France in Black Africa

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FRANCE IN

~ K AFRICA

FRANCE IN

BL~K AFRICA

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T ~ McNama~

1989 Na~onal De~nse Un~erM~ Washington, DC

Nation~ Defense Universi~ P r o s Pu~ications

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OpinionG conc~s~ns, and recommenda~ons expressed or imp~ed ~ th~ volume are s ~ e ~ those of the author and do not necessarily ~ p r e ~ n t the ~ews of the Nafion~ De~nse U~versi~, the Depaflme~ of De&nse, or any other government agency. Th~ book conta~s copyright material. The photographs and prints inc~ded ~ th~ book may not be reproduced without permission of the owne~, whose addresses ~l~w: The US ~brary of Congres~ Washington DC 2054~ La Docume~aSon F~n~a~G Pho~th4xlue Afrique, ~ , quai V o l ~ e , 75840 Pads Cedex 0~ Gamma-Li~son, 150 East 58th S~eet, New York NY 10155; Magnum Photos Inc., 72 Spring S~eet, New York NY 10012. Editorial Expels, Inc., Alexandria, V i r ~ copye~ted and copymarked the final manuscfipL proofread page proof, and prepared the index for this book. NDU Press pub~ca~ons are sold by the US Government Printing Office. For ordering in,treaSon, ca~ (202) 78~3238 or write ~ Superintendent of Document~ US Government Printing Office, Washington DC 20402. First pfintin~ Sep~mber ~89. McNamara, Frands T e ~ 1927France in Black Africa / Fran~s Te~y McNamara. poCmo Includes bib~ographical r e ~ n c e s . $~0.00 @st.) 1. AfricG Sub-Saharan--Rela~ons~France. 2. France~Rela~ons-~Afric~ Su~Saharan. 3. France~Colo~e~Affica. 4. Africa, Frenda-spea~ng West-Hi~ory. 5. AfricG French-spea~ng Equatofial~I-Iis~ry. I. Title. DT353.KF8M36 1989 966'.0917541~dc20 89-12996 CIP

This book is &dicated to the memoGq of Governor General F~lix Eboud, a black Frenchman of honor and vision, The seeds he aM his chief, Chu~rlesde Gauile, planted so many years ago in Brazzaville Mve continued to germinate and to

Governor General Fdlix Eboud

CONTENTS Fwe~ P@ce ~e:

France Ac~es and AdmiNste~ an Em~re ................................................ 3

Two: T h e R o d ~e:

to ~ ~ e n c e

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Cooperation ~aces C o l o n i a l i s m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

F ~ r : T h e S w o r d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 Nve: O n e M a f f s ~

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

S ~ : Was R ~ 1 W o r t h It? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 No~s ......................................................

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BM~ra~y

.............................................

253

~e AuNor ...............................................

275

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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F

EWO

When, in 1960, France g r a ~ e d ~ d e p e n d e n ~ to its c~onies in West and Central Africa--an emp~e cove~ng an area the size of the contiguous U ~ d ~ a ~ s - - t h e French st~ in~nded to ret~n influence ~ Africa. T h o u g h a s y s ~ m of accords with these newly ~ d e p e n d e ~ African natons, based upon ties n a ~ l ~ ~ r m e d over the c~omal years, France has succeeded ~ r t h e e decades ~ p ~ r ~ n g i~ poMPon in Afdcan ~ s . The course of Franco-Affican re~~ons in the near future, ~ o u g G is ~ss than c ~ t ~ n . In this book, A m b a ~ a d ~ F ~ n ~ s Te~y McNam~a oub lines France's a c q u i ~ o n and a d m ~ a t o n of ~s ~ k A~ rican e m p i r e and traces the ~ r m e r c ~ o n ~ p a t h s to ~dependence. Draw~g upon that background, the amba~ sador exam~es the structure of pos~ndependence F ~ n c ~ A@ican rela~ons and recent strains on those ~ o n G esp e ~ a l ~ Af~can econom~ c ~ s and ~ e French tendency to focus on Europe. Because of those strains, he suggests, F~nce alone may be u n a ~ e to suppo~ its ~ r m e r dependendes much ~ n g e n He b ~ v e s that b n ~ r m s~utons ~ A ~ c a n p r o t e i n s will have to involve ~ r n a ~ o n ~ organiza~ons like the World Bank and I n t e r n a t o n a l M o n e ~ r y Fund as well as other na~ons such as the Un~ed S~tes and France's European partn~s. A m b a ~ a d o r McNama~'s book w ~ h ~ p observe~ und e ~ n d F ~ n c h a ~ n s over ~ e coning y e ~ G as France actively p a r ~ d p a ~ s in the closer i n t e g ~ o n of W e s ~ r n Europe w ~ s ~ l ~ n g ~ m ~ n ties to ~ k A ~ i ~ .

Bradley C. Hosmer ~ e u ~ n a ~ Genera, USAF President, N a t o n ~ De~nse Univer~

PREFACE

During

the 19th and early 20th c e n t u ~ e s , France acquired a vast African empire. T ~ s empire expanded rapidly, though without any d e a ~ comprehensive plan. But then the French have never been keen c ~ o n ~ . (Algeria was the only d e s t n a f i o n of largescale French c d o n ~ l migration.) Indeed, most of the French have b e e n d ~ i n ~ r e s t e d in overseas inv~vement. O n ~ at those historic moments when national pride has b e e n a r o u s e d have the French given m o r e than Mkewarm support ~o c d o n ~ l adventures. So A~ ~ca was le~, by and hrge, to the s e p a r a ~ initiatives of an i n t e r e s ~ d minority made up mainly of mffi~ry ofricers and merchants. Even the c h u ~ h , whose m ~ s ~ n a~es played a ~ a d i n g r ~ e in France's earlier North American empire, had no more than a secondary r d e in e n c o u r a g i n g French territorial e x p a n s ~ n in black Africa. The waning of ecde~as~cM influence in F~ance itself d u r i n g the late 19th c e n t u r y was no doubt the cause of this lack of church influence. The three m o ~ i m p o r ~ n t e ~ m e n t s u n d e r l i n g the French lurch into Africa were (1) France's d e , a t by the PrusMans in 1870, (~ a mercan~l~t sense that a rising indu~fiM power n e e d e d assured m a r k e ~ and sources of raw matefiMs u n d e r its own c o n t r , , and (3) a ~ a r that Franc~s traditional nemeM~ Great Bfi~in, would a n n e x the lion's s h a r e of territory as the E u r o p e a n scram~e for Af~ca neared its end. C o n ~ a r y to w i d ~ y

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h ~ d views on c d o n i ~ m , f i n a n d ~ gain was not the p ~ m a r y force motiva~ng French involvement in black Aft_ca. From the o u Z e L p d i ~ c s and na~onal ego were ~ o ~ at ~ a ~ as p o i n t in drawing the French GoAfrica and h ~ d i n g t h e m there. From C d b e r ~ s ~me in the 17th century on, m e ~ can~le i n , rest was one e n d u i n g influence. But laler the French ~ s o saw Af~ca as a source of mili~ry manpower that could serve to redress the w o ~ i s o m e dem o g r a p h i c i m b a l a n c e d e v e l o p i n g as G e r m a n y ' s p o p u l a ~ o n b u r g e o n e d and France's ~ a g n a t e d . This percep~on was r e i n f o ~ e d by experience in two World Wars. And late~ Franc~s d e d ~ o n to r e t ~ n her influence in Af~ca a f a r granting her c d o n ~ s independence in 1960 was ~ r g e ~ d ~ v e n by a refusal to accept the s~tus of a middle-~zed European power in a world dominated by two giants. Her p o ~ o n at the center of a group of d e p e n d e n t but sovereign states s~ll affords France a place in the world u n e q u a ~ d by any other c o u n t y of her Mze or powen A constant c o n d i ~ o n , t h o u g h , has been that the net cost of acqui~ng and m a i n t ~ n i n g African connec~ons not be an u n d u e b u r d e n on the French ~ x p a y e ~ . This provi~on has been carefully honored during most of the c ~ o n i a l and p o s ~ o n i a l years. A l t h o u g h the French u s u a l l y strive to p r o t e c t A ~ i c a n intereMs, French interests as a r u ~ take pdority. N o n e t h e ~ s s , France has generally succeeded in the delicate b a ~ n o ing of her own interests with those of Africa, e s p e d ~ in the p o s ~ n d e p e n d e n c e period. Indeed this a ~ e n ~ o n to Af~can interests is part of the cement that has sus~ i n e d the unique Franco-A~ican rela~onship.

Frame in ~ a ~ A~ka But a c~sis has developed in the 1980s. The diffic~ty ~ems ~om the acu~ econom~ pro~ems ~ d n g France's A ~ i c a n p a r t n e r s and the h m i ~ o n s of Franc~s finand~ means ~ cope w~h thor needs. At the same time, the French are becoming i n ~ e a ~ n ~ y Eurocentr~. More than m o ~ o t h ~ European~ they are loo~ng ~rward to ~aying a cent~l r~e in an increasing~ i n , g r a n d common European market. The rise ~ p o ~ o n s of power of younger genera~ons in both A~ ~ca and F~nce ~ like~ ~ fu~her weaken ~es ~rged by long, c o m m o n c~onial expe~ences. Indeed, a wao ~ h e d may already have been reached in Franc~Affican r e ~ o n s . The a~ump~ons that have grounded these " p ~ g e d " re~tionships are b 6 ~ n n i n g ~ be ques~oned. My goal in writing this book ~ to i n ~ r m a general a u d ~ n c e about the u n d u e F r a n c o - A ~ a n r~a~onship--the nature of the ~es and how they developeG and the changes in both France and Africa that are s~aining ~ o s e ~es today--and to s p e c u ~ on the future of the r~a~onship. S u r p ~ n ~ y little has been written in E n O c h since the early 1960s on the ex~ao~ dinary r~a~ons the French have r e ~ i n e d with their ~rrner colonial dependences in ~ack Africa. IndeeG few books of a general n a c r e on the s u ~ e ~ have been published ~nce Vir~nia Thompson and her husband, Richard Ad~fL wrote their tomes French West A~ica (1S5~ and The Em~ging S ~ s ~ Fren~ Equatorial A ~ a (1960). What has been published on Francophone AG dca in more recent years is restri~ed m ~ y ~ special s u p e r s or ~ ~ d u ~ counties. In compa~so~ the Hterature w ~ e n on A n g ~ p h o n e Africa d u ~ n g the

s a m e p o s f i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d has b e e n rich and ~entiful. This curious lacuna was fi~t brought to my aRenfion in 1984 by D~ Peter Duignan of the Hoover Institution at S t a n f o r d University. He s u g g e s t e d that I might help d o s e th~ h ~ r a r y gap w h e n I ~ff my post as ambassador to Gabon. W h e n the State D e p a ~ m e n t agreed to my request for a yea~s sabbatical, I launched on a course that has f a s d n a t e d me ever since, interr u p ~ d only by 2 years spent in Lebanon dodging the occasional stray artillery shell, car bombe~ or po~nfial ~dnapper. S ~ n f o r d Unive~ity, with its superb l ~ r a r y ~ d l i ~es, was the ideal place to begin my research. The A~ fican c ~ c t i o n at the Hoover Institution is c e r ~ i n ~ one of the m o s t extensive and best organized in the U n i ~ d States. I never asked for any secondary source, no m a ~ e r how obscure, that the l~rafians at Hoover were u n a b ~ to produce either from their own collection or through a rapid inteflibrary exchange. H o o v e f s superb A f f k a n collection, coupled with an extenMve s y s ~ m for c a ~ b ~ n g books and per~dical h ~ r a t u r e on Africa ~ o m M1worldwide sources, forms a tribute to the years of ffuRful effort expended by Curator Peter D u i g n a n , his a s s o d a t e Lewis Ganns, and A s N s ~ n t Curator Karen Fong. I was fortunate in being able to spend 9 months as a Foreign Af~ffs Fellow at HooveG where I was allowed to pursue my research in an ideal atmosphere of quiet and schdafly discretion. S u p p o ~ o f k r e d was generous, but never foKed. R e l u ~ a n t to risk the p r e l i m i n a r y d r a ~ that my yeaffs ~ b o r at Stanford had produced, I left the manusc~pt and my research matefiMs safe in the United

~ii

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States w h e n I d e p a r t e d on a s ~ g n m e n t to Beirut. Alt h o u g h my work was rarely out of my mind d u ~ n g those 2 years, I did not r e s u m e it un~l I r e t u r n e d to Washington in S e p ~ m b e r 198Z A~er my a s ~ g n m e n t in B~ruL the State Deparb ment again acceded to my request and as~gned me to the Insfitu~ ~ r Na~onal S ~ a ~ c S t u d , s at the Na~onal D e ~ n s e U n ~ e r ~ t y as a Senior F ~ w . There I was given e n c o u ~ g e m e n t and generous a s ~ a n c e in re~sing and u p d a ~ n g my preliminary dra~ by the Institutes directo~ D~ John En~cotG and by i ~ d~ector for research, Dr. Fred Kile~ Much useful advice and con~ructive c ~ d s m were ~ v e n by D~ Kile~ Dr. Joe G ~ d b e r g , Dr. Jeff S ~ m o n , and other c d ~ a g u e s and staff members of the Ins~tute. Before c o m p e t i n g my text, I visited F r a n c e a n d six F r a n c o p h o n e A ~ i c a n c o u n t i e s . These v i s i t , and the many conve~a~ons I had with a wide variety of k n o w l e d g e a ~ e p e o ~ G a~ forded an i n v a ~ a b ~ opportunity ~ deepen my knowledge, verify or ~e~se c o n d u ~ o n s , and bring my study up to date. My readers should be aware from the outset of some of the ~ m i ~ o n s of this book. ~ b it should be borne in mind that ~s s u ~ e ~ is the French in Af~ca; it is not focused primarily on Africa or on Af~cans. This H m i ~ t ~ n may ~ o u ~ e some r e a d e r , who will c o n s ~ e r the book to be u n j u s t l y skewed in perspec~ve or in interpr~afion. To answer such c~fidsm I can o n ~ a o knowledge ~hat some v a l ~ ~ r n a ~ v e i n t e r p r e ~ t ~ n s are not presented in this book and some events of cons ~ e r a ~ e ~ s t o ~ c a l i m p o r ~ n c e are not included. I most o~en tried ~o make my judgments ~ o m a French p ~ n t

~ii

of v~w. As a iesulL African and other European v~wpoints may seem to have been neg~c~d. The reader also should understand that the histor~al sections of the book were inc~ded ~ pro~de backg r o u n d and historical perspective to the general reade~ They were not based on o r ~ n a l research using primary sources. RatheG they are a synthe~s of the existing ~terature in French and in En~ish. The already i n ~ r m e d reader may choose, therefore, ~ skip d i m ~ to the sections on the more recent, posfindependence period, which are based on personal observation and research in primary souses. Discretion demands that I not list all the people with whom I spoke during my ~ to France and AG fica. But among the most useful and interes~ng were ~cques FoccarL Maufice Robe~, Pro~ssor Piece Dabezies, Pierre Biarnes, Professor Jacques Marseil~G Pro~ssor ~ a n - P ~ e Cot, Philip Decrean~ Professor Henri Brunschw~, Professor E~c de Dampierre, Marc Aicardi de Saint-Paul, Henry O'Bryan, ~ a n de Rosen, Jean Audibert, General Jeannou Lacaze, and JeanFrancois Maurel. I also wish to express my sincere thanks to my Foreign Service c ~ a g u e s at various posts who dM so much ~ help and guide me. These inc ~ d e Lieutenant C~onel David And~off, Lieu~nant Colonel Mary Becha, Ambassador John Blane, Ted Brynn, Ambassador Frances Cook, Tony DM~meG Ambassador David Fields, Laurence Flanner~ John Hoste, Tom House~ Lars H. Hyde, Gary Kassebaum, Ambassador Dennis Kux, Bob La Gamma, Fred La So~ Ambassador Sam Lupo, ~ n e t M~kemeG ~I1 M~hoefeG Bill Pope, Janet Price, Elisab~h SchuleG Joe Sikes, Ted Van Gilde~ and Ambassador Lannon Walker. In

xix

~ance ~ ~ a ~ A~ica addition, I am gra~ful to Peter D ~ g n a n , Amba~ador And~w S~ma~ WiH~m F ~ , and Amba~ador John McKesson for read~g the final dra~ of this manuscript and providing very useful critiques and comments. ~naH~ very s p e d ~ thanks must go to my e ~ Tom Gill, and to the deputy dire~or of the NDU Research D k e c ~ r a ~ , ~ e u ~ n a n t C d o n ~ ~nnings Mace. My long-suffering wi~, Nhu De, also merits my p r ~ ~ u n d gra~tude ~ r her unfailing suppo~ ~ all things great and small.

F~~E IN

~ K AFRICA

ONE:

France Acquires and Admi sters an Empire The

earliest accounts of French invoNement with Mack Aftra Mend myth and ~ in a hazy story of Cahis fishermen visiting the rich fishing grounds off the coast of Mauritania in the 12th and 13th centuries. Whatever the truth in these stories, the earliest substantial and su~Mned French contact with Africa invalved the slave trade. Be~nning in the early l ~ h centur~ d ~ u m ~ a n c e s encouraged the buying and ~ansporting of slaves to the New World. A ready market existed in the Americas, where the b e ~ n n i n g of a plantation economy required large numbers of strong, docile laborers. The local Indian popu~tMn had proven unadap~ble. At the time, only Africa combined mili~ry and pdifical weakness with a ready supply of phyMcally tough, adaptable people within easy range of the cane and cotton fields of Noah and South America and the Antil~s. Unfortuna~ly, EuropeanG AmericanG Arabs, and other Africans were o n ~ too ready to serve as s u p p e r s in the dreadful black ivory trade. French slavers, along with their colleagues from many other nations, set up c ~ n stations a~ng the

3

France in BlackAfrica west coast of Af~ca. Gor6e, Senegal; E1 Mina, GhanG and O ui da h, Benin, were only three of the better k n o w n of these slave collec~on and e m b a r k a ~ o n p ~ n ~ . The transatlantic slave t~ade th~ved for about two centuries before b~ng outlawed in the first decade of the 19th centur~ By this time, many of the o~ginal trading centers had expanded into other less repugnant forms of commerce. Along with bases set up by the European and American naves to support antislave patr~s deployed off the coast of West Af~ca in the first half of the 19th c e n t u r ~ there were French trading posts G ~ n p ~ , which became the nuclei for early cdonizafion. The trading posts on the coast of Senegal near the present site of Dakar were the most important of the early French enc~ves in A f t r a . Their founda~on is proudly d a ~ d 1638 by both French and Senega~se. At that time, agents of the Compagnie Normande, a charter company created under p d i d e s laid down by Louis XIIFs first ministe~ Cardinal Richelieu, established a small ~ading p o ~ on an island near the mouth of the Senegal Rive~ This modest es~bl~hment was moved in 1659 to the present site of S~nt-Louis, becoming the first permanent French insta~aton on the coast of black A~ica.~ More than a century of desultory p r e s e n c e followed. D u r i n g this period, howeveG French presence was expanded along the coast and some dis~nce up the Senegal River Valle~ These unpromiMng beginnings would be the base from which France would ~ r expand inland to the conquest of a vast sub-Saharan empire. To further compl~ate the depredat~n of disease and the lack of s u p p o r t ~ o m the m~trop~e (mother

4

France Acquits and Administers an Emp~e country), French rule over the small S e n e g a ~ s e enclave was i n t e r r u p t e d by British occupation on three occasions. 2 N o n e t h d e s s , w h e n the ~ s t period of Bfi~ ish p r e s e n c e e n d e d after the settlement of the Napoo ~onic Wars in 181Z it was found that htfle permanent damage had been done to the local population's at~chment ~) the French language and customs. Indeed the sizable m i x e d - b l o o d c o m m u n i t y t h a t h a d g r o w n around the F~ench ~ a d i n g posG was, ff anything, even more a t ~ c h e d to France. No doubt this identification was encouraged by the easy i n t e ~ a d a l social r~ationships that e ~ s t e d , and continue to e ~ s b in Senegal. The "assimilation" theor~ so a p p e ~ i n g to some French intellectu~s in the first h ~ f of the 20th centur~ had roots in these e a ~ y years of u n s d ~ o n s d o u s m i ~ cegenation. The ~ c f that many mixed-blood children were sent to France for education f u ~ h e r reinforced the Affican~ identification with the mother c o u n ~ Their p r e s e n c e in F r e n c h e d u c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s also tended to Hberalize attitudes toward cu~ural as~mflation that had been born in the French R e v ~ u t i o n of 1789. In contrast to the easy ways of the French, rigid British attitudes toward racial m i ~ n g with "people of color" e n c o u r a g e d S e n e g a ~ s e defections d u r i n g the relatively brief period of British occupation. The introduction of p e a n u t s in 1837 by a French m e r c h a n t n a m e d J a u b e ~ living in Gor6e finally provided the struggling colony with a viable cash crop; p e a n u t s were a timely alternative to the slave trade, 3 and the oil ~ o m the c r u s h e d nuts s u p p h e d the busy Marseil~s soapmakers with a secure source of vegetab~ fat.

Ft~nce in Black Africa Then in 1854 the a p p ~ n t m e n t of an energe~c and imagina~ve n e w governor rescued the sleepy c ~ o n y from its usual torpon

General Faidherbe Indeed the birth of France's modern Mack African empire can be dated from the a p p o i n t m e n t of Louis L6on C6sar F ~ d h e r b e as governor of Senegal in 1854. Like m a n y a m b i ~ o u s y o u n g officers of his da~ Faidherbe chose to make his way in the Army Corps of Eng i n e e ~ following a m e d ~ c r e academic career ~ 8 t h in a class of 120) at the p r e s ~ o u s ~ c d e Polytechnique in France. Early service in the p a d f i c a ~ o n of A l g e ~ a aroused a li~long passion in the young officer for adventure in exot~ ~ a c e s and for study of a l ~ n cultures. In Paris, his a p p ~ n t m e n t as governor of the c d o n y of Senegal was v ~ w e d as no great event. Indeed his more conve~tional m ~ r y colleagues must have seen R as a dead end to a m e d ~ c r e caree~ For France's imperial fuo ture, howeveG it turned out to be provident~l. Before being n a m e d governo~ Faidherbe had ab ready served in Senegal for 2 years as a m ~ i ~ r y engb neer. His unusual i n ~ r e s ~ and energy impressed his supefio~ Governor ProWL as well as the ~ a d e ~ of the local French c o m m e r c ~ l community. Both s u p p o s e d his candidacy for the governorship with authorities in Paris. From the o u t s e t , F a i d h e r b e had clear goals in mind. Nrst he sought to expand and c o n s ~ i d a ~ a base in Senegal. He then planned to open up ~ade r o u ~ s into the inte~or and link the upper Niger River basin with F r e n c h ~ o n ~ d ~ d p o r ~ on the coast. His concept

France Acquires and Administers an Empire

LIB~

Louis LOon COsar Faidherbe

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was not based on s i m ~ e m i h ~ r y conquest or impefi~ a g g r a n d ~ e m e n t . I n s ~ a d he focused on the commercial a d v a n ~ g e to be gained in reorienting the tradb t i o n a l t r a n s - S a h a r a n c a r a v a n t r a d e to F r e n c h c o n ~ d ~ d ports on the west coast. At the same time, Faidherbe w i s h e d to prevent c o m m e ~ e ~ o m h l l i n g into British h a n d ~ Bfi~in had ~ s o es~blished ~ading posts on the coast and was eager to expand her own b a d e with the intefio~ Early in his g o v e m o ~ p , F a ~ h e r b e succeeded in r e i n ~ K i n g a firm coas~l base anchored on the ~ n g - e ~ ~bfished French t ~ d i n g poMs in Seneg~. This original coastal enclave, usually referred to as the four comm u n e s , c o n M ~ e d of S ~ n ~ L o u ~ , Gor~e, Daka~ and Rufisque. They had been accorded special s ~ t u s in 1848 and t h o r inhabitants enjoyed full French citizenship. F a ~ h e r b e then p r ~ e c ~ d this base i n ~ n d by ex~ n d i n g a line of for~ up the Senegal River Valley His ulfima~ aim, which was never realized during his time in Africa, was to push this line of penetration into the heart of the S u d a n to the u p p e r reaches of the Niger Valley in what ~ now the Republic of Mall. The g r e a t e s t i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t blocking Faidh e r b e ' s s c h e m e was a large and a g g r e s s i v e Tokolor army led by E1 H a ~ Oma~ (The Tokdor are a Muslim Peul p e o ~ e w h o o f f , n a r d in the Fum-Toro r e , o n of Senegal.) O m a r was in the process of carving out an empire in lhe r e , o n and ~ e w e d the French as a potential threat. The two met head-on at Medina in the upper Senegal River V a l ~ where F a ~ h e r b e had recently built a fort. The d e ~ n s e of Medina by a g a ~ o n ~ d by Paul Holle blocked and t u r n e d the Tokobr thrust toward the coasb assuring French dominance of the sffa~ c Senegal River V a l ~

8

~ a n ~ Acquires and Adm&@t~s an Emp~e Although Faidherbe was not a ~ e to zeal~e his ub fimate goal of linking the upper Niger with the Senegalese coastal ports, he did succeed in unifying and padfying Senegal. He also le~ a carefully prepared base for future French expans~n into the intefion

The ~ a n c o ~ s ~ a n

War and Hs A ~ e r m a ~

Power re~tionships in Europe changed decisively with the defeat of France in 1871 at the hands of Prussia and her s m e a r German aH~s. A new, powerful Ge~ man Reich came into being following the disas~ous peace imposed on France. Interesfingl~ Gener~ Faidherbe played a minor though heroic part in the later s~ges of the war as commander of the Frend~ "Army of the North. ~ French preoccupation with Germany was virtually complete during the decade following their defeat at Sedan. The cautious French fe0red that colonel expansion could bring them into conflict wRh Great Bfi~in or Italy and further isolate France. 6 Therefore it was not until the early 1880's, with the French regaining t h o r s~Gconfidenc~ that interest in c d o n ~ l expans~n began to revive in French political and business c~des. Preoccupation with affairs in Europe, coupled with a desire for revenge against the Germans, dom~ nated the thoughts of the French officer corps a~er 1871. Few graduates of the French mili~ry academy at St. Cyr in those yea~ chose a posting to the marine inh n t r ~ the m ~ n force of the colonial army. Service with the Marous~G as the marine i n ~ n ~ y are called, was viewed wi~h dis~von First, it automatically took the oG fice~s away ~om the focus of national vengeance. Seo ond, the Marousins thems~ves were viewed as soc~lly

France h~ Black Africa undes~able in an officer corps still d o m ~ e d by the afistocrac~ they were apt to be republicans, anfide~ ks, and of petit bourgeois ofi~ns. Indeed c o m m i ~ n ing from the ranks was not unheard of in the harsh but mcre open Mamus&s sys~m. GraduaH~ howeveG young officers' sense of adventure, thirst for ~ o r ~ and deske for early promotion overcame their r e l u ~ a n c e to leave the ~adifionM famework of the metropolitan army. The unattractive p r o s p e r s of a dull garrison ~ "waShing the ~ u e fine of the Vosges" was a strong prod to the more active souls in the officer corps. Ultimately many of the best office~ who o p ~ d for ove~eas service during the period ca~ne to b ~ v e in F~nce's " d ~ n g m ~ s ~ n . " Like most Europeans of the day, they were convinced of the implicit superiority of thor own d ~ z a t ~ n and saw the impo~tion of thek cuRure as the ultima~ ~ in selfless genero~ty. A century later they may be judged as having been extraordinary in their ethnocentric arrogance. Nonethe~ss they were attuned to the values of their da~ Indeed even tod~y the commRment to a d v i ~ n g mission is very much alive in France. Wha~ver the ~uRs of such attitudes, France benefited greatly from this early generation of c d o n ~ l s d d ~ . Not only did they win her an empire, but they also provided some of her best ~ a d e r s h ~ in the ~ r ~ e trials of World War I. IncMded among the former cdonial soldiers who later distinguished t h e m s e N e s on European battlefields were such figures as Jof@e, GaH~ni, Henrys, GuillaumaL Degau~G M a n , n , Gaurand, and Fanchet ~Espere~ 7 The fact that these office~ of the cdonial Army were virtuaRy the only senior French officers who had heard

10

~ a ~ e ~quires a ~ ~ m ~ t ~ s

an Emp~

a shot fired in anger aRer 40 years of peace virtua~y assured their s~ecfion for senior command in war~me.

Acquiring an Ernp~e By the 1880s the s~ge was again set ~ r two qu~e independent French thrusts into the A&ican interior that w o u ~ ~ f i m a ~ define France's huge African emp i n s ~ e ~ h i n g from the shores of the Mediterranean Sea to the Congo Riven The western arm of this ~ a n t pincer would be m o u n ~ d from Faidherbe's base in Senegal. In 1880, C a p , i n ( ~ r G e n e ~ J.S. Gall~ni was ~ v e n o r d e ~ by Colon~ B f i ~ de FIsle, ~ e governor of Senegal, to trace a route to the Niger River and to rees~blish con~ct with Fa~herb~s d d adve~afieG the Tokolon Faidherbe's old enemD E1 Hadj OmaG the ~ u n d e r of the Tokolor e m ~ r e , had died in 1864 and been succeeded on the throne by his son Ahmadou, whose h ~ d on his sandy d o m ~ n was th rea~n ed by internal d~s e n~on. In 1880, the Tok~or nation was both i n t e r n ~ unstable and menaced by strong external ~es. The most p ~ e n t of these threats came from SamorD a member of the Mandinka p e o ~ e , who ultima~ly carved out a ~ z a ~ e e m ~ ~ r ~mself with i~ seat at Kankan in the hil~ Futa Djalbn reg ~n of what ~ now Gu~ea. The h e a ~ ~ Samor~s mffi~ry s t ~ n ~ h was ~ s own c~n, the Tour6. (The first p ~ d e n t of the Republic of Guinea, S~kou Tour6, claimed to be a grandson of SamorD) At this e a r ~ s~ge of his caree~ G ~ e n i commit~ d the c~s~c ~ u n d e r of underestimating his enemy.

11

france in Black Africa

DOCUMEN°IATION FRAN~AISE--Hi~IRE, ~ O ~ E o M E R

J. S. Gallieni

12

Frame Acquires a~d AdmM~ters an E m ~ Shortly a ~ e r e n t e r i n g Tokobr territor~ he easily dem a n d a group of Tok~ors in a s~rmish. Then, against the wishes of A h m a d o u , he c o n s t r u ~ e d a small fo~ at S a b o u h l ~ in Tok~or t e r r t o r ~ Arrogantly--and, as it proved, i m p r u d e n t l y - - G a l l ~ n i set off with only 150 men for A h m a d o u ' s capi~l at S6gou, hoping to force negotiations with the Tok~or leade~ On the wa~ his small retinue was aRacked and Gallieni was ~ k e n capfive on A h m a d o u ' s o r d e r . (This was G a ~ e n i ' s second expe~ence as a pfisone~ As a young sousqieu~nant, he had been captured by Bavadans in 1870 d u ~ n g a hardfought basle in the Franco-PrusMan Wa~D A h m a d o u final~ was forced to re~ase GMHeni and his compan~ n s folMwing the arrival of a s~ong French relief cAu m n u n d e r Colonel B o r g n i ~ D e s b o r d e s in Tokolor ~rritory in February 1881.9 The e n s u i n g n e g o t i a t i o n r e s u l t e d in a t r e a t ~ which the French later ~ i l e d to ratify. As part of the bargain, the French agreed that they would not bu~d a fort in Tokolor territory in return for a grant of exc~Mve figh~ to e M a ~ h trading posts in the Tokolor empire. C~afly th~ agreement was e x t r a o r d i n a ~ favorab~ to French c o m m e r d a l i n , r e s t s ; it granted the French exc~sive ~ading fights over an e x ~ n ~ v e ~rfitory w h i ~ barfing entry to their British competitors. N o n e t h ~ e s ~ C ~ o n e l Borgni~Desbordes would have none of it. As h a p p e n e d so often with the French of this period, a h e a d s ~ o n g soldieG t h o u s a n d s of miles from home, with slow and i m p e r ~ communica~ons with his supervisor~ took the bit between his ~ e t h . Disregarding orders, he invaded Tokdor ~ r f l ~ r y ~ t e r in 1881. Ahmadou, miscalculating the i m p o r ~ n c e of the threat to his longer t e r m i n t e r e s t , did not o p p o s e Borgnis'

13

provocation. Vacillating for ~ar of an attack by Samor~ whom he reckoned to be the more dangerous enemy, Ahmadou held his forces back. In the inddent, Borgn~ and his successors won some easy victorieG ~°finally capturing Bamako in 1883. On this, as on many future occa~onG th~ French ex~d and encouraged the chronic diviMons among Africans and took advan~ge of the consent in~rnecine fighting on this unstable southern frontier of Islam. By throwing the weight of their r e ~ t ~ e l y small but well-armed and d i s d a i n e d forces behind first one and then another African group or ~ a d e r - - m u c h as Britain did in Europe in the 19th century--they ultimately became the decisive s ~ a ~ c element in the region. G~Heni, returning to A~ica in 1886 with the title of commandant sup~rieur du Soudan Fran~a~ and the rank of l i e u t e n a n t colonel, finally pacified the region through a subtle a p p l ~ a t ~ n of mili~ry force. JudidouMy picking his fights whi~ keeping his e n e m a s off guard with constant r e m i n d e ~ of France's p o ~ n t i ~ m ~ r y s~ength, he gradually asser~d F~nce's dominance in the upper Niger Valle~ Indeed, the "Hero of the Marne T M d e m o n ~ r a ~ d a rare undemanding of the need to harness mfl~ary force to w~l-defined politic~ goals. Perhaps Gall~ni had read the great Chinese mfli~ry thinkeG Sun Tzu, du~ng his long service in Indochina. In any case, he cer~inly became a successful prac~tioner of the subtle art of dominating an enemy with a minimum of well-directed force. In the Sudan he first employed some of the ~c~cs he wouM later use so successfully in the conque~ of Madagascar.

14

France Acquires and Administers an Empire

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L.~UMEN*FATION FRAN(~AISE

Mandinka lead~ Samory

15

French presence on the Niger River was now firm~ e ~ a ~ h e d . The Tok~or e m p ~ e had been di~ d e d and weakened. Bd~sh commerd~ penetra~on ~ o m S ~ a Leone into the Sudan through the FuR D j ~ n had been Mocked. Sadly, with Gall~ni's depa~ ~ , the velvet ~ove of diplomacy was aga~ ~ m o v e d ~om the mailed fist. Early in 1889 his successo~ C~on~ A~m~ wi~h neither clear m a n d ~ e ~om Pads nor serous provoca~on, ag~n ~ c k e d the T o k o ~ . W~h little ~ f f i c ~ , he occu~ed ~ r cap~al at S~gou and committed F~nce to smash~g the already weakened Tokolor sta~. With Tokolor power des~oyed and the~ ~ a d e ~ s ~ p ~ exile ~ Sokoto On what has become northern Nigeda~ A~hima~d ~ n e d ~ s atten~on ~ the Mand ~ k a empire of Samory, whose he~tland was the r u ~ ged Futa Djal~n. In April 1881, the French a~acked toward Samor~s cap~al ~ Kankan. To the surprise of the French, r e l i a n c e was fierce and pr~onged. Samor~s ~oops were ~ i ~ e d and armed with precb sion ~fles procured quietly from British traders in ~ e ~ a Leone. A s ~ l ~ d commande~ Samory ~ught a flever camp~gn, re~dng ~owly eastw~d and scorch~ g the earth as he w i t h d ~ w in good order with his army and poli~c~ structure intact. Indeed Samor~s camp~gn ~ s e m ~ e d in many ways the ~c~cs Afrikaners em~oyed a ~ w years ~ter a g a ~ the B~fish in South Afric~s Boer Wa~ In a ~ ~ took sever~ years of ~rm~nt figh~ng ~ d e ~ Samor~ who was finally captu~d in ~89 and exiled ~ the inhospitable clima~ of southern Gabon, where he d ~ d 2 yea~ l a ~ (An in~ s ~ n g ~ o t n o ~ ~ this ~ d ~ s ~ r y is that ju~ b e ~ his own death in 1984, Samor~s descendanL S~kou

16

Frame ~quires a ~ M m ~ t ~ s

an Emp~

T o u ~ , preMdent of Guinea, visited S a m o r ~ s grave ~ in Gabon.) The u n a m b i g u o u s use of raw m i l i ~ r y p o w e r by GMheni's s u c c e s s o ~ ~ H ~ doubt that France w o u ~ not long t d e r a ~ s ~ o n g MuMim s t a ~ s in Africa south of the Sahara. T h e fever for c ~ o n i a l a c q u i ~ f i o n h a d struck. The s c r a m ~ e ~ r A f t r a was on a m o n g the Eur o p e a n p o w e r s , w h o h a d a g r e e d on the rules of the game at far-off Berlin in 1885. The race to claim u n c o m m i ~ e d t e r r i f i e s in the c e n ~ r of Africa, no m a ~ e r h o w i n h o s p ~ a ~ e , was f u l ~ engaged.

Da Brazza Stakes a Claim in Central A f r ~ a S u r p f i ~ n g l ~ it was not in Senegal or the Sudan, the seats of virtually M1 earlier French coloniM activity in black A f r c G that the next French colonial initiative took place. I n s t e a d it o c c u r r e d in Gabon, w h e r e the French Navy h a d e s t a b l ~ h e d a small station in 1842 to s u p p o r t its m o d e s t antislavery activities. In 1875 the Minister of the Nav~ Admiral de Montaignac, confided a mission of e x p l o r a f o n to a young Ralian-born aristocrat, Pierre S a v o r g n a n da Brazza, w h o h a d only recently become a n a t u r a h z e d French d f i z e n a n d been c o m m ~ s M n e d in the French Navy In an incredible feat of e n d u r a n c e a n d p l u c k , da Brazza m o u n t e d t h e O g o o u e River nearly 1,000 miles to a p o i n t near the present site of Francevil~ in s o u t h w e s t e r n Gabon. He and his party t h e n trekked across the ~ e e ~ s s Bateke Plateau to the Alima Riveg which flows south into the C o n g o . Da Brazza t h u s h a d f o u n d a r o u t e that byp a s s e d the falls a n d r a p i d s in the lower C o n g o River and had reached the n e t w o r k of t h o u s a n d s of m i l s of

17

00

3"

~~AT'ION

Pierre &~gr~n da Brazza during his explorationin ~bon.

FRA.N~

~ a ~ e A ~ u i ~ s and Adm&~t~s an Empi~ navigable s t r e a m s that d r a i n the w h o l e of Central Af~ca. The colonial occup~rs in the south, unlike those in the Sudan, faced no militarily s~ong, ~ghtly organized Mushm states. On the c o n ~ a r ~ the popula~on was usually friendly unless aroused by overaggres~ve or i n s e n ~ v e i n ~ u d e r s . T h e y w e r e m a i n l y Bantuspeaking peoples who lived in r e ~ v e l y small vil~ges. D e p e n d i n g on terrain and climate, they either w e r e hunters and g a t h e r e r s or practiced a p ~ m i ~ v e slasha n d - b u r n a g ~ c u l t u r e . The really d a u n ~ n g problems facing the French and other E u r o p e a n s w h o came to equatorial Af~ca to profiL to occup~ or to proselytize were primarily health hazards and the physical difficulty of p e n e ~ a ~ n g the dense rain forests. Only the n u m e r o u s ~vers provided reasonable means of reaching the interio~ Endemic tropical diseases like yellow fever and mala6a claimed a high propor~on of Europeans who a ~ e m p t e d to live in this region up to recent times. It was only with the large advances in trop~al m e d ~ i n e made d u r i n g World War II that whites could live in compara~ve safety in places like Gabon or the Congo. In the 19th centur~ it was the opfim~fic missionar~ s d d ~ or trader who anti~pated survival into middle age. As an example of the~ quiet fatal~m, American m~sionafies bound from Boston ~o Gabon in the mid19th century o ~ e n carried their gravestones on the ship with them. The tender ages one sees on many of the pathetic squares of Vermont marble in a forgo~en c o m e r of the Protestant cemetery in L i b r e v ~ attest to the incredible d e d i c a ~ o n a n d s t o i d s m of t h e s e d e v o t e d folk. ~2

19

France in BhKk A ~ a

Stanley's Challenge A s ~ e ~om the d i m a ~ and the i m p e n e t ~ e jungle, the most serious challenge to the o ccu p at~n of e q u a t o ~ A f t r a came &om the competition posed by other Europeans. The souKe of the most ~ c ~ v e compefi~on for the French in the Congo basin was the en~rprising king of the B d ~ a n G Leopold II, and his p ~ v a ~ organ~ed In~rna~onal African A s s o c ~ o n , founded in 1876, and the C o m i ~ d'~tudes du Haut Congo, founded in 1878. In a clever move, L e o p ~ d hi~ed Henry M. S ~ n ~ y (the intrepid ex~oreG journa~ isL and locator of Dav~ L i ~ n g s ~ n ~ in 1878 to lead his expedi~ons to ~ y daim ~ as much of this vast and po~ n t i a l ~ rich r e , o n as the European p o w e~ would ~t him get away with. ~ n ~ who was aptly c ~ d Bou~ Malari in Swah~i ~ r a l l ~ "rock breaker), was a brill~nt ch~ce. He was iron wH~d and suf~red ~ w noticeable restraints or scruples. He had crossed the con~nent in 1876-77 at the head of a c d u m n composed of 3 Englishmen and 300 ~ u g h Zan~ba~ aska~s (sdd~rs) and p o r ~ . ~3None of the other En~ishmen and only half the Zan~ba~s were to sur%ve the ha~owing trip that ended at Boma near the mouth of the Congo Rive~ S ~ n ~ y had thus crossed the continent, demons~a~ng that the great Congo River network was na~ga y e for thousands of mi~s above the impassa~e ~ p i d s and ~lls near the west coast. He had also ~ u n d a ~as~le way around these ~ natural barders. To Leopdd this meant that the pene~a~on of the Congo b a r n was possible @ore the west without ~cing the formida~e o p p o ~ o n of the w d b a r m e d Z a n z ~ a ~ slave traders

20

Frame Acquires ~ d Adm&~t~s ~ E m ~ who then d o m i n a ~ d Ea~ Africa and the African great ~kes reg~n. S ~ n ~ y was engaged now by Leop~d as an agent, and the race to acquire the heart of Af~ca was on. Opposing Stanley was the r e ~ f i v e ~ gentle da Brazza. Subsequent French claims in the Congo basin were based on his success in finding a route from Gabon to the navigable w a ~ of the Congo River upstream ~om the present sites of Kinshasa and Brazzavffie. At first the French were slow in ~s p o n d in g to L e o p d ~ s p~vate in~ia~ve. In d e s p e r a ~ o n , fearful that Stanley would succeed in laying claim to large portions of the Congo basin, da Brazza hims~f set out a second time @om France with i n a d e q u a ~ financing and without permission from the Minis~y of the Nav~ ~ N o n eth ~ less he succeeded in e s ~ i s h i n g a small post at the p o d on the ~ght bank of the Congo RiveG at the ~ of modern B ~ z z a ~ l ~ . Da Brazza also signed a ~eaty on 10 S e p ~ m b e r 1880 with the Ba~ke paramount chieL Makoko. This document ceded sover~gnty to France over vast though ~-defined ~rri~rieG including the s ~ a ~ c p o d above the Congo River rapids. (Ironb call~ this broad stretch of calm water u l t i m a ~ became known as the S ~ n ~ y Pod.) Da B ~ z a wa~ howeveG ~ctim of a ~me-honored African scam. The sovereignty that Makoko so generously conveyed to France had q u e ~ n a ~ e v a l i d l y both in tradition and in effec~ve occupat~n. But for that m ~ G da Brazza had been d e ~ g a ~ d no power by the French government to sign such an agreement. Neve~he~ss the treaty was ratified by the Na~onal A ~ s e m ~ y in Pa~s in an uncharac~fis~c b u ~ t of enthus~ asm. The race was then on b e t w e e n da Brazza and

21

~

in ~

~

S t a n l e y for c o n t r ~ of t h e g r e a t b a s i n of t h e C o n g o Rive~ The French ultimately got the poorest p a r ~ of this rich r e , o n . These were, howeve~ the p a r ~ that could be m o ~ easily i ~ n e d ~ t h o r c o n q u e s ~ ~ r t h e r north in the S u d a n . In t i m e , t h e d i v i s i o n (at the line of t h e U b a n ~ ) was sanctified by the C o h e r e n c e of Berlin in 1885. ~ T h e r e a ~ e ~ F r e n c h e x ~ o r a t o n in this r e , o n was o r i e n t e d n o r t h t o w a r d the 5 a n g h a , Lake C h a d , and the A n ~ o - E g y p t i a n Sudan. The French, the G e ~ roans, a n d t h e British w o u l d u l f i m a ~ settle their boundaries in the center of Africa, and France would exert s o v e ~ n t y over a vast contiguous p ~ c e of Africa s ~ e ~ h i n g ~ o m the M e ~ a n e a n to the Congo.

The Final Battle T h e c l i m a x of t h i s 2 0 - y e a r saga w a s a t h r e e p r o n g e d m i h ~ r y expedition m o u n t e d against the Sul~ n Rabah, w h o f i n a l ~ was cornered and Ml~d on the banks of Lake Chad on 22 April 1900. As an f l M M ~ t o n of the scale of the canvas u p o n w ~ c h this final act was ~ a y e d out, the n o r t h e r n a r m of the expedRMn moved south across the desert from Algeria, another c d u m n came east from Nige~ and the third arm marched north from the Shari. ~s The sca~ of the operation was ~ u ~ c~ossM. MoreoveG it took in s o m e of the moM ~ h o s p i ~ b l e ~ r r a i n a n d climatic c o n d i t i o n s that exist a n y w h e r e on the g b b e .

Coastal Acquisition Over the years, the French had established themselves at several points along the w e ~ cen~al coast of

~ a n ~ A~ui~s and A d m m ~ s ~ Empire Africa. Their main interest was ~ading, with a ~sser interest in m ~ o n a r y activities. After the signing of the Act of Berlin in 1885, the pressure to stake out formal claims to these stretches of the coastline and their hinterlands--indeed, to as much of A~ica as possib l e - b e c a m e irreMs~ble. The Br~sh were ~ready well e~abl~hed in S ~ a Leone, the Grid Coast (Ghana), and the Niger delta region (Nigeria). The Germans took Cameroon and Togo. The Portuguese held the Angala coast and shared a scattering of small offshore is~nds with the Spanish. Unlike the Sudanic inte~o~ where the impetus often came &om vainglo~ous military officers, pressures for occupation on the coast came ~om long-e~ ~bl ~he d French c o m m e r d ~ interests who wished to protect their trade and exclude compe~tors. For once, public opinion in France was favorable to colonial acqui~on.

The Ivory Coast Acquidng the Ivory Coast was the work of two men. Their o p e r a , o n was brilliant in its ~mpli~ty. Fearing British i n t e r v e n ~ o n from the nearby Gold CoasL Gus~ve Binger ~ pro~ge of Faidherbe in Senegal) departed alone from Bamalis to a v i d arousing B~tish suspidons. He met secretly with a French ~ader named Marcd T r ~ c h - L a ~ n e at Kon~ in what became the n o r t h e r n Ivory Coast. The two men then proceeded south, signing treaties of pro~cfion with Aftcan chiefs as they went. Treat,s in hand, they set up the cdony of the Ivory Coast in 1893. Pads rewarded Gus~ve Binger by naming him the fi~t governo~ ~z

Frame ~ ~ k

A~

Dahomey Occupat~n of Lagos by the British in 1861, and subsequent ~ a r of their expanding commerd~ grasp, finally induced the French to proclaim a p r o t e c t o ~ in 1883 over eastern Dahomey with its capRal at PortoNovo. At the same time, they occup~d the nearby trading port of Cotonou. Heavy commitmen~ in the Sudan, cou~ed with a Hngefing bel~f in the exaggem~d ~les of Fon mffimry prowes~ TM encouraged French re~ c ~ n c e to add to their miH~ry burdens. (The Fons had a h i g h ~ organized and soph~fica~d p~itical and sodal structure. Indeed, they were to be the su~ect of the fi~t b n g anthrop~o~cal study done by an American schdar in A ~ a . The author was Melville Herskovi ~ of No~hweMern Unive~ity.) Finally, a~er much v a d l ~ o n , they lost patience with the imprudent young Fons ~ader, King B e h a n ~ who had succeeded the wiser Gele~ to the Abomey throne in 1889. In 1892, French troops occupied Abomey almost efforflesM~ deposing Behan~n and div~ing his ~ngdom. At first an effort was made to rule ind~ecfly through the Fons h ~ r a r c h y in Abomey and Allada, and for the east through the Gan chieL To~, in Porto-Novo. E v e n t u ~ a unRed c~ony of Dahomey was es~blished, with little more than ceremoni~ r e s p o n s i ~ f i e s ~ff to the chief.

Spoils Divided The final episodes in div~ing African ~rfitofies and defining ~onfiers were played out between Europeans. France's andent an~goni~, B f i ~ , s p ~ d the com~e~ness of France's conquest by ~ n g posses~on of the mouth and lower reaches of the Niger Valle~

Fran~ ~quires a ~ A d m ~ t ~ s an Emp~ British c o n e d was then extended up the Niger to o o cupy the hon's share of the best pads of the d d Hausa emp~e. At about the same time, the French had peac~ fully occupied the n o r t h e r n portion of the Congo basin. This area was then extended further north to Chad, where a junction was made with French posse~ ~ons in West and North Africa. A final agreement was s~uck between the c d o n ~ l p o w e ~ in 1898 that h r g e ~ c o m p l i e d the partition of West Africa. 19 The hs t African confrontation between the French and the British took ~ a c e in what was then the western part of An~o-Egyptian Sudan. A small French expedition under Captain le Marchand was d ~ p a ~ h e d to the Upper Nile in 1896 with the aim of putting p r e ~ u r e on the British in Egyp~s Sudanese hinterland. ~ The F ~ n c h had a hngering am~tion to link their West and Cen~al African empire with the Red Sea by a ~ans-Saharan railway. British ~ c ~ r y against the Mahdi~ fundamentaHMs at O m d u r m a n in 1898 e n d e d these dreams and undercut le Marchand's mis s ~n . When faced with o v e r w h e l m i n g British force, the French agreed to evacuate the Htfle Sudanese oa~s of Fashoda (then occup~d by le Ma~hand% tiny ~ e ) , avowing the risk of a more serious c o n d o n a t i o n with the Brib ish. The folbwing year (1899) the French ~ w o r e te~ ri~fial ambitions in the Nik basin. The eas~rn HmRs of the French empire were then set. ~ n a l l~uidation of o u ~ n d i n g A n g b - F r e n c h differences in Africa took ~ace in 1904 with an agreement rearing the decks of residual Af~can p r o ~ e m s in antidpation of the En~ n ~ Cordia~ between the two European p o w e r . The c d o n ~ l p o w e ~ had yet again d e m o n s ~ a ~ d the subordination of t h o r African interests to their European in~s~.

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From Pacification to Administration The brief p e ~ o d of intense ac~vity from 1880 to 1900 had been e x t ~ o r d i n a r ~ France had acquired vast t e r ~ t o ~ e s in West and C e n ~ a l A&~a. She now was ~ c e d with the ~ss drama~c but n~flesome p r o b ~ m of a d m i n i s t e r i n g the empire that the e n t h u ~ a s m of her s d d ~ r G sa~ors, and merchants had won. F o ~ u n a ~ a w o r ~ n g m o d ~ was at hand. Forty y e a ~ earlier Fa~herbe had de%sed a s y s ~ m of a d m i n ~ a ~ o n ~ r the p o r ~ o n of Senegal that he had acquired outside the ~ u r communes. With some modifica~on in d e ~ and in spi~t, this a d m i n i ~ f i v e model ul~mately was imposed on all of Franc~s new A ~ a n d o m ~ n s . As t e r ~ t o ~ e s were acquired and p a d f i e d , they were o r g a n ~ e d i~to cdonies. Governors were n a m e d and the territory divided into what became the d a s ~ c s u b d i v i s ~ the c~c~. At fi~L French m ~ r y office~ were a s s i g n e d as commandan~ de ceK~ to assure firm control. Aff~an chiefs were a l ~ w e d to head o n ~ the b w e s t two e c h ~ o n s of the a d m i n i ~ v e pyramid, the canton and the v~lage. F a ~ h e r b e ' s o d ~ n a l concept was to govern indirectly through the ~ a ~ f i o n ~ h ~ archy, but this p ~ n ~ e was s u b v e ~ e d by his success o r s , w h o w e r e u s u a l l y l e s s s e n s i t i v e to t h e admi~ve u~lity and the soc~l v a ~ e of preserving the authority of the ~ a d i ~ o n ~ c h ~ £ I n s ~ a d , they pre~ r r e d to impose a h ~ r a r c h y of French administrator~ who o~en were ~ r c e d ~ c o m m u n i c a ~ with the popula~on through local interprete~ of frequently indiG ferent linguistic ability The result was o ~ e n m u t u a l i n c o m p r e h e n ~ o n b e t w e e n governors and governed. French values were too o~en u n c o n s c ~ u s ~ imposed

~ I Y ~ N T A ~ N FF~N~Mb~

Administrative tribunal in French colonial Ajffica.

