FREEDOM NOT YET
NEW SLANT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND ONTOLOGY
A series
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CreJf(m IJnl'is, Philip Goodchild,
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FREEDOM NOT YET
NEW SLANT: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND ONTOLOGY
A series
rditcd by
CreJf(m IJnl'is, Philip Goodchild,
fllld KCIIIII:th S"rill
Kenneth Surin
NOTYEr Liberation and the Next World Order
DUKE: UNIVERSITY PRESS
Durhalll lind LOlld(J1I
© 2009 Duke University Press All rights rescrvl-d Printed in the. United States of America on acid-free paper @ Designed by Amy Typeset in Carter
Ruth Buchanan
+
Cone GalJiard
by Tseng lnformation Systems, Inc. Library of Congress Caraloging-in1\lbJication dara and republication acknowledgments appear on the last printed page of this book. Frontispiece: James Baker Hall, 7!Jor1l5. Courtesy of the James Baker Hall Archive.
For Andrcll' Mac/chosc
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
IX
Introduction 1
PART I 1.
-nle Complementary Deaths of the -nlinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject 21
2.
Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation H
3.
l'ostpolitical Politics and Global Capitalism 65
4. The Exacerbation of Uneven Development: Analysis of the Current Regime of Accumulation 94
5.
-nle Possibility of a New State I: Ddinking 125
PART II 6.
Models of Liberation I: "flle Politics of Identity 141
7.
Models of Liberation II: The Politi c s of the Place of the Subject 165
8.
Models of Liberation II I: The Politics of the Event 197
9.
Models of Liberation IV: -The Religious Transcendent 226
10. Models of Liberation V: Nomad Politics 241
PART III 11. 111e Possibility of a New State II: Heterotopia 265 12. Prospects for the New Political Subject and Liberation 285
Conclusion 295 Notes 299 Bibliography 371 Index 407
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Jandl Watson for much hdp given in countless ways while this book was written. Reynolds Smith, my editor at Duke University Press, was exemplary. Andrew Madehose was my first teacher in economics and philosophy. He will not agree with many of my arguments, but my debt to him has been immense.
Dem an' dem economical plan Still can't find solution &orro\\�n' money fe lend World Bank a nuh wi fr'en
Is life an' debt all wi a fret Life an' debt freedom not yet
MUTABARUKA, Lift alld Debr We shed blood all rhc.se years in ordcr to buy land at market price.l�
USULUTAN camptJillo, 199.!, quoted in Elisabeth Jane Wood, Forging
Drnwmuyfrom Below
"kn of good fortune often cause empires lOU ItEIlD,
to fall.
Berlin
Selbst in dem sagenhaften Atlantis Briillten doch in der Nachr, wo das Meeres verschlang, Die Ers.lllfendcn nach ihren Sidaven (Even in fabled Atlantis lhe night the ocean engulfed it cnle drowning still screamed for their slaves) BERTOLT BRECHT, �Questions Irom a
Worker Who RCJds�
Introduction
l'eriodizations (not to be confused with chronologies, which merely indicate the dates of events), no matter how rough and ready, are indispensable for any lUlderstanding, at the systemic level, of the emergence and consolida tion of political systems and instirutions and their lUlderlying structllres of economic production and accumulation. \.Vhere pcriodi7.ation is concerned, the argument of this book is framed by two emblematic or symbolic dates, 1989 and 2001. At the time of writing it is possible rilat 2008 may be added to these symbolic dates at some futllre time, given the fact that there is a growing body of economically informed opinion coalescing arOlUld the view that the bank liquidity crisis which started in 2008 represents the most critical moment for modern capitalism since the great crash of 1929. I t is, however, much too early to fasten ourselves to dlis judgment; sullice to say rhat the ar gument of this bOClk, which has been in the process of formulation since the mid-1990S, is that dle current financial crisis, like its predecessor economic crises, is broadly explicable in terms of a marxist (or nl""O-marxist) model of the inherently problematic structure of capitalist development. That is to say, the financial crisis which emerged in 2008 is the product of deep and postponed tensions and impasses in dle capitalist system of accumulation, pressures, and deadlocks which are constitutive of the system itself, so dlat their removal will require a supersession of the system itself.!
The year 1989, invariably associated with dle fall of Soviet-style communism, coincides in the minds of many with the apogee of the JXllitical project as sociated with Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This JXllitical project
was trumpeted by its proponents as an American or British "renaissance" in
the world order of that time. It was "morning again in America," said the ever-smiling Reagan (probably mindful of the need to create as much "media separation" between the now-famous images of his beaming optimism on America's behalf and the vote-losing sepulchral earnestness of his predeces sor, Jimmy Carter). -lllatcher in
film
repeatedly invoked the reputed Victo
rian zenith of Britain's imperial supremacy in her pronowlCements about her government's policies: "\Ve must return to Victorian values," she brayed on such occasions. The Reagan-Thatcher project was of course premised on a staunch anti-Sovietism in particular, and a repudiation of any kind of "left" collective politics in general. -llle Reagan-11latcher project was in turn a resJXlnse to the growing eco nomic sclerosis which led to the downfall of the so-called Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist development, an era of relative overall prosperity which e.x tended from 1945 to 1975 and which involved a protracted boom in mass pro duction and mass consumption, to which the French gave the felicitous term
lcs trmusgloriruses.2 The economic complement of the JXllitical dimensions of the Reagan-Thatcher venture was neoliberalism, dlat is, the "free market" ideology which viewed dle 1970S collapse of the long JXlstwar economic expansion as the outcome of allegedly systemic, as opposed to inadvertent or merely contingent, impediments to the operation of markets and mar ket forces. -This neoliberal contention was in turn buttressed by declarations about so-called labor market rigidities (invariably attributed by Reagan and Thatcher to the "excessive" bargaining JXlwer of labor unions), "crippling" government regulation and intervention, "e.xorbitanr" tax bllfdens placed by "big government" on heroic bur somehow still hapless "entreprenellfs" (apparently some things never change; this, after all, was dle overwhelming refrain of
101m McCain s 2008 presidential campaign, with its mindless and '
repeated salutations at campaign rallies of the tax-phobic "Joe the plumber"), as well as the allegedly paralyzing effects of a costly welfare system said to be laden with "disincentives" for the working force (one recalls here the moral pa ni c generated by Reagan and his handlers around the fa ntas y figure of the "welfare queen," typically depicted as a black single mother who drove a Cadillac to pick up her welfare check).3 -llle 1970S economic disintegration associated with the demise of dIe Golden Age was therefore to be addressed by a simple policy prescription, according to the soon to be ascendant neoliberals: to make things better, said the followers of Reagan and Thatcher, governments should remove or ame-
2
INTRODUCTION
liorate all these restrictive policies and their pointless rigidities in order to give markets and market forces a much freer hand. Governments, especially, had no business trying to control markets.
DC1"cglllntWII
and p1"il'atizatum
were thus adopted as key guiding principles, and monetarism and attention to the supply side became the favored governmental financial policy tools; this was the essence of the Reagan-Thatcher ideology (though as Jacques Mazier, Maurice Basic, and jcan-FranS"ois Vidal point om, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
[OECD] did temper dlis neo
liberal approach with some elements of Keynesianism in its policy frame works, and Reagan's overstuJl"ed defense budgets, and his administration's willingness to run massive budget deficits, did amount to a kind of "military Keynesianism").4 TIlls contrived evacuation of the political sphere in dIe somewhat disin genuous name of "small government" (TIlatcher, after all, gready augmented centralized government in Britain by virmally dissolving all of its subnational municipal strucmres, and George vV. Bush dangerously, and some say lUl constitutionally, advanced dIe prerogatives of the executive branch of gov ernment after September 11), along with the cod wisdom that "everydling should be left to the market because dIe market knows best," helped create a political void, especially now dlat the collapse of dIe Eastern bloc has left the United States and its close allies in an uncontested globally hegemonic position. With the gutting of the substantive political formations and their asso ciated practices and strategies put in place by dIe regulated capitalism of the Euro-American postwar era, politics in dIe post-1970S \Nest was increasingly degraded into the mere management of voter opinion, involving primarily the mass media-focused orchestration of ""hot button" issues capablc of mo bilizing largely docile electorates. (Examples of such issues come easily to mind: the anxieties of American "security moms" after September 11; gay marriage and gun rights in dIe United States; the antisocial behavior of lUl mly iIm er-city youth, called "lager louts" and "racaille"
[scum] by Tony Blair
and Nicolas Sarkozy, respectively; campaigns to repatriate undocumented immigrants and radical Islamic clerics in London allegedly hell-bent on re placing British law withsharm; the frowned-upon but titillatingly publicized sexual practices of polygamist sects in the American \Vest; and so on.) In the course of such events, the traditional dividing lines between "left" and "right" came to be blurred or erased, as politics in the \Vest became more and more a matter of occupying a palpably mythical "center," this being the
INTRODUCTION
3
presumed location where electoral majorities, no matter how ad hoc, could most easily be put together by the constant trumpeting of such hot-button issues, at least in dleory or psephological fantasy.5 -nle nodal point of this by now epochal shift was subsequently located in the political movements associated with Bill Clinton and Tony Blair, whose basic dlOugh unstated function was to underwrite and consolidate dIe trans formations brought about by Thatcher and Reagan and thcir acolytes. Blair's "-Third Way" and the American president's "Clintonomics" involved the fur ther "de-social democratization" (the term used by Gerassimos Moschonas) of society as dIe neoliberalism instituted by their predecessors, far from being tempered, came to be even more fully entrenched by Blair and Clinton.blbe political void created by today's ubiquitous economic managerialism in the West (hence dIe mantra "What is g<Xld for "Vall Street is good for all of us;' admittedly not heard so much during the economic meltdown of 2008-9) and dIe accompanying deracination of civil society, have been compensated for ideologically by a spurious politics of human rights and the taking of the society of the spectacle to levels undreamed of by Guy Debord and his colleagues in the Situationist movement. "Human rights" interventions (of the kind wldertaken in the past decade or so in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Liberia, and Darfur) were designed to show that the "new" politics espoused by Blair and Clinton (and it should be emphasized that such human rights interventions were nO[ disavowed by the 2008 American presidential candidates, Jolm ,\-lcCain and Barack Obama) was premised on what gave the appearance of being a resolute and sincere ethical core. However, the vapidity of such appeals to human rights was quickly revealed by the West's failure
to
do anything during the terrible Rwandan genocide, its silence in
the face of Russian atrocities in Chechnya (Russia, like Israel, said it was merely fighting "Islamic terrorism" in its own land), the well-documented abuses perpetrated by the pro-\Vestern Sri Lankan government against its Tamil minority population, and the unending passivity of Europe and the United States in the face of Israel's brutal dispossession of the Palestinian people? Meanwhile political spectacles continue to proliferate. One recalls the British Conservative agriculture minister John Selwyn Glimmer force feeding beef burgers
to
his yOlmg daughters in front of television cameras
at dIe peak of Britain's "mad cow" crisis in dIe 1980S in a piteous attempt to convince viewers that eating British beef at dlat time was safe, and Blair's artful manipulation of dIe Princess Diana effect at the time of her death. It is also hard not to notice the incessant pandering to second-rate film actors, 4
INTRODUCTION
elderly roek musicians, sports personalities, "celcbrity" journalists, and media performers (hence dle obligatory appearances on Sawrday NightLi!'! and the shows hosted by Oprah Winfrey and Jon Stewart in the United States and by Sir Michael Parki n son and Sir David Frost in the United Kingdom), evinced by Clinton, Blair, Sarkozy, and their followers, as well as the circus perfor mances that now pass for summit meetings (the mandatory group photos of leaders dad in identical batik shirts or some other "native" costume of the host colUmy). Many will recall George W. BLl�h's grotesquely staged "Mis sion Accomplished" aircraft-carrier landing, as well as his much publicized cycle ride with Lance Armstrong Sexln after the latter won the Tourde France for a record sevendl time. -nlere is also the seeming need at some stage during an election campaign for nearly every (white) American politician to be tele vised in a cowboy hat riding a horse or toting a rille while wearing hwning camouflage.s Ille list can be extended nearly to infinity. At the same time, the neoliberal economic agenda has been prosecuted with unre mitting fervor by its sponsors in the advanced industrialized coun tries, and despite dle back-slapping televised appearances dlat American and European government ministers make with co-opted celebrities such as Bono and Bob Gcldof and the much trumpeted but largely cosmetic "initiatives" on global poverty announced every few years at G8 sununits, the income gap between rich and poor cowltries continues to grow.1> The ncoliberal eco nomic credo (emblematically associated here with 1989), while it has come under increasing criticism in recent years, especially after the spectacular collapses accompanying dle 2000 dot-com and the 2008 U.S. credit market bubbles and the regionwide economic failure of the East Asian economies in dle late 1990S, nonedleless shows no signs of running out of steam at the idcologic al levcl. Nor does it give any indication that those who manage the world economic system wil l alter its course to take this planet's dispossessed masses significantly into account. In light of the spectacular economic failures just mentioned,
all of which
were initially publicized as ncoliberal success stories, the advocates of the ncoliberal prospectus have had to be much more judiciously understated in their support for it. But the ensuing subterfuges and disguises used by tllCSC advocates of ncoliberalism do not diminish its wlderlying hold on the m inds of those shaping public policy across the globe. Hence in the 2008 U.S. presi dential election campaign, the same old strident advocacy of trickle-down tax
cuts was made by the Republican Party candidate, John McCain, and
the dogma that "only privatization can save tlle U.S. social security system" is voiced repeatedly, while the regulator of the United Kingdom's postal INTRODUCTION
5
service (rhe Ropl Mail) re.'ce.'ntJy issued a call for its partial priV;}ti7.arion.1o It is Olle.' thing to discredit nooliix'ralism as all imdlccmal project (and tllis is increasingly being done.'); it is another to unfix its grip on thc minru of decision-making clites in Europe 3.nd North America in W3yS that could bring about an epochal transformation of our current system of production and accumulation.
9/U/.1001 While Ile.'oliberalism has held sway for ove.r tlUCl' decades as an economic and political ideology, it has to bc acknowledged that the.' evcnts now placcd unde.'r the.' titk "'9/U/"l.OOln have also had a very considcrabh.' impact on dl' veloped, den-loping, and nondeveloped countries alikc, main.!}' bc'-'"a.use of thc way these cvcnts have becn used to mobilize American public opinion in an avowedl)' nationalist and exceplionalist dircction. TI1C political catechism idcntified with thc American neoconserv:l.live movcment-t"O Wit, Ameri can execplionalism, the adamant subordination of the rest of the world to America's interests.AmeriC"J.'s pursuit of unilater3.l and preemptive war in the.' namc of"the struggle against terror" (as the formcr "'war on terror" is now called in U.S. gove.'rnment circles during these morc chastened, post-Iraq occupation, timcs)-has been gin-n a frec rein since thc Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Wasllington.11 If llcolibcralism is the teO/lOlllic regime.' lUlashamedly favored by America and its allies, thell ncoconservatism is h t. e political complement str.uegka.lly linked to this ncoliix'ral popular religion. And if 1989 is t.hl' year m.arking the elear ascendancy of neoliberalism, then 9/11/2001 signifies Ihe apot.heosis of power for its ncoconservative coullterparl. l1 There is of course no such thing as a "pure" politiCS existing only by and for itself. E\'Cry kind of politics is a politics motivated and driven by some regnant idcologic;}1 norion of tile nature and scope of till' political. Hen . ce for most of the sevel\l"eelllh century lhe prcvailing polith.'"al framework in Europe was defined by tile histork compromise between European aristoc racies and a powerfully emergent mercanrill' bourgeoisie.; as;} result of this conciliation
3.
politics marked by a del'p ;}nd defining interest in questions
of sovcreignry .and the rights of lhe (individual) citizen came t"O prc\'ail. The political wridngs of GrotiWi, Hobbes, i'ufendorf, Locke, and Spinoza arl' concl'rned overwhelmingly with such questions ofinJividu.a1 rights ;}nd t.heir COIUlCCtiOIl with sovereignty, questions which could not have ix'en posed by their predecessors in the Middle Ages}J 6
INTIlODUCTION
Similarly, in the eighteenth century a vision of politics highlighting the issue of the artificiality or mere conventionality of the political and social could b e g i n to be addressed, now that Grotius, Hobbes, and others had al ready posed the key question of what came to be known as "constinuion ality." Exemplary in thsi regard are ROllSscau, Hume, and Kant, for whom the polti ical is fundamentally a matter of contrivance or arrangement, so that constimtionality itself had an irreducibly factitious character. Perhaps the most radical acknowledgment of the sheer contingency that pervades social and political structures is I-hune's statement (which is almost an uncanny prefiguration of later theories of ideology), "As Force is always on the side of the governed [for the many are governed by the few], the governors have nothing to support diem but opinion. It is, therefore, on opinion only that government is founded; and d il s maxim extends to the most despotic and most military governments, as well as the most free and popular." 14 -This i-hunean appreciation of the artificiality dlat pervades
all political
and moral orders extends, with a number of significant differences, to Rous seau and Kant. Germane in dlis context is Rousseau's pr inciple that civil society is the primary source of the ev ils dlat aflli ct its members, dlat people are what their government makes them into, and that the realm of the po litical dlerefore affords the only means that humans have of remedying these afflictions.l s While it may seem implausible and even egregious to lump Kant with l-lume and ROllSscau, rhe commonality among these thinkers arises from Kant's insistence that all action can ultimately be reduced to the work ing of the human will and that the unconstrained capaeity
to
exercise one's
will (albeit n i accordance widl the law) is the basis of freedom, nilminating in the insight that the ideal polity is olle which enables die freedom (or "spon taneity") of one being to be reconciled with the freedom (or "spomancities") of other beings according to a unv i ersal Iaw.16 For l-iume, Rousscau, and Kant, politics is dms essentially a set of in stitutional practices designed for rhe ordering of die human will, the pri macy of dIe ullimpeded will (except, where Kant is concerned, when the law is breached) reflecting the complete ascendancy and self-confidence of the bourgeoisie in cighteenth-cenmry Europe. The problem of die political which preoccupied GrotitlS, Hobbes, Spinoza, and odlers-their primary goal being to produce a figure of the (early modern) citz i en that could be rec onciled with the ontology and explanatory schemas of the mechanist physi cal science of die time, as well as the outer limits of any prevailing Christa i n orthodoxy-was by the time of l-iume, Rousseau, and Kant supplanted by a conception of die political in which the figures of the citizen and civil society INTRODUCTION
7
could be taken for granted (at least philosophically). It was now possible, in tllis period of a by now fully anchored mercantile capitalism, [0 install the image of a "free" and entirely factitious civil society in which citizens could begin [0 be at home in tllC laissez-faire mentaljti of tllC burgeoning capitalist markets.17 By rhe beginning of the nincteemh century, with the emergence of the main elements of what was to become the fully fledged modern European state system (as opposed to the early modern Westphalian dispensation of 16+8), tile several strands of Romantic nationalism began to permeate visions of the political. The Romantic repudiation of rhe legacy of the Enlighten ment of tile seventeenth and eighteenth cenmries was manifested most di rectly in tile linking of the state form to conceptions of etlmicity. Civil so ciety itsclf was subsumed by the stmctures of the nation-state, as tile notion of sovereignty was yet again transformed: where once sovereignty reposed in the people's assembly based on the active participation of citizens, now the people were disaggregated and only their representatives assembled. The people thus had
[0
be lmified by another principle, based this time on the
nation-state defined, tribally, on the basis o f ethnic and thus ultimately lin guistic affiliation.ls Martin Thom quotes Madame dc Stad from her work Des
circoIIStnllccs actuelles on this powerful historical shift: according to Madame de Stad, while in bygone epochs liberty "consisted of whatever ensured the citizens the greatest possible share in tile c.,ercise of powerl,] liberty in mod ern times consists of whatever guarantees the independence of citizens from governments."I? -This paradigm
of the political underwent a furtller transformation in the
second half of the nineteenth cenmry, when industrial capitalism superseded its mercantilist precursor, making i t necessary for tile paradigm's ethnically oriented nationalism to find ways of accommodating the industrial working classes of most Western European nations, as well as North America. In this period, electoral franchises were broadened, albeit gmdgingly and unevenly (women were c.,e1uded even as the franchise was being extended; in most "'estern industrial nations women were denied the vote until after "'orld "'ar I). -The altered parJdigm managed to retain its laissez-Caire economic orientation, though it was now adjusted for the ethnically bounded nation state, with its growing population of proletarianized labor.20 After \.Vorld War I the industrial capitalism of the previous period had to contend with the growing need to bring about a compromise between labor and capital, mainly as a consequence of the urgent requirement tllat the dev astating economic consequences of the Great War of 1914-18 be addressed. 8
INTRODUCTION
And so the first slow steps leading somewhat unevenly to the welfare capi talism of the Golden Age after World War
II
were taken_ This compromise
between labor and capital received a further and vital impetus from the Great Depression and World
War II,
and from these events came the enhanced
institutionalization of the social democratic docnines that occurred in most Western European COlUltries during this period. (The New Deal was viewed as the American correlate of European social democracy, t o the extent that i t too required American capital to compromise with labor.) The vision of the JXllitical that prevailed in this historical phase (the time from dle Great Depression onward) still favored the nation-state as dle pri mary locus of social and economic activity. But this notion was augmented by the principle dlat dle individual political subject was entitled to a wide range of social rights: universal health care and education; subsidized housing, child care, and public transportation; employment and wage protections; state provision for old-age pensions; and a relatively capacious overall so cial safety net. 1he compromise between capital and labor notwithstanding, there still existed
an
effective dividing line between left and right; while in
Europe during World War
II
the parties of rhe right tended to be Christian
Democrat and mildly nationalist, their rival Social Democratic parties often had e1ectorally viable communist parries to their left, which meant that redis tributionist economic programs, no matter how cautious and mild, always had a viable political constituency. Hence the situation obtaining in Britain today, where dle "new" Labour of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown is aligned with the Conservative Party as dle two comending parties of rhe identifi able center-right, leaving the more or less centrist Liberal Democrats and the \.Velsh and Scottish nationalist parties to be the
more radical
parliamen
tary bloc, would have been simply undlinkable during the postwar Golden Age.11 As
I
mentioned earlier, this substantive political demarcation between
left and right started to disappear when neoliberalism became hegemonic from the 1970S onward, and this loss became pervasive after the collapse of "actually existing communism" in 1989. A market zealotry which views JXllitics solely in terms of positioning conformist citizens in front of the mar ket, and which insists dlat economic equality can be presented to "realistic" voters only as an abstract "equality of opJXlrtunity" (as opposed to requiring even a minimal degree of actual income redisniburion)-thcsc convictions being this market fundamentalism's main propellant-had dovetailed with the wholesale incorporJtion of electoral politics into the society of the spec tacle from the 1980S onward. INTRODUCTION
9
In the process, politics in Western Europe and North America has been put in the service of a sometimes bullying, sometimes cajoling populism (which is what the hugely revamped post-9/11 American nationalism really amount.� to in domestic terms) that has effectively eviscerated the politi cal by turning it into the mere business of manipulating and dragooning voters according to the largely fictitious rhythms of election cycles. In this "'postpolitical" politics (not to be conflated with the "apolitical" annihilation of anything to do with politics), politicians and their attendant logos and slogam are advertised and marketed to their somewhat bemused and docile constituencies like tile hard-to-differentiate fizzy beverages typically found in American and European vending machines. Politicians in America and Britain today havc to f)()SSCSS a "brand" in order to succeed; hence in the 2008 U.S. presidential ekction, the McCain "j'vLlVerick" brand apparently flopped with tile electorate, while Obama's "Mr. ('.001" brand was deemed to have been a success. There is no other way to account for the influence wielded in the name of the prevailing market fundamentalism by such advisers as Karl Rove and Alistair Campbell on George W. Bush and Tony Blair, respectively. Indeed in the 2004 and 2008 U.S. presidential elections the category of the "low-information voter"-who knows almost nothing of a political platform o r prospectus, but who can be relied on to be enticed by tile media-conveyed "brand" of this or that politician with an appealing "personality," typically re flected in the ability to speak with a sympy voice (Ronald Reagan), or having an alluring smile (Bil l Clinton), or posscssing a folksy demeanor (George W. Bush before his catastrophic decline i n popularity helped e.xpose this pre tense for what it was), being blessed with "good hair" (John Edwards before his fall from grace), tile ability to drop at will an upper-class accent for the more declasse "Mockney" crony Blair), or having tile abii l ty to wink sugges tively at an audience (Sarah Palin)-became cnlcial for the pollsters, focus groups, and public relations comultants of the major political parties.22 Hand in hand with this marketization of the liberal-democratic politi cal sphere has been the full-scale conversion of political parties into post ideological vote-harvesting machines mn by profcs.sional cadres primarily attuned to rhe desires of corporate interests. Ross McKibbin describes this development thus: -nle typical politician today, whe.ther minister, shadow minister or "ad viser," proceeds from student politics (often with a politics degree), to political consultancy or a think-tank, to "research" or the staff of an active politician. He or she is "good at politics"-which means being good at 10
INTRODUCTION
the nU"eh,1nics of politicS, not neccss.lfily its ideas. The consequence is that the mechanics drives OUi thl' ideas, and (he immedhl.le expels the long-term. l'oliti(S is what the Dil l i y A1iIiI [3 right-wing British t'J.bloid] says today; the long-term is what the Dnily Alnil might say tomorrow_ The crucial relationship now is Ix>tween the politician, the journalist and the '"ad"iser,�1.1 Looking :'lt this from :'lIlother :1ngle, it could be s:1id th3t modern politicS (that is, the politics of the West since 1776 or 1789), until the past couple of decades at le:1St, has always Ix>en about thc st'rugglc to position or reposition so\'Creigmy in some institutional formation or strategic mode of political agency (or both, more ofren than not). However, in today's "low-intensity democracy" so\'crcignry reposes mostly, if not entirely, in the market, and gh'en thc centrality of the self-serving internal apparatuses of the present day politiC".l1 part)' (which, b)' being almost exclusively media-focused and driven by the systemkJ.lly induced compl1l�ion to g:lfller \'otes for thcsake of being at the top of the electoral COUIlt no matter what, ends up operating to the detrimcm of an adl'quatcly fUllctioning public sphere), the "dcllIocratic citizen" of today h:1S been left to dangle in the resultant \'oid.1" As McKibbin puts ii, "The political elite is now probably more divorced from sodety, and from any wider organising principles or ideology,
than al any other timc ill
the laSt 150 years:' lS 'Vhat is desperately needed tOOa)', therefore, is a new sociopolitiC".l1 settle menr, al once practical and thcorel'iC".lI, thai will reclaim the polilical for the projcct ofa democracy tim will always place the inrerests of the dispos.�esscd at' irs heart. Given the present tarnished stJre of the political (to wit, the "media-theatricali7.cd" politics referred
t'O
b)' Jacques Dcrrida) in Western
Europe and the Uniled States, this democratic project can advance itself only as a projce! of liberation, a libel'ation from the dispossession that is thc r.lle of tlte overwhelming majority of children, women, and men on this planet. This book asks what, if anything, marxism has to sa)' about this putative project ofliberation, lhe bank credit crisis of 2008 and 2009 h:1S prO\'ided a massive iml>ctUS to
commentary, some of it bordering on the imbecilic, evcn though the likely tl'ajectories of this crisis have yer to reach a pOill! of dear discemmem, TIle aim of this book is not to dc1h'er prognoslic.uions on evems such as this, mo mentous though they ma)' be, bur to anal)'7x the economic structure which proVides enabling conditions for such economic crises
as
the 111ird World
debt crisis of the 1980s {from which some developing economies ha\'c never
INTROf)UCT(ON
U
truly recovered), the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financial collapse n i 1997, the dot-com failure in 2001, and now the credit market upheavals. As long as this capitalist structure continues to exist, it is likely that such crises will be chronically recurrent. My argument focuses on this capitalist struc ture, and while I advert to some of these crises for what they reveal about tilis underlying economic configuration, I proceed on the premise that the occurrence of an economic crisis is always contingent on the possibilities and capacitics inherent n i this structure. An analytic primacy thus has to be accorded to this structure, as opposed to the descriptions (however accurate and helpful they may be) of this or tilat specific crisis.
