this axiom, in that they posit the liberation or redemption of an entire people, an elect, or a community of the devout, even for those who are not in a position to evince any desire for the new, such as the wloorn, infants who A .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

59

die, or the brain damaged. In such cases, rhis desire for dIe new clearly has to be predicated on dIe collectivity n i volved, and not on specific individuals belonging to it.) -The cnL"\: of this desire for the new comes when there i� a situation in which this desire is confronted widl the total absence of any conditions dlat conduce to its fulfillment. What happens to liberation when the desire for liberation is conftonted with the stark impossibility of its realization? Lib­ eration then necessarily has to become the desire or the dlOught of the new in the absence of all conditions.33 The absence of historical and political conditions for an adequate libera­ tion can serve as a powerful intensification of the desire for liberation. Re­ flection may go beyond the bowldary represented by these historical and political conditions, but it does so only as dlOught, as speculation, no matter how profound. The futility of any merely speculative practice having lib­ eration as its object in dIe absence of its historical conditions of possibility means dlat liberation has to be lodged n i nothing else but a countervailing power that s i c.\:pressed bodily and only bodily, including of course bodily affects. Thought founders on this impossibility, bllt the body and its affects remain to conftont what defeats thought. This ptompts a turning to the di­ rectly lived, to zones of viscerality in the life-world as yet not permeated by the powers that destroy even the thought of liberation. Here is dIe core of a constitutive. ontology of practice, one that furnishes he t basis for resistance and the continued mobilization of the desire for rhe new.34 This providcs only a horizon, albeit one that is salutary and absolutely indispensable, for a resuscitation or sustaining of the desire for the new. Something more needs to be said about this ontological horizon and its rdation to its precursors as horizons for the ontological constitution of practices of liberation.

The COllditions ofPossibilityforLiberatwlI and tbe Futllre Using the most general terms, it could be said that prior to the onset of modernity (bearing n i mind that this is preeminently a category defined by and for Europeans and Nordl Americans), infinity and perfection were the primary forces that shaped human beings. In this classical epoch dlat c.\:­ tended from antiquity until its demise in the European eighteenth cenrury, liberation was unde.rstood as the quest for perfection and the transcending of finirudc. In the modernity that succeeded dlis classical age, modernity being a relatively brief phase which reachcd its point of culmination in the Euro­ pean nineteenth century, finitude bL""<:omes dIe primary norm for envisioning 60

CHAPTER 2

the texmres of human life, these textures extending across a space of comigu01lS

domains that could be termed life, labor, and language.35 -nle episteme

whose name is modernity, and whose mark is finitude, marks a well-known crisis for religious sensibilities, perhaps most visibly reflected in the "works ofsuspicion" associated with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (as I pointed out in chapter 1). However, and this continues Foucault's periodization, this post­ classical episreme itself went into crisis , and modernity was supplanted in turn by dle current or postcontemporary episteme. The onset of dle current episteme was heralded by Nietzsche, but for Fou­ cault it is still an episteme of dle future. In it, finitude (understood typically as empirical constraint) is displaced by a ceaseless flux of forces and their mutations, a flle.: that Foucault's n i terpreter Deleuzc calls an "unlimited finiry"

(filli-illimiti).36 In dlis new formation, beings do not approximate to

or depart from perfect forms (as they did in the classical episteme), nor are they epistemically recalcitrant (as dley were in the modern episteme, which viewed them as a problem for the constitlltion of knowledge, as witnessed by Kant's rigorous emphasis on the necessary "legislative" tasks of Reason). Instead, the current episteme views beings as ensembles of forces arranged algoridunically. The "lUllimited finity" that marks these configurations of forces allows a "finite number of components [to yield] a practically

lUl­

limited diversity of combinations."37 Recursiveness in the mode of an ''lUl­ limited finite" is thus, "emblematically," the modus operandi of the epoch that comes after modernity. Foucault had a narrative that purported to account for dle displacement or supersession of modernity along widl its pivotal creation, the figure of Man. In Foucault's famous image, j\1an would be erased in the way that a wave washes away the drawing of a face at the edge of the sea.3� Moreover, as Fou­ cault saw it, ofdle three components of the so-called anthropological triad­ life, labor, and language-it would be language that would pave dle way for the episteme that superseded modernity and Man. Man would be lUldone or overcome by the "enigmatic and precarious being" of dle word. Here, as Deleuze has argued, Foucault got it wrong, or at least he was somewhat off­ track: as Foucault himself subsequently came to acknowledge, the practices and forms that are shaping the new episteme are arising not so much in the area of language as in the areas of life and labor (what subsequendy came to be called "biopolitics" by Foucault). Deleuze's position on the practices of the emerging dispensation is clear from the following quotation: "The forces within

man

enter into a relation widl forces from the outside, rhose of sili­

con which supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the A .\IARX[ST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

61

organism, or agrammaticialities which supersede the signifier. In each case we mllSt study the operations of the superfold, of which the 'double helix' is the best known example. What is the superman? It is the formal compound of the forces within man and these new forccs. It is the form that results from a new relation between forces. Man tends to free life, labour and language within himself."39 It is important to be cautious about all such pronounce­ ments on the character of eJXlchal shifts and transformations, of the spirit of tillS or that age, even if they come from FOllcault or Deleuzc or Hegel. After

all, even Foucault lived long enough to sec that he did not get it right about language and its role in the emergence of the JXlstcontemporary episteme. But with this cautionary note n i mind let llS asswne tllat tile new practices that have emerged, and arc still emerging, in the domains of life and labor arc clearly important for any understanding of postcontemporary knowledges and powers, and tlms for the concept of liberation. Dcleuze makes a concluding comment about the superman, or the "para­ human,'" as one may prefer to call it, who comes to exist in our postcontempo­ rary episteme and which forms a threshold for the next pan of my accowu:

The superman . . . is the. man who iseven in charge of me animaL\ (a code that can capmre fragmcms from other codes, as in the new schemata of lateral or retrograde). It is man in charge of the very rocks, or inorganic maner (the domain of silicon). It is man n i charge of the being oflan,guagc (mat formless, mute, ullSignifying region where language can find its freedom" even from whatever it has to say). As Foucault would say, me superman s i much less than dle. disappearance of living men, and much more man a change of concept: it is me advent ofa ne.w form that is neidler God nor man and which, it is hoped, will nor prove worsc man its tWO previous forms "o "

:

"-nle advent of a new form that is neither God nor j\1an": in other words, the dawning of times in which the desire for tile new that prompts our search for liberation will take the form of a movement beyond dle diak""Ctic of perfec­ tion (God) and finitude (Man), these forms having been exhausted as moder­ nity has been displaced by the postcontemporary, just as modernity itself once succeeded the episteme of the classical age. So, what is it to conceive of liberation, as desire but always as politics, without the forms of God and Ma.n, or perhaps more precisely, God or Man? What happens to liberation as a category in this eJXlch of radically new practices of life and labor? (TIlCSC questions will be taken lip in chapter 9, when I deal with the model of lib­ eration associated with Christian transcendence.) The practices and the needs of the subjects of these very new worlds will 6.!

CHAPTER .!

be the practices and rhe needs of beings who take dIe aleatory and rhe ma­ terial (Negri) as rhe basis of their self-constitution. Desire, or COIJatlls in Spi­ noza's terms, is what constimtes human subjects, and desire exists only in exterioriry, in the surpassing of itselfin the always changing movement. -nlat is the basis for a conception of liberation, one that can never find adeqnate figuration but that hopefully is likely to be satisfactory because it opens its subjects [0 rhe urgency and bareness of the never predictable event, "the new." All this amounts to an outline "grammar" or "logic" of liberation, one that, qua logic or grammar, is lUlavoidably and maybe even problematically abstract. This abstraction may be especially troubling for dIOse who arc marxists, given marxism's customary injunction dlat abstraction be avoided because it is one step removed from idealism

(if it

is not already the very

essence of idealism itself), and marxism is of course a self-professed materi­ alism with a bnilt-in propensity to vicw any idealism as a pernicious vice. An objection of this kind nonedleless overlooks marxism's reliance, as a political materialism, on some kind of reflection on the constitution of dIe political (or the historical, given the weight placed by Marx and his followers on its character as a historical materialism), and especially, given the conten of the argument of tills book, on an ontology of the political. This ontology of the political, and the human constitutive power that I view as dIe basis of the political, serves as dIe metatheory needed to COllllect marxism widl its field, which is capitalism in all its ramified manifestations. Marxism, under the mbric of what its exponents term "historical materialism,"

has always

had its own overarching theory of the. processes, in bodl their practical and theoretical dimensions, involved n i the material transformation of human life. In Ernest Mandel's words, "Historical materialism . . . provides a mea­ suring stick for human progress."41 The status of the theoretico-practical as­ semblage that is a historical or political materialism is profoundly contested even (or especially!) within the marx ist tradition, bur dlere is no need for us to enter here n i to the complex debates that surround the notion of a histori­ calor political materialism; suffice it to say that what matters is precisely the principle identified by Mandel, namely, dlat any kind of social and political transformation, even marxism's own "dleorization" of this transformation, needs some evaluative principle that makes possible the appropriate kinds of assessment of what transpired n i the course of that partirular shift in social and political conditions. A difference is necessarily enacted in the course of such transformations, and sinct� a shift logically or conceprually implies a movement between two positions or conditions, it s i the task of dlis overA .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION

63

arching evaluative principle to account for the "difference" made by that dif­ ference (Le., the movement between the positions and conditions and ques­ tions). What then docs marxism register when dealing with the possibilities and realities of such transformations? To ascertain what marxism registers in such instances is perforce to have a theory of the analytical and practical ditlerence made by marxism (the task of historical or political materialism), and this is precisely the mctatheoretical task assigned to the concepmal car­ tography of liberation outlined in this chapter. -The question of the prospects and opportunities available for the kind of social and political transformation n i dicated by marxism can be answered only by a survey of the social, political, and economic developments brought about by capitalist c.xpansion since tlle Second World War. These develop­ ments constimte the field of external variables underlying a concept of lib­ eration congruent with a marxist elaboration of tllis project oflibcration, and they arc discussed in chapter 3.

64

CHAPTER .!

CHAPTER 3 Postpolitical Politi cs and Global Capitalism

Some of the more significant c.xternai variables needing to be identified and characterized as part of our conceptualization of a marxist project of libera­ tion are provided by a conspccms of the period ofcapitalist development that has been n i existence since the Second World \Var. As I n i dicated in chapter 1, the demise of the classical Citizen Subject associated with the emergence of a postpolitical politics was accompanied by a momentous modification of state sovereignty, and the prcdsc character of the changes assoc iated with this reconsrirurion reguire in particular an account of the political and eco­ nomie transformations dtat have taken place since the Second World \.Var. These transformations involve a new mutation of the capitalist system, and they have to be depicted in some detail if the impact of this mutation on the form of dIe state is to be registered. Once this is done, and dIe shifts dlat have taken place n i regard to the form of the state and the apparatuses it encompasses are clear, it will be possible to determine what is entailed in the move from the classical Citizen Subject to its ostensible successor, dIe sub­ ject sponsored by today's world-integrated capitalism and its accompanying postpolitical politics in dIe West.

After dJC Sec()nd World War Willie there is considerable agreement (though not absolute unanimity) about the underlying causes for dIe demise of capitalism's so-called Golden Age (Le., the prolonged expansion associated with high employment, grow­ ing wages and welfare c.xpenditures, generally high consumption, and be-

nign business cydes that lasted n i die advanced industrial countries from

1945 to arowld 1973-74), there s i no real consenslls about the economic, political, and social transformations rhat have followed the end of the long age of prosperity.l Analysis of the transition from the Golden to the Leaden Age (to use a term of Joan Robinson's) is carried om under several famil­ iar tides: "late capitalism," "advanced capitalism," "disorganized capitalism," "deregulatory capitalism," "integrated world capitalism," "postindustrializa­ tion," "post-Fordism," "f1c. ...ible accumulation," "the n i formation cconomy," "globalization," and odlers.2 -nle lack of agreement on what precisely is encompassed by dlese tides is compounded by the outright skepticism of those who maimain that it is not dear whether the major transformations associated with a putatively epochal movement to a less regulated, more "adaptive," and morc "reflexive" system of capitalist accumulation have in fact taken place, and rhat dlese changes arc not as full-blown as they are sometimes taken to be.

TllUS it is argued that

the world prior to 1913 was just as economically integrated as the world after

1970, that domestic national marke.t.� have retained dlcir primacy n i the inter­ national economic system to this day, and that c.'(port markets, widely viewed as a key indc. ... of world trade integration,

are

still highly concentrated and

unevenly spread.3 TIle United Nations Development Programme's Humall

DevcloplllC1lt Report 2005 is worth quoting here: One ofthe prevailing myths of globaliz.1tion is that increased trade has been a catalyst for a new era of convergence. Expanded trade, so the argument runs, is narrowing the n i come gap between rich and poor countries, with the devdoping world gaining from access to new technologies and new markets. Like must myths, this one eombincs some dements uf truth with a hefty dose of exaggeration. Some countries arc catching up, albeit from a low base. But successful integration is thl' exception rather than the mle-and trade is a driver of global inequality as we!! as prosperity. For the majority of countries dIe globalization story is one of divergence and marginaliz.Jtion.4 Figures

4 and 5 n i dicate thar a mere seven developing cOlUltries account

for more than 70 percent of low-tcchnology exports and 80 percent of high­ technology exports. ·nle Humall DCl'cWpIllC/itReport 2005 draws the n i evitably stark condusion from these figures: "Much of the developing world has little more than a toehold n i manufacturing export markets. . . . Today, the share of world exports of Sub-Saharan Africa, with 689 million pl'Ople, is less than one-half that of Bclgiwn, with

66

CHAPTER 3

10 million people."s Widl the transparent

High- alld medium-tc.::hllolob'Y exports Share ofworld exportS (%)

r-

All other dCYeloping regioflS Latin America & the Caribbean

r-

East Asia

Share ofde\"doping conntry exports, 2000{%)

/.: 1:0 China

Other

=

'"

16

Y:{. i.

;\\ex ico

� 1

Taiwan Province of China

1981

Korca, Rep. Mala�..ia

Singapore

2000

Low-techllology exports Share ofworld exports (%) ;0

-

F

Sub·Sahaall r Africa

I-I--

Latin America & the Caribbean

All other dneloping regions

Easr A,ia Share of dn"eloping country exports, 2000{%)

-

China

0-.." ".lJ

�

1981

-1-.

2000

Other

10

Korea, Rep.

1� \ Taiwan

...

India

' lrovlIlce of China Mc�ico

Export succcss is highly concentratcd

Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Dndopm,mfUpor'2005, 116.

Share of world tOC"! (%) ,;

------Imports

" ---,----\-+--+�V'V,

Exports ·

, """

1970

1980

,"'"

"'"

5. Sub·Saharan Africa's falling share of world trade

Scuru:: United Nations Development Programme, Hu",an DnYiop",,,,r Rrpvn �OO5, u6. failure to inelude the world's pexlrer (and poorest) coumries in world trade, globalization in the form of world trade integration, despite its vaunted sue· cess n i some quarters, has simply not advanced the economic and sodal n i ter· ests of the hundreds of millions of people who live in the.<;e cowltrics. There s i doubtless a more complex story to be told abom this and related develop· ments, and though tllis is a very important area of debate, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve deeply into its e.xtended implications and om· eomes.6 But the emdal point made here-that the world's pexlrer cowltrics are not benefiting from world trade integration-is augmented in tlle rest of this book, and the conclusion drawn from it is reinforced in subsequent chapters. "" hat is significant for tllOse who reflect on the role of the state in capital­ ist accumulation is the fact that from the late 1960s to the 1980S the prevalent phase of capitalist development started to encOlUlter macroeconomic im· passes with a resultant persisteIU stagflation, and that there ensued from this 68

CHAPTER ,

crisis JXllitical and economic conditions of a qualitatively new and different kind (those of a post-Fordism, etc., etc.) for the exercising of state capacities and fUIlctions? Hence the suggestion was increasingly made that rhe pro­ cesses associated with post-Fordism, globalization, flexible accumulation, and so forth have profowldly transformed the complexion of state appara­ tuses and strategies, and that these systemic transformations have cumlua­ tively established the basis for a new kind of nation-state facing much greater (external) constraints on internally regulated economic development. However, the debate over relative scales of world economic integration, when confined to the terms of the dichotomy "globalization today versus the pre-1913 internationalized economy," tends to overlook one absolutely cmcial feature of capitalism, namely, that a global system of acnullulation and class stmggle has always been the basis of any form of modern capital­ ist acnullulation. The segmentation of the world economy n i to the various national regimes of accumulation is a function of the constitutive polariza­ tion that pervades tillS global system, and the conflicts and antagonisms that exist between the different national regimes of accumulation are primarily, though by no means exclusively, the olltcome of this worldwide polarization and its attendant processes of lUleven development. To discuss worldwide economic integration within the confines of the mbric "globalization today versus rhe pre-1913 internationalized economy" is to consider n i tegration only as a force that wlifies to varying degrees dIe various already existing national components of an earlier (prc-1913) and a later (post-1960s) phase of capitalist c."pansion. It is ro overlook the fact that a worldwide and con­ stitutively polarized system of accumulation is precisely the prior condition for the emergence of all the phases of capitalist expansion and their associated national regimes of accumulation.8 The various national regimes of accumu­ lation and tht, stmctures devised to bridge them are at one and the same time expressions of dlis fundamental polarization and an attempt to manage the resulting uneven development dlat is this polarization's n i evitable outcome. I shall return to the question of this worldwide capitalist polarization in chapter 'I- since it is one of the pivotal arguments developed in dlis book. The changes that were beginning to take. place n i the early to mid-1970S did of course have odler significant modalities and implications. For in­ stance, it became increasingly apparem that capitalism was attenuating its seemingly inc.'l:tricable link widl the project of modernity and modernization just as the crisis associated with the end of the Golden Age was entrenching itself. Dming dIe 1970S tht, increasingly fashionable neoliberal ideologies commended a form of capitalism detached from modernizing aspirations, POsrPOLlTICAL POLITICS

69

and the received wisdom that industrialization and the possession of indus­ trial capital are the engines par excellence of modernity, as well as being the decisive enablers of economic progress-so that an economy is said to be developed, developing, or undeveloped depending on whether or not it has traversed an appropriate path to industrialization, and thus to have taken the "right" steps toward modernization-would become increasingly dis­ credited over subsequem decades. The state, according to the paradigm of economic development supported by [hi.� increasingly embattled received wisdom, was the primary n i strument of industrialization and moderniza­ tion, and with the abandonment of the norion that modernization

is

the

royal road to economic advancement, the accompanying notion that tile state was the dynamo powering any push toward modernity and develop­ ment was also challenged, primarily by the popular supply-side ideology. For tllis neoliberal ideology, initially propelled by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations bur soon taking roO[ n i the tllinking ofinternational organi­ zations such as the IMI' and the World Bank and in several European Social Democratic parties, adherence to the imperative of market expansion (i.e., liberalization, privatization, deregulation, etc.) was tile "new" way forward. "tbe state's function was to aid the expansion of the market by providing the appropriate macroeconomic and microeconomic environment, as well as an adequate institutional framework, for market activity. To do otherwise, said the neoliberal ideologues, would be to distort pricing mechanisms, and tlms to hinder a country's economic development.9 Although I won't consider tllis neoliberal de-emphasizing of the project of modernity and moderniza­ tion (a project which posits, even f i only as a collective aspiration, an n i e.\:tri­ cable link between economic advancement and social progress), tile position developed here on the role of the state in the new regimes of international competition that have emerged since the end of the Golden Age will involve a critique of a munber of aspects of this neoliberal ideology (especially the disjunction it posits between econonlic advancement and

anytiling like

a

substantive notion of social progress and emancipation).

71fr "}Jollmvillg Ollt" oftbe Nation-State? -There are several versions of tile thesis tllat a qualitatively new kind of nation­ state has emerged since the end of tile so-called Golden Age of post-Second "'arid War economic prosperity. Perhaps the Dest known of these in tile literature is the thesis developed by Bob Jessop and others of a similar n i -

70

CHAPTER 3

tellccmal fXllitical-cconomic conviction (notably Joachim Hirsch).10 111is position -that of a "hollowing out" of the nation-state after the onset of the capitalist crisis of the 1970S-is embodied in the following theses: 1 . Since the 1970S a post-Fordist regime of accumubtion (which may not yet be fully realized) has provided the available comours for state formations

or state projects. 2. Economic and political apparatuscs and strategies whose previous basis

was the nation-state arc superseded or modified by systemiC forces which exert thcmsdvcs in tWO direcriollS: (a) toward rhe tl"3nsnationai and global, and (b) toward the local and regional. 3. The resultant state, which docs not emerge dircctly our of the crisis of Fordism, is the outcome of the comple x interplay of twO major transfor­ mations: (a) nternally, it becomes a "competition state," adapted to the new international competitiVl' environment created by the post-Fordist sysum of accumubtion; and (b) as the internal complement of (a), the State. becomes a post-Fordist "Schumpeterian workfare state," having abandoned the social and political consensual arrangemenb between capi­ tal and labor that prOVided the preceding Fordist "Keynesian welfare Staten with ib l"3ison d'ctre. 10 deal with each thesis n i turn:

Thesis 1: The dispbcement of Fordism by its post-Fordist counterpart is taken by Jessop to n i volve a fundamental alteration: (a) [0 the character of the labor process and its means and methods of organization; (b) pattern of macroeconomic growth; and (c)

to the basic

to (what Jessop refers to as) " the

social mode of economic regulation" and its associated social and political order.!1 (a) Post-Fordism repbees the Taylorist mass-production labor process that typified Fordism with alternatives such as flexible specialization and Toymism. Mass production is not eliminated in its entirety, but the move to

fle:dbility is intended to overcome dIe blockages and structllrJ..l weaknesses that undermine Taylorist mass-production sysrems.11 In this way, says Jessop, capitalist entrepreneurs seek to overcome the alienation and resistance ofthe mass worker, the rdat ive stag­

nation of Taylorism and mass production, competitive threats from low-cost exporters in the Third 'Norld (or, indeed, from domcstic or foreign competi­ tors already using post-Fordist production techniqucs) and the relative satu­ ration of markets for standardized mass production goods; and/or to l1l(."(t

POSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS

71

me growing demand for more differemiatcd products,

tion

ac

to

brake me

rising COSts of non-Fordist service sectors (notably in the public sector) and measures to boost productivity and pro/its in manufacturing.LI

llle srructural limits and contradictions of the Fordist regime arc a spur to i.nnovation (to this extent Jessop is a follower of Schumpeter), and labor and production flexibility are intended by capitalist economic agents to provide a (post-Fordist) production ellvironmenr attuned to the guest for innovation and resJXlnsive to the demand that more efficient ways of "operationalizing" the outcomes of iIUlovation be found. (b) Fordism rested on a macroeconomic framework that promoted full employment in the national economy primari l y through the management of aggregate demand and the governance of collective bargaining and labor markets.14 The aim of this concordat between capital and labor was to cre­ ate a "virtuous spiral" of high employment, growing wages and welfare ex­ penditures, mass conswuption, and benign business cycles. For a variety of reasons, this macroeconomy became increasingly difficult to administer vir­ mously, and stagflation, productivity slowdowns, rising lUlemployment, a declining worldwide average profit rate, current account imbalances, and chronic debt (especially in the less-developed cOlUltries) became increasingly prevalent in the Fordist economic system. The reproduction of the capitalist means and rclations ofproductionwas affected by the economic and political instabilities dlat accompanied this crisis, and key clements of the debilitated Fordist regime of accumulation were abandoned, albeit in piecemeal fashion and not always consistently (hence, for instance, Reagan's well-documented adherence to a "Keynesianism" based on military expenditures, as his admin­ istration incurred record deficits in order to ensure military supremacy over the USSR). From rhis decomposition of the Fordist regime there emerged, again somewhat unevenly and with significant national variations, the linea­ ments of a guite different macroeconomy.15 The new macrocconomy aimed to cultivate flexibility and continual innovation hrough t an array of supply­ side instruments highlighting price and quality, with the goal of enhancing competitiveness through he t " freeing" of market forces. The new macro­ economywould supplement the "lean" and "just-in-time" production meth­ ods that had ariscn in response to the "production dilemmas" that appeared to beset Fordist-Taylorisr mass production. \Vith this new macrocrollomy ill place, a shakeout of the seemingly outdated Foniist industries could occur, and the new lean and just-in-time production systems introduced as their successor.16

72

CHAPTER 3

(c) The "social mode of economic regulation" typical of post-Fordism re­ inforces the supply-sidc preference for flexibility that defines this new macro­ economic environment. ·nle wage relation is manipulated to drive a bigger wedge between skilled and unskilled workers than was generally permitted under Fordist auspices, and labor market flexibility and fragmentation is ac­ tively promoted. Industrywide collective bargaining arrangements are re­ placed by individual enterprise or factory-level wage bargaining, and new forms of rhe social wage are devised and implemented as Schnmpeterian "workfare" replaces Keynesian "welfare." 17 The same flexibility is sought after in the restmcmring of corporations, who, now no longer constrained by state-sanctioned employer-worker compacts, call adopt policies based 011 the principle of "leanness" and rhe strategy of employee retrenchment. Mar­ kets have become more segmented as niche targeting becomes standard com­ mercial practice. Bank credit systems have become internationalized, and the barriers between credit, insurance, and fXJrtfolio invcstment made more per­ meable as financial n i stitlltions combine previously compartmentalized ac­ tivities in the name of "diversification," a deeply flawed process that reached its disastrous point of collapse in the 2008 financial crisis.1M Jessop maintains that the fXJst-Fordist "mode of societalization," which regulates the political and social order rhat buttresses the ex isting mode of economic regulation, is still in the process of being consolidated and that "it is too soon to antici­ pate what this would involve" beyond the claim that what exists at present is "unresolved competition which involves at least the Japanese, German, and American models- each of which is . . . encountering problems on its home ground;' so that "a well-developed and relatively stable posr-Fordisr forma­ tion remains an as yet wlfealized possibility."19 Hirsch likewise makes a great deal of this new capitalist "triad."20 This assertion of an "unresolved" triadic capitalist competition is deeply problematic, not least because it is at least ten years out of date. Jessop's and Hirsch's fOCllS is evidently on productive capitals and their affiliated systems of accumnlation, and their theoretical perspective, while it does acknowledge that an exponential growth in finance capital has occurred in the past two decades, does not really deal adequately with the full implications of this massive c.xpansion of financial and currency markets. For this growth of finance capital has clearly made possible a re­ assertion of American hegemony, albeit n i a somewhat different form from the one that prevailed in the heyday of Fordislll. More will be said about this shortly. 1hesis 2: -nle Fordist regime had at its core economic and political appara­ tuses and strategies whose basis was the nation-state. With the onset of postPOSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS

73

Fordism, these state-oriented formations and principles came to be super­ sedcd or modified by systemic constraints which extended themselve.� in two directions:

(a)

toward the transnational and global, and (b) toward the local

and regi onal (though Jessop correctly n i dicates that the impetus toward the transnational and global which characteristically inflects post-Fordism was in fact inaugurated in

the late phases of Fordism).ll This trend was n i tensi­

fied by the new convergence on fle.xible production and on the supply side, and was further galvanized by the freshly ascendant international competi­ tive regimes which emerged from tile crisis

of tile

1970s.22 -nle upshot is

that the capitalist state underwent a fundamental reoricntation as its appara­ tuses and governing axioms were reshaped by the pressures of international competitiveness, supply-side adaptation, and ptoduction method and labor market flexibility. This new environment compelled the state to adapt itself to a greatly expanded transnational economic and political domain, even as

it had to find new oppornmities for accumulation at the regional and local levels. Jessop provides a good description ofthis vertical and horizontal spa­ tial expansion of the range of dle state's activities, an outreach that constrains states while still providing str:ltegically positioned countries (primarily t1msc within the OECD) with opportunities to secure economic and JXllitical ad­ vantages: i ponam and even rnains much Whik the national state remains politically m of its national sovereignty (albeit as an ever more ineffective, primarily jUridi­ cal fiction reproduced through mutual recognition in the imernational com­ munity of nations), its capacitics to project its power even within its national borders art· decisively weakened both by the shift towards mcrnationalized, i tk.xible (but also regionaliz.cd) productiol1 systems and by the growing chal­ lenge posed by risks emanating from the global environment. This loss of autonomy creates in rurn both the need for supranational coordination and the space for subnational resurgence. Some state capacities arc transferred to a growing numbcrof pan-regional, plurinational, or international bodies with a widenil1g range ofpowers; others arc devolved to rcstn1ctured local or regional levels ofgovernance in the national state; and yet others art· being lL\urpcd by emerging horizontal networks of power-local and regional-which by-pass ccmral states and eonm.xt localitics or regions in several nations.H

For Jessop and Hirsch,

a

less autonomous state ensues from this " after­

Fordist" st"Jte of affairs. Bur is this really the case? I shall contend later, fol­ lowing Michael "tann, Linda \Neiss, and odlers, that this is too sweeping (and simplifying) a view of the complex environment n i which the contem74

CHAPTER 3

porary nation-state operates (though to be fair, both Jessop and Hirsch grant that the nation-state retains its political importance despite being "hollowed our"), and that some state functions are actually enhanced by globalization, while others are attenuated. Thesis

3: The resultant state (which,

as

Jessop and Hirsch point out,

does not emerge directly out of the crisis of Fordism) is tile olitcome of the elaborate n i terplay of two major transformations: (a)

c..xrernally,

it be­

comes a "competition state," adapted to the new international competitive conditions created by the post-Fordist system of accumulation; and (b) as the internal complement of (a), the state becomes a post-Fordist "Schumpe­ terian workfare state," having abandoned the social and political rationales

(premised above all on a corporatist "social contract" between capital and labor) tllat enabled the now receding Fordist "Keynesian welfare state" to flUlCtion. This Schumpeterian workfare state derivcs its enabling conditions from the surrolUlding emergent post-Fordist regime. Its telos is the consolida­ tion of its (increasingly Schumpeterian) state apparatuses thtough an aerive promotion of this regime. ·TItis it does by developing state capacities whose

raison d'ctrc is tile encouragement of innovation and new tedUlologies, innovation and technological advancement being seen in the context of the workfare state as the best way to get the state to respond to the new interna­ tional competitive environment.24 The upshot of this move to a Schumpeterian workfare state is a transfor­ mation of state apparatuses, as the activities and policies of supranational for­ mations and systems, as well as international regimes and organizations, be­ come morc consequential n i the after-Fordist political and economic setting. -llle various strategies of devolution favored by governments responding to this emergent regime of accumulation also foster the growth of regional or local states and translocal networks.

But the nation-state continues to retain

many of its political functions, especially those concerned with the repro­ duction of labor and tile regulation of the wage form, even as it surrendcrs several of tllcse to supranational and subnationallevcls of fKllitical organiza­ tion. -The state, suitably restmcrured or hollowed out to deal with this more "open" economic environment, is still required to manage the linkages across the various territorial demarcations est"ablished by the new geopolitical order

that is aligned with post-Fordism, but as it does so its role is redefined by cha.nges "in the balance of forces as globalization, triadization, regionaliza­ tion and the rcsurgence of local governance proceed apace."25 -llle key political transformation involved in tllis hollowing out of tile POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS

75

state is the transition fromgol'rrlllmmt [0govcrnance, that is, the movement from a form ofpolitical organization n i which the official state apparams em­ ploys irs hegemony over its semi- and nonofficial counterparrs to ensure the primacy of the state in the regulation of economic, JXllitical, social, and cul­ tural lifc, [0 one n i which the ofiicial state apparams reduces or relinquishes its direct involvement in the regulation of these domains and concentrates instead on "meta-governance."26 In metagoverna.nce the st"Jte and its appur­ tenances provide the conditions and resources which enable nongovernmen­ tal and scmigovenulleHtal apparatuses to organize dlemselves, sometimes n i tandem with governmental institutions and sometimes not. Governance in the Schumpeterian workfare state dlerefore involves an ensemble ofstate and nongovernmental partnerships, with no necessary or automatic presumption of the state's primaL}' in dlis configuration. The state and dIe other constim­ em elements in these partnerships arc alike deemed to be constrained by market mechanisms and thdr intermediations.

The Rise ofall Equity-Based Growth Rrgime While Jessop and Hirsch recognize dlat dIe post-Fordist dispensation has seen

a considerable expansion of the various forms of finanee capital, this ac­

knowledgment on dlcir part neverthcJcss does not seem to encompass some of the more profound implications of the explosive growth that financial mar­ kets have undergone since the

1980s. C...enainly this relative de-emphasi7ing

of dIe role of finance-led regimes of accumulation in contemJXlrary capitalist expansion has been a problematic feamre of dIe thinking of rhe Ecole Regu­ lation lUltil very recendy (when Michel Aglietta and Robert Boyer started to deal widl the part played by deregulated financial markets n i transforming the stmcmres of competition dlat arc a central feature of the Regulation School's accow}[ of post-Fordism). -nle n i creased primacy enjoyed by finan­ cial capital over n i dustrial capital in the countries of the North and \.Vest in the past couple of decades is coterminous with dIe rise of an equity-based growth regime in most of the developed countries (and the Unites States in particular). ·nlis equity-based regime, which was perhaps still in dIe process of becoming fully fledged when dIe

2008 banking crisis started to bite, has

made possible the reassertion of an American economic hegemony (which admittedly could film out to be short-lived if a protracted and severe reces­ sion starts to embed itself at the end of 2008),27 and this finance-led regime's current sign ificance will

greatly affect the state's role n i the current and (in all

likelihood) succeeding phases of capitalist development. 76

CHAPTER 3

i USS billion) TABLE 1. Daily \'oiume of global foreign exchange transactions (n

April 1986

188

April 1995

1,120

April 2001

1,380

April 1989

650

April 1998

1,590

April 2004

1,880

April 1992

840

Sourer: Bank of Intemational Senlemenl�, Triellllial Central Rank SlIn'IJojFllmjJlI Exe/JilI/DC and Derimril'cs ,HanftAcril�ty 2004-, March 2005, Note: Tumover in this t'J.blc is given at April zOO4 exchange rates. The figure for April 1986 s i taken from Elwell, �Global Capital "-larket IntcgrationU (www.ncsconline.org!

niejcrsrepons) and is not givcn at lOO4 exchange rates; Elwell takes his figures from the Bank of International Settlemenl�. For a helpul f analysis of global foreign exchangc transactions, sec Nissanke, �Re\"cnue Potential of the Currency Transaction Tax for

Development Finance: A Critical Appraisal,u JVqr/d /'IsriwujM Del'dopmmtEconomics

Rtstarcb, December lOO3 (www.currencytax.org).

Proponents of the view that the state is being hollowed out or is n i re­ treat must therefore be willing to analyzc this American-dominated equit)'­ based growth regime; indeed, given that this regime is prccminent among current growth regimes, and bearing in mind also that financial markets arc the most globally n i tegrated of all the markets, the overall plausibility of the hollowing-om or retreat thesis will hinge on the outcome of this analysis. The rist� ofthis equity-based growth regime has had a powerful impact on the economics of the Ics.s-devclopcd countries

(LOCS), and so any c.xamination

of this regime's impact on state formations and state capacities must take lDes into account. Jessop and the members of rhe Ecole Regulation, while noting post-Fordism's considerable dfL"Cts on rhe econolllies of the nonethclcs.s pay scant attention to

LOCS,

LOC state formations and acnllilulation

regimes.18 It is diflicult to do full justice here to the Illany facets of the epochal trans­ formations that have taken place in extraterritorial financial markets and in­ stitutions since the early 1970S. With the abolition of restrictions on inter­ national capital movements initiated n i 1973, the volume of transactions in global foreign c.xchange markets rose from an average of $15 billion per day that year to $1,880 billion per day n i 2004 (see table 1). In April 2000f overall turnover, including nontraditional foreign exchange derivatives and prod­ ucts traded 011 global foreign c.xchanges, averaged over S2 trillion a day. This was nearly fifteen times the sizc of dle combined daily turnover on all the world's equity markets.19 Less than 2 percent of this sum is currently devoted to trade n i goods POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS

77

Netherlands 2% emada 3%

Hong Kong

\U",,,,

M . "'�/

Kingdom 33%

Countrie. with ,jure> b. dun I% not indu,l
,;;;;:---L-�-;U

nited States

6.

17%

Country perccntagc of shares of dlC foreign exchange market, 2001

S,,"ra: Federal Resc:rve Bank of New York,

TlJeBas;cs ofFort!!Jn Tnule Rlld £-ufm'!!Je, "Foreign

Currency Exchange;' www.nyJrb.org/education.

and services (compared to 15 percent in 1973). The proportion for foreign direct n i vestment (FDI) is just as small, though FDI flows to developing and emerging market COlllltries have risen significantly since the 1990S. The rest, amounting to more than a trillion dollars a day (exceeding the aggregate gold and foreign exchange holdings of all tile world's central banks), is devoted to transactions, mostly short term, by private individuals in currency and orher financial markets.30 But n i noting some of the more distinctive features of these shifts, it can be seen that in addition to tile smpendous groWtll in the overall daily volume offoreign exchange transactions between 1973 and 2004 there has been an equally marked change in rhe composition of the flows themselves, especially to the LDCS. Global foreign exchange transactions arc very much dominated by three cowltries, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Jap:m, who between tllem have 60 percent of the foreign

c.x­

change market (figure 6). Despite the primacy in regard to foreign exchange markets enjoyed by a mere duee advanced n i dustrial cOlllltries, the impact of capital flows to the markets of the emerging market countries has been considerable. Capital flows to emerging market countric.� amounted to $230 billion in 1996, nearly six times the level at the begiIllling of the 1990S and four times greater than in their previous high point, the commercial bank lending explosion of 1978-

82. At tllat time rhe LDCS started to attract a greater share of these global capital flows, in spite of the setbacks represented by rhe Mexican peso crisis 78

CHAPTER 3

of 1994 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 11le share of devdoping and transition economies in global FDI rose from 15 percent in 1990

w

nearly 40

percent in 1996. In addition, the rise in tileir share of global portfolio equity investment wse from less than 2 percent in 1990

w

30 percent in 1996.3J

However, tile Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the end of the Ameri­ can dot-com bubble. in the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a de­ dine in total net flows to emerging cowHries in the nvo years fwm 1999

w

2001. But there has been a steady revival since 2001, though as of 2003 these flows had still

w

reach their levels in 1997, and even while the steady rise

of foreign direct investment has clearly been little affectet.i by tllese crises, portfolio investment took a big rumble during tllese crises, from which it has not recovered (tables 2 and 3). Since the 1980S olticial flows have lost thdr previous ccnrrality, and levels of bank lending have been low since the debt crisis of the 1980S. Portfolio investment grew significantly in the early 1990S but has remained a major cause of financial volatility, as witnessed by the Mexican peso and Asian crises, and its impact has been much reduced since the Asian crisis. Foreign direct investment, however, was tlle main compo­ nent of private capital flows w the emerging market economics in the 1990S. This phase of development is wdl sununed up in the Deutsches BWldesbank report on the role of fordgn direct n i vestment in rhe emerging economics: In the all:ern1Jth of the Asian crisis, according to the European G.:mral Bank,

nC[ privatt capital flows to 45 Emtrging Mark/.:[ Economics dcdintd to 1% of GOP in 2002, afta having stood at 3.7% of GOP n i 1995. During this ptriod FOI not only held up but actually inneastd. Striking is the shill: that occurred Simultaneously in tht rdativt sharts of net private capital flows for the dif­ ftrent ftgions. \Vhile in 1996 the capital flows wtre e\"tnly spread at around 4% of GDp, by 2002 the Asian share. had fallen to 1% of GOP and that ofLatin America to only 0.5% of GOP, while the European accession countries en­ joytd an innease in their share to 7% of GOp.32 The global financial situation n i the years since 2005 shows a basic conti­ nuity with the trends of the past nvo decades. -nlUS the Institute of Interna­ tional Finance said n i a recent press rdease that "the net private capital flows to emerging markets rose to $782 billion in 2007 from the previous record levd seen in 2006 of $568 billion."H The variability of some of their specific components notwithstanding, the available evidence therefore shows that there has been an exponential growth in overall capital flows w the emerging market economics in the two decadc.� since tile 1980S. (It is too early to tdl what the longer term impact of the 2008 bank lending crisis will be.) POSTpOLlTlCAL I'OLITICS

79

TARLE 2.

Net private capital flows to emerging market economics, 1971-1989

(in USS billions) Annual Avccage COllntries(position

1971-111

1982-89

11.4

16.6

'"'

5.3

12.0

Portfolio investment

0.6

6.2

Others

6.4

-1.7

n.a.

4.2

0.8

L3

0.0

0.1

n.a.

2.8

8.1

10.3

'"'

1.7

5.0

Portfolio investment

0.2

l.l

Others

6.2

4.2

-14.6

l.l

'"'

-0.6

0.5

Portfolio Investment

-0.1

4.9

-13.9

-4.4

1 7.9

1.0

on,

3.4

5.2

Portfolio n i vestment

0.5

0.1

14.1

-4.3

Total capital flows, net

n.a.

41.4

Net ofticial flows

!l.a.

27.3

-20.8

-2.5

-2.1

-30.0

AU cOImrries

Africa '"' Portfolio itlvestment Others

Asil!

Middk East and Ellropc'

Others

Wi-sferll Hemispben:

Othas

}Jelllortllldllni irtlm

Changes n i reserves Current aecollnt

Sollrcu: Deutsche BWldesbJ!lk, the RakofFDI ill EIIINlJing Marka Economies Compared {() Or/Nr Furms ofFinancilig: I'mr Del.dopmmts and f'lip/ilariotlSfor FilumciI!l Stnbiliry oj Emerging AIarkc!Eco/wlllies (FrJ!lkfurt, 2003), based on IMF, WarM Economic Ouriook, September 2002; lMF database. •

Including the countries of the fonner USSR n i transition.

This very substantial total private investment in the

LDCS

(albeit n i only

a few select ones, mainly in East Asia, though Brazil and Russia are begin­ ning to see increased flows) has been made possible by important stmctural changes in the financial markets themselves and by the creation of several new n i stmments of international finance since the 1980s, largely because of liberalization and also because of the emergence of completely new n i terna­ tional markets for securities, fumres, options, swaps, international mutual flUIds, international bonds (these markets were opened to developing COlUl­ tries

n i the 1990S),

and American and global depository receipts that gave

American companies access to the stock markets of industrialized and indus­ trializing countrics.34

Part

of this development was a new interest shown by n i vestors in

developing-country stock markets that led quickly to a boom in the East Asian bourses; in 1993 alone the share indc..'ies in Hong Kong grew by 116 percent, in Jakarta by 115 percent, and in Manila (the best Asian performer in that year) by 154 percent.35 The scale of this very rapid growth can be in­ dicated by a comparison, made by Ajit Singh, between the relative times it took the United States and the LDCS to reach roughly the same capitalization ratios: "the speed of development of Third \"orld stock markets in the recent period may be judged from the fact that it took eighty-five years (1810-1895) for the U.S. capitalization ratio (market capitalization as a proportion of

GD!') to rise from 7 percent to 71 percent. In contrast, the corresponding laiwanese ratio jumped from

74 percent in just 10 years be­ tween 1981 and 1991. Similarly, between 1983 and 1993 the Chilean ratio rose from 13.2 percem to 78 percent; the Korean from 5.4 percent to 36.2 percent and the Thai from 3.8 percent to 55.8."3... -nie Asian financial crisis put a sud­ den brake on h t is exponential growth in Asian stock market capitalization, but by 2003 the Asian Development Bank, citing Institute of International 11

percent to

Finance figures, reported:

The outlook nn private capital flows to emerging markeL� rose to a 3-year high of S19.p billion n i 2003, up from $128.3 billion in 2002. Nn private flows to devdoping Asia accoumed for S116.7 blilion nearly double the amount of $66.3 billion in 2002. Half of this total (S58.3 billion) was financed by direct mestmem, i much of it flowing to the PRC rPeopk's Republic of China]. An improving economic environment and rising corporate profitability led to a surge in portfolio inflows to developn i g Asia from $2.8 billion in 2002 to $29-4 billion in 2003. Bank and nonbank !ending accounted for a further $29.0 billion, up from $6.7 billion in 2002.3' ,

POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS

81

TJ\fILE 3. Net pri\'ate capital Ao\.\'S to emerging market economics, 1990-2003 (in US$ bi!!ions) Armual A"'-:rage

Q,ur1trics/I'ositi011

All cO/mtrin

1990-

1997-

96

2002

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002"

2003"

142,2

61,0

228.8

\02.2

62, I

84,8

29.4

24.9

62.4

64,9

'D<

62.0

156,8

114,4

141,7

153.6

164.0

158.0

In I

151 , 3

160.9

l'ortfolio l i wcst:ment

59,0

5.2

9Q2

46,7

-0.1

34.3

-4,3

-42,6

-3.0

-4.0

Others

21,0

-101,0

24, I

-86.2

-91.5

-113.4

-124.3

-104,6

-85,9

-91,9

Africrr

7.1

9.7

II , 9

9.4

II , 6

15,I

6. I

6.9

8.8

8.9

FDr

2.5

10.9

3.6

7.8

6.4

9.3

7.7

22.3

11.8

10, I

l'ortfolio invcstment

1.8

1.1

2.8

7.0

37

8.2

-2.2

-9,0

-1,0

-l.3

Others

2.9

-2.4

5.5

-5.4

1.5

-2,5

0.6

-6,4

-2.0

0.1

60,4

0.6

122, I

7.1

-45.9

6.8

-12.9

16.7

31.6

7.9

'D<

31,7

56.3

53,4

56.8

59.7

61.2

54.2

47.1

58,7

59.0

l'ortfolio il1Vcstmenr

16,5

-0.8

32.8

7.3

-17.9

14,4

43

-13.5

0.7

-9.7

Others

12,2

-54,9

35.9

-56,9

-87,7

-68.8

-71.4

-16,8

-27.8

-41,3

22.5

-11.0

7.2

15,0

9.1

0.2

-22.4

-48,4

-19,6

-9,4

FDr

3.5

7.5

4.8

5.5

6.5

5.5

7.9

10.8

8.8

1 1.5

l'ortfolio invcstment

6.3

-10,5

1.8

-0,9

-13,2

-3,2

-13,7

-22,0

-9,8

-6.6

12.7

-8, I

0.6

10.4

15.8

-2, I

-16.7

-37,1

-18.6

-14,4

"'''

Middk East find Turkey

Others

Uhler" Hrmispber(

40.0

45.6

64.9

69.3

72.7

49.7

48.6

22.8

10.3

26.5

6.1

23.4

12.3

15.5

60.1

64. I

64.7

66.9

40.4

45.6

Portfolio investm<.:1It

26.8

10.6

39.5

25.9

22.3

I 1.9

4.7

-2.2

1.0

7.6

Oth<.:rs

-5.0

-23.8

-14.9

-\2.7

-9.8

-26.3

-20.8

-41.9

-31.1

-26.7

I 1.8

16.2

22.6

"

14.6

13.0

10.0

26.8

31.2

31 . I

FDr

6.1

23.4

12.3

15.5

20.9

23.9

23.4

25.1

31.5

34.7

Portfolio investment

7.5

4.7

13.3

7.5

5.0

2.9

2.6

4.2

6.1

6.0

-1.8

-11.9

-3.0

-21.6

-11.3

-13.8

-16.0

-2.5

-6.4

-9.6

165.0

92. I

220.5

170.5

132.0

97.0

29.6

40.3

83.0

83.1

23.1

31.1

-2.3

68.3

69.9

12.2

0.2

15.4

20.6

18.2

Changes in reserves

-69.9

-97.4

-108. I

-68.8

-48.2

-87.9

-113.2

-119.9

-146.6

-129.7

Current accoullt

-80.8

32.9

-96.5

-69.1

-52.3

34.1

128.4

94.7

61.3

41.7

FDr

Unmtrirs ill trlJmitirJII

Others

Mrllwm'ldmn ilon! Tora! capita! flows, ncr Net onida! tlows

Sourres: Deutsche BWldesb'Ulk, 1IJr Role ofPDl ll i EmCJlI'iI!9 AIIJ'*nECiJlwmies Oml/'I'md to OriJrr PIff'1IS of P;nllwing: Pllst DtlvlopmfllfS //lId ImpliCilficmJiff Finlmcilll SfilbilityoJEmolJillgMII'*tJ ECiJllOmics (Frank­

furt, 2003), bJscd on J1>1P, WorldEClJlIOmic Outioo/.:. September 2002; EstinlJtc or projection.

•

11>1 F

d,ltab:lSC.

Clearly, dle Asian cOlUlrries recovered well in the years after the crisis of 1997, and in the process portfolio n i flows started to pick up as well. -nle consequences of LOC reliance on c.x[ernal capital flows have been noted by students of international political economy in recent years; rht, growing dependence of lOGS on external capital flows has also been instru­ mental in creating the structural conditions responsible for a potentially chronic economic n i stability, especially when LOCS arc confronted with large inflows that prove unsustainable for dlcir t.'Conomies or rapid outflows which quickly become unmanageable. Thus, in addition to the Mc.xican and Asian currency crises, there has been the Russian default of 1998, the Brazilian peso crisis in 1998 and 1999, and Argentina's financial crisis of 2001 (though finan­ cial market turbulence is certainly not the sole cause of these crises).38 10 begin with, dlere is dle sheer disparity of scale between rhe combined

resources of the funds run by financial institutions in the wealdlier countries and the market capital of low- to middle-income countries very new to this foml ofcapitalism. In 1994 the combined pool of funds managed by financial institutions in dle high-income countries ran to around $10 trillion

to

SIS

trillion, whereas the total market capitalization ofall lower-income countries was in the order of $1 trillion.3S> In 2000 the estimated total value of world stocks, bonds, securities, and other financial assets was $50 trillion.40 Total global equity market capitalization in that year amounted to $37 trillion; of this, 40 percent was located in the United States and 20 percent in conti­ nemal Europe, while a mere 10 percent went to developing countries. The United Nations High-Level Panel on Financing for Development reports that $7.5 trillion was saved or invested worldwide in 2000.4J Of this, only

$1. 7 trillion was invested n i developing countries in that year. Total world 1'01

inflows were $209 billion in 1990, $473 billion in 1997 (S178 billion, or

35 percent, was the developing cOluuries' share), and $1,118 billion (5190 bil­ lion, or 17 percent, was rhe developing countries' share) n i 2000. Howe\'er, the share of dle world's 48 least developed cownries in 1999 total world FOI was a meager 0.5 percent. In fact, 70 percent of incoming 1'01 in the period

1993-1998 went to a mere 20 developing countries (out of 138). The abi l ity of many LOCS to influence trends and developments in global financial mar­ kets s i therefore extremely limited. The Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach made precisely this point in his testimony to the U.S. I-louse of Rep­ resentatives in May 1999:

Ir may wdl be rhar tht,: tn i y t,:lllerging market ewnomks of the world art,: lit­ erally awash in the turbulent seas of fin:lIldal capital. For c.xamp!c, the equity 84

CHAPTER 3

market capitalization oflarge emerging market coumries such as Korea, Malay­ sia, Taiwan and Brazil each totaled abom $150 to $200 billion in the pr<'-crisis period ofthe mid-1990S. By contrast, the capitalization of the U.S. equity mar­ ket was about $6 to $7 trillion during that period (and is now closing in on $l� trillion) . . . . At today's market levels JUSt a 0.5% move Out ofU.S. equities into the emerging-market asset class-hardly an unreasonable asset allocation shift for performance-oriented instirutional investors-would bc worth arOlmd $60 billion. Such an n i crement would equate to fully 6% of the combined market capitali7...ation of the major equity markets in thc devcloping world:u The effects of an imbalance of this kind during a f".lpid capital-movement episode are potentially catastrophic for

an

LDC,

whose stock exchange is

likely to be dominated by foreign-owned portfolios that can be pulled out very quickly. Portfolio investors arc prone

to make quick withdr:l\vals of

their funds f i short-term performance targets arc not met or if other eco­ nomic indicators arc thought

to portend weakness (such as the high levels

of nonperforming loans n i East Asian banking systems that are said

to have

been instnuuental in bringing about the financial crisis in 1997). "fllis s i espe­ cially true of U.S. mutual funds, which are n i clined to jettison their holdings if quarterly lXrformance standards are not reached or if a falling market is

expected. A third karnre of the new kinds of portfolio capital that promote instabilities of the kind seen in a number of LDCS in the 1990S (Mexico, the

East Asian countries) has to do with the disposition of short-term invest­ ment capital not to reflect underlying economic "fundamentals" such as out­ put or employment.43 A rise in U.S. or European interest rates, say, with no change whatsoever in the macroeconomic conditions of the LDC involved, can nonetheless induce a changc of perception on the part of foreign port­ folio investors with holdings in that lower-income country. A swift rever­ sal of investment flows results as funds arc chaIUleled elsewhere in a stock market stampede, with possibly devastating consequences for prices in the equity markets of the

LDC

thus affected. The behavior of this new form of

short-term portfolio capital is quite different from that of financial and indus­ trial capital as characterized by Marx, since the virtual autonom}' it enjoys in relation to acrnal economic activit}' (this being the primary source of its volatility) makes it correspond more to what he calls "fictitious capital" in volume 3 of Capital, where it is used to designate a form of capital that cre­ ates money n i ways completely detached from the productive process and the exploitation of Iabor.44 Chapter 4 provides a more detailed description of this finance-led, equity-based accumulation regime.

POSTPOLITICAL POLITICS

85

The Impact of the Current Fillance-Led, &fllity-Bnsed Growth Rt;Hime -nle immense proliferation of pension, n i surance, and nmmal funds n i the past two decades or so has changed radically rhe circuits of realization and accumulation that arc currently at the disposal of the capitalist system. The

LOCS,

as we have seen, arc in an even more vulnerable position than their

wealthier cOlUlterpart.� when it comes to dealing with financial market vola­ tility. This is not to suggest that LDC governments are entirely powerless when confronted with surges ofexternal capital; there is considerable evidence that a number of viable policy instruments arc available to govenullents seeking to control financial market turbulence.4s In fact, the instances provided by Mexico and Vietnam provide nteresting i contrasts Witll regard to rhe issue of market opennes.� and a country's ability to adhere to economic policies which eschew market liberalization. Larry Elliott, summari7ing the views of Dani Rodrik and Ha-Joon Chang, notes the following differences between the economic strategies ofthese two countries, which have espoused diamet­ ricallyopposed strategies with regard to "market openness" : One has a long border ,,·ith the richest coumry in the world and has had a free­ trade agreemem with irs neighbour across the Rio Grande. It receives oodles of inward investment and sends irs workers across the border n i droves. It is

fully plugged in to the global economy. The other was the subject of a U.S. trade embargo umil 1994 and suffered from trade restrictions for years after that. Unlike MexiCO, Viemam is not even a member of the WTO. SO which of the twO has the better recem economic record? The question should be a no-brai ner if ail the free-nade. thcories arc right -Mexi co should be streets allead of Viemam. In fact, the oppoSite s i nue. Since ,\-lexico siglled the Nafta (North American Free Trade Agreement) deal with the U.S. and Canada in 1992, its annual pcrcapim growth rate has bardy been above 1%. Vietnam has grown by around 5% a year for the past tWO decades. Poverty in Viemam has come down dramatically: real wages in Mexico have fallen.-46 Acknowledging the fact that " market openness" is not a panacea for the

LDCS CatulOt obscure the equally compelling fact that the important changes brought about during tile two decades-long ascendancy of he t finance-led, equity-based growth regime necessitate a revision in one of marxism's key positions on the genesis of capital, namely, that a precapitalist "space" has to adjoin tllC. "space" of an existing capitalist accumulation

to provide

the

latter with a source for tile extraction of surplus value (this being the essence 86

CHAPTER ,

of what Marx called "primitive accumulation").47 The problem with Marx's theory of primitive accumulation is that, as Rosa LlLXemburg noted, dIe notion rests on a seeming incongruity, namely, that in capitalist accumu­ lation dle conditions of direct c.xploitation and dle conditions for realizing surplus value are separated by space and time. ·nle former are limited by the productive capacities of the society n i question, while the latter depend, not on productive capabilities, but on the power to consume (and this in mrn hinges on that society's "antagonistic conditions of distriburion").4H Ille up­ shot is that the mere presence of the conditions of direct exploitation is not sufficient to enable capitalist reproduction to take place. For LlLXemburg, therefore, capitalism, if it is to reproduce itself and expand, must have avail­ able to it, even in its maturity, both the primordial capacity to consume alld the allied resources of distribution needed to satisfy this capacity. The problem with Luxemburg's resolution of Marx's conundnull re­ garding primitive accumulation is that the several and varied instnullents of credit can intervene rl'peatedly to reactivate capacities to consume, dlereby obviating the spatiotemporal gap between LlL'.:emburg's conditions of di­ rect exploitation and the conditions for realizing surplus value. lodged in the capacity to consume.49 For instance, the nub of the 2008 financial crisis was the set of economic and political circumstances which enabled housing

to

become the principal object of financial speculation n i America and Britain. Shelter has from time immemorial been regarded as one of the primalhuman needs, and a rational society would deal with it n i these terms, so there s i no inevitability which necessitates that housing be dle focal point of a financial market speculative frenzy. -nle speculative housing market unleashed for a short time a phase of "easy credit," which in turn fueled conslllllption, albeit widl dle disastrous economic consequences dlat are now becoming more and more apparent. Money is thus the essential bridge between the two sets of conditions reqnired for the realization of capital's circuit of value, and credit (in dtis case, equity-derived wealth) forms a "surplus" fueling the power to consume. An equity-based, fina.ncialized growth regime of dle kind that has existed in the past two decades or so is nowadays very much dle synchroniz­ ing link between capital's production and consumption conditions. In fact, the wealth derived from equity that feeds consumption undertakes one of the key functions assigned by Marx and Luxemburg to a "primitive accumula­ tion." The finance-led and equity-based regime adverted to here has been char­ acterized in a number of very recent works by members of dle Ecole Regula­ tion.50 This rcgime, which is now dominant and is variably dispersed across POSTPOLlTlCAl POLITICS

87

the advanced economics, possesses dIe following distinguishing features, many of them associated widl the phenomenon of "the new economy." For the pivO[al role played by the wage-laoor link in Fordism it substitutes a matrix of financial instinuions and innovative instruments, and the stabiil ty of dIe system is entrusted [0 dIe Central Bank and nO[

[0

state-mediated

capital-labor collective wage arrangements (as was dIe case in dIe heyday of Fordism).51 Firms become oriented toward capital markets and their logic of public valuation rather than meeting performance criteria based on increas­ ingly olltmoded principles of corporate organization and governance, so that "successful companies capture quasi-rents downstream in fast-expanding markets for final goods and services where the goodwill resides and at dIe same time pass the costs of making commodities on to others."52 Its other dlaracteristics have been described thus by Robert Boyer: Many giant mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on cor­ porate governance, diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of popula­ tion, all these rransformations . . . lead to a toully novel regulati on mode

... rcombining]

labour market fleXibility, price stability, developing high

tech sectors, booming srock market and credi t to sustain the rapid growth of consumption, and pcrmaneilt optimism of expectations in firms. The. capaCity of each country to adapt and impkmeIlt such a model would be a key bctor i n macroeconomic performance and would determine that counrry 's place in a hierarchical world economy governed by the diffusion of a fin:lIlcializcd growth regime.53 At the same time, dIe structure of consumer demand has been reconstinued as a response to lUlprecedented levels of product innovation and niche mar­ keting. Since both demand and supply arc generally regulated by asset price expectations, dIe possibility exists of a benign spiral in which heightcned expectations of profits lead to an appreciation of asset prices, which in turn boosts incomes and consumer demand, and this is nun vindicates dIe initial heightened expectation of profits, thereby triggering (hopefully!) anodler round of self-fulfilling profit c.xpectations. As is clear from dIe U.S. housing­ loan crisis of 2008, it was the combination of loans [0 less creditworthy bor­ rowers and the lUlwarranted expectation that housing prices would continue rising indefinitely (and thereby serving as a source of easy credit) which fueled the anticipation of an unending "virmous spiral" in the U.S. hOllsing market. -The potential risk of making loans to "marginal" borrowers was presumed to be offset by dIe rising "value" of rhe assets purchased by these hazardous loans, and when the assets in question subsequemly declined in value in a 88

CHAPTER 3

cl3-�sic bubble collapse,the now LUlsafe loans became "toxic"(the favored term uscd by journalists working in the business and finance segments of U.S.media outlets).

"ntis new profit-propelled system of accumulation enables the top echelon of salary earners to rely on more than fixed wages for incomes,since they now enjoy greater acce.<;s to wealth derived from equity and pension fund holdings.The wealth originating from financial markets is able to galvanize consumption on an overall .scale barely conceivable in previous regimes of accumulation.In this ostensibly benign spiral,therefore,"the whole macro­ economic dynamic is ...driven by the compatibility between rhe expecta­ tions emanating from financial markets,rhe reality of firms' profit growth and interest-rate dynamics,which the central bank is trying to direct. "54 This finance-led system, though led by the United States, is of course globalized,and so other national economies mnst respond to the financial rate of return available in their counterpart economics: movements of capital affect exchange rates, and a country's exchange-rate policy affects its credi­ bility as a protagonist in global financial markets.Even the perennial exten r al trade deficits of the United States have to be financed by the savings of other countries (primarily China) ,giving the economically bankmpt United States an incentive (though there are others) to promote an open and "competi­ tive" international financial system dlat will give it access to the savings of Asian and European countries. The international system of financial markets has thus undergone a scries of historic stmctural transformations since 1972, several of which are still taking place.55These include changes in the sources of international credit and a new capital-recycling mechanism; together they began a revolutionary transformation that has continuing effects.-nle changes in the sources of international credit are well known, but,says Randall Germain,the more

important changes have taken place in rhe capital-recycling mechanism, that is, "the form of credit made available to the world economy, in the net­ works of monetary agents which control acccs.
POSTPOLlTlCAl POLITICS 89

markets),59 the complementary growth in the audlOrity and effectiveness of private monetary instirutions (toward whom the balance of power has now gravitated), and the changing of the criteria med to govern access to flows of mobile capital (these having already moved in favor of the interests of largely unregulated private agents).6 0 \.Vhilc private instinuions have grown hugely in importance, dle state continues to have a role because capital mobility is not perfect,in at least two respects.One is dlat the statestill possesses a degree of macroeconomic policy autonomy, dlOugh this room for maneuver is nonetheless circumscribed by the global integration of financial markets and by the propensity of states in this simation to allow private agents usc of their policy instnullents in ways which effectively make these agents proxies for state and public authority. Ille second is the preemi nence enjoyed by dle United St"Jtes (and ro a lesser extent the \'""estern European nations and Japan)

in

determi ni ng dle course

and constitution of global financial markets ; allied widl this is the prima..." enjoyed by dle financial markets in New York, Tokyo,and London. A state­ based hegemony is thus very much dle continu ing core of the international financial system.Slit this state capability notwithstanding, today no single st"J.te or public authority has effective control of rhe international financial system (even if the instirutions of American hegemony and the OECD central banks have a pivotal place in this system) . -nle result is a growing regionaliza­ tion of interest rates and the decli ning importance of reserve requirements as financial institutions become more hybridized and their resources more interchangeable as a result.61 There is no unitary model of how this finance-led growth regime relates to other regimes whose raison d'ctre is less the accumulation of financial assets and more dle production and exchange of commodities. Boyer identifies a number of alternative post-Fordist growth regimes: those led by Toyot­ ism (Japan umiI1990),services (the United States in dIe 1980s),informa­ tion and communication technologies (Silicon Valley since rhe m i d-1980s), knowledge-based sources (the United States s ince the 1990S),competition (most OECD COUlltrieS since 1985),exports (the East Asian

tiger econo­

"

m i c s "),and finance (the United States and United Kingdom since the 1990S). It is evident from this typology that dlere can be hybrid post-Fordist forma­ tions (e.g., the U.S. economy's dependence on knowledge-based sources, information and communication technologies, and finances, with the last preponderating primarily because it is the strategic locm of rhe country's resources for macroeconomic management).6 2 At the same time, the weight of evidence, considered earlier in this chap90

CHAPTER 3

ter, indicates overwhelmingly that the poorer lDCS have virtually no place in this system from which they can hope realistically to influence its overall direction. Fundamental asymmetries permeate the international financial system, and the divorce between financial and productive capital, integral to the equity-based, finance-led growth regime, only reinforces dIe worldwide economic polarization that has been a feature of capitalist accumulation since its inception. This time, however, a different kind of account must be given of the world­ wide economic JXllarization from dIe account dlat prevails in dIe standard theories of uneven development and dependency. In the standard theories, unequal exchange e.xists because of an internat i onal division of labor which allows the. advanced industrial countries to commandeer high-level indus­ trial productive capacity while consigning LDCS to dIe production of "low value-added" commodities or the e.xtraction of raw materials (this being the phenomenon of compulsory maldevelopment described by Samir Amin and others in the dependency and uneven development school), and because international trade on these terms can never be mutually advantageous. Figure 7 indicates that in 2001 35 percent of developing country exports were devoted to agriculture and food, as well as ores and minerals. Figure 8 shows, conversely, just how small the agricultural sector is in relation to industry and services where the developed countries are concerned. However, in the finance-led growth regime, the main source of inter­ national economic JXllar ization is precisely dIe alltonomy of finance capital from productive capital. Finance capital, or "money," often in forms that are sometimes hard to recognize, so far have they departed from rWI-of-the-mill conceptions of "curtency;' synchronize.� the production and consumption circuits identified by Rosa Luxemburg, and this synchronization speeds up the processes that realize surplus value by abbreviating the linkages between production and consumption. Command over the essential instnullent of synchronization, that is, finance or money, therefore translatc.� more or less immediately into the capacity to realize surplus value, and this in ways de­ tached from the productive process itself and dIe direct exploitation of labor itself (which nonetheless takes place, especially in "low value-added" zones of production).63 This fundamental disconnection of finance (and "fictitious") capital from productive capital in dIe equity-based growth regime causes asymmetries berwccn dIe high- and low-income countries that appear to be even more deeply entrenched dIan the parallel asymmetries in previous growth regimes, where political-economic power resided (largely) in a cowltry's ability to

POSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS 91

0

All food iTems

•

AgriculrnraJ raw mlrcrbls

0

Fuels

13

Ores Jnd IlJer:lls

0

Manufactured goods

•

Other

7. Developing country exports by commodity group Sou...: United Nations CAlnfcrcncc on Trade and Dn-dopmcnt, ZOIU, [)ep
"

,-----

" +--1 "t-;=I w

" -I-L...L [)C,-doping Mrica

Dcll:loping America

Dcwloping Asia

o Agriculture

Ix"'lopin;::

Oceani.

o

Industry

Coumric, in Cemr.ll .nd Easrcrn Europe • Servin:s

iI. Gross Domestic Product by cxpcndintre and economic activity

(ill percentages), 2001

SO"",,: United Nations C.onfcrclKc on Trade and Development, ZO<J4-, f)ept:/opmmf,md Gloimlizaritm: Fart, ""d Fi!JIJ,... (New York: United Nations, 2O!J�), 21.

Developed

Coumrirs

command industrial capacity (the ability of rhe USSR to keep up with the United States up to the 1970S being the paradigmatic case). Qucstions of the organizing of the power to command industrial capacity arc undeni­ ably complex, bur this particular form of conmland is in principle less path­ dependent than the JXlwer to conunand a financializcd economy, where the stmctures of financial intermediation arc so path-dependent (so far they seem quite specific to the United States and United Kingdom) that they arc likely to defeat any attempt at replication.64 A Singapore or Tokyo and, to a much lesser cxtent, a Qlina (or rather Shanghai and I-long Kong) or India (or rather Mumbai) may benefit b y performing selective functions in this equity-led regime, but a Mali or Ecuador or Fiji can do little or nothing to establish even a toehold in such a system. So ti le question remains whetl ler the more dam­ aging effects of t i l e asynunetries generated by the finance-lcd, equity-based growth regime can be surmounted by an lDC such as Mali or Fiji o r indeed any of the 150 or so LOCS.

POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS

93

CHAPTER 4 The Exacerbation of Uneven Development Analysis of the Current Regime ofAcclIllIlIlatuJ/I

Chapter 3 showed that powerful asymmetries exist between the economically advanced "metropolitan" countries and the countries of the less-developed periphery, so that capital flows between the metropolitan center and the LDG periphery accord fundamentally with rhe requirements of the economically advanced countries. For the poorer lDGS, it is very much a case of "If

YOli

play by ollr rules, YOli may perhaps hope that small rewards will come. your way every now and then." j\1arkcts and governments in the LDCS arc given little or no option but to tailor their strategies and policies to the require­ ments of markets and governments in the economically advanced countries. Anyone who thinks that Alan Greenspan (then) and Ben Bernanke (now) somehow lose one minute of sleep over economic trends in (say) Angola or Nepal during their respective tenures as chairmen of the U.S. Federal Reserve dearly does not live in the world taken for granted by 11Je ECimom ist and the

WallStrectJOlin/a}, let alone

USA JaMyand Fox News. (Certainly the world

would be a better place for most of its inhabitants if more people refused to live in the world defined by

TIfe Economist, etc., but entertaining

such fanta­

sies about Greenspan's or Hernanke's possible nocHirna l global economic anxieties is not even going to make us think that the world needs to be a dif­ ferent and better place for its most economically downtrodden citizens.)

011 RItaillill,H allli Modifying the DrpelldtllCJ Paradigm In this chapter I examine the claim, advanced in many quarters and in several versions, that dIe most recent forms of capitalist development have ctkctively discredited theories of uneven or dependent development, because dlese theories hinge crucially on conceptions that arc no longer plausible theoreti­ cally and rhat have moreover been sidelined by rcrent historical events. TlIUS, as I mentioned in chapter

3, the end of the Golden Age o f postwar economic

prosperity in the West resulted in a radical restrucruring of world capitalism that enabled the emergence of new regimes of international competition. -nlese new regimes have cau.sed many LDCS to lurch into protracted chronic debt and current account imbalances. At the same time these LDCS have had to face the foreclosure of any real alternative to complete assimilation into the capitalist system of production, especially since the only apparent alter­ native to capitalism, the "acrually existing socialism" of the former Eastern bloc, fell into desuetude in 1989 (if not before). However, while the majority of peripheral and semiperipheral cowltrics have not benefited from the regime of accumulation superseding that of the Golden Age, the cowltrics of East Asia (the so-called East Asian Tigers) have until recentiy been able to advance economically, thereby controvert­ ing a major tenet of tile deptlldmcia school. \..\Iith the significant advance of the East Asian countries, it was no longer possible to maintain a hard and fast distinction between "core;' "'scmiperipheral," and "peripheral" nations (if indeed this was ever really possible) and to insist that dependency is an ineluctable condition of nations not initially situated inside the capitalist core, and dlat moreover tile very constimtion of the core requires otiler na­ tional econom ics to exist in a syste mic state of economic subordination to the metropolitan countries. At a more purely theoretical level, critiques have also been made of the various "essentialisms" and false "universalisms" that arc said to bedevil the underdevelopment and dependency paradigms. Examples of tilese include the presumption that industrialization and the possession of industrial capi­ tal arc absolutely crucial requisites of economic progress (so that a country's economy is deemed to be developed, developing, or undeveloped depending on whether or not it has traversed an appropriate path to industrialization, hopefully reaching W. W. Rostow's mythical "rakeoff" point, and tims to have amassed a commensurate kind and scale of indllStrial capital; the in­ ability to think beyond the state

as

the primary and essential vehicle of eco­

nomic development; tile (often unacknowledged) importation of problemUNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

95

atic assumptions regarding dlC role of foreign investment and foreign trade in dIe LDCS; a Eurocentric bias; an overlooking or dc-emphasizing of pro­ duction undertaken by women; and an underestimation of dIe implications of widespread and haphazard industrial development for the environment. In the face of dlese and other challenges to dleir paradigm, proponents of theories of uneven development or dependency have, according to dleir critics, done little more than reiterate (1) dleir conviction that some form of socialism can still function as a potential countervailing force to capitalist depredation, and

(2)

their belief in dIe efficacy of sonll� kind of strategic dc­

coupling of the LDCS from the capitalist world-system, again with the hope that this can function as a protection against capitalist encroachment. BU[, say dlese critics, neither (1) nor (2) appears to be viable in the current capi­ talist dispensation. Ihis dispensation is more staunchly and comprehensively inhospitable to socialist aspirations than it has ever been (thereby blocking otT any "socialist path" to socialism). Moreover, the completely integrated character of actually c.\:isting world capitalism ostensibly makes any attempt at decoupling a surefire recipe for econo mic collapse or exrinction. In examining these charges leveled against dIe dleory of Wleven devel­ opment, I suggest that there is a good case to be made for the rctention of notions of uneven development and dependency, albeit framed in very dif­ ferent terms. After

all,

as dIe previous chapters indicate, persistent interna­

tional economic inequalities remain, and if anydling are becomin g even more intractable, and the problems of chronic debt and pervasive international market instability arc still around, as was apparent in the East Asian crisis, dIe collapsc of dIe U.S. subprimc loan market in 2008 (whose ram ifications arc still being registered), and dIe plight of nearly every sub-Saharan nation since the 1970s. Furthermore, at a theoretical level, the past decade o r so has seen several compelli.ng attempts on the part of dependency thL"Drists to rid their formulations of essentialisms and false universalisms, and especially to think of the developmental state in other than purely mechanistic or monolithic terms.l I won't engage specifically with any of these attempts at reformulation, however, convincing though many of dIem may be. Instead, my goal is to arrive at a version of dependency theory through the constmction of an ac­ count of the impact, both economic and political, of transnational financial capital on the LDCS. ·nle m i pact of global financial markets is a phenomenon nO[ usually taken into consideration b y proponents of the theory of uneven development. Underdevelopment has tended to be viewed primarily in terms of a coumry's flawed or incomplete negotiation of dIe processes of industri-

96 CHAPTER 4

alization, and the large-scale effects of a whole range of new globallinancial markets on LDCS have been felt only fairly recemly (and primarily within the past decade or so at that), thus making it difficult for dIem to be registered by all but the most L-urrent analyses of underdevelopment and dependency. With this objective in mind, I rake the dependency or uneven develop­ ment paradigm essentially to involve accepting some version of each of the following related propositions: 1. Dispari6es in wealth bnwecn nations as a group arc due fundamentally to asymmetries of economic and political powcr mat arc constitutive of the capitalist system of devc!opment, and indeed of world capitalism gener­ ally. 1.

The asymmerries ofecollomic and poli6cal power existing bnween groups ofnations cannot be removed or Significantly amc!iorated within the stmc­ tures and strategic possibilities that arc integral to the prevailing system of capitalist accumu!ation. l

TlIe COl/tinllil!.1! Eamolllic Polarizatio n -The JXllarization between Nordl and SOUdI is more pronounced dIan it has ever been. The United Nations Humall DCl'cloplllC/t / Report for 1997 showed that the share of world trade for the forty-eight least developed nations, rep­ resenting

10 percent of the world's population at that time, had halved in

the previous two decades to just 0.3 percent, with over

50 percent of all de­

\'C!oping countries not receiving any foreign direct investment (two-thirds of which went to just eight developing counrries).3 -The

Opll/rIlt Report

1997 HUll/ali DCl'd­

indicated dlat around a hundred developing and transition

countries experienced slow economic growth, stagnation, or outright de­ cline, and the incomes of more than a billion people no longer reached levels attained ten or even thirty years before. The

1997 Report indicated that 1.3

billion people lived on a dollar a day or less, that dlere were

160 million

malnourished children, that one-lifdI of the world's population was not ex­ pected to live beyond forty (in some countries life expectancy has fallen by live years or more), and dlat

100 million people in the NardI lived below the

poverty line (dIe North also has

37 million jobless people). Well over a bil­

lion human beings lacked access to safe water, nearly a billion were illiterate, and around

840 million experienced hunger or food insecurity. -The same

report also showed that the net wealth of ten billionaires was

1.5 times the

combined national incomes of the forty-eight least developed nations.41he

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

97

accomplishments of some nations in the face of such adversity are co mmend­ able and even heroic: during 1980-95 Burkina Faro, Gambia, Senegal, and Zim babwe reduced child mortality by a third to a half in the face of declining incomes for much of this period, and Algeria, Jordan, Pen!, Syria, and Trini­ dad and Tobago by a half to two-thirds (the latter nations despite reductions in per capita income of 20 percent or more over the previous decade). What was the situation nearly a decade later! The United Nations Human Devdoplllt1lt Report of 2005 recorded some improvements in overall human well-being in the lDCS over the course of the 1990S, but also described a simation in which the world's pexlrest citizens continue to face a daunting stmggle for survival. In some respects, their plight is even more dire now than it was in the 1990S: in 2003, the 460 million people of eighteen poor cowltries saw the human development inde.xes of these countries sink below their 1990 levels, a situation the 2005 Repurt de­ scribes as "an unprL'"Cedented reversal."5 In addition, 10.7 million children a year die before their fifth birthday, and more than 1 billion people (20 percent of the earth's population) live on less than a dollar a day, while 2.5 billion live on less than nvo dollars a day (3-4).6 The human cost of rhe IIIV/AIDS epidemic has been staggering: in 2003, 3 million sufferers died and a further 5 million individuals were infected, with millions of children left behind as orphans and life expectancy levels in African countries being greatly reduced (in Botswana, for example, HIViAlos has caused a decline in life e.xpectancy of thirty-one years; 3-4).lbe growth in the number of countries undergoing an HOI reversal (Le., a significant decline in living standards, based on the Human Developmem Index) is shown in table 4. The latest Human DCl'd ­

OPlllt1ltRepurt, published in 2007, shows that sixteen countries have suffered HOI reversal since 1990, that is, a decline of only one country since the Rcpurt published in 2005. It is therefore wldeniable rhat rhe disparities benveen North and SOUdl have increased in the era of globalization as economic stagnation has become the lot of many lDCS during this period. According to the Humall Dcl'clop­

IIIwt Rcport of 2005, "During the 1990S, 25 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and 10 in Latin America experienced a sustained period of economic stagna­ tion" (35).7 The Repurt adds that in "the two years after Russia was engulfed by a financial crisis in 1998, 30 million people were forced below the poverty line. In Argentina the population living below the extreme poverty line more than tripled from 2000 to 2003" (36). -The 2005 Report goes on to say that dlis "underlin[ed] yet again a lesson delivered by the 1997 East Asian financial

98

CHAPTER 4-

TABLE 4. Countries nperiencing HDI reversal

1980-90

199{)-lOO3

Democratic Republic of the. Congo

Botswana

Guyana

Cameroon

Hai ti

Central African Republic

Niger

Democratic RepubliC of the Congo

Rwanda

Cote d'Jvoire

Z.1.llIbia

Kazakhstan' Lesotho RepubliC of Moldova' Rll�sian Federation' South Africa Swaziland Tajikistan

•

Ukraine' United Republic ofTan7..ania· Zambia Zimbabwe

SOllrce: United Nations, Hllman Del'flopmtnT RrjJlJrTZ()()j, 2L "Country does not have HDI data for 1980-90, so drop !\lay have begun before 1990.

crisis: integration into global capital markets comes with high human devel­ opment risks attached"

(36).

The share in global income of the poorest 20 percent of the world's people has fallen from

2.3

percent in

1994, while the ratio est

20 percent rose

to 78: 1 in

1960 and 1.4 percent

of the income of the top

from

30: 1 in 1960

1994-8 One way

to

in

1991 to 1.1

percent in

20 percent to that of the poor­

61: 1 in 1991 and

grew still further

of rectifying this income disparity would be for

poor countries to achieve the intemational equivalent of upward mobility, that is, to begin to acquire a greater share of world income in relation to their better-off neighbors. But here too the prospects arc disheartening for the world's poorer cOlUltries. Distinguishing between "rich," "contender;' "Third \Vorld," and "Fourth World" countries, Branko Milanovic, then lead economist in the World Hank's research department, shows that where coun­ try mobility is concerned, the trend is for stability in the Fourth \Vorld (or

UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

99

TARLE 5. Country mobility matrices 196o-7!1 and 197!1-2000 (in percen tages)

Rich

Contenders

Third World

Founh World

Rich

73

20

7

0

100

Contenders

14

32

IS

lOll

Third World

0

,

36 59

36

100

Fourth World

0

0

0

100

100

Rich

82

12

o

100

C..amenders

13

6

6 69

13

100

Third World

3

6

28

64

100

FOllrth World

o

o

5

95

lOll

Total

/960-71i

1971i-2(}()()

Source: Milanovic, lVorim Apart, 69, table 7.3. poorest) e chel on, combined with downward mobility for the contender and "fllird World

group in gs (tabl es 5 and 6 and figure 9 ).9

-niese figures poi nt to two fairly inescapable conclusions: (1) there has been

more immovability at the extremes, that is, among the cowltrics

grouped

as "rich" and "very poor" (all the poorest countries were in dIe

bottom in the 1960-78 period, and 95 percent were in the same position during 1979-2000), and (2) any movement among the "contender" nations was largely downward. Thus, among th e contender countries, twelve were downwardly mobile and three upwardly mobile in 1960-78, and thirteen were down w ardly two-thirds of

mobile and two upwardly mobile in 1979-2000. Almost

Third World cOlUlt ri cs slid into the FOllrth World category in

1979-2000. Taken as a whole, upwa rd mobility was a me re 4 percent and 3 percen t in the two periods, respectively; downward mobility as a whole was

24 percent and 29 percent for dIe same periods.1O

-These

figures suggest that prospects arc less than rosy for dIe nations of

the South,

many of which have been on a path of downw ard income mo­

bility since the 1960s. It is estimated that the nations of the South need to expand e conomically at if they arc to provide

a rate of around 6 percent atillually for several years

employment opporrunities for their expanding labor

forces (growing at about 3.5 pe rcent a year in COlUltries such as Bra7il and Mexico) and if dley arc to hope to meet dleir citizens' basic needs for food, 100

CHAPTER 4-

TABLE 6. Country mobility matrices 1960-78 and 1978-2000 (number of countries) Third

Founh

World

Worl d

Total

Rieh

Contenders

30

8

3

0

41

Contenders

3

7

8

4

22

Third World

0

2

23

14

39

Fourth World

0

0

0

25

25

28

4

2

o

34

2

1

II

2

16

2

10

23

36

o

2

42

44

/960-711 Rich

1978-2000

Rich C.ontendcrs Third World Fourth World

o

SOIln:e: J'.lilanol'ic, World.- Aparr, 1>9, table 7.-\.

shelter, clothing, health, and education over a twenty-year period.!1 1his is in addition to the fact, noted in chapter

3 and confirmed in figures 9 and 10,

that the wealthy countries are the overwhelming beneficiaries of the invest­ ment flows needed for economic advancement. \Nherc all inward flows (i.e., both

1'01

and portfolio equity) are concerned, from 1995 to

2000 the rich

countries received five times as much investment as the poor countries. It is also noteworthy that in 2002 the developed countries received

64.5 percent

of 1'01 stocks. Given such figures, which indicate that the world's poorest countries are nowhere ncar meeting the growth targets required for their advancement, proSpl'Cts for dle countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds appear to be ominous, if not already dreadful, for large numbers of their inhabitants. At the same time it nel-c\s to be said that in rhe two decades between 1985 and 2005 in the twenty-four DECO (i.e., high-income) countries where data were available, the cumulative risc in inequality in these countries was 7 per­ cent. 12 'TIlercfore, even dle world's high-income countries have c.."pericnced a significant internal rise in income disparity in the past two decades. -TIlis phenomenon has thus to be coupled with the widening income gap between rich and poor countries. \Vorse is that these trends show no sign of slowing down, let alone re-

UNEVEN DEVEI.OI'MENT

101

·

, · ·

5

"1

II.

0 1970-1974

1975-19i9 D

9.

1980-1984

Rich Countries

J985-\989

1990-\994

1995-2000

• Poor wuntrics

Inflows of direct and portfolio equity investment per capita (1970-2000),

ill US. dollars at 1996 prices Source: Laura Alfaro, Scbuem Kalcmii-Ozcan, and Vadym VOi05O\'ych, �Why Doesn't Capital

Flow from Rich to Poor Countrie" An Empiri(allnvcstigation,� Working paper, Nm'cmbcr 2005, 62, figure 1, www.pcoplc.hbs.cduf\alfaro/lucas.pdf. Note, Inflows of total "<juicy (Fill and portfolio (quity investment) divided by population

arc based on data from toc International Monetary Fund and International Fund Scn";cc, and ace depicted n i 1996 U.S. dollars. Data arc for 98 countries and ",-eraged over fi,-c-rear periods. The FD[ inflows correspond to direct investment in reporting cconomy (line 78bcd), which includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital, and financial derivatives associated with variorn intercompany transactions between affiliatl..! enterprise,. Portfolio equity inflows correspond to equity liabilities (line 78bmd), whicli includes shares, stock panicipation, and similar document, that usnally denote ownership of equity. Rich countries nclude i 2, high GOP per capita countries that arc classified as �rich� by tlie World Bank: poo, conntrie, denote the 75 remaining countries.

versing themselves, even though thc United Nations estimated in its Hllmall

DeJ)cioplllt1ltRcpurt of 1997 that it would take only 1 pcrcent of global income and arOlUld 2 to 3 percent of national income in all but thc most impovcr­ ishcd counrries to fund a program to eliminate world poverry.13 Where the field of comparativc international political economy is concerncd, thesc stark facts call for

an

account of the systcmic intcrnational incqualities that are

their basis. Since thc aim of the uncven development or dependency para­ digm has always been to furnish prccisely such a thcory, it has not Iackcd a prima faeie rationale cvcn whcn some of its formulations havc becn ques­ tioned and fowld in whatever way to be lacking. 1hc time is certainly right for a revisiting of dlis paradigm: global capitalism as currcntly configurcd confronts less wcaldlY nations with scvere, systemic, and pressing problems, problems that only the Wlevcn dcvelopmcnt paradigm has sought ro depict 1O�

CHAPTER 4

o Mrica o America • rub

•

Coumrics in CcmrJ.! and Eastern Europe

o

Dc\"CJoped Coumries

10. Inward foreign development investment stocks b}' region in2002 s"urce: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,zoo.s, /k,ylopmmfalld Globafiwrion: Fam m,d Figures (New York: United Nations, 200+), 35.

and analyze in a serious and theoretically comprehensive way. Is there some­ thing better for the poorest of the pOClr than the "triage" prescriptions of the t.."lrrendy "l dominant capitalist liberal-democratic global configuration? If so, what arc the outlines, both practical and tlleoretical, of this alternative set of possibilities?

The TrallSllatiollnliz.ntioll ofFinancial Cnpiml THI': SITUATION OF TI·IE LESS WEALTHY NATIONS (EAST ASIA IN PARTICULAR) It is difiicult to do full justice here to the many facets of the epochal trans­ formations that have taken place in extraterritorial financial markets and in­ stitutions since the early 1980s.14 But in noting the more distinctive features of tllese shifts, it can be seen that in addition to a very considerable increase in the overall volume of transnational capitaillows since the 1980s, there has been an equally marked change n i the composition of the flows themselves, especially to developing countries since the 1990S, Witll the Asian crisis of 1997-98

as

a decisive factor n i marking the economic and social impact of

such flows. Capital flows to LDCS were drastically reduced by tile Asian crisis. According to Stephany Griffith-Jones, citing IMF figures, net private capital flows to

LOCS rose to nearly $240 billion in 1996

(having grown constantly

throughout the first half of the 1990S), tlleH decreased to less than 5120 bil­ lion in 1997, decreased by approximately 40 percent to less than $70 billion

UNEVEN DEVELOPl>IENT

103

n i both 1998 and 1999, decreased to less than $10 billion n i 2000 (the impact of the Asian crisis being palpably evident n i the figures since 1997), and then rose to a not very impressive $F billion in 2001.15 This rising or recovering trend has continued; rhe Institute of International Finance (IIF) reported in 2005 that net private capital flows to emerging markets rose n i 200-+ to an estimated $279 billion (the highest since 1997), a substantial increase over the 2003 figure of $211 billion and more than double the 2002 total of $125 billion.16 Tltis rising trend of private capital iiows to emerging markets has continued up to 2008; the lion in 2006, with

an

IIF

reports that these flows reached $568.2 bil­

estimated $782.4 billion for 2007, and a forecast drop

to S730.8 for 2008 as a result of the collapse in cile U.S. subprime marketP China and Russia (espt.-cially its oil and namral gas n i dustries) have been the main beneficiaries of cilese private capital flows. It is important therefore to understand the kinds of IXlrtfolio investment lIow cilat moved in and our of East Asia n i these alternating phases of finan­ cial expansion and contraction, even if only to form a notion of rhe character and magnimde of the crisis of 1997-98 and its aftermath, and what cilis s i likely to entail for a new and modified version of the Wleven development or dependency paradigm. (lberc is of course another reason for focusing on East Asia: it is the economic darling of many advocates of neoliberalism, who love to believe cilat all cile developing world's economic problems would be solved f i only more developing countries could become like Taiwan and Malaysia. But we shall see that East Asia's story in regard to financialization, the cornerstone of the currenciy dominant regime of accumulation, in the end provides few real grounds for such optimism.) Part of this exponential growth in financialization was a new n i terest shown by investors, drawn by relatively high interest rates, n i Asian stock markets that led quickly to a boom n i the East Asian bourses, which petered out very soon after cile economic debacle of 1997-98. The scale of this ex­ tremely rapid East Asian stock market growth has been noted by Ajit Singh, among ocilers (sec chapter 3), where Singh's analysis of the relative times it took rhe United States and cile emerging countries to reach roughly the samc capitalization ratios shows cilat the East Asian economics rose at a much faster pace than the United States did, albeit in an earlier developmental elXlch. At the same time, the growing reliance of rhe Ea�t Asian countries on IXlrtfolio investment was instmmental in creating cile structural conditions fCSlXlllsible for cile collapse of East Asian financial markets n i 1997-98.18 To begin with, there s i rhe sheer disparity of scale between the combined resources of the funds

104

CHAPTER 4

mn

by financial institutions in the most advanced

industrial countries and the market capital of middle-income countries very ncw to this form of capitalism. As I have noted at several points n i this chap­ ter and chapter

3, and as I will note again, the combined market capitaliza­

tion of high-income countries (llles) vastly exceeds that of tile Loes. 1be effects of an imbalance of tllis kind during a rapid capital movement episode are potentially catasttophic for an LDe, whose stock exchange is likely to be dominated by foreign-owned portfolios. Furtllermote, portfolio investors can pull out of markets very quickly, and are prone to do so f i short-term performance targets arc not met or if otller economic ndicators i are thought to portend weakness (such as tile high levels of nonperforming loans n i East Asian banking systems tllat were said to have been instnunental in bring­ ing about the crisis of 1997-98). This is especially true of American mutual flUIds, which arc capable of redirecting their n i vestment flows Witll possibly devastating consequences for prices n i the equity markets of the loe tlms affected.19 Ihe behavior of this form of short-term portfolio capital is quite differ­ ent from that of financial and industrial capital as characterized by Marx, since the virmal autonomy it enjoys in relation to actual economic activity (tllis being the primary source of its volatility) makes it correspond more to what he calls "fictitious capital" in volume

3 of Capital, where it is used to

designate a form of capital that creates money in ways completely detached from the productive process and tile c.xploitation of labor.lo Interestingly, the only advice the \.""orld Bank and its representative, Mohsin Khan in this case, were able to give Loes faced with a potentially damaging reversal of portfolio nvestmeIU i flow is the now familiar refrain "Strive for consistency in the m i plementation of strong macroeconomic and structural JXllicics, and ensure that borrowed resources arc appropriately invested."21 A country f:lCing significant withdrawals of fotcign portfolio capital will encounter tile "usual" problems resulting from pressure on its exchange rates and its balance of payments (with a resulting drain on foreign-exchange re­ serves) and from the almost inevitable price falls in domestic financial mar­ kets. Ihis in

turn

can result n i a weakening of the LDe's financial system,

which is more likely if banks and financial houses are elosely integrated Witll the securities sector and have borrowers with a high level ofinvestment in tile domestic market; tllese borrowers will default on tlIeir repayments and leave the banks and financial houses facing shortfalls in meeting tllcir obligations, which they may then try to discharge by borrowing abroad.ll In the longer term, however, tile lower-income country relying on relatively large inflows of short-term capital provided by foreign JXlrrfolio investment (as opJXlsed

UNEVEN DEVEI.OPl>IENT

105

to foreign direct investment, which is harder [0 withdraw quickly), and dms facing the possibility of overnight capital flight when financial markets be­ come volatile, confronts a serious problem of macroeconomic managemcnt encompassing, but also extending beyond, the phenomena-runs on its cur­

rent..-y, interest rate hikes, a balance ofpayments and foreign reserves squeeze, and so fonh-more inunediatcly visible when capital market volatility starts to become more generally dismptive. For dlis instability makes it dilnculr for lower-income countries to pursue independent fiscal and monetary JXllicies and to have a coherent strategy for managing c.xchange rates. This is especially so when the lower-income COWltries involved have only very shon periods of time in which to find workable realignments in vast and unstable markets. (In 1995 the JXlrtfolio nvestment i market's worldwide transactions amOlUlted [0 $1.3 trillion daily, or $312 trillion in a year of 240 business days; n i 2005 this daily figure reached $2 trillion.)23 Mort..'Over, as was evident during the c.xchange rate instabilities after the European Exchange Rate Mechanism debacle in 1992, transnational capital markets are now large enough, and instimtional speculators possess sufficient resources that arc swifdy interconvenible (banking, securities, and nsurance i. businesses now blend n i to each other, as indicated by the comprehensive transformation in the United Kingdom of what a couple of decades ago used [0 be "building societies"), to neutralize the coordinated e/forts of even the American and Western European central banks during a financial crisis. Central banks in dlC

LOCS, with resources that arc a fraction of their OECD counterparts, have vir­ tually no chance of sllcceeding where much bigger central banks have failed (and will continue to fail in rhe absence of more permanent institutional arrangements to control such instabilities). -nle lOCS face a constant and seemingly irremovable dilemma n i this vast

and fluid financial environment. To raise standards in education and increase healdl service provision and social welfare they may have to pursue an in­ dependent fiscal and monetary policy, bur dlis will almost certainly result n i exchange rate n i stability; setting independem exchange rate levels will likewise cause rhe country n i question to have less control over its domestic macroeconomic and monetary arrangements. -nle three siruations-capital mobility, fiscal and monetary policy autonomy, and stable c.xchange rates­ seem dlcrcfore [0 be mutually incompatible, leaving countries, especially lower-income countries, with little or no room to maneuver. In addition, and dle Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 bore this out, JXlrtfolio funds, both foreign and local, tend not to go into those sectors, manufacturing and agrkulture primarily, that take longer to produce signifi-

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cant yields, bur instead find their way into domains where options favoring quick money are more readily available, namely, the stock market and real estate. Ihis is just as likely to be true of an East Asian LDG in 1997 as it is of the United States n i 2008.24 The ideal situation for such threatened lOGS would be a multilateral strategy that is coordinated accordingly, bur which still allows a country to use a range of capital controls that give it a degree of macroeconomic and monetary policy autonomy in the face of financial market integrJtion.25 Bm the coordination of multilateral dforts to stem capital market instability is difficult to sustain over dle longer haul, when the crisis dlat prompted the n i itial search for multilateral coordination has dissi­ pated and national self-interest reasserts itself in the absence of institutional forces and principles strong enough (politically and not just economically) to counter such fissiparous tendencies. And so the stmcturJI dilemma remains: market integration places a high premium on the coordination of policies between nations, but this coordination is harder to maintain in the longer term because there seems to be no way of obviating tendencies to fall back on national self-interest when it becomes more difficult to support coordi­ nated macroeconomic and fiscal measures for more than a relatively short time. This is dear from dle inability of the United States and the European Union to agree on a concerted strategy n i dealing with the current financial crisis.1be EU countries have shown little or no reluctance when it comes to the direct takeover of banks ("nationalization" ), whereas in rhe United States the specter of socialism has led to a policy of subsidizing banks as opposed to taking ownership of them. i-!ere of course dle HICS have a huge advantage because they have a much better chance of using dleir economic and political resources to manage SUdl crises in ways not available to their poorer

lOG cowlterparts:

dley can use

these resources to allow their fiscal and monetary policies to operate inde­ pendently in the short term, and the policies they implement in this con­ nection are not necessarily to dle benefit of the less wealthy nations (who in any case enjoy no such freedom to decouple fiscal from monetary policy).26 For example, dle "stmctural adjustment" package that South Korea had to accept as a condition ofgetting its IMF bailour during the Asian crisis caused a rise in unemployment because the government had to lower or eliminate its subsidies to state-owned enterprises and set high real interest rates to reduce Korea's current accowlt deficit and keep the won stable. But this did not seem to figure among dle

IMF'S

primary concerns, which, as in every­

thing else dlat comes under its purview, are to safeguard "confidence" n i the international banking and trading systems and to preserve and promote

UNEVEN DEvELor....IENT

107

access to markets worldwide as an end in itself. In a similar case, the Mexican economic collapse in December 1994 was precipitated in part by high U.S. nterest i rates imposed by the Federal Reserve to prevent the U.S. economy from "overheating" and to help reduce the size of the cowury's chronic cur­ rent account imbalances; however, when U.S. interest rates rose, j\{cxico's debt simation beca.me lUlmanageable and the peso went into a free falp?

SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS -nle absence of a viable system for ensuring adequate macroeconomic matl' agement in the face of financial market volati l ity is a problem that is particu­ larly pressingfor LDCS. That absence, however, is the outcome of a more pro­ found failure that results from the convergence or intersection of two other crises: the crisis that accompanied rhe ending of the postwar Golden Age, when the social and economic costs (inflation in particular) attribmed to Keynesian and New Deal and Great Society policies intended to ensure that consumption was somehow always in line widl production were found to be "unacceptable" by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations; and dle suc­ cclxling crisis, when the neoliocral switch of emphasis from fiscal to mone­ tary policy (augmented by an army of supply-side n i stnunents) mmed out to be too deflationary, so that monetarism was abandoned in the early 1980S by its leading exponent, the British Conservative govenunent. Since then there has been no adequate system of national macroeconomic management capable of producing sustained noninflationary growth involving no re­ course to speculative bubbles (which are short-lived in any case, as evidenced by the U.S. dot-com and the U.S. and British housing market bubbles in the past decade), whether in dIe United States or elsewhere. llle powerlessness of dle LDCS in the face of world financial market instabilities must necessarily be seen in this broader and more encompassing context.28 The prevailing ncoliberal ideology, promulgated in the United States but also espoused by multilateral instimtions such as the World Bank and IMF, accords priority to keeping inflation low, to avoiding price "distortions," to monetary discipline (though not quite full·blown monetarism after the disastrous 1980s), atld to deregulation atld ibemlization. l Neoliberalism has no solutions for exoge­ nous capital market volatility beyond dle pious injunction that the affected countries should try always to have "sound macroeconomic fundamentals" and embrace open markets.29 -nle components of this ideology were seen by the World Bank and others as the enabling basis of East Asia's "miraculous" economic success. -The collapse in 1997-98 of dle economies of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Soudl Korea (as well as Japan's lingering recession),

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along with America's need in the 1980S to rely on the short-lived dot-com and housing market bubbles to float the economy, have exposed in the most abrupt and dramatic fashion this ideology's economic and political limita­ tions.3o It is in this context that a new and modified version of dependency theory has its place, along with the notion that we may be on the threshold of the emergence of a new and somewhat different regime of accumulation (though it is too early to make any predictions). \Vhatever happens, the claim made by Giovanni Arrighi and others that Japan and the other East Asian economies constitute a formation that has begun to supersede an American economic hegemony that has lasted for most of the past cenrury can no longer be upheld in dlis bald and wlqualified fashion, if indeed at all. For the immense proliferation ofpension, insurance, and murual funds in the past decade and a half has changed radically the circuits of value realization and aCClunuiation that arc at the disJXlsal of the capitalist system, and the crises visited on the LDC economies by exogenous capital volatility are almost certainly a primary outcome of this new state of affairs.31 Ille impact of these new circuits of value realization and accu­ mulation on the economies of the LDCS has to be taken n i to consideration, especially since these nations are confronted lUuelentingly by an ideology (the "Washington consensus" identified by JOIUl Williamson) which insists that all economic advancement, including progress beyond the most abject JXlverty and immiserarion, must necessarily be market-driven. j\10reover, the question at the heart of theories of dependency and uneven development, namely, the possibility of implementing a postcapitalist system of produc­ tion and accumulation, can be answered only by an analysis ofthese new and very recent capitalist circuits of realization and accumulation.

Portfolio Capital ill Practice As I stated earlier, the sheer disproportion in the relative sizes of rhe stock market capitalizations of the H ICS and the so-called emerging countries af­ fords the former group of nations more flexibility in dealing with interna­ tional capital market mobility. As Table 7 shows, in 2002 total stock market capitalization n i North America, Europe, and Japan amounted to $19-466 trillion, while the figure for the emerging market countries was $2.525 trillion (out of a world total of $22.810 trilIion).32 In addition to being dIe recipieIUs of capital flows dwarfed by the IIlCS, the scope for economic policymaking in the LDCS is constrained in another way, namely, by the particular forms of the concentrations of accumulated

UNEVEN DEvELor....IENT

109

TABLE

7.

Selected indicators of the size of the capital markers,

2002

Bank

Bonds, equities, and bank

Total

assetst

=='

Bonds, equities, and bank assets> (in percent OfGDI')

270U5.4

43570.2

40063.2

106443. 0

330.8

4930.9

7891.4

12822.3

17654.9

36202.5

418.4

3(,77.7

4226. t

6000.4

10226.5

12839.U

27U40.7

405.3

104.9

11625.0

5033.0

14823. 3

195{)6.3

6909.6

38471. 7

344.0

736.0

37.0

570.2

499.6

307.4

807.0

1100.2

2477.4

336.6

10480.8

68.0

11055.6

4533.4

14515.9

19049.3

5899.4

35994.3

344.'

3973.3

461.2

2095.5

4841.9

2072. 7

6914.6

6212.1

15222.2

381.9

Austria

2{)6. I

9.7

33.6

156.3

152.6

308.9

278.8

621.3

303.5

Belgium

245.4

I 1.9

138.7

304.0

256.4

560.4

1000.9

1700.()

690.6

Detunark

172.4

27.0

76.7

100.0

238.2

338.2

425.9

840.8

486.2

Finlal\d France

131.9

9.3

138.8

82.1

52.7

134.8

297.4

571.0

435.4

1438.4

28.4

1025.6

780.7

1151.3

1932.0

3161.7

6119.3

425.7

GDP

Tot'J.1 reserves nllnus gold·

Stock market capital. ization

Public

Private

32197.4

2513.9

22809.6

16564.8

European Union

8656.7

289. I

5734.3

Euro Area

6678.1

207.9

11216.8

World

North America Canada United Scates JJP al\

Debt Securities

NimwTandllm items EU countries

Germany

1992.3

"

2348.0

3208.2

2969.6

6863.8

3#.5

Greece

133.4

•

II . 8

173.0

175.9

414.9

311.4

Ireland

122.1

9

72.9

103.6

195.9

659.4

540.0

1188.0

28

822.8

2031. I

1789.4

4297.5

361.8

21.1

OJ

27.0

27.0

529.4

580.9

2820.4

Netherlands

419.8

"

669.3

867.7

1345. I

2731.4

650.7

Portugal

122.3

'0

82.0

161.7

174.5

383.4

314. I

Spain

657.3

3<

353.6

718. I

918.0

2097.7

320.2

Sweden

240.6

,�

337.9

359.4

359.4

876.5

3M.7

1565.7

3<

1445.6

1919.7

3724.2

7444.5

475.2

7415.9

151E

1062.0

2573.8

6980.4

12079.3

162.8

Asia

3429.4

975l

820.9

1527.3

4911.4

84{)4.5

242.2

Latin America

1658.5

16.

178.4

643.0

773.9

1725.4

105.2

Middle East

737.2

,3>

[3.5

18.9

598.5

669.9

73.4

Africa

450.3

7P

20.8

08.5

315.3

500.4

112. I

1140.5

189

28.4

316. I

381.3

779.1

81.8

Italy Luxemb ourg

United Kingdom Emerging markets

Europe

Som-a: [MF, Glob,,1 Fillallcial Stabili ty Rrpm "Data are from Institute for fiscal Srudie.<;.les me assets of me Bank of England.

tAs.sets of commercial banks. t Sum of me stock marker capitali:l.J.tion, d

assets in pension and mutual

funds in the HICS, especially

by the business

practices of the managers of these funds, who arc concerned solely with their short-term dividends and nor in the leasr with the (longer term) economic and social well-being of the economics in which their funds arc invested. Thesc assets aTe immensc. 111e disproportion between thc holdings of thc.�e mutu3.l and pension funds and of the less wealthy nations is palpable, f i not staggering. To give yet another example, private pension funds in the

DECD

countries, without including insurance funds and mutual fLUids,

amounted to ofthe

2001 n i

58.986 trillioll, dwarfing the total stock market capitalization

LDCS (52.525 trillion n i 2002).H

Moreover, the forms of I..-apital associated with pension, mmual, and in­ surance flUIds have done away with many of the traditional disciplincs c.xer­ cised by ownership at the poim of produnion.11le reason for this is that the fill;ulcial instnullems created as part of the burgeoning of such funds arc less amenable to established diSciplines and forms of regubtion (as was clearly

evidem in the subprime loan

Ill;uket CO[[;lpse), becallse the instTlllllemS in

question arc not positioncd within relatively soble and organized lIl3.rkets n i the W3.ys typic3.l of Illore conventional forms of fin3.ncial capital. These instruments arc managed by relatively few and largely anonymous flUld mall­ agers, based overwhelmingly in the United States, the United Kingdom, and a few olher countries, and their complexity is often such that they tend to be understood, f i at all, by only a few specialists. 'nlere are three lllevir-Jble ol\tcomes of tilis situation:

(1) the creators of these novel, often hybrid, n i ­

stnullents stand most to benefit from their deployment simply because mey are in a position to be m3.ximally cogniz.,'lllt of their ntricate i workings;

(2)

since many of these inStnullcllts arc conSciously designed to pass financial risks and tr:lnsaC[ion COSts from rhe lendet to the borrower,

LDC

financial

institutions that borrow through them ineVitably take higher risks than their lender banks in the First World (rhis being parr of the prevailing business ide­ ology of�risk transfer"); and (3) as with any financial market innovation, tile first users of the mechanism or channel in question tend invariably to profit disproportionally from it: as these mechanisms come to be Illore widely uscd tile rates of tilcir attendant gains arc inclined generally to fall. 'nle power of tilOse who conrrol such funds and the llistrumellts and channels tilrough which they arc deployed is tilerefof( massive, and these highly mobile and relatively IUlconventionai forms of capital are very mllch the locomotive force of tile newest regime of capitalist accumulation. Bur this cxpansion in its recent fonn of transnational portfolio capital docs not augur well for the developmelH of the LI)Cs. 111ere is ;ulIplc empiri-

112 CHA)'TER-+

cal evidence of direct correlations between portfolio capital equity inflow and exchange rate instabilities, as there is of the destabilizing "income effects" generated by stock exchange volati l ity, of the failure of portfolio n i flows in LOGS to be matched by increases in aggregate saving and investment in those COlUltries, and of the propensity of stock markets to favor the survival of large, though rclatively wlprofitable firms at the expense of their smaller bur more efficient counterparts. Odler difficulties exist, such as the proneness of financial markets to failure (due to the now well-known information deficits, unenforceable contracts, etc.); the inability of rhe LOC relying on foreign portfolio capital to use this short-term and speculative capital as part of a long-term macroeconomic strategy; and the susceptibility of such capital to exogenous pressures (shifting U.S. interest rates, the paramountcy of the needs of H IG investors, etc.).34 But the. most important consideration here is dlat the transnational fi­ nancial markets have done nothing so far (nor do dley give any indication of doing so in future) to deal with what is perhaps the single most important causal factor in the economic declines experienced by many Latin American and sub-Saharan African countries since the 1980s, declines that in many cases are continuing into the twenty-first century. 11lis is the outcome of the inability of the governments of the COlUltries n i question to maintain levels of real investment. According to the WurldDel'clopmwtReport of 1991, gross domestic invest­ ment decreased n i the Latin American and sub-Saharan countries as a group n i the 1980s, at the same time that both groups experienced their largest declines in growth rate.J5 Trends in these countries twenty years later have improved somewhat, especially where rhe Latin American growth rate is concerned, though the region as a whole still has a problem with attracting investmentY' 1he situation in sub-Saharan Africa n i the first decade of the twenty-first century has been less minollS overall than in previous decades, but this was almost entirely due to better prices for primary commodities such as oil and metals, needed by China and India to fuel their economic growth. Moreover, these improvements took place in only a handful of COWI­ tries, with South Africa being dle main beneficiary.37 Why did real n i vestment fall so significandy in dlese LOGS n i the 1980S and 1990S, and why is dlis situation persisting for so many LOGS n i the twenty­ first century? Will the c."ponential growth n i transnational financial markets occurring since. dIe 19805 do anydling to alleviate dle chronically low levels ofinvestment (and output) in these nations? -nle answer to the second ques­ tion, given dle evidence available so far, is no. In fact, the need of emerging UNEVEN DEvELor....IENT

113

COllntries to keep real interest rates high n i the hope of attracting foreign investor funds by ensuring higher rcmrns for foreign capital and to fall in line with the deflationary intent that is standard to all lMF and World Bank "stmctural adjustment programs;' will, all else being egual, lead to lower real wages. Given continuing high levels of unemployment, this policy will inevitably have negative effects on that country's income distribution. Given also the high existing levels of poverty, a growing population, depressed wages (for the reason just ndicated), i lUleven economic performance, and other possible factors, such as a decline in the guality of land stock (and the almost cerrain depletion of enviroIUllental assets), rhere is certainly no way that dle poorer nations will be able to gener:lte enough savings and invest­ ment endogenously to drive any kind of real growth, even if they try to heed the World Bank's injunction to seek their "comparative advant"Jge" (dlOUgh many nonindustrialized nations have no evident comparative advantage to benefit from) and to maintain open trade and n i vestment arrangemenrs as the optimal way to ensure such growth. j\10reover, significant amounts of foreign portfolio capital arc nO[ likely to flow in the direction of such coun­ tries, even f i they seek to implement open trade and market arrangements. -llie plight of such LDCS is grim, and given dle almost complete absence of instimtions and mechanisms designed at both national and international levels to promote long-term investment and financial stability, continued st"Jgnation is virtually inevitable for most of these countries. Many of them have already been consigned, n i Samir Amin's words, to a fourth 'A'orld that has no significant prospect of advancing even to the threshold of ndustri­ i

alization and of benefiting in any way from current and fumre expansions of international trade.38 Richard Kozul-Wright, a senior economist at the United Nltions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), sums up dle situation faced by rhe overwhelming majority of LDCS in a paragraph that is worth guoting at length: Imcrn:ltional trade and foreign capital movements remain largely dominated by transanions anlOng the already-rich countries, and though developing coumries have been trading more, all roo often they have betn earning less from these anivities. [Foreign diren investmtmj has rarely flowed to the poorest coumries whae economic growth and accumulation have failed to rake off or ha\·t remained weak and uncertain. . . . Although FD! can ncorpo­ i rate a developing coumry imo internationally integrated production chains, it often confines it to those funnions rtquiring unskilled labour, ofttn the assembly of imported compontms. . . . The finding that despite a rising shart

114

CHAPTER 4

of world exports of m:lnunctures, me developing coumries' share of global \'alue�added (i.e. gross facwr incomes) in manufacturing points w

FD[

as

widening, rather than narrowing, the gap between rich and poOr.39

Regarding the much-touted advances made by China and Indi:t in recent years, Kozul-Wright says: The L""Conomies of a more dispersed and sf'l.""Ciali Led international division of labour have tended w accrue disproportionately w advanced countries and w the foreign owners of capital. This has not mled Out some catch-up perfor­ mances, most recently and notably in China and India, albeit n i both cases, i ncithu coming from a vcry long way behind the !cading pack. However, n case can a Strict diet of opening up [to the global marketJ explain successful growm performance. Rathu, 10<.";11 "policy heresies" appear to have helped successfully manage the n i terface between internal and external integration n i a way that has helped pcrperuate virtuous growm cirdes:40

In short, the success of China and India is due, f i anything, to their willing­ ness to buck the prevailing neoliberal consensus. The fundamental insight of dependency theory- hat t all claims to the contrary notwithstanding, capi­ talism is not inherently progressive-appears to be more probative than the cozening neoliberalism of hose t who insist mat open markets and the pur­ suit of comparative advantage arc somehow going to be tile salvation of the world's low-income countries.

DrpendwCJ Jhrwy R£!!isitcd Pia a Drtollr through Giol'flllni An'igbiJs Analysis oftbe Cun'wt World-System Dependency theory has aimed to provide an c.xpbnation for the systematic underdevelopment of the nonindustrialized or semi-industri:tlized nations (tllereby filling a lacuna in marxist theories ofm i perialism, which have tended to focus more on the contradictory nature of capitalist production and irs property relations and less on the politically instituted relations of c.xchange between nations).41 Dependency theory has done more than this, however, because as one of its corollaries it has the proposition that as long as acmally existing capitalism prevails, the LDCS as a group are not n i principle going to be the beneficiaries of any structural changes in tile intemational system. But if this is tme, then it behooves the proponent of dependency theory to pro­

vide an account, howevt'r stylized, of the current makeup of this system. To my mind, the most historically detailed and analytically rigorous analy-

UNEVEN DEVELOP....IENT

115

sis of the current regime of accumulation, its relationship to its predecessor regimes, and the conditions being set down now for its possible successor is the one furnished by Giovanni Arrighi in ·fiJe Lmlg "/ll'tntieth CtlltlIry. Advo· cates of any version of dependency theory must at some point engage with the argument of this c..\:emplary text. One of Arrighi's aims is to account for the decline n i profitability and eco· nomic growth associated with the ending of the Golden Age of the Western economies from dle 1970S onward. His primary analytical notion is that of a "systemic cycle of accumulation." Adapting Marx's formula for the basic circuit of capital money ..... c011lllwdities ..... IIwre mOllcy (M ..... C - .M')

Arrighi argues that each systemic cycle consists of two phases. One is a period of "mate.rial expansion," in which profits are derived largely from the produc· tion and traffic in conunodities, and which Arrighi takes to be the equivalent of the.M - C component of Marx's fOffimla. The other cycle is a period of "financial expansion," in which profits come primarily from financial enter­ prises and not from the c..\:tension or intensification of the production and traffic in commodities, and which Arrighi takes to be the equivalent of the

C ..... M' segment of Marx's formula. Arrighi describes these c..\:pansions thm. Material expansions occur be· cause of the emergence of a particular bloc of governmental and bminess agencies capable of leading the system toward wider or dccper divisions of Iabor.42 These divisions of labor n i turn increase returns n i capital invested in trade and production. Under these conditions, profits tend to be plowed back n i to further expansion of trade and production more or less routinely, and knowingly or unknowingly the system's main centers cooperate in sm· taining one another's expansion. Over time, however, rhe n i vestment of an ever·growing mass of profits in the further expansion of trade and produc· tion inevitably leads to an accumulation of capital over and above what can be reinvested in the purchase and sale of commodities without drastically reducing profit margins. Decreasing remrns set in; competitive pressures on the system's governmental and business agencies intensify; and dle stage is set for the change of phase from material to financial expansion.43 Arrighi identifies four major systemic cycles of accumulation, or "long centuries;' in Western capitalism: the Genoese, the Dutch, the British, and the American. He also thinks it possible that Japan or East Asia is on the verge of constituting itself as a successor (fifth) major systemic cyele. In addi·

116 CHAPTER 4-

tion, he identifies (in his response to l'ollin) three differeIU sourees of finan­ cial profit that have a particular role n i the processes of financial c.xpansion: 1. A source n i which "cut-thrOat imcrcapitalist competition" creates exces­ sive liquidity that finds an Outlet in financia! transactions z.

A source n i which the Significant redistribution of income to capitalists creates conditions for the profitability of such financial transactions

3.

A source in which the liquidity generated by this protitability moves from cemcrs that arc no longcr capable of sustaining mau:ria.! expansion to those that arc devdoping this capability, thereby creating the. conditions for the supersession of the previous phase of financia.! expansion44

Arrighi says explicitly, "All financial expansions were eventually superseded by a new phase of materia! expansion."45 This may be tme of all systemic cycles of aCCluHulation up to dle present one; on this there is no need to argue with Arrighi (or widl Pollin, for that maner). But unless this charac­ terization of succeeding phases and cycles is to be c1evated into a teleology that mns a staunchly dialectical course (a "logic of world cronomic history" in the manner of Hegel),46 dle possibility must be left open that there may be no recognizable successor systemic cyele of accumulation to the present one, and har t the primacy of dle current systemic cycle may dms extend n i definitely n i to the (so far anticipatable) fumre. Or it may be possible for there to be a series of transformations, however prolonged, of the current phase of financial c.xpansion, so that by dIe time this series of transitions has progressed far enough dlere will no longer be a foml of capitalism that resembles the presently regnant and American-sponsored systemic cycle, or ndeed i for dlere to be anything like a systemic cycle of accumulation in the way characterized by Arrighi.47 If thest' scenarios were to obtain, dlen Marx's n i sight that dle capitalist has no intrinsic interest in the value of commodities he or she buys or finances so !ong as the commodities in question can be sold for a profit wi!! be borne out, and rhe blissfully "utopic" simation for dIe capitalist, whereby the capitalist moves directly from the initial sum of money to yet more money, to still yet more money, and so on (the circuit .M - .M'

.....

Ml ..... M' ''''' AI"),

bypassing

altogether the production and exchange of commodities (dIe circui t M .....

C - M'), will have materialized. If this new regime of accumulation should be implemented, then, pace Arrighi and Pollin, tills wi!! have occurred widl­ our dIe accompanying impems to generate conditions for a new and succeed­ ing phase of material c.xpansion. But how is dlls possible, given hat t profits

UNEVEN DEVEI.OPMENT

117

necessarily must at some point come from the production and circulation of commodities? (TIlls is not to suggest that there will no longer be any material or commodity-production expansions if these scenarios occur. A material expansion may take place in fmure, but it will not do so according to the ebb-and-flow logic oudined in 'file LUllg TlVNltieth C.C/lwry.) For Arrighi the two circuits or phases of capital arc in a relationship of oscillation. To pm it somewhat schematically, when capitalists can't make enough profit from commodity production or have overaccllmlllated as a result of commodity production, they switch to financial transactions; they remm to commodity production (only) when the speculative bubbles gen­ erated by excessive financial expansion have burst. In other words, Arrighi conceives of the relationship between phases as one of succession or alterna­ tion, that is, as an essentially temporal relationship. But a significant body of work on recent inte.rnational trade and financial regimes seem to indicate that the relationship between financial and productive capital is now primarily spatial, so that what we have in world capitalism today approximates more a complex amalgam of two simultaneously c.xisting subregimes, one that is purdy financial and one represented by commodity production and its atten­ dant forms of productive capital.4�

-The huge disparity between the sizes of dlese subregimes needs to be emphasized again-not just the scale of dle pension, insurance, mumal, and hedge funds, bur also dle sheer volume and value of trading on foreign ex­ change markets (dle world's largest financial market), which as early as 1994was nearly forty times the daily value of cross-border trade:�9 In 2005 global financial stock totaled more than $u8 trillion and was predicted to increase to $200 trillion by 2010. In 2002 dle gross value of cross-border equity trades constituted 80 percent of global equity market capitalization, a huge leap when compared to 1989, a year in which cross-border trades constimted 18 percent of a substantially smaller world equity marketY' As a result of the important changes that have taken place n i the interna­ tional system of financial markets since the 1970s, including changes in the sources of international credit and a new capital-recycling mechanism, today no single state or public authority has effective control of the international fi­ nancial system, which was not the case n i Arrighi's two most recent systemic cycles of accumulation, dle American and the British, which gave markets in New York and London a clear and decisive primacy in those systems of accu­ mulation. TIle result is a growing regionalization of interest rates and the de­ clining importance of reserve requirements as financial institutions become more hybridized and their resources more interchangeable as a result.5! 118

CHAPTER 4-

"illere is therefore no unitary, comprehensive model of how financial system (whidl can appropriately be viewed as an

dlis global

M - M'

sub­

regime) relates to dle production and exchange of conunodities (which con­ stitutes a

C - M'

subregime). The dynamics of the relation between these

two subregimes as it involves the economic system of a particular COWltry (or group of countries) or region is inflected by path dependency, so that the eco­ nomic activities dlat form this particular dynamic necessarily occur widlin, and have outcomes dlat

are

determined by, an always specific strucmre of

political and social relations, a strucmre which {hat country or group of coun­ tries mayor may not share with other countries or groups of countries.52 Some countries or cities-Hong Kong and Singapore come readi l y to mind because their economies hinge crucially and overwhelmingly on the provision of financial services and dle undertaking of a variety of entrepot nmctions-display a very substantial embeddedness in dle financial sub­ regime or circuit of capital M ..... M'. C--ountries dlat are much more depen­ dent on manufacmring-Taiwan and Brazil are good examples-arc more profoundly embedded in the commodity-production subregime or circuit of capital C - M '. Still others, such as the United States (especially) and Japan, evince a powerful embeddedness n i both of dlese subregimes. 1be forms of embeddedness in these subregimes arc inevitably somewhat stylized in this accowlt, since there is no such thing as a pure or perfect regime of financial enterprises nor one of commodity production. And since there. is n i principle a potential multiplicity of forms of padl dependem_l' and embeddedness, dif­ ferent cowltrics can relate in very different ways to one or bodl of these sub­ regimes. But what of the claim made by Arrighi and Pollin that, in l'ollin's words, "the.M .....

M' circuit of pure financial deals operates successfully only

because dlis operation always presupposes a newly successful M ..... C - .M' circuit"?53 In the account being canvassed here, the financial capital subregime

(FC�R)

can stand in a variety of relationships to the productive or manufac­

mring capital subregime (PC ..5R), and each such relationship will have its own particular dynamism, though it will certainly be possible for us to categorize the different kinds of relationship and heir t accompanying dynamism and to formulate principles that govern the relationships and dynamisms under consideration. In dealing widl Pollin's question (filtered through my own nomenclature), a great deal will depend on whether the

FCSR

happens to

be in a relation of subordination or superordination to dle /'CSR. In a capi­ talist order, the survival or continued viability of dlis or that

FCSR or l'CSR

is wholly contingent on dle capacity of that particular subregime to generUNEVEN DEVEI.OI'MENT

119

ate continued surpluses. Failure to do this would result in a crisis for dlat subregime and for the capitalist system which it embodies. This is rhe only absolute necessity incumbent upon any system or form of accumulation as long as capitalism prevails. To continue to extract surpluses a regime has to enable its agents or instnunents to find outlets or markets into which these surpluses can be chalUleled. Determining the subordination or superordi.na­ tion of an FCSR in relation to a PCSR will therefore require a determination to be made of their respective (and always path-dependent) capacities to gCller­ ate surpluses. Judged on dle basis of the respective scale of the surpluses dley have generated, presented in dlis chapter and chapter J, there s i compelling evidence dlat since the end of dle Golden Age FCSR and not l'CSR has been the primary capitalist subregime (dlOugh with dle current financial crisis this state of affairs may no longer obtain, even in the slightly longer run). -nle primacy of FCSR over l'CSR n i the past two decades is plain to see. So is dle fact, given groWdl of this magnimde, dlat in dlM time surpluses in the

IIICS have been recycled n i to financial expansion (such as housing and prop­ erty markets) and not so much into commodity production. "Vidl generally weak levels of productive output, rhe ducat of an immense overabundance of commodities being left unsold is thereby reduced. And it is dlis threat which lies at the heart of the insistCllCe (which appears in Pollin's question) that financial capital can continue to have life only if the system of accumu­ lation it subserves manages to maintain or increases productive output (i.e., ncorpor,ues i a "successful M -

C - MI

circuit"). Of course, commodities

"have" to be produced, but in the current system of accumulation this is being left to the economies Witll low labor costs which function therefore as suppiers l for the markets of the I-IICS. Arrighi himself notes dns when he says, "lThe1 main strucmral feamre of the emergent [East Asian] regime remains

the provisioning of wealthy markets widl products that embody the

cheap labor of poor countries." But he then goes on to say, "Nevertheless, the 'informality' and 'flexibility' of the Japanese multilayered subcontract­ ing system, combined with the abwldance of parsimonious and industrious labor in the East Asian region, endow Japanese

and East Asian capital with

a distinctive advant"Jge in dle escalating global race to cut labor costs. It s i precisely in this sense dlat the emerging East Asian regime of accumulation is a negation of the old U.S. regime."s4 However, it is clear dlat there is no such "global race" (let alone one that is "escalating")

to

rut labor costs, since

the FDI that targets such low-cost labor in developing cOlUltries is being aimed very specifically at a tiny minority of COlUltries. As I indicated earlier, most of the world's FDI goes to a mere handful of LDCS, most of tllem East

120 CHAPTER 4

Asian, while dIe overwhelming majority of LDCS outside East Asia receive Iitde or no 1'01 (though Russia and Brazil have started to receive more I'DJ). There is a quest for low-cost labor, granted, and though some feamres of irs general trajectory may conform to rhe one delineated by Arrighi, it is not by any means a global quest. On the contrary, the search or "race" for cheap labor has a marked regional structure (Africa and most of Latin America are effectively disqualified from participation from dIe ourset), and its direction widlin that structure is even more highly selective. Few would deny that the quest for cheap labor sub­ servc.� the imperative of stocking the markers of the wealthy nations, bllt the overaccumulations of the wealthy nations are not allowed to saturate commodity-producing domains located lil low-income cowItries (i.e., do­ mains which bclong to dIe I'G�}{); n i stead, in dIe currently prevailing capital allocation mechanism these surpluses arc plowed back nto i dealings on world­ wide financial markers (the FCSR.) primarily to fund the U.S. current account deficit. When surpluses do find their way to the less wealthy countries, dley do so through the intermediation of these financial markets, which means that they can always be pulled out of the LDCS at extremely short notice. Attention also needs to be paid to rhe entirely new configurations of speculative and industrial or commercial capital that now exist. Many cor­ porations nowadays derive profits from speculation as well as the enterprises they arc more commonly associated with, and so the need to look for outlets for surpluses in new commodity-producing circuits is less pressing. For in­ stance, since 1993 American Airlines has been hawking irs own mutual fund in conjunction widl its frequent-flier program, and in dIe United States the quasi-federal agencies, dIe now notorious Federal National Mortgage Asso­ ciation (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac), buy up mortgage loans from banks and thrift societies and package diese into bonds that arc then sold on the securities market, a pro­ cess therefore known as securitization. As we know only too well, securiti­ zation led to dIe downfall of Fannie Mac and Freddie Mac in 2008.55 Money continues to be n i vested n i a few developing cOlUltries, of course, but it is in the very nature of 1'01 dlat it be generated from a foreign source, so dIe sur­ pluses that accrue from dlis investment in the LDCS will rerum to the foreign source in question (usually an IIlC). The East Asian crisis of 1997-98 can be attributed in part to this almost complete reliance on foreign capital, especially on the part of the so-called second-tier East Asian newly industrialized countries (Indonesia, Mai:tysia, and TIiailand). Arrighi's prediction in dlis regard is quite plausible: dIe cenUNEVEN DEVEI.OPMENT

121

ters of the emerging regime of accumulation will receive a surge of foreign capital drawn to dIem by the prospect of higher rates of profit than those available at the centers of the declining system. Sm the heavy reliance of the East Asian cownries on foreign nvestment i has several troubling features that inmIediately qualify any judgment of dIem as the (collective) potential successors of the dominant but ostensibly fading U.S. regime. In

1991-93

Malaysia had an amlUal average ratio of FDI to gross domestic capital forma­ tion of 24.6 percent. -nlis also accounted for its high services account deficit

(56.7 billion) in 1995, caused by foreign companies repatriating their profits. Malaysia also had a problem with low total factor productivity, which grew at an annual rate of only 2.2 percent between

1991 and 1996. At the same

time, Malaysia had a massive credit expansion, averaging over 30 percent a year between 1994 and 1997 and constituting around 160 percent of its GOP, with bank loans alone approaching 57 percent of GDl'. In -nlailand in 1997, every dollar exported contained 43 cents ofimported materials, so dependent were its export-oriented manufacturing sectors on imported parts. Thailand also had a large foreign debt total of $90 billion. Indonesia had a foreign debt total that stood at $60 billion at the time of its 1MF bailout in 1997. Nonper­ forming loans in the Southeast Asian banking system amounted to approxi· mately $73 billion, over 13 percent of Southeast Asian GDP.56 Even a dl""Cade after the crisis of

1997-98 these hardly seem like nations belonging (with

Japan and China) to the regime of accumulation seen by Arrighi and many others as the potential successor to the possibly declining U.S. regime.s7 Together, the features that most strongly defint� actually existing world capitalism point inexorably to the relative autonomy of financial (and "fic­ titious") capital from productive capital, that s i , the autonomy of the FCSR from the PCSR. -nle embeddedness of a national economy n i either or both of these subregimes is strongly path-dependent; for the economy of a particu­ lar nation, this may either enhance or reduce the autonomy of the FCSR n i relation to the PCSR, or vice versa. But in reality there is no such thing as an absolute autonomy or an absolute n i tegration of these subregimcs: financial capital markets and regimes and productive capital markets and regimes are necessarily related to each other, because funds are free to move between them and poic l ies made n i regard to one necessarily affect the other. At the same time, the world capitalist system that has emerged since the end of the Golden Age is in crisis because the surpluses yielded by the

FCSR

enable dIOse national economies most deeply embedded in it to escape many of the disciplines that arc m i posed on those economies which function by being embedded primarily in the 1'C.�R (let alone the stark inequities that con-

122

CHAPTER 4

from thosc in the Fourth World, which belongs to neither subregime). The most telling illustration of this is the accomplishment of the United States in getting its massive currem account and federal budgct deficits subsidized by the domestic surpluses of other cOlmtries. These countries must convert their surpluses into low-yielding U.S. Treasury bills so that they can hold olIi­ cial reserves of U.S. dollars as a safeguard against sudden reversals n i capital flows. But then they have to borrow money at higher rates to finance their own development.5� Only a country as widely and powerfully embedded in the FCSR subregime as the United States can grant itself this option, which must make the United States, now able to comfKlrt itself as the "investor aristocracy" of this world capitalist system, an object of envy for ma.ny a poor country srmggling with its fiscal deficits but with no financial market resources at hand to bring it dlis kind of miraculous but nonetheless ulti­ mately chimerical economic relief.51' Worldwide economic polarization in its currem manifestation s i driven more by the divorce (always fKllitically n i stituted and maintained) between financial and pnxluctive capital, and

less

by dIe mechanisms of unequal

exchange a.� typically understood in dependency theory. In rhe typical ac­ count, unequal c.xchange exists because of an international division of labor which allows dIe H ICS to commandeer n i dustrial productive capacity while consigning LOCS to the production of primary commodities (this being the phenomenon of compulsory maldevelopment described by Samir Amin and odlers in dIe dependency and uneven development school), becausc interna­ tional trade on these terms can never be mutually advantageous. However, in dIe account being canvassed here, while there still is wlequal exchange-it being undeniable that even in dIe era offinancial capital (and its ftmdamental divorce from productive capital) rhe less wealdlY countries function essen­ tially as producers of primary commodities and as providers of cheap labor­ the main source of international economic polarization today s i precisely the autonomy of finance capital from productive capital. ·TIIis autonomy estab­ lishes asymmetries between dIe high- and low-income countries that appear to be deeply emrenched. So the question remains whether, and if .so to what degree, dlese asymmetries are surmountable.

SlIrmOlllltillg llItematiollai Ecollolllic Polarization The development fKllicy prescriptions-trade and price liberalization, de­ regulation, privatization, and closer links with the world economy- ofinter­ national financial n i stimtions such as dIe World Hank and the 1MI', as well UNEVEN DEVEI.OP.\IENT

123

as those nations, primarily the United States, responsible for underwriting the neolibcral Washington consensus, arc largely irrelevant to the economic simation of the LDCS, many of whom arc still stmggling with varying de­ grees of success to make the. long-term stmcmral adjustments necessitated by the major recession and debt crisis of the 1980s, the boom-and-bust crises of the 1990S and today, and the market volatility associated with these up­ heavals. According to these n i ternational instimtions and wealthy countries, swimming with the ride of global economic integration is the only way for­ ward for the poorer nations of the South. 111e dependency and uneven de­ velopment paradigm has long been associated with the proposed ddinking of the economies of he t South from those of the North.60 -This dclinking strategy is commended because of the conviction of those upholding the un­ even development paradigm that the situation of the lowe.r-income cOlUltries cannot be improved stmcruraUy within the terms of the prevailing regime of accumulation. As we have seen, a judicious sCnlriny of the available evidence is hardly likely to controven dtis conviction. \Vith the kinds of financial and monetary control afforded by ddinking and with more democratic political institutions, LDCS can at least pursue more consistently, f i not more seri­ ously, the project of an economic liberation that hopefully will stan to bring to an end the newest form of economic dependency.

124

CHAPTER 4

CHAPTER 5 The Possibility of a New State I

Dc/il/killg

The analysis of the current regime of accumulation provided in chapter 4 supports the proposition that economic relations bcnvl-cll tile world's rich and {Xlorcollntrics arc stmcrurally defined by fundamental asymmetries that make the extraction of surpluses from the LDCS, whether directly or by morc complex circuits of accumulation, a pervasive condition for rhe economic advancement of the wealthy countries. 1hc outcome of this entrenched sima­ tion is a systemic inequality, affecting both economic and social conditions, which greatly impedes the advancement of a large number of

LDCS.

Any

attempt to conceive of a viable liberation for the impoverished masses of women, children, and men from this condition of economic and social pri­ vation (it may perhaps be bener characterized as a mode of pauperization) must therefore fOCllS on the causes of this inequality in order ro furnish prac­ tical proposals for its immediate amelioration and ultimate elimination.

Wh)' Drlink? The economic advancement of the world's HICS, located mainly in the North, has gone hand in hand with the progressive impoverishment of the citizens of its less well-off countries, located mainly in the SOUdl (where

85 percent

of the world's JXlpulation ive). l It follows from this that the removal of this North-South polarization, whic h at its root is class-based, must be. the goal of any project of liberation.! In this chapter I argue that the best way to re­ move this fundamental polarization, from the poilU of view of the countries

of the South, is through a str.ltegy of delinking. The economic development of the nations of the North under capitalism has so far required the South to "adjust" to the economic aspirations of the North. 11le array of strategies associated with ddinking proposes that this economic subordination on the part of the South should no longer be the case, that s i , that the economic development of the Somh must on cile contrary follow strategies no longer requiring it to make systemic "adjustments" whose basic rationale, whether explicit or merely tacit, s i the economic advancement of cile North. 1b think otherwise s i to acquiesce in a reality where the gap between North and SOUcil, already pronOlUlced, will only grow, with calamitous consequences for even larger numbers of human bcings in the SOUcil.2 It is easy for (lUlinformed and sometimes ill-intentioned) critics of the delinking strategy to portray it as an autarkic severing of links with cile rest of the world, akin to the dreadful vision Poll'ot tried to impose on Cambodia, or the one which prevailed in Albania ("cile world's most secretive state") in Soviet times, or in North Korea today. However, the Albanian, North Korean, and Cambodian scenarios are very far from the proposals advanced by proponents of the delinking strategy. Proponents of ddinking claim cilat economic advancement for the nations of the SOUcil will take place only when these nations are able to pursue their own policies for developing productive systems appropriate to the needs of their people, while at the same time establishing n i ternal political conditions for owrcoming economic and social inequality, and then using the logic of tillS (new) system of productive and social relations to structure their deal­ ings with cile advanced capitalist countries. The nit i ial aim is to find alterna­ tives to the prevailing "structural adjustment" policy advocated by neolib­ eralism, which compels the nations of cile South to trim their policies to the demands of n i ternational capital, and thus to cile detriment of cile social and economic interests of the majority of their people.3 -nle current system of accumulation is at root a structure of e.xploitation, no more and no less, and so delinking is premised on the need to find im­ mediate alternatives to this structure of exploitation. 1his exploitation is not only economic, but also extends into cile spheres of social and cultural rec­ og!lltion for those who are exploited.4 Recently, Lance Taylor, who has made a number of careful criticisms of the World Bank over the years but who is hardly to be regarded

as

a marx­

ist, has recommended a partial delinking on "narrowly technical grounds."s Taylor has analyzed extensively the data regarding the open trade and capital market strategies of a cross-section of fifty lower income countries (going

126

CHAPTER 5

as far back as the economically more propitious 1960S) and found few gains and some losses accming from these exogenously oriented policies. "flle same conclusion is drawn by Mark Weisbrot, Dean Baker, and David Rosnik in their assessment of the " development" policy favored by multilateral institu­ tions such as the \.Vorld Bank and IMF over the past twenty-five years: The. past quarter century has seen a sharp decline in the rate of growth for the vast majority of low- and middlc-incoml'. counnit:s. Accompanying this decline has been reduced progress for almost aU the social n i dicarors that arc available ro measure health and educational outcomes. . . . Indeed, som..: economists have n.'"Cently concluded that more "policy au­ ronomy"-the ability of countries ro make their own d..:cisions about eco­ nomic policy-iS needed for developing countrics.6 The "policy autonomy" Weisbrot et al. commend is not sufficient, though it is certainly a good start for some LOGS. Policy autonomy does not necessari ly take into account rhose acmal market linkages which serve to disadvantage the

lOGS,

and unless something is done systemically to deal with these link­

ages that work to the detrimem of the South, very little will be achieved. Taylor has helpfully proposed tllal

lOG

countries should dispense on a

piccemeal basis with linkages to the markets of the North that bring "the least benefit.�" or exact "tile greatest costs," concluding tllat a limited and selective autarky of this kind offers them a better bet for economic survival. As Taylor puts it, "The inwardly oriented resource allocation strategy seems the least risky, especially for large countries."7 Given that openness to global capital flows makes an LOC more vuinerJble to enernal shocks and to the potential onset of financial crises such as the one tllat occurred n i East Asia, it would seem to be in the best interests of the

lOGS to buck the wisdom of tile neoclassical consensus and attempt a stra­ tegic and selective delinking along the lines reconunended by Samir Amin, Lance Taylor, and others. This would at least place the LOCS in a better posi­ tion to nert greater control over their macroeconomics as they implement development policies tllat are endogenously oriented, as opposed to placing their faith in roller-coaster financial markets that have the lOGS at tllcir mercy ("by the throat" may be tile more apt met"Jphor). So tile first step n i a ddinking strategy would be a cost-benefit analysis of all the linkages that a particular

LOG has with the countries and institutions

of the North. The c.xample of Argentina a few years ago, which decided to pay off all its debt to the IMF in order not to have to submit to rhe

I,\IF'S

stmctural adjustment requirements, shows tllat it is possible to escape the DElINK1NG

L!.7

rutelage of the n i stitutions integral to the "Washington consensus." 8 Like­ wise Venezuela, which has never had to accept 1M!' assistance, n i 2006 paid otT all its loans [0 the \.""orld Bank, again in order not to be beholden to that institution. The exemplar for these cOlUltries, at least when it comes to in­ dependence with regard to such organizations as the 1M!', World Bank, and WTO, is of course Cuba, which despite dle long-standing U.S. embargo and the peremptory withdrawal of aid from the USSR at the time of its dissolu­ tion, nonetheless has child mortality, literacy, and general educational and health levels that match dlOse of most

OIlCO

countries, and certainly the

United States. 1he question of maintaining or severing such linkages with the countries of the North will have to b e unerly pragmatic ("Is this really to our Pl:Ople'S benefit or not?") and based strictly on the national or regional interests of the LOC in question. -nle guiding principle in such decisions to continue or to abandon link­ ages with the capitalist metropolitan centers is the need to revise, and if nec­ essary discard, the. international regulatory framework, superintended by such organizations as the IMF, the WTO, and the 'A'orld Bank, which governs trade relations between the

LOGS

and the wealthy countries of the North.

-nlis regulatory system works overwhelmingly to promote the interests of the Nordl, and the

lOGS will have

to find the means to ensure more, and

fairer, access to dle markets currently monopolized by dle economically ad­ vanced cowltries. Another requirement will be the complete reorganization of the n i ter­ national financial system, whose current disposition is very much to favor speculation on the part of private n i vestors n i the wealthy countries at the expense of the poor citizens of dle

LOCS.

If the

lDGS are to benefit from fi­

nancial arrangements which promote longer term investment in productive activities, then it will be evident to all but dle most biased observer that the current regime of accumulation, which privileges short-term speculation to the detriment ofjust abom everything else, will have to be drastically refash­ ioned. Priority will have to be accorded to those forms of financial activity which allow productive investment to be steered in dle direction of countries such as Mali and East Timor, which hardly figure in the thinking of stock market strategists and fund managers n i London, New York, or Zurich. In addition, dle world's poorest LOCS will have to be afforded resources that enable them to keep their exchange rates fairly stable, as opposed to fluc­ tuating at the whim of central banks n i the wealdlY countries of the Nordl (which is dle United States, basically). No -nlird World country should face radically diminished economic prospects and the impoverishment of its

128

CHAPTER 5

people simply because the U.S. Federal Reserve wants to loweror raise n i ter­ est rates in order to "soft-land" dle domestic economy or to make a dent in the massive U.S. current account deficit. The most satisfactory outcome for the countries of the SOUdl would be a regionalized system of exchange rates, potentially able to serve as an lOC bulwark against opportunistic shifts in the monetary policies of OECO countries (especially U.S. monetary poicies).9 l To reiterate a point already made, development is highly path-dependent. 111at is, it is more likely to occur if it is imposed in appropriately sequenced phases. TllUS, to cite a banal c.xample, financial openness is not likely to be of immediate benefit to a peasant-based society with little or no access to stock market capitalization; of far more use to such a society will be debt reduction, suitable enhancements in agriculmral tedUlology (dlOugh not of the agribusiness variety!), and a more equitable system of land distribution as opposed to wholesale privatization of utilities. As Samir Amin has repeat­ edly pointed out, the overwhelming majority of dle people of dle South are peasants; n i fact 3 billion (i.e., 50 percent) of the world's population arc peasant farmers. To state the obvious: to a mral population entirdy lacking in utilities such as water and electricity, an IMF-imposed privatization of utilities is worth.lcss.w Cmcial here is the issue of agriculmral productivity. Farmers in the de­ veloped North, widl access to the latest redmologies associated widl wide­ spread agricultural industrialization, have very high levels of productivity in relation to those of peasant farmers, only a small segment of whom have ac­ cess to mdimentary mechanization and who arc thus able to benefit in small ways from dle so-called green revolution. (NO[ that the green revolution has been an unqualified boon for poor farming populations in the countries of the South. ,'vhny of dlis revolution's "gains" have been sequestered wholesale by multinational agribusiness corporations to the immediate and total detri­ ment of poor farmers.) -nle overwhelming number of peasant farmers in the South have. no access even to basic tedmologies; as a result, says Amin, the ratio of productivity of the most tedUlologically advanced tier of agricultural production (in dle countries of the North and West) to that of the poorest forms of peasant agriculture (in rhe South), which stood at 10: 1 before 1940, is now approaching 2,000 : 1.11

Compounding this state of affairs is the decline of prices n i the agricul­ tural sector in relation to prices in the industrial and service sectors to one­ fifth of their level fifty years ago. ·nle questionof uneven development s i thus first a.nd foremost an agriculmral question. Open and deregulated markets, along the lines proposed by the WTO, would not be of much use to the overDElINKING

l29

whelming majority of these three billion peasant farmers. Their predicament is tersdy swnmed up by Amin in the following terms: One

can

imagine that the food brought to markcc by today's three billion

peasants, after they ensure their own subsistences, would instead be produced by twcnry million new modern famlCfs. The conditions for the success ofsuch an aln;rnative would inelude the transfer of imponant pieces of good land to the new agriculturalists (and these lands would have to be taken Out of thc hands of presenr pcasanr societies), capital (to buy supplies and equipment), and access to the consumer markcts. Such agriculturalists would indeed com­ pete successfully with the billions of present peasants. But what would hap­ pen

to

those billions of peopk? . . . What will become of these billions of

humans \X;ings, thc majority of whom are already poor among the poor, who feed themselves with great difficulty? In fifty years' time, ndustrial i dcvelop­ menr, even in the fanciful hypotheSiS of a cunrinued growth rate of 7 percent alllmaHy, could not absorb even one-third of this rescrve.ll

'The only viable alternative for this

50 percent of the world's population is

for peasant agriculture to be maintained for several decades, while modern tedUlologics and methods are introduced and agricultural productivity in the SOUcil is raised. \Nith this rise in productivity more peasants in the SOUcil can move from subsistence farming to the higher value-added industrial and service sectors, in this way avoiding immediate immiseration and cile. pre­ cipitous collapse of their supporting social networks. However, rhe policies now being pursued by the international financial organizations and the gov­ ernments of the North are quite the opposite of the sane and rational pro­ posals made by Amin and others. ·TIlese policies, premised on cile "need" for a wholesale market deregulation in world agriculture, will have even more calamitous consequences for those whose lives are already precarious. Even now, as was seen in previous chapters, the lot of those living on less than two dollars a day is being made worse by such policies. -TIle preponderance of the peasant agricultllral sector n i the Somh is matched by an equally strong tilt toward urban-based industrial production in the metropolitan countries (mainly in the North). As Amin points out, four-fifths of the urban dwellers n i the advanced cOlUltries are workers en­ gaged n i some form of industrial production. But even here there is precari­ ousness, since a large segment of cilese workers are engaged in low-wage and "informal" modes of labor with little or no social protection. Table

8

depicts the distribution of the world's urban population. Ihe popular (or working) classes constimte 75 percent of cile world's urban population, wicil

1,0

CHAPTER 5

TABLE 8, Percentages of total world urban population Centers

Peripheries

\\'ealthyand middle classes

II

13

25

Popular classa•

22

54

75

Stabilized

( 13)

(II)

(25)

(9)

(43)

(50)

33

67

10<1

2

3

Precarious

Total Population illvol"ed (billions)

World

Sollrct: S. Amin, �1he Conditions for an Alternative Global Syslem.� •

Amin makes a distinction between the middle and popular classes (rlmmpoplilaim).1he

latler consists of a segment in Trasonably well-waged and guaranteed employment (i.e., they are Mscabilized"), while the rest belong to the �precarious� segment.

the " precarious" com\xment accounting for -+0 percent of the popular classes in the metropolitan "center" and 80 percent in the countries of the "periph­ ery," that is, about 60 percent of the global popular class. In other words, the precarious popuhr classes form around 50 percent of the world's urban population and a great deal more than this in the countries of the periphery. "There arc now 1.5 billion n i dividuals who belong to this prcrarious group, which presents a massive problem for the world's poor countries as they struggle with huge expansions of already crowded cities, growing social and economic inequality, insufficient access to globalized markets for their com­ modities, and a shortage of investment to promote economic and social de­ velopment in these countries.

Structural Collsideratio1JS The systemic inequities faced by the lOGs, capmred by statistical data of the kind just presemed, can easily be taken to represent phenomena that are merely transitory, " blips" that will be ironlxl out when tht� LOGs get with the program that the neolibcral consensus has decreed for them. According to this neoliberal consensus, the problems confronting the LOGS arc remedi­ able in principle primarily because LDG economies are beset by "market dis­ equilibria" which need to be "corrected," and the principal m i pediment to this correction is the failure of the lOGS to adopt "good policies" that allow DELlNK1NC

131

markets to function without interference Of impediment. Ibis contention, however, takes no account of the pefvasive stmcmral hurdles that confront poorer cOlUltries in acmally e.xsti i ng capitalism

(as opposed to the fantasies

about open markets dlat possess the minds of those who advocate neoliber­ alism).13 -nle LDCS, and indeed all countries whose economic fate.� are tied to actually existing capitalism, face a seemingly insurmountable obstacle posed by an ingrained logic of capitalism which operates in two ways, one tending to promote underconsumption and the other overaccumulation. First there is the problem posed by a systemic propensity to undercon­ sumption in the capitalist economics. This propensity can be explained by a simple arithmetical example, derived from the pioneering work of Baran and Sweezy.14 Suppose the total output of a particular economy is wages constituting

50 percent and profits 50

omy workers' consumption is

50

100, with

percent, and that n i this econ­

percent, while the consumption of the

economy's capitalists is 25 percent, and investment s i a further 25 percent. \.-\le then suppose that this distribution changes to a ratio of 40: 60 between wages and profits, and that dIe capitalist conswnption and the investment figures remain unchanged. Since workers cannot consume beyond their wages, total

demand in t.he economy would be only 90 percent, as opposed [0 the initial

100.

But f i the state then has an expenditure of 10 percent, raised by taxing

profits or by borrowing, then rhe output figure will be profits constituting

50 percent, while

100, with

the wage bill remains at

after-tax

40 percent.

Neither the total output nor the share of post-tax profits in this economy would have changed in regard to the initial situation, even though consump­ tion is now at

40 percent as

opposed to the n i itial

50 percent. This built-in

propensity toward underconsumption is never visible since it is effectively concealed by state intervention. Haran and Sweezy argued that dlis was a de­ fining feamre of post-\Vorld War II capitalism, when the immense military expendimres of the West (and especially of dIe United States) compensated for this n i herent tendency toward underconsumption. -The root cause of dlis susceptibility to lUlderconsumption in the capitalist system is a "law of the motion of capital" identified by Marx, namely, dlat

as surpluses arc acquired

by capitalists who then use dlese surpluses to ex­

pand production, output will rise n i due course and accumulation will be en­ hanced. At the same time, the bargaining power of labor increases, and widl tillS improved bargaining power wages tend to rise. Capitalists respond to this rise in wages by introducing labor-saving teciUlologie.�, which, because they release workers nto i the pool of dIe unemployed, will calise wages to fall again. But while capitalists now have reduced wage cost.� thanks to the 132

CHAPTER 5

introduction of labor-saving machinery, this machinery has to be paid for, and consequently investment in capital goods on the part of capitalists has to go up. -The enhanced profitability made possible by a declining wage bill

is

countered by the growing costs of investing in labor-saving tl"Clmology.

-nle response on the part of the capitalist is to reduce labor costs, which gen­ erJtes surpluses that can then be invested in expanded production, and the whole cycle is set off again. This time, however, there arc fewer workers to layoff (the labor-saving tedmology having ensured this). $0 each subsequent round of laoor-saving technology enhancement releases workers from an ever-diminishing workforce. In time, the labor force will be so drastically re­ duced that no more surpluses can be extracted from the few (or no) workers left.15 At rhe same time, the cost of investing in capital goods to make up for a progressively reduced labor force has also gone up. Profits will then fall, in­ evitably, and so necessarily will the wage pool, and with it effective demand. Falling wages and declining consumption are thus a built-in tendency in the capitalist system: in Marx's words, there is " a natural tendency for the rate of profit to fall." 16 A similar logic, premised on a frantic drive to reduce wage costs in order to boost profitability, wlderpins the current corporate dispo­ sition to downsize by resorting to offshore outsourcing. Second, this account of the falling rate of profit is eomplemellted by an­ other explanation, also Marxian, relying on the notion of a competition be­ tween firms which results in overproduction and overcapacity (the overaccu­ mulation thesis). According to this explanation, whose foremost proponent in recent years has been Robert BreIUlerp the decline in the rate of profit which confronts capitalist enterprises has its basic cause n i the fairly con­ stant disposition of producers to enhance profitability by dl"epening capital, that is, resorting to cheaper and more effective forms of production while maintaining output. But even as they do this, producers have to disregard, more or less, the capital that has already been sWlk into their enterprise. 111is already encumbered capital ("fixed capital") constitutes an inflexible cost that caIUlOt be driven downward. Producers will seek to maintain their competi­ tiveness by reducing prices, bm given that they cannot avoid the unbending costs of their fixed capital the n i evitable outcome is a decline in aggregate profitability.Ihe n i sight here is that investment in labor-saving technology, designed to save profitability, only n i creases the ratio of fixed capital to wage costs. Hrenner says that dIe very measures taken by capitalists to maintain profitability, measures which are rational for dIem to rake individually, fail to overcome tht, problems that squeezed profits n i the first place and have the added effect of impelling further measures, again sensible and necessary [)ElINKING

133

when undertaken individually but which when taken in the aggregate put yet another brake on (aggregate) profitability. Confronted with redueed profit­ ability some firms will persist in their enterprises rather than look for more lucrative alternatives, while other, lower cost producers will find it profitable for them, n i dividually, to move into these areas despite their overall reduced profitability. -llIe result is a downward spiral of overcapacity and overpro­ duction, entailing a (further) reduced profitability and leading inexorably to declines n i investment and output growth, as well as n i the rate of wage increase. These declines in investment and real wages lead to declines in pro­ ductivity and effective demand in both Departments I and Il; this in turn puts even more curbs on profitability. ·llIe only remedy for this siruation-a restoration of profitability-is for large enough numbers of high-cost, low­ profit firms to be dislodged from lines facing overcapacity and overproduc­ tion with their attendant reduced profitability, and placed in higher profit lines (23-24). The corollary of this n i terfirm state of affairs, when extended to competition between national economic blocs, is that a particular capitalist bloc will prevail only to the extent that it "achieved a certain rationalization and revitalization, largely through shedding redundant, ineffective capital and intensifying labour" (38, 254). TIllis works "the malign invisible hand" that for Brenner more accurately characterizes the nature of capitalist com­ petition than "the benign invisible hand" of Adam Smith (23). -llIe tendency of the rate of profit to decline is countered in a number of ways byfirms and he t governments that support dIem. Immense amounts of government money underpin an assortment of tax c."l:emptions, scaled-down tax assessments, liberal depreciation write-ofls and tax credits, price mainte­ nance policies, loan guarantees, payments in kind, research and development grants, insurance subventions, marketing services, export subsidies, irriga­ tion and land reclamation projects, dIe tolerance ofpremeditated (and some­ times blatantly illegal) corporate overcharging on government contracts, and odler, virtually unlimited forms of government beneficence to private industry (such as dIe no-bid contract system that has been such a boon to Halliburton and its subsidiaries n i Iraq), immediate bailouts when firms fail through dleir own greed and incompetence (such as the huge Savings and Loan bailout of the 1980S in rhe United States and the bailout of several collapsed investment banks on \Vall Street n i 2008), various privatizations and deregulations that swell corporate balance sheets (such as the swathe of privatizations that took place in dIe United Kingdom n i the 1980S and 1990S, when deliberately underpriced state assets were virtually given away to private investors, while at the same time the investment banks handling IH

CHAPTER 5

this multi-industry sdl-off made a killing from bloated commissions paid by the Conservative governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major), and of course the military expenditures ("military Keynesianism") cited in the aritlunetical example provided by Baran and Sweezy. These strictly e:mge­ nom n i terventions (and only a mere handful have been listed so far!), whose clrect is to combat falling profit rates, represent externalities, in the sense that they are basically political measures existing outside the purview of markets and their associated forces, but which are clearly intended by their protago­ nists to sway the functioning and performance of markets themselves.ls -nle dire economic simation of the countries of the South is not therefore simply a result of the LDCS encountering hurdles to frcc trade as they struggle to deal with the economic and social impact of globalization, or their cur­ rem

lack of "efficient" and "clfecrive" institutions, or their inability or lUl­

willingness to open themselves to the "competitive discipline" of markets, or a combination of all dlese. Unless significant steps are taken to remedy the structural causes of IUlderconsumption and overaccumulation (or sys­ temically created lUleven accumulation, since the sub-Saharan countries are confronted by chronic disaccumulation) there is Iinle that can be done in the longer term for the world's poor cowltries

as

long as the prevailing system

of capitalist accumulation is not ovemlrned. 1he fact of the matter is that despite ncreased i private equity financing and foreign direct investment, the

lDGS

transfer more resources in the aggregate

to

their developed counter­

parts than they receive from those countries. According to the UN'S

Wllrld

Ecollomic Sitllation alld Prospects 2006, "This pattern of negative transfers has lasted for abom ten years and reflects the growing export surpluses of de­ veloping cOllntries. The magnitude of these transfers has risen steadily from about $S billion in 1997 to

54S3 billion in 2005. Net transfers to the poorest

cOlUltries in sub-Saharan Africa arc still positive, but also on the decline, reaching 52 billion in 2005, down from $7.5 billion in 1997."11> Moreover, as the

World EaJIIlllllic Situation ami Prospects 2008 n i dicates, overall world eco­

nomic growth is not likely to increase in 200S; n i

2004 the world economy

grew at the rate of 4 percent, declining in 2005 to 3.2 percent but growing to

3.S percent n i 2007, while it is expected to dedine to 1.S percent in 200S, with 2.1 percent forecast for 2009.20 Even here there arc danger signs, since, as the

UN

report points out, the

lDCS

in recent years have benefited from higher

export conunodity prices, and h t is favorable situation cannot be expected to last n i the long run. At the same time,

lDGS that have to import oil and

agricultural products to fud development arc going to have to deal widl the adverse effects of die higher cost ofoil and food m i ports. Underconsumption DELlNK1NC

135

and overaccunmlation (and persistently uneven patterns of accumulation) are absolutely n i tegral to capitalism, and the question of overturning them is therefore willy-nilly the question of working for a postcapitalist system for the organization of production and the circulation of the goods. Anything else might as well be called "business as usual," and "business as usual" has invariably spelled disaster for the world's poor countries.

Optumsfor the COlilltries ofthe .wuth The countries of the South are not in a position to secede at one stroke from the global economic system. Their inullediate. objective, as I said earlier in the light of the findings of Lance laylor and others, is an abandonmem of specific links that are of Iitde or no benefit to them, while retaining those links dlat are obviously beneficial. The current aligIUIlent of the capitalist system will not allow for anything approximating to an effective degree of redistribution between rich and poor countries, and the only way to deal with this simation is for the poor countries to begin to make prJctical decisions about linkages with dle wealthy countries that will for once be n i their own interests.21 -nle next step in this process of overcoming dle worldwidc polarization that works against the poor nations has [0 be a regional consolidation of (poor) countries interested in forming a bloc capable of resisting the inevi­ table repercussions that will ensue from taking measures associated with de­ linking: dle cancellation of aid, pulling out of short-term capital, diplomatic sanctions, and so forth. It i.� interesting that such a bloc, admittedly ad hoc, is in the process of being formed in Latin America, where a visible alliance s i now being formed between Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, with Argentina's policies toward the IMF showing that while it has not explicitly aligned itself with this group, its fKllicy orientation nonedleless is fully accordant with the objectives espoused by this left-oriented group of Latin American nations. A more formal aligIUIlenr of South American nations would obviously be the nc..xt step for these countries, as indeed would be a similar alignment among the sub-Saharan African, the Central Asian, and the Pacific Island nations. We should not be sanguinely utopian about the possibilities of setting up such aligIUIlents; the pressures on such countries to cut deals with the tich nations [0 promote dlcir own economically specific n i terests are going to be very difficult for them to resist. A corollary of the fKlsition being taken here is that dle impcms for change in the capitalist world-system is not likely to come from the predominantly prosperous North, which has litde or no incentive to bring about a signifi1,6

CHAPTER 5

cant, let alone radical, transformation of this system, bm rJ.ther from dIe Somh. No individual or group in power in the United States, European Union countries, or Japan and China has anything significantly at stake in enabling the poorer countries of the South to move beyond the systemic pauperization that now confronts them. What we have at present is the pre­ tense (and it is tllis and notlling else) that what is in rhe interest of the. world's rich countries is also somehow in the interest of the cowltries of the Somh. llle availabk evidence suggests that this is not true. The countries of rhe South have to seck to bring about this deep-seated transfonnation before it will register

significantly Witll the nations of the Nortll. At the same rime,

this should not preclude the formation of alliances with progressive forces in the North, bur rhe terms of this alliance formation should always be those promoting the n i terests of tile poor nations of the world. Of COlifse a great deal more than alliance or bloc formation can and should be lUldertaken. For one thing, there could be the impkmentation of a global system of taxation, forexampk, by taxing any income derived from resources that belong to the global commons, such as midocean fisheries or mineral resources. This income can then be dividl""
DElINKINC

l37

CHAPTER 6 Models of Liberation I The Politics ofIde1ltity

I have already argued (sec chapter

2) that the life-world of rhe individual

subject is constituted by an amalgam of semiotic assemblages whose mutual permeation produces an overall effect that gives rhe individual in question his or her social and cultural subjectivity. Ihis proposition was reinforced by the argument that particular phases of capitalist development always serve as the enabling conditions for dIe emergence and solidification of these social and cultural life-worlds. -nlCSe enabling conditions are provided by capital­ ism's mode of societal regulation, which comprises rhe apparatuses (edu­ cation, the legal system, religious institutions, media and communications networks, etc.) that produce tht, forms of subjccrivity and dle structures of desire and sentiment essential for continued capitalist production and accu­ mulation. Thcse apparatuses produce dle subjl""Ctivities and fomls of desire and sentimcnt of vast nwnbcrs of men and women duough the creation of a doxa which "normalizes" the functioning of the capitalist systcm. I have also argued (see chapter 3) that dlC late 1960s and early 1970S saw dlC demise of the dominant form of capitalist production and accumulation, associatcd with dlC "virtuous spiral" of high levels of employment, abundant wages and welfare e.xpenditures, the rise of a culrure of mass consumption, and nearly dlree decades of rdatively benign business cycles. In dlOse decades, dlese conditions conduced to the possibility of a rdatively effective working-class politics. At any rate, this system of production and accumulation depended on a concordat between capital and bbor which allowed the working classes a share in the economic gains that ensucd from this virtuous spiral. Ihis

paradigm of production and accumularion, depicted in some circles as the Fordist regime of capitalist accumulation, was superseded by a series of de­ velopments whose cumulative effects have come to be associated with the rise of a post-Fordist, neoliberal globalization. With this shift the postwar compromise between labor and capital was jettisoned, and the conditions for an effective working-class politics seCHled to disappear with the Reaganite and Thatcherite derailment of this concordat. As one would expect from the foregoing, a shift of this magnitude, from one paradigm of capitalist devel­ opment to another, was bound to be accompanied by a fairly radical transfor­ mation of the political core of the life-world of dIe. ndividual i subject. -nlere are two slightly divergent positions on tile rise of a "new" poli­ tics at the end of the 1900S or in the early 1970s. According to the first, the spreading prosperity associated with the postwar Fordist dispensation made a class-based politics and its associated identities less indispensable for the broad mass of working people; as tile economically propitious times asso­ ciated with this dispensation took root in the late 1950S and continued into the 1900S (the Conservative British prime minister of that time, Harold Mac­ millan, campaigned on the slogan "You never had it so good!"), an increas­ .ngly i prosperous working class had less and less neCt.i to rely on worker­ based forms of action to secure and consolidatt' financial and social gains, imJXlrtant though these worker-based initiatives had been for establishing the initial phases of post-\Norld War II prosperity. This relatively well-paid, and overwhelmingly white and male, working-class stratum was able on the whole to protect its financial position as the downturn of the 1970S and 1980S manifested itself, and gravitated n i fairly significant numbers toward the neo­ liberal policy regimes of Reagan and ·nlatcher. For these. blue-collar Reagan­ ites and Thatcherites, the so-called affiuent workers, tile Thatcher and Rea­ gan regimes were more attwled to the aspirations of those seeking to retain the gains accnting from the JXlstwar economic c..xpansion than the option represented by what seemed like a confiscatory social democracy or played­ out Keynesbn "welfare statism" apparently unable or wlwilling to change Witll dIe times. Lower taxes, reduced public c..xpenditures, and the tnullpeted ideology of a "more competitive economic environment" (mixed in with ample doses of populist authoritarianism!) were more to the liking of this emerging "JXlstproletarian" echelon than dIe previons policy regime's Key­ nesian adherence to what appeared to be (to these working-class supporters of Reagan and Thatcher) a progressively more ossified and dysfunctional (and costly) welfare state. The Reagan-Thatcher Glcic!Jsc!mltllllllg owed its energies to the political conjuncture that arose n i response to the economic 141

CHAPTER 6

decline experienced in rhe advanced n i dllStrial countries in the 1970S and 1980s, and this neoconservative ascendancy exacerbated the drift away from traditional forms of working-class identification which had started to emerge during the peak period of postwar prosperity.! In those earlier decades, n i the 1960s in particular, the civil rights, femi­ nist, peace, ecology, and gay liberation movements started to find increased scope for collective action, often deriving their m i petus from rhe example set by Third World liberation movements at a time when the prosperous West (the North-South axis would become more truly gennane after the world­ wide debt crisis of the 1970S) seemed to be ever more deeply immersed in the joyless satisfactions afforded by the burgeoning consumer socicty.2 At the beginning the civil rights, feminist, peace, ecology, and gay liberation move­ ments coc.xisted with an older New Left that had also drawn inspiration from the various -nlird World militancies; when the influence of the New Left and the trade union movement started to wane in the 1970S and 1980S, the new social movements associated with the struggle for peace and the resistance against environmental despoliation, as well as racial, gender, and sc.xual dis­ crimination, soon showed dlemselves

to

be the only forces capable of op­

posing in any concerted way the depredations of the Reagan and lllatcher regimes.3 -The new social movements rarely became much more than ad hoc coalitions when dley acted togedler, but dIe 1970S and 1980s would certainly have been an even bleaker time for the caLISe of a progressive politics if these groups had not been able, however fitfully and haphazardly, to m i pede the full-blown consolidation of the neoliberal and populist-authoritarian hege­ mony. With the. emergence of the new social movements and dIe falling away of the old, class-based political arrangements, however, very different pos­ sibilities for organizing a politics directly motivated by dIe guest for libera­ tion came to rhe fore. Ihis development was furdler intensified n i the late 1980S and 1990S by the rapid proliferation of edmic and national identities n i Eastern Europe and rhe countries of the former Soviet Union and the rise of groups campaigning for inunigram rights n i \"",estern Europe. More will be said about dlis in the remaining parts of this chapter:� While this account of the rise of a new politics in dIe 1960s and 1970S relates its emergenct' to the collapse of dIe Fordist-Keynesian mode of regu­ lation that had prevailed since rhe end of World War

II,

a second kind of

account prefers to characterize rhe rise of this new polities in terms of a more specifically national situation. TIllIS, it is held that it was the guest for a specifically American national identity in World War II which propelled the broader search for kinds of political identification not based on class or class THE POLITICS OF !DENTin"

143

fractions. According to David Palumbo-Liu, whose accowlt is rctailed here, the war efiart necessitated the creation of the notion of an American iden­

tity wide and powerful enough in its appeal to draw the general population into the sweeping war mobilization. Palumbo-Liu regards Margaret Mead and Ruth lknedict as the primary protagonists n i this endeavor.5 Working for the U.S. Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services during World War II, Mead and Benedict used the resources afforded by their disciplinary field (cultural anthropology) to arrive at an understanding of the. "American national character" that appealed to dle category of "distinctive­ ness" to show what it was aOOm the American ethos that enabled those who belonged to it to possess dle qualities that made these individuals typically and characteristically "American." At dle. same time this culturally sanctioned understanding had to be sufliciently elastic to accommodate large numbers of immigrants who wanted to belong to this ethos, in dlis way acquiring the badges and emblems that would enable dlem to be regarded as properly American.6 After the war dlis liberal definition of thl' American national character, while retaining some of dle enfranchising propensities inherent n i its original formulation, was nonetheless significantly transformed under the combined pressures of urbanization, the groWdl of dle federal bureau­ cracy, and capitalist expansion (later on dIe ideological batdes of the cold war would become an important causal factor in bringing about this transfor­ mation), and n i so doing caused the earlier and still relatively roomy notion of an "American distinctiveness" to be superseded by a tighter "American exceptionalism'" that had to operate in a context defined by the new postwar multipolar internationalism. America's postwar role as a superpower required it to be set apart from its acmal and potential competitors, that is, to retain the differences that made it ostensibly distinctive, while the post-1945 multipolar international regime enjoined dlat these competitor nations in mrn be allowed to preserve the differences that accounted for their own national specificities. Ideally, differences would be retained without being construed and acted upon in ways that would allow these differences to become sources of conflict and instability. As Benedict said, " 1lle tough-minded are content that differences should e:dst. Illey respect differences. Their goal is a world made safe for differences, where the United States may be American to dle hilt widlOlit threatening the peace ofthe world, and France may be France, and Japan may be Japan on dle same conditions."7 -nle preservation of difference becomes a virtue, to be upheld and promoted along with the proposition that the world is a better place for allowing differences to coc.xist. In this way a newly engi1#

CHAPTER 6

neered American feeling for mltionaliry, a largely romantic sentiment serving as the primary impcms for the formation ofan American identity serviceable for wartime needs, is mmslated imo the realization tlla. others (the French, the J;lpanese, erc.) arc likewise entitlcd to have aspir:trions toward nation­ ality. However, this new cosmopolitical regime, whose cosmopolitanism was attenuated by the fact that it largely envisaged a world dominated by AmeriGI and (\""estern) Europe, soon had to accommodate a phalan,\: of newly inde­ pendent African and Asian nations that were not going to acquiesce in a geopolitical order constrained (for them) by the terms and conditions of a taken-far-granted Euro-American political and culmral supremacy. Ratio­ nales now had to be found for inserting the countries of an evolving "tbird V.'orld into this "'post-Bandullg" international order, an lUldertaking which required the mitigation of the " problems" caused by the more or less intrac­ t:lble culmr:ll differences which ostenSibly set apart these newly independent COlUlrric.� from their colllHerparts in the 'West (and East). 'nlC 'I1tird World's inclusion in this order further spurred dle zi�gging growth :lnd modifi­ cation of the previously instituted geopolitical logic based on the principle of a coexistence of differences. 'nlere ensued from the implementation of this geopoitical l logic a multiculturalism which gathered speed from the 19705 onward, as the cold war ended and the world economy was rapidly n i ternationalized. -nle strategic prescriptions embodied n i tills many-faceted and vigorous multiculmralism quickly took over from those motivating the more decorous .Uld less supple cosmopolitanism that had been enjoined by Mead and Benedict during the war as notions of a "world culture," "cul­ tural diverSity,'"' "cultural senSitivity," and so on gained prominence in the political .1Ild cultural vocabularies of this new multicultural tcmplate. 'Illis template lay at the heart of ;l whole range of new activisms conducted on behalf of a democrJtic extension of the principle of djfference. Palumbo-Liu shows compellingly how it was an acute anxiety over these activism_� whidl prompted the creation of such bodies as the Trihteral Commission, whose 1975 report, 71Je Crisis ofDemocracy: Report OIl the GOl'tnUlbility ofDemocra­ cies to the 7-,.ilatrrn/ Co mmss i ion, contained an essay by Samuel Huntington that prefigured his hter The Clnsh of Cil'ilizntiollS alld the R.emakilll1 of World Order.8 1bis multiculturalism, arising in tile 1960s and 1970S and becoming fully institutionalized in the 1980S, bm with its roots in the restrained in­ clusiveness of a World Wa.r 11 cosmopolitanism (which enjOined that differ­ ence was fine as long as implementation of its principles accorded with the reqllirements of the relatively self-contained American ethos of the 1940S THE POllTlCS OF lDE!-'TITY

IoU

and 1950S), is one of the primary bases of the new politics dlat succeeded the dethroned political culture of the Fordist-Keynesian dispensation. -nle fXllitically motivated quest for an identity, however, has in numerous instances a provenance that long antedates the 1970S and 1980S, that is, the period generally associated with the onset of the new poit l ics that on dIe face of it has transcended the need for political identifications based on class affiliations. h is important, therefore, to say precisely what the difference is, qualitatively, between these long-antecedent quests for a politically saient l conception ofidentity and the much more recem quests which stem from the dethronement of a class-based politics. Tracing the particular specification of an identity (and its cognate c..xpressions and forms) back to the Second \Vorld War, or to

1707

(the time when a recognizably British identity first

emerged in somedling like a full-blown sense), is m i portant and salutary, but an lmdertaking of this kind simply begs the question of how an identity­ forming conjuncture was able to materialize in the

1960s and 1970S, and in

tlIis way set itself apart, however tentatively, from the previous attempts to constitute the earlier versions of the identity under consideration. For in­ stance, if there was an attempt to constinue dIe beginnings of a recogniz­ ably British national identity in 1707, it becomes more than a matter of curi­ osity to ask what n i principle makes a British identity espoused nearly duee centuries ago qualitatively different from the British identity envisioned n i the 1970S and 1980S, when Mrs. -nlatcher, by bringing into play a collective fantasy of an insular sovereignty widl its accompanying notion of a narrow British identity, was able, through the mobilization of these fantasies, to convince many voters of her resolve to pm the "Grear" back into "Great Britain." A remotely plausible answer to this question has to acknowledge that somedling manifestly ditlerent took place in the

1960s

and

1970S

at an ar­

dIitectonic level (which, among odler things, allowed Mrs. ·nlatcher to "be" the Mrs. Thatcher of this rebarbative fantasy) and that a very different kind of political logic was animated by this change, a logic whose basic elements were supplied by a putative world culture (one existing more as an ideal than as an actuality, since it is m i possible to imagine what a truly global nllture would be li ke). At any rate, dlis would be the ideal of a culture capable of accommodating a distinctively new species of universalism, one dlat exists in a novel relationship widl rhe newly rl""Cognized particularisms that happen to mark all the necessarilypartinl cultures to which we now belong (the Ameri­ can, the Brazilian, the British, the Samoan, the Sudanese, the lllai, and so forth).? The pressllfe exerted by this inescapable need to ncgotiate between 146

CHAPTER 6

the numerous partial culrures, whose clamorous amplirude has become one of the established fearures of rhe post-1960S conjuncrure (and is the source par c..'\cellence of the anxieties of soml"One like Samuel l-luntington), is pre­ cisely what establishes the difference between the current sitllation and its prcdecessors.!o

TIJe Politics ofltUlltity Ille politics of identity seems to be one of four main options for organizing a politics directly motivated by the quest for liberation, the others being the politics of subjectivity, the politics of the event, and nomad politics. Each of these is to be identified with a particular conceptualization ofthe transforma­ tions responsible for altering the social and cultllral lifc-worlds of individual subjects, and each conceptualization sponsors a specific vision of the forms of collective liberation nceded by these subjects.lllere arc several conceptions of liberation even within marxism itself, this in tum reflecting the near certi­ tude that a collective liberation, should it occur, is nO[ likely to be confined to a single, well-defined political trajectory.!l A politics of identity that is no more dlan an extension of the liberal par­

liamentary democracy (in some quarters it is called "capitalist democracy") which dovetails so smoothly into acrually existing capitalism has to be dis­ counted from the outset as dle putative source of a genuinely revolutionary social and political project. No collective social transformation dlat is all­ inclusive in scope can be bodl mutual and comprehensive while having no way of extricating itself from actllally existing capitalism. Only a version of identity politics that does not cohere \vith the lineaments of actllally existing capitalism would be genuinely compatible widl this putatively revolutionary project. Since a "pro-capitalist" or "non-anticapitalist" identity politics docs not sullice, a theoretical model of an identity poit l ics compatible with this rt'volutionary project is relatively easy to come by. The conceptual core of this anticapitalist identity politics would be as distant as possible from its non-anticapitalist counterpart. Two considerations obtrude at this point. First, it s i necessary to confrom the argmllent dlat no politics of iden­ tity can be anticapitalist in principle, for two reasons: (1) identity politics emerged root and branch from a conjuncture which militates against dle pos­ sibility of a broad-based anticapitalist politics and is therefore a symptom of this failure rather dlan an antidote to it; and (2) conceprually, identity poli­ tics is necessarily a version of an ultimately ineffectual politics of difference, and as such will never be able to infuse a movement with the antagonistic THE POLITICS OF IDEl-.'TITY

1"7

power needed to fend off dle depredations of capitalism. An identity poli­ tics, according to this view, can never be anything more than a compromise formation; it is on this accowlt constrained to be a politics of consolation that cannot aim for the overthrow of dle very system that has enabled and limited it at the same time. As such, it has to be discounted from the outset as one of the parJdigms foran anticapitalist revolutionary politics. Or so this argwnent goes. Second, the previous objection notwithstanding, even if it can be shown that it is possible for an identity politics to be a viable p:trt of an anticapitalist political formation, concerns necessarily arise over the character of dle spe­ cific contributions an identity politics can make to a formation of dlis kind. For, clearly, very many things can conceivably contribute to an anticapitalist politics, ranging from a large-scale insurrection to mounting a campus cam­ paign against corporations who employ sweatshop labor, or a campaign to resist the peremptory eviction of tenants of remal properties that have been foreclosed widlOut dle tenants' knowledge in the 2008 subprime housing loan crisis, or a campaign to hold Wall Street financial delinquents and Wash­ ington lobbyists responsible for dleir malfeasances in this same crisis. -nle argwnent that the politics of identity is unavoidably an adaptation of the politics of difference, and that it will not be able to inspire a movement capable of resisting capitalism, is made by those who contend that a politics based on dificrence will never be sufficiently adversarial or antagonistic: a particular manifestation of dle politics of difference can differ only from its competitor manifestations, and this does not even imply anything about the desirability of the difference under consideration. It cannot accowlt for the weight of dle difference made by dlat particular difference, something borne out by the always irresolvable arguments dlat arise when someone or some group n i sists that he or she or it has such and such a character because of the particular identity he or she or it happens to have. A group which insists dlat it is X by virme of possessing identity Y afiirms only that it is not something else (say, Z) because anything that is Z typically does not happen to possess Y, the condition of beingX. In other words, to be different from X is only to be identical with that which is not the same as X.12 While this purely logical argument against dle politics of identity carries some conviction (at any rate for those who

are

apt to be convinced by purely logical arguments of this

kind), it is nonetheless problematic to the extent that it implies that logic is

all that one needs where identity is concerned, and dlat we need not be too troubled by the fact dlat struggles over difference are more likely than not to be political struggles, so dlat in many cases dlCSC stmggles can have dle SllP148

CHAPTER 6

planting of capitalism as their focus. However, there are historical instances n i which anticapitalist stmggles have clearly incorporated a racial or ethnic component; one thinks here of the politically significant alignment between the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress in the stmggle against apartheid, or the Zapatista stmggle n i the Chiapas region of Mexico. In borh cases, the stmggle against racism in 50mh Africa and the stmggle undertaken on behalf of the indigenous people of the Chiapas re­ gion, to combat racism or the victimization ofindigenous peoples is perforce to be in opposition to the stmctures of capitalist e.'ploitation which serve as the underlying practical logic for this racism or ethnic victimization. Hence it is the convergence of an antiracist or culmral and ethnic stmggle with anticapitalist resistance which can lend force and popular legitimacy to

both forms of resistance.

In which case, the challenge for marxism is to find

theoretical models and political configurations which conduce to an align­ ment between these two sets of political forces, one of whic h does nor pos­ sess any kind ofanticapitalist orientation. ·TIle objection that identity politics owes its existence to a conjuncmre which has precluded the possibility of an effective anticapitalist politics is therefore much more significant than the merely concepmal objection just raised (and disposed of): if an anticapitalist politics is not feasibly in prospect, then any hoped for convergence between the politics of identity and an anticapitalist stmggle is just a straw n i the wind.L3 It is important to note that the virtually unquestioned normative posi­ tion assigned to capital is apt to cause a misunderstanding of its dynamic. For instance, it is invariably held that the "laws'" of capital set objective and unalterable limits to economic behavior, so that any breach of these limits (e.g., ignoring market forces, flouting the .so-called mles of competition, not ptomoting private enterprises n i order to featherbed the public sector) is deemed to cause quite unacceptable economic and social consequences (such as capital flight, failing stock markets, currency collapses, disastrous effects on job allocation, rising rates of poverty). But these outcomes in no way show that these limits are inviolable, nor do they demonstrate that the "laws" of capital arc immutable. On the contrary, this n i dicates only that capital has already been given a position of primacy in an existing political and economic stmggle. It in noway follows from the fact of this primacy that capital's position never was, and never is going to be, assailable. The limits of capital are not the limits of the universe (which is to say that they are nor metaphysical).14 Acknowledgmem that the supremacy of capital is always a prinllcy that THE [,OL1TleS OF IDEl-.'TITY

14-9

derives from a political and social stmggle is important for the analysis of the causes of the decline, or demise, of an effective anticapitalist politics, as well as the saliency this politics bestows on class-based movements and agents. The claim, made primarily by those eager to say that politics today s i no longer about right and left, that politics today necessarily transcends class and class affiliation, only reflects the fact that the social antagonisms inherent in capitalism have mutated n i a way which requires them to be presented to us as something that docs not involve class and class position. In the United Statcs, for instance, the impact of the recent collapse of the dot-com and housing market bubbles on the working classcs is never refcrred to by politicians n i dlcse terms; dIe euphemism "the challenges facing work­

ing families today" is always used n i stead. Intercstingly, dIe superwealthy who live off n i ve.�tment incomes are never referred to as "nonworking fami­ Iics," since to refer to them in this way would be to let the proverbial cat out of the bag and to concede that there arc a significant number of Americans who make money, lots of it, without having to work, which is precisely what the capitalist system in its current form is intended to accomplish for its beneficiaries bur cannot admit at dIe ideological level. The idea that the poli­ tics of identity has replaced an old class-based politics can thus be accepted only if it is granted at the same time that [his development is still part and parcd of an ongoing antagonism with the forccs of capital, and dlat this ideological disappearance of class is itself dIe result of a continuing conllict necessarily taking place at the Ievd of an enduring class antagonism. What America need� more than anything else is the real possibility of a public ac­ knowledgment that there is an American working class, and that dlere also are nonworking families, not Dccause they can't get work (the fate of many who

are

poor), but precisely because nonworking families of dlis ilk are so

rich they do not need to work. A profound ideological shift will occur when ordinary Americans realize that nonworking Americans also include seg­ ments of dIe financial oligarchy whose investment portfolios arevoluminous enough to free them ftom the need to wldertake wage labor. The suggcstion that the politics of identity s i anchored in a conjuncture of a "post-New Left politics which has (rhus far) not been able to supply the ineaments l of a comprehensive politics of liberation-in which case an identity politics cannot hope to be part of a movement decisively opposed to the prevailing hegemony unless it is part of an overall emancipatory poli­ tics that is devised and implemented in order to serve as a condition for an adequate identity politics-is more or less implicit in dIe writings of Paul Gilroy and Wendy Brown.IS A much more damning criticism of identity 150

CHAPTER 6

politics is made by Slavoj Zifck, who argues that "multiculmralism" (which for Zf i ck is pretty much a surrogate expression for the politics of identity) is nothing less than "the ideal form of ideology" for global capitalism, a form of colonization that docs not, however, require the colonizing agency of the nation-state metropole.16 Zifck goes on to say: i\lul6culturalism invoives patronil:ing Eurocemrist distance and/or respect for local cultures without roOtS in one's own particular culture. In other words, multiculturalism is a disavowed, invertcd, self-rdercmial form of rac ism, a "racism with a distance" -it "respectsn the Other's identity, conceiving the Other as a self-enclosed "aurhenticn community towards which he, the multi­ culturalist, maimains a distance rendered possible by his privileged univC"rsai position. Multiculturalism is a racism which cmptics its own position of aU pOSitivc COntCnt (thc multiculturalist is not a din.:ct racist, he doesn't oppose ro thc

Other thepm·tielllar values ofhis own culture), bur nonetheless retains

this position as a privileged empty po/lit uf Imil'CYSality from which one is able ro

appreciate (and deprec iate) properly other particular eulmres-the multi­

culturalist respect for the Other's specifiCity is the very form of assnting one's own superiority.!' Mulriculmralism, in Ziek's i view, is an ideological screen for an wIparalleled homogenization of culture brought about by global capitalism and its nec­ essary accompaniment, our economically privileged liberal-democratic so­ ciety, coupled with the apprehension, however empty-headed, that the now ubiquitous capitalist order is not going to be supplanted. Multiculturalism, says Ziiek, allows our critical energies to have a stand-in target: instead of having us direct these energies at global capitalism itself, multiculruralism takes the battle for cultural difference to be the "real" conflict, thereby leaving untouched the fundamental homogeneity brought about by worldwide inte­ grated capitalism (which is left unquestioned by the denizens of multicultur­ alism). Instead offinding ways to confront, n i an informed way, the systemic depredations of the V\'all Street tycoons over the course of a cenmr)' or more in American capitalism, it is easier for man)' Americans to succumb to the economic banalities and non sequiturs of a co-opted ignoramus like "Joe the plumber" (the quintessential emblem of a fictitious anti-elitism promoted above all by representatives of the current American plutocracy) n i dIe 2008 U.S. presidential campaign. A position similar to Zitek's is to be found n i a work written primarily from a national and global security perspective, Philip Bobbitt's grandly tided '11Je

Shield ofAchilles: War, Peace, and the Course ofHsi tory, where the THE ['oLiTleS

OF

IDENTITY

151

profXlsition dlat the "market-state" has now emerged as dle dominant form of st"Jte organization is harnessed to the thesis rhat the market-state is be­ coming "more meritocratic, more muhicultural, and morc .secular" as a result of a propensity to decentralization that cannot be contained.IS According to Bobbitt, the market-state, unlike its precursor formation, the nation-state, no longer aims to provide universal welfare for its inhabitants ; having m i posed market-driven limits on what it can lUldertake on behalf of its citizens, this state prefers instead to optimize, through deregulation and privatization, their 0pfXlrnmitics as dley deal with "freed-up" markets and their forces. The market, especially dle global market, becomes the effective arbiter for the activities of the state and its citizens, diluting in this way the sovereignty that had hitherto resided in the state and its apparatuses. With this diminu­ tion of state sovereignty, it becomes possible for a range of entities beyond the nation-state, among them muhinational corporation.s and even organi­ zations like AI Qaeda, to function as "virtual" st"ates. One of dIe scenarios for the shape taken by dle American market state, by dlen fully decentral­ ized thanks to constitutional amendments, at some time in the fUn1rc (20251

20501) is envisaged by Bobbitt in the following quasi-retrospective terms: In the United States, culrural groups were allowed, by constitmional amend­ ments that altered the application ofthe 14th Amendment, to transform states to

their own liking.

