FRANCISCUS DE MARCHIA
ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY De Wulf-Mansion Centre Series 3 FRANCISCI DE MARCHIA OPERA PHILOSOPHICA ET THEOLOGICA II,1
Reportatio IIA, qq. 1-12
Editorial Coordinator: Russell L. Friedman Editorial Board: Girard J. Etzkorn, Roberto Lambertini, Fritz S. Pedersen, Chris Schabel, Tiziana Suarez-Nani
The De Wulf-Mansion Centre is a research centre for ancient, medieval, and Renaissance philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of the Catholic University of Leuven. It hosts the international project “Aristoteles latinus” and publishes the “Opera omnia” of Henry of Ghent and the “Opera philosophica et theologica” of Francis of Marchia Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)
FRANCISCI DE MARCHIA Reportatio IIA (Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum) qq. 1-12
Ediderunt Tiziana Suarez-Nani William Duba Emmanuel Babey Girard J. Etzkorn
Leuven UNIVERSITY PRESS 2008
Cette publication est le résultat d’un projet de recherche financé par le Fonds National Suisse de la Recherche Scientifique pendant les années 2005-2009. Published with the support of Universitaire Stichting van België
© 2008 by De Wulf-Mansioncentrum - De Wulf-Mansion Centre Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain/ Universitaire Pers Leuven Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven (Belgium)
All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated datafile or made public in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers. ISBN 978 90 5867 700 6 D/2008/1869/45 NUR: 732
CONTENTS General Introduction to the Series Editors’ Acknowledgements Introduction I. Francis of Marchia’s Life II. Francis of Marchia’s Works 1. Quaestiones in IV libros Sententiarum 2. Quodlibet 3. In libros Physicorum 4. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam (books I-VII) 5. Quaestiones super primum et secundum librum Metaphysicorum 6. Improbatio contra libellum Domini Iohannis qui incipit “Quia vir reprobus” 7. Quaestio utrum nativitas Christi fuerit naturalis 8. Sermons III. The Commentaries on the Four Books of the Sentences 1. Composition, dating and manuscript tradition A. Principia B. Book I C. Book II D. Book III E. Book IV 2. The content of the Commentary on the Sentences A. Book I B. Book II C. Book III D. Book IV IV. The Questions on the Second Book of the Sentences 1. Redactions A. Reportatio IIA and Reportatio IIB B. Reportatio IIA, the Redaction DH, and the Principium secundi C. Summary of results 2. The text of Reportatio IIA V. Summary of the Themes Treated in Reportatio IIA, Questions 1-12 VI. The Sources of Reportatio IIA, Questions 1-12 1. Explicit sources 2. Implicit sources VII. Francis’ Doctrine of Creation and Historical Impact: A Preliminary Assessment VIII. The Edition 1. Manuscripts 2. Stemma
vii ix xi xiii xix xix xix xx xxi xxii xxii xxii xxiii xxiv xxiv xxv xxxii xxvii xxviii xxix xxx xxxi xxxii xxxii xxxiii xxxvi xxxvi xxxvii xlvi lv lv lvi lxx lxx lxxi lxxiv lxxvii lxxvii lxxviii
IX.
3. Retention of manuscripts 4. Characteristics of individual retained manuscripts 5. Editorial method Editorial Conventions 1. Symbols used in the text 2. Symbols used in the apparatus criticus 3. Abbreviations used in the apparatus criticus 4. Abbreviations used in the apparatus fontium and the bibliographies 5. Sigla of the manuscripts
lxxxii lxxxiii lxxxv lxxxviii lxxxviii lxxxviii lxxxviii lxxxviii lxxxix
Reportatio A in II Librum Sententiarum, qq. 1-12 Q. 1: Utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo Q. 2: Utrum creatio sit possibilis subiective et obiective Q. 3: Utrum omnia alia a primo ente indigeant actuali conservatione ab ipso Q. 4: Utrum creatio et conservatio sint idem realiter Q. 5: Utrum duratio rei differat ab ipsa re durante Q. 6: Utrum tempus differat a motu secundum rem Q. 7: Utrum creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua relatio realis Q. 8: Utrum relatio realis creaturae ad Deum differat realiter a creatura Q. 9: Utrum relatio creaturae ad Deum ut ad causam efficientem sit eadem cum relatione creaturae ad ipsum Deum ut ad causam finalem Q. 10: Utrum creatura sit immediate producta a Deo per intellectum et voluntatem et per actum intelligendi et volendi Q. 11: Utrum creatio‑actio sit in Deo vel in creatura vel in utroque Q. 12: Utrum creatio cuiuscumque rei creabilis fuerit possibilis ab aeterno et utrum fuerit de facto
195
APPENDIX: Reportatio in II Librum Sententiarum, Redactio DH Q. 1: Utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo
226
Bibliography Primary Sources Secondary Sources
243 247
Indices I. II. III. IV.
257 258 261 263
Index biblicus Index auctoritatum Index codicum manuscriptorum Index nominum et locorum
1 46 76 85 96 102 105 115 131 132 156
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
Since last century, when Pierre Duhem and Anneliese Maier published their groundbreaking studies of medieval natural philosophy, Francis of Marchia, an Italian Franciscan who read the Sentences at Paris in 1319-1320, has been best known for several original and highly interesting scientific views. Recent scholarship has not only confirmed Duhem’s and Maier’s observations, but has also highlighted other areas of Marchia’s thought that show his creativity and deserve more study, such as his philosophical theology, political philosophy, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. That Marchia’s works enjoyed a sizeable medieval readership is witnessed by some twenty-five manuscripts containing his Sentences commentary in whole or in part. Moreover, a lively discussion of certain of his views can be traced in the second quarter of the fourteenth century, and his impact can be seen even on such major thinkers as William of Ockham and Gregory of Rimini. Thus, Francis of Marchia’s importance as a thinker and as an influence on later discussion cannot be doubted. Nevertheless, because his works are for the most part unprinted, modern scholars have been hampered in their efforts to reconstruct Marchia’s thought, let alone its reception. The goal of the series Francisci de Marchia Opera philosophica et theologica is to improve this situation. The series is dedicated to publishing in critical edition most of the currently unprinted works of the Italian Franciscan, and will eventually make available at least the Scriptum (or longer) version of Marchia’s commentary on I Sentences; both versions of Marchia’s commentary on II Sentences; Marchia’s commentaries on III and IV Sentences; and a volume of Marchia’s Philosophical and Theological Quaestiones. Each volume in the series, in addition to the critically edited text and the apparatus criticus and fontium, will include an introduction discussing the nature and the transmission of the text in question, as well as the major doctrinal points Marchia makes there. The present volume contains the first twelve of the forty-nine quaestiones found in the longer version of Marchia’s commentary on II Sentences, a version also known as the Reportatio IIA. Over the next two years the remaining quaestiones of that version of Marchia’s II Sentences will appear in two volumes, as will the shorter version of Marchia’s II Sentences (called the Reportatio IIB) in one volume. Since the present volume is the first to appear in the series, it opens with a comprehensive introduction written by Tiziana Suarez-Nani and William Duba. Including a summary and reconsideration of the evidence currently at our disposal concerning Marchia’s life and known works, the introduction will serve as a point of departure for future studies
on Marchia – studies, which in their turn will allow us to nuance some of the views presented here and answer some of the remaining questions. Russell L. Friedman Leuven August 28, 2008
EDITORS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This edition is the product of international teamwork and collaboration. We have benefited from the help and support of numerous scholars, and we would like to thank especially R. Friedman (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven) and C. Schabel (The University of Cyprus), whose initiative brought about the project of editing Francis of Marchia’s Opera Philosophica et Theologica, and who have generously and continuously provided us with informed advise. We extend our thanks also to the other members of the editorial board, F.S. Pedersen and R. Lambertini, who read, in whole or in part, the text. In addition, we are grateful to S. Ebbesen, F. Amerini, and two anonymous readers for the Universitaire Stichting for their commentary and suggestions. We would also like to express our gratitude to Leuven University Press and the editors of the Ancient and Medieval Philosophy series, who graciously agreed to publish this work. Furthermore, we are indebted to the Department of Philosophy of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), which placed at our disposal the material and computer resources necessary for the project. Our debt extends to the teaching assistants of the Chair of Medieval Philosophy, D. Travelletti and O. Ribordy, who have shared in our labours and have provided us with their unwavering support. This work could not have been realized without the assistance of the Swiss National Foundation for Scientific Research, which, from October 2005 onward, has provided the financial means necessary to bring it about: to the Humanities and Social Sciences division we convey our heartfelt gratitude for their generous support.
INTRODUCTION By Tiziana Suarez-Nani and William Duba
I. Francis of Marchia’s Life As common for many medieval thinkers, few biographical details survive for Francis of Marchia (Franciscus de Marchia, Franciscus de Esculo, Franciscus Rubeus de Pignano, Francesco d’Ascoli) before his lectures on the Sentences.1 Born around 1290, Francis hailed from the Italian village of Appignano del Tronto, now belonging to the province of Ascoli Piceno in the region of the Marches, where most likely he entered the Franciscan Order. University studies probably brought him to Paris around 1310. During the academic year 1319-1320, he most likely lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Support for the 1319-1320 dating of Francis’ lectures comes from a piece of evidence internal to his work: the explicit from the Reportatio on the first book as contained in a manuscript of the National Library of Naples (BN VII. C. 27, f. 126va) states that Francis of Marchia read the Sentences at Paris in 1320.2 Further support comes from the works of the Franciscan theologians Francis criticizes and from those who criticize him. One of Francis’ most important interlocutors, Peter Auriol, read the Sentences at Paris in the period 1316-1318, and was regent master in 1318-1320. Francis often considers Auriol’s positions and further uses Auriol’s Sentences commentary as a source for other opinions.3 Moreover, Francis seems to react to a position on 1 The following studies have traced Francis’ life: A. Teetaert, “Pignano, François de”, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, v. 12, Paris 1935, cols. 2104-2109; N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franciscus de Marchia, Leiden 1991, pp. 11-34; N. Mariani (ed.), Francisci de Esculo OFM Improbatio contra libellum Domini Ioannis qui incipit “Quia vir reprobus”, Grottaferrata 1993, pp. 3-34; P. Vian, “Francesco della Marca”, Dizionario biografico degli Italiani, v. 49, Rome 1997, pp. 793-797; C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2007 edition):
; R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, Francis of Marchia, Theologian and Philosopher, Vivarium 44 (2006), pp. 3-14; W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del IV° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco di Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2008 (forthcoming). 2 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences: Question List and State of Research”, Medieval Studies 63 (2001), pp. 31-106; the explicit appears in that article on p. 85: “Explicit Lectura Fratris Francisci de Marchia super primum, secundum Reportationem factam sub eo tempore, quo legit Sententias Parisius, anno domini MCCCXX.” 3 R. Friedman, “Francesco d’Appignano on the Eternity of the World and the Actual Infinite”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del I° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2002, pp. 83-99; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris 1316-1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, Aldershot 2000; C. Schabel, “Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini and the Problem of Predestination”, in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden 2002, pp. 221-265; T. SuarezNani, “Linguaggio, conoscenza e libertà. Note in margine alle questioni 26 e 27 del commento di Francesco de Marchia al II° libro delle Sentenze”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 50 (2003), pp. 354-375; T. Suarez-Nani, “Un modello
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the status of the accident of quantity analogous to that held by William of Ockham in his Sentences commentary, dating from 1317-1319.4 More clearly, Francis criticizes Landulph Caracciolo, who read the Sentences at Paris in 1318-1319.5 Finally Francis Meyronnes, who read the Sentences at Paris in 1320-1321, criticizes the theory of projectile motion formulated by Marchia in his commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences.6 All these elements taken together allow us to place Francis of Marchia’s lectures on the Sentences in 1319-1320. Some time after reading the Sentences, Francis probably reworked his lectures for distribution in written form, perhaps finishing in 1323: the explicit of the commentary on the fourth book of the Sentences as contained in the Chigi ms. (Vatican City, BAV, Chigi B VII 113) says that it was made in 1323.7 For the period from 1321 to 1328, we have very little information on Francis’ movements, and what we have is not certain: there is no explicit indication that Francis was at Paris after 1321, nor anything that places him at Avignon before 1328.8 N. Schneider cites a note by L. Wadding in the Annales Minorum for 1321 referring to Francis’ presence at the court of Robert of Anjou, King of Naples (1278-1343).9 This could be the case, especially since Francis’ fellow
alternativo di conoscenza? Francesco de Marchia e la spazializzazione del rapporto conoscitivo”, Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 53 (2006), pp. 345366. 4 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, pp. 3-5, citing P. Bakker, La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250-c. 1400), Nijmegen 1999. 5 P. Bakker, La raison et le miracle, v. 1, p. 403. 6 Franciscus de Marchia, Principium in quartum librum Sententiarum, redactio B, ed. C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta and the Context of Its Development”, Vivarium 44 (2006), (pp. 47-80), pp. 60-80; R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, pp. 5-6. 7 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 106: “Explicit Reportatio quarti libri Sententiarum sub magistro Fransischo de Marchia Anchonita Ordinis minorum facta per fratrem G de
anno domini 1323.” Henceforth we will indicate the manuscripts according to the sigla established in the study. See infra, p. lxxvii. W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone” (forthcoming); in this study, Duba assembles evidence suggesting that the 1323 date, if it is correct at all, refers to the completion of the written work, and not the date of the lessons. See also C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I of Francesco d’Appignano’s Commentary on the Sentences”, in D. Priori and M. Balena (eds.), Atti del II° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2004, (pp. 97-149), p. 104. 8 W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone”. 9 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, p. 15, and L. Wadding, Annales Minorum, Quaracchi 1931, v. 6, p. 423 (n. XL): “Floruisse hoc tempore in regio coenobio sancti Laurenti Neapoli litteris et virtute, Regique fuisse a consiliis fratrem Francescum Asculanum Picenum Minoritam, scripturae inde transmissae testantur”. I.-H. Sbaralea, Supplementum et Castigatio ad Scriptores trium Ordinum Sancti Francisci a Waddingo aliisve descriptos, v. 1, Rome 1759, p. 257.
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Franciscans at Paris, notably Landulph Caracciolo and Francis Meyronnes, had close ties to the court of Naples, but the written documents to which Wadding refers have not been found, and they likely no longer exist.10 Many biographies of Francis follow Teetaert in asserting that Francis attended the Franciscan chapter general at Perugia in June 1322.11 In March of the same year, John XXII promulgated Quia nonnumquam, lifting the ban on the debate on Apostolic Poverty established by Nicholas III’s 1279 constitution Exiit qui seminat. In reaction, the chapter general at Perugia issued two public documents which defended the orthodoxy of the position holding the radical poverty of Christ and the Apostles.12 These documents carry the names of five masters of theology and two bachelors, among whom Francis of Marchia does not figure. Teetaert’s precise assertion was that Francis, at the council of Perugia, signed these declarations. His statement does not correspond to the evidence he alludes to, and most likely stems from a confusion on his part.13 In the documents pertaining to the 1328 flight of Michael of Cesena and his supporters (including Francis of Marchia) – documents to which we will return below –, Francis appears as lector of the Franciscan convent at Avignon. At times, the modern literature assigns to Francis this role starting in 1324, based on an indication taken from the Quodlibet of the Augustinian Hermit James of Pamiers. In question 16, James raises the argument that a contradiction can be avoided through the formal non-identity of the terms. He then brings up the refutation, noting: “Contra istas raciones arguit magister Franciscus de Ma in quadam questione quam determinavit in curia, de qua ibi respondi sibi.”14 A study of the movements of James of Pamiers suggests that the “curial disputation” took place in 1324,15 thus leading to the conclusion that Francis of Marchia was in Avignon in 1324. Yet, at least one manuscript witnessing James of Pamier’s Quodlibet (Avignon, Bibliothèque municipale, 314) cites the name of the ‘Franciscus’ in full, namely “Franciscus de Maronis,” that is, Francis Meyronnes, who very likely was in Avignon in
W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone”. A. Teetaert, “Pignano, François de”, cols. 2104-2109. 12 P. Gauchat, Cardinal Bertrand de Turre ord. min. His Participation in the Theoretical Controversy Concerning the Poverty of Christ and the Apostles under Pope John XXII, Rome 1930, pp. 54ff. P. Nold, Pope John XXII and His Franciscan Cardinal: Bertrand de la Tour and the Apostolic Poverty Controversy, Oxford 2003, pp. 1-24. 13 W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone” (forthcoming). 14 Text as noted by F. Pelster, “Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: Raymundus Bequini O.P., seine Questionen und sein Correctorium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A”, Franciscan Studies 15 (1955), (pp. 30-47), p. 40. 15 W.J. Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael of Massa, OESA. A Redating”, Augustiniana 45 (1995), (pp. 191-207), p. 195. 10 11
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1324.16 So there is no positive evidence for the beginning of Francis’ period at Avignon. Another source suggests that Francis was Franciscan provincial minister for the Italian region of the Marches between 1327-1332, but this was not the case.17 Such a claim would be difficult to square with Francis’ close association with Michael of Cesena’s circle during the flight from Avignon to the court of Louis of Bavaria. On December 8, 1322, John XXII issued the bull Ad conditorem canonum, in which he assigned to the Franciscan order the ownership in common of the goods that the order used. In reaction, Bonagrazia of Bergamo protested the papal decision, and the pope, in turn, had him arrested and imprisoned for a year.18 In late 1327, as the controversy simmered, John XXII summoned Michael of Cesena to Avignon. Arriving in December, Michael quickly became aware of the pope’s hostility, and by mid-January the pope forbade Michael to leave the city. On April 9, 1328, the pope summoned Michael and accused him of inciting heresy. Michael protested these accusations in a document dated April 13 and known as the Appellatio Michaelis in Avenione, accusing the pope of heresy. The first of the witnesses to this document is Francis of Marchia: “Acta, gesta et facta fuerunt praedicta coram religiosis et honestis viris, fra tribus Ordinis Minorum, Francisco de Esculo, in sacra theologia doctore et lectore tunc in conventu Fratrum Minorum de Avenione.” Francis’ name is followed by those of William of Ockham and Bonagrazia of Bergamo.19 This document establishes the current terminus ante quem for Francis’ presence as lector of the Franciscan convent of Avignon. The final break between the Minister General and the pope came the night of May 26, 1328, when Michael of Cesena, Bonagrazia of Bergamo, William of Ockham and Francis of Marchia fled Avignon for Italy and the court of Louis of Bavaria (who in January had received the imperial crown from the Roman people), and the pope excommunicated them. Having arrived at Pisa by June 9, the fugitives issued further protests, capped by the public “Pisan 16 B. Roth, Franz von Mayronis O.F.M. Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Lehre vom Formalunterschied in Gott, Werl-in-Westf. 1936, pp. 44-45; H. Roßmann, “Die Quod libeta und verschiedene sonstige Schriften des Franz von Meyronnes”, Franziskanische Studien 54 (1972), (pp. 1-76), p. 59. C. Schabel and W.J. Courtenay, “Augustinian Quod libeta after Giles of Rome”, in C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages: The Fourteenth Century, Leiden 2007, (pp. 545-568), pp. 562-568. 17 J. Weisheipl, “Francis of Marchia”, New Catholic Encyclopedia, v. 6, New York 1963, p. 32. In the introduction to the Improbatio (cited in n. 1 above), pp. 5-6, Mariani casts doubt on whether Francis ever exercised this function. In a forthcoming article, R. Lambertini will conclusively show that Francis never held such a post. 18 Bonagrazia’s protest is closely linked to Louis of Bavaria’s “Sachsenhausen Appeal”. See on the incident, P. Vian, “Francesco della Marca”, p. 794; R. Lambertini and A. Tabarroni, Dopo Francesco: l’eredità difficile, Turin 1989, p. 116. 19 G. Gàl and D. Flood (eds.), Nicolaus Minorita: Chronica, St. Bonaventure, NY 1996, p. 189; S. Baluze and J.D. Mansi (eds.), Miscellanea, vol. II, Lucca 1761, p. 140.
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Appeals”, which sought to prove that John XXII was a heretic.20 Francis of Marchia signed these documents as well: “Cui appellationi et provocationi incontinenti adhaeserunt et eam approbaverunt religiosi viri frater Franciscus de Esculo, doctor in sacra pagina....”21 From that point on, Francis actively participated in the polemics and recriminations exchanged between the circle of fugitive Franciscans and the Avignon papacy. The Franciscan order, at the Paris Chapter General held in June 1329, elected a new Minister General, Geraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot), and reiterated the excommunication of the four fugitives. Pope John XXII replied to Michael of Cesena in the bull Quia vir reprobus, issued on 16 November 1329, affirming that Adam was the first to hold property, and that property has a divine origin. In taking such a position, the pope elicited numerous reactions,22 including that of Francis of Marchia, who in 1330 wrote the Improbatio.23 In this text, Francis refutes point-by-point the position taken by the pope in the bull, and calls John XXII “insanus,” “insulsus,” “hereticus,” “perversor,” “fremens contra Apostolos,” “delusor,” “abusor” and “pervertens iura humana et divina.”24 Francis and his companions followed Louis of Bavaria from Pisa to Munich, taking up residence in the Franciscan convent there in 1330. Also in Munich was Marsilius of Padua, author of the 1324 Defensor pacis, which John XXII had condemned in 1327. Francis participated in the intense polemical activity going on in Munich, and is credited with writing a second Improbatio, now lost, in 1332.25 When Benedict XII succeeded John XXII as pope (December 20, 1334), Louis of Bavaria sought to mend his relations with the papal court, an act which meant distancing himself from the rebel Franciscans. In 1340 and 1342, respectively, Bonagrazia of Bergamo and Michael of Cesena died impenitent, 20 R. Lambertini, La povertà pensata: evoluzione storica della definizione dell’identità minoritica da Bonaventura ad Ockham, Modena 2000, p. 210 and N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, p. 20; the texts of the Pisan Appeals, known as the Appellatio Maior and the Appellatio Minor, are edited in Gàl and Flood (eds.), Nicolaus Minorita, pp. 213456. 21 Gàl and Flood (eds.), Nicolaus Minorita, p. 423; for the Appellatio Minor, see p. 455 (evidently in a different hand from the rest of the Appellatio Minor, and being word-for-word identical with the witness list of the Appellatio Maior). This identification appears in the “Collectoriae” MS, Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, 276/A, f. 31v, which carries the “Appellatio maior” of September 18, 1328; R. Lambertini, La povertà pensata, p. 210, n. 89. 22 R. Lambertini, La povertà pensata, pp. 233ff. 23 Edited by N. Mariani, Francisci de Esculo, OFM, Improbatio (supra, n. 1). 24 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 21-22, n. 58, citing A. Heysse, “Descriptio codicis bibliothecae Laurentianae Florentiae S. Crucis, Plut. 31, sin., cod. 3”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 11 (1918), pp. 251-259. For a description of the chief positions Francis takes in his Improbatio, see R. Lambertini, La povertà pensata, pp. 214226. For the influence of this text on William of Ockham’s political philosophy, see esp. the studies of R. Lambertini mentioned in n. 93 infra. 25 This text is alluded to in the catalogue of the Avignon pope, Benedict XIII. See P. Vian, “Francesco della Marca”, p. 794.
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as did William of Ockham in 1347. At some point, Francis of Marchia fell into the hands of the Inquisition. He was tried and, having retracted everything he had defended in the previous years, acquitted.26 He was then sent to Avignon, where the new pope, Clement VI, sought to use Francis’ abjuration as a model to bring back to the fold the remaining partisans. These events took place between 1341 and 1344;27 in particular, Francis abjured his views and professed his faith in the presence of Clement VI on December 1, 1343.28 The recent discovery of a manuscript (Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 4246, ff. 37r-39r and 40r-41v) containing the record of the case brought against Francis provides an insight into Francis’ position and his strategy for defending it.29 In effect, he firmly defended his position on poverty while dissociating himself from the ecclesiological and political positions that he had shared with his fellow exiled Franciscans during the conflict with John XXII. Nevertheless, such a defense did not convince Clement VI, and included in Francis’ 1343 abjuration were those theoretical points concerning poverty that he had sought to defend to the end.30 Francis disappears from the historical record after 1344. Perhaps he succumbed to the plague that, a few years later (1347-1351), laid waste to the population of Europe.31
26 Fragments of this case have been collected by S. Baluze and J.D. Mansi (eds.), Miscellanea, vol. II, Lucca 1761, pp. 281a-284a and reproduced by N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Sententia et compilatio super libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Grottaferrata 1998, pp. 85-95. 27 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 24-25; Schneider’s hypotheses on Francis’ movements at this time are adopted by P. Vian, “Francesco della Marca”, p. 795. 28 This date appears in Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano, A.A. Arm I-XVIII, 5014, ff. 109v-110r, containing the text of the “Absolutio et confessio fratris Francisci de Esculo de ordine Minorum.” For more details, see E.L. Wittneben and R. Lambertini, “Un teologo francescano alle strette. Osservazioni sul testimone manoscritto del processo a Francesco d’Ascoli”, Picenum Seraphicum 18 (1999), (pp. 97-122), pp. 97-98. 29 E.L. Wittneben and R. Lambertini, “Un teologo francescano alle strette”, pp. 98ff. 30 E.L. Wittneben and R. Lambertini, “Un teologo francescano alle strette”, p. 122. 31 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 25-26.
II. Francis of Marchia’s Works Known since the fifteenth century as the Doctor succinctus, Francis of Marchia authored several works, of which only a part have been edited. Since this is the first volume to appear in a series dedicated to making Marchia’s works generally available, we supply below a list of Francis’ writings (authentic and doubtful), along with an indication of what has already been edited, in order to provide an overview of the state of research on Francis’ texts. As further volumes in this series appear, the hypotheses and evidence offered below concerning individual works will be nuanced and augmented.
1. Quaestiones in IV libros Sententiarum Francis’ commentary on Peter Lombard’s four books of the Sentences derives from Francis’ teaching at the Franciscan studium at Paris, most likely in the academic year 1319-1320. The extant written commentaries, however, may have been revised later. Numerous versions and redactions of this work survive.32 Major Editions: N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus (=the four principia and the prologue to the Reportatio), Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 31, Grottaferrata 2003. N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius (=Reportatio I) in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Distinctiones primi libri a prima ad decimam, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 32, Grottaferrata 2006. N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius (=Reportatio I) in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Distinctiones primi libri ab undecima ad vigesimam octavam, Spicilegium Bonaven turianum 33, Grottaferrata 2007.33
2. Quodlibet This written work, if the name is correct, would derive from a university exercise. With the exception of one question that also appears at the end of a copy of William of Alnwick’s determinationes (Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. For further discussion and a list of the editions of individual questions, see our discussion on Francis’ Sentences commentaries, infra, pp. xxiv-xxx. For the full contents and the state of the question concerning the manuscript tradition, see R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”. 33 Father Mariani’s edition of the remaining distinctions of Book i is currently in press and should appear shortly in the same series. 32
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6768, ff. 98rb-100vb),34 and a separate redaction of two others (neither of which was likely written by Marchia), only one manuscript witnesses this text: Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16110, and even then in an extremely fragmentary and faulty manner. A medieval librarian erred in placing the title of this work on folio 125r instead of 126r, and this mistake went unnoticed until very recently. As a result, the Mariani edition publishes nine fragmentary and complete questions, but the first two, questions 1 and 2, in fact come from Scotus’ Reportata Parisiensia. On the other hand, Francis certainly appears to be the author of questions 3-9 (as they are numbered in Mariani’s edition). The place and the date of the disputation cannot yet be determined.35 Edition: N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo OFM Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex commentario in librum Sententiarum, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 29, Grottaferrata 1997.
3. In libros Physicorum Two manuscripts carry this work, a literal commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. Francis stays faithful to the genre of the literal commentary, expounding the Philosopher’s views even on the topics where Francis elsewhere disagrees with Aristotle.37 This text could be the product of a course taught at 36
34 See G. Etzkorn, Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum: A Description of Some One Hundred Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus collection, Leiden 1996, pp. 199-209. 35 W. Duba, “Continental Franciscan Quodlibeta after Scotus”, in: C. Schabel (ed.), Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century, Leiden 2007, (pp. 569-649), pp. 600-609; “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone”; “The Authenticity of Francis of Marchia’s Quodlibet: the Testimony of Paris, BNF Ms. Lat. 16110”, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 49 (2007), pp. 91-102. The relevant questions from Scotus’ Reportata Parisiansia (d. 3, qq. 6 and 7) have recently been edited and translated in A. Wolter and O. Bychkov (eds.), John Duns Scotus. The Examined Report of the Paris Lecture: Reportatio I-A, St. Bonaventure, NY 2004. 36 Naples, BN, XI. E. 47; Vatican City, BAV, Vat. Ottob. lat. 1816. 37 A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie, 3rd ed., Rome 1968, p. 161. The question concerning projectile motion confirms this: in his commentary on book IV of the Sentences, Francis criticizes Aristotle’s theory, and replaces it with his own concerning the virtus derelicta. See book IV, q. 1: “Utrum in sacramentis sit aliqua virtus supernaturalis insistens sive eis formaliter inhaerens.” All redactions of this question have now been edited; see C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, pp. 60-80 (edition of “Francisci de Marchia. Principium In quartum librum Sententiarum, redactio B”); “La virtus derelicta di Francesco d’Appignano e il contesto del suo sviluppo”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del III° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2006, (pp. 125-154), pp. 140-154 (From MS E). E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV of the Sentences. Traditions and Redactions, with Questions on Projectile Motion, Polygamy and the Immortality of the Soul”, Picenum Seraphicum 25-27 (2006-2008) (forthcoming).
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a Franciscan studium. At the moment, we have no information that could help determine the date of this work. Edition: N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo OFM Sententia et compilatio super libros Physicorum Aristotelis, Spicilegium Bonaven turianum 30, Grottaferrata 1998.
4. Quaestiones in Metaphysicam (books I-VII) Francis’ question-commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics survives in several manuscripts. Two contain books I-VII: Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, Cod. 3490, ff. 1-57r and Bologna, Collegio di Spagna 104, ff. 48r-102v.38 No doubt remains concerning its authenticity,39 and the work may have been completed before 1323.40 Editions of questions: l. I, q. 1 and l. VI, q. 16: ed. A. Zimmermann, Ontologie oder Meta physik?, Leiden 1965, 1998 (second edition), pp. 56-71. l. II, q. 5, ed. N. Schneider, “Eine ungedruckte Quästio zur Erkennbarkeit des Unendlichen in einem Metaphysik-Kommentar des 14. Jahrhunderts”, Miscellanea mediaevalia 18 (1986), (pp. 96-118), pp. 104-107. l. VII, q. 5, ed. N. Schneider, “Franciscus de Marchia über die Wirklichkeit der Materie (Metaph. VII q. 5)”, Franziskanische Studien 71 (1989), pp. 138-158, pp. 144-149. Proemium, ed. R. Friedman, in: S. Folger-Fonfara, “Franziskus von Marchia: Die erste Unterscheidung einer allgemeinen und einer besonderen Metaphysik”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005), (pp. 461-513), pp. 504-513. l. VII, q. 1, ed. F. Amerini, “Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis. Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of Accidents”, Vivarium 44 (2006), (pp. 96-150), pp. 144-150.
