Foundations of Dharmakirti's Philosophy

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

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Tom Tillcnwu (chaU). UNwrri,, -/r.-IW JUM! C lbQOn, UlUllmi,,#fc.Jifi-iA. s.Gwctp Imyfu.. WiPic.. C,ol'. M-'-ta

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J"'"" c,..o. H.,... U";'-';7 Paul Ham-. UrUwrri7 t{Cnrtmru,. N,., ZtJn.J Toni Huhn-. V".-..rV U.wn.u,. N,.,ZaltuJ Shotyu KaIJUA, Hi~ UttiWl'1iIJ Thuprm JinIN Lanpi. J,.sri_ t{TiWu.t et.ain, M_.I Frank RqnoIds. u.mtlU, U";wrrilJ #/ OK. E. Gene Smilh, Tija"ff &MbiJ.t Rl»lIm c",ItT, NtMI Y. ,.t Cristina Schcrm.sdu.ub, U,.;.".pIJ.fUu.ffM Enuc Swnkdlncr. u"illmu, #!V"wro". Leonard van du Kuijp. H_'" UIIiwni'J

STUDIES IN I ND IAN AND T IB ETAN BUDDHI SM

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKI RTI 'S PHILOSOPHY John D. Dunne

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John O. Duruw. P, an. - (Studies in Indian and lIbmn Buddhism) Include. bibliopphical ~krcnca and inr.ks.. ISBN ~161 71-1"'X (pbk. : aUt. pipet) I. DIwmakfini, rm am. L Yogt ....tan (Bu.ddhlun}-Eatly...orb 10 ltoo. I. Tide. II. sma. BQ7!19.D·m F68 100-4 Fouoouion olDtwrn.akini'. pohiIo.ophy I

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Coments Preface Abbcniarions

I'

A Note 0 0 Ibe Sanskril and TIbetan Tnmlarjoru INTR OOl!CT ION

III

, I

" I

PUMAI:fA Ttu:ou: DHAIlMAItIllTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

1.1 TIN l'rocf!U lI(Knllwirt,,znJ lu Instn""4'rIt

1. 1

IS IS

Two Ubiquitous lrutrumenu: Peraylion and Inference

l.Z

Sham:!. No6oru Concerning PerccpruaJ A-wareneq

Z}

Slwod Notions Concerning Inference The Basic SrnJcmre ofInfttma:

zs

16

The Evidence-PrMicue R&don and 1[5 Exemplifiation

1.8

The Evidence-Subject Relation

H

A Restatement

U

Pramera; 1M -&.r

u

The Simplicity of [he RaJ and a Fundamental Difference

]7

I.' l'u'l!M

G

Cmtat

1S

1·4

P4i"ts4Diwr:m«: TlNAcriD""IUiA,nll

I. S

Sumnwry

p

1

DHAIlMAItIllT I'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

n

1..1

1M Sub ofANIiysis.· DJu.mutkirtii Mnh6ti

n

.11

49

CONTENTS

~"

External Realism as a l...cvd of Analysis Divergent Ince!prmtions of External Realism

6,

79

1.)

79

MQrt D1I P.rtit:14ltm The PC'rcqnibk as Ultimacdy Real

8.

The U\cimardy Real as Inaprasiblc and Momentary

Do Paniculan: Have Sp:atw 1.1

.

The Two PrIlmf1i14 The Two Rc:a1irics

ExtC'nsion~

"

,8

Utliwrs;t/s

II}

Summ2ty of Oturmakini's ApDh.-Thtory

u6

Concerning Sameness or Effect

1

Art I lniycrsa ls Pcrmaocnr>

116

Three Ways of Coruuuing ApQIM

1,1

SVABHAVAPRATlB.ANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFIIRENCI!

, .1 &/atilUl U,rollth Svabhava:

&YO"" ~u,.Prt:sma.

The Two ScRSC$ of $lMbIMw

IS)

Swbh411t1 as · Propeny-

IU

SWlbhillfJU

·Naru~·

Naturc-Jl!/tbhilllf and the Dusal Complex The Subi«t (Jbtt,.",;,,) and SlNIhblilNl as -Nawrc" p TIN PrwIllCtum-mDtit ({the Svabhavapratibandha Some Igoes in the: Applicacion of me Production-mode Concerning Necessity

' oj

LIS

158 161

169 171

In 181

The Detcrmilllllrion of the Production-mode

191

0" tbr &1A1i4nship Jmwn.n ITIpmyilnd MUJI"

19)

Some HeuristK Tunu

196

The Subordination of Propcny TO Narure

198

H Svabluva-l'ViMna."" tiN IJmti".m«k A Few Pmblems

10)

118

CONTEN TS ..

4.1

I NSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYINC THI1. SOU RCIlS OF KNOWLEDC E

22}

PrimiJ:aya III

U}

~/nstrllmmJ4lity"

Purpox and Instrumentality

1.19

The Role of Scripture

1)1

A 5«:ming Ci«:uluity

2.})

SaipturaJ Inference and Dharmakini's

Rtjecrion of C redibility Axiological Concerns: Murual Rtslrunl of Path and Goal

1)9

l..4S

.p DIMmuJtirti on /nstrJlmenllWl]: 71N &rlinl CtllnmcnllJr;.u A(W..",

2.,:2-

Some Basic DdinilMJn5

1S)

-rdie Funaion" (IfT'lhUriJ ll)

156

lrutrumentality (prtlm4l!Ji1) in Terms ofTwo Efftnl

160

lruuumentality in T emu of Ihe Mediated Effect

instrumenwity in Tctnu of the Unmcdiated Effect

161. 168

The Two Effeca and the Two ScnICS of AnlMJrriy4

171

The Primacy of hrrqlirthil

178

Instturncnra.li£Y in Terms of Human Aims: Some Problems and Solutions

280

A Disparity in T ime

181

ObstruCled Action

2.85

PctCCplion and Confirmation

Perception as Motivalor (prilll{lnAJ:t,): The Question ofNovdty Infcrcncc. Error. and TnufWOnhines.s Ultimale and Conventional PrilwUM CONCLUSION

Nlfturr. P""!'tUn. ifNi RLfi_mr

187 198 )10

)4 ]t9 )10

CO NT ENTS

~

Appendix ofTransladons

)31

A Nott 0" UK TTllmlAh'om

HI

I.

PVSVad PV'.J
m

1.

PVSVad PV,.68-7J

H9

). PVSVad PVl.IJJ-1
m

PVl.~14-U.J

)61

4. PVSV ad

S. PV1.1-4 with SrImiOI'lS fmm PVP llNi PVT

l7<

6. PVJ.l- IOwith Srlmiom fmm PVP llNi PIT

39'

7. PVJ.l9
396

8. INmmmtlltiry ill tk Herubindu (HB: ~ ·. lJ-j ·. t6)

."

5

BIBLIOGRAPHY

INDEX

4'9

Preface

HP.N I FIRST P.NCOONTUtlD BUDDHIST thought some ~f1[y years ago, the Buddhist analysis of identity especially caught my anention , and this soon Iw me to a study ofN:igirjuna. k is perhaps common, my first artempa at reading Nigirjuna wc:tt confused and confwing, but ali is leu common, I abo was able to consull two fine Buddhist thinkers: Tara Tulku Rinpoche, a well-known scholar in the Tibetan Gdug (Dtt [II!') U'adirion, and Robe" Thunnan, who had invited Tara Tulku to teach lit Amherst College at the time. Both Thurman and Tara Tulku encouf'llgN me to study me woru of Je Tsongkhapa (Rje T song kha pa; 1357- 1419), whose reading of Nagarjuna fo rms the philosophical bedrock of the Gelug tradition. On Tsongkhapa's interpretacion, the Uy to understanding N;igirjuna lies largely in the proper USC of a certain style of reasoning: namely, the system of inferential reasoning devdoped by Dharmakini, :a renowned South kian Buddhist of the stvenm century (CE.). T uming, to DharmaIdni's works. I 500n encountered a host of compet:ing--cven incompacible--interpretations among the numerous commentluors on Dharmalcini's thought in Tibet. An :attempt to :accoum for these differences. along with the ,hetr interest and difficulty of the m:areri:a1. soon drew me into an intense study of Dharmmni during my gl'llldwte work at Harvard Uni-

W,

versIty.

Under the guidance of M2S2toshi N:ag:atomi and M. If-wid Eckel, the: focus of my rescuch on Dh21malcirti moved to the South kian interpretations Wt prt'CC'dc: and inform the: highly disp:aflue re:ad.ings of Tibetan cxc:getes. I mwt :admit that. at first, I sought to determine which Tibetan reading was "the correct~ intc:rpretUKm in light of South Asian pr«edena. but it did nOt take long for this approach to strike me ali hopelessly nme and. in the end. entirdy uninteresting. Instead, I sought to conrcxrualiu the

"

'"

PREFACE

divergence of TIbetan opinion by understanding the history of the interpretation of Dlwmakini's mouglll in South Asia iuclf-:a shift encour· aged by my gradu;nc work with Charles Hal.I~. A grant from American In5(irulc oflndian Studies enabled me to spc:nd (W() years at the Ccmrallnstitute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Samath, where I read commentaries on Dhannaldrti's works with Prof. Rim SaJ'!l1w Tripi~i. and this pt:riod in India was crilical lo my resorch. E~n in the Sanskrit works of South Asia. howcvtt. the inu:rprttation ofDhannUim's thought develops and diverges (0 a wide alent; hence. with the mnaned hdp o(Tom Tillcmans, I setded t'VCl'Ltwdly on a focused accoUnt of the c:arlie:st South

me

Asian interpretations of Dharmwrti as the subjm- of my doctoral d~r­ alion (1m), which is dftttively the fim draft of this book. As I was completing my doctoral work. Gco'ld Dreyfus's !WopW'" Rt~lilJ,

an eltmsivc study of the Tibetan interpretations of Dharmakini, appeared in print. ThaI work, along with numerous conversations with Dreyfus. aided me considerably in my research. While tremendously helpful , Dreyfus's study of the Tibetan interpm::ations also highlighted the nttd fo r a similar, historical KCOUiU that focuses on a specific South Asian iiUerpm::adon. This book contributes to fulfilling that nttd. My dissemtion built on Int work of numtrous sc:holan, and in tht course of the substantial revision) that led to mil book, many res:pond<ed with helpful comments and suggestions. Tom TiUmwu conrinued to p~ vide the son of advice wh~ pel'$picuous practicality is matched by the keen philosophical insighu on which it resu. Ernst Steink.ellner, whOK work figures prominendy at crucial juncrures of my argumem, took the trouble: to go through the enure text- His critiques. suggestions. and encouragement have added greatly to this book. ShOryU Kabura likewise provided a number of luggcnions, some through an attnded and entertaining debate about paniculars. Brendan Gillon's careful and detailed respofUCJ wen: esptcia.lly hdpful for darifying my analysis ofDharmakini', ontology. Eli Franco provided a comprehensive response 10 my discussion of justificatinn or -inslrumenCiliry- (p,..lfIIirrJNV that heipM me to clarify my interpretation. HcJmut ~r dirr:ctcd me to some important passages and provided welcome encouragement. And Richard Hayes's pithy remarks proved especially helpful in reconceiving the overall COnten of my interptetatlon . Many others who work on Dh:um.akini and related iuuc:s aided me in varimu ways. A few ,hal enme ~ily to mind are T ab.d!i Iw:ao. Birgit Kellner, Horst Lasic, Parim.al Pam, Ernst Preu, and Mark Sideriu. In this

PREfACE

regard. I must especiallytlunk Mardt Mtjorand Piotr BaIcrrowicz.ofWar· uw Univen:i(),', Orienr:a.l Irmitute for organiz..ing in 1001 a mOl( fruidul seminar where, amid the beauty of the Polish countryside, debates on Ohar· malUni (and much d5c besides) went on through the night. O n that occa· sion, and on others as well. I am sure thar some critic:a.l comment or quiet suggestion has proved helpful in ways mat I ha~ failed to notice. To all rhosc mar have grme unrhanlcM. I apnlngiu lOr my lOrgrrfi.llnes.,. Having joined the faculty of the University of WISCOnsin· Madison in 1999, I began to work intensively with students. and although various responsibilities nude ir difficult to begin any se:rious m-isions before 100). I managed to usc the early VttSion of my manuscript in a ft:w of my semi· nars. Students. I ha~ learned, arc cxcdlent reachers, and their questions and arguments

::add~

much to my thinking. ~ thl!' manulCrip( movll'd more

rapidly rowvd its final form . twO graduate students assisted me as editors. Eddy Falls read me manuscript with an ~ to the arguments. and his com· menu hdped to sharpen my discussion on a number of points. Q uisuan Hmcn: went through the whole work. including noubly me Sanskrit and Tibetan citations. and his contribution was likcwUc welcome. ThroughoUt all (hil timf', my publiJhl!'r Tim McNeiU and editor David Kittelnromalong with Tom Tdknun$ as series edi[Qf-a:en;:ised great patimce. Ln \II hope mat the dday was wonhwhile. Last and foremost, I must honor and thank the contributions of Sara McClintock. my chief editor. critic, supponcr. and spowe ro hcr I owe more thanks than I could ever cxprcu. Despite being a RCW mother with an academic (i.e .• ~rworked and somcwnat erratic) husband, she some· how ~ ro oomplete her own d.isHrtation. begin an academic Cln!U,

maintain her equanimity and fundamental cher:rinw, and still give me the most hdpful comments on dll!' nunuscript. Perhaps I am spoiled by such acdlcnt CXImpanionship. reple[e with the finest edirorial advice and schol· arly insight. But when in the care of a bodhisattva. how can one really be spoiled? Madison. WlKOrWn May 19. l.OO
uu

Abbreviations

1,1, }, etc.

Immedi:l.tdy following any abbrevi.arion, :I. numer.al indicates a chapter or S«Iion number (fO r example, PVI indicates rhe first chapter of PY). Verse numbers fOllow the chapter or Stttion number (for aample, PVI.lS indicates VC'IX lS in chapler I ofPy).

-0

Following any abbreviuion, "-0- indicates the Tibetan translation of the tat in question :as found in the Sde dge: roitiou.

AI<

AbhidhRrmIllwi4:as pres<:rvcd in AKBh.

AKBh

AbhiJhllmfllltoi4bhlg:t. 5C'C author V:asubandhu (1970).

AS/FA

AsiAtiKht 5tuJim I ElUIic AsiAtUfllc.

BCA

&Jhullryi.Jilfira. 5C'C author Simideva.

BKGA

Scinigc zur Kultur- und

G

Gno1i's edition of Prami!'lllH1rttikit, 5I1irtJu/",mlinllp4ri«hu4. and PVSV.

HB

HttllbiNiIl. 5C'C author OMrmwni (1967) .

Gcist~jchte kiens.

HDT

JAM

jOUmAloftht AmniC41l A(mimt] of&lipon.

JAOS

jOllmAl oflIN Amm(1I7I OrUnw!>«in}.

JIABS

jOllrnlll oftlH Int~tionlll AmKiArjon for BlIlitihul Stwiin.

lIP

J.nmuJ "['''''MIn PhiluwpllJ.

ABIIRE.VIATIONS

~,

K

Karl)akagomin, author of Pralflli!lllwiTttiu.w.vrtt(lilul.

LPP

LApprtinuil!Jllf4ri/q4. Sec author Dharmottar:l h99lc).

MMK

M{j/~mJllutlUrilrl.

NB

N]4y4binJll. Sec author Dhurnaki"ni (1994).

NBh

NJiytlb~

NBT

NJti14bintiMfiltl. See aumor Oharmouara.

NS

NJi1J4n4trlU.. See :luth~ r Gauwna.

NY

NJIiJ4wirtti.ltlL Sec author Uddyoahr.a.

NVTT

NytlyttlNimiilIl4tptt"..t ikl. Scc author Vkaspatimiira h98s).

POS

PaJ4rtlNuJhamuJSil~t;raha.

PS

Pramd!'lJSilmlllXllJIL For PSI, sec author Digniga (11}68: edition by Hattori). For other chapters. sec: author Dignig2

Sec author Nagirjuna.

Scc author Viuyiyana.

Sec author PrUampada (1994).

h9ss--6ta; translation of Kanahvannan and Dad pa'i shes rab).

PSV

~~

For PSV on PSI, sec: author DigtUg:a (14)68). For other panions of PSV. Itt author Digniga (19H-6l b).

PV

Pr.",ui!"'VlirttiJUL .Xc author Dharmakirri under the dater of (hesc editions; PYI • Cnoli edition (1960); PVl. • S2rp1r.rtyiy:..na edi [~ n (1938-40): PVJ • ToWci cdirion (1979. 1985); PV.p -t4B • Tillcmaru edition (1000); PV+149ff . Sarplqtyipna edition (1938-40).

PVin

PrIl""'!"l";lIik~

Sec author Dharmakini under the dates

of these editions: PVinl • Vett~r edition (1966); PVinl • Steinkellner editio n (1979); PVin) • PVin-D (199lb).

PVinT

Pr.m41)IWinikltJll!i!ti. Stt author Dhacmott:ara (199lb).

PVP

PrIlm4!1'lwirtti!Japllftj iU S«: author ~abuddhi (1991).

PVSV

Pram4!J1lNrttiltltWDpajMvrtti; also called SlHIvrni See author Dharmwni (1960).

I'vr

1'r1lm41)11wirttlkllfilr4. Set' author $akyabuddhi (1991).

ABBREVIATIONS

PVT-p

Peking edition of PVT. See aumor ~buddhi (r9Ss-60).

PVT-,

Satulcrit fragmena ofPVf. Sec author Sakyabuddhi (.991).

PW

Prrl1l'W!fIIlJirttikllvrffl. See author Manorathanandin.

PW-n

VibbDticandra', notes to PW; induded in SiIp./qtyiyana edilion ofPV (r9J8-,.o).

IN TS TSP

SU,klllA4rttikil. See author KumiIila (I99J).

VN

VidanJ4Jot. See aumor Dlwmakirri (1991C).

WSTB

Wttnn ShHiim UP" Ti#Hul6t;it

WZKS

Wttnn Lit:Khrifi for Jit KliNk SwJ.uims.

WZKSO

WJmt"I' LitKhrifi for JU KliNk SU-

YO

y,&tiJipiki. Sec aumor "Unknown."

TllltwUII'r'trllhll. Sec author Sintara1q.ita. TllltwUII'!'t;rilh4p4iijjJtll.

Sec: author Kamala.ftla.

II"" BJUidhimruslnuuU. II"" Otuuints.

A Noce on the Sanskrit and Tibetan Translations

Tibetan tC'XO appear throughOUt this book. Most of these umsIations arc also included in the appendix. where they art ~mOOided in the largtt pusages from which I have extracted th~m . For convenience. th~ titles of most Samkrit and TIbetan texa arc abbreviated in accord with th~ tabl~ of abbrrviadons, which is also a key to th~ various roitions of Sanskrit and Tibcran tatS that I have employa:l for the translations. As with most philosophical works in Sanskrit. Dharmakini's taa often employ II dialogic modd, whereby Dh:umakini argues in response to critiques apressed in the voice of an objector (Pjjrw~), whether actual or hypothtt:icaL To represent this convention, I have used quotation nudes to indicate the beginning and end of an objection in a nanslated passage. Another feature of thu textual tndirion is me interweaving of tats, such mil( a commentator's prose often includes phr:ues from the veiW or commemary mat he u discussing. [n some ca.scs, it is especially hdpful (0 know which phrases in a commentary a~ supplied from a verse or anomer commentary, and in such instances, I have italiciz.ed the phr:ues in question. Finally, a.s a plaincd in me inuoducrion, I have avoided to me greaten at~n t possible me use of square brackeu to indicate irucrrions in uaruJacions. When brack.ru remain, th~ inscmons arc particularly lengthy, or mey arc less dearly supponc:d by commentaries or

I

NPOJ:L\NT PA$SAC E.$ fROM s...NS"JJT and

grammar.

Introducrion

B

UDDHIST PHILOSOPHUS

often spcU of beginninglcuncss. It is

daimN. thai !he minds o f livin g bcoi"Sl> for e>ample, have no Mgin-

ning. and mat OUf current universe is only one in a beginninglcu cycle of expansion and dcoy. Some Buddhuf minkus would claim that even me mon mundane tuk can have no true beginning. That is, if a beginning OCCUr$, there mUSt be some moment, some -now," in which it occun. For the present to exist, howcvu, there must be a pm and a fuNfe, for what wo...kl - now" mean if there WlI;re no lime o ther than now~ And of COU lX, if there is a pUt, then how could now be a bcsionin!j? Now mould instead be the end of the past. Each beginning. in short, must iudf have a beginning.' In a more a:mcrct:e senK, this book also sam ITom bcginningle5$neu, for it arises from a need fOf a point of dcparture----a pl:llct: from whtch to begin-in my work on the thought of Dharma1c.lrti, a South Asi2n Buddbul philOlOphcr of the KVCnth "011.11')' (c.a.).' ThaI Dharm.a.ltirri U wor-

my of OUf attention SttmJ sc:ucdy ncttUaJy to justify. Following upon me work of his pmf«:euor Dignlga, Dharmwni addressed at length numerous quesrions that are ofcentral conct:m to Buddhist thought and practict:. The impact of his views on Buddhist throries of ~roeption, infettnct. and I For ~ ~ modd, _ AKBh .J AK).19 (.,,...J.4). A phibophical a«:ot.iIIl ill found ill tbt ~''''''NMp~and ~oINipj"""'. MMK.

2 Tbc: cblaofot....nuIdni I n r. from~, bul in tbt abtmaof anythi", _dcfin· iriYf" I follow Fra~'1 wrlI-known &nick ([961). Con«mi", lindmd. (1910) propoW or an earlier cbu, hill UUlIIM:nl ill ~ Oft the prabkmaril: aluibution or the M~""""",,MIi,.1O BniV1lYittdca, and ill thw dubiow. II ill auci:al1O IIOIr WI. on my~, tbt preciK dan", oiDbarmdlm and hlIcommcnUIOtI is r. '- impoI'WI1 than wod: tN.t Iocala thc:M

fi&ura in I rd.uivc 1mK. In thil rtpnI. KraNoer',

fiM uampk.

,

work (1m) ill

,

FO UNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

language is difficult (0 overestimate. [ndttd, it would not 1x: outlandish to claim that his ideas arc: repeated in twry Mahiyina Buddhist philosophical work written aftcr his time in South Asia. To this day. the TIbetan m.ns1arions orrus Sanskrit tau arc m:ired. swdkd. and debalCd by Tibetan monastic scholars to such an r:xtcnt that, in the ctntraJ monasteries of the largest Tibetan tradition, a It.ngthy monastic holiday is devoted cnrirdy to debate on the of Dharmmni.'

'NOm

The difficulty in beginning a com'Crsarion on the work of Dharmakirti nems from a problem that ohen plagues systemuic philosophy and theol· ogy: the demma of tbe system art so righdy intmwined that first word of an argument appc:an: to prcsuppox the system in iu entirety.' In Ollar-

me

makirri', case, twO circumstances render this hermeneutical circle paniculally vexing. First, the systcmaticity of his thought is matched by itS complaity and a rrant concision. And second. the BuddhiSt traditions of Sotllh Asia and Tibn. in their revert:nct For Dharmakini, have reappr()+ priated his works through Suca:s5ive generations of commentaries such that we encounter a sometimes dauling variety of ways to read Dharmakini. Al a result. WI: often And a striking lack of consensus on the mOSt basic issues in me contemporary study ofDhunWdni 's thought. A lack of corucruw is not itsdf a problem: Dominick Lau pra ius noted that one: frequendy acknowledged sign of a great work is its resistance to ddlnitive interpteation.' Ncvenhcless. in the case of a systmtatic thinker such as Dharmakini. some of out most useful readings must emphasize the tighdy woven fUrore of the web of idc:a.s that constitute his thought. and without a consensus on even his most basic positions, such readings b«ome impossible. Instead. WI: And ourselves arguing over the dcta.ib of a paniculu position---5uch as his notion of an entity's fUrure (.fVIlbhatw)-without 3 1 am .mrnns 10 eM J."l tip" tWt, the ~ lup holiday of which L..obans GyIIIO PI.,. vida • fucin,rilll and mo¥in& account ;n bia mtmOin (I".). Gcorp Drqfus pva an =ended...d ~riw iiIIXOlIIIl of lhe ewtIt (1OO}:'Wf). and he libiK diJcw.a; eMO¥e\"' &II pbtt of DlunnalrJni in I>F lup cduaOOn.

.. G.W.F. H.-F. 1Oc CDmpk. ~l\Ilhe nWn body orhis IcctUICJ on rdipon of 181, with thil

art:U

(r9IBa l}):

The qtlCJ{ion with wIUch _ haw 10 bcpn is: · How 1m.." 10 ~ , IwgiMins?" FOI il is of CIOUlX at Ieaa , IOrmal requilCnlml of aU .oa-.rific: knowkdsc. and ~ phiJo.opby. thai noct.illl should O\XW it. it that hal noc fCI been po_cd. AI the bcsin. nin" •
.0.,

thins anlrc:nlcnl. , l..aCapra h !JIj:}I).

an,.·

INTRO DUCTIO N

J

the point where we ask how theories about an entity's nature relate to orner issuC$, such as the questions of rational jwtification and authority. The central aim of rnis book iI thus 10 conuibure 1Ow:mi the devdopment of a COI\SMSUS by presenting the foundations ofOharmakini's philosophy in terms of a consciously coruUUcted starting point. In speaking of the "foundations" of Dharmakini's philosophy, I mean rnose issues that repeatedly surhcc: throughOUt his work: they arc the fundamental demena of his conceptual system mat, on my view, make all of hi, argumenu pos.sible. I have otg2Jliw:! mose demenu under thrte broad categories; (z) ontology, (1) me "natunl rdation" (swiJhilJllprlftihllnJh.) in inference. and the issues ofjwufication and authority, which I place under the rubric of • instrumentality" (prlim4?tJ11). These broad categories, which structure this book. encompass all me demenu that enable one 10 understand and appreciate any argument made by Oharmwni. At the same time, these categories include what is most difficult-and hcna:, most controversial--in Dharmakini's though!. Thus, somewhat to my surprise. I have written a book that is both an in-depth introduction to Oharmakini', philosophy and a detailed intcrprctluion of certain difficult poinu in his work. t ~ coming to

u)

A Quntion ofMtthod: A Point ofDqJarrurt The central concern of my approach to Dharmakirti', thought is my intercot in developing interpma.lions that attend to iu systematicity: the manN!f'

in wh ich o~ tt-,~icaI

poJitio~

u

d~ uniq~..u

of partieu6n

(1VII't.':w?W')-is mutually constr.:l.ined md enabled by numerous omen. such a5 the ultimate irrealiry of universW (1Iim4~?W') or the role of habi.ruation in perceptual judgment. Above: all, one intetprnive pt2Ctice initially led me to read Dharma.kini·s work in this fashion : namdy, my inelucuble reliance on t~itional commentaries. But while I learned this v:aIU.lhl., leuon fmm ,h., .u yle of re:>.
. I 5pUk of tM -founcbrioos" of Dharmaklrri'. phibophy to U 10

:illude In ,he _1 in whid! his rdmd_ punW. of «rain\)' (~JUgaU an intriplinS form of foundaDonali.Jm rhl! it ~ rdotiYiIll. Such an inluprrtalion. ~r, ~uira eon.idcnbk ~.ion 10 OIwmUlrti'. ~cmaticity. and , I thus pl'CMl~ ~ ciIdy .he I)'JX of KUdy thai corutirulClIhiJ book. Hroer:, I will !OUCh on rhis iAuc: aplicidy ",>11 ito tI ........cl........" ....... "''''';..,. tI.. <[uaUuol vfDh.or....J.J"i·. xani"5

mU>t remain a IUbrat. albn. an imporranl OtW, of thill .study.

~;••n..li.m

•

FO UN DATIONS OF DHAIMAKIII.Tl'S PHILOSOPHY

m~ntafors,

thor practices and ccrain fearurc:s of their texts likewise posed a set ofhismrica1 problems thaI compdlcd me to construa a scuti.ng point. In sum, I will focus on only Dharmakini's earliest tUts, me PrIlm4!U1" INirttilt" and SVtI"!'fh, and I will resort only [0 the earliest commentators, IXvc:ndrabuddhi (c:a.. 67S C E.) and ~uddhi (ca. 700 c.E.). To undernand my rea501U for restricting this srudy in the aforementioned f.uhion. I should first aplain why I was kd to rely on commmwies. In dlC: several yean: of research that went into this book. twO reasons compelled me to resort frequently to commentaries. First. in practical

terms, any reader of Dharmakini's Sanskrit (au knows mat his dliptica.l and intricate statements often remain im~nttrablc without commentarial elucidation. Spcalc.ing in general of Dharmwni's style. Rkhard Hayes rttm to - the tortUow writings of this highly compla: thinker.'" And referring specifically to Ihe SlIIJurtti (PVSV), a tat that is especially imporuru for my analysis. Hayes and Bundan Gillon together nOle:, -Dtwmakirci', styk is 50 rerse mat it is nor always immcciiatdy clear what philosophical points h~ intends 10 make...• I would add dUll . leave alone th~ question of its philosophical conl~nt. evm th~ straightforward meaning of a sentence sometimes seem utterly obscure in Dharmakirti's sparse 5l)'1~. The f'CIuh is that. unless one wishes to argu~ from highly conjm:unl int~rpreutions, one mwt rcftt 10 commemaric:s. wbm: missing phn.scs:ll~ supplied and the dcgandy IOnuous relations of Dharmwrti's grammar ar~ plausibly re$laled. Thus, for purdy practical reasons. comm~nwjes become an jnevi(2.bl~ companion on any foray into Dhannaldrri's texu. Beyond pr:r.ctK:al conUrN. however, lies another compcUing reason for my rdial\Cr: nn oomm~ntaries: my larger airn-.n~ dut extends beyond Ihe prescnt work-is not 10 understand Dharmaldni's thought in and of itself, bul rather th~ 5ubscquenl '"' of his thought throughout the hislO!)' of Mahiyina Buddhism. Thus, cvm if one could somehow undentand Dharmakini's works in a manner mal ignored the history of their intc:r* prctalion, such an approach would thwart me in my goals. In part, an:abir .nrical ~ing would be useless becl.U5C it is a fanrasy masquer.Wing :IS truth: my a.ssumplion h~rc is thar my own undemanding is historica.lly condilioncd, and thus, an ahistorical reading of Dh:umaldrti would be at besl ddudcd. 8uI setting uiclc questions of ddusion, onc of my central aims in attending 10 the UK of Dhannakini's thougiu in particular hislOf'* 7 HJ)'ft (191")19). 8 Hlya iUld

Gillon

!10K

(1991:1).

INTROOUCTIO N

,

ical momCf1ts is to creat(: an awattMSS of my own location by rdkaing on me way omen ITom a diffeunt time and piau appeu ITom my perspective to be conditioned by meir circumst.:lnccs. I do not C-nvision that such an awattllCSS wiU awaken me from the nightmare of history so thai I mighl move beyond my own ·contingent arrangements.- InStead, by gaining a greater awattncss of dut contingency, I hope to ante a more dkctive agency therein.· Thus, in consulting commentaries, I have not used them as unc;:onrcsted rtStliltermnts of Dhumwni's tau. Instead. I have sought to learn and even to employ me style of reasoning dut they bring to the interpretation ofDharmakirti's thought." In doing so, I am nO( only able to USI! this ....-ork as a foil to the styles of reasoning available to me in my own milieu. but I also hope to have offered an interpretacion of Dharmaldrti's thought that readily enables ooe to more deeply apprmate its relevanct in the history of Buddhism. Having chosen 10 rdy on commentaries, I eventually encountered thrtt featurtS of their style of reasoning thai are especially relevant here. lbc first is the S)'Stetnattaty that we have already mentioned. Put simply, for modirinnal commentalors. the hen interpretation of the mailer at hand is one that allows for the grearest rohercn~r al lean- produces minimal ren _ sion-with any and all other issues addressed by Dharmakini, One: upshot of this sysrematic :approach is that it inadvertcndy highlights the pieces Uul do not fil readily into Dharmaldni's philosophical punic, Among the str2rcgics used to cope with such inc;:onsinencies is the second rdevant fea(UJ'C of this style of rc:asoning. namely, that meaning res.idcs in the author', infennon. noc in his ccxu, and. mat in most CUCII the author', intention remains the J2/T1e over the enrirt corpus of his ....-ork. Finally, the third fearure of the style of reasoning employrd by tflld.itional comrnc:nt.:ltors is straightforward: Dharmakini, to pur it Mundy. can never be wrong, , I dnw tht notion of "coolingm :ur:ancanmu" fi-om Quentin Sk.inna (I~), Oapir.r SkinntT'l probkmaric mlplwil on authorial inrenl, M doqucndy ~ III IV .tIow laa &om ochn- timet ro di'f'l,« OW' own _ptionl. In tone. Skinner'. ~ taembIa 1..aCapn'l (191,), and it coouva with the monolithic: (and --'vol hubrisric) notion of one'l own lUaorialloacion due is implied by the "re-«fIlClIion- m:jwmt by Ridwd Rony'l mnbod of"nlional -oon" (1914),

mill

10 In

uans tht notion of • ...yk of lftIOIIi"" I om rdrrrins 10 the - " of Ian Hadins

(1911), In brief, Hadcin" poine,...nidl mill\! Ix c:onaiveI! •• micldk way Ix..« .. incom· ~ity and iD
6

f OUN DATIONS OF OHARMAK IIlTI 'S PHILOS OP H Y

In combination, these three features-systematiciry, me appeal (0 authorial inlenl , and Dh.atmakIni's inviolable corrcaneu-lead {O several concrete practices among tnditional commentators. Fo r o ur purposes. the most relevant practices roncc.m the resolution of inconsincncics eyc when::

nt.

pieces of the puzzle do not perfecdy Sp«ifically, if :I. commenclltor con· fronts an inconsistency fo r which he can formulaiC: a solution, he will feel free (0 supply arguments that. if nec.cssary. move bqrond the tal; from the comment:UO[S' standpoint, movement beyond the text is justi fi~ because the: locus of meaning is not the (61 but Dharmakini', intention. Neverthdes.s. even though Dharmakinj's comment;uors fed free 10 move beyond the tO:l, their arguments will nor contradict the problematic or inconsislent passage at hanc:!.. Instead. commentators mnntua ugumcnu in the semantic ,pace thaI is ldT opcn by the t a l itself. In some cases, a passage's ambiguity O1XN it to multiple l'C2dings, and this ambiguity constituteS thc: SpilCC where such arguments may be created. In most castS, however, me strict and highly inflected slyle ofDharmal:ini's Sanskrit-along with a precisely defined technical vocabulary-leaves linle room for such semamic maneuvering. As a result, commentators must onen depan from the text altO~ her to eompose, in dfect:, a statement of the unsaid that supplies the rtquisite argument. lbe hermeneutica.l principle that enables a commentator to supply such ~denda is the appeal to Dharmakini's intention: one is simply revealing his intention. For a oontemporary academic intetpmer, these various fearures and practices of traditional commentaries lead to two clear advamages and some notllble problems. We have a1ttldy (Ouched on one advantllge, namdy, the: anention to systematiciry, which permits questions that are impossible if one anends only to minutiae.II As a second adwntage, the: commentarial practices offer the contemporary interpreter an opportuniry to a :mside:r the regnant intdlectual problems and contributions in each commentator's historical era. That is, since the commenta(Ors arc most ooncemed with resolving inconsinencies, and since resolutions to old problems lead to nl:W critiques, each generation of commentators is thus responding to a nl:W set of concerns rypical of that era. Hence, by providing access to the concerns thaI arc distinctive of each generation, the commentaries can se~ as an impotum tool fo r the won: of intdiectual history. While the uaditional oommentarial apprcnch offers these adwnrages to the contemporary interpreter, the "ery same features and practices also I I Fo r me« on

mil iJsuc, I « ,he oondo.uion 10 dlis book.

I NTRODUCTION

7

prove problematic in a way that has led me to place: strict limits on the prescnt srudy. The attention to SYSlematicity, inasmuch as il is coupled with an appal to Dharmakini's intenrion. pennia commentators to move freely among Dharmwni's tc:xU, and since: DharmaXini composed eight philosophical works, Il a contemporary interpmer would encounter significant problenu if she were 10 uncrilically accept the commentators' approach. In pf1lCtical terms. the shc:tt size ofDharmak:itti 's written corpus would require a contemporary hinorian to apply the ament, highly focwcd standards of historical interprc:t:ation over an unmanageable :amount of matc:ri:al. BUI more imporwu, a hilurc: to attend to the: diffc:renc::es in Dharm:akini's lau c:ffc:aivcly leads o ne [Q :adoptlhe same: Stance: :as the tndition:al commentators, namc:iy, th:al meaning resides in Dharm:akini's inlemio n. nOl in the tau. In orner words. if! choose: to aplain rne meaning of:a passage in Dh:armakini', Pra1Ni!fllwirttW" for c:xample. by recourse: to any other passage: in any orner ofDharm:akirti's tau, I mWI da.im th:at something beyond Wt tCXt itsclflinks it ta thO$C othe:r tc::lU. For the: tr.;J dilaon:al commentators, that link is provided by rne: intendons in Dh:armw"i's mind, and unless I affirm:an cvc:n more: obscure: link:agc:, I tOO will evcnru.:ally rtSOn to the notion ofauthorial intention. ~nd the pmh.. lent.. anc:nd..:anr upon any a tte mpt" to u ncrlVc:r inrc:tuion , oJ thc: main diffiallry here is Wt, in constructing my own versio n of Dharmwni's mind, I will fail to Itt the version presc.nled by the commentaries :at hand. In olher words, as the particularities of the tau themsdves fade from coll5idencion. 50 too will the distinroon bt:two:... my own imagined Dh:armaki:ni and the: commennu ors' venian. My ~pon~ to mil problem il not to rejc:.cr m e: c:omme:nr,uiCf; in favor 12 Dhannaldnflcaruc. won. io poobably rho: Pr.tu~ rCom~wyon rho: lNCf\I' menu of ~,. wbo.c lOur dIipca1 covn iNucs of ir.fm.oa. IUlhority and justili",lion. puc:cprion. and upunm', rap«ti..... y. n.c,., topic. CO¥cr rho: enriK nnB" of rho: usual iIIun ~ by PramlI;Y ThcorJ. ~ otykof diK:oww in whid. Dhannakini parlicipa.cd chapt.... I). Another early _ .... i. !be s..fMi~· 0\" simply SI/ftllf1li r AIlIOam~wy' •• knpIycommenwyon rho: """"~Ilint dupl..... which di-o. I ,nfnma. In tffmI of u....... Ur.o:. rho: s-."m iI probt.bly Dhannakini"1 IuJm woriI: it it eenainIy rho: 100ft diffiadt. Two lam 100tI, !he Ptw~tti/uytI and ~Iti_ C<:I"I'n lhc. AmC wpia u rho: Pr~ and u AIda m.,. ottenaibly ~ rho: proUI of Iopia prop« 10 Pramio).. Theory. a1t1oousk .he NWIti..... it quile "-on. To diKl IM fiuthn _ lOpicl addraacd in Ihae man cmenI works. Dtwmakini aOO CGrrIf*C'd four odoa leW:

<_

rho:~~ rAnal~ol R...blionl·). Hm.#iM. rQuin~olRc»onilll" ~1IU1fbIu,.,;,w,;

rproof of om.... Minda1. and V.u.."""" (" Proadutel b [)d:,ue"),

which it probably hit bs! J) The ~I

wont.

praenud by O,..td Hoy (1971) iI &rnOnJ.he _lucid in Ihil repd.

8

FO UNDATIO NS O F DHAkMAkIRTI 'S PHI LOSO PHY

of some pu~ reading of Dhannakini, nor to rtj«t alrognhcr the intenexrualiry of Dhmnakirti's work. Inslod, I havt chosen to restrict my focus 10 DharmalUrti', earliest and most atcnsivc wooo, namely the p"",u/t;UIVtirttilt. and me SVIIIJ!ffl, lengthy prose commentary on the first chapIcr of the Prllmi!l4NrthkiL In ~ry~, I move beyond these tau only when the commentators themselves prompt me to do so. This technique

me

allows me

to

avoid both the: practical and methodological problems ass0-

ciated with an attempt to speak in [emu of Dbannakini's entire philo-

sophical corpus. Another challenge prCSUlred by traditional commentaries is the manner in which they arc layered. ~ nOled a~, the rnppropriation of Onarmakini in each commenwial gcncntion makes it possible to appreciate the intellectual interests and contributions of each commentator, but we create that possibility only ifwe discern dcu-ly the distinctions among commentarial 5U':1I:2. A3 is already MdcnI, on my vitw each COmment:lfOt constructs an imagined Dharmakirti who replaces the text as the reposiwry of meaning. and in this imagined Dha.rm.akini's mind. all S)'1temic inconsistencies find their resolution. In rmny cases, commentaries from the same generation largc:ly ague their Dhannwni-s can be treated as on~d those: commentaries therefore form a single commenwial stratum. When, however, one moves on to another generation (or f O another line of interpretation). a new Dhumakini appears. And since Dharmakirti', fOIts arc: taken by the commentawrs (0 be the inviolable account of all that mauc:rs in regard to issues such as perception. inh:reorial reasoning. and sc:nwuia, the history of Buddhist theories on these: issues in South Asia is embodied by a line of imagined Dhumaldrri-s, each corresponding to the inrerprttalion of a panirular commentarial stntum." The chief challenge: for a contemporary interpreter is the work of sc:paradog commcntarial S[rata. In shon_commentaries tend 10 build one upon the other, and they thus dc:vc:lop historical byers, often expressed in terms ofthc accrued rcpcrition ofkc:y phra5eli or ideas from their prM«.essors. At least some inrerprttarions-and c:vc:n many phnCCI of Dcvcndrabuddhi, the fi rst commentlltor on DharmWni', Pr,,,"41,MvirttiJtIl, appear to be rq>eated. in all subsequent commentaries on that work. no matter how Late those: commentaries might be." The: next commcnt:ltor, Sakyabuddhi, nat-

I 5 h "f'pc.oo.. th.. in cad. of hi. ...... n <>Ommen" on .he "".- o r ...... p..,wJ'!"'u, .......

Manoc-adwwldin (o:wdfrl,.( ~l «Drury), theautbor olf'VV. recotdr1lUb.cim INIl)' olJX¥en.

,

IN TR.ODUCTION

uraily repeaa Dcvendrabuddhi's commentary. since part ofhU work is a subcommenwy on Ikvt:ndrabuddhi's tat. But Sikyabuddhi also expands upon Devcndrabuckihi's work by adding his O'NO insighu. When we then come to later authon such as Santaralqira (71.S~-788) and Dhannottafa (A. ca. 800), we find that the ideas and often verbatim phrases.----of both Ikvt:ndrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi are repeated in their worla without any indication as (0 their origin. " This trend continues even in Tibet, where ideas and phrases of South Asian commentators are repeated without identification by Tibetan authon." It is worth reiterating that the Iayaing of commentaries does not come about bccau.sc commenta(Ors, in some slavish adherence (0 tradition, fail to be original. Indeed, the layering of commentaries indicates exactly the opposite: each maNm rcpresenu a new set of innoV2tions and insighu brought to the issue at hand by that generation's commentaton in response to the various developments of their times. Considt:r. for example. the fol lowing comment or Sikyabuddhi . Here he summariu:s a passage from Dharma1cini's SVdl!J'ffi that addresses Dhannakirri's philosophy orlan~ The idea in this passage is that since expressions take as their objccrs a cnnceprual appearance fhat i.s o:dudcd from other appearances, they are therefore established to have other-cxclusions as their objectS." drabuddhi'.commma. And nm PrajMbncupu, ...... won iI: Ilriki.. for h.iI ~dy ddilMnu dtricion to ~ ..... prmou. (:(IIJUnmwil:$, _ ~'I -0. from lime 10 rime. Sec, r...r insona, hili . . of doc eampk of doc twlns.I PVJ.n. (~u· lor'l"u...., 9).lj; PYP:U9aI) and me nocion of Wlivnais as _1Ur.f ( h'-~U· ~,,. .); PVP: I )l~} in flil commala on PV).I9-l.I . 16 Slntanktita. for eumpk, dttm::J hil: notioa of tho! three ~ of constrvin& me tmn rrs" OO:HOO)J from ~buddhi ~ bdow. 1)11f, and abo PVr".2b-I4D K:l~. Dharmo«an (PVIIIT. 5mnkdlMt and Krua.tr 1919,,).)11) adopu ~'. notion of mIriaM" (_r./!J and auinPc ~) inamunmtaliJ}' (10, In IICICOIlIII of lhoeK

IUIJi1 ,

norioona. _

bdow.

~f~lI). ~ .....

(PVi"T. S...
'~:'.I If)

.dopa, albric wUh _ rnocIifiaUon, ~nbuddhi'l noc:ioN of"....."... and "y.M (for ~i'I.,jew, I « bdow, 166ft). n- I « Oldy. rn.. 01 numeroou Qampk$. 17 See, for Qamplc. ~ Md.os Idan'. dioOnction beno«" Il\ISfwonhi,- (.""''!'..u.) in IcnN 01 AIh;m and ob;ea (Drcyfuti I~). This dioOnaion b in fJo: 6", prescnltd by ~ (PVP"~ , , poilU dw Siky. Md.os &dan doa noc: niK. Of count" wbm Tabaan coau:nmOll)($ repeal !be WOfdI oflhrir South AlAn praLl - s, Ihry do 10 in librtan tnndadon.

18 PVT(78b41.JPVSV .JPVI .6~ l""lti!hJi' plM" J.u J.,,.i",", "",.,.,,.

j-,

10

FOUND ATI ONS OF DHARMIIKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPHY

Tht: basi< poinl here is dul2l1 objca (1lnJu, ~)of 211 apress.ion (iIlbJll) such as "cow" is actually a spt:cific type of nt:glUion dut Dhnmakini calls an "olhcc-o:dusion" (Imyiipohll). Words, in short, have ncg:uions as meir objt:ru. Wim Ihis p:w;age in mind, let us turn 10 the much bttt commenttry' of l
mnr objtm. 19 For Dlwmaldrti, the pos.ilion dul c:pressions have affirmations (llitihi) as their objt:ru is directly opposed 10 Ihe claim thai apressions rake otheraclusions as rneir objectS. Thw, when Karl)akagomin repeats Silcyabuddhi's commcnt. hc cnds it wilh :II conclwion thlU is Dum" opposiu 10 Sakyabuddhi's. In allmng ~i's condwK>n. Kar~min clearly had a specific problem ro address." bUI we can only become aware of Ihal problcm if we 110M and rake as significant Kar~akagomin'J modification of Sakya.buddhi. And we can only do $0 if we resisl the apparenl synchroniciry of the commenraries. Attention to commenrarial strant-a kind of tatual archaeology-is «ntraJ to my interpretation of Dhannakini. Specifically, I aim 10 ptUenl an interpretalion Ihat focuses on Ihe earliest commentarial S[llIItum as formed by the inlerprttalioru ofDcvendrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi." Thc

/IV.,."". ~,.

N. 'P .....

......,.Ji"_.

PVI.4 ";,iI,i.,.,.,..,,.*' sMJIw", in

19 K(11P7-1I) MJ PVSV

.y.,;m,.. iii,. . . .

tk'/ !hJir [roj l

pIN.. ,,{ IM i "" (... ,,"" J. tn4,. ~

~uU (i",..~~ ,,;w,.,...,.'~ ;~ ,,~.

"'..."

N()(c WI me, nnphasir in the Inrul..

lion .. mlM.

20 In ~ Irrms. his plObkm ir .... one fim tUtcd by UddyoWwa {NY .... NSl.l.66; 617.1-4; lruubud below, 1)7}-namdy, WI the conlmi of an a:pra.>on Of c:oncqx....m U -CIM'" iI JUbjccriYdy apcricnad U an affimuolion , 10 how can ,he ob~ of sud! an a:prcstiort or C""lXpt be • MPlion1

21 Ginn mar hinorial i",pon1IKC, " ir ,,,,nw; ....... Inn aIonc any deu.ila of II".;. Ii..,. or Uutitulional afIil.i:olionl, _ CilIInOI na.1U the pr«iK dales of theM: twO aucialIy impoe· .... , conunen
w. can only _ e .....

~.

b..ddh.i "'taM~. and dw Silcy.buddhi muse puotde KanulaIiI&. KamaWiIl.,

INTRO DUCTION

"

panicular version of ~ Dharm.aldrtt procntcd here thus arises in dialogue with their venion. It is only by developing a resrrictcd interpretacion in this manner thar we can begin the painnaking cask of separ.tting commenr:uial byers so as to learn the insights [lut chancteritt each commenclIor's work. U And, as noted above, my aim in doing so is to get lOme IC'nK of tbe historical
.m

mooco.er, wnMC COIT\mCIItarioon (and ~lsrudicd dirccdy under) SinW'llqit:J. Siner T.bcun -.n:a allow ... 10 pbWbIy daim Wt ~waIctUa _ aai~ in the mid emnuy. we m.... hnc • rdati¥c duin& thai pbca Dcw:ndnbuddhi and $&y:.buddhi noc bdOn:: 1M ICWCIIth cmnuy, b.n noc afia' tIM- atfy cipltl. This type of rdaUOOf. appro1illUte datin& it I)'pieaI in !he ~ ofSO.JlD Alian thinkrn. but ro. ow pu~ a hiMorieaI uW)'$U Mcdo only !he rrYliw duos of !Mae thinkcn in rrlarion 10 ada odw:r. 22 In addilion 10 {"" "~oric1I ~Iio", ,hat underlie dw intnp~rion of DIwmMirti·, work. one can also poinllO a pnaical CIUIaIt"M of approoKhins his wOOt in me Whion. Sp«ffiaIIy, ;1 mabIa one {O pba timiu on !he- wcondaJy mamUl lO ..nid. one: rrkn..

I. .. pn:ciody b.ru. n::uon thaI we ...w.,.y rdari¥dy KUlI .'~Iion 10 _ _ I. bud·

1<1"_.

olok or' .." vb ... .t- Q{ 0 •.,.,... to,,1) .ond (.".)-d,..o, """'. oohuwiK be CONidm:d rdcnn .. WCtC '"' 10"udy Dhumaki"f. thou&h. io an a/Wroric:tJ fashion.

11

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPHY

tnoounter in DhilfTTlakini's thought, but I do hope that I have come (0 an interpretation Wt is -good- in that it - reactivates the process of inquiry, opening up new avenues of invcsrigation, cri6cism, and sdf.reflection." 1)

Som~ Suggtstio1ll for th~

&tUkr

Because: this book has various ainu. it also has various audiences. My over· all aim is to make the content and ityie of Dhannakini's reasoning-u interpreted by Dcvendr.abuddhi and ~buddhi-available to all my readen, and this goal thus applies to alIaudienco: of this book.. I also hope. however, to speak directly (0 specialists in an attempt 10 encourage a his-. lorica.lly focused consc:nsus on at least some centr.al issues. Hence, I aim to proem an argument Wt is of sufficient rigor and deW! 10 maint:ll.i.n a specialist', atttntion. In doing so, however, I wish to avoid the risk wr, in its technic:ality and minutiae. my presentation will become impenetrable to readers not activdy tngaged in this fidd. Balancing me nccd.s of Jpecialisu and more broadly inleltSt«i readers has iu dangcn:. Those tngagcd dirtttfy in rtscaICh on Dhacmakirti or Pramitta Theory might occasionally ask for (Yen greater abundanee of deu.i.l and citation, while thost: nOI dircaly tn~ in such research will find addi· tK»nal dttail supttfluous or evtn overwhdming. To allay some of this risk, I have taken ~ral st~ FiBI, I haY(: plaud all innoduaory materia.! in the tint chapter, when I prestnt an overvi~ of the style of discouI'U fOcused on Pram~ Theory. Second, when we tum in the remaining chapten 10 a deuikd cuminalion of Dlwmakini's own views. I offer a sustained bUI overly rechnic:al argument in the body of the lat, while providing greater technical detail in the nottS. Third. ,0 provide all read· en with ,he most nlevant primary source material, I have included an aleNive appendix of cr.ansluions from key passages in Dhumaluni 's works. Finally, I have auempled to avoid 10 lhe greuesc extenl possible the use of sqU:lll! br.ackeu in my tr:rnsl.arions of primary ( att. In the academic study ofPram~ Theory. the u.sc of (square] brackets has bewme a standard pr.lctice as a means 10 indicate words or phrases in me translation mat. while implied by the source text or supplied by a commenwy. art nor actually presenl in the soura: lal. This pracria leads to an atmndy lit-

no,

13 UCopn. (')'IIB').
hiRoric:aIIy \oaI;ed--«.di1ll INI I un wg " jnc ~.

INTRODUCTI ON

'J

enlist notion of translation. where: the mark of an "accurate- translation is its ability to be rtad as a simulacrum or the original. By ignoring the way in which !ranslation involvca: ;I dialogue with the tat, such an approach produces tl'aIU!3rions wr wiU IlO( enable;l rc:ader to dUnk through Oharm;l· Idni's works in the way that I ho~ to enoourage! ' Brxkcu, moreove:l, are obviously directed only at specialists. sino: onlY;l specialist could son OU! the: philoJogK:aI implications of such imcrtioru:. For orner readers. brackets arc: at besl:;I disuxtion, and at worst they exclude nonspecialists by rc:mind· ing the:m wt the trarulation is simply a aib for the source tat, rather than a translation pn It. A crib--a 1001 10 case the reading of Sanskrit and libw.n--nuy have its uses. but it obviously is irrdevanllo those who can· nor read thrx languages. For thrx reasons, I have: decided to eschew brack· cu. except where the inserted !ext is unusually lengthy or not clearly implied.. My assumption is that, even without b~ specia1isu can read· ily determine which phrases and words have been supplied by context or commcnary. With the above proudurcs in mind, I am able to ofttr some practical suggestions on how;l rader mighl best applOKh this material. For th~ x:t.ivdyenrgM in t.he study nf Dh;lrmaKini or Prami-:ta Throry. Ihe ove:rview of Prami~;I Theory may provokc $Ornc lucful rcf1~nru, hut if these readers choose to move direct.ly to the discussion of Dharmakirti', method and onlology (chapter 2), they will 1101 lack any material c:uenti.al to my intcrprttation. Scc:ond. I would remind specialists that many notes may be of panicular interest to them. since the notel often contain atcnded. technical arguments. Other readers may also find the notes of coruKknhlc inlcreJ:l, bur I would SU88'51 Ih:u if thc an~rivc rcchniali3 prove tiresome. the argument in the body of the tat m;ly rc:main both intelligible and useful, even if me not:es arc not consulted. Fin.ally. 1 remind all readers Wtthe appendix contains lengthy translations of lOme relevant primary tats. My interpretation succteds only to the extent tb;ll th~ texts, perups initially !hunting. become vibrant and intriguing scums of cMl'Igc.

24 Paul Griffiths ",...:,1). in hia wry dUawion of &Buddhisl: Hybrid English: PUff rho: iJIue in mrlt ICmII: "'l1loert is abtoluldy no fQJCn why8uddholocr sIMKLId bemI,~ &II her· mail: trldition, JaIed from rho: Wlinilia~ and pwed down from maNn 10 pupil by mpli· .... II i

.. . ......, --'1 lica cati.."ti.." . ....

mmmuniry." .5« aOO c"bnOn (' m ).

~.

I.c.oM od(·t.....u.lUlIC'I" r,urn the: ....;.k, .:.da..it:

1

I

Pramiil)a T heory: D harmakirti 's Co nceptual Context

F WE A1E TO ENGAGE wi th Dharmakini'l philosophy in;ll manner that

enables us to think through his style of reasoning, then we must learn to speak Dha.mu.lOni's language thai is, we must b«omc skilled in the discourse WI makes Dharmaldni's philosophical choices pou.iblc. Since thai philosophicallangwgc is highly complex and prccisdy inflected. some rcadcn may find it helpful to have a primer of sora. With those readers in mind. I have provided in this chapler a basic overview of Dharmalcirti's conceprual conte:n .' Tn do so. the du.prer cmphnittS some JigniflClnl

poinu of convergence among South Astan philosophers of Dharmakirti's era who participated with him in a styie of discourse 'MIT call apramil)a Theory.- ThUl, in a secondary sense, this chaprer will also alert readers to some of my presupposirions. for any :lUcrnpt at a synoptic overview inevitably ~ea.ls at lean some of iu author's assumptions.

J. I TIN

Proem ofKnowing And In Instrumml

To undersllUld Dharmakirti's concqltual COntal, WI: mw t a pp recialC~ that his location within Ihe Buddhist traditton is only part of a morc complex l:a.ndu:::lfW!. Alrhollgh he cle:..iy Owe!! much

fa

his Buddhin p«d«~n: . his

work aIJo draws from other traditions. In some Cl$('$, Dharmakirti appcan to adopt olhers' theories, but most notably he adopts a particular mode of

PIn_I'"

1 R.c:adm. who Kdt • more cxtetW.., inuodunion lIl.lIy I1nd Jorwdon Ganon', ill a.maJ lNii4 (wo. ) 10 tM, ap«i:ally bdpNl. A 11..., inlrodlKlOl}' work fOcwnI on 1M rdc'+'Iftl 8l1ddhi" phUotophalndilioru il raul Wil1ianu ' B...uJnn T1».pr (1000). for ........ >11:1 . _ _

hill • ...tHl'a"n• ..-noicW" ut ..........iuno oha.m! ...-.,

M:arilaI (.,u:U-16. l' and n - )7). .j

Pn.m~

1bcvriau,

KC

16

fOUNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PHILOSO PHY

discourse in which subject maner, technical vocabulary, meroricaluyle, and approach 10 reasoning are all slured by numerous philosophers from several traditions. We a n J'(:fcr to this style of discourse as Prami~a Theory,or ~ thcory of the innrurnena ofknowled.ge_-, It is me kind of phil<. ophy praCliccd by Ihe mOll! important of Dharmooni 's principal inlerloanors, induding the Naiyiyib Uddyol2kara, the V~b Pralasta· p:1da, and the Mimi'!'lsala. Kumirila.' The primary concern of PllllTIilJ.a Thcory is me determinacion of what constitutes indubiable or indisputable knowkdgc and Ihe rdiable means of attaining il.' While many South Asian philosophers cnmine knowledge in a general fashion, P~a Theorists discuS5 this issue in grcar detail rhrough a shared lechnical vocabulary thai permits and encoura~ dialogue across traditions. Thar is, philosophers who focus on the study of prllmli!"l deliberately en~ with other philosop~th from their own philosophical lineage {JN1f'11MJ'Ilrd} as well as other tr:a.dilion~r spcci6c questions within a larsa-. shared conIO((. To some: e:ncnt. this larger COntext consisa of a par. ticubr style of Samlai! VttK and p r~, bUI it also stems from inccssarll atte.nlion 10 an ongoing dialogic contal. HrnOl:, these thinkers continually refer not only to previous tau within thei, own rr.r.ditions. bUI also in olh· ers' traditions. In employing such ddibt:rale inlcnomwity, PramiJ:la The2 In lfICUin, of ·Pram11p 11Icory: I am foIlowinc Malibl (J~: u), Iu for W Inm "~." iu 11K in dVa COlli", is a INnerof IOfl1C dispulC (_aP«WIY Poem '91-.:,..,· Ii",). Ho_e>u, thr anini iauc lxR is ".,,urathn- ~jfIbu, lnCIu POIf« (1914:)11) has indialtd, a .-.dispcxitionalllK ol " ~" ;. acupubIc fOr,,.,,,,,,, ~~l1r if"knowIedge" ;' UKd fOr doc cinaminalc (Olllm i dt2! is n«-nJy tho- n:suJ1 of a ,UN!"...nm il is ukcn 10 iu fullest alml---tNol is,...ncn il lUida action r,,.,,1If1ti) rdati~ to. hUlT\l.O aim r,.~ Sft, £01 t::lWtlpk. NBh s and I I ""NSu.l. 5« alto doc diKuwion in dupea 4, whar I Wo diKlI. II Imp !he IUC oftbt tam · irutrwnall,"

J TIw: Ib.,a of thac philCHOpkn Ut l,Inc=ain, bill tMy ,'.."" all active al _ bttwem SSO and 6'1. l'hdr INlivt

ch~

poinl

orda' is: Prdauaplda, Uddyoubn,

""""'"'-

me

" MMiW o.andmwwIs PfIII'LIl)a Theory 10 be bated IIpon whal he ails "Nyiya method.." H" IIO(ft "urlhis mtthod ' aimed at ..:quiri n& uidl'ncc tOt IUppon;l\f;' hyporhcsia ... and thus nunins I dubiny 10 oauinl)'" (191':69). He abo nons, -n.. pi of the Nylya method is a ";.,.,.,.a philotophic dcasion or. c:ondw>on which U certain." Evm a eunory pane., II thr 1i1cn.11,I~ wimin this uyIc of diKounc Ihows mal iu philotophcn wnl' wno:mcd ...;m certainI)' (a/thou&" _ wiU '" ill d>apur 4 thai aru.inl)' n«d noc entail ...mdical il)'). II is imporWll 10 /IOIe thai fix thac philoiophcn. W puquil of «rUinl)' ~uin:s IOITIC' il'1i!W doub< (l6~or dai~ 10 know (jij....j u ia rllCMmahon • .5« NBh ""NSI.I,I, U7t..pJ.btIJN .... 1I;'l'i" ;u.. .,.,.; "...-" iii,!, 16n,; 1I'!fII!i" .... DtwmaItirti (fOr ~, P\'SV .... PVI... 6) ........................... ie-. S« ...... M• .a.J b'U," ) ..... 8..-.._

u,)

bngo:r ('996:164-)66)·

PRAMA~A THEORY, DHAIlMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

17

orists do not simply note what had been thought in the past: rather, they anmlpt ( 0 justify a particular imerprttarion by rC$ponding to the criticisms of others, whether within or outside their own traditions. Each ~nm.tion of philosophers thus represents a n~ layer of interpretation formed by new criticisms and rebuttals. Already by Dharmakini's time, me debates bctwttn various traditiON had gone bacIc and forth several times, and his war\- "- thus thoroughly .. ng;n~ ;n rh~ cnn laT formed hy eI.rlier criri. cisnu and his own an:empt to justify what he sees as the Buddhin view. One up$hot of all this is that, in some ways, DharmalUni shares more with thinkers from other traditions than he does with Buddhists such as Sthiramati or Candralcirti, who do not en~ in pramli,!" discourse.s The general contoun of PraIJW:la Theory that delimit Dharmwrti's own thought find their fint systemni( er:p~l;on in the NyliyllJiitTllI!> of Gauwna (ca. I SO c.!!.).' Even at this early stage, a notable charactaistic of Pra.mir)a Theory is the development of 1 technical vocabulary that aliialer Pra.milp. Theorisu inherit and share, A cenlral theme in this vocabuhuy i.s the usc of what J callihe ~ system. ~ a formulaic way of analyzing the "functional e1emenb~ or It.raltll5 that contribute to an action (1triy4J.' Following Gautama'r lead, Vitsyiyana (0. .. n ), the eul.iest oeomment:;ltor on the NJ'liytUiitrta, applies the /u1,iJk4 system to the verb P'IIma, " 10 know indubitably, ~' Of the possible Itir.us or elements in an action, thltt are panicularly relevant (0 the analysis of the act oflmowing: the agenl (Itim!) who acts on :ut obj«t or ~pati~nt~ (ltllfflllln) by means of:ut instrUment (U'II'!"). Adding to these three: the action (mp) iudf. Vitsyiyana and all

"rd.

, ,., dear CQrnpk of ad! di,o,,",," iI the ~ 10 ..:ripIur:lI citation. ~ ~ wc:h ,..Sthinm#i o n: Budd.hisc lYIr.on many ."..",.iont. and.arne Buddhiu dUnUn wd. u Candnklni employ Kriprunwim grm: frequency, This appeal to wha, an: in dfca lita'· aryolOUras is entirdy absenl in OIwmaIdtti't W'Ofk, and he dwes th it zmenllen· dcncy with iflOIt Pramlq.a Thcorim in non ·&ddhitc tnditions.

w-

6 or alUlK, the qumionl concani", dw naNn: and maN of,lUin;", inchibitabk knowI· edce an: catily IJ"IC:t;d 1'0 mud. ~ induding _ early Upanipcb .. wdI ,.. Bud· dl.l.oo ....... -.I"'''"'''P''' '-"c bee.. ......de ... ~ doc ~ hl.o phi'-'PhY tN.tdiJm1y I"orm!he oontm for DharmUlrti'. woc-k. For IIUsroriaIIt1IIUIW'1 ofNyty.. IUIhon and worb. _ Porm' (l97T-1- 11).

won:..

7 The I«w rt.uinu of the

U~ f)'SfCtn

is ,h( KmUhIfiU of Pacalljali',

M.hi~

I-+l}lf. 8 This

of;

..mo', aymoIosy yiddI meani,.. IUCh 111 "1'0 rncatuJ1O" Of "10 "mt

bu. in KnW we il OOIl¥C)'l meaninplUdl III -' 0 uanaln" "[O know indubitably,· -10

know without !he poaibiliry of mul," and fO on. Sec, for aampk, MaliW h9l6,J6j,

18

FOU NDATI ONS O F DHAIlM""IIlTI ' S PHILOSOP HY

subKqucnt Prwlil}a Theorists apply this W.irillM analysis 10 mc verb p,"mIl so as to dcriyc four tcmu: prllmA'!. pramiti (or prllwu1J . prllmlJll. and prlll1lli!l"-' These tcrms refer to thc agem who knows (p1"llIMf!), the action of knowing (pnm,;,; or prami). me object known (prllmfJ")' and tM irutrumcnt used to acquire that knowledge (p,..mi!l"). Using me:sc four terms. Prwlil;la Theorisu devdopcd a fourfold style of analysis 10 ana1yu knowled~ events. That is. their overall analytical framtwork assumed that every knowledge cycm inyolved thc event as an IUti#II, an IIpt engaged in mal action, a mtll1U for 11K- production of that action, and an ~bjm to which mat action is principa.lly rclated. An:alyses of thc process of knowing through mesc four tenns became sW\dard among Prwlil}a Theorists. " Before we continue with our discuuion ofthesc four fams oflcnowing. we musl first m:ocniu that rc:Idm familiar with mc cpistemological tM.. ories developed in the Euroammcan philosophicaltraditioru may f«l that out use of the term "knowledge" herc is somewhar irregular. On most Euroameria n accounu, MknowledgC· is a belief or attitudc that is true (under somc set of candidons or rruth theory). k a bdicf or artitude, · Icnowled~· is dispositional, and illhcrd'orc a nnot be an act in itself. But on the accou nt ofPr.uniQa Theory thaI we have given above. "knowiedgc· (prami,; or pwd) is the act (1triytlJ of "knowing indubitably" thai is con$Iituted by a process in""ving the imcr.lction of an agent, instrument, and object of knowtedge. This modd requires that the Maction of knowing" (prilIM or prllmiti) be a cognitive t'VCnt occurring in a particular person's mind within a particular set of circumsrances. A theory of knowledge must therefore rUe into account any rdevanl aspect of those circumstllnOCf that, for aamplc. mighl disto" a cognilive ev~m in such a mann~r thai we should not consider it knowledge. In e:umining distortions diat prevent a cognitive cw:m from being a knowledge event, these theorists shared a gencral conception of the relation bcl'tOiCCil body and mind. Hence, lhcy :all think it relevant to discuss at length the way in which physical infirmitKs such as jaundice or CltanClS migJu dinoH cognitive evenu: a person with jaundice will sec conch shells ali yellow: a person with Clt:atactS thinks mat his water-jug is filled with sma.ll picco of hal,. They also generally maintain that intcnse emotions such as intense anger or lust so srrongly affect the ' NBh:u-l.4 and,..w_ 101M l.lbiquiry of this praaia- rdIoxu tho: influence ofSansluio: gamnw on Pnmi~ The.... ,.. Fu. "" iMAoOUn. uI ..... ...... uI r""'" ;~
PRAMAI':-IA THEO RY: DHAR MAKIRTrs CO NCEPT UAL CON T EXT

19

mind that all cognitions occurring with those emotions are necessarily distoned. This way of apprmching cognitive distonion--4fld numetOld othtr ruch wues dearly indicates [hat an accoUnt of the cognitive cyent or act called ~knowlcdgt" (prllmiti or pwni) is ooncemed largely with the proa:ss of producing that cyent. And the mood that we have cited- involving the imeraaion of agmr, object, and instrument- provides the ~15tructure fOr Pramil}a ThMriu..' :anal"..is nf that pmcr:n;. 11 When Gaur:ama, Vitsyi}'Ula, and subsequent Pramil)a TheoriSIl used this modd to give an accoum of knowiedge-f:Venu, their works address especi:illy me "rll~ or "insu'UlTICDu ofknowkdge,· and it is for this reason that Marilal and omen!'der to this genre of philosophicalliu:rarure as Pr:uniI)a Theory. Bur why tlike an analysis of the instrument ali one', themuv: foc1ls 1 Why nor foell.( ;n..,e:ad on the agent. obj~ , o~ evenr itJdf?!J To answer such quenions in a somewn:ar speculative manner, we might give a historical argument mat borrows a principle of Prami .c:ta Theory iudf: if two persons arc to have an argument. they must fin:t share many poinu of agreement, TIut is, if any TWO discussanu arc to disagrtt mono ingfully on some poim. their discussion must be framed within some uo of ag~ment . " When d i$CUiling rhe acquiJirOon of indisput:oble knowledge, Pr.unil)a Theorisu geMn.lly agree o n many basic noriofU about the

instrumenu of knowledge (prllmJi!'llJ. wherC2S they gc-nerally enoounter fewer UC2I of agrttmcnr on other aspca.s of that proct:SS. Since they (end (0 agree more readily on issues related to the instrument or means in the process of knowing, the instrument naturally becomes the focus-the propositionallubjecr-of their discu.uions. The difficult probl~m we face in making this type o f argumem is that we cannot rudily ezplain why it is that these thinktn tended to agree more readily on issues related to th~ instrument ofknowledgeoWe may suspect mat some luge pool of oommon assumptions underlies the emphasis on the instrumenu of knowledge. or perh:aps that an emphasis on the instrument most readily affirms their approam by aduding other styles o( discourse. Somewhat ironically. these II Mari1al h !1i6:los) wccincly poinu 10 lk proca.s in qual;on as aUA.!: "In the tam o o ~ the notion of ·a llJC and °lxalUC ~ inlO OM. " 12 For lhole already funilw .nIh p~ n-y. om m.ly ~mply uk: Why doa • ."..tId Iilu: a ~ moniker for mit atyk of discount. ....... UJ ,,--ritiJ,btr, and 1".,,"~,.:IUnd ridicuIow!

r~,lh

IJ On I p~ 'Th.roty 3C"«IWII, Ont CItI only lfI\H" :aboul 1M Inllh of. p"""",rion {yttdjUJ If om bepns by accq>tinz (II lax provisiotWIy) W Cl:Uimu of dill piopo5i· tion '• ....bjm " . . , tIM",..·,,).

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPUY

suspicions require US to acknowled~ that PtaJTliJ:Ia ~rins would not oplicidy discuss sh:a.rcd assumptions or coven oclusions, since all such issues would be obscured by their vcry givenness. Hence, due to the rela· ti~ lack of research in this area, the subtler fonn of this historical argument an only be suggestive at this point. ,. Putring aside co~n notions, one can also point to argumcntl made by the thcorisu themselves. Among these are lWO distina arguments that oplicitly acknowledge:lfl emphasis on the importance of the i flltnllfWftof knowledge (prAwui'}ll), rather than the agent (prtlwuitr), object (prtlmt}'l.), or W action of knowing itself (prAmit;). The first argumCOt is suggested by the compannivdy early works ofV:1ts)iyana and Uddyoakan." This argument amounu to the claim that the emphasis on analysis of the instrument of knowledge derives from its primaq in the process of knowing. To U.K the analogy of a person oming a tft'C with an axe: the person and the tift can be identified as the · cutter" and the "cut object" only when the action of cutting occurs, and m..t action can only occur when a culung Uuuumel1lthe axe-is employed. It is only by changing the type of instrument used that the action then becomes a dilfcttnt aaion. That is, if we replace the with some other penon, or if we can direct the att apinst some other object. the action is nill the action of cutting. In mononeither the agent nor object can changt: the chanctcr of the action. If. however, some other kind of instrument. such as a yardstick, is used, then the agent (" the cuuet'J. objea (" m..t whK:h is CUt) and action ("cutting") all take on a diff"ttmt chancter: they become the "mcasurtr," the "measured" and the action of "measuring." Hence, inasmuch as the chancIer of the instrumenl determines the chanacr of the olher th~ factors. the innrument is primary. This way of undersClnding the instnuncnr a.s primary appears to have been widely accepted among PramiJp Theorists. induding Dharmaldrti ..

.111

ounlnu.,

14 Poutt", ~n.III.rI"J;.~ ~fIN1 (I~J) is o ne any lnemplll 10_ UllStalro usumpciom. Rucg b~ ud 1001) .... no.P!ftI in I oimilat diJcwaion throusb the moeif of tIx "tdipolu iII!.tnNm." In tl:l"mII of aMmprioN, I am rdftrins 10 thr '""'" ofig, _IOlpciono:of lN;ttcr. dw body. dw; CXNmOa. and 10 -w. would bc:u dj ,rcdy on choius mD in I phibophial argummt. H~, m:ent work IXI ~~ (Z~ '991 and 199)), lOr e:ampk, advanca OUt unOenrandilll illihis rcprd.

ms

15 Sec N8h (4)0-4.4 j) and NY (4)0-4.4d .. 1.1.11- 16 .nd CIp«ialI)' NY (16-10). Vic»patimim'scommcna (NVIT: I6-IO)'~ UJdi.oI Jo,m" a1d.ougl dwycomc mud. 1011:1" in rhc: hiscoric:allkvdoj:llllft1l olNrtra- A nujor COl"""" of thrsc pM 8' is dw conranulity of the u....t. and rhc: ddinidon of :an inatntrt>ml (u"ruJ as d..- " _ prominent cauAI &c.un"

(...o,./u~

16 1M arl"mml for rhc: primaqo of INN!",

th~t

I ht"" summMiud ho:K if !'rom th.:

PIlAMA~A THEORY: OHARMAICI I.T1 'S CONCEPTUAL CON T EXT

1"he semnd set: of :arguments due o:pUcicly acknowledge th~ emphasis on

the instrumentS ofknowl.cdgt are adduced only by Buddhist philosophers, beginning with Digniga and Dharmakini. ThC:K philosoph~n reject th~ notion of an ag~m, and on their view, the cogniriv~ ev~m identified as knowledF is ontologically identical to the instrument, which they conttivc [0 be a mental image. In some comau, they also regard the object or p::!ti~n t :u dq>endent in ~nv. ~nSt! nn rh~ in_ ttmmenr, either bcca~ it i5 not onrologicaJly distinct from the instrument, or because: the chancu:r of that object is determined by the character of the instrument iadf. Hence:, on their view, the instrument is clearly primary, since: all of the other functional dementi in a knowledge CY'Cm arc either unreal or detennined by the instrument. In subsequent chapters, ~ will have an opponuniry to cxamin!!' DhumaJcirti's vll!'WS on,.jl t.h eSt! i~m~ in grea tl!'\"" ckr.r.il. Finally, one can also note that the emphasis on the instrumentS of Irnowlcdgt allows (or even requires) Pnmil)a TheoristS to discuss at length the place: of scriptute: (tif,llmil) or verbal testimony as such an instrument, In all p~ Theories, scripture plays a spttial role, in that it is an ;flJtTW",nll (pramtit;Jll) or means dut enables one to obtain Irnowlcdgc that is otherwiR un!!'dy bI!'yond on!!", ke .... M2ClYcbinu verifi,.bl~ only by sc:ripru~ on!!'n bI!':u directly o n th!!' sotl!'riological go
"..u..-trr,

uniq~ of the inarwncnI (i.e., NV:I<}.r. ~" ~~ d. the rdromi arpmmt ac NV:W .I: , ..~~twIfll. This is only ~ ollC'l'-

era! P""f"Vd by Udd,oukan (I-if) in IoiJ lIIaIysit of ~wrun>& Othu arswnenlJ indudr: I) YViatioN 00 d~ buic lhmx W I abe apt and ob;ca Q!I only ~ roNidc~ VI a,pIr and ob;ea when abe insawnml iI funaionin& (i.e., IIMw~ ~ "',IIIN'." J,drt~ ki4: and~) 0'Uia1iona 00 lhc claim ihaltM inmumml II prinwy beallK ir COIllO jtm bJon, abe aauaI producDon of dx action (i~.• rmw_"""'''".m~ ~",).

11

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKtRTI'S PHILOSOP HY

this sharm ~mphasis on th~ import2fttt of the irutrum~nt is encoul"28ed by a host of ~n and obscul1: assumptions. Nevenhdm, wt can still summariu a rather large number of quite clear and a plicit assumptions offered by th~ theorists themselves. With this in mind, I begin this sketch of the conceptual context ofDhumalOni's thought by discussing the pra~ or "instruments of knowledge~ so as to highlight th~ notions thar he shared with other Prami.c)a Throrisu:. I will move on to aamine some shared notions oonttrning ilUuummral objects (prllmtJII), and after highlighting the importance of purpose, I will conclude with some brief I1:muks concerning the agent (prllmAtr) and knowied~t itself (pramA or pmmiri). T_ Ubilpi_11IStnlmnJU: Purqn.".,.J Irr.frraur

When speaking of the ilUtruments of knowledge, the various traditions of South Asian philosophy and the individual philosophers within those traditions disagree considerably on metly what ways of knowing should be considered instrumental (i.e., insta.nces of pramA!IIl) , and what forTll5 a.re spurious or faulty. They also di$:lJf"«' about the criteria through which one can adjudicate wheth~r a panicuJar form of knowledge is instrumenra.l or not. Despit~ these: and other disagrccmenu:, they find considerable common ground on a number of other wuesY The foremost of these: is simply the notion tha.t the inSlruments afknowledge must be investigated: for most of th~ philosophers, Ihis need stems from the ttntrality of knowled~ in the search for spiritual fr«dam or mD~ That is, to be:com~ free, one mwt rei,. upon correct knowledge. but if one is unable to distinguish correct from incorrect knowledge, how could one recognize one's knowledge a.s correct!" With lhe renowned but compar1lti\'C!y sp.use exception of the lokiyata or Cirvika tradition,If :ill Pramir)a Thmr1sts respond to the n«d for a means of obtaining indubira.l>le knowledge by positing lit killt twO basic insuu17 Indeed. IIx Nlliyiyilw. ar InA. aplicidydia:wa thr noOOn Uuol dim: ~ am.in philotOpIUaI principls dial an: shared by philolophcrs: i"of Ihtm• ..u of principLes an: aspecu of p....w:,... n-ry (_ NSu.1l wilh NY ud NBh If4 rit. (l6))).

me.

18 Thr:daim Uuo. COITCCI knt:noicdp: iI indispcnAbk for !he awnmcnl ol llbttation iI ma
C)n~

of me,

fey,

In-&plh WOfU on Ihl' form

or Sou,h ~an

PRAM.J.~A THEORY: DHARMAKIRTI' S CONCEPTUAL CONTE.XT

1)

menn: perceptual awarencu (pratya/tpt) and inference (anumlitul).a Of course, me virrua1ly ubiquitow accq)(~ of perception :and infcttnoe docs not prevent these thinkers from disagreeing on c:xacdy how these insuuments of knowing o~(t. Ntvetthdess, in accq>ting JXrctption and infcrmct as instruments ofknowl«igc. PramiJ).a Theorists share amin prauppositioru and basic doctrines conccming the instruments oflenowkdge. SNrwl NorU"u Cn.crmi1f1 Pnupnu.JAtL'IIrnuu When spealcing of perceptual awareness. PramlQa Th~risu agree. first of all, that this way of lenowing dqJCnds dir«tly on the sc:nso:. Indeed. the centnlity of the senses in this way of knowing is implied by the term 1'....7"'~ i~lr. ....... ich iJ oF.:.e:n

con!rn~ "Y"'0logioJly

ro m.e::ln -briOre the

senses:)' We must ~ careful. ho~. to rocalJ that in addition to the five senses familiar to Euroamerican traditions, these philosophm also stipulare a sixth sense: the mental facu.lty (maNIJ). Hence, any instance of-JXIUptual awarencss- may be an awareness of a mental object. rather than a visible form. sound. smdl. taste. or tactile object. Prami~ Thcorisu neany all 2Srft" on the .tipul:uion of a .i%th serue. and they :lJ12Srft" on the' n-nu-ality of the senses in perceprual awu~e$S. u Another general point of agreement concerns rhe manner in which JXrceptual awareness occurs. AU PnuniQa Th~rists agrtt that ~fC<"ptuai awareness necessarily involves the contaCt (w,,,,i*,,'f4. spark etc.) of an objcct (vi,urya, .rtha, etc.) with a sense faculty (i"Jriyil). lJ And except in the case of mental objecu. rhey generally assume it appropriate [0 consider this cont2(:t

fO

involve' a relatio n involving matter (,...,.,) or , ubscance

20 Many ~xcepc odw::r f"omuof ~ W ... .m4J,.m (pruwnptM induc.tion). II~ (an&lopal indlKrion), and . - ~ thtou&h ICripcun:). FOI an o'(I'iew of dw Y&ri ..... tOmu of _lhr~." dLaptnJ ill B~".

"'-!fiI.

21 For cumplc, NBh (81 iii NSf.l.j): ~ ,rui~,!, ..",i!J ' ...~~M; PDS b}-4): tif7MlN'9 .. in ''''Y''''w: and ~''''W {. I: • .,.....-'f.o..

(II"'",,,,.,,, , ...

,....... ___ ;'; ,,..~... (d'. r.!lcrn&RS ' ,,0' &740 n. ,&7).

II A1tbou&h Kwnirib ill Sv I.!~ 169) mainwru Wi dxrc an: only five ItIlK organa. .1.:.'"'41) nota Ihll in !.smuli,iIt41lw mind iI lila poxilcd ... I IenIC. Gal,IWI\I (NS:I.I.,. ) mo spoke of ooIy Ii." ICtUa, bu. UddrouJan (NYuJ MiNS:u .... ) and Mlbtcquml Naiyiyiku aeeqxed me mind ... IItIlK (1ft Di~'1 cnficiun oflhil illoCOlUiSletlC)' ill PS:.,&I:I94 and 195: Hattori 196I:}l-J9).

JIu ("

2J 5«, for cumple: YO (1:11°, 161; lhu). NV <9• ...,.,. "" N$:I.I .• I. and Sv liNt. J'I'Ik;Ioc}ll n lb:and l I1.a1-1!J)· ~rti docs I'lOl offn any al.....vr c::ommmu on Itw Ihco.y of KnK faculty conlXt (iMiri,.,.,."iu".), bu.... ir cvidm. in other coo.au (i.e..

fOU NDATION S O F DIIARMAKI RT I'S PH ILOSO PHY

(4f11.".). They also agree: th:U physica.l (i.e.• m:attrial

or fubstanti:a1) defecu

in th~ ",nse: facu lties can contribute to c~rt:ain types of errors in pt:rttptual awa~nw. as when a person with ataracu appauntly sees small hairs or bugs in front of mdr eyes." Another important point of 2grttment is mat perttprual awarcnw is either the most vivid or thc least mediated form of awarenw. and that in this x nsc it wes precedence over oth~r instruments of knowing. luch as inferencc.11 Most of these philosophcrs also agree Wt me basic building blocks of matter ar~ itreducibl~, pmkss aronu or "infinitesim:al panicles" (plmIWll~II). According to the philosophers who accept this notton, infinitesimal panicles:m t OO small to bc pt:rttiYed by ordinary pt:1'$01U; in5lcad. the maner perceived by ordinary pt:noN consists of particles that ha~ somchow bccn aggregated into:an entity of perttptible size.· Although thc:sc points of agrccmcnt :m ccrt:ainly significant. it is important to noc~ that Prami~ Thcorisu often disagree upon m~ prccisc contcnt of perceptual awarcness. ~imcr because mdr ontologies conRia, or because they differ ov~r thc d~ to whKh perceptual awareflCSS is deterr··...,. ,~). loio Il ...... T.,( ""'_I""~.lo ""welT ~ ........ v...t-..Jl ....·......... ..Iuo'li ..,11• ..... (qui.., cig>ifica,,,) rnodi6a ....... ~ PS,). lf _........., WI. in rho: awe.:u wbm, DhannaIdni admiu D.femal JC!\R obj«u. M IOIIowt Vuubo!.ndhu·1 wofk ",t.c,( ... il " nor $UprncdnI by D~ hi< tMory of _ orpn QOtIIK1 would bo: simi. br to the one f'wnd in V.ubandhu·. A~~ (AK:J.)O and AKNo M tir.).

po.,_ ... ""

24

(_

Sc... PV (p,J). Sv (~SH4). YO (l1:P.7). and NY (114 MlNS:I.I .41.

25 For Viuyiyana and UddyoaIwa. pctci(Cdc...... whido if; Wcm kwpnlfll by aD ~ 'J'h..oNu{Mohan()' 1 "1:1)1-~J. u an epUwnlC panJld 10 mot'I: ~IC conom\I with VlVMinea.

n.,.).

16 5«. for aamplc. PDS (1),). wbeft the ipCOfocalions ~~ arc in put mUnt \0 dOO,.w.h dw r>tlUfKioru of ordirwy pcnons. who c:annoc pacti." inIiniIc:firrW panicb. fioto thai of'-';'" who an deJcribed u bcilll eapahM: of PClut;.;", Wm (PDS:",, ). Sc... abo NBh (497) MlNS 1.1.}4: -Sub.uncc in the lUll: of an infinileti.nu,J pMliI;k il nor lhe object of pcrap!lon (J..&.u) beawc putKWs arc: beyond the wnsca." 11-,..~

___ thi~ . . . urW_~ _ w...." .ti...m,.u.u .!'iiM,. 01. DIw·

Ii_.

..>AI"i... hoc" ~ns doc [.un ..... R.c.d ..........up.,;n'. cap.aoca the. ___ <>pinion (c:.s.. at PV).I,..Rl. Sc... bdow.,s.

P RAMA ~A T H EO aY: OHAIlMAKIU" S CO NCEPTUAL CO NTEXT

l.S

minate, We will consider some of ,hoc debates when examining Dharmakirti', particular theory of pcrccplion, but for now, let us rurn to an overview of inference (.",u,ul1lA), SlMmJ NQritlru CortUr1lj,.,/ltfirm« Infercnn:al knowWg-e:md the topics rcl:.rcd to it:arc p:uticubrly importam

to Pramil;la Thcorius,J1 One can point to three basic reasons fo r the importanCe ofinfcrmcc: first, it provides:acxcu to entities mat arc to some degree unavailable to the 5etl5CS, and such entities arc onen under dispute. Second, it is closely tjed to me understanding ofianguage, an iS5ue mat is cssmtial [0 the 5UC:CCSS of the South AsWl philosophical enterprise.II And third, it provideJ the fftmoewoft. for formal duputation. an undeniably crucial aspen of South AsWl philosophy. As Manlal hill noted, the carlie$[ theories of inference probably arose out of a co~rn with the codificuion of philosophical debate. but propedy spcalcing. what is mant by inferencc here is not a Mryllogism or some other argument. Ramer, an infettllCC produces or constirutes a knowlcd~­ even! that IcnQWl iu object by mcanl of Icnowledge about another object that is invariably related to that object. A node aample is the inferential cognition that knows fire is present in a particular locus by I1lC2ru of pcrccptual knowledge of smoke in mat same Iocw. Inference dearly involves some steps. for in providing knowled~ of one thing by means of knowing something innriably related to it, the aa ofinferellCC requires a sequential structure, which ¥oIC will disaw below. Nc.omdcss. the central concern for these thinkers is nOl the fonna.lUm of lhat struct\lrc: itself; instead, they ate most conamcd with the way in which that suucture supplies the n«csmy conditions for an inference. PramlJ:1a Theorists generally speak of two forms of inft:rencr: MinferenceM for-oncsdf' (svdrth4"ltnuiM) and MinfemKr-for-othcrs (p4r4rtMlIw1ltll1lll), M

27 Tho: nst majority of ~ l tell:iact ~ ~t more a«mOOn to infdtliOL and iu tdau:d. ropia (wch u the 1Il.tuJ'e of conupru.aI ocoptitiool than to pu"ptlUl awumat. Noel abo Mohanty'l obM::o ..tioft: - In a work do:vored ro doc c:ot>CXpt of I'QIOO. a t.hoeory ofinlftmoo m ... oc:aopr. CftItni ~- (1" 1:100),

28 Many South AAan phiL. ,Nn 0II'tft awa.ft that if 01>1' a;ouId lIOI ~ an adequau- aa:owu of~ tbt arWrur.m1 of opirirual fi«dom (~moaplKil pi of nearly aU ~ South AIiln pftiIoIopbm of this period, would bt impouibk. To • pnl C'%ttD1. tbt c:rucial rolf of~ in tbt analnmenc oflibaetion raG on ia \lie u. tool dw allows one to 1UppU.n1 faIK bdir& ( ";~"""" m.I]tI. ctt.) wid. indubitabk knowkdsc.

