Free Banking Volume I Nineteenth Century Thought
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Free Banking Volume I Nineteenth Century Thought
Edited by
Lawrence H. White Associate Professor Department of Economics University of Georgia, USA
An Elgar Reference Collection
The International Library of Macroeconomic and Financial History Series Editor: Forrest H. Capie Professor of Economic History and Head of the Department of Banking and Finance The City University Business School, London
1.
Major Inflations in History Forrest H. Capie
2.
Multinational and International Banking Geoffrey Jones
3.
Monetary Regime Transformations Barry Eichengreen
4.
Financing Industrialization (Volumes I and II) Rondo Cameron
5.
Financial Crises (Volumes I and II) Michael Bordo
6.
Price Controls Hugh Rockoff
7.
Protectionism in the World Economy Forrest H. Capie
8.
Commodity Monies (Volumes I and II) Anna J. Schwartz
9.
Debt and Deficits (Volumes I, II and ill) Lakis C. Kaounides and Geoffrey E. Wood
10. Central Banking in History (Volumes I, II and ill) Michael Collins 11. Free Banking (Volumes I, II and ill) Lawrence H. White Future titles will include: War Finance Larry Neal Stock Market Crashes and Speculative Manias
Free Banking Volume I
© Lawrence H. White 1993. For copyright of individual articles please refer to the Acknowledgements. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Gower House Croft Road Aldershot Hants GUll 3HR England Edward Elgar Publishing Company Old Post Road Brookfield Vermont 05036 USA
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Free Banking. - (International Library of Macroeconomic & Financial History;No.ll) I. White, Lawrence H. II. Series 332.1
ISBN 1 85278 597 7 (3 volume set)
Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge
Contents Acknowledgements Introduction
PART I
PART U
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THE BRITISH FREE BANKING SCHOOL 1. Robert Mushet (1826), An Attempt to Explain from Facts the Effect of the Issues of the Bank of England upon Its Own Interests, Public Credit, and Country Banks, London: Baldwin, Cradock, & Joy, 180-207 2. Thomas Hodgskin (1827), 'Money', Popular Political Economy, London: Charles Tait, 178-218 3. G. Poulett Scrope (1832), 'The Rights of Industry and the Banking System' (excerpt), Quarterly Review, 47, July, 439-57 4. Samuel Bailey (1840), 'On Joint-Stock Banks, and Country Issues', A Defence of Joint-Stock Banks and Country Issues, London: James Ridgway, 1-100 5. James William Gilbart (1841), 'The Currency: Banking', Westminster Review, XXXV, 89-131
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AMERICAN FREE BANKING THOUGHT 6. Richard Hildreth (1840), Banks, Banking, and Paper Currencies, Parts 1, 2 and 3, Boston: Whipple and Damrell, 109-13, 117-99
237
3 31 72
91
PART UI LATER BRITISH WRITERS 7. Herbert Spencer (1858), 'State-Tamperings with Money & Banks', Westminster Review, XIU, 210-32 8. O.E. Wesslau (1887), in Bancroft Cooke (ed.), Rational Banking (/he Remedy for Depression in Trade) Versus Bank Monopoly, London: Elliot Stock, 37-64
350
Name Index
378
327
Acknowledgements The editor and publishers wish to thank the following who have kindly given permission for the use of copyright material.
Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. for excerpts: Richard Hildreth (1840), Banks, Banking, and Paper Currencies, Part 1, Chapter XXV, 109-13; Richard Hildreth (1840), Banks. Banking. and Paper Currencies, Parts 2 and 3, 'Argument for Open Competition in Banking' and 'An Apology for One-Dollar Notes', 117-99.
Every effort has been made to trace all the copyright holders but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary arrangement at the first opportunity. In addition the publishers wish to thank the library of the London School of Economics and Political Science, the Syndics of Cambridge University Library and the Photographic Unit of the University of London Library for their assistance in obtaining these articles.
Introduction The question of free banking - or laissez-faire in money - raises theoretical, historical and normative issues more fundamental than those confronted in ordinary modern discussions of monetary and banking policy. Ordinary discussions focus on secondary details and marginal adjustments. They take it for granted that a government monetary authority (a central bank) will continue to provide a basic fiat money, and that a government regulatory system will continue to decide what banks may do. Discussions of free banking, by contrast, consider non-governmental money and banking frameworks that are radically distinct from present arrangements. They contemplate the consequences of allowing unrestricted money issue by private banks, and of having a monetary system without a government central bank. The lineage of free banking thought extends back to the work of Adam Smith, as Sidney Checkland's essay (Volume II, Chapter 1) makes clear. In the nineteenth century, vigorous debate greeted legislative proposals to establish government-sponsored banks (like the second Bank of the United States) or to reinforce the central banking status of existing governmentsponsored banks (like the Bank of England). Central banking was clearly not yet taken for granted. Many economists shared a predisposition toward laissez-faire in economic policy. Although those who applied laissez-faire ideas to money and banking (as represented by the first six chapters of Volume I, and as discussed by the first five chapters of Volume II) were never the majority, they were a major force in the British and American debates over monetary institutions early in the century. By the end of the century (Volume I, Chapters 7 and 8) they had been relegated to fringe status. The fringe status of free banking thought persisted for the first seven decades of the twentieth century. With the decline of laissez-faire views on economic policy generally, defences of laissez-faire money and banking between 1900 and 1970 (Volume ill, Chapters 1 and 9) were especially scarce. The only noteworthy academic contributors to free banking thought were Ludwig von Mises (1978 [1928]) and Vera Smith (1990 [1936]), the latter providing a survey of the nineteenth-century debates in a doctoral dissertation written under F.A. Hayek. In addition there were a few rather isolated non-academic contributors, most notably Henry Meulen (1917, 1934) and E.C. Riegel (1944, 1978 [1954]).1 At the University of Chicago during this period, home to a well-known tradition of classical liberal economic thought stretching from Frank Knight and Henry Simons in the 1930s to Milton Friedman and George Stigler in the 1970s, the leading authorities considered money and banking to be exceptions to the desirability of free markets (Simons, 1948, pp. 161-2; Mints, 1950, pp. 4-7). They supported government monopoly of note-issue, and offered a , lOOper cent reserve plan' for the restriction of deposit banking. In 1957 Gary Becker offered a brief 'Proposal for Free Banking' that in retrospect represented an important departure from the 100 per cent reserve plan toward greater appreciation for laissez-faire (though it too argued for retaining government monopoly of note-issue). Becker's paper evidently circulated around the University of Chicago - it was cited by Milton Friedman (1960, p. 108, n. 10) in the course of an influential statement of a non-Iaissez-faire monetary and banking framework
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that drew principally on Simons and Mints - but it remained unpUblished until now (Volume III, Chapter 2). Research on free banking questions has expanded tremendously since 1970. The proximate stimulus for most academic research is the work of other researchers, and I discuss below the specific developments in monetary theory that set the stage. Friedman and Schwartz (1986) cite three broad cvrrents in the economics profession generally that have helped promote free banking thought: (1) the emergence of public choice theory, with its skeptical view of government; (2) the 'rational expectations revolution', with its emphasis on studying the structure of policy regimes; and (3) the revival of Austrian economics, with its attention to institutional orders fonned spontaneously without central design. The most important realworld event in the background has undoubtedly been the poor performance of existing central banking regimes, especially the disturbingly high inflation rates of the 1970s and the painful disinflation of the early 1980s. These three volumes reprint the majority of what I consider to be the key articles of the earlier and modem free banking literatures. The modem theoretical literature is marked by a number of sharp controversies. I have an obvious intellectual stake in several of these controversies, and personal judgements have no doubt biased my selection of articles. But I have tried to include both sides of the debates that have occurred in print. I have avoided articles that are available in other collections. In particular, James A. Dorn and Anna J. Schwartz (1987) include at least eight relevant policy essays (Chapters 11-18) in their volume on monetary refonn, Dorn (forthcoming) another half-dozen more, and Kevin Dowd (1992b) assembles 11 chapters on free banking history.
The Nineteenth-Century Literature The English financial crises of 1825, 1836-37 and 1839, and the rechartering of the Bank of England in 1833 and 1844, fuelled a large pamphlet literature and volumes of Parliamentary testimony on alternative monetary institutions as causes of and potential cures for business cycles. Three major schools of thought emerged in a classic debate that has influenced monetary thinking around the world and to this day. The Banking School advanced a non-monetary theory of the cycle. The Currency School charged the banking system, but especially the country banks, with enlarging cycles by expanding pro-cyclically. The Free Banking School held that the Bank of England, by over-expanding and later having to contract to safeguard its reserves, both initiated and drove the business cycle. The country banks, closely constrained by competition, were innocent. Where the Banking School held the Bank of England blameless, and the Currency School proposed to strengthen its monopoly and fasten a policy rule upon it, the Free Banking School argued that the English monetary system could be made self-regulating by eliminating the Bank of England's monopoly over the London circulation. 2 The first five chapters of Volume II provide the first collection of Free Banking School works ever assembled. A complete bibliography of the School's writings between 1825 and 1845 would include at least 40 pamphlets and journal articles, but the five items included here are among the most important. The concluding chapters of Robert Mushet's 1826 book provide an early and influential analysis of the Bank of England's role in generating boom
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and bust. Thomas Hodgskin, in the chapter on money from his 1827 economics text for working men, applies a laissez-faire philosophy widely enough to include a defence of private coinage. G. Poulett Scrope, though he diverged from the School in some respects (he was something of an inflationist with a weak allegiance to the gold standard), offers in his 1832 article one of the most sophisticated accounts of the market processes at work regulating the circulation of each issuer in a free banking system. Samuel Bailey's 1840 pamphlet, reprinted here in full, combines criticism of the Bank of England with defence of the English joint-stock banks (newly formed after reform legislation lowering legal barriers to their entry was passed in 1826 and 1833). Bailey (1840, p. 99) makes the proto-Hayekian3 argument that only competition, and not any system of deliberate central management, could provide 'the nice adjustment of the currency to the wants of the people' . James William Gilbart' s 1841 review article demonstrates the distinctiveness of the Free Banking School's position, as he criticizes the theories and proposals of authors both from the Banking School (Thomas Tooke) and from the Currency School (Samuel Jones Loyd). The American debate over free banking during this period was similarly inspired by business cycles and by legislation to recharter the government's bank (specifically, the 1832 bill to recharter the second Bank of the United States, vetoed by Andrew Jackson). The American debate was seldom as theoretically sophisticated as the British, and American writers were accordingly more prone to cite their British counterparts than the reverse. As George Selgin and I indicate in our secondary account of the Jacksonian era (Volume II, Chapter 4), the leading American proponents of free banking were John McVickar, William Leggett, Henry C. Carey and Richard Hildreth. The work of Hildreth (1840) is the most detailed and sophisticated of this group, and two long extracts from his second book have been chosen to represent American thought. American writers continued to discuss free banking in the late nineteenth century (see Selgin and White, 1990, Volume II, Chapter 5). They made few theoretical innovations, focusing instead on criticism of the national banking regulations imposed during the Civil War. The most comprehensive restatements of the case for free banking were those by William Brough (1895, 1898). British free banking writers similarly focused, from 1845 onward (Fetter, 1965, pp. 251-5), on restatement of principles and criticism of Peel's Act of 1844. Their ranks are represented here by Herbert Spencer's 1858 essay and an excerpt from O.E. Wesslau's 1887 monograph (Volume I, Chapters 7 and 8). Tyler Cowen and Randall Kroszner (1987, Volume II, Chapter 2), survey a diverse group of writers from the 1896-1917 period, crediting them with having anticipated certain ideas in the modern literature that collectively have been dubbed 'the new monetary economics' , particularly the idea that laissez-faire would separate the medium of account from the medium of exchange. (The 'new monetary economics' is represented by Volume ill, Chapters 9-20.) Scott Sumner (1990; Volume II, Chapter 3) persuasively challenges many of Cowen and Kroszner's characterizations of the views of two principal members of the group, namely Arthur Kitson and Henry Meulen.
The 'Free Banking' Era in the United States The modern reconsideration of historical experiences with systems of plural private note-issue
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began with Hugh Rockoff's 1974 article. Like Benjamin Klein's article on 'The Competitive Supply of Money' of the same year, which also appeared in the Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Rockoffs summarized a doctoral dissertation written at the University of Chicago. But neither article cites the other, and Rockoffs early work (1974, 1975a, 1975b) does not appear to have been motivated by its broader implications for laissez-faire monetary regimes. Rockoff dispels the misconceptions that (1) the 'free banking' laws passed by various American state governments in the 1837-60 period instituted laissez-faire, and (2) the laws typically led to 'wildcat' banking and other disastrous consequences. The laws did allow freer entry, but notes had to be secured by specified government bonds, so that 'it was a far cry from pure laissez-faire' (Rockoff, 1991, p. 75). Wildcat banking was rare, and in states where it did occur it was actually encouraged by poorly designed bond-security provisions. Little research followed Rockoffs work until interest in alternative monetary regimes had been rekindled. Robert King (1983) examines the record of New York State after first surveying the key theoretical questions raised by the idea of laissez-faire in money. Arthur Rolnick and Warren Weber (1983) explicitly motivate their account of four states' experiences by its relevance to modern debates over the stability oflaissez-faire banking. Rolnick's research agenda has perhaps been influenced by the work of his colleague Neil Wallace at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Rolnick and Weber's article reprinted below represents only a small sample of their output on the US free banking era (1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988). Other noteworthy, recent and published work on the topic includes articles by Rolnick's student Andrew J. Economopoulos (1986, 1988, 1990) and by Kenneth Ng (1988). Rockoff (1986, 1991) has summarized the normative and positive lessons from this literature to date.
Other Experiences
Proponents of free banking in the nineteenth century did not point to the 'free banking' systems of the United States as models to be emulated, but pointed instead to the relatively unrestricted banking systems of Scotland (1716-1844), New England (1820-60) and Canada (1817-1914). Other episodes of banknote competition took place in Sweden, Switzerland, France, Ireland, Spain, Latin America, parts of China and Australia. In all, there appear to have been at least 60 countries or colonies that allowed note-issue by competing private banks, subject to varying degrees of regulation (for a list see Schuler, 1992). Only two such cases (Scotland and France) are represented below because several article-length histories remain unpUblished, while a number of others are readily available in a highly recommended collection of essays edited by Kevin Dowd (1992b). Two key books on the history of a leading free banking system are those on Scottish banking by Sidney Checkland (1975a) and Charles Munn (1981). My critique of the empirical relevance of the legal restrictions theory (White, 1987) draws heavily on these two sources, as do the comment by Tyler Cowen and Randall Kroszner (1989) and my replies to critics (White, 1990, 1991) debating how closely the Scottish episode represented laissez-faire. Richard H. Timberlake (1987) and Eugene N. White (1990) broaden our range of evidence by examining episodes of private money-issue under rather exceptional circumstances, in coal-mining communities and during the French Revolution.
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Private Clearinghouses An important line of historical research has begun to investigate the capability and institutional mechanisms for self-regulation in a competitive banking system. Munn (1975) tells the story of the origins of the Scottish note-exchange system, often praised in the nineteenth century for regulating the note-issue of the Scottish banks. Timberlake (1984), Gary Gorton (1985), Donald J. Mullineaux (1987), and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) examine the roles of clearinghouse institutions as private regulatory agencies. These studies indicate that more than simply the price system (or what Gorton and Mullineaux call 'the market') has operated to discipline banks, and to insulate the banking system against panics, at least in the cases of the Suffolk system of antebellum New England and the US National Banking system. Selgin and White (1988) and Steven Horwitz (1990, 1992) suggest that many of the 'hierarchical' aspects of clearinghouse institutions in these cases are attributable to legal restrictions peculiar to the United States, whereas Mullineaux (1988) attributes them to enforcement and incentive problems inherent to banking.
Modern Theory and Policy No collection of articles alone can fully represent the modern free banking literature. More so than in other topic areas of economics, many of the pioneering contributions have been made in books and monographs rather than in articles. The articles on theoretical and policy issues in Volume III often cite the important works by Kevin Dowd (1988a, 1989), David Glasner (1989), Charles Goodhart (1988) and George A. Selgin (1988a). I apologise to these authors for under-representing their importance in the following collection; this reference to their books is intended as partial compensation. I would also mention my own books (White, 1984a, 1989a) here, except that I have already clearly over-represented myself in the selection of articles. The most important author not represented below is F .A. Hayek, whose two monographs (1976, 1978) issued the first prominent challenge in the postwar era to state control over the provision of money. The modern free banking literature cannot be traced to anyone seminal article or monograph. Vera Smith's (1936 [1990]) important book, and the history-of-thought articles in Volume II, Chapter 1, make it clear that economists have been debating these questions periodically at least since Adam Smith's time. As the first four parts of Volume III indicate, there are at least four strands within the modern theoretical literature, respectively discussing (a) 'traditional' free banking systems with a distinct base money, (b) competing non-commodity base monies, (c) competitive payments systems without base money, and (d) the 'legal restrictions' theory of money.
Free Banking with a Distinct Base Money In a traditional banking system, bank-issued money can be redeemed for a more basic money. In an ideal free banking system of the traditional sort, the banking system is not politically regulated and the quantity of basic money is not politically manipulated. Most nineteenth-
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century proponents of free banking (see Vera Smith, 1990 [1936]; White, 1984a; White and Selgin, 1990; Selgin and White, 1990), and early twentieth-century proponents (Mises, 1978 [1928]; 1981 [1912]), took it for granted that the basic money would be gold or silver coin. Drawing from the arguments of these writers and from the historical evidence they cited, my own work (White, 1984a, 1989a) has likewise focused on the features of free banking on a metallic standard, which I consider the most plausible outcome oflaissez-faire in money (Selgin and White, 1987; White, 1989b). The idea of free banking on a metallic standard has an obvious kinship with defences of the gold standard that stress its potential for automatic and non-political regulation of the money supply (Rothbard, 1962; Salerno, 1983; Sennholz, 1985), though not with the sometimes appended proposal that banks be required by law to hold 100 per cent gold reserves against their demand liabilities (see White, 1989a, pp. 156-7; White, 1992). Selgin (1987, 1988a, 1988b) argues that allowing decentralized money-issuers to choose their own reserve levels not only saves resources but also improves the macroeconomic performance of the monetary system. Restoring gold or silver to the role of monetary standard and reserve medium is not logically necessary for the system to have a distinct and unmanipulated basic money. Milton Friedman (1984), Richard Timberlake (1986) and George Selgin (1988a) have proposed free banking on a permanently frozen base of fiat dollars. Critics worry that an unregulated fractional-reserve banking system is prone either to serious fraud (Friedman, 1960; Cooper, 1989), pro-cyclical over-expansion of the quantity of bankissued money (Goodhart, 1988, p. 50), or contagious banking panics whose remedy requires government deposit insurance or a government lender of last resort (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Bordo, 1990). Historical studies (cited below) belie the first worry. Selgin (1987a, 1988a, 1992) and Dowd (l988b, 1988c, 1989) address the second and third of these worries with both historical evidence and theoretical arguments.
Competitive Non-commodity Base Money An important impetus to the literature on 'private fiat money', as Bart Taub (1985) calls it, was the debate in the late 1960s on monetary optimality. Monetary economists, originally concerned with the inefficiency of the US government policy prohibiting interest on demand deposits, tried to state precisely the conditions for efficiency or optimality in the holding of money balances. The question naturally arose as to whether competition would produce optimal results in the market for money balances, just as (under the right conditions) it produces optimality in competitive markets for ordinary consumption goods. Paul Samuelson (1968, 1969) influentially argued the 'nonoptimality of money holding under laissez-faire': the right conditions do not hold for competition to produce monetary optimality, he claimed, because money-holding involves an externality. Our individual efforts to economise on holding money end up restricting the value of everyone's money and make us all less wealthy than we could be. Milton Friedman's (1969) analysis of 'the optimum quantity of money' essentially coincided with Samuelson's. Among the several rebuttals to Samuelson, Robert Clower's articles (1969, 1970) are perhaps the most effective in showing that Samuelson's externality argument is logically incoherent. Clower indicated only in passing that Samuelson had not really specified an institutional setting
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consistent with laissez-faire in money. Phil Gramm (1974) also mentioned but did not fully develop this point. It was left to Benjamin Klein (1974), in an article based on his University of Chicago dissertation, to attempt to spell out what laissez-faire in fiat money would mean at the level of the individual money-issuing firm. As Taub (1985, p. 193) notes, Friedman (1969) did not connect the optimal supply of money with private competitive supply. In fact Friedman in an earlier work (1960, p. 7) had argued that the competitive supply of non-commodity base money was not feasible. It would lead to an infinite price level, because any individual issuer would keep printing dollars so long as a 10 dollar bill (or a 10-to-whatever-power dollar bill) was worth more than the paper on which it was printed. Klein (1974, pp. 429-31) points out that Friedman's argument, by implicitly assuming that anyone has the right to print indistinguishable 'dollars', neglects a critical feature of market competition, namely firms' enforceable brand names in their products. (This point was also made by Earl Thompson [1974].) In effect Klein brings to Chicago-school monetary theory a lesson from Chicago-school property-rights and industrial organization theory: suboptimal outcomes reflect poorly specified property rights. Friedman's own views have evolved significantly over the years, under the influence of research on public choice and to some extent on free banking. His 1960 monograph must now be contrasted with his 1984 article proposing a form of free banking, and with his 1986 article (co-authored with Anna J. Schwartz) explicitly reconsidering the question of government's proper monetary role. The central question of Klein's article is whether a profit-maximizing firm issuing a nonredeemable money will live up to a promise to preserve the money's purchasing power, or will instead choose to cash in its reputation for the one-shot profit available from over-issuing the money. Hayek (1978) never really considers this question. Taub (1985) restates it as the question of the 'dynamic consistency' of a policy of preserving the money's value, and brings a rational expectations model to bear. Lance Girton and Don Roper (1981) argue that competition would in fact compel a money-issuing firm to 'offer a goods-back guarantee', i.e. to make its money redeemable, so as to be bound by an enforceable contract. I concur with their view (White, 1989b, p. 383).
Competitive Payments Systems Without Base Money If money-issuing firms under laissez-faire do indeed offer a goods-back guarantee, in what
good or goods would they redeem their money? A group of authors, beginning with Fischer Black (1970), have contemplated non-traditional systems in which the redemption media would be non-money assets, so that no base money would exist. The only money would be bankissued or 'inside' money. Henry Meulen (1934) and E.C. Riegel (1944, 1954 [1978]) were neglected forerunners of some aspects of these ideas. 4 A more influential precursor to the development of pureinside-money models was the 'New View' of money and banking associated with James Tobin (1963; for a secondary account see Glasner, 1989, pp. 171-5). Tobin argued that under competitive conditions the quantity of bank-issued money is subject to a 'natural economic limit' determined by the interaction of demand (depositor preferences) and supply (cost conditions in banking). Though this analysis was meant to apply to banking in a traditional
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base-money setting, Tobin's critics argued that it slighted the distinctiveness of base money as the system's nominal scalar. Tobin (1969, p. 26) went on to claim that, absent legal ceilings on the interest rates paid on currency and deposits, 'there would be no room for monetary policy to affect aggregate demand'. Black (1970, p. 10) endorses this view, and elsewhere (Black, 1987) argues that monetary policy is passive even in our current monetary system. Black's 1970 article went apparently unnoticed for a decade, except for self-citations and a critical comment by George Benston (1972). During this decade the real-world deregulation of banking stimulated the interest of economists in the conceptual endpoint of the process. Eugene Fama (1980) made Black's article, together with articles by Tobin (1963) on the 'New View' and Harry Johnson (1968) on optimal money holding, the taking-off point for his own analysis of an unregulated banking system from the perspective of finance theory. Fama differs from Black in recognizing the uniqueness of base money as the nominal scalar in our current system, but argues that in principle the payments services provided by banks need have no connection to the numeraire good. Leland Yeager (1968, 1978), arguing from a monetarist perspective, was one of the sharpest critics of the applicability of Tobin's 'New View' and related passive-money-supply doctrines to a money and banking system of the current kind. But precisely because of his long-held understanding of the significance of the quantity of base money in our current system, particularly the role of monetary disturbances in driving inflation and business cycles (Yeager, 1956), Yeager has long had an interest in alternative monetary systems (Yeager, 1962), and has now been attracted to the possibility of a system without base money. (I and others used to call such a system 'cashless', meaning 'devoid of base money', but Yeager [1989] objects that this term misleadingly suggests the absence of hand-to-hand currency.) Crediting Black, Fama and Robert Hall (1982) for various constituent ideas, Robert Greenfield and Leland Yeager (1983, 1989; also Yeager, 1983) propose a competitive payments system without base money principally in the hope that monetary disequilibrium can be eliminated by abolishing base money. The unit of account in this system must obviously be something other than a unit of base money. A natural candidate, also endorsed by Dowd (1988a, 1989) and Glasner (1989), is a bundle of goods whose purchasing power is stable in terms of some significant price index. Critics of this proposal for' separation' of the unit of account from any medium of exchange or redemption (White, 1984b, 1986; O'Driscoll, 1985; McCallum, 1985; Hoover, 1988) have raised a number of questions about whether the Greenfield-Yeager system is feasible, efficient, or would naturally prevail under laissez-faire.