A question list for this commentary appears in A. Zimmermann, Verzeichnis ungedruckter Kommentare zur Metaphysik und Physik des Aristoteles aus der Zeit von etwa 1250-1350, Leiden 1971, p. 37 and pp. 140-145, and P. Künzle, “Mitteilungen aus Codex Mazarine 3490 zum Schrifttum des Franziskaners Petrus Thomae, vorab zu seinen ‘Quaestiones in Metaphysicam’”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 59 (1966), (pp. 3-37), pp. 17-23. For a full bibliography on this text, see R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 33, n. 12. 39 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 27-29. 40 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, p. 15; S. Folger-Fonfara, “Franziskus von Marchia: Die erste Unterscheidung einer Allgemeinen und einer Besonderen Metaphysik”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005), (pp. 461-513), pp. 495-501. 38
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5. Quaestiones super primum et secundum librum Metaphysicorum This short work probably abbreviates only book I of the larger Metaphysics commentary.41 It survives in two manuscripts: Florence, Biblioteca MediceoLaurenziana, Fesul. 161, ff. 67ra-73ra, and Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 3130, ff. 29ra-36vb. This work has not been edited.
6. Improbatio contra libellum Domini Iohannis qui incipit “Quia vir reprobus” This polemic work is a refutation of John XXII’s bull Quia vir reprobus. It was composed in the year 1330, and has three manuscript witnesses: Florence, Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurenziana, S. Croce plut. 31 sin. cod. 3, ff. 23r85v; Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 4857; Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 14812, ff. 36r-47v (fragmentary). Edition: N. Mariani, Francisci de Esculo OFM Improbatio contra libellum Domini Iohannis qui incipit “Quia vir reprobus”, Spicilegium Bonaventurianum 28, Grottaferrata 1993.
7. Quaestio utrum nativitas Christi fuerit naturalis Nazareno Mariani has published this quaestio as a ‘sermone inedito di Francesco della Marca,’ from Munich, Staatsbibliothek, CLM 8991, ff. 159171.42 Although the treatise appears in this fifteenth-century manuscript amid a series of sermons attributed to Francis Meyronnes, the explicit reads, “Explicit questio bona et sermo bonus et subtilis de nativitate Domini... Francisci de Marcia.” Mariani rightly observes that Bartholomäus Roth had doubts about the attribution to Marchia. Roth cites the explicit as a case where a scribe mistook Meyronnes for Marchia and does not question that Meyronnes is the text’s actual author. Mariani, on the other hand, holds that the evidence of the explicit should not be so casually discarded, and publishes a transcription of the text from CLM 8991 as being by Francis of Marchia. Mariani’s case for an attribution to Marchia is weakened by the fact that CLM 8991 is not the only manuscript witness. Roth explicitly names as witnesses to the treatise the Venice 1493 edition of Meyronnes’ Sermones de sancR. Lambertini, “Predicare Aristotele. A proposito di alcuni sermoni recentemente attribuiti a Francesco d’Appignano” (forthcoming). Lambertini publishes a question list, showing that the Vatican manuscript containing this work only treats questions parallel to those on book I in Francis’ major Quaestiones in Metaphysicam; therefore it is likely that this text only treats book I, and not book II. 42 N. Mariani, “Sermone inedito di Francesco della Marca”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 99 (2006), pp. 213-250; on this quaestio, its authenticity and status as a sermon, see also R. Lambertini, “Predicare Aristotele” (forthcoming). 41
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tis (ff. 15va-22rb); Munich, CLM 18606 (f. 192r-204v); St. Florian, XI, 138 (ff. 78ra-89rb); and Oxford, Balliol College, cod. lat. 67A (f. 106ff.).43 To this list, Heribert Roßmann adds Frankfurt, Stadt- und Univ.-Bibl., Ms. Leonh. 12, ff. 2r-19v.44 Mariani’s attribution needs to be weighed against the full evidence that Roth provides. While the St. Florian codex presents the quaestio as anonymous, and Balliol has it following, but not contained in, a series of sermons attributed to Meyronnes, the Venice edition identifies it as composed by Meyronnes. More significantly, Roth also transcribes the incipit to the fifteenthcentury copy contained in CLM 18606 (f. 192r): “Questio bona seu sermo bonus de nativitate Domini Franciscus de Maronis aut sic titulis formetur: Utrum nativitas Christi fuerit naturalis.”45 Therefore, against the explicit naming Marchia, there is an incipit identifying Meyronnes as the author. Moreover, other works contextually identify the treatise with Meyronnes, not Marchia. A critical study, most desirably an edition from all witnesses, is needed to clarify the issue of the authorship. Editions: Franciscus de Maronis, Sermones de sanctis, Venice 1493, ff. 15va22rb. N. Mariani, “Sermone inedito di Francesco della Marca”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 99 (2006), 213-250 (from Munich, CLM 8991).
8. Sermons Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 3130, contains a series of philosophical and theological works associated with the study of Aristotle, including Francis’ questions on book I of the Metaphysics (see above). Among these questions are two anonymous sermons: Amice, ascende superius (f. 31ra-va) and Doctrinam sapientiae et disciplinae scripsit in codice isto (f. 32ra-va). Mariani has proposed that Francis of Marchia is the author of these sermons. They appear to be similar to sermons in praise of Aristotle that university arts masters would give at the beginning of a course. The identification of these sermons with Francis of Marchia is hence uncertain. Edition: N. Mariani, “Due sermoni attribuiti a Francesco della Marca”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005), pp. 571-595. 43 B. Roth, Franz von Mayronis O.F.M., pp. 247-278, where Roth also makes a vague reference to “other” manuscripts. 44 H. Roßmann, “Die Quodlibeta und verschiedene sonstige Schriften des Franz von Meyronnes”, p. 60, n. 183. 45 B. Roth, Franz von Mayronis O.F.M., p. 274.
III. The Commentaries on the Four Books of the Sentences 1. Composition, dating and manuscript tradition As a bachelor of theology, Francis of Marchia lectured on the Sentences at Paris, most likely for one academic year, presumably 1319-1320.46 Like his contemporaries at Paris, he would have read the four books of the Sentences in the order I-IV-II-III,47 and commented on the Lombard’s text in question form, using the topics discussed by Peter Lombard as points of departure for his own investigations.48 Four times during this course of lectures, Francis would have held a principium, a ceremonial disputation marking the beginning of his lectures on each For general information on Sentences lectures and their regulation in this period, see, e.g.: P. Glorieux, “L’enseignement au Moyen Age: Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle”, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age 35 (1968), (pp. 65-186), esp. pp. 111-18 (Sentences). 138-141 (principia); “Sentences (commentaires sur les)”, Dictionnaire de théologie catholique, v. XIV, Paris 1939, (cols. 1860-1884), col. 1862; Z. Kaluza, “La nature des écrits de Jean de Ripa”, Traditio 43 (1987), (pp. 257-298), pp. 260-261; C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I”, p. 102, n. 1. More generally, and for further information concerning individual lectures on the Sentences, see W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England, Princeton 1987, pp. 7-9; O. Weijers, Le maniement du savoir. Pratiques intellectuelles à l’époque des premières universités (XIIIe-XIVe siècles), Turnhout 1996, p. 52; F. Del Punta and C. Luna, “La teologia scolastica”, in: E. Menestò, G. Cavallo and C. Leonardi (eds.), Lo spazio letterario nel Medioevo. 1. Medioevo Latino, Rome 1993, v. 2, p. 340; R. Friedman, “The Sentences Commentary, 12501320: General Trends, the Impact of the Religious Orders, and the Test Case of Predestination,” in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden 2002, pp. 41-128; A. Oliva, Les débuts de l’enseignement de Thomas d’Aquin et sa conception de la Sacra doctrina, Paris 2006, pp. 238-241. 47 An important early witness to this usage is Remigio de’ Girolami, Prologus super IV Sententiarum: “Quartus angelus tuba cecinit, Apoc. 8 [12]. Liber iste ‘Sententiarum’ qui secundum consuetudinem antiquam debet a nobis exponi post primum librum.... Et propter hoc lectura quarti libri ‘Sententiarum’ premicti videtur lecturae secundi et tertii...;” text cited by E. Panella, Il De subiecto theologiae di Remigio dei Girolami O.P., Milan 1982, p. 10, n. 7. There are exceptions to this usage, e.g., Thomas Aquinas; cf. A. Oliva, Les débuts de l’enseignement, p. 252. On Marchia, see A. Maier, “Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamsforschung”, Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, Rome 1964-1977, vol. 1, Rome 1964, (pp. 161-200), p. 180; Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie, Rome 1955, p. 200. 48 For the structure of Francis’ commentary and its relation to Lombard’s text, see infra, pp. xxxvii-xl. With regard to the changes in structure that mark the evolution of commentaries on the Sentences in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see the studies in G.R. Evans, Mediaeval Commentaries on the ‘Sentences’ of Peter Lombard, Leiden 2002, as well as W.J. Courtenay, “Philosophy in the Context of Sentences Commentaries”, in: G. Fioravanti, C. Leonardi and S. Perfetti (eds.), Il commento filosofico nell’Occidente medievale (secoli XIII-XIV), Turnhout 2002, pp. 445-467. 46
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of the books of the Sentences. The bachelor would give a sermon to the assembled faculty of theology before considering a question related in some way to the book of the Sentences he was starting to lecture on.49 We have written texts of Marchia’s principial lectures. The written versions of Francis’ Sentences commentaries proper bear a relation to Francis’ teaching, but in diverse ways. Some texts appear to be pure reportationes: copies made by a student (a reportator) of what the speaker said in the classroom. Others seem to have undergone authorial revision so that we might speak of a revised reportatio (or ordinatio or reportatio examinata), or a scriptum, a separate written work. Francis’ commentary on the Sentences survives for each book in more than one version, and the traditions, witnesses and circumstances are different for each book of the Sentences. The current state of research has not removed all doubts concerning the relationships between all these texts. Nevertheless, using the study of R. Friedman and C. Schabel as a guide, and bringing it up to date with later studies,50 we can depict the current state of research and establish the known facts.51 A. Principia A written version of the ceremonial lectures Francis held at the start of lessons on each book of the Sentences survives. Ms. M contains all four principia, while JKVa have the one for book III (Principium tertii), and a second copy of book II (Principium secundi) exists in D. For the relationship between the principia and the commentaries on the Sentences see the studies of R. Friedman (for book I, “Principia and Prologue in Francesco d’Appignano’s Sentences Commentary”) and A. Poppi (“Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus del commento alle Sentenze di Francesco della Marca”, Archivum franciscanum historicum 97 (2004), pp. 469-480). 49 On the genre of the Principia in general, see especially, W.J. Courtenay, “Theological Bachelors at Paris on the Eve of the Papal Schism. The Academic Environment of Peter of Candia”, in K. Emery, R.L. Friedman, and A. Speer (eds.), Philosophy and Theology in the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, Leiden (forthcoming). On especially Marchia’s Principia, see R. Friedman, “Principia and Prologue in Francesco d’Appignano’s Sentences Commentary: The Question ‘Quaeritur utrum ens simpliciter simplex possit esse subiectum alicuius scientiae,’” in: D. Priori and M. Balena (eds.), Atti del II° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, (pp. 123-149), pp. 124-127. A written redaction of all four of Francis’ principia can be found in Madrid, Biblioteca nacionàl 504, in the order I-IV-II-III. 50 C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I”; R. Friedman, “Principia and Prologue”. These studies challenge the hypotheses set forth by N. Mariani, “Certezze e ipotesi sul Commento alle Sentenze di Francesco della Marca OMin.”, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 95 (2002), pp. 93-183. 51 In what follows, we refer to the manuscripts by the sigla assigned in R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences” (for the sigla of manuscripts used in the present edition, see the list of sigla infra, p. lxxvii).
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Edition: (as ‘Quaestiones praeambulae in IV libros Sententiarum’) ed. N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo Commentarius in IV libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi. Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus, pp. 147-343.
B. Book I Francis’ commentary on book I of the Sentences exists in two versions, referred to as the Reportatio and the Scriptum. Four manuscripts (EHQX) witness the shorter Reportatio, although H seems to have a different redaction starting with q. 19. Moreover, E contains several fragmentary questions possessing enough significant variants that one suspects a distinct redaction.52 The longer Scriptum, witnessed by thirteen manuscripts (ACFLMNORSU VYZ) shows signs of having been reworked by the author53 after 1322.54 Four of the thirteen manuscripts carry part (ACL, the first part of q. 1) or all (R) of the prologue to the Reportatio.55 Distinctions from book I currently edited: Reportatio Prologus (as ‘Quaestiones praeambulae’ and ‘Prologus’), Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus, ed. N. Mariani, Grottaferrata 2003, pp. 345ff. dd. 1-10, Distinctiones primi libri a prima ad decimam, ed. N. Mariani, Grottaferrata 2006. dd. 11-28, Distinctiones primi libri ab undecima ad vigesimam octavam, ed. N. Mariani, Grottaferrata 2007. d. 39, dd. 42-44, and dd. 45-48, ed. C. Schabel, in: E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008) (URL: http://plato. stanford.edu/archives/spr2008/entries/francis-marchia/).
Scriptum Prologue, q. 1, ed. N. Mariani, Francisci de Marchia sive de Esculo OFM, Quodlibet cum quaestionibus selectis ex commentario in libros Sententiarum, pp. 377-88 (from MS C). While Mariani maintains that H abbreviates QX, C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I”, pp. 117-121 argues that H appears to be a separate redaction. See also our remarks on DH’s redaction of book II, infra, pp. xlvi-lv. 53 The term scriptum appears in one manuscript: Z, f. 93vb; C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I”, pp. 102-103; R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, p. 1, in nota. 54 C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Book I”, p. 105; W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano tra Parigi e Avignone”. In the forthcoming edition of the Scriptum, G. Etzkorn notes that in d. 20 Francis cites the arguments of Peter Auriol as being of a Doctor bonae memoriae; Peter Auriol died in early 1322. 55 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, pp. 49-50. 52
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Prologue, q. 2, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 361-76 (from MS C). d. 1, q. 13, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 525-42 (from MS C). d. 1, q. 14, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 304-16 (from MS C). d. 2, q. 16, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 414-27 (from MS C). d. 2, q. 18, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 543-60 (from MS C). d. 3, q. 20, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 507-15 (from MS C). d. 3, q. 22a, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 516-24 (from MS C). d. 3, q. 23, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 351-59 (from MS C). d. 4, q. 24, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 324-45 (from MS C). d. 8, q. 27, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 429-43 (from MS C). d. 8, q. 28, a. 1, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 477-505 (from MS C). d. 11 (partial), ed. R. Friedman, “Francis of Marchia and John Duns Scotus on the Psychological Model of the Trinity”, Picenum Seraphicum 18 (1999), pp. 46-56; d. 22, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 389-413 (from MS C). d. 24, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 414-75 (from MS C). d. 27, ed. R. Friedman, in: ‘In principio erat verbum’. The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250-1325, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Iowa, 1997, pp. 555572. Transcription of d. 27, q. 1, a. 1-2 in N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 295-303 (from MS C). dd. 35-38, ed. C. Schabel, “Il determinismo di Francesco de Marchia”, Picenum Seraphicum 18 (1999), pp. 69-95 and 19 (2000), pp. 18-55. dd. 39-40, ed. C. Schabel, “La dottrina di Francesco de Marchia sulla predestinazione”, Picenum Seraphicum 20 (2001), pp. 9-45.
C. Book II Book II survives in three redactions. The most significant is that dubbed “Reportatio IIA” by Friedman and Schabel, and is witnessed in whole or in part by 14 manuscripts (ABCFGKLNPTVWYZ). While the explicit to V calls the text a scriptum, the explicit to K names William of Rubio as the reportator.56 In addition to IIA, Friedman and Schabel named the version found in a sole manuscript witness (E) “Reportatio IIB”. IIB presents a considerably shorter and different text than Reportatio IIA.57 A third redaction (DH) bears strong ties to IIA, although it contains a shorter text. The relations between 56 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 54. 57 See the discussion in N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 37-39.
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the redactions, and between the witnesses to IIA, will receive further consideration in the discussion below.58 All questions from book II currently edited come from IIA: q. 3, ed. N. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 346-350 (from MS C); q. 12, a. 1 (partial), ed. R. Friedman, in: D. Priori, ed., Atti del I° convegno internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2002, pp. 100-101 (from MSS BCYZ). q. 16, a. 5, ed. C. Schabel, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Supplement to Francis of Marchia (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ fall2007/entries/francis-marchia/). q. 25, ed. Mariani, Quodlibet, pp. 317-23 (from MS C). qq. 29-32, ed. N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie des Franziskus de Marchia, pp. 41-75 (using BCGLNW).
D. Book III There are three versions of the commentary on book III. Thirteen manuscripts (ABCEFHJMNPTYZ) witness in whole or in part the major version (redaction IIIA).59 At the end of P’s copy of the main redaction, questions 1-8 are repeated in a second redaction (P’, redaction IIIB). Finally, W contains a different version of the text (IIIC). The explicits of BCHY call IIIA a reportatio, while T qualifies it as editus, suggesting that Francis revised the text.60 The commentary on book III is the shortest of the four, covering only a small portion of the Lombard’s text and comprising only fifteen questions, sixteen if one includes the question Utrum Christus fuerit vere frater noster, witnessed only by JK. Currently edited questions from book III: q. 1, a. 1; q. 7, a. 1 (IIIA, IIIB and IIIC): W. Duba and C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book III of the Sentences”, Picenum Seraphicum 26 (2007) (forthcoming). q. 13 (IIIA): W. Duba, “Francesco di Marchia sulla conoscenza intuitiva mediata e immediata”, Picenum Seraphicum 22/23 (2002/2003), pp. 131157. infra, pp. xxxvi-lv. W. Duba and C. Schabel “The Redactions of Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book III of the Sentences”, Picenum Seraphicum 25-27 (2006-2008) (forthcoming). For the manuscript tradition of book III, see W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano sull’immacolata concezione”, in: D. Priori and M. Balena (eds.), Atti del II° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2004, pp. 59-75; “Francesco di Marchia sulla conoscenza intuitiva mediata e immediata”, Picenum Seraphicum 22/23 (2003/2004), pp. 127-130. 60 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 57, for the stemma. 58 59
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E. Book IV Ten manuscripts (ABCDHKPYWZ) witness the commentary on this book in its entirety, and two (EVb) in a fragmentary manner.61 There exist three versions. Two are closely related, namely BDHKY (Redaction IVA) and CPWZ (Redaction IVB), with MS A shifting from IVB to IVA after the first few questions. E witnesses a few questions from a third redaction (IVC). The relationship between these versions is problematic, and many hypotheses have been formulated, such that we cannot as yet take a definitive position on the history of the text’s transmission, outside of stating that none of the versions are abbreviations.62 The most recent studies have revealed that the versions relate to each other in different ways at various points in the commentary.63 In any case, the explicits to BCHP identify the text as a reportatio, and P further qualifies it as editus by Francis. Moreover, C and P identify William of Rubio as the book’s reportator, and C provides the date 1323, which may refer to the date the specific written redaction was completed. Currently edited questions from book IV: Redactio IVA q. 1, ed. E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV of the Sentences, with Questions on Projectile Motion, Polygamy and the Immortality of the Soul”, Picenum Seraphicum 25-27 (2006-2008) (forthcoming): from all MSS. qq. 46 et 47, ed. E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, ibid. qq. 61a-b, ed. E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, ibid.
Redactio IVB q. 1, ed. C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus Derelicta and the Context of Its Development”, Vivarium XLIV (2006), (pp. 41-80), pp. 60-80.
61 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 40. 62 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, pp. 57-59; N. Mariani, “Certezze e ipotesi”, p. 114; R. Lambertini, “A proposito del IV° libro del commento alle Sentenze di Francesco d’Appignano: la quaestio 37”, Atti del II° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, D. Priori and M. Balena (eds.), Appignano del Tronto 2004, pp. 9-26; R. Lambertini, “Francesco d’Appignano e Guglielmo di Ockham: alcuni aspetti di un rapporto non facile”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del III° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2006, pp. 89-124; E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV”. 63 R. Lambertini, “A proposito del IV° libro”, p. 17; E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV”.
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Redactio IVC q. 1, ed. C. Schabel, “La virtus derelicta di Francesco d’Appignano e il contesto del suo sviluppo”, in D. Priori, ed., Atti del IIIo Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2006, (pp. 125-154) pp. 140-154.
In addition, numerous passages have been published from Francis’ commentary on book IV in studies on his philosophy of nature and on his doctrine of accidents.64
2. The content of the Commentary on the Sentences Peter Lombard’s four books of Sentences were organized by its author into books and chapters; in the early thirteenth century, Alexander of Hales imposed upon Lombard’s text the organization into ‘distinctions’ that is associated with the text today. Francis of Marchia’s commentary on the Sentences was composed at a moment in the evolution of the genre when considerable distance had been established between the written commentary and Lombard’s text as it was reorganized by Alexander of Hales. By the third decade of the fourteenth century, this evolution would lead in some cases to the abandonment of the structuring of the commentary according to distinction in favor of an organization based exclusively on questions (quaestiones).65 In contrast to this later development, Francis’ commentary follows the structure of the Lombard’s text, but without completely adhering to it, and without reproducing all the articulations. Francis’ commentaries on books I and IV present the questions with the divisions into distinctions still evident. Book III (all redactions) follows the structure of the Lombard’s text, but makes only one mention of a distinction (q. 2, mentioning that it is dealing with material from d. 2). Book II, Reportatio A has no divisions into distinctions, but rather contains references to the “three parts” of the book.66 Reportatio B has very few references to the Lombard’s text. Moreover, while, with the exception of book III, the size of Francis’ commentary does not vary much between the books,67 the topics treated have been carefully selected and reflect the author’s interests, reducing the scope of the commentary with respect to the Lombard’s text, and giving it a more personal character. As the edition of entire books of Francis’ commentaries is just beginning, we shall describe the major themes that occur in the various redactions, and point to the scholarly studies so far done on individual topics. 64 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 98. 65 R. Friedman, “Conclusion”, in: G.R. Evans (ed.), Mediaeval Commentaries on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Leiden 2002, (pp. 509-527), pp. 524-525. 66 For the structure of book II, see infra, xxxvii-xl. 67 Comparing just the various Reportatio versions, book I contains 71 questions, book II 49, book III 16 and book IV has 66.
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A. Book I Francis’ commentary on book I begins with the questions on the prologue concerning theology as a science and its subject (God), what can be known of God through science, and the nature of this science (speculative in patria, and practical, after a fashion, in via).68 Passing to the first distinction, Francis discusses questions concerning the will, the act of the will, freedom and its relation to the ultimate goal (i.e. eternal life).69 He then considers final causality and the cognizability of the infinite in detail before arriving at the Trinity.70 Distinctions 5 through 30 focus in detail on issues involving the Trinity.71 Francis raises in distinction 30 the issue of the relationship between God and creature, specifically from the perspective of God, and he will return to this theme in the present volume, qq. 7-9, from the complementary perspective of creatures. The following distinctions, 31-34, continue to treat relations, but within divinity. Distinctions 35 and 36 consider created reality, contingency and the knowledge of future contingent propositions,72 while distinction 37 addresses God’s omnipresence in things, and His cognition of particulars. Predestination takes up distinctions 38, 40 and 41,73 while 39 considers divine ideas.74 In distinctions 42-44, Francis asks what makes creation possible, and he returns to the theme of the will in distinctions 45-48.