16

FO UNDATIONS OF OIiARMAKIll.TI 'S PHILOSO PHY

The former is simply an infCmcial cognition: one looks at a smoky room, for C'Umple, and (with other conditions in plaao). one infm that fire is present. In COntrast, an infermcr-for-othm is one that is stared verbally 50 as to indue: an inferential cognition in another penon, In other words, this laner ~infa­ encc" (which is aauaI.Iy a series of stalCfTlcrUS and not an inferma:) is meant to result in another penon having his own infcrenct-for-oncsdf with regard 10 the question at hanci. In this sense, infettna-for-oncsdflies al the core of these: thinkers' inferential throry. But ironically, the I[rucrural dements tholt are neccssary for one to have an infertfltt-for-onesdf are primarily aplorod in di5Cll.S5ions ofinmncr-for-others, To avoid w confwion that this overlap incurs, bdow I will often speak simply of "inkrena:: with me understanding that OUf main focus is the enminarion of the conditions no "pry for a correct (as opposed to a spurious) inferential cognition to oc:cur. THE BAsI c SnUCTUIl£ OF iNFEIl£N CIE

A5 one might expect. the afomnentioned importanO: placed on infen:nce promptS considcl'2ble disagrccmenr among Prami.r)a Throrisn, bur their analyses of inferenCA: always indude Ihe same basic. minimal structure,1t Schemaljaljy, I render il as follows: S is P because E

A typical C'Umple of Ihis type of inference is: The hill (S) is a Iocw offire (P) because of the presence ofsmoke (E).-

Here, S is Ihe "subject," called the uiJh.yaJJ1iIl7t1i" or pt&,4 in Sanskrit;JI P 291M cliapano:nlJ amoII& p~ TMacisa focwon lM.,y in wIUch mil baicll:rucru~ mlU'l Ix IUppomd c:WJoruni. ThiI: amounlS ta an ~I .bow 1M ckmo.na r...r,..J'" an ;n~ Khan (.919'llI9-1.
*

30 Sprri.liKI wiD naK Tiql!he mirUmal ilruttuft I praJII)M' hm: iI I'IOX !"ttMaled in. fann admil~ by m y ~ n-.isc ntiler, ;1 il lM IJ1X olinkm>a anc finds in commc .... wi:IIli~l\I~, .. Qttnpl.ilVd by dw; oIt.dda~ Malctnml, ',dri.frynilJ"Ul"l'f! iruUtIItb. My mluennan is tIuc 1M 1U\K'fU~ of mil _m>enl iI IIx b.io; mn:: oflUl"""" P'apuiy

""""""'.

.ho. th.c """" fd!- h.u been ...cd ... iocc !>etc; on« .0 ,da- .0 the ...t.;
*

PRAMA~A THEORY, OHAkMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

17

is me · predicl.[e.- known as the ~rma: and E i.s the Mevidence'known as the hmt or /ingll. The fi rsl (wo clements. the subject and prnli· cate, together form me ~ p ropositjo n ' (prillijlill or J14*!4), -S i.s P.- )I Hayes and others have employed an alternative terminology, where the subject is called me Mquali ty.possesso r" and the predicate the · quality."JJ This ter' minology has me advantage of conveying more literally the sense of the Sanskrit term5 (uiJbya.)JJu,rmin and (uiJbya.)dhtzmlll. and it avoids any

hu SwIlf11i (PVSV,. lliPVI.I).in iu rrirrwr Kme ,.u:,.dmota the propoAlioo. CDnWI:' in, oflt~ 4 '4r&t,..",i" and ~ ~. sina!he ·iJ"'·!H""j" it. PM' f~ of !lw ptopolilion, the Itrm ,..,. (propoMlion) mly be wed II I ma:lphor lOr d>t" ·0, hi¢! M .... 01" • ...u,jca..

f"""""""

lZ n ....... J ..... E,,&i;.t......... '",upuoOu...n' r... "."j IWVt ,...1 ... run with --...... i,_ icism, moH l1O(ably from Mohan!), 11991-"09"-" 0, • '( .. orkl", of '98ll. Mohanry', pGfnl ia thaI " 1 Ius! 0f>C' of dw: oerua of'ptOPt" or 10 d'inml Kivu. may be di~ • In other "fI'Of"1h. il iI"an abruaa rncl)' rowards which one< INy We difum ll mitudo. or !he wnc Ittirudc II d.ifkrml times.' On his vn, tt.iI..:nwof·~ion' io not ~ ...... i.ro.c 10 dw: " I ndian Iopa. - bcaIUC in ~ to thcmtltcnt of a mrntal act {as dcsenbcd br the Nytya. II kaoc) • p
m-

in~.

II is pouibk. ~.o. (.tl , 10 mlploy ' propotirioo' in anocnn KnK". llocanut MaNnI)' hu focwc:d on is ClIlmsionaI. bul - propolilion' may also Ix- wed in an inte'nlional KIIK. when ;1 no IonfP ~ 10111 ".I:ow.c rn.il)" W . Or; AOrndlOW inckpcndrnt of ~ mental ",,', COOl· (uII, bul nthe. coruUu of thai conlent itad! oqjtJ,.,.~ 1U1nn dun ctClIt ,

rnwftI,.,.

illfi IIIWntkntandin&- thU W2'J of ~ "ptopo'ilion' QfI be helpfUl when Wicd to the "tUiju/~ of an infncna, for it 'lig .. the MnKtUrc thai is specifIC 10 wch eo rwndy, doc li/wmrti1llJJ.wmM ~ pualld in imprwtanl "'"")'110' p
" Sct-, fOr irucuocc, H~ya h9lla:,a.wi"'),

FO UNDATION S OF DHAR,MAKI II.TI ·S PHILOSO PHY

potential misunderstanding COrKZming the notion of a proposition. Neverthdess, · quality·pos5C$$Or~ is quite cumbe:rsome:, and inasmuch as the English term "quality" can also be: misleading. "subject- and "prediCiUe:" appe:ar to be: the: best choices.)Io TH E EVIDEN CE- PIlED/CATE R£LATI DN AND ITS ExEM'U'ICATION

According to Dharmakirti and his fdIow PramiJ:)a 'Ibe:otisu. any meory of inkrena: must contain at least the: relations implicit in the: baste model presented above. The: first such relarion is ge:nerally called the IIJIipti or "pervasion· - it is the relation bttwttn the e:vide:n~ (E) and me predicate: (P)." In our aample:. this is the relation h<:rween fire and smoke. Prami.!)a Theorisu generally consider this relation (Q have rwo asp«U: me positive co ncomitan~ (,lnwtYA) and the negative concom itan~ (VJIlti"uJ.- 'I~ positive concomitana is a Stare: of albin; such mat wherevt'f me: eviden~ (E) is present. the predk:ate: (P) must be: present. In our example. mis would be: Stated, "wherever mere: is smoke:, there is necessarily fire:." The negative /In addioo.w problem b= is dut. in I Eurounnican phiIotophical OOOtal. ~qualitKs~ ~ undcmood to br rq>n.tabk. bt.. m.. EncUsh ICt1'II ~qwlicy" iI onm uwd to Irvubl.. ~

~ wIUch

tdns to • ~ q~jl)'-ituto.na:.

JS Althou&h dx Saruluil Imn ".,ti and odxr. rebud tmJU (lOCh af 7"u.. .,."., and ~ OCCUr ift dx worIa of UddrouJw;a (..." . NV" ..... and ;als• ..-.;.) and Pnh,tap"h (q., PDS:I1'), dxw pbibopben do nuc M,.. dc.cribe dw: rdMMJa bu."" pmIia~ and ~ • ~ indcul. in ftW1r_ Itxy make only implicil rrkrmc:c 10 the reb. lion.. In COIIUUI , both Kumlrib (... " , Sv, ,,,....._ ,-i-) and Dhannulrti (PV. HD. PVift. ND: ,.m...) ~ dx tmn ",.,n I)'ICmIWc:alIy to dcxribr dw: pmlial~na: fda· lion. and foilowift, DipIIp'1 1ead, dxy a.ppar 10 be dw: fine. Pnmlq.a l1xoNu 10 nnploy ""',,; wnsiRall.l,........ ~ia: rna. -... bo:ame m.. 00I1D. J611w: un .....ldr tranJiuiO<\. " pot;iti~ ~ ilo.ncc" r.nd "MpIM ammmiWK:c" ha"" become lruldard (or .....H]olII· .,..'''l and [)upit .. I~ ' irw:kpn«. I haw ct.o.cn ,0 .. mploy m..... ,nn,u,tionl hm:: 1'0 as to.ovid dw IIftn«aAr)' confwion of introducill,_ talnS.. For ••...,.. Oberiwnmer n aI. (1"1:61) ~lMIId "Gcmcin· ......... Vorlwmmc:n [von Grund lind FoIlCl." 00, il is IlOI II all dnr how thiltum--'d ~ diMinpilhai from (co-oa:uncna). Althoupl ......,.. docs it>dcN amount

.,..rimi.tl.-.,..,,,l.

I." ..'. .

""'P"-'-' (..JuMw-) in i .. "tI .... .... in do. ...... ,.... of inr.r-c,. (d'. Oberhammer. eI al . ,,,,,61), this intcrp~rion or .......,. iI applic3bk 10 .daC<.QO;Uil,. n::... i<:.nI ' u ","w,a..:a uf <101: noidaouo;. O ne of u.... pl'tlblnn, with Inllubtiont: lNt involve tlx EnKlilh word " 1qI'1~~ (u ift "ncp.0 trW ••

PRAMAf:lA THEORY, DHARMAKIRTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

:'9

concomiunc.e IperiAo that the evidence (E) is present only in the presm tt of the predia.le (P) and not in any other circumstances. Dharmakin i often States the nqarive concomirana:. or "restriction; in an affirm:uive statemmt (i.e.• a statement that involva no grammatial nqacion). In our cwnple. me positive statement would read. "There is smoke fUJI] where there is fire."" Most Pramil).a Theorists. however. formul ate the ncptive cn ncom it:...a (I f re
10

th.,... philosophcn, in ortkr

10

h:t_ :an inn:ll n ~ of inf~f'

m rial knowlodgc: one musl be aWl« of the pervasion-the rwofold rc:I:IItion consisring of the positive and neg,uivC' concomitance. So too. the pervasion must be general: it cannot be restricted tO:ll singlC' case. but must pertain to tift conc.omiWlU") II dw IIJWtirr•• il noc nec:euarily Ailed» I Mplion. Sft. fo, earn· pI~ Oh.,.... lrl"i '. fn'mlll~.;"n n( "7 ",;,.,tll in PVSV .J PVI.I (Co ,s..)) , "J"i~ 1M "'",UN ihl"",~(" H 8:1' ,]-I),

)7 Stt

m.e pt'c.ioua notc for roo« on OhanrWiini', pOliti'" formulalion of Inc n'Sl'M

c:onoomiW'>C.(.

:J8 1 ha", choKn dK ~ Imll "n«.CSAriIy" and in tda~ forms 10 aKI'I'C)' fWO rypa of Sanskri, conRnKt~ lhotc thai nnploy ~ rc:Rricti", ~i<:k tw, and tho.c: thaI nnploy an ac!-.nb such as iIttwM", (e". Sv, ~1f""'-n.4b) Of """""", (c.". PVSV PVI.lI: G:l9,'). 1M usap;t' at "'" rjwc: "onIy1 in me fotmulation of ,ho: mdcnoe-predicalC rd.-o.

*'

do: I .on P~ 'I,Oft • " an•Im~"~"P"'
0'nann ....... , ...I """" ' . ... ' . , .. ' en ___ - ~ '- Ibctc pbibopbcn '0 uno,kqw,d ,hal relation as • nco;aJaI}' tdation, ",rbft lhan • ~ c:opr_nc:c (*Mno.. etc.) , In hil dir,"ina of the hiKoric:al II"I.IUition from throtiet tN, potitl mct'ecopt'-.u of c.idcnoeand pmlian: 10 rhoK'NI poIil a ,'" "" '')' n:lacion, Poe_ Iei' (1977-"'- ' 94) has;upN thai pbilolophcn ouch ill Uddyoabn. and PnbmpL.b rq>raenl an inlc:nncdulC", btt.w, me rdation »wpiUt,U and ~ rebtion » ncccauy, While i. is uuc lhi, Pnh'laptda', work (pru ' 147-~. UI) ahibia ooIYI modeM IIIcmpc 10 $!'lOW beyond tIlCft wpmmoo, UddyoaIwa. in tw aiDqlK ofDi&niP (NV:l6)-167 .J N$ ••IJ; ci. H.ya ,,&0,,..,11) &nd eI, .. Iw;..... "PI'"'" 10 ..ndoc........t And rocy,i..., oonmmiWltt ill mnuapoliOonal. 1M implication here il tN. the evidence-predicate rdalion is NCn"')'oo hi:!: tboory. UddyoaIan.', rcc:op.ilion ofdK~,c ldation ill nrusary ill Wo augmed by the faa that. e¥m in cue when; only the MpM conoomiWlOe 0' rauiaion can be acmplihed. dK cvidenc:c-Pftd.ica.c .mtion nill c:onai... both (NV'I .... - LU). Ohartn:akirti', RCOS1Iilion of ~ ~pred>ca,c rdltion as rw......my io abuncbndy dar, and his diat:inaiw contriburion lie in fotmubtion of. 1N~"UhII (5« SfCinkdlna' '971:101-104 and &110 below, chaplcr J). Dharmaklni nnpIoytan no:n ~ ~ cite UK ai tWI (e" . in hil initial praocnano. of.,qti in PVSV ..tpy,.I; G',-I1-IJ). His ~-- . . ' ...... T 1ft

p
m.e

,0

FOUNDATION S OF OHAIlMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

all cases of the kind in question. In ,he dialogical comol of inference-foromers, me5C' twO requirements-dm Oil(' have knowledge: of !he: pmrasion and thai il be gcncral-an: rdImcd by a frequcnt claim: namely. thaI an infercncc. for-othcrs must be accompanied by :ltleast a supponing example (sMlhamr,.a."l.t4nla). MoSt philosophers maintain thai a countC'rexample (IJIlUDumrJild."',t hla) may also be n«essary. at Ins! in SO~ cases. The supponing example is dt:l.wn from the domain of -homologolU insrances" (UI'p4.4;w}-rumdy. loci thai art similar to the proposition to be provt:n (S

is Pl in Ihal they au qualified by P. In an inference of tire from smoke, a kitchen (mAhiituUII) il the rypical example. The aim is to appeal 10 a noncontroversial cue that eumplifies the rdationship Ixtwttn the Nidencc eE) and thc prtdicuc (P): Ooco's pasl aJXricncc of kitchens iIIusuates the positive: concomiW1CC of smoke with fire, in that onc's om.:rvations conform to a nccessary relation between Ihc presence of smoke and thc prtS* cncc of firc . Thc countclaamplc is dlllwo from the domain of hetcrogeneous instances loci thar arc dissimilar to S in that they lack P. A typical countcraamplc for thc Imokc-fi~ infcrcnce is a lakc. Herc, thc point is to show that the presence of ,he evidence (E. (he smoke) is not observed in the absence of the prtciicate, fire; or aitemativdy, dUI smou is prescnt onl y when Ii~ is present, and not othclWisc.J'I

pofoiIion haJ _ aimibrities with KwnitW.'l, who« detaiprioru of ~ jQiln.e and rxpIi", OOIKOIliiW>Ol' ind,,* ~ 1OUowin&:

If ~ pRKOOf of ~ wac: pnv:oda! by ~ prama of fin::, ,hm non-fi~ bet.. ndudtd fivcn f.II:>OU, would be ~I only in ~ c::uc: of ncH\·unokc. Thw.. ill ,his 11.. , .. ioU, io "",.-...Jed t..,. .""............... Lilo.c..iK, ;..... ",..;1... non-fin:: is ~ by I'IOn~. IIrIOkc: g. adlldN from non-fin::: at auch. i, is N ( p';ly ~ by fin:: bc:a.- " Iw no pouibillry of aisrinl U11CN1W odw:r non-f,", kKus.1""'"-iIMw pi.l:Wo._ ~/'k iupir III"'1"~ 11.Jhii_ftIf --1'

II""-r.,~ I-,u,....

rlbno-.v

"*""J ....~ ~""- III,.." III~WJ"'"' -J<6,..._...JtM.tNJ ",."." JInw ..",

",0,;;_ "'/'k ~ III ... '1"~ 11 ~i_ Sv. . ...."u,U,I1w1-I141bj.

r,.n',

J9 WhelM GOt 01' maR a::unpia nmiloo be- ("ed in an '1Ikn:nu-IOr-odont. rIM _~ NI_ ...t. in PO" .. ,....,. ...... 'YI'" ~ ... ;.t~ "',•. ho-i"'.ddt ......nd in PO" "fW'" m., vV-wot of tilt- pniloJopha in qucaion.lJddyoW;ara (NV:!+4-'"'s), KUlIIirila (S\!, ..... and DharmaidRi (1'V,.J6) all n::cosniK INoI in _ infcn:nco:t only me, poIiln.e W"CO",iOOOf an be- OftIlplihed bta. . lhoe domain 01 ho;,tlOS"_ CIHI iI nnP')'O !lUI iI-. thn-e an:: 1'10 insana:r. of mClies thai do I\OC poACIf tho! propnt)' 10 be prowm. Such cua an:: prim.ily thoK in wbKh cURal« is impoMibk widlOullbe pmiig.IC in q..-ion. For a::unpIc, (Or. pboo.opha- who !!Wnw", We all raJ tIIinp an:: fM'O'SRrily impm!W'lCnl. an inf=nc:c in which impmnanmct' is. pmticaw< haJ no M~ ~ ilrC" no aiKml, ptt-

.........,,,'j,

m&roal ..... n5'-

In...do caoca, j, .. . - ... 7'0 p
PIlAUAI:
}I

In part. the usc of cumples indicates the psychologism within pram4!J1l discourse.- That is. these philosophen are not intere5ted only in fhe formal aspects of inferential reasoning; rather, they wish to demonstrate the conditions nccessuy for me occurrecnce of a knowledgc-cvem that is inferential in form. The distinction Mle is broY«n the knowledge th,u smoke is alwa}'l concomitant with fi~, on the: one hand, and dte knowledge lIut a Imnk"'_protlud ng fi re il prrs.ent in :a p:arricui:a.r CiSf" . on thl! othl!f. For Pramil)a TheoriSts. the positive concomitana is a rdation thai mw! pertain bnwern me evidence (E) and the predicate (Pl if we arl! fO infer that dte subjttt (5) is qualified by the predicate (P) beCIIUoC it is qualified by me evidence: (E). But for thCSl! throrists, it is also crucial that 1M know/dgt of dtc positive concomitance is a nCttSSary p4lrt of the process that leads to an infct-ential cognition of fire in :a locus by -..y of:a prrcc-rru:al oognilion of smoke in that locus." In addition to me psychologism underlying the usc of examples, one can also point to ce:rtain ontological concerns that att implicit in claims for the nuu~ of positive and ncpUve concomiWI('.C (,,~IW)'" and ",.nrrhj. Uddyoulun ""'yalll) oIurc ..... "'- (NV"+t-'.s). A1thouf!;h Udd,..,.:obn·• no< dar. ;' _ _ likdy thaI for him poIicift concomilVlClt is not I malin of men: copl'CKna, !.ina a theory thai pmniu -'I·formed infnmca when only lbe posilive coneomiuna is aempiific.d ......w.J n(K be pMXft4fu1 if thaI relation _ DOl ,........,...'Y. UddyotKan (NV"4l\$lt'lled,. FOt difkrHlI ttUOfU, both Ko,unlrw. (SV, ....,,""'-I)I- In) and DlwnWtini (MY ""PVI.I)Ib. G").I- II) rqea this

.-m-;.. en.""'"

me

me

.mn.

type of atp;umnll.

In .adi.ion to allowins I .... ' tilt counrnaatnpk is not ,M 'Y in aU cuoa, Dh.unWtini (pVl.l7-tJ, PVSV ..., ~ PI as &r as to Ay that 011< 1'211 diJpmx with aampks alto~ if lbe pernsion (~,D) iII"'ready &milg, ,0 lhc in,c.!ocu.on: in...do cuoa, .... JIC" ...-......... doa.- .to
.a Mohamy (1911 and 1991:101- 111) rmw'u ~I lmgth on ~ in Soulh Amn theoriaofin~.

41 The claim!lw the!t philotopMn ·a", not i.,em,t<:!" in fOl'mal rnsooinl ""',. KCTIl a bit n trem., bu, siven the abidin, conccrru wilh praclical application (1,,,"!'1i) Ind

pUfpoK r,r~"") in PramlQ-l Theory, dcvdopilll a J)'Mcm of (<
FOUNDATIONS OF OHAkMAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOP HY

"necessity of cnmples in an infere:nce-for-othcrs. According to many South Asian philosophers, me (W1)fold reladon betw«n evidence and predicate ClnnOt be $t2ted in :a.bstncrion from the substances that bear ~ predicates. When a dispuram (In us all him - Devadaml attempts to indUtt another to infer the prew:nu offire: on a mountain from smoke on that mo untai n, Dcvadana must dcmonSU;Ji U," 10 his interlocutor that the presence: of smol«: is neassarily concomitant with the presence of firc. BUI M cannot do 50 by appealing to the case at hand----the smoke and fire on the mountain-preciKly bcc:ausc rhis case is under dispute. Of coune, Dcvadata migtl! simply stal e' m;u rdadon in abnracrion from any given locus or substance. bur many PraJTlil.u "Throrists, especially those from non-Buddhist traditions. resist this approach. This is duc in part (0 the nOlton that. if the p«d.iCI.[CS in quesrion are tttI, they must Ix insWlriucd in some substance or locus; and if one CUlnOI appeal to any such undispUlcd inst2mi· arion, dK rWity or rhost ptedicar(S mnains dubious. Hence, fu r some Pram1r)a ThroriSt5, on~ or the reasoru for insisting upon examples is that they savt [0 demonstrate the reality or the emines adduced as predK::ate and n-idena:. This ontological mJuiremem also has a ee:rrain resonana: with an epinemic rcquiremem-namdy, th:u the relation in quc:stion must have iu finaJ appal in sense pe.ctption itself. In this smsc, ev~n ir one can logicaUy adduoe rQSOns why some stat~ or affiairt must hold t~. one's argumenu arc generally considered unreliable if one cannot appeal to sensory opcti· enee: to suppon that rc:asoning.·l

me

mm

~2 \l'hik KwniriJ..

(S\'. •--_1))) dearly linlo!lx ..'Unromf of I bomoIopu cumpk

ill..kId)'O(aIw-a who iru4u mal infama m\l$l alto Ix ~ in puajlbon. His cvmmcnlJ, which often SO unnociad. _ wonh aone in dv:ir cnti~. 1M ~t bqiru as I rapol\fe ro I Buddhist opp<M>e1'1 who, duoush.be eottteqUCflttl of d... Buddhial cmiqur of ...I'rnf;kd CIItities. has bttn pwIxd by UddYIMWn into daim· ins mil all f'(rcqKiocu are inrnmriaJ. UddyoubD (NV:.t67) ~ .. foOows: 10 om"" . . ·1 rolltt ..." il

Ir one: ""'tft 10 uh d'le potilion tIw all copilioru ~ inkmuial. !ben Ifxn, ~ be no in~ II III bec:a~ dx wbjca would flOC ......" been 1XT'iJ.cd Ihrousb ...... apcion.. And if dx ~ .. hOI c:osn= duoo.agI pc •....,pr;on. an inkmoa don noc

oorur. Some: Iu.." AJd that """ a n hotft an infield," of..,pcnnuibk obj«U. but do= ~ no ad. infUCb"". .ana " is noc ~ 10 inl"er ..,paxnsibk ob;tcu. Whr, "8caYlC, as I .... w:;u.. aid, ,be JUb;c:a noI bam oopIixd.. ["'-111 "'''11__ ;ty - ; " " ' . '''IIIIIbUWW-; ~_ ;"""P"w.W tIJ."";!'14- ... ,o"""u'!i

n.

,"'''''n.# I"",." .#~.rtbq. l1li,.",,_ ,.".wn"." MiNh.", .. ,,~~ I um.",;# ! JJ.n.i~ '"MI,;.

~,. .,,"'IJittI~ :.u..ulloOlJI

W-.

,.".,..w u,.Ju,.~ . Uddyoo .......... 50" 001 to.-.. w, .... mini",", «qui""",",,, Fo. i.n1i:1U>U ........... "'O;":' and

,.idcna

~

puuptibIe.

PlAMA.~A T H EOR.Y: OHAR.MAICIR.TI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

H

THE EVIDENC E-SUB IECT REUTION

So far we have d.i.scusscd the basic form of inference, :lnd we have discwsed one of the kty relations in this inftrence: the twOfold pervasion (UJ4pti) consisting of positive :lnd negadve concomitance (IInWl]1I and vytItirtlttt) thae pcrains bctwccn the evidence and the predicate, One other kty infcrt'ncial rdation muse also be discussed: the relation caJltd N/H'NlJ4 (":IIpplialition") or, lU Buddhin thin~n rend to call ii , P"~"J..,l"'I9IJftJ r prescnce of the quality in the subj«I"), In some ways. this rdation is maighrforward: il limply consilu of the relation bctwccn the evidence and the subject (the t/M"";1I or ,./q;t) of the proposition in question. In omer words, for p"""JNrmIluito hold (fue, the evidence must be known to be a quality or predicacc (JIM,.."..) of the proposidon 'J subject. In the cu.mple of inferring fire on :II mounu.in from th ... prcwnce of $mOke, ~""'1Il would simply mean mat the smoke used as evidence is present on the mounain. The need fOr this relation is probably quite obvious; after all, it would mm little IenlC to prove that the mountain is on fire by noring that smoke is prcscm in my pipe. An even more obvious aample would be the in.fermce: "Joe is a bachelor because: ofbcing unmarried." PIIJr! • .n..."""/~ here would .ill1ply mean th:u evidence addl.lCedthe ncr of being unm:arried- peruiru to him , not someone ...11e. OtherwUc, we might inftr: "Joe is a bachdor because his dog is unmarried." And this docs not make any obvious sense. Thus, the basic poim of JHI~rmIlt4 is thar one must readily know that the evidence u a predicate or propeny of the subject. Some philosophCfli, such as tht' Naiyiyika Uddyotakara, claim that this relation must always be known through perCoq'uon," but Dhaz-motkini and IUbscqUCRt Buddhists maintain that this reluwn may be d«t'rmined through anoth~r inftrencc." A RuTATEMENT With the above discussKm in mind, In us resate the basic demena ofinftt· ~ aa:ording to PrarrW:ta 1bcorisu. This resamncnt combi.nci tht dementi of both infen:nce-for--o n_lf and infercnce-lOr·othcn, and it .. malnt ....

heuristic 0VttVit'W of inkrmcc, r.athcr than the depiction of any philosopher', theory:

43 s... t+w, J" eo ioon """~.

44 DIwmaklrti maka rru. claim ..... noubIy in HB (, ' ,1,).

FOUNDATi ON S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ProjJQsiritm (prarijl\i, p~) : Th~ mountain (S) is a locw of fir~ (P).

EvUima (hcru, linga): Bcca~ m~re is smoke (E). TIN Evit:bnu-PruJi~1I1t Rtlation (vytpti, f'"WU;Dn) and Its Exnnplifi~at;(Jn: Wh~r there is 5mou (E) th~re is fire (P), as in a kitch~n . And withoUi fire (- P), thert is no smou (-E), u on a lake.

T1K EvUkncNJlbj'«t RtiatiDn (pakpdhammi orupanaya): This mountain (S) is a locus of smoke (E).

All of th~ dements figu re explicitly Of implicitly in every PrarnlJ:la Theorin's analysis of inference. In the case of inferencc-for-oneself, me aemplificnion P" w is SUlXffluous, but tbe principle expressed by thal exempliflcalion-thal the evidenct-predicate rtl:lIion be generalizable beyond tbe cast al hand--is niH required. In a 5e1Ut, all the elements art also only implicit in an infe.rencc-for-onesc:lf, in that they art not explicitly stared. whereas al least some of the dements must be. explicitly 5t:1.ted in an inferenc:e-for-odlef1. Numerous disagreements arise, howeYer, on tht details of infertnce.for-others. We have already noted. for example, thaI th~ philosophm do nOI agree on the degrtt or type of exemplification n«dsat)' in an infercnce-for-othen. Similar disagreements abound concerning which dementS may be. dropped as superfluous to a SCltemenr ofinfe.rence, or whether some additional st;uemtnts arc required. But these disagreemenu focw primarily upon the a plicit prtStfltacion Of repetition of one element or an()(her; the implicit prtstnce of these dements in an infertnce is not a mailer of conrcntion. j ,

45 Conum;nl ...... ieh clemenu m.... be: aplieidy n:ltw. Uddyo.ah.., and his fdlow Noiyiyikao stand ac 01>( o:nd of dv: ~, ....t.lk Dtwm:oJdni and ..... foIknotn take ~ diamctriaIly oppoKCl ¥ioew. Aaotdilll.o .be sundard NyI,....-kw- dc;fwdcd by Uddyotabra. dv: poopwirion mid< Ix _mI DOl only ac mr~nnin" bu. ;. m.... Wo Ix tqlt:lml l ' ohm mil ... conc:huion Of -1Um1N00n" (NpMlUl4). Hma. foo. Naiy.iyiba, .I\ill.~ in/ff. ma-Ior-odlm Iw fiYe dcrnmu Of "limbo" /.,;p).

I. The mountain q.1ocw offiR (the propoai. ion: ,~lijU, Beaux ;. iII.1ocw of srnoU (the ~ J.m.) J.. WhcRO(IIben: il lInlOIu:. then: ill fin:. »in ~ banh; without fin:, then: is no omoIu:, .. in • t..b: (~ion and annplificolion: "JtI.......,....) .... The rroounwn is a Iocw of .mou (!tN: ,pplic uion: "I"''"''Y4 or IUtenlm' of 1.

,...,·4,

.toO

I. Tha&'OfC,

me, mountain it ~ Iocw of fin: (oondwion Of swnnwion: "ip_,..,.

PRAMAIiA T HEORY: OHARMAKIRTn CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

J5

W e haW! now owerM rhi!' mou Io:Ilii!'nl vill'WS IMt Pr:a.mil)a Theorisu share aboul the two ubiquitow forms of instrumenu of knowledge: perccpt:ion (prtl~)and inference 6"'II*nIl). Let us now rum to lO me basK: views concerning the instrumental objcct (pramry.t), the objca of an insuumenc of knowfedgt:.

1.2 Pf'2I1leya: Th~ "R~ilr Al

nOled

pln'iously, the term prafflrya refers

10

the object of the indu-

bitable knowledge derived from an inst rument of knowledge or pf'llmi!f4,

and to clarify that a pra",lJ" is specilically an object of this kind ofknowledge. I will pmly manllali!' ,ra",~:as ~inJt rumen~ objecr ...• For P~a Thcoruu, an inn rwncntal object is ncccssarily what we might call "rt"a!. in English. I am thinking here especially of the Sambit tCfm SIlt, a participle fonncd from tht verb ~ tO bdaiu· (111). The: connoaIn irs fuJIac forni , this ~ indudel both 1M poei~ and neprivc conc.omiunoe in the aanplifialion, bul as _ iu.,y 1«11 , Uddyoubra:Wo:&dm.ia inrerenas thai invohoe only poIJlM concomitance (Le., I '-'IboMJfI'l) or on.,. nqaUw conoomiu.na: (i.e., a

'-''''"'r

.ri,mflj. For additional mru.rb and ¥ieM on the Nliylyib approach. I « ....,....;.lI y Mati. bI b~:n-7I). Pomr (1977:110-111). and Mohanry (1991:101-106). In COrIttUllU Uddyoubra. Dhumakini, on his m(-.f rnarun..,ft. prensl panimoniaw approKh. This panimony Menu &om his rommlion (iMerilcd from DignJp) tNl an illfna-ott thouId OftIy contain the "mcana" (IIIJ}",M) for ..,-..:ruil'll:an inkrmtial WF'irion in the inrnioculor. As, one tnipl aput . ... th;, b.iJ.DhannUIrti ~ the remlmIC'nl of 1M .,...-.poArion:ll' tondLUion. bile k rven the need ro MaU' the propo.;rion 1Il..a. His poinl is tNl the propotilion is IlOl Klually. 'mc:;lru' ro the immckd inkrmlW coplilion: n.bcr, the mans it ronKiUlled by Ik "rhmfold e>idma:" (,...;,..,.",Ii,;,p). i.~, n-ickna: dwaani!ed by iu rdalion 10 the 1Ubj«r mel by Ht2bliJbed potili.,y and nepti.,y toncomiWIU.. For this reUI)Il, Dharmaklrti :Wo ~ lbe need 10 IC"~ the IQiOIl xpuudy (as in, "bcautc it illlocw of ItnOkcl. ~ the: Oft!yekmmu n«.eM&ryare: the tuecmc:nl of the pcmWon (in _ QIC:I..ith ill Icaot pooitivc oemplifiarion) alon@;..irA the~. of the: cWXnClNubjm: rNlion Gtw!;s'&.....u). Sec Tilkm:ana {'9ii and 1m}. Kwnlril. lua an inrermedialc IIO'ition buwCCh Udd)Vlabra and Dharnu.ldnL He mainwnr thai an inkftllCC-fOr-odlcn &houId always induo;k swcmmu of the proposilion. the ._t.lot ~wb;ca rdacion, and the pcn-.won aanplifio:d by 1l1caot. poeiiM aampk. The propoIirion nuy be _ed :II ather:an inilial "ilw:si," (~) or I condoaion (-;'--J. ckpcndins on whnhcr ;1 it Kaled btfotc or Iner the ,.. ir*,,..t.l and acmplilKd pervuiolL Sec $V (....1OIi_· 107ffl. For an arulloriQ] bul utdid ICIDOUn l. I « Shan b~; ~JR) .

'*""

,,"1'*


}6

FOONDATIONS OF DHARMAK'RTI'S I'HILOSO I'HY

clons of JIlt converge on the notion of $Omethi.ng that is present in a Jubstantial &shion, be it directly or indircaiy. Such an objCCl is -real- beause only -the real" an be the conttnt of a correa or indubiClblc knowledgeC'mlr. for Prami/:la Thcorisu, it makes no sense to speak of an indubitable cognifivt evt:nt whose objttt is unrca.l." Cbrly, this position ruts on $C'Veral assumptions, the most obvious of which i5 me nmion that cognitive eventS always have ob;cas. This is less [rivial [han if $Oundi, fo r these philosophers maintain that every mcltal state or form of consciousness is a cognirive cvmt; in snon. they espouse an imenciona.l meory ofcorucioumcss. That is, all momcnlS ofconsciousness n«CSArily have objccu. and there arc: thus no instanCeS of contentlw aW'UC:OC$S or momenlS of consciousness without obj«:u. Pr.un1r:la Theorists thus daim that, even in instanCtS where a cognition is mi.stakt'n, one must niH account for the p~ of an object. even though mal obj«t is $Omchow illOOm:cdy cogniud.'" In addition to claiming dur instrumental objcas real, these philosophers also maintain that me -real- is na....ssarily -knowable- (jMyir), and this is understood to m~ that me -rea.l- ncccuarily an be mkcn as an instrumental obj«t." The overall epistemological implication h(rc is that, for these thinkers. it is absurd to a5SC;n that some cntiry ill real and ~ utterly beyond anyone's knowledge. Or. to PUt it another way, any argumcm for tm reality of some entity must ultimatdy relt on some means to know that emity indubitably.

r",..",LJl'Jarc:

has DOted: "As · krIowabk· li~,,.. .,.. OI'.J'tIo;:IooI .. ",;dUn_ d-ococia of,,-.h:w- cquivalmt IG 'e:aismu,' ~t and dnmnin.Jtion cqlUlly Im't II airma fix o:ziormor.." In hi. ..... on dUs I'nIWk ('996:n.I-4), he c:ommcntI !hal • on this MJb. .ita, ~crisu I YUf lilmlNft from both Indian and WaKm IUthon .. ..· 'J1w; poinr Mre ;' dur if 'p""'(IIIOOXUII, if '. ,urily hM I rollhint; II ia objttt. Hmor,lIIl)'thln& known by a ~ iI _ lily raJ.. l'hi5 is indc-td a ubtq.u1Olal dWn IlIlOClK PYun1qa lhtorUu; in Dtwmakirti', tIIW, ic;' rd'.a:tu:! in Ihcdaim. "To aile illO be paca+. For _ on Dtwmalcirti·, ..w:w, in thi. rqard. _dupm 1 (t.m. -41

~ ( ,~)6i)

481 rekrMre fO thcnocton oliUusionorth. probkmofoloo_~ (u.r.;,.ti, .y.mtlljU,.., " • .,tM'M, Oc.). N.5. Drmd (t~17) noIet tNl "a11lndim ~ilomph­ kaI JdIoob••• , fO;,.. all thrir doarinal diffcrmcc:t, IK in JClUiliOIt on one pOUII, namely qN1CII'OkIp'a" n:aliIm. llw obja:r of cop>itioa (an " " ' " be an unrtal m ilt)'. - To Aly thlr thit it tturol"a11 ~ achooI." is an owasaremellL For ownpk. on CandtUinj', nrw, lhe WIlI",1 of an ordirwy penon', JIftttPlion il Mo...,. an unrnl ",tit)' (M.J},. JW.-.uow"""~'O?-loI" M~_w.."""I5.lJ; cf. rdlcmalll l!J9Ol'4S.... 9). Nev. ~ OnYid', basic point orrt:a1nly applies 10 p~ Thtorisa: C'Im in _ of ntOr, ...... connor cb.im ,har ~ occun..;thoo.il an objea. For,....dy of _ problems !har an inlmrional theory of ~ (!Wet for Buddhiat pbilotopMn. I « Griffi lh.

h9l6l. 49 See

Pon~

h?61 '9) for _

on thit iMtJe..

PRIIMAf:lA THEORY, DIiARMAJ(IIlTI 'S CONCE PTUAL CONTEXT

}7

Beyond thiJ fundam~ntal ~i.n~mologic:a1 principl~. PramiQ,a Theorists shared other basic assumptions about m~ rol (lilt). For our purposes, th~ most pervasiv~ and rdcvant :wumprion is "th~ real" is "simple" (dA)." A brief c:urniruuion of this shued issu~ wiU also allow us to apprcciat~ a fundamenw diffttc:nce that distinguishes Dharmakirti', thought from that ofhiJ opponents.

mat

TIw Simplinty (111M RuJ -.J" FII",umntllll DiffmN« 'Simpliciry" tranSlates the Sanskrit [emu (itlltvlf and titlltil, which literally mean ·singularity" or "on~nC55." A thing that is qualified by simpliciry is singular or "o n~" (t"It.r}-it is a .seut1tS5 unit." Simple things sund in conrrur reo r ~ rh"r

"rI'!

qu"lif'ied hy ' mLllriplicity" (...,,/'_14). " r.. rm rh"r

might also be translated as "nonsimpliciry," "complex.iry," or "pluraliry." When PramiI:'ta 1beorists claim that the real. iJ simple and hence nonplunl, they adduce three genttl.l fomu of arguments. The rust are arguments from experience. Proceeding from the principle that a perceptual object is real, many philosophers argue that an object of pattption is singular. If WI! mk,. w:r.rer-jug. fOr eumpk. H the obj«t of our vifu:&l perception. the Wolter_jug :l.ppe2lS H singular in our perception. This lint type of argumeru often occurs in conjunction with the second type: arguments from language. In claiming that a water-jug presents iuclf as singuIar in percepcion, lTWly PramiJ:ta Theorists:appeal to peiceprual judgment: the W':ltajug pr~nts iadf as singular bcaust the perception leads to (or includes) a conccprua1 determination of that perceprual object as a single ming. namely, :I. w;uer_jug. In short. our peruption a1JOW5 III to correctly think or say. 50 Amons DIwmaklni'. opponena., Kwnirb iI W only phibopher .mo appa.n ..;Ilil\& 10 make lOme conceuiolll.pllll W inruiriGn mat w raJ is oimpk (_~,. Sv. Ii..,.....w..."lq-Ul). It __ likely, h.o",(~, thai Kwn1tiIa', poinl bm is tbu in ICnnI of itt copilion by -nriow pn.>ns. a oincle mlil}' may haft man,.. C'f'CfI rnunWI,. CIOf>ltJdiaory qwdi .... Thif ~Iy IICIa>nb with his pramUlUon of I • qwdiry. P'C"" __ • (~.) ... chc paexptL.lal obja;l: (fCC npmi.ll y Sv. '~lfl -IU). 1u ;. ollen the c...c, Kwnirib·. c:onMnIaI of r..!.rionl in ImIlI of·dilfttenoe.nondiffcrmcx" (HwII~ nuke:. a p.....::iM: UlCUllWftI ofhil pmltion difficuli. Nou chal, unlike iu .... in rhc conCCXI ofinfa'ma, 'qlYlity_~" iI probably the Ilea lrandalion or ~i" in mil comm:. Ana tIN,.;.. ;. ~ roug.Jy cquinknl 10 ,he _.,.. ...." of the Nylp -Vai"fila ' I The tnpw, 'IIO'Ofdt "unil" and "uniry" an tmlpDns tnrulation for mand ~m.&i, but only ironc .ncndliO their ~ In. rdalni ~tc:n. MatibI (19?1:nl abo \lift "Ioimpk" for m.

}8

FOUNDATiONS OF DHARMAKI RTI'S PHILOSOPHY

"1'h:1.[ is a wal{'r-jug. ~ Since W lerm "water_jug here is singular. it must refer 10 a single obj«t. These argumena rest on the daim dul the gramnur of a:prasions corresponds 10 the rca1 propmies of objcca. More sp«i6ca1ly. !he singulariry of an exprc:uion corresponds ( 0 W singulariry (dAt.l, mttJJa) of me object ( 0 which il is applied. In shon , in Ihis ~rd allan, grammar and Ontology stand in a relation ci isomcr:ric correspondence.» When combined wilh the nolion dut the real is simple or singular. Ihis alleged isometric correspondence: })(:fWttn gr.tmmatical and ontological number leads to Ihe second type of argum{'nt as an imponant corollary, namdy, that a grammatically plural a prcssion musl in fact rder to mullipie obj{'Ct$ that ar{' ontologically singular or simple. Thus. ifit is meaningful , a grammatically plural expression or concept must correspond ontologically to numerous, ontologically simple entilies. This condngcncy of grammarical pluraliry on ontological singularity poina [ 0 thc third set of argumena in F.tvor of the reaJ as simple. These arguments rest on lhe we of reduaM analysis (vibh.if., vicar.. etC.) and the principle rhallhe real is irm:lucibk That is, when we apply the appropriate form of analysis to a real entiry, we should nOI be able 10 break or anaIyu il inlOsmaller partS. since a real enlity is simple. If that seemingly real entity can succmfully be fu nher analyud--broken into para. as it were-then its simpliciry is only apparent; it K'ttIU 10 be simpl{', but in faa il is compia. and as such. it is not truly real. In this way. onl~ simplicity corresponds [0 analytical irm:lucibiJiry. Thus, if any real thing is n«emrily umple or unitary, il is also neccuarily irm:lucible under reductive anaIysis." Many Pramif.\a Thcorisu usc (or at least allude to) all mree fonns of vgutnc:n l to c:scablish a real thing as simple. but throughout these arguments. d~ notion thaI the real mus! be simple remains uncontened for Dtwnukirci and his principle opponents. Their un:mimiry on the issue of simpliciry, hownn. lcads them to a shared problem, which we can illuslfa[e in [eons of me aJlcgcd whole du[ is a water-jug. We may daim Ih.U, wbcn we sec: a ft

S2 Thor qummu pramfcd hom: an: d>OK IOund in dlCworksof'Vlupyana (NBh:.¢1-111) and Udd,.oulw:a (NV;461-1 lj .JNS1.I.)I- }6). Sft Mobanry (I99J:&6-9Jl for an 1$P""'i 11lr lddial.tWllmary of m-~ ... Many.d>OUn haft rrcop>izc.d tt.. impomnco: of pmmar to

Soum AsU.. thougIf. buf tt.. KnI..p

lOon of 1M uzumcnl

mUll fv if fOund ill

nolion of the rnJ:os

t~

BrorIkt-. llm )· S}

AJthough Halbf.ue:

rd'~

Imjuetldylo

I~

"irmillCiblf" in

Vmqilao philolopby (1991.']1. '1, li S. I..). IMI«.OOduy lil tflllW'l: 01\ Bnlvnanical ~ 11°CU01 ....... liu1.: nupI.......... .hi. i ......... "".., .....'U'IUI' oll
PRAMAI:-lA THEORY: DHARMAKJlt.TrS CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

'9

Wolfer-jug. we are I«ing II single thing. but we mwt also admit that we can readily I« its paru---the base. me rim around me top. and so on-in the same fashion. We thw encounter an apparent antinomy: the water-jug is a tingle: real ming looud in a paniculartime and plllCC and consisring ofa cerrain IImount of mattc1". and ~ in milt very same time. place. and maner. we: also sec (and can meaningfully speak of) multiple real things such as a base :lnd rim. Thm. we mll.n Hk: are we sccin& one thing o r many thinp~ The possible rcsponso; :lie perhaps obviow: one can either choose to defend the simplicity of things that presuppose the aisrence of real pans. or OM can intist that the simple is ncccw.rily pardcss. The former position is ch:aracteristic of those South Asian philosophers such as Uddyotakara who StfCSS the pe.ctprual and linguistic approOKhes 10 simplicity: for these rhinkenl , :lny :lOXIunr mun

r~rve

the onf"logieol inmir;.,nJ rhar sr.....

from the way we perceive and speak of things such as a water-jug. If a spatially atendcd object such as a water-jug appnrs (0 be onc thing. and if we can speak meaningfully of it in the singular. then our ontological account of the Woller-jug must likewise show how II single. real. uniruy w,:uer-jug docs not 1ose ilS simplicity even though that single entity is disoibuted ovo" multiple paru that are themsel ves sim ple and 1e:U. With this issue in mind, phllO$Opherr fum u Uddyot:akar:. ,pc21c of a real "whole" or "part-possessor'" (Ilvayavin): a rttI substanct instantiated or participating in iu real parts. and yet entirely distinct fTom thcm. A theory of substantially ainem. unitary wholes that are distiner from ~it pans may satisfy somc intuitions about perception and language. but even on the view ofiu proponcnu it leads to some difficulties. For narnpl~. given these (hinkenl' view of m:lrter. they must admit that a whol~ water-jug should weigh more than thc total weight of iu pam. That is. before the twO halves of a water-jug are conjoined. th~ haVC' a certain wcight. and whcn they arc conjoined. a new. additional substana--thc W;lrcr·jug-comcs into !xing. Since thc conjoining of thc halves creates a new substanct oVC'r and beyond the halves of the water-jug. one would eo
substance. Uddyotakara, in a ramer undistinguished. attempt to deal with this problcm. dainu that a whole docs indttd weigh more than the total weight of all iu parts hut that the difference in weight is undettttable."

s.c Uddyocabn nukts thioo:him ~f NV:.9J ("'NS~ I .H) in hil atemivediK'\Wion ofthc

DhwrWtin:.-,

..,.,..,'" (NV'4~I} ~ NS;1..' .JJ-J6). for rdiuallOO of tIua cnmple. PV• . lfl-16,: 1ft Wo 1Ji&rUp., con:mmu in PSV (4;rt.-47)).

YJcW. 1In'.

for

-40

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAKIIlTl 'S PHILOSOPHY

In contrast. South Asian Buddhist thinkers utterly ret«t the teal existence of wholes; indttd. a mereologic:a1 critique of wholes is one of the ear· lieu and mOil paradigmatic forms of rrouctive analysis in BuddhiSt thought. In their crilique of wholes. Buddhist thinkers mainwn thai entities such as water-jugs may Sttm 10 lK simple. but in fact they are not because il is not possible for;ill real end£), [0 lK distributed over or panicipate in partS that are themselves simple. Many of the arguments that they adduce for this critique fall into a genre that Tibetan thinkm later called the " ndthe:r-one-noNnany~ argument. This nyic: of critique rdics on milKlUI tUi llJm.nJllm to demolUlrate Uu.t it is unu:nOlble to maintain that;ill whole is identical to its real pans Of that a whok is dislinct hom its real pans. And sinct any rm thing must be: either Ktentical to or distinct hom any other mtl thing, if the pans are incked real. then one mUSt conclude: that the whole is unreal." Hena'. on the view of Buddhist thinkers, only panicss things can be simple. which is 10 Ay that simple things cannot be disuibuted over or instantiated in other simple things. And since they agrtt mal only the simple can be real. they must insist that only the pardeu-the undistributed-is real. Ahhough they reject [he existence of real wholes. Buddhist thinkers unde:rsruJd thai they mUSt also account for our perceptual and linguistk practices. whereby ~ believe oursdves to be: pcrcriving and spealUng of wholes such as water-jugs that are distributed over their parts. This leads Buddhist philosophers to discuss two "iffirrnt typn of"Illity: an appuent reality in which things can only Ix called "real- (or -rrue") in conventional, contingent. or nominal terms (u'!'''.rtiut or PfI'jiillptwu). and a highest level. of rea1ir:y in terms of which mings are ulrimaldy real (/M,..",.nhtu.I). This fundamental flOtion of the ~twO realities- or ~ twO truths· occurs throughoUt Buddhist texts, and the works of Dharmakini are flO acepcion. Within the Buddhist context that informed Dhannakini's thought. the: mosl relevant sratc:mtnt of chest twO levels of reality occurs in the Ahhitlhttrmttkoill (and bINi.tpt) ofvasubandhu:'"

55 For tht "ncidw:r_,*' lIWIy ~1 ' ln ~. 1IfC rdkrnant (I~l and 1~}). 1Up­ .mn (JOO.:."-'IOo4l disa.laa _ o f tht ~ ~ of .bit")'k of ana/ysia.l. is WORh nocintI m.u tht "1!X'ftI or IUdI arpmmu Pmllfl90Kl a IIOOOM&lU IOrm of1or;ic.

56 Thecommmt;llOf'1 Dewmdnbuddhi (q.. PVJ>o,b "'1'V",U-'I7. and • • .JPV).I94l ,....1 hJ..yJ ....1.IJ,i (...... t'Vr;.....t.) r.~lOCfl.IT";'" V....L-..J.h .. _ .............u: uf ....... ul Otwmaklni', thKNia

PRAMA~A THEORY: OHAFlMAKIFlTI 'S CO N CEPTUAL CONTEXT

4'

That of which one docs not have a cognition when it l'las bttn broken [into parts 6nl"JWw)j is conventionally real (Ul'!'lJ!1isat); an example is a water-jug. And ilia, of whidt one does not have a cognition when other [elemenw qualities (dlMmsa)j have bttn excluded from it by the mind is also conventionally real; an example is water. Th:l[ which is otherwise is ultimately real (p'wlwui~t).'7

"",.Iffionw,

S7 AK6.4' ~"" un'flN 114 ".II.. ·.lJl.ir tI1I]"i,.N Jhryi (II lIf' I III,!,,,,,",,' ~~ ~bnckl:tcdpbn$Ct · inlg puu" (II ...... ,,{.~) and "dnnmwq.w. itieol" (JNnu..jcome &om VasuhandbU·1 own commmtary. .......idI reach (AKBh:&,o): llIar of which _ doc:t ' - .....~. OOInilion..ben il ...... bf.cn ~ inlo para iI c:on'lUltionally rcaI. An eumpk iI. w:IIlu_ju," for when J oraler· jus il brokm inlo shards. ont doc:t noc ....."" • qnirion of il. And ,....., of which OM doa no! han a qn.irion when od>n- ckuKnal qualitH:. (.O--) ..... ve b«n a d udai (.,.;".,) by me inrdlca (h@) ilaiIO fO Ix known I I QOIIwntio.u1ly mi. An c:umpk iI-'ler. for wkn _ nM:nally adudes ia form and 10 on. ont has no CO&Ririon of -.rtl. Th..ol if. QX1'1U1lional dcsipwioaa art appl~ 10 lhoN: thlnp such II w:IIru· jup and WUtt. Hcn«. wkn _ $IIy. by me for« oJ COII ...... lion. ~ ill a -.lcr·j1.os and _ ...... _ ...."".poI<- the l<\Od. (~"..,..) (duo ... _ loa..... poIu:n o f ......... ;. r..J (.... ,A: _ ..... ve noc IIJtcKd. blxbood. H~. it iI caIkd J "c:onwnlional 1I'\llh·!or ·con...... tionaI talky·l. 11w: aiII~ of dtinp in a """y Other dwo chal illillimue taliry. Th.al of which one lliU hu. cognition ~ when il hu bttn broken iI .... limaldy rnL And Wt of which one Ifill has • CO&Ririon eftn wbm Olher demmlal qu.ol ilia JI"( menIally c:xduded is aL.o ....liDUldy real. An aarnplc is form (,.,.; f« when chal form is broken into infinilelimal partida. 0lK tIill Iw a CO&Rition of Ihlol raJ !hinS (""',..) [n.undy . fonnJ . And whcn othcr c1cnM:n,ai qualiriu luch u 1Uf.~ uc IMnwly _dudod from it. D~"iU ..... ",,!"itio n of ...., -10_ ... nue it fo.m. On. .....uld Itt thaI Ihit is aJ.o rhe CIJ( wirh KlUalion and to on. Somnhins it laid 10 Ix ....1'· mudy rcaI [oe Ir\IC (....."....... lx<;:au.x il c:zim Wtimatdy. The: prnious JnalU:n Iuove said thaI the .... liDUIC realiry aim in me w:IIy thaI is apprd1.mdecl by ItalIJatICknl (~....an:nao 0< by !he mund&nc .-.rcnc&a that is obaincd ...bocquau. 10 !hal IfWIItmdmt awarcnca. And convmtioml ratiry aisa in me ..,.y thaI ;1 it ~ hcnded by other forms oJ awan:naa. un,.,., 114 ,• .a-U".,w,.,1ItIli ...., ....'!'.,n- 1 ~ ~ I "'"" In ufJltI1. Mi'flM fIM~r "" w..1ItIli I J-"" r...",,, .,..,. .... - . . #1,.. -'Im ,{,{"'~ "" U. ri. _ r~ w'!'",.u.r .",/i•

.1

u.-.i",. ,..,...c.

....",.,.. 1 ~ II",h I ~ hi 11,07' ~." ~'fI .r~~r 114 ~ I tqII nw ,.. J6'!'~ ~ 1II'!'."nNih ~ d1ri,; ""I1I«-!I ....".,...,..."r "" ~ ilJ nIIr ....",."nufJtl", I "" '1f]tUhtJ ,.r~", I "'""

rho'"

"".",., Ii .. ,0" ,'8;, INwwn I .,.,u;..,.#/

"

Ii ""U9i 1111 ,.rmdrrb....,r 1-;'

,i

"',w,..

iii ,..,,-.JllirlWIoi,.,., _ i i i . . . . . "" rll~'J "" htUbir u.""1J nor I nor,!, .,..,.....". Jrf!,"'1IJ4 I ruu ,-nu~ M#1fIi, pu.... iii l ,.dM ~~,.,..... lJI?tIu III' ~W.! 'u _ ~ ",tIM pu.1fIhdItIstI"... 1~ ir,Jrou IMIM ....~fJtl",

tU4I*", l _

~ _~

iti"j"'~ .

m..-,.,.

04.1

FOU NDAT IO NS O F DHAIlMAKIATI 'S PHILOSOPHY

V:uubandhu', presentation of the: fWO realities reflc:cts the: Buddhist me:reological critique: mentionc:d above. Although the AbhUihllrmalttJU is not aplicit on mu point, V:uubandhu', theory thus rests largely on a critique: of spatial atension. In other words, if a ming is arended in space. men it nece:ssarily has pam in mat it lt least tw ~sides"-lOp, bottom, left. righI, and SO on. Since that atended thing an therefore: be: reduced (mrough acruaI physical fora or mrough analysis) to its pam, it is not simple. And since it is nOI simple, it is not truly or ultimatdy real. In contraSt, me simple: entities that re:main after analysis arc: ultimately real. On the: view found in the AbhiJha~ these: simple: entities are infinitesimal panicles (P«NmA!',l)or irreducible e:ntities and Slates. In a later tat, V:uubandhu applies a merc:ological analysu to infinitesimal particles of matter themselves, and he: leads his readers to me: conclusion thai c:vm matter it not ultimately real bc:cause it does not withstand merc:ological analysis." Following V:uubandhu's lead, Dignaga and especially Dharma1cirti also apply a mc:uologica.l sl)'le: of critique to temporal extension, with Ihe: muh thal all real entities-whether particles or me:ntal states-are: "mome:ntary" (I¥!'iltll), in thai they exist for only an infinitesimal amount of time." !u the critique of te:mporal c:xrension suggests, a me:reological analysis of wholes provides a paradigm for the: critique: of entities that are wholc:--likc:: that is, they ahibit -distribution" (lllllNtJllJ. A whole: is a disrribUlc:d enol)' in Ihlt it is a singk real thing that is somehow instantiated in other single real things that are its paru. The: same may be said of a pc:rdur:ul( entity thaI allegedly endures ovu lime:: to be: teal, it musl be: a single thing distributed over numerous tc:mporal instances. Dharmakirti likewise alends thit style of critique 10 universals: if a universal (such as fOtvII or "cow- nt$$~) is to be: real. il must also be: a single real thing that is dinributed over all the: individuals that W'C call -rows." But perhaps the quintessc:nrial form of this style of argume:nt is Dharmmni's critique of relarions. Dharmakini prc:sc:nb hit critique of rdatiom in the S4",bIl1llih4J'1lriJf!il, where he responds 10 various positions that argue: for the: e:xistence of uhimaU'ly real nobtions. Dharmakirti systematic:aJly rejc:cu all such claims, and on his viN', a rdation can only ~ rea.I in a conventional or nominal sense:. His argumenl rab on me uncontested claim that he.shares with his opponenb: namely, thar an ultimately rc:a1 thing must be simple. Hence, if a

menw

581'he 10.1 in

que5lion it!hc v.".fniA-.lano;! iu: V,mi. 5« ~rin ( WOI:191-1(4).

59 S« me diIauaion in chapm l (j1A).

PAAMAr:,./A THEORY, DHARMAXI RT I 'S CONCEPTU AL CONTEXT

4}

rd:uion ~ to bt' ultim:udy rt:a.I, then it [00 must bt' a simple. unitary entity. If a relation iJ hypomsiud in such a £uhion, Ihe mereological style of analysis applies because the relation mwt now be conceived much :IS a whole: a single thing that. while existent in iudf. is sommow dintibuted over IU pans.

At various poinu in the SambanJh.1pttri~ Dh.armaIOrti relies on a Mod_ rh er-l)ne-not_mllny" ,..g,,~nr In m:lke hie rooinr. :Inti hie :lrgumenr mnves

b:ack and form across a cc:nrr:U question: if II rel:uion is II real thing. then is it one wim iu relata. or is it different from tbtm? Noting that II relation presupposes the pr~nce of al lusr twO rdatll. Dharmakini dismisses the notion that ,he rebtion could be a real thing thllt is one with (i.e.• identical to) the rebD over which it is distribured. In orner words. if me relation aM the rdllr:a ue """. then how can ~ intelligently fpe
And in response to me daim mat me rdation could be different from iu rdaD. he offers a verse that is panicularly helpful for understanding Dharmmni's ontology; If twO things are related by virtue of their connection 10 one relation. then ont: may ,.d,-. - What relates those

twO

rebr:a to the

rebtion~"

The re5ult is :on infinite regreu. and the notion of a rebtion is rhw not correct,"

Dharmakini's poinl is that. if a rebtion is different from the relata. then it must srill sommow bt' disuibured over them in order to serve iu ~iRClion :IS II rd:uion. Hence. one may ask whether. by vinuc of being distributed over the rdatll, the rd:t.tion is thereby one with the rel:!I:!.. or different from

them. If il is one, then there can be no relation. since rdadons presuppose multiplicity or plur:Uity. And ifi! is different from the rdaD. then we must argue that there is lOme 5eCOnd-order relarion thar connects the relation to its relata. We can thw apin ask: is (his second-order relation on~ with irs 60 I:>twmUini makes rhiI UJIlffiCflt at variow; poinu in Ia.t. btu pcrNpi lht most obvi_ ; . in the t«Ond >aX: "You may think thu a..mUon is a tomminpins of na'-1,lf'f:L Bill if the ..mea I~ twO, then how can that be'- (rii~ In _ ...... u ltI~ iIM_). )n hia commmwy. DharmakIrti notcr. "If the mac.a wen: to be one, then una: ~ would nor be: two n:bta. wlu.1 rd:nion would tbcrt bet w~ ask ttW; bea ...... relation prnuppota [Ill leastl two fdac:.- bs6a: tdt,.O'" M:JII"l 'mI,. til" prJiI-J,.i fhlir 'mI"I""l ~,."", iii";".,.. # rI}.

m_,.

s....,•

1M,..,., ""9" _"""""'_tis

61 .u.yn.~ 10..4' ",,u;,. liM_tIM t il M

M~"'~t

IItdM.

,.",..,,..u,. """

~f

U!t ""'-

4
FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOP HY

relau, or different from mem? The infinite regress from this point should ~obviow .

I have cited. Dharmakini's argument by infinite rqrm because it $0 dearly points (0 a theme within his ontology, namely, the rejection of me notion that an entity could ~ at once one (and thw a simple real) and yet panicip.m: in what is many. Such alleged. C'mities includC': a wholC' participaring in its pans; a univenal participating in iu particulars; a perdurant entity participating in its tempo~ insunces; and a rdation participating in its rdata. Whatn'C'f motives ~ might attribute to him," it is dear [hu Dharmakini uttC'riy rejecu any possibility of unity wimin plun.1ity, and as a result. all such entities mwt ~ u1tinutdy unreal for him because they all can ~ reduced (0 me entities over which they are allegedly distributed. The argumem by infinite regress is also particularly belpfuJ for understanding Oharmaldni's omo\ogy in iu wider context. In pan, the argumem is hdpful because it presupposes a fundamental area of agreement, n:undy, that a real thing is simple or one. At me same time, howtVtt, the argument by infinite regress also points to an especially crucial point of disagreement. That point becomcs dear when W1;: rcc:ogni:te that the regress suCCtt'ds only under a cenain condition. As Stephen Phillips n()(cs: The rcgrC'S5 is .sn up by treating the relation as a term, as the same son of thing. logically, as the mata.. Without an argument that a relation is a diA'CKnt son of criner. it seems that if a third rhing is required (0 relate two things. then the third thing r((juires equally a fourth and a fifth to tie it up with the first twO, ad infinitum." PhiUips points OUt that Dharnukini's critique of relations succeeds by treating the relation as the same kind of ·crinu· as the rdata. Without this assumption, me critique might easily be evaded. We know that if the mation and the relata are real, thC'n each mWf be onC' or simple (~k.). SuppoK. 62 ~ likdy mQII;iv:l [ion;' Dhannakinl'l n«lIlO okknd the Buddhitt nocion of....~ (MJI1IUII or IMmtwf]tl). which is anna! 10 hi! _crioIopcaI project. Flp«ia!ly alta N~ Ikoddhist ~tI apinst ~ Idf (m-"j ro.:u. DOl 0lI the: imp
PRAMAt::IA THEO RY, OHAitMAklRTI'S CO NCE PT UAL CON T EXT

4S

however, Wt numbtt does not :apply in me same way to thae emities: that is, we can point (0 and count the rdal':t, but we cannot coum me relation in that fashion. This me:tIU that. although real. the rdation and the relata a.ist in difhlc,l ways: a real rebrum canno t mn:ain "one" and be d isuibuled. C'IV'er anomer marum, but the relation can remain "one" and be disuibuled. OVC" its rdat:l. And not only U" a relation be distributro ovt:r in rdal':t, ir is p~~y the kind nf thing thaI H distrihured oller in relaur.. Indeed, this is pan of what we mClll we say that il is " re:ilr (lilt) :and :an instrumental object (prilmryll). If we respond 10 Dh:armakini's :lIRUmcnt against hyposwiud relations in this fashion. we co~ to a question Ovtt which he:and his opponents fundamentally disagree: can we use the unqualified term "real'" (Sill) to rekr to thingy that :lR' not ~ in the same ,."y~ Thu is, iF an entity is "ml ," mun it be real in the same way ali all o ther real entilies ~ Dharmakini's mai n OpponcnlS will inevil2bly answer thi5 question by affirming the divt:rsity of ways in which an entity mighl exist and still be Jiltor real. Indeed, in w me cases th.at affirmative answer leads to a pletho ra o f terms fo r d ifferem ways of being real," Dharmakini. however. urteriy rejttl5 any such possibility. In the next chaptCT , we will see th:u, on his view, only spatiotemponlly irreducible p:uticul:an are "real," and on the mon accut:ate account, they alone are instrumental objem (prilmtyil). Everything else can be called real only in a con~ntional o r spurio us (SII'!'IJ!h) 5(n5(.

1.3 Purpouas umiat Beyond the ontological wumption of simplicity, Prami l)-a Theorists from all traditions share anomer atca o( considerable agreement: the nOlion of prlfJOjlNl or "purpose:" ali forming the comat within wh.ich an inst rumental object is known. The first PmniIJa Theorist to establish th.e place o f purpose ali a tuemAryromponent in the process of kn owing was probably Gautama. Citing p~ at the O UUCt oF h it: N~tr" (NSI.I., ) :LI:a 604 I un rdminc hrn: 111) tho: LUC of the: ramJ - . . . "';IM, ~ Uri... by variow NyJyaVli'qil.. thinkcn.. Ser: Poun (' 97'r.140-141) for an excdkm ~ of mil u.-. For Ohannakini. thinp mUN be raJ (1M) "ill the ~ Wly" ill mal any lUI nlliry mUN _ the:_criurion of-1M dlicaq-" (~Manyofhi.-OI'f gftCIIU, !.ownu, aR' wiDina; 10 apply di-..: uilaia: _ tb.inp aR' lUI in dUl: they an: dir«tly COIIlaClro by tho: KIlXI, odlCI1 an: tal beaUlC, for Gampk. !hey an: dw objeco 01 ]in~ Of tonapfWl mpWons. For ~ dnaiIed cfUr:waon of rd-ucd -.-. '" DunM (1999:b -70).

.. 6

FOUNDATIONS O F OHAIlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ttnnal topic of his work. he larer defines it: "the purpose is the ll'f1htJ aiming at which one actS . "6) In other words, it is with some purpose in mind that one ittlu ro act in a manner informed by the indubitabk knowledge that an instrument of knowledge provKies. In this selUe, purpose is a aucial conrat within which ruch knowledge occurs. Gaucuna'$ definicion, ho~er, is 5OmeYIM.t difficult to understand, fo r it employs the ambiguous term IInh4. whose many meaninltS include ",oaI," "thing: and "object." This ambiguiry often awes confusion, but it abo allows one to make :I. point: when :I. "thing" is being raken a! an "object: one docs 50 bc:cause that "thing" will serve SOIYlC "goal" We see this in the commencuy offered by me earliest Naiyiyika commentator Viiayiyan:l.; Having apprdtended mat an Ilrtha is something to Ix: obtained or diminated, one then impkmenu me mearu for obtaining or diminating it. One should know that thai (lnhtl is me purpose bc:cause it awes one to act. TItat is, one thinks '" wiU obain this (lrriHI " or '" wiU avoid this tI1TiHI~is kind of apprehension of the IIrrha is what is mQllt by "aiming .111" the II,.,;",. ... Uddyotahra, one of Dharmakirti's main opponenl:5, clarifies eualy what one is apprehending: What is one app rehending~ One is apprehending the causes (s.idha1Ul)ofM.ppincss and suffering. That is, having undemood, "This is a cause of happinc:ss." one then Strives so a! to obrun hll l"l"int:l.~.

And h:l.ving undO':l'Srond,

""' i~

11 rhO': ClIUJOt:

nr ~1Iffi.,r_

ing," one am so as to eliminare suffuing. People arc motivated (prll:Jlljyau) by the atwnmcnt ofhappincss and the dimination of suffering. Hence, their purpose is the atrunmcnt ofhappineu and the dimination of suffering."'" ,S NS •.•.&.4> JW"' .....,...JJ.i1tr?- rw-"" "-)0j666 NBh (lS6) ...tNSI.I.14'

.-

,.", ",..", ~ 1M",.,.'!' "" .) "')or ~", .....tiP,IMui ~ rM .$",.,.... ,....""u.m.tMfII J i"..", .nJJn. .,.,...i 1MsJJ"'; Wli .".~

67 NV bs6-' f7) ...tNSI.I.l.4' ~ 'r -r _ ~.t.Inob . I_ _ ~r-F'l' _ _ ._::;/ . ~.:,.~":;:tt;:':i"'~_;:;' .. ilijUrMf .....H \"!,P" "..,.",11. "'.\ Ud*'-"o iii d*ip ...,. .t.¢H L hl4Jro"',

*'"

PRAMA.~A THEORY: DHARMAKI RTI 'S CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

47

In shon. ooc's purpose is [0 obtain happines.s and dimin.:ue rulfering; to do so, on~ implnnena th~ awes of th~ former and dimlnat~ the causes of the Iatt~r. It is within this contat Wt oncnnploys the inmumena oflmowl· edge. and on~ does so in ol'dcr to gain knowled~ of those instl11lOental objects (pr.mtytt) Wt will ~nabl~ on~ to obain happint:Sl and avoid $Uf. fering, An impomnt corollary of this claim is that if an instrument of lmowlMV iJ: f1~n.rily u~ wirhin [he eo nr~l[( of:lo pu~ , then an ins(lum~nt ofknowltd~ must result in a Jamni.uumgnition-i,c,. ont: in a propositional form , such as "This is a au.sc of happiness." Without IUch dctumin:lotc contcnt, thc cognition could not moriVllltc and guide action. as Uddyoalwa would have: it do, But is purpose truly a n«mllT] f.aaor in this process an ont: not simply employ lOme means of lcnowlcdse-ucb U:Io form:a.llogi<:-dur i. nor tied to any purpose? In this regard, Uddyotabra remarla:

Also. it is incorrect to claim that purpose is not a contributing faaor in reasoning (nJii14nl.)' Incked. thought divorcM from purpose is not a contributing faaor in reasoning. In contrast, ptlrpcKC is the ,""",?,conuibuang f:.ewr (p,.UJM1UlIit") for the procas of invC!nig:arion (pAri~viJJ,j), bec:luse the p rocess of investigation is rooted in the purpose that it serva:."

By claiming that the

~proccss

of investigation" (i.e., the application of instruments of knowledge) is rooted in the purpose toward which onc mives, Uddyotakan. points to the prychologism within diKOUrK on ,,..,,u!M- If. penon baa no purpox: in pining knowledge of lOme object, then ~ if that object is available to some instrument of knowledge, she wiU flO( cogniu: it precisely bcausc dtc has no reason to do so: me Iacb the purpose or motivation mat is a neccssary fxtor in the knowing process. Although Uddyotalon and his kilo,," Naiyiyilw arc perhaps the dearesc in their analysis of purpose, me same principle appean to be shared by m(N:t of Dbarmakini'a fellow Pramil)a Theorisu, Pralasc:apida. for c:am-

68 NY (m ) _NSI.I.1
,...,;~ ~.oip.,.,.. ~~ ..."J"Ih-.7i HMJ..";11 -H' ", 1M "~Iip'" jli I ~ no~.,.

~rtU/t.tr

in.

,,,,,.,;._ ...... "",. .yffluJ iUllto*

.,s

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMA"IRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

pie, does no( ofkr anything approaching Uddyocakara's analysis of purpose;" but at the very ouun of his tcxt he makes it dear that the knowIcdgc of rea.litythat oneobwlU through a means oflmowledge does indeed serve a sp«:ifie purpose:: it enablrs one to obtain spirirual. liberation." In Kumirila's philosophy ali wdl, purpose figures prominendy as a fnlui~ment of knowledge. It is true, of course, that Kumirila's main conttrn is with the purpose that a trealise embodies, but this is merdy a rUla:[ion of tM f.act tim, for him, the only [rue means of obtaining spirirually relevant knowledge;ltt "te:Xfs": namdy, the Vtd4.r thcmsdves. 71 This point of view, however. doc:5 nOf prevent him from commenting t"nqucndy on Inc impornancc of purpose. ali wncn nc remarks: Even a fool doc:5 not act without being directed toward a purpoK. If he we~ [0 act in that fashion , what would he nced his intellect for?n A£ wilh Naiyiyilw. Kumirila ties purpose with action. One acts so ali to

obtain a purpose. and the role of knowledge is 10 enable 011(: to determine both the purpose and the means [ 0 Dixaining it. We find much the same sentiment in Dharmaki"tti's ph ilosophy. but in his cue, purpose takes on a distinctive role in the determination of what COnstiNteJ an ilUtrumcnt of knowledge. That distinCtive role is indicated by his usc of the term arth41tri]i.. Below. we will have an opporrunity 10 examine this lerm and its meaning in Dharmwtti's philosophy, but here we can note that one ofia meanings is simply the · accomplishment" (Irriyd) of a "goal" (arth.), or what I call · tdie function ." Of course. for Dharmaldni to speak in these: [erRU is nothing new. The commenu cited above dearly suggest that Uddyotalcm. also $2W efficacy ali a crucial component of knowlcdgc.." In 69 His two IUCI ofd~ In m

"-for'" in PDS (1S4 and p6'J ~ &r &on. helpf1U. ~~r't~·+I1r

700:PD51: ....,......

....".

AJthouch lhc meana of obtainina this knowkdcr

Mj* ....".urltlllljU_'!'''~ coma from !~ 8 D/w,.. nunifC:sco:d

Ihroup lhc ill.jllRl:tions 01 the: Locd(I/N,..u,..~ tiJMndJ ~ on .raWtapida" ""m!I tha! [)N".. (or. moft ptopc:. l, opnki,,&> lhc matd _ UMS 10 obWn IcnowIecIp- ihroup tNl IN:M, tj . ;' iudf'

..-!'14

~,

71a

.OW( ......... !)-....).

noW. ,.",_Jtti4i.,.,.rihJ.. ss:

,..w-

,. • .,uiJ m'lrIi".""...,. iii". ~ H.

_~

_

-.ttl. .,., ..",.",. f ...... ....

73 Indml u Halbha: Iw no«d (1991:7'0). Udd)'Vl2bn. and lid (dkIw NaiyirikM abo wed

PRAMA~A T HEORY: DH ARMAKlilTl 'S COf'lCEPTUAL CONTEXT

-49

Oharmaldrti's philosophy, h~r, IITthahiyd is not rmrdyan aspect of knowledge: it is. from at lean o ne penpective. me prindpal criteri on in m c detennination of some cognition as an instance of knowledge. This may givt sorm readers visions of a preoocious pr2&marism predating Peirce by more than a millcnnium. but this imctpretation would bt: ovtrsating the cue. Instead. we need only note that. while most PramiJ:la Theorisu feengni-uod ~ impon:2rlU; of purpous :l Ind gnall in the process of knowing. Olwmakini iJ willing to place a much stronger emphasis on goals than any of his conremporarlcs or principll opponenu.

1." Points ofDiwrgmct: Tht Action and Agmt Up to this point, we havt aamined certain common assumptions and concepts shared by most Pramilp. Theorists in rdation to the instruments of lmowkdge and the irutrumenDi objeru known thereby. When we e;um ine the remaining two aspectS of the knowing pf('l('ttS i.e.• prllmiti (the aerion of knowing through an innrument ofknowledgc) and prilNtr (the 2r t of mu :w:tion}--~ lind much leu 2gl?CfTlent among t~ thi nk~. In ~ to pr.",iti., me "action of Imowing" o r Imowled~t th2t raulu from employing an instrumctlt of knowledge:. there is considerable diRgr«mcnt bmYtm Olwmakini and his opponenu. This disagrffincnt focuses on two key issues: lim, is the action (kriy4) of knowing dinina from iu other aspects. cspeci.illy the instrument (laM!"')? Second. if acrion and irutrurmnt are distinct. do they stand in a causal relation. such that me instrument is the cause :md the xtton il the eIkct? The Bnhmanical thinkers to whom Olwmakini appean to aUude-the unknown SiJ!lkhya author of the yWitlipiu, the V~ib Pramtapida. the Naiy.1yib Uddyotakara.. and the Mimi'!"lWa Kumirila-generally claim dut action and ifUtrument are distinct." although Uddyotilira does allow for their con· ·..ergcncc in certain cues." These philosophen also gener.dly daim that the rd2tio n lw:rwu:n the :ocrion 2nd inJfrnmem i$ OIu~ l ; Ihty do nOl ,

h~f.

agree on how that causal process OpeDtei. Nevenhdcu. sintt the action of

tb. mm ~ Fran<;Q (1m:66) maka

~ WIM'

obtcnation.

74 5« YO (Is-I), POS (J.4)- 14S), NV (I$-u .J NSI.I.I). ~ Sv (""""~147-I JI; ~ ....761.

n

5«, for c:QIIIpk, NY (a,).

SO

FOUNDATION S O F DHARMAKIRTl 'S PHILOSOPHY

knowing is in most ClSCS considered the result of the instrument, it is known as the pfllm#~pJu'--rhe -effect of me instrument" or - insrrument:lll effect." Thw, for rh~ phiJosophen, pra",iti comes to mean the knowledge th:u results from the functioning of an instrument ofknowlcdge. In contraSt (0 this position, Dhannakini follows the lcul of his predecmor D~ and rejects;my actual difference between the instrument;md the dkct; henee, he also denies any causal relation befwcen them. This eomc:s to be: one of the hallmarks of Buddhiu PDmil),a Theory: m:l.t the alleged -effccr:- of the inruument's function is nothing but the instrument

ioo£. ... As fo r prllm4rr, the -agent" of knowing, the BrahmOUlic:al thinken

(0

whom Dharmalcini alludes identify it with:ll self (limu:1I)or, in the case of the Sirpkhya. :IIumor of YllkMipik4, with the Penon {P1ln4f4).71 This issue rcceiva varying degrees of :l.nention from Dlwmakirti's clostSt intcrlocuton, Uddyocilir.t being the most extensive in his remarks." Nevertheless, although all these: Brahm:llnical philosophen discuss the agmt as itmll" (or pllt14f6), they disagree considerably on their interprct:lltions. lbc diVtt1ity of opinion eoncnning the 1lmu:1I or pllr'llfll as the agent may hdp expla.in the F..a thaI Dharmalcirri doe5 not uaay any dirca refuution of this notion. But ~n without :II direct reruution of:in Iltmll" or pllt14f6 as the agent, it is dear that Dharmakini collapses the gramm:uical category of agent (prllPUirrJ in me process of knowing into the category of the action (pr"",itiJ, the -rcsulunt" knowtcdge. This follows from the uhim:l.te identity that he assertS of the action/instrUment (lrriyilkllrll!",) relation in all cases: if me categories of action and instrument are unre;al, the reality of the agent also becomes untenable. For Dharmakini , this also means dU(, :l.t the highest level of analysis, the rcality of even the instrumenwobject is ultimatdy reducible to the instrument itself."

76 In ~'. work. chc ultinwc idcntiry of !Tt'''''~ and ,nmtili' '''''''!'i9f.d" is di.. CIIDed II in PSV .J PSI.I.Icd- IO (Halloo 1j/6lh8-19; d . Hlnori'. not:5, I.U-67, PP.9]-I07). Dtwmaklni diJcuaell the AIM \auc II ICYetaI painu, lhe moa Alient PV).}II-}19 and PVHH-})9. Se... chapccr .. (16IR).

n

~ for aampIc. PDS (141-141),

bans

SV (~..u...7) and YO (Ill-IU).

78 Stt NY <697-n:} UNS}.1.I-17). lJddyobkan.'. lcnpr ~ on U-fI ao:nWly cncOO. Myond NSU .17, but chc portion rckrmllO here lOt"" chc (OfT of the: di Kl lllioo.

7'J For IrtdI of analysU, _ chapter 1 (s,ff). TIw; moo: impoltlnl toUKG for me reduction ot .... ~ .... oIo;.a ... "... ................. ..... PV'. ~I)-a-I f and PV,.~J1O. t d* , dolt in chapccr .. (,aff).

PRAM: Ar;.rA T HEO RY, DKARMAKI RT r S CONCEPTUAL CONT EXT

SI

1.5 Summllty Since me main purpose of mu chaptet Uto sketch some of me more salient aspects ofDharmwni's conceptual contat, let us conclude by rd[e(';uing some of me notions widely sham! by Pram~a Th«)ruu. Refra.hing our memory here wiU aMi us in our endeavors bdow. • The main concern of I'ramil)a Throry is the investigation of the proper mcaru or irutrumenu (pr.m4!fA) of obaining knowkdgc. 1M act (Itriytl) of having such knowkdge may be divided into four componenu; pr.m4!'A (tht: ilUuumenc or means), prllWU}il (me object), prllmJItr (the: agent), and prII,"itj (the: action or knowledge-cvent iudf). • In lenni of tho!' in«rumo!'nt!: ofknowlM~ . nn.rly aU Pr:uni.r)a Th~ri$t!: accept III u4/I two kinds-perr.eptwl awauncss (pr.~) and infer-

entt (."lItNiNl). •

Pr-.ml~a

Theorisu share ~eral nOlions aboul perceptual awart:ncss. including; the central role of sensory contaCt (j""~,,,,;It.~): the vividnCD of perceptxm; and the varieties of error. especially thOle caused by physical defectS.

• In rcgan:lto inference, these th~rub marc a large: number of meories, including the basic suuaure of an infc:rcnct (MS is P because EI and the types of rcluions among mese (emu (Sub;oa, Predicate, and EvKience) that must pertain in order for an inkrtntw knowkdge-nent to occur. • In terms of oncology, one centraJ point of :agxee:mC:nt U that any real (1II1) thing is a knowable ming (jlkyll). and that c:very knowable thing is (or an be) an instrumental object {J1'lI'"9"}. • Ontologically. a "'realM thing must :We be simple (tit.): it is a singular, panlC$$ unit. The affirmation of singularity also leads to an importalll issue that distinguuhes Dharmakini', thought, namely, his insistence: that a . imple encity cannoc be dinribuced oVo!'r o mer .imple enc.iria.

• For all P~a Theomu, purpose {prllJ'flilltlA} forms a cenn'al contat for ;ill acts of knowing. Finally, to dose mis chaptet, we should note mat by seeing Dharmakirti's work within the contat of the: concepts and assumptions mat he shared with Br.Uunani.c:a1

p~ ~rUu,......, a n moO'\l!

dewiy uncIernand 10.....

ofhis philosophical choices. OUI undcrsttnding is especially e:nIunced if we

Sl.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAKIIITI 'S PHILOSOPHY

inttrprct: Dharmakirti as standing in rwo traditions; on WOrK hand, he: is a Buddhist philosopher, but on the other, he is engaged in intertC'Xruai. intert"raditionaJ discourse on prtl1M!'4 Iu a Buddhin, Dharrnaldrti'. soteriology commiu him to a form of antirealism, but as a PramiJ:la 1Reorist. Dharmakirti must uphold some we claims, including the uscnion that at least percqnion and infttcncc give us accurate Icnowledgc of the world. Thest: rwo commitmenu--the commitment to critique realism and the commitmem to defend the usefulness of pelccption and inference u trustworthy sourot'S of Icnowtedgo--are often in rc:nsion. We have noted. for example. that Dh.arm.:akirti's brand of antirealism requires a rejection of disrributed entities, while the prn'ailing South lui.an Prama..:a Theories of his time plUumed conlmonsensc, duuibuted emities as the objeca of perception and inference. Thc:sc issues point to ~ topic of the following chap.. tel', tumdy, the ontology that we find in Dharmakirti'. works.

2

Dharmakirti's Method and Ontology

W

H lN WI. EX.UoIIN.l

Dharmakirti's ontology. we immediatdy

encounter a problem: DharmalUrti appears to emptoy ",flilipk and C\'m w-,.nbkontologies. It is only by undemanding how this multiplicity ~rves his rhetOrical and prulosopnical mttbod mat wt can hope to avoid a dismWivc and incompltlc interpretation of IW thoUsflt. Hence, we will 6rst discuss mal method, and with that diV1!f,ion in twwl. we will then study the dct:a.ils of his ontology.

Dharmakirti employs a philosophical method that tw caUKd considttablc confusion among his interprnen. In shon. M employs more than OM 1)'1"" lcmatic description of reality. and it #/~/ln that these descriptions are muruaUy conuadictory. N~eu. ~ descriptions itt not in fact contradictory bcc:ausc they arc not applied :1.1 the same level of discowx; irutcad, they fill into a hierarchy of d.iKo\lJ'$Cl-wftar San McOinrock Iw calkd a ·sliding scak of analysis"-wht« mort accur.lltc dcscriptiow of what we pelttiVC and dUnk supmcde less accunte ones,' Why would one ever employ a less accurate description ~ The gcnen.l Buddhist answer is that in some cues a lest accurate description is didaaic:ally or JOCcriologj-

cally prefuablc.. For Dharmakirti. the purpose of composing philosophiaJ U'f"3ri"" is [0 dimirultc confusion. 0 .... i,lIy me fundamenaJ spiriwal ignoI Mc.cu- Uf"'" bod. d.e .. ..I. , """ ...... dw ~ol aieo ..... ....dI iINa h",..lj,,,. _ 104).

"

S4

FO UNDAT IONS OF DHAut AKIII..TI 'S PHILOSO PHY

rance: (allidyi) mal pc:rperuues sWftring.' BU[ a ueuiS(: that aceeds the abilities of its audiCDct would not ~move their confwion; hence:, a composition that is superior in its anaJytical accuracy may be infirior soteriologically in relation to a particular audience. The notion of a sliding scale of philosophical views is found in numerow 50Urccs before DharmaJdrti'. time. and it was particularly imporwu to Mahayana thinkers. Early Mwyinists such as Nigirjuna dearly wished to idcmify tbenudves as Buddhists, but they also sought to introduce new views or descriptions of realiry that they considered to be more accurate than those promulgated previously. The problem is that. if a Mahayinist supplants earlier views with allegcdly more accurate ones, other Buddhists might argue that the Mwyinist is effectively ~jecting the Buddhist tradition as a whole. The solution to this problem is to accept earlier views provisionally: although they may be inaccur:lte in some regards. these views or descriptions help beings to free themsdves from lheir confusion. That is. if deeply confused beings were presemed with only the most accurale descriptions of reality, mey would reject them OUt of hand. since: those descriptions are 50 countcnntuitive as to seem prepo,nerous [0 most ordinary persons. Hmo:-. to be most dkaive, Buddhist teachings should be tailored to the audience at hand. In sud! conlan, more acussible descriptions may be caught. if they help beings to eliminate at least 50me of their erroneous beliefs.' 2 For tIk JIO'ilion Uw liM: putpoK of a ualiK iI to dispd oonfuaion. _ PVLsb (Uur.1fI """'-i_..). Confwion (",.J,c) ill aplicidy idmcificd .. ir;nonnec It PVI. lll.-UJ I.!Id PVSV .J ril. (G:III.IIft), ...bot it ill also apWntd thaI i&oorancz ill the- und.trlyinsaUlt of

...-...

3 Nipj ...... whom I take 10 bot liM: au~ of the /WJtbJi (_ WWe.. lOOJ.), ..as prolNo. blr liM: lira to o;kfmd an apli(il hio:nrchr of news in Il)'IInnatic oontat.. Sec his RAnwINil (4.6?....,,) and MMK (IU). Candra1rJI1i '. commentary on MMKJI ,6 ("'-'ItU,..w.,S6-)6)) ;" I nUnc of qoocuiont dw. ht IlKS to dtfmd dlil mahoci. In Jht ~ fTom /lMJobJi mmDoncd MR. il dear WI NlprjIaN ill COIMJucd with ~fC:Idg, apr...: liM: MahlJ'inL 'Tbt; WI: kw __ of lht K'Clion Itt' wonh quocinl in d>eir wumr:

il .