France ht Black Aftra w i t h o u t r e g a r d to cultural d i f f e r e n c e s . Unlike Fa~herbG who spent much time in the study of ethnography and bcal languages, most French admini~ t r a t o r s - - e s p e ~ M l y in the early colonial p e ~ o d - remMned ignorant of such things. Too o~en the combination of their own ignorance and the c o m m o n ~ held cultural assumptions of the time led to out-o~ hand den~rafion of the un~miHar as primitive and und~zed. The imporMnce and c o m # e ~ t y of admini~ering a vast colonial empire s u g g e s ~ d to the orderly French mind the e s ~ i s h m e n t of a c~onM1 m i n ~ y in Paris. H e r ~ o ~ the Ministry of the Navy had been the ~adRional protector of the scattered coastal t~ding posts in Africa and of the increasing~ i m p o t e n t dependences in Indochina. This same Ca~e~an pass~n for orderliness sugges~d the grouping of c d o n ~ s under the authority of a governor general. Thus in 1895 the c~onial ~demfion of French West Africa (Afrique Occ~entaM Franqa~e (AO~), was formed. At first, AOF inc~ded Senegal Sudan, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast. Appropfia~ly, Saint-Louis in Senegal was named as the capRal of the new %derafion, and the governor of Senegal was ~ven the added honor of serving as governor general. AOF ~fimately grew to include all eight colonies of We~ Africa, with its a d m i n i s t ~ v e seat at DakaL 2~The ~ d e v a~on of French EquatoriM Africa (Afrique ~qua~fiaM Franqa~e (AEF)) was slower ~ ev~ve. A comm~safiat general under da Brazza was created in 1886 with its h e a d q u a r ~ first in L~re%lM and then in Brazza~lM. ~ n a l ~ a ~dera~on was e s M ~ h e d in 1910in the image of the AOF government general. ~ (The two mandated

France ~ q u i ~ a ~ Adm&~t~s an E m ~ ~r~tofies of Togo and Cameroon were brought under French a d m i n ~ a f i o n folbwing the German d e , a t in World War I.) A~er the heady draft of conquesL the French soberly took stock of the vast lands they had conquered and occupied. Soon they came to reahze that the hin~flands were not the Eldorado of legend. Sadly, this ~ i t o r y was found to be mainly poo~ undevebped, and semiarid. The thrifty French ~ s l a t o r s in Paris q u ~ k ~ res~ved that the a d m i n ~ a f i o n and devebpment of this vast empffe were not to be subsid~ed from the French ~easur~ rathe~ the cMonies must be selG suffident. Because it was obvious that many of the in~fior ~rfitofies were not capa~e of produdng enough revenue to support even rudimentary adminis~afion, ~ say nothing of a surplus for devebpment, the French hit upon the scheme of subsidizing the poorer territories with revenues raised in the richer coastal territories. To a d m i n ~ t e r budgetary red~tribufion, the government general was Mrengthened in 1904 and armed with the fight ~o cM~ct the relatively ~crative customs and excise taxes. At the same time, the governor general was accorded ~uly ~ceregM p o w e r . He was prodMmed to be the "repoMtory of the powe~ of the R e p u t e " and stood at the apex of a h i g ~ y central~ed administrative pyramid. ~ Whereas the NatMnal A s s e m ~ y in Paris might pass laws and the president of the Republic might proclaim decrees, it was the governor general who held lhe crudal power to implement both law and polic~ MoreoveG u n d e r his r e g u ~ t o r y powers, he could issue reguhfions defining how laws were to be appl~d. ObvMuMy such reguhfions could be at least

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Fran~ A~ui~s and AdmMist~s an Emp~e as i m p o r ~ n t as the o~ginal ~ N a t i o n , for it was these r e g u h f i o n s that interpreted the law and instructed adminN~afion on how to a p ~ y it. FinaHN he couM impose taxes (other than import ~fiffs) and create state monopd~s. Indeed, the p o w e ~ ~ R to the m i n i s ~ r of c d o n ~ s were paltry in compaNson; the hMder of this portfol i o ~ c o n s i d e r e d of secondary i m p o r ~ n c e in the cabin e t - c o u l d not even offic~lly c o m m u n k a t e directly with the l ~ u t e n a n t governors in each cMon~ but was f o x e d to pass his correspondence through their h ~ b archical s u p e ~ o c the governor general. Only in the critical area of finance was the governor general required to submit his budget to the m i n N ~ r of cdonieG who might suggest c e r ~ i n changes. He couM not veto or change individual items but had ~ approve or disapprove, en ~oc, the governor generags entire presentation. At the same time, the H e u ~ n a n t governors in the various c ~ o n ~ s were ~R with limited autonomous adminNtt ative authority. They were, in e f ~ , the pfindpal resident subordinates of the governor g e n e ~ l . Federal c o f ~ w e r e s w ~ l e n with revenue from c u ~ o m s duties. These substantial fiscal resources gave the ~ d e r a l a d m i n N ~ a f i ~ its real powe~ The c~onies themselves retained only the revenues from the head ~ x 0 e v ~ d directly on M1Af~can adult m a ~ and from some local ~ e s . ~ Although the p r e d s e formula for imposing the head ~ x v a n e d sHght~ between c d o n ~ s in AOF and AEE o n ~ the r e h t i v e ~ ~ w Africans who had acquired French dfizenship in either ~deration were excluded. ~ O R e n the head ~ x was collected in kind through forced work on p u n k ~dlities ~ke roads. The

31

France in Black Africa head ~x was c d ~ e d by African authorities ~ the can~ n and village ~vels. The proceeds were then passed up the hierarchical line to the c d o n ~ l ffeasur~ This duW did noL of course, make the African ~ n ~ n a f i e s espedaHy popuMr with their fellows. From 1904 on, the c d o ~ e s w ~ e required by law to be self-supporting except in national d e ~ n s e and in the financing of public works of imperial i n ~ m ~ . ~ W i ~ o u t doubt one of the pfindpal reasons for the es~hment of the ~derafions with their centralized s e r ~c e ~ unified budgets, and autonomous sources of revenue was to s u b ~ z e the admi~stration and deveb o p m e ~ of the poorer c ~ o n ~ s through ind~ect ~xes, which fell most heavily on the ~cheG coastal states. Virtually all major d e v e ~ p m e n t projec~ undertaken be~re the end of World War II were financed through the governor generaVs budget, and the surplus from that budget was routindy m ~ r i b u ~ d ~ the c d o n ~ s in deficit to meet ordinary a d m ~ i s t ~ t i v e costs. ~ Taking an ex~eme exam~e, Chad mc~ved 90 peKent of its revenue from this source during the in~rwar years.

The Cinderella Federation In AEF there were no affluent colon~s to provide surplus revenue to be redist~buted. Lacking internal resources and unwilling to provide me~opolitan subsidies, the French followed the model of King Leopold's Congo Free State. Initially they chose the dangerous exped~nt of granting concessions to private companies to develop and a d m i n ~ t e r large tracts of land. By 1900, 40 companies had been granted conce~ sions over about 250,000 square mies. ~ Unfortunatel~

Fran~ A q u & ~ a ~ Adm&~t~s an Emp~ most were grossly u n d e K a p i ~ l ~ e d and none made any meaningful investment in basic inffas~ucture. Instead they ~aded and bought ~ w rubber and ivory at the bwest possible prices @ore the Mcal Af~can population. The wel~re of the c d o n ~ s and their p e o ~ e s was thus subordinated to p~va~ in~re~s. The resulb ing abuses greatly embarrassed the French Government, u l ~ m a ~ forcing it to impose controls on all p~va~ conces~onaffes and to rescind the bulk of the concesMons. The highly centralized ~deral sys~m, in which the Heutenant governors were subordinated to the governor general and m~or budge~ry powe~ resided in Dakar and Brazzavil~, survived with only minor changes down to the eve of independence. R was o n ~ in 1957 and 1958 that the fundamental law (lo#cadre), folMwed by the new constitution for the ~Rh RepubliG reve~ed this paRern. Inevi~bly, resentment of the r d e of lhe ~derations had grown among the rehtively affluent coas~l s ~ s . This resentment became espedal~ s~ong in the Ivory CoasL which, with the help of conservative French business in~reMs, u l t i m a ~ des~oyed the ~derations just before independence in 1960.

A~imfl~n

and A s s o c ~ f i o n

"As~mflafion" and "assodafion" were the princip~ p ~ p h ~ ~em~ ~at dom~a~d ~ench cdo~ • o u g ~ and practice during most ~ the h ~ of Franc~s second c d o n ~ l e m ~ m (~80-D60). Indeed, echoes of these competing doctrines continue even ~day ~ anb m a ~ discussion ~ the nature ~ France's m~tions with her ~ r m ~ c d o ~ .

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The concept of asMmihtion refers to a process by w h k h non-French peoples were to be assumed into the body of the French nation, taught its hnguagG and indoctrinated in its culture. They were to become French through an accuRurafion process. The concepfs history is long, da~ng back to France's first c d o n ~ l empire in the 17th and 18th centuries. It was first applied in Africa in 1848 when the residents of the four historic French c o m m u n e s on the coast of Senegal were granted French dtizenship and representation in the National Assembly in Paris aMng with the residen~ of R6union, the French West Indies, and a ~ w other sca~ feted d e p e n d e n d e s with French connections dating back to the ancien r~gime. ~ Few pro~ems arose when the areas invMved were small and the numbers to be asMm~a~d were r e h t i v e ~ ins~nificant. Difficulties with this romant~ concept developed, howeveG when General Faidherbe began to expand French c o n e d into the Senega~se hin~fland. He was then ~ced with hrge n u m b e ~ of p e o ~ e living in a total~ d i f ~ r e n t culture who had little basis for understanding or relating to French civilization. Being a pracficM man, Faidherbe Mgned treaties of p r o ~ n with the traditional r u ~ r ~ these treaties acknowledged French sovereignty while MMwing the members of the native h~rarchy ~ continue to ru ~ over their ~Hows with only loose supervision by French offidMs. Faidherbe recogn~ed this s y s ~m of indire~ c o n ~ as the least disruptive, the cheapesL and therefore the most p r a ~ a b l e means of governing at minimum cost and fuss. His pragmatic approach to African reality was h ~ r d~nified with the term "assodation" and further

Fran~ Acquires ~ d A d m ~ t ~ s an E m p ~ refined by Gallieni in Madagascar and Lyautey in Morocco. French i n ~ l ~ u a l ~eahsm, howeve~ would not be stilled by any such mundane ~ r m u ~ . Eighteenthcentury phiMsophe~ such as Montesqu~u, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Diderot p ro v ~ed intd~ctual ~ t i m a c y ~ the concept of cultu~l as~milafion. The French Revdufion of 1789 had awakened a miss~nary zeal in the French. Many were driven ~ spread their culture, ~nguage, and p~itical p h i ~ s o p h y to the less fortunate n o n - F r a n c o p h o n e . Their ultimate gift became language and culture. Human equality and the value of educat~n as a co~ecfive ~ envffonmen~l dif~rences were raised in republican France to the ~vel of secu~r dogma by dedicated advocates of asMmflafion. (Like most zealots, French dvili~ng m~Monafies assumed cultural superiority. In this regard, the French were ~ r from b~eingalone in their ~hnocentfism.) ~ t ~ r w r a n ~ g between a s s i m i ~ f i o n ~ and ass o c ~ f i o n ~ continued to d o m i n a ~ French colonial thought ~ r the h ~ c e n t u r y b e ~ World War II. Philosophic immo~lism resuRed. Advoca~s on each side of the doctrinal battle conMdered the opposing view untena~e. ~ Their one point of agreement was that independence for the c d o n ~ s was out of the question. In the meantimG the French admini~rafions in the two ~ d e ~ f i o n s had qu~fly turned to a form of db r e ~ admin~ffation despite the numerous treaties of protection they had signed with traditional rulers. Whereas British c ~ o n ~ l civil servants g e n e r a l ~ respected what they regarded as the traditional hiera r c h ~ French r e p u b l i c a n s w e r e not c o m f o r ~ b ~ governing through what many saw as u n e ~ h ~ n e d

35

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~ u d a l tyrants. The fact that only slightly more than 12 percent of the adminiMrato~ d u ~ n g the p e ~ o d 18871939 spoke an African language s u r e ~ did nothing to improve u n d e r s ~ n d i n g and a p p r e c ~ t ~ n . ~ Not only was the system they evolved direc~ it i n e v i ~ b l y became highly central~ed. Lines of d e d ~ o n flowed @ore the colonies to Dakar or B r a z z a v ~ and through these centers to Pa~s. Lo~cally, loc~ a u t h o ~ e s in the c d o nies could not be granted a larger role than those in France herself. The place of the m e ~ o p o l i ~ n pr~fet was fil~d in ~he c d o n ~ s by the governo~ and the sou~pr~fet by the c~nmandan8 de c~c~. The p e ~ o d between the two World Wars has been cal~d an era of lost opportunities for the French in A~ rica. D o ~ n a l w r a n g l i n g c o m b i n e d with a chronic s h o r ~ g e of m o n e y to produce s ~ g n a ~ o n . The result was v e r y m o d e s t d e v e l o p m e n t b o t h of h u m a n resources for assimHa~on and of m a ~ a l and governmental s~uctures for some form of e v e n t u ~ assoda~on based on r e s t i v e equality with France. A ~ w stafis~cs may help ~ u s ~ a ~ ~he degree of torpcr resulting ~ o m the Great D e p r e s ~ o n and the debfl~a~ng b n g - ~ r m e~ ~ c t s on France of the d e v a s t a ~ o n of World War I. By 1936 there were o n ~ 80,509 Ind~n~ Citoyens Fran~a~ (French c~izens of Af~can o~gin) in all of AOE More shocking, o n ~ 2,136 were ~ o m colonies other than Senegal. Indeed even in S e n e g a l the ci~zens ~ o m the four c o m m u n e s made up a ~ r g e m~ofity of Aff~an d b izens. ~ In view of the fact that they had h e ~ ci~zenship since 1848, their n u m b e ~ can h a r d y be used to d e m o n ~ r a ~ later success in as~m~afion. On the contrar~ as late as 1939 there were only 63,200 students in p ~ m a r y s c h o ~ s throughout AOF, w h ~ h at that ~me

36

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had a total p o p u l a ~ o n of 14.7 million. ~ The great maj o l t y of those s t u d e n t s were in village s c h o d G which gave no more t h a n a 2-year h ~ r a c y course. At the apex of a s ~ e ~ y ~ d e d educational p y r a m i d were the h a n d f u l of R~nd~ ~oles. The most t l u s ~ u s of these were the m e d i a l s c h o ~ at Dakar and the ~ c ~ e William Ponty at Gor6e. At a slightly less e ~ v a ~ d ~vel were the v e ~ f i n a r y s c h o ~ at Bamako and the ~ a c h e ~ c r i n g e s in S u d a n a n d the Ivory Coast. For s ~ g h t aca d e m ~ G there were two lycd~ in Senegal that granted cer~ficates c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the French bacca~ur~at.~ The situa~on was roughly ~ m i ~ r in the two mand a ~ d ~ r f i t o ~ e s of Togo and C a m e r o o n . Sadly, the Cind e r ~ territories of AEF were even ~ s s well e n d o w e d with educa~onal ~ l i ~ e s t h a n AOF or the m a n d a ~ d territories. D e s p i ~ all the ~ l k of c u l t u r ~ a s ~ m i ~ t i o n , it was c ~ a r that u n d e r the colonial r e , m e , the p u r p o s e of p o s t p r i m a r y e d u c a ~ o n for A f ~ c a n s was v o c a ~ o n ~ . The a d m i n ~ a ~ o n d e c i d e d the t y p e of training a n d n u m b e r s n e e d e d to p r o v i d e c a d r e s in v a r i o u s categories to the a d m i n ~ a ~ o n . A ~w ou~nding students, i n c ~ d i n g Af~ca's fi~t ~vofesseuragr~gG L 6 o p d d SenghoG were sent to France for advanced education. They were a rare ~w. While Hp service was o ~ e n paid to France's d v H ~ i n g misMon, Htfle was done in prac~cal t e r m s to i n t r o d u c e the b u l k of the p o p u ~ f i o n in ~ a c k Af~ca to French c u ~ u r e before World War H, des p i ~ the ~ c t that French was the offi~al language as well as the ~ n g u a g e of i n s ~ u c ~ o n in the s c h o ~ s . All other forms of s c h o ~ were discouraged, i n d u d i n g the Koran~ s c h o d s in ~he M u ~ i m ~r~tofies. Nonetheless

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FranceAcquires and Admm~ters an Empire only a minority spoke French, and a m~o~ty of those spoke it badl~

Econom~ Stagnation Benign n e ~ e ~ b e ~ describes the French at~tude ~ward economic devebpment du~ng this period. An integra~d econom~ devebpment ~ a n provMing for the crea~on of infrastructure (to be financed with credits gua~nteed by the m~ropole) was proposed in 1921 by the energe~c minis~r of c d o ~ e ~ A ~ e ~ Sa~aut. Although a m~o~ty in the NationM Assembly voted to accept the plan, the same m~o~ty refused ~ appropria~ funds ~ ca~y it out. ~ Indeed ~ t h e r than r e c d ~ n g financial help kom France, the c d o n ~ s were ~xed to a ~ the md~op~e with her own postwar finan~al problems. In 1927 AOF cont~buted the s u r p ~ n ~ y hrge sum of 19.4 m ~ n &ancs to France's budget. Governor General Gard~ commenting on the cdonial sub~dy to the m~ropole, gallantly a ~ e r ~ d in Daka~ "Our duty ~ clea~ France calls, ~ e respond.'~ Unfortunately this comment reflected France's tradi~onal at~tude in her r e h ~ o n s h i p with the c ~ o n ~ s , namel~ pu~ing her own interests first. Thus the economic d e v e b p m e n t that took place in Africa during this in~rwar pe~od was concentrated on the production of export crops and their ~ a n s p o r ~ o n ~ ove~eas marke~, main~ in F~nce. As a ma~er of po~c~ pfiorty was ~ven ~ the p r o d u c t i o n of raw m a t e r i a l s n e e d e d by French indus~ It would ~ke Wo~d War II ~ awaken France ~ Ihe need to ~eat black Africa 1Ne more than a ~ n t s o u s e of readi~ avai~b~ raw m ~ e r M s and uncom~Nning

France in Black Afr~a

s ~ d ~ r s and a p r ~ e c ~ d market ~ r French m a n u ~ o ~ d goods.

Road to Independence The

s t u n n i n g d e , a t of the F r e n c h in June 1940 d e h v e r e d a rude shock to the complacent c ~ o n b als, w h o were as surprised and h e a r t ~ c k as t h o r metr o p d i ~ n c o m p a t r i o t s ~ a n d even more d i ~ d e d . They were torn between duty and honor. The two key g r o u p s in t h e c ~ o n ~ G t h e a r m y a n d t h e colonial a d m i n i s ~ a f i o n , w e r e both by t r a d i ~ o n c o n s e r v a ~ v e and i n t e n s e ~ patriotic. By the nature of t h e ~ insfitu~ons, officers and c ~ o n ~ l a d m i n i s ~ a t o ~ were disda i n e d a n d r e s p e ~ f u l of h ~ r a r c h ~ T h u s w h e n orders were received ~ o m the g o v e r n m e n t in Vichy to cease hosfih~es a n d to respect an a r m ~ c e with the G e r m a n and ~aHan enemies, they were a n g u i s h e d and uncertain. For m a n y there could be no question of disobeying a d e a r order ~ o m w h a t they considered to be the ~ma~ national autho~ty. Reinforcing the natural p r e d i s p o s i t i o n to follow o r d e r s w a s t h e fact t h a t Franc~s most r e s p e ~ e d s~dieG M a ~ h a l H e n ~ P~t~n, was n o w at the head of the g o v e r n m e n t issuing those orders. At the same ~ m e there was the normal inclination to wish to continue the fight against a tradi~onal e n e m ~ F r e n c h colonial s o c ~ t y a n d its leaders t h u s were divided and ~ c e d with a ~ r f i ~ e d ~ e m m a .

41

France in Black Africa Torn by the di~mma, the French c ~ o n ~ l emp~e in ~opical Africa spl~ in two. AOF, under the ~ a d e ~ ship of Governor General P ~rre Boisson, remained ~yal ~ Vichy and the Marsh~. AEE j ~ n e d a~er some wavering by the m a n d a ~ d ~r~tory of Cameroon, fallowed the black governor of Chad, F61ix ~bou6, in rej e c t i n g the a r m i s t i c e a n d in j o i n i n g an o b s c u r e bhga d~r general named Cha~es de Gaul~ in con~nuing h o s t i ~ e s . As we now know, it was the la~er ~de that would triumph. HoweveG in those dark days of 1940, prudence would not have sugges~d bet~ng on the survN~ of those who insis~d on con~nuing an unp r o m ~ i n g struggle, m u c h less on their ultimate ~ctory F~lix ~ b o u 4 Despera~ Mtua~ons some~mes produce unusual Made~; so it was with the c ~ h p s e of France in 1940. ~ is difficult to i m a ~ n e de GauHe b~ng p r e e n e d into national Madership of a r e p u b l k a n France at any other time. On a somewhat reduced seaM, |he same might be said of F61~ ~bou6, who was the first French offidM in charge of a substantial piece of French ~rfitory to defy V~hy and to announce his ~ r f i ~ r ~ s decision to j ~ n the Free French in conHnuing the armed struggle again~ Germany and Imly. ~bou6 was a rare bird among prewar French c~onial adminis~ators. Not o n ~ was he blacG he was also an avowed S o d M ~ t and Freemason who had been named to the post of governor in Guad~oupe by L6on Blum's Popular Front government in 1936. His sudden transfer to Chad in 1939 was seen by himselL his

The Road to Indepevadence

~

(X3~4G~S

G ~ n o r General Fdlix ~bou~ with Charles ~ Gaulle at B r a ~ v i i l e in 1944.

friends, and his e n e m i e s as a d e m o t i o n and p u n i s h mere.1 Ebou4 had made influential enemies among the politicians a n d b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i ~ in Guadeloupe. h e i r revenge was to be his. assignment to one of the m o s t u n c o m f o r t a b l e a n d u n p r o m i s i n g capitals in France's African empire, well away from the tropical splendors of the Antilles. For someone l i ~ I~bou6, who enjoyed good living, it was a purgatory: W h e n l~bou4 arrived in Fort Lamy, Chad, the governor's residence lacked even electricity; water for 1,ds morning bath had to be p u m p e d ~ h a n d to the second floor. 2

43

Despite the d r c u m M a n c e s of his assignment, ~bou6's presence as governor in this s ~ a ~ g i c a l l y ~a c e d sand pit at the time of the French cdlapse in Europe was ~ u R o u s for the Allied cause. ~~ was equally f o ~ u n a ~ that there happened to be several other well~aced independent-minded gentlemen in AEF at the same time. The presence of C a p , i n 0 a ~ r GeneraD Leclerc--whom de Gau~e had sent--was also of capi~l importance in rallying Gabon and Cameroon to the Free French c d o ~ . Indeed, without senior m i s e r y all~s, c ~ a n s like ~bou6, no ma~er how h i g h ~ ~aced in the administration, w o u ld not have been able to carry the day. S~zing on the sudden ~ a n s ~ r to Dakar of GoveD nor General Boisson, ~bou6 and his coconspirators w e ~ able ~ swing the whole of AEF ~ the Free French cause. * ~bou~ then became the natural Free French choice to be named as governor general of the ~ r g e ~ piece of French ~ r f i ~ r y then under Gau~st con~d. Given the drcumMances of his a p p ~ n t m e n t , ~bou6 e ~ o y e d great respect and influence in Ga~list councils on c ~ o n i ~ polic~ He s~zed the oppo~unity to oppose what he had long v ~ w e d as mindless ~fo~s at a ~ i m g lafion. I n s ~ a d he used his extens~e p o w e ~ to augm e n t t h e r o l e of t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c h i e f in t h e administ~five ~ructure. Of ~ r grea~r impor~nce, he issued a decree as governor general on 14 Ju~ 1942 defining a new ~atus for the African e l i , . He called R no~ a~e dv~u~. Sens~ly, this ca~gory of~red the African efite a s o d ~ and dvil status compara~e to the~ educational and ~ c ~ sodal ~vel. Unlike full French citb zenship, howeve~ ~vduf status did not requ~e the h ~ d e r to forgo i m p o r ~ n t aspects of Aff~an culture.

~ e Ro~ ~ I~ew~ence (The n e w status was c o n ~ r r e d on Africans who had ab mined a ~gnificant ~vel of French education and culture.) This was e s p e d a l l y i m p o r t a n t in areas such as marriage, w h e r e p o l y g a m y was c o m m o n , often expected at the time among Africans. Inheritance was ano t h e r area in w h i c h c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e d i f f e r e d substanfiMly from Western c o n c e p t . ~ In some tribes, for in~ance, property was passed through the m a t e d nal line. In others the bulk of a man's property passed to his clan as c o m m u n a l propert~ rather t h a n to his wife and direct offspring. Prior to Ebou6's innovation, many well-educated Africans had refused dfizenship because of the social and legal p r o b ~ m s it p o s e d for t h e m a n d for their families. T h u s this i n n o v a t i o n a m o u n t e d to a grant of soc~l justice, giving ~ g ~ reco g n i t i o n to an i m p o r t a n t n e w class w i t h i n A ~ i c a n sode.ty. Ebou6 continued to be a m ~ o r voice for reform in French c ~ o n ~ l pAicy and practice until he d ~ d suddenly in 1944 in Cairo, shortly after the Brazzaville Conference.

The Establishment Stays w ~ h P~tain AOE unlike its poor e q u a t o r i ~ siste~ r e m a i n e d loyal to Vichy. At the time, t h ~ cautious respect for n a p row ~ g i f i m a c y reflected the a ~ i t u d e of most of the French establishment in both the m~tropole and the cAon~s. Governor General Boisson, who had been suddenly ~ a n s f e r r e d &om BrazzaviHe in 1940 to b a s t e r V~hy con~ol in DakaG followed a difficu~ fine of combining fierce respect for P6tain's authority with resistance to the efforts of Pierre Laval a n d his G e r m a n

friends to gain g r e a ~ r c o n e d of the AOF. 6 The ~ a ~ comedy ended with the 1942 A ~ e d landings in North Africa. B ~ s s o n himseff p ~ d deafly ~ r his unbending adherence to his p f i n d ~ e s . Following de Gaul~'s a ~ sumpfion of power in A l ~ e ~ in 1943, he was imprisoned and died w h i ~ aw~ting trial.

Brazzaville Conference Free French fortunes had improved dramatically by ~ 1943. The a l l ~ s were on the offen~ve through° out the world. An A n ~ o - A m e f i c a n army invaded and took c o n ~ of French North Africa. The Germans and Italians s u r r e n d e r e d in Tunis~. The tide had finally turned in Russ~, and the A m e r ~ a n Navy had won a series of hard-fought victo~es in the Pacific against the ~panese. The Free French themselves were now in contr~ of the great bulk of the French empire, excepting only Indochina. 7 De G a u l ~ and his h e u t e n a n t s had s h o u b d e r e d aside the A m e r i c a n favorite, G e n e r a l H e n r i G ~ a u d ~ o m m a n d e r of the French forces in North A~ rica) and ~ k e n contr~ of the p r o v i s ~ n ~ government in Al~ers. ~De Gaul~'s vi~on of a fighting France ral~ing her forces and c a ~ y i n g on the battle from her ove~eas territories was becoming a reality. None~h~ess there was s t ~ resistance ~ o m Roosevelt and, to a lesser extent, &ore C h u ~ h ~ to gran~ng the enlarged r ~ e de Gaulle sought in A i l e d councils. To f u ~ h e r bedevil French re~fions w ~ h the~ powerful a~ies, A m e r i c a n a n t i c ~ o n ~ l attitudes had been ens h ~ n e d in such basic Alhed s ~ m e n t s of p ~ y as the Atlantic C h a r t e r (1941) a n d the D e c O r a t i o n of the

~UMENTA~ON ~gN~AI~

Senegalese Tirailleurs preparing to embark at Da~r in Wor~ War ii, .q

France in Black Afr~a United Nations (1942), and incMded in the m i n u ~ s of the A l l ~ d c o n ~ r e n c e h ~ d at Tehran in 1943. 9 A l t h o u g h de Gaulle h a d c o m e a long way from those dark days in the s u m m e r of 1940, his p o s i t i o n even a m o n g his allies was ~ r from secure. Moreove~ the f u t u r e e M s ~ n c e of the F r e n c h overseas e m p i r e , u p o n w h ~ h he had ~ s ~ k e his d ~ m for s ~ t u s with his allies, was in question. At the same time, de G a u l ~ was u n d e r extreme pressure from within the French comm u n i t y o u t s i d e o c c u p i e d France to d e m o n M r a ~ his leadership of the s u b s ~ n t ~ l ~ r f i ~ r y n o w flee of V ~ h y c o n ~ . What more ef~cfive gesture to satisfy both in~ r n a f i o n a l a n d internal F r e n c h n e e d s t h a n to call a c o n v i n c e of governors and g o v e r n o ~ general fiom all the A@ican territories to join w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the c o n s u l ~ f i v e p r o ~ s ~ n a l a s s e m ~ y ~ o m A l ~ e ~ under the d~ection of General de G a u l ~ himseff? To the eye of a m a s e r p ~ i t i c a l ~ c t i ~ a n like de G a u l , , the ideal v e n u e for such a c o n ~ r e n c e was Brain zaville. As a s y m b d it would have been hard to beat. "Brazza" was the capital of the first m ~ o r ~ r f i ~ r y to m l ~ to the Free French cause in 1940. ~ was ~ s o h r remo~ed ~ o m the p~itical w ~ n ~ i n g then ~ n g ~ a c e in Algie~. Hnally, the administrative m a c h i n e r y in this c d o n i a l b a c k w a ~ r was u n d e r the firm c o n t r ~ of one of de G a u l ~ ' s ~ d e s t and s ~ u n c h e s t s u p p o ~ e ~ , GoveD nor G e n e ~ l Ftlix ~ b o u t . T h e r e were m a n y practical reasons for h d d i n g a c d o n ~ l c o n ~ r e n c e in 1944, but the fact that the inspiration for it was born (according to Governor Henri Laurentie~D in L o n d o n in a m e ~ i n g b ~ w e e n de G a u l ~ and h ~ c o m m i s s ~ n e r for c ~ o n ~ R e n t Pleven, suggests that the d ~ e r m i n a n t reason ~ r the c o n ~ r e n c e was de G a u l ~ ' s n e e d to reinforce his

48

The RoM ~ ~ d ~ e ~ e ~ e por t i on as d o m ~ a n t ~ader of the French outside o o c u p i d France to a skeptical All~d ~ a d e ~ p . The con~rence was opened on 30 ~ n u a r y 1944 in Brazzavffie by General de G a ~ ~ h ~ capadW as pres~ e n t of the French National Committee of ~berafion. S p e a ~ n g ad head of what the c o n ~ r e n c e c o n ~ d e r e d France's p r o ~ s ~ n ~ government, de Gaul~ warned those non-French who would p ~ s u m e to decide the fate of France's colonial empire, "It belongs to the French nation, and o n ~ ~ heG to proceed, when the time is o p p o r t u n ~ to make ~ r m s in the i m p e r i l structure which she [France] will decide upon in the context of her s o v e ~ n ~ . T M Q u i ~ clearly t ~ s was a warning to proclaimed anticdo~aHs~ like Pre~dent Roosevelt that France alone would d ec~e ~ e ~ of her e m p i ~ when the war had ended, ~ g a r d ~ of declarations made in international d o c u m e n ~ such as the Atlantic C ha r t e r or at i n t e r n a ~ o n a l conferences at w h ~ h val~ ~presentafives of the French nation were n ~ present. Such a p u ~ic d e ~ n s e of French sovereign fights at a time when France was occup~d by a ~ n army was aimed at f u r t h ~ e s ~ n g de Gaull(s ~edentials as a nat~nal ~ade~ H a~n g made his print at the constance, he depa~ed the f o l ~ w ~ g day ~ r A1~ e ~ via Bangui and Fort Lam~ Thus, asMe ~o m his opening ~m a r ks , de Gaul~ took no further part in the c o n v i n c e ~s~f. W~h i n~r natio n ~ politicMng out of the wa~ the con~rence, under the c h a ~ m a n s ~ p of Ren6 ~even, then split into w o r ~ n g groups ~ consM~ the various aspects of c~onial p ~ i c ~ The d e l ~ e ~ t i o n f ~ w e d guMance given by Gener~ de Gau~e and by P~ven in the~ o p e ~ n g remarks.

Charles ~ Gaulle opensthe Brazzaville Conj~ence in january"1 ~ .

~ e Ro~ ~ lnd~enden~ In his instructions to the c o n ~ r e n c G Pleven t ~ d the c o n ~ r e e s that p ~ ques~ons would be ~ v e n p~o~ty. Spedfically, the "incorporation of the A&ican mass into the French world" should be of paramount concern to the c o n ~ r e n c e . R e ~ r d n g to the various in~ r n a f i o n ~ decorations made by the All~s on the future of c~onial peopleG P ~ v e n firm~ asse~ed, We read from time to time that this war m u ~ end with what is cal~d an e n ~ a n c h i s e m e n t of c ~ o n i ~ peoples. In c ~ o n i ~ France, there are n ~ t h e r people to e n ~ a n c h i s e , nor rac~l discrimination to abolish. T h e r e are p e o p l e w h o feel t h e m s ~ v e s F r e n c h , a n d w h o w i s h to take, a n d to w h o m France w ~ h e s to give, an increaMngiy h~ge r ~ e in the li~ of the democratic institutions of the French community. These are people w h o m it ~ intended will move s ~ p by s ~ p towards the purest form of p ~ i t i c ~ e n ~ a n c h i s e m e n t . But it is not i n t e n d e d that they gain any form of i n d e p e n d e n c e other than French independence. ~ Because it was composed m a i n ~ of c~onial governors, the c o n ~ r e n c e had no d e c i s i o n m a ~ n g powers. N o n e t h e ~ s s it did m a k e r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , w h i c h were to carry considerable weight in the future. Many l a ~ e D d a y observers have d e s c ~ b e d the conference's r e c o m m e n d a t ~ n s as conservative. The p d n c i p ~ reason for th~ j u d g m e n t was the c o n ~ r e n c ~ s rejection of autonomy or of independence o u ~ i d e the French comm u n i t ~ C o n s i d e ~ n g the times and the n a t u r e of the c o n ~ r e n c ~ this j u d g m e n t seems un~ir. The c o n ~ r e e s were m a i n ~ c d o n ~ l dvil servants. The c o n ~ r e n c e ib se~ was held in the middle of a wa~ while France was still occupied by a foreign army. There had been little

51

Fran~ ~ ~ a ~ A~ica serious prewar consideration given in France to eventual independence for the Af~can c~on~s. Indeed, for most Frenchmen of the f m e , the sugges~on that c~onial peoples be ~ v e n d ~ c status equal to that e ~ o y e d by meffopditan French was c o n s ~ e ~ d ~ be the h ~g h t of l~erahty. Few Frenchmen would have expec~d a ra~onal being to choose te~itorial independence over m e m b e ~ h i p in, or a s s o d ~ n with, the French nafon. Even ~day, aside from the quesfon of polific~ independence, the con~rence recommenda~ons seem generous and progresMve. On the pNi~cal side, the con~rence recommended that both Af~cans and Europeans from the c ~ o n ~ s be represented in a consfi~ uent assemb~ to be convened a f a r the war ~ d~a~ a new consfitufon ~ r the w h ~ e French nation. Such a c o n s ~ t u ~ o n , it was suggested, should provide for larger and mo~e ef~cfv e representafon for the cdonies in the central authority of the m~rop~e. For the first time, an offic~l French b o d y - - ~ b e i t with o n ~ consu~a~ve p o w e ~ - - s u g g e s ~ d the p o s s ~ i h t y of a ~derafion being ~ r m e d between France and her cdonies. W ~ n the territories thems~veG the con~rence recommended a s s e m b l e s composed of Af~can and European members elected on the basis of u n i v e ~ a l suffrage. The deliberative powers of these a s s e m ~ s were limi~d, howeve~ to approval of the cdony's annual budget and to proposed public works p r o j e c t . Otherwise the a s s e m b l ~ powers would be consultafive. At the same ~me, the governo~ present took care to p r o ~ t h o r own prerogatives. They spedficaHy r e o ommended that the a s s e m ~ powers be HmRed to consu~afon on matters involving the rulemaMng powe ~ of governors.

52

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In h ~ guidancG Pleven t a d lhe committee considering social question~ "Improvements in African li~ will be the basis of our c d o n ~ l p d ~ " The con~rence further defined this point with a recommendation that "the activities of Europeans and other non-Africans in the cdonMl ~ r r ~ r i e s of Africa must ~k e the primacy of African interests into account." Reflecting the influence of Governor G e n e ~ l ~bou6, the con~rence re~ ommended that his newly es~blished status of n o ~ e ~vo~d be adopted in all cdonies. In a passage with a particuhfly contemporary ring, the c o n ~ r e n c e addressed womeWs rights in the context of ma~iage, divo~e, and the ~mily. Despffe the ascendancy of assodationist d o ~ r i n ~ assimflationist sentiment was not dead. The c o n e y ence made a great p a n t of insisting that all education must be in French and generouMy recommended that p~mary schoMs be e~ablished in all vilMges with 50 or more scho~chHdren. The governo~ magnanimous~ recommended t h ~ advanced ffMning and educatonM ~ d H t ~ s be created in all t e r ~ t o ~ e s to assure the growth of an African ~Ae. Both these gestures of generosity of spi~t came, howeveL from the governor~ hear~ and not yet from their pocketbooks. Most surpfisin~ the con~rence calMd for industfiM~aton in the c d o n ~ s and for direct interterfitoral trade. This was a clean break with the m e r c a n t i l ~ t spirit of the past. French buMness i n ~ r e s ~ had always insisted that all trade pass through the m~ropMe and that cobnial markets for m a n u ~ d u r e d goods be ~e~erved for m e ~ o p o l i ~ n ~dustries. The g u y i n g principle of the p r i m a c y of m e ~ o p ~ i t a n c o m m e r d ~ in~reMs had been enshrined in the unwfi~en c d o n i ~

France in BlackAfrica

(pacte cdon~ O, which was b~ng directly chal~nged by th~ c o n v i n c e made up p r m a f i ~ of cdoMal admin~a~. Indeed, this measure would almost c e r ~ i n ~ not have been so read~y adopted had the commerdM ~ M s been b e t ~ r ~ p r e s e n t e d at the con~rence. A~er the wa~ ~presen~fives of the c~onial lobby would again fight tooth and nail to ~ock the im~eme~n of any such generous impMses. In the mythmaking process that oRen su~ounds such historic events, the Brazzav~le Conference has come to be seen as the first step in the process ~ a ~ n g to independence 16 yea~ h ~ Main~ on the s~ength of his speech to the conference, Char~s de Gaul~ is looked upon by many African na~onali~s as the god~ther of independence for Francophone Africa. A careful m a ~ n g of the texts of the speeches and proceedings of the con~rencG including de GauH~s own general mmarkG indica~s that ~dependence o u n c e a French context was ex~icifly excluded. The meaning of "a French con~xW was not f u r ~ defined. NonethelesG w h a ~ v e r the p u r p o s ~ y vague ~ r m u ~ o n was in~ n d e d ~ mean, there is no doubt that the constance aroused expe~a~ons of change. Although no Africans p a r ~ d p ~ e d ~rectly in the c o n v i n c e , echoes from the awaken~g p~i~cal consdousness of a newly educa~d African eli~ d ~ penetrate the c o n ~ r e n c ~ s d ~ e r a f i o n s . In, spi~ of the absence of AfficanG the ffrepresMMe Ebou6 introduced to the con~rence debate a memorandum wfi~ ~ n by Africans. By d ~ n g so, he ~rced an impor~nt symb~ic ~cogMfion that the growing Af~can elite had valM o p ~ n s that shouM be ~ k e n ~ consMerat~n in the m a ~ n g of d e a c o n s affec~ng ~ e m . One of covenant

~

~d

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~bou6's African pro~ges, Jean-Hilaire Aubame of Gabon, later wrote, It was impossible to con~nue ~o think accc rding to the d d c d o n ~ H ~ concep~ons. In this regard, the Conference of Brazzaville can be con~dered a real Dedara~on of the Rights of African Man; perhaps a ~mid Declaration, incomplete and some~mes re~cenL but ~ch in possibili~es.'3 Aubam~s assessment may be overdrawn, but ~ does demonMrate the importance AfHcan na~onaHsts ab tached to the Brazzavil~ Con~rence. Of all the recommenda~ons e m e r ~ n g &om the conference, the one with greatest l o n g - ~ r m significance may have been the one sugges~ng the estab~shment of locally elected a s s e m b l e s in each terHtor~ Eventually these ins~tu~ons were to be the instruments that pd~kaHy rnobH~ed the A~ican ~ i ~ G led to the formaHon of p ~ i ~ c ~ parries, and u l ~ m a t e ~ shaped the demands for independence. Indeed they were the s e e d b e d s in which the first generaHon of modern p~iHcM leaders developed in Francophone Africa.

The Fourth Republic The war oveL a cons~tuent assembly was convened l a ~ in 1945 in Pads to draft a new consfitu~on for the French Republic. Faithful to the promise of Brazzav~e, African representatives were included in its membership by special decrees of the proviMonM government d a ~ d 21 A u g u ~ and 13 Sep~mber 1945. u Personalities &om the ReM~ance and ~ o m the Free French dominated debate. There was an espedMly

s~ong and well-organized C o m m u n i s t representation. The more conservative e ~ m e n t s in French society were not so w ~ l represented. Some s u f ~ r e d the mint of c a hboration with Vich~ or w o ~ e . OtherG except for the GaMli~G were still p~iticaHy disorganized, and many of t h o r prewar p~iticM organizations and institutions were discredi~d. The draR constitution produced by this first constituent a s s e m ~ y r e f l e c ~ d the body's i d e ~ o ~ c a H y s k e w e d c o m p o M t i o n . The g e n e r a l l y c o n s e r v a t i v e French body p ~ i t i c was u n r e a d y for its more radical p~scfiptions. W h e n put ~ a v o ~ in a r e ~ r e n d u m , the proposed c o n s ~ t u t ~ n was d e m a n d . Back to the drawing boards, a second constituent a s s e m b ~ was chosen in 1946. By this time the i m m ~ diate postwar dust had begun to settle and a resurgent fight was a ~ e to claim its share of assemNy seats. An ~ive mode~onservative m~ofity was formed w i t h i n the a s s e m b l ~ capable of reMsfing the wello orches~ated C o m m u n i ~ s ~ a m r ~ r tactics. A c d o n i ~ lobby, based f i r m ~ on a group called the ~ G6n6~ aux de la CNon~ation Franqaise, was successful in removing m a n y of the earlier constitutional proposals affecting c d o n ~ l issues. From this p ~ n t on, this conservative group representing Franco-Affican business i n ~ r e s ~ wouM continue ~ exert a strong influence on French c ~ o n h l p ~ i c ~ Two of i ~ s ~ o n g e ~ pillars were the Chambers of Commerce and I n d u s ~ y in M a ~ H e s and in Bordeaux. To t h ~ day these same groups are a o five in France in d e ~ n s e of theft c o m m e r d ~ and financial i n ~ r e ~ s in Africa.

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~ ~

~

Despi~ the efforts of s p e d ~ interestG all was not lost in ~ r m s of constitutional change and a l ~ e r ~ tion of the French c ~ o n i ~ r e , m e . The second constib uent a s s e m ~y succeeded in ratifying its predecessoVs ab~ition of forced labor and of the o~ectiona~e ind~ g~nat. It also approved the granting of dtizenship to all ~ h a ~ n t s of the c d o n ~ s without affecting their d ~ l status. This was a real break with French j u ~ d ~ tradition and neatly salved the p r o ~ e m ~bou6 had addr e s s e d with his no~Ne dvolud status. Of p erh ap s grea~st prac~cal significance, the second constituent assembly s u p p o r t e d the major fiscal and financial management reforms, which had as their centerp~ce the creation of the Fonds ~Investissement et de D6veb oppement ~ c o n o m ~ u e et S o d ~ (FIDE~ (the Fund for I n v e s t m e n t a n d for E c o n o m i c a n d S o c i a l Deve~pmenO. The new consfitu~on was an odd hybrid. It ab ~ m p t e d to link the already rebellious Indochinese s ~ s as sem~utonomous nations w~h the French Repu~ic in a ~deral assoda~on to be called the French Un~n. The new French R e p u ~ side of the union was ~ be a ~ghfly c e n ~ a h z e d unitary s ~ t e con~s~ng of (1) m e t r o p d i ~ n France; (2) the newly minted ovemeas d e p a ~ m e n t s of R6union, French West Indies, and Guiana; and ~) the ove~eas ~rritories. This h s t category was made up essentially of the Af~can ter~todes and Madagascan For a people who p~de themselves on the rigor of their logic and the c o h e r e n c e of their thought, this untidy compromise had a pecuHa~y pragmatic air about ~. The upshot was t h ~ ~ack Af~can deputies would sit as full and equal m e m b e ~ in the French N a ~ o n ~

57

A s s e m ~ representing the African ~ r f i t o r ~ s that w e ~ cons~ered integr~ parts of an ~ d i v i ~ e ~ p u b iic. Of perhaps g ~ a ~ s ~ f i c a n c e ~ r the futu~, an e ~ e d a s s e m ~ y (as ~ c o m m e n d e d at Brazzaville) was established in each of the ~rri~ries. At fi~t the a ~ e m blies' powers w e ~ consultative, with aH executive aut h o r i t y still h e l d by a n a p p o i n t e d g o v e r n o r . N o n ~ h ~ e ~ this postwar process, inv~ving direct popular e ~ c f i o n s for the first time in black A@ica, marked the real b e ~ n ~ n g s of a p~itic~ process that ~ d 15 years l a i r to independence. At the same time, France took a step ~ w a r d a s s i m i ~ t i o n that would e v e n t u ~ arrive at a dead end. For the A&~anG once theoretical equ~iW with m e ~ o p d i ~ n Frenchmen was ach~ved, there was by deflation no way ~ continue to improve t h o r politic~ status. The i n e ~ m ~ e resuR was ~us~afion ~ r many Africans as they k l t the emotional pull of fis~g p d ~ c ~ expec~tions among c d o ~ a l peoples. On the French side, the danger of 40 million Frenchmen b ~ n g overwhelmed by their more n u m e ~ ous ~ r m e r c ~ o n ~ l s u p e r s began m trouble many who came increa~ngly ~ see such an ou~ome as an ine%m~e and u n d e r r a t e end ~ as~mflation. The sons, daught~G and gmndchfld~n of these tim~ folk now may be numbered among the s u p p o r ~ ~ a n - M ~ ~ Pen and his Front National.

E~ed

A~em~s

With the end of World War II and the adoption of the Constitution of the Fourth Republic in 1946, there was a burgeoning of optimism and of pohfical acti~ty in French Africa. For the first time, ordinary Africans

58

~ e RoM ~ I ~ e ~ would be able to v o ~ for black c a n d i d a ~ s w h o would represent them in the highest ~gis~tive institutions of the French Republic. Of course the s y s ~ m of elections and the p o w e r s of the local ~giMafive b o d i e s w e r e hedged with careful h m i ~ and restrictions. Nonetheless a ~ a n t s ~ p on the road to dec~oniza~on had been taken. In the t ~ b u n a l that really m a R e r e d - - t h e French National A s s e m b l y - - t h e Af~can representation was sm~l: two or three deputies per ~ r r i t o r ~ This was a token compared with the tot~ membership. N e v e r t h ~ ~ss the African d e p u t e s were there on the benches as full m e m b e r s on an e q u a l basis w i t h F r e n c h m e n e ~ e d ~ o m Pa~s, Lyons, M a r s e ~ e G and Li~e. Event u l l y t h o r voting presence would be felt in a badly di~ d e d assembly. French ~tizenship had been granted ~o all former s u p e r s under the n e w c o n ~ u t i o n . Provisions w e r e to be m a d e to a c c o m m o d a t e c u s t o m a r y ~ w and practice. Some rest~ctions on fights remained, but these would ~ t e r be removed. W h a ~ v e r the s h o r ~ o m i n g s of the new cons~tution, no other 20th-century c~onial p o w e r - - t h e Bdb ish, t h e A m e ~ c a n G the B ~ g i a n G the D u t c h , the Portuguese, or any o t h e r - - w o u l d make such a gesture. ~s generouS- of spi~t surely created an abiding sentim e n t that has h e l p e d bind F r a n c o p h o n e Africans to France long after the F r e n c h e m p i r e has formally ceased to e~st. No a m o u n t of c y n i d s m or evidence of selbservice can c o m p l e ~ efface Rs g~ndeu~ The pr~iferation of ~ M a f i v e b o d ~ s - - m o ~ with very l i m i t e d p o w e r s - - h a r d l y s t a n d s as a m o d e l of logic. Aside from the N a t ~ n a l A s s e m ~ two other

59

France in BlackAfr~a b o d e s were e s ~ i s h e d in Paris: the Coundl of the Repunic (Sena~) and the A s s e m ~ y of the French UnMn. The Un~Ws Assemb~ was ~ have been the parliament of a French ~deral s y s ~ m c o n f i n e d in constitutional proposals dra~ed by the first constituent a ~ e m ~ Although the French v o ~ rejec~d the proposed ~deral sys~m, the UnioWs A s s em~y was unaccounta~y ab lowed to sur~ve ~ r 15 years as a c o m ~ a ~ e debating dub with no c~ar p o w e r , si~d in Ve~ail~s. The Senate was the upper house of the sys~m, e ~ o ~ n g Hmited powers to block ~g isMfio n initiated by the National A s s e m ~ At the second a d m i n ~ a f i v e level were the two great Aff~an ~ d e r a ~ o n G AOF and AEE with their capi~ls at Dakar and Brazza~He. Le~Mafive bodies called grand coundls were e M a ~ h e d here too. ] h ~ r unoffidM m e m b e ~ were chosen in indffect elections by the territorial a s s e m b l e s . Again, powers were mMnly a d ~ s o r ~ except on b u d g e ~ r y maRers. The executive powers of the govemor general were--at least in theory--left untouched. For the future, the most p o r ~ n ~ u s of the Fourth RepubliCs ~giMafive innova~ons was the e s ~ h ment, at the base of this pyramM of assemblies, of a parfiM~ elected a s s e m ~ y in each of the territories. These bodies had del~erafive powe~ o n ~ on budgeb ary m a t ~ . Otherwise they advised the governoG whose executive p o w e ~ were leR intact. Membership in the territorial a s s e m ~ s was com~ex. Ce~ain adminis~afive offici~s were ex offido members. The gove r n o r h a d p o w e r to a p p o i n t a few o t h e r s as represen~fives of corpora~ i n t e r e s t - - f o r example, the C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e and I n d u s ~ Elected

~e ~M ~ ~ M ~ e m e m b e r s were c h o s e n in direct e ~ c ~ o n s , but the d e ~ torate was d i v i d e d at first into two c ~ g e s . The first was m a d e u p of E u r o p e a n s along with those ~ w Africans w h o h a d a s s u m e d French dvil s ~ t u s . 1~The s e ~ ond was c o m p o s e d of the great bulk of former African s u p e r s w h o had b e e n granted French d t z e n s h i p but r e l i n e d ~adifionM ci~l s ~ t u s . L a i r the o n e r o u s twocollege s y s ~ m was d r o p p e d in both AOF a n d AEE Direct a n d indirect d e c f i o n s to fiH seats in these several ~ g i s h f i v e bodies h a d the e f ~ of immediately creating a sizable p ~ i f i c a l elite, for t h e r e were m o r e than 800 Af~can ~ g i M a t o ~ at the v a r ~ u s ~vels of gove r n m e n t . ~ Elec~ons became a regular ~ a t u r e of life in French A f t r a b e t w e e n 1946 and i n d e p e n d e n c e (1960). T h e s e e ~ c f i o n s e n c o u r a g e d g r o w i n g p d i ~ c a l awareness, espedaHy a m o n g the urban e l i , , and ~ d to the formation of politicM parties. The e ~ a b l i s h m e n t of the ~ r r t o f i M a s s e m ~ s a n d their e v e n t u a l e v ~ u ~ o n into full-blown ~ g M a t u r e s was an u n f o r e s e e n ~ c t o r in the r e d u c ~ o n in power and eventual d e m i s e of t h e o n c e - p o w e r f u l g o v e r n m e n t s general in Dakar a n d Brazzav~e. As never before, the territories b e g a n to be the focus of politicM activity rather than m e r e s u b d i v i ~ o n s of a larger a d m i n i ~ r a five u n ~ n set u p for the convenience of c d o n i ~ a d m i n istrators. T h e ~ # c a d ~ in 1956 w a s to c o m p l e t e this process just before i n d e p e n d e n c e .

Aff~an Poli~M ~ s The Constitution of 1946 h a d estab~shed the i n s t tufional framework within which a n e w s y s ~ m would evolve. The nascent African p~itical elite r e s p o n d e d by

61

~n~

&~

~

developing their own ~Mruments ~ func~on in this sys~m. As ~sewhere in ~ l a ~ v e ~ Lee parliame~ary ~ s ~ f i o n G ~c~ons ~ r m e d around issues and leade~. Some of these groups q u e r y evolved i n ~ p~ific~ parses capa~e of m o ~ l ~ g popu~r support on the one hand, and of func~on~g as pafl~mentary parties w i ~ i n the c o m ~ e ~ m u ~ y e ~ d parliamen~ry sys~ m on the othe~ A~ually, African pdifical organ~a~on began du~ ~ g the p ~ p a ~ o n s ~ r the two c o n s ~ o n ~ conventions held in 1945 a n d 1946. At the c o n s t i t u e n t a ~ e m ~ s t h e m s ~ e s , Alrican ~prese~a~ves coord i n a ~ d their acfi~fies through an i n ~ r m a l caucus known as the Bloc Af~c~n, led by L a m ~ e Gueye of Senegal. Aff~an m e m b e ~ of the conMituent a ~ e m blies also worked closely with sympathetic French m e m b e r . In the main, these tended to be S o d ~ i s ~ and C o m m u ~ s . Once ~ the Na~on~ A s s e m ~ the A~ican members ~lt the vaned pulls of am~fion and ~ e d o g ~ Many j~ned French p ~ c a l parses. Lamine GueyG L6opdd Sengho~ and the G ~ n e a n depu~, Yacine Dialb, became m e m b e ~ of the S o d ~ t Party ~FIO). P~nce Doula Manga Bell of Cameroon j~ned the C a t h d ~ Mouvement R 6 p u ~ a ~ P o p ~ (MRP). H o u p h o u e b B ~ g n y of the Ivory Coast and Fi~ Dabo Sissoko of Sudan j~ned the Mouvement Undue de ~ R e n ~ a n c e Fran~a~G which was ~nked to the French Communi~ P a r t y . ~7 WhOever their p a r ~ affiHa~onG Af~can deputes m ~ n t a ~ e d their ~ r m ~ Hnks with each othe~ On African ques~ons they ~nded to work toward the same goals ~om within thor various met° ropoli~n political grou~ngs.