On these topics, see A. Poppi, “Ontologia e scienza divina nel Commentario alle Sentenze di Francesco della Marca (1319)”, Miscellanea francescana 104 (2004), pp. 100-120 and F. Zanin, “Gregorio da Rimini contro Francesco d’Appignano sulla conoscenza scientifica dell’oggetto della teologia”, in: D. Priori and M. Balena (eds.), Atti del II° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2004, pp. 27-58. 69 On these issues, see generally G. Alliney, “La ricezione della teoria scotiana della volontà nell’ambiente teologico parigino (1307-1316)”, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 16 (2005), pp. 339-391; specifically on Francis, idem, “La libertà dell’atto beatifico nel pensiero di Francesco d’Appignano”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del III° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2006, pp. 9-34. 70 For Francis’ treatment of the cognizability of the infinite, see N. Schneider, “Eine ungedruckte Quästio zur Erkennbarkeit des Unendlichen in einem Metaphysikkommentar des 14. Jahrhunderts”, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 18 (1986), pp. 96-118. 71 For some of these themes, see R. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250-1350, Leiden (forthcoming), cap. 12, part 2. 72 C. Schabel, Theology at Paris, pp. 189-220 and pp. 324-336; F. Fiorentino, Gregorio da Rimini. Contingenza, futuro e scienza nel pensiero tardo-medievale, Rome 2004, pp. 75-76, 83-84, 188-189. 73 C. Schabel, “Il determinismo di Francesco di Marchia”; “La dottrina di Francesco di Marchia sulla predestinazione”. 74 C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia on Divine Ideas”, in: M.C. Pacheco and J.F. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale, Turnhout 2006, pp. 1589-1599. 68
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B. Book II See the detailed treatment, infra, pp. xxxvi-lv. C. Book III Francis’ commentaries on book III are the shortest of the four books. The most complete version has fifteen questions, plus an additional question found in two closely related manuscripts.75 As noted, only q. 2 mentions the Lombard’s distinctions (“Circa distinctionem secundam”), although the other questions address material associated with several different distinctions in Peter Lombard’s text. Francis’ rough contemporary and fellow Franciscan Peter Auriol (reading the Sentences two years before Francis), similarly has a disproportionately short commentary on book III, suggesting that the reason might be institutional, perhaps related to the fact that book III was the last one treated by a bachelor in the course of lectures.76 Francis’ commentary on book III starts with a series of questions on the hypostatic union (qq. 1-6, related to distinction 1). After addressing the possibility of the Incarnation, he considers its vessel, the Virgin, with two questions relating to Peter Lombard’s distinction 8: whether the Virgin was a mother in the same sense as other women (q. 7)77 and a defense of the Immaculate Conception (q. 8).78 Questions 9 and 10 relate to distinction 18, and treat the redemption: namely in what way the redemption can be considered the cause of the Incarnation,79 and whether the redemption could be brought about by a mere creature. The next three questions (qq. 11-13) relate to distinction 14 and consider the human soul and the intellect of Christ.80 The following question
On the various redactions of this book, see W. Duba and C. Schabel, “The Redactions of Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book III”. 76 For an examination of Auriol’s commentaries on book III of the Sentences, see W. Duba, “The Immaculate Conception in the Works of Peter Auriol”, Vivarium 38 (2000), pp. 5-34. Examples of disproportionately short contemporary commentaries on book III abound. For instance, Francis Meyronnes’ commentary on book III in the 1520 Venice edition is very short, both in absolute length and in the number of questions, in comparison to his commentaries on the other books. 77 See on this question, C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia and the Women”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del IV° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2008 (forthcoming). 78 Consult on this topic, W. Duba, “Francesco d’Appignano sull’immacolata concezione”. 79 See W. Duba, “Se non ci fosse la redenzione, ci sarebbe l’incarnazione? Il rapporto fra la reparatio humani generis e la causa dell’incarnazione del Verbo secondo Francesco d’Appignano”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del III° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2006, pp. 35-46. 80 See W. Duba, “Francis of Marchia on Christ’s Cognition of the Word”, in: M.C. Pacheco and J. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale, Turnhout 2006, pp. 1613-1624. 75
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(q. 14), pertaining to distinction 36, considers the connection of the virtues,81 while the last two return to Christ: His relationship to grace and glory (q. 15), and (in mss. JK) in what sense Christ can be considered “our brother” (q. 16).82 For book III, Francis appears to have carefully selected a limited number of themes to discuss. In these themes, Francis complements his highly personal theological perspective with precise philosophical analysis and defends unique positions not only in Christology and Mariology, but also in psychology and anthropology. D. Book IV Among Francis’ works, the commentary on book IV has to this point attracted the most scholarly attention, in large part due to Francis’ discussion of projectile motion in the initial question. As with book II, the first question begins with a reference to a principium: “Circa principium quarti libri...”83 This reference suggests that the question was part of the quaestio collativa that a bachelor of the Sentences held before beginning the lectures on the particular book.84 Further supporting this hypothesis is this question’s lack of strong relationship with the first distinction of book IV of the Lombard. Finally, Schabel has recently argued that the whole of the first question constitutes the “‘missing’ fourth article” of Marchia’s principium.85 In terms of content, the question considers the power (virtus) that works in the sacraments. In the three articles of this eminently theological question (“Utrum in sacramentis sit aliqua virtus supernaturalis insistens sive eis formaliter inhaerens”),86 Francis inserts a small treatise on natural philosophy: the first two articles are dedicated to motion, in particular the force that serves as cause of motion in violent motion (first article)87 and in natural motion (second article).88 In the third article, Francis See E. Babey, “En vertu du lien. François d’Appignano et la ‘connexio virtutum’ (III Sent. q. 14, a. 3)”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del IV° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2008 (forthcoming). 82 This last question appears in only two manuscripts: J, ff. 103vb-106rb and K, ff. 221v-229v (R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 98). 83 The phrase circa principium appears in three manuscripts that carry the long version; see C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, p. 57. 84 R. Friedman, “Principia and Prologue”, pp. 123-125. 85 C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, p. 57. 86 Edited in C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, pp. 60-80; C. Schabel, “La virtus derelicta di Francesco d’Appignano”, pp. 140-154; E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV”. 87 “Primo videbitur utrum in instrumento artificiali sit sive recipiatur aliqua virtus a principali sive artificiali agente ipsi instrumento inhaerens sive formaliter inexistens”, in Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, p. 61, ll. 40-43. 88 “Secundo, videbitur idem de instrumento naturali, utrum videlicet in manu vel in lingua, et sic de aliis naturalibus instrumentis, sit aliqua virtus influxa a potentia principaliter talia instrumenta naturalia movente, alia a forma ipsorum cuiuslibet propria et a motu”, ibid., p. 61, ll. 43-46. 81
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applies the results of the first two to the sacraments, considered as spiritual or supernatural instruments.89 It is in this question that Francis formulates his famous theory of virtus derelicta, later known as impetus, and this is the reason why this question is the most studied text of Francis’ thought.90 Indeed, the doctrinal and historical significance of Francis’ thought in this question is unanimously acknowledged. Moreover, it supplies an eloquent witness to the philosophical value of the medieval debates on theological themes. Moving on to the rest of the text, Francis privileges certain themes, in particular the Eucharist, which receives fifteen questions,91 and marriage, which gets nineteen.92 Additionally, distinction 21 addresses a hot topic of Francis’ time: property, and Francis makes it a matter of positive law as opposed to
“Tertio, ex hoc videbitur principale propositum, videlicet utrum in sacramentis, quae sunt instrumenta spiritualia sive supernaturalia, sit aliqua supernaturalis virtus eis inhaerens formaliter”, ibid., p. 61, ll. 46-49. 90 Among the numerous studies dedicated to Francis’ position on this theme, see: A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, pp. 61-200; Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, Rome 1958, pp. 350-354; “Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamsforschung”; “Die naturphilo sophische Bedeutung der scholastischen Impetustheorie”, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, v. 1, pp. 353-379; Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, Rome 1949, pp. 133-136 and pp. 241-247; N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 225-237; “Kontexte des Naturbegriffs”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del I° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2002, pp. 161-173; M. Wolff, Geschichte der Impetustheorie. Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der klassischen Mechanik, Frankfurt 1978, pp. 191-198; G. Federici Vescovini, La teoria dell’impeto, Turin 1969, pp. 1-21; K. Michalski, La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIVe siècle, Krakow 1928, pp. 1-2, 47-49, 56; D. Priori, “Francesco d’Appignano: Frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora”, in: idem (ed.), Atti del I° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2002, pp. 103-115; F. Zanin, “La rielaborazione del concetto di vis derelicta in Nicole Oresme”, ibid., pp. 117-158; “Francis of Marchia, Virtus derelicta, and Modifications of the Basic Principles of Aristotelian Physics”, Vivarium 44 (2006), pp. 81-95; C. Schabel, “La virtus derelicta di Francesco d’Appignano”; “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”; S. Livesey, “Accessus ad Lombardum: The Secular and the Sacred in Medieval Commentaries on the Sentences”, Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévale 72.1 (2005), (pp. 153-174), pp. 165-167. 91 See on some aspects of Francis’ theory of the eucharist, P.J.J.M. Bakker, La raison et le miracle, vol. 1, pp. 86-94 and 399-408 (with passages of Francis’ texts). Francis’ theory of accidents has also been studied by F. Amerini, “Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis. Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of Accidents”, Vivarium 44 (2006), pp. 96-150 (with an edition of Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, VII, q. 1); “Francesco d’Appignano come fonte di Paolo Veneto. Il caso degli accidenti eucaristici”, Picenum Seraphicum 25-27 (2006-2008) (forthcoming). Moreover, a comparison between Francis’ doctrine of quantity and that of Ockham has been proposed by R. Lambertini, “Francesco d’Appignano e Guglielmo di Ockham”. 92 See C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia and the Women”; E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV” (with an edition of q. 46 (“Utrum sit contra ius naturae quod una mulier habeat plures viros”) and 47 (“Utrum sit contra ius naturae quod unus habeat plures uxores”). 89
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natural law.93 Towards the end, distinctions 43 to 47 treat the Resurrection, separate souls and their immortality.94
R. Lambertini has extensively studied this theme in numerous works, chief among which are: La povertà pensata, pp. 196-204; “Oltre la proprietà, alle origini del potere: Francesco d’Appignano nel pensiero ecclesiologico-politico del Trecento”, in: D. Priori (ed.), Atti del I° Convegno Internazionale su Francesco d’Appignano, Appignano del Tronto 2002, pp. 51-66; “Francesco d’Ascoli e la polemica francescana contro Giovanni XXII: a proposito del rapporto tra l’Improbatio e l’Appellatio magna monacensis”, in: A. Degrandi, O. Gori, G. Pesiri, A. Piazza and R. Rinaldi (eds.), Studi in onore di Girolamo Arnaldi offerti dagli allievi della Scuola nazionale di Studi Storici, Rome 2001, pp. 277-308; “A proposito del IV° libro del Commento alle Sentenze di Fran cesco d’Appignano”; “Francesco d’Appignano e Gugliemo di Ockham”; “Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham: Fragments from a Dialogue”, Vivarium 44 (2006), pp. 184-204. 94 The immortality of the soul will be treated again in book II, qq. 18-19. On this topic, see T. Suarez-Nani, “Peut-on prouver l’immortalité de l’âme? Démonstration et certitude selon François de Marchia”, Picenum Seraphicum 25-27 (2006-2008) (forthcoming); E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV” (with an edition of book IV, q. 61a-b, substantially the same as Reportatio IIA, q. 19). 93
IV. The Questions on the Second Book of the Sentences 1. Redactions Three redactions of Francis’ commentary on book II of the Sentences survive, and an awareness of the relationship between these redactions is necessary to evaluate Francis’ thought as contained in these texts. The present volume presents the first part of the major redaction, Reportatio IIA. This text exists in 14 manuscripts, namely ABCFGKLNPTVWYZ. E, that is, Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 943, reports a different text (and will appear in an edition directed by Girard Etzkorn). To distinguish these two redactions, Friedman and Schabel have proposed the titles Reportatio IIA and Reportatio IIB, which we have adopted, abbreviating them as IIA and IIB for the discussion that follows. In addition, Friedman and Schabel noted that manuscripts DH “share a rather different text.”95 While the text in DH has strong textual similarities with IIA, at times it deviates greatly. From soundings in the manuscript tradition, it became evident that DH reports a different redaction, although closely related to IIA. As an appendix to this introduction, we have edited q. 1 as it appears in DH in order to illustrate the range of differences from IIA. Friedman and Schabel also suggested that V contains an abbreviation of IIA, and yet they observe that a note in the manuscript calls the text a Scriptum.96 Our soundings suggest that V could just as easily contain an extremely faulty copy. For all of V’s faults, however, our reconstruction of the stemma codicum places V in a privileged position with respect to the original, and so we cannot discard V’s observations as entirely inauthentic. So at least three redactions exist, and, while no unambiguous, explicit indications permit us to state the relationship between the texts with certitude, we can advance hypotheses with respect to the three texts. First, IIB is an early reportatio, perhaps reflecting Francis’ Parisian lectures. Second, DH reflects the text in an intermediate state, possibly a revised reportatio. Third, IIA revises and completes the text as found in DH. In order to support these statements, then, we need to consider the relation between two groups of texts: IIA-IIB, and IIA-DH. The following examination considers examples from throughout Francis’ commentary on book II, and not just those related to the first twelve questions of IIA. Particular questions in these works are indicated in the format redaction:question, where redaction can be IIA, IIB or DH, and question reR. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 55. 96 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 56. 95
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fers to the number, for example, IIA:4. Paragraphs are indicated using the abbreviation n. A. Reportatio IIA and Reportatio IIB The content of IIA and IIB is largely the same, at the level both of the questions considered and of the argumentation within those questions. In the actual structure of the commentary as well as its explicit and implicit articulation, IIA reflects a text composed in written form, while IIB presents strong evidence of orality. Since both commentaries treat the arguments of Peter Auriol, we suspect that both IIA and IIB relate to Francis’ Paris lectures. Structure According to Friedman and Schabel’s numeration, IIA has 49 questions, and IIB 65. A comparison of the questions reveals that, with the exception of IIA, q. 1 (derived from the Principium secundi), IIB has one or more questions parallel to each of IIA’s discussions, and, for the most part, there are strong correspondences between the internal structures of the questions. We have prepared a table of corresponding questions (or discrete groups of questions) between IIA and IIB, along with distinctions from Lombard’s Sentences to which these questions would presumably belong, the latter determined from a comparison of question titles with those in the Sentences commentaries of Peter Auriol, Landulph Caracciolo and John Duns Scotus, which are divided according to distinction. An asterisk (*) marks the cases where, in IIB, Francis specifies the distinction, along with, in cases of divergence, the “traditional” distinction such questions marked in parenthesis: Table 1: Question Order in Reportationes IIA and IIB Reportatio IIA q. 1 q. 2, a. 1 q. 2, a. 2 q. 2, a. 3 q. 3 q. 4 q. 5 q. 6 q. 7 (conclusio 1) q. 7 (conclusio 2) q. 8 q. 9 q. 10 q. 11 q. 12
Reportatio IIB q. 1 q. 2 q. 3 q. 4 q. 5 q. 6 q. 7 q. 8 q. 9 q. 10 q. 11 qq. 12-15 qq. 16-18 q. 19
II Sent. distinction d. I d. I d. I d. I d. I d. II* (I) d. II* d. II* d. IV* (I) d. IV* (I) d. IV* (I) d. IV* (I) d. I d. I d. I
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q. 13 q. 14 q. 15 q. 16 q. 17 q. 18 q. 19 q. 20 q. 21 q. 22 q. 23 q. 24 q. 25 q. 26 q. 27 q. 28 q. 29 q. 30 q. 31 q. 32 q. 33 q. 34 q. 35 q. 36 q. 37 q. 38 q. 39 q. 40 q. 41 q. 42 q. 43 q. 44 q. 45 q. 46 q. 47 q. 48 q. 49
INTRODUCTION
qq. 20-22 q. 23 qq. 28-29 q. 30 q. 24, a. 1 q. 50 q. 51 q. 24, a. 2-a. 3 q. 25 q. 31 q. 26 q. 36 qq. 37-39, a. 1 qq. 37-39, a. 2 qq. 37-39, a. 3 q. 40 qq. 32-35, a. 1 qq. 32-35, a. 2 qq. 32-35, a. 3 q. 41 q. 42 q. 43 q. 44 q. 45 qq. 46-48 q. 49 q. 52 q. 53 q. 54 q. 55 q. 56 qq. 57-60 q. 61 q. 62 q. 63 q. 64 q. 65
d. III d. III d. III d. II d. III d. III d. III d. VII d. VIII d. IX d. IX d. XII d. XIII* (XIV) d. XIII* (XIV) d. XIII* (XIV) d. XIV d. XV d. XV d. XV d. XV d. XVI d. XVI d. XVI d. XVII d. XVII d. XXV d. XXV d. XXV d. XXV d. XXV d. XXV d. XLIV d. XLIV
So, with the exception of q. 1, which is missing in IIB,97 the two redactions treat the same subjects. The two questions from Friedman and Schabel’s list Schabel and Friedman, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 93, n. 46, suggest that IIB:3 refers explicitly to Francis’ principial lecture on II Sent., but this is based on a misreading. In fact, the MS reads “Dixi in Primo, distinctione secunda”, and refers to a specific argument found in all redactions of Francis’ commentary on book I (Scriptum I, d. 2 (= q. 17); Reportatio I, d. 2 (= q. 22)). On the other hand, IIB:28-29 appears to contain a reference to the Principium secundi, nn. 383-385. 97
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that lack a parallel in IIA, qq. 22a and 27, are in fact short questions written in the margin of the lone manuscript witness (E). Often in the margins of E one finds arguments written against Francis of Marchia’s positions as expressed in the text, so, most likely these marginal questions are not by Francis of Marchia.98 Nevertheless, IIB exhibits a certain disorder in its approach to the material. For example, IIB has two groupings that address the Heavens: qq. 32-35 (which Francis explicitly associated with d. XIII) and q. 41. The first discussion, qq. 32-35, is preceded and followed by angelological questions. A comparison with contemporary works reveals that these topics are traditionally treated in d. 14, after the discussion of angelology, so IIA’s order is closer to that followed in other written Sentences commentaries. Both IIA and IIB contain a few questions that do not seem to be regularly treated in commentaries on book II. Most notably, the immortality of the soul, treated in IIA:18-19 and in IIB:50-51, does not appear to be a regularly discussed topic in Franciscan commentaries on book II of the Sentences. Curiously, exactly the same questions can be found in Francis’ commentary on book IV (redaction A).99 While roughly following the structure of the Lombard’s book II, IIA makes no mention of distinctions. Instead, IIA divides the book up into “parts” with each part being introduced in the incipit to its first question, making explicit the following structure: question 1: begins with the label “principium” (Circa principium secundi libri). questions 2-12 (on creation): no further classification. questions 13-27 (on angels): “the first part” (Circa primam partem secundi libri). questions 28-36 (on the Heavens and the elements): “the second part” (circa secundam partem istius libri). questions 37-49 (on the intellective soul): “the third part” (circa tertiam partem huius libri).
IIB has one mention of a division into parts. Q. 40, corresponding to IIA:28, begins “Circa tertiam partem istius secundi libri”, suggesting that the section on creation, unnumbered in IIA, was considered as the first part. In 98 A survey of the seven major marginal notations in E, IIB:1-19, corresponding to IIA:2-12 finds six against Marchia’s position, and one not prima facie incompatible; this latter comes from IIB:16-18, where a long argument in the margin of E also argues that “actio sit realitas habita addita rebus permanentibus agentis et patientis et rei absolutae quae ab agente producitur in passo”, while Francis seems to favor a position that action, passion and motion are really identical (see the summary of q. 11, in section V, infra). 99 Edited by E. Katsoura, C. Papamarkou and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on Book IV”.
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addition, IIB refers eight times to the distinctions of book II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences: q. 4: d. 2 (Circa distinctionem secundam). q. 5: d. 2 (Secunda quaestio est circa secundam distinctionem). q. 6: d. 2 (Tertia quaestio circa eandem distinctionem). q. 8: d. 4 (Circa distinctionem quartam). q. 9: d. 4 (Secundo circa eandem distinctionem). q. 10: d. 4 (Tertia quaestio circa eandem distinctionem). q. 11: d. 4 (Ultima quaestio circa distinctionem quartam). qq. 32-35: d. 13 (Circa distinctionem decimam tertiam).
IIB therefore contains sporadic explicit references to the text’s articulation, suggesting that a clear structure into part and distinction underlies the questions, but is not entirely communicated to the reader, nor do the parts that are indicated correspond to the “traditional” distinctions for such questions. IIA, on the other hand, has no reference to distinction and a full articulation into parts (although, curiously, the first section does not correspond to any ‘part’). Both IIA and IIB are clearly and consistently divided into questions, but in IIA, a question is always the primary division of a text, while in IIB at times several questions will be treated under a single division.100 So, for example, IIA has three distinct questions on the Heavens in qq. 29-31, while IIB treats the questions together, as the following outline makes clear: Friedman and Schabel’s pioneering question list follows Pelzer’s numeration for MS E, and, as a result, inconsistently reports this, sometimes mentioning when the question titles are treated together, and sometimes not; in any case the actual articulation of the questions lies outside the scope of their article. So, IIB:12-15 are treated together, in the same order as the articles of IIA:10, but the questions are listed in the order announced. That is, IIB, qq. 12-15 are treated in the order 15,14,12,13, matching the structure of IIA:10, aa. 1-4. Rarely, the list misses a series of questions masquerading as one, so Friedman and Schabel, p. 94, list IIB:24 as “Circa potentias angeli quero primo utrum intellectus et voluntas in angelo et in homine sint eiusdem speciei.” In fact, IIB:24 announces three questions, namely: “Utrum sensitiva in homine et bruto sint eiusdem speciei”, “Utrum potentiae abstractae, puta intellectus et voluntas, in homine et angelo sint accidentia, vel sint realiter idem cum essentiis in quibus radicantur”, and “Si potentiae sensitivae sint accidentia animae vel non.” In any case, the “question” has three articles, namely “Si sensitiva sit eiusdem rationis in homine et bruto” (art. 1), “Utrum intellectus in homine et in angelo distinguantur specie” (art. 2), and “Utrum intellectus et voluntas sint accidentia de genere qualitatis tam in angelo quam in homine” (art. 3). Finally, they observe (pp. 95-96) that IIB:57-60 are “treated together”, but then, perhaps confused by the “ad tres primas quaestiones arguitur quod non...” of 57-60, fail to note that IIB:61 and 62 are actually the same questions as those identified as IIB:58 and 59, respectively. 100
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IIA: q. 29: Utrum caelum sit animatum. Videtur quod sic... Contra... Respondeo... Sed contra... Secundo sic.... Praeterea tertio... Ad primum... Ad secundum... Ad tertium... Sic ad quaestionem. Ad rationem in principio, patet ex dictis. q. 30: Utrum caelum moveatur effective a principio intrinseco, puta a forma eius, vel ab extrinseco, videlicet ab aliqua intelligentia. Videtur quod a principio intrinseco... Contra... Respondeo et dico quod iste motus non est effective a forma caeli, sed ab intelligentia. Hoc autem probare est difficile. Unde non valent rationes quorundam quae adducuntur ad hoc probandum. Avicenna... Sed hoc non valet... Alii probant per hoc... Sed hoc non valet... Alii probant sic... Sed nec istud valet... Et ideo probo istam conclusionem aliter, et hoc sic... Ad rationes in oppositum.... q. 31: Utrum primum mobile sive ultima sphaera sit per se in loco. Videtur quod sic... Contra... Respondeo. Quaestio ista habet difficultates secundum philosophos, non autem secundum fidem, quia cum primum mobile secundum fidem contineatur a caelo empyreo, per consequens est in loco. Secundum autem philosophos non continetur ab aliquo, sed continet omnia, et tamen movetur localiter. Et hoc supposito, est difficultas quomodo ipsum potest poni in loco... Quantum ad istam quaestionem primo excludam tres modos dicendi; secundo dicam aliter. Quantum ad primum est primo unus modus dicendi... Secundus modus dicendi est... Tertius modus dicendi est... Quantum ad secundum principale ... dico ... ` Sed hic sunt duo dubia... Ad primum... Ad rationem in principio patet ex dictis. IIB: qq. 32-35: Circa distinctionem decimam tertiam quaero (32) utrum caelum sit animatum. Quod sic... Contra... (33) Secundo quaero si caelum moveatur a propria forma ipsius caeli. Quod sic... Contra...
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(34) Tertio quaero si caelum sit in loco... Quod sic... Contra ... (35) Quarto quaero sine argumentis si terra sit per se in loco. Ad ista per ordinem. (32) De primo, scilicet utrum caelum sit animatum, dico quod tria faciunt difficultatem in proposito. Primum est... Secundum est... Tertium est... Dico hic... Tunc ad rationem et difficultatem primam... Ad secundam difficultatem... Ad tertiam... (33) De secundo articulo, qui est de secunda quaestione principali, utrum sit a sua forma propria corporali, videtur quod sic... Dico quod motus caeli non est effective a caelo... Avicenna probat hoc... Sed diceretur... Et ideo alii probant hoc sic... Sed diceretur... Item, arguitur sic... Diceretur... Et ideo arguo aliter... Et ideo respondeo ad primam rationem in oppositum... (34) De tertio articulo sive de tertia quaestione, utrum videlicet caelum sit in loco per se. Quod sic... Contra... Per idem ista quaestio faciliter potest solvi, quia primum mobile non est ultimum corpus, sed continetur a caelo empyreo, quod non movetur, et sic diceretur esse in eo sicut in loco; sed secundum Aristotelem non possit sic dici... Restaret tunc dubitatio utrum caelum empyreum, eo ipso quod moveretur localiter, esset per se in loco. Hic est unus modus dicendi... Ideo est alius modus expositorum communium... Tertius modus est... Et ideo dico quod... Sed contra ista... Item... Ad primam... Ad aliam rationem dico...
This outline is necessarily schematic and focuses on specific details of the texts. The argumentation in the two versions is largely parallel, and the structural differences are less substantial than they would appear. Most notably, IIB has two sets of principal arguments for the questions. IIB:32-35 begins by enumerating the questions, and proposing arguments pro and contra for each one, except the last. The question presents no corresponding structure that specifically resolves these arguments. Questions 32-34 then receive treatment in three separate articles, and each article begins with another series of arguments, which we will refer to as the ‘principal arguments,’ inasmuch as they correspond to the principal arguments pro and contra at the beginning
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of IIA:29, 30 and 31 respectively. In terms of structure, then, the arguments at the beginning of IIB:32-35 are superfluous and incomplete. In terms of content, some of the material points of their objections remain unaddressed, such as IIB:33’s argument sic that, if the Heavens did move according to an intrinsic principle, their form would be pointless (otiosum). IIA:29 raises three objections after the solution and resolves them, while IIB:32 places the objections before the solution. In that same pair of questions, IIA provides a non-response to the principal argument (“patet ex dictis”) where IIB does not respond at all. IIA:30 has a principal argument contra, while IIB:33 lacks one. Both IIA and IIB then state Francis’ opinion (namely, that the motion of the heavens is not from an intrinsic form in the heavens, but from an extrinsic intelligence), and mention three insufficient proofs for this view before finishing with the proof that Francis finds sufficient. Closer examination of the principal argument contra found in IIA and missing from IIB reveals that is identical to the second of the three proofs that Francis judges insufficient.101 Finally, IIB announces a question 35, on whether the Earth is per se in place, but the question is a ghost: IIB:32-35 states it at the beginning of the question sine argumentis, and never treats it. No parallel occurs in IIA. These details, taken together, point to IIA as a revision of IIB, smoothing out the rough edges of IIB, cutting the material that is not treated, and making minimal additions in terms of argumentation. An examination of a reverse case, where IIB reports three distinct questions that correspond to one question in IIA, confirms this suspicion. With the exception of a handful of arguments,102 IIB’s reasoning in qq. 1, 2 and 3 parallels IIA:2, articles 1-3. The text here concerns the ways in which creation is possible, and hinges on the different ways that the act of creation can be considered. The subjective possibility of creation refers to the possibility of creation considered from the side of what is being created, while the objective possibility of creation indicates the 101 IIA’s Argument contra reads: “Contra: quia, si esset a forma caeli, esset determinatus ad aliquid unum;” while IIA renders the second insufficient proof as: “Alii probant per hoc, quod natura de se determinatur ad unum, quo habito quiescit; sed motus caeli non determinatur ad aliquod unum.” 102 IIA, q. 2, n. 13, has no corresponding passage in IIB; IIB, q. 1 (E, f. 1vb), after a passage parallel to IIA, q. 2, n. 26, adds another counter-argument: “Item, causalitas effectiva simpliciter prior est causalitate materiali, quia materia non materiat nisi quia efficiens efficit, et prioritas causae materialis est prior secundum quid. Ergo origo erit prior simpliciter suo subiecto et posterior, quia secundum quid causatum, quod est impossibile. Quare impossibile est quod creatio-passio sit subiective in termino creato. Patet ergo quid dicendum;” IIB, q. 3 (E, f. 2va), after a section parallel to IIA, q. 2, n. 62, continues: “Tunc ultra: omnia alia a primo sunt ab ipso primo sicut a fine, secundum Aristotelem. Ergo similiter omnia sunt ab ipso sicut ab efficiente. Sed immaterialia non possunt esse per generationem, ergo per creationem. Probatur primo minor, quia nihil deducitur de non-esse ad esse sine efficiente, alias dicerem tibi quod nihil est ab alio sicut ab efficiente, sed omnia ponuntur in esse a solo fine, et sic superflueret causa efficiens in universo.”
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possibility of creation considered from the side of the creator who creates.103 The major difference between IIA and IIB in treating this issue lies in the arrangement of the principal arguments. At the beginning of q. 1 (“Whether creation is subjectively possible”), IIB presents an argument quod sic and one contra before determining the question negatively. IIB, q. 2 (“Whether creation is possible objectively”) and q. 3 (“Whether creation can be demonstrated”) have no principal arguments. IIA, q. 2, on the other hand, has a double set of principal arguments, corresponding to the subjective and objective possibility: First, it seems that it [creation] is not subjectively possible, because no action that has a subject is the total production of a thing; but creation is the total production of a thing; therefore it has no subject. Secondly, I argue that is not possible objectively, because objective potency is founded in subjective potency; but creation is not possible subjectively; therefore nor objectively. But against this. And first, that [creation] is subjectively possible, because what is suited to a genus, is also suited to its species; but having a subject is suited to action, which is the genus with respect to creation-action, and to passion, which is the genus with respect to creation-passion; therefore, etc. Secondly, that it is objectively possible, because what is impossible cannot be brought about; but creation is brought about; therefore it is objectively possible. (IIA:2, nn. 1-4).
The argument against creation being objectively possible assumes a negative response to creation being possible subjectively. That is, the minor premise states that creation is subjectively impossible. The argument for creation being objectively possible uses the same type of definitional analysis of creation as the argument against creation being possible subjectively. Whereas the antisubjective case defines creation as “the total production of a thing” and claims that the totality excludes a subject, the pro-objective case focuses on creation as the result of production, what is brought about. Being possible objectively is being able to be brought about. One of the two principal arguments of IIA:2 that pertains to the second article, namely the second argument, assumes the conclusion of the first article. The placement of this anticipation of the conclusion before the article that contains it points to the questions being treated separately before being combined, and hence that IIB is prior to IIA. Stylistic Comparison Compared to IIA, IIB bears strong signs of orality. IIB’s references are less precise and the text carries signs that it derives more or less directly from classroom lectures. For more on this theme, see the summary of the question in section V of this introduction, infra. 103
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A difference of precision in internal references suggests a distinction between a revised text and a reportatio of lectures. In general, IIA refers more precisely to the text of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences than IIB does. So, for example, where a reference in IIA:40 indicates book IV (“ut in IV° libro dictum fuit”), its parallel in IIB:53 simply refers to earlier (“probavi supra”). Similarly, IIA:42 refers to the following question (“erit sermo in sequentibus”), while its parallel, IIB:55 simply refers to “elsewhere” (“alias videbitur”). More conclusive still, the text of IIB preserves indications of being delivered before an audience. For example, at the end of the extremely short IIB:11 (parallel to IIA:9, the shortest question in IIA) there appears the response to the principal argument of IIB:10 (parallelled in IIA:8, n. 40), with the notation “to the counter argument for the last question” (“ad rationem in oppositum pro ultima quaestione”). Francis himself offers one possible explanation for this phenomenon of structural elements crossing the divisions between questions. IIB:64 raises a series of arguments against Francis’ position, and contains the exposition of the position Francis holds, but does not resolve the arguments against it. IIB:65, after treating the question, states: “Then one can respond to the opposing arguments that were adduced in yesterday’s lecture, to which no response was given” (“Tunc potest responderi ad rationes factas in lectione hesterna, ad quas non fuit responsum”). IIA, on the other hand, has both the principal arguments and the response in the same question (q. 48). Such details point to IIB being a pure reportatio of Francis’ classroom lectures, and prior to IIA. Still uncertain is whether IIB reflects Francis’ Parisian teaching or some prior lectures on the Sentences. In IIB:16-18, Francis refers to having heard a position defended “by one doctor during my time at Paris.”104 Friedman and Schabel have proposed that this doctor is Durand of St. Pourçain, and on this reading the reference would be to Francis’ period of study at Paris, before becoming bachelor there.105 Nevertheless, by the very fact that the text states “tempore meo Parisius” it is implied that Francis was not delivering his lecture at Paris. Even if IIB is not the product of Paris lectures, Francis was certainly aware of the positions of Peter Auriol, who lectured at Paris in 1316-1318. For example, Friedman notes that IIA:12 is produced largely in reaction to Peter Auriol’s prohemial question to book II of the Sentences, which would have been discussed in Fall 1317, possibly as a principium.106 There, Auriol argues against the possibility that the past is infinite, and poses five arguments and IIB:16-18, (E, f. 8vb): “Ad sextum posset secundo modo dici quod visio et auditio sunt essentialiter respectus, sicut audivi teneri ab uno doctore tempore meo Parisius.” 105 R.L. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, p. 2. 106 R. Friedman, “Francesco d’Appignano on the Eternity of the World”. See for Auriol himself, Petrus Aureoli, In II Sent. (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 1-8); cf. also the minor redaction of this question by Auriol (Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 6768, ff. 29rb-30rb). 104
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a confirmation ex dictis doctorum. As Friedman noted, the five arguments appear in IIA:12 as “quinque rationes speciales” (nn. 41-47), which are then followed by six “rationes communes” (nn. 48-53). IIB has the reverse order, treating five of the six rationes communes before announcing “ad idem arguo sex aliis rationibus quae videntur aliquibus demonstrationes.” The argument that appears as a ratio communis in IIA but as a specific demonstration in IIB is Auriol’s confirmation ex dictis doctorum. Although appearing at the end of Auriol’s rationes, it is a confirmatio since it assumes the impossibility of an actual infinite and shows its suitability without demonstrating it. Perhaps for this reason, IIA places this confirmatio among the rationes communes. In any case, these arguments directly reflect Auriol’s treatment as preserved in his Parisian lectures. Francis might have had access to Auriol’s thought before 1317, possibly as the fruit of his Toulouse lectures of 1314-1316, or before that, at Bologna. Auriol’s pre-Parisian lectures on book II do not, as far as we know, survive.107 Nevertheless, the positive evidence suggests that IIB is a Reportatio of lectures held after Auriol’s Parisian lectures on books II and III (1317-1318), and prior to the redaction in IIA. If IIB is not from Paris, therefore, it would likely relate to Francis’ teaching in the academic year immediately preceding his Parisian lectures on the Sentences, that is 1318-1319. B. Reportatio IIA, the Redaction DH, and the Principium secundi To aid in identifying the precise relationship between IIA and DH, we have edited the first question in DH. A comparison of the structure and some stylistic elements makes apparent that DH is not an abbreviation of IIA. Rather, IIA appears to be a revision of DH. The first question also has strong parallels to Francis’ separate Principium secundi, so we will explore these links to make some preliminary observations on the relations between the texts. Below, we have provided a table that shows the paragraph-by-paragraph articulation of IIA:1, with the paragraph number in the present edition indicated in the left-hand column. Labels that describe in English the formal content are in square brackets ([ ]). We have indicated in bold where DH has corresponding paragraphs in the same order as that of IIA; we have indicated Both the Rome 1605 printed version (d. 15, a. 2, p. 223b) and the minor redaction (Vatican City, BAV, vat. lat. 6768, f. 45ra) refer to a decretalis nova, namely the Clementine constitutions, approved by John XXII on October 25, 1317. On Auriol’s position as a reaction to the council of Vienne, see A. Baldissera, “La decisione del concilio di Vienne (1311) ‘Substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis forma’ nell’interpretazione di un contemporaneo”, Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 34 (1942), pp. 212-232. For studies of the discussion of the soul as form of the body that end with the Council of Vienne, see R. Zavalloni, Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes, Louvain 1951; T. Schneider, Die Einheit des Menschen, Münster 1972; and P. Mazzarella, Controversie medievali. Unità e pluralità delle forme, Naples 1978. For Francis of Marchia’s position, see T. Suarez-Nani, “Une anthropologie dans l’horizon scotiste: François de la Marche” (forthcoming). 107
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in italics where DH has corresponding paragraphs but changes their order with respect to IIA. In the table, roman type denotes that no text is found in DH corresponding to this paragraph in IIA. Corresponding passages in the Mariani edition of the Principium secundi are noted in parentheses, and will be referred to later. IIA q. 1, parallels to DH and the Principia:
Utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo 1 Quod sic 2 Quod non 3 Divisio Textus (380) Art. 1: Quid sit creatio 4 [Statement of Rule] 5 [Application of Rule] (382-383) [Three Arguments for the Unity of Species] 6 Arg. 1 (384) 7 Contra A. 1 (387) 8 Contra-C.-A. 1 (388) 9 Arg. 2 (386) 10 Contra-A. 2 (391) 11 Contra-C.-A. 2 (392) 12 Arg. 3 (385) 13 Contra-A. 3 (389) 14 Contra-C.-A. 3 (390) 15 Auctoritas 1 Rationes in oppositum 16 Obj. 1 (397-398) 17 Obj. 2 (399) 18 Obj. 3 (400) 19 Obj. 4 (401) Ad rationes in oppositum 20 Contra 1-obj. 1 (402-404) 21 Contra 2-obj. 1 (405) 22 Contra 3-obj. 1 (406-407) 23 Contra 1-obj. 2 (408-409) 24 Contra 1-obj. 3 25 Contra 2-obj. 2 (cf. 357) 26 Contra 2-obj. 3-4 (410-411) Art. 2: Utrum creatio-actio sit demonstrabilis de Deo 27 [State of the question] (412-413) 28 Divisio Textus (414-415) Conclusio prima: Forma syllogistica tenet in divinis 29 Arg. 1 (416) 30-31 Arg. 2 (417-419) 32 Arg. 3 (422-423) 33-34 Arg. 4 (424-425) 35 Arg. 5 (420) 36 Arg. 6 (420-421) Conclusio secunda: Forma syllogistica tenet in terminis modificatis 37 Arg. 1 (436-437) 38 Arg. 2 (434)
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Conclusio tertia: Forma syllogistica tenet in terminis singularibus 39 Arg. 1 (446-447) 40 Arg. 2 (447-448) 41 Arg. 3 (438) 42 Arg. 4 (439-440) Conclusio quarta: Forma syllogistica non tenet nisi cum aliqua modificatione 43 Arg. 1 (453-457) 44 Auctoritas 1 [= Prior Analytics I:33] (465) 45 Contra 1-Auct. 1 (466) Contra 1-C. 1-Auct. 1 (467) 46 Contra 2-C. 1-Auct. 1 (468-470) 47 Contra 2-Auct. 1 (471) 48 Contra 1-C. 2-Auct. 1 (472) Contra 2-C. 2-Auct. 1 (473) Example (475) 49 Contra 3-C. 2-Auct. 1 (474) 50 Contra 4-C. 2-Auct. 1 (474) 51 Contra 3-Auct. 1 (476) Contra 1-C. 3-Auct. 1 52 Contra 2-C. 3-Auct. 1 (477) 53 Contra 3-C. 3-Auct. 1 54 Contra 4-C. 3-Auct. 1 (478) 55 Arg. 2 (479) Alia argumenta pro secunda conclusione 56 Arg. 1 (426-427) 57 Arg. 2 (429) 58 Contra 1-A. 2 59 Contra 1-C. 1-A. 2 (430-432) 60 Contra 2-C. 1-A. 2 (433) 61 Contra 2-A. 2 (504) 62 Contra 1-C. 2-A. 2 (505-506) 63 Contra 2-C. 2-A. 2 (507) 64 Contra 3-C. 2-A. 2 (508) 65 Conf. 1-C. 2-A. 2 (509) 66 Conf. 2-C. 2-A. 2 (512-516) 67 Conf. 3-C. 2-A. 2 (434) Quinque argumenta contra conclusiones positas 68 Obj. 1 (483) 69 Obj. 1b 70 Obj. 2 (495) 71 Obj. 2b (cf. 300) 72 Obj. 2c 73 Obj. 3 (496) 74 Obj. 3b (497) 75 Obj. 4 (498) 76 Obj. 5 (499-500) Responsio ad argumenta 77 Contra 1-O. 1 (491-493) 78 Contra 2-O. 1 (484) Contra hanc rationem arguitur 79 Contra 1-C. 2-O. 1 (485) 80 Contra 2-C. 2-O. 1 81 Contra 3-C. 2-O. 1
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82 Contra 4-C. 2-O. 1 83 Contra 5-C. 2-O. 1 Ad haec argumenta 84 Contra 1-C. 1-C. 2-O. 1 85-86 C2-C1-C2-O1(486-489) 87 Contra-C. 2-C. 2-O. 1 88 Contra-C. 3-C. 2-O. 1 89 Contra-C. 4-C. 2-O. 1 90 Contra-C. 5-C. 2-O. 1 Ad alia argumenta 91 Contra-O. 1b 92-95 Contra-O. 2 (502-503) 96 Contra-O. 2b (cf. 321-322) 97 Contra-O. 2c 98 Contra-O. 3 (501) 99-102 [In support of C.-O. 3] (512-520) 103 Contra-O. 3b (511) 104 Contra-O. 4 (521-522) 105-106 Contra-O. 5 (523-526) 107 Contra 1-C.-O. 5 (527-529) 108 Contra 2-C.-O. 5 (530-531) 109 Ad ista respondeo...