A pmmuian will make _ .ndmts ~ t¥'CfI the: alphabft. I..ihwik, Iht Bud· dha taua;hl Jht Dharma in acoord with .... dOOpIa' .bilitia.. The Otwma ht COughl 10 II)rN: illi:w liM: putpc* of ROppiIll ntpuYity. TO~. ;1 illimalal the: pracria of vinuc. And to _ . ht CO.,.n1 one that. ill: baed upoo dual,,,,, H e couchl to 101M I Dharma flOC bued. on dual,!),. And to II kw, he lIushl a ptOfound DIunna diu In · riM. liM: timid; its Q' lera ill anptincu Ind mmpMAon. and il illhc mc:IlII to IIwn awahnin" Hena, !be wix JhouLd a:uc to dcspUc the: MIIhl~ and thty should b.o< ....'" ..-.. f.ithful ..............i ........, """"rk<" ,...""",,ina;. (14m ' Ii 4-~""" ttanI. in Dunne and McOirllock 199T-7I ). fJouIMi... wi; '~mr!,,~,,; ,-:t !.)ltl

DHARMAKII.TI'S METHOD AND ONTO LOG Y

" Mahayina thinkm ddend this approach by claiming that the buddhas themselves have employed it as a rdJl:Ction of their · skill in mean? ("~A.J.r~)--dtcir ability to speak or behave in a F.uhion that will be most beneficial for particuw beings at :I. particular time and place.' In thiJ regard. Dharmakitti speW of the buddhas as being like d~hants who shut one qe. This mm.phor t:akes :advantage of the bet that an elephant's eyes :l.re loc:arM on the sides of its had; henet. if an d~ham doses one eye. she will not see anything on that side. Likewise. almougb the buddhas have realized me uhimate narnre of things. mey -dose one eye~ to mat ultimate reality when teaching beings. because ordinary ~rsons (p.nhAliA1IIl. ArwltJ4r1irr) annot see the world in mat fashio n.' Following the pandigm of skill in means, DharrtWtirti's philosophy eme~ from a hien.n:hy of views in which. as Dreyfus norlS. -more com· monsensical views are subsumed by more critical but more c.ounterinnUtM views.... This hierarchy amounts to a succmive series of approximations that draw CV'Ct doser to the most accurate possible description. In each case, the inaccuracy of a description stems from its origin in an erronrous belief

bJJJN

'..u,14lhJ ~ ..~...,. ,.~_". H ~ •• •

1.,"'--".

1"'1 '¥ ,,;,u~ / ~'~ ' UI;"'''-!r ~iJ~ttiIri"M H~. _t/tqbftp; oMinf1!'~ /Ri~zWp""1!'~~_

_,.i'riiU...,.1I

Hi'; o.J'.,_~~,~ / "

IJdrUJnjll/t~~­

(}bhn 1911.:111-0)0)].

41n opnki",of HI' L.~ I . to ~~ "'""'" of ~ Imn in m. Mahiylna. esprci&Uy in V,.;,1I{)w Iiln'U. ~ Blftl (1991.1 arsuea for. sliBhdy differmo IIAfIt sp«:illc fO lhe

Mitt bY"" of ..... ~ ~ __w. Ju P)'" Iua poin ........... . M ~ n-... of aiIori"lone', n:ao:b.i"l 10 W abiJjUc,: of bcinp oo:aus tbl'O\lghoul $UCb .u1Rl, w best known aampk beinS lbe "burnint; houK" mnaphor of ,he ~",..,..~ri" (Pyc ,ns:l-'l, )7-41). 11Ie norian of a mndy a mana fO an end ia a1Jady pt& em ill arty Imlerial. an obYiow example bc:in& 11K snake and M mcaphon of w AI.·

""""'U.."".

l'll"/",_".,{M.jfoi_,.;.",. n :1.17-U9)· 5

a. DftyfuI (1997-104). Tbr rdt'nOl Pl'1~ in Dhamuklrti', WOI'k ia PVJ.u I-1.I9: The uhilmlt: n.al\m of dw copiti...e OOOIUlI (~) in pa«ption ia IWII known by tbooo: n.oon iJ no< 1Up
on-

w

CII"

,,,.,..ttl.

6 Orryb (1997:104).

S6

FOUND AT IONS O F DHARMAKI RTI 'S PHILOS OPHY

(JIIP.rillljfU1M). whereby something that is non-x is believed to be x (lIus",i'!fl utdplllM).' It is supersed~ by a dtJCJiption that eliminates

thOK errors, but which nuy itself nill contain inaa:uracics. ~tickv2, p~ ably a comemporary of Dharmakini, describes such a progression in this fashion :

In IhiJ regard, it is observed that then: art two kinds of pefJORS, the spiritual ac:kpt (yor;i~) and the ordinary person. Among these, the: orcfuwy person is muted by the JOlin.. And J'l'tins art muted by s"a'"sivdy mon: advanctd JOtins through a distinaivc qualif)' of their understanding.'

Although Dharmakini himself ncvrr cxplicidy states his hKnrc:hy of views. it is dear that he is following a model much like: Sinridcva's, and in examining the details of the progressive stages of analysis, we nuy ckrivc the following tirnplificd hiuarchy from his tau and early commmtarors:' I.

1'1N- &litfi o/OrrJ;Nlry Pnw1U: The most inaccurate descrip-

tioru of ra.liry stem from ilncmptl ill Prc#rvinl the naive bd~

of ordinary persons.It The most problematic belief is the notion Nt things composed of spatiotemporal components somehow 7 DlwmakIrti anployt 1M ph~ . _i'!fJ ~ at PVin.l..lc.. Thill a..d other ....::b pbtue:I piOyidt • • Kalaln pua it. "~rimebonored ddWtion of error in India b94-u,j. Oil 6c:cmcJ1t1 abouc rhiaddin.irion. when one inqui... into 1M buU for ~error. For I>IwmWni•• conotpnW urorlftlWl copition ilOM thai "aupuimpota" (_ II~' type .,(~ unu> . . ubj
J

I 8C.A ~)-43Ir.

u_"J.N/JM tIn!-,.,.'n

"'4yllr U 'f,('r.llrJlli~"';_ . ~ . r;.-J.

.... Iiw P- of I.'.. _

~

,.,.., _

~ 1.

~

..H

" •W NOfC dIac Pnj6ibrunati pro-

, Wh ik Dhannakll1i doeIlIOI. aplJcidy In« lhac Irvds. ~ and ~ dhi do offu dear diftsionJ, apnrially 01 rb.. dUrd and fourth Inda.. For. liM cumpk. ICC ~ I"NIMion ofPV)..I94-1.l.4 in dw ~ 10 Her"!'. "'7 UK ofrhc lo:mI "ordilUlJ~" u manl lO rdka ap«iaII71M ~ .,oolpasliH r onc who u "-'.rcd"). whlch implic:l1IOI. only a belt of ioaipl inlO re»iIy. bul a a:n:a.in reUnntt IO aud! insi&hL Buddhia thinkcn ohm ~ bel_bell dw WK~cd bdicCo of o..i;""'7 pc_ A<>d V,; , I' b an:

OHARMAKIIlTI 'S ME.T HOD AND ONTO l OCY

crist in dininction Flom those components. In philosophical

ckbate:. the paradigmadc case of dtis commonsense beUtf is the notion of a "whole:" (lIWl]tlvi1l) that exists sqnnte: From ia pans. For IOte:riologica.l purposes. the most important Form of this belief is ut~ri. according [0 which me:re: aisa an lnMn or absolutt self mat. while Fully autonomous. is somehow related to or reliding with in r.ho!' connituo!'flu of rho!' mind and body. All

Buddhist philosophcn seck to eliminate ullki:J'Uir!# and any beliefs, such as the notion of a whole, that an: corollaries of it. Hence, this Icvd of description is ncve:r accepted. even proviIionaUy, by any South Asian Buddhist philosopher. It is mentioned only so as 10 refute il. "

1M AbhitJhll/7/fll Typo~; One: can be dissuaded from the belief that some thinp trulyaist in distinction From their $pati()(emporai constituena by learning more accurate descriptions. According to these dcscriptioru, which we will ~r to as the ..Abhidharma typology." when we speak of things such as wholes 1.

o r th~ liNfUl". we are j us~ applying nama ~o wha~ are a.c:rualIy bu.ndla ofin-cducib1~ m~taI and physical dements At

r,u"" .....).

least three basic ClTOrs. howcvtt, pe:nist in rhcsc ckscriprions: a) some demcna, such as colors, are: said [0 ha~ spatial atcnsioni b) some clcmcntl aJ'C' thought 10 ha~ ttmponl cxtcruion (nhin); and c) the dementi arc rcpcatable-i.c., they require: conceptu.al

a:tcnaion, wch that aU earth patticles, For cumplc.

ha~

some

objeaivc Am~eu that enables one to ickncify them aU as cuch

--. to be rooced

itllhote: uncbbomcd, CO!IUIMXIKIIIC bdic6 dw BuddhiIu take to br; mit-

Weal. See Drqfua U99T-SI-f9). II ~ mist\! br; wnpced 10 c:onsidu !he olt.ma!ipv:d ViWputrip.;l .. an uccphoP, bul only if _ ......,toeq... v''-wid! ~ s...:n Buddhia dUnkcn. 1,4 C'd , . .oduiCUCid ds.mucha 10 br; re;e.:w,. ~"and InrfiJtI. To KnIC: 01 d>ci, ~ ~ in dIia ~contidcr.n.- __ of praiIo: 10 the B.ddhaeom~ bran unk~ a ...... ~

re'

r•

When the mlnd CDnmiru die _ _ ", am" (4: . +f.(/. the condouicy olbinN will noc br; f*ified. "' am" doc. noc Ica¥C the bean what chm: iI bdid" in the rdf. And anor no otbcJ rcac:hcr in the world ill proponcnr ofldi'm theft iI no pull otbcJ dwI)'DIItvicw, theWrJIOpa«. (d'7+ m _ • f • .IL. · ... U-'!"Jllii! · M y:1tb.I.w.n.,.,..~" .... 1tIlJIlfl n ."".; Ibu j.tpti URi . .......,. 16 / - , . . M IJ~_-«'''_IIl.oIlZU+ III . (II.cuHded in

u,..

Ydomim', .tWA

f

fhk~k,cotdJw.;

""".1119).

Sl

FO UNDATI O NS OF DHAI.MAKlItTI"$ PHILO SO PH Y

particles. For Dharmakirti. th~ Abhidharma rypoIogy is best representN. by Vasuba.ndhu's presentation of th~ Sarvastivada rypoI. ogy in the AhhUiJM~ Although Dharmakirti oa:asionally employs the typology of the AbhitJhal'mA/toU, he critiques the ontology that it presupposes. II

}. "ExtrnuJ ik.Jim. ~-tJx TINory ofExt""'" ThilltJ tIS UIIUJw. MoftlU1UlUJ P~In: One can be weaned of the erroneous bdief in spatial, temporal. or conceprual extension by demorutraring that only paniculan. which lack all such extension. truly aist. The belief in spatial atmsion arises from a miJa>ru{ruai of {he mation between the mental image that appcan: in a perceptual consdousneu and the entities tNt cause: that image. The belief in t~mporal e:x~nsion is an ~rror that ocxurs due to misconstruing a quick SUCCC$Sion of diKrere momena in which the previow moment causes the nat moment in a causal continuum. AJ for conceprual extension, the appattnt sameness implicit in our ability to identify any things as the 5afTle in kind or IlarufC' is just subjectively constructed on the basis of the observed causal charaaerisria of disaae: particulan. OI"lC' erroneous belief remains in this description: mat any form of atra-mental ma[(er--cv~n infinitesimal paniclcs-can resist a mereological analysis. Later commentatOrs catled this level ()f description the "Sautrintibviev.r. Howevtt. me c:adiest commentators. Devendrabuddhi and ~akyabuddhi . often speak of it simply as the vlev.r that asscns that thert: arc entities-most notably the objectS of ptteepciontbat aist aternal to any mind (INihyirtlulJl1J.). Along tbese lines, 'N'C wiU reftt to tbis position as MExternal Realism." This viewpoint is the one most ofTen adopted by Dharmakirri. appar-

12 The AMj'b...hLr (AI() p..-nQ a SanIairida.,y". (a1lhouch AKBn. VuulMndh ...·, oom c:ommcnwy. include. potiriona idallitlcd u Sa"'~ . Dtwtnoldrli rJen to thor Abbidhanno I}poiog U. - . I o;on(CQL In doe DOntca ol~.1Or cumpic:. he aU..da to Vuub&ndhu·.diK"uion inAKBh. Hrft hil conam with tIw cypoIog it indicated by hit dfwn 10 danonItnk thai tIw oquation 01 ~ ...... and • .wy. need no!: COGuadiet whttc IIKh an ~tion iI no!: cspIic:ic (_ PVSV .. PVI.1lJ- '11); _ a1J1) PVL1,,..I}6ab. 115O""116b. 119-1~. 191, and 19kd-19hb). ln addi· tion. Dhannakini abo usa thc:Abbidbarmo.,..an lOr the dulifiation oiborh...mw and ..... __ u.I ""'-co (_ r... _pIeo. PVSV ..JPVI . ' J1-'''~). Hi< ...-;.c...... olopct:ial sn.d mnponl almaon ill daaibed below I9Iffl.

mal I'.........,..

:alWlI)'lI

..,....",11,.

DHARMAKIRTn METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

~ntly e2SC

bttaust: it mikes a balma betwttn depth of analysis and

"

of compreh~nsi on. l)

... Epuumic likillism-AU Entitin Ilrt Mtnul: Th~ ~rroneow belief in lh~ exi.Sl~nce of extra-mental matt~t is eliminated through the rnlization mal th~ subjectlobjKt duality apparent in awan:ness ill acrually d~ 10 rhr inRt=\CII! ofignnrancr (1IuUiyd). As such, mac duality is erroocow, and any dctCrminuions based upon ie, such as the notion mal the cause of th~ objKtive appearance in sensory awareness is du~ to cua-mental pamda:, is also false. Since this da:cription is noe iudfbased on any ~rroneow bdidi, it is th~ most :lCCUl'1Ite, AU TIbetan commentators and $Omr.la~et'

rd"C'T to miJ '"""POinl :H the ~Yogicira- view. but the early South Asian commentatol"l often rc:fer to it as -the view mat objects of awareness are internal - (shn bya nIInlti Jin}NI' ",,'11 ha ... IIntllrj/U:yltWiti4). Oha.rnuIoni, who refers to it as "the view things are merdy cognitive content- (lIijfUlprinui""w), ~mplO)" tbis view consist~ndy only South Mian commentators

mat

in One lignifican1 ceaion of h i.

p,.,1IUl~wl"r;Jr...

To avoid the

conR:llion ofOlurmakirti'. p~nclI!ion with owr philO5Ophirt identified as ·Yogicira," we will rc:fcr to this position as -EpiJtemie Idealism,""

13 Fill' J lucid and rcfrahin& approach to dw; term -rnIi$m,- teo: ConCOI (1000), In £.ala" naI R.caIiNn, cbf Icnn -rcaliwn" mm:;we to cbf local 00""''''' .1 c:omnwncrl! Wt lOme peruptu.al obj«tJ c:Ut1 oulliOc the mind. Hena, when rpaItin& from thil pt:!$p«tiV1: Dlwmaldrri CItI be. -ralia" about am _mmw tbinp: and yn I "roominaliR" in that hoe ~;ea. the a.iunI« g(

u.niYnWll. Sumc lNy claim mal _ ahouId jUlI UK the Icm\ "s"lIuinlika," .... ich 1M a.rIy COnIlIlmtilOf ~ docI we 00 I< Ic.t _ O<;CIIDon (u9b), 8m wine "Swuilllika" in dW Whio.:wI CItI lad Ig both hiMora! and philoIOphiaI coaf'uaioa. In a hiauric:al c:onteu, me Ierm INy ubIcun:!he c:ompla td.otioruhip anxK\I dvtt diIIina bnnds ul ~t: the aplicidy · Swutntib.- thcoria aptewd in VuubandhU'lAlCBh, the ~ RcaliIc Ihcwiag(Dlwmakirri 'I". ' [)f Su~pta, and Dtwmakitti', own bcerrqJ RaIlM dxoria.ln.bun, it lNIy be hewimaIJy Ilnwilc to cquarc -Sautdntib- with all puII-Vuubandhll F..amW ReaIiam (1J/s;JtIl riM.wMJ, eV1:D if dw &tcmaI Ralian if qualified all 1\01 SarriWrida and noc Madhyamaka. TItii bc:k ulhiaOfical datiry ~ 1M pocmti..al lOt ~ c:onfwion, lOt if Eacmal RaIism annat be caoiIy ~_cd wiIb aplio;idy SaUlrIn.iIta ~ an inlnpl'mltioo g( DtwmaIdrti'I &tcmal RaIiIt qumma in lermt g{ Sauninrib phiboph;w moQnUonJ will be mil!cadi,... II iI ~ IW thiI teaJ(ltt that bo:Kh ~ and Sik,.abuddhi dearly

p.Jcr!he term 14 Hm:, dw;

~

ICt'Ill

"qmmnic" iI meant to reinforce dw; nocion WI DhmnaJdrti'l critique

60

FO UNDATIONS O F DHAi.MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

AJ I have mentioned earlier, me aplicit pUrpoK of Dharmakirti's philosopby is to free beings from suffering. and wben we mate his IOteriology with me hierarchy of views disO'swd above. we can ICC how soteriological mnurns inform Dharmakini's philosophical method. On Dharm.aJonj's view, sufft:ring arises from .w:Lf
of CllD-mcnw mtitia an- in dx molal of ~l= n ill dill _ know in pe,,:cp-tion (I admil m. "Epismnic: ldc:aJiIm- il llOII'IC..na1 ~ bur it is me_ sua U>d IaA mjdr.!i .. twminoios:ra'llibbk). l:>IwmUirti anployl dUl Yiorwin hill knghy di..·.;o., of tM inruwncnw dfea ~II me end oflbe IhUd chapen, farti,. wim tM pro&opc at 1<).4If. Conamin& the ti"II,. __ ...

,i,..,

n . $ikyabuddhi

(- .~ . w6as. Vinitadeva &lao

ram.,,,,. ....

LUa

it in ~ pbca; uamplai include "Jt;oNJ and "Jt

u.eet the' term ~I>tndy (~IM:~. The: Sanskril -..rj"",... 54 iI a. rMj. The cquhoalcnl term -..rj~ 0C0ln in ~ (:uo.,!l '" which..., -..Id ~ me libnan tq1.linkn, "- ..... -... ~~~y tJ",J.: unfortumcdy, the lalla' pM.: is COCI'Uf" in PVf (1 L4bl). N lOr ObarmaIdni'llIKof ~

Ii.....,.,..., PVin·D (l66aJ- 1.).

15 Sec PVI.l1lo- U J and PVSV" cit. (G" u.ufF, ~Icd in the: appmdiV; PVa. I. ,....,Ub; PVu "cd- ",; PV1..JO,cd- JOub. 1M m«twWm or sWi"crinl iI IWnmariud U PV1..:u]Cd-I'~

One who bdi .u (lilcnlly, "au"] thc IClf' will always dillJ to it ,.. "I." Duo: to dUI dillli.. Of!( WIRI for pL no. and mal minliUdu the f"aula [of tho.: dUnp mal aft imacined to 00", pl.euuft1. Seana:!hoIe dUnes .. havina poUU'I'e qualidu. OM yarN ' " them, and doinllO, _ ~optiaIU" "m.iM" thoK IIXInI of ac:mmplilhins the dui,cd pIalu~ Thmfore, q ions as OM iI .1U(bed '0 the «Ir (bltUl1IMti~ _ wW mNin i ll wpdra. And when "'- it I noOon old, dine if llIIXioon 0I1Mhtt. F...... thcdiJrinaion bdu&i. Jand omaCDn'Oel anxhmanand neniotI. IJr4' ~ ~ ..mi.", iii ~ nwIM9 n mJ.b...MJq. tr1JMi '!1~

Mrr' ~ / l"~ ,.,.~. --m UI~ ~ H __

~IIiw»""'t"_,. ~ / invIr; _',.,~ ..,.,.,,;6401p1,,.nrr..

, ",.... .01.

Note thai tho: idtnUfic:aclon of,.,., fn!i .. the' f;,,~metu:al eaute 01 d-din&in& it 0ftI1 impliciL Sec, for cumpk. PV1..IJS- I)6ab: 11sc: anridol:t for u.. C&IUC: 01 RLffcrin& it QbbIitbcd by ~ the _liaI nllllU of du, ClUK. .5uIf"ain&', ClUK iI dinPII8 ~ taka oondirioned Wnp '" iu ob;a:u; WI dinr;in5 ;' a_cd by_'J fiDtion on the lIOliont of IeIr and miM. Tb.: -.I;.arion of ~ wftid, motndM:u !hole notiorw. . IGpI the dinr;in&. I ~· ~ "Jr,"'''''''. ''-rO:, '

........i,

•

1+

"t l .-woIJ1'

& ~.,.. , 4s"", "'.

+

+r>4-'-(r"'r4,~ U

6,

DHAR-MAKIR-TI 'S METHOD AN D ONTOLOGY

ing about ignoranc:z (avitiyti) in lemu of me primary role it plays in tbe generacion of suffering." Thus, when one elimin:ues I4JkliyaJmi, one is eliminating a form of ignorance. If we atlend carefully to Dharmakini's approach to ignorana, we sec that on his lcx:oum ignorance is an ingrained cogniri~ habit that imputes a unity Of sameness omo thinfrS [hal in bet bave no such unity or sameness. Allhough Dharmakini does nOI PUI il quite in these terms. ignorance thus amounts to tbe belief WI a re:a1 entiry may be disuibuted (alluiw) OVtt space and/or time. 11 Dharmakini proposes thai ~ eliminate ignorance (and, hence, 14tltiJa4r!.tt) by realiz.ing thaI its alleged objecr-an enciry distributed over space and/or time-is unrnl. If this interpreution is correa, then Dharmaltini's 5Oteriology rests upon a progressively subtler critique of all d.i5tributed entilies. If we apply Dharmalcini's .KlfC:riologial madl.":1 m (hI.": hil.":r.lrchy of Vlrwll discussed JUSt above. we sec wtthe hierarchy reflectS the IOteriology. In short, Dharmakini ainu (0 elevate suffering bein!? from (IJ the completely erroneous belieh that arise from ignon.nce 10 I-4J the elimination of all enor, which enables the elimination of all suffering. The progression from 111101-41 is characterUed by a refutation of ever subder fornu of disuibured enr:iria, lind it corrHpondJ to a sotmological p r~ion from w seate of an ordinary penon 10 the state of one who has attained spirirwl lii>cnlion (_}q.). Thus, along the lines of Sintideva's nOtton of luccasively morc refined levels of undcntanding. the scale of analysis is also a scale of progression toward spiritual perfection. While d-.e 1MUllllfit", for moving up the scale is 5Oleriological. the mt41U 16 Dlwmakirti'l .,;xuio!otJ edUbia. ddi~ turnudopell imp!ecision dw " ..... &om an manpc 10 aa:onunodace at laM twa dUfwm .....,.. of ddinll1l* ClIUK of suan."" ,~, cid>cr .. ~ or .. conNaion (,.J,.), wbac both 1m)' ~ in'nprrlnl • ~ (~. The e:rpIicit l'qUItioCI in qllCAion (II"~ - ",.;,. _ • .v,.J ia: KYa'll pbas. indudin& PVUll_ll).

mack.,

"* ...

17 I but dW inlCfplmtion of ~ upon Dtwma!Wti'. npUd. aafl:mmt duo. isnorsntt q aNKXpc.wiry (PVSV .JPV'.9' n'b; G:,c:l.1O: ",~. This illUpported by 1M claim dut iponna: il t(It.In:e of.n &,,1 .. {PV,.J.u..-c.: .."..."..". ~1f~p.o;~ /""~, ...d ..... ~ .... .Joo ..... _ _ of ... (.....u {PVSV .JPVuw, G:lIo.1O-U; II ( . ~/ ." "uWM>lMN!J). Thc.:kat imp/aeion iI dul Jcnonnotcan be: equated with conaptuIIIiry. 1M ofDlwmaldrti'••nxk on aNI'

u...

roa..

upcu.aliry is iu imputaUoa (,.....~ of an untal i~ (oiU,.)-moa pamcu1ar1y WI of ~ (~-omo Ihinp aJw ~ in faa umrly dQrinn (- . lOr aampk. PVI.A-70 r.nd MY .J m., tnNilled in dw: appendis;..., alao bdow, 1..4). Thc climinxOon ofisnoranc:e can mill ~ undemood all an elimination of 1M Imdrnc:y (.wlli) due 10 which one cornpuIii¥dy impum AmnICa omo n";lles dw ue in faa not dw: ame. For enmpll, r<'UI ~

r.a

all
by l1li"1

61

fOUN DATI ONS Of DHAlMAK I RTI' S PH ILOSOP HY

for moving up the scale is a panicular form of reasoning (pKtI) that enables one to critique ever subder types of distributed entities_At each lcvcl, this reasoning is used to analyze some enuties that were taken to be ultimately existent according to the ontology of the previous level; the result of the analysis demonnrarcs that some kinds of entities that were thought to be ultimately existent at the prnious 1C\-eI of analysis arc found to be ,.ot ultimately existent at me next, subtler level of analysis. Generally, the entities mistakenly thought to exin are thOK mu scc.m to be given in perception, or in some cascs the existence of such entities is required to explain what SttmS to be given in ~ption_ For example, at the first level of analysis. a water-jug exisu as a whole in distinction from iu ~ fo r it seems that when we see something that we call a ~ watcr-jug. " what we see is a single. whole, entire thing. But when we move to the next level of analysis, we diKovu that. in filet, all that truly exisu arc the components of what we would call a "water-jug"; no "water-jug" exists in distinaion from these componcots. Rawning (pin) mables one to move from the first level to the second in that one arrives at the rtjccrion of truly existcot wholes by systematically employing a specific form of JUKU. namely. the mercological anal~is diKuucd above. What ill most important here is that this lame form of reasoning moves one not just from the fint to the s«ond level, the way to lIN top ofllK Kak. That is, when one moves from but indttd one level to the next. in each case the style of argument used to aitique the entities that were thought to exist at the lower level is the "neither-oncnor-many" analysis mat lies at me core of the critique of wholcs. To sec how this style of rationality moves one up the scale, let us brieRy rcsate that movemCDt. In moving from me first to the $«Ond level. one refutCl the real c:xdtence of"wholcs" and similar cotities (such as the .twum). To do so. one argues that it is impossible to demonstrate the existence of a whole mat is either truly distinct from or truly identical to ia parts. This very inability to specify whether a whole is identical to or distinct from ia pam is thought to be sufficient grounds for rejecting the existence of the whole. In moving from the second to the third level of analysis, the paradigmatic a.sc is me universa.!, which a.ccouna fo r conceptual extension in that it is allegedly distributed over the individuals that insWlOate it. Similar enocics include a ttmporal.ly persistent entity that is meant to be disuibuted over ia temporal instances; also included are entitics that arc thought to be distributed over a spatial extension. Here again, the inability to specify whether a univt':ral is idenTical to or di.snna /Tom iu insrann:ues is sufficient grounds for rejecting the rrue existence of univcnals: the same

.u

D HAR.MAKIRTI ·S METHOD AN D ONTO LOG Y

6,

analysis applies to other distributM entities. mWilNs ",WIlnJis. Only unique. mommtary. and parrlas partides and mental components rmuin. Finally. in moving from me mird to the foum level of analysis. the inability to specifywhnher the image in puttprion is lingular or multiple is me primary argument against the exinentt of extra-mental objects. " In mis way. variOUi "neimer-one-nor-many· argumentS, which arc pennutations of the meroological critique of wnoles. any one all the w:ly through t~ levd.~. The style of reasoning employM. however. is not the only continuity in the levels. We have altcady noted that at eac:h level the entities whose reality is critiqued are pm:Udy those that were taken to be ultimatdy real at the prrnous level of analysis. Thus. the Icvck of the.scale exhibit continuity. in that an ontological commitmem at a prrnous level is taken to the next kvd. with the oOt':(Ki"n thu the d~im i. IIffi""",~t the p~oull~ . but tinJiuiat me nat level. An additional fC2turt of this continuity, however, is that even when critiqued at a higher Icvd, .somc aspects of the omological commitment of a previous level mAJ JtiU IN m4ind, but only as contingent or conventional. For eumple. at the second level of analysis (me Abhidhamu typology) the existence of a water-jug will still be allowed. but now only ~I ('f"'tJntrimuu, erin~t . "'nher man "lti"","lyaUtcnt. In other words. the opression "w:ltcr-jug" may continue to be used, :is long :is we undersW\d that it is merely a oonvenicnt term for a bundle of parrides. And at the third level, me ultimate existence of univcrsaU is rejca:ed. but one may continue to speak of them as conventionally aistent. This way of relating me lcvcU-wncre ultimate ontological commitments at one level are carried over to the nat all conventional commitmenu--rdlects the doariM of the

twO

truths. a Ufltr.l! motif of Buddhut thought that ~

have discw.Kd earlier." While the doctrine of me (Wl) truths helps us to unde:rstand the continuity among the levels, that continuity still involves .som~ significant complaitic:s. One issue is immediately probltmatic. SpccifioJ.ty. it is sometimes difficult to separ:ate ontological claims that are being relegated (0 a provi, ional n . nu &om those tha, are being rejected outrigh •. 'In;' problem ;,

encvbated by the fact that the same belief. such as -a water-jugs aim," II Set !he uansbrion of PVJ.I~-l14 and abo tf". cU.a.aion on 'f»rlaI ataItion t.a--, 981[ "'-ha UJUmonI: in tf". ~rion from ExremaI RaUsm 10 EpistmUc Idcali$m ;. doe notion m.1I an ExItrlW Ralia cannoc specif)o wbMcr I ~ objcn is idcnOcal (0 or dUtina from tf". JUbi«tMry a:IIniIin& it. bu. dU!: ItJUIl'rfI' appc:an 10 be KCOndaIy. 19 Stubo¥'t. p .

6,

FOUNDAT IONS OF DIiARMIlKIRTrS PHILOSO PHY

nuy be preserved wid! one meaning of"w:uer-jus- and "aim" but rejected with another mooing. If we consider this bdicfin terms of the movement from me fil1t hcl (the beliefs of ordinary ~rsons) to the K'COnd level (the Abhidharma cypology). we find that at the second level one will compkuly rtj«t me enstcnce of a water-jug ...ncn, in accord with the nalVC ontology of me first kvcl, it is concrivro to aist as an entity in distinction from its pam. However. the existence of a w:llcr-jug can also IN provis;tmaDy lI«~uJ at the second level. bill only ifone construes water-jugs as conventionally w tent entities thaI arc in fact reducible to their pam.Discriminating continge:ndy preserved ontological claims from those that arc rtjccttd may at limes be difficult. but we have JUSt hit upon twO principles that in all cases should guide our interpretations. We have nOted du[, when w(' critique but uiU renin an ontological commitmem to some

entities thought to be ultimately aistent at a lower level, we only commit [ 0 the conventional existence of those entities at a higher level. Our first interprttive key is that [he conventionally existent entities in question must IIIUN1J1/H rttiucibk to the ultimately existent entities that arc affinned withOUI reservation at thai higher level Our second principle is that, to constitute the final , tnansition.:al position that moves one &om one level [0 the next, such entities must be at the furthest point of reduction at their own level. Thus, to the extent that the existence of a water-jug is preserved in the Abhidharma typology, me conventionally existent water-jug must be reducible to its ultimately real pam. To the extent thai conventionally existent universaU arc preserved in External Realism. they must be reducible to ultimately real particulars. And to the extent that the conventional existence of appa~ndy external sc:nsc: obiectS a~ preserved in Epistemic Idealism, they mwt be reducible ( 0 ultimately real mind. To PUt it another way, what is mmmon about a level is me commitment (0 the ultimate existence of a dow of things mal exhibit two features: to the a tent thai any other entities can be accepted as conventionally aistent, they must be reducible to these ultimately existent things; and in (etou of a higher level, at least some of those WIle ultimately real mingt will be the obj«:t of oitique. We thus should not apcct that the entities accepted as ultimately existent at any given level will rcqui ~ any further analytical reduction within that kw/befo~ they become the objC'C1S of a critique at a higher level.

20 This is the poinl made in AK' ..... S« 1bcM: 40-41.

DHARMAKI RTr5 METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

6,

The question of the levels of analysis in Dharmakini's thought becomes panicularly important when we consider the third lcvd, aternal RnIism, for it is at this kvd thac Dharmakini docs the V25t majority of his philo. IOphical work.. His accounts of p!!rccption, infcrcntt, and philosophy of langwgc are prescnred almost adusi...dy in temu nf&termll Rc:lllilm. P:m of what this means, ofcoune, is that Dharmakini docs the vast majority of his philosophical work from a phiiosophD.l standpoint tMl M krn1l1.1S to '" folse in the details of its ontology. And we can draw a crucial hermencuticallcsson here: ifDharmak.ini knows that not aU of a particular sraodpoint is U\IC, then be presumably also knows that he need not defend every aspect nf thaI .uandpnint. We will rcrurn to this peculiarity of Dharmakini', method monly, but Dhannakini's usc of E:.:temal Realism begs another question that we must fint address: how do we know what conuituta: aternal Realism for Dhannakini? This question may seem a bit ingenuous, but it is far morc pcnpicaciOUI than it may appear at first glance:. In most casc5, when we cumine the woo-Iu of a systcm:uic thinker such u Dhum:alc.ini. ~ get the dearest sensc of tb:u thinker', philowphy-his coherent SCt of thcori_ when the thinker is obliged to defend the most problematic of his positions; and in most casc5 , such defenses requira: the thinker to reconcile competing theories within his thought. But while Dharmalcini has a predilection for systemaricity, he is also almost always operating with a set of lheorics--utemal Realism---that he is not obliged to defend in all cases bec:aU$C, in imporunl w:I)'$, he does nor hold Ihou theoria 10 be true. And for much the same reason , tensions bctwcc.n competing philosophical cboiCCl within E:ru:mal ikalism need not always be reconciled. Iu interprners, we: are left with an OCCUM)Oal but maddening vagueness: just when wc: apcct Dharm.akini to re:solvc a problem or reconcile a tension within E:.:tcmal Rn.iism, he glides over the issue as seemingly unimporunt!' If we were r~nS Dhumn1ni o n th~ :w;umptio n t~t Extern:a.l Re:a.Iism were his final view, then we would be quite right to object vigorously ttl this annoying vagueness. Since:, h~, arguments abotn External RnIurn ace only a mcaru to a .$Oleriological end for him, we mWf instead attcnd 21 A Krikins CD.fOpk ;. the :lppeal10 tUf'''1'JII"'If-rUjU". rjudgmml of wnma.l as I caoual mWf 0( hil philoeophy 0( I~ Wltik "f'PC"Iins 10 \his wrKqI(, Dtwnu1tJni """ apWns il. 5ft bdow,

",ft'.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK.I RTI' S PH I LOSOPHY

carefully to th~ implications of wing a philosophical view ror purposes th.:u mnscend that view in such a way thaI on~ cvenrual.ly acknowledges m:u the view is f.alse. Our fiBI issue is simply thC' question of how Dhannaki"rti Sttdes on ExtC'rnai Rcalism as a level of analysis. To address this issue, WC' should recall that a singl~ style of analysis or reasoning is meant 10 carry 01 all the way up the scale of analysis. If ruch is the casc we should ask why we would ever StOP at a panicular level. Th.u is, if an int~lIigent ~n applies me analysis properly, should that person not simply continue the analysis to i15 final condwlon in Dharmaki"ni's Epistemic ldealism~ It is true that one mwt shift &om one paradigmatic object of negation to the nat- fin, wholes. then repealable or o tendcd entities, then extra-menu! objects. Each of these neganda is, in turn, the main object of critique at the vuiow levels. We might thw apca that a .!hift ITom onC' ncgandum to the nat would ronn an obviow caesura-a -stopping point- that delineates a level of analysis, one of which is Extcrn.al Realism. But if moving up the scale is limply a matter of applying th~ mereological style of critiqu~ to each object that we believe to be aistent, then a systematic application of analysis should ('()",~l w to move up the scale. We should, it sccnu, be swept aJong by the force of our rcasoning. if we assiduously apply the analysis. The mere nc:cd to chan~ the foci of our critique docs nO( seem to give u.s such a pawc that we mwt develop an entire ontology, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy ofbnguage at a particular level, bUI Dharmakirti assumes a panoply of such theories at each level; and he especially works through such theories at the levd of External Realism. Clearly, then, the f.&a that me analysis pawc:s al each level is not just a matter of f.&ciliatinl the switch of focus from one object of analysis 10 the other. Some other facton must be in play, but our greatest problem in interprning Dharmakirrl is thaI neither he, nor any other Buddhist thinker, ever tell" u.s what aactly might make u.s stop our analysis to such an atenl mat we develop a a morc-or-less unified set of theories on perceprion, bnguagc, and the Iikc-al thaI kvd. Certainly, ifDharmakirti is con· sistent with the discourse of compusion that we fi nd in other Buddhist thinkers, the tnltrtU reason fo r sropping Ih~ analysis must ~ that maximal hdpfulnes.s to $Cnticnr beings would be impeded by not Slopping. A5 Drcy· £US notes, the problem hC're is that higher levels of analysis become progressively more counterintuilive;U to put it another way, one can bend bangs' minds only JUSt so far before they snap. But while we may charita-

mat

vi'"

DHAItM AKIItT1 'S METHOD AND ONTO LOGY

"

bly and pbwibly auribu[e mis pm.! reason to Dharmalcirti. our most slnighrforward explanation is historical: Dharmwrri inherits the levels from his (primarily Buddhist) prcdccasors. Indeed, most modern interpreten agret: mat Dharmakini praentl his argumcnu in a manner that genenUy ainu at compatibility with lhc: widest possible Buddhist audience, and since most arguments are presented in me conten orExtcrnal Rcalism, that meory is presumably acapable to the broaden audience.. While Dharmakirti employs utun.al Realism as a broadly acccpClble theory in which he can do most or his philO5Ophical work, we should reiterate mat he is not obliged to defend (or even aamine) all aspcas Oruternal Rc:alism, since he begiN with me undemanding that the theory, while heurisdcally wdU.l. is Fundamentally Rawcd. And by not being obliged to k&nd cw.ry Hpcer of rhO'! rlv:ory. Oh,.rrnak:irti ~nfOf'CC5 ~ bro<>d ~_ ability of the meory, Thar is. were he obliged to dcknd all aspects or the theory. he would find himselr mired in details tMt would lead him to distinguish versions orExtcrnal Realism. Defending jWt one detailed vcrsion, he would lose mose members of his audience who preftt another vcrsion. In d&ct, by avoiding a complete :account and defense of External Realism, Dh,...Trullcirri lilccwi~ noid.c .m y I'I~ to addfft..1 d~iu. dur ~ a martel' of conrention among Exrem:al Rc::alistS. A.J interp~crs., hO'Wl:Vtt, we are still k:fi with a fundamental problem: for Dharmakini, wMt in External Rcalism 4n need to be: defended, and wh:1[ can he let slidr. A.J we Mve jWt noted, put of DharmaJcjni's geniw is his calculated imprtcisul1l about the views that he works with, in thar this very imprecision :allows him 10 encompass competing views thar disagree on what mUJI be fOr DhannaJcini IIlfi""jN'1't.,,' dcn.iI. of an ontologic:a.l posi-

tion. These details are unimporrant in that they are 1'101 relevanl to the analysis tMI moves one from one Icvd to me nat; in mon, they are unimportant to the sotedological enterprise that me lC:ale of analysis 5etva. And since dmils of various 2CtUaI (i.e., hinorically a((ested) or potential disagrttments within External Realism are unimportant, Dharmwni can

w

offi-. a prnoenr:...ion m ar i. coiYlp:uible -ith ,. bro"" r.angc of ~ and

potential versions or External Rcafum- prccisely by avoiding the unimportant details that would cause disagreement. What, however, shall we do if we encounter what appc:tr to be competing versions of Extunai Realism in Dharmakini's work? O n rhe intcrpre-ration I Mvc givm here, truly competing theories would be mose that offer di~rgeru

Vf:I1:iolU of what i. ultim:atdy real ro ruch an """tent du.t differ-

ent uguments would be: required to make the transition from E:.:temal

68

fO UNDATIONS O f DHARM AKIRTr S PHILOS OPHY

Realism to Epistemic Idealism. Especially problematic would be a ClSC' in which one vel'$ion of Ezternal Realism assertS the ultimate reality of enti· ties thai. according 10 another version . are jwt conventional . In effect. we would be dealing with a vel'$ion of External Realism whose ultimately exis.tem things mwt first be further analytically reduced to the ultimately ais· tent things of another \'el'$ion of External Realism before the Epistemic Idealist critique is applied.. If such a reduction were inde«i necessary. it would obviously be a case of an imfH'rt4n1 difi'erence among External Real· ist theories. nOI an unimportant one. The theory whose ultimate entilies must be further reduced would be an incomplere version ofE:nernal Real· ism; the theory that assertS emilia that require no further reduction would be in me family of throries that art properly called External Re:lIism, in that they reprcse.nt the position thaI is critiqued by Epistemic Idealism. Now it may seem that we are just picking nirs ha e after all. Dharmakirri himself does not give a rul.l accoUnt of External Re:lIism. But as inter· prners. WC' at I~t need to know what does not count as an External Realist mrory for Dh.armwni, since our interplttll.tions will be markedly affected. mereby. If. fo r e:umple. a water-jug an inde«i exist fo r External Realism as an ultimatdy real particular without beinR reduced to its partS, men when Dharmakini presents his nominalist philosophy of language in terms of atemal Realism. he faces a f.ti rly straightforward task. But if on External Realism a water-jug is in fact nothing but the infinitesimal particles that compose it, then me account of reference in the ClSC' of me term ~water-j ug· becomes f.u more difficuh. Divining me External Realist accoum of a waler· jug's ontological starus-be it ultimately real , conventionally rea1, or utterly unrW-is obviously crucial m our hermeneurical enterprise. We can add here that the presence of truly competing throries at the ume level of analysis would also be disastrous to Dharmwrti's own enterprise. By the most clwiable accoum, his aim is 10 lead us to Epistemic Idealum, 2nd his method is to prcp:m us (0 accept that position by first convincing us to accept an omology with a narrow and specific SCI of flaws that he will critique from an Eputcmic Idealist perspective. If, however, he wishes us to accept an obviously amtr.ldietory and incoherent onmlogy, he will fail. And WC't(' he to prescnt aterna.! Re:lIum in a manner mat openly acknowledges and argues equally for incomparible positions, it is not clear how he could avoid obvious contradiction and incoherence. On the other hand, if WC' can gain acccu to the Epistemic Idealist critique without a coherem version of External Realism, men Dharmakini's usc oflevd s of analysis becomes inexplicable. We could, fo r example, bypass External RcaJism ahogtther and

OHARMAKlkT I 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

from rNo, Ahhiclh:lorm:lo rypnlogy dinealy In Ff'i~u':m ic IdelllL,m. w~ would need to hnd MIme other compellins-nd prob;ilily ICSIi charitablereason fo r Dharmakirti's use of E:ft«nal Realism. Nevenhdess, while we may argue that Dharmakini's &:ternal Realism should ('Vinu at lean an osteruible coherenu , subsequent inferpreten of Dharmakirti have often fa.iltd to agree on what that coherent position might be. m~

Diw'X".ll"'U'f'J'rn.tilJru ofExumJ &tJism ~

Dreyfus has skillfully a plained, the history of the interpretation of Dharmakirti'J thought has witnessed some striking divergenu in what counts as &:temal Realism, where we undersWld &:ternal Realism to be tlut philO$Ophic:d nuKe from which Dh:lo rmakini presena :a.nd def~nds most of his mcories. ~ we will sec: bdow in greater dttail. the crux of the issue here is what counts as particulars (tlJttW!4~)' the sole uldmatdy real entities in Dharmakirti's presc:nt:ltion of &:ternal Realism. Among later TIbetan interprttm especially, the diversiry of opinion on mis issue is striking. Drawing on the analysis of the Tibetan philosopher Sakya Mchog \dan, Oreyfi.u sketches three over:JI pocitioru,

... (Sakya Mchog ldan] shows that Dharmakirti's analysis ofc:nernaJ objtcts is aniculated arounci three levds of analysis: {t} At :10 commonsense level, objtcts such as jugs and $0 on are said ro exist. (1) At a dccpcr level, however, these prC2llalytical ideas cannot stand. When aamined in rdation to 5C1\SIC spheres (tlytIUZNl, sityr ...dHJ), objecu of COmmOflSoenH disap~ and the color offin: i.s distinguished &om the fire. This is the levd of analysis corresponding to what I describe as the Ilbmutt~ ;m~rrlllriD1J. .. .The ontological analysis, however, cannO! StOP there, for evm entities such as color:arc not real. TherefOR' (3) at the deepest level, only their infiniteWnal components:arc real. The third level corresponds to wful[ I ~"e dacribed:lo& the _tul..,J '-" 'n'frn..b.,..lJ

Siky2 Mchog ldan', analysil iJ useful because it covers the gamut of posi. tiom found not only among Tihmm interpreters, but also among more reant interpretm and possibly among $Orne! South ~ian comment:ltors. Speaking of the first three levels, Dreyfus goes on to note:

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK I RTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

levels (t), h.), and (J) function at differt:nt levels of analysis. When discussing epistemology. the lim level is wually prckrred for it is the closest to the way ~ conCC'ive of things. At this level, ~ conceive of ourselves as perceiving objccu such as jugs. Such a description is nOf sustainable, however, for commonsense objecu are not lindable under analysis. Hence ~ oem to move to a higher level, at which our epistemic p~ica art: redescrilxd as involving only phenomenologically available entities such as colors.. But funher analysis reveals dm even these entities, which we usuaUy think. we: pcruive. are fiction.a.l. Hence, ~ need to move to a yet higher view, according to which only momentary particles are rnI (the Standard interprtt:uion) following a nr.uqy of asanrung scales. h is important to r"W.iz.e that Dharmakirti does not believe that these levels are equ.a.lly valid. Rather. for him , each level has iu own limited validity within its own proper context of usc. Ultimately, none of these thrtt levels is valid, for they all assume the aistence of atemal objeas, a prcsuppruition mat Dharmakini ultimately rejects,'·

Th~ differt:nt

Dreyfus' approach to the levtls of analysis closely ruembles my own: in
y0 _

AmlrJinK to ONnM Beliefs of Ordinary Persons Abhidharma Typology uternal Rnlism' Epistemic Idealism

M", 1wu/kJ "Sao"..."........

A major point of con~(jgcuce in OUf int~rp retations is me notion (hI[ thc:sc I~ are nOI all-equally v:alid: :lS Dreyfus pUts it. In other words. a lower level is superseded by a higher levet. For example. Dreyfus noteS that entities considered real at level I- narndy, ~co mmonsen$C objecu" such as smoke or water-jugs an be reduced to me entities considered real at level 1 , narnely, the spatially extended objeas mat 2J'(' the sensible e1emenu or 4]IItll1l" of colOt' and so on. In short, commonsense objects may be reduced

DHIIRMIIKIRTI 'S METHOD liND ONTOLOGY

7'

to their spatially atrnded strWble componems. On thc::sc: oa:uioru. says D~, commonsense objectS art unreal. But he: goes on to D.y:

1bc::sc: commonJc:fl$C objects:uc: presupposc:d ... to be: real at other times. For c::nmple:, while: discussing me way in which ausal rc:lations are undentood [i.e., at: PVt.}4£f] , Dharmakirri shows how w~ und~n:t:lIfld th ~ rebtinn herwN!n fire and lmnk~ hy

observing how smoke follows me prc::sc:ncc: of fire. In thil disawion, ausal rdarions:uc: described as involving commonse:nse: objccts sud! as smoke dut:uc: thus assumed at mil kvd of analysis to be: real."

DreyfW maks it dear that thil il a full-Aeodsed commitment on Dhann"... kini's pan to me: reality of commoruc:rut entities (level .), and not simply a rc:oognition that these: entities:uc: comingcndy aistcnt as coottprual consuucUons. In other words, the Faa ,hat Icvd I (commonsense objc:ca) is superseded by level 2 (seruible elements) docs not Ic:ssc:n Dharmaldni's alleged commiuncnt to the reality oflc:vd I (commonsense objects) in thocc poRiOM of Dharmakin;'s work where it is -allegedly employed. Indeed, Dreyfus discwsc:s at length some Tibc:t2n minun Iuch. as Mkhu grub Dgc legs dpal bung who do not c:vm rccognizc the reduction of commonsense objectS to seruible elements. These thinkers maintain that, on any view mat presupposes the aistena: of external objectS. at least some commonsense objectS are ultimately real paniculan. The point. then. il dut acoording to the Tibetan thiokm that Drqfus discusses. the reno ~Sa.utrintika· (the ~ Extem,j Realism- in tft'ml of which Dharmakirri does m(HI of his philosophical work) may apply to If"] of the positions from level I up mrough kvd}. This mcans that on some Tibetan interpretations. Dharmakini is willing to make a commiancnl to the ultimate reality ofeimer commorutrut objectS {level I) or spatially extendc:d elements (lcvd 2) for w purposes of arguing From the Sautdntika standpoint. In contrast, t mainrun thai o nly level J mould be c:omidered "Sautr.inrika- o r. in my lerminology. "External Realism. ~· ~ a prc:scntlltion of TIbetan interpretations of Dharmakini, Dreyfus' srudy is immerutly helpful and k«nly drawn, but Dreyfus :also contends l S DrqoNs (lm:a,). 26 ~ • dar 1tW. In hJi: view, Dhlrmaklni .uows for conf\iain& IICClOUlIIS within thot

Saurttnrib (Le.. &:lcrna.I RalisI) mw: IhfOU!.h

mol(

ofhil......,m DIwmakini prelmU

72.

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

IMt thesc' intttpmlltioru are' at lt2St "pmly right" 2$ d~ictions ofDil2rrnakin:i's vi~ . Th21 is, he maint'2.iru that, especially when discw.sing epinemology. Dharmakini does indttd speak 2$ if oommonsenS(' objecu were ulrimatdy real. n Al I s« ii, Orq.fus makes such renurks in order to defend the plausibility of the Tibetan intefPrtt.ltions. In other words. he is urging lU not to dismiss these T ibetan views aul of hand and in$lead to consider how Tibetan interpreters may have been able to read Oh:armmni's tau in a manner thai supponed the ulrimate reality of commonsense enlitKs. NcvmhdClS. whik ~ should re'main open-minded aoom lhe pl:ausibility of Tibetan intetprmtions,:a atd'ul reading ofOhamukini's lOts shows dUll he n~r oplicidy ,rates Ihal lerms such 2$ "smoke" and "fire''' rcfn lo :any spaliotemponlly Otlended emilio thac art ultimatdy real.- In the absen« of :any such explicit stalement. it seems far preferable 10 fOllow Oharmakini's a plicil description of [he rtfen:ncc of luch terms. llul is, Oharmakini notes mat a term such 2$ "water-jug" (sh4f4) is simply a linguistic convention employro as a convenient means 10 indirectly expreu multiple infinila:imal panicles thaI, due to their proximity. Clusally support each orher such that mey together perform functions that art of interest to us. When we are thil'l'ty. cem.inly il is casier 10 say. "Bring a w:uer-jug." than 10 say. "Bring some mutually supponing infinitesimal p2tticles tMI. through that causal suppon, set"I-C the functions associated wim the conccpr 'w,lIIer jug.'" Dharmakini, especially when m.d through the earliest South Alian commentaries, goes to great efforts to show Ih21 words for common5Cf\se (fltities should be inlerpm«i in Ihis fashion at the level of External Rnlism; in doing so, he is clearly disrancing himself from :any ontological oommitmenr 10 such entities. And this makes good 5CflSC. sinC% when he 01tiqud External Realism fro m Ihe perspective of Epinemic Idc:r.lism, he clorly assumd that Exlernal Rnlism reduces all seemingly orended material encities 10 uncxtended infinitesimal panicles!' n:alifI; OCIn«fIIinJ the cr.iHraa of IN cr.ltfrW world. H~ ckfmcI. a ....alkd Sallirlimilu poai lion. Wi,hin hi: alto KCmt fie.. 10 mow !:w:IW(n confIinin& :ICW\UItJ. ~ lor foUoon the.,.rw deoattxd~. reduans mI.t)' to the .nlnK'lion of p;>nkw IWlida and moment:f of ~ AI 00...... rima. hoW"~I . 1:w: i.om aomckd obj«lI such as colon Of ,""~ Of f\Im com~ obj«u" h997:l6). So:.."w 1997:106/[

bUrudf . a

mis"""

27 Dny(w (1997:97). 28 S« PVSV ..tPV,.,. (G:I1.I- IJ.lj).

2? Th;,. i.n«:rp«:g<..... olDb.u-......Jol..

i·.

a . D~ ('997:19, n.t... l. _.~

"""'"

<0

be bao. ...."'d ... .M CAlii.c.c com_

mo:tWilOlS. In Dbannaldrti'l works. dw 1l"I0II1 imponilm 1M..... 1ha1 di.... cs this iMuc if

DHARMAKIRTl'S M ETHOD AND ONTOLOGY

" (me

In :a vein s.imibr [0 these poinu of divergence with Dreyfus' level I reality of commonscnlC' objt.c:u), I :also lind myself in disagr«menl with Drq'fia' claim that Dhannakini also accepts 1n bctwttn me ·Standard Intcrprttation, which I take to be Drcyfiu' undemanding of Dharm:akirti's final position on Eztern:al Realism, :and the intcrpremions whereby mticics with spatioccmporal exteruion can be taken as ultimately real. Dreyfus clariliCl: M

found 1I PVSV Mif'VI.I}1-I.1.. A ()C)nIpku .nru.luion and IIOCQ hom Sikpbuddhi', _ rnmwy VI: found in the ~ (m) . JO Drqfw (a99r.96l.

s. bdow.'" To thiI; cb.... 1 ........, fou.nd Oftly

an.

ptc ..... in rithn PV or PVSV ""&I>' k .....Jog .........."""'!'t"'" ,le ~ ""'......., vi.- .............. t ...... d'~ .. u. '" Db..• maIdrti'. rdUorion of!he Sirylkh)'1l....,..m of ~ and .-,.. (PVSV IIIIPVI .16)_11o, I lilll) when; at one poin. (PVSV ..... PV ••r]1c6-17l; G:IO. ~7 .• ) be, fqWoICS!he oppono:n'" notion 01...,. wich hit: nocion 01 !he parti<;ular (~ Since~,... ph~ would IIn&m1:and :an enmckd mlily ,\Kh U I water·Jus 10 be whac .bey call • """" (YD:.14,ft), dUs mishl sugest that DhamWdni is abo xapcinSludI an aimo:kd coo ly. HOHCOcr. sin<;c thc.c: same phiIo.ophe:n do IIOC xapc dsc I>Otion ofinfiniu:tirml panidc/;

31

(_

YD:ln.1pij, ., _

baa, in

(lOW

w ~ of odwr compdlilll t'IicImu. 10 _

Dhar.

rmklm 'l fqlUUon of I1IkftI and _h*",'!'" mcrdy II a meaN of nWulll hll p Oint 10 Iw Inter-

Iocurors. See abo the next chapl:n. n ... , .

74

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK.IInI' S PHILOSOPHY

Dtspitc ia strength, I bdm mat 1M , tandard interpm:acion docs 1\0( account for.:>mc of Dharmaltirti', idc::u mnccming onrology. I am suggesting dUll Dharmairti', accoun t is not un i~. ConRicting dements in his vinr.' contndia th~ Sautrintika account thou h~ adopts in some pamorhi, work. These demeno suggest an alt~mari~ v~ according to which sl»ually extended ~ a~ to be included within the pwview of the real. According to this view, materia! reality is not reduci bl~ to in atomic compoMno but also includes atended obj«u such as shapes and tan· gible ob;cca. I am not arguing that this is Dharmaldni's view. but, rather, that this view is present in his work. It represents a Itvd of hi. analysis which is oft~n not rccogniud by scholars who tend to present his viC'A' as brine mo~ unifi~ man it is,'" The most significant insigiu her~ is that our intttprtution must not oonJfrue Dharmaldrtj's philosophy as fully un ifi~, if such unity would mean that, for example. his entirt epistemology and his entirt ontology must fully support each other tU1f1S1 kvds oftlnAly1is. In other words. whatever Dhatmakirri', Anal position might be, he need not argue in a manner thai is fully consistent with that final position. so long as his argumentsthrough a kind of sotcriological syst ema t icity-I~xi one up the sale of analysis, Ncvt:nhclCS5, if we h«d the int~rprtt.illtion of the earliest com· mentalOn, we also must not ign o~ the coherence or systematicity withi" a levd that we discussro above, And if we do admit such systcm:nicity within a Icvd, thcn we will be hard put to find any clear instance in which ·spatially enended ohjcctt arc 10 be included within ,he purview of thc rtaI.· Why then wou.ld Drqfus hold this pos;ition? He has two basic rea· sons. The first concerns a tension that he 5C'CS in Dharmaldrti's thought I bcli~e that the~ is a tension within Dharmakini's ontology bctwccn an atomistic reductionism. which is in accordance with his overall ontological p:nEimony. and a Ics:s mductioniuic delin. eation of reality, which aJlows for tb~ reality of extended objects. This tension is due to the very dO$C connection bctwccn ontology and epistemology in Dbarmakirti', system.... IOharmakirtil boldJ that perception off"c:n an undistorrcd rdIcccion of reality. Accordingiy, what is perceived by perception must exist in real·

DHARMAKIRTI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

iry. This aClles a problem for Dharm:akirti', ontology, 1tK-wt: do seem to perceive extended obj
"

The dichotOmy th:u Dreyfus highligha is one that runs throughout Buddhist thought: it i~ the b.:oPc ~n~ion ~ " n ~rpe:al m the evidener: nf the senses, on the one hand, and me mgcncies of reductive reasoning. on the otha. This tension c:m:ainly is relevant ro Dharmakini's work, but I would maintlin that, based C$pecially on the earliest commenwies. Dhannakini's thought confomu prinwily to reductive reasoning. and not to me evidence of the senses. ~ we will ICC in greater detail below. when confronted wim thls r~)c," in ~ ro ~ ~ ~tiry mch :as" w:a~_j ug. Dh:arm:a.kini ~ flO( choose to somehow defend me commonsense intuition that water-jup exist. Instead, he gives a detailed cxpbnation that can account for me causal functionality required fo r the successful reference of the tcnn ~water-jug" willxnathc c:x.istmcc of any single mtity that 15 the ,d"aem. Rather than supponing a single, spaoor.cmporally c:xtmdcd ,deem, Dhannakirti's apIanation :accounts IW the ieU:iehce of" term such:as "w:ater-;US" only by ~in8 to infinitesinul particles. Moreover. when fpedcing of en:ended entities such as a wa£ef-jug, Dharmaldni MltTcaIJs them parricuWs (tm4t",,'(IItS). If. now~. we c:n.mine the problem of "foella to ouended entities through the lens ofLatcrcommenta.ton writing in Sanskrit o r libecm, then we do find ~ eYer increasing tendency to mab: cona:ssions to commonsense inrerprea.tions of the ev1dence of me senses, to the point mat even entities such:as water-jugs will be :ulmirted :as p:atticubn prior to any reduction ( 0 infinirsim:al. p:atticia. Since Dreyfus is mgaged primarily in a study of the libean intClprea.tions ofDharmwni. it olMou.sly makes good senJC for him ro heed dosdy

Thia conclusioo lconcernin, .,.acia! aunaioa] ;1 certainly ... rpriJin" for if aoa apl..... 0N.t....JUm'. ~ •........d.""";mal Oftt060po.i ........ ry. h ........... ·

,ndicu 01:00 puAp, ~ DtwmalUni _ .... fo imply thaf mafm.! rcali!)' ia mluc:ibk co .tomic compoomu. . ..This lppam1f inc:l)lUisctney ia dlK. U l:argutd e:arlic:r. fO, f~ within DhannWrti'. rhou&hf ariAn, OUf of the double pmpccriw: thf" orime. hia thoupt: the ontolopcal and the cpuu:moIop:oL Onm1opa!!y • ... awuion ia mIuud co inl1nimimal panidcs. EpUrnnolopcaUy, he :c.el , a.do I rnluaion is Iwdtr to 1\UWn.. Ac:tordin, 10 hia Ii.ondaa.entallhaia dI.u pu«ption accurardy rdk.:t.. rcaliry, e:u~ would ttenI to m.... b:u:ruion 'ppc:m, anti" all, 10 paLCption. Thi.

notion of awuion.

oeemJ

10 lad Dharmaklrtl 10 ag;cpllt _

kw:l • minimal

76

fOU NDAT IONS Of OHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOS OPH Y

this realist trend toward [h~ accqawa: of ClteOOtd entities. And in doing so, h~ provKlcs us with a ~ apprKiation for the need ro coma rualiu historically the commentarial im~rpm:l.cions ofOharmakini. Beyond dirttting our attention 10 Tibcran commentators' appeals for the rality of cnendtd emitio, Dreyfus also raises an issue based squarely on Dlumukirti's own way of speaking. Specifically, he noto that Dharmakini himself appc:lrs to speak of atcnded entioo such as water-jugs as if they were indttd truly ral. Whm speaking in this fashion , Dh:umaldrti onen uses the tcrm "baWl, which we can translate as "cntity," -cr.iucm thing, ~ or JUSt -thing," We will not undcnU~ here a detailed cnminarion of this tenn, but we ClJI agree with Dreyfus when Dharmakirti uses the term, he seems 10 mean that "hdllttS arc causally efficient. And since (as we will sec) only ultimately ral particulan are causally efficient, it v.-ould certainly seem that "hdvlI5 such as water-jugs should be COUnted as ultimately real particubn. This would, howc:vcr, contradict our omologK:al dictum that ultimatdy real entities should no< be reducible to other emities. Turning again ro the Tibcun thinker SaJcya Mchog ldan, Dreyfus remarks:

mat

To solve this problem , Sikya Mchog ldan offers the following solution in parts of his works ... , breaking down the dyadic structure of Dharmakirti's system through the creation of an intermediary category. In addition to real things [particulars) ... and ineffectivc conceptual conslructions, is a third category, conventional things (Jrun rtko" /II. 'j tln:ru po). Thil category indudo sensibilia such as color, Wte and tangible objccu as well as commonsense objccu such as jup and 11ttS. These objecu arc generally char.lClcriu:d phenomcna [i.e., universalsl but are impermanem. They perform a funnien bUl only conventionally. All phenomena thai have a rension in space and time bdong to this intermediary caregory. They are not reallyefttctivc, for the performance of their function boils down to the functions pcrl"ormed by their constitut nt atoms." In gencral, the iRlerprctation that I adopt in this srudy resembles that of Sakp Mchog Ichn, since I tOO undcnond Dhannakini to usc the term MaWl r thing") as way to spaX. of water-jugs and other such extended thinS1 that, in lCt1TIS of the way~ usc Iangwgc, appear to be camally cfficic:nL I also agree

DHARMAI(IRTI 'S METHOD AN D ONTOLOG Y

n

that an arcnde.d bh4vtl is flO( ac::tu:I.l1y Clus:illy effic:imt. esptci"lIy sinct Dharrrakini goes to grat lengths to explain how the seeming au.s:al dt.ciency of , mat~rially atcnd«l bhiva such :as a wattt-jug is to be c:zplain«l only through th~ ausal efficiency of infinitesimal particles, and not through the a.istcncc of a real, single ~mi()' that we would call a "Wouer-jug." On this interpretation, th~ lam "water-jug" rd"ers in a manner that enables on~ to c:al.ll::l..!ly manipubrr thr, atn _mfilt2l world through me li.mmora ~ by the tcnn "W:l.ter-jug." but this in no way means that "water-jug" must rder to a singk, real, at:mdr:d mci(), that performs thoK functions. As Dreyfus poinu out, Sakya Mchog ldan, faces some probl~ms with his interpretation. Specifically, by spuking of a -water.jug" as a "conventional thing." he immcdi.a.rdy ensconces hirNdfin a scholastic di50l55wn of omological c:at~rirs. Wr. might unOr.nf:lnd ~Icy:! Mchog ldan's inrerprr:t2tion as an attempt to resist several centuries of a move toward realism in the interprttation of Dlurmalcini, whereby the category of conventional reali()' is associated uniqudy with univenals whose
they art unreal, we have to admit that they ~ permanent and incffcctive (since being a nonthing. pel11W1ent, a consuua and ind:Tective ~ equivalent almost by definition). While it is rtlarivdyeasy to imagine a uoMrsai such a5 existence as pcnmnent, it is mort difficult [0 gram that colon and shapes a~ permanent at

well! Most mwrn intoerprftr:n SC'tm

10

ha.voe been unper-

turbed by this prospect, even though it seems 10 complct:dy conmdia our pr.tctical (!Xpt:lience. They ~ rady to assert that for Dhumakirti coion, tastes and smeUs arc nor cawally produced and perform no function , Rather they arc conceprual overlays and a5 such they arc changdcss!1I 35 11Nl

78

FO UNDATI O NS O F DHA1MAKIIlTl'S PHILOSO PHY

A5 a distillation ofTIberan objections [0 Siky.t Mchog ldan's posicion, Dreyfus' analysis is insightful. But if ~ take mis interpm::uion and place it in a dilttrent hisrorical contat- namely, that of me earliest commenta[On-the problenu mentioned by Drqfw no longer apply. First, the n«d to ontologically categoriu MlVilS simply appears (0 have been a non-wue to thc:sc early commentators. urntinly, Dhumakirri himself seems unO)nccmed with such quc:stions. The tew suggest that he and the early commentarors, when diJcussing atended entities. adopt the category of the conventional from the Abhidharm.a typology, such that atendcd entities such as a water-jug would continue to be JUS( conventional. Later commentarors, especially in Tilxt, apparendy feel that this approach does not provi
DHAIlMAkI RTI 'S METHOD AND O NTOLOGY

armded object be they commonscruc objccu or just colon and wchis not induded. Given Dhannakini's reliance on EslCrnai Realism, much of our srudy will be concerned with that position. It is wonh reiterating that, while h(' generally spt2b: from this st1nce, it is not one that he Stdu to fuUy defend. Perhaps the best way to iIIwtrate this poinr is by coruidering the faa that. almnugh F..1u.:mal ReaHn on rn lngy i! bnM on ea u.aliry. Oharmaici"; qu i_

roy admiu that even causality is jwt a nutter of convenuon..v BUI if we

heed Dharma.ldtti's rhetoric, such radial anti-realism is not germane fo r us now. Fint, we must appreciate Dlwmakini's External Realist onrology, and to do so, we must tum to the basic d('ments in his ontology, namely, tht: "insuumenw objccu" (prflmt}ll) of the instruments of knowledge (p ........!""").

2.2 DhannaJrinii Onfology TN T",. Pramcyu- TM T",. JWJitin We have noted that Buddhist phil~phen pas;t IWO levels of reality: me u1tinutdy rd (pr1l"umh.IIIIIJ) :and the eo nveru ionally real (1II'!'",nuI). On Vasubandhu', formulation, irreducibility is what distinguishes these cwo 1~1s of reality. Anything that can be reduced either physlcally or analytically into corutituem elements is conventionally real; that which cannOt be 50 reduced is ultim:ndy real. Thus, on this theory the u1timatdy real mUlt be an irm:lucible, parrleu. unitary entity." FoUowing Va&uMndhu in dtia bGsic formubtion, Dh:utn:aJcjrti m ai nwnf that the ultimately real is n«esnrily partlcss. And elaborating on Varubandhu', charaacrizacion of the ExtemaI Realist position, Oharmakirri J7Thi1quia bul arikillllCimiaion iI die INin poilll ofDtwmaldni', mponac wan ot.;ec. Don t.c PVJ-V WI all production is j_ CGnwnrionai. SIICh an ob;eo;tion deady undc:fmina 1M wrimacy of ~icuIats, bu, ntb.:. du.a ~ goualiry, OburrWJrti bronlcalIy rQPOOCb. "-.. J6M wJtj, "lOr which David Edd in • priYlK( communication (,,;, T-shin) Iw: propooord the hipdy au aM:~. ~t(nf." Sn: PV).I- Io, ,nNlarcd in thc

......... s.:..

the di.."sfton ~ in chIpm I (J7ffl. I. Mldidon 10 AK:6-4 and AKBh ... nt.. aor abo VMUbu!dhu'nrJUmall from simplicil)' in dx V;~ (.., ..... LII- I 'l. whnr: it it; UKd in I Yopdn COftIalIO rdUlC the: reality of alengJ ob;ecu. Note dial it doa IMK If"PW that Vasubandhu·. dil(!'qiolu ol"_ ~ pvticulan" (.,.u_w,.~ }8

~:JO-fJ ...../\Xl.IO) and ~COfIIIomcntcd panida- (~II~fII)(.AJ(Bh: IIo'­ AlU.uab) '" 10 be: I.km .. c:hananUcK ol the Sauulnrib pOODon ~ in AKBh. It

80

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

funher maint2iru that simplici[)' is also tempor.tl. In , hon. on Dhumwrti's view the u1timatdy rea.I cannOt be distributed either spatially or tcmpor.tlly." Digniga, Dharmakini's predecessor in Buddhist Prm\il)a Theory, applies an additional stipulation to the ultimately real: it must be inapl"C$Sible. That is, the u1timatdy real cannot be the objocr of concepnw rhnughr nr I::lngtl~ge.· nh2J"m~lli" i ~cO"pu- rhi$" Form., b rion , ~nd ~J is

implicit in Dign1ga's work. he adopts this requirement to cxdude from ultimate reality the type of distribution associated with language, & noted earlier, all Prami!)a Theoristf maintain that the ·object of langua~· (iAbtJdrtlMj nC'O"$nrily indudes a universal, and a universal is necessarily distributed over multiple instances, Thus, when Dhumaldrti maintains m 2t the ulrim21dy ~ is nol the ob}ca of l:lllgu:agc, he mc:aru tMl j t hu no ·continuity· (1II1IHlya) or distribution o\'t:r other instances. The ultimately real thus lacks the type of stmanti, distribution presupposed by South Asian philosophen in their theories of language. and this in pan means that universals (Um6#]1'w"'!l4). the objectS of thought and language, an only be rc:a.l in conventional tums (SII'!'IJ!1is4t).·' When take...

Iose'he~.

this re<)uiretne nt-t.e., th"llhe uhim:uely,...,:0.1 be

devoid of spatial, tempor.tl, and semantic distribution--c:an be lumma· riz.cd by st2ting that the ultimately real is utterly unique. That is. each ultimately real entity is. as Dharmakini puts it, completely cxduded or distinct

U lhil UII~ poaition thaI appean co be tM primuy poinl of dcpanun for Dlwmakirti'l En... Realise onlolop.

w

39 I>hannUlrti mmlioN tM p;utkunat 01 poanialU.........m.: 10k ulrilNldy rul lhins--'n K¥rn1ol pbcu. indudins PYSV .J PVl..... (G:17.1). The ul!.~tabiliry of particulan is

eo.-nuns

...Ied, {oHumpl<-, . PVI.7Uband PVSV ......t. {G: ". ~l. moma,~ f'ot- a div'lMion in Vuubandhu'. work.. _ W p«KIIulion of the: Saulrlntib arpmmu apirut the four ch.m.c:ttristig of ~~nslO dot VlibhiPb (AKBh:1S?ff . . AK1.~) and abo his commmlS in AK.4 (a lai h,. Dreyfus 199;.61). Dlwmakilti discwta mocnenunnat al ~ points in dw: S... ",m. inciudinS PVSV "" PVI . I~t.-I96 (G~..6-'UU.£4)

"lid lOll Dlmai.... "'SUII""''' ..JP'VLdX>II. TIE ba.t L ........ ·li. IIM i.., ........... in HR. wt.n.. the argumenl il one: &om amena: (- J . For an account focwi", on thaI qumcnl , _ esp:ciaIIyOetkt (199) .

"0 Diptlp dairns WI particubn are inaprasibk in ....0.1" JUCh u PSV . . PSI.I.wI and np«i.Uy PSV .JPSUff(17I7ffi,

41 DtwnWtini IUIIllI up lhiI basic pmniJC in.be phtue •... individual entities nefti' prodUQ1: • di.uribu.lcd aWUt:neM wilhoul dcpoetId.ins on , "ninnal' 1M UJlriJ IIJtI!"'Jt&!I sJttti1rJ'V'irqrltfl ~ ~MI!'~-""'; II'VSV ~ I'V I. I04; G:SJ.-4-1JJ. ~ _ will dioa.uo f'unt- DharmaIurti'. notion thaI" univmoal. beins, discribu.red mory, c:annoc be ultim.ndy rnl. Oharrnakirti abo =narka:

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"

from every other entity (J41V.dt6 hhmNL J41V.dtil vy4vrtliL U4ntll"1'illJ1liL etC.)." Exprused in mis fuhion. uniqueness points to one of (he rwo basic constraints on Dharm.alci'ni's ontology, namely, that the real mwt conform (0 the dictates of reductive reasoning. That is, if an entity wen: distributed and rnw reducible. it would not be unique, sinCt' it would shaI'(' a spariote:mporallocus or semantic identity with the entities over which it is dUrrlhurM. AI [he .lame rim .... Ihe crilerion of uniqu~eu:l1Mo me:lru rh:lt Ihe

u1timatdy real has a specific {niJAtIl}or restricttd spatiotemporal locus and nature: it occurs in a specific time and place with specific causal capacities. Expressed in this fuhion, uniqueness satisfies Dharmakini's s«ond basic ontological consmint: mat the real ahibit a kind of regularity (implicit in me tenn niJ;ttll) such mat our perceptions do nOt appear to be simply random (tlltllmriJ.II)Y

In terms ofOOm irreducibility and regularity, me uniqueness of the ultimately real is reflected by 1Vd~?U'> the term mat Dignaga and Dharmakirti USC: to refer to ultimately real entities. In its earlier wage in Vasubandhu's Abhidharma works, II. 1Vd1a~~ is II. way of dwacr:crizing an

0..'-' dMJ wb"' ;. <.,.~ '"<Jk fiu.ni- ;, ." .lsi-m, mJ u"',,, ~

MJ"';' For, liS I wiD apbin. wNl ddinaral thinp and unreal thinp it rhci,CIfNC" it)' 01' incapacity for relic f'unaions. AJOJ . , thinJ (uW) thai it eapabIc ofldic func:. tionI is _Jimihlnl ftIn -"J ,hi",.. "'- is ... ~II f{." tffia fo",.J"u it Jisnihrd [PVI.uS61 . 'Thotrd'oft. tina r:hcy:arc i~ of relic fUnaions. no un;' ¥'Cf'Al it. real thins- Rather. only • wUq"" paniaalar (,,;Jq.J u • rtaI thins brau..e doc ldaimil tdK ftuw:Don iI fulfilkd only byl!.... wUqloW: ~ [PYSV .JPVI.I66: "J4,...nhilt. MIw,. M~-!I !r.s.sabll iM", "'" hi _1H1Whf_

w,.(U'" J*l6rdldf~~1J Mr ~ I "

Mllwri ~ irwri _

~ I ~~

ffIM!r

r.slllh ~""""''''-!r h66cdJI ""'111M _". JhthJ'6'"

_~6_ / lWhfhr

mq. ..... 1IU4 ..... ....,~n4i .

In addition ICC PVI."-70 and PVSV *,PVI.7Iab (G:" .17-1I, tr....l.lIed in tho apptncfu). ConemUns tho awI¥mrioml ralit)'of univasals. DIwmaIcirti ~y In'Uidt;tny d.iKwof this daim. bul M don KlIIC it aplicidy in PVJ.J. Tlw uniftfUb IK eorm:ntiona1ly rtaI is alIo dearly impliod by od.rr "~Il,....dI1i dw usnrion in PVI.70 dial un;>'CI'

'*

.... &rc

-commonly oUd to be .cal- (_

,~,.,) o

(-~.

42 For dbeullJhrrV and 3
",....1IJhrfU

4J lmporunt JOI.Il'ca indlWk HB (u ·.I1fT: ""!' r• .w.UIc'...MJ"usdM~ _"k"'~ hMIm "~rwpdi'" CJ6 ",.-rIn'...m) and HBT (194'.loft)

",e

81

FOUNDATIONS O F DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

object in teons of a proprny mat is pcwIiar to the type of entity in qucscion. When, for exampl~, OM "attends to the SlNI~!I'l· (SlNI"'!q4!1'ltnll1UlJlt4r.)

of -matter" (riiptt), on~ understands it to ha~ "the charu:teristic ofOOng diuurbcd [by oontxt, crc.r (~"?UiJ.!q4!'1'). On this USOlgC.:I. nNl"'~!", is not uniqu~ to:l. single individuaJ, but is ra.ther the defining ch.anacristic of :I. single type of entity (dhttTmll) in me Abhidharma typology. In oonmst , when "auending" to:a IIlmi1f'Il~~ one is focusing on thinp in terms of the sixteen.aspects (iltJrtl) of the Nobles' Four Truths. ~ A Slimli1fp· ~!I" therefore chanctcrizcs numtfQus types of entirits: form , sensation and so on have: different SlNIIctt,.~s, but the same shuillJ'f'~s , 5uch as impermanence."

DigNg2 and Dharmwrti make UK of boch the terms ~!I" and J#mIi",.~ but they usc them differcndy. We h:l.V'C seen mat, for them,

...tIcft Arap CO<\SU\IQ du. IUImnnlt in rom. of ~ 1"hiI b...ac noOon !hat IQJ mu· ria ~. tptcif.c: If"" , ., iiploc:ut abo ~ IaUrnmD in MV, such • ...tP'Vt.nd, (G'44' MH'(" ,..' IIw ( ow Witfe.,...,.,. -,..,., u.,..'!"l and ..... N1oJfl, ocw: olioe>'· en! pbca: what: DIwmikIrti ~dy ~ w poISibility of randomllCM (G:99.ilff. ... ... , .. f~-'"'1 ""~ \J.J ""' , + .... ~ I _¥ ,;.,.. """+>1.+-,,,..; ?J.sJ<'. Anocha _ of du. iAur in PVSV iI ..... P'Vl.n (G:ll.wft). Sa: also the dltcuaion by Dnyfu&. foIIowina 1M Tibetan Ilithor Go ~ pill bSod nanu ""'" F hm:6~).

rii,.

II ~l'iU"'!Uo .... AXBh 44~ ! . AI for the UAF o( ~!Mo"" thc detcripl:m 01 the ~ fonN ol ~.ttmdin&· (_«1Mr.)in AKBh ()70) ..... AK1.7l.c:: "IJII _M~ ,...,,~.!i"-~ w,..thi ~iU""'IJII Nftit] nM~ I .......) ,,~ __ ~ ~".,NJtduIJ l .Jhiwu.hi~

+t For 1M ddinilm 01

_

.

·MIIo' ",•• I!b"""",,lto!lJi.t...

~s""".-..u..-u.

P F (,\.10".... ....tAKR.. ~N. (,01» .. ill.-rau-of ..... ~ and ,."..,,~ I « IIied at p1i«d ~ in thc K.I.:.

W1yin ....Oct.

u-u ,.,,/iuu .,.

dN Ii'" fori " ...;""fiJMII pm.a ocw:', ~t (";";"Ifl).. How IhouId WI be- done a, •..Jya", iN ,.,. IJ1n I{"--uno .JrIM NJ,. -n.... ~.

H..;., .,w,w

_

iAK'.~I. OnrdocslG in Ofdtt ro

Mi"" . . . . l=nt 01 iu pttticvbt and uniYUAI dw·

Ibi." tAK6.I-4OIiI. The body ill anaIyud in oo:teriIOes, IlId 10 100 ~ lmWion. mind and lbiop (A", . ). A particubt dwx· luUric (_I.~""'illhc ~ (_flt...Jof theM: anirio:s Ii.e., the body, n d . l1w impcrmann-oa of thc tondirioncd, me pUnfUlneII 01 the mncaminatcd. dw cmpnand ~ 01 all dcnKilW tbinp--dae ~ unM:n:al cbaDaaiuia. Whli ill me /lUUre of thc bodyt II ill thc faa ofbcin@; oomP'*"' of!he tll_nD and dcmauaIlNl·

[• .y,..."",," ... c,~ ....?h _ ."",,..tiItlM/JbI..,,,./IIf ,,;,.;,.~ u...,."..lfhrII.. I ~ (W '"~ " . . , . , I H]tIvi«i~ i lliWt,.!Y~ II u,...,.. ~!fIfbJth!t ~....J.d,!, ti_'!' ihtt~ t. ~IV INifb!o _h+r!""'" I lhfir; h +r!Wf!' til • .u~ ~".,,!, ~ In....

..... ,,,..Jt;,,)

'b'

i!wwn'...,..,...•. I.

. ... _ . k Iwwl(Oht / .w,...,..'..

-!>U!> .... H+w!t l

lJ,.;;u.

DHAJl.MAKIJl.TI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

1VIIt.~(III

"

i5 a [erm for an unerly unique. uhimardy rn.I emil)'. Thus.

unlike Vasubandhu's SHU",!,'" on their view a SHI6~!", cannot be repeated across individuals. They also maintain mac any object of language or thOughl U a slm41fJ41A~~ regardless of whe!her il ch2fxmittS one or many types of mtities. To rdlea !his usage. I will trandale IVII~!I" as - particular" and slm4",.w,.!'4 as ·universal:"' In addition to df2wtng on Vasubandhu's notions of simplicil)' and Dignaga's oommenlS on the il\Cl.prcssibility of the uJ timare, Dharmakini also introduces a new way of characterizing particulars: a particular mus, havt- ·,die function" (IlnhUriyJ), which for the moment we wi.lll~' only as a way of speaking about causal dficacy.... At the m05[ refined levd of analysis, only panicu.lars have tdie function ; mat is, only particulars are all.Qlly dficient. :and rhi, :appeal to Clltlulity accounts to:a l:arge degTft' for the non-randomness of perception. H ere. it iI impomnl lo rdtef2te that Dharmaldrti speaks of spatiotcmporally o:tcndtd bh4wa or entities (such as water-jugs) that a« nOI particulars as if they 100 had Idie function. and the« is mus a rhetorical slippage between talk aboul particulars and talk aboul thin&, (bh4wa) reducible [0 p:tniculars. O n our inrerprctll[ion. Dhunulcini inrenru thai things luch all w:lIrer_ju&, may ~ nid f O h.:l"Ve tcIic function in mat they are reducible to paniculan.- Since we will rerum to the question of tdic Nnetion below. at thil point we will jusl note mat since only paniculars have Idic funetioA. only particulars produce effects. Hence, things mal produce dfectS a« particulars (or they 2fe reducible 10

_f,,"'/fII

16lmyNs (lm~ and odIm Iu~ tnnaIare:l and ~ u "ip«ific:ally cbarx=iud pbmommon' :and "~11 dwaacriud phmommon," tapKli.cI),. One pcob&cln wid! rbaot U"&NIarioru is tht- II1II: of"plxnotIKnon." ~ this lerm irnpIieI;. plxnomeo:..u.. pooition incompatibk wid! &:tnnaI RWiam ~ SuicUJ' ipC'Ikin&. amrW ubjeccsan: noc "phcnomma" in that they an not tnalW mIlW"lI; r.... t ld........... dKy arc -fc7!W A tcCOnd pr1)bIm:o iI that ">pcrifoc" and .~" Iu¥t moft" in c0mmon with Vii$Ul.ndhU'1 1IIII: of m.:.c IrnTU II. - 1 to di~nria" tht- 1ICOpc= of VI ",Iiris p' .p" MoO...; ........ -r •.,!",,"_ ......... '""1'..-.....;'1'. \Vh.ik "'"" .. _ _ con';"";"'''';n. this nocion in Dipdp and DharmaJdni. il is ckal thaI tho: qo_io" of daKif1i", pmptr. ties aoc:onlin, 10 dKU- tc:OfK illUbordiNllt to _ ...... 1" about distincion b.ucd upon per. apO>ililY. apr-r'libililY and.. for Dt.arm.Wni, dIicxy. "This is QWKiody danonstnled in tho: Ww:s rl.uit-tu foe- tho: ~ of ,he mini ~!"'f and ~""!"'f in Dharmaldrti. PV).I..,.

47 'T"Ix dlanaumr.lion of puticulan II capUllt of .die Ii.oncrion is madr
48 S« bdow, 91.

8<4

FOUNDATIONS OF D HAI.MAKI RTI 'S PH ILOSOPH Y

particulars}, and since only paniculars arc: ultimately real, anything mat bib to produce an efJ"«.t is not ultimately real."

2.3

M OlT

on PQrhcularr

TIN Pnuptibk lIS UtnmAu/y R~.J Th~ prindpl~

mat only particulars produce dfccu ~Iates closely to Dharmakirti's throry of perception, for he maimains that perception is ausal. That is, when a perception occun:, a 5Cnsory obj«t aas as a contributing aUK for the production of a cognition in which an "image" (lilt.ir.)of that sensory object appears, Thus, in a balic sense, "perception" (pNtytlJt,.) simply refers [0 a cognition with such an image, and since me image is a mental event that occun prior to any judgment or in[~rpretation, th~ usage or the t~rm "imag~" is similar 10 Ihal of "sense datum" in Euroam~rican philosophy. For Dharmakirti, a perception is a source or accurate knowledge about the SCIlSOry object because th~ perceptual cognition's image of th~ object corresponds lO the object. That is, inasmuch as the image is eauscd by the objea:, the image may be said to have "me form of th~ object" (.nhariip4); and as such. the image has a "similarity" (J4t/rfya) to that object.:It This mtaJU tiur perceptions accurately rdkct the way their objectS ailt, but it also means thai a perception is n"'f'C"nrily the effect or

49 The charac:ttriAlion of p"nicllbn U Qp>bk of !die funroon is maoK u ~ poinD, indocii"l PV).I - J and PVSV ..... PVI.I70-111(C:tr,I- , ), O . Napromi (1 96~). 5« alto. for cnmpk. PVSV ..... PVI.11Io-I1ub (G:I7,I-4l: ~

.,...tM an.n.fII; ••1Iifw

thai unique individ-w (,;;q.) .ktoo:;, th Hjm r-r""'1tiftJ,

tJm.r/ (i.,., .".,.".11] II,.

;,.,;, r.uN ,It,

I.Ht ,.~J .n.m..JJy

n.Ii~1

'_, '."J IWd.;"" u- it it. ;..mn.iM'(f"'''+'''!WJ. AJJ MMIU -r",-.tt "NItrtUtOt • lit .. m .." ill _ MftWin.II M ~ II{- [PVI.17Iccl71), It 1w.Imdy t-n toleel thar only rlw which it capable of rdie 'tD"r ' ~ .

funcuon .. a rul dunlo II ill unique ilKi'ridual (ICaIfdin& 10 othcn· ~J. 1111 u-ry.". klnqwlf' IIIr _lt~!V'" itJ-1# f "'lIJiP1ri~ ...~ ,.~",~ ff(PVr"11c,.--qa1 N,u ~Uri wI . . .-.. i" M1nf / ... r-.uq. tfMo1.

[•• mq. rw f ... nolrrbIt:f ,.". ."..",..,. ;,nr f

,...,.'!'

50 Dbarmakln:i docs nor dirudy de.cribc tho cut! proc.cu of pcrcqxion. bur IW c:auaI !h0Of}' with iu principk of c.onduioNl ~ (ml be p.:u...d from vuioua _ and pasuccs. ind~ PV). I09, PVp41-141, rv' ,JOI- }l9. PV).m- }4I. 5ft alJo PYin ..... PVi .... ,.. (10" '>, J-,..i ... "'-f J.w,.. ',Ii . . . J-r 'IN J.o 1M pJ-o 1M,.; '"",.. '""

Jill _

DHARMAKIIlTl 'S METHOD AND O NTOLOGY

a,

itl obj«t.II In combination wi th the chim th:af only the ultim:atdy re:a.I is cau.saIJy efficient. the ca.us:aI n:aturt of ptlccption underlies:an important theorem in IU, system: only p:articul:an :arc perceptible. :and only the per· cqKible is ultimatdy real, AJrhough Dha.nnaldrti is typically d liptial in this rtprd. he implies the following argument: first, a petaption i5 the effect ofitl object, Scoond, only ullimatdy real mcicics produce dfccu, lbctdO~. nnly ulrim:uely ~l enriries-p:micuhn__c::m ~ (hit: nbj<=:s nf p<"-n:q'>cion, for only uirim:atdy ral. entitics--p:an:iculan-producc dfecu, ~ ~I

Set-. for c:umpk, PV).lJ.4; &ape lOr ~ a ClUK, thrft it nodUnt: me thaI lhal could contriNl( &II mul)", ban& the apprdIaIdtd oe;ea, Atncq 1M alllG of a~ dw aW( in ~ Umop: awvax.&rioa ilalkU
haf- rail ... M louI.