Marxism Today For marxism it s i a commonplace, enjoined by the mutual permeation of theory and prJctice, that things occur in specific and determinate ways, and possibilities in some situations are unavoidably conjoined witil their absence in otiler circumstances, so that material limits invariably coexist with open ings and opportunities. It is a truism also that liberation n i the face of a massive dispossession must involve change. Marxism is first and foremost a theory and a practice of historical and poitical l change, involving the fol lowing levels: - A description and analysis of the cyeles of capitalist accumulation and consumption - A political theory and practice of liberation premised above all on the supersession of capitalist relations of production, it being understood rhat the space of rhe political is opened up by capitalist relations of production - A reading of the history of philosophy, since philosophy is the science of the categories of the virmal, the possible, and the real, these cate gories being integral to any depiction and analysis of social being - An analysis of sociocultural formations and subjects, since society and culture are the context in which such subjects act Each of these levels develops in different and specific ways. However, the insight that breaks and continuities at one level are usually reflected at other levels is central to marxism. So, all else being equal, the existence or absence of an oppormniry to engage n i a quest for social and political liberation is likely to be accompanied by the existence or absence of a parallel crisis of production and accumulation at the economic level, and vice versa. 12
INTRODUCTION
Any hisrorical and political crisis is thus just as likely ro be a crisis of categories, and the current crisis (the one that has e:dsted since the demise of the Golden Age of JXlstwar capitalist expansion in the
1970S) is also a crisis
of the category of social class and the accompanying notion of a socioJXlliti cal struggle. 11le material failure of a previous kind of instimtional politics, something palpably evident after
1989 (our emblematic date), is reflected in
the failure or problematization of these key categories, in particular dle cate gory of class struggle and its attendant political aspirations. \,Vith dle collapse of a politics enjoining a substantive separation between right and left and the emergence of a "postpolitical" politics based on media-oriented populist spectacles, the categories of social class and class struggle, of militancy n i the broadest sense, were jeopardized or pushed to one side, as politics and JXlstpolitics-in late capitalism this is a politics rhat is one and dle same time populist alld authoritarian-have become more and more a matter of getting the right media-friendly faS"ade for dle hypocritical and gleaming-eyed pro fessional politician.2tt Innovation and change at the level of the political is therefore absolutely crucial, and so has an undoubted ontological primacy for marxism. Bm just as important for marx ism s i dle innovation or renovation of its categories, especially those that bear on the notion of liberation. If this is a time when real political iIUlOvation has become more unexpected dlan ever, dlen this is also likely
ro
be a time that is ripe for unc.xpected innovation at the level
of (marxist) theory and philosophy. This book addresses the question of this categoreal n i novation. This bexlk has three main sections. The first deals with the current regime
of accumulation, where I argue that financialization on a largely global scale is now the chief instnunent of subordination and dependency on rile part of the poorer nations, and that our conceptions of a globalized political econ omy must be modified
ro
take account of dlis momentous shift roward a
highly mobile financial capital. -n10se, me included, who started to make this argument in the
1990S, and who were greeted widl some skepticism then,
now (at the end of
2008) n i variably find ourselves talking to the converted
when advancing this claim. The second section deals widl the constimtion of subjectivity, since sub jectivity is one of the key arenas in which dle struggles against dispossession take place. Subjectivity, or dle realm of culmre more generally, is conceived here as the reJXlsitory of the forces and drives that enable human beings ro be produced and reproduced
as
social beings. It is a truism rilat without
this production and reproduction of social and subjective being dlere can be INTRODUCTION
13
no flUlCtioning economic order. "nle discussion in dlis section focuses on a number of key dleorizations of subjectivity, and dle emphasis here is phi l o sophical, as opposed to the focus, inspired by social science, on international political economy in the first section. Ibe dlird section takes up the theme ofliberation, and its key geopolitical proposition is the notion of an economic dclinking on the part of the poorer nations. Where subjectivity is concerned, 1 argue that the precepts of a tired humanism need to be replaced by alternative conceptions of subjectivity and agency which do not require dlis jaded humanism as a premise; like liberal democracy, this concomitant Illunanism has failed in decisive ways to live up to what it promised, at least as a set of options materiali7.cd in a viable institutional politics. Is it possible to conceptualize (necessarily and unavoid ably in theory but also necessarily for practice) somedling emancipatory that can potentially move the majority of human beings, disenfranchised and de prived as they are, beyond the reach of dlese increasingly evident systemic failures? The following pages deal widl the enabling conditions for these economic, political, and social failures. As I have indicated, my argument is avowedly marxist, and my motivating impulse is supplied by the conviction that the governing institutions and forces of our society are owned and managed by powerful clites, planetary in scale, paying lip service (if at all) to dle veneer of accountability demanded by raday's "thin" democracies. But the longing for somedling better, or less bad at any rate, cannot suffice by itself when it comes to launching an emancipatory project. Likewise dle mere analysis of the fundamental stmcrural m i passes of "actually existing capitalism" is also not sufficient on it.� own. Ibis analysis and the longing for a better world, ndispensable i dlOUgh they are, need to be buttressed by a careful sense of where beyond "actually existing capitalism" dle myriad forms of a creative and perhaps still to be imagined activism can take us. The failures of"acrually existing socialism" associated here with the year
1989 mean that there can be
no wholesale returll to its previous forms and arrangements. ·nle bureau cratically centralized state is dead, whedler in its Soviet or milder corporatist forms. \Vhich is not to say that there is no need for any kind of bureaucratic organization; after all, it is a commonplace dlat complex societies calUlOt flUlCtion satisfactori l y without at least a modicum of administrative scaf folding. Vhat , we must aim for and at the same time experiment with, n i myvicw, is something considerably to the political left of the nowadays skin-and-bone and barely living remnants of the previous social-democratic or New Deal 14
INTRODUCTION
consensus (some would say this consensus n i fal..""t expired some time ago), while eschewing any longing for the shapes of a Soviet-style state socialism. Hut simply arguing for this vision will not advance us toward its implemen tation unless we also scrutinize rigorously the possible ways of realizing this vision, and have as well an adequate grasp of the obstacles likely to stand in the way of any concened attempt to n i stitute such a project of liberation. \Vhere do we begin to make a start on this undertaking? There has to be a vigorous democratization of our economic and political i.nstitutions; it is imperative that we find ways to create vastly strengthened mechanisms of accowltability that cannot be kicked to the side so effortlessly by those with the power and influence gained without too much dilliculty in our society by just about anyone with a fat bank balance and bulky invest ment portfolio. As part of this process of redemocratization it will also be necessary to weaken the hold of the professionalized oligarchies who today nUl the major European and American political parties (the kind of "no ide ology please, only the electoral count matters" oligarchy basically contemp tuous of the elecwrare) and to replace it with a poitical l system with parties once again committed to substantive ideological positions (and thus at least embodying a real difference between right and left), in this way becoming a little more reflective of the ramified and often contradictory wishes of the electorate. The sitllation prevalent in Hritain and tlle United States today, where the mechanisms of political represemation arc in the hands of two virtually indistinguishable center-right parties, will therefore have to be rec tified quite radically. Any form of democracy heedful of tllese imperatives would already be much less "thin" than the neutered versions being paraded today. In addition, the amply documented weakening of the bonds of commu nal solidarity in the United States and in Western Europe (tllOugh let
lIS
not become enamored of romantic notions of the "organic commwlities" of bygone ages) has had as one of its concomitants a perceptible decline in the level of political engagement (the big rufilout in the U.S. presidential elec tion of 2008 notwitllstanding)P The upshot is tllat a strengthening of these communal bonds is probably a necessary condition for enhancing participa tion in democratic arrangemenL� potentially more substantive than those currently sanctioned by today's "thin" or "low-intensity" democracies. 111e reinvention of such forms of collective solidarity (involving what Raymond Williams aptly called "resources for a journey of hope") is thus a cnlcial task for those invested in the project of liberation. -nlere can be no guarantee that this reinvention will acrually take place or succeed in the longer term-there INTRODUCTION
15
arc no teleologically certified outcomes or "iron laws of history" here! -bur that something like tllis reinvention is needed if the lives of the majority of human beings arc to be bettered is a proposition that cannot really be gain said. In some cases, these fom1s of collective solidarity and agency will have to be enacted at the national level (whid1 is not to imply tl1at they calUmt also be ratified at a subnational or paranational lcvel). In some countries there is also a vit"ally important place for a detribalized and popular civic nationalism, which may not be attainable in the mmediate i future or on a large enough initial scale, bur which could nonetheless be indispensable for a project of liberation. (There are importam lessons to be learned from the work of Tom Nairn on a civic as opposed to an etlmic nationalism.) ·n1is possibility will be discussed later, as will several other proposals concerning this project of lib eration, once tl1e conceptual scaffolding for tl1em is set up in tl1e subsequent chapters.The revolution I advert to should not be confused with something similar n i the popular consciousness, namely, the stereotyped characteriza tiom of "insurrection" or "rebellion." Insurrections and rebellions will occur as long as there arc people who can no longer acquiesce in living conditions they find absolutely intolerable. lbere will certainly be times when such in surrections will help advance the course of liberation, and some when they will not. Only an abstract dogmatism will insist from the begiIming that the lot of the downtrodden will never be improved by allY recourse to an n i sur rectional violence. But by "revolution" I mean a fundamenr-al and lasting transformation of the capitalist mode of production and aCClunulation and its accompanying stmctures of social relations, and a revolution of this kind may take many generations to bring to fmition (if indeed it were to succeed). Or a revolution may come about in a relatively short time, as was the case with the collapse of tl1e former Eastern bloc in 1989-91. But ci1e likelihood that ci1is revolution will be long, involving as it docs the fundamental super session of the capit"alist system, for now seems a less implausible seenario tllan tllat of a spcrtacular and rapid overmrning of the present system. The revolution may also be long because for the foreseeable future its eventual lineaments may be gleaned only indirectly, as opposed to being part of an explicit and quickly m i plemenrable political prospecms.28 11le ex emplary militant in this simation will thus have to be not only active and engaged, but patient and persistent, and also alert to the possible emergence of hitherto undetectable modes of political and cultural c.xpressivity. As Raymond \Villiams put it, "Everything that 1 wlderstand of the his tory of cile long revolution leads me to tile belief that we are still n i its early 16
INTRODUCTION
stages."19 Or maybe, just maybe, the movemem toward revolution could be at a somewhat later stage? vVe have no way of knowing, but what cannot be gainsaid is dlat dlOse massively disadvantaged by this system have Iitde or no choice but to engage in an economic and social stmggle in which the beneficiaries of this system will not surrender their positions of advantage willingly and quickly.
INTRODUCTION
17
CHAPTER 1 The Complementary Deaths of the Thinking Subject and of the Citizen Subject
The concept of the subject is one of philosophy's pree minent topoi, and like all philosophical concepts it operates in a field of thought defined by one or more internal variables. -nICSC internal variables are conjoined in diverse re lationships with such external variables as historical cJXlchs and political and economic processes and events, as well as functions which allow the concept and its associated variables to produce a morc or less specific range of tmth effects.] -nle trajectory taken by the concept of the subject in dIe history of philosophy affords considerable insight into how tillS concept is produced, and as a result this philosophic-historical trajectory merits examination by a nyone interested in this concept's creation.
7lJe Classical Citizen Subject There is a convemional wisdom in the history of philosophy regarding the more or less intrinsic connection between the metaphysical-epistemological project that seeks an absolute ground for thought or reason (What is it that enables reason to serve its legislative functions?) and the philosophico political project of finding a ground in reason for the modus operandi of a moral and political subject (On what basis is reason able to legislate for the good life or right action?). According to the lineaments of what is by now a thoroughly well-seasoned narrative, the essential congruence between the rational subject of thought and the complementary subject of morality and politics was first posited by Plato and Aristotle. -nlis unity between the two
kinds of subject then found its suitably differentiated way nto i dIe thought of Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Leibniz, I-Iume, Kant, and Hegel (and a host of their successors). The core of this narrative is expressed by thc somewhat Kantian proposition, characteristic of the Enlightenment n i general, that reason provides dIe vital and indispensable criterion by which all judgments concerning belief, morality, politics, and art are to be appraised, so that rea son is dlC faculty dlat regulates dIe thinking being's activity. This activity is in turn the essential means for reason's deployment in any legitimate thinking about dIe world, dlat is, for the thinking being's capacity to describe and explain dIe world in ways that accord fundamentally with reason's precepts. And this precisely because reason s i dIe irreducibly prior and enabling con dition of any use of dlis capacity on the part of the subject.2 Reason, in other words, constitutes the thinking being, and the activity of dlis being in mm enables reason to unfold dyn:unically (to provide a somewhat Hegelian gloss on this initially Kamian proposition). In the topography of dlis unfolding of reason, both rational thought and politics :Uld ethics are deemed to find their dovetailing foundation. -nle philosophical tradition provides another way of delineating this con nection between dIe rJtional subject of thought and the moral-JXllitical sub ject, one that also derives its focal point from Kant. Using dIe distinction between asubjectlllll (i.e., the thing that serves as the bearer ofsomething, be it consciousnc.�s or some other property of the self) and a slIbjcctJlJ (i.e., the thing that is subjected to something else), the tradition has includl-d among its repertoire of concepts a figure of dlought taken from medieval philosophy dlat hinges on dIe relation between the subjectum and the subjectlls. Etienne Balibar, n i his fascinating essay "Citizen Subject," uses dlis distinction
urge that we not identify Descartes's
dlinking thing
(res cogitans)
to
with the
transcendental subject of thought that very quickly became an ineliminable feature of Enlightenment epistemology. Nothing could be further from the truth, says Halibar, because dIe human being is for Descartes the lUlity of a soul and a body, and this wlity, which marks the essence of the human being, cannot be represented in terms of the subjecmm (presumably because the subjecmm, qua intellecmal simple nature, can exist logically without requir ing the presupposition of a unity between soul and body).3 As the unity of a soul and a body, the human individual is not a mere intellecmal simple nature, a subjectum, but is, rather, a subject in anodler, quite different sense. In this very differem sense, dIe human individual is a subject transitively related to an other, a "something else," and for Descartes this "somedling else" s i precisely the divine sovereignty. In other words, for Descartes the 22
CHAPTER 1
human individual is really a subjecrus and never the subjecrum of modern epistemology, the latter in
any case owing its discovery
to Locke and not
to Descartes. For Balibar, therefore, it is important to remember dlat Des cartes, who s i palpably a late scholastic philosopher, was profoundly engaged with a range of s i sues dlat had been central for his precursors in the medi eval period, in particular the question of the relation of lesser beings to the supreme divine being. This was a question which both Descartes and dIe medieval phi l osophers broached, albeit n i different ways, under the ntbric of the divine sovereignty. The Cartesian subject is thus a subjecrus, ont� who submits, and this in at least two ways significam for both Descartes and medieval political dle ology:
(1) dIe subject submits to the Sovereign who is dIe Lord God, and
(2) the subject also yields to the earthly authority of dIe prince, who is God's representative on earth. As Descartes put it n i his letter to Mersenne (15 April
1630), "Do not hesitate I tell you, to avow and proclaim everywhere, that it is God who has established the laws of nature, as a King establishes laws n i his Kingdom."4 From dlis passage, and from his odler writings, it is clear dlat the notion of sovereignty was at once poitical l and theological for Descartes, as
it had been for the earlier scholastic philosophers. This is not dIe place for a detailed discllSsion of Balibar's essay, or dIe
magisterial work of Ernst Kantorowicz on this topic; the former, in addi tion to being a litde brief (the section on Descartes is only n i tended to be an overview), is also not entirely new n i what it proposes, since Leibniz, Arnauld, and Malebranche had long ago viewed Descartes, roughly their contemporary, as a follower of Augustine, who fmUld philosophy's raison d'ctre in the soul's contemplation of its relation to God, and who therefore took the dependence of lesser beings on dIe divine cminence as philosophy's primary concern. 5 Blit f i Locke is the tnte inventor of the modern concept of the self, as Bali bar maintains, who thcn is the real author of the fully fledged concept of the transcendental subject, if Balibar is indeed right to n i sist that it is not Des cartes? 1he true culprit here, says Balibar, is not Descartes, but Kant, who needed the concept of the transcendental subject to account for dIe "syn thetic uniry" that provides the necessary conditions for objective c.'pcrience. Kant in effect foisted onto Descartes a philosopheme that was really his own "discovery," with Heidegger as his more than willing subsequent accomplice in this dubious undertaking. The omcome ofthis grievous misattribution has been momentous for our understanding, or lack thereof, of the course taken by dlis branch of the history of philosophy.6 THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT
23
Kant, however, was about more than just the "discovery" of the transcen dental subject. -nle Kantian subject also had [0 prescribe duties for itself in the name of the categorical imperative, and in so doing carve out a realm of freedom in nature that would enable this subject to free itself from a "self inflicted tutelage" that arises when we can't make judgments without the supervision of an other; this of course includes the tutelage of the king. The condition for realizing any such ideal on the part of the enlightened subject is the ability to submit to nothing but the m le of reason in making judgments, and so freedom from the power of the despot when making one's judgments necessarily involves a critical repositioning of the place from which sover eignty is exercised. Kant declared that no more is the locus of sovereignty the body of the king, since this "tutelage" is stoppable only if the subject is able to owe its allegiance to a republican polity constituted by the rule of reason and nothing but the m le of reason. Whatever criticism Balibar levels at Kant for the (supposed) historical mistake he made with regard to Descartes, the philosopher from east Prussia nonetheless emerges as a very considerJble figure in Balibar's account. For Kant also created the concept of a certain kind of practical subject, one who operates in the realm of freedom, and this practical subject, whose telos is the ultimate abolition of any kind of "self-inflicted tutelage," had to cease to be the "subject" of the king (i.e., the subjectus of Descartes and medieval political theology) in order to become a "self-legislating" rational being? Kant's great achievement therefore lay in his simultaneous creation of the transcendental subject (i.e., the subjectum of modern epistemology) and the philosophical discrediting of the subjectus of the previous theologico philosophical and political dispensation. The concomitant of Kant's philo sophical glltting of the "subject" who owed his fealty t o the king was dllls the political emergence of the republican citizcn who from 1789 onward (though a good case can be made for including
1776 in this periodization) would
supplant the subject/subjecms of rhe previous historical and philosophical epoch. In the process, Descartes's philosophical world of subjects who sub mit, albeit "irrationally" from the Kantian standpoint, to the laws of God and king was dislodged by Kant's world of "self-legislating" mtional subjects who engage in this legislation precisely by adverting to dle rational and non theological notions of right and duty. This new subject is dle embodiment of right (Recht) and of dle operation of practical reason (right being for Kant dle outcome that can be guamn teed only by the proper
usc
of practical reason). Furthermore dle subject is
considered a citizcn to dle extent that he or she embodies the general will, 24
CHAPTER 1
in which case dle only laws worthy of the name arc dlOse which "come only from rhe general, lUlited will of the people."s Sovereignty is thus glossed by Kant duough a recasting of the Rousseauan social contract. Laws arc rationally promulgatl-d only when they exemplify the general will, and this exemplification of dIe general will is possible only f i there is a perfectly just civil constitution. As Kant put it in his "Idea of a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose," "The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in whichfrctdom under e.xter
na/ laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent widl irresistible force, in mher words, of establishing a perfectlyjust cil'if constitution."9 -nle outcome, as the philosophy textbooks tell us, was a crucial separation of the eardlly from the heavenly city, of earthly sovereignty from divine sover eignty. However, if Kant is the tme n i augurator of the Citizen Subject, then for Balibar, Michel Foucault is the great theorist of the transition from the world of monarchical and divine sovereignty to the world of rights and duties determined by the state and its apparatuses. Salibar concludes his essay widl the following observation: "As to whedler dlis figure lthe Citizen Subject,] like a face of sand at the edge of the sea, is abom to be effaced with the nc.\:t great sea change, that is another question. Perhaps it is !lodling more tilan Foucault's own utopia, a necessary support for that mopia's facticiry."10 I would like now to address the Foucauldian question left by Salibar for future consideration and pose the question of the current destination or fate of the Citizen Subject. 10 do tilis we have to look again at Kant. The reason that constitutes the subject is perforce a Transcendental Rea son. -nle obvious Kantian inflection here is not accidental, because the reason that grounds the subject is not a reason that can be specified within the terms of rhe activity of the subject: this reason is dle basis of dlis subject's very possibility qua subject, and by virtue of that, reason is necessarily exterior to the "activity" of dle thinking subject. Reason in dlis kind of employment is thus the activity of a single and universal quintessence whose object is reason itself, so that reason has necessarily to seek its ground within itself, as Hegel noted.11 Reason, by virtue of its self-grOlUlding, is perforce the writing of the Absolute.11 lbe subject's ground, which has to reside n i Reason itself, is therefore emirely and properly metaphysical, and any crisis of Transcen dental Reason unavoidably becomes a philosophical crisis of the thinking subject. Kant himself was the first to realize tilis, dlough it was left to his philosophical successors in the movement known as "early Romanticism"
(FnilJrolllalltik) to m:l.ke the acknowledgment of this crisis ofTranscendental Reason into a starting point for philosophical reflection.13 THINKING SUBJEct AND CITIZEN SUBJECT
25
Vith \ Nietzsche, however, the hitherto radical figllfe of the transcenden tal subject is propelled into a crisis, and with this ostensibly terminal crisis the fundamental convergence between the rational-epistemological subject and the moral-political subject is denied any plausibility. We know from the te....tbooks of the history of philosophy that reason, insofar as it operates on both the understanding and the will, is placed by Nietzsche entirely within the ambit of the
iVille Zllr Macht,
so that power or desire becomes the en
abling basis of any epistemological or moral and political subject, thereby irretrievably undemlining or dislocating both kinds of subject. The "will to knowledge" for this Nietzschean-Foucauldian school of thought depends on a logically and psychologically antecedent "will to power." As a result of the n i tervention represented by Nietzsche, tmdl, goodness, and beauty, that is, the guiding transcendental norions for the constitution of this episte mological and moral-political subject, are henceforth to be regarded merely as the functions and ciphers of this supervening will to power. The same conventional wisdom also assures us that Marx and Freud likewise "undid" the two kinds of subject and thus wldermined even further any basis for their essential congruence. The constellation formed by Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud (and dleir successors) shows bodl the transcendental subject and the ethicopolitical subject of action to be mere conceptual functions, lacking any substa.ntial being (Kant having already argued in the
Critique of Pure
Reason that the subject of thought is nor a substance). -nlis hackneyed narrative about the collective impact of the great "masters of suspicion" is fine as far it goes; what is far more nteresting, i. however, is the story of what had to come after Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, ofwh:u it is that was going to be done with the mins of the epistemological and moral and po litical subject who ostensibly had reigned from Plato to Hegel before being dethroned in the late nineteenth century.14 It is interesting that Balibar, who is as resolute a marxist as anyone could be in these supposedly post-marxist days, appears not to take on board in "Citizen Subject" Marx's well-known critique of bollfgeois democracy, but instead regards Foucault as the thinker who more than any other registered the crisis of this bourgeois Subject. Be that as it may, it is hard to deny that the transcendental subject of modern epistemology suffered calamitously at the hands of Nietzsche (and of Hei degger and Foucault after Nietzsche), and that political and philosophical developments n i the twentieth century have cast the Citizen Subject adrift in a rickety lifeboat headed in the direction of the treacherous philosophical reefs mapped by Foucault.