DH has an inverted order with respect to IIA in two locations. First, the two principal arguments are flipped (nn. 1-2). Although IIA displays some corruption in the manuscript tradition, it is not clear which order to prefer: no redaction provides a response to the principal arguments that might suggest one order is to be favored over the other. The second case of a disruption in order (nn. 79-82), however, very clearly favors IIA. Francis considers an objection maintaining that syllogistic logic does not apply to the divine (n. 68), and counters it (nn. 77-78). To this counter-argument, he records in IIA five further objections (nn. 79-83), and refutes them (nn. 84-90). DH, on the other hand, only considers four further objections (DH nn. 59-62), with IIA’s fourth objection in second place, and the fifth objection absent, so that the correspondence between paragraphs in IIA and DH is: 79<-> 59, 80<->61, 81<->62, 82<->60 and 83<->none. Yet DH then refutes all five further objections (DH nn. 63-68). The refutations refer to the objections in the order preserved by IIA: DH’s reference to the “second” objection (DH n. 65) indeed points to the second objection in IIA, but in DH’s version, it is third. Moreover, DH refers to a “fifth argument” (DH n. 68), which is only preserved in the other redaction (IIA). If DH were a subsequent revision or abbreviation of IIA, it would be difficult to explain how the order of arguments got corrupted. With respect to IIA, DH’s version of question 1 also lacks two large sections of text. Most notably, DH ends before IIA does, without the text corresponding to IIA, nn. 96-108, covering Francis’ response to the last three of the “five
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INTRODUCTION
arguments”, as well as the two final (unresolved) objections to his responses. Instead, DH announces, “For the other arguments, go to the prologue to book I.”108 The redaction of book I that has a question in the prologue with parallels to this question is the Reportatio (a version of which is contained in H). Nevertheless, Reportatio I does not contain a passage parallel to the missing text here. The reference therefore seems inauthentic, perhaps the attempt of a copyist to shore up the obvious shortcomings in the text. Taken in isolation, it might be construed as the work of an abbreviator. The other large swath of text in IIA (nn. 55-67) that is absent from DH disrupts the structure of the argument, suggesting that it is a later accretion. DH, without the missing section, clearly articulates the determination of article 2: it purports to set out four conclusiones. In support of the last conclusio, it interprets Aristotle, Prior Analytics I:33, as arguing that syllogisms hold only when their terms are determined. Francis raises three objections against this interpretation and refutes each one in turn. Then Francis raises five objections against his conclusiones and the question ends in the middle of the refutation of these objections. IIA adds to this not only the remainder of the refutations all the way to the abrupt ending of the question, but also a section between the discussion of the Prior Analytics and the five objections, and in this section he gives another proof of the fourth conclusion, (n. 55), adds two more proofs of the second conclusion (n. 56-57), before raising and refuting two objections to the second of those proofs (nn. 58-67). In other words, the part in IIA absent from DH constitutes a return to proving the conclusiones and to raising new objections. The section goes against the structure set forth in both IIA and DH, suggesting that it is added in IIA as a revision with respect to the text witnessed by DH. More significantly, DH, q. 1, a. 2, has one less conclusio than IIA. In IIA, the four conclusions of the second article turn on the application of syllogisms, and Francis argues 1) that syllogisms can be applied to God; 2) that the syllogistic form holds “in modified terms,” that is, when the terms of the premises have some explicit (or implicit) determination, such as ‘universally’; 3) that syllogisms hold “in singular terms,” when particulars are involved (and they would take a singular determination, such as ‘totally’); and 4) that not only can the syllogistic form hold in modified terms (as conclusion 2 states), it only holds when the terms are determined. DH does not state this last conclusio. IIA lists the four conclusions at the beginning of the article (n. 28) and, at the requisite place, announces: “The fourth conclusion is that the syllogistic form only holds with some modification” (n. 42-43). DH, on the other hand, only states that there will be four conclusions (DH n. 27), and introduces the “first proof ” of the fourth conclusion (DH n. 40) as if it were the “fifth proof ” of the third conclusion, namely that the syllogistic form can hold in singular terms. 108
DH, n. 70: “Pro aliis vade ad primum in prologo.”
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The wording of the first proof of the fourth conclusion, and the discussion from the Prior Analytics that follows make it difficult to see that a change in conclusio has taken place in DH. The first proof of the “fourth conclusion” in DH reads: Again, in whatever material the middle term can vary, a modification is necessary; but in singular terms ; therefore, etc. (DH n. 40)
The syllogism seeks to prove that modification is necessary in syllogisms with singular terms. It therefore assumes the third conclusion, namely that a syllogism can hold in singular terms, and further assumes that syllogistic rules are formal, not dictated by whether their terms are singular or universal. A superficial reading, however, might see the reference to singular terms and assume the argument focuses on proving that syllogisms hold in singular terms, and hence that it related to the third conclusion. The authoritative text adduced from the Prior Analytics furthers the confusion in DH, since while the text clearly states that the “intentio Philosophi” is that “necessaria est modificatio” – and thus it relates to the fourth conclusion – the examples that Aristotle adduces are of two singulars, namely the musical Micalus and the intelligible Aristomenes. Finally, the objections raised against the authoritative text turn not on the necessity of modification, but on whether Aristotle meant that syllogisms apply to singulars. Therefore, while DH clearly announces four conclusiones, and, at the spot parallel to IIA’s fourth conclusio, DH evidently shifts topic, there is nothing explicit in DH to make this change apparent. It is unlikely, therefore, that a revision or an abbreviation of IIA would have concealed this structure. On the other hand, if IIA were a revision of DH, one would expect the missing structural element to be made evident, that is, that Francis, in revising DH, would have seen the confusion and cleared things up. The texts support this latter situation: IIA is a revision of DH. A third question by Francis of Marchia is parallel to IIA:1 and DH:1, namely the Principium secundi. Hence we must consider what the relationship is between DH, IIA and the written Principium secundi and how these relate to any original lectures held by Francis. The Principium secundi stems from Francis’ quaestio collativa lecture held at the beginning of his Paris lectures on book II of the Sentences, which, if our understanding of the dating of Francis’ lectures is correct, would have been given in early 1320. The relationship, however, between the oral principia and the written one still needs to be clarified. Therefore, the early 1320 date can apply only as a terminus post quem for the written version. Although no stylistic evidence can be considered conclusive with respect to the date of composition or relative order of the texts, we can point to some general differences in style, and, on the basis of one of the few passages that appears verbatim in the Principium and IIA:1, suggest that both the written Principium secundi and IIA:1 underwent a similar act of authorial revision.
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INTRODUCTION
One major difference in the arrangement of IIA and DH, on the one hand, and the Principium secundi, on the other, is in the presentation of conclusions and objections in the second article. The Principium secundi presents entire “units”, each consisting of the conclusion, the objection to it, and the counter-arguments; after presenting one unit, it moves on to the next. IIA and DH present all four conclusions before raising and treating objections. The structure of the Principium secundi echoes that of other written principia; for example, Pierre Roger’s Parisian principia and Francis Meyronnes’ replicationes, from their year as sententiarii in 1320-1321, both follow the same structure of considering and replying to objections to each conclusion before advancing to the next conclusion.109 But this can really help us very little with determining the order between the three texts, since structuring the debate in this way in the Principium could very well be a written convention, and DH could just as easily be the version closest to the oral disputation. An examination of a passage absent from DH, but present in IIA and the principia provides insight into the relationship between these texts. The first article in IIA, DH and the Principium secundi is parallel in structure and argumentation, with one major exception: IIA, nn. 24-25 does not have any passage parallel to it in DH. The second paragraph does, however, bear a relation to an argument in Francis’ Principium quarti. The paragraphs constitute part of a rejection of three arguments from authority against Francis’ view that specific unity has extramental existence. IIA, DH and the Principium secundi raise the same three objections in the same order: Moreover, the Damascene, IV Sentences (=I De fide orthodoxa), establishing the difference between divine and created things, says that in creatures, community consists (or is considered) only by reason and intellect, but diversity consists in reality. But in God, conversely, community is considered to be real, but difference or distinction is only by reason. Therefore the specific nature, which is common in divine things, in creatures does not have any unity in them, except according to reason alone. Moreover, the Commentator, I De Anima, comment 8, says that it is the intellect that makes universality in things. Moreover, even IV Metaphysics, and also XII, the Commentator says that universals are gathered by the intellect; therefore, etc. (nn. 17-19, cf. DH, nn. 18-20, Principium secundi, nn. 399-401).
All versions have the same response to the Damascene, namely that here he is referring to the “division of separation,” according to space and time, and not to the “division of distinction” (n. 23; cf. DH, n. 24; Principium secundi: nn. 408-409). Likewise, they all counter Averroes’ two arguments by claiming that he is denying the real existence of universals in the sense of Platonic ideas (n. 26; cf. DH, n. 25; Principium secundi, nn. 410-411). Between these two responses, however, IIA has arguments not found in the other versions: 109
François de Meyronnes - Pierre Roger. Disputatio, ed. J. Barbet, Paris 1961.
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To the Commentator, I say that there are two types of unity of specific nature or of any universal: one by which the universal is understood as abstract and actually one, and another by which it is understood as able to be abstracted. Or it can be said that the unity of community is considered to be by reason alone in creatures in the same way that the unity is considered to be real in God, and this is what the Damascene meant, and not otherwise. But the unity that is considered in God to be real is a numeric unity that can be made many without God’s being divided. And such a common unity is considered to be in creatures by reason alone, because although whiteness is really one in its inferiors, nevertheless it is really divided and made many in them, and therefore it is not really one in number in them. But the intellect, abstracting the specific unity from every numeric diversity considers it in actuality as one in number, and therefore conceives it with a single act. And therefore it has one way of unity outside the intellect and another in the intellect, since outside the intellect it is really one, but divided; but in the intellect it is one in number, undivided, and conceived in a single act. And the Commentator speaks of this unity in I De anima, comment 8, that it is the intellect that acts or makes universality in things, and not of the first unity, which namely is universal in potency. And the Damascene means to speak of this unity when he says that the unity of community is considered in creatures to be by reason alone. (nn. 24-25)
Given the surrounding arguments, this passage is not entirely necessary, and the references to the same authoritative arguments that are addressed in the paragraphs immediately preceding and following are more disruptive than superfluous: more than being additional arguments, they break up the flow of the text. Moreover, the first paragraph (n. 24) shows signs of being fragmentary.110 The second paragraph does have, however, a parallel in Francis’ principia; specifically, the second paragraph (n. 25) is almost verbatim the refutation of the same authorities found at the end of a. 2 of Francis’ Principium quarti (Mariani ed., nn. 357-358) – a parallelism made all the more remarkable by the fact that, in the Principium quarti, Francis does not adduce those authoritative passages, but only the refutation of them.111 With the awkward status of this paragraph in the Principium quarti, and the fact that, unlike the case for book II, the Reportationes on book IV do not have any text that overlaps with the Principium quarti, it is tempting to suggest that the revision from DH to IIA involved the integration of additional arguFor most witnesses (AFGLVWY), the text ends abruptly with “et alia qua intelligitur”, leaving unspecified how the universal is understood in the second sense. Three of the four witnesses for the family ß (BCK) leave the paragraph out entirely. P ends with a subverbal fragment (“et alia qua intelligitur ar.”). The reading that we have adopted (“et alia qua intelligitur ut abstrahibile”) appears in only two closely related manuscripts (NZ), and it is most likely a copyist’s correction. 111 Mariani (Quaestiones praeambulae et Prologus, p. 253) inserts into the edition of the Principium quarti the two authoritative arguments from the Principium secundi, and notes: “Duae precedentes paragraphi non sunt in textu, sed requiruntur in improbatione opinionis que habetur successive n. 357-358, et accipiuntur ex n. 399-400” (sic). 110
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INTRODUCTION
ments from parts of the principia that were not going to be integrated into the Sentences commentaries, or perhaps Francis meant to add these arguments to the Principium secundi, copied them on a correction sheet, and they were inserted in the wrong place. An error shared between the Principium secundi and the main tradition for IIA supports the theory that this passage in both places was copied from a single, separate correction sheet. Specifically, the word plurificabilis (translated above as “can be made many”) did not exist in the original; rather the common ancestor for all extant copies of IIA (ω) and the Principium give implurificabilis. In IIA’s case, the plurality of the manuscripts (AKLPY), including those on both sides of the stemma closest to the original (see the discussion of the stemma below), all witness implurificabilis. One manuscript (W) witnesses impossibilis, one (F) omits from the penultimate word of the preceding paragraph (n. 24) clear to the end of the article, and three (GNV) hypercorrect to et plurificabilis. Only three manuscripts (BCZ) provide the theologically correct reading, and they are fairly remote from the text. The Principium secundi also reports implurificabilis. Implurificabilis does not work in the context, since Francis’ point is to show that, outside of God, there are two types of specific unity: 1) the unity of an extramental particular thing and 2) the unity of the mental conception of a species. 2) is the unity of reason for which the analogous case in God constitutes a real unity. If 2) is, as the text originally said, a unity “implurificabilis sine divisione,” then we could not conceive of a single species being in many things without destroying the notion of a common species, nor could we even abstract the notion of a species from particulars. If we follow some copyists in emending the text to “plurificabilis sine divisione,” then the real numeric unity in God would be that of the divine nature, which is shared by the persons of the Trinity (which would only be separate or distinct according to reason), without those persons being really separate or distinct. So this passage was added in the revision from DH to IIA. It appears in the Principium quarti in exactly the same wording, including sharing the same original error. In the Principium quarti, it is in the wrong place; it is a response to a question never asked. Perhaps the passage existed on a loose piece of parchment; however it was written, this evidence suggests that both the written principia and IIA are authorial revisions of prior texts. Once IIA is understood as being a revision of DH, with additions and corrections written in the margins or on separate sheets, one has the explanation for other textual peculiarities. For instance, IIA:12, n. 25, contains a passage that, uncorrected, reads: “Et ita in primo signo praesupponit simpliciter, non tamen sub ratione mensurati, in secundo sub ratione mensurati non primo, sed secundo signo.” Three witnesses (BCZ) apparently try to correct the text, omitting “in secundo sub ratione mensurati non primo.” The others all report substantially the same text, with the repetition of “not in the first sign, but in the second sign.” DH, on the other hand, reads “Et ita in primo signo prae-
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supponit simpliciter, non tamen in ratione mensurati, in secundo in ratione mensurati.” If IIA is a revision of DH, the superfluous text “non primo sed secundo signo” could have been a marginal note that was inadvertently copied in. C. Summary of results To sum up our findings, Reportatio IIB, witnessed solely in ms. E, is a raw reportatio of Francis’ lectures, either the same Paris lectures witnessed by Reportatio IIA and DH, or lessons held outside of Paris in the years immediately prior to Francis’ Parisian bachelorhood. The relation between the texts found in DH and in Reportatio IIA appears to be that IIA is an authorial revision of DH, although it seems not to have been entirely worked through. The Principium secundi also appears to be an authorial revision of the same disputation that served as the basis for the first question of IIA and DH.
2. The text of Reportatio IIA The critical edition of Francis of Marchia’s commentary on book II of the Sentences that we are presenting here therefore consists of the version known as Reportatio IIA. It will comprise three volumes that echo in part the organization of the text: volume I: questions 1-12 (on creation) volume II: questions 13-27 (questions on the “First Part” of book II; on angelology) volume III: questions 28-49 (questions on the “Second” and “Third Parts”; on the elements and cosmology, and on psychology, respectively).
V. Summary of the Themes Treated in Reportatio IIA, Questions 1-12 The doctrine of creation, common to the three monotheistic religions of the Western world, presented a challenge to Scholastic thinkers, who had to account for this dogma by means of reasoned argument. Their explanations for creation have considerable speculative interest since, in seeking to delineate divine action towards the world, they must examine and distinguish the different types of action, production and causality that occur in the production of each individual reality, and in the whole universe. The distinctive characteristic of creation is that it comes from nothing (ex nihilo, de nihilo), and hence the discussion of this theme leads to an exploration of the notions of being and nothingness, as well as the relation between them. In turn, this examination involves an investigation into the temporal nature of creatures and how beings that exist in time relate to the divine eternity. Hence this whole line of investigation becomes an opportunity for theoretical developments in medieval ontology and metaphysics. Like other commentators on book II of the Sentences, Francis of Marchia confronted these issues. Nevertheless, inasmuch as Francis’ text is a questioncommentary, the Lombard’s text plays a distant role, providing only a rough order of the themes treated. Francis’ own position, in fact, comes about from an argumentative confrontation with the opinions of his actual or near contemporaries, among whom figure Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol.112 Francis formulates his position concisely and employs a language stripped of superfluity, characteristics that over a century later rightly earned him the title “Doctor succinctus”. Question 1 As noted above, Reportatio IIA begins with a question that derives from Francis’ Principium secundi libri, a text that reproduces Francis’ quaestio collativa,113 determined while sententiarius before beginning his lectures on this book of the Sentences. This long question (109 paragraphs) claims to discuss the possibility of demonstrating creation understood as God’s creative action (creatio-actio), distinct from creation as understood as the object of this action (creatio-passio). But Francis only arrives at properly discussing this theme in the last article of the second question. In this first question, instead, he considers two topics in two articles: he first analyzes the notion of creation, and then addresses the possibility of applying syllogistic logic to discussions of the divine. The first article defends the thesis that “Creation is the total production of a thing with respect to all its intrinsic principles, both singular and universal, 112 113
See infra, the tables of implicit sources. See supra, pp. xlvi-lv.
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potential and accidental, but differently” in each case (n. 5). More precisely, creation is the total production of a thing according to its individual principles as well as according to its universal principles taken in an absolute sense, but it is not the total production of a thing according to its universal principles and in a universal way. Every production is of a singular reality, since no universal reality exists independently. Nevertheless, the creation of a singular includes the production of the universal principles present in it and shared by other individuals of the same species, and in this sense the creation of a thing involves the production of its universal principles absolutely speaking. In drawing this distinction, Francis begins his discussion on the extramental unity of universal principles, a discussion that plays out against the backdrop of Scotus’ position, and which Francis will take up again in q. 15, a. 2, adopting an intermediate position that, while not totally denying extramental reality to specific natures, only grants them a unity of privation (mere privativa).114 The second article of this first question proceeds immediately to consider the validity of syllogistic argumentation. Confronting three contrary theses,115 Francis enumerates four propositions: 1) syllogistic argumentation applies to divine realities (n. 29); 2) syllogistic argumentation is most valid when the terms are “modified”, that is determined through qualifiers such as universaliter (n. 37); 3) syllogistic argumentation holds in singular terms, that is, for individuals (n. 39); 4) syllogistic argumentation only holds in modified terms (n. 43). These conclusions are followed by two series of objections and responses, as well as a third series that does not receive a response; in fact, n. 109 ends in mid-sentence: “I respond to these objections. To the first, when it is argued....” It does not seem that Francis ever finished the question: the third series of objections finds a parallel in the Principium secundi, where Francis introduces the same objections by stating, “Against these arguments: I raise two objections against myself,” but he does not resolve them.116 114 For the conception of the individual and its relation to species, see T. SuarezNani, “Un nuovo contributo al problema dell’individuazione: Francesco de Marchia e l’individualità delle sostanze separate”, Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale XVI (2005), pp. 405-459 (with a transcription of In II Sent., q. 13-14). 115 IIA:1, n. 27: “Quidam dicit quod forma syllogistica non tenet in divinis. Alius dicit quod forma syllogistica tenet in divinis, sed tamen non in terminis modificatis. Alius dicit quod forma syllogistica non tenet in terminis singularibus. Omnes tres concordant in hoc: quod termini singulares non indigent modificatione ad hoc, ut formetur debite syllogismus ex eis.” We have not identified positively those associated with these positions, but they are likely Francis’ fellow socii. For a similar division see, Francis Meyronnes, Replicatio in IV (François de Meyronnes - Pierre Roger. Disputatio, p. 136), and discussion in S. Knuuttilla and A. Lehtinen, “Change and Contradiction: A Fourteenth-Century Controversy”, Synthèse 40 (1979), (pp. 189-207), pp. 189-190, and H.G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 13001335, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1974, pp. 143-158. 116 Franciscus de Marchia, Principium secundi (ed. Mariani, p. 305): “Contra ista. Obicio contra me dupliciter.”
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The text limits itself to examining the conditions of the validity for applying syllogistic to divine reality. As noted, for the discussion of whether the action of creation is demonstrable of God, one must wait until the third article of the following question: Francis’ conclusion there is that God’s creative action cannot be demonstrated since it is a production that effects the passage from non-being to being, but it can when it is conceived as the total conservation of the thing. Question 2 The second question continues the analysis of creation, considering it with respect to what is created (creatio passiva): it explores its possibility in terms of the subject of creation (subiective) and in terms of the object of the creative act (obiective). The discussion is divided into three articles. The first article examines the possibility of creation in terms of the subject of creation. The subjective possibility of creation can be understood in two ways, depending on the relationship between creation’s subject (that in which creation occurs) and its term (what is created). In the first way, the subject of creation is really distinct from its term. In the second, the subject and term of creation are really identical, but can be considered differently as subject and as term (n. 6). On this distinction, Francis considers, explains and criticizes two positions. The first is that of Giles of Rome, for whom creation is possible in terms of its subject, which consists in the essence of the thing to be created, distinct from the actuality of being, which is the term of creation.117 The second position belongs to Giles’ adversary, Henry of Ghent, who challenges the real distinction between essence and existence and defends the idea that creation is possible subjectively insofar as the subject coincides with the term of creation.118 Criticizing the two positions, Francis radically rejects the subjective possibility of creation because, insofar as it is the total production of a thing, creation cannot presuppose anything (n. 27). The term of creation, on the one hand, and the created thing, on the other, are really identical and there is no need to posit a subject that is prior to the thing, even one that differs from the thing merely by a distinction of reason (nn. 28-29). The second article examines the possibility of creation from the point of view of the object (obiective), and asks if the objects of creation exist in objective potency prior to creation (n. 34), addressing the position that creatures before their creation exist objectively in their cause, i.e., God. Francis reports the position originated by Godfrey of Fontaines, and later developed by John Duns Scotus. In effect, this position denies that the subject of creation, the thing outside of God, exists prior to creation, but affirms such an existence for the object of creation, the thing that God’s creative power is directed to 117 Aegidius Romanus, De esse et essentia, q. 9 (ed. Venetiis 1503, ff. 20vb-21va); Theoremata de esse et essentia, Theorema 5 (ed. Hocedez, pp. 19-25). 118 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet X, q. 7 (ed. Macken, pp. 189-190 and 193).
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making. The object exists in the sense of being in passive potency corresponding to an act of production, namely being in objective potency (that is, the virtual existence of something in its cause). The objects of creation therefore exist in the objective potency corresponding to God’s creative power.119 Francis rejects this position, denying the objective possibility of creation, on the grounds that an object, prior to its creation, has no real existence whatsoever (nn. 42-50). Nevertheless, Francis does not discard the notion of objective potency outright; rather, he suggests that it only applies to productions from already existing beings, and therefore he makes a distinction between “potency without qualification” (potentia simpliciter), where a thing said to be in such potency really exists, and “logical potency” (potentia logica), according to which being in potency merely signifies a logical possibility. In the first sense (potentia simpliciter) all things can be said to exist in potency or in actuality. In the second sense (potentia logica), before its creation, a creature “is possible,” insofar as its being possible does not imply a contradiction with the real being that will constitute the term of its creation; in other words, insofar as “being possible” is understood logically and not ontologically (n. 58). Hence Francis’ conclusion that each created reality is possible terminative, that is, as the term of creation: “I therefore say that creation or its term is really possible neither subjectively nor objectively, but only that the term of creation is really possible terminatively, because it is possible with respect to real being” (n. 60). The third article replies to the main inquiry announced in the title of the first question, examining the possibility of demonstrating the divine act of creation. This article disposes not only with principal arguments, but also with listing other opinions, and goes straight to the determination. Francis distinguishes two ways of conceiving creation: as the total production that effects the passage from non-being to being, and as a total production, but without the passage from non-being to being, in other words, as the total conservation of the thing. Francis’ conclusion turns on this distinction: in the first way, creation cannot be demonstrated, but in the second way, as the total conservation of the thing, creation can be demonstrated (n. 72). He will further clarify this conclusion in the two questions that follow. Questions 3 and 4 Questions 3 and 4 extend the preceding analyses and make evident the relation between creation and conservation. The third question asks “whether all beings other than the first need actual conservation from it.” The structure is very simple: principal arguments and author’s response, supported by four arguments and confirmed by Aristotle, Averroes and Augustine. 119 Godefridus de Fontibus, Quodlibet III, q. 1 (versio longa) (ed. De Wulf- Pelzer, pp. 170-173); Ioannes Duns Scotus, Reportata Parisiensia II, d. 12, q. 1 (ed. Vivès, v. 23, pp. 1-13); Lectura II, d. 12, q. 1 (ed. Vaticana, v. 19, pp. 89-92).
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Francis replies in the affirmative: all created beings depend continually and actually on God, whether immediately – in the case of incorruptible beings –, or mediately – in the case of generable and corruptible beings (n. 3). One of the key points in his argument consists in placing stronger dependence on extrinsic causes (the efficient and final causes) than on intrinsic ones (for example, matter and form). Intrinsic causes precede the thing caused only in order of generation, and follow it in order of perfection, while extrinsic causes precede absolutely (simpliciter) the thing caused, both in order of generation and perfection. So the matter and the form of the composite precede the composite, but are less perfect, while the efficient and final causes are both prior to and more perfect than what they cause. Consequently, if it involves a contradiction to posit that a being actually exists without its intrinsic causes, all the more would it be contradictory to posit its existence without its extrinsic causes (n. 9). This argument finds reinforcement in the recurrent motif of the superiority of the first cause with respect to second causes, and of the capacity of the first principle to conserve an effect even in the absence of secondary causes (n. 19). Thus this permanent causal dependence of what is created on the first cause is identified with its conservation, since “the dependence of things on God as agent is nothing other than their conservation. Consequently, all beings actually depend on God and are continuously conserved by Him” (n. 6). Question 4, concerning the relation between creation and conservation, confirms this thesis. The first of the two articles of this question enumerates and demonstrates the author’s theses, while the second considers and resolves objections. Francis denies any real distinction between the creation and conservation of things: “I reply that they are distinguished neither really nor formally, nor in any way outside of the intellect” (n. 3). The arguments adduced in favor of this thesis seek to show the absurdity of distinguishing these two actions for two chief reasons. First, it would mean making the conservation of things an accident posterior to their creation (n. 5), since, if a thing’s creation is not the same as its conservation, both cannot be essential to the thing’s existence. Second, it would mean attributing to God two distinct acts having the same term (n. 10). Nevertheless, their real identity does not exclude their being rationally distinct, which occurs when the intellect conceives of creation (as a relation between what exists and that on which it depends) as an act prior to the term that it posits into being (n. 17). In spite of the absence of references to contemporary interlocutors, these two questions take into account the state of the question in the wake of the discussions by John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol,120 from whom Francis borrows some elements in creating his own position.121 120 Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 1, qq. 1-3 (ed. Vaticana, v. 7, pp. 1-20); Reportata parisiensia IV, d. 12, q. 1 (ed. Vivès, v. 24, pp. 183-197); Petrus Aureoli, In II Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 2 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 27a-32b). 121 In particular, he distinguishes himself from John Duns Scotus in denying the formal distinction between creation and conservation, and from Peter Auriol in denying
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Questions 5 and 6 Questions 5 and 6 broach the topic of duration for permanent beings, and time for successive beings. Their structure is minimal: lacking principal arguments, they provide the author’s position, raise objections and resolve them. They do not expound and critique the positions of contemporaries. Question 5 asks “whether duration differs from the thing that lasts,” and the response is negative. Francis’ thesis of the identity between the thing and its duration is supported by several arguments, the first of which reveals the connection with his position on creation and conservation. Indeed, creation’s term is the created thing, and the term of its conservation is its duration; consequently, since creation and conservation coincide in the same thing, so do the thing and its duration (n. 1). Moreover, if this were not the case, duration would be an accident, and God could conserve something in existence without the accident of its duration, which is absurd, since conservation in existence implies duration (n. 2). Question 6 considers the relation between time and motion: “whether time really differs from motion.” Francis replies along the same lines as before: for Francis time is really identical to motion, since time is, in effect, “the duration of a successive being,” and the same situation holds for successive beings as for permanent ones (n. 1). In any case, against the objection that, just as motions can be fast or slow, so can time, he states that time as measure is neither fast nor slow. Moreover, time as measure does not measure itself, but rather inferior motion, so time connotes above all the highest motion, that of the motion of the first mobile, as the supreme extrinsic measure. In this sense motion and time can be specifically the same, but numerically different: for a motion is measured by the time numerically identical to a superior motion, and never by its own; the first mobile’s motion provides the time in relation to which all other motions are measured, but it is not itself measured (n. 6). For this reason, the motion of the first mobile, and its time, cannot be described as faster or slower, because it is regular and uniform, although the other motions and durations may vary (n. 7). Questions 7-8-9 These three questions study creation from the perspective of the relation between creature and God. Question 7 asks whether the relation between creature and God is real, and Francis affirms that it is. He distinguishes two modes for this relation: one is rooted in the first actuality that follows the production of the creature, the other is that of origin, or of the production (also known as the “preceding second actuality”), a relation understood as mediating between the creature as produced and God as producer (n. 3). Francis clarifies his position through two conclusiones: the first conclusion asserts that the second mode of the relaany real or formal distinction between them.