Drryfua h99T-,j6) appon 10 up tNl when Dtumuldrti dUm from Emma! R.aliun 10 EpiRnnK 1daIw... M abandon. W a ..... model of pcruption. Bul in f.a. Dbannakirti w..pIy
I>N.nnU.irti'. IIlOM ~ IUlenxnl of mil poinl is; -UiA:ma: is just pattp' lion- IPVSV .. PVI." C '+IO: _ ' " rf. SlhUkdln.rr 1~Jl.t I. nil daim. ..i.kb mipl nom bo: JV>dc:mi "To mn it 10 t.. puetiwui, - indiala 1M doR rtblion be.... etU ptiIXpbon IlId the IIhilNfcly raJ ill Dtwm.akini', philotophy. To this_ add parpr dul specifytNC (II only patticubn produ« dkcu; (II dw; oe;ea of a paap: luai , _ ii, puticubr; 1)1• puapcwl a...vr:_ is rdalcd by pgaiUvc and ncptive

.,.IHJJJir,.,.;

objca in lhal il iI caUKd by lao obj«t: and (4J I I14jyoma/ if wvtal in dial iI it incapable of &II df'C(I. PV}.I _, it dw t.nG rlGiou for hI and bl. Paaup rdcnnl w and 14J induck;

conmmjWKC 10 ju

ul

cau.sinc

PV),S9: Thtrc if indtptndml .pprdlcnsion (i-.... paapcion IInmcdiucd by conapes) of mal objora wilh which, d"", 10 d.( ~ Clplcil)' of mal ob;ca. th.u aware_ ill rd.ucd Ihroup. P"'IM IlId nepi'lC"U ,ccnilllla. A. dUll! dial if oma INn dw IlL, OM mal is 401 concomiwlI with 'W'ltmcsl in dw I'adUonI it lqoond Ihr --- ,•......wn.- J-"'" ! ".,.."...rdiktJ I -.,.. , - , . r~'"

""-":rio' __

.~ .",..-.,;~ .

PViu .Ju (1flb?-IS)l1j: Then _ rwo kind. of ob;ecu (tmJ.). dx dircaly per«pIlbk ~ and dw; mnott ~, or !hex two. dw ditealy ptrcqxibk it dw 10 -..bich dw, form (u.,,,,oJ- .w,.JnI dx imag: in _ _ onnf'orrns Ihr-r;h pnoilift and no:pOve eoow:onUlaIKI'. "if. wUqll(, real mintolW!ldy, me puricular. TIx cxhn doc. 401 Nve d.( capoc:icy 10 direcd)' pIaa: ill own form in • ........-• .0 iI

...,1,.., ,.

1

bo: (dim:dyl puuMd (,.,.,.,. .. {yJ.MJ. (... ,.; - , . p]iJ ",oJ""P" ,.'" D"" ,. # tit " P"I zIIrt • ,. i ".."," ..... ~ ..,. '1" ,. iN" tIiutf JJ.r,. i rjn III . .0.",., ~,. _ .i "'''P'' III", . . I,u ,.; ." -... C&nnoc

86

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PH ILOSOPHY

In relation to this issue. Dharmakini makes some additional commcnu thai , on Sakyabuddhi's interpretation, amount to a striking asscnion: every ultimately real entity is perceived by some perceiver somewhere. Although Sikyabuddhi's interpretacion may not be beyond doubt. another important but 'oYCaker claim is explicit in the pas:sagc--namdy. that the capacity to create a pcrccptKm of itsdfis the minimal telic function of which any ultimately real thing mWI be c:apable. H

_ ]i" ,. j . , . , , . i roflll Wi" ",....," ...." .,rJ M I pi- iii . . " ' . '" ,....,

"lIP" .;.,,.' _,." -.,,.1 pc:.tfo.-:n

~r,.",.,..u

'dwI,.",u ""1,

PV).JO: A uni¥en;aI (:&/\IV)[ nom tIM, tdic fwv:rion of Amply prodOOnc i ImIOf)' lIWUCIIeIIofiadf. ADd p.eciody (tIW) IxaUK i. it irK'lpobkof.tw. illw no narure (...v,.J [i. .... i. iI untmL d . PVP:l.4J1.sJ. lOt ohit incapecioy lOt rdic fUnction ill dK dcfjnition of unrc:aI dUnp. (ju.........mJ.d.r.!'" ."~,,, .u nM 141 I tM

..I.

~ ,,.. -,.,.""',u.,-..~

S3 Noc~ dul pan of wiuo, it II JOb " - it tIK ~ iNuc: of ""'- it IIKaIIt by · p".Q
We Qy the foIIowir,c: FOC' tho.e eLitrml Ihinp that. Iu.YinI beat knowrI (i.e. . per' ca-I] II _linK by IOI'iXOIK, arc IlOl !lOW known. their OISAtion ill invariably COIl' oomiwlI with their existtnce. They, 00"1 produoed, art aabli&b«I UI be impermanmt. The teaIOI\ fOr lhif it dw !he foIJowi"l is "'" poAibk: hi !hal tho. thinp ~ dK ~ of produeinc an nnsmc::. of thenuod.a ya: bter (,.~), IIOC Ita...;"' ......oed no 10"1" ptodooe such an - . OC' (1) that dwy -..Id dqKnd upon ~ eke ill ordo:r UI produa: dw • ....aIffM:II. NadKr of thac it poMibic becauK dwy an: embIithed to 1u.V't the ~ of procfucins thai i W U - " And in»on,,", at ....... thi"", ..., ........... ckpet>cko>.. 0<> od.c... to produce ...d:o. an _ no ~ of them wou.Id ~ ........ Apel dlClr is II!! 'I'cb real 'binl baz'lK cyqy rqI rbinl is known h:r mint knam u IOlQC riQK and pin If dK thi", irl quarion ~ IlOl "'polk of ~
....,.14 ... ~ ~ "',.nf1ff ( ~...~.,.". ~ I ,.. ... rqtt /uMIkU It;I!'rij jUUI!' ,,;""rwg I ... ujN"."""'!' It;~ tin I ,.,...,.~"..n, ~ jUu ' jU-..k#"J.d"h'" ~ ~ _ ...... Nt .~ ~

~"I4liM" ~

_in Nkgi"';.1 .

Sikyabuddhi (PVT, ..,..:sa&If .. K:J)4.19ffl imu p'cLi dK undo:rIincd ph..... III mpotue UI O...d:o. ...... thin.s" to mean "there iI GO such I Wr., due it IlOl all ob;ra ofk"o.. [PVf (..,..:Ja6): /u

-JUt" * ... ",;

k.,"

*

DHARMAKI RTI'S M ETH OD AND ONTOLOCY

" causal-

Now, thoe cb.ims about the relationships among ultimate reality, ity and perception suggest another implicit d2i m: anything that is perceived is ultimatdy real. That is, if a perception occurs, some object has acted as a cawe. Only ultim:udy real entities can act as a cawe. Hence, if a perception occun, it necessarily has some ultimately real entity as its object. This Sttf1U to make good KnK on Dharmakini's view. Nevenheleu. as it sands this d2im is pmhlematic, for it cnrrvs inrn cnnflicr with hi~ scantily gni tio n . Th .. r is, on Dh .. rm.kin:i ' J ",i~ p""tcq>rion il :JW2Y'

devoid of conceptuality; in~rpmatioru or judgments such as -this is water"

JJn.,.