26
CHAPTER 1
But can the course of this stricken lifeboat be altered, and the fWlCtions and modes of expression typically associated with the Citizen Subject be reconstituted in some more productive way, so that this Subject, or its suc cessor (but who would that putative successor be?), would be able to meet the political and philosophical demands generated by the prescntlyemerging conjuncmre? Here one senses a certain ambivalence at dIe end of Balibar's essay, a wish that Foucault was perhaps not going to be right when it came to a final reckoning of the fate of the Citizen Subjt.'Ct, and dlat new and better times would somehow come to await a radically transformed Citizen Sub ject. But what could be the shape and character of this new life for the Citizen Subject? Balibar has an emphatic proposal: the Citizen Subject will live only by becoming a revolutionary actor. I want to take Balibar's proposal as the start n i g point for the discussion that will occupy the rest of this dlapter. There is also the question of dIe theoretical "space" that was once occupied by the transcendental subject of epistemology. \.Vhile we may not quarrel widl Halibar's suggestion that dIe (modem) Citizen Subject supplanted dIe (medi eval) subjectlls who owed its fealty to the sovereign monarch and sovereign deity (this now being something of a philosophical commonplace), it has also to be acknowledged, and Halibar himself is certainly aware of this, dIal Kant placed under the category of Right not merely action, bur also knowledge: the Kantian subject is both the Citizen Subject who acts and the epistemo logical subject who reflects in accordance widl dIe principles of Reason. This subject may have been displaced or finally extinguished in the second half of the twentiedl century, but the question of the "right use" of Reason remains, or at any rate, the question of the place of a hoped-for right usc of Reason still poses itself. We camlOt accept dlat Reason has "died" simply because its previous philosophic embodiments have been subjected to a concerted critique, no matter how devastating that critique may seem to be. TIus issue is therefore one that demands to be addressed, as a prolep sis
to
dealing with the question dlat s i this book's central concern, namely,
that of a potentially enduring transformation of collective political practice, one capable of supporting a project of liberation adequate to dIe challenges posed by today's strucmral and conjuncmral conditions. TIlese conditions, as we saw in the introduction, are those of a globalizing neoliberalism that
has been the dominant regime of accumulation since the end of dle postwar boom in the 1970S (even if dlis economic nt.""Oliberalism appears to be on its knees as a result of the 2008 subprime lending crisis) and a neoconservatism
THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT
27
that has bolstered the American poitical l hegemony of the period since 1989. An adequate liberation would therefore be one dlat produced political sub jects capable of surmounting the depredations associated with this globaliz ing neoliberalism and it.� complementary American neoconservatism.1S
The Demise of{he Clnssicni Citizen Subject \Vhatever Foucault may have said about the supersession of rhe posrclassical
epstime, i and dle death of dle Man-Citizen that accompanied this superses sion (I take. Foucault's Man-Citizen to be coextensive with Balibar's Citi zen Subject), it is obvious dlat dle subsequent political mutation of classical liberalism n i to a globalizing neoliberalism, as wcll as the disappearance of a viable socialism, have both served to form the basis of what is palpably a new conjuncture. This conjuncture, which some (including me) have called the "postpolitical" politics of the time after 1968, represents an added burden to the already harsh philosophical fate meted out to this Citizen Subject or Man-Citizen by dle "masters of suspicion" n i the late nineteenth century and early twentieth. The rulmination of this trajectory in the postpolitical poli tics of the past few decades (as described in the n i troduction) seems to reduce the force of the critique embodied in he t writings of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud; the subjcrt's appareiU superfluity n i this postpolitical dispensation lmdermines the very need for its critique. With the effacement of the focus (i.e., the Citizen Subject) of this critique, critique also finds itself fading into insignificance. At the same time, the apparent superfluity of the classical Citi zen
Subject makes more urgent the question of the ontological status of its
pmative successor, dlat is, dlt' subjcrt of tillS postpolitical politics. Is the subject of this postpolitical politics still some kind of vestigially effective subject, a ba.rdy breathing renmant of the Man-Citizen of Foucault's mod ern episteme or Balibar's Citizen Subject of the time after 1776 or 1789? And if dlls is tmly so, there comes dle question of what powers, if any, reside n i this seemingly obsolescent renmant of dle classical Citizen Subject. Have we been left with nothing for the metaphysical constinuion of dle possibility of politics bm dle sheer acknowledgment of the power of dle body, dle power of bare life (as proposed by dle thinkers of the "inoperative" comnumity and the community to come), or the appeal to some kind of undeconstmctable justice (as proposed by Derrida and his epigoni)? We don't have to spend too much time dlinking abom such suggestions to recognize that the practices and orders of thought associated with the "societies of control" limned by Dcleuze, and dlOse of dle domain of the biopolitical identified by FOllcault 28
CHAPTER 1
bur also developed by Agamben and Hardt and Negri, derive their saliency from this postpolitical conjuncmre. The centrality of the problematic of the postpolitical, arising as it does from the effacement ofthe Citizen Subject, for any putative project of liberation can therefore hardly be gainsaid. By dIe 1960s and 1970S it had become dear, or dear enough, that the politics of the past two hundred years was no longer able to manage the com plex and uneven movements of force that had been unleashed by dIe newest regimes of capitalist accumulation. AldlOugh many periodizations rake 1776 or 1789 to be dIe emblematic starting point for dlis politics of dIe "classical" Citizen Subject (a politics which by the 1970S and 1980S had become more and more clearly perceptible as a "previous politics"), by "classical" politics I mean both a politics based on a centrally planned economy of the party-state (i.e., the system of government that e:dsted n i the former Eastern bloc) and one predicated on the market-oriented liberal-democratic state (associated in a complementary way with what is still called "the West"). 111e citizens of the former Soviet bloc, and of the vVest adversarially simated in relation to the Soviet Union, were both members of dynamic political dispensations requiring visible and even intransigent distinctions between left and right, in ways that are becoming increasingly difficult to imagine in an epoch marked by such solecisms as "compassionate conservatism," "a socialism compat ible with the requirements of the capitalist market," "we're all middle-class today," and so forth. No matter how one assesses this previous politics, with its somewhat rigid ideological demarcations between left and right, it was always, even in countries of the former Soviet bloc, the politics of a particu lar phase of capitalist development. As indicated, this classical politics lasted from 1776 or 1789 until the lirst unravelings of its supporting international system in dIe early 1970S.16 It has already been noted that he t metaphysical heart of this classical poli tics was a particular conception of sovereignty and of the political subject ideally subsumed under the benison of this sovereignty through the principle of representation. Only those vested with sovereignty by those who qualify as members of the polity can tntly represent those who qualify as members of the polity! Sovercignty is thus vested by a polity which in turn is deemed by the sovereign to be the body politic instimted to confer sovereignty, in an unending loop of murual affirmation. Such is the delining, and circular (in the practical and not just the logical sense), formula of this model of liberal democracy. With the new capitalist dispensation that came into being in the 1960s and early 1970S, a dispensation now described and analyzed wIder several THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT
29
familiar titles ("post-Fordism," "disorganized capitalism," "flex ible accumu lation," "worldwide integrated capitalism," " late capitalism," "empire after the age of imperial empires," " the domain of the biopolitical," and so forth), such notions ofsovereignty were progressivdy eviscerated or circumvented. Ille unprecedented transformations in the capitalist order of the past fOllf decades or so were accompanied by a deracination of the classical political subject, that is, tile Citizen Subject who up to now had been at once enabled and constrained by the principles of sovereignty embodied in the previous political dispensation.lo put it somewhat schematically, if Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault wldid this classical epistemological and political sub ject, and n i he r process undermined irs philosophical rationales, then tile move to a postpolitical politics associated with the latest stage of capitalist development has had, ostensibly, the effect ofdoing away with the very need for such a classical Citizen Subject as well as tile accompanying phi l osophical rationales provided on its behalf.17 The thing rendered equivocal and otiose by Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, and Foucault, but still needed by the politics that lasted from 1776 or 1789 up to the 1970s, had by the 1970s started to become something of a rdie. Today's regime of capitalist accumulation and tile neoliberal and neo conservative ideologies identified with its current ascendancy simply have no need for the classical Citizen Subject, just as they have no need for the ideology of modemization that was an intrinsic component of the first or classical liberalism and the various socialisms and communisms whic h rivaled tillS liberalism in tile period from 1870 llntil 1989.lH -nle disciples of Milton Friedman and Leo Strauss who today control tile U.S. government's elite do not give a hoot about substantive notions of an informed and involved citizenry (however mythicized these notions have tended to be in the sdf exculpatory or self-congratulatory versions of America's special "destiny"). All rhat matters for Palll Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, John McCain, and Sarah Palin (and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom a couple of decades or so before, in her own version of English e.xceptionalism) is that you and I toe the line set down by those who widd power. One docs not have to be Naomi Klein or George Monbiot to acknowledge that, however complex the processes art� which led to the emer gence of the current phase of capitalist devdopment, it is virtually undeni able, especially in a time which is seeing the beginnings of an economic crisis whose scale is becoming comparable to the great crash of 1929, that corpora tions and markets have gained hugdy n i legitimacy and power at tile expense
30
CHAPTER 1
of the now deracinated Citizen Subject. At the same time, the accompanying notion (however much pervaded by the several myths th,1t buttress the ideol ogy of liberal democracy) of a sovereignty lodged wlconditionally in a state that, as a matter of principled necessity, placed its administrative fWlCtions at the disposal of its "people;' has also sucClunbed completely to the dictates of corporations and the dogma of the market.11l The historical and social conditions rhat served to legitimize rhe liberal democratic state and its activities, as well as the figure of this now bygone Citizen Subject, were severely lUldermined in the episteme instituted by transnational late capitalism, whose influential proponents in the overdevel oped economies of the North see it as their right [0 administer everything in the name of capitalist (over)accumulation. Thus, for instance, anyone who is moderately well-informed is likely to know (albeit without necessarily being dismayed by such knowledge) that a coterie of energy company executives, including those of Enron until its demise, effectively policed the Bush ad ministration's energy policy; that Italy's government is in the pocket of one of its richest men (who bought his way n i to the prime ministership of his country); that Tony Blair's entourage at the JohalUlesburg Earth Summit in cluded the boss of one of Britain's biggest corporate polluters; rhat weapons manufacturers, as a result of brazen revolving-door hiring policies, arc so completely in league with departments of defense in the advanced industrial countries that this is no longer reckoned a scandal; and so forth. In the place of rhe Citizen Subject posited as an ideal by rhe Iiberal democratic political systems of the past two centuries by and large now stands a new kind of ideal subject, to wit, a consumer subject cajoled and tutored in this country by Disney, Fox News, and USA Tonny. In place of the ideal of the sovereign state whose raison d'ctrc was the representation of its "people" there now exists a state formation that has been transformed over the course of rhe past few decades nto i a much more loosely amalgamated bundle of functions and apparatuses (economic, political, ideological, mili tary, and so fordl), with some functions and apparamses demanding very high concentrations of state power for their operation, and others little or none. I-icnce, to take an example very much in die news as I write, spying on American citizens without recourse to judicial warrants is deemed an absolutely necessary c:l:ercise of state power by President George \V. Bush and his handlers, while the functions of the Internal Revenue Service and the govenunent-run social security system are considered superfluous enough by some Republican politicians to warrant the wholesale privatization of
THINKING SUBJECT AND CITIZEN SUBJECT
31
America's tax collection and social security systems.20 The various compo nents of this highly selective ideology of"market choice," "market flexibi l ity and efficiency," and "the free mobility of capital" operate whenever the func tions of the state can be abrog:lted in favor of the private interests rhat serve mling elites, bur are quickly suspended when they do not happen to advance the interests of these elites. I-ience the pathos of rhe sentiment expressed n i a bumper sticker sometimes seen on the vehicles of those likely to be typecast in he t United States
as
"liberals": "It will be a great day when our schools
get all the money and the air force has to hold a bake sale to buy a bomber." The cry behind this slogan is plaintive but tmthful, insofar as it is true dlat for many, if nO[ most, Americans it s i simply inconceivable that privately organized sales of baked goads by schoolchildren and their parents be used to fund the production of air force bombers designed to create " shock and awe" in refractory Third \Vorld countries.21 -nle prevailing system of capitalist production and accumulation, and the state formations associated with it, constimte the external variables for the operation of the deboned political subject of today. Just as important for the argument of this book, the emergence or consolidation, at the level of the subject's activity, of political practices capablc of overturning the regnant capitalist order will hinge cmcially on the possibility of supplanting, at the systemic or stmctural level, this globalized system of production and accu mulation. -The theoretical armature for a project of liberation capable of creating a postcapitalist society will dIercfore ncorporate i a critique of raday's world integrated capitalist system and its underlying conditions. To the extent dlat marxism (albeit one that s i exploratory and not schematic and unilinear in the way that some previous versions were) has shown itself to be the only "theory" genuinely ntended i to furnish a comprehensive critique of this kind, the project of liberation can usefully employ marxism's distinctive practico-theoretical lexicon when approaching the question of dlis project's conditions of possibility. It is thus a tmism for dlis undertaking dlat those who wish to be free first have to produce knowledge of the things dlat stand in the way of their freedom. This in fact is dle acid test for such a project of
liberation: Does it furnish such knowledge, or docs it sweep it more or less gently to one side? Of course events can and do overtake those who form and steer public opinion. TIllis even dle most polished spin doctors were hard-pressed to serve up blandishmcnrs that could diminish what Hurri cane Katrina revealed about rhe all too visibly racialized social and economic
32
CHAPTER 1
structures of New Orleans (in particular) and dIe United States (in general). The same state of affairs is also evident in the current financial crisis, when any campaigning American politician, of no matter what persuasion, has to join in the rimal condemnations of dIe "c.xccsscs" on \Vall Street, while having done all he or she could to create a political framework dIal abetted these excesses.
THINKING SUBJECT AN D CITIZEN SUBJECT
H
CHAPTER 2 Producing a Marxist Concept of Liberation
The fKllitico-historical and philosophical demise of the "classical" Citizcn Subjcct, the primary features of which were sketched in chapter 1, was ac companied by a momentous modification of state sovereignty. The changes associated with this rcconsritution of state sovcrcigmy involved a powerful mlltation of the capitalist system, and it will be possible to determine what is entailed by the shift from the Citizen Subjcrr to his or her ostensible suc cessor (i.e., the kind of subject sponsored by today's world-integrated capi talism and its complementary political formations) only by providing dlC mdiments of a description and analysis of hi t s latest phase of capitalist de velopment. Marxism has so far shown itself to be the only school of thought whose raison d'e:tre is this overall critique of capitalism, and this chapter broaches the question of what predsely is involved in producing a marxist concept of liberation'! -The motivation for producing this concept ofliberation s i supplied by the conviction that liberated political and social subjects will emerge only when capitalism, which has failed comprehensively to improve the economic and sodal conditions of the majority of humankind, is supplanted, and that the critique of capitalism is therefore essential for any real insight into the con ditions that will have to be rcmediated as a precondition for the emergence of such fully liberated subjects. In the begiIming was stmggle. If there s i , or has to be, something like a "posmlate of reason'"' for the ensemble of theoretico-practicai propositions that s i marx ism, it is perhaps this one. -The srmggies of countless women, children, and men for a bener world have taken place over the ages in very
diverse settings of theory and practice (and this is
to state a commonplace!).
This diversity is of such amplirude that it cannar be encompassed, theoreti cally or otherwise, within a single movement, even one as powerful and com prehensive as marxism. Many have engaged in differcnt and not always nec essarily congruent ways in such struggles. These struggles have never owed their "relevance" to marxism. Rather, it is marxism, n i whatever form, that
has owed its "relevance" to them. As long as people struggle for Iiberarion and this in the end is a collective and collaborative. project imeparable from the quest for happiness- it will be possible for marxism to be, or to continue to be, "relevant." Broaching the question of marxism's hmdamental because comtiruting relation to the project ofliberation, and acknowledging that marxism derives its saliency from dIe latter (and not vice versa), n i turn poses dIe question of marxism's position n i regard to the supersession of capitalism, since it is an axiom for all schools of marxism that liberation inextricably involves a countervailing action directed at rhe capitalist system of production and accumulation. But doesn't capitalism c.xercise its dominance in many modes and at many levels, not all of which give the appearance of being directed by the forces and agents of capitalism? Can't it plausibly be presumed, more over, that specifically anticapitalist struggles are not the only ones germane for those seeking radical and permanent changes n i their way of life? At tempts to address these questioIl.s can proceed on two fronts. First, there are those who will argue rhat ascribing an overwhelming normativity of this kind
to
anticapitalist struggle n i evitably de-emphasizes
struggles in orhercontexts not usually asrociated with the forces and arrange ments integral to capitalism, such as struggles for gender and racial equality and campaigm against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Second, there arc those who will argue, in a way that seemingly parallels the argument' about marx ism in the previous paragraph, that mass mOVClnel}[.� with an emancipatory intent c.x isted long before the emergence of the capitalist sys tem. The implication is that marxism, whose rairon d'ctre is overwhelmingly the critique of capitalist political economy, is not sufliciClltiy encompassing as
a result of tilis singular focus to do real justice to tilese precapitalist radical
alternatives and the movements that were their vehicles. The argument canvassed in this book does not require a detailed response to tilese hesitations over marxism's putative scope as a tilcory of liberation. Suffice it to say that the perspective c.�poused here on the emergence and devclopmCllt of capitalism departs from more standard marxist or marxisant accounts by proposing that marxism does not have to underwrite what s i in A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
35
esscnce a developmelltalisr conception of the growth and consolidation of C'Jpiralism. According to this developmcnralisr conccption, capitalism as a fully fledged mode of production was :lble ro emerge only when it had supplanted its predecessor feudal mode of production, just as the feudal mode of pro· duction had n i
film
to dispbce a preceding sbve-based mode of produc
tion in order to attain primacy. It is widely accepted, even in marxist circles, that tltis devdopment'Jlist scheme is llnsatisfactory.2 The position taken n i this book escilews the conceptual underpinnings of this devdopmelltalist scheme. Instead, it takes the core ofanycapit'Jlist system to be constituted by practices and formations involving the employment of formally frec bbor by the owners of the means of production in order to enable the appropriation of surplus value through the operltion of markets. In clpitllisll), bbor :lnd :III other factors of production h:lvc the form of commodities, though it s i of course not nccessary for all socbl formltions in an actually existing capi talist socicty to be subsumed under the conunodiry principle (after lll, Trap pist monasteries coexist with Goldman Sachs in contemporary America). Moreover, ownersltip of tile means of production need not be confined
(Q
private individuals and comp;mics, since owner-operators, consortia, banks, investment truStS, cooperatives, pension and mumal funds, ;1IId the state can :Ill exercise the various forms of such oWllership, even in a full-blown capital ist system.3 In addition, formally frec I:ll>or Clll exist alongside sla\'cry, V:lS s:llage, debt·peomge, and flmily work in l capit".llist system. All that m:mers in determining whether or not:l mock of production is capitalist s i for "free" wlge bbor to l>c the economy's prim:lr)' means of rellizing surplus vllue. 111e capit".llist mode ofproflucrioll therefore hlS two components:
(1) a pro
duction process thlt organizes the socill rd:ltions of production and their patterns of imeraction with the rcgnant technological plmdigm, and
(2) all
accumulation regime which lIses a range of macroeconomic instmmenrs to promote capitalist production and consumption (figures I lnd In :lddition to comprising necess:lrily
l
2).
mode of production, capitalism
:lIsa requires for its proper functioning :l system of regubrion or domin:ltion with tWO constituent modes. The first is l socia/ III/Kit: of (amomi, regll/atioll, which superintends the social conditions of possil>iliry for the various pro cesses of production lnd accumubtioll th:lt ill concert m:lke up the c:lpit".llist system. 11le social mode of economic regulation, as its name implies, governs roles :lnd functions inhercnt in manuflcturing and otllcr production pro cesses, oversces labor prlcticcs, and man:lgcs thc social l>asis of distribmion nctworks. Hencc, and this is JUSt one c.'\ample, in many Europc;\11 countries 36
CIIAPTER 2
,\IOOe of Production Sites ofPrOOurtion Social Relations of Production
[Material and Immaterial
1-
/ H
I
"
'rodu([ion I Pnxe,"
Technolngies ... Forms ofTedlllological
"- /
'\r---
ProductionJ
A,""unlu larion
"hcroccouomic
Rcginl<'
Instruments ,
1-
Sires of ('..onslllllption
OrganiLuion
1. The mode of production
System ofRcgulation
'-; Social '\-lode of Ecouomie
�
� -
cgulJtion
Sit�s of
0
Modc o
SocicraJ Regulation
)--
APPARATUSES
""
FAiucJtion
I
Familr Structure
l'roducrion
!