The Legal Restrictions Theory In a distinct line of development, a group of monetary economists centred around Neil Wallace has also concluded that a laissez-faire payments system could lack a base money of the current sort, although they have never detailed the alternative institutional arrangements they envision. As Gerald P. o 'Driscoll, Jr. (1985, p. 11) notes, there is an affinity between Wallace's theory that the demand for base money of the present-day sort rests on legal restrictions and Black's view that laissez-faire implies a world without money. Wallace (1983, 1987) believes that non-interest-yielding currency would not survive the competition it would meet under
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laissez-faire (assuming that nominal interest rates are not close to zero) from interest-yielding payable-to-the-bearer bonds. In this view the rate-of-return discrepancy between government currency and bonds today is due to legal restrictions against private currency issue. Wallace's conclusion is driven by an arbitrage argument: financial intermediaries free to issue currencylike liabilities would bid away any rate-of-return spread between their assets and their liabilities that was wider than the costs of intermediation (which Wallace estimates to be about 1 to 2%). An unpublished early work by Bryant and Wallace (1980, p. 1) indicates that the legal restrictions theory grew out of a larger project, one that encompasses Wallace's (1980) wellknown work on the overlapping generations model of money, namely the New Classical macroeconomics project 'to render monetary theory subject to standard modes of analysis' . The New Classical critique of the older Keynesian monetary and macroeconomic theory is well known: Keynesian models are inconsistent with standard microeconomics, and are populated by agents who fail to recognize the regime under which they live (they lack 'rational expectations'). By alerting economists to the importance of studying alternative monetary regimes, the 'rational expectations revolution' has unintentionally played a vital role in stimulating interest in free banking research generally. With a nod to John Hicks (1935), legal restrictions theorists consider it a crucial task of monetary theory to explain why people hold an asset (money) that is dominated in rate of return. But where Hicks sought an explanation in 'frictions', Bryant and Wallace (1980, p. 3) believe that 'adequate modeling of the frictions that inhibit the operation of the law of one price has indeed proved refractory'. In particular, they find serious defects in partial-equilibrium macroeconomic models like Tobin's (1969), and general-equilibrium models with transactions costs like Heller and Starr's (1976) and their own earlier work (Bryant and Wallace, 1979). A satisfactory theory of transaction costs not being available, they advocate instead trying to study money using the zero-transactions-costs or perfect-arbitrage approach of finance theory. Against the predictions derived from the legal restrictions theory, Fama (1983) and I (White, 1987) argue that non-interest-bearing currency can survive, and historically has survived even under laissez-faire with interest on other assets above 2 %, because computation and transactions costs make the interest on small-denomination currency not worth collecting. Wallace (1987) and Bryant (1989) respond that competitive currency issue might instead eliminate the rateof-return discrepancy by driving nominal interest rates on all other assets down close to zero. This implies (assuming that the real rate of interest is not affected) that currency issuers would denominate their liabilities in an appropriately appreciating numeraire. Warneryd (1990) objects that the social adoption of such a numeraire is not automatic.
Policy Implications One of the most important recent critiques of free banking is Charles Goodhart's (1988) argument that private clearinghouse regulation inadequately addresses enforcement and incentive problems, creating a 'natural' need for the development of a government central bank. But does history actually show us central banks developing naturally, i.e. without government intervention? Friedman and Schwartz (1986, p. 54) remind us that Vera Smith's (1936 [1990], p. 148) conclusion was unequivocally no: 'A central bank is not a natural product of banking development. It is imposed from outside or comes into being as a result
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of Government favours. ' Few will regard this fact alone as sufficient evidence for a positive or negative verdict on the desirability of central banking. Governments around the world certainly have had their reasons for imposing central banks (that is, for monopolizing the issue of basic money and nationalizing clearinghouse functions), and for restricting the issue of money by private banks. But have they had good reasons, grounded in the welfare of moneyusers? Are there any good reasons? Modern neoclassical economists have two standard rationales for government involvement in the provision of a good: externalities or natural monopoly. Roland Vaubel (1984, 1985) confronts head-on the question of whether either of these rationales applies in the case of money. With respect to basic money, he finds that the externality or public-goods argument for imposing a common government money reduces to a natural monopoly argument, and points out that natural monopoly cannot justify barriers to entry by private producers. With respect to bank-issued money, as Friedman and Schwartz (1986, p. 49) note, Vaubel seems to allow that confidence externalities (like contagious bank runs) might justify government providing deposit insurance or acting as a lender of last resort. Martin F. Hellwig (1985) emphasizes the problem of dynamic inconsistency with competing non-commodity base monies, the problem also analysed by Taub (1985). With respect to bank-issued money, Hellwig (1985, pp. 585-6) finds that economists cannot draw welfare conclusions for or against laissez-faire. Possible problems of information asymmetry and moral hazard mean that 'we simply do not know very much about how competition among inside monies works' and that 'it is unclear whether government intervention is harmful or useful'. Hellwig does not consider any historical evidence on how competition among inside monies has in practice worked, e.g. on ways bankers and their customers have tried to minimize information asymmetry and moral hazard problems. Nor does he consider any evidence on whether government intervention has in practice proven harmful as compared with laissezfaire. These questions are taken up by the subsequent two articles. Friedman and Schwartz (1986, p. 40) emphatically conclude from their wide reading of monetary history that government intervention has indeed been harmful - destabilizing and efficiency-reducing - on net. They doubt that government will remove itself from the monetary arena, however. Richard E. Wagner (1986) offers a complementary public-choice analysis of both points: why government fails to provide good money, and why it deliberately persists. Unlike his fellow public-choice theorists H. Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan (1981), Wagner does not take it for granted that the market will 'fail' in the provision of money unless government intervenes.
Notes 1. For secondary accounts of Mises' and Meulen's writings see White (1992) and Dowd (1992a). 2. This paragraph draws on White (1984a, pp. 53-4). For other accounts of the debate that also emphasize the question of free banking versus central banking see Smith (1990 [1936]) and Schwartz (1987). 3. F.A. Hayek (1988, pp. 14-15) in fact calls Bailey 'an acute economic thinker of the nineteenth century' and quotes his statement (1840, p. 3) that detailed business decisions require 'minute knowledge of a thousand particulars which will be learned [sic; Hayek has 'learnt'] by nobody but him who has an interest in knowing them'.
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4.
xvii
Yeager (1989), however, has on at least one occasion adopted Riegel's 'valun' (short for 'value unit') as a name for the unit of account.
References Bailey, S. (1840), A Defence ofJoint-stock Banks and Country Issues, London: James Ridgway. Reprinted below, Vol. I. Becker, G. (1957), 'A Proposal for Free Banking', unpublished ms. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Benston, GJ. (1972), 'Controls on Banking and "a World Without Money''', Journal of Bank Research, 3 (4), Winter, pp. 59-61. Black, F. (1970), 'Banking and Interest Rates in a World Without Money: the Effects of Uncontrolled Banking', Journal of Bank Research, 1 (3), Autumn, pp. 9-20. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Black, F. (1987), Business Cycles and Equilibrium, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Bordo, M.D. (1990), 'The Lender of Last Resort: Alternative Views and Historical Experience', Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Economic Review, January/February, pp. 18-29. Brennan, H.G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1981), Monopoly in Money and Inflation, London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Brough, W. (1895), The Natural Law of Money, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. Brough, W. (1898), Open Mints and Free Banking, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons. Bryant, J. (1989), 'Interest-bearing Currency, Legal Restrictions, and the Rate of Return Dominance of Money', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 21 (2), May, pp. 240-45. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Bryant, J. and Wallace, N. (1979), 'The Inefficiency of Interest-bearing National Debt', Journal of Political Economy, 87, April, pp. 365-8l. Bryant, J. and Wallace, N. (1980), 'A Suggestion for Further Simplifying the Theory of Money', Unpublished ms., Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota. Checkland, S.G. (1975a), Scottish Banking: a history, 1695-1973, Glasgow: Collins. Checkland, S.G. (1975b), 'Adam Smith and the Bankers', in A.S. Skinner and T. Wilson (eds), Essays on Adam Smith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 504-23. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Clower, R. (1969), 'What Traditional Monetary Theory Really Wasn't', Canadian Journal of &onomics, 2, May, pp. 299-302. Clower, R. (1970), 'Is There an Optimal Money Supply?', Journal of Finance, 25, May, pp. 425-33. Cooper, R.N. (1989), 'Is Private Money Optimal?', Cato Journal, 9 (2), Fall, pp. 393-7. Cowen, T. and Kroszner, R. (1987), 'The Development of the New Monetary Economics', Journal of Political Economy, 95, June, pp. 567-90. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Cowen, T. and Kroszner, R. (1989), 'Scottish Banking Before 1844: a Model for Laissez-faire?', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 21, May, pp. 221-3l. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Diamond, D.W. and Dybvig, P.H. (1983), 'Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity', Journal of Political &onomy, 91, June, pp. 401-19. Dom, J.A. (ed.) (forthcoming), Alternatives to Government Fiat Money, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishing. Dom, J.A. and Schwartz, A.J. (eds) (1987), The Search for Stable Money, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dowd, K. (1988a), Private Money: The Path to Monetary Stability, London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Dowd, K. (1988b), 'Automatic Stabilizing Mechanisms Under Free Banking' , Cato Journal, 7, Winter, pp.643-59. Dowd, K. (1988c), 'Option Clauses and the Stability of a Laisser Faire Monetary System', Journal of Financial Services Research, 1, pp. 319-33. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Dowd, K. (1989), The State and the Monetary System, New York: Philip Allan. Dowd, K. (l992a), 'The Monetary Economics of Henry Meulen', Journal ofMoney, Credit, and Banking, 24, May, pp. 173-83. Dowd, K. (ed.) (1992b), The Experience of Free Banking, London: Routledge.
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Economopoulos, AJ. (1986), 'The Impact of Reserve Requirements on Free Bank Failures', Atlantic Economic Journal, 14, pp. 76-84. Economopoulos, AJ. (1988), 'lliinois Free Banking Experience' , Journal ofMoney, Credit, and &nking, 20, pp. 249-63. Economopoulos, A.I. (1990), 'Free Bank Failures in New York and Wisconsin: a portfolio analysis', Explorations in Economic History, 27, pp. 421-41. Fama, E. (1980), 'Banking in a Theory of Finance', Journal of Monetary Economics, 6 (1), January, pp.39-57. Fama, E. (1983), 'Financial Intermediation and Price Level Control', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, July, pp. 7-28. Fetter, F.W. (1965), The Development of British Monetary Onhodoxy, 1797-1875, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Friedman, M. (1960), A Program for Monetary Stability, New York: Fordham University Press. Friedman, M. (1969), 'The Optimum Quantity of Money', in The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays, Chicago: Aldine. Friedman, M. (1984), 'Monetary Policy for the 1980s', in J.H. Moore (ed.), To Promote Prosperity, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press. Friedman, M. and Schwartz, A.J. (1986), 'Has Government any Role in Money?', Journal of Monetary Economics, 17 (I), January, pp. 37-62. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Gilbart, J.W. (1841), 'The Currency: Banking', Westminster Review (American edn), 35, pp. 45-67. Reprinted below, Vol. I. Girton, L. and Roper, D. (1981), 'Theory and Implications of Currency Substitution', Journal ofMoney, Credit, and Banking, 13 (I), February, pp. 12-30. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Glasner, D. (1989), Free Banking and Monetary Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Goodhart, C. (1988), The Evolution of Central Banks, Cambridge: MIT Press. Gorton, G. (1985), 'Clearinghouses and the Origins of Central Banking in the United States', Journal of Economic History, 45, June, pp. 277-84. Gorton, G. and Mullineaux, D.I. (1987), 'The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-bank Clearinghouses', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 19, November, pp. 457-68. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Gramm, W.P. (1974), 'Laissez-faire and the Optimum Quantity of Money', Economic Inquiry, 12, March, pp. 125-33. Greenfield, R.L. and Yeager, L.B. (1983), 'A Laissez Faire Approach to Monetary Stability', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 15 (3), August, pp. 302-15. Reprinted below, Vol. m. Greenfield, R.L. and Yeager, L.B. (1986), 'Competitive Payments Systems: Comment', American Economic Review, 76, September, pp. 848-9. Reprinted below, Vol. m. Greenfield, R.L. and Yeager, L.B. (1989), 'Can Monetary DiseqUilibrium be Eliminated?', CatoJournal, 9 (2), Fall, pp. 405-21. Hall, R.E. (1982), 'Explorations in the Gold Standard and Related Policies for Stabilizing the Dollar', in R.E. Hall (ed.), Inflation: Causes and Effects, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hayek, F.A. (1976), Choice in Currency, London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Hayek, F.A. (1978), Denationalisation of Money, 2nd edn, London: Institute of Economic Affairs. Hayek, F.A. (1988), The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, London: Routledge. Heller, W.P. and Starr, R.M. (1976), 'Equilibrium with Non-convex Transactions Costs: Monetary and Non-monetary Economies', Review of Economic Studies, 43, June, pp. 195-215. Hellwig, M.F. (1985), 'What Do We Know About Currency Competition?', ZeitschriJtjUr WinschaJtsund SozialwissenschaJten, 5, pp. 565-88. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Hicks, J. (1935), 'A Suggestion for Simplifying the Theory of Money', Economica, n.s., 2, pp. 1-19. Hildreth, R. (1840), Banks, Banking, and Paper Currencies, New York: Whipple & Darnrell. Excerpt reprinted below, Vol. I. Hodgskin, T. (1827), Popular Political Economy, London: Charles Tait. Chapter 8 reprinted below, Vol. I. Hoover, K.D. (1988), 'Money, Prices and Finance in the New Monetary Economics', Oxford Economic Papers, 40, pp. 150-67.
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Horwitz, S. (1990), 'Competitive Currencies, Legal Restrictions, and the Origins of the Fed: Some Evidence from the Panic of 1907', Southern Economic Journal, 56 (3), January, pp. 639--49. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Horwitz, S. (1992), Monetary Evolution, Free Banking, and Economic Order, Boulder: Westview Press. Johnson, H.J. (1968), 'Problems of Efficiency in Monetary Management', Journal of Political Economy, 76, September/October, pp. 971-90. Kahn, J.A. (1985), 'Another Look at Free Banking in the United States', American Economic Review, 75 (4), September, pp. 881-5. Reprinted below, Vol. II. King, R. (1983), 'On the Economics of Private Money', Journal of Monetary Economics, 12, May, pp. 127-58. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Klein, B. (1974), 'The Competitive Supply of Money' , Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 6 (4), November, pp. 423-53. Reprinted below, Vol. III. McCallum, B.T. (1985), 'Bank Deregulation, Accounting Systems of Exchange, and the Unit of Account: a Critical View', Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 22, Autumn, pp. 135-60. Meulen, H. (1917), Industrial Justice Through Banking Reform, London: Richard James. Meulen, H. (1934), Free Banking: an Outline of a Policy of Individualism, London: Macmillan. 2nd edn of Meulen (1917). Mints, L. (1950), Monetary Policy for a Competitive Society, New York: McGraw-Hili. Mises, L. von (1978 [1928]) 'Monetary Stabilization and Cyclical Policy', in Percy L. Greaves (ed.), On the Manipulation of Money and Credit, trans. Bettina Bien Greaves, Dobbs Ferry, NY: Free Market Books. Mises, L. von (1981 [1912]), The Theory of Money and Credit, Indianapolis: Liberty Classics. Mullineaux, D.J. (1987), 'Competitive Monies and the Suffolk Bank System', Southern Economic Journal, 53, April, pp. 884-98. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Mullineaux, D.J. (1988), 'Competitive Monies and the Suffolk Bank System: Reply', Southern Economic Journal, 55, July, pp. 220-23. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Munn, C.W. (1975), 'On the Origins of the Scottish Note Exchange', Three Banks Review, 107, pp. 45-60. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Munn, C.W. (1981), The Scottish Provincial Banking Companies, 1747-1864, Edinburgh: John Donald. Mushet, R. (1826), An Attempt to Explain from Facts the Effect of the Issues of the Bank of England upon Its Own Interests, Public Credit, and Country Banks, London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy. Excerpt reprinted below, Vol. I. Ng, K. (1988), 'Free Banking Laws and Barriers to Entry in Banking, 1836-1860', Journal of Economic History, 48, December, pp. 877-89. O'Driscoll, G.P. Jr. (1985), 'Money in a Deregulated Financial System', Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review, May, pp. 1-12. O'Driscoll, G.P. Jr. (1986), 'Deregulation and Monetary Reform', Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Economic Review, July, pp. 19-3\. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Redlich, F. (1947), The Molding of American Banking: Men and Ideas, Part I, 1781-1840, New York: Hafner. Chapter 7 reprinted below, Vol. II. Riegel, E.C. (1944), Private Enterprise Money: A Non-Political Money System, New York: Harbinger House. Riegel, E.C. (1978 [1954]), Flight from Inflation: the Monetary Alternative, Los Angeles: Heather Foundation. Rockoff, H. (1974), 'The Free Banking Era: a Re-Examination', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 6 (2), May, pp. 141-67. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Rockoff, H. (l975a), The Free Banking Era: A Re-examination, New York: Arno Press. Rockoff, H. (1975b), 'Varieties of Banking and Regional Economic Development in the United States', Journal of Economic History, 35, March, pp. 16O-8\. Rockoff, H. (1986), 'Institutional Requirements for Stable Free Banking', Cato Journal, 6 (2), Fall, pp. 617-34. Rockoff, H. (1991), 'Lessons from the American Experience with Free Banking', in F. Capie and G.E. Wood (eds), Unregulated Banking: Chaos or Order?, London: Macmillan.
Free Banking I Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1982), 'Free Banking, Wildcat Banking, and Shinplasters', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, 6, Fall, pp. 10-19. Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1983), 'New Evidence on the Free Banking Era', American Economic Review, 73 (5), December, pp. 1080-91. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1984), 'The Causes of Free Bank Failures: a Detailed Examination', Joul7Ull of Monetary Economics, 14 (3), November, pp. 267-91. Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1985), 'Banking Instability and Regulation in the U.S. Free Banking Era', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, 9, Summer, pp. 2-9. Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1986), 'Inherent Instability in Banking: the Free Banking Experience', Cato Joul7Ull, 5 (3), Winter, pp. 877-90. Rolnick, A. and Weber, W.E. (1988), 'Explaining the Demand for Free Bank Notes', Joul7Ull o/Monetary Economics, 21 (1), January, pp. 47-71. Rothbard, M.N. (1962), 'The Case for a 100 Per Cent Gold Dollar', in L. Yeager (ed.), In Search of a Monetary Constitution, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Salerno, J.T. (1983), 'Gold Standards: True and False', Cato Joul7Ull, 3, Spring, pp. 239-67. Samuelson, P. (1968), 'What Classical Monetary Theory Really Was', Canadian Joul7Ull of Economics, 1, February, pp. 1-15. Samuelson, P. (1969), 'Nonoptimality of Money Holding Under Laissez-faire', Canadian JOUI7UlI of Economics, 3, May, pp. 324-30. Schuler, K, (1992), 'The World History of Free Banking', in K. Dowd (ed.), The Experience of Free Banking, London: Routledge. Schwartz, A.J. (1987), 'Currency School, Banking School, Free Banking School', in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary ofEconomics, New York: Stockton Press. Scrope, G.P. (1832), 'The Rights of Industry and the Banking System', Quarterly Review, 47, July, pp. 407-57. Excerpt reprinted below, Vol. I. SeIgin, G.A. (1987), 'The Stability and Efficiency of Money Supply under Free Banking', JOUI7UlI of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 143 (3), September, pp. 435-56. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Selgin, G.A. (1988a), The Theory of Free Banking, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield. Selgin, G.A. (1988b), 'Accommodating Changes in the Relative Demand for Currency: Free Banking vs. Central Banking', Cato Joul7Ull, 7 (3), Winter, pp. 621-41. Selgin, G.A. (1992), 'Bank Lending "Manias" in Theory and History', JOUI7UlI of Financial Services Research, 6 (2), August, pp. 169-86. Selgin, G.A. and White, L.H. (1987), 'The Evolution of a Free Banking System', Economic Inquiry, 25 (3), July, pp. 439-57. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Selgin, G.A. and White, L.H. (1988), 'Competitive Monies and the Suffolk Bank System: Comment', Southern Economic Joul7Ull, 55, July, 215-19. Selgin, G.A. and White, L.H. (1990), 'Laissez-faire Monetary Theorists in Late Nineteenth Century America', Southern Economic Joul7Ull, 56 (3), January, pp. 774-87. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Sennholz, H. (1985), Money and Freedom, Spring Mills, PA: Libertarian Press. Simons, H. (1948), Economic Policy for a Free Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Smith, V. (1990 [1936]), The Rationale of Central Banking, Indianapolis: Liberty Press. Spencer, H. (1858), 'State Tampering with Money and Banks', Westminster Review, 69, n.s. 13, January, pp. 210-32. Reprinted below, Vol. I. Sumner, S. (1990), 'The Forerunners of "New Monetary Economics" Proposals to Stabilize the Unit of Account', JOUI7UlI of Money, Credit, and Banking, 22 (1), February, pp. 109-18. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Taub, B. (1985), 'Private Fiat Money with Many Suppliers', JOUI7UlI of Monetary Economics, 16 (2), September, pp. 195-208. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Thompson, E. (1974), 'The Theory of Money and Income Consistent with Orthodox Value Theory', in G. Horwich and P.A. Samuelson (eds), Trade, Stability and Macroeconomics, New York: Academic Press, pp. 427-53. Timberlake, R.H. (1984), 'The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse Associations' , JOUI7UlI ofMoney, Credit, and Banking, 16 (1), February, pp. 1-15. Reprinted below, Vol. II.
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Timberlake, R.H. (1986), 'Institutional Evolution of Federal Reserve Hegemony', Cato Journal, 5, Winter, pp. 743-63. Timberlake, R.H. (1987), 'Private Production of Scrip-money in the Isolated Community', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 19 (4), November, pp. 437-47. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Tobin, J. (1963), 'Commercial Banks as Creators of Money' , in D. Carson (ed.), Banking and Monetary Studies, Homewood, IL: Irwin, pp. 408-19. Tobin, J. (1969), 'A General Equilibrium Approach to Monetary Theory', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 1 (1), February, pp. 15-29. Vaubel, R. (1984), 'The Government's Money Monopoly: Externalities or Natural Monopoly?', Kyklos, 37 (1), pp. 27-58. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Vaubel, R. (1985), 'Competing Currencies: the Case for Free Entry', ZeitschriftfUr Wirtschafts- und SoZialwissenschaften, 5, pp. 547-64. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Wagner, R. (1986), 'Central Banking and the Fed: a Public Choice Perspective', Cato Journal, 6 (2), Fall, pp. 519-38. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Wallace, N. (1980), 'The Overlapping Generations Model of Fiat Money' , in J. Kareken and N. Wallace (eds), Models of Monetary Economies, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pp. 49-82. Wallace, N. (1983), 'A Legal Restrictions Theory of the Demand for "Money" and the Role of Monetary Policy', Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Quarterly Review, Winter, pp. 1-7. Reprinted below, Vol. m. Wallace, N. (1987), 'A Suggestion for Oversimplifying the Theory of Money', Economic Journal, 98 (390), conference supplement, pp. 25-36. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Wiirneryd, K. (1990), 'Legal Restrictions and Monetary Evolution', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13 (1), January, pp. 117-24. Reprinted below, Vol. III. Wesslau, O.E. (1887), Rational Banking (the Remedy for Depression in Trade) Versus Bank Monopoly, London: Elliot Stock. Chapters 6-10 reprinted below, Vol. I. White, E.N. (1990), 'Free Banking During the French Revolution', Explorations in Economic History, 27, pp. 251-76. Reprinted below, Vol. II. White, L.H. (1984a), Free Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience, and Debate, 18{)(}-45, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. White, L.H. (1984b), 'Competitive Payments Systems and the Unit of Account', American Economic Review, 74 (4), September, pp. 699-712. Reprinted below, Vol. III. White, L.H. (1986), 'Competitive Payments Systems: Reply', American Economic Review, 76 (4), September, pp. 850-53. Reprinted below, Vol. III. White, L.H. (1987), 'Accounting for Non-interest-bearing Currency: a Critique of the Legal Restrictions Theory of Money', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 19, November, pp. 448-56. Reprinted below, Vol. III. White, L.H. (1989a), Competition and Currency, New York: New York University Press. White, L.H. (1989b), 'What Kinds of Monetary Institutions Would a Free Market Deliver?', Cato Journal, 9 (2), Fall, pp. 367-91. White, L.H. (1990), 'Scottish Banking and the Legal Restrictions Theory: a Closer Look', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 22 (4), November, pp. 526-36. Reprinted below, Vol. II. White, L.H. (1991), 'Banking Without a Central Bank: Scotland Before 1844 as a "Free Banking" System', in F. Capie and G.E. Wood (eds), Unregulated Banking: Chaos or Order?, London: Macmillan, pp. 37-62. White, L.H. (1992), 'Mises on Free Banking and Fractional Reserves', in J. Robbins and M. Spangler (eds), A Man of Principle: Essays in Honor of Hans F. Sennholz, Grove City, PA: Grove City College Press. White, L.H. and Selgin, G.A. (1990), 'Laissez-faire Monetary Thought in Jacksonian America', in D. Moggridge (ed.), Perspectives on the History of Economic Thought, vol. 4, Aldershot, UK: Edward Elgar. Reprinted below, Vol. II. Yeager, L. (1956), 'A Cash-balance Interpretation of Depressions', Southern Economic Journal, 22, April, pp. 438-47. Yeager, L. (ed.) (1962), In Search ofa Monetary Constitution, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Yeager, L. (1968), 'Essential Properties of a Medium of Exchange', Kyklos, 21, pp. 45-69.