&4tr.,. .. _

ml1"''' -;Ji",,(PVT: fot,.. PVr·p ("'"'6a.t): .Nt.,. -;Ji" ,.. but J({sJ4.)O): ... ui.....J~ ~_~ li".oJ ..,,)). Hena, m.e reuon. "be:awe rwry lUI Will it known by IOmC known at _ Dint and place•• illdiellCl • buic mjllimnmt of raJ thinp; in dTa:t.. raJ thin« .... be: puwu Ho ..e.u, thac twO doucd pb.-can bt: read lhit ""y OlIly if me obj«tion Riled by $1kyabuddhi it wppOcd. 0tbm01sc. tht ph. '""' _ •....J man: n~nlf7Jlr wi.h
"""'fUt"

~~~,.,autwjU~ .

JJn,.

D"'''

H Cono:ponul and I\OClClOtoa:pcual puu:pc:.w iDlUion arc indudcd IInde. tht rPJU&I ate< pyof-5pUriow paa:pOot,. r,..~1.r/Ms..). dacribcd by Dhannaldni M PV).1U: "'Thuc ate lOut kiDdI of ~ pclapcioo: three kinds ofllClOOtJKual awuenca and one thaI is. norw::oncq>n.W I~ thaI an- I'rotn cfurutbanca in rk physial bua. ,i.c., tht: &c • ..Icy]."

I """~

...".....,jU_... .u~~

If ! _'"

I . ...-'. "......

~~

~.

~ (_,.uu...- /4.

no., mree rom. of ~ 5pUriow pc:la:ption Il'lUlDoncd in tM _

arr. "uroncow awumCII" (Mri"tijUu). "ronvcnoon.alllincW-ie 1W:lm1CA- (~vrujU-). and " in~· entiallW3lmCU and .., on- (.,,-U;). "l"bc. (l.tCJOOa m: bMcd llpon DiI"iP" brief IfGunmt of UfO. (PSI.I.~). We m: Q)named MfC only wid! "fflOlICOW ~

whido if IImIIiIr. form of pc:ra:pnW iUwion. All

Q;XS of nonconcrprual spuriow all paa:pcual iUw.iona. For mo.e on Dbarnu. klrti·. docoryof urar, lD rdlrioo to o;pup., theory.:lIld iU~1Im1 IfIftrpfCQUOf\. I « Funayuna (1m).

DQl,"

pc:"'''pc;u.n c:anespond to what

_.....,..jd

88

FOUNDATIONS O F D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

or Mthis is a mirage- must occur after the perception. In the most rypical form of a conceprual illusion. me image in perception arisa in such a way that an unschooled person is confused by the similariry bctwcrn the perceived ob}«t and some olher object. He thus ·superimposes· (Irual judgment about the issue in qu~ rion . Ooc cnrn~e cired by Dharmakini i5 the ap~(r ofhain in the visual petctpOoru ofa person with cataracts; his basic point is that. in regard 10 me question of whether one is smng hairs, a judgment twed on percqxua1 conlenl cannol be corrcct.!O A correct interpretation through perceptual judgmenl is impossible because, with regard 10 the issue in question {"Art. these hain~', a judgment that is COl1.linent with the image will not cnablt' tht' peroen.-tt to act upon an objco that can function in a manna consislent wilh that judgment. That is. in relation 10 whC'ther me perceiver is scc.ing ha.in, a judgment based on the image itsdf will lead the pcrcciva 10 condudt: thai she is indeed smng ha.irs. Even if the pm:eiver determines through other mam Ihat me is not s«ing ru,in. the pen:qnual image will still Rp~IIT UllHhain; hentt, a judgment 1w«I JUSt on the image will inter· pm it as an image ofha.in. Nevenhdcss, while the content of the perception always scc.ms to be hairs. if the percei\'tt cries (0 act on the judgmem s s Dtw-makini dclcriba concqxual mor in PVSV .J PVI.,. H,b (G:4HI). For the ncxion NI habitlWion condirions !he dctt:rmiNotiont m.: follow upon • pcttt'ption.. tee, 100cumpk:. PV •.fI; and PVSV M m. (G :)LI R) , u'&nA:aud in die _ d!apler (n.,,).

fmjumdy cUtd. 001 other aiCII include: the pcrccpOon ofalip.cirdc made by a quicklywhiricd Iotdt. me paapilon ofllftl as morin& &on. the pasp«56 Thil caw it dx mot<

,;"'" of. pc_

'"""'ins _ . "-" and ........... ~ drccco....-l br dw: ;",L.'. _

of!he body'l hwnon. Sec NS •., .

8,

DHAJl.MAKI RTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOlOCY

that rhcy 2rc indeed h.airs. mc perceiver will not be 2blc to act on an object

th.at has ~ causa.l durwcristia apC'Cud of hairs: any attcmp[ to brwh those "haiB~ 2way will &.il. It is in this seruc th.at 2 judgment consistcnt with the imillt will nO( enablc thc perceiver to 2ct upon an J,jtct m,at can fune-rion in a manncr consisrcnt with m.at judgmcnt. In citing a case such.as thc appearance of hairs to 2 person with cataracts, Dh2rmwtri retnforttl tho!- ;n(~biliry of nonoonttpuul crro.., th~ du.. toned inugc (which lculs to misleading intcrprct2rions) comes from a p:u. ticu1:u flaw, and .as long .as thc flaw remains inlact, it will always produce a distorted im.agc.'7 Without removing the Raw. no othcr factor- increased acuity. h.abiruation. graduatc studies in optometry- will prcvCnl thc dis· tonion. To PUt it anomcr way. evcn if an optometrist with catar.aCU gives an honest rq><)rt of w6.1 ,h~ sees, th~ optOmetrUl will ':ly that .h~

tees

hairs. Thus, an a.pen in dcsctt travel can distinguish a mi~ from water JUSt by looking ae thc spot in question; but a cat:u'aCtOus optometrist can· nOt distinguish bctwcc:n hain and certain cfkcu of cawacu jllS( by looking at thc hair·Ukc images appearing in his visual perception. To rerum. thcn. to thc notion of thc pc:rccptiblc and thc uhim.atdy real, D6.rmaIdrU', theory of nonconcqmW error rugsau ~I. despite the pl:au.

57 Thil point is made in PVJ.JS9-)61, whm:- Dharm&Itlrti diJaweJ the IUION fix daimin, dw the oubjcctIob;.a duality in our P",cw:pcio;u: .. ..:nWIy un-.l. Noc~ hen:: chat tM kind of topition aNa: from · inmnal dlstonioCl" (.~ is comJNn::d 10 _ t'amiliar ilIl11iona (i.~, the QW'XI-hain iIIwioa), ud mal distortion ml$ tbcOlCf(M~ amounl coa dcf«t in the mind or mental f.cuky ir.df, norher th3n a II>M: miKorumw ol'iu ob;ca. The _ in qlKlCion tad II follows:

mat

Thinp do . - lllrinu.tdy luve W MNn [fIlCh all bans an ~ obj«t ~tMIiI~ dw they an ptiai....d to Iu-.c ....... mc they hive neithct a go.cuW'a m..Jriplicil_ ~ [PV},)S,]. - SuI ~ 10 -wJy COO'tUIUon (WI), dlK 10 upaicncilll_ Jimibmy, an illusion an.. becaUK one demmiMs tNt ...tUch does noc ha¥t such-and.....dt a nawn all luvilll that iWW'C.. Bw in tho. aoc, that if noc poMibic becaUK on )'OIl! ..ww noc C¥m 0fK mti.,. in the -'d iI ot..a-i 10 hive llul illtim' [or ba"l an ...... cl... ..Jo:,J "" .........

..a..;.:........t ...d.J. (rv,.~,.t.J.

11lft'e iI challtind «illusion. bul theI-e iI alto the: one dw br its 1lI~ an..ibwo:d ill dw it onpnalo::a; ffom an inu:ma/ d41onion (_~ ~ if W c:uc wilh the pou:ption of luin by a P"1OII wilh CIW'IICU and 10 on, it conwru a hlK ~ appcanna withouf ckpcndinl upoa W ~Uon of Iimibri.,. and wc:h. [PV).j6tcd-P'V).j61] IM.IN'"... ..mifJtt". ~,!",..". ~ I J-lrttU,.v. ~ w ~'!' tqJJ!f _ ~ U ·14 1M) { "",Vi ~ IJn.Jllti, ~ 1 ~"i WU""""",.OIlJ#j<_ ..",. ,., III ...n.1f4j j4p1J _i"" d.".,i filMr-"'; I .fiJUf .",. ,. .",."..,.,w_IlilillM.. If 41, ,~,. ,,;,.~tiMbi..J I ~~ un.irUiw, /-1. I .........

90

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKlRTl 'S PHILO SOPHY

sibility of consistcnt arguments to the contrary, IOmc pcrccprual imagea' luve not hem produced by ultimately real objccu. But what then is the statUS of objem such as the - hain· $C'Cfl by a person with cawaca? If they arc not ultimately real. they arc nOl particulan, And since for Dharmakini. thc only other type of object is univerWs, we should SUpJ'O'C that the - hairs- arc univeruls. But in the c:au under consideration, the hair-like image in cognition U: vivid, and Dharmakirti maintains that this U: true only of perttprion of particu1an: the pei ccption of the color blue is vivid, but the com eO[ of the conccptwl thought, "blue," is not." Docs this then mean that we must invent lOme mird type of object, the object of flawed pcrttptions? To IOlve this problem Dharmakirti employs a philosophicaJ technique that, as with the sliding K:a..le of analysis, U: crucial to his ontology. That is, from one pcrtpective, ccnain entities arc not uhimatdy real, but from another pcr1pcctivc. the $afJle entities ." ultimately real. In the cue of the - hair· seen with the cararacrow eye. Dharmakirri notc:l tlut it appears vividly precisely bca.ust. even though wrongly interpmcd as "hair.· tIN imlltt itselfis stili _ mnllIli ntmt, and as such. tIN im4tt (not its cause) is a mental particular. But when construed as the perception of an c:xtcrnal objter that has the causal rnanaeristia cxpcacd of hair. the image is nor a particular. What is important about this technique is that Dlurmakirri allO applies it to conccptual.l.y collStruacd univcrsab. Construed :II entities that arc instantiated in multiple particu1an, they arc not ultimately real. But construed as mental events, they ." ul timately real." Although much mo~ could be said on the notion of the pc:tttptible :II ulrimatdy real, Ie!: us restrict owsdvcs 10 this final observation: ~n if (as Sakyabuddhi maintains) the nature of the rdatioruhip bcr.. ccu pc:rttptibility and ultimate reality is sud! thai all ultimately real entities a~ n«eswily pcrceiv~, this dots not aBow us 10 condtuk thaI objcca thai arc not

vivid ~ it ~ wMdItt Ie be 0CQl/'rl1ll1n 1M mlnd 01_ who it &Ikep or ~wakc.. And an ~ !hat "' ocherwiK [namdy. 110{ vivid,Jio nonc:onccpc.w. ~dxr rhc mpDer ~ incithathcliupi",or wWnlru~ -I,.."."..w- .,.".,.w.~~itti l ~ ,.;mj" , JhqlN!1

SI.5«. (or cumpk. PV}.I99: "M

IWlnftC:II

wid!

~

..,.,...._.

S9 Fw all ofrhc ~atpnn>" _ PV}.]-Io, u-ansIa,eci in appmdiI; U9rm). This qummt appeuIlO rae on ~', IQ;mnml, ~i ~"nh YfJ ,""",,, ..~ (PSI.I.7'lb). Noe aIJo tho! sli~ ben; iM:('fOun object md imaF- u-1Iy, in tpQkins of .... ucf'ion _wo nd ....... oa.;.a IObo.~~ ., -'N;' ....... _01 ............ H _ , ho ••• u , we ~ tpe"kina of tIM ~ iMlt and 110{ ia C&.w, _ a pvticubr.

,.

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AN D O NTOLOGY

pe,aptible to .wi are neuSSlrily nonaistent. That is. although the object itself mwt act' as a cause, a perceiver's perc:eprua12CUity is also a causal fac.. tor in perception. Hence, since that aC\Jity v:uia, an individual perceiver cannot definitively condude whether an entity that is bt:yond his pc:rccpruaI abaitics docs or docs no. w.u." T'IN U/ri"..uIy /Utd III ltu%J'rnsibJe lind MtJmnJlM]

We have Sttn dut the rdationship bttwctn causal efficiency and ultimate rc:ality is imponant to Dharmakirti', notion of perception: since perception is a causal process, only a causally efficient entity can be perceived. And in order to be ultimately real, an entity mwt be perceptible; hence. only e>I,lJ::l.Il y efficir.nr enriri~p~nicul~T1! Illtim~tdy mi. The relationship berwttn causal efficiency and ultima.e reality also underlics ('NO other, interrdated dainu made by Dharmakitti: lil'Sl, dut particula.rs are not the objectS of concepruaJ thought or language. and second that particulan cannot endure for more than one ins.ant. Particulars, in other words, must be ino:prusible and momentai)'. These (WO dainu .tand in ~ nnightfcnwa.rd rdationship: on the one hand., an endty directly apres£ed by thought and language cannot dunge; on me omer hand, a causallyeffic::ient entity mwt change. Hence, since partic::ulars are pc:rceptible, mey mwt be causally efficiem; and since causally efficient entities mwt change, partic::ulars cannot be what is directly apres£ed by concrprua1 thought and language. We mwt add here the further spccific::ation dut if a partic::ular changes. it mwt change at f::fery innam and thus be mommt::uy. We will disc:ua m il poim monly, bur first 1ft w coru.i
noteS:

In acruaIil)' (- . J . ~. a dUng that .. l'1(li bftna PC:":"; ~ is ~ a isrml not nonaiattnt bta" 'C 011 the ont band, I:ftII eJIWI( tbinp m;y.t QOI b., pcrori-' " cmain timc:s dw to ba:ing q>istmUc&lly I'UIlCn in fttmJ of rha:ir narun: and 10 0<1, and beoux Oft ~ orha hand. rtw IIOftpaa pcion is tqU&lIy I(l in dw: ax oJ nona;. iRan lhlnp aIio. IG:lol.llff. _ _ ". ",",?k""Jll_ .."",,, 1 _ _ qi _f& ' ·Ji..,.,rd,,'1iI ~ "",."u-t&" UlJhAlDqi n.9wtlthl.

_II

91

FOUNDATI ON S O F DHAlMAKIRTl 'S PH ILOSOPHY

individual or entity that we aU a · cow" would be one thing now, and after 2 change in which no sameness continues, Wt "ww" wouJd no longer be 2 cow, In short. mere mwt be some continuity rllnvlIJ4) th2t accounts for twO f:acts: since we can corrccdy call that individual a ·cow" over the entire dun.tion of ia existence, something about the individual must remain the same over time such that it can always be: called a "cow," And sincc ~ can also corrc:cdy rc:oogniu other individuals as being a "cow," then: must be something the same about all those individuals, despite their m:any differences, Wt allows w to corttCtly call c:ach of them a The alleged entity that ac:c:ounu in both ways for this samencss is a · universal" (s.lm4nJil. Urn', erc.), and it is the fact thar c:ach cow-individual somehow insrantiates the universal· cowness" th.u allows us :always to call such an individual 2 "cow," If ~ consider a universal such as "cowncss" to sommow exiu in distinction from the individuals themselves, we can easily allow for the many differences among individual cows, md we can allow for the m:any changes that:an individual cow undergoes over time, Despite such ch:anges :and variations. the univusal "cownes.s" that each row inswulares remains the same. and inasmuch as each oow-individual alwaY' instantiates the universal "cownen," each one can always be coruoc::dy callffi a "cow," As long as we can assert univcrs:a1s in this fashion, the cb:angcs:and variations among individuals will not vitiate the sameness uquired by thought:and lan~ Suppose. bowcvcr, that me universal · cowncss" iuelf were to change in such 2 m:annet that what was once ·cowncss" now became something omer than "covmess," In that case, an individual which a momcot ago inst1nuated the universal "cowness" would suddenly instantiate some univtnal that wed to be · cowncss," bur now has become 2 non-cowncss universal, such as "honencss," Hence, what was a moment ago ealJed a ·cow" should now be called a "horse," Neither Dh:mnal6ni nor :any of his opponents wouJd maintain Wt what was oncc corrccdy calJed a "cow" could in the vel}' next moment be suddcoly and correcdy called 2 "horse," For mese and other such m.sons, a univusal cannot change precisdy because it is mrough direct reftttnoe to a univtrul that mought 2nd language can indirectly rekr to me individuals that irutantiate it,"

"ww:

61 SIx. for eumpk. PVSV .JPVI ,I~

(C:~. lll1):

II is cbimcd dw a univasai ill pnnw.al[ ~ux if;1 ~ impamanmt, it -.1d noc be !he: Arnt (-*".J in aU insanas btaux one mill! [i.e.. the Wli~l -.1d ...... [in d.. fU. and..-he. [.... , _lUna diKw.n. tN.n d.. ....; __11 ...ouJd.n..e [in !he tIGI mamall], ThaC:Ult, thec:opkion olia inmncau the an>(

_.J

DH .... RM .... KI RTI ·S MET HOD ....ND ONT OLOGY

9J

Implicit he", is the auumption tim any changt: in me univetUl mWt be: a change in its idenu[}'; that is, if the univl:'rsal ·oowness" changes in any way at all, men il has changro into something other than the universal ·oowness.- We do nOt have Ihe luxury here of claiming that me universal can change in some of irs accidenral propenies and remain unchangro in ia essential properties. We cannOt Opl for such a solution b«:ause: univefull on he:ir nn pm~rTi~ ar all , wherh~ we cmuider them in ternu nf thl:' l ul>stantialisl ontologies of mosl non-Buddhist Soulh Asian systems or in temu of Dharmwni's nominalist theory of universals.O: Hence, since it cannot manifest change through some alteration in accidenw properties, if a uni~ changes, it essentially changes, which is to say thai it becomes 50mething dse, In shon , if "cowness- changes, it becomes a univerul that ~hou ld ~ insr.> nfi ~ ~

in

indi"id,,~ll .har

weff' nncl' .. nWl'. hll' nnw aff' nn

longer cows. Thus, in order for the mcrcntw function of language and thought to suc:eced, univcrsals cannOt change. On Dharmakini's view, hov-ner, if universals do nOt change, then they cannot have any causal efficiency bc:cause in order 10 function cau.sally, an enrity mU$( change. That is, if an entity cannot change, then ifit i$ not currently producing an efha. it will n"",~ produce an e/Tect. It could not produce an effect becaw:e an unchanging enu')' that is nOt currt'ntiy in the stllte of producing an dfea cannOt change from the state of nOt acting as a cause into the na~ of acti ng as a cause:. Alternatively, if an unchanging entity were to produce effects, it would

i".,,_

......,Id """ boo 1""",;bIo!. i"" ....... (IJ,.,U) ""n....,. ................. induu""'" * copition. r,,~ iii ~'" igtftr I tI"u,.tfIt ~"."" INul/Jil ~

tUf'tlfJtIJ>IJ"th II. l'he ~ dw a uniwn:aI ""'" in _ _ bo:CO
m.

(_

62 Sec below, 116.

m.

m.

FO UNDATI O NS OF DHAIlMAK i RTI' S PHI LOSOP HY

have to produce all of itli effectli simultaneously in every momem , since it could never leave [he causal state. He.nce, if an unchanging entity wcrt: to produce a pc:lCC:prwd image as iu effc.ct in o ne's mind, then one would nec· essarily ~rttivt' that entity continuously for eternity. These absu rdities indicate that unchanging entities, such :1.5 universals, canno t produce any effects. including pc:rccprwd images." We have seen th us far [hat, fo r Dharmakini, universals cannot be causally dficient because causa.l efficiency uquires dunge, but universals cannot chan~. And since: universals have no causal efficiency, they canna! be ~rccivtd, since: the ~n::cprua1 image (or sense datum) is an effect of the e ntity that is considem:l the object of ~rceprion . But unlike univerub, paniculars Cliff be perceived bttaU$f: they can participate in Ihe causal process that is pcrttption; and since they art thus causally dficient, they must change." In this fashion . Dharmakini argues [hat particulars must change. but he wishes 10 do more Ihan that: he also argues that the dunge in qucstion is a complete change that OCCUlt instanr.an~usly. In other words, not only do particulan change, but they change entirely at every instant: they :ue momentary (~!,jk"), To argue that change requires momentariness, Dharmakini rcsoru 10 a

63 Soc, 1Or~. tho. argumttIi apilVl the puapJon of pnmanml ~ in PVJ.llff. The pivocal ¥aX (PVJ.lI) in this ~l n:ads:: "'131 pnnunen. uni~ .~. is capo' bkof producin&a cosnilMln ofiudr .. ooly li.~ . alw.t,..J eopabk.lf. 00 u.., IKhtt hmd. I. is lOmnima in(:;lp.>bk of producin& Ibi ooptirioo • •hen i. iii a1wa,.. inc.pabk of doi"fi to." linu.u jUMplUN1« ~'!' ~". ,... lilt / .,th4J.,!-t:II'!' !-~ mI,u"j.r.,'!' unuJ,U".

fII. /..,.

AtJultWnu obou. c~ and ...ual offi""'Y '"" ..t.o ....-.uneR. 'n O .....""""n... coitioq .... ofl - pcmwICfIt" {1Ji".. ~~cmaI : ' unchangins1 God at worid-acaiOf (PV1J...9and 1)-)0). lbc:to: arsulUna often re&C noc only on the IIOIlon eN. pnnw>ml thlnp ClnOOI be modi· 6ed by elx addition ~ ~bo:ra(lioo of qualiciet.. bul abo thai produaion q Kq\la"i~ and dUI teqUCflriallty prauppo6CI dunv. I han':wumtd thae la1m' cwo axioms for .he p~ta­ lion~. Soc PV1..4Jab (a. Nopomi 1911): 'En.;la dw oiJ< in '''""porU ~do 001 Of'i&iIUICfrom the POIIXI{1O«Icia). and ,hal which c:&nnOI: be modific.d ClI\noIlkpcnd upon. JUPPl>t'iinr; oondi.iona" 11flkr....., ~".i~ No.iW"." ~!"4tl . Soc abo PVSV.,J PV.l" (G:rn.l4ff) [.w". '''l'1li' ~t:II"",""Mh4101'" dfrdA""'!' *.,"-!-ri, ,obo·u,.,,'!'

,*~lJip'" ."u~~ "', Chhcr ~ induck PV •. j S ""PVSV .,J rit.. (G:u.wfl) and H B (c'I- , , ' .•~ ' . J). Soc Scrinkdlnct (1961) and Octke (199) .

601 Bdow _ will_ thai. 00 Dlurmakini', n.w. a univcrAI is oonscNCiled by (ONtruin&a casni1i..r: image in ccm\I oil rqillion. 11x ~ _nl$ fol the pnmommal conum in conapruaI and linsui*tk qtIi.ions; the nqarion iICCOWIiI for u.., ditnibucion requim:l by !housh' and Ian~. On duo theory. the uniwnal .... i..,. is ind«d QUlaIly df'.....cioou, .nd .. oudo.. it ... p-"Oadar. Bo,.. w'-' ~ved in
.,

DHARM AKIRTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

Uy

mcory. any properties (sva6h4_) predicable of a particular (or of an

entity ~ucible to paniculan) mw! actually be identical to the panicuIar(s) in question. That is, we may oorr«tiy speak of a thing as iuving prop-ertics; we can corrccdy laY, ~Th is p;per is white:" As we shall l:n er sec, this type of st2temcm is correct in that it conforms to the causal ciuracteristia of the entity in question. Neverthd(SS, the statement is misleading in that it sUg&eia a distinction between a propeny (·white ~) and the thing that possesses Ihe property r lhis paper-). In fact, that distinction is unrcal ; instead. properties arc actually identical to the: property-possessor that they qualify. Without going inlO detail. ~ can nore that Dharmakirti's justification fur this opinion rests on his critique of relations. inasmuch as one cannot specify whether hyposrasiud propenies arc the same as or different from rhe rn\re"y-~sor r.h~t rh~ :>1I~ly qU:llify.61 In rejecting any real distinction betwttn a thing's propenies and the thing i~l f, Dharmakini holds [hat the apparent distinction betwccn a thing and its pro perties is actually a result of the process of conceptual abstraction that we employ in order to speak about a thing's causal characteristics. One conceptually abstracts and construcu the property ~ bl ue." for e:umple. from a blue_arom in order (0 focu l on the bhlc-:>tom'. capacity to p:lrticip:lte in the production of a blue image in a pcrceprual cogni_ tion. In fact , however, there is no property "blue" that is distinct from tbe atom iudf." In tenns of change, this theory of properties makes it impossible to claim that the atom could somehow remain the same alom and yet undergo a in one orits propenies: a bluc-atom cannOl: become white and yet retain its identity as the same atom. The implicit argument here is dut if:my property or the :Hom d'l:lngts, then the :>tOm iuelf mw t ch:mge, because me property is actually identical to the atom. H ence, ir the atOm changes in cauW ternt5--Cither because it starts to produce an effect or it stops doingso--then tbe atom itsdf mWt "change" in that it cca.scs to be the: same atom; in this sense. a ~change" in (he atom acru.aIly means the ces-lation or the atom.

crumgc

6) T1w: rcnnal uyLe of aitiquc tmployal by Dbarrnakini . 0 rdiI.., hypoilI' of one ",opary ("",MiN)~ niden« for anodw:. ",OP"'I1. Stt nat chapm.

w

w

w

66 Some- dealll of thil ....-. of ~bttnetion OK cIiJcwxd in 1M nat chapttr; 1M moll rtlenol ~ in OhannaltIrti'. wurk II PV' .s!r60 and PVSV "rlr., l!1lNbted bdow (ch.4, n.l.4).

96

FOU NDATI O N S O F DHAlMAKI RT I'S PH ILO SOPHY

Before we explore the issue of change and cessation further . we should first noce mat when Dhannakini argues agaiNt any real dininction be[V;een propenies and the mings mat possess them, he f'requendy mentioN a corollary. mat wruuever causes the ming must also be: me cause of all its propenies, since me propenies are nothing but the thing iuclf.17 This follows simply from the notion that. ana the thing has ariKn. whatC'Ver comes into existencc after that thing must be: something omer than mat thing. And since it is other man the ming, on Dharmakini's view it annot corr«t.ly Ix: count~ as a property of the thing. since the properties must Ix: idcnrical (0 that thing. With all this in mind, let us schematically restate the relevant aspects of Dhannakini', th~f)' of properties: if we can correctly predicate property )( of thing then )( mun be: idcntiallo B. Hence:. if any propcny )( were 10 come into exu-tena (be newly predicable of B). it is B iuclf thaI musl be: coming into existence:; and if any propmy)(wcrc to cc:asc 10 exist (no longer be: predicable of B). ,hen B iudf must cc:asc 10 exist_ By restating Dharmwni's th~f)' of properties in this fashion , we an more ckarly Itt how it applies to the: issue of momentariness. Let us:wwoe Dharmakini is correa when he PY' that propenies are not actually difl'etent from property-posscssors. In that case, an entity that we can correctly say ~ perdures· (i.e., remains the same over time) must be one tru.t initially aro5C in that fashion . Since the abstracted property called Mperdurancc" is actually nOt different from the thing itself, in order for the thing to no longer be correctly called Mpcrdurant: the thing iudf must cc:a5C BUI since me thing is perdurant, how could it ever cease? That is. to no longer be called "pcrdurant" the thing must cca$C' , but since the thing has ari5Cn as something that we can correaly w l - perdurant" (i.e., continuing without change), it therefore cannot cc:asc. And sinct it cannol cc:ase, it cannot change. We know, h~r, that some things do indeed change. since we

a

67 Dharmwrti mda mil point II I numba of pIxa. indudillB th( discussion of momm",,';MiI al PVI .)) and PVSV "" ti... ...t.m: he mn.arb.1Or aampk. · 11 ill'IOI com'CI thai a qw1iry wIUch ia I'lOl csublisMd whm tofM chi ns is nabliJhe:I if 1 ",oper!)' oi dlal thi~ nor can _ ay mal • q...... ,ty ~ a ..- ~ dilrnml /tom 1M auaa of _ thi", is a "'<>pUlf of dlll dUns.. (G W.l~U: ... hi _ ill.ug,.1fM Rig-... .,.,,~ "" Will>.Mb.~ .

1lw: faa mat aU 1M F"openia: pmliabk of. thin,OOfnC: into ~ with thai thinS is tM on rolopal buillOr Dhmnol.k.im·, daim tNt one: proP..,I, an t>:n'f M ,nVlliabk m.. den« for anotha plOPC:II,. and ;1 if implicil in 1M oft tcpnted phflS( MtiNIlliITilo",.JJ,j1l (i ...... .....

dw po P '"'1

.0

be p ... . ~ ..

io "l .. YUiably _

, mi ..... wid. dw...- pracncc" of

1M proputy addllad iN utOc:rcc). S« 1M ~ di.tawion below in ch:.pI~ J.

DHARMAKI RTI 'S M ET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

97

have ~rttptions of mem only at spC'C ific times and places (and not at all times and places). S in ~ thOSoC' thinS' change. mey mU$t cease; and Ji n~ those things ~, they must nOl iK: perduram. Moreover, if those things arc not perdUl'anI, they must arise:u nOI perdun nl (i.e. , not unceasing). And since: things arise as not ~rdur.tJn, they cannO[ exist over time, which mC'aJU that me')' mwt immroiatdy ceue. Therefore, all petttptible thingswhich means all cau..tally efficient things-mwt Ix: momenury (/q4l1iltll): they endure for only an instant (~!"l).M If ~ construe these: arguments about momentariness with the require· ment for the constancy of an a prasion's object (lItbdliTtIut), we an Stt that. if particulars mw t Ix: constantJy in flux Ix:c.awc they are causally effi· cient, men particulars cannot ~ the objecu of thought and language pre· civ:Jy keaLLY. they M nnTperdu","" Th L L~. ,.lrhnugh Oh,.rm,.kim 1'I'I:Iy Ix: l...u than explicit on this point. the awal efficiency of particulars underlies the claim that they are inexpressible. 68

a. PV5V a'PVl.1b

(G: •.,.ufJ). ln thU Kaion

m.

1 1u~

presented 1M IrJUn'lmt for

m.

lIK>mCIlw1nao in a way maL ;, meant 10 bridsc afJ"mml a)nenning cawdco.nca of caution (..m.u..)with d~ afJ"mcnl for momenw1nal from cximnoe (i.e., to-aIkd " , _..---. _ ~.J1y ()"d,., '99) r- an .,...,."i- t~ .........) . ~n"01I ..... (,' ") .... ~ed mal the IfJtUnlm l from ainma: ill mort prominall in DlunmkIni', Iala faTS, bul be dearly don rIO( mean to vitia(1: rh.c: strong roruinLLiry mal 1'UJlS 1:oo:1 .. « u rdi,.",. rion of any QWC' for a:waUon, on 1M OM lund. and arcuma ll from cxlRma:, on other, l1w COfLrinWty oprillP from Dhannakirti'l rheory of ptoperrics U;I n:U.ICl IOawaI· iry and pm:cprion. 1I is ill ~ dw _ _ borh arsummtl in PV and PVSV, ~ Dhanna.kini fIOII only rdilla aLiX'd assaOOn , bul he also maka a.lcnsi~ UK of !he uxu· menl 110m aillmU (PVSV .II PVI.I,l.-I9'r. G:'7. t8- loo.Ui). Orhcr.1as a lmsr,." P''''V'' indude:

m.

m.

m.

m.

w.

/'VI.II(>: ~6ItttU". ... _~.tmrt. ·" "" 1 W'JI'~ riA7,wU'I]4nIM'!I df;t ~1WfI1Wl Hand PVSV .J til. {G:,,,,lt--I.J}. ..~ ~~n.. tw lOI_

n.n....~~.. JJ.r-~~~ ..1Ni..,,,..m!I. Stt We PVSV iii PVI.I17 (G:".17): ,.Ji umw'lfl ""i"._ "":!If1Tll oJ /,nvf. ~I }, and PVSV '" PVI.ISllb (G :U,.l)-lS): _".". ,.~u'!l P-"'I"1"'!' b "-!t _ w i ~ IrJ ""j".,.. ..".m_ I!tt.WtiJ M.nwi I ... . ", lbJ",iulW JlfmWIJII MWi..;,.__ "uj,, ~

'V.

Note ol.o ...... o.eyn.. ('lm',~ anne; KJ... .!p' ~ ",toI..ut. s.. oIething m ill in rh.c: proa:u of dippparing' and "the mon: LIRI-lI tonno!lliioo of d~ rona:pr, it, mal ' ming has already teUcd 10 be." HO"!'CI, if the« is such an ambiguiry, il appan fO ~ mLKh cxac.abaled by rh.c: Tihtun lI't11sLu;Od /SIfhw", an: :aU IramUU'Ci as }it,.J IIP"I tJnJ ~"I&.

mil

98

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

We have juS! Sttn that, , intt paniculars an: o,usally efficient, Ih~ mWI ~ inexpressible and momentary. Tbis ontological rtquin:mcnl emlxds particulan in Ihe KgUbriry of causa.lity, and it mw gu;tranlcu tnal pc:. ec;prions arc: nOI just random. Paniculan, ho'NC'o'u , mUSI also conrorm to ,he: dictat~ of reductive reasoning, and they thus mwt ~ irrc:ducible. Moreover. on our rtlding of the commennricr 10 Dharmakirri', work, thc itttducibiliry of particulan requires mat they lack spatial exlension. In our di5CWSion or Dharmakini's philoJophical method, \W: n(Ked thaI other interpreten do nOI accq>t lhill view; Drcyfw., for aample. maintains ,hat what he calls the "alternative vi~. " which :mribul~ sp,uial cxtcnsion to panKulars, is a poIition ( 0 which Dharmakini mak~ an ontoloeical commitment in at least lOme comexrs. We will now examine this issue in greater delail To recap some points made: ClItliu, we should n(Xc that for Dreyfus, the "sundard interpretation" is what he calls the "Saurrintib " position: rttI external objt'CU (bihytinhas) exist, and thOK objt'CU have no spatial exten,ion; they are, in shon. infinit~ima.l particles (p4mm4!'I4). This is what we haVl: called "Exlernal Rali.Jm.· In OOOlr.uc. , Dreyfus::oho idcnuflC:f an "alternarM view." whtrmy external parriculan: may have sp.aci.al extension. Dreyfus arguts that, while the srandard interprtllllion may be primary for Dharmakini, Ihe alternative interprtt:uion nC'Venheless forms pan of his onmlogy.MA curiow aspect of Dreyfus' approach to the "alternative view" ill the cla.im that he is "not arguing thai this is Dharmakini's vi~, but. ramer. thai this vi~ is prescnt in his work." Dreyfus does not mean Dharmakini ,imply memioll$ Ihis vi~. fo r DharmalUrti frequently cil~ views specific:ally for the purpose: of rejecting them. Instead, Dreyfus means that tht" alternative view is acccptnt (at least implicitly) by Dh:llTl'lilini in lOme case where Exlernal Realism (the ~'nndard view") is IOmehow inadequate, and thai in such cases, Dharmalcirti employs the alternative view without dearly rejecting or embtacing it. In the section on method. we noted thai Dreyfus across levels of analysis reminds w to resist any tempt:u ion to formulate a systematic uniry in Dharmakirti's work. Dharmakini's method is such that he: is not only permined, but is indeed (lMp!o argue from positions that he wiU CVC!nrually aNndon, if his 5CXeriological project is 10 succeed.. Neverthelc:ss. we also argued thaI DharmalUrti'. thought cannot be: so disjointed that. wht"n argu-

mal

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LO GY

.

ing from an ontological srance that he will abandon. that same ontological SUJlce itself exhibiu .uch:oJ, drgrrr ofinCOMrencr thai il is no longer clear what onr should critiqur when making thr transition to a higher Irvd of analysis. In otmr words, even though Dharnukirti', Exlrrnal Realism dots not providr a fully unifiro and systematic ontology. he nevmhdess is quite dear on thr issues that COUnt when we mo~'r from External Realism to Epinemir:

ldel1ri.~m.

And what issues do COUnt ? A full reckoning would require a close c:xamination of what Dharmaldrti and his commenr:uors mean by Eputemic Idc:alism. and we will not attempt that prodigious task hert:. Ncvmhdcss. we can fint naIr that , when Dharmaldni applies an Epistemic Idealist eridque to External Realism in his PrlfmA!'avdm;kll, he does so whrn pre~nrins the Exurnal Rral iu rellpon ~ 10 a problem in ,he theory or prtuption. In brief, thr problrm is that thr objrcu of prrcrption srrm to exhibit at least some spatial extension. but mrrrologically rrductivr rn,soning suggesu that only infinitesimal partides, which lack spacial extension, can be truly real. We will shortly Stt that in this context. Dharnukirti as Extrmal Ralist has every opportunity to resort to the alternative interprer.llion to solve th:u problem. Nevenheless, he chooses 10 avoid the alternative interpretation. What is mon important here is that the very concerns mal lead him to avoid the easy solution posed by me a1trmative interprer.uion arc prrcisrly thr conerrm that lead him to abandon External Realism ahognher. In other words, WI:' srr a Strong dtgrtt of consistency in the move from External RcaJism to Epistemic Idealism: nOI a consistcncy of ontological commitmcnt , but rathcr a consistcncy in stylc or 'CIl$Oning. Oreyfw agrees mat thc alternacive view becomes rdevant in mc context of peruption. That is, on the: one hand. External Realism (Dreyfus' " St:U'l dard view") oprtatCS on a principle of ontological parsimony thar rtduces all u1tim:udy real physical cmilies to infinitesimal particles (pttntmA!'I4), which have no spatial cxtension. But on thc other hand, DhannaJcjni', theory or ~ption mainrai.u that indivi.iu.al inlinitO!$ima.l ~ides are nOt pm:cptiblc to ordin:lf}' persons; ilUtcad, only "aggieg:ucd" (l4'!'OI4) infinitesimal pan;des a~ prrttived, and the mntcnt or appearance in peittption is therefore extended. According to Dreyfus, Dharmmni dcili wim the problem by implicitly introducing the "alternative view," whttcby Dharmakini concludes mal spadally extl:n
100

FOUND.... T10NS OF DHAkM ....KIII.T! ·S PHILOSOP H Y

panicubrl.y rt'icvant." For Drq'fus, it is in tht formtt pungt that Dharmakini rnahs an ali~ conoeuion to c:um
71 Wee wuIJ .I... ,...., ....1.... ~11 p<eooi,'5 -...- 01,'-"'51, d...,. """",,, '" ho..., booeu to- .... nifooom lOr Dhaom;aki"i and his Cltlia.c contn'ItIItll OQ. For (nftlpk. ""PfI'O'C thai ' ) a congIomo-raree is I parti.o:o.Lbr; 1) common..:llk~fUCh at afootlWl ue thc:.cfult puticulan; and J) puUadl.rs. at DhumWni mainu.im. ""' panIca (_~. In tMQX. when we _ _ footbaJ1. we &houId _ dK ani", footbaJl, lina _football:ll _ pmiculu it purlaa. Thus. no pan of the: iOorba1I it WlWCII when ...., 100II ac it. 1""Ns would aMurdIy rcqwn:; thai we _ thai we CIII _ all Ada of thc: ~ airnua.n-..sty. nom the: pm of the fooIba1I thai is puued apinM t~ gound. 0., ...., m.101 wiJh fO a1Iow thai. min~1 aiud ro4of.pad. is • pomculu. and IlOl a comrnonKRtC enuty IUd! u a fOOdWI. !!.\II III dut: ase. _ would t.n., to XCOWII lOr t~ r.a that. aunpk, when I pucon my tcadilll &!U6CI. _conpomenlt of"otnI c~ Will a moment IIIf;O flOC • panicWu hit now b«omt- I panjo:ubr btauM: I CUI now _ iI. ln dka, ...., would bo- nuItin& partio..bndcptndail IIpon the,...mow IIrnJC r.c.. ultia and mind. of diffcrmc pn-...:: thai which io. putiaaW OM ptnoXI would IlOl b0a particular !"or anotha-. This r:ypt of oub;«t- or mind~ <:ontndiru the: b.sie moci'l
ro.

ro.

12 I boo-_ (.-n . . .ac ........ C,,",,,,) ~ hclpfi.J . - of d..: cum .""'W""n.<><. in rnt 0( 0I)f~ Ora"';,. on Kirkham h99sl . TiUtllWU diainphhel

~

QIft .

bcl,,~a

,.,

DHARMAKlilT['S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

A3 Dreyfus notes. PVJ.19,,-214 is the most impomnt passage for this

issue in the Pr."uitwwirttiwlI. The argument then concerns two closely related questions: can perception be conoeptuaJ, and given the incongruence that ~rainJ bctwttn {he singularity of a ~rcep(Ual image and the multiplicity of the infinitesimal particles cawing the imagt, must wt: admit wholes (..""",v;m) or conglomerates (....muJayas) exist as the objects of perception in order to prcsc:rve the correspondence between image and object? According to most of Dlurmakirti's interlocutors-most nOOlbly t~ who follow the Naiyiyika Uddyorahra and the Vaik!-ih Prafasa· pada--g pelCt!ption can be determinate; in other words, it can have a deter· minate comem such as · this is blue.'" These philosophers also maintain that a material object of perception is in most ClSd a whole IJttJl'vin) that is a distinct.. singular. real cn~;'Y created by (bur nor ~lIivalent 10) in pam. n If, for example, one 5ttS a blueberry on the table before one, the: berry as a whole can be taken as the object of one's perception. Follow;ng Digniga's lead, Dharm:ak.ini rejecu both of th~ positions: that is, he maintains dut perception is always nonconceptuaJ, and wholes do not truly exist. Thc rejection of these positions is consistcm with Dlurmaldni's anlirea.list cri· rique or d inribmM entiries. for borh or thC50C daims i nvol~ thl!' pre-nipflO'" sition or such entities. This is obviously true of :lily :wenion that a whole r"UflJIIvin) is rea.I, since such an entiry would be distributed over iu pms ("~WIS). In the: case of dainu for detcrminatc perception, the dimib. uted entity in qucstion is a universal. since Prami.,a Theorists maintain rhal the COntCnt of a dcterminadon such as · Ihis is blu(- is either wholly or panly on( or more univcrsal." Such cntities cannot be admitted as objeca: or percqn10n by Dh:unukini. for he contcn& th:l.t thc objeo:u or pc:ra:prion are ultimately rea.I; mus, if wholes or universals w(re admitted

mat

r..

"~as cotIJN"K'I'" and ·~ ... con,",nion: H( noIn tN. 1Hxh rypcs In: conupondcnot rhcoria in ma. a ccnain bet mIlA cxisI if 1M ~t ptOpClIition. onumm.or bdid'iJ to I..t ...... ",.. fi ... !)'pC. conpucncc. in.u..a an.ddcd CO
7J.sc.: ....... J9.

74 Udd)'Olllk&n', di",'flior, of the

y~

(NV"s!r69 .. aJ NSt.t.t
..urtt for the I1n&" ofthc-ooiesCOf>((rflin&thc ~ rowt.ic:h a un~ ... d .. ~ (jbi) io d>c objet;< of_ ......pu.t.aI and llnpdMkcopldo.... 'SO:': alto 8w.x.u (I~). Scharf{t~

and Muc.h h".).

un

FOUNDATION S O F O HAAM AKIRTI ·S PHILOSOPHY

as objecu of perception. Dharmakini would b.= oblig~ 10 :l.dmit th~ ultimate reality of :1.1 leas, som~ di stribut~ entities. In the first verse of ,he pasgge mentioned by Dreyfus (i.e., PVj.T94), Dharrn:l.k.ini begins th~ argum~m with the voic~ of an objmor who is :l.u~rnpting to point OUt inconsisuncies in the Buddhist argum~nts against both the nooconcqnuality of perception :l.nd ,h~ claim that wholes do not exist. The yerse reads: Someone obj«t$, lhat which is :tggrC:g:lted (sa'!'ritil) is a conglomcrue (SIlmwili1")' and in th:l.t senst it is a universal (kim4nya). [Accotding to Buddhists such as Vasub:l.ndhu], one has perception of such things. Furthermore, any cognition of:l. universal is n«.CSS:ltily associated with conttptuality."" A& ~ h:l.vc: not«l.. Dharmak.ini and his prcdttcs50rs maintain that infini-

tcsimal p:l.nides arc not on th~ir own perccptibl~ (for ordin:l.ry persons); instead, they mu.u ~ -aggreg:lted- (J4,!,ril4) in orde:r 10 ~ ~rceived. And since: the: term kim4ll1" runiymaJ") an ~ :l.pplied to :l.ggreg:lted p:l.rtid es, th~ objector points out that Dharmakirti Iw fk fonoadmitted thar perception an ~ conceptual, for Dharmakirti himself maint:lin$ dm universals arc: nca:ssarily associ:l.ted with oonce:pts. Dharmakini responds that "aggrtgation" hcr~ does not mean that the particles arc: forming a singie: whole:: rather, "aggregation· refers to a pardcular state of those panicles, namely, Thar their proximity ~nablc:s th~m 10 ausally suppon QCh other such lillit they can ause an image in th~ petttiv~r's mind. He: remarks: Due to a rdation with othc:r things [ i.~., other particles], infinitesimal particles that arc different [then their own previous moments] arise [from the:it own pre:vious mome:nu such that they can produce: an awareness). In that scnst, they arc said to ~ "aggrcgat«l.." and as such. they arc: said to ~ a condition for the production of awarencss. Moreover, the distinctive: quality that particles obtain does not occur without the other particles with which thty arc: in proximity. Hence, since awarc:ness does not have any nccc:ssary relation to a single particle, awarencss is said 75

I'V,.•",: ..,.o~ M~ M""""-""'" ""'" ~""'; *0 I

v..".""",,, •• '#yN H.

",w...JJhil nl...IJ-'!'

.....

DH ARMAK I RTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'OJ

have :it universal [in rM sense of a group of :otgg.tg;ltcd pa.nidn) as iu object." 10

AJ (Xvendr.abuddhi makes clear, Dharmakin i's point is that when the term -aggreg:otted- is :itpplied 10 infinitesimal panicles, it does nOt refer [0

their form:ittion ofsome single entity; instead, it is:it way of expressing a distinctive property thai ~tJCh infi nitesimal panicle has obtained by vinue of iu production being conditioned by the proxim:itte presence of the omer, surrounding infinitesimal p:itrcides. Th:itl distinctive property is the ability, when causally wistcd by omer infinitesimal particles. [Q particip:itte in me causal complo: (MtJlJlimJItriJ th:itt produces :it perceprual cognition. And since omer infinitesimal particles art ~uired for a p:itn icle to arise wim such :> propcot}'. :> singl(' [",, ' Otl'rmn ic "",":>lIy .....ing e ...~ hy mLilripk infiniteSimal panicles mat :itTe simulW\cously apprehended. Hence. a single perception is not related to a single infinitesimal particle, but n ther to many infi nitesimal particles.n 76 PVJ" 9J- '96: .nhlllUrrlbhiu",J,.,Nihi) " " " ~ ~ ,.N / ..1t14l "~'!'ri14l "hi

'"

.;.'iU'!" ju-j---!o /I "~".'!" ~ ,,, _'~,..r'" "!"''' I - ' r~.;"'''.Ij jU-.. ~ "~_ Il a . the mnsbtion olin- ¥tna by Drqfw ('m17-&1).

77 IXomdrabllddhi (PVP:II,b.). commmrins IlJlOIllhe wnICI rileV above. cbriIia how lhe Illim ~ pin a ddtinaiw: !,>lOp" rt·nwWMw by ";rt\K of the prmimity of II", prm. ow partida: in.he same Q)
Dw .. " rrt..,... wi,..,Jw,. ""Ift1-i.f .. dIM: 10 II", procna: of COndiriOM which enIlf "'" p'opclry-_Iobrl"" dial iI d", apac;ty 10 produu Ill\ a~ j"fi"j· 1rIi...J ~ INI ""..., the capocity 10 produ« an IWII <not. .n. &om m..; , • •hu.n,i.1 ""•...,., n• .....Iy. ~ .. inl; .. i•.,.i......1 f"'rrit:1eo Ii" ,r... .. ...., """" in. uumlmal do ...... ha..... mar apacity. n.., word ·agrrp.lnI ' ap~ m.:- putick. that N..., their ..spo...,~ apxi.ia which an: lItaincd ....nm lher arc in proximity wim dtia and mal od"'l" putidc. 1*" pMn """f ,.; '"lIt''' iIrtI phJi, I ""'''' ,., sbn 1'" ~ I"r ~ I" i ",., '" j ",.., khi" Ii,M'" 'j ,.,.,..." ,,~ "" i # I ,,~ ' - k>t", i T1" "'l*'" " .... ", __,.. ..., 1M "..,. ",.. u,."", ~1*; ,,'" ", I """,hru pM" Mt Dw' "" 1M J..,pJ- J..., pM" """ "J'I k;-,- ~.,

"' ' ' p m. ,... *",.,

*

. . . ,., OO" .. ~ _ _ .._", ...... . ....,."" IfNI IoJ-J HI.

Dr-mdrabuddhi (PVP:li9/4El) alJo

,961:16) ..nctdly the notion of an

the Buddhitu arc act\l2lly pG'itins I wholt N ... in «pId 10

objcaion m.nI caru." by DipLIp (Halton m.nI as md.:nu for the daim Ih.u the ob;ca of pcrapcion:

lKlIet Ill\

lJtUII~ iI

mil objeaion. ooncnnint: ~~ the ~ quality of pro-

ducinl ~ thai an- in infiniraimal putida dUf 10 their rcQ.>on wilh odxt __ aNa: &om ihc onrufonna.ion of doeir fOrmer ttopeai..: continua mal art" in murual conjunaion (fl-1Ihw1l "J'I1¥r P J,.,). TIw dUrinc:tivt:qualirt will n()( an,., ",;m.,.,.
.ha.

104

FOUNDATIONS O F DHAllMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

This response dispels th~ obj('Ction that D~nnakini is in dfect admitting th~ cxi5{~nce of a distributed entity (such as II "unh'mlll" or II ~whoJe ") . for he tus shown that lh~ I~rm "aggregat~" does not mean that a singl~. physK::a.l enlity aisa; inst~ad. it expl'tS5e5 $Omclhing discinaiv~ about each infinitesimal partide. And since no distributed ~ntity is involved in pCJCxplion, DharmaJdni is nOI obliged to admit that perttplion is amceptual. Although Dharmakini may be able to deny that the Buddhist Es:lcmal Realist throry involves the supposition of any distributed entity as the objca of perccprion . th:1I denial does not deal with ,he futth~r daim that the assumption of such a distributed enlity~p«ifica1ly, th~ assumption of II whole in the case of a marcri~ . pcrccprual object-is required for the cohereno: of his throry of perception. Amplifying upon the comments of his prro«essot Viayiyana," the Naiyiyika Uddyoukara makes ,his very point when he says:

Ii.

...... . " _ ".. • ..., Mt'nIII? m.n- ,.. Ii",v ,.~r>« awvn1CII d.ac. noc IuY! the: po oputr _Mb.olbri"l.... rily rtbted to ~ cstabIiduncnt of. sub0laAI% wt.ich U • panick, ..... ~""' ~ apaci.;.. of mo. p&nidrs ~ prodLPI. linp, ~ as [heir dkcl. they an Aid to be die: 00II1_ objca of an~. ~. univa-AI (If1i, .. ~ Ihcyarc all dw:obj«I: olthoe_ but thoe • ..arrnao u noc n nriJy rd.aled ("1ft,. . ~IO anyo.insJe on. 01 thr:m.. In other word., 1M '"IIO'1Kf>Ca u !he C'OItImon dfm of all of them. I... iii Z. JII,.,,,w ,.,." .,......., Iryi VItf MIl pJM,. ...", )"I .. "" "..,.. " " 11M ,. ~ .... ~ ,. ; ~,., ~ Nr pr N ' ~J-M JUtft-' u aItout"" Nr "" .. Z. -t' ,. W"", ,. r Dl u., tt# ji lu .. /nhi,. ... roW"".,..,..." SO< Df" ,. 1M ~ ..,. Ow .. J dNJ,. ~,. Z. Z. fNII ,..1"w,;-.. pIM,. Ii« -.I,.r ,., I -J,., irw u I 1M 'tI,.. N ,., ~,., ~,. i "'11.( Wi" (W" """ ,.. Ji" ,. i """ .. 1* M ,.. '" f"hli, I 1M ,. oi

,..,*J.t,..,.

* 1M,.,., *"" "'P" n ..,., -' * ,.; ,J,J,....,. .Jus Iryi ...... 1M k,., T''';'''''' tsbi" (.",..,.",. ",;.t Iryi f"hlir"'" I * "-Kli 0.,. tIf,., "..,. .,..."" ..''trit IlytJJ-1tytJ,.;,;.,or "'",. . ."""¥,. . ",-J"" I mi' * 4.t M 11JM¥fd u" ,." Iryi I""" '" . . "' z.. _ ..,., ,.. " ';" ~ I* Mt "-ot (u ~ * Ii ..... h,." .... .,.. .. , tin l1li. 600 ....,.,,., "",,. urr Ii" MM tIM.. rM ,.,

j

If; " - ....,

78 NBh (. " 100) uNS1.I .)I-,J6:

HO'OI' U on.

to

qucNion ~ penon who. dtnyin, thoe ra/ity of I whok and minkinc.

"pu~pt"".hou1d not bt: Io.t: clai .... m.t the objc.;t of PCI"j>6on (~ ill 3 hap (,.~ of infinilesimal putides? ~ should ask about the objKI of • .:opirioo of I pc"xi.~ ob;.a u~. as in dw: (OpIition, "'Thit ill ..... pm.." ThaI is. on..noutd - . "Docs. toplition of sinpluity IY...: an undiffam· ti.ted roti.,. u iu ob;ca. or docI illY...:. di~I~lcd roricy u iu objca:?" Iril tw an undiifmnlialcd uui.,. ill iu objm. dwn sir>« on. is ¥Iowina thai die: LIl!dilfera>. tl.ucI ob;c>co;.. _ h i.. cIlfrc ...... [d..an the mul.ipIe ...linioaimal ~ tho. comp\* il ), onr hu wmillfd 10 • proor thaI I whok aisu. And in the cu. mal.

.'' 'w.ec:

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHO D AND O NTO LOGY

O n~

asks a penon aboul

""

th~ objta of a perceptual COinition of

singul:aricy, as follows; Does a cognition in the form. "1his substance is si ngulu,~ ha~ a multipl~ obj«t or an undilf~rtmi.ltro objta? If it has a mulrip l~ object. then since it is not observed that on~ has a correa determin.;uion of linguJuity wim regard ( 0 multiple mtities, thaI cognition would nOI be: COtr«t. ThaI is. with regard ( 0 multipl~ entities. a cognition in the fOrm. "1his is singulu" is incoITC'Ct. O n th~ othtt hand. if that cognition hu :an undiffertnti.:atro entity as iu obja:t. th~n the obj«t of a cognilion of singularity is a who l~ (1lIlItJ'lu;n) ,"

Uddyotakan. hcrc nisei the probk m of nu merical correspondence. Thai is. if me nbjrcu of ~l'cq)[ion:are:KfU:l! 1y

"'IIJrjp"infinir~iIl\2,J

parrid..s while th~ im:ag~ crc:atro by rnose infinitesim:al panicles is sinpwr. th~n how can one claim mal pcrcq)[ual images correspond 10 rn~ir objccu? If th~ perception is not ro be: C'rronrous. is it not nt'Cetsary to suppose mat rnose multiple particles :are subsumed by a si n gl~ entiry-a wnolC----lhat is th~ obj«t of perception? In PY).I97- W7. Dhumakirti responds 1'0 (hiJ problnn prim~rily by cri_ tiquing me :alfttn:ati~, namely. that:an obj«t can ~ singu1:ar and yt't contain or ~ncompw multiplicity. Choosing :an espcci:ally moong c:xampl~, Oh:armakini focuses upon the percqnion of a huuttfJy's multiple colon. For ft'WlY ofOh.:armakini's interlocuton , including Uddyo takan. this type of perception is especially problem:uic. for they must maintain dut the coment of such a perception is singular. even mough it contains multiple colon. Thi, leW 10 the 2U<.': rUon of:l. biurre ""nliry: the color eall
mu.hipk emilia :u IU obj«u. it is I'lO'l raIONbIc for one 10 ho"" I pClCqxio<\ ollinpdaril)' wid! reprd lociilfuf:O'II mt;ria; for;1 • I'lO'l obtc:....m dw in me C:I.IC of non·spwiow pt:.apUon _lou me Ch(h'lt'-'An .,y.,.'!' ,."."..~ - iii,. rlu6,JJJ,;, ....,,1fbfb..,m ihti"j, Mi,,~ I ...." ... ij6?ti lsocl t'rf .nIM._.""jurtM/ ....y.~ I ......n~ t'rf w,;,,~ ~..." . ..,.,..m'~ ",w.".;." ... in ~ In.4J/hir ... irlJ-u in1,

cog1Iition of 5inpbril1lou

Jr...,...

n"...

7<J NY (soc) . ; NS1.I.JI-s6 (cilrd abo br Kcy!:I90): d.hIUM..,.,.". ""'If"~ ",.". hI/Jhi, If.", w". tint.".", in iii". ;,.". ......~ "_,,y.,m' I JIIIIi """".,.,.",. HInq. tul.rillNI#I -:po* .... _ U/ NInq. rlut", iIIIm< in J"*u.!o ,,..~ I "r!tIMi"MnIM~~ In m~ ~. '. .,.rtUi.

.,.M.

106

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMA KIRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

rimlor" or "vuieg;uion" (ritr.j, which is rnetnt to be: itself a ""p color. even though it contains multiple colors. Using ·v:lriegation- to sWld for all forms of multiplicity, Oharmakini argues that it makes no sense 10 claim that an object can at oncc be: singular and vuiegated.· To avoid unn«essa.ry prolaity, we will assume mat Ofurmaklrti', arguments against varieg.ned singularity are convincing."' The more prtSSing issue- is that, even if Dharmakirti corrtttfy rejects the notion of a real. varieg:ued singularity, he has nOl meteby solved the problem of numerical corrcspondmcc mentioned above. It is one- thing to say that the others' nOlion of a singular yn variegated entity is incoherent; it is quite another to explain how his own claim that a perception of singularity with regard to multiple infinitesimal pmicles is not erroneous. One of the confusing a.sp«rs of the passage mentioned by Dreyfus (PV3.194- :n.4) is dut it does noraplicidy unpack Dhamukirti's response to lhe problem of numerical correspondence. The etrly commencuors Devendrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi do, however, o::p1ain the solmion, and they do so by apparmdy refwing to anomer passage: Dh.armakirti', Sl.ltlvrm on PVI.137-14l-" In that passage, Oh.arnukirti explains how an expression mar appears 10 rdi-r to a s.ingle cl'lIiry i5 in fact a convenient way to indirealy o::press multipk parricubn on the basis ofsome commonality in their causal ~ristia. An exprtSSion such as "warer-jug," for o:ample, is used to o::ptt:55 the facr mat multiple inllnitesimal partides a.re individual.ly in a scne that a n be: collectively referred to as a ·conglommttion" (UlmUiNz); as such, mey can work togtther [0 perform common dferu by virtue of aus:illy supporting each omer. Hencc, talk about a 5ingle "watt'l'-jug" is actually talk aoom rh~ fact Ihat th~ multiple paniculan work mgerher to produce common dfecu; thett is mw no need to as5ume that there: is a ra.I, 5ingle entity called a ·water-jug" or e\"CfI a ·conglomcr.ltion."OJ A 5ingle expression

80 PV).wo--107. A1dlOlls/l lhc la m r>rr.lileral!y mearu · muhicoloc,· [)/q1TNki"i and his foIJow.m (mM I~ lam mcupnoricaDy 10 rdtt 10 any Iypt' of multiplicity thai is meaUl 10 be. onnb.ucd 10 • lin"", eftnty. Su, foe example. dw u..e of dw lam by ~rabuddlu (PYP",.r.bR) and ~ (PVT: "?, UlObffl.

81 R.cadm who wid! 10 (Qlni,.... ,hese ~Q can ronsuI, IIw appendil!. ~ tIwy ;>0: u"ansl~lcd in full. 82 Ncilna Ocvendrabuddhi (1'VI':.s,b,ff. IransblcU aobovc, n) no. ~i (PVT. "-""'I ~ff) apliciUy a lol' PVI.IJ7-'41, bur 111.11 pam&" appats fO M lIw .uuta of their intnpmationa.

8J s... PVSV u'PV' .'j7-'41 (G,6B.7-U)'

''''

DHARMAKI IlTl'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

may also be used to exprt:SS UK fact that panicu1an that arc aaually multiple may, due to being in me lalllC state (4I11Uth4), produce common dtccu. Dharmakirri remarks:

LikcYlisc, those [panicuian] which ate effective (tlP"Ju}y4tt) for lOme single function either Kparlltdy or in combination arc "rra.~ by "preL~ion1 ,hal indic:u~ a 'lpecific sral~: rhey lIll! exprascd in that way 10 that one might make them known all at once. Examples of such opressionsa.rc: "visible" or "obstructive." Tbosc [particulars] can be exprc:sscd in mu way due to the same-nc:s.s of their difkrcnce (bINUs4mb1Ji1) from others that arc nOl oc:rurring in mat kind of state'" The anal)'Jis gh'en by ~buddh i makes il particularly cle:ar that, on his interprttlltion at least, Dharmaltirti is referring to the issue ofinfinitesima.l particles acting together to produce a single perception: Concerning the usc of a single expression for a Stale, Dharmakini uys. LiJuw;y. thM, .... ThDu mnnJ: infinilC!limal ~n: i<:I C!l (fNlrIlMl1!'tI) such as blue particles. Stparllulyme:uu putides rueh

as blue and yellow ones that arc not mutually depending on each other {pllrllpllrinAfWkf4 111 Cf" "bi1lll1;1I11 means th05C that arc together, one with the other. For JDrtU rilllk fonnum-that is, for me production of perceptwl awareness, or for the prevcmion of

For

in~.

u..:..: par1~ that in ~tion (,._~) paf'orm a ,,;npc

df.:u Iu." no diMincrion &om eadI othn in mac they pcrfocn. thai df'fCt. Th",,,,·v«. il woWd bot: pointka 10 nPf"'l any sudI dilrincDon. For this uaJ(M'I. in Olein 10 rd'« ( ....,.;-.,..)10 all oJ them al once. pcopk apply (• .,..IiAw) onr npro:pjon 10 them. sudI II "wam·iui- (:htt~). n.o.c panXuIan that bm I W'Arcr·ius 1« aU equally ("tNq.) differml from tbri, ~ homoIof;ues and Mlftc:olop.el. bul ';ra mq. COIIn.lle 10 thor: fWfiUmeru of thai fU'P'* {ou.cb as conlaini,,! W'AltrJ. ,hq Iff dlstinsuisbed from odIm IN. do noc IU!fiU IN. purpok. Ha'ICC. dlIC 10 tlAt nondiff«Cf'ICX. r:bcy Ire qnixd (p.ti]"II~) withou. disrinction fronI each ocher. IJ<' ..~ 1ti".nJ .....'!" Wrytr'!" h"","ri U14'!' InN ~MJ..u",."mu ~..m ,up ~ II;'" j
..." .

""IIf

,.."fly
;i ,,v..1t ..1rUJU H

hwUI "I"'JtIiJ-IIU ttl ~II4riMl!l ~,.., ~ ,-,.~, d.w,!" "*",,,,,IIU ,.IIiMrliIlttI!I..".r:ip .m

84 PVSV "" PVI.I'7-14t (G:61.t l-l.d:" t •

.J..

'JfMr M. N..u""."..

108

FOUNDATIONS Of DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

another particle occurrinR in each individual particle's locus. So thttt (Ir!' mi,ht nrAltt thmr known .0 .t onu mam: for the sake of definitively determining many particulars from a single cxprasion. In this ~ , those that Irt' effective (lIjNIJU}y4nk) for the production ofoculu awareness arc called "visible·; mey arc thw wn.;u is expressed by an apres:sion for mu particulu sute. And those that prevmt the arisal of another particle in their locus arc called ·obstructive." "Bul particles of blue, ycUowand $0 on are complctdy discinct (IltyllnUJ bhinn4!Jj, $0 how an they be expressed with a single apression such as 'visible'~" It is Jilt to tIN Slfmtr,m oftlxiT diJformtt (bhdtulimdn",) from othm. 1beir sameness [or univmaJl (lIlm4nJfl) is their differenoe from what is other than them--i.e., others that art not visible or obstructive. Thu is their sameness h«:a.lLK: they are all excluded from those othen. It is for that reason thu they may all be called "visible." dC." From ~buddh i 'J commel1l cornes the ~ution that he and Dcvcndra.-

buddhi attribute to Dharmakirti in response: to me problem of numerical cortespondence. To be specific, the singularity of the perceptual image is not congruei1l to (i.e.• has no oomorphic correspondena with) the singu85 $ikyaOOddhi (PVT:u>}.Isff. K:l7LJIfJ): 61/1tUJMr....u.. ~ I ~

;lfJtII/i I" ;;

" llliIli,.,."v,.1NI/J 117)1 , ..u.., in ";~i~ ,.,...,.,._~ ,._~ _ . ,... ,.r...m~ I i - v in' r~"';iU- ......bk ,._7M,.m),.Ii....4JN N ..!rJ n. ".~". I ......... dMliNUJ NHv., /lilt",.,""" I IIIlTII " ru,._ijUw ,.,..,.jytulu I u .~~ SIIttiMri.... is] WJrIIUr I ~ nwtId6 ,.,..,.,.,.m", ,...np.u"n I u,.~ iii 1_ ... 'fit.,i"'" ..,.....,u,w".... u Iwb.". ~ ,."iI/.,fn,lilcf d_ g.",. iii .,. ~J.. I uJ. .. M.t ':rf,d~ I uM1IJ4M.J. ·~ruip. ,~ ,. ilNrl.SII"'~~.; J ,?_~t l ..... hm."' l PVT:l6,.sIf.,-.u.

"u,.

P"'''''I_'''''

"'. p i tiN"Ib ~ _ ""I~'" Utn "" .. J..,.,. _ u I iii '''t''' 10 J. .,. ,.; rJ.J pi- ... .., p l • • _ " . .. IIi "'P'f ,. ""'" _ ,. III ... ,. ";.,, ....." t.. /oil .N/oil ~ ~ l "wI 1M u... r.- .. ,,;" III R 'J.u 1M . . ~ I ;. ' ahit' m .,. .. "i IIlit Ii ru". >ht. ,. ..... I ,.",Ii""'" pJM" "..., .. ; trfI i:JN,. III" I tit ur >ht. ,. ,.,uI ?i ... tI" ,.;". .,. .. IIi P '"' P. i# "' I tit III ...itt" ......". ,.,,J,n /II J. ,.,.. Hr ~ .. P'" ""Ji" ,. tU "'" iii fUI hAr ~ ,., t." oi !Shit tis ~" .",..,. din I?' III ,• .., ti"" ... p-" .",..", .. i W i:JN,. P"f,no 116M,.* "",III """I «.r.,.,.;". ,""" .- /,..",,,,. ill", _,. t.." ,. "'" "i ;J,i" hi II. "",,. _ ,n. _ I tU "'" . ." J.,..,. III.",.; p rriI tis ji Iur f"j./rr ... pM/I "'" I.u ,.. "",. i lIJI' ,.,uIJ. eM .,. .. J. .,. ,. _

'*'

-"I" "'" ",. . ,.,.,. ..

iii.,.,.

1*;"" "'"

" 1.... pI- ........ -',.~J..r,. -',.MtJ. ..... "'*',.P"C,.. ,..~

""'Ii",. Ji" u I rNlfII r..t J" "'" I.u u.,,. ,.,uI iJi """ .. I PI' ~ " .......

DHARMAKIIlT I'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'09

larity of its physical causes. Instead, the singularity of the image' ~"&"t1 with a singulariry of cauu! function : multiple external causes ue producing a single effect, the image. In other words, the singulariry of ,he image coITCliponds to the f'act that multiple infinit(Simai particl(S af( working togmer to produce a single dkct. Thus, the fact of some atoms being Min aggrcg:arion ~ docs 001 signify any actual, physical unity; inncad. it signifies only the singularity of their effect. And indeed. this is not a singularity of all their drecti, since each individual atom n ill produces individual dfeco. such as iu own suint:quefl[ moment. Thw, as is strongly implied by Dharmakini and spttincally St:lt«i by Sikyabuddhi," the aauaI objccu of a single pcn;:cption arc mulciple infinitesimal partK.lcs. Hmce, jfjt is a phys-ial obj(Cl, the panicular (1JJ/I14~!I") mwt be an infinit(Simal panicle (pII1'IJlm,i'!'tJ). lind "n

"88" g:a'" <:::a nnor bf."

nNI"'~~"

In her excdknt dissm2tion on the panicular. ~ mnarb upon Dharmakini's sU'atCfJ' oflooking to the nature: of the correspondence bc~CUI image and object in order to accoum for numerical corrcspondcnc:e.- But although Kcyt a.ppe::us 10 have a fairly dear norion ofDharmakirti's solution, she~86 111ft bd'ort-

me ~ ciltd abow-. ~dIIi rtn'LaJb: "MortOYe1'. in !he third~

M . (i.~ . • t PV).'94ff) M will ""pl.in how il iI WI. ~ mo..p ~;. no pan-po"! IItt (or '-hok1, 1M obj«t of _ pc:I CXption;. julc lllfiniu:,;,nal puridc:l."ur 1ur!'6" """""

'rIMII,.,

-.I,., JIIItl ,aJ ,;- l'1li# klot .... "''''''" III'" oi,.J"" ,., M "i kit 1'''''' ,. " Doo'" (r61:a~d; SkL presn-I in K b , 1): N"S4~ -.,.n_'!' ,.,..~ ........ ~ n,.,.s whi ",.",~radt: bidJo'l ".tip*' ";"'w. Not~ Mtt ~ typic:aI inwnion ol .... ~ and prtdkMc in thr Y.b$n tnn$Ulion ).

,.tIM

,....,"*

87 Mo;(]inlodt hoop6I-69. n.l sl notf$ dut Sinl:ar:aktill .00 K:am&llllu, foUowinS uturmakIru, ..... tooMi ttuJ poIition. SIN: mnsb'a the rdcnnl VftX rrs Sl)): - n..- inllnilaO..w.,.mda: whid! uiK:II mutwJly ~ ~ not bc:yond 1M KNC:S, bc:nu.c: tbry ~ thr ob;ccu of 1M 1mIQ" 1 .",.~nII uittl'!''' jJt4 ,.,.....~ , ..illbi..m".tJ .", ~ 1«'"'"""14 '/1. And w &110 rnmIata KamaWila·, mnarlton 1M Vtt1C"1I

it not aobI4hcd !hat inlinilcWnal panieb iln' bo:youd !be ~ bca\lte dK. pWda dw ha~ auaintd. putituI:ar _, iU'c ~ by dw: wnta" [~~~ lltilfliriJ"""'!' nJij"~""r4""" ;~,.,.t\. 1M nocion thai infinilaimal panidcs ~ pe>cxpciblo: in thilwouc daoibcd hen- ;. oIIOlUpponcd by ~:. ruowucd by Col1m (1,"'74, 1I.1J). From 1M pc:' ¥Ui~ OIdot Abhitllwnu TypoIosy, dili intnpl'tolion byp:aucs ",._.. 1.7 ". a1~cl in fiver of .'.fI1I'S"""~ An impon:anr desidentum Mtr is 1M quao:ion of tilt' hisroriaI .., teccdma ofDhumaldrti'. tt..ory of per_ uptio.ln. Whik dw alIUiOon 10 Sal'Yilti>'id.. Abhidh:arma is &.iny dar in thil K'CIion, ..... do nee Imowwhrthcr Dharmakini .... any particular oro: ofSa.r.isti.io;b. otOWiQ in miM. Many dunIu 10 Sh6ry(t Kauura for ~n& IlK 10 work-

eo.:

eo.:'.

88 Sincx Kc)'I 's di.crution (19101 his MW'Cf bun published. il lw pnNpi: b«omc: Wouckd In _ ecruln dqm: or ob«wIry. 81.11 II iI. In faa, one 0{ thf tnOflI' oufltl.ndln8 _ , Audia of Dh:annakirti, :and I m:ommmd i. hipIy 10 my mockn.

110

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKiRTrS PH ILOSOPHY

mdcss insiJU that me sensory ob;ea~ hmer. !he panicubr-is a real, singk entiry. namely, the agg":gatc." An argument. ho ....'a"eI", that appc:a1s to lingutari!)' of cfFc:a as me basis fur the image's singularity in no way requires any such claim. In f.act, on Kcyt's interpretation. Dharrnalcitti', roundabout means of accounting for numerical cotl"C'Spondence: would be pointlw be:cll~ numerical correspondcnct would no longer b<: problematic;II single particular (namdy. Ihe: agg~Ie:) would isomorphically correspond through pr«:isc- congruence to a single: i~. and the divc::~nce: bc:rwe:c:u the multipliciry of!he aggltg;
DHARMAKIRTI 'S METH OD AND ONTOLOCY

III

n:al RcUist argumem is ,hal, when leveled again$( the Exlern:al Re:aliJl's nolion of a cognilive image. lhe critique of variegated singularity pointS to the same problem in his own system. In mon, while me Nyiya.yaH~ib theory of perception restS upon me supposition of a variegated singularity [hat iJ material, the aternal R.ealist theory resa upon the notion of a var· iegated singularity that iJ mental, Dh.:umaki"1 maireE this point at PV),108, where. ~pealr:ing in ,he voice of an objccror, he says: ~ I f singul:trity

is not possible in the case of objects such as a bur· terfly's wing that have vari~a[ed appean.nces, ,hen how can there be a single cognition whose cognitive appearan« iJ vuitption?"'" Sakyabuddhi, referring in pan to the commena of his pmkccssor Deven· dn.buddhi, amplifies on tht laner part of Dharmakini 's verse::

-'" thnr how clln thn-t IN II singh ctlf"ition ~COf"in'lIt IIp~II'" ...";1 ...ri,!I1,,"r~ objeC'lor thinks the fOllowing: "You who espouse thiJ theory about perception :tho usen that cognitions occur with cognitive images, Hence, a variegated image iJ essen· (ially the cognition iadf (hltt'i INiIII"JiIi till tJIIr ",): dtal being ,he ClS(', you accept th,u cognilion has a variegated cognitive appearancc.-(And when Devcndrabuddhi'" commenu), .~­ fort, it is ineonc/wivt; he mUttS that me objeaor thin\r:$ the fol · IQwing:

~

r=son 't:atea in the form, ' thu whieh i,

V:l.ri~ued

does nOI have a single nalur(" is inconclusivt because ('Vtn though cognition is of a singular nature, it can have a variegated cognitive appearance, "'J

91 pv,.aol,

"""'-~~ ~~ ~

J...'-t' IV,..g.- 1 ~_

thw, ~~ L..

/,4;• ..4l

.."....,<: 'Hi ll 92 PVP:19JU. 93 PVT ("J"I':WIuR): rt J/;f HI MtriJ wp4Y 1ft /urJ...... .......,. .... o..r l ""'''' 4w N iii ...,.... tI.. ........ r I ,....,. i ..uN ' _ .. ~ ..,.'" IJ. M6", , . tU", w. ,. ..,oJ 'MtI tU l M /ur ... .-.oJ,.,/, H. i D'",.p" ,..,/, Iu ... M. _ tWtr JNll fm.: Jj & Uurtr,. p" _ I ,/,; 1¥r .... "P ,.p" _ ,,;pttf

-lIiwrl,. '; u.s """ "" ,,,,.,"0111 ..., ._ ..hop ,.. Jill ,.. ,/, ,rrii tJ .....,. Jill " u.n

Jill

kbill ....

~

J.n.,."

H f pll ~ .... "t:" , . r 11M trit ti ",'" W,'II ,.,u]ill ... J'I'''' IOU ~ /NIT ....'" ... ,.,u Ityi # ,.. II;

111

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK1RTl'S PHIlOSO PII Y

A5 we havc seen, Oh2J1llooni's Extem21 RealiSt critique of 2 physical v2rieg:ued singuluity ~uires rum 10 2CCOunt for thc incompuibility ~n thc multiplicity of infinitesimal partides :lIld thc singularity of pcrccpnlal appearance. Spc.tlcing rrom :lIl External Reali$( penpeaive, he de2ls with (hi. problem by admining rcaJ multiplicity at the physicall.:vd while deferring real singularity to the menw level. AI the samc limc. hc can still :argue for com::spondence by mainwning that 1M singul.trity of 2ppearancc 21 Ihc menta.llcvel corresponds to s.ingul.trity of effect.tt the physical level. O n this Extcrru.! RnliSI posicion, onc is thus fiu to deny the ultimate aistcncc of :lily physical cntity thu is 21 once varitg:lled and singuW withOUI harming onc's theory of prrccption. When. howevtt. this same :uu.lysis is applied to the mental bd itself, the External Realist cannot employ till! same motif. 2n im.tge m2y have multipic colon:. :lfld il is proenled with some degree of 2pparcnr Spalial extension (slhuLllil). which is 10 uy thai: it has regioru. such as righr, left, upper :lfld lower. Thus. both in terms or phenomena.! coloration :lfld Otteruion, a cognitive im.tge is "v:aricg:l.ted" (citra). But 2 cognitive image is a.!so meanl to be nothing bUI thc mind it.sdf, which is singular. Hcnce. thc ExtcnW Realist is obliged 10 admit that a cognitive i~ is both w.rieptcd and singular. And if a variq;ated singulariry an ~ admined at 2 menw Icvd. why OOt 2dmit it .1.1 the physical kvci? The central problem hue for the Extcrna.! RoWin posidon is m21 variegated singularity of a cognitive i~ an001 ~ Otptained 2way by admining the acruaI mulriplicity or the image and dckrting the singularity to somc other level, for t~ is no other lcvellO which External Rca.!ism might turn. It is true th.tt the Extema.! Realist mighl defer singul.triry to conceplua.!iry. but since 211 cognitive images appc:u- to have spatial eneruion (nh;;/m4), thil would ~ in effea: an admission llul a.!1 perccptioru 21l! conceptua.l; such :lIl admilSion would Il!nder Dlurnakini', system unworbble.M In response to the imr:act;J,ble problem of the cognitive image's variegated singubrity. Oh2l'Tn2kini 2bwdons Extenul Realism in favor ofEp isternic ldealism.:lfld the fUming point from Extctna.! Realism to EpistcmK: Idealism comes :at the vem cite-d above (PVJ.108). There is. of course, much more that could be said here, but for our proem purposes, the important iuuc is that, 2t least on I~ interprmuion found in Sikyabuddhi's 94 nUll il. I>IwnWdn; would no IonF haw _ 10 panic:ulan. the ioIc ukimardy ruI ml;tia in hi. Iy1I:nn. And wi~1 tudI aa:aI, that- wou1d be no maN to diJrincuisb (.(III. rdc. (i...trccdy) 10 ~ ...d thooc tha. do .,.... foo. ..d. • deoc" ..; .....ion io u1.illUld,.. I:wM "poll the Idie ~/hcx-, thai dwxtrri_ puticubn aIoM..

<>
DHARMAkIItTl'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

HJ

commrnt:lry. mis V'a'SI: specifically lhows us trun the External RaliS! argument against variegated singularity rests upon a rejection of any such entity at w physial levd, for it is pKCiscly this rejection mat makes the argumerll contradiaory {and, hentt. inferior (0 the EpiSiemic Idealist theory) al the I~ of the cogniti~ image:. And sintt me External Realist critiques the notion of a vui~ted singularity at me physica.llevd, he cannot defend the 8uddh;~r

view of pr.IO:l'rion by f'M iring ~m~ ~ingl~ ~nriry Ih::If is an ap;g~

gation of infinites imal panicles. Keyt is thus incorrect to claim that DharmalUni's argument against variegated singularity requires him to accept an aggregate as a single particular. Iu we conclude ow discussion on parriculan, we should now confidmdy be able to answer me quc:st:ion mat gives me section its tille. -00 pan icuhrt 6.w: ~f>'ln:ol <':le. such ... . molt.! 2rf! produced by c:auus :&nd " lIVe effects~ A complete aruwer to mis qU$ion would rcqui~ mo~ '~ th:rn we have here. but in brief. we can mum to me passage from the Sliflupti mentioned earlier (PVSV .ra'PVI.t}7-L41.). lbal is, we should simply under· stand these: as cases in which, for convenientt, Dhannakini speaks of, for enmple. -me causes and dfecu of smoke- ntther than - the common ausal origin :rnd potcrltial for dfccu rd~ t to multiple infinitaimal panicles that, when consickred in ~nru: of those common co.usaI chuaaeristK:a, may be called~. ~ Indeed. as we have noted Dhannakirti occasionally uses the cerm Maw ("ming; as:rn expression for material things such as mlO~ lim. although extended, an: actually reducible to unextended p.:tniculan;.9!

2. -I Un;WTSI:Ils · We have observed mar in addition 10 pc:rcepcion. which takes paniculan as its objects, DharmalUrti aI.so admits infen:noe as an instrument of know!· 95 Sonxol w manyaampkl indudt: !heweol M;w to d.xribewnok~ (PVSV MliPVI.Js: G:1.J..l1lf): !he adduaion ol !he 0Ql\u fw:uIty .. an i...w>ec ofl MI.. (MV .II PVI.98: (;:,.,.1,/: and IlK menllOn of I waCtt-I" "' an eomple of I

G:,I.!rIl.).

*"" U'VSV d

"VI.I,);

II"

fO UNOAnON S Of OHAMMAKI MTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

edge. As demon.nnred in the pmriow chaprtt, inferences rely upon a rda· rion of"puvasion" {vpipti} that pernios bctwten the evidence (linl", w ) and the predicate (0 be ptovrn (~rma). Smokr, for aample. is pttvadrd by fire such that in all cases whrre smokt is found, fire is prcxnt. This relation is a general one: it pcrtailU in all cam where smoke is prescnt. In pan as a result of the generality of this rebtion, the predicate Clnnot ladf be a particular, for a particular cannot be distributed ovtf other inSQflce5. I nst~ , the predicille must be an idea or concept (mch as "fire1. This idea or concept is what Dharmakirti means by a univcnal, and he thus undersmuts inferences to take universals as their objects.· While Dharmakini maintains that universals arc the objectS of inference, we have secn that on his view, univenals are not ultimately real because. unlike paniculars. they lack ,e1ic functi on. We can understand this distinction bctwetn universak and paniculan in a commonsense f.uhion-an 1WOnmem of particulars that YIC label "fire" actua.Ily produce hot, but that label or concept "fire" ClnnOt boil our tea. On this basil, Dharmakirti de:nics thr ultimate reality of universals, and that de:nial is coruiuem with his :antirealin projKt. We should thus note: tbat Dharmakirti's notion of.a universal diffen significantly from the mdiu throrieli of phi105ophers such as the Naiyiyib UddyotWr.a. Specifically. for realists such as Uddyo!ann a univenal exists in distinction from the: conceptual cognition that apprelKnds it. but for Dharmalcirti a universal docs not exist indcpe:nde:nt of a conccprual cognition." In rejecting the uhimale reality of univenaiJ, Dharmakirti is de:nying that an aprcssion or concept refen "in an affirmati\'e manner" (vidhirVp"J to its rcfercm by virtue of the presence of the universal(,) to which that exprcsston or concept: is rdared. Nc:vcnhelcss, Dhannakini does not thc:rcby fltt himse:lf from the obligation [0 :tCCOum fo r how conceptual cognitioru can still guide: action in the world. This obligation sreml in pan: from Dh.arm.akin:i's unde:tst2nding of why we usc conce:pts, whether the:y be within inference: or simply within a linguistic comat . To be sprcific, he 96n.., inf£l tll(U w., IUI~ ill thtitobjau" rYidcnllTom PV).I-). II - 0 11 ~'I 'P.o:
rmn

'17 The.- conciIc lIilancnl of dw ~ indficicncy-q.nd hcna irroli~ lUIiYCr_ .. '-'dindws,.".pn(-'PVI_I66,G:l+IO): . . . . _'!I~_' 1.~ ~ . _ 5« "00 PV"'- J .owI .... Im""n! met .ph<>.- of ,he: aonuch (PVSV . . PVI ,2.lG- m . G ,loti.l7-IO?\I: Ir.. ...t1lN on chape .... 4. , 10).

DHARMAK!RTI'S MET HOD AND ONTOLOGY

us

m:a.inwns dut we USC concepa nm: limply out of some pernicious habit. bm rather with a specific purpose or goal in mind.'" We might, for I:UlTlple, seck [0 heat ourselves in front of a fire:. and ~ might then usc the conceptual knowledge: of fire acquired through an inference in order to obtain a real, particular fire that has the capaciry 10 fulfill the tdos (art"") that we seck. On this understanding of why we usc lingwn ic and conceptual cognitions. Dharmalcirti is obligM to , hOY! how univeruk, ~ though unl'Cl..!. can nn'Crthdcss yidd information about particulars. That is, he must show how our words and concepts make seosc, even without the prcsc.nce or "affirmation" (vidhi) of any ulcimatdy real universal. To gain at least some sense of how Dharm:akirti dcaI.s with the problem of meaning in the absence of real universals, let us brieRy uamine his JljW.:w-theory. which for him ('Xplairu how we arriVf':1.I meming through the amstruaion of universals dut are rul only conventionally (not ultimately). We will begin with a summary, and then we will also inquire into two aspcctJ of his theory: the nmion of particulars having the same effect, and the question of whether conventionally real universals arc permanent. FinaJly, we will raise some problems that the 4PO~fheory must address, and we will answer them by referri ng to three senses of the term JlptJIut. ,8 s« PVSV "P'VI.,) (G'4j.}I-+6.,): p..,.. liof........... MJ ..,.,. ,bw ,hi",,1iIhitIJ 11« n/, ,. ~pliJh mnT /i"InIMJJ1*" i,. ...ur ,. ~".pIish n- ~. i, if for UN rr_ lb., .;pifon ~ HjmI.. [P'VI.,,] The tXt mat pcoplr _Id encounter considuabk difficulry if Inq._ not 10 form Iiplimlioru or we apmWu is not .i mply I mailer of IOITlIt pmIicioua

.,,1UtI ,.

...hi. (..,..",_)

R...n...• ......."...;"1 ..... ~ an .,...,..;,.~ . ........ __ an ""ptftOion ....

IOIN'lhinc dac,;' an undmaki............ pnctiaI xOor.---ror tho- sili of_pl. This

n..-.erv«,

is .. brc::au$o InUtb \lIIderu.kinp would be ipmi. it m.akes KIm ~ I prnon who is applyins Clpre.siona 10 IOmahi", ihouJd ha"" • dairrd dfca in miDd. And all pb .,~ ddinod u nther tho- 'Iu.inm~rll of whal one daira or ~ .minl or P;O)'l .un"ion .0 .he
u6

fOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKIRTn

PHILOSO PHY

Overall, our aim hen:: is 10 raise: Ihe central issues and problems in (he apoha-thcory, and to avoid surpassing the scope of that goal, we must fo~ any detailed o:amin:nion of the other analyses by modern interpreters, despite their importance to my undmt:lnd.ing of Dharmakini's philosophy of language." SlImnutry ofDhttmutlnrti i AfDIM- TINory'"

Dharmaltini maim:ai.ns thai thctt an: mree different types of univctsals: those based upon the real (i.e., particulan), ~ based upon the unreal, and those based upon both. To simplify our wk. let us coruider only the type of universals thai an:: based upon real thinp-i.e., univcna1s consuUcted on the basis of pciu prual content caused by partlrulars. A straightforward case is the universal that is the object of the concept ~ m:I~ that occurs when. seeing first one and then anomer objca, we recognize (pNty4bJ,;-vjiUl) fWO objcas as "rtd.· ~ we have nOled, perception is causal, and for Dharmakini this mearu mat in the case o( our visual cognition of those objects, me infinitesimal particles that constitute each of them cooperate with other causal filcrol':l so as to crr:::IlC inuscs dUll \W: coneqnu.:uiu as simibr in their respective pcrt:q'lrual cngnitioru. Sin« cach inugc is an cffi:ct. il i~ as much a particular as those infinitesi.mal panides. AJ a particular, each image is utterly

unique, and it cannot be distribuled over other particulars. Hence, the images themselves a«f1,,'U (or the universal--the "sameness" {s4millJll}-that enables us to call both obj«ts "red.. -,., Nevcnhdc:ss, each image. precisely bcausc il is unique, can be the basis

(,.,,""t

fo r the conn ructio n of the appropriate universal. 1luo.r i,. a panicular il defined as ,hal which is capable of ,die function (.nh.Itriy4). which means

mat i, muSl produce dfccu. 8m on Dharmakirri's view, any entity thai produces cffccu has necessarily arisen from causes; indeed. as we shall see 99 n... work of Sidcriu (a~s. 19511 and 1995I) ... '-n Qf>KialIr hdpiUl. dopil~ my dis. "V-n>Cft• ..,.;.h _ _ Df ... - I ........... 'lVlU1e f'ocu.inll p,i_ily on !an•...!.ti•• and Kamablib. Sidniu iI MYCnhcIe. quil~ 'ist" 10 nOt~ that mud! of thn. approKh I<) W •...,.w.thtoory is 10 ~ IOund in DlwmUini. apcOally u rt:ad mroup. thr: ~nwy of $~. 0tMr mockm 'II'Ofh of impooutlCC to my inlapm::lrion etperiaIly induck

1'- ofTIllnmnt Crml and Ka~ (1991). 100 PVSV .JPV,.6I-7f. n:and..la! in m. appc:ntia. «NIWn. I numba ofw ~II dl,cwwd in

dw remainder of !his chafm:r.

101 On Ihr Ihm: rypn of unlvrrul.s, ICC PYSV . . rvl.l!ll (G :91019ff).nd rV}.f ,l;d:

"1M",.".

"j;

·'In,.

_UlIthhiWM,.,~ pJ/s-.rJl.

Conc:aninc I'CICIDp1ition ~u..).

DHARMAKIRTI' S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"7

in the next chaprcr. the range of dTccts that the particular is capable of producing is determined by the cawes from which it has arisen. A particular's uniqueness thus amounu to the faa that it has arisen from specific causes and that it therefore is capable of producing a specific or restricted range of cffcru. '11 If we COlUidcr an image that arises from what we would call "red," that i~ (a mental paniOJlar) is unique or "excluded" (1IJd1J!TUl) from :ill other paniculars in that no omcr partiwlars :uUt from exactly the same causes or produce aacdy the same effecu. The image, being the unique dfca of the unique paniculan that produced it. thw setvts :u the b:uis for acluding the: imagts produced by other paniculars..... The: f..C(. however, thaI each image acludes:ill other imagCll by vi nue ofiu uniqueness is not in itself adequate to account for our usc of concq>U ",n,! I",ngll"'se wr: require '" nOtion o f J:lmencu. ",.nd n O I jU!t d ifTe:lellOt!. We: must have lOme notio n of lameness bc-causc we nttd4triOO.rd. annor be, J ...nm....J it ~~ II . for oampio:, PV,.16j-.67 and MY "'PVC.7.aI (G:40-)-.1) •• ruuIamI in the appmdi;L TI.t notion that ~ Qltitia may be, conPdomd thc AmC in tNlChey JR all eqcully dif-

n.r

fm:nt f'roon oWr nltiria: oaun rhl'OU!houl PVSV. 5c'C apm11ly PVSV MlPVL7J (uans"ted in thc ;oppcnclm). IOl5c'C, 1Ora:ampk. PVSV "'PVI.I6(; (G:l4. u.~j.l) and thc nGl chapen (I',), wht:.., .... ;.....io~ .

• 03 ".., norion tNl ...niq""...,. of J>Mticubn: it ... ltilllJldy the ~ 101 CONINainl uni· ¥aaU rhlllUl!ih adusion is aprcsscd ill, for cx:a3pk: PVSV '" PV' .70 (G:}I.•?if; _ thc appendDJ; PV'.71Cld and PVSV "'til. (C~9.1 6ffi_~: PVSV "'PVc.&! (C 'JS.1-Jr.

and PV)..I69. 104

n.r ~ role of ap«ettioru in cht ronwllCiion or univcnah it indiattd by tht

~

. . of thc ~ dbi_ r apeacd1 wid! rdaion 10 dlorClIIk'I and dkcuon thc basis ofwbldl J unl¥tTJ&lls CQf\IIl\Kttd. oS« I'VSV . . 1'\'1.9' (d ied earlkt. n.98). $eo- alto dw: ~rma 10 dbip~ in PVt.6I-70 and MY '" til. (G:" .'; _ thc appendO: fo. a

III

FO UNDATI O NS O F D HA1,o.tAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

such dispotitions prompts us to conmue the image in question as distinct from C'ntities that do not have the causal eharactC'ristics C'XpcclC'd of what we call "red"; at thC' samC' time, we ignore other elitC'ria, such as having the causal char.lctC'tiSlics cxpC"CtC'd of that which is "round" or "SWC'C1 , " W'hen we look at rwo obj«a that we will 001 "red,~ the first objC"C1 produces an imagC' that acludes all images that ....-c would "orcaJl "red," and thC' imagC' from the second object also C'Xciuda thOst images. If we do not inquire runhel into the differences bctwttn those twO images thC'm5Clvcs, we can construC' both images as mutually qualified by a negation, namC'iy. thdr difference: from non-red imagC'$. That mutual difference, which Oharmaldni calls an "C'Xdusion" (IIJiivrni), thus bccomC'5 their nondifference. In shon. that C'Xclusion or nondiffcrC'nce pert:lins 10 all things ,hat arC' dif£trent from thOst that do nOI havC' thC' apccted causal charactC'Jistia-in this case the cawal charactmsrics cspected of that which we call "red." I~ In this way. C'XciusiolU, being formed on thC' basis of the images in conceptual cognitions, arc construed as negations that qualify those imagC'5. Thus. whilC' mC' images themselves arC' completdy unique-they do not have anWlJll and thus are not disnibutC'd over othC'f instances they can be construed as qualified by a n~tion that t4ts have ""wrjIJ. inasmuch as oornpIctc tnrubtion). Tlw: notion of dIC ncpiVl: - limit" (,lIwJllij in oppoaition lo wbid! ~ "elution il CI)I'lHruClrd appnn to OClaIr only ona in dv (i.~, PVSV MiPVI.I' j)•

s.-rm

...t.eR DlwmWni rmwb (G:tl.J.H}'): it iI CSlWliahrd that aU apralioN and COIIttpU ~ a d wio.,. (~) u mnr objtcu. bon lhou!h 1N:s.t CG-rJemui&l aprcssio.,. and ODn«pu.:kpmd upon lhe _ rnI,hi"" ,hey ~VI: di~n' obj«u; lhey haft diff'ercnl ob.iecu ~ apt->on..-:I conupto or~ ~ (wf" ' ,... ' 1, r",",-) in teO/'1IU of acJwions appnr in copilion all if they ~ o:llffi:rcnl; and CIIdwlon, appear diff'erml due 10 those: adusiont· diff'~ tilal an:' eoNIn.octrd \hrougb die dilkiCi'ICCI in thdr dditni,m (• ...Jhi). [uuM' siJJh.", twI urw yUJ viwbllilql -i1u4JI ('ff 1 M m ~tiYnI~.,. ~_ .-'hijJ"J.~;"'i~ ~~ Mt;,,1tt1" ;"'P"';~" .,;,orffpi,.t.y..... w.;",...~ .... ..,. 'J"hndor~

.ha,

.no..:

r,Yhs ..

~i (rvr:1,~PVT..,PaH _ K:}47. ~jO) drfina "ddimilcr~ (nMihi) u follows:

lui adU;SO(ln ', dduniln IS IIIaI from wluctl one emblu"," lhen: 10 br ~ adUSlon, For aampic. die ddimi'cr of die acL.uion a1kd "pmdua" jo "I\On,produa. ~ Likt'III'ik, I'ot dv cxdwion drfinrd u " impcntWlCfl«" .M delimite. is "pcrmaneD\".C." and on on {i.e.• the same .. appliabk 10 all odlcr COIIttpUI. IJoI PJbt"i. ,.. ".,....u!J".w Ii ,.,., ••Wh# I Jf'lhi -'1vM' V-,. .,.~ I"v", .,.;".,..t,~

,?-,,,,,,,,,,,,u,.

I ~ TIlC ~

j~ .

tt... o:rWn !:.lIil;'" nuy bcc:ocuidercd nondilinull bccawI: dwy arc &II differ·

6 ...... .oJI...u.:. cou...... crnphui-I .. lCV'Uoi pi-:... indudint; I"VSV .Jrv..;ryd {G ...... t;Il), MV MiI"V,,9!Cd (G.......l and csp«iaIIy in I'VSV MiJ'VI.IJ7-'41 It..e appmdix).

CIl<

m.

OHARMAKI RTn

METHOD AND O NTO LOGY

".

rh:u n~rin n :appl i~ In :all I.he inst::llnces in quesrion: :all me instances in question exclude wh~t is not red, Through mis :approach, Dharmwni arrives at a theory of universals (s4tn1lnytllalq.a!'4) that requires both the image :and me exclusion. That is, $[rialy speaking, a universal is ~ combination of mar which is nor dismbUled (i.e., lacks Ilnvaya) :and mat whim is distributed. nil: image, as a menIal p:trricub. , is nor distribtlt~ . bu' ,hI! 6dLls;/:>n (IJ)I"JvrrtiJ. :1_ ' a n~';n n

applicable 10 all the images in qucstion, is distributed, Lacking distribution, the image alone cannot be the universal. But on Dharmakini's theory of qualities, a negation cannot exist in distinaion from that which it qualifies; mef(:fore, me negation alone also cannot be the universal. The universal must merefo re be an image mat we construe in terms of a particular ~ of neg::ation. mundy, the exclusion of th:at which does nee: h:tve the expected effects. As we have secn, for us to apply this negation to all the images in question, we must admit that all the images in question have the same dfttt. Let us c::umine this imponant issue in grearer derail.

Dharmakini claims that :a universal is oonslruaed on the basis of me exclusion of all the entities in question from thos.c that do not have me expected causal char:l.creristia. Dharmwni rccognius, however, thaI if u m in things-such as those called "waler-jugs--are excluded from olhers because: those: others do nOt have the expected causal char:l.cteristics, one is also assc:ning that all the things we call Kwater_jugs" have the Ill"" causal chanctul$t;cs, they a.lI have the ca....w chanieterUt;cs cs:pcaed of. "wate, jug."* For Dharmak:ini, this amounu to the claim that, in the casc: of all warcr·jugs, we may identify at least some of their causes as [he ~same· (tkll). and most importandy, we may likewise identify at kast lOme of their dfCCb as the "same:"" 106 FoIIowin& OIwmakIlti, ~ will5ptU; of"'hinp" ( ~_) IUCb III . "w;ucr-jUJ" rp.,u j in. ~ Iha sIoaa OYa"tM lOOK prcciK 1R:almcrn ..nutbt tIM: nuclo»c:opK - '""ius iI in faa ncxhin, bul mimwnpic infini!t$inai panicIcJ. M ~ haw alrndy M"nI/.98I1l. !hit ptooedun puu,. limpl:il1a DharmWrti '. aalt. in tha. M ~ no! m(. GOnJtandy 10 inhn· ilC:simal pmlcks. 107 ..... though DI>:armUl rti tpcQfia1Iy ditcWKS 1M C'ONuuaion olllnr.tnaJs in lmN of

mfiria linin, tIM: AmC (ypcIof thai mmtion both

(G:A .I.4-69,l ):

wa)'l

"*,...

b.r: tmds to foo::w upon IaInm$ of dkct. PM '" of wllJInKlm& u,mcneu Include !,\lS\I "" t'\lI "}7-141.

110

FOUNDATION S OF DHAItMAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

D hmna.kin i's focw upon sameneu of d fm becomes panicularly wient when he presenu his .cpon.thcory in terms of the :act of rcmgnition, as when a perceived enti ty or individual (",ati), such as a lone water-jug, is recognized to be the same as another individual. M noted ead ier, when an individual is pe.ccil"cd. it produa:s a JCnsory cognilton containing an image that corresponds corrdarivdy to the panicular(s) that productd il. That image. which is in DC! idem ical to the cognilion in which il arises, is a memal particular, and as such. it is no Ic:s.s unique than Ihe individual that produced il. If Dhu mw n i were to claim that individuals :m the same btcau~ thO$(' effects-the cognitivt" images they produ«--are the ~Rme· (tit,,). then it ICCms that he must conU'adia his ontology of paniculars: if he 1:1)'1 that two images. which :m mental particulars. :m the same. then how can he 5;l.y that all pankulan are unique? Speakinl in the voice of an obj«tor, and wing "cognition· to rmr to £he cognitive imagt. Dharma.kini ptus the problem this way: • But tlllh l'Df"itiD" is II" tj{m f{thost intii"iJIUIU, ,,"" Cllf"itill" is tiifftrmt (PVl.lo8cd) for each real rning (pwi 6h1lllilm). That is. as with the indi vidual thar caused the awan'nm. the cognition in which it appcart is distinct: therefore. how can all those speciftC individuals have the same dfcct? For the cognition is thei r effm. and it is diffen: nt in each case. In oth('f words, the

purlculan haw tIw GIIV cffea. In order to aprai INI thry haw that dI"ea. onr: ~ thnn.nth ~rCS$ionlwchu -.mct+ilIIi" pt u. id«! thai tM Ii~ Somt;

"'.oed.

............ tiuI, tko, JV""'1l> ...... 0. . . . . . . . . . . . ' - " "......1 t",;c. 0- o:ut liodl...royi tIfAtA parricubn in
are Othtt than thnn. Liltn.iloe. in tennl of havins tnc AII10e cawc. one can aptcll ... tw ia naru.i~ ..ith a "n~ ap........ in onkr to fxili t.tc prxlial aaion. F.Prnpks _ "H uo;f",d. " "Jcrxy c-," or ". ~ an.e. irnmuIiatdy after dIOn~ or

".ound ia cawaUy producul" tJoolJ\&i~..,. utU.,. bllliJoi.,. _,.,.Mc~ p.jMid.u.jfJ ~ f ~Itm~ • ...,."thu~ttW f ,,"1M r'4"'':rt N~ ~""N1"Url]il~ M~ irua _ 1.

I.,.· ,.

Other aampla include: PVSV .d 1'V1-40-4l (G:II.It-l) : .,. ~ IJMM ilili dt~ ~ ,....,.,; ,-~. ,...., ,.. ~ ~ I w.s..w-;.. it]dm~ vii' .. ,,....,""""~It;o thtIIJtfII"-UJtI ~~ ",.~ I ,.thJ ",u.~ Id...!y .wbl,,"i"~ri­ hi>1I~ PVSV ,",PVI.6. (G:JI. ~): ad ;1'" )i l ..rbhi,!, _'!"I'll,.'. ...,,~ ,,~,,~ MiI/ytt.... ~.....M..,., ihwtUlt• •~ ~-.,.".m,"A ! •.y.,.r ~ and PVSV ,",1'V1.7sd (G:.p..H): ,.JwJ.,.,J,iqi mi. ,_UJ U,J" .,. ~"""-'J"''''jlU.w;u,.. .,J,..h,'jt1'1' 4-____ ~~ '\ 4'1 Uhi.d U, wy.,./II m.. _twit.;',.j. 'rIJinrM,. &

,,.,.,,..,..,,IMi,.U;. .

j"

'hi

",!wi""'''''

DHARMAICIRTI'S M ETHOD AND O NTOLOGY

single dfcct of Woller-jugs and so on, such as bc:arina water, is different for c:ach 5ubst:lllcc because me substances arc d.iff'c.rent, Hen«, those individuals, being different, do not have the same effect.'" '· To avoid. tbis problem, Dbarmakirti maimains that (he cognitlorui.e.. the cognitions with imagtS corresponding through awali[y to their ob;ca.-:are not what account for the sameness of thow objectS' effectS. Instead., those cognitions themselves aa as awes for anOther cognition, a -judgment'" {prilfJillMmIlrl4jIWM} th:a.r is the -ume~ {~ltil} for all the individuals in question. He explains: i~ nm :I

prohlem. hK:al.ue 1M Mf"iliD1I pmJlUNi by LiUh inJividMil/ in quarion is nonJif!amt sinn flUh copilion is lIN CilMJL ofII j wiprnl tlNll is lIN IIlmL for.U lIN indivitJlUls in quntiDII. And linu thry iI" lIN CIIUlt1 ofw SIImL CJIf1Iiti41U. tIN ituiiviJwJs "" llisD 1I(JnJijJrrtn/[PVI.I09]. '"

Thil

Dhllrmllkin; ::admillE rhllr

r~

o::ognirion--or

mo~

prP.ci!W!ly, r~ o:ngniri~

imagc--produ«d by >t2Ch individu:..! is indct!d unique. Hence, one cannot Jirtalyuse those images as the wamnt for the claim that the individuals arc the same bccause they havt the.same dfm. If those cognitive images arc to be used ro demonstrate tMIIM individuals which produced Ibe imago; arc the.same, Iben Dlurmmrti must first show how those imy the effects of the individllal· arc (hem5Clves the AmC. To do 50, he oncc agai n turns to the principle th:lt entities ue the 1:lJl1C if they produce the nme dI'«t. That is, he maintains t:h:a.t those cognitiYC inugo; arc all the same bccau.sc thl:)' all produce ,he same eff«t, namdy, a judgrnmt (pnlfJillJamllrl4jIfllM) that takes as iu object the aforc:mentiooed cognitivt image and construes that image in the urne fashion in each case. For example. all the cognitive images can be the same bccause thl:)' a1l ltad to the judgment. "This is rtd.· Dh:arm:>kirti then m:lint:tins th:l t. if those cognitive im:ages :Ire the ume

108 J>VSV MiPVI.lokd (G:j6.Io-I.j; _ .... ihiJ;~ ~ ~ r. "j~tL [PVI.lokd l ".raIti...". J w..., u",../ii4Jti_ ftju~,.· ~, I ...... ~ I "'" .. ..w~

...,.." wr. ~tL J,.J W="'/IM ••. Miu .. ~~~,!, "'" .,;~.,.", 160 b.I ~ rwri ~u,!, j.ht,Uu,!, u.,-.. .,;, 101

I"VSV"" l'V'.1O'I (G :)6..' H7'7):

-q.~ /7"'_' /~

UhtJiIii I dMIti~.,um.n. W .....~ [PV1.lo,l.

........... tINr

11.1

fO UNDATIONS Of DHARMAKIRTl'S PHILOSOPHY