Social ('.condi[ions
Religion
L:gal SI'stem Media Medic.1 S)�tem
Sites of
Ac[ors illd Subject!;
Military
('.onsumption
2. The system of regulation
a post office clerk often serves
as
a bank teller, since n i these countrics post
offices arc also commercial banks; this is a simation an American post office clerk docs not have to deal with since the U.S. postal system is not a banking system in the way that the post office is in many European countries. The difference n i job specification between a European post office clerk and his or her American eow!terpart is due to two quite different social modes of economic regulation (at least with regard to having the post office function as
a bank). The second dement in the capitalist system of regulation is a mode ofsoci
etal regulatwn, which, while not directly commanding the stmctllfcs and forA ,\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
37
mations that subtend capitalist production and accwnulation (this being the task of the social mode of economic regulation), is nonetheless needed to mobilize an integrated system of appararuses (education, the legal system, rcligiollS instirutions, media and communications networks, and so forth) that create the agents and the stmcmres of desire essential for continued capitalist production and consumption. A high school home economics class that teaches smdents to balance their checkbooks is making its contribution to maintaining this system of production and consumption, though more often than not teaching this skill is likely to be called "enabling students to deal with the real world." Ihese apparamses arc harnessed to create a doxa or common sense in which any seriollS expectations regarding alternatives to capitalL�m arc discounted from the outset, so that the accumulation of capi tal seems an entirely norma! state of affairs for the overwhelming majority of citizens. In the parlance of the typical American local bar or pool hall habitue, or the dTcctively mythicized "Joe the plumber" or "Joe Sixpack" of the 2008 U.S. Republican election campaign, "Hey, what's wrong with making a buck (or two)?" or "Why the heck should I have to spread the wealdl around?" -The two modes of the capitalist system of regulation therefore encompass a vast array of subsystems of control and regulation dlat enabk this "regu larization" of capitalism's modus operandi
to take place. -nlis doxa-forming
assemblage includes organizations, general social mles and prescriptions, rituals, conventions, social roles, culrura! dispositions with their attendant identities, collective outlooks, and modes of calculation,
all of which coa
lesce to "regularize" or "normalize" (and not just to "regulate") the processes associated with capitalist accumulation.4 -nle social processes which make possible dle creation and distribution ofsurplus value operate through a class system (about which more will be said later) which is effectual in both the social mode of economic regulation and the mode of societalization. It is important to note dlat the mode of regulation in its most basic fonn ncorporates i systemic constraints whose modus operandi is sitllationally defined. llle circumscriptions embodied n i this modus operandi are always specific to particular times and places, they encompass definable groups of agents, and their operation always involves a specific social strategy or set of social strategies. Especially helpful here is Bob Jessop's distinction be tween the " stmcmral" and dle "conjunctural" moments that are integral to the functioning of any field of social practices and collectively held beliefs. Stmcrural moments arc relatively n i variam and cannot be changed merely by dlis or dlat agent or group of agems embarked on a given strategic course of 38
CHAPTER 2
action in that particular place and time. By contrast, conjuncmral moments are those n i volving eourses of action whose strategic basis is modifiable in principle. Jessop's distinction has the mcrit of acknowledging that what may be a constraint for a particular agent or group of agents can without any real or apparent change represent a "conjuncrural oppormnity" that can be used more or less productively by other agents. This accOlUlt alro suggests that a systemic constraint for a particular agent or set of agents can with the passage of time become a conjunctural opporrunity for that individual or group of individuals should the latter have recourse to a different social strategy. By choosing different rocial strategies, provided of course that these happen to be available, agents can affect in varying ways and degrees the course and oU[comes of the systemic constraints and opportunities inherenr in the mode of regulation.5 It goes without saying that the stmctural constraints embodied in dIe mode of regulation are sometimes overwhelming, and that in such cases the ability of agents to obviatc or bypass these stricrures is inevitably going to be limited or nonexistent. But the possibility of change in regard to this or that component of the mode of regulation cannot be ruled out from dIe outset: constraints and opportunities are necessarily context-dependent, and any possibility of a change of rocial and political context carries with it the likelihood ofsocial and political transformations that are potentially real and Iasting.6 The overall logic of dIe mode of societal regulation need not be liberal democratic, even if this has generally been the case historically where capi talism is concerned. As thinkers as diverse as those of the Ecole Regulation, Resnick and \-\lolff, and W. G. Runciman have indicated, the capitalist mode of production s i alro compatible with a quasi-feudal mode of rocietal regu lation (as in latter-day Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates), a communist rocial mode of economic regulation (as in dIe "state capitalism" of the former USSR), or even a putatively communist mode of rocietal regulation com bined with a capitalist mode of economic regulation (as in China today)? Hence, for insta.nce, challenges to a quasi-feudal mode of rocietal regula tion that happens to be coupled with a capitalist mode of production could still be salient for anticapitalist stmggles even if the motivations of dlOse contesting the quasi-feudal social formation in question in no way involve an animus directed toward capitalism per se. A case in point is the stmgglc for women's rights in the Gulf Emirates, which is clearly not anticapitalist in regard to its formative tendencies, but which, depending on the context, can nonetheless be encompassed, strategically, in an anticapitalist stmggle which A .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
39
makes gender equality one of its primary concerns. A marxist or marxisant conception of liberation will therefore acknowledge that opposition move ments which do nor direaly contest capitalism and its appurtenances are not by virme of tbat fact necessarily tangential or epiphenomenal [0 ostensibly "real," because c.xplicidy anticapitalist, struggles. Capitalism, as the nexus of a production process and an accumulation regime (these constituting the mode of production) and a social mode of economic regulation and a mode of societalizarion (these making up the mode of regulation), is after all a diverse ensemble of parts, each managed by a sublogic which need not cor respond directly or immediately widl the sublogics dlat control the function .ng i of other parts of dIe system.8 The various component parts of dIe capitalist system have an overdeter mined relationship to each other, and challenges [0 capitalism can therefore occur potentially at many points (culmre, legal institutions, etc.). As a result, there can be no preemption ofa particular form ofopposition simply because. it does not possess rhe face of an overtly anticapitalist struggle. Revolution ary change in such a system, f i it occurs, can n i volve a range of very diverse transformations, some of which may lack an inunediate connection or con gruence with movements whose raison d'ctre is the quest for an explicitly postcapitalist order. Challenges to the capitalist system dlercfore nel-d not bear directly on the mode of production or the social mode of economic regulation, though it is much more li kely that an unconcealed anticapitalist struggle will affect these two modes in directly visible ways. But struggles conducted at the level of the mode of social regulation can affect the pre vailing form of capitalism even if they do not appear on the face of things to alter any existing arrangements in the mode of production and the mode of societalization. It is polities, militancy, understood n i the broadest terms, therefore, dlat makes it possible for marxism still to be germane, indeed central. But tllls is a politics which has to acknowledge that the dispositions of power in our cur rem
social and economic realitics, and the irreducibly complex and uneven
movements of force aligned widl these dispositions, are too varied and un stable to be managed by a politics of dIe kind that has existed for the past two hundred years (dIe era of the Citizen Subject that prevailed from 1776 or 1789 to 1989, if not a decade or two earlier). As it has done for previous epochs, marxism provides a practical-theoretical armature for addressing some of the more decisive questions for a politics after 1989, that is, a politics that is in herently of the twenty-first century.
¥l
CHAPTER 2
However, as we have seen, a marxism capable of encompassing this poli tics will have to be premised on the insight that the possible defeat of capi talism will necessari l y involve a variety of stmggles, not all of which will be manifestly anticapitalist. The mutations lUldergone by capitalism since the time of Marx and Engels, and tlle modes of resistance to which these muta tions are a response, may have to be matched by parallel transformations of (marxist) theory itself. As a political materialism, marxism has
to
register the m i port of these
metamorphoses of capital in tlle very deptll and scope of its conceptual operations where this happens to be appropriate. Consequently, the asser tion made by some of its schools of marxism's character as a ".science" is best understood not as an attempt to confer a stultifying incontrovertibility on its axioms (as happened in Stalins i t Russia), but ratller as the recognition of a "systemic" demand on the part of marxism for these principles to be revised in the light of changed historical circumstances. Capitalism's ceaseless dyna mism is thus to be matched and complemented by the tlll""Oretico-practical dynamism of marxism itself. One recalls here that Lenin, when confronted with some new situation, used to say, "About this, Marx and Engels said not a word." \> The cmcial question here is the one sometimes implied in the charge that the marxist parJdigm is n i crisis becau.se capitalism is no longer (if indeed it ever was, as some diehard anti-marxists would insist) congment witll the a.xi omatic frJmework proposed for its analysis by what is basically an "outdated nineteenth-century idl""Ology," as tllese critics of marxism allege it to be. In responding to such anti-marxist objections,
I must note that this congru
ence between the field of capitalism and the axioms of marxist theory can be accounted for only by a principle, a second-order principle, tllat is not itself "marxist." This is necessarily so because tile applicability of marxism to the field constiruted by capitalism can be specified only metatlleoretically. This metatlleoretical or "transcendental" specification, which, to repeat, is not something that marxism itself can furnish, will pinpoint the conditions and principles that enable this particular field (viz., capitalism) to be governed by ths i particular a.xiomatic (viz., marxism). -The appicability l of a tlleory or paradigm (any theory or paradigm, not just marxism)
to
a field cannot, on
logical grounds, be certified by tllat theory itself, since the norms and axioms for the connection of the theory in question to its field calUlOt be determined inrratlleoretically. This is occanse the relation of the theory in question to its putative field, which has the typical logical form aRb (object a is in relation R
A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
41
b), cannot be specified by a or b, since the relation R is external, logically, to both a and b, and its character can therefore be specified only by to object
some other theory which has as its (own) object the emire logical frame of the relation between the two n i itial objects n i volved, in this case [aRh[.lO
Marxst i Metatheory The project of a new and transformed human collectivity, essential
to
the
realization of the emancipatory potentials that are a buill-in requirement for a political materialism like marxism, is likely to have two primary com ponents. The first s i a politico-philosophical tlK'Ory specifying the forms of, and rhe acmal and potential practical trajectories taken by, this sought-for radical transformation of our current social and economic orders. The second is a critique of tile circuits of economic and political power that impede those forces conducing to this radical transformation. This marxist project has been pursued in recent years, albeit with a variety of cmcial modifications, primarily by Althusser and rhe other thinkers who followed on from tile Althusscrian "moment," most notably Deleuze and Guattari, Antonio Negri (with his collaborators Guattari and Michael Hardt in
Commullists Like Us and Empire,
respectively), Etienne Balibar, Jacques
Ranciere, Fredric Jameson, and Alain Badiou. Marx of course created dIe essential lexicon used by these and other tllinkers to formulate the theoreti cal hub of tllis emancipatory project; some of tile leading items featured in this Marxist glossary are "c..'ploitation," "revolution," "accumulation," "com modity," "mode of production," "class," and other, somewhat more techni cal notions such as "surplus value," "commodity fetishism," "falling rate of profit," and "real subsumption." This concepmal repertoire has becn augmented n i more recent times by these successors of j\1arx. Among a great many other things, for instance, Deleuze and Guattari added "desiring production" and a fascinating and ex panded concepmal rendition of tile "mode of production" to this lexicon; Badiou has theorized afresh the notion of revolutionary possibility from d1e standpoint of tile "tnuh-event" and its ramifications for political sub jectivity; Althusser provided a rigorous, yet in some ways imprecise expan sion of the concept of "ideology" to designate the very thing tllal Foucault would later put at the heart of his disquisitions on "governmentality"; Ne gri has elaborated j\1arx's own somewhat wlderdeveloped concept of "real subsumplion" in order to make it the cornerstone of a theory of globalized capitalism; in a brilliant and original way Negri also substituted Spinoza's .p.
CHAPTER
�
norion of "rhe multimde" (Illuititudw) for notions of "masses" and "classes" that for some marxislS have become less applicable to rhe realities of this current phase of capitalist expansion; Jameson has used marxist categories for an immensely creative explorJtion of the current conjuncture's symbolic and culmral forms; and Balibar has used this Marxian framework in his more recent work to produce some remarkable analyses of the JXllitics of racism and edmonationalism. The elaborations provided by dlese writers caIUlOt be regarded as a simple stretching of dle marxian conceptual bungee cord to this or dlat limit. Marx ism is perforce an "incomplete project" because capitalism has nor yet reached a discernible point of total exhaustion or retreat. Each one of these represen tative thinkers has amplified dle marxist project while acknowledging fully the hugely ramified and challenging task set by dlis incompletion. As I n i di cated earlier, at another, more ontological or logical level the incompleteness of the marxist enterprise s i an incompleteness that is inherently constim tive, because marxism CalUlOt deliver to itself its own metatheory; it cannot, that is, give lIS a logically required higher-order theory capacious enough to supply the overarching \varrants for its own theory of the capitalist field. The sought-for project of radical transformation, constmed here as an appication l of the principles of an always exploratory political materialism, is the very heart of this metathcory. -nle logic or axioms dlat govern the notion of a collective hwnan liberation therefore oversee ally attempt to sketch the skeletal oudines of this metadleory. So what is the proper form of this meta theory heedful of the requirement of a collective liberation.> How is a concept of the appropriateness of the marxist paradigm to be produced? Producing the concept of dle appropriateness of the marxist paradigm re quires the producer of dlese concepts to begin by distinguishing adequately between the following: 1. Those concepts that cons[itLJ[e a theory of X or Y or Z. 2.
Those concepts that belong to a particular mrmifmatioll ofX or Yor Z and which constinne the "exprcssivit)''' ofX or Y or Z, and whic h can become the objects described and analy;':ed by the aforementioned theory of X or Y or Z. These eoncepts
can appropriately be design:ncd X- or Y' or Z
(the superscript asterisks indicate that X' or y. or Z- arc. manifestations ofXor Y or Z). 3. The state or
cOlldition
that is X or Y or Z
as
such, a condition which
o\'erdcrcrmincs the cxpressivities yidded b y this statt" or condition (sec figure 3).
A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
43
Tbtury ofX (X ocing an cxprrss;vitr)
t Concepts belonging to l l'lnicuilr manifestation ofX, md which constitute the ex{Jresf;,'ity ofX.
TIlc s" conceptual nllnifcsr:uions aIT ,ksignatcd as X'
t TI,e State Or flmdition ofX ", such (indcpcndl"dy of an)' of its manifestations X")
3- Theory, cxprcssivity, and condition per sc In the case of marxism, the application of 1-3 would yield the following rcsults. lhe category (a) would be the marxist theory whose object could be a particular phase of capitalist development, a process within such a phase, a specific institution or set of institutions associated with rhe phase in ques tion, the decisions of individuals and groups of individuals, and so OIl. Under (b) hc t objccrs in (a) receive expression through the words and texts of a very diverse mnge of agents and organizations (workers, immigrants, dIe unem ployed, old-age pensioners, trade unionists, company managers, federations of bosses, local councils, members of dIe legislature, dIe output of think tanks (Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, etc.), the news media, national governments, international organizations
(UN, IMF, \Vorld Bank, Il u, WTO,
OileD, etc.), NGOS, dIe writings of academics, novelists, pla)"vrights (Ques nay's
Tablrall ieollollliqllc, Adam Smidl's TIfe Wralth ofNlltiollS, Polanyi's The Grellt TmllSjorlllltion, l the Han'llrd Business Rel'ielV, Martin Amis's MOlley, Conrad's Nostrolllo, Arthur Miller's Death of II Sa/csman, etc.), films (Ken Loadl's Kes, Sam Mendes's American Beauty, Elia Kazan's On the �Vllt"front, etc.), all these constituting the c.xpressivitics thal are, or can be, "dleorizcd" by this or that application of marxist theory (i.e., a). But (c) the expressivitics
n i (b) have as their basis a diffuse array of material conditions whose overall effect is to overdetermine the expressivitics in question. A currently ex isting conceptualization is always provisional and can therefore be superseded by a newer one; no conceptualization expresses or determines n i a way that is completely exhaustive of the condition or situation dlat it brings to expres44
CHAPTER �
sion. An expressiviry works by naming things, but the thing named is never the rhing itself; it is instead rhe panoply of eflects associatcd with the thing in question.
(Tltis is the basis for the famous Alrhllsserian refrain ""llle concept
of sugar is not sweet;' "TIle concept of water is not wet," etc.) Spinoza was the first to turn this insight
("An expressivity is rhe effect of a thing') into a
plti l osophical axiom, and Althusser and Delellze (Deleuzc admittedly some" what later than Althusser)
are
to be credited with rhe systematization of this
insight. TIle " thing," n i this scheme, is a concrescence of its effects (it is the event of this concrescence), and the effects in question vary with the totality of interactions that have that particular thing as thcir point of focus. It should be stressed that the process of experiencing an effect gives rise to an "affect," so dlat there is a close causal link between "effect" and "affect." For example, rhe horse that races is a very different "thing" (especially for its jockey and horse"racing fans) from the horse that drags a plow (especially for the peasant farmer using dIe horse for dlis purpose).!! TIle "thing" being an assemblage of effects and affects, and there being in principle a huge vari ability in the way these assemblages can be organized, no c.xpressiviry (qua the tide of the assemblage in question) can eliminate ab initio its competitor names and the assemblages designated by them. For instance, dIe collapse of the giant U.S. energy trading company Enron (with ties to dlree dozen or
so
senior officials n i the Bush adntinistration) has been placed by busi
nc.�s conUllentators and analysts into a number of such assemblages. Enron's downfall has been characterized as "a resultant of an energy market collapse," "a classic nUl on rhe bank," "a hedging structure collapse causing a liquidity drop," " the American spl""Cies of crony capitalism at work," "dIe bursting of the 1990S U.S. speculative bubble," "the result of inadequate business regu lation," "the outcome of the greed and venality of top management," and more. A theory of capitalism, as marxism of course is, is not therefore about capitalism per se but about dIe concepts dlat are generated by capitalism and its denizens and even its critics, or indeed by anyone through which the effectivity of capitalism s i bespoken. These concepts are in turn related in a variety of ways to other assemblages of practices. Hence the concepts generated by the conditions associated with capitalism can, in dIe relevant context, be related by an appropriate theory to the concepts or expressivirics associated widl dIe assemblage of practices named "Protestantism" (in the classic manner formulated by Max Weber in 71Je ProtestantEthic and thc Spirit
of Capitalism) or "modernist art"
(in dIe way understood by T. J. Oark and
others). A theory of capitalism does not bear directly on capitalist formations as such, bur ratller on the concepts of tllis or that manifestation of capitalism A MARX!st CONCEPT OF lIBERATlON
45
and its associated agents and figures, and these concepts (what I have called "exprcssivities") arc just as acmal and effective as the condition or set of con ditions that is capitalism itself.l2 Tlll'Orics operate on expressivities, and expressivities n i turn arc connected with the conditions that enable them. -nle correlations established between expressivities and dleir enabling conditions depend for their cffectivencs.� on always specific, because contingently ordained, distributions and orderings of power. Iheories arc thus the outcome of a productive process, namely no more and no less dIan the putative object of this process, the expressivities that mediate the conditions which they express even as they arc enabled by the conditions in question. A theory is a practice, just as the conditions me diated by an expressivity are always provisional multilinear assemblages of practices stmcmred by arrangements of income, assets, stams, power, and so on. A theory, in short, is a practice of concepts located in a macrosocial field with its own practical possibilities and outcomes from dlese possibilities. Capitalism's concepts are not given in the ensembles of practices that constimte it, and yet they arc capitalism's concepts, not theories about capi talism. Hence dle formulations of a Rosa Luxemburg or Enrique Dussel constimte a theory "about" capitalism, while the concepts of capitalism arc likely to include the notions (which may be inchoate or half-formed) of the ownership of private property, bank lending strategies, dle place of the peas antry in mral social orders,
GM crop technologies and their role in agribusi
ness, that acmally arc operative in, say, the thought and practice of a banker in pre-World War 1 Germany or a Mexican rural smallholder in the 1990S. Every concrete rendering of capitalism generates for itself its own "think ability" (and concurrently its own "unthinkability" as thc. obverse of thi.� very thinkability), even f i this or that capitalist condition is not taken to be such by those whose condition it happens in fact to be. TIllis the Mexi can smallholder (of today) or the German banker (in dle time before World War I) in their respective historical and social conjuncmres, the former (say) by owing deference to dle rich landowner and dle latter (say) by assuming that he
is n i vesting wisely on behalf of his customers by putting money in
the pre-World War I German munitions industry, contribute to the think ability of a particular instantiation of capitalism, even f i dIe individuals in question arc unable to acknowledge that this owing of deference (in dle case of the Mexican smallholder) or blind thinking about the supposed virtlles of investment in the pre-vVorld \Var I German armaments industry (in the case of dle German banker) are precisely the kind of conduct that enables a
46
CHAPTER 2
particular recension of capitalism to remain a viable system of production and accumulation, in the shorter term at any rate. It is this smallholder's or this banker's concepts or c.xprc.ssivities that constitute the thinkability of the condition n i which he or she is inserted, even though he or she may be unable to perform the requisite operation of transcoding that renders a particular piece of deferential behavior or routine thinking about the seeming benefits of certain investment strategies n i to an explicit marker or symptom (in something like the Lacanian sense) of a par ticular capitalist system of production and accumulation. Another way of making this point would be to say that a particular capi talist dispensation, like each and every social and cultural condition, has to secrete its multiple expressivities precisely in order to be what it is, and that its concepts, in ways that arc n i escapably selective, confining, and even arbi trary, are rhematizations or representations of these expressivities and thdr attendant conditions. Or more briefly, that the concepts of a particular capi talist order arc its exprc.ssivities limned n i the form of that order's think
ability. Theories ofcapitalism, by contrast, arc the olitcome of a theoretical opera tion whose object is the natures and functions of these expressivities. ·nleo ries of capitalism operate on a particular capitalist order's thinkability and involve a kind of transcoding. It is JXlssible to ask the question "'What is the form of capitalism operating n i cllis dispensation?;' but there is anocller kind of question, involving quite another kind of theoretical operation, that can be asked as well, in cllis case: "What is (a) clleory (of capitalism) ?" Capital ism, qua order or dispensation, is a prodigiously varied and complex prac tice of signs and images with an accompanying orchestrJtion of affectivity, whose theory clunkers such as Joan Robinson and Karl Polanyi and Samir Antin must produce, but produce precisely as conceptual practice, in this case a practice that generates, always in a metalanguage, concepts that reflect upon the concepts and c.xpressivities of capitalism's denizens, expressivities which therefore constitute what is n i e/Iect a basal or first-order language that comes subsequently to be transcoded. No clleoretical intervention, no matter how refined or dlOroughgoing it may be, can on its own constitute clle concepts of cllis or cllat capitalist order; the concepts of the denizen of capitalism are expressed in advance and ndependencly i of the personage, invariably an academic, who reflects on the concepts of those whose situations are typically those of the peasant, banker, hctory worker or manager, homemaker, retiree, refugee or asylum seeker,
A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
-1-7
billionaire ilwestor, and others.lbeorists and intellcrmals, qua theorists and intellcrruals, can traffic only in theories ofcapitalism (or culture or collective fantasy or whatever). The
concepts that theorists produce can be operative n i more than one
field ofthought, and even ill a single field it is always possible for a concept to
fulfill more than one function. An obvious example is the concept of "value," which
features promn i ently in the discourses associated with economics,
sociology, ethics, psychology, and aestlletics. Each domaill of thought is defined by its own n i ternal variables, variables to
that have a comple.x relation
their counterpart external variables, such as historical epochs, political
and social conditions and processes, and even tile bmte physical character of things.13 It is an implication of this accowlt of conceptual practice tllat a con cept comes into being or ceases [0
be operative only when there is a change
offunction or field. Functions for concepts must be created or n i validated for
the concepts n i question to be generated or abolished, and new fields must be brought into being n i order for tllese concepts to be rendered inapplicable or illegitimate. 10 see this, we have only to consider the accounts of twentieth century American capitalism provided n i a well-known semipopular text like
John Kennetll Galbraith's The NelV Inn/lStril11 State or Michel Aglictta's now
egulati n C{ crises nu cnpitalisllle.
classic R
o
Galbraitll follows Thorstcn Veblen's pioneering n i sights into the emer gence of a teclmocratic class and uses tile notion of a
"technostrucmre" as
a master concept to characterize tile course taken by American capitalism in the twentieth century, basing his argument regarding tile centrality of this tedmostmcrure for the dynamism of the American system of accumula tion since World \.Var I on an analysis of a number of textbooks on business organization and information provided Robert j\1cNamara,
by company executives (n i cludn i g
then an e.xecutive at Ford), as well as more theoreti
cal works in economics by Kennetll Arrow, Joseph Schwnpcter, and others. These sources can be mined to provide
a panoply of "stylized facts" that
fWlCtion as expressivities, which can then be used as the basis for theoretical formulation on the pan of the cronomist, in this case the autilOr of "Ill/! NelV
Indwtril11 Stl1te.i4 Likewise Michel Aglietta's more technical work uses detailed evidence drawn from key U.S. economic indicators to delineate Fordism's structure as
a regime of accumulation and to show that falls in productivity anddcrlining profitability, which had appeared first in the United States in tile late 1960s,
prior to spreading to other advanced n i dustrial economies, were tile harbin ger of a more signi ficant decline
48
CHAPTER 1.