This led to romiderable migratio1l withill the United Stater

as its citiulIJ soltght collgellial states that catered to religiolls, ethllie, al/d political prejermur. All these new "States" retained an open trade rdation with the rest of the United States much like the one. that prevailed in Europe within the E. u., and all adhered to a common defense policy with thc rest of the United States under a much-shrunken defense establishment. Only their state constitutions were radically different: some permitted a LUlion of chutch and stat{'; some allowed the prosecution of"hau: speech" and forbade books and movies that reinforced racial or gender stereotypes; some reintroduced corpo­ ral punishment; while others forbade capital punishment. Then: were feminist states where women were given certain affirmative benefits, including require­ ments that a cerrain numocrofofficeholders and corporate board members Ix: women; there were religious fundamentalist states that forbade commerc ial transaerions on the Sabbath, reqUired prayer n i schools, and outlawed the sale of alcohol; there were ethnic states where English was a second language ; alld

so 011. IIIshort, the lIew statespermitted a closermatch betH'em the milles oja cenaill

polity and its legal rilles-a rerutio1l, irmay be said, to the IIIlrl ker-state's l/diffe i rencc to wltllrfll milles. 19

152

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The scenario Bobbitt conjures of a putative multiculmralism taking root in the fully federalized American market-state accords with Ziiek's analysis of the key premise motivating the politics of multiculturalism. Ziiek takes this fundamental category, multiculturalism, to be that ofthe empty univer­ sal, a "homologous utopia," in which the United States becomes the demo­ graphic enactment of the "chain of equivalence" (between liberals, feminists, religious fundamentalists, political and culmral conservatives, edUlic sepa­ ratists, protagonists of lifestyle niches, and so on) that underlies this identity­ based politics. -The empty universal, because of its vacuity, can be infused with any contem as long as all the contents involved are taken to be "equiva­ Ient."20 Ihe problem with this particular invocation of the chain of equiva­ lence is dlat even in a leftist politics like that of Laclau and Mouffe, dle cmcial dimension represented by the stark realities of capitalist economic exploita­ tion and dle power stmctures inherent in its attendant liberal-democratic governmental appararuscs are occluded or drastically de-emphasized.21 A politics of some kind may be involved in establishing the condensations and shifts that activate the chain of equivalence, but n i dle end no anticapitalist stmggle is genuinely enjoined in this form of identity politics. This impov­ erishmem or evisceration of the political is espl'Cially evident in the extreme libertarian vision of utopia delineated by Robert Nozick in Alltlrchy,

State,

mil! Utopin.22 As David Runciman has pointed out, Nozick's "metautopia" amounts to an apotheosis of the decentralized multiculturalism visualized by Bobbitt, and it is instructive to c.xami.ne it for this reason alone.

Anarchy, StnU, tlnd Utopia frames a conception ofthe "minimal state" that is compatible widl a whole range of communal options, which for Nozick are

subject only to the proviso that individuals should be free to join and

free to leave these communities. -TIle Nozickian minimal state is confined to "the narrow functions of protection against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on" (ix), since "a state or government that claims . . . allegiance . . . must be

IlClltrnl between its citizens" (22; Nozick's empha­

sis). Arguing against anarchism, which prescribes no state, and a state form that exceeds dle bounds permitted by the minimal state (especially in dle provision of social welfare), Nozick delineates a vision of the minimal state that can serve as a "framework for utopia." In setting out the conditions for dlis utopia, he begins with the anodyne observation, delivered with more than a touch of rhetorical artifice, that there is no form of an ideal society that would be shared by the following amorphous collection of n i dividuals, all of whom happen to be renowned: "Wirrgenstcin, Elizabeth Taylor, Ber­ trand Russell, lllOmas Merton, Yogi Berra, Allen Ginsberg, Harry vVolfson, THE 1'01lTiCS OF IDE!<.'TITY

153

l11Oreau, Casey Stengel, The Lubavitcher Rebbe, Picasso, Moses, Einstein, Hugh Hefner, Socrates, Henry Ford, Lenny Bruce, Baba Ram Das, Gandhi, Sir Edmund I-Hilary, Raymond Lubitz, Buddha, Frank Sinatra, Columbus, Freud, Norman Mailer, Ayn Rand, Baron Rothschild, Ted Williams, Thomas Edison, H. L. Mencken, lllOmas Jefferson, Ralph Ellison, Bobby Fischer, Emma Goldman, Peter Kropotkin, you, and your parents" (310). In this "utopia of utopias" (the phrase is N07jck's) there will be commu­ ltitieS that consist of "visionaries and crackpots, maniacs and saints, monks and libertines, capitalists and communists and participatory democrats, pro­ ponents of phalanxes (Fourier), palaces of labor (Flora Tristan), villages of unity and cooperation (Owen), mumalist conummities (Proudhon), time stores (Josiah Warren), Bruderhof, kibbutzim, ktmdalini yoga ashrams, and so

forth" (316). As long as they adhere to the absolutely unobtrusive frame­

work of rights that overarches these communities, "anyone may start rilly sort of new community (compatible with the operation of the framework) they wish. (No community may be excluded, on patemalistic grounds, nor may lesser paternalistic restrictions geared to nullify supposed defects in people's decision processes be imposed-for example compulsory information pro­ grams, waiting periods.)" The supervening minimalist regime of rights and rules remains impartial and detached from dlese communities, and dleir members simply get on widl their lives, as environmentalists, comnuntists, computer gamers, vegans, religious ftmdamentalists, practitioners of rai chi, devotees of blue grass music, antivivisectionists, and so forth. So in dlis utopia there is a fundamental evasion of rhe fKllitical, and moreover dlerc can be no real need for politics: one simply goes to a place where it is possible to live with people who share to a significant enough c.'([cnt one's political and culmral preferences.23 -This Nozickian vision of an eeri l y dcpoliticized state coheres with the picture sketched by Bobbitt of a mwticulmral United States brought into being by a modified Fourteenth Amendment, in which the most significant action undertaken by an individual appears to be his or her ntigration to a "congenial state," thereby allowing the individnal in question to live, " by choice," n i this or that conununity of ethnic separatists, antivaccinationists, train spotters,

s & 1>1

devotees, owners of fighting dogs, or one run by IBM

or General Electric or Al Qaeda or whatever. It would therefore not be lm­ fair to view Nozick's proposals for a metautopia as the culminating point or utopia for any identity politics, and at dIe same time as the integral reductio ad absurdum of a politics of identity organized according to the tenets of a liberal multiculruralism. "You do your thing, and I do my thing" . . . . 154

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Bobbitt is justifiably anxious that market-states, whose raison d'ctre is the promotion of the market and its institutional trappings, are not likely to produce on an adequate enough scale "public goods" of the kind needed to ensure the ultimate survival of these states, let alone promote the well­ being of the overwhelming majority of their n i habitants. In a similar way, the conceptual difliCl.lltics which vitiate Nozick's "utopia of utopias" also illustrate graphically the ultimate bankmptt..-y of any rights-based regime not accompanied by a substantive conception of human well-being. Ihe follow­ ing conclusion is therefore inescapable: a true utopia (though heterotopia is the favored notion in this argument) would be one that underwrote n i principle a fairly substantive conception of human well-being, even as it ad­ dressed the very considerable problems that attend any search for a substan­ tive conception of this kind. This substantive conception will conceivably, or even necessarily, allow a place for the politics of identity, but it would not be one that conformed to the rights-based principles (in the case of Nozick) and the rational calculus of state power (in the case of Bobbitt) that underie, l whether c..xpiicitiy or implicitly, their respective multicultural lltopias.24

Another Politics ofJdenWy? The preceding section indicated that tile politics of identity needs to remove itself from the auspices of a liberal multiculturalism if it is to be theoreti­ cally plausible and practically cJlicacious from the standpoint of a substantive poitics l of liberation. Any situation involving the constitution of fKllitical identity whose logic is derived from a framework that approximates Nozick's metalltopia or Bobbitt's radically decentralized federalism is nor going to deliver specifications of this identity adequate to the needs of the project of liberation

(unless

of course "liberation" for religious fundamentalists, ell­

vironmentalists, animal rights activists, gays and lesbians, pacifists, ethnic separatists, and so forth consists precisely in being able to belong to a com­ munity composed of individuals professing pretty much the same political­ cultural afliliation as oneself; there are circumstances, for instance, in which one's sense of being a victim is likely to be diminished by belonging to a sepa­ ratist movement of tllis kind, and that being able. to live with many others like oneself therefore amounts to a "liberation" for such putative victims).lS It will be important to consider whetller the new social movements, valUlted in certain quarters as vehicles for a hoped for substantive liberation, are none­ theless trapped n i a nc..xus of historical and political forces that will culminate nexorably i n i an uncongenial (from tile standpoint of those who propowld a THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY

155

substantivt� liberation) utopia of utopias with a philosophical chara([er and geopolitical rrajec[Ory of the kind charted by Nozick and Bobbitt, respec­ tively. Providing an answer [0 this question requires us first to take into con­ sideration at least five features of idmtity as a category with an important function in political-philosophical and social-historical discourse. -nle first feature is that identity as a category is attended by an undeniable plurivocity, which in rurn poses the question of what it is that notions as disparate as the following have in common: "German European identity" (as counterpoised to, say, "\.Vdsh European identity"), where the context involved is that of national identities;26 "European Muslim identity" (as cmUlrerpoised to, say, "European Christian identity"), where the context involved s i that of religious identities;27 "African Ibo identity" (as counter­ poised to, say, "African Kikuyu idemity"), where the context involved is dlat of putative etlmic identities; "Indian male identity" (as counterpoised to "India.n female identity" ), where gender considerations operate in conjunc­ tion with the category of dIe nation and the national; "northern Californian identity" (as counterpoised to, say, "southern Californian identity"), where the region and regional differences are the operative backgrmmd categories, albeit in ways that may be lost

[0 many non-Californians; "white Somh

African identity" (as counterpoised to, say, "black South African identity"), where the context is supplied by notions of racial difference (the simation would be very different f i "white South African identity" were counterpoised to, say, "white Botswanan identity"); "Afrikaaner SOUdl African identity"

(as counterpoised

to, say, "British South African identity" ), where the dis­

tinction between South Africans of Dutch and British descent supplies rhe operative context; the identities of retirees or senior citizens (as cmmtef­ poised to those identities reflecting other demographic orsubculmral niches, such as "skateboard kids," "young professionals," "Generation Xers," "soccer moms," "rednecks," "weekend warriors," "disco queens," "dot-commers," and so forth); " British identity circa 1707" (as counterpoised to "British identity

"), where the difference involved is specified n i terms of different

circa 1945

historical epochs; "New York Jewish identity" (as counterpoised to "Russian Jewish identity"), where it is differences within a religious tradition dlat pro­ vide the operative framework for glossing the identities in question; and so fordl. The demarcations at work in dlis cursorily drawn list of identities are only a cross-section of a more extensive range that is virmally inexhaustible in scope (what about identities associated widl professions or dIe pursuit of leisure activities, or widlin specific n i stirutions and industries?). Of course the identities of all bm a very few individuals arc formed as a result of an 150

CHAPTER 6

extensive crisscrossing concatenation of a substantial set of the different ele­ ments belonging to the range referred to above.28 It should be evident from all this that the concept of identity carries the freight of a considerable history, going back at least three or fOllf centuries where its provenance is concerned. This history influences any usc of the con­ cept, sometimes in ways that escape the attention of even dle most sophisti­ cated of these users. As Michael Herzfeld has pointed out in his useful pr&is of dle concept of identity, such grOlUldbreaking works as C. B. Macpher­ son's The Politicnl 7heury ofl'ossessil't 11Idil'dllali i sIII and Louis DlUllOm's Homo HiemrcIJicus show compellingly that the notion of an identity, in this case a

specifically European identity, s i replete with assumptions derived from the ideologies of individualism that emerged n i Europe with the onset ofmoder­ nity. -nus individualism went hand n i hand with the accepted wisdom that the defining marks of the (Western) individual

arc

property ownership and an

impllted rationality, and as rhe age of empire began these were augmented with the supposition of a racially inflected European colonial superiority that

was rapidly disseminated from dle metropolitan centers to Europe's colonial posscssions.29 Any careful invocation or application of the concept of iden­ tity has no alternative but to take this previous history into consideration. -nlese days, when there is widespread awareness, among the denizens of the academy at any rate, of the problematic ideas and dubious impulses whidl

lie behind dle logic of this "colonial difference," it is relatively easy to usc the academy's array of critical tools-made availahle to us by Edward Said, Gaya­ tri Olakravorry Spivak, Homi Bhabha, Stuart Hall, Enrique Dussel, dle Sub­ altern Historians Group, among others-to eliminate such assumptions of a European (and white) superiority from this or that application of the concept of identity. But even when helpfully cleaned out in this way, dle concept of identity still tends to retain some of dle other unhappy features of its initial European backgrOlUld, in particular the one involving presumptions about self-autonomy, presumptions tied in this case to the conviction that identity is inexpugnably about some kind of "self" who is a self precisely by virtue ofpossessing that particular identity.3o Herzfeld suggests that the best way to avoid this parochialism, which fails to recognize itself for what it is because it generalizes these distinctively European particularities and, whether wit­ tingly or unwittingly, takes them to be constitutive of the category of identity as such, is for us to be appropriately circumspect when the category of an identity is employed. This critical circumspection can take several forms, but cilese will center THE [,OLlTICS OF IDENTITY

157

primarily on the question of the particular interests that are served by es­ pousing a certain identity and the conditions under which that identity is sustained. lbese would nclude i the interests that are served and not served by contesting the identity in question, with particular attention being paid to the differences between the local, regional, and national levels in ascertain­ ng i.. the naturc of these interests.31 An n i quiry of this kind places a particular emphasis on the contexts in which notions of identity are used and focuses less on the difficulties associated widl an intrinsic conceptual content (i.e., the maner ofan identity concept's logic) than on the outcomes of its particu­ lar conditions of employment (i.e., the matter of this concept's prngmatics). -nle concept of an identity encompasses a number of distinct but sometimes overlapping strands or elements, but whatever these are, they are dle product of a dynamic that is irreducibly political. -nle identity of something is always the product of the desire, necessarily social and political, in which that rlting happens to be invested and which efiecruates dle identity in question through dle dynamic of this production. 11le overall configuration of markers usually associated with the {Xlssession of a particular identity (gender, racial, edmic, national affiliation, and so fordl) are the outcome of this desiring production. Em how does the bearer of an identity come to be produced? How does one become an exemplary bearer of"African Americanness," "Anglo-SaxolUless," "Turkishness," "Turk­ ish womanness," and so on? In all the representative cases, identities are pro­ duced through processes of differentiation, so that "Turkishncss" (say) is produced rluough its difi"erentiation from "Lebaneseness," "Japaneseness," "Mcxicanness," and so forth. In dle end, therefore, it is dle putative border betweenone's own etimos, race, nationality, gender, and so on and the rtlmos, race, nationality, and gender of some " other" that produces the identity asso­ ciated with one's erhnicity, race, gender, and national afliliation. These bar­ riers between crlmoi, races, nationalities, and genders are not impermeable, however; they are more like a see-through scrccn or piece of too-wide net­ ting, evocative of Hegel's famous distinction n i the Logik between the two kinds of exteriority to an identity concept, that is, the insuperable "barrier" (Schrallkr) and the more porous "limit" (Grmu).32lf cultural barriers are not insurmountable and are really perishable limits (in tile Hegelian sense just specified), then it becomes harder to insist on the absolute distinction be­ tween "being English" and "seeming to be English" (this being another way of stating tile insight behind the problematic of a postcolonial "hybridity" posed by Homi Bhabha's famous locution "not quire/not white"). For here we mn into tile difficulty identified by Hegel, namely, that of providing a 158

CHAPTER 6

specification of an identity concept

(Grt1lzcllbcgriff)

n i terms of its internal

determinations, that is, within its "limits." The presence of a conceptual barrier between being English and being Fijian and being Nigerian, say, makes the difference between them relatively easy to specify: we simply use the operation of negation, and n i so doing are able to determine that to be English is nor to be Fijian and not to be Nige­ rian, and so on. However, when it comes to grasping the concept "being English" within its limits (in Hegel's tedUlically recondite sense of "limit" ), its n i ternal determinations become harder, if not m i possible, to enumerate satisfactori l y. \Vhat marks someone as "being English" when dlere arc lUl­ deniably many different kinds of n i dividuals who appear to qualify for this designation? Playing cricket? But there are many English who don't play cricket. And besides, Pakistanis and West Indians also play cricket. What about being a subject of the Queen of England? But New Zealanders are also subjects of the Queen of England. Eating roast beef and Yorkshire pudding? But what about those who happen to be (English) vegetarians? Liking tele­ vised darts, snooker, sheepdog triak, and lawn bowk? One will find quite a few English men and women who evince a profound distaste for dlCSC activi­ ties, whedler televised or not.33 Specifications of identity depend on the dialectic of identity and differ­ ence, which in turn pivots on the operation of negation. Its effectiveness as an .instnllllent for demarcating between any " them" and any "us" is neces­ sarily circwnscribed and provisional, especially when the operation of nega­ tion is difficult to perform. Hence being),okozlllll1 (grand champion) n i sumo wrestling was long regarded as a quintessential marker of "Japaneseness" until Akebono became. grand champion, when the knorty circumstance of his being an American from Hawaii (originally named Chad Rowan) posed

a conundnull for many traditionally minded Japanese followers of sumo. Hegel was aware of this problem nearly two centuries before thegaijin (for­ eigner) Chad Rowan became :yokoZI/1J11, when he suggested dlat negation does not in itself enable one

to

specify a concept's determinations: a rose

is not a lily and not a daisy and not a daffodil, bm saying dlat something is

not a lily in no way indicates what it is that makes a rose a rose, since being George \-\1. Hush or being dle Gobi Desert or being n i visible is just as com­ patible with being a nonlily as being a rose is. So when Chad Rowan acquired what had hitherto been as "amhentic" a marker of "Japanese" identity as anyone could reasonably hope for, the use of negation to demarcate "being (authentically) Japanese" from "being (audlentically) American" became llll­ avoidably problematic. Those who insist on the strict separation between THE 1'0LlTICS OF IDENTITY

159

the "authentic" and dIe "inaudlemic" in such cases are unavoidably engaged n i the interminable labor of distinction production. 11Iis work may be rela­ tively easy to undertake when the demarcation between "being America.n" and "being Japanese" is n i stantiated duough Ronald Reagan and Empetor Hirohito (where dlis demarcation retains the character of a Hegelian con­ cepmal barrier, and the use of negation to arrive at a specification, how­ ever attenuated, of "being American" and "being Japanese" s i still possible). However, in pursuing this Hegelian tack, once "being American" and "being Japanese" are approached in terms of their concepmal limits, what exactly are the conceptual determinations of "being American" (especially in the case of Akebono/Chad Rowan) or of "being Japanese" (again in the case of Akebono/Chad Rowan), especially now that Akebono/Rowan has taken Japanese citizenship) And what, moreover, if dlese determinations are such that dley can never be viewed convincingly in terms of the logic ofmutual ex­ clusion? It is conceivable, for n i stance, that (the accident of birthplace aside) Akebono, who now speaks fluent Japanese, has Japanese citizenship, and is married to a Japanese woman, could possess more of the n i ternal determina­ tions ofJapaneseness than, say, the child of a Japanese business executive who came to dIe United States as an inbnt, grew up n i dlis country and decided to remain here, and who now prefers North Catolina barbecued pork to

any other food, has started to lose his or her fluency in Japanese (this being yet another spin of the needle that oscillates between the "authentic" and the "inauthentic"), and has married a white American from Rocky j\10unt, North Carolina. This needle spins n i terminably because no Japanese person possesses fully all the appropriate internal determinations that constitute the concept of "being (properly) JapanesC:' and this not because the Japanese are a particularly "hybrid" people (for the purposes of discussion dley could just as well be TWIisian or Zambian), but because, as Hegel pointed out, the full set of internal determinations of any concept, when apprdlended at its limit, can be approached only asymptotically. To be authentically Japanese or French or Samoan is always possible, certainly, but this never amounts to anything more than someone's being n i effect sufficiently Japanese or French or Samoan. Desire and fantasy, and above all politics, must unavoidably do the rest, as writers on nationality and etlmicity from different fields and theo­ retical orientations, such as Benedict Anderson, Anthony D. Smith, Etienne Halibar, and Slavoj Ziick, have been telling us. -The concept of identity (it would be more accurate to refer here to "iden­ tities" ) itself has a variegated history, which has to be taken into account as part of dIe attempt to do justice to the politics behind the formation and dis-

100

CHAPTER 0

semination of identities. The question " Who is this (person)?" is a function of the question "What kind of person is this?:' and the nel"1i to consider the issue of "the kind of thing X is or the kind of thing Y is" when addressing the question "Who is X or Y?" makes it clear that

all individual identities

are necessarily a function of their collective counterparts.34 Ibe politics of identity pivots on the premise that identities are based on differences that are entided to be regarded as legitimate (or even celebrated). This premise can be granted, and in itself is entirely uncontroversial. But what is problematic, given the essential derivability of individual from collective identities ("no specification of an individual identity without consideration of its basis in a collective identity"), is the furdler assertion that the politics of collective identities can be bypassed or overlooked when dealing widl individual iden­ tities. Of course the identities of groups based on ethnic, radal, gender, reli­ gious, national, and age differences (as well as the identities of environmental rights groups, animal rights activists, gay and lesbian rights groups, taxpayer protest groups, "fat acceptance" groups, etc.) are collective identities in the necessary but nonetheless trivial sense mentioned earlier (since belonging to a group necessarily confers on one a collective identity). But what is con­ troversial about the politics of identity is dle (furdler) claim that groups and individuals who define themselves by adverting to dificrences based on considerations of ethnidty, race, gender, religion, nationality, age, and so on have interests that caIUlOt be secured or promoted by more generalized forms of agency, such as class or some kind of affiliation with state formations. $0 the crucial question here is whether any JXllitics of collective identities is a JXllitics that involves at some necessary level these more comprehensive and nclusive i forms of agency (most not"ably, class or class fractions or a connec­ tion with state formations). The existence per se of groups who derive their identity from differences based on considerations of ethnicity, race, gender, religion, nationality, age, sexual orientation, body size, and so on cannot be said to depend directly on dlese more inclusive

kinds of agency. As I indicated earlier, the identi­

ties of these groups can be established purely and simply on the basis of the (Hegelian or quasi-Hegelian) logic of identity and difference; hence one is entided to be represented by the National Association for Fat Acceptance be­ cause one is not thin, the American Association for Retired Persons because one is not a dlirty year old, and so on. But the existence of states of afi"airs or situations n i which dlese concerns regarding edmicit)" race, gender, reli­ gion, nationality, age, sexual orientation, body size, and so on become salient depend for their c.xistence on structures that are more encompassing than THE [,OllTiCS OF IDENTITY

l6l

those which lUlderlie the immediate constirution of identity-based groups. It is clear, for instance, dlat these identity-based groups have as preconditions for dleir existence the emergence of a modern sense of individuality and sub­ jectivity, since it is this modern sense of self which enables individuals to see themselves as dIe "owner" of an identity. It is also evident that conceptions of national idemity depend for their existence on the formulation of citizenship niles that connect individuals to a particular ahllos, in this way enabling these individuals to understand themselves as the "citizens" of a nation affiliated widl that particular almos, and that dlere is a cnlcial

link

between forms of identity and appararuses

of identification which would not exist but for a long and prior history of categories and collectivities.35 More generally, the possession of an identity depends on a formation of a very wide range, something akin to Foucault's

dispositif or grid of intelligibility, which consists of niles, invariably not avail­ able to members of the dispositif in question, that make available to these individuals modes of visibility and e.xpression that would not e.xist if the dis­ positif in question had not been in place. Hence, and these are two examples that come randomly to mind, someone living in medieval Paris would not be able to regard himself as "French" because his dispositif would not have given such a person the opportwlity to conceive of himself as a member of the "French nation" (there being no French nation at that time), just as a contemporary of St. Paul would not have had a notion dlat his beliefs about Jesus from Nazareth constimted a "religion" in the way rhat Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism are today customarily viewed as "religions" (rhe notion of religion belonging essentially to a modem dispositif which used the category of "a religion" to denote a well-defined repertoire of practices and convictions dlat belong to a particular "people''). For all dlese reasons, therefore, more wide-ranging forms of agency and subject formation, and dIe resources of identity associated with these forms of agency and subjectivity, are absolutely necessary for dIe functioning of any politics of identity, n i cluding one of dIe kind dlat has existed since the 1960s. But from the srandfmint of a marxist conception of liberation a further kind of affirmation is needed, namely, that the stnlctures typically underlying these more expansive forms of agency and subjectivity must n i some way involve class or class fractions, and through dIis, to be connected with the prevailing regime of capitalist aCClunulation. The important question here involves he t nature of dlis COIUIection that ident ity-based groupings have to the system of capitalist accumulation. It has to be emphasized that the con­ nection between an identity group and dIe capitalist regime of accumulation

H'>2

CHAPTER (,

is not a direct one: any attempt to depict struggles involving race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or religious affiliation as being "really" about class and capitalist exploitation s i simply not plausible. The position devel­ oped in dlis book stresses the crucial mediation dlat is represented by the Iife­ worlds to which subjects belong and whose function is integral to the opera­ tion of dle mode of sodetalization required by capitalism. The state and its apparamscs arc dle primary vehicle for this mode of societalization, and the mode of sodetalization in turn orchestrates the life-worlds which provide the basis for the formation of subjects and agents (and thus of their identities).36 Identities arc formed through dle operation of a range of mechanisms that function at multiple levels, and any suggestion dlat all struggles involving identity arc somehow class struggles "in disguise" is to be resisted. To sec why dlis suggestion needs

to

be guarded against it is m i portant to consider

the tole played by struggles involving identity.

lrkllfify Strll.!l!Jlcs Any struggle is conducted, potentially, at many levels, and each ofthese levels may involve a range of transformations of the consciousness of those involved in these struggles. Michael Mann has ptoposed a typology of working-class consciousness that can be suitably modified to provide a classification of the main kinds of subjectivity and agency n i volved in stmggles:37

1.

Simpk idmtity - the definition of someone lS l member of l partieuhf group, elrrying with it l simple lWlfeness of tlking plrt in the activities of that group in concert with others belonging to it.

2.

Opposition-the perception that by virtue of belonging to one's group, one is likcly to be opposed by those whose interests lfe not served by thl' activi­ ties of one's group. The sense of iden tity lml opposition tend to feinforce each other.

3. Totality-the acCeptlnCe that ilfc1ltity and opposition contribute to the COIl­ stitution of one's over:lll SOCili circumstances and the entire SOCiety of which one s i a member. 4. An aluYllntive society-dle objective that l Struggle will culminlte in f i it moves through all its Stlgcs. Howevef, as Mlnll says, "True revolurionlfy consciou sness s i the combination of all four, and an obviously r:lfe OCCUf­ rellce.�l8

The movement from (1) to

(+)

involves the capacity to connect one's im­

mediate c.xpericnce to a conception of underlying strucmres and finally to THE ['oLiTIeS OF IDENTITY

163

strategic conceptions of an n i cisive alternative to one's society. For marxism, though not necessarily the politics of identity as such, the movement from

(1)

to

(4)

takes place when antagonisms in the domain of production are

coupled with the emergence of a collective oppositional consciousness, and it is only when these conditions are in place that protagonists will have the capacity to gravitate toward a socialist wlderstanding of the transformation of society.3\> A politics of identity which docs not allow for a progression through

all four of these stages will not suffice as a theory of (complete) liberation. Of course, any kind of social and political advance (involving, say, identity and opposition) is to be welcomed n i a world ruled by an amalgam consist­ ing of plutocratic elites, organizations such as the

IMF, World Bank, and

WTO, which serve the interests of these clites, and a substantial dutch of n i ternational business organizations. Too often marxists have dismissed and overlooked struggles simply because they appeared to n i volve and sanction experiences based only on identity and opposition, but not totality and a conception of an alternative society. In any case, Mann's typology will pro­ vide a set of norms for any assessment of a particular movement's (or pro­ gram's) potential when it comes to serving the many causes whose conver­ gence is the crucial n i gredieIU n i any advance toward a decisive liberation.

164

CHAPTER 6

CHAPTER 7 Models of Liberation II

The Politics ofthe Place ofthe Subject

Ibe politics of subjectivity can be associated, primarily dlOUgh not ncces­ sarily c.xdusivdy, with any politics premised Oil he r notion of a ftmdamcntal reciprocity between a subject, or the "place" ofthat subject, and the putative "other" of this subject or subject-place.1 Jacques Dcrrida is the most notable exponent of the thought of such a politics, though where Dcrrida is COIl­ cerned Enunanud Levinas is very much the background force inspiriting this line of cthicopolitical reflection. Any discussion of this politics ofsubjectivity has to acknowledge from the outset what Dcrrida himself has insisted, albeit

with the meandering twists and spirals typically associated with his rhetoric of deconstmction; for example, "I will propose an abrupt deceleration, but in order to speak to you about urgcncy";2 "Indeed (to further tangle the threads of this prehistory) I almost began this introduction precisely with the problem of translation. Hut did I avoid doing so? I-lave

1 nO[ already

done it?";3 " I will push hyp::rbolc beyond hyperbole."4 The discourse of the subject, says Derrida, while necessary and lUlavoidable, nonetheless has to be comprehensively renovated (though for Dcrrida no such conceptual renovation can control the conditions under which it is undertaken, nor have power over dIe couscquences that eusue from dlis undertaking), so dlat it behooves us to speak of the "effect" or "trace" of the subject radler dIan the subject p::r se.s

Rmo)!(ltillg tbe Dscourse i ofthe Subject For all that he has said about the need for a radical reconstitution of die discourse of the subject,

and of dIe complementary need to conceptualize

the subject as the outcome of a doxa or strategy that "produces" it, Derrida resists any suggestion that the subject has been "liquidated"

in his writings,

or in those of Lacan, Aldlllsser, Foucault, and Heidegger, who are widely regarded as c.xemplary thinkers of "the end of Man." Far from it: the subjcct is for Derrida the name of dIe irremovable power that poses the primor­ dial question to which the

who that is the subject is n i effect the inescapable

answer. Whl�re Derrida is concerned the only answer that can be given to ,

the qnestion "Who?" has to be something that emerges from a place approx

i­

mating to that of dIe subject.6 \Ve must resist the urge to contrast Derrida's work just before his death, with its fairly dear emphasis on retaining the place of the subject, widl his earlier work, which n i places seems to favor an antihumanism dlat commends a "decelltering" of the subject Already in 1966, in his lecture "La structure, .

Ie signe et Ie jeu dans Ie discourse des sciences humaines " Derrida contrasted ,

two "interpretations of n i terpretation," one which does not try to pass "be­ yond man and humanism," and the other which docs. He refuses to gloss the difference between these two positions as one requiring a choice to be made between them. To have to choose bet\vl'"Cn these "interpretations of interpre­ t"J.tions" in this way is to fail to see that there is an irreducible commonality which exists between them that allows their difference to be established in the first place (the ground of this commonality being suppied l by the famous Derridean quasi-concept of dIe "supplement")? In a lecture published in English in 1968 as "The Ends of Man," Derrida again distances himself from

an antihumanism of the kind more typically associated with Althusser and Foucault, arguing as he did n i "La structllre, Ie signe et Ie jeu" dlat a dlOice between dlis antihumanism

and the kind of "anthropologism associated "

\vith dIe writings of Heidegger and Satrre is as false as it is problematic. Making use of Nietzsche's distinction between the "superior man" (hiihere

Mensch) and the "overman" ( Ubermensch), the former still distressed over the loss of dIe tmth of Being while die latter accepts tlIis loss joyfully in an "active forgettng i " Derrida argues that there arc perhaps two "ends of man": ,

one still vestigially anthropocentric, embodiet.i in the figure of the hahere Mensch, and die other rcsolutcly postanrhropocemric, embodied n i the figure of the Obermensch. Derrida suggests that we may be suspended be­ t\veen these t\vo ends of man, and that there is no ultimate basis for choosing 166

CHAPTER 7

between them. In the first case, we confront the being who, embodied in the Nietzschean figure of the superior man, stands guard over the sarcophagus of the metaphysics of existence, feeling a palpable grief at the demise of the man of mctaphysical humanism, but only too aware that this is a vigil over a corpse that cannot be revived; n i the other, the overman leaves the dead to themselves and escapes to another threshold that is beyond Being and Man. But, says Derrida, each of these ends of man is just as much ours as the other. 10 escape in the maIUlcr of the overma.n is impossible, since rhc very attempt

to leave behind the corpse of Being has to retain its place of burial as exactly that localityfrom which one has to break away. To flee from he r presence of the dead is still to be pervaded by he t spectrJ.1 presence of rhe dead. (The tenor of tins argument about the " never tmly left bdlind" is something of a formula or " posmlation;' the kind of term Derrida would probably prefer. One dlinks here especially of his SpCCtcl-S ofMarx.)8 11le place of the subject and its attendant metaphysics of being are thus never really left behind n i Derrida's writings, though dley arc subjected to a consistent and painstaking deconstruction, a deconstmction that began as early as "La stmcmre, le signe et Ie jeu" in

1966 and which has manifested itself in everything he subse­

quently wrote on the subject. Ihe subject who is submitted to this deconstmction arises from a " space" of responsibility dlat is antecedent to rhe subject's emergence and its identi­ fication with the self, with the consequence that "the relation to self, in this simation, can only be difference, that is to say alterity or trace. Not only is the obligation not lessened n i this situation, but, on the contrary, it finds in it its only possibi l ity, which is neither subjective nor hwnan. Which doesn't mean that it is inhuman or without subject, bm that it is out of dlis dislocated

affirmation

[thus without 'firmness' or 'dosedncss'] that something like the

subject, man, or whatever it might be can take shape."9 For Dcrrida, and in "Eating Well" he is simultaneously at his most Hcid.eggerian and Lcvinasian, the wbo that becomes the subjcct is the one who answers to the other in tlns simatioll of primordiality (this representing the legaL], of Lcvinas), tlle other n i this case being the one who poses to rhc one who becomes the subject the primal question of its being

(dlis being Derrida's rendition of the Hei­

deggerian DflScill).1O Thc call from the odlcr is dIUS the basis of dIe subject's constimtion, and the responsibility of heeding or overlooking this call is for Derrida dlC core of dlis event of subject constitution. The gravamen of the argwnent in "Eating \.Vell" is that deconstmction, as is necessarily dIe case widl anything that belongs to metaphysics or epis­ temology, is situated within the remit of a philosophy of the subject. 111is THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

l67

assertion may be difficult to reconcile with the antillllm:mist impulse that dearly motivated some areas of Derrida's earlier work, De fagrammatologie being perhaps the exemplary nstance i of this seeming hostility to any kind of philosophical or political anthropocemrism. In "Eating Well;' however, Der­ rida has moved beyond an unqualified repudiation of the anthropocemric principle, primarily (and here I agree with Herman Rapaport) by espousing a logic of recognition of the kind that belongs to the distinguished tradition extending from Hegel to Sartre, bur which would nO[ typically be associated with the author of De lagrammatologie. This logic of recognition was expanded in "Eating Well" to include the possibility of one's recognition by animals and nO[ just human beings. For Derrida, if one can be recognized by an animal, it dearly follows that the operation of the logic of recognition is not limited to the domain of dIe hnman, with rhe cmcial implication that rhe animal is siruated in principle in the very place where the subject is. The place of the subject is willy-nilly the space of the parahuman, bllt, equally, rhe space of the parahuman (the appropriate way to characterize the "beingncss" of the nonhuman animal) is for Derrida coextensive with the place of the subject. The upshot is that the demarcation between the human and its beyond is destabilized, and both the human and its "animal" exteriority can be placed within dIe ambit of the subject.!! If the disposition of the philosophical humanist s i first and foremost to buttress the philosophy of the subject, and in so doing to retain what the con­ cept of the subject is intended to secure philosophically-namely, the funda­ mental insight that the source of meaning docs

/lot reside n i some stmcture

or wlconscious and m i personal principle, but rather in some locus of reci­ procity or primordial response (however deconstmcted the latter arc) -then what deconstruction necessarily accomplishes is the simultaneous modifica­ tion and retention of dIe place of the subject or subjectile. For Derrida this place is retained even as it is deconstructed. Deconstmction destabilizes the boundary between belief and skepticism, reason and madness, caleulation and spontaneity, text and conte.X[, human and nonhuman, the metaphysical and the premetaphysical, and so forth. But Derrida's retention of the place of the subject or subjectilc even as decon­ struction is pursued comes from the inescapable realization that the very posing of the question of this destabilization has to n i volve a who, in tillS case a who that bespeaks inescapably dIe place of the subject or subjectile. For to pose the question of what is at stake when a boundary is questioned or its

16S

CHAPTER 7

notion entertained is perforce to posit a conviction, no marrer how provi­ sional or tenrative, that the bowldary in question opcrates in this or that way, that it has this or that significancc, and tltis in tllrn automatically impies l that there is a putativc who that will be addressed by this boundary's notion, a II'ho that can potentially be "convinced" to whatcver dcgree and in whatever way by that which happens to be posited by the notion in question. -nle acknowledgment of the philosophical pcrtinence of thc

who s, i

in

a roundabout way, Derrida's way of rendering Heidegger's Dasein: some mode of being-in-the-world (thc core of any definition of Dasein) is neces­ sarily involved when thcre is the mere possibility of a question being posed about the onc who poses the qucstion. \Vherc Derrida and thc Derridean "Heidegger" arc concerned, the very possibility of formulating a question presupposes thc prior affirmation of the conditions, always involving a modc of being-in-the-world, whic h makc it germanc for that question to begin to be posed by the one who poses it. "IllCse conditions includc the mode of being-in-the-world of the one who venmres the question as well as that of its putative addressec (thesc can of course be onc and the same nd i ividual).I2 But this

II'ho, while occupying the logical or "grammatological" space of

thc subject, does not for Derrida possess in any significant way or dcgrce the feamrcs typically taken to define the subject of classical metaphysics and epistemology. This

who cannot be this

classical human subject becausc thc

grammatological space is the space of Dcrrida's deconstructcd, and thus parahuman, subject, and this subjcrt is for both Derrida (and thc Derridcan "Heidegger") the equivalent of a singularity that is beyond all the categori­ zations that arc involved in thc constitution of the classical human subject. The following passage from " Eating Well" is unambiguous on this point: Undcr the heading ofjemein!..tfkeit, beyond or behind the subjective "self" or person, there is for Heidegger a singularity, an irreplaceability of that

which remains nonsubstimtable in the structure of Dasein. This amounts to an im:ducible singularity or solitude in Mitschl (which is also a condition of Mitsein), but is not that of the individual. This last concept always risks poiming both toward the ego and an organic or atomic n i di visibility. The Dn ofDaseill singularizes itselfwithout being reducible to any ofme categories of human subjectivity (self, reasonable being, consciousness, person), precisely OCGlUSe it is prcsupposed by aU of thosc.B

Two claims can be embodied in the proposition that the "Dn of Dnscill singularizes itself without being reducible to any of the categories of human

THE [,OLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

169

subjectivity (self, reasonable being, consciousness, person)." One is that there are n i bct several philosophies of the subject, to wit, the humanist subject, the subject of writing, the subjectivity instituted by Dascin, the subject as the one designated by the wIJo, and so on, each governed by a separate logic but with no overarching principle to bring them together nto i a single, coherent whole. The other claim is that the singularity designated by the wIJo is consti­ tuted in such a way that it can llCl'er be taken to be a subject (in the full-blown senses underwritten by these philosoph ies of the subject), because the who, here more appropriately designated as a subjectile, comprises myriad objects and part-objects, without any intrinsic rationale or metaphysical accord to unite these parts n i to a "philosophy" of the subject as such. While these two claims can be used to complement each other, they in no way necessarily imply each other. It is possible after all to insist that there is an irreducible plurality of philosophies where the subject is concerned, with no overarching rationale to unify them nto i a comprehensive accowlt of the subject (in this case one would in effect be maintaining dIal dlere is no ground for a theory of the subject), without accepting the proposition dlat the "subject" is a mere fafoll de parler. (The person who accepts this proposition would not even be able to affirm that there is a subject capable of functioning as a theoretical object.) In other words, to determine that dIe subject is a merefarm deparkr, one would have to demonstrate why the assertion that there is such a dling

as a subject lacks plausibility n i a fairly decisive way, perhaps by showing in a nontrivial manner that singularities or subjecti l es are all dlat really exist, and that a subjectile is necessarily an amalgam of objects and part·objects lacking an a priori unifying principle which can elevate these object and part-object components into a subject. -The difference between dlese two positions can be stated thus: in the first case, dIe place occupied by the subject is not ontologically void, but the mat­ ter of choosing between different conceptions of the subject is nonetheless permeated by an evident undecidability; in the second case, the place occu­ pied by the subject is ontologically void because the subjectile (whose mode of being cannot be rendered n i to anything like dlat of a subject) resides in its place, and the question of wldecidability caIUlOt dlerdore even begin to arise. But even f i dIe claims embodied n i these two positions do not imply each other (and for analytical purposes dley are perhaps best kept apart), it is still possible to assert dIem both. Indeed the imprims of bodl are to be discerned n i Derrida's "'Eating Well." 14 It has to be noted, however, that the Derrida of "Eating \Vell" and "To Unsense the Subjectile" has swung toward dIe second of these two perspectives on dIe subject and subjectilc, widlOut 170

CHAPTER 7

repudiating the norion, especially canvassed in his earlier writings, that the theory of the subjCt.:t, qua theory, is permeated by a fundamental undecid­ ability. In "Eating \.Vell," " To Unsense the $ubjectilc," and the long essay "Finis," Derrida takes as his launching point Heidegger's elaboration of the concept of "nothingness" (NiclJtigkeit) in Beillg and Time.tS TIle analysis of "thrown­ ness" provided in Being alld Time identifies bdng with the Nothing and the Not because Dasdn (Le., that which accounts for the "beingness" of one's being) has no control over the ground of its being. In Heidegger's "analytic of Dascill;' thrownness is presented as an existential stmcmre which defines Dasein; by virtue of being "thrown" Dasein is confronted by unconditional possibilities that would exist even f i you or I did not, from which Heideg­ ger coneludes that these possibilities can have no ultimate meaning for us. Absolute possibility thus has a basis in something that Dascin itself cannot entirely dispose of, since to be a being is to find oneself thrown into sOllie possibilities, and thm never into all possibilities, and so possibility n i its fullest amplitllde has a growld whic h caIUlOt be encompassed by Dasdn. In

being thrown, Dasein can only project itself in the face of possibilities it

caIUlOt contain or be fully in command of, and as SUdl it lacks the fixity or completeness of being it would nl'Cd to have if it were to be an " essential" being. Lacking essential and comprehensive being, Dasein's only indispens­ able possibility is the impossibility of essential and comprehensive being, and has thus to be characterized as "nothingness": to be thrown is necessari l y not to have command over all possibilities, over the grOlmd of one's being, and this ground, in its absoilite opacity to Dasein, must therefore constimre itself for Dascin as an insurmountable nothingness. Dascin is a norhingness not able to make possibility into its own defining possibility. A final nonrelation to possibility is Dasein's only possibility. An irremovable stmcmral nullity therefore defines Dasein, and the voice of conscience (Still/me ,us Gewissens) for Heidegger is a voice addrcs.scd to us n i the realization that the world is flmdamentally meaningless because of this nulliry.J6 For Heidegger, I am someone, that is, some being, but the "beingness" of the being that I am is not given to me as an essence even as I heed the call of conscience. My life is the projCt.:t constitmed in response to dlis call, bm dlis project has to con­ stmct its ground in dIe awareness dlat no such ground s i given in advance, and that dlis lack of "givenness" where being is concerned is rhe very thing that gives life its character as "project." 17 There is no growld from which one responds, soberly and responsibly (these being the hallmark of Heideggerian "authenticity" ) to the call of conscience. THE 1'0LlTICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

171

11lis Hcideggerian existential duownness, having its ontological corre­ late in the doctrine of nothingness and issuing as it does in the claim that our essence can never be given to us, is taken by Derrida to provide the lin­ eaments of the concept of [he subjectile. The subjectile is the being who is nor in possession of its being, the one who, like the Anaud depicted in "To Unsense the Subjectile," has passed beyond the necd to have an essence.IS By passing beyond the need to have an essence, the subjectile, like Heidegger's thrown n i dividual, is the exemplary deconstruction of the rational animal that the metaphysical tradition has typically taken as a defining feamre of the human.19 \'Vhat hen [ determines who or what can be located in those spaces and places of the question to which humans and animals alike ostensibly belong, all with the warrant, suppied l by Derridean deconstruction, to be considered subjects or subjectiles? The Derridean answer is ethics, understood here in a sense that makes it ntegral i to the political. But, and this is the gist of the passage from "Eating \.Vcll" cited earlier, tills ethics or poit l ics will be driven by a theory of singularity, and the features dla( define this dleory will lie at dle heart of this ethics or politics. The notion of a singularity is virtually indispensable for any political philosophy seeking to obviate the endlessly problematic polarity between the "individual" and dle "collective" dla( is essential to dle Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel tradition of reflection on the state and sovereignty, and so Derrida certainly possesses one of the key theoretical elements for providing an alternative to this tradition.

TIle Ethical and Political Singularity For l-leidegger, as we have seen, the call

(Ruf)

of conscience is a call dla(

each individual heeds (or fails to heed) without having an essence to serve as a ground for his or her response to dlis call. 11le call of conscience forestalls any attempt at human self-mastery or self-possession, and as such the call (dlOugh for Heidegger this call is issued n i silence) is fundamentally ethical and politicaPO The call of conscience is a call to responsibility, as dle follow­ ing passage from Being and Time makes dear: The statement dIat Dastill is at the same time the cal!cr and the called has now lost its empty formal charKter and its obviousness.

Omscimcc rcpeals itselfas

the call ofCIIre: me caller is DaSfill, anxiolls in thrownness (in its already-being­ in . . .) about its potentiality-of-being. The one cal!ed is also DaSCill, called forth to its uwnmost potentiality of being (its being-ahead-of-itsclf . . .j. And

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whn is caUed forth by me sunmlOrIS is Dmtill, our of falling prey to me they (already�bcing-togemcr-with-the-world-taken-care-of . . .j. The call of con­ science, that is, conscience itsclf, has its ontological possibility in me fact that Dascbl is care in the ground of its being.ll In other words, the call of conscience is an event which discloses to us Da­ scin's fundamental character as care. LI this evem of disclosure, I find that I am thrown into a past that is nor entirely at my disposal, but which, as the groundless ground of my future, nonetheless constitutes the basis for my potentiality of being, a potentiality from which I construct my life as a project. Only in this way can I avoid leading the kind of life in which I bil to realize that Dasein confronts me with choices between which I have to choose, even dlOUgh there is no ground for making these choices. The n i di­ vidual is thus confronted with two ways of being, one authentic (exemplified by the willingness to make the choices that n i evitably bce us) and the other inauthentic (c.xemplified by the flight from the need to choose). Responsi­ bility, as one would expect, consists in not turning away from this need to make choices. LCYinas, having accepted that Hcidegger had undermined irretrievably any pretension that metaphysics (and ontology specifically) could serve as the "first philosophy," would take this call of conscience and locate it in an ex­ pic l itly e.thical stmcture, in this way mming ethics into dIe "first philosophy" that ontology could never be. For Lcvinas all subjects are such by virtue of the call made by dIe other, with justice then being defined as one's irreducible. responsibility for the other. Despite Derrida's firmness in maintaining that the postdeconstructed subject begins widl a consrimting nonidentity with itself, he still accepts the LCvinasian principle that its underpinning as subject (albeit a deconstructed subject or subjectile) comes precisely from a call made by dIe odler, and the corollary of this principle that justice is one's irreducible responsibility for the other (dlOugh Denida would emphasize that this re­ sponsibility is c.xercised in he r face of dIe undecidability dlat pervades one's relationship with the other). The problem with Derrida's position here c.xtends all the way back to Hei­ degger. If critics and the ethical (for simplicity's sake we can lise some bald nomenclamre that Lcvinas would have been far more comfortable with than Heidegger, who was unrelenting in his repudiation of tidy designations),

and alw politics and rile political, derive from this constitutive feature of Dasein's stmcmre, its typical mode of being-in-the-world, dlen there is an unavoidable sense in which the politics that is legitimated or entailed by this

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conception of rhe subject is a politics of decision vitiated by Hcidegger's (andperhaps Derrida's) inability to tdl llS how the (seemingly always solitary) subject or subjectiic moves from ever-present undecidability [0 concrete po­ litical decision.22 TIlis is especially the case if one is talking of the subjectile who, as I-ierman Rapaport points out, is marked by a certain "autism." It is not apparent how the individual who happens to oc defined by this autism is going to be able to function satisfaclOrily as protagonist in any kind of nontrivial collective political project.B TIlis difficulty will be addressed later, after further discussion of Derrida's positions. -nlere is a troublingvoluntarism at the heart of l-lcidegger's conception of Dasein, and a numocr of commentators have noted a profound philosophical hankering after individual authenticity that reflects Kierkegaard's influence on Heidegger.14 TIle Derridean equivalent of l-lcidegger's thrownness is the "interminable experience" which Derrida associates with "a sort of nonpas­ sive endurance of the aporia," this endurance being for Derrida "the condi­ tion of responsibility and of decision." 25 TIle "endurance of the aporia" is subtended by a "stmcture of nullity" that has remarkable affinities with the stmcture displayed in Being and Tillie. TIlis I-Ieideggerian reprise is evident in the following passage from Aporias: The aminomy hen: bener deserves the name of aporia insofar as it is neither an "apparcIlt or illusory'" antinomy, nor a dialectizable conrradiction n i the Hegelian or Marxist sense, nor even a "transcendental illusion n i a dialectic of the Kamian type," but n i stead an interminable txperience. Such an expcrknce must remain such ifone wants to think, to make come or to Icr come any eveIlt ofdecision orof responsibility. The most genera! and therefore. illdewrminatc form of this double and single duty is that a responSible decision must obey a

dllty that owes IlOtlJiltfJ, tbat mllSt (l)rt llOthillg ill order to be a dllty, a duty mat has no debt to pay back, a duty without debt and therefore without duty.26

Derrida goes on to draw out the implications of the assertion that the ethical decision is not bound lip with a "determinable or determining knowledge, the consequence of some preestablished order" (17). Rather than maintain­ ing a rclation to a determination derived from an order of this kind, he pro­ poses that the ethical decision (and presumably his t holds for the political decision as well) be seen as an intermption of the preestablished order and the determinations s i suing from it, while still retaining a rclation to rhis intermption and that which it intermpts. TIle threshold of this intermption resembles a " borderly edge" and corresponds in Dcrrida's scheme of things [0 the Hcideggerian "limit situation" (GYCllzsitllfltioll), which for Hcidegger 174

CHAPTER 7

is the place in which being displays itself to Dasein when Dascin is resolute n i the face of the nullity of e.\:istenceP At the threshold of this borderly edge the maker of ethical and political decisions is faced with a twofold duty. On dle. one hand, his or her decision and its accompanying responsibility, constimted as they are by dle "wlcondi­ tionality of the incalculable," calUlot be shielded by the assurances and certi­ mdes provided by knowledge, dIe institution of a program, or some kind of appeal to reason.lS At the same time, and this is rhe aporia in the exercising of a genuine responsibility, dlese conditions for the making of rhe decision in question cannot simply be discarded: they guide the decision while remain­ i.ng "radically heterogeneous" to the calling that solicits the decision and its accompanying responsibility in the first place. Decision and responsibility have, simultaneously, dIe character of a passage and a nonpassage,

as

dIe

one summoned to decision has to bar himself or herself from the guarantees afforded by "typical forms," such as knowledge, reason, and programs, while at the same time realizing dlat no wish or decree can cause these to be jetti­ soned. The person who decides has thus to live n i dIe lUldecidable while acknowl­ edging the presence of principles and conditions that bespeak the very pres­ ence of the decidable. To decide s i to do so in the active presence of these "typical forms" alln the power of the LUuiecidable dlat make.� every tmly edlical and fKJlitical decision into a singular event, but widlOut having at our disposal any principle that enables us to determine how we arc to make the passage from the undecidable to the detenninate and vice versa. Derrida takes this "aporetic stmctllfe" to be n i tegral to politics and rhe political, contending that there will be no edtics or fKJlirics without he t "inexhaustible singularization" that stems from the operation of this "aporetic stmcmre" (Aporas i 20). To quote Derrida from 77fe Other Headillg: These conditions can only take a nega6ve form (without X mere would nO[ be

V). One can be cert:lin only of mis negative form. As soon as it is converted into pOSitive certainty ("on this condition, there will surely have been event, deeision, responsibility, ethics, or po!itics�), one can be sure that one is begin­ ning to be deceived, n i deed beginning to deceive the other. \Ye arc speaking here with names (event, decision, responsibility, emics,

polities) of"things" that can only cxceed (and mllSt exceed) thc. order of meo­ retica! determination, of knowledge, certainty, judgment, and of statements in the form of "this is that," in omcr words, more generally and essentially, mc order of theprcSl'1It or ofpresCllttltiUlI. Each time they arc rcduced to what

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me)' must exceed, error, recklessness, the umhought, and irresponsibility arc given the so very presemab!c face of good conscience.29 In odler words, politics and ethics can only be engaged n i a realm dlat com­ bines, in a way that is unavoidably aJXlretic, the typical and the singular, and the practices assocbtt�d widl dle political and the ethical can be undertaken only n i a conditional mode, widl conditions being specifiable in a stricdy negative form (meaning that dle conditionals in question can indicate only necessary but never sufficient conditions). Two features of this account stand out. First,

all ethical and political decisions are marked by an epistemological

insufficiency whose source is ontological. Epistemological insufficiency has its origin in a lack of ontological sufficiency that structurally conditions all situations in which decisions are made. Second, and this is a corollary of the previous trait identified widl Derridean ethical and political decision making, the individual making such decisions, confronted by this omnipresent episte­ mological n i sufficiency and its underlying lack of ontological sufliciency, has to deal with a "limit of [rudl" that stems in the end (and this is where Derrida shows himself to be Heidegger's greatest disciple) from the sheer unavail­ ability of ontological knowledge concerning the ego, consciousness, person, the soul, the subject-that is, all the premises of metaphysics.3o A thinking of

being without dle prop of metaphysics would have to be a thinking that goes beyond being, resnlting in an attempt to acknowledge the "place" occupied by that which "bestows" being. But any thinking whidl broached this subject would have to face a set of aporias dlat cannot be dissolved or circumvented. -nlis a:dom of Heidegger's thought is dle starting JXlint of all the positions taken by Derrida on the ethical and the political. A thinking of the ethical and dle JXllitical is for Derrida n i e.xorably bound

up with the "experience of the aJXlria" and the thinking conducted on behalf of this e.xpericnce. For both Derrida and Hcidegger dtis is an experience of being faced with a limit, of arriving at that limit. The experience of this event JXlses the question of dle one who experiences this arriving at dle threshold of limit, of the singularity of dlis being who arrives at the limit. -nle nature of he t limit is such that the new arriVtlllt "comes to be where s/he was not expected, where one wa.� awaiting him or her without waiting for him or her, without expecting

it [sJ attwdre], without knowing what or whom to

expect, what or whom I

am

pitality toward he r event"

waiting for-and such is hospitality itself, hos­

(Aporias 33). Nor only is the new arrivant affected

by the threshold which he or she approaches, but the very experience of the

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threshold itself is affected by the approach of the new arrivant. "This occurs because the new arrivant brings out, in his or her approaching of the thresh­ old, the possibi l ities residing in the dueshold that had only been latent until the emergence of the arrivant. Derrida alights on dle performative character of this disclosure of possibility: dle possibility brought nto i the open by the arrivant comes n i dle form of" an invitation, a call, a nomination, or a prom­ ise

(Verheiml/!!1, Hcissm, etc.)" (33). The crux of this disclosure of possibility

resides for Derrida in dle figure ofthe subjectile, or what he calls (inAporias) "dle absolute nrrimnt": The absolute arrillJ1It docs nO[ yet have a name or an identity. It s i not an invader or an occupier, nor is it a colonizer, even if it can also become one. This is why I call it simply the arriwmt, and nO[ someone or somcrhing that arrives, a subject, a person, an n i dividual, or a living thing, even less fa] mi� grant. . . . Since the arrimllt does not have any idcmity ycr, its place of anival

s i also dc-identified: one docs not ycr know or one no longer knows which is me cOl1mry. the place, the na[ion, the family, me language, and me home in general that welcomes the absolute arrimllt. (34)

Ille absolute arrivant is "'not an intruder, an invader, or a colonizer, because nvasion i presupposes some self·identity for the aggressor and for the vic­ tim."

Denying that the absolute arrivant can serve as a "legislator" or "the

discoverer of a promised land," Derrida depicts the arrivant, a being "as disarmed as a newly born child," as one who cannot be identified with any telos or eschatology, since this being "excel-ds the order of any determinable promise" (Apurias 34; emphasis in original). AldlOugh the arrivant cannot be reduced to any of these terms, he or she nonetheless makes all thesc pos­ sible, "starting widl the humanity of man, whic h some would be inclined to recognize in all that erases, in the anil'tlllt, he t characteristic of (cultural or national) belonging and even metaphysical determination (ego, person, subject, consciousness, etc.). It is on dlis border that I am tempted to read Hcidegger. Yet dns border will always keep one from discriminating among the figures of the arrimllt, the dead, and the rCl'enallt (the ghost, he, she, or that whic h returns)" (35). >nle reference in this passage to Hcidegger is sig­ nificant, because Derrida states lmambiguously in dlt, paragraph following this passage that he is using the figure of dle arrivant to rethink the notion of Dascin. Just as l-Icidegger used this notion to deconstmct the anthropolog· ism that s i the taproot ofV\'estern Illl'taphysics, Derrida seeks to complement and reconstitute the l-lcideggerian Dascin through his account of the arri­ VaIU.

l-Icidegger used rhe existential analysis of Dascin's bcing-toward-deadl THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

177

to undo onrorheology, the essence of the superordinate system of possibility that made the so-called ontic sciences (biology, anthropology, historiogra­ phy, psychology, etc.) possible, by analyzing death as the "possible impos­ sibility" which, because it cannot be absorbed by this system of possibility (death being the cessation of all possibility for Dascin), represents its untran­ scendable and aporetic limit. In a similar way, Derrida's absolute arrivanr is an "impossible possibility" that marks the limit of a seemingly n i vulnerable system of representation. The notion of a radical finitude lies at the heart of the analytics of Dasein, and Derrida's concepmalization of the absoilite arrivant derives from the extension and deepening of this norion to a num­ ber of existential simations not considered by Heidegger in Being lind Timc. These are the simations of"mouming andghosting (rCI'Clllillce), spectrality or living-on, surviving," the situations par excellence when it comes to defining the subjectile or absolute arrivant.31 Derrida follows Hcidegger n i asking the question, From where does possi­ bilityemerge for Dasein (in the case ofl-Ieidegger) or the subjectile or arrivant (in the case of Derrida) when they face up to the aporctic limit represenred by the grOlUld of Dascin'5 or the arrivant's possibility? The answer, for bocil Derrida and l-Ieidegger, can be found only by making recourse to the self­ constitution of Dasein and the arrivant. This question of self-constitution­ and here Derrida includes the self-constimtion of the ego, person, conscious being n i a way that Hcidegger would perhaps nor countenance-is posed in terms of the question of cile "mineness" (jemeilligkeit) of rhe being of Dasein and rhe arrivant. This is how Derrida a.nswers cilis question: "If/cllleilligkeit . . .s i constimted in its ipseity in terms of an originary mourning, cilen the self-relation welcomes or supposes the other within its being-itself as

dif­

ferent from itself. And reciprocally, the relation to cile mher (in itself Olit­ side myself, outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved apprehension" (Apurias 61). Derrida calls this net.:essary proximity to the ociler in one's self-constitution "the reciprocal axiom," and suggests that cile apprehension of death, whether of my own death or cile death of an other, is always instituted by a "mineness" that is circumscribed by the ego or even rhe conscious "';' 11le reciprocal axiom cannot be suspended; to mourn, and rhe certitude of death makes mourning n i evitable, is necessarily to not have oneself be there for rhe other or cile other be there for oneself. Mourning, from which cilere is no escape, is thus irreducibly political: "There

is

no polities without an organization of the time and space of mourning,

without a topoitology l of the sepulcher, wicilOut an anamnesic and thematic relation to cile spirit as ghost

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7

[rCl'enlillt], without an open hospitality to the

guest asghost lin English in the originalJ, whom one holds, just as he holds us, hostage"

(61-62).32 In this conceiving of the possible that is the core of

the "e.xistential analysis of death," "being-possible" is shown to be the "being proper to Dasein." 10 await oneself at the limits (and this is necessarily bound up with an awaiting of the other) is to engage in something that is unavoid­ ably destabilizing. Derrida identifies three structures or modes n i this waiting at the limits constiruted by the waiting for death (a waiting we arc consigned to whether we like it or nor):

(1) "awaiting oneself n i oneself" ; (2) "waiting

for the arril'ant," so that one waits for someone else; and (3) waiting for each other

(s'attwdre PIIII l'autre, ('une Pautre; Aporas i 68).

Having a relation to death s i impossible, says Derrida in a necessarily laborious formulation, bl""Calise death is the showing

as

such of that which

caIUlOt appear as such, and so we are able only to name the one thing which appears in death: (the event of) a being's physical or corporeal perishing.33 Death, the "possible m i possibiity;' l is for Derrida the limit at which one waits, since the state of affairs that would make this waiting cease can never materialize. The only thing that would preempt this waiting is the provision, at the point when life is ebbing, of more life, and yet more life, all adding lip to endlessly enended life, and this of course can never happen for a mortal being. Sooner or later we find ourselves at he t place of this aporetic limit. But it is also the place where one is awaited. At this aporetic limit, a place that cannot be chosen (even the one who chooses voluntary euthanasia, say, only alters the time at which he or she comes to this place), the place of dle one who waits and the one who is awaited can be exchanged, interminably, since this is a destination to which no one belongs. No one can be "at home" at the threshold where all possibility ceases. In this place, dlen, all are arrivants. For Derrida we are kept by this secret, a secret that bespeaks a true democracy, since all belong to this place, even if none of us s i "at home" in it.

Singularity and Politics A fundamental presupposition of \\'estern metaphysics is that of an irrevo­ cable stability of conceptual deployment. Metaphysics is possible only if judgment, adequate judgment, is possible, and stable boundaries between concepts and nonconcepts or failed concepts arc dms its sine qua non. How­ ever, this requirement dlat there be a certain fixity to the boundaries that exist between the concept and the nonconcept cannot be met by any final guaramee, and Derrida (like Heidegger) shows n i text after text why judg­ ment, and thus also metaphysics, never have ultimate possession of what THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

1]9

they need conceptually and so can never n i sist that dIe distinction between conct�pt and nonconcept is

as

stable

as

it is typically taken to be. There will

always be an "outside" or "surplus" to metaphysics dlat unhinges dIe very principle of such a stability. If the needed distinction between concept and nonconcept is unstable tout court, then any fixity that attaches to it can emerge only as the resultant of our practices and, by virtue of this, dIe always contingent arrangements that underlie these practices. ·nlCSC practices generate concepts and bestow on them thcir conditions of intelligibility, and it is from this grOlUld that the notion of a singularity derives its force. Ihis insight has bt-en operative in Derrida's thinking from dIe beginning, and his much (and in some cases willfuly) l misunderstood claim n i De lagrallllla l tologie that "there is nodling outside of the text

[il ll)'11 pas de hors-texte]" encapsulates the principle of an

intertextuality (as Derrida's defenders arc wont to maintain n i dlcir ell"orts to protect him from the accusation rhat he is a pernicious "idealist" of the tc.n). Bur also, and perhaps more significantly for our purposes, this for­ mula can be wlderstood to encompass dIe principle, integral to Derrida's lUlderstanding of conceptual practice, dlat "everything" is illSide the text.34 -nlis "everything" would include historical, social, political, and economic considerJtions dlat bear on a [c.n's conditions of intelligibility and tmth, and the claim that "there is nothing outside of dIe text" can then be taken to imply that this (Derridean) theory of tcxtuality and conceptual practice is in ell"ect a dlCOry of ideology. -nlat is, the text profTers a world, which may be the real world or an alternative to that world, in which certain interests arc deemed desirable or wordlwhile and legitimated in the process, while others are overlooked or sidelined and therefore delegirimated.J5 With a constitlltive instability pervading dIe operation of concepts, every conceptual operation is susceptible to deconstruction, that is, the constant permeation of our practices, and not just our textual practices, by what Der­ rida calls diffirllna:. ·nlis in turn connects widl the subject's character as an absolute singularity. Subject cOllStitlition takes place in a field of practices sull"used by the

qllmi-tmllScmdmtal dlat is

dill"crance, and rht, unreserved

Heraclitean passage of diffcrance submits everything to effects that decom­ pose and reconfigure whatever it is that comes within its orbit.36 The strate­ gies that enable dIe movement of differance (these strJtegics are not, how­ ever, identical widl the "event" of the movement of diffcrance) to be what it is are themselves susceptible to the passage of differance (dlis bcing the nub of deconstructive practice), so that rhe enterprise of critique or analysis is itself subject to deconstmction. The upshot is that while metaphysical prin-

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ciples are placed n i abeyance by diffcrance, diffcrance cannot function as a "better" metaphysics than metaphysics itsclf; if it did, diffcrance would have to become an alternative metaphysics, and in doing this, it would have [0 be­ come the presence that it cannot be (since diffcrance is itself the condition of presence, and as that which has to "be" in order to enable presence, it cannot itself be present). If the event of the subject's constitution is subject to the movement of diffcrance, then this event has to originate in an undecidabi l ity that is absolutely primal. 1he subject qua singularity or subjectile e.xists be­ cause the elemental wuiecidability that ensues from diffcrance always calls for a stabilization, however brief and mdimemary, n i the face of the unde­ cidable. \Vhether the realm is meaning or politics, values or metaphysics, any stability of concept or judgment, no matter how provisional or ephemeral, has to follow from a resolve in the face of this measllfcless undecidability to let concept X designate this bllt not that or permit judgment Y to involve the affirmation of this and this but not that or that. At

any rate, concepts

are deployable and judgments issuable only because of a prior ocelusion or stilling of this originary undecidability, thereby enabling us to disregard the mprints i of the ceaseless filL'( that arises from this absence n i principle of the decidable .n

TIlls occlusion or stilling

of the chaos of the undecidable is not in itself

irresponsible. 1here would be no lived world without it; quite the reverse, responsibility counsels that this flux be immobilized in order to make rhe determinations that arc needed to make life livable. It is this flux that makes ethics possible, since ethics and politics arc not possible widlOlit dle real pos­ sibility of making determinations, the " art" of discrimination being n i tegral to ethics. Geoffrey Bennington, perhaps Derrida's most faithful and still rig­ orous interpreter, and also his coauthor and translator, has said the following about this opening for the ethical :

This possibility of ethics in undecidability and n i ventivity is not itself (yet) ethical or political but is, beyond good and (,vil (as Derrida said of writing ,

n i 1967), also the impossibility of any ethic s beillg ethical. Bur if this open­ '

ing s i not yet itself ethi cal, it gives both a principle for judging (any ethical or political judgement that closes off this condition of undeCidability is pso i

facto suspect) and a principle for the infinitisation of nhics and polities This .

infinitisation, which takes place each time finitely, is also called j ustice . For all metaphysical doctrines of ethics and politiCS dose off the undecidable at

some poim: political and social philosophies of ill colours project tdeologies whereby politiCS and morals arc oriented towards their end (in social justice

THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

,

1111

virruc, nansparcncy, etc.), whereas the deconstntctive constntal cannot but suspend this tdeological thrust (this has madc it suspect to many commcnta­ tors) with its radical appeal to a future (thc coming ofthe undecidable singular cvCnt) which wi!! never be a present (this fl1tuf(� that is not a futun' present determining the claim from the carliest work that the future is necessarily monstrous, i.c. formless) although it always happens

11011'.

This appeal

to

an

irreducibly futural future (the interminably j,-l'rmir or to come) suspends de­ construction always this side of any ethical or political doctrille orprwmmme. But Dcrrida is prepared to link this thinking to that of a democracy which is the ethieo-political figure of the never-absolute, never-present dispersion of

diffirallce. Far from preventing ethico-political decisions of the most concrete and pressing kind, this democracy to-come would be the condition of possi­ bility of all decisions, and simultaneously the condition ofimpossibility of any self-righteousness about them.38 111is passage draws out in yet another way some of the implications of the Derridean premise that with the iluJXlssibility of a direct route to the abso­ lute (this being preeluded by difi"crance, since any contiguity with the abso­ lute would arrest he t passage of differance), all who approach the thresh­ old of the ethical and the political do so as arrivams. The engagement with the undecidable lUldertaken by each subject or arrivant is thus absolutely singular: if diffcrance is unending movement, shuttling between the tran­ scendental ("the political," in this case) and dle empirical (Le., "politics") ill order to interrogate bodl in terms of a quasi-transcendental dlat neither can hope to encompass, and which therefore has dle capacity to suspend both realms while also propelli..tlg them n i entin:ly unanticipated directions, then all political and edlical engagement has the potential to take directions dlat arc novel and distinctive. The absence of finality, c..xcept when this is instimted, whedler overtly or tacitly, in order to m i pede the passage of dif­ fcrance (thereby only making this a finality that can always be "nndone" by this quasi-transcendental), means hat t all politics and ethics partakes of the singular. Everything that defines the political (Le., the transcendental plane superordinate to concrete political activity) as we encounter it in the JXlliti­ cal forms and processes explicitly manifested in everyday life, and this quo­ tidian practical politics as it is interrogated by the metaphysics of the political (in tllis way connecting again with the inc..xhaustible passage of diffcrance), always brings with it the possibility of an encOlUlter witll the other. Our re­ spective encounters here arc always with this other, a "not me" n i "me," dIat is the sine qua non of any engagemem with the JXllirical and the ethical.

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One must qualify, if not dismiss outright, dIe impression dlat dlis un­ ending shuttle between the two planes, productive as it is of the irreducibly singular, generates in all kinds of new and n i teresting ways a politics and edlies in which subjects are constantly confronted with novelties and fresh challenges that derive ultimately from the movement of diffcrance, situations which then have to be dealt with through an exercise of the subject's will. -nle passage of diffcrance docs not turn politics n i to voluntarism and politi­ cal logic into a logic for an orchestration of the will in the face of the filL'\: associated with rhe " dance" or "play" dlat is diffcrance, where responsibility takes dlt, form of a "resolute" c.xercise of the will as the subject deal� more or less nimbly with an endless succession of contingencies and "accidents." Derrida's positions on rhe political and the ethical clearly militate against the view that politics and ethics n i volve, at dleir core, what is in essence an exercise of the will (though for Derrida they certainly do not preclude this willfulness). For Derrida, the poitical l subject motivated by a sense ofrespon­ sibi l ity is more likely than not to be claimed by a tradition that he or she ap­ proaches as an inheritance to be adhered to even f i aspects of dlis inheritance are challenged or rt�pudiated.3\> Here Derrida wants to usc the dt.""Construc­ tion of the metaphysics of concepts, and this co ipso includes the concept of the political, to show that a deconstruction of metaphysical concepts s i itself necessari l y political, and that dlis vigi l ance in the domain of metaphysical concepts in turn enjoins, through a kind of osmosis or contagion of practice enabled by diffcrance, an active vigilance in the complementary sphere of an everyday politics, that is, what counts as politics in the more commonplace senses of dIe term.11lis connection between deconstruction and dIe. political is explicitly made by Derrida in his celebrated claim that "jmrice is dIe WI­ deconstructible condition of deconstmction," which palpably implies that at least one of deconstruction's conditions is insusceptible of deconstmction, and rhat this r i removable condition s i jnstice (and hence politics) itself:�o The assertion that a specific polities (a politics n i compatible with dIe re­ quirements of justice would be ruled out, peremptorily, as a condition of deconstruction) is the unfettered condition of deconstruction shows decon­ struction to be situated at the core of dIe political, and vice versa. Decon­ struction operates at the bellest of a spt""Cific conception ofjustice or respon­ sibility as a condition of discharging its other responsibilities. Bur how do we get from this somewhat generalized conception ofjustice, with its attendant politics, to more practical concerns having to do with peace and war, dIe causes of famine, racism, the merciless c.xploitation of women and children, dIe making of decisions and the determining of courses of actions, and so THE [,OllTiCS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

l83

forth? After all, valuable though it is to find a politics crisply and rigorously at work in the throes of deconstmctive practice (i.e., the realm of the onto­ logical), it remains the case that this generalized politics can operate only n i terms of a transcendental horizon and dms have no visibk connection widl practice and commitment (i.e., the realm of the ontic). Derrida has declined to usc deconstmction as a guide for developing pre­ cepts and principks that can inspire conduct. As he sees it, any attempt to use deconstmction to generate political and ethical precepts that will be "useful" for individuals in dIe daily round of their lives is inherently problematic: if used in this way, deconstmction vitiates an mportant i condition for the making of real decisions, since decisions are tmly made only when they are arrived at in the face of dIe undecidabk, and not because a moral or politi­ cal calculus s i availabk that can be applied by rote:u Decisions in the non­ aporetic sense of the term, for Derrida, can be made only in a context sub­ tended essentially by the undecidable; if it were odlerwise, one would simply be adhering to a course that had been predetermined, and this would be no real decision. In stressing the indispensability of this place of the undecidable for a genuine ethics and politics, Derrida adverts to a set of modalities sanc­ tioned by the undecidabk-the possible, the conditional, the "perhaps"­ that arc indispensable accompaniments to the making of real decisions.42 lknnington characterizes this position of Derrida's in the following way: Dernda will say that an evem that occurs on the condition ofthe perhaps lifa dlat condition (bur remembers it

as

its condition): "If no decision (ethical,

i terrupting deteffilination by getting juridical, political) s i po�iblc wimour n i the very imo theperhaps, on the other hand the same dl."cision must nterrupt dling that is its condition of po�ibiliry, the perlJaps itself." Radicalising this thought abour events in general in the comext ofdeci sions leads to a rens i crip­ tion of the concept ofdecision away from me concept of the subject to which it is traditionally bound.43 Derrida's stress on the "pcrhaps" goes hand in hand with a significam demar­ cation made between the SIIbjrct and the epent, harnessed here to the aim of having the subject displaced by the event. The subject needs to be displaced, according to Derrida, because the n i tactness of the traditional subject, premised on notions of self-sufficiency and autonomy, makes every decision undertaken by this quintessential embodiment of rationality and sovereignty nto i something that is fundamentally extraneous to the beinghood of dIe subject. As he puts it, a decision made by this subject is "an accident that

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leaves the subject n i different." By connast, the event "will surprise both the freedom and the will of any subject, in a word surprise the very subjectivity of the subject."44 A genuine decision is one that dislocates the n i tact subject by inserting into the being of the subject the order of the evem, which then serves as an e...[.: eriori!y to the subject, inciting in the subject a passivity or receptivity which conduces to an out-of-joinmess that makes the one who decides into a subjectile. The subject, in the account Derrida proposes, is no longer to be viewed as a "most real" which dk"Ctively turns the world n i to a secondary reality that has to derive its substance from the being of this mmovable i bulwark. 'nle following cmcial passage ftom PolitilJllcs de Famine indicates that in the process of being intermpted by this exteriority, the being of the-one-who-decidcs becomes an arrivant even in regard to itself: "In principle absolutely singular, n i its most traditional concept, the decision is not merely always e.xceptional,

it makes an o:cmptioll of me. In me. I decide,

I make up my mind, sovereignly, would mean: the other-me as other and other than me, makes or make an exception of the self-same. This presupposed norm of any decision, this normal e...c .: eption docs not exonerate from any re­ sponsibility. Responsible for myself before the other, I am first of all and also

respollSiblefur the other befure the other."45 Derrida here rums rhe Heideggerian diremption of the Dasein of the subject by the nullity of Being into an axiom according to which the subject's corresJXlndence with itself is intermpted by the passage of diffcrance. (diffcrance being, among the many things that it is, Derrida's casting of this Hcideggeri:m diremption n i to the form of a quasi­ transcendental), so that the decision made by the subjcct bl"Comes ethical at its core. In coming to a decision, I am drawn into an "event" in which the other is JXlsitioned as a llot lIIe in an incliminable adjacency to me, so that my deciding is dle outcome of an oscillation between the two poles of the

me

and the IIOt lIIe, and the II/e, by virrue of this diremption which consigns the self into an e.'(ile from itself, is thus an arrivant responsible for the arrivant that is the other (in me). "Home," according to this conception, is dle sin­ gularity which emerges from this event n i which a subject constmcts a place in order to deal with its constitutive exile from self and from other, as much as this subject or subjectile is constmcted from dlis place, and as a result is able to issue a welcome in spite of this e.xile. Home, dle place created by the law of wllimitcd hospitality, is where this resJXlllSibility for die other can be discharged, where one or more arrivants can be welcomed unreservedly. This absence of reservation results from the accompanying absence of a determi­ nation that bestows on the arrivant an " essence" or an "anticipation" which

THE [,OllTiCS OF THE ['LACE OF THE SUB/ECT

l85

serves to neutralize dIe "otherness" of the one who s i dIe srranger.46 Hospi­ tality and responsibility have to be without ground, and this nonexistenee of ground is due to the movement of diffcrance. As I said earlier, diffcrance is the quasi-transcendental that is ultimately feSJXlnsible for dlis crucial and originating lack of a ground for politics and ethics. With dlis primordial absence of a ground, undecidability becomes an all-enveloping condition for dIe emergence of democracy: democracy arises when dIe myriad singularities that elude n i corJXlration into an Absolute or All arc rhen free to be organized in ways that make dIem n i susceptible to being dragooned by an organization or n i dividual acting solely at tht, be­ hest of a doctrine or program. Democracy is JXlssible for dIe Dcrridean only when forces preemptive of the possible arc warded off and a ubiquitous and yet enabling uncertainty is installed in the realm of the ethical and dIe JXlliti­ cal. Politics is possible only when a dueshold of hesitation or reserve allows dIe political subject oppornmities to experience thc displacements and reori­ entations n i tegral to any process of transformation and renovation.

Politics beyond Politics? A fundamental gJP between the undecidable as the concomitant ofthe quasi­ transcendental dilfcrance and dIe event of making concrete ethical and po­ litical decisions is n i tegral to Derrida's deconstntction of dIe metaphysics of the political, a metaphysics that has prevailed from the time of the Greeks to Carl Schmitt. Ihis gap may make Derrida vulnerable to what looks like a telling objection advanced by Simon Critchley, who believes that Derrida cannot show how the subject or subjectile, in dlis account, s i going to be able to move from the all-encompassing undecidability so pivotal for deconstruc­ tion to the making and implementation of concrete political decisions. How is one to surmount dIe aporias arising from the chasm between the transcen­ dental or quasi-transcendental basis of wldecidability, with its supervening logic of generalization and generalizability, and dIe "facticity" of everyday decision making, with its logic of the sheerly singular? One way of n:sponding to an objection of this kind is to argue that those who find it compelling fail to sec dlat Derrida's insistence on the separation between dIe quasi-transcendental and dIe empirical, which seemingly mir­ rors the I-lcideggerian distinction between the ontological and the ontic, is intended not so much to create an impasse between the transcendental and the empirical (as these critics of Derrida contend), but is instead a way of lIot absoluti7ing the distinction between the transcendental and dIe empirical

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particular.47 Identifying the feamres of the aporetic logic which governs the passage between the quasi-transcendental and the empirical does not of itself prohibit commerce between the two, bm instead di�plays the terms and con­ ditions that subtend this movement, in this way indicating the compromises, oversights, evasions, and commitments whic h attend the making of this or that connection, no matter how distended or ntervallic, i between dle quasi­ transcendental and the empirical. Derrida in effeet provides the lineaments of a conception of the contingent and the singular in his elaboration of the "nonconcept" of diffcrance, the whole point of which is not to elose off the empirical and dle transcendental from each other, but rather ro allow the oudines of the always contingent underpilUlings of any traffic between the two to be acknowledged and acted upon. ·TIlis passage or oscillation between the empirical and the quasi-transcendental is then the contc.xt, a context itself necessarily outside the purview of the "factically" political and dle ethical, from which dle factically political and ethical singular emerges.

TItis context underlies dle encounter between me and an other, in which we confront each odler as arrivants. Or more precisely, it is dle odler's other that, as a third party .i nvolved in the interchange between dle other and me, who confronts the odler in me.4S TIle complexity ensuing from dle "being there" of this dlird party in the encowtter between the odler and me makes justice possible, maintains Derrida, because dIe presence of an other n i me and in my odler makes it impossible for our relationship to be governed by the principles of a normativity whose overall character has been determined absolutely in advance. ·TIle singularity of the event of such an encounter owes its existence to this radical undermining of the notion that the encow}[er has an essential stmcture in which everydling is given in advance (herein lies the gist of Derrida's critique of Uvinas). For Derrida, justice is possible only because the other is singular and because the event of my engagement with the other has a character that is not set in advance. TIle trajectory of this encOlUlter has to partake of the undecidable and the interminable to ensure that no finality can set limits to justice. If the other is weleomed because he or she happens merely to embody some principle, or because hospitality to the other is decreed programmatically, then my encounter with the odlercannot be animated by a tme justice or spirit of hospitality. Limits can be set to the factical c.xtension or applicability of programs and principles, but if dlis were to be dle case, justice and hospitality would be vitiated in the process. -nlis response to his critics notwidlstanding, Derrida still has a problem with the everyday or factical dimensions of the political. Even if it is granted that dlOse of his critics who accuse him of driving an absolute wedge between THE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

187

the transcendental and the empirical are mistaken because he is, on the con­ trary, interested in conceptualizing in as rigorollS a way as possible the meta­ physical (and para-metaphysical) assumptions underlying the interchanges between these two domains, there remains the question of the nature of the conceptual practice involved in establishing a Derridean deli mitation on traffic between the two domains. A conceptual practice, as well as having a specific stmcture, culminates in a specific outcome or outcomes, and the outcome of Derrida's conceptual practice in taking the demarcation between the transcendental and the empirical to function as the fulcrum for concep­ tualizing an adequate enough notion of an ethical and political possibility raises questions that cannot be ignored. What happens when the Derridean notion of the subjectile o r arrivant is inserted into the realm of the factically o r acmally political? Especially toward the end of his life, Derrida did address political ques­ tions of undeniable consequence; the imprisonmem of Nelson Mandela, immigration (the stams of the so-called

srtllS

pnpiers or wldocumented

for­

eigners) in France, genocide, human rights, rJcism, European unification, and Algeria are among the themes dealt with in rhe texts of the past two decades or so. Blit for all this, c.xcept perhaps in the eyes of his more fer­ vent admirers, there is something curiollSly unsatisfactory about this body of writings. There is of course the fondness for the elusive and the aporetic, the unbridled zest for etymological twists and turns (the affinit y with Hei­ degger in

this respect has been much noted, though Derrida lacks the pon­

derousness of his German predecessor), conjuring up the proverbial image of a dog chasing its own tail. But this is a minor foible when pitted against the seriousness and palpable rigor of the work being done in such texts as Poli­

nqlles de l'all/int, Spectres de Marx, Apories, and Rqglles.4'1 At the same t i m e , it is important that we continue to pose the question, which as we have seen is vital to any consideration of the sllStainability of the project of liberJtion, of an openness, a "cermill openness" (this would be Derrida's preferred idiom when characterizing this openness) to the possibility of the emergence of a specific kind of collective subject (since liberation will require the activity of this subject on a significant scale). And not just any collective subject, but a collective subject capable of initiating a range of transformations rhat can have an impact in areas as diverse as Burkina Faso and Washington. In re­ flecting on this possibility, it has to be borne in mind that a philosopher can reflect on the political in at least two ways, given the perspective on libera­ tion canvassed earlier. One option, and it need not be explicitly chosen, conceives of the political 188

CHAPTER 7

solely or primarily as a concepmal emity or philosopheme. The other, and again it is a preference that, philosophically, need not be voiced for what it is, requires that this thinking of politics involve not only the analysis of con­ cepts, but also rhe pursuit of a specific historical and political task, namely, the project of a collective human liberation premised on a decisive super­ session of the capitalist system of accumulation.5o A reflection or discourse of the latter kind on the singularity of political practice will have three foci:

(1)

a subject or addressee;

(2)

the discourse itself, which will take the form

of the formulation of a particular political problem, and which has its own conditions of intelligibility; and

(3)

an object, which is the concrete sima­

tion addressed by the discourse and is the place that circumscribes its con­ ditions of possibility. The pursuit of a collective human liberation involving a supersession of capitalism will clearly require this discourse to be one dlat addresses the question of the possibility of revolutionary transformation, of creating a state or society not finally constrained by the imperatives of capi­ talist accumulation. -Those addressed by tllis discourse, its putative subjects, would be those who would be affected by this possibility of transformation. Its object would be the historical and political conjlUlcrure which enables or blocks dlis possibility, in this case a particular arrangement of classes and their always uneven relations to the mechanisms of capitalist development. Framed in this way it is difficult not to conclude that Derrida's is a dlinking that remains entirely at the level of the philosophical. Of course, there are. the vaunted declarations of Derrida himself and several of his conunentators that the whole point of deconstmction is to show how this bowldary between philosophy and its "outside" is fundamentally lUlstable and aporetic. For Derrida, as we have seen repeatedly, the Dowldary between a concept (phi­ losophy or metaphysics in dlis case) and its outside is wlavoidably caught up in the movement of diffcrance, and so no mastery over the placement of this boundary is achievable in principle. TIle origins of this DoIUldary, or any boundary for that matter, have inserted into them the elemental dismption represented by diffcrance, and this absolutely precludes any attempt to im­ pose a philosopllical rectitude or discipline on dle course taken by diffCrance. Hut this claim widl regard to the all-encompassing wldecidability affecting the operation of any philosophemc can itself neveT escape, fully, philosophy or metaphysics. \Vhile the efficaciousness of the philosopheme can have no ground in a "presence; as Derrida maintains, the realization of this inevita­ bility has to be generated within a frame that encompasses dle philosopheme in question

and its outside,

or even the totality of philosophemes and their

outside. And this frame. will have to contain within itself dle mark of philosoTHE POLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

189

phy o r metaphysics; it cannot escape this fate.Derrida has never shirked the implications of this leitmotif or axiom of deconstmction.On the contrary, he has said repeatedly that the abyss which lies on the other side of a bowId­ ary or limit is the only place from which an infinite and ungualifiL-d respon­ sibility, and thus ethics and politics, can emerge. With the impossibility of mastery or appropriation, every subject and subjectile has to accept respon­ sibility for what transpires at this necessarily disconcerting limit: "You reach the edge from which what once seemed assured is revealed in its precarious­ ness, its historical breadth-without necessarily disappearing or collapsing." He goes on to say, ....In 'this' place ... you must find yourself, hear yourself out, yourself and your reader, beyond all reckoning, thus at once saved and lost."5J 10 not acknowledge the challenge posed by this inescapable moment of decision is to fail to heed the call of responsibility, and thus to be a stranger to the ethical and political.52 (Failing to heed dIe call of responsibility is an impeccably Heideggerian way of '""pressing the matter, but then Derrida's conceptllali zation of dIe theme o f a summons to responsibility is close

to

Heidegger's.) Derrida also says dlat in this "iteration" of responsibility at the abyssal limit, responsibility itself, though it remains an ideal in its form as a summons, is inevitably compromised and its tenets adheret.i to only incom­ pletely. -nlis summons is where singularities materialize and intersect, where "manners of living, voices, writing, of what you carry widl you, what you can never leave behind" converge to create an ""old lIewlallgungc: the most archaic and the newest, unheard of, and thereby at prc.scnt unreadable."53 Derrida insists dlat dIe production of singularities is governed by a logic which makes it impossible for dIe ego, or any center of consciousness, to fWICtion.At the same time it is hardly deniable that an irremediable abstrac­ tion has seeped deep into this account of rhe constitution of dIe singular. For Derrida, rhe singular comes into being at exacdy dIe moment when the aporetic limit is reached.Or perhaps more precisely, this moment is the occa­ sion and also dIe stimulus for the emergence of dIe singular. Approaching the threshold of the limit dlUs becomes the. indispensable condition for the emergence of any singularity. But what happens when this moment draws ncar) Then, says Derrida, one confronts the undecidable, always, and thi.� unavoidable encounter is then the impctlls which moves the subject or sub­ jectile away from any kind of fixity (admittedly this is a fixity displaying itself primarily o r perhaps e\'en exclusively at the level of concepts ), so that what was previously thought to be immune to the impress o f the contingent is now brought within contingency's reach."ille inevitability of this encOlUlter 190

CHAPTER 7

with contingency is thus the vital and indispensable horizon for generating singularities.54 Ontological difference is the womb from which the singular emerges. The subject's or subjectile's situation

as

a singularity is conditioned, as a mat­

ter of conceptual logic and hence a.\:iomatically, by the movement of differ­ ence. But who or what is the one addressed or constituted by this movement of the undecidable? -nle one so addressed or constituted is for Derrida the one whose being is permeated by what BeIUlington has called "the event of alterity" (i.e., the event which constitutes the singularity):

Dcrnda's man)' morc or less visible imecvemions in connece political situa­ tions . . . arc to mis c..xtem not merely the circumstantial acts of a philosopher elsewhere, and more importantly, developing theories ofknowledge, bur con­ tinuous with each act of deconstntction from the Start, always more or less obviously marked b)' a strategic event of decision in a given context. This does

I/otproJlide II tlxoyctiCillmodd forpolitiCS so much liS it stril'ts to keep opm tbe tpelll of alterity wbicb Illonc Wilkes politicspossiblt and illfl'itllble, bllt whicb politienl phi­ losophy of1111 c%llrs has alwnys tried to close.55 -nle conceptual practice intrinsic t o rhe kinds of JXllitical intervention undertaken by Derrida, and subjected to rigorous reflection in his texts, conceives of politics sively,

a.�

as

taking place primarily, though by no means exclu­

a comext-given "event of decision." Events of decision involve,

potentially, many different kinds of subject (individual, collective, national, transnational, local, gendered, sexual, legal, and so on), depending on the nature of the discourse that makes possible the instantiation of the subject in question. Bm the absolute priority accorded "the event of alterity " does seem to indicate that the subject brought t o this point of decision is typically the solitary individual. Moreover, the

crux

of this encounter with alrerity is

not necessarily to further a project of liberation (however one defn i es that project), bm, rather, whether o r not rhe one immersed in this encOlUlter is able, through this encounter, to "keep open the event of alterity." If JXllitical circumstances, those of an impending revolutionary situation, say, necessi­ tate in whatever way a foreclosing of this prized event of alterity, then the clear implication of this passage (and indeed all of Derrida's oeuvre) is that this revolution must be deemed to have failed in some sense, even if-and this is an entirely plausible scenario-rhe revolution in question improves in very visible ways the lives of large numbers of women, men, and children! Elevating the event of alterity into an untranscendable horizon for rhe constitution of the political clearly

has

counterintuitive consequences with

THE [,OLlTICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

191

regard

to

the realm of the materially political. -The event of alte rity is dle

con dition that makes possible the emergence of a singularity, but the singu­

larity comes into being by "making politics possible," and presumably not by ac co mplis hing a nything else in the realm of "actually e:dsting" politics . It would seem that in Derrida's accOlUlt one becomes a singularity by taking a decisive step in what is irretr ievably a metaphysical p oli tics, or the metaphysi­

cal dimension of p olitics, in which "being political," purely and simply, is co­ extensive with "keeping politics open." And maki ng rhe opening of politics a prized and non n egotiable principle even when human beings may be dying as

a result of actions taken in the world of a n acmal politics is wldeniably

counterinmitive. But to pose dle question again: \Vhat kind of singularity is it dlat emerges from this confront"Jtion with the event of alterity associated by Derrida and his followers with dIe passage of diffcrance?