lxausc: thty allle.td to th~ sam~ judgm~nt . then one can also gy that th~ individuals that pnxluttd thov: cognitive images in the fim place arc all th~ gm~ because thty too produce th~ sam~ dfcct. Thm, th~ wam.1\I for th~ sanl~ness or the individuals is that thty produce the same cfkct: the cognitive images. And the wamuH rOt the gffiCncs.t or the cognitive images is ag:lin that thq produCt' the 5:lme effect: a a nain ~ or judgment. /u ~ hav~ dcscrilxd it so rar. this d)(ory leaves itsdr ~n to an obvious rebuttal: what warrants the sameness or the: j udgm~nts ~ That is, Dharma.ltini', initia1 problem is that individuals arc unique, so the samenc:ss required by language: and concrpu must be accounted ror by samellCS$ or df« t. Bur ir he tUfns to th~ cognirive im.ages produced by those individuals, he has the same problems because those cognitions, like the individuals them.sdvC$, arc unique. Ir he now turns to the claim that those cognitive images arc th~ sam~ b«.ausc: they produce the same judgment, th~n h~ appean to havt fallen into an infinite regress. In other words, it would appear that we nttd, once again. to warrant the g mencss or those judgmenu by appealing to the sameness or Ihrirdfcca; and or course:, me wnmcss or the judgmmu' dfcca will once again tC'quire the: same warnnt, :;& nd JOon.'" Dharmakini's response: to this problem is c:xprc:sscd. ir somewhat ellip-rically, in his commenral)' on rhe verse: cited above. Nore mon here he uses the metaphor or an ~ overlap-or ~ mixing" (141!U'l'1.4) or individuals whereby the nature or one is somdJow partially prcsc:nt in the nature or the other. For Dharmakini, such an overlap is impermissible in the as
* KatnaWib

6 ' alikdy .............. ~;.

DHAIlMAKIIlTI 'S METHOD AND O NTO LOGY

" J

lap. Moreover. this is called Ibdr - no ndiff'ertnt differtnct"namc:ly. tha r cxd usion (lIiwlA) from Other things m:n b}' namrt do nOl cause thai elfa:l. they arc: understood to be adudcd in this fashion bc:caU$t: they causc some same effect . such :u a cognition /(Dntaining an ima~ that lcads 10 the same judgmentJ. In lerms of Ihe cognition thai each individual produces. even though it is dilfttcnt fo r every sumtanct, each cognition appears nondifTcrtm fro m thc: omen in qucstion in that by iu namrt it causes a jUdgmem that overlays the image in rhc: awarencu with a nondilfttcnce. Moreover. Ihc: innanca in question cause that thing (.rth.t~namdy. an awarenc:u and such mal appears nondiffertm and thai in turn causes mal kind of judgmem. Therefore,

Th ~ inu:l n ~

Th rough Thei r n:lTU".· p rnduu

~

Ji ngill':

cognition wilh an image thai pnxnu them as overlapping whose ultimate oh;ea is their difference in ruamrt (S'llflhIMVIlhhuJ4) from aU orner things,lIl :u has been repeatedly Stated. Therd'ort. the 11 2 1 1u~ uanil,u ro /lJfl1ohJt,r,~ in aaotd wim dw COIIIaI Mft. np",;'11y as providro by the IOIIowIII& vax. Al l llndcnund II. the ICfIIl u ~ mantto c.on~ the nocioa thaI IIhi ..... tdy. lhc ... "b"b. it a DOII-cnticy; i. it lhc mc:n: r>ep,ioa tha • ."",..m...r I difTfttn« in ftllom (_;lMN~) mal dill.inKUitMI particubn whkh pnform the: "arne:" fimaion from d>osc that do noc. This "diff'titiltt" is an adllJion ("Ji~.1Onn at MPIion. and UIUCft i. annoc be. n:..I mory ci4
,..,."fIInbtI

Ka'IWIt

for I~ poIili~ up«U of~"'" eopillon.: namdy. I ) ~"'" ,"""irioru

do noc pram. thmud_ U IICplioru. bul an: illl'lad o:paicnad wim _ fixm at rom· oJ tOnlnll (dw -..ord o. ooncqM. "cow" OCCl.In ";Ib _ kind ofimag: in dw mind); and 1) 10 Ix weful. mnapu and ttp«SIIOIIi mo.m bUll! OM ,nlO COlIna with (or .. mply tefft 10J puUc:ubn; mil "rcftn:nlw /Unai.on" iI ~tM:. in that OM u1tinurdy pi... knowkdv of puticuWs. and noc rqarlons. Mort "~ti>ot" inlUjMrn>fions. which lqin immtdindy after Dharrnaltini and sOOli' &IIr b«onM: ~ pronounced. affirm _ pOOli";ry in OM or both that wzp: 4) thry KI'c:II the importaoor ..r i~ or appn.n.rKa i~ COI .... p' ..... iOOplilloru; and/or ~ rhty loy auphuis 0 11 u,., abiliry of wordi 10 lead one 10 INniculan. Bocb • and • are pramt in

..r

iIIfft'J"'"U''''''''''''

DIumuklni·. pbilooop/ly. to .hae noc mtiody unru.w : thq- !limply.lel a ckpN anplwillNI I IIndtnund 10 be un,rurouro. In hisp.uoIthe:compound .....WMNMo 4,..._,....., find web .c:-oIthe "poa. n..,," i"'~lion • ill $1ky.&buddhi. In I baP: WOK, the imporu.nl qUc:ltion " - is: wIut iI dw ...fJ.btIW A ncpi~ in.aprnllion illo"y Uw dw Mum,.. if; ruUy nodtinS If..u: ir iI. nqnioA, and .ocptiotOido noc m..:. ApoIia~ 'apA_ ilfOayrlw the ...v · . . is ruUy the ~iad.u. bul only indirtedy ..... " ;. mu Imtr imerpicuDon thai c:oIoft ~ buddhj '. mnuta whm he p..a _WV,,~~,!,(PVT:I 17U_l . K::uJ.J1-d):

..r

-u,

"""'NJN~

fh-,.']t!W

.",...",."..'!' ~'!',. t'N , .... _rUN ",,.,..riN ;ym ";,,.,It.; I ~~UftIU " ' . . . , . (~""Il' "p hi

1tItyMI,..,

111

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

nondiff~rena:

of things consulS of the fact th:u they have the

sam~ ~fkct .'1J

Dhumaltitti's solution to tM: problem ofinnnite regress is that sameness of effect does nona as (he warrant for the claim (hat those det~nninations of sam~ness ~ the same. Innead, h~ dC'Yerly shifts what ht: mons by !xing Mthe same" (~It.). Th~ judgments in question ~ th~ sam~ nOl because: they have th~ same dfea. but because: they ph~nomenally pr~nt the "same~ content: by ovtrlaying the images in th~ cognition that produce them with a Mnondifference~ (lIb1mJ.), each judgment takes th~ same form, such as, "This is rt'd •• This amounts to an appeal to some unspecified combination of exptriencc and mental dispositions: when we look at ctn:ain iliinl?1' we just interptd them all as "red." in the: COntext fOrmed by ccnain dispositions and the way thai we we the term "'red: This appea1lo exptriencc and disposilions highlighu the importanCe of mind-dq>endency or ~$ubjectiW' fa.c.. tors- in the process of constructing exclusions. That is, Dharmaklrti maintains that wh~n we constructel:dusions. we do not do so haphazardly or OUt ofsome pernicious habit; rather, we have some purpose in mind. and (hat purpose provides CXpect2tiOIU and interests mat form the coma! of our concept formation. Ukewise, we learn how to usc: language and are habituated to that usc:. An apple and a strawberry, fo r example. will be different if we are concerned with [h~ir distinctive eff«ts, bUI if we ar~ only pJM" 1M I.t,. i .,. .. '" rtyitI tItnt ..",,.,.,, oi "Y''''' ...... ,.i -p",.,.J,.

rAn 1Ihit ....... ,., """'~ / ...... ,., mlffil"; ~,.,. "1If1i..usJM" """ J.t,.i .or - Mo,r,.. .. fI.fo ..).

AJ it dear hcre. nwMnIl'''''' is I2km to ~!ht: pmicu1u (_!.r""~ -HNM iI bctc wed moch :II -~ jn Gjridlioill

JWticuIu

~ ", kind oftfft," or~', par' bctc rakm 10 ~ JynOIIym of ~ 11W iI the inltt-

such:ll

Dcular tree.." In short....1IhiH is pm2oUon takm by Scftnkdlfter('97I:'90 and ,-;",j. Hownft. since the mon:alfItttI of the diW' ..ion fOa.-on iIwIIIu diliadK%. andNnu the next 'I'ffK ItrtSICt ROC!ht: ~ bul.hI. unreal ad"......... ~., inleljri'ftalion doeI ROC Re'JI WUrlllled heu. II)

rvsv a'rv','Q7 (G :16.1t-S7.7):

"iwtli_ NUI,.thl """ MiMI....,. "",WM_1fUII7P u;ri 1""'" Ill~ 1w.tIJj,i, .......,;, .... 1 uI!' ", WWitu/! ~ ....~ I';u!;wNvw WM_~,; _."""_ iii til / ill , . qb1I iIwIII I't} ~~NII/.t!I AwJtri'd.cr)or "1Il1.hi""'~"""II
"Mi_

u,.qW

DHARMAKIRTr5 METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'"

COnttm~

with thtir coloration. wt igno~ that diff'tttnct in light of tht samtness constructed in terms of color. And of courst, our ust of "applt" and "Str.lwbcrry" is dtpendmt in pan on our habituation to certain lin.. . gwsuc practl(:cs. Whilt Dh.atmaldrri's appeal to o:pc:ntnct and dispositions rdltcU mt mind-depc:ndent aspects of the o:dusion procas. it is coupled with somtrhing mnrr:: an lIp~llo Ih~ narure {prllftrti or WIlhhtivtt,J of thinV lh~m _ sdvcs. That is. when ~raI individuab produce cognitions that in turn product the Amt judgment. "This iI red," it is not just my own apcaations. conditioning and other relevant dUpositions that go into the conmucrion of that exclusion. Ramer. beyond my own subjectivity, the: entities in question., Ihrir ""tllrt (WIlbh.i1h%1/IfI. prllJrrry4. ttc.) product cognitions wf,"'<e C(lnrenr i~ (:lIp" hI ~ (Of hr.ing mnsrn,,~d :15 " r~ ." More rh"n 5Om .. appeal to c:xpuienct. it is this assertion of the nature of mings that putl an end to any infinite regress. We can pose the question. "But wh] do tbose individuals all produce cognitiolU that can lead to the same judgmcm?" And Dh.atmaldni can answer, "Bca.usc it is their nature to do so."'" Some interprcws ll1lIy fed rather dissatisfied with Dhannakini's appeal to nlllUl(,. In cfk.ct, he i.s Qying um wh~n wt can all :ill red things "red; for eumpl(', it is not that they :ill imtanti:lt~ th(' univerul "rcdneu"; nor that they all possess some real. specifiable similarity; nor even that tbey all have the "same" dfca in a way that 'Nt! can ultimately specify in objective temu. Rather, all those things arc JUSt different from non-red things, and tht reason for meir diftcrence is simply that ., thrir ""tJlrrmcy appear that way to us when wt attend to what 'Nt! mean by "red." Even me seeming objeeUvity of thu appeal to mature lll:IIy diQPpoint some, for:ll we will see in the nat chapter, a [hing's Mnatunt (SVIIhhtillll) is also ronceprually conmuct~ through the RfHJI»-dt4Jry. On this interpreflllion of what Dharmakini means by nature, Dhamukini's talk about the naturt: of things that we call Mred" is besl understood as a way of saying that, in ultimate tcnns, there is no mcuphysically defensiblt reason for the fact that we call them "red. M

Thw, if one i, hoping fot an

ultimal~y

•• " 111;' lppn1 to the natliK of tninp b«oma Dharmakirti rcmuica:

deferuible motaphysic:a.l r_ n • I~Cnt

wMn, in a rfl.alni (Ontc:..,

Indeed. it ia /lOC COIf'C'Ct f,.. ... IIrlMui) 10 qllCltion r,.."."""".;
",,,,,...-.v..r .. .,._.,. ,-,.....,.,.'"

*1M"

116

FOUNDATI O NS OF DHARMAK I RT I'S PHILOSO PH Y

Ihen Dharmakini's answer 10 Inc problem of samenas is diuatisfying. On Ihe other lund, one might suppose thai we arc engaged in a fnunadng and frujdess enr~rprisc when we yearn to specify in precise terms the metaphysical warrant for our we: of Ih~ tttm "ud." In that case, Dharmalcirri's al\SW'er is quite satisfactory, or perhaps even liberating.

Wha£CVCf migtll be the degree ofOlutmalcini's covert skepticism, il is dear thai nis .~throry is fonnulatm largdyas a reaction to roIist theories of univenals. and with that in mind, Ont mighl mainain dUI Ohannaldni has not al all solved !he problems he sc:cs in those roIist theories. Many of mesc probkms focus upon chc impossibility of a roI. permanent universal luving any inuiruic relation to its impermanent instances:. We h2~ already seen thar, in Oharmakini'l philosophical milieu, a univ«sal such as "water-jugncss" {P .WlNlj musr be pc:tdur.tnt, foe ifit were to change, entiric:s that wert prc:viou.dy called a "water-jug" oould no longer be the rd'crents of Ihe term "water-jug. " In BUI if the univcm.l ptrdures even when one of its il\St2OC'.CS ceases. how can il be an es:scnrial propcny of mat irut2nCrllndetd. we h.aw: already noted that. if the unMml perdUI'C!i when its instances cease. then that universal is emnrially differcrn from its instanCcs. and on Dhannwnj's view, if r is tI.5CJ1tially different from,. men r cannot be intrinsic or c:s5fe1ltial (0 J. Thus, if waICf-jug-nas rp/AtLw) is different from all individual waler-jugs (:h4f4S), then water-jug-neu is not csse:ntial 10 any individual water-jug. Hena. no individual water-jug would really be a "watcr-jug."I" One mighl suppose flur rhi~ ome pmhlem applies In rJw., .rpJ-rhcory. ThaI is. if Ihe universal qUit adusion-thc nondiffcrent difference pc:t"raining 10 all water-juS' accounts fO r the sameness of those waler-juS', then mal exclwion must nOI change. But ifit docs nOI change, one mighl ;wume llul il pc:tdurcs. It would mill appear thaI Oharmaldrti has simply arrived III disguiKd meory of re.al, pc:rduranl universah, and thai the ailiosllU he hH r.l.i~ ~vin~f ~Iism would :1pply rn hil own .~rem . Inde«t. nuny subsequent Buddh.i.u philosophers, cspcci.a1ly those in Tibet • .assumed mal Dh.armakini did indttd mean for universals to be permanent, although 115 .sc... aboo
,....,s.

~ (16) and

jl.' ISn:... "-''"''''Tn ........ .- ;_""and 116

PVI.I 6ib-c

PVSV M
~ i& f...Jif in

WI _ ",. -1Jw nr-m ~ I . " tbwJ ". 'ItIJt' 11JNM!r".

_;a

DHARMAKI RTr S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

"7

they did nOI clearly cxplain how DharmakIni would avoid his own criticisms.III Fortunately, an interprtt.ation lwt:-d on Dhannakini's tCXtS alone relieves us of any tedious n«d 10 confront Dharmaltini with his own altaeks, for Dharmakini clt:arly rejeas the nOtion thai the core of his ver· sion of unNcrRls namely, cxclusions--are petmanenr:'" A

",.,,,tim. IltH"n ""tillY: IImu. tint' CIZ""nt amui", nJ;t lIS ""u)trJuranCt' ~

~nDn-ptrJuranu."

[PVl.I69abj That is. there is no such thing u all as an ~Olher-cxcl usio n ." And con· cepts of that eJ:c1usion's ~rduring or ceasing by its nature, which would follow from it ha\'ing a nature, do not make $Cnst: int

Dr

(nA ItlZlpllnu).

In shon_cxclusions are negations. and as negations, they cannot beu any propcnics at all. Hence, how could one say that they are either permanent or impermanent? This same notion relates 10 Dharmaltini's claim Ihal abstract predicates (such as "water·jug·ncss~ or ~cowncss~) cannot bear qualities. Dharmaltini nOles that it makes no sense to say, for example, Mits cown~$

is while."'" Presumably, this:tlso me2ll$ dut o ne eannO( s-ensibly

assen, "cowneu is permanent." Thi5 principle parallels the opinion5 of many of Dh.armmni's opponents, for whom universals cannot insrantiate qualities or other univeruls. By denying that exclusions can be considered either permanent or impermanent. Dharmwni avoids the problems Ih.U would arise: from the claim that his constructed universal changes. for ifi! is nOI impemunem, i! docs n Ot ch:u1ge. At (he lame time, he avoid. the problem of the univernl remaining after its instances cc:ase, fe r the universal is also not pemunem, and thus cannot pc.rdure. We have scc:n, however. thai Dharmakini admits 117 See Dtqfuo h99]:I06R) . 118 PVI.I69Ib and PVSV

.u rit.

d I .L,V- ,Ml I .... ? ..., "'Ior ....,~v /uJptt1l".

"'"

"'bJ ...MJw,.".,. fill IIWd. _Mol"."..,..,;",:,!"'!> ,-u.;_dti.._

(G:lpl-ll): ,.i.,rur I:i~'

""'J'" ....

119 DlwmUirti (PVSV ...tPVI.61, G:JH- )J.ll) dnWll dWill((ion be:f'IOtCh pmUca,e"J"U'00na (,o",.....-u.u.; and wbjcct~ (.u...... i~). In thr counc of doing to, he noIeilhac 1 predialr-apraPon. .....id! e.praw:s jusl thr mc~ adusion iudf, eannor allow fo, thr appIiealion of OIher pmlieale1 10 lhal cxdus.ion. The pall. rcadI::: "Bul ~.auld be: no difkr=a: in d.t~,ic con'lUlOoIII wed for m( Mlbj(Q o.nd I"niica,( '-'au", wj,hou, !he ~ of rc:aJ , d.lulRQ lhl"", tlxR .. no pur· P'* for it. '

118

fOUNDATION S Of OHAJ.MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

n..,
M tn_n..u for ,,,- 1M ~.IIS (i.~.• f1"Iiu" "'Ims;.ou fWiI /U "CftI1IItII·.NI ,..11m ~III ".m ......... i ;, 1Iu,INf-wr ~ Jiffrmo,..ti"f r-/j. rin (~. wink IN I."" J.n 11M. T'bU Jijformu i ll _"M r."_~,, (~ r.ttforwu u IN tq«IIUHN.J 1M JInS'" ....". ;,,. ~ , ,.,; IUInIInII [PVI.'I]. Wbm. ~ [i.c.., aliicencrJ who Iw II() apccolioNconcaning the p«ICII« of OIhttcadusionswishs ro know.-hnhc Of noc 1M _adusion ol'horw' " .ppli· abk ro • $p«ific sro- obj«t, 1M $JICUcr, in otdn 10 inform 1M listener m.1I thaI It:ind of mft~ odUJion ill appIObk. rru.ka it known wid> an aprtaion fOr which the- XIIWIlK: COIlYUlUon ha& b«n consauc:rm in thai bshion.; that is, the ~ "")'$. "N",,·honeneu pcnairu 10 this" (.!WcwtlWllllU]MJli). On 1M..mer hand. when . . . ~Mf who is "", wilno..l ap«UlioN c:ooccrning acluaioru oth« than non ·hone...,.. wi.1oa 10 know Wt Wicabi1ity of Ihe adwion of hone, then lM JpcUtt emplorl an apresaion for thc adusion ofhone: COf\SII'\JCd in I manner dlat does noc disalloorl)lhn caduaiom: in nnJer.o....uthar ob;m: koown in duol way. T1w is, lhc apukcr iI)'S. 1'hlI is I noo-honc: Haw:c. sina in d~ fomxr C&K the \IX of lhe apreNion diAllows other differmca. MKh an cxplwion can be wrd 10 apml Mi· tMr c:o-mel'ftllialil)', nOI lhe qualil)'/q......tifird relarion. For cumpk:, om ealtn(t{ pl'Of'C'lly "'y, "lu arwnen ill whi~: A prc
,r«U.Jn

...... \

~

........ ;. .... _,.-...lon 01 ......... _d....t-. a... in ..... _

nd Iolnd 01

a~, rwndy, a wbjca-apreuion,

thcrt is the- poMibilil)' of C:O-"{UUltiaJicy and the qualil)'/qualilied malion. A Nbjta-aprnt.ion may indicale c:o-~enrial· icy bcc::aux. in acrord with the ..:mantic COIIYUlrion JO¥mIi", thc aprusioo. it indi· ala thallhc q.....!ilia, whic:h a.re aduaioN, a.re conjoined 10 a qu.allI)"poAaIOf or oubjccL Sin« the .... bjca thus -=nt 10 boca W1iury dUng WI ~ nriouo puu. it thetdQrc appean thaI way in «>snition. A oubject-aprc:.ion QII abo aprra the qualiry/qualified malion bcawt; OM apecu cxhcr adwioru.. IIrllJljtutillM ..., hi ..~_~ ... "., I,..." _"

~

l ,.tIM hi I

~1IlInJ'~.ri~""riJtn4 ..

UJ-~ / ~~iu.rwIV...,,-o.;-!t IPVI ·"Jr '"~"·

,.IU ...J.",..?"_ ...J"ItM.....

~

,,'!ffU1Ii/qtt ....~"..,.,.". j iju..u

"'tlMMti"iu,.~,!, ~~ J.Unt."..,

iU"'-

""; .. • -n.m..,.. ."..nri

1)IIfIitI "....~ ""_i,"J.ilUMl"i~~ ..". ialNtri •• a,m,,",.~ ,u""," r.ur.iMiN.,-.n1ltwk ~u,. ,,..,..A~u '-n. ~,.. iri f .", nc

,.,.". ",~~n,.U.il'ilJllj ... 1hthMhiJur.~,!, .uq.~. 11M" N I fMN'" iri I "",,,Jtn~ iwIJhn 6"'1l]l rlt.· twd"..~lr 1 "inltlu,.tak tw 1 'ririyr". MIt ...ri I """"" ,.~,,~

""""If)

..,.1tJtI._

,.~'!.ttJ--i'" &1..,.,..;, .,;~ ...,. ~.t...::rnw .,.._ ... ..",~,a,.tNc tw

01·

,.....~ ".".".,...... 1

~i !7.f,J7fI) and ~;n (\.49.uH) confum that in the obow: ~, the aample, ° lu COIlO...,.. is while: is mun! to iIIustnlt an absurd statement• .sa, alto M:onoradwwKlin (PVV .. rir.), who rcrnarkI thai in this CIfIe -In INoI cue [i.e" when I prcdicale
"',.,...,Itf.,.

n,

DHARMAKIil.T1·S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

a cognitive inugt: or appearat\tt:as the positive content in conccprual cognitions. Can we not say that mu image u eimer pt:tnWlent or impermanent? Dharmaldni responds:"·

ANi.Jso lIn

.,,,,""10/ JUtrj!n.,d j1NlV/ is tiN""" thaI. NIf-

niti4n inllOlvinf _ IInillt7'1ld !Ms.'" For tIM, rtllJDn as _Ii. 1M criticism ctmurnin! JurtJllr.nu the not qp/y to otlHr-Dct:lwillPl.

[PV•.I69cdl lndoed, a conccprual cognition b:u no obj«t: it u a false: awareness r",ithyoijNi1lll) in mat it prcscnlJ a single image :as inst2nfiared in dilfcrcnt instances. Since its object does not exist, it ndmer pc:roures nor does not pc:rdure.IU An im:l8'" in " con ..:rpn.o:al cogn irio n, w h,.n co nJtruM

:;oJ

qu:al if1«1 by an

cr.dusion, seems to be an entil}' repeated in multiple insCll\Cel. Coruuucd in thaI fashion , even the menw con.tent of a conccpt'ual cognition-thc

120 PVSV .... PVI. I~ (G~ll): ~" ,mb) *?-"..",eii!"{flll";,o';";'-

.... 1thJ.~~,H_ ...' ..·Wh_ili ... w'·~IjA ... IIItim.w.;n~ .... 121 Tht in~ olthe "nTOf· (~u thc image iudfis prO¥idtd by~. dhi (zoIU jf. PVT-s:Jb¢'):

ANI. thc cxhtr-adwion thai is dw.n~ U thc copIilM ~ in a CXII'IapnaJ ~ ;, tiN "lUi ;1 iI thc miM·h 01. copIirion in¥OMnl a WI~ Wi is, of," co"..... pc:,w ODpIitioII.. Tbud""', char r.;.... of odwr-c:u:luaion abo cIoa; IlOl aW [PVT..., ~y (WirA, i_ 1M"''' ; 61.; UJI pb.lIlMtfU Ow" p1If]lll,. iii "';i W. 1# . - . , .. ...., . C'4II W. ,..'" """" n", lImJ"]l1I .. I Nt... ... """'" _]III IN. PVT·"

..,Nt ...

*

.

*

U',.~.,.,., ~

nwM,..,.....,u * ,.,.,]N" ,.,i1ft

I /J M~ Ul ";..,."-.1 ..".,,...,.;

{!

';*''fiW]i h· U'-~'';; Nhir"'9',.."j.

Karc;!abpnin (p.PJ) confirms the

1lw" miFnk~

po. of nTOf U 1M imqe il)dl: • A...t.J. ... """.

dK univtral-~ NI appem_ tho: ~ indifl'a.:nt dUllS';' dw
JIb ..aam~,..niM ..."IhW") Jtf1oo~Umw 'h -1. 122 Not.. tbac ~ (PVT.....Jb.4.) .......kI .......... mod the -.of pan of tho: commm.

JliiShdydaTcrcndy:

Why iI it: I (abe ~ iDbannaldrti Af'1 ......... BeaUiot I ~ COl! ni.ion', ob;M:, '" IIni¥mal ,.J,jd,;, "" ;~ I~,._ .11 ,,1/ tiN ......, ;_ttaf 1-1 tiN "".. '"~ ;11 Mithrr "m.rn _ ., _"m.n. Why? & r - rIw . . "',.", foist . _ .... _ t:DsI..

,rnntUJ. ..-w"

This would yjdd 1M tnNbcion: Indcod, om. ~ cosnJUon Iw no iJb1ea; Ii. II a f:ab( awarenc:fI: in thai its objca, an ~ tNl iI iruanriami in ~. imcanca.. ncit:hcr p!'rduro nor Goa i'IO( perd un: bla. . thai objea doa IlOl ai.t..

IJO

FOUNDATIONS O F DHAlMAKiRTn PH ILOSOPHY

image that appears in that awarenes:s--is unreal.. Hence, jt ( 00 cannot be .said to be t;ither permanent or impermanent. Should wt; tht;n concludt; tJut the mt;nal image itself is unruH No. wt; should nOI. for when considered simply as menal content, that image is a panicular. In mat case, however. it is no longer the combination of image and exclusion that is tht; univusal, for it is not construed as rt;pt;ated in multiplt; inst:anOeS. In mon, tht; image in a conaprual cognition is both real (as a unique menal evem) and unreal (as an apparently distributed universal). We have s«n thU motif before in the case of the "hairs- in the vistW perception o( a person with c:atafaCu. It is al that same: point in the Prllmil!'AVilmillll that Dlurmakini notes Ihat the image in conceptual cognition is both real. and unreal. He docs $0 by raising an objection and offering an answcr.'U ~ Jf a unive:rsaI

is also a thing (artha) in terms of having the narure of awareneg, then you would have: to concludt; that il i5 a parricular.• Since"lo'o"e do indeed a5St;n that a univt;rsaI is a panicular, 'Jo your nate-mem po.ses no problem for us. Bur in lemu of having the nature of other objeas, it is a univc:rsa.I in that it has thc saInt; form (or all tht; objectS mat it s«ms to qualify. It has that same fo rm because it i5 based upon their exclusion fro m other objects. BUI as a universal. (hat image in awareness is not a real thing (vastu) because il is ,hal which is expressed by language ... .

[PVJ.9Cd-uaJ .'r) 123 PVJ.9Crl-ua: jUury.~ 'nh-Jw 1hW"~ rn ,f4JIjJ;lu 1/ Ufthq~ u.,. ....,;;,._ """uU l _nw "~'rM~~ 1I rM._~ ~,•... See aOO W appmdiz ~S). 124

~d,.,.b"Mh;

(PVP:I1]a6) mmrb:

Sin« the vni~ a.ho is by rurure awarmess iue/f, _ acttpI rNl ;1 is a panicular. H.....a. "'-' ; ..... .-. ......."..... ni-! hy .1v "f'f""'...., •• n.l-.;.ninn.j Jw.

,...j.......

tt]iJ"" ,. j ,;,,;, ' " , . ' " ""'f ti 1II,w" rr]iJ,.." "" Mt/,. M fur ... pi" - ' M I cf. pW .J n·t. j~UfJ4 d~ ,..m.,.~~ ~twIJ~ . 1n Sumnurizing lhc potnl hn.:. Dreftndnb.Mh.j (PVP:u ;bl- a) r-mwU:

SiltCt it it leN..,... ,. ~ il ia: !he -----m..1 ia, ;1 is lhc alll( b«:auK lhc COS· nilion appean in thai fashion by vinu( of depending upon !he adwion of other obj«u. II doe. to 1in«;1ia produud Ih~ one·1 apmm.x (...."' ... tU.wtu) 0( oJ.., aduJN.~ "'i ... Appcarins ... ...d.. i.;. ,he: "n,""nol 0( th.o. objcco. In ..... ""'Y ;1 is defined III (bod!j a panicu1ar and I uniwoul. [.... J. hrfnI pItyi, ~ I

u.,,.

DHARMAKIRTI'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

.,.

When we combine this explanation with the one pr~ntt:d above (PVI .I69cd). we see that. when the image in a oonccprua.l cognition is considered simply as a menw t:Yem, it is real. The implication is mat, coruidered in mat way. the image is impermanent; as with all particulars. it is in oonsttm il.UL But if (he image is construed as a universal-i.e.• construed to be: qualified by a distributed adwion--it is as unreal as mat o:cIwion it..elf. and the IInre:a1 a nnn! he either permanent or impermanl!nt.

Thru W..".o!Gmstnti"IApoha O ne can perhaps already set: mal Ihe interplay ~n image. adusion and particular is crucial 10 me apo/Ja-theol)'. bUI despite ml! importance of ~ dU'~

:upecu of the I!XduJ;on proceu, Dh:rrm:lkirri himsdf did no, offer perspicuous a plarullioru of Ihe precise roles thai they play. The task

of delineating the apol»theol)' in ternu of these th~ aspccu was left to the early commenl2tor Sikyabuddhi, whose a planarion became a sandud for some later Buddhist scholars., A Sakyabuddhi remarks: Cona m ing thi' theory. there are threoe kind, oP" other-adu, ion, Fim:. there u the t:l:duded (1IJIi,,!,11I) partiwlar. because it is mat from which an: o:duded this and that other [pan:iculatl.""

"'~ ,. tf7iJ II. 1M" pM" 1M fM,,. ~ brU7I,. 'i 'l' __ 11M M IsM......, ... ; ,h,ir " 11J4f,.;.,. ",n.-", ... J.s ~,.. ;~,,. I jn M'i "",;" ... 1M

M fur ,.",u",Sf'1"j ",rsJ."

JIIUf'"

"pJ-,., t - ,.,;" .... ..,.

126 'IlUI i$ _ noubIy w ~ for SlnwUJiu :and lUmaWi.... Thftr a!XOW\l t/ W thr« lOnna of.".e. appean 10 be: t.ued upon SiJcyabuddhi'. inlt'p'tution (5« TS:1oo1o-1009 and TSP -' nt:)90-)91). a . Ortyfw (Im ::}SfI) and Sidcriu (1m),

127 pVfoS rads, "mm: obj«u thaI = .. : 128 'IlUI ....lmtt IX*' • kw philolop::al problmu. The fine ptobkm ODCK'UN HI ..., ftJtJ, which .....,..J,d "'118"'" :an ..m.....,..,.......mo. 0 .... u..-,· in .he orisinal SaIuIcm. ",.. -.I.d, h.o .. . ... __ , ..... odd, .,<>OC _ -w.I be ..... ul~ ' 0 _ . ro.-. Ur.:r'" ....., cue. I ""'~ rhw cno.m 10 inc.nprc1 thiI u a puai.... co...uuaion. Thc probable Suukril ror mil sJou of would ~ oW:: ~ _","."," (nQ(~ tN, thiI con· flNCtion docs no.: !'alliin: a plunl conjuptionl. The IC'COnd pbilolof;ical p!obkm iI tht .bUm.: ,.. ( 'Ji J.s phtI" ""'" pJu• ...J. Althoup. Ihil iI c.onfinntd by me Olber editions of tht Tibc:an ten. tht ..... ti~ ,.. iI fn:.. qumdy confWcd widllho: p.utic:k J., whid> would htre lUnd lOr a kK:am.: ~ mdill&Such. n:adinS would pdd tht Sanskrit sic.: lIS",;""",".""", Thil sJou iI in I()me _)'I ptcf~. abk 'i) me ""'" fil~ Ililo'o<:. for II roon: dc:arly UitIwI mar me p.utkIIW II tht NsilIOr .be formu1acion of adwiont. ThiI bner sJou aIJo rdatel mort ca&ily 10 tht onE

,.-.,.,.4

."JI'-"

.,w.,."

radin,

_p,""'u.

I}l.

FOUNDATION S O F OHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

It is in terms of this kind of adusion that Dharmwni said fat PVI .",O): "lhings:lrC by nalu~ quali6ro by Iheir o:clusions from all homogenous and hctcroglMcous things. ~ This kind of exclusion is established as th~ basis lOr pr.actical action through language or infcr~mial signs; bowev~r, it is not established as th~ object aprcssed by language. The second kind of"othcr-adusion~ is m~re other-ocision (,rnpJ?'I'v.urlNJanuilro1j bcca.usc in this case "othcr-o:clusion" is consuued to mean the acluding of what is other. This il what previous savants establishro as th~ nondiffcrtnu mat applies to all cascs becaust a me~ negation is not distina in any instance from any orner insClJlu. ThO! r.hiro:! fOrm of "rnher-ocdusion ~ is rhe "I'f""lr.:lnoe in" con-

ceptual cognition because it o:dudc:s what is other. H~ncc, it is what me autOO£ of the uotisc considers to be thc objca aprcssod by lan~ It is not reasonabk to say m:u such is the case in terms of the othcr-cxclusion that is the o:duded particular. This would not be reasonable because, if me: conccpl1..L:l.! image had the n"'''~

of.he (p" ....c... l".J. i....... ,Id ~ ' 0 .,in when rh.e 1"" _ ticu1ara:ascd 10 o.ist sina: they would be nondiffucllt; and what is prescnt aftcr a particuJar ceases is another panicular that is acoepted to be different from that previous panicuJar.'>t

QtC'd by Stkyabuddhi (PVI.40). Ho.cnr, RauuJUni ~..:.w,;."'I') and Jlllwrimiua ~'''''''''lU-'J01), who rckr to • .5imiW (bue flO{ quie~ idmlical) thred'oId fofft'lI..1alion, boch auoc,alc dill po. wnh .,.~_.. and nor wid! mr adudtd panialbr. Ftou.Lly. the third probkm cono:rnI the mcanin, due dorive fn>m thit PThat ia, it is dar thaa Sikyabuddhi wist.a 10 ha~ ,his way of CONUV.iIlJ .. rmr to the: pMtKclIf as I un)q1lC' nll ify. This would fIIFl tJw, gIou iMwt •ec:oIded by RaaWdrti and abbc-Ma1Cd I'O .. by JMnalrimim. Ramaldrti and JlUndrimill'll ~ proI:W>Iy rJnrin& co _ l aIn P"f"uuotion of~i'l praa!gtion. and this is ON: tQIOIl for haiuti", in adopIins their rWi"" In addition, their Pou Rquim us (0 cnw:Pd the obbliw: panidc "'" 10 I iii., and Iinoe thac It( no! ohm coofi.ucd, ow ~Iion ....,..J.,I1u~ 10 be made: on Imumic: JIOIIndt aIonc. Thus, a1tbouF ;u". ..",....."u ..~" nuy well bc:!.1 coo~ !he lMIlIin, inemdcd by Sikyabuddhi. I Iu~ .-kc:ted (0 In~ the 11011 II ;1 sanda.

we.w. ...

,.,.-u.., .,..

...,IiI.""

...-u ..,..,..".

129 ~ WVT:1OOOJfF.PVT-r.Jb1fi): 'Jir ,.; P'- Jd .....; nu.. ""'".., Ji.. Nr~ "", i ,."r "''''t'...tJh,vo",..

" / ,, &hit tol"; 'Ji "",~" u", p" .,{ ft},. .... Ji" At",,;.,...JuuJ

w.r,.

_11"''''''w..,.. . .

_ I .u.-• .... p1w.gi .... .., "" 1u.,,... "",.; 6nnr~ r ..,, / r'.... • 1 'Ji ~"C.,.,..w", 1fIfI' "" " " "'" i I/J.II ~ kyi nno ..,;J'" ...... 1-pJMf "'" Ji" ",' /,VoIr ~,., .,.. ... "]ill ... ,.; -Ji" ,... / pfo ,. ....r.zh- J:l*I,. i fh1ir,w"

DHARMAKIRTn METHOD AND ONTOLOC Y

' ll

H~~ we: find ~uddhi describing m~ panicular. th~ adusion and the imagr in t~rms of thret: difk~nt ways of understanding th~ Sanskrit compound 1Iny4p6ha. lbc panicu1ar is -mal from which Othe:r is o:dudcd" (1IS11I4J IInytUi .po""'t~).'· AJ such, it is th~ 1lJiff!114. the "isolatM.," the: "o:ttaCted," or simply tht -acluded: In shan, it is an utterly uniq~ entity. Th~ o:clwion itSelf (vy4urni) is the: m~re "excluding of o lh~r" J'Dh4_m). And me: im.llgr u rh.lll rhmugh or nn rhe: huu of which one: excludes other (Imy"" IlpohyilU ·"rlU) . This duc:d'old schema allows Sakyabuddhi to clearly separate three aspects of the exclusion process. To understand the full implications of this interpretation, let us sec how it responds to four problenu that the IIPf4theory must addre:ss--namely. problems of (I) the relation between a universal and panicubrs; (, ) the dinrihurinn of.ll nnnttiuenr, (J) rhe men",.1 cnnrenr of cnnt:r:pnl.lll cogni _ cions; and (4) the discontinuity betwttn m~ntal content and rd'erentt. In addirion to unpacking Sikyabuddhi's int~rprttation , our ~ to these qucstiolU wiU also aUow us to restate the analysis of the I1poh4-r:heory that we have given th us far.

(11",,-

me

(I)

UII;IJtI'UII_;'UtllllC't

" Lu;,,,,

This problem is the one m.u we: cited :lt the beginning of our discuuion on universals. and we: can f(:iten.te it in the form of a qucscion: if there is no u1rimatdy rc:aI universal instanciated in aU its instances, how can the

:dJj.., P"t nr,... oi "'" q." (P: "'" -J J.r P _1ItI -' '" ft#fJ*' "" ~,."... "" pIMf,.yi""" __ rM"""'" _,. ~,.., - ",. i ~, "" I" ,,,,,,.,,; 'Jis ph- .J.., ;,nI,.;,;,,;, "... ,.., ".,,.; "'" t. nut",

1M pJ,. till'" JUt

'*",.

,_"," i~'lI fP"f""" kif --ft'S ... ih;.J,,"~" ttyiJ ... tiM ~ .. iIi,.",.. 1M!.p1 u,..,.,ti",Dba "]iJl4r,..i.a-, ... .". _ "?*' ,. M",;"", II I M;..,....,.;4. Ow".,." ... M..w,,. PI" oM..., Dro,u l JIM JM,. ,.,J ,.; ~, "" f ,..", ti IIUJh.,. ",..,.... , . P"I',." ,. J" """ M I.s pJ-

",... 'J.UlI l

.4."'"....,

_ I Jj ... .1UbJI ... """.+6.1-. ,..,dhhJ~""lIuW~;MoIt.i...-M ... ~tlIJdk!i;pi,~~. ~ ~ I ,.. '" "'...~ I .""..",.~,.,."""ft J.itW I ~", ~ in I "" IIIrwWiJ..Jnv~" ~"'~II f ~."..". ....... '" ; .. . fh f ~ .. .RUbotl 1,ij.,.".uu..,.,uyiMi· .... ~ f Ir.! ... lJooI .•. • 1If'I6I!I f nwL,~.. MJ,.·Aj'foJll# I rM .,.mw,!" f ~· ""'_~JII1!' fIInrI;" "UfJrUJ 11M 1"11 n,p..n "'~!Jhwr.,!" Jilt

Ub..,I..".... ....,... b\... ",'

.,.~ /,..,

I:rM

u,"" -J*I it:!-

......

nWww.,

130 Thlti. a cooj«nlral ra:oruuuction tucd upon

dwn~

(f'VT:z00b4): if; loorp/»ll

",,,,phII,,.J,,,,,,,,,,,,',w,,a.Sco: the: phiJol.osieaI mnuIu in dl« ~ nou.

1).4

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAkMAKI RT I 'S PHILOSOPH Y

concept ~fire" have any rdarion to me pan icul:u s that we call " fire "~ O n Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, the claim that the panicular is ~ th at from which all others are excluded" jusrifies for Dhacmakirri the relation between a cognition that involves a univcrsalluch as the concept "fire" and a specific instance of a fi re. Thai ii , the univma.l "fire" rcfen 10 all fi res because all fi res are diff't.mn from aU otha entitia thai do nOI have the causal characteristia o:pc:ctcd of .something we call "fire : This differen tiation of all fires from non-fires is not a mere whim, fo r it is basI!d upon the uniqueness of each mlity that we call a "fire": each one is actually differcnl in all ways fro m IlUother entities. Although we consuua a universal by focusing upon only .some of thO$(! differences, Ihis docs not vitiate the IX! that Ihe differences we do focus upon arc basI!d upo n the uner difference of the entitia in question. ThUl, since the univcrul- which amoun ts to a sd ccrive difference or acl usion-is based upon the utter difference of each entity. the universal has an indirect relation to thO$(! entities.OJ'

(2) Distribution This second problem concerns IlIfIltlJll. the disuibution or continuity that is nC'C"Pry for a universal ro apply ( 0 muhip\e instances. Here the quation is: if there is no real univerul instantiated in all instances of fi re. what sameness could acco unt for the faa that we can refer ro all of them as fi re? O n Sikyabuddhi's interpretation, Dharmakini accoun ts for disn ibu-

131 TM nocion of a "Jdc:ai,(" difktrocc orcxduaion can ~ K'CfI in, for exampk. tM foI· lowing pN " (PV5V ,.jPV' ,9' nJb: G,..9.1'--t9-1J). which rcfft1llOW di~anIOIl& uhim.o,dy minp ~ "p...al tn"D' ("'!".~ i .. UK .... u{ I ~.i.iu ..:

dis.,,,,,,

H.";"I stnf tNt miJ11' {arthu) • • /J~,u.tfornl. ~",p/iJI tIN 16"'~ IIIk fo"m." (. " bWiyl) ,..d. ~ tIN r.r.td..J"m, rr"j.illJ 1M IlIilh t:tprmi.1fJ II¥I ,n, 111 thri~ Htyrr tIw Ji/frrntn fiw", tbi"l' u..1 ." .tINr u.." 1"wINII ur,,,,p/iJllbt .Prmtnltilw ut.s. H..Ii1tf.", II, "., c." Ibnr M'llJ'liu II¥I ""., """';, tIN 16"., ~ 1M .fo"",nrti.NIi mi"l'- ........ ovbt:oI.", INf .",,,,," ,mil'· .tuIJ ..~ t/ti1tf./tbt 16_ ,,~. [PVI.98 nib], II hat al~ been .aicl lu

,-'wri." .{

PV •. 7S) duo ......

."t

,hi""

d-ash ........ ouch .. the ~ and 00 _. ""' dinjnct. they accom ·

plish lk.......: Idil: function. A prnon __ rNl amons things. tome aaompliah dv: .......: Idil: function, JUCb . l k pi'odl.lClitn of an ~ U wth thaN: thinp arc coocq1(u.al1y diHinguiWd &om 0100 things !hat do 001 do to. ThoJc, things thlll produce by dxit vny ~t\Il( • &L.r: a~ in thai ptnon.; thai tlO'UalClJ iI asIOIiIltd with apru&ionr W I l\aV( as Ibrit ob;ea 1M adusion of tho.c things from dial which doa 001 pa rorm the afomncntionrd actMiy. 'J'b.iI &It( 11II2mI(SI iI tIIw 1M rccocnition. I'ltUI iI m.1-' 'I'h4 rccocnitionaiawarcna:l arna beaUS( lbe: imprinl pbad In UK mind by dull per""" pln10w apc, ichcc baa bca-o ...........ocU [loy wh... 1Ih... pruendyl«inlll . In Ib il aa of ~ilion lbe: differenc.. bctwct:n lhole

DHARMAK!RTt 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'l!

tion through the mere · other.acluding" that is the exclusion (vydvrttj) irxlf.1u a negation, Ihe cxdusion can be colUtrUCd as conrinuow across all irs instances becaU$C, as Sakyabuddhi notes, a mere: neg:uion cannOt be distinct acros.s instances. A negalion is also not Juscqnible 10 the critiques mat Dlwmakirti levels against the distribution of rtal universals. For example, some of his arguments re:ly on the claim that, if a universal5ueh as "WoIterjug_~· {z1lll.t4I1JM)~rr a rr.aI cnnry. rhen it mulit ~ cither Ihe.u.mc as or dilfewlI from the irutmce:s in which it is instantiated. If"WlItcr-jug-ncss" wcre' idt"ntK:alto any specific Wolter-jug, then as with that watcr-jug iuclf, it would not be distributed ovcr other instances. On thc other hand, if "water-jug-ness" 'NttC something cssc:ntially othcr duln its instances. then once again it cannot be distributed. Among ,he many rasons cited by Dhunuki"i i., rhe cbim th:u a cngnition of rhinv :u rh e .a rne mu1t al.'iO

indude the cognition of those thin&, as differem, but if the content of a conceptual cognition is JUSt a univma1 distinct from its instances, the difference among the instances would nor be included within mat cognition.,n Implicit hert is the nmion that the final justification for the claim that an entity is distributed is a cognition in which that emity appears to be distnhmf!d (i.e., an ...~prtl.tip.un) . In conrr.H:t, when mn.cid .. rf!d:l;~ a mere

negalion, :I; universal construC"led through Musion encounters no such difficulties, because as a negation, it cannot be said to be dther ultimately the same as or di/krent from its instances. In a sense, by relegating distri-

fhinp iI p.-d . - (..~~ (jU~~ ..", ..", JmW IthNlt )i hmwub f flrN1f'J """"1IJfl~i~ JJw....iMib uN I u'f'riJIl fTUYIlj... IlijU,..". h"M .." fl",.u,uN lPV'.tI-99JIbJ f to!_ $ ' Mt-M I" MINt ~ri!'l'i ~"w;...J iri I ,.", ....",. jUtU.iiU.. ~ ~to JNd1fl" ~1
1)21"hocx and othrr UJ'lI'"I'MU an found at PVSV .JPV,.I)9C.d-'07Ul. 5« abo PVSV .J PVI.1I0 {G:' 7.7--' Sj:

... d" nondiffttmc:t; of lhinp coruUu of dw IKt thai Wy ~ the: ~ dfton. A..J tIMl ..- - . ,br...p tfforr is.oJy 1M nrbui.,11 .JriM, ....hk. ___ -.... ,;"" 4fm. II is only dw land DOl _ .q>uafl: \UII¥maI] krlltoSta ral thins wbicJI it.u,,,.,, ,IN ,1tj"1fm ",-, it .....ifil$ ...."..,J,ftI! it Ji'trihuJ ....... ""'''-' ,...../IUI is lUI Hs, ,.",Ii,. ;, 1Nu.1u imI fll.ru.lJ rrfotnl. lPVI.I toa-<:]. Indttd. dwR is no IUd! 11moasal thai, aItt.ouP tK"xptibk, Ippc::ar ro 1M: dift'em\, from iu insunca. I

-.!>Of

.•he..!r 0UlCd 0.1 ... [No caou •.yk• • t I'VSv "'1'"V"'JI'I'~.unolol . Or, i( tha~ wa~ MICb • IInivnuJ , il would noc be Ioared in anr of iu i,..nn.cQ. How COIIld if be Iw~

1}6

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAItMAKIRTr5 PHILOSOPHY

burion [0 :I nq;ation, Dharnukini blocks any :lnf!mpf :I[ raising disnibution (or:l distributed entiry) to thf! levd of ultilrnlltf! realiry.on

1M ClUK of an awumcss1And we have alrady pramit'd I proof lOt ~ ~wion of .ud> • ullivcn1J. Th<,tfOi<. Jhc comInlCtion of Uu., type' or III\j ~ is WfOII&. !"wi>Jwt.riaw iJM".,,..,. UIJc~ I JJ dwlk.".~ I tN ..I 'J"S]tl".NJ1iuft I _~ ~ n4f

SIn

r",'i 00... go f _

hi """',. "~_1IRI7..n._ PI ftNriJ .Ulriu'!' brIM,. jUJUIJmi, in f "..~ .. .tJJM,..

u .........,...bm). 13) f«. rdfvan. P"P3F. '" MY "'PV,.Q-;oo, rrarulalni in me ~ ~ also ~ IOUowiI1l (PVSV "'PVl.IlI; G:6J-16-6.t.I6). Nou mal in m~ fWAC", IIu.YC insmni!he ~pkof-Uft:" and "non-im:"lOasrod..iFy Jhc ~I: TMdi~ Itha< is Jhcdinaob;c-n of ~1 ha. no _nlW .... IW'( (.~ Tbu -.: ~ i, .. ","-..ins an tskntiaJ n.aJUn (~~;" simply I eqe of oosniove oonfiuioA. iI;, _ ..iii_*,. ..i.ui,.,.dNnviu, tbnt_ ..._ .....it rlMt. fflfI tho'lff n«Wi.,. ouIndI ;, • _ I /biltf 1#9'''~. 76it

n.""UII'_ . ....W••

'f_

M._

h.J. tliJj"rrn«IN... "-t. " (PVI.n .. ] An eucnlial OWun (riiJl4) it whal a thi", is in ~ of!he u1umaK. lr .diffc,uu [....,;h. medilti:JUIIO< from non",fttl ~ 10 haw: 11\ CllmIW n.run. d.m il would rithct 1M. tnmlially 1M iruu.noe Uu.1 il qual iroes [i.~ . tp«ific Uft]. Of dK il would bo: aKntiaUy whal ill not mal ~ (i.e., it ~ not IM..ha. ,ftt1. ,(;.-.... in - . . u... u..w- ludf. ohm;u.. dw u.-na. would IM.diffamtialD: doa not ","ve dw: ....."'" ofbeing -Ihirts dk. Hmo:, me ...... tiaJ owun of the diffucna.not to be-;we 11M. (5pCCific IIftl. and ill UKllIiaI .... run is w bo: tornethint 0Ihcr Idw! tIw ,roe-Wunu]. Ru. in caK •• hi:.tkct, dw: dung [i.e., tht I~~] would btc::rd....t.d "'"" ma. ldiff...."'a: from non-ln!Oi:]. Hmcz, ON' could not ay du. tht inSlana (i.e., 1M ipt'Cific .ra:1 has I diffdtno< from thOR ! i .~, non· .m:t]. FOf dut whic:h is tUtudni fro... lIOmCthilll is p~ th:o. IaUft' thin«.- "ThaI'" diflUaoa: !No: is one thin« c:annoo: pmain ro lOOK odItt .hey would N." no Ieb,ion bt""ecn than. I( thtrt W(f( I rdation. i. woukI ha." 10 be- mu:awddfm rda.ion !bcaUK tht rwo ctllitia: ~ difftmoc]. III m..: QIt. 1M di(· f(lt,1IO< would be all -nI.i.&I ptDpUi)' tN •• ptoduad br w panicuIat. HmO<. slnot lhing c:alkd "di/ferm(ft" and minp c:aIkd "effi.cu" woukI ..... br disrina. aU cffcca woukI br adusioru thai pertain 10 dxir alUel. Mooco.t•• if the diIk,.,oa: [from rIOn-lrCt] W(f( in UKnot ~ odItt Ilhan !he lr=illSW"Oot it IttmIIIO quIIifyJ. ihtn the [differmc:c from non·,fttl abo would h__ • ,Ii"'" . _.~ ft.or" , ..,.. [.-On........... ,,,-" i. 'l.... lir..,,). "",,,.. oinac (..... I;~ from non·.fttl would have as iu ddimitins quali'1 (..;i*i) I diffi:>woe [from tIw uce-iMWIOt]. it would not br a difkrma pcrWnir\110 WI iMUnot, jwt I f an u llirdy diff""," .. ,btlanor doa noc poruin 10 lhal ilUlII'I«. Bu. [the diffumoe &om non-.fttl ...... ittd( ddimitcd by. diKC=>et" [from iQ in.rtancott). llUItad. one qualify Itho:: Itcuayin&1, "'This is (mit .m' . ] diffuuoa: from tNl (non·Uft]: Honco:. irwm..m as ;1 Iw no ddimilinJqualil)'. tht diffumoe doa not cUe. Th.:n(o«. tht dilK,tuO<;" no! ditiinc [bum tht illlOl>tt mal i, ~ to qualify]. and ';noe. lhcK it no third P' "il*;.,.I«. caJ ohi.. looM.-
.ha,

mu. ........ , K

*"

DHARMAKIRTI 'S METHOD ANI) ONTOLOGY

(J) Mmt4i l'IJntmt

1he problem of mental or phenomenal oonte.u arUes when a univenal is construed simply as a mere negation, since Dbarmakirri and bis interlocutors all maintain that affirmative c:oncepru.aJ cognitions (j.e., those mat ue not negations) prcsent some positive content as an objcct in cognition. For Dbarmwrti, this positive content would be: an appearance or image:: in me mind. If. hnwrver. (he univenall~ a meTe neg:r.rinn. men a cnnc.epmal cognition-i.e., one mat has a universal as its object- would involve no positive content at aU, fOr how can a negation be: pr~ted in a positive: fonn? This is the airicism kvdcd by the Naiyiyika Uddyotakan against the initial fOrmulation of the .:JpJ»-thc:ory proposed by Digniga. Dbarmak:irti'l predccmor. Uddyot2kara remulcs: There is this notion that me object 6mlM} of me word "cow· is tbe otber-cxdwion, "is not a n on-cow.~ But is tbis otberadusion an existent (bJuiw) or a nonexistent (llbluillllJ. lf it is an existent, is it a cow or a non-cow? Ifit is a cow, men we have no disagrttment. But if me object oftbe word "cow· is a nonrow, then , my goodness such sJdll in ~m:ultia! On the other hand, it is not reasonable that the othef-exciwion be a nonexistent because a nonWsumt is not the objea of either the act of conveying meaning nor the act of undemanding what is conveyed. That is, through me word "cow~ being hnrd, one neither conveys nor undersClllds a nonc:rislent. In addition, me object of an apression is cognized by cognition, and no one cognius a nonexUlem:as a rauh ofhe:.rinS the W'Qrd "<;ow.-')<

.....hi"y_ """ f ~1'/UrtM .... II~tIM ... hi Mn.li J,MJ" ~ i n",!fh I/"JII hi ,.",....... ~ ! iIhnW fflI..w,-"" ~ I N".. II~"'" N I ~ uJ ~ ~JtytU __ jJ,*u I .... hi IM7" ..,.... UtJIMY" I .... uJ """ ~ ¥"" I ~ d1tJU nw IJIZ ! utili (II 1HJl_ t4mJU .,n-rtn4 ! ,.. 1..w"lJ" Md. iii .... 1Jll 11'" ~ J '.IM, al WJha' u~ uJ ~ uJ lJJ",,,,,nli .. i}w I>btJ. iii (II "" fyi. I .... '" II",.RJ"S1" ~"1JwNIi I u,.......JhJIHJl.t f ""Ii "" "" !lryIIUn!'4M4"" iii ~If' ujjllJUU1!f Md.. if] llviJqJt I -UrJi!'; ~".,!, ~ I'Jl4! I tfI

~~ ~

_~

f

"?h! ili~""""

~"UrwlW (II

.IN.J.t;- tAU

r.Jrii,.""

..w,.""

.,.t

WwJ" i n ~pUJtilvit ""I1J
&,

." ~

""~~.1 .

1)4 NY:,,?I..,. ..JNSLLU! "'"I'l)oar "'?"Iv & 'fo ~1Ir ... M.n.titi t'(,w"ijfl>*!t. ,. ~""

1)8

FOUN DATIONS O F DHAlMAKlRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Uddyorabra's point is that, rtg2rdless of whnher Dignaga considers an other-exclwion to be existent or nonexinent, he cannot mainwn his claim that the object of an expression (JabJartha) is an other-aclwion. If an othcr-cxclwion is an aistcnt thing, and if the object of the word "cow" is an other-exdwion, then in order to avoid the absurdity of claiming mat the object of the 'N'Ord "cow" is a non-cow, Digniga mwt admit that the otherexclwion is a real thing innantiated in all cows. But if Dignaga were ( 0 assent to such a position. he would simply be upholding Uddyorabra's own theory. The other option is to claim th:at an othcr-cxclwion is a nonexistent (.bMIIIl), but Uddyorabl1I rejtttS such a claim 1xa~ expt:rience tells us that when we ~ words sud! as "cow," the objects of those words arc presented affirmatively as aistent, and not negadvely as nonexistent. On ~buddhi 's interpmation, Dhannakirti accounts for the positive content ofsuch cognitions by pointing out th:at the cognitive im:agc (lk4ra), "that which acludcs other," is indeed pan of what constitutes a universal fo rmed through adwion.'" But in the course of including the cognitive im:age within the aclwion process, Dh:armwni goes bqond merely accounting for mental content. In addition, Dharmwni also claims that the cognitive image is that [ 0 which one applies the negation th:1.t is the aclwion itself Indeed, this is precisely why Sikyabuddhi refers to it as "that which acludes other." And since. as ~ have Sttn, the exclusion (vylvrm) is what accounts for the sameness that allows for distribution, that sameness applies actually ro the image itself. and not to the p:aniculars that gcner.ncd that image. Nevertheless, on Dharmakitti's view, one can soU claim that aclwions have an indirect relation to particul:an 1xa~ the uniqueness of images corresponds causally to the uniqueness of Ihe particulars that produced them.'JoO The construal of the cognitive image as the lwis for the selective negation thai is me exclu.Uon has an imporwlt implicarion WI we Mve touched on earliet: when Dharmakini spt:aks of universals, he means a combination

IJJh. ~ iii III , - Mtl~ ~,. p"" tifft' in {II, - p~ rulsti 1Ii~ III . dMtm .n. ~IJmW.t4tIt- I .MMIIIU ,., "" ,..!~ ~ PI "" pIltltJAlr.""ruU MJ.iw ,m,. "" "" ,.".".ri,.m!l l ~ f . ,wi· f'U'1I ".,.,.~, "" u pMUM .Mh.I", A.Jrit ".n~". iii. pU~

,,.,;,-t,,.,,.,ti,.,,,.,

'i

1),5«, 1'01' o:nmrk, PVSV "/PVI."-1o. cmub,cd in me appcnd.U:. 1}6 ThO. I'orm..L.ti.on oppIia only

<0 ..... i,..,....J..,

!he only type of univcnalt lNI _

an'

fo, mod on .Iw: buio of rcal .ninp. ......id. art

comidmn& MR.

DHARMAKI RTI 'S METHOD AND ONTOLOGY

'J9

of image and the aclusion. The a:dwion on its own cannol be the universal because it lacks meneal. conlen!. But the inugc on itS own cannO! be the: uni~rsal bta~, as a menial particular, an imagt: cannot be distributed. (.,) DimUllil'lliity lutwtm am/ml.lIIa rtftmr«

The role lhat the cognitive image plays in the construction of universals 1M! fO [hil fOu"h problem I.h:u rh~ "P"~['->ry must :>ddn51. Th~1 is, Dharmwni dr«uvdy maimains that the 5ubjective experience of a conctptual cognition-i.e., a cognition involving a univma1-is of a menw im~ or appearance. Likewise, the sameness established by c:xclu.sions actually applies to the cognitive images; hentt. our conccprual cognitions are actually presenting an image as me same as orner images. and not a particu lu as [he umll' U othll'r p~"icubn:. But if WI!' ::Ifll' "p"rill'ncing mll'n~1 images, and if the 5a11\eness inherent in concqxuali[), applies to images, why would ~ act on p:uticulars? In other words, if I employ inftrtnces that leads to the conceptual cognitions such as -there is fire over there" or ~sound is impermanenl," men those: conceptual cogoilions arc actually directing me just to images. And images do nor perform any of the Functions opcaed of the enr.l._ment:al p~icuhr, we would c:tll - fire- or "sound-; ~nce. if my purpou ~ 10 wum my hands or to nuke a sound, me conc:q)luai cognilion has pre$CIIlcd me with $Omcthing that CIII'II'ID/ fulfill that purpose. DharmalcIrri cannO! $Olve mil problem by mainaining that conceptual cognitions-i.e., cognitions involving univnuls-cakc pMticulars as their objects, becawc, as we have: already ~n, DharmalcIni denies any such possibili[),. One mighl appeal to the causal rdation between image and parlicular. but while this may be lTUe when such cognitions are analyzed. they

do not in fact present themselves in that fashion in practitt. Thai is, in practice ~ do nOt think, M There is fire- and then think. M The fi~imagc construed as universal in the conceptual cognition. 'mere is fire : has an indir«t causal relation with $Ome actua1 fire, $0 I should move toward. the actual fire . ramu than warming my hands at me image.- Instead. we simply move toward the fi~ l .t1 In cffccr. ,his founh problem is p.sychologica1: mere is a di.scontinui[), between the subjectiyt content of conceptual or linguistic cognitions and

137 In addilion TO PVSV UPV'.91 (cind atx-. n.,8) I « a11O. for aampk. tIM: IrptncnU iii againsc an "ilimatdy c:Itina1, c:bu-Iiyt (}tin) u tIM: object of aprcJ-

in

PVSV PV,.,..«

lions (ld MrdJ/I). 1M poin, oflheK ugwncnll il mal iflhe:acnuJ alntml 01_·1 00f;'I,. lion ;,.~ . mm or.e willaa upon !he univnW, .nd no!: upon tIM: parti(uIar.

.40

FO UNDATI ONS OF OHAItMAKIItTl'S PHilOSOP HY

th~ ~f~~ntt of m~ cognitions to ili~ tdically dliacious paniculars on which ~ act. Adopring the voitt of an objeaor, Dharmakini puu the

problem miJ WIly: ·WeU, through this universal which you ha~ dcfmed :IS dilttrenee, does one cognize me particular as me same as other paniculm, or does one: cognize something dse [-namdy, a cognirive inugo-J as me same as other [imagcsP If me panicubr iJ whar one: cognit.es as me same, then how can it be an object of conttprualiry? And how could thm be Idie function (~rth4Itri]i) mrough ma, other objecr [i.e., the imageH And [if the inugc: were the obj«t) men on~ would not cogniu: universals such as impermmcnce :a.nd 50 on in paniculm. Thus, the panicul:a.rs would nor ha~ impertn:l.llencc:a.nd such as thor na.,u~, :a.nd impenn:a.. nenee and such would nor be the qualitlc:s of rtaI things."'" Dharmakini's mponsc: is 10 mainl2in that all conceprual cognitions involve a fundamental error (bJ,rintl): namdy, Wt due to a beginninglc:ss imprint (.Ni4iwis4M) in the min
I.r"'!"""

1)8 I'VSV "/PV' .7sd (G;.p..J-..1): Iti,.,.. _ _ 'hi &t,+,o- ~...",......,..- ....

~ iri,~", nIv"",;",. , Iti,. tiu; I,,*,,' ..t..~,. ~ ~ ~

....._ "

1 • .,._ H It.tJ,.,. ."IMItriJI I

-v~~ ti,.j".~,

139 On !M lIO[ion of 1M Iq,inninpCSf imprint,

..rirn .~,. . , . d _ _

Jet, (Of

cxampk, PVSV .,/ PVI.'-4

(G :}·P)-17):

Soon- objtt.... "Bu. lina one cu:l.uded !lu ",;' OWN upcalM in other mingo ....... (an iu other-adusOon be • ..... m,naI!. II is a lItIivnAI bcalUC it appcaf1INI way in IM<:OpIition ofR. aI~ chen-;. ac:ruaUr no .....ivena! JHr .... A Linp.owiaUy bued msnffion OCXUf1 in such a way ml[ i, ,.......;",..,. (~.lQrLmonDl ,hi .......'~.., .... , ..ruallyJ -.0..,..1.. and;, dn... 10 IUIda !he influnlOt of alq,inni..ge. propensiry 10 oombiroe <:OpIitiw inug:s in dW F.ubion. Ihlm- ilUlfi", dw)w ~"Pj M ...,..-,hJj,jft...,.,... , ..thUh" fiIIPM ,,.,;~, I ... ..i ii'!'rit ......,.". lObUs'; I ~ 1noJJJJi, .,.u;".~ -'!fI!Hbt .,; Aw"",.,. ~!;'lJti j?lu-1 .

S« abo PVI.JO'j: The objco;t of 311 aprcuion b .;ru..1eci in I c.onapnw cosnilion IN. hal :uiM:n due .., bcpnni..g- c:opo"r..: ionprin..: it io one: 01 throe kind. 01 cntin.:. (""--J i...... mud> ... it;. "-d mhrr upon rnI thinp,lItIrnllhinp. or both.. t• * .........

",1w"",..u.WJn"; 1ul.i.Jz

...wi....

Iw rriItiJJM " - - " ""'''''d'~J.1 .

DHARMAKiRTI'S METH OD AND ONTOLOGY

'..

specific content of each conceptual cognition is iudf the result of anomer imprint (viJANi): the imprint left upon the mind by the pera:ptual ape· rienee of the paniculan represented in that conceptual cognition.'· Dharmwni raises this theory al a number of points. but perhaps the mO${ salient presen12tion occurs in his response to the obj«.rion raised just above. Since this pasnge combines all the dements thai W'C: have di.scw.sed. i[ is woRh ciring in full : This f.auh (i.e.• Wt conceptual cognitions would not guide one to particulan;) does not apply becaUK in rdation to the appearance in conccprual awareness. W'C: form conventiofl.l ("1"v.JHirIl) for universals. co-.cfuemiality. and the subjca-prcdicalc rdation. ~J21 :IW:ln"n~:u1Y!S ;n ~ on ;mrnntt ~hu h:awbttn left by pe.a:ptual o:periena. which apprehends the IUtuteS of real things. Even though it does nOI haw those reallhings as iu objca. conceptual cognition ~ to haw those things as iu objea-the nattm of conceptual cognition is to imagine that its objca has the IUturt of being an extra-mental thing. Conceptual cogni6on OttlIB in thar fiuhion b.ec,"~ it is by n:arurt produad by the imprinu mal previow experiences of panicul:an have pbctd in the mind. Sintt concqxual cognition is [indlttcdyJ pr0duced by objccu that have nondifJerern effectS. conceptual cognition ittrns to apprthend a nondiffertnt image of an object. 1bat image is ultimatdy tht WIl( in thai it is dilfen:nt from other objem that do not accomplish the intended function. The;""'8'" which. "P~ 10 !he oo~ ~il;"n seernIi TO

be o:temal. singular, and capable of tdie dficacy. t:ven though it is not. It appears this way becaux pmons engaged in practK:al action (J1]IlwJMrill) proceed by imagining that an aspect of their concepl is that way [i.e.• o:rernal. etc.l. Otherwise. they would nOI engage in such activity. Because it appcan as something that And PV,.1,: 1lIc appc:arana of &II Glcmw 1U[1ft with rrprcI [0 a dau-Iip 01' the: ~ of an ob;m .. if the: un~ ~ ia _tUI nat\m it a ropIi~ mot'. lluo, mot' it caused br menw condi[ionins thai coma &om .mns minp thai war ~nu bqinninpc. lime:. ,....."". .........". 'ar)VJ u~ .. tr~ 1 ~1I,q, WtMIiHli-u,u,yJItj ' w";"";¥J

me

I".

140 hl .ddition 10 the: P"OP cited juK bdow. _ alto MV .,{PVI.70 (G:)I.I]-U ). "{ PVI.71 (G,...,.1O-1I). and .JPVI.,I "ab (G:.,.u).

142

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKI RTI ' S PHILOSOPHY

i5 c:tpable of:ll tdie function.

m~ cognitive :IIpptanncc:.s«flU 10

bt different from dut whieh does not luve th:llt tdie function , bUI it is not ultimately real btausc it i5 not :II f.acror in a praeti. cal lest. as I will explain. Those mentaJly experienced objects Ihat come about through real mings Itt app rehended ( 0 be the same by virtue of that univusaJ because they appear in temu of an exclusion from some other things. But a panicular if nO{ what i5 apprehended as me same because it doa not appear 10 a conceptw.l awareness. Those conceptual appearances, while appearing ( 0 be cs.dudro from some other dUngs. also appear 10 possess adusions fro m those other things; as such, they apjXaI to be nondilTerent. Although those conCC'pruai objects are not real in and of themselves. concc:ptual cognition presems (lIpU4rUNlJ them as if they wtre. H ence. one forms conventions for universals to group many objectS and C()orcfercncialil)' to abstract muhiple qualities from a single object-the apparently distributed object of these conventions is faI.sc. Every ro nvenoon, being CQnSICucted through the imprinu len by aperien(cs of particula rs, i, erro n ~us (viplAva). Ncvtnhdess, conceprual cognitions whose production is connected to paniculars arc UUStwonhy with regard (0 mose paniculan. even though those paniculars Itt not appearing in lhose conceprual cognitions. An o:ample is the erroneous cognition of a jewel when one sees the glimmer of the jewd. Other cognitions arc not trustwonhy because, ~en though they also arise from a distinction of lhe thing. these other cognitions fail 10 dete rmine the: dutinaive qualities of the thing in acco rd with the way in whieh it was experienced;'" having fail ed to make thar determination, they ! uperim pose some other distinction OntO the dUng by app rehc:nd.ing$Ome dighl similaril)'. An o:ampic i5 the cognition of a jewd whcn one sees lamplight. '"

,"I

Sik,-..buddhi (PVf:96->. 1<:,8)) po-s .,,_..!"' ... "ik~

1"2 PVSV .... PVI.1sd (G:"'I-IH1.11,

tWy.

I,..

~ ~~

I jMu/wiM4si,., ",.,IN tJ ...."""."..tW/hiIt.r"~,.,.u;""".;. n4j jUtW,!, _6IJh..rrlln!lil".. M.tNll
";ut,-Iu,,, ."."."",

,nou..· 'l'~ oJ"..

h, . .

" j.. . ,4U~ ~",."+ oJ · ,' ',..-;;_ ~" . ...~Jm.. tM.."",IJ>d"!".""...m.....u..nh,,,. IMN", 'niMlth-!> ,r",;MJ,;

DHARMAKIRTrs METHOD AND ONTOLOG Y

'"

To overcome [he discominuity bc:tween menral content and refttc:nce in conceptual cognitions. Dharmakini here prc:se-nu what amounts to a - the· ory of unoonscious error, ~ as Tillemans has called it. In orner words. A type of error (bhrtinli) is always presem in conceptual thought. Specifically, an esst:ntial feature of such thought is that it involva; a f.Use determination {lIIihyauaSliJA} of the apprdlended fICtion as bc:ing a tnl panicular, and (htu. hy::ln IIncon~'L~ en or. thi1 thought a n m::lkl': us reach (priiJHlJt~::I particular in the world. ~ , ... Thus. for Dharmakini, conceptual cognitions lead us to real things only because ~ make a fundamental error when we have such cognitions: we mi.stake their content, the cognitive image, for the particular thai it represents. As Dharmakini puts it d~here, the conceptual construct is M

~i gnonxt· (DJNUi},i";u)

in th O'!

~n!\l!

rh," il i, m n" n,t:ti

::11

iF it

~re

iden ti.

cal 10 the particular.'" O ne of the more important outcomes of this theory is that. strictly spalting, universals Jhould nOi be counted as the insnu· menral objecu (prtlmty4). The most straightforward reason for this claim is simply that, as Dharmakini indiales in the above passage, if a conceplual cognition were (0 lead one only to the combination ofinuge and adusion that is ::I u niverw , then that cognition would not d irKt on.. tow:ard ::In I':ntity capabll': of telic fUnaion (tmJultriyii). And :IS Wf: shall see in dupte! four, a cognition that cannot direct one toward an emiry capable of the desired Ielie fUnaion cannot be insrnunenw on Dharmakini's view. We can thus think of univcmls as having a twofold character. When ana· lyud in terms of the Dhannakirri's aiterlon fo r u1timatt eristena:, unfvttsals arc ultimatdy unreal, for they are incapable of (die funaion . With this in m ind. Dhumakirti himselF m.:aint:airu: th:u , nrialy Jpe::alc.i ng. then is o nly

,,..,,,,uf1

IMhJ- hwiu

il¥l~ 9i wUriwllIJIlwhirit;ti". "'~""* II",.uW '''WI lfJWj#gb ... ~,.", ,."ciMJ..,w 1MiUbi~ Mi"_111 w. _ ("6 U t ~,.ri~~ ici "..~".q l " 'nhI ~"jl!di_ /no. ..""'1M hi tJlt7-l1 """"n.I ~!'~ ,..nMb.tMr _ -u.~!W1fI ,.,trI,,.,,,.;M.l..1OJI I ", __ <"If hMk>J .rl.!~,..---.,.".- 'Ii pYI~ _ _ """'",w; ... ,,,.tiUJ,,,;,; I ..,.,.". _14111 llpi utlw ..,.,..rt.MII lIIitbJlnlw ........""',.,.uNdo ~ """,,,.cr I ,.,tw/ (~ nwlc"*!M1ibf nw MrilMiJiUobttti!r-

h"""

1Ii,"_ iii "'ipllQ·b' U.-.v".

-'!Jrtho IIUlf"'ci~tw 'pi .....no.., II";"".'

-.u -t;U~,. iN ""(lj~IIuf1 M,,"'" udbtJ.'./lJ.b,.w u" lI,i ,.thi. ti.rJ1<'OIiJq611I<W'It!"''!f ,.';".0- /rilf'rit """"Y"P"&'!VN6 nJq6"UnIUIN..p4J tIi,.,,~ n.. _(lil ... ,I*rfJ. 10 T .tlcnuru 1I"'''!n).

144 Sec PVSV .... PVI.:uo-:1.I1 (C!l07 ....); lIusialfCi in chap.:" .. (j oo).

I
fOU NDATION S OF DHAIlMAKI RTI' S PH ILOSO PHY

on~

kind of instrum~ntal object: panicub.rs.'" BUI universals may n~r­ theless be used to guidt one toward paniculan, and lhey aUo arc presc:nlw in conctprual cognition as if tht)' wert raJ.. From thot rwo Iantt poinu of v~-thc: Pr2Clica.I and the psychological-universals may be gtanlN a type of provisional exiuencc:. And by assuming that type of provisional aUtenC(', one an employ con«"ptw.l cognitions--cspc:cially inftttno.~­ to accomplish one's goals, mosl notably the spiritual goal of liber2tion ("'I)~. '.

Tht claim that infet-c:ncc can tnablc one to accomplish one's goaI-
IVIlbhJwpr.tiiNINiha.

1455« PVJ.j:HS with ~'I commmtJ (1......0). 146 5« bdow. d.apl:er 4 (poft).

3 Svabhavapratibandha: The Basis of Inference

that both Digniga and Dharmakirti admit only two forms ofin.m umenw obj«u (prllmtyta). namdy, particulm (JU4uA;uI!UfS) and univcrsili (JIi"'inJ«"'~!w) . Both philosophers th<: existence of only two instrumenw objeas as WUTUlt for :admitting only (WO forms of awareness as instrumental: p:rcqx:ion (Prll~) and inference (."'111111,..). Their argu~1 resu in pan on the claim thaI particulars are inexprestibk: and univcn:a1s:ll'e not: causally efficient: ~ing in"rn!Uibi
I

N TH!! PU:VtOUS CHAPTE"

we have

m

K'CO

me

While this -disjunction" (vipl.rnvt) bmvttn perct:ption and inference distinguishes Digniga and Dharmakirti from 8rahmanical philosophers. admining o nly two fornu of irutrumeno oflmowlf!dse ~ nor n~l2J'i1y:ll significant departUre from non-Buddhist South Asian tradiriofl5. II is true, of course. that many other traditioru do admit more than pcrcqxion and inference as in5lrumenw. Naiyiyiitu such as Uddyotakara accept ('NO additional irutrumena: analogy (f4JH1miNl) and lan~ (iAbJmlAbJA). I

5« tho I"~. '

If chapc~r

(,,).

·aI',

2 Set NSI.I.' : ",_,;,*,.,11. • .,..,. d u,.",..", . . , .. . .114... Analosr iJ 11)061 dotdy a_a uN widl JeaminllinsuOOc con~rioN. III wbm OM is mid "dw mw-Iiu aaruu ova' tbm: ill eaIIN a ,....,.. - S« aI.o Uddyouhn 'l commnlD (NV:I6i-'71), ..ruct. do.dy ~kI V~ (NBh:uS'): " .jU_ ,."..",.. ~tliJtIsJt' riU,.lf4 .. ..,........ and especilily (1"""']0): ~ MwJ..,.".,..., ..1Ifl~,!, ~"w,.k

i"..,..tr

1IIM~",,"""""'~qili,~~..,.~iIy , ~thI h]Ol P"'''''''!'f ,...,. ~ pM ..- ' r ell. , , _ .m,.. 1JtJ>i]4> lw. . tI·~ -JH'd N _ lJor p~~ ..1f'itIni MIfIj/WM'!'ftIiM....

.

~i#.

'"

..u...

1,,6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PIULO SOPH Y

Mirnif!ua\w who follow Kumaril:a acttpt:all of these. while also :admitting presumption (IIrthil"'ttijJ :and an innrume:nt Wt mc:y call - nonexiue:ncc~ (I,bh4vaP But in dc:nying instrumenmity (prama!']II) to these :allc:gc:d mans ofmowic:dge:. Dhannwrti :and Dignaga are ofte:n jusl rejecting Ihe cJ:aim th:at these :addition:ai mc::aru 5houId be c:uc:goriud Kp2r.udy. In the C25t of langu:agc. for erample:. both Dignaga.:and Dh:armmrti frttly admit thall.an~ can be::a trustworthy source of ccmin types ofknowlc:dge. but thcir dUm is that. in casc:5 whc:re: a linguisric cognition is funaioning as an instrumenm aw:arencss, il is 2CtU:al!y a type of inferc:n« .' Dignig:a :and Dh:armwrti also admit um..in irutances of presumption (ImhdJHllti):as wdl formc:d infc:rt:nccs. and one: might :argue ,h:at the: ~mc: would be true: for some insWlCCS of rosoning by .m:alogy.· The poin!. (hen. is ,h:at by 3 In "prctwnpUoa,· om prauma dx cmuna: of III crltiry without..tUch ~ a1ludy dnmnined mote of affain -.1d bo: impc*ibk. Saban. ("'Nr.r~)O ..JM;",j~ 1-1.1), cirin&: dx opinion of dw: Vrnik£r&, P- dlC c:umplc of ptaWnilll dut IA¥aduu muaf bo: ~ ou~ b. ..." .... one knows tNt bo: iI a1i~. but _ doc. not .... !Urn llIY' wJ.cn, in dlC houie 1l1C pocmrial problcmJ with mil rype of~ ~ iUunfllled by Kumirib'1 e:wnpk of pmumption '-cd on inklua: by infttma one can obsenoe th.It dlC OlIn t...........cd; hnoa, ..... pruwna d.... i. 1\as doe ~'" 10 move. Saban'. citation of dlt; Vruikln'. ddinj ~ rc:acU: IInblpMnir "1i J.1'JU!I In._ 1IInJ.. '"",'N ....,.~tlJ MnIMk.u,.,u; ,.,IM j i _ .,....."..,. tffMMJa &-rftI_ hhi....

-~ Kurdrib (SV. ~tlil) pYU: ~";ju. ~""" IIhJtUlM w""wt f .fn1'D!' ..~...".".~ni'~ fl 4 For a ~nl trt.llrMnl. I «

KdI"". (1997).

S Dignlga IIIIS mil dearly H rs,.1Ie£. fUya I ~:lst) . Dh.um&k1ni'l opinion is found", nllmcrow points, indlKlilll PVl.laI-t. TM IpC!cific ~ of;nkrmot intr:ndcd hm: iI an infdUICte from df«r (ta: below), lilltt that iI. callAl tdation beta" .. dlC ilnlSt in. fit. rmer'1 mind and dlC IInonnu of 1M spnkcr. Stc-. for c:nmple. PVSV fill PV I.117 (G:UJ.lI- 17): A natcmcnl is prompted by dlC ~·s inlmlion ("',"i~ to eonununicall: I 'fK' cilic meaninJlob;m (lin!.), for. pnIO!I..no knows, ilIilsulUllCn t iscornilll from WI immrion." th.Il II
6 Di~ (PSV'4Q&1ff .. PS2....49) fPCCificaly diKw.a p'QUmption (tmItI,.m). and he rhl! 101M fomll of praumption arc aau.ally inferm<:n. Dharmaklni (PVSV . . PVu,&ab; G:II]'-1I1) mcnOoaa an ilIJW"Cf't for dw: ois<mo: of the ~ fKUlric:J (i,.;n,.J. ..... whac he doc. not opoocify i. ~ ....:h. ..... MJWDCD' .. dc.uty all ~.,( p,Q
1f!\KS

SVAIJHAVAPItATlIJAND HA: TIlE BASIS O F INf ERENC E

147

acctpting only (wo forms of instruments. Dignap. and Dharmwrti arc not ncceuarily rejecting ilf toto {he othe.r forms of knowledge admiued by their Brahmanical counterparts, thq are simply subsuming some forms of knowledge in inference. ind«d, Dignaga and Dhannakini share this opinion with one of tneit Brahmanical coumerp.arts, namely, Praiastapida.! Of the two forms ofirutrumcnts o(knowted~ admitted by Dharmilini, we havre al~y (Dverrci {he most salient wues in Dharmakirri's theory of pucqKion in the coune of the prtViOU5 chaplet's discussion of particulars, the objects o( pttCt'ption. In the prc:5(nt dupler, we shall focus upon DIur· makirti's theory of inference. Dharmwrti follows the basic structure of inferencc discussed in chapter I.' He acupts two overall ClIu~gories that bear the name "infettncc": rhl!}' lilY: ";n~~cr._fnf-on~lf" (nNirth4l1J1wui_) and "infficnu-for-oth· en" r,.rtirth4l1J1matul). Suict.ly speaking. "inkrencc-.for-otbcn" is not actually an inference at all; rather. it coruists of proof statemcnu adduced with the intention of inducing another to infer what one. al~y knows. Ir is an "inkrencc" inasmuch as its goal is an inferential cognition; so tOO, it employs: the basic theory ofink:t-cnc:r: described in the COntCXl or"inferencefo r. oncsdf." As befort:. "in&~cc" h~rc will M used 10 rd'O!T to "inkrence_ for-onesclf: unleu olh~rwisc n(Ked.' Iu OOIed abon. N~yiyilw.such.lJdctyoQbno di..:uM anaJop primarily in :o.linsWWc conlat, ~ OM karns the~" of new WO«h. wo:h:or "x• ..",. O{a bovine op«ia:l. by :onaIop to the rmm.uof already 1lnoot.1I wonk JUCh IS "row." H3non {19'6S:nl lw loami thu ~ cumpk in Diplp', wodt:. whm: il U uaecI 10 mow thai tom<: IOrms of anaJosicaI reuon illfi acnWly. form ofinkn:1'n". It is podibk that DhmnUirti wocld 0QI'l .

=

loIda'iUdI an arzumml

<0 ""

baxd on I ....fHoIawhm.

(KIr

I"VSV MWI.)I:d; G :..P)-Lf).

7 S« PDS:ai'-Uil. 1M hiKorial rda,ion ofPnbslapida:and Dipip if; diRk "h 10 at» liUI with any r
8 Sec d\.iplfl" I (Uilf).

9 DisnIp OOICI lhll ,.,..;,.",~ _ _ u oclr ~Iy Q/kd ;lIk":" C" (I'SV,.ob'_1 .JPS,.•),

JL1II ill lOr OftC$df thne ariIea. cosniUon of w inlttmdum from:o. cop!iUon of C¥idma: n:pkte with the duu upms. 10 100, dairi"l fa ~c • wgnirion of the infcrcndwn in anocha-. one SUtCU cvidmcc replete with 1M th_ upuu: [thai f)'IX of ""r~tl u called ini"cfcnat.IOr-ncn.u- _ mft:IphoncalIy applies 1M rw'M of the dI"ect 10 the CIUJe. Vi Izv ...Ki IIInJ i ""f1/c "." atll Di ,J,n,. sl]tJ k},j" ... ~ 1M "." l'flrf Di Jtn ,. ~,., 'J.i _ aIt.J,...", ,.; "." Wj.J , . ,.j~IIDi Mil oi.;.. III ~ " " 1# 'D'I' W ..... h ~ ,.'i~,..j . FoIlowinl Oig>ip. Dh¥trWUrti alto malnWni cha, ,.mrJ.iIlIl__ U GIlly mraphor-

,. *

PI"'''

1,.8

FOU N D ATI O NS OF DHARMAdRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

J . J RLlation lhrough Svabhava: &yond "o,. PraLna · In contemporary 1Ch0lanhip on the- topic, it is generally agrc:td that one- of Dhumakini '$ major innovuions lies in his approach to the: relations among the me-mbC"n of an inferenCe', and tha, ,his innovation 5te-nu from his atfemplro solve a central problem in tht thtory of his Buddhist ptedtceSsor, Dignaga. In brief, me- prolNem is dl.tI, on Dignilg:a's ehrory, the prestnCC of tht evidtntt (Ixtu, liifta) does not n«mllril] mtllu th,l.( the property to bC" proven (~mIIl) is also prescnt.II Although one can point to two Icchnical issues in me- way Digniga structured his thtory dut cre:ue this lack of ccrt:linry," tht basic SOUI'CC' of this doubt is the qJistemic problem of induction: how can we arrive at a general rult-foch as the fact ,hat smokt always indicates fi~y e:nrapolating from a finitt numbC"r of obscrvarions! Despitt all of our prC'Yious cxpC'rience:s and aU dut we can now observe, is il nol possible that me case at hand (or SOO')(: fUlure case) docs nol (or will noe) conform to those cxpC'rienccs and observations?'1 tri¥tutp~-'!' ,...."""". ."....._ bo TdJcmaN (.yI1) and PrnJ (,"~.

jc,aIly aJkd "" infamce (NBp: _ry.,...,...,. s... .. Cf. I'VI" ,.. ).

I ltir.~

...,.s).

IDA. Strinkdlnn Ilu poUlin! (lUI h"':JI.. I>twnukini', focuIon mil p.obitm may -U be chK .0 hu auociation ...im IJtoUUHI .. an i".~n of Oipip ...no WJI proNbly

of l>tuormUlni',.~ IInnIcm iI ccmnIly cmii!ed wim deccaillJ mil probkm in DiSfdp·,lheo!y. a1mougn M proposa t lOIurioll w. Dbmnaldni docs 110( accqx. ~ (J"tl lw gvm .. plHllibk .xounl of the bIckground dUI lead. lip III Dlwmakini', _

' u,....

(lO..

II 11K fine problem it .hal i( _ I5IUIM Dignip to be -aing " d>rory of in~ thai Ic.b . 0 indiopuUlbk ~ in aU c:uca. .Ip does lIQ( proridt an Mkq\u'I' ma.ns of dcurmininJ tho nc:p1M rorK'OIniW>a: ("'JtUiI'rhl~,n) (S.ci nkdlnu 'I'M ~ of thcJe diffieulriet if WI DiA"lP has acmwned fnt otLIr _ ~ eondilioru, b..al not MIfIkicn. ooca. /Or dnwiAS . tru#W<Xthy inr(l("..... Haya (,,sI:.slR) arpn tha. Dipip', tw I'IIIC ihnd.y "failed· ill lW thooryof infnmu:. bul racher mal the WKntain.,. implicit in Dipdp·l!ftc. IIrf is an ClJIftlUon of his "'rpcicilm. Keprda of whethn Ibis if 1M caK, Dhannaklni', ....... Ihrory is cbrIy ~med dimilQu"I unuruilllis.

'".:)1,,),

a,

m...c

12 Sn: ~ (I".:........l.1, ). Sidtri.. objeaa to llling "induaion" II a phibophiallool.lO praml thor: issueJ .ha. prompc thr: formub.ion of.M ,...~ti..,wIM. bul hill :upmenc it ~ on tho UlUlnpOOn thal "therc: uonly one ... uu~acl'Oi""..mOon in the IopcaI -rem of ""y inkrmc.." booJ:Jlo). 1would. inltmd up wr.h= i I _ dian _ ony to pac•• e INlh bca"vlhctt ill _Ihan one: ony 10 I!ndcnand th. ~ ma,ion (N.- """,.. pk, .. " ... "'u,•• c '" , N""'Llc~). WI ... """,,"," ot....." •..doJ"j'. poubk ....., inducti..., ""'" Ulha. Iw -U . rdalion trUlh dc:pmds l1li th. IQlUtc:I or idalli!ioos of

....oo.c

SVA"HifVAPItATlBANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

149

We can understand Dha.rmalcirti', response ro this problem as an attempt" to move away from the grounding of rht pervaJiion rt:btion (vyipri) in any appcal to "mert: obsnvation and nonobscrvation" as the bases for esrablishing me twO aspects of pervasion, namdy positive and negative con· comiWlce: (lIlt WlJIII and IIJIlti"lta),U That is, on Dharmakirti', view one cannot establish the positive concomirance by mert:ly Stting that in every (2.o;e whe~. for elCImple. smoke is observed. fi~ is also ob5crved: nor can one establish me neg;.cive concomitance: merely by me fact that one has nOt obKrved a case when: smoke is present even though fin: is absent. Instead, in order to draw a wdl formed inference:. one must be able to speciry the manner in which the evidence (Imoke) is related to the predicate (fire), such mat every instance of the former must be accompanied by me I:.tter.l'

Although Dlurmakirri does not PUt it this way, me specification of this relation involves two separate tasb, Firsl, one must show WI would con· stitute me type of relation sought here, rumdy, a pervasion relation (UJiipri) mat t;lUrlllltm our ability to infer the predicate from the evidence. Sec· ond, one must have a procedure fo r determining C2SCS in whKti thar reLa· tion ir in place. Of these two tub. I will focuJ upon Dharmwni'f lhc.dao thnnJeIoa. wtw. ..bt lhc R~ of u.. mation annot be di......:cd &om iu contall. CO'm if _ undom.nd tilt' omla to be ~ thAt do not rdn to rW thinp in lhc

_.....

IJ From Dlwmaldni'J Jl(npeai~. 1IvarucnI'I IItempc at IOIvinllhc 1'1'" in DipUp'1 philMoph)' rdieI hea..uy on mere omanrion and ~. aM DIwmailrti·. a;.

'i<J-.. .,J .I.i•• ~ "'po,; ... . ~ ~y Ai __ ...I rn .......Iy •• lwo"........•• i .. ""l"""'........ I .. . ""

~ lhcaitiquaouur II I'VI ,II-Jl (G:9.1- :IO.17) • ....t.cft much of ~ ItJIIIIICllI JOaues upon the impoaibilif)' of emoblish.iDS nonobIet •• 000,. For tilt' pan1Id dQ..

.".n..m thJoush

ouAon rn HB. _ 5.cinkdUw:r (196"71.

14 Thil poUIl iuummuimi II

PVI ' JI-J~

The ba dill lbinp lUnd in the rdationUIip r1 a.1ISC IOd df«t 01' that OM thing iI. plopc:
r....:, dfCICI' and ..

II ,",,~~"I...tifi.od Iorthc: rule (~ol ........... mpo.. niecl non-uiaing. Thai ruk i& MM cktmniDed from not &erina the evidence in hetuOSU_ caxo and .mng i, in ~ QICI. Otbcrwisc, how could one arrM " the Nk WI OM thinlo namdy • CItIK. ,....-april, aim beau« a ruin 01'11a'I, which aft lhc drecu. aiat1 Or how could _1ITi~ II dw principle if an Attriblite mal i& I _Mad of the e¥idena: 11M. CIIlIe that i& dil'farnl &om the CYKkna:', aLQd Thia; would be lih inftrrinl mat IOIDCthrnS ;.. mel. bccalUt i, i& • doih, r~'" RW'''''''''''' ''~ I ".;• • r.-.ry.._ ","",Uri 1M 1M tJ.n.1W H • ...,.'!'~"iJw~ U; ,.,~ 1 .~ .. r.II/Mi,,, .., tIh.~ /IIls.ui~,,,,,

,.-,...,.*

ISO

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

formulation of the ptrvasion rdadon bttwttn ~i dence and predicate. Besides being an area thoU requires clarification, his "icws on ptrvasionor mo~ accuratdy, the mort fundamental ~Iatio ns on which pervasion is bued-a.rc panicularly innovative. On Dharnukirti's view, the relation (Ihe IlJilpti or Mpervasion") between evidence and predicaee cannot be I maner of mere co-presence or cooccurrence (lfI1MblNll/';''' Inm~ad, mat ~Ia!ion mwe alwa)'l amoum to an IIvitu1bMlItllliy4m4. a nomological "rule" (lI;JllmIl) or restriction whereby the evidence (MN4, /i';t.) does not occur (nil bbttvati) without (vi1Ul) the predicate (uJhp). " This type of rdation will nevtr be Mmisleading" I~ [I may be hdpfiallO think of IIXft CO-p'eRnCe in term!' of the MKalkd parMkut of rtu.terW impl.".nnn . TIu. io.. wfw.n _ ...... ,~ " .... ., on . r, III • _~ ~ I..
.,J.

........ ••

ilM reruI, ,ha[ ow c:ondilK>nal hokIa wbnt~ , iI fal~ H~n« , "if all appiel a~ (CI:~ tbm all appieI ~ INitl" iI • rnx: oondiliorW. bul il iI [I"W only bccaUJc _ ba~ red1Kal the rondirion.JllO a IXlII.junaion.. ThU rrukcs no _ foe- Dharmakim. ~na M pbas I hipt 'IlIhw: on dw: intuition dA,. when _ UK oondirionaU in raKKlins. if-= ploptlly understand dw rncaninl of dw condJtionaI'l aniKecknI. ,.., an compdkd to acapt 1M IOONftluall. if _ wish 10 I"ftnain "..ioaa!. Thw.. in raptltm 10 1M I~ cumpk. otwmakirti ...",.w uk. "Why should I think WI Mins • IrtnhcdlOn has an)"lbi"lto do ..iu. btlnfi frui. 1" "'" ~--.... ~ P''''''P'''' w ,""'""-'c i... nnic ptxtic:a dA. allow W 10cktmniM..-hen. pervuion holds. For a OttnletUlory tra.unc:n, of !da,ed iaucs. I« Sideriu (WO}).

unot

161 n Pins thil compound. 101M phil. . .' i _ tw;.:omc apparm •. The meaning dAr I ~ .. 1t ed.......wd bo-~ primarily from an inletp!da!ion of thecompound _1-'-~ (.~,..{ w. • .u,.-.~ althoush :an .mIpis ofi! u :an inllrummw .., "'nqJI...",.w aJ.o yjdd dw dairal maninll:. It u impon:anl '0 nett, ' - ' ". thaI in dw 000. •.,., of the initial pracnllOOn of dw IJ"P'S of rt_ in HB r... ki..I • ... IriJJJ,a. ~ J mlfiMi...,,;,.wUJJJ.m 'H' DIwmalcirri pnwides a sIou lhac IlDOUn tilO limili~ .." .. ~ (ni"'MJ-,. ~). Mo~ IptcifiaJly. hu inl~'P"lItioo rudJ

b,... ,.,.,JI).

(HB:s' ·H): ni~ meuu mal IN: predate pr:rvades lM anribu.~ of lM IUbjea adductd u n'idmce.. lba, niuMJ. doc:. not Gilt in lM calC' of:any •• icIma other than the !hm: typa of cooickna mallioned heK. Hmcc, if iI.aid 10 be restricted 10 JUSt thac dim:.l1
,.,.1iNIHi

...,-...uui n,

."..i.";"" ""J'd'I.

Thc compound 1.n1fiMh.";"-,hw mcaru tho: - mtric:Uon r,,;"""J of If.;,.n& ... · 10 mo.e three Iixnu of...-idrnc.c. and _ - ' the saint s.I- provided by ~i (PVT:6li7 • "'1.11-16') in his ("I)ttUQtnU on »VI.!. ru UK of "\Ie compound as a pitlft .." ..... ho.,"'f. u p«UlW 10 the specific cant.,., of~fyinl thc number of types of rdi&f"Yidm.cc. a.. ...... ~. compound U bcs< undmwod» a ....; f' lJl' Olin ilutrummw

"w: 14.,.."'1& F.... """",pic. bu..

.*

radinp KUJI W poGdobic in
""""'11

SYA8HAYAI'R,ilTlaANDHA : THE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

lSI

(lIJ4hhit4rtt): mar is. since our rule (niydma) leUs us mal the evidence (s uch

as ,make) cannot occur without me predicate (such as fire). the evidence musl ~ an indicator flllmllltllJ of Ihe predicale (e.g., smoke will a1w.ays indicate fi re). In short, Dharmaldrti ugucs for a ntUSSllry "um'In belWttn evidence and predic lte. and he calls ,his rcl:ation a wabhllvapratibam/ha, a term that I wililcavc untranslatcd. allhough il may be rendered as a "nal",.,.1 "1:II;on." 11 f"oro.o.-ud (through """vrm1t/w; md(t\Oe 100ft!y thrtt reliable forms of evidmot from pVl.I, for m. di·.... "ion wrrounding PVI.) I iud( docs not allow for even:&ll implicit mama: to IDe rumaioA r";"_J of IllfiIlJMi"" to enly Ihlft (emu ef eYidma. Scwnd, while Slky:abuddhi'l own comrmtlD art: ambiguous, lhey dcarfy do not fUppon a scnili~ ..t _ ptiJ'lllll radinll of mfflbhivtut;",_ II pVt.,.. His commenD (Pvr~sa6-4 sb,) raid: 1""1 ti ~,tk by hi,. • .....,,,,....,. ,.,.".,. .,vir",. tki pbJo', / 'I7" J.r", ."... ft.i • ,. Itf" pm ~ ,.; ~ "" "", 6. "'''IIf"''' ,. bt ."j lImJ,." Sf"''' pm ~ ,. .."'...., kin"..,..,." ~,. ~'i 6J.& npJ It:fi "''''-'..,uJ1Iu J.r"l '''''I J,J,;" oi ""l'~.,.,.", 6. mnI v ",j ~"l...,..,..,. We can rroo¥Cf much of m. Sorukril of thtaoe commenD by alraain! me appropriate phruc:s (rom K;afl)akaJOmin (".,"-,) . fo!Iows;,,- tM'!' , ..ti6.",u",..!M p...a.rv.ft w ....t I u.,.u,..~.-.I'" ,,7ti-U, 'fA; " .4.~~~, _M.i.-.lwl ...u""Y"t.r~~" ~t ~ IIJII.~ (II 1i"'~IIi";""".q, ~r",} lliM Nl Ml~ r"tn ,., p N V }, Althoup me, aaa oquinlmlofthe TiMan ",..,. P" VarI""" be indubimbly de!crmincd r.om lW"~in'l ~i,. i,;' " .... ~, ........ clca.r rtICnl :&II orip~ orUri.". Althoup. Ka.r~i n'. hiAoric:al poeilion (nol 10 men lion the qw.liry of hi. c:ommenwyl maltetl his own, indCf><"n.knl ranarb 1m rdcvanl. he aplicidy adopts a umwlJM,~ ~ing. Stt, for eumpk:87.13~ .... hi.u,-.!l eM"""," vi,.;..., u.""tilJ~ and a .lo-ll-Nry.-1Ii t.IIII.f]mulJi"" (I) .. u ~""Y"woup.rtislJll.w,... j"., (I) w- rMI.i"""''''''"'JN'tti"ikttyII I'M *",.NiJuyo /til P""" .rlII~" "iytuu>eik~ ~, II iI this UIagt" lUIpted by S1ky.buddhi and confirmed by Kanpbgomin, wIlereby muMlIJII.";"'_ is WlCIusrood.a .,, 'U"'''J'IO chat is ..... reionnl to tho: di:scu.oion or lOItI~ti~

,"'1_

ms'"

tI.r.""'" "'"

17 This lrarulation is the chotu adopled by Ha,..,. and Gillon (1991). Al
m.

Ip .

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOP HY

On Dharmwn:i's view. a wabhdWlpratiha"""'" comes in rwo forms or modes. II may be a cak of · producrion-from-thar- (tIlktpllttij. which I will call the a production- mod~. - or il may be relarion of id~ntiry (tJdti,"'l"J. which I will call lhe "idemiry-modc." These rwo rel:uioru provide me basis for Dharmakini's rwo forms of affirmative ~idence (W/hi). Thqr are respectively: 1t4'J1'MNl, "evidence consisting of an dkct- or simply -effectevidenc~"; and WtlbIuiIJaMtu.. ·evid~na: consisting of a Iwtbhiwt" or .. I .... bluiv.n'id~nce . - Dharrnakini first delineates cff«t-evidcnce and JWlbh.i~
An effect is evidence for a cause in terms of that number of II1IIbIM~'iIS without which ir could nor occur (..u;dbhdvi). Also. a (1IIII-lbIM"" is ~idence for a IVIIbhil"" mar is innriably consequem from ia mere: presence.I. Dharmakini h~ SClrcs Ih2t one may use eimcr an effect (hirya) as evidence for its cause, or a IlJIlbhaUil as evidence for a IIIIIbh4wt. The rdiabil18 PVI.l:

*..,..~

,i

nw"'".i,,.

Mtl""INbnI".rwJhi,.., a:

JM;, ."d6l.hi Ur~ I ~ ,.....", M.l ...
Oharmakirci', wrnmmu in MY (G:}.I~J) on this wux. 1""~ IrIIUblcd il . irit ~ ~Kp>mdy &om h..umWrri dearly cot\HJUeI with both the:: df'ea (Ury.}aains as ,.idalCl: and m.. a .... ~inkrmllJom wr dfut. Dlwmaldni·, _ mabieI; him 10 apply the: ph __ _ ~i, Jia 'J.l.jr fO both the:: cffca (U".".) and tho aux (Ur"!W) beaux the irutnllnmw e- ol ...M.lNi,,.. "unr""y pbw.i1My ~ con_f\N:d with ~thcr. I "'vr allmlpted 10 con"o'!J' til;. ambipiil}'.;tII tIw: Engiiah ph.-- -in rnnu oi"; the adnnnct' of this InRSlalion i. thaI. I f wilh 1M Suuluil iud{, illpplin /!'10ft darIy fO tho: awe than tho: dIi!a. Ir !rambled .. tlTobcddcd. the fint and Jim word of tho: .hird,.w. dIould ~ rcnde,cd Ilipdy difkrmdy. H_ is Illy IranaIa.!ion of thar ponion of tho: wux induding m., im~ldy MlrfoundinS proM from PYSV. Worda of tho YftX an undntincd:

tw<:I,...

""""' 1{

M 4fon iI m.lnf«fOr dw twlrtMi""...,u. (.... Wwj i" rk ,._.."n,. _, whim ;, ~ _ 6'-;" beaUK QUI tho.c .... """,tia of the allX..•• AM 6 '"JMTJ (....) iI m.lnwfor." tDnUiMJ ~""'t iI i"...n.l9lWWrfW'1lfi'- tiN -..~ I u".~ nwMi...,j, jiwJMir ."'dMi,,; Un.{tt I tqJIfI ~ I lliU".WIIlIry.Mit IIi, nw tlMn-ir, u;r ,,;d _ M",."ti I ... ",.iJMl,., MIw 'Ii Mi1411tJnVlI .....JJH"i I hmu

",,,,,,. I{"""

;0' N".,..)! . N,- ~ ..... I ....... foil , "I ~~'.

as a subsuanlloariY( (i.e.

tadint (PVJ':.....,) ol .... 1oc:ati.e in ~

pi tJ..,. " MhtJr-"...1(K:17.1.I)). ~n copin

SVA"H)'VAPRA T1&tNDHA: THE. BASIS Of INfERENC E

ity or ·accur.acy· (,n~bhic;irR) of th~

If}

modes of n-idena art ~ mocks of SVIIiJh4l1t1pratibRNiha, production and twO

rap«tivdy upon tht twO idtntity. Thu is, an effect can SttVI! as evidence for its cause: b«ause. on the rdacion by production. uru.in IWIbhi.,. of fhl! dfca (such as smokt) an· nOI occur without ttru.in IVIIblJli.,. in ml! cause (such as fire) . ukrwist, a lIHlbhlvtl can serve as n-idenu btcaust, on the identity rdation, Ihe Wl!l.hhiilNl ::Wfucrd :IS thr r:videl1Cr: (such as "bring a sugu maple"} ntcelSi· tato Ihe pmmce oftht IfNlbhivtlto bt proven (such as "bring a uccl. In other words, it is nOI possible for the entity in qUl!Slion to "bt a sugar maple"' ifit is nm also "a trtt.· "

The

T.,...s:nun ofSvabhiva.

One can ptrhaps already sec thaI a proper undersranding of the twO forms of cvidenc:z admintd by Dharmakini-namdy, dreer- and 1IItIbhd~i ­ denct--mun be derived from an understanding of Ihe twO forms of S'IJtl~lNIp""rilNt,.JJ,a. A propc'f undersanding of tIJiIbhtilNfpTluilw,Liha I'CIits in rum upon an understanding of [he term flNJbhilNl. Unfortunaldy, IW/bh.l_ cannot be expl~led mll.':fdy by r«OUI"Se to ~ t=u.iuion, for :as Stll.':inkdlner has pointll.':d out, IWlbhdf.l
pie, of tht SVIIbhAlHIof smokt in the sense of the "'nalure· of smokt. On thl! second sense, tINIbhllltl ctpreues an entity's charaaer1stia or pro~nies, :lnd on mu ~, :10 subject u underscood to h2ve multiple ,."..bhll_. O ne can say, for aample. that ·composed o( maner: ·substantial: and so on

PVT. INt first (ar.I9-W) offnJ an a1tnnati.., _1\131 of doe Ioeali ... III Un!"'....".

mabIins him 10 in~ me illMrwnmallll im""".Mwu~{fJ(P:L}.U). Thilllntt lUI'

.,,;,..6:w...

intricWn&. but il ;"'iOIn die mation ofdle iNlnunmallO 1 hi... abo IlOl foIlowaI Karqakapnin', p ton of 00ftItNi1ll thr: pbruc ,.t/t.I.rytuM";'-Mbwith boch me awe and the dUa (K:17.1)-l.4 and l.I.1-S). all d'liI ~ unn«eonrWy ~....

~;"

19 Sued on

=

me ~ of lhI: tnnI 6JM... and IlOl _MiN in the wale Olt
Harrs (1910) Iw arpIC'Ii mal dIeK all' sicnifica.nldi.fNmitOtt btlUtu. the pwilion found in die PtJ"_!'."mi~and dw ofDhamualru',laler rexu. Steinlcdlnu (J"o). ho .. coer. haI ~":II~ aonYino:inslr dw dUt ClI)iOCUil ;. mioplaad.1u Srftnkdlner noc~ aonI within pv and PVSV DlwmakIrri makes it dc:u thaI both,."". (Ihe -indicalCdo 01' plopeu, 10 ~ plOoth) and r-k- {tho: -inl.tica1Ot"" or~) ~ _ t v - . Set l'V:!i V "" I'VI." (Gc&+,.) and PV,.19l with PVSV "'" til. (G:,&.IJ-9].7).

IS4

FO UNDATION S OF DHARMA](IRTI'S PHILO SOPHY

are swbh.i1lll5 ofsmoke:, and in the previous chapter, much of our ralk about "proj>(rties'" rdlect~ th~ term IINIbIMVII in our primaI)' sources.· ""hal is common m both of mese meanings of swbh.i1l4 is the notion that il is essentWto themtity in question: on DharmalUrri's way of putting it, flO funhcr causes arc l1!quircd for th.al entity 10 possess a Wtlbh4"., I, Since an understanding of IlIffbhilWlpratilJlmJhll requires an undl'rstanding of thl' term twthhdlNl in both of its senses, pan of our taSk in Ihe fOllowing pages will ~ 10 unpack both mcaninp; of me lerm, AJ we do so, however, (WO points must ~ kl'pl in mind, First, as Sieinkeliner notes, Dharmakini hinudf doo nOI provide a compkte accounl of me distinction and relationship bnwttn IlNlbhiv. as property (or "property-swrbh.it"'-) and IWlbh.i1lll as natufC' (or "narurc-fwbh.iv.t). Indeed, he docs not even provKt~ any dear demarcation for the usage of the term in one $Cost or thl' olher. Henu, if we arc to anempl 50me explication of IWlbhdlltl. we will at 20 Slrinkdl~1 (19711 IOU m., lim 10 d,- a d4tincrion bet'Olccn o;wo di!fcrmr ~ of .......".,., The fxt dulINM.lrwU naNn can only be appIiedJin&ularlyto any p-m. caUq iI best iUURrartd by CMoS whca the ram oco:u" in i",uummrallinpdu (_MIWU) Of wirh tbc ,.,; tufIU: (,...w.-I4J. For c:umpIa in Pvsv, _ "" PVI,nab (G:1.1.I6 ); "" PV•...-v. (e ,)., .... ), .. rvL 7); .... rv •.,. " ,\1 (e. ,o.~). U-J in mi> ':11K. ...J ~ ' .. ;. a oynonym of ,.../trri wbOdt it .........i ...... !uM ..... sit...- lOr N.H.""" .... "",....,. For ttIIm, pia of mil rype of ...... of ,...Jrrri in PVSV. Itt: G'40.u "" PVI.n ; G:41'" "'" PVL7J; G:$O.) ';PVI.,. ' 9.b: G:f7.). ';PVI.I09 (mmpan!his instanatof~wilh tbc ncatby ~ of rNM.i_l4a, G:S6.lOO; G:60.1J JPVI.IlI; G'1'O-16 .;PV,.,.... ). Wbn! I.I$td in !be pllInI, _#b.hwdoes noc ownurily rand for !be '"•.",. ...II~y ,""'1JJb. of a Jin&k mlitr; inMcad, dw plural ohm oa:un whca many mcitXi art beitls ~ as when one sptoLIu of many rh.inp who.: nalwa _ di!fcrm, or noc difftrtm (in PVSV I«: Go,6.7 .... PVUI; 67.. ';PVI.IJ7-14l; G:'JuJ ""PVI.1,,). In conttm fO ,n- CUCI. pluof -'IM_ ... P'0f"'"T include .-MJ_;~).. U b;~in N •. ).....J _ut~".. in PVSV JI"VI" J?-141 (G:6I.u - I.J). Similar ~_ f'ound in HB (~s., 1..11: ~~ . In -'[Q of ....M.i... in dw Jinpllar _ alto in m., ICftIC of·p'~lry'­

n.!

~

...-,.u.,.",,,; p.,....''''''oi/I

u.-,.nwu......".

p~

Sirinkdlnct. in

IIOmC

coneoru compoonda cadins in -jl",--MM... and ")6_ _ '

_M4w~p:od~

211u Scrinlcdlnn (1974'J1})."... -,...MiowfJiI INI P'~hl (til•• ...;. 6bi"';) of IOIl'ofUUfl& which ;. noc cuatd by M'>mnhinll doc. bw ;. Jivtn wid. , .... 'hina iud(.- ,"'" notion due a JNJJ.illftii inrrimic or ~IW 10 an nWry in dw dUI muty does ..... ~..,

mw

any fiuthcr ClUIa 10 be q.ulillrd by thai _1rIoi. iI made al ~ poi"" in PVSV. including .... PVI.7 (G='.l6); "" PVI.16 (G:l7. lo-u): .J PVI.zI (G:I,.ls- uuh ""!'VI.J'; 1 (G::ao.»-'lI; 11.6-7); ""PVI.., (G:t.6 ..,...): PVI.I66 (G:a.,u); ""rvl.l" (G:99.lo-lI); "'" PVI.161 {G : ~ . J.O-lIh "'" PVl.ln (G:14S....,): .JPVI.l7'6 (G:14S.lot-'S). AU of dwx .QlmlCnU may be unden!ood ... grounded in at.. !wOe "OM of ntUIM.. .. ~tuMhi.. in PVI.1. and !he claim in tbt commcawy on tNl 'tttIC thai ... caliry .......J.d no< ...h .....·~ F " I I . 'l.....u
*'

lhoi,..,... ~ iJI.hw";"'/IfJ~ I Ur.~ ""'~MimilJ.

,-1'

SVABHJVAPRA TI!ANDHA: TH E BASIS OF INFERENCE

ISS

timcs be obligttf to denvt ugumenu and positions !h2! alT only suggested by Dharmalcini's though!. Second, wr mw! also K'CIll a crucial point raised in the previow chapter. n2ffidy, thiU although Dh.trmakini speaks of spatially c:xttndc:d things such as a Wllter·jugs :as being emidcs (bh4t'llS) th:1' 1 h2ve effc:cu, he doc:s not mean that they arc paniculan (sINIld!"!'flS). Instead, as we have seen, Dharmakini specifics th2t, on the Exttrnal Realist view (bihyirthttl!4J4), spatially extended emitics such as Wllter-jug.s arc actually .tggrcgations of multiple infinitesimal p.trticles wh~ proximity en2bles them to produa: effectS that they would not produce othenvi.se. Talk about extended entities such as Wllter.jugs and the effectS of those: entities is simply a matter of convtnience wd conventionY In the COntext of the term WIIbhil,,;z. this point is crucial, for sVIlbhiiva as n:ature :and lVilhh4lN1:H prnpc:ny c m both be applied t:ither to sp,uially l'Xtendc:d entities, which :are only convcnriOn2l1y real, or to noncJ.tended p2rticul2l'S, which art ultimatdy ml Thc potential confusion hefC is that. as YIC shall 5«, both.senses of Wtlbhiiv4 rest upon notions of causal funaKmaiity, which is restricted to particulars in Dh.trmaldrti's ontology. Hcncc, if one YlCfC not to k«p in mind that talk about the causal functionality of extended cnti(iel u simply:l. nuna or cnnvt:nil'ncr, one might believe th2( Dh.trm:l.Kirti's use of ~hb.i1Nl .as propeny :l.nd IIIahh,;,," :u n:alllte in the contl'XI of atended entities would imply that such emitics themselves have cau.uJ functionality, and that Ihey are therefore particulars. We havt a1re:ady seen mat this is not the case, and below we will .see that the causal functionality implicit in both senses of Iwtbhilwt is 2C(ually reducible to the causal functionality of paniculars, To avoid complexity, however, we will follow Dhar· mrnni and foc:u l primmlyon th~ ~ of[~ IrrmJ :II 2ppl ir.d (0 l'X(~lkd entities such U Wll(er-jugs. Svabhiva lIS "ProJH1'fJ" When Dharmooni u.ses the term nwbhliwt in the sense of·property," he mnm for i, 10 ~" JhA""'lI (" ·proprny" o r ·prrdic.u (>") "ppliM tO:l. s~.

22 5« tIw prn;ow: chapett (,IfJ).It .. imponat\11O mltn.IC ~ lhal in nnployin& lemu ~Iion, Dharmdlni does DO( mnn 10 adopt: 1M JIO'Ii(ion 01 moIisu ~h 1.11 lJddrouIwa. who maimains lhal 'uMUnca Ihlt alc 1M JW>m (.MJIl""') of I _Itt· i ............oe .'1c.......... ("'n..... cm;
...dI ..

me

IS6

fOUNDATIONS Of DHARMIIKiRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

cHic Jhan"i" (a -property-posscssor" or "subim-).1J This should immediately prompt us fO tum to Dlurmakini's .poIm-mcory, for as we havt s«n, on Dharmakini's view any prope:ny or predic:ue is actually an exclusion (lIJiivrttiJ; specifically, if is an exclusion that excludes mose entitio that do not have the expected dfecu or aU5C:S. To speak of a rose, for a:unple, as having the propmy of "being a flower: we construct an exclusion whereby that entity is excluded from al1 entities that have not arisen from the aUSC5 mal produce flowers and fMt do not have the dfecu expected offlowen.J< In shon, on Dharmakini's view 10 be a propmy is fO be an exclusion. 2J a. Sicinkd1ncr hY7~n_~). llx JUbjea-pm;Iian: Of' propc:rt)'.poucuor-propmy rdalion (JMmrUJ.u..r-) ir; pAfticubrly impomnt for undcnwId.illKlM US9 of ~ II:mI S.... W.... Specir.c.uy. •h~ me predicn~ iI indeed a prop<:rty-nod,W... c:onNr\K'd .. a pmlicalt.