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Yeager, L. (1978), 'What are Banks?', Atlantic Economic Journal, 6 (4), December, pp. 1-14. Yeager, L. (1983), 'Stable Money and Free-Market Currencies', Cato Journal, 3 (1), Spring, pp. 305-26. Yeager, L. (1989), 'A Competitive Payments System: Some Objections Considered', Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 11 (3), Spring, pp. 370-77.
Part I The British Free Banking School
[1] Excerpt from Robert Mushet, An Attempt to Explain from Facts the Effect of the Issues of the Bank of England Upon Its Own Interests, Public Credit, and Country Banks, 180-207
CHAPTER X. Recapitulation of the prindples attempted to be established jn the foregoing chapters.
IN the foregoing pages, I have endeavoured to establish the following principles: 1. That in a country with a paper currency, payable in gold on demand, any undue or unnecessary extension of its amount, such as would not be called for in the ordinary course of commercial transactions, and never would be made if the whole currency were metallic-but such as may be made by loans to Government, purchase of Exchequer bills, on loans, mortgage, or on stock-will lead to a reduction of the current rate of interest, an unnatural rise in the price of Government funds, and a general spirit of gambling in all money securities. 2. That if the currency of the country were entirely metallic, or the proportion of paper the lesser quantity of the two, we might be less subject to such violent and extensive fluctuations in the value of property, so productive of ruin and distress to the community, and rendering it a matter of doubt whether as a nation we derive any advantage from the substitution of a paper for a metallic circulation.
4
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181
3. That under a system of cash payments, the Rank of England could not add to the amount of the currency, beyond the legitimate demands of the country, or such as would be demanded if the whole circulation was metallic; unless she resorted to loans to Government, or on mortgage, purchase of Exchequer bills, or loans an stock; and that when she has recourse to such measures, so completely at variance with the soundest principles of banking, it is followed by an extension of the circulation of country bankers, in a far greater proportion than the increase to the basis of the currency, in the first instance, by the extension of the issues of the Bank of England; and sooner or later will produce a demand for gold on the Bank, so as to force her to a contraction of the currency -endangering her own safety, destroying the credit of the commercial community, and the banking estahlishments of the country. That when the Bank of England is obliged suddenly to contract its issues, either to preserve its gold, or to augment its amount, it may be followed by such a contl'action of the country circulation as for a length of time to keep the bullion value of our currency much higher than in other countries, and causing a fall of prices from diminished consumption, the want of confidence, and the means of exchanging commodities, that bears no true relation for the time to the state of the foreign exchallge~ 011 tile mal'lcet price of gold, as ap-
5
Free Banking I
pears to have been the case in
H~2(),
1821, and
18224. That while the Bank of England possesses
the monopoly of the currency-paper as well as metallic, by the existing regulations of the Mint she has the power of regulating the current rate of interest, which would otherwise be regulated by the current rate of profits on coinage; that under the operation of this monopoly, she may acquire an extent of treasure, which in the end may be attended with such a supposed sacrifice of her pro~ fits, by loss of interest, as to induce her to adopt measures to free herself from the encumbrance, and lead to very great fluctuations in the value of money and property generally. Lastly.-From the undue or unnecessary increase of the currency, which could not take place if the whole were metallic, we have the origin and sole cause of' general speculations and overtrading, which proceed with its increase, and in their progress demand or require new additions to the circulation and credit; and, from the conse~ quent facility of obtaining credit, may far outstrip the actual increase of the currency; a state of things that cannot be prolonged beyond the safety of the Bank, which again depends on the stodL of her treasure: the issues are then contracted, this is followed hy the contraction of the wuntry circulation, credit is destroyed, and sudtlCllly our markets assume tIll' appearance uf low
6
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pikes, over-production, or imlefil'ii.e supply.f. If thIs
principle is applied to tile contraction of our Cllrl'ency in 1815 and IHI6, with the low prices that followed; its extension in 1817 and 1818, and the general speculation, overtrading, and high prices, that succeeded; and again, to its cont.-actioll in 1819, 1820, 1821, and 1822, and the general COIllplaint of abundance of foreign and home pl'oduce, and low prices that continued throughout these years; and lastly, to the increase of the curl"ency in 1824 and part of 1825, with the accompanyillg" rage of speculation, overtrading, and high prices that followed, we see the establishment of the principle in all its forms and effects. In the opinion of Mr. Tooke, general speculation and overtrading may take place in a country where the currency is purely metallic, and instances the extensive failures in Hamburgh in 1798. But it must be remembered, that these failures were subsequent to, and I have hardly a doubt were consequent upon, a very sudden and violent contraction of the currency of England in 1797, and extended throughout the whole of 1798, as a reference to the then foreign exchanges will confirm. It is more than probable that the exten" High prices are not necessarily favourable to speculation and over-trading, but on the contrary, low, and rising I,rices; which imply a new relation between commodities and currency, from an increase of the latter. The cvils of such a system arc not wnlined to England, but must protillt'C a corresponding effect Oil thc l'ommcrciul relations and credit of every country with which Eng:lalld holds intcrc(lnr~l'.
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184 sive speculations in Hamburgh, which failed in 1798, had their origin in the extended currency and high prices of England in 1795 and 1796. In these years we had also our speculations and overtrading, and they were checked by the necessity imposed on the Bank to diminish its issues. The failure of credit in England would extend to Hamburgh, as a matter of course; Hamburgh at that time being most extensively connected with us in commerce. If we refer to the state of the money market in Hamburgh, in December last, we shall find, even with her purely metallic currency, that the state of her public credit was not different from our own ; but it was in this case also, as in 1798, subsequent to, or accompanying, the state of public credit in England.* If these are legitimate conclusions, it would appear, that the evils of our paper currency are not confined to England; and are far more extensive than has hitherto been conceived or admitted; and may be an argument, stronger than any yet produced, for remodelling our system of paper currency, and, if not abolishing it altogether, to confine it within such limits, as to diminish, as much as possible, the chances of its producing such extensive mischief. '" By recent accounts from Paris, we have been informed of extensive failures on their Stock Exchange; but these failures have been subsequent to the contraction of the circulation in England.
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CHAPTER XI. Proposed remedies for the regulation of our currency.
I SHAI.L now proceed to state such remedies as may enable us to avoid in future the evils that seem to be inseparable from the present system of our currency. It is necessary to begin with the Bank of England, as I think the cause of the late failure in commel'cial credit has in a great measure, if not altogether, been traced to her measures for unnecessarily, unless for her own interest, increasing the amount of the currency. I would, therefore, take the power from her of lending to G0vernment on Exchequer bills, on mortgage, or on stock. None of them seems consistent with the legitimate principles of banking. It would be desirable also, and I think it very practicable, for the Government to raise money at any time on Exchequer bills, for the arrears of the consolidated fund, without doing so through the medium of the Bank. If the Government would establish in the city a banking-house--call it the Exchequer and Treasury Banking-house, where every public accountant would have his accounts, by which the Treasury would at all times have the balances of every public account at command (which balam:cs
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amount on an average to from four to five millions) they could, through the means of theil' own bankers, raise money in the public market at the current rate of interest, Such a plan as this would avoid all interference with the current business of the Bank. If she retained the management of the natiolJal debt, the Treasury and Exchequer bankers would pay over to her the intel'est due quarterly, and no more intimate connection need exist. The Treasury and Exchequer bankers, according to the balance of cash on hand, could apply it to the purchal'e of Exchequer bills, and so diminish the charge of interest to the Exchequer. The profit which the Bank now makes on these balances would be transferred to the public, and would do more than pay the expences of the banking establishment. The result would be the same as if the Treasury kept the accounts of all its servants, and made a profitable use of the balance in hand. As it has been proved, and I hope satisfactorily, that our paper currency is in an undue proportion to its metallic basis, I would propose that the Bank of England should not issue notes below the value of 20l. If this became the general regulation for all banks issuing promissory notes, it might bring back our currency to the state it was in a few years previous to the suspension of cash payments in 1797, when our gold currency was estimated lJy LUI'd Liverpool, Mr. Rose, ami others, at ii'oUl
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IH7 twenty-five to thirty millions. That stich a measure would not entirely prevent the variations in the value of money, inseparable from the use of a paper currency and so injurious to the public welfare, I am willing to adDlit. The nearer the approximation to a currency entirely metallic, the more steady and uniform ",ill its value be; and perhaps the essential interests of the community would be consulted by prohibiting the circulation of any promissory note below the value of 501. giving the bank of England the power, for the convenience of the country, to issue Bank post bills for sums of 10/. and upwards. If these regulations were adopted, I would propose that the trade in coined money should be perfectly free; that the Mint, according to the plan I had the honour to propose before the Committee of the House of Lords on the Affairs of the Bank in 1819, should possess a fund, which would enable her, immediately on the quality of the bullion being ascertained by assay (and in no case should this exceed forty-eight hours) coined money would be given in exchange for it. I have already endeavoured to show how important and essential such a regulation is to the interests of the community, and the probability, that if such a regulation had been co-existent with Mr. Peel's bill, we should have escaped from the long continued ruinous prices that followed the
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188 measures of the Bank before and after the resump· tion of cash payments. I would further propose, for the general convenience of all classes, but particularly the lower, that an addition of three or four millions should be made to the silver currency at the rate of half a million per annum. The silver currency in the country can never be said to be proportioned to the wants of the community unless every labourer throughout the kingdom can receive his weekly wages in the current coin of the realm. That this is not, and has never been, the case in this country, I think I may safely affirm. On the contrary, we have had 58. and 28. 6d. notes, and checks upon provision shops, and meetings between masters and servants in public houses for the payment of wages, taking from the labourer the power of spending his wages where he pleases, and the advantages of a ready money purchase. The tendency of such a system is to render the labourer more dependant and degraded than he would otherwise be, and in point of fact it must operate, more or less, as a tax on his wages. I am satisfied that an abundant silver currency would add decidedly to the morality, comfort, and independence, of the labouring classes of the communit.y. The profit which the government would deri\Te from these progressive annual coinages (which can be suspended on the first appearance of excess),
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IH9 would defray the greater part of the charges of the Mint establishment. With regard to the circulation of the country bankers, I would propose, first, that the banking system should be thrown open to within sixty-five miles of London, as agreed upon by the Government and the Bank in 1822,* but that they should issue no notes of lower denominations than the Bank of England. If joint stock banking companies followed the freedom of the trade, there would be sufficient security for the public, and the power of overissuing considerably reduced by the paper currency being confined within narrower limits. That portion of the currency from a 11. note up to twenty or fifty, whatever may be the limit, will hereafter, being metallic, form the solid capital of those who think it their interest to follow the profession of banking. This portion of their capital bankers will lend at interest in the discount of bills, as formerly; but as it is a real and substantial capital, it will not be liable to the same changes from scarcity to abundance, or from abundance to scarcity, as if it were entirely paper. The effect of this plan would be, to give great solidity to our banking system; it would be men of real and substantial capital that would embark in the business, and the public would be freed from the • Since this was written this desirable point has been arranged between the Bank and Government.
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190 ruin OilS consequences that follow an extension and contraction of the paper circulation. A really useful system of paper currency. that !IIystem in fact that enables a nation to apply a portion of her metallic capital to other and productive purposes, ought to be the aim of the Government. If that portion of capital, whatever it may be, can be saved, without producing ruinous speculations and overtrading, it will be beneficial; but if it is attempted to save more capital, by the substitution of paper, than the nature of the system will bear, and subject the community to much more extensive loss by the attempt, it proves something bad in the system: it becomes a question, then, what are the proportions of paper and coin, if any, that can be maintained beneficially in a country, so as not to cause a greater destruction of capital, by speculations and overtrading, than the saving which re~lUlts from the substitution of paper for gold. This is the true mode of estimating the advantages and disadvantages of a mixed currency, such as we have in this country. Supposing the whole CUl'reDcy of the three kingdoms to be fifty millions. If twenty-five millions of gold and twenty-five millions of paper do not keep us free from the evils of a greatly varying value in money, we ought to try any other proportion, greater of gold, and less of paper. If every proportion fail in giving us a fixity of prices, such as would result from a purely metallic currency, ht'IWficial to all, and injllriom to none': we oug-ht
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at once to come to the resolution of having no other than a metallic currency. Tn other words, make England as the county of Lancashire. An opinion prevails, and I think an erroneous one, that if we were to abolish our paper currency, neither rent nor taxes, of course the interest of the national debt, could be paid. We have attempted to prove that all the advantage to be derived from our paper currency, as a substitution for gold, is the profitable use of that capital for which the paper is a substitute. If this is five, ten, or twenty millions, then the reproduction of that capital, with a profit, is the limit, as it is the maximum, of the actual advantage of our paper currency. Inasmuch as it is an increase to the amount of the productive capital of the country, in so far it assists in the payment of taxes, but no further. Taxes are never paid from currency, though paid in currency. It is from the profits of capital alone that taxes are paid, and currency is the medium by which they are paid. It is of no consequence, therefore, whether the currency is all paper, or partly paper and metallic, or entirely metallic, as far as the payment of rent and taxes are concerned. There has been attributed to the paper currency of this country a sort of magic power, by which wealth has been created and the Government revenue collected, to a much greater extent than it could otherwise have been done, by which the intel'est of the nat.ional debt
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192 has been paid, and without which landlords could not have received their rents; and the inference drawn is, that if the paper currency was restricted in amount, or entirely abolished, the Government could not carry on the affairs of the nation, and landlords could not receive their rents. In this conclusion I cannot agree. If the paper currency at any time has kept prices in this country above their bullion value, which is admitted was the case during a considerable period of the restriction on cash payments, rents would also rise. The restoration of the currency to its Mint value would restore prices to their bullion value, and rents would fall to their proper level, but the landlord would sustain no further injury. The rise of rents from a depreciated currency was not all gain to the landlord, for the purchasing power of his rents was reduced in value from the rise in price of all the articles of consumption. When rents, on the other hand, fall to their bullion value, the loss to the landlord is more nominal than real. General prices are lower, and his diminished amount of rent can command a greater amount of the necessaries of life. I have thought it necessary to state thus much of the principles of currency, before noticing what regulations it may be advisable to introduce with regard to the circulation of the country banks. This subject has deservedly occupied a great
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deal of public attention of late, and several plans have been proposed with the view of introducing health and stability into this portion of our circulation. The assimilating of the country banks of England to those of Scotland has been urged as a remedy (or the evils of the present system. That the introduction of joint stock and chartered banking companies into England would be attended with great advantage, no one will deny-that is acquainted with the stability of the Scotch banks. It would operate as a complete protection to the holders of notes against the insolvency of any of the banks. Here the benefit would end; and great as it manifestly is, I think it the lesser of the two evils that exist in the present country banking system of England. The extensive dis.. tress at this moment felt throughout England, from the discredit and insolvency of the country bankers, has its origin in the power of adding largely and unduly to the amount of the currency. This evil was not confined to England. Scotland has had her currency augmented to the level of England; has had her joint stock speculations and overtrading; has also had her circulation contracted, and public credit impaired; her labourers thrown out of employment, and a general stagnation in trade. The only difference in the two cases is the distress and loss that the lower classes of England have sustained from being the holders of the notes o
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194 of such banks as have become insolvent. But even this distress, great and lamentable as it may be, is not to be compared with the far greater misery that afflicts the population in both countries, from the want of employment that follows the destruction of credit and capital during the stagnation of buying and selling. The poor must suffer until general confidence is restored; and supply and demand resume their ordinary level. The introduction, therefore, of the Scotch system of banking into England, though much superior to that now existing, would be no effectual remedy for the greater evils of our present paper currency, inasmuch as it would not take away the power of adding suddenly and largely to the currency, or diminish the necessity arising from the use of that power, of ~uddenly and extensively contracting the circulation. Another plan has been proposed in the Scotsman's newspaper, 17th of December last. The writer states, that " the repeal of the injurious and absurd restriction which has obtained for more than a century in England, by which more than six individuals are prevented from entering into any co-partnery for the issue of notes, has been suggested as a remedy for the evils complained of. But though this repeal would, by allowing the formation of great joint stock banking companies, possessed of adequate capital, be a very great improvement on the existing system, we are very far
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indeed from thinking that it would of itself be sufficient. There must always be infinitely more hazard in conducting the business of banking in a highly commercial country like England, than in Scotland; and nothing can be more absurd than to argue, that because few of the Scotch banks have failed, they would therefore succeed equally well in England. There is more speculation in Lancashire in a single week than there is in Scotland in a twelvemonth; and the risk incurred by the banking establishments there must be proportionably great. The fact is, that no company, whether it consists of sir, or si:r hundt'ed thousand partners, ought to be permitted to issue notes at pleasure. For you can have no security that they will not abuse the power to do so; at the same time, that it is certain that the ruin occasioned by the bankruptcy of any establishment will most commonly be directly proportioned to the number of its partners, and the credit and confidence it has enjoyed. To insure the public against the bad faith or the imprudent conduct of the issuers of paper money, it has always appeared to liS to be quite indispensable that a law should be enacted, compelling all individuals or associations who issue notes to hold a certain amount of Government securities proportioned to their issues,as a guarantee for the payment of their paper. There may he some difference of opinion as to the limit at which this proportion ought to he fixed. but we do not o 2
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196 think it ought to be less than two thirds of the total amoullt of the stamps issued to them. It is to no purpo&e to contend that this would be laying banking companies under any improper restraint. Had the freedom they have hitherto enjoyed been productive of no bad consequences, they would have had some grounds for protesting against being subjected to any restriction; but after the wide-spread mischief, and destruction of individual fortunes, caused by their misconduct and want of capital, Ministers are not only warranted, but they are called upon by a just regard to the public interests, to interfere to put down the present system. Besides, it must be remembered that the bankers will get the same rate of interest on the funded property that is got by other individuals; while the obligation to hold it will have the effect to exclude all persons who are not possessed of capital from the trade, and will prevent those who are possessed of capital from improperly extending their issues. Neither do we attach any weight to the objection of those who contend that this measure would be opposed to the principle of the freedom of industry; for, though generally true, this is a principle that does not hold universally. It is, for example, admitted on all hands, that in order to prevent the confusion that would arise from the currency of coins of different values, but of the same denomination, it is expedient that Government should interfere to prohibit the circulation of
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197 private tokens, and of all coins which have not been struck at the public Mint. But if such a regulation be, as it most certainly is, expedient, why should it not also be expedient to endeavour to secure the public against loss from the issue of worthless paper money. Women, mechanics, J.. bourers, and individuals of all descriptions. who are no wise qualified to judge of the stability of different banking companies, are all dealers in money; and they have a clear and undoubted right to expect protection and security from such an obvious cause of loss as the granting of permission to everyone who chooses to send notes into circulation." This plan has for its object the protection of the public, who are the holders of the notes of the English country bankers, from any 16ss in case of the insolvency of any of the banks. In this respect, the plan would be productive of the same effects as the joint stock banking companies of Scotland; and beyond this security, the writer does not seem to have any other object in view; and admitting that it would be a guarantee to the public, which I think it would, it is clear, that it is obtained by a sacrifice of a portion of the rate of interest on banking capital in England, to which Scotland and the Bank of England are not subject. It is, I think, objectionable. The writer justifies the principle of his plan, because, in his
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198 opinion, there must necessarily be more hazard in conducting the banking <:oncerns of a highly commercial country like England than in Scotland. N ow the competition of capital, and the consequent rate of profit, must be the same in Scotland as in Lancashire, and the relative amount of capital and currency will he the same in both. Consequently, there can be no higher state of commercial credit, or greater speculations, in the one country than the other, and no greater hazard to the banks of England than to the banks of Scotland. If, by any regulation the relative amount of currency could be decidedly greater in Lancashire than in Scotland, more extensive speculations and Illore decided hazard would attend banking in Lancashire than in Scotland-but this is supposing a case entirely a.t variance with the principles of currency, which reduces itself to one common level throughout a country. It is the operation of this principle, that renders speculation general, and never local in a country. Speculation and overtrading, as I have already endeavoured to explain, have their origin in an undue increase of the cllrrency, and such as could not take place if entirely metallic, and when this increase takes place in one part of the country, from the very nature and intimate connection of commercial transactions and banking, it becomes in a very short time general in all. There therefore cannot be two rates
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199 of speculation in a country, without a disproportionate amount of currency, which in the nature of things cannot exist. As far, therefore, as the principle of speCUlation is concerned, there seems no motive for placing the capital of country bankers in England upon a different footing from that of Scotland, which is admitted to give complete security to the holders of their notes. I doubt, however, that such a plan could be carried into effect. For if the rate of interest on banking capital was 5 per cent, a country banker would prefer converting that portion of his capital which he is required to hold in Government securities at 8-6- or 4 per cent into gold, and lend it at the current rate of interest at 5 per cent. The operation of the plan, therefore, if attempted, would be to bring us precisely to the same result, though in an indirect and objectionable way, that would be obtained by the plan that I have in conclusion to propose, that of reducing the paper currency, so as to leave the proportion of one-third paper and twothirds gold. This would leave the banking trade perfectly free, and the security of the public will be found in the amount of capital in gold and silver in circulation compared with the proportion of paper. I would, therefore, propose as a general plan for our currcucy, that 110 bank issuing promissOl'Y notes payaulc 011 dcmand iu England, Scotland,
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and Ireland, should be permitted to issue any note of less value than 20/. The accomplishment of this plan should he very gradual, lest the currency should be forced, as in 1819 and 1820, to an unnaturally high value. I would propose, therefore, two years for withdrawing all notes of the value of one and two pounds; in the third year, notes of the value of 51. may be withdrawn; and in the fourth those of the value of 101. ; so that in four years the plan would be in full operation. With a view to facilitate this measure, and give perfect freedom to the trade in money, I would Pl'OPOse to place the Mint under such regulations, with a capital of 250,000/. as would convert all the bullion brought for coinage into currency in forty-eight hours. If this plan was ohjected to as more expensive, and leading to more extensive coinages, I would answer, that from 1777, when the reformation of the gold coinage was completed, to 1797, the average ye.arly coinage was about one million and a half of gold: or about thirty millions; and from 1817 to 1825, a period of nine years, the average annual coinage has exceeded three millions and a. half, or upwards of thirty-two millions sterling.
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CHAPTER XII. Remarks on the plans proposed in Parliament for improving the currency of the country. SINCE the preceding pages were sent to press, Parliament have met, and the state of the currency has been matter of discussion. The general opinion seemed to be, that the circulation of the country bankers was the chief, if not the whole cause of the evils from which the public are suffering; more particularly that portion of it which consisted or notes of one and two pounds value. There can be no question that the insolvency of the country bankers, having a large amount of small notes in circulation, is an evil of great magnitude, and seriously affects the comfort of those in whose hands such notes ultimately fall. But this is a minor evil, in my opinion, to the existence of a power, which has been very frequently called into active operation, that of adding largely and unduly to the amount of the currency; originating schemes of speculation and overtrading, which in their reaction not only affect the comfort of the lowest classes, but ("'ith the exception of annui. tants and persons of fixed money incomes) all classes of the community, far beyond the failure of a few country Lanks. In the late pani<: aLout
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202 70 country bankers became insolvent; and let it be supposed, that the actual loss to the holders of their notes amounted to one million and a half; which is about one-eighth of the whole country circulation in 1825. And if it be further supposed, that one half of the whole, or 750,0001. was held by the working classes (which I think is a liberal calculation), and if their numbers be taken at 500,000/. in England and Wales, their indiviTo a labourer with a dual loss would be 11. lOs. family, I will admit, that the loss of thirty shillings is a matter of considerable consequence; but great as the injury done to him is, I think it comparatively trifling, with the sufferings he and his familyendure by his being thrown out of employment, during the stagnation of trade and manufactures, following such a crisis as we have lately experienced in the money concerns of the country. But the labourers are not the only sufferers; their employers and their families suffer also; and relatively, perhaps, to a much greater extent. Their capitals are deteriorated, and numbers of them sink from respectable stations in society, to a state not much removed from their servants. For such transitions from comfort and affluence to poverty and distress, a remedy ought if possible to be found. In the preceding pages, I have endeavoured, by facts, to tl'ace the calise of such overwhelming Jisll'CbS to its ol'ig'in, and I hope i:iuccessfully. If it
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is to be found, as 1 think it is, in the nature and management of our cUITency; the remedy can only be applied in a system that will protect the whole community from a recurrence of such extensive ruin and misery as we are now witnessing. The remedial measures proposed by his Majesty's Government, though in themselves beneficial, will not, in my opinion, be attended with such extensive benefit as may be supposed. The introduction of joint stock banking companies, upon the Scotch system, will be as complete a check against insolvency as now exists in Scotland; and here the benefit will cease. The lower classes, indeed all classes, will be freed from the risk of the insolvency of the country banks-as much so. as if the whole country circulation were supplied by branch banks of the Bank of England. The second measure, that of introducing gold fo), the one and two pound notes, will be of very little consequence, provision being made against the insolvency of the country bank; and ought to be no more necessary in England than in Scotland, under the same circumstances. N either measure, it appears to me, is even of the nature of a remedy for the main evil, because they do not take the power from the Bank of England of adding extensively to the currency. It is from the exel'cise of this power that I have endeavoured to trace the cause of general specula..