that marked the beginning of the end of
this Fordist regime of accumularion. Under Fordism, according to Agliena, production and consmnprion were both characterized by the use of mass standards. Production was based on large-scale, standardized conveyor-belt production of medium-size consumption goods (cars and the larger domes tic appliances). Swift productivity gains ensued that were reflected in rising income and the emergence of mass markets. Aglictta highlights rhe wage relation as it impacted productivity and profit levels, as well as connecting production with the domain of consumption. He also emphasizes the labor process, and several sections of lUglllatwlI
et crses i dll capitnlismt deal with
the tasks that workers characteristically undertake as well as the tedmologies employed in these undertakings. Fordism, in Aglierra's account, hinged cru cially on dIe deployment of mass technologies by a trisectioned workforce of highly specialized, semiskilled, and unskilled workers who provided this regime of accumulation with its dynamism. Riglllatioll et crises dll capita/isme is therefore replete with "stylized facts" drawn from a welter of statistical sources: he t National Bureau of Economic Research, the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U. S. Uureal! of Labor Statistics, the Office of Business Economics, and rhe Federal Reserve Board. Agliena also refers to histories of American labor and consults Fortullt maga7jne and reports of congressional committees and subcommittees. These sources, which delineate the external field of a certain phase of capitalist development, constitute c.xpressivitics that Agliena can then work into a dleory of the Fordist regime of accumula tion and dIe first stages of its demise.ls Neither Aglictta nor Galbraith would be able to formulate rheir theories of capitalism without the expressivities that were lodged in such (nonthl""Oretical) documents as Furtllnt or dIe rec ollections of Robert McNamara when he was president of the Ford Motor Company. At a more general level, the concepts dlat are "expressive" of capitalism follow niles that govern dleir appearance and perpetuation. It may be the case, however, that capitalism s i more plausibly viewed as an order of orders, that is, as an order that brings together and orchestrates rules for an amalgam or network of practices, practices having n i more or less complex ways to do with everything from the establishment of the labor process and its repro duction, to the constitution of the production process (in some cases widl a special emphasis on the role of technology), the distribution and redistri bution of incomes, and rhe creation of patterns of consumption. The term "capitalism" is bestowed on the strategic logic dlat orchestrates these niles. However, focusing on dIe writings of economists such as Galbraith and Aglictta makes possible a depiction of this logic only at a relatively high level A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
4-9
of abstraction, as much as these economists make recourse to more concrete expressivities that are perforce presented in the form of "stylized facts." To get to the more tangible dimensions of this logic's application one perhaps needs to resort to the irreducible specificity of historical or ethnographic description, that is, by rurning to a form of characterization that studies ex pressivities in all their context-bound specificity. There are many well-known srudies of one or more facets of capitalism by anthropologists writing as ethnographers; examples that come to mind are Michael Taussig's 71fe Dept!
and Gmlllwdity Fetishism ill SO'llth Amerca i and Shamanism, OJlollialislII alld the WildMall: A Study ill Terror alld Henling, and Aihwa Oag's Spirits O'f1{£ sistallee alld Capitalist Discipline: FactO'ry WO'mm ill Malaysa i . It calUlOt be de nied that works such as these involve descriptions of cultural and economic phenomena, and therefore involve willy-nilly an element of abstraction. Bur the task of description as undertaken by edmographers involves a defining proximity to those who happen to confront the same phenomena in directly self-involving ways (dlese being the "participants" of the standard ethno graphic schema). Ethnography's fundamental nearness to its putative object (ofdescription) gives it a concreteness not typically possessed by odler logics of description, though dlis in no way suggests dlat such ethnographic objects are raw data or brute facts wh ich can then serve as dle grOlUld for subsequent (and proper) dleoretical formulation.16 For an ethnography is itself a species of description, and dlerefore operates at one remove on the expressivities of those who participate in the cultural or social formation being described by the etlmographer or local historian. It is thus a truism worth repeating over and over again that marxism is a theory, one belonging to a domain of thought whose basic n i tellectual disposition is tllat of a political materialism (and n i this sense marxism is therefore also a kind of practice), whose field is capitalism. This field is con sriruted by an immense range of c.xpressivities, and these c.xpressivities serve as an irremovable exteriority to the enterprise of theoretical fonnulation. "ille question of dle namre of the field from which the concepts of marxism derive their saliency is obviously one dla[ is especially crucial, since this field is the location of the external variables that are marxism's fundamental en abling condition. It follows from dlis that if the field that is capitalism did not c.xist, dlere would be no need for marxism. Bur before I discuss some of the primary external variables of the field in which the concepts belonging to a marxist theory are generated, somedling needs to be said about the mecha nisms underlying the constinuion of dle lived world that s i the contc.xt from
50
CHAPTER 2
which the perceptions, desires, thoughts, and actions of (capitalist) social and political agents are orchestrated. "flle daily round of life for the social subject is complexly mediated by ensembles of images and affects; images and affects n i tum are distributions of temporal and spatial relationsP TIllis the lived world of, say, the newly unemployed Appalachian coal miner who leaves the town of \Vheeling, West Virginia, to work as a loader in an air-cargo dispatching center in Newark, New Jersey, will be established by an ensemble of sign-images constituting the "'new" world of the city of Newark, a similar ensemble constituting the "old" world of the Appalachian mining town, the sign-images prevalent in the new world that is Newark which designate the West Virginia mining town that used to be home for the ex-miner ("Tllis is how the typical inhabi tant of Newark thinks of the place I came from"), the sign-images designat ing Newark that prevailed in dle old world of the small coal-mining town ("Tllis is how the people of \'Vheeling typically view Newark"), and dtis be cause the semiotic registers of dle movements between different life-worlds have themselves to be incorporated into dle constimtion of the worlds n i question. -flle ex-miner's concepmal rendition of the Appalachian world left behind is now inflected by the ex-miner's insertion into the new semiotic ensemble. that is Newark, just as the currently n i stantiated semiotic ensemble that is Newark is always itself constituted by the semiotic ensemble that is the ex-miner's previous lived world, in this case the Appalachian town n i the mountains of West Virginia. ·flle West Virginia mining town is always prehended in terms of the New Jersey ciry and vice versa, and dle world I have left behind is prehended n i terms of the world I have moved into, just as the world I have moved into is always prehended (if not entirely, then certainly partially) in terms of the world or worlds I previously inhabited. In dlis way a whole range of multiply linked sign-image assemblages under lies one's prehensions of dle temporal and spatial relations embodied in the antecedents and ptoximities that enable a life-world (tbat ex-miner's world, but still a public world) to be constituted out of the flux that is composed of these antecedents and proximitics. Tllese semiotic assemblages-designating Newark, the Appalachian town that the ex-miner has left be.hind, the ensemble regulating the. transition from dle one to the other, and so on and so forth-are crisscrossed by yet odler as semblages (each with an associated affective component) dlat designate such formations as family, job, education, circle of friends and associates, race, regional accent and speech patterns, and of course class position. -flle notion
A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
51
of being a protagonist in any kind of social or political order, therefore, is an abstraction denoting a particular kind of relationship between these assem blages; the notion of bcing such a protagonist is inevitably mischaracterized when it is viewed as an object that is directly denoted by, for example, the concepts "capitalist subject," "Appalachian miner," "unemployed worker;' and dlcir various cognates. For the object itself is already an abstraction from rhis nexus of assemblages and dIe inherently unstable linkages between them. The expressivities of the capitalist subject have dIe subject's insertion n i to {hs i matrix of assemblages as dlcir condition of possibility; to not be embedded n i dIem is perforce to be somedling other than a capitalist subject.l6 At the same time, a considerable variation can exist n i the kinds of assem blages that go into the constitution of dIe life-world of dIe capitalist subject. 1he assemblages that constitute the lived world of dIe London-based media tycoon who is a Russian citizen, or rhe Italian telephone operator working for a German multinational pharmaceutical company based in Milan, or dIe rice-growing peasant in nlral Malaysia (so vividly depicted n i dIe etlmogra phy of James C. Scott's now classic
Pmsall{ Resistancc)
-
Weapons of (he Weak: E!'erydiiy Forms of
these are just as much assemblages of capitalist subjects
as is dIe life-world of tile ex-miner from Appalachia. Marxism, as a thl.'ory of liberation, has no alternative but to present itself as a theory of the transfor mation of dIe life-world of capitalist subjects. It is not sufficient for marxists merely to posit a tramformation of the mode of production and to regard this focus on the mode of production as tile sole and c.xclusive rationale for those projects of liberation sanctioned by marxism. The transformation of the mode of production is of course an essential element of dlis sought-for liberation, but for marxism taking dIe project of liberation to its point of culmination will demand dIe transformation of the life-world (and its en compassing forms of subjectivity) of capitalism's denizens. Liberation, if it is to be effective, has to operate at the level of our subjectivity or life-world. Hence the need for a dlOrough description and analysis of these life-worlds, conducted at the olltologicallevel in the manner just specified.l9 The primary external variables of the field n i which the concept of a capi talist subject is to be generated today will be identified through an account of the conditions of possibility for the emergence of dIe assemblages th:lt create the personage of this subject and the exprcssivities that define this personage. It would take an extended and complex narrative to enumerate the full range of these c.xtemal variables, and dIe account developed here is unavoidably schematic. To tell this story properly is, after all, to have to tell a fairly com plete story about the course of modern capitalism. 11le theoretical and pracP
CHAPTER 2
tical bedrock of the applicability and intelligibility of the concept of the capi talist subject is a particular stntcmre of exploitation positioned in relation to specific historical and social stntcmres and their associated conjunctures; the theoretical operation involved n i producing the concept of the capitalist subject makes it a:domatic that he or she is this subject precisely because he or she happens to be exploited in some appreciable way, and this because he or she is subjected to the particularity of (capitalist) n i terests in ways that re flect fundamental asymmetries of power and the capabilities enabled by such power. The effect of these asymmetries of power is to place this subject n i exactly thnt stmcture of c."ploitation.2o Illere are many strands in the overall stmcture of c."ploitarion, and it is a commonplace dlat the stmcture which subtends the lived world of the rice-growing peasant in Malaysia is perforce different from die lived world of the Milanese telephone operator. In sununary, die capitalist structure of exploitation at its highest level of
generality has two axes: the mode of production and he r regime of acnl mulation (with the latter always functioning wIder capitalism as a mode of domination). Stmggles against capitalist exploitation, if they occur, have to occur along both these axes. Stfllggles regarding the mode of domination are primarily stntggles for greater social visibility and more effective social agency; stntgglcs regarding the mode of production have die reallocation of value as their primary (though not necessarily exclusive) focus. Abolishing the stmcture of exploitation is a necessary precondition for any pursuit of a project of liberation aspiring to be decisive and significant. Efforts directed at the abolition of die capitalist stmcture of exploitation can operate on one or both of dlese axes, and no effort expended a.Iong one axis is to be discounted in principle at rhe c."pense of dIe other. Stmggle can n i volve innumerable paths, and the avenues to liberation are likewise uncOlUltable. Since marxism is either a project of liberation or nothing, the surmounting of any com ponent of capitalism's stmctures of exploitation is n i absolute accord with marxism's raison d'ctre.
'nle Desire 'flmt Is the Ontological Grollnd ofLiberation and Truth Liberation in its essence involves a strategic lUldertaking designed to over come conditions enabling a stmcture of exploitation to hold onto its reach and effectiveness. The stmcture of exploitation therefore represents a critical mpediment i posed for die (marxist) project of liberation. The heart of any marxist project of liberation s i the emancipation of subjects from some unA MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
53
acceptable state of the world or condition attendant upon their being in the (capitalist) world; this recognition is accompanied, for marxism, by the allied realization that capitalism is the primary (though not the only) causal factor rcsJXlnsible for the existence of this state or condition. Liberation, then, s i in its marxist manifestation a dynamism impelled by desire, n i this case he t desire to overcome, circumvent, or ameliorJte an Wlac ceptable state of being associated widl a specific disJXlsition of the capitalist system.l1 Liberation for marxism is thus a concept internally related to the desire for capitalism's abrogation. As such, liberation has to be approached through an analysis of the conditions and functions of this (for marxism) primal desire, and this desire's names, its situations, its outcomes, its pro ductions. Desire has a role that is evell more primary than this, however, since the production of the world begins widl desire. The philosophical ac knowledgment of this all-important proposition came from Spinoza, who said n i his Ethics, " V \ e do not endeavour, will, seek after, or desire somedling because we judge it to be good, bm on the contrary we judge something to be good because we endeavour, will, seek after, or desire it." 21 Spinoza's proJXlsition can be said
to
be an axiom for marxism, since the notion dlat
the production of dIe world can begin only widl desire requires marxism to acknowledge that the cornerstone of the project of liberation is a prior on tology of human constitutive power or desire.l3 This ontology of constirutive power charts the various trajectories of human desire, and in so doing allows the project of liberation to have
as
its "knowledge" rhe dlcorems delivered by this ontological charting of the lineaments of desire (dlis in a nutshell being Spinoza's own program). 1be ontology of human constitutive JXlwer will delineate what it is that the en sembles of desire going by the name "human" are capable of, and what their aversions and attractions are. -nle ontology of human constitutive power is thus a necessary prolepsis to any specification of dle dleoretical core of the project of liberation. -nlis ontology has to be accorded priority in a marxist marking out of liberation as a concept, if only because a project of IiberJtion is above all a system of truth-efTects, and any truth-effect (or fusion of tmth-effects) can, depending on historical and social circumstances (and the mdiments of these are always political), be prevented from displaying itself. A tmdl-effect does not produce automatically, and hence cannot guarantee, its own processes of acrualization; it cannot of itself banish dle matetial conditions, whatever they may be, dlat could in principle dismpt its realization as a truth-efTect. (This is tme of any system ofthought, including the ontology ofconstinuive 54
CHAPTER 2
power being canvassed here; as a regime of tmth-effects it too calUlOt insti tute by fiat its own modes of realization, and it too can always be prevented from realizing its truth-effects.)24 A truth-dlcct, Oil this account, is the resultant ofactive desire, often having the force and character of a "project," in this case a project motivated by a particular arrangement of this constitutive desire or striving. For instance, Nelson Mandela's desiring his freedom (and dms the abolition of apartheid)
is a truth-effect because dns desire functions as an enabling (though not in itself sufficient) condition for the removal of all dlat stands n i the way of the realization of that desire. We could call this a "truism" of dle logic of desire, inasmuch as to desire X is to aim, no matter how ambivalcntly, to make true what it is that conduces to the attainment ofX. But what is it to desire X in ways that aim to make tme what it is that conduces to the attainment ofX? -nle relation between truth and falsity becomes significant at this point. Falsity emerges when a fundamental undecidability s i introduced between the real and the unreal. It is mportant i to note here that falsity is not mere error or confusion, but the capacity, the sheer power that makes a JXlten rial event of truth succumb to the forces of nondecidability.15 Truth is tims the force dlat cOllnters the constitutive nondecidability lying at the heart of falsity, a falsity coextensive widl the diminution of tile possibilities for a real and sustainable liberation. If this nondccidability prevails on a decisive enough scale, timse engaged n i the pursuit of trudl and liberation would not know which processes, constitutive of this pursuit, they would have
to
be
involved n i precisely as a condition of living liberated lives. As such, truth is the sine qua non of any materialization of the principles of liberation. To live n i truth is
to live under the name of liberation and all dlat conduces to
it, and vice versa. In the case of the apartheid regime in Soudl Africa, Nelson Mandcla's quest for his country's IiberJtion required him and his allies n i this struggle to find ways of rendering decidable the questions of what had to be done in order to destroy apartheid:
to fight against apartheid, Mandela and
his associates had to place themselves in, and in the process create, specific truth-effects about dle nature of white South African racism.16 But liberation and its attainment are not the ever-so-visible physiognomy of an abstract ideal order. To elaborate: bringing any principles of liberation to their point of real ization reqnires-and this watchword bears frequent repeating-dlat atten tion always be given to concrete political circumstances, since rhe JXllitical
is an insuperJblc condition for liberation's constitution as dlis or that spe cific event of liberation. For the truth of liberation, if it s i to be achieved in A MARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
55
material form, can be manifested only in a context indelibly marked by the particularities of power (including its abuse), and these particularities are perforce always political. Ibe truth of liberation is therefore irreducibly the possible truth of a political standpointP It is unimaginable that Mandela, AlUlg San Suu Kyi, Albertina Sisulu, Steve Biko, "nlOmaS Sankara, Martin Luther King Jr., Lenin, Emmeline Pankhurst, Bolivar, Garibaldi, and a host of others be the protagonists on behalf of liberation that they are without a protracted m i mersion in the political. Tmth is inseparable from politics. However, when truth is applied to a political standpoint it must always be qualified by the word "possible." For tmth is what breaks n i to and n i terrupts the seemingly undifferentiated continuity of life (a continuity permeated by the nondec idability that is falsity's defining mark, and which a fortiori con ducc.� to the absence ofliberation), just as it dismprs the fantasies that under lie and make possible the seamless continuity of everyday life ("God bless America," "It's great to be a Bmmmie [a native of Birmingham, England]," "lexas is one special place," "\Ne live n i a part of Virginia that is the real Virginia and the real America," and so on). An adequate politics always calls for decidability, regardless of whether this insight is purveyed by those on the right
(Carl Schmitt comes to mind here) or the left (Badiou and Zuek)
or in some more substantive versions of liberalism (Max Weber and HaIUlah Arendt). "nle tmth, as the event of this dismption of the (politically inaugurated) continuity of life's everyday course, as the power that counters life's (politi cally sustained) nondecidability, is always a "point of exception" (the phrase
is Hadiou's). Tmth is an always specific series of operations on quotidian reality's fundamental propensity to nondecidability, or where the question of liberation is involved, on this reality's predisposition to render undecidable any basis for distinguishing adequately between liberation and those forces that militate against it.28 111e quality that defines tmth-and dlis is a quality that eo ipso also characterizes justice-is thus the quality of a singularity or exception, a singularity that does not cohere with the (politically instituted) continuity of Iifc.29 Ibis s i thl� kind of singularity or exception in which a specific operation or amalgam of operations establishes the basis for an event of liberation by bringing to the point of absolute decidability a particular historical or political process that hitherto had eluded, or been bypassed by, the political forces that make effective the various stmctures of decidability. Politics dlUS establishes the "bcingness" of tmdl and liberation, if one wants to put this in a Hcideggerian idiom. "nlis operation or set of operations, whose name is tmth, does not pro56
CHAPTER 2
duce automatically, and hence cannot guarantee, its own mode of acrualiza tion; dlat is, it cannot ofitself banish the historical and political conditions, whatever they may be, that serve to preempt its realization as a tnldl opera tor. When this happens, and these preemptive political and historical con ditions are active, nondecidability necessarily prevails. In this way untrudl holds sway and the possibility ofliberation is diminished. The tnldl operator and its encompassing regime therefore require a politics capable of activating and sustaining them; quite simply, there is liberation only when there s i a politics able to banish the forces of nondecidability. Again, this is precisely why liberation is inseparable ftom politics. Only political practice can annul the nondecidability or lUltnith of all that counters liberation. It is dear from this that any elaboration of liberation as a concept has to place an inarguable centrality on dlt� conditions underlying dle production of the tmdl-effects belonging to the system of liberation in question. No prac tice of liberation, nor any theoretical principles stemming from that practice, can portray those actively seeking liberation as individuals or groups who lUust "settle for life just as it is." Liberation's logic is irreducibly transforma tive. Even those conceptions of liberation that profess, or perhaps promote in slightly more vigorous ways, an "acceptance" of the social and political order or world as it is (as in some versions of stoicism) n i variably aftirm the need, whedler real or merely felt, for dIe protagonists involved actively to come to the point of such an acceptance. Ibis acceptance has to be worked for. That is, inherent in dlese more quietistic conceptions of liberation is the presumption t1lat such individuals or collectivities have to change, practically and in the end decisively, at least thcir dispositions toward the world (i.e., thcir own "subjectivity") even if not the world itself. This is precisely he t point at which the question of dIe conditions that subtend the production (or dle dissolution) of trudl effects arises in all its force, for the diftcrence made to the life-world by any practice conducing to liberation hinges crucially on the emergence of conditions that eft·ecmate truth by creating an evem of tnldl. It goes virtually without saying that the event of truth can also be forestalled by countervailing forces that obviate its emergence, and that dIe project of liberation invariably takes the form of a struggle widl those countervailing forces directed against the surfacing of the event of truth. Also important for any "thematics" ofliberation is the insight that dlere is a perceived need for liberation only because something about the lived world is distorted, because dlat world is for m:UlY of its subjects a place of misfor nUle and even catastrophe. ·TIlis basic distorted quality of the life-world, or A .\IARX[ST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
57
one's being in this world, which for this thematics is the driving force behind the quest for liberation, can have another consequence: for some of these subjects, the realities of a catastrophic world are the obvious starting point for battling the distortions and calamities that serve to underline the need for liberation. For these individuals or groups it may be the case that hope for the potential for change can survive or become effective only if the figures of liberation become figures of redemption rooted n i some kind of transcen dence-and these figures are hidden, or expressed indirectly by other means. 11lis is especially true of many apocalyptic or messianic traditions. These concealed or partly shrouded figures can then be retrieved only through the use of rituals or interpretive resources that have been refined and attwled n i suitably complex ways. 11le exemplary n i stance of this strand of messianic thinking is provided by Walter Benjamin, who in his ""flleses on tile History of Philosophy" used thc code of a historical materialism to express, alle gorically, utopian and messianic (and therefore "theological") impulses that for him were forced om of sight by a history that had succumbed to barba rism. For Benjamin the truth-effects of these hidden utopian propensities are marked by lUltimeliness and discontinuity, and thus can be registered only allegorically.30 A more complicated form of attention then needs to be paid to these characteristic discont inuities and their associated untimeliness, since a bro ken history discredits all conceptions of inexorable progress and teleology and ensures that any transcodings of potential m i ages of liberation (and the tmth-effects that go with these. images) will be unfamiliar and hard to retrieve. The argument of this book does not require the support of these messianic or utopian traditions, though it acknowledges their saliency for the constitution of the life-worlds of many who are dispossessed or m3.rgin alized. A glance at rhe anthropological texts of Michael laussig or Jean and John Comaroff will indicate tile significance of messianic religious traditions and figures for such individuals and groups, and insof:tr as the ensuing con victions are JXlwerful motivating forces for those seeking political change it is important for any theory of liberation to take these religious motivations into accowlt.3! It is virtually axiom3.tic that the implcment3.tion of tmth-efTects depends cmciallyon the 3.ctive presence of the conditions of possibility for a project of liberation. Tltis s i something of a conceptual requirement, since tmth has value only because we first deem it valuable to become involved in the con stitution of a particular tmth-event, to continue to seek this event of tmth, to 3.void self-deception in regard to wh3.t is considered to be a tmth-event, 58
CHAPTER 2
to heed those who
are
in the best position to discern this tmth-evem, and
so forth. TIlLIS, for n i stance, there may be someone who, contrary
[0
the
available evidence and contrary to the convictions of everyone else, hap pens to believe that her child survived rhe tswlamL She happens to be right, because it is tme that her child survived the tsunami, and it is a good thing that this belief is tme, that is, that her child's surviving has the character of a truth-event. But what makes it a gexld thing that this belief is tme is simply that it is good that the child survived. Here the value of truth (its effects, in other words) is clearly dependent on the sheer value of material survival.32 It is the reality of the child's survival that brings decidabiliry to the event of the mother having the conviction that her child has survived the tsunamL If truth-effects, and indeed the value of truth as such, arc n i extricably oound up with the value attached [0 the relations that we have to the material con ditions which wlderlie these efr..."t"C s, then the value of the truth-ell"ccts asso ciated with any presumptive project of liberation will depend crucially on the conditions, always but not soldy political, that subtend these projects. The tmth-cffects generated by this or that project of liberation depend for their decidability on the "making true" of this event of liberation by political practice; n i the absence of such practice, the effects of tmth are not likely to be compelling or far-reaching. Identifying and characteri7ing these conditions of possibility for a par rk-ular guest of liberation will reguire the kind of dense specificity that only . an ethnographic (or in some cases, microhistoricaI) description can aspire to provide; phi l osophy or theory (as we have seen) aims at something morc general and in a sense more problematic, that is, conditions given in advance of their appearance in he t realm of phenomena or material events. Neverthe less, it can be said that a "logic" of these conditions, of the kind being sought here, will contain a number of features intrinsic to the concept of liberation. TIlese include the axiom that those engaged in a quest for liberation have to be possessed of at least a desire for the new or difl"crent, inasmuch as for these protagonists there s i necessarily a contrast betwccn a prevalent state of affairs (one held [0 be in need of liberation, Le., "the old") and one which represents a supersession of this state (liberation itself, Le., that which sup plants "the old"). Ihis "desire for the new" is thus the primary, though not the exclusive, defining characteristic of liberation. (It should be mentioned here that there are religious traditions which provide an apparent exception to this axiom, in that they posit the liberation or redemption of an entire people, an elect, or a community of the devout, even for those who are not in a position to evince any desire for the new, such as the wloorn, infants who A .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
59
die, or the brain damaged. In such cases, rhis desire for dIe new clearly has to be predicated on dIe collectivity n i volved, and not on specific individuals belonging to it.) -The cnL"\: of this desire for the new comes when there i� a situation in which this desire is confronted widl the total absence of any conditions dlat conduce to its fulfillment. What happens to liberation when the desire for liberation is conftonted with the stark impossibility of its realization? Lib eration then necessarily has to become the desire or the dlOught of the new in the absence of all conditions.33 The absence of historical and political conditions for an adequate libera tion can serve as a powerful intensification of the desire for liberation. Re flection may go beyond the bowldary represented by these historical and political conditions, but it does so only as dlOught, as speculation, no matter how profound. The futility of any merely speculative practice having lib eration as its object in dIe absence of its historical conditions of possibility means dlat liberation has to be lodged n i nothing else but a countervailing power that s i c.\:pressed bodily and only bodily, including of course bodily affects. Thought founders on this impossibility, bllt the body and its affects remain to conftont what defeats thought. This ptompts a turning to the di rectly lived, to zones of viscerality in the life-world as yet not permeated by the powers that destroy even the thought of liberation. Here is dIe core of a constitutive. ontology of practice, one that furnishes he t basis for resistance and the continued mobilization of the desire for rhe new.34 This providcs only a horizon, albeit one that is salutary and absolutely indispensable, for a resuscitation or sustaining of the desire for the new. Something more needs to be said about this ontological horizon and its rdation to its precursors as horizons for the ontological constitution of practices of liberation.