Given all th e above, dlis can only be a singularity constituted at a fairl y high level of abstraction: politics is kept open, yes, but open in ways that could prompt anyone becoming a singularity, or havi ng already become a singularity,

to overlook

what happens ill a situation involving dle welfare

of acmally existin g sub jec ts . After all, t he singular individual owes his or her singular ity to a movement, that of diffcrance, whose primary orienta­ tion or guid ing i mpulse is not really the transformation of the world bur the

keeping open of politics. It could be argued of coutse that this openness of the political is precisel y an enab ling condition of this s ou ght -after material trJllsformar ion. But were dlis argument to be made, the question of dle gap bet ween the event of alr erit y and this proje ct of material tr ansformation

would still arise; furdlermore, dle principle that on ly the event of alte rity is needed to consrimte singularities is left untouched by this cou nterargument. 10 see dlat this account of the constitution of the singular is beset by a trou­ b lin g detachment fr o m the situations of a concrete politics, we can contrast

this view of the singular with the one to be found in the wr it ings of Gilles Ddeuze. For Deleuzc, any entity is what it is, or is able to become what it was in the process of becoming, becanse it is the outcome of a n always specific conver­ gence of forces. It tmllsmirs forces and receives other forces, and the. plexus of these forces makes up dle constitutive powerof the individual (dle notion of

a "constitutive power" being borrowed from Spinoza).56 >The individual, as the event that results from this convergence of forces, is also a singularity. No

individual receives or transmits forces in e.·wetly t he same way as odler indi­ vidnals; if dlc), di d individuals would be qualitatively indistinguis hable from ,

each other; dlat is, there would be no individuals. However, dle individual's 191

CHAPTER 7

"nature" as this singularity, as opposed to that singularity or that other one, is always due to a precise concatenation of forces. What makes Abraham Lincoln the singularity that he is, is the amalgam of forces having to do with his being born in a log cabin in Illinois, his decision

to

abolish slavery, his

speech at Gettysburg, his assassination, and so on, to encompass a veritable myriad of such powers, some received and others transmitted, and coming together to constimte the event "being born in a log cabin;' "deciding to abolish slavery," "speaking at Gettysburg," "being assassinated;" and so on, so that "Abraham Lincoln" names the resultant of all these events. A power­ ful empiricism is at work in this conception of a singularity, an empiricism which derives from the insistence that singularities result from an always par­ ticular constellation of material forces, a materialism which is missing from Derrida's definition of a singularity in terms of its relation to an insistent structural event of alterity generated by the passage of differance.57 If we remm to the delineation of a conceptual practice congruent with a project of radical social and political transformation, then Derrida's unrav­ eling of the horizon from which nil philosophies of the. political must begin

will have as its subject or addressee dIe one who is the subjectile or arrivant. Bur of course

nil are

arrivants when facing the event of alterity dlat is the

mark of an irreducible contingency: George \N. Bush and Nicolas Sarkozy, as well as the Zambian copper miner and the Chicana hotd chambermaid in Los Angeles. Of course each of these individuals will, or will not, be con­ fronted by their respective events of alterity in quite different ways. But this thinking of the event of a1terity has to reckon with an inescapable feature of this encowtter with alterity and its capacity

to

bring one to the realization

that we are all arrivanrs, namely, that dIe Zambian copper miner, say, is in all likelihood going to have a vastly different wlderstanding of his bcinghood as an arrivam from the understanding possessed by George \N. Hush (and this not merely because the Zambian miner did not go to Yale, did not come from a wealthy family firmly positioned at the heart of his cOlUltry's mling elite for generations, etc.).111 is commonplace draws attention to tile need for a view like Derrida's to be complememed by something like a theory of ideology, or at any rate to have at its disposal the wherewithal to accomplish what it is that a theory of ideology is imended to achieve. For the Zambian copper miner and the talentless plutocrat in dIe \"hite House are situated in com­ pletely ditl"erenr life-worlds. (Who can fail to acknowledge this?) And this realization has at least one major consequence with regard

to rhe status quo:

George \-\1. Hush will in all probability acquiesce to this stams quo, whereas the Zambian miner will in all likelihood not fn i d it so congenial. Quite difTHE I'OLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

193

fcrent subject formations and quite different modes of decision making are at stake here, and conceptual practice has to begin by acknowledging this if it is

to

succeed as conceptual practice.

The Derridean could argue, however, dlat this criticism misses the point: what the Derridean deconstmctionist seeks

to

provide is a specification, at

the logico-metaphysical levcl of the condition of possibility, of an always­ nor-yet-decided, so that decisions regarding practices and dIcir outcomes are never yet made by the one who faces the event of alterity. Decisions can be made only when "the ordeal of dIe undecidable" has been submitted to, and from this ordeal emerges a "hesitation," referred ro by Derrida as "a messianic hesitation," which "does not paralyze any decision, any affirmation, any re­ sponsibility. On dIe contrary, it grants them their elementary condition. It is their very experience."5� But there is a logical chasm between a depiction, no matter how detailed or p<.�rsuasive, of the conditions of possibility for making edlical and political decisions (i.e., what Derrida seeks to delineate) and the ideological implications and practical outcomes of making partirular ethical and political decisions (what our acconnt of a conceptual practice accordant with a project of radical transformation enjoins).The quest for just social and political arrangements is a defining featnre of any such project, but setting down logical conditions for the pursuit of justice will show only what is nec­ essary at the formal level for the implementation of an emancipatory project. It will not be substantial enough propositional content needed

to

to

imbue this project with the concrete

demarcate adequately between the respec­

tive life-worlds o f the Zambian copper miner and George \N. Bush. This in­ capacity is crippling for any project of radical social and political transforma­ tion, since no such project can hope to get off the ground without having the means to identify the features that distinguish, systemically, the life-worlds of those who are exploited from the worlds of dlOse comfortably positioned at the depths of the structnre of domination which subjugates those whose basic condition is that of being exploited.59 -nle

discourse of

a conceptnal practice capable of sustaining a project of

liberation will be one which formulates a particular political problem, or set of problems. In the case just referred to it will concem itself with dIe political ramifications of a sitnation marked by fWIdamental asymmetries o f power that create the life-worlds of the QIicana hotel chambermaid and Zambian copper miner and George \V. Bush, and which constitute the chambermaid and the miner and the president as social and political subjects. -nlere is no hint in any of Derrida's works, even in such a discourse. 194

CHAPTER 7

Specters ofMnrx, of

the necessity for

"flle

object of

dlis conceptual practice will be the concrete situation ad­

dressed by the discourse, which functions as the place circumscribing its conditions of possibility. For our purposes, tins place will be the respective life-worlds of the Zambian copper miner, the Chicana chambermaid in Los Angeles, and George W. Bush, and the crucial question for the one who en­ gages in this conceptual practice will be one that focuses on the asymmetries of power that, among other things, are responsible for perpetuating a fun­ damentally inequitable situation which allows these life-worlds to be main­ tained in their c.xisting form. Conceptual practice, at any rate tile conceptual practice of anyone invested in a project of radical emancipation, will pivot on this need

to

replace tllese life-worlds with significantly different alterna­

tives. loni Negri did not mince words in his response to Specters of.Marx when he said that Derrida's insistence on "solitary transcendental horizons" when expounding his conception of jmtice means that he had notlling really to say about exploitation and the form s of capitalist regulation that subtcnd this ex­ ploitation. Negri is absolutely right, not necessarily about tile "solitary tran­ scendental horizons," but certainly about the absence of a Derridean reckon­ ing with the structures responsible for an actually existing exploitation. l11e tragedy of the politics of subjectivity (at least the Derridean version thereof) is that it has no way of inserting the subject into tile domain of tile actually political.6o We are left instead with a paralyzing Kierkegaardian pathos that provides no way of imagining resistance at the level of a politics of collective action. The altenl:ltive to this pathos is a militancy based on a materialism of the singularity that is the subject. At issue here is the cmcially important dis­ tinction between, on the one hand, forming or constituting a subjectivity, or putting in place the conditions responsible for its emergence (these having in Ddeuze's case to do essentially Witll a specific accumulation o r aggregation of forces), so that this subjectivity, or the conditions wlderlying its presence, is already the outcome of a palpable politics (rhe transmission and reception of these physical forces being always already ordered by a politics), and, on the other, providing a quasi-metaphysical elaboration of this subjectivity or set of conditions (tins having in Derrida's case fundamentally to do with a response to the event of alrerity), and only then broaching the. question of a politics that conforms in principle to this constituting logic or set of enabling conditions. Derrida's writings on the political approximate more closely

to

the laner position, those of DdeLlZe and Guanari to tile former.61 One is a politics that can be addressed or alluded to only after a fixity o r blockage has been undone by keeping things open

to

the passage of diffcrance; tile other

THE I'OLITICS OF THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT

195

is a politics that, materially and therefore politically, comes before dle passage of diJfCrance and provides conditions for any manifestation of alterity. For proponents of the latter JXlsition, it is necessarily the case that before the movement of diffcrance there is politics. For those who take dlis JXlsition, Derrida and his followers have put dle proverbial cart before dle horse and preempted the possibility of a militant JXllitics.

196

CHAPTER 7

CHAPTER 8 Models of Liberation III

The Politics ofthe El'ent

The politics of the event, associated here with Alain Radial! and, to a some­ what lesser extent, Slavoj :luck, finds the possibilities of a reinvigorated mili­ tancy in the political reorientation opened up by a particular kind of singu­ iarizatioll, one stemming from an encounter with the Real or a tmth-cvent (the primary c.xcmplars of this kind of singularization for Radial! being sllch figures as St. Paul and Lenin). From these distinctive singularizatiollS there emerge possibilities of a rupture with the baneful rcaliry of the present; ill rum sllch mpmrcs provide the potential for anticapitalist political interventions. Scvaal of his commentators have noted that Badiou's truth-events rend to bc remarkable and rather splendid (St. Paul's conversion, rhe Frcnch Rcvolu­ tion of 1789, the Bolshevik Revoilition of 1917, and the events of May 19(8), as well as being associated with obviously charismatic personages (Lenin, Mao, St. Paul), and Simon Critchley and others have criticized Badiou for what seems to be a kind of political romanticism.! The other seeming ptob­ lem with a politics of rhe e:l:ceptional event is that it is the American right, and to a lesser degree the New Labour government in Britain, that are now using the category of the c.xceptional event to mobilize the very considerable resources of power and coercion that are at their disposal after September

11, 2001. September 11 is

clearly the American right-wing and British New

Labour obverse of Badiou's

1968 tmth-event, as evidenced by such claims as

"Things can never be the same again after the attacks in New York and Wash­ ington," "From now on everything is different," and "After September 11 we have to fight the terrorists on dIcir own soil," used by George Bush and his

handlers not just to mobilize American public opinion as a response to AI Qaeda, but also to promote the Republican Party's overall right-wing do­ mestic agenda. In Andrew Bacevich's eloquent words, "President Bush will bequeath to his successor the ultimate self-licking ice cream cone. 10 defense contractors, lobbyists, think-tankers, ambitious military officers, the hosts of SWlday morning talk shows, and the Douglas Feith-like creatures who maneuver to become players in dIe ultimate power game, the Global \Var on lerror is a boon, an enterprise redolent with opportunity and promising to extend decades into dIe funtre."2 -nlere is of course something cynical and opportlUlistic abom this right­ wing exploitation of the event of September 11. As is clear from the way the BlISh administration has used this emblematic event to let itself olf rhe hook for lISing torture at Abu Ghraib and Guanranamo, to justify the invasion of iraq, to curtail civil rights in America, and even to make a case for oil drilling in the Alaskan wilderness and for maintaining military ties with "au­ thoritarian" Central Asian regimes, rhe event of September II is in dIe eyes of many a fraudulent rationale for pursuing a foreign and domestic policy accordant with the object ives of the IK"Oconservative faction dlat dominated policy formation in the Bush administration. September 11 is, palpably, no truth-event in the sense uscd by Radiou. But the fact dlat rhose who rule us have fabricated, and probably will continue to fabricate, "tmdl-events" of the kind associated with dIe right's vision of September 11 is hard to gainsay. (The

2008

presidential campaign of John McCain and Sarah Palin provides

morc than enough evidence for dns kind of duplicitous "evental" produc­ tion.) There must therefore be at dIe very least a critique of this appeal to truth-events by the right which can serve as a complement to the left's own descriptions of the truth-event. The basis of such a critique is to be found in some of Badiou's more recent writings, where he states explicitly that "not every transformat ion or becoming is a truth and consequently dependent upon a founding event and a fidelity to this event."3 -nle left's attempts to mobilize a countervailing power to this right-wing assimilation o f the appearance of the trudl-event have to involve the insis­ tence that some things really have remained tile same in spite of something like September 11, that, for instance, the e:dgent claims of justice and the cause o f equality, which are marks of tile genuine tmth-event, have not been abolished or shelved by tile events of September 11. As the American country singer and anti-death penalty campaigner Steve Earle reminded an audience in London a few days after September 11, "George W. Bush did not stop being stupid on September 11th."4 If September 11 is the appearance of the 198

CHAPTER 8

tmth-event par excellence for us today (and I entertain this proposition as a somewhat dubious position, no matter how much one may abhor personally the killing of innocent people in New York and Washington that day), dlen this is its profoundly fundamental truth, its "axiomatics": that the world will not be a better place for the majority of human beings as long as our leaders continue to provide forms of bogus psychic relief for rhe bewildered and confused, as well as the plainly nasty substratlul1 that exists in every elec­ torate, since these forms (inducing a war fever over Iraq in the case o f Bush, conducting a xenophobic campaign against asylum seekers in the case of the former Australian prime minister John Howard, making specious appeals to human rights and riding the late Princess Diana and the late Queen Mother "effect" in rhe case of Tony Blair) are utterly disabling, even in the shortest of short runs. The tmdl-event has an inviolable impetus toward the libera­ tion of all human beings that takes it in a quite difl"erent direction from the Right's dragooning o f these events. This insight of Ihdiou's, focused on ad­ dressing the question "\Vhat is it to have a radical commitment to justice and equality?," needs to be taken seriously in any characterization of the tmth­ event dlat avoids dle attempted appropriation of it by dle right.

7lJe Politics ofthe Truth-£pent The core of Badiou's conception of dIe tmdl-event resides in his desire to make the radical militant integral to the left's understanding of political agency. The accowlt he gives of this radical militant is subtended by the fol­ lowing a..x ioms. The most significant of these a..xioms is embodied in the as­ sertion that radical commitment is stmctlired by truth, or more specifically, a tmth procedure. This tmdl procedure, part of Badiou's "science of the mul­ tiple in general," has two characteristic features: it combines a dimension of subjectivity widl an adherence to strict universality. The trudl procedure be­ gins as part of a "situation" (the term is Badiou's), constitllted in a particular time and place, which is structured by rigorously egalitarian principles; it is these egalitarian principles which set this tmdl procedure totally apart from the Right's attempts to constmct truth-events.5 The structllre of the ensuing commitment is not enabled or constrained by

any

psychological or social

canons or principles, since for Badiou only a properly universal truth can be the adequate source of a genuinely radical commitment, and is thus not to be understood as a function of dlis or that subject's personal psychology or social beliefs o r values. A simarion provides constraints marked by an inevitable specificity, but THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

199

the tmths that prompt assent from a subject are capable ofgaining dle adher­ ence of anyone who happens to be in that particuhr situation. Even if it hap­ pens to be induced from a particular simation, the character of a tmdl docs nor depend on any existing forms of power, knowledge, or awarencss. Not having any need to depend on prevailing configllfations of power and judg­ ment, a [mth s i necessarily novel n i relation to the situation from which it emerges, and the subject's being is constituted precisely by his or her relation to this novelty, which therefore represents a departure from the stams quo. -This departure from the status quo is for Badiou exacdy what constimtes an "event." The axiomatic logic of the simation, according to Badiou, is that of "infinity-minus-one," that is, dle unique "void" which, n i Badiou's axiom­ atics, is the noneIllul1erable and lUUlamable that is the ground for the an­ tagonisms, revollitionary discipline and fidelity, and radical nonconformity that characterize a militant polities. If something lends itself to being named and enumerated, it can be fully identified and described by our prevailing encyclopaedias of knowledge, which purvey little more than opinion, and so cannot provide the impems for the creation of a genuinely transformative social and political movement. At this "evental site"

(site iJlinclIICllfiel)

the certitudes afforded by e:dst­

ing paradigms of knowledge (Le., opinion) are suspended, and the truth dlat emerges from dle event's "possibility of dle impossible" will posscss the capacity arc atmned

to

generate radical dispositions on rhe part of individuals who

to the event's potentiality.6 Such n i dividuals are constituted as

the subjects of dlis event's trodl. -nle militant subject is thus someone who maintains a fidelity to an event's consequences. The trodl is then the assem­ blage that emerges from dle event's genuinely novel ramifications and out­ comes. 11le subjcrt's fidelity to dle event's consequences is identified with the capacity to reconfigure rhe situation's self-organization qua the simation that it is, all the while maintaining a disciplined adherence to t.he intellec­ tual contours and practical implications of the event itself. -nlis disciplined adherence has to be lUliversal: anyone acting on behalf of the interests of a particuhr group in a situation only manages to reflect a certain kind of partiality and not anything like a genuinely universal interest. It would be a mistake, however, to see Badiou as the proponent of a Habermasian uni­ versal communication. As Badiou sees it, in an "acrually existing politics" in which electorates are nvariably i encouraged to converge on a mythical

"'center" which in reality reflects only the more or less concealed partiality of mling-c1ass interests masquerading as universal principles, dlOse n i terested in a genuinely universal politics have to separJte themselves from this mythi200

CHAPTER 8

cal center, and in so doing will give the impression of lacking impartiality. The defenders of a real universality then seem (to the upholders of this sham political consensus) to be one-sided and partial, if not downright biascd.lo quore Badiou: Democracy thus inscribing ibdfin polls and consensus necessarily arouses thl: philosopher's critical suspicions. For philosophy, since Plato, means breaking with opinion polls. Philosophy is supposed to scrutini7.ceverything that is spontaneously considered as "normal.n If democracy desigllates a normal state of collective organization, or political wil!, then the philosopher will ask for me norm of this normality to be examined. He wi!! not allow for the word to function within the frame of an authoritarian opinion. For the philosopher l:\"erything consensual becomes suspiciOUS?

A subject constituted by a genuinely universal polities will recogni7.c that the truth of a cause will hold indifferently (which is not t o say that tile pro­ ponents of this truth will themselves be indifferen t in its pursuit) for all who belong to the siruation in question; the tnuh is "generic" and thus will nor discriminate between individuak8 For a militant poities, l every n i dividual counts as one, and dIe only real interest is a universal interest. Its pure ge­ neric character notwitllstanding, the truth of an emancipatory politics, as the possibility of tile impossible, pits "dlat which is not yet in being, bm which . . . thought declares itself able t o conceive," against the bland formations of consensus, the ersatz universality promoted by the regnant liberal order.? Repudiating a kind of u niversalism founded on the premises of liberalism, Badiou finds tile possibilities of an alternative militant wliversality in tile singularizatiollS opened up by the encounter with the truth-event tion. Central

to this point of

in ques­

vicw is tile proposition that the generic quality

that necessarily inheres in the being of all that exists is not discernible except through rhe exceptional commitment o f rhose who emerge as subjects by virtue o f being opened

to

the event. This exposure to the truth-event will

reveal Being to be pervaded by a fundamental multiplicity tllat is nonetheless u niversal. The truth-event will therefore be at odds witll any politics based on identity, since identity divides subjects from each orher and is therefore .i ncompatible with the axiom of equality. Or, as Badiou succinctly puts it, "Politics can only think as the tllOugh t of all." lo His assertion tllat "politics can only think

as

the thought of all" notwith­

standing, Hadiou maintains that true politics is inextricably conjoined to the exceptional, since only the exceptional can mmivate a politics not circum­ scribed by the apparatuses of tile state. It is tllis stress on confronting the exTHE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

1.01

ceptional that prompts some friendly critics to chi de him for what seems like political romanticism. While cilis Schmittian politics of the exception or the exceptional event does not nullify Badiou's insistence that a genuine politics adheres

to cile principle Everyone can occupy rhe space of the political, if "

they decide to do so;' it does cause some difficulties for anyone who agrees with Badiou's metapolitics.11 Radiou maintains cilat the fundamental premise behind the politics of rep­ resentati on, cilat is, the politics associated with the great thinkers of liberal­

ism (preeminemly Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel), is fatally flawed. For Badiou it is axiomatic that aD can participate in a democratic political process, and so a politics premised on a contest to be the representative of cilOse who must then agree to be "the represented," this being the procedure constitutive of

political libcralism, is to be rejected. Against the bifurcation of the represen­ tative and the represented required by liberal-democratic parliamentarian­ ism, Badiou suggests cilat there is really only one political actor: rhe we that

is constellated by a political procedure driven by the imperatives of liberty, equality, and fraternity (especially fraternity). Indeed, the dichotomizing of the political actor required by the so-called parliamentary democracies has as one of its main consequences a rendering transcendent of the state's political

power, for it is the state that ptovides rhe mechanisms of sovereignty wh ich allow a select few to become representatives and a great many mhers to be the merely represented. Parliamentary liberalism, which regards the state as the indispensable core of sovereignty, can never challenge the state, and so it only obscures the realities of the fundamental power wh ich lies behind this

sovereignty and allows it to perpetuate itself. Parliamentary liberalism there­ fore pits abstractions such as "the people" and "cile masses" against the state, with cile st"Jte possessing all the n i stnul1ents of coercion and persuasion for

organizing its citizens n i to "cile people or "the masses." "

10 a considerable extent, however, rhe critique of capitalist parliamen­ tarianism n i terms of the unacceptably abstract model of sovereignty and representation it presupJXlses, which is the crux of Radiou's metapolitics, is

somewhat dated. ComemJXlrary capitalism has bypassed this model of sover­ eignty and representati on, even if it still clings to the husk of cile parliamen­ t"Jry system. -The revolutionary transfonnations in financial accumulation discussed earlicr n i this book have had several imponam political results, the

most significant of which has been rhe bypassing of capitalist parliamenrari­ anism's system of representation. vVith the emergence of financial capital as the primary instrument for rhe furthering of acnul1ulation, at the expense

of those drawing wages and salaries, the notion of a "stakeholding society" 202

CHAPTER 8

has arisen to enfranchise not just private citizens, but also corJXlrations and financial organizations; these bodies are alleged to have just as much of a stake n i civil society as the represented individual citizen. When financial corJXlrations are considered to have just as much of a stake in society as citi­ zens,

it becomes relatively easy for dlOse in power to suggest that it is the

primary responsibility of citizens to vote for policies and parties which at the very least do not disfavor corporations; the flawed presumption here is that the interests of corporations and the interests of citizens coincide perfectly if only the right "fi."'{" can be fOlUld. Hence the repeated and sometimes hys­ terical wamings of financial market collapses and currency market [Umbles that supposedly serious publications such as The ECOIwmtst and the Wall Street

jOll1"llai issue when a party or candidate with even mildly redistriblltionist policies looks like getting elccted.12 As i'rabhat i'atnaik points out, "free­ dom" in such a context is tacitly or even overtly equated with the freedom of corporations to engage n i accumulation with as few constraints as possible. When this happens, political represemation is radically modified, and those elected as representatives in fact represent corJXlrations as much as, if not more than, they represent individual citizens. This development is exacerbated by the fact that electoral campaigns, which in the advanced industrial cowltries are overwhelmingly television­ based nowadays, depend more and more on corJXlrate subventions for dlcir publicity campaigns. One does not have to be a Ralph Nader to acknowledge that politicians in dIe United States, for instance, represent business interests as

much

as

they purport to represent dlcir constituents. Badiou, however,

with his refusal to consider dIe realm of economic n i terests, may have given up dIe chance to register dlt' impact of this powerful transformation wrought by financial capital in recent decades. \Vhen the sure can no longer distin­ guish between the interests ofcivil society and those of tht' business corpora­ tions, tile entire JXllitical prospectus of those who purJXlft to represent "the people" in liberal democracies must be regarded with at least a modicum of n i itial suspicion. Bm how is politics to bt' "de-statified" n i the way required by Badiou? Can a revolmionary JXllitics in the currem conjuncture hope for a complete dis­ placement of dIe state? Badiou's antistatism has something in common widl Hardt and Negri's Empire, but it is not difficult to see that the notion of a preemptive de-statification is somewhat implausible.13 To his credit, Badiou came to change his mind on dlis put"Jtive de-statification. Where he once accepted the orthodox marxist position, a position incidentally also adhered to

by classical liberalism, that affirmed the necessary exreriority of the state THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

203

with regard to the domain of the political, he now believes that a complete de-statification of tills kind is impossible. To quote Badiol!: We tended to leavt the state outside tht field of politks in the snia sense. Politics unfo!dtd attordillg w the interests of the masses, and the state WlS the c.uernl! adversary. This was our way of being faithful

[Q

the old communist

idea ofthe withering away ofthe Stlte, and ofthe Stlte'S neccssnily bourgeois i qUite different. It is dear md reactionary character. Todlyour point of view s dlJt there lre twO opposed forms of amisutism. There. s i the communist heri­ tage of the withering of the state on the one hlnd; and on the other there s i uitraliber:tlism, which also calls for the suppression of the state, or n least its reduction [Q its miliury and police functions. \Vhat we would SlY now is thlt dlere arc a certain number of qucstions regarding which we. cannot posit the absolute. exteriority of dle Stlte. It s i radler l matter of reqUiring something from the state, of formubting with respect to the state a certain number of prescriptions or statements. I'll take up the example I gave l moment ago, because it s i m c.xlmple of militam urgency. Considering the fate of the Sflllr­

papierr in this cOlmrry, a first orientation might have been: they should revolt against the state.. Todly we would say thlt the Singular form of their stmgglc is, r:tther, to create. the conditions n i which the state s i \cd to chlnge this or that thing concerning them, to repeal the bws that should be appelled, to uke the measures of mturaiization [rtglllariZlltum] that should be taken, lml so on. This is what we. mean by prescriptiollS flgflillSt the rtate. This is not to say thn we partkipate n i the state. \Ve remain outside the electoral system, outside any plrty representation. But we include the sr:lte within our politi­ cal field, to the extent that, on a number of cssentill pOints, we have to work more through prescriptions against the state than in my radical c.xteriority w the state.l�

In a word, Badiol!'s requirement is that we work against the state rather than regard the state as being wholly exterior

to the political domain. "flle

proposition, now accepted by Badiol!, that the state is not a pure exteriority in respect to the poiltical is salutary and plausible. But some critks have

noted that there is a strongly reformist tinge to Badiou's proposal concent­ ing "prescripti ons against the state," namely, that " the singular fonn of their

struggle s i . . . to create the conditions in which the state is led to change this or that thing concerning them,

to repeal the laws [hat should be appealed,

to take the measures of namralization

[r;;qllll1riznrioll] that should be taken,

and so on." Is this all that can be done against the state?

-nle other notable feamte of Badiou's conception of the militant, and in204

CHAPTER 8

deed of his entire tre:ltIneiU of the political, is a rigorous separation between politics and economics, coupled with his insistencc that the economics only records or analyzes the stams guo, and thus has no pan to play in any con­ ceptualization of a radical political alternative to rhe status guo:

Any viable campaign against capitalism can only be political. There can be no economic batde against the economy. \Vc havc economist friends who ana­ lyse and critici ze very well the c.xisting system of domination. But everything suggCStS that on this point, such knowledge is useful, bur provides no answer by itself. The position of politics relative to the economy must be rethought, in a dimension that isn't rea.lly transitive. We don't simply fall by successive representations, from the economy into politics. What kind ofpolitiCS is renl�y heterogeneous to what capital demands! -that is today's question. Our poli­ tics is situated at the heart of things, in the factories, in a direct rdation with employers and with capital. Bur it remains a manerof politics-that is to say, of thought, of Statenlems, of practices.ls There is a troubling convergence between Radiou's refusal of rhe state (though he later modified his position to acknowledge that the state is not a pure exterioriry), for example, his injlUlctions not to vote, to stay outside "parry politics," and this absolute repudiation of any "transitivity" between the political and the economic.16 Granted that the key principle here is the need to maintain a " heterogenciry to what capital demands:' but the restric­ tion of politics to "a direct relation with employers and with capital," coupled with the abstention from any state-supervised politics, etlectivcly severs po­ litical subjectivity from the sitllations that make up "political and economic objectivity." Not that there is a readily identifiable "subjectivity" and "objec­ th'ity" here, but to keep them apart n i the way that Badiou does overlooks the fact of capital's immense complexity as an assemblage of assemblages. Or if one prefers a more Hegelian-Marxist way of plltting things, he elides the central part played by dIe vast network of mediations in dIe functioning of the capitalist system. Militancy is absolmcly essential for an emancipatory politics, but it is hard to see how it can be sufficient if it is severed so radically from any " transi­ tivity" with the economic domain and the apparatllses of the state. Eman­ cipation will reguire, at least in the beginning, a complete restnlctllring of the state, among other things, and it is hard

to

conceive how [his can be

accomplished f i the political is severed from dle economic, and the. political (whidl for Badiou is always anodler name for the aleatory realities of a poli­ tics) is then confined strictly to "direct rclations with employers and widl THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

205

capital." The state provides the cnlcial enabling conditions for the realization of economic surpluses, and as such is foundational for contemporary capital­ ist appropriation.t7 Rur let us consider again rhe matter of the event and its connection to truth. There may be something here that, for Radiou, is able in principle to acknowledge the decisive relation of politics to the economic dimensions of capitalist aCClullulation.

Truth, Truth -Effects, and Polities Hadiou has recently hinted that his earlier demarcation between a "situation" that is n i principle capable only of generating opinion and of conserving the status quo and an "event" capable of furnishing new axioms of tllOught and practice as well as a genuine wliversality is perhaps too rigid.ls In his Logiqms

des mmuits, he identifies four kinds oftransformation: "a modification (which is the mode ofbcing of dIe objects of dIe world), a fact (which is a transcen­ dental novelty, bur one endowed with a low degree of intensity), a singu­ larity (a transcendental novelty whose intensity is strong, but which has few consequences), and an event (a singularity with consequences of maximal intensity)."19 This is an ontological schema, and as such it provides lIS widl a framework for reflecting on the nature of transformation in principle, although clearly something else will be Ilelxled for a more comprehensive and yet concrete notion of the political event. Radiou is of course aware of the need for this further requirement, and he goes on to say that "in order to arrive at a new type of existence with regard to a given problem (the st"atliS of sexual differ­ ence, dIe future of Palestine, the resurrection of music after serialism, etc.), it is necessary to possess, at one and the same time: a cerrain transcendental regime of intra-worldly modifications, the shock of an event, the constitu­ tion of a new subject, the nlie-bowld consequences of this constitution, and so on" ("Afterword" 236). -nle problem here, however, lies not so much widl the ontology oflIl(l(iification or transformation per se (as much as some have quarreled with him over his choice of set theory as rhe means of displaying the logic of this ontological framework), but rather with the criteria used to idemify the evem whose defining feature is that of the "shock," that is, the quality of being able

to

thwart any kind of predict-ability with regard to the

prevailing order of reality, and then the well-known Hadiouian principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. -nlis inevitably takes politics away from the realm of ontology (indispensable though ol1tology is when it comes to spl"Ci-

206

CHAPTER 8

fying the conditions subtending the presentation of obje<:ts as such) into the domain of what can only be regarded as a history of the present, or a version of standpoint theory having the concrete practices of political agems as its focus. Badiou is certainly aware of this need for something like a history of the present or of standpoint theory, even if he does not quite use dle nomen­ clature of cidler. But the insights embodied

in these positions are certainly

compatible with his own formulations. For instance, he has made it clear that there has to be a "concrete analysis of change," while maintaining that it is precisely "a certain transcendental regime of intra-worldly modifications, dIe shock of an event, the constitution of a new subject, the nile-bound consequences of d lis constitution, and so on" dlat provide the basis for this "concrete analysis of change"

(236).

Badiou also suggests that this "concrete analysis of change" has to be undertaken via "the constnlction of a tnldl." As he sees it, only dle rcrourse to dlis constmction avoids the "logic of interests of the human animal." Human interest is all-pervasive, which emails that we find ways to overcome this " logic of interests," which is "the logic of dle (very many worlds) inhab­ ited by this crafty, cruel, and obstinate animal. In other words, bcrause only this constmaion [of a tnlth] is trans-human." Badiou adds, "All 1

am

doing

here, in fact, is corroborating some very old speculative statements. Plato: philosophy is an awakening, ordinary life is nothing but a dream. Aristotle: we must live as immortals. Hegel: dle absolute works through us. Nietzsche: we must free the overman within man"

(237).

Badiou argues that only dIe constmction of a tmdl, which for hi m only philosophy can accomplish, will enable us to avoid "an anthropology of fini­ tude" dlat does no more than ratify the accomplishments of "this crafty, cmel, and obstinate animal." So any proposal, such as mine, which calls for Badiou to take the path of a history of dle present or some kind of stand­ point dlcory in order to provide a "concrete analysis of change;' must involve philosophy if it is to do justice to " the desire, forced by an evental outside, to move beyond the resignation of established beliefs"

(237). -nle choice for

Hadiou, dlercfore, is simple but momentous: either resignation to the status quo or the enabling of a tmth, generated philosophically, which, because it is philosophical, allows the power of an event to force the odlerwise resigned luunan animal to awaken itself and desire anodler, better world. TIus tmdl can come only from a concrete event, albeit one which avoids the taint of an anthropology of finitude.

THE rOllTiCS OF THE EVENT

207

It is axiomatic for Badiou that truth is evental. That is to say, a tnuh is such that it is generated by a happening with implications that defeat the human

urge to repeat and to calculate: For the process of a truth to begin, somnhing must happen. What there al­ ready s, i the situation of knowledge

as

such, only gives us repetition. For a

truth to affirm its newness there must be a SIIppklllcnt. This supple ment is commined to chance. It s i unpredictable, lUlcaiculable. It is beyond what s. i

I call it an event. i errupts A truth appears in its newness, because an (vema! supplement m rcpctition.10 If a tmth can emerge only as a pure novelty, this being a fundamental principle for Hadiou, it is nonetheless the case that the tmth in question has to be appropriated by a subject n i order to be what it is, and it is this process of appropriation which makes tmth properly ethical. Truth is ethical becausc it constitutes a simation in such a way that the subject of that tmth s i drawn powerfully into a responsc that is irreducibly faithful: "The. fact that the event is undecidabk imposes the constraint dlat a subject of the event must appear. Such a subject is constituted by an lltterance in rhe form of a wager. The utterance is as follows: 'Tltis has taken place, which I can neidler calculate, nor demonstrate, but to which I shall be faithful''' ("TIle Ethics of Tnuhs"

250, Badiou's emphasis). It is here that Badiou must face the question of dIe structure of dlis wager. How does the movement from the undecidability of the evem to the occur­ rence of dle wager take place, not just "empirically," but also as a matter of processual logic? Docs every manifestation of dIe undecidable result in a wager? ·nle wldecidable certainly creates dle strucmral possibility of such a wager, but what else has to take place for dtis (mere) possibility furdler to be consolidated into a formation in which a subject can respond to a wager of the kind posited by Hadiou? Clearly, though not necessarily in a way that is sclf-e.xplanatory, dle subject has ro be affected in significant ways by dle im­ plications of the event lUlder consideration.l11ere has to be a reckoning widl i turn involves the effectivity of dle event on dle part of the subject, which n an estimation of rhe effects of the truth that brought the subject to the point of confronting the wager that he or she must now make. But what enables truth to possess this effectivity? What is it about truth that, omologically, elicits dle response of fidelity, that prompts dle decisive break widl routine and rhe hollow repetition of the statlL� quo that market democraLJ' finds so congenial? Badiou docs not shirk thesc or sintilar questions. His possible 208

CHAPTER 8

resJXlnse to them hinges on the basic insight that when the event of truth occurs, the subject opens himself or herself to [he diremption or rupmre represented by dlis evem, and as a result the mpmre functions as dle basis for an acknowledgment on dle part of this subject that a fWldamental trans­ formation has taken place. \Vith dle onset of this fWldamentai transformation, the subject can dlen proceed to verify or disconfirm dle occurrence of this transformation byem­ barking on an n i vestigation of rhe forces that enable this transformation to be what it is; in dle process this investigation becomes a moment of conversion for dlat subject. ·nle trudl becomes dIe tmdl when the subject is IawlChed on this process of investigation and conversion, when the [ruth procedure "induces" the subject into fidelity to the event and its implications. For the subject to do this, he or she must constmct a tmth by making a choice (the core of rhe wager) "within the indiscernible." -nlere is something in every truth procedure that requires the deed of creation [0 be incalculable as to the enabling basis of the trudl thus being generated. Radiou s i worth quoti ng at lengdl at this point:

Bur what is a pure choice, a choice without a concept? It's obviously a choice confronted by twO illdiscenlible terms. Two terms arc indiscernible ifno effect of language permits dlcir distinction. But if no formula of language distin­ guishes twO tCfmS of the situation, it is cenain that the choin: of having the verification pass by one rather than the. od}(;:r can find no suppon in the ob­ jectivity of their difference. It s i then an absolutely pure choice, frce from any presupposition other than that of having to choose, with no indication marking the proposed terms; the. choice by which the verification of the con­ sequences of thc a.·dom will first pass. This means that the subject of a tnldl demands the indiscemiblc. The in­

discernible orb>anizes the pure point of the subject n i the process of verifica­ tion. A subject is what disappears between twO indiscernibles. A subject is the throw of d}(: dice which docs not abolish chance, but Kcomplishes it as a verification of the axiom which founds it. What was decided concerning the undecidable event must pass by tbis term, indiscemiblc from its other. Such is the local act of a tnldl. It consists in a pure choice between twO inJiscern­ iblcs. It is then absolutely tinite. ("The Ethics of Tnlths� 2SD-51, Badiou's emphases) This passage calls for some elaboration in terms of an c.xamplc or two.2I Resorting to Badiou's favored set-dleoretic armatllre, one can define an event n i terms of its self-intactness or self-correspondence widl regard to its being, THE rOLITICS OF THE EVENT

209

E to E, such that from the event E a grounding and enabling statement p can be derived, E ....p, . which is another way of saying that E is the cause ofp. Fur­ ther implications can then be drawn from rhe basal statement p. \Nhen E is the cause ofp, the upholder ofp cannot be indifferent to E: if she is indifferent to E, then she has no ground for afiirmingp.22 Once E is belief-causing, then the believer who assents to p on the basis of E has in some sense to maintain a fidelity to E as a condition of adhering to the conviction thatp (is the case) as well as being faithful to all that is entailed by p. At rhe same time, assenting to p on the basis of E is an act distinctive in at least a couple of ways. First, there is the disjwlCtion betweenp as such and

p as asserted in this or that particular simation; "It is snowing" may be true for me n i Manhattan today bm not for my sister in Burlington, Vermont, and vice versa. But the relation ofp to its localized simation of enunciation is never given inp as such.23 This rdation ofp to its localized situation stands outside of p, and so cannot be named or designated by p; even if the state­ ment "1t is snowing in Manhattan right now" contains an explicit reference to Manhattan and to the falling of snow at this time, there is nothing in "It is snowing in Manhattan right now" which establishes a relation between this statement and the situation n i which snow is now fulling n i Manhattan. Indeed, this relation can only be the outcome of a specific assembling of fuctors and conditions from the congeries of speech and cultural forms, per­ sonal dispositions, collective stmctures, and so on that make up the situation under consideration. The rclation between a statemem, a speaker, a time, and a place has to be assembled in a specific way, and can never be deduced from the statement alone. Second, from the relation of a statement p to its "founding" event E (i.e., E -p), it cannot be n i ferred fromp itself that it has this founding relation to E. Since E is the growld ofp, the rdation between

E and p necessarily has to stand as an

c. ...teriority

to p that cannot be named

byp. 11111S, such notions as "insurrection;' "guerrilla formation," and "trans­ continental class stmggle" had to await the event that goes by the name "Che Guevara" to receive their distinctive cast when used in the context of Cuba's contribution to insurrectionary struggles in Bolivia and Angola in the 1960S and 1970S.24 A sitllarion, then,

has

to wldergo an extractive operation before it can

yield a truth or set of tnuhs. In this extractive operation, comJXlllents of the situation are "forced" in ways that create, out of the incompleteness of the sitllation (an incompleteness that pervades tmth itself), the possibility that "permits anticipations of knowledge concerning not what is but what

would IJape bem iftruth si brought to completion. "25 A stmcmre of anticipation 210

CHAPTER 8

is created as a result of this extractive operation. A tmth cannot be described or identified as it is now, but once a condition e.xists n i which a tmth will have been, then, as a result of this extractive or forcing operation, it can yield many possible kinds ofknowledge because the tmth in question would have been brought to its point of completion (whic h for Badiou is exactly what forcing involves). -nlat a tmth permits interventions of a certain kind as it takes its course is the very thing that allows knowledge to emerge and to be constmcted, in which case the tmtll is not something that one knows, but is rather the condition which enables the various encyclopedias of knowledge to be created and circulated. "'here tmth is concerned, therefore, it is tme to say that one knows only after the event. One knows one has fallen out of love only after one has fallen out oflove; Richard Perle, the leading American neoconservative, knew he was a neocoIL�ervative only after his conversion from being a disciple of the cold war Democratic senator Scoop Jackson to being the Republican neoconservative he now s i . Given that a forcing has to take place in order for statements to be ex­ tracted from a situation, and that a fundamental wldecidability pervades the underlying basis of this e.xtraction, dlere is always the possibility of variation in the generation of statements and dlC kinds of n i terventions (scientific, po­ litical, amorous, artistic) which issuc fordl from this or that forcing. (Badiou, incidentally, pits this philosophy of irreducible and infinite variation, which accepts stark incommensurabilitics between forms of being, against the tra­ dition of vitalist philosophy associated with Spinoza and DelellZe, which n i Badiou's eyes always allows the unity of relations between these forms of being to tmmp incommensurability.)26 What n i Badiou's scheme of dlings enables a tmth to have this efficacy? Forcing enables the components or e.!ements of a simation to be propelled by an event from the void into the domain of an expressible knowledge. The event discloses the void of a situation and in so doing keeps at bay the pos­ sibility that the subject's powers of expression can bridge the gap between the UIUlamed simation and the modes of speech about it. This revelation of the void is an incitement to tmth, since the subject must now respond to what has been revealed with regard to the void. In fidelity to the event, the subject has to strive to find resources of expression or symbolization that en­ able a connection to be built up between the unnamed void and the domain of names and designations. Those placed in that situation then have ro take sides with regard to the named event which dley now confront: Are they going to be in favor of it, or are they going to be against it? Interventions are constituted by this taking of sides, and the subject is constmcted by the THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

211

"investigations" he or she undertakes as a consequence of taking sides with regard to the evemP For Hadiou, the tmth that is at issue ill this taking of sides adheres stricdy to the law of the excluded middle; rhat is, a statement is either [me or false, with no possibiliry of a middle ocr-veen truth and falsity. Hadiou has no tfuck with those who espouse a perspcctivalisr conception of the truth, or those who, n i the maiUler of Foucault, maintain dlat truth is an "eflcer" of a " regime of practices." There is a huge technical literaturc on the law of the c.,e1uded middle, too large to delve into n i a work like this, but Bldiou's devotion to dle bw of the excluded middle has momentous conse­ quences for his conception of politics.28 Bldiou's conception of tmth, wedded as it is to the bw of the excluded middle, s i in

turn

derived from his adoption of l plrticular version of set

theory, which nUlSt now be looked at more closely. In a short but perspica­ cious review article on VErre et "il'illt1JlC1Jt, the late Jean-Toussaint Desanti dellt with the choices made by Hadioll when it came to using set theory as the blsis for his ontology. Desanti's discussion, as befits

a

philosopher of

!Illdlematics, is technically recondite, but the nub of his argument ceorers on Badiou's usc of the Zermclo-Fraenkel (ZI') system of set dleory to pro­ vide the blsis for his ontology. The crux of Desanti's position s i the defining felture of a set, namely, thlt l set hls no intrinsic "meaning," but is defined by the elements or memhers dllt belong to it; rhlt is to say, it is defined ex­ tensionallyand not conceptllally or intensionllly. In other words, in logicll symbolism {xl x is the forty-third president of dIe United States} is the same set lS {xl x is George W. Bush} because dleir respective members arc dle same n i dividual, in this case the person named "George W. Bush" who happens to be the forry-third presidellt of the United Stltes. Moreover, set membership is determinate, so that it is always the C�lse that any possible member of l set is either in thlt set or not n i it, with no p!:J.ce for any kind of imprecision or 1mbiguity. nlc�e �lrc nor the only principles required ro mlkc ZI' work, bur together they render it inevitlblc thlt Hadiou's "inrrinsic ontology" (the term s i DesJllti's) will exclude by definition the question of its "margin." 2\1 -nle Jlllrgin in rhis case refers to a form of writing dlat is beyond or n i ex­ cess of ontological writing (i.e., set theory), hur which is nonetheless essen­ tial to onrologicll writing. -nle realm of ontological writing, as we have seen, consists simply of mles lnd procedures for the constinttion of sets and their membership, and:J.S such it can do no more than indicne the items dlat popu­ Ilte the field designated by dIe intrinsic ontology (items such as George W. Bush, lelves, dogs, texts, hijackers, musical scores, Mldamc Curie, hydrogen molecules, prime numbers, and prime ministers). An intrinsic ontology Clll212

CHAM'ER 8

not, by virtue of its confinement to ZF, deal with the vital questions lodged on its margins, to wit, such questions as "what was said; what was thought; what we would need to re-think; what we should try to do in order to live" ("Some Remarks"

62).

Desanti is convinced that Badiou needed to resort to Paul Cohen's notion of "forcing" to deal with tillS problem of the margin that cannot be dealt with solely by employing the resources of set theory.3o Desanti then tells the following parable to illllStrJ.te the nature of the problem created by this commitment to set theory: Imagine that there arc people obliged to move about in a territory whose bor­ der they carulOt cross because this border is so contrived as to push them back however dose they come, each and every time they approach it. They would soon begin to suspect that this effect has its somce on the other side of the border. They would in fact have no choice but to believe this, for since there arc no clues within thcirown territory allowing them to poim to the source of this effect, the latter is all the evidence they have for the existence of the bor­ der. It would be as though their border was "infinitely" distant for them: they would be incapable either of reaching or crossing it. Nevertheless, this border would Sti!! constirute a "beyond" because its effect would not be produced from within the bounds of their territory. In order to deSignate their situation as one ofmbjectwlI, of assignation to this strange territory, we simply call these PL"Ople (they could be "human," but that is of no importance here) "subjects." Bur since "being subjected to the territory" means "being subjected to what lies beyond it," these particular people would end up trying to fashion some way of deSignating, or marking, what might be going on in this beyond, all the more so because they would come to attribute an infinity of effect..., which they would undergo as "subjects," to the effect of the border itself. As sub­ ject to these. effects, however, they would be unable to mark or specify their poinL � oforigin within their own territory. . . . Such asubject must express the connection bctween an "internal infinite" and an "externaliz.cd infinite" -an "indiscernible real" but one which, again as subject, it has to "mark." ("Some Remarks" 64, emphases Desanti's; translation modified) Desanti presses his critique by saying that set theory or intrinsic ontology can provide only the means for e.xpressing an "internal infinite," and as such

has no way of accounting for what lies

beyond the border of the territory

mentioned in IllS parable. In order to have access to the. "externalized nfi­ i nite" that lies on the other side of the border, the subjects of the territory need, at the very least, theoretical instnl!Ilents that set theory, limited as it is THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

213

to the internal infinite, cannot deliver on its own. Bur what other resources are needed by the inhabitants of Desanti's fabled territory if they are to avoid the fate of an irremediable confinement within its bounds? Desanti's pro­ posal is that Badiou needs another "basic ontology" if he is going to be able to ensure adequate omological access to the externalized infinite. He ends his fCVieW ofVEtre et l'ivinclIICltl at tllis point, but it s i a point that remains well taken, and it behooves anyone interested enough to pursue the question of the ability of Radiou's theoretical armature to do justice to this externalized infinite. Some supporters of Badiou have shown that his writings subsequent to VEtrc ct Pil'inemmt have reflected important shifts n i his position as he has tried to overcome the limitations of that book's ZF set-theoretic ontological apparams. Peter Hallward, who has access to Hadiou's unpublished papers, suggests that Hadiou's n i terest in category tlleory s i integrally bound up Witll his attempts to deal with the recalcitrant externalized infinite.51 Badiou's re­ course to category theory is rhus indispensably a part of this search for a way to complement ZF set theory n i order to include, but also to move beyond, the internal n i finite of ZF set theory, and by so doing to find the means to accommodate tllis problematic and cims far excluded externalized infinite. Category theory differs from set theory in a number of important respects. -nle most notable of cilese is the fact that category rheory is attemive to con­ siderations of meaning and semantics (i.e., n i tensionality, as opposed to the exclush'ely extensional orientation of set theory), as indicated in figure 11. The arrows in figure 11 express relationships between such categories as "progressive citizen," "the Bush administration," "critics ofthe Bush admin­ istration," and "cile prison at Guandnamo" in terms of the symmetrical re­ lations of "endorsement" and "disapproval." As Hallward says about any diagram of this kind, which can connect progressive and nonprogressive individuals or groups or can be inverted to express the position of cile non­ progressive citizen, any disapproval (and here I refer to my own c.xample and not the one given by Hallward in Badum: A SubjeCT to Truth) of the Bush ad­ ministration's policy on the internment camp at Guandnamo Bay, whether expressed n i concrete actions taken or merely declamatorily, has as its corol­ lary an endorsement of those groups critical of the Bush administration, and vice versa.52 This somewhat cursory account shows that one of cile fWldamental dif­ ferences between set cileory and category theory is that while the former is derived from and regulated by its a.xioms, the character of this or that category can be specified only by a process of empirical n i spection. TIlliS, 214

CHAPTER 8

Progrc.\.Sil'c Group or I ndil'idual

Endurscmmf

Critics of Bush Administration

11.

S""rce:

Bush Administration

Guancinamo Prison Policy

Adapted from Hallward, BIII/iou: A Subject to Truth.

317.

where our Guandnamo prison c.xample s i concerned, i t is entirely an em­ pirically contingent matter that dle Hush administration's policy of housing "enemy combatants" in an offshore location so that they will not fall under the juridical purview of the American legal system has (even in the United States) attracted much criticism up to now; however, i t is entirely conceiv­ able dlat such opposition on the part of progressive citizens will disappear

if dle Guandnamo prison regime is drastically reordered so

a.�

to bring it

into line widl international law, hard though it is to m i agine how this can be done at a location like Gua.ntanamo Bay. While category theory permits the kind of empirical pinpointing that set dleory does not, it has to be acknowl­ edged that Badiou himself understands the relation between the two types of theory in a way that seems to preclude dle possibility of any straightforward alignment between, on dIe one hand, intrinsic ontology (focused here on Desanti's internal infinite) and set theory and, on dIe odler, category theory and the c.\:ternalizcd n i finite. For Badiou, as Hallward points out, has always n i sisted dlat category theory is not some kind of supplement to set dleory; in Hadiou's words, "For me, set dleory is still today rhe only consistent on­ tology that I know of."33 Category theory's function is thus to elucidate the logical implications of an already made ontological decision, and this because the sole domain of category thl'Ory is a possible universe, while set theory can be entmsted the function of deciding a particular real (as opposed to a merely possible) lIniverse.34 Hence, where om Guandnamo prison example is concerned, knowing that dlerc is an opposition between dle Blish admin­ istration and its critics on the legality of the prison, and maintaining that proTHE POLlTtCS OF THE EVENT

115

gressive movements are structurally disposed to oppose the Bush administra­ tion's policy regarding the prison, in itselfshows only that a choice is there to be made between the options available-in this case, a choice between siding with rhe administration and opposing it. All that category theory can do here is to lay bare the strucmre of the pos­ sible options confronting the potential chooser. It cannot operate at the level of ontological decision, which for Badiou is necessarily a level that involves reference to truth, that is, the real universe as opposed to the merely possible universes of category theory. TIlliS, f i there is a world that includes rhe set or class of canines, then since cat.�, horses, and birds arc not extensionally identical with regard to canines, and since the identity of a set is determined exclusively by its membership, the set {xl x is a canine} cannor be the same set as {xl x is a feline}. In other words, given that there arc dogs in the (real) world, and dogs are nonfelines, dogs and cats cannot, ontologically, belong to the same class n i this (real) world. Category theory therefore only elabo­ rates the premises that underlie set theory. It cannot in principle augment these premises, nor can it breach in any way the principles wldergirding c1as­ sicallogic, and in particular the principle of bivalence integral to that logic which insists that the true is irreducibly opposed to the false, and vice versa, with no possibility of any kind of "in between." So for Badiou the canons of set theory are superordinate over those of category theory; the latter can amplify, but n i no fundamental way extend, the ontologic sanctioned by set theory and classical logic n i general. Accepting that this is the only war­ ranted relation obtaining be[\veen set theory and category theory, however, will plunge Badiou back into the problem dlat Desanti identified with his ontology, namely, rhat since the objects encased by this ontology are limited to those compatible with what ZF set theory itself permits, and thus can be defined only extensionally, Badiou's ontology cannot deal with dIe ex­ ternalized infinite. Badiou's a:domatic ontology therefore seems doomed to remain within the confines of dle territory widl unapproachable boundaries adverted to in Desanti's parable. What this entails for a viable conception of truth is something we have to consider n i due course. While it is possible to go back and fordl on the question of the e:l:ternal­ ized infinite n i particular, and a suitable axiomatic for truth in general, the choice on these matters comes down ultimately to [\VO views of dle logic of nmltiplicity, one Platonic and the odler Aristotelian (according to tht, terms of art provided by Badiou), or in i-bllward's lapidary formulation, "dle subtractive austerity ofNumber over the seductive plenimde ofNamre,"

.H6

CHAPTER 8

referring to Platonism and Aristotelianism, respectively.3511le two logical or ontological traditions thus identified are:

- Platonism or Unicity (olUological, of the void) -Canons of classical logic; ing and is localized; standard set thtoryexprcssed diffcrence rcsults from be

in first-order logical notation; rclations arc determined internally by their terms.

- Aristoteliallism/Leibllizimlism or Plurality (ofvOids) -Canons of n i tuition· ist logic; difference results from action and movement and is globalil.ed; category theory; rclations arc extt:rnal to ther i terms.l6 There is no procedure that can vindicate a putative choice between these two ontological traditions, since someone's being a Platonist or an Aristote­ lian/Leibnizian is preciselywhat predetermines the ontological commitments made by those who happen to count themselves as Platonists or as Aristote­ lians. ·nlere is therefore no such science or philosophy as "meta-ontology," and in the absence of the means of adjudication afforded by a metatlll"r "O y, the choice between the two traditions is groundless from a strictly ontological point ofview. For Badiou, it follows from this that the choice ofan ontology can resuit only from a decision that is without a basis that is transcendental or that s i indebted in some kind ofprimordial way to rhe ultimately arbitrary conventions of language. -nle decision setting axiomatic ontology in motion s i an event or Act (this Act, a "pure" decision, is arbitrary, albeit in a way that differs from the arbitrariness of Saussurean linguistic conventions). \Virh the occurrence ofthe Act, the process of a fidelity to an event can begin, and with tllis fidelity, whose primary stmcrure is provided by tmth and its procedures, thought also can begin, and thought for Badiou has an inherently logical or axiomatic stmcrure.37

a version of Platonism that lends itself to a plausible rapprochement with the lUldecidable and rhe arbitrary, one which enables the ax iomatics linked to the former to superintend tile latter notions, though Badiou docs acknowledge that conceptions of the arbitrary Balliou's aim here is to outli.ne

and the undecidable belong more appropriately to the alternative ontologi­ cal tradition associated with Aristotle and Leibniz.38 This contention is then fleshed our via dIe claim that for Badiou only Platonism bestows on the notion of possibility the maximal degree of logical breadth. -nlis claim lUlder­ lies Badiou's stern refnsal to admit that non-Platonism, with its commitment to a constructionist ontology, is superior to Platonism because tile Aristote­ Iian/Leibnizian tradition keeps its notion of the possible wide open simply

THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

217

because it is always susceptible to constmction. As Badiou sees it, the Pla­ tonist commitment to the law of dle excluded middle entails that anything which is nO[ false is then tme and nodling else, and d1at anything which is nor logically impossible is logically possible. And so for Badiou Platonism's u nderstanding of the possible is wider than anything permitted by the con­ stmctionist approach favored by non-Platonism. Having eschewed the law of the c..xduded middle, which always requires that tmth or falsity be the only admissible logical constraint on possibility, the non-Platonist schools of thought h:lVe to gloss possibility in terms of its sheer constmctability, and so possibility comes to be equated with what is deemed conceivable by the one who happens to be doing the constmcting. Blit if possibility is collapsed into conceivability, and given that conceivability is moreover a patently psychological notion, it follows, according to Badiou, that the non-Platonist must permit the always variable facts of this or dlat psychology to determine how much scope is dlen to be accorded the concept of possibility. The stmcture of this argument against h t e non-Platonist point of vicw is essentially that of a reductio ad absurdum. To elaborate: while it is logically possible for a human being to swim, unaided, across the Atlantic Ocean (in the sense that no logical contradiction is involved in making this supposition), it is nonetheless plausible to believe that for most of us it is in­ conceivable dlat a human being be physically capable of such a feat. In which case, the notions of (logical) possibility and (psychological) conceivability simply do not overlap. Furdlermore, it is also evident dlat possibility, when compared to dlis psychologically based conceivability, is really the more logi­ cally capacious notion. 10 this e.xtent, therefore, Radiou is right: Platonism, as he characterized it, appears intrinsically to be less capable of being en­ snared by the vagaries of human psychological capacity or incapacity. (This psychology is also for Badiou an element of the despised anthropology of finimde.) And so, if one agrees widl Radiou in seeing little option but to ac­ cept Platonism, dle only tenable position requires us to accept that anything is possible as long as it is not logically impossible. 1he problem widl Platonism, its initial persuasiveness notwithstanding, is dlat it still does not provide the wherewithal for dealing with the e.'\ternal­ ized infinite invoked by Desanti in his critique of Badiou.39 It is a minim um condition of dealing widl the externalized infinite that there be some way of registering more than just dle extensionally marked objects of dle internal­ z i ed infinite, these being the only generic objects recognized as legitim ate by an a:domatic set theory governed by Platonist principles. Bur what will it mean to proceed beyond extensionally defined objcrts? The only alterna218

CHAPTER 8

tive for those wanting to make such a move beyond extensionality is to ac­ cept the principle of intensionally defined objects, that is, granting that there has to be an active incorporation of the Aristotelian(Lcibnizian tradition of ontology, since it s i this tradition, rather than its Platonist counterpart, which permits intensional objects. This tolerance of intensionality, though, is exactly what Badiou will not countenance. This s i a seemingly intracrable m i passe, muess it is possible for axiomatic set theory to be elongated n i some way that enables acquiescence in the principle of intensionality. Desanti's hunch on tllis issue comes immediately to mind, namely, that Badiou bor­ rows Paul Cohen's notion of "forcing" to c..'{tend axiomatic set tlleory be}'ond the realm of extensional objects. However, this suggestion faces an immedi­ ate problem: forcing is Badiou's way of allowing objects to be orchestrated in configurations that exceed the structures of conventional knowledge, but he still insists that these objects, no matter how reconfigured, remain exten­ sionally defined and subject to the laws of classical logic."o It is by no means clear, however, that the externalized infinite can be approached adequately f i the nstnU1lents i of this approach arc constrained by the requirement that only extensional objects meet the test of absoillte logical propriety. -nlere is a built-in parsimony to Badiou's ontology tl13t seems to resist any open­ ness to intensional objects. -nle axiom of extensionality basically confines an ontology to objects th3t lend themselves to inunediate or easy recognition as existent objects. For nsrance, i if extensional objects arc tile only objects permitted, then {xl x is my paternal grandfather} and

{xl x is Gilbert Surin}

arc easily extensionally e<Juivalent, since both my paternal grandfatller and the individual named Gilbert Surin arc existent objects. However, if inten­ sional objects arc also permitted, then, to choose a f.uniliar example from mythology,

{xl x

is a winged horse} and

{xl x

is Pegasus} arc (intension­

ally) e<Juivalent. Cnley would of course also be extensionally e<Juivalent for Badiou.) But what would happen if we had to adjudicate a siruation in which, say, I came along in a fit of complete ontological derangement and insisted that {xl

x is a winged horse} and {xl x is my grandfather Gilbert Surin}, and

moreover that I also happened to believe with utter conviction tlIat in this insrance {xl x is a winged horse} and {xl x is my grandfather Gilbert Surin and not Pegasus}? To preclude such incongruities Badiou would have to restrict his ontology to palpably existent objects, and n i so doing banish such enti­ ties as winged horses, but n i tile process he would necessarily preempt the possibility of gaining ontological access to the externalized infinite (which presumably is populated by a pletllora of intensional objects). However, as Hallward has pointed out, Badiou is conunitred to an understanding of exTHE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

219

tensionality which stipulates that a set is defined entirely by its elemeiUs, with no restriction being placed on how those elements arc related or com­ bined. lbis definition of c..xtensionality is therefore sufficiently capacious to permit sets to have intensional objects as their members as long as they meet the appropriate combinatorial constraints on the formation of sets:u Bm this flexibility leads to some cowlterintuitive results. It is possible for

{xl x is beieved l by Kenneth Surin to be the greatest chess player ever} and i Gary Kasparov} to be identical sets because x n i both cases s i Gary {xl x s Kasparov. But {xl x is tile greatest Azerbaijani chess player ever} should also be identical to these two sets, since the Baku-born Kasparov is also Azerbai­ jani. It is possible, however, for me to assent to {xl x is believed by KeIUledl Surin to be rhe greatest chess player ever} and {xl x s i Gary Kasparov} but nO[

{xl x is the greatest Azerbaijani chess player ever}

because I happen to

have tile mistaken belief that Kasparov is Russian or Georgian or Ukrainian or whatever, with no thought that he might really be Azerbaijani. So, while according to the a:dom of extensionality n i its purest form, all of {xl x is be­ lieved by Kenneth Surin to be the greatest chess player ever}, {xl

x is Gary

Kasparov}, and {xl x is tile greatest Azerbaijani chess player ever} arc n i fact the same set, in acmal fact tile belief-set that can properly be imputed to me should not include {xl x is the greatest Azerbaijani chess player ever} and {xl x is Gary Kasparov}. Of course, the upholder of the expansive version of the axiom ofc..xrensionality could argue, and would be right to so argue, that had I been better informed about Kasparov's place of origin I would sec my mis­ take and in um ..-diately acknowledge that {xl x is the greatest Azerbaijani chess player ever} is also the same set as {xl x is beieved l by Kenneth Surin to be the greatest chess player ever} and {xl x is Gary Kasparov}. This possible escape route for the upholder of the roomy version of the axiom of extensionality, tempting though it may be, nonetheless begs tile question whether it is more important to retain tile axiom of extensionality come what may, or to give an accurate account of someone's specific and localized belief-set. ·nlere. is no clear-cut rule here: n i some cases, given the highly localized nature of belief-sets, we may want to lise category theory to do thework of displaying the logic of tile belief-set in question, while upholding tile axiom of exten­ sionality as an overarching logical principle, but in others we may deem it more important or useful to give an accurate accowlt of someone's belief-set, maybe even dispensing witll the axiom of extensionality (anathema though this would be to Badiou and his followers). -nle decision to grant primacy to the characterization ofsomeone's belief­ set, with the need to make intensionality absolutely central, may require the 1.1.0

CHAPTER 8

suspcnsion of the a.xiom of cxtensionality, and with it thc Iaw of the excluded middle, so that the principle of truth-effects, as opposed to truth or falsity

simpliciter, becomes a perfectly acceptable omological option (as much as Badiou and his followers may oppose any such move, n i volving as it does a clear repudiation of the a.xiom of extcnsionality). Whatevcr decision is made here, it will be hard to insist that once intensional objects arc permitted by an ontology, thc law of the excluded middle and a strict version of the axiom of extensionality will be ea.�y to uphold and to apply. For it is evident that they won't: oncc intensional objects are permitted, it dlen becomes more difficult to maintain that statements arc either tme or false, with no options in be­ tween such as "partially true," "somewhat false," or "not entirely true." Once such "vague prcdicates" arc permitted in the domains of truth and falsity, we have to grant that tmth-effects exist, and not just the two truth-values "tme" and "false." This would involve a concession on Radiou's part, since he categorically precludes dIe inclusion of tmth-effects n i his ontology. The norion of a trudI-cffect is considerably more elastic than that of trudl or falsity per se. A truth-effect is what it is

as soon as someone is disposed

to act on dIe conviction that the statement in question is accepted as tme, or false, or probably tme, or not entirely true, and so on. The crucial ques­ tion for those who accept dIe existence of truth-effects is the cOlUlection between the conviction that something is true or false and the plausibility of the conviction in question. -Thus, for instance, my conviction that my em­ ployer is treating me badly is likely to have rhe effect of n i creased resentment on my part and an unwillingness

to take on extra responsibilities

at work.

Hut a truth-effect does not convey any information about the nature of the grounds or the rationale(s) someone may have for holding a particular con­ viction; in the example just given, my conviction that my employer is treating me poorly, while it may have undeniable effects, does not n i any way signal that I have genuinely good or genuinely bad reasons for possessing this con­ viction. It cannot be denied that someone can believe that he or she is being badly treated even when dIal is not the case, and that someone can think that he or she is being well treated cven when that s i not the case. Certainly one can believe that one's employcr is being good to one and for that truly to be the case; equally, the judgment that one is being badly treated could be sup­ ported by the fact that one is indeed being badly treated by one's employer. lllese scenarios lend themselves fairly easily to rhe kind of representation enabled by category theory, which is able to acknowledge from the outset that there s i no necessary match between someone's beliefs and the grounds that justify the holding of those beliefs, though, all elsc being egual, for most THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

221

ofthe time someone's beliefs are not hugely incoherent. 1be polar altemative to the presumption that individuals arc generally right in their beliefs would be to suppose that persons arc likely to be mistaken a great deal of the time with regard to most of their beliefs and, more generally, that rational beings as

a generality could hold massively n i coherent beliefs.42 The upshot of this

principle is that if I am likely to be right most of the time in my judgments about the way things are, then I have to grant the same assumption to other putatively rational beings.

A truth-effect, therefore, arises when a rational being holds a statement to be true, and as a consequence accepts that certain entailments arc generated by adhering to the truth of the statement n i qucstion, though of course no statement is true (or false) simply becallse someone happens to believe that it is true (or false). The basic insight here is that it makes a difference when a belief is held to be true, as opposed to false, and vicc versa, though as just stated, someone's holding a belief true in no way ensures that it cannot be false, and vice versa. The only altemative to upholding these truisms would be to suppose that as a matter of generality it makes little or no difference to

us whether our beiefs l are true or false, though a better way of stating

this may be to say that most of us care whether or not we are warranted in holding the convictions we possess, the possibility ofself-deception notwith­ standing.

Truth-Efficts alld Politc i al Olltcollles Given these truisms concerning truth-cfft."ts "C , a political system can be viewed as an immense and overdetermined amalgam of truth-effects, and any truth-effect (or set of truth-effects), depending on historical and social circumstances (these of course always being political), can be prevented from displaying itself (or themselves). A truth-effect docs not produce automati­ cally, and hence calUlOt guarantee, its own mode of actualization; it cannot of itself banish the historical conditions, whatever the), may be, that could in principle preempt its realization as a truth-effect.43 A truth-effect, in this account, is the product of desire, often having the force and character of a "project," n i this case a project motivated by a particular arrangement of this constitutive desire or striving. For n i stance, the event of Nelson j\1andela desiring his freedom (and thus the abolition of apartheid) results n i a truth­ effect, or in a set of truth-effects, because this desire functiOlL� as an enabling (though not a sufficient) condition for the removal of all that stands in the way of the realization of that desire. \Ve could call this a " truism" of the 1.1.1.

CHAPTER 8

logic of desire, inasmuch as to desire that X be the case is to aim to make tme or realize all that conduces to the attainment of X. Or, if we go back to Desanti's fable, the inhabitants of the territory who believe that some power outside the borders of that territory is preventing them from approaching its boundaries will vcry likely also believe that some form of agency situated on the other side of its borders is the source of the mysterious force that is being exerted on them. llleir belief that this statement is true will probably set in motion a plethora of other convictions and actions, such as the desire to get rid of this outside agency or to neutralize its power, or to

turn

this

power on their enemies, and perhaps to communicate with it, and even to create systems of knowledge about it. Such desires and beliefs have a clear analogue n i the beha\'iors of those denizens of this planet who do not doubt that there is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe, or who believe that their actions arc being guided by a supernarural power. Equally, the belief that the world needs to be transformed radically will potentially carry with it a range of accompanying practices and convictions. A truth·effect, then, is Iikel}' to initiate beliefs and actions on the part of its subjects which structure desire. in ways that promote the realization of a state of affairs identified as the "truth" of that siruation. 111is characterization of the close connection between a truth-efl"ect and the desire to bring about the state of affairs that realizes the truth at issue is very similar to Badioll's description of the fidelity procedure. The subject of a fidelity procedure is prompted by the event, which inserts a break in the normal course of things, to make an intervention in a situation. By virtue of making this intervention, the subject is confronted with the task of making new choices, and in the course of making these choices, the event is named. A case in point is the French Revolution, where a simation of generalized dissatisfaction with the monarchy was turned by the decisions and actions of Danton, Marat, Robespierre, and others into the event that came to be named the French Revolution. 111cir fidelity to the event led to the broadening circulation of specific forms of militancy, thereby enabling Danton, ,\-tarat, Robespierre, and their confreres to form new alignments and disengagements with regard to the original event, n i this way releasing even more forces that took the event n i ever newer directions and created yet more forms of fidelity for the subjects facing the event."" -nlis accOlUlt of the e\'ent and fidelity to the event is obviously compatible with the characteriza· tion of a truth·effect being given here. Illlls, where the French Revolution is concerned, the forms of desire activated by the widespread dissatisfaction with the monarchy led Danton, ,\l3rat, Robcspicrre, and others to envisage THE POLITICS OFTHE EVENT

21.�

the lineaments of a constitutional republic, though this revolutionary vision was soon to be undermined by Napoleon Bonaparte. It is clear from this that any treatment of liberation or militancy as a con­ cept has to place an undeniable centrality on the conditions underlying the production of the trudl-effects of this or dlat system of liberation. A nearly wliversal de.testation ofdIe French monarchy on the part of dIe populace put in place the conditions dlat generated the trudl-effects to which Danton et alia were able to respond. In tllrn the forms of desire associated widl these revolutionary responses and the patterns of fidelity created n i the process led to other new situations, and these in turn generated novel trudl-effects and new forms of desire. But why is it important for this question to be raised? It behooves the writer on liberation or militancy as a concept to pose this question because no practice of liberation, nor any theoretical formulations stemming from that practice, can view the seeker of liberation as someone who settles for life just as it is (i.e., has "adjusted" to the nonnalcy dlat in Hadiou's thinking requires the rupture introduced by dIe //oI'UII/ of the event before dlis baneful reality can be pushed to one side). -nlis is precisely the point at which thc. question of the conditions that subtend the production (or the dissolut ion) of truth-effects arises n i all its force. For the difference made to life by any practice conducing to liberation depends crucially on the emergence or the suppression of the conditions that effectuate "tmth." 111is provides only a horizon, albeit one that s i salutary and absolutely in­ dispensable, for a resuscitation or sustaining of the "desire for dIe new" (the

IJUVI/III). A great deal more needs to be said about this ontological horizon, but I will conclude by indicating briefly how I think t1lis accowlt of truth­ effects and its wlderlying ontology has some advantages when compan..x1 to Hadiou's accowlt of dIe truth-event. What this ontology of truth-effects possesses is something that Radiou cannot provide, constrained as he is by his intellectual indebtedness to Plato and Sartre. To be more specific: there are many ways of relating truth

to

the

real or the concrete. Far from there being a dialectical relation between trudl and practice, tmth and practice form an endless relay: at one moment tmth is plugged into practice, at another practice is plugged into tmth. And there is a potential multitude of such relays, not Hadiou's wlitary relation of the truth­ event to the fidelity of the follower. To be fair, Radiou does allow dlat there arc many ways of exercising this fidelity, hence his resort to category theory in his more recent work. But at the same time it is clear that for Badiou the event of trudl stands as some kind of surd exteriority to be embodied n i the life ofthe militant. Truth, however, is muchmore malleable and protean than 2201-

CHAPTER 8

this. It is known by its effects, and these are inlllensely plentiful and variable. A Platonism like Badiou's cannot accommodate this insight. A more suitable alternative may be the Aristotelian/Lcibnizian logical tradition that Badiou views as the alternative to this Platonism.

Conc/lISoll i A cowltervai l ing politics should nO[ seck to predicate itself on the event of exception, and for this reason would seck a radically different ontology that enabled us to organize signs n i new ways, as well as finding new theoretical operations and formulations. It would also discover novel and sometimes disturbing styles for organizing gestures and actions and expressing dissatis­ factions, in many places and n i many times. After all, even as tacit SUllC­ rures for the disclosure of revolutionary possibility taken in the most abstract sense, the events that go by the names "St. Paul" and "J\1ay 1968" mean noth­ ing for most of the inhabitants of the earth. The import of these notions may be implicitly wliversal, but they arc not pragmatically available to those who lack a basic familiarity with the fowldations of Ouistianiry or the tlnvarted revolution of 1968. Finding ways, in their specific locations and contexts, of getting rid of tile shah of Iran, or Margaret 111atcher, or George \V. Bush, or the tyrannical junta in Myanmar/Burma on the contrary possesses a saliency that s i politically less elusive. To accomplish such things, urgently needed patterns of revolutionary opportunity will have to be sought, and hopefully fowld, in theoretical formulation as much as on the streets. But it is not clear that we need the singularization of an c.xceptional event for such a politics, as much as a great deal of what Badiou says is sane and saluary t for any kind of militant project (e.g., his conviction that nothing good can come from a situation which has the fingerprints of state control all over it). Also, by making politics sensitive to the plight of people like the SIIlls-pnpers i and other detainees (a.� opposed to viewing it in terms of the machinations of power­ mongers in parliamentary and congressional chambers), Badiou has brought to the forefront the n i creased likelihood that capitalist parliamentarianism is itself now falling into desuetude.

THE POLITICS OF THE EVENT

225

CHAPTER 9 Models of Liberation IV The Religious TrallScmdmt

"fllC conceptions of liberation discllssed so far arc premised on notions that arc rigorously immancntist; they make no appeal to any principle or force that cannot be accollnted for entirely n i terms that arc located n i historical and social processes that arc "this-worldly" in the strict sense of dlC term. But it should not be presumed witham further reflection that a conception of liberation is not able in principle [0 accommodate positions involving an appeal to the transcendent.! If there can be a viable accoum of liberation based on some kind of recourse to the transcendent, then it would be per­ fectly legitimate to fXlsc rhe question of the proper form of such a theory of liberation based Oil this recourse. The line of argument I consider here begins by assuming hat r there can be such an appeal

to

the transcendent (on the

gtounds that no logical canons arc breached by the mere making of such an appeal) and proceeds to c.xamine the claim that the transcendent, constmed theologically, can serve as the basis for an adequate account of liberation. A suitable, perhaps the most suitable candidate for an approach to lib­ eration based on an invocation of rhe transcendent is the " universal pacified myth" of the vision of Christianity underwritten by the Radical Orthodm.:y movement. In this chapter I broach the question of the transcendent n i terms of the formulations integral to the Christian mythos, inasmuch as I do not discount from the outset rhe plausibility of the position of those who pro­ fess to stand within the circle of faith. -nle most important upshot of this acknowledgment is the centrality that has to be accorded to the notion of incarnation in setting the absolute norm for any Olristian account of repre-

sentation and linguistic mediation. For the incarnation to make sense, there has to be the presupposition that representation and mediation, ultimately, are divinely sanctioned and, by virtue ofthis, arc wholly adequate (at any rate for cimse who dwell within the circle of faith).:! The basis for this presuppo­ sition is not diflicult to grasp, inasmuch as if the reality of godness cannot be expressed in language, then agnosticism is cile only logical outcome. This in turn

poses cile question of the gtound for affirming this ontological affinity

between the divine reality and language; for those who stand wicilin rhe circle of faith, cile answer ies l in upholding the incarnation, or rhe doctrine of creation (more specifically, the view cilat the created order is made in the divine image, or imago dei), or bocil. -nle doctrine of analogy cilen bcromes the most appropriateway to daborate and to secure, theologically and philo­ sophically, this fundamental insight into the basic expressibility of godness. The doctrine of analogy operates by maintaining that we can impute to godness whatever qualities would need to be possessed by cile supreme and absolute reality capable of being the author of the entire created order. Wis­ dom would of course be one such quality, and so wisdom can be attributed to godness, though since the divine being possesses its attributes in cile mode of infinity, godness possesses wisdom in the mode appropriate to cile divine nfin i ity, whereas creaturcly beings possess this attribute in a finite mode. Hence cilere is an infinite qualitative distinction between the modes in which the t\vo qualities arc respectively possessed. It is clear, therefore, rhat any conception of language congment with the Christian mythos will relyfundamentally on the via IJImUfgia, as opposed to a Scotist, Spinozist, or Dcleuzean univocity oflanguage. For if the incarnation or rhe doctrinc of creation is to serve as the normative underpinning for a Christian conception of expression and representation, then godness has to be capable in some way of being rendered in terms of semiosis. Bur at the same time, since godness is infinite, and thus axiomatically transcendent with regard to any finite order, this infinitude (the transcendent) necessarily ensues in a transcendence that exceeds the bounds ofsemiosis. Linguistic univocity, by contrast, would require that statements about godness be made in exactly the same sense in which they arc made with respect to crearurely beings (or so the philosophico-theological argument in support of the via analogia goes). Transcendence, in cile sense that calls for the reality of the transcendent to bc acknowledged, cims becomes the absolute requirement of the Christian mycims. It is important to recognize this, because no mere exteriority can suilice to serve as dlis transcendent; no mere invocation of, say,

diffrcnee r

or supplementarity or lUldecidability or sublimity will suffice, these being THE RELIGIOUS TRANSCENDENT

227

some of the favored candidates for dIe role of an eneriority to semiosis n i contemporary philosophy and philosophical theology. Only a metaphysics of participation (in the divine Being), and dIe via analogia that is its linguistic corrdate, can serve as the principle of connection between inunanence and the transcendent.3 -nIis being so, the constituting rdation of dIe Christian mythos (in par­ rindar) or the discourse of a full-blown ontological transcendence (in gen­ eral) to the convictions of Christian militants such as St. Paul and St. Ignatius ofLoyola must be retained f i we are to make sense of dIe activity of such mili­ tants. So while Alain Badiou's book on Paul brims with powerful insights, his suggestion dlat Paul's theological beliefs be consigned to he t realm of "fable" cannot be taken as it stands, especially by dIOse who profess to be Christians.4 Which is not to suggest that these Pauline bdicfs should then be taken to be literally (me. But coming from someone who for Christians emlxxlies n i an exemplary way the central tenets of the Christian mydlOs, Paul's statements about godness are to be constmed analogically, which s i not

to imply dlat they are true, since dIe doctrine of analogy is a theory of

meaning and not a theory of trodl. Though, like every theory of meaning, it presupposes that certain things are true (especially about meaning!). To place this analogical constmal on Paul's statements about godness re­ quires at the very least that the ontology of participation be accepted as the bedrock of Paul's theology (even f i Paul himself did not explicitly use the lan­ guage of participation). The theological espousal of the language of parrici­ pation will in turn militate against the characterization of Paul's theological language as "fable" (at any rate for those who are convinced of the tenability of the language of parricipation as a way of connecting the immanent widl the transcendent). Of course acceptance of the metaphysics of participation is confined to those disposed from the beginning to a certain rdigious or theo­ logical orientation, and there caIUIOt be any presumption that those outside the circle of faith, someone like Badiou, need adhere to such a metaphysics. Bur when it comes to making sense of Paul's discourse, dIe language of par­ ticipation can properly be assumed. To not do so would be

to

accept that

a large part of Paul's discourse is simply ncoherent i (this may be what the appellation "fable" basically asserts), save those parts of it that testify to his exemplary militancy. A lesser injustice would be done to Paul's discourse about the divine if it were understood n i terms of the via analogia and dlen deemed, for whatever reason, to be Iargdy devoid of tmdI, dIan for most of it to be taken as a fable except for those "acceptable" components of it dIM pertain to his consummate milit"J.ncy.5 n8

CHAPTER 9

For dlC rcasons just indicatl-d, thc conception of the transcendent rc­ quircd by the Christian mythos cannot be disrcgardcd evcn if we arc sceking to providc an account that is confincd strictly to the political import of the writings of such Christian militants as Paw or Ignati us of Loyola. Acccpting the via analogia as dlC basis of this discoursc, howcvcr, requires that scrutiny be dirccted at dlC via analogia as such. The claim advanccd by members of the Radical Orthodoxy theological movement is that only the via analogia can provide a safeguard against nihilism, nihilism being rhc n i evitable fate confronting a Scatist, Spinozist, or Deleuzean univociry of languagc. The upshot of this claim is that none of the inunancntist models of liberation bcing considered in this book (the politics of dlC subjl'Ct, dIe polities of iden­ tity, the politics of the event, nomadology) is ultimately satisfactory becausc they all result n i c.xorably in nihilism. In dlC words of Conor Cunningham: If mnaphysics (the science of Being) is [0 oc metaphysical it must dissoeiate itself from philosophy and continually demand theological discourse on the qucstion of Being. Metaphysics must cscape philosophy because the lauer's forms of explanation will violate each qucstion supposedly asked. It must also demand theological discourse on the qucstion of Being because only the­ ology, which appeals ro transcendence, can offer a form of nplanation rhat will escape the aporias of philosophical explanation. Ml1:aphysies exists only octween this refusal and this demand. Such all upshot would enable metaphysics to be metaphysical, and philoso­ phy to be philosophica,

]liz.:

purdy descriptive. To be so philosophy would

have to reposition itselfwith regard to theology, deferring to the lauer's mode of discourse, ycr in so doing opening up a space for its own articulation. Only in this way will rhere be ever bc metaphysics and philosophy proper.6 llle tacit assumption on thc part of sllch theological critics of inunanent­ ism is that only a model of IiberJtion bascd on

the transcendent is

able to

avoid thc snare of nihilism, and therefore that thesc transcendcnce-based models arc frcc of thc pitfalls rhat attend dlcir imma.ncnris[ counterparts. As can bc gleaned from Cunningham's remarks, an imma.ncntist metaphysics, by virtue of its abjuration of thcology, can only result in aporias. llle only way out for mctaphysics, thcn, is to be subordinate to theology, that is,

to

a diseoursc n i volving a necessary resort to the transccndent. Bm are these transccndcnce-based conceptions thcmselvcs free from significant objec­ tions?

THE RELIGIOUS TRANSCENDENT

229

The Via AI/fllogin The following set of claims will be hugely tendentious in rhe eyes of some, but the espousal of the via analogia ostensibly militates against Ouistianity's "universal pacified myth" in at least one respect, namely, that the via analogia ncrcssarily acknowledges a hierarchy among beings, specified in terms of a being's proximity n i principle to the Godhead (angels being nearer the God­ head than humans, humans than other creaturely beings, and so forth),

so

that there is, and here one resorts to the language of Spinoza and Nietzsche, the inevitable possibility of the sad or reactive passions arising when a being is lower down the ontological hierarchy. For with analogy there is always a primary and a secondary analogate,

so

that some kind of pn i

emil/Clltiae

becomes absolutely unavoidable, with one subject (the primary analogate) "producing" the other (the secondary or derivative analogate), at any rate "conceptually," through the wlavoidable mechanism of the analogy of con­ cepts. In such a divinely n i stituted hierarchical order, some created beings will necessari l y be more eminent, ontologically, dun others simply by virtue of the divine fiat. Christianity could forestall this pathos of reSSCllfimtnf by adhering strictly to its Platonist philosophical antecedents, this Platonism in effect allowing a relationship of "peaceability" to be maintained between the primary and the derivative analogates, so dlat the eminence ofthe primary analog:lte does not cause a violence of intractable " d f i ference" betwcrn it and its derivative analogates. But the price of this has to be dle incorporation into Christianity of a version of the doctrine of preestablished harmony? By sanctioning the equivalent of a preestablished harmony bt,tween levels of being, dle unavoid­ ably Platonized Christian mythos obviates the pathos of ressentiment that

is bOlUld to

exist between the different levels of being (which an analogical

doctrine is required to posit). But do we want to adopt some version of the doctrine of preestablished harmony? Christianity's peaceableness is thus guaranteed only when there is logi­ cally prior commitment to dle ontological requisites of a preestablished har­ mony (in fact, acceptance of this divinely ordained harmony becomes an ontological condition for being a Christian), since tllis is the only way to preempt absolutely the occurrence of the sad passions. This preestablished harmony is thus vital for Christianity; its ineluctableweddedness to dIe great dlain of being, without which it cannot operate the via analogia, is at once its power and its weakness. As I said, dlis problem for Christianity's universal pacified mydl arises because hierarchies necessarily impose difference. Bm 2,0

CHAPTER 9

it could be argued that difference in itself is not necessari l y to be identified with an nevitable i ontological violence, since there can always be a peaceable difference. (According to Radical Orthodoxy this is precisely the ontological core of Christianity's wliversal pacified myth.) TItis is so because, on this ac­ count, only Christianity is capable of providing a metaphysical legitimation of a difference that does nor result in ontological violence; only Christianity can furnish an ontological backing for hierarchy that does not n i volve re­ course to terror. But if I am right, it can make this claim only becausc. of its prior adherence to some version of the doctrine of preestablished harmony. Therc is an interesting implication here: it has to follow from tltis that difference as difference will be peaceable only when all become Christians, for only then will there be the possibility of a universal and peaceable acceptance of difference. The Christian mythos will work only when all are guided or constrained by it, which means that the via analogia can plausibly serve as the basis for Christianity's univcrsal pacified myth only when the whole world is converted or somehow drawn to the. Christian mythos.s Christianity bestows harmony, the peaceability that surpasses all peace, through its "essence," which raises the question of whether harmony can be given in this way, or whether, as urged by the Scotists, harmony can come only from the striving of collectivities whose efforts are organized by the operation of a will guided by eros (a question I shall return to shortly). Univociry, the Scmist doctrine par excellence, is disavowed by Radical Orthodoxy, but it could be argued that it alone is capable of securing the principle of an accord among beings without overriding difference in the process, because for univoeity (at least in its Scotist-Deleuzean rendition) difference resides purely and simply in the repetition of singularity, with no hierarchy among the singularitiesY Second, there is the matter of what comes first: the wliversal myth that fOlUlds peaceable difference or the solidarity with other human beings, out of which comes the development and consolidation of a rationaity l that en­ joins peaceability. -nle Christian mythos requires the first of these alterna­ tives, whereas the Stoics and David Hume, as well as Deleuze and Guattari, are

to be aligned with the second of these choices. TIle problem with the

immanentism of the position identified here with Stoicism and Hume and Deleuzc and Guattari (and it happens also to be my own position) s i that solidarity s i never attainable by desiring solidarity as an end in itself. (nle desire for solidarity for its own sake seems to be an inherently tragic desire, as when one seeks absurdly to make friends merely for the sake of the prin­ ciple of having friends.) -nms a politics that never gets beyond the principles ntegral i to the political is doomed to futility. THE REUGIOUSTRANSCENDENT

:!31

-The whole point of politics is not to abolish the political (this being an equally tragic gesture), bm rather to use dle domain of the political as the means

to

get to those things-solidarity, compassion, and the negation of

cmdty- hat t imbue the JXllitical with iL� constiment power, and which therefore cannot be engendered by the political itself, even f i the political is absolutely necessary for the realization of solidarity, compassion, and the negation of cruelty in their active and practical forms. "The political derives its strength and character precisely from this constituting exteriority.