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204 tion and overtrading, the reaction of which produces such extensive mischief throughout the community. As this in my opinion is the greatest of the two evils, I should have been glad to see the remedy extend to both. The substitution of four or five millions of gold for the country one and two pound notes, will operate as a very slight protection against an overissue of paper by the Bank of England. It must be remembered, that in 1793, we had a very similar failure of commercial credit to the present; and at that time, I think I am correct in stating that the Bank of England had no notes in circulation under 101., and the country bankers none under 51. But even with this extensive metallic currency, we were not protected from general speculation and over-trading, the reaction of which produced such extensive calamity at that time. Mr. Tooke states in his recent work on currency,* that in 1790, the amount of treasure possessed by the Bank was 10,097,000/., and its notes in circulation amounted to 10,217,3601. In 1791, the Bank increased its issues by an advance to Govern. ment of 1,500,000/.; and it was followed by an increase of the country circulation; and I have no doubt to a greater extent than the mere issues of the Bank, upon the principle I have in the preceding pages explained. The consequence was a drain upon the Bank for golJ; so that its treasure ., State of the Currency. p. g.,!,
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hy September, 1792, was reduced to 6,255,000/. Mr. Tooke states, that there was a further drain of nearly three millions more in the next six months, which he supposes snpplied the place of the discredited notes of the country bankers. In February, 1794, the issues of the Bank amounted to 10.963,380/., and in February, 1795, were increased to 13,539,160/., being 2,575,7801. or fully 18 per cent. By the 31st December, they were further reduced to 9,204,500/., being a reduction from February, 1795, of 4,334,660/., and equal to 32 per cent." There can be no surprise, with such facts as these, that the public should be subject to the mania of speculation and over-trading; nor at the re-action that follows the contraction of the currency. It was tampering with the currency that produced the dreadful crisis of 1797. If the Bank of England increased its portion of the currency 23 per cent in one year; the circulation of the country bankers, upon the principle that I have attempted to establish, would considerably exceed that of the Bank. The attempt, on the part of the Bank, to check the drain upon its coffers for gold, produces a general discredit of the country paper, as in December last; so that, in fact, to find a sufficient remedy for the unwholesome state of the currency, we should begin with the Bank of England; for it would seem that the
* See the Lords' Report of Secrecy,
1797.
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206 evils originate with that establishment. Any remedy, therefore, that does not impart to the currency an uniform value will not be attended with prospective benefit. The substitution, therefore, of gold for the one and two pound notes, will not protect us from an over-issue of paper. It is from this conviction I have proposed that the metallic basis of the country should be still further extended; and that no notes should be in circulation under 20/. I do not say that this will protect us entirely from an over-issue of paper by the Bank of England; but it will certainly operate as a check. When the monopoly of the Bank expires, and the trade in money is perfectly free, a better order of things may arise, and more paper and less coin may be employed, with perfect security to the public; for there is no reason why the competition of capital employed in banking should not produce a steady and uniform result, alike beneficial to the public and to the capitalist. The competition of capital would protect us from any fluctuation in the current rate of interest; the circulation would be always full, but it would never be in excess; any attempt at excess would be instantaneously returned upon the Bank that made the experiment: neither would there be any deficiency, as it would be the interest of every banker to keep the cil'culation to the level of the value of money in other countries, A similar result would follow, as if thf'
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whole currency were metallic; prices would be steady: capital would be freed from its present violent fluctuations in value; the wages of labour would be uniform; and there would be no transitions from comfort and affluence to poverty and want. The moral tone of the community would be improved; there would be a check to the spirit of gambling, general speculation, and over-trading. The completion of such decided improvements ought to be the aim of the legislature.
[2] Excerpt from Thomas Hodgskin, Popular Political Economy, 178-218
CHAPTER VIII. MONEY.
Definition of money.-Natural circumstances which occaaion the invention of money.--DHferent substances which have been used as money.-The precious metals now universally adopted.Reasons for the preference given to them.-Theyare natural or universal money.-Difference between money and wealth.Circumstances which determine the value of the precious metals, and the quantity of money in circulation. - Governments cannot alter the value of money, nor the quantity necessary. -Origin of coining.-It does not alter the natural relation of value in the precious metals.-Frauds practised by Govern .. ments by means of the coin.-Money is regulated in minute detail by natural circumstances, and does not, therefore, require to be regulated by governments.-Origin and evils of government paper.money.-Origin of commercial paper.monl"}'. -Promissory notes and bills.-Vast amount of these now in circulation.-Advantages of this species of money.-Natural cireu.mstances which give rise to bankers.-Their promissory notes form only a small part of commercial paper money.-Advantages of bank notes.-Their disadvantages result from the interference of government.-Amount of the issue of country bankers.-Natural ciroum8tances control and regulate paPil' money. " ~{ONEY ," to use
the definition of Dr. Smith, " is the instrument or means by which every individual in the society has his subsistence, conveniences, and amusements regularly distributed to him in their proper proportions." It is, in fact, only the instrument for carrying on buying and selling, and the consideration of it no more
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179
forms a part of the science of political economy, than the consideration of ships or steam-engines; or of any other instruments employed to facilitate the production and distribution of wealth. It is different from all other instruments, in respect to its being used by the whole community; and not being exclusively the property of any individual. It affords also a very instructive proof of the manner in which the general laws 6f nature operate on the minds of individuals, producing a uniformity of conduct, equal in regularity to any of the movements of the planets. Governments have meddled incessantly with money, which in our time has been the fruitful parent of intricate discussions and painful changes. Money has accordingly attracted much learned attention; and the principles which regulate it have been the subjects of much dispute. On these accounts it is worthy of a brief notice, though having of itself no stronger claims to be treated of in political economy than any of the other instruments or merchandizes useful to man. Into the history of the alterations made in it by our government. or into an examination of the conflicting opinions and schemes of theoretical writers and practical dabblers in legislation, I have no wish to enter; and I shall, therefore, confine my observations to the natural circu'mJ tances which gave occasion to the invention, first of metallic) and afterwards of paper money, and which regulate the quantity and value of both. I have already mentioned the natural circumstance of all commodities being produced in unequal periods, while the wants of the labourer must be supplied daily. This circumstance influences the conduct of mankind at all times and places, after a division of labour has been
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180
NATURAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
introduced. In the rudest state of society, the fisher· man or hunter may obtain a supply of food in one ex~ cursion, but the maker of bows and arrows, canoes or stone hatchets, must employ some days to complete his task. So at present, the produce of the baker, the butcher, or the shoemaker, can be brought to market in a few hours, while the farmer, the tanner, or the grazier, must wait weeks, months, or even years, before he can oWer his produce for sale. This inequality in the time necessary to complete different commodities, would cause the hunter or the baker to have a surplus of game or bread, before the maker of bows and arrows, or the grazier, had any commodity completed to give for the surplus game or bread. No exchange could be made; the bow maker or the grazier, must be also a hunter and a baker; and division oflabour, could its advantages have been conjectured, would only have been regarded as the visionary scheme of some hot-brained enthusiast. The obvious utility of division of labour suggested the means of getting over this difficulty, wltich consisted in the invention of money. Another natural circumstance which influenced the invention of money, was the inequality in the value of commodities which cannot be divided. A bow and arrow could at no time have been precisely equal in value to each of such different things as a hut, a canoe, or a hatchet; or to an ox, a deer, a hare, or a salmon; and these things could not be exchanged for one another, without some measure to determine how much or how many of other commodities were equal in value to those which could not be divided without destroying them. This measure also, be it what it may, is money. H One man," says Dr. Smith, H we shall suppose has
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Free Banking I OCCASION THE INVENTION' OF MONEY.
181
more of a certain commodity than he himself has occasion for, while another has less. The butcher has more meat in his shop than he himself can consume, and the brewer and the baker would each of them be willing to purchase a part of it. But they have nothing to offer in exchange except the different productions of their respective trades; and the butcher is already provided with all the bread and beer which he has immediate occasion for. No exchange can in tbis case be made between them. He cannot be their merchant, nor they his customers; and they are all of them less mutually serviceable to each other." "To obviate this difficulty," Dr. Smith adds, "each of tht!m would endeavour to obtain possession of some (additional) commodity, which he kne,v would be received by others at all times and places ;". this commodity is money. The language used by Dr. Smith might almost make us suppose that he regarded the invention of money as a chance occurrence; or, at least, that he had not formed any accurate idea of those specific circumstances which give rise to the employment of some one commodity as money, whenever the division of labour is introduced. Those circumstances are inequalities in the periods necessary to production, inequalities in the value of indivisible commodities, and one man not producing what another desires, while he desires what that other possesses. Owing to these natural circumstances, labourers cannot possibly supply their mutual wants by barter. The invention of money, therefore, or the employment of some one commodity as a measure of the value, or means of exchanging all commo• Wealth of Nations, book i., chap. 4.
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182
DIPPERENT ARTICLES USED AS MONEY.
dities, is a natural and necessary step in the progress of society; is introduced by division of labour, being essential to the continuance of this practice; is as equally useful, therefore, as it, and as generally adopted. METALLIC HONEY will first engage our attention, and we shall consider only the precious metals. For al. though some particular commodity, as a measure of the value of other commodities, has been used since the beginning of history, and amongst most of the nations of the earth, just as they have all had some measure of capacity and of linear extent; yet, as one nation selects a yard and another e metre as the measure of length, so different commodities have been employed as money at different times and places. In the early ages of the world, the articles most generally useful, such as cattle, salt, iron, cloth,· and in cold climates, among the ancient Russians for example, furs,t were used as money; in the West Indies, sugar; in N ewfoundland, salt fish; and in some parts of Africa, small shells,-have been the currency. On the western coasts of this continent it is still customary, as it was for .. • Wealth of Nations, book i. chap. 4. t Cour. d' Economie Politiqu.e. The armour of Diomede is said by Homer to have cost nine o.ren, but M. Garnier has shown, according to M. Say, Notes to Storch, that this valuation was made in a species of metallic money having an ox or a bull stamped on it, and so called from this circumstance; just as we calla certain coin a sovereign, from its bearing the image of the King's head. There is no reason to suppose that the King's head is stamped on the gold because it is worth about twenty shillings, but an ox was probably about equal in value to the piece of metal on which it was stamped, and was selected because oxen had previously been used as money.
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REASONS FOB. ADOPTING THE PRECIOUS METALS.
183
merly in Virginia, to reckon in rolls of tobacco or bars of iron; and in Bomou, Major Denham informs us in his recent travels} that gubkas, or narrow strips of cloth, constitute its money. The precious metals, however, or gold and silver, are now, and have been for ages, the money not only of all Europe, but of the greater part of Asia, Africa, and America, and they are willin~ly received at the islands of the Pacific Ocean. As natural circumstances dictate the use of some one commodity as a measure of the value of others, or as a means of exchanging them, so we may be sure that the preference universally given to the precious metals, has its source in some obvious natural circumstances. These natural circumstances are the peculiar proper· ties of the metals, and they are stated by Mr. M'Cul. loch to be, first, the capacity of almost infinite divisi. bility, so that they can be made to represent commodities of almost every degree of value; second, great durability, so that they are not deteriorated by time; third, great value in small bulk, 80 that they can be cheaply transported; fourth, sameness, so that pieces of metal of the same size and denomination, are always equal to one another; and fifth, steadiness in value, without which they would not serve to measure the value of other commodities. It is not affirmed that the value of gold and silver is invariable, but it is less variable than that of most other things. The other qualities mentioned also belong, in a higher degree, to the precious metals than to any other known substances; and these qualities have operated with such uniformity on the mind of man, at all times and places, that they have always induced him to act in a uniform
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184
THEY ARB UNIVERSAL MONEY.
manner, and employ the precious metals as money. The power of the mightiest conqueror the world ever saw, lasted only for his life; and his influence extended only over a very limited spaee, while the use of the precious metals as money, has been known for many centuries, and is now nearly universal. The employment of them as money, therefore, and it ought never to be forgotten, began, like division of labour. without the interference of any legislature. :Metallic money is not like an army of ruffian soldiers, the offspring of law, and the creature of governments, it is something instinctively adopted by the human race. "It has not been," says the philosophic Turgot, "in consequence of any agreement among men, or by the intervention of any law, but by the nature and force of things, that tbe precious metals have become universal money." It is sometimes supposed that money and wealth are synonymous, which is indeed true of individuals, but not of nations. During the late war, for example, when the notes of the Bank of England were declared by the legislature to be good and sufficient money, the precious metals were nearly banished from circulation. N otwithstanding the loss of our gold and silver, and notwithstanding a more profligate waste of public treasure than even the subjects of our most extravagant government ever before witnessed, the nation increased in population, power, and wealth. An individual gets all the money he can, and is said to be rich in proportion as he possesses or can procure a great deal of it; but the wealth of nations is exclusively measured by the conveniencies, comforts, and luxuries enjoyed by all their inhabitants. The money possessed by an in-
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Free Banking I WHAT DETERMINES THE VALUE OF MONEY.
IB5
dividualmay be called his wealth, because he can buy with it whatever he wants j the money in anyone country will in general circulate as money only there, and the bullion, like cloth or corn, will only buy commodities from other countries, or exchange for them in proportion to its intrinsic value. We can hardly suppose, as natural circumstances dictate the employment of some one commodity as a measure of the value of others, and forcibly recommend the adoption of the precious metals for this purpose, that the quantity of money possessed or required by any country at any one time, is not also regulated by some natural circumstance. As money is not the offspring of legislation, 80 it is not by laws that its quantity or value are regulated. Two natural circumstances which exist quite independent of governments, though they interfere with and derange them; viz. the quantity of labour required to obtain or purchase the precious metals and other commodities, and the number of exchanges to be completed in any given time and place, always determine the relative value of these metals to all other commodities, and what quantity of them must be in circulation. As all commodities are exclusively the produce of labour, there is no other rule, and can be no other rule, for determining their relative value to each other, but the quantity of labour required to produce each and all of them. This circumstance establishes between the precious metals and all other commodities a natural relation, subject only to such variations as may be caused by an increased difficulty or facility of procuring anyone commodity, including the precious metals. I do not say that governments cannot alter and disturb this relation; that they may not, by prohibi-
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186
THE VALUE
or
THE PRECIOUS METALS
tions or bounties~ enhance the difiiculties of procuring some certain commodities; and that they may not, by particular taxes, derange the proportions in which they would naturally exchange for each other; but I say different quantities of labour are naturally necessary to procure, and different degrees of diffi.culty are naturally met with in procuring all commodities, and these different quantities of labour, these different degrees of difficulty, establish in our minds a natural relation of value between all commodities, including the precious metals, which, though it may vary, exists at all times and places, quite independent of any human laws whatever. The precious metals, therefore, have a settled value, both in relation to each other, and in relation to all other commodities, which is always determined by the quantity of labour necessary to produce each and all of them.· Thus when the harvest is short, the quantity of labour employed in preparing the ground and gathering in the crops, being about the same as if the harvest were abundant, more labour than usual has been employed in producing a given quantity of corn, and corn accordingly rises in value in relation to all other commodities. The apprehensions of scarcity may inter• It is perhaps necessary for me to notice that some authors reject labour as the exclusive standard of value; and add profit and include rent. With their trifling, verbal, and nonsensical discussions, I have no wish to take up the reader's time, particularly &8 all the observations in the text apply only to the relative value of commodities, which is, for all commodities, equally affected by rent and profit; which, therefore, as far as the relation I am considering is concerned, may be rejected, even on their theories, without leading to any error. The reasoning would be wrong, certainly, if I were to include labour, the creator of aU wealth, as they most erroneousl y do, under the term commodities.
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REGULATED BY THE COST OF PRODUCTION.
187
vene and raise this price far beyond what remunerates the agriculturist for his labour; but, independent of this apprehension, the corn would necessarily rise in value, because more labour had been expended on a given quantity. On the same principle, it is well known that the successive improvements introduced into the manufacture of all metallic articles and most articles of clothing within the last century, having diminished the quantity of labour necessary to produce them, they have all fallen in value. On the same principle also, the discovery of America lowered the value of the precious metals throughout Europe. The consequence of that discovery was to supply us with gold and silver, particularly the latter, by means of less labour than was necessary to obtain them from the mines of Europe. Accordingly, gold and silver in a few years fell so much in value, that the period of the discovery of America has become a remarkable era in the history of political economy, as well as in the more extensive history of mankind. After that period it became necessary throughout Europe, to give more than three times as much silver as was before given for corn.* This alteration was co-extensive with the use of the precious metals as money; and confirms to demonstration the statement, that their value in relation to other commodities is determined by natural circumstances. Having established this principle, we see clearly another principle which determines the quantity of money required in any country. Gold and silver are used for many other purposes besides money; and they are expensive articles. As money they facilitate the ex.. Wealth of Nations, book i. chap. ll.
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WHAT RRGULATES THE QUANTITY OF MONEY.
changes which are necessary to the continuance of division of labour. Miners will not supply these metals without an adequate payment, and other men will not pay miners unless they require the precious metals. Their want of money is regulated by the number of exchanges to be made or the quantities of goods to be bought and sold; and thus the quantity of money required at any time and place, is always determined by the number of exchanges to be made. Of course the relative value of the precious metals to other commodities determines how much of them must be given for other things; and the number of sales to be made within a given period, determines, as far as money is the instrument for effecting those sales,-the quantity of money required. Governments may indirectly, but not directly influence the quantity of business, and thus the quantity of money necessary in a country. They may for example, by exorbitant taxation check all industry, and extinguish many productive enterprises, but producing nothing themselves, they have no powE'r whatever to increase business; and, therefore. no power to influence or determine the quantity of money required in any country. At all times, however, they have endeavoured to regulate both the value of the precious metals when used as coin, and the quantity of money in circulation. Not to enter any further into the history of their proceedings than is necessary to explain the principle and source of their interference, I shall here only remark, that whenever they have by their regulations departed from the standard established by the natural circumstances just pointed out, the tendency of thing& to regulate themselves by these natural circumstances
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Free Banking I ORIGIN OF COINING.
189
is so much more powerful than all the restraints of the legislator, that sooner or later it has mastered his laws, and occasioned frightful convulsions in property. When the precious metals were first used as money, they were always weighed like any other commodity; a practice still continued in China and some other countries, and still adopted in all countries with foreign coin. "Abraham," we are told, "weighed to Ephron the silver which he had named in the audience of the sons of Heth, four hundred shekels of silver, current money with the merchant."· "The revenues of the ancient Saxon Kings of England are said to have been paid, not in money but in kind, that is, in victuals and provisions of all sorts. William the Conqueror introduced the custom of paying them in money. This money, however, was for a long time received at the Exchequer by weight, and not by tale."t At present, if we carry foreign coins} or even guineas, to a money changer, he weighs them to determine their value. The plan of dividing the metals into small pieces, certifying the weight and value of each piece by a stamp or mark, was an after invention; the utility and conveniency of which, as a means of telling every body that the metal was genuine, and what it was worth, must soon have forced themselves into notice. The visible characteristics of the precious metals are possessed by other substances, and it requires the art of the goldsmith or assayist to ascertain their genuineness. For every man to go through this proce!!s in buying and selling would be impossible; and even to weigh each piece of metal, would be almost ~
Genesis, chap. xxiii.
t Wealth of Nations, book i. chap. 4.
Free Banking I
]90
GOVERNMENTS THE ONLY COINERS.
an endless task. By the bullion being assayed in large quantities, then divided into small portions, each portion being marked to signify that it contains a certain weight of metal of a specific fineness, individuals were spared the trouble of assaying and weighing the metals. Such a process is therefore very useful, and accordingly coining has been introduced wherever the preciou~ metals have been employed as money. Governments having perceived the use which might be made of taking this process into their own hands, forbad individuals to coin money, and declared themselves the only lawful coiners. From money being used by the whole society also, it is not the peculiar business of anyone individual to regulate and arrange it, though I have no doubt, had the matter not been interfered with, that in the progress of society there would have arisen a class of labourers deserving the confidence of society, whose exclusive business it would have been to have supplied metallic, as such a class of men now sl.lpply paper money. It having been supposed, however, in this as in numberless similar eases, that unless the legislature made regulations, there would be only disorder and confusion, governments accordingly assumed the power of coining. Moreover, those who are allowed to coin money mu~t necessarily enjoy the public confidence, which governments have generally done,-whether justly or not, the reader must determine for himself,-or they have been able to compel obedience to their decrees, and having assumed the power to coin, were either tru~ed or obeyed. To me there seems no other grounds for governments taking on themselves the charge of providing the community with coined money.
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Free Banking I EFFECTS Oll' COlKING ON VALUE.
19]
Coining, the reader will recollect, does not and cannot alter the natural relation of value which exists between the precious metals and all other commodities, except that it adapts them better to perform the functions of money, adding to their utility, and giving them a slight increase of value in proportion to the labour of assaying and coining them. We should immediately see the absurdity of any endeavour to alter the relative value of commodities, ,vere the attempt made with any thing but money. If the government, for example, should decree that an ox should be given for a sheep, and a sheep for a hat or a pair of stockings, its folly would be laughed at, its unjust interference would excite our indignation, and its decrees would be despised and disobeyed. The same would be the case with all other similar commodities; and what is there then in the nature of gold and silver which should release them from this general law, and enable governments by a fiat of theirs, to establish a relation of value between them and other things which does not naturally exist? There is nothing; and when it has been ascertained, for example, that a piece of gold as large as a sovereign is equal in value to a quantity of silver containing twenty shillings; or when it has been resolved to coin gold into pieces weighing a certain number of grains, the King's head, and the royal arms, or whatever else may be the chosen marks, are only intended to testify this fact to the community, on the authority of the sovereign. It is a declaration that the piece of gold is worth twenty shillings. Formerly it was the custom to mark on each coin its weight and value, in relation to some other commodity, and this good custom is still kept up in some of the nations on
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FRAUDS OF GOVERNMENTS.
the Continent. A piece of gold in France, though called a Napoleon, or a Louis d'or, tells you, or told you on the reverse side, up to a late period,-for the present government has substituted the lilies of the Bourbons for the words of common sense,-that it was worth twenty pieces of silver or francs. In this country the people are informed by a proclamation of the value of the coin; and his Majesty's head, and the royal arms, or Britannia, or George ancl the Dragon, are substituted for some plain expressions which we can all understand. When the reader iii aware that governments have no power to alter the natural relation of value between the precious metals and other commodities, and that they have only assumed the power of certifying this relation by issuing coin, in order, as they say, to guard the people against imposition and fraud, he will form a correct opinion of their honesty, honour, and trustworthiness, when he also recollects or is informed, that all governments have frequently used this power to delude and defraud their subjects. They have either mixed the precious metals with baser materials, or tlley have divided them into smaller pieces, certifying at the same time by their public seals, or by the busts of their chiefs, that the coin remained of the same value. It would carry me a great deal too far, were I to enter into a history of the proceedings of the different governments of Europe in debasing the coin of their respective dominions, endeavouring to cheat their subjects by tricks unworthy of the meanest sharpers :-though I know not if the whole history of the erring confidence of mankind affords a more instructive lesson; and I must content myself, therefore, with mentioning the single example of the English
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Free Banking I FRAUDS OF GOVERNMENTS.