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tion between creature and God, namely that of origin or of second actuality, is solely a relation of reason, since every real relation requires a real foundation. Since such an act of creation is prior to the creature, the creature cannot, before its creation, supply any foundation for a real relation (n. 5). The demonstration of this conclusio provides the opportunity to discuss the opinion of Peter Auriol, for whom the relation of origin indicates a relation of causality that is real and distinct from the creature as term of creation.122 Francis criticizes his fellow Franciscan for many reasons, chief among which is that by the act of creation God immediately produces the creature, without any intermediary act called “origin.” Origin is nothing real outside of creation itself, and cannot be considered as a cause of the creature (n. 14). The second conclusion maintains that the relation of creature to God according to the mode of first actuality (which follows the production of the creature) is a real relation; indeed, once posited in existence, a creature really depends on its creator. By this thesis, Francis draws out the consequences of his notion that things have a greater dependence on their extrinsic causes than on their intrinsic ones (q. 3), as well as that creation and conservation are really identical (q. 4). This theme is further explored from a complementary perspective in book I (Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 59; Scriptum, d. 30, q. 52), where Francis treats it from the side of the creator (Utrum Dei ad creaturam sit relatio realis). Question 8 continues the investigation, asking whether the real relation from creature to God really differs from the creature itself. After principal arguments, question 8 considers and refutes two opinions, and in those refutations Francis reveals his own response, which he then further specifies in the following question. Indeed, Francis does not spell out his position in determining this question, but clarifies it indirectly across the discussion of the two opinions. The first appears to be that espoused by William of Ware, according to which the relation of creature to God differs neither really nor formally from the creature itself, since the creature would be nothing without its dependence on God.123 Francis criticizes this conception on the basis of the preceding question’s distinction between the two modes of relation with God; this relation to God is according to the mode of first actuality, and hence is a real relation that presupposes its foundation (in this case, the creature as posited in existence). As such, the relation is posterior to its foundation, and hence is necessarily distinct from it (n. 32). Petrus Aureoli, In I Sententiarum (Scriptum), d. XXVII, a. 1 (ed. Romae 1596, pp. 598b-600b); In II Sententiarum, d. I, q. 2, a. 2 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 18a-20a). 123 Guilelmus de Wara, In II Sententiarum, d. 1, q. 4: “Relatio creaturae ad Deum est ipsa substantia creaturae” (Florence, BNC, A. IV. 42, f. 70ra); for this reference, we rely on the testimony of the Scotus editors at Ordinatio, II, d. 1, q. 4-5 (ed. Vaticana, p. 120, in nota). 122
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The second opinion posits real identity and formal distinction between the creature and its relation to God. Francis presents two versions of this opinion: one maintains that no relation is really distinct from its foundation (n. 14), and this opinion is that of Henry of Ghent;124 the other, that of John Duns Scotus,125 defends the idea that the only relation not really distinct from its foundation is that of the creature to God (n. 19). Francis refutes both versions of this opinion on the grounds of a distinction he draws between “positive dependence” and “negative dependence” on God. “Positive dependence” refers to a real, positive relation by which every created being really depends on God; “negative dependence” refers to the relationship by which one thing cannot exist without another (n. 34). The former relation of dependence, as was seen earlier, is posterior to its foundation (what is created), and separate. God can thus free the creature from its relation of positive dependence, since this relation is posterior to the creature, but not from its relation of negative dependence, since the creature cannot exist without God (n. 35 and n. 38). Consequently – and this is Francis’ thesis – the real relation (in the sense of positive dependence) of the creature to God is really distinct from the creature itself. Question 9 then pursues this investigation into the relation of creation, asking whether the relation to God as efficient cause is the same as the relation to God as final cause. The solution, in two short paragraphs, constitutes the entirety of this question, and Francis’ solution is more probable than definite: “Here it could likely (probabiliter) be said that it is one and the same relation, or that they are really distinct” (n. 1). If the second probable case is chosen, one would have to consider the objection that really distinct relations would exist between the same extremes, to which Francis replies that causalities of different types suffice for making different relations, without specifying either how this is so, or how, in the case of the first probable case, different types of causality can constitute the same relation (n. 2). Question 10 Question 10 returns to the act of creation and asks whether the creature is produced immediately by an act of the intellect and the will, or by another act and another faculty. Francis’ long, articulated response covers four articles, two on angelic action and two on divine action. The first article asks whether an angel moves the Heavens immediately by an act of intellection and willing. Francis responds: “An angel moves locally neither the Heavens, nor any other body, nor even itself, by an act of understanding and willing, but rather by some third act, different from either of Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, q. 3 (ed. Macken, pp. 56-59, 80 and 84); Quodlibet V, q. 6 (ed. Badius, Louvain 1518, f. 163vZ). 125 Ioannes Duns Scotus, Ordinatio II, d. 1, q. 4-5 (ed. Vaticana, pp. 128 and 135136). 124
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those acts, which third act is indeed the act that executes the command of the will, really distinct from the act of understanding and from the act of willing or commanding” (n. 4). The demonstration of this thesis relies on the distinction between acts relating to objects that are determinate in size, space and time, and acts relating to objects that are not determined in this way. Acts of movement belong to the first group, and acts of intellection to the second group (n. 5 and n. 8). The acts by which an angel moves are therefore really distinct from its intellectual and volitional acts. For the first time in his commentary on book II, Francis mentions an article condemned in 1277, namely that “an intelligence moves the Heavens by will alone.”126 Cited without comment, the censure reinforces Francis’ argument, presumably by implying that an intelligence moves the Heavens by some other power than the will, but it neither clinches nor dictates his position. The second article raises the same question concerning the faculties and asks whether an angel moves (the Heavens) immediately by the intellect and the will. The response is analogous to that of the preceding article: “I say it can be proven that the angel does not move immediately by the intellect and the will, but by a third faculty that executes the acts of these two faculties” (n. 16).127 The demonstration of this thesis hinges on the theme that each type of faculty belongs to a different genus. For this reason, a faculty contains virtually the inferior powers of its genus (for example, the intellectual faculty contains the sensitive power of apprehension), but it cannot contain the inferior powers of a different genus (the intellectual faculty cannot virtually contain the appetitive powers) (n. 17). Now, the motive power belongs to a different genus than that of the intellect or that of the will, so that it is not contained by those faculties, but is distinguished from them as a third power (n. 19-20), a power that is inferior to them because it is directed towards inferior objects (n. 26). The third article applies the same question to God and asks if God acts immediately by the intellect and the will. Before stating his position, Francis considers the opinion that conceives God’s action as analogous to that of an angel, and thus posits that God acts towards things external to him (ad extra) by an executive power different from his intellect and his will (n. 29). This is Peter Auriol’s opinion.128 While in the preceding article, Francis agrees with Auriol’s view as it applies to angels, here he criticizes it with regard to divine action. For Francis, it is unacceptable that God act ad extra by a power other than his intellect and will, since it runs counter to divine perfection. The intelR. Hissette, Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Louvain-Paris 1977, n. 74, p. 134; D. Piché - C. Lafleur, La condamnation parisienne de 1277, Paris 1999, pp. 144-145. 127 This is also the position of Peter Auriol (In II Sent., d. IX, q. unica, a. 3; ed. Romae 1605, p. 96a-b), to whom Francis makes no reference, however. 128 Petrus Aureoli, In II Sent., d. I, q. 2, a. 1 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 17a-18a). 126
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lect and the will of God are perfect powers, and a third power that would serve as their executive instrument would necessarily be inferior to them, and hence would be a necessarily imperfect power, which cannot be attributed to God (nn. 32-33). Francis’ solution then returns to the position that God always acts immediately and exclusively by his intellect and will (nn. 36). The fourth article applies to God the question asked in the first article and inquires whether God acts immediately by an act of the intellect and the will. Here too Francis considers at the start the position of Peter Auriol,129 who maintains that God acts ad extra by an act that executes the command of the intellect and the will. Again, Francis rejects this conception and defends the radical difference between the mode of divine action and the mode of action of creatures. In creatures, the executive power is really distinct from the intellect and the will, while in God the powers and their acts constitute one and the same perfect identity. Consequently, everything that God produces, he produces immediately by his intellect and his will and by his act of intellection and willing (n. 48). Question 11 This question raises the problem of the subject of creation as divine action (creatio-actio). In four articles, Francis brings up various opinions, through the discussion of which he arrives at his solution. The first article clarifies what an action formally is, and compares two opinions. The first, that of Henry of Ghent,130 conceives action as an externally applied respect, distinct from the category of relation by the fact that the latter is an internally arising determination. The second opinion, on the other hand, conceives action as an absolute form, and not a relative one. In the course of the article, Francis plays the opinions against each other, criticizing the first by means of the second, and the second by means of the first, without himself taking a position or proposing a solution.131 Francis clearly takes a position in the second article, concerning the foundation of action. First, he discusses Henry of Ghent’s opinion, which sees action as being founded in motion, and not in an active or passive power (n. 28).132 In response, Francis holds that action is not founded in motion, because motion is produced by the action of the agent; action is therefore the cause of motion and as such it precedes motion (n. 33). Petrus Aureoli, ibid. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, q. 3 (ed. Macken, pp. 79-80). 131 IIB’s discussion of this theme takes place in qq. 16-18; in criticizing the second opinion by the first, he makes the following comment: “Ad sextum posset secundo modo dici quod visio et auditio sunt essentialiter respectus, sicut audivi teneri ab uno doctore tempore meo Parisius.” This doctor could be Durand of St.-Pourçain, who read the Sentences between 1308 and 1310. See R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, p. 2, n. 1. 132 Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet IX, q. 3 (ed. Macken, pp. 79-80). 129 130
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The third article continues the investigation and asks what the subject of action is. Francis structures his response in two sub-articles, the first asking whether action and passion are really distinct from motion. He sets out reasons why such a real distinction does not hold (actio non distinguatur a motu), and there is only a distinction of reason between action, passion and motion (n. 39). Francis then makes some arguments that posit a real distinction between action or passion and motion, noting that motion can cease while an action remains (n. 44). Without openly opting for one solution over another, Francis seems to prefer a view denying a real distinction between action and passion, on the one hand, and motion, on the other. Indeed, he affirms that if one adopts such a solution, many difficulties are resolved, and based on this position, he responds to the arguments for a real distinction (nn. 48-52). In the second sub-article, he follows an analogous procedure, proposing two opposing views. If action and motion are really identical, then the subject of action, like the subject of motion, will be the patient (n. 53). If, on the other hand, action is really distinct from motion, it becomes difficult to determine its subject. Indeed, there are some reasons to believe that the patient is the subject of action (nn. 54-61), while others suggest the agent (nn. 62-69). Here too, Francis qualifies his solution as likely: if one maintains that action is distinct from motion, it is more probable that the subject of action is the agent, and that it is founded in an active power (n. 70). In Article 4, Francis does away with any such hesitation. In a succinct paragraph, Francis replies directly to the initial question: “Since creation-action is really nothing other than the volition of God,133 just as creation-passion is nothing other than the creature, consequently creation-action is formally in God” (n. 91).134 Question 12 The last question on creation treats a hotly debated theme in the scholastic culture of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries: the eternity of the world. Francis approaches the problem from the point of view of divine agency, and asks: “Whether the creation of any creatable thing was possible from eternity, and whether it actually occurred?” After the statement of the question follow four principal arguments, two (one pro, one contra) concerning the actuality of creation, and two (one contra, one pro) on its possibility. Likewise, Francis divides his response into two articles concerning possibility and actuality, respectively. In identifying the two, Francis opposes the position of Peter Auriol, In II Sent., d. I, q. 2, a. 1 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 16a-18a). 134 Cf. also Franciscus de Marchia, Reportatio I, d. 27, q. un. (ed. Mariani, pp. 549594); Scriptum I, d. 27, q. 1 (ed. R. Friedman, ‘In principio erat verbum’. The Incorporation of Philosophical Psychology into Trinitarian Theology, 1250-1325, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Iowa, 1997, pp. 555-563). 133
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The first article, on the possibility, takes up 77 of the 80 paragraphs of the question, and subdivides the discussion of possibility according to the creation of permanent beings (first subarticle) and that of successive beings (second subarticle), inasmuch as their different ontological status could lead to different solutions; indeed Francis makes reference here to aliqui magni doctores, according to whom God certainly could have created from eternity permanent beings, but not successive ones.135 With respect to permanent realities (separate substances), the first subarticle expounds and criticizes three opinions that deny the possibility of eternal creation. The first of these opinions argues from the principle of creation (the divine will) and rejects eternal creation, because it would compromise divine freedom and the contingency of creation (n. 8).136 Francis counters this view, affirming that God’s eternity is compatible with the contingency of creation in the same way that God’s eternal foreknowledge and predestination are compatible with the contingency of the foreknown and predestined: because what God wills is willed from eternity, but what he wills outside of himself (that is, what is created) he wills contingently (n. 11). For Francis, necessity and contingency are the manners of producing a thing, and not determinations of the thing itself. Further, an effect being contingently produced signifies precisely that it could have not been produced. God therefore would have been able to produce the world from eternity, but in a contingent manner, that is, in such a way that he could have not produced it (n. 13). The second set of arguments denies the possible eternity of the world from the point of view of the term “a quo” of creation (that is, from nothingness), positing that nothing that receives being after non-being can be eternal (n. 18).137 Francis rejects this line of argumentation on several grounds, including that logical posteriority does not imply temporal posteriority. Rather logical posteriority simply implies that the thing presupposes something logically prior. Being posterior in this sense does not require coming after in time; for logically prior and posterior can share the same first temporal moment of existence. Consequently, even if the world were eternal, alongside divine eternity, it would not exist according to the sense in which what is first (i.e., God) exists, but in the sense in which what is posterior by nature exists, that is, as something presupposes its principle (n. 23 and 25). The third line of argumentation rejects the eternity of the world with respect to the term “ad quem” of creation. Since everything that is produced is produced at a determinate instant, and since every instant is fleeting, nothing produced can be permanent and eternal. Francis takes issue with this position’s notion that creation occurs in a temporal instant, since that would im135 That is, Petrus Aureoli, In II Sent., Quaestio prohemialis, a. 2 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 3b-5b) and In II Sent., d. I, q. 1, a. 2 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 12b-15b). 136 Cf. Henricus de Gandavo, Quodlibet I, q. 7-8 (ed. Macken, pp. 27-46). 137 Among others, this opinion was defended by Bonaventure, In II Sent., d. 1, p. 1, art. I, q. 2 (ed. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, Quaracchi 1885, v. II, p. 22).
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ply submitting the agency of the first principle to the conditions under which creatures act (nn. 27-28). This consideration allows our author to formulate his own solution: since none of the positions mentioned concludes that an eternal effect is impossible, one must admit that God could have created permanent entities from eternity. Creation from nothing only signifies the total production of the thing.138 As such, it does not imply that there existed or did not exist things prior in time to creation. Consequently, the creation of permanent entities is compatible with eternity, because creation admits equally of having a beginning in time and of not having one (n. 31). To the already classic objection that in an eternal world there would be an infinite number of souls, Francis responds that, on the one hand, God could have produced from eternity without producing infinite realities, and, on the other hand, the existence of an actual infinite is possible.139 The second subarticle addresses the same question with respect to successive beings. Here, Francis engages Peter Auriol, the sole interlocutor in this subarticle, whose position was that even if God was able to create from eternity permanent beings, he could not create successive realities, such as motion and time (n. 40).140 Our author draws upon two series of arguments in favor of Auriol’s position: reasons that are proper to him, and common reasons (taken from Bonaventure, John Peckham and Matthew of Aquasparta). Francis’ criticism, both of the proper and the common arguments, turns on the notion of the infinite and confutes two erroneous assumptions in Auriol’s position: on the one hand, that being passed through (pertransitum) is proper to the past (n. 59) and, on the other hand, that the past can only be a potential infinite, that is, an infinite according to succession (n. 61). Francis defends a diametrically opposed position: being passed through is not proper to the past (since an infinite past does not have limits), just as being able to be passed through is not proper to the future (n. 59); moreover, if past time is infinite, it is actually infinite, “not actually remaining and existing, but actually passing by” (in actu praetereunte: n. 61). Thanks to this conception of the infinite, Francis can now defend the audacious thesis of the possibility of an eternal creation of successive beings, since there is no contradiction in positing an infinite duration of a successive reality, such as time.141 As Francis asserted in q. 1. Here Francis refers to his discussion on the infinite in his commentary on book I of the Sentences, Reportatio, q. 24 (=Scriptum, q. 19). See the study by R. Friedman, “Francesco d’Appignano on the Eternity of the World”; cf. also A. Maier, “Diskussionen über das aktuell Unendliche in der ersten Hälfte des 14. Jahrhunderts”, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, v. 1, pp. 69-70. 140 Petrus Aureoli, In II Sent., Quaestio prohemialis, a. 2 (ed. Romae 1605, pp. 3b5b). For the manner in which Francis employs Auriol’s doctrine, see R. Friedman, “Francesco d’Appignano on the Eternity of the World.” 141 R. Friedman, “Francesco d’Appignano on the Eternity of the World”, pp. 9899. 138 139
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The first article concludes with a digression, where Francis opposes those who claim the principle “every whole is greater than its part” does not apply to infinite quantities (n. 73). To the contrary, Francis states that the principle does apply; nevertheless, since to have parts or to be a whole is repugnant to the nature of the infinite qua infinite, when it comes to the infinite we can only consider parts by considering the infinite as something finite. Therefore, any thought experiment involving the addition or subtraction of parts from an infinite quantity considers those parts and wholes as if they were finite (nn. 76-77). The second article, concerning what really happens (quid sit de facto), consists in a simple negation: although the world could have been created from eternity, in fact the world was created in time (n. 78), because the will of God is eternal, but it has produced every created being contingently and in time (n. 79).
VI. The Sources of Reportatio IIA, Questions 1-12 Francis treats his selected themes and elaborates his positions with reference to other thinkers, employing explicit and implicit sources, the identification of which serves to procure a better understanding of Francis’ doctrine as well as of the theoretical landscape in which it is situated. In this section, we present a quantitative treatment of the sources for questions 1-12.
1. Explicit sources We have tabulated the explicit sources for questions 1-12. By “explicit source” we mean a text or author cited by name as part of an authoritative argument. Table 2: Reportatio IIA, qq. 1-12, Explicit Sources Quaestio Aristoteles Averroes Augustinus Sacra Scriptura Alii q. 1
3
4
q. 2
1
1
q. 3
1
1
q. 4
1
Damascenus (2) Anselmus (1) 3
2 2
q. 5 q. 6 q. 7
4
q. 8
2
q. 9 q. 10
2
q. 11
10
q. 12
4
2
5
1 1
Condemnatio paris. 1277 (1) Hugo a S. Victore (1) Eustratius (1) Liber sex Principiorum (1)
1
In the first twelve questions of the commentary on book II, we count 58 explicit sources, a relatively small number, given the length of the text. Among them, Aristotle and Averroes dominate, particularly in questions 1 and 11, which treat the action of creation and syllogistic logic, and the relationships between action, passion and motion, respectively. In the two short questions on duration and time (qq. 5-6), no explicit source appears, and the even short-
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er (two-paragraph) question 9 likewise lacks any citations. Question 4, treating the relation between creation and conservation only makes two references, and these to “the intention of Augustine.” Many of these authorities are loci communes, and still others come from Francis’ adversaries, as is the case for the stray references to the Liber sex principiorum and to Hugh of Saint Victor. Indeed, Francis’ most creative use of authoritative arguments comes in criticizing his adversaries. In q. 11, for example, Francis reports a position arguing that action is an absolute form, citing a passage from Ethics X (1173a13-15) in support (n. 13). Francis counters with two arguments (nn. 26-27), adducing the interpretation of Eustratius. In the same question, Francis responds to arguments stating that action is not in the agent with an extended discussion of Physics V as expressed in Aristotle's text and in Averroes’ commentary (nn. 83-90). In general, however, we can conclude that in the first twelve questions of his commentary on book II of the Sentences, Francis does not rely heavily on authoritative arguments; his use is primarily limited to Aristotle and Averroes, and occasionally Augustine, and he rarely calls upon them.
2. Implicit sources We use the term “implicit source” to refer to a position or opinion that Francis discusses as roughly contemporary to his own. Implicit sources are introduced by the expressions quidam, alius, una opinio, unus modus dicendi, etc. There are a significant number of implicit sources, and they are important for Francis’ doctrine. We have associated most (21 out of 26) of the implicit sources of contemporaries with an author. We should, however, underscore that our identification is based on edited texts, and thus prefers classic, thirteenth-century positions to the versions of them held by later thinkers. So it is more than possible that, in adducing an opposing opinion, Francis does not have in mind the classic authority, but rather a contemporary or near-contemporary, whose positions may not have been recorded, and, even if they are recorded, may not be readily accessible. In addition, Francis could very well report the “classic” positions through an intermediary’s view.142 In spite of these limitations, we deem it useful to signal all the implicit sources identified with certitude or probability, in order to aid the reader in placing Francis’ positions in their historical context. At times the text of Francis reveals the tacit presence of other sources, sometimes his interlocutors, and sometimes the transmitters of the positions of others. For example, as the first question relates to his Principium secundi, many of the competing positions and criticisms of his own views come from 142 Indeed, through Scotus’ treatment of the same problem we have identified the position in q. 8, n. 3, with William of Ware. It is quite likely that Francis himself reads Ware through Scotus.
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his fellow bachelors. Since most of these sources exist in manuscript, if at all, the analysis of them falls outside the scope of this edition. Table 3: Reportatio IIA, qq. 1-12, Implicit Sources Quaestio
Implicit Sources
q. 1
Ioannes Duns Scotus (1) unidentified socii (3) Aegidius Romanus (1) Godefridus de Fontibus (1) Henricus de Gandavo (1) Ioannes Duns Scotus (2) no implicit sources no implicit sources no implicit sources no implicit sources Petrus Aureoli (1) Aegidius Romanus (1) Guilelmus de Wara (1) Henricus de Gandavo (1) Ioannes Duns Scotus (1) no implicit sources Petrus Aureoli (2) Durandus de S. Porciano (1) Henricus de Gandavo (1) Ioannes Duns Scotus (1) unidentified (1) Petrus Aureoli (1) Henricus de Gandavo (1) Bonaventura (1) Ioannes Pecham (1) Thomas de Sutona (1) unidentified (1)
q. 2
q. 3 q. 4 q. 5 q. 6 q. 7 q. 8
q. 9 q. 10 q. 11
q. 12
This table makes clear the parallel that exists between implicit and explicit sources. In questions 5, 6 and 9 there are no sources whatsoever; questions 3 and 4 have no implicit sources, and there are very few explicit references. Thus, out of twelve questions, five present Francis’ position without an explicit link to the discussions of the time, while seven come about through a detailed engagement with contemporary positions. Let us consider now the presence of each author in different questions:
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Table 4: Reportatio IIA, qq. 1-12, Implicit Sources by Author Author
q. 1
Aegidius Romanus
q. 2
q. 7
1
q. 8
q. 10
q. 11
1
Bonaventura
1
Durandus de S. Porciano
1
Guilelmus de Wara
1
Henricus de Gandavo Ioannes Duns Scotus
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
Ioannes Pecham Petrus Aureoli Thomas de Sutona
q. 12
1 1
1
2
1 1
This table shows the most important interlocutors for Francis: John Duns Scotus, Henry of Ghent and Peter Auriol, all present in three or more questions. Francis pays considerable attention to the doctrines of these authors; their views are often the target of his criticism. Francis’ relation to Peter Auriol deserves to be more closely studied and probably should be nuanced according to subject: indeed, even if he often criticizes Auriol, Francis sometimes shares a similar position (e.g., q. 10, a. 2), and often he seems to work out his own view with reference to his fellow Franciscan’s commentary on the Sentences (for example, in qq. 3, 4, 5 and 6). Thus it is very probable that Peter Auriol’s commentary serves as an important tacit source for Francis’ work. Since they are based only on the first twelve questions, these observations are preliminary, and we hope to be able to expand on them with the publication of future volumes.
VII. Francis’ Doctrine of Creation and Historical Impact: A Preliminary Assessment Without doubt it would be premature to assess Francis of Marchia’s doctrine at this point. The critical edition of his works has just begun, and we hope future detailed doctrinal and historical studies will clarify his views. Nevertheless, we can make a few remarks concerning the first twelve questions of his commentary on book II of the Sentences. His doctrine of creation consists of the following theses: 1) creation is the total production of a thing (that is, of all its intrinsic principles); 2) creation presupposes nothing whatsoever; prior to creation, creatures do not exist in objective or subjective potency; 3) all beings depend actually and continually on God as efficient cause; 4) the creation and the conservation of things are really identical; 5) the relation of creature to God is a real relation only after the production of the creature; 6) the positive relation of dependence of creature on God is really distinct from the creature, while the negative dependence coincides with the creature; 7) God creates immediately everything that he creates by his intellect and will; 8) the action of creation is formally in God; the passion of creation is identical with the creature; 9) God could create the world from eternity, even though, in fact, he created it in time. By this doctrine Francis shows himself to be a thinker who is at once profoundly rooted in the philosophical and theological culture of his time, and yet independent of it. On the one hand, through his methodology and his use of implicit sources he demonstrates his full awareness of the contemporary debate, with respect to which he takes his own position and clarifies his views. Thus his doctrine is profoundly anchored in the culture of his time and the geographic space that delimits it, in this case the discussions at the university of Paris at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. Within these discussions, he is particularly linked with the Franciscan tradition (present in his writings above all through John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol), with which he shares some general views and from which he adopted the ideal of poverty that he would defend even in opposition to ecclesiastical authority. On the other hand, Francis does not hesitate to oppose his fellow Franciscans, even the most illustrious ones, and he defends his own positions: keeping to the theme of creation, he distances himself from Scotus with regard to the relation from creature to God (thesis 6) and from Auriol with regard to the status of action, passion and their relation to motion (thesis 8); furthermore, he criticizes Auriol on the relation between creation and conservation (thesis 4), on the modality of the relation from creature to God (thesis 5) and on the immediacy of divine action (thesis 7). Concerning the eternity of the world (thesis 9), he defends an innovative and rare position, breaking with the Franciscan tradition. These few elements, on which addi-
FRANCIS’ DOCTRINE OF CREATION
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tional analysis will bring further precision, show his independence of spirit as well as the value in studying his thought in its own right. This value and this interest did not escape Francis’ contemporaries and immediate successors. Although a comprehensive study of the reception of his thought has not yet been made, already it is clear that he had considerable influence, that quite a few thinkers took his views into consideration, and that several adopted them.143 His influence is at work notably in William of Ockham’s Opus nonaginta dierum,144 as well as in the philosophical works of Walter Chatton, John of Reading and Aufredo Gonteri Brito.145 Francis Meyronnes knew and criticized Marchia’s theory on the motion of projectiles, and the imposing commentary on the Sentences of William of Rubio, the erstwhile reportator of Francis’ works, also witnesses his influence.146 Michael of Massa explicitly employs Francis’ position on the univocity of being, and tacitly uses other elements of Francis’ thought.147 Gregory of Rimini, followed by Hugolino of Orvieto and Alfonso Vargas of Toledo considered attentively Francis’ view of the status of theology.148 Substantial parts of Paul of Venice’s Metaphysics commentary come from Francis’ prior effort.149 Finally, John the Canon’s commentary on the Physics witnesses the importance of Francis’ philosophy of nature: John cites him 25 times, third in line after Scotus and Auriol.150 These few indications that we currently possess invite the conclusion that Francis was one of the most important authors of the first half of the fourteenth century, that his contemporaries recognized him as such, and R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, pp. 6-10. R. Lambertini, “Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham”. 145 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 31-32. W. Duba, R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Henry of Harclay and Aufredo Gonteri Brito”, in: P. Rosemann (ed.), Medieval Sentences Commentaries II, Leiden (forthcoming). 146 N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 250-252 and 313-320; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris, pp. 210-214; “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”, pp. 48-53. 147 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, pp. 6-7; C. Schabel, Theology at Paris, pp. 214-220; R. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University, cap. 12, parts 2-3. 148 F. Zanin, “Gregorio da Rimini contro Francesco d’Appignano”; D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the Fourteenth Century. Note on Editions, Marginalia, Opinions and Book-Lore”, Augustiniana 6 (1956), (pp. 146-274), pp. 220-222; J. Kürzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Scholastik im 14. Jahrhundert, Münster 1930, pp. 59-60, 141-146, 158-163. 149 F. Amerini, “Francesco d’Appignano come fonte di Paolo Veneto. Il caso degli accidenti eucaristici”. 150 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, pp. 8-9; J. Kraus, “Die Lehre von der realen spezifischen Einheit in der älteren Scotistenschule”, Divus Thomas (Freiburg), 14 (1936), (pp. 353-378), pp. 369-371; G. Etzkorn, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale, 29 (1981), p. 93; D.-J. Dekker, “John the Canon on Time and Motion. A Case Study in Aristotelian Natural Philosophy and Early Scotism”, in: C. Leijenhorst, C. Lüthy and J.M.M.H. Thijssen (eds.), The Dynamic of Aristotelian Natural Philosophy from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Century, Leiden 2002, pp. 225-248; C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Virtus derelicta”. 143 144
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that he continued to enjoy such esteem for at least a century.151 Moreover, his influence was so great that one can even speak of the existence of a “Marchist School.”152 We hope that the present edition will contribute to completing the portrait of this author and his work, and that in itself it will improve our awareness of the heritage of medieval thought.
151 In a catalogue of the first half of the fifteenth century listing important personalities in the Franciscan Order, we read: “Magister et fr. Franciscus de Esculo: hic fuit magnus theologus et philosophus et multum inventivus conclusionum scientificavit, plures libros sacrae scripturae exposuit et super Sentencias subtiliter scripsit et sermones compilavit” (O. Bonmann, “Ein franziskanischer Literaturkatalog des XV. Jahrhunderts”, Franziskanische Studien 23 (1936), (pp. 113-149), p. 129; N. Schneider, Die Kosmologie, p. 34). Christopher the Cypriot, working in the 1490s, is more laconic, but just as appreciative: “Franciscus Rubeus de Marchia, subtilissimus doctor, ut eius opera testantur” (C. Schabel, “Early Franciscan Attacks on John Duns Scotus’s Doctrine of Divine Foreknowledge” in M. Olszewski (ed.), What is ‘Theology’ in the Middle Ages? Religious Cultures of Europe (11th-15th Centuries) as Reflected in their Self-Understanding, Münster 2007, (pp. 301-328), p. 301, n. 2). 152 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Introduction”, p. 10.