~e R~d ~ ~&wn&~e As the d e , a t of the draR constitution proposed by the first constituent assembly so dramatically foreshadowed, the c d o n ~ l bbby was ~ become efkcfive again in working against c d o n ~ l r e a r m . In reaction, African pafl~mentarians called a meeting in Bamako ~ ~ r m a u n i ~ d front and deve~p a common ~ a ~ g y . Prestigious m o d e r a ~ leaders like SodaliMs Lamine Gueye and L~op~d SenghoG howeveG d ~ not aRend. Some claimed their absence was due to pressure from the Sodalist m i n ~ r for ove~eas F~nce, Marius Moulet. O t h e ~ cited a wish to a v i d being tainted by association with the radicals some ~ared w o u ~ d o min a~ the con~rence. Wh a~v er the reasons ~ r the m o d e r a ~ ~ader~ absence, the upshot was a con~rence dominated by the more e x ~ e m e nationaliM e ~ m e n t s enc o u r a g e d by F r e n c h C o m m u n i s t s , t h e o n l y m e ~ o p ~ a n represen~fives ~ a~end. DespRe its skewed i d e ~ o ~ c ~ compo~fion, the o u ~ o m e of the Bamako Con~rence was not ~1 negative. It produced French Africa's first and most succ e s s f ul m a s s i n t e r t e r f i t o f i a l political p a r t ~ the Rassem~ement D6mocrafique African (RDA). Houphouet-Boigny's succes~ul Parti-D6mocratique de la C6te d'Ivoire (PDCI) was chosen as a model for the RDA branches in other territories. Much like Sun Yah sen's Kuo Min Tang Party in China, PDCI had drawn i~ tightly knR organizational inspiration ~om Marx~t models while its ~ i t o r ~ l representation p a r a ~ e ~ d the French adminiMration. Under a variety of names, the party would be r e ~ a ~ d throughout AOF and in Cameroo~ a~eit with v a r ~ n g degrees of success. A f u n d a m e n t ~ dispute arose at Bamako among RDA organizers over the desired degree of interterritorial integrat~n. The m o ~ progres~ve e ~ m e n t ~ men

~ n ~ in ~ k

Aff~

like Gabriel ~ A r b o u s ~ e ~ ~ v o r e d a t ~ h f l y i n t e g r a ~ d i n t e r t e r f i ~ a l party. H o u p h o u e ~ B ~ g n y a n d o t h e r more cau~ous n a ~ o n a l i ~ s like him o p p o s e d such com~ e ~ integra~on. H o u p h o u e t , as ~ a d e r of the best organized and best financed ter~to~al part~ was p ~ s u m a b ~ u n w i l l i n g to risk s e e i n g his b a s e subm e r g e d in a m u c h ~ r g e r parW that he could not contrY. I n s t e a d he a n d o t h e r cautious m e n p ~ e d a looser c o n ~ d e ~ l a ~ a n g e m e n t with g ~ a ~ r ~ r f i ~ f i a l autonomy. In the e n d their p ~ n t ~ ~ e w prevailed. The financial s u p p o r t s u p p l i e d by PDCI to the n e w b o r n RDA m u s t have been a crucial e ~ m e n t in H o u p h o u e C s c a ~ n g the day. In any case, H o u p h o u e ~ s oppoM~on ~ a ~ghfly organized i n ~ r ~ o f i ~ o r g a n ~ a t ~ n was ~ a n ~ c ~ a ~ his l a i r move to u n d e r m ~ e AOF. L o o s e r i n t e r t e r ~ t o ~ a l r e ~ o n s h i p s m e a n t that RDA became more a ~ d e ~ o n of l ~ m ~ d e d ~ofial p a r s e s t h a n a u n i t a r ~ i n ~ r ~ ¢ o ~ a l parW. Indeed its g ~ a ~ s t success was in Pa~s, where R D A - - u n d e r H o u p h o u e C s ~ a d e r s h ~ - - ~ r m e d the nucleus of an A~ ~can caucus. H o u p h o u e ~ s g e n i u s as a ~ c f i ~ a n w a s f u r t h e r d e m o n s ~ a ~ d w h e n he l e d RDA to break w i t h t h e C o m m u ~ M s in 1950 with e n c o u ~ g e m e ~ ~ o m F ~ n ~ois Mitterrand. ~ was c~ar ~ ~ m that ~ e C o m m u ~ conne~n h a d b e c o m e a H a ~ H ~ in an ~ e a s i n ~ y conservative F ~ n c e . Within a ~ m a r k a ~ y short ~me, H o u p h o u e t succeeded in shifting a ~ a n c e s - - a s well as his o w n i m a g e - - f r o m the e x ~ e m e ~ft, to c ~ b o ~ o n w ~ h the a d m i r a t i o n and an all~nce with i m p o r ~ n t French c o m m e r d a l interests. Once a d a n g e r o u s radb cal, he now became the darling of some of the more enlightened c ~ o ~ ~s~. Houphou~ commend h~

The Road to Independence i

L ¸¸¸

DOCUME~ATK)N FRAN~AISE--~ICE

I N F O R ~ A f I O N DI~ LA G ~ I ' E - L Y I ~ R E

F~lix Houphouet-Boigny, s ~ w n here with de Gaulle in 1958. t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in 1956 by b e i n g n a m e d a m e m b e r of the MoUet g o v e r n m e n t . U l t i m a t e l y it w a s this complex m a n - - B a o l e tribal chief, African nationalist, successful planter, associate of Comm_unists, brilliant p a r l i a m e n t a r i a n - w h o w a s to play s u c h a large role in d e t e r m i n ing the f u t u r e of F r e n c h Africa. I n d e e d it w a s his w o r k on the toi-cadre m 1956 a n d on the text of the n e w constitution in 1958 t h a t s e a l e d t h e fate of the f e d e r a t i o n s a n d set t h e c o u r s e t o w a r d an i n d e p e n d e n c e t h a t retained strong French bonds. It could be a r g u e d that H o u p h o u e t w a s F r e n c h Africa's m o s t influential politician in t h e decade before ind e p e n d e n c e . H e h e l d a p o w e r f u l position in RDA, w a s

65

Fran~ in ~ a ~ Africa in u n ~ s p u ~ d c o n e d of his own s d ~ pdific~ base ~ the Ivory Coast and had powerful m e , o p t i O n connections. He was noL howeveG w i ~ o u t African fivalG e s p e d ~ aRer he ~ d the RDA break with the French C o m m u ~ s in 1950. From that p~nt on, radical e~ments began to move away from Houphouet and ~om his more m o d e m ~ cd~agues in RDA. By m ~ - ~ 5 0 the radicals had c o n s d ~ a ~ d thor h ~ d on RDA a f f i l ~ s in Guinea and the Sudan. Eventually a secondary power ce~er developed in the ~ o s ~ y orga~zed RDA, based on a ConakrpBamako a~s. TM D e s ~ ~ i s ~eob ~ c a l s~it in the parW in AfficG Houphou~ continued to d o m ~ a ~ the RDA caucus ~ Paris. On an i n ~ d u a l level, H o u p h o u e ~ s only real c o m p ~ o n ~ r primacy among Afri~n p ~ d a n s ~ p r ~ n d e p e n d e n c e Francophone A~ica was L6opold Senghor of Senegal. French Affic~s fi~t ~ 1 ~ quarried French u~ver~W p r o ~ o G Senghor began his political career as a m e m b ~ of SFIO in the first constituent ass~ mbly. At the outset he was the ~fted protege of the ~ader of SFIO in Senegal, Lam~e Gueye. In 1948 Senghor broke with Gueye over the question of Aff~an subser~ence to the SFIO m e , o p t i O n hiera~hy. ~ Senghor then j~ned, and q u e r y d o m ~ a ~ d , the Ind6penda~s ~ O u ~ M ~ (IOM). A major p ~ i t i d a n needed both a p a f l ~ m e ~ a r y ~oc in Paris and a power base in Africa. Senghor a o quired both. The IOM was a bose ~oc of pafl~mentary representatives in Paris of various party and ~ e ~ o ~ c a l persua~ons whose one common trait was refusal of m e m b ~ s ~ p in RDA. Senghor also began budding a mass parW ~ Senegal. With the help of his

The Road to Independence colleague, M a m a d o u ~ a , he l a u n c h e d the Bloc D6rnocratique S6n6galais (BDS). By 1951 BDS h a d succeeded in wresting the d o m i n a n t place in territorial politics, in Senegal from the l o n g - e n t r e n c h e d Socialists. I n d e e d BDS's victory was so complete that even Lamine Gueye lost his seat in the Natl'onal Assembly. S e n g h o r w a s n o w ready to enter the lists with H o u p h o u e t . The two differed philosophically; Sen~|j~,{EI~rATION F R A N ~ A ~ g h o r was c o m m i t t e d to a COOPeRATe: N.A,P~ more formal sodalism, and Ldopold Senghor Houphouet, the tribal aristocrat and planter, was more attuned to liberal economics and private ownership. T h e i r m o s t p r o f o u n d political d i s a g r e e m e n t , however, was on their differing perceptions of the interests of their two homelands, Senegal and the Ivory Coast. No doubt personal ambition also played a part in their growing rivalry.

The Colonial Era Nears its End ~Vorld War II h a d irreversibly altered the political context in w h i c h the French colonial empire existed. Only the densest of cdonial c u r m u d g e o n s could not, or would not, see the inevitable ending of the colonial

67

France in Black Afrka era. The war h a d a r o u s e d n e w e x p e c ~ o n s a m o n g s u ~ e ~ p e o ~ e s t h r o u g h o u t the world. The Wilsonian d o ~ n e of s e l G d ~ e r m i n a ~ o n had been ~ v e n n e w H~. The g e n ~ could not be p u t back in the bottle. Afdcans and AMans had seen their cMon~l m a s ~ s u f ~ r ign o m i n ~ u s deCaL in s o m e cases at the h a n d s of nonEuropeans. In France as in m o s t other impe~al count i e s , the m o r e ~ i g h ~ d began ~ discuss h o w best to preserve w h a t they ~ e w e d as the benefits of the cMonial s y s t e m while altering it to m e e t t h e d e m a n d s of a c h a n ~ n g world. For France, a~er the dreadful expe~ences of two World Wa~, the a ~ u ~ m e n t s would be difficult. A s ~ r t had b e e n s u g g e s ~ d at B r a z z a ~ l ~ in 1944. There, con~ r e e s a d v a n c e d the possibility of some form cf ~ d e r a l r e ~ o n s h i p b e t w e e n the m~rop~e and i~ cMon~l dependencies. As we have seen, the posMMHty of eventual i n d e p e n d e n c e w a s c a r e f u l l y h e d g e d w i t h t h e condi~on that it ~ k e place within a "French c o n ~ x t . ' ~ To m o s t c o n t e m p o r a r y ears this may sound contrad~r~ In A@ica, t h e n a t u r e of f u t u r e r e ~ o n s with France as well as rela~ons between Af~can ~ r ~ t o ~ e s t h e m s e N e s w o u l d be the m a i n focus of debate in the p e 6 o d leading u p to i n d e p e n d e n c e in 1960. At fi~t the degree of a u t o n o m y to be ~ v e n the ~ o ~ e s and the rate at which the devolution of power would occur were the central issues. The debate in~nMfied with the return ~ o m France in the mid-1950s of a growing n u m b e r of African u n ~ e r M t y g r a d u a l s . ~ T h e s e m e m b e r s of Africa's second political g e n e r a ~ o n were g e n e m l ~ ~ s s r e s p e c f f ~ of French authority and French institu~ons than were t h e ~ predecessors. They had r u b b e d Mbows

~

~d

~ ~

~

with French students in the c a ~ s ~ o n g the Boulevard S t . - M ~ h ~ in the heart of the Latin Q u a r ~ n They had b e e n exposed to the ~ r m e n t of ~ e a s that d ~ u ~ f i e r y in French student and i n ~ H e ~ u ~ d r d e s . These often b n ~ y and i m p r e s s ~ n a ~ e young Africans w e ~ most frequently sought out and ~ f l u e n c e d by represen~tives of the French ~ . Indeed, it has o ~ e n been s a ~ that the L a t ~ Q u a r ~ r was one of the world's most successful s e e d b e d s for the spread of Marxist ideas among ~ign students. ( C o n v e ~ students w h o went ~ M o ~ o w sever~ y e a ~ ~ t e r w e ~ more ~ften ~ o c u l a ~ d against M a r x ~ b L e ~ M thought by t h o r int i m a ~ knowledge of its practice ~ the Soviet Union.) In any case, how c o ~ d these young p e o ~ e return unaG fected to a colonial m i l ~ u w h e r e a w h i t e skin still earned a u ~ m a t i c p r e ~ n c e ?

Election of 2 January 1956 The p o l i t i c ~ i n c u b a t i o n p e r i o d e n d e d early in 1956, 10 y e a ~ after the ~ h of the Fourth Republic. A g fican p d ~ c a l a m ~ t i o n s had evolved from as~mflation ~ more nationalistic go~s. = The young African parties ~ r m e d in the postwar period and ~ m p ~ e d ~ several French and territorial e~cfions were now put ~ a crudal test. ~ e c t i o n s w e ~ called on 2 ~ n u a r y 1956 ~ r the French Nafion~ Assembly. W h e n the r e s u l ~ were ~ , RDA was the biggest w i n n e r in AOF. The party had won 12 seats, compared with 3 in the p ~ o u s a ~ e m ~ In contrast, S e n g h o f s IOM had s u f f e ~ d ~ s a s ~ o u s bsses. O n ~ 6 of its ~ sitting deputies were returned. The SFIO ~ r e d ~ m o ~ as badly, ~ n g one seat out of three. ~ was ~ c o g n i t i o n of RDA's electoral s u ~ e s s and

France in BlackAfr~a of the i m p o r t a n c e of t h e p a r t y ' s s u p p o r t ~ r the narrowly based Mallet c o a l ~ o n g o v e r n m e n t that brought H o u p h o u e b B o i g n y ~ n e w p r o m i n e n c e as m ~ r ef s ~ w i t h o u t pofffol~. The pace of events in F r e n c h A@~a h a d accelerated aRer the d e , a t of the French in ~ 5 4 at Dien ~ e n Phu a n d the outbreak of civil war in A~efia. The b a d ~ shaken polifidans of the Fourth Republic had no i n ~ n fion of allowing violence to deride the issue in France's ~ a c k A@ican e m ~ . Mollet had Fromised w ~ e - r a n g ing constitutional ~ r m . ~ To h o n o r his p r o m ~ G the n e w Soc~Hst p ~ m ~ r charged ~ s m ~ r ~r ove~eas France, G a s ~ n Deffe~G with H o u p h o u e f s a s s ~ n c e , to prepare a ~ h e m e of constitutional and a d m i ~ s ~ five ~ r m s ~ r the o v e ~ e a s ~ r f i t o d e s . H o u p h o u e ~ s years of m a n e u v e r i n g n o w p a ~ off. He was ~ p o r t i o n to exercise a m a j o r i n f l u e n c e on t h e f u t u r e of all of French Africa.

T~ L~-C~ The resu~ of Deffe~e a n d H o u p h o u e C s work was to be s e m ~ a l ~ Franc~s relations with her African c d o n ~ s . ~ was called the loi-~d~ of 23 June 1956. With ils i m ~ e m e n ~ n g d e c ~ e s , the n e w law came i n ~ full ~ K e on 4 April 195Z In e f ~ it ~ p ~ s e n t e d the end of the power and u ~ of the two great c d o n ~ l ~ d ~ a ~ o n s . Houphou~ had won and Senghor's ~deraHsts had lost. It also spelled the e n d of the g r e a ~ r French Republic that ~ m p e d the overseas ~ r r i ~ f i e s ~ a u ~ f i e d s ~ with the m~rop~e. The p d n d ~ e of ~ r ~ t o ~ a l aut o n o m y was finally accepted and the road to i n d e p e n d ence cleared. U n d e r this f u n d a m e n t ~ ~ s ~ o n , a

The Road to I ~ ~ e n c e substantial block of e n u m erated p o w e r s over local aff a i r s -was t r a n s f e r r e d to p o p u l a r l y elected t e m t o r i a l governments, albeit with reserved powers retained by t h e m4tropole. 2. T h e colonial g o v e r n o r c o n t i n u e d to preside over the colonies b u t lost m u c h of his a u t h o r i T over day-to-day governm e n t a l operations. Except in a r e a s s u c h as d e f e n s e a n d external affairs, executi-ve p o w e r s w e r e i n v e s t e d in a c a b i n e t s e l e c t e d f r o m Gaston Defferre, the territonal a s s e m b l y unresponsible ~r the der the leadership of a vicedrafting of the p r e s i d e n t -who b e c a m e , in loi-cadre. all b u t n a m e , a p r i m e ~ ister. For the first time, the a d ~ J s ~ a t i o n w a s responsible to m e m b e r s elected by universal suffrage. Ehaal electoral colleges w e r e abolished a n d the o n e - m a n - o n e vote p r i n c i p l e firmly e s t a b l i s h e d , T h e p r e v i o u s l y allp o w e r f u l g o v e r n m e n t s g e n e r a l in D a k a r a n d Brazza,~dle w e r e s h o r n of m u c h of their authority. S e n g h o r bitt e r l y d e n o u n c e d t h e p r o c e s s as b a l k a n i z a t i o n . T h e indivisible Republic p r o c l a i m e d so v e h e m e n t l y at Brazzaville in 1944 h a d i n d e e d b e e n divided, ~*Ath governing p o w e r s s p l i t b e t w e e n t h e m~tropole a n d e l e c t e d temtorial governments. Ironically, it w o u l d not be the F o u r t h Republic poli f i d a n s (who h a d d o n e so m u c h in 15 years to p r e p a r e

71

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for eventual selGgovernment) who would ~ a d F~a~ce and her Nack Af6can d e p e n d e n d e s in the final s ~ p s on the road to p~itical de~verance. Instead destiny o ~ d a i n e d that Charles de GauHe w o u l d shape the final s ~ g e s in a process he had b e g u n - - p e r h a p s u n w i b t i n ~ y - - a t the BrazzavH~ C o n ~ r e n c e . ~ We can see now that the ~ # ~ d ~ was indeed the d e d ~ v e s ~ p that began the final unraveling of colonel ties, ~ a d i n g q u i c ~ y to independence for aH of French Af6ca. Perceptions at the time were less clea~ Most French policymakers and a m ~ o ~ t y of African p o l i t c ~ ~ a d e ~ were still searching in 1956 ~ r a means ~ mMn~ i n African assodation with France w h i ~ satisfying g r o w i n g d e m a n d s for s d ~ d e t e r m i n a ~ o n . Francois Mitterrand, for i n s ~ n c e , caHed in 1957 ~ r an end to colonial domination in order to b e t ~ r preserve Franc~s relations with Af6ca. ~ At that time even S6kou Tour6 sought to s u s ~ i n asso~afion with France on a v d u n ~ r y basis. N o n e t h e ~ s s it was p r o b a ~ y never realistic in those h e a d y days of the late 1950s to expect that, once aroused by a ~ s t e of autonomy, nationalist spi~ts could be long satisfied w i t h a n y t h i n g short of somet h u g called full independence.

The Fifth Republic While A ~ i c a n p o l i ~ c i a n s jostled for p o s i ~ o n within the poli~c~ s y s ~ m that had been created by the ~#cadrG e v e n ~ in Alge~a and France i n ~ r v e n e d d e d sivel~ The French Army's revolt of 13 May 1958 brought d o w n the F o u r t h Republic. G e n e r a l de GauHe was s u m m o n e d Dom selGimposed retirement at C ~ o m b e y q e ~ d e u x - ~ i s e s to govern in Pads. The FiSh Republic was proclaimed and a new constitution drafted,

largely f o l ~ w i n g the p r e s c ~ p t i o n s laid d o w n by the General h i m s e l £ The African ~rfitories had h a r d y beg u n to d ~ e s t the changes brought about u n d e r the ~ # ~ d ~ w h e n a bewildered African e ~ o r a ~ was called on once again to vote o n an even m o r e f u n d a m e n t ~ c h o ~ e for the future. A g ~ n , H o u p h o u ~ o u t m a n e u v e r e d his ~ d e r a h ~ o p p o n e n t s . As a m e m b e r of the French c a ~ n ~ he was, by fight of privilege, p r e s e n t at the working s e s s ~ n s that d r a ~ e d the n e w constitution. In contrasL h ~ ~vaL L 6 o p ~ d S e n g h o ~ w h o h a d r e f u s e d a cabinet p o s t in the Debr6 g o v e r n m e n L was c o n s u m e d o n ~ as o n e of the three African m e m b e r s of the c o n s f i t u t i o n ~ consultative committee after the draft had been commend. S e n g h o £ s opposition to portions of the n e w constitution d e a h n g w i t h A f t r a was v e h e m e n t b u t u n a vailing. All h o p e of t u r n i n g AOF a n d AEF i n ~ s ~ o n g ~ d e p e n d e n t ~ d e r a t i o n s was lost. v D e b a ~ in the constitutional c o m m i t t e e was concerned m a i n ~ with the in~icades of r ~ a t i o n s b e t w e e n the i n d i v ~ u ~ African ~ r r i t o r i e s a n d France. In this d e b a ~ H o u p h o u e t ~ vored a c o n ~ d e r a l ~ r u ~ u r e with no i n ~ r m e d ~ authority b e t w e e n the i n d ~ u a l ~ i t o f i e s and France. The c o n s e q u e n c e s of r~ecting African ~ d e m f i o n were e n o r m o u s : Each African ~ r r i ~ r y w o u ~ s ~ n d on its o w n in its relationship with France; ~ d e r a l unity, and w h a ~ v e r s ~ e n g t h went with it, were b ~ . Senghor a n d his f ~ e n d s were r e d u c e d to a r g u i n g for a looser c o m m o n w e a l t h type of a s s o d a t i o n m a d e u p of f u r y ind e p e n d e n t states. The final o u ~ o m e was c o m p r o m ~ e . The s h o r b ~ v e d " c o m m u n i t y " ~esulfing ~ o m the n e w constitution would have a c o m m o n nationality, senate,

and p r e s M e n t . As p r e s ~ e n t of the c o m m u n i t y , the p ~ d e n t of France would retain substantial p o w e ~ over such m ~ as unified d e ~ n s e , ex~rnal affaffs, c u ~ e n c ~ e c o n o m ~ p d i c ~ and s ~ a ~ c m~erMs. Un~ss s p e c ~ c a l ~ excluded by agreement, France would also s u p e r ~ s e sensitive areas such as courts, h i g h e r education, external and ~ a c o m m u n i W ~ a n s p o r ~ tion, and ~ c o m m u n ~ a f i o n s . ~ In ~ c t , the position w o ~ d be o n ~ superfida~y d f f ~ n t from that w h ~ h exis~d under the loi-cad~. The new s ~ s w o u ~ enjoy a ~ r g e m e a s u ~ of internal self-government. Howeve~ much of the real power was ~ e d by the p r e s ~ e n t of France and c e r ~ m i ~ e r s . The description ~ v e n the n e w ~ d e ~ f i o n b o r n on 13 July 1957 in P a r i s - " F ~ n c ~ A f r i c a n United S t a t e s " w a s h a r d ~ apt. ~ To partially a c c o m m o d a ~ the advocates of a c o m m o n wealth, provision was made ~ r p e r i o d ~ p ~ m e m ~ i ~ terial m e e t i n g s a n d for c o m m u n i t y a g r e e m e n t by ~eaW. Ratification of the new constitution was ~ be by r e ~ r e n d u m h e l d in each i n d i v i d u M ~ r ~ r ~ The c h ~ c e was to be an unequivocal "yes" or "no" vote on w h ~ h e r the v o ~ wished the~ ~ r r i ~ f i e s ~ m m a ~ in the communiW as a u ~ n o m o u s ~ p u b l i ~ or ~ accede immed~ ~ outright independence. To ~ f l u e n c e ~ e c h ~ c e of the new African v o ~ - and of the~ leaders--the French presented both cabot and stick: French largesse would continue to flow to ~r~r~s that o p ~ d for c o m m u n i t y m e m b e r s h i w it would end a b r u p t ~ for those w h o chose i n d e p e n d ence. De G a u l ~ himse~ embarked on a selling tour of French Africa in AuguM 1958 just b e ~ r e the final ve~ s ~ n of the constitution was published. To emphaMze the seriousness of the c h ~ c e ~ his African a u d ~ n c ~

~

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~ l~dence

he assured them that a "no" vo~ would c e r ~ i n ~ bring immedia~ independence. BuG he cau~oned, the consequences of such a ch~ce would be heavy. The price, he warned, would be the end of aH French ~d. (~nce 1947 the A@~an ~ r ~ t o r e s had benefited ~ o m subs ~ n t a l French finandal a s ~ a n c e ~om FIDES.) Reaction ~ de G a u ~ s haughty "~ke R or leave it" presentat~n of the proposition was general~ unfavora~e among the young African ~ i ~ s in m o ~ of the ~D rto~es. The n o ~ b ~ excep~on was the Ivory Coasb where H o u p h o u e t had carefully prepared opinion through his well-drilled PDCI cadre. C h a r a c ~ r s f i c a ~ de Gau~e rem~ned outward~ unmoved by oppo~fion and c~fidsm. In the vofin~ o n ~ S6kou Tour, s Guinea dared reje~ the community. His Part D6mocra~que Guin6en (PDG) was in firm c o n ~ of the Guinean coun~ysid~ the traditional c h ~ had been r e p u d ~ d , and ~ch mineral deposits were b e ~ n n i n g to be e x p i r e d in Guinea by non-French c o m p a n ~ s . Thus Tour6 ~ l t himse~ in a stronger position to assert his independence than did m o ~ of his nafiona~st cd~agues in other terfitoreso There are some who c~im that Tour,s reo s~ve on the independence issue was influenced by pressure @ore radica~zed studen~ and worke~ among his own suppo~e~. These ~ements had ~ g e d ~ b ~ gun to accuse Tour6 of b~ng a French toad~ ~ Leaders in other ~ r r i ~ e s may have been ~ m p ~ d to r ~ e ~ the French offeG but they generally resisted ~ m p ~ o n through ~ar of being r e p u d ~ d by thor own e ~ o rates. Only in Niger did another party of any impo~ tance o p e n l y call for a " n o " vote. There, the still p o ~ f i c ~ powerful French Army and a d m i n ~ a t o n

N1

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~T

. . . .

CharLesde Gaulle arrives in the Ivory Coast during his August 1958 tour of Fr~h Africa.

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combined with conserva~ve Hausa chie~ to d e , a t the Sawaba challenge and chase its i m p r u d e n t leadeG Dj~o Bakar~ into e ~ . ~ Even in Guinea, after the results of the r e ~ r e n d u m were known, a somewhat contfi~ Tour~ a t ~ m p t e d to mdlify de Gaulle with an of~r to j ~ n the community v d u n ~ l ~ De Gaul~ cddly reje~ed th~ effo~ at c o n c i l ~ o n . Ins~ad, he cast the o~ fender into the darkness outside the golden Francophone d r d e . General de Gau l~ replied to what he viewed as Guinean impertinence in typical eschatological form: All a s s ~ n c e to Guinea was immed~tely termina~d and aH French p e ~ o n n ~ abruptly withdrawn. Showing the nastier side of t h o r nafion~ personality, a number of depar~ng French interpre~d their ins~uc~ons to ~ r m i n a ~ all a s s ~ n c e q u i ~ l i ~ r a ~ Reports at the ~me said even things Hke ~ p h o n e s were dismantled and taken home to France. True or not, such ~les of French v i n d ~ v e n e s s g a i n e d wide c r e d e n c e and caused unneeded bi~erness. This harsh ~eatment was cer~inly a factor in S6kou Tour6's f l i r ~ o n with the S o v i e t . The disaster for Guinea that ultimately f~lowed Tour6's decision was to have tragic consequences for the Guinean people. It seems doubtful that a w i ~ d d campaigner like de Gaul~ acted o n ~ out of p ~u e. Why, then, did he treat Guinea so b r u s h y ? One possible explana~on is that he c a ~ u ~ d the dete~ent e f ~ of his harshness on o p i n ~ n in the other ter~to~es. Cleafl~ his ac~on was aimed at preventing further de~c~ons. Had he not acquiesced so q u ~ k ~ and easily to pdi~cal independence for aH 13 other African m e m b e ~ of the commun i t y o n l y 2 y e a r s later, the s i m p l e r e x p l a n a t i o n

France in Black Africa of pique m i g h t satisfy m o s t inquiry. In light of his n i m ble shift in a t t i t u d e , o n e is t e m p t e d to s p e c u l a t e t h a t de G a u l l e m a y e v e n h a v e w e l c o m e d the o p p o r t u n i t y afforded by Tour~'s impetu o s i t y . At the t i m e , de Gaulle was heavily engaged in the delicate operation of extracting F r a n c e from the q u a g m i r e of civ:d w a r in A l g e r i a . H e c o u l d have r e c k o n e d t h a t a c o m paratively cheap demonLOCHON/GAMMA s t r a t i o n of t o u g h n e s s against a radical regime in S~kou Tour4"s Guinea was a small black African coun- the only French African try might help disarm colony to reject s o m e of his m o r e d a n g e r - membership in the o u s critics in F r a n c e a n d French community Algeria. At a m i n i m u m , de in 1958. Gaulle w o u l d not have w a n t e d to a p p e a r p e r m i s s i v e on the q u e s t i o n of political i n d e p e n d e n c e in the midst of the grave domestic crisis c a u s e d b y h i s e f f o r t s to e x t r i c a t e F r a n c e f r o m Algeria. In any case he may well have viewed the comr n u n i t y as a stage a l o n g a r o a d l e a d i n g t o w a r d m o r e complete i n d e p e n d e n c e . ~ e m o s t vexing a n d persistent question remains: W h y -were t h e t w o F r e n c h f e d e r a t i o n s b r o k e n u p ? Clearly, strong African s u p p o r t for the survival of the f e d e r a t i o n s existed. T h r o u g h o u t its colonial history,

78

~e R~d ~ Ind~de~e

France had worked to centralize administrative authority and ser~ces in Dakar and Brazzavil~. Why, then, in the d o i n g days of empire, were the ~derations broken up into 13 barely viable independent s ~ s ? The weakness of ~rritories like Chad, Upper Vol~, Mauri~nia, and Dahomey was cer~inly recognized during the cobnial era. Indeed, their need for budget sub,dies was one of the p f i n d p M reasons for e s t a b l ~ h i n g the ~derafions. The m o ~ easily identifiable e n e m a s of West African ~deration were HouphouebB~gny and his European and African friends in the Ivory Coast. Revenues c~ed in the Ivory Coast had long been diverted through the ~ d e r ~ budget in Dakar to help sub~dize regular and devebpment budge~ in the poorer territories of AOF. Iv~fian resentment of their perceived r~e as the ~deration's milk cow was deep and long ~sfing. Houphouet, as the a~est pafl~men~rian and best placed A ~ a n p d i t i d a n in the French sys~m, undoubtedly had a strong influence on the shaping of French A@ican p ~ i c ~ His pre~dency of RDA combined with his unriva~d pditical connections in Paris to make him a formidable foe of African federation. Noneth~ess, powerful as he was, Houphouet and his friends could not have desffoyed the two historic ~derafions on their own. They must have had support and encouragement ~ o m other powerful quar~rs in France. Logic and cu~ently available evidence suggest that the perpetuation of strong Franco-Affican links was the undeHying go~ of French p d ~ Indeed, what beRer way to perpetuate dose re~tions than to split the empire into many d e p e n d e n t ministates averaging

France in Black Afrka 3 million souls each? Dealt with i n d i v i d u ~ l y by France, these weak, f i n a n d ~ strapped c o u n t i e s were ~kely to be less adventurous and to possess far ~ss b a r g ~ n g power than would two ~rge, more finandaHy secure ~derafions. ~ To this day many Aftcan nafionahsts believe firm~ in such a F~nch "divide and d o m i n ~ e " conspirac~ Wha~ver thor motives in ending the ~derafionG the French certainly m u ~ have been aware of the independence ~ver t h ~ had g6pped much of the A ~ a n p d ~ dite. It wouM be s~e~hing c r e d ~ t y to suggest that they did not con~der the p o s s ~ t y of c o m p l e ~ p~i~cal independence w h e n they d~a~ed the p r o ~ s ~ n s in the ~#cad~ that q u ~ k ~ ~ d to the demise of the ~dera~ons. Indeed they would have been uncharac~6sficaHy careless had they not considered how best to pro~ct French b n g - ~ r m inteD ests in case events led to ~ r e s ~ f i b l e d e m a n d s for independence. In an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the authoG General de GauHCs own African ad~seG the redoubta~e ~cques Foccart, indirectly confirmed that the breakup had been in~nfion~. ~ De G a ~ , he said, recognized that the ~derafions were "too d i v e , e " to survive once the c d o n ~ l hand was removed. They " i n e ~ y " would have become " u n M a ~ e , " and eventual~ would have broken up in b ~ r n e s s and confl~t. The ~rminafion of the ~dera~ons b e~re independence av~ded this po~ n f i ~ dangerous p r o ~ e m and ~ the Af~cans with "more managea~e ~ a ~ G " Foccart asserted. De Gaul~'s v ~ w of the permanency of the community as an institution is also fundamental ~ an und e r s ~ n d i n g of these events. Foccart contended that Gener~ de GauHe had foreseen p d ~ a l independence

The Road to Independence in 1958. The Gener~ ~ e w e d the community as a s ~ p in a process rather than an end in ~sel£ De GaullG Foccart inMs~d, a n t i d p a ~ d granting independence in 1965 or 1966; the ~ c t that independence came only 2 years a~er the formation of the community surprised the General. Once Mali demanded independence in 1960, Foccart expl~ned, the others quic~y folbwed. The General " ~ m ~ y acceded to Af~can~ wishes." Another well-informed French observer confirmed to the author that de Gaul~ d ~ indeed a n ~ p a ~ independence, but with a ~n g er "appren~ceship." All the terdtodes were not expe~ed ~ be granted independence at the same ~me, he claimed. Rathe~ it was recognized by those in the French government dealing with A f t r a that "some ~ R o d e s were more ready than others for independence."

Econom~ Dependence Only modest economic development ~ o k ~ace in French Mack Af~ca b e ~ 1945. Most of what d ~ ~k e ~ a c e related to infrastructure--railways, ports, airfie~s, and so f o r t h - - ~ help move ~ w m a ~ M s ~ France. From the end of the 19th centur~ a form of me~an~m was imposed on the empire. H eav y -some~mes uncontrolled--expend~ures during the m ~ r y conquest had convinced many in France that c d o n h l expan~on was not p r o f i ~ e . ~ By the turn of the centur~ there was a s~ong ~ h c ~ n c e to provide con~nued finan~ng ~ r the Afdcan c d o n ~ s directly from the m e ~ o p o l i ~ n ~ e a s u r ~ To give teeth to this sen~ment, a law was passed in 1900 p r o ~ n g c~onial e x p e n ~ t u ~ s except in excep~onal ~ u m s ~ n c e s .

81

Frame ~ ~ a ~ A~ica Sd~suffic~ncy and the primacy of m ~ r o p o l i ~ n over c d o n i a l interests became the guiding p ~ n d ~ e s of French c d o n ~ l prac~ce. D ~ f l ~ s ~ n e d by the barren nahW of the~ newly acquired Saharan ter~tode~ the French a n ~ o u s ~ sought an aRerna~ve to free the French treasury of the burden of finandng even a minimal adm~is~ation ~ these unpromi~ng lands. The s d u ~ o n ~ u n d was a com~iment ~ the mgm nuity of the French, if not to their genero~ty. They grouped ~ e poor but e c o n o m i c ~ viable coastal cdon~s with the d e s p e r a ~ poor sem~esert hin~fland ~ r ~ r i e s in two great ~ d e ~ t i o n s . They then inves~d the ~ d e ~ o n g governing b o d e s with impor~nt ~x~ g pow~s. The n v e n u e s a c ~ u ~ g ~ the governments general ~om t h d r ~rming of indirect taxes were then used to finance common ~ c h ~ c ~ services ~ r aR cdo~es. When these common expenses w e n meg the sup ~ u s n v e n u e s w e n distfibu~d ~ the member c ~ o ~ e s ~ cover ~heir budget deficits. Wha~ver n m ~ n e d was then used to finance devebpment. By 1951 the coastal ~rfi~fies of AOF w e n produ~ ing ~ percent of AOF expo~s ~ y v a ~ . At the same time, the poorer hinterland count~es such as Chad, Upper Volta, Sudan, and Niger w e ~ getting as much as 90 percent of the~ ~ g u ~ r b u d g ~ ~ v e n u e ~ s u b s e t s @om AOF. ~ The burden ~om t ~ s ~ s t r i b u t i o n of income fell mainly on the exporbcrop-produdng coastal c don~s . Surplus n v e n u e s ~ e y might ~ h e r w ~ e have used to finance their own development w e ~ ~phoned off through the ~ d e ~ f i o n budget ~ finance the defid~ of t h o r poorer ne~hbors in the i n ~ o ~ Thus, w ~ burdens on the French ~xpayers were eased, the main

victim was econom~ and sodM development ~ the r~ative~ more affluent Af~can ~ r ~ e s . In happy contrast to ea~ier decades of the 20th centur~ the h s t ~ yearn of French coloniM r u ~ ~ Mack Africa (194&6~ w ~ e ~ch in accom~ishment. A ~ e ~ ated social and e c o n o m ~ d e v e ~ p m e n t a c c o m p a n ~ d the pace ~ t in devo~tion ~ p ~ l fights and powers to Africans under the Fou~h and ~ R h Republic. The ~stitutionM vehicles chosen as condui~ for this sudden ~ o ~ o m ~ g of French finandM aM were FIDES and i~ d ~ b u ~ e m e ~ arm, the Caisse C e n ~ a ~ de la F~nce • Ouff~Mer (CCFOM). For the first ~me in this cen~ r ~ the French broke w~h t h o r ffaditional in~stence on c ~ o n ~ l s ~ s u f f i d e n c y and p r o d d e d l ~ g ~ a ~ , ~ m ~ deveMpme~ financing ~om ~ e French ~easury in the ~ r m of grants and ~ a n s on conces~onal ~rms. ~ Th~ b u n t of genero~W was ~ifiM~ mo~va~d by genuMe ~ g s of g m f i ~ d e ~ r Af~can wa~ime loyalW. No doubt the French also w ~ h e d to share with their c d o ~ e s some of ~ e a s ~ s ~ n c e ~ e y thems~ves were rec~%ng under the American-financed M ~ s h ~ l ~ a n . Nonetheless (as EIHot Berg so ebquently p ~ e d out in a closely r e a s o n e d article w ~ t t e n in 1960), w • r o u g h t h o r devebpment assistance the French wove a web of dependence around their African ~ r ~ e s . In some ~ the Francophone counffies this tight pattern of dependence is s~ll in ~ace. ~s e~ments include dev ~ o p m e n t capital, skilled manpoweG p r e ~ r e n t i a l ~ade p r o ~ o n s , and pr~ective finandM contrds. The degree of African dependence was remarkable. For ins~nce, 70 percent of the c a ~ l invested ~ public pr~ects in AOF from 1947 to 1956 came from the French ~ e a s u r ~ (The percentage in AEF was c o m p a ~ y

83

high.) Even the 30 p e ~ e n t of the pubhc investment funds contributed by the ~ R o f i e s thems~ves du~ng this period was po~ible o n ~ because F~nce was paying a large portion of their ~ r d t o ~ a l a d m i n ~ a ~ v e costs and all the cost of m ~ n ~ g mil~ary ~rces in the African ter~todes. A second factor that contribu~d s u b s ~ n t i ~ ~ African dependence on F~nce was the ~ u r e to Af~ca~ze personn~ in both the p u ~ and the p~va~ sectors. V i r t u ~ no barriers were p o s e d to French m e ~ o p d i ~ n d~zens settling in AOF or AEF before independence. E s p e d ~ ~rge influxes ~om the m~r~ po~ took ~ace during the 1950s, as ~ r m e r c ~ o n ~ ~om Morocco, Tu~sia, and Indochina moved ~ ~ack Africa. The ~ a d y s u p ~ y of skil~d F ~ c h m e n w i ~ n g ~ work ~ the c d o n ~ s a~ed as a brake on the ~ n g and subsequent promotion of Africans into ~ c h ~ c a l ~ s ~ l ~ d and managed~ po~s. The ~ebling of the European pop~a~on ~ the Af~can territories between 1946 and 1956 ~ a good ~ d ~ a ~ o n of the mag~tude of the movement of French ~ Af~ca dudng this period. ~ The preoccupa~on of such a ~rge por~on of the small Af~can e ~ with p d ~ c s o b ~ o u s ~ HmRed the numbers a v a i ~ e to take up the ~ u c i a l ~ i m p o r ~ n t m ~ d ½ q e v ~ posts in the a d m ~ a ~ o n and the p~va~ secton The p ~ o u s ~ n o ~ d p r ~ i ~ o n of ~ isla~ve and advisory bodies a ~ n e absorbed much of the best African ~ n t from a s~ll small po~. Notwithstanding African p ~ c ~ c o n ~ in aH the ter~to~es by 1958, Frenchmen con~nued to domina~ the mp and m ~ e ~vels of the a d m m ~ a ~ o n . Even worse, African~a~on had h a r d y begun ~ the p~va~ secto~ Just before independence, management and

~e ~

~~ e ~

~chn~al services were ~ f f u ~ all whi~; only 2,100 Africans were H~ed among managemen~ and p r o ~ ~onal-lev~ pe~onnel out of a to~l work force of more than 250,000 in AOE ~

Econom~ Development French econom~ ~anners w e ~ sfi~ se~ous~ tal~ ~ g about an i n d i v i s ~ ~ p u ~ as ~ as 1956. B e ~ 1956, ~ a n n i n g and infrastructure development were based on a hrge, imperial ~ p u ~ k ~ t h e r than on a ~ thora of small, d e s p e ~ t e l y poor ~ d e p e n d e n t states. Change in focus did not take ~ace until after the ~ ~ d ~ suddenly edipsed the ~ d e ~ o n s and ~ r ~ a u ~ n o m y ~ e d planners to shift priorities hastil~ Th~ lag in French pe~epfion seems fu~her ~ suppo~ the conten~on that b~kan~afion of French Africa was not a ~ n ~ c o n s ~ e r e d , c a r e f ~ ~ a n n e d French ~ot. Ra~e~ as happened with other c d o ~ p o w e r , the French probab~ ~iled to a n t i c ~ a ~ ea~y independence and went on d e v e b ~ n g a ~ d e ~ l in@as~u~ure with 1Rile thought to the possible consequences of ~D ~torial autonomy. To exacerba~ the appa~nt ~ o n n e c ~ o n between politics and economic d e v e ~ p m e n t , ~ a n n i n g was done in the years b e ~ r e ~dependence by French bureaucrats who were h r g e ~ i s l a n d ~om the polific~ realities of Africa. By and large, the Af~can elite was p ~ o ~ u ~ e d with politics and with equa~W of smtu~ local peo~e had Httle ~ s p o n ~ l i w ~ r mana~ng thor own econom~s. ~ Because economk d e d s ~ n m a ~ n g d ~ not concern them, they devebped l i ~ interest or expertise in such ques~ons. The ~o-frequent dream of

France in Black Africa y o u n g Af~can ~ u d e n t s - - t h e n and n o w - - w a s to become a d ~ l servanL work in an office, and wear a suR and neck~e. Too m a n y of A@~a's best and b d g h t e ~ students had little interest in the ~ c h n ~ p r o ~ s ~ o n s or in p ~ v a ~ bu~ness. (In part, this ~ c k may have been because of a lack of e n c o u r a g e m e n t by the French.) Worse yet, e m p l o y m e n t t h a t m i g h t r e q u i r e getting o n ~ s hands dirty was r e j e c ~ d out of hand by many as unsuited to an educated person. Consequentl~ large n u m b e r s of French ~ c h n i c i a n s and skilled workers c o n ~ n u e to enjoy e m p l o y m e n t in m a n y c o u n t ~ e s in Francophone Af~ca long a~er independence. By and large, o v e ~ c o n ~ of this i n g e n ~ u s system of i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e r e m a i n e d in Paris long a ~ e r 1960. Key economic d e d s ~ n s cn investments, prices to be paid for e x p o r t s , a n d prices c h a r g e d for F r e n c h p r o d u ~ s s d d in Africa were r o u ~ n e ~ made in France by Frenchmen.

Independence It is hard to judge whether F o ~ a r ~ s account of de GauH~s pres~ence is ~ l ~ accura~. For the autho~ ~ has the ring of truth and s q u a ~ s with what we know of de Gaull~s d e ~ s ~ n s and chara~e~ C e ~ n l y , if anyone k n e w w h a t was in de GauH~s mind w h e n he took de~Mo~s c o n c e r ~ n g A~ica, it would have been his trusted adviser on Afdcan affairs. Nonetheless, creative c o s m e t o l o g y is n o t u n k n o w n as a h i s t o r i c phenomenon. In any case, the Franco-Af~can c o m m u ~ prov ~ e d a very u s e f u l a ~ t short-lived, vehicle ~ r poli~ ical t r a n s i t i o n to i n d e p e n d e n c e . By 1960 e v e n

~ e R~d ~ ~ d ~ d e n c e H ouphou~, the most commR~d African advoca~ of the c o m m u ~ , was d e m a n ~ n g full ~dependence for the Ivory Coast. This time the French r e s p o n d e d q u e r y and generously. Independence was g ~ n t e d all African members of the c o m m u ~ with no threat to c r f i c ~ impo~ant a s ~ s ~ n c e p r ~ e ~ s or ~ f u t u ~ assodafion with France. On the c o n t ~ r ~ French pdifical archRects worked ima~nafive wonders in improvising fcrm~as ~ a t granted sove~ignW ~ the African ~ e s while maintaining close a s s o d a f i o n with France. F ~ n c h fle~b~W was even ex~nded ~ the p ~ n t of a~ cepfing the short-lived Marl Federation as a member of the communit~ ~ o m e contended that Senghor and ~ s friends h o p ~ viewed the Mali Federation as a fi~t s ~ p ~ w a r d ~consfitufing an ~ d e p e n d e n t West African ~ d e ~ f i o n . ) Independence, of course, meant dff~rent things to countries at very ~ f ~ r e n t s~ges of sodaL p d ~ c ~ , and economic de v~o p men t. At one e ~ m e was the Ivory CoasL ~ e s s e d with a rich agfic~tur~ economy, a s o p h ~ f i c a ~ d p~ifical ~ a d e r s h ~ , and a well-d~ciplined mass p~ificM p a r t ~ At the other end of the s p e c t r u m was Mauritania, w h o s e population was ~ r g ~ y nomadic and whose capRal cit~ NouakchoR, was at the time of independence little more than a desert oasis. I nde e d , much of the small M a u f i ~ n i a n admi~fion was s ~ l housed in SainbLou~, Senegal, on the south ~de of ~ e Senegal Riven Nouakch~t ~cked even the ~ c i l ~ e s needed to accommod~e minimal g o v e r n m e n t services for a small i n d e p e n d e n t state. Most of the new Francophone sta~s were q u i ~ deafly unprepared in any practical sense ~ r ~ d e p e n d ence in 1960. Indeed, some would never make much

87

France in Black Africa

~ c ~

A~ca ~ d ~

MAL,N,GE,' AF~CANREPUBUC BURKINA I BE FASO TOGO

RWANDA GABON

ZAIRE B~R~UUNDI.

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sense as viable nafion-s~tes. Thor borders had been drawn by European~ o~en with no regard to cultural ethniG or econom~ factors. In French Africa in 1960, probably only Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Guinea were reasonably well prepared for i m m e d ~ t e independence. Even the Ivory CoasL as late as 1956, had no African civil servants in policyma~ng poMfions. ~ The much-vaunted asMmflafion policy had provided a smaH, w~beducated ~ i ~ who equa~d thor metrop~i n n counterpa~s in education~ and ~chnical found~ tion after 1945. In terms of p~ificG many had the inva~a~e experience of 15 years of on4he-job ffaining as members of various French kgiMafive bodies and advisory coundls, including the French Nafion~ Assem~y Rself. A ~w, like Houphouet and Sengho~ had been cabinet m e m b e ~ with real power in several of the swin~ng-door governments of the French Fourth Rep u ~ . The deep divis~ns that ~agued French posb war politics had meant that these A~ican leaders occa~ona~y played crudal rdes in sus~ining narrowly supported coalition governments. A~er 1956, many A~ican leaders had served as m e m b e ~ of territorial governments. By 1960 ~ w were foreign to the give-andtake of politics in a modern state. It was to this Frencheducated elite that the French transferred power in 1960. Once S6kou Tour~ was excluded, the men who assumed top leadership in most French African states were modera~G with the n o t a t e exception of Modibo Keita of Ma~. Thus the top polific~ ~ a d e ~ h i p was experienced and o f ~ n well prepared. The next level of technicians and adminis~ators, howeveL was very thin and o~en fll prepared.

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Dff~mnces in histor~ g e o g ~ p h ~ and economic po~ntial, of course, were crucial in de~rmining the future of the successor re~mes. All were, to one degree or anothe~ economkM~ underde~ebped. Most were • ~ d e d aMng ethnic and mli~ous fines. Fronfie~ were often arbitrarily drawn with scant regard ~ r natural or ~hnic divi~ons. (Of coupe, the number and dispersal of ethnic groups in Africa would have made e t h i c a l l y u ~ f o r m s ~ s impossi~e no ma~er how frontier lines were drawn.) With the n o t a t e exception of Senegal tolerance of political oppo~tion wouM not Mng sur~ve pditic~ independence. ~nally, many new re~mes re~ e d ~ thems~ves as S o d ~ fol~wing the ~ e ~ o g ~al chic of the day. l n d ~ M u ~ chara~er and d ~ u m s ~ n c e s were de~rminant in setting the nature of future re~mes. At the time of independence, the four countries of the ~ mer equa~fial ~ d e ~ f i o n were less evolved p~ifica~y and econom~a~y and more d o s e ~ fled ~ France than were t h o r sister republics in We~ Africa. Cameroo~ a former German c ~ o n y and a UN trust ~ r f i t o r ~ became a ~deration with an An~ophone minority a~er the southern part of the former British ~ust ~ r r i ~ r y was added in Oc~ber 19~. Senegal with i~ b n g er h i~ ~ r y of p~ifical devebpment, was more s~Gconfident than other c o u n t i e s in tolerating nomin~ pdific~ opposition. The Ivory CoasL with its relatively prospe~ ous economy and subManfiM number of influenfiM African ~anters and e n ~ e p r e n e u ~ , was more open to ~beral econom~s than countries like Mali, which suG ~ r e d both rural poverty and a strong Marxi~ influence in i~ ru~ng party. Tribal and regional differences were so strong in tiny Dahomey that they p r e v e n ~ d even

~e ~

~ ~nden~

nominal p ~ M u n i t y w i t h i n national p~ificM ~es. Chad was probab~ ~ e m o ~ ex~eme ~ ~ hop~ less econom~ ~v~bffiW and national ~ t i f i d ~ The northern half was desert with a few scattered oases and was p e o ~ e d by MuMim nomads who largely i ~ nored its a r ~ a f i ~ drawn frontiers. The southern third of the ~ u ~ r ~ on the other hand, was r ~ a t i ~ ~rffie. It was p e o ~ e d ~ ~ a ~ ~k ~an ~a~ ant ~ r m e ~ who ~ o d ~ e d ~ R o n as a ~ ~op. ~ fu~ ther c o m ~ a ~ the problem of national u n i t ~ the southerne~ were m a i n ~ Christians and aMmiMs who had been v ~ m s of a form of h e b ~ Be~re the arrival ~ ~ e ~ e n c h ~ e y had ~ m d m ~ sh~ ra~ng ~ the ~ r m M a b ~ nomad ~ s from the northern desert. Di~uption of theft sodeW was ended ~ the a~ rival of the French. The ~ a ~ o n M p o ~ r sy s~m was then turned on its head. The a d a p ~ e southerners q u i c k ~ grasped o p p ~ f i e s ~ c o o p ~ a ~ with the c ~ o n ~ e ~ and b e ~ m e theft ~ s p e n ~ e au~fiafies. At the same time, the northern M u ~ m warrio~ disd a i n e d ~ r e i g n culture, e d u c a ~ o n , and language. When the time came ~ ~ a n s ~ r p ~ e L the sons of the ~ r m e r ~cfims were best ~aced to inherit p o ~ r and poMtMn @om the French. L o n ~ s u p p m ~ e d n ~ e m ~me~ ~k~ ~ff~ed, ~ad~g ~ a ~ 1 ~ ~ cept a l a r ~ l y s o ~ h ~ d o m ~ a ~ d ~mmem and adm~ation. The resulting conffict ~ t ~ northerners and southerners has been a m ~ o r factor in the chronic ~ s ~ that has a f ~ e d ~ e ~ ~ Chad.

91

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in ~

Nary a

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Ripple

In t h e i m m e d i a t e p o s f i n d e p e n d e n c e p e r i o d , French presence in Mack Africa declined little, ff at am, in most African F r a n c o p h o n e countries. Although fo~ met admin~a~ exchanged c ~ o n ~ l g a d braM for business s u i ~ and the a n o n y m i t y of titles like advise~ t h e s u b s t a n c e of t h e i r d u t i e s o f t e n r e m a i n e d u n changed. Even at the most vifib~ and s y m b d ~ ~vel, f o r m e r g o v e r n o r s in G a b o n a n d Niger simply m o v e d into newly o p e n e d French embasfies as the first French ambassadors assigned to these countries. In even more u n u s u a l cases, f o r m e r F r e n c h g o v e r n o r s w e r e app o i n t e d as a m b a s s a d o r s to France &ore e x - c C o n ~ s . R a m a d ~ r ( ~ r m e r governor in Guinea, C a m e r o o ~ and NigeO was n a m e d by Mall as its first a m b a s s a d o r in Fails, and M a u b e r n a (the la~ governor ~ Guinea) was N i g e f s f i ~ t a m b a s s a d o r to France. ~ A ~ h o u g h ~ r m e r c d o n ~ l dvil servants stayed on as advisers or on con~act in former ~rifish c ~ o n ~ they were m r e ~ if ever given the ~ b i ~ t y that the French enjoyed. I n d e e d , some of these cozy a ~ a n g e m e n t s s u r ~ v e ~ this d~y in several F r a n c o p h o n e A ~ a n count~es with nary a fip~e.