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pound and penny, which had been so adulterated by successive governments, that when Dr. Smith wrote, they contained about one-third only of the quantity of metal they originally contained." It has been quite in vain, however, that governments have tried to give a value to their coin different from that of the precious metals they contained, settled as that is in our minds, by what Dr. Smith calls the" higgling of the market;" or rather by the labour required to procure them and all other commodities. Whether they have altered the denomination of the coin, while the quantityof metal in it has remained the same; or whether they have lessened the quantity or deteriorated the quality, and have preserved the same denomination; all the efforts of successive governments here and on the Continent, to keep the public coin in circulation at a fictitious value, have been quite fruitless: and whether the standard were a pound as in England, a livre as in France, aflorin as in Austria, it has always come, in a very short period, to exchange for the value of the precious metal it contained, and no more. TIle universality of this fact establishes to demonstration the uniformity as well as the universality of that law which settles and determines in the minds of all men, at all times and places, the natural relation of value between all commodities. Were it suitable to enter in this short treatise into • For the illultration of thp. statement in the text, I must refer to the" Wealth of Nations," book 1. chap.4; to Mr. Storch's Cours d'Eoonomie Politique, vol. 4, Note on " Banking;" and to an admirable article by Mr. M'Culloch entitled" MOM!J" in the Supplement to the Encyclopilldia Britannica. Such writings teach real practical wisdom. K
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GOVERNMENTS OUGHT NO'!' TO BE COINERS.
the question whether governments should have the power of coining money or not; and were the question worth discussion, which it hardly seems to be; for paper11UJne!l issued by private individuals, whatever may be the opinions and practices of legislators on the subject, will unquestionably supersede, even to a greater degree than at present, metallic money,-I think I could shew, as money is not, like an order of nobility or a regiment of dragoons, the invention and creature of governments, that they have no occasion to regulate the coin of any country. I am sure I could satisfy every reasonable man, that no individuals are so utterly and completely unfit for this purpose as those who possess and exercise political power. Experience tells us, that of all false coiners, none have so sported with the confidence of mankind, under the pretence of protecting them from false coiners, as governments. By making alterations in the coin, they have altered all the relations of property, and have produced longer confusion and more varied misery in every country of Europe, than could by any possibility have been caused by their subjects resolving not to submit to their power. In practice, moreover, the question seems already settled. To supply the necessary quantity of bullion is unquestionably a far more important part of the whole process than assaying it and certifying its value by a stamp. As the rule, our government never interferes with the supply of bullion; leaving it to individuals, who import or export bullion according to the state of the markets. The mint merely stamps what they bring, most injudiciously charging them nothing for the labour of coining; and taxing the nation for the benefit of those who deal in money. It would seem therefore, both in theory
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Free Banking I MONEY REGULATED BY NATURAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
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and practice, that the best way of keeping the metallic currency of any country steady in value, and to have a proper quantity in circulation, is to allow both bullion and coin to be freely imported and exported like all other commodities, and freely dealt with by all classes and conditions of men, like the equally useful articles of hats and shoes. * In all the works of Nature we may observe a delightful uniformity of purpose, a harmony in executing that purpose which never permits any collision, and a completeness which leaves to our finite understandings nothing to be desired. There are never any harsh interruptions of the general order: and as natural circumstances dictate in one stage of society the use of the precious metals as money, regulating both their value and quantity, it would be inconsistent with that general order to imagine that Nature ceases her instructions at this point, and leaves the numberless other circumstances connected with a safe and sound currency to be regulated by chance, or by the ignorant
'* There is abundant reason to believe that the practice of coining originated with individuals, and was carried on by them before it was seized on and monopolized by governments. "In many countries," says Mr. Storch, "the care of ascertaining the weight and stamping the metals was left to individuals."- " Such was for a long time the practice in Russia." The Royal prerogative of coining therefore, about which so much has been said in Parliament, is of no remote antiquity. It smacks much more of usurpation than the practice of issuing bank-notes. Individual coiners would always be responsible to the public; but the individuals who possess the powers of government are in almost all countries irresponsible. They alone may defraud the community uncontrolled; they therefore ought not to have temptation laid in their way, by being the only privileged coiners. x2
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MONEY REGULATEn BY NATURAL CIRCUMSTANCES.
presumption of ambitious men. Though money is sometimes supposed to be the invention of statesmen, and to require their control more than the other parts of that wonderful system of combined production which takes place in civilized society, I know no part of it which affords, better than money, an illustration of the important fact, that this system is regulated in its minutest details by natural circumstances. lVloney, we have seen, is a universal, and therefore a natural invention; and the precious metals are universal or natural money. Their value is determined by that natural law by which labour produces all wealth, and is the sole measure of value : and having a determinate natural value in relation to other commodities, the quantity of them required at any time and place is regulated by the quantity of produce to be exchanged, or of commodities to be bought and sold. A certain chemical proportion in alloying the metals must be observed, to make them answer the purpose of money in the best manner, and mathematical laws dictate into what aliquot parts they ought to be divided; though hitherto these latter circumstances have formed no part of the scientific researches of those who have discussed the theory of money, or have vainly attempted to regulate it by their decrees. In tracing the origin of money, I have mentioned its chief utility. It aids production, by facilitating barter and contributing to division of labour. "'Vhen money," says 1\I. Storch, "supplies the place of all other commodities, every man can more readily give himself up to one exclusive occupation; rejecting all other means of providing for his wants, than that of procuring, by the sale of his own produce, as much money as possible, being fully assured that with money
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Free Banking I GOVERNMENT PAPER MONEY.
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he can buy every thing else." As a man can dispose of small portions of produce that is corruptible, for what is incorruptible, he is under no temptation to throw it away; and thus the use of money adds to wealth, by preventing waste. The disadvantages sometimes eloquently attributed to it by poets and moralists, arise not from the convenient use of stamped pieces of gold and silver, but from the passions of men; they are examples of profusion or ambition, of fraud or avarice, or of the power possessed by some over the labour of others, of which money is only the sign, the representative, and the servant. PAPER MONEY, one kind or another of which is used in the greater part of the civilized world, is now to be treated of. We may distinguish two species of it, each of which possesses very different characteristics, and has very different eff~cts ; viz. paper money issued, regulated, and controlled by governments; and paper money issued and circulated by merchants, bankers, and tradesmen, for the purposes of commerce. Paper money of the former description has been issued by almost every government of Europe, either directly by its authority. or by some bank, the funds of which it has appropriated to its own use, while it has forcibly kept the notes of the bank in circulation. On the Continent, the sovereigns have generally issued their own paper, for the express purpose of supplying their wants by this mode of levying a tax on their subjects; or as a substitute for metallic coin. In this country the government, after borrowing the funds of the Bank, passed a law to make its notes a legal tender, and relieved it from the responsibility of paying ill specie. So far it acted on the same arbitrary principles
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ANTIQUITY OF THE INVENTION.
as the governments of the Continent. It converted the Bank into a state machine for emitting and keeping in circulation a forced and depreciated paper money. The reasons which should make us refuse to governments the privilege of coining money, have tenfold force against their becoming bankers and issuers of paper money of any description. "The payment of their notes depends," says Mr. Storch, "on the will of the government, which cannot be compelled, like individuals, to fulfil its engagements."· However they may debase the coin, it still possesses some value, and cannot be issued ill boundless excess; but paper money, which cannot be exchanged for specie, is quite valueless: and as there can be no limit to its issue, it confers on the individuals WllO possess the government a boundless power of working mischief. The invention of this sort of paper money is of great antiquity, and its use is of wider extent than the reader may probably suppose. H It was invented," says Mr. Storch, "long before the first bank of circulation was established. That of Saint George of Genoa, the most untient we know of, was not founded till 1407, while Koblai, the grandson of Genghis Khan, introduced paper money into China towards the end of the thirteenth century,-·an example which was immediately imitated by his cousin Kaigatou, the Klmn of Persia. Both were, however, soon obliged to abolish it, in COIlsequence of the great disorders it produced in their respective states. I do not on this account," Mr. Storch continues, "pretend to affirm that paper money was invented among the Mongols; on the contrary, the invention was so easily made, that it was probably •
COUl'S
d'Economie Politique, book vi. chap. 14.
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Free Banking I A CAUSE OF GREAT DISORDER.
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brought into use long before this period. Since that time," he adds, "the Chinese government has again introduced paper money into its dominions, and I possess a Chinese assign at, which was given me by a Russian traveller on his return from China."· It seems also, from the same author's statements, that paper money is used in Turkey. Paper money issued by governments is, therefore, very extensively known, and has been long in use. Of this description of paper money I have only to say, that it never is issued but for the purpose of surreptitiously and fraudulently levying a tax on the people. It is a complete cheat and a nuisance; and from the period when it was invented by the Tartar robber Koblai, it being the worthy offspring of ,Mongol rapacity, till the acts of the last session of our Parliament, or its authorised issue of Exchequer bills during the present session, paper money, issued, regulated, or controlled by governments, has ever been as at first, and in all countries, as in China and Persia, a source of innumerable disorders. Commercial paper money is something very different; promissory notes to pay certain sums of money at specific periods, are probably the most ancient species of commercial paper money, and must have come into use almost as early as the invention of writing and the beginning of trade. The merchant who undertakes a long voyage, or the manufacturer who plans an extensive project, requires the means of subsistence and of continuing his operations till his produce can be hrought to market. He accordingly borrows the goods which he needs daily, or the money to buy them, pro• Cours d'Eeollomie Politi(ple, vol. 4. note xvi.
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COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY.
mising payment at some specific time, or when his own produce is sold. Persons are willing to supply him with this accommodation, because his future produce will be his only means of payment, and in fact the only commodities produced to exchange for what he immediately requires, and of course the oIlly market for it. Such was probably the origin of promissory notes, and, in their most legitimate form, they are merely a happy invention, like metallic money, for exchanging commodities requiring different periods to complete them; which, without such an invention, could never have constituted the market for each other, and neither of which, consequently, would ever have been produced. It is, however, to be considered as chiefly resulting from those long commercial undertakings, which extend over months or years before they produce any thing for sale, of which there are no examples in the infancy of society. All trade, though nominally transacted by money, is in fact the exchange of one commodity for another. The London merchant buys wine at Oporto for so many milreas, and the Portuguese merchant orders cloth from London to the amount of so many pounds sterling; but in fact, the wine pays for the cloth, and the cloth for the wine. The Portuguese merchant obtains from his neighbour, the wine-grower, for a proper consideration, an order to receive the price of his wine from the London importer, or the latter procures from the cloth-manufacturer an order to receive the price of his cloth from the Portuguese importer; and, by such an order, each of these merchants is enabled to pay his creditor. on the spot where he lives, without using money. The order to receive such a. sum is called a bill of exchange. In
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Free Banking I PROMISSORY NOTES.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
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fact, therefore, the cloth is bartered for the wine, money being used to reckon the value of each without any being transmitted, or even employed to effect the payment. Such orders or bills, it is obvious, are not confined to making payments between, politically speaking, foreign countries; they are also used to make payments between individuals of the same state. 'fo enable the person on whom they are drawn to provide for the payment of them, this depending principally on his selling or completing the article, on account of which credit has been given to him, they are made payable at or after some specific period. Like promissory notes, they have a settled and fixed term of payment,-and, in general, represent commodities on their way to the market. 'fhose who received promissory notes or held bills not yet due, might require to make purchases or pay-· ments when they had no money. In this case they would make over the notes or the bills to their creditors, pledging their credit as the credit of the issuers of the promissory notes, or of the acceptors of the bill, was already pled gd for its payment; and thus both promissory notes and bills of a long date would pass through many hands, and be the means of making many payments before they were finally discharged. In general all bona .fide commercial bills and notes orignated in a well-founded expectation of having the means at a subsequent period, by the production or sale of commodities, to take them up, or pay them. At least, they were in the vast majority of cases duly honoured, and thus they came to be considered as of equal value to the money they were to entitle the ho1der to receive at a K
5
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EXTENSIVE USE OF BILLS.
certain time or place. As long as they are so considered, and as long as they are in circulation, or passing from hand to hand, they perform all the function~ of money. " Bills of exchange," says Mr. Burgess, " have long ceased to be merely an instrument of commerce to render perfect a mercantile transaction between country and country, and internal bills have become gradually more and more a part of our circulation; they have ceased to be so currently used by the manufacturers in payment of small sums under ten pounds as they were thirty or forty years ago, owing to the high rates of stamps upon small SUIllS. Bills above the value of ten pounds form now as completely a part of the currency as bank of England notes. They are used to pay for minerals-for all kinds of raw produce used in manufactures-for all the principal articles of food or clothing, and recently, in some cases, for mere labour. If a butcher in the north of England buys cattle, he pays for them partly in these bills, and partly in country bank notes. If a miller buys corn, or a mealman or a baker flour, he does the same. If a Yorkshire wool-buyer purchase wool of the farmers in the country, or in Northumberland, or in Lincolnshire, he pays for it partly in these bills, partly in country bank notes, or sometimes wholly in one kind, and sometimes wholly in the other. In the manufacturing districts of Yorkshire and Lancashire, no man, generally speaking, thinks of paying for any commodities above the value of ten pounds, otherwise than by a bill after date. This practice is now very general through the northern and midland
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Free Banking I AMOUNT IN CIRCULATION.
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counties, and is increasing in other parts. ill" "A bill at three months is considered in Lancashire and part of Yorkshire, which as regards bills is almost half the kingdom, to be a money payment.+" Mr. Burgess then proceeds to make some conjectures as to the amount of such bills which are continually in circulation. The data on which he proc~eds seem worthy of confidence, and he concludes that the amount of such bills continually in circulation, continually performing the functions of money, is not less than three hundred millions S'rERLING. 'Vhether this statement be strictly accurate or not, it cannot be doubted by any man ill the least conversant with the present mode of managing business, that bills and promissory notes issued and circulated by manufacturers, merchants and traders, do at present constitute by far the greater part of the circulating medium, understanding by that the instrument used for buying and selling, of this commercial and euterprising country. This species of money is comparatively of such modern origin, and has grown up with such great rapidity, that governments have not yet thought of regulating its issue except by levying a stamp duty on bills and notes; we are all therefore fully sensible that this valuable instrument is not the offspring of legislation. It may be even doubted if there be any .. A Letter to the Right HOIl. G. Canning, &c. &e. Henry Bll1'g'ess, Esq., page 19.
t
By
Ihid. page 24. This letter is evi,lently written hy a man well aClluaillted with the commercial districts of England ; and the statement deserves, I am informed, the confidence of the reader.
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NECESSITY OF COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY.
possibility either to regulate or control it by law without such an interference with private business as would not be tolerated. Whether the few presumptuous beings who call themselves, and who get a multitude of beings as unwise as their masters are presumptuous, to call them the state, sanction the issue of commercial paper money or not; whether they permit bankers' notes for every sum, or limit them to a specific amount, paper money must and will form the principal part of the circulation in every well-peopled and industrious country. It grows up in all count.ries, for it is in use in every part of the civilized world, unwilled by the legislature and almost unknown to it; and seems as necessary a step in progressive improvement as that metallic currency, which it has already superseded to a vast extent, and seems destined almost wholly to supersede. It is not a question of theory, whether paper can be substituted for gold and silver; it is not a proposed arrangement of some individuals, or of the legislature, to employ paper for metallic money; it is not a scheme of some hot-brained projector, hut it is found in practice and by general agreement, that by far the greater number of exchanges can be and are actually made without using metallic money. The costly commodities of gold and silver may therefore be dispensed with in the progress of society, and all the labour necessary to keep a money of the precious metals in circulation, amounting to several millions sterling per annum, in this country alone, may, hy the happy invention of commercial paper money, be directed to produce commodities adapted to supply our animal wants or add to our enjoyments. The promissory notes issued by bankers, commonly
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Free Banking I BANKERS PROMISSORY NOTES.
205
known by the name of bank notes, are only one particular Idnd of commercial paper money. Properly speaking, they no more fall to be considered in the science of political economy, than the promissory notes or bills of any other class of traders. They form altogether, including the Bank of England. notes, and all the bank notes issued by private bankers, not above the sixth part of the commercial paper money of the country. Why they should have so exclusively attracted the attention of politicians, and why they should have been the subjects of so much censure, while every other description of paper money, particularly that authorised by governments, the very worst of all, should lmve been unnoticed or praised, cannot be accounted for on any scientific principles. But this being tile fact, I propose very briefly to explain the origin and utility of private bankers, and of the bank notes issued by them; from which we may probably learn, that they are a necessary part of that great social system of production which is not the offspring of legislation; and they therefore do not require, in any manner or degree, to be regulated by the legislator. With the exception of banks expressly established by governments, like the Bank of Assignats, at St. Petersburg, and the Bank of Stockholm,-and of banks incorporated and authorised by governments, to which they have granted exclusive privileges, like the Bunk of England, it is plain that the existence of such a class of tradesmen as bankers can no more be attributed to any act of the legislature, than the existence of such separate classes as farmers and merchants. As men multiplied, and division of labour was extended, one class of men came to deal only in money, as ano-
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ORIGIN AND UTILITY OF BANKERS.
ther class deals only in wine, or in Manchester goods. As trade extended, the exchanges between different states, and different parts of the same states, became more frequent, and many transmissions of money or bills of exchange became necessary. This species of business fell into the hands of those who dealt exclusively in money. In consequence, it was soon found convenient to employ them in settling all accounts between merchants living at different places} and even at the same place. From the extensive connexion they formed by this employment, they came to know, better than any other men, the mercantile character and credit of merchants and manufacturers: they were, therefore, enabled to lend out money to advantage; and most of the persons who had money to lend, placed it in their hands for this purpose. They accordingly became, and still are, the chief agents in supplying money or capital to those who engaged in useful undertakings, the produce of which could not be immediately brought to market. Thus arose that class of men called bankers, who are still very important, and have long been very useful labourers. We may be satisfied of their utility by observing, that they are found in every part of Europe, and that all classes and conditions of tradesmen and dealers 'Voluntarily employ them. They first sprang up in Italy, then the most enterprising and civilized part of the world; they came from that country to this,-Lombard Street, the great seat of our banking establishments, deriving its name from them,-and at present, while theirs is a branch of business almost extinct in Italy, it is established in every town of this country, now the great seat of commercial enterprise, and the farthest advanced in the
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Free Banking I ORIGIN OF THEIR ISSUE OF NOII::S.
207
natural system of co-operating production. Their business results naturally, therefore, from division of labour, and is extended as men multiply. Being only one small, though a necessary branch of this vast system, why should their proceedings or business be in any manner regulated by that legislative authority, wllich had no hand in establishing, and is unable to extend division of labour? In fact, there is only one small part of their business with which our government does interfere, viz. the issuing of promissory notes. Let us look, therefore, at its natural origin. They receive money in deposit, and they lend money. They are, as the rule, therefore, persons of established credit, and worthy of confidence; and their promissory notes, on account of their transacting all the money transactions of the neighbourhood, are naturally much more acceptable than those of any other tradesmen. Instead, therefore, of lending money to a merchant or manufacturer to buy commodities, they lent him their credit. They exchanged the large promissory notes or bills of other tradesmen, for their own small promissory notes. To the merchant, on account of their established credit, these small notes were as valuable as gold. The bankers have confidence in the individual to whom they lend money, for the whole length of time his bills are to run j and their promissory notes are, to all other persons, better than his, on account of their general credit, and on account of being made payable at sight " while the large commercial bills drawn on account of commodities not yet in the market, are always made payable at some specific and distant time. Bank notes grew out of bills of exchange and promissory notes, and only differ from
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BANK NOTES A PART OF THE NATURAL SYSTEM.
other species of commercial paper money, in being the promissory notes of a particular class of tradesmen deserving general credit; and in general having the great advantage of being payable at sight. The circumstances which led to the invention of them are made so palpable by these gradual steps, and they are obviously so useful, being adopted without the interference of the legislature,-and, generally, adopted in proportion as the community advances in opulence,-that we can, I think, have no hesitation in supposing them also to be a necessary part of the great natural system of co-operative production. I see no scientific reason, therefore, why the issuing of promissory notes by bankers should in any respect or degree be regulated, controlled, or influenced by the legislature. The astonishing extent to which the practice is carried of settling accounts and making payments, without the intervention of money, can hardly be known to the great majority of the community. In London there is a place called the Clearing House, at which the clerks of the different banking-houses meet at one specific time every day, to balance all accounts between these houses; and as almost all merchants and dealers of every description make all their payments by means of bills payable at some banker's, or by checks drawn on a banker; as they all have their money paid into a banker's, and as a considerable quantity of business originating in the country is transacted or settled for in town, not only by far the larger quantity of all the payments of every description arising from the trade of the metropolis, but also from the trade of a large part of the country) are made by the London bankers; the consequence is, that they have daily immense sums to
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Free Banking I BUSINESS OF THE CLEARING HOUSE.
209
pay to each other. In 1810, according to evidence given before the Bullion Committee, the amount settled on ordinary days at the London Clearing House, between the different bankers, was at least five millions sterling; and 011 settling days, at the Stock Exchange, this amount was frequently fourteen millions. By means, however, of the clerks of the different banking-houses meeting at the Clearing house, and only paying the balance of their respective accounts, 220,000[. was the whole amount of money or hank notes required to pay the enormous sum of five millions sterling daily. The bankers of the metropolis are the agents for paying the greater part of the bills ill circulation; so that, ill fact, the chief money transactions of all England are settled by the insignificant sum' just mentioned. Even this, it is supposed on good grounds, may and will be dispensed with. Such is a specimen of the natural and vast system of cooperating production; which, unknown and unmarked by us, is continually extended, and continually simplified. So much nonsense is spoken in Parliament, and written in the world at large, about bankers and bank notes, that it is right to add, that this beneficial simplification is the result of banking, and of employing commercial paper-money. Briefly to enumerate the advantages of bank papermoney. It seems to me to be such a useful instrument for supplying the daily wants of those whose products require a long time to perfect them, that it can no more be dispensed with, as society advances., than weights and scales. It is cheaper than coin; and the profits made by bankers in the first instance, arose from their substituting a cheap for a dear instrument.
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ADVANTAGES OF BANK NOTES.
Such profit, however, can only be large while the process of getting rid of the coin is going forward, which must in its own nature ever be very gradual. By no possibility could paper be made all at once to supply the place of the precious metals among a people accustomed to the latter as coiu. Among a people once accustomed to paper-money, and who have again had a metallic currency forced on them, it may, if circumstances permit, be suddenly substituted for gold. This process of getting rid of the coin, and replacing it, our government has renewed almost lleriodically; at one moment ruining bankers, and at another tempting cupidity to turn banker, by the prospect of enormous profits; permitting the issue of country bank notes for small sums in 1822, and forbidding it in 1826; while before 18.16 it will most probably again be permitted. In the measures which have been adopted or recommended as to issuing bank notes, it would be difficult to find a single scientific principle. They are directly and completely adverse from the regular progressive and steady march of civilization. The quantity of money, it has been explained, required at any time in society, depends on the quantity of business. Now this necessarily varies with tIle seasons. To keep money as much as possible steady in its value, the quantity should vary with the business to be done. As the rule, bankers only issue their note!; by discounting bonafide commercial bills, which are the best possible data for judging of the quantity of business. The issue of bank notes varying with the amount of bills discounted, they being also in all cases returned to the banker, if he put too many in circulation, is, perhaps, the best method which can be imagined or devised
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Free Banking I PREVENT FLUCTUATIONS IN VALUE.
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to make the quantity of money in society vary with the quantity of business. Thus bank notes, when the issue of them is freely permitted, when no corporations are endowed by the legislature with exclusive privileges, when the issues of every banker are checked and controlled by the watchfulness of rival bankers, tend continually to prevent all those fluctuations in prices which are occasioned by alterations in the relation between the quantity of business to be transacted, and the quantity of money in circulation. If little or no coin be used, it forms a nominal standard not liable to deterioration from wear. Paper money supplying its place, and being continually renewed at the expense of those who issue it, suffers no deterioration. In this case coin becomes to paper what the imperial gallon deposited in the custody of the Speaker of the House of Commons is to all the measures of capacity in the kingdom,-an almost invariable standard, subject to none of the bruisings and batterings of daily use, by which they may be, but by which paper is, at any an'd all times corrected and reformed. Having such a nominal standard as long as the circulation of paper is entirely free) it seems to be a measure of value which would be liable neither to depreciation nor fluctuations. The characters on paper-money are legible, and every man capable of reading may tell its value; but to know whether coin be good or not, requires the skill of the assayist. Bank notes are on this account also hetter than coin. That they have been frequently forged seems to me, in almost all cases, the result of the Bank of England monopoly. Notes issued by private bankers, who control and check each other, are rarely or
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EVILS CAUSED OF LATE
never forged. Their circulation is so limited as to space, and they are, in the natural course of business, so frequently returned to the issuer, that to forge them, with any prospect of advantage, is almost impossible. Of the credit due to a country banker, whose notes supply the place of money only in his own immediate neighbourhood, almost every man in whose hands they fall can judge; so that it is hardly too much to suppose if the whole business of banking were left, like the business of making hats and clothes, perfectly free, if there were no government and national banks, that bank notes could neither be forged nor issued to excess.· I beg the reader will recollect that I have only endeavoured to ascertain the natural origin of commercial paper-money, and that I mean tlle above observations only to apply to that species of papermoney which grows up among tlle productive classes • If the statement in the text, as to the origin of paper-money, and the source of its utility, be correct, we cannot condemn every species of government paper-money too strongly; governments are not producers, they have no commoditiell on their road to the market, and can have no claim whatever to issue paper-money. Even exchequer bills are wrong, they represent a revenue hereafter to be received, but all the credit which can be reasonablyobtained on the commodities which will constitute that revenue, is obtained and used by bills and notes of one kind or another, while the merchants and manufacturers are preparing these commodities, or bringing them to market. All hills drawn and circulated on mere revenue by those who do not produce commodities, although they may hereafter be entitled to receive certain sums, are more than is required for the business of the country, and are always issued that the issuer may obtain a share of other men's produce before he has any legal claim to it.