Tht,

desire named "the political" has always to be the desire for that which the JXllitical itself enables (this being the place where the political has its neces­ sity), but which the JXllitical CallIlO[ bring n i to being by itself. The world is nor yet ruled by dle requirements of solidarity, compassion, and dle negation of cruclty. "flley are dms real without being actual; that is, they are virtual. It is the political as it s i presendy constimted (viz., dle dovetailing of eco­ nomic neoliberalism with political neoconservatism described earlier in this book) which stallds in dle way of dleir actualization. If the political is able to move to a new and different constitution, then solidarity, compassion, and the abandolUllent of cruelty will move from being real to being actual. They are real now, however, because they act on the present constimtion of the JXlitical, l which has to work ceaselessly to keep at bay those forces which,

if dley could be given free rein, would bring into being a collective state of affairs in which solidarity, compassion, and dle abandonment of cmdty can acmally flourish. "Actually existing politics" wards off this radically new JXllitics which will allow dlis new Eardl to manifest itself: a new poitics, l a new form of being, though one that is already real without being acmal. Christianity is fowuied on a logic that affirms the rationality of a desire grounded in somedling beyond dlat which we know and desire, and to this extent it is ontologically disposed to acknowledge the cxreriority premised on self-surpassing desire, dle desire dl3.t gets beyond what desire itself Call know or anticipate. This is a truly remarkable ontological asset (if one can speak. of it in this way), since it enables Christianity ceaselessly to move be­ yond the limits necessarily constimted by the given (this movement being another name for the exteriority adverted to in this book). This is something that liberalism never really can do. Slavoj Zifek is therefore quite right to insist that Christiallity and marxism are dle only two real metaphysical alter­

natives to Iiberalism.1O

Faced with the ultimately SpuriOlL� choice of harnessing marxism to the ontologicallineamems of Christianity (it should also be noted that for John Milballk this is the only viable ontological option open to marxist social232

CHAPTER 9

ism),]] or trying somehow to make marxism compatible with liberalism ("the management of difference that has always to be placed within limits in order to facilitate this bureaucratic administration of difference": this aptly expresses liberalism's metaphysical nuekus), Zikk has dearly opted for the former. But are we confined to two, and only two, alternatives: on the one hand, a marxism functioning concordantly with Christianity in the manner advocated by Milbank and :luek, or, on the other, a marxism which, because it has no real way of engaging with its exteriority, can only become a dis­ posable appendage of liberalism (albeit one witll a bit more struggle tacked on to it than liberalism typically permits) ? How is the project of liberation to come to a proper acknowledgment of the exteriority constituted by this self-surpassing desire? Here we should end where we began, that is, with the figure of KalU. Kant broke. with his scholastic precursors when he declined to view Being as the transcendental of the transcendentals, and instead made tmth and judgment function in place of Being in his first Critque. i Kant faikd to see, however, tllat the notions of truth and judgment cannot really perform this surrogate function, for two reasons. First, makingjudgments always presup­ poses other judgments, and these in film presuppose yet other judgments, and so fonh.l2 Second, the use of trudl and judgment to serve as quasi­ transcendentals depends in any case on a harmony ofthe faculties that simply cannot be justified by reason.l3 So imagination (Le., aestheties) displaced judgment n i Kant's third Critique, as he made rhe Critiquc ofJudgmcnt com­ plete the transcendental argument that could not be completed by his first

Critique. Feeling then inevitably becomes the organizing principle for com­ pleting the transcendental arglUllent, since only feeling can harnlOnizc the bculties. Just as important is anodler consequence of dlis Kamian shift from judgment to the imagination and feeling, which is that the sublime, neces­ sarily lodged in the nOlullenal for Kant, becomes for him the only place for the properly ontological. German idealism then t(X)k over this axiom regard­ ing the imagination as dle proxy for the transcendental of rranscendentals. It is perhaps noteworthy that the contemporary interest in the "unpresenr­ able" (the writings of Lyotard, Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida, and Nancy come readily to mind in this connection) is really an e.xtension of the exemplary philosophical pattern established by Kant.14 But this pattern has now nm its course: today what is presentable in the popular culture is precisely the " un­ presentable" as it is displayed in the phenomena which go under such labels as "panic culture," "trauma culture," "hyperreality," and "the matrix." But how does one philosophize this momentous transformation, imporTHE RELIGIOUS TRANSCENDE!>.'T

233

rant as it is for any thinking about the absolute exteriority that is the meta­ physical (though not the practical!) place from which any kind of movement toward a revolutionary transformation will have ro issue as thought? What lies beyond this hisroric change, which in effeet requires the very present­ ability of the sublime, where its being the sublime (i.e., the wlpresentable) has become paradoxically the precise condition of its presentability? With the now normative reinsertion of the sublime into the realm of feeling and sensibility in this paradoxical movement (Kant in any case having prepared us for this shift with his linking of the sublime ro time), rhe m i agination has to yield to sensibility (or so it would seem); or, more precisely, it would appear that feeling and the passions have supplanted the imagination at the level of the facultic.s. Kant's faculties, if we retain them, now necessarily re­ late to each other through affectivity and the structures of affect (though, as we shall sec, Gilles Deleuze is almost certainly right in calling this "pathos" rather than affect per se). Indeed, nowadays it is affect, or rather pathos, and overwhelmingly these, which preselect judgment for its availability as (largely spuriom) judgment. One only has to watch the evening news on American local television to get a glimpse of how pathos conditiom what is prc.semed to the viewer as judg­ ment or a putatively " tme" rc.cord of events; it is a commonplace observation to note that these evening news bulletins typically recount an endless succes­ sion oftrivial episodes, rendered (ephemerally) significant only by the largely n i consequent ial realization on the part of the viewer that, say, " this happened in the nc."t town down the interstate," "this happened two blocks away from where I live," "1 shop at the supermarket where this break-in t<X)k place," "I went to school with the sister of this burglary suspect," and so on, a.� each news bulletin catalogues one or morc traffic accidents with only minor in­ juries, a grandfather being bitten by a neighbor's dog, a local teacher's arrc.st for driving while under the influence, the death of the mayor's mother, the new patrol car purchased for dIe town police, a cute puppy being taken to the animal shelter, and so on, ad nameam. Admittedly, very little judgmcnt seems to go into the presentation of dlese storic.s, but what .scarce judgment there is, is entirely at the disposal of the need to get viewers to identify af­ fectively with rhe images being purveyed on the television screen. Judgment is thm deliberately subordinated to a lamentable and utterly impoverished orchestration of pathos. If all this is symptomatic of the wider culture, then certain philosophi­ cal conclusions likewise become inc.scapablc. One such conclusion would

234

CHAPTER 9

be dUl dIe sheer unpresCllt"ability of pathos, even in a popular cuirural form like the American local television news, has the inevitable dfcrt of Cllabling pathos to float around like an wnethered balloon, so that affcrtive intensity is left to be as uncoded and unconstrained as possible. Judgment in the proper, though not entirely unproblematic, scnse of the term s i bound to rhe claims of trudl, and truth itsclf is based on the strict exclusion of dIOse possibilities that

nUl

counter to the trudl in question (dIe tmth of "I flew to Chicago

yesterday for a three-day stay" impies l dlat I did not fly to New York or San Francisco yesterday, that I did not go to Chicago by cafor train, that I did not travel to Chicago today or the day before yesterday, and so forth), whereas an uncoded pathos is nor constrained in this way by even the most minimal of the c.\:igencies of trmh. The free-floating quality dlat n i heres in pathos means that pathos can easily attach itself to incompatible statements: an American whosc son or daughter is serving in Iraq can thrill to the allilOUnCCluent that "'Rumsfeld is doing a great job" at a military parade in which dIe erstwhile U.S. secretary of dcfClISC is surrounded by flags, patriotic music, floating balloons, and confetti, and still feel annoyed and upset dIe same day when he or she reads the headline "U.S. Soldiers in Iraq Lack Proper Equipment"

n i dIe local newspaper. The pathic effects of statements Call

be experienced

withom any intrinsic connection being made to the constative properties of the statements in question, in which case the constative character of the statement effectively becomes flUlCtionally unpresentable, as the lUlcoded and unbounded scnsibility trumps even the imagination in the appropriation of such statements. The overall effeC[ is one of a pervasive dCJXlliticization, as citizens can have all kinds of warm feelings about any politiciall under the sun regardless of the policy dcrisions he or she makes ("Arid Sharon is a true man of peace," ""Ronald Reagan was the greatest American president of the twentieth CClltUry:' "Silvio Berlusconi has restored pride in Italy:' "Tom De­ Lay is a man of absolute integrity," and so on). To get back to Kant. Kant's circumscription of reason had thus effectively broken down by the time he got to dIe dlird

Critique, when he was forced

to concede dlat the

faculties cannot be regulated n i their employment. Hencefordl dlere could be no preest"ablished harmony of dIe faculties. Deleuze has a passage on the groundbreaking implications of Kant's "CluallCipation of dissonance" that is worth quoting: This s i no longer me aesthC[ic of the Crtique i of Pure Reason, whidl considered rhc sensible as the quality that could be related to an object in space and timc; nor is it thc logic of rhe sensible, nor even a new logic rhat would be time. It

THE REUCIOUSTRANSCENDENT

235

s i an aesthetic ofthe Beautiful and the Sublime, n i which me sensible takes on i deployed in a pathos beyond all logiC, me auwnomous value for ibdf and s i at the very and whidl will grasp time as it bursb forth (limlS SOlijnillssemcnt), origin of its thread and its vertigo. TIris is no longer till' Affect of the Critique

ofFllre Reasoll,

which linked the Sc!f to the I in a relationship that was still

regulated by the order of time; it

s i a Pathos that lcrs them evolve fredy in

order to form strange combinations as sourccs of time, "arbinary forms of possible inruitions." It is no longer the detemlination of an I, which must be joined to the determinability of me. Sc!f in order w constitute knowledge; it is now the undetermined unity of all the facultics (the Soul), which makes us enter the unknown.IS "nlis unconstrained deployment of all the faculties nevitably i politicizes any undertaking involving knowing, feeling, and doing, although this is a conclusion hat t Kant himself failed to draw. (In this sense Kant is symptom­ atic of rhe culture that prevails wday, where affect is pervasively depoliti­ cized.) A very significant philosophical opportunity opened up by the "dis­ sonant accords" (the phrase is Ddeuze's) introduced by Kant in the Critique

ofjudglllC/lt comes with the accompanying

acknowledgment tllat it is not

reason whic h leads us to the real, but rather the will guided by eros, so that reason is produced as an effect that emerges from the will's striving. Kant thus opened a way that led back to Scotus and Spinoza, and from these fig­ ures a trajectory could be launched that takes us forward to Deleuze. "nle Scotist a.xioms that reality is to be approached by the will guided by love and that reality is constituted by worlds of singularities, events, and virtualities, and not of subjects and objects, allow all these items to be "ex­ pressively" distributed: all kinds of possible worlds, extending to a potential infinity, can express the same singularity, event, or virtuality, so there is from the beginning a complete preemption of any bureaucratic administration of these. "expressive" distributions and the worlds in which they are located. The very constitution of reality is politicized, but not in the sense that involves, necessarily and from the beginning, a coercive reining in, a stultifying man­ agement of this multiplicity by the negative power of the state or sovereign. 11lt� distribution of expressivirics is governed by a logic of ceaseless prolifera­ tion, one which is freed from any ontological dependence on the categories and principles of classical representation and the anthropological presuppo­ sitions which guided the previous architectonic of rea.mn and thl� politics sustained by it. With this uncontainable production of expressivity, there is an absolute "beyond" for all that is given. As the horizon for the eritique of

2,6

CHAPTER 9

anything that is given, this beyond is precisely the exteriority needed for any viable project of liberation. The sublimity that manifests itsclfin the. popularculrure as the ever greater expansion of an uncoded pathos at the expense of [mth and reason therefore represents a profoundly missed opportlUlity for the general culrure. The "de­ transcendemalization" of truth could have instituted an alternative cultural political regime in which tmth and affect would have been jointly guided by the will linked to eros, and thus powerfully politicized. Instead, will and eros were themselves displaced by a vapid sentimentality that gave an wlcoded pathos a virtually unlimited field for expansion. A critique of the popular cul­ rure can thus no longer be premised on the hope that [mth can somehow be brought back n i to service as a transcendental capable of disciplining patlms. For what it is worth, the horse that is pathos has now fled the stable, and there is no point in bolting the stable door. It is not transcendentally main­ tained truth dlat will recc>({c this wlCodcd pathos from now on, btl[ the will guided by eros, though we Ca!Ulot be certain that even dle latter represents a realistic cultural political option in advanced capitalist societies. To repoliti­ cizc what has so far been massively depoliticizcd will be something akin to a revolutionary undertaking.

A New 0lltoWgica{ Script? For the remainder of this chapter, it is m i portant to examine whedler a wholly immanent ontology, with the will guided by eros as its Scotist pivot point, can serve

as

dIe c.xteriority to the political which a hugely depoliti­

cizcd contemporary poit l ies desperately needs to possess if it is to be capable of motivating a viable project of liberation. As I pointed out in the previous section, this Scmist-Spinozist-Deleuzcan ontology posits an infinity of expressivities and [heir associated possible worlds in a way that is at once rigorously immanent and materialist, and also rigorously politicized. Without being transcendent (there being no univer­ sal subject and universal object for it to transcend), this ontology serves as a transcendental field for dle becoming of new multiplicities, each new multi­ picity l being potentially another name for a new kind of political agent iving l for a liberation that the old sovereignties arc now unable to forestall.!6 It has been objected to this Scotist-Spinozist-Deleuzcan ontology that it is really a species of nihilism. Once it is assumed or asserted, so this objec­ tion goes, that all finite being folds back into the virtual, [hen an inevitable devaluation of finite particularity has to ensue, since the virtual can only THE REUGIOUSTRANSCENDENT

237

be the void into which is collapsed dle entire array of differentiations dlat is the growld of each particularity. In dle absence of an ultimately sustain­ able ground for differentiation, particularity is irreuievably undermined, and without a real particularity dlis ontology has no alternative but to end up by positing the One into which all finite difference is poured and totally abol­ ished. Scoms, Spinola, and OelellZe, their philosophical picas on behalf of particularity norwidlstanding, thus end up being disciples of Ploti.nus, the first great philosopher of the One.17 Ihe argument that dlis Scotist-Spinozist-Oeleuzean ontology can only culminate n i a nihilism of the void does not take a crucial feature of Oelcuze's ontology into accowlt. Oeleuze is qnite c.xplicit dlat the void of deterritori­ alization does not exist on its own, but rather exists necessarily in a triptych of dimensions, in which there coexists a dynamic and mutually determining relationship between dle three levels that consist of (1) the monism of a pure perceptual moment,

(2)

the dualism of composition in which pure percep­

tual moments arc unified or " made n i to one" to form sllch objects as a rain­ drop or a forest, and

(3) dle void, which is a pure act of separation or division

that divides things endlessly, so dlat the raindrop can become a molecule of oxygen that can then become something else, as it enters ever new circuits of causality, and so on.

This book did notcmerge from the void, bur from an

assemblage with a particular process of causality that allowed paper, dle act of writing, print technology, the present state of the publishing industry, the author's n i culcation n i to a particular matrix of dlOUglu production and intel­ lectual practice-what we in the academy call "scholarship" -to 0per:lte con­ jointly to produce Freedom Not ut. And with its insertion into a new circuit of causality, this book can in mrn become a text for an examination, a door­ stop, kindling for a bonfire, or a paperweight. (A friend of mine who once lived in a cockroach-infested apartment told me dlat for a long time Oeleuze and Guattari's A

77JolIJlllld Plateaus, a weighty tome, was his f:lVored imple­

ment for bringing a scurrying cockroach to a dead halt.) 1he existent object arises only as dle outcome of such dynamic interactions, and any notion that Odeuzean objects emerge from the pure void and disappear n i to it when they cease to exist (as dlis or that object) is therefore incorrect. 111e Odeu­ zean void always exists simultaneously and in conjunction with the other two dimensions, namely, the moments of evanescent experience and the unity of composition.18 -nlere is no all-encompassing void constituting an absolute exteriority to dle object for dlis particular ontological uadition. As a result, the problem dlat is usually taken to be insurmountable for proponents of the absolute void, namely, how the logico-metaphysical transition from the 2,8

CHAPTER 9

nothingness of the void to the presence of existent objects is to be under­ stood, docs not apply n i Deleuze's case. Quite simply, for Deleuze there is no absolute void, and he r question of the movement from sheer nothingness to the plenitude of existing objects does not arise for him.19 Alongside this objection to an imma.nentist ontology voiced by the sup­ porters of the flnnlqgn i tIIts i is another, related objection, to the effect that both Scoms and Deleuze have no way of conceptualizing the transition from pure possibility to actuality, since they do nor acknowledge a mediating prin­ ciple, n i voking the notion of participation (as the analogy doctrine docs), to enable the transition from possibility to actuality. According to this objec­ tion, f i the existent objcrt docs not participate in that from which it emerges, its emergence can only be surd and arbitrary. This argument for the centrality of analogical participation can be used against those who uphold notions of univocity and immanemism only bcrause it begins with the assmnption that these norions have to begin from possibility, which then has to be converted somehow into actuality. But Deleuze follows Scoms in making an impor­ tant

distinction between possibility and pottlltinlity. Possbility i encompasses

the range of what a thing can become without ceasing to be itself, and if something is merely possible, it is not actual (though of course it has to be possible if it is to become actual). l'ountinlity, by contrast, is act, active, and actuality.20 Potentiality,

unlike

fKlssibiliry, is a state of power, in

this

case the power of producing dIe state of affairs that actuates dIe possibility in question. Potentiality already presupposes an active causal nexus from which dIe acmated entity can emerge. And so Dcleuze and his philosophical predecessors arc able to avoid dIe objcrtion dIat, widl no ontological basis for appeal to the principle of an infinite Being who can convert possibility into actuality, this school of thought is left with an actuality that is simply a ghostly ontological facsimile of mere possibility. But is dlis ontology derived from Scotus, Spinoza, and Dcleuzc really compatible with marxism, understood here as a theoretico-practical anna­ ture requiring both revolution and socialism? The ontological script that can be written out ofthis delineation of the inunanent field ofdIe multiple is cer­ tainly compatible with a marxist conception of liberation. Some would argue that while Deleuzc can acconunodate dIcoretically the notion of revolntion, socialism, which requires that transformation to a new order of social being, cannot be encompassed by a phi l osophy which, n i the eyes of such critics, conceives of order stricdy n i terms of "metastability," and so has to accept the principle that all order is ultimately arbitrary. For if order is no more than metastability, it can never amount to more than a momentary arresting of THE REUGIOUSTRANSCENDENT

239

chaos, and socialism needs more for its realization than just the suspension of the basallhLX .ll For Dcleuze, however, the attainment of socialism is inherently oowui up with struggle, n i tllis case, the struggle to construct an assemblage that is finally able

to

escape the constraining power of the capitalist state. -The so­

cialist assemblage would be one premised on a counterpower that can be di­ K""Cted against the powers of the state assemblages. And here rhe insight that these state assemblages are not fixities, bllt at best only metastable structures, has the tremendous advantage of allowing the conceptualization of their fun­ damental impermanence. As Brian Massumi points out, if metastability im­ poses order, this order is never more than a contingent arresting of disorder. -nle next (socialist) order will come, unless the apparatuses of the capitalist state are able to continue to forestall its arrival.12 And only a politics (for me a marxist politics though it could well be a politics of a radical bur nonmarxist variety) can put in place the conditions that will allow the supplanting of the apparamses of the capitalist state. We cannot be sure, however, that this strictiy immanentist ontology is compatible with Christianity, which seems to be wedded irreducibly to an ontology of tile transcendent. But the possibility of Christianity's being able to incorporate an ontology of unqualified inunanence s i one that can­ not be ruled Ollt tout court. Or it may be that we cannot after all obviate the transcendent, despite what 1 have argued in this chapter, in which case Christianity's ontological preeminence is guaranteed, as John Milbank and otilers have argued. Either way, we know that it is possible for us to delineate convincingly the terms of a conceptual basis for a notion of liberation tilat is unrelentingly inlllanent. What this actually portends for conceptions of liberation so far premised on the transcendent is really another story. For the moment, the immanent ontology of liberation certainly bypasses liberalism, but, as I noted earlier, we callnot be so certain rilat it does the same with regard to Christianity. The only important consideration here, though, i.� whether this inunaneiU ontology can undergird a marxist conception of Jib­ eration, and regardless of what tins portends for Christianity as an ontology, this is all tilat a philosophical marx ism needs.

240

CHAPTER 9

CHAPTER 10 Models of Liberation V

Nomad Politics

Nomad politics, which can readily be identified with Dclcuzc and Guattari's nomadology, has two primary virmcs.J First, unlike its counterpart politics of rhe e.'(ccprionai (vent (associated n i chapter

8 with the writings of Alain

Badiou), it docs not rely on the extraordinary event to provide a basis for the convergence of collective agents around a project of libcratioll.2 The crowds who seemingly emerged out of nowhere to restore Hugo Chavez [0 the presidency of Venezuela after he had been deposed n i a COllp, or the similar crowds of protesters at several G8 swnmits (these now tend to be held in out­ of-the-way mouIltain or island resorts n i the hope of dlwarting protesters), both constitute nomadic formations whose actions are regarded by some as harbingers of significant futurc political transformations.3 Second, and in a more philosophical vein, nomadology has the great merit of bypassing the problematic of representation identified earlier with dle model of sovereignty underwritten by dle "previous'" politics, that is, the modcJ which requires an orchestration, primarily through the mediation of the state, of the throng of individual wills n i to a single collective will or body politic. As I poi.nted Olit earlier, this assembling of dle hodgepodge of n i dividual wills into "the people," who are then represented by dle sovereign or parliamentary body, is regarded by proponents of this liberal-democratic political tradition as the essential, indeed transcendental condition for effective political action.4 In nomadology, this axiom of liberal-democratic political action is totally dispensed with (since in reality all it dcJivers is a mercJy symboic l "unity in

diversity") because the logic of the nomad's political being cannot but be structurally autopoctic; as I already mentioned, nomadic formations direct themselves according to their own powers and their own histories. It should also be noted tllat overlaps are possible between nomadology and tile fKlli­ tics of the event, this convergence being very evident in the work of Dcleuze and Guattari, for instance, who take nom:ldology to provide the logic for a project of stmggle bm who also accord certain events (e.g., the foundation of the Paleolithic state, May 1968) a decisive fKllitical significance. As we h:lve seen from the disnlssions in the preceding chapters that h:lve focused on the politics of identity, of subjectivity :lnd the place of the sub­ ject, and of the event, tile kinds of reflection embraced by the thinkers placed under tllese mbrics have as their commonproblemati'lue the question of the dl:lracter of political subject in the conjuncture of a "postpoitical" l politics. Postpoitical l poitics l is still :I politics; even in an epoch in which the tradi­ tional medl:lnisms of fKllitical representation (identified n i tllis book Witll the trndition tll:lt extends from Hobbes, via Rousseau and Kant, to Rawls) have been supplanted, there is still the need to ensure the continued produc­ tion of social cooperation, this being an absolute requirement for continued capitalist accumulation. In rhe advanced capitalist economies, :IS was seen in part I, these days tile production of social cooperation is undertaken pri­ marily by tile service :lnd information industries, whose primary aim is the promotion of the m i peratives of c:lpital.

The Production ofSocial Control -nle need to maintain constant control over tile forms of social cooperation in film requires tll:lt education, training, and business never end: tile busi­ ness time scale is now 24/7; tile Tokyo stock e.'(change opens almost as soon

n i an unending cycle, training is "on the job"

as

the one in New York closes

as

opposed to being based on the traditioll3l apprenticeship modd (itself :l

holdover from feudalism), and education becomes "continuing education," that is, sometlling ril:lt continues tluoughollt life and is not confined to those aged six to twenty-two. As I noted earlier, this essentially dispersive pro­ pensity is reflected in the present regime of capitalist accumulation, where production is now metaproduction; that is, in tile advanced economics it is no longer focused on rile use of raw materials to produce finished gOClds, but rather on the sale of service.� (especially in the domain of finance and crcdit) and products that n i volve rultural and symbolic production. Social control

2.p.

CHAPTER 10

is no longer left to schools and police forces, but is now also a branch of mar­ keting, as even politics has become "retail politics," in which politicians seek desperately for an im:lge of themselves, or for some "hot-button" issue, to market to largely passive and apathetic electorates ("Doesn't George \V. Bush look absolutely great in blue jeans?"; "Tony Blair sweats too much when he s i on TV"; "Aren't Sarah Palin's glasses fantastic?"; "Let's have dle Ten Com­ mandments put up in Alabama courthouses"), and when public opinion spe­ cblists and spin doctors (Dick Morris in the case of Bill Clinton, Karl Rove for George W. Bush, Alistair Campbell for Tony Blair) are more important to prime ministers :lnd presidents than are capable and wise civil servants. Recording, whether n i administration or business, is no longer based on the written document kept in the appropriate box of files, but on computerized spreadsheets, bar cOt.ies, and other forms of electronic tagging.s The implications of these developments for sure theory are momentous. -nle state itself has become fragmented and compartmentalized and has :lC­ cmed more power to itself in some spheres while relinquishing power totally in odlers. Blit however much the state has mut:lted in dle era of comrol soci­

eties, it still retains the function of regulating, in conjunction with capital, the ":lccords" that channel social and JXllitical power. In his Leibniz book, Deleuzc m:limains that state and nonstate formations :lre constimted on the basis ofsuch "concerts" or"accords."6 These accords are organizing principles which make possible the grouping into particular configurations of entire ar­ rays of evems, pcrson:lges, processes, institutions, movements, and so forth, such that the resulting configurations become integrated formations. As a set of :lccords or axioms governing the accords that reguhte dle operations of the various components of an immensely powerful and comprehensive system of accwnulation, capital is simated at dle crossing point of all kinds of formations, and thus has dle capacity to integrate and recompose capital­ ist and noncapitalist sectors or modes of production. Capital, the ":lccord of accords" par excellence, can thus bring together heterogeneous phenomena and make them express the same world, that of capitalist accumulation. Accords are constituted by selection criteria which specify what is to be ncluded i or excluded by dle terms of the accord n i question. These criterb also determine with which other JXlssible or actual accords :l particuhr ac­ cord will be consonant (or dissonant). The criteria dlat constitute :lccords :lre usually defined and described by narratives governed by a certain normative vision of tmth, goodness, and beauty (reminiscent of rhe so-called medieval transcendemals, albeit translated where necessary into the appropriate con-

NOMAD rOllTlCS

243

temporary vernacular). A less portentous way of making this point would be to say that accords arc n i herently a.xiological, value-laden. \.Vhat seents to be happening today, and this is a generalization that is perhaps somewhat ten­ dentious, is that these superposed narratives and the selection criteria these accords sanction, criteria which mayor may nO[ be explicitly formulated or entertained, are being weakened or qualified n i ways that deprive them of their force. Such selection criteria, which tend to be policed by the state, usually function by assigning privileges of rank and order to the objects they subsume ("Le Pen is more French than Zidane"; "Turks are not Europeans"; "English is the official language of West Virginia" -the politt� equivalent of "Get out ofhere if you want to speak Spanish at a ,,vest Virginia governmcnt office"), as the loss or attenuation of the customary force of such accords makes dissonances and contradictions difficult or even impossible to resolve, and, correlatively, makes divergences easier to affirm. Events, objects, and personages can now be assigned to several divergent and even incompossible series. The functioning of capital in the control .societies thus requires that the state become internally pluralized. The transcendental principles which subtend the constitution of the social order are embodied n i what Deleuze and Guattari call the socius. in Allti­

Oedipus,

the socius is said to be necessary because desiring-production is

coterminous with .social production and reproduction, and for the latter two to take place desire has to be coded and recoded, so that subjects can be "pre­ pared" for their social roles and flUlCtiom. The socius is rhe terrain of this coding and recoding. Another rationale for the .socius stems from the part it plays in consolidating rhe capitalist order. Desire is simultaneously enabled and limited by capital, which frees it from its previous embodiments or cod­ ings so that it can be placed at the disposal of capitalist expansion; after this decoding bycapital, desire is then reined in or recodL-d so that it can subset\'e the novel requirements of capitalist production. Coding or " n i scription" is thus central to the coustitlltion of the .socius, and Deleuze and Guattari respond to rhe crucial question of the "surface" on which this imcribing takes place by n i voking the notion of the Earth. The Earth precedes the comtitution of the socius and is the primordial unity or ground of desire and production. As such the Earth is rhe precondition of production, while also being the object of desire. The first form of the socius

has therefore to n i volve a territorialization, undertaken by a "territorial ma­ dune," which parcels out rhe Earth into segments of social meaning. Once territorialization has occurred, it becomes possible for social ma­ chines (the core of the socius) to operate. Social machines have humam as 244

CHAPTER 10

dlcir parts and arc essential to the generation of cultural forms, which arc needed

[0

link humans [0 their (teehnic:ll) machines. Social machines orga­

nize flows of power and desire by coding them. -Olere arc all kinds of flows: diffcrent kinds of humans, vegetation, nonhuman 3.nim3.ls, agricultural im­ plemeIl[s, flows dlat involve bodily functions and organs, and so on. Noth­ ing escapes coding, and so nothing can escape the purview of the socius. If the socius is a megamachine (a machine that reguhtes odler machines), the fud that drives dlis machine is desire, dlOugh desire s i sh3.ped and orches­ trated by irs n i sertion into tlus megamadline. In modern societies the nature of tlus insertion of desire into the social megamachine has been significanrly transformed. To facilitate the functioning of c.lpiTalism, flows have had

to

become more .Ibstraet, since in ordcr [0 work "Ipital requires lnrersubsti­ tutabiHty, homogeneity, relentless qU3.lHificarion, and an array of exeh3.nge mechanisms. Hand in hand with rhis 3.bsrraction goes a privatization of the social, sincc a systcmic overvalu3.tion of the individual (" Each and cvery one of ),ou matters to me" is the slogan of thc typical huckstering politician on die campaign tmil) is required

to compensate for tile massive collective dis­

investment that takes place in the social as a rcsult of the inexorable growth of die processes of abstraction. 'nle vehides of this privatization arc mled by the Oedipus principle, which functions as a kind of tr;mscendenral regime for the investmem of social desire. Other principles, prim,lrily eoneeflled with morality and punishmem but also with de.lth :Uld cmdty, arc also effective in [his domain. In dispensing with psychoanalysis as the ontology for this constitution of the socius, Ddeuze. and Guattari find it necessary to replace Freudianism widl another ontology ofsocial constinnion. 111is alternative, called by [hem "schizo.:lnalysis" or "nomadoIogy," begins by refusing any kind of transcen­ dental principle purporting to serve as tile ground of tile socius. In place of the logic of neceSSity and cominuity that char.ICterized previous ontologies of the social, Dclellze and Guattari Opt for one tll;lt is marked by "ruptures,� "[imits: "Singularities," "ironies;' and "eolHingencics." 'nlC traditional logic displaced desire as tllC motor th3.t drives the soci3.1 megamachine, and its rcpbccmellt would have to rcinsull wh;u was pushed aside. Schizoanalysis or nomadology would provide a new conception of c..xperience and desiring­ production, emphasizing forms of experimentation not constrained by tile ego or Oedipal stmcmrcs, as well as tile ne.ed to create new forms of collec­ tive (as opposed to merdy individual) liberatioll. 11lis liberation would not, n i deed could not be sponsored by either tile state or capital.

NOMA!)

rouTlcs

2iS

NOlllatWlogy Using the

i itial template, Ddeuze writings of G eorges Dlimezil as their n

and Gliattari provide a fascinating narrative when addressing thc questi on

of political sovereignty n i the platcau titled "Treatisc on Nomadology."7 In­ voking Dumczil s dualism of thc shaman king and the priest jurist cilCY go '

-

-

,

on to say: Undoubtedly, these twO poles stand in opposition term by term, as the ob­ scure and the dear, the violent and the calm, the quick and the weighty, thc terrifying and the regubted, the "bond" and the "pact," ere. But their oppo­ sition is only rdativc; they function as a pair, in alternation, as though they cxpressed a division of the One or constitutcd n i themselves asovereign unity. "At once antirll(:tical and complementary, necessary to one another and con­ sequently without hostility, lacking a mythology of conflict: each specifica­ tion at anyone Ievd automatically calls forth a homologous specification on another. The twO togethert·.maust me field ofthe function." They arc rlle prin­ cipal dClllcnts of a State apparatus that proceeds by a One-Two, distributcs binarydistinnions, and forms a milieu of interiority. It is a double articulation rllJt makes me State apparatus into a stmtlllll.8 Ddeuzc and Guattari take DumLtzil's pcrsonifications, at oncc complemen­

tary and mutually rcn i forcn i g, of the magician-king and cile jurist-priest to constitutc the two-prongcd function of cilC statc. Thcy also follow Dumczil in opposing tills state apparatus, and thus cilC figures of the magici an-king and cile jurist-priest, the Cowltcrforcc represented by the war machine (the

apparatus typically

oyed by nomads). The respt"Ctive properties pos­

cmpl

sessed by the state appararus and the nomadic war machinc can be tabulatcd in hc t following manner (for these propcrties, sec A Thoustllld PlnUtlllS,

60):

sovereignty (polI!YJir)

WAR MACHINE power (pl/iNlllce)

law

event

fi.xity of Being

ontological innovation

gravity

celerity

me. public

secr«l'

binary distributions

multiple becoming

permanence

evanescence

conservation

power of metamorphosis

STATE APPARATUS

246

CHAPTER �o

352-

milieu of interiority

milieu of exteriority

internal, biuniwxaJ relations

external relations

polsi

nomos

semiology

strategy, pragmatics

"striated" space

"smooth" space

coding and decoding

territorialization and deterritorialization

king, jurist

warrior, prophet

concentration

dispersion

strategies of exelusion

resistance, openness

"arborescent"

"rhiwmatic"

hierarchical

nonhierarchical

identity

transformation

individuality

singularity

false plenitude, empty repetition

facing the \'oid

delimitation

immeasurability

Goethe, Hegel

Kleist, Artaud

apparatuses of power

packs, bands

theorems

problematics

formal concentration of power

solidarity

religion

offenses against gods and priests

harmony

rhythm

architecture, cooking

music, drugs

history

geography

measured time

(cIJYOf/os)

indefinite time of event (aeon)

Egyptian state

Moses

man

"becoming·woman"

Ddeuze and Guattari caution against viewing the opposition between the state apparatus and the nomadic war machine n i strict binary terms: Ibe problem is that the eHeriorit)' ofme war machine n i relation to the State apparatus is everywhere apparent bur remains difficult to conceptualiz.c. It s i not enough to affirm that the war machine is cxternal to the apparatus. . . . \Vhat complicates everything is that this exninsic power of the war machine tends, LUlder cerrain circumstances, to become confused with one of the tWO heads of the Scate apparatus. Sometimes it is confused with the magiC viole nce of the State, at orner times with the State's military n i stimtioll. . . . So there s i a great danger of identifying the structural relation between the twO poles of political sovereignty, and me dynamic interrelation of these twO poles, with me power of war. . . . \Vhcnever the irruption of war power is confused with NOMAD POLITICS

Z-l-7

me line of statc domination, everything gus muddled; the war machine can then be underswod only through the categories ofthe negative, since nodling s i left that rcmains outside the State. Bur, rerurned w its milieu of cneriority, the war machine is seen w be of another species, of anomer namre, of another origin. (355) For Deleuze and Guattari, the law of the state is despotic and priestly n i its most fundamental impulses, and anything like an n i terpellation (admit­ tedly an Aithusserian notion that DdellZe and Guattari would certainly not want w usc) of the subject is perforcc conducted in congruence with those "tl ll .' • orems" sanctioned by the state's despotic and sacerdotal orders, thesc sacred or quasi-sacrcd orders persisting eycn when the polity in question s i a liberal democracy with an accompanying normativity ostensibly resting on entirely secular premisesY Etllico-political subjects n i terpellated in this way will therefore be caught up in a transcendental validation of their sub­ jectiYities; for Deleuze and Guattari, legitimation at the hands of the state always places the subject at the mercy of an arche, or founding principle, that requires dIe citizen to be created in the m i age of the state's figures of sover­ eignty, n i this case dIe overarching despot and priest. The outcome will in any case be a thousand little despots, a dlOusand little priests, all defined as model citizen subjects. Ibe state, in dus account, is the product of thought, in this case a think­ ing which is inextricably linked to a desire dlat for Deleuze and Guattari is ubiguitollS and endlessly productive: "Everything is production: tr0dl/ctiml

ofprodIlCCUJIIS,

of actions and of passions; produccioll

of ncm-ding processcs, of distributions and of co-ordinates that serve as points of reference; prodl/ctiml of collSl/mptiollS, of sensual pleasures, of anxieties, and of pains. Everything is production, since the recording processes arc mmed i iately consumed, im­ mediately consummated, and these consumptions directly reproduced."10 -The implications of dlis position arc profound and radical, and they point to, among other things, a significant difference between a standard and al­ most normative reading of Foucault and the authors of Capitnlislllc ct schizo­

phrenic.

DelellZe and Guattari dearly accord great importance to desiring­

production (as indicated by the passage above). But this undeniable saliency of desiring-production does not translate n i to the primacy of the modes of production as such, which is what one would expect of a more conventional marxist or marxisant t1unking. Instead Deleuzc and Guattari bestow this pri­ macy on the so-called machinic processes, dlat is, the modes of organization that link myriad kinds of "attractions and repulsions, sympathies and antipa-

248

CHAPTER 10

thies, alterations, amalgamations, penetrations, and expressions that affect bodies of all kinds in their relations to one another" (A '17Jo//.Sswd P/atrnlls 90). The modes of production depend on these machinic processes for their constinltion ('1-35). The upshot is [hat the modes of production are always themselves the product or derivation of a ceaselessly generative desire: what enables each mode to be constituted is an always specific, indeed aleatory aggregation of desires, forces, and powers. ·nle organization of productive desire gives the mode of production its enabling conditions, and not vice versa, as is the case in some of the more typical marxisms. In arriving at this formulation, though, Deleuze and Guattari are very much in line with what Marx himself said about the necessity for society to exist before capitalism can emerge in anything like a fully fledged form: a society-state with preexisting surpluses has already to exist if the (capitalist) extraction of surplus-value is to take place. To quote Deleuze and Guattari: "Marx, the historian, and Childe, the archaeologist, arc in agrecmem on the following point: the archaic imperial State, which steps in to overcode agriculrural communities, presupposes at least a certain level of development of these conunwlities' productive forces since there must be a potential surplus capable of constiruting a State stock, of supporting a specialized handicrafts elass (metallurgy), and of progres­ sively giving rise to pubic l nmctions. This s i why Marx links the archaic State to a certain [precapitalist] 'mode of production'" (A "UJOIISfilld Plateaus 428). -The state, in other words, gives capital its "models of realization" (434). But the state that provides capital with the models it needs in order to be effec­ tuated is already functioning even before it manife.�ts itself as a concretely visible appararus. The state, in tillS case the Paleolithic state, destroys or neu­ tralizes the hwlter-gJtherer societies hat t it came to supersede, but before this happens there has to be a necessary point of convergence between the state and the hunter-gatherer troupes. ·nlis point of convergence, which the troupes ward off and anticipate at the same time, designates a situation or space in which, simultaneously, the existing hunter-gatherer formations are dismantled and their successor state formations put in place. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari, tile two sets of formations unfold "simultaneously in an 'archat."Dlogical: micropolitical, micrological, molecular field" (431).11 -nle sute achieves its "actuality" through a comple.x and uneven process .nvolving i the arresting or caging of nonstate formations, so that both state and nonstate formations e.xist in a field of perperual imeraction. This inter­ active field, in the parlance of Dclell7.e and Guattari, is irreducibly "micro­ political" or "molecular," and so sute formations, which for them are quinNOMAD POLITICS

Z4-9

tessentially "macroJXllitical" or "molar," are nor positioned in a field that has already been transformed by the state apparatuses or their prototypes n i to something that is (now) exclusively macroJXllitical or molar. It is virtually an axiom for Deleuzc and Guattari that before, and alongside, the macroJXlliti­ cal there is always the micropolitical. -nle state has perforce

to interact widl

the micropolitical.

-nlis s i at odds with a certain interpretation of Foucault (regarded as the exemplary philosopher of the micropolitical) which views micropolitics

to

be a relatively new development arising more or less strictly in response to forms of power, preem.inently bioJXlwer, that did not ex ist before the onset of the most recent phases of modernity. \Vhile it is not quite elear whether Foucault himself should be saddled with this view, it remains the case that for Deleuzc and Guattari the state apparatuses always emerge n i a "molccu­ Iarized" field that the state never entirely contains or neutralizes. -nle ap­ pearance of the state cannot therefore be the outcome of its own efficacy, of any inherent propensity on its part to generate its own enabling conditions. \Vhatever its powers, autogeny is beyond the JXlwer of the state to accom­ plish. j\1icropolitics have therefore always been antique in it.� provenance, and rhe state came about as an n i vention designed to arrest dlese micro­ political forces. Moreover, as an invention, dle state necessari l y had

to

be

"dlOught" before it could begin to be efiicacious in any social and political field.ll But the state has to deny this irremovable factitiousness of its "origins" and present itself precisely as its "opposite," that is, as an unthought (at any rate where origins arc concerned) : " Only dlOught is capable of inventing the fiction of a State that is wliversal by right, of elevating the State to dle level of de jure universality"

(A -flJollSlllld Plateaus 375). -nlought confers on the

state its character of a singular and universal form, dle fullest c.xpression of the rational-reasonable

(Ie ratioll1ul-raisollllable). The foremost

exponent of

tllis "thought" behind the genesis of the state is of course Hegel, who explic­ itly views the state as the embodiment of the universal, as the realization of reason, and thus as the spiritual community that incorporates all individuals within itself. Against this view, which derives the state from the rational­ reasonable, Deleuze and Guattari hold that it is the rational-reasonable itself that is derived from the state. The state provides the formal conditions for the enactment of the rational-reasonable

(375-76), and thought (as rhe pri­

mary instantiation of dle rational-reasonable) in turn necessarily confers on the state its "reason"

(lui timmer, ncccssairemrllt "raison»; 556 n. p). Reason .

or thought becomes the province of the state in dlis Hegelian (or quasi250

CHAPTER 10

Hegelian) view, and Deleuze and Guattari therefore propose a wresting of thought from the state and a complementary reruming of the state to thought, in the form of an acknowledgment of the state's irreducible fictive­ ness. The archaic state that arose from a recoding of the primitive territorial codes of the hunter-gatherer troupes instituted an organized production as­ sociated with the creation of "a particular kind of property, money, public works" (A 1hollS(llId PfliteallS 448). But this archaic state was not able to pre­ vent a substantial quantity of "decoded flows" from escaping: The State docs not create large-scale

works without a flow of indepemknt

labor escaping its bureaucracy (notably n i memines and in metallurgy). It docs not create the monerary form ofthe tax without flows ofmoney escaping, and

nourishing or bringing imo being orner powers

(notably in conmlercc and

banking). And above all itdocs not create a system ofpublic property without a flow of private appropriation growing up beside it, then beginning to pass beyond its grasp; this private property docs not itself issue from the archaic system but s i constituted on the margins, all the more necessarily and inevi­ tably, slipping through the net of ovcrcoding. -This

(449)

epochal transformation confronted the succeeding state apparatuses

with a new task. Vhere \ the previous state form had to overcode the already coded 110ws of the hunter-gatherer groups, the new state apparatusc.� had to organize conjunctions of the decoded 110ws that had been escaping their ar­ chaic predecessor. These became the appararuses ofa polynucleated and more complex kind of state. But even here the state could not prevent decoded 110ws from escaping (yet again), and the. most recent versions of these flows attained an "abstract," "generalized" conjunction which overturned their adjacent state apparatuses and created capitalism "at a single stroke" (45253). Capital thus represents a new and decisive threshold for the proliferation of flows, and this capitalist "force of deterritorialization infinitely [surpasses1 the deterritorialization proper to the State" (453). But capital's superiority in this regard did not spell the end of the state. Instead, the state wlderwent a further mutation, and the modern nation-state was bonl.

Tile State ami Capital The relation between the state and capital is thus one of reciprocity. Capi­ talism is an " independent, worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or 'megamachine' of which the States are parts or neighborNOMAD POLITICS

251

hoods" (A 77JoIISlilld Plateaus +53). The state form is not totally displaced by the "worldwide, ecumenical organization" of capital, but in its modem manifestation it has become a "model of realization" for capital. As such, it is the ftUlction of each statc today to "[group] together and [combine] several sectors, according to its resources, population, wealth, n i dustrial capacity, etc." (+5+). Under capitalism, the state serves "to moderate rhe superior de­ territorialization of capital and to provide dIe latter with compensatory re­ territorializations" ('+55). llIe state becomes a field for the effectuation of capital, and it does this by reharnessing and reorganizing flows which capital brings together and decomposes (221). Capitalism will even organize and sustai.n states thal are not viable for it.� own purposes, primarily by crush­ ing minorities through integration and c.'\termination (+72). Ihe primacy of capital manifest.� itself at the highest level of abstraction: capital is an interna­ tional organization that can organize with a prodigious resourcefulness the various state formations in ways that ensure their fundamental "isomorphy" (which is not to be confused widl "homogeneity" in Dcleuze and Guattari's scheme). International capitalism is capable of bringing about dIe isomorphy of very diverse forms and their attendant forcc.�. As I noted earlier, Dcleuze maintains that cultural and social formations are constituted on the basis of "concerts" or "accords." 13 These accords or organizing principles make possible dIe grouping into particular configurations of whole ranges of phe­ nomena, such that dIe resulting configurations become integrated forma­ tions. As a set of accords or axioms governing the accords that regulate the operations of the varions components of an immensely powerful and com­ prehensive system of accumulation, capital is situated at the nodal point of a plethora of formations, and thus has dIe capacity to integrate and recompose capitalist and noncapitalist sectors or modes of production.14 Capital, the "accord of accords" par excellence, can bring together heterogeneous phe­ nomena and make them express the same world, that of capitalist accumula­ tion. -Thus in Malaysia, for example, the accord or set of accords that controls the high-tech world of downtown Kuala Lumpur (the location of what was until recendy the world's tallest skyscraper) and the accord (or set of accords) that constitutes the world of Stone Age production to be found among the tribespeople in the interiors of eastern Malaysia (Sabah and SarJ.wak) are not intertranslatable (or not direcdy or immediately so). But what dIe accord of accords created by capitalism does, among myriad odler things, is to make it possible for the artifacts produced by dIe indigenous peoples of these interior regions to appear on dIe tourist markets n i downtown Kuala Lumpur, where 252

CHAPTER 10

they are sold alongside Microsoft software, Sony camcorders, and Macintosh

1'0werBooks. The disparate and seemingly incompatible sphercs of produc­ tion and accumulation reprcsented by downtown Kuala Lwnpur and dIe in­ terior regions of Sabah and Sarawak (which are only about five hundred milcs from Kuala Lumpur)

are rendered "harmonious" by a higher level accord or

concert established by capital, even though the lower level accords remain (qua lower level accords) disconnected from each

mher. Each

lower level

accord retains its own distinctive productive mode and its associated social relations

of production, even as

quite different modes

it is brought

n i to

relationship with other,

and social relations of production

governing ground-level accords)

by

(each widl its

own

the meta- or mega-accord that is capi­

talism in its current world-integrated phase. The concerto grosso brought about by this prodigiously c.xpansive capitalist accord of accords enables the lower level accords to remain dissociated from each other while still express­ ing the same world, the world of dIe current paradigm of:tccumulation. In a country like Malaysia, and indeed anywhere else in the \vorld, every and any kind

of production can thus be incorporated by the capitalist algorithm and

made. to yield a surplus-value. This development has

effectively disma.ntled

the intellectual terms of the age-old debate about precapitalist modcs of pro­

duction and their relation

to

a successor capitalism. -nlis debate was con­

cerned, n i dIe Ill:tin, widl

the putative laws th:tt

of the prec:tpitalist modes

by their capitalist successors, but the qucstion of

underlay dIe supersession

this superscssion h:ts become moot n i the current phase of accumuhtion: as the case of Malaysia illustratcs, the precapitalist modes can continue to exist in precisely that form but at

the same time are inserted into a complex and

dynamic network that ineludcs, n i the spirit of a vast and saturating ecume­ nism,

all the various modes of production, precapitalist

and capitalist alike,

so that they function in concert with each odler, in this way promoting the realization of even gre:tter surplus-values.!5

Accords Accords are

constituted by selection criteria,

which specify what

is

to be

n i cluded or excluded by the terms of the accord in qucstion. ·nlCSe selection criteria are being weakenl-d

or qualified in ways

that deprive them

of their

force. The selection criteria that ground an accord assign privileges of rank and order to the objects

they

subsume ("John McCain is

more American

than Barack Obama"; " Toledo is a qun i tcssentially American town in a way that Miami is not"). The disappearance or we:tkening of the tradi tional criteNO....!AD POLITICS

253

ria that buttressed such accords makes dissonances and contradictions diffi­ cult orcven impossible to resolve; concomitantly, divergences become easier to uphold. Events, objects, and personages can now be assigned to several divergenr and even incompossible series, a phenomenon spectacularly dem­ onstrated by Lautreamont's uncannily surrealistic definition of reality (or beauty) as "the chance encounrer between a sewing-machine and an umbrella on a dissecting-table." Such a Lautreamontean, culwrJ.lly sanctioned disposition in the present day, conducing as it does to a traffic in all kinds of n i compossibilitics and divergences, is becoming increasingly commonplace. As each of us takes the opporrunity to negotiate for the fifteenrh or hundredth or whatever time the several historical avant-gardes, the writings of Borges, cyberpunk, the matrix, and so forth, we become familiarized with the propensities of a Lau­ treamontean con�ciousness in ways not available

to

a learned and cosmo­

politan person living as recently as fifty years ago. 11111s, for instance, we have a whole genre, magical realism, predicated on the logic of incompossi­ bility (something can be a bird and Simon Bolivar at the same time and, even more "implausibly," at the same point in space); tllere is a new technological form based on the same logic (such underwent in his video

·nJrilkr),16

as

the morphing that Michael Jackson

as well as entire schOClis of music which

usc tones in series that escape or block any kind of resolution by the diatonic scale (as in the work of John Cage, Tom Takemitsu, and free improvisational jazz)P Such examples can be multiplied according to one's taste. This pervasive weakening of the force of these "transcendental" accords, and of the narratives and images which sustain them, may be associated with the collapse of a number of once widely entrenched distinctions; the boundaries between public and private, n i side and outside, before and after, political left and political right, and so on have all become difficult, if not impossible, to uphold. In the process, however, accords thus detached from the narratives and other conditions capable of guarJ.nteeing their stability likewise become "impossible." \.Ve may be living in worlds that are no longer predicated on any real need to secure and maintain accords, worlds charJ.c­ terizcd by sheer variation and multiplicity (but still functioning according to an "J..'l:iomatic,

Le., capital, that ensures their fWldamental isomorphism n i the

face of this lUlcontainable diversity), worlds rllat partake of a nco-Barogue perhaps more " tmly" Baroque than its predecessor, as Dcleuze maintains n i his book on Leibniz. Or rather, rllese arc worlds in which the work of accords is now done emblematically and allegorically, so that there is no real

254

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accord for what it is that, say, constitutes "Englishness" (or perhaps more accurately, there is now the realization that our accords determining what it is that constitutes "'Englishness" rest on an ineliminable fictiveness, so that these accords lack any kind of transccndenral legitimation). In the absence of anything approximating to a transcendental backstopping, "being English" can be designated only ascriptively or emblematically, dlat is, nonabsolutely, as when Queen Elizabeth II (who has as much claim to be regarded as Ger­ man) is so easily allowed to "cowtt" as "English," while supporters of the Conservative politician Enoch Powell, a British and n i tellectually upscale version of the polld jaiste Jean-Marie Le Pen, were able to cavil nastily over whether a London-born son or daughter of a Jamaican immigrant could jus­ tifiably be regarded as "English." The ascriptive or emblematic imputation of Englishness would allow it to be placed into at least a couple of divergent series. There would be Enoch Powell's grimly robust and settled series, which would effectively confine Englishness to him and his benighted ilk, but other, more expansive series would count as English the London-born children of Jamaican inunigrants, the half-American Winston Churchill, the Ca.nadian-born English tennis player Greg Rusedski, and the Japanese-born novelist Kazuo lshiguro. Cru­ cial to this more ascriptive way of assigning or determi.ning identities is the abandonment of dIe concept in favor of description (a move delineated by Deleme n i his Leibniz hook). Typically, dlt, specification of an identity re­ quires dlat the identity under consideration be determinate in regard to a concept ("being a communist," "being Irish," "being an economist,'" or what­ ever), a concept whose range of applicability is regulated by certain criteria of belonging. -nlese criteria are motivated and underpinned by accords of the kind described earier, l and the breakdown of these accords means that the concepts they support and organize can be replaced by descriptions. Hence, for example, in place of the concept "being an English person" one could have the descriptions "Queen Eliza.bedl II conducts herselfas an Eng­ lish woman," "Greg Rusedski s i the Canadian-bam teIUlis star who plays for England," "the Japanese-hom anglophone Kazuo lshiguro is a novelist," and so forth. Such descriptions, as opposed to dIe concept " being English," would allow Englislmess to be used ascriptively or emblematically, so that it could be placed, depending on the particular instances involved, n i two or more divergent series. This substitution in principle of the description for the concept would be a not inappropriate way of acknowledging the emergence of a new intellectual and cultural condition (we could call it dIe time after

NOMAD POLITICS

255

the end of the Empire, which is our time undeniably) in which it has become more difficult than ever to claim that there really are transcendental accords

which subtend this or that way of designating Englishness. The worlds opened up by Capitalisme ctschzophrenic i are worlds whose ac­ cords are characterized in very decisive ways by dle kinds of allegorizing and emblematizing propensities just described. "lbese are worlds marked by the "systemic" loss of transcendental accords; dley are worlds that are perhaps seeing the exponential growth of the capacity to accommodate what Deleuze

and Guattari call "dle anomalous" (I'allolllal). The anomalous, n i dleir vicw, "has nothing to do with the preferred, domestic, psychoanalytic individual. Nor is the anomalous the bearer of a species presenting specific or generic characteristics in their purest state; nor is it a model or unique specimen; nor

is it dlC perfection of a type incarnate; nor is it the eminent term of a series; nor is it the basis of an absolutely harmonious corresJXlndence. 1he anoma­ lous is neither an individual nor a species; it only has affects, it has neither

fumiliar nor subjectified feelings, nor specific or significant

characteristics"

(A 'nlol/sand Plateaus 244). -The realm of the anomalous lies between the do­ main of "substantial forms" and that of "determined subjects"; it constimres "a natural play full of haecceiti es, degrees, ntensit i ies, events, and accidents that comJXlse individuations tot"ally different from those of the well-formed subjects dlat receive them" (253).18 ·nle upshot is that each individual is a potenti ally n i finite multiplicity, dle product of a phamasmagoric movement between an inside and an outside.11t All this amounts to dle lineaments of a new and interestn i g theory of the place of the subject in dle cultures of contemporary capitalism. Capitalisme ct

scbwphrinie i approaches this theory of the subjl"1:t via a dlcory of singularity, the category that more than any mher goes beyond the "collective versus individual" dichotomy that is essential to the Hobbes-Rousseau-Hegel tra­ dition of reflection on dle state or sovereign. Ihis account of sn i gularity, and here I must be very brief and schematic, can in turn be connl"1:ted widl the theory of simulation given in Deleuze's Lolliquc dll seIlS and Difference ct

ripitition,

since for Deleuze simulation (or the simulacrum) is the basis of

singularity.lu In a universe of absolute singularities, production can only take dle form of a singularity; each singularity, in dle course of production, can only re­ peat or proliferate itself. In production each simulacrum can only affirm its own difference, its distanciation from everything else. Production, in this account, is a ceaselessly prolf i erative distribution of all the various absolute singularities. Production, in Deleuzc's nomenclamre, s i always repetition of 256

CHAPTER 10

difference, the difference of each thing from every other thing. Capitalism, though, also embodies a principle of repetition. The axiomatic system that is capitalism is predicated on identity, equivalence, and intersubstitutivity (this being the logic of the commodity form as analyzed by Marx). In which case, repetition n i capitalism is always repetition of the nondifferent, or rather, the different in capitalism is always only an apparent different, because it can be overcome and "retlirned," through the process of abstract c.xchange, to that which is essentially the same, the always fungible. Capitalism, as

Capi­

talisllle ctsch:wphrill i ie indicates, effects an immense series of transformations ("deterritorializations"), only to make fKlssiblc more powerful recuperations and retrenchments; it breadles limits only in order to impose its own limits, which it "mistakenly" takes to be coextensive with those of the universe.21 The power of repetition in capitalism is therefore negative, wasteful, and ultimately nonproductive. Capitalistic repetition can therefore be said to be nonbeing n i Spinoza's sense, a conclusion that Delcuze and Guattari do not hesitate to draw. In the scheme of l Apitalisme ct schwphri i lle, i capital is constitlitively lUI­ able to sustain a culture of genuine singularities, even though it creates the conditions for the emergence of a cultllfe that could, with the requisite trans­ formations, mutate into such a culture of genuine singularities, a cultllfe, however, that will necessarily be postcapitalist, which has the capacity to produce such singularities.22 Intrinsic to the notion of a singularity is the principle that a common or shared property cannO[ serve as dIe. basis of the individuation of X from all that is lIot-X: f i I share the property of being over six feet tall with anyone else, dlen that property cannot,

in and

of itself, serve to individuate either

me or that person. A singularity, the being-X of that X dlat makes X different from all that is lIot-X, cannot therefore lUIite X with anything clse. Precisely the opposite:

X is a singularity because it is not united to anything else

by

virtue of an essence or a common or shared nature. A singularity is a dling with all its properties, and although some commonality may pertain to this thing, that commonality is indifferent to it qua singularity. $0 Felix Guattari will have the property "being French" n i common with odler people, many millions of them, in fact. Hut a singularity is determined only duough its relation to the totality of its possibilities, and the totality of possibilities dlat constinltes Guattari is the totality of an absolute singularity. If another being had each and every one of dIe possibilities whose totality constituted and thus individuated Guattari, then that being would perforce be n i distinguish­ able from Guattari . -nlis being and Guattari would be dIe same person. NO....IAD rOLlTICS

257

In a time when transcendental accords can no longer really give us our worlds, Deleuze and Guattari believe we have ro look for worlds that give us a different basis for the construction of solidarities, worlds in which a new kind of politics can find its raison d'etre. -nlis politics will start from the realization that our criteria of belonging are always subject to a kind of chaotic mOlion, that our cultures have always told us an enabling ie l when they denied this, and through this denial have made possible the invention of nation-states, tribes, e1ans, political parries, churches, perhaps everything done up ro now in the name of conmmnity. 'TIle reader of Deleuze and Guat­ tari may have the feeling, both dreadful and exhilarating at the same time, that

that time, the time up ro "now," has begun inexorably to pass.

But we

still need our solidarities, now more than ever. They arc indispensable for any politics capable of taking us beyond capitalism. These solidarities, howe\'er, will be based not on the securing of transcendental accords; capitalism, that most revolutionary of forces, has moved that possibility into desuerude. Our solidarities will be predicated instead on what the reader of DelellZe and Guattari will know as the power of singularity, a power still perhaps in search of its appropriate models of realization.23 Since this politics still awaits its models of realization, the power of sin­ gularity, which despite the absence of these models is still precisely that, a power, can only manifest itself as the wldertaking of a certain risk, rhe "play­ ing of uncertain games," all the things that conduce to the "revolutionary­ becoming" of people who have not yet made the revolution their explicit agenda. What will be the relation of this revolutionary-becoming ro rhl' project of the state? Can the solidarities associated with these singularities be regimented, and thus neutralized, by the state in ways that preempt n i sur­ mountably the prospects of any kind of revolutionary transformation? -The flows of power in the current social and political dispensation are fluid and relatively open, even as they arc JXlwerfully managed and contained by the elites who rule us. 111is development underlies the increasingly wide­ spread perception that governments n i he r advanced industrial countries wield more and more control despite the simultancous prevalence of ide­ ologies of deregulation, privatization, and "getting the government off the backs of the people" (the mantra of Ronald Reagan, among others). And so it looks increasingly as if the notion of representation which made the previous kind of "citizenship politics" possible has now been supplanted, even as the instnnnents which underpin it are treated as sacred objects. There is perhaps no better example of dlis than the. U.S. Constirution, traduced by an ever expanding capitalist depredation even as its traducers profess their undying 258

CHAPTER 10

veneration for this old docllment.24 The blocking of any passage through the philosophy and politics of representation underlying such developments will have significa.nt effects not only on our conceptions of citizenship, but also on our related notions of etlUlicity, race, patrimony, clan, nation, and sovereignty. These notions have deeply ingrained personal resonances that will continue to be felt despite the criticisms directed by philosophers and theorists at the concept of representation. Bur if the philosophy of represen­ tation no longer works, and its limitations are impossible to conceal, what should be put in its place? -nle invention of something different (such as the Delell7.ean notion of a political desire or form of willing based on singulari­ ties not regulated by transcendental accords) to put in place of the system of representations that has governed thinking and practice about ethnicity, race, patrimony, cla.n, nation, and sovereignty, these representations being the cornerstone of the (pist/we or

I1Iwtaliti that has

prevailed since

1776 or

1789 or 1492 (used here as emblematic markers), will have to be an immense collective undertaking, perhaps spanning many generations. 1he core of tltis system of representation is its m i perative that all are required to "belong" in some way or other to the various collectivities superintended by this system's logic. An enabling political desire will free us from the need to continue to make dlis a world where all are required to belong to such collectivities. State power is ofcourse the most significant impediment to tile realization of dlis emancipatory lU1dertaking. The state identifies, COlU1ts, and assigns to its various classificatory systems coundess numbers of human beings, all as part of its admiItistratiye remit, and the pressing question for the Deleuzean aCCOWH of political desire is its capacity to mobilize desire n i ways that make possible an obviation of state power. The world is changing even as we reflect on it. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been largely n i stmmental in the emergence of a U.S. hegemony. As a result, the antagonism between capi­ talism and bureaucratic socialism has been replaced by a range of stmggles among competing brands of capitalism (German social market capitalism, the Blairite Third Way, American free market capitalism, Japanese corporat­ ism, and so on). Here the outcome is still WKertain, as n i dicated by the con­ tinuing world economic stagnation and the wars being fought by the Hush administration and its allies. Despite tltis uncertainty, there are a number of trends in the international system that appear to be fairly consequential. Pre­ eminent among these is a more active role n i this system for regional as well as local states, and tllese are being accompanied by new stmctures of cultural identification that are tied to regions or subregions radler than nation-stares (such as tile various "separatisms" associated with tile Basques, Catalonians, NO.\IAD rOLlTICS

259

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ing autonomously of dle state system, will furnish the stimulus for adopting a different kind of allocation strategy, one premised on a (selective) delink­

ing, and embarked upon with the PurfXlsc of transmuting the state apparatus (sinct� the state is the institutional asscmblage that has final control of the regime of groWdl, and indeed there can be no properly constituted regime of growth without the involvement of the state). 1he first priority therefore

is a "'destatized" collective national liberation project, the success of which will then lead to a reconstitution of the state itself. Most c.\:isting propos­ als for economic and fXllitical reform in the less-developed countries view the reform and reconstitution of the state

as

the principal objective whosc

attainment will then lead to a whole range of other benefits ("efficient" eco­ nomic development, protection of hwnan rights, the upholding of democ­ racy, etc.). This is to put the proverbial cart before the horse, since in many

lDGS the state is merely an instmment at the disposal of the mling elite (who tend n i variably to be the recipiems of the substantial personal benefits to be derived from subservience to the Washington consensus). It will therefore be necessary to have an alternative and non-state-oriented base within the

lDGS in question from which the project of state reform can be initiated and sustained.

CnfJitalislllc ctschi:wphrinic s i perhaps best viewed as a compendium of po­ litical knowledge, nonmolar and nonarborcscent in aspiration and plltative scope, which furnishes axioms for the pursuit of the revolutionary project of surmounting capitalism. Dcleuze and Guattari insist dlat there are no pregiven laws to shape or entail this olltcome; only struggle, and failures always accompany successes in struggle, can do this. The only other alter­ native is acceptance of the current finance-led, equity-based growth regime with its concomitant American hegemony and continuing worldwide eco­ nomic polarization. -nlis line of argument is taken up in chapter 11, where I argue that the poorer countries have no option but to choose a strategy of sclective "delinking" from dle econom.ics of the metropoitan l center.

NOMAD ['oliTieS

261

CHAPTER 11 The Possibility of a New State II Hcterotopill

V\'here discussions ofutopia arc concerned, rhe warning given by M. I. Finley s i particularly apt: "Ever since Thomas Morc gave the world the word Utopia early in the sixteenth century, a scmamic duster has grown rOllnd it, or per­ haps I should say a spectrum of meanings, of great range and complexity, and of no little confusion." I Consideration of the notion of utopia, bodl as a concept designating a particular kind of reflection ("thinking about a bener future;' "thought that confounds social pessimism;' "thinking that neces­ sarily involves the criticism of ideology" ), or as the more or less practical implementation of some scheme or blueprint for a Dener world ("concrete utopia," "rhe utopian design of institutions"), tends to be conducted in terms of one tense ("the future") and one modality ("the possible" as against " the impossible" or "absolutely unrealizable"). 'A'hen cast in these terms, the concept of utopia is marked by a temporal specification signaling a radical break between an existing state of affairs and one that is still to be realized: the time that is properly utopian is always the time lifter some previous time deemed to be nonutopian. If this is not the case, then the utopian is glossed n i terms of a IIOW that is so completely ade­ quate that it CMUlot be improved upon or superseded n i some fundamentally dec isive way. In the ianer casc, the parrent of temporality is admittedly some­ what altered, but its import remains the same; that is, when the present is re­ garded as an apotheosis or culminating point, we can hope only to maintain i[ in its present form, in which case any transformation of an ex isting state of affairs can amount only to a decline or fall from this current state of supreme

exeellence, and so in principle the furore can only continue to be " the same" as the present or else amount

to

a decline or worsening in relation to the

present. In both cases, however, and this is the crucial POilU, a gJP is neces­ sarily posited between a better or best possible state and a worse or worst possible state. In the one case the putatively good state exists n i the future (in which case the better or best possible state is yet to come), and n i the other it exists now (in which case the furore cannO[ be the sphere in which any real improvement occurs and is more likely than not to be regarded as dystopian). -These propositions are clearly exemplified in the following quotation from Oscar Wilde's essay Tbe SOli! ofMall lllldcr Socialsm, i so famous that it appears as

a motto on nearly every website dealing with the subject of utopias: "A

map of the world that does not include Utopia is nO[ worth even glancing at, for it leaves om the one country at which hlUnanity is always landing. And when Humanity lands there, it looks out, and seeing a better country, sets sail. Progress is the realisation of Utopias."2 Implicit in \Nilde's characterization is the proposition that utopia is a des­ tination to be arrived at or moved toward, and that this movement is ine.,tri­ cably linked to a certain conception ofprogress, so that "landing" necessarily takes the form of a progression from one state or condition to another, with the clear implication that the preceding state is ostensibly a less gexld "coun­ try" than its successor, the place or condition of plenitude or perfection. Regardless of what may be said ahom this narrative of progress canvassed by Wilde, utopia is constmed in it as a "departure" made from a place or occasion that is qualitatively n i ferior to the subsequent place or occasion of "landing." -The assumption at work in this somewhat commonplace logic of the utopian is that of an inverted relation to the situation of a currently exist­

ing society, so that tile utopian is depicted by the adherents of this logic as a state of affairs necessarily involving m i provements upon existing social ar­ rangements, or, even more rJdically, the pursuit or implementation ofutopia

is thought to require the complete overturning of these arrangements in their present form.3

Utopa i l'erstlS Heterotopia? -The question of tile relation of the utopian to existing social forms has been a ve.\:Cd one throughout tile history of utopian thought. An interesting com­ parison can be made between the respective positions of Finley and Foucault . Finley, who concludes his essay with Wilde's declaration "A map of the world that does not include Utopia is not worth even glancing at," clearly endorses 266

CHAPTER U

the logic of the utopian just mentioned, with its emphasis on the inextri­ cable bond between thl' utopian and conceptions of social progress. Fou­ cault, by contrast, arguccl in his litde essay on "heterotopias" dtat utopias, unlike heterotopias, arc "fundamentally unreal spaces."4 Finley, in contrast­ ing the notion of utopia widl myth (such as the myth of a Golden Age or a Garden of Eden), maintained dlat utopia has a practical and aerive relation to "reality," and that

this

relation is cnldal

to

any

transforming

influence

that the utopian imagination may have upon existing social formations.s Foucault has a quite different emphasis, and characterizes heterotopic places as "real places-places that do exist and that are formed in dle very founding of society-which arc something like countersites, a kind of effectively en­ aered utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within dle culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. Places of this kind arc outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. . . . Between utopias and these quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience" (24). Foucault's paradigmatic example of the heterotopic site, "a mixed, joint experience," is the mirror. Giving a twist to the Lacanian thesis of thl� mirror stage, as well as Merleau-Ponry's concept of a "chiasmic" stmctllre which enables beings to "slip into each odler;' and merging these n i sights with the kernel of Bataille's notion of a "heterology" to form what he calls a "hetero­ topology," Foucault writes: The mirror s, i after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. I sec myselfthere where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a SOrt of shadow that gives viSibility to

myself, that enables me to sec myself there where I am absent: such is the

utopia of the mirror. Bur it is also a hcterotopia n i so far as the mirror does c.xist n i reality, where it exerts a son of coumeraetion on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Starti.ng from this gaze thar is, as it were, directed roward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; J begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute. myself there where J am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when J look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, cOllilected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be percclved it has to pass through this virtual point whi.ch s i over there. (2_1.)6

Hl:.'EROTOPIA

1.67

111e heterotopia idenrified by Foucault in this passage is notable for the way it is premised on a particular conceptllalization of the relation or passage between an "inside" and an "outside" that transcends, even while working its way through, the dichotomy betwcen the real and the unreal. At work here, therefore, is a certain conception of the modal category that bypasses

l'irtllnl, which functions as a

dlt� relationship of conrraricty typically said

to c.x ist between the JXlssible and the acmal (and about which more will be said shortly). At dle heart of this passage bctween the inside and the outside is a move­ ment between a succession of images, in this case dle various m i ages of one­ self "over dlere" n i the mirror (rhe outsidc) and dle complementary images of oneself "over here"

(dlC insidc). TItis movement or oscillation between

these sets of images is really a movcment between perspectives, at each of which a particular ensemble is constructed out of these images by the per­ ceiver? "Heterotopia" is thus the name of the orchestrating principle which links these perspectives into an amalgam that makes it possible for thcir as­ sociated ensembles to be enfolded into each other, dlis cnfolding being the outcome of an organization of forces in the perceptual field that results n i the concretely indivisible composite that s i "1." More generally, and taking into account forms of organizing forces that have nothing specifically to do with perception, dlis organization or process is precisely what generates the structural "site" of this or th:lt heterotopia. A radical constructivism there­ forc underies l Foucault's characterization of heterotopia, and this construc­ tivism is generalized by him to encompass all heterotopias, and not just those manifestations of heterotopia in dlC domain of perception.8 Heterotopias JXlssess a modality, that of the virtual, which is quite differ­ ent from dle modality characteristic of utopia; utopia belongs in principle to the realm of a possibility that, qua pnre possibility, awaits its JXltential actu­ alization in some future, a fumre that will come to be utopia's presem when this acmalization in fact takes place. Unlike the purely JXlssible, however, the virtual is real, bur somewhat like the possible, it is not actual (although it does not share any other properties with the possible). Only a state of af­ fairs which had been possible can be actual; the virtual, by contrast, s i a pute exteriority that is adjacent to, and inextricably bound up with, all elements n i the actual, while not in any way partaking of dle acmal. 111e acma] acts on the virtual, since the virtual constitutes a basis for the emergence of dle sin­ gnlarities which manifest the virtual in dle domain of dle actualY TIle event from which a singularity (which, as a singularity, s i neither individual nor personal) comes to exist eludes its manifestation in that singularity even as it 268

CHAPTER 11

is brought to expression in it; here Deleuze and Foucault adhere to the Stoic doctrine which affirms that the event is real without being acmal. The virtu­ ality that is heterotopia takes shape when a world s i constimted by a certain ontological genesis. A measure of philosophical abstraction is unavoidable in providing a description of this ontological genesis, but since the structure of heterotopia is rooted in the strucmre of this ontological genesis, this de­ scription must be a part of the delineation of the heterotopic place.

Olltological Gmesis and the Structllre ofHeterotopia: Sollie Ideas of Gilks Deleuze A world exists when it can be populated by olle or more singularities.lO These singularities, which are potentially infinite n i number, are selected as a result of an operation in whic h a singular point is extended to encompass a range of "normal" points. l11is extension occurs wltil another threshold ofsingularity is encountert'd, and a world s i constituted and actualized when tills and other

singularities extend over that particular range of normal points. Singulari­ ties are ac[Ualized in a world, and also in the individuals who belong to that world. Ihese modes of acrualization are several, according to Deleuze: "To be actuali7.ed or to actualize oneself means to extend over a series of ordinary points; to be selected according to a rule of convergence; to be incamated in a body; to become the state of a body; and to be renewed locally for the sake of limited new acrualizations and c.xrensions" (110).11 \\'hat is actualized is also expressed, and what is c.xpressed is a world that is composed of "differ­ ential relations and of contiguous similarities" (111). At this point Deleuze introduces the Ldbnizi:m idea of an illcompossibility. According to DelellZe, a world is formed when a series depending on a particular singularity con­ verges with a series which depends on another singularity; this convergence then defines compossibility. Conversely, when the series in guestion diverge, another world emerges, one thar is incompossibk with the first. The concept of incompossibility cannot be derived from the notion of contradiction: the state of affairs in which George W. Bush does sanction the occupation of Irag is incompatible with the one in which he does not sanction the occupa­ tion of Irag, not because these two propositions contradict each other, but precisely because of the n i compossibility that obtains between the world in which Bush sanctions the invasion of Irag and the one in which he does not. Hence when one of these worlds is acmaIi7.ed, the other state of affairs can­ not arise, and vice versa. But it is entirely a matter of political and historical contingency whether or not Bush sanctions the invasion of Irag; hence the HI:."TEROTOPIA

269

ProfXlsitions expressing these two states of affairs

arc

not logically contra­

dictory. Though of course once one of these worlds is actualized (in this case the one in which Bush d&s sanction the occupation of Iraq), the other (in tillS case the world in which Bush does

'lOf sanction tile occupation of Iraq)

cannot be brought to the point of actualization. This stmcture of incompossibility aL<;() governs the emergence or onto­

logical genesis of the heterotopian situation. -Thus the world n i which Bush does not (or better still, is unable to) sanction tile invasion of Iraq is hetero­ topian with regard to rhe world, which happens to be the actual world, in which he does have this capacity (and did in fact choose to exercise it). The

form of this ontological genesis s i quite different from the form that sub­ tends the emergence of utopia. As was seen earlier, the proponents of utopia typically vicw it as a destination to be arrived at or moved toward,

so

that

this movement is inc.'\tricably linked to a certan i conception of "'progress." "ille premise behind this somewhat commonplace logic of the lltopian is that

utopia stands in an inverted relation to a currently existing (nonuropian) situation. Hy contrast, the notion of heterotopia makes no such presump­ tion of this inverted relation to the acrually existing world or any state of affairs

in tilis world. In fact, Foucault's characterization of the heterotopic

place as a "mixed site" in which a virtual element contends with an element that happens to have been acrualized is an apt description of this ontologi­

cal genesis. In the case of tile Bush-sanctioned n i vasion of Iraq, there was a pon i t at which the world in which Hush sanctioned this invasion and the one in which he did not were both actualizable. It is now widely agrel-d that any

refusal on rhe part of Tony Blair to be Hush's accomplice in this invasion, combined WitilleSS pliable dispositions on the part of the U.S. Congress and the United Nations (What if many more countries in the Security ('-<mncil

were able in the end to share tile position of the skeptical French?), as well as outright hostility ftom the Arab world to the prospect of an American n i vasion (What if every Arab country followed the c.'\ample of Turkey n i not allowing its territorial space to be used as a springboard for the American invasion?) would have created a political situation in which an American

nvasion i of Iraq would have been difficult to mount for obvious political and strategic reasons. Over time, however, the series constituted by these

putative events (which of course did not transpr i e) diverged from rhe series associated with Bush's s anctioning of the n i vasion of Iraq. In a word, tile two worlds in question came to be incompossible. Before this, though, there was

a period of fXllitical contestation which, in slightly different circumstances, such as tile subsequently preempted mobilz i ation of the forces potentially 270

CHAPTER U

opposed to the Bush administration's invasion, could have resulted in the actualization of the world, a properly heterotopian world, in which Bush would not have been in a position to sanction an nvasion i of Iraq. Why is this heterotopian ontological genesis seemingly so important for political thought? In thinking about this question, we have to ask f i it is not indeed the case that the heterotopian ontological genesis invoked here has a counterfacmal stmcture which, given rhe essential namre and function of coullterfactual strucmres, can only be seen to be as constitutively " unreal" as the very utopian stmcture being challenged here.12 Any significant argumem on behalfof the notion ofthe heterotopian thus has to reckon in someway with dIe theoretical contours of dlis counterfacmal stmcture. In dIe case of heterotopia, the putative heterotopian state of af­ fairs, though real and existing, nonedleless functions as a kind of cowltersite to the domain of the actually existing (here I follow Foucault to the letter), and can therefore be appropriately c."pressed by a coullterfacmal condition of the following kind: "If this heterotopia (i.e., this cOlUltersite) existed, dlen George W. Bush would not be made president." Again, it is possible for the antecedem of dlis conditional to be accepted as true ("Heterotopia exists") and the consequent nonetheless to be rejected ("If heterotopia existed, then George W. Bush would [still] be made president"). Of course it would be logically impossible to affirm both these consequents simultaneonsly, since the consequent of dIe following statement is clearly contradictory: "If this heterotopia existed, then George W. Bush would not be made president

and George W.

Bush would (still) be made president." Bm no affirmation

of heterotopia in itself enables us to determine which particular wing of this consequent is tme or likely to be true. Of course, dIose inclined to accept dlat heterotopia is by its very nature oppositional and counterhegemonic would n i all probability be inclined to say that, given the kind of policies he espouses, George \V. Bush would not really be in a position to be made presi­ dent if (this) heterotopia existed. But there is a flUldamenral undecidability n i this counterfacmal stmcture dlat Foucault himself never addressed in his essay on heterotopia: dIe affirmation made with respect to a particular sima­ tion dlat it constitlltes a heterotopian state of affairs does not in itself enable us to claim that it has this or that character n i any strict or c."clusive way. In this respect the heterotopian structure is wllike iL� utopian counterpart, in­ asmuch as utopia, by virtue of its defining logic of rhe n i ve.rted relation in re­ gard to the real world, is able to possess a rather more specific character than the ostensibly heterotopian space docs. In a utopian world, or at any rate for most of those who arc disposed to believe that such a world falls widlin the HETEROTOI'IA

271

limits of conceivabi l ity, George W. Bush would lIot be made president. That is to say, when identifying a utopian space, one would have

to profess dlat

utopia requires that George \V. Bush not be made president, or else (and one can imagine a fervent Bush supJXlrter saying this) one would say that Bush's being made president is absolutely compatible with, or is indeed required by, rhe affirmation of utopia. (Granted that the laner state of affairs is less likely to happen than the former, especially since supporters of the Repub­ lican Party tend to view utopias as being of interest only

to

communists,

dreamy idealists, charlatans, and so forth.) Heterotopia, by contrast, seems to be much more amorphous: its constitution cannot be specified through

the operation of dialectical negation in the way that is constimtively dIe case

widl dIe. inve.rted relation of dIe utopian condition. $0 how arc we to idcntify the lineaments of the heterotopian "space," given its inability to determine n i anydling like a precise way dIe chara.cter of a particular and specific political orientation?

Huerotopiall Space? In the heterotopian space, it is transparently obvious that there is no such thing as a sn i gle or straightforward relation of this space

to the real world.

-This is dear from FOUC:lult's description of what he calls "heterotopology," when he says of tllis "simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live" that "there is probably not a single culmre in tile world that fails to constitute heterotopias. This is a constant of every group" (24). What is said here of heterotopia calUlOt be :lffi.rmed with regard to utopia, no matter how elastic a definition of utopia is espoused, since it s i

obvious that the utopian imagination is fairly strictly confined to the modern period n i \Vestern thought, representing as it does the core of a secularized version of Judeo-Christian eschatology.L3

Foucault categorizes heterotopias into two basic kinds. On the one hand, there are "crisis heterotopias," loc:lted in "privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation

to

society and to thl'

human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, men­ stmating women, pregnant women,

the. elderly, etc." (24). He goes on to

say: In our sOcicry, these crisis hcrerotopias arc persistently disappc:tring, though a few remnants

can

Sti!! be found. For c..xample, the boarding school, in its

ninerecmh-century form, or military service for young men, have cCfninly

272

CHAPTER 11

played such a role, as the first manifestations of sexual virility were n i fact

supposed to take place "e!sewhere" than at home. For girls, there was, until the middle of the twentieth-century, a tradition called the ""honeymoon trip" which was an ancestr.tl theme. 1he young woman's deflowering could take place "nowhere" and, at the moment of its occurrence the train or hOl1ey� moon hote! was indeed the place of this nowhere, this hncrotopia without markers. (24-2S)

Ihis accowlt of the crisis heterotopia depict.� it as a kind of liminalspJ.ce, very much akin to the sense of Iiminality lllJ.de well-known by Victor Turner, that is, as a situation in which a decisive threshold comes to be crossed, so that at the point of crossing the n i dividual involved is betwixt and between, ncither what he or she had been but still not yet what he or she is in the process of becoming. ·The liminal space is the place where identities arc dissolved and reconstiruted.14 Contrasted with the crisis heterotopia is the "heterotopia of deviation," in which " individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the re<Juired mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and ps),chiatric hos­ pitals, and of course prisons; and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on dle borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopb of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, bm is also a deviation" (25). Other examples of heterotopic spaces given by Foucault J.re the utopian colon)" dleaters, cemeteries, cinemas, gardens, saWlas, motels, and holiday resorts. It is fairly obviolls that these heterotopic zones arc not necessarily political (though n i fairness it ha� to be acknowledged that Fou­ cault himself does not maintain that dley are intrinsically political); some such zones may be, but it is hard to conceive of the typical retirement com­ munity e1ustered around a golf course or a Club Med resort as a location where any kind of immediately recognizable or concerted political activity is likely to take place.IS 1he space of heterotopia is preeminently a space where what Foucault calls "local strategies" prevail, and while his emphasis on dle breaching of norms is evident n i his delineation ofheterotopia, dlis emphasis does not 011 its own signal the crucial or indispensable presence of political activity on dle part of the inhabitants of that heterotopia. It is hard to deny that the transgression of norms, in itself, can be merely reactive or amount to no more than a gesrnrc of consolation motivated by feelings of disem­ powerment and nihilistic rage, rather than any real sense that the society in <Juestion can be decisively transformed on a more or less systematic scale. What needs to be added to this conception of heterotopia f i it is to be HETEROTOPIA

273

tilted conceptually in dIe direction of a systemic transformation of society as a whole, that is, the understanding of emancipation or liberation presup­ posed by a less orthodox marxism? (We need to leave open here dIe real pos­ sibility that Foucault was himself the adherent of a "deviant" marxism.) In other words, the notion of a heterotopia is not in itself essentially po­ litical or apolitical; rather, a putative heterotopia would be in a position to warrant this appellation of "the political" f i and only if certain other condi­ tions, to wit, those warranting this appellation, happen to enable the hetero­ topia in question. -nlere is an irreducible contingency that attaches to the notion of a heterotopia, and the question of a heterotopia's being political is one that can be resolvet.i only if the underlying conditions for dlis hetero­ topia are in themselves political. But what would have to be in place for a heterotopia to be political in this more robust sense? Moreover, what would be the nature of the sl""emingly deviant marxism, whether faithful to Foucault or not, that kept open a place for this politically inflected heterotopia?

Reverse Ormatioll allli the Place ofHeterotopia If we retum to dIe norion of the heterotopian as something that is virtual rather than actual, it will be possible to acknowledge dlat a heterotopian reality would be incompossiblc widl respect to dIe world, the actual world n i dlis case, in which it is possible for hundreds of millions to go hungry, to face diseases that are eradicable, to suffer in wars that need nor be fought, to toil n i conditions that amount to a modern serfdom, or, in the example cited earlier, a world in which it is possible for George W. Bush to be made president. This incompossible world, real bllt alas not yet actual, would be one in which none of these things would be tolerated or couiUenanced; that is, it would be a reality in which dlerewas a determined and wholehearted at­ tempt on the part of governments, international agencies, and private orga­ nizations to provide the mass of human beings with fexld, jobs, relative peace and a guarantee of personal security, reasonably adequate health provision, passable housing and shelter, a minimum level of education, and living envi­ ronments dlat arc not inimical to human well-being. 10 ask where we would find this hererotopian world is somewhat misleading, in that the question presumes that there is, in actuality, a specific place where George W. Bush cannot be made president, where there are enough jobs and food for tht, mass of impoverished human beings, and so on. Blit it is evident that no such place is to be found on any significant scale, at least not in the acmal world. However, if we make the assumption that this virmal world, incompossible 274

CHAPTER 11

with the acmal world, though it is real, is nonetheless prevented from actu­ alizing itself, then we make dle kind of claim that is common in certain fields of physics, biology, and economics which entertain rhe notion of a reverse causation. To be more specific: in a reve.rse causality, an event located in the future can act on the present, or the present can act on the past. This nms counter to the traditional image of the "arrow of time," in which dle flow of events is always from past to present to future, with present becoming past as the fumre becomes present. There arc numerous rationales for reverse causation. One is mathematical, as c.xemplified in Henri Poincare's recurrence dll"r "O em, according to which any isolated dynamic system whose total energy is un­ changed will return arbitrarily in time to one of its initial sets of molecular positions and velocities; thus no process is irreversible, and so in time (i.e., given a very long time) the coffee spilled on my jacket will return to the cup that cOIUained it, and the Iiguid coffee now returned to its cup will in mm decompose into its initial components of coffee beans, grains of sugar, and powdered milk.!" Anodler case comes from economic dleory, where Pardla Dasgupta and others have sought to address the well-known conundnun of the relation between environmental despoliation and poverty. While it can be IXlstulated that a significantly degraded environment will conduce in all probability to greater poverty on dIe part of its in.habitants, the reverse causa­ tion also holds, inasmuch as the poor are often more likely to degrade the natural enviromnent in their guest for dle mere necessities of life, by raiding forests for firewood, practicing slash-and-burn cultivation, and so on.17 In the case ofdle political domain, the action of a reverse cause takes place when some ostensibly "future" state of affairs, the comnllUlist revolution, say, is warded off n i the present by the forces dKlt keep capitalism in place. If the forces responsible for maintaining capitalism weakened or were displaced in some other way, then, all else being egual, the conununist revolution would no longer be impended. Hence dle. state of affairs known as "communism" is already anive, it preexists, even dlOugh its acmalization

can

lie only n i

some as yet unspecified future, because even as dlis future evem it represents a limit for the expansion of capitalism. Capitalism is what it is precisely be­ cause it has to be organized in such a way that it can keep at bay those forces which,

if dley arc not weakened or dissolved by already c.xisting capitalism,

would bring about dle conmmnist revolution. The revolution, which is yet to occur, is already active as a reverse cause that already existing capitalism

has to contend with, and dispel with some succc.<;s, if capitalism is to continue to exist.!8 HETEROTOP!A

275

Vhere \ the principle of heterotopia is concerned, the notion of a reverse cause can be invoked to suggest that heterotopia, though not actual, is none­ theless the siruation that capitalism has to ward off in order to continue to be what it is today. So heterotopia is active as the virtual but "inacmal" state whose explosiveness capitalism has to contain and neutralize, since failure to restrain the potentially irruptive fKlwer of heterotopi:t would result in thc demise of capitalism. But capitalism continues to be what it is, it retains its efficacy, precisely because it has been able to construct the right kinds of mechanisms to keep heterotopia (rcvolution, in other words) at bay. Hetero­ topia is thus integral to the operation of capital, to its self-organization, since without heterotopia capitalism calUlOt exist. The capitalist order s i an effect that has heterotopia as its cause, though the btter is virtual and nor yet acruaJ.11> llle hcterotopia in which George W. Bush calUlOt be made president, in which jobs and food are available for those whose lives are for now destroyed by poverty, and so forth, enables capitalism to be what it is by stimubting a capitalist cowtterpower to the heterotopian situation that would be actual were it not for dIe exercise of this baneful counterpower. -nlis ontology of heterotopia,

if one can call it that, in turn facilitates a

counterpart epistemology of dIe revolutionary event. It docs not do dlis by placing at our disposal "knowledge" of what s i going on in the hearts and minds of some future revolutionary subject (this would be a kind of bad utopianism!) or rhe hidden dimensions of a fKlit l ical process, but rather by furnishing a reason whose primary dleoretical operation is fundamentally that of a subtraction. \.Vhat, bit by bit and hert' and there, do we nl'Cd to do in order to take away from capitalism that which makes it fKlssible for it to be so pervasively efficacious: This is perhaps the question par excellence dlat is fKlsed by this application of the notion of a reverse causality. Broaching in rhe way that we have done here the question of marxism's fundamental because constituting relation to the project of liberation (i.e., heterotopia's raison d'ctre) in turn JXlses the question of marxism's position in regard to the supersession of capitalism, since it s i axiomatic for all schools of marxism that liberation inc.xtricably involves a countervailing action di­ rected at the capitalist system of production and accumubtion. But doesn't capitalism c.xercise its dominance in many modes and at many levels, not all of which give the appearance of being commanded by the forces and agents of capitalism? Can't it plausibly be presumed, moreover, that specifically anticapitalist stmgglc.� are not the only ones germane for dIe construction of heterotopia?

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As I argued earlier, it is a mistake to assume that anticapitalist struggles require one to dc-emphasize or disregard struggles in mher contexts not typically associated with forces and formations integral to capitalism, such as struggles for gender and racial equality and campaigns against discrimina­ tion based on sexual oriCllt"Jtion. Heterotopia needs these kinds of struggle just as much as it needs anticapitalist struggles, even f i one acknowledgc.s that anticapitalist struggles have a catalytic effect on these other kinds of struggle. Ihere are those who will argue that mas.<; movements with an emancipatory, and thus c..xplicitly or implicitly hererotopian intent existed long before the emergCllce of tile capitalist system. Ihe implication is that marxism, whose raison d'ctre is overwhelmingly the critique of capitalist political economy, is not sufficiently encompassing as a result of this singular and restricted focus to do real justice to tllc.se precapitalist radical alternativc.s and the varied hererotopian movements that were tllcir vehiclc.s. Heterotopia has always existed, even in precapitalisr formatioIlS.2(1

Arrivil!9" at Heterotopia Here it s i perhaps best to begin by discussing a specific example regarding the economic delinking of the so-called peripheral capitalist economics from those at the metropolitan core (a position endorsed in chapters

of

and 5). I

argued tllat one of the distinctive features of the CUffCllt globalized world­ system is a bllfgeoning of financial markets and financial capital, and that this is where the newest versions of primitive accumulation arc taking place. In the past primitive accwIlulations tended to take the form of a movement nto i precapitalist formations, subsuming them in the procc.ss under tile logic of capitalist accumulation and production by taking advantage of doci l e and often newly proletariani7.ed labor forces, in this way making it possible for these newly capitalistic economic.s to yield sllfplus value for those who "in­ vest" in them. By conrrast, n i the current regime of accumulation dominated by financialization, primitive accumulation takc.s place when cOllIltrics tllat arc already capitalist, but that arc usually located in the "semiperiphery," free up thcir already capitalist economic.s by opening tllem to overseas financial markets based overwhelmingly n i New York, London, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore (bllt especially New York and London). -nle first movers into a new financial market tend to accrue higher returns than latecomers. Ihis is the absolute basis of financializcd primitive accumula­ tion: tile brokers and invc.stors who pioneer a ncw market can reap benefits

Hl:.""TEROTOPIA

277

that will not be available to market actors who come after the first-comers. This development has taken place without the proletarianization required of earlier primitive accumulations. At the same time we have seen that these new financializcd regimes bring very few benefits to the countries who have freed up their economies in this way. Financial markets constrain home government economic policy, since these governments arc c.xpected to promote n i vestor confidence by ensur­ ing fiscal solvency, keeping n i flation low, and adopting investor-friendly monetary fKllicics (these measllfes being sanctioned by the prevailing neo­ liberal consensus upheld by the U.S. government, the

1MI',

and the World

Bank). Government noncompliance with what financial markets want can be severely punished. I·fence in 2002 n i terest rates on Bra7il's public debt rose to prohibitive levels as it looked increasingly likely that the left-wing candidate Lula would be elected president. (Some skeptics would say that Lula ceased to be left-wing the moment he was elected.) Speculators with­ drew from the Brazilian real and its bond markets, and Br:l7il's credit rating was downgraded to the levels of Nigeria and Argentina. In the end Brazil had to seek an

1.'.11'

bailout and implement the austerity measures typically

required by the 1MI' as a condition of granting a loan. As Dani Rodrik, from whom the example of Brazil is taken, points out, "Investors were in dlCct telling the electorate: you have the vote, but we have the ability to cmsh the economy. Once elected, Lula was faced with a choice between exacerbating the financial crisis or outdoing the financial conservatism of his predecessor. He chose the latter."21 As we have seen, cOllntries yielding to the mles of this neoliberal consen­

SlL�

on open financial markets are usually subjected to chronically unstable

inflows and outflows, as well as debt spirals. A heterotopia for countries like Brazil in 2002 (and now) would be one in which they are no longer dra­ gooned by this destmctive financial system. Achieving this would require a considered withdrawal from the deleterious aspl"cts of a global market sys­ tem that impoverishes huge numbers of Brazilians, a course of action not without its own risks and costs. Bur there are no clear benefits for Brazil from continued participation in internationally integrated financial markets. To quote Rodrik:

The net benefits of the "busincss-as-usual" strategy are quite unclear. . . . Under current mles of good behaviour, these countries are effectively pre­ cluded from raking on additional debt anyhow -removing the main benefit of financial integration even if one assumes that capital flows wi!! revive soon.

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Many of tht.:m arc t.:ngagt.:d in highly eoscly sdf-insuraIKt.: e/fons, which would 110[ be necessary f i there were reduced financial openness. Forexampk, a com­

mon strategy is to build up foreign rest.:rvt.:s as insurance against rt.:vcrsals n i capital flows. However, mis entails exchanging low-yielding U.S. Treasury securities for high-cost debt-a boon for the US. Treasury but a rotten deal for the home cconomy.1l The heterotopia for Bra7jl and the many other countries in a similar situation would bc one in which they can choose their own economic policies with­ out n i terference from the

IMF

and the US. Treasury. But of course, the IMF

and rhe U.S. Treasury have this capacity precisely because this heterotopia is currently forestalled; n i deed, this heterotopia has to be obviated as a condi­ tion of the

1M F

and the U.S. Treasury having tile ability to constrain Brazil's

economic policies so that even a left-wing Brazilian president has to toe the line laid down by tile

IMF,

the US. Treasury, and their ancillary institutions.

So how can this heterotopia, now virtual but not yet actual, be brought to the point of actualization? I have suggested Ihat what is needed to establish a heterotopia as an actu­ ality for less-developed countries like Brazil is an economic strategy based on a piecemeal and ad hoc delinking from the global market, where a country which perceives itself not to be a beneficiary in the current l'"Conomic dispen­ sation is given the latitude to examine one by one the linkages it has with eco­ nomically and politically privileged countries, and then to sever those link­ ages which are not to its advantage or which funerion to its detriment. These linkages are then "subtracted" from the sum total of that cOlllltry's connec­ tions with other economic entities, .so tllat gradually (but sometimes perhaps quite rapidly) the heterotopian situation is attained, at least in principle. In this heterotopian situation tile country n i question will have reached a point where it has been able to disconneer itself from rhe powers which prevent it from achieving its own "autocentric" economic development. Heterotopia is achieved when a country like Burkina Faso or Papua New Guinea can take practical steps to bring about its own autocentric development, and this kind of development is not therefore rhe e : ..e1usive preserve of the wealthy

OEeD nations. In faer, it is these wealthy nations which collude actively in a state of affairs that prevents tllis already real heterotopia from being achieved in actuality. This heterotopia will come about in rhe poorer countries only when mpediments i to its realization arc subtracted from the components of an actually ex isting capitalism. Class struggle is the pivot of the previous versions of tile delinking

HETEROTOPIA

2.79

strategy, and thus of any arrempt to bring about a hetetotopia for disadvan­ taged countrics. -nlis emancipatory project h3S as its focal poilU the recon­ stirution of an alternative class in dle peripheral countrics whose heterotopia is, ultimately, the avoidance of tht, recompradorization of the country in question.23 Class stmggle is dms the indiminable b3Sis of heterotopia. Only through such stmggles, and they arc likely to be protracted, can radically new kinds of communal and collective instirutions be created. -nle regnant capitalist regimcs of accumulation all prcsuppose a fundamental division in political and economic decision making between ci3SSCS with more direct and more immediate access to the levers of such decision making and classes whose level of access is cither diminished or even nonc.xistent (Witll dispari­ ties in n i come levels pretty much reflecting tim ability or n i ability to secure access to the loci of power and autllOrity). There can be no genuine democ­ racy 3S long as moneyed elites n i nearly every cOlmtry on the planet are able to tilt their political and economic systems in favor of those able to purchase power and authority. Many forms of militancy will be needed to COWHer the Leviathan of global capitalism and to establish this heterotopia

as

an acruality, but we

know n i outline what is required if life is to be better for rhe ordinary citi­ zens of Mali, Honduras, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, E3St Timor, Edliopia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, and so on. At rhe same time it h3S to be ac­ knowledged that dlere is no ready-made model of democratic socialism that can be trotted out widl a proverbial snap of the fingers, and a great deal re­ mains to be done in the way of experimentation and self-interrogation.