VIII. The Edition 1. Manuscripts There are 17 known witnesses to Francis’ commentaries on book II of the Sentences:153 A
Admont, Bibliothek der Benediktinerabtei, 178, ff. 1ra - 69vb (s. XIV)
B
Città del Vaticano, BAV, Barb. lat. 791, ff. 1ra - 89vb (s. XV (1472))
C Città del Vaticano, BAV, Chigi. lat. B VII 113, ff. 105ra - 165rb (s. XIV (1327)) D
Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, 517, ff. 1ra - 35vb (s. XIV)
E
Città del Vaticano, BAV, vat. lat. 943, ff. 1ra - 45ra (s. XV)
F Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, II. II. 182, ff. 258ra - 297rb (s. XV) G Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, Fol. 334, ff. 183ra - 246vb (s. XIV) H
Paris, BnF, lat. 3071, ff. 81ra - 124va (s. XIV)
K Roma, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, 1007 (S. Bonav. 2), ff. 1r - 175r (s. XV) L
Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 532, ff. 142ra - 225vb (s. XIV)
N
Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII. C. 23, ff. 131ra - 200rb (s. XIV)
P
Praha, Metropolitni Kapituly, 531 (C 99), ff. 2ra - 130va (s. XIV)
T
Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, O. 206, sup., ff. 1ra - 11rb (s. XIV)
V
Città del Vaticano, BAV, vat. lat. 1096, ff. 119ra - 189ra (s. XIV)
W Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 4826, ff. 2ra - 91ra (s. XIV) Y
Paris, BnF, lat. 3072, ff. 92ra - 147rb (s. XIV)
Z
Paris, BnF, lat. 15852, ff. 95ra - 153vb (s. XIV)
As noted earlier, E has the redaction known as Reportatio IIB; DH carry a minor redaction of the major version; and the major version is witnessed by ABCFGKLNPTVWYZ. Of these, T only carries the last five and a half questions (qq. 44-49). F contains only qq. 1-30 and the first part of 31, while K is missing qq. 18-19.
See the list and full description of MSS in R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, pp. 39-48. 153
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INTRODUCTION
2. Stemma To establish the stemma, Girard Etzkorn and Camarin Porter conducted soundings on the text, collating all witnesses on questions 3, 10 (a. 1), 18, 22, 30, 38 and 42. Gordon Wilson then used their results to establish a preliminary stemma, which we confirmed and adjusted based on shared omissions and major variants from the established text. The stemma is thus provisionally meant to be applicable to the entire text of Reportatio IIA:154 Table 5: Franciscus de Marchia, Reportatio IIA Stemma Codicum ω α
β
γ ζ ι L A
K
η
V
θ G
ε
P
B
Y C
κ
W N
Z
F
This stemma expresses the relationships among the texts, as best as we can determine, excluding contamination. A quantitative analysis of shared variants from the established text will be provided in the Introduction to the third volume of the Reportatio IIA, when the entire critical text is available. While no doubt exists concerning the right side of the stemma (β), some manuscripts on the left side (α) occasionally present conflicting relations that suggest contamination. To show how these relations and contaminations, combined with scribal particularities, express themselves in the text, we present four difficult cases of significant variation among the manuscripts.
Since it only presents the last few questions of IIA, T is not included in this stemma. 154
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Case 1. One of the more complicated passages in book II occurs right at the beginning of q. 1 in the initial arguments. While this question is, as noted above, parallel to Francis’ Principium secundi, the principal arguments are not parallel. Moreover, Francis never responds to these arguments – for that matter, the response to the question Utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo does not appear until q. 2, a. 3 –, and so Francis does not mention the argument elsewhere in the text, which might otherwise have provided some insight into what he meant. Since they are introductory arguments, we cannot even assume they were meant to be compelling. As they appear in the redaction DH, the principal arguments do not pose any philological problems: Et videtur quod non, quia creatio‑passio non est demonstrabilis de creatura, ergo nec creatio‑actio de Deo. Contra: notior est actio quam esse et potentia. Sed esse demonstrant philosophi de Deo; nam philosophi demonstrant Deum esse. Ergo etc. (nn. 1-2)
The initial argument against the demonstrability of God’s creative action argues from the indemonstrability of the reciprocal passion of creation. The counter-argument hinges on the claim that God’s existence is less known than God’s activity. Neither side comes across as convincing, but the et potentia of the counter-argument plays an uncertain role. Et potentia is not logically necessary, and perhaps serves to underscore that alongside the action and the agent one must consider the active power that gives rise to the action. In IIA the two principal arguments are reversed, so that the first argument is in favor of the demonstrability of creation, and the second is opposed to it. The witnesses only have minor variants for the second argument, which reads: Contra: creatio‑passio non est demonstrabilis de creatura, ergo nec creatio‑actio est demonstrabilis de Deo. (n. 2)
For the first argument, however, something went wrong early, and the witnesses diverge to the point that the only two manuscripts to share exactly the same reading are BC: A: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilior est actu esse quam potentia esse ut potentia; sed esse de Deo est demonstrabile; ergo et creatio-actio. BC: Videtur quod sic, quia actio est notior quam (actio add. sed del. B) potentia, et potentia quam essentia; sed essentia est demonstrabilis de creatura. F: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilior est actio quam esse nec potentia; sed essentia est demonstrabilis de Deo, ergo et creatio-actio. G: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilius est actu esse quam potentia esse ut potentia; sed esse est de Deo demonstrabile; ergo et creatio-actio. K: Videtur quod sic, quia notior est actio quam esse vel potentia; sed esse est demonstrabile de Deo; ergo et creatio-actio. L: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilior est actu esse quam potentia esse ut potentia; sed esse est de Deo demonstrabile; ergo et creatio-actio.
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N: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilius est esse actu quam potentia ut potentia; sed esse est demonstrabile de Deo. P: Videtur quod sic, quia actio est notior quam potentia; potentia quam essentia. Sed esse demonstrant philosophi de Deo; nam demonstrant Deum esse. Ergo creatioactio est demonstrabilis de Deo. V: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilius est actu esse quam potentia esse ut potentia. Sed esse est demonstrabile de Deo; ergo et creatio-actio. W: Videtur quod sic, quia notior est actio quam potentia, et potentia quam essentia; sed (sup. lin.) essentia vel esse est demonstrabile de Deo; ergo et creatio-actio. Y: Et videtur quod sic, quia notior est actio quam esse nec potentia; sed esse demonstrabile est de de.; ergo et creatio-actio. Z: Videtur quod sic, quia nobilius est esse actu quam potentia esse; sed esse est demonstrabile de Deo; igitur et creatio-actio.
In many copies, the confusion is evident, which explains the further variants as copyists tried more or less satisfactory ways of “fixing” the text. The copyist for P evidently saw a problem and integrated from the redaction DH; indeed, P at times elsewhere contaminates from DH. The argument underlying all these variants turns on the identification between what is more known and what is more demonstrable, and on the assumption that God’s creative action is a type of action, just as God’s being is a type of being. The position seems to claim that, since action is more known to us than the being that gives rise to it (through an active potency), therefore the action of creation is more known than God’s existence. But since God’s existence is demonstrable, so too is the action of creation. In our reconstruction, we prefer the reading of K, and the state of the manuscripts can be explained by conjecture from the evidence: in the original, two abbreviations caused difficulties: notior, abbreviated (noor) such that it admitted also of the expansion nobilior, and vel (vl), where the superscript l invited ambiguity with ut and nec. β got notior correct, and possibly vel as well (K), but by the time the text got to Y, the vel had become a nec. BC’s common ancestor (η) saw this text, and hypercorrected, changing the argument to make power an intermediate step between action and essence, not existence. On the other side of the stemma, α read nobilior for notior and ut for vel. The role of potentia in the original was already difficult to interpret; with “esse ut potentia,” it gave rise to the hypercorrected “potentia esse ut potentia” (γ, AGLV). This reading (“being-in-potency qua potency”) in turn became “potentia ut potentia” (ι, N), further adjusted by W to a fit analogous to P, possibly by contamination, (“action is more known than potency, and potency is more known than essence; but essence or being is demonstrable of God”), and by Z into an argument that makes sense. One might question this reconstruction on two related grounds. First, “actu esse quam potentia esse” seems well attested. Since the minor is “being is demonstrated of God”, and being divides into being-in-actuality and being-in-potency, then the major would fit into the argument. On this reading, nobilius would also work, the difference being that, in the case of notius, the
THE EDITION
LXXXI
major would be arguing that being-in-actuality is more demonstrable of God, while, in the case of nobilius, the argument would turn on the implied premise that any demonstration of God’s existence would be in effect a demonstration of the most noble being. These interpretations, while plausible – indeed, plausible enough for the copyists –, lose track of the question: Francis’ preliminary arguments do not seek to show God’s existence in actuality, but rather his action ad extra. Therefore, the argument must consider God’s action rather than his actuality. Most likely, ω intended to have the text we have reconstructed, but equivocal, erroneous or illegible abbreviations hampered transmission. The plurification of variant readings reveal how successive copyists try to resolve the problems, and confirm in part the stemma we have proposed. Case 2. An even clearer error occurs in q. 10, a. 2 (n. 28). Francis argues that an angel moves not by the intellect or the will, but by a third, executive power. Against his view, he objects: Moreover, secondly, no power is of itself reflexive on itself, except only the intellect and the will; but that power by which an angel moves itself locally is of itself reflective on itself; therefore it cannot be different from the intellect and the will. (n. 24)
On our reconstruction, Francis responds, in part, to this objection: To the second argument, when it is said that ‘no power is reflexive, except the intellect and the will’, etc., I say that there are three genera of powers: for there is a certain power that is not of itself reflexive on itself, nor even on its act, such as any particular sense, for example sight, and even the common sense; for although one sensitive power is capable of apprehending the object and even the act of another, such as the common sense can apprehend the objects of particular exterior senses, as well as their acts, nevertheless it cannot apprehend its own act any more than the other particular senses can apprehend their own acts. Another power is of itself reflexive on itself and is essentially (per se) reflexive on its own act. Another power is the middle between these two, namely a power that is of itself reflexive on itself, but not on its act essentially (per se primo), but rather only accidentally and consequently, such as a motive power. (n. 27)
Francis lays out three types of power with respect to reflexivity: 1) powers that are not reflexive in any way (a sense can sense neither itself nor its action of sensation), 2) powers that are reflexive on both the object and the act (such as the intellect can have itself as an object, and can reflect on its own intellection), and 3) powers that are only reflexive on the object (an angel can move itself, but cannot move its action of moving). The textual problem arises as the majority of manuscript witnesses (AB CLNVYZ) omit 2) by homeoteleuton. FKP report the text, allowing us to postulate omissions in γ and ε (and contamination in the case of F). But GW
LXXXII
INTRODUCTION
also have the text, and indeed share a few variants in and around the omitted text: both omit ‘communis’ in the second mention of ‘sensus communis’ (l. 260); in the omitted text, both add ‘primo’ after ‘per se’ (l. 265); in the line following the omission, they both omit ‘videlicet.’ Perhaps the omissions were complex, and G or W change allegiance, or perhaps these manuscripts had access to another witness that they consulted in moments of difficulty. In any event, there is evidence here of a complex textual transmission involving some contamination between the branches of the stemma. Case 3. The third case occurs towards the end of question 29, and has already attracted the attention of scholars.155 Many manuscripts contain a large omissio per homeoteleuton (approximately fifteen lines) between the responses to the second and third arguments of the contrary opinion (nn. 18-19). AGLNWZ commit this omission, while F omits an even larger swath of text, and V a smaller amount. BCKPY report the text. The small omission witnessed by V is perhaps an initial error made by γ, which ζ compounds into the large omission witnessed by AGLNWZ, and into an even larger omission (eighteen lines) by F.156 Case 4. Finally, towards the end of the commentary on book II, BCY present a garbled text. In the middle of paragraph 4 of q. 47 (“...dictamine et iudicio”), BCY suddenly jump to q. 48, par. 2 (“puta voluntas...”). A reader of B noticed the error and wrote instructions in the margin on how to arrive at the proper text.157 K, which, as the stemma shows, often sides with BCY against the other manuscripts, here has the text in the correct order. Most likely, BCY’s common ancestor had the innermost two bifolios of a quire reversed in binding.
3. Retention of manuscripts From the fourteen manuscripts, we retained six. We retained manuscripts largely based on the results of soundings done by Etzkorn and Porter, and the reconstruction of the stemma. We sought to represent the manuscript tradition without burdening the apparatus criticus with variants and omissions whose erroneous nature was evident. Manuscripts F and T were not retained because they were incomplete witnesses. V, while relatively close to the original, presented so many omissions Schneider, Die Kosmologie, pp. 44-45; R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 56. 156 P does not seem to contaminate from DH in this case, since then one would expect P to follow DH in omitting the superfluous nunc from l. 143. 157 B, f. 81v: “Require inferius ubi est istud signum *”, and a corresponding mark on f. 84r. 155
THE EDITION
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and unshared variants that some have suspected it of being a different redaction.158 That left the remaining pool of witnesses to choose from: ABCGKLN PWZ. B and C, as discussed below, were retained because they presented few unshared nongrammatical variants and because of their importance both as witnesses to the other books of Francis’ commentary and as the source for contemporary discussions of Francis’ thought. To serve as a control on BC, allowing us to distinguish when family (β) as a whole (as opposed to merely subfamily BC) disagrees from family (α), we selected Y, a fourteenth-century manuscript with a moderate number of errors, over K, a rather corrupt fifteenth-century copy. For the witnesses to the other side of the stemma (α), P provides a clear text with relatively few mistakes, but with some hypercorrections. We retained it owing to its proximity to the original. For the others, we preferred L and N, with relatively few omissions and singular variants of questionable value, to G and W. A and Z, owing to their proximity to L and N, respectively, we deemed superfluous. Thus, the six manuscripts used throughout this edition of Reportatio IIA are: BCLNPY.
4. Characteristics of individual retained manuscripts In preparing the critical edition, the peculiar tendencies of particular manuscripts became apparent, and, alongside the stemma and the good sense of the argument, aided in the establishment of the text, and likewise should serve the critical reader in evaluating variants. MS. B Copied by Theodiricus de Almania for Nicolò Modrussiensis,159 this 1472 copy shows the scribe’s concern not only for reproducing the exemplar, but also for making it comprehensible. He does not shy away from adding words when they improve the sense or stylistic flow of the passage. B’s hypercorrective tendency becomes particularly notable in cases where its family (BCKY) suffers from an omissio per homeoteleuton, and B will supply words that usually correct the grammatical flow, sometimes the sense, but hardly ever the omission. For example, in q. 8, n. 11, BC’s ancestor omits “Ergo multo minus cum eo quod est ad se” by homeoteleuton. C carries the omission; while B emends the text, inserting “ergo nec”. Finally, B tends to expand abbrevia158 R. Friedman and C. Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s Commentary on the Sentences”, p. 56. 159 F. Lepori, “Ragione naturale e rivelazione in una disputa alla Scuola di Rialto: il «De mortalium foelicitate» di Nicolò Modrussiense”, Medioevo 13 (1987) (pp. 223301), p. 226, n. 8.
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INTRODUCTION
tions, but not always correctly, as in q. 12, n. 11, where the scribe expands the abbreviation for “contingentia” as “continua.” MS. C Dated to 1327, C witnesses a commentary of Francis of Marchia for each of the four books of the Sentences, the only major shortfall being a missing quire in book III, such that qq. 7 and 11 are only partially present, and the questions between them are no longer extant in the codex. While C is generally an excellent witness, each book is copied in a different hand, and the position of C needs to be evaluated separately for each book of the Sentences. For book II, the copy in C is very close to that in B (as noted above), only without B’s tendency to hypercorrect the text. MS. L Leipzig is a good witness to the text, relatively free of corruption and of hypercorrection. Its major weakness is technical: bound tightly, the text on the inner margins (that is, ra and vb columns) is not always legible, particularly on microfilm. Like the commentaries on the other books of the Sentences that both witness, for book II as well, L appears a direct ancestor of A. MS. N Like L, N is a good example of the family FGLNPVWZ. The scribe’s distinguishing characteristic is the occasional abbreviation of a masculine pronoun with the neuter form (quid for quis, aliud for alius, etc.). MS. P P is a late-fourteenth-century copy, obviously prepared by and for persons with knowledge and interest. The heavily-annotated manuscript also contains hypercorrective additions of words. When the scribe of P encounters a difficult passage, however, he does not hesitate to resort to contamination. Indeed, as noted earlier, P seems to turn to a copy of the DH redaction to resolve problems. This association in times of trouble has led previous studies to suggest that DH might be copies of an abbreviation that depended on an ancestor common with P.160 But, as already mentioned, DH’s occasional distortion of the articulation of arguments makes it unlikely that it is an abbreviation. Furthermore, the similarities between P’s departures from the IIA main readings, on the one hand, and the text of DH, on the other, suggest that P consults DH at specific moments. For example, as noted above, the copyist of P resolves the problem of the two principal arguments to q. 1 by copying the form of DH. He copies them, however, in the order of IIA, i.e., argument Friedman and Schabel, “Francis of Marchia’s commentary on the Sentences”, pp. 55-56. 160
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pro followed by contra, and reversed with respect to DH. Then, at the end of the question (n. 109), where in IIA the text announces the resolution of those principal questions (“Ad ista respondeo. Ad primum, quando arguitur”) and terminates abruptly, P suddenly produces word-for-word DH’s ending to the question (“Pro aliis vade ad primum in prologo”), even though DH’s instructions refer to the responses to objections to the fourth conclusion, which IIA (and P) contains. In spite of this contamination, we have retained P because it is for the most part a faithful witness to a text fairly close to the original. Nevertheless, readings that prefer P over the other witnesses may have little more authority than direct editorial interventions on the text. MS. Y Y was selected not just for its proximity to the original and its quality, but also to provide a textual means for distinguishing the entire family BCKY from the closely related pair BC. Y is an average witness, with few omissions and little hypercorrection. The trademark of Y’s scribe is the simplification of words and abbreviations, often to the point of producing ridiculous readings or a nonsensical ‘mumbled’ abbreviation, such as in q. 1, n. 44, where the scribe failed to read micalus any of the four times it is used, and as a result writes something similar, abbreviating it more each time until the last one resembles uls’.
5. Editorial method In preparing this critical edition, we have sought to serve different and at times divergent purposes. A critical edition should provide access to the text as the author conceived and composed it. At the same time, it needs to account for the text as contemporaries received and understood it. But an edition must also make the text comprehensible to contemporaries, and account for modern interpretations. In weighing these demands against available resources, the editorial team made its decisions with an eye towards the project’s primary goal: to contribute to the task of reconstructing and exploring medieval thought. We have no direct access to Francis of Marchia’s commentary on book II of the Sentences, neither (obviously) as he himself conceived it, nor even (as far as we can determine) as it came from his pen, or that of his secretary. The reconstruction of the stemma codicum shows that none of the manuscripts constitutes a privileged witness to the text, and a detailed treatment of all available witnesses reveal that each has its idiosyncrasies. Thus, to arrive at a text close to the original, we have adopted two guidelines. First, when presented with divergent readings, we favor those that most likely represent what the original had over those that are stylistically superior. Second, while we do reproduce in the text some obvious shortcomings that most copyists would
LXXXVI
INTRODUCTION
silently correct, we do not report total non-sense.161 Copyists will occasionally produce verbisimilar graphical marks that fall short of signifying any known or suspect word. They will do this either unwittingly through cognitive or mechanical error, or fully cognizant that they are ‘mumbling’ a word or abbreviation that they themselves do not understand in the exemplar. Such mumblings do not appear in the apparatus criticus unless we can resolve them into a word. On a different level, authors will occasionally mistake one word for another, or garble the syntax of a phrase, and their secretaries might do even worse when they failed to grasp the Master’s scholastic sophistication. While normally content to leave these cases as is, where we felt these shortcomings impeded the evident intention of the author, we intervened in the text, either explicitly indicating our changes (e.g., q. 1, n. 46, “et arguam sicut philosophus”, where “sicut prius” was almost certainly what was meant), or following a corrective reading of one of the copyists. Naturally, for problematic passages we consulted all manuscript witnesses, including those not retained for the edition. Clearly, the apparatus criticus offers the reader the possibility of evaluating our reconstruction of the text. At the same time, we have assembled it in such a way that it presents the major forms under which Francis’ contemporaries had access to the text. Indeed, our selection of manuscripts was primarily informed by the need to represent adequately the range of readings that exist in the manuscript tradition. For the same reason, we include in the apparatus obvious errors, provided they resemble Latin words. We have made an effort to produce the text in as accessible a form as possible. In addition to the obvious matter of our insertions of subsection headings, we have adopted a classicizing orthography. Every manuscript witness has significant faults that impedes it from serving as a base text, and the range of spellings used in each only imperfectly maps against that range we presume Francis would use, if we had an autograph available. Therefore, we decided against fabricating an orthography based around what we suspect the author employed, and preferred an orthography that, while itself a fiction, has the advantage of being familiar to a greater number of modern readers.162 For similar reasons, but less controversially, we do not indicate in the apparatus orthographical variants, or extremely minor differences (chiefly ‘ergo’ and ‘igitur’). We sought to apply divisions and titles to the text sparingly, and, as far as possible, to base the titles on Francis’ text. They are descriptive rather than interpretative; so, for example, opinions are presented as anonymous (e.g., “alia opinio”) unless Francis explicitly associates it with an author in the text. 161 Cf. J. Hamesse, “Les problèmes posés par l’edition critique des reportations”, Franciscan Studies 46 (1986), pp. 107-117. 162 For the debate on orthography in the editing of medieval philosophical texts, see the defense of the medievalizing approach in A. Oliva, Les débuts de l’enseignement, pp. 289-298, and the literature cited there.
THE EDITION
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This edition is primarily based upon microfilm images of the manuscript. Some details, such as deletions made in red ink, and marginal corrections and changes, may not be visible on the microfilm, and may go unreported. For the same reason, we do not usually indicate whether an inserted word or a correction was made in the same hand or a different one. For greatest clarity, we simplified the indication of variants, eliminating those that can admit of equivocity. For example, when a witness displaces a word by two or more words, the apparatus criticus indicates the variant by listing all the words in order, and avoids the use of scripsit post and ante. Likewise, whenever possible, addidit is preferred to praemisit. This pragmatism extends to the apparatus fontium. Francis’ commentary belongs to the context of a contemporary debate. Most positions that he considers ultimately have their scholastic roots in a handful of university thinkers who shaped the discussion, but many he is most likely considering by way of intermediaries. Unfortunately, texts do not survive for all of these intermediaries, and, in the cases where texts do survive, they rarely exist in a modern edition. Hence, the references to Marchia’s interlocutors in the apparatus fontium should be understood as indicating the point of departure for the opinion, and not as excluding intervening interpretations. For reasons of economy, we have suppressed apparatus notes for Francis’ internal references when they refer to an argument immediately preceding (by a distance of one or two paragraphs).
IX. Editorial Conventions 1. Symbols used in the text | <…> […]
Column break Editorial insertion of word(s) Editorial expunction of word(s)
2. Symbols used in the apparatus criticus ] ? !
lemma separator variant is uncertain in MS variant is certain in MS, albeit absurd
3. Abbreviations used in the apparatus criticus a. m. add. corr. del. exp. illeg. inv. iter. leg. lec. dub. mg. praem. mut. om. om. (hom.) spat. vac. sub lin. sup. lin.
alia manu addidit correxit delevit expunxit illegibilis invertit iteravit lege lectio dubia in margine praemisit mutavit omisit omisit per homoeoteleuton spatium vacuum sub linea super lineam
transp.
transpositio, transpositionis
4. Abbreviations used in the apparatus fontium and the bibliographies AL CCSL CSEL
Aristoteles Latinus Corpus Christianorum, series latina Corpus Scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS
5. Sigla of the manuscripts B = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Barb. lat. 791 C = Città del Vaticano, BAV, Chigi. lat. B VII 113 L = Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 532 N = Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII. C. 23 P = Praha, Metropolitni Kapituly, 531 (C 99) Y = Paris, BnF, lat. 3072
LXXXIX
REPORTATIO IIA, qq. 1-12
B 1ra C 105ra L 142ra N 131ra P 2ra Y 92ra
Circa principium secundi libri, quaero utrum creatio sit demonstrabilis de Deo. 1. Videtur quod sic, quia notior est actio quam esse vel potentia; 5 sed esse est demonstrabile de Deo; ergo creatio-actio. 2. Contra: creatio-passio non est demonstrabilis de creatura, ergo nec creatio-actio est demonstrabilis de Deo. 3. Circa quaestionem istam sic est procedendum. Primo est hic videndum quid est creatio-actio vel etiam creatio-passio. Secundo, 10 utrum creatio-actio sit demonstrabilis de Deo. 4. Quantum ad primum, dico quod, licet inferius inferat simpliciter superius, non tamen universaliter; licet enim sequatur: ‘si est homo, est animal’, non tamen ‘omnis homo’ infert ‘omne animal’. Sed 15 isto modo, puta universaliter, superius infert inferius, sicut ‘omne animal’ infert ‘omnem hominem’. Et sicut est de inferiori et superiori, ita dico de productione utriusque, videlicet quod productio inferioris infert simpliciter productionem superioris, non tamen universaliter. Sequitur enim: ‘Sortes est productus simpliciter, ergo animal’, non 20 tamen sequitur universaliter: ‘ergo omne animal’.
1,3 libri] sententiarum add. N | quaero] primo add. LN 5 Videtur] et praem. NY notior…potentia] actio est notior quam (passio add. sed exp. B) potentia et potentia quam essentia BC nobilior est actu esse (N: inv.) quam potentia esse (N: om.) ut potentia LN actio est notior quam potentia potentia quam essentia P notior est actio quam esse nec potentia Y 6 esse…demonstrabile] essentia est demonstrabilis BC esse demonstrabile est Y | esse…Deo] esse est de deo demonstrabile L esse demonstrant philosophi de deo nam demonstrant deum esse P | Deo…7 de] om. (hom.) BC 7 Contra] passio add. sed exp. Y creatio] actio add. sed exp. P | creatura] creatio sed corr. Y 8 nec] om. BC | creatio] est add. sed exp. C | est demonstrabilis] om. P | Deo] quare add. N 9 Circa] hanc add. P quaestionem istam] inv. N | istam] illam C om. P | est procedendum] inv. P | est2…10 est] enim videndum est quid sit P 10 vel etiam] et quid est N et quid P 11 sit] om. B 13 simpliciter] suum add. N | simpliciter superius] inv. P 14 non tamen] inv. P 16 isto] illo C 17 inferiori…superiori] inv. P 18 productio] praedicatio LNY 19 productionem] praedicationem LN praedicative Y 21 universaliter] om. B | ergo] om. B | animal] non add. N
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
5. Ad propositum, dico quod creatio est productio totalis rei secundum omnia principia sua intrinseca, tam singularia quam universalia, potentialia et accidentalia, differenter tamen. Est enim productio totalis rei secundum eius omnia principia singularia, non autem secundum omnia eius principia universalia universaliter. Licet enim sit productio totalis secundum eius principia universalia simpliciter, non tamen est productio totalis rei secundum omnia eius principia universalia universaliter. Principia enim ipsius individui – et ipsum individuum – habent aliquam unitatem extra intellectum cum alio individuo eiusdem speciei. 6. Hoc autem probatur tripliciter. Primo sic: unitas realis non removetur ab aliquibus nisi propter aliquam diversitatem oppositam ei vel sibi oppositam includentem; unum enim oppositorum non removetur nisi propter aliud oppositum vel aliquid ipsum includens. Sed humanitas in Sorte est una realiter et similiter in Platone. Ergo, quod non sit in utroque istorum una realiter, hoc non est nisi propter aliquam diversitatem quae est inter ista duo oppositam huiusmodi unitati reali. Sed inter ista duo non est nisi diversitas numeralis, quae non opponitur | unitati specificae. Ergo per istam non magis removetur unitas realis specifica a duobus quam ab unico solo tantum.
23 secundum] simplex sed corr. mg. Y | intrinseca] mg. P om. L | tam] universalia quam add. sed del. P 24 potentialia et] tam potentia quam LN | enim] creatio add. N 25 secundum1] corr. mg. Y | secundum eius] quantum ad N | autem] tamen N eius add. P 26 omnia eius] inv. PY omnia N 27 totalis] rei add. LN | universalia] etiam add. N simpliciter] et ipsum individuum add. BC ipsius individui add. N 28 tamen] mg. P totalis rei] inv. N | omnia eius] inv. P | universalia…29 ipsius] universaliter non tamen principia alicuius N 29 et…individuum] om. BCN 30 unitatem] varietatem BC 32 autem] om. P | probatur tripliciter] inv. N probatur P | unitas] veritas B 33 aliquibus] aliquo Y | propter] per BC 34 vel] aut Y | oppositam] vel oppositam add. N 35 aliquid] aliquod LN | includens] corr. sup. lin. ex impediens B 37 hoc] om. LN | propter] per sed corr. mg. P 38 duo] dua P | oppositam] opposita BC | oppositam…39 duo] om. (hom.) N | huiusmodi] huic L 39 nisi] om. NP | numeralis] universalis B | non2] sup. lin. P 40 per] propter P illam vel per add. N 41 duobus] individuis add. N | unico] uno N tantum] quare add. N
1,32 Hoc…tripliciter] Cf. infra q. 15, art. 2.
P 2rb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
B 1rb
L 142rb
N 131rb
3
7. Ad istam rationem respondetur primo sic. Dicitur enim quod unitas specifica est duplex: quaedam realis, et tali unitate natura specifica est una in quolibet individuo per se sumpto; et ista non removetur propter aliquam diversitatem. Et alia est unitas communis et universalis, et tali unitate natura specifica | est una in pluribus individuis; et ista unitas non removetur realiter ab aliquo individuo per se sumpto – nec prima a duobus individuis per se sumptis, quia numquam fuit in eis. 8. Contra: unitas quae est in quolibet individuo | est realis. Quaero ergo tunc quare non est realis, sed tantum rationis, unitas quae est in duobus individuis. Unde arguo sic: unitas de se realis non removetur a duobus plus quam ab uno nisi propter aliquam diversitatem illorum duorum, quae quidem non est in uno solo; sed unitas specifica est de se realis, saltem in uno individuo; ergo quod non sit realis in duobus, hoc non est nisi propter aliquam diversitatem istorum. Sed inter ista non est aliqua diversitas opposita unitati specificae, cum solam habeant diversitatem numeralem; ergo etc. 9. Secundo arguebatur sic: | diversitas realis non removetur ab aliquibus nisi propter aliquam unitatem oppositam vel includentem oppositam; sed diversitas specifica est realis, et ista removetur a duobus individuis eiusdem speciei; ergo hoc est propter unitatem aliquam oppositam isti diversitati. Sed inter duo individua eiusdem speciei non est aliqua unitas praeter unitatem specificam; ergo etc.
42 istam] om. Y | primo] om. NP 44 removetur] retinetur sed corr. mg. Y per add. sed del. P 45 Et] om. P | communis…46 et1] rationis et realiter sine BC | et universalis] et realis L om. P 46 una…individuis] in pluribus individuis una N 47 ista] prima add. sed del. P | realiter] om. P 48 nec] natura B natura sed corr. C 50 Contra] secunda B | realis] realiter BC 51 ergo] sic C | non…52 individuis] unitas quae est in duobus individuis non est realis sed tantum rationis P | est1] sup. lin. Y 52 arguo] arguitur N | de…realis] realis de se sed corr. cum signis transp. P 53 aliquam] mg. P 54 quae] qui Y 55 est…se] de se est P 57 ista] illa duo N 60 propter aliquam] inv. L propter N 61 ista] illa N 62 eiusdem speciei] om. P | unitatem aliquam] inv. P | aliquam] istam sed corr. mg. Y 63 oppositam] vel includentem oppositam add. N | isti] illi P
42 Ad…respondetur] IOANNES DUNS SCOTUS, Ordinatio II, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1 (ed. Vaticana, v. 7, pp. 402-410). 59 Secundo…sic] Cf. infra q. 15, art. 2.