French Pol~kal Model H a ~ n g p a r t i d p a t e d in French e~cfions and instit u t i o n s since 1945, the F r a n c o p h o n e p ~ i f i d a n s a n d p o p u N f i o n s were w ~ l acquainted with French d o m e ~ tic p ~ i f i c ~ institutions, and p~ifical mores. W h a t then could be m o r e n a t u r a l t h a n that m a n y w o u l d c h o o s e the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the Fifth Republic as a m o d e l for

The R ~ d ~ M & w ~ e ~ e their o w n constitutions? (In some cases the comparison is almost w o r d for word.) Not o n ~ were the French forms ~ m i l i a G b u t often the s a m e French constitut i o n a l a d v i s e r s a s s i s t e d in d r a f t i n g t h e A f r i c a n constitutions. C e ~ a i n ~ the c e n ~ a f i o n of power in the jmperial presidency that one found in the French C o n ~ i t u fion was well s u ~ e d to ~adifional African ~ a d e ~ h i p concepts of the s ~ o n g c h e f . No doubt it h a d the f u ~ ther advantage of satisfying the a m ~ f i o n s of m a n y of the n e w c h e f s of state. The F r e n c h centralization of s ~ power ~ s o p r o v ~ e d a degree of n a f i o n ~ c o h e ~ o n t h r o u g h its a d m i n i s t ~ t i v e networks to l o o s e ~ formed, often arfifid~ s ~ t e s . As p r e % o u s ~ n o , d , the b o u n d aries of all these new states were European creations of the l a ~ 19th c e n t u r y - - n o more than vague fines on a m a p d r a w n in Berlin in 1885, c u t t i n g i n s e n ~ t i v e l y across e t h n i c a n d n a t u r a l t o p o g r a p h i c lines. The resulting p r o ~ e m cf divided tribes and d ~ e d loyalties has Mnce bedeviled relations a m o n g African n e ~ h b o r s as w ~ l as the internal c o h e s ~ n of m a n y of the r e ~ o ~ s ~ a g i ~ states. ~

93

THREE:

Co eration Re aces C o ism More

than any other European colonial powe~ France (and particularly her pre~dent, Charles de GauHe) succeeded in preventing political independence from automatically breaking the dose links that had been forged with her black A~ican former colonies. On the c o n ~ a r ~ formal i n d e p e n d e n c e was v~wed by many French as a price to be paid to preserve the close cultural and economic ties forged over the previous c e n t u r ~ At the same time they wished to avoid at all costs a repetition of the dreadful colonial wars they had experienced in Indochina and were experiendng in Algeria. In an effort to preserve a degree of French d o m i n a n c e while satisfying African demands for autonomy and equality, the French first prop o s e d a l o o s e n i n g of political ties by g r a n t i n g autonomy and internal selGgovernment within the context of a French community of nations. This formula was accepted initially by most of their A ~ a n pawners, but pressures soon increased for full pdific~ independence. FinaH~ resistance to the community came from an unexpected quarten ttouphoue~Boigny of the Ivory Coast and his three partners in the recently formed Consul d'Entente ~refused to join the commu-

95

France in BlackAfrica nit~ pre~rring a b i h ~ r a l r~afionship with France. The ins~tu~ons of the community were then sffi~orn, and the idea of a French-~d con~derafion was al~wed to d ~ from conspicuous n e ~ e ~ . Ins~ad an ingen~us sys~m of bilateral agreements became the basis of rehtions b ~ w e e n France and her Aff~an pa~ne~. Again Houphouet called the tune. He wanted no ~minders of the ~deraHsm he had so b n g ~ewed as inim~al to the i n , r e s t s of the Ivory Coa~. De Gaul,, with unusual fle~bility, bowed to the wishes of his most v a n e d A@~an all~ F~nce then embarked on the negofiat~n of agreements that were to govern her relations with all of her former ~ack Af~can dependencies except Guinea. They were called cooperation accords. The process by wh~h they were reached was surpfiMn~y un-Ga~c in its pragmatism and apparent lack of stud~d coherence. The accords were ~rilliantly tailored to the needs and desires of various p a ~ n e ~ . A ~ a n g e m e n ~ with Mali included o n ~ econom~ and ~chn~M assi~ancG but agreements with Senegal, the Ivory Coast, the Cen~al African RepubliG Congo, Gabon, Chad, Dahome~ N~eG M a u ~ n i a , and ~ f ~ r the coup d'etat in 1963) Togo included a full range of di~omafiG de~nsG economic, m o n e ~ r ~ finan~aL commer~M, and ~chnical as~Mance agreements. Cameroon and Upper Volta skipped the common de~nse accords but s~ned all the others. (They did, howeveG sign mili~ry aid a g r e e m e n ~ . O Thus, although i n d e p e n d e n c e prof o u n d ~ changed the formal nature of relationshipG the continuity of French asM~ance and presence was mMntained. As we have seen, Guinea was the only exceptMn.

CooperationRep~cesC~on~l~m The formal p d i ~ c ~ equahty wRh France that A~ rican leaders had long sought was achieved. Aside ~om the ~ r m e r Sudan (wh~h had inhefi~d the name of Mali when her short-lived ~derafion with Senegal broke up), there was little thought ~ v e n among Aftcan ~ a d e ~ to h a s ~ n i n g the depa~ure of the French. On the con~ar~ most were concerned wRh avoiding a breakdown in government a d m i n ~ a ~ o n and ser~ces and a s~gna~on in devebpment in t h o r d e s p e r a ~ poor countries. In most, the small A~ican elite was bare~ able to cover the p d i ~ c ~ and ~ p policyma~ng pos~ in the a d m i n ~ a ~ o n . Critics of independence ~ ~ ~an~e abound. As might be expec~G many African nafionaHs~ considered the n e w r e l a t i o n s h i p s n e o c ~ o n i a H M . In the French Nafion~ A s s em~y and the Sena~, the w ~ d o m of ~gning individu~ rather than multil~er~ accords was ques~oned. Some deputies ~lt that it would have been wiser to preserve a federal ins~tu~onal ~ a m ~ work. Re~rences were made to balkaniza~on and "microna~ons." Many cfi~cs reasoned that ~ made Htfle economic sense to grant theoretical independence to c o u n t , s as bere~ of resources as Chad, Upper Volta, and the C e n ~ A~ican Republic. The dismembering of AOF and AEF was compared u n ~ v o r a b ~ with B~b ~h effo~s ~o preserve the unity of N ~ e ~ a , a ~rritory roughly equNa~nt in many ways ~ the d d AOE Once the pa~ern of i n d i ~ d u ~ independence was set, the French went about d e w i n g ingen~us means for preserving French interests. The cooperation accords have been the resfl~nt ba~s for these ex~aord~

97

~n~

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n a r y relationships that France still enjoys with her former Af~can d e p e n d e n c e s . Bina~on~ committees (commissions m~s) meet every other yean The French and their va~ous A~ican partners j ~ n t ~ sort out the programs and p r o ~ e m s invdved in their ~ t e r ~ re~fions. Dff~rences have i n e ~ b ~ arisen, but the system of accords r e m ~ n s the f l e ~ e ~ a m e w o r k w ~ h i n which these e x t r a o r d i n a r y r e ~ t i o n s h i p s c o n ~ n u e to e~st. Over the years, r ~ a ~ o n s with some countries have w a n e d w h i l e o t h e r s have g r o w n m o r e i n ~ m a ~ . To d a ~ , howeveG no c o u n t y has o p ~ d out of the s y s ~ m and s ~ y e d out. Even Guinea began negotia~ng agreem e n ~ with France before the death of S6kou Tour6 in 1984. S o m e a c c o r d s w i t h G u i n e a have since b e e n ~gned. The b a ~ n c e between benefits and cos~ in the s y ~ tern is difficult to st~ke. The various aspects of the re~fionship cannot be judged in is~afion; the s y s ~ m is a web, and i n d i ~ d u ~ accords do not s ~ n d on their own. The p r e ~ r e n c e s France enjoys in trade and investment would not last ~ n g without generous French aid oG in some c o u n t i e s , without France honoring her security guarantees. The cost to France ~ high, but the return has been ex~aordinar~ No other m i d d ~ - ~ z e d power in the world e ~ o y s ~ m ~ a r status and in~rna~onal influence. To a large degree, this influence and posi~on resu~ from the s p e d ~ posi~on France occupies at the center of a ~ m i l y of Francophone Af~can na~ons. Indeed she r e m ~ n s the dominant power in a ~ r g e p a ~ of Af~ca. For France, the v a ~ e of her p o r t i o n in Africa was never based s d ~ y on econom~s. Unlike other c d o n ~ l

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powers, France has ~most ~ways based cdonial policy preponderant~ on pdifical considerations, induding her m~s~n c ~ r ~ e (dedication to the spreading of French l a n g u a g e a n d culture). In the p o s t i n d e pendence era, considerations of nation~ image and influence continue to be the most i m p o r ~ n t ~ctor in forming French policy toward Francophone Africa. This is not to say that the practical side of the French character is c o m p l e ~ absent from France's calculation of her interests in Africa. On the con~ar~ the French are careful to preserve as many econom~ privileges and advantages as p o s ~ e in thor dealings with thor A~ican friends. Indeed, as costs mounG the econom~ aspects of the relationship may well outweigh considerations of grandeur and of political influence.

Comm~ Commerce, of course, had never been n e ~ e a e d . Perpetuation of France's ~vored position in the mad kets of her former A~ican d e p e n d e n d e s was an e ~ dent aim of the c o m m e r d ~ clauses of the accords on economY, m o n e ~ r ~ and financial ma~ers. Redproc~ advantage within a preferential sys~m was the central theme of the original accords. Quo~G freedom from customs duties, guaranteed commod~y p~ces, and unrestricted movement of goods between France and her African trading partners were specific measures prov~ed for in the accords. The purpose of the marvelous~ vague euphemism, " ~ ccordin~e commercial polities," was ~ v e n dearer meaning in the phrase, "to assure that pre~rences are r e s p e ~ e d and Franc

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France in BlackAfrica Zone resources u s e d judidously. "3 (The franc zone ~kes in all of those c o u n t i e s that m ~ n t ~ n at ~ a ~ p a n of t h o r m o n e ~ r y reserves in a common p o d in Pa~s. Their c u ~ e n c y is fled in a fixed pa~ty with the French franc. Moreove~ the m o n e ~ r y p ~ y of the whale zone is closely coordinated.) Thus the p r o ~ c t i o n i ~ spi~t that had prevailed since the b e ~ n n i n g s of the French empire lived on in the accords. In the postwar period, this d o s e d e c o n o m ~ system had two m a i n purposes. One was to shelter the w a ~ w e a k e n e d French econom~ The other was to pro~ d e offidal French deveMpment capi~l ~ the African d e p e n d e n d e s . Trade b e t w e e n the m ~ p d e and her overseas t e r ~ t o f i e s h a d always b e e n carefully con~ d ~ d . In the i m m e d i a ~ postwar period, about 70 p e p cent of the ex~ater~tofial trade in both AOF and AEF was with France. (The percentage was lower in Togo and Cameroon. The UN trusteeship s ~ t u s of these two former G e r m a n c ~ o n ~ s allowed s o m e w h a t greater non-French access to t h o r m a r k , s.) Marke~ in French-speaking Africa were p r o ~ c ~ d by a network of ~fiffs, q u o ~ and exchange conCds. To c o m p e n s a ~ , the French paid surpr& (prices higher than those paid on the w o ~ d markeO for c~onial impo~s. MoreoveG access to French m e ~ o p o l i ~ n markets for African products such as peanuts, palm oil, cocoa, bananas, and sugar was guaranteed. In return the French extracted p~ces higher t h a n those in the world market for their m a n u f a c t u r e d and processed goods. It has been reckoned that the surpr& borne by France in 1954 on the ~ a d e w ~ h her overseas ~ r ~ t o ~ e s cost the French consumers 60 billion d d French francs. Correspondingly, France's c~oniM customers in the

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CooperationReplac~ C~on~l~m same year paid a surpr&of 80 billion ~ d French francs. Thus the net advantage accruing ~ France a m o u n t e d 1o 20 billion old F r e n c h francs. 4 Even in d e v a l u e d ~ d francs, this was a c o n ~ d e ~ e sum. As t h e s e figures s u g g e s b b a d e b a ~ n c e s historically have f a v o r e d France. q n v i s i b ~ " t r a n s f e r s by French c o m p a n i e s a n d individuals repatriating f u n d s to the m~op~e were a further ~ z a ~ e drain on the African e c o n o m ~ s . H o w large those deficRs were is difficult to say because in~sible ~ a n s ~ w ~ h i n the franc zone w e r e n o t s u ~ e ~ to a n y c o n ~ s . (One knowledgeable b a n ~ n g source i n f o r m a l ~ e s f i m a ~ d , howeveG that in r e c e n t years s u c h transfers from G a b o n a b n e have a m o u n t e d to a net flow of about $1 ~ o n a yean) With their u s u a l i n g e n u i t y in s u c h m a ~ e ~ , t h e F r e n c h b a l a n c e d p e r e n n i ~ deficits a n d p r o v i d e d n e e d e d l ~ u i d i t y ~ the s y s ~ m t h r o u g h t h o r Md prog r a m . G r a n t s a n d l o a n s w e r e g i v e n t h e c o l o n i e s in a m o u n ~ m o r e cr less equal ~ t h o r p a y m e n t d e r i d e . The few ~ a k s in the c b s e d d r c u ~ were ~ u g g e d with p o d e d foreign exchange held in Paris. This simple mercanti~st a r ~ n g e m e n t worked well un~l F r e n c h trade w i t h the world o u t s i d e t h e franc zone b e g a n to e x p a n d in the m~-1950s. French m e m bership in the E u r o p e a n E c o n o m ~ C o m m u n i t y (EEC or c o m m o n m a r k e 0 in 1958 finally e x p o s e d a f u n d a mental weakness in a s y s ~ m based on noncompetitive prices and cos~. The question finally b ~ l e d d o w n to this: H o w could France's m e m b e r s h i p in an o p e n market in Europe be c o m p a f i ~ e with her p a r t i d p a f i o n in a closed m a r k e t in Africa? F r e n c h a ~ l i t y w a s - - a t ~ a ~

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~ r a time--equal ~ this s e e m ~ y impossible chal~nge. W i ~ amaz~g dex~riW, the French s ~ e d a ~ nificant part of the burden of subsidizing their ~rmer d e p e n d e n c e s to their European partners. All of France's ~ r m e r tropical A~ican d e p e n d e n d e s were q u e r y included among the 18 African states that first benefi~d @om the Yaound6 Convention with the EEC. s ~nce ~ a t time ~ e Francophone African counties have ~een included in each subsequent EEC-financed deveb opment ~ n d negofia~d under Yaound6 H and Lom6 I, II, III, and IM They have also benefited ~om thor a~ sociafion with the EEC through ~ v o ~ e tariff arrangements. Main~ at French ~sfigafion, the EEC took on the further task of p r o d d i n g price support funds ~ r primary products ~om s ~ e ~ e d und~deveP oped benefidafies through the S~bex Program ~ r a ~ f i c ~ m l produc~ and Sysmin Program ~ r m ~ s . Thus, French creativi~ deftly fixed raw material prices p~d by thor ~ d u ~ f i e s ~ levels comparab~ ~ ~ o s e p~d by their European c o m p e ~ . At the same time • ey got ~ r EEC p ~ e ~ ~ help share the burden of commo~W subMd~s. Most a s ~ n ~ n ~ they accom~ h e d this diplomatic ~ u p de m a ~ while ~ g the g r a ~ d e of African benefidaries who con~nue to view France as their most energetic c h a m p ~ n in the EEC. To prov~e a per~ct end to the s ~ r ~ the French m p o r ~ d ~ wa~ed off wRh a ~rge share of the ~ a f i v e contacts financed by EEC aid money in Francophone A~ica. The costs in the EEC--at least in the early s ~ g e s - - w e ~ borne m a i n ~ by the prosperous West n~mans. N o n e ~ e l e ~ a price was u l ~ m a ~ pa~. Fmnc~s ~ c f i v e m o n o p d y in ~ade and ~vestment in her ~D mer African d e p e n d e n d e s theorefical~ ended when

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Coop~ation Rep~c~ Cdon~sm the newly independent c o u n t i e s formed an associa~on with the EEC. In ~ct, howeve~ her co mmerc~l predominance p e ~ i ~ s in most of these countfieG am belt at a gradual~ declining ~vel. The excep~ons are to be found m ~ n ~ among those countries that have exo p e ~ m e n t e d with S o d ~ m , such as Guinea, Mali, Benin, the Congo, and (more recently) Bur~na Faso. Despi~ ide~o~cal differences, though, France con~nues to be these countfie~ ~ r g e ~ ~ading partnen In the case of the p o ~ n t i ~ r~h Congo, France has ignored ide~ogy and made an important econom~ comeback since the d~covery and development of important offshore ~1 depoM~. Even Guinea has seen the error of her ways. Before his death in 1984, S6kou Tour6 renewed relations with France. French ~ d and trade have ~nce become increa~n~y important to his successors. Military equipment apart, Conakry's shops are ag~n s~cking consumer goods ~o m France. The ~ w weHh e e ~ d Guineans may now buy their Camembert at o n ~ a 10~percent markup over Paris~n p~ces. French commer~al i n , r e s t in Francophone Africa has been concen~ated mainly in four counties. Un~l recenfl~ the Ivory Coast was the mecca for French commerc~l a c u i t y in West A@~a. Long ago Abi~an replaced Dakar as the pfincip~ focus of French ~ade and finance for the whole region. The growth of the Ivory Coast's French popula~on by a factor of 4 to 5 since independence is a good indica~on of the count , s centrality to French Af~can bu~ness i n ~ r e ~ and acti~ty. Economic recess~n and A ~ a n ~ a f i o n in the late 1980s, howeveG have combined to shrink French presence there from a high of 50,000 in 1980 to ~ w e r than 30,000 in 1988. OH-~ch Gabon has become the second m ~ o r focus of French interest and investment.

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France in Black Afr~a AgMn, the French p o p u h f i o n of this ~ b r c h httle count y burgeoned since independence. In 1960 the French population in Gabon n u m b e r e d only 4,000, but recently it has swelled to 27,000~more wh~es in p r o p o ~ tion to the n a t i o n a l p o p u ~ f i o n t h a n in a n y o t h e r African c o u n t y except the Republic of South Africa. The third country of spedal e c o n o m ~ interest for the French is C a m e r o o n . France's relations with Cam e r o o n have never b e e n quite as close as those w i t h her former c d o n ~ s of Gabon and the Ivory Coast. First the League of Nations m a n d a ~ and ~ r the UN trusb eeship p r o h i b i ~ d d ~ c r m i n a t o r y ta~ffs and invesb ment codes in this former German colony. Nonetheless the French a d m i n ~ a t o n was able to favor the solid implantation of French buMness in~itutions informM~ before independence. The rehtive prosperity that Cameroon e ~ o y e d a~er independence encouraged fu~ ther expanMon of these i n ~ r e ~ s . O n ~ in recent years has the economy fallen on hard times as a result of the sharp decline in commodity export prices. The other African c o u n t r y of s p e d a l interest for France is Senegal. S e n t i m e n t and s ~ a ~ g i c position ~ a y a larger part than commercial intere~ in d e ~ r m i n ing French attitudes toward this Mte of the ~ d e s t implantation of French presence in b h c k Africa. As any s c h o ~ c h i l d can see ~ o m an atlas, Dakar remMns a p ~ n t of primary s ~ a ~ c i m p o r ~ n c e in the South A~ ~ntic. It s ~ n d s on the bulge of Af~ca, ~ d n g Brazil Hke a sentinel guarding the ocean passage from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic. The l u r e r of this former jewel in France's imperial c r o w n has ~ d e d since the city was created by the French to serve as the c d o n h l capi~l of a great West Af~can empire. Sadl~ ~ is now

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cut off ~om i~ natural hinterlands by the breakup of AOF. Nonethe~ss it remNns the ~rminus of the b n g French-built rail-fiver transportation network connecting it with the i n ~ r ~ r Niger River basin. As Faidherbe ~resaw, this makes Dakar the natural outlet ~ r the re, o n . Because of Daka~s position, historN and previous status as capital of AOE the French built an impressive i n ~ a s ~ u c t u r e there over many years. No doubt they would be most r ~ u ~ a n t to abandon it.

Private Investment Dakar in SenegM, A ~ a n in the Ivory Coas~ and L i b r e ~ l ~ in Gabon served as early bases for French c o m m e r d M p e n e ~ a ~ o n . It was @om these trading posts that the French spread a vast commerdal network into the interior as their A@ican empire expanded. O n ~ in the Ivory Coast and in the forces of the Congo and Gabon was there any Ngnificant effo~ be ~r e World War II to invest p d v a ~ French capi~l in ~ a n ~ o n s or other concesNons, s The larger invesb ments in mining and in p e ~ d e u m e x p l N ~ o n came o n ~ after World War II. In the countries where business remNns in p d v a ~ hands, ~ a large por~on of whNesa~ ~ade is still controlled by a few large French trading c o m p a n i e s . Formed ea~y in the c ~ o ~ N period, these compan~s ~aveled on the coa~afls of the French s d d ~ and sa~ors in the~ expans~n of French influence and con~N into the intedo~ The largest is the C o m p a g n ~ Frangaise de gAfrique O c d d e n ~ (CFAO). The second most prominent N the Sod6t6 CommerdMe de g O u e ~ A ~ k a i n (SCOA). Each has vertically in teg ra~d inhouse banking, shippinN ~Nght forwardin~ and insurance connections. In Gabon, for instance, these

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France in BlackAfrka c o m m ~ d a l e~phants c o n e d over half of all w h ~ e s ~ e and retail ~ade. As a c~on~l ~gac~ they frequently are benefidafies of government m o n o p ~ s ~ r the import of key produc~. In Gabon, SCOA has a m o n o p d y on the i m p o r ~ t ~ n and wh~esaHng of all d g a ~ t ~ s . More recenfl~ howeveL aggressive Lebanese ~aders have come to c h ~ n g e the French commerd~ domb nance, at ~ast in retail trade. In the Ivory Coast abne, the Lebanese are said to number more than 100,000. The great bulk of this Levan~ne p o p u ~ t o n is concent~a~d in commerce.

Crisis in the Terms of Trade In the years following independence, France enjoyed regular favorable ~ade balances with her former African dependendes. Trade surpluses grew ~om 25 million French francs in 1960 to more than 2 bHhon French ~ancs in the early 1980s. In the mid-1980s only Africa, among m~or trading areas, produced favorable trade balances for France. 8 To finance this ~ade with Africa, France has devoted almost 40 percent of aH French m e d i u m - and long-term export credits to Africa. More recently a c~sis has developed in ~ade wRh A~ica. Commodity prices have dramatically fallen. (The Economist, an authoritative London weekl~ reckons that commodity prices generally have declined 30 percent since the early 1980s. 9) Terms of trade have turned sharply against African primary producers. Thor ability to pay for impor~ whi~ servi~ng heavy external debts has suffered. As a resulG French ~ade has declined substantiaH~ Liquidity in both the West

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and Cen~al African franc zones has become a serious p r o t e i n . Guard~ns of the French ~easury are getting "nervouser and nervouser" as they are forced to absorb the r e s u l ~ n t growing ba~nce-of-payments deficits through the operations accounts m a i n l i n e d by the ~ e a s u r y for each of the r e ~ o n a l central banks. The French am again acfive~ s e e i n g help ~ share thor AG ~can burdens from international finandM institutions and from other W e s ~ r n donors. This time they are casting t h o r net beyond the EEC. For the time b ~ n ~ at leasL ce~ain structural facto~ ~vor French ~ade and investment in France's ~ met Af~can dependendes. They include the following: • A hrge proportion of the commerdal e s ~ i s h ments in the econom~M~ impo~ant countries are French owned or at least French managed. • The ~ e ~ r French produ~s and p r o d u ~ Mentification is of long s~nding. • French standards are in force for buiM~gs and machiner~ • Membe~hip in the ~anc zone means that fo~ eign exchange is not needed for purchases from France. Thus, doing b u s i n e s s with France is much easier than with any other trading coun~ • French governmental expo~ finan~ng is usual~ a va i h~ e at attractive ~rms. • French aid is r o u t i n e ~ tied to the purchase of French goods. • In most of the Francophone government departm e nt s and parastatal o r g a n i z a t i o n s , m a n y French ~ c h n ~ a l ad~sers am still worMng who influence procurement d e a c o n s .

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The ~ct that Frenchmen have remained or departed, howeveG has not always been as important for French ~ade as most out~ders might assume. Indeed, the tastes and professional o d e n t a t ~ n of a Frenchspeaking A~ican elite have outlived France's official depa~ure. Thus France con~nues to gain long-~rm benefits from her a s ~ m ~ a ~ o n i M efforts. W h e t h e r these attitudes can be passed to future postndependence genera~ons is moot. Much will depend on the con~nuing of a m~or French cultural and educational effort in these Francophone count~es and on the atttudes of future ~ a d e ~ . For moM of these Afdcan couno ~ s , French is s~ll the only via~e ~ngua &anca and is likely to remain t h o r offic~l ~nguage and the pdndpal medium of modern educa~on. Given these ~ngu~tic and cultural advantages, France should con~nue Io enjoy a spec~l privileged p o ~ o n in the c o m m e r d ~ li~ of Francophone Africa b n g a~er the last miniMe~al ad~ s e r has depaffed.

The End of Monopoly This being said, the ~ace of France in the external ~ade of her A@~an partners has dec~ned (in r e ~ t v e ~rms) since 1960. At the trne of ~dependence, France had a v~tual ~ade m o n o p d y w~h her A@~an dependencies. This exclusivity has now ended, although France remains the ~ngle most impor~nt trading partner for most of Francophone Af~ca. Exports to France as a percentage of total exports range from 10 percent ~ 49 percent. Impor~ ~om France to F~ncophone A~ fican countries range from 28 percent to 65 percent. ~ Pa~dox~ag~ ease of cu~ency c o n v e ~ i t y has been

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an important ~ctor in ~ c i l i ~ t n g the gradu~ trade diver~ficat~n that became i n e d i b l e once France had made the d e d ~ o n to j ~ n the EEC and ~ d her African allies into the EEC as a s s o d a ~ members. Over the years, France has expanded her own ~ade with the nonoFrancophone A ~ a n counties. Indeed, Nigeda has become one of her most impor~nt ~ading pawners and a redpient of substantial French investment.

French Aid Econom~ aid has served as a lub~cant to grease the trade engine, compensa~ng for balance of paym e n ~ disadvantages and providing means to purchase French goods. At the ~me of independence, all 14 fop mer African dependendes were still h e a ~ dependent on France. Indeed they still ~oked to France for a h r g e portion of their development capital and for ~ a i n e d manpowen Only the Ivory Coa~, which genera~d 45 percent of the total export earnings for the entke AOF in 195Z 11 and off-rich Gabon were re~five~ prospe~ ous. Most of the others were despera~ly poor and had only dim prospeds for any ~ n d of s~GsusMining d ~ velopment. External aid was v ~w ed as indispensable by most African pofiticM Made~ suddenly ~ c e d with the daunting ~ s k of running independent countries on the most meager resou~es. Direct French economk asMs~nce to the black AG rican ~rritofies had begun in earnest o n ~ after World War II. Before then, the ~mi~d funds av~lable for devebpment came from local sources or from sur~uses generated by the two great African ~derafions. The

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Fran~ m ~ a ~ A~ica a m ount s devoted to d e v ~ o p m e n t were modest because local resources were meager and ~deral budgetary surpluses had to first cover chronic o r d i n a r y b u d g e t deficits r o u f i n ~ y s u f ~ r e d by the p o o r e r territories. In the realm of econom~ aid and devebpment, political independence brought changes that were more apparent than substantive. Names of French aid organizations were changed, but their methods of d ~ n g business remained the same. In most cases little more than the ~ e r h e a d on their s~tionery was a~ered. The same Frenchmen continued to work on the same dev~opment p r ~ e c ~ with only a nod ~ changes in pditical status. FIDES became the Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6~fion (FAC). CCFOM became the Cause Cen~ a ~ de Coop6rafion ~conom~ue (CCCE). The Ministry of Overseas France, with its h e a d q u a r ~ on the Rue Mons~ur in Paris, became the M i n ~ y of Coope~fion, with o n ~ an ~ r a f i o n of the ~gns on the oG fice doors. T h u s the s y s t e m an d the p e r s o n n e l ~ m a i n e d ~ r g ~ y unchanged. The resulting continuity and ~mflhfity with pro~ems have proven invaluable resouKes to France and her Affkan partners. French a ~ ~ m a i n s a central ~ature of the French s y s ~m of cooperation. Without its lubricating e f ~ s , the machine would ; e ~ n ~ have s~zed up ~ n g ago.

Monetary Issues F ~ g m e n ~ t ~ n of F ~ n c h c ~ o n ~ l m o n e ~ r y ~sfi~tions d ~ not accompany the politico ba~a~zafion that took place in 1960. Wisel~ the two m o n e ~ r y

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Cooperation Replaces Colon~l~m u n ~ n s , which were the cent~l ins~tu~ons of an integ r a n d cdonial econom~ structu~ in Africa, w e ~ p r ~ served in the coopera~on accords. Many observers now share the view, expressed by The Econom~t in 1982, ~ t h ~ a sound m o n e ~ r y s y s ~m has proven to be one of F~nce's m o ~ v a c a t e ~gac~s ~ her ~ r m e r A~ ~can dependencies. In ef~cL the va~ous cu~enc~s in the franc zone cons~tu~ a sin~e f i e r y exchangea~e money at fixed p a f i ~ e ~ o ~ n g the bac~ng of a common ~serve held by the French ~easur~ In Francophone Af~ca most countries still use the m o n e ~ r y unit created in 1945 as the franc of the Cdonies F~n~Mses d'Afrique (CFA). (The a b b ~ a ~ o n CFA pe r ~s ~, but it now s ~ n d s ~ r C o m m u n a u ~ Finand6re Afficaine.) At the ~me, two ~ s ~ dXm~s~ns were created to issue and c o n ~ the m o n e ~ one for AOF and another ~ r AEE The institu~s were subo~ dinate to the French ~easury and the Bank of France, but they did p e r ~ r m H m i ~ d ~ e n t r a l b a n ~ n g f u n o ~ons. At the same ~me they helped coordina~ mone~ r y affairs in their regions with the rest of the franc zone and with the central m o n e t a r y a u t h o r i z e s in Pads. O p ~ a ~ o n s accounts were opened ~ r each monetary region at the French ~ e a s u r ~ These accounts w e r e - ~ n d sffil are--the central mechan~m of the system, func~oning like the mMnspfing of a w a s h . All currency exchange transactions must pass through them. In 1959, reflecting the change in p~i~cM s ~ t u s that ~ a n s ~ r m e d the ove~eas ~ i ~ e s into a u ~ n ~ mous republics, the ~ s ~ dXm~s~ns became re~onal banks with HmRed central b a n ~ n g functions: (1) the Banque C e n ~ a l e des ~tats de gAfriquy de FOueM (BCEAO) and (2) the Banque Cen~ale des E ~

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France in Black Africa de gAfrique ~ q u a ~ r M e et du Cameroun (BCAEC). Despi~ the change ~ names, the Matu~s of the two institutions ~ m N n e d Nrge~ the same. The new African repuMks were ~ v e n equal representation with the French on the governing b o d e s of the two banks. At the same time, the operations accounts at the French ~easury became the ~ p o N ~ r y of ~ r t u a l ~ all African franc zone ~ n exchange reserves. They also rem a ~ e d the g u a ~ n ~ of the uNimRed convertibiliW of CFA ~to French francs. With ~H politicN sovereign~ ~ 1960, the futu~ ~ m o n e ~ r y ~Nfions and insfitut~ns became the su~ect of negotiations between sovereign states. Reflecting Cen~al Africa's (~rmefly AEF's) lower level of economic d e v e ~ p m e n t , the regMafions governing the new BCAEC ~ m N n e d unchanged. It was empowered ~ issue cu~ency and r e d , c o u n t commerc~l bffis ~ r the pfiva~ secto~ but it cou~ not grant credit di~ctly ~ governments. N o n e t h e ~ , the BCAEC was author~ed to rediscount ~easury bffis bought by local commerdal banks. Negotiations with West Africa were more com~ex. They w e ~ c o n d u c e d in two s~ges. NrsL gene~l operations agreements on economiG commerdaL and monetary matters were signed with each countr~ Then, a d e ~ i ~ d multiN~rN agreement on mone~ry cooperation was n e g o t i a ~ d . A full agreement was Ngned on 12 May 1962 by Senegal, MMi, Mauri~NG and the ~ u r states of the ConsNl d'Entente, u Togo adhered to the treaW on 10 Ju~ 1963 a~er the coup f l e e t that a c c o m p a n i e d the assasMnation of President Olymp~.

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France ~ Black Afr~a Unlike the more re~xed Cen~M AfHcan negotiations, negohafions with the West Africans were more difficulk The ~ e r i n ~ e d on subsmnfi~ modifica~on of the cdonial statutes governing the ~st~u~ d~m~sions. Accordingl~ the statutes were r e u s e d to perm~ the BCEAO to lend m o n e y to m e m b e r governments. (French ~ a r of infla~on had precluded such prac~ce in the past.) Lim~s on such ~ n d i n ~ howeveL were careful~ set. The total of a~ crediL ~ u s the v a ~ e of treasury bills discounted for commerc~l banks, could not exceed 10 p e r c e n t of the tax receipts of the m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s d u r i n g the previous year. A further res~icfion was placed on c o m m e r d a l bank~ h ~ d i n g s of ~ e a s u r y bills: They could not exceed 10 percent of the# average pHvate depos~ l~biliHes duHng the p r e ~ o u s year. To further d r c u m s c H b e g o v e r n m e n t credit, the direct advances to governments were not a l ~ w e d to be o u ~ m n d i n g for more than 240 days. ~ M e m b e r s h i p on the b o a r d of d i r e c t o r s of the BCAEC r e m ~ n e d e q u ~ l y divided between French and ~cal government representaHves. In West Africa, this issue was c o n t e n H o u ~ it was ultimately settled with the F r e n c h a g r e e i n g to an A ~ i c a n m a j o r i t y on the BCAEO's b o a r d of d i r e ~ o r s . In practice, this m e a n t that the French minoHty could be overruled by a simple m@oHty on ma~ers of rou~ne importance. M a ~ e ~ of g r e a ~ r i m p o r ~ n c e , howeveL required a m@oHty v o ~ of twooth~ds of the members. Thus the French could block vows on ma~ers they c o n ~ d e r e d of suffic~nt interest.'s T h ~ s a ~ g u a r d was ~ e w e d by the French as essendal to ensure the soundness of the s y s ~ m and to protect French reserves, which remained the p H n d p ~

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prop for the CFA and the u l f i m a ~ guarantor of the w h ~ e ~anc zone. In the a ~ e r m ~ h of the breakup of the Mali Federation, Marl (formerly Sudan) seceded from the West AG fican M o n e ~ r y U n ~ n (WAMU). On 1 July 1962, Ma~ issued her own cu~ency. A~er a ~ n g and d~ficult n ~ gotiation, France finally agreed in July 1963 to give a limited guarantee of convertibility to the Mali ~anc. Finally, in 198~ Ma~ gave up her own cu~ency and was ful~ r ~ n t e g r a ~ d into the ~anc zone.

Evolutionary Change The structure and statutes of WAMU and of the Cen~al A~ican M o n e ~ r y Union (CAMU) r e m ~ n e d unchanged ~ r over a decade after independence. Both c e n ~ banks m a ~ i n e d their h e a d q u a r ~ in Pads, where they e ~ o y e d a sym~ofic ~ f i o n s h ~ with the Bank of France and with the French ~easur~ By 1972 pressures for change had built up in both m o n e ~ r y unions. With some b i ~ e r n e s ~ M a u ~ a withd~w from WAMU in 1972. The M a u d ~ n i a n s d ~ m e d that France benefited most ~om the e~sfing m o n e ~ r y a~ ~ n g e m e n t s and the poorest m e m b e r s , like M a u l t a r a , benefited ~ast. To defuse a tricky ~tua~on and to ~ s ~ further withdrawals, the French agreed to ~ n e g o ~ a ~ the m o n e ~ r y accords. Amended West A~ rican monetary accords were c o n c e d e d and became eb fective in 1974. The statutes governing the BCEAO were r e vi s e d in 1975 in line with the n ew treaty pro~ons.. French influence was ~ m i n i s h e d under the re~ d ar~ngements. BCEAO h e a d q u a r ~ was moved

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to D a k a r in Senegal, m a k i n g d u b b y ~ n c h e o n s w i t h colleagues at the Bank of France and the French ffeaso u r y m o r e difficult for BCEAO officials to arrange o n short nonce. A c o m m i R e e of heads of state was superi m p o s e d as the s u p r e m e governing body. To spare t h o r chiefs from u n w a n ~ d drudgery, the council of m i n i ~ ~ was i e ~ i n e d as a p ~ y m a ~ n g body. C o m p ~ f i n g t h e h i e r a r c h y of c o m m ~ e s w i t h o n e a c t u a l l y deo s ~ n e d to do s o m e work, a board of dire~ors was re~ i n e d to preMde over the f u n c ~ o n i n g of the BCEAO. French influence on this board was r e d u c e d to 2 d f f e o ~ in a b o d y of 14. H e n c e f o ~ h most d e d s ~ n s would requffe only a simple m~ofity. To decenffafize mone~ r y policy a n d ~ v e i n d N ~ u a l countries g r e a ~ r power over t h o r o w n economies, na~onal credit c o m m ~ e s were c o n s ~ t u ~ d . While the BCEAO c o n ~ n u e d to set ~ o b a l financing ~ r g e ~ for each m e m b e r c o u n t r ~ national credit c o m m ~ e s derided h o w cred~ w o u ~ a o t u a l ~ be u s e d in their v a ~ o u s countries. The French were not r e p r e s e n t e d on these counffy c o m m R ~ e s . In light of the recent growing f i n a n d ~ c ~ s in the r e , o n , the French may n o w insist on such representa~on as a m e a n s of i m p o M n g m o r e d i s d ~ i n e on a s y s ~ m that has been lax in controlling credO. Growing African pressures also forced s ~ t u ~ r y r e v i s i o n in t h e C e n t r a l A f r i c a n M o n e t a r y A r e a (CAMA) ( ~ r m e f l y CAMU) in 1972. The n a m e of the re~ o n a l b a n k was c h a n g e d from the BCAEC to the Banque des ~ t s de FAf~que C e n ~ a ~ (BEAC). The b a n ~ s h e a d q u a r ~ was s h f f ~ d ~ o m Paris to YaoundG in Cam e r o o n . The ~fle of the bank's c h e f execu~ve officer was c h a n g e d to governoL a n d he was c h o s e n by the b o a r d of d f f e ~ o r s for a 5-yeaG r e n e w a ~ e term. The

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board of ~ o ~ was ~ d u c e d ~om ~ ~ 12 members. P ~ o u M y France had 8 members, Cameroon 4, and each of the other member states I each. ~ The shrunken board was composed of 4 Cameroon members, 2 ~om Gabon, 3 &ore France, and 1 each ~om Congo, Chad, and the C e n ~ Af~can Republic. Reflecting the growing a ~ e r f i v e n e ~ of the C e n ~ A ~ i c a n s @ s p e d a l l y C a m e r o o n , Gabon, and the Cong~, a g ~ a ~ r degree of na~onal d e d s ~ n m a ~ n g was introduced at CAMA. H e n c ~ o ~ h credit targets w e ~ set by national m o n e ~ r y c o m m ~ e s ~ t h ~ than by the BEAC. As a g u a r a n t e e against abuse and to m ~ n t a i n coherence of p ~ i c ~ the governor and two auditors (one of w h o m is French) a t ~ n d meetings of the na~onal m o n e ~ r y commi~ees ~ the va~ous member countries. As a g r o u ~ they are caHed the C ~ g e des Censeurs. The French wish now to ~ d u d e some ~mflar contrd~ng body in the West Af~can sys~m.

How the System Works By partidpa~ng in these m o n ~ a r y unions, the A~ Hcans have a c c e p ~ d ~mHa~ons on their sovereign powers. In return they have rec~ved a French guarantee of % ~ u ~ un~m~ed converti~lity of the CFA at a fixed rate of 50 CFA to 1 new French franc. (The fixed parity between the CFA and the French ~anc can be a~ ~ l e d o n ~ with the unanimous agreement of all parses to the m o n e ~ r y accords.) The A~icans have also rec e de d a degree of French s h ~ r ~om balance-of-payments p r o ~ e m s and expert a s s ~ n c e in m a n a ~ n g their m o n e ~ r y affairs. The French, of course, view the~ presence at the heart of these AfHcan econom~s

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France in Black Africa as a crucial part of their ability to m M n ~ i n a privileged p o r t i o n in t h o r former African d e p e n d e n c e s . The m ~ c h a n t s of the s y s ~ m were d e s i g n e d with con~derable ingenuity d u r i n g the law c~onial period and, with adj u ~ m e n t s to c h a n g i n g ~ m p e r s and times, remain e ~ senfial~ intact. The two c e n ~ a l b a n k s issue all c u r r e n c y for the m e m b e r countries. The individuM m e m b e r s may not issue theft o w n c u r r e n c ~ d e v a ~ e or r e v a ~ e the CFA, or interfere l e g a l ~ w i t h the flow of c a p i ~ l b e t w e e n m e m b e r n a t ~ n s . E x p a n s ~ n of credit is s u ~ e ~ to Hmi~ set by the treaty w i t h France a n d can be u n d e r , k e n o n ~ a~er consuRation with the French. National foreign e x c h a n g e acquisitions m u s t be ~ a c e d in the BCEAO or the BEAC. The b a n k m u ~ then ~ a c e at ~ a s t 65 percent of the p o ~ e d assets in the operations account at the French ~ e a s u r ~ The b a h n c e of the p o ~ e d reserves m a y be placed in s h o ~ e r m acc o u n ~ wRh i n ~ r n a f i o n a l i n s t i t u t ~ n s such as the I n ~ national Bank for R e c o n s ~ u c t i o n a n d D e v ~ o p m e n t OBRD, also called the World Bank), with which m e m ber states are a f f i l ~ d . The foreign exchange value of reserves h e m in the operations account is assured against the e f k ~ s of a F r e n c h d e v a l u a t i o n . C o m p e n s a t i o n has b e e n paid to A f f k a n c o u n t r i e s a ~ e r several French devaluations. Positive balances in the o p e r a t i o n s account are also paid interest at the current Bank of France i n ~ r v e n f i o n rate. Should the accounts be in d e f i d b the BCEAO or BEAC m u s t first b a h n c e the account with its o w n reserves and (when necessary) with other member assets. To g u a r a n t e e s o u n d f i n a n d a l m a n a g e m e n t , the BCEAO a n d BEAC aze required ~ c o n e d d e m a n d for

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~e di t whenever ~reign assets ~H below 20 percent of sho~4erm l~bffifies. Normal~ these measures would inc~de ra~ing discount ra~s and reducing rediscount ceilings. Countries responM~e ~ r the imb~ance are expec~d to ~ k e prompt remed~l action to restore baP ance to t h o r accounts. Temporary French i n ~ r v e n t o n occurs w h e n a bank is not a ~ e to pro~de enough additional assets or otherwise restore po~tive balance to the ope~fions a o count. The French then s u p ~ y French francs by b u ~ n g CFA, which they h d d until the defic~nt bank can redeem them. Such cu~ency swaps are meant to provide o n ~ ~ m p o r a r y rel~f. In p ~ n d ~ e they are an earnest of France's guarantee of convertibility of the CFA into French ~ancs. Howeve~ the French will almost ce~ ~ i n l y impose Hm~s on the use of the operations account if growing defid~ reach u n a c c e p ~ e ~vels.

The ~ m ~ s of C e n ~ a l Bank Power Both the BCEAO and the BEAC have the power to set reserve requ~ements and to r e g u h ~ interest rates w~hin t h o r reg~ns. In practice, n e t h e r bank has a~ ~ m p t e d to exercise these powers. Reserve requirements have been ignored and i n , r e s t ra~s have been focused more on promotion of econom~ devebpment than on m o n e ~ r y o~ectives. Indeed the most useful p ~ i c y i n ~ r u m e n t that has been readily a v a i ~ e to WAMU and CAMA is the setting of rediscount ceilings. The banks are able to increase the money s u p p ~ in only three ways: firsL by granting credit to a member government; second, by refinandng commerdal bank credi~ and third, by ex~nding s h o r ~ r m agricultural and export c r e d i t .

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The use of e v e n t h e s e l i m i ~ d m o n e ~ r y instrum e n t s has been careful~ d ~ u m s c f i b e d in both m o n ~ Wry u n ~ n s . With q u i t French u r ~ n g , WAMU fimRs the a m o u n t of o u ~ n d i n g credR ~ any m e m b e r gove r n m e n t ~ 20 percent of that g o v e r n m e n t ' s ~ x r e c ~ p ~ in the p r e c e d i n g year. C A M A uses a ~ightly d f f ~ r e n t ~ r m u ~ ; BEAC credit to m e m b e r governments may not e~ceed 20 p e ~ e n t of a g o v e r n m e n t ' s b u d g e ~ d (~x or nontax) r e v e n u e of d o m e s t i c origin for the p r e v i o u s yean The forms of g o v e r n m e n t credit s u ~ e c t to these limi~ i n d u d e short-term advances, proceeds @om the sale of g o v e r n m e n t securities, and the r e d i ~ o u n f i n g of c o m m e r d a l credit. A d r a w i n g d o w n of I n t e r n a t i o n a l M o n e ~ r y F u n d OMF) credib if d e p o s i ~ d at the central bank, is not s u ~ e ~ to the credR ~mR. Moreove~ credR to certain p a r a s ~ l enterprises is not treated as gove r n m e n t credit. There a ~ no s t a t u a r y limits on nongovernmental credR.

What D o the A @ ~ a n s Get O ~ ~ ~? S o m e d e s c r i b e t h e t w o m o n e t a r y u n i o n s as France's m o s t v a h a ~ e ~ g a c y ~ her ~ r m e r ~ a c k African d e p e n d e n d e s . These u n ~ n s have e n s u r e d a level of finandal d ~ d ~ i n e that has h e ~ e d m e m b e r governments to a v i d s o m e of the d a n g e r o u s ~ m p m t i o n s to w h ~ h so m a n y other d e v e b ~ n g c o u n t i e s have fallen v ~ f i m . The a t t r a c ~ o n s of a stable c u r r e n c y w i t h ~ e e convertibi~W a ~ such that E q u a ~ f i ~ G u ~ e a was ~ d ~ j ~ n C A M A ~ 1985. She was, of course, the f i ~ t nonF r a n c o p h o n e c o u ~ r y ~ become a m e m b e r of the ~ a n c zone. R u m o ~ p e ~ i s t that G ~ n e a - ~ a u and the tiny

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ishnd nation of Sao Tom6 e P~ndpe may also ap~y for indu~on ~ lhe zone. B~h am ~rmer Po~uguese cdo~es with o ~ y geograp~c proximity ~ recommend • d r members~p. Guinea (Conakr~ has been m o ~ n g in the direction of reintegrafing into the franc zone. The main obstacle is said to be opposition from the Ivory Coast. DomesticaH~ Fulani traders in Guinea favor joining WAMU. Other important Guinean ~ m s t s rm p o r ~ d ~ are profiting from the flee-floating Gu~ean ~anc and oppose the m o n e ~ r y ~scipline that would be imposed by the BCEAO. Thus G~nea's j ~ n g the WAMU is ~ r from c e r ~ . The guaranteed free convertibility of the CFA into French francs has provided WAMU and CAMA members with the ~ e ~ i n g s of a hard currenc~ This has proven a distinct advantage in a~racfing p o t e n t i ~ investors and ~ r d g n ~ e ~ . Through flee converfibili~, WAMU and CAMA countries have unffi recently av~ded the scourges of cu~ency ~ack m ~ k e ~ n D pa> a~d econom~s, and gross~ overva~ed cu~endes that have done so much econom~ damage d s e w h e m ~ Ag ~ca. In shorb the bacMng of the French ~easury has prov~ed WAMU and CAMA wRh that most predous but ~so most f f a ~ qu~iW: confidence.

Strains WRhin the System For the first 15 yea~ ~ the~ e~s~nce, ~he BCEAO and the BEAC ran continuous surp~ses ~ their ope~ atons accounts. The real effect of these s u f f u s e s was ~ provMe a com~ffa~e b a n ~ the F~nch ~easur~ In more recent years, howeve~ WAMU has produced a

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France in BlackAftra series'of deficits. These shortfal~ reflect chronic bala n c e - o G p a y m e n t s p r o b l e m s that have t r o u b l e d WAMU's two most important m e m b e r , the Ivory Coast and Senegal. Until the mid-1980G the CAMA operations account remained in s u r ~ u G reflecting the prosperity of ~ l - p r o d u d n g GaboK Cameroon, and, ~ a ~sser ex~nL the Congo. More ~centl~ even these relafive~ affluent countries have suf~red balance-oG payments deficits as oil and other commodity prices have ~ l ~ n . Ironically, the superior c~dR ratings of the Ivory Coast and Senegal have been m ~ e d ~es~ngs. As markets for their commodity expor~ declined in the late 1970s and e a r ~ 1980s, both countries were allowed ~ run up external debt while ~rcumvenfing ~ c h n ~ a l fim~afions imposed by BCEAO s ~ t u ~ s . The serious d e b ~ s e r v i d n g difficulties both countries now suffer were exacerbated by their eafl~r a~lity to aRract easy credit and avoid m o n e ~ r y d~dpline. The problems caused by domestic economic weakness in France and by the long ~ c e s s ~ n in the Thud World have c o m b i n e d to exert n ew strains on the Franco-Aff~an m o n e ~ r y sys~m. The French are und e r s ~ n d a ~ y concerned by the persis~nt defici~ b~ng run by ~ u ~ all African franc zone m e m b e r . On the African Mde, there is ~sentment ~ the ~ck of consul~fion by France before major actions are token aG ~ c t i n g the whole of the franc zone. Their evident impotence to influence such d e d ~ o n s that so di~ctly affea their e c o n o m ~ such as the deva~afion of the French franc, has infuriated a n u m b e r of the more pricey African ~aders. (African m e m b e ~ of the franc

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism zone were not consulted before any of the four devaluations of the French franc that have taken place since 1981.17)

Monetary Crisis For the first time in p o s t i n d e p e n d e n c e history, both central banks are now in serious arrears with the French treasury. The precipitous fall in c o m m o d i t y prices, coupled with a fall in the value of the dollar, is ravishing even the strongest African economies. Heavy debt-servicing charges are further burdens. Even former high flyers like the Ivory Coast and Cameroon are in serious difficulty. As an indication of the seriousness of the situation, the Ivory Coast in 1987 actually suspended debt repayment (to the horror of French bankers and international financial experts at the IBRD and IMF). 18Both Abidjan and Yaound~ have been urged by the French to accept IMF-prescribed austerity plans in return for readjustment loans. This change in French attitudes concerning the advice of the once-shunned international institutions reflects the seriousness of the present economic crisis. It also may indicate that the French no longer are willing or able to bear the burden alone of supporting the increasingly troubled African economies. Indeed the French are energetically seeking burden-sharing assistance from all available quarters. As chairmen of the Paris Club, they have played the role of friendly broker between African clients and their governmental creditors. In the London Club they have attempted to play much the same mediation role b e t w e e n African g o v e r n m e n t s a n d their private creditors.

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France in Black Africa To further complicate matters, France herself is suffering domestic economic problems. While French aid is being maintained in nominal terms, inflation is eating into its real value. Because of the chronic operations account deficits, the franc zone machinery is under great strain. France is being forced to s h o u l d e r these deficits with little h o p e that any of the African e c o n o m i e s - - a s i d e f r o m G a b o n ' s - - w i l l s o o n be righted. One French authority acknowledged publicly that monetary policy had been "relatively lax.-19 This cannot "continue with impunity" during the present recession, he a s s e r t e d . This w a r n i n g is n o w being translated into action. Both the BCAEO and the BEAC have taken steps to i m p l e m e n t restrictive m e a s u r e s aimed at squeezing their m e m b e r countries' economies and bringing their accounts at the French treasury into equilibrium. No doubt this discipline is being imposed as a result of strong French pressure. The results can be seen in what one senior Abidjan banker described privately to the author as a serious liquidity crisis. A similar situation has arisen in C a m e r o o n , w h e r e several undercapitalized banks are said to be near closing. In the salad days, w h e n the C a m e r o o n e c o n o m y was booming, the capital of these politically well-connected banks was inflated by government deposits. With the squeeze on the m o n e y supply and on credit, the gove r n m e n t has been forced to w i t h d r a w its funds from the banks, leaving them with empty vaults and embarrassed managers. Unfortunately the application of monetary discipline m a y be c o m i n g at just the w r o n g time. The shrinking of the m o n e y supply and of credit during an

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Cooperation ReplacesColonialism economic crisis can only d e e p e n recession. One sympathizes with justifiably nervous French treasury offic i a l s . N o n e t h e l e s s t h i s s e e m s n o t i m e to b e o v e r c o r r e c t i n g for past leniency. By doing so, t h e y could jeopardize institutions they want to preserve and undo good work of the past.

For the Future Since the arrival of the Mitterrand government in office in 1981, rumors of a plan to revise the franc zone system have been circulating. A plan developed during Jean-Pierre Cot's brief tenure as minister of cooperation in the first Socialist government (1981-82) called for setting up national currencies. Each would be convertible at a specific rate into a CFA monetary unit administered by either WAMU or CAMA. The proposal was rejected at the time both by Francophone Africans and by the more conservative elements that replaced Cot and his friends in Paris. Nevertheless the idea has not completely disappeared. Rumors persist that elements in the Bank of France continue to toy with the idea of national currencies in which rates of exchange w o u l d vary and the F r e n c h franc w o u l d reflect the strength of the respective economies. The Cameroon government is said to favor some such arrangement, arguing that a single fixed parity for the CFA affords a h i d d e n subsidy to some of the poorer countries like Chad and the Central African Republic at the expense of their m o r e affluent m o n e t a r y partners. 2° If such a plan is implemented, the carefully balanced franc zone monetary system could be jeopardized.