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Free Banking I BY PAPER MONEY.
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of society from the division of labour. That both government and commercial paper-money have in our time been productive of incalculable mischief, it would be madness to deny. We have seen nominal prices rise and fall twenty per cent. within a few years,-the variations having been caused by an improper issue of paper-money. Whole hecatombs of unfortunate wretches have been sacrificed on the altars of the law for imitating the names of those who were abusing public confidence to a much greater degree than their victims who suffered the penalty of death for their guilty avarice. Debts have been augmented or lessened, and all money contracts substantially violated. One class has been defrauded to enrich another; and the whole course of business has been diverted from its usual channels. No man has in consequence been certain of the amount of his income for two successive years; and confusion, dismay, and terror, such, perhaps, as were never witnessed in any country not overrun by a victorious enemy, nor devastated by some great natural calamity, have been caused in this, year after year, by an alteration in the quantity and value of paper-money. If such evils were inseparable from the invention, whatever may be its natural advantages, they would be far outweighed by its social disadvantages, and it would be impossible to condemn paper-money too strongly. But the reader will find in the Wealth of Nations, in l\'lr. M'Culloch's admirable article entitled Money, in the Supplement to the Encyclopredia Britannica, and in lUr. Storch's book, numerous examples of governments having caused, by tampering with metallic coin, "a greater and more universal revolution in the fortunes of private persons," to use
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NOT NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF BA~K NOTES.
the language of Dr. Smith on this subject, "than could have been occasioned by a great public calamity." In consequence, however, of the present extended use of paper-money, governments have latterly, and since the publication of Dr. Smith's book, always effected the same unhallowed purposes, by tampering with paper-money; and the present generation feeling only present evils-regardless, apparently, or ignorant of the economical history of Europe-has attributed those fluctuations to the instrument itself, which have been caused by the manner in which it has been abused by the 'venerated governments of E~rope. Such fluctuations, caused by similar conduct, frequently occurred when the whole circulation of Europe consisted only of coin. If from the abuse of paper-money we are to condemn its use, nothing will escape our censure. What can he more lovely or consoling than religion, and what has been perverted to more detestable purposes? In its name are continually practised base hypocrisy, blasphemous iniquity, and shameless plunder. With the perversion of a beautiful natural contrivance, with the wrong-headed speculations of ignorant and designing men, with the gambling and fraud of scheming projectors, with the ignorant cupidity of kings and statesmen, the natural science of national wealth has nothing more to do than to point out in what manner their conduct is opposed to its principles; though we must all lament that infatuation in m!lnkind, which refuses to take counsel from experience, and continues, after repeated proofs of deceit, fraud, and treachery, to place confidence where confidence never was merited. Declining on all occasions to examine in detail the effects
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Free Banking I LOCAL BANKERS THE BRST.
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of social regulations, I cannot explain the circumstances which have led in this country to the perversion of paper-money. I agree, however, fully with Dr. Smith, " that private and local banks, and private and local bank notes, which may be called natural, as contra-distinguished from legislative paper-money, are attended with the most advantages, and the fewest dangers." From the conduct of the governments of England, Russia, Austria, France, Denmark, and Sweden, with respect to paper-money-of which an impartial and not unfavourable account is given in lVlr. Storch's book-it is plain, that national and government bank-paper, ought on no account to be tolerated. Governments have no commodities on the way to the market, which is the natural guarantee of all papermoney j they cannot be compelled to make payment, and they can know nothing of individuals, which knowledge is the only secure foundation for giving them credit. l\:f uch has of late been said against Country bankers, and I readily admit, they deserve censure; but whoever takes into due consideration the vast extension of business within the last fifty years, and the great demand for bank notes, in consequence of the political state of the country, giving immense profits to bankers, will find numberless excuses for their conduct, which cannot be made for other classes of tradesmen, who have effected equal mischief by the circulation of their papermoncy. Banking, or at least the issuing of bank notes, is, as it were, a new business, and while the temptations to engage in it have been very great, the correct methods for carrying it on have been imperfectly known. And after all that has been said against country bankers, their issues of late have been far from extravagant. It
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ISSUES OF COUNTRY BANKERS.
is proved, for example) by parliamentary documents, that the issues of the Bank of England have been trebled in amount since the year 1792, while the amount of the issues of Country bankers were less, immediately prior to the late revulsion in the latter end of 1825, by seven millions, than they were in 1814, and less by four millions than in 1807. * Nothing but colossal power can work colossal mischief, and if that revulsion and consequent distress were in any degree caused by paper-money, they were so vast and extensive, that nothing less than the immense power of the Bank of England, which did actually vary the amount of its issues one-sixth within a few short months, could have caused them. Whatever may have been the real object of the Acts of Parliament passed in the year 1826, to put a stop to the issuing of bank notes for one and two pounds, because Mr. Canning supposed, very ridiculously, that country bankers were usurping the king's prerogative of coining money, their effects have been to injure country and local banks, which are the best kind, and to augment the power of the Bank of England, which has already done inconceivable mischief. They are a direct violation cf the principles of free trade, which the ministers profess; but as the Bank of England is under the control of government, those Acts have added to the power which it before possessed over the currency of the country. By tampering with it, the government has already inflicted vast misery on us, and no man can expect, from this added power, any other result than increased mischief. t ... See Edinhurgh Review, No. 87. Article Commercial Revulsions. t The consequences of Messrs. Canning and Huskisson, dc-
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Free Banking I BANKING REGULATED BY NATURAL LAWS.
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That issuing bank notes and the business of banking, must be conducted on some settled principles to make them advantageous, is quite certain; but to expound those principles, is the duty of the persons who write on the art of banking. As both the value and quantity of metallic money are regulated by natural circumstances, as the quantity of paper-money necessary is determined by the number of exchanges to be made, there is reason to believe, that the whole business of issuing bank notes is subject in its minutest details, to controling natural circumstances, many of which, whether theoretically known or not, are already acted on. parting in this instance from the liberal principles of free trade, on which their popularity was founded, are now coming home to them. By destroying country bank notes, they added to the general distress, lowered prices, and increased the difficulties they must at any time have encountered in amending the corn laws, to whil'h they stand pledged. On the one hand they gave, hy increasing the distress, additional urgency to the claims of the manufacturing classes for the repeal of those laws; on the other, hy lessening the quantity of the circulating medium and thus lowering the price of corn, they alarmed all the agriculturists and all the landlords, who are under engagements to pay specific sums, and roused sllch opposition and such dread of the consequences of altering the corn laws, that it is doubtful if they can carry through their poor and spiritless measure; and it is certain they can accomplish hy it nothing Leneficial. To have oLtained a satisfactory modification of the corn laws from the landed gentry, it was necessary that prices should he high, that they should have Leen threatened with an inundation of foreign corn undel' the present law; hut this necessity, which Legan to exist, was in part removed hy the illiheral measure respecting eountry hankers, which thus sllpplied tho~e who predously hated hoth Mr. Canning and Mr. II uskissoll with arh'1lments against them, and has tended to destroy their popularity and ruin their reputation.
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OUGHT NOT TO BE CONTROLLED.
There can be no doubt, for example, that there is a point at which it becomes disadvantageous to substitute paper for coin. Some persons of good judgment have stated, that one pound is below this point; and this principle, though it has not been either scientifically or practically ascertained, has been made the basis uflegislation. Banking, however, let us never forget, with the issuing of bank notes, is altogether a private business, and no more needs to be regulated by meddling statesmen, than the business of paper making. In fact, the impertinent interference of law-makers, their pretended wise regulations, but in reality their tricks and frauds, with the currency, have been the causes of all the evils we have suffered within the last century from variations in the value of metallic and paper money; and nothing can rescue mankind from such desperate fluctuations in prices, as have of late afflicted all the countries of Europe, but allowing, both the coining of metallic and the issuing of paper money, to find, under the controlling influence of natural circumstances, their proper course and just level.
71
[3] Excerpt from G. Poulett Scrope, Quarterly Review, 439-57
For these reaSOIlR, we reject the proposal of a degradation of the standard established in 1819, as essentially unjust, inadequate for tlte )Iurpose, amI destructive of all credit, pulJlic as well as private, and of all reliance on the security of property, which it is the very oltiect of the remedy we are in search of to confirm and maintain. There remains anotller course for consilieration; one which we have urged for sometillle past on the public, as the true mode of relief from 0111" Illonetary dilliclIlLies; one which, if it cannot be expected to work a JIIiraele in the imlllediate restoration of the lIational industry to vigorous health, will at least bring about a gr:llitml Cllre, by givillg room mill play for the development of the vi.y 1I'!rciicafrix inherent in the patient's constitution; which, if it will not at alice relieve creditors from the burden of their eugagelllcllts, will at least put them in the way of paying them off by industry and exertion, without :lIIy additional incull1brance. We mcan the removal of the mischievolls restrictions which now fetter the circulation of credit through this country, and the concession of thc free right of cOlllmerce to provide itself with whatever instJ"llnwnls it lIlay J"<'c(uire for cikcting its exchanges, IIninterfered with lJy those ollicious legislative illtcrmeddlillgs which experience has sulliciently proved to lJe fatal to almost everything they touch, but to nothing so much as to the currency. It is physically impossible to carryon the commerce of the civili7.ed world by the aid of a purely metallic currency-no, not though our gold and silver coins were every tenth year dcbased to a tcnth ! Why, in London alone, five millions of money are daily exchanged at the Clearing-house, in the course of a few 1lOurs. We should like to see the attempt made to bring this infinity of transactions to a setllement in coined money. Credit money, in some shape or other, always has, and llIust have, performed the part of a circulating mediulll to a very consideralJle extcnt. And (by one of those wonderful compensatory processes which so frequently claim the admiration of e,·ery investigator of civil, as well as of physical economy) there is in the unture of credit an elnsticity which causes it, whcn left unshackled by law, to adapt itself to the necessities of commerce, and the legitimate demands of the market. Well may the pl"Oductive classes exclaim to th(}~e who persist in legislating on the subject, and are Ilot cOlltl'nt without determining who lJIuy, and \\,110 may not, give credit to another, what kind of mouied obligations shall, 01" shall
not,
73
Free Banking I
440
The Rights of Industry and the Banking System.
1101, be allowed to circulate-tllat is, to be taken in exchange for goods at thc option of the parties-well might they cxclaim, as the lllerclHlnts of !'uris did to the ministcr of LOllis. whcn hc askcd what his mastcr cOllld do for thclll-' Luisscz 1I0US fuire,'-' L('ave liS alonc, to SlllTOUlid ourselvcs wilh thosc prcculltions which cxpericncc will suggcst, und thc instinct of sclf-prcscrvation put in execution.' But tlrc simple principlcs of banking, as laid down by Adalll Smith /rail' a century ago, have uevcr been acted IIpon or rcgarded by the government of this country. Ami it will be of SOlllC servicc to take a brief rcview of thc successi vc interfcrenccs of our o\\'n legislature with the crcdit-currency of .England, anti bring into juxta-position with thcse scvcral measlII'cs thcir imlllcdiatc rcsults, as they showcd thcmselves in the gcncral priccs of produce, and the condition of the productivc classes. Thc first and Illost fatal error was thc concession, or at Icast thc continucd rcncwal of thc Bank chartcr, by which a JIIonopoly in the issuc of notcs within sixty-fi"e lIIiles or London, accompanicd by a prohihition on their"issuc by more than five partncrs in any part of England, was confirmed to a metropolitan banking COI11pany, undcr tllC IIIa1H1gement of a secret dircctory, whosc procccdings, uncheckcd by the WllOlcsolllc restraints of competition, responsibility to sharcholders, or public supervision, werc ncccssarily liable to crror am\ capriec, granting the abscnce of any intercsted motivcs. By their faulty management of this privileged monopoly, the valne of the entire currcncy has bccn often unrcasonably, amI without warning, deranged, and evils of the greatest magnitude inflicted on the tradc of thc coulltry. This mismanagemcnt led to thc next crror of the legislature, the act of 1797, for relieving this privilcgcd bank from tire liahility to pay its 1I0tes on dcmand. No govcl'lllllent, having sound notions on the nature of p:lpcr currcncy. would have tnken such a stcp, ' for 110 calamity that conld befall thc country from the vicissitudes of war, short of thc actual conqncst of it, could be more calc.ulatcd to expose it to immediate cmbarrassment, and ultimate ruin and bankruptcy, than thlls letting tIle llanks loosc upon the public, to issue whatever quantity of papcr they pleased.'* The Bank dircctors having no dcfinite rule for their guidance, and being hampercd moreover by thcir conncxion with govcrnment, at one timcenlarged, at anothcr diminishcd their issues, with little or 110 rcgard to the real demand for money; and thc flllctuations thus occasioncd in prices, brought ullavoiclnulc ruin on the heads of thousands, and converted trade into a mere gambling spcculation. Thus, ill 1801-12, Bank-notcs were at a discollnt, comparcd with gold, of sevcn or eight per '" Parnell on Banking, &c.
cent.,
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The Riglds of Industry and the Banking System.
441
cent" which ill the next year was reduced, by diminished issues, to two and a half per cent. But in 1sag, and the five following years, the lhnk poured forth such a profusion of paper as depressed its value from ten to twenty-five per cent. below that of bullion; while imlllediately after, in 1815-16, a sudden contraction of. the issues brought lip the notes to withill OIlC :1IIt1 a half per cent. of par with gold, and, as a Hatural consequence, 110 less than two hundred alld forty clllintry hanks stopped payment. The return to cash paymcnts in HllD was an attempt, on the part of government, to retrie\'e their prcvious error in the Bank restriction act, aud, we may add, by committing an equal or still greater error. For, in the first place, it was altogether overlooked by Mr. Hicnrrlo, Lord Liverpool, and the other advocates of the restoration of the slandard, thnt, under the restriction, gold, not having been walltcd for use as a medium of exchange throllgh the 13ritish elllpirc, was thereby lowered in value, but that the certaiu effect of a retllrn Lo specie payments IlIust be an advance in its valuc proportioned to the increased llcmand that would arise for it to be employed as coin; and that consequently the market price of bullion at that time could ue no measure of the value it would obtain after the passing of all aet which went to create a new demand for gold to the extent of perhaps thirty lIIillions. The secoud error of the bill of 181!), was, that not being accompanied by measures for repealing the llIonopolyof thc Balik of England, and putting the system of credit cUITency on a footing of freedom and security, it failed in its object of providing a steady ami uniform supply of money. Instead of any approach to freedom, indeed, new restrictions were imposed. A n act was passed prohibiting the issue of all notes under five pounds; the consequence of which, and of the obligation on banks to provide a reserve of gold, was an insufficient supply of money, alltl the fall of prices which brought on the severe distresses of 1821. .As a (em porary relief the small notes were again permitted to issue; bllt here the opposite error of the legislature (which, throughout the whole of this unhappy drama, invariably controlled what ought to be left free, and gave full license to what ought to he coutrolled) came into play. Whilst the law actually prohibited the formation of banks all the broad foundation of an extensive partnership, any illdi-viduul, though destitute of a shred of property, had liberty to issue !lotes wit,hout guarantee of any kind. The natllral consequence was, that at the iirst, favolll'abl~ J)rosp~ct of tl'3de, an, over-issue occurred fr?m parties who rmg Lt gatn, bllt '!ad nollul!g ,t,o lose, ~y fomentlllg the most extravagant speculatlOlls 011 fictitIOUS capital. Hence mose the lIlad excitemellt and delusivc prosperity of IH24-5; till, at
Free Banking I
442
The Rights of Industry and the Banlcing System.
at the dose of the latter year, the bubble hlll'st; the sudden withdrawal of the issues of the Bank of Ellgland, alarmed at lellgth (that is, six mOllths after it should have perceived the danger) at the state (If the exchanges, gave the signal of a general pallic; credit of every kiwI was paralyzed, and the ulliversalnation on the eve of h:mkruptcy. 'Vhat measures, after this severe lessoll, did the legislalnre adopt? Were they at length taught by experience the necessity of establishing a sOllnd banking system? 17m' from it. They left the coulltry b:lnks of England :IS unsafe- :11\(1, of course, after the failure of seventy, far more discredited than before; lll1d instead of giving freedom to the issue of paper by responsible parties under etlicient securities, they fettered the circulation with precisely the same trammels which had brought on the sufferings of 18£ I, and passed the bill of 182G, again prohibiting the issue of small notes. The result, of course, Ims been the same train of unhappy consequences as before, namely, the continued and increasing distress of every branch of industry. Dllrillg each of these successive phases, the changes ill the conditioll of the productive classes, alternately elev:lted allil depressed, stimulated by high prices and ruined by low, so illllllediately followed the corresponding alte\Oations of the cmrency-laws, as to leave no room for doubt on the conncxion of the two as cause alld effect. Whilst these sec-saws of general prosperity and adversity evince the dangerous and mischievous character of our uctllal monopoly-crippled banking system, under which every relaxation brings on over-issue. ovcr-speculation, and a crash-every contraction grinding und intolerable distress; they, at the sallie tillie, suffice to prove that the effeet produced 011 prices by the comparative scarcity of the predous metals, which, during ullthis period, were diminishing ill quantity, can be cOllnteracted by the operation of paper Illoney; and lead to the conclusion that we have only to build our system of IJaper currency on a ratioual foundation, to secure our pl"Odnctive classes from sllilering in any way through the increasing deficiency of gold aud silve.·. There are, we know, some statesmen who oppose allY reconsideration of om monetary system, crying, ' Let us meddle uo 1I10re with the currency; it IllIs never been tampered with, Imt evil has followed.' This would be nil very reasonable if the currency were not at this moment interfcred with by the existing laws, and prevented from estahlishing itself, as it would otherwise do, OJ: a sound basis. Instead of being" sellled, as sOllie imagine, it is, at this moment, ill the most vitiated, unsettled, and deranged condition, through the perverse cuntrol of the I:IW. That law, as we have said, gives unlimited
75
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Free Banking I
1.7te Rights of Industry and the Ran/ring System.
443
mited license to cOlllltry ballks to issue notes without a farthing of property to back them, at the sallie time that it prohibits their issue by parties of slIch IlUtllUer and pledgcd capital as would offer an effectual guaralltee for their solvettcy. It follows, of course, that battks of this stamp, attd of which as matty as seventy uroke at ottce bttt the other day, cmlnol possess fit" ol1lfidel1ce of the 'filMic, who therefore, ill gelleral, prefer gold to their lIotes. The prohibiliott of Ilotes under five pottllds still further increases the lll1JOUltt of gold required for circttlatioll. The consequellce is the absorption of all itllmense allJottnt of sovereigns into active use, in additioll to the reserves of the ilallk of ElIglalld, nnd the numerous coulltry banks which, from the ticklish state of their credit, must keep by thelll a large stock of coin.* But a gold circulation is necessarily a dear and a cOlltracted one. Country battks will by no mealls :H:comllJodatc their customers with advances in gold to the samc (!xtCttt that thcy would in theit· own lIotes. Their httsiI1CSS Iltust clItirely change its nature if, ittslcad of leudittg their credit or responsibility, they arc to lend hard cash. Their advances in this case mllst be greatly limited, and they mnst also charge SHch an interest 011 thenl as will cover, Itot merely the risk and the expense of their establishment, but likewise a pro/it on their capital employed itt the purchase of gold. The cottseqllence mllst be, and is, a great limitatiolt ill the atltOllttt of country circulation, a s·carcity of tltottey, and a ruinous fall of prices. llut it is dcnied by some that there is UllY deficiency of mouey. On the contrary, ' the money-market,' they say, ' is glutted. In London loans of money are to be obtainctl at three or four per cent.' They do not perceive that the deficiency of the money in
* There call he no
Free Banking I
44·1,
The Rights of Industry and tlte JJa71l~ing8ystr1ll.
circulation through the cOllntr)" nnd its acculllulation ill the hands of c:1pitalists who can find no use for it, instead of being inconsistent with each other, are necessarily co-existent, and are both owing to the same cause, the weak, crippled, and uiscredited. :ltate of the eOl\ntry banks, whose peculiar provincc it is to facilitate thc circulation of money, to act as the intermediate party between those who wi~h to lend and those who wish to borrow. Werc the laws repealed which paralyze the eflicicncy of thesc establishments, ~llId a wcll-organized system of banking introduced, the capital which now stagnates in the metropolitan money-market woulu, by its agency, bc spread over the whole slIrface of the eountry, and employed in Slllall portions in prolllotillg the various operations of productive industry. There are, however, still we believe a (daily diminishing) llumber of persons, who consider that tile laws of 1810 and 182(j, though followed, tlley admit, by great temporary distress and t1iflieuity, have ,et alfonled us the' invaluable blessing' of a ' sound allll wholesome' cmrcncy. SOllnd and wholesome! A state of thc circulating mediulll which has turned the horn of peace illto a phial of wrath; which, after twelve years of ~lggravated sllirerings and IIlIexampled struggles, has draggcd the iuuustriollS por1ioll of tbe COlJllllllllity to the brillk of all abyss, alit! will illevitably, if eOIltilJlJed, preeipitate them illto litter destruction; which bas brought about a decreasillg revellue, a failiug COllllllerce, a ruilled lauded interest, starving mauufacturers, an ullcmployed, pauperized, tliscontented population-this, truly, is a s0ulld and wholcsome currency, and an invaluable blessing! Though the prejudiee which in 1S'2G ran so strongly in favour of a metallic CUlTcucy has been pretty wcll abated by the dearly bought experiellce of its' invaluable blessings,' yet the notion is still elltertailled b), SOll1e, that paper-money is a lictioll, an imposture,-' worthless rags,' as Cobbett calls them,-and metal the only safe eurrellcy. As to paper beillg fictitiou~, if hy this is lIIeHllt that it has 110 intrinsic value, that is precisely what constitLltes its peculiar merit, since it enables it, at 110 cost, to fullil the oflice of a capital which can be bctter cmployed in the production of consllmable cOllllllodities. But if uy lictitious is meant worthless, it call ollly refer to had paper, not to good; to the lIotes of rotten amI illsccme banks, not to those oi" ~ound and un'lllestiollaLle ones, for whose notes there can be 110 possible !loubt that gold IIwy be obtailled ·whenever it is required. The paper issued by ballks of the latter character, actually rrpresenflf, and is backed by a double c:lpital-that of the bankers themselves, and that upon the security which they have Jent their notes. The way, therefore,
or
77
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Free Banking I
The Riglds of Industry awl tlte Banking System.