45
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
10. Ad istam rationem respondetur quod diversitas potest removeri ab aliquibus non tantum propter unitatem diversitati oppositam, | sed etiam propter unitatem disparatam. 11. Contra, reduco sic rationem: diversitas aliqua non removetur ab aliquibus nisi propter unitatem oppositam vel saltem propter unitatem aliquam disparatam; sed inter individua eiusdem speciei non est unitas opposita diversitati specificae, nec etiam disparata, quia non est inter ipsa nisi diversitas numeralis, quae non repugnat unitati specificae nec diversitati; ergo etc. 12. Tertio arguebatur ad idem sic: maior diversitas | removet aliquam unitatem quam non potest removere minor diversitas; quod patet, quoniam imperfectius non potest in effectum causae perfectioris. Sed diversitas specifica est maior diversitate numerali. Ergo ipsa adveniens diversitati | numerali tollit aliquam unitatem realem quam non tollit ipsa diversitas numeralis, alias non esset maior ea. Sed diversitas numeralis removet unitatem numeralem. Ergo, praeter istam, removet aliquam unitatem realem ipsa diversitas specifica; sed non removet nisi unitatem specificam; ergo etc. 13. Ad istam rationem respondetur quod non valet, quoniam diversitas specifica, quae est maior, et diversitas numeralis, quae est minor, sunt alterius rationis, et ideo gradus unius diversitatis potest removere gradum alterius diversitatis. 14. Contra: quia, ut dictum est, causa imperfectior sine perfectiore non potest in effectum causae perfectioris; sed minor diversitas est 65 istam rationem] ista N | diversitas] deitas sed corr. mg. Y 66 non] om. B | tantum] tamen Y | propter] diversitatem add. L | diversitati] om. BC 67 etiam] om. CP | propter] virtutem add. sed del. P 69 aliquibus] quibus B | unitatem2] oppositorum vel saltem propter unitatem add. C 70 aliquam disparatam] inv. BCP | inter] duo add. N 71 diversitati] unitati C | unitas2] diversitas codd. | unitas etiam] inv. N 73 nec…etc] ergo nec diversitati quare N 74 arguebatur…sic] ad idem sic L arguebatur sic ad idem N ad idem arguebatur sic P | diversitas] re add. P 75 quod] om. N 76 quoniam] quia P 77 maior] om. C 79 tollit] aliqua add. sed del. Y | ipsa diversitas] inv. Y | alias] aliter L 80 unitatem numeralem] diversitatem N | praeter] mg. P illam vel add. N 81 diversitas] deitas sed corr. mg. Y 83 quoniam] quia LP 86 diversitatis] rationis N 87 quia] mg. P om. L | perfectiore] imperfectiore B perfectiori P 88 potest] per se add. P 74 Tertio…sic] Cf. infra q. 15, art. 2.
C 105rb
P 2va
Y 92rb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
5
imperfectior in genere diversitatis; ergo non potest per se in effectum maioris diversitatis. Sed effectus maioris diversitatis est removere 90 unitatem maiori diversitati oppositam; ergo hoc non potest facere minor diversitas. Ergo stat ratio. 15. Praeterea, haec videtur esse intentio Philosophi dicentis quod, L 142va | sicut se | habet oratio ad rem, | sic partes definitionis sive orationis ad B 1va partes rei. Sed partes orationis sunt genus et differentia; ergo, sicut 95 definitio habet partes, ita et res definibilis habet partes definitionis partibus correspondentes. Ergo animal divisum in speciebus per differentias habet aliquam unitatem realem extra intellectum minorem unitate numerali et etiam specifica; ergo etc.
100
16. Sed contra istam conclusionem arguitur primo sic. Accipio asinum vel aliam rem quamcumque heri productam et asinum hodie creatum, et arguo tunc sic: omnis realitas istius asini creati hodie fuit heri simpliciter nihil; sed tota realitas alterius asini creati heri fuit heri 105 simpliciter; ergo istius asini ad illum non est aliqua unitas realis. 17. Praeterea, Damascenus, IV Sententiarum, ponens differentiam inter divina et creata, dicit quod in creaturis communitas consistit sive consideratur sola ratione et intellectu, diversitas autem re. In Deo 89 diversitatis] maiori diversitate add. N | ergo…90 diversitatis1] om. (hom.) Y 91 hoc…potest] non potest hoc N 92 Ergo] et sic P 93 Praeterea] prima C | haec] hoc C | esse] mg. P 94 oratio] vel definitio add. N | sic] ita P | definitionis…orationis] definitionis orationis L orationis sive partes definitionis N inv. mg. P 95 partes1] partem Y 96 ita] sic P | definitionis partibus] inv. P 97 partibus] om. N | divisum] iter. sed del. P | speciebus] species N 98 intellectum] obiecto add. mg. Y 99 et] om. P 101 conclusionem] rationem P | primo] om. L 102 aliam] aliquam Y | quamcumque] om. N | heri productam] haberi productam C productam haberi Y | hodie] homine C 103 creatum] causatum BC | et…sic] et arguo tunc si BC et tunc arguo sic L tunc arguo sic N arguo tunc sic P | creati] causati B 104 alterius] istius Y | creati] causati B creati…fuit] creati ad minus fuit N fuit antea minus P creati minus est haberi Y 105 simpliciter] aliquid add. BC nihil add. sed del. N 108 sive] vel P | consideratur] in add. P | et] vel L | autem] in add. P 93 Philosophi] ARISTOTELES, Metaphysica VII, cap. 10 (AL XXV-3, p. 148; 1034b21-22): “Ut autem ratio ad rem et pars rationis ad partem rei similiter se habet”. 106 Damascenus] IOANNES DAMASCENUS, De fide orthodoxa I, cap. 8, nn. 16-17 (ed. BUYTAERT, pp. 42-43) summatim.
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
autem, e converso, | communitas re consideratur, differentia autem seu
P 2vb
110 distinctio sola ratione. Ergo natura specifica, communis in divinis, in
creaturis non habet [in eis] aliquam unitatem nisi tantum secundum rationem. 18. Praeterea, Commentator, I De anima commento 8, dicit quod intellectus est qui facit universalitatem in rebus. 115 19. Praeterea, etiam IV Metaphysicae et etiam XII, dicit quod universalia colliguntur ab intellectu; ergo etc.
20. Ad ista per ordinem. Ad rationem primo, quando dicitur ‘omnis realitas’, etc., dico quod hic arguitur in quattuor terminis, et 120 ratio peccat per fallaciam aequivocationis et secundum quid et simpliciter. Detur enim maior et minor, puta quod ‘omnis realitas istius asini fuit simpliciter heri nihil’ et quod ‘omnis realitas alterius fuit ante, videlicet heri’. Sed ex hoc non | sequitur conclusio quae infertur, videlicet: ‘ergo istius asini ad illum non est aliqua realis unitas nec eis 125 aliqua communis entitas’; sed sequitur: ‘ergo istius ad illum nulla fuit heri realis unitas sive communis entitas’. Non-entis enim ad ens sive entis ad non-ens non potest esse aliqua unitas realis. Et ideo, sicut non 109 autem1] est add. P | communitas] quidditas N | re] rei P in re Y | consideratur] considerata sed corr. N | seu] sive LY vel P 110 divinis in] om. (hom.) L 111 secundum] corr. Y 115 etiam1] om. P | etiam2] commentator P | XII] 2 BY a C metaphysicae add. P 116 ergo] om. N 118 Ad2…primo] et primo ad rationem P | primo] primam N 119 dico] dicitur Y | arguitur] 4 add. sed exp. Y 120 ratio] ideo N | et1…121 realitas] om. BC | et2] om. Y 121 quod] quia Y | asini] creati hodie add. mg. P asini…125 entitas] mg. Y 122 et] etiam L vel etiam N | realitas] alicuius add. sed del. Y alterius] om. N | ante] aliquid BC 123 videlicet] ut L om. C | ex] om. C 124 videlicet ergo] sic C | ergo istius] inv. N 125 istius] animalis Y 126 ens…127 ad] om. (hom.) L sive2…127 realis] vel econverso non habet realem unitatem P 113 Commentator] AVERROES, De anima I, comm. 8 (ed. CRAWFORD, p. 12): “Intellectus est qui agit in eis universalitatem”; Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. HAMESSE, p. 176, n. 27): “Intellectus agens causat universalitatem in rebus”. 115 IV Metaphysicae] AVERROES, Metaphysica IV, comm. 7 (ed. Iuntina, ff. 72v-73r); Auctoritates Aristotelis (ed. HAMESSE, p. 138, n. 280): “Apud Aristotelem ipsa universalia sunt collecta a particularibus ab intellectu qui concipit inter ea simultudinem et facit ex eis unam intentionem”. || XII] AVERROES, Metaphysica XII, comm. 4 (ed. Iuntina, f. 292rbD). 118 Ad rationem] Cf. supra n. 16.
N 131va
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L 142vb
B 1vb
P 3ra
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sequitur: ‘hic asinus non coexistebat heri alteri asino, ergo non coexistit sibi modo’, ita non sequitur: ‘huius asini ad illum nulla fuit heri unitas realis, ergo nec modo’.| 21. Secundo potest dici aliter. Potest enim concedi quod istius ad illum nulla fuit heri, nec etiam est hodie, unitas realis simpliciter. Sed ex hoc non sequitur: ‘nulla est inter ista unitas simpliciter, ergo nulla est inter ista unitas realis’, quoniam non omnis unitas realis est unitas simpliciter, sed tantum numeralis. Specifica autem, licet sit realis, est tamen unitas secundum quid realis, sicut Aethiops est albus realiter, non tamen simpliciter.| Et ita, licet inter Sortem et Platonem sit aliqua unitas realis secundum quid, nulla tamen est unitas realis simpliciter inter eos. 22. Tertio etiam potest dici aliter. Quando enim dicitur: ‘nulla realitas huius asini fuit heri simpliciter nihil’, verum est secundum numerum. Concedo etiam quod natura specifica eius non fuit universaliter nihil. Sed ista non est contra istam: ‘natura specifica asini hodie creati fuit heri simpliciter nihil’, quia contradictoria dicta de termino communi sine distributione non | sunt contradictoria, sicut ‘homo est albus’ et ‘homo non est albus’ non sunt contradictoria, sed ‘omnis homo est albus’ et ‘quidam homo non est albus’. Et ideo ista: | ‘homo est simpliciter aliquid’ et ‘homo est simpliciter nihil’ non sunt contradictoria, sed ista: ‘omnis homo est simpliciter aliquid’ vel ‘homo est 128 coexistit] existit N 129 modo] et add. LN | illum] corr. mg. Y | nulla] natura BC heri…130 realis] unitas realis heri N 130 unitas] voluntas sed corr. Y 132 nulla] non P unitas] voluntas sed corr. Y 133 ista] vel illa add. N | unitas] realis add. N 134 inter ista] inter illa L om. P | quoniam] quia L 135 autem] om. P 136 unitas…quid] secundum quid unitas sed corr. cum signis transp. P | albus realiter] inv. C 137 aliqua] ista L 138 realis1…quid] secundum quid realis BC secundum quid realis in corr. cum signis transp. P | unitas2…139 eos] inter eos unitas realis simpliciter N | realis2] om. PY 140 etiam] enim Y | dici aliter] inv. N | nulla] naturalis C omnis P 141 realitas] voluntas add. P | verum] medium sed corr. mg. Y 142 etiam] cum hoc add. N 143 istam] ista Y om. N | specifica asini] inv. BCY 144 creati] causati BC | termino] natura L 145 est] homo add. sed del. P 146 et] om. N | non1] sup. lin. N | sed] ista add. N 147 et] om. N 148 aliquid] om. Y | aliquid…nihil] nihil et ista homo est simpliciter aliquid N 149 omnis] mg. P | aliquid] et add. sed del. P | homo2] non add. N 141 asini] Cf. supra, n. 16, ubi legitur: ‘omnis realitas istius asini creati hodie fuit heri simpliciter nihil’.
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
150 universaliter aliquid’ et ‘quidam homo est simpliciter nihil’. Concedo |
155
160
165
170
ergo quod nulla entitas numeralis huius asini fuit heri simpliciter nihil, nec etiam natura eius specifica fuit universaliter heri nihil, et quod omnis entitas numeralis alterius, puta creati hodie, fuit heri simpliciter nihil, et etiam quod natura eius specifica, licet non universaliter, particulariter tamen heri fuit nihil ante productionem istius. Sed ex hoc nihil sequitur contra dicta. 23. Ad Damascenum, dico quod illa auctoritas est ad oppositum. Ibidem enim dicit Damascenus quod in divinis unitas est in re et divisio ratione, in creaturis autem communitas est sola ratione. Unde dico quod eo modo Damascenus negat unitatem realem a creaturis quo negat distinctionem realem a personis divinis. Sed ipse, cum dicit quod personae divinae sunt unum re et differunt ratione, non intendit negare a personis divinis distinctionem realem, sed solam distinctionem vel divisionem separationis. Cum enim sit duplex divisio, videlicet distinctionis et separationis – qua aliqua sic sunt inter se distincta et separata quod unum non est in alio –, loquendo de divisione distinctionis divinae personae, non ratione, immo realiter sunt distinctae; non autem loquendo de distinctione separationis, quia una est in alia, quod probat Damascenus per illud verbum Christi: Ego in Patre et Pater in me est. Sicut est duplex divisio sive distinctio, ita est duplex indivisio;
150 universaliter] simpliciter C 151 nulla] om. L | huius…fuit] fuit huius asini P fuit huius Y 152 etiam] om. P | heri] simpliciter add. P 153 entitas] entis sed corr. P | creati hodie] inv. LN 154 nihil] om. N | quod] quia N | licet…universaliter] fuit (sed exp.) nihil non L 155 heri] om. B | heri fuit] inv. P | nihil] propter add. sed del. Y | istius] ipsius Y 156 nihil…dicta] non sequitur contradictio P 158 enim] tamen N cum Y | divinis] dictis Y | in2…159 ratione1] in re et differentia ratione BC in re divisio vel distinctio ratione N realis P 159 sola] soli Y 160 Damascenus negat] inv. P | unitatem] realiter add. sed exp. Y 161 distinctionem] differentiam L | a] et Y | ipse…dicit] ipse dicit L ipsemet contradicit vel dicit N tamen cum dicit ipse P 162 et differunt] differunt tamen N 163 personis divinis] inv. CLY 164 sit…divisio] om. L | videlicet] scilicet P 165 qua] quam N | inter…distincta] distincta inter se P 166 quod] quia sed corr. sup. lin. Y | non] om. Y | divisione distinctionis] inv. Y 167 immo] ut BC | realiter…distinctae] numero sunt distinctae realiter L 168 distinctione] divisione Y 170 est1] et add. BP | est duplex1] inv. B | divisio…distinctio] inv. N | sive…171 indivisio] om. (hom.) L | indivisio] indistinctio sive divisio N 157 Ad Damascenum] Cf. supra n. 17. 169 Damascenus] IOANNES DAMASCENUS, De fide orthodoxa, cap. 8 n. 17 (ed. BUYTAERT, p. 44). || Ego…170 est1] Ioan. 14, 11.
Y 92va
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
L 143ra P 3rb
N 131vb
9
est enim quaedam indivisio opposita divisioni distinctionis, et alia opposita divisioni separationis – et istam Damascenus negat de Deo secundum rem; ergo etiam divisionem separationis tantum concedit sive affirmat in creaturis. Et hoc est quod ipse probat ibi per hoc, quia quae distinguuntur realiter in creaturis separantur loco et subiecto, cuius oppositum est in divinis. Ex quo patet quod medium Damasceni ad probandum unitatem divinarum personarum esse realem, distinctionem autem esse rationis, est indivisio separationis ipsarum. Et per oppositum, medium ad probandum distinctionem creaturarum esse realem est divisio separationis, non distinctionis; | quare etc. 24. Ad Commentatorem, dico quod unitas | naturae specificae sive cuiuscumque universalis est duplex: quaedam qua intelligitur universale ut | abstractum et actualiter unum, et alia qua intelligitur abstrahibile. 25. Vel potest dici quod unitas communitatis consideratur in creaturis sola ratione, eo modo quo unitas consideratur re in Deo, et sic intendit dicere, et non aliter, Damascenus. Unitas autem quae consideratur in Deo secundum rem est unitas numeralis plurificabilis sine divisione sui. Et talis unitas communis solum consideratur ratione in creaturis, quia, licet albedo sit una realiter in suis inferioribus, tamen est realiter divisa et plurificata in eis, et ideo non est una numero in eis realiter. Sed intellectus abstrahens unitatem specificam ab omni diversitate numerali considerat eam actu ut unam numero, et ideo uno actu concipit ipsam. Et ideo alium modum unitatis habet extra intellectum et alium apud intellectum, quoniam extra intellectum 172 opposita] om. N | Damascenus negat] inv. B | de Deo] dicendo BC respondendo P 173 secundum rem] inv. N | ergo] om. L | tantum] et tamen L 174 affirmat] confirmat P ibi] illa P 175 realiter…creaturis] in creaturis realiter P 176 quo] quod N 177 divinarum] om. BC | divinarum personarum] inv. NP 178 ipsarum] om. N 180 non distinctionis] om. B 181 Ad…184 abstrahibile] om. BC | Commentatorem] secundo de anima commento 8 add. N primo de anima add. P 8 Physicorum add. Y | unitas] uni Y 182 qua intelligitur] intellectus intelligit P qua intelligit Y 183 ut] iter. N | et1] etiam add. Y | intelligitur] intelligit Y 184 abstrahibile] ar(!) P om. L 185 communitatis] realis Y 187 intendit] intelligit B | et…Damascenus] Damascenus et non aliter P 188 Deo] eo L plurificabilis] implurificabilis LPY et plurificabilis N 192 ab] ad B 194 uno] unico NP ipsam] eam Y | habet…195 intellectum1] om. Y 195 alium] aliam N 181 Ad Commentatorem] Cf. supra n. 18.
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
est una | realiter, sed divisa; apud autem intellectum est una numero indivisa et uno actu concepta. Et de ista unitate dicit Commentator, I De anima commento 8, quod intellectus est qui agit vel facit universalitatem in rebus, et non de prima unitate, quae videlicet | est universa200 lis in potentia. Et de ista etiam intendit loqui Damascenus, quando dicit quod unitas communitatis in creaturis sola ratione consideratur. 26. Ad Commentatorem, I De anima et XII Metaphysicae, patet per idem. Dico enim quod eo modo ipse negat universalia esse extra animam quomodo Plato ponebat ipsa esse extra, sicut patet in eisdem 205 commentis allegatis. Unde sicut Plato ponebat universale separatum ab inferioribus secundum rem, isto modo negat Philosophus et Commentator universale separatum extra animam; sic enim, ut separatum, habet esse praecise in intellectu. Et ideo apud intellectum universale habet modum unitatis numeralis, quia sicut unum numero est indivi210 sum, ita universale apud intellectum est indivisum; et ideo istud est universale in actu. In rebus autem extra non habet esse separatum, et tale non negat, quia est unum in potentia, id est admixtum cum divisione. Et quod ista sit intentio sua patet III De anima commento 18: “Et omnia dicta ab Aristotele in hoc sunt quod universalia nullum esse
196 autem intellectum] inv. NP 197 ista] illa LN 198 commento 8] om. P | agit vel] agit et L om. P | universalitatem] utilitatem B 199 et] om. L | videlicet] om. P 200 ista] illa N | intendit loqui] intelligit BC 201 in…ratione] sola ratione in creaturis P 202 I] II PY XII] 11 BC 2 Y 203 Dico] dicit BC | eo] secundo BC | ipse] sup. lin. Y | esse…204 animam] extra animam esse Y 204 quomodo] quo P om. BC | esse] om. P | extra] animam add. N 205 commentis] locis L | sicut] dicit LY om. N | ponebat] posuit P om. BCY 206 ab inferioribus] a ferioribus(!) B a singularibus LN a sensibus Y | rem] ita add. B 207 separatum1] separari P | ut] utrumque P 208 habet esse] est L | esse praecise] inv. P | universale habet] inv. sed corr. C 209 modum] mera B mere C | numero] om. L 210 ita] sic L | universale…est1] et universale est apud intellectum N 211 non] vero BC spat. vac. P 212 id est] et N | admixtum] admixtio BC | cum divisione] conditione L 213 patet…anima] III de anima patet Y | commento 18] lec. dub. B | 18] om. B 214 Et] ideo add. N | ab Aristotele] ad Aristotelem B | in hoc] om. L | sunt] stant N | quod] vera B vera quod C quia L | universalia…215 habent] nullum esse habent universalia L
197 Commentator] Cf. supra n. 18. 202 Ad Commentatorem] Cf. supra nn. 18-19. De anima] AVERROES, De anima III, comm. 18 (ed. CRAWFORD, p. 440).
213
B 2ra
C 105vb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
Y 92vb P 3va
11
habent extra animam, | quod quidem intendit Plato”, quoniam, si ita 215 esset, non indigeret ponere intellectum | agentem.
L 143rb
27. Quantum ad secundum, quidam dicit quod forma syllogistica non tenet in divinis. Alius dicit quod forma syllogistica tenet in divinis, sed tamen non in terminis modificatis. Alius dicit quod forma 220 syllogistica non tenet in terminis singularibus. Omnes tres concordant in hoc: quod termini singulares non indigent modificatione ad hoc ut formetur debite syllogismus ex eis. 28. Et ideo in isto articulo pono quattuor conclusiones. Prima est quod forma syllogistica tenet in divinis; immo nec etiam tenet summe 225 | in aliis. Secunda est quod forma syllogistica tenet in terminis modificatis, nec tenet perfecte in aliis. Tertia est quod forma syllogistica tenet in terminis singularibus. Quarta est quod forma syllogistica non tenet nisi cum aliqua modificatione apposita in praemissis.
230
29. Primam conclusionem probo sic: omnis syllogismus tenens gratia formae tenet in omni materia; quicumque enim syllogismus non tenet in omni materia, sed tantum in aliqua, non tenet gratia formae, sed gratia materiae. Sed syllogismus qui non tenet in divinis non tenet in omni materia, salvata debita forma syllogistica, cum syllogismus 235 possit formari secundum eius formam debitam in divinis. Ergo nec syllogismus tenet gratia formae, sed gratia materiae. 215 animam] spat. vac. Y 216 indigeret] oporteret N potest add. sed exp. B | agentem] et gentem Y 218 Quantum] autem add. C | secundum] articulum add. N 220 modificatis] mediantis add. sed exp. N 221 terminis] syllogisticis add. sed. exp. Y 223 debite] om. Y 224 Prima] conclusio add. N 225 immo] ergo C | immo…etiam] primo quod non Y 226 Secunda] conclusio add. NP | est] om. BCL | syllogistica] exp. B | modificatis] mediantis Y 227 est] om. L 228 in] om. Y | Quarta] quartum Y conclusio add. N 229 apposita] posita N 231 conclusionem probo] probo primo P 232 omni] sup. lin. Y non] eam add. Y 233 in omni] sup. lin. Y | materia] materiae Y salvata forma syllogistica add. P 234 in] sup. lin. Y | divinis…235 in] om. (hom.) N 236 eius formam] inv. L nec] nullus P 237 formae] om. L 218 quidam] Hae opiniones esse sociorum Francisci putantur.
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
30. Secundo arguo sic: in quacumque materia tenet primum principium, in eadem tenet forma syllogistica; sed in divinis tenet primum principium; ergo etc. Probatio maioris: quia principium non est principium nisi respectu principiati; ergo, cum primum principium sit principium, erit principium respectu alicuius conclusionis; maior enim propositio non est principium respectu minoris, sed respectu conclusionis. Sed nullum principium potest applicari ad conclusionem nisi mediante forma syllogistica. Ergo, ubi | non tenet forma syllogistica, nec primum principium; ergo etc. 31. Probo minorem, puta quod primum principium teneat in divinis, quia in quacumque materia non tenet aliquod principium, in ea potest stare eius oppositum. Ergo, si in divinis non teneret primum | principium, ibi posset stare eius oppositum. Hoc autem est falsum, quia tunc in divinis contradictoria essent vera; ergo etc. 32. Praeterea tertio sic: si forma syllogistica non tenet in divinis, aut hoc est propter illimitationem terminorum aut propter singularitatem. Non propter primum, quia tunc eadem ratione non teneret forma primi principii in divinis; maior enim est connexio praedicati primi principii ad eius subiectum quam conclusionis ad ipsum principium; si ergo, propter illimitationem terminorum, conclusio non sequitur ex praemissis secundum formam syllogisticam debite ordinatis in divinis, | nec conclusio habet connexionem necessariam ad praemissas, eadem ratione nec praedicatum primi principii ad eius subiectum; ergo etc. Nec propter singularitatem, quia vel propter singularitatem in essendo 238 arguo] om. P | primum principium] inv. N 239 in eadem] in eodem Y om. P in1…240 principium1] om. (hom.) BC tenet forma syllogistica add. mg. C 240 Probatio] Primo B 241 principiati] principii LY 242 sit principium] om. (hom.) BC sit…principium2] non (sed del.) sit primum P 243 respectu1] om. L 245 ubi] nisi C 246 nec] non L | primum principium] inv. N 247 Probo minorem] inv. LN primo ostendo Y | puta] scilicet P | puta…248 divinis] om. L 248 aliquod] primum P 249 teneret] tenet L 250 ibi] in ea N | autem] etiam Y 251 contradictoria essent] contradictio esset Y 252 Praeterea] om. LP | sic] om. BC | tenet] teneret N 253 est] esset N | illimitationem] illorum L | terminorum] connexionem add. L 255 primi1] om. P | enim est] inv. P praedicati primi] praedicati ipsius mg. P 256 ipsum] om. L subiectum add. sed del. C 257 illimitationem] illorum LP | terminorum conclusio] terminorum terminorum connexionem L 258 secundum] sic C om. B 261 quia…singularitatem2] quia vel propter singularitatem praem. sed del. P om. (hom.) B | quia…262 singularitatem] om. (hom.) Y | essendo] nec add. B
N 132ra
B 2rb
P 3vb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
C 106ra
L 143va
13
vel propter singularitatem in concipiendo. Non propter primum, quia secundum te omnia quae sunt – etiam in creaturis – extra intellectum sunt singularia in essendo, et ita etiam in creaturis non posset formari aliquis syllogismus, quod falsum est; quare etc. Nec propter secundum, quia in divinis possunt accipi termini universales et propositiones dicendo: ‘omne essentiale est communicabile; sapientia est essentialis; ergo est communicabilis’. 33. Praeterea, ostendo quod forma syllogistica summe tenet in divinis et non in aliis. Hoc probo sic: quanto aliqua materia est magis necessaria, tanto magis tenet in ea forma syllogistica; quanto enim propositiones sunt magis | necessariae, tanto magis necessarius est syllogismus ex eis factus secundum formam debitam. Sed sola materia | divinorum est summe necessaria, alia autem nonnisi tantum participative respectu eius. Ergo etc. 34. Ex hoc concludo correlative quod forma syllogistica magis tenet in divinis ad intra quam ad extra, cum maior sit necessitas ad intra quam ad extra. Ex quo sequitur quod nisi forma syllogistica teneat in divinis ad intra, nec tenebit ad extra; et ita sequitur quod nihil possit demonstrari de Deo, nec causalitas nec aliquid aliud. Hoc autem est falsum; ergo etc. 35. Praeterea, negans formam syllogisticam non tenere in divinis concedit simpliciter formam syllogisticam tenere in divinis. Probatio istius: quoniam, aut hoc negans negat sine aliqua ratione, aut propter
263 secundum] hoc add. C | te] hoc C esse P om. B | etiam] om. CNY | in] sup. lin. Y intellectum] om. P 264 et] om. LN | ita] om. P 265 etc.] om. N 266 accipi] esse BC 267 sapientia] capra B 268 om. C 269 Praeterea] ideo N | tenet] teneat N 270 et] om. P | Hoc…sic] probatur sicut N | est magis] inv. LN | magis…271 tanto] necesse creato Y 271 tanto] om. BC 272 necessariae] necesse Y | necessarius est] inv. P necesse sunt sed corr. in necessaria Y 273 factus] factis sed corr mg. Y | debitam] syllogisticam P 274 divinorum] divina L | tantum participative] participative tantum (?) una Y 275 respectu] om. L 276 concludo correlative] concedo corollarie (ambig. B) BC ergo infero corollarie P 277 intra] mere C | extra] extrema C | cum] magis sive add. BCY maior] in aliquo sed corr. mg. Y | necessitas…278 intra] ad intra necessitas BCY 278 intra] mere C | quo] hoc L | syllogistica] non add. Y 279 intra] mere C | nec] om.L sequitur] sit Y 280 Hoc] quod P 281 etc.] spat. vac. N 282 tenere] teneri BCNY 283 formam…tenere] syllogisticam formam P | tenere] teneri BCPY | divinis] et sic concedit et non concedit add. P | Probatio] propositio B 284 quoniam] quia L | aut1] ad N
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
285 aliquam rationem. Si sine ratione, cum syllogismus sit ratio, negat
rationem sine ratione. Si propter rationem, aut illam rationem supponit tenere et concludere, aut non. Si non, ergo frustra propter eam hoc negat. Si sic, ergo supponit in ea salvari formam syllogisticam; ergo etc. Sed negans formam syllogisticam in divinis tenere negat simplici290 ter formam syllogisticam. Negans enim syllogismum [non] tenere in omni materia in qua fiat debite secundum formam ei debitam negat simpliciter syllogismum tenere gratia formae; quod enim tenet gratia formae, tenet in omni materia in qua salvatur illa forma. Ergo talis negat simpliciter formam | syllogisticam. Ergo a primo ad ultimum, 295 negans formam syllogisticam in divinis idem concedit | et negat. 36. Praeterea, contra negantem medium disputationis non est disputandum; sed medium disputationis est syllogismus, quem simpliciter ille negat; ergo etc. 300
Y 93ra P 4ra
37. Secundam conclusionem, videlicet quod forma syllogistica teneat etiam summe in terminis modificatis, ostendo sic: quanto | termini aliqui sunt magis invariabiles et minus multiplices, tanto magis salvatur forma syllogistica in eis; quanto enim propositiones 305 sunt minus multiplices, tanto magis tenet forma syllogistica in eis. Omnes enim fallaciae contingunt ex variatione terminorum et multiplicitate propositionum. Sed termini modificati sunt magis invariabiles et propositiones ex eis formatae minus multiplices. Ergo etc. Probatio minoris: quanto aliqui termini possunt habere plures suppositiones, 285 Si…cum] non sine ratione quia BCP | syllogismus] mg. P 286 rationem3] om. L supponit] praesupponit LN suppone sed corr. P 287 et] om. P 288 ergo2] quare P 289 Sed] praeterea P | negans] negabit sed corr. C 290 syllogismum] formam syllogisticam N | non] om. codd. | tenere] essentialiter P 291 secundum] om. Y | ei] eius P 292 syllogismum tenere] eum tenere syllogismum Y | quod…293 tenet] om. (hom.) N 293 tenet] om. Y | salvatur] in add. sed exp. L 294 simpliciter] illam add. N | a] de C 295 negat] narrat Y 296 Praeterea] secundo Y | non…297 disputandum] om. L 297 sed…disputationis] om. (hom.) B | quem] quia add. P 298 ille] iste P 301 videlicet] scilicet N | videlicet…302 modificatis] om. P 302 teneat] tenet B 303 multiplices] simplices L 304 quanto…305 eis] om. (hom.) Y 305 in eis] om. P 306 multiplicitate] multiplicatione N terminorum add. sed exp. B 307 termini modificati] non media L 308 minus] corr. sup. lin. Y 309 termini] non Y
B 2va
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
N 132rb
L 143vb
15
tanto sunt magis variabiles, et propositiones ex eis formatae sunt magis multiplices. Et e converso, quanto termini habent determinatiorem et certiorem suppositionem, tanto minus sunt variabiles, et propositiones ex eis formatae minus multiplices. Illud ergo quod excludit multiplicitatem propositionum et varietatem terminorum non impedit formam syllogisticam, sed magis facit ad ipsam. | Sed modificatio sive specificatio et determinatio terminorum est huiusmodi; determinatiorem enim et certiorem habet suppositionem terminus modificatus quam terminus sine modificatione, sed absolute et universaliter acceptus. Ergo etc. 38. Praeterea, conclusio particulata non sequitur nisi ex altera praemissarum particulata; conclusio enim particularis non sequitur ex utraque praemissarum universali, nec ex utraque particulari, sed ex | altera universali et ex altera particulari. Sed conclusio modificata respectu conclusionis simpliciter est conclusio particulata et determinata, sicut ista: ‘homo est animal per se primo modo’ respectu istius: ‘homo est animal’; omnis enim conclusio determinata est particulata respectu conclusionis indeterminatae; ergo etc.