The COllditions ofPossibilityforLiberatwlI and tbe Futllre Using the most general terms, it could be said that prior to the onset of modernity (bearing n i mind that this is preeminently a category defined by and for Europeans and Nordl Americans), infinity and perfection were the primary forces that shaped human beings. In this classical epoch dlat c.\: tended from antiquity until its demise in the European eighteenth cenrury, liberation was unde.rstood as the quest for perfection and the transcending of finirudc. In the modernity that succeeded dlis classical age, modernity being a relatively brief phase which reachcd its point of culmination in the Euro pean nineteenth century, finitude bL""<:omes dIe primary norm for envisioning 60
CHAPTER 2
the texmres of human life, these textures extending across a space of comigu01lS
domains that could be termed life, labor, and language.35 -nle episteme
whose name is modernity, and whose mark is finitude, marks a well-known crisis for religious sensibilities, perhaps most visibly reflected in the "works ofsuspicion" associated with Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud (as I pointed out in chapter 1). However, and this continues Foucault's periodization, this post classical episreme itself went into crisis , and modernity was supplanted in turn by dle current or postcontemporary episteme. The onset of dle current episteme was heralded by Nietzsche, but for Fou cault it is still an episteme of dle future. In it, finitude (understood typically as empirical constraint) is displaced by a ceaseless flux of forces and their mutations, a flle.: that Foucault's n i terpreter Deleuzc calls an "unlimited finiry"
(filli-illimiti).36 In dlis new formation, beings do not approximate to
or depart from perfect forms (as they did in the classical episteme), nor are they epistemically recalcitrant (as dley were in the modern episteme, which viewed them as a problem for the constitlltion of knowledge, as witnessed by Kant's rigorous emphasis on the necessary "legislative" tasks of Reason). Instead, the current episteme views beings as ensembles of forces arranged algoridunically. The "lUllimited finity" that marks these configurations of forces allows a "finite number of components [to yield] a practically
lUl
limited diversity of combinations."37 Recursiveness in the mode of an ''lUl limited finite" is thus, "emblematically," the modus operandi of the epoch that comes after modernity. Foucault had a narrative that purported to account for dle displacement or supersession of modernity along widl its pivotal creation, the figure of Man. In Foucault's famous image, j\1an would be erased in the way that a wave washes away the drawing of a face at the edge of the sea.3� Moreover, as Fou cault saw it, ofdle three components of the so-called anthropological triad life, labor, and language-it would be language that would pave dle way for the episteme that superseded modernity and Man. Man would be lUldone or overcome by the "enigmatic and precarious being" of dle word. Here, as Deleuze has argued, Foucault got it wrong, or at least he was somewhat off track: as Foucault himself subsequently came to acknowledge, the practices and forms that are shaping the new episteme are arising not so much in the area of language as in the areas of life and labor (what subsequendy came to be called "biopolitics" by Foucault). Deleuze's position on the practices of the emerging dispensation is clear from the following quotation: "The forces within
man
enter into a relation widl forces from the outside, rhose of sili
con which supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the A .\IARX[ST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
61
organism, or agrammaticialities which supersede the signifier. In each case we mllSt study the operations of the superfold, of which the 'double helix' is the best known example. What is the superman? It is the formal compound of the forces within man and these new forccs. It is the form that results from a new relation between forces. Man tends to free life, labour and language within himself."39 It is important to be cautious about all such pronounce ments on the character of eJXlchal shifts and transformations, of the spirit of tillS or that age, even if they come from FOllcault or Deleuzc or Hegel. After
all, even Foucault lived long enough to sec that he did not get it right about language and its role in the emergence of the JXlstcontemporary episteme. But with this cautionary note n i mind let llS asswne tllat tile new practices that have emerged, and arc still emerging, in the domains of life and labor arc clearly important for any understanding of postcontemporary knowledges and powers, and tlms for the concept of liberation. Dcleuze makes a concluding comment about the superman, or the "para human,'" as one may prefer to call it, who comes to exist in our postcontempo rary episteme and which forms a threshold for the next pan of my accowu:
The superman . . . is the. man who iseven in charge of me animaL\ (a code that can capmre fragmcms from other codes, as in the new schemata of lateral or retrograde). It is man in charge of the very rocks, or inorganic maner (the domain of silicon). It is man n i charge of the being oflan,guagc (mat formless, mute, ullSignifying region where language can find its freedom" even from whatever it has to say). As Foucault would say, me superman s i much less than dle. disappearance of living men, and much more man a change of concept: it is me advent ofa ne.w form that is neidler God nor man and which, it is hoped, will nor prove worsc man its tWO previous forms "o "
:
"-nle advent of a new form that is neither God nor j\1an": in other words, the dawning of times in which the desire for tile new that prompts our search for liberation will take the form of a movement beyond dle diak""Ctic of perfec tion (God) and finitude (Man), these forms having been exhausted as moder nity has been displaced by the postcontemporary, just as modernity itself once succeeded the episteme of the classical age. So, what is it to conceive of liberation, as desire but always as politics, without the forms of God and Ma.n, or perhaps more precisely, God or Man? What happens to liberation as a category in this eJXlch of radically new practices of life and labor? (TIlCSC questions will be taken lip in chapter 9, when I deal with the model of lib eration associated with Christian transcendence.) The practices and the needs of the subjects of these very new worlds will 6.!
CHAPTER .!
be the practices and rhe needs of beings who take dIe aleatory and rhe ma terial (Negri) as rhe basis of their self-constitution. Desire, or COIJatlls in Spi noza's terms, is what constimtes human subjects, and desire exists only in exterioriry, in the surpassing of itselfin the always changing movement. -nlat is the basis for a conception of liberation, one that can never find adeqnate figuration but that hopefully is likely to be satisfactory because it opens its subjects [0 rhe urgency and bareness of the never predictable event, "the new." All this amounts to an outline "grammar" or "logic" of liberation, one that, qua logic or grammar, is lUlavoidably and maybe even problematically abstract. This abstraction may be especially troubling for dIOse who arc marxists, given marxism's customary injunction dlat abstraction be avoided because it is one step removed from idealism
(if it
is not already the very
essence of idealism itself), and marxism is of course a self-professed materi alism with a bnilt-in propensity to vicw any idealism as a pernicious vice. An objection of this kind nonedleless overlooks marxism's reliance, as a political materialism, on some kind of reflection on the constitution of dIe political (or the historical, given the weight placed by Marx and his followers on its character as a historical materialism), and especially, given the conten of the argument of tills book, on an ontology of the political. This ontology of the political, and the human constitutive power that I view as dIe basis of the political, serves as dIe metatheory needed to COllllect marxism widl its field, which is capitalism in all its ramified manifestations. Marxism, under the mbric of what its exponents term "historical materialism,"
has always
had its own overarching theory of the. processes, in bodl their practical and theoretical dimensions, involved n i the material transformation of human life. In Ernest Mandel's words, "Historical materialism . . . provides a mea suring stick for human progress."41 The status of the theoretico-practical as semblage that is a historical or political materialism is profoundly contested even (or especially!) within the marx ist tradition, bur dlere is no need for us to enter here n i to the complex debates that surround the notion of a histori calor political materialism; suffice it to say that what matters is precisely the principle identified by Mandel, namely, dlat any kind of social and political transformation, even marxism's own "dleorization" of this transformation, needs some evaluative principle that makes possible the appropriate kinds of assessment of what transpired n i the course of that partirular shift in social and political conditions. A difference is necessarily enacted in the course of such transformations, and sinct� a shift logically or conceprually implies a movement between two positions or conditions, it s i the task of dlis overA .\IARXIST CONCEPT OF LIBERATION
63
arching evaluative principle to account for the "difference" made by that dif ference (Le., the movement between the positions and conditions and ques tions). What then docs marxism register when dealing with the possibilities and realities of such transformations? To ascertain what marxism registers in such instances is perforce to have a theory of the analytical and practical ditlerence made by marxism (the task of historical or political materialism), and this is precisely the mctatheoretical task assigned to the concepmal car tography of liberation outlined in this chapter. -The question of the prospects and opportunities available for the kind of social and political transformation n i dicated by marxism can be answered only by a survey of the social, political, and economic developments brought about by capitalist c.xpansion since tlle Second World War. These develop ments constimte the field of external variables underlying a concept of lib eration congruent with a marxist elaboration of tllis project oflibcration, and they arc discussed in chapter 3.
64
CHAPTER .!
CHAPTER 3 Postpolitical Politi cs and Global Capitalism
Some of the more significant c.xternai variables needing to be identified and characterized as part of our conceptualization of a marxist project of libera tion are provided by a conspccms of the period ofcapitalist development that has been n i existence since the Second World \Var. As I n i dicated in chapter 1, the demise of the classical Citizen Subject associated with the emergence of a postpolitical politics was accompanied by a momentous modification of state sovereignty, and the prcdsc character of the changes assoc iated with this reconsrirurion reguire in particular an account of the political and eco nomie transformations dtat have taken place since the Second World \.Var. These transformations involve a new mutation of the capitalist system, and they have to be depicted in some detail if the impact of this mutation on the form of dIe state is to be registered. Once this is done, and dIe shifts dlat have taken place n i regard to the form of the state and the apparatuses it encompasses are clear, it will be possible to determine what is entailed in the move from the classical Citizen Subject to its ostensible successor, dIe sub ject sponsored by today's world-integrated capitalism and its accompanying postpolitical politics in dIe West.
After dJC Sec()nd World War Willie there is considerable agreement (though not absolute unanimity) about the underlying causes for dIe demise of capitalism's so-called Golden Age (Le., the prolonged expansion associated with high employment, grow ing wages and welfare c.xpenditures, generally high consumption, and be-
nign business cydes that lasted n i die advanced industrial countries from
1945 to arowld 1973-74), there s i no real consenslls about the economic, political, and social transformations rhat have followed the end of the long age of prosperity.l Analysis of the transition from the Golden to the Leaden Age (to use a term of Joan Robinson's) is carried om under several famil iar tides: "late capitalism," "advanced capitalism," "disorganized capitalism," "deregulatory capitalism," "integrated world capitalism," "postindustrializa tion," "post-Fordism," "f1c. ...ible accumulation," "the n i formation cconomy," "globalization," and odlers.2 -nle lack of agreement on what precisely is encompassed by dlese tides is compounded by the outright skepticism of those who maimain that it is not dear whether the major transformations associated with a putatively epochal movement to a less regulated, more "adaptive," and morc "reflexive" system of capitalist accumulation have in fact taken place, and rhat dlese changes arc not as full-blown as they are sometimes taken to be.
TllUS it is argued that
the world prior to 1913 was just as economically integrated as the world after
1970, that domestic national marke.t.� have retained dlcir primacy n i the inter national economic system to this day, and that c.'(port markets, widely viewed as a key indc. ... of world trade integration,
are
still highly concentrated and
unevenly spread.3 TIle United Nations Development Programme's Humall
DevcloplllC1lt Report 2005 is worth quoting here: One ofthe prevailing myths of globaliz.1tion is that increased trade has been a catalyst for a new era of convergence. Expanded trade, so the argument runs, is narrowing the n i come gap between rich and poor countries, with the devdoping world gaining from access to new technologies and new markets. Like must myths, this one eombincs some dements uf truth with a hefty dose of exaggeration. Some countries arc catching up, albeit from a low base. But successful integration is thl' exception rather than the mle-and trade is a driver of global inequality as we!! as prosperity. For the majority of countries dIe globalization story is one of divergence and marginaliz.Jtion.4 Figures
4 and 5 n i dicate thar a mere seven developing cOlUltries account
for more than 70 percent of low-tcchnology exports and 80 percent of high technology exports. ·nle Humall DCl'cWpIllC/itReport 2005 draws the n i evitably stark condusion from these figures: "Much of the developing world has little more than a toehold n i manufacturing export markets. . . . Today, the share of world exports of Sub-Saharan Africa, with 689 million pl'Ople, is less than one-half that of Bclgiwn, with
66
CHAPTER 3
10 million people."s Widl the transparent
High- alld medium-tc.::hllolob'Y exports Share ofworld exportS (%)
r-
All other dCYeloping regioflS Latin America & the Caribbean
r-
East Asia
Share ofde\"doping conntry exports, 2000{%)
/.: 1:0 China
Other
=
'"
16
Y:{. i.
;\\ex ico
� 1
Taiwan Province of China
1981
Korca, Rep. Mala�..ia
Singapore
2000
Low-techllology exports Share ofworld exports (%) ;0
-
F
Sub·Sahaall r Africa
I-I--
Latin America & the Caribbean
All other dneloping regions
Easr A,ia Share of dn"eloping country exports, 2000{%)
-
China
0-.." ".lJ
�
1981
-1-.
2000
Other
10
Korea, Rep.
1� \ Taiwan
...
India
' lrovlIlce of China Mc�ico
Export succcss is highly concentratcd
Source: United Nations Development Programme, Human Dndopm,mfUpor'2005, 116.
Share of world tOC"! (%) ,;
------Imports
" ---,----\-+--+�V'V,
Exports ·
, """
1970
1980
,"'"
"'"
5. Sub·Saharan Africa's falling share of world trade
Scuru:: United Nations Development Programme, Hu",an DnYiop",,,,r Rrpvn �OO5, u6. failure to inelude the world's pexlrer (and poorest) coumries in world trade, globalization in the form of world trade integration, despite its vaunted sue· cess n i some quarters, has simply not advanced the economic and sodal n i ter· ests of the hundreds of millions of people who live in the.<;e cowltrics. There s i doubtless a more complex story to be told abom this and related develop· ments, and though tllis is a very important area of debate, it is beyond the scope of this chapter to delve deeply into its e.xtended implications and om· eomes.6 But the emdal point made here-that the world's pexlrer cowltrics are not benefiting from world trade integration-is augmented in tlle rest of this book, and the conclusion drawn from it is reinforced in subsequent chapters. "" hat is significant for tllOse who reflect on the role of the state in capital ist accumulation is the fact that from the late 1960s to the 1980S the prevalent phase of capitalist development started to encOlUlter macroeconomic im· passes with a resultant persisteIU stagflation, and that there ensued from this 68
CHAPTER ,
crisis JXllitical and economic conditions of a qualitatively new and different kind (those of a post-Fordism, etc., etc.) for the exercising of state capacities and fUIlctions? Hence the suggestion was increasingly made that rhe pro cesses associated with post-Fordism, globalization, flexible accumulation, and so forth have profowldly transformed the complexion of state appara tuses and strategies, and that these systemic transformations have cumlua tively established the basis for a new kind of nation-state facing much greater (external) constraints on internally regulated economic development. However, the debate over relative scales of world economic integration, when confined to the terms of the dichotomy "globalization today versus the pre-1913 internationalized economy," tends to overlook one absolutely cmcial feature of capitalism, namely, that a global system of acnullulation and class stmggle has always been the basis of any form of modern capital ist acnullulation. The segmentation of the world economy n i to the various national regimes of accumulation is a function of the constitutive polariza tion that pervades tillS global system, and the conflicts and antagonisms that exist between the different national regimes of accumulation are primarily, though by no means exclusively, the olltcome of this worldwide polarization and its attendant processes of lUleven development. To discuss worldwide economic integration within the confines of the mbric "globalization today versus rhe pre-1913 internationalized economy" is to consider n i tegration only as a force that wlifies to varying degrees dIe various already existing national components of an earlier (prc-1913) and a later (post-1960s) phase of capitalist c."pansion. It is ro overlook the fact that a worldwide and con stitutively polarized system of accumulation is precisely the prior condition for the emergence of all the phases of capitalist expansion and their associated national regimes of accumulation.8 The various national regimes of accumu lation and tht, stmctures devised to bridge them are at one and the same time expressions of dlis fundamental polarization and an attempt to manage the resulting uneven development dlat is this polarization's n i evitable outcome. I shall return to the question of this worldwide capitalist polarization in chapter 'I- since it is one of the pivotal arguments developed in dlis book. The changes that were beginning to take. place n i the early to mid-1970S did of course have odler significant modalities and implications. For in stance, it became increasingly apparem that capitalism was attenuating its seemingly inc.'l:tricable link widl the project of modernity and modernization just as the crisis associated with the end of the Golden Age was entrenching itself. Dming dIe 1970S tht, increasingly fashionable neoliberal ideologies commended a form of capitalism detached from modernizing aspirations, POsrPOLlTICAL POLITICS
69
and the received wisdom that industrialization and the possession of indus trial capital are the engines par excellence of modernity, as well as being the decisive enablers of economic progress-so that an economy is said to be developed, developing, or undeveloped depending on whether or not it has traversed an appropriate path to industrialization, and thus to have taken the "right" steps toward modernization-would become increasingly dis credited over subsequem decades. The state, according to the paradigm of economic development supported by [hi.� increasingly embattled received wisdom, was the primary n i strument of industrialization and moderniza tion, and with the abandonment of the norion that modernization
is
the
royal road to economic advancement, the accompanying notion that tile state was the dynamo powering any push toward modernity and develop ment was also challenged, primarily by the popular supply-side ideology. For tllis neoliberal ideology, initially propelled by the Reagan and Thatcher administrations bur soon taking roO[ n i the tllinking ofinternational organi zations such as the IMI' and the World Bank and in several European Social Democratic parties, adherence to the imperative of market expansion (i.e., liberalization, privatization, deregulation, etc.) was tile "new" way forward. "tbe state's function was to aid the expansion of the market by providing the appropriate macroeconomic and microeconomic environment, as well as an adequate institutional framework, for market activity. To do otherwise, said the neoliberal ideologues, would be to distort pricing mechanisms, and tlms to hinder a country's economic development.9 Although I won't consider tllis neoliberal de-emphasizing of the project of modernity and moderniza tion (a project which posits, even f i only as a collective aspiration, an n i e.\:tri cable link between economic advancement and social progress), tile position developed here on the role of the state in the new regimes of international competition that have emerged since the end of the Golden Age will involve a critique of a munber of aspects of this neoliberal ideology (especially the disjunction it posits between econonlic advancement and
anytiling like
a
substantive notion of social progress and emancipation).