445
fore, to prevent the issue of a fldiliollS currency is to rcquire security from banks, 01' to allow of companies being formed with a paid-lip capital as a guarantee of their solrcncy. liut for those who refuse making this improvcment on Ollt' banking system to cry alit against paper as bcing fictitious, when it is the miscmblc system thcy pertinaciously adhere to which alone admits of uny bad paper being issued, is sOlllething too much. Two powerful 1Il0tives hare contributed to create and keep alive this prejudice among certain c1asscs. l~irst, the bias which the monied interest. natllrally feels ill favour of a state of the circlllation which is continually adding to thcir wealth at the expense of thc rest of the community. Thc cry of' worthlcss rags' ",ill bc fOllnd chieHy to proceed from that intercsted quarter.· It would 1I0t bc diflicult to point out among the most prominent bullionists Some who have illcreased the value ofthcir propcrty half a million 01' more by thc cnforcemcnt of our' sound and healthy' system of currcncy! Secondly, the vague drcad cntcrtained by thosc who havc uot the capacity or leisure to probc the qucstion to the bottom, of the renewal of the banltruptcies of 1825, from which many of them arc still smartillg. No person, however, of information does, or ever cOllld dispute the vast superiority of a paper currenc), Mer OIlC of coin ;-thc advantage of saving thc expcnse of a cnpital of thirty, forty, or lifty millions in this cOllntry, locked lip in an IInproductive form, alit! ellabling us to clllploy a grcat part of tbis dead stock in adding to our wealth and enjoyments. A metallic currcncy is merely a more convenient form of barter. It still retains many of the inhcrent and unavoidable faults of that method of exchangc, appropriate to all age of barbarislll, though modificd by thc peculiar qllalities of tile precious metals, which render thelll, as is universally ndmittcd, a less objectionable mediulIl than any other cOllllllodity of intrinsic worth. But it is only the wallt of intercoursc between parties, 311(\ the consequent limitation of credit-or, in an advanced state of society, thc perlIicious illterferencc of government~-which cau forcc COlllmercc to cmploy, to any considerablc extent, so clumsy and costly an instrumcnt of exchange. In order to illustrate thc simple character and practical advalltage of a paper currcncy, let liS supposc three parties, of whom A oIVes lOut. to B-B thc sallie to C-allli C to A. There are thollsands of snch circlllatillg cngagements alwap in cxistence, thollgh varied ill thc amollnt allll the nUlllber of parties through whom the chain of obligation passes. A, for instance, is a maltster, B II fanller, and C his landlord; or A lIIay be a tailor, B a clothier, alld C a capitalist who has lent B mOllcy Oil ll1ortgllge. COlild these parties meet allll becollle aware of their \"IJI.. XI.\"lI. NO. XCI\". ,~ II n:lati\'c
Free Banking I 44G
The Rights of lndustry and tlte Banking System.
relative position, they would only have to exchange acquittances, and settle their accollilts withollt the use of mOlley in any shape. But the transactions of actual business are too lIlultiplied and complex to arlinit of all debtors and creditors assemhling in a room together to balance their respecti\'e acconnts in this way. Therefore money, in some shape or other, IIIl1st be employed for the purpose. Where the currency is purely or principally metallic, it is clear one of these parties, at least, 1I1nst make a fresh sale of goods, probably at a considerable sacrifice, in order to procure ca.ih with \"hich to pay his creditor. Ullder the system of cre(lit-cnrrency ill lise tllroughollt Lancashire, A wOllld pay 13 by his bill at a fixer! date; B would transfer it to C, and Chand it back again to A. This is clearly an immense improvement over the mode of pa)'lTIellt in an article of intrinsic value. But there are Jet great disadvantages attelldllllt on the use of private bills as currcncy. Before 13 will accept A's bill, he \IIust be convinced of his solvency. But how is a man who wants to sell to make himself aC(lllainted with the circulllstances of a\l who wish to huy? Two strallgers, for illstallce, bargain ill a fair 01' market. The bllyer prodllces a hill indorscd with a whole strin~ of n:llllcs. They lIIay be all .. espoll~ible pcrsons, :Ind yet thc H"lIer kilO'" nothing of :lny of tllcnl. 11 e mllst therefore either risk the chance of the indorsers beillg all JIIell of straw, or lose the sale of his goods. It is cvidently a vast improvcment IIPOII this awkward systcllI for a company of well-known alld wealthy pers{lIls to set lip a bimlc, backed by a large paid up capital, amI lelld their credit ill the shape of notes as a circulating medium in lien of either coin or private bills. The supposed transactioll wOllld thcn assume this shape. Either A wOllld borrow the 1001. of the bank on his personal security, with which to pay 13, or pay him in his bill which would be discounted at the ballk. In either case B would pay C in the notes; which. tholigh the chain or accounts extellded through the whole alphabet, wOllld settle them all without fllrther expense to any of the parties than the interest 011 the period rcquired to complete the transadion. The notoriolls credit of one great establi~hlllent is in this way employed as a substitute for the IInccrtain and varying credit (If individuals, or the costly and awkward mediulII of coin; and thc fac;ililies llllls aflimlcd to the circlllation and exchan;;e of every artiele of production, and thc COIISe(l'lcnt inGl'case of the trade, indllstry, allll wcalth of the country, are beyond all calculation. , The inventioll of pnper-III
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The Rights of II/(lnsfry and the Banking System.
447
one of the main call~es, as effertive a canse as the steam.engine itself, of the rapiel improvement of Great Britain in procluction and wealth, and of the rate at which she bas outstripped the remainder of the world. Does anyone believe that if our commerce had been cramped ,by restriction to an exclusively metallic circillation, we should have made the progress we have made within the last finy years? Though one sovereign may not circulate in the cOlin try, a paper-pound, payable in demand fo\' gold, at a fixed standard, hy banks of unquestionable security, is as safe, ami a less variable, and a far more convenient medium of exchange, than gold itself.'-Credit Currency, 1830.
But then, it is said, paper-money has been productive of immcuse and extensive mischief. U IHluestionably it has. The l1istory of the paper-currency of England, for forty years past, displays a snccession of flnctuations in the value of 1110ney which have occasioned irreparable il~jllry to millions. But since during this time there has existed in Eugland a rigid mOllopoly in favour of a chartered banking company, is it 1I0t just possible that these misfortnnes arc owing rather to the dcfective system of banking cansed by that monopoly, than to any inherent mischief ill papermoney, which, as we have shown, is merely the substitution of credit for barter, of a cheap :tnd relined mediulll of exchange for all expcnsive and clulllsy olle? Tllis presumption is COIIsiderably strcngthened when, Oil tllruin~ our eyes to a neighbouring country, ill which no 1II0nopoly 01" restriction 011 banking exists, but which, iu every other circLulIstallce relating to trade, is on the same footing exactly with England, we find a pure papercurrency to have supported itself for nearly a century and a half, not simply without producing any il~ury worth speaking of, but acknowledged by all to have beell one of the most efficient callses of the prodigiolls strides which Scotland has made in wealth and improvement during that period. Those, indeed, who look a little more closely into the matter, are perfectly able to trace all the mischief occasioned hy the English paper-currency to its necessary source in our monopoly-crippled banking system; while the freedom which characterises that of Scotland is ill their eyes the allsuflicicnl explanation of the security ami eflectiveness which cxperiellcchas proved it to possess. • Thc case of Rcotch hunking,' says ~ir H. Parnell, 'is, perhaps, the most perfect and satisfactory illustration of a science that has ever existed. It leaves nothing to be desired, in order to establish, beyomlllisp1Jte, the conclusion, that if hankers are restrained from issuing notes for less than twenty shillingR, and are subjected to tho obligation of an immediate anel Ul1COllditiollUI payment of their notes, as soon as prescllted, the trade of bankillg may, with safety to the public, be rcndered, ill all other reRpects, free.'-Poper lIfoney, p. 151. ~ II ~
Wc
Free Banking I 44~
'1'11" Rigltfso/ InrIllsfry (/nd the Banking S!Jstem.
"'c will
not here go into the description of that system, eicellencies of wllich were miulltely pointed ont in a former p:Iper, to which we refer our realiers. * We shall content ourseh·cs with liu)"ing, that with slIch an example before liS of a system Qf ptlper-currency, not merely perfect in theor)" but which has stO()1l the tcst of a century's experience, lind that not ill China 01' Utopia, out ill this island itself,-ill a part of Britain ill no JIlrtterial cirr:lIl11stallce differing from Yorkshire or Cumberland, except :1S being :1 few miles farther from London,-in the teeth of this to ha\'!' gone on Iloullflering, as we h:1ve done, from bad to worse, patching :11H1 botching ollr currency with oue qnbckery after another, ami settling down at last in an aUempt to carryon the t:')IIHlIl'l"Ce of this gr{'at country hy imrle1', lIlay wi'll he a matter of a;;tonis\tment ev{'n to those who arc 1II0st deeply convinced of the writy of Oxcnsticrn's saddelling retlection. The B:1llk is about to he pllt upon its trial; and if it call be pro,r·.d, Ily r"ir evidence, to have worked ",PlI for tl)(~ natiou at 1:11)1:1\ alld to lie tlte most lilling in~lrnnlenl tllat can h(' provided for tlte important purpose of slIpplying a soulld, IIniform, and slIfl"ir:iPllt circlllating medilllll, ' always filII, Hever ill excess,' then we -shall 1II0st willillgly hnil its rc-establislllileni. But we do 1I0t conceal our opinioll that its defenders will have great diflicllily ill lIJ:1kilig out their case. ]'vIr. Tooke, Mr. 1\1 IIshet, Sir 11. Parnell, Mr •• Joplin,,\" a urI 111 any other writers of great authority, have, as We think, demollstrated, that in each of the occurrences of sudden fllletllatioll in the vallie of the circulating medium, whidl, withill thl~ Inst forty years, have destroyed so much capital, alJ(l caused the ruin of so many innocent illdividuals,-in 17~):J, lSI J, IS15, [81 S, alltl 18'24-5, the mischief originated in the miscondllct or illJprudence of the Bank of England. In every installce it was t1ll~
* No. 86, art. Ii. 111t;le this nrtidc i. going throll:.;h the prc"" we prrccivn this gcntleman hns T"hli
\r"
II"""
}.lint ". a ft:now-lttl'(llln~J.'
ill this
eaU!ic.
81
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Free Banking I
The Rights of Indns'ry alld the Banking Sy~,tem.
~'19
thc state of the issues of that g(cat centl'al reservoir wllic:h enlUlHraged the iliad over-issue of the coulltry ballks; and it w:t!J tllc weldell nnd hlnly withdrawal of its accommodation that g:n'C the signal to the panics alld runs, before which those frail establi,~hlllellts-prevelltecl as they are by the law from haSj.l)g thelllselves O!l a foulldation sufliciclltly broad to sccure the (;ontrdellce of the public, except ill tillles of gencral excitement anll carelessness-gavc W;)y by scores. We have scen bllt one nttcllJpl at a defellce of the Balik, or plea for the rellewal of its exclusive privilcges,-thc pamphlet attributed to Mr. M 'Culloch, and entitled, ' 11 istorical Skctch of the Balik of Ellgland.' Of tlJC historical portion of this essay \ve have ollly to remark, tfr:lt it passes ill silencc over uearly all the successivc errors of the HUlIk I)irector~. Thus, whell the several IalllelltaLle revulsiolls uf credit frolll 17!J3 to 18Q5, arc under notice, the ackllowledged over-issuc of paper-Illollcy, in which they originated, is attrilmh:d to the ('oulltry UHlIks, alld llolhing is Bait! 0[" thc c:wllIple lIud eH(~ollrag(,llIellt alfordet! the III by the Balik of Ellgland. It \\'as impos~iule, howevcr, for thc writer not tl) adluit the flagrant instances of illl pmdellce on thc part of the Bank ill 1 i97 amI 1825; sO'the forlller i., excllsed Oil the grolllld of the ' prcssillg solicitations' l)f .M r. Pitt, alld the latler attributed to I a llIi~t:lke of tllC Directors.' lhit this elTor, it is said, ' frolll ",halc\'er C:lIISC it procecded, Wtls' lllOSt illjllrious 10 the Balik, which was urought illlo a ~talC of cOllsideraulc danger. We have, fb('niofe, the best of all S(!Cr!rities-the ollly one, indeed, 011 which the least stress can, hI" l;!r~l, -the plain alld oLviolls illterest of the parties concerned,thnt slich III istakes will not he offreq1/ellt OCCII'f'/"CTlCe.' (!) .May we not urgc against this, that ,we have the cvidcnccof,e'X.pe." ricncc-the Lest of all proofs,-that such l1Iistakcs will be, becmu.$(~ they hu\'c been, of frcqlleut OCCllrrCllcc? But placillg' evclI' orrl" expcrience out of view, that does lIOt slll'ely seem a very clefeusiIJle system, (L Jlrioti, which puts it in thc power of' a secl'et cOJUmittee of irresponsiLlc persons to bring the whole country to tllevcrge of gencral Lankmptcy by J a llIistake;' or an ' indiscre-· tion,' or at the' pressing solieitatioil' of a ministe!'. Having thus proved the advantage of giving to a pri'\'ilcged company the complete control over the "hole currency of the elllpirc~ by the slIpcrlatire argullIent that it is lIot probable this power would bc very /refjlU!1Iily, abused so far as to inl'oll'e thc whole commll.Jlity in rllin, the writer goes on to show, Hlat a systelll of freeumu. sllch as exists in Scotland, ofrers no silllilar security. To be !lUff: ~t was impossible for him to cieny thc stuLborn fact, thal HIe .Ellgli~hsy6tCIll, foullded on thc Bank mOllopoly, Iz(z.~ convulsc\i. ahe' Coulltry over allci o\'cr ngllin, whilc the free l'ystclll of Scotl:ul
pursued
Free Banking I
450
The Rights of Indll,yt1·y and the BlLllldng
83 ."'y,~te1n.
pursued the C\'CIl tCllor of its uscful course, wholly undisturbcd by panics or rlln5, ovcr-issues, 01' re-actions, The oilly rcsourec, therefore, of 0111' sage is to dcelare poitlt- bialik, that the systcm which is perfeelly safe iu Euinburgh would be destl'llctivc ill LondOIl! Alltl the I'eason, tllat one is a provineial, the uther a mctropolitan CUITeIlCY, und 'there is nu analogy bctween the two! ' This appears to liS It rlreum, The seclII'ity agaillst over-isslle, whieh proves practically effective in Edinburgh, is the knowledge that sllch over-issue must imlllediately depress the cxchange with Londlln, mill so crcate a delllllllli for gold 011 the ballks. Thc mallagcrs of the hauks on this uccollnt lIarrowly wateh the exehallgcs, alld elllarge or rcstriettheir isslies accordingly, The scclII'ity agaillst over-issue ill l ... ondoll, were banking as frce there us ill Edinburgh, would be the certuillty of its heilig, in like mallllcr, followcd by a fall of thc cxehallges with the c:olliillent, allll a drain of hull ion for cxportation, Whem is the real difl'crellce between the two cases '! Howcvcr, as if lIot relyillg IIIlIeh on this funeied distinction, 0111' author cOllfidently puts forward :mothcr objection as dccisivc of thc whole qucstion. AmI sincc there is some lIovelty ill his m'glllnellt, unt! tile case of the Balik is, by its ollly supporter, rested strictly UPOII it, we lIIust alroru sOlllcwlmt more space to its cxaminntioll thnll its substancc would otherwise merit. Thc objection is, that' how ndvalltngcous socver competition mny be in most cases, thc free competition of banks l1nL,~t occasion over-issue, beclmse it is in the power of anyone bank to render the whole currency redundant, allll it will be for its intcrest to do so in order to drive the others out of the field.' • As this,' writes our philosopher, , is a matter of vital importance in the discussion of this question, let us suppose that there are ten banks, all enjoying equal and unbounded credit, established in London for the: issue of notes, and that they have issued I,OOO,oool, each: suppose further, that 0110 of these establishments thinks proper, with a.view to some interest 01' }lurpose of its own, to increase its issues to 2,000,0001. : the curl'ency of the metropolis, assuming it to have been previously. at its proper level, will, of course, become redundant, and there will be a fall of the excha.nge, and a demand for gold, It is clear, however, from the fact of the over-issuing. hank being in quite as high crcdit as any of the others, that only tllC same lmrporlion, 01' ten pel' cellt" of its notes, will bc returned upon it for payment, that will he retul'lled upon the others, so that when the exchange has recovered itself, and the dl'llin lias ceased, it will have 1,tHR,000l, aOoat, mill the othel' banks !J09,oool, ench, 'J'hatsneh wonl,1 he the case 110 nne rau rensonahly douht, A merdmnt srI'S, from the deprcssion of thr r:o<ehnng(>. t.hat the cllrrcncy is redundant; nllfl as all notes urc, IIl1dl'l' the Cil'cuIIIstanecs snpposrd, .equally good ill his estimution, lie scmls those ill for payment which come first to hand, It is no busilless of his to inquire whether the redundancy
Free Banking I
84
The Riglds oj Illdu"~{ry and tlte Banking SY,'fiem.
451
dnllcl:lnC'Y of cnrrency he ocC'asioncd by the proceedings of the ,bank A 01' the bank B; neithcI', l'edIRI'R, eoulcl he ascertain the fact, though lie m're to .take the trouble of inquiring into it; and though he did, it would make no change in his conduct, So long as he believes the different notes to be alike good, he will show no preference to one more than to another, but will return them indiscriminately upon their issuers, while he can make a profit by doing so. 'rhus it appears, that wcre several lmnks fOl' the issue of notes established ill London, it would be in the power of anyone opulent hank to occasion a heavy drain for bullion, and great distress and emharrassment throughout the ('ollntl'y, (!) All that would he required to produce these results would he, that she should add considerably to the amount of her issues. Ami she might do this fOl' variolli'! ohjeC'ts, to realize an immediate lll'otit; to ohtain a great ultimate accession of husiness hy submitting to the risk of an immediate slIcI'ilict,; to weaken and embarrass her rivals, &c. It wou]el he to no ]Iurpose that all the other establishJl]cnts eonduetc'd theil' hnsilless ill the soberellt manner and 011 the l'oulldest principle!!; their foI"llCamnce could 110t prl!Vent them from hcing materially injured by the proceedings of this single establishment, and some of them would certainly be tempted to endeavour to repair the injury done them by aeting in the same way, It would therefore seem, that the free system, which we have been taught to consider as capable of eradicating all the evils that have been hitherto attached to banking, is one that, if intro
N ow the first and most obvious answer to this novel and elaborate argument is, tlmt it proves too much ;-it professes to demonstrate that the free com petition of bankS' must, everywhere and always, occasion over-issue, distress and embarrassment throughout the country. There are none of the circulllstances in the case assumed peculiar to London; they are common to rival banks in Scotland as well as everywhere else, Bllt it is afact, not denied even by the author, that, in Scotland, competition does not occasion over-issue; bllt, on the C01ltr31'y, completely prevents it: the experience of a hundred unci forty years might be appealed to as a sn/licient answer to our author's it priori argument to tire l~Oll trary; hnt the fallacy by which he is misled is easily seen through. His reasoning evidelltly proceeds on the assumption that the wh~le 'Illalltity of paper which a bank can oncl? push Ollt, by discounting at a lower rute, or on lighter security than its rivals, remains P1?771wTll?lllly on1, with the exception of its prop(lrtionate share of tfle entire o\"er-issue, But everyone knoll'S that, on the eCllltrar)" there is a eontinual and rapid return :Illd re-isslle of notes going 011 ;
85
Free Banking I
The Rights of Inclusf'l'Y wul the Banking System. on j so that to enable the o\'er-issuillg bank to keep al10at any lar
86
Free Banking I
The Rights nf Industry (/nrllhc Ban!til1g System.
oy
453
bullioll, rind t!leir profits being lessened this increase of thcir ullproductive stock,' they would be at lellgth drivell to imitate its example. Acclllllulate bullion! Why, in the first place there is a d1'Oiu. upon the banks for bullion supposed, by the ohject-or hilllself, to accompany this struggle; and we need lIot insist tllat there callnot be a ruillous draill and an illcomeniellt acculllulation in the bank reserves at tl:e sallie time. But, secoII(i1y, HllIst gold stick for eyel' in the collers of these ballks whell it ollce gets there? Can they uot sell it? Alld IIIlIst not the overissuing ballk buy the gold of them just as fast as they pour in its notes? aIHI, since they get the gold uf tllis bank at the Mint price, while the ballk lIIust buy it of thelll at the increased price \yhidl the over-issue has caused, is not the whole forcc of the drain throwlI upon the over-issuillg ballk alone by this combillatiull of the other ballks against it? A))(l is it lIot clear that, by occasionally resorting, 01' threatening to resurt, to this rcsource, the principal hanks llIay always prevent over-issue Oil the part of any individnal bank? And, inJacf, is not ove.,-i~stle uniformly so prevmfed -in Scolln.nd? And has it not constalltly operated so as to prevent it 'I Alld yet, on the stn~np;th of these shallow fallacies, our doglllatist declar('~ that the free co~lpetition of banks introdn~etl into t.()lItlOIl would ' a~gravate the over-isSllc of I Rq,~ It. flwnwwd-Ji,ld;' alltl , whclI die rCGoil did take place, as ill 18~5, the 0111)' ditl'crence would be that it would be a t!lot/sand timeg more Se1JC1"I?!' Pretty well this. In 1H£;, private and public credit were on the \'crge of extinction. IVlr. H IIskissoll declared the nation to ha\'c heclI witllin twenty-follr hours of a state of barter i-and the min aud billlkruptcies,-the snflerings alld lIIisery that were the actual results 01' that crisis, h:l\'C beelljustly described as unequalled since the breaking up uf the 1\1ississippi sche11le in l'rance. 1\nd Jet we arc told that the systell1 which gave rise to this crash is the best that can be devised; anti that another, which has been for a century in operation in Scotland \i'jth lllliforill s:ifety and success, wonld, if introduced illto Ellglantl, occ:lsion crashes IL fl101/,.l"lnd (imrs more srlJPrc! I f hardihood of assertii)JI were the only I'e(JlIisite in :1Il :Icivor.:tte, the BUllk directors, it rnll~t be owned, have seemed an able challlpion. 111 Iris remarks un the inipolicy of cstablisllillg It National bank, we nrc illclillcil to agree witli him; we ngree also ill Its beillg highly de~lrahle thnt whatever noteissuing Lank or b:ulks arc established ill Loudon shollid adopt the deposit and cash-credit system of Scotlalld, the benelits of which arc incaleulable, aud have been alreudy dwelt on in fOl'lller N limbersof this JOlll'llal. But as to engrafting this system Oll the Balik of Englalld, how is it to be accomplished? Once concene all exclusive
aCCitnwlu{c
Free Banking I
454
The Rights of Industry and the Banlcing System.
exclnsive privilrge to that or any other establishmellt, and 11.ley will act on the principle of all monopolists, namely, a narro\\"lng of the market, allll an enhancellJent of the terms. Competition alone can secure for the pnblic, in banking as in other things, the widest accommodation at the cheapest rate. On tllCse grollnds we d ifrcr wholly from the concluding assertion of ollr author, that the Bank of England ' answers, or lIlay casily be made to answer, every legitimate pnrpose that a bank ollght to serve, and that it would he IIlIwise to introduce new establishments in its stead, of wbich the results, in so far as they can be determined beforehand, may be Immo1!11ced il~urious alike to individllals and the public.' "\Ve :.tlinn, on the contrary, that dearly-bought eXjll!ri(!Ilce has determined the results of the present privileged estahlislJlnent to be 'injurious alike to individuals and the public ;'-that the same sure t~st has proved other establishments based on a system of freedom to be, 011 the contrary, productivc of security and un(!xceptionable ;)(Ivantages,-that the Balik of England, as at present constituted, scarcely answers anyone' of the legitimate purposes that a bank ought to scrve,' and that the ' crise with which it cOllld be made to do so' is an assnllJption unwarranted by fact or ar~ulllent.
Our own opinion, as at present advised, is decidedly in favour of the proposal of Sir H. Pamell, ill his valuable tract Oil Papermoney and Banking, published in Hl!27, hardly a word of which, we believe, it would be uccessary to alter ill reprillting it at present, so completely have its assertions and predictiolls been borne out by the experience of the last five years. We think, with him, that ' cOlllmercial credit, instead of beiug left to the mercy and discretion of twenty-four Balik of England directors, ought to be placed under the protection of a free system of banking: on the one hand, the principle of profit would lead the banks to extend credit at all times as far as it ought to be carried; while, on the other, the principle of competition would prevent them from going too far, aud forcing so much paper into circulation as would lower its value.' We think the influence of this overgrown establishment over the value of funded property is far too dangerOilS a power to be entrusted to auy private individllals, however lliglt and honourable their character. By the proceedings of the Dank, the stocks may at any time be elevated alii \ dcpressed again, by five or ten 1'('1' cent., and the property of otlwrs transfe ....ed into the hands of the operator with perfect s('curity frolll detection. ""Ve thillk the cxe\nsivc powcr posscssed hy the Balik of iSSllillO" notf's, alJd its ('IHlrIllOIiS capital, givc it all arbitrary and tynllllliclJ authority o\"c .. tlte whole COIIJllJerce of LOlldon, illcolI,istl'llt ",ilh the libel~ty of trad(~ alld the security of property. We think the COlnlCXlO1I
87
88
Free Banking J
The Rights of iltdustnj and tlLe Banldllg System.