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France in BlackAfrica Pressure from the IMF for devaluation of the CFA in its parity with the French franc has been persistent. Thus far the French government, despite objections from some of its financial experts, has been adamant in its public rejection of any change in CFA parity. Nonetheless, growing economic pressures on the French and their African friends may force some changes. To most outsiders the CFA franc seems clearly overvalued. The price of West Africa's principal exports, coffee and cocoa, has plummeted in recent years. Coffee prices have fallen by a third in the past decade, and cocoa now sells at half the price it once commanded. The Ivory Coast finds herself in the impossible situation of paying 750 CFA francs per kilo for cocoa that is then sold on the world market for about 500 CFA francs per kilo. (Local producers are guaranteed at least 400 CFA francs per kilo; the balance of the cost is for transportation and overhead. The guaranteed price has been continued into 1989 with French financial support.) Substantial devaluations of the heavily overvalued cedi (Ghanaian currency) and the naira (Nigerian currency) have dramatically lowered costs in Ghana and Nigeria, exacerbating their Francophone neighbors' problems. A month's labor of a Ghanaian farm worker, for instance, now earns the equivalent of about $30, while an Ivory Coast farm worker receives approximately $100.21 As a result of the altered economic circumstances, the pattern of smuggling has reversed; Francophones now buy cheap goods clandestinely from their Anglophone neighbors. Thus the pressures for devaluation may yet become irresistible. In the

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Cooperation ReplacesColonialism longer term, the French will face some fundamental decisions on their African monetary arrangements as the p o s s i b i l i t y of c l o s e r E u r o p e a n m o n e t a r y u n i o n approaches.

The Importance of Culture A l t h o u g h m o s t foreigners a s s u m e that the most important aspects of the French connection are monetary and economic, this is not necessarily a French view. Not long ago a French ambassador in a Francophone African country was asked what he thought was the most valuable aspect of the French colonial legacy for Africa. W i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n , the a m b a s s a d o r res p o n d e d , "The French language!" Many n o n - F r e n c h may wonder at this French emphasis on language and culture. To some it may even seem quaint in its ethnocentrism. Nonetheless it reflects a genuine, longstanding French c o m m i t m e n t to a civilizing mission. The accompanying assumption of cultural superiority underpins French willingness to bestow on others what they consider a precious gift of language and culture. It can be argued that their efforts to assimilate colonial populations have been based more on idealism and g e n e r o s i t y t h a n on m e a n - s p i r i t e d a r r o g a n c e . French linguistic and cultural proselytizing has been coupled with a willingness to accept as equals people who have acquired a good knowledge of French. This missionary zeal has had a subtle but substantial influence on w i d e r French national influence and power. Despite a superficial similarity with Portuguese colonial policy, no o t h e r m o d e r n colonial p o w e r has att e m p t e d the c u l t u r a l a s s i m i l a t i o n of its colonial

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France in Black Africa subjects on a n y w h e r e near the scale France has. Historically, only the Chinese have been more successful. French efforts to create a Francophone elite in Africa have been successful, by and large. The resources and energy that the French continue to put into reinforcing and s p r e a d i n g their culture may be the most potent long-term investment in maintaining the close ties b e t w e e n France a n d h e r African ex-colonies. Clearly it is France's position at the center of a linguistic bloc of countries that preserves her special position in the world as a near-great power. Would it not be ludicrous for any other middle-sized Western E u r o p e a n power to pose as an alternative to the Soviet Union and the United States? Since de Gaulle's presidency, the French have been able to carry off this role w i t h o u t loud guffaws from the rest of the world. As Jean-Pierre Cot commented, There is no sector to which French cooperation is more attached t h a n that of Culture. The promotion and the diffusion of our language, the spread of our ideas, of our art and, more recently, of our technical knowledge, has always been in the forefront of our preoccupations. 22 In Francophone Africa the educational system has been the main instrument used to spread French culture. Since World War II a determined effort has been m o u n t e d to c r e a t e a black African elite w h o s e language, modes of thought, professional orientation, and tastes were French. A l t h o u g h the F r e n c h - e d u c a t e d elite was a small part of the total population, the French reinforced its importance in the later years of colonial rule by placing its members in positions of increasing power in the administration and by expanding their

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism role in politics. Unlike the British, the French colonial system did not favor the traditional African hierarchy. Instead the French passed political power in their colonies to elites they had consciously tried to create in their own image. In a few cases---Mall and Guinea are t h e b e s t e x a m p l e s - - t h i s p r o c e s s was less t h a n successful. No serious leader---even among the most ardent F r a n c o p h o b e s - - h a s sought to displace French as the official language of any of the former dependencies, as Julius Nyerere replaced English with Swahili as Tanzania's official language. Indeed such a proposal would probably be greeted with wide derision. (One possible exception is Mauritania, where Arabic has been given official status.) To maintain linguistic and cultural ties, c o o p e r a t i o n accords w e r e s i g n e d with all the n e w states ensuring French support in the vital area of education. The only exception is Guinea. The reason in this case was not a rejection of French as a language; rather, it was part of the price Guinea paid for refusing to join the French c o m m u n i t y in 1958. Nonetheless, French remains Guinea's official language. In all other cases France agreed to supply the teaching and administrative personnel to run existing schools and to continue e x p a n d i n g education systems. To gratify each country's desire for prestigious postsecondary facilities, France agreed to establish or enlarge a number of institutions of higher education. Conditions were also fixed in the accords to ensure that academic standards would be maintained at a level allowing for equivalency with French metropolitan degrees and diplomas. Provisions were also included in various accords to protect the integrity of certain favored institutions such as the University of Dakar. 23

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France in Black Africa

France's Backyard (Pr~. CarrY) Francophone black Africa has continued to be the single most important geographic focus of French assistance since independence in 1960. Despite frequent criticism of this concentration and recommendations that the geographic distribution of aid be broadened, 24 the French continue to focus the lion's share of their aid on their former black African dependencies. As an indication of the priority culture and language enjoy in the overall assistance program, 70 to 80 percent of French technical assistance personnel continue to be teachers despite a sharp decline in overall numbers since the early 1980s. In addition to the civilian aid personnel who draw their regular French salaries (plus a generous bonus for service overseas, free housing, and other special benefits), there is another category of French technical assistance personnel called national service volunteers. They substitute civilian overseas service for obligatory military service. The majority of them have also been teachers. French Peace Corps volunteers and French military medical personnel connected to civilian hospitals are the other groups of technical assistance personnel. The most recent statistics for all categories are given in table 1, taken from the Ministry of Cooperation's 1989 budget documents. Since the mid-1980s, budgetary constraints in both France and the receiving African countries have required retrenchment in the numbers of French technical assistance personnel. In the Ivory Coast, which has been by far the largest recipient of technical assistance, the numbers of French personnel were cut in half

130

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Cooperati~ Replaces Colonialism

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France in Black Africa from a high of 4,000 in 1980 to about 2,100 teachers in 1988. 25These reductions were taken mainly in the secondary schools. (For some years, there have been virtually no French teachers in primary schools aside from the few schools that cater mainly to French expatriate children.) The positions vacated by the French teachers have been filled by Ivoirian university graduates.

Study Abroad Study in France has been another strong influence on the c o n t i n u e d d e v e l o p m e n t of a French-oriented elite and on the perpetuation of a French cultural tradition in France's former black African dependencies. Since independence, the n u m b e r of students studying in France has been impressively large. In 1988, 200,000 foreign students were studying in France; in the early 1980s, more than half of them were African. (This percentage is thought to have declined somewhat in more recent years.) Not included in these numbers are students who attend short, nonuniversity courses. Moreover there are still small but significant n u m b e r s of African students w h o come to France for secondary and primary schooling. These are usually the offspring of the affluent black elite in countries like Gabon and the Ivory Coast. It is surprising that fewer than a quarter of the African s t u d e n t s in France benefit from s t u d y grants funded by the French government or by their own governments. In 1988 there were only 5,700 African students in France w h o received grants from their o w n governments and 2,066 who were recipients of French s c h o l a r s h i p s . 26 Most of the s t u d e n t s are f i n a n c e d

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism through private means. Indeed there are stories of villages pooling their meager resources to pay for the studies of a particularly promising student. The mystique of study in France is still strong in Francophone Africa. Even distant relatives and family friends bask in the reflected glory of a student who has been to a French university.

The French Way of Life--Is It Wearing Thin? French culture is pervasive in the m o d e m sectors of all Francophone African countries. In large cities like Dakar, Abidjan, Douala, Libreville, Brazzaville, and YaoundG the visual evidence of the French connection is reflected everywhere--in the shops, in the movie theaters, in the sidewalk cafes, and, above all, in the communications media. With recent improvements in communications, this overwhelming cultural and commercial presence is transmitted throughout the countries, albeit at diminishing strength as one goes farther into the provinces. The intensity of the cultural presence also varies with the level of affluence of the country and with its cultural policy. For obvious reasons, commercial presence is strongest in the relatively affluent centers of the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon. As one might expect, it is much less obvious in the desperately poor Sahelian interior. The attitude of the local government toward its own indigenous culture is also an important factor in the degree of encouragement or freedom given the promotion of French culture. Some countries, like the Ivory Coast and Gabon, opted for what amounts to a systematic francification of their societies. In other, more traditionally oriented societies,

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France in Black Africa the French p r e s e n c e is m o r e discreet. (This is especially true in the heavily Muslim countries in the interior, w h e r e there has been a traditional reluctance to accept Western ways.) In all of the 13 former French dependencies in West and Central Africa, the French language and French material culture have long been viewed as virtually s y n o n y m o u s with modernity. In recent years, however, some more worldly-wise Africans have begun to compare the quality and cost of goods and m e t h o d s from F r a n c e w i t h t h o s e from o t h e r sources. Meanwhile, some French and a few Africans are beginning to complain that the quality of instruction in schools in French Africa is declining. The equivalence of degrees from some African schools and universities is being questioned in France. The former minister of state for cooperation, JeanPierre Cot, sadly n o t e d a decline in the quality of French spoken by African students. In rural areas and in the quartiers populaires, Cot noted, the proportion of the population who "more or less" understand French does not surpass 10 to 20 percent. 27 At the same time, other observers have noted a marked improvement in the quality of applicants for certain higher level study grants. It may be that both p h e n o m e n a are occurring simultaneously. A well-educated local elite is evolving at the top as a result of greater access to superior educational facilities. Another significant factor may be the growing presence of the children and grandchildren of an earlier French-trained elite, who have grown up in cultivated, virtually French h o m e environments. At the same time, the quality of schooling for the mass of the population may have declined with the decreasing

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism presence of strict French schoolteachers. (This was certainly the author's impression after visiting schools in several Francophone African countries.) In primary schools in some African cities, it is common to find classes of 100 or more pupils. Ultimately, however, French influence may not be measured by the quality of French spoken by the ordinary people in Africa. Widespread use of mediocre French, or even of a creole patois, may be a more viable vehicle of French influence than a small elite, divorced from the mass, who speak in Parisian accents like latter-day Russian nobility.

Population It is amazing that in 1982, more than 20 years after French Africa gained independence in 1960, there were still 200,000 French residing in the 11 former colonies and 2 former protectorates that had made up AOF and AEE Since that time, the French population has dramatically shrunk to about 100,000 in 1988. Nonetheless the full significance of the size of this continuing French physical presence is clear only when one realizes that the French population in the same territories at the time of independence numbered only 150,000. Thus the overall numbers of French in black Africa grew by about a third after independence. The subsequent decline in French presence reflects the replacem e n t of French by g r o w i n g n u m b e r s of Frencheducated Africans, the economic slump in Africa, and the waning of French interest in Africa. The postindependence growth in the French population living in the former colonies was especially surprising because the French have never been known as

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France in Black Africa keen emigrants. Their sole large migration was to the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, where almost a million French settled in Algeria. West and Central Africa were never favored places for European settlements. The forbidding, near-desert conditions in the Sahelian countries, coupled with their apparent lack of economic promise and their interior isolation, made many wonder why the French would waste effort on their conquest. The hot, humid climate of the coastal regions was almost equally inhospitable to European occupation. Yellow fever and malaria killed or disabled a large proportion of the few Europeans intrepid or foolish enough to risk life on the "mosquito coast" before antimalarial prophylactics became available. During the long years between the final conquest (in the last decade of the 19th century) and the end of World War II, the French population was sparse and limited to small groups of administrators, soldiers, missionaries, and employees of trading companies. Dramatic change began to take place only after 1945. For the first time, the French invested metropolitan funds in capital development in hitherto-neglected African territories. As a result of the increased economic activities and improved health conditions, the European population in AOF tripled in the period between 1935 and 1953; in AEF it more than quadrupled during the same years. 2s Unlike the populations of other former colonizers in Africa, the French expatriate population continued to grow after political independence was granted. The distribution of the French population, however, has changed since independence. People have followed not the flag but the franc. Postindependence

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism Table 2 French Living in Francophone Black Africa, 1988 Country

Population

Ivory Coast Gabon Senegal

23,509 16,496 15,975

Cameroon Congo Togo

12,127 6,210 3,652

Central African Republic Burkina Faso Niger

3,302 3,129 3,091

Mall Benin Guinea

2,918 2,781 2,547

Mauritania Chad

1,778 1,375

Source: Union des Fran(;ais de I'@tranger."Nombcede Franqais Immatricul~s dans Nos Consulats~'La Voix de France, Paris, October-November 1988, p. 24. (Note: Actual population is higher than these figures, which are based on French citizens registered at their consulates in the various countries.)

growth has concentrated in the African countries that have appeared to have the best economic prospects. (See table 2 for 1988 French population figures in Africa.) Well over half the total French population in Francophone Africa now lives in only four countries: the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, and Cameroon. Of these, the Ivory Coast and Gabon have experienced the most dramatic increases. In 1982 the French population of the Ivory Coast was 50,000, having quadrupled since i n d e p e n d e n c e ; it has now declined to fewer than

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France in BlackAfrica 24,000. Gabon had an even larger proportional growth: from 4,000 French in 1960 to more than 28,000 in 1984. Despite the significant decline in more recent years, Gabon, with a total population of about I million, still has the highest ratio of whites to its black African population of any country in Africa other than the Republic of South Africa. Elsewhere in Francophone Africa, French populations have d r o p p e d markedly since the immediate post-independence period. In the Sahel, where the French were never numerous, only Niger continues to have a European population of any size. In the coastal countries, Togo's modest foreign population has more than doubled. At the same time, Benin's less hospitable political climate has resulted in a decline in the numbers of resident French since the early 1970s. The small French population in the Central African Republic has also fallen. Following the discovery of oil and an easing of anti-Western attitudes, the Congo's French population has begun to mount. The character of the French population in Africa has also changed since independence. As one would expect, administrative posts in all of the countries are well on the way to being Africanized. Nevertheless there are still a number of the old administrators working as advisers, especially in countries like Gabon and the Ivory Coast. For the most part, however, the ranks of the long-term expatriates who expected to spend all or most of their working lives in Africa are thinning. Now they are usually r e p l a c e d - - w h e n they are replaced by Europeans--by persons on contract for set periods. Unlike their predecessors, these individuals are usually looked u p o n - - a n d view themselves--as

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism temporary help. They are typically technicians serving outside the regular hierarchical command structure. In the private sector, however, expatriates in senior- and middle-management posts are still common. But even here they are gradually being replaced by the growing numbers of educated and trained young Africans. Idealism and adventure still motivate some expatriates who come to work in Africa. However, the opportunity to amass a financial nest egg from the higher salaries and generous allowances paid to expatriate staff is more frequently the primary motivating force, especially among the younger recruits. In colloquial French, the phenomenon is often referred to as "faire

le CFA."

Africans in France The obverse side of Frenchmen residing in Africa is Africans living in France. Before 1945, virtually the only Africans able to enjoy the dubious pleasures of winter in France were soldiers from the colonial army and a trickle of students. This pattern reversed dramatically after 1945. Beginning with the constitutional assemblies in 1945-46, a host of African parliamentarians descended on Paris and on Versailles, where various French assemblies met to discuss the affairs of the French Union. At the same time, increasing numbers of students and trainees of all varieties began to arrive in France for periods of short or prolonged study. Although arriving black Africans were not comparable in numbers to the influx of southern European and Algerian immigrants, the various student quarters, like the Latin Quarter in Paris, began in the late 1940s to take

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France in BlackAfrica Table 3 Africans Living in France, 1982 Country of origin

Number

Senegal Cameroon Ivory Coast

29,188 13,143 11,346

Congo Mauritania Togo

8,501 5,177 5,086

Benin Central African Republic Gabon

4,269 2,828 2,756

Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) Chad Niger

2,263 1,217 1,104

Source: Minist~re des Relations Ext0rieures---Coop~ration et D~vetoppement, "La France et I'Afrique," Paris, 1984, p. 21, based on Cartes de S~jour valid on 31 December 1981, Ministate de I'lnt6rleur et de la D~centralisation. More recent figures were not readily available. (Note: These figures do not include the sizable numbers of French citizens of African origins. These would include all children born in France of Afdcan parents.)

on a more visibly cosmopolitan tinge with black, brown, and yellow faces mingling freely with the fairer complexions of the native French. During the 1950s and 1960s, the numbers of Africans living in France permanently or for protracted periods continued to grow. By 1981, the number of black Africans residing in France was 86,575. Table 3 gives numbers of Africans living in France in 1982. Although no precise figures are readily available for more recent years, the numbers have almost certainly grown. As

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Cooperation Replaces Colonialism one would expect, the vast majority of these people were from Francophone countries. The strength of the national contingents depended greatly on the state of relations between France and their country of origin. Thus students from the Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Gabon have become relatively numerous while those from Mali are comparatively few. A new phenomenon began with the recent onset of the terrible droughts and harsh economic recession in Africa. Desperation forced many to leave their homes in the Sahel in the 1970s and 1980s to seek employment in France. (A large portion of the Senegalese resident population in France falls in this category.) Although the French reaction to immigrant workers has most frequently been focused on North Africans, black Africans have felt some of the nastiness. Right-wing advocates of immigration controls in France enjoy attentive audiences, especially among the working-class French. Further arrivals from Africa are being quietly discouraged. Repatriation of sizable numbers of resident Africans, however, is unlikely as long as they possess valid resident and work permits. The temporary African student population in France has remained stable since its rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Its numbers may actually decline as opportunities continue to grow for study in their own countries and scholarship money becomes tighter. Growing racial antagonism in France may also discourage some Africans from going to France or from remaining there.

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FOUR: The Sword

The

army in Africa was ill-prepared for independence. A French-led colonial army had been crea t e d in t h e late 19th c e n t u r y to p r o v i d e c h e a p m a n p o w e r for the conquest of an African empire. The soldiers were the tough, long-suffering Tirailleurs S~n~galais with officers drawn from the French marine infantry. This colonial army continued to serve France well in two World Wars, in Indochina, and in Algeria. At the time of i n d e p e n d e n c e , the force n u m b e r e d 60,000 m e n m a n n i n g 90 garrisons in black Africa and Madagascar.~ The bulk of the troops were spread in a fan-like deployment across the Sahel from Mauritania to eastern Chad, guarding the southern approaches to Algeria.

National Armies Before 1959, no real effort had been made to create national armies in the future i n d e p e n d e n t states. Ind e e d de Gaulle h i m s e l f , as p r e s i d e n t of the F r e n c h community, proudly proclaimed, as late as 9 February 1959, "The army charged with the defense of the Community is one. It is u n d e r a single command. "~ A maj o r i t y of t h e o f f i c e r s , a n d m a n y of t h e s e n i o r n o n c o m m i s s i o n e d officers (NCOs), w e r e French. (In February 1956 there were only 77 African and Malgasy

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France in Black Africa officers in the French Army. 3) Recruitment among the educated African elite for the colonial army had been next to impossible. At the same time, French military authorities had shown little enthusiasm for preparing African soldiers for commissioning from the ranks. No doubt they w i s h e d to keep control in French hands. Moreover, recruitment long had been focused on tribes thought to have a martial tradition. The fact that these same g r o u p s t e n d e d to be a m o n g the least well e d u cated made bootstrap commissioning difficult. R e a l i z a t i o n t h a t A f r i c a n officers w o u l d be n e e d e d - - a n d q u i c k l y - - d a w n e d on the French general staff in 1956. Following the enactment of the Ioi-cadre, a marked increase in officer training was undertaken. A special school, I~cole de Formation des Officiers Ressortissant des Territoires d ' O u t r e - M e r a (Training School for Officers from Overseas Territories), was opened at the colonial training center at Fr6jus in the south of France. Small n u m b e r s of African officer candidates were also enrolled at the French military academy at St. Cyr and at the officer school at Cherchell in Algeria. In all, 276 officers w e r e t r a i n e d at Fr6jus from 1956 to 1965. s Their numbers and countries of origin are shown in table 4. It was not until 1959 that the need to organize national armies was seriously addressed by the French. A plan was then quickly concocted by the French general staff (modestly called the plan raisonnable), laying out the steps to be taken in forming a national army for Cameroon. This p l a n - - w i t h only m i n o r a d j u s t m e n t s - became the m o d e l for armies in all the Francophone states. 6

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The Sword Table 4 Africans Trained as Officers at Frdjus, 1956--65 Country

Number of Officers

Senegal Madagascar Upper Volta (Burkina Faso)

56 34 34

Dahomey Sudan (Mall) Congo

22 22 20

Chad Ivory Coast Central African Republic

17 16 14

Niger

11 11 7

Guinea Gabon Togo Mauritania

7 3

Source: Anthony Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa (Oxford: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 360.

In the end, national armies were hastily patched together on the eve of independence. Fr6jus and other regular officer training courses were not capable of supplying the sudden need for a large body of officers. Old soldiers were given accelerated training courses----often aimed at raising their levels of general educat i o n - b e f o r e hasty commissioning. Typical of this mass promotion of former senior NCOs was the man who eventually became known as Emperor Jean I (Bokassa). Indeed he was the first officer commissioned during this period from the Central African Republic.

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France in Black Africa (Earlier there had been an African officer in the French Army from Central Africa; he was killed in World War II.) The sad lack of formal preparation in forming the officer corps has since plagued these small armies. Illprepared African leadership has often resulted in years of dependence on French advisers who frequently held the real power of command and decision. (In some cases French control was perpetuated with the complicity of certain African political leaders.) The lack of respect for uneducated senior officers, coupled with the frustration of seeing military power remaining in French hands, ultimately contributed to the epidemic of coups d'etat mounted by better educated junior officers in a number of Francophone African countries.

Strategic Concept Political i n d e p e n d e n c e and the accompanying need to establish national armies forced the French to reevaluate their military strategy in sub-Saharan Africa. They soon concluded that a continuing French military presence would be n e e d e d to support the newborn local security forces, to assure stability in the region, and to protect French citizens and their residual interests. At the same time it was recognized that a large, permanent French military presence was politically undesirable, unduly expensive, and militarily unnecessary. Instead, French planners envisioned a first echelon of security in Africa provided by local forces formed into national armies. These forces were to be trained, equipped, and stiffened by French cadres.

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The Sword This portion of the scheme followed the plan raisonnable formula that called for each country to recruit a small national army of 5,000 men and a gendarmerie of roughly equal size. To back up this modest national force, the French provided for elite French intervention forces to support local forces--or subdue them, if necessary. These French forces were to be deployed in two tiers. Relatively small units were stationed at a few strategically located bases in Africa. The bulk of the force was held in France, ready for rapid deployment by ship or by long-range aircraft. This combination of basing relatively small, quickreaction deterrent forces in Africa while retaining a large mobile reserve in France had obvious advantages for the French. First, it reduced both the political liability and the cost of maintaining permanent large French bases in Africa. At the same time, relatively small French garrisons placed conspicuously within easy striking distance of the largest concentrations of French interests preserved visible French military presence. The prepositioning of stocks of equipment and ammunition, ready for the use of units arriving by air from France, assured rapid reinforcement. The forwarddeployed troops, based on a fire brigade model, could intervene quickly to smother local problems at an early stage, before they could spread and become a less manageable conflagration. To illustrate how quickly the French military can react, the troops at Camp de Gaulle on the outskirts of Libreville, in Gabon, are said to be under standing orders to have a platoon of fully armed troops at the presidential palace, 5 miles from their camp, within

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France in Black Africa 30 minutes of an order from the local French ambassador. One assumes that units at Abidjan and Dakar have similarly precise instructions to move smartly to protect friendly chiefs of state.

Military Cooperation Military ties with the Francophone countries of Africa are based on cooperation accords similar to those that define French economic, political, commercial, monetary, judicial, and cultural relations. Twenty-two such agreements have been signed. They are of two types. One is a mutual defense treaty that commits France to the internal and external defense of the African cosignatory. Originally these defense accords were signed with 10 of the 14 former French dependencies in black Africa. Only five now remain in force. 7 The second category is the military technical assistance accords. As the title implies, these agreements provide the legal framework for French military aid. In the early 1960s, such agreements were routinely negotiated with all the former dependencies except Guinea. Originally they were used as a vehicle to provide help in forming the new national armies. Since that task was completed, the military technical assistance agreements have provided a framework for the administration of French military aid, sales, and technical assistance programs. The programs range from relatively large, with Senegal and the Ivory Coast, to nominal, with Mall and Benin. In addition to the agreements with former French dependencies, France also has signed military

148

The Sword cooperation a g r e e m e n t s w i t h the former Belgian dependencies of Zaire, Burundi, and Rwanda. Most recently, a n o m i n a l a g r e e m e n t was s i g n e d w i t h the former Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau. Table 5 gives an indication of the current status of French military cooperation accords with various African states. Planning has taken French national interests carefully into account in setting force d e p l o y m e n t s and priorities. Factors considered in making these calculations include the following: • Economic importance to France. • N u m b e r of French residents in an area needing protection. • C o n t i n u e d access to i m p o r t a n t sources of raw materials for French industry. • Protection of important lines of communication. • P r e s e n c e of local leaders w i t h special ties to France. • France's position as a world power. Based on these criteria, an i n n e r core g r o u p of countries has been given pride of place in French planning. This group includes the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Senegal, C a m e r o o n , and, to a lesser extent, Togo. Since 1976-77, the French have also placed Zaire at the fringe of this c h a r m e d i n n e r circle of countries with w h o m France enjoys especially close security relations. A second category of countries that enjoy special, but less close, military relationships with France is composed of Niger, Chad, and the Central African Republic. The degree of French commitment to the security of this g r o u p is not so certain. The p r e s e n c e of French economic interests is not so strong, nor are the ties of culture and sentiment.

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France in Black Africa Table 5 Military Cooperation Agreements between France and Black Africa Defense Agreements

Signed

Cameroon Central African Republic Gabon

1974 (confidential) 1960 1960

Ivory Coast Senegal Togo

1961 1974 (renegotiated) 1963

Technical Military Assistance Agreements

Signed

Benin Burkina Faso Burundi

1975 (renewed) 1961 1969

Cameroon Central African Republic Chad

1974 (renegotiated) 1960 1976 (renewed)

Congo Gabon Ivory Coast

1974 (renewed) 1960 1961

Mall Mauritania Niger

1977 (renewed) 1976 (renewed) 1977 (renegotiated)

Rwanda Senegal Togo

1975 1974 (renegotiated) 1976 (renegotiated)

Za'ire

1974

Source: John Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper No. 201 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 25.

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The Sword

Aside from Niger there are now relatively few tangible French interests or residents in any of the Sahelian countries. Chad, of course, is strategically positioned at the center of the continent, forming a buffer between the Arab north and the black populations of Central and West Africa. Libya's thrust into Chad and its aggressive attitudes toward moderate Francophone African regimes further dramatized Chadian importance as a barrier astride trans-Saharan lines of communication. To underline Chad's military significance, French willingness to help defend Chad has been seen by African leaders like Houphouet and Bongo as a litmus test of the reliability of their own French security guarantees. The Central African Republic is important as a base for French troops near the center of Africa from which they could be quickly deployed to neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon, or Zaire. Finally, six Francophone African countries are on the outer fringe of the French security network in Africa: Benin, Congo, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mauritania. France's relations with most of them have warmed in recent years. The congruence of a Socialist president at the t~lys6e with a cooling of ideological ardor among Africans has helped improve these relationships. The Sahelian drought and the world economic recession have encouraged previously rigid ideologues toward greater pragmatism in seeking assistance for their countries. Finally, neither the Russians nor the Libyans have been especially generous in providing economic assistance. As one African Marxist pointedly commented to the author, "You cannot eat an AK-47

151

France in Black Africa assault rifle." To u n d e r l i n e the point, political questions that featured prominently in earlier Franco-African summits were virtually ignored at meetings in 1987 and 1988. Instead, African chiefs of state were preoccupied with their o w n mounting economic problems and w h a t France could do to relieve these problems. This pattern seems likely to continue.

Military Bases The presence forces are located in a few well-chosen bases in Africa, primarily as a visible sign of French intentions to protect political and economic interests. Implicitly, certain friendly regimes are included. Proximity of these bases to ports and large airfields is an ess e n t i a l f a c t o r in t h e i r a b i l i t y to s e r v e as s e c u r e bridgeheads and as resupply points for follow-on intervention forces. The initial choice of locations for the major bases was Dakar, Fort Lamy (N'Djamena), and Pointe Noire. Additional small bases and logistics facilities were implanted at Port Bouet, Ivory Coast; Douala, Cameroon; and Niamey, Niger. Surprising to say after almost 30 years, this military network has survived with only a few adjustments. By 1963 the base in the Congo was moved to LibreviIle in Gabon, following the overthrow of President Youlou by a group of radical young army officers. A r e q u e s t by C h a d , c o u p l e d with chronic instability, led the French to move their principal permanent base in Central Africa from N'Djamena south to Bouar in the Central African Republic. O t h e r w i s e the locations of the three major bases on the west coast remain the same. They of course are located near the

152

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principal centers of French political and economic interest in Francophone Africa. It is certainly more than a coincidence that Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Gabon h a p p e n also to be the only former French dependencies other than C a m e r o o n still governed by civilian chiefs of state. The implicit guarantees furnished by permanent French military presence surely have contributed to the longevity of their rule.

Numbers The n u m b e r of French military in Africa rose to 12,560 in late 1984. a Previously, the n u m b e r s were maintained for some years at around 6,700 troops with an additional 1,200 military advisers. (These figures, however, includes a sizable contingent at Djibouti, on the African east coast.) The increase in n u m b e r s in 1983-84 was due mainly to the increase in troops stationed in or supporting operations in Chad. Presumably, the numbers will decline as French involvement in Chad d e c r e a s e s . (Table 6 gives figures for French troops and military advisers in black Africa.) French resident population figures are given in table 6 for each country to illustrate the relationship between troop distribution and the presence of French citizens and other interests. Although base locations are not an absolute barometer, they are clearly correlated with the numbers of resident French in a country and the existence of French economic and commercial interests. In virtually all cases the flag has followed the franc. Only in Senegal do cultural and strategic considerations clearly outweigh economic ones.

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France in Black Africa Table 6

French Troops and Military Advisers in Black Africa Country Benin Burkina Faso Cameroon Central African Republic Chad Congo Gabon Ivory Coast Mali

Troops

French Population

2 15 84

2,781 3,129 12,127

1,600 2,500

78 125 10

3,302 1,375 6,210

600 500

122 115 5

16,496 23,509 2,918

52 60 20

1,778 3,091 709

34 110

15,460 3,789

60

Mauritania Niger Rwanda Senegal Za'fre

Advisers

1,250

Sources: The Military Balance 1987-1988 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), pp. 61-64; Chipman, French Military Policy andAfrican Security. p. 24; Union des Fran~ais de I'[~tranger, "Nombre de Fran~ais Immatricul~s," p. 24. (Note: The actual French population is certainly larger than the number of citizens who registered as residents at the French consulates.)

The Presence Force The bulk of the presence force has been made up of lightly armed but well-trained and highly mobile infantry drawn mainly from the 11th Airborne Division and the 9th Marine Infantry Division, both based in France. Forward-deployed elements are stationed in battalions or companies for 6-month tours in Africa.

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Unlike the troop units, the c o m m a n d and support cadres come to Africa on individual assignments, usually for at least 2 years. All troops in these overseasdeployed units are either professional soldiers or longterm national service volunteers. The French Air Force normally maintains a small force of 8 to 10 Jaguar A fighter-bombers in Africa to provide ground support and reconnaissance capability for the presence force. The aircraft and accompanying aerial refueling tankers are divided among Dakar, Libreville, and Bouar. Their capability should be greatly enhanced if the French go ahead with the purchase of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft. The French Air Force also has a fleet of Transall C-160 transport aircraft and helicopters to provide mobility and air resupply capability to the ground units. Air transport capacity has recently been augmented by the purchase of Lockheed C-130--H aircraft. This purchase will greatly increase airlift capacity and expand their range. The availability of C-130--H aircraft will also reduce French d e p e n d e n c e on American heavy airlift but not completely eliminate it. French naval presence on the West African coast is usually modest. Two amphibious landing ships are normally based at headquarters of the French South Atlantic Naval Command at Dakar. These vessels are capable of transporting a small landing force for a seaborne intervention along the African coast. (Joint maneuvers have been held with naval participation in several of the coastal countries.) The Navy also is capable of limited logistics support along the coast or up

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France in Black Africa the many navigable rivers and also conducts maritime surveillance with Brequet-Atlanfique maritime reconnaissance aircraft flying from Libreville, Abidjan, and Dakar.

Out of Sight, but Not Out of Mind The third military e l e m e n t of de Gaulle's triad strategy was a rapid intervention force based in metropolitan France. President de Gaulle saw clearly in 1959 that the large colonial army could best be used as the nucleus for the formation of national armies. Alt h o u g h a continued French military presence in the newly independent countries might be desirable from a French point of view, it should be discreetly limited in size and restricted to a few carefully chosen bases and logistics facilities. To combine effective deterrence with political sensitivity, the larger French sword must be out of sight, but not out of mind. The obvious solution was to combine a rapid intervention force stationed in France with relatively small forward-deployed e l e m e n t s m a n n i n g and protecting strategically placed bridgeheads and supply depots in Africa. This simple tactical concept had the Napoleonic virtue of concentrating an elite reserve force of considerable mass ready to intervene in any chosen direction. Strategic mobility was thus r e s t o r e d to the F r e n c h Army that had been p i n n e d d o w n by colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. Static defense and internal security in Africa were to be t u r n e d over to the newly formed national armies, operating under French guidance.

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The Sword The withdrawal of the French Army from Algeria provided de Gaulle with the elite soldiers n e e d e d to form such a hard-charging intervention force. French parachute infantry had become legendary for their agility and elan in both Indochina and Algeria. As a quick reaction "fire brigade" in a Third World environment, they would be hard to top. Thus, the spearhead of the n e w force became the G r o u p e m e n t A6roport Parachutiste (airborne group), composed of the 3rd and the 8th Marine Infantry Parachute Regiments and the 2nd Foreign Legion Parachute Regiment. Equipment and tactics were oriented toward a highly mobile airborne force. 9 Supporting arms were held to a minimum. No organic artillery larger than heavy mortars and light antitank weapons were included. Armored cars constituted the only armor component. Jaguar fighter-bombers were to provide close fire support for the g r o u n d elements. The force was ideally suited to engage the kinds of lightly armed enemies they were likely to encounter in Africa at that time, but was not well suited to take on a disciplined, heavily armed force provided with air and antiaircraft capability. C o m m a n d and control of the force followed a strong presidential pattern set in the constitution of the Fifth Republic by President de Gaulle. It provided for a French equivalent of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (le g~ndraI chef d'~tat-major des armies) taking orders directly from the president of the Republic as commander in chief in a crisis. ~°The chief of staff must give his professional estimate to the president, evaluating the risks involved, proposing the military course of action most appropriate, and specifying the time the operations will require. At the same time, the chief of staff

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France in Black Africa must define for the armed forces the nature of the mission and the means to be used to accomplish it. He must also make his military colleagues aware of the political and diplomatic aspects of the operations that may limit their freedom of action. The commander of the intervention force is then responsible for drawing up an operations plan and, at the president's command, executing it. This direct presidential command relationship has survived the four presidencies of the Fifth Republic. None of the presidents who have followed Charles de Gaulle, including the Socialist incumbent, modified it significantly. Admittedly, greater ambiguity was introduced into the system during the period of cohabitation with the right-of-center Chirac government from 1986 to 1988. Consultation to the point of informal negotiation then took place between the president and the prime minister. Whereas the president could give an order to intervene, the prime minister and his cabinet colleagues controlled the means of support for an intervention. Thus, lines of command and control became more blurred. Nevertheless, the two political elements worked reasonably well together during the second Chadian intervention. Since the election of a left-ofcenter government under the moderate Socialist Prime Minister Rocard, previous ambiguity has largely disappeared and presidential predominance in Africa and in the security field has returned.

A Stronger Force From its GauUist beginning, the intervention force has been significantly strengthened over the years. Under President Giscard d'Estaing it was enlarged to include two full divisions: the 11th Parachute Division,

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The Sword with a strength of 13,500 men, based at Pau in southwest France; and the 9th Marine Infantry Division (les Marousins), with 8,000 men, stationed in Brittany. By tradition, the units of the marine infantry played a major role in winning and protecting France's colonial empire. Indeed, before the emancipation of the colonies, these troops were referred to as the colonial troops. Their orders and budget came mainly from the French Colonial Ministry, which inherited its role from the Ministry of the Navy. This evolution, of course, explains the origins of their d e s i g n a t i o n as marine infantry.

31st Brigade To supply some heavier combat capacity, a new unit was added to the intervention forces in mid-1981. This was the 31st Brigade, headquartered in the Provenial town of Aubagne, near Marseilles in southeast France. The brigade was fully mechanized, with its own organic tanks and artillery support. Trained in amphibious assault, the 31st could be deployed by sea with its heavy equipment. The following units make up the brigade: 11 • 2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment • 21st Marine Infantry Regiment with a battery of 155-mm BF-55 cannons • a squadron of the 501st Tank Regiment with 10 AMX-30 tanks The addition of this heavy brigade to the intervention force provided a unit capable of sustained combat against a more heavily armed enemy. The fact that the French have lacked a military transport aircraft capable

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France in BlackAfrica of lifting the AMX-30 tanks, however, limited the unit's mobility to comparatively slow nautical deployment. The unit's heavy equipment could be deployed only in coastal areas unless the operation was undertaken with the help of an ally possessing aircraft capable of lifting outsized loads. (This, of course, has been the case in Chad, where American heavy airlift has s u p p o r t e d French i n t e r v e n t i o n . ) The French Air Force's purchase of C-130--H aircraft will partially correct this previous shortcoming. In any sizable deployment, however, the French will still need help, for the 12 C-130-H aircraft that have been ordered cannot move or supply more than a regimental-size operation.

Force d'Action Rapide (FAR) The next step in the evolution of French intervention forces was announced by French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu in June 1983 as part of a major program to reorganize and m o d e r n i z e the French Armed Forces. As announced, the program was to be implemented over a 4-year period (1984-88). Of greatest international interest were indications that the French intended to cooperate more closely with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in the forward d e f e n s e of Europe. H e r n u an d s u b s e q u e n t spokesmen were careful to abjure any intention to reintegrate French forces into the unified NATO command structure. Nonetheless, Hernu mentioned quite deliberately, in an interview with Le Monde on 18 June 1983, that possible French deployments would be discussed "with our allies."l~ Since that time, the French have made it quite clear that they will participate with their

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allies in the defense of Europe from the outset of hostilities. This position, of course, represents a substantial break with the Gaullist past. Nonetheless, Chirac's neo-Gaullist government maintained this commitment to the forward defense of Europe. No important change in attitude is likely to take place in this regard under the Rocard government, especially with Francois Mitterrand at the Elys6e. It was feared in some quarters that the reorganization might have serious implications for French ability or willingness to intervene in Africa. The cream of the French Army, which long had been earmarked exclusively for use in Africa, was to be included in a n e w formation called the Force d'Action Rapide (FAR), with an important E u r o p e a n mission. To accomplish this mission, the units of the FAR are being more heavily a r m e d for c o m b a t in a h i g h - i n t e n s i t y e n v i r o n m e n t against an e n e m y a r m e d with all of the most sophisticated machines of war. This appeared to many to be a sideward step into Europe, further decolonizing the French Army. (See table 7 for 1987--88 strength of FAR.) Early African fears of a decline in French commitment, however, have not yet been borne out by events. The relative ease with which the French were able to insert and maintain a sizable force in Chad--albeit with important US assistance--suggests that their intervention capabilities have not b e e n seriously d e g r a d e d . More w o r r y i n g to Africa, however, was a decision to s p e n d the bulk of France's n o n n u c l e a r p r o c u r e m e n t funds during 1984--88 on costly new antitank weapons and on new tanks. At first the French did not budget for significant improvements in their long-range airlift capability. Their d e p e n d e n c e on the short-legged Transall

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France in Black Africa Table 7 Army Component of Force d'Action Rapide Unit

Strength

Comments

11th Parachute Division

13,500

Ready for overseas deployment.

9th Marine Infantry Division

8,000

Theoretically ready for overseas deployment. However, being reequipped as a light armored division similar to the 6th Division.

27th Alpine Division

8,500

Two battalions have been assigned to a joint Franco-German brigade.

6th Light Armored Division

7,400

A light armored division using wheeled armored vehicles. Division was formed around a nucleus of the 31 st Brigade. It is now composed mainly of Foreign Legion units.

4th Airmobile Division

5,100

Primarily antiarmor with 240 helicopters and a reinforced infantry regiment.

Logistics Brigade

2,000

Source: The Military Balance 1987-1988.

C-160 had long been identified as the principal weakness in the French ability to intervene in Africa. Their reliance on leased civilian air transport and on US Air Force help to support their forces in Chad dramatically illustrated this weakness. As previously m e n t i o n e d , however, p u r c h a s e of American C-130-H transport aircraft s h o u l d go s o m e d i s t a n c e in solving this problem. Nevertheless, African apprehension has not fully dissipated. The lack of coherence in the missions and

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The Sword composition of the FAR is evident to all. The FAR is not a tactical c o m m a n d that could be deployed as a cohesive unit either in Africa or in Europe. Rather, it is a h o d g e p o d g e of units u n d e r a single administrative c o m m a n d w i t h potentially conflicting missions. The initial reason for setting it up was to reassure the West Germans by a demonstration of French commitment to the defense of Europe. The traditional overseas intervention u n i t s - - t h e l l t h Parachute Division and the 9th Marine Infantry D i v i s i o n - - a r e still formally tasked with intervening in Africa w h e n needed. However, the 9th Marine Infantry is being reequipped with heavier equipment more suited to combat in Europe than to the African b u s h . It is t h e r e f o r e q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r these units will continue to be available for intervention in Africa, especially if there should be s i m u l t a n e o u s crises in Africa and in Europe. From an African point of view, a not very satisfactory response was given by the then chief of staff of the French Army w h e n asked by an Ivoirian student at the French Ecole de Guerre in Paris what France would do if faced with challenges in both Europe and Africa. The chief of staff, with surprising candor, reportedly replied that France is a E u r o p e a n nation; her survival could be at stake if t h r e a t e n e d in Europe. Therefore, priority of r e s p o n s e m u s t be given to c o u n t e r i n g a threat in Europe. Under such circumstances, African n e e d s m u s t take second place. ~3Needless to say, the element of ambiguity that the FAR's dual mission has brought to French security interests is troublesome to some F r a n c o p h o n e African leaders, despite the fact that P r e s i d e n t M i t t e r r a n d , P r i m e M i n i s t e r Chirac ( w h e n in office), and Prime Minister Rocard have all

163

France in Black Africa continued to insist on the firmness of their commitment to their African allies. French Intervention

In the years just before and after independence, French forces were busy assuring stability and peaceful transition from colonial to local rule. They supported newly formed national forces in maintaining order in several recently independent countries. In Cameroon, they first organized and then assisted Cameroonian efforts to suppress a rebellion mounted by the Bamilekeled Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). Some 300 French officers and NCOs were involved in these operations that lasted from 1959 to 1964. Mauritania was another site of early French military activity that spanned the transition from colonial rule to independence. Operations took place in the Western Sahara from 1956 to 1963, until the newly formed Mauritanian government organized itself and was able to assert a presence in the vast, empty northern reaches of the country. The French in 1960 played a key role in foiling an attempt by radical Sudanese leaders of the short-lived Mali Federation, led by Modibo Keita, to take political control of the federation's governing machinery in Dakar. The overconfident Sudanese aimed at setting up a unified state that they could dominate. French ofricers serving with the Senegalese g e n d a r m e r i e warned the more moderate Senegalese leaders of the danger and helped outmaneuver Keita and his friends by deploying Senegalese gendarme units to strategic points in Dakar. The French high commissioner re-

164

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fused to honor Keita's request for French military intervention, sealing the fate of the Sudanese attempt to take control of the whole of the federation while excludhag the moderate influence of L@opoldSenghor and his friends from power.14 The most important instances of French military intervention in black Africa to date are as follows: • Cameroon--1957-1964 • Gabon--1964 • Chad--1968-1975, 1977-1980, 1983, 1986present • Mauritania--1956-1963, 1977-1978, 1980 • Central Africa--1979 • Zaire--1977, 1978 The most dramatic intervention that took place in the early independence period was in Gabon in 1964.is Elements of the local army mutinied, taking President L6on M'Ba prisoner. French paratroops from Brazzaville and Dakar were quickly dispatched to Libreville, where they squashed the rebellion, rescued the president, and restored M'Ba to power. This sudden intervention in support of a d e p o s e d president came as something of a surprise. The French had done nothing the previous year in Togo when President Olympio was assassinated and his government overturned. Nor had the French intervened in Congo-Brazzaville to support Abb6 Youlou, who was forced to resign his presidency. Later, the French again took no military action in response to a long series of coups d'etat in Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and Upper Volta during the late 1960s. One may safely assume that the difference in Gabon was the presence of substantial quantities of oil, coupled with a pliant government.

165

France in Black Africa The next scene of French intervention was to be Chad, where revolt broke out in 1968 in the northern Saharan provinces of Bouhou, Ennedi, and Tibesti. The French feared instability would spread from this strategically placed country to its neighbors to the south and west. The credibility of French security guarantees in Africa also was in question. Initially, France came to the defense of the largely southern, animist-Christian government against a challenge mounted by the Muslim nomads of the northern Chadian desert. French intervention in this troubled country has been repeated several times since. Despite this impressive string of French interventions during the 9 years following independence, de Gaulle slowly r e d u c e d French c o m m i t m e n t after 1962.1~ His successor, President Pompidou, continued to gradually draw down French military presence in Africa while giving attention to the role of the intervention forces based in France. He also continued to focus French activities in the more prosperous Francophone African countries and sought to broaden French relations elsewhere in Africa. In line with a quiet reduction in commitment, Pompidou graciously acceded to African w i s h e s to revise their m i l i t a r y c o o p e r a t i o n agreements. "Giscard the African" In contrast to his predecessors, President Giscard d'Estaing kept his soldiers hopping. His two interventions in Zaire in support of the Mobutu regime surprised most observers, who had assumed the French intervention forces were not likely to be employed outside their accepted sphere of special interest in the former French colonial empire.

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In 1977, Giscard's response was relatively modest. He sent advisers, arms, and aircraft to help a mainly Moroccan force repulse an incursion from Angola into the copper-rich Shaba Province by forces of the Front de Lib6ration Nationale Congolaise (FLNC). The FLNC troops were reportedly the remnants of the Katangan gendarmerie that had taken refuge in Angola in the mid-1960s following the demise of the Katangan regime led by Moise Tshombe. Giscard's second Zairian adventure in 1978 was not so measured. This time he sent the 2nd R6giment ]~tranger Parachutiste; they jumped over Kolwezi from US Air Force C-141 aircraft. The intervention was made in conjunction with a force of Belgian parachutists. Once on the g r o u n d , the tough legionnaires made short work of the FLNC, chasing those who survived back into Angola. Giscard revived a long French interest in Zaire and its mineral riches with an official visit to Kinshasa in 1975. Seizing an opportunity for support and for further legitimization of his regime, Mobutu welcomed m e m b e r s h i p in the Franco-African family. As an adopted son, he has since participated in all of the group's annual summit meetings. In the course of their early courtship, France had apparently signed a military aid agreement with Zaire, which was to be invoked as t he m a i n ju s tificatio n for later F r e n c h intervention.17 The final and most controversial intervention during the Giscardian years was Operation Barracuda in 1979. French paratroops made a sudden assault on the sleepy capital of the Central African Republic. The purpose was to depose Emperor Jean I (Bokassa), who was

167

Frame in Black Africa

SIMON/GAMMA

Zai're's President Mobutu at Kinshasa airport.

168

The Sword in Libya at the time, and to replace him with a less erratic successor. Giscard's motives were subsequently questioned. He and m e m b e r s of his family were accused of having profited from his previously c h u m m y relations with Bokassa. It was even suggested that Barracuda was m o u n t e d to rid Giscard of an embarrassment. (It should be noted in Giscard's defense that he may have been urged to take action against Bokassa by other African chiefs of state, including Houphouet and Diouf of Senegal.) Ironically, G i s c a r d ' s actions in Zaire and elsewhere were criticized by both the Socialist left and by the Gaullist right. At the time, opposite points of the political compass accused Giscard of sacrificing French independence of action by defending the more general interests of the Atlantic alliance. Using unusually colorful l a n g u a g e , Francois Mitterrand, as leader of the Socialist opposition in 1978, pointedly c o n d e m n e d France's role in Africa, characterizing France as the "Cuba of the West" and as "NATO's gendarme."18 (Paradox~cally, only 5 years later in 1983, Mitterrand himself was reminded of these words w h e n as president of the Republic, he too sent French troops in American aircraft to intervene in Chad against the Libyans.)

France's Moment of Truth in Chad The Chad crisis of 1982 came just as French relations with their closest African allies were beginning to recover from the trauma suffered following the Socialist electoral victory in 1981. Suddenly, French credibility was again in question. The French were reluctant to

169

France in Black Africa

ABB,a~SPMAGNUM PHOTOS

Jean Bokassa crowned himself Emperor lean I of Central Africa in 1977. r e s p o n d positively to a C h a d i a n request for military ass i s t a n c e to r e p u l s e a n i n c u r s i o n by L i b y a n t r o o p s . Great p r e s s u r e w a s exerted u p o n Mitterrand simultan e o u s l y by his A m e r i c a n ally a n d by such valued African ~ e n d s as H o u p h o u e t , Diouf, Bongo, a n d Mobutu. The Africans a s s e r t e d that the credibility of French security g u a r a n t e e s to their o w n countries w o u l d be in doubt if France did not intervene in Chad. Some of the A f r i c a n l e a d e r s p o i n t e d o u t to M i t t e r r a n d t h a t privileged relations involve reciprocal responsibilities. O n e cannot enjoy advantages without meeting these

170

The Sword responsibilities. Ultimately, the F r e n c h reluctantly c o m m i t t e d their troops to C h a d in 1982 but limited their deployment to the southern half of the country. This effort to avoid direct confrontation with the Libyans had the effect of dividing the country in two and leaving the Libyans in control of the northern half. 29 To c o m p o u n d the earlier d a m a g e to their image, the French were made to look foolish w h e n President Mitterrand negotiated a w i t h d r a w a l with the unpredictable Libyan leader. To the great embarrassment of the French, Khadafi was caught red-handed cheating on this withdrawal agreement. Libyan troops had not w i t h d r a w n across the border as agreed, but had hidden themselves some distance from their accustomed bases in Chad. In the m e a n t i m e , the French h a d - - i n good f a i t h - - w i t h d r a w n the bulk of their forces south to the Central African Republic. W h e n this bit of Bedouin trickery became public knowledge, Mitterrand was accused of gullibility, or worse, by his critics. In terms of domestic popular approval, this period was probably the nadir of his first presidency. The second French decision to intervene in Chad was less a m b i g u o u s and m o r e successful. Operation Sparrow Hawk (Epervier) was m o u n t e d to counter signs that the Libyans i n t e n d e d to move south of the 16th parallel, a sort of red line drawn by the French across the middle of Chad. The essential elements of the operation were logistics s u p p o r t for the C h a d i a n s and French air support. Without the French logistics support, the Chadians could never have stood up to a wellsupplied Libyan Army. French air support later played

171

France in Black Africa a key role in the ultimate C h a d i a n offensive by neutralizing Libyan tactical air s u p p o r t at a critical time. The resulting victories have mollified some of France's African critics and restored s o m e luster to the tarnished French image.

Conflicting Influences on Chadian Decisions Many critics have failed to recognize the complexity of conflicting pressures bearing on French decisionm a k e r s as t h e y c o n s i d e r e d i n t e r v e n t i o n in Chad. As one e m i n e n t French academic authority explained in p r i v a t e c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h t h e a u t h o r , France m u s t think of her interests in North Africa as well as in black Africa. Relations with Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco are in m a n y ways as i m p o r t a n t to France as her relations with her black African friends. 2° Indeed, France even has enjoyed profitable commercial relations with Khadafi's Libya. O n the domestic side, there were also countervailing p r e s s u r e s . P r e s i d e n t M i t t e r r a n d faced s t r o n g resistance to military intervention in Africa from within the pacifist w i n g of his o w n Socialist Party. Opposition also c a m e f r o m F r e n c h m o d e r n i s t s in the b u s i n e s s c o m m u n i t y w h o p o i n t e d o u t that F r e n c h trade w i t h Francophone black Africa is no longer as important to France as it once was. A war with an Arab Third World country, they argued, could jeopardize equally important trade with Arab and other Third World countries. On a more personal level, C h a d i a n President Hiss~ne Habr6 was said to have been implicated in the death of

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a French Army officer, Commandant Pierre Galopin, and the kidnapping of French archaeologist Frangoise Claustre. This incident is said to have weighed especially heavily with Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, who enjoys close personal and political relations with the slain officer's brother. 21

Implications for the Future French reservations and early indecisiveness in Chad sent contradictory signals to both friend and foe. The subsequent victory with firm French support reduced, but did not remove, doubts about the reliability of French security guarantees. African allies have now made it clear that failure to maintain the credibility of her security guarantees could undermine other valued aspects of the special relationship France has so long enjoyed with many of her former African dependencies. When the first Chadian intervention was being considered, moderate African leaders were not reticent in reminding the French that their relationships are indivisible; privileges in one area carry responsibilities in another. Thus as long as France wishes to enjoy the advantages of a privileged relationship in her African backyard, she must be prepared to pay a price; this price obviously includes the possibility of occasional military intervention.