,_ Ho _ . whlJc tlw ...bj«< io ..........ur • ,....,...nr_Mol... a~ fn.xn lhc entity 10 whidl it ill IIItimatdy idullial. it iI pcaelled in eos--

O'."'Oj.ooa .. .Jw a ..... , ..., .... u

nilion .. ir;1 wen: 1M poACAOI' of lilt pmlicara; iU auch. il 00.::. not ~ . . . propmy 5«. i'oraampk. PVSV *,PVI.71 (G,...~u.):

""N.

In addirion to It.. (Onvenlion. of W-inStallIUlion and tilt likt, lhc diKinaion of..b}m and pmlicact pauining 10 d... cqpUtn-r appcannec ;n a ~ c:oplition iI alto not contlldktory in the ...... y dut it ill oopiKd. It iI JM*ibk that a oopitM ~ be dOOnn from YaIicw obiotVt.nfl". For other tcXtWJ nota on this P".... and an a1tnnatM mn.ialion , _ tt...appendiJo: t.H6).

"Us

,..,.,rly.r"

,0,.,,.,,,,,,,,, ;...

."..

*'

N Sa chaplet 1 (utiA') . For u.., sub}m-pm:!icaIC .dation apRSKd in tcmU of ~~"",..,m. _ PVSV *,PV1·S9 (G'Jl-1Ul). It is impOfwlllo note due Dlwtnaldni ...... 1... ( ...u.,. a JPC'ci1lc: "'tanan 10 d... di"ea dul....t.... ....Mh. iI uxd in d... _ of "ptoptrty," il rd"cn to an adl.l$ion. This is i. JW1 du,e 10 the faa due Obarrnakini himtdf" cUd . - du.lr ...u_~ ,.... tw<> onua ol . ......_ ........ JU.;........., I..... (Le. . ,. '! h ..... P'optfty and "",M.i... iU Nllur.,). Nnutbc ..... _ pm Fin I'VSV do rugae suman

SVA8HifvAPRA TlBANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFERENCE

157

Hen«, when the term wabhdlHl is used in the sense of "property," if simply stands for an o::clw ion. h is aucial, however. fO nole that, since a property formulated as an exclusion is constructed in terms of only one aspect of WI subject, the subject in question still has numerow other aspcas lOr which o::cIwions arc possible. In other words, the subject in question may be considered to have numerow property-wabh4"VdS."

of p.optH)'-nwilti... and IIJi."m. An aamplc of auch an eqlUlion iI found in PVSV ..JPVu6J. J- bJon duo. f'UAF. Dhumakini donia dw an ape ...ion could rem ro an u1rinuldy raI P10ptnrnvitiN disuilxuro 0¥'Cf aU tht iruanca 10 wtoidl!lul ezptmion rdefS. An ~jcaor ~ ~r PV1.I6}. and MVapbi ... m., ob;..nor·, qualm !luI such a dilUilxllcd nw~ would be n«as&fY 10 explain dw aU dlOK "raChIS ha~ the Amt dkct. Buc in nil apbnacion of 1M ~jeaor'l pDlilion . I>harmaJdni iI obiipllO opaIt of no diwibuccd nwMiw' ochn dw! an adUlion ' (G:lLlI: "Jh! ..i" ",...,..,. Thil "'fiV"1 a IIJi~ may aho be corWdomd • ~ A las aplicil eq!Alion or ~iI; wi.n SMiIti... alto OCCUR in MV ..J PVI.I J7-I4J. (trINb.cd in tht apptndR). ThtK, Dtwmaklni ....,. ",..,111; (or dw .dated I""' ,.nivrm) in vaOow compouMiJ (G:U ,' 7: flu,ltl"..,-vrt". G:U .U): flU'""" !6Thft#. G:67·. 'l: -1!~~",",) 10 dilcula rlIt l'IOIion I .... II~ ~ of. poup of n .. rti.o-o .. """";tut..l. by th.ft • .tfr~idO« r.- .....H doo< ...,. Ito_ ..... ""'peo:tod ~. Thd tnoOIiril w.td 10 explain how muhiplc _irucnu of. WlIler-iuI!; can be aIJcd!he same: ewm lnoup,hcy do I'lOl IKIwJly form • KpU1l.t mlit}' duo. io WI.er-jus- In C'.OUlK of tNl expbruoon, M'fM2b 01 dw ·INIIft".nd -=II IN. att dw ~ of. Wllcr.jul!· (G:" ,,!, p.~M.i" riir'7"!r). Unb _ undamndp.~1Ibi 10 be I w,,1Irihi('UI wbich CIIC phraK would mQII O w form and lOon w. hl¥e 1M nalUft 01. Wlra-juI!1, dw IQlo:mM' ·nwu._ of I ....Iet_ju'" (sIMf4J"'~) Q qu.itt darly mruu .0 be • coruuucrion b-.I. upon 'IM exdusion of what dOQ !>Of h.,,« .M dfc« (expcacd of] .....,. (flUlltil".")h.. " i). ThUl. thQ piIR£C 100 would eqUllC Propat)'tqu;lrion

w.

_ewha.

w

.nc

me

*

.nc

_ -- _. """",._• ..,...!"LL .

. ,

"

(

' )

2S Ir!he equalion of propcny-_Mi_ wim cxdusions (.,.....,..niI) iI ioo-l ICCUnIC, m..n nlUllbo:r of poNibk p.opu.,-_Ml_ ill I~K:a1I, !imidca. Thio Q the impl.ialion of PVI.Ic>--iI , -...htK Dlurmaldni c:oruidtn w specific CIIC of propmico oonaruaai lOr all mrit}' du-out;h I dcfinltm: dn.mniru.ion (-..,.JJUbtcquml ( 0 I pau:pcion. Dlwmaldni'l AWn c.onoml htft illO.bow thai sudI determina.ioN do no! rd'er 10 tMit objKu .poet. u..dy" (,,;JJ,;,;;~ but nu.c.- uk. MPriody: th:a, iJ. dwylili exdurioru .. tMi. obj«co .......'_ ·exd·......,· amWIy mcana m., ~ orprnmtlon offaltc impuatiQno (~ 01110 an ot.;ea. Bul whm [)twmKini IUIJInwUa !he argumenl in the: twO vena: bdow, M also poIno OUt that mc.c impulII~ htnu. propatiel; c:orutNCIro Ihroug. exdusion---...-c .. numa'OUl .. Inc numba of &be imputations. which IU£RUU ...... !hey aft tho:-In.:

omically limidal:

.c,._

1M dtfinilM:dtram inariona and exprea.ions ....II_1O 1M imputation of pudicucs wroogIyanribu.cd 10 a..m;ca att ... nurnrrow .. tbt impuPrionsofinoor1m prcdic:ucs. timor, " - a:pnaionI and dcfiniri-tt dacrmiNriom a111uv.: diaina abj«u.. ~. If a lin"" expKllIOft or conctpnW oasn,uoo [dur '0 ~nl affimuri.-dy] wac: 10 pe.o. llinr;k- n:aI,hi"" thac would be no objta other tIw. ~ mi", itxU'1O which il would rmr. n ... ttf",c, all expK$&ioru would be oynonymt

ISB

FOUNDATIONS O F O HAIM AKI RTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

A5 with wabhdva as - propc:rry . ~ 10 understand the usage of the term Ivabbtlva in the KnK of - nature. ~ v,e an: best served by returning to the Itpom..thtOry. Previously we have mn that one of the fundamental moti~ vations fo r the formulation of the apoi»theory is to accou nt for the fact that we have ~djsuibudve cognitions" (ItnJlJl!fliprllf]ily4): we an look at sevetal entities and n:cogniu: them all as -the same" (rlr,,) in that they ilIt' all water-jugs. for example. For other South Asian philosophers. this type of cognition is easily accoUnted for by appealing to the presence of a single universal. -waler-jug- nm~ (tM.uUlNJ). instantiated in all of thost: e:ntities. Thus. one an cogniu them as the ~me and call them all ·water-jugs" because one's various cognitions quite literally cont21in the ~me objKt. namely. that universal. For Dharmwni, however, this option is not available. for it is a form of rt:a.Iism that he rej('Ct$. Instead, he must find some other aplanation for our cognition of all thost: individuals as the same. DharmalOni does so by for~ mulating a -nondiffert.n«· ("bbrJ.) that pertains to all the entities in question. Specifically, he claims that although all the individuals in question arc actually unique, they are all nondiffercnt in that they arc all different from thost: entities that do not have the potentials to produce the expected dfccts and that have thus not bttn produced by the apect~ auses." In the previous chapter. we have secn that. when Dharmakini discusses aclusions, he plac%S panicular emphasis upon the samenm of the effect (and not the sameness of the auses) that is asscned of all the entities to which the same exclusion is to apply. We have also seen that this appeal to a sameness of dfcct can lead to a number of problems. the most obvious of which is an infinite regress. To resolve these problems, Dharmakini appeals to the notion of a · judgment of sameness- (rlulpratyaw"uni4jli4ft4). On this argument, the claim that all the e:mities in question hav~ th~ sam~ efttct

[and aU conapnw c.os;nilioru would Iu~ me ~ com a ll]. r.,ww,.,. '~1fIlro'" Utttt;w, ,,;tt~ I ftW J...uJ ... _ y J,i,;tt~ Hup_iltnw I.j.. ~ ri.rJrw --n f Ind'h]/"......",~ iii ~,. M._ 'il.

VJtl,,.

"*_

Whik 1'- _I"I!B M. tlN.rnk.JlimidClinaJoi poai~ propmy"sv.dJ!,i_ dw.;>CI\W nwnoo cons(n.arud ~ lipan tht (l)nlm formrd by ~ habilll>.lion and 10

_ . s.... PVSV .,JPVSV , fM (di"",,'-' ........... "

S!I')

26 5«. for rnmpk. PVSV "PVI.n (,f3rub,od in m., a~J. 5« abo I"" di ....,"io n of dka in ,he prMoui cMpm (1I!i1J).

of ......-

SVA'H1V,4PIlATIIJANDHA : THE BASIS OF INFER.ENCE

IS9

resrs ultimately on the &ct that they eventually produce a sccond-otder cognilion-a judgmnu-in which (he individuals in question are idenci~ fied as the same type of entiry.17 A1llhe entities we call ~btue, " for cnmple. product' peruprual images thai, when the proper conditions arc' in place, willlcad to the judgment. Ihis is blllC." In speaking of Ihis "judgmenl of sameness: Dharmakini appears 10 appeal in pan to mind-dcpcndem faccon, such as the interestS, expocr.ttioru and omer relevanl dispositioru of the person in whose mind the dclerminarion OCCUI'1. But if subjeaive facron werc' solely rcsporuiblc for the arisal (or absence) of the wne judgment in various irutanccs, men Dharmakirri', philosophy would lack the ttrt2inry for which he Strives: there would be IlOthing aboul things memsdves mat warrantS our application of one or another lerm to them. Inncad of this semantic anomie, Dharmakirri maimairu that. once we understand temu IUch as ~ WIIler-j u g" and · elephant," our corrC'CI application of those temu is not JUSt a matter of whim: entities that have certain effcas are indirectly called. "WIlIer-jugs," while those with certain other effects art called "elephanu." and without changing the meanings of these ternu, we cannot be correct if we literally call some water-jugs "dephanrs" and some dephanu "WIlIer-jugs,"· 27

a. Sirinkdlnn (19]1:190).

28 n... notion I~I.(""":U-C fiud wi
All cmilia (M.n.), 1xauic lhey arc elIuobliabai in lheir own nIolUltS (_Mohwj. by nalUft (_~ ....) F .... (lJMti"JI nd ... ioru; (~") from all bo~ and ~mOSt'_lhinp ("",MI~~ n.u.ro.c, abjccu (...m.-) arc concrioal u h:.vins~' IUnds of qu.alilirs ~riIJWi...i> d.... arc indic:r.riVI: {•• .pItt.¢ of d>oK obj«u' discina~ propntia: too.e qlAlilirs au NICd on this and WI from ..tUch mm, is !he a ciusion of rhaK ob;.cu.d 1lwdOrc. W I discinc:t:i~ plOp"" .,

which is copim:l by mc:&III of IOIIlC pm!ica~ (~C&II/lOII

~

known by mans

of any ocher pmficale; lima, dw ptc:Kntl.ion ("7'" +ii) [of uh imaldy idmUal ~ abanctcd !Tom Ilk _ "'bt
p,w,fnau ~~~ H --WJ#"""""~ ~ -".n,...u l ... III ~,.. '''J'"'l'' _ MiJtJtJ f'J"lWSIbo·,./JJ. a ~ {PVI',sQ,. )(;,01) p..e.1thJrj1f U ~.nd he pouc.!he compound "J'l.,mM.ltiIf U 'pot.,...;", adusiom" (IM:,...;"'", /J...",... .. """!rri-"~ no! recordcci in 10. K (loI.wff) COfUlrun il U P"M,! (P'J.L'-4' - I.4!), i.e.. as 'Jhr'titfl ~u.

b~i (pVf''i6bI.-J'' K:lIl.H) gIouajtln·MJ...", tlhtmMMJ.. and he offtn !he awnplc of impcrmancna and JO on {rifr ~ u", ~ . . " j

160

FOUNDATI O N S O f DHARMAKlRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

Thus, Dhumakirti's Rpoh.:J..theory is based in pan on the way things are, and this is expressm by his usage of me lerm fWlbhdllll (or a synonym such as pr"rt') in the seRSC of " naturc .~ That is, it is Mby their natu re ~ (fWlbhduma, pr~) all the entities that we indircaly call a "water-jug" have the same effccu. For the Rpoh..mCOry, perhaps me most important "same cff'ect" mal each of the entities in question produces is the aforementioned "judg.mcnt of sameness" (tIUlprRtyttllll1NlrWjfi4r1il). But Dlurmakini also means for me norion of wabhJloW as nature to explain nOI just that judgment, bul IIU the eff«t:s or functions of which an entity is capable. This dearly suggesu Ihal an cnlity's nature-lVllbh.i1lll is me warrant for all of the adwions mat can be. constructed for mal entiry. If we can say that a waterjug is "bluc," what we mean is that it is excluded from aU that we would not call "blue,~ The basis for formulating [hose adwions is that those orner entities do not have me cau.sal characterislies apccted of entities that bear me propcrt)' ofbcing "blue." And the grounds fo r the claim mat the entity in qucstion JoN have the ClIp«ted causal chan.cteristic.s is that entity's nature: by iu natUre, thaI entity has arisen from the rypes of causcs that eruoble it to have, by iu nature, the potentials to produce all me cff'ecu apccted of somcthing wc call "blue..... This means, of course, that an

dJ« iii ~ ;,..,~ II<' ",i ""f ,. ~ lit UfJ ,.;,; ". JlNtmuMrJi "lIi".,. lqukfi!J"!l .,,}.

' 'The

~ion "indicative:" for

.'Wfihi" it manl 10 ClpClUT rho: pc of rho:

sJou oAm.:! by Siky.abuddhi (1'VT:16b: ""fI 'grtr H) and Ka~n

{K.: II1: _IthNU/JII~tuIilL}.

dGt)II\maDa1Jy, rho: lint mnnbn ollll1l"iJwNlhll~ should Ix corutNC"d wilb lhe "d,uM pronoun.! of, -,.• ... ~ :and I haw: {rantbltd aaconIinpy. Sik:yabuddhi (PVT:s6\IJ.). ho...ettl:r. unckmands t1111"iHNiJM~:II ~1IiN~ "baicd on theadl
lhal diffrmll dtinp haw: a nondifferml dTcct. whereby choN: Ihinp an Aid {O ~ I nondifkmK:,r; in dlar dq an aU be dwaaQ'Ucd by I diff~ ffom dtlnp dial _ Other !han t ' - tIw ha..., rho: aI"oIcnlCilriontd dt"ea. Bul how can tilit be II\( cud" ."" '1111'_" (, ••qn) rhi"t' iJ l..m tIM, .Idwwp """ .,., iijfrmtl, ., /hri....hO" (,...hJN) _ .[IIK.t rnlrifrn til IIw Mrf""IiJJWlnJ1 .f1M $11_ ut.. ("rth.) •..n,
-t It"

SVA6HAVAPRATf6ANOHA: T HE IlASIS O f INFERENCE

161

enury's propcny-m,bMws. being I:quivalentlo an exdusion. arc subordinate 10 ill nalu~11I4bh.i~..... Below, ~ will explore: the implicatioN of this rdatioruhip bctwttn propcny-nwblM"" and nalurc-w.fbh.lllfl. For thc momcnt, ~ need only remark thaI an cntiry's narurc-,,,,,bh.it41 musl aCI as thc warranl for all terms applied 10 that enlity. And sina: the appliotion of a tcrm 10 an obj«t is warranled both by iu causes and iu ....,t~nfi~1

O!ffl!cu .. ~n en tity'.c nJmrl':-
WI!

mJy ea l1

-the lOality of its causal characteristics"; the ouscs and condidons from which il must have arisen, and the corrc:sponding dlccu that it iJ capable of producing." NATUU-SVAaHAvA ANO THE C.W $.o\L CoMPLEX V~loed

wi£hin DhlU'm~rti ', nOlion of I!Jlth&iu.:u n"u~ i. ~ IUOng ~j~_

tion of random (likiUmikJl) causality and thus a strong commitment (0 the regularity of ousa.1iry. H e expresses Ihis regularity primarily through various forms of the verb ni-YAM , to ~restrict." ln terms of an entity's ability [0

,he.........,. f..:uhy, '*"" ubjccl. ''[!.In, and "lCIUliun (_-'-"'.............. (-.:cunIl"I'"

otha-pniloiophial. d~.dr, the &amy, mind, !he objea. and conlXt-produa aan·

p: dfta, namdy, an l...-annQI uf a..uibk form. 1bcy produu thif OM, ~ dfea ~ ~ !My do /'W){ imwuiale I ",niftnl! mal ia IQtricud 1(1 h.avins thc nIDI~ of producins WI dim. I...ikcwiw. diMina iJ\KlRCa of liftS W ... Ii~ and ., on by !Mit vef)' n,II"'~ prodooe thc _ dfea, namdy • • rec:optilionall .... ~ hM an ~ of e.eh i~ Q the _ ... (he othcn. i.e•• U I "tm:: AIIlrt'Oinsanas havot thoKsmledfa:o~n ~!My at!: no( dislriOOIN thconeowt thc tKhtt. Or tMyxmmpUsh 1OnM:!)(her tdie: IUnaion rlu.r ill(I be don.. by.-i,...m U wmbtuDon. ~ and., 01\. in .aord with ~ eondi,iont, Bu, nom donush wafn and web arc Wo not diAina fTom f lftl in dm any mUf)';1 diffnml from all othcn, ..-aln and 10 on IX¥CI1hdao do no( pc:rform ~ alOrcmmlioncd tdic fUnaiona, jwI: as the Q l and to on QIlnoc plVdua an aonmw:Jf ol";'ibk form. [ ~'!" """" M;"tfhobt 1f1JJi,,1IIII!' 1tbJ-'!' In'If _..,. u,. M. 4' 1fUwr4 i" """,'" I "Iflrrir ~ MiftlltfJ'!' ~ ""'If""IJIf-nlrrhlfjU..u,. Wrtl..."~ I ~ ) i ".~Ufllmil .... ~MI (PV1.7)1 U ,nbnoJriytl~t.k1f_1WUrI ~ __ ......W'lf>!'"iu'fl_1UlJ If'; ~..."q- ~ ripllijU_ rh,!, jlf1llfJlMD IW,!, liN 'v,. )i fIIotrI4 J-.n-"NJ' )i 1..kr1Jt'iMu.,. ~ lN1J'1'" Inj~ jIf""",lID If"",!, _ 7/fm.,rw'JlfJl'l!l MlMMf!Ir,iju!' u"Um'Py,., ~", OM lit ~ )ijlf'M'»CIt m~..J ~jU"'-1.

wt

30 I base thc ~ "roaIif)' of c:oU$al dlaranuUtia" on Strin.kdlnn'. flOIOon of the "I0I1liry of c:au.NI ~Ii(ies" U hit po..: fix ....MJw as nlIt\IIC, He mnarb (t944!9), 1'hoe maNns oltheword _lJwr.win ~ compound -iNM...,-i'-rO.. ,tbm uotd II a (trm 10 ,ndlClU die , _ « 1M Iopcal ncxw--can only be 'CSKII«, ' Uhatmaklru'l dmoullOn

for the raJ IIdn, ... a roaIif)'

or aual pouibilitics.~

161

FOUNDATIONS OF DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPH Y

product dftctS, ht affirms a - ro tricrion in causal potentials" (uxtiniJl'mA)," which is ro say simply thaI any givtn tluiIY by its nature is only Clpablt of producing some dfects: an apple 5C:'C:d ClnnOI product an ti tphallI. And in ttnns of an cntiIY's ClUses, ht claims that an entity's causal potentials art ro [riered prccisdy be:caust they have ariscn from cenain causes: if is impossiblt for an apple seed fO product certain typo: of dTccts because: il is impossible for it to arise: from certain kinds of causes.),I Wbilc these notions of restriction art negative in character, they amount to pruitive claims: an entity has tht pottntiili to produa ctmin types of dfcas beaUS( it has arisen from ctrtain rypc:s of causes. There is thw a beginninglCSli chain of ClUSCS and effects: me range of an entity's causal potentials arc defermined by its causes and conditions, and Ihosc caustS and conditions are thenudvcs effects whose: rangt of possible causal potentials is likewise dere:rmined by their causes and conditions." It is precisely fo r this 31 n.c, COInpound t.hi~ 01' an equiyaklll consuuaion is used 11 RYUaI poina in PV wd I'VSV. indudin&: I'VSV "" PVI . ~ (G:11..lS): PVSV "" PVI.I9S (G:".II): PVSV PVI.1!! (G :I)1.17): PVI.lS7: PVSV "" PVI.lSl (G :149.n - 1J): PV 1.191 and PVSV ,J riI.

*'

(G:l S7.6-I).

321M moll IOCCina Halm"lall of !his poinl is found in PV1.1.8 ub: "From dw: rewiaiDl'l. in dw: nawlT'"n>u~ ... of dw:CIolIKcomet dw: ICSttiaiof! in the nalurc-~of thedka.-

(nwMthw,.;,.,tMtI ~ "",MI~~ . 33 See. for a:am.pk. PVSV "" PV1.l671-C (G:.... I.-Ip: cired by Sl~nkdlna h971:1U. n.n and }4): ..:0: aIso~, wpm- 1, n.II.,. Heft, Dlwmakim mpondJ 10 I Siqlkhya objKtion mal, wMoul tome rqxaablc aa..n:o: Of propoty. ;1 wouJd no! be: pol'iblc 10 ar .hitt many individu;ot" which 1r1' all-.:oriaJly di~nl , aUK 1M ~ dka: This if "., Ik (MI. Ii...., . .bho"p.U ""inn .... Jiffr,.,."fiw ... •U ..be.. nltili~ ,.~ tIw t/ftrl i,. I/_ri. ... wlJif, . d.m .. ...~ ,Itis ,IN ...", ... .[ ,Ite nI,iri" c."" 11M, 4fin. (PVI.I67a-cJ Ifm.- erllities coruin ,....., OI'Mr n .. il;a., .hen aU m,ilia would d rhcr be- produan of anythi", ~ or none would be: a producer of anythins al aU in malW:y ~ all eq.wJy dilfcfnll &om anyone m.ily'. haI~''''''Mhoo ofbeinc the producer of !he dt"ta in qUlSlion. Bul ~n thoush all odin mUlia ~ not dislina. in .hc;. J ,ffi;",,,,,,,, rrom
u

mo..r:

,b.,

SVABH1VAP.tATI&ANDHA: THE BASI S O F INFERENCE

16}

reason thaL even if Dharmakirti 5UCSSCS the sameness of efreer as the warnm for the application of Ihe same lerm to multiple entities, he is in the end also appealing to a sameness of cause. In other words, if we can call cerain entities "water-jugs" bccawc Ihey have the Arne type of dfccu, we art al the same time s.aying that those entities have come from the same type of causes. In short, we arc appealing to those entities' naturt-lV4bh4lN15: the toalil)' of thor causal charxtcr1srics. This emphasis upon cau.s:aliry leads one naturally to su p~ a clost relationship bctwccn the notion of IV4bhallltas naturt and Dharmakirti's theory of causality. $ro nkdlner poinu p.1nicu1arly to the rd.ationship between Dharmakirti's notion of narurt-lV4bhdV4and his theory of the "causal compla" (hmmlmagri), the new of causes and conditioru mal arc required for t he production of an cfJ'ect. Indc«l. lOme PllQgel in Dh:umooni', W()rk IUgesl a rt:bdoruhip bcrwccn an enlity's naturc-lV4hhdlW and ill particip.1tion in a prc:scm causal compla)< or iu uisal from a past causal complc:L

dfca in queKion l iadr aIIl'It:I f'rom lOIN' ocher aUk. Th.... lilt; JrqualCr or aWCI io ~ For. by dw:: ~ nmu>: orwa..,... and wdko;Q, ~I dUnp ~ IIIInC thinp Wt an: their ausa, .... hik other mi"8' an: IlOI. their aUla. There II no i ..............uJ ....,u,.......1",,,,,-,",<. ma, euo •......u.:.. ohi.. 1",""'__ /,i Wtn/, 'Ii-u.!o bin" u ~ I ~ }of... I rUsy. jDuUJ 6muU ~....tM/.I--". ~".u u Ml ~.JtV iii ",u ~ ,.., '11". ... IIiJq.&fI_Mrlwt I "'.. h.1IIIriJ 1m.l~1 ~Mkij ~ ...,.r'[' 1 111 IJi W}'I ,..MI".

.5.,..

."'"Ii "".

Mt.tU..." )i

u,-,.. I ... J.;

-pir U'-J ~ .. ,..J.U", i ii I iii I "'·... tW.rw ....,rlqi"" ,,;,,_J,hj~ I WlUI _M.#w .,. noM... ilJ WJfU' I WJip· llljjltu1fl.novwl IiIM",..,..u .trUir -"'f'D-'!"fU# .m"d...". It; JWrJ &n.r ""~ ,.M6..u U, .~ _ 1ri1!friil ~'Ow"", "' • Altt..:.up the (:I« cndinp of lukWandtoon arr~ . • pluni KIIIf.wn~ by In impliri. - Ui It" Stkpboaddhi PVT:l,abJ (dickel in PVT-

...".""" ....,..". "?,,"",-p'" " . . , Itt

IJit hi. }of'!'

i"

.

t: lbJI- KJ14,.lj).

J.4 PnfupI W

molt tcpI'DCntalM: such p"PV is I~ ont mentioned ~nd Il1.Iulucd by S,nftkdl.... (1\11"111-116). M y ""n.!a.ion (PVSV .JPV'.:r. G " ........,) rnds:

TIN . n,.J . /... 4J«o "- u i..Jmw' it -.1 ./. (4-J " -,Iex it d.~ "" 4 _Mho. I{"- ......J ..",,ta .............. {r.,..m, forI "" 1foc1 i ,~" ' - _ .",un", tW. (PVI.71 ThaI (cap«il)' IOrl the production of an dI'ea doco IlOl dtpmd on an,.minll otMr man ruch I roUooliion of w cn,i,ift in the aual mmpla. lMrd'ort;, !Nt [apacil)'l. ...t.icb if 'nnrUbly mOJrq1lC01 from W!llm: or

MtH""'."

dw :0":>1''''''' or c:awct.;". ~... or dw Ulil)'. [namely, tN' causal compIexl. Bu, in thiI a..e. _ """ infw only W pouibWl)' of the ariA! or W dJea from the aUA! complo bcawe _ [only] int'cn Inc: apaciIJ ~U) or dw: ausal (Ompla to p~ duac the cfka. TIw aW LI)'. dnot tt IIlnvvbbly consoequcn' wim the mm: praer..:c or Inc: complete (OmpM:o: or a..-. io jwt. _M.l"., and""'" is ....Iu. is infaTC'd,

16..

fO UNDATION S Of DHAlMAlClRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

Ncvenhdess. al thOUgh such a relationship does exiSl. an entity's nature-Ivabh4va should nol be equaled with a causal compleJ:, whether it be a prcscm causal complex in which it pmicipates or the past causal complex &om which it arose." Concerning the interprttation of an enti ty's narurc-nwbhaw in terms of iu participation in some prescm causal compla, we should rtmuk twO rdevanl pointS about Dharmakirti's notion of a causal oomplex. Fim:, when Dharmakirti uses the term, he mons for it to refer ( 0 "Uthe causes and condidons that contribute to the production of a particular effect. This notion itself restS on pre--Dharmakirtian anaI)'5CS of causality according ( 0 which the entities that oonuibuu! to the production of an effect are classified in (urns of the role they play in the causa.! process." WilhoUi going into deta.iI. we can nOle Ihe general distinction be(Wccn a primary cause (htlM, Ibn-iii

~ -.("'!U ~ •....".;J"'u

I .nhJ""'._~lWt ,.

,.,.MJ". 'IfM"""!'ita!t IPVt.7] tUb.,i J"'dMs.".1Iihfth ,..",.", ~ in ,.,.....tnhf."'-'IJi

lHltIMw MJ-,. I u,... • INN!.". ~t ~t ~rru.~ io_ lJoru SiUllllf"iIjlli". ~1V7'D"""M""Mt I ~u u ullUfrl....ni"....Mhi" in·

nvjIM.,.IJhwun.."••?-" 1]. N.in p....".. I 1M"" c:t-n.o ",nckr nvMJ- wi:. as Slonkd.llVr ..... a in I I.a[~ worlr. (1!l91b:717). This ambiB"io:y.hould ranine! W WI Dtwmaldni do.. noo: himldf make a fomW diaioclion between W I'W'O meaninp of_w.n. I ha~ adopted from Sltinkdlnu, IUId dw Wk of ...uaI dncia"" nuy :as eaJily be aMOci.aled with an mtio:y', propc h ) ' ''''Mb. u

u... uu.

mil

with illlU~JMM.I ...

35 It is rIOI ftlludy dear whctha- Suinkdlner hinudr I\lQ/U 10 cqU.lII~ 1U(UKo1""Mb. with ... uW compla. or IllmtaliYdy to OONU'\IC Q.l.lu~"..MI... onIY;1I t=nt of ... wa1 poo:o:n~. and rIOI in IUUU or:on o:nury', dfccu. Althoush Sicinkdlncr probably did not inlrnd tither of d~K intnpmalioru of lUiU~""M.hoor. boo:h misnl be dmved from his~. as iI dnnoruulum by tbr IOUowillg pamp I17t:1l,.

-n.c [IUN~I """""'of a thingil d~ pown' (/Uti) 10 brinS about an dI«t

(~I,.uuT

I"Snbhln tina Din~ ill d~ Knh (J",!ri/lJ. tiM Wirkung llerYOnlibringm"]. 197':1." In lDhunu.kirti',] onlOklsr, [nao=-l_Miow"",ir.e,; tbr f'OW'" of "\1,,1' 10 1, " " :l>on as • pnno:.ple of Inn. 1:1lIIrnot .... [In ckr Onl~ bronun _/JINhw!Idic Knfi dcr DiIlfF. zuwirkro. &It PrinUp ihra Sri...... I. rI1J:»« In OfIdngictI COfIirKU _6& h4(! mc:uu the po-. of thinp u tllf: principlt of their bri"" in IopctI gonieKU tho: word tnWlI dot c.onccpt. dw is tbr dd'irUtc naOoruI conarua (.......I,w)WI is rdaredlO raJ things. lIN. 11,14: [For IUN~_~ ] ... thr: 1...,,,Luion 'CMcna:, WI:Kft" would be quitr ~r in Ontolopcal rontaU, u il would aand b thr: rt1 indiaincc lOI2Iiry ef the: nriow po$&ibililia., pown1 of a thins 10 be or b«onx pm of dHumn CluW complaa..

J6 S«. for CA/llplo:. AKl..49ff;and AKBh um. (I.79ft) .

S VAJ!HAVAI'RATlJ!ANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFE RENC E

16S

1IJNl44111lN hI. etc.) and its supporting conditions (lIlh4kliripralJ4}tIJ. In (h~ case of tht prodUCtion of:lo sprout, for example, the seed will be consKiered th~ primary QI.IS(:, while soil. water, and such will be supporting cond jtions.J1 In this case, if tht t~rm "causal complo~ is to apply to tht totality of causes and conditions nccamy for the production of:lo sproUt. then it must apply not JUSt to the seed (primary CII USC), but also to all of those suprorting rondinnn~ (,he JOil, w:lter. :lo ne! JO nn). O ne o n ~~k ~ I ~ nf j l R I a seed nor even of jusl :lo seed and soil as being th~ C:loW:loI complex for the production of a sprout." )7 Vuubuldhu (AKL61 and AKBh ..J til. ; IW - )1t1) ,efers 1O.1Msic: diRinaion br~ CCIi primary OIlK (,.~) and rupponifll coocIilkIN (,.J.Uri,,). DN:rrmki"i', mat oonunmtllOl'J .lIude 10 mit lwic diRinction II nrious poinu. indtldin&- lOt namp&c, in IXvo:ndn.buddhi'. wmmcnll on I'VJ.U H ,... (PVP::a67a) : ...... , . R,. lti t. &-,. J..itI,.; "'P ..,. "" ~ w,.r", PlUM , . , k". Jiyd "" ~". M £e}lf", """",., JIwJ ,. "" .., In! ,. i "D"';II WIIf ",it '" »t' ,. IIJ' u",11 rit ~ ,. 'i """"';11 ... .... FOI' arMKbtra:amp&c,1fe ~i'lcommmuOll PVSV ..JPVI.I7OW (PVT:l.OlI )ffi PVT..:1a6ff)· 38 DNrmakirti'l \lit of ~ tmn · ou..W t'Ompla: " (4muJIIUIJri) is ~ ",doer (Oftfusi"" Jina il in¥Olvu diffnml liruarioru: ;1.11 "incompltfc ou..W compla:" M".II 1Ht-.l,....). • "complete 0 .-1 com pln." (uJtJ.l I"t>ubuf:rI). ....dopmm, {Jtui~-.) in I tonunuwn (1II1114Mjtudl W I lhey are __ fully c:apabk of producin& ;1.11 cff«L ThUl, in the case of the prod..aion of I sproul, the X'td and all ia MLppOI'tinc condilioru an: nor complat wbo:n W teed is fin! pbntrd. and they do nor become complat umil causal compla dcuiops to rhc pornl of aaually prodlCins iu dfc,;t. In tbon, W complat oUAI oompla is the orw 0«W1 in the moonml prior to thccfka. 11 ia wonh nori", WI dUs IMKion of -complac- accoonu for DIwmaklni'scWm!ha1 one can_ inftr uiaI of an tffet:t: 110m a ClIlK, o:wn if WI __ io ...;.>I>ffip-ic.I by 011 .." In this rtprd. DharmakJn i', WIt of lbe ItTm "calUal tompla" (~) is wdI iU.... U"lred by rhc IOtIowins PIS", (PVSV _PVI_I ~5; G:~I. I6-99.I). H ~, DtwmaIdni ~ t.ht iaut oIt.ht ousa! tompla in t.ht tonlal oIatab1ishinllNl an ml il)' cs.- nor requi", any fimh.cr OUKI eM' tondilioru in order lOt il 10 cnsc:

mlft

mal

mal

w

.""N1Iy

mal

166

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Th~ second

rdev:tnt point concerning th~ notion of a causal complex is mat an ~ntity may panicipar~ in several causal complaes, and that tb~ causa.! complexes arc nOI id~ntic:al . In som~ cases, :ttl t:ntiry may simult:ll~ ncou.sly participatt: in mon: than 0I1t: causal complex: a seed, being mommwy. can panicipatt: in tht: causal complex for tht: production of tht: na t momml in the continuum of i" muena, but al thr: s:amt: nmt:, il may particip;lte in the causal complex for [he production of a SproUl. acarly, Ihe causal complcxes in th~ !wo cascs arc nOI tbt: same: the seed in question may be the primary cause in both ClSCS. but the supponing conditions will dearly differ. Soil, for instanu, may be n«fSSary fo r the S«d in question to produce a sproUt, but it is irn:laranl to tilt: production of w su~uem moment of the Sttd's continuum. In addition to the simult;mcoU! participation in multiple causal complexes. it s«ms likely thaI an entity may h.a~ the porendal to parricip;lle in contradictory causal complexes, ahhough it is noc ll«CIWiIy ,Ix CUt ,....", C&IUCII havot drew Ioinu i, if pouibk dUll Ihrit eond.itioru: be incomplrtc or thai tbero be a hirIc:r Q\Ua or MlpponIns conditions. do nor .~ "'ily Iwoo: th.M ""t1.Ul: rl.f• • of produO,,& di:aJ in _ CISr:t brooo.- fVft1 when ~ iI the QluaI compia of ca.nh, 1C'fd and Wilm, ~ lOIna"imcs it no production of a Iprout: Thil u nor an arpmnll apiMl our pCIIitjon, becawoe in "'" cue II -JI. rho: cawaI rocnpkJ: ~ upon ~ do:.dopmcnl ofthar COOlpiel of QlUiet and eoodiliont in a continuum. Bul in Of00 ICI petish.. thins doa /101 do:pelld upon i&lIy rul1.Ul: cXvdopmmL MOfCO'IeI", in tha,1 connnuum of QII.LIoaI ODmplaa. .Ix final ON" • ..ru.:t. iI /101 For

il

r ......

...

">ti,

;, ..<.....,....,.j by

~

fwuoa inM..." in do< "",,,,,,,urn "" ,he

,...oJ",,""" of ,ho< cfk.ct,

definiuly Iw tha.! dfc.n. Within WI COtI.inu),llll of (:II.IQI wmpbcs, only dull final (:IuW oompIa iI rho: sptoUI·SClIW. ~ pm'iow momml ofrbc-oontinuu.m'.doevdI>pmftII is CKbn lhan m., fin.aI causal compkr. tach such momml is jwt lOt Ihc purl"*' of thai hnal rnornftl. in the coo linuum. And nochinS can 11',","",,1 W oonlinUUI!>'. final moment from poooIuci.nS ill dkct.. [.Ii 1 _ ", .~ bN/1 ~"'"" lNlii"t".,~.riH~",U."'" / .!wl!f ~.try.hJ
t""" r,rrMi""'"",,,

U ... ~",.".. 1II~.u ~""""'IfI I _ ~

_ ~ .,; ~jt " ' - ' . 1OJ""1!f

6hi;",iiij. WhM~ .pi kMkiJ IlihtilrlllJllt~ I ,... utripi J.rIlWM

SVA6HAVAPIlATlBANDHA: TH E BASIS OF INFEREN CE

167

wiU actually Jnnicipllce o nly in a C20UW co mplex for which ,he nrhe!' suI'""

porting conditions arc prescnl. For example, some seeds, in addition 10 h.aving [he capaciry- to produce sprouts. may also be crushed to produce oil. AJ with me case of.a SproUl and a subsequent moment of me seed. me effeas-a sprout .and oil- rtquire different causes and conditions. but unlike m.at previous case. me causal complexes in question are incompatible. This incomplltibilily doer not . however. mitigate the potential for [he

seed 10 participate in eimer complex." Wim mese poinu about the notion of causal complex in mind. it should be evident mal one should not equate an emiry's nalU~-IVilbhdva with iu participation any specific. prescnt causal complex. The primary re.ason for avoiding Ihis tqU2rion is dUll. while an entiry-'s nature-svabh.iV4 stands:as a marker fo r the rOt:Llily of thar entity'6C:lwai c:har:taeriniC$, the c:auui co m-

plex in which mat enri[)' is acrually situated will nOi necessarily include all those possibilicies. A sesame seed has the polentiallo produce .a SproUl or oil, so if our interprtt.nion of IWlbhiva as nature is correa, the nOlion of thai seed's n.ature-svabhdva must subsume both of these: pmenci.als. We h.avt: a1re.ady Sttn, however, mat both of these polenlials cannot be .actualized in a ,insle Clausal co mplex, si na [hose co mplc:xa a~ ine;ompatible. A , imilar argument can be made without appea1ing to the case of con-

uadictory causal complexes. We can note Ih.at a water-jug, for ex.ample, has the potenri.a1 10 be Sttn (i.e., i[ can produce an image in visu.al awareness), and it also hu the potential for carrying waler. These: (W() polenti.als musl be subsumed by its nature, and if nature is equivalem ( 0 causal compia, (hen those two polentials should necessarily occur in the same causal compla . This
oc;o;un,

the; othe r should

nccesnrily occur, but Ihis is clearly not the CISI!. When watt.r is presem in

,.ri!UmJ~"'" I ,.,uNI!" ~ ItkU .~.,. f ""...In .,,~ Ur.~_tri "",...,J,iu sJ ';""'NIJ ",. { ~ "lmiJ"".J.m.fJ f ....,.., iii ~ ~ ' f i ,liM ..... f Nt t. tAI!""'" bini ,f.';""",",'!' "._~ ".

UrJ-".rr41

sm..

39 To my knowInIF. Dharmaki"i doc. IK)I o::xplicidy dil<;uu 1M notion of C.O I'''ndicroty c:wuJ complcxa:. but it scmu implicit in his!hcory. Hf doa dikuw tIx notion of an mory panicipaling in mulripk. diAcmu alWl comploes. 5«. fOr enmpk. PV).UH }4: Ewm lhoush illw ncither-onc,oo"nwIr (.epualf] awal POlCllliah. . Ihill! is Mill ~ 10 produa: multipk dkcu by io -.ery nacun:. ""T"his is 00l 1O, for mul tiple, dfmJ.nowd nO( arise fmm a linsk Ihi,,&-' II iI nor the cue WI a siDgk effect ariJa; from • singk aUllt. 1Whcr. all 1M variow dtccu of a thing ariJe from a Qual compla. And one: thing may b( in twO 101 mon:Ja..w oomplaa. Hcna:.lt is Aid thaI that Ihins produca mwupk dfuu.

168

FOUNDATION S OF DHAI.MAKIRTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

il$ hollow imerior, a water-jug fulfilb il$ potential to contain waler, bUI if it hap~s to be in the dark, it wiU not fulfill its polenrial for producing an image in visual awucness, Ukt:wise, if light and the other requim:l supporting conditions are presem, the water-jug fulfdls the potentia.! for producing an image in awareness, but if Ihe~ is no water in its interior, il wiu not fulfill its pon:ncialto contain waler. Thus. if an entity's nantr(' were oquivakm 10 the causal complex in which il iJ presently participating. then a Wller·jug in the d2rk is not a waler-jug. or dse a waler-jug is not by nalure mible. Likewise, a water-jug without water would nOI be a water-jug. or me a waler-jug does not by its natu~ have the capacity ro contlin water. So 100, a sesame s.eed being crush~ in an oil prcu would not be a sesame Sttd, sintt it is nO! pan of the causal complex for the production of a sproUl; or else a sesame seed planted in fer· tile and watered ground would nOI be a sesame seed, since il is nOI siruared in the causal complex for the produaion of oil. II should thus be dear thai the lotality of the causal char.actttistia that constitutes the nalU~-I"..bh.i".. of an entity such as a seed or a water-jug is rIot oquivalenllo that entity's paniqn.rion in one or more presenl causal complexes, primarily because the number of causal complexes in which an emiry actually panicipalC'S could nC'VC'1 oqual the number in which it could potentially panicipale. In other words, its actual functions will never o:ru.wt its potC'Otial functions, bUI the norion of a Wilbhdva as nature must accoum for all those potemia.! functions. 00 In addition to the: problematic equation of an emity's natufe-tv.bhQ".. with its participation in some present causal complex, we should also note the temptltion to oqu:ate an entity's natu~ with the causal compla thai produced thaI entity. AI first gIanct, this would make some sense, sintt we

[ .ww"tIc""'~

uJ WMwr II _ ~.

i"

.,i

Ii ~ "'vj~ 1,~i..rntdi",!" ......iMm04,,_ tUi""", M~ "rIIfUlf",WMIM!J I m,!, "u

*i'!"riJ ....".

M.b.'!I ' " .tvU~ 1.-1.

NOIe INI tJw; cblm dw an mllty p""........ ndlhcr I single: auAJ pcxmli2l nor mu.l lipk pcxmtiak is meanllO tdVlC: dw: rftfio:acioa of IcauAi pocmWl u an uldmacdy c:aistcnl eIllity.

"0 Yn anoI~r . ..mIni ~I apinst lhe ~uival=« of ,.,.MMNII IU.luJ"e with the l"IOIion of I atiAI compla is dw, in the cu< of an end!)' such as I WlIltf·jU&> (nrilia lhal _ would no! inruil:ivdy tOftWUI: as upeas 011 Wlla-juc'l lUlUft' would Ix "fir- included in dUI IUlurr. For nampk, the causal compla lOr the prodlKlion 01 dw: i~ oil ""'""ius in risuaI ....... _ includes demma -.h u lill\! and.sornsory conlXC (",.,;.J. If the na,,,,,,-nwMw_ of .....c ....i... c<[Ui..kn. to ..... co.....J <>om ....... u..c.. cn';.>eo ....a. .. llshl and ICIIIOty cntllXC alC pm oil WilICf. ju.g·IIUIUfIt.

SVA6H,tVAPRA TI&4NDHA, T ilt BASI S OF I NFEREN CE

16,

haw: s«n WI an rnri[), has a amin n~ plttisdy:lS a result of the ClUSCS and condition! Ihal produced il. Ncvmhdcss, despite a close relationship betw«n an entity's naturc:-n.whh.iva and the Cluul complex ,hat produced it, Dharmakini's system docs not allow us to equate the twO. For c::umple, sina Dharmakini maintains dut cawcs arc momemary entities distina from their efreclS, me equation of an emity's nature wilh the cauul complo (bar produced i( would oblige w; 10 admi( that: ,) a w:uer-jug's natull! is wmC1hing different from the water-jug; 1) a WOlter-jug's nature: mslS before the WOlter-jug aislS; and}) a water.jug's nature no longer existS whrn the W2tc1'-jUg exists. None of these conclusions arc compatible wi,h Dharmilini's philosophy. THE SU BJECT ( DHARMIN ) AND SVABHAvA AS " NATU IlE~

Up to tbis point, our interpretation of IINIbh4Ui1:lS "nature" may be summarized as follows: an entity's natu~.rvablM'w is the totality of an entity's causal characteristics, and this amountS to a restriction upon the kinds of df'cas that it h:lS Ihe potential to produce and the kind of causal complex from which it has arUcn. If this interpretation is correct, one :lSpect of this mNning of IlNlblMua should be immM.iudy obvious: :I. suhject (dAo""j ..) em have only one nature·"Jf1blNIVtl. and the narurc-n.wbhdwtof ,hal subject cannot apply to subjccu of another kind: the nature of smoke is not the nature of a water-jug. This :lSpect of tIItlbh4&N11:lS nature stands in conlrut to wabh411J1 as propc:ny. for as ~ havc 5c:Cn, an entity such as a watCf.jug may be conceived as having multiple propcny-JWlbhdws." But in specifying thai a subject may have multiple propcny-svabh.:iv.a but only one n;uure-".,..bhdv.r, fWO k~ Usuu must be kept in m ind. FiRI, we haw: already sec:n dut Dharmakini critiques the ultimate rcality of dis-

ttibuted encities such as water-jugs. In other words, on Dharmakini's view a water-jug is rU)l ultimately real. and there is no 'ingle particular {svalRlqRJ;UI} thar is in and ofiuclf a waler-jug. Ruher, in the comot of Out intCfC:SU conttming the mevant causal characteristics, a "wa(C'r.jug~ is iudf c:onc:eptu,.jly eonnruC;le
170

FOU N D ATIONS OF DHARMAK I RTI ' S PHILO SOPHY

together to produce certain effects, Thus. Dharmakini mainrains that "w:ater-jug~ is merdy a convenient fiction that is imagined to be: dUtributcd ovt:r all the paniculars in quc:srion, This suggestS that the "n,:uurt of:l. waterjug" must also be: conceived as distributed over those particulars. Every infinitesimal particle: of the: -waItT-jug" is equally a locus of Ihe "narurt of a W2ler-jug" in that thq all arise: from the: causal compla that produces what we: identify as a ~ wate:r-j ug: and they likewise: all participate in the: productKm of the: effccu of that water-jug. Hence, Ihe: nature-n.wbhdllR of a wate:r-jug, like: me: water-jug itself, obviously QnnO( refer to some: ulrimatdy rc:al, single emity that is distributed over all the infiniteSimal pani· cles mal form WMI we: call a "waler-j ug."~ The second issue: concerrn: the particulars themselves. 11121 is. when cerrain particulars. due to the: conditiorn: of their arisal, nave acquired ccn:ain distinctive: causal pote:ntials, we: are able to call those: particulars a "waterjug" by otcluding other particulars !hat do not havt: tno.sc distinctive porentials, since lhose: Otner particulars have not arisen wiln tne aforementioned conditions such as proximity. In this sense, those: particulars may be: conttprualiud (by way of their otclwion fro m other particulars) as propc:nyslJIIblNilhlS of a warc:r_j ug."l But we: may also trear each particular-in !his casc:, c:ach infinitesimal paniclc:-on iu own as a subjcct (tONt rmin). In

"2 S« a~. ~ 1 (9IJ1f) and J>VSV ..JPVC.IJi'-141 (IraruJ..lIIrd in

dot o.ppnocfiJ.). Com-

1MII1illl on pan of Ihe bner~. Kn~abgumjn noca I~' tbcK iI no 'in9c a.ual po<","i..a1 (/lUtijtha. caW in me d",irw;t nllilia thac , due <0 _lUnll~bn 10 produce ~;" ~ •. *... n tLod . _ •......;..'S (_ 'h]"1.: ..... ,..._ "'1*',u idH. ~uj. Ju St,.;"Ia,tt. ncr (1' 71;116') has lICKed, Dtwmakim (1"\',.16.4 and J>VSV Mrit.~ G:I).7-u ) aplOcitly rcjrocu die nocion of I .inp a usal po
.4) In addilion 10 me pr"""-ly cited prcocntlllion in F'VSV .... PVI. I)7-141 (_

'M appen.

dix fOr I complnc lra.nWtion). 1M notion of I paniruI.u «IM:rurd q ,. f'«1"Clly•....uMW an I:IC' fOund in me, twO IDIIowinl!. rda~ I"m".... 11 is impomnt 10 1ICU!.ha1 me IX)fIIClI ofboth pmlV" ia 1M dnnuNoCDIKm WI, while dot urUvmaU (()1U(n>(lrd /III meobj«u of conapa mow M rorui<.kmI dot dim:c objco:u of tho.r c:ortupu. ~ uniVft"Al. midi WI;' mardy I:IC' constructed on dot hIuU of a wally effkicnl panicubn. The firM ~C pauagt' ir. PVSV MPV ••171C-171 (G :14i.1i-f7.7). wIUc:h n:adr.

'f'bcm'orr II",. uniqlK individual

(~aJc.M iI fI". Hjm [.[~.,,]. • ..J NINr .IN"" {i., .. ..".,.jk ,.wpM] .1r.n...u, nl"tUuNIOI; • • ,,~ i.JillUl· ...J if i, ulkJ." -~fftt1 ".r. ·c...~. " .M _ d.i". lIN, ir " . ""nin
.,,.rnu/y .>btI,

/u"

SVA8H1VAPR,ATIBANDHA: THE BASIS O F INFEREN CE

171

shon. ~ can. at the same time:. speak of the - naru~" of an infinitesi mal partide. Now. on the Extanal Realist view, an infinitesimal panide is iuelf a paniculu, so one might swP«t that the distinet nature-sWlbhdva of tach infinitesimal panicle could iuclfbe a J»nicuiar. This would be ,upponed by the: plausible: notion that the: subject to which the nature:-slIIIbhlillll applies involves no distriburion in this case: it is the: infinitl'$imal panicle: itself. But rven if this is [rue:, a panicular's narure-JINlbJuitw is srill not ifself a particular. The: most straightforward reason for this is simply that a nature-lIKIbhillll is nc:cessa.rily treated :as a dhttmw-a qualifier or aurit>ute dinina from the: infinitl'$imal panicle: which is in dhtt""in, the: e:ntity that pos:sc:s:sc::s or is qualified by that dhttmt4. This is best iIlwtr.ued by a gmitive conS1n1Clion such as, -The: naru~ of the: infinitesimal particle:," Dhnm,.ki"; m,. i nt::l ;n~ ,h,., in such ~pra.ions the: tOm....,., iJ :actto.:L!ly ideocical to the: tiharmin iuclf. The: appare:nt sc:p:ar.ation of the: dhtt""", from the:

real thin" rhm il -..Id IlOl ~ ~ fur ;110 ~ Unpnoep!:ibic, beaUie tM cosnition of diffumr thinp aI nondiffnmr.t.ouJd Ix a _ by tM p.,,«ption ofil aI ;" .. ~" ...,...t i" .'-n. , .... ~ ..... 1 ... ...... ,"- '-J'" ~ ,..., H .... ~!' I

H"'" ~Hri W ,... _no i" . h.r", / .

~ ~ lift _"''?!wM ;g"u l lAltJtltipti~..moib,~~

...-

flU

t•

.w,. ,...1,.,,...., ,.., ,..",..,.

~~ ~ / ...... fMJirrlMt_-'!ry..JI' ~..,..,u~o.-!",w.

"''' f ""..,..w,.,~fJ'iJ ~.jJ,;"""N~ .

Dtwmakirti it ha.. addraai", Sirpkhya pbilooop~ and Moe: lhosc: arnor phiboplxn do KCqK If« YD:rss. rsft), hit cqtl.1rion of ~ ";th nwJ.~!U;1 bat wwkr_ Awd u ~ poIemical~, r,tha 1!wI a prrcisc dchnilion of~!",- Thit tqtl.1lion of 1M1.~f""";rb ri/qJl doG. '-'"n, If'PM"'r1y bd 10 an tqlUtion of nwJ.~/.U wirh propnty.~"" rn lhe foilowrn& r-gt" {I'VSV "1'V1.I79-11o; (,;:n.l6-ii!-tJ, wheft w I~rm ~_" it ~ aI an tquinklH of prOPCi" ' _~ IlOl:

,.,..,..!'_

n.t "'ffi •• hM • ..J ,..",.u"jforrwn tlwt.rr i,ultmpw PI " ' - rhtt,.rr HsN ..,." rIMt

nwrtW,.,.1ftTJ (u-) tlwnthfonW", ",." ~. !-Mil - . tJ,.t!"NII MII(.......iJJn,. .....i" •••• ..;J ... rfforr..J.id, u,." , ..,.,.." ~ it ., in __ Mnorr iiJfrrnot rw11'hi", • . • ,,4 in 11_ _ {t<Jirh ,.".,.; ,. thi"l' "'''- _ "-1 it tIw ,. ." _{",;., ... A ".I iJn", U _ tJistrihW "'" ."Y.thrr ruJ

r-

1hi",~_.tl.tn..iN,

n.",,.,.,.,..,,

..... -..ut,........ u ..J.Jt J.", ..... .....JJ . . /..,..,;,., ..4N:J.

"- _ _ _,IiJJII. ap«W tffrrt/.[ PVr.l19-rlol To accomptith _ p;o.iJ ill~_ i~inlO mediffermca and nondifft.tencu ba"hC( •• obj«u......:t. ... by inqui,· ins aboul thr WII" thu I row it dilknnl from I hone and tM ways thar il it no!" diIkR"," Inquiri"'l in rbis 1\uhJon, all pt'1O)o1l tMn ..:r:..;m ~ 10 just me . . . which wt" call thr '"_66 'wf of. IN... r"."'broIlMI!"'~""'" )orr'!'"..""" _ f unU'¥J1wJ.NkM"''' ~M
M;"...

MI"... wri Mnt.....~'!' 1M IN~ ""H r.:dIiJ'll".Jhi1trrJ- p._11 f l.

,.rrd1mo ....... ,.,.

171

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTJ ' S PH ILOSOPHY

dharmin is simply pan of the adusion process. and is hentt conccpnal."' How then should WI! Imlt natufl!.-lIIflbh4wi It Sttnl5 best to consider it a special c:asc of swbhilllll in the sense of a propeny. That is, when we: speak of some of me properties of a ~ warer*jug. ~ such a5 ib "impermaMnu~ or irs · matcrial iry,~ we: 46nJtnKI those properties. which do not ttist rvcn concq)[uaIly before their construction , by abstracting just a b of me causal ch:mcteristia from within the fotality of possibilitiCl that is the water-jug's "natufl!.." This suggests, of course, that the water-jug's " nalU~" is a com* posite cntiry consisting of pos!ibilitics. Indeed. we have mus far spoken of it in this fashioo for usc of aplanadon. But if we wish to be mo~ precise, WI! must not consider the water-jug's naturt a5 itsdf a dusln'of possibilities. bur rather as a scamlcu uniry from which. through the a:clusion process.

«

For the wh;cct-prtdicatt ,mUon JeC PVSV "" PVI.n (uarubttd in n. 1, and in the appmdill). ~ also the f'oIIowin, pMnp- (PVI_S9-60 and PVSV "" til.; G:)LI)-}).J}: I .. _ -tdN "-'1.f~'" thm .",41' ....... ..oJ tJmn,.;...~ "'P;~ -t u" fo ...., ·tIw c«/tuiMo ;, .", /hi", .". lIN arl..MtI n.riIJ ;, • .u-... 11", ,..... 41rruiMa • ..J Jnn.i ...~ "'Pi,.,,",,..r-- jout III _teN rMl'nuN.... IPV•. !,) On lilt theory 01 ot:htr~lwkln. il;' not W CUI:' that the adwion;' om thllOK and thc adOOed mi"l lrhal the adution qlUliha) is anothu, This~ ~ 110 btao.ue one would lor fDn:rd. 10 rorw::l~ thai dw: adutkd thin, lauch U I cowl ill alJo adudcd from iu adution li~, il WOlIId he adudtd!Tom thc adusion from __ COWl. In Wi cut, Illtexdudtd mi"l IAOdo .. lcaw) WOlIId br rhal llTom....t.ich il _ adudcd, sud! as. honotl. I(dw wm' til( c:uc, men thcR wou.Id be: no adusion lof •ccw" &om -honc:"]. ~, thc adusion is just thc adudtd milll iadf. The di(krmc:r in the apraaioN lOr and linguistic: ~Iioru: of the eulusion and euludtd COOK from the diiklttlOt bawUIl tho: onnanlK: oonWtuioru: applied 10 them. 1bm: ia no aawI diff'cmICIt in mcrnKt (~ ~Sina: IW iJ no diik.cna: in ,dUuk<,. diff'dU>Ol in the ..... anric ronw'lfions make. no Ioe1Ue brcawc the cxprcuiom fo, IUbjc.oa and prtdk:m would drnotc (.~) thc I&InC tftin&. likcwioc. a gramlNltical QJf>ordarion (ruch II thc p iI;W of 'thc cownatof I cow'} thai inwotw.. distinction ben. CUI the «me"u reWed aUo makcf no IoI1lK btawc it dtpmdI OIl. diff'a'ttla t.n.UIl the «ma\lI. ~ Au'-tII "'" ~ W 11_ ,bi,." • l'W",_tK.J met tIini"l' ;,1m ill rtr-.n i..JiuuP dK,rwIicut,;,., is u" ~ (.nJ",) • ifit fIInY Jilform, "".. tIw ,~~_" " ,..J""J~;• ..J... f ... "''''1'''''' {(~ [PVI _""! It;' "",,n., cut thai any UK olbn~ is mtrintd til thecsaa>tColan ob;ta brawt ont wouJd be fOrud 10condudr thal ... himsOal (.aN""'; UAft would not OCC\Ir. typaol "AlP an uxntd 10 mu 10 fW'I) ditUna thinp whether thc thin" art aaw1Iy di.. lina or noc. 8ci1ll anployal in INI WJ.y. U>cy naiJy poinl ow thc .dcl(ilI .. if ;1 wen: IWOdiffft(Dt thing. ThctJon:, e¥m lhou&h both ' (II(TW' and · w .. , =IT~ rtkr 10 the I&InC ob;m (urh.c). diffrrml orrnatIOc oonwnlioru: an conHruatd JO tNt one: mishl kMw lbar 10ft!(: auribult is prtdicaml of _ oub;ta- \Vhcn ...m JCnWuic """'............ ...., ~ a ~ w+- "",,..bo. arc dUotinco "f'f>aIn in """" nition in tuch a (uJ,ion rhal il indici.,u thc pmiic::aoc: .. if'il wen: diHcrct\1 from

m.n...

n-

SVAlIHJVAI'RA TIIlANDHA: T HE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

17 )

we abstract th~ various possibilitits th:u un
propeny-slNlbh4vas. The point here is m:u (he cawal char.aaeristia of an emiry do not actually exist as real, dinina entidts whose aggrcg:alion constitutc:s iu nature-n.·4bh4"", but rathu th:u th('f tOO must be abstraaed from me uniry that is the nature-_bh4V4. We can thus consid~r the nature-mlbhilNl to be the seamless totaliry of causal characteristics that is me subject iuclf, ~n if mal subject iudf is one constructed through the process of exclusion.') We will rerum (0 ibis issue below, but fim let us aamine me twO moots in greater dmil.

me ~. nom though it u [in ba) noc diff«ulI from iL T1W ocrun hm"'" _ u habinlamd by fq)Orcdly obcrn". that the r""""tic:aI rd.atioll iI ...ro in dw way. Thlt ~ of. gnrnnurical rtblion doc:. not iudf CONtinlle ill ~ QK VI actual di..incrior! bra. . mere i, noohi", '0 ~I dw IUC of...dI • ,. ..... ..".., rw/I Iuu. ,nri,.niMeJ.. til "'!"Itn.MttU, / ... -,dh.• izjl _ ... *?t~,.".wMN. .".,.....u.,mtlt~ 1 uN ttl .".,litdi~ ";w,,,w ~tNJ l .n.,.r ~~ 'pi vi!N.ftli, '7.6lirrfti,,; 1 MI"_,,, .~". i ....vni NtJt w.~u[1 trV,.60) ... IV;

-nI'"

IIM"'"""

vrffl, iLthJl4 ",,'Jt'MJHI',.,.lit,b 1 u ,.Ih.i IlJUiriftu -"mriku iii ".,..,..", itJtmu Ulthi ,,~ "", .rrhmr .,,.,.·..tVhnu ,,.,ft.U6Jrntri / «'1111 P "' P""'''' ;1} ~"""IIInJJM1U ft~ ~ u#NUu,!,

ftkjJ ..,.,......~tW

,i

~u.m.,!, ftrw s.~ .".,liriktbthi .;/t4dti, .nJ,J",.,."" n..u.,;",.,v; ".,IiMJ" ....nhi1llltrr "pi whi p1TJtIfMnltmi~t I ... ul-Wll,.,...trw w.. ,,~ / "'Y"n-Jpi '"~ ~ ,,.,,.,,,Jt#IhJ#JhJllit I ,.,u,.jJ.,.,!" ftw,riJ tlt.t1llN......... ~u uM~ ,Uiltl,yJ,.1Iirthtt'!' 1whII__

,i,.II,••

1

The Ira...t..;.,., of this

._1.

pnraK {"the .wwion is o n, thinS and

the QCIu.W

~...i'r .. ... outI"",-" ."?-'7".""j, .~"!',., i'JI ;........ I"""~Ic:> .I"" llll~rp'rion of the 0'CnC pm by DharmaIdni in pvsv, ....t.cn ~ is &k-d aj; I1Jhrttir -,Jand -,.1IJhrrU:. .61IJIII nw ",""UlJ. Hdalcd narunJIy xcordin& 10 !he Saruluil.;1 wouJd read. "otbn.adulion and CMhcr.adudcd. "

bIn Dbarmakirti"1 """,n commm,ary b.1ow. • "wti is appanndy po..cd as ~"ti /ruiMlti. Thil is confumcd by ~buddhi {rvT:nb .. K: I~ whop...... i. &I~

45 The faa mal a IUb;.a (Jhn".i,,) iI. corut~ prope"Y. _M.hwconm"cd

ita has b.tn diIcwscd abo...: (n. ll).

aj;

a sub-

17<4

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

3.2 TIN ProduC/;on-mtuU oftIN SV2bh:iV2pratibandha The (W() basic nOlions of swbhtiva thai we have summarized above enable us to describe the produaion-mock ci the Ivabhdwpr'luibflNihll-i.e., what it is about cause and. effttt that enables w to inkr infoUibly rbc: former from the laner. In brief, one can simply say that the effi:ct's narure-swbh4tIA and the cause', rururc-SlNlbhtitIA mutually "rcsuia· each other: for the clfca to have: the naturc-swbluiVfl thac ic has. ic must come from thar specific kind of cause, and for the cause (0 have the naturc-sV4bh.iva thai it has, it must have the capaciry [0 produa that specific kind of effect. Although Dharmm"i clearly understands this restricrion that constitutes the productionmode of the SlIilbhllNfprlltiiNlntiJM to be one that pertains mutually bctwccn cause and effecl, he expresses his theory by explanations thar emphasize either the cause or the dfca. In both cases, his theory is expressed quite d liptically, but when ptuC:nted prinurily in terms of the effect, his Statemenu :unount to the following:

Prwil«tilJn-moM txprtJMd prim.ri/y in ItTmI lJflM rJfrrt: if some entiry J can be called " s." then it has the nature or an S. which means that it ha.s arisen rrom the cause that produtt5 an S such thaI it ha.s the potentials to produa all the effects cxpected or an .s: In shon, ;1 bears all me propeny-lINlbhti~ or an .s: It is known that being a product or Fis a property-slf4bhdVII or an S. Hence. ir some individual is an S. it mwt have: arisen from another individual tlut is an F. To use the aample or smoke, ir some individual can be called "smoke. ~ [hen it has me narure-sV4bhaV4or smoke: it has alltru: property- JlIoIfbh4~ or smoke. The i3ct or being a product or fire is a propcny-SvabhalW of smoke. Hena, ir SOffit' individual can be called "smoke,· it must have been produced by a fire." Dharmakini employs mll«ti~ lUi IIbJurJllm to express these arguments for me production-mode in terms or the cause. In the SVllvrtti ht' notes that. if smokt by its nature arises fTom fire. men it annot arise ('\."Cn ona from something otht'r than nre. If it were to arise from something other than nre. then smoke would be causeless, since it can occur even when its cause (fire) is absent. To avoid this unacceptable conclusion. one cannol claim thai

SVA!HAVAJIRATI!ANDHA: THE BA SIS O F INFERENCE

17S

.lOme orher. non-fire entity causes smou. brause die gme unacceptable oonclusion would apply: smoke can occur cvm when dlat other, non-fire enrity is absellI. In response, one might attempt to hroge one's argument by allowing for some type: of"fuzzyM production, whereby something similar to smokc comes from something other than fi ~. But, assuming that "similar" means "having the 5aJT\e effccu," Dharmakini responds that one amid nor aanunr fOr the .unoke's differc:rxr from orher entities because differmces in causes account for difkrcnces in effecu. His point is that it is precisely by appealing to dilTc:renu or nondifTucnu in their dTa.-u that we say that some enciries are similar or dissimilar. Having abandoned any such notion of"fuuy· production, if one limply insists that smoke is causcless, then one could not acco Unt for the observed fact that, rather than occurrin g hllphu-'lnlly. ~ mokc OCCUI"l' in ~pccir.<: rime< lI n ri pb<:t!ll." Th<':$C rhrox

unacuptable conclusions from the SW"!'tti-i.e., that smoke would be causcless. that the dilfncncc in causes accounu fo r the dif'krcnu in df'ccu. and that spatiotemporally rC'S tncted occurrence does not apply to causeless entities---also appear in the HrtllbilUk There, hown'tt the argument oonurning dilTc:rencc is replaced by a more specific argument: namdy, that if lmok~

can N- producM bolh by lh:u wnich by it!: " :lnl", producrs tmoJu. and that which by in narure does not produce smoke, then smoke itself

would be by iu nature both smoke and nonsmoke." 47 In addition 10 ~ P' P nrul.ued in ~"PP'nda (PVSV ",",PVI.J4--J7). _abo PVSV ..,{PVI.I91 (tnrulucd.t-.:, n.}J).

4B In HB (10' -4-17), DlwlrWani oIrcn dIC foUowin" mot'r concitoe argummc

EIrect uwi auor an: m"nWIy ddin«l'II hr.-ins 1M 1""I""I)f-_IJt.l_ 01 hftnt IN prodllt'l'd uwi ~ prodlKU. In thil rtprd. if ~ ..-rft aho 10 COOlC from ron-.ahinJ odICr dun tho: allAl compla 01 firr and 1UCh, thm i, would IlOl h.a.-c dw: pl'OpC'lt)'_6IJj ... ofbrinS prodlK.ed by fire. Hma. il would IlOl arix ewm ana: from fire. just all is does IlOl arilc from lOtIlC'dr.ins rUe [1IICh ... Wllerl. Nor would dlC c;a1lAl com-pk:< of'fin. nc. prodllCC ~ If¥Cn (lRQ1 braWl: it would IlOI h.a.-c 1M ptopen,· _MtJ.. of prodllcins 1oInOIIt£ would h.a.-c ~ 1lIIU", ofbolh.,...,u and non· ~, bra""" an dI'a:t'l prop<:"'-.... Mr.h. _ cauKd by ~ propmy.~ of U$(:3UIr. And if ~dfca:., .. ..,..."' .•,..jI. wm: IlOIlkpmdm, upon dw _Mh. ofiu (::I""':, Ibm OM wou.kI be farad ,0 admil dw dlC dfm:'1 pt. ll)',.,.MtJ_ Irr aweku. Tllo:rdOre, dw ",ilich prodllU:l lrnoU: iI. particubr ~ of caw:aI compla of firr uwi ouch. And du.1which is prod~ from w" pm.icubr ~ uJ ......... "",u.,.,.. '" ru~ ,.nJ ....... is ..."*"- Si",,", .I", .,....., iIlId elTa,;< ...... in ""to f.hion racrintd in dICit narure· .... M.i', • • u...., if no production. of dlC dfft:t from that 1

po..,...""

176

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAIlMAdRTI'S PHILOSOP HY

As with .he presemation that is stated primarily in terms of the effect, Dharmakini's explanation of Ihe production-mode of the w.bhilNlprllti1¥n4iHt in terms primarily of the cause is a40 elliptical. One can. however, derive the rollowing presentation from his arguments: ProJuctitm-",otkapmml i" lnms oft~GlI«. if some individual can be: caIkd .. p''' mcn it Ius me IUture of an F. it hu arisen 110m me causal complex m.u produces an Fsuch that it has the potentials to produce all the df«a ofan F. In shon, il has all the propcny-lVtlbhi~'iZS of an F. It is known thai the potential to produce S is a propmy-wahhiva of an F. Henct, if some individual is an F. then it must Iuve the potentia.! 10 product S To USt me crampic offite. if some individual can be: called a-fire," then il has me IUture of a frrc: it must come 110m me ca~ thai produce fire and thw il mWI have the causal potmcia1s offire. h is known tlul fire Ius !he POICIUial to produce make. Hena:, if some individual can be called "fire: it mWI Iuvc me poccntial to produce smou.ft

In the SWlI.rtti. (he argumems used to defend these claims thaI focus upon Ihe cawe arc summarized in the rollowing brief pa.ssage

mal

... a panicular property-svahhiwt of smoke is it is prod uced by 1h1( {Le.• fi re]. Likewise. the cause, fire also has the propertyswbhiVll of producing thaI kind of effect. If smoke wtte 10 come from something else, then the capacil)' 10 product smou would nor be a propctty-nrabh.iVII of fire. Hence. fire would nOI pro-

...-hich iI of a dlifCf'm1 kind dun rlw CI..,. of tIw kind of drea. Hena. an dIln iI IV)I mi.,bdinS aboul iu ClUK.. llIcrd"o~ if the: rdarion of ClUK and df=; II maOlishcd. rlw ~n of rlw dfca by tM ClUK if aUo aabliWd. IJ.t-,.,J~ j.",...u-."....w,..~ ~.~. ""']'di JIti_ :eM) ali"", .ueJ-- "pi tIM""' IiUJII

4'' '

"'ii-1fJtf!I _~ ... """rilJ ~ .,. ,.,. ... tIM. . ntIM-..twl,

u,; shufri"", j#1WJn• ..-~,.., M. i ......,.,.....'

.... u IJN-,.

r.J.~,.~tl..Mitw. . ~~~_1Kwh ';M...... Jhi~~bI ;lJh. ~MJ...U'f'~ ....~

,.~ ~-Iftlt- wtNIJ,,~"'-!I-" 'p~~,. -".,.0. sJ-F~";r.!>".ow-. ili~".,., tN'f' ~.a,.,u, ~

lI",.mr ... M....n. ,., fUry.",

~

1M

.,.Mu6rtlti ""'" "*"- ....,

.u.,.a.,.. ,y"!WM ~ ,;JJ)M M.r""tiI. 49 S« FVSV ,",PVI.}4-J7 (u)lli\uni in Iht:appmdix).

u-r.,..lcw.

SVA 6HAV,VRATI6A NDHA: TH E BASIS Of INFERENCE

duu smoiuo: even ona!. Nor an th.u which cornel from

In lOme

other caU1C' be: smoiuo:. for it has come from an entity that docs not have the propc:rty-lVItbh4lA1tof producing smoke:. And if that other entity actually does have the propc:rty-/VoI'bh4va of producing smoke. then that other thing must be: fi~. Hence:. the: re:lation be:lWttn an c:ffc:ct and a caU1C' is not misle:ading." Combining the: pc:rspcctivc:s of both ClU1C' and dTect, Dharmakini concludes his argument with these: verses: A termite: towe:r is fire: if il has the: nature: of fire:. If it does not have: (he: rnlltu~ of fire: (which includes the propc:rty-lvabh4v4 of prOOudng sm(l~J. how could smokr:uise in m(' p~ttofjun a Ic:rmite: towcr~ Smoke: could not arise in thai case bc:cause: fift has the propc:rty-SV4bhd'va of being the: caU1C' of smoke:; itS distinguishing charaCteristic (bh«J4) is to have: the causal potentia! (0 produce: smoke:. If smoke were: to come from that which is not the cause: of smoke. it would be causc:las." In shon _by vinue ofiu narure:-slIAbh.lV4, smoke: has the: propc:ny-lNbhdv.or of being an effect of fire:, and by its narurc-svabhdv., fire has the: propc:rty-

nwbbivtlofbc:ing capable: of producing smoke:. In this sense. smoke: and firc: arc: rc:luc:d u\rough their respective: natures. At this point, howeve:r. it is important [ 0 rc:call that the tdation bc:twttn an effect (such as smoke:) and iu caU1C' (such as fire:) musl act as a warrant Ihat guannu:es the: tNStwOrthinc:u r.orvis.or".lAIlk) ofinfe:«:nca based upon

dfO:<:I~idcncc:

(as whe:n

~

infer fire: from smoke). When examined in Ihis lig}u, Dharmakini's theoty evinces 5Ome: problems and lacunae. lc:t us now eumine: a few. &tIM In>>n i" tIH App/irJltu,." D/ tIN ~" -,,,otk To He how the: theone.: _ ....vc: d~ so far are applicable: ( 0 infere:nce. ~

,i

PVSV iii PVI.n «;:1).,....)): ujj."i. In J ... I>hJ*~ tf),M.... iti f ...rhIltm.r.,; IiUlMMiu.orItby.j4_~N/I f 1MJi"J"AI M.hot ,... $II IiUJII ,...M,m, in f utkrrI4,i ,... j.,..." J ,... N $II ~ bJtJ..u Mmlt I uI:JWlNHlItZ_ C4 $II it]

-,.""*"";'

""*_

__

....,.,i,

5 1 PVI.J6-)7: .",inwtM.h.w{l t.1muy4".~ M."..''''' ~ f .t.IM,...",inMMb. ,... ~_ ....diwl!< ~ H tIhtt~ 1II...m,. JNt6Un~" f~"',!to ..; 6hJw $II ~ ~ H.

""*IIUSJ'"

178

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKI RTI' S PHILOSOPHY

should ptorbllps begin by rttalling (hat the produCtion-mode of tb-: SWlbh.ilNlpriltilxI1,,{ha is m<:ant to ac.c:ounl for the ~ion rd':lIion (lI]t1ptiJ in an inf~ncc from dT<:a 10 ClUK. ~ not<:d eariiu. that rdation consists of a pnv:ackr (",.",kil), which is here th-: cause, and th-: p<:rvaded (vyd".,J, which is here the eff<:a. As h:as been explain<:d, this means that any locus of the eff<:a must also be: (within cemin spatiolemporal limiu) II locus of rhe ClUSt'. BUI ir doo; not mean (har any locus of the aUSt' must be: also II locus of thc eff<:a. Indeed, DharnuJdrri specifically r-:jccu tit<: notion that effects an be: reliably infured from causes, and in the specific ColSC' of the fi re-smoke inference, South Asian philosophe:rs generally cbim that some fires do not produce smoke_~ The reilltionship between p<:rvadcr and pervaded is rhus :asymmetrical: wher~r the ptrvaded (smoke) is prtSeOl, me ptorvader (fire) must be p~OI, but it is not the: ColSC' that wherevet' dle p<:rm-:r (fire) is present, the: pervaded (smoke) must also be present_ Dhumakirti's objective in the formuluion of Ih-: production-mode of the tlNilbhdvapfll'ilNtlUiha is 10 ground me p<:rvasion rebtion in a type of ncccs~ i ty: smoke is nt:ec:SSarily rhe product of fire , and fire is nccesurily what can produce smokt-. With the pervasion relation in mind, let us now aaminc four lwic issues that, in one way or IInother, could indicatc problems in Dharmakirri's argumentS for the production-modc of the II1IlbhdvapralibaNih4. My intention in n.ising these issues is to demonSln.tc the problems that Dharmakirti must c:xplicidy or impllcidy resolve ifhis arguments ue to be: actually IIpplicable to inferences from df<:a to ClUSt'. The four issues are w-:

(. Smok-: is not thc only product of fire. 1. Only some fi res produce smoke. }. Only fire is apable of producing smoke. ... Fir-: is not th-: only entity that may be called

~$ moke-producing·

(JhiiltUljaMM).

I. Smolu is nor 1M only proallrl olfirt. In his arguments presentr:d in terms of dle dfea:, Dharmakini claims (hili smoke ncccssarily Iw the propeny-m,bh4tw, ~ product of fire. BUI while Ihis proptony-Wilbhd"", may be necessary to smoke, it is not neccsnry to only smok-:. If this w<:re not tht. ColSC', then :ashes. which arc an tffect of fire, would also be smoke. HCIlCC, as with the pervasion of smoke by fire , M

52 W~ mUSl IMK(. ~. tN, uOOctamiin. h.ishJ'Il'tS(rimd condilioru, on.: nI.I'I il'>dem

infer In cff«I &om a cawc, acro.dinllO Dharmakini Stt SlcinkcUna (1m).

SI'A8HAVAI'RATlaANDHA: T H E BASIS OF INFERENCE

179

the relation of "smoke" to "product of fire" is also asymmetrical: "product offire~ pervades "smokt, ~ but the opp<»i[e is !'lOt true. This amounu to me claim thaI the correct dmrmination of some eIllity as being "smoke" is a sufficient condition for one ro correctly apply the property-wahhdvll "product of fire ~ 10 mat entity. but me correct cUterminuion of some enrity as possessing the property-.rvahh4V1l"product of fire~ is not a sufficient condition for one m pmpe-rly identify mit entity as "smoke." This is the moST typical ~y that Dharmaltirti formulates a property-.rtNlhlHi"", and we will el:plore it further under the rubric of Ivdhhav~idena. At this poiIll. we can briefly characterize it as follows: if P is a property-Wdhhdv.r of S. chen me rot:al au.sal characteristics [hac mu.u be in plact: if an entity i5 to be correctly called .. S"will necessarily include the a usal characteristics required rn ctilihar enrity " p. " It is rhis norinn nf pmperty_.rvahh4W11 that underlies Dharmakini's argumenu for the production-mode in terms of me effect. That is. if the fact of being produced by fire is a properry-/WllhhdWII of smoke, then me lOtal causal charaa:cristics rt12t mUSt be in place if an eml£)' is [ 0 be called ·smoke" will ne«ssarily include the causal characteristics required to call that entity "product:cl from fire."))

ffttly lIJ"" jim proJuu smolu. The asymmcuicaI nature of the pervasion rdation requirc:s that only some ~.

fires product smoke, but in me SVII~ Oharmakini's arguments for the production-mode of the uVJhhivap,-.tihllntIJM speak of fire as nC'CCSSarily Mving me propmy-wahhdll4 of producing smoke. This is, in faCt. a missatement that Sakyabuddhi and other commentators correct on the basis of a p~1d punge in the H""bi"J... The problem here iii ,ha,. if fire were necessttily to bave me propmy-JVilbhdll4o( producing smoke. Ihen any fire tha.t did not product: smoke would not be a fire. This diJcJq)ancy is corrected by noting tMt, although only some fires product smoke. IIOfires are ,",.hk of producing smoke. In effect. Dbarmakini appeals to an implicit distinction betwttn necan.ry. nondi5positional propenies and necessary. di.cJlOSirinnal properties. Thai i.c. rh~ propo!rty-n.w"hhorof " ~n8 3 producr of fire" is a neoeuary. nonJirpotitioIW/propmy of smoke in thai all instanCeS of smoke are 1ldU4U, product:d by firr. But ~ apable of producing smoke" is a necessary, JispmtionAlpropcrty offire in that all fires are (I1""Duof producing smo~. but do not necessarily do so. The fact thai some fires iIC~­ aU,product: smoke is then accoUnted for by the f.act thai the insrance ofhre S3.s... bdow, 19+

ISo

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PH!LOSOPHY

in quesrion is pan:iciparing in:l complete ClIusai complex for the production of smoke. Indeed, Dharmakini explicidy maintains m:u in an inference from effect 10 caUK, one is :lctually inferring me causal compla. J. Only fir( ~n

is ~ilp"bk o/protilUint Im06t.

Dhannakirti defends me production·mode of me tvilbhdwpratibiZNIha wilh :lrgumentf in tenns of the ClIUSC, he adduces :I sp«ific. dispositional propcny-nlilbhdN. such as "capable of producing smol«," as a property of the cause, such as fire. In adducing this property, he does not assume an asymmetrical rdarionship betwttn mat property-mrbhdlliland the ClIuse. Thai is, until« me relationship between "smolce~ and me propertyWilbh411r1 "prodUCI of fire," me implicit relationship betwttn "fire" and the propmy-Wilbhdllil"ClIp;lble of producing smoke" is symmetrical: the correa dC"l:ermirultion of some emil}' as being "fire" is a sufficient condition for one to contttly apply the properry-WilbhdVd "ClIpable of producing smoke" to mat entil}'. likewise. the correct determination of some entity as possessing the propmy-Wilbhdw "ClIpab!e of producing smoke" is a sufficient condition for one 10 correcdy iMmify mat emil}' as "fire. ~ Thw, it is n"«1isariiy the case thaI if an entity is a fire, it is capable of producing smoke, and if an entity is capable of producing smoke, it is a fire. This suggt:S1$ that, if property-Wilbhillil Pis me type of propcrty-svabhallil :adduced here and Fis the ClIU5e qualified by that propcrty-Wilbhav.r, then eimer: t) me tOIa! ClIusai characterinia that mWI be in plac:c if an entity is to be contttly called .. r wit! necessarily be Wnricill to the causal ch:mcttrisria requirro to corrtttly call thai entity" P"; or 1) an entil)' has the ClIusai characteristics required to correcr.ly 0111 thai enliry .. P" if and only if that entiry possesses the lotal causal characteristics that must be in pbcr if an entiry is (0 be correctlycalled "F~ This way of understanding the presence of propeny-llIilbhoiVd P as a sufficient condition for idencifying the subject that il qualifies as being F stands in contrasl (0 the more f2miliar inlCrpret2rion applied to ~ prodUCI of fire ~ as a propcrry-SVIIbhdllil thai is necessarily applicabk (Q smoke, btu not a sufficient condition for the determination of its subjecl as being smoke. The reason 10 interpret a prope:rty.sva6hdllrl such as "ClIpable of producing fire- in this fashton should be fairly obviow: to take the example of smoke and fire . if the argument fOr the produa ion-mode of the svabhdVilpraribiZtrtiha in temu of the ClIWC amounts tO:ln argument from the propeny-SVIIbhdw"capable of producing smoke" to fire as the subj«.l (Jharmin) quaJified by that property. and if something other than fire (such as a termile rower) can also poUGS that property, then an endry [hat produces

SVA6HAVAPMTJaANOHA: TH E BASIS OF INFEREN C E

181

Imou iJ not n~rily a fire. AJ we have ~n , Dlurmalcirti got;!:as f:a.r:as [0 say thar. if a termitt tower is aaually producing smoi«:, thtn it must bt a locus of fire. 4. Fin iJ nOI 1M Imly mliry thAt m4J bt (JlU,d "smoltt-producinl(dhumajanana). If the propeny-.roabhA"" -C2p:;1ble of producing Jmoke~ i~ nOI only n~. essarily applicable 10 aU fires, but is abo a sufficienl condition for me entity to which it applies lO be: a fire, and if the wood and such in a causal cornplcx that produces smokt ~ also ~smokt-producing: then one would be: forttd to conclude that wood and such are fire. Ahernatively, to use the example of a seed and a sprout, if the propc:rty-Ilwbhd". ~capable of producing a rprout is a sufficient condition for th:u entity to which il applif'!l 10 be: a seed , and if lOiI and such also panicipatc in the production of a SproUl, then lOiI and such ~ a seed .1O Dharmakini himsdf does not address this problem dirrctiy in the S"'vrni, but he does appear 10 recogni:r.e il 10 lOme cxtenl. His recognition of the problem is suggested by w claim that tht causal complex is what one :iCtually infen through :.n inference," bUI if Ih .. c1:t.im were inlerpreted nrictly, hi. ugumentll for the produccion-mode of the fWlbhJ""p,."tilNttJdh4 in terms of the cause would f2iJ: that is, tht dnermination of an enlity as having me capacity to produtt smokt' would not be a necessary and sufficient condition for applying the concept ·fire~ to th:.t entity, since rnt entity in question could:as easily be wood. II mw sa:rTlS likdy mat in claiming llut the causal compla: is inferred in an inference, he also means to preM

KrYe lO me distinction between the primary cause

r..phUtwlutu) and Ihe

supponing condilions ("","4ri,.). In shon , mt properry-twohiva "capable of producing smoke" mWI IOmehow apply to the primary Gillie in a way lhat differentiates it from the s«ondary cause. DharmalOni's StVlvrt,i contains some argumtnu tMt might supply this testriction, but ovenJl his pre:senr.ltion there: iI incomplete in this regard." His Ht'tubi"J.. o£fus mon::

po¥.,,.... U.......

,So4 The probkm men Ooncd hen:: i.~., m., '1xWon of u.. ooopo: of the •~ of produci",...>Okc--it ~mibr 10 0flC' noti«d by On.kt 1199').

5' PVSV ...tPVI.J7 (G:IJ.lO).

56 The diiawion of priCTW)'QIUC andwpponinfi c:oodJtion in PVSV MpV,.19S mar provick rhc: crpt of rtltriction thac it MCCUlIy!wK, lOt DlwnuJdrti thcr~ sugpu dw m., pri. mary awe it..hac deI:=ninccl eM type of dJ"ta Ih.:al it produud by I QUAI compko:. In Ibon, lui VJWl'Il'nI .. A '(J thai ~ m..:...;. lOll, """IU iUld IUd! nu;r occur In IxKh eM alUll complel. dw produc:es I batky iplOll' and eM causal compk:c; thac produces I ria

181

FOUNOATIONS OF OHAlMAKllTl' S PHILOSOPHY

a tensivc comments on the distinction bctwt-cn primary cause and suppon ing conditions, but he cf()(S not appear to addrtSS dil't'ctly the problem of restricting the properry.svA'bhliva "capable of producing $moke~ in a manner lim would suppo" his arguments for the production-mode of the SWlbhli""pralibllNiIM. >1 CONC ERN INC NECESS ITY

In our examination of the four issues addressed above, we have .s«n th:u Dharmakini implicitly relies upon some notion of necessiry. Although it u incomplet:e, Dharrnakin i's inchoate theory of neassiry is probably what prompts many contempol'al)' interpreters to rranslate property-SWlbhalid as "esscntw property." Thu tntnslation may be suggestive. but it mWI be employed with caution. Specifically, the notion of an "essentia.l property~ Iptolli.

!her ~ do not M"': lhe _b4J"" or Prodoon8 a ria ' ptOLIl whcta in I

QutaI compla duol i"d"des I. barley Ked (and 1\01 I. ria I«d). The reuon for !his is tNl ~ .,il. ~~ and od>t. condilioN in ~ c:ompla pin the of prodoon8 I. ritt ~I from the p~na: or !he rice seed. Tht moll tdtYanl put or ,he p»A8C. whim raponds '0 ,ul"rnenu '"Pinot IN: nOI;on ,hal an tnli!),', dDUVClion (,,;dJ;,) I . t'¥t!)' !IN)lntn1 is not inm.wc (W ~nriallO WI tI1riry. reads II follows (G:'J9"'-' 4):

,,,,,MiN

"Bm . in wow w ........ ricttprotJI" 10 be pmtIl.ICIed. a hatlry - ' and wch nuy ..... be in n«d of :anythift8 .ddiDonal beaUK ,tl 1M aupponin8 oondioons ooil for tbt- production the riu 'PfO"1 JOmtIimtI be in !he proximity or ~n !he harky -=I and ..m." How is il l\Ol i" need of -miftl? Tho, is, in.umuch .. they (i.e.. the IN.rky K'nI and aucbl do /IOl ha." tht wUhi"" of produc:in8 the.itt JPIO'" thai a rice r«d two they an: in ncni WI ,,,,Hh,iN. "In ,hal caK. IOtM fibricaral or QUlC..II I:fllilies nur;abo 001 haw thll J''''iJhh" ,I.., .....a.c. .k.:.r." A ria: oud and ouch ha~ eha,_~of produc:i"81 riu~e due CO thcir own QUK{,J. Heoot, W I which doe.: /IOl haw thoK cawa doe.: 1\01 ha...: .hal _Mbra. And i, is pc:rcciwd mac I CIUK [or I ri« «Cd 01 a hariq...-dl ... I rauiacd autal poccnUal. Nor is il rt:IIOI1Ibk- 10 claim dw d>t rsriaion in J""bh.iw WI pm:ai1U 10 dUnp (.nI!.a) is random (~iU) beaClK WI which dna DO{ rcqui .... awes and conditioN for io MlI:nI:t antI(K be rcsoicted in span. ,irr>t and ",bllIf1«. [ ....,," ~ jII"" ......~ I ~ai, ~1Ii'!' Witi, w",fpi "',!"r
or

""'r

or

rom ..

or

".eo..

,......

..

;; uq..m"

Msri,.

,.,.*"

.,i

_1>Ith. ";-,,,-,.1t6I1fIlI "mw~,.,.u. ... .,;~ I Iili~rtbrt qi III "",MJJW!J JI"i 1M 'S'*""';,. '",,,,,,,MiN!! ~ 1";",.;.Jn;J,. III IomtfJ ""'rii~ , ..filii " " I ... r. "",~"""iy.r_ "niMu"" ~fJ I

iii,. ...

."iWffiM

....~ ~",...~.ttt.

57 In noUn8 we the ~O;n H B do not "apJlQl"" 10 addre. thicl probkm.1 mnn 10 uI" 1-10- ...........t,...;.. ......... bc)"'l<'lo
Ic:awopen ohc: pooo-iobilKr ...... ~ u-uuW' Kopt of ~ pnxnl woriI--mi&hlllncowu

-.I,.... lJOiUUon.

SVA"HAVAPRATI&A.NDHA.: THE IASIS OF INFEREN CE

183

must nOI be allowed to introduce an unw:arrantM. form of essemi.al.ismand its aftendanl problt:m5--i nto Dharmaldrri's system. In this COnlal, if we are to think in IUms of necessity, it may be hdpful to draw from the: Euroamerican philosophical u:w.itio ns and introduce: the distinction bctwccn the pro:ticuion of a property as being neceuary U ft and the predication of a property as being n.......sury tk didf}. If a property iJ prM.iared tb ft. then the suhjfit' in que...ion nea:ssarily h:a.s me identity in qUClition tU llrubjm. If we claim, for example, that "being smokt~ is predicated tk n of some individual, then the identity of that individual is "rcnurily smoke. In other words, it is not poS5ible for u.s not to treat that individual as -smoke." The necessity here concerns the relation between the individual and a particular property, and nOl (he rdation ~n prorerries l.hem.
u

~ 1M p'ellmllilion hm:of ill.&. and tk~lOOCbIjlicJ" modified

mal,

IOXOOW'lI for !he manin...tUcb DlwnW:ini ~ W nlnion bURuil. JiM,."j" (~ ·Mibfca") and a " ' - - (. ' prcdiaIC"), T cdtnic:ally, in ill Jk. modaIiry n«cUiry appIicllO I whok propo"lion (i.e.. ";1 iii fW"C*4Irily IN< mol dvub;.aof. ddiniti", daaminllion of blue is blue; .. OFF" .! <0 J;~fIJ ,M;ry, in....t.;d, ~'YappI'" <0 the indjYi.du.oi {i.e., "i , iii ...... u.,.. the obj«t of . ddiniu~ dnmninarion ofblUo! is DeCaAriJy bI""~J (0. Pbtuinp 1974't-I}), ~ 1_ iI, that- notioru ~ conYUtibk 10 DbrmoJdrri'. way of conoo:i"u,S"poopaoitioru· (.u..""i"''''-- Uructurftj by daimins rha!, in ill kM mod:aIiry, dK' ncuaity penai'" bt""",, twO JiM,.. ril is nco;.a.sarily UUoe!ha, the ~'" nun u ,be objca by W ddinili~ danmination of'bluc' pcKKSM:Ilt\( """,-- 'bluc", wbik in tk rt modality, !he nc'Ctaity penal'" be",«n thc ,u""""i1l snd ib '" "we.) r'l ir. UUoe ~ W Jhn".;" nIu:n as !he objca by w dcfinitM dctnminarion of'blue' .... nrily ~ the ..""",.. 'bIue- ). F.... u .... ~ un ,-.aei'T' _ till: uf.~<.a! (if _oai"lD """uu.cnW) P"':'''''~' to I'bn". np (1974), S« ~Iso me bnefbutlUCid ditawion of c.ma: by Sou (I 99SJ, IICf

184

FOUNDATION S OF D HAItMAKI II.TI ·s PHILOSOPH Y

an individual can lx: ron,n rucd :as a subject (Jhitrminj flU ~s moke: the propmy-1V4bh4V4 ofbcing ·smoke" musllx: prcdicucd of that individual, With this in mind. we can then nOle dur, ifbring ·smoke" wtte prcd.iatcd ' " rt of thar individual. it would not lx: possible foe dUll individual 10 not bear thar propcny. In simple terms. one can say that that individual would lx: in nsmusmokc, But Dhannakini's theory of nUu]tl C"dellnitiw determination" or "correa judgment") belies any such tk rt CSSlentiaiism. Dh:umaltini claims that. in a COITCCt judgment immediardy subsequent to a pcrupnon, the pmUcations one makes of an individual arc marWy conditiont'd by mind-depcndcnt Faaon such as expectation. need. context, perceptual acuity. habituation and so on, Thus. when a child who stUdies under hil b.ther SttS him coming from afar, he will Ilnt conceive of that person as ·father" r.nhcr "tcacher," O r. in a morC: gruesome example. whcn a dog. a libcnine, and a Jlltin gaze upon a dead womm's body. the dog S«I it as food , the man sen it as a woman, and the Jlltin seer it as a corpse," Dharmakini's point in adducing these examples is that the individual may lx: construed in multiple Wll)'S with tilde owrIap: the minddependent facton underlie the manner that a dog interpreu his perception of a woman's body will have little to do with the facton that unckrtic a libertinc's intClprC:t:ltion ofsuch :l. perception. In orncr word.t, the:

man

m:u

59 Tht paUlV i" qUCltion is PVSV .... PVI,sf (G:JI,I6-JLU). I" addition 10 IOcwincpnJlly upon ddin iti.., dnamin.ation (~ Obumaklrci ho:n: c.ondudcs his ~l tnat, C¥m thoogh any ptia:pUon OW""HNy conWIIJ &II the dllla that the ob;ut can prO'l'ide to the prrtl:i.."., the Ikwmi"uiont that the ~ mOW ITom thallblll:an: dq>ctldml upon 1M patti",,', dUpoJirions. In rlw eumpk of tho: woman ', body. ~i

dad_',

(rVt':7'Qblif .. K:I#o l~ p'tnicb lIWIyc(lhrdoeWls, Lt.., INI w~". body. and tnallht pnmven:an:. ~11, a IIMi .libntilK. The pM "rads:

doc

"But why .. il that, C¥m though one .... hid. p"ICCpl.w ""p"Iicnoa: of"'" n.a1;UlC of • re:aI di'''fi (_"'I'M"') thai is diRina from :aU od>cr thinp. _ c&oa ISO'! ha.., • mnemon ic: dnerminalion ofil ar wchl" BtcauJe 1M 1t1ppIlfti", condirioou:an: IIdtins. And IhtlJo.~ . wnt tIN.p HV IMI ."",," .J,J (>~""fI1 ~M • tIM"" ".ti" (.rJq.) ,.., it {rJti_iJJJ MMJ '" ,...... _ ""P;.,. ....., JiJ,;.-;.., ...,..... ("w,.);" ~ In..,.,..i_';''' --r'''- '".....do thnr ;, n" tpJin- IPVqlJ Altbou&b _hal apc' icl'lCltd Vi rlllit,. thai 11M no pMU and wboK ~1\IfC'o_w... it dinincl from :aI othrr tbinp. _ doa 1>01 thnmr dnermine all iu dirunciM qu:alilios (MtJ,,) beawo: JUCh I CIIlp'ition dq>cndt Oft otbn CliUKf. ~I is. pnupt.w upcl klllX prod\ICQ ~IWI" ~tioN (.,;s. aIJ'Y.~ in aaord with _ 'I nwnl>ll conditioni,.. for 6o¥Ori"B dw: fomIu1ation of oeruin _\XL Foreompk, C¥m iboufih!hen: is no diKnmu in thaI lhty an: alltttin& m.... n , Iwhm. ~,.....,. the bodyof I drad W'DfnUIJ. "'" c:onaiyu illo "'" a wopoo:; 1. 1.....fUj '-"I W<><1:l_ i. w be 1......-n; ..,.J ( I I,unpy tluJ) o:uou:i_ it 10 be food, In fUCh aKa, 1M KUil)' of ,he inul.lca, doe concqH.w imprinu

-,,.m.,

SVAIlHA VAPRA TIJANDHA: TH E BAS IS OF INFERENC E

18S

alImpk suggests that the dog will nevrr COnMVl': of the bodY:lS hi.5 lovn. :&J1d the libmine will never conc:tive of it :1.1 food. Now, if these propeny-lV4bh4uas--"bdng a love,- and "being food-wm: tk rt n«:essary of mt: individual in question, mrn that individu.aJ "'lUI bear thost- predicatcs, regardless of any Otht:, predications mat may have bttn mack. In Euroamerican philosophy, ont: ()'pical Wlly of dtmOlUmlting th:u a prMial {~ P iJ not'" rt' n~ry of cktermin~t~ individual x is to ' and !he faco WI he if one', leoc:ha. upon .mn' .....·' F.IlM meni"" one rhinb. "my rarher if comire"; OM doa IIOl think. "my lneher is meninJ. " I .n~,......; It~ _ _ Mi"M -.w,w '"..M.~.,.' ",1iM;"" ... "..". "w.,. M.iIffti J ,.J..,Urio¥i.

M;._...

~ J w.lu J~u6iu )i ~ ;,.J-i-;;u J:Jt¥~ iti~~

,. INn,.- H1*9", ~t.; _ _

1tIJh. ""'...

"''''''''UII IIIIiMfi _

,.,.,.MnIq" tlPm ~ M.iIffti I ftm(lh~lIIiI J.".JH.". t,; ,.tlJ.ir,iit.J,J-

..,.,.". ~n".,.,,,~'; l,.tIJl riJMMn.~ fi h't",.u,.;,,;~ ,,;~ 1_ ,!, ,... . . .u, h~ Ir.n't"- ;" u.,. "'odJ.HJ M. __ .~. '+rJ.H/MlI ' IqtIM 1M rtf ,...".nhlntUMJlliiWNrlll ,..., ; 'JO'li'i ,,.tIJl~~ fi"f6n"~"-""n!Nfid_""d.'; ...'"

NUIn,.,...

""*"mann, i,; 01.

60 I am he.... 10 arp.ommu by -r of uusworid idnlliry. S« Pbnlinp (In ...,lR). Vap""'"' (I",) oIttn a ckar md ckWIcd accIOIlnr of IUCh uswnmu.

186

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

whereby a form~rly applicable predicate is no longer applicable-thus r~uitu a c h:l.ng~ in causal characteristics. Hence, if ptMicatts eh:l.ngc, causal charactt:nstics change. and if caus:a.l charact~ristics change. identity changes. h is thus not dear wbethu Dharmakini would ~ willing to ~nter­ rain ew:n hypochctically the notion of a trans·case individual that bnrs different prMicatei. This is in pan dcmonstraled by the fact thai, in the examples cited above, Dhannwni p~bly does not mean for all the ptedicues to ~ contradictory: the endry in question has the ~nature" - the causal dunctcrisria: '«Euited for the respective pcrc.civns to identify it as, for example, "food, ~ :I. "Iowr· or a "corpse. ~., The resistance to a tram--casc individual bearing differt:m ptedicales in Dh.armakini'J philosophy oould even suggest mat he espouses a de "essen· rialism. That is, if we cannot alk about some individual that occurs with diITcrem pmlic:ltel in multiple ClS(S or worlds. it Sttms tha t W(: will be un:l.ble to deny Ih:l.t, if x is P. then il is not possible that in any case )( does not bc:ar [he predicate P, even if the case: where )( docs bc:ar P is restricted to a single possible wocld. But W(: would be incorrect to ascribe: tk rt essentialism to Otw-malcirri, for ew:n if we cannot show that in one case}( is P and in another case is not-P, his system readily allows us to demonnr:ltc that even if in some: case )( has the propc:ny-svllbhoit'll P, it is possible that in some other ca.sc xdoes not bear the propcny-IV4bh4"", P. Th~ kqr point here is th:l.t, N"1ns som~ N1f1'iur t'D7lJrrwn l/,oy proJ'f"l'TrSlNlbhoil'llS on 1M

lNuis oflIN tUlturt-lllllbhiva ofthaI i"'/iviJuJ. Ihlll inJi"MU/ ellnnOI ~ UliJ to br brarin, .nJ prnUCilltJ .1 II//. Thw, in the example mentioned above,

in the ca.sc where a dog is prcscm but the li~rtinc i$ nO[. the body burs the to this point I!u.w wntd tho: qu=ioJn of ",hrdwr aU thl'tll: of tbnt
61 Up

...urinnoftir ,..;,." io.n). I ... ny .,..... _ """ J>«>h.hIy'V"" ,h.o, nn ~"y ..... fi&",.:,,;"n~' Ir:u. rwo olthac judp>mu m.... be- dem>cd .. IJJJ~ (basal on rnI thinp), and hma, [UU

the: mulripliciry of correa but II Ir:u. aathcUWIy inc:om~tibk judpnrnt still appIia. Probably put of DIwmaldni', point ~ is that ~ th_ intnpmrn----thr 00s. tho: libmilW and tlw Mi........u ICtUI!Iy livins in differ"1 brmic workU (1M';' and IS • mult, dwir intnpfft:ltio
t~,iono.

I alI...Jc: '0 mil ~

S VA6H)VAPRATIMNDHA: T H E SASIS O F INFEREN C E

187

propeny-svahh.iva "being food ... but it doc=s not bear the proptny-ltwbhdVd "il a lover: And when me libertine is praent but the dog is not, Ihe: body bean [he propeny-lIIfI'bhdt.., "is a lover" but does not bear the propertysvabhtillll .. is food ... Now, mis may seem 10 be an inadc:quate: way to show that individual )C does not tk rt bear P, which is me same as saying that the identiry of)C is 1'\1)1 ~urily (or ~ on l nt"('.l5.urily ind utk) P. Ooe: mighl m.:linrain. for c:umple, mat even if me property Pis not constructed. xstill has the causal characteristics mat make it capable of bearing P, hence. since the causal characteristics can themsdvo be construed as amounting to a prt'dicate, Dharmwni's position still rests upon tb rt essentialism. But such a response:: would be ignoring the:: fact that me "causal characteristics" me::m~Ives

do f\O'I

~Iy

exist: for e:x:tm ple:. in terms of the: individU.:!l' , cap::!t;.

iry to produce entain dtects. the~ u e no separate causal potentials (11&,;) distinct from the indiv\dual iudf, nor is ~ even one sing.le::, UlllVrutrJU'Ud nature or undifferentiated causal potential from which w Other potentials might be constructed.t.I Instead, a1llhcsc entioQ arc consuuaed, and in the case of spatially extended or distributed entities such as a water-jug. the individoal iudfisQaIUUUCted.. Of eou~, 0<1 Dlumulurti'J vi _ _ can s:ay mat. in the ~ where an individu:al xu Jl-whl"n, for ex:ll1lple. me nu
where my coat is blue, it is not possible mat my coat is not blue. Since DharmakIni's system docs not allow tk rt predication, and since $Orne notion of n~i ty is al leasl implicil in the: StMbh.i_p,..,iln"JJ,., we: might as.sume that Dharmaldrti's syste::m involves an inchoate norion of tk Jictll na:es.sity pertaining among propmy. sWlbhtiwa. But while:: we may usefully make:: this dai.m for hronnie purposes. we must do so with exurme caution. lbc first reason 10 exerclsc caution hal already been pointed OUt: an entity docs nO( aau:ally bear a propeny· s""bh.i1-1t1 umil mat property· nMbIM~... hall b.ec:n c:oruuvacO in n:lalioo 10 a mind, aod if minod·de:JKndent factors such as imerest arc not in place, then me propcny-slIlI'bhtivas in question will nOt be construCted, eYen if they tk dUro stand in a n...-ncary mation to w me other property-lIIfI'bh.i1lRS that have been constructed. In Dharmakini's discussions of inference. this iuue is transparent, for it is naturally assumed that one:: is indeed interested in knowing, for example, 62 See abcwe, ft . • L

188

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKlRT I'S PHILOSOP HY

whether or not there is:l /itt in OIlC!'S room." H~, upon .sttingsomcthing identified as smoke, the propeny-I",,6h4VA ~produced from fire," which is tk Jicto n«nary [0 smoke. will be readily contnucred. But tht:~ arc orhcr tk Jicto n«C'5sary properties, such as being momentary (~!,jk(l), that may not Ix constructed. since they arc irrelevant (or cvm anrithrucaJ) to the conurns of ,he pttson drawing the infe~nu. In soon. if wt wish ro claim that DharnulUni's system involves an implicit norion of tk tikto ncussiry. wt must remper that daim with lhe considerable emphasis on the relationship between psychologism and onrology in his system. An additional reason to be cautious concerning any claims for an implicit tk JinD nC'CCSSiry in Dharmakini's system conccnu his failure to fo rmulate and provide adequate terminology for a dislinaion bctw«n nea:s.sary and accidenw propcrtic:s, even though ~ such dislinction is dearly required by his thcory of infcre:n«. If wt conUder, for c:umple, die case of .stting something thai I identify as smoke billowing &om my room, my abiliry to infer the pronmate prcscncc offire from mat perception relies upon die faa: that · produc.cd from fire" is tk Jirt# nC'CCSSaty to smoke. But any givc:n instance of smokc, such as thc onc I sec billowing from my room. has numttOw propcny-lWfbhd_ that, although not nMc!pry to smoke, can Ix and may acrually be constructed of that particular instance of,moh. I may notice that the smoke is reflecting a blue light, or I may see that il is swirling quiddy, or the shape of its doud may resemble a rhiflOCCTOS. BUI these propcnic:s are nor tk Jim ncccssary 10 smoke: I cannot say mat, if something is smoke. then it necessarily rcscmblc:s a rhinoceros. Indeed, on a &w occasions Dharmakirti himself docs recognize a need fo r such a disrincrion. For c:umple. in the basic formulation of inference cited earlier .... Dharmilklni spccific:s that for elkct--cvKkn«, 0 1\(: is oon· cerned with that number or propcrty-n.wbh.i1l45 in the cawe withOl.lI which a some other number of propcrty-wabhall45 in the effect oouId IlOt occur. In giving a quantilative speciflCation (with the tcrm yawul) of property1VIIbh.i-., Dhannakini answm the objcction dial. sin« all the propcnies off'ire . for c:umple. panicipalC in the production of an df"ect.such as smoke.

63,., with moll ~ 11woriots. OhamuI
,.",,,.ti,.rra

SVAIHAVAP,t..tTlBANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFEkENCE

189

:lnd liner:lll rlv. rmprnleE nf Imnlrr: arr: rqu:;al1y r:Fra.-u. onr: might IU~ mat any propeny*sr.wbh.ill# of me effect can be wed as evidence for any property*W4bhdV4' of the caUSl!!~ As Sakyabuddhi suggests. this objection points to the problemacic cue in which. by focusing upon me subscmcial* ity of lmolre and the brightncu of some individual fire, one rttiuccs me inference offirr: from smolre to an infe:rr:ncc of brightness from substantial* ity. Glossing the beginning of Dharmwni's rr:spon~, ~kpbuddhi noles mat such an infert:nce would dearly not Ix rdiable bcaUSl! the properties in quesrion-substanci.ality and brighmess---
erry*WIlhh4r.w of being Mproduced from mal (caUSl!r (t.JffllnJd}-which is common to other, nonsmou encities, such as ashes. Instead, as Dhannakirri

65 Thil iI 1M P of,he objection (PYSV ..JPVI.I.; G:}.'1-" ): "Since if w df«t iI indica· Ii..., ofdx,......, beGu'1e i, ariacJ from dx a ...... dxn una: CIWe and o:ff=;arc in mIN of aU !heir up«U (--nh4) .he produar and wtw iI produad. they ""'IJIdd be Ihc indicrolfd and rhc indialOf in rams of all Wit upecu.' (,M'i ..JII~ ~ v-M'" _thJ p"".-.u~-m..j.ttW""'WW~ .

66 SH PVT:l1bt-7. 67

a . ~n (K."17.6ff). who build. on SlJry..buddhi', infapt"=tlon by lIOIing !lu,

!he irTCknnl propcnia arc the "common araibu,lQ" ·individ~

anribum-

and Gillon ('99':SI-1I).

(~,..;

(~,..)

01 tmokc and !he

of individ~ firea. Set Wo the d"mum in Hayes

190

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PHILO SOPH V