455
c~nl1exion of a pri;ate and exclusively privileged bankillg company wIth govel'lllllent IlIlproper and dangerous, as tending to seduce the olle party into extravagance, the other into concessions inconsistent with the interests either of its shareholders or the public; -above all, we think that it will be impossible to prevent the recurrence of ruinolls fluctuations in the extent all(\ value of o lit' cUITenC}"-altel'llations of over-issue at one tillie, extreme parsimony at another-under any system but one of competition and publicity. That freedolll is the sole guarantee for safety, experience and reason combille to demonstrate. The ollly measures which appear to liS to be needed upon the expiration of the Balik charter are, 1st. That all banks be required to deposit secllrity in govel'lllllent stocle to the full alllount of the notes they iss lie. '2dly. That the law be repealed which prohibits the issuing of notcs under live pounds. 3dly. We would make the notes njmelropoZifan bUllks (July convertible into bars of bullion, on thl' plan of l\Ir. Hicardo, alld allow the notes of coulltry banks to be paid in those of metropolitan banks. This would relieve the country banks from the necessity of keeping a large dead stock of gold by them to provide against panics or maliciolls runs upon them, which, under a system of freedom, might probably never OCClll', out which yet the banks mllst be prepared for. "Ve need not repeat here the argllmellfs by which 1\1 r. Hicardo, and, after hilll other writers, have demonstrated that excessive issue by the provincial banks will be as readily checked by their liability to pay their notes on demand in Bank of Englalld notes as in gold; and the extension of the privilege to all metropolitan banks, as well as the Bank of England, can in no degree weaken the security-on the supposition that these and all banks are required to deposit government securities to the extent of their issues. If these measures were adopted, it may be asked, what shall we have gained? We answer, in the lirst place, the establishment of a perfect currency, cheap, secure, and not susceptible of sudden variations in its. amount, and consequently in its value. Such a banking system, by proportioning the supply of money to that of commodities, will act like a charm on the present depressed condition of the productive classes, among whom there is all almost total stagnation of credit, from the absence of a sufficient medium of exchange, and the consequent impossibility of obtaining remunerating prices in any bu~iness. To the want of such a system alone, by which the void occasioned through the deliciency of the preciolls metals would have been lilled up, is owing, as we have shown, the winotls decline in prices of the last fifteen years, during which industry has undergone 1II0re stlllcriligs in peace tllan she ever cntimed ill war; and which has placed England ill the anomalous
89
Free Banking I
456
The Rights of Ind1lstry and the Banking System.
anolllalollS, and otherwise inexplicable,
position
of a n;ltion
plunged deeper into distress vy every increase of its pronllctilJlI~, that is, of its real \ve:t1th ! But, secolldly, puttill~ out of sigl,t its sallative efrect 011 tlw present circlllIIst:tll('es of the cOllntry, the pr.1'11!{l'Ilcnt hellelits of a soulld paper circlllatioll will be iIlC:t!Clllab Ie. it will ohviate the n:ClIITellce of evils similal' to those we arc wfferillg IIl1der; it will prevent those fitflll alld ruinolls IIl1c:" tnatiolls ill the value of 1II0lley hy which trade has been alternately over-excited amI depressed dllrillg the presellt century ;-it ",iiI give a wholesome steadillcss to the currency, proportiolling its supply exactly to the wallts of the market. . :Moreover, the nation will ve saved the vast expense of a metallic circlllation; alld a largc portioll of its capital, 1I0W locked up uIIl'roductively in gold, will ve set free to ve elllployed ill the paYlllent. of lavollr and the creation of consumahle wealth. The productive capital, alld, COIISCI!IIClltly, the :l\Il1ual prodllction alld COIISUIllption of the COlllltry, ",ill be illcrrased bj' so Illlu.:h, provahly by forty or fifty milliolls. Lastly, tIle restoration of this lIlass of metal to the gelleral markd of the conlillcrcial world, frolll whence we have been drainillg it dnrillg thc last lirtcen years, will everywhere lower the v:lllle of tllc metals, alld witll thelll that of l1Ioney. Prices will rise ollce lIIore Oil the COlitilll'lIt as well as here, ~o tlHlt the 1,1'0Cess will be IIl1relL ill our cOIIIIIH'reial trallsactions, I'XCl'pt iJyth(~ gradually increasing retul'lls to illdnstry both ill the hOllle :\1ld the forcigll markets. j\ lid sillcc it is the pecnliar virtlle of a credit CIiITCIIC), to expand with the increase of productiolls, ollr COIl1merce will 110 10llger be crippled by a grtmillg dclicicllcy of the circulating mcdilllll, no longer forcell to reglilate its pace hy the slow alill ,ariahlc rate at ",hidl the reluctant earth can, by a lavish sacrilice of hlliliall life and happiness, be lIIade to give III' its ores -bllt will be flll'lIished with tlmt grand desideratullJ, (which itis at once the first duty alit! the sOllndest policy of the go\'el'lllllent of a' conllllen;ial COlllltl-y to provide,) (t ctrrre.nc.'l thllt will (JpJlTooch uS' lwa'l'l.'l as l'ossibZ(: to cOllslww!J ill v(ll,/.(', r.xlwll.diny (/1Id cmLiracfiJl(T in (J.1/t()l(.Jli with Ute rcul 'lVI'HUh (if which it is tlte in.l'fTlllllcnt exchange,. therehy keeping the aggregate of prices 011 a par with
(1
the aggregate costs of productioll; givillg the lIIerchant, the lIIanufacturer, the fanner; :lIIn thc tradesman, some gccllrity thnt prtllIenee, skill, :tud illtillstl'y willlllcct with 1'cnwnrrntion,. that their ClIlclilutions Oil the provable demalld and supply of the markets :-:hall 1I0t at I('a~t V(~ o\'(:rthrowli hy an nllforcseen :111(1 treacherolls variatiol\ in the vallie of lIIoney. Industry C:11I110t bill thrive IIllder such a system; l\1ld ",hat allglJlI~lIts the wealth of the nation lIIust increase the rcsomCl'S its goverlllllt'nt, and the average enjoyments of every class of society. Productioll ",ill be restored to its
or
90
Free Banking I
The Riglds of Indusfrt and the Banki.ng System.
457
its wonted health and vigour; the misery, and with it the discolltent of the working classes will. disappenr; and encouragement will be again atforded to that spirit of ellterprise, persever.ance, and acculllulation, which has alrcady carried this country to so high a position among nations-and, if fair scope be but given it, will ·continue to urge her forward in an ullbounded career of improvement, prosperity, and geueral happiness. We cOllJmenced by showing, that the first and most indispensable of the BIGHTS OF INDIISTHY is the security of the property ac,]uircd by industry. We have since shown, that the existing state of the currency, as brought about by ullwise interfeh~nce aurl the establishlllcnt of exdusive privileges, is completely destructive of that security,-that it has occasioned, and cOlltinues to occasion, an Ill~just and treacherous transfer of the earnings of the illdustriolls to the idle,-of the property of the producillg to the 1I01l-producillg class. In the nallle of the industry of the country we eiaillJ, then, as the furl'lIlost of its rights, a revisal of this fraudulent alld jnggling system, and the estabJisiJmcntof a free, sound, aIHI equitable. currency. If the refusal be persisted in,-if the rights of industry arc dellied, CIIII we expect that allY other rights ",ill be IOllg respected? If the property of the industrious is lIot protected, how lIluch lungel' will other property r(,Jllaill inviolate '? I I ow IIllldl 100l~(!r ought. it to J"(!lIWill ~o-thc foundatioll of all rigbt to properly lying solely ill the right of indnstry to its earnings?
[4] Excerpt from Samuel Bailey, A Defence of faint-Stock Banks. and Country Issues, 1-100
ON .JOINT-STOCK BANKS, AND COUNTRY ISSUES.
PART I.
A MIDST the discordant opinions and multitudinous discussions to be heard on all sides upon the subject of Joint-Stock Banks, it is not easy to discern the real merits of the several questions at issue. We shall hardly see our way clearly throug'h the confusion unless we set out from some plain and acknowledged principles, and steadily pursue them to their legitimate consequences. If this could be accomplished, the controversy (amongst men of sense, at least) would soon be at an end. It is obvious that the great point to be determined is, how far the State can heneficially interfere in the business of banking. The fundamental principle in the general policy of interference is, that the state should not interpose in any case where private interest and exertions are adequate to accomplish an affair without it. The supreme authority should limit itself to those matters which private efforts are incompetent to deal with. It is no,,,, uni\'ersally admitted that amongst B
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Free Banking I
the things which are thus ou t of the province of go· ,"ernment, the various trades in which men engage may be rightly classed. After much dear-bought experience, we have at length arrived at a drgl'ce of knowledg'e sufficient at least to teach us that the business of production and interchange requires no aid from the law; that a man may be left to gro,~ wheat and barley, to manufacture cloth, to deal in hats and hosiery, as he pleases, and to sell them at what prices he can obtain, without the necessity of the governing power watching his steps to prevent him from sacrificing his interest, or from reaping extraordinary profits in consequence of the supineness of his fellow men. The only purpose for which the State can interfere in these matters with advantage, is to uphold good faith and protect him and those with whom he deals from mutual injury. For this end, payments, contracts, and promises are enforced. There are certain prescribed modes in which he can extort the money that is wrongfully withheld, and compel the fulfilment of the bargain which anyone endeavours to evade. But there are no laws to save him from imprudence, none prescribing what capital he shall have, or what proportion it shall bear to the amount of business transacted, or what profits he shall make; none limiting the number of his offices and warehouses and factories, or fixing the towns and seaports where they shall be situated. Regulations of this sort would be manifestly ill-judged, burdeu-
Free Banking I
3
some, and unnecessary. Such poinb are to be determined by the vigilance of the party concerned -requiring minute knowledge of a thousand particulars which will be learned by nobody but him who has an interest in knowing them; and, although they are not invariably decided with perfect wisdom, they are determined more wisely on this plan than they could be on any other. There is, however, still one trade in which govel'11ments distrust the sagacity of self-interest, and deem that the vigilance and discretion of persons at a distance, and imperfectly acquainted with the circumstances of a contract, will be superior to those of the parties who are on the spot, and al'e immediately concerned. Dealing in money is imagined to have something so peculiar about it, that Legislators cannot forego the fond fancy that there is a necessity for their interposition. Allowing a merchant to load other commodities with a pront of fifty per cent. for six months, if he can find any body to take them at that rate, they will not permit him to charge a profit of six per cent. for twelve months, should his commodity be gold, although thousands may be willing to pay it. In imposing this restriction, the law, however, is now admitted, by all who have studied the subject, to do mischief. The restraint is justly regarded as the lingering relic of past ignorance, preserved by prejudice and sinister policy. No reason can be adduced why the trade in money should not be left Il 2
93
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4 as free as any other trade. Thl' law itself docs not aspire to direct a man from whom he shall borrow, or how much he shall lend. It pretends only to limit him iu the remuneration to be received for the lise of his money, and cannot really effect what it aims to accomplish. If we omit all reference to taxation or police regulations, the effects of which on commerce ought to be merely incidental; there appear to be only t\\'o cases of importance in whieh the State can properly interfere with allY trade or branch of production, for any other purpose than doing justice hetween man and man; or, at least, ollly two cases that can affect the question before us. l. One of these is when an undertaking is of so peculiar a nature, that it cannot be entered upon witllOut special powers and privileges. Canals and railroads, in the execution of which it becomes needful to trespass on the property of reluctant parties, may be cited as instances. In sanctioning such undertakings, the State is ohliged to grant a sort of monopoly, and having withdrawn the check of competition, it may with propriety interfere in various ways, according to the circumstances of each case; sometimes prescribing the maximum of profit-sometimes the rate of charge--and sometimes particular modes of proceeding. 2. The other case is where tIle prosecution of illdividual intcrcsts would interfere with branches of industry, or departments of excrtion, which the
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State itself 11:15 thought propel' tu aSSUllle, Thus, in our country, the Government has undertaken the convcyanec of letters, antI the coinage of money ; and ill order to facilitate 01' insure the accomplishment of its purposes, private persons may be very properly restrained from any proceedings which would tend to defeat them. Now, it appears, that in pursuing the trade of' a dealer in money, the transactions of an individual could come only within the latter reason fur restraint. By issuing billil or notes, wbich he mllst unavoidably do, in some shape or other, he might be neutralizing the proceedings of the Mint. It is now beyond dispute that coin and notes of the same denomination will not long' circulate together. Individuals, therefore, 1Iy issuing such notes, might drive away the specie which the State had provided, and intendeu to form part of the currency. then, Government has determined, for any reason, to have a metallic currency, consisting of certain coins, here would be a plain grounu fur restricting the dealer in muncy from such issues of paper as would uefeat the design; but that object having been secured, there woultl be no reason left for extending the prohibition to the issue uf notes of higher denominatiolls. On the supposition, indeed, that he enjoyeu the sole privilege of issuing notes in a given district, his case wou lu fall under the first head; amI as he wuuld have a monopoly from Govemment, the
It:
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6 consequences of that monopoly might be properly limiteu by special checks on his issues. But if he had no monopoly of the sort, but was exposeu to the operation of free competition, he could not be reasonably subjected to restraint, in regard to the hills or notes which he might find it convenient to issue, except for the purpose already mentioned, of maintaining the circulation of coin. This is, in fact, the precise situation ill which an individual is placed in this country. He may deal in money aa he likes; he may draw bills; he may issue promissory notes, above a certain sum; he may lend at pleasure and borrow as he can, with the single restriction on the rate of interest. Alive to his own advantage, he will engage in t.hese transactions so far as he finus them profitable: subject to competition from rivals pursuing the same course, and tlependiug ill every step on the voluntary co-operation of others, he will Snu the transactions which he can carryon to a profit, whether borrowing or lenuing, or issuing notes, rigorously limited by the interests of those with whom he has to do. Thus, apart from the interference of the State, arises that combination of incitements anu checks which spontaneously insures that, in the long run, the business of dealing in money, like all other trades, shall be carried to an adequate, but not to an excessive extent. What iii tl'lle policy in regard to all individual ctll'J'ying on a t nulf', i~ tl'lll'1wiicy whell judividual~
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7
combine in partnershIp. When they unite in this way, there can be no more ground for interference with them as traders than when they were separate. The union may create a necessity for additional regulation to secure the performance of engagements between the partners themselves, and between them and the public, or otherwise to prevent wrong, but it can occasion no call for interference in the management of their trade. The proper and profitable management of it will be secured in as high a degree as is practicable by the same play of interests which we see so effectual in the case of individual traders. The number of partners can obviously make no difference in the matter, whether two or two thousand. In the latter case, a few still further laws might be necessary than in the former, for the sake of convenience in adjusting any points of right and wrong which might arise between the partners themselves, and between the partnership and other persons: but a multiplicity of partners would still form no ground for interfering in the management of the business. Nor could there be any just or adequate reason for limiting the number of partners by law. Private interest would determine the beneficial number with a precision unattainable by legislative regulations. Two would not unite unless they found it their interest to do so; and if a thousand found it their interest to unite, no reason can be shown why they should be prevented. The
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8 principle here insisted on is admitted with regard to other trades-but again it has been fancied that in this respect the trade in money may be shackled and hampered to the advantage of the community; and our legislators, in the plenitude of their wisdom, formerly restricted the number of partners in the business of banking to six. Not only was there no rational end to be answered by this, but mischief, deep and extensive, was sure to ensue. If there is any trade in the world in which a large number of partners is peculiarly desirable, or ill which, at least, the number should not be arbitrarily abridged, it is the very olle selected for this limitation; because it is the trade of all others in which the undoubted stability of the companies engaged in it is of the highest importance. The consequence of the restriction in England may be seen in the columns of the Gazette. It was under the impression of similar views to these that the British Government withdrew the restriction in question, and threw open the banking trade to large as well as small partnerships. In doing so, it very wisely abstained from attempting to regulate such points as the interest of the parties concerned would spontaneously provide for. The provisions of the law were almost exclusi vel y di rected to facili tate the formation of large partnerships, and to remove obstacles to the fI'n!1\' a!'s('rtioll I)f J'ight alld redress of wrong,
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9 arising out of circumstances peculiar to them. As the customary modes of joining anu retiring from a partner!'lhip would have been t.roublesome and expensive, where a considerable number were united, the law prescribed easier modes of accomplishing these acts. And inasmuch as, from the number of partners, there would be difficulties in suits at law, conducted in the same way as suits relating to ordinary partnerships, the legislature obviated these difficulties by introducing the appointment of public officers, to sue and be sued for the whole company. Further, as the list of partners would be continually liable to variation, it became requisite to provide, that the creditors of the Bank should have it in their power to ascertain at any time the actual shareholders; and the law very properly directs how this is to be effected. All these are regulations springing out of the manifest differences between large and small trading companies; they were designed to obviate the peculiar inconveniences of the latter, in points of formation and legal redress; they conferred no exclusive privileges, and were not at all intended to interfere with the management of the business. The same checks were left to operate on this, as on the affairs of individuals. The responsibility of partners was wisely retained in all its force. No attempt was made to prescribe points of conduct which there were ,u]cquatc motives to regulate.
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lO
On the whole, the Act, although in some respects faulty, appears to have been judiciously framed, and to have limited the interposition of authority to its proper objects. Its principal feature, in fact, consisted in withdrawing an interference which ought never to have had place, and making a few provisions to regulate the new state of affairs, which might be expected to arise in consequence of that withdra wal. If the Legislature had simply taken off the restriction formerly existing in regard to the number of partners, it would have effected a great improvement in the character of Banks; but, by introducing also a few regulations, founded on the peculiar characteristics of large companies, it secured still more effectually t.he formation of solid establishments, adequate to the business of the country. All this, it may be said, is very plausible "in theory," but has the Act . answered its purpose? Has the system of Banking called into existence, and fostered by it, proved beneficial to the country 1 Have not evils ensued, requiring the interposition of the legislature 1 To the first question, we unhesitatingly answer in the affirmative. The law on the subject has provided the country with a considerable number of sound establishments. Up to the present moment, although pecuniary difficulties in the commercial world have reached an
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almost unparalleled height, none of the depositor!:; of money in Joint- Stock Banks, and none of the holders of their notes, have lost a shilling. To the second question we reply;-It is true that there has been mismanagement-it is true that there has been embarrassment in some of these establishments; but all this equally occurs in private business, and was what every man of sense expected at the outset of a new system, or rather an attempt to reform an old one. Both in private concerns, and in Joint-Stock associations, such evils, it may be added, unfailingly lead to their own rectification. To prove what is here asserted, let us examine in detail the principal charges brought against the system itself, as well as against the mode in which it has been carried into effect, and which are put forth as grounds for the interference of the legislature. 1. It is in the first place alleged that the law has led to the undue, and therefore mischievous, multiplication of Banking Companies. 2. It is further alleged, that there has been a great deal of mismanagement in conducting the affairs of these companies. 3. It is more especially charged against them that they have unduly swelled the currency of the country, by a great over issue of their notes. 1. As to the first charge, it may be admitted as probable that too great a number of banking com-
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12
panics have been formed, and too many banking offices, principal and subordinate, opened: but to complain of this, is to complain of the inevitable movements of the mechanism of society. If any one inquire how it is that any town is supplied in such nice adjustment with the number of drapers, tailors, hatters, and saddlers, which its wealth and population require, varying as these vary, he will find that this is not done by the wisdom of government, but is the result of certain tentative steps taken by private individuals, who are induced to set up in these several branches of business by the hope of gaining a livelihood, or bettering their condition. If they find room enough amongst their competitors, they do well; if they find the ground preoccupied, they attempt perhaps to gain custom by underselling their neighbours; the latter are forced to resort in self-defence to the same means; a reduction of profit ensues; the trade becomes a losing one from being overdone, till the superfluous traders are thrown out, and remove from the town, or appear in the gazette. So it has been, and will be, with banking companies. The same tentative steps have been taken with the same hopes of success; and by the same process-the disappointment of those hopes-will the redundancy, if it really exist, be corrected. The incitements and checks are the same in one case as in the other. No wisdom, short of omniscience, could so well proportion the number and extent of these establishments to
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]3 the wants of the community, as those principles of human nature which spontaneously work out the result. Admitting, then, for argument's sake, the alleged evil to its utmost extent, we cannot admit that it furnishes any ground for legislative interposition-because the same evil occurs in every trade-because there are always principles in operation adequate to correct it-and because needless interference is not only useless but mischievous. 2. It may be also allowed that there have been in some of these Companies very striking instances of mismanagement and overtrading j but no instances surely more striking than we witness in other branches of business. It was just what was to be expected from the opening of a new department of commerce, or rather of one from which the people had been shut out, and the nature of which they did not sufficiently understand. Besides, in 1835 and 1836, an inordinate spirit of speculation seems to have spread over the country, and a passion for Joint-Stock Companies of all sorts, set prudence and reason aside. This mania, although it manifested itself in the multiplication of banking companies, and the manner in which they were conducted, could not obviously be owing to them. It had a much deeper source, and this was only one of the forms in which it appeared. Thus, two different causes were in operation at the same time, to swell the amount of business transacted by the Banks. In the first place, some
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14 of these establishments being newly formed, deficient in experience, and having a business to acquire in the face of rival companies, were led to push their transactions in the spirit of competition or avidity, or from ignorance of conse· quences, beyond safe and proper limits. In the second place, they were affected by the general spirit of speculation and overtrading which prevailed in the community, and would have been almost forced into overtrading themselves, or at least into a large extension of business, had they not already had a predisposition to pursue that course. In all this, however, there is nothing but what is temporary, nothing which will not correct itself, nothing peculiar to banks or banking companies, large or small. Other commercial establishments are constantly exhibiting the same phenomena. Open in any direction a new prospect of gain, or let an increase of demand for any important commodities arise, and you will soon see the same sort of rivalry, the same undue extension of business, and the same dereliction of the strict line of prudence. Looking at the worst instance that has occurred of mismanagement in large banking companies, the instance in which a Joint-Stock Bank was under the necessity of applying to the Bank of England for assistance to a very large amountwe may point to parallel cases in the large mercantile houses of London and Liverpool. These
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15
houses have evidently pushed their business far beyond the limits of discretion, have exposed themselves to the chance of accidents beyond their own control, and have been saved from ruin like the banking company alluded to, by an arm on whose aid they had no right to calculate. That such houses should be led into the error of overtrading, is no doubt greatly to be lamented; the mischief they may produce by it, is scarcely to be conceived; and the advantage of preventing it would of course be commensurate. But in such cases, who ever dreams of legislative interposition? of limiting their sphere of exertion? of enacting that they shall do business only in a certain ratio to their actual capital? of prescribing how many warehouses they shall establish, how many ships they shall charter, how many bills of exchange they shall draw, and what amount of drafts they shall honour? When the markets have been inundated with raw materials or manufactured goods, has Parliament interfered to prevent subsequent importations? When South America was opened to British enterprise, and the eagerness of speculation madly shipped cargo after cargo without bounds or discrimination; when coffin furniture was exported to nations who buried their dead in winding'-sheets, and skates to countries ignorant of ice; was an Act passed or even dreamed of, to restrain the folly? The case of Banking Companies is just the same
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as that of mercantile companies, or individual mer· chants. N a reasons exist, why the former should be placed under supervision and restrictions from which the latter are exempt. All the reasons on which the latter are exempt apply to the former. Both are subject to that eagerness after extending a profitable business which, salutary as it is on the whole, is so apt to outstrip discretion; both are alive to the contingency of loss, and interested in listening to the voice of experience; while they are also alike in being more intimately acquainted than any other party can be with the thousand consider· ations on which the prudence or imprudence of any of their steps depend. And, lastly, the errors of both can be corrected by nothing but ampler expe· rience, sounder views, and superior knowledgeacquisitions not to be forced upon them by Acts of Parliament. And, after all, what are the evils hitherto pro· duced by Joint-Stock Banks, and who are the sufferers? The holders of notes and the depositors, or,in other words, those persons who have trusted the Banks 1 No. Who then 1 The partners themselves. If there has been any loss, it has evidently fallen ill the right place, on the proper parties. With views of profit they have become partners in establish· ments not adapted to realize it, or they have neg. lected to exercise that control and vigilance over the management, without which the desired result ~ould not be attained. They ha,-e made erroneous
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calculations, 01' trusted the issue to chance, or COIlfided where confidence was not due, and they have no right to complain of any body in the world but those individuals who may have deceived them. If they had become partners in any mercantile concern, and been equally supine or misjudging, they would probably have encountered a similar disaster. Men who grasp at profit must run the risk ofloss. Thus, the mismanagement and over-trading of Joint-Stock Banks, even if the charge8 could be substantiated more generally than they can be, afford no more ground for interference than similar faults in other commercial establishments. This conclusion, indeed, is, I believe, not disputed in regard to those banking companies who are coutent to trade in gold and Bank of England paper, and do not issue notes of their own. "Mismanage and over-trade as you like," say these objectors, "so long as you refrain from circulating your promissory notes; but if you choose to deluge the country with your paper it is necessary that you should be placed under the salutary control of the state." This brings us to the consideration of charge the third. 3. The allegation that the Joint-Stock Banks have unduly and mischievously swelled the currency of the country by over-issues of their own paper, is, in fact, the grand charge of all. Even the friends of these establishments shake their heads at so grave a fault. c
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18 This point, nevertheless, has been much misconceived and misrepresented. It is surprising, indeed, to see how little the real state of the case is understood. The generality of writers on the subject appear to fall into one common mistake-the mistake of conceiving that the Bank of England and the Country Banks are analogous in their character as banks of issue, and possess a similar control over the currency. A close examination, nevertheless, will show that there is scarcely a point of resemblance between them. As banks of issue, they are in a totally different situation. While the Bank of England has a power of issue not limited by the existence of rival establishments possessed of equal privileges, and without any check but the necessity of paying her notes in gold when demanded---a check which may be disregarded, as every body is aware, for a long period-the Country Banks, rivals to each other, act under circumstances which immediately and effectually limit the amount of their circulation. It is scarcely possible, indeed, that there should be a more