Heterotopa i perms

Utopia . . . Agaill

But how is this characterization of heterotopia really differeIU from utopia? Is it not positively a mopian state of affairs when countrics like Mali and Haiti can hope, realistically, to feed their people by (hopefully) delinking their economics from countries at the economic celUer, that is, the wealthy nations who belong actively to a system that prevenL� such LDCS from pro­ moting what would otherwise be an autocentric development? Arc we merely splitting terminological hairs by insisting that a sought-after transfor­ mation ofdlis kind s i "nicely" heterotopian and not "unacceptably" utopia.n: "'hat really is the difference between dlcse two tides or fomls of words for what St""CIllS very much like the same mode of emancipation, beyond a kind of semantic shadowboxing? 280

CHAPTER U

The utopian, as I pointed Olit at the beginning of this chapter, is premised on a relatively dear contrast between a drastically flawed situation and its negation that culminates n i a perfect or completely transformed condition ("another country") that for its proponents is appropriately to be. designated

as "utopia." Dialectical negation is thus the basic enabling mechanism for the creation of utopia. By contrast, ht�terotopia does not rely on dialectical negation for its conting into being; a heterotopia already exists because it had

already to be warded olf in order for an existing state of affairs to be what it is. To actualize the virtuality that is heterotopia there need not be a recourse to dialectical negation. What is required is something quite different, namely, an operation of a piecemeal, but still conceivably protracted, subtraction, that is, a subtraction of all those linkages to the global market which serve systemically to disadvantage a poor country. This operation is not to be con­ fused or confiated with a shallow reformism capable of being sanctioned by the existing ncoliberal order; while many heterotopias can undoubtedly be merely reformist in this sense, the more significant ones aren't. After all, a scenario that enables a Chad or a Yemen to pursue an autocentric devel­ opment would be truly revollitionary in the currell[ setting, since it would require a wholesale transformation of existing economic knowledge and any policy prescriptions derived from such knowledge. At present countries are marginalized and censured when they give the slightest hint of not conform­ n i g to the prevailing neoliberal consensus, as Malaysia was when it decided to regulate capital flows during the Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 in the face of the conventional wisdom trumpeted by rhe IMI' and the U.S. Treasury.l4

A heterotopia that allowed countries to follow the example set by Malay­ sia would be a momentous development, but it would not be utopian. One indication that it s i not utopian is the fact that heterotopias of dle kind en­ visaglxl here can be linked to each odler to form a more encompassing set, a heterotopia of heterotopias, so to speak. -Thus a heterotopia in which coun­ tries can pursue economic policies not constrained by dle neoliberal con­ sensus could be coupled to a heterotopia which pursued policies of sustain­

able development or which treated economic refugees and immigrants more justly. In each case it would be up to a particular group of COWltries and economic agents to form dle heterotopia in question, and it is conceivable that a country or transnational n i stitution serving the cause of one hetero­ topic formation would not be able or willing to facilitate another, adjacent heterotopic formation. In each case, it would take a certain set of poiti­ l cal arrangements, buttressed by the appropriate institutions, to adhere to a particular heterotopic formation. Without these, there would be no heteroHETEROTOPIA

2111

topia of type X, though this would not n i itself preclude the emergenct� of heterotopia type Y or Z, given other, somewhat different arrangements and nstirutions. i The centrality of political arrangements and n i stitlltions when it comes to constituting heterotopia point to a feamre of heterotopia that Foucault tended to overlook n i his admittedly brief and sometimes gnomic essay on the subject, namely, that heterotopias come to be actllalized only when they are effectively mobilized by agents who act more or less strategically. -nlllS some acmalized heterotopias are the direct and sometimes immediate out­ come of large-scale popular mobilizations along the lines of the mass pro­ tests dlat resulted n i the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos, the shah of Iran, and Slobodan Milosevic. Others are actualized when antagonisms which had previously been mmed or neutralized are suddenly c.xacerbated or brought nto i the open, such as dIe American civil rights struggles in rhe 1960s and rhe struggles for independence in the postwar perioo in Asia and Africa. Still odlers come about when certain limits in the formation of a consensus are

recognized, and it becomes clear that dIe existing system can't form a

new consensus to deal with an emerging social or political problem. ·nlis seems to be the case with the Bush administration's so-called war on terror, widl its constant appeals to a "state of exception" dlat a liberal consensus will probably not be able to accommooate, as civil liberties are increasingly erooed, normal administrative procedures suspended n i such area.� as immi­ gration and law enforcement, unilateralism overwhelmingly defines foreign polk}', and the U.S. government keeps the populace in a constant state of anxiety over "security threats" in order to frighten people into supporting the "firm and resolute" George W. Bush and his administration. Liberalism as an ideology has an incredible elasticity, but it remains to be seen ifit can be stretched to include the so-called war on terror and its palpable manipulation by the post-9/U American national security state. Here is an opportwlity for the actualization of heterotopia if the liberal consensus fails, though this opportunity could also lead [0 somedling much worse, as xenophobic and audloritaria.n proclivities are given more room to manifest dlemselves by this American national security state. Such concerns notwithstanding, there is still a fundamental difference between a conceivable utopia and the heterotopia that can potentially be actllalized in rhe current conjuncture. Utopia is a "better country" no doubt, but it is much easier to conceptualize dlis bener country than to identify the complexities of the systems that have to be modified or replaced if the project of liberation is to be brought to fruition. The notion of a reverse causation 282

CHAPTER 11

allows rhe proponent of heterotopia to focus on the precise mechanisms that have to be put n i place ifheteroropia is to be actuated. There is a world, real bur not yet actual, in which there s i no George W. Bush presidency (or rather, n i which there would be no possibility of making him president again in 2004),25 no American national security state, no specious "war on terror," no illegal preemptive wars. In this respect rhe issue where heterotopia is con­ cerned has overwhelmingly to do with the reali7.ation of a quite specific po­ litical project, one whose lineaments arc contingent upon the historically and politically determinate circumstances that prevail at this time and place. TIus political project will pivot on cOlUltering the powerful pressures exerted by a certain state of capitalism and will respond to dIe requirements of this singular conjwKture by seeking to orchestrate the forces needed to actuate the cOlUltervailing powers associated with heterotopia. The prin­ ciple behind this orchestration is class stmggle, to the extent that the ruling powers forestalling the actuation of heterotopia operate on the need to main­ tain existing economic and social inequalities and a globally polarized devel­ opment, and in so doing creating a worldwide class of the dispossessed and disadvantaged. (It is important to stress that this class is not to be confined to dle n i dustrial proletariat.) TIle greatest challenge for the proponents of heterotopia is the mobilization of this n i ternational class. Those most dispos­ sessed have the greatest stake in doing away with the murderous and brutal powers that mle over us, but it has also [0 be acknowledged that extreme privation often cheats people of dIe very resources required for reaching even the threshold of political mobilization. TIlis points to a political project inaugurated primarily in the countries of the SOUdl, whose masses often experience levels of insecurity unthinkable to dIOse who make speeches about national security in dle United States and Britain. \Vhat can be dont' in the. \Vest and North? Here dlere is an interesting contrast between the countries of old Europe and dle United States. A great deal can be done, and needs to be done, in the United States and clsewhere. 10 mention a single c.xample: wuil very recently in the United States it was considered unpatriotic to criticize George W. Bush in public without minc­ ing one's words. Who would say widlOut mincing words n i an editorial n i the New York Times or the

Wnshil!9"ton Post, let alone the Wall Street journal,

dlat in [mdl George W. Bush is a child of privilege, an intellectual mediocrity with a sketchy record in the Texas Air National Guard during the Vietnam War and a failed business career afterward, who for nearly eight years pos­ tured as dle " top gun" enforcer of dle global order? People would fall down laughing if it were suggested to dIem in Britain, Australia, France, Spain, HETEROTOPIA

283

Germany, and Italy that it was unpatriotic to criticize Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, John Howard, Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, Jose-Maria Aznar, Gerhard Schroeder, or Silvio Berlusconi. Many American heterotopias exist, some only potentially, ofcourse, but one of them certainly involves the cessa­ tion ofsuch mindless patriotic blathering. In America, to deride a George \V. Hush (at the start of his presidency as opposed to its sunset, when the prov­ erbial rats were starting to flee the sinking ship) in the way that the lecher­ ous Berlusconi has always been mocked in Italy-that could have been an American heterotopia (with no Italian equivalent, of course).26

Heterotopia is n i c.xtricably bound up with the creation ofa range of tmdl­ effects that usher into the realm of actuality what is already real, albeit as a virtuality. There are many enabling conditions for the crossing of this thresh­ old between the virtual and the actual, but one of the primary conditions for tllis movement is a desire, organized widl sufficient force and coherence, for the making of this transition. Using the notion of an incompossibility in­ voked earlier, we can say that dle world desired by proponents of the project of liberation -a heterotopia, or maybe even a heterotopia of heterotopias­ is one that is incompossible with regard to the (now) actual world, since the actual world is the world in which vast numbers of human beings go hungry and lack most of life's basic necessities while having absolutely no recourse to a just solution for these problems. To desire this heterotopia is perforce to desire all that conduces to the supplanting of this now actual world; it is to desire to remove all dle conditions that sustain this acmal world and serve in the end only to ensure that the heterotopian world is kept at bay. -Ib want heterotopia is to want a certain kind of causality with regard to the world. (As an aside, we may note dlat perhaps it was Spinoza who first systematized this insight.) It is this a:dom, more dlan any other, that separates dIe notion ofheterotopia from most kinds of utopia. If I could summarize all this in my own pidgin English, I'd say "Heterotopia good; utopia not totally bad, bur not as good as heterotopia." Paradoxically, dlis probably captures the same nsight i expressed in what Slavoj Zifck has called (mistakenly) one of dIe great Hushisms. To quote former vice president Dan Quayle (whose saying it really was), "The future will be better tomorrow."

284

CHAPTER U

CHAPTER 12 Prospects for the New Political Subject and Liberation

In this chapter I focus on the question of the steps that need to be taken if a policy of delinking on the pan of the countries of the Somh is to be imple­ mented. I also deal with the question of dIe new forms of subjectivity that conceivably will have to be devised f i this JXllicy of dclinking, and its super­ vening projt."Ct of liberation, are going to stand a chance of being achieved. -nl{� proposals I advance here will be somewhat schematic, but I hope that the previolls chapters have identified the theoretical growlds for the claims set out in this final chapter. Using Michael "hnn's well-known typology for classifying the primary forms or modes of power, namely, the economic, political, military, and ideological, dIe rest of this chapter considers the desiderata or requirements for a project ofliberation with a decided emphasis on the needs of the citizens of the world's poor countries. Where economic power is concemed, I have argued that the countries of the 50mh have little alternative but to espouse a findy calibrated ddinking strategy if their economic simation is not to become even morc parlous cilan it is today. With regard

to such a dclinking strategy, the

lOGS

will do no

economic hann to themselves if they conduct a fundamental but judicious reassessment of their economic linkages with the advanced industrial nations and cile international economic institutions (such as the World Bank,

1MI',

and WTO) cilat in the main operate at the behest of the wealthy countries. Each linkage should be scnttinized, and if it is seen to be disadvantageous to the poor COllntry in question, it should be dispensed with. 11le corol­ lary is that cile linkages which confer advantages on the less wealthy country

arc to be retained. This polk}' of a judicious and piecemeal assessment of what works in a poor COlUltry'S economic interests is not to lx' confused with the wholesale autarky practiced by Albania during the regime of Enver }-Ioxha (1908-85), a confusion that is seldom avoided by dlOse who criticize Samir Amin a.nd other advocates of delinking for wanting a "pie in the sky" economic isolation in an age of globa..l integration. Ille rationale for such a strategy is obvious and completely rational: If something costs your people more than it benefits them, and if there is little or no prospect that these costs will be ameliorated, whycontinue to make your people suffer in order to pay, and continue to pay, for it? As Dani Rodrik points Olit, countries that buck conventional economic wisdom (such as the \Vashington consensus) on such measures as restrictions on the movement of capital face an immediate howl of protest from those who subscribe to this wisdom, but once that economy docs well despite its repudiation of the supposed wisdom, capital quickly flows back to it. Capitalists arc very scmpulous about making money, but they arc often not scmpulous when scmples get seriously in the way of making money. The example cited by Rodrik is Malaysia, which was heavily criticized for going against the advice of the n i ternational financia..l institmions by m i posing capi­ tal controls when the East Asian financial crisis started to spread across the region from Thailand in 1997, but which had no problem attracting back this n i ternational capital when it became clear that Malaysia had weathered the crisis better than its neighbors who had fallen in line with what economic ordlodm.), had enjoined. Ille options here dlerdore amount to the prover­ bial no-brainer: fall in line with the orthodoxy enjoined by dle Washington consensus and crash, and foreign capital will flee the shores of your CalUltry, or try somedling different (to wit, capital controls), and if you succeed the foreign money will soon come back, and f i dlese capital control measures do not succeed, the money had in any case already fled your markets duough the now well-known "contagion effect." Poor countries, according to Rodrik, should therefore have no qualms about imposing restrictions on capital movements if this will secure them against destabilizing flows of capitaJ.l -The United States may be the sole superpower left, bm it does not follow from dlis that the world is also becoming less complex from a geopolitical standpoint. Far from it, this American primacy is perfecdy compatible widl an increased comple:dty in the socioeconomic and political domains, and America's superiority in military power does not nece.�sarily translate into lasting configurations of economic, ideological, and political power.2

286

CHAPTER U

Especially important for the poor countries has to be an industrialization of agriculture, though this has to be an industrialization conducted not in terms of the requirements of the e..xfKlrt-based agribusiness promoted by the advanced industrial countries as an economic panacea, but one subserving the economic needs of the lDCS themselves. This industrialization of agri­ culmre, if lUldertaken properly, will allow the lDCS to move beyond subsis­ tence agriculrure, and with these agricultural surplnses, industrialization can begin to occur. The members ofthese societies can then move beyond finding ways of feeding themselves at a subsistence level and seek ways of producing ndustrial i surpluses to benefit their own people, and not necessarily for ex­ port to the high-income countries. V'I'here

military

power is concerned, a major curtailment of America's

military power will help not only its poorer citizens (though there can cer­ tai.nly be no guarantee here, given the vagaries of the American electoral sys­ tem), but will also aid any area of the world that can potentially benefit from a world system that allows power to be dispersed n i a more ramified way. The swiftest way of accomplishing this objective is to do away with rhe U.S. dollar as the world's reserve currency (or at any rate to have another currency, such as the euro, serve as a competitor alternative to dIe U.S. dollar). Some would argue that there are other sowld economic reasons for retaining the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency, and that these reasons are sufficient to outweigh any perceived need to diminish American military power by reducing America's capacity to finance its wars by using the dollar's supremacy to borrow easily from external sources. It is widely accepted that the United States basically subsidizes its military by having other COWltries hold their reserves in U.S. Treasury bills; once they can hold these reserves in euros or the yen or yuan (in whatever combination), the United States will not be able to finance its military expendirures by the simple expedient

of manipulating interest rates. ·nle UN report

�Vurld Economic Situation alld

Prospects 2006 is well aware of the perilous situation that lies ahead once mher countries start to diversify their reserve holdings: Despite low interest rates worldwide and ample liquidity n i global finandal markers [thiS was before the 2008 bank liquidity crisis] there arc strong rea­ ,

sons to be concerned about the sllstainability of the global imbalances. The current aCCOlillt deficit of the United States contilllles

to

increase at a rapid

pace. The concomitant risc in the United States ncr foreign liability position could eventually erode the willingness of foreign investors to buy dollar­ denominated asSets. 1his could lead to a precipitous fall in thc value of the

THE NEW POLITICAL SUBJECT

287

United Statcs dollar and an abrupt and disorderly adj u stment of me global imbalanccs.3

11le rest of the world should hold the United States accountable for the mili­ tary impact of its geopolitical decisions by making any willingness to buy dollarized assets contingent on U.S. compliance with international environ­ mental treaties, international judicial accords and weapons conventions, and the basic tenets of inrernational law regarding the use of torture in the in­ terrogation of mose labeled "terrorists" who are currently detained without due process. The rationale for this step is not to create global economic chaos, bnr to show, in a principled and considered way, that the willingness of the rest of tile world to buy dollarized assets wil! from now on depend on the readiness of the United States and its allies to act in accord with tile principles of international law

(as opposed

to paying mere lip service to international

law).4 -nlis makes sense for those wanting a world heedful of the needs of its poorest and most beleaguered citizens, not only from the point of view of political strategy, bur also economically, since most of tile rest of the world is in danger of getting a raw deal every time the United States manipulates its interest ratc.� to subsidize its current account deficits (and its military ex­ penditures), and more generally its levels of domestic consumption. More important, however, the ability of the United States to use its weap­ onry to pummel an enemy into fairly prompt submission does not translate into a similar ability to negotiate the many gradations bc.tween military force and political capability. As the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan have revealed, the sheer exercise of American military power does not in and of itself culminate in a "mission accomplished." Ihe capacity to deal with insur­ rections and insllfgencies,

to

police rather than to bombard, to bring about

local political transitions, to set up protocols tllat facilitate tile transition from conquest to reconstruction, all of these require tile deployment of a political power whose subtlety vastly exceeds the compass of bmte "shock and awe" military force.s l'o/iricnlly, and tllis is the complement of its indisputable military su­ premacy, tile United States has the advantage of being able to set or influence in decisive ways the rules by which tile international system flUlCtions. -nlis

capacity is reflected in a propensity toward unilateralism, as opposed to seek­ ing multilateral accords, when dealing Witll contentious international issues.

-nle unwillingness to accommodate rhe countries of the United Nations (ex­ cept in situations where this suits the immediate and obvious convenience

288

CHAPTER 12

of the United States) and the scorn heaped by rhe Bush administration on treaties regarding environmental protection, weapons li mitations, and the jurisdiction of international courts signify a profound aversion on the part of the United States to act in concert with other nations except when this is to its immediate convenience or advantage. The lXlor people of the world could benefit immeasurably from a geopolitical system with several nuclei, so

that no one nucleus of power could assert its unqualified ascendancy over

the others. But how is the American im perial juggernaut to be slowed down? No matter how little one sympatllizes Witll the motivations and aspirations of some of its associated ideological movements, Michael Mann is right to say that to this point tile only concerted opposition to American imperial ambitions has come from the Muslim world, which, in addition to the self­ inflicted wounds afflicting many of its polities, is having to bear tile traumatic burden of opposing the first empirt� of the twenty-first century, while the Tony Blairs, John Howards, Silvio Berlusconis, and Nicolas Sarkozys of this world comfKlrt themselves as supplicants on bended knees, and its Gordon Hrowns and Vladimir Purins duck and weave. tlleir way around the proverbial eight-hundred-powld gorilla so as not to be pummeled by it into immediate and abject submission." The ftmdamental point to b e grasped here is that tile United States and its cronies (and their proconsular am:iliaries such as the

1MI'

and World Bank)

have no right whatsoever to determine the fumre of Iraq or sub-Sallaran Africa, or indeed any other part of the world. This nonnegotiable principle has to be enshrined in any framework for a more just and equitable, and thus truly alternative political order for tile poor countries of the world. This alter­ native political order can begin to take shape only if these poor cowltries are able to carve out a space of refusal for themselves, where their destinies will no longer be governed by diktats derived from neoliberalism, Witll its blind attachment

to

market fundamentalism, and from American neoconserva­

tism, with its self-serving American exceptionalism and bellicosity? Only in such a radically different space where a "high-intensity democracy" is likely to flourish can the lDCS reclaim their own development and improve the lives of tlleir ordinary citizens. -nle interesting question here, of course, is rhe connection between the LOCS' need for a "thicker" democracy and the scarcely denbble absence of such a democracy in tile United States and tile United Kingdom. There will come a time when the LOCS may see. that having a democracy that is more substantial than the attenuated, because merely "representational," democ­ racy espoused by tile richer countries of tile Nortll and \Vest is somehow

THE NEW POLITICAL SUBJECT

289

inextricably connected with the movement [0 a high-intensity democracy in the North and "'est itself. In other words, there has

[0

be a movement

toward a fuller version of democracy in the rich cowltries as a concomitant to the sought-after transformations in the (poor) countries of the South and East. \Vherever it needs to happen, real democracy must always begin at home. -nle fundamental shift that has to take place involves a supersession of the prevalent "thin" forms of democracy. (What /'CaDy happens to American democracy when one has dIe good or ill fortwle to be represented by ctooks like Tom DeLay, Ted Stevens, or Randy "Duke" Cwmingham; or by skilled, o r somewhat less skilled, opportlmists like Newt Gingrich, John Edwards, Arnold Schwarzenegger, John McCain, Joe Lieberman, and Bill and I-lillary Clinton; or by the senescent Sttom 11mrmond, who left the U.S. Senate at the age of one hundred in 2003, by which time he was clearly lmable to distinguish the U.S. Capitol from the Parthenon; or by Elizabeth Dole and the late Jesse Helms, or indeed a huckster like the former lexas senator Phil Gramm; as well as by countless mediocrities, though the list would almost certainly have to begin with George W. Bush, Dan Quayle, and Sarah Palin?) -nle only alternative to this constricted and thin-boned version of democracy, with its built-in propensity for sound-bite sloganeering by political hacks o r demagogues prepared to say whatever it takc.� to gain oftice, and even for the stealing of elections, as happened in Florida in 2000, is a democracy th:lt re­ quires an inherently greater degree of participation on the part of those who arc effectively disenfranchised by the existing "low-intensity" democracies.8 But dIe poor countries caIUlOt wait for their wealdIY counterparts

to

be­

come more democratic before they dlemselves espouse a thicker version of democracy; the economies of Burkina Faso and East Timor simply cannot affor d to wait while Americans debate dIe merits of Sarah Palin as a 2012 presidential candidate. -nle delinking strategy advocated in dlis book is de­ signed to allow the poor countries dIe opporrnnity to create this alternative space of refusal by themselves and on their own terms, initially by creating conditions which enable the lDes at least to begin to esr-ablish dleir own circuits of accwnulation. -nlis process has to be accompanied by a state con­ stmction geared to providing administrative and other resources essential for the well-being of all citizens and not just the mling elire and its partners. The current form of imperialism is, in MaIm's apt phrase,

all

"ostracizing

imperialism," inasmuch as the stmcrnre of c.xploitarion enjoined by dlis im­ perialism is highly selective; many countries are excluded from the global economic system simply because dley do not meet the minimum conditions

290

CHAPTER 12

for exploitation, so that a Macau or a Tunisia qualify for " investment" (the euphemism for exploitation, given the fact that profits from such investment will almost certainly be repatriated), but a Mali or a Haiti do not.9 These economically disenfranchis ed countries desperately need to have ac­ cess to their own regime of accumulation since their current situation leaves them completely e.xcluded from any ki n d of productive accumulation and production. (Admittedly, the Macaus and TWlisias arc inserted in a capitalist regime of accumulation, but in so doing have to sacrificc their people to the demands of this unrelenting capitalist accumulation proccss, and so they too have a dire need for an altemative reg ime of accwnulation favoring a global­ ized economic democracy.) More will be said later about the conception of participatory democracy favored by the argument being advanced here.

Ideologically, the LDCS will have to find ways of enhancing their ideological resources since these are now tilted very much in the d i rections favored by the United States and its allies. ·nle American message of "individual freedom, material abundance, and democracy" may still resonate in many parts of the world, but its appeal has been declining, and precipitously so in the Muslim world. America's peremptory i.nstmctions for a "global governance" match­ ing the starkunilateralism it has espoused since September 11 has caused it to bevicwed with gready increased suspicion in many parts of the world. The core of dlis unilateralism is the doctrine of a "permeable sovereignty," which allows the United States and its partners to intervene with a missionary zeal (by invoking the ideals of "human rights" and "democracy") in the state stmctures of other cowuries, precisely in order to align, or realign, these stmctures so that they are in harmony widl American self-interest'!o -nus American ideology is certainly being contested, and dle primary im­ petus for this contestation is provided by nationalism, and Muslim nation­ alism in particular. The insistence on an inviolable sovereignty that lies at the core of any nationalism is dearly re/lected in the attempts of the Mus­ lim nationalisms to posit dlemselves as a "colUuersovercignty" to America's global hegemony. Not that these countersovereignties necessarily involve a viable state formation, since the American occupations have transformed lraq and Afghanistan into failed states and rhe long-suffering Palestinians constitute a nation that is yet to become a state.!1 The poor cOlUltries, who urgently need something richer and more sub­ stantial than the American version of individual freedom, (thin) democracy, and material abundance (based as it is on the need to maintain concerted and systemic i.nequalities that cannot be reconciled with the requirements of justice), even if only to provide dleir citi7.ens with basic necessities, dearly THE NEW 1'0LITlCAL SUBJECT

291

have to enhance their state capacities so that these can further the creation of an alternative, fairer and more democratic global order. 11Ie nation-state is not going to be abolished by globalization, though its funct o i ns, and the ar­ rays of strategies associated with these fWlCtions, have undoubtedly changed and w li l continue

to

be transformed in the years to come. Only by creating

this more eguitable and democratic political order, with its active and well­ informed citizens and progressive domestic social movements, will it be pos­ sible

to

show, in concrete rerms, the colossal mistake involved in confhting

this hoped-for eguitable and democratic order widl what is deemed desir­ able, or indeed simply "wlavoidable," by dIe bared fangs of American militar­ ism countersigned by its governing elite, the Bush administration's prating about "freedom" and "democracy" norwithstanding.12 -nlis enhancement of LDC state capacities is premised on a revived and revolutionized nationalism which eschews the calamitous etlmically and reli­ giously based nationalisms that have prevailed up to now. Leaving behind these flawed nationalisms that have been in place since the eighteenth cen­ tury and pressing forward to launch this new civic nationalism will pose stiff challenges for rhe LDCS, especially since the distractions afforded by dema­ gogic appeals to religious and ethnic differences are a constant temptation for governing elites faced by citizens desperate for the simple necessities that make life tolerable.13 We long for a universalism that will take us beyond the viciOlL� particularities of the endlessly contending nationalisms, bm the only u niversalism we have today is the one provided by capitalism. 1bere may be a productive and harmonious universal that lies on the other side of capital­ ism, bm for now dIe only large-scale formation able to disrupt the tidal wave of global capitalism is the political nationality of the nation-state, and the urgent project confronting us is to constmct this political nationality along the lines of a civic nationalism. The current capitalist regime of accumula­ tion consigns entire nations and reg o i ns (and I am not referring here only to the poorest economies of the South) and social groups and communities (dIe mst belt, unproductive smokestack industries, uncompetitive hill farms, low-skill sectors, etc.) to an economc i ally ste.rile redundancy. To achieve a less ineguit"able world, social arrangements will have to emphasize dIe well-being of entire societies; this will almost certainly reguirt� relating production and consumption, despite all the obstacles and complc.xities, to more general and more extended inrerests than is currently permitted by c.xisting capitalist arrangements. -nlis civic and secular nationalism will in [Urn have to employ an impor­ tant distinction, made by Samir Antin, between the state apparatus and the 1.91.

CHAPTER 11.

nation.llle overwhelming tendency has been for a country's state apparatus to be appropriated by its ruling dite or national bourgeoisie. In tht, case of the lDGS this has invariably led to a rcrompradorization, since the national bourgeoisie has always favored alliances with international capital as long as

these alliances have left the state apparatus in dlcir hands. The construc­

tion of a project of national liberation, however, involves not only ddinking along the lines outlined in the previous chapters (and this in order to avert recompradorization), but also the formation of a popular national alliance among the people.14 -nle construction of a broad national popular alliance, fWlCtioning independently of the state system, will provide the impetus for tile adoption of a different kind of allocation strategy, one premised on a selective ddinking involving several policy dements intended to reverse the processes of recompradorization dlat have so far afHicted the lDGS. "Finan­ cial openness" along the lines specified in the Washington consensus that governs the thinking of dle

1MI',

World Bank, WTO, and OEGD has been

shown to be of no benefit to the lDCS; to the contrary, financial openness has tended to favor the forces of recompradorization and the accompanying economic cil entalism at the hands of the U.S.-led eqnity-ba-",d acnuuulation regime now dominating, but also troubling, the global economic system. To forestall this dismal outcome a slate of policy initiati v es favoring auto­ centric development for the lDCS must be espoused, including controls on capital movements, debt forgiveness, investment strategies designed to make the poorer lDGS less dependent on the production of primary commodities, the formation of regional blocs and alliances to pool resources and consoli­ date economic gains, and rhe taking of political steps that will nltimatdy result in the abolition of tile

IMF

and tile \Vorld Bank. All these policies will

nndoubtedly find immediate disfavor widl Wall Street and tile otller stock markets of tile world (though for tile foreseeable future these entities will be fully occupied with tllcir self-inflicted financial messes). Bllt the obvious trutll bears repeating: stock markets don't give a fig about improving tile lives of tile world's poor people. A fundamental ingredient in the implementation of this autocentric groWtll regime will be the social and political mobilization of tile appropri­ ate classes and class fractions in the lDG in question. This mobilization will be undertaken with a view to transforming the state apparatus, especially in view of the fact that the state is the institutional assemblage that has ulti­ mate control of the regime of accumulation and that there can indced be no properly constituted regime of acnuuulation without the intervention of the state.

THE NEW POLITICAL SUBJECT 293

-The goal of a "destatized" collective national liber.uion projcct is not an end in itself, since accomplishing this is intended to lead to a rl"Constimtion of the state itself (as opposed to the abolition of the state, this being the fan­ tasy of some antiglobalization movements). ·nle current philosophy imposed by the Washington consensus requires making the reform and reconstitution of the state the primary focus of any economic and political reorganization in the lDGS, in the hope that this will lead to efficient economic develop­ ment, alleged protection of the rights of the individual, and the upholding of democr:lcy (alas, very low intensity dcmocracy is what such reformers invari­ ably have in mind).ls The difficulty with tllis proposition is that it ignores the fact that in many lOGS the apparatuses of the state are much more likely to be commandeered by a small elite, and that in tile current phase of capitalist development such elites (or oligarchies, as they are in many cases) perceive their economic interests to coincide with the imperatives of rhe \,Vashingtoll consensus. W ithout a radical transformation of tile state project itself, there­ fore, it wil l not be possible for progressive social and political forces to create apparamses (witl l i n the LOG in question) capable of functioning as plausible alternatives

to

existing forms of the capitalist state. ·nlis is an especially im­

portant consideration since the prevailing social and political forces are al­ ' ready likely to be subordinated to the interests of that LDG S elite, as well as to the over arching requiremenL� of the Washington consensus itself. There are no pregiven laws to shape or nl"Ccssitate this outcome; only stmggle, and failures always accompany successes in stmgglcs, can do this. The only alternative is acceptance of rhe current finance-led, equity-based accumulation regime (neoliberalism), with its imperial American lUlderpin­ ning (neoconservatism). \Vorldwide l"Conomic polarization has been the only resultant of the primacy of this accum ulation regime and its predecessors. For the poor people of the world this is hardly a satisfactory alternative.

294

CHAPTER 12

Conclusion

At the time of writing this conclusion (April

2009),

it is clear that capital­

ism is going through a phase involving major but not yet fully understood transformations associated with the current global liquidity crisis. In re­ sponding to this crisis, most of the economically advanced cOlUltries have at least nationali7.ed a part of their major financial institutions, thereby con­ troverting an essential tenet of the neoliberal onhodo),."y that has prevailed since the collapse in rhe

1970S

of the post-Second World \Var, Keynesian­

New Deal capital-labor compact. It is too early to proclaim the de mise of this neoliberal orthodo),)'; it may have buried itself, or it may somehow find the wherewithal

to

achieve the economic equivalent of a fraught cardiac re­

suscitation. But for many informed observers, financializcd globalization has reached a point of collapse from which there may not be a return to what is labeled "economic normality" in the bllSiness pages of dte American daily newspapers. Unless "economic normality" is understood merely in terms of a restoration of

CEO

compensation

to

something like previous levels. 1here

are clear signs that President Obama's "financial rescue package" is being milked for the purpose of this restoration. But, as I have said repeatedly in this bexlk, dte world's poor caIUlOt wait for this American-led equity-based economic system to revive itself. If a better world for the masses of hwnan beings now trapped in condi­ tions o f cnlshing poverty is to be brought about-this of course being the basic goal of the project of liberation elaborated in these chapters-it is Cnl­ cial that we ask whedte.r liberal-democratic capitalism has within itself the resources needed to bring about tillS better world. If it does not, and capi­ talism has becn given countiess chances by its apologists (with the accom­ panying excuses and exculpations when the so far inevitable failures ensue),

then the question has to arisl� whether this better world will begin to :lppcar only when a range of decisive posteapitalist transformations needed to realizc. this better world can take place. If it is determined that these radical transfor­ mations are needed and that it is beyond the capacity of liberal-democratic capitalism to revive itself, then the question of a supersession of capitalism becomes urgent and perhaps even necessary. Very few today bclicve that a restoration of American prosperity is going to improve the lives of the ab­ jectly poor in the United States and elsewhere. I argue that a historical and political point has been reached where there is now no :llternative to this project of seeking a supersession of the capitalist order. Of course, there is no guarantee that this supersession can in fact be accomplished, just as there is no :lSsurance that what may come after capitalism will be any bener. Hut there is now virtually incontrovertible evidence that this capitalist system h:lS failed most of the world. Something different can and needs to be tried, or the plight of the poor will in all likclih<Xld become even more desperate. If the arguments advanced in this book have a measure of plausibility, then there is little alternative but for

us

to try to find, however hesitatingly, this

different, and postcapitalist, way. But, as I have said at many points in the argument formulated here, tllere are no necessary laws which preordain this postcapitalist state of affairs . All routes to this better life for the world's poor people are going to be the object of struggle, protracted stmggle, involving forms of social and political experimentation which may not always suc­ ceed. In some parts of tile world tins stntggle is already under way. For most of us in tile wealdlY countries, the question is whedler we turn our back on this stmggle or find even the smallest of small ways to register, in tlleory and practice, the fraught but powerful :lSpirations of dle protagonists of this stmggle. To be on the side of the seemingly chimerical hopes that the hope­ less somehow find a W:ly of holding f:lSt

to,

or aligning ourselves widl an

economic system that repudiates these very hopes as a basic condition of its viability, this is the existential and systemic choice confronting those living in the wealthy COlUltries (even as it can be acknowledged dlat the despcratcly poor also dwell in the very midst of dle wealthy countries and are not con­ fined to the countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds; after all, exploitation is everywhere, and so inevitably the exploited are also everywhere). An increase in

GNP

does not abolish or ameliorate poverty;:IS we know

all [<Xl well from the case of tile United States and Britain, poverty is caused by the same mechanisms which create wealdl for others. As much as the pro­ ponents of capitalism baulk at dlis "socialist" conclusion, given the capitalist 296

CONCLUSION

character of these mechanisms, to be in favor of wealth creation is willy­ nilly to be in favor of poverty creation. In capitalism these go hand in hand, though the "cwming of reason" peculiar to capitalism has so far been able to convince enough people that it is somehow a matter of pure accident when poverty accompanies capitalist wealth creation. I have argued for an alternative rationality whose core is the amelioration of global poverty, and thus for dIe supersession of dIe system of economic disenfranchisement and exploitation which has prevailed up to now.

CONCLUSION

.!97

NOTES

II/trotil/ctirm 1 lbere are as yet few detailed analyses of the crisis of :w08. However, [ have found uslful Wade, "Financial Regime Changd� 'Vade claims thelt the neolib­ eral paradigm which has prevailed since the 1970S has now received its quiems. Given what has transpired so far in the global economy in 2008 and 2009, it is difficult

to disagree.

2 On this so-called Golden Age, see Glyn et al., "The Rise and Fall of the Golden Age,� 39-125. 3 The grip of this "free market" ideology during the time of Reagan and Thatcher is displayed in the following passage from a column by the London Glirmiul1I journalist I'eter '''ilby: �In the mid-90s ...I discussed with a senior New Labour adviser how a Blair government might change the country. lbe Thatcher gov­ ernments had succeeded in doing so, we agreed, because so many policy propos­ als could be tested agaill5t a simple question: ·How does this create

J

market?'

Civil servants, ministers, advisers and thinktanks all came to understand that if their ideas didn't create or enhance markets they were probably wasting their time." See Wilby, '"'Forget Raw Hsh and Berries, It's EqualityThat Saves Lives,�

nx GlillmUI1I, 28 Onober 2005.

4 See Mazier, BasIc, and Vidal, �Vbell Economic Cri5U Endure, niL The merger between nl-oliberalism and Keynesianism associated with OECD policies is also a key dement of the "Third Way" espoused by Britain's New Labour govenmlent and Gerhard Schroeder's Social Democratic administration in Germany, as well as the succeeding Christian Democrat administration led by Germany's current chancellor, Angela Merkel. 5 On the blurring of the line between left and right, see Moschonas,

III tbe Nil/lie

if50ciniDemocracy, xiii. 6 For commentary and analysis of the economic dimensions of the policies of Clinton and Blair, and their fundamental continuity with those of Reagan and

Thatcher, see Pollin, C.ontrlllr ! ofDoce/n; R. Brenner, The Boom nlld the Bllbble; Baker, nJe COlI.ftrmtil'e Nmmy Stnte and nJe United Stnru Sillce 1980; Dumenil and Levy, Crue et wrtU de true. See also Dumenil and Levy, "Costs and Benefits of Neoliberalism.�

7 For J stinging critique of this ideology of human rights, see Badiou, Ethics: All Ulldentnlldillg ofEI>iI; Zikk, "Against Human Rights.� See also C. Foley, nJt;

nJill BIlle Lille. S On the current mJllifestation of the society of the spectacle, see Nairn, "At the

uS." 9 See United Nations, 171& Inequality I'redimlllCltl : Reportoll tbe Warld Social Sitlln· tirm .1Oos: "The global commitment to overcoming inequality, or redressing the imbalance between the wealthy and the poor, as dearly outlined at the

1995

\-Vorld Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen and endorsed in the United Nations Millennium Dlx:laration, is fading� (1). The Rtpart goes on to say, �Eighty percent of the. world's gross domestic product belongs to the 1 bil· lion people living in the developed world; the remaining 20 per cent is shared by the

5 billion people living in developing countries. Failure to address this

inequality predicament will ensure that social justice and bener living condi· tions for all people remain elusive, and that communities, countries and regions remain vulnerable to social, political and economic upheaval� (1). It is a central thesis of this book that the predicament of the world's dispossessed has to lie at thl' hean of any purported theory of liberation. Hopefully liberation will con· front the likes of Rupert t\'\urdoch, Donald Tnmlp, T. Boone Pickens, Bernard Madoff, the \Valton family, and others with the inevitability of a decisive trans· formation, but whatever happens, this hoped·for trJllSformation for Murdoch, Trump, Pickens, Madoft: the Waltons, and their ilk will be qnalitativelydifterent from the changes that will matter for those living on less than one dollar a day. The comprehensive acconnt of this global il l eqnality is to be found in Milano· vic, Worlds Apnrt, which shows that it is not only inequality between countries that has incteased in the past two decades, but also inequality witbin countries. See also the country studies in Therborn, IlIcqllnlities ofthe World.

10 See Baker and Weisbrot, Socinl ScC/lri�y; BHC News, �Call for Sell-oft· of Royal Mail," at http://news.bbe.co.uk, accessed

14 May 2008. A wealth of available

evidence discredits such calls for privatizations. A detailed analysis of the priva· tizations undertaken by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and John Major shows that they had virtually no impact in the longer term on British prices and overall productivity, while {'ontributing to the widening of income gaps. for this analysis, see Florio, nJC G'rrnt DilY.•tllr&. II Bacevich, 'Die Limit! ofPower, provides a sober critique of this American excep'

tionalism.

12 Jacques Derrida is absolutely right to refer to the symbolism associated with 9/11 3S the outcome of a �media·theatricalizatiol.l " See hL� Rl¥Juu, xiii. l3 For a lucid overview of this transition from tile Middle Ages to early Moder· 300

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

nity, sec thc summary article by Haakonssen, "Divine/Natural Law Theories in Ethics_� See also the decisive account given in Macpherson, The l'olitical-nJcoryof l'OSlC5Sily Imih'idunlism, as well as Jonathan Israel's vastly cmdite but also some­ what problematic two volumes, Rndicnl ElJligbtwmcnt and ElilightemllCllt Con­

tuted_

14 Hume, "On the l'irst Principles of Govenmlcnt,� 16_ 15 for useful discussion, sec Hawthorn, E1Ilighfw1IICltl nnd Vopnir, .!3-29_ 16 See Kant, The Mctnphysia of AfornJ.., 161-64_ There is an ambiguity in Kant's definition of the will. On the one hand, as W ille, the will functions as a Icgis­ Iative faculty whose autonomy is thc. condition for issuing maxims in accord with a universal law; o n the other, as W illkiir, it is an executivc faculty whose spontaneity or freedom is the condition ofits adopting thc autonomous decrees issuL-d by IVille_ Fora useful untangling of this ambiguity, see Bcck, �Kant's Two Conceptions of thc \Yill,�

38-49.

17 On the relation of Hobbes to the. mechanist physical science of his time, see the fascinating account given in Shapin and Sehatfcr, Lel>wthall alld rhe Air-l'ump. for a more genera.! overview, see funkenstein, -nltolo!J.r alld tbe Seulltific Imag;­ IInti01l. HUlllC'S friend Adalll Smith needs

to be

included in any detailed sur­

Vl")' of the Zeitgeist of eighteenth-century mcrcantilc capitalism. Jcrrold Siegel rightly views Smith as thc author of modem individualist "self-fashioning";

Sl"C -nJ e idm of tIlt Self, 139-67. On Adam Smith, see also Kothschild, Ecollomi,

Sentimellts.

18 There is a vast literature on this epochal transformJtion, and I havc found espe­ cially useful Thom, Republics, NatiollY, alld Tr i bu ; A. D. Smith, -nle Er/mic Ori­

gi lls ofNatom i and Cho1(l1 l'eoples; A. \Y. Marx, Fnith ill Narum; LOwy and Sayrc, J{iPolre tt me1alJcoJie.

19 See -nlOm, Repub lcs i , NatiaJl5, alld Tribes, 93, quoting in his own translation Anne-Louisc-Germaine dc Stad, Dei C ircumtmlctJ actuclles fjlli pel/I'mt termilJcr fa Ril'OllItioll et des prillCipel fjui doil'Cllt fOllder la Ripubliql/e CJ/ Fm1lct, 20

HI-H.

to this period, and to its prl-decessors, is covercd in trilogy -nJe Age ofRel'OllItioll, 1789-148, The Age ofCapitn l:

The histori{·al background Hobsbawm's superb

1848-1875, and The Age ofEmpire: 187J-1914. The era that follows is coverl-ci in Hobsbawm, The -"We ofExt»:1II(s: A Hisrory ofthe WarM, 1914-91. See also Bayly,

-nx Birth oftbeModem World. 21 For illuminating cross-country studies of the siruacion of Social Democratic parties since thc

19805, sec Glyn, Socill l Democracy ill Nfolibeml Timu.

22 Perhaps the only consolation to be dcrived from this dismal statc of affairs is that it has inspired somc of the most invigorating political polcmics in decadcs. For the United States, see, for instance, Lazare, -nIt Veh'l't Caup; T. Frank, Wbnt'..

tIlt Mnttcr with Kmlsas? for Briuin, see Nairn, I'al-inb and After Britain. For France and Nicolas Sarkozy, see Badiou, De fjlwi Sarkazynr-il k 1wm? On market fundamentalism more generally, sec Altvater,

-nJ£ Future of the Market.

Lcys,

Mnrket-Dril'C1l l'ulitia; Glyn, Capitalism Ullleas/ltd.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

301

23 McKibbin, "What Works Doesn't Work," u. MtXibbin invokes here the. ideas of Robert Michels, who in Ur $oziologie du I'artciwtsC1I5 ill der II/odcT'IIeII Dell/o­ kmtie: Ulltcrmchm!!JCII iilm- die oIigarchiscben TCllde,IUII du Gruppmlcbe1l5, pub­ lished in 1911, argued that because oftheneed in modern n i dustrial societies for rapid and complex decision mak ing, political parties are increasingly managed by cadres of professional �experts" who, with power in their hands, would in­ exorably constinlte themselves as an antidemocratic oligarchy. 24 On "low-intensity democracy," see Gills, RocanlOra, and Wilson, "Low Inten­ sity Dcmocracy," 3-34. Significant here too is Jacques Ranciere's notion of a "hatred for dcmocracy," whercby supposedly liberal-democratic governments can get away with the mere profession of the trappings of democracy (whilc at the sanle time suspending 'Jllkro corpl/S, phone-tapping their citizens with­ out legal oversight, mak ing arbitrary arrests and deportations, etc.), a� long as thcy find ways to convince their electorates that we as "democratic citizens" arc. somehow in the fortunate situation of living in a political order very different from those who are cruelly oppressed by the rulers of "evil" totalitarian regimes such as the ones in Cuba, Sudan, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or Venezuela. See RanciCrl\ Hatred of Democracy. 25 McKibbin, �\Vhat Works Doesn't Work," 20. 26 The definitive work on "authoritarian populism� remains Smart Hall's TIJe Ham Rood to Rmell'al. See also the essays by Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clark,

and Robert in their I'olicillg tbe Crisis. On political hypocrisy, see the historically researched and politically barbed volumes by David Runciman, TIJ e Polities of

Good IlItentiOlI$ and Political Hypocrisy. 27 ror some this claim abont the decline of cOllIDUlnal solidarity may resonate with the thesis advanced by Robert Putnam in his much publicized BowlingAlolle. As critics have pointed out, Putnam's thesis s i based on problematic conceptions of social capital and civic cOlllmunity. My argument s i based n i stead on the documcnted segregative effects of significant and actual income disparity: rich and poor people don't lin: in the samc neighborhoods, don't go to the same shops, don't havc the samc leisure activities, don't eat the same food, don't listcn to the sanle music, don't go to the same schools, don't dress n i the same way, don't go to the same places for their vacations (if indecd the poor can afford a vacation). The work of the late Pierre Bourdieu is pivotal on this issue of the flllldamental spatial separation between those who arc wealthy and those who arc not. Sec, for instJnce, Distil/ctilnl. For a more summary treatment, sec Bour­ dieu's �The Aristocracy of Culture." Moreover, there s i ample and consistent documentation correlating income levels and levels of political participation. See, for insunce, U.S. C.ensus Bureau, Voter JilNlOlit ill 2()()�: "·The voting rate of citizens Jiving in families with annual incomes of less than $20,000 (,1 percem) was lower than those Jiving in families with n i comes of $50,000 or more (59 pern,m)."

,02

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

28 The referenee to � feeling" here has a theoretical import derived from Raymond Williams's well-known notion of J "structure of feeling." An example from populJ "l culture may be apposite. \Vhen Mrs. Thatcher came to powcr JIld con­

solidated her grip on the British polity in 197<), the focal point of an initial populJ "l culmtJl opposition to

the Thatcherite GlciclJJdmltmmg was lodged al­

most en tirel y n i the punk rock movement. One thinks here of the Clash, Elvis Colstello, Sham 69, and Joy Division. Jo y Division's album UllklOl WII 1'ImJlfru represented an iconic repudiation, at the subliminal level, of anything that Mrs. Thatcher could ever have brought herself to avow as �pleasurablc." The kc y theoretical teo'n here is

Jacques Attali, Noise, where it is Mg ued that ml Sl icai

nxies allow expre.ssive possibilities that are in advancc ofwhat the regnant so­

cial codes are able to offer. As Attali put it, �What is noise to the old order is harmony to the new" (:15). InH.>resti.ngly, after the suicide of its lead singer, Ian C urtis, Jo y Division became New Order. 29 Quot<'d in Dai Smith, Rnymomi

IViIlimllJ, 473. On the "long" revolution, see R. Williams, The Loug Rel'Ollitioll. Some may argue that this tripartite division of the book's arg ument (l) politi cal economy I (the currell[ system) (2) subiectivity and the politi cal (3) political economy II (liberation) is con­ ceptually untidy. I have resisted the te mpt ation to put the entire discussion of political economy into one large section, on the growl(1s that to do so would be to stack the discussion in favor of political economy from the outset, leavn i g �

-

�

the (for me)

-

very i mportant examination of the philosophy of the subject (and

its crucial relation to the. political) hanging on as a mcre appendage to political economy.

Chapter 1. TIJillking Subject alld Citizcn Subject 1 This understanding of the (·oncept is based in part on Deleuzc, �A Philosophical Concept . . . , 94-95. "

2 On reason as a legislative faculty, see Deleuze's l apidar y explication in Kant's

Critwl i l)biw,opJ�y. 3 See Balibar, Ci tizen Su bject; H-57. In another work, Identiri(tdifferCllu, Bali­ bar goes on to arg uc that it is Locke and nO[ Descartes who invents the modern concept of the self as that which the "you� or the "I" possesses. 4 For Descartes's letter to Mersenne, sce his l'biw,ophical E=Yi and CorrespondCllu, 28; also n i OWl'T&S de Ducartu, 1: 145. BaJibar refers to this letter on page 36 of "Citizen Subject." The great study of the king as the bodily representative of God's sovcreignty is Kantorowicz's TIJe KilW's Two Bodies. 5 The importance of thc Augustinian tradition for Descartes is stressed in l\'iclll, "The Intellectual Sctting," 33-86, see especially 69. Sec also Menn, Dumrt(J alld Augmtillc, where Menn says that the Canesian and Aug ustinian "doctrines of "

'

faith are the same; and narurally so, since Descartcs' doctrine of faith is a conse-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

303

qUCllCC of his adoption of the Augustinian doctrine of the free e..'l:ucise of will

n i jlldgment� (B3). See also Jolley, "The Reception of Descartes' Philosophy," 393-·P·3· 6 According to Balibar, the notion ofthe transcendental subject arose from Kant's

modification of the Cartesian rogitu, with the Lockean self beginning a second tradition that circumvents Kant before ending up with \Villiam James and Berg5011. See Balibar, "Je/moi!soi.� 7 According to Kant, the monarch in Jll "age of Enlightclilllcm" has authority only if he embodies the. general will of the citizens: "Something which a people may not even impose upon itself can still lcss be imposed on it by a monarch; for his legislative authority depends prcrisely upon his uniting the collective will of the people in his own." See �An Answer to the Question 'What (s EnlightenmenL)'," 58· 8 For this, see Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in ·Theory but It Does Not Apply in Practice"� 77. 9 Kant, "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," 45-4.6. 10 Balibar, ·'Citil-cn Subject," 55. Balibar says a great deal more about the Cartesian and medkval theological mbjtctm than can be indkated here, rightly pointing ont that a notion that had evolved over sn'enteen centuries from Roman times to the period of the European absolute monarchies is not easily encompassed n i a single definition. He also rightly indicates that the supposed "llI'Iml of the Citi7.cn Subject has to be regarded with some skepticism, since. under the aegis of bourgeois democracy this subjecr was always going to retain some traccs of the old mbj{ctm. 11 I;or Hegel's (early) view on the operation of "speculative" reason, Sl'C -nJe Dif­ ference betweCII Fichte's and Schelling} Sptelll ufl'hiwwphy, 88. For excellent com­ mentary on this aspect of Hegel's relation to Kant, see Pinkard, Hegd, 100-67. 12 The essential correlation between Reason and the Absolute entails that every operation of consciousness, pnKtical as much as theoretical, nl"Cessarily falls within the remit of the Absolute. ·The subject of thought then has to be the sub­ jl"Ct of morality and politks, and vice versa, a connection previously established by Kant when he moved from the. Erst to the Second Critique, that is, from the subjl"Ct's understanding to the subject's willing and acting. 13 On Kant Jnd early German Romanticism, see Beiser, TlJe fim uf &awn; EII­ lightmlllmt, R.£l'oJlftioll, alld RJJlllalJticifm; (lerma" Idealism; and TI" Rumantic ImpemtilY. See also Pinkard, Gerlllall l'bilosupJ�y J7ofO-ISifo. 14 -There is an alternative philosophico-political tradition to the. one JUSt outlined here, which extends from Italian Renaissance humanism, with a particular focus on the Machiavelli of the Dsroni, i to the tradition of English civk republican­ ism that J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner have done so much to define and analyze, James Harrington, John Milton, Henry Neville, and JohnToland being the e."'(empiary figures of this tradition. The English republican tradition n i turn exerted a profound influence on the originating figures of American constin!304

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

tiona! thought, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in particnlar. 'ntis strand of political thoughr plaeL-d fJr less emphasis on Ell.lightenmenr conceptions of the subjl"Ct, though undeniably a deistic religious impulse mns through much of it, and this deism is of course one of the primary features of the Enlightenment. To bring the. story up to date it has to be notl-d thar Jeffersonian consrirutional thonghr has been taken up by Anronio Negri, whose later writings

GUl

be said

to reflect the influence of this tradition as mnch as they do that of marxism. for Skinner, see LibertybefllTe Liberalism and his essays in Bock, Skinner, and Viroli,

Mncblll i 'Clli alld fupllblicallism. For Pocock, see Politia, Lallgllage, alld Time and

'fix Aiacbial'elliall iliomellt.

For Negri, see in particular IllslIIlJCllcics, espl"Cially

the first four essays. Also influential for Negri is Spinoza, who rcpresenrs a Dutch strand of this civic republican tradition. For the relation of Spinoza's politics to his philosophy, see Israel, fuufical ElIligbtCIIIICl I tl .

15 Some would argue that there is no need to look too far for an alternative to the Citizen Subject thar prevailed from Locke to Kant; the civic republican tradition menrioned n i note

14

above is one obvious source for any soughr­

for replacement. The civic republican tradition does not underwrite the En­ lightelUllem episH:mology thar ptoved to be insurmountably problematic for dlOse seeking to uphold the fundamental tenets of this epistemology and its concomitJllt philosophico-theological subject. It would be premJture for us to adjudicate in the appJl"enr dispute between these two ttaditions, since there could be adequate growlds for upholding neither tradition (this in fan is the. position taken in this book).

16 A case therefore exists for saying, where periodization is concerned, that the short rwentieth cenrnry which began in 1918 realiy endL-d in 1968 or the early

19705. For this view, sec Negri, "The End of the Century," 'flu; Politics ofSnbl'Cr­ s;rlll, 61-74· 17 It is important to distinguish between the conditions ofPO>Jibility that underlie the emergence and demise of the Citizen Subject (these having essenrially to do with the historical JIld social conditions associated with capitalist developmenr) and the conditions of illtelligibility that underpin the philosophical rationales ("the knowledges") which sustain this subject. The two kinds of conditions funnion on different logical levels, and conditious of n i telligibility serve a very different purpose than do conditions of possibility. \Ve can foliow Foucault in using the notion of the episteme to bridge the two sets of conditions, so that conditions of possibility allow an episteme to exist, and the existence of the episteme in rum enables discourses to be coustruned which provide conditions of intelligibility for knowledges, and so

forth. On this, see Deleuze, Flmeallit,

47-49. 18 On neoliberalism as a formation, see Harvey, A Brief History ofNeoliberalislll; Dumenil and Levy, Crise cr JOrtie de crise; Chang, GWbalisatJrlll, Economic DCI'tlop­

alld tlx Role oftlx State; Standing, Beyolld tbe New Paternalislll; Saad-Filho and Johnston, Neoliberalism; Boltallski and Chiapello, the Nell' Spirit of Capi-

malt

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

305

tnliJ:m. On neoconservatism, see Dorrien, Imperinl De>igm; Norton, Leo Strauss nlld tbe Politics ofAmericnll Empire. 19 George Monbiot himself made this point with a beautiful cynicism in an article which began thus: "If Jesns Christ were

to return to earth and the beast that

ascendeth Out of the bottomless pit were to slay the greater part of mankind, the first thing the media would do would be to find out how the markets had reacted. Ihe. next would be

to ring Sir Digby Jones, the head of the unfLxl­

erJtion of British Industry, for a comment.� See Monbiot, "Who ;lln�� 'nIe the

Runs Brit­

US. equivalent of the Confederation of British Industry would be

US. Chanlber of ummerce, though the CBI, as the sale "trade union" of

its CEOS and top industrial managers, has a position of influence in Britain that the Chamber of Commerce GIJl achieve only in a dream world.

20 On proposals to outsource the IRS, see the article by Donald C. Alexander (a former IRS commissioner), "Hired Guns for the

" IRS,

New York Time>, 4 Octo­

ber 1995.

21 The. hyperbole that possibly marks the "bake sale� example may be e:l:cused f i one reads the carLinI analysis providLxl in Bacevich, tbe New Amcrialll Militnr­

i.rm.

Bacevich, J former

US. Army colonel, is a Vietnam \Nar veteran (whose

son died in the IrClq war) who professes his "conservative Catholic inclinations"

TTJe Nell' AmeriClln Alilitnrism. Also relevant here is Bacevich's earlier AmeriCilIi Empi»:. I have also benefited from reading Mann, IlJcobcrwt EmlJirr,: Sjn!!er. �;prIJf'mte lYnrrion-; Hirst. Wgr And Power in tbe 21St Cmtllrv,; in the preface to

or medical benefits or an adequate retirement pension? If it can't, and if no amount of tinkering with the system in its present form can accomplish this, then the only alternative for those in need of such fundamental necessities is a quite radical reconstitution of the present order. The marxist tradition calls this novel reconstitution " revolution," and while not many individuals without ade­ quate honsing, health insurance, or pension plans, let alone food, would in all likelihood profess their adherence to those propositions given the name "marx­ ism," their standpoint, once they are in the position of acknowledging that the system in its current form is able

to do little

or nothing for them, is perforce

that of those who either acquiesce in their misery or who long, even in the face of despair, for some way out. Given the intractability of the existing order for those who benefit least from it, the way out for those in desperate and exigent need Glll only be what some of us call "rl·volution.�

,06

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

2

For an attempt to complicate and render more plausible this marxist develop­ mental scheme, Sl'C Anderson,

PaJJIlgC5from AlltUjlfity ro Fwdalism, e.spl"-"ially

18-46. For a more Weocrian perspective on the transition from the end of the Roman Empire to the rise of European feudalism, see Mann, the SuI/reo ofSocinl

Power, 374-99. 3 W. G. Runciman, ""The 'Triumph' of Capitalism," 33-47. 4 "This point about the mode of regulation's "regularizing" function s i made by Bob Jessop n i "The Social Embeddedtless of the Economy." I

anl

n i debted to

Jessop for my understanding of the capitalist mode of regulation. The question of the identities of political subjects

as

they function in the quest for liberation

is taken up in the discussion of identity politiCS in chapter 6.

5 for example, the decision of many Americans to purchase their medicines on­ line from Canadian pharmacies was highly instrumental in getting the Bush administration ducing

J

to join with American pharmaceutical manufacturers in intro­

nationwide prescription plan that quickly became notorious for its

labyrinthine complexity and limitlxi usefulness. What was a systemic constraint

within the American system for getting affordable prescription medicines (high prices and limited choices due to the blatandy monopolistic conditions enjoyed by the pharmaceutical companies) bl'Canle a strategic opportunity for those Americans with access

to computers (as well as the Canadian pharmacies in­

volved!). Ihis in turn prompted the American pharmaCl'mical manufacturers to vressure th,e Bush,administration to olu!! this looDhole bv n i troducin!! a Dre-

6 On the dialectic of structure and agency, see Jessop, "Interpretive Sociology and the Dialectic of Structure and Agency."

7 For accounts of this lack of a nl'Cessary congruence between the means of pro­ duction and the. mode of societal regulation or domination, see W. G. Runci­ man, "Ihe 'Triumph' of Capitalism"; Jessop, ""Regulation Iheory in Retrospect Jnd Prospect"; Resnick and Wolff,

elms allli Hi5tury. Runciman maintains that

capitalism is an ensemble of practices n i which ownership of the means of pro­ duction Gill take several forms, ranging from individuals to the state. Runciman also believes that formally free labor can coexist alongside other work systems in capitalism. This conclusion is shared by Re.snick and \Nolff, using a very different theoretical framl"Work. My account departs from Runciman's in three respects:

(1) the notion of the mode ofsocienl regulation (taken from Jessop) used in my rendering encompasses the two modes (coercion and persuasion) kept separate

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

307

by Runciman; as

(.!) Runciman's pinpointing of markets and the quest for profits

defining features of capitalism does not emphasize capitalism's inherent pro­

pensity to realize profits precisely dlroUgh the exploitation of wage labor (this being the cornerstone of Marx's theory of surplus value); and (3) Runcimall accords centrality to a theory of social sekction (indebted in a paradigmJtic w"y to evolutionary biology) in singling out those practices responsible for in­ stituting capitaIL�m. Michael Mann's \\'eberian-inflected theory of social powcr distinguishes between economic, political, military, and ideologiGu power, and the account of the mode of production and the mooe of regulation dcveloped here would, mutatis mutandis, place "bnn's notions of political, military, and idt>ological power in the category of the mode of societal regulation, and his concept of economic power in that of the mode of (economic) production. For Mann's highly importJnt work, see TIJe SoIlrt:uufSociall'Oll'tT: Vol. 1,A Histuryuf

/'owerfrom the Begim/ing to A.ll 1760, and Vol. 2, The /{ise uftbe CltlS.fesalUiNatioll­ .�tares, 1700-1914. 8 The position delineated here on the mode of production and the mode of regu­ lation is indebted to Jessop, �('ost-Fordism and the State" and uFordism and l'ost-Fordism." Jessop restricts his discussion to one vcrsion of capitalism in both these essays (viz., post-Fordism), but his act·ount of capitalist rcgulation can easily be modified and gcncralized to provide the foundation for a general theory of capitalist development- Especially useful is his breakdown of the Ecole Regulation's notion of the. mode of regulation into two distinct components: a umode of socictalization" and a '""s ocial mode of economic regulation." See also Jessop and Sum, Bryrmd rbe }{q]lIlatwn Approach. .ck, introduction to Rav/lfti{ll/ ar the Garn, 11. It 9 ror Lenin's remark, sec ZiY is noteworthy that many of Lenin's contcmporaries took hin} to

be

more in­

debted, in his theory of rcvolution, t o the writings of those who belonged to anarchist-inspired movements of rural insurgcncy than to the thOUgilt of Marx and Engels. On this, sec thc Palestinian marxist lony Cliff's magisterial four­ part biography, Ltllill. 10 In

aRb, if a

is

theory (marxism, in this case) and

b is the formation that is capitalism which stands in relation /{ toa, thcn while a is per definiens a thoory, it is not clear at the same timc what the ontological status of b is. While b is at J

the vny least a set of material conditions and social relations, a distinction in principle needs to be madc between a condition per se and the expression s or e.'\pressivities gencrated by that condition . •r.. 10re will be said about this in the next section. 11 On this, see Deleuze, "On the Superiority of Anglo-American Literature," in Deleuzc and Pamet, DialqJlICS, 60.

11. This is why Slavoj Zizek has bt"Cn right to insist in his various writings that it is both futile theoretically and unsatisfactory politically to seck to distinguish between "ideology" and some brute facticity represented by "economy." To be confronted by thc concepts or exprcssivities of capitalism is to confront the

308

NOTES TO CHAPTER .!

reality of capitalism (even if the urea!ity� overdetermines the expressivities in question), and vice versa.

13 It is possible to view this complexity n i ways akin to Althusser's notion of an "overdetermined" relation between formations, and between formations and the points from which subject positions are constinned.

14 See Galbraith, The Nell' IlId/lStriRl State. For Veblen, see ElIgill(Cn and rbe Pricc

Sy!itcm. 15 See Aglietta, A 7heur.r of CapitaliJ;t Regulation. See also Agliena, " World Capi­ talism n i the Eighties."

16 Certain forms of historical inquiry can do this just as well as edmography, so dlere is no suggestion here that the smdy of the concrete forms of a particular embodiment of capitJlism is the prerogative of the etlmographer and no one else. In Tmth alld TmtbflllllcJJ Bernard Williams shows that even the description of historical and ethnographic particularities is suffused with traces or residues that are not contained within the described simation.

17 ·nlis understanding of the image and sign is derived from Gilles Deleuze: "The m i age itself is the system of the relationship between its elements, that is, a set of relationships of time from which the variable. prescnt only flows. . . . Whar s i specific to the image . . . is to make perceptible, to make visible, relationships of timc which cannot be seen in the represented object and do not allow them­ selves to be reduced to the. present." Sl'C Deleuze, Ci1/e1lla 2:

71le Time-Image, xii.

Signs are usecond-order" images that render thesc temporal relations visible in thc ....first-ordcr" images that embody them (the first-order images being consti­ fiaed intrinsically by the modalities of movement and time), through the inter­ vention of a "third-order" i.mage-sign that functions as the "interpretant� be­ tWl'Cn the first- and second-order images

(30). In other words, a sign functions

as a packet of knowledge and affect regarding its objcct, but this knowledge and affect are "released" only through the i.ntervention of the sign-image that is the n i terpretant, the latter increasing and adding new packets of knowledge and Mfen to the first-order image-sign. Images and signs are thus plastic, changeable assemblages. 18 The signs that compose an assemblage can be assigned to at least three levels or components of the assemblage. One set of signs will relate to the political subject's ag�:ncy and pranices; another will designate the. forces, strucmres, and formations in which this agcnt')' and these practices are nercised; and a dlird will supply the particular collte:n in which forces, strucmres, and formations are efficacious and the political subject's pranices undertaken. Forces, struc­ tures, and formations (on the one hand) and agency and pranices (on the other), along with the context in which bodl are manifested, together constitute an amalgam that is the social and political process in which social agenL� are in­ serted. This process is always stabilizlxi and reduced n i its complexity by social agents as a condition of their being able to act. ·The subject is thus always "in bt>rween� several sodal roles, statuses, names, identities, various ;rlfiliations and

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 309

disaffiliations, enfranchisements and disenfranchisements, and so forth, and the construction of this "in betwecn� is the terr.:tin in which the subject is produced (�5ubjectivization,� as the jargon has it). 'nus s i also the terrain in which the project of liberation and equality finds its ground. Jacques Rancihe has empha­ sizl-d the centrality of this �in between� for a constitution of the political but says that the person who occupies this space of the "in between" is always the proletarian. "Ihis is an unnecessary circwllscription: any social subject occupies this space by virtue of being a social subject. The proletarian, however, occu­ pies this space under separate and specific auspices, in that he or she embodies an identification that subjects him or her to

J

constitutively inequitable struc­

mre, that is, a stnlCillre of exploitation that provides little or no benefit for the proletarian, at least in comparison to the advantages enjoyed by those who arc beneficiaries of the capitalist system. Sec Ra.ncierc, �Polities, Identification, and Subjectivil..J.tion,� 6,-70, and "TIl<" Cause of the Other.� 19 Raymond Williams has constantly stressed the importance of local affiliations i the constitution ofhmllan subjectivity. Sl� �Cultl1re Is Ordinary," ,-18. n 20 'nl<" presence of this structure of exploitation is a necessary but not in itself sufficicnt condition for the emergence and perpemation of the condition that makes the capitalist subject what he or she is. As I pointed out earlier, a serf or J slave belongs to J structute of e.'l:ploitation by virme of being what he or she is, that s i , an outcast who s i wronged in fundamental ways. But historical or social circumstances alone would determine whether this serf or slave happcned to belong to a precapitalist or capitalist structure of exploitation. Being a serf or a slave does not in itself specify how or why one s i e.'l:ploited, as much as it would provide a brutally dear awareness of the fact that one has been and s i being wronged. 21 Liberation can also be tile name of the extinction of that desire; the desire to end desire is treated in some religious traditions as the exemplary means of overcoming pain and suffering. For marxism this position is without warrant. Enjoining as it docs th., supersession of capitalism, marx ism necessarily has to underwrite the desire for this supersession, and the desire to be rcleasL-d from all desire is simply not an option for the serious marxist. 22 Spinoza, Ethia, III, 9 scholium, p. 172. 23 Antonio Negri, in his great work The Samge Anomaly, has drawn attention to tile centrality of this ontology of constitutive power for SPlll07_"l'S ethics of lib­ eration. 24 On truth-effects, see BaJibar, "The Infinite Contradiction,� especially 162. 25 On this see Deleuze, "Doubts about the Imaginary," 65-66. 26 As contemporary newspaper accounts and the. novels of Nadim' Gordimer and J. ,\1. Coetzee make very dear, there were ma.ny in white South Africa who placed themselves in positions where such truth-effects were simply not able to be lllanifested. There is a sense in which the Afrikaane.r brute wholeheartedly in favor of apanheid is in J position of greater clarity with regard to such potential 310

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

truth-effects than the haplessly l>Yasive, white South African ukind soul" who believed that blacks should of course be " treated well,� but who thought at the same timc that Mmed resistance was "bad� or "unnecessary:' and that an appeal to the goodwill of H. E Verwoerd, P. W. Botha, E W. de Klerk, and other Afri­ baner leaders was all that was really needl.:d to end apartheid, "given a bit of timc," of course.

27

Badiou makes this poillt in uPhilosophy and Politics," 29. Badiou dearly beliL"" es that a philosophy is necessary if the possible muh of this political standpoint is to emerge. He shares Plato's view that there has to be a necessary concatena­ tion betwecn philosophy and politics if justice s i to find its place of actualiza­ tion. Interestingly, a similar position is takcn by the emphatically non-Platonist Deleu7£, who insists that such dlings as rights are not creatlxl by "codes and pronOlUlcements" but "by the philosophy of law." See Deleu7-e's essay �On PhiJosophy� in Negorintwm, 153. The principle straddling the otherwise quite different positions of Badiou and Deleuzc derives from the insight that politics cannot on its own transcend the disarray ofpartiality and interest (Badiou), and that political Jctivity in the mainstream s i typically constrained by having to be undertakcn through the auspices of the apparatuses of the state (Deleuze). For the latter point, see Deleu7£ (with Parnet), "Many Politics," in Deleu7£ and Pamet, DialogUe>,

28

124-47.

Admittedly, the pervasive nondecidability of quotidian reality comes about as a result of politics itself. In the age of integrated world capitalism, the. state has the basic function of disaggregating and neutralizing the countervailing forces ranged against it, in this way placing the. apparatuses of the state at the. disposal of capitalist acolillulation. Anyone who in 2009 doubts this is perhaps totally unaware of the massive. government bailouts, in nearly every economically ad­ vanced country, of banks whose lending policies in recent years have been con­ sistendy reckless and intellectually discordant with any professed respect for "economic fi.UldamentJls� (I of 2008 and

am

referring here of course to the financial crL�is

2009). The state's primary flUlction, therefore, is to ensure this de­

cisive continuity, with its concomitant undecidability, so that even those. forces ranged against capital arc somehow allowed to function in ways that augment capitalist accumulation. 'There is a confluence between dle state and the social, in which the forms of opposition to capital are not efhced, but instead are used to intensify and extend the forms of social organization fi.lrthering capitalist accumulation. There. is no better illustration of this phenomenon than the way the oil and coal-mining companies nowadays seek not to distalKe themselves from �green" causes, say, bur instead project themselves as cxemplary cnstodians of the environment, primarily in television commercials in which, to a backdrop of sunshine and chirping birds overlaid with soft new age music, disused oil fields or open-pit coal mines are shown to be planted with trees and blooming flowers. By rendering nondecidablc the difference between a genuine steward­ ship of the environment and the lasting environmental despoliation that in fuct

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

311

rakes place when oil and coal extranion occurs, any opposirion, potcnrial or real, to the profir-taking aniviries of the American oil and coal companies is cffcerivdy nenrralized or blnnted. In dle age of a tTnical polirieal reason, it is perhaps no surprise thar rhe first Presidem Bush should insist on calling himself an �environmeiUalisr." The srate is of coursc the principal architcer of social arrangemems designed to give rhe forces of nondecidabiliry a freer rein. The American state is in eifeer the metacorporation of the corporations, as many left-leaning commenrators have poimed out.

29 for rhis, see Badiou, �Philosophy and i'oliti{S,� 29. See also Deleuze, �On Phi­ losophy,� in Negotiatioll5, 153, whcrt� he asserts, "Jurisprudence . . . is the philosophy of law, and deals with singulariries.

. h advances by working our from

singulariries."

30 See Bcnjamin, "'Theses on rhe. Philosophy of History,� 255-66. 31 In addirion to rhe works of laussig already mentioned, sec Comaroft" and Co­ marofl", OfRel"llltiolllllld Revollltion, and Jean Comaroff, Bodyof1'0",", !:jpirit of R£iUfallce. See also the essays colleered in Comaroff and Comaroff, Modemity IIl1dIt! Mllkollmm. 32 This formulation and cxanlple s i taken in slightly modified form from Bernard Williams, �Truth in Ethics." H See Negri, �Notes on the Evolution of the lhought of Louis Althusser,� 54. Negri is discussing a Iinc of rcfleerion, involving revolutionary thought and praerice, pursued by Althusser in the writings of the last few years of his life, My next few paragraphs are indebtcd to Negri. Benjamin's remark "Only for dIe sakc of the hopeless are we given hope,� though not mentioned by Althusser or Negri, also reflcets this cnD': of liberation. For Benjamin, liberation can be e:"presst-d only in terms of what Adorno has called an "impossible possibility.� See Adorno, "A Portrait of\Vaiter Benjamin," 24l. H As I pointed out earlier, Spinol-a ptovides In

plary formulation of this

c.wm

ontology of the desire for liberation in his Etbiu.

35 For these terms, see l'oucault, the Order of nJillg!. Foucault's account of the three epistemes-dassicai, modern, and curreiU-is being invoked here and in the following paragraphs. See also Rabinow, "Artificiality and Enlightenmcm," whose line of argumenr regarding FOUCJult is being followed very closely here.

36 See Deleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 13l. 37 See Dcleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 13l. 38 For this image of MJn as a drawing Jt the water's edge, see Fou{'ault, nJe Onkr ofnJing!,387. 39 See Dcleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 132. 40 See Deleuze, FOIICIIlllt, 132. Thecmbedded quotation is from tbe Orderof7hillgi, 38. 41 See Mandel, "Karl Marx," 7.

312 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

G mptcr j. POJtpoliticnl l'oIitics 1 On the Golden Age, see Kindleberger, �Why Did the Golden Age Last So Long!," and the somewhat riglllnti01mute narrative provided in Glyn et aI., �The Rise and hlJ of the Golden Age.� \:or acCOlUlts of the course taken by dle ad­ vanced cJpitalist countries n i the succeeding decades (the 1980s and 1(905), see Glyn, "The Costs of Stability" and ""Global Imbalances" ; Lipictz, ""The Debt Problem"; Ma7ie.r et al., IVhm EC01wmic Crir(5 Elldlll'?; Pollin, "Contemporary Economic Stagnation in World Historical Perspective" and

CIlIIWUrJ of De­

iCmt. for accounts of the precise nature and causes of the crisis of the 19705, as­ sociated by some with the demise of the Golden Age, see the

liglllntiOllllifte

Lipictz, .Mmgcs i nlld Mimdcs; Mandel, nJt S(cOIld Slump, whose explanation is based on an application of ""long-wave" theory; O'Connor, Ammllflntioll Cmir, who vil'ws the crisis as one of J pervasive overproduction leading to an acute diminution of surplus value; and R. Brenner, nJt Ecolwmics oJGlobnl lifrblllmcc, who rejects the Fordist/post-Fordistdichotomy, and indeed the whole notion of a Golden Age, in favor of an explanation in terms of a systemicllly debilitating competition lx,tween earlier and later developing national capitals. Ash Amin, "Post-Fordism,� gives a lucid overview of the literantre on the transition from the Golden Age to its successor.

2 Baker, Epstein, and Pollin, introduction, 1-34, see especially 16, explicidy link the onset of the. Leaden Age in the mid-1970S with the emergence of globaliza­ tion. l'oulantzas, CltllW

ill vlIItempomry Cnpitnlirm, links the emergence of a

new m i perial formation driven by American capital to the crisis experienced by the postwar system of accumulation. 3 Hirst and Thompson,

Globnliz.ntioll ill QII(Stioll, arc convinced that a "genuine"

globalization occurs only if its associated processes involve the elimination of the state, and since the state has not ceased to exist and

to be effective in n i ter­

nationall'Conomic management, they conclude that dlere has not bern a " true" globalization. The question of the role of the state in these transformations is obviously a crucial one, butpace Hirst Jnd Thompson, it is somewhat implau­ sible

to presume that the elimination of the fllllctions of the state has to

be an

absolutely necessary prerequisite for genuine globalization. For other skepti­ cal arguments about the �openness" of the world economy, sec Gordon, "The Global Economy," by now clearly datlxl, but still important as a relatively early but important statement of the skeptic's position. Gordon's data cover only up to 1984, and the world's economy has certainly become more ""open" since. then. The claim that the world economy prior to 1913 was just as integrated as its post-1970 counterpart is judiciously examined by Baku et al" introduction, 15. They conclude that while overall the levels of integration between the two economic dispensations are roughly similar, there arc two very significant dif­ ferences nonetheless: from 1950 to the present there has been J substantial rise

NOTES TO CHAPTER :1

313

n i the percentage of manufacmring exports on dIe part of the. less developed economies (who were scarcely visible as economic forces prior to 19l:j), and, again unlike the earlier dispcnsation, there has been a massive growth of short­ term capital movements ill the current phase of capitalist accwnubtion. On the primac)'of domestic national markets, see MaIID, �HJ.S Globali;o;ation Ended the Risc and R.ise of the Nation-State:," who points out that

80 percent of world

production is still for the domestic market. Mann's data are very likely to be out of date by 1.008, but Glyn, in "Global Imbalances," 31, points out that based on

OECD labor forcestatistics, such domestic economic activities as " wholesale and retail tr.J.de, community, pcrsonal and social services, utilities and construction together account for some 00 per cent of employment in dlC

OECD as J whole,

r.J.ther more in the U.S." 4 United Nations Development Programme,

Hlflllnll DC1'Clopmmt fupu/"t 200S,

116. Figures 4 and 5 arc takcn from the sallle publication. 'The calculations for figure 4 arc taken from the United Nations Industrial Dn·elopmcnt Organi;o;a­ tion, llldmtrial Dfl'Clopmmt Report 2004, and those for figure 5 arc taken from the World Hank, 5 United Nations

�Vo/"ld LHl'c/opmmr bldicatlm lOOS. Development I'rogr.J.mme, Hlfmnn Dcvtlopmmt fuporr lOOS,

117· 6 The problem is that aggregate flows of trade and investment GUl tell us only part of the story. These flows have microeconomic effects, J.Ild until these effects are identified and J.Ilalyzed, the fuller story is not likely to unfold. TIIUS in a more opcn economic environment of the kind said to be made possible by global­ i7_,ltion, the possibility of a firm relocating to another country may make its workers opt for lower wages in the hope of maintaining overall employment levels, and the complete story can be told only by examining the cffect of an n i vestment flow on that country's demand curve for labor (since in some firms workers may still wish to sacrifice ovenll employment in order to safeguard their existing wage levels; the story of workers accepting job cuts n i order to retain current wage levels is certainly one we read about nearly every week). Without looking at the demand curve for labor, we cannot tell whether workers in a particular sector arc trading jobs for wages or wages for jobs. On the need to take such microeconomic considerations into account when examining the effects ofglobal flows of tr.J.de. and investment, see Hardhan, Howles, and \Yaller­ stein, introduction, 1-11..

7 Peck and Tickell, �Scarching for a New Instimtioml Fix," 280--315, follow Alt­ vater, "Fordist and post-Fordist International Division of Labor J.Ild Monetary Regimes;' 1.1-45, ill treating "post-Fordism" as a term employed in a purely negative sense to designate the end of a particular phase of capitalist develop­ ment without the accompanying suggestion that a successor phase was already, or L�soon to be, in place. According to Peck and Tickell, the ending of one such phClse could be accompanied by a period n i which several post-Fordist forms competed with each other for consolidation before one becClme dominant.

314

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

Hence their preference for the more neutral term nfJI'oJordilmc, which carries no implication that the transition from an exhausted strand of capitalist devel­ opment (Fordism)

to another (post-Fordism) had already been accomplished.

8 The n i sight that a pOlariZl-d world system is the condition for the emergence of any modern regime of capitalist accumulation lies at the heart of the writings of Samir Amin. See. Ainidelylop1llC1lt Jnd Re-ll.radillg

tbe Pomvnr Period.

9 The World Bank's �Vorld DClylopmmt ll.rpmT of 1997 espoused these neoliberal precepts in a mapter titled "Refocusing the Effectiveness of the State," whose. basic premise is that �rthe I state has much to do with whether countries adopt the institutional arrangements tUlder which markets GUl flourish" (29). The. dear preslllllption is that the �flourishing of markets� sets the primary agenda for a coulltry's economic policy. TItis postulate lies at the heart of what Lipietz has calk-d ....liberal productivism,� that is, the. ideology which overturns the principle, crucial to any project ofsocial emJ.llcipation, that tedmological progress is justi­ fil..:! by sodal progress, in favor of the notion that tedmological progress is self­ justifying and needs no other warrant. See Lipietz, �l'ost-Fordism and Democ­ racy," 3'B-H, and ....The Next Transfomtation," 112-40, especially 122-27. "nte problem with Lipietz's characterization ofneoliberalism is that it over­ looks neoliberalism's part in supporting rent- and rcnticr-led l'Conomic activities (which have little. or nothing to dowith production per se). lbis is a ctitical over­ sight given the central role pbyed by finance capital in the colltemporary world economy (as pointed out in Dunford, 'Towards a Post-Fordist Order?"). I shall deal with the vitally important relation of the state to financialized regimes of growth later in this chapter. to

In four books, The C npimlilt Stnre, Stnte "D}(()J:Y, l1x Future oft/x Cnpimlilt Stntc, and Stnte l'ull't'r, Jessop has provided the most sustained thinking in state theory undertaken from a marxist perspective since the late Nicos Poubnt7.as. Jessop's position, which merges insights taken from the Ecole Regulation and systems theory with a neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony, hinges cnldally Oil the J;ordism/post-Fordism dichotomy. Joachim Hirsch's position is very simi­ lar n i its theoretical orielltation, except that, more than Jessop, he emphasizes the causal centrality of the �denatiotlJ.lization" of capital that cnsues from the crisis of J;ordism. See Hirsch, "Nation-State, International Regulation, and the Question of Democracy," "Globalization ofCapital, Nation-States and Dcmoc­ racy," and "Globalisation, Class and the Question of Democracy."

II See Jessop, �Fordism and I'ost-Fordism,"

State,"

47-52, and ....l'ost-Fordism and the

251. Jessop also considers the emergence of new technologies to be

another cnlcial factor in the rise of post-Fordism. See "Post-Fordism and the State,"

258, and "Capitalism and Its Future." Interestingly, in �l'ost-Fordism

Jnd the State," Jessop considers the role of new technologies to be part of the movement to flc.'l:ible specialization, whereas in "Capitalism and Its Fumre" he regards the appearance of Ill"V tl'Chnologies as

all

n i dependent (but still co­

present) constituent of post-Fordism. It should also be noted that when refer-

NOTES TO CHAPTER :l

315

ring to Fordism and post-Fordism, Jessop is careful to distinguish between the two strands, one "theoretical" and the other "practical," thar are constitutive of each of them JS stmcrures: on the one hand, the " acrually existing stn1cmr.l1 fonn� and dynamics,� and on the other, �the presence of modes of calculation Jnd strategies which aim to implement them� ("Posr-Fordism and the State,�

254). This distinction s i analytically necessary because of the lag that can exist between the two levels. As Jessop points out, planners and economic agents Gill be engaged, often without evident intent, in implementing the rudiments of an emergent regime of accumulation (such as post-I'ordism) loven as its sometime­ to-be replaced colutterpart (Fordism in this case) is still active and dominant.

12 The caveat that Fordist."faylorist production is not entirely displaced by post­ l"ordist flexible production is necessary because dlere is still a "pcripheral� Ford­ ism and laylorism in the. less-developed countries. For an anempt to analyze the first stages of this development, see Lipiea, " lowards Global Fordism?" This is Ixx:ause post-Fordism affords the possibility ofre{·omposingTaylorist principles into a "neo-Taylorism� that can be inserted at selective points in the production process. On this, see Lipka, 1oll'IInU II Ncll' EcrJ1wmic Order. For the counterargument that flexible specialization is not as generalized as many of its proponents take it to be, Sl"C Hirst and Zcidin, " Flexible. Specializa­ tion," 220-39. Jessop, however, s i cautious enough to say that "flexibility alone

L�insufficient to define post-I�ordism� ("Post-l'ordism and the State,� 258).

13 See Jessop, " Post-Fordism and the State,� 258. The proposition that capitalist production regimes seck to overcome or bypass the. alienation of the Fordist­ Taylorist mass worker by moving to production systems rdying on "after­ Fordist� flexible bbor practices and strucmres (and appropriately "socialized" workers and social subjects) is central to the thinking of other schools of marx­ ism and not just the riglllnti01mutc Jessop. See, for n i stance, Negri, Revollition

R£tricvtd, 17Je Politics ojSllbl'ersi01I, and "Twenty lbeses on Marx." 14 See Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 255, and "Capitalism and Its Future," 57l. 15 Jessop is careful to stress that the. emergence of the post-I'ordist macroeconomy cannot "be reduced to effects of a crisis of Fordism" since other gl'Opolitical fac­ tors played a key part in the unfolding of post-Ford i sm. The. end of Fordism was succeeded by "often n i tense struggles between competing versions of capital­ ism," and dlese struggles were affected by such events as the end of the cold war, the onsetof the Pacific Century, and the rise of multiculturalism, and not just by macroeconomic considerations ("Capitalism and Its Future," 573 ). Hirsch more than Jessop emphasizes the part played by the cold war in generating "global Fordism." See his "Globalization of Capital, Nation-States and Democracy;'

39-40. 16 On "lean� production viewed from J perspective similar to that of the Ecole R.egulation, see Hoogvelt and YuasJ, "Going Lean or Going Native?"

316

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

l7 Jessop, "Restrucruring the Welfare State," 54-76, and -'flle Transition to Post· Fordism and the Schumpeterian Workfare Statet 13-37.

l8 jessop, -Post-Fordism and the State," 259-61. 19 Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 260. The financial crisis of 2008, continu­ ing into

2009, drives home Jessop's point that a "relatively stable" post-Fordist

formation has yet to be rea!i7.cd.

20 Hirsch, "Nation-State,� 276. 21 Jessop, ""Post-Fordism and the. State," 262. 22 Jessop argues that the post-Fordist state did not materialize directly from the crisis of Fordism. Rather, resources drawn from Fordist forms and principles were employed n i itiaUy in an unsuccessful attempt to contain the crisis. Only when these failed did '"transitional post-I:ordist regimes" emerge. See "Post­ Fordism and the State," 262.

23 jessop, "Post-Fordism and the StJtet 264. See also Hirsch, "Globalization of Capital," 42.

24 jessop, " Post-Fordism and the State," 266-71, suggests that there are in fact three Schumpeterian workfare state strategies. One, perhaps the most fre­ quendy acknowledged, is neoliberJI and bask-aUy submits the state to the re­ quirements of the private Slx:tor. The second is neocorporatism, which differs from its Fordist predecessor to the extent that it seeks ro accommodate supply­ side considerations and combine self-regulation with state regulation. The third s i neostatism, which uses state apparatuses to orchestrate responses oriented to the supply side. In aU cases the new international competitive environment dlJt defines -after-Fordism" sets the terms for the. implementation of these strate­ gies. Jessop also says that these strategies can be combinlxl, as they are in the European Union, for instance. .

25 Jessop, "Post-Fordism and the State,� 275. See also Lipierz,Mir'Wt:>alldMirncle5, 25· 26 Jessop, -Capitalism and Its Future;' 5H-79. 27 Although, pace Jessop and Hirsch, the. ability of the United States to head and direct this l"<juity-based reginle has, for the tillle being at any rate, put paid to notions of a " triadk-" competition in which Germany and Japan are serious economic rivals of the United States. It is still early to tell whether the bursting of the housing market bnbble, and its associated banking failures, has pnt paid

to American leadership of the equity.based regime of accll1llUlation. On the tendency of the Ecole Regulation

to

overestimate the potential of the Japa­

nese and German models of capitalism to compete with their "Anglo-Saxon� counterparts,

see

Grahl and Teague, "The Ri gulntiolJ &hool, the Employment

Relation and HnJJlcializJ.tion."

28 In his more recent work with Ngai.Ling Sum, Jessop does acknowledge the "Eurocentrism" of his earlier work. See Jessop Jnd Stull, Beyond tbe Rrgulntioll Approach.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

317

29 l;or this figure, see International Fit1Jncial Services, London,

City Bll$intM

Series. 30 See Bhaduri, "Implications of Globali7..ation for ,\.hcrocconomic Theory and Policy in Developing Cownries," 152. Sec also Harris, �International Finan­ cial Markets and National Transmission Mechanisms,� 199-212; Griffith-Joncs and Stallings, �New Global Financial Trends," 143-73. A goo:! summary of the changes that have takcn place in global financial markets in the past two decades is in Helleiner, Statu alld tbe Rccmcrgf1lccofGlobal!'illallce; Griffith-Joncs, Global

(Apital Flows; Eatwell and Taylor, Global Fillallu at Risk; Obstfcld and Taylor, Global Capital A11IrketJ. 31 For these fignres, see Drabek and Griffith-Jones, �Summary Jnd Conclusions," 215. 32 Deutschcs Bundesbank, Tbe Role ofFDl ill Emergi ng A1nrka ECOIIomu i , 9. 33 Institute ofIntertlational Fi.na.nce, "Resilient Emerging Markets Anract Record I'rivate Capital FJows,� press release, 6 March 2008. This press rele3Se goes on to say that "dircct llwestment into emerging economies is currendyon an upswing with net inward

FDI to total $1.86 billion this year, compared to an cstimated

$1.56 billion in 2007 and $167 billion above the :W06 volume."

H Henwood, Wall Street, is still the most readable and informative account of many of these new financial instruments and dlC. markets in which they operate. According to the

lHallcbutcr Gllardiall IVcekly, 9

November 1997, the United

Statcs had more than 2,800 mutual funds controlling over $4 trillion, with $220 billion being placed in them in 1996 alone (nearly double the 1995 total of $1.42 billion). At the time. of the crash in October 1987 there were only 812 U.S. mumal funds manJging a total of S242 billion. By 2003 pension funds consti­ nned 40.7 percent of aU U.S. equity assets, invcstment companics 22 perccnt, insurance {·ompa.nies 23.3 percent, bank Jnd trust companics 11.7 perccnt, and foundations 2.4 percent. In the past twenty-five years investment companics Jnd mumal funds have grown very rapidly (2.6 percent of assets in 1980 to 22 pcrcellt in 2003), followed by pension funds (32.6 percent in 1980 to 40.7 percent in 2003). In this period, bank and trUSt companies have declined sig­ nificantly (38.8 percent of total assets in 1980 to ll.7 percent in 2003). For this information, sec Omference Board, Imtitlltiollal lliloestmmt Report 2005.

In 1994 two American pension funds alone, dle Teachers' Insurance and AmlUity Association-College Retirement Equities Fund the California Public Employees Retirement System

(TIAA-CREF) and (CalPERS), had assets of

$140 billion and $100 billion, rcsp{"<:tively, and the largest pension fund in the United Kingdom, the Post Office and British Telecom Fund, had holdings of S35 billion. For dlese figurcs, see Minns, "1he Social Ownership of Capital,� 43. By December 2007, TlAA-CREF'S assets had risen to $437 billion (see T1AA­

CREF press rdease, www.tiaa-crcf.org., accessed I8 May :w08); byMarch2008, calpERs holdings had risen to $1.42.4 billion (see CJlpER.� prcss release, www .calpers.ca.gov., accessed 18 May 2008). By January 2008, the total for world-

318

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

wide pension fund assets in the major elevcn markets had risen to hS trillion (see '''atson Wyatt's Global Pcnsion Assets Study, www.wJtsonwyatt.com.• ac­ cessed 18 May .w08). On the �short-termism� of pension fund mmagers, see the dctailed studies in Clark, l'emum fil1ui Captalism; i Minns,

'flle Cold War in Welfare; Blackburn,

BalJking 011 Dentb, and Age SIXJCk. 35 Asian Development Bank, Asum Delylopmmt Omlook 1994, 18. lhe Asian Bank welcomed thc processes of liberalization that led to the surge in portfolio in­ vestment. 36 Singh, " Portfolio Equity Flows,� 23, makes the point that in 1992 there werc 6,700 compa.llies quoted on the Indian stock market, compared with 7,014 COIll­ pmies in the United States, 1,874 in the United Kingdom, and 665 in Germany. In addition, the �average daily trading volume on the Bombay stock market has been aOOnt the same as that in London-abont 4S,OOO trades a day." 37 See Asian Dcvelopment Bank, A.riaJl Dely/oplllmt

Outlook 2004, www.adb.org,

accessed on 3 January 2oo5. 38 For a comprchensive ovcrview of the effects of financial globalization on dle emerging economies, see Prasad et al., Effects

ofFinll1lCinl Globalizatwn 011 Dc­

l'I:lopillg Coulltriu, wwwjmf.org, accessed on 3 JanuarY 200s.The authors draw numerous conclusions from the data, but two stand ont for our pUllloSCS: (1) in­ creased financial integration is neither J necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic growth (India and China have impressive growth rates in spite of limited capital account liberalization, while Pem and Jordan have suffered eco­ nomic decline in spite of being more open to capital flows); and (2) whilc devel­ oping countries do benefit in some ways from globalized financial integration, these benefits are morc likely to be. reaped by the advanced economies. The authors conclude that "the empirical evidence has not established a definitive proof that financial integration has enhanced growth for developing countries� (paragraph u4). lhis skepticism is reinforced in Rodriguez and Rodrik, "Trade Policy and Economic Growth," 39 Henwood,

�Vall Street, 16, provides a table which shows that in 1994 the United

Kingdom, J"pan, and the Unitcd States had shares of world stock market capi­ talization that totaled 8 percent,

24,5 percent, and 33.5 percent, respectively,

while the share for the emerging world totaled a mere l2..7 perccnt: Malaysia had 1.3 percent, Taiwan 1.6 pen:ent, lhailand 0.9 perccnt, the Philippines 0.4 percent, Korea 1.3 percent, Jnd Indonesia 0.3 perccnt of world stock market capitalization that year (figures taken by Henwood from International Finance Corporation, Emc'lfi ng Stock Marktts Factbook 1995). 40 The United Nations High-Level l'anel on Financing for Development, fupurt. Thc next few figures given in this paragraph arc provided in the same RC/'firt. 41 Ibid, The next few figures given in this paragraph are provided n i the same Ju-

1'''.''' 42 Roach, "Learning to Live with Globalization," Testimony before dle Commit-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

319

tee on Banking and Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives, 20 May 1999, cited in Penis,

"n,e Volntility Machi/Je, 46.