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39. Tertiam conclusionem, quae est quod forma syllogistica tenet 330 in terminis singularibus, probo primo sic: in materia contingenti, particularis potest esse vera, universali existente falsa, sicut ista est 311 Et…313 multiplices] om. (hom.) N | quanto termini] ipsam cum Y | determinatiorem] maiorem determinationem P 312 et1] om. Y | minus] magis Y | minus sunt] inv. P 314 excludit…propositionum] concludit multiplicem propositionem Y | varietatem] variabilitatem L 316 sive] seu P | et] vel P | terminorum est] et L 317 determinatiorem…et] dictae (sed exp.) determinatiorem enim Y determinatiorem…318 terminus] quoniam terminus modificatus habet certiorem et determinatiorem suppositionem quam terminus non modificatus N 318 sed] scilicet PY universaliter] universali L 319 acceptus] assumptus Y 320 Praeterea] item N particulata] particularis LP 321 praemissarum particulata] inv. Y | particulata] particulari P | non] nec B non add. mg. C 322 universali] universaliter Y 323 universali…altera2] om. (hom.) L | ex] om. PY 324 particulata] particularis P 325 per…326 animal] om. (hom.) L | modo] et add. B | respectu] om. C | istius] illius C 326 enim] om. N | est2] et L | particulata] particularis P 330 quae…quod] quod est L quae est Y | quae…331 singularibus] om. P 331 primo] om. P | primo sic] inv. N 332 universali] sua praem. Y
16
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
vera: ‘quidam homo currit’, ista universali existente falsa: ‘omnis homo currit’. Tunc arguo sic: ‘Sortes currit, ergo quidam homo currit’; ista conclusio sequitur enthymematice, non tamen nisi in virtute alterius praemissae subintellectae, puta istius: ‘Sortes est quidam homo’. Sed constat quod utraque istarum praemissarum est singularis, | et tamen forma arguendi est bona, et conclusio sequitur. Ergo forma syllogistica tenet in terminis singularibus. 40. Praeterea, nulla propositio mediata potest esse certa nisi per immediatam; sed ista propositio: ‘quidam homo currit’ est mediata; ergo ista non est certa nisi virtute alicuius singularis | quae primo est certa. Aut ergo ista mediata est certa et deducta ex aliqua immediata singulari, aut ex aliqua singulari et alia universali simpliciter. Non ex universali, quia universali existente falsa, singularis potest esse vera. Praeterea, quia universalis magis est remota a singulari quam singularis; ergo etc. 41. Praeterea, in quibuscumque terminis tenet primum principium, tenet forma syllogistica, quia forma primi principii non ordinatur ad conclusionem nisi mediante forma syllogistica. Sed primum principium tenet in terminis singularibus, alias contradictoria essent simul vera et simul falsa in eis; in quibuscumque enim non tenet aliquod principium, eius oppositum potest stare, ut superius est argutum. Ergo etc. 42. Praeterea, in quibuscumque terminis tenet summe forma primi principii, in eis summe tenet forma syllogistica; sed forma primi 335 enthymematice] ex entitate BC | alterius] ipsius Y | alterius…336 puta] om. P 336 subintellectae] intellectae LN 337 istarum praemissarum] inv. Y | est] particularis vel add. L 338 arguendi…forma2] om. (hom.) L | conclusio] e converso Y | Ergo] quod N 339 singularibus] quare add. N 341 immediatam] immediatum Y | quidam…currit] homo currit quidam cum signis transp. P | mediata] medium Y 342 ista] om. P non…nisi] est certa (cum signis transp.) nonnisi B | nisi] in add. LN 343 certa1] creata C | certa2] creata N 344 singulari1] et add. sed del. P | aliqua] ista Y | ex2] sup. lin. C 345 quia] nam L | singularis] particularis P 346 a] intelligenti (?) add. L | singulari] singularitate P | quam] iter. B | singularis] singulare C 349 non…350 conclusionem] ad conclusionem non ordinatur N 351 terminis] formis L | alias] aliter LN 352 simul1] om. L | et…falsa] om. Y | quibuscumque] quibus L | aliquod] aliud Y 355 terminis] om. P 356 primi principii1] inv. P | summe tenet] inv. LY summe N 353 ut…argutum] Cf. supra n. 31.
P 4rb
C 106rb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
B 2vb
17
principii in singularibus | terminis summe tenet. Probatio: quia magis tenet in illis in quibus tenet virtute propria quam in aliis. Sed primum principium tenet in terminis singularibus sive in propositionibus quae componuntur ex talibus terminis virtute propria, non autem in aliis. 360 Quod patet, quoniam istae: ‘homo est animal’ et ‘quidam’ vel ‘Sortes non est animal’ non sunt incompossibiles nisi in virtute alterius subintellectae, puta istius: ‘Sortes est homo’. Istae autem: ‘Sortes est animal’ et ‘Sortes non est animal’ sunt per se incompossibiles; ergo etc.
L 144ra P 4va
43. Quarta conclusio est quod forma syllogistica non tenet nisi cum aliqua modificatione. Hanc probo sic primo: in quacumque materia contingit variari medium, necessaria est aliqua modificatio excludens huiusmodi variationem ad hoc quod forma syllogistica sit 370 bona; sed in terminis singularibus contingit variari medium; ergo etc. Probo minorem: quandocumque aliquid est illimitatum ad duo extrema ad invicem incompossibilia, tale ut stat sub uno illorum variatur a se ipso ut stat sub alio, sicut anima ut stat sub capite variatur a se ipsa ut stat sub pede; sed terminus singularis potest esse | illimitatus ad 375 aliqua duo repugnantia; ergo ut stat sub | uno variatur a se ut sub alio. Minor patet, quoniam paternitas et filiatio in divinis sunt incompossibilia inter se in eodem supposito, et essentia indistincta penitus est eadem simpliciter utrique. Tunc ergo arguo sic: ‘haec essentia est haec
357 in…tenet] in terminis singularibus summe tenet L tenet in terminis singularibus summe P | terminis] non Y 359 in2] om. Y 360 terminis…propria] virtutibus mediante terminis virtute Y | autem] om. L 361 quoniam] quia P | quidam vel] quidam homo vel LNY om. P 362 in] om. Y | subintellectae] scilicet P 364 et] om. N | sunt…se] per se sunt N 367 Quarta…368 Hanc] quartam conclusionem LP | conclusio] quae add. N 368 primo] om. P 369 variari] coariari(!) Y 370 huiusmodi] istam N | variationem] modificationem praem. sed del. N | quod] ut P 371 ergo…372 minorem] probatio L 372 aliquid est] inv. BP 373 ut stat] potest stare L | illorum] istorum BC extremorum add. N 376 stat sub] sub N quem Y | ut2] stat add. BC est add. sed exp. L 377 Minor patet] sicut patet BC om. P | quoniam] quia LP | filiatio] filius Y 378 et] om. P indistincta] indivisa P 379 utrique] uterque Y | sic] om. Y
18
REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
380 paternitas; haec essentia est haec filiatio; ergo haec paternitas est haec
filiatio’. Conclusio est falsa, et | tamen praemissae sunt verae; ergo forma syllogistica non est bona, quia videlicet medium variatur, cum tamen sit terminus singularis; ergo etc. 44. Haec etiam est intentio Philosophi, puta quod necessaria est 385 modificatio in terminis | singularibus, in Io Priorum in illo capitulo ‘Quomodo reducimus syllogismos’, ubi sic dicit: “Aliquotiens autem propter similitudinem positionis terminorum”, non sequitur conclusio. Et ponit duo exempla. Primum est istud: ‘Aristomenes intelligibilis semper est; Aristomenes est Aristomenes intelligibilis; ergo Aristome390 nes semper est’. Secundum est: ‘Micalus musicus corrumpetur cras; Micalus est Micalus musicus; ergo Micalus corrumpetur cras’. Nec in primo nec in secundo sequitur conclusio, praemissis utriusque existentibus veris, et hoc propter defectum modificationis apponendae prae380 paternitas1] et filius in divinis sunt in compossibilia inter se in eodem supposito et essentia indistincta penitus est eadem simpliciter iter. sed exp. cum signis 'va-cat' Y haec4…381 Conclusio] conclusio haec filiatio cum signis transp. P ergo paternitas haec est haec filiatio add. N 382 est] vera vel add. N 383 terminus] om. N | singularis] singulis (?) B 384 etiam est] inv. B est LN | puta] scilicet P | necessaria…385 modificatio] modificatio est necessaria P 385 Io] libro codd. | in3…capitulo] in primo capitulo N capitulo primo P 386 Quomodo] alio modo L autem add. sed del. P reducimus] reducamus N | sic dicit] inv. N 387 similitudinem] aristomenes add. sed del. P 388 istud] illud BCLY | Aristomenes] aristoteles BCNY | intelligibilis] intellectualis P 389 est1] sed add. N | Aristomenes1] aristoteles BCNY | est Aristomenes2] om. (hom.) C Aristomenes intelligibilis] aristoteles (mg. Y) intelligibilis BCY intelligibilis aristoteles N | Aristomenes3] aristoteles BCNY 390 Micalus] vocalis (!) Y 391 Micalus2] vocalis Y | Micalus3] vocalis Y om. P 392 praemissis utriusque] ex praemissis utrisque N 393 apponendae] apponendo BL apposito C appositae vel utriusque istarum N 385 Io Priorum] ARISTOTELES, Analytica Priora I, cap. 33 (AL III-1, p. 74; 47b16-17). 388 ponit] ARISTOTELES, Analytica Priora I, cap. 33 (AL III-1, pp. 74-75; 47b21-25): “Si enim in quo A ‘semper esse’, in quo autem B ‘intelligibilis Aristomenes’, in quo vero ‘Aristomenes’. Verum est autem A inesse B; semper enim est intelligibilis Aristomenes. Sed et B C; nam Aristomenes est intelligibilis Aristomenes. A autem non inest C; corruptibilis est enim Aristomenes”. 390 Secundum] ARISTOTELES, Analytica Priora I, cap. 33 (AL III-1, p. 75; 47b29-34): “Rursum sit in quo quidem C ‘Miccalus’, in quo autem B ‘musicus Miccalus’, in quo autem A ‘corrumpi cras’. Verum est ergo B de C praedicari; nam Miccalus est musicus Miccalus. Sed et A de B; corrumpetur enim cras musicus Miccalus. A autem de C falsum”.
Y 93rb
N 132va
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
P 4vb
B 3ra
C 106va
19
missis, ut Philosophus dicit ibi. Et tamen in utroque istorum arguitur in terminis singularibus; quare etc. 45. Ad haec respondetur quod Philosophus non accipit ibi istos terminos pro terminis singularibus, sed pro communibus indefinite sumptis, sed hoc nihil valet, quia tunc ita dicam tibi quod, ubicumque Philosophus accipit terminos communes, quod accipit eos pro terminis singularibus, quod nihil est dictu. 46. Praeterea, esto quod Philosophus ita accipiat eos, ego tamen volo eos accipere pro singularibus, sicut sunt, et arguam sicut prius sic: ‘Micalus musicus corrumpetur cras; Micalus est Micalus musicus; ergo’; conclusio est falsa, et tamen ambae praemissae sunt verae. Quod ergo conclusio non sequatur, hoc est quia non est universaliter verum, ut Philosophus ibi deducit, quod Micalus musicus corrumpetur cras, quia non corrumpetur quantum ad substantiam, licet quantum ad accidens corrumpatur. Unde, si sic argueretur: ‘Micalus musicus universaliter corrumpetur cras’, conclusio sequeretur, | sed tunc maior esset falsa. Ex hoc potest argui: illud quo posito habetur forma syllogistica debita, et quo non posito | non habetur, pertinet et est necessarium ad formam syllogisticam. Sed terminis singularibus sumptis simpliciter non habetur forma debita syllogismi; ipsis autem modificatis habetur, ut patet in praedictis exemplis Philosophi; ergo etc. 47. Alio modo respondetur quod, quando Philosophus dicit | quod in praedictis duobus syllogismis non sequitur conclusio, quo-
394 istorum] illorum Y 395 quare etc.] om. P 396 quod] quia Y | non] mg. Y | ibi istos] istos N om. BC 398 nihil] non L 399 terminos] secundum add. sed exp. B | quod] sup. lin. L del. Y om. P 400 dictu] dictum P 401 Praeterea] similiter N | esto] om. B | ita] vel Y | accipiat] accipit B | eos] om. N 402 eos accipere] inv. P | pro] terminis add. P | et] om. P | prius] philosophus codd. 403 sic] facit N om. L | Micalus1] vocalis Y | Micalus2] vocalis Y | Micalus3] vocalis Y 404 ergo] etc. add. LP micalus corrumpetur cras ergo etc. add. N 405 sequatur] sequitur L 406 ibi] ibidem Y | deducit] ita add. P | Micalus] vocalis Y 407 corrumpetur] corrumpentur P | ad1] idem add. sed exp. Y | licet] sed Y 408 Unde] Vide C | argueretur] arguetur BC | Micalus] vocalis Y 409 sequeretur] sequitur LN | sed] quia P 410 esset] est N | potest argui] patet argumentum B sic add. P 411 et quo] aequo sed corr. B | pertinet et] om. N 412 sumptis] suppositis BC 413 debita syllogismi] syllogistica debita LN 414 habetur] om. L | ergo] sic L 416 quoniam] quia L
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400
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
niam “non est universaliter verum, quoniam ‘Micalus musicus’ corrumpetur cras”, etc., non intendit per hoc Philosophus dicere quod ideo non sequitur, quia signum universale praemissis non apponitur – 420 ut tu infers –, sed quia signum universale quod requiritur ad syllogismum sive in praemissis non potest addi termino singulari, cuiusmodi termini accipiuntur | in praedictis duobus syllogismis. 48. Contra: primo, quia supponis quod in terminis singularibus non possit fieri syllogismus, cuius oppositum in tertia conclusione 425 superius est probatum. Secundo, quia illud quo posito vel non posito habetur forma debita syllogistica non est necessarium ad formam syllogisticam; sed istis signis universalibus, puta ‘omnis’ vel ‘nullus’, positis vel non positis, habetur forma debita syllogismi; ergo etc. Probo minorem, quia arguendo sic: ‘Micalus musicus corrumpetur 430 cras universaliter vel formaliter; Micalus est Micalus musicus; ergo etc.’ habetur forma debita syllogismi et conclusio sequitur valde bene; ergo etc. 49. Praeterea, signum ‘omnis’ non apponitur termino nisi ad excludendum eius varietatem; sed ista potest excludi per aliud signum,
417 est] om. L | universaliter verum] inv. P | quoniam] quia L quod P | Micalus] vocalis Y | musicus corrumpetur] corrumpitur P 418 etc.] et etiam Y | per hoc] om. BCP Philosophus dicere] inv. P 419 sequitur] conclusio add. P | apponitur] mg. P 420 tu infers] infertur N | sed] ut add. sed exp. Y | quod] mg. P 421 in] mg. P 423 primo…supponis] quia primo supponis L hoc arguitur primo quia supponit N 424 non…syllogismus] om. L | fieri syllogismus] inv. N | in…425 probatum] est superius probatum in tertia conclusione N 425 probatum] ostensum P 426 habetur…syllogistica] forma syllogistica debita habetur P | debita] om. N | non…necessarium] iter. sed del. Y 427 puta] autem (?) add. Y | vel] et N 428 positis1] om. Y | debita syllogismi] syllogistica debita syllogismi P debita syllogistica Y 429 Probo minorem] probatio minoris (sed corr. L) LN | arguendo] arguitur BP arguo C | Micalus] vocalis Y 430 Micalus1] vocalis Y | Micalus2] vocalis Y | musicus] om. P 431 habetur] hic praem. BC | debita syllogismi] syllogistica debita P 432 ergo etc.] etc. PY om. N 433 Praeterea] hoc add. L | non] om. C 434 varietatem] variabilitatem LN variationem Y | ista] illa varietas N ita P | per] ad sed corr. mg. Y ad add. sed exp. Y
417 non…418 cras] ARISTOTELES, Analytica Priora I, cap. 33 (AL III-1, p. 75; 47b35). 420 tu infers] scilicet: ut opponens infert quod Franciscus teneat. 425 superius…probatum] Cf. supra nn. 39- 42.
L 144rb
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
P 5ra
N 132vb
21
puta per ‘universaliter’ vel ‘totaliter’, quod potest addi termino singulari variabili causaliter sive virtualiter, licet non formaliter; ergo etc. 50. Praeterea, Philosophus non dicit ibi quod ideo conclusio non sequatur, quia huiusmodi signum non potest apponi sive non apponitur, quod tamen dixisset, si ista fuisset causa. 51. Tertio, respondetur quod ideo conclusio non sequitur in praedictis syllogismis, quia arguitur in terminis compositis, non simplicibus. Contra: primo, quia Philosophus non reddit istam causam quare non sequatur conclusio, quia videlicet termini sunt compositi, sed quia “non est universaliter verum quoniam ‘Micalus musicus’ corrumpetur cras”. 52. Praeterea, illud non facit ad formam syllogismi quo non posito vel posito habetur forma debita | syllogismi; sed posita simplicitate vel compositione terminorum potest haberi forma debita syllogismi, aliis quae necessaria sunt concomitantibus; ergo etc. 53. Praeterea, si compositio terminorum tolleret formam syllogisticam, hoc non esset nisi quia variaretur medium; sed huiusmodi variatio potest excludi; ergo etc. 54. Praeterea: | ‘haec essentia est haec paternitas; haec essentia est haec filiatio’, non sequitur: ‘ergo haec filiatio est haec paternitas’, vel e converso; nec: ‘hic homo est species; Sortes est homo; ergo etc.’ In utroque tamen istorum medium est idem, non variatum formaliter,
435 termino] non BC 436 virtualiter] ubi est BCY universaliter P | licet] sed N 437 Praeterea] Prima B | ibi] om. L | ideo conclusio] inv. P 438 sequatur] sequitur LP huiusmodi] hoc L | apponi] termino singulari add. L | apponitur] apponi L 439 tamen] cum BC non L | causa] vera L 440 sequitur] ex praemissis add. N 442 reddit] dedit N 443 sequatur] sequitur L | conclusio] immo Y | termini] termino L 444 quoniam] quod P quin Y vel quin add. N | Micalus] vocalis Y 446 non2…447 vel] posito vel non P 447 debita syllogismi] inv. N | simplicitate…448 compositione] inv. P 448 compositione] compossibilitate Y 450 compositio] tota add. sed exp. Y | tolleret] tollerunt B 451 hoc…esset] non esset hoc P | variaretur] variatur Y | variaretur medium] inv. P 453 Praeterea] prima B item P | haec2] om. BP | haec3…454 filiatio1] et haec filiatio est haec essentia P 454 haec1] om. B | haec2] essentia est add. P 455 vel…converso] om. N non sequitur add. P | nec] nam L | etc.] non sequitur add. N 456 In…tamen] et tamen in utroque P | istorum] illorum LY | medium est] inv. P | variatum formaliter] forma Y 444 non…445 cras] ARISTOTELES, Analytica Priora I, cap. 33 (AL III-1, p. 75; 47b35).
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440
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
variatum tamen virtualiter et causaliter; dupliciter enim contingit | medium variari, videlicet virtualiter et formaliter. 55. Praeterea, quod etiam in terminis singularibus varietur me460 dium, patet. Arguam enim sic: ‘hic color est visus sive videtur; haec albedo singularis non videtur; ergo haec albedo non est hic color’. Conclusio est falsa, praemissis existentibus veris; ergo hoc est quia medium variatur; quare etc.
Y 93va
56. Praeterea, arguo ad secundam conclusionem, videlicet quod forma syllogistica teneat in terminis modificatis, primo sic: in quibuscumque tenet primum principium, et forma syllogistica, cum non possit ad conclusionem aliquam applicari nisi forma syllogistica mediante; sed | primum principium tenet in terminis modificatis; ergo 470 etc. Minorem probo dupliciter. Primo, quia in quibuscumque terminis non tenet primum principium, in eis potest stare eius | oppositum; sed ita est impossibile quod idem simul sit aliquid formaliter et non sit formaliter illud, sicut quod sit aliquid absolute sine modificatione et non sit illud; ergo etc. 475 57. Praeterea, forma modificati principii tenet in terminis modificatis; sed forma primi principii est modificata, quia contradictio est 465
457 tamen] formaliter add. sed exp. B | causaliter] totaliter L | dupliciter] dicitur B 458 videlicet] scilicet P | virtualiter…formaliter] inv. Y 459 Praeterea] idem P | quod etiam] inv. C | etiam] om. P | singularibus] simplicibus P | varietur] variatur L | varietur medium] inv. P 460 enim] om. P | sive] et non L | videtur] dicitur N 461 singularis] singulare B singulariter Y | videtur] haec add. sed exp. C | non2] videtur add. sed exp. C hic] om. N 462 est1] om. C | praemissis…veris] tamen praemissae sunt vere L 463 quare] ergo N 465 Praeterea] prima B | arguo…secundam] arguitur ad tertiam L arguam ad illam P | videlicet] scilicet P om. BC 466 primo] primum B 467 quibuscumque] terminis add. P | principium] tenet add. P | syllogistica] in terminis modificatis add. Y ergo etc. minorem probo dupliciter primo quia in quibuscumque add. sed del. Y 468 aliquam] concretam (?) C istam Y 469 principium] cum add. sed del. Y tenet] om. C | ergo etc] om. L | ergo…470 Minorem] om. B 470 etc.] om. C | Minorem probo] inv. L 471 potest stare] inv. N 472 ita] ista CY istud N | idem…sit1] sint simul N illud simul sit P idem sit simul Y 473 sicut quod] idem illud idem P 474 illud] idem P 475 Praeterea] prima B item N 476 modificata] vel immodificata N | quia] qua B 465 secundam conclusionem] Cf. supra nn. 37-38.
B 3rb
L 144va
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
P 5rb
C 106vb
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affirmatio et negatio unius et eiusdem secundum idem in eodem tempore, etc., quae omnia sunt modificationes quaedam ipsius primi principii; ergo etc. 58. Ad istam secundam probationem respondetur quod istae determinationes non sunt modificationes, quia modus non est de essentia rei cuius est modus; nunc autem omnes praedictae determinationes ‘ad idem, secundum idem’, etc., sunt de essentia primi principii; quare etc. Tunc dicit quod duplex est modificatio sive modus: quidam sequens definitionem | sive essentiam rei, et alius praecedens. Et dicit quod nullus modus est de essentia rei. 59. Contra: quaero quid intelligis per modificationem. Modificatio enim non videtur dicere aliud quam determinationem; constat autem quod ista omnia: ‘ad idem, secundum idem, similiter, in eodem tempore’, etc., sunt quaedam determinationes; ergo etc. Unde non video quare magis formaliter debeat dici modificatio sive modus | quam quodcumque istorum. Probatio: omnis determinatio relativa circumstantiarum per modum circumstantiae est modificatio; sed omnes habitudines positae in praedicta descriptione primi principii sunt quaedam determinationes habituales circumstantiales; ergo etc. Minor patet discurrendo per singulas: ‘secundum enim idem’, ‘ad idem’, ‘in eodem tempore’, etc., sunt habitudines circumstantiales, et
477 idem] ad idem add. P 478 etc.] om. N | quae] quia Y | sunt] vel immodificationes vel add. N 479 ergo etc.] etc. L om. P 480 secundam] tertiam L | probationem] propositionem BN | quod] om. N 482 essentia] esse P | determinationes] scilicet add. P 483 idem1] et add. P | primi principii] inv. P 484 quare] ergo L | quare etc.] om. B | dicit] dicitur P | quod] quo B | sive] vel P 485 sequens] corr. P | definitionem] distinctionem NY | sive] rei praem. P seu N | et] om. NP 487 Modificatio] viae add. sed del. Y 488 enim] autem N est add. sed exp. Y | videtur…aliud] vult aliud dicere N | aliud] ad B 489 secundum idem] om. (hom.) BC | similiter] et add. N | similiter…490 tempore] om. L 490 etc1] etc.] om. N 491 dici] attribui L 492 istorum] praedictorum P | Probatio] praeterea L | relativa circumstantiarum] naturae circumstantialis P 493 circumstantiarum] constantiarum sed corr. sup. lin. B | circumstantiae] circumstantiarum L 494 omnes] praedictae LN 495 sunt] sicut C 496 discurrendo] distinguendo BCY sed corr. mg. Y singulas] partes add. P | enim] om. Y | ad…497 tempore] om. P 497 in…tempore] om. L | etc.] quod add. P | etc…498 principii] om. Y | habitudines] habitudinales N | et] om. P 480 Ad…probationem] Cf. supra nn. 56-57.
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REPORTATIO A IN II SENTENTIARUM
istae partes clauduntur infra essentiam primi principii; ergo etc. Nec motivum suum valet quando dicit quod modus non est de definitione rei, quia verum est quod modus non est de definitione rei quae non est modus, definitio autem modi bene includit necessario modum; nunc autem primum principium est modificatum, ut dictum est; quare etc. 60. Sed potest dici aliter, et melius, quod istae determinationes et modificationes praedictae non sunt de essentia primi principii, nec de eius propria definitione per consequens. Ponuntur tamen in eius descriptione; sunt enim quaedam circumstantiae necessario concomitantes rationem primi principii. Probatio istius: aggregatum per accidens non est de essentia unius entis per se; sed istud totum: ‘ad idem, secundum idem, similiter’, etc., est quoddam totum aggregatum unum per accidens, primum autem principium est unum per se; ergo ista non sunt de intrinseca eius ratione, licet sint quaedam circumstantiae ipsum necessario concomitantes. Sicut enim ens reale habet accidentia sua | realia ipsum concomitantia, ita ens rationis accidentia rationis. 61. Secundo, iste dicit quod duplex est primum principium, videlicet complexum, et hoc est logicum, ut ‘homo est animal, homo non est animal’, et tale, ut dicit, non tenet in terminis modificatis; non enim sequitur: ‘non est animal quidditative, ergo est non-animal quidditative’. | Aliud est primum principium incomplexum, et tale est metaphysicum, ut ‘homo est animal, homo non est animal’, et tale 498 istae partes] ista parte BC istae per se L 499 motivum] modum BCY medium L motivum nec medium N 500 quia] om. N | de] essentia vel add. P 501 nunc] inter Y 502 est2] om. B 503 potest] posset P | istae] illae N | determinationes…504 modificationes] inv. P 504 essentia] esse N | primi] om. P 505 eius propria] inv. Y 506 sunt…quaedam] sicut L et sic sunt P | necessario] necessariae sed corr. L om. BC necessario concomitantes] inv. P | concomitantes] circumstantes L 507 Probatio istius] praeterea istud L totum add. N 508 unius entis] inv. N | sed] per add. P | idem] et add. P 509 similiter] realiter Y om. LP | quoddam] om. N 511 intrinseca…ratione] eius intrinseca ratione L eius ratione intrinseca NY | sint] sicut B | quaedam] om. P 512 ipsum necessario] inv. L | concomitantes] circumstantionantes (!) L 513 realia] universalia N concomitantia] circumstantia L | rationis1] enim add. sed del. Y | accidentia] habet praem. N entia BCPY 514 primum principium] principaliter N 515 et…logicum] om. L logicum] locatum B | animal] om. L 516 non est] inv. LN | non3] sicut L 517 sequitur] homo add. P | ergo…518 quidditative] om. (hom.) BC | non-animal] animal L vel add. Y 518 quidditative] nihil ergo est animal quidditative add. N | Aliud] illud N 519 metaphysicum] modificatum C | animal1] et add. LY
L 144vb
N 133ra P 5va
Q. 1: UTRUM CREATIO SIT DEMONSTRABILIS DE DEO
B 3va
Y 93vb
25
tenet in terminis modificatis, quia vel est animal quidditative vel non est animal quidditative. Non tamen oportet quod sit animal | quidditative vel sit non-animal quidditative, quia tunc est principium complexum, quod non tenet in terminis modificatis. 62. Contra: primo, quia assumis falsum; secundo, concedis propositum; tertio, non solvis difficultatem. Primum probo sic: impossibile est esse duo principia simpliciter aeque prima quin unum necessario in aliud reducatur. Aut ergo principium incomplexum, quod ponis esse metaphysicum, reducitur ad principium complexum, vel e converso. Non primum, quia prius non reducitur ad posterius; sed incomplexum est prius complexo. Nec secundum, quia logicus non accipit sua principia a metaphysico; ergo etc. 63. Praeterea, omne principium respectu alicuius est principium. Quaero ergo tunc: principium incomplexum | quod ponis, respectu cuius est principium? Vel enim est principium respectu terminorum, vel respectu principii complexi, vel respectu conclusionum. Non primum, patet. Nec secundum, quia primum principium complexum non dependet nisi ex eius subiecto et praedicato, ita quod subiectum et praedicatum eius sunt praecise eius principia. Nec tertium, quia conclusio non dependet nisi ex maiori propositione et minori, quarum utraque est principium complexum; ergo etc.
520 vel2…521 quidditative] om. (hom.) L 521 Non…522 quidditative] et si non est animal quidditative ergo (mg.) non est animal non tenet P 522 vel…quidditative] om. (hom.) L | sit] om. N 524 assumis] affirmas B | concedis] compositum add. sed del. Y 525 propositum] propositionem B | solvis] solvit N | difficultatem] definitionem B Primum] prima N 526 esse…aeque] esse duo principia esse (exp. C) simpliciter causa (exp. C) BC duo principia simpliciter esse aeque NP | prima] perfecta P | quin] quando Y necessario…527 Aut] in aliud necessario reducatur aliud L necessario in agendo reducatur ad aliud N in aliud necessario reducatur aut P 527 aliud] includatur add. sed exp. C | Aut] ut B | incomplexum]