State of Readiness The current deployment and mission of French forces continue to underline France's readiness to intervene in Africa. Nonetheless, intervention, even during the most assertive Gaullist and Giscardian days, has never been automatic. Even the existence of joint

173

France in BlackAfrica defense agreements has not fully guaranteed intervention, as both Abb6 Youlou in the Congo and Hubert Maga in Dahomey learned to their despair. The presence of French troops in a country also has not been a foolproof guarantee of willingness to use them on behalf of a threatened political leader. Diori of Niger and Tsiranana of Madagascar were both ousted by their own military while French garrisons sat by quietly. Thus, although the military means and legal justifications are in place, a will to intervene cannot always be assured. Future French leaders of all political stripes are likely to continue to be p r u d e n t in their commitment of military force in Africa. Nonetheless, it is inevitable t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s will d e m a n d action occasionally. Future situations that might face French leaders are not always foreseeable, but some relatively safe generalizations can be made. Clearly, external aggression would almost certainly be met by a muscular French response, especially if it threatens one of the four countries with which France maintains overt defense agreements. France is also likely to respond favorably to a request for support should Niger, Togo, or C a m e r o o n be t h r e a t e n e d by outside forces. A n o t h e r French intervention in Za~re is also a possibility, particularly if the external threat were credible and French citizens again endangered. The most sensitive area of potential intervention remains an internal threat to an existing regime. Only in the Ivory Coast, Gabon, a n d Senegal are s t r o n g enough interests present to warrant predicting a likely positive response. First, the large concentrations of F r e n c h citizens in e a c h of these c o u n t r i e s could be

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t h r e a t e n e d , or serve as a convenient pretext for military intervention. (In this context, a senior French officer in Gabon once jokingly c o m m e n t e d to the author that the protection of French citizens and p r o p e r t y "could cover a multitude of sins.") Important French economic and cultural interests are also strongest in these three countries. Finally, these three core countries r e m a i n almost u n i q u e in retaining civilian-led governments, none of which are by African standards excessively repressive. Overt French military response to internal threats s e e m s unlikely elsewhere, unless French citizens are patently in imminent physical danger. In December 1984 a "high official close to President Mitterrand" was quoted as saying, "African countries w o u l d have to accept that France could no longer p r o v i d e t h e m w i t h a m i l i t a r y u m b r e l l a in all circumstances. " 2 2

Covert Intervention The ultimate symbol and guarantor of French intentions to protect their interests and to maintain their influence in sub-Saharan Africa is u n d o u b t e d l y the physical presence of units of the regular French A r m e d Forces, backed by a large, readily deployable intervention force just over the horizon. Nevertheless, situations have arisen over the past three decades w h e n the French did not choose to deploy regular, easily identifiable troops but still wanted to intervene with force. In such cases they relied on a variety of official and quasiofficial clandestine services to p r o d u c e the discreet forces that could be used without open identification with the government of France.

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France in Black Africa Before independence, control of the machinery of administration was in French hands. Undercover police operations were used to monitor and influence African political activity. Many of these operations were p a s s e d on to the n e w l y i n d e p e n d e n t g o v e r n m e n t s , often with the former French police operatives serving as advisers. In other more sensitive cases, the French turned former police assets into their own intelligence networks. The African section of France's principal external intelligence service, the Service de Documentation Ext6rieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), was established in 1959, on the eve of independence, by Colonel Maurice Robert, just r e t u r n e d from Dakar w h e r e he had set up the service's first networks in Africa. Robert's work coincided with the formation of the n e w French c o m m u n i t y of sovereign states and with the great u p s u r g e of n a t i o n a l i s t s e n t i m e n t t h r o u g h o u t Africa. The first clandestine operations are said to have been undertaken in 1959 and 1960 by the new service in Guinea in an attempt to topple S~kou Tour(}.23Needless to say, they were unsuccessful and may have encouraged 'Ibur6's paranoid brutality. A n o t h e r well-publicized c l a n d e s t i n e trick w a s the a s s a s s i n a t i o n in S w i t z e r l a n d in 1960 of F61ix M o u m i e , leader of the UPC.

Katanga Libre! The earliest clandestine French paramilitary adventure in postindependence Africa that the author is able to identify occurred in 1961 in Katanga Province of Zaire. In the spring of that year, a group of 12 French

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The Sword

officers arrived in the Katangan capital of Elisabethville at the invitation of the secessionist leader Moise Tshombe. The group was led by Colonel Roger Trinquier, a quixotic French soldier who had acquired a reputation in Indochina and Algeria as one of the French Army's leading theoreticians and practitioners of revolutionary war. According to his own account, Trinquier was promised the post of commander of the Katangan army and police. Indeed he claimed to have a copy of a contract signed by Tshombe and naming him to this post. 24 French official complicity in Trinquier's activities was never openly acknowledged. Trinquier, however, claims to have had the blessing and encouragement of President de Gaulle's minister of defense, Pierre Messmer, before he undertook his mission. 2s The fact that the colonel and the other officers who joined him were on active duty in the French Army when recruited for service in Katanga tends to confirm at least official knowledge and probably acquiescence.2~ (Messmer's military aide has been identified as the project's action officer in the Ministry of Defense. 27) Trinquier and his friends did, of course, resign from the army, allegedly at Messmer's insistence, before accepting Katangan employment. Thus official complicity in the Katanga operation is not in serious doubt. Clearly the Ministry of Defense was involved with Trinquier's group. Judging from appearances at the time, the French consulate in Elisabethville was in regular communication with the French mercenaries.28 Indeed, Trinquier himself claims to have kept the consul informed of his activities. Since

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France in Black Africa nothing involving the French government--officially or quasi-officially--took place in Africa during that epoch without Jacques Foccart's approval, one assumes he and de Gaulle himself were well aware of Trinquier's Katangan caper and approved of it. It would be stretching credulity to believe otherwise. In his own account, Trinquier describes setting out for Katanga with a team recruited from among the elite regiments of the French Army (that is, the Foreign Legion, the Colonial Infantry, and the "ll6me Choc" [a specially trained c o m m a n d o g r o u p attached to the French secret service]). Trinquier's own stay in Africa was short-lived. Belgian resistance to a French invasion of their turf was fierce. Trinquier's romantic plans to mobilize the population and to terrorize the UN peacekeeping force horrified the more practical-minded Belgian bankers. Understandably, they were more interested in the safety of their investments in the region's copper mines than in the organization of Katangan peasants into a successful guerrilla force ready to fight a revolutionary war against a hard-to-identify Communist threat. Using their considerable influence in Paris, Elisabethville, and elsewhere, the gnomes of Brussels assured that Colonel Trinquier's Katangan stars were quickly eclipsed. Although the colonel himself was soon back in Paris, the rest of the French m e r c e n a r y g r o u p remained in Katanga under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Faulques, a former Foreign Legion parachutist who suffered crippling wounds at Cau Bang and Dien Bien Phu, in Vietnam. Despite his physical handicaps, Faulques remained an admirable soldier who actively led his men in the field. Under his command the French group played a key role in bringing the first bout of

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The Sword fighting (in S e p t e m b e r 1961) b e t w e e n the Katangans and the UN forces to an inconclusive cease-fire. They lured a company of Irish soldiers from the UN force to an isolated position in the copper-mining center of Jadotville, 50 miles from the main body of UN troops in Elisabethville. W h e n fighting began in Elisabethville, t h e y s u r r o u n d e d the i n e x p e r i e n c e d Irish. Short of drink and food and u n w i l l i n g to risk casualties in a peacekeeping operation, the Irish c o m m a n d e r surrendered his troops, putting 200 hostages in the hands of the Katangans. In subsequent negotiations the Katangans were able to use the Irish prisoners to gain an advantageous cease-fire. Dreams of copper and cobalt may first have drawn the French to Katanga. Their military have since returned twice, in 1977 and 1978, to what is now called Shaba Province of Zaire. Ironically, these later visits w e r e on b e h a l f of the central g o v e r n m e n t of Zaire. French relations with President Mobutu's government have grown close. The Zairian leader is now a prominent m e m b e r of the Francophone family, even contribu t i n g t r o o p s to s u p p o r t t h e C h a d i a n s in t h e i r difficulties with Libya's Colonel Khadafi. French military advisers are now training and leading Zairian para t r o o p units. Moreover, the f o r m e r F r e n c h chief of staff, General Jeannou Lacaze, has become a military adviser to President Mobutu himself.

Biafra: Another Lost Cause Earlier experience in Katanga seems to have awake n e d in the French a taste for secessionist provinces and lost causes. French support for the Biafrans in the

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France in Black Africa Nigerian civil war (1967-70) was another such experience. Evidence of French official complicity was as clear in Biafra as in Katanga. French mercenaries served in Biafra, and little effort was made to hide the fact that France was a major supplier of military equipment to the Biafrans. Indeed Gabon, where the French have always enjoyed great influence, became a center for the French assistance and a rest and recreation center for French mercenaries serving in Biafra. A nocturnal airlift was organized to lift supplies from Libreville to airstrips in Biafra. The flights were given the unconvincing cover of humanitarian aid. At the time it was an open secret that the medicine and food shipments were heavily larded with cases of guns and munitions. The military attach6 at the French Embassy in Libreville, Colonel Merle, was charged with coordinating the flights. 29 The French and some of their closest African allies viewed the Biafran challenge to Nigerian unity as opportune. The potential power of a united Nigeria had long been viewed as a danger to French regional interests and to the regional leadership of old friends like H o u p h o u e t . In fact, s o m e s o u r c e s s u g g e s t t h a t de Gaulle's decision to support Biafra was heavily influenced by H o u p h o u e t and by Gabon's President Bongo. Whatever the origin of the initial impetus, the French studiously m a i n t a i n e d that assistance to Biafra was never direct but passed through Gabon and the Ivory Coast. 3° In a recent interview with the author, Jacques Foccart c o n t i n u e d to i n s i s t - - w i t h o u t a trace of a smile--that France had merely assisted Gabonese efforts to bolster the Biafrans21

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The Sword

Benin The next clandestine operation involving Francophone Africa was aimed at overthrowing the idiosyncratic regime in Benin (formerly Dahomey) headed by Mathieu Kerekou. Initially an avowed anti-Communist, Kerekou did a s u d d e n about-face in 1974 w h e n he allied himself with a group of young progressives, officially changing the country's political orientation to that of a Marxist-Socialist republic. The background of this operation remains murky, but a mixed group of white mercenaries and Beninois dissidents reportedly were recruited by the long-time French m e r c e n a r y leader, Bob D e n a r d . D e n a r d had served as a m e r c e n a r y in Zaire and Biafra and had also been involved in a successful coup d'etat in 1975 in the Comoro Islands. To complete his credentials, Denard is said to have served for some years as one of the many technical advisers surrounding President Bongo of Gabon. In this capacity, he is said to have used the pseud o n y m Gilbert Bourgeaud. 32 The m e r c e n a r i e s w h o attacked Benin trained in Morocco a n d s t a g e d their arrival by air in C o t o n o u through Gabon, according to a report written by a UN commission that investigated the raid. The investigators based their conclusions on documents that allegedly were left behind by the raiders and on an interview with a man w h o m the Beninois claimed to have been one of the raiders inadvertently left behind w h e n the others w i t h d r e w from Cotonou. The raid itself met with little initial opposition after the group landed at a sleepy Cotonou airport early on a S u n d a y m o r n i n g . The m e r c e n a r i e s t h e n m a d e

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France in Black Africa their way into town along the road paralleling the beach to the presidential palace. Shots were then exchanged with troops guarding the palace. After a relatively brief encounter, the raiders w i t h d r e w to the airport w h e n expected s u p p o r t from disaffected elements in the Benin army did not materialize. The raiders then left as they had come, on their o w n aircraft. Few casualties and little serious material damage were suffered. In m o r e r e c e n t times, the w i d e l y a c c e p t e d assumption of French intrigue and covert connivance in Africa has diminished. The picturesque gang of mercenaries and Gaullist political action thugs that tarnished the image of previous regimes lost many of their official connections with the election in 1981 of a Socialist government. Since that time the presence of an unfriendly Socialist president has assured that most of these elements have remained underemployed.

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FIVE:

One Man's Family

A familial spirit persists in France's relations with her former African colonies. Important matters were and are f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e d , and often decided, at the chiefs-of-state level. The French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never played more than a peripheral role in relations with Francophone Africa. Instead, policy has been made by, and relations conducted from, the Elys6e, using the Ministry of Cooperation as its principal o p e r a t i n g arm. To mark its special role, many in Paris and Africa have come to view "Cooperation" as the Ministry for Franco-African Affairs. Annual Franco-African summit conferences have been held since 1973. They are invariably at the chiefsof-state level, alternating between sites in France and in the African capitals. The French president customarily assumes a central role as p~re de famiUe. In recognition of his special role, he is given the place of honor at ceremonial dinners and is always found at the front and center of the traditional conference photographs, surrounded by smiling African colleagues. On such occasions, pride of place for African chiefs of state is defined in r e l a t i o n to the p r e s i d e n t of France. For instance, Houphouet-Boigny, as the doyen of African leaders and only preindependence presidential survivor, is always placed next to the French head of state or

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France in Black Africa at the side of the host opposite that given the French president. In addition to these formal g r o u p conferences, most Francophone African leaders pay regular visits to Paris, w h e r e they are routinely w e l c o m e d at the ]~lys6e Palace with mind-bending ceremony, flowery speeches, and good wines. As in most families, occasional spats have marred relations between France and certain of her African offspring. Nevertheless, France has broken relations only with Guinea, and this rupture is now well on the way to being mended. Several years before his death, the errant S~kou Tour6 was welcomed back to the fold in a lavish state visit to Paris, much to the chagrin of critics who suggested that such a welcome was inappropriate in light of the brutality, of the Guinean regime and its long Marxist associations. Despite these criticisms, President Giscard d'Estaing paid a memorable return visit to Conakry in 1978, the first by a French chief of state since de Gaulle's fateful p r e i n d e p e n d e n c e visit in 1958. Under President Pompidou, the family circle was first enlarged in 1970 to include the Francophone former Belgian colonial dependencies of Zaire, Burundi, and R w a n d a . More recently, L u s o p h o n e , H i s p a n i phone, and even some A n g l o p h o n e African cousins have been invited to the family reunions. This practice of widening and, as some see it, diluting the closeness of relationships with France has been resented and resisted by certain charter members of the Francophone club. Nevertheless summit meetings go on at great exp e n s e to both French and African taxpayers. I n d e e d the 1986 Lore6 Conference was said by some observers to have been the most grandiose so far. In contrast, the

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~a

Fresh President Giscard d'Estaing with S~kouTourddu~ng Gi~rd' s visit to C~kry, Guinea, in I978, first visit ~ a Frenchheadof state in 20 years.

France in Black Africa 1987 conference at Antibes, in southern France, was a decidedly more somber affair. Participants were preoccupied with the crushing economic problems caused by the cost of debt servicing and fallen c o m m o d i t y prices. On the French side, growing concern over the burden of expanding budgetary and foreign exchange s u p p o r t to virtually all their African friends was reflected in P r e s i d e n t M i t t e r r a n d ' s invitation to the world's developed countries to take up theii share of Africa's b u r d e n - - and quickly. 1

Conduct of Relations The original Gaullist concept of a French community of sovereign states has continued to be reflected in the special way France conducts her relations with the Francophone Africans. The Fifth Republic's Constitution foresaw a close-knit c o m m u n i t y with a French president at its head. To support the community's governing body made up of the chiefs of state of m e m b e r countries, a secretariat was established. This administrative organ outlived the community it was designed to serve. The reason for its survival probably lay in the insistence by Charles de Gaulle on preserving presidential primacy in m a n a g i n g relations with France's f o r m e r black African d e p e n d e n c i e s . In a s e n s e , de Gaulle ignored the full significance of granting political independence.

De Gaulle's Sancho Panza To establish and carry on his personalized and often secretive relationships in Africa, President de Gaulle found the near perfect i n s t r u m e n t in Jacques

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One Man's Family Foccart, w h o m he chose to be the first secretary general of the community. It would be oversimplified to characterize Foccart's relationship with de Gaulle as a sort of Sancho Panza to de Gaulle's Don Quixote, but there was something of the faithful, self-effacing, practicalm i n d e d retainer in Foccart; even some of de Gaulle's most ardent admirers would admit that there was more than a little of Quixote in de Gaulle. Foccart's genius lay in his ability to faithfully carry out de Gaulle's wishes w i t h o u t losing the p e r s o n a l respect of those he was dealing with. Indeed, Foccart came to be regarded by many in Africa, as well as in France, as de Gaulle's alter ego in all things pertaining to French relations with Africa. 2 During the de Gaulle and Pompidou presidencies, Jacques Foccart b e c a m e the e m b o d i m e n t of a special p e r s o n a l i z e d style of F r a n c o p h o n e relationship. He was at the elbow of his own president and in constant touch with African presidents and their important ministers. To demonstrate the degree of his influence, Foccart and his staff p r e p a r e d all presidential decision papers on issues involving Francophone black Africa and c o o r d i n a t e d all p r e s i d e n t i a l briefings. H e controlled visits to France by African dignitaries and to Africa by F r e n c h p r e s i d e n t s . F o c c a r t ' s b u r e a u c r a t i c p r e d o m i n a n c e in all things African was most clearly manifested at the Thursdav afternoon interagency conferences held to coordinate French activities in Francophone Africa. The meetings took place in Foccart's commodious t~lys6e offices with the diminutive secretary general seated firmly in the chair. 3 They were routinely attended by representatives from the ministries

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France in Black Africa most involved in relations with Africa, such as Cooperation, Defense, Treasury, and Foreign Affairs. Representatives from other agencies were invited w h e n subjects within their fields of special interest were to be discussed. It was commonly understood that discussion ended w h e n Foccart proclaimed, "the President told me" he wanted a certain thing done. Other participants at the m e e t i n g s were painfully aware that the secretary general met daily with General de Gaulle and regularly with Pompidou to review African questions. Because no other participant or his minister had the same access, only the most intrepid or foolish bureaucrat dared question Foccart's authority to speak ex cathedra for de Gaulle or Pompidou. Foccart's own version of his role in the decisionmaking process is more modest. In a conversation in Paris in 1988, he e x p l a i n e d to the a u t h o r t h a t he brought the "General's wishes" to his meetings. They were then "freely discussed"; differences could be expressed and alternatives p r o p o s e d . W h e n a plan for dealing with the problem was finally agreed on, Foccart would then take it back to the General for approval. The process described by Foccart seems more collegial than was generally a s s u m e d to be the case u n d e r de Gaulle's imperial presidency. In cases of d i s a g r e e m e n t , one can a s s u m e that only one or possibly two votes counted, the General's and Foccart's. Indeed there are those who insist that Foccart himself made or guided virtually all the major decisions affecting Africa during both de Gaulle's and Pompidou's presidencies. Neither president, according to these well-informed observers, was especially interested in Africa. As Pierre Biarnes pointed out in his

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One Man's Family masterful exposition of 350 years of French presence south of the Sahara, General de Gaulle "devoted the bulk of his time to relations with the traditional great powers in Europe, America, and Asia, as well as to the modernization of the industrial base and the French military."4 The fact that the General visited sub-Saharan Africa only once after 1959 can be taken to confirm that he was less than consumed with interest in Africa. To an even greater extent, the same lack of interest has been ascribed to President Pompidou. Nonetheless, whatever the precise formal decisionmaking arrangements, anyone with bureaucratic experience will understand that the person who presents problems, possible courses of action, and suggested solutions to the boss wields tremendous power. When he monopolizes the chief's ear, it is often he who actually molds decisions that his boss may ratify. (The only near parallel in recent American history to Foccart's dominance over African affairs in the French government was the power wielded by Henry Kissinger and his National Security Council staff in the Nixon White House.) Foccart holds an indisputably unique place in the history of the postindependence evolution of FrancoAfrican relations. With the possible exception of President de Gaulle himself, no other Frenchman has made a greater imprint on France's relations with her former African dependencies. Despite his cultivated anonymity, Foccart's reputation has become legend. Some knowledge of the man and of his accomplishments, therefore, should be instructive in helping to understand the extraordinary relationship that France cont i n u e s to e n j o y w i t h h e r f o r m e r black A f r i c a n dependencies.

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France in Black Africa

The Foccart Phenomenon Of relatively modest middle-class origins, Foccart was born on 13 August 1913 at Ambri6res-le-Grand in Normandy. His father's family had long been farmers and merchants in Guadeloupe. Foccart found it natural to enter the import-export trade at the age of 22. Peaceful pursuits for him--as for other young Frenchmen of his a g e - - w e r e interrupted by war with Germany in 1939. After the armistice of 1940, Foccart joined the Resistance. Using the pseudonym Binot, Foccart rose rapidly to assume a post in charge of a sector in Normandy shortly before the Allied landings in 1944. With France liberated, Foccart was integrated into the French Army and began training for missions behind enemy lines in Germany. Shortly before the war's end, he parachuted into Germany, landing with his team behind German lines near the Baltic coast. The war ended with Foccart a lieutenant colonel in command of one of the units that made early contact with the advancing Russians. Following his demobilization and reestablishment in the import-export business, Foccart began a long political career. In October 1945, his deep attachment to General de Gaulle, coupled with a good war record, assured Foccart a place on an electoral list for the constituent assembly headed by the Gaullist and prominent Resistance leader, Jacques Soustelle. In 1947 de Gaulle asked Foccart to help him organize what later became the GauUist party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Franqais (RPF). 5 From that point on, Foccart became a leading figure in the internal direction and organization of

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One Man's Family Gaullist politics in France. At the same time, Foccart began his lifelong preoccupation with Africa. In recognition of his superior organizing skills and his unswerving loyalty to de Gaulle, Foccart was chosen treasurer general of the RPF in 1953 and national party secretary general in 1954. When de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, Foccart was at his side. Early in 1960, Foccart was named secretary general of the French community. Two years later, Foccart's title was altered to "secretary general in the presidency of the Republic for the community and for African and Malgasy affairs." Foccart retained this latter title, and his special position in the l~lys6e, throughout the presidencies of de GauUe and Pompidou. He was also given the immensely powerful task of overseeing the French secret services for the president. Foccart's only break in Elys6e service occurred when he was dismissed briefly in 1969 by Alain Poher, president of the Senate, who assumed the presidency of the Republic for the interim between the resignation of de Gaulle and the election of Pompidou. Poher's reason for dismissing Foccart appeared at the time to be a mixture of principle and political expediency. Like many others, he both feared and condemned Foccart as the principal organizer of a network of shadowy, semiofficial groups first organized during the Algerian war to fight the clandestine battles against the Organisation de l'Arm6e Secr6te (OAS). During their deadly back-alley combat against the OAS, his stalwarts earned the colorful sobriquet of barbouzes (the false beards). The barbouzes did not disappear after the war in Algeria ended; instead, many continued to find employment as the muscle supporting the RPF in domestic

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France in Black Africa political rough and tumble. To formalize their status, the group assumed the rather high-sounding name of Service d'Action Civique (SAC). With Foccart's support, SAC e x p a n d e d its activities to Africa, w h e r e a n u m b e r of SAC militants provided an unofficial covert action reserve. The leader of SAC himself, Pierre Debizet, became an "adviser" to President Bongo of Gabon. A gangland killing in southern France later gave this appointment u n w a n t e d public attention; it was alleged that members of SAC were involved in the sordid affair. The new Socialist government in 1981 seized on the incident to launch a public investigation of SAC, which finally resulted in its official suppression. Whereas the barbouzes supplied some of the more colorful, and later embarrassing, elements in Foccart's stable, his early connections in the import-export business provided him another ready source of informants with g o o d local cover s p r e a d t h r o u g h o u t Africa. 6 Thanks to this network of unofficial contacts--amusingly referred to as Honorable Correspondents little went on in the ports and airports of Africa that Foccart was not quickly made aware of. 7 Foccart's network was further extended into the regular French police, military, and intelligence establishments. These last contacts w e r e f a c i l i t a t e d by F o c c a r t ' s old R e s i s t a n c e connections and by his status as a reserve lieutenant colonel a s s i g n e d for t r a i n i n g a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n to SDECE, the French equivalent of the US Central Intelligence Agencly: Finally, Foccart's position in the I~lys6e, w i t h special r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for o v e r s e e i n g the various b r a n c h e s of French intelligence and police, gave him a u t h o r i t y to task official services and provided free access to their information. The fact that

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One Man's Family Colonel Maurice Robert, one of Foccart's closest associates, headed SDECE's African operations from 1959 to 1973 assured Foccart of that powerful agency's closest cooperation in Africa. Indeed it was often said during the Foccart p e r i o d t h a t o n e c o u l d n o t clearly distinguish between the activities of the official services and those of quasi-official organs like SAC. Significantly, Foccart's personal n e t w o r k of inf o r m a n t s a n d c o - c o n s p i r a t o r s w a s not l i m i t e d to Frenchmen. From the end of World War II until independence was granted in 1960, a regular flow of visitors came to Paris from Africa as members of a plethora of legislative bodies, governmental advisory boards, and study missions. Foccart made it his business to get to k n o w m a n y of t h e s e o f t e n l o n e l y a n d ill-at-ease strangers. T h r o u g h his Gaullist connections he was able to do favors or simply to make lonely Africans feel more welcome in the cold, impersonal Parisian world. Later, w h e n s o m e of t h e s e m e n b e c a m e influential leaders in their own countries, Foccart's many gestures of friendship paid off h a n d s o m e l y in assuring him a wide and appreciative circle of African friends. Once installed in his l~lys6e office, Foccart was even better placed to broaden and reinforce his circle of friends and clients. No doubt Foccart made full use of the power and prestige that went with his post at the epicenter of French government. W h e n accused of having large sums of m o n e y in special accounts at his disposal for use in "black bag" operations, Foccart calmly acknowledged that such monies did exist but quickly denied that he controlled them. Instead he modestly confided that the General's chef de cabinet (administra-

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France in Black Africa tive assistant) m a n a g e d all s u c h accounts. Disbursement, he insisted, was m a d e only with the General's p e r s o n a l p e r m i s s i o n . To the a m u s e m e n t of m a n y de Gaulle watchers, Foccart's description of the disbursem e n t of black bag funds for clandestine operations conjured u p a marvelous image of Papa Charles, the severe traditional father figure, writing a note to his chef de cabinet a u t h o r i z i n g a c e r t a i n s u m to be g i v e n to little Jacques: "PriOre de remettre ~ M. Jacques Foccart la somme d e . . " like an allowance to a n e r v o u s schoolboy. 8 Foccart was, of course, a kingmaker. He played a major role, for instance, in gaining the Gabonese presidency for a y o u n g chef& cabinet n a m e d Albert-Bernard Bongo w h o h a d earlier b e e n d i s c o v e r e d by Foccart's friend Maurice Robert. The process was well described in the m e m o i r s of Maurice Delaunay, w h o was French ambassador to Gabon at the time and one of Foccart's helpers in the efforts that led the dying President L6on M'Ba to designate Bongo his successor and transfer exe c u t i v e p o w e r to B o n g o as his n e w l y e l e c t e d vice president. 9

Foccart's Ups and D o w n s W h e n de Gaulle s u d d e n l y left the p r e s i d e n c y in 1969, Alain Poher, as i n t e r i m p r e s i d e n t , p r o m p t l y sacked Foccart. The secretary general's African friends were deeply disturbed. As a mark of their concern, 10 African chiefs of state are said to have pressed incoming President P o m p i d o u to restore Foccart to his post in the t~lys6e.~° This u n u s u a l gesture m u s t have b e e n unp r e c e d e n t e d in relations b e t w e e n i n d e p e n d e n t states.

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One Man's Family W h e t h e r it was decisive in restoring Foccart to his place of s u p r e m e influence over French-African policy is not clear. P o m p i d o u may or may not have liked having this daily r e m i n d e r of his illustrious predecessor so close at hand. Nonetheless, Foccart was too well e n t r e n c h e d in the Gaullist party a n d in Africa to be lightly d i s m i s s e d by a n e w Gaullist president. In any case, P o m p i d o u is said to have h a d even less interest t h a n de Gaulle in the day-to-day details of French relations with Africa. He therefore left Africa to Foccart, intervening only w h e n major problems or decisions arose. Foccart v e h e m e n t l y denies the existence of a "Foccart intelligence n e t w o r k " (rdseau). He does, however, admit to having had a wide circle of friends w h o h e l p e d h i m in Africa. But the celebrated network of spies, assassins, and mercenaries simply never existed, he insists. It w a s t h e " c r e a t i o n of overactive j o u r n a l i s t i c imaginations." Inaccurate press reports were widely q u o t e d in books and in other n e w s p a p e r s . A m y t h then took on a life of its own. If there h a d been a "Foccart n e t w o r k , " s u r e l y t h e r e w o u l d have b e e n at least o n e defector from the g r o u p in 30 years. The fact that there never has b e e n a defector "proves that a network never existed," Foccart carefully reasons. Strictly speaking, Foccart is correct. He never has had a formal intelligence organization of his own. Instead he h a d a loose web of well-placed friends and associates w h o m he could task or call u p o n to provide i n f o r m a t i o n or m u s c l e as t h e situation r e q u i r e d . The fact that this was not a tightly organized formal organization in no way detracted from its effectiveness. In fact its m o r e n e b u l o u s nature m a d e it all the more dangerous and difficult to identify and attack.

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Cohabitation Like the proverbial cat with nine lives, Foccart again reappeared at center stage with the formation of a new Gaullist government in 1986 under Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. N a m e d an adviser to the prime minister on African affairs, Foccart was again in a position of influence--albeit d i m i n i s h e d - - w i t h i n top FrenchAfrican policymaking circles in Paris. The presidential monopoly of power over African affairs had been broken, for the time at least, as Socialist president and Gaullist p r i m e m i n i s t e r " c o h a b i t e d " in an u n e a s y power-sharing relationship. Inevitably, competit!on for power and a u t h o r i t y developed between the Elys~e and a politically ambitious prime minister who viewed himself as a strong candidate to replace his president. In this uneasy situation, Foccart's position at one of the centers of decision was no more than that of one of the important players who jointly determined French-African policy. Foccart himself a d m i t t e d to the author that he no longer involved himself in the day-to-day m a n a g e m e n t of Franco-African relations. Occasionally he organized an ad hoc interministerial meeting to sort out a troublesome problem. Unfortunately no one held regular coordination and control meetings during the period of cohabitation as he once did, Foccart admitted. As a result, a degree of immobilism and some inc o h e r e n c e c r e p t into the c o n d u c t of relations with Africa from 1986 to 1988. For the most part, Foccart busied h i m s e l f w i t h special m i s s i o n s , visiting old friends like H o u p h o u e t and Bongo on Chirac's behalf. It is not surprising that, with Foccart's return to a position of influence, some of his less savory friends

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One Man's Family again surfaced in Africa. In an article on Guinea, Le Monde noted the presence in Guinea of Foccart's friend, the former head of SAC, Pierre Debizet. 11The article commented in uncomplimentary terms on the "Gabonese-like" atmosphere that the presence of such French personalities encouraged in Conakry. At the same time, stories of "special envoys" again appearing in Libreville and a rejuvenation of the Clan des Gabonais (Gabonese Gang) were heard again. 12 Whatever the future may hold for this septuagenarian, Jacques Foccart's reputation is legendary. It may have led both his foes and his friends to exaggerate the man's power and the malevolence of his actions. There is little doubt that Foccart wielded great power during General de Gaulle's presidency, albeit in the General's name. His position remained more or less intact during the Pompidou era. Only the arrival of a non-Gaullist in the presidency, who may have feared and resented the independence of Foccart's base of power, finally dislodged the secretary general. Almost certainly he will never again exercise such power. His physical appearance has always belied his reputation; Pierre Biarnes described him as resembling a small-town lawyer. Well into his golden years, Foccart is now a short, balding grandfatherly figure with a large, round head and owl-like features exaggerated by thick glasses. Very serious in unfamiliar company, Foccart now appears to lack the energy that he must have had in his earlier years. But his thoughts remain clear and his speech well articulated. The fact that Chirac gave him a prominent place in his official entourage is proof of the man's residual mystique and of his power

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France in Black Africa as one of the remaining Gaullist superbarons. The reelection of Mitterrand and Chirac's loss of the prime ministry in June 1988, however, almost certainly ended Foccart's days of power and glory.

Foccart's Successors The disappearance of Foccart from the Elys6e in 1974 s i g n a l e d no c h a n g e in the p r e e m i n e n c e of the presidency in relations with Francophone black Africa. On the contrary, Giscard hastened to appoint Foccart's former assistant, Rend Journiac, as his own counsellor for African affairs. 13 W h e n Journiac was killed suddenly in an aircraft accident, he was replaced by his own deput~; Martin Kirsch. As a former finance minister, Giscard put much emphasis on modernizing the French e c o n o m y and in further b r o a d e n i n g France's foreign economic relationships. Nonetheless, traditional friends in Africa were not neglected, nor was Africa e v e r far f r o m the p r e s i d e n t ' s p e r s o n a l view. Surprisingly, Giscard the modernist took a much more personal interest in the conduct of relations with Africa than his two predecessors and was far quicker to intervene militarily. Unfortunately for Giscard, some of his personal relations in Africa were to contribute to his defeat in the presidential election in 1981. His special friendship with the idiosyncratic Central African emperor, Jean Bokassa, and his subsequent role in removing Bokassa from power, were especially d a m a g i n g politically.

The Socialists S o w Seeds of Doubt The election of a Socialist government in France on 10 May 1981 was a truly dramatic event, bringing both

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One Man's Family joy and chagrin to Franco-African relations. On the one hand, many of those Africans in political opposition, especially among the young educated elite, looked to the new French government to use its power in Africa to encourage political liberalization and to hasten the retirement of an older political generation perceived as hopelessly corrupt and given to toadyism. On the other hand, the entrenched power elites who had long dominated the countries of Francophone Africa were fearful. Since preindependence days, many had enjoyed close relations with France and with a variety of French senior political figures. More often than not, their French friends were conservatives, many with business interests in Africa. Seen through a conservative African political prism, the French left appeared a dangerous bogeyman. Socialist spokesmen often reinforced these fears by describing African leaders like Houphouet, Bongo, and Ahijo as corrupt and repressive. As a result, in African centers like Abidjan, Libreville, Dakar, Lom6, Niamey, and Yaound4, it was commonly assumed that, once in power, the Socialists would try to carry out the preelection threats so frequently expressed by party spokesmen. As might be expected, these fears were often encouraged by French conservatives. Unfortunately some of the initial signs from the newly victorious men of the left in France reinforced African apprehensions that Socialists, once in power, intended to support radical political change and to reduce French aid to traditional recipients in Francop h o n e Africa. I n d e e d , from w i t h i n the new government itself, the minister-delegate of cooperation, Jean-Pierre Cot, proclaimed opposition to the old

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France in Black Africa p e r s o n a l i z e d r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h a few traditional friends in Africa. D e c o d e d , this kind of loose talk meant only one thing to Africans of all philosophic persuasions: Cot i n t e n d e d to end the close relations his predecessors had long enjoyed with "African cousins" in various Francophone capitals. Even more threatening, Cot a n n o u n c e d that French aid would no longer be focused almost exclusively on Francophone Africa. In the future, he proclaimed, France would broaden relationships throughout the Third World. This was interp r e t e d - - a n d must have been intended by Cot to be so interpreted--as meaning that the inner core of traditional French friends in Africa would no longer have a special call on the F r e n c h treasury. France w o u l d widen her circle of aid recipients beyond the cozy former colonial family. Such a broadening of the numbers of recipients, of course, suggested to the nervous Africans that the size of their pieces of the finite aid pie would be reduced. From the o u t s e t , h o w e v e r , t h e r e was discord a m o n g the n e w g o v e r n m e n t ' s Africanists. If one listened carefully, the Socialists did not speak with one voice. Cot was, to be sure, a clear advocate of support for brave new Third Worlds and for a depersonalization of the old African privileged relationships. To emphasize his detachment, Cot insisted on using the formal second person plural form of address w h e n in Africa. Francois Mitterrand, on the other hand, was an old friend of many of the African political patriarchs; he add r e s s e d both H o u p h o u e t a n d S e n g h o r (former coll e a g u e s and c o c o n s p i r a t o r s in the h a p p y g a m e s of political musical chairs during the Fourth Republic) using the m o r e familiar second p e r s o n singular. 14This

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One Man's Family linguistic distinction may seem of slight importance to non-French speakers, but it carried enormous symbolic significance to Africans used to being treated as members of the family. Quick to sense opportunity, well-connected African leaders soon b e g a n to bypass Cot with their requests for assistance. Instead they sent them through the Elys6e's back door to the president's affable adviser on African affairs, Guy Penne. At the same time they made it clear that France, too, enjoyed substantial ad z vantages from her privileged Francophone African connections. These advantages, they pointed out, depended on reciprocity. France could not expect to gain advantages from her trade and investments in their countries w i t h o u t according significant privileges to her African partners. Concurrently, at home in France, the new Socialist government was learning some hard economic lessons. Recession hit the French economy especially hard in 1981, following a short, unwise attempt by the French to reinflate their economy while their principal EEC partners were following countervailing constrictive m o n e t a r y a n d fiscal policies. M i t t e r r a n d and other more seasoned heads in his government soon realized the lack of wisdom in pursuing will-o'-the-wisp Third World influence at the risk of losing solid privileged economic relationships in Francophone Africa. In short order, French realism overcame Socialist flirtation with h i g h - s o u n d i n g ideals. The most visible victim in the shift was Cot, who was offered a comfortable sidetrack as ambassador in Madrid. With admirable dignity he refused the offer, preferring to return to his professorship at the Law Faculty of the University of Paris. With

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Francein BlackAfrica his departure, the team of progressive young people he had assembled at Cooperation was soon dispersed or silenced. Cot was replaced at Cooperation by Christian Nucci, a reassuringly close and obedient presidential political ally. When appointed, Nucci had the added virtue of knowing little about sub-Saharan Africa. From the outset he gave every appearance of understanding that the president would make all major decisions i n v o l v i n g Africa a n d that P e n n e and the president's son, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, would carry out the policy-level contacts with African chiefs of state.

Plus ¢a change, plus c'est la m~me chose Many were surprised in 1981 when the incoming president, Francois Mitterrand, named Guy Penne as his personal counsellor for African affairs. Critics of the appointment complained that Penne had no previous experience of Africa. Many assumed that the appointment signaled a diminishing of direct presidential interest in African relations. As time has proven, Mitterrand had no such intentions. Moreover, Penne did bring certain assets to his new job. First, he was trusted by the president as a long-time political associate and old friend. The clincher, however, may have been Penne's strong connections to French freemasonry. Upon taking office, Mitterrand must have seen that most existing Franco-African institutions remained tainted by Gaullist influence. In casting about for alternatives, the president may have perceived that the Freemasons constituted one of the rare groups to have

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One Man's Family escaped Foccart's and his friends' attention. (Presumably, Masonic anticlerical views were not compatible with the Catholic views of de Gaulle and Foccart.) Discreet Masonic presence was widespread in Africa and its influence substantial in certain key Francophone countries. (In Gabon, for instance, President Bongo is himself grand master of the Grand Lodge of Gabon.) Freemasonry, therefore, may have appeared attractive to the n e w French president as a vehicle to facilitate the establishment of his o w n informal network in Africa. Judged from this standpoint, Penne was not such an illogical choice as the Elys6e African point man. 15To second Penne, the president n a m e d his o w n son, JeanChristophe Mitterrand, w h o - - u n l i k e his c h i e f - - h a d some first-hand knowledge of Africa. Jean-Christophe had served as a journalist based in Togo for Agence France Presse, where he had established friendly relations w i t h P r e s i d e n t E y a d e m a . S o m e W e s t e r n eyebrows were raised by the a p p o i n t m e n t , but in Africa the fact of having the president's son as messenger was much appreciated. Whatever the n e w I~lys6e African team lacked in substantive experience, they made up for in that vital bureaucratic quality of access to the president. In any case, Mitterrand probably felt no need for expert Africanist advice. He was himself no novice to African affairs. In Fourth Republic swinging-door governments he had been minister for overseas France. Moreover, the president's own personal relations went back a long way with m a n y African leaders like H o u p h o u e t and Senghor. Indeed he is often credited with being one of the catalysts in the s u d d e n b r e a k u p in 1951 of Houp h o u e t ' s m a r r i a g e of c o n v e n i e n c e w i t h the F r e n c h

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France in Black Africa C o m m u n i s t Party. Following his political divorce, Houphouet quickly shifted allegiance to Mitterrand's o w n U n i o n D 6 m o c r a t i q u e et Socialiste de la R6sistance (UDSR) in the French National Assembly. It was from this political base that H o u p h o u e t was offered his first portfolio in the government of Guy MoUet. Houphouet was then able to exercise great influence on events in Africa and in Paris w h e n he helped another of Mitterrand's long-time political allies, Gaston Defferre, draft the Ioi-cadre in 1956. Under the circumstances, it was natural that President Mitterrand s h o u l d take a personal h a n d in the conduct of relations with Africa. Some of his initiatives, however, have inevitably caused chagrin in Socialist ranks. Party critics had long c o n d e m n e d w h a t they described as the personalization and manipulation of Franco-African relations as practiced under the two Gaullist presidents and by Giscard; to see their own Socialist president revert to similar practices was especially galling.16 Nonetheless, Mitterrand's decision to come out of the closet and exercise direct personal power was impossible to block after the disarray in Franco-African relations that occurred d u r i n g the brief tenure of Cot and his idealistic friends in Cooperation. (Given M i t t e r r a n d ' s p e n c h a n t for Florentine subterfuge, it is even possible that he foresaw this outc o m e w h e n h e o r i g i n a l l y a c c e d e d to t h e C o t appointment.) From mid-1982 until the formation of the Chirac government in 1986, the president dominated the conduct of Franco-African relations. Mitterrand made major decisions himself, after consulting with what has b e e n d e s c r i b e d as a r e s t r i c t e d g r o u p of long-time

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President Francois Mitterrand with S#kou Tour# and Bongo to his right, ?¢lobutu to his left during the Franco-African summit at ~vian in 1983. friends and trusted advisers. For delicate missions in A ~ c a , Francois de Grosouvre and Roland Dumas were most frequently used. El ys6e w h i z k i d Jacques Attali and the former chief of the presidential military staff, General Jean Saulnier, also were members of the small group used by the president to deal with African questions. ~7Penne, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, R6gis Debray (former journalist and Ch@ Guevara admirer), and H u b e r t Vedrine of the Elys@e staff are others said to have influenced decisions on African questions. TM Critics of M i t t e r r a n d ' s conduct of relations with Africa claim t h a t it lacks c o h e r e n c e a n d s y s t e m a t i c

2,05

France in Black Africa analysis. Since the departure of Cot from the Ministry of Cooperation, they assert, no attempt was made to integrate French policy within a broader conceptual framework. Despite President Mitterrand's long background in African affairs, or perhaps because of it, his African perceptions and contacts are dated and unresponsive to the views of younger Africans. 19There may be some justification for these accusations, but the fact remains that Mitterrand was able to repair much of the damage done to traditional relationships during the first year of Socialist government. Nevertheless, the deeper shock delivered to comfortable relationships by the Socialists' assumption of power has persisted. The initial restoration of calm in relations was short-lived. Stress and serious doubts again arose in French relations with her closest African allies over evident French reluctance to intervene in Chad in 1982. A second shock to African confidence came with the apparent French bungling of the Chadian crisis in 1983-84. Bewilderment replaced doubt in many African minds. First, the French were reluctant to commit troops in the face of a clear Libyan threat to Chadian sovereignty. Later they committed troops, but only after being pressed and cajoled by their most valued African friends. In an about-face in 1984, the French then withdrew their forces despite verified Libyan duplicity. Subsequent Chadian victories with French support have blurred the earlier vision of a reluctant, bungling France. Nonetheless, doubt had been cast on the French image as a reliable, capable ally. Tightly organized presidential control of FrancoAfrican policymaking and of the conduct of relations

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One Man's Family was interrupted in 1986 with the election of a centerright majority to the National Assembly. The president was then forced to take the views of neo-Gaullist Prime Minister Jacques Chirac into account, as he never did those of his earlier Socialist premiers. In these changed circumstances, Mitterrand was not able to d o m i n a t e the various bureaucracies dealing with Africa as he and his predecessors h a d in the past. Nevertheless both Mitterrand and Chirac a t t e m p t e d to avoid o p e n dispute on African matters. Neither saw sufficient political a d v a n t a g e to w a r r a n t t h e risks in c h a l l e n g i n g bipartisanship in this delicate area of French relations. Chad might have p r o v i d e d scope for such disagreement. In fact, no major disagreement broke the surface. Some observers claim that Chirac was quicker to reinsert troops in Chad than the more cautious Mitterrand. Most knowledgeable French--including Foccart-a c k n o w l e d g e that cohabitation led to a degree of immobility in the conduct of relations with Africa. Nonetheless all confirmed that close French relations with their former African d e p e n d e n c i e s continue to enjoy substantial support in France, reaching across partisan political lines. O p e n opposition came only from groups at the fringes of French politics, that is, the C o m m u nists and the ultra-right. More worrisome for the longer term, however, is w h a t Professor Henri B r u n s c h w i g described to the author as "the historic French disinterest" in all things foreign. 2° (C. R. A g e r o n confirmed French disinterest in colonial questions at a conference on decolonization in 1984. 21) Other concerned French officials and academics confirm what they describe as a

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France in BlackAfrica decline in French interest in Africa, especially as a younger, more Eurocentric generation rises to positions of power. Descending From Olympus

Ministry of Cooperation. The special relationship that exists between France and her former African dependencies was given bureaucratic recognition by the establ i s h m e n t of an a d m i n i s t r a t i o n d e v o t e d almost exclusively to the management of French aid under the cooperation accords. Established in 1961 as a full ministry, Cooperation took over many of the nonpolitical responsibilities previously exercised by the Ministry of Overseas France. Unlike its counterparts in most other Western donor countries, Cooperation is responsible for both military and civilian aid. With a mandate limited almost exclusively to Francophone Africa, Cooperation has been seen by its African clients as "their" ministry. This African vocation has remained surprisingly intact despite occasional efforts to expand its responsibilities to other areas in the Third World. Like many other overseas assistance organizations, Cooperation has been the target of frequent gove r n m e n t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s . Over the years it has bounced back and forth several times between full ministerial status and the nominal tutelage of the minister of foreign affairs. Its most pronounced shift was in 1982, when an attempt was made by the Socialist government to integrate Cooperation with Foreign Affairs. The admirable but unrealized purpose of this integration, according to its author, former Minister-Delegate for Cooperation and DevelopmentJean-Pierre Cot, was

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One Man's Family to broaden the recipients of French aid to include countries throughout the Third World, to focus more clearly on economics and development, and to tie foreign assistance to more coherent foreign policy objectives. For the first time, the future of Cooperation as an integral organization seemed threatened. Cot's plan was to meld together Cooperation personnel and structure with those of Foreign Affairs. He asserted in a book written after he had been eased out of his ministry that he and Foreign Minister Claude Cheyson had intended to "irreversibly a n c h o r the two a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s together. ,,22 This fanciful ambition was never realized. The "irreversible" bindings between the two ministries were quickly loosened after Cot's departure. The union's final coup de grace was given by the incoming Chirac government in 1986 with the reestablishment of an ind e p e n d e n t m i n i s t r y u n d e r the firm control of the strong, independent-minded Gaullist, Michel Aurillac. 23To reinforce the strength and bureaucratic clout of the ministry, Aurillac included people like Foccart's old friend, Maurice Robert, in his immediate entourage. Under Aurillac, the ministry resumed its role as the principal element of the French government dealing with day-to-day relations with Francophone Africa. The new minister was not to be relegated to a subordinate role. On the contrary, policy was refocused along lines dictated by Aurillac. The minister's prescription for a Gaullist African policy was set out by Michel Guillou in Une politique Africaine pour la France, written under Aurillac's guidance and published in 1986 by the Gaullist "Club 89," of which Maurice Robert remains

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France in Black Africa secretary general. 24 This new policy guide confirmed that Francophone Africa was again to become the principal beneficiary of French assistance with the core countries of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Cameroon, and Togo receiving the lion's share of attention. 2s Bowing to economic stringency in France, the Gaullist team at Cooperation sought alternative sources of development financing. Private investment was encouraged. International organizations, such as the World Bank and the IME were asked to lend their assistance in confronting the severe economic crisis that was devastating Africa. This more open attitude has continued under the g o v e r n m e n t of the m o d e r a t e left a p p o i n t e d after the June 1988 elections and headed by Michel Rocard. The French have s h o w n a growing willingness to cooperate with other Western bilateral sources of economic assistance, including the United States. French budgetary restraints, coupled with the daunting dimensions of the e c o n o m i c problems facing even the erstwhile prosperous countries like the Ivory Coast and Cameroon, have forced the French to take this m o r e o p e n and cooperative stance. In an evident effort to reassure African moderates, Senator Jacques Pelletier (a non-Socialist, a long-time m e m b e r of the center in French politics, and an associate of Raymond Barre) was n a m e d minister for cooperation. Pelletier's relations with President Mitterrand go back many years. Predictably, he has shown no inclination to challenge the president's dominance in African affairs. The Prime Ministmd. The prime minister traditionally played a minor role in the conduct of French external relations under the Fifth Republic's strong presidential

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One Man's Family Constitution. 26This role changed in 1986 with the selection of a premier, not of the same political party as the president, who had his own presidential ambitions. N o n e t h e l e s s n eith er the Elys~e nor the Matignon sought confrontation in the area of relations with Francophone Africa. Instead, throughout the period of cohabitation there was quiet cooperation over delicate issues like the French role in the fighting in Chad. Breaking with past practice, the prime minister participated in Franco-African summit meetings. Shared responsibility could not be avoided. Under the Constitution, the president had to be consulted on major policy decisions. But day-to-day responsibilities for running relations with Africa were dealt with by the prime minister and his cabinet colleagues. Only the president, as commander in chief, could commit troops to an operation in Africa. The support of these troops, however, came from b u d g etary resources under the cabinet's control. Thus the two political opponents were forced to cooperate or risk a mutually embarrassing breakdown in the conduct of French relations in Africa. Chirac's early appointment of Jacques Foccart as his African adviser was a strong public indication that the prime minister intended to play an active role in an area previously reserved to presidential initiative. To underline his intentions, Chirac paid a highly visible visit to Abidjan and Dakar within a month of assuming the prime ministry in 1986. He continued to play a conspicuously active role in the conduct of relations with Africa throughout his 2 years in office.

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Francein BlackAfrica Presidential predominance returned with the loss of power of the center-right coalition and the appointment of a center-left government under the prime ministership of moderate Socialist Michel Rocard.

The Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Finance, especially in times of economic difficulty, plays a major role in Franco-African relations. Its voice is especially weighty in determining levels of economic aid and in controlling the vital monetary arrangements that provide French backing for the CFA. Ministry officials monitor the delicately balanced franc zone system and are strategically placed within the structure of the two monetary unions and banks of issuance in West and Central Africa. In short, their role is that of guardians of the French treasury, controlling unwanted calls on French reserves. Occasionally the treasury must impose discreet monetary discipline on prickly African chiefs of state without arousing open accusations of infringement of sovereignty. With the deepening economic crisis now facing sub-Saharan Africa, the French treasury has taken the lead role with the government and private bankers represented in the Clubs of Paris and London (see also p. 123) seeking ways to manage the heavy pressures of excessive debt service on weakened African economies. The treasury is understandably the most receptive element in the French government to the IMF and IBRD (or World Bank) efforts to impose economic reform as a condition for the continued receipt of financial assistance and debt relief. Treasury g n o m e s recognize France's incapacity to provide alone the financial crutch so desperately needed by many African clients.

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One Man's Family Indeed some African countries are now reaching the point where annual debt servicing exceeds total export receipts. In these strained circumstances, the treasury's voice in policy forums must grow in authority. No doubt the treasury had a large voice in forming the scheme announced by President Mitterrand on 6 June 1988 to cancel one-third of all French government and government-guaranteed loans to the poorest African countries. The president appealed to the other six developed countries meeting at an economic summit in Toronto 19-21 June 1988 to take similar action to reduce the crushing weight of debt servicing on the poorest countries. 27In typical French fashion, this gesture combined generosity with self-interest. The French are carrying m u c h of the weight of balance of payments deficits suffered by their poorer partners in the franc zone; thus a cancellation of unpayable debt costs little in real terms and gains much in political gratitude. Moreover, cancellation or easing of debt by other creditors automatically lightens the French treasury's burden of mounting African payments deficits.

Ministry of Defense. The Ministry of Defense has traditionally had a keen interest in Africa. It was military and naval officers who first acquired the bulk of France's African empire. Years after the formal demise of that empire, Africa still provides the French military with a role worthy of their world-class pretensions and an arena in which French warriors can practice their martial skills at no great cost to France. In strategic terms, the French military continue to view Africa as the exposed flank of their Mediterranean world. The c ont i nue d p r e s e n c e of French troops (12,000) with

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France in BlackAfrica bases in Africa constitutes tangible evidence of the force of their ongoing commitment. In financial terms, military assistance accounts for 15 percent of the total French aid budget. 28 Although the bulk of this direct aid comes through the Ministry of Cooperation, the Ministry of Defense supports substantial additional outlays for French bases and French troop units stationed in Africa. The Ministry of Defense budget also pays for the intervention forces stationed in France but ready for deployment in Africa. Change, however, may be coming in France's military involvement with Africa. As noted in a perceptive study of French military policy in Africa done for the prestigious Institute for Strategic Studies in London, the principal military challenge that confronts France in Africa over the next fifteen years is to manage effectively the transfer of responsibility for security to the Africans themselves. France's role as a force for stability in the region can best be played out by encouraging and helping to guarantee the development of regional security structures, while maintaining some capacity to aid those states which still desire support. 29 Such a daunting task should provide enough scope for the m o s t e n e r g e t i c a n d i m a g i n a t i v e of F r e n c h policymakers.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The historic role of the Quai d'Orsay in relations with Francophone Africa has been marginal. Jacques Foccart confirmed to the author that neither the prime minister nor the minister of foreign affairs "interfered" in relations with Africa during his tenure at the Elys6e. Since independence in 1960,

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One Man's Family relations with Francophone Africa have been treated as a private domain reserved to the president of the Republic. As noted, special organs in the Elys6e and in Cooperation were created to deal directly with these countries; indeed they have never been treated by the French as foreign countries. The Quai's role thus continues to be of only marginal influence on relations with Francophone Africa. Nonetheless the Quai does become involved peripherally in Francophone questions because of its lead role in French relations with the rest of Africa.