Perris's book remains the

best guide for the instinuional and other conditions which enable volatility­ induced financial collapses to occur in the emerging cOllltries.

43 The capacity of present-day stock marke,ts to deviate from " fundamentaL�" for considerable periods of time is found not only in the stock exchanges of the emerging countries but also in the established stock markets of London and New York. On this, see Singh, "Portfolio Equity Hows and Stock Markets in financial Liberalization,"

1.4. See also the comprehensive overview in Desai,

FilJlmcial Cruu, COlltainmmt, fwd Colltagirm. 44 For dle notion of "fictitious capital," see Marx, Capital, vol. 3, part 5. Harris, "Alternative Perspectives on the Financial System," has invoked this notion to explain the highly autonomous character of present-day transnational capital markets. Eighty percent ofall foreign transactions involve a round trip of a wL�k or less, and most take place within a single day. See Tobin, "Prologue," xii.

45 See the various essays in Drabek and Griffith-Jones, Managing Capital Flows in

Ii/rbufmc Timu, whit'h support the view of Mann, "Has Globali7.ation Ended the Rise, and Rise ofthe Nation-StJte?" (see note 3 above), and \Neiss, "fl,& lliytb ifthePowerless State: states operating in a globalized �:conomy still retain capaci­ ties which enable, them to macromanage this or that element of globalization (in this case the problems associated with financial market fluctuations). States can also use these capacities to advance the course of globalization, and indeed globalization rarely advances without some degree of collusion on the part of the governmenL� involved. See, also the collection of essays in Weiss,

Stam ill

the Global Eamon/x The evidence for state leadership of deregulation is carefully marshaled and analYl.ed in Vogel, Freer iliarket.>, More fulle5. On the state and globalization, see also Pettis, The Volatility lIiachille; Chang, Globalimtioll, Ew­ lIonlie Dewlopmmt alld tbe Role oftbe State; Calomiris, "Capital Hows, FinanciJI Crises, and Public Policy"; Aybarand Lapavistas, "Financial System Design and the Post-Washington Consensus." 46 Larry Elliott, "Two Countries, One Booming, One Stmggling: Which One FollowL..:! the Free-Trade Route?,"

"flJe Guardiall, 12 December 2005.

See also

ChJllg, Bad Samaritans. 47 Strinly speaking, this is not quite accurate, since Rosa Luxemburg, in the AcC/l­

IIIlIlatioll ofeapital, had already questioned Marx's formulations regarding this primitive accumulation when she came to the condusion, in her theory of im­ perialism, that l'ven "mature" phases of capitalism nelxled a precapitaHst domain to serve as a base for the creation of surplus value.

48 Lm;:emburg, 'DIe Accmlllllatioll ofCapital. 49 For this reason Luxemburg maintained that a precapitalist �space" would have to adjoin capitalL�t zones of accumulation to serve as the source of primordial demalld, not just in the. first phase of capiralist expallsion but also in its "mJUlre" stages.

31.0

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

50 See, for instance, Aglietta, "Le capitalisme de demain," 101, and "Shareholder Value and Olrporate Governance"; Aglietta and Reberioux, lIanu Adrift;

Corpomte G01'IT­

Boyer, "Le politique 11 ['ere de b mondialisation et de la fulJllCe,"

13-75, and " Is

�

Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Altemative

to

Ford­

ism?� 51 Boyer, "Is J FinJllCe-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to l'ordism1," 112. The primacy of the central banks in the current system is demonstrated by dJe. U.S. Federal Reserve's commJllding role in responding to the current subprime cnS1S.

52 Aglietta, "Shareholder Value and Corporate Governance," 148, 150. 53 Boyer, "Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism?," 116. The notion of "shareholder value" developed from the 1980s onward is carefully explored in Higstein, 1he Arc/Jt(Ctlfre i ofMarkets, especially chapter 7. The institutional complemCllt of this "unfettering" ofthe shareholder (now also encompassing the

Ct:o executive stratum)

is a new regime of "performance­

oriented" surveillance for middle and lower-tier managers Jlld workers using the latest information technology. See the fine, if sonK"What chilling, accoullt of these developments in Head, TIJe New RlIthlw EcrllJumy. 54 Boyer, "Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism1," 121.

This fJluasy of a benign (Jlld of course completely depoliticized!) "synergy" between central bJllk policy, the performance of the finJllCial markets, and the bnsiness plaus of companies s i very much behind the rationales provided by the. Bush administration for its policy of "tax cuts for the rich." In his testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives in Ouober 2008, Alan Greenspan (the pre­ \ious head of the U.S. Federal Reserve) admitted his culpability in promoting this now discredited "synergy." On the pivotal role of advJllced-country central banks in this new growth regime, scc OrlCan, Le polfl'Oir de

lajimmer, 249-53;

Pauly, Who Elected the Hal/ken?

55 In what follows I adhere closely to the overviews presented by Germain, TIJe

Illtemational O'l}aniZiltion ofCudit; Webb, the l'olitimlECOl/o1IIyofl'olicy Coordi­ nation; Pettis, TIJe VolatilityMa,bill&; Grabel, "Ideology, Power, Jlld the Rise of Independent Monetary Institutions in Emerging Economies," 25-52; Obstfeld Jlld Taylor,

Global Capital lHarkets; Hamles, "institutional Investors

Jlld the

Reproduction of Neolibe.ralism." Harmes is especially good on the shifts that have taken place in investment allocation criteria with the emergence ofthe nl'W financialmJl"kets.

56 Germain, Illternatiollal O'l}allization rfCudit, 136. 57 Even those who write. about international financial markets from a neoliberal perspecrive belkve that there s i a problem today with inadl'quately supef\ised markets. Sec, for example, Kapsteitl,

GOlJernilig the Global Eamomy.

The sub­

prime credit crisis in the United States represents the latest pitfall for what is acknowledged to be a largely unregulated credit system. 58 it is important to note that the rise of instability is not necessarily to be equated

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

321

with a scaling down of international coordination. As "'ebb,

7"e Political

Eco/lomy ofPolicy Coordination, 252-59, points out, if anything there has been more coordination in the international economy since the 1970s, though it has not managed to provide levels of stability previously reachlxi. Vogel, n i Fr(cT

MaTketJ, More RIlles, also argues that deregulation �rcform� has in fact been government-led. 59 Helleiner offers a good account of market deregulation by state and public monetary instinnions. See Statrs alld the RumCJlfCIJu of Global Fillal/u, which stresses the preeminent role of the state in fostering the integration and deregu­ lation of markets. See also Goodman and Pauly, "1he Obsolescence of Capi­ tal Controls?,� who use a more dialectical approach which views govermnent policy leading to increased integration and mobility, and this new siruation in rum

leading private agents to press for even more deregulation.

60 As 'Yebb puts it in TIJe Political Economy ofPolicy Courdinntioll, "Governments have preferred to take theirchanceswith unpredictable burdens m i posed by pri­ vate markets responding to national policy differences, rather than coordinate n i order to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of future international market pressures" (259-60). 61 Germain, IlItenUltiOlUlI OllfalliZlltioll !fCudit, 16l. 62 As mentioned earlier, the problem with dlC influential positions ofJessop and Hirsch s i that they have not placed enough emphasis on the primacy of the equity-based growth regime; if anything, the weight of significaJKe in their theoretical models is on the knowledge-baslxi, information and communica­ tion technologies, aJId competition regimes, withlittle more thJn a glance being directed at financialization and its m i pact. 63 In fact bbor Jnd the holders offixed assets are disproportionally subject to tax burdens since they lack the monetary mobility that is at the disposal of pos­ sessors of financial assets. It should be notl-d that the ability to use credit or llloney to synchronize the circuits of production and consumption s i precL�ely what allows the United States to do what no other coumry can do: enjoy a re­ spectable growth rate while having a negative savings rate and chronic external trade deficits. Basically, the United States is able to disconnect investment aJId savings (this connection being the theoretical heart of classical market thL'Ory) and to use income derived from financial asset holdings to subsidize investment and consumption (especially the latter). ·The growing perception now is that this disconnection is in fact the primary cause of the current finaJKial crisis. 64 ·nIe rdative freedom from path dependency of the structures associatL.a with the acquisition of industrial capacity is the basic principle underlying the (now dis­ credited) notion of the developmental state. Intrinsic to this notion is dIe for­ mula that a single developmental trajectory of a hierarchical nature embraces all countries, and that development takes place when the less-developed countries move up this hierarchy by emulating their developed counterparts. (1heorists of underdevelopment or dependency maintain that subordination is the inl>vi-

322

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

table lot of the less-dn·eloped nations becanse the hierarchical character of me developmental trajectory virtnally decrees mat some nations remain economi­ cally disadvantaged precisely in order to furnish me advanced economies with resources needed for meir own development.) On this developmental state, see dle essays, both meoretical and based on case studies, in Woo-Cumings, TIJe

DCI'dopmmtnl State. Chapter 4. VI/ea'n Del'tlopmcnt 1 Especially m i portant here are the views of dlose who maintain that the impor­ tant consideration in analyzing me functions of the state in economic develop­ ment is the politics of the regimes, institutions, classes, and groupings that are inserted into this or that state process or state project, the state being anyming bnt a static form or edifice that can be counterpoised to "markets" or �multi­ lateral institntions" or "transnational corporations." See, for instance, Cumings, "The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," 44-8,; Johnson, �Political lnstitntions and Economic Performance," 136-64; Deyo, Bencatb the Miracle; Maxfield, GOl'ernilW Capital; \..\'00, Rnet ro the Swift; Reno, Corruption and State l'oIitics ill SicrTa Ltollc; Mamdani, Citiztll alld Sub­

ject; Chang, �The Market, the State and Institutions in Economic Develop­ ment;' 41-60. 2 For useful general discussion of these two principles and meir implications, see, i ter alia, Escobar, EIICllllllterilW DCI'elopmmt; Larrain, 7h((}riei ofDel'eloplllmt; n Leys, TIJt Hire and Fall ofDCldopmmt 7heory; Toye, DilmmUIJ (}fDel'l:iopmellt. 3 United Nations Development Programme, Humnll Dtl'tloplllem Htport 1fl97. i 1.5 tinles the combinL-d na­ 4 The claim that the net worth of ten billionaires s tional income of the forty-eight least developed nations was the focus of the article by Larry Elliott and Victoria Brittain, "Seven Richest Could End World Poverty," Mallcbutcr Glilln/inli Weekly, 22 June 1997. The United Nations De­ velopment Programme, Humall Del'(IoPIll�lItfuport1997, estimated mat me cost of its proposed S80 billion antipoverty program could be covered by the wealth of seven billionaires. The. "stmcmral adjnsUllent" programs advocated by the international Monetary Fund and the World Bank for developing countries re­ quire the wholesale elimillation of expenditure on education, healm, and social services, and dlis in cownries that may be experiencing a decrease in the years of average life expectancy. 5 UniH:d Nations D<'velopment Programme, Humall Del'tlopmmt Report2005, 3. The HDI (HllllJlI Development Index) is a composite indicator encompass­ ing three key aspects of human well-being: income, education, and health. As the Hmnall Del'elopmmt RefX'rt puts it, "The HDI is a barometer for changes in human well-being and for comparing progress in different regions� (21). The next few statistical items in me main body of the text are takenfrom this report, Jlld the pagination is cited in parendlescs. NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

323

6 It is interesting to note dlat while the incidence ofdollar-a-day poverty fell by 50 percent between 1990 and l.OOl, 90 percent of that decline took place between 1990 and 1996, with declines since the mid-IWos falling at one-fifth of the 198096 rate. See United Nations Development Programme, Human DCl'tlopment

Report 2005, H. 7 United Nations Development Programme, Human DCI'Clopm&IJtReport 2005 de­ fines a "stagnation period� as "a year in which a country's per capita income is lower than that of any time in the. past two years and higher than at any time in the subsequent four years� (18, n. "3). 8 Thus in 199.. the GNP per capita in Rwanda and '\Iozambique was S80 and S90, respectively, and in the United States 0$25,800, Japan 0$300,630, and Swinerland S37,930. In 199" average life expectancy at birth in Moz�mbique was ..6 years (no figures were available for Rwanda), in the United SUtes 77, Swinerbnd 78, and Japan 79. See the World Bank's World DCI'Cloplllt1lt Report 19¢, 188-89. In 2005 the GOP per cJpita in Rwanda 'Uld MozJmbique was SI,206 and 0$1,2,,2, respectively, and in the United States S"I,8\1O, Japan $31,267, and Swinerland S35,6". (The 199.. and 2005 figures have not been standardized for purchasing power parity and so are somewhat misleading, even if they convey an accurate enough picruee of intercountry income disparities.) In the 2oo0-l.005 period, average life expectancy at birth n i Mozambique h�d declined to .... years, while Rwanda's was "3."; the United States, Switzerland, and Japan registered gains in life expectancy n i comparison to 1993, achieving figures of 77.", 80.7, and 81.9 years, respectively. Sl"C '''orld Bank, WorldDel'l:lopmmtReport2006, 292-93; United Nations Development Program, Hmnntl DCI'Cwplllcnt}&port 2007/2008. 9 See Milanovic, IVorldJ: Apart. In this incisive and detailed study, Milanovic de­ fines these four categories (rich, contenders, Third \Norld, t:ourth World) by first stating that the dividing line between the rich and the contenders is deter­ mined by using the GDP per capita of the poorest WENAO country (i.e., COUll­ tries of Western Europe, North America, and Oceania, excluding Turkey) as the demarcation point between rich countries and those just behind them (the contenders). Hence in 1960 and 1978 the poorest WENAO country was Por­ mgal, with a GOP per capita of S3,205 and S7,993, respectively (these figures being adjusted to establish purcha�ing power parity, or 1'1'1'). In 2000 the poor­ est WENAO country was Greece, with a GDP per capita of $13,821 (adjusted for 1'1'1'). Countries above this demarcation point were classified as rich, and countries with a GOP no more than one-third below the. least affluent WENAO country were termed Ucontenders." Contenders are "within striking distance lofl catching up and joining the rich.� u·Ihird World countries arc those with a per capita GDp level within one-[thirdl and two-thirds of the. least affluent WENAO country, and thus are not within �striking distance ofthe rich since their incomes would on average be only about one-half of the poorest WENAO coun­ try." Finally, l;ourth World countries are those "very poor" countries whose

32"

NOTES TO CHAPTER ..

GDPS are less

than a third of the per capita

CDP of the least affluent WENAO

country. See Miianovic, �Vorld., Apart, 61-62. 10 See Milanovic,

World!- Apart, 68-69.

11 These points are made by Ajit Singh, from whom these figures are taken, in "The Actual Crisis of the 19805," 10+-6. Singh also notes that virmally throughout the 1980s, a decade of economic recession, the Latin American and African coumries made net resource. transfers to the. developed coumries, rather than vice versa; in 198+-85 alone the Latin American and African countries trans­

to the developed nations. In a paper published in 2000 Singh writes, "Developing countries need to attain a ferred S+o billion and S5 billion, respectively,

trend increase n i their growth ratcs, possibly to their pre-ly80 long-term rates of about 6 per cent per year . . . to achieve and maintain meaningful 'full em­ ployment' . , . with rising real wages and n i creasing standards of Jiving�

(Global

Economi£ Trclllu and Socinl DC1'l:lopmCllt). 12 See "Int'ome Inequality and Poveny Rising in Most OEeD Countries," a sum­ mary of Growing

Unequal: 11Icume D�triburioll and l'Ol>erty ill OEeD COlli/trw,

www.oecd.org, accessedon26 0ctober 2008. 13 The claim that 1 percent of global income s i

all that is needed to eliminate

poverty worldwide is perhaps unrealistic, given the complex causal relation­ ship between economic factors and human capacities that has to be taken imo account in any characteri7..J.tion of poverty. Ihe United Nations Development I'rogramme's 1996 HmlUlII DCl'e1()PIll�lItReporttried to reflect this complexity by having two sets of indices of poverty, �income poverty" and "human poverty,� bllt this only emphasized the difficulties involvlxl ill mak ing plausible the claim dlat global poverty can be eliminated by expending 1 percent of the world's mcome. The subsequent espousal by the Hmnnll lJel'(lopmwt Report of the Human Development Index, taking into account education and health as well as income n i ascertaining the. standard of living, s i certainly J methodological advance on previous reports. But the 2005 Rrport's claim that .$300 billion, which "repre­ sents 1.6% of the income of the richest 10% of the world's popuiation," will "[ lift] 1 billion people living on less than .$1 a day above the extreme poverty line threshold" (+) is implausible in the absence of spl"<:ific proposals for achieving a rapid and irreversible transfer ofwealth from the world's richest inhabitants. Ihe 2005

Report goes on to recommend "achieving sustainable dynamic processes

through which poorcountrics and poor people can produce their way out ofex­ treme deprivation" (+). ""Dynanlic processes" in such statements is a typical ex­ ample of n i te.rnational organi7..J.tion boilerplate prose; it means nothing unless the richest 10 pereent of the world's population ean Jctually be brought to the point of relinquishing 1.6 percent of their ineome, so the crucial question has to be the one of bringing about this desired state of affairs. Liberal-democratic appeals to good intentions (charity, voluntarism, etc.) have been issued in the

NOTES TO CHAPTER +

325

West for cenUlries to no real effect, and programs of signifiGlllt and immediate economic redistribution are deemed invariably to be (too) " revolutionary,� and thus unfeasible, in this postpolitical age. Precisely! For the very poorest, and those. in solidarity with them, the alternative therefore is rl"Volution, or noth­ ing. The world's poorest people GUI only weep every time they Sl"C Bono or Bob Geldof or Sting appearing at the side of Tony Blair or George W. Bush, since such appearances give the impression that Bbir and Bush arc serious about dIe plight of the hungry and homeless. For a critique of Bono and Geldof and thcir fondness for photo ops with politicians who pa)' lip service to the needs of the. poor, see Schlosberg, "The Day the Music Failed." 14 It is impoITant that the question of EastAsian economic success be broached be.­ cause American apologists for neoliberalism such as Thomas Friedman arc fond of citing the. East Asian �tigereconolllies� as exempbrs for poorer countries-as if thcre were one simple recipe for economic advancemem that these countries have no alternative but to follow! 'Thcre arc numerous studies of the East Asian crisis, and ! have benefited from reading the following: Jomo K. S., Tigers in

Tnmble; Michie and Grieve Smith, GlobalI1I5tability; Akyiiz, l-d., EmtA.rinn De­ I'clopmmt; Pcmpel, TI,e 1'0litic5 oftbe AiialJ EcomllllicCrisis; Noble and Ravcnhill, Tlx AJiali Financial Crisis and tbe Architecture ofGlobnl Finance; Chang, Pallla l , and Whittaker, FilJllllcial Libcmlizati(l/J and tlx Aiian Cffiii; Stiglitz and Yusuf, /l.J;thiliking tlx EastA.rinn Miracle; Jomo K. 5., After tbe Sturm; Chang, Ihe Emt .AJian Del'clopmmt Experimce. On these transformations I have consultl-d Griffith-Jones and Leape, Capital Howl'to Dm'loping Collntries. A bter version ofthis paper authored by Griffith­ Jones is at www.gapresearch.org, accessed on 7 January 2006. References arc to the bttcr paper. Sec also Harris, "Imernational Financial Markets and Na­ tional Transmission Mechanisms," 199-212; Scn, �On Financial Fragility and Its Global Implications," 35-59. A good slUlllllary of the changes that have taken pbce in the global financial architl"<:Ulre of thc past two decades is in Griffith­ Jones, "Regulatory implications of Global hllancial Markets," 174-97. lhe in­ stitutional basis of dlese shifts is discussed in Woods, -n,e Political EC{l//OI/I.Y of Globalizato i n. More recently, there is a mine of data and information in the historically inflected overviews given in Obstfeld and Taylor, Global Cllpiml

Mnrken; Andrews, Hennings, and ('auly, GOI'ertlil!9 tbe Worldj-M{l/Jey. A nseful conspectus of the global financial architecture is in Michie, Ihe Handbook of Globnlimtioll. 15 Griffith-Jones, Capital Flowi to DcI'c1apillg Cmllltrics, 2. 16 institute of International Finance, www.iif.com. accessed 6 January 1.005. The projected figures for 2005 arc expected to be ncar those. of 1.004. 17 Institute of International Finance, www.iif.com.accessed 20 Ma)' 2008. 18 On this investment growth, Sl"C tables 2 and 3 in chapter 3. 19 The capacity of present-day stock markets to deviate from "flUldamcntals" for considerable periods is found not only in the stock e.'l:changes of the emerging 326

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

countries but also in the established stock markets of London and New York. See Singh, " Portfolio Equity Flows," 24. See also Aglietta, " Financial Fragility, Crises, and the Stakes of Prudential Control," 293-,01. 20 On "fictitious capital," see Marx,

Clipitlll, vol.

" part 5; Harris, "Alternative

Perspectives on the Financial System"; Tobin, "'ProIOh'lle,� xii. 21 Khan, "Recent DevclopmenL� in International Financial Markets," 52. Khan is now

3

senior offici31 with the

IMF. Grantlxi that dlere is no consensus on

the effects created in host country financial markeL� by rises in foreign inter­ est rates, there is also no consensus on the specific impact of foreign portfolio investment on domestic country exchange rates, especially expected exchange ratcs. Empirical work is still being done here. One study that shows a corre­ lation between the inflow and outflow of portfolio investme.nt in and out of Mexico and the behavior of U.S. interest rates is Grabel, "Marketing the Ihird World," 1761-76. lbe often highly complex transaction mechanisms for these new markets have not been around for very long, and information on them is still incomplete, though becoming less scarce. But Mohsin Khan's advice was hopelessly inadequate from the beginning. The

lDCS Gill try to be "'prudent"

and "implement sound stmctural policies" but still not auran foreign invest­ ment or redu(·e their poverty levels. A more productive assessment than Khan's of the potential problems posed by transnational portfolio capital of this kind is given n i Devlin, Hrench-Davis, and Griffith-Jones, "Surges in Capital Hows and Development," 225-60. See also Weeks, "The Essence and Appearance of Globalization," 50-74; ['alley, "'[ntemational Finance and Global Deflation;97-110. 22 See Griffith-Jones and Stallings, "New Global Financial Trends," 164. The option of borrowing from foreign banks to deal with an

lDC'S intemal eco­

nomic exigencies has now been virUlaJJy eliminated by the bank liquidity ctisis in the OECD countries. [f Hies are facing a sl-emingly unprC(:edented crisis, the plight of the poorer countries is, given the balance of probabilities, more likely to be devastating. 2, For these figures, see Tobin, "Prologue," xvi. According to the World Bank, in 1990 there were 2,2 emerging market funds throughout the world, with net as­ seL� totaling $13.7 billion. By mid-1995 these had increased nearly sixfold, with estimated net assets of about $12, billion. See World Bank,

World Dcbt TahIti, 20. For the 2005 figure, see Merrill Lynch and Capgemin i, World Wmltb RCf¥Jrt

2005·

24 [nl995 "Ialaysia had J services account deficit ofS6.7 billion (20 billion ringgit), due mainly to foreign companies repatriating profits from their investments. See FllrEmtcrII Ecmwmic Rel'iell', 12 December 1997, 65. The propensity for"'fast money" to gravitate toward propertydevclopment and speculation is borne out by the fact that in Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia, the volume ofnewly construned offiee spJ(·e in 1997 alone exceeded the volume for the whole of the preceding ten years, and the supply of retail space in 1998 represented J rise of

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

327

140 percent from 1995 levels. See Far ElHtern Economic R�]liclV, 15 May 1997, SO.

25 On the inconsistent triad or -trilemma" of capital mobility, stable exchange rates, and monetary policy independence, see B. J. Cohen, "Phoenix Ri�en"; Obstfcld and Taylor, Globnl Capital Marketl, 29-31. On the thesis that in prin­ ciple capital mobility disposes govenmlents to seek a multilateral {·ooperative fTamnvork for monetary and fiscal policy adjustments, see Andrews, "Capital Mobility and State Autonomy"; Andrews and Willett, "Financial Interdepen­ dence and the State." "Chere is an ample Iiterarure indicating that, globalization notwithstanding, national governments do have room to make macroeconomic policy changes that stabilize overseas capital flows. See, inter alia, Harris, "H­ nancial Markets and the Real Economy," 60-72; Goodman and Pauly, "The Ob­ solescence of Capital Controls," Goodman and Pauly make the argument that there need not be a separation between (longer term) foreign direct investment and (short-term) portfolio capital since the political arrangements devised to deal with the latter will have implications for the former (81). 26 Andrews and Willett, '"Financial Interdependence and the State," 487, make the relevant point that the United States can pursue fiscal policies that cause significant flucfilations in the dollar, whereas the {·ourse taken by the dollar on international cnrrency markets rarely affects U.S. fi�cal policy. At the time of this writing the U.S. dollar has reachl..:! historical lows against the euro, and yet nothing has changed significantly in U.S. mauoeconomic policy in responsc. Few other countries enjoy the luxury of being able to overlook to such a de­ gree the impact of fiscal policy on their currencies, and vice versa. The greater economic flexibility afforded wealthy conntries such as the. United States was noted sixty years ago by Albert Hirschman in Natiolial POll'cralld rbe Strllctflre oj JlltenUltionmTmdc. For the problems small states enconnter when international markets are able to constrain domestic economic policy, see Katzenstein, SmaU

Stares in World MlIrketJ. 27 lhere were of course other factors at work in the Mex ican collapse, not least the vast amounts of foreign eqnity capital that flowed into Mexico in the 1990S. iktween 1992 and 1994 the average annual capital inflow rate was 8 percent of

GDI' (as opposcd to 5 percent of GDI' during the previous peak in 1977-81). The share price index in the "kxican stock market rose from 250 in 1989 to 2,s00 in 1994, even though its averagl> allnual G DP growth rate betw('Cn 1990 and 1994 was only 2.5 percent, and even though Mexico's current JCCOWU deficit in 1993 was $20 billion, representing 6 percent of GDP (it rose to 9 percent of GDp in 1994). On the matter of high interest rates, it should be ack nowk-dgcd that the Bundesbank was also pursuing a policy ofhigh interC5t ratC5 in the early 1990S. After the collapse, Mexico's real GDp fell by 7 percent n i 1995, and that in Argen­ tina by 5 percent through

J

-knock-on� effect. For this, see Singh, ''I'onfolio

Equity Flows," 26. The similarities between Mexico and Argentina and some of the East Asian countries a fl'W years bter are easy to Sl'C. 328

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

L8 Thc dot-com boom of thc Iatc 1990S endcd very quickly, and thc United States startcd to go into recession in Lool. llle U.S. expansion that has takcn place since LOO3 has now petered out with thc current financial crisis, so dcpcndcnt was this expansion on a housing markct boom that collapsed predpitously. japan is only now emerging, albeit fitfully and vcry slowly, from a decade and a half of recession, and thc Western European nations still face high Icvels of wlemploymcnt and relatively low growth ratcs. L9 These �market-fricndly" injunctions are contained in thc World Bank's influen­ tial World D{l'{Wpmmt }{(porr published in 1991 (sec espl"Cially 5). Thc United Nations Development Programme, Hlfmnll DeJ'l:loplIICllr Report 1997, after chronicling thc widening gap betwcen wealthier and poorer countries (a gap that has a great deal to do with thc illhospitability poorcr cOlunries experience "systcmically� at thc hand of international tradc regimes that use "free trade" and "'open markcts" as shibboleths), still brings itself to ('ommcnd the markct as a solution to thc. plight of the poor: "Markct compctition otters an important way n i which people, especially poor peoplc, can escape economic domination by exploitative governmcnt, big landlords and big retailers" (102). 30 For thc. World Bank's assessment of East Asia's cconomic success, see its pub­ lication Tli( Emt Asian Miradr. Robert \Vade provides a fascinating account of the ways this rcport was gerrymandcred to fit thc tcrms of the Bank's neolibe.ral idl"ology in ""japan, thc World Bank, and the Art of Paradigm Maintenance." The Bank's World LXl'(lopJ//wt R{port 1997 backtracks on its earlier and sheerly idl'Ologicai hostility to the state, but tries to show that state intervention, whose effl"Ctiveness in some cases the Bank now grndgingly acknowledges, is none­ theless compatible with "market friendliness," As Lance Taylor notlxi in �Edi­ torial: Thc Rl"Vival of the Libcral Crl"ed," there have been other reccnt changes n i the World Bank's policy disposition: the already noted �recognition of thc m i portance of at least functional public intcrvention" and �thc. need to provide supporting revenues; realization that controls on e..uerna! capiral movements and pmdential regulation can help contain finandal fragility; abandonmcnt of the doctrinc that raising the local intercst rate will stimulate saving and thereby growth; initiativcs to roll over or forgive the bulk of official dcbt owed by thc JXlorest economies." At the same timc, Taylor rightly believes that thc World Bank is still some way short of adopting policies that fully support tlle. eco­ nomic advancement of lower-in("ome countries. A vcry similar assessment is to be found in Singh, "Openness and the Markct hic.ndly Approach to Develop­ ment:' who provides trenchant critidsm of the Total Factor Productivity model that underlies thc World Bank's approa{"h to dn·eloping countries. This model, says Singh, unrcalistically assumes " full employmcnt of resources and perfect compctition, nonc of which obtain in the rea! world. Morl'Over, it is a wholly supply-side model which ignores altogether the role of dcmand-factors" (1813). 'UtC problcm with Singh's argument, howevcr, is his belief that thc institutional

basis for thc japanese model of economic growth was replicated by Taiwan and

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 329

South Korea, with Indonesia and Malaysia possibly following close behind. The latter part of this claim will appear wildly implausible to anyone with firsthand experience of the cormption·ridden bureaucracies of Indonesia and Malaysia. 31 For Arrighi, see Ihe LOllg Tll'mtieth Cmtllry and " Workers of the ,Vorld at Cen­ tury's End." Though Arrighi s i careful to acknowledge that ....it is not at all dear whether the emergent Japanese leadership can actually transbte into a fifth sys­ temic cycle of aenunubtion" (3:15), I shall argue below that it is possible that the emerging or next system ofaccumulation may not be one thatcan be 11Ilder­ stood in terms of J national hegemony that makes intelligible or plausible the notion of a leadership exercised in these terms by Japan or China or anyone else. 'nle view that the rise of the East Asian nations has startlxi to put an end to U.S. economic supremacy is complemented in some quarters by the conviction that their emergence as economic powers also effectively discredits dependency theory, whieh maintains that nations outside the capitalist core, such as the East Asian economies, find it stmcturally difficult if not impossible to leave behind their initial "peripherar or �semiperipheral" developmental situations. For such a view, see Doner, "Limits ofState Strength," 398; Hawes and Liu, "Explaining the Dynamics of the Southeast Asian Political Economy," 630. More recentiy, Arrighi has champiolllxi China as the successor of the American economic hegemony. See his Adam Smitb

ill Beijing.

Arrighi's arglilllent is detaikxi and

sophisticated and Gill be responded to only in a similarly detailed way. Suffice it to say that while he seems to be right in his assessment of the unraveling of America's hegemony, China will not really become the next global economic hegemon until it is able to command financial markets and their accompanying n i stmments n i the ways the U.S. and Western Europe have at their disposal. 32 See International Monetary Fund, (;loIml Fillaucial Stability J{eporr.

B See OECO, �Total Assets of Private Pension Funds within OECO Countries (2001),� www.oecd.org, accesslxi on7 January 2006. H In this connection Lance Taylor has noted that "Ihalf] the people and

two­

thirds of the countries in the world lack full control over their own economic policy. Expatriate 'experts' managed by industrial cOllntry nJtionais and based n i Washington DC regulate their macroeconomics, investment projecL �, and social spending� ("Editorial," 145). 35 On this, sec Fishlow, " Economic Development in the 1990S," 1826. Fishlow makes the point that the World Bank has consistentiy ignored the issue of in­ come distribution, emphasi7ing instead tile question of higher pr<xluctivity. ! am

indebted to his account in the rest of this paragraph.

36 Thus, Jccording to UNCTAO 's World imutmmtDirectury 2V04, in Latin America Jnd the Caribbean "[ FOI l flows were down by 4% in 2003 and an overall 55% between 1999 and 2003." The same report does say, however, that this decline shows signs of bonoming out. This note of optimism perhaps reflects the. fact that n i 2004 developing country GOP grew by the record figure of 6.6 percent, J trend that had begun in 200;. But at the sJllle time, net capital flows to devel-

330

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

oping conntrics rcachcd 4.5 perccnt of thcir GOP, still somc way below thc high figurc ofovcr 6 perccnt attaincd in thc mid-l99oS. Scc Wurld Bank, Global DtI'tl­

uplllmt Finallct .WOf, http://sitcresourees.worldbank.org, acccsscd un 9 January 2006. 37 To quote the \.Vorld Bank, �Net FDI inflows Ito sub-Saharan Afrieal JIllOlmted to $11 billion in 2004, compJred to portfolio lXJuity inflows of S3.5 billion JIld privatc debt inflows of under S2 billion. Oil producing countries, notably An­ gola and Nigeria, along with the. largest cconomy in the region, South Africa, Jccounted for 36 pcrcent of thc FDI inflows to thc region, below thc averagc of 53 perccnt over thc prcvious sevcn ycars. All of the portfolio equity flows and most of thc privatc dcbt flows arc conccntratlxl in South Africa." See World Bank,

Global DClduplllmt Fill/met ..!ODS, hrrp://siteresources.worldb,mk.org, ac­

cessed on 9 January 2006. 38 Akyliz and Gore, �The Investment-Profits Ncxus in East Asian Industrializa­ tion," cmphasize dlC importancc n i East Asian growth of overall capital accu­ mulation and thc rolc of govcnmlent in spccding it up. Many analysts, includ­ ing thosc at the World BJIlk, havc tcndcd to stress thc importancc of resource allocation for East Asian industrialization at thc expcnsc of thc inte.ractions be­ tWl>en profits JIld n i vestment. I don't want to generalizc thc East Asian model, bnt thc importance of profits and investmcnt for growth highlightcd by Akyiiz and Gore puts in cven plainer relicf the. prcdicament of many LDCS, who simply do not havc the rcsourccs to invcst in growth. For Samir Amin, scc his Capital­

um ill tlx Age if Globalizatiol/. In my characterizations of unevcn dcvelopment and thc ....thcorizations" of it providcd by marxists, I havc had Amin's pionccr­ ing work most in mind, though I havc tricd to remain aware of thc differences betwcen him and other mcmbers of this tradition. 39 Kozul-Wright, �Mind thc Gaps," 58. 40 Kozul-\'Vright, "Mind the Gaps," 59. Kozul-Wriglu's argumcnt is supportcd by \.Vadc, "financial Regime Changc!," who shows that China's risc Jccounts ovcrwhelmingly for what many rcgard (mistakenly!) as

ol'erall LDC cconomic

advancement sincc thc 1980s, and morcovcr dlat China's economic succcss is not duc to thc "open markct" shibboleths undcrwrittcn by thc ncolibcral con­ scnsus, but rather by a govcrnmcnt-drivcn and strictly rcgulated dcvelopment policy. The stJte, and not markcts, has bcen thc drivcr of China's economic growth. 41 [t is precisely fur this rcason that Ernesto Laclau rcgardcd dcpendcncy thcory as a dlviation from marxism. According to Laclau, dcpendcncy thl'Ory eschcws analysis of thc mode of production Jnd the relations of produnion (for Laclau thc hcart ofmarxism) in favor of the analysis ofdlC system of c.>:changc bctwecn nations. Sec his "Fcudalism and Capitalism in Latin America." 42 Scc Arrighi, ""Hcgcmony Unravclling: Part 2.,'" 87. 43 Arrighi, '"Financial ExpJllsions in World Historical Pcrspectivc," 155; scc also Arrighi, '"Hegemony Unravelling: Part 2," 86. I take. this description ofhis posi-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

HI

tion from Arrighi's somewhat heated response to a review ofhis book by Robert Pollin. See. Pollin, " Contemporary Economic Stagnation in World Historical Perspective." I don't mean to adjudicate n i this exchange, and merely use part of Arrighi's response bl'uuse it contains an excellent summary of the position he sets out in ·nx Long Tll'(//t�tb Cmtllry. 44 Arrighi, ....Financial Expansions," 157. See also Arrighi and Silver, CbnOJ alUi GOI'­

"/lanre ill the AiodeTII World System. 45 Arrighi, "Financial E"pansions," .." 157. I'ollin agrees with Arrighi on this point (that all financial expansions are succeedlxl by their material counterparts) in "Contemporary Economic Stagnation," 115-17. 46 That no such Hegelian

IVclweist s i at work in Arrighi's

architectonic is dear

from his insistence that "sustained financial expansions materialize only when the enhanct"
makes financial expansion possible withont the promptings of interstate compe­ tition (a notion Arrighi gets from 'Veber) since (1) the overwhelming majority of states are in no position structurally to join this competition even at the most rudimentary level, and (2) the new kinds of capital come in a bewildering number of forms (which are often hybridized) and move at such velocities that states cannot "compete" for them in the old ways. Even the \Vorld Bank, for all its enthusiasm in fostering what it takes to be competitive trade and markets, Gill

do no more than enjoin

lDCS who

are an:'\ious to attract sllch capital to

"keep exchange rates favorable" and have "sound macroeconomic fundamen­ tals." Though well meant, such prefectural advice is simply gratuitous and akin to the injllllction that pupils should give it a go when competing in the school three-legged race. But the World Bank's vapidity in this context is profowldly symptomatic; as the preceding discllssion has shown, there is virtllally nothing that most undeveloped countries can do at present to create "adl'quJte 'demand' conditions" for mobile portfolio capital. Warren Buffen does not stay up at night pondering over a possible lucrative n i vestment opportunity that Berk­ shire Hathaway (his investment company) could exploit in EastTimor or Mali. And yet, until the current financial collapse, this has been an era of prodigious expansion of financial capital. 47 Arrighi considers roughly similar scenarios in his epilogue to -n,& Lollg TiI'C1I­ fiet"

Century when he outlines three possible

outcomes that may transpire in

the event of a supersession of the U.S. regime of accumulation (354-55). First, the United States may use its military and political power to retain the surplus capital that would otherwise go to J new center of accumulation, in which case

332

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

it would become. "a truly global world empire." Second, East Asian capital may supersede the American regime, but since the new regime would not have the military and global political power of its predeccssor, "dle underlying layer of dle market economy would revert to some kind of anarchic order." Third, capi­ talist history may be terminated by the growing violence that its various orders have spawned in the past six hundred years. The argument broa{"hed in the final part of this chapter poses an alternative to dlese three scenarios. I maintain that J polynucleated, multispatial regime of global capitalist JC{"unnuation now pre­ vails, one premised on diftcrent and sometimes quite radical degrees of sePJl"J­ tion betw{'Cn Marx's two primary forms of capital, namely, productive capital and finance (or financial) capital. The term "finance CJpital" does not occur in Marx's oeuvre, but chapter 1.7 of voluille :1 of Capital ("The Role of Credit in Capitalist Production" ) was the basis of the fuller elaboration of the concept n i Hilferding's Fillallzkapital. Marx did suggest that there were two ways of extending the means of credit available to industrial capital that correspond n i brief outline to Hilferding's two notions of productive capital and finance capital. 48 There is a problem in mapping the distinctions made in this chapter onto Arrighi's distinction betwl-en the " material phase" M C and tlle "financial phase" C M' of a systemic cycle ofaccumulation. Pollin suggests that Arrighi's renditions of Marx's formulas are problematic because they "obscure the logic operating in both phases," namely, that more money (profits) must ensue at the. end of each of these processes. This may be so. In this chapter, howcver, the dis­ tinction between "productive capital" and "financial capital" refers not so much to two alternating phases as to two different spatial configurations or logics for the organization of capital. Consequently, "productive capital" and �financial capital" do not map easily onto (Arrighi's) .,11 - C and C MI, respectively, and I use "productive capital" and "financial capital" rather than his formulas in giving my account. In �Hegemony Unravelling: Part 1" and "Hegemony Unravelling: Part 1." Arrighi borrows David Harvey's notion of J "spatial fix" to talk about the forms of reorgalli;r;ation created by new phases of accuillulation, but this emphasis on spatiality is still compatible with his axiomatic presump­ tion that distinct phases of accunmbtion succeed each other epochally (i.e., temporally). 49 Helleiner, ""nle World of Money," 1.95. The volwne of transactions on foreign �

�

�

exchange markets more than quadrupled between 1986 and 1992, and the daily total rcported gross turnover rose from $9:J2 billion in April 1989 to $1,354billion n i April 1991-, J rise of :IS percent. For these figures, see Eichengreen, IlItCrimtiollm Monetary ArrallgemmCJfor the 21ft Cmtury, 61. Eichengreen also notes that the volume of net dai l y foreign exchange transactions now exceeds dle total official reserves of all LI,IF member countries combined (64). The IMF had 178 member nations in December 199:1 (Eichengreen's time of writing).

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

3:13

50 I'or these figures, sec thespeloch by U.S. Securities and Exchange ('"ommissioner

Roel C. Campos on 13 June 2005, www.sec.gov, accessed on 9 January 2006. 51 On dlis, sec Germain, TIx illterllntiontll OwnlJizatioli ofCr(dit, 161.

52 The importance of path dependency is recognized in Pollin, �Contemporary Economic

Stagnation, 117. �

53 l'ollin, "Contemporary Economic Stagnation," 116. lhis question is posed oc­ cause it is m i portant

for Arrighi and Pollin, though, as will be. seen, it is not

necessary for us to answer it f i we think of the relation between financial capital and productive capital in terms other than those of alternation or succession. 54

Arrighi, TIJe umg Twt:lltiffb Century, 14S.

55 On American Airlines,

sec Harmes, ln5tinnionJl ltwestors, 112; for Falmie "

�

Mac and Freddie Mac, sec Henwood, IVnll Streff, 91. Henwood's book s i a remarkable source of information for anyone imerested in the myriad new and differem ways in which the current capital recycling mechanism works. 56 The details

arc given inmy unpublished paper "The 1997-8 East Asian Financial

Crisis. 57 Sec Arrighi, TIJe Long Twentieth C.mtlfry, ,25-56, for his assessment of East �

Asia's economic

advance, made prior to the collapse in 1997 of the region's

economics. Arrighi is right to emphasize the importance of "cheap-labor seek­ ing investment" in taken

promoting regional growth, but account also needs to be

of the path-dependent stmcrural sensitivity of the industrial policies of

the Southeast Asian

governments to what was happening in Northeast Asia

in the mid-19S0S. On this strutTural

sensitivity, see /omo K. S, et aI., Sollthenst

kn i J MiwndtTitood.Miracle, 160.

58

Dani Rodrik has rightly called this U.S. dence game,�

ac(()mplishment�

u

a "financial confi­

and says that it amounts to "a boon for the U.S. Treasury but a

rotten deal for the home economy." Sec " ''' hy Hnancial Markets Misbehave," 190.

59 I take the term "'investor aristocracy"

from Harmes, "lnstirutional lnvestors,"

114, where it s i

used to designate those. workers who may have belonged to a "labor aristocracy in the days of the Keynesian and New Deal economic dis­ "

pensation, but who (in considerably smaller numbers) investors by the succeeding phase of accumulation.

arc now transformed into

It is important to note that

an effective state formation is a prerequisite for the United States successfully to channel into the fiscal

system tax rl'Venues harvested from stock exchange

speculation. The. role ofthe state as the forcing house par excellence for securing ta.,\ revenues has ocen strcssed by Max Weocr and Michael Mann. For Mallll, see

"The Autonomous l'ower of the State," 109-,6. Sec also Hobson, The IVenlth of Smm, csplocially 252-B. Marxists need to engage more strenuously with this

neo-Weocrian approach to the state system if thl)' are to analyze satisfactorily the ensemble. of substructures that make up the FCSR. 60

Sec especially Samir Amin, Ddinki,w; Diaz-Alejandro, "Ddinking North and South," 72-121.

314

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

G mptcrJ. Delillkillg 1

For a powerful critique oIthe way such international organizJtions as the World Bank systematically exclude any consideration of the class-based nature of the J.!I.xation of surpluses in capitalist regimes, Sl"C Wolff, "World Bank/Class Blind­ ness," 172-83. "Class" here is understood as a particular kind of social structure needed to organize and allocate. surpluses. Harriss, Dcpoliticizing Delylopmellt, shows how the \Vorld Hank's newfound interest in the notion of"social capital," an emphasis associated with Joseph Stiglitz's previous tenure as its chief econo­ mist, serves to efface the effects of class divisions in the poor countries.

1.

The magnitude of the North·South polarization is reflected in the bct that the so·ealk-d three Northern blocs (the United States, Europe, and JapJn and East Asia) between them acconnt for over

80 percent of world production,

trade,

and finance and over 95 percent of global research Jnd development. On this see Mann, "The Hrst Failed Empire of the Twenty-First CenUiry,"

3

58.

Anyone who thinks that the poor nations benefit from such compliance need only look at the fate of the privatization ofTatll.ania's water snpply, imposed by the World Bank as a condition of debt forgiveness. The Tanzanian govenilllent subsequently cancelled the privatization contract n i ;W05 because of the British­ Germatl consortinm's poor performance. Numerous such privatizations have been imposed on Third World conntries as a part of structural adjustment pro­ grams. On the Tanzania water supply case, see Vidal, "Flagship Water Privatisa­ tion Fails n i TJlll-Jllia," 1he Gliardul1I, 25 May 2005. On the narrow tl",-·hnocratic criteria used by the World Bank to assess development projects, see Pincus, "State Simplification and Institutional Building.�

4 In this account, "exploitation" refers ro the appropriation of a society's surplus product by a particular class or social group. As Marx argued, every society, f i it is ro grow, needs to produce more than is required merely for that society to reproduce itself; the appropriation of this surplus, which typically is created by every productive force in that society, by one class or social group therefore in­ volves tile exploitation (by that appropriating class or group) of the. otherdasses and groups whose productive efforts were an inextricable part of the processes by which that society's surpluses are generated. On this see Foley, "The Value of "'Ioney, the Value of Labor Power, and the Marxian Transformation Problem."

5

laylor, "Economic Openness,"

91-147. Those

inclined to

be sanguine

about

the way LDCS are treated by the World BatIk and

IMF can find in press reports numerousexalllpiesofhow these organizations "advise" the poorest LDCS, such a� Sierra Leone after the end of its recent civil war. According to a report in nJ& Gllardian: Even before Sierra Leone's u-year civil war ended in February 2002, the aid advisers from Washington and London had arrived in the capital of Free­ town with their prescriptions for developmellt and tackling poverty. ·Their solution to the problems ofthesccond poorest country in the world

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 335

was to privatise virtually the entire country, including, most controversially, the national water utility. See David Pallister, "Developing \,vorld OJtlfused by UK Aid Guidelines,� TIJt:

Guardian, 24 September 2005. 6 \Neisbrot, Baker, and Rosnik, " The Scorecard on Dl'velopment," 45-46.

7 laylor, " The Rocky Road to Rcform,� 141. Taylor has analyzed several results from the adoption of the prescriptions enshrined in the Washington consensus and concludes that they have been only barely successful as a reform package, not infrequently providing a combitlation of"high interest rates, stagflation, de.· regulation and financial crashes." This leads him to suggest that LDCS would be betteroffnot underwrititlg capital markets and choosing instead state-provided credit channeled through development banks or made available directly by the government. laylor concludes that "the Bretton ,Voods institutions . . . remain impervious to the. fact that thc invisible hand plus a minimal governmcnt (espe­ cially in its fiscal, regulatory and investment roles) do ,JOt necessarily act togethcr to support sustainable l'Conomic growth" (96). See also Taylor, �Extcrnal Lib­ eralization, Economic Performance, and Distribution in Latin America and Eisewhere,� 166-96. Support for this position is given in the. country studies in Armijo, Fillal/cial GlobaliZlltiOIi alld Donocrluy ill Emerging Markeu.

8 Uki GOlii, "Argentina's Unorthodox Rehab," The Gllordiall, 10 January 2006. 9 For proposals regarding a "new regionalism� that would involve dismantling the World Bank and the [.'.IF, see S. Amin, �Regionalization itl Response to Polarizing Globalization,� 54-84.

10 Rudra, Globalizatioll alld the J�ce to the Bottom in DCI'ClopiniJ COImtrin, has ar­ gued on the basis of empirical studies that while globalization has indl'Cd pro­ moted a "race to the bottom" on the part of the LDCS, the "losers" in the LDCS are not the poor (who have nn'cr benefited from LDC domestic institutions), but the tDC middle classes, who are vulnerable to the opening of LDC domestic institutions to the forces of globalization. II

On this point and for these ratios, see S. Amin, "The Conditions for an Alter­ native Global System Based on Social and International Justice."

12 S. Amin, "The O}[Jditions for an Alternative Global System:' 13 The root of this very powerful fantasy is actually an J.'\iom in neoclassical eco­

nomics now widely discredited outsidc the domain oflK'Udassicism, but which is still entrenched in the thinking of the Washington consensus, namely, the ;tSsumption that the "rational" expectations of self-interested markct actors can be "adjusted" by market forces providlxl those forces are nor "distorted" by governments or other agcncies with an intcrest in market manipulation. On this axiom and its role in LDC economies, see Grabel, "'TIle Political Economy of 'Policy Crl-dibility'�; Shaikh, "The Economic Mythology of Neoliberalism,"

41-49. I-or all his reluctance to move to a policy position that not only repudi­ ates the Washington conscnsus (which he already has) but also regards some form ofpostcapitalism as the only real way beyond this consensus (which he has 336

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

not), Joseph Stiglit7" thcn chief economist at thc World Bank, did begin to see that this ax iom is not really tenable when onc begins to grasp the modus oper­ andi of actually existing capitalism. On Stiglit?" see his collection of spel'Ches and lectures, with a commemary by Chang, in Chang, josep"

Stiglitz ami tbe

�Vorld Htlllk. On the World Bank's problematic instrumcntality with regard to LDC macroeconomic policy, see Pincus and Winters, Ivim't:1ltillg tbe World Htlllk. As Chang points out in hisKickilJg AlI't1J tbe LatidlT, L-3, hardly any of the. developlxl countries now propping up the Washington consensus themselves espoused the nakedly laissez-hire policies they now advocate for LDCS during their own developmemal phases in thc eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See

nJe Wealth ofStatu; Hobson and \\'ciss, Statualld Ecollomi,Delylopmmt; Bergerand Dore, Nnti01miDiFcnitynnd Global CapitnliJm. A move beyond the \Yashington consensus emerged under also the detailed cowury studies in Hobson,

Stiglitz's intelk'Ctual leadcrship at the World Bank, but this "post-Washington consensus" quickly came under fire for focusing too nUKh on market imperfec­ tions while. studiously ignoring questions of power, and thus for adhering to the. very liberal capitalism responsible in the first place for the Third \\'orld's Iaek of developmcnt. For this critique of the "post-WdShington consensus,� sec Fine, Lapavitsas, and PUKUS, DelJ€lopment I'olicy ill FUle, �New Growth Theory,�

the TiI'elJtJ-Fint Cmtury.

See also

1.01-17.

14 -nlis elucidation of Baran and SWl'CZY is takcn from Patnaik, �A Saint and A Sage:' See also Baran and Sweezy, A101wpolJCapitnl; Sweezy, nJelhcU') ojCapi­

tnliJt Del'Clopmcllt. 15 The problem here is that capitalism nl'Cds to treat labor ;loS a full.fledged com­ modity, yet this is impossible. C..vmmodities

arc

fully intersubstitutable, and

while Iabor-substintting tl'Chnology COIJl be introduclxl, and s i being introduced all the time, in this way substimting for workers, in the end therc

CJn

be no

substitution capable of ueatulg a completely workerless environment. Even f i machines did all the work, certain n i formation inputs at least would have to be made by workers or managcr-workers, such as the decision whether to install machines of i)l)e X or type Y.

16 To quote Marx, �A fall in the profit rate, and accelerating accumulation, are simply different expressions of the same process, n i so far as both express the development of productivity . . . there is an acceleration of accumulation, as far a� its mass is

concerned, even though the rate of this accumulation falls with the

tate of profit� «(Apital, :I: H9). There was capitalist centers between

J

severe decline Ul profitability Ul the

1970 and 1990, when the profit rate in the. G7 coun­

tries was on average about 40 percent lower than for thc period 1950-70, while. n i 1990 it was ner,

45 percent below the peak reached in 1965. On this, see R. Bren­

The EWlllnlirr l of Global Tifrblflmu, 186,

figure

11. There is an endless de­

bate. Jmong marxists as to the plausibility of Marx's theory of the falling rate of profit; one such debate is whether the �undef{"onsl\Jnptionist" view (e.g., Baran and Sweezy) s i right or whether the �overaecumulationist" view (e.g., Robert

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 337

Brenner) is more persuasive. For obvious reasons I cannot delve into the details of these debates. Suffice to say that the empirical evidence is firmly on the side of some kind of declining profitability thesis (here Marx was therefore right), as much as we may debate the nature of the precise mechanisms responsible for this decline. My position is that there is a fundamental spatial division between structures of accumulation whit·h enables both these. theories to operate in tan­ dem: the countries in the South generally suffer from underconswnption, while those i.n the. North tend to encounter overcapacity and overprexluction, and in both instances dle rate of profit s i driven down. Hence the. frl"quent exhortation made by economic policymakers n i. \Vashington and London that the Asian economies should save less and consume more! It should also be noted that this theory was extended by Rosa Luxemburg into an accollnt of imperialism; according to Luxemburg, capitalism has to cOlillter the falling rate of profit by seeking new wnes of accumulation, and these are perforce located outside the developl-d capitalist centers. On spatial divisions and their mpact i on accu­ mulation, see R. Brenner, Jessop, Jones, and '\hcLeod, Statt/Space. On weak effective demand in the lDCS, see the empirically detailed studies used in Taylor, "External Liberalization,� 192-93, which lead him to conclude that even when trade regimes were liberalized, �trade . . . held back or added weakly to effective demand" (192).

17 See R. Brenner, The Economics of Global T'lIrblllmC( and TIle Boom and rIle Bubble. -nle page references cited in the text n i the following paragraphs are to TIJt Eto­ Mlllio of Global "filrblilmu. 18 As Michael Parenti points out, the aim here s i for firms, with the ready col­ lusion of governments, to ensure that �the costs are socialized; the profits are privJti7.cd." See. his "Goveflilllent by Giveaway," to which this paragraph s i n i debted. for socialism, since costs are socialized, profits have likewise to be socially owned and distributed. On the impact of the British Conservative government privatizations, see Horio, The GreatDilY5ture, who concludes that these privari7_1tions had Iinle long-term impact on prices and productivity but contributed to a widening of income disparities.

19 United Nations, World ECOIJOlllie Situation alld I'ro5peet5 lOM, www.un.orglesa, accessed on 4- February 2006" 20 United Nations, World £Collolllie Sitl/miml alld I'rmpects lo08, www.un.org/esa, Jccessed on 21 May 2008. The financial crisis worsened rapidly toward dlC end of 2008, so clearly this projeetion of growth for 2009 may need to be revisl-d in the light of recent events.

21 Even the judicious Branko Milanovic comes to the conelusion that the only way to deal with the increasingly entrenched global plutocracy is for there to be a move toward redistribution. See. his Worlds Apart, 157-63.

22 for these proposals, see S. Amin, "The Conditions for an Alternative Global System."

23 The n i terest in removing the causes of poverty is not a nl·W one, nor is it con338 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

fined to marx ist and nco-marxist thinkers. As Gareth Stedman Jones points ont in his invaluable All Elld to Puwrty?, this debate goes back to the late cigh­ teenth century, when it engaged Thomas Paine, Omdorcct, and othcrs. Sec also Thompson, TlJe Politicsufbufjllality, which shows that a strong egalitarian strain existed in the thought of the founding fathcrs of the Republic which has since been extirpated.

Chapter 6. TJl e Politics ofIdentity I The tme picture regarding working-class consciousness in the postwar period is

much more complicated than thc on,· provided in my cursory sketch. Michael Mann's pioneering

CumcwlIsJ/eJ$ and Actwn amlJIIg the We5tCrII WorkilW ClaM,

based on surveys in Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, shows that working-class consciousncss in these countries is marked by a profound "dual­ ism,� so that �co-e:l:isting with a normally passive sense of alienation is an ex­ pericnce of (largely economic) intcrdependence with the employcr at a factual, f i not a normative, level. Surges of class consciou�ness arc continually undercut by economislll, and capitalism survi\"Cs� (68). Mann confirms the picmre givcn in this text, and goes on to say that " those who arc most alicnated and most desperate arc those who arc least confident of their ability to change their situa­ tion. Those who arc most confident in their own power and clearest in their intentions feel lcast embaulcd and disposed towards dcspcrate remedies" (70).

2 Thestultification ofcyeryday life titataccompaniedtheprosperity of the postwar years was mocked in the writings of the Heats in the United States (Ginsberg's

HOIl'I and Kerouac's Dbarma Bum! arc exemplary in this regard). The inappro­ priately named Angry Young Men werc a British parallel to the Beats, but the irr,>verence and contrariness that permeated such works as LllckyJim, Look Back

iJ/ A/wer, and Jwm at the Tup did not last long. By the. time Mrs. Ihatchcr took office in 1979, the erstv.·hilc Angry Young Men (Kingsley Amis, John Braine, John Osborne, and Philip Larkin) had become bibulous old reactionaries with an unstinting admifJtion for hcr policies. I�or the cultural contnt underlying the emergence of thc Angry Young Men, seeAlan Sinfield's c.'l:cellentLiterature, Politic5, alld Cultllre ill Pustll'tlr Britain. For studies of the cultural context for Beat writing, SL'C Mitmen, van der !knt, and van Elteren, Bmt Clilmn; Raskin, American 8crmlll. 3 For two accounts, from rather different persp"ctives, that stress the considerable significance of Ihird World insurrectionary movements for left-wing activist groups in the \Vest in the 1960s, sec Elbaum, J{clYJiutirm ill the Air; K. Ross,May

'68 alld ItI Afterlivc5.

4

The most notable recent auempt to delineate the significance of the new so­ cial movements for the quest for emancipation is probably Laclau and Mouffc,

HtgelilollY and Socialist StratWY.

Sec also their "Post-Marxism without AIXllo­

gies"; Ladau, "Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity," 93-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

H9

108; Mouffc, " Democratic Politics and the Qucstion of Idcntity,"

33-,45. For

commentary, see Landry and MacLcan, "Rercading Laclau and Mouffe�; Fisk, "Post-Marxism," 144-65. For an account which sces the crisis of the New Left as thc ground for the emergcncc of the new social movcmcnts and its subsequcnt identity politics, see Farrcd, �Endgame Idcntity?"; Gilroy, "British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Idcntity," .!23-39.

5

See Palwubo-Liu, "Multiculturalism Now." See also his �Assumcd Idcntities."

6

Palumbo-Liu rcgards Mcad's Alld Krep YIJ/lr PowderDry: All AmbropologutLooks

at America as the locus classicus of this endcavor. Hc s i indebted to the discus­ sion of Mcad and Ruth Bcncdict in Shannon, A IVurld Made Safefor Dif!erwccs. Shannon argucs that the. American politics of idcntity Jrosc not in the so-called countcrcultural 191los, but two dccades before, during thc cold war.

7

See Palumbo-Liu, '''\Iuiticulturalism Now,"

U2-q, quoting Benedict, n)e

CJff)5IllJtbcmmn alld the Swom, 14-15. 8 Palumbo-Liu, "Multiculturalism Now," Unitcd States,"

u5-16.

See also Huntington, "lbc

59-115; 71)e Clmb of Ch·i/iz.ntiolli allii the }{elllakj,{1J of World

Order. 9

Homi Bhabha is thc forcmost dlinkerof the problcms posed by this situation of a necessary negotiation bCt\V('en cultures, all of which are wlavoidably partial by virtuc of thcir embeddedness in the local. See

17Je Locatioll of Culture and

" Culeure's In-Between." 10 A qualification of �current� is needed herc, because the ncoo to engage in a negotiation �tween partial cultures is not confined to the pa st few decades, bnt was fclt in bygone centuries. Linda wiley has made the point that a British identity had to be. forged ou[ of its Scottish, \Velsh, and Irish clements n i order to enable Protestant Britain to wage war with Catholic France and to cnablc Britain's impcrial

CIlterprises.

See her BritolJJ: FOflJi1!IJ tbe NarWlJ, 1707-1837. Her

suggestion that facilitating Britain's imperial ontreach is a motivating factor n i this recourse to a British identity s i borne ou[ by Gananath Obeyeskere, who argues that British sailors exploring the Pacific in the eightecnth ceneury had willy-nilly to feson to a conception of British idcntity n i their attempts to make themselves understood, as "British,� to the inhabitants of the islands. See Obeyeskere, "'British C..anb ni als,'''

7-31.

11 The suggestion here that a fueurc collenive liberation will almost ccrtainly cm­ body many disparate approaches and forms of action s i in line with the late Iris Marion Young's persuasive argument that pluralism will be an unavoidable fea­ ture of a fumce transformed society. Sec herjmticc ami the 1'0litic5 ofDiffermce, chapter 6. 12 The forcmost reC(�nt exponent of dlis argumcnt is \Valter Benn Michaels. Sec his "Political Science Fictions." Michaels's main point in this essay is that real antagonism arises only at the level of political ur ideological difference, and not racial or cultural difference, and that here it is not "differcnce" bur "'sameness" that is germane. If one believcs that one's ideological position is right or par-

340

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

takes of the truth, this is not because it happens

to be. different from someone

else's, but blx:ause one believes it to be right or true for everyone. 'nlat is, one believes it

to be the same for everyone. A contention between rival tmths is

thus more properly to be seen as fragmentation within the. univers;tl and not as a battle between particularisms. A similar point about the nlx:essity of this "nniversalism of truth� is made by Alain Badiou in ;til his writings. Michaels's conclusion is that there is re;tl politiCS only when there is "an indifterence to difference� (662). His position is problematic insofar as he. assumes that cultur al or racial differenccs cJllnot be "real" politic;tl or ideological diftcrences, whereas it is clear that then.> can be instances when racial or cultural differences are un­ avoidably political (apartheid South Africa would be a case n i point). For a cri­ tique of Michaels along these. lines, see M. it Ross, " Commentary," especially 835-n 13

l :un ('ettainly not suggesting that movements based on identity cannot be effi­ cacious independently of anticapitalist struggles conduned under marxist aus­ pices. As I indicated n i chapter 2, this claim s i not plausible when struggles occur in contexts marked by very diverse social relations, the r:Ulge and pleni­ mde of whk-h C:Ulllot be encompassed within the remit of a single movement, however capadous and dynamic that movement is.

14 On thinking that the limits of capital are coe..uensive with those of the universe, Sl"C DeleU7.e and Guattari, A TlJQmalld Platen/Ii, 23-24. The point that capital's supremacy is not unassailable is made by Slavoj Zizek in several of his works, but most notably in "Multiculmralism, or the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capit;tlism,� especi;tlly 35. 15 l:or Gilroy, see "British Cultural Studies and the Pitfalls of Identity," 223-39, where he concludes that it is important "to dispose of the idea that identity is an absolute :UId to find the. courage necessary to argue that identity forma­ tion-even body-coded ethnic and gender identity-is a chaotic process that em have

no end. In this way, we may be able to make cultural identity a prem­

ise of political anion rather than a substinne for it" (238). Gilroy contends that the theme. of identity is already present when the question of class affiliation

to E. p, Thompson's TIlt Maki,w (If the ElIgliJ;" Wurking Class and Rk-hard Hoggart's 7"e VIeS (IfLiteracy. This adds an is posed, a proposition that is essential

n i teresting complication for those who regard the concern with identity as a feamre of a politics that sU('ceeded one based on the institutions ofclass, Wendy Brown is less concerned to argue that identity politics is the successor of a pre­ vious class-based politics, and prefers instead tosee this transformation in terms of the weakening or disappearance of J viable critique of capitalism. For Brown, see States (If Injury, espedally 59. See ;tIso Brown's ",VoWlded Attachments," 199-227· 16 Zif.ek in several of his works, but most notably in uMulticulmralism, or the Culmral Logic of Multinational Capitalism," espedally H. 17 Zu.ek, "Multiculturalism," 44; his emphasis.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 HI

18 Bobbin, "n,c Shield ofAchillu, 750. Bobbin's argument relies on a numberofvast theses expressed with considerable magniloquence (e.g., " We are at the begin­ ning of the sixth great revolution in strategic and constitutional affairs"; ""nle new age ofindeterminacy into which we are now plunging") to conclude that the outmoded nation-state structure is not going to be able to deal with a whole range of geopolitical and cultural problems caused by all emerging conjuncmre that will be dominated by "market states." See 213-42 for Bobbitt's at·count of the market-state. For J useful review of Bobbitt's book, to which ! am much n i debted, see David Runciman, �lbe Garden, the Park and the Meadow." 19 Bobbin, The Shield ofAchiiks, 750-51; Bobbitt's italics. It should be pointed out that this s i one of several scenarios countenanced by Bobbitt, though he does believe that this one is more likely to be reali7.cd than the others. What Bobbin does in constructing this scenario is to n i tensify further tendencies that arc al­ ready manifesting thenl�dl'es demographically. For instance, the most recent U.S. census revealed that 5, percent of Californians do not identify themselves as white and that 40 percent of Californians speak a language other thJn Eng­ lish at home. The migration of"liberals� to states like Oregon and Vermont for culrural political reasons and Florida "snowbird" retirees with monocultural preferences to leave polyglot south Horida for less cosmopolitan Appalachian mountain towns ill Georgia and North Carolina are phenomena that are in the process of being documented. 1.0 ·There is a slight but still significant difference between the operation of the �chain of equivalence" in the respective accounts provided by Zikk and Rob­ bitt. Zitek follows Ladau JndMouft"e.in taking the chain ofequivalence to oper­ ate among progressive groups (women, blacks, workers, gays, and so forth), whereas in the "developmental picmre of thc State" constructlxl by Bobbitt this chain encompasses all identity-based groups. On the chain of equivalence n i Ladau and Mouffe, see, in addition to their HegcmOl�Y and Socialist Stmtegy, Mouffe's " l;eminism, Citi7.cnship and Radical Democratic Politics,� espl'cially 372. Bobbitt, a professor of constirutional law and J former official on the Na­ tional Security Council and other agencies (in both Republican and Dcmocratic administratious), holds no brief for any kind of progressive politics, preferring n i stead to talk of the "importance of developing public goods-such as loyalty, civility, tnlst in authority, respect for family life, reverence for sacrifice, regard for privacy, admiration for political compctence-that the market, unaided, s i not well adapted to creating and mJintaining� (814). Bobbin is dearly a cold war liberal with the slightest ofThird \Vay whifts to some ofhis convictioJlS, and his list of"virrues" would probably meet with approval from Dick Cheney Jnd Donald Rumsfeld, but not perhaps Trotsky, Thomas Sankara, Cesar Chavez, Mariategui, or Subeommandante Marcos (who today would probably want the n i vocation ofsuch "public goods" to be tied insome way to a critique of the role ofthe United States as the principal arcrutl'Ctofa banefulglobal order, J critique that s i nowhere to be. found n i "Dx Sbicld ofAcbitm). The argument ofnu Shield 341. NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

ofAchilles hinges on the

thesis that states are constimted by the relationship

that obtains between military power and strategy and the legal system, and for this reason Bobbin Glllnot do real justice to notions of l'Conomic, political, and idl'Ological power in the way that, say, Michael Mann does in the Sonn:uofStxinl

l'owC/", volumes 1 and 2. 21

This point is made by Zikk and Wendy Brown, See Zizek, "Multiculturalism,"

47; Brown, Stnrn ofInjnry, 64. Brown is likewise concerned with the problem­ atic nature of the universal as it is invoked by a troubling version of the politics of identity.

22 All snbsequent references

to Nozick,

Annrchy, Stntc, nlld Utopin

are cited in

parentheses in the text. David Runciman has notlxi the affinity between Robbin and Nozick in �·nle Garden, the Park and the Meadow." Nozick subsequently moved to a version of liberalism inspired in part by isaiah Berlin and repud.i­ ated his earlier libertarianism, preferring instead a position that acknowledged "multiple competing values." His earlier absolutist libertarianism was never more than a defense of one of these competing values, and this value could "sometimes be overridden or diminished in trade offs." "or this repudiation, see Nozick's essay �·nle Zigzag of Politics," in 111( Exnmined Life, especially 292.

23

As David RuncimJll has correctly observed with regard to Nozick in �The Gar­ den, the Park and the Meadow."

24

It is important to recognize a fundamental difference between Nozick and Bobbin, their conmlonalities notwithstanding. Nozick's metauropia is derived conceptually from his doctrine. of the minimal state, a doctrine he takes to be enjoined by the conception of the inviolability of individual rights he imputes to Kant (but which admittedly owes more to Nozick himself than to Kant). Nozick is simply not interestlxj in the historical conditions that mayor may not make such a �utopia of utopias" realizable. By contrast, Bobbitt is profoundly interested in historical processes, and. in fact takes the market-state to be one of the outcomes of the "fifth great revolution in strategic and constitutional af­ fairs," namely, "'the Long War� that began in 1914 and ended with the senlement reached in Paris in

1990 that brought an official

end to the cold war. Strictly

speaking, Bobbitt's muiticulmrai and decentralized market-state polity is not a utopia, if �utopia" is defined as the embodiment of an ideal state of affairs (however the content of this state of affairs concerned, this polity resuits from the weakening of the nation-state

as

is characterized). Where Bobbin is

"market in sovereignty" created by the

the traditional repository of sovereignty. This

polity in itselfis not something that is necessarily desirable or undesirable from a philosophical standpoint, and Bobbitt does not pay anention to its philosophi­ cal underpinnings.

25

Robbin's decentralized federalism, in addition to showing that a multiculmral politics will be a constitutive feature of the modus operandi of this system, also makes it clear that this multicultural politics is nor likely to be in a position to distinguish in practically significant ways between progressive and reactionary

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 343

in such a system, feminist, environmental protectionist, and gay and lesbian communities will cx ist alongside Southern Baptist fundamentalists and Alaskan wolfh\lllters in a relation of parity. 26 "\Ve do not want a German Europe, but a European Germany," said Thomas Mann, implyn i g that to be a "'good German" s i incxtricably bound up with being a good European." Fora useful discussion of the. implications of the quo­ tation from Mann and othcr issues, sec Risse and Englemann-Martin, "Identity Politics and European Integration," 287-316. -IowaN the. end of his life, Ray­ mond \ViIlianls took to referrn i g to himself as a "\Velsh European" in order to avoid having to designate himself as a Briton. 27 On religious identities, sec Kastoryano, Negutintil!9 Identities; and "Muslim Diaspora(s) in Western Europe." 28 This crisscrossing quality in identity constinnion was dealt widl in chapter 2. 29 Sec Herzfeld, "1he European Self," 139-70. For Macpherson, sec TIJe l'olitical TIxm:y ofPos5tssil'e Individlln/iJ;m. For Dumont, see Hom(} Hicmrchims and &sap m/ IlIdil'idlloliJ;m. One of the outcomes of th is process, whereby the concept of a European identity came to bc permeau:d by the dovctailing ideologies of an individualistic autonomy and colonial superiority, was dle extrusion of non­ Europeans (such as Muslims) from the. conccpmal fold of this identity. On this, SLoe Asad, "Muslims and European Identity," 20!)-27. Herlield also makes the point that fields such as cultural anthropology can serve the useful function of identifying thc efte.:L� exerted by this ideology of individualism in our analyses of nationalism and the role of the nation-state. 30 Herzfeld provides a list of anthropological texts and studies of nationalism which incorporate features of thistroubling individualism in "'The European Self." Of course the notion of identity is not confined to the individual and can be extended to groups and even nations, as indicated by the title of Fernand Braudel's magisterialL'idmtitide In Fmm:e. 31 For such questions, sec Herzfeld, "'The European Self," 14-4. Herzfeld is of course speaking of an e.".;:plicitly European identity in this essay, but his caveats about thc invocation of a European identity can be. generalized to cover any kind of identity. 32 "fhe distinction between a Grmu and a Scbmllke is highly technical and not without its problems. For a discussion of the distinction Jnd some of the prob­ lems involvl-d, scc Inwood, A Hegd Dictimlllr.v, 177-78. B An American colleague of mine, obviously fond of television, said that it was the telecasting for hours on end of these sports," in which everything seeml-tl to happen in an unending slow motion (and that was when something happcned at all!), that gave him the greatest culture shock" on his first visit to Britain. Incidentally a similar sentiment in regard to cticket is e."l:pressed by Zi ick, who calls it ""a senselessly ritualized game, almost bl)'ond the grasp of a Continental, in which the prescribed gestures (or, more predsely, the gestures established by an \lIlwrinen tradition), the way to throw a ball, for example, appear to be gmforms.

"

"

"

,

344

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

tesquely 'dysfunctionaL'" SL'C "Enjoy Your Nation as Yourself," 200-237, quo­ tation from 280 n. 2. 34 On the essential derivability of individual from collective identities, see Caplan

and Torpey, introduction to

DowmeIJti'!!J Jlldil'idlffll

Jdmtity, 1-12, espe­

cially 3. 35 On the development ofthese citizenship rules and the history of these CJtegories

and collectivities, see the essays in part 3 of Caplan and Torpey, Docu1llf1lting IlIdjl'idllfll JdCllti�y, 197-270. For a different approach to these questions, ap­

pealing to a logic of admini5tration he calls "governmentality,� see Foucault, "Governmentality," 87-104. 36 37

! discuss the nature and function of the state in the current regime of accumu­ lation n i chapter 1l. See Mann, ComcouslltJJ i and ActiOlI among tbe �VCitel"1l Workj,!!J Cltw, 12-13. lbe typology of forms of working-class COll.'iciousness provided by "-hrm is modified in my account to be more generally applicable to aJJ forms of political struggle.

38 Mann, Comd oUJlIuJ find Action tIIlW'!!J tbe �V(5terll Workil!!J Clan, 13. 39 Ibid.

(]Japrer 7. -nJe Politics ofSubjectil'iry 1 It would be more accurate to say that for Jacques Derrida dlls ....place" of the

subject is strictly speaking a "nonpbce" positioned n i a relationship of adjacency to the "place," in the chain ofsignification, from which the. significrs that consti­ nne the subject are able to funnion. Or to pnt it in Heideggerian parlance: Der­ rida appro.1ches the subjen in terms of a poetics as opposed to a semiology. 2 Derrida, "Ethics and Politics Today,� in NegotiatiOlIJ, 296. 3 Derrida, "lmroduction: DesistJ.nce,� 5. 4 Derrida, ....To Arrive-at the Ends of the State;' in Rogues, 143. 5 Though he never pres ents his thinking on the subjen (or anything else for that

m.1tter) in the. form of theses or arguments, Derrida nonetheless advocates a recasting or deconstruction of the "place" of the notion of the subjen in " Eat­ ing Well," especially 272. In "To Unsense the Subjenile,� he proposes that the notion of the subjenile

(Ie mbjrctile)

be substituted for that of the subjen, the

former connoting tlle elements of subjugation and projectability that are not present in the classical doctrine of the subject. To quote Derrida, ....Subjenile, the word or the thing, can take the place of the subjen or the objen-being neither one nor the other� (61) . As will be seen later, Derrida's account ofjustice and the ethics of responsibility views the place of this subjeniJe as its starting point. 6 Derrida, ....Eating Well;' 258. 7 t:or the English version of "La stmcture, Ie signe et Ie jeu dans Ie discourse

des sciences humaines," see "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in IVriting alld Difference, 278-93, especially 293.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

345

8 Durida, "Ihe Ends of Man," in Mnr;gim ofl'hiIoJopb.y, 111-36. 9 Derrida, " Eating Well,� .!61; emphasis and parentheses n i original. 'This power to ask the question to which the subject is the answer is Derrida's rendering (which is not to be eonfmed with anything like a straightforward appropria­ tion) of Heideggu's lJaieill. For insights into the relation between Derrida and

! am indebted to Bcnnington and Derrida.}/U"qlle5 Drrridn, .!74-81; D. Wood, Thinkillg nfter HeitU!1!Jcr, esplx:ially the essay "Hcidegger after Du­ Heidegger,

rida," 93-105.

10 Durida states in �Eating Well" that not even Heidegger escaped the structure of a "transcendental analytic," and that no philosopher, and this again n i clndes Heidcggcr, has been able to extricate philosophy from its grounding in an "an­ thropologism." This declaration and its ranlifications Jre taken up and accen­ tuated by Rapaport in Lnter Den-ida, 97-137. For Dcrrida's own estimation of the relation of his thought to that of Heidegger's, sec the essay �DifUranee" in

MmlfiIlJOfl)bilosopJ�y, .!2-.!5, and l'05itiOIlS, 9-10. Sec also the fascinatingessay by DerridJ et aI., �The Original Discussion of'Diffcrance,''' especially 86. Derrida's statement about Hcidegger's failure to overeomc the vcry anthropologism he niticized wonld be disputed by some of Heidegger's commcntators, even f i they happcn not to engagc directly with Derrida. Sec, for instance, DasUlr, "'The Critique of Anthropologism in Hcidegger's Thought,� 119-H.

11 Durida's claims about the capacity of the animal to recognize the other qua other are likely to be controversial. Be that as it may, the argument regarding thc pariliUlllaJl and the singular that hinges on this claim Glll be detachl>tl from it and viewed in its own right.

12 'This s i a gloss on De.rrida's construal of Heidegger's Dasein, which Derrida vicws as the power of a being to ask questions about itself. Sec. �Eating \\'ell,�

160-61. 13 Derrida, "Eating Well,� 271. The early Duridean text which recommcnds a dc­ centering of the subject is "StrucUlre, Sign, PIJy� (Sl'C note 7 above). But we should note Rapaport's salutary reminder that there is a flmdaJllcntJI difference between Hcideggcr and Durida at this point. For Hcidcgger, unlike Derrida, the

who which embodies

this power to ask questions about itself s i not to be

identified with Dasein; as Heidegger sees it, the very capacity to ask such ques­ tions already makes the

who n i to a social and psychological subject,

and hence

prevents it from bcing an appropriate manifestation of Dascin. For Derrida, on the other hand, and here thc influence of Lcvinas is perhaps more tclling than that of Hcideggcr, this

who is an alien element not to be incorporated into the

nexus that makcs it a psychological and social subject. See R.apaport, Lnter Der­

rida, 116-17. Rapaport's main argument is that thcre is all "earlier� and a "later� DerridJ, the former espousing a dlx:onstructed linguistic subject, the bnu es­ chewing the linguistic turn and preferring the existential subject made well­

knO\\,t by Sartrc and deconstructed in a �counter-existentialist existentialism� n i augurated by Uvinas, but developed by Bataille and Blanchot and takcn up

H6

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

by Derrida. Rapaport also suggests that Derrida oscillates between several phi. losophies ofthe subjcx:t (the. humanist subject, the subject of writing, the. subject of Dasein, the subject as the wbo, and so on) without according primacT to any one. My exposition n i what follows is indebted to Rapaport's understanding of Dcrrida's positions, though I take issue with his reading of Derrida's subjectiJe. In fairness, however, it has to be noted that the problem with the subjectile is as

much Dcrrida's as Rapaport's.

14 Both these positions are also present in Heidegger's writings . Bei,!O nlld Time straddles two senses of Dasein, one n i which Dasein, bcx:ause it possesses irre­ ducibly the property of " mineness" (jemeilligkcit), has always to lx- addressed by a personal pronoun ("I am," "you are"), and the other in which Dascin tran­ scends the world. For the former, see Bej,!O nlld Timc, 40; for the "transcen­ dence of the Being of Dasein," see 33-H. In his bter writings Heidegger stressed more the separation of Dasein from "Man," and maintained that its essential function is to serve as the '"guardian" of being (which it does by '"falling away� from itself). On this see Heidegger, GCSIImmmgnbe, 302. William j. Richardson suggests that in hL� later writings Heidegger StresSLxl Dasein's growlding in " the primordial not that belongs to being," a grounding in negativity expressed through two images, that of the abyss (Abgnmd) and that of the -nonground"

(U,!Onmd), thc formercolUlOting "mystery" and the buer '"subversive power," See Richardson, "Ihsein and the Ground of Negativity," especially 50. 15 "Finis," in Aporias, 1-42, can be viewed as Derrida's unraveling (and simulta­ neous retention) of the. key Hcideggcri,Ul notion of a "being toward death."

16 Heidegger, Beil!O nlld Timc, 238-84. Heidegger takes this " voice of conscience" to be inextricably bound up with Dasein's "everyday self-interpretation." For valuable commentary, see Guest, "L'Origine de Ia ResponsabilitC"; Dasmr, '"llle Call of Conscience," 87-98.

17 Heidegger, Beingnlld Time, 285. The exemplary readings of this aspect ofBej,!O nlld Time arc to be found in Dreyfus, Bcj,!O-ill-the-World; Haar, HdMM£r et {'osmer M /'IJ(Jmme. 18 Rapaport takes this mark of the subjectile, that is, its passing bc)'ond the. need to possess an essence, to be a primary feature defining the figure of the subaltern, for reasons outlined below (see note 20), I believe. this claim to be quite prob­ lematic. For Rapaport's claim, see Lnter Derridn, IH-37.

19 It is for this reason that "Eating Well" takes seriously the possibility that animals can occupy the space of the subjectile.

20 At the same time it has to be stressed that the call of conscience is not a moral Slllimons. As '\Iichel Haarpoints out, this call is strinly "autoaffenive" because. it is addressed by Dasehl to Dasein out of Dasein's thrownness, Jnd does not correspond to an imperative issued by J deity or moral order that would stand n i relation to Dasein as an exteriority. See Haar, HeideMcr, 45-54. 21 Heidegger, Beillg nlld Time, 256; emphasis and ellipses in original; trauslation slightly altered. NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

H7

22 Simon Critchlcy has made this criticism of Dcrrida, bue it should also be di­

recced at Heideggcr. Sce Critchky's cssays '"['ost-Dcconstruccive Subjcccivity,� and "Dcconstruccion and Pragmacism: !s Dcrrida a Private lronist or a 1\lbJic

Liberal?� in his colk·ccion Etb0-l'olitia-5I1jccti b l'ity. One way of crying to ncu­ tralize an objcccion like Critchky's is to argue that Dcrrida is referring here to thc political as such, that is, the conditio/IS that makc political accs and n i stim­

tions possible, as opposed to politics as sut'h, that s i , the concrete accivities and organiz;ations that have their enabling conditions in the political as such.

For a

similar distinccion, see Ikardsworth, Derrida and rbe l'olitical, ix. The focus un the pulitical, as opposed to politics as such, cnables us to appreciate Derrida's smdied refusal to issue stipulatiuns regarding this or that particular accivity or political agenda, or to say that f i une is a marxist, one would do such and such, urevcn if une were a marx ist, one would be such and such. A certain metaphysics of the political has to be adhered to f i one s i to find such stipulations persua­

sive, and the whole point of deconstruccion s i to discredit a metaphysics of this kind.

Lt:Vinas is exempt from this charge of voluntarism (which is not to sugge.st that his conccption of the cthical is frce of problems) bccausc hc use.s the notion of an irreducibk cxcess to serve, in efflx:t evcn f i not in intcnt, as a transccnden­

tal principle that is cxtcrior to thc ethical and the. political and which thcrefore ,

rdativi7.c5 both thcse domains. Ibis transcendencc, premised on thc notion of an other infinitdy different from all its othcrs, is, however, thc source of other

difficulties. Derrida himself criticized Ll:Vinas for resorting to the concept of infinity in this way, since the infinite always has a parasitic rdation to thc finitc.

See Derrida, "Violence et metaphysique, English vcrsion (rl'vised) in IVriting "

alld Differmce, 79-153. Dcrrida s use of "the politicar as a quasi-transccndental '

may have apparent affinities with Uvinas's philosophic disposition for the tran­ scendcnt, but differs from it because Derrida takes pulitics, in a vcry compli­ catcd way, to have lines of COlllcction to particular accive traditiuns, marxism being thc tradi tion to whit-h Derrida is in closest, though not necessarily un­ broken, proximity as an "inheritor." On this n i hcritancc, see Derrida, 5fXctrn

ifMarx, 54· 23 Sec Rapaport, Later Darida, 12,,-25. Rapaport secs no problem with this and docs not blink at the potcntially problematic implications which stcm from say­ ingthat the Dcrrida of "To Unscnse the Subjeccile" is speaking on behalf of the

muee subjcctiJe, who by virtue. of this mutcncss is unavoidably subaltcrn. There L� a glaringly obvious difficulty with this proposal, sn i ce having the. philosopher

speak on behalf of thc subj l ...·tilc, and there secms to be no altcrnative to this secnario n i Rapaport's conccption of the subjecciJe, eftcctively makes the phi­ losopher thc primary initiating force when it comes to undertaking any projccc of political cransformation. At any rate, the onus for making this transforma­

tion, for giving it its initial impetus, will lie with thc philosopher, who will be

348 NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

n i a position to name and authorize the desire of the mute subaltern. Rapaport

thinks this is one way of resolving the problem identified by Gayatri Spivak in her classic essay " Can thc Subaltern Speak!,� that is, by having thc philosopher speakon behalfof the. ones who Jre rendered silent. But this is reaUy no solution at alL TIle philosopher, oranyone else in a similar position, has to be able to hear the subaltern n i the first place. R.apaport's error lies in presuming dlat having the n i tellectual resources and the inclination to fashion a thl'Oryof the subaltcrn (as he and Derrida undoubtedly have) s i equivalent in some sense to having the ability to be heedful of the desire of the subaltern. Willingness (the domain of the ethical) cannot be confbted with ability or capability (the domain of the political) since someone can be willing and not able, or ablc and not willing.

24 AB Richard Polt has noted, althongh there are only three footnote references to Kierkegaard in Beillg and Time, each of these comments favorably on the Danish philosopher widely regarded as the precursor of modern ex istentialism. See Polt, Heidl!f!1er, 166 n.

orld, esplx:iaJJy 120. See. aLro Dreyfus, Beilg-in-the-W l

the appendix (cowritten with JaJle Rubin) titled "Kierkegaard, Division II, and Later Heidegger," 284-340.

25 For this formulation regarding the "endurance of the aporia,� see Derrida, Apo­ rias, 16.

26 Dcrrida, AjJQrim, 16; emphasis n i original. SubslXJuent quotations from AporiaJ are cited parenthetically in the. text. Sec also Derrida, l'anil!1li, 5-35, and The Gift

ofDeatb. 27 Hcidegger, Beig n and Time, 275-76. It s i interesting that Derrida notes in Apo­

rim

that thl' structure of the '""borderly edge" is expressed in a langnage that

"does not fortuitously resemble that of negative theology"

(19).

28 On the "unconditionality of the incalcnlable," see Derrida, "To Arrive-At the Ends of the State (and of War, Jnd onYorld ,Var)," in Rqgues, 141-59.

29 This passage is quoted inAjJQrim, 20; emphasis in original. ·The original is in "fl,&

OtherHeading, 80-81. Derrida identifil"S three kinds of aporias: (1) an absolute impermeability ofthe borders between knowing and not knowing, (2) ane:l:cess of permeability between these borders, and

(3) dle antinomy which precludes

the very notion of J. passage across these borders

(20-21). In each case, their

difterences notwithstanding, the outcome s i a pervasive epistemological insnf­ ficiency.

30 The desire to analyze our situation without resorting to assumptions derived from philosophical anthropology, and ultimately theology, underlies Heideg­ ger's recourse to the cumbersome apparatus that constitutes the "analytic of Da­ selll." Like Kierkegaard, Heidegger's ultimate goal is the. critique of ontotheol­ ogy, the theory of the intelligibility of the totality of being, premised on the existellce of a highest being or its cognates. But this critique is not undertaken III the spirit of a skepticism directed at the highest being. Rather, Heidcgger (and Derrida follows him here) llndertakes this critique through an interrogation of

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

349

dIe mmed i iately given, or that which is directly encountered in the everyday. On this, see Courtine, "Donner(Prendre,� especially

28; Dastur, "lbe Critique

of Anthropologism in Hcidegger's Thought," 31 [ am not sure that Derrida is entirely correct when he says that these concepts were not delineated by Heidegger because he regarded dIem as belonging to "derivative disciplines such as psychology or psychoanalysis, theology or meta­

(Apol"im, (1). If the analytic of Dasein accords a primordiality (UI"­ ifJrnllglichkeit, perhaps Heidegger's favorite word!) to AIWIT as one ofthe �b,\Sic physics"

moods" that discloses Dasein's being to itself, then an equal emphasis is placed on

Em,bIoSJuJJt:it

(resoluteness), Heidegger's version of Nietzsche's creative

transformation, which transfigures the past and opens up new pOSSibilities of being. If there is anything like a decisive difference between Derrida and Hei­ degger (and there may be other, equally significant difterences), it would reside n i Derrida's unrelenting propensity to de(·onstruct all the places from which the philosopher speaks, and in so doing to bring philosophy into a relationship of adjacency to the promptings of a "new order of law and democracy to come� (this new law being for Derrida the law of;l1l unconditional hospitality). Hei­ degger, by contrast, requires philosophy to be attuned only to the language of dIe ancient Grl"C,ks and his particular brand ofphilosophical German, since only these languages have, ostensibly, a special affinity for those rare Jnd e:l:ceptional occasions when Being is disclosed. This criticism of Heidegger is trendlandy made in Bourdieu,

The Political Olltoil{fJY ofMartill Hcidrggcr. For Derrida on J.

"new order of law and democracy to come," see his essay "On Cosmopolitan­

011 C05mopolitallum and Forgil'cIU'SJ, 23. It could be argued of course that the specific import of a work like Heilig alld Time is at odds with this cir­

ism," in

cumscription of the scope ofphilosophy, since the outcome of Heidegger's �de­ struction" of all previolls Western humanisms (these having reduced the world to the projection of a human subject) is an expansion of Being's purview to include "l�erything," and that Heidegger's real failure, lay in his llability i to find J.

politics congruent with Heilig fwd Time's occluded democratic principle. For

this view of Hei/w nlld

Time's fWldamentai, and radical, accomplishment, see

DasUlr, "The Critique of Anthropologism n i Heidegger's -nlOught,� 119; how­ ever, Dasturdocs not deal with the political implicJtionsof this line ofthought. Derrida would probably not disagree with this assessment of Heilig ami Time.

32 Geoftrcy Bennington has modified and extended to philosophy Derrida's proposition that "there is no politics without an organization of the time and space of mourning� and argues that with the application of this doctrine of radical finitude there can also be no philosophy "without an organization of the time and space of mourning.� See his
only death that can be named.

(I can experience the other's lack ofpresence, but

never my own lack of preselKe, as much as I may dread, in

350

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

J.

life that is always

too short, the onset of my own lack of "being-present" that s i inevitable the moment I am born.) H For this claim, see Derrida, OjGrammlltology, 158.