71fr "}Jollmvillg Ollt" oftbe Nation-State? -There are several versions of tile thesis tllat a qualitatively new kind of nation state has emerged since the end of tile so-called Golden Age of post-Second "'arid War economic prosperity. Perhaps the Dest known of these in tile literature is the thesis developed by Bob Jessop and others of a similar n i -
70
CHAPTER 3
tellccmal fXllitical-cconomic conviction (notably Joachim Hirsch).10 111is position -that of a "hollowing out" of the nation-state after the onset of the capitalist crisis of the 1970S-is embodied in the following theses: 1 . Since the 1970S a post-Fordist regime of accumubtion (which may not yet be fully realized) has provided the available comours for state formations
or state projects. 2. Economic and political apparatuscs and strategies whose previous basis
was the nation-state arc superseded or modified by systemiC forces which exert thcmsdvcs in tWO direcriollS: (a) toward rhe tl"3nsnationai and global, and (b) toward the local and regional. 3. The resultant state, which docs not emerge dircctly our of the crisis of Fordism, is the outcome of the comple x interplay of twO major transfor mations: (a) nternally, it becomes a "competition state," adapted to the new international competitiVl' environment created by the post-Fordist sysum of accumubtion; and (b) as the internal complement of (a), the State. becomes a post-Fordist "Schumpeterian workfare state," having abandoned the social and political consensual arrangemenb between capi tal and labor that prOVided the preceding Fordist "Keynesian welfare Staten with ib l"3ison d'ctre. 10 deal with each thesis n i turn:
Thesis 1: The dispbcement of Fordism by its post-Fordist counterpart is taken by Jessop to n i volve a fundamental alteration: (a) [0 the character of the labor process and its means and methods of organization; (b) pattern of macroeconomic growth; and (c)
to the basic
to (what Jessop refers to as) " the
social mode of economic regulation" and its associated social and political order.!1 (a) Post-Fordism repbees the Taylorist mass-production labor process that typified Fordism with alternatives such as flexible specialization and Toymism. Mass production is not eliminated in its entirety, but the move to
fle:dbility is intended to overcome dIe blockages and structllrJ..l weaknesses that undermine Taylorist mass-production sysrems.11 In this way, says Jessop, capitalist entrepreneurs seek to overcome the alienation and resistance ofthe mass worker, the rdat ive stag
nation of Taylorism and mass production, competitive threats from low-cost exporters in the Third 'Norld (or, indeed, from domcstic or foreign competi tors already using post-Fordist production techniqucs) and the relative satu ration of markets for standardized mass production goods; and/or to l1l(."(t
POSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS
71
me growing demand for more differemiatcd products,
tion
ac
to
brake me
rising COSts of non-Fordist service sectors (notably in the public sector) and measures to boost productivity and pro/its in manufacturing.LI
llle srructural limits and contradictions of the Fordist regime arc a spur to i.nnovation (to this extent Jessop is a follower of Schumpeter), and labor and production flexibility are intended by capitalist economic agents to provide a (post-Fordist) production ellvironmenr attuned to the guest for innovation and resJXlnsive to the demand that more efficient ways of "operationalizing" the outcomes of iIUlovation be found. (b) Fordism rested on a macroeconomic framework that promoted full employment in the national economy primari l y through the management of aggregate demand and the governance of collective bargaining and labor markets.14 The aim of this concordat between capital and labor was to cre ate a "virtuous spiral" of high employment, growing wages and welfare ex penditures, mass conswuption, and benign business cycles. For a variety of reasons, this macroeconomy became increasingly difficult to administer vir mously, and stagflation, productivity slowdowns, rising lUlemployment, a declining worldwide average profit rate, current account imbalances, and chronic debt (especially in the less-developed cOlUltries) became increasingly prevalent in the Fordist economic system. The reproduction of the capitalist means and rclations ofproductionwas affected by the economic and political instabilities dlat accompanied this crisis, and key clements of the debilitated Fordist regime of accumulation were abandoned, albeit in piecemeal fashion and not always consistently (hence, for instance, Reagan's well-documented adherence to a "Keynesianism" based on military expenditures, as his admin istration incurred record deficits in order to ensure military supremacy over the USSR). From rhis decomposition of the Fordist regime there emerged, again somewhat unevenly and with significant national variations, the linea ments of a guite different macroeconomy.15 The new macrocconomy aimed to cultivate flexibility and continual innovation hrough t an array of supply side instruments highlighting price and quality, with the goal of enhancing competitiveness through he t " freeing" of market forces. The new macro economywould supplement the "lean" and "just-in-time" production meth ods that had ariscn in response to the "production dilemmas" that appeared to beset Fordist-Taylorisr mass production. \Vith this new macrocrollomy ill place, a shakeout of the seemingly outdated Foniist industries could occur, and the new lean and just-in-time production systems introduced as their successor.16
72
CHAPTER 3
(c) The "social mode of economic regulation" typical of post-Fordism re inforces the supply-sidc preference for flexibility that defines this new macro economic environment. ·nle wage relation is manipulated to drive a bigger wedge between skilled and unskilled workers than was generally permitted under Fordist auspices, and labor market flexibility and fragmentation is ac tively promoted. Industrywide collective bargaining arrangements are re placed by individual enterprise or factory-level wage bargaining, and new forms of rhe social wage are devised and implemented as Schnmpeterian "workfare" replaces Keynesian "welfare." 17 The same flexibility is sought after in the restmcmring of corporations, who, now no longer constrained by state-sanctioned employer-worker compacts, call adopt policies based 011 the principle of "leanness" and rhe strategy of employee retrenchment. Mar kets have become more segmented as niche targeting becomes standard com mercial practice. Bank credit systems have become internationalized, and the barriers between credit, insurance, and fXJrtfolio invcstment made more per meable as financial n i stitlltions combine previously compartmentalized ac tivities in the name of "diversification," a deeply flawed process that reached its disastrous point of collapse in the 2008 financial crisis.1M Jessop maintains that the fXJst-Fordist "mode of societalization," which regulates the political and social order rhat buttresses the ex isting mode of economic regulation, is still in the process of being consolidated and that "it is too soon to antici pate what this would involve" beyond the claim that what exists at present is "unresolved competition which involves at least the Japanese, German, and American models- each of which is . . . encountering problems on its home ground;' so that "a well-developed and relatively stable posr-Fordisr forma tion remains an as yet wlfealized possibility."19 Hirsch likewise makes a great deal of this new capitalist "triad."20 This assertion of an "unresolved" triadic capitalist competition is deeply problematic, not least because it is at least ten years out of date. Jessop's and Hirsch's fOCllS is evidently on productive capitals and their affiliated systems of accumnlation, and their theoretical perspective, while it does acknowledge that an exponential growth in finance capital has occurred in the past two decades, does not really deal adequately with the full implications of this massive c.xpansion of financial and currency markets. For this growth of finance capital has clearly made possible a re assertion of American hegemony, albeit n i a somewhat different form from the one that prevailed in the heyday of Fordislll. More will be said about this shortly. 1hesis 2: -nle Fordist regime had at its core economic and political appara tuses and strategies whose basis was the nation-state. With the onset of postPOSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS
73
Fordism, these state-oriented formations and principles came to be super sedcd or modified by systemic constraints which extended themselve.� in two directions:
(a)
toward the transnational and global, and (b) toward the local
and regi onal (though Jessop correctly n i dicates that the impetus toward the transnational and global which characteristically inflects post-Fordism was in fact inaugurated in
the late phases of Fordism).ll This trend was n i tensi
fied by the new convergence on fle.xible production and on the supply side, and was further galvanized by the freshly ascendant international competi tive regimes which emerged from tile crisis
of tile
1970s.22 -nle upshot is
that the capitalist state underwent a fundamental reoricntation as its appara tuses and governing axioms were reshaped by the pressures of international competitiveness, supply-side adaptation, and ptoduction method and labor market flexibility. This new environment compelled the state to adapt itself to a greatly expanded transnational economic and political domain, even as
it had to find new oppornmities for accumulation at the regional and local levels. Jessop provides a good description ofthis vertical and horizontal spa tial expansion of the range of dle state's activities, an outreach that constrains states while still providing str:ltegically positioned countries (primarily t1msc within the OECD) with opportunities to secure economic and JXllitical ad vantages: i ponam and even rnains much Whik the national state remains politically m of its national sovereignty (albeit as an ever more ineffective, primarily jUridi cal fiction reproduced through mutual recognition in the imernational com munity of nations), its capacitics to project its power even within its national borders art· decisively weakened both by the shift towards mcrnationalized, i tk.xible (but also regionaliz.cd) productiol1 systems and by the growing chal lenge posed by risks emanating from the global environment. This loss of autonomy creates in rurn both the need for supranational coordination and the space for subnational resurgence. Some state capacities arc transferred to a growing numbcrof pan-regional, plurinational, or international bodies with a widenil1g range ofpowers; others arc devolved to rcstn1ctured local or regional levels ofgovernance in the national state; and yet others art· being lL\urpcd by emerging horizontal networks of power-local and regional-which by-pass ccmral states and eonm.xt localitics or regions in several nations.H
For Jessop and Hirsch,
a
less autonomous state ensues from this " after
Fordist" st"Jte of affairs. Bur is this really the case? I shall contend later, fol lowing Michael "tann, Linda \Neiss, and odlers, that this is too sweeping (and simplifying) a view of the complex environment n i which the contem74
CHAPTER 3
porary nation-state operates (though to be fair, both Jessop and Hirsch grant that the nation-state retains its political importance despite being "hollowed our"), and that some state functions are actually enhanced by globalization, while others are attenuated. Thesis
3: The resultant state (which,
as
Jessop and Hirsch point out,
does not emerge directly out of the crisis of Fordism) is tile olitcome of the elaborate n i terplay of two major transformations: (a)
c..xrernally,
it be
comes a "competition state," adapted to the new international competitive conditions created by the post-Fordist system of accumulation; and (b) as the internal complement of (a), the state becomes a post-Fordist "Schumpe terian workfare state," having abandoned the social and political rationales
(premised above all on a corporatist "social contract" between capital and labor) tllat enabled the now receding Fordist "Keynesian welfare state" to flUlCtion. This Schumpeterian workfare state derivcs its enabling conditions from the surrolUlding emergent post-Fordist regime. Its telos is the consolida tion of its (increasingly Schumpeterian) state apparatuses thtough an aerive promotion of this regime. ·TItis it does by developing state capacities whose
raison d'ctrc is tile encouragement of innovation and new tedUlologies, innovation and technological advancement being seen in the context of the workfare state as the best way to get the state to respond to the new interna tional competitive environment.24 The upshot of this move to a Schumpeterian workfare state is a transfor mation of state apparatuses, as the activities and policies of supranational for mations and systems, as well as international regimes and organizations, be come morc consequential n i the after-Fordist political and economic setting. -llle various strategies of devolution favored by governments responding to this emergent regime of accumulation also foster the growth of regional or local states and translocal networks.
But the nation-state continues to retain
many of its political functions, especially those concerned with the repro duction of labor and tile regulation of the wage form, even as it surrendcrs several of tllcse to supranational and subnationallevcls of fKllitical organiza tion. -The state, suitably restmcrured or hollowed out to deal with this more "open" economic environment, is still required to manage the linkages across the various territorial demarcations est"ablished by the new geopolitical order
that is aligned with post-Fordism, but as it does so its role is redefined by cha.nges "in the balance of forces as globalization, triadization, regionaliza tion and the rcsurgence of local governance proceed apace."25 -llle key political transformation involved in tllis hollowing out of tile POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS
75
state is the transition fromgol'rrlllmmt [0govcrnance, that is, the movement from a form ofpolitical organization n i which the official state apparams em ploys irs hegemony over its semi- and nonofficial counterparrs to ensure the primacy of the state in the regulation of economic, JXllitical, social, and cul tural lifc, [0 one n i which the ofiicial state apparams reduces or relinquishes its direct involvement in the regulation of these domains and concentrates instead on "meta-governance."26 In metagoverna.nce the st"Jte and its appur tenances provide the conditions and resources which enable nongovernmen tal and scmigovenulleHtal apparatuses to organize dlemselves, sometimes n i tandem with governmental institutions and sometimes not. Governance in the Schumpeterian workfare state dlerefore involves an ensemble ofstate and nongovernmental partnerships, with no necessary or automatic presumption of the state's primaL}' in dlis configuration. The state and dIe other constim em elements in these partnerships arc alike deemed to be constrained by market mechanisms and thdr intermediations.
The Rise ofall Equity-Based Growth Rrgime While Jessop and Hirsch recognize dlat dIe post-Fordist dispensation has seen
a considerable expansion of the various forms of finanee capital, this ac
knowledgment on dlcir part neverthcJcss does not seem to encompass some of the more profound implications of the explosive growth that financial mar kets have undergone since the
1980s. C...enainly this relative de-emphasi7ing
of dIe role of finance-led regimes of accumulation in contemJXlrary capitalist expansion has been a problematic feamre of dIe thinking of rhe Ecole Regu lation lUltil very recendy (when Michel Aglietta and Robert Boyer started to deal widl the part played by deregulated financial markets n i transforming the stmcmres of competition dlat arc a central feature of the Regulation School's accow}[ of post-Fordism). -nle n i creased primacy enjoyed by finan cial capital over n i dustrial capital in the countries of the North and \.Vest in the past couple of decades is coterminous with dIe rise of an equity-based growth regime in most of the developed countries (and the Unites States in particular). ·nlis equity-based regime, which was perhaps still in dIe process of becoming fully fledged when dIe
2008 banking crisis started to bite, has
made possible the reassertion of an American economic hegemony (which admittedly could film out to be short-lived if a protracted and severe reces sion starts to embed itself at the end of 2008),27 and this finance-led regime's current sign ificance will
greatly affect the state's role n i the current and (in all
likelihood) succeeding phases of capitalist development. 76
CHAPTER 3
i USS billion) TABLE 1. Daily \'oiume of global foreign exchange transactions (n
April 1986
188
April 1995
1,120
April 2001
1,380
April 1989
650
April 1998
1,590
April 2004
1,880
April 1992
840
Sourer: Bank of Intemational Senlemenl�, Triellllial Central Rank SlIn'IJojFllmjJlI Exe/JilI/DC and Derimril'cs ,HanftAcril�ty 2004-, March 2005, Note: Tumover in this t'J.blc is given at April zOO4 exchange rates. The figure for April 1986 s i taken from Elwell, �Global Capital "-larket IntcgrationU (www.ncsconline.org!
niejcrsrepons) and is not givcn at lOO4 exchange rates; Elwell takes his figures from the Bank of International Settlemenl�. For a helpul f analysis of global foreign exchangc transactions, sec Nissanke, �Re\"cnue Potential of the Currency Transaction Tax for
Development Finance: A Critical Appraisal,u JVqr/d /'IsriwujM Del'dopmmtEconomics
Rtstarcb, December lOO3 (www.currencytax.org).
Proponents of the view that the state is being hollowed out or is n i re treat must therefore be willing to analyzc this American-dominated equit)' based growth regime; indeed, given that this regime is prccminent among current growth regimes, and bearing in mind also that financial markets arc the most globally n i tegrated of all the markets, the overall plausibility of the hollowing-om or retreat thesis will hinge on the outcome of this analysis. The rist� ofthis equity-based growth regime has had a powerful impact on the economics of the Ics.s-devclopcd countries
(LOCS), and so any c.xamination
of this regime's impact on state formations and state capacities must take lDes into account. Jessop and the members of rhe Ecole Regulation, while noting post-Fordism's considerable dfL"Cts on rhe econolllies of the nonethclcs.s pay scant attention to
LOCS,
LOC state formations and acnllilulation
regimes.18 It is diflicult to do full justice here to the Illany facets of the epochal trans formations that have taken place in extraterritorial financial markets and in stitutions since the early 1970S. With the abolition of restrictions on inter national capital movements initiated n i 1973, the volume of transactions in global foreign c.xchange markets rose from an average of $15 billion per day that year to $1,880 billion per day n i 2004 (see table 1). In April 2000f overall turnover, including nontraditional foreign exchange derivatives and prod ucts traded 011 global foreign c.xchanges, averaged over S2 trillion a day. This was nearly fifteen times the sizc of dle combined daily turnover on all the world's equity markets.19 Less than 2 percent of this sum is currently devoted to trade n i goods POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS
77
Netherlands 2% emada 3%
Hong Kong
\U",,,,
M . "'�/
Kingdom 33%
Countrie. with ,jure> b. dun I% not indu,l
,;;;;:---L-�-;U
nited States
6.
17%
Country perccntagc of shares of dlC foreign exchange market, 2001
S,,"ra: Federal Resc:rve Bank of New York,
TlJeBas;cs ofFort!!Jn Tnule Rlld £-ufm'!!Je, "Foreign
Currency Exchange;' www.nyJrb.org/education.
and services (compared to 15 percent in 1973). The proportion for foreign direct n i vestment (FDI) is just as small, though FDI flows to developing and emerging market COlllltries have risen significantly since the 1990S. The rest, amounting to more than a trillion dollars a day (exceeding the aggregate gold and foreign exchange holdings of all tile world's central banks), is devoted to transactions, mostly short term, by private individuals in currency and orher financial markets.30 But n i noting some of the more distinctive features of these shifts, it can be seen that in addition to tile smpendous groWtll in the overall daily volume offoreign exchange transactions between 1973 and 2004 there has been an equally marked change in rhe composition of the flows themselves, especially to the LDCS. Global foreign exchange transactions arc very much dominated by three cowltries, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Jap:m, who between tllem have 60 percent of the foreign
c.x
change market (figure 6). Despite the primacy in regard to foreign exchange markets enjoyed by a mere duee advanced n i dustrial cOlllltries, the impact of capital flows to the markets of the emerging market countries has been considerable. Capital flows to emerging market countric.� amounted to $230 billion in 1996, nearly six times the level at the begiIllling of the 1990S and four times greater than in their previous high point, the commercial bank lending explosion of 1978-
82. At tllat time rhe LDCS started to attract a greater share of these global capital flows, in spite of the setbacks represented by rhe Mexican peso crisis 78
CHAPTER 3
of 1994 and the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. 11le share of devdoping and transition economies in global FDI rose from 15 percent in 1990
w
nearly 40
percent in 1996. In addition, the rise in tileir share of global portfolio equity investment wse from less than 2 percent in 1990
w
30 percent in 1996.3J
However, tile Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 and the end of the Ameri can dot-com bubble. in the first decade of the twenty-first century saw a de dine in total net flows to emerging cowHries in the nvo years fwm 1999
w
2001. But there has been a steady revival since 2001, though as of 2003 these flows had still
w
reach their levels in 1997, and even while the steady rise
of foreign direct investment has clearly been little affectet.i by tllese crises, portfolio investment took a big rumble during tllese crises, from which it has not recovered (tables 2 and 3). Since the 1980S olticial flows have lost thdr previous ccnrrality, and levels of bank lending have been low since the debt crisis of the 1980S. Portfolio investment grew significantly in the early 1990S but has remained a major cause of financial volatility, as witnessed by the Mexican peso and Asian crises, and its impact has been much reduced since the Asian crisis. Foreign direct investment, however, was tlle main compo nent of private capital flows w the emerging market economics in the 1990S. This phase of development is wdl sununed up in the Deutsches BWldesbank report on the role of fordgn direct n i vestment in rhe emerging economics: In the all:ern1Jth of the Asian crisis, according to the European G.:mral Bank,
nC[ privatt capital flows to 45 Emtrging Mark/.:[ Economics dcdintd to 1% of GOP in 2002, afta having stood at 3.7% of GOP n i 1995. During this ptriod FOI not only held up but actually inneastd. Striking is the shill: that occurred Simultaneously in tht rdativt sharts of net private capital flows for the dif ftrent ftgions. \Vhile in 1996 the capital flows wtre e\"tnly spread at around 4% of GDp, by 2002 the Asian share. had fallen to 1% of GOP and that ofLatin America to only 0.5% of GOP, while the European accession countries en joytd an innease in their share to 7% of GOp.32 The global financial situation n i the years since 2005 shows a basic conti nuity with the trends of the past nvo decades. -nlUS the Institute of Interna tional Finance said n i a recent press rdease that "the net private capital flows to emerging markets rose to $782 billion in 2007 from the previous record levd seen in 2006 of $568 billion."H The variability of some of their specific components notwithstanding, the available evidence therefore shows that there has been an exponential growth in overall capital flows w the emerging market economics in the two decadc.� since tile 1980S. (It is too early to tdl what the longer term impact of the 2008 bank lending crisis will be.) POSTpOLlTlCAL I'OLITICS
79
TARLE 2.
Net private capital flows to emerging market economics, 1971-1989
(in USS billions) Annual Avccage COllntries(position
1971-111
1982-89
11.4
16.6
'"'
5.3
12.0
Portfolio investment
0.6
6.2
Others
6.4
-1.7
n.a.
4.2
0.8
L3
0.0
0.1
n.a.
2.8
8.1
10.3
'"'
1.7
5.0
Portfolio investment
0.2
l.l
Others
6.2
4.2
-14.6
l.l
'"'
-0.6
0.5
Portfolio Investment
-0.1
4.9
-13.9
-4.4
1 7.9
1.0
on,
3.4
5.2
Portfolio n i vestment
0.5
0.1
14.1
-4.3
Total capital flows, net
n.a.
41.4
Net ofticial flows
!l.a.
27.3
-20.8
-2.5
-2.1
-30.0
AU cOImrries
Africa '"' Portfolio itlvestment Others
Asil!
Middk East and Ellropc'
Others
Wi-sferll Hemispben:
Othas
}Jelllortllldllni irtlm
Changes n i reserves Current aecollnt
Sollrcu: Deutsche BWldesbJ!lk, the RakofFDI ill EIIINlJing Marka Economies Compared {() Or/Nr Furms ofFinancilig: I'mr Del.dopmmts and f'lip/ilariotlSfor FilumciI!l Stnbiliry oj Emerging AIarkc!Eco/wlllies (FrJ!lkfurt, 2003), based on IMF, WarM Economic Ouriook, September 2002; lMF database. •
Including the countries of the fonner USSR n i transition.
This very substantial total private investment in the
LDCS
(albeit n i only
a few select ones, mainly in East Asia, though Brazil and Russia are begin ning to see increased flows) has been made possible by important stmctural changes in the financial markets themselves and by the creation of several new n i stmments of international finance since the 1980s, largely because of liberalization and also because of the emergence of completely new n i terna tional markets for securities, fumres, options, swaps, international mutual flUIds, international bonds (these markets were opened to developing COlUl tries
n i the 1990S),
and American and global depository receipts that gave
American companies access to the stock markets of industrialized and indus trializing countrics.34
Part
of this development was a new interest shown by n i vestors in
developing-country stock markets that led quickly to a boom in the East Asian bourses; in 1993 alone the share indc..'ies in Hong Kong grew by 116 percent, in Jakarta by 115 percent, and in Manila (the best Asian performer in that year) by 154 percent.35 The scale of this very rapid growth can be in dicated by a comparison, made by Ajit Singh, between the relative times it took the United States and the LDCS to reach roughly the same capitalization ratios: "the speed of development of Third \"orld stock markets in the recent period may be judged from the fact that it took eighty-five years (1810-1895) for the U.S. capitalization ratio (market capitalization as a proportion of
GD!') to rise from 7 percent to 71 percent. In contrast, the corresponding laiwanese ratio jumped from
74 percent in just 10 years be tween 1981 and 1991. Similarly, between 1983 and 1993 the Chilean ratio rose from 13.2 percem to 78 percent; the Korean from 5.4 percent to 36.2 percent and the Thai from 3.8 percent to 55.8."3... -nie Asian financial crisis put a sud den brake on h t is exponential growth in Asian stock market capitalization, but by 2003 the Asian Development Bank, citing Institute of International 11
percent to
Finance figures, reported:
The outlook nn private capital flows to emerging markeL� rose to a 3-year high of S19.p billion n i 2003, up from $128.3 billion in 2002. Nn private flows to devdoping Asia accoumed for S116.7 blilion nearly double the amount of $66.3 billion in 2002. Half of this total (S58.3 billion) was financed by direct mestmem, i much of it flowing to the PRC rPeopk's Republic of China]. An improving economic environment and rising corporate profitability led to a surge in portfolio inflows to developn i g Asia from $2.8 billion in 2002 to $29-4 billion in 2003. Bank and nonbank !ending accounted for a further $29.0 billion, up from $6.7 billion in 2002.3' ,
POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS
81
TJ\fILE 3. Net pri\'ate capital Ao\.\'S to emerging market economics, 1990-2003 (in US$ bi!!ions) Armual A"'-:rage
Q,ur1trics/I'ositi011
All cO/mtrin
1990-
1997-
96
2002
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002"
2003"
142,2
61,0
228.8
\02.2
62, I
84,8
29.4
24.9
62.4
64,9
'D<
62.0
156,8
114,4
141,7
153.6
164.0
158.0
In I
151 , 3
160.9
l'ortfolio l i wcst:ment
59,0
5.2
9Q2
46,7
-0.1
34.3
-4,3
-42,6
-3.0
-4.0
Others
21,0
-101,0
24, I
-86.2
-91.5
-113.4
-124.3
-104,6
-85,9
-91,9
Africrr
7.1
9.7
II , 9
9.4
II , 6
15,I
6. I
6.9
8.8
8.9
FDr
2.5
10.9
3.6
7.8
6.4
9.3
7.7
22.3
11.8
10, I
l'ortfolio invcstment
1.8
1.1
2.8
7.0
37
8.2
-2.2
-9,0
-1,0
-l.3
Others
2.9
-2.4
5.5
-5.4
1.5
-2,5
0.6
-6,4
-2.0
0.1
60,4
0.6
122, I
7.1
-45.9
6.8
-12.9
16.7
31.6
7.9
'D<
31,7
56.3
53,4
56.8
59.7
61.2
54.2
47.1
58,7
59.0
l'ortfolio il1Vcstmenr
16,5
-0.8
32.8
7.3
-17.9
14,4
43
-13.5
0.7
-9.7
Others
12,2
-54,9
35.9
-56,9
-87,7
-68.8
-71.4
-16,8
-27.8
-41,3
22.5
-11.0
7.2
15,0
9.1
0.2
-22.4
-48,4
-19,6
-9,4
FDr
3.5
7.5
4.8
5.5
6.5
5.5
7.9
10.8
8.8
1 1.5
l'ortfolio invcstment
6.3
-10,5
1.8
-0,9
-13,2
-3,2
-13,7
-22,0
-9,8
-6.6
12.7
-8, I
0.6
10.4
15.8
-2, I
-16.7
-37,1
-18.6
-14,4
"'''
Middk East find Turkey
Others
Uhler" Hrmispber(
40.0
45.6
64.9
69.3
72.7
49.7
48.6
22.8
10.3
26.5
6.1
23.4
12.3
15.5
60.1
64. I
64.7
66.9
40.4
45.6
Portfolio investm<.:1It
26.8
10.6
39.5
25.9
22.3
I 1.9
4.7
-2.2
1.0
7.6
Oth<.:rs
-5.0
-23.8
-14.9
-\2.7
-9.8
-26.3
-20.8
-41.9
-31.1
-26.7
I 1.8
16.2
22.6
"
14.6
13.0
10.0
26.8
31.2
31 . I
FDr
6.1
23.4
12.3
15.5
20.9
23.9
23.4
25.1
31.5
34.7
Portfolio investment
7.5
4.7
13.3
7.5
5.0
2.9
2.6
4.2
6.1
6.0
-1.8
-11.9
-3.0
-21.6
-11.3
-13.8
-16.0
-2.5
-6.4
-9.6
165.0
92. I
220.5
170.5
132.0
97.0
29.6
40.3
83.0
83.1
23.1
31.1
-2.3
68.3
69.9
12.2
0.2
15.4
20.6
18.2
Changes in reserves
-69.9
-97.4
-108. I
-68.8
-48.2
-87.9
-113.2
-119.9
-146.6
-129.7
Current accoullt
-80.8
32.9
-96.5
-69.1
-52.3
34.1
128.4
94.7
61.3
41.7
FDr
Unmtrirs ill trlJmitirJII
Others
Mrllwm'ldmn ilon! Tora! capita! flows, ncr Net onida! tlows
Sourres: Deutsche BWldesb'Ulk, 1IJr Role ofPDl ll i EmCJlI'iI!9 AIIJ'*nECiJlwmies Oml/'I'md to OriJrr PIff'1IS of P;nllwing: Pllst DtlvlopmfllfS //lId ImpliCilficmJiff Finlmcilll SfilbilityoJEmolJillgMII'*tJ ECiJllOmics (Frank
furt, 2003), bJscd on J1>1P, WorldEClJlIOmic Outioo/.:. September 2002; EstinlJtc or projection.
•
11>1 F
d,ltab:lSC.