Other Agencies. Various technical ministries participate in discussions of issues or aspects of policy that pertain to their areas of special concern. Such ministries include Agriculture, Education, and Transportation. They do not, however, have a role in determining general policy and are usually consulted only on questions in their areas of competence. Overall Coordination. As one senior French official pointed out to the author, policy toward Francophone Africa has remained essentially unchanged for the past 30 years with only a short, tentative break w h e n Cot was at Cooperation. Mitterrand, however, quickly reversed these tentative changes to return to a traditional neo-Gaullist policy. Thus even under cohabitation, conflict was avoided, with only occasional "irritating differences of opinion." The most serious consequence of cohabitation, according to another well-informed official, was the blocking of some ambassadorial appointm e n t s . U n d e r th e C o n s t i t u t i o n the p r e s i d e n t is empowered to act on such nominations, but the prime minister must countersign the appointment.

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France in Black Africa With the departure of the Chirac government, cohabitation has e n d e d and presidential predominance has been reasserted over French relations with Francophone Africa. M o d e r a t e Socialist Prime Minister Michel Rocard and his cabinet colleagues have reverted to the traditional practice of deference to presidential direction on the conduct of relations with Africa. The choice of Jacques Pelletier (a non-Socialist with personal ties to the president) as minister of cooperation was no doubt made to reassure African leaders and to make presidential influence over the implementation of policy clear to all.

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SIX: Was It All Worth It?

De

Gaulle's ingenious scheme for satisfying African d e m a n d s for political independence while preserving the essence of French interests in black Africa has succeeded brilliantly. Until very recently, the French were able to balance benefits with cost to almost everyone's satisfaction. To the w o n d e r m e n t of most outsiders, Paris retained its place at the center of a web of interlinked relationships that still bind the rndtropole to most of its former African colonies. What brave soul would have predicted, in the superheated nationalist atmosphere prevailing in most African capitals in 1960, that the French population resident in Africa would actually grow, that French garrisons would continue to be quietly accepted by independent black African countries, or that France would continue to dominate the e c o n o m i c life of her former colonies decades after granting them formal independence? To best appreciate the success that French-style decolonization achieved, one has only to visit neighboring former Belgian, Portuguese, or even British colo n i e s . In m o s t , t r a n s i t i o n f r o m d e p e n d e n c e to independence was brutally abrupt. All too frequently, the result has b e e n years of dislocation and chronic instability. True, t h e F r e n c h have not a l t o g e t h e r avoided these problems. But the transition in most former French colonies has been cushioned by a continuing French p r e s e n c e . In the best of cases this has

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M~/M_AGNUM

~I~IOS

A Senegalese vend~ drives precious firewood to market through the dry African interior. w o r k e d to p r o v i d e stability, orderly a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , and a m e a s u r e of m o n e t a r y discipline.

Success in Relative Terms French success in Africa is not w i t h o u t blemish. Its most obvious achievements are concentrated in a few relatively affluent c o a s ~ l states w h e r e France has foc u s e d h e r efforts a n d resources. The p o o r Sahelian countries r e m a i n neglected and w i t h o u t m u c h hope, their p o p u l a t i o n s periodically suffering the effects of drought and barely able to feed themselves at the best of times. The n o m a d s of these desert and near-desert countries may be materially worse off n o w t h a n their precolonial g r a n d f a t h e r s were. Ironically, m o d e r n i z i n g

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initiatives taken by outsiders with the best of intentions have too often contributed to the devastation of fragile traditional societies. Modern medicine, improved cattle-breeding techniques, and more productive dryfarming methods have unwittingly played a part in overburdening a vulnerable physical environment. At the same time, the traditional social fabric has been weakened without being replaced by a viable alternafive, and the social order has too often been disrupted. Poverty and political instability have gone hand in glove in places like Chad, Mali, the Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso. To add to nature's woes, humans have contributed their own measure of folly and malevolence. The excesses of former Central African Emperor Jean Bokassa were unusual in their publicitygrabbing absurdity. But Bokassa has not been the only African leader to fall victim to the Lorelei of megalomania. In his case, many now believe French leadership should have quietly curbed his excesses, ttad he done so, President Giscard might have saved himself and Africa much pain and public embarrassment. He might also have avoided the need to intervene militarily with Operation Barracuda in 1979.

Divide and Dominate? The French have been accused of balkanizing Africa. Critics allege that the demise of their two colonial federations and the granting of independence to a bewildering number of small, weak states resulted from a French plot to divide and dominate. The lack, to the author's knowledge, of any convincing documentary evidence of conspiracy certainly does not rule out the

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France in Black Africa possibility that such thoughts may have crossed the minds of those who drafted the loi-cadre and the relevant sections of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic.1 (Indeed, Jacques Foccart confirms that the breakup of the federations was intentional.) Whatever the reasons, one must admit that the breakup of the federations has resulted in a number of weak, dependent states that can be easily manipulated by France To be fair, the result for Africa has not been all bad. Putting things in their most positive light, the ending of the federations did free resources for use by the more economically promising coastal states for their own development. The alternative might have been a disappearance of these resources into the Saharan sands to finance the chronic budget deficits of inviable desert economies. On the political side, the division into smaller, more manageable, more ethnically homogeneous units may have reduced political instability to some degree. The two federations were unwieldy, heterogeneous composites originally brought together for the administrative convenience of the colonial power. Without a firm colonial hand, squabbling and inexperienced politicians might well have found the federations ungovernable. The early demise of the Mali Federation gives some indication of the fate a larger federation might have suffered. Thus the breakup of the federations may have saved the former French dependencies from some of the problems that have plagued other large, multiethnic African neighbors like Nigeria, Zaire, and Ethiopia. The obverse side of the federal demise was the loss of budget subsidies that the poor Sahelian and tiny coastal states had come to depend on to offset endemic

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budget deficits. During colonial times, the federations redistributed revenues collected in the more affluent territories to the poorer territories. Large federations also permitted economies of scale in providing services that the smaller and poorer states would find difficult or impossibly expensive to provide for themselves. Finally, added strength in dealing with the French and other foreigners might have come from continued unity. But since independence, French and other foreign aid donors have attempted to provide these subsidies and services without depriving other more affluent countries (with greater developmental prospects) of the use of their own slender surpluses for development financing. Despite the breakup of the federations, some interterritorial institutions have survived. The most important are the two regional central banks. In the context of these common monetary institutions and arrangements, the poorer countries derive benefit from their continued association with their richer neighbors. Much more significant advantages come, of course, from their association with the French treasury. For most Africans, the down side of monetary union is the limitation on national sovereignty that is implicit in the existence of the regional banks' connections with the French treasury, and the French-imposed discipline inherent in these relationships. Over a quarter-century's experience suggests that the key resource-rich coastal states of Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Gabon have generally benefited most from what has amounted to French management of their economies and from a stabilizing French presence. Until very recently, they have been

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France in Black Africa generally more prosperous and more stable than their more independent neighbors. The poor Sahelian countries, on the other hand, have not been large beneficiaries of economic development. This failure is due more to a paucity of natural resources than to a lack of foreign generosity. Nonetheless, French presence, coupled with massive international assistance, has helped them to organize in the face of natural calamity. It has also subsidized certain minimal government services. On the security side, the French have helped to prevent Libyan domination of Chad, with its potential threat to other neighboring countries in West and Central Africa. Sadly, one must admit that the French have not been especially successful in helping provide political stability to these poor countries. The most telling argument supporting the choice of those Africans who opted to continue their association with France after achieving political independence in 1960 may be the shambles the potentially rich Guinean economy became under the twin burdens of 25 years of S6kou Tour6's brutal mismanagement and the imposition of inappropriate Marxist economic models. On the other hand, there are those who claim that France has h a r m e d some of her African friends by m e d d l i n g too much in their internal affairs and by propping up unpopular and tyrannical regimes.

Cracks Begin To Appear Only in very recent years have serious cracks begun to appear in the Francophone African facade. Falling commodity prices have combined with heavy debt

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Was It All Worth It? repayment obligations to cause major economic problems. The resulting cost to France of maintaining her privileged position has risen dramatically under these unfavorable circumstances. For the first time in postindependence history, all the economically important African m e m b e r s of the franc z o n e are n o w suffering serious balance-of-payments and b u d g e t a r y deficits and are consequently making heavy calls on the French treasury. Even s u c h p r o m i s i n g stars as G a b o n , the Ivory Coast, and Cameroon have been hard hit by the decline in c o m m o d i t y prices. 2 Domestic economic problems at home have comp o u n d e d the adverse effects of the African crisis for the French. 3 To f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e m a t t e r s , b o t h t h e s e crises come as the French are working to complete the restructuring of their own economy in anticipation of the free-for-all competition expected w h e n the last national trade barriers in Europe are lowered in 1992.

French Doubts Growing Desperation is certainly too strong a term to describe the French reaction to the current economic conjuncture and the dim prospects for early improvement in Africa. Deep concern is a more apt way of putting it. The costs to France, as the guarantor of African monetary stability and c u r r e n c y convertibility, are mounting. Doubts are growing in France about her ability and willingness to continue to meet the growing needs of an increasingly impoverished circle of dependent African states. A mark of the degree of French concern is the eagerness with which they have proposed burden sharing to other potential donors. Previously s h u n n e d

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France in Black Africa international institutions like IMF and the World Bank are now courted by the French with proposals that they lend their m o n e y and advice to Francophone African governments. These are the same African partners whose favors the French jealously guarded only 5 or 6 years ago. At that time, the concept of chasse gard~e (exclusivity) was still very much alive. Today, French officials deny (with a measure of credibility) the existence of a wish for any such exclusivity. The French efforts to find relief in e n c o u r a g i n g others to share the b u r d e n of aiding their Francophone African friends is not without precedent. Under their sponsorship, the F r a n c o p h o n e Africans some years ago were able to gain substantial assistance and trade preferences from the EEC. In the process the French lost few privileges while gaining the gratitude of their African friends. One assumes that the French would like to repeat this extraordinary sleight-of-hand performance. Circumstances, however, have now changed. French leverage with both multilateral and bilateral donors and creditors is not as strong now as it was in a younger EEC. The more realistic French officials a p p e a r to be aware of the relative w e a k n e s s of their position and are willing to pay the price in further sharing of influence and access to markets in their former chasse gard~e. France's a n n o u n c e d intention to cancel one-third of all official debt of the poorest African debtor nations seems a deft stroke. 4 Convincing others to m a k e similar c o n c e s s i o n s could again gain the French credit with their African friends while reducing the heavy toll imposed on franc zone reserves by debt servicing balance-of-payments deficits.

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Are the French Really Going To Quit? None of the foregoing should be interpreted as indicating that the French are now preparing to suddenly abandon their advantages and retreat from privilege in Africa. That step is not in Gallic character. In any case, they have for many years been quietly and gradually accommodating to inevitable changes in both France and Africa. Originally the cooperation system helped France adjust to the psychologically painful withdrawal from empire and entry into an increasingly integrated European open market system. Realism forced grudging recognition that French attempts at autarchy, dating from Colbert in the 17th century, were not compatible with membership in the EEC. The traditional French economy had to be restructured. Industries that could compete in open world markets had to be encouraged and the noncompetitive sacrificed. Nonetheless, only a fool would give up residual advantage until forced to do so. At the same time, France's psychopolitical need for a national image of world importance had to be satisfied. The French simply could not walk away from the strong sentimental ties that bound them to their former African empire. President Mitterrand demonstrated the strength of these traditional ties when he reversed the efforts by his own Socialist "Third Worlders" in 1981-82 to weaken ties with traditional friends in Francophone Africa.

Watershed? Despite the strength of old and valued ties, one must now ask w h e t h e r a w a t e r s h e d has not b e e n

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France in Black Africa reached in France's relations with her Francophone African friends. Clearly many of the French needs for a special relationship already have been satisfied. Restructuring of the French economy has reached an advanced stage. The old wounds to national pride have all but disappeared. Though still potent, sentimental ties are weakening as older generations in France and Africa begin to pass power to younger people who have not endured the pain or enjoyed the pleasures of close, prolonged association. In France, the population is becoming increasingly Eurocentric, with a corresponding decline in interest in Africa. In Africa, France has quietly diversified its interests outside the traditional Francophone circle. Nigeria, for instance, has become France's single most important trading partner and the site of significant French investment. Frenchmen are questioning whether the uncertain economic advantage and the dangerous potential for involvement in u n w a n t e d military operations are really worth the added prestige that African connections afford.

Europe's Middle Kingdom Surprisingly, the French, more than most other Europeans, seem to be looking forward to an increasingly open and integrated European common market. 5 For instance, public opinion polls taken in France in recent years indicate that more than 70 percent of French company executives regard the dropping of all national trade barriers s c h e d u l e d for 1992 as a " g o l d e n opportunity. ,,6 What does this mean for the future? Is this growing fascination with Europe only a passing fancy, or

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Was It All Worth It? will the French seek their special destiny in a u n i t e d Europe? As m a n y French see it, France occupies a central position in Western Europe, a bridge between the Latin and Germanic halves of the subcontinent, with one foot on the shores of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n and the other on the banks of the North Atlantic. Has the time come for France to revive Napoleonic dreams of leadership of a united Europe? Does what appears to be a w a n i n g A m e r i c a n interest and influence in Europe present France with both an o p p o r t u n i t y and a challenge? Are conditions now propitious for an exertion of F r e n c h l e a d e r s h i p in W e s t e r n Europe? G e r m a n y - France's traditional competitor for continental hegem o n y - i s still d i v i d e d and plagued with self-doubt. Britain--France's historic nemesis--is an island state with strong extra-European ties and interests. Would not a central role in a united Europe satisfy traditional French thirst for grandeur while providing markets of scale to a m o d e r n i z e d French industry? Mention of such a role for a so recently weakened and divided France may seem fanciful. But there is no d e n y i n g the q u a l i t y a n d a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of c u r r e n t French participation in E u r o p e a n institutions. Their d e m o n s t r a t e d willingness to participate again in the forward defense of Western Europe at the side of their NATO allies is equally incontestable. 7 It was, after all, the former French minister of finance, Edouard Balladur, w h o p r o p o s e d a E u r o p e a n central bank to his EEC partners in January 1988. s Ultimately, the ambitions of a younger, more technocratic generation may be more compatible with a united Europe than with a grouping of poor, d e p e n d e n t Third World ministates, despite historical ties.

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France in BlackAfrica At a m i n i m u m , one can say that French aloofness has c h a n g e d to e n t h u s i a s m for interaction w i t h their European cousins in an increasingly integrated Weste r n E u r o p e . Ironically, as F r e n c h i n t e r e s t in Africa wanes, her u n i q u e position at the center of a group of Third World countries could actually s u p p o r t her ambitions in Europe. France, of course, does not yet face an either-or decision; she does not yet have to make an absolute choice b e t w e e n Africa and E u r o p e and m a y never have to do so. Nonetheless, the gradual decline in her position in F r a n c o p h o n e Africa seems already to be u n d e r way. Rising costs and d i m i n i s h i n g interest are likely to accelerate m o v e m e n t in this direction.

Disengagement A s s u m i n g that the preceding conjecture is correct, h o w will France a c c o m m o d a t e declining French interest in A f r i c a c o n g r u e n t w i t h b u r g e o n i n g A f r i c a n n e e d s ? To b e g i n w i t h , o n e m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t withdrawal from the outer ring of p o o r Sahelian countries is already well advanced, and changes in attitude toward b u r d e n sharing have taken place even with regard to the core countries. French financial and technical assistance r e m a i n s vital to the desperately poor outer-ring countries. However, residual French interests in these areas are based m a i n l y on the slender reeds of sentiment, F r a n c o p h o n e solidarity, and these countries' u s e f u l n e s s as buffers to p r o t e c t m o r e substantial French interests in the key coastal states. The French are already aggressively seeking help for these poor countries w i t h o u t the ambivalence that their more tangible interests i m p o s e on t h e m in the core countries.

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French interests are increasingly concentrated in the inner core countries of the Ivory Coast, Gabon, and Cameroon. More recently, there is evidence of a decline of French interest and presence even in these core countries. The dramatic decline in the French population of the Ivory Coast, from an estimated high of more than 50,000 in the early 1980s to fewer than 30,000 in 1988, 9 may be attributed, at least in part, to a growing loss of French interest and confidence in the future. Certainly the prospects for the Ivory Coast do not now appear as bright as they once did. The c o u n t r y is e n c u m b e r e d with one of the world's highest debt-per-capita ratios. Moreover, it has only an inherently weak coffee-cocoatropical fruits economic base to support its economic burden. Even the casual visitors to Abidjan, once they recover from the dazzling brightness of its shining, m o d e r n architecture, must wonder how such a fragile economy can support over the long run the splendid infrastructure that has been built. Some French pessimists even suggest an eventual regression in European presence in most of Africa to a latter-day trading-post disposition, with foreign interests c o n c e n t r a t e d in coastal t r a d i n g enclaves a n d around raw material production centers. This back-tothe-bush p e s s i m i s m is surely exaggerated. Neither France nor the world can or should reverse 100 years of history by turning their backs on Africa. The continent will certainly continue to be a major source of raw materials for the i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s of the world. The French have long been deeply and profitably involved in the production and shipping of these products. African markets are clearly not vital to any major industrial c o u n t r y - - i n c l u d i n g France. Nonetheless they do

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Modern Abidjan, in the Ivory Coast. constitute i m p o r t a n t outlets w h e r e the French are likely to enjoy c o n t i n u e d a d v a n t a g e as a result of lang u a g e , l o n g - e s t a b l i s h e d h a b i t , a n d c u s t o m e r preference. Finally there are strong moral a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n reasons w h y France a n d others in the developed world c a n n o t tuna_ their backs on a sizable slice of the world's m o s t d i s a d v a n t a g e d people.

Will the Franc Zone Survive European Monetary Union? The c e n t r a l pillar of F r e n c h p r e s e n c e in Africa, aside from the French l a n g u a g e , has b e e n the extraord i n a r y franc zone m o n e t a r y a r r a n g e m e n t s . C a n they survive the current economic crisis w i t h b o t h regional

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central banks in serious deficit with the French treasury? Will the African members insist on a devaluation of the CFA at a time when their exports are having difficulty competing in world markets? The probable answer to both these questions is, maybe. The French are well aware that the backing afforded the CFA is at the heart of their relationship with their African friends. Refusal to guarantee convertibility or to finance "temporary" deficits could unravel the whole carefully balanced system. Despite declining interest and growing disenchantment with Africa, there is little evidence to indicate that the French are now ready for any such major surgery. Rather, they are attempting to impose discipline on the member countries through the regional banks and by supporting IMF-sponsored readjustment programs. Unfortunately, this strategy may further deflate the economies at just the wrong time. If necessary, the French treasury will probably grudgingly accept the need to continue financing the deficits, at least for the near future. At the same time, they will certainly bring all their considerable ingenuity and influence to bear on reducing budget and balanceof-payments shortfalls. President Mitterrand's "forgiveness of debt" ploy in June 1988 is a move in this direction. The CFA franc is clearly overvalued. Nevertheless, the French deny that a devaluation would improve the marketing of African exports. They contend either that the sale of most of these exports (that is, oil, cocoa, and coffee) is denominated in dollars or that they suffer from relatively inelastic demand. On the outgoing side, they point out that a large portion of the debt service is denominated in dollars. Devaluation would therefore

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France in Black Africa result in declining income and a larger debt service. Several Francophone African bankers with whom the author discussed these questions seemed to agree with their French colleagues. Nonetheless there have been constant rumors that an adjustment in parity between the CFA and the French franc may take place. IMF officials are said to be the most ardent advocates of such an adjustment. They contend that a devaluation must take place if Francophone exports are to become competitive in the world market. Costly anomalies like the Ivory Coast's cocoa producer subsidies cannot be sustained indefinitely, although the French again provided a surprisingly generous bailout in late 1988 by buying a large portion of the Ivoirian crop at inflated prices. Houphouet's attacks on "international speculators" as the villains denying a "fair price" to cocoa producers must become increasingly hollow as time passes. 10For the present, powerful French commercial interests seem likely to continue their support for African resistance to devaluation. The longer term prospects for the CFA, however, are less clear. A French finance minister has proposed European monetary union to his EEC colleagues, and Frenchman Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, has become the proposal's most outspoken advocate. But the process may be long and difficult, especially in the face of d e t e r m i n e d British resistance. Nonetheless, Europe seems to be moving in that direction with enthusiastic French leadership, despite Margaret Thatcher. What will happen when the Europeans get around to forming their monetary union? Will France's European partners agree to con-

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The I v o ~ Coast's F4lix Houphouet-Bo~ny, dean of Franc~hone African presidents, calling on Mitterrand at the Elys~e in 1983.

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France in Black Africa tinue to back the CFA? A senior African banking official in Dakar contended that there are no insurmountable "technical p r o b l e m s " that would prevent continued s u p p o r t of the CFA by a E u r o p e a n m o n e t a r y union. "Political factors," he contended, would decide the issue. '~ He is certainly correct. But would the British, the West Germans, the Dutch, et al. be willing to join the French in tying the CFA to a European currency unit? Would the F r e n c h insist on such an a r r a n g e m e n t ? Some suggest that this would be an "elegant" way for the French to avoid the whole question of a devaluation and an eventual dismantling of the franc zone. 12The answers to these important questions are not apparent. The EEC c o n t i n u e s to give g e n e r o u s aid to Africa. Would France's European partners be willing to extend their generosity to currency guarantees? Only a very tentative maybe can be safely given in reply.

Military Arrangements French military presence and defense agreements constitute another highly visible element in France's unusual relationships with her former African dependencies. One logically assumes that any contraction in other French interests would result in a corresponding attenuation of her military deployments and arrangements. In fact, a measure of ambiguity has already appeared as a result of increasing French commitment to the c o m m o n defense of Western Europe. Forces that had previously been dedicated solely to intervention in Africa have now been given a second mission involving the defense of Europe. Sensitive Africans are wondering w h e t h e r this m o v e is a sign of a w e a k e n i n g of French c o m m i t m e n t to their defense.

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Initial F r e n c h r e l u c t a n c e to c o m m i t troops to Chad, and their quirky withdrawal in 1984, reinforced these doubts. More recently there have been rumors that the French may be encouraging the formation of an inter-African intervention force. This is certainly a logical d e v e l o p m e n t , w i t h p r e c e d e n t in the small multin a t i o n a l A f r i c a n f o r c e s e n t to S h a b a in 1977. Nonetheless such rumors tend to unnerve insecure African leaders w h o look to France's willingness to intervene as their o w n ultimate security guarantee. The most telling indicator of future French intentions in the military realm may be the rearming of the 9th Marine I n f a n t r y Division w i t h h e a v i e r w e a p o n s o b v i o u s l y aimed at strengthening its ability to fight in Europe in a high-intensity conflict. Will this change also weaken the ability of this traditional overseas intervention force to a c c o m p l i s h its A f r i c a n m i s s i o n ? The a n s w e r is unclear.

Language and Culture L a n g u a g e is the aspect of French influence and p r e s e n c e that is likely to be most e n d u r i n g . Francop h o n e Africa has no really viable r e p l a c e m e n t for French as a lingua franca or as a vehicle for advanced education and international communication. African languages abound, but few are spoken widely enough to warrant their b e c o m i n g the national language of a single c o u n t r y , as Swahili has b e c o m e the official tongue of Tanzania. Moreover, ethnic jealousies often preclude favoring one African language over others. The absence of technical vocabulary and a broad body of literature are other shortcomings.

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France in Black Africa Thus, for a variety of good and not-so-good reasons, French remains the national language in all the former French dependencies except Cameroon and is likely to remain so. (Cameroon is legally bilingual; both French and English are used as national languages, but French clearly p r e d o m i n a t e s . ) Given French dedication to the propagation of their language and culture, one can assume that they will continue generous support for cultural activities no matter what may h a p p e n to other forms of aid and cooperation. Quite rightly, the French value the automatic advantages that common language and cultural affinity afford. Moreover, their zeal to "civilize" has not entirely disappeared.

Vacuums Rarely Remain Unfilled There are those who contend that France has actually h a r m e d African interests by her intense involvement in African affairs. On balance, I do not share this view. I believe that the French have served both Western and African interests by protecting and helping to s u p p o r t some weak and vulnerable parts of Africa. Should their presence decline---as now seems likely-a v a c u u m could result. On a world scale, the region may be of only secondary strategic and of limited economic importance. But the chronic distress of areas like the Sahel will continue to pose troubling moral and humanitarian problems for the affluent "First World." Potential mischiefmakers like the erratic Colonel Khadafi might again be attracted by an opportunity for influence even in such poor and forbidding lands. One hopes that a more general international presence could replace any decline in French presence. The

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EEC, the World Bank, and the IMF are already engaged in the area and should be encouraged to broaden their involvement as required. The United States, Japan, and other friendly Western donors may also be called on to expand their bilateral assistance programs. The French themselves should be encouraged by their EEC partners and their other Western friends to continue to play a leading role in F r a n c o p h o n e Africa, as long as the people of the region wish them to do so. Others, however, should help France bear b u r d e n s that she is no longer able or willing to carry u n a i d e d . Certainly no other non-African power could replace France in Africa w i t h o u t an u n f a v o r a b l e reaction from the Africans themselves. The special French role has usually served both African and Western interests. One hopes that it will continue to do so.

Lest Hopelessness Breed Desperation More fundamental to Africa's future than French presence or absence on the continent is the deep economic crisis of the 1980s that has brought most of black Africa to its knees. The intractable long-term problem of declining world d e m a n d for Africa's traditional exports of food and raw materials has no quick or easy solution. Only Japan among the non-Communist developed countries now regularly suffers a food deficit; all others produce often troublesome surpluses.13 A "third industrial revolution" seems on the way to perm a n e n f l y cutting the d e m a n d for the traditional raw m a t e r i a l s t h a t have p r o v i d e d Africa's o t h e r m a j o r source of cash earnings.14 I n d e e d , typical high-technology p r o d u c t s like s e m i c o n d u c t o r s and glass-fiber

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NOTES ONE 1. Pierre Biarnes, Les Fran¢ais en Afrique noire de Richelieu d Mitterrand (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1987), pp. 33, 44. 2. John D. Hargreaves, West Africa: The Former French States (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), p. 69. 3. Pierre Biarnes, p. 85. 4. Andr6 Demaison, Faidherbe (Paris: Librairie Plan, 1932), p. Z 5. Ibid., pp. 219-38. 6. Paul-Marie de La Gorce, La R~publique et son armde (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1963). 7

Ihl,4

~

19-4

France in Black Africa cable u s e only a fraction of the n a t u r a l raw materials that earlier industrial products c o n s u m e d . 15 Promising alternative sources of income for Africa are difficult to identify. N e i t h e r industrialization n o r inter-African trade s e e m s to hold m u c h promise for the foreseeable future. The flood of capital that followed the a b r u p t rise in oil prices in the 1970s has all but dried u p and is unlikely to recur. Protectionism is n o w m u c h more acceptable than it was w h e n the newly industrializing n a t i o n s of Asia were facing w i d e - o p e n m a r k e t s with hearty appetites in North America and Europe. Equally discouraging, the prospects for substantial increases in inter-African trade are limited. At their present state of d e v e l o p m e n t , African neighbors are m o r e likely to be competitors than c o m p l e m e n t a r y trading partners. No one has yet solved this chicken-or-the-egg dilemma. Unless s o m e o n e can come u p with a new, more p r o m i s i n g d e v e l o p m e n t strategy, Africa seems b o u n d to the harsh discipline of declining world c o m m o d i t y markets. Is m o s t of Africa, then, destined to live at or n e a r the s u b s i s t e n c e level, w i t h i n a d e q u a t e i n c o m e s u p p l e m e n t e d by a p e r m a n e n t international assistance dole? As a partial alternative, the French have long suggested stabilizing markets with price s u p p o r t s and assured market access. A p p l y i n g this formula, or one like it, to world markets may not be an adequate or even desirable solution. Nevertheless s o m e workable formula m u s t be found. O t h e r w i s e h o p e l e s s n e s s could breed desperation, with u n p l e a s a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s for us all.

238

France in Black Africa 13. David Levering Lewis, The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), p. 16. 14. Henri Brunschwig, p. 154. 15. Ibid., p. 157. 16. Ibid., p. 158. 1Z Ibid., p. 159. 18. See Sir Richard Burton, A Mission to Gdele King of Dahome (ed. C.W. Newbury) (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966). Sir Richard in 1863 made light of the vaunted Dahomean military prowess. His description of the Fon "Amazons" is especially a m u s i n g . He r e c k o n e d that the Dahomean warriors had greatly deteriorated since their victories in the 1850's under King Geso.

Notes 26. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, "French Economic Policy in Tropical Africa," in L.H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, Vol. IV (New York: Cambridge University Press (for the Hoover Institution), 1975), p. 129. 27. This, of course, explains the opposition of Houphouet-Boigny, of the Ivory Coast, to a perpetuation of the federation within a postwar French Union. 28. Pierre Biarnes, p. 201. 29. Henri Brunschwig, p. 134. 30. William Cohen, Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971), p. 132. 31. Ibid., p. 126. 32. Lord Hailey, p. 200. 33. Ibid., p. 1261. 34. Ibid., pp. 1266-67. 35. William Cohen, p. 111. 36. Raymond L. Buell, Vol. I, p. 939.

TWO 1. Brian Weinstein, Ebou~ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 212. 2. Ibid., p. 216. 3. Jean de La Roche, Le Gouverneur GOn&al Fdlix l~bou~, 1884-1944 (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1957), p. 104. 4. The AEF consisted of the four colonies of the Moyen Congo, Gabon, Chad, and Oubangui-Chari. 5. Jean de La Roche, p. 160. 6. Hubert Deschamps, "France in Black Africa and Madagascar," in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, Vol. II (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 248.

241

France in Black Africa

7. Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos were still nominally administered by French officials appointed by Vichy. A Japanese army, however, was present in Indochina. The fig leaf of French control was ultimately dropped in March 1945 when the Japanese jailed the French administrators and seized direct control of Indochina. 8. Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle: Vol. 2, Unity 1942 "14, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), pp. 419-83. See also Dorothy Shipley White, BlackAfrica and de Gaulle (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), p. 91. 9. Robert L. Delavignette, "French Colonial Policy in Black Africa," in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, Vol. II. 10. Laurentie was Pleven's political director at the time and was therefore well placed to know what was going on in the highest Free French circles in London and Algiers. 11. Text of General Charles de Gaulle's opening speech to the Conf6rence Africaine Franqaise at Brazzaville, 30 January 1944. 12. Opening speech by Ren6 Pleven, Commissioner for Colonies, at the Conference Africaine Franqaise at BrazzaviUe, 30 January 1944, "Textes et documents," Algiers, Commissariat aux Colonies, 1944. 13. Quoted in B. Weinstein, F.bouG pp. 302-03. Also see J.H. Aubane, "La Conference de Brazzaville," in Eugene Guerneer, ed., Afrique ~quatoriale Fran~aise, Encyclop~die Coloniale et Maritime, 1950, p. 186. 14. Pierre Biarnes, Les Francais en Afrique noire de Richelieu d Mitterrand (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1987), p. 291. 15. "Civil status" refers mainly to matters involving marriage and inheritance. Monogamy was a condition of French civil status. 16. Robert L. Delavignette, p. 263.

242

Notes 17. William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 53-54. 18. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 19. Ibid., p. 59. 20. Brazzaville Conference Report. 21. In 1929-30 there were only two French West African students registered in French universities. By 1954-55, there were 684, with an additional 200 following university-level courses at Dakar. (Institut National de la France, 1961, table XII, p. 68, as quoted in William J. Foltz, p. 70.) 22. Henri Brunschwig, "De l'assimilation ~ la D6colonisation." This paper was presented at a colloquium organized by l'Institut d'Histoire du Temps Pr6sent on 4-5 October 1984, entitled "Les chemins de la d6colonisation de l'empire colonial franqais." The paper was published by Editions du CNRS, Paris, 1986. 23. As a U.N. trust territory, Togo had been given a measure of autonomy in 1955 with an executive responsible to the territorial legislature. This devolution of power was to serve as a model for the loi-cadre. 24. The subjects over which legislative power was transferred to the territorial assemblies were (1) land, (2) soil conservation, (3) agriculture, (4) forestry, (5) fisheries, (6) most mineral rights, (7) internal trade, (8) customary law, (9) primary and secondary education, (10) health, (11) cooperatives, and (12) urbanization. 25. Pierre Biarnes, p. 343. 26. Franqois Mitterrand, Prdsence fran~aise et abandon, 1957, referred to by Pierre Biarnes, p. 337. 27. William J. Foltz, p. 91. 28. Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schacter, French Speaking West Africa in Transition (New York: International Conciliation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 1960), p. 403.

243

France in Black Africa 29. Pierre Biarnes, p. 349. 30. Kaye Whiteman, "Dignity Against Dignity," West Africa (London), 3-9 October 1988, pp. 1824--29. 31. William J. Foltz, p. 95. 32. Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schacter, p. 402. 33. Jacques Foccart, interview by author, Paris, 19 January 1988, at Foccart's office in the H6tel Matignon. 34. A.S. Kanga-Forstner, The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 35. Elliot Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," American Political Science Review 54, No. 2 (June 1960), p. 403. 36. Virginia T h o m p s o n and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 253-54. 37. Elliot Berg. 38. Elliot Berg cites European population figures for the AOF on p. 397 of his study. These rose from 32,000 in 1946 to 90,000 in 1956. By 1960, most sources reckon there were 100,000 Europeans (mainly French) in the AOE The European population of the AEF, Togo, and Cameroon in 1960 was estimated to be about 50,000. 39. Ibid., p. 398. 40. Ibid., p. 404. 41. Crawford Young, "Decolonization in Africa," in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialism in Africa, Vol. II, p. 495. 42. William B. Cohen, "The French Governors," in L.H. Gann and R Duignan, eds., African Proconsuls (New York: The Free Press and Hoover Institution, 1978), p. 45. 43. A few examples of divided tribes in West and Central Africa are the Ewe in Ghana and Togo; the Hausa in Nigeria and Niger; the Bateke in Gabon, Congo, and Zaire; the Fang in Cameroon, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea; and the Fulani in all the Sahelian states, plus Nigeria and Cameroon.

244

Notes

THREE 1. The Conseil d'Entente was composed of the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Niger, and Upper Volta. 2. Maurice Ligot, Les accords de cooperation entre la France et les ~tats Africains et Malgache d'expression Fran¢aise (Paris: La Documentation Fran~aise, 1964), pp. 27-48. 3. Ibid., p. 97. 4. Teresa Hayter, French Aid (London: Overseas Development Institution, Inc., 1966), pp. 72-73. 5. Catherine Gaybet, The Second Convention of Lomd: EEC Aid to the ACP Countries (1981-85) (Brussels: Bureau d'Informations Europ6ennes SPRC, 1982), p. 2. 6. Lord Hailey, GCSI, GCIE, An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 1400. 7. Of the economically significant former French African dependencies, only the Congo has nationalized most private businesses. 8. G6rard Moatti, "La France et son Afrique," L'Expansion, No. 224, 21 October-3 November 1983, p. 178. 9. "Poor Man's Fund," The Economist, 13-19 February 1988, p. 17. 10. Bernard Vinay, Inspecteur G6n6ral des Affaires d'Outre-Mer, "La zone franc d'aujourd'hui," Marches Tropicaux, 28 November 1986, p. 2987. 11. Elliot Berg, "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa," American Political Science Review 54, No. 2 (June 1960), p. 403. 12. "French African Economies: The Empire Stays Put," The Economist, 10 July 1982, pp. 66-67. 13. Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, and Niger. 14. Teresa Hayter, pp. 64--65. 15. Maurice Ligot, p. 100. 16. The members of CAMA are Cameroon, Gabon, Chad, Congo, and the Central African Republic.

245

France in Black Africa 17. Bernard Vinay, p. 2981. 18. Mireille Duteil, "La dissidence du pays mod61e," Le Point, No. 768 (June 1987), p. 39. 19. Bernard Vinay, p. 2979. 20. "Money: Inside the Franc Zone," Africa Confidential 29, No. 10 (13 May 1988), pp. 4--6. 21. "Francophone, devalue," Economist, 8 August 1988, p. 12. 22. Jean-Pierre Cot, A l'~preuve du pouvoir (Paris: l~ditions du Seuil, 1984), p. 171. 23. Maurice Ligot, pp. 104-08. 24. Brigitte Masquet, "France-Afrique: D6passer les contradictions," Etaludes, November-December 1981, p. 22. 25. "La coop6ration Franco-Ivoirienne, ann6e 1986," Mission de Coop6ration et d'Action Culturelle, Ambassade de France en C6te D'Ivoire, Abidjan, 1987, p. 8. 26. Figures given the author orally by an employee of the Ministry of Cooperation. Judging from similar statistics for 1984 published by the Ministry in "La France et l'Afrique: Etude des relations Franco-Africaines politiques, financi~res, economiques, commerciales et culturelles," Paris, 1984, these figures seem reliable. 27. Jean-Pierre Cot, p. 172. 28. E Datson and L.O. Datson, "The Economic Role of Non-Indigenous Ethnic Minorities in Colonial Africa," in L.H. Gann and P. Duignan, eds., Colonialismin Africa, Vol. IV (New York: Cambridge University Press (for the Hoover Institution), 1975), p. 612.

FOUR 1. Robin Lockham, "Le militarisme franqaise en Afrique," PolitiqueAfricaine, II (5) (February 1982), p. 100. 2. N. Marten, "L'enjeu africain et la politique franqaise d'assistance militaire," Stratdgie Afrique/Moyen Orient 13 (2~me Trimestre 1982), p. 18.

246

Notes 3. Moshe Ommi-Oz, "La formation des cadres militaires africaines lors de la mise sur pied des arm6es nationales," Revue Fran¢aise d'F:tudes Politiques Africaines 12 (133) (January 1977), p. 88. 4. The name of the school was changed in 1959 to l~cole de Formation des Officiers du R6gime Transitoire des Troupes de Marine, reflecting the political changes that had taken place under the constitution of the Fifth Republic. St. Cyr served as a model for the school, which had a basic course lasting 2 years. A third year was added to provide specialized training for the specific arm--i.e., infantry, artillery, a r m o r , e t c . - - i n t o w h i c h t h e officer w a s to be commissioned. 5. Anthony Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa (Oxford: Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 360. 6. Ibid., pp. 86-90. 7. Defense agreements are in force with Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central African Republic, and Togo. 8. Le Monde, 1-December 1984, p. 3. 9. Pascal Chaigneau, La politique militaire de la France en Afrique (Paris: Publications du Cheam, 1984), pp. 79-80. 10. G@n~ral Jacques Servranckx, "Les actions r~centes de la France en Afrique," DEfense Nationale, p. 36. 11. "Le 2~me R.E.I. aN'djambour III; coup d'oeil sur la 316me Brigade," Kepi Blanc (421), February 1983, Aubagne, France, pp. 13-21. 12. Jacques Isnard, "La France cr6e une force antichars pour assister ses allies en Europe," Le Monde, 18 June 1983, pp. 1, 18. 13. An account of this exchange was told the author by a reliable person who was present at the meeting. The response was given in a public forum with many foreigners p r e s e n t . T h u s the r e p e a t i n g of the s t o r y violates no confidence.

247

France in Black Africa 14. William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali Federation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 180-183. 15. For an American observer's account of the event, see Charles Darlington, African Betrayal (New York: McKay, 1968). 16. See John S. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper No. 201 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 10. 17. Ibid., p. 13. 18. Le Monde, 13 June 1978, in R. Lockham, "Le militarisme fran~ais en Afrique," Politique Africaine, May 1982, p. 58. 19. George Moore, "French Military Power in Africa," in Arms and the African, W.J. Foltz and H.S. Bienen, eds. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). This chapter gives a good summary of French military involvement in Africa. 20. Professor Pierre Dabezies of the Universit6 de Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, and Ecole d'Administration Nationale, January 1988. 21. Laurent Zecchini, "Les tentations de reconqu@te du Pr6sident Tchadien," Le Monde, 3 April 1986, p. 7. 22. Tile Times, London, 10 December 1984, p. 5. 23. Roger Faligot, Services secrets en Afrique (Paris: ]~ditions le Sycamore, 1982), p. 67. 24. Roger Trinquier, Jacques D u c h e m i n , and J. le Baully, Notre guerre au Katanga (Paris: Editions de la Pens6e Moderne, 1963), pp. 53-81. 25. Ibid., pp. 53, 68, 72. 26. Ibid., pp. 73, 92; and Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, La piscine: Les services secrets francais 1944--84 (Paris: ]2ditions du Seuil, 1985), p. 256. 27. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, p. 256. 28. Based on the author's personal observations in Elisabethville in 1961-62. Also see Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, p. 257, for further confirmation.

248

Notes

29. Maurice Delaunay, De la casquette d la jacquette, ou de l' administration coloniale d la diplomatie Africaine (Paris: La Pens6e Universelle, 1982), p. 184. (Memoirs of the French ambassador in Libreville.) 30. John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 230-31. 31. Maurice Delaunay, pp. 176-82. 32. Roger Faligot, p. 74.

FIVE 1. Jean De La Gueriviere, "La fin du quatorzi6me soremet Franco-African a Antibes: La France rejette l'annulation pure et simple de la dette du continent," LeMonde, 13-14 December 1987, p. 3. 2. Phillipe De Craene, "De Gaulle et l'Afrique noire: Un bien charnel," in La Politique Africaine du Gdndral de Gaulle 1958-1969, Actes du Colloque dl Bordeaux, 19-20 Octobre 1979 (Paris: I~ditions Pedone, 1980), pp. 306--07. 3. American Embassy, Paris, Airgram No. A-111, 5 February 1972, addressed to the Department of State, drafted by A.L. Steigman. This document was declassified with selected portions expurgated by the Department of State. 4. Pierre Biarnes, Les Fran~ais en Afrique noire de Richelieu Mitterrand (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1987), p. 362. 5. Paul Gillet, "Jacques Foccart," in Les h~ritiers du Gdndral (Paris: ]~ditions Denoel, 1969), pp. 53-54. 6. Philippe Bernert, SDECE Service 7: L"extraordinaire histoire du Col. le Roy-Finville et de ses clandestins (Paris: Presses de la CitG 1980), pp. 231, 255, 279. 7. Brigitte Nouaille-Degorce, "Bilan politique de la coop6ration," Projet, May 1962, pp. 551-52. 8. Paul Gillet, p. 52. 9. Maurice Delaunay, De la casquette ~ la jacquette (Paris: La Pens@e UniverseUe, 1982), pp. 160-70.

249

France in Black Africa 10. Paul Gillet, p. 57. 11. "Les vautours de Conakry," Le Monde, 1 November 1986, pp. 10-11. 12. For a sensationalized and somewhat overdrawn description of the atmosphere in Gabon and of the shenanigans of the Clan des Gabonais, see Pierre Pean, Affaires Africaines (Paris: Fayard, 1983). 13. Brigitte Nouaille-Degorce, p. 552. 14. In French, the use of the second person singular or plural in address is an important question of etiquette. The formal second person plural form is normally used in speaking to everyone except family, ex-schoolmates, ex-army buddies, extraordinarily close friends, and colleagues in certain professions. Thus the use of the familiar form between French and African politicians is unusual and filled with special symbolic significance. 15. "Freemasonry: The French Connection," African Confidential 28, No. 1, 27 May 1987, London, pp. 1-2; Laurent Zecchini, "M. Guy Penne quitte l'l~lys6e; le bon moment?" Le Monde, 19-20 October 1986, p. 6; and Jean-Francois Bayart, La politique Africaine de Francois Mitterrand (Paris: Editions Karthala, 1984), p. 121. 16. Jean-Pierre Cot, pp. 212-21. 17. "Arm6e: l'Apr6s Lacaze," Le Point, No. 659, 6 May 1985, Paris, p. 22. 18. Jean-Francois Bayart, p. 99. 19. Ibid., pp. 96-103. 20. Professor Henri Brunschwig is one of the leading authorities on French colonial history. Before his retirement, he was director of l']~cole des Hautes l~tudes en Sciences Sociales. 21. C. R. Ageron, "L'opinion publique face oux prob16rues de l'union Fran~;aise," in Les chemins de la d~colonisation de l'empire colonial Francais (Paris: I~ditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986), pp. 33-48, 109.

250

Notes 22. Jean-Pierre Cot, A l'~preuve du pouvoir (Paris: l~ditions du Seuil, 1984), p. 203. 23. Laurent Zecchini, "Recentrage de la politique de cooperation," Le Monde, 5 April 1986, p. 2. 24. Michel Guillou, Une politique africaine pour la France (Paris: Collection Club 89, Editions Albatros, 1985). 25. Laurent Zecchini, "La coop(~ration selon le RPR: Les Francophones d'abord," Le Monde, 2 April 1987, p. 3. 26. For an insider's view of how the French system works in relation to Francophone Africa, see Jean-Pierre Cot, pp. 211-15. 27. Wall Street Journal, 9 June 1988, p. 27; and Washington Post, 9 June 1988, p. A33. 28. Minist~re des Relations Ext~rieures, Cooptration et Dtveloppement, "La France et l'Afrique: ]~tudes des relations Franco-Africaines politiques, financitres, 6conomiques, commerciales et culturelles," Paris: 1984, p. 29. 29. John S. Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper No. 201 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985), p. 46.

SIX 1. Jacques Foccart told the author in an interview in January 1988 that "the Africans" insisted on the demise of the federation. He declined to identify "the Africans" involved, but did nod a g r e e m e n t when asked if H o u p h o u e t was among them. 2. Cameroon suffered a 45-percent drop in the value of its exports in 1986. "West Africa: Touching Spheres of Influence," The Economist, 1 February 1988, pp. 160-61. 3. The Economist, "Economic and Financial Indicators" section, 19-25 March 1988, p. 110, reported that France suffered a current account defidt of $4.5 billion in 1987.

251

France in Black Africa 4. Edward Cody, "France to Forgive a Third of Poorest Nations' Public Debt, Says Mitterrand," Washington Post, 9 June 1988, p. A33. 5. "France: A survey," The Economist, 12 March 1988. 6. "They're Designing the Future and It Might Wash," The Economist, 13 February 1988, pp. 45-46. 7. See Diego A. Ruiz-Palmer, "Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the Conventional Defense of Central Europe," Comparative Strategy 6, No. 4 (1987), pp. 471-512. 8. "A Long Road to Reform," The Economist, 26 March 1988, p. 86. 9. La Voix de France, "Nombre de Fran~ais immatricul~s dans nos consulats" (Paris: Union des Fran~ais de I'Etranger, October-November 1988), p. 24. 10. "Houphouet's Cocoa War," West Africa (London), 11 July 1988, p. 1243. 11. Conversation in Dakar with the author, 5 February 1988. 12. "Money: Inside the Franc Zone," African Confidential 29, No. 10 (13 May 1988), p. 6. 13. Peter Drucker, "Low Wages No Longer Give Competitive Edge," Wall Street Journal, New York, 16 March 1988, p. 30. 14. Flora Lewis, "Dregs of the Oil Crisis," New York Times, 20 November 1988, p. 23. 15. Peter Drucker.

252

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY Books and Reports Adloff, Richard. West Africa: The French Speaking Nations, Yesterday and Today. New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1964. Ageron, C.R. France coloniale au parti colonial? Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1978. , ed. Les chemins de la dFcolonisation de l'empire colonial Franfais. Paris,/~ditions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1986. Aicardi de Saint Paul, Marc. Le Gabon du Roi Denis c~Omar Bongo. Paris, l~ditions Albatros, 1987. Ajayi, J.EA., and Crowder, Michael, eds. History of West Africa, 2 vols. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972-73. Ambassade de France, Abidjan. "La coop6ration FrancoIvoirienne, ann6e 1986." Mission de Coop6ration et d'Action Culturelle, Ambassade de France, Abidjan, 198Z Ango, E. "Les besoins futurs en ressources a la lumi6re des perspectives du d6veloppement de l'6ducation au Gabon." Paris, UNESCO, 1984. Arlinghaus, Bruce E., and Baker, Pauline H., eds. African Armies: Evolution and Capabilities. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986. Austin, Dustin. Politics in Africa. Hanover, NH, University Press of New England, 1977. Ballard, John A. "The Development of Political Parties in French Equatorial Africa." Doctoral dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1964. Barbier, Maurice. Voyages et explorations au Sahara Occidental au XIXi~me si~cle. Paris, Editions l'Harmattan, 1985.

253

France in Black Africa

Baulin, Jacques. La politique africaine d'Houphouet-Boigny. Paris, Editions Eurafor Press, 1980. Bayart, Jean-Franqois. La politique africaine de Francois Mitterrand. Paris, t~ditions Karthala, 1984. Baynham, Simon, ed. Military Power and Politics in Black Africa. London, Croom Helm, 1986. Benoit, Joseph Roger de. l'Afrique occidentale francaise de 19441960. Dakar, Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1982. • La balkanisation de l'Afrique occidentale fran¢aise, Pr6face de L6opold Senghor. Paris, Nouvelles t~di-

tions Africaines, 1979. Bergot, Erwan. II~me Choc. Paris, Presses de la CitG 1986. Bernert, P. SDECE Service 7: L' extraordinaire histoire du Col. le Roy-Finville et de ses cland~stines. Paris, Presses de la Cit6, 1980. Betts, Raymond E Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory 1890-1914. New York, Columbia University Press, 1961. Biarnes, Pierre. Les Francais en Afrique noire de Richelieu ~ Mitterrand, Librairie Armand Colin, Paris, 1987. Bonin, Georges. Le Togo du sergent en gdn~ral. Paris, Lesaret, 1983. Bourgi, Robert• Le G~n~ral de Gaulle et l'Afrique noire: 19401969 (Pr6face du Pierre Dabezies). Paris, Librairie G6n6rale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1980. Brunschwig, Henri• L'Afrique noire au temps de l"empire Franfais. Paris, Denoel, 1988. • Brazza explorateur: I'OgoouO 1875-1879.

Paris, Mouton et Cie, 1966. . Brazza explorateur: les traitOs Makoko, 18801882. Paris, Mouton et Cie, 1972. • French Colonialism 1871-1914: Myths and Realities, English translation by Wm. Granville Brown.

London, Pall Mall Press, 1961. • Noirs et blancs dans l'Afriquefranfaise. Paris,

Flammarion, 1983.

254

Selected Bibliography Buell, Raymond Leslie• The Native Problem in Africa, Vols. I and II. New York, MacMillan Co., 1928. Burton, Sir Richard. A Mission to Gelele King of Dahome (ed. C.W. Newbury), London, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Camus, Daniel. Les finances des multinationales en Afrique• Paris, Editions l'Harmattan, 1983. Castor, Elie W., and Tracy, Raymond. F~lix F:boud:gouverneur et philosophe. Paris, Editions l'Harmattan, 1984. Chaigneau, Pascal. La politique militaire de la France en Afrique. Paris, Publications du Cheam, 1984. Charbonneau, G6n4ral Jean. La jeunesse passionn~e de Gallieni. Bourg-en Bresse, Editions Touristiques et Litt6raires, 1952. Chipman, John Somerset. French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper No. 201. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985. Clayton, Anthony. "Foreign Intervention in Africa," in Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, ed. Simon Baynham• New York, St• Martin's Press, 1986. • France, Soldiers and Africa. Oxford, Brassey's Defense Publishers, 1988• Cohen, William B. Rulers of Empire: The French Colonial Service in Africa. Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1971• Coke, C. NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985. Conrad, Joseph. The Heart of Darkness and the Secret Sharer. New York, New American Library, 1910. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. Afrique noire, permanences et ruptures• Paris, Payot, 1985. Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine, and Moniot, Henri. L'Afrique noire de I800 a nos jours, 2d edition. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1984. Corbett, E.M. The French Presence in Black Africa. Washington, DC, Black Orpheus Press, Inc., 1972. Cot, Jean-Pierre. A l'~preuve du pouvoir: Le tiers mondisme pour quoi faire? Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1984.

255

France in Black Africa C6te d'Ivoire, 1960-1985:25 ans de libertG de paix et de progr~s. Abidjan, l~ditions Fraternit6 Hebdo, 1985. Crepin, N.M.M. L'armde parle• Librairie Arth6me Fayard, 1983. Crowder, Michael• Senegal: A Study in French Assimilation Policy. London, Oxford University Press, 1962• • West Africa Under Colonial Rule. Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1968• Darlington, Charles• African Betrayal. New York, McKay, 1968. d'Esme, Jean. Gallieni. Paris, Librairie Plan, 1965• de Gaulle, Charles. The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1959, 1964. de La Gorce, Paul-Marie. La Rdpublique et son arm~e. Paris, Librairie Arth6me Fayard, 1963• de La Roche, Jean. Le Gouverneur G~ndral Fdlix Eboud, 18841944. Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1957. Delauney, Maurice. De la casquette ~ la jacquette, ou de l"administration coloniale ~ la diplomatie Africaine. Paris, Pens6e Universelle, 1982. Kala-Kala. Paris, Robert Laffont, 1987. Delavignette, Robert L. Freedom and Authority in French West Africa. London, Oxford University Press, 1950. Demaison, Andr6. Faidherbe. Paris, Librairie Plan, 1932. Dior, Osman B. Les hdritiers d'une ind@endance. Dakar, Les Nouvelles t~ditions Africaines, 1982. Dirwiddy, Bruce, ed. European Development Policies: The United Kingdom, Sweden, France, EEC and Multilateral Organizations. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1973• Dumont, Pierre. Le Francais et les langues africaines au S~n~gal, Pr6face de L6opold S. Senghor. Paris, I~ditions Karthala, 1983. Dumont, Ren6. L'Afrique noire est mal partie. Paris, l~ditions du Seuil, 1962• •

256

Selected Bibliography DuruplG Gilles. L' ajustement structurel en Afrique: S~ndgal, C6te d'Ivoire, Madagascar• Paris, Karthala, 1988. EbouG A.ES. "Discours en Conseil d'Administration," Afrique Equatoriale Fran¢aise. Brazzaville, 19 November 1942. Ediafric. Afrique noire, de A ~ Z. Paris, Ediafric--La Documentation Africaine, 1971. • Les intdr~ts nationaux et ~trangers dans l'~conomie Africaine. Paris, Ediafric--La Documentation Africaine, 1978. • La zone franc et I'Afrique. Paris, Ediafric-La Documentation Africaine, 1977 and 1979. Fage, J. D. A Guide to Original Sources for Precolonial Western Africa Published in European Languages. Madison, WI, African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1987. Faidherbe, G6n6ral Louis L6on C6sar. Le S~n~gal: La France dans l'Afrique occidentale. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1889. Faligot, Roger. Service secrets en Afrique. Paris, Editions le Sycamore, 1982. Faligot, Roger, and Krop, Pascal. La piscine: Les services secrets Fran~ais 1944-84. Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1985. Foltz, William J. From French West Africa to the Mali Federation. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965. Foltz, William J., and Bienen, H.S., eds. Arms and the African. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988. Forsyth, Frederick. The Biafra Story• Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1969. Freund, Bill. The Making of Contemporary African History. Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1984. Froelichler, Capitaine. Trois colonisateurs: Bugeaud, Faidherbe, Gallieni. Paris, Henri Charles La Vauzelle. Gallieni, Lt. Col. Joseph S. Deux campagnes en Soudan Franfais, 1886-1888. Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, 1891.