35 Lucien Goldman noted this connection benvl"Ctl Derrida's account ofdiffcraHce and Marx's conception of the relation of theory to practice a long time ago (1968), when he said the following n i the question-JHd-JHswer session that fol­ lowed Derrida's lecture "Diffcrance�: If we try to situate Derrida's theories in relation to Marxist epistemology

. we find a dose kinship together . . . with a great terminologkal dif­ ference. I readily pay tribute to the lingnistic resourcefulness of Derrida's employment of the words difference and

diffinl1lC&, which seem to me to

correspond fairly closely to Marxist concepts of thL·ory and praxis (there is, in fact, no theory which docs not bring along difl:"erences, nor is there a pra.'lis : which does not imply a difJimnce in the attaimbility of the goal). In this perspective, to say that all theory is connected in

J

more or less

mediated mailller to praxis and derives from it, or indel-d, to say that differ­ ence presupposes difJimnCl, do not appear to me to be . . . entirely different claims. For Marx, all knowkdge . . . even sensible intuition, derives from praxis, which is a detour, an action in time, and implicitly, to use Derrida's [ermiHoiogy, dijJimllce. See Derrida et aI., "The Original Discussion of'Differance'� (1968),� 90. 36 Differance s i a quasi-transcendental, not a "pure" transcendental, because it lacks the stability that a true transcendental possesses, this subility being itself a condition of the transcendentai's capacity to confer stability on the conceptual objects subsumed under it. 37 As Derrida puts it in his classic essay "Diffcrance,� "Such a play, difJimncc, is . . . no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of a conceptuality, of a conceptual process and system in general" (Ma?Jim ojl'hi/oroplJy, 11). 38 Bennington, II/terrl/ptillg Dcrndl!, 16; emphasis in original. 39 Derrida's tcxtsdealing with the theme ofethical and political responsibility tend to focus on the question of this negotiation with aninheritance, whose weight is dispbYL-d in ways that sometimes escape the purview ofthe. onewho is, howe.ver ambiguously, a recipient at the hands of this inheritance. SfXctcn uj.Mnrx is the te."I:t in which Derrida's own inheriunce s i scrutinized for its presuppositions and unacknowledged dimensions. 40 For Derrida's assertion regarding justice, see u·Ihe Force of Law," 945. 41 Bennington especially has pressed home this point, and I follow his interpreta­ tion of Derrida in the next few paragraphs. See butrmpting Denida, 25. 42 For these modalities, see Derrida, l'olitia ujFricl/dsliip, 38. 43 Bennington, buerTllptingDen-ida, 27; emphasis in original. ·nle internal quota­ tion from Derrida is taken froml'olitics ojFrimdship, 68.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7 351

44 Derrida, l'olitiu OfFriendship, 68. 45 Dcrrida, l'olitiu ofFriendship, 68--69; emphasis in original. 46 'file law of unlimited hospitality is statl-d thus by Derrida: ""Let us say ycs to

wbo or wbat tilI'm liP, before any determination, before any Mlticipation, before any dmri i jicatum, whether or not it has to do with J foreigner, an immigr.l.nt, an invited guest, or m unexpected visitor, whether or not the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, animJ.!, or divinc creaUlre, a living or dead thing, male or female" ("Step of Hospitality/No Hospitality," in Derrida and Dufourmantelle, OfHospitali�y, 77; emphasis in originJ.!). 47 For this rejoinder to the objl"Ction posl-d by Simon Critchkj', see Bennington,

Illterrupring Dcrrida, 200 n. 2o. 1be gravamen of Belillington's rcading of Der­ rida's distinction between the quasi-transcendentJ.! and the empirical is that Derrida makes this distinction preciselyin order to permit a movement between the two poles, albeit a movement JCcordmt with the logic of difterance. 48 On the importance of the third party in my encollllter with an other, see Der­ rida, "Thc Word of Welcomc," n i Adieu: To Emma/mel Lil'imu. For valuable commentary on the relation ofjusticc to ethics, Sloe ikrnasconi, ""Jll�tice without Ethics?� 49 This demmd for self-reflexivity, when coupled with Derrida's relish for tcxUlal intricacy, influences much of the commentary on his writings, and so it is not uncommon for commentaries to begin with a declaration that professes to sus­ pend commentary in the very course of undertaking it (e.g., "What is it to 'ac­ company Derrida' when writing on Derrida?"; "My dispatch is divided, without destination and withont message�). For such a gesUlre, see Fynsk, "Derrida and Philosophy,� 152, Lcavey, "Destinerrance,� 33. It is hard to imagine commen­ tators on Deleuze or Badiou, say, anguishing n i similar ways over the matter of "'accompanying" these thinkers, or whether commentaries on Deleuze and Badiou GUl have a '""destinJtion" or convey a "'message." 50 This demarcation betwcen the two ways of undertaking J reflection on dIe po­ liticJ.! follows the position taken by Louis Althusser in MacbinlYUi and Us, 9. lbe ne:1:t few paragraphs arc deeply indebted to this book for its account of "concepUlJ.! practice." 51 See "'lntervil'w with Derrida,� in Wood and ikrnasconi, Den'ida alldDijJimllce, 73. This n i terview was conducted by Catherine David of I.c 1wul'd obsCI"lYltmr Jnd publishl-d in the issue of 9 September 1983. 52 The connection here is not only with the political and the ethical, but also with the religious, as Derrida's writings in the decade or so before his death made in­ creasingly clear. Religion has not been dealt with n i this chapter, and the reader s i referred to the discussion of this subject in de Vries, " Derrida and Ethics," 172-92. 53 '""Intervkw with Derrida," 73; emphasis in original. 54 Ir s i a mistake therefore to charge Derrida with "quktislll," "indifference to practicJ.! politics," and so on, as some of his more careless critics do, because of 352

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

this stress on undecidability and the '"frl'C play" of diffcrJnce. 11lC emphasis on the undecidable servcs to banish tdeology from histor y, and with this opening of history (tdeology involving a foreclosure of possibility), historical changc is aptly

to be viewed as a concomitant of the operation of the undecidable. See

renvcs, �Derrida and History," 271-95.

55 Bennington, llltermptilig Derridn, H; emphasis added. 56 ror this conccption of constitutive power and its antl'Cedcnts in Spinoza, see Ddeu7.c, �pilJoza.

57 I use this Ddeuzean understanding of singularity in chapter 10 to provide an account of the subj en possessed by the coUenive desire for liberation.

58 Dcrrid a, 5pecttn ofMmx, 169. 59 Dcrrida was taken to task for this �formalism" by Laclau in his review of 5peetcn (}f.Marx. See Ladau, "The Time

Is Out of Joint.� Stella Gaon valiantly auempts

to extricate Derrida from the charge, leveled by Nancy Fraser, Gayatri Chakra­ vorty Spivak, Kate Soper, Alex Callinieos, and others, that his steadfast prefer­ ence for a "conditions of possibility" argument when and political efiectivdy leavcs

dealing with the. ethical

him with nothing concrete to espouse but an

anemic sodal liberalism. Gaon managcs

to show that the strucrure of promise

identified by Derrida as an integral clement of a marxist ontology of justice is predsely that, a neccssary condition of this ontology of justice, without being able iu the end to show us how Derrida will be able to identify the animating prindples for

the implementation of a marx ist or lllarxisant projen of libera­

tion. See Gaon, "'Politicizing DeconsmlCtion.'"

60 See Neg ri, "The Spener 's Smile," 5-16. 61 I am referring here to Deleu� and Guarrari's p roposition, which serves as an a."I:iom for the theoretical armatUlT cre,ued by them in Mille platenux, that "be­ fore

being there is polities [car al'll/It I'itre, iI y a la politiqllc J." See A 7hollJ/llld

1'latcnllS, 249. There is a hiatus be.tween the "actually" political and the "concep­ rually" political, and as much as Derrida is right to insist that there is an end­ less rclay between the conceprual and the acrual, his inability to move beyond a thinking

immured in the formalism of an endlcssly recycled "conditions of

possibility" argument means that he cannot addrcss adequatdy the siruatioll of

the dispossessed. The possible Derridean rejoinder, "But what is it to address the siruation of the dispossessed!," has its place, but it has to be accompanied by the salutary realization that broaching this qucstion can only be a conceptual prolepsis to the neccssarily pranical pursuit of liberation.

Chapter 8. -n,t l'aiitic5 ofthe El'Cnt 1 See Critchley, "Demanding Approval." 2 Bacevich, "Expanding War, Conttaning Meaning." 3 See BJdiou, "Afterword," 236.

4 On Earle's remark, see N. Cohen, "And Now the Trouble Really Begins." NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 353

5 For this equalitarian axiom, see Radiou, L'Etre cr/,irincment, +47; Radial!, D'lIn

diSIUtreobsCllre, 15. 6 On the " possibility of the impossible,� see Radion, Etbics, 3Sh1-2. 7 See Radial!, �Highly Speculative Reasoning on the Concept of Democracy," ,8. II

Thus, for Radiol!, Paul is all exemplary militant because his "unprecedented gesture consists in subtracting truth from the communiurian grasp, be it that of a people, a city, an empire, a territory, or a social dass� (St. 1'all/, 7).

9 Radiou, Ethics, 38. 10 Radiou, Ahrigide mc"tapditiqlle, 156-67: ""La politique de pem seulement penser comme pensee de. tous." 11 for this principle, see Radiou, La dutnllcepolitiljll€ (28 May 1998), 3, quoted in Hallward, �Badiou's Politics," paragraph 4. I am grateful to Hallward's article for some of my formulations. 12 l'rathab Patnaik, in an article to which ! am indebted for these reflections, men­ tions thc advice. given by the Wmhillgron1'ost when the Congress Party won the indiangeneral election. According to thePost (regarded n i the United States as a liberal newspaper!), investors in india, and this would include foreign corpora­ tions, should have just as much say in indian elenions (purely by virtue of being n i vestors) as individual Indian citizens, since. the �suke" of investors in India was presumed to be just as {'onsiderable as the conunitments of the individual citizens themselves. See Patnaik, ""The Illusionism of FinJIKe." 13 The affinity between this aspect of Radiou's thought and the work of Hardt and Negri is noted in Bosteels, " Logics of Antagonism.� 14 Radiou, Etbics, 97-98; emphasis in origimJ. See also Alm:"/Ji de mitnpoJitiljlu, 160, where Radiou's statement "Politics places the State at a disunce� makes it explicit that the state is not annulled, bm rather has its otherwise measurc!ess power brought within the circumscription of politics. l;or Badiou's earlier cir­ cumscription of the part played by the state in politics, sec L'Etre rt /'iJinemCllt, 258, where fidelity is depicted as a " counter-state� or "bc!ow-stJte.� 15 Badiou, �Politics and Philosophy: An Interview with Alain Radiou," in Etbics, 105-6; emphases in original. 16 These injunctions to refrain from electoral voting and participating in party politics make sense only in specific political contexts. Thus in the United Sutes, where both thc Republican and Democr.:ttic Parties are parties of capiul, with \Vall Street JIld the corporations as their primary constiruency, it matters little whether or not one takes part in the charadc of American parliamentary poli­ tics. By contrast, say, f i one of the nationalist parties in Scotland or Wales had a chance of displacing New Labour from power in their respective regional par­ liaments, then it would probably be a good idea to vote for Plaid Cymru or the Scottish Nationalist Party. Anything that contributes to the dismantling of thc projcct of�Great Britain" is likely to enable J more productive form of politics n i those cOllltries. 354

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

l7 Radiou, however, appears recendy to have qualified his position on economics and its ancillary human sciences. Instead of dismissing these outright as mcre "ideologies" designed to measure and uphold thc status quo, he now seems to accept that there are areas of thc human sciences that �touch upon the being of objects" (and thus avoid being merely ideological), to wit, "phonology n i linguistics, the foundations ofMarxist economics, perhaps a part of thc anthro­ pological theory of kinship, perhaps also a segmcnt of psychoanalysis" ("After­ word," 2H). He further acknowledges that L'Etre

et l'il'illtmmt did

give the

impression of a rigid demarcation betwL-cn upure conservation (situation, ency­ clopaedia) and becoming (inquiries, subjects, the generic)," and that he now sees the need for a more complex concepnmlization of the modes by which change takes place n i the world. This more refined conceptualization is set out in his recent Logiques des I1wlIdu, which arrived too late to be considered in detail in this chapter. 18 See note 16 above. 19 Radiou, �Afterword," 236. Subsequent referCllces are cited parenthetically in the text. 20 Radiou, uThe Ethics of Truths,� 250; emphasis in original. Subsequent refer­ ences are cited parenthetically in the te xt. 21 My analysis of Radiou's positions on tmth owes a great deal to Bosteds, "Alain Badiou's Theory of the Subject," part I and part II. R05teds's indispensable essays chart in fascinating detail thevarious changcs that Radiou's vil'ws on trnth have undergone in his numerous writings, concluding with an anticipation of the account of tnuh and subjectivization that Radiou was going to provide in

LogiqllCS des »Jrmdes. Ibe account I give of the relation of truth to the event, while indebted to B05teels, departs some.what from the initial psychoanalytic context in which Badiou, and Bosteels following him, franle their formulations. 22 Thus if the car accident I had just outside Cambridge in September 1981 is the cause of my believing the statement ul must drive more cautiously," then I can­ not remain indifferent to the L-vent that is the car accident n i which I was in­ volved ill September 1981. If I were n i different to this event, then either I have another basis for assenting to this statement, or my believing this statement lacks any real basis, and I therefore have no adequate ground for choosing be­ twccn " 1 must drive more cautiously" and "I have no nl-cd to drive more cau­ tiously." A belief-causing l-vent, once it is belief-causing, neccssarily generates effects which can be terml-d its "tmth-effl'Cts." -nlis formulation needs further refinement, because it can be read as (1) E is the cause of my coming to hold the belief thatp, and (2) E is the basis of my conviction thatp is true. Where (1) is concerned, my relatively minor car accident could have triggered a deep-seated childhood fear (say) that, once aroused, simply shocks me into believing that I need to do something about my driving, whereas in (2) my accident causes me to revise and even falsify some of my previous somewhat self-deceiving beliefs about my driving (that I was a very cautious driver, that I drove within the limits

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

355

of my capability, etc.), in this way causing me to affirm the statement "I must drive more cautiously" as the resultant of this revision of my beliefs. Strictly speaking, E has tmth-efl:"l'us only in sense (2). However, if E shocks me into tile conviction that I must drive more cautiously, then it nel-ci not be. incompatible with (2), though of course both (1) and (2) can obtain without the other, even if there could be times when they may happen to obtain conjointly. E is a tmth­ event for Badiou more in sense (2), though given his alertness to the psychoana­ lytic core that subtends belief, it should not be concluded that he s i n i different to issues that surround sense (1). 23 There is a complexity here that caJUlot be ignored. "It is snowing in Manhattan� could be true n i Manhattan, but it has no application to Burlington, Vermont, n i terms of its presuppositions. (The unerer of the sentence '"It is snowing in Manhanan� makes no reference to Burlington, and so, properly speaking, "'It is snowing in Manhanan� s i neither true nor false. where Burlington is con­ cerned.) 24 The e.umple is mine, bur l owe my understanding of Radiou to Hallward's excellent Badiou: A Sujecr b fO Tn/til, 135-39. 25 Badiou, "Verite: For�age et innomable," n i Hallward, 7hink Again, 127; trans­ lation altered, emphasis in original. It s i very likely that Badiou s i adapting Lacan's notion of the "fuUlre Mlterior� or future perfl"Ct in his account of"forc­ ing.� The fUUlre anterior has a distinctive stmcUlre-"1 was that which became who 1 am now so that 1 GIJI become what I was nor� -which begins from the premise that thc truth s i fundamentally incomplete. As this stmcture indicates, the truth unfolds when we become that which we were nor, though what we are now is something that results from something that we had to become in order to be who we are now. According to this stmcmre, one is always about to arrive or will have arrived at some later time. FOT this stmnure, see LacaH, "Logical Time and the Assertion ofAnticipated Certainty." Forexplication, see Hnk, Tf}t

LncaninlJ SlIbjrct, 64-65. 26 Radiou, "Afterword," 235. 27 Here ! summarize. Radiou's argument in I!Etre (t l'ilillcmmt, 365-69. Peter Hallward notes that Radiou does nor identify the subjen with the investiga­ tions themselves; rather, the subject is realized only as he or she moves between terms, testing them and finding new ones to supplant those found inadequate. There is a profoundly aleatory quality to this movement, as the subject revises and modifies the modes of expression available to him or her in order to extend the implications of an event and to force new knowledges into being. See Hall­ ward, Badiou, 141. 28 It has to be saidfrom the outsetthat Radiou's espousal of the law of the exduded middle should not be read as an endorsement of the view that there is only one locus oftmth OT only one name for the tmth. Radiou insists that truth has many loci from which it is spnlJIg, and many names, but once a statement s i J candi-

356 NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

date for a truth-status, the principle of bivalence holds; that s i , the statement is either true or false, and nothing else.

29 Desanti, "Some Remarks on the Intrinsic Ontology ofALlin Badiou,� 61. Sub­ sl-quent references are cited parenthetically in the tc.u.

30 To qnote Desanti: ""As I see it, the fact that Badiou takes up forcing is the. price he has to pay for his decision to install himself from the outset with MI intrinsic ontology�

(6,). A similar concem, albeit lodged from a dift"erent theoretical per­

spective, is expressed by Emesto Laclau, who argues that Badiou's fundamental ontology is incapable of accommodating such notions as "overdetermination� or "analogy," which should IlJve a place in any adequate conception ofontologi­ cal possibility. See Laclau, "An Ethics of MilitMlt Engagement," 136.

31 The unpublished manuscript in question is Badiou's "Topos, ou logiques de l'onto-Iogique. Un introduction pour philosophes, tome

1," dated 199, in the

bibliography of Hallward, Bndiou. Hallward quotes the following passage from this manuscript: �Category theory is especially suited to the examination of 'dual' ontological situations, that is to say reversible correspondences, ambi­ guities of position, identities mrned on their head, effects of symmetry and mirroring. In this sense its spontaneous philosophy is Delellzian, and it narrows the gap between the symbolic MId the imaginary as much as possible� Hallward, BndiOlI, 417 n.

(26). See

22. I am deeply indebted to Hallward's c."l:position for

the foregoing presentJtion of Badiou's use of category theory.

32 Hallward, Bndum, 307. Hallward refers here to the then unpublished text of Badiou's LqgiljluJ des

"wlldr, chapter

3,

10-12, MId recapitulates Badiou's un­

Jvoidably technical discussion of category theory. Needless to say, myexpo­ sition here is gready simplifying in comparison to the treatments of category theory provided by Badiou and Hallward. The. reader wanting more than just a glimpse of the theory should consult Bndiou: A Subj(Ct to Truth. H Sec Barium,

308, where Hallward quotes from Badiou, �Topos, ou logiques de

l'onto-Iogique. Un introduction pour philosophes, tome 1:' 76.

Barliou, 308, where Hallward cites Badiou's COII/·t tmitt d'ollto/ogie tmmitoire, IH. 35 Hallward, Badiou, 52. For Badiou's early attempt to demarcate between these

H For this claim, see

two conceptions oflogic, see "La subversion infinitesimale."

36 With slight modifications this is the account given in Hallward, Bndiou, 31l. The difference bet"lvl-en Badiou and Deleuz.c on ontology becomes clear at this point, since the laner is explicit in his repudiation of any ontology based on extensionality. For this,

SI..'C Deleuzc, Difference nud Repetition.

For a helpful

comparison of their respective ontologies of mathematics, see D. W. Smith, ....Badiol! MId Deleul£ on the Ontology of "hthematics:' 77-93.

37 Badiou has bccn taken to task for the �dl'Cisionism� that stems from the power­ ful focus he places on the sovereign act. See, for instance, Bensald, "Alain Badiou and the Miracle of the Evcnt,�

94-105.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8 357

38

For Badiou's attempt to bring these two ontological traditions together while maintaining the primacy of the Platonist tradition, see his Court traited'ollto!qjie

trallsitoire. 39

In making this point I grant Desanti's assnmption that the inhabitants of the territory in his fable need to be able to give an accoullt of what lies beyond its borders if they are to be able to say something meaningful about the force that ostensibly repels them when they approach these borders.

40

1he most important of these laws of classical set theory s i the axiom of e.'uen­ sionality, that sets are the same if they have the same members or elements.

41

See Hallward,

Badioll, 86.

For Badiun's permitting of intensiunal objects in

sets, see his '"Topos, ou logiques de l'unto-Iugique. Un introductiun pour philo­ suphes,� 42.

42 1his formulation is indebted to

Donald Davidson's well-known principle of

charity, which holds that we haw no alternative but to asswne that other per­ sons are to be reckoned right in their beliefs most of the time. The alternative would be to assume that someone could be wrong most of the time in his or her beliefs, and given that most other persons are rational beings like oneself, it would be a mistake to preswne that one is a rational being who is right most of the time in one's beliefs, but that other persons Jre mistaken most of the time in their beliefs, despite being rational like oneself. Just as one would not presume that one's beliefs are overwhelmingly incoherent, so also one should make the presumption that the beliefs of others, as a generality, are not massively inco­ herent. For Davidson's principle of charity, see "RadicJl lnterpretation.�

43

1his s i true of any system of thought: as a regime of truth-eflects it too cannot n i stimte its own modes of existence, and it too (an be prevented from realiz­ ing its truth-effects. On truth-effl"Cts, see Balibar, ""'The Infinite Contradiction,�

162. 44

for this, see Badiou, L'Etrt et l'el'elll lc fl l tl ,

257.

Chapfer 9. TIle Religirllls Tramcwdmt 1

The standard distinction between "transcendence" and "rhe transcendent� needs to be clarified at this point. "The transcendent" refers to a reality or force that lies n i a realm that GUlllOt be encompassed within the purview of worldly historical and social forces, while "transcendence" signifies any kind of exteriority to an existing state of afbirs, and as such is nut necessarily incompatible with "the imma.nent.� In the latter case, there is nothing self-contradictory in affirming an "immanent trJnscendence,� as long as "transcendence� is not lmderstood as the equivalent of "the transcendent.�

2

As Graham Ward correctly points out n i his "Transcendence and Representa­ tion," especially 142.

3

On this need for a metaphysics of participation, see "Iilbank, I'ickstock, and Ward, introduction to fuuiical Orthodoxy,

358

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

3-4.

4 For Badiou s suggestion that Paul's religious beliefs can eftectively be discounted '

as ··fable," see his St. Paul, 4-5. i itself amount to a critique 5 Ihis point needs to be qualified because it does not n of Badiou. It is not unacceptable to put to one side Paul's theological convic­

tions if one is giving an account solely of his character as a militant, but his theologkal judgments cannot be overlooked if one is setting out to make sense of his discourse as a whole. Ihe crucial point here s i whether it is possible to determine the political import of Panl's discourse without taking its theological dimensions into acconm as well. 6 Cunningham, ··Language,� 64--65. Cunningham's position s i developed in greater detail in his excellent Gmealqgy of Nhilifm. i See also Milbank, ·Only Theology Overcomes Metaphysks," in his collection of essays Tb, �Vurd Made ·

StralJge, ,6-52. 7

Lcibniz;, who made this doctrine the Iynchpin of his philosophical system and

who saw it as the c.xpression of Christianity s philosophical core, s i by virtue of this the great modem Christian philosopher. For aspects of commentary, see '

Riley, Leibnz i ' Ullil'er5ll1}lIrnpmdellcc.

8 I am not talking of conversion in the empirical Sl'llSe, involving such absurdi­ ties as forced bapts i m Rather, conversion here rclers to an ontologkal state of affairs in which all are somehow drawn into being adherents of the Christian mythos, whether consciously or m i plicitly. 9 It will be obje-cted to univocity that, unlike Christianity s "good difterence," it .

'

ivocity has as its necessary con­ comitant inmlan<'ntism, so that difference is cast entirely as phenomenality, in which case difterence is negotiated only on the basis of the power of those who sec things in tbi> way and not tbar. According to these critics of inullanl'nce, in absolute. immanence everything has to replicate the given (because ontologically this is all there is to replicate), and this then becomes the source of an unavoid­ able ontological violence. Univocity holds beings on the same plane through sheer and naked power, whi ch then has perforce to destroy peaceability. I am can legitimize only a "bad difference� since

un

indebted to John Milbank for many helpful discussions on this topic. 10 For Zitek's position, see TIle Fragik Absolute, 011 BeliJ:f, and TIJe l'uppet and tbe

Dwarf John Milbank arrives independently at a position similar to Zilck's when he says that "to achieve an adequate ontology . . materialist socialism needs to invoke theology" ("Matera i lism and Transcendence," 7). Milbank diverges from Zitek (and Badiou) on the important question ofthe. transcendent, which the marxist thinkers, with their �secularislxl l'ia lI>ltim," disavow. To quote Milbank, "The turn to the se{'uiarised I'ia /Jcgtltil'tl however, because it docs not admit any real transcendent superabundant plenitude within which reli­ .

gious performances might remotely participate, never recognises any degrees of more-or-less correct manifestation of the absolute, or any advance. towards the absolute that s i not equally and inversely a regression" (12). 11

Milbank, '·"hterialism and TranscendelKe," 14-16. NOTES TO CHAPTER 9 359

12 Howard Caygill has dealt brilliantly with this asPL'H of Kamian judgment in his

Art of}udgmmt. 13 Gilles Deleuze hdS stated this problem perspicaciously: "'Now we see Kant, at an age when great authors rarely have anything new to say, confronting J prob­ lem that will lead him to an extraordinary undertaking: if the faculties

Gn

thus

enter into variable relationships in which each faculty is in tum regulated by one of the others, it must follow that, taken together, they are capable of free and unregulated relationships in whkh each faculty goes to its own limit, and yet in this way shows the possibility of its entering into an iI/determinate

[qUdcOllQIIC I

harmony with the others" ("On Four Poetic I:onnulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy," EWI'y5 Critical alld Clinical,

H-H; emphasis in origi­

nal).

14

l;or a theological reading of this contemporary repristination of the sublime, see Milbank, "Sublimity," .Hl-H.

15 Deleu7.c, "On Four Poetic Formulas That Might Summarize the Kantian Phi­ losophy," H

16 The basis for this nl�V immmentist ontology is Spinoza's insight that the other is not a subject n i the sen�e associated with Locke and Descartes, but is instead a mode. whose expressivities are registered by other modes, each with its own spe­ cific kind of receptivity determined by the kind of mode that it is. For Spinoza's formulation, see his EtbiCl, especially part I I, proposition 49 (pp. 156-57 of the I'arkinson edition). I:or elaboration, see Deleuze,

b:preJYiollirm iI/ l'bilo50pby;

Howie, Ddmu and Spilwza.

17 This is the. gist of Badiou's critique of Dele.u7..e. in his quite brilliant Delmzc:

"flx Clamor of Beil/g.

John Milbmk endorses this critique in UMaterialism and

Transcendence,� 15-18. Conor Cunningham provides the. first complete geneal­ ogy of this baneful trajectory from Deleuze back to Plotinus in his Gmealogy of

Nibilis»I. As [ will shordy indicate, I disagree with this assessment of Deleuze. 18 Brian Massumi has correctly pointed out the franal nature of Deleuze's concep­ tion of the object, which requires it to be Imderstood in tertn� of the triptych of dimensions just mentioned. See A

User's Guide to "Capita1�111 and Schizophre.

na," i :15-38. I am indebted to Massumi's account. 19 Advocates of the allalqjia mtis, Jolm Milbank for n i stance, believe that the doc­ trine of analogy does not have to confront this problem because it avoids posit­ ing any kind of originary void. For Christian theology the source ofthe created order is the ineffable divine plenitude from which all things are engendered. The account just given of Deleuze.'s fractalized conception of the object shows that DeleUl.c too has a theory of the originJry plenitude, except that in his case it is a rigorously immanent one.

20 For this definition of "potentiality," see Deleuze, SpillOUl, 97. 21 See Milbank, "'Materialism and Transcendence," 23-25. 22 See Massumi, A

360

UiCT"'5 Guide to "Capitaliwi alld Schizopbnmin," 57-58.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9

G mptcr /0. Nomad I'oliti£!; 1

There are significant affinities between the nomadology of Deleuze and Guattari and the theory of the multitude Jssociated with Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt's Empire. Sl"C also their lVIlIltitlldes:

War and Democmcy in the Age ofEm­

pire. These affinities hinge on their respl"Ctive versions of autopoesis:

nomadic

formations and multimdes are said by Delenze and Guattari and by Hardt and Negri to dirl"Ct themselves according to their own powers and their own histo­ nes.

2

It should be pointed out that some of Alain Badion's more recent work shows less emphasis on the. exceptional l"l·ent and more on the. contribution of cvents, cvcn of a quotidian variety, to the formation of subjectivity.

3

For an application of multitude theory to the events that led to Chavez's rcsto­ ration as president of Venezuela, see Heasley-Murray, ""It Happened on TV." For the GenoJ G8 demonstrations, see Negri, "Italy's P05tmodern Politics,�

4 5 6 7

5.

Sec chapter 1 above. See Deleuze, "PosL'Kript on Societies of C.ontrol," Negoriation<, 177-82. See Deleuze, The Fold: Ltibnz i alld tbe Baroque. Like each of the plateaus inA Ihomlmdl'li!tmm, the "Treatise on Nomadoiogy"

has a date attacbed to it, n i this case 1227, thc year in which Genghis Khan died. Deleuzc J.Ild Guattari give no expiJnations for dlCir choice of such dates, and one can only surmise tbat Genghis Khan's I'ax AI01l,golica is for Deleuze and Guattari an emblematic instance of a countersovercignty to be posed agaill5t the sovcreignty of the polis that Genghis Khan challenged from his movable base in the steppes. This much can be gleaned from pages 417-19 of A Thollsand

I'laream. 8

DeleU7.K and GnJttari, A TlJOmand I'lateall', 351-52; emphasis in original, trans­ lation slighdy altered. Subsequent references Jre cited parenthetically in the tcxt. Thc interior quotation is from Dumezil, Afithm-Vanma,

U8-24, which

deals with the difference between the bond and the contract.

9

It would be interesting to contrast Balibar's citizen subject with Deleuze and Guattari's subject of the state apparatus. The central premise of Balibar's argu­ ment, namely, that thembjtctm ofmedieval polities had bl"Cn supplanted by the post-Kamian wbjrcwm or citizen subject, is not one that Deleuze and Guattari would readily accept. Halibar's cautionary note that under dlC remit of bour­ geois democracy the citizen subject is always going to resemble in some impor­ tant ways the wbjcctm of the dispensation that prevailed beforc the emergencc of bourgeois democracy would be wholeheartedly assented to by Deleuze. and Guattari. Where Deleuze and Guattari are concerned, however, the (current) era of a postpolitical politics, having jettisoned any substantive notion of sov­ ereignty based on the principle of repreSClltation,

G ill

no longer provide the

proper raison d.'ctre for this bourgeois democratic subjl"Ct.

10

DeleU7.K and Guattari, Anti-Oedipll', 4; emphasis in original.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

361

II It should be pointed out, though, that the state is understood by Ddeuze and

Guattari in two senses. In one sense the state is to be identified with the forma­ tions and apparatuses that constimte it. In another the state is, preeminently, a metaphysical conception, a machine. of ttanscoding that (lUllike the assemblages which embody it and which have to be constmcted and positioned at this or that point in social space) �comes into the world fully formed and rises up at a single stroke, the lUlcOllditioned Urstaat" (A nJOIIUllld 1'latenm, 437).

11. It follows from tlris that there is a sense in which consciousness (taken here to include all the ramified outreachings of desire) constitutes something like J

domain of the virtual, and

so

precedes the "actuality" of social apparatuses

and formations. The ....dlinking� of the state is a function of consciousness par e.xcdlence, and is therefore the product of this virtuJ.lity. Clearly this hCls sig­ nificant implications for any simplistic claims about the primac)' of the �actu­ J.lly" materiJ.l in marxist thought and practice. The virtual, as Ddeuzc, follow­ ing Bergson, has insistl-d, cuts across the division between the possible and the actual. "Before Being there s i politics" (A nJOmmui 1'lateam, 203), certainly, but ine xtricably bound up with politics is the drinking that is locatl--d n i the realm of the virtual, and this thinking breaches the long-hdd distinctions between "thought� and �practice" and "materialism" and "ideJ.lism."

13 Sec Ddeuze, 17Je Fold, 130-37. 14 To quote Ddellze and Guattari: �There is no universal t'apitalism, there is no capitJ.lism in itsdf; capitalism s i at the crossroads of all kinds of formations, it is neocapitalism by nature"

(A 11}(JllJlmd 1'laftam, 20). In AlIti-Oedipll$ Dde.uze

and GuattJri indicate how capitalism is able to perform this n i tegrative func­ tion: ""Capitalism is in fact born of the encounter of two sorts of Aows: the de­ coded Aows ofproduction in the form ofmoney-capital, and the det'oded Aows of bbor in the form of the 'free worker.' Hence, unlike previous social machines, the capitalist machine is incapable of providing a code that will apply to the whole of the social fidd. By substituting money for the very notion of a code, it has created an a.xiomatic of abstract qUJntities that keeps moving further and further in the direction ofthe deterriroriJ.lization of the socius" (n).

15 There have long been economic world-systems, of course, as Andre Gunder Frank, Christopher Chase-Dunn, Janet Abu-Lughod, Jnd others have pointed out. My claim that capitalism in its current dispensation takes the form of a meta-accord is not about the world-system as such, but about its present mani­ festation, that s i , how the meta-accord that is capitJ.l gets to establish a world­ system with

J

fundamentall), isomorphic stmcture, something that did not

occur with previous world-systems.

16 The. cynical would say that Jackson's morphing in the video is simply a reeapitu­ lation of the transformations that his own visage has undergone iu reel>nt times thanks to the ministrations of plastic surg"'Ons.

17 Cage describes his work as ""music without measurements, sound passing through circumstances" ("Diary: Emma Lake Music \Vorkshop 1965," A

362

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

Year

from Mrll/riay, 22). Slavuj Zizek has made a similar point abuut divergence and n i cumpossibility when he says that many differem seL� can in principle be de­ rived from the same culleniun. See The l'lnglle {}ffimtmie•.

18 Elsewhere Deleuzc says that �the Anomalous is always at the. fromier, on the borders of a band or multiplicity; it is parr of the latter, but is already making it pass imo another multiplicity, it makes it becume, it tr:.J.ces a line-between� (Deleuze and Parnet, Dnll{gllo, i 42). 19 In an imerview

Oil

Foucault and his work, Deleu7.c refers to this movement

between oUL�ide and inside as something which involves "subjectless individuJ­ tions� ("A Portrait of Foucault," Negorinrwm, 117). These "subjectless individua­ tions" are a defining characteristic of the Anomalous. I am almost certainly going further dlall Dcleuze and Guattari in my use of the Anomalous. "tbey take this category to be a defining feaUire of the "line of tlight,� which is present wherever lines of flight are to be fmmd. In the account given here, I take the Anomalous to be pervasively present in the epoch of the breakdown or dissolu­ tion of transcendental accords; that is, I view it as the operation of a currently regnant capitalist culmral logic. This, however, is entirely compatible with the positions set out in C Alpitnliime diChiwplnillie. In DinII{gIIeS, Dcleuze says, "Ihe State can no longer . . . rdy on the old forms like the police, armies, bureau­ cracies, cullective installations, schouIs, families. . . . It s i not surprising that all kinds of minority questions-linguistic, etlmic, regional, about sc.'I:, or youth­ resurge not only as archaisms, bnt in up-to-date revolntionaryforms which call once more into question n i an entirely immanent manner both the global ecun­ omy of the machine and the assemblages of national Statcs. . . . Everything s i playc-d in uncertain ganles, 'front to front, back to back, back to front'" (147).

20 For his accoUllt of simulation, see Dcleuzc, Diffirmce cr ripititioll, 92-101, and nx Ll!!Jic ofSmiC. Delnv.c's theory uf simulation s i complex, bnt its gist can be stated thus: if, cuntrary to Plato and the tradition of philosophy deriv('d from him, there

e m

be no primal)' of a putative original over its copy, of a model

over its representations, so that there can be no basis for differentiating between "good� original and "bad" cupy, then everything is itself a "copy-original�; it is an "original" of itself, or rather its "origin" is a copy or "shadow" of itself. In the absence of any possibility of separating copies from ostensible originals, each thing, in simulation, is thus an absolute singularity. Everything is different from ('verything else, Jnd this in

mrn

is the basis of multiplicity. In this and

the next few paragraphs I have taken several sentenccs from my "Reinveming a Physiology of Collective Liberation:' It should be pointed out that a sinliJar stress on the concept of a singularity is also to be fOlUld in Denida's account of upoliticai desire� in his Politics {}fFriClld.bip, 20-27. 21 To quote Deleuze and GUJttJri: If Marx demonstrated the functioning of capitalism as an Jxiomatic, it was abuve aU in the famous {'hapter on the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Capitalism is indeed an axiomatic, because it has no laws but immJ-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

363

nent ones. It would like for us to oclieve that it confronts the limits of the Universe, the. e.'l:treme limit of resources and energy. But all it confronts are its own limits (the periodic depreciation of existing capital); all it repels or displaces are its own limits (the formation of ncw capital, in new industries with a high rate of profit). This s i the history of oil and nuclear power. And it does both at once: capitalism confronts its own limits and simultaneously displaces them, setting them down again farther along. (A Ihomalld l'latmm,

46;;) 22 In the process of removing thc conditions that enable transcendental accords to maintain themselves, capitalism promotes a rulmral logic that favors the de­ scription over the concept, and this cultutal logic aiso contains within itselfpro­ pensities that weaken or obviate the dichotomy between the. m i \ividual and the collective, and thll'> creates the conditions for the emergence of a culmre that, with the supersession of capitalist "tlonbcing," will allow singularity potentially to occome generalized as a cultural principle.

23 The sketchy accowu of singularity given here is taken from the much more substantial treatment n i Agamben, Tile COInil/g C All/mm/lity.

24 A point well made in Lazare, Tlx Frozm Republic and Tlx VdJlet Collp. 25 Fordiscussion, sec Jessop, "Capitalism and Its Future." 26 This fommbtion is owed to Jessop, "Capitalism and Its Furure,� 574-75. 27 Samir Amin has argued that only in this way can the system of J globalized cconomic polarization oc neutralized and ultimately dismantled. See Amin, " Conditions for Re-launching Development:' 73-84, and "For a Progressive and Democratic New World Order,� 17-32.

28 S. Amin, "Conditions for Rc-bunching D('velopmellt,� 84. 29 S. Amin, Ddinking, 136.

Chapter II. Hcterotopin 1 Hnley, "Utopianism Ancient and Modcrn," 3. Sir M. L Finley, born Moses Israd Finkelstein in New York in 1912, was associated with memocrs of the Frankfurt school during its period of l'Xile in the United States. Dismissed from his teaching post at Rutgers during the McCarthy en, he became a distin­ guished economic and social historian of the ancient world at Cambridge prior to his death in 1986.

2 \Vilde, llx .�olll ofMal/ llnder Socinlum, 1089. 3 A caveat s i necessary here. Hnley makes a distinnion between "static� (or "as­ cetic�) and "dynamic" (or "want-satisfying�) utopias, and suggests that premod­ ern utopias were essentially static, in that they sought to attune tile sensibilities of their protagonists to a world marked by seemingly indunable scarcities and limitations. According to Finley, it was only after the onset of modernity ingen­ eral, and the Industrial Revolution in particular, that dynamic utopias Glme

ro

be promulgated. He is careful to point out, however, that even after the lndus-

364

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10

trial Revolution ascetic utopias existed alongside their modern counterparts. Sec "Utopianism Ancient and Modern,� 11.-14.

4

Foucault, '""Of Other Spaces,� 1.1.. Subsequent rderences arc cited parentheti­ cally in the text.

5 Finley, '""Utopianism Ancient Jnd Modertl,� 12. It is interesting to contrast Finley's position with that of Deleuze aHd Guattari, who argue that the con­ cept of utopia is problematic precisely because of its connection with history. Contrasting the event, which is pure becoming and thus outside history, with the state of affairs, which is historical, they contend that only the event is truly revolutionary, since utopia is "still subject to [historyI and lodged within it as an ideal or motivation�

6

UVhat Ii Philosophy?, llO).

Foucault does not acknowledge the echoes of Bataillc, Merleau-l'onty, Jnd Lacan resonating in his delineation of heterotopia. There are of course im­ portant differences, especially with LaCJn and Merleau-Ponty. Lacan uses the notion of the mirror stage primarily, though not exclusively, to adumbrate the logic of identification (with the Other), whereas l:oucault, as we shall sec, s i concerned less (or indeed not at all) with the dynamic of inner identification and more with the topographical strucmre of a countervailing power. Merleau­ Ponty's description of the �chiasm" which underlies all perceptual activity has an apparent bearing on Foucault's conception of what happens when one looks into a mirror: "As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so well indi­ cated by the double meaning of the word) be doubled with a complementary vision or with another vision: myselfseen from without, such as another would SL"C

me, installed in the midst of the visible, occnpied in considering it from a

cenain spot"

(1he Visible and IlIl'isible, 130'). Merleau-Ponty describes the nec­

essary folding of this "outside" into Jny self-seeing. The big difference between Foucault and Merleau-Ponty resides in Foucault's rejection of anything that approximates a "philosophy of subjectivity,� a philosophy integral to Merleau­ Ponty's existential phenomenology. For this rejection, see Foucault, The Order

ojTIJings, xiv. For Bataille's COtKept ofheterology, which he defines as �the sci­ ence ofthe completely other" (science de ce qlli eft tOlltalltre), see "The Use-Value of D. A. F. Sade (An Open Letter to My Comrades),� 91-101..

7 For J. suggestive account, using a franKwork derived from Dcleuze's philoso­ phy, of how this constructivist conception of perception works, see Martin, �"fhe Eye of the Outside," 18-28.

8 On Foucault's "constructivism," see Deleuze's interview on Foucault, "Break­ ing Things Open, Breaking Words Open,� Nrgotiarilllll, especially 91-9,.

9

Actllcl in Fren{·h has

the connotation of being present or current, or topical,

and thus tempotJry, a sense not reflected in its English equivalent, whose se­ mantic affinity s i with " the real." Another senlantic consideration to be borne. in mind here is Foucault's propensity to gloss �the acma!" in terms of Nietzsche's "untimeliness" (UnzcitgcmiW), where it will have a meaning closer to "the non­ Jctual;' Foucault's terminology notwithstanding. On this see Deleuze, "Break-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

,65

ing Things Open," 86. Important here is Delenze's "The Actual and the Virtual," n i Deleuze and Pamet, Dialqgllf5, 1..8-p. On the. constitlltion of the world in terms of events and singularities, see Deleuze, Dif/irCllcc et rcpctithm, 17,-77. On the separation between states of affairs and (,,'eiltS, see Deleuze, -nJe Lqgu of

.')eme, 109-17. The key Foucauldian text is "The Thought from Outside," 9-58. There

is a suggestive summary of Foucault's relation to Blanchot n i Deleule,

"Life as a Work ofArt," Ncgotiariom, 94-101,

especially 97.

10 Ode.uzc defines a singularity in the following way: "Far from being individual or

personal, singularities preside over the genesis of individuals and persons;

they are distributed in a 'potential' which admits neither Self nor I, but which produces them by actualizing or realizing itself, although the figures of this acmalization do not at all resemble the realized potentiM. Only a theory of sin­ gular points s i (Jpable of transcending the. s)�uhesis of the person and the analy­ sis of the individual as these are (or are made) in consciousness" (TIJt Lqgic of

.')eme, 10,). All references to this work will henceforth be cited in the main body of the tc.u. I am indebted to TIJe LqJic ofSmse for the next few paragraphs. 11 It is imp ortant to remember that the distinction between an n i dividual and a sin­

gularity is central for Ddeuze. According to him, individuality is the outcome of a process that relates acmM ideas

(e.g., thepolitical dmlOmtratWlI), events (e.g.,

Illy king pre5e/Jt at thif dClllomtmtWlI), and sensations (e.g.,

mygrowing excite­ wmtwhile Jt this demonstration) to virtual intensities (e.g., thif excitewmt) and Ideas (e.g., tbe pllre mriatWn «to become e:>.:citcd" if becomil!IJ dmrer as �to become apat/xti," if rrcedillg iI/to ohm/rity bcmllse ,"fir rc/atioll to "to b(((JIIUpolitical�r ill­ roll'edv is cbm!IJed), whereas singularity is this process of connection itself. An individuality is thus the outcome of the process of singularization. A hdpful account of Deleuze.'s conception of

the rdation between a singularity and an

n i dividual is in James Williams, GilIe5 DelewuI (£DijJerCllu and Repetition," 138<,.

12 Fundamental to this countert"actual structllre is the condition that the state of affairs

posited by the cOlmterfactuai in question does not curremly obtain.

Hence in the counterfactual "If having a top-class intellect were a condition for

being presidcm, George \Y. Bush would not be presidem," the antecedent

of this conditional,

to wit "Having a top-class intelk'Ct is a condition for being

presidem," is one that docs not obtain. It is ofcourse possible for someone who is convinced that George 'V. Bush is an intellectual force to hold the opposing counterfactual, namely, ''If having a top-class intellect were a condition for being president, G('Orge W. Bush would (still) be president (because ! happen to regard him as a top-class intellect)." 13 See Funkenstein,

7hfOlqjy alld tlu Scientific lmagilmtioll, ,..0-48. Funkenstein

argues that a mechanistic

philosophy, a resultant of this secularizing process,

had to be in place in order for society to be conceived of as a machine that could

be significantly modified and improved. 14 See Turner, Drnllms, Fields and Mctaphon.

,66 NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

15 The. charge, often leveled by marxist or marxisant thinkers, that Foucault's thought is fundamentally depoliticized may have something to do with Fou­ cault's emphasis on "micto-power� and "local strategies,� this emphasis being n i tegral to his chJl"acterization of heterotopia. The question of Foucault's re­ lation to marxism is a complex one, but it centers primarily on what Foucault took to be marxism's one-sided and problematic emphasis on the ideological apparatuses of the state, leading it to deal inadequately with forms of power and resistance that fcll outside the purvicw of d1ese state appararuscs. In this t:oucault was right, though it does not follow from this either that his suppos­ edly Weberian conceptions of micro-power and local strategies were eo ipso adequate or that Jny resort to them by Foucault and his many followers s i nl."(­ essarily a mJrk of some kind of"depoliticization."

16 See Poincare, Lu Mctbodu NOIfl'ClIei de la Micalliljue Cdute. 17 See Dasgupta, ""lhe Economics of the Environment." 18 The notion of reverse causation is absolutely central for the " universal history� developl..'d by Deleuzc and Guattari in A

1TJOII.snnd PlatmllS.

For Deleu7-c and

Guattari, as we. have seen, the state has always existed, even in hunter-gatherer societies, because these ""primal� peoples (1(5primiti�'C5) had toward oft· the state apparatuses in order to be the kind of society they were. SI.'C especially page HI. Perhaps the. most helpful treatment of Deleuze's conception of causality is De­ Landa, illtmsil'/; SCUIIU and VirtllalPbi/osopiJy, 117-31.

19 It has to be admitted that this s i not how FOUCJult himself conceives ofhetero­ topia, since by and large for Foucault heterotopias are spatially situated; that

L�, there has to be some ""site� where the heterotopia is instantiated. But if this requirement is dispensed with, it s i easy to see how dlC principle of reverse causation can be applied to heterotopia.

20 This of course overlooks the possibility that capitalism has always ex isted, in the sense that there has always been an acmmubtion of surpluses. Even hwner­ gatherer societies needed surpluses to feed those who went ont hunting and foraging, and were thus functionally capitalist. This is the argument of Deleuze and Guattari; see A ThollSalld Plateaus, 429-3l.

21 Rodrik, "'Vhy Financial Markets Misbehave," 189. For details of Bra7il's eco­ nomic siruation around the time ofLub's election, see Rocha, "Neo-dependency n i BrdZiL�

22 Ibid., 190. 23 See S. Amin, Detillking, 160. 24 On Malaysia's recalcitrance in respect to the neoliberal consensus, see 'Vade, "The Asian Crisis� and "The Asian Debt-and-Development Crisis of 1997-8,� See also Wade and Veneroso, "The Gathering World Slump and the Battle over Capital Controls.� ,\bhysia did recover more quickly from the crisis than did those countries which adherl.'t1 to the consensus.

25 The logic ofincompossibility adverted to earlier specifies that once Bush became president in the actual world it was not possible for him llOt to Ix> president in

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

367

this panicular world. Another world, real but not yet actuated, would have to be realized in order for him not to have been made president again in LOO". L6

On the buffoonish Herlusconi and the Italian media, see Ginsborg, Siil'iuBertus­

co/Ii. One also recalls here the satirical play �The Two-Headed Anomaly,� writ­ ten by the Italian Nobel laureate for literature Dario Fo, in which &rlusconi, k.J10\\�1 to be touchy about his height (he s i 5 feet 5 inches tall without his plat­

form shoes), is among other things portrayed as a puppet dwarf who received half of Vladimir I\ltin's brain after his own brain was severely injured in an at­ tack by Chechnyan terrorists during his visit to Moscow. Pmin, never doubting that his own brain was that of an extraordinary genius, decided he {·ould easily function with half a brain, and donated the other half in a life-saving gesture to the now brain·dead Herlu5coni. After his surgery Berlusconi senses he is Iulim but has the disconcerting memories of the KCB colonel that (\ltin once was, Jnd has developed a taste for vodka as opposed ro fine Italian wine. Might

J

possible American heterotopia therefore include, as a very preliminary offering, someone who could perhaps be the American equivalem of Dario Fo?

Chapter 12. "flJC New Po/iticnt Subject 1 For Rodrik, see " Why Hnancial Markets Misbehave,� 188-91.

2 The point that America's status as the sole superpower does not necessarily represent a simplification of power relationships in the direction of unipolarity s i wcll lllade in Therborn, "Into the 21st Century,� 89. For a similar view, see Mann, "Globalization and September 11."

3 See United Nations, �Vorld Ecollu»lic SimatirJII alld l'rospects .wo6, www.un.orgl esa, accessed on 5 February 2006. .. Admittedly, this s i a �weapon of the weak"; those who are perceived to be strong are in a position to ignore principles and conventions, while those who are weak. have little option but to insist that such principles and conventions be observed. lhis adherence is strategic, however, insofar as those who espouse it will always be looking for a state of affairs in which th,'y, who are consigned to a situation ofsubordination or subalternity, will no longer be subordinate (i.e., beholden in this case to the U.S. dollar as dle international reserve currency).

5 This point is well lllade in Mann, "The First failed Empire of the Twenty-First Ccntury,� 66, who poinL� out that there is a gulf between �battleficld victory� and ""imperial pacification" that dlC United States seems unable to bridge. 6

See 1\1aIlll, uThe First biled Empire of dle Twenty-First Century,� 80.

7 ·nlis configuration of the c8 countries and the international financial org.llli­ zations JJllounts to what Ignacio Ramonet has rightly called an unaccountable upIJJ1,·tary executive.�: "Over the past ten years, globalization, combined with J

laxity on the part of politiciJJls, has resulted in the surreptitious creation of

a kind of plJJletary executive, {·OllSisting of four main actors: the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Devclop-

368 NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

ment and C.ooperation, and the WTO. Immune from dcmocratic pressure, this informal power network mns our world JIld dccides thc fate of its inhabiLlnts. And there is no counterpower-parliJillent, media, political parties-that can corrcct, alter or reject its decisions� ("A New Dawn,� 1). Ralllonet's account of this unaccountable planetary executive needs to be modifiL-tl in at lcast one rc­ spcn: the Unit�xl States ha$ to be added to his list of actors. Although thc I.\IF, the World Bank, the. OECD, and theWTO arc rightly viewed as paranational for­ mations in Ramonet's sense, the Unitcd States is thc world's only tmly supcr­ vening political and cconomic force: it is the guiding force behind these instim­ tions, while also cxercising its own version of an international cxccutive power. The L\IF, the World BJIlk, the OECD, JIld the WTO therefore colllplement and reinforce the U.S. goverlUllent's policy objectives, bnt thc United States is also a plJlletary exccutive in its own right. For J dcrailed account of how this un­ accountable planetary executive works in the current world-system, see Leys, �Democracy," 57-67. 8 Thus the fcderal appcals judge and legal scholar Richard Posner characte.rizes

the U.S. elcctoral system as an instmmcnt cxplicitly designed to faciliLlte the orderly transition from one. administration to another, and not some mysteri­ ous alchemy that convcrts thc popular will into a (peoplc's) governmcnt. As a judicial conservativc, ['osner has no objtx:tion to this " postpolitical" guttcd ekx:toral process, since for him wanting any alternative to it would be to suc­ cumb to romantic delusions. Sce his Hrraking tbe Deadlock. Morcovcr, when, unreservedly, both the Rcpublican and Democratic l'arties are parties of capi­ tal, economic choices for votcrs ccase to be meaningful. As my colleague Jerry Hough points out, "Both parties have stmctured thcircconomic policy so as to try to maximizc their support n i thc upper class of the population-the 25% of [thel population tbat makcs abovc $75,000 a year in family income" (Cbanging

Party Coalitiom, 1). 9 For Mann on this "ostracizing imperialism,� see his "Globalization Jnd Septcm­

ber ll," 5,-56. 10 ! rake the. notion of J -permeable so\'ereignty� from Gowan, "The New Libcral Cosmopolitanism,� 60-6S. See also Gowan, -nJt Global Gamble and "US: UN,� For a stirring critiquc of the appcal to human rights to justify wars against "fun­ damcntalism,� scc Zi7.ck, "Against Human Rights." II

See Mann, "The First Failed Empire of the Twenty-First Century," 76-78, whose line ofargument is takcn up in these paragraphs.

12 On this confhtion, see Blackburn, -The Imperial Presidency and the Revolu­ tions of Modcrnity," 168-71. As I write Rarack ObJlllJ has just won the 2008 presidential election, but I Jill inclined to the view that ObJma will end up go\'­ erning pretry much as a Climonite centrist (albeit with one or two adjustments). Though matching Clinton's competence (definitely a considerable mercy given the course of American presidential politics from 2000 to 2008!), OballlJ is in all likelihood not going to do llluch more for the. poor countries of the South NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

369

(and m i poverished Americans) than Clinton did, especially given the currently unpropitious economic dimate. The consensus so faron Obama's "financial res­ cue" package s i that it s i providing a windfall for those who caused the problem n i the first pl�ce, as opposed to restructuring the banks themselves. 13 See Nairn, Face> IJ/NatiIJlIalism, in which he makes the crucial point that "po­ litical nJtionaliry" and its concomitant �nationality politics" are unavoidabk in the modern world, but nlocd not be accompanied or tainted by ethnonational­ ism. Nairn believes the various etlmonationalisms to be a contingent historical phenomenon manifest from the mid-eighteenth cenmry onward. TIlese etlmo­ nationalisms preempted otherwise more acceptable versions of political nation­ ality (which he refers to as " civic nationalism") by endorsing irrational myths and atavistic conceptions of the a/l1I()J ("chosen" peoples, "manifest destinies," etc.). Nairn derives the distinction between "civic nationalism" and "ethnic nationalism" from Ignatietf, Blood alld Bdollgil!!J. See also Nairn, "Breakwaters of .woo." Also very importJnt here is Armstrong, Natiom bcj(ffe NatilJllalum. Nairn's point is salntary because ofthe extremely common tendency to demon­ ize the nation-state and nationalism. 14 See S. Amin, Ddillkillg, 136. 15 RadicJI social and economic transformation occurs only when mling elites find themselves compelled to take into account the interests of the less privileged while still trying to maintain their own privileges ("\Vhom do we invite to the negotiation table!"), or when they are placed in a social order that peremptorily withdraws their privileges ("Are we going to be exiled, are we going to be lined up against the wall by a firing squad, are our Swiss bank accounts going to be se­ questered!").The best detJikd account ofthis attemptto establish a ""dcmocracy from below" s i in E. J. '\bod, F(ffgilW Democracyfrom Be/om \Nood's narrative shows that the m i petus for a movement to democracy in many poor countries is provided by the country's impoverished dasses, who insist on their inclusion in the prevailing political system.

370

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12

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INDEX

Adorno, T. W., 312 Il.

H

Agambcn, Giorgio, 29 AgJiena, Michel, 48, 76, pI Il. 50, 3u

Bacevich, Andrew J., 198, 300 n. 11, 301 Il. 31, 353 n.. 2 Badiou, Alain, 42, 56, 197-25, 227. 201,

Akebollo (Chad Rowall), 159-60

312 n. 29, 340 n. 12, 352 Il. 49, 353 Il. 3, 354 Illl. 5-11, 354 nil. 13-15, 355

AI C!aeda, 6, 152,154, 197

Il. 17, 355 n. 19, 355 n.

Althusser, LOllis, 42, H, 166, 248, 309 ..

356 Iln. 25-28, 357 Illl. 30-37, 358

Il. 52, p6 n. 19

Il. 13, 3u n. 33, 352 n. 50

20,

355 n. 21,

Altvater, ElmJl", 314 n. 7

Il. 38, 358 n. 40, 358 Il. 44, 358 Iln. 4-5 (ch. 9), 360 n. 7, 361 n. 2; and

Amin, Samir, 47. 91, 114, u3, u7.

the universal, 200-201

U9-31. 260, 286. 292. 315 Il. 8, 331

Balibar, Etienlle, 22-28, 42-43, 160,

Il. 38, 334 Il. 60, 336 Il. 9, 336 Il. 11,

303 Iln.. 3-4, 304 n. 6, 304 n. 10, 353

n6 Il. u, 338 n. 22, 364 nn. 27-29,

Il. 43, 361 Il. 9

367 n. 23, 370 Il. 14 Analogy, donrine of, L27-40 Anderson, ikllooin, 160 Andersoll, Perry, 307 Il. 2

Baran, Paul A., 132, 135, 337 Il. 16 Bataille, Georges, 267, 346 1l. 13, 365 1l. 6

Arelldt, Hallnm, 50

Beardsworth, Richard, 348 n.. 22 Beasley..Murray, Jon, 361 n. 3

Aristotle, 21, 207, n6-19, 225

Being, 166-67, 171-72, 176, 185, WI,

Arrighi, Giovallni, 109, 116-23, HO Il. 31, 331 Jill. 'P-43, 332 Iln. 44-47. 334 n. 54

229-31, 233,239 Bcnedin, Ruth, 143-45, 340 Il. 7 Benjamin, Walter, 58, 312 n. 30, n. 33

Artaud, Antonin, 172

Bennillgtoll, Geoffrey, 181-84, 191, 350

Asad, Talal, 344 n. 29

Il. 32,351 n. 38, 351 Il. 41, 351 n. 43,

Asiall Development Ballk, 81, 319

352 Il. 47, 353 Il. 55

Il. 35, 319 n. 37 Attali, Jacques, 303 n. 28

Bergsoll, Henri, 304 n. 6, 362 Il. U

Augustine of Hippo, Saint, 23, 303 Il. 5

Ikrnallke, Bell, 94

&rlusconi, Silvio, 235, 284, 368 n. 26

Bernasconi, Roben, 352 n. 48 Bbckburn, Robin, 309 n. 12

65-66,6')-70, 95, 108,122, 141,313 n. 1; supersession of, 12, 16, 35, H, 135, 276, 310 n. U, 336 n. 13 (ire nlio

Blair, Tony, 3-5, 9, 10, 31, 199, L43,

Rl'volution); system of regulation,

L70, L99 n. 6, P5 n. 13, 343 nn.

36-40, 53, 141. See nho Globalization Caygill, Howard, 359 n. 12 Chang, Ha-Joon, 86, 320 n. 46, 336 n. 13 China, ll5, 330 n. 31, HI n. 40 Christianity, 7, 62; and theology, .!26-40 Clinton, William Jefferson, 3-5,10, L99 n.6 Cohen, Benjamin J., 328 n. 25 Cohen, Paul, 213, U9 Colley, Linda, HO n. 10 (',omaraff, Jean, 58, 312 n. 31 ColllJroff, John, 58, 312 n. 31

Bhabha, Homi , 157, 158, 340 n. 9

L4-L5 Blanchot, Maurice, 346 n. 13, 365 n. 9 Bobbin, Philip, 151-56, 34L nn. 18-LO Bonaparte, Napokon, LL4 Bosteels, Bruno, 3H n. 13, 355 ll. U Bourdieu, Pierre, ,OL n. L7. 350 ll. 31 Boyer, Robert, 76, 88, 90, 321 n. 50, 321

n. 51, 321 n. 53, 3U n. 54 Braude!, Fernand, 344 n. 30 Brenner, Robert, 133-34, 313 n. 1, 337 JUl. 16-17 Brown, Gordon, 9 Brown, \Vendy, 150, 341 n. 15, 343 n. U Buffett, n'JI"ren, 33L n. 46 Burma, L25 Bush, George \V., 3,5, 10, 31, 159, 193,

194, 197, 198, 199, 212, 214-16, L25, L43. L59, L69-72, 276, L8L-83, 289, L92, 307 ll. 5, pI n. H, 3L5 n. 13, 366 n. 12, 367 n. L5 Cage, John, L55, 36L n. 17

CollUlllmism: Soviet, 1, 14-16, 29, 72; still to come, 275 (ieI:nlw Revolu­ tion) COllcepmal practice, 188, 191, 193-96,

352 n. 50 Critchley, Simon, 186, 197, 348n . .!2,

352 n. 47, 353 n. l Cuba, u8 Cunningham, Conor, 229, 359n. 6

Capital: controls on movement; 86,

107, L86, po n. 45, 3L8 n. L5; "'ficti­ tious," 85, 91, 105, 320 n. 44; limits of, 149-50; as men·aecord of ac­ cords, L43-44, 2j.!-53; mobility of, 85, 88-90, 105-8, 3LO n. +4, 332

n. 46; po.stwar compromise with labor, 8-9, 72, 75, 141-42, 295; so­ cial, 302 n. L7, 335 n. 1 Capitalism: devclopmcntalist con­ ception of, 36, 69-70; industrial, 8,

116-L3; mercantile, 6-8; moderni7.a­ tion and, 30, 6')-70; modes of pro­ duction of, 36, 53; new mutations of, 65, 116-L3, 150, 202, 276-78; postwar "Golden Age" of, 2-3, 9, 13, 408

INDEX

Dasgupta, Panha, L75, 367n. 17 Dastur, Fram;oise, 350 n. 31 Davidson, Donald, 358 n. 42 Debord, Guy, 4 DeLJnda, Manuel, ,67 n. 18 Deleuzc, Gilles, 21, 42, 45, 61-62,

192, 195, LU, 227, 229, L31, 235-40, L41-61, 30, ll. L, 305 n. 17, 308 n. ll, 310 n. 25, 312 n. L9, 312 n. 36, 312 n. 37, 312n. 39,312 n. 40, 341 n. 14, 352 n. 49, 357 n. 31, 357 n. 36, 359 n. 13, 360 n. 15, 360 nn. 17-LO, 361 n. 1, 361 nn. 5-10, 362 Illl. ll-I4, 363 JUl. 18-21, 365 n. 5, 365 JUl. 7-9, 367 n. 18, 367 n. 20

Delinking, 14, 96, 125-37, 260-61, 279-80,1.85-94, 1.93

Depelldency theory, 91, 95-137, 321. n.6

crisis of 1997, 5, Il, 79, 81, 84, 85, 96,98, 103-8, 121-1.1., 127,286,31.6

n. 14; fillancial crisis of 1.008-9, I, 4-5, Il-12, 1.7, 73, 76, 79, 88-89, 96,

Derrida, Jacques, 11, 233, 300 n. 12,

104, 107-9, Ill., 1:14, 148, 150, 1.87,

H5 nn. 1-7, H6 rul. 8-1:1, H7 n. 15,

1.95, 3Il n. 1.8, 321. ll. 63, 31.7 n. 1.2,

H7 n. 19, H9 Jill. 25-30, 350 lill. H-

31.9 n. 28, 332 n. 46, 338 n. 1.0; Great

35, 350 n, 37. 350 n. 39, 350 n, 40,

Crash of 1929, I, 30; Mexican peso

350 Il. 42, 350 n. 43, 352 nil. 44-46,

crisis of 1994, 12, 78-79, 84, 85, 108;

352 nil. 47-49, 351. nn. 51-54, 353

Russian default crisis of 1<)98, 84,

n. 58, 353 n. 59, 353 n. 61, 363 n. 20;

98; Third World debt crisis of the

on deconstruction, 1.8,165, 167-68,

1980s, 11, 72, 79, 124; U.S. dOLcom

172,180, 183-84, 186, 189-91,194,

crash of 1.000, 5, Il, 79, 108-9, 150,

H8 n, 22, 350 nn, 31-31.; on justice,

31.9 n. 28

1.8,173,181,183, 187, 194-95, 351

Elliott, Larry, 86, 31.0 n. 46, 323 n. 4

n. 40; on thc pIKe of the subjcct,

Emblematic dates and periodization:

165-96

Des,:artes, Rene, 22-1.4, 303 nn. 3-5 Desanti, Jean·Toussaint, 212-18, 357 nn,

29-30, 358 n. 39

Desire, 54, 58-60, 62-63, 158, 1.44-45, �"

Deutsche Bundesbank, 79-80, 318 n. 32 Developing and Less Developed Omntries (LDCS): financial markets

-1492," 1.59; "1789,� 24, 26, 40, 259; . "19" '8," 28, 197, 225, 242, "1989," 1, 5-6, 9, 13-14, 40.95; " 9/11/2001," 1, 6, 10, 197-98, 300 n. 12; -2008," 1

Ethics, Dcrrida's position on, 173-76 Event: concept of, 175, 184-85, 191, 193; politics of, 197-225, 242. $u tlls(J

Badiou, Alain Exploitation, 126, 335 n. 4

and, 77-93, 319n. 38; in relation to

Farred, Grant, 339 n. 4

developcd countries, 66-69, 90-91,

Financial markets, 13, 73, 76-93, 9(,-

95-103, 125-37, 260-26, 1.85

Developmcnt: cconomic, 67-69, 7694; maldevelopment, 91, 123; llJl­

l'ven, 94-137;

99, 109-15, 315 ll. 9, 319 n. 38

Fink, Bmce, 356 n. 1.5 Finley, M. L, 265-67, 364 n. 1, 364 n. 3, 365 n, 5

DumaiJ, Gcorgcs, 246, 361 n. 8

Fishlow, Albert, 330 n. 35

Dumont, Louis, 157, 344n. 1.9

Florio, Massimo, 300 n. 10, 338 ll. 18

Dunford, Mick, 315 n. 9

Fo, Dario, 368 n. 1.6

Duns Scoms, and Scotism, 227, 229,

Foley, Duncan, 335 n. 4

1.31,236-40

Dussel, Enrique, 46, 157

Fordism, 48-50, 88, 141-43, 146; post­ Fordism vs., 30, 69-77, 90, 308 n. 8, 313 n. I, 314 n. 7, 315 nn. 10-11, 316

Earlc, Stl�'e, 198, 353 n. 4 Economic crises: Argentinian finan­

n,12

Foucault, ,\-liehel, 26-28, 30, 42, 61-61.,

cial crisis of 1.001, 84; Brazilian peso

162,166,1.12, 248, 1.50, 1.66-84,305

crisis of 1998-99, 84; East Asian

n. 17, 312 ll. 35, 312 n. 38, 365 n. 4;

INDEX

409

Foucault, Mi{'hel

(colltiml(d)

Harriss, John, 335 n. 1

on governmentality, 42, 0145 n. :15,

Harvey, David, 333 n. 48

,63 n. 19, 365 n. 6, ,65 n. 8, 365 n. 9,

Hegel, G. \Y. F., 21-22, 26, 62, 117,

157-61, 168,172,202,207,250,256,

367 n. 15, 367 n. 19 French Revolution, 223-24

304 n. 12, 332 n. 46

Freud, Sigmund, 26, 30, 61, 245

Heidcggcr, Manin, 23, 26, 56, 166, 169,

Friedman, Thomas L., 326 n. 14

171-79, 185-86, 188, 190, 0145 n. 1,

Fnnkenstein, Amos, 366 n. 13

0146 n. 9, 0146 n. 10, 346 n. 12, 346 n. 13,347 nn. 14-17, 347nn. 20-21,

Galbraith, John Kenneth, 48-49, ,09

n.14

0148 n. 22, 0149 n. 24, 349n. 27, 0149 n. 30, 350 n. 31

Gaon, Stella, 353 n. 59

Helleiner, Eric, 322n. 59, 333 n. 49

Germain, Randall, 89, 321 nn. 55-56,

Henwood, Douglas, 318 n. 34, 319

322 n. 61, 3014 n. 51

n. 39, 3014 n. 55

Gilroy, Paul, 150, 339 n. 4, HI n. 15

Herzfeld, Michad, 157, 344 nn. 29-31

Globalization, 27-28, 65-68, 71, 73-93,

Heterotopia, 155, 265-8.+

96, 102-3, u8, 141, 151, 286, 292, 313

Hirsch, Joachim, 71, 74-76, 315 n. 10,

n. 2, 313 n. 3, 314 n. 6, 319 n. 38, 328

316n. 16, 317n. 20, 317 n. 23, 322

n. 25, 336 n. 10, 368n. 7

n. 62

Glyn, Andrl",", 313 n. 3

Hirst, Paul, 313 n. 3

Goldnun, Lucien, :151 n. 35

Hobbes, Thomas, 6, 21, 172, 242, 256

Gowan, Peter, 369 n. 10

Hobson, John M., 336 n. 13

Greenspan, Alan, 94, 3un. 54

Hough, Jerry, 369 n. 8

Griffith-Joncs, Stephany, 103, 326 nn.

Hume, David, 7, 21, 231, 301 n. 14 Huntington, Samuel T., 145, 147, 340

14-15 GuandnanlO, 215-16

n.8

Guattari, Felix, 42, 195, 231, 241-61,

HI n. 14, H3 n. 61, 361 n. 1, 361 nn. 7-10, 362n. 11, 362 n. 12, 362 n. 14,

Identity: American, 143-45; British,

146; politics of, 147-64, 201, 242

363 n. 19, 363 n. 21, 365 n. 5, 367

Immanence, 226-40

n. 18, ,67 n. .w

india, U5, 354 n. 12

Gummer, John Selwyn,

4

Indonesia, 122 Institute of International Finance

Haakonssen, Knud, 300 n. 13 Haar, Michel, 347 n. 20 Hall, Stuart, 157 Hallward, Peter, 214-19, 354 n. 12, 356

(IlFl, 79, 104, 326 nn. 16-17 international Financial Services (Lon­ don), 318 n. 29 International Monetary \;und

(1MF),

n. 24, H6n. 27,:157 nn. 31-36, :158

70,103, 107-8, 114,123,127, 128,

n· 41

129, 136,278, 281, 285,289,323 n. 4,

Hardt, Michad, 29, 42, 203, 354 n. 1"

,61 n. 1 Harmes, Adam, 321 n. 55, 334 n. 55,

334 n. 59

410

INDEX

327 n. 21, 330 n. 32, 335 n. 5, 368 n. 7; dismanding of, 293, 336 n. 9 international trade, 66-69, 76-94, 114,

314 n. 6

Inwood, Michael, 344 n. ,2 Israel, jonathan I., ,00 Il. 13, 304 Il. 14

Liberatioll movemellts: Ilew social mov�."mellts, 14" 155; Third World, 1.43, 339 Il. 3

James, WilHam,

,04 n.

6

jameson, Fredric, 42-43 japan, 109, II6, 120, 329 n. 28, 329

Life-world, 51-53, 57, 60, 141-42, If7, 163,19,, 194-96 Lincoln, Abraham, 19,

n. 30; share of global foreign ex­

Lipktz, Alain, 315 Il. 9, 316 n. 12

change market, 78

Locke, jolill, 6, 21-23, 303 Il. 3, 305

Jeffersoll, Thomas, ,04 n. 14 Jessop, Bob, 38-39, 70-76, 307 n. 4, n. 6, Il. 7. 308 Il. 8, 315 nn. 10-II, 316 Jill

.

n. IS Lm;:emburg, Rosa, 46, 87. 91, 320 Iln. 47-49,337 Il. 16

12-15, 317 nn. 17-28, 322 n. 62,

364 nn. 25-26 jones, Gareth Stedman, 338 Il. 23 Joy Division, ,03 Il. 28

MacmiUan, Harold, 142 Macpherson, C. 8.,157,3°0 Il. 13, 344 n. 29 Major, JOhll, 135, 300 Il. 10

Kant, Immannel, 7, 21-27, 61,202, 233-37, 301 Il. 16, 304 Illl. 6-13, 305 Il. 15, 343 Il. 24, ,61 Il. 9

Malaysia, 122, 252-53, 281, 327 n. 24, 329 Il. 30, 367 Il. 24 Mandel, Ernest, 63, 312 n. 41

Kantorowicz, Ernst, 23, 30, Il. 4

Ma.ndela, NeiSOIl, 55-56, 188

Kastoryano, Riva, 344 Il. 27

Manll, Michael, 74, 163-64, 2&6, 289,

Keynesiallism, 3, 71, 72-73, 75, 108, 135, 142-43, 146,296, 334 Il. 59

290, 307-8 Il. 7, 313 n. 3, 320 Il. 45, 334 Il. 59, 335 Il. 2, 339 n. 1, 342 n. 20,

Khan, Mohsin S., 105, 327 Il. 21

345 nil. 37-39, 368 n. I, 368 Il. 5, 368

KierkegJard, S(�ren, 174, 195, 349

n. 6, 369 Il. 9, 369 Il. II

Il. 24, Il. 30 Kleill, Naomi, 30

Mallll, "[homas, 3+4 Il. 26 Marke.t: fundamentalism and dogma

Kindleberger, Charles P., ,13 Il. I

of, 9, ,1-32, 289, 301n. 22, 329

Kozul-Wright, Richard, u4-15, 331

Il. 29; "opellness," 84-87, 89, 108,

Jill

.

39-40

114-15, 126, 129-32, 29" 329 Iln. 29-30, HI Il. 40

Lacall, Jacques, 47, 166, 267, 356 Il. 25, ,65 n. 6 Laclau, Ernesto, 153, 331 Il. 41, 339 Il. 4, 342 Il. 20, 353 Il. 59, 357 Il. 3 Lautreamont (Isidore Luciell Ducasse), 25o'-55 Leiblliz, G. 'N., 21, 23, 217-19, 225, 243,254, 269, 359 Il. 7 Lenin, Vbdimir !IIich, 41, 56, 197 U·vinas, Emmanuel, 167, 173, 187, 346 Il. 13, 348 Il. 22 Leys, ('..olin, ,68 Il. 7

Marx, Karl, 26, 30, 41-43, 61, 6" 85, 87, 105, II6-23, 1,2, 133,249, 257, 307 Il. 7, 308 Il. 9, 320 Il. 44, 320 Il. 46, 332 Il. 47, 335 n. 4, 3n Il. 16, 351 Il. 35 Massumi, Brian, 240, 360 Il. 18, 360 Il. 22 '\-bterialism: historical, 63-64; politi­ cal, fl-·B, 50, 55-60, 63-64Mazier, jacques, 3, 299 Il. 4 McKibbin, Ross, 1O-1l, 302 Il. 23, ,02 1l. 25

INDEX

4U

Mead, Margaret, I'B-H, 3fO n. 6

Palestine, 4, 206, .1;91

Melll, Stephen, 303 n. 5

Palumbo-Liu, David, 143-45, 040 Iln.

Merkel, Angela, .1;99 11. 4

5-8

Mecleau-Ponty, Maurice, .1;67, 365 n. 6

Parenti, Michael, 338 n. 18

Michaels, Walter Be11l1, HO n. U

Palllaik, Prabhat, 203, 337 n. 14, 354

'\Iilanovic, Sranko, 99-100, 300 n. 9, 3.1;4 n. 9, 3.1;5 n. 10, 338 11.

u

Milbank, John, .1;3.1;, 359 nn. 9-11, 360 n. 14, n. 17, n. 19, n. 21 Monbiot, George, 30, 306 n. 19

n. 12 Penis, Michael, 319 n. 4.1;, 3n n. 55 Plato and Platonism, u, 26, .1;01, 207, n6-19, 22,,-25, 230, 357 n, 38, 363 n. .1;0

Moschona5, Gerrasimos, 4, 299 n. 5

Poincare, Henri, .1;75. 367 n. 16

Mouffe, Chantal, 150, 339 n. 4, 04.1;

Polanyi, Karl, 47

n. .1;0

Politics: biopolitics, 28, 30, 61; as

Multiculturalism, 145, 151-55, H3 n.25

deddability, 56-57, 311 n. .1;8; market-drivCll, 135; ontology and, 60-64; postpolitical, 10-Il, 28-.1;9,

Multitude, 43

65-93, .1;42, .1;90, 36111. 9 Nader, Ralph, 203

Nairn, Tom, 16, 300 11. 8, 370 n. 13 Nationalism, .1;91-9.1;; civic vs. ethnic, 16,370 n. 13

Pollin, Robert, 117-19, 333 n. 48, 3014 nn· 52-53 Polt, Richard, 349 n. 24 Populism, authoritarian, 13, 142, 302

Negri, Antonio, 29, 4.1;-43, 63, 195,

n. .1;6

.!O3, 304 11. 14, 305 n. 16, 310 n. 23,

Posner, Richard, 369 n. 8

312 n. 33, 316 n· 13, 353 n. 60,:154

Pouhntzas, Nicos, 31:1 n. .1;, 315 n. 10

n. 13, 361 n. 1

Poverty: income. gap between rich and

Neoliberalism, .1;-6, 27-28, 30, 69-70,

poor cOlunries, 5, 66, 97-102, 125,

104, 108,115, 124, 126, 131-32, 142,

129, 329 n. .1;9; income gap within

232, 278, 281, 289, .1;94, 295, 305

countries, 99-10.1;, 300 n. 9

n. 18, 326 n.

14, 3.1;9 n. 30, 331 n. 40

Niet"zsche, Friedrich, 26, 30, 61, 16667,207.230, 350 n. 31, 365 n. 9

Power: constiment, 54, 19.1;, .1;32; distri­

bution of, 46, 92, 20.1;, .1;58, 279-80, 287; explOitation and, 53, 336 n. 13;

Nomadology, .1;41-61

will to, 26 (Ice alsu Nietzsche, Fried­

Nozick, Robert, 153-56, 343 1111. 22-24

rich)

Obama, Ratack, 3, .1;96, 369 n. 12

Quayle, Dan, 284

Obeyeskere, Gananarn, 3fO n. 10 Ong, Aihwa, 50

Rabinow, Paul, 312 n. 35

Organization for Economic Coopera­

Radical Orthodoxy mOl'Cment, .1;26-40

tion Jnd Development (oEeD). 3,

Ramonet. Ignacio, 368 n. 7

74, 90,101, 106, 128, 129, .1;79, 313

Ranciere, Jacques, 4.1;, 309 n. 18

n. 3, 3.1;5 n. 12, 330 n. 33, 368 n. 7

Rapaport, Herman, 168, 174, 0146 n. 10,

Orlean, Andre, 3n Il. 54

412

INDEX

n. 13, 347 n, 18, H8 n. 23

Rawls, John, 242

Smith, Anthony D., 160

Rcagall, Ronald, 1-4, 10, 70, 72, 108,

Smith, Dalliel W., :157 Il. 36

142-43, 160, 2:15, 258,299 n. 6 Rcason, 22-27, 61, 175, 233, 235-37, 250, 311 n. 28 Rcgulation S<:hool (Ecole Regulation), 76,77, 87,313 II. 1, 315 Il. 10, 316 1l. 13, 316 II. 16 Rcvolutioll, 1.47, 189, 191, 200, 203, 225,234, 237, 260,275,325 II. 13;

Social democracy, 1-6, 14, 143, 301 1l. 21 Socicty of control,

2S,

242-45

South Korea, 107 Sovereignty: divine, 22-23, 27; politi­ cal, 6-8, 11, 24, 27-31, 34,65, 74, 152,172, 202, 236, 256, 258-61, 291, 343 Il. 24, 361 11. 7

definition of, 16-17, 306 n. 1;

Spectacle, society of, 9

French, 223-24; as opposed to insur­

SpillOza, BanJch, 6, 42, 45, 54, 63, 192,

n.-ction or rcbellioll, 16

211, 227, 229,230, 236-38, 284, 304

Richardson, Willi am)., 347 II. 14

Il.

Roach, Stephcn, 84-85, 319 n. 42

n·56

Robinsoll, joan, 47, 66 Rodrik, Dalli, 86, 278-79, 286, 334 n. 58, 367 nil. 21-22, 368 n. I Romanticism, 8, 25 Rousseau, Jean-jacqucs, 7, 172, 202, 242, 256

14, 310 lin. 22-23, 312 n. 34, 353

Spivak, Gayatri ChakrJ.vorty, 157. 348 n. 23 StaCl, /\iillc-Louise-Germaine de (Madame de), 8, 301 n. 19 Stalin, joscph, 41 Statc: capacities, fWlCtions, and

Rudra, Nita, 336 Il. 10 Runcimall, David, 342 n. 18, 343 nn. 22-23

projccts, 69-76, 89, 163, 172, 201-2, 206,225, 236, 241-61, 292,315 n. 9, 322 n. 59, 323

Runciman, 'V. G., 39, 307 Il. 3, 307 n. 7

Il.

II.

1, 354 n. 14, 362

11; capitalist, 1-8, 65-76,205-

6, 240; globalization and, 69-76, Said, Edward, 157

89, 313 11. 3, 321 n. 58, 322 Il. 59;

Sarkozy, Nicolas, 3-5 Schizoanalysis,241-61

" hollowing-out" of, 70-77, 243; idcological apparatuscs of, 2-6, 7172, 75,142, 152; nation-5tate, 8-9,

Schmitt, Carl, 56, 186, 202

69,71, 74, 151-52, 292, 343 n. 24,

Schumpcter, joseph, 71, 72-73, 75-76

344 n. 29; workfare-5tate, 71-72, 75

Sattre, Jean-Paul, 166, 224, 346 II. 13

Scott, James C., 52

Stiglitz, Joseph, 335 n. I, 336 n. 13

Sierra Leone, 335 n. 6

Strugglc: dass·baslxi, 13, 141-44, 150,

Sillgh, Ajit, 81, 104, 319 n. 36, 320 n. 43, 325

Il.

11, 326 n. 19, 328 n. 27,

329 n. 30 Singularity, 56, 169, 170, 172-76, 17987,189-93, 197. 201,231,236, 25658, 268-6<), 312 n. 29, 353 n. 57. 363 Il.

20, 365 nn. 10-11

Smith, Adam, IH

163-64, 279-80, 283; cconomic and social, 17, 34-35, 40, 53, 240, 242, 261, 294, 296; gellder-focused, 39, 147, 277; racc-focu5ed, 147, 277 Subject: Radiou on the, 200-201; citizcn, 6-9, 25-34, 40, 65, 304 11. 10, 305 11. 17, 361 n. 9; consumer, 31; Derrida 011 thc, 165-94; political

INDEX

413

Subject (conri/wed) and social, 12, 21-H, 51-53, 163, .. .., ,09n. 18; moral and 186, .roo, 2 epistemological, 21-33; of a world to come, 62-63 Subjectivity, 13-14, 52, 57, 1"1, 162, ,10 n. 19; politics of, 165-96, 2,,2. Su nlw Subject

Sum, Ngai-Ling, 317 n. 28 Sundaram, Jomo Kwante (Jomo K.S.), ,H n. 57 Sweezy, Paul M., 131., 135, 337 n. 16

privatization in, 1H, 300 n. 10; share of global foreign exchange market, 7'

United Nations: Development Pro­ gramme (UNDP), 66, 102, 31" lUI. +-5, 323 n. 3, 323 n. 5, 32+ Illl. 6-8, 31.5 n. 13, 329 n. 29; Industrial De­ velopmem Organization (UNIDO), ,14 n. +; Trade and Dl>Yelopment Agency (UNCfAD), ,,O n. 36 United States: attack of September ll, .rom, 3, 6, 291; global hegemony of, ,,73, 76, 90, 107-8, 259, 261,286,

T.·lIlzania, H5 n. 3

291, 313 n. 2, HO n. 31; nationalism

Taussig, Michael, 50, 58, 312 n. 31 Taylor, Lance, 126-27, 136, ,29 n. 30, BO n. H, 335 n. 5, n6n. 7, ,,7n. 16 Taylorism, 71, 316 n. 13 Thailand, 122 Thatcher, MargMet, 1-", 30, 70, 108, 135, 1,,2-..; , 1..6,225,299 n. 6, 300 n. 10, 303 n. 28, 339 n. 2 lheory (in relation to expressivities and matuial conditions), 41-45 "Ihom, Martin, 8, 301 n. 19 Thompson, Grahame, 31, n. , lhompson, Michael j., ,,8 n. 23

in, 6, 10; neoconservatism in, 6,

"Iuyotism, 71, 90 Trade, world, 66-69, 76-9", 114, ,I" n. 6 Transcendence, 58, 226-40; rbe traH­ scendent vs., 358 n. 1 Truth: as decidability, 56-57, 237, 311 n. 28; falsity vs., 55-57; inseparable from politics, 65; truth-effects, 21, 5"-59, 221-25, 28", 310 n. 2", 310 n. 26, 355 n. 22; tnnh-events, 197225

27-28, 30, 1+2, 198, 211, 289, 294;

New Deal, 9, 14, 108; share of global foreign exchange market, 78 Univocity, 227-31, 359n. 9 Utopia, 15,-55, 265-84 Value, 48, 5:1, 244 Venezuela, 128 Viscuality, 60 Vogel, Steven K., 321 n. 58 Vries, Hl,nt de, 352n. 52 Wade, Robert Humer, 299n. 1, 329 n. 30, 331 n. 40, 367 n. 24 Ward, Graham, 358 n. 2 \Vashington consensus, 109, 12", 128, 261, 286, 293, 294, 336 n. 7, 336 n. 13 Webb, '\Iichael c., 3un. 58, 322n. 59 Weber, Max, 45, 56, ,,2n. 46, 334 n. 59 Weiss, Linda, 74, 320 n. 45 Westphalia, Treaty of, 8 Wilby, Peter, 2 Wilde,Osc
Turner, Victor, 273, 366 n. 14

\VilI, guided by eros, 236-37

United Kingdom: Conservative Pany, 9 (set nlw lhatcher, Marg
Williams, Bern
41"

INDEX

Wood Elisabeth, 370 ll. 15 \\'orld Ballk, 70, 99, 105, 108, ll4, lZ3, ,

n6, lZ7. 128, 285, 289, 314 ll. 4, 315

ll. 9, 323 tl. 4, 324 tl. 8, lill.

31.7 tl. 23, 329

29-30, 330 n. 38, 332 n. 46, 335

YOUllg, Iris Marion, HO ll. II

Zermclo-Fracnkd sct thl"Ory, 212-25 Zikk, Slavoj, 56, lSi, 153, 160, 197, 232-33, 284, 30811.12, HIll. 14, HI

n. 1, 3:15 n. 3, :135 tl. 5, 336n. 13, 368

n. 16, HIll. 17, 342n. 20, 343 n. 21,

n. 7; dismandillg of, 293, 336n. 9

H4 11. 33, 359 11. 10, 362 n. 17. 369

World Tradc Organizatiotl (\¥To), 128,

n. 10

129, 285,368 ll. 7

INDEX

415

KENNETH SURIN is Chair of the Program n i Literamre and a professor of religion

and critical theory at Duke University.

Parts of this book appeared prl>viously in the following: '''The Continued Relevance of Marxism' as a Question: Some Questions," l'oly­ gmph, no. 6/7 (1993), 39-71; '''Reinventing a Physiology of Collective Libera­ tion': Going 'Beyond Marx' in the Marxism(s) of Negri, GUJttari, and Deleuzc,� futhillking MARXISM 7 (1994), 9-.!7; "On Producing the Concept of a Global Culmre," Natums, Culrur(f, alld Idmtities, ed. V. Y. Mudimbe (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), 199-119; "The EpochalityofDeleuzean Thought," -nxury, Culture alld Society 14 (1997), 9-11; "Liberation," Criticnl "lCrlllSfur Rrli­ giollf Study, ed. Mark C. laylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 173-85; "Standing Schumpeter on His Head: Robert Brenner's EW1IIlInia ,

of Global Tllrblflmu,�

COII/pamti!'e Stlfdier of SOllth Asia, Africn aJ/d tlx Middle East 19 (1999), 53-60; ""Afterthoughts on Diaspora,� South Atlantic Qllarterly 98 (1999), .!75-32S; '''A Question of an Axiomatics of Desires': The Deleuzean Imagillation of Ge()literamre,� Delmzc and Litemtlfre, ed. Ian Buchanan and John Marks (Edinburgh: Edn i burgh University Press, woo), 167-93; 'De1ire Is World-historical': Political Knowledge in Capitalirm and Schizophrenia;' l'oly­ gmpb 14 (.wOl), 129-41; " Now Everything Must Be Reinvemed': Negri and Revolution,� -nJt l'hilosophyofAntollio Negri, lxi. Timothy Murphy and MustJpha Abdul-Karim (London: Pluto Press, WOS), 20S-42; ",Vorld Ordering," SOlltl; Atlantic Quarterly 104 (.!005), 185-97; "Control Societies and the Mamged Citi­ zen,"jllnctures 8 (2007), 11-25; "1000 Political SUbjl'Cts," Ddmzc and tbe Social World, ed. Adriall Parr and Ian Buchanan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2(06), 57-78; "Rewriting the Ontological Script of Liberation: On the Question of Finding a Nl"W Kind of Political Subject " Olltolqjy in I'mcnee, cd. John Milbank, Slavoj Zi7-ek, and Creston Davis (Durham, N.G: Duke Univer­ sity Press, 2005), 240-66; "Hostage to an Unaccountable Planetary Executive: The l;lawed -'Vashington Consensus' and Two �Vorld Bank Iv:ports," World Ba"k Literature, ed. Amitava Kumar (Milmeapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 238-57. "

'

,

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Surin, Kennedl Frc�xiom not yet : liberation and the ne.:1:t world order J Kenneth Surin. p. Clll. - (New slant) !ncludes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8223-4617-3 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-822,-46,1-9 (pbk. : a1k. paper) 1. Philosophy, Marxist. 2. Marxian economics. 3. Communism and society. 4. Socialism and SOCiety. I. Title. II. Series: New slant. B809.8.s86S 2009 33S.4-dc22 2009030107

S OClA.L T U ll O ..T/M.AU1SM The ncolibcral pro;c:ct of the West h;ls crcattd an

increasingly polar­

NEW SlANT:

ized and impovaishcd world, to thepoint that the vast majority of its

millo!, PDLmcs,

libc:ntDn from. their present socioeconomic circum­ staocc..s.. The ma rxist thcori5t Kenneth Surin contends that innovation citizens rcquhe

ONlOllX:Y

and dlange at the levd of me political nmS( ocrur in order to achiC\'e this liberation, and for this endeavor man:ist thax-y and philosophy are indispensable.. In Frerdom Nit Ttt, Surin analyzrs the nature of mt global eronomic systan, particularly with regard to the

our rurr

plight of less de\'Clopcd countries, and 1"£ dillt:USics tl"£ possibilities

of creating new political subjccu neccssary to establish and sustain I l iberated world.

Surin begins by aamining the rurrmt regime of accwnulation- the global domination of financial markets o,,'\':r uaditional induuria.1 economies-which i5 used

as an

the subordinadoll and dcpc.ndcnC)' of poorer natbru. He ttrn moves to

m i tn.tmcnt for

me corutirution of

subjectivity, or the way humans: art" produced as social beings, "'hich he caSl:S as

the key arena in

which struggles aglinH dispossasion oocur. Surin critically engages 'With the major philrnophi­

cal posilioru mal have been sue;ated reciprocity bctwocn

as

mOOds of Iibaarion, induding Darida's notion of

subject and. its omer, a rcim'igoratcd militancy in political rmrkntltion

I

bued on the thinking of Badiou and Ziict, the nomad politics ofDclcuzc and

Guartan,

and

the poIitio of me multitude posed by Hardt and Negri. Finally, Surin spedfia ttr malcrial conditions needed for liberation from the economic, politica� and social failures ofour rur�nt

synan. Scc:king to illuminate I route to a bctttr life for the '\\Odd's poorer populations, Surin investigates the philosophical possibilities for a marxist or nco marxist con<rpt of liberation -

from capitalist aploitltion and the regimes of pow�r that support it. fIIFradom Not Ta h a

sruoning,.

nunlfe, and major wort. It provides a unique combination of

5tTOJl; empiril;;al rcscardtand s:ignificant thaxctical !iiOphilt l ication Kcnneth Surin is after a v.urX­ able: raxlcl for revoJution within the broad frame of the marxist tradition, and he provides sig­ nificantcng:.ganc:nts with approaches indu;:Hng identity, subjo.:tivity (DcITida),evcnt (Badiou), nomadolos>' (Dclcuze and Guattlri), and trans:lXndmce (Radical Orthodoxy), cutting through each with a sure hand. This book Mil be at the IXntcrof discussiom for a

-ROlAND BOER, a

bog time to comr::"

or ofP,lItimlMyrh: On tht Use ,,,ul AhuSt tfBihliadThmu.s

uth

"Fm:dom Nut Yet will m i aest all those seeking alternatives to the present system of capitalist

political and finanwl control:"

- PAUL

NITON, author ofDdeuzr (md t/�PoIjti:lf/

K.:::nocth Surin is Chair of the Program in Ltcnturc and I professor of religion and critical

theory

at

Duke University.

DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS Box 9C)66o

I Durham, NC�nOB.0660 I www.duk:cuprc.ss.edu

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