Clearly, dle Asian cOlUlrries recovered well in the years after the crisis of 1997, and in the process portfolio n i flows started to pick up as well. -nle consequences of LOC reliance on c.x[ernal capital flows have been noted by students of international political economy in recent years; rht, growing dependence of lOGS on external capital flows has also been instru mental in creating the structural conditions responsible for a potentially chronic economic n i stability, especially when LOCS arc confronted with large inflows that prove unsustainable for dlcir t.'Conomies or rapid outflows which quickly become unmanageable. Thus, in addition to the Mc.xican and Asian currency crises, there has been the Russian default of 1998, the Brazilian peso crisis in 1998 and 1999, and Argentina's financial crisis of 2001 (though finan cial market turbulence is certainly not the sole cause of these crises).38 10 begin with, dlere is dle sheer disparity of scale between rhe combined
resources of the funds run by financial institutions in the wealdlier countries and the market capital of low- to middle-income countries very new to this foml ofcapitalism. In 1994 the combined pool of funds managed by financial institutions in dle high-income countries ran to around $10 trillion
to
SIS
trillion, whereas the total market capitalization ofall lower-income countries was in the order of $1 trillion.3S> In 2000 the estimated total value of world stocks, bonds, securities, and other financial assets was $50 trillion.40 Total global equity market capitalization in that year amounted to $37 trillion; of this, 40 percent was located in the United States and 20 percent in conti nemal Europe, while a mere 10 percent went to developing countries. The United Nations High-Level Panel on Financing for Development reports that $7.5 trillion was saved or invested worldwide in 2000.4J Of this, only
$1. 7 trillion was invested n i developing countries in that year. Total world 1'01
inflows were $209 billion in 1990, $473 billion in 1997 (S178 billion, or
35 percent, was the developing cOluuries' share), and $1,118 billion (5190 bil lion, or 17 percent, was rhe developing countries' share) n i 2000. Howe\'er, the share of dle world's 48 least developed cownries in 1999 total world FOI was a meager 0.5 percent. In fact, 70 percent of incoming 1'01 in the period
1993-1998 went to a mere 20 developing countries (out of 138). The abi l ity of many LOCS to influence trends and developments in global financial mar kets s i therefore extremely limited. The Morgan Stanley economist Stephen Roach made precisely this point in his testimony to the U.S. I-louse of Rep resentatives in May 1999:
Ir may wdl be rhar tht,: tn i y t,:lllerging market ewnomks of the world art,: lit erally awash in the turbulent seas of fin:lIldal capital. For c.xamp!c, the equity 84
CHAPTER 3
market capitalization oflarge emerging market coumries such as Korea, Malay sia, Taiwan and Brazil each totaled abom $150 to $200 billion in the pr<'-crisis period ofthe mid-1990S. By contrast, the capitalization of the U.S. equity mar ket was about $6 to $7 trillion during that period (and is now closing in on $l� trillion) . . . . At today's market levels JUSt a 0.5% move Out ofU.S. equities into the emerging-market asset class-hardly an unreasonable asset allocation shift for performance-oriented instirutional investors-would bc worth arOlmd $60 billion. Such an n i crement would equate to fully 6% of the combined market capitali7...ation of the major equity markets in thc devcloping world:u The effects of an imbalance of this kind during a f".lpid capital-movement episode are potentially catastrophic for
an
LDC,
whose stock exchange is
likely to be dominated by foreign-owned portfolios that can be pulled out very quickly. Portfolio investors arc prone
to make quick withdr:l\vals of
their funds f i short-term performance targets arc not met or if other eco nomic indicators arc thought
to portend weakness (such as the high levels
of nonperforming loans n i East Asian banking systems that are said
to have
been instnuuental in bringing about the financial crisis in 1997). "fllis s i espe cially true of U.S. mutual funds, which are n i clined to jettison their holdings if quarterly lXrformance standards are not reached or if a falling market is
expected. A third karnre of the new kinds of portfolio capital that promote instabilities of the kind seen in a number of LDCS in the 1990S (Mexico, the
East Asian countries) has to do with the disposition of short-term invest ment capital not to reflect underlying economic "fundamentals" such as out put or employment.43 A rise in U.S. or European interest rates, say, with no change whatsoever in the macroeconomic conditions of the LDC involved, can nonetheless induce a changc of perception on the part of foreign port folio investors with holdings in that lower-income country. A swift rever sal of investment flows results as funds arc chaIUleled elsewhere in a stock market stampede, with possibly devastating consequences for prices in the equity markets of the
LDC
thus affected. The behavior of this new form of
short-term portfolio capital is quite different from that of financial and indus trial capital as characterized by Marx, since the virtual autonom}' it enjoys in relation to acrnal economic activit}' (this being the primary source of its volatility) makes it correspond more to what he calls "fictitious capital" in volume 3 of Capital, where it is used to designate a form of capital that cre ates money n i ways completely detached from the productive process and the exploitation of Iabor.44 Chapter 4 provides a more detailed description of this finance-led, equity-based accumulation regime.
POSTPOLITICAL POLITICS
85
The Impact of the Current Fillance-Led, &fllity-Bnsed Growth Rt;Hime -nle immense proliferation of pension, n i surance, and nmmal funds n i the past two decades or so has changed radically rhe circuits of realization and accumulation that arc currently at the disposal of the capitalist system. The
LOCS,
as we have seen, arc in an even more vulnerable position than their
wealthier cOlUlterpart.� when it comes to dealing with financial market vola tility. This is not to suggest that LDC governments are entirely powerless when confronted with surges ofexternal capital; there is considerable evidence that a number of viable policy instruments arc available to govenullents seeking to control financial market turbulence.4s In fact, the instances provided by Mexico and Vietnam provide nteresting i contrasts Witll regard to rhe issue of market opennes.� and a country's ability to adhere to economic policies which eschew market liberalization. Larry Elliott, summari7ing the views of Dani Rodrik and Ha-Joon Chang, notes the following differences between the economic strategies ofthese two countries, which have espoused diamet ricallyopposed strategies with regard to "market openness" : One has a long border ,,·ith the richest coumry in the world and has had a free trade agreemem with irs neighbour across the Rio Grande. It receives oodles of inward investment and sends irs workers across the border n i droves. It is
fully plugged in to the global economy. The other was the subject of a U.S. trade embargo umil 1994 and suffered from trade restrictions for years after that. Unlike MexiCO, Viemam is not even a member of the WTO. SO which of the twO has the better recem economic record? The question should be a no-brai ner if ail the free-nade. thcories arc right -Mexi co should be streets allead of Viemam. In fact, the oppoSite s i nue. Since ,\-lexico siglled the Nafta (North American Free Trade Agreement) deal with the U.S. and Canada in 1992, its annual pcrcapim growth rate has bardy been above 1%. Vietnam has grown by around 5% a year for the past tWO decades. Poverty in Viemam has come down dramatically: real wages in Mexico have fallen.-46 Acknowledging the fact that " market openness" is not a panacea for the
LDCS CatulOt obscure the equally compelling fact that the important changes brought about during tile two decades-long ascendancy of he t finance-led, equity-based growth regime necessitate a revision in one of marxism's key positions on the genesis of capital, namely, that a precapitalist "space" has to adjoin tllC. "space" of an existing capitalist accumulation
to provide
the
latter with a source for tile extraction of surplus value (this being the essence 86
CHAPTER ,
of what Marx called "primitive accumulation").47 The problem with Marx's theory of primitive accumulation is that, as Rosa LlLXemburg noted, dIe notion rests on a seeming incongruity, namely, that in capitalist accumu lation dle conditions of direct c.xploitation and dle conditions for realizing surplus value are separated by space and time. ·nle former are limited by the productive capacities of the society n i question, while the latter depend, not on productive capabilities, but on the power to consume (and this in mrn hinges on that society's "antagonistic conditions of distriburion").4H Ille up shot is that the mere presence of the conditions of direct exploitation is not sufficient to enable capitalist reproduction to take place. For LlLXemburg, therefore, capitalism, if it is to reproduce itself and expand, must have avail able to it, even in its maturity, both the primordial capacity to consume alld the allied resources of distribution needed to satisfy this capacity. The problem with Luxemburg's resolution of Marx's conundnull re garding primitive accumulation is that the several and varied instnullents of credit can intervene rl'peatedly to reactivate capacities to consume, dlereby obviating the spatiotemporal gap between LlL'.:emburg's conditions of di rect exploitation and the conditions for realizing surplus value. lodged in the capacity to consume.49 For instance, the nub of the 2008 financial crisis was the set of economic and political circumstances which enabled housing
to
become the principal object of financial speculation n i America and Britain. Shelter has from time immemorial been regarded as one of the primalhuman needs, and a rational society would deal with it n i these terms, so there s i no inevitability which necessitates that housing be dle focal point of a financial market speculative frenzy. -nle speculative housing market unleashed for a short time a phase of "easy credit," which in turn fueled conslllllption, albeit widl dle disastrous economic consequences dlat are now becoming more and more apparent. Money is thus the essential bridge between the two sets of conditions reqnired for the realization of capital's circuit of value, and credit (in dtis case, equity-derived wealth) forms a "surplus" fueling the power to consume. An equity-based, fina.ncialized growth regime of dle kind that has existed in the past two decades or so is nowadays very much dle synchroniz ing link between capital's production and consumption conditions. In fact, the wealth derived from equity that feeds consumption undertakes one of the key functions assigned by Marx and Luxemburg to a "primitive accumula tion." The finance-led and equity-based regime adverted to here has been char acterized in a number of very recent works by members of dle Ecole Regula tion.50 This rcgime, which is now dominant and is variably dispersed across POSTPOLlTlCAl POLITICS
87
the advanced economics, possesses dIe following distinguishing features, many of them associated widl the phenomenon of "the new economy." For the pivO[al role played by the wage-laoor link in Fordism it substitutes a matrix of financial instinuions and innovative instruments, and the stabiil ty of dIe system is entrusted [0 dIe Central Bank and nO[
[0
state-mediated
capital-labor collective wage arrangements (as was dIe case in dIe heyday of Fordism).51 Firms become oriented toward capital markets and their logic of public valuation rather than meeting performance criteria based on increas ingly olltmoded principles of corporate organization and governance, so that "successful companies capture quasi-rents downstream in fast-expanding markets for final goods and services where the goodwill resides and at dIe same time pass the costs of making commodities on to others."52 Its other dlaracteristics have been described thus by Robert Boyer: Many giant mergers, capital mobility between countries, pressures on cor porate governance, diffusion of equity among a larger fraction of popula tion, all these rransformations . . . lead to a toully novel regulati on mode
... rcombining]
labour market fleXibility, price stability, developing high
tech sectors, booming srock market and credi t to sustain the rapid growth of consumption, and pcrmaneilt optimism of expectations in firms. The. capaCity of each country to adapt and impkmeIlt such a model would be a key bctor i n macroeconomic performance and would determine that counrry 's place in a hierarchical world economy governed by the diffusion of a fin:lIlcializcd growth regime.53 At the same time, dIe structure of consumer demand has been reconstinued as a response to lUlprecedented levels of product innovation and niche mar keting. Since both demand and supply arc generally regulated by asset price expectations, dIe possibility exists of a benign spiral in which heightcned expectations of profits lead to an appreciation of asset prices, which in turn boosts incomes and consumer demand, and this is nun vindicates dIe initial heightened expectation of profits, thereby triggering (hopefully!) anodler round of self-fulfilling profit c.xpectations. As is clear from dIe U.S. housing loan crisis of 2008, it was the combination of loans [0 less creditworthy bor rowers and the lUlwarranted expectation that housing prices would continue rising indefinitely (and thereby serving as a source of easy credit) which fueled the anticipation of an unending "virmous spiral" in the U.S. hOllsing market. -The potential risk of making loans to "marginal" borrowers was presumed to be offset by dIe rising "value" of rhe assets purchased by these hazardous loans, and when the assets in question subsequemly declined in value in a 88
CHAPTER 3
cl3-�sic bubble collapse,the now LUlsafe loans became "toxic"(the favored term uscd by journalists working in the business and finance segments of U.S.media outlets).
"ntis new profit-propelled system of accumulation enables the top echelon of salary earners to rely on more than fixed wages for incomes,since they now enjoy greater acce.<;s to wealth derived from equity and pension fund holdings.The wealth originating from financial markets is able to galvanize consumption on an overall .scale barely conceivable in previous regimes of accumulation.In this ostensibly benign spiral,therefore,"the whole macro economic dynamic is ...driven by the compatibility between rhe expecta tions emanating from financial markets,rhe reality of firms' profit growth and interest-rate dynamics,which the central bank is trying to direct. "54 This finance-led system, though led by the United States, is of course globalized,and so other national economies mnst respond to the financial rate of return available in their counterpart economics: movements of capital affect exchange rates, and a country's exchange-rate policy affects its credi bility as a protagonist in global financial markets.Even the perennial exten r al trade deficits of the United States have to be financed by the savings of other countries (primarily China) ,giving the economically bankmpt United States an incentive (though there are others) to promote an open and "competi tive" international financial system dlat will give it access to the savings of Asian and European countries. The international system of financial markets has thus undergone a scries of historic stmctural transformations since 1972, several of which are still taking place.55These include changes in the sources of international credit and a new capital-recycling mechanism; together they began a revolutionary transformation that has continuing effects.-nle changes in the sources of international credit are well known, but,says Randall Germain,the more
important changes have taken place in rhe capital-recycling mechanism, that is, "the form of credit made available to the world economy, in the net works of monetary agents which control acccs.
POSTPOLlTlCAl POLITICS 89
markets),59 the complementary growth in the audlOrity and effectiveness of private monetary instirutions (toward whom the balance of power has now gravitated), and the changing of the criteria med to govern access to flows of mobile capital (these having already moved in favor of the interests of largely unregulated private agents).6 0 \.Vhilc private instinuions have grown hugely in importance, dle state continues to have a role because capital mobility is not perfect,in at least two respects.One is dlat the statestill possesses a degree of macroeconomic policy autonomy, dlOugh this room for maneuver is nonetheless circumscribed by the global integration of financial markets and by the propensity of states in this simation to allow private agents usc of their policy instnullents in ways which effectively make these agents proxies for state and public authority. Ille second is the preemi nence enjoyed by dle United St"Jtes (and ro a lesser extent the \'""estern European nations and Japan)
in
determi ni ng dle course
and constitution of global financial markets ; allied widl this is the prima..." enjoyed by dle financial markets in New York, Tokyo,and London. A state based hegemony is thus very much dle continu ing core of the international financial system.Slit this state capability notwithstanding, today no single st"J.te or public authority has effective control of rhe international financial system (even if the instirutions of American hegemony and the OECD central banks have a pivotal place in this system) . -nle result is a growing regionaliza tion of interest rates and the decli ning importance of reserve requirements as financial institutions become more hybridized and their resources more interchangeable as a result.61 There is no unitary model of how this finance-led growth regime relates to other regimes whose raison d'ctre is less the accumulation of financial assets and more dle production and exchange of commodities. Boyer identifies a number of alternative post-Fordist growth regimes: those led by Toyot ism (Japan umiI1990),services (the United States in dIe 1980s),informa tion and communication technologies (Silicon Valley since rhe m i d-1980s), knowledge-based sources (the United States s ince the 1990S),competition (most OECD COUlltrieS since 1985),exports (the East Asian
tiger econo
"
m i c s "),and finance (the United States and United Kingdom since the 1990S). It is evident from this typology that dlere can be hybrid post-Fordist forma tions (e.g., the U.S. economy's dependence on knowledge-based sources, information and communication technologies, and finances, with the last preponderating primarily because it is the strategic locm of rhe country's resources for macroeconomic management).6 2 At the same time, the weight of evidence, considered earlier in this chap90
CHAPTER 3
ter, indicates overwhelmingly that the poorer lDCS have virtually no place in this system from which they can hope realistically to influence its overall direction. Fundamental asymmetries permeate the international financial system, and the divorce between financial and productive capital, integral to the equity-based, finance-led growth regime, only reinforces dIe worldwide economic polarization that has been a feature of capitalist accumulation since its inception. This time, however, a different kind of account must be given of the world wide economic JXllarization from dIe account dlat prevails in dIe standard theories of uneven development and dependency. In the standard theories, unequal exchange e.xists because of an internat i onal division of labor which allows the. advanced industrial countries to commandeer high-level indus trial productive capacity while consigning LDCS to dIe production of "low value-added" commodities or the e.xtraction of raw materials (this being the phenomenon of compulsory maldevelopment described by Samir Amin and others in the dependency and uneven development school), and because international trade on these terms can never be mutually advantageous. Figure 7 indicates that in 2001 35 percent of developing country exports were devoted to agriculture and food, as well as ores and minerals. Figure 8 shows, conversely, just how small the agricultural sector is in relation to industry and services where the developed countries are concerned. However, in the finance-led growth regime, the main source of inter national economic JXllar ization is precisely dIe alltonomy of finance capital from productive capital. Finance capital, or "money," often in forms that are sometimes hard to recognize, so far have they departed from rWI-of-the-mill conceptions of "curtency;' synchronize.� the production and consumption circuits identified by Rosa Luxemburg, and this synchronization speeds up the processes that realize surplus value by abbreviating the linkages between production and consumption. Command over the essential instnullent of synchronization, that is, finance or money, therefore translatc.� more or less immediately into the capacity to realize surplus value, and this in ways de tached from the productive process itself and dIe direct exploitation of labor itself (which nonetheless takes place, especially in "low value-added" zones of production).63 This fundamental disconnection of finance (and "fictitious") capital from productive capital in dIe equity-based growth regime causes asymmetries berwccn dIe high- and low-income countries that appear to be even more deeply entrenched dIan the parallel asymmetries in previous growth regimes, where political-economic power resided (largely) in a cowltry's ability to
POSTPOllTiCAL POLITICS 91
0
All food iTems
•
AgriculrnraJ raw mlrcrbls
0
Fuels
13
Ores Jnd IlJer:lls
0
Manufactured goods
•
Other
7. Developing country exports by commodity group Sou...: United Nations CAlnfcrcncc on Trade and Dn-dopmcnt, ZOIU, [)ep
"
,-----
" +--1 "t-;=I w
" -I-L...L [)C,-doping Mrica
Dcll:loping America
Dcwloping Asia
o Agriculture
Ix"'lopin;::
Oceani.
o
Industry
Coumric, in Cemr.ll .nd Easrcrn Europe • Servin:s
iI. Gross Domestic Product by cxpcndintre and economic activity
(ill percentages), 2001
SO"",,: United Nations C.onfcrclKc on Trade and Development, ZO<J4-, f)ept:/opmmf,md Gloimlizaritm: Fart, ""d Fi!JIJ,... (New York: United Nations, 2O!J�), 21.
Developed
Coumrirs
command industrial capacity (the ability of rhe USSR to keep up with the United States up to the 1970S being the paradigmatic case). Qucstions of the organizing of the power to command industrial capacity arc undeni ably complex, bur this particular form of conmland is in principle less path dependent than the JXlwer to conunand a financializcd economy, where the stmctures of financial intermediation arc so path-dependent (so far they seem quite specific to the United States and United Kingdom) that they arc likely to defeat any attempt at replication.64 A Singapore or Tokyo and, to a much lesser cxtent, a Qlina (or rather Shanghai and I-long Kong) or India (or rather Mumbai) may benefit b y performing selective functions in this equity-led regime, but a Mali or Ecuador or Fiji can do little or nothing to establish even a toehold in such a system. So ti le question remains whetl ler the more dam aging effects of t i l e asynunetries generated by the finance-lcd, equity-based growth regime can be surmounted by an lDC such as Mali or Fiji o r indeed any of the 150 or so LOCS.
POSTPOLlTICAL POLITICS
93
CHAPTER 4 The Exacerbation of Uneven Development Analysis of the Current Regime ofAcclIllIlIlatuJ/I
Chapter 3 showed that powerful asymmetries exist between the economically advanced "metropolitan" countries and the countries of the less-developed periphery, so that capital flows between the metropolitan center and the LDG periphery accord fundamentally with rhe requirements of the economically advanced countries. For the poorer lDGS, it is very much a case of "If
YOli
play by ollr rules, YOli may perhaps hope that small rewards will come. your way every now and then." j\1arkcts and governments in the LDCS arc given little or no option but to tailor their strategies and policies to the require ments of markets and governments in the economically advanced countries. Anyone who thinks that Alan Greenspan (then) and Ben Bernanke (now) somehow lose one minute of sleep over economic trends in (say) Angola or Nepal during their respective tenures as chairmen of the U.S. Federal Reserve dearly does not live in the world taken for granted by 11Je ECimom ist and the
WallStrectJOlin/a}, let alone
USA JaMyand Fox News. (Certainly the world
would be a better place for most of its inhabitants if more people refused to live in the world defined by
TIfe Economist, etc., but entertaining
such fanta
sies about Greenspan's or Hernanke's possible nocHirna l global economic anxieties is not even going to make us think that the world needs to be a dif ferent and better place for its most economically downtrodden citizens.)
011 RItaillill,H allli Modifying the DrpelldtllCJ Paradigm In this chapter I examine the claim, advanced in many quarters and in several versions, that dIe most recent forms of capitalist development have ctkctively discredited theories of uneven or dependent development, because dlese theories hinge crucially on conceptions that arc no longer plausible theoreti cally and rhat have moreover been sidelined by rcrent historical events. TlIUS, as I mentioned in chapter
3, the end of the Golden Age o f postwar economic
prosperity in the West resulted in a radical restrucruring of world capitalism that enabled the emergence of new regimes of international competition. -nlese new regimes have cau.sed many LDCS to lurch into protracted chronic debt and current account imbalances. At the same time these LDCS have had to face the foreclosure of any real alternative to complete assimilation into the capitalist system of production, especially since the only apparent alter native to capitalism, the "acrually existing socialism" of the former Eastern bloc, fell into desuetude in 1989 (if not before). However, while the majority of peripheral and semiperipheral cowltrics have not benefited from the regime of accumulation superseding that of the Golden Age, the cowltrics of East Asia (the so-called East Asian Tigers) have until recentiy been able to advance economically, thereby controvert ing a major tenet of tile deptlldmcia school. \..\Iith the significant advance of the East Asian countries, it was no longer possible to maintain a hard and fast distinction between "core;' "'scmiperipheral," and "peripheral" nations (if indeed this was ever really possible) and to insist that dependency is an ineluctable condition of nations not initially situated inside the capitalist core, and dlat moreover tile very constimtion of the core requires otiler na tional econom ics to exist in a syste mic state of economic subordination to the metropolitan countries. At a more purely theoretical level, critiques have also been made of the various "essentialisms" and false "universalisms" that arc said to bedevil the underdevelopment and dependency paradigms. Examples of tilese include the presumption that industrialization and the possession of industrial capi tal arc absolutely crucial requisites of economic progress (so that a country's economy is deemed to be developed, developing, or undeveloped depending on whether or not it has traversed an appropriate path to industrialization, hopefully reaching W. W. Rostow's mythical "rakeoff" point, and tims to have amassed a commensurate kind and scale of indllStrial capital; the in ability to think beyond the state
as
the primary and essential vehicle of eco
nomic development; tile (often unacknowledged) importation of problemUNEVEN DEVELOPMENT
95
atic assumptions regarding dlC role of foreign investment and foreign trade in dIe LDCS; a Eurocentric bias; an overlooking or dc-emphasizing of pro duction undertaken by women; and an underestimation of dIe implications of widespread and haphazard industrial development for the environment. In the face of dlese and other challenges to dleir paradigm, proponents of theories of uneven development or dependency have, according to dleir critics, done little more than reiterate (1) dleir conviction that some form of socialism can still function as a potential countervailing force to capitalist depredation, and
(2)
their belief in dIe efficacy of sonll� kind of strategic dc
coupling of the LDCS from the capitalist world-system, again with the hope that this can function as a protection against capitalist encroachment. BU[, say dlese critics, neither (1) nor (2) appears to be viable in the current capi talist dispensation. Ihis dispensation is more staunchly and comprehensively inhospitable to socialist aspirations than it has ever been (thereby blocking otT any "socialist path" to socialism). Moreover, the completely integrated character of actually c.\:isting world capitalism ostensibly makes any attempt at decoupling a surefire recipe for econo mic collapse or exrinction. In examining these charges leveled against dIe dleory of Wleven devel opment, I suggest that there is a good case to be made for the rctention of notions of uneven development and dependency, albeit framed in very dif ferent terms. After
all,
as dIe previous chapters indicate, persistent interna
tional economic inequalities remain, and if anydling are becomin g even more intractable, and the problems of chronic debt and pervasive international market instability arc still around, as was apparent in the East Asian crisis, dIe collapsc of dIe U.S. subprimc loan market in 2008 (whose ram ifications arc still being registered), and