257

France in Black Africa Gann, L.H., and Duignan, P., eds. African Proconsuls. New York, The Free Press and Hoover Institution, 1978. • Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara. New York, Frederick A. Praeger (for the Hoover Institution), 1967. , eds. Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, 5 vols. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975. (Vol. 1, The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914; Vol. 2, The History and Politics of Colonialism 1914-1960; Vol. 4, The Economics of Colonialism). Gaybet, Catherine. The Second Convention of Lomd: EEC aid to the ACP Countries (1981-85). Brussels, Bureau d'Informations Europ6ennes SPRC, 1982. Gbagbo, Laurent. Rdflexions sur la Conf&ence de Brazzaville. Yaound6, Editions C16, 1978. Gide, Andr6. Travels in the Congo. New York, Modern Age Books, 1937. Gifford, P., Louis, W.R., and Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. Decolonization and African Independence: The Transfer of Pow~ 1960-1980. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988. Gifford, P., Louis, W.R., and Weiskel, T., eds. France and Britain in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972. Giilet, Paul. "Jacques Foccart," in Les hdritiers du G~ngral. Paris, ]~dition Denoel, 1969. Gowon, Yakubu. The Economic Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic Integration, 3 vols. Doctoral Thesis, University of Warwick, England, 1984. Grellet, G6rard. Les structures dconomiques de l'Afrique noire. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1982. Guillaumont, Patrick, and Guillaumont, Sylviane. Zone Franc et deveIoppement Africain. Paris, Economica, 1984. Guillou, Michel. Line politique africaine pour la France, Pr6face de Robert Galley. Paris, Collection Club 89, t~ditions Albatros, 1985.

258

Selected Bibliography Haberson, John W., ed. The Military in African Politics. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1987. Hardy, Georges. Faidherbe. Paris, t~ditions de l'Encyclop6die de l'Empire Fran~ais, 1947. Hargreaves, John D. The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa. London, Macmillan, 1979. • Prelude to the Partition of West Africa. London, MacMillan & Co., 1963. • West Africa: The Former French States. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Harshe, Rajen. Pervasive Entente: France and Ivory Coast in African Affairs. Hyderabad, India, Humanities Press, 1983. Hayter, Teresa. French Aid. London, Overseas Development Institution, Inc., 1966. Hopkins, A. G. An Economic History of West Africa. New York, Columbia University Press, 1973. Hugon, Philippe. "Les Afriques en l'an 2000, perspectives 6conomiques," in Afrique Contemporaine. Paris, La Documentation Fran~aise, 26me Trimestre 1988. Jackson, R.H., and Rosberg, C.G. Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant• Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1982. Johnson, Wesley C. Double Impact: France and Africa in the Age of Imperialism. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1985. Kanga-Forstner, A.S. The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1969. Kerekou, M. Le peuple B~ninois condamne l'agression imp&ialiste et s'oppose ?l la reconqu~te coloniale de son territoire. Cotonou, R@publique Populaire du B@nin, 1977. Kimble, G.H.T., and Steel, R. Tropical Africa Today. New York, Webster Div., McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Lavroff, D.C., ed. La politique africaine du G~ndral de Gaulle (1958-1969). Actes du Colloque Organis~ par le Centre

259

France in Black Africa Bordelais d' ]~tudes Africaines, le Centre d't~tude d'Afrique Noire et l'Institut Charles de Gaulle, Bordeaux, 910 October 1979. Paris, l~ditions Pedone, 1980. le Vine, Victor T. Political Leadership in Africa: Post-Independence Generational Conflict in Upper Volta, Senegal, Nig~ Dahomey and the Central African Republic. Stanford, The Hoover Institution, 1967. Lewis, David L. The Race to Fashoda: European Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa. New York, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987. Lewis, William H. French Speaking Africa: The Search for Identity. New York, Walker and Co., 1965. Ligot, Maurice. Les accords de coopdration entre la France et les ftats africains et malgache d'expression Francaise. Paris, la Documentation Fran~;aise, 1964. Lord Hailey, GCSI, GCIE. An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. London, Oxford University Press, 1938. Loucou, Jean-Noel. Histoire de la COte d'Ivoire. Abidjan, CEDA, 1984. Ly, Abdoulaye. L'dmergence du n~ocolonialisme au SdndgaI. Dakar, Editions XamlG 1981. Mahieu, Francois ROgis. Introduction aux fi'nances publiques de la COte d'Ivoire. Abidjan, Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1983. Manning, Patrick. Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880-1985• New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988. Marenches, Conte de, and Ockrent, Christine. Dans le secret des winces. Paris, Editions Stock, 1986. Marseille, Jacques. Empire colonial et capitalisme franf,aise: ttistoire d'un divorce. Paris, Albin-Michel, 1984. • L'age d'or du colonialismefranfais. Paris, Albin-Michel, 1986. Martin, Michel C. "From Algiers to N'Djamena: France's Adaptation to Low-Intensity Wars, 1830-1987," in Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict, David Charters and Maurice Tugwell, eds. London, Brassey's, 1989.

260

Selected Bibliography Matthew, J.V. "Joseph Simon Gallieni (1849-1916): Marshall of France." Unpublished doctoral dissertation at the University of California, Los Angeles, 1967. M'Bokolo, Elikia. Noirs et blancs en Afrique #quatoriale: les soci~t#s C6ti~res et la p#n#tration Fran~aise (vers 1820-1874). Meredith, Martin. First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the Postwar Era. New York, Harper & Row, 1985. Michalon, Thierry. Quel ~tat pour l'Afrique? Paris, t~ditions l'Harmattan, 1984. Minist~re des Relations Ext~rieures--Coop~ration et D~veloppement. "La France et l'Afrique: Etude des relations Franco-Africaines politiques, financi~res, 6conomiques, commerciales et culturelles." Extract du num e r o s p e c i a l "La F r a n c e et l ' A f r i q u e " de l'hebdomadaire Marches Tropicaux et M~diterran~ens, Paris, 1984. Mitterrand, Francois. Presence franfaise et abandon. Paris, 1957. Moose, George. "French Military Power in Africa," in Arms and the African, W.J. Foltz and H.S. gienen, eds. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1985. Morgenthau, Ruth Schachter. Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1964. Ngansou, Guy Jeremie. Tchad: Vingt ans de crise, Preface de Philippe de Craene. Paris, l~ditions l'Harmattan, 1986. Nzouankeu, Jacques Mariel. Les partis politiques s~n~galais, Preface du President Abdou Diouf. Dakar, I~ditions Clairafrique, 1984. Oliver, Roland, and Atmore, Anthony. Africa Since 1800, 3d edition. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. "The Flow of Financial Resources to Less Developed Countries 1961-65." Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1967.

261

France in Black Africa Osso, Bernard. Le chef d" Etat Africain: L"expdrience des dtats africains de succession Fran~aise. Paris, Editions Albatros, 1976. Overseas Development Institute. "French Aid: The Jeanneney Report," London, Overseas Development Institute, 1964. Pabanel, Jean-Pierre. Les coups d'dtat militaires en Afrique Noire. Paris, l~ditions l'Harmattan, 1984. Pean, Pierre. Affaires Africaines. Paris, Fayard, 1983. Person, Yves. Samori: Une r~volution Dyala, 3 vols. Dakar, IFAN Dakar, 1968 (Vol. 1), 1970 (Vol. 2), 1975 (Vol. 3). Porch, Douglas. The Conquest of the Sahara. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. Rosenblum, Mort. Mission to Civilize, the French Way. New York, Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1986. Ruscio, Alain. Ddcolonisation tragique. Paris, l~ditions Messidor, 1987. Sarraut, Albert. La raise en valeur des colonies Francaises. Paris, 1923. Sergent, Pierre. II~me Rep: Alg&ie, Djbouti, Kolwezi, Beyrouth. Paris, Presses de la CitG 1984. Slade, Ruth. King Leopold's Congo. London, Oxford University Press, 1962. Spartaus, Colonel. Operation Manta; Tchad 1983-1984. l~ditions Plan, 1985. St. Jorre, John de. The Brottmrs" War: Biafra and Nigeria. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1972. Stremlau, John J. The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War 1967-70. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977. Suret-Canale, Jean. Afrique et capitaux: geographic des capitaux et des investissements en Afrique tropicale d"expressian Fran~aise. Paris, l'Arbre Verdogant, 198Z • Afrique noire, occidentale et centrale, 3 volumes. Paris, Editions Sociales, 1958, 1964, 1972.

262

Selected Bibliography • Difficult~s du n~o-colonialisme Fran¢ais en Afrique tropicale. Paris, Centre d'l~tudes et de Recherches Marxistes, 1975• Syndicat National de l't~ducation et de la Culture, R6publique du Mali. "Memo sur la condition des enseignants en R6publique du Mali," Bamako, Le Conseil, 1974. Terray, Emmanuel, ed. L'~tat contemporain en Afrique. Paris, Editions Harmattan, 1987. Tetu, Michel• La Francophie: Histoire, probl~matique, perspectives, Pr6face de L.S. Senghor. Montr6al, Guerin Litt6rature, 1987. Thompson, Virginia, and Adloff, Richard. The EmerRing States of French Equatorial Africa. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960• • French West Africa. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957. Traxler, Elizabeth Evatt. "French Relations With Francophone Africa: A Case Study of Linkage Politics in the Post-Colonial Era." Unpublished doctoral dissertation from the University of South Carolina, 1982• Trinquier, Col. Roger, Duchemin, Jacques, and le Baully, J. Notre guerre au Katanga. Paris, Editions de la Pens6e Moderne, 1963• United Nations Security Council. "Report of the Security Council's Special Missions to the Republic of Guinea Established Under Resolution 289 (1970)." New York, 1970. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. "OECD Trade With SubSaharan Africa." Washington, DC, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1984. Weinstein, Brian• Ebou~. New York, Oxford University Press, 1972• Welch, Claude Emerson, ed. Soldier and State in Africa: A Comparative Analysis of Military Intervention and Political Change. Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press, 1970.

263

France in Black Africa White, Dorothy Shipley. BlackAfrica and de Gaulle. University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979. Yansan6, Aquibou Y. Decolonization in West African States with French Legacy. Cambridge, MA, Schenkman Publishing Co., Inc. 1984. Young, Crawford. Ideologyand Developmentin Africa. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982. Zartman, William I. "Africa and the West: The French Connection," in African Security Issues, ed. Bruce E. Arlinghaus. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1984.

Journal Articles "Africa and France." Afro-Asian EconomiqueRevue 13(140-141) May-June 1971: pp. 7-17. "Afrique centrale, capitale Paris." JeuneAfrique (1241), 17 October 1984: pp. 34 ~5. "Afrique noire," l,eMaci (572), 12 September 1983, pp. 5-40. (Articles on French commerce with various countries in Africa, such as Benin, Cameroon, Congo, the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Guinea, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Mali, Niger, and Senegal.) Alibert, J. "Le secteur priv(~ fran~ais dans la coop6ration." Actuel D~eloppement 5 January-February 1975: pp. 2125. Angouga, Jean-F~lix. "La pr6sence militaire de la France en Afrique." PresenceAfricaine 116, 4~me Trim. 80: pp. 4363. "L'Arm~e: l'apr~s Lacaze." Le Point, 6 May 1985. Asiwaju, A.I. "The Berlin Centenary." West Africa, 4 March 1985: p. 41Z Assidon, Elao. "Commerce capitif monn6tarisation et substitution d' importation: Le cas de l'Afrique de l'ouest." Tiers Monde 27 (105), March 1986: pp. 77-96. Ban, Daniel, and Mingot, Karen. "French Intervention in Africa: dependence or development." Africa Today 27 (2), 2d trimester, 1980, pp. 5-20.

264

Selected Bibliography BarbG R. "Le March6 Commun: Instrument de la politique n6o-colonialiste en Afrique." Economie et Politique (114), January 1964: pp. 12-25. Baumel, Jacques. "Le France a-t-elle encore une politique Africaine et mondiale?" Revue des Deux Mondes (3), March 1985: pp. 561-565. Benoit, Joseph Roger de. "Coop6ration: L'exp6rience du S6n6gal." Croissance dex Jeunes Nations (202) Avs. 1982: pp. 19-26. (Interview with President Diouf on French aid to Senegal.) • "La politique Africaine de la 56me R4publique." Revue Politique et Parlementaire 86 (912), October 1984: pp. 15-22. Berg, Elliot. "The Economic Basis of Political Choice in French West Africa." American Political Science Review 54 (2), June 1960, pp. 39a~ 405. Bini, Obi. "France's Imperialist Role in Africa." The Guardian, 21 January 1981: p. 15. Bobe, Bernard• "Le commerce ext6rieur de la France avec les pays en vole de d6veloppement." Commerce Ext&ieur (331-332), April 1983: pp. 61-67. Bon, D., and Mingst, K. "French Intervention in Africa: Dependency or Decolonization•" Africa "lbday 27 (2), 2d Quarter 1980, Denver, CO, pp. 5-20. Brardone, G. "Le Tiers Monde contre la France." Croissance des Jeunes Nations 176, October 1976: pp. 19-26• Bridier, Manuel. "Bilan et perspectives de l'aide financi6re aux pays Africains: L'exp6rience de la Caisse Centrale de Coop6ration l~conomique.' Monde en D~eloppement 14 (53), 1986: pp. 105-136. Cadenat, Patrick. "La France et le Tiers Monde: Vingt ans de coop6ration bilaterale." Documentaires (4701-4702), 14 January 1982: p. 204. Chapa, Philippe. "L'intervention militaire de la France en Centrafrique." Defense et S~curitF 3, 1980: pp. 307-322.

265

France in Black Africa Claude, Patrice, et al. "La coop6ration en question." Le Monde, 18, 19, and 20 December 1979. Cody, Edward. "France to Forgive a Third of Poorest Nations' Public Debt, Says Mitterrand." Washington Post, 9 June 1988: p. A33. Colloque, Franco-Africain. "Le Gen. de Gaulle et la d6colonisation." Etude Gaulliennes 6-22: April-July 1978: pp. 7179. "Congr~s des CEE d'Afrique noire." Abidjan, 16-21 April 1980. Le Conseiller du Commerce Extdrieur 367, October 1980: pp. 2-6Z Coquery-Vidrovitch, Catherine. "Colonisation ou imp6rialisme: La politique Africaine de la France entre deux guerres." Movement Social (107) 1979: pp. 51-76. David, Dominique. "La FAR en Europe: Le dire des armes." Ddfense Nationale (40), June 1984. De Craene, Phillip. "De Gaulle's African Policy." African Quarterly 10 (3), October-December 1970: pp. 204-215. de Guiringaud, Louis. "La politique Africaine de la France." Politique Etrang~re 2 (47) 1982: pp. 441-455. Drucker, Peter E "Low Wages No Longer Give Competitive Edge." Wall Street Journal, 16 March 1988: p. 30. DuBois, Victor D. "Former French Black Africa and France." American Universities Field Staff Reports, West African Series: Vol. 16, 1975. Duteil, Mireille. "La dissidence du pays module." Le Point (768), June 1987: p. 39. Economides, Basile. "R6flexions sur les possibilit6s du potentiel psychologique de la France ;~ l'6gard des TiersMonde." Penant (793), April 1987: pp. 117-123. Economist. "France: A Survey. O6 aUons-nous?" London, 12 March 1988. Economist. "Francophone, devalue." London, 8 August 1988. Economist. "French African Economies: The Empire Stays Put." London, 10-16 July 1982.

266

Selected Bibliography Economist. "Poor Man's Fund." London, 13-19 February 1988. Economist. " T h e y ' r e Designing the Future and It Might Wash." London, 13 February 1988. Faits et Documentations. "Le voyage du Pr6sident de la R6publique Fran~aise au Togo, au B6nin, et au Gabon." Afrique Contemporaine 22 (126), April, May, and June 1983: pp. 43-4Z Feuer, G. "La r6vision des accords de coop6ration FrancoAfricaine et Franco-Malgaches." Annuaire Fran~ais de Droit International 19, 1973: pp. 720-739. Forget, P. "La politique de d6fense Fran~aise a travers les d6clarations de Mitterrand." D~fense Nationale 38, December 1982. "France and Africa." African Report 28(3), June 1983: pp. 921. "France--Afrique: Apr~s Pompidou." Jeune Afrique 692, 13 April 1974: pp. 14-21. "France---Cameroun." Afrique industrie 13(279), 15 June 1983: pp. 7-78. "Free-Masonry: The French Connection," African Confidential 28(1), 27 May 1987. Georgy, Guy. "La politique Africaine de la France." Mondes et Cultures 39(2), 1979: pp. 109-117. . "La politique de la France." Afrique Contemporaine, March/April 1979: p. 6. Guena, Yves. "De la France d'outre-mer a la Communaut6: L'6volution institutionelle et administrative." Mondes et Cultures 43(3), 1983: pp. 453-464. Guillemin, Jacques. "Les campagnes militaires fran~aises de la decolonisation en Afrique Sous-Saharienne." Le Mois en Afrique, June 1982, pp. 124-141. Hardy, J.P. "La mise sur pied des arm6es nationales Africaines." Revue Mistorique des Armies (2), 1983: pp. 90-95. Hayter, Teresa. "French Aid to Africa: Its scope and Achievements." International Affairs 41(2), April 1965, pp. 236251.

267

France in Black Africa Hazera, Jean-Claude. "Les Fran~ais en COte d'Ivoire jusqu'a quand?" Jeune Afrique 21(1082), 30 September 1981: pp. 116-120. Hernu, Charles. "S(~curit~ internationale et d~veloppement: La France et l'Afrique." Revue des Deux Mondes (8), August 1982: pp. 263-270. Hodgkin, Thomas, and Schacter, Ruth. "French Speaking West Africa in Transition." International Conciliation (528), May 1980. Hubbard, Diana. "Coface: Giving French Exporters An Edge." EconomicDigest 13, February 1981: pp. 5--6. Hugon, Philippe. "La politique Fran~aise de Coop@ration et la crise financiOre dans les pays d'Afrique Sous-Saharienne." Mondes en Developpement14(53), 1986: pp. 35-68. Hull, Galen. "The French Connection in Africa: Zaire and South Africa." Journal of Southern African Studies 5(2), April 1979: pp. 220--233. Isnard, Jacques. "La France cr6e une force antichars pour assister ses alliOs en Europe." Le Monde, 18 June 1983. Jalade, Max. "Francois Mitterrand en Afrique noire ou le voyage N~cessaire." Esope29(422), 15 June 1982: pp. 4148. "Kaddafi et Mitterrand ont reculG qui hOritera du Tchad?" Jeune Afrique (1238), 26 September 1984: pp. 22-28. Kalfl@che, Jean-Marc. "France: Pour redonner souffle a la coopOration." G~opolitiqueAfricaine (1), March 1986: pp. 5-26. Kramer, Jack. "Our French Connection in Africa." Foreign Policy 29, Winter, 1977-78, pp. 160--166. "L'Affaire Debizet: L'Afrique Francophone enfin dObarrass6 des rOseaux terroristes Gaullistes." Peuples Noirs--Peuples Africains 4(23), October 1981. "L'Afrique et la France dix ans apr@s l'indOpendance." Connaisse Afrique 37, September 1971: pp. 2-31.

268

Selected Bibliography "L'aide de la France au monde en d6veloppement en 1980." Statistiques et Etudes Financi~res, S6rie Rouge (4), 1982: pp. 15--47. L' Hullier, Fernand. "Les Gaullistes et l'Union Fran~aise: Action et r6flexion, 1943-1953." F.tudes Gaulliennes 6(22), April-July 1978: pp. 71-79. "La France en Afrique: Droite et gauche, la continuit& dans la continuit(~." Couranl Alternatif (28), Summer 1983: pp. 15-20. "La France Socialiste face au Tiers Monde." Critiques de I'Economie Politique (20), September 1982: pp. 8--42. La Grange, E. de. "Le G6n4ral de Gaulle et la d6colonisation." Etudes Gaulliennes (3-4), July-December 1973: pp. 180-195. Lamb, David. "A Different Path." The Wilson Quarterly 3(4), Autumn 1988: pp. 114-31. "La politique Fran~aise en Afrique." Nouvelle Revue des Deux Mondes (12), 1979: pp. 577-585. "La pr6sence militaire fran~aise en Afrique." Liberation Afrique, Supplement of Bulletin Cedetim 1, January--February-March 1979: pp. 9-16. "Le commerce de France--PVD in 1980, I." Marches Tropicaux et Medit~rraneens 37(1869), 4 September 1981: pp. 22612264. Le Comte, Bernard. "Que faire aujourd'hui; ici?" Economie et Humanisme 240, March-April 1978: pp. 57-74. Lellouche, Pierre, and Moisi, Dominique. "French Policy in Africa: A lonely battle against destabilization.'" International Security 3(4), Spring 1979: pp. 108-133. "Le 26me R.E.I. ~ N'djambour Ilk Coup d'oeil sur la 316me Brigade." Kepi Blanc (421), Aubagne, France, February 1983. "Les Africains jugent la France." ]eune Afrique 20(989), 28 November 1979: pp. 73-108.

269

France in Black Africa "Les investissements publiques fran~ais en Afrique noire Francophone au cour des cinq dernires ann6es (197276)." Europe-Outremer 54(564), January 1977: p. 56. "Les t e c h n i q u e s franqaises en Afrique: C o m m e n t les grandes compagnies se sont grosip~es pour exporter." Afrique Agriculture 72, August 1981: pp. 21-24. "Les vautours de Conakry." Le Monde, Paris, 1 November 1986. Lethu, Th6r6se. "Le 12~mesommet Franco-Africain." Afrique Industrie 16(338), 15 January 1986: pp. 6-11. Lewis, Flora. "Dregs of the Oil Crisis." New York Times, 20 November 1988, p. 23. Lewis, W.H. "Francophone Africa." Current History, March 1971: pp. 142-145. Liddell, Andrew. "Financial Cooperation in Africa: French Style." The Banker 129(643), September 1979: pp. 105111. Lockham, Robin. "Le militarisme fran~ais en Afrique." Politique Africaine II (5), February 1982: pp. 95-110. "M. Guy Penne quitte l'l~lys6e: Le bon moment?" Le Monde, Paris, 19-20 October 1986. Manue, Georges R. "Le Pr6sident Pompidou en Afrique noire: Tournant est pris." Revue des Deux Mondes (3) 1971: pp. 580--588. Marchand, Jean. "De Val@ry Giscard a Francois Mitterrand: La politique de la France en Afrique noire." Ecrits de Paris (430), December 1982: pp. 5--13. Marten, Guy. "Les fondements historiques, 6conomiques et politiques de la politique Africaine de la France: Du colonialisme au n6o-colonialisme." G~n&~re-Afrique21 (2), 1983: pp. 39--68. Martin, Nicolas. "L'enjeu africain et la politique franqaise d'assistance militaire." Strat~.gie-Afrique-Moyen Orient (13), 26me Trim, 1982: pp. 15-22. McKinlay, R.D., and Little, R.E "French Aid and Relationships: A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of

270

Selected Bibliography French Bilateral Aid, 1964--70." Development and Change 9(3), July 1978: pp. 459--478. Messmer, Pierre. "Le Gen. de Gaulle et la d~olonization." F.tudes Gaulliennes 6(22), April-July 1978: pp. 19-32. Michael, Marc. "Un programme r~formiste en 1919: Maurice Delafosse et la politique indigene en AOF." Cahiers d'F.tudes Africaines 15 (2), 1975: pp. 313--327. Moatti, G~rard. "La France et sot. Afrique." L'Expansion (224), 21 October-3 November 1983: pp. 173-183. Moisi, Dominique. "L'intervention dans la politique ~trang~re de la France." PolitiqueEtranger51(1), 1986: pp. 173180. Morel, Bernard. "La cooperation ~conomique avec les pays en d~veloppement." Mondes en D~veloppement 14(53), 1986: p. 259. Muledi, Sango. "Les accords militaires Franco-Africains d' ind~pendance." Peuples Noirs--Peuple Africains 4(19), January-February 1981: pp. 17-35. Newbury, C. "The Formation of the Government G~n~ral of French West Africa." Journal of African History 1 (1): pp. 111-128. NouaiUe-Degorce, Brigitte. "Bilan Politique de la Cooperation." Projet (165), May I982: pp. 547-558. Ogbuagu, S. "From Cooperation to Generalised Co-development: Alternative Models of Economic Relations?" The African Review 10(2), 1983: pp. 52-62. Ogden, John. "French in Gabon." Contemporary FrenchCivilization 8(3), Spring 1984: pp. 339-348. Ommi-Oz, Moshe. "La formation des cadres militaires Africains lots de la mise sur pied des armies nationales." Revue Fran~aised'Etudes PolitiquesAfricaines 12(133), January 1977: pp. 84-93. • "Les imp~ratifs de la politique militaire fran~aise en Afrique noire ~ l'~poque de la d6colonisation." Revue Fran~aise d'Etudes PoIitiques Africaines 12(134), February 1977: pp. 65-89.

271

France in Black Africa "OiJ va l'argent de la coop6ration?" Actuel D~velappement 32, September-October 1979: pp. 54-60. Pean, Pierre. "France-Afrique: S6curit6 contre matibres premi6res." Le Nouvel Economiste 79, 2 March 1977: pp. 4852. Plantey, Alain. "Independance et coop6ration." Revue Juridique et Politique 71(4), October-December 1977: pp. 1079-110Z • L'organisation de la coop(~ration." Espoir 12 October 1975: pp. 54--61. . "L'organisation de la coop6ration avec les pays d'Afrique Noire et Madagascar," Espoir 13 December 1975: pp. 38-46. Politique Africaine II (5), February 1982, Paris. Edition devoted to "La France en Afrique: Image et perceptions; pr6sence militaire, jeux politques, enjeux economiques." The most germane contributions were a. Quantin, Patrick. "La vision Gaullienne de l'Afrique noire: Permanences et adaptations." b. Dagut, J.L. "L'Afrique, la France et le monde dans le discours Giscardien." c. M~dard, J.E "La Conf6rence de Paris (3--4 November 1981): Le changement dans la continuit6." d. Richard, Alain. "Les Parisiens du concert: Discour m@tisse ou discour domine?" e. Bach, Daniel. "Dynamique et contradictions dans la politique africaine de la France: Les rapports avec le Nigeria (1960-81)." f. Hugon, Philippe. "L'Afrique noire Francophone: L'enjeu ~conomique pour la France." g. Luckman, Robin. "Le militarisme fran~ais en Afrique." Rondos, Alex. "Paris' African Pulse." West Africa 29, September 1980: pp. 1905-1906.

272

Selected Bibliography Ruiz Palmer, Diego A. "Between the Rhine and the Elbe: France and the Conventional Defense of Central Europe." Comparative Strategy 6(4), 1987: pp. 471-512. Saper, Tom. "'The EEC and Aid to Africa." InternationalAffairs 41(3), July 1979. Schwab, M. "The Political Relationship Between France and Her Former Colonies in the Sub-Saharan Region Since 1958." Centre d'Etudes Fran~;aises,1968: Amboise, p. 61. Servranckx, G6n6ral Jacques. "Les actions r6centes de la France en Afrique." Defense Nationale. "Sommet de Vittel." Jeune Afrique (1188) (articles on 10th Franco-African Conference). Soudan, Francois. "Les coop6rants ont-ils chang6s?" Jeune Afrique 23(1174), 6 July 1983: pp. 48--51. "Special Afrique." L'Express 1549, 14-20 March 1981: Paris, pp. 103--133. See especially Aron, Raymond, "La politique africaine de la France"; Bonazza, Patrick, and Esperendieu, Jacques, "A qui profite l'Afrique?" Stanisland, Martin. "Francophone Africa: The Enduring Connection." Annals of the American Academy 489, January 1987: pp. 51-62. Suret-Canale, Jean. "De la traite coloniale au n6ocolonialisme: L'impact sur les 6conomies d'Afrique tropicale d'influence fran~aise." Recherches lnternationales (13), September 1984: pp. 11-24. Tauscoz, J. "Le rapport Gorse sur la coop6ration." Esprit 40, November 1972: pp. 682-705. Trenard, Louis, "Une 6tude d'opinion, le voyage du G6n6ral de Gaulle en Afrique noire (a6ut 1958) vu par la presse." Etudes Gaulliennes C(22), April-July 1978: pp. 109-126. Trugnan, Roger. "La politique Africaine de la France." Cahiers du Communisme 62(1), January 1986: p. 94. Vakemtchouk, Romain. "La coop6ration militaire de l'Afrique noire avec les puissances--I. Avec la France." Afrique Contemporaine (127), September 1983: pp. 3-18.

273

France in Black Africa Veaud, Maurice. "La Caisse Centrale de Coop6ration l~conomique et les nouvelles orientations de la politique Fran~aise d'aide au d6veloppement." Af'rique Contemporaine (130), June 1984: pp. 3-20. Verin, Pierre. "Coop6ration et francophonie•" Mondes et Cultures 42(2), 1982: pp. 163-172• Vinay, Bernard• "La zone franc d'aujourd'hui•" Marches Tropicaux, 28 November 1986: p. 2987. Vinour, John. "Mitterrand's Grand Plan in Statescraft Goes Awry: Libya Fudges a Deal." New York Times, 25 November 1984: p. E-5. Wallerstein, Immanuel. "How Seven States Were Born in French West Africa." Africa Report VI, March 1961. Weiskel, Timothy C. "Mission civilisatrice." The Wilson Quarterly 3 (4), Autumn 1988: pp. 97-113. Whiteman, Kaye. "Dignity Against Dignity." West Africa, 39 October 1988, pp. 1824-29. • "President Mitterrand and Africa." African Affairs 82 (328), July 1983: pp• 329-343• Zecchini, Laurent. "Recentrage de la politique de coop6ration." Le Monde, 5 April 198Z • "Les tentations de reconqu6te du Pr6sident Tchadien. " Le Monde, 3 April 1986. • "La coop6ration selon le RPR: Les Francophones d'abord." La Monde, 2 April 1987, p. 3.

274

THE AUTHOR Ambassador Terry McNamara completed work on this book while assigned as a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University, having begun the project at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. Ambassador McNamara is one of the Department of State's most experienced Africanists. His first posting to Africa was in 1957 to Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Subsequent assignments have taken h im to Zaire, Tanzania, Zambia, Benin, and, as ambassador, to Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome e Principe. He has also served at the Department of State in Washington as a research analyst for Southern Africa and as an economist on the South African desk. In addition to his African assignments, Ambassador McNamara had three tours of duty in Vietnam, has been posted to Quebec and Beirut, and has served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. His training assignments have included periods at the Foreign Service Institute, the Armed Forces Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Department of State's "Senior Seminar."

275

INDEX population and citizenship Abidjan, Ivory Coast, 103, 105, statistics, 36-37, 85, 136 211, 230 redistribution of revenues, Abomey, Dahomey,24 79, 82 AEF. See Afrique Equatoriale role u n d e r Constitution of Fran~aise Fourth Republic, 60 Afrique ]~quatoriale Fran~aise settlement of French citizens (AEF) in, 84 administration of, 32-33 tax collection, 31-32 educational facihties, lack of, trade with France, 100 37 two-college electorate sysestablishment of, 28 tem, 61 monetary institutes, 110-111 Ahmadou, 11, 13, 14 population statistics, 136 role under Constitution of Algeria civil war, 70, 78, 95, 156, 191 Fourth Republic, 60 French population, 136 settlement of French citizens relations with France, 172 in, 84 s u p p o r t for Free F r e n c h Antibes, France Franco-African conference cause, 42, 44 (1987), 186 trade with France, 100 two-college electorate sys- AOF. See Afrique Occidentale Fran~aise tem, 61 Afrique Occidentale Fran~aise Archimard, Colonel, 16 Attali, Jacques, 205 (AOF) economic subsidy to France, Aubame, Jean-Hilaire, 55 Aurillac, Michel, 209 39 educational facilities, 36-37 Balladur, l~douard, 227 establishment of, 28 Bamako, Mali, 37, 63 export statistics, 82, 109 Houphouet undermining of, Bank of France, 118, 125 Banque Centrale des l~tats de 64 l ' A f r i q u e de l ' O u e s t loyalty to P~tain, 42, 45--46 (BCEAO), 111, 114, 118, monetary institutes, 110--111 119, 121,126 political parties, 63, 69

277

France in Black Africa Banque Centrale des I~tats de l'Afrique I~quatoriale et du Cameroun (BCAEC), 112, 116 Banque des I~tats de l'Afrique Centrale (BEAC), 116121, 124 BCAEC. See Banque Centrale des t~tats de l'Afrique I~quatoriale et du Cameroun BCEAO. See Banque Centrale des I~tats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest BDS. See Bloc D4mocratique S6n6galaise BEAC. See Banque des I~tats de l'Afrique Centrale Behanzin (king of Fon people), 24 Bell, Doula Manga (prince of Cameroon), 62 Benin. See also former name, Dahomey clandestine French mercenary operation, 181-182 French military technical assistance programs, 148 French population decline, 138 security relations with France, 151 Socialism in, 103 trade with France, 103 Biafra, 179-180 Binger, Gustave, 23 Bloc Africaine, 62 Bloc D~mocratique S6n6galaise (BDS), 67

278

Boisson, Pierre, 42, ~! 46 Bokassa, Jean, 145,167, 169, 170, 198, 219 Bongo, Omar (Albert-Bernard), 170, 181, 192, 194, 203, 205 Borgnis-Desbordes, Colonel, 13-14 Bouar, Central African Republic, 152 Brazzaville, Congo, 21, 28, 33, 48 Brazzaville Conference (1944), 48--49, 50, 51-55, 58, 71, 72 Burkina Faso. See also former name, Upper Volta poverty, 219 security relations with France, 151 Socialism in, 103 trade with France, 103 Burundi military cooperation agreement with France, 149 relationship with France, 184 Caisse Centrale de Coop4ration Economique (CCCE), 110 Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer (CCFOM), 83, 110 CAMA. See Central African Monetary Area Cameroon c o o p e r a t i o n accords with France, 96 economic problems, 122-124, 210

Index extraterritorial trade, 100 as former German colony, 23, 9O French interest and presence in, 104, 133, 210, 221, 229 French military activity, 104, 133, 210, 221, 229 national army, 144 national languages, 236 political parties, 63 security relations with France, 149 s u p p o r t for Free F r e n c h cause, 42, 44 CAMU. See Central African Monetary Union CCCE. See Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique CCFOM. See Caisse Centrale de la France d'Outre-Mer Central Africa. See also Afrique ]~quatoriale Fran~aise franc zone, 107 French military intervention, 165 monetary negotiations with France, 112, 114 Central African Monetary Area (CAMA), 116, 117, 119122, 125 Central African M o n e t a r y Union (CAMU), 115. See also C e n t r a l A f r i c a n Monetary Area Central African Republic as base for French troops, 151 cooperation accords with France, 96

French military intervention, 165, 167, 169 French population decline, 138 military relationship with France, 149 poverty, 219 CFA franc. See Communaut6 F i n a n c i e r e Africaine franc CFAO. See Compagnie Frangaise de l ' A f r i q u e Occidentale Chad c o o p e r a t i o n accords with France, 96 French military involvement in, 151, 153, 158, 165, 166, 169-173, 207, 222, 235 Libya's threat to, 151, 179, 206 military relationship with France, 149, 151 north-south conflicts, 91 poverty, 219 revenue statistics, 32 s u p p o r t for Free F r e n c h cause, 42 Cheyson, Claude, 209 Chirac, Jacques, 173, 196--198, 20Z 211 Chirac government, 158, 204 Claustre, Fran~oise, 173 Cocoa production, 126, 232 Coll6ge des Censeurs, 117 Commodities markets, decline of, 106, 122, 223, 237-238 Common market. See European Economic Community

279

France in Black Africa Communaut6 Financi/~re Africaine (CFA) franc, 111, 115, 118, 212 convertibility to French franc, 112, 117, 119 future prospects for, 125, 126, 231-232, 234 overvaluation oL 126, 231 Comoro Islands, 181 C o m p a g n i e F r a n ~ a i s e de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), 105 Compagnie Normande, 4 Conakry, Guinea, visit by President Giscard (1978), 184, 185 Congo balance-of-payments deficits, 122 cooperation accords with France, 96 French population increase, 138 French private investment in, 105 security relations with France, 151 Socialism in, 103 trade with France, 103 Congo Free State, 32 Congo River and basin, 17-19, 20-22, 25 Conseil d'Entente, 95, 112 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, 33, 93, 157, 186, 210211, 220 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61

280

Cooperation accords, FrancoAfrican, 97-98, 129 military accords, 96, 148-149, 150, 151-152, 167 monetary accords, 96, 99, 110-111, 112, 115 Cot, Jean-Pierre, 125, 134, 199201, 202, 204, 208-209 Cotonou, Dahomey, 24, 181 Culture. See Language and culture, French Currencies, franc zone. See Communaut6 Financi6re Africaine franc; French franc Da Brazza, Pierre Savorgnan, 17-20, 21, 28 Dahomey, 24, 90, 96, 165. See also present name, Benin Dakar, Senegal, 104-105 capital of AOb, 28, 33 French military bases, 152, 153 French trading post, 8, 105 medical school, 37 Tirailleurs, 47 visit by Chirac (1986), 211 D'Arboussier, Gabriel, 64 Debizet, Pierre, 192, 197 Debray, R6gis, 205 Defferre, Gaston, 70, 71, 204 De Gaulle, Charles, 42, 43, 50, 54, 65, 95, 157, 166, 186 at Brazzaville Conference, 48--49, 50, 54, 72 and breakup of federations, 80--81, 86

Index and Constitution of Fifth Republic, 72-73, 74-75, 157 as Free French leader, 42, 46, 48-49 military strategy, 143, 15615Z 166 relationships in Africa, 186-189 support of Biafra, 180 termination of assistance to Guinea, 77-78 tour of French Africa (1958), 74-75, 76 De Grosouvre, Francois, 205 Delauney, Maurice, 194 De I'Isle, Bri6re, 11 Delors, Jacques, 232 Denard, Bob, 181 Dia, Mamadou, 67 Diallo, Yacine, 62 Diseases, tropical, 19, 136 Ebou4, F61ix, 42-43, 43, 44 ~5 at BrazzaviUe Conference, 53, 54 establishment of notable dvolud status, 44, 45, 53, 57 support for de Gaulle, 48 Economy and finance. See also Monetary system, Franco-African economic d e p e n d e n c e of French black Africa, 8185 economic d e v e l o p m e n t in French black Africa, 8.586 Franco-African commerce, 99-110

French aid to former African dependencies, 109-110 French private investment in Africa, 105-106 Education and schooling African students in France, 132-133, 141 Francophone Africa, 108, 128, 129, 134-135 French colonial federations, 36-37 EEC. See European Economic Community Elections, political elected assemblies, 58-61 election of 2 January 1956, 697O 11th Airborne Division, 154, 158 Elisabethville, Zaire, 177, 179 E1 Mina, Ghana, 4 Equatorial Guinea, 120 Etats G6n6raux de la Colonisation Fran~aise, 56 European Economic Community (EEC) African associate members, 102, 103, 109 aid to Francophone Africa, 102, 224, 234, 237 French membership in, 101, 104 proposed European monetary union, 22Z 232 l~vian, France Franco-African summit (1983), 205 FAC. See Fonds d'Aide et de Coop6ration

281

Frmwe in Black Africa Faidherbe, Louis L6on Cdsar, 69, 26, 28, 34 FAR. See Force d'Action Rapide Faulques, Lieutenant Colonel, 178-179 FIDES. See Fonds d'Investissement et de D4veioppe o ment t~conomique et Social Fifth French Republic, 72-81, 158, 210 Constitution of, 33, 71-75, 93, 157, 186, 210-211, 220 FLNC. See Front de Lib6ration Nationale Congolaise Foccart, Jacques, 80--81, 86, 186198, 211 Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation (FAC), 110 Fonds d'Investissement et de D6veloppement I~conomique et Social (FIDES), 57, 75, 83, 110 Fon people, 24 Force d'Action Rapide (FAR), 161-163 Fort Lamy, Chad, 43 French military base, 152 Fourth French Republic, 55-58, 70, 72, 89, 200, 203 Constitution of, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61 elected assemblies, 58-61 Franco-Prussian War, 9-11, 13 Francs. See Communaut6 Financi@re Africaine franc; French franc Franc zone, 99-100, 110--115,212

budgetary deficits of members, 122, 223, 224 future prospects for, 125--12Z 230-232, 234 liquidity problems, 106-107 structural factors, 107 Free French, 42, 44, 46, 55 Freemasonry, 202-203 Fr4jus, France military training school, 144, 145 French Air Force, 155, 160 French Army, 41, 75, 144, 156, 157, 178 marine infantry, 10, 143, 159 officer corps, 9-10, 146 revolt of 13 May 1958, 72 French Equatorial Africa. See A f r i q u e l~quatoriale Fran~ise French franc devaluations of, 122, 123 parity with franc zone currencies, 100, 111, 117 French Navy, 155--156 French Revolution, 5, 35 French Union, 57, 60 French West Africa. See Afrique Occidentale Franqaise French West Indies, 34, 57 Front de Lib6ration Nationale Congolaise (FLNC), 167 Front National, 58 Futa Djallon region, Guinea, 11, 16 Futa-Toro region, Senegal, 8 Gabon balance-of-payments deficits, 122

282 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Index commodity prices decline, 223 c o o p e r a t i o n accords with France, 96 economic prosperity of, 109, 221 explorations of da Brazza, 1718 French colonial initiative, 17 French commercial activity in, 104, 105-106, 133 French interests and presence in, 153, 174-175, 210, 221, 229 French military intervention, 165 French private investment in, 105 population statistics, 104, 138 security relations with France, 149 s u p p o r t for Free F r e n c h cause, 44 Gallieni, J.S., 11-14, 16, 35 Galopin, Pierre, 173 Garde, Governor General, 39 Ghana, 23, 126 Giraud, Henri, 46 Giscard d'Estaing, Val6ry military intervention in Africa, 166, 167, 169, 219 practice of Franco-African relations, 204, 219 strengthening of intervention forces, 158-159 visit to C o n a k r y , G u i n e a (1978), 184, 185 Gor6e, Senegal, 4, 8, 37

G r o u p e m e n t A6roport Parachutiste, 157 Gueye, Lamine, 62, 63, 67 Guiana, 57 Guinea, Republic of clandestine French intelligence operations, 176 economy, 222 Mandinka empire, 11, 16 p r e p a r a t i o n for independence, 89 RDA affiliates, 66 refusal to join French community, 75, 77, 129 relations with France, 77, 96, 98, 151, 184 Socialism in, 103 trade with France, 103 and WAMU, 121 HabrG Hiss6ne, 172 Holle, Paul, 8 Houphouet-Boigny, F61ix, 6466, 65, 67, 70, 183, 203204, 233 and Constitution of Fifth Republic, 73, 75 drafting of Ioi-cadre, 70, 71, 2O4 on Ivory Coast cocoa production, 232 as leader of RDA, 64, 65, 66, 79 and Libyan threat to Chad, 170 opposition to West African federation, 76, 96 political party affiliations, 62, 63, 64, 203-204

283

France in Black Africa

refusal to join French community, 95-96 rivalry with Senghor, 66, 67, 73

French population decline, 137, 229 French private investment in, 105 French technical assistance personnel, 130, 132 independence, 33, 87, 89 population statistics, 103, 106, 137-138, 229 prosperity oL 90, 109, 210, 221 resentment of federalism, 33, 79, 96 security relations with France, 149 teachers colleges, 37 Ivory trade, 33

IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). See World Bank IME See International Monetary Fund Indrpendants d'Outre-Mer (IOM), 66, 69 Indochina, 84, 95, 143, 156 International Bank for Reconstruction and Developrnent (IBRD). See World Bank International Monetary Fund Jean I (emperor of Central African Republic). See Bo(IMF), 120, 123, 126, 210, kassa, Jean 212, 224, 232, 237 Journiac, Renr, 198 IOM. See I n d r p e n d a n t s d'Outre-Mer Katanga Province, Zai're Ivory Coast, 95 French paramilitary operaacquisition by France, 23 tion (1961), 176-179 cocoa production, 126, 232 cooperation accords with Keita, Modibo, 89, 164-165 Kerekou, Mathieu, 181 France, 96 dependence on French subsi- Khadafi, Colonel, 171, 179, 236 Kirsch, Martin, 198 dies, 233 economic problems, 122, 210, Lacaze, Jeannou, 179 223, 229 French commercial activity Lagos, Nigeria British occupation of, 24 in, 103, 133 French interest and presence Language and culture, French in, 153, 174-175, 210, 221, French as official language, 229 108, 109, 236 French military technical asimportance in Francophone sistance programs, 148 black Africa, 108, 127-

284

Index

129, 130, 133-134, 235236 mission civilisatrice, 99 Laval, Pierre, 45 Law. See Loi-cadre Leclerc, Captain, 44 Leopold II (king of Belgium), 20-21 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 58 Les Marousins, 9-10, 159 LibreviUe, Gabon, 19, 28 as French commercial base, 105 French military base, 152 French military intervention, 165 Libya commercial relations with France, 172 threat to Chad, 151, 170, 171, 179, 206 Loi-cadre, 33, 61, 70-72, 73, 74, 80, 85, 220 Lore6 Conference (1986), 184 Mali c o o p e r a t i o n accords w i t h France, 96 French military technical assistance programs, 148 monetary issues, 112, 115 poverty, 90, 219 security relations with France, 151 Socialism in, 103 trade with France, 103 Mall Federation, 87, 115, 164, 165, 220

Mauritania c o o p e r a t i o n accords w i t h France, 96 French military activity, 164, 165 independence, 87 m o n e t a r y a g r e e m e n t with France, 112 security relations with France, 151 M'Ba, L@on, 165, 194 Medina, Senegal, 8 Merle, Colonel, 180 Messmer, Pierre, 177 Military, French bases in Africa, 152-153 clandestine paramilitary operations Benin, 181-182 Biafra, 179-180 Katanga Province, Zaire, 176-179 colonial army, 143, 144, 156 intervention activity in Africa, 164-182 Chad, 151, 153, 158, 165, 166, 169-173 covert intervention, 175176 intervention forces, 156-164, 169, 176-179, 219 number of troops in Africa, 153, 154 organization of African national armies, 143--146 presence force in Africa, 154156, 234

285

France in Black Africa

relationships with former African dependencies cooperation accords, 96, 148-149, 150, 151-152, 167 future implications for, 173-175, 234--235 strategy, 143, 146-148, 156, 157, 166 training schools, 144, 145 Ministry of Cooperation, 183, 204, 208-210, 214, 215 Ministry of Defense, 213-214 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 214-215 Mitterrand, Francois, 64, 72, 198, 205, 213, 215, 225 appeal for aid to Francophone Africa, 186, 213 conduct of African relations, 202-207 military i n t e r v e n t i o n in Chad, 169-172 relationships with African leaders, 200-201 Mitterrand, Jean-Christophe, 202, 203, 205 Mobutu (president of Zaire), 166, 167, 168, 170, 179, 205 Mollet, Guy, 70, 204 Monetary system, Franco-African. See also Central African Monetary Union; Franc zone; West African Monetary Union colonial m o n e t a r y institutions, 111-112, 114 cooperation accords, 96, 99, 110-111, 112, 115

286

future implications for, 125-127 monetary unions, 115, 117, 119, 120 Montaignac, Admiral de, 17 Morocco, 35, 84, 172 Moulet, Marius, 63 Moumie, F61ix, 176 Mouvement R6publicain Populaire (MRP), 62 Mouvement Unique de la Renaissance Franqaise, 62 MRP. See Mouvement R4publicain Populaire Niamey, Niger, 152 Niger, 96, 151 European population, 138 military relationship with France, 149 Nigeria, 97, 109, 126, 226 Niger River and basin, 14--16, 23-25, 105 Nile River basin, 25 9th Marine Infantry Division, 3, 154 Notable ~volu~, 44 45, 53, 57 Nouakchott, Mauritania, 202 Nucci, Christian, 202 Nyerere, Julius, 129 OAS. See Organisation de l'Arm6e Secr6te Olympio, President, assassination of, 112, 165 Omar, El Hadj, 8, 11 Operation Barracuda, 167, 169, 219 Operation Sparrow Hawk, 171

Index

O r g a n i s a t i o n de l ' A r m 6 e Secr6te (OAS), 191 Ouidah, Benin, 4 Parti-D6mocratique de la C6te d'Ivoire (PDCI), 63, 64, 75 Parti D@mocratique Guin6en (PDG), 75 PDCI. See Parti-D6mocratique de la Chte d'Ivoire PDG. See Parti D~mocratique Guin6en Pelletier, Jacques, 210, 216 Penne, Guy, 201, 202, 203, 205 P~tain, Henri, 41, 45 Pleven, Ren6, 48, 49, 51, 53 Poher, Alain, 191, 194 Politics. See also Elections, political political parties, African, 6167 Pompidou, Georges, 166, 184, 188, 189, 194, 195 Population Africans living in France, 139-141 French population in Africa, 135-139 Private investment, 105-106

R6union, 34, 57 Richelieu, Cardinal, 4 Robert, Maurice, 176, 193, 209-120 Rocard, Michel, 158, 210, 212, 216 RPF. See Rassembleraent du Peuple FranCais Rufisque, Senegal, 8 Rwanda, 149, 184

SAC. See Service d ' A c t i o n Civique Sahel droughts, 141, 151, 218 lack of French interest and presence in, 133, 138, 228 Saint-Louis, Senegal, 4, 8, 28, 87 S~o Tom(~e Principe, 121 SDECE. See Service de Documentation Ext6rieure et de Contre-Espionnage Senegal, 11, 26, 34, 67, 90 balance-of-payments problems, 122 British occupation, 5 coastal trading posts, 4, 5, 8 c o o p e r a t i o n accords with France, 96 French interests and presRabah, Sultan, 22 ence in, 104, 153, 174Rassemblement D6mocratique 175, 210, 221 Africain (RDA), 63, 64, French military technical as65, 66, 69 sistance programs, 148 R a s s e m b l e m e n t du Peuple m o n e t a r y agreement with Frangais (RPF), 190, 191 France, 112 RDA. See Rassemblement D6population statistics, 36-37 mocratique Africain

287

France in BlackAfrica preparation for independence, 89 security relations with France, 149 Senegal River Valley, 4, 8, 9 Senghor, L6opold, 66--67, 6Z 71, 87, 165 and Constitution of Fifth Republic, 71, 73 political affiliations, 62, 66-67 rivalry with Houphouet, 66, 67, 73 as university professor, 37, 66 Service d'Action Civique (SAC), 192, 193, 197 • Service de Documentation Ext~rieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), 176, 192-193 SFIO. See Socialist Party Sierra Leone, 23 Sissoko, Fily Dabo, 62 Slave trade, 3--5 Socialist Party (SFIO), 62, 66, 69 Soustelle, Jacques, 190 Sudan (French), 16, 22, 37, 66 Tanzania, official language of, 129 Tax collection, "French colonial federations, 31-32, 39 Tirailleurs Senegalaise, 47, 143 Togo as beneficiary of French assistance, 210 cooperation accords with France, 96 coup d'etat, 112, 165 extraterritorial trade, 100

288

foreign population, 138 as former German colony, 2.3 m o n e t a r y agreement with France, 112 security relations with France, 149 Tokolor empire, 11, 13, 16 Tokolor people, origin of, 8 TourG S6kou, 11, 72, 77, 78, 78, 184, 185, 205 clandestine French operation against, 176 death of, 98 economic mismanagement, 222 as leader of PDG, 75 rejection of French community, 75, 78 Trade, Franco-African, 99-109, 226 decline in commodities markets, 106, 122, 123, 223, 237-238 French colonial empire, 23, 32-33 Treiche-Lapl~ne, Marcel, 23 Trinquier, Roger, 177, 178 Tshombe, Moise, 16Z 177 Tunisia, 84, 172 UDSR. See Union D6mocratique et S o c i a l i s t e de la R~sistance Union D~mocratique et Socialiste de la R4sistance (UDSR), 204 Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), 164, 176

Index

Unions, monetary, 115, 117, 119, 120. See also Central African Monetary Union; West African Monetary Union UPC. See Union des Populations du Cameroun Upper Volta, 96, 97, 165. See also present name, Burkina Faso. Vedrine, Hubert, 205 WAMU. See West African Monetary Union Wars Algerian civil war, 70, 78, 95, 156, 191 Franco-Prussian War, 9-11, 13

Indochina, 95, 143, 156 World War I, 10-11 World War II, 44, 47, 67-68 West Africa, 25, 112 franc zone, 107 monetary negotiations with France, 112, 114 West African Monetary Union (WAMU), 115, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125 World Bank, 118, 210, 212, 224, 237 World War I, 10-11 World War II, 67-68 Allied war effort, 44, 47 YaoundG Cameroon, 116 Yaound6 Convention, 102 Youlou, Abb4, 152, 165, 174 Zaire, 149, 167, 184

289

F R A N C E in BLACK AFRICA

Text and heads set in Palatino Book design by Editorial Experts, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia Cover mechanical prepared by Laszlo L. Bodrogi Maps prepared by Nancy G. Bressi Advisory readers

Peter Duignan, Hoover Institution, Stanford University William J. Foltz, Yale University Andrew L. Steigman, Georgetown University Editorial readers

James C. Gaston, National Education Corporation Thomas A. Julian, Institute for National Strategic Studies NDU Press editor

Thomas Gill

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Lieutenant General Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF President INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES Colonel A r t h u r T. Fintel, USA Acting Director

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• .. the best concise description of the post-independence Franco-African institutional structure• in a c t i o n . . .

William J. Foltz Yale University

As France approaches major decisions about its "European vocation" vs. its "African vocation," this book will provide the basis for understanding the French internal debate of the next f e w years• Andrew L• Steigman Georgetown University

~ •

National Defense University Washington, D.C. 20319-6000