indicatcs," his poinl is 10 eliminate properties thar are nor construed in terms of the effea. Thw, unqualified "substantiality- cannol act as evidence for fire, bUI when construed as a propeny-lWbhillQ of smoke, it can act as evidence. If wt: assume Ihal ar leasl pan of Dharmwni's intention is to rekr to propeny-rntbh4wa that are necessarily concomitant with the mere presence of smoke. then this again poinu (0 an inchoatC' distinction bt:tw«n es.sential and accidental propenies. Although lhe interpretation wt: have jWI SUggesied indicates an inchoale accidC'ntallc:ssenriai distinction in Dharmwni's philosophy, that dininc· tion remains vague and undeveloped. lbat Dharmakini did nOt fully recognize an accidental/es.senrial distincrion is best iUWInted by what appear to be IWO ovt:n.lJ comolS fot the US( of the rum IWbh4Wl in the sense: of propeny. In one rype of context, the tC'rm tINIbh.ilNlopresses a propeny of a determinate subject~ne construed as a subject 'lUll one ofilS property· IlIQbhti". such lhal the propeny in question is J, tiiao necessary to rhe property in lenns of which Ihe individual is construed as a subject. This is the familiar case of where an individual construed as a subject 'lUll smoke necessarily has tM: property of being produttd fTom fire. In the second type of conlO I. 1V1lbh4~.. opresses a propeny of an indelerminate individualtnal is, an individual that is a subjea 'fJUI individual. and nOI qua one Onts property-lWtbh.rl~... In both cases, the (erm IVIlblNiua conveys some notion of necessity: for a determinate subject /fUll smoke, its suablNi_ are those properties thai all instances of smoke mw t have. BUI for an indeterminate individual , its IlHlbhilJllS are simply all its propenies. In the former case, an :accidentallessential distinction is clearly (C'lev-mt, bUi in [hC' latter, no such diuinaion is possible." Regardlm of how we construe a propeny-swblNiva in relation to an indC'tCrmina[C' subject. our problem as imerpreters of Dharmwni's phi. losophy is that M: often does not dearly distinguish between thai comot 68 I am rdmins 10

mnark& tNl

m.: ronrinllOllion of DlurnWdrti'. COIl\llKfl':If)' Oll dai. ¥m<' wbn< he

m.: S"DnllI clw-aamwa or m. dI1.a may alto act ;u e¥icknce provided tNl

quabfoed ;u propomots of IhI: d'feCI IG:, .17-11: kI./J'I1.,-OJJ/q#fr• 1i",.viItj'j i*;~ r- tbUlI]hJ1fI).

IMy

an'

m.:

..., 'Mo_utl1fl/

69 OMan paim ro ~ c:ampb in PVSV. buc an o/mour; c:qe is RfK mal ~ Iu~ ben. diKwoins (PVI.1.: ibJln!o ...w..n..ir;fi JM.;r .""/fIu,.m - l ' I nwM.iw MiN )j ~MhriJ",rMbi,u ,,,. Hm:, nwM4w in ~ ntUlNlWir ~~ IlllUl rdn- (0 ptOpfttic:I; aiindMduak, AAa !he ip«i';'::nion JlvrdJHti/l would odIuwilC Ix supnfluoua. BIll in the btfCf ~ of dw: VCIIe (IWMiw Miw -,; Miw...trhllrMbi,u). .. I."" 01_"....... rd"..... ",wI!! . . ~ ••he propc •.,.......",...in '1_..... Qnoo< be COIUln.oed in ,mnt of an individual, AI _ shalI_ in QUI" w.cu..ion of nw....,~

m.:

m.:

It.,....,

SVA6HAV.VLl TI MNDHA : THE BASIS Of INfERENC E

19 1

and the mntat of a dttermiruore rubjecr. This raiSlS a difficult quenion: it this simply a failure of clatil)' on Dharmaluni's pan (who seems to lave only lad an inchoate notion of:an :accidema1Jcssenrial distinction). or is mis a consciously employed rheroric:a.l technique intend~ to undermine w notion that mere are real properties (mch as dhii11fiJtrI4, "smokencss") mat constitute the essences of things? I find no easy answer to mis question. Of rhi.!; much. ho~r. WI! can be JUre: for the purpo5CS of the JINIbhalJlljmllilunJh... the predicuion of "smoke" is 1181 C$$Cntiai to any individual. but if an individual is connrued in temu of one of ia proj>(:rty-svabh41145 as a determinate subject "smoke," then it must be: possible to reliably conUNCI other property-swbhll145 :15 wdJ. including "product of fire ." The same restriction applies muutU muunJis 10 an individu.al construed as a 5L1hj<:Ct

QW1l "fi~. "

In sum. men. me production-mode of the svabhdlldpratibalflihR :amounu to a necessary rdation bc:twoc:n the swblNil!45 that are necessary for the cortect application of the concqn (such u "smoke1 adduced:15 the effect and the IINIbhll!45 that are necessary for the correct application of the concept (such as "fire") adduced as the cause. This relation is neceuary simply ~UJol' (~concq>( of the ~ ("~moke") ;c corrr:ctly ~rr1iM only if the entity in question is produced. ttom rhu ause--in Other words. the bet of being produad from that ca~ is implicit in the concept of me effect.

TIN Dnn-mi_tiD,. of,IN Prodwtio1l·mtuU Dtspite the problenu:and lacunae that remain in Dharmmrti's formula tion of the production-mode of the ,""bhli....p,,,,;L ..tlbA. it iJ nol ~bsurd to claim Ihat he has made a good Stan toward clarifying the type of relation thai must be in placr if we are 10 solve the problem of induction in :an inferenoe from effect to cause. It should be: oIMow;, hOW'eVer. that despite the potential usdUInc:s.s of his analysis. Dharmmrti has dearly not solved the problem of induction in iu cntimy. For he is niU Ie.ft with the second Wlk th.:u is involwd in fpecifying th~ 1 re:l:ation.: h" mun "'" ~bI" to formu _ late a reliable procedure for determining whether that relation is indeed in pl:ace. The. procedure proposed by Dlurmmni relics upon a combination of peraption and nonpcruption. and it is unde.rstood to involve either three or five. steps." Focusing on the: five-step method, Brendan Gillon gives a synopsis thar poinu to the buie problem in Dharmalcini's method:

191

fOUNDATIONS OP

D IIA~MAK I RTI ' S

PH ILOSO PHY

.. . Dh.1.rmakini seems to bdieYC m;iIt a 5nluence of five simple non-rd.ationa.l observations resula in relational knowledge:. For example, one observes (I) first mat a place has ncither smob: nor fi fe; (1) then, whrn fire is brought, thai Ihe pl:ace has fire yet no smo~; CJ) nat. that the: pia« has both smou:and fire: (4) then, whrn (he fire is n:moved. that the pl2CC has smoke yet no fire; and (~) finally. mal the place has neither smob: nor fire. The problem is m.1.( this sequence cannot dUcrimina.te betwCC'n genuine causes and spurious correbtions. Suppose one obsttves rh2t a place Iw nather.1. donkey nor smoke. then when 2 donkey is brought, one observes th2t me pl2CC has the donkey but still no smob:, bUi a moment tater, onC' observes the place ( 0 have bach the donkty:and smoke. Later. whrn mC' donkey is removed. one observes tlur the place has no donkey hut still has smoke. And finally, when the smoke dissipoltcs. the place has neither a donkey nor smoke. But the donkey, even though it satisfies me condirions for being the cause of smoke. is not iu cause. MOf'COVCf. funher observations will never dimina.te the possibility of spurious correlation. But this is JUSt the induction problem .1.gain!' Were we to supplement Gillon's evaluation with 2 more dcuiled account, we would examine the relevance of Dharmakini's theory of pttccptual. judgment (prlltyMltplp.?!'lklbJJMnik4]ll) in this contat. Nn<enheless, even wilhout such details, Gillon leads us to the crux of the problem, namely, that this pro
n

(,""st).

I..aak (1m) ups m,,1 GiIJon'. a ;liWm "miucs ill oO;ea" brnUK;1 doeo noc :KCUrlldy IkpKI Dlwmakini', IQrIhod for Ikcumini,. aUlOllity. I am indinod 10 ~ m"t Gillon', tIUUl"lMI, especiaU y his RrJI ~ rrquira Unp!o"'''I(ftt; Lasic'. own accounc (' m :an);'. much ..... p c:Ooe: radi ... N~ Cillon'luW,... is...dW in ill IUrlt pracnmion of lhe: buM: pobkm. one dUI' rmWlIf ~ on 1Mic:'.~: namdy, !hal • .....- of pt.« p!ions .nd nonpCl ccp1ioru cannoc ptoo'idc- ~n« of I causal td.Ilion without !he Q>UI~I UIIUIIp1ion Ihai the pct«ptual judpnulu in question ar~ aJrady ~

"",",a:...buo.. • .be.......J ch..-...:ou;.u.:.,,( .... cno.;, iu in <[_;."".. Wi .............. aMUrnfKion.

Gillon'. donkq will mntinuc 10 be a 1lIOII

WI ... dcomc

au.

SVA!H.iVAPRATJ6ANOHA , THE BASIS OF INFERENCE

19}

3.3 On,1N /&l.atioluhip bdwun Propvt] alui Nature have focused on dkct-cvidcna. which is based on the production-mode of the tINlbhliVllpratibandha. As. we rum to tINlbhtiva-cvidena. which is based on the identity (lIlJatm)4) mode. we will sec that most of the poino we have made are still relevant. Before. hoWCVtt. applym! dK:K puinu IU swbhoiiIR"'CYiucna:, we nccJ fint tv D
W(

... rhis suitability of the thing [to fuUiU a function \ is based on the Sl.!abhavtL Whether a thing fulfi lls a functi on IZunodo)" depends on whether it has the corresponding SVilbh4l1tL" That

71 SlrinkdIne:r (1971:1.09): "In ok. OntOlosie bakultl wUbi...fJ die KnIt lin ,".v.., :Us Prinzip ihra Sri.... ... "

Din~,

:w

7. P'VI.I~ and PVSV.Jril. (G:.... r6) : "'lbM which it~of I~ funaion uan wo· mudy raJ t:hin& ror dail aIont ill the chuaaeriaOc WI disUngu4hes dw: raJ and dw: unraJ, namely, WI the: former hal dw apacify for tdic: function,...t.ik the: lmer doer noc t...-..: thaI ~Iy. • [lol

,.,."..nhi"-

W .. ,. ~fl l iM1ff tN hi IItfItJWHltllur t.~.".,....m,.I ..).,.'ll M ~r.j a .the: uuWuion by Suinkdlra (1",:1'), n..10).

n; Strinlcdlra inlendi mal z-d be ukm ill both dw JeNcI he allribulCl 10 both -pi" and "fUnaion..- 5« 1911:11""11), n..,.

.,,;,..

i.t"., at

76 StrinIcdlner MlppotDIlhiI daim wida the ~ tnsubcion /iQm PVSV (1911, n.Il): "Abo thar alone brinp abouc Iht" fiiliiUmcm of iI function/pi only beaWC;1 poueff:ts the corTaPOOdilllt 1NMiN.· [Auch du eint: YOIIbrin".fit" ErfbJIq de5 Z..-kes nUl. wei! er den m~endm SnbhlVll baim; G:.,.I,ff. .... )i u".~". ,.nNM.h.,."u

"'" "',.,,1·

194

fO U/'liOATlO/'li S O f O HARMAKIRTI' S PHILOSOPUY

which has no IVtlbhilllll cannol fulfi ll a goal and il is therefore not real," Stcinkdlner's poinl here iJ that SlNIbhtilltl in the ontological SC'nSC' refers to the causal capacity of the: entity in question, As he pUC!: it, "Ihe IVtlbh41N1 [i,e" Ihe narurt-IVtlbiMtltlj of a thing is its powa (14kti) 10 bring about an dna (luiryotpWlIJI),'" And since a thing u ultimatdy mal only if il produces effects, dw SC'nSC' of IVtlbhtiva (i,e., as nature) can be called "ontological," inasmuch as an entity devoid of causal capacity, being incapable of effects, would be: unral. It is imponant 10 nore thai SreinkeLIner's "ontological" interpl'tt.ltion stl'CSSC'S the notion of narure-SJI4bhil14 as an entity's causal potentials. h might mnd'orc appear that he tw not taken account of the fact that an entiry's narurt-n.vbh.illll must be: the warrant fo r propmy-SVtlbh.iwa such as "produced from that [causer (ujjll"J4) which ate based upon an enrity's causes, rama than its dftas. N~lw, although Sldnkdlner does indttd stress Ihe nOlion of causal potential, he clearly means that an mrity's narurt-nwbhtiAf also mcompasses an enticy's causes." In addition to nOling that an entity's naturt-SJI4bh4"" mUS! :lCCOunl fo r propmy-SVtlbhtiwa rclattd to iu causes as well as iu potential effccu, we have also seen that an entity's rutture--lWIbhi"" should not' be: construed as an ultimately real entity: there is no fUrure of things distina /Tom the things themsdves. InStead, a nature-lWIbhmr U simply a special ca.se of an adusion (IIJilvrtri). At first gJance, Stdnkdlna's use of the word "ontologica.l" mighl suggest rnat he would nOI agKC with this formulation. BUI in facl. Sldnkdlner maintain5 that cvc.n in its "onlologica.l" SC'IlX, wtlbbdfI(J does "otrrf~ to Mlme ulrim:udy R21 carnal power, and he aIel argu~t1 from Dharmwrti's work that demonSlflue that poinr,- SrdnkeUna goa on 10 Ay that, rather than corres:pooding to lOme ultimatdy mal mtity in .he world. the ~ onlological" IVllbhl,... ~ ... can ooly hi: mnnl in a figuralive SC'1lX in order to aprcss the state of affain Ihat many causes, which are Stcinkdlntt (1'71!1h- IIJ):' ... m- ~I ckI Dinp hmLhl auf dmI SvabhI.... Ob rin 'riMll Zwa:Ic niWll,' tww; auuehlicllidr. datIOn 3b, ob os den ~ S¥3bbM hat..

n

Din,

78 Scrinltdlntt (lJlI:IIJ): ·S..,bhba rinG DiIlJ'G itc die Knfi 'to<'J.Ubri"F" •

(~). aM

Wirkuns Mr·

79 5« Sc.rillkdlntt', diJcuaion of PVSV .J PVI.I67a-< (Inl: IU , n .)} and )4). Set: aUo ~, n.}).

80 Son: Strinl"d.",. ('71.,,16) .aud .... u...u... uf OI .... "..Io.i,,;

G:',,7- II) ,

(rv...6.... ..t I"VSV "" ,';.q

SVA8HAI'APRATIMNDHA: THE BA SIS OF IN FERENCE

19'

amditioncd mrough their own ~pKtivt: causes. produce on~ and me: sam~ effect. ... , In the case of an ~ntity such as a water-j ug, a nature-w.ofMdw is mus -a mere, conv~ni~nt sign {Siv1lfor (h~ f..ct that th~ appa~nt 'working together' of the causes for the production of a single effect is 10 be grounded exclusively on the bcginningkss pr«Onditioning (of those causes) by {theirl resp«ti~ determinate causc:s.~" Since Sicinkcltncr mainf:lin.'l thai thc~ il no ult.imateiy rc::al naturesvahhirNlof things, he would presumably:agree Wt this ItNlbhiflll must also be conltructed in some fashion . And in Dharm:akirti's philosophy construction always involves the process of exclusion described in his a~ha­ theory. Of course, this does not mean that, in constructing a thing's narure-ltNlbhoiw, the mind of the perceiver alone simply creates the ca.wa.I characteriniCl th:u correspond ro the th ing'." n:Ul1rc. Thin~ :lri.~ from renncted auses and produce resuicted effects ~Icss of whether their ·capacity" to do so has been conttptualiud." We have undcrsrood 5reinkdlner [Q mean that a n.:nure-lvabhoit'll i5 itSelf an ultimatdy unrc:a.l entity conStructed through exclusions, and on this basis I am largely in ~t with him on tht: discinClion bmvttn the twO ~nses of nMbhJv... One :l.$pecl . however, of SIe;nkellnc,'r prescnf:ltion need.r funhcr expbn:uion. That U, in dc5cnbing nature:l.$ the ·ontologia.!" mCllling of IVtlbh.i1llJ, Steinkellner could be misinterpreted as suggesting that an entity's ·ontological" svabbiva (itt narurc-svabh.iva) is somcnow "mote real" than its "1ogic:al" wabh411i1S (iu propcny-svabhillilS). Now, as Steinkdlner has shown (and :as we M.~ also noted), many passages in Dharmaldni's worXs do indeed indiate that an entity's propcrtyrwlhiM- are ontologically . ubordin,ue to iu IUture-.m
of these are passages in which Dharm:ak.ini justifies the conJtruaion of exdwioru :as the warrantt {p,a,,!"inimitlA} for words. Th:1;[ is, even without a tc:al univ~rW-such as "bl uencss" (,oriuuv.r}-iost2nriated in all the entities in question. one can correctly and wcfulJy apply a word such ali 81 S.. inkdlrou (1'71:,16); • ... I..."n d iu n... in iibtn• • _

Si,,_ .,mc.in...in. urn J;c

T.u.adlC III bn.richnen, daB mchrac UrAdoea, die: aUf ih,en cpn UlAChc:n hcnlll Cflupr«hn>d bcd.inll lind, rin wod d~ Wi"'",,! bmoorbri~.·

82 S,nnkdlncr ('nr:117): "(So ~ "'=II ckt 'Svabhlva des Unxhcn.kompkus· .. .abJ

bIoBa, ~ue ...... Si&d fur die T auachr:, doll ..... ochrinban: 'Zusammcn""irun' ¥OIl Uruchm lUI" Enaog\Ing riner ~ Wirku"8 auadtlidUich _ lin anfant;lo-n Von.\UJCrnI"I _ Cf1tspitd"nd bacimmendcn UrsadIcn tu Iqri1ndcn itt.' IIJ It II impoItant to r«:a1l that

dUo cirdc.

-cao.uc-- and - dfca- an :aln:ldylXM'lCC'pU- We ann.oI; ~

196

FOU NDATI ONS OF DHAkMAKl k T I 'S PH ILOSOPH Y

· blue· to all those unique particulan because the oclusion in question is formed on rhe basis of the faCt that each entity has "by its nature" the · same· {tkA} caw:a.l fullCtion." In this way. the reality of the prope:rry-swbh.iv.. -blueness," for CX2fTlpic, is subordinate to the disrinccivt naturt-n.wbhdwr of each entity dut produces an effect that can be conceptualized as -blue." But we have Ittn that neither a propmy-swbhdVA nor :ll narurc--svabhdwr can be an ultimately rcaI particular 'IlIA It'llbh.iva.ft and it is thus 00( at all clear that ~ terms should be rmlred with different dcgrccs of ontoklgical commitment. If we do so, we effectively posit a third ~ of reality: first, the ultimate reality of paniculars; second. the convcmional reality of ProiXrry-/lAIIbhiVAS (such as -blucncu') constructed through exclusions; and .hird, some quasi-ultimatc reality of an entity's narurc--IJl4bh.iva. which is nO( a particular but is somehow "morc real" than an cnory's propcrry-/wrbhdV4S." There is no evidence for such a thrcd"old schema in Dhannakini's work, but it would surely be incvitabk if we difft:rentiate the ontological commitments appliable to propcny-swbhdNS and nature-/V4bhitlOlS. But if neither a naturc--wabhRwr nor a propcrry-swbh.iv. is ultimately real, how are we ( 0 explain what seems ( 0 be the ontological grounding of an entity's propcnia in its naturd To attempt such an explanation, let us begin with a few heuristic terms.

&1M HnirUtU- TtrmI Earlier, I remarked that:ll clear oplanation of the distinction and relationship belWttn propcny-/wrbhd"" and nature-swblM~... cannot be derived directly from Dharmakini's own works. We could. of course. stop our inquiry al this point and simply nott the incomplctcnc:s.s of Dharmakini's &4 a . SlrinkdJlICI' (J~"71--47J) . .Xc abo 1M di .... 1SIion of ~ of cfka in LM ~ ..x:..... ~tr (119ft). 85 TIw; qualiliation flUllMiIbtI ... is man! {O ac:coum for cues whtr-e 1M infinilaimal..,lidcJ of a WlIltr· ju&. b aampk. misht br: ~ propmy.n .. fw- of I WlIfa---jlll- &11 wIIik mis is indetd a caw....tltre -ptVf>t' I,._MINI · ~ indirKd, 10 a panicW.v, 10 mn."'" 1M inlinill:oirnal partidc::o in mil fashion, OM mlUl ODhClCPlua/iK lhmI as piOptnin by ."..,.of an cu:I..... (i.~ , LM ~ of tba.e inlinilQimal puticIc. !hat do IlOl have LM QUA] dwamrisla of 1M infinitclinul panidc:r that afT dle pmptny-, ...M.h. of a WlIleI'juJ) . .Xc~. n-4J. 86 CIc:uIy. ohc ,h,,.., rUfIDI ulao;l ..w..r-~ ~! ' AI • .,... and ~~! "t4rI-J afT IlOl cand>obIa lOr 1M threJoid rality requited hen, .ina: both P'optIlrnwt~ 'w and ~ nature-nwMIN

=

SVAIIHAvA'RATI6AftlDHA , T HE BASIS OF I NFEREN CE

197

philosophy. But I beliNt that we can profiably eomine these ideas further by formulating an explanation that. while based on his philosophy, highlightS ideas or th~ries that att only implicit in his work. II ICCffiS that me best way to attempt an explanation is to coin a handful ofheurmic temu. Although they have no dear Sanslui6c equivalents, these temu wiU prove useful for seeing how cm::a.in aspetts of Dharmak.im'5 "P"I-thmry:art: rt:lev2nt to interpreting the senses of IIJiIbJuJlNI in his phi-

Jo.ophy. The first tttm is ..bstr4dioll, which we can define as concept-formation through the exclusion process. The procc:u of :abstraction is based upon an enol)' conmued as:a subject. Ttut is, whcn we ab5tr:act Mhaving branches" from ,he concept "nee: we are "selecting" or :abstr:acting amLin causal ct..:.r:ocrr.ri~io fmm wi rh in rhe ror.:aliry nf fM CloDl du~l!f'driol ",!lr d: rho-: narure-twbh.twt of a "uee," and we construct the predicate "having branchcs" on me lwis of those abltracted causal characteristics. Abstraction, however, can also rest upon anomer process that Dharmakim dearly discusses, although he provides no single term for it. To dcscribt this process, I will introduce a KCOnd heuristic rerm, «/nuptJuJ ctM!ncttlrt. Through W pl"OCrU of concqnu:a.l ~~. individuals rh:u :iN' ..ceu _ ally distinct art: construed :is if they wert: aU COlUtitutive of :a single indi_ vidual. Hencc, in the case of "having branches; the formation of rh:l[ predicate is implicidy pru:eded by the conceptual coaIc:scc:na of the infinitesimal paniclc:s in a manner mat colUlrua; Ihem in tenns of the loality of causal cluraattistia that is the n:arurt--JVIlbh4J11fof wn:l[ we call a "tree." This "coaIescencc" must be conceptual, because although me physical char:>C'tenst>c. of rhof.e inlinitesim:&l panidet tilow us to co ruickr them,... arUing from ceruin auses and conditions SO:is to have ccm.in common efli:cu. we are not oblixnJ to consider those infinitesimal panicles in that fashion; we can, if we choose. consickr each infinitesimal particle individually. Hen«, when we abstract properties such as "having branches" from a " tll'(:,~ we art: not $latting with a "tree" as a given. Instead. th~ M tree- must :&1.0 be concepru:tlly constructed. This means that the form :u;o n of the predicate Mhaving branches" as :applied to a "tree- acrually has rwo aspcc;u:

fim. one c:onceprually coaIcscc:s those infinitesimal panicles by considering them in temu of ccmLin causal characteristics (i.e.• those resuicted [0 wh:ar we call a "tree"), and second, one abstraas the predic ue "having branches" from that [o[:a.iity of causal charaaeristia iuelf. It is impomun to distinguilh co nc.epru:al coale&eenc:e from :mother fun -

damental concqxual process in the "pN;w-theory. I will call mis process

t98

fOUNOATI O NS O F OHAlMAKlllT" s PHILOSOP HY

iJmtificilric", the a mnrual of discrete instances of, for cnmple, a ~ trcc" as the "same· (,kA). In concq>ruaI coalescence, the discrete entities in qucstion arc construed as forming a single individual or inn-ancc. they are all the Msame" in thar they all constitute a single (tIt4) thing. In "identification" the discrete entities are themselves instltnoes, and their.sameness consists macly of the predionion of the same univcnalto them without their necessarily participating in any single entity: all tree~irutanccS are the "s:lIT1e" in rnat one: pre:dicues "crecness" of them. This me:ans, of course:, that concc:pmai coaIe:sce:nce can justify identification: if individual infinitcsimal particles an: undustood as constitutive of a ~ tlcc '" the: infinitesimal particles may be treated individually as the "same" in lh:u each is an "infinitesimal panicle of a u'tt." It is important to nott th~t ide:ntificatK>n plays.a ccmnl role in Dharmakirri', ilpo/M-thCOry. for any concqlt that is construed as rtte:rring to more: dun one irucmcc mwt involve: ide:ntifio tion. TIN SlihorJiNftilJ"

ofPropmy U1 N.tIIIY

If we rurn now to the: application of the: .aforementioncd he:uristic te:rms to the twO meanings of swbht111t1, we find that the:y (:Dable: w to explain how an entity's prope:ny~n...bhivas are: suoordin2le: to iu narure-slltlbhiw with~ OUt having 10 suppose: some greate:r ontologica1 commiUTIe:D[ 10 natureWilbh4114. The: ke:y poim here: is 10 me account of the rdationships among concq>a, causal cru.nctttlstics, panicul.atS and onlologica1 d.aims. We: have: alrc.ady noted mat for Dharmaldtti, a prope:tty~svabhill4, such as "being composed of manu," is a concept based upon re:althings. Thus, he: is effeclivdy malOng a claim for some: type of omologjca1 reality under~ lying the eorttCt application of that concept. He: supportS thar claim by appealing 10 the notion of a narure-JVilbMva. which we can understand .as a predicate: that refers to the lotality of me: causal characterislics of the subject to which that pred ica [~ is .applied. But that subject's nalureJI/Ilbhiivil is nor in iudf a rnI entity; inste:ad, it is a concept based upon inriividu.al [Unicu\ars "working logtthe.r- to havr the effectS in question. Hence, if an appca1lo.an entity's narure-tIJIlbh.iva is succc:ssfui in (:Xplain~ ing the: ontologica:l ba!u tor formulating iu prope:ny-JIJIlbhdvm:. we must be able to demonsrnue: how a narure-svabhdl/ll is itself reducible in all cases 10 parricul.al1. We an do so by applying the: [(:tAtS discussed above. Conside:r, for exampk. (h~ pro~ "h:lving b .... nch~- U :;IppliM to:l ~ u~. " The. ontological basis for the predication of that property is that a ~ Utt· by its nature

SVAIHAVAI'RATIJANDHA: THE BA SIS O F IN FEREN CE

199

(lVIlhhillmA) is capable: of producing [he: dfc:cts that att the: basis for [he: abstraction of th:u predicne. By conceptually reverting this proccu of abstraction, we can sec th:u the proptrty-Jlldbh4v.r ~having branches is ~uciblc to the: narure-lVII'hh41f4 of the subject that it qualifies. Thus, we can undertcand that propc-rty-lvabb.iva as subordinate to that naturc-

swbM/HI.. Tlut na~swbh.iva itself. however, is nothing but the totality of causal characterinia tNt is the ntt itsdf. Thus, for an ap~ to the "Utt's narurcIVIlbhliva ~ to scrve as the ontological ground for applying the predicate "having branches," we must dcmonnrate (he ontological grounds for me "uC'C· itself. We do so by noting that the concept of a "tree" is formed by conceptually coalescing individual infinitesimal panicles that have gained cemUn causal porentials due ro me mannc:r in which they have been produced. In this way, by ~ucing the concept "uC'C· iudf ro the causal potenliab of panicularJ mal have been produced in a certain fashion , we can ground our ontological cla.ims in paniculars-thc only u1timatdy raI entities in Dharmwnj'J system-withom hyposwiring some real naturctlNZbh41Jt1 of the ~ trte." In me end, what we have formubtcd is a principle of ontolofi~4' miwtum that appears 10 underlie Dharmakini'J system." Proptnies can be reduced to the narure-swbh.iv.r of the Jubjea (dIM,.",in) that they qualify. This amounts to a reduction of the proptnics ro (he subjea iudf, since its rnllru~swbh.i1l4 is a marker for the totality of the cau.sal c.haracteristia mal is tNt subject. And if Dharma1drri's ontology does noc allow mat subj«t iuelf 10 be a particular, a consinent onrotogy would require that it be reduccd to the particulars mat, by arising from a certain type of cau.sal compia, account fo r the cau.sal potentials of that subject. One of the advan~ of this way of interpreting Dharma1drri's we of tIIIIbh.i1Jll is mat it also cn:abks us to actlOunt for an implicit notion of "levels" or "ordcrJ" of concepts in Dharmakirri's work.· A concept at me loweSt kw:1. which Yo'(: might call a "first-ordcr" concept, is one that invol\U only one of the conceptual procesSC$ mentioned above. One can argue mat "infinitesimal particle." for example, is a firJt-Qrdcr concept. On the External Rnlist view, an infinitesimll panicle is itself a particular, so cooccptual 37 Hcrc w.:.bouId rcalI Fnnco·lob.ctvalioN on Dtwmaklni'. ml..aift mru...d (Franco UX>l).

88 K.tIl.If1II (1'79 and 1991) aIJlIC' thai. hicnrchy of uni-w. is c:kariy mjuiml at leal! by Oip>1p', vm.ion of tbe ..,..thco.y.

FO UNDATION S O F OHAIlMAKIR.T[ 'S PHILOSO PHY

coalescence is not pan of the formation of dllll concept: unlike tm- colleq)! " tltt,- th~ conttpt "infinitesimal partid~- does not rtqui~ us to conJtru~ multipl~ parric.uJ.an as constituting a singl~ ~ntity. And if we treat an "infinitesimal particle" as a subject. this conupc is of course consuuaed. but nol through absmcrion, Indeed. tilt on1ycoocqxual plOCt$S applicabI~ to "infinitesimal particl~ - would be )d~Juificuion , for m:u concept does present each infinitesimal p.1rtide as the same: (rIfA) as all other infinitesimal particla. If Dhannakirri's philosophy is 10 remain coh~rent. this norion of "levels" or "onkn" of concepts s«ms ineviable, for it appears (0 be th~ only solution to the problem of tht subjca-shifi. d.i.scusscd earli('l". This shin is the one thaI occun between the natut'e--nwbh.tllll' of, for a2mpl~. a "water-jug" and th~ natut'e--sPllbhiv.r of an individual that ell" be construed as a particular instance of a "Woller-jug." This problem becomes most obvious when we choose to translate this usage of nwbhilNlu "e:ssencc." To be specific, we will find it difficuh to account for why an individual identified as a "Woller-jug" appears to have rwo naruru or "C5S('nces": on th~ on~ hand, as an instl.nCt of a "Woller-jug." mat individual has the "essencc· of a warer-jug. which accountS for the faa dlln we can colTlXtly abstraa propenks such as "impttmanence" from it. But on the other hand, that individual bnn; other properties. such as "bdng mad~ in KiSi," thaI are acddemal to a "w:l.ter-jug.· If ~ other prediCltCS art: comctlyapplkd to thal individual, then must be warnmed by itS essence: by iu csstntt (swbh4l1t1J11) that individual must have the df"tas that enable us 10 abslf2Ct the property "made in KiSi.Now, sincc "made in KiSi" is accidental to being a "water-jug." we cannOI say thaI il is th~ naturc-JWbhilloll' or "cs.scncc" of thaI individual qUll w:l.t"-jug to be made in KiSi, for water-jugs arc not neccuarily made in KiSi. But it is the nature-lVtIbhtilNl or "essence" of that individual 'lUll individual to be made in KifI. This ~double-essencc~ would lead us to conclude Ihat mat individual is "essentially" or "by its nature" (swblMlIt"NI) both "made in Kali" and nOI "made in KiIi"! By appealing to som~ implicit notion of orders or 1~1s of concepu in Dturmakirci', thought, we can avoid this contradictory imposition of (W() narure-swblMV4S or -es.smces- in fWD ways. First, by understanding ~n

mer

89"ftw, p'obkm of ~ rubj«t.dtift IUId dM: ~ problem of dx COlUmKoon of a wbj«t as an aduded allity (II]l"fU4J susgau t~t MltiW ~tni dM: nuua whal he: claimed that 1M - conup!' of 'o"',..;... .. was ~. lIalUal ro onloklpcal bdidi of ,t.., [!'nurh AWnllncidan'- ('9RS: 1.1~: ~i,rd r.,.1~ ' II9TfDO. 1\.19).

me

90 Noc( thaI, aina both w ~ ~ anributtd in ~ of tho: totality of w o:ntity'. aUAI dunctcriHia.. thil contJadierion annoc ~ raoI:¥«I by appcaJil'lllO a elqoI'Y..u.ifi.

SVA6HAVAI'RA TlIMNDHA; THE BASIS O F INFEREN CE

101

na[~swbh.iVllor

-C5Se"ncc· as an adwion. we can sec trutt both of thoc natu~"",bh4&!115 or "C5Se"nces," although not identK:al, rould apply to the same individual without contradiction. We can claim that we are aaualIy dealing with twO different subjectS involving diffaem roncqxual procCSKS in their formation. Seoond, by employing the notion of "orden" of ronapa, we can sec trutt a w,uer-jug's naturc-swbh6V11 (the total causal ehar:aoeriniec a"f1'!OM nf a "warer_jug'") H:II a higher nrdn rhan an indivillual',

nature-swbhiw (the (Ow causal duracteriJlics of [rutl individual). The w:lter-jug- na tu~ is abstr:aaro from the individual-natUre, and by nO( c:hoOIiing to concqnualitt w individual as a subjttt IJUil w.lICf-jUg. one effectively reduces me warer-jug-nuurc (the tow causal charxteristics of any water-jug) 10 me individual-nature (me toral causal characteristics of that individual) .

Finally, the intaptn2tion of IIMbhiw as "nature- p~med here prevents unain problenu in the interpretacion of WtlbM"" in the compound nNlbhdlNlprtltilHl1Ulh4. $reinkeUner has noted that, although we can point to no dear gloss for the rompound in Dharmakirri's own works, 1IMbh.i1Nl in this conlcxt mould mean what he calli •cssmcc· and [ prefer to call • natureWllMA __ - The buic poim here is lhat if IWIbhli,wp",Ii&.,ulh., is me:llU 10 provide a buH "in re:dity" for the indubitability of weU-formed inferences, then we should expect the term to refer in some way to the causal functionality on me basis of which the temu of an infetcnce are construCted. We can supplement this cxplanation by noting that the "essencc· of a distribUted entity such as a "twt is reducible to the paniculars th,u participate in that causal complex, We arc thw not kft with the postulation of some th.ird level o r .-.Iiry bcn.een panicvJan IlIld universals. This intcrpreution allows US to take account ofShoryii. }(atsun', initial response to Sto nkcllner's presentation of IINlbhlwpratibaNihA. In 1986, Kauura remarked: Although Sreinkdlner explicidy Statts that fINIbhilNl in this compound li.e., SINIM.i_,,..,tiIM-'M can only h.ave the onrologic:al meaning. viz. C5Se"ncc, I wouJd ramer take it to mean "concept," the second meaning of 1INl6hiva used in logical COntOU as pointed out by Stc:inkdlner him5Cif. According to DhannalUni's ontological conviction mat everything is momentaI)', a relation IUd! aJ tM Madhyatmb lC'dIniquc of applyinll:WO -aamca- to lhinp ttom U'ta 01 m.. .-- moIilia..

w

pcnp«-

101

FOU NDATI O NS O F D HAlMAK l llT I'S PH ILOSO PH Y

or connection is possible nO( in reality but only in the conceptual uni~rse because only conapa, being understood as -adu· lion of others~ (an]iipom.). an howe the nature of the "universals" (silmJillJll) of other systems of Indian philosophy. Thus Wlfbhtiva in nwbhilltlpratibanJha primarily denotes ~ uni­ versa]- as exemplified by smokc-.nCS5 or fire-ness conuprually constructed by Ittrylpolur. in other words, the concept of smoke or fire." tn a subsequent article, Kao:ura recounts a discussion that he held with S[einkdlner on this issue; During the second IntcrnarKmai Dhannakini Conference held in Vienna, June [989, we [i.e., S [dnkcll ~t and Karswa\ h2d a deb;..[e on this topic and came 10 rca.liu: that thecc were at least twO oppming pmi[ions; namdy, one held th.at SVIIbhtivapratibaNihll represented the nate of affitirs in reality (how thinp .arc and how they.arc connmed with e.ach other) and the other held that the term meant .a logical concqn. i.e., the necessary connection be~n the prob.ans and me probandum (thus, somewhat synonymous with av;tulbhtiwJvyipri). Steinkellner playfully named the former sambandhtlv4lill and the Laner vyiptivitlA.., Katsura goes on fO (XInfess trult his research on PV4 h2d ·convened" him to the so.alled JII",lNzrulhttlNi4a. This conversion m.akes good sense, for Ka[sun's earlier position did not take adequate .aCCOUnt of the ontological appeal implicit in the norion of nNlbhilltlpwibltnJh.. Ncvmheless, some of his earlier suspicions wecc indeed well founded , for as we h.ave s«n, tINIbhlllltl ("natucc·) in SVIIbhivapraribandhtt cannot iudf be .a panicular, hence, it must be an exclusion, as Ka[liun argued in his earlier artide. With the presmtation I haW' given here, we can follow Kauura's initial inruirion white noting tlur. li~ properry-n!ltbhtiVdli arc nru:curiiy higher order (XIncepts than the narure-tINIbhiva on which they are based. SVIIbhtivtl as naturC' can still amount to an appeal fO some underlying ontological reality.

9 L Kaaura (1916:17).

92 Kaaun. (1"l:)6-J]).

SVABHAVAPRA TJ.fANDHA: T H E IlASIS Of INFE REN CE

103

3.4 SV2bhava-t'Vidtnc( QnJ th( Idmtiry.-motk In me interprwilion of trHIbhtilHl that I have just presented, one notion appc:an to be commonly assumed by interpmen ofDharnulci rri-namcly, m.e principle of ontological mluction. But while some such norion is clearly implicit in Dharmwrti's wone, me aaa role it plays an be panlcularly difficult in one comext; namely, the identity relation that underlies trHIbha,. evidence. Ln us begin by s12ting the basic form of such an inkn!nce based on Dharmwrri', usual srock example: This is a ttee because it is a sugar maple," O r, to use another rypical example:

A w.uer-jug il impermanent because it is produced. As we have nored, Dharmwni's formulation of the svabhtivapratibtlnJha aims to provide an invariable rule (niyJlm4) for the pav:nion relatinn that evidence in any well ·formed must penain ~ (he prrdic:ne and inference. If in me first example such a relation il in plac:r, we mould always be able to say mat if a ming "is a sugar maple," it also n«asa rily "is a ttee," And likewise in the second example. such a rC'lation gua~tces mat if a thing " il produced," it n«essarily "is impermanent..... For Dharmakirti. our ability to invariably infer me pmlicue from the evidence in such c:asa iJ w:lrnnr«l by thil kind o f ~I :u ; on: n:omely, a l1 ...bht1W1I'~l2ti""..Jh., in the mode of "identi ty" (t.itJ4tmJll), But what is meant by "identity" here~

tnc

931 haw ct.o.m ben: to ~ Dlwmaklm ', UIU.i cwnplr of ~ to"wp nupk: whidt ihouJd be ~ funilia! It lease to rndm in Nonh AmcriQ.

u.c. prcdicariorlJ (i.e., -il . uu" ramn than iI a "lfft") "",.,..,. twO functions, I'lfR. I mean CO !how mal "lrft: if "p•.,.,...cd by a ....ooallli", in

94 ~ indwion of -is" in

nnI

nomina,;", QIC (~). iI ~ KUIIf;:1I a prtdicatc or property (JNmu) .ppI>cd 10 • JUbjea (IN,,,,;,,) in • JU;lrmml "a~ of dw wb;ect" (IN_ ivtlritt; _ chapocr 1, n. 11,). Second, 1M inclusion of -is" _ to mark. IUC of an abAlXI ~ (Mbty ...'1'9-J. We o;an mw.void awkward nroIopsma. aJCh ill "produan_" (ip.unw). ·1i~1IOI· (Ii~"""'). and 10 00. A1thoup mil ~ doe. diminalc 1M diKinaion betw rrn sm emmu "r:lpreWw of IM .w,;.a" and "a~ of dw p«diaIC" (IN- .M6_). dw 1mW\00: dilkom« berw.cn t'-IU'~U is lOt in 00 directly rdcvant co the 1:>Iw....... kim ', inr~lial theo.y, This iI :lmply dcrnotmn ml by.he faa thll DNnrWdn i In::IIQ the ~ _~u u !op;ally imm:hanpble itllirp!. "'~ and "'~1Iu,._,!, (_ PVSV .JPVI,1S: G"4J.II: .l'llISbml in 1M appendu),

me..

W4

FOUNDA TI ONS OF DHHMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y

~r the ~rs, Steinkdlner has uimirably culled from Dharmakini's

texts all of the passages relevam ro interpreting Dharmwrri's use of the term ~ identity" Given Dharmwni's reliance upon causality as a means to ground his onrology, it is not surprising ro find that in many of these passaga, the notion of ~ idcmity~ is also based at least partially on causality. In the case of "is impermanem· and ~is produced, for example, Dharmakirri claims that the causes that give rise to 2n entity that "is produced" art euctly the causes Wt give risc to tnat entity's Mimpermanence." In other words, if an entity ~is produced, ~ no further causes are needed for irs "impermanence" because the causes that mm it "produced" also rmkc it "imperm2Mnt." lndeed, ifboth "is produced" and "is impermanent" are to be: propeny-mlohdvas of the entity in question. they mwt be: there from th2t entiry's inception, for otherwise 2 thing would have to ch2nge iI'S nature-sVll'bh.i!.l<:l, which is by definition unch:tngeable. In orner words, if me tow ity of the causal chU2Cteristia (i.e., the n2rure-mlohdva) of mat entity cannot provide the warnnt for the ctmstruaion of me propenies "is impermanent" and "is produced." then those propenies will never be: 2pplicable to that individual. How is this an argument for the "identity" of "is impermanent" and "is produced" ~ It would.s«m mat, thw far. Dharmakini appeals to something qui te similar ro the principle of ontological reduction that I luve coined above.. llut is. the aUSC'S that give rise to an instance of a "water-jug." for example. can be: used as the basis for correctly abstracting the COnttpl'S of both "is impermanent" and "is produced" from that "water-jug." Thw, rhr:se: abnrxted propttties can be reduced to the subject or propcny-bc:an:r (JharminJ from which they have been abstnaed. The twO propcnies ~ th us "identical- in that they ~ in fact nothing but that a;,.rmin itself. The same analysis an be applied to thl." case of " is a tree" and -is a sugar maple." If \rt can eorrecdy say of an individual th2t it -is 2 sugar maple" and also th2t il "is a tra:: then what \rt mean is that no funher causes are n~ry for us to apply one of thest> predicates [ 0 it. In shon. both of these: p~icates are ontologically reducible to the subject that they qualify.91 Now, if this ontological reduction were all th2t Dharmakin i meant by "identity,- then we could raise numerow criticisms against this notion. O ne obviow critici5m is that, on thi5 theory, me inferentt could be: interpreted as a tautology.'" If the predicate to be pro~n (uldhyttJ 2nd the eviR

9S Xc !w:.flI hoo) ror a diocwaion of IOITK rdn3nt pm IF

96 This p'obkm is ""'p'_d throu&b

rhelmn".nj~(PVSV .JPYI.)9).

$ VAAHAVAPRA TI.!ANOHA; THE BASIS O F INFEREN C E

dena' iH~ in f..a nnrologK::ally id~nrica.l . 2nd if we mue no specification beyond this slatement of ontologic:al idc:nrity, then we 2fe in dfect saying "This is 2 cree bec:ause it is a tree." Dlwmakirri takes this criticism sc:riousiy, and his entire elcunus on the llpoh..theory in the SVllvrffl can be understood as a response to this issue. Hi.! argument comcs down to the claim that. in an inference by way of JV4bhoiVII-eVidence, me t'Yidence 2nd predial", "rr indeed onrolngia lly identic!' bur they do not hav~ the same mc::aning (,mha) bec:ausr. they art fonned on the basis of o:cluding different "deIimiten" (IIwuJhj).n Although we do not have the spaer to ev:alwte Dharmakini's :argument fully. the basic treatmr.nt of the 4'poh.,..du:oty that I have presented earlier should SUggesl that chis aspect of his philosophy is not implausible. T "urology iJ i n~ " problem rh:u Dh"rm~kirTi m"~1 "void. hur if i ~ probably nO{ the most serious criticism that ensues when me identity-mode is undcntood to consist merely of onmlogic:al reduction. To be sp«ific, if all we mean by the identity-mode is mat me evidence and the predicate are ontologic:ally reducible to the subject (dhllrmill) that they qualify, Ihen this would justify a bevy of flawed inferences. For example, mere reduction would '"-TUbl... w: co ny. "This i." U t t becau~ ic is exii(~nl. " After :011, the propel't)'-lV4bh.rlV4 "o:iJtence" (IIInJ) and ~ treeness" (vrit!IIItW) "re both reducible to the subject (tiharmill) that they qualify. An obvious response to this point is to say that such an infettnce would nor pass the (cst for negative concomitance (lIJ1l1i"ltllU]4pri). That is, one would observe (hat "coSten«" am be present where there is no "tlttness," But the problem here is th2( this is falli ng back on "mere observation , ~ which on Dhannakini', view canool provide:l ~u fo r ,he rype o f n e<:a:sary relation berwecn subjecr and predicte Ihat he seeks. Dharmakirti rejectS such cases by noring thaI one rim fonnulate spurious inferences that "" pass the tCSt for nep(ive concomitance and yet "" 1I0t gWtantec the presence of the predicate with the evidence.'Y1 Sec d ......c, .. u ],-u ',

98 1M ~ in qU$ion is PVSV MPVl.Jbb (G:U.......1S):

lhr: adusion of !he evidmoe in ~ casa is aublished bcaUK il is DOC pClCched whm.he prcdic:m in qllCStion it: DOC ptQml." If tiN II"-t;.,, .{,IN nrIkttcr i" ~,..., UUI ;, nl4&IiJiNJ thN ..p '"'It.JnnwttH". tbn. wit] _..JJ rrJrUIi"""-iJt-.w (J,qn.u) ., ""iskUi"f! (PVI,.bIll f« aampk. 1OITOtOI'M: mi&h' infer. lba.t pi«a: offrui, au ripe bccawc they au DOC dilfffm. in color [from 1Iw; ,1Sted OMr Of -rMx au JWft1 beaUR.hey COITW from 1Iw; AIM btandI [u the temd _I"; IIw wpporung aamplc is tha.1hcy au ripe or

fO UNDATION S Of DHARMAdRT I'S PHILOSOPHY

To sec bow one can formu late a spurious infcren« of this kind. we must fint rtca.Il that the subject (Jh4,..".in) of the proposition to be inferred (prtuij U) cannot iudfbe the basis for formulating tbe twO forms of concomir2nc:c: we must appeal to CUC$ other than those included in the proposition to be proven." With this in mind. Dbarmakini asks us to consider a case where we have some nuits of a «min kind before us. and we arc seeking those: mat bave a puticular taSte. Let us assume. as Dharma· kini implies. that (he tasre we scdc is a p,;micularly delicious taSte that this

m.iu

_ ·jllH liu the ~ I ha~ jw:! Q!tfI: III mis illkrena, aU doe: _ III' ripe of ... hich one ...ut.e. 1'0 speak han lIftn ir>dudcd ill lhe ,ubjc-n under diKuaion

~ TN. brinr; rhc cate, ~ the pm;Iicuc in quation (~;. IMX p
Some IpbiloooJli...-nauch II '~I claim, ·In mil f)'pC of litw.rion. doe: _"" in hcm¥"c(IUI1:a$CII of !he p!opt'nJ adcIooed II C"¥id.mcc iI incondwM blol.lK onot IWpC'CII ~I i. mipi be coon.umandni by. puupilon of one of dot ITWu in q.....ion.· &u .hil QlIIIIOI be .he (:tK blo_ therr iI no counrnmandinr; pe.-upnW ~III of III object thai baa hem akt;n II the wbtea of III inu.ua. · Bu • •• ..,..,., lain rime one ..upl .... ot:. po:rupcU&l ~ 01 the t::Iltt .ha• ..uJ coon,cmund a d lUion ofthc •• ide .... in hctn"8"na>UI o:ua. . If one ~ ...... such tn. . . . . . . ohe caw. then one .. commirou.s ohe fi...h 01 Oot:iUtmSion bloUK thm:........ud be no ncu:uuy ratriaion (,,~ WI guan&I~ the abKnu 01. oowumnandilll perorption in oche. lituatiool II wdl,IWithour admitting • ....U"....,..ti~I_(:I.1I, ..;Imit only tiw. a o.IttmUy acrivt: insllu, mental • ...-armatl C'Otu"mmrw;Is ,hil faulty aduaion of dot nidma. If_not 1ft ac:ti¥t.wu-maI ~ 10 oountermand the~, tbm inrcm- would be unreli· able: in aU I:a$CII (bcco'I»" IllY "iduo« mip' ~IIWIy be ooun,crmandoed). Insuad of relying on simple nonob.crvalMwl. ,~aclusloa of cbt ~ from

---

d mil on&kes io: midading. ("'''01 wH6.Jw ·"..,.,t.",'\>lr ~

....m

,ha.

.,.-., ..;; IMMrHJI '""rffl!I f7krlNfMtwI.,..u;.i>; .,,,, I,,.,,,Ji'UhI rW:r rdtu

,-ullJ '''''If'l'I1Jhj "" ~i1UqM/ d,u''''',,..w-.tr1tIJ H ~ i,; I ."qi "~1MqII,.1q1U",!" ~

..ftIltJiiblw ;.01,-,..... I' ;'; ...,..".

",.MHd,~

I

...

,..."..,.Lf'hiM.a..,.~"'iIJ""I /~~'lrlliair / ~U.wJ ..ti err l MN ~ .1i,~ 1 ~rnn~MJIIIh 1.,-" "..~",

4jj6d'_ 1 4"r'!4IMJJMM _".~ 1 "",tirJur ,., sWUM nw WiiM ...", iii whiMh-..,.. ~ 1."y.J.",6hb ,., ilwriJ .iU., .j#y~ 4f7 .".ti""". ,Q,.q. uJ..... ~ ~ ..".ti~ ~~"IM}"' .

"a: Tillcmaru: (I"a:Si and n.61.

S VAIHAVAPRATIIANDHA : T HE BA SI S O F I NFEREN CE

10']

kind offruit can have whe:n ripe. Dhaflnakjrti th~n asks us to consider twO different contats. The first contot il; me practical simation of deciding which fruia on a particular trrc will have thai special tll5fe. We are uncon· cemed wilh other fruia, and thus the fru its on this tree form the ~ntirety of our induction domain. With this in mind, we taste a few fruiu from all the branches of the nrc, and we find that the fruits we sdected from a particular branch all have Ihal delicious tasle, while allihe others we have lUted do not. Pointing to that one branch, we then infer, "all thc:sc fruits ha~ that delicious tute beaUS( they come from mat same branch, like the ones we ha~ lUted, and unlike all me others.- Now, it just 50 happens that only that branch does have delicious tasting fruits (perhaps only mat bra.nch received enough light), Hence, when we make our test for ncg:acive conoomiWlCC. we will tk flU"tD f:a..i11O find any instance m.u contradiCts our inference: any fruit that f:a..ils 10 be on that branch will aho fail to have thaI lUte. But docs mil; mean that all the fruiu on that branch do have ,hat WIt:?

[n the IeCOnd comar, we are anending to the color of the fruiu in front of us. I..e!: us suppose mal they are blueberries. and that we sce:k sweet ones. We tlSte a few of various hues, and OUt observations suggest that all blueberria with a panicular blue·bladc hue are SWtt( , while mhers do not. Selecting the remaining benies of tlUt color, we claim, -all these blueberries are SWttC beaUS( they have mat same blue-black shade.- Now, only blueberries of that shade (I'" be sweet, 50 we have selected all of me possible candtdatc:s as pan of our proposition 10 be proven . For this reason, tk flUt4 the inference passes the test for negative concomitance: in me sample available for obstrvacion, all non-blue-black blueberries are not S'A"Oet , Thus, in both thil; contat and me one above, we might assume our inf'c.rences (0 be wdl formed. Any bluebeny-gourmand, however, knows that even a blue-black blueberry can be brusquely bitter. But if we posit an idemi£), relation on the baJi.s of ontologic:aJ reduaion, we would have: no way of avoiding this type off.illacious inference. The color and lUte may be "identical" in clm they are both reducible to the subject that they qualify. But if we happen to inirialIy formulate the positive: concomitance of the pervasion relation bctwccn color and taste on the basil; or blueberri~ that are both bluc--black and sweet, we would ha~ no reason," UtOrtjcct that formulation. One might claim mal the sample should be broadened beforr we draw our inference, but broa
108

fO UNDATION S Of DIIAIM AKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

delicious. blue-black blueberries.,01 h is for this reason that Dharmmni goes as far as (0 say that fW" II li"IU obtmJlltio" can be sufficient (0 establish a pervasion rt:lalion betwttn Ihe evidence and prrdic ue. For Dharmakini, the vicWitudes of the sampl( arc irrelevant if one knows that a slIIIbh4l!11prlllibllndhll is in place. and without a svll6h4Vi1prlltl'lMndhil, broadening the sample would be usdcss.... Thus, Dharmakini's explicit ~jection of the type ofimproperly formed in~nce we have JUSt discussed suongly suggtsU that ontological reduction cannol in itselfbe whal he means by the identiry-mode of the swbhilNJprlltI'IJIINlhII. With this in mind, we can murn to Dharmmrti's definition of 100 1 h.ovc . 'mpLined .he dioaouion h"u. If ............ 0

~

mo<e ..,.,......e, .... m .... ..,..

n(l(e duol . fOl' Dbannalrlni (PVI.9-IO and PVSV .J tTl. : G '7.1H.1j). Ihis type of infet· ma acllwly employJ dl"CCI...,.,idmc.c, It.~ta. Dh'llmU;ni is obIi&cd 10 inletpr~ this type of inJ"nm« aJ hued..pt'ln It.",.;,.m. because. according 10 the Abhidharma typal. OIY tlAl nc adopu and Miapu 10 Erlemal Rnlism, infinilesimal panicles of color au di"intl tTom ;nfinilctimal panicla of wle. B UI as Haya and Gillon have Ihown (lnl :6,), Ihis I)'IK of inf"raKe (whi.eh •• ""1.9-10 is an infercDU fTom lute 10 color) implicitly rd~ on the U$I: of nw.... ~. w-hcrcby one infen lhocapacity (J'I';O '1) oflhe roIot-alomllO act aJ IlIpportlnl con4illoru for 11K IUIC... IO ....., 'T'he dJffi:...,nce In 11K prae... ~_I"" in(vcnec (rom color 10 lU!e--i. mal we ue no< oaly infernn,. capacilY, INI abo the fact thai lhal Clpa(i'Y is fUUy aclival~. Thus, 10 Hilt !he praenl aamplc mort prcciKly. _Ihoold nolt tim 11K IWO proptr'Y.,.•• Mi... in qualion lit no< ptM";n;nl '0 the blueberry, INI r:nhrr 10 11K colot-atonu of 1M blueberry. Sp«if'i. cally. Ihe ptrccption of color allows one It> dettnnine thaI thOM: color·alOIN an: actUally 1\>CIled in a aU$:ll compla whereby Ih.1 potmtial ;1 activated. HenO', the property. ,.,.Mi"., actinl &I rvidenu in our IirJbciow infcuna: of lurt from color illnc proptrty of "ha.,inl,n activated potcrtliallo produo;c I d'llk-bJuc color." Ulinr; Ihil Pf0pt.'Y· ,.bbtI"", II cvkIma:, another propmy·nwMl"", is fallariouJ,ly infarm, namc:ly. (:l' .t.ouId mili il c:ka, why Dharmakirti rudy chootct: 10 ~nl his anaIysil'l an 1I0mk Irvd. It ;1 woMh nocifl& that . unlike the ;nfercnu from color 10 WI(, 1M in~na (rom color [0 ".ipt" is more dim;tly an in(crena by .....iN..,..rvidelKc. • inee "nptons" refen 10 • Itlrufotmltion applicable 10 all thc .IOms corulrued as the blueberl')'. tOJ",.. .. ,I.e

p. ofdai.... ...ch_

... nodUn,othet [than an ~I or a propmy._MoIJW\ an lCfVC II cvi.oknu bcc:ow,c !he I'CllricUon of unx.:ompanim non-ariA"I docs not pcmoin 10 IIAI w'-c: naNre iI not rcbled 10 11K probandum. IPVSV .J""1.I0l G:I.I1-IJ.: /inUI"~ Iwt..rp....8 iti l .".ti4-Jl'wwWM_Jt;";NlW.""",ry.1IIibh4N~ .

....,

... one who acuptt thai, by muon of Ihe ntpl»n of one: crtti!}' bud! II fire}. another [1UCb 1I1fnOI<e] 11 otp.rd. mUll ..... MUpI ma. ohcn: is 0IHnc: ._~;.

tntitiea. [PYSV PVI.14: G:IO.l)-14: .. , ....... ";~IIJ'6""rffl" w,.,. ,.,. Ukit lAd ~ 'rvJrAtiI¥NihII ." q~ . HNiIM peruininl M""ccn lhote

JWO

SVAlIHA"VAPRATIlIANDHA: THE BASIS OF INFEREN CE

w.bJMw-cvidence and sec dut. in :I. lubder form. the s:ame concern is evident. Thu is, the ddinition itsdfis cr:afted in a manner dut aims to move beyond the simple onrologial identity ofevkIc:nce to predicate. Let us recall me definicion as found in PrllmrIt;Jllvirttiltll:

ALso, a WIIbhlVll is evidence for a WIIbhlllll mat is invariably consequent from its mere (wui",1I) p~ncc [PVI.t.cd).la For the purposes of moving beyond the omologial identity of predicu e and evidence, the key term in this definition is milrll ("mere" or "jUSt"). In employing this term, Dharmakini pointS nOt only to me on[C)logical unity of prtdica[e and cvidelXX, but also the way in which the evidenoe is "n ;nVll r;"ble "indiator" (samAlta) of rhe predic:ue. 1W2r.l, in COntra5110 my inlerprttalion, has argued mu the term mlilrll (" mere" or "just") should be understood such it reftts jWltO the ontological idenlity of predicate (wIhya) and evidence (uitJJumll):

m:u

From this [definicion] il is eviden, that [he uitih}1lS occurrrncc in aocord:anoe with the mere amena of the ,.dha"a does nor mail the logical proposition th:at the SiUJhyII is alW2Y' restricted by [he JIitJhJl1lll and hence pervaded by the laner, but it refers to the factw.l relation in which the sdtihyIl arises always from the

s::ame cause as thu of the s4JhJl1lll.'OJ

I inuead argue WI the lerm "mete" does indeed have:l. "logical" functh"l it restricu the evidence ro the pn:dieate by p~en t ­ ing both overextension (IltiprllSllntll) and under-ntension (nft1lll14). Consider the case of a thing that we identify as :I. "sugar maple." O n Dharrnakini'l formulation of lVIlbh.iua-cvidencc. if we wish [0 s:ay that this thing "is a uec" because i, "is:l. sup maple." we mwt maintain mat the -mere" (wui".,,) pracntt of the propcny-sw-bh.iJloll' adduced as evidence ("is "IU(Pl' maple) is sufficient to demolUtf2te me pre:senc.e of the propcrtyWIlbhtWtt to be proven (-is a tree1. The qualifier -mere" has rwo functions. cion, in the

K'nR'

102 PVI.ud.; /om4I~6b.M)i WM"""",,,..,,,.,..Jhi"; Ii In my I~tion I ~ suppIiN d., _ for I>h.iw )i. whidI h;u; limply been dickd for ronric:al fQSOfIl. S« SrcinkdIner (.996>. who poinu otn that d., =cu."". "*,..., ddinicioN round in Dharmaldrti'. tal ~ aU xmantiall, rquivalmt.

nnou.

10) I....... (100)'64).

1.10

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

First, it tdls us that omcr propc-ny-SWbh.oiV45 atC irrdC'V1Ult to our inference. Thc sugar maplc we adduce as an aamplc may be' tcn mC'tcrs tall, or irs leaves may be' red; but thc:sc propc-rty-wabhdVQS arc irrcJcnnt to our concern. We nttd only abS[r.lct from the thing in question the propertywabhAm, " is a sugar maple.~ This prcvenrs an under-cxtcnsion: if we believe: th21 along with "is a sugar maplc~ \OI'C must supply "is (en metcrs tall" in order to cotablish that a sugar maple is a tret , then shon sugar maplt$ will no longer be in the domain of similar c::asa. Thus, if thc individual that is the subject of the inference happens CO be shan. we will not be able to infer that it "is a tree." For this reason. allowing (he propc:ny-wabhd'w "is ten meters taW ro be a parr of or a supplement to the evidence "is a sugar maple" incurs an under-atension beause it impropc-rly acludt$ some "sugar maples" from consideration as "trees." Second, ·mere~ tells us rhar if we mwt supply other prope:rty-wabh4V45 before we can affirm the presence of the predicate. then OUf cvidence is not in itself sufficient to demonsuate the prc:scnce of the predicate. For example, if in lieu of "is a sugar maple" we use the prope:rty-wabh4va "is leafy." we migtu attempt to infer: !"his is a tree bttause it is leafy: We would find . howC'VC't, counterexamples, such as ivy. which are leafy, but not a tree. Thus. "is leafy" would require supple~ntation with other properties before it could serve:as cvidcnce for "is a tree." In other words, "is leafy" includes roo many cues, and if we use it as evidence, we incur an overextension. If my interpretation of "mere- in me definition of svablmlW-CVidence is correct, then we have already moved a consider.lble way toward an understanding of the identity-mode that does not test on simple ontological reduction of evidence to pmiicue (or both to the subject). Dh.arm.akirti's :answer, in shon, is [0 place a restriction (through the qualifier "mere") on the type of properry-wablNifltf that we can adduce as cvidC'ntt. Even though the various sugar m:aples that we sec may h:ave m:any divergent qualitiC$height, le:af color. sweetness of s:ap-thc:sc qualities will be excluded by -mcre bec::awe they:arc irrdC'V1Ult to inferring -is:a Utt," either bcc:a"SC' they improperly adude some individu:als from the dom:ain of "is :a (fCC," or bec::ause they impropc-rly include some individuals in that domain. A.J we shall sec, this dose reading of Dharm:akini's definition of IWI'blNiva-cvidentt suggesu me way mu we must understand the identitymode, if we:arc to :avoid accusing Dharm:akini of an egregious logical error. But even if our te:ading of "mere'" is helpful, we must f:att the problem of ft

lInd~n:f:lndin8

Dh:lrm:lkini's (lwn st::l remenu in r... brinn

to

,h... idcntiry.

mode. Panicularly important-and p:anicularly tfoublesome-are the

SVA8HAVA,..rATllIANDHA : THE BASIS Of INfEREN CE

1.11

many passago: whert DharmalUni describes the rdation of - identi()," (t4J4rm".J by employing ,he compound lA'tJV4bh4v_lilera.lly, "thallVabJuV4"--or some equivalent compound (/iUlbJuva, twrman, elc.). Most commonly, he sp«ifies mal tht property adduced as evidence r is:ll supr maple; can be qualified:lS "dUI-SVilbhdVII" in rd.ation to me property [0 be provc:n ("is.a u·ee·) .... The t\N'Ofold question th:lt arises !let(' is: how do ~ conslrue the relationship bnwttn the compound's t\N'O members (i.e., "thai" and "'SVilbh411tl1 in mtx cases. and what is the rdevant meaning of SVilbh4wi Without going into great philological detail, ~ can note th:lll there are only (WO vi.able alternatives for the interpretation of"thu-swbhdV4." The compound either means - Ihe tvabhiva of that" (tllSyilllHlbh.tiva!JJ. or it means - having that:lS ia SVilbhtiva" {)iUJII tilt Wilbh.tiIlilINl!JJ. Thus, if we are speaking of the evidence, and ~ 52y that it is "tMt-n.'J1bh.iva" in rtl:lltion to me predioll:. then ~ mean either that the evidence is the predicate's IIHIbh.iw., or th:lllthe evidence has the predicate :lS ils wabhdva. With thtx possibilities in mind. ~ can tben inlcrpt('t Ihe meaning of IIIflbhiWl :IS either narure-.wabhit'il or propertY-.nwbh.tiV4. Combining these beton, we arrive at four possibilities for the intC!prct2tion of:ll statement in the form "the evidence is Ul1wIbhiWl in relation to the predicate."'" Option I. Option :z..

The evidence is the predicate's n:lture-lVilbh.tiVil. The evidence is the predicale's property-SVilbh4V4.

,.._M.l...

1004 On me ...., of and if:!: cqlli...mn1S (ap«ialty wilhb.), Itt smnkdlna Cl9I41 md IWllIa (UIClJ). Cua when dICK mmpoondJ afr applied as doacriprioru of the n'idmor; Ilte 1M II"1(II( .devanl 10 (M,lf ddaulion, bul dICK (Ompollnds may alto Km' ;U doacriprioru of dw: pmIigIR 10 "" provm (~ 1M larm ~ is puticubriy common wirh EN: compound .. 4b1v... For. paDdip.u.:~. Itt PVSV -J1'\'1.I 7-J.8:

G:I'.''''): WIwn

tnc pmiic.&tc 10 "" p~ is in thai w;lYacabIishcd 10 ""either the I,..]Ml..

of dw: CYidmor Of EN: ClUK of the Mdmcr, rhm IlI"Ir an IftIOfI as f'oIIo-: ifimP'"IIWICrIOr itat..ml in attrtain thl"" then tlw thin(l. no! conwuaaf; iffin: .a!.rnl. ~. oolmOltr. Ono: can raJ(\II in this WIIylxo;.o...., (Iti) dw: pmlic:au: in qtlaOOn is m.. evidence', ....IIIM.. or (:I""" A.nd ~ c:ouId tho: ~ IICXlIr wirtlClUl ill ClWD p'.,t, -nwMiw Of CKIfC HCIIOe. t¥m withoola Ioxw (~). tlw Mp!;~ COftCOmitana (:In Rill br ckmorulnlrci in me contrary ewnpk . [,..IIM' ,~.n~ vAt,.... 1tm......H wllti:y.nWMl.r Itp+ ~ _ M-Iti UJ".,..Mht ell ~-; 1 ttUiJI ftj ,. "'JIII_.w.. ..",., wl l Mm.,!, ,....,. _ .........IJIO blJlO ...'""""'"' ~ it] lirwJ- IllllMt"/fllfi ~"u ,_;.o".,ti ..,.,ti'"4 iI. 1050_SlCinkdhxr (I~n).

111

FOU N DATIO NS OF DHAI.MAKIRTI ·S PHILOSO PHY

Option j . 'Ille evidena hilS the pm:licau~:as its narurt-w.rtbhoiWl. Option 4. Th~ evidena has Ihe pralicace:as its property-w.rtbh.iv#. In his comments on the compound t4lJlJIlbh.iva, Stonkdlner has argued that (he (erm w.rtbJuilHl shouLd ~ner.ally ~ im~rpmed:as M~na. M i.e.• nuure-w.rtbhilHl, and this leaves us with JUSt option J and option 3. Applying this 10 our c:xample and using the term M~ naM for nature-w.rtbhdva, we would say for option 1: M being a sugar maple Mis tIN amlct of "being a t~. MOr, if we restate mis in morc: ordinary language, " 10 be a sugar maple is the c:uenc:c of being a tree. MIn contrast. if we favo r option j , we would say that "being a sugar maple has "being a (fCC" tIS ;lJ amlct. Again. in ordinary language: "to be a sugar maple is in CS5Cf1a to be a t~. M In much of his work on me topic Steink.c:llnc:r appc:ar$ to favor oplion I , and on this reading, Dharmakirti would claim that Mto be a sugar maple is th~ wc:na ofbt:ing a t~. " I. While such a rc::lding U philologically possible fOf 201 lcasl some cues of the compound t4tsVt1bJuiva, from a logical poinl of view, this interprcution is potenlially disastrous. To sec:: what is disaSlfous here, it is important 10 recall a foew points. On Dharmakirti's view. a predicate (such :as Mis a sugar maple") is consuUctc:d on the basis of the causal ehaDcteristics of things. And if a predicate is properly applied to its subjc:ct (dJMmrirl) . Ihen thai subject must luw: the causal characteristics required for the cons[tuaion of that prcdicale. In ilion, if we call something a "sugar maple," rlut entity must luvc all the causal chancterUtics opc:ctc:d of a "sugar maple." And when we speak of a narurc-JV4bhivli' or M~na" (w.rtbhivll) of a trC(', we are rcfc:rring m the totality of the causal characrerisrics that an individual qUil lrcc-insttIla must have. By dr.twing together these notions, we an derive the following equivalencies: M

"is a sugar mapkM • the causal characteristics required for the conmucrion of me predicate. "is a sugar maple."

106 5rcinkdlncr (l97,.:u6):

And ~ [DhamWdnil .ddt in apWnins thisdcfin.ition: "A1tboush 1M IWO propcnies '"'" difkrnM by rirtur 01 mal djtT.:rma: whKh c:onaiIu in me dilkrml~ (",.urtti .. ~ {""" tho: ............'" uti"" I",Ut"'''11 ILl", i.Jn,;,'6 ......... '11 io {••....By (_ "''''J nothillJ bul tM hCO: (_INN~) of 1M indKalecl [propcuil (/itfti)." lHB:p'fF. .,m,-""'JJ(#i~ ~bMk )i _ ~..."., .

S VA6HAVAI'MTI&A ND HA: TH! BASIS OF I NFERENCE

"the essence of a

Irct~ •

1.1}

me IOui caus:al ch:anacristics that :any utt-inst:ance must have.

"being:ll. sugar maple" • me cauul chancteristia required is "the rsscnce of a trtt" for the conmuaion of lhe prrdiCltr "iJ: a.lug:u maplr" iJ: rM totaliry of caus:al char:acteriJ:ria that :any ttrc insrance must have.

Thus, if the evidence (" is a sugar maple1 is the osence of the prcdicate to M prov~n ("is :I I~"), we :In' actually claiming WI all treef are Jugar maples. which leaves us with a numbcr of Stidty problenu. For cx:ampk. rithrr maple syrup can br mw from the 53p of:an oak trtt; or oaks arc not acrually mcs; or if oW arc trees but do not produce maple ~p, lhen the ability to produce the sap ror maple syrup is not one of the caus:al charactcristia required for an individual to bc call~ a "sugar maple." The probI('m h('r(' i. :on inversion of thc relation between pe!'V2ded (vy4P7"') 2o.l'id pervader (.".JMlt~). ,''' To usc the 11fl~ o f cxlclUionl, we cxpect the evidence to bc of smaller or equal extension wim me pred.icue. such that all insranca of the evidence arc included in the CJ:tension of the predicate: as in the claim, "all sugar maples are trees." But in ba. by ~ying that the evidence is the rsscnce of the pr~ica le, we have inven~ this relationship, which amounu 10 me claim, "alltree5 are sugar maples." A pocsible f'QIp<)rue to thil: criticil:m is

(0

m:um:un WI it improperly

COnslNeS :an abstract predicate (such as ~tl!4, "is a ncc" or "uttnessi as having an essr:ncc. Since such predicateS arc in faa aclusions, they cannot be said to have an essence al all.'· Although J agree with this criticism, one must bc careful about interpreting iq implkations. OcarIy. U " Irter\CS5" cannot ilJdfbcaran esKna. then we mwt modify our inlcrprcution orthc cbim Wt the evidence is chana('ri~ :;II wlSWI,/M",. relali~ 10 rhe predicale. Instead, we should undcrsttnd the compound tllulMbhd". not in terms of the evidence and predicate thcmsdves, but r.Hher in lerms of instances that instantiate the evidence and prcdicate. Thus, in lieu of say· 1fJ7 Hays fim Iflade. point of dW ...., h 9l7;,11- JU). and lwua (&00,", has cbrifoal • numbn of iu nmifoadono..

114

FOUNDATION S OF DHAIlMAKiIlTr5 PHILOSOPH Y

ing, as in option I above, ~T0 be a sugar maple is me astntt of being a tr«. ~ ~ could mo~ accuratdy say. "an instancc of a sugar maple is the essence of an inSlancc of a tree.~ But even though this way of opressing option I guards againSt me reification of predicates or (S$(nc:cs, it does not solve the basic problem al hand: ~ Still arc saying ,hat if some individual is a nee, then it is in (S$(nce a sugar maple. Hence, oaks produce me sap for maple syrup, or oaks art not trees, or sugar maples do not produtt the up for maple syrup. Thus. it should by now be dear lhat in Sl2.temenu about me identirymode of Ihe IWIhhill!ltpralibtlnJJu., ,he compound ulIJvahhil"" and its cquivalrn u cannal mean ,hal ,he propcny adduced as evidence is the "(S$(nce~ (i.e.• the naru~-lWhhaWl) of me property to be proven. If al all possible. we should intcrprn the oompound as oplion-l. according 10 which the: evidencc has the (S$(ncc of mal predicate. Or. to be mo~ precise. Wf: should say. -rhat which iT15tanti:u:es me evidentt-propcrty has the essence or narure-J1.ItIhhoiw of that which instantiates me predicare." Slated in this &.shion. it may appear (har we arc talking aboul (W() diffetell( iT15Clllciates here: thai which iT15tantiates the cvidentt. and that.....ruch inscamiates the predicare. This is where "ontological reduction" becomes rdevam. That U. although an ontological identiry does not exhaust ,he meaning of all sraremcnu involving tlflSVAhhallll, it is dearly pan of what th~ Slatcmenu mean . The property serving as evidenc.c and ,he propcrry to be inferred are reducible to the very same entity: "being a tree" and "being a sugar maple" arc ontologicaUy idenrica.l, for they arc nOI actually diStinct from the individual in question. Thus. an individual that instantiares the evickncc ("being a supr maple") iI itself an individual that insl2.lltiales the predicate ("being a tree"). but in me specific sense ,hal, by vinue of instllntiaring the evidence nICing a maple~) , it has the (S$(ncc of the predicate-insOInce (i.e.• it has the (S$(nC( of a ~ (reel . With the equivalencies sketched above. and whh the proviso that we arc speaking here of instances and not JUSt abstract predicates, ~ can modify our I':Ihl~

al;

follows:

the subject of "is a sugar maple". an individual that has me causal chancterisdcs required for the oonnruction of the predicate, "is a sugac maple."

SVA6HAVAPRATI&A.NDHA: TH£ BASIS OF INFERENCE

·~nct of a

l iS

trot " me toflli causa.! du.racte:rutia mat any u«·instance mwt have.

me subject of Mis a supr maple:" .. an individual that has the: causal has the: "essence of a tree" characteristics required for the consrrucrion of the: predicate "is a sugar maple" has the total causal characteristics mal any Utt instal1ce mWI have:. Thus. to $[ate mis point slighdy diffcre:ndy, on ow example: the ide:ntitymode of the svabhavapratiba"am, meanl mat, if we an correctly apply the prcdK:atc Mis a sugar maple" to some individual, then mat individual nce-

cswiIy has me causal characteristia required for the construction of the predK:ate "is a tree," If this is indeed what Dharmakini means by the identity-mode of svabhavapratibandhiz, it seems to make good sense, Since conceptS arc constructed on t~ bam of an entity's caual chaT2Cl'erisria , if we in~ from the COTnO' predication of one concept thar anocher concept is also correctly predicable of the same entity. then presumably ~ arc saying mat the causal characteristics necessary fo r the predication of me former concept include all the causal charaaeristia necessary for the predication of the larter concept. We could mus argue mat. in this rcprd. Dharmaltirri is employing a different kind of reduction, namdy. a ron«ptual ffductWn whereby more complex concepti that are b:ueci upon a wider ~8e of C2un.l chancteri,", cia arc reducible (0 simpler conceptS mat are bued upon a narro~r nngc. Thus, since "is a sugar maple" can be reduced in this way to "is a tree." we can infer that any given individual is a 1rt:C if it is a sugar maple. Fonunatdy, this analysis of me compound tAtsViIbhliva (i.e., oprion): the evidence has the predicate as itS narure-sWlbhava) accounts for me vast m.. jority of C':Ise: in which Dharmakirri employs: i( 10 describe the identity_

mode. and it conforms 10 a careful reading of me tenn - mere" in his definicion of the svabhilJllt-a'idence, Option ) also avoid,., llnributing to Dharmwni a position that is complndy untenable from a logical point of view. whereby the desired logical relation berw«n evidence 2nd prtdicale is inventd. Nevertheless, option-) cannot llCCOunl for every usc of me compound t4trV1thlullJJl. TW2r:1 pointl 10 a number o f inSr:ln~ that some of Dharmakini's later commentators interpret as option I (the evidence is the CS$(:ncc of Ihe predicate), but most or these instances can as easily be taken

116

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

as option ).'" Iwata cites one case. ho~r. that it unambiguously t/41 amenable to option }. h is a vmc from the third dupter of the Praml~­ INirttilil:

At cemain times (i.e.• when wing an inference] Ont ha5 an tsCI~ lishtd cognition of one thing through some other thing which saves as evidence. ThaI evidence through which one has that cognition is necessarily rilvaiyam) either produced &om that thing or the SWfbhilitl of that thing. 1I£1V).']OIf'''' What W( havt tT2lUlatro hert as "the Iwbhillllof that thing" is aaually the compound Iillsllilbbiva in the original Sanskrit_The grunmar hert it such that W( cannot possibly interpm I4Jmlbhtiw to mean -has that thing as its Wflbhi"tf (option }). And if we inttrprtt IfJiIbhilitl as narurt-lViIbh.i"" or essence. then W( have dearly arrived at option I , "the evidence is the essence: of the predicate. ~ But perhaps we should first considtr the verst thaI coma ne n in the Prtl1M!'4Nmilil.·

It is not possible fo r a thing to occur withom its own Oust or WQbhilitl. And thal character rripa) that is observed in these two cases is prtciSC'ly the definition that applies to omtr reliable evitknce.IIPV).7111'" For Dharmaldni the main point of thit verst is the assertion that the -characrer- of dfcct-cvidtnce and IVilbhiJNl.n'idtnce must apply to all cases of rtliable evidence; in other words. all forms of rdiabk evidence must oonfo rm to these two in some fashion. For our purposes. however what is most inlertSting ~ it that he again usc:s me term IViIbh4va, but now fIIiIbhiw rerm 710110 I}" nnJnrrt. bl4t to 1M prrJicillt. Thus, in PV}.70. he laYJ that me evidma: is the: n..bhi/lll of the prediOK, but in PV}.71. he laYJ that the 1091W::1I.1~ -osniu:l duol in mol! CUD op!ion I (I.e. "'lI~ is no!: ~Iy RqIIimI by m., ~ of m., J>UAF in '1uaOOn. Commomuillo to. exunpk. on an OClaIr-

H 8 (,.'-4), IWilla IIOlCS, -of"""""" i! .. abo 1*Jibk: «> inu:.pfCf till_INN U IIrr.r.Ino-mhicompound [i.e, option }I."

rcnot of ",""",Miw in

I ] 0 PV)'1'" ,.uJ.> u.u.;, tiMIIM .". f'Wtitir ->M!t bwit f "'" II.c,.'!' III,. jlJ4 _ w.. fi .....WI If. Colt
M.a.

] I I PVJ.71' ~"'i_,!, -MJ_'!' _ ,,;U ~ _Mttow.!o f"... ~ ~ 1117" tInI"'!' tU 1c"'!"'M II.

SVA 'HA'VA PRATJ.tANDHA.: THE BASIS OF INF ERENCE

117

cviMna' ClIlnnr o«:ur without iu 1VtIbIMwz. namdy, tilt: pudicu~ This usage lrnIIy JUrp..w us, but it should not. Instead, ~ should recall that in the definition of swbh.iv.-evidence, the term swbh.iw is used to dcsaibe both the evidence and the predicare. That is, on Dharmaldni's formulation one 1VIlbhtiV4tstands as evidence for another 1VIlbhaw in the case of the identil)'-modc. Now, eM ~ning of WIIIhh.i.,. in me Jr.Olnd ~rv: WI'; have drM (PV).,,) should be &.irly obvious: when we say that the evidence ("is a sugar maple") cannot occur without its swbMIIII ("is a fI'CC"), if $CCffi5 d ear thar IV4bh4w must mean nafUrc-swbh4""" Thus, something cannot be a sugar maple if if is nOl in CS5CnGC a tI'CC.III But wbat then do ~ do wilh the compound tAllwlbhalJll in the previous verse (PV}.70)? Do ~ say that the evidena' is the essence of the predicale, even though we will {hen immffli:ucly uy (i n

PV}.7d that the predicate is me essence of lbe evidence? TIlls interpmacion introduces a stunning dcgrcc of conceprual incoherence into Dharmakini's thought, and we would be forced to conclude either thaI he was t:ru.ly ignonnt of how to work with qualities and essences, or else that be was extraordinarily inq)[ al doing so. Cluricably. we do luve vw)[her op'io n: we can decide th:>t in PV).70, the leno SWlblNiWl mlUt be! tre:itM as "propcl'f)'-lWblNi",,-" In other worW, in thaI verse Dharmaldrti is simply saying that the evidence is a propertyJVIIfbh.i.... of me predicate (this formulation is option 1 in our lin) . In relation to our example, Dharmaldni wo uld be saying mal "is a maple" is a propcrty-lWbhiw of " is a trtt," or in ordinary language, "being a IrnIIple is a property of being a trtt." At first glance this may appear equally incoberan, but if woe unckntand both of thete properties 10 be >denrical lO:;l single individual, Dharmaldrti would in effect be reminding us that the property -is a sugar IrnIIple" is idenliaJlo the individual mat "is a Utt." In ordinary rcrms, he would be saying. "being a maple is a property of this individual thaI is a trtt." In short, he would be reinforcing the importrnce of me principle of ontological rMuction. We have already seen thai OntOlogical reduction is nOI in itself sufficient to justifY the type of relation required between evidence and predicate for a succesdi.1l inference of this kind, but in reminding us of thai reduaion Dharmakirti is not committing any great error. AJ intcrprctm of Dlwrnaldrti's thought, the lesson we can learn here is 11211111 atlUmcm II made dKwbm:

In

I'V and I'VSV. Xc, for aatnpk, I'VSV U

PVI.I7-lI; G:lI.f..., (tnIutucd abo-oc, n.I04/.

118

fOU NDATIONS O f DH"aMAdRT I 'S PH I LOS OPH Y

that, while wt ha~ numerous textual rtaSOns to Stt rwo difftttnt mn-nings in (he term svabhiiwt, wt should not forget mat Dharmilini never clearly stares that he is using the term in two distinct ways. Often the context of a usage forcefully indicates me preferred meaning of swbhllllll (as · propnty" or -nature' . but in many crucial cases, including rhe verses that we ha~ just considered, Dharmakini's words offtt no unequivocal choice. We nced to k«p this ambiguity in mind. fur it may suggest thar Dhanna1cini has deliberatdy hidden some specific pu~ in this equivocation-a purpose that modem inrerprttm ofDharmaldni have yet 10 detecr. BUI it nuy also indicate that Dharmakini's theory of inference through nwbh4~dencc: s..imply was not very well worked out, With this in mind, kr: us examine $Orne potential problems.

Along the lines of our discussion above. we may be able to come to an interprttation of swbhd'va--cvidencc and the identity relation that wt would find easily defensible. bUl cvt"n so. a number of problems remain. lnc: mO$t striking difficulty is simply that. although Oharmakini does appear to recognize the insufficiency of mere ontologica1 reduction as a basis ofinfet· enct, he never explicidy explains how the identity-mode of the twbhi~­ prlltibandha does not amounl to a reduction of me propcnies in question to the individual they qualify. In other words. while the additional stipulation of a "conceptual reduction· is probably the mon consistent possible way of interpreting me WtlblNiV4pnl.libandh4 k identity-mode. the V1.gucness and incompleteness of Dharmaldni's diSCU5Sion of this topic makes il impossible to definitivdy defend the inrerprtra.tion I have proposed. And although some later commentators may ha~ suggested a similar imerprcDtion, al this point I cannot say whether such is the cue.II) My inability to definitively establish how Dharmak.ini moves beyond mere omologica1 reduction is in part a tcSul( of (he ambiguity of his State-ments. bUI it abo $Cems to rdlea ctrtain lacunae in Dharmak.ini', thought. Perhaps the most Rlicnt or Ihest is the distinction between ao::idenw and cucntial proptnies, for although such a distinction is implied by both modes of the twbhliWlPrtlli611nJha, to my knowI.cdge Dlu.rmakini never dirccdy propoaes a mcam for formulaling such a distinction. III F.... . P'-"'''''''' ol ... he< , ...._1"01.1 ..... in i,,~ byway ol_UJ-.....idcnc:e. (I!nl). Foe 1 vny wd'uI Rudy dw a;>miroa Iwata (100)).

I « Onb I«

w poairionl ofbr« comm~m~ron.

$ VA6HJVAPRATJIANDHA, THE BAS IS OF INFERENCE

119

The a~na of a clear theory conctming euencial and accicknt:a.l propertte5 is particularly problematK: in the case of the: identity-mode. nut is. it s«ms that the COI1ttt predication of Mis a sugar maple~ invu1ably allows the correct predication of "is a trtt- 10 the WIle individual because the causal cbaracterutia r«{uircd for me: fonnt:r pm:licate include all the causal ch:mcmisrics f'!'Quired [he lalter. Now, ralk aboul "causal cbaracteristia" is always convertible 10 talk aboUt proprrty-wablMwa. Ixcause Ihe latter are: constructed on the basu of tht former. Hence, undtrsnnding proprrty-wabh.iwa to bt "essmWl propmies.- 'Nt: should bt able to say that an individual that is a sugar maple is necessarily a frC:C: because the: essential properties of a sugar maplt include all the essential propenies of a tttt. But this presumes that thoK propc'rties of the individual in question that art necessary fo r it to btar ,ht predicates "is a 5Ugar maple" and "is a tttC" art distinguish«! !'rom those tNt art not nrcrss:uy for thost prtd.ications. If tht particular tntiry in question has a certain height. we must ~ ablt to specify whether that height is ascntial to either a "sugar maple:." a "trtt," or both. Dharmwrti. however. does not ~en use consistent terminology for speaking in this fashion . we have already secn that svahh4V4. which probably should not' be rendered as "C$.SCntial propeny." is not wed in a way that clearly distinguishes the accidetllal from the c:ssc:ntial. Even if we assume that Oharmakirti does present a clear accidcmallessmrial distinction (along with consistent use of some (<<{uilitt: terminology), this YIOuid not solve another problem: we: still nerd a way to MttrmiM what is essential and what is not. Since the pervasion rrlanon in an infrrr:ncc by lWhlMlNJ-eYidcna: u based upon identity (t44.lmty.). we can think of this problem in ternu of verifying the pervasion relation when we employ an ink:rence using sv.:rhhdl'lI-C'Videna:. Although he: ofTc:n no clear proctdure in the PrIlINi!'4lNirttiltll or Swt"!ffi. in laler tOts Dharmakirti proposes a procc:dure whc:rdty that rc:lation is affirmed by "an instrumtnw cognition that demonstrates the incompatibility of the presence of the evidrnce in the: contr.TIdictory of the predicate to be proven - {~vi,.ryII~ hdiJJutlt,,pf'll1lUi!'4).I1' In the: description of this procedure, a key term is -the contradictory(";"''14yll). Sleinkc:Jlner has convincingly argued that in wing Ihis lerm, Dharmakirti is nOI merc:ly referring to the absence of the predicate (lIlJhyllJh.iv.:r). but rather to a "comradictory,· i.e., an entity that

ror

ror

11411 is worth llOOIi"l dw,. ~ thoup DlwmUiru doe. IlOOI ap/icitly lOrmulate thU pro«dun: in rvsv,:an inchoale f'onn ofil is IUund al PVI.191:and PVSV M rit.

no

FOU NDATION S O F D HAlMAKlRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

conlfadicts the: prc:dicatt; in such a way thai any third pouibility is excludro. Thus, in our example:, this cognition would nc:ro [0 show that the: prc:dicare:·is a supt maple" is nm merdy absent where!feo:ltt abse:nt. but rathe:r that the: prroica[C COIIIJ fUlt N correctly applied to an individual that bcm the predicate - is a non-ttcc." Srcinkdlner has funha shown, especially on me b..sis of a discussion in Dharmalcini's Vauny4}a. mat this tc:5t is accomplishc:d by appealing IO a particular kind of nonperttption (ilnupalabJhi). Sp«ifically, when we examine:an individual th:at inn:anti:ales the: conlfllldiaoty of the propeny to be prove:n, we do not perceive a property that petv2des (",apax.Jht,mu:) the c:vidence:.u , In a convincing extrapolation from Dharmakini's chosm a:ample (i.e., inferring momenranness from cxisre:nu), Ste:inkcllner IU~esU that in out type of example, the: pc:rvading property fo r which we would test would be -having branches and such."'" Now, the: norion of a -pervading property" (vytlpoJuuiharmll) can be con5inently used in the: sense of an -cs.smtial property" of that which it perma, for as we have secn in chapte:r I, a pervada is prc:srnt in:all cases of the penrackd (uyiifryll). Indeed. IIJiIpJadhamut is one [Crm in Dhannakini', philosophy that could be tquated in all iu conrats with the notion of an M c:sscnti:al propaty." But.:ven if we have mus found a consiste:nt way ro speak of essential properties, the nonperccption of a sugar maple's pervading property in an individual that is a non-trtc is not in itself sufficie:nt ro .show that an individual mat -is a sugar maple" is nco:s.wily an individual that • is a tr«: Consickr. for example. an inferential cognition in the form , "This is:a cal because it is a sugar maple." LLI us assume: that we can somehow daermine that :a pervading property of a sugar maple is "having branches and I U Strinkdlnn- (I"I) polnlJOIII UDI. propnIy spnIcinKo- 1M lest by WlIy of sltihJ-.,;~ /'"lw"pll1fli!U is ckIcribecI by Dtwmakini in VN only in Imni ofthc inlmna: (by .... y of ..... MJ_"idcna) ofrnomcnwi_ fmm cWlOIot. H( plopoKl Ull) , ~ , o.n -apcrimml in inlerprnation" ~I(by 1M pro<:cduu used in llul cue is applied to 1M inklCillX of"bcin&~ ueo:"rrom "bril18 a Ii~ ·(or, to...., Oo,1l'eamplc:. "beinsa tIft'"rrom "brin! a MIP maplc:"). I ~ SII:;nkdJnn'l apnimml 10 Ix fully MKYXAfuJ in IIx _ dw M bas c:orrrcdy ckpiaed dw I)'p( of promIun: duol ;, meanl 10 apply univuAlly 10 all in~ by ~. In o.ny caK. " " ' if ~ 'IO'CfT not: 10 ..:>cqK Sto:iohllncr', curriR, !he llJUmml p«tnIltd loCI far_ L.. td upon 1M p'¥hy-_MJ_ "twi118' ueo:" and -bri. a alp' ~"-wouId apply JUS/: as wdJlO -mommwillCll" and -aif~."

_',fti, .."","",i<

L16 SmnkdlMf (1"1) dni_ u,i.o proprny from briJ commtnll in I'VSV d PVI,'} (G:16.~17· 1).

SVA6HAVAI'RA TlBAN DHA: TH E BA SIS O F INFE R. ENCE

HI

_u.di" (f.ikh.uJinulttvtlj. On thi ~ In~it. 'Nt would verify the pervasion rd.uion in O Uf inlf:rt:ncc by me nonpelccpnon of Khaving branches and such· as a correct predicate of non-caa. We know that the range and vicissimdcs of our obscrv:l.tioru should have no impact On the outcome of this tCSt. so we JUSt c:u.mine thl'tt non-caa that happen to be at hand: a dog. a car, and a hooligan. We find that the causal characteristics necessary for predicating Kb""n".hes "nd such" " .... nOf per«ivt:d in "ny nf fh~ CL~ . _'" _ Ih L L~ conclude that the sugar maple in front of us is a cat. Obviously, something is flOt quite right here. The problem, of course, is that we have failed to cstablish that "having branchcs and such- is an -wenda!" or ptl'Vllding proptny (VJlipaltaJhamus), flOt only of a sugar maple (the evidence) , but also of a cat (the predicate). In other word.. before resling for the nonpcrception of th:tt per_ vading propt'ftY, ~ first need to know whether "having branches and such" is a pervading property of cats such that its prcdicability is relevant to deciding whether the items we tCSt are indeed contradictorics of a cat. But if Steinkdlner's account is COIT«t (and I think it is), then the procedure offered by Dh:umakini docs not give us any means of determining how to sdeo;t tho: pcJv.lding property for whkh 10 test. This is not terribly surprising. for the only way we could determine whether, for example, Khaving branchcs" is a pervading property of a cat is by using svabh4va
FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

prolnbly is /HIr1 of the identity relation. 1II it does nOi entirely solve our problem. Fint, we must determiot: which properties of any given individ· uaI arc: germane 10 the predicale in question; is hdght, for o:ample, relevant to being a me, and if so, how shon mighl a [rc:c be? This ilITlounl'S to the; rhorny problem of describing oactly what constitutes a worldly convenrion. &cond, if we N.sc: idrnlity wholJy on ronvefuion, we lose the OntOlogK:al appc:a1 implicit in Dharmaldni's nOlion of wabhivapr.lilNtIUiha. ln shon. the oerci5e of reasoning ITom the filet of "existence" to "momenG1rindS" would be reduced to a mere word-game ofleaming the accepted rules for applying these terms. and it would ignore the question of whether ,hose con~ntions are based upon the causal charaaerlsda of u1timardy rcaJ paniculars. On Dharmwni's view, to ignore (hat que:uion would be disastrous, for if WIlbhJllflpr.,ilNurtlJM is. as we shall $«. to act u the: warrant for the trustworthiness of inference. it must enable inference to lead us to things that we can use to accomplish our goals. It must, in other words, lead us to particuWs th:n arc capable of the telie functions that we seck. Thil brings us to the question of the instrumentality (prifPllilJJtl) of inference and ('\'en of JXrcqxion; why should we believe that either is a ltwrwonhy means of knowled;e? In the nexl chapler we will examine lU(;h quenio(U.

118 Ser:, !'or t:nmpk, IN: p"FIfII' fTom D1unnocora'l ~..pUcif.td by Sctinkdlntt !l991;n,sI), H~. DtwmotI2l1 dearly ~ IIw: ~ UAF of ganVlml>oN 10 be: 'v;,~ by .......~iookoo;c. n..: I". 5'" (NI)T:"" r~») mob (d. ..... ,nu... lMion by S.rinlrdlntr, ' ; N .);

,.ur;i.aI

1iItU,..

,Iu"

In ,hil rtprel, mppow in a pba abwIdanl in 1OfMOI'Iot..now. a nil 1i".u,.10 I dimwit who is I.Inhmilia "';,h m., lam (.,."whmt) "Ii'!fltl"t" and ma. Idh him, ",his ill trtt." When lIu, happmI. ,be- dim"';l, bccalJlC of hil aupidil)', bd~!Iu, me: IiIflUll'I tallnaa iuboa ICnWllie ICWK (" i",itUjb lhoe fUm "11ft." Thil dull iI ma. ;rllrod1.iUd by ,1w: 0!h0 fdLow 10 tIw: &a dut!hac o1I li~i ~ 10',

'r - ....... oerruon.tcc:o..... 1Or ~ ............ "1.-" .0 il . ~...t.e. kl.1ow

"1"htn- ~ no od\tf ~R\aIllic 12:aeJ, IUCh II mc: indica,oed f,''!fItI'" 011_ and ouch, for 1M appIic:arion ofllw: tam ' \Ift' 10 d'" indiridlUll""cad" iu mctt /" w~ nell u,be- .muncie CIUK. ' In ocher oronia. eM ImWldc CMIK ulhoe faa of pcMWM"

.u.yt::

incbrancNs and IUch wNo:h;' irw:luded in WOOiMXpI ."..,.." [",,,..,,•• ,Ji~ tJm iNiiM1i'!fltl~~'*'ltnwriiwnl",Ii~"..,M dJW)

t •

•

'"

..,.,. iii uuU ....~m.;~ __"'''; ~ ";".itvJlf.MIJ"l; f iii ..~ ~ttw"'''''.i i", .,q..,.,lkIhIrr ,_~", ~ ,.;",itth·

..

.., ..... oJ.

~~ ...._,.

I ..". ,. "~_".'!'

tIi_", if;"";",.", if]~ .

..."'"......

11i':'4, .,.., ' I" ,

4 Instrumentality: Justifying

the Sources of Knowledge

S

O FA. WI! HAVE EXAM INED some

issues in Dhannakini's ontology by way of his views on instru~nw objttts (pr(l"'~); ~ have also discussed flNfbhlvaprmibantihll as the basis for his theory of infttena:. In this chaplet, we will inquire imo the fou.mbrioru o f Dh:umaldni', epistemology. More specifically, w.! shall examine what it is mat justifies the claim that perception and inference arc each 2n instrurncm of knowtrogc (p1'ltmJity). In the language of PrlIImlQa Theory, this is Ibe question of ~i nstrumcntalii}'· {pr4m4!fJ4}, an issue that Pr.tmil).a Theorists generally tmu as a tOp ic: of discw.sion in and ofirsclf. It a mc:crru flOl the workings of an a1legN instrument of knowl«l~ it a pt."lCq)tion. an in~nce. the smsc faculties, a sacred tal, or ~me other candidate-Oul r.athcr what it is mal ;wrifies the d.ai.m WI one or another of th~ is ind~ an itutrurncnt of knowledge. To introduce ,he ccmnl iSliues al st3kc in discourse on

irut.nunmtaliry {pri'm4tryrt}. YooT will first discuss some critical problems of rransl.:uion. I.n doing 50, we will darify thc manner in which Dharmakini's theory of innrumcnrality is tied to his conception of the uhinutc goa.! of Buddhist pracrio:. 1bc remncc ofDharnu.lcirti'l ulrimatc pi wililcad Ul to thc problem of a tttming circularity in Dhannakirtj'l theory of imlNmen tality, which in tum will prompr Ul IO consider thc implicitly axiological contat o rOharmakini'1 thought. With aU thac ill$ua; in h;md, we will then assay a dOSt: analysis ofDharnu.lcirti's theory of ilUtrumcnraiit)' it5c1f.

4. J PrirniU)ya

aJ

*'mrrummtll/i'Y "

AJ mentioned previously. l u:uulalc prilm4!,1'l as "ilUtru mcntality" 50 as fa indiatc that al1 discussions of prilm4'.'~ mUll take account of Ihc SaNkrit U)

11.4

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

grammatical concerns that frame thili discourse across all South Asian tra· didons. Specifically. Pramil)a Theorists across all mditions recognize thai the gnmmatK:al fo rm of the word prllmi!", rinstrumcnl of knowledWt) ili indicati~ of an inslrument (lAr.!U) in a verbal action. For aample. in the sentence. '" cut Ihe tree with an axe," the rerm "axe" would be in the instrumental case in Sanskrit. Liktwisc. Prami!:,a TheoriSts universally unlkrst:lnd the issue of prtlm4!'y. as mated to the claim that the thing in question- the sense faculties. scriprurc, an act of inferell«. or some other candidate-is the instrument (prtlm41J11) in an act of knowing (,rlltd or pl'ltmili). Thus. when arguing for tht prtlfNi!'J4 of one or another candKbte, these philosophers ineviably rum to the quesbon of whether thai candidate manifests the propenies of a grammatK:al instrument. In extended discw:· sions on prtlm4!fYt1. (hili concern Ic:a
noUn&!hat C¥C:n

lhe M J~

for wbom the yunmaial instrummwity of a /N~ ia I tb«wmc.l inconvmimce. wiU KiIIdi"" .'I'W,*/Uin 1nc.ICfIN. Stc, lOt cwnpk, Sv (-"*ta!I): ,,;,.utlll_tnlf' ....".., "'-/UIf' MM /,.,.~ Plnhuitathimikl (....,."..,..-iUr...-,6) 0(M"Q1MnU< . ;",i rwlf' !",,.jW; Ur.~,*".". ".",.,~ wuJ~ ......!U',. iii I '"' •.._ ~

•

....

... ·,IL·...· _ M .J.., ..L.iJw. 0; ' , •

~.IL;

. .... iii,;

~ ...

, _T_ _ -•

~.

IN ST RUMENTALITY: J UST IFYIN G THE SOU RC ES O f KNOWLEDGE

11.5

Scholarly communiria tend to dtvdop terminol~ habits, and the nev.- tr2nsl:.u ion of p,im.i!fYll as - instrumentality" may not be well received by some specialisu. One objection might simply be that the term is unfamiliar, but on my viev.-, the term', unf:uniliarity speaks strongly in its favor. My poim is mal the gr:ammatica1 fnme in which we encoumer discussions of primli!'JIl is unique to South Asian thinkers working in Sanskrit. Hentt, in W2)1S mat we may nor immediardy recognize. PnmiQa Theorists deploy arguments about familiar issua such as justification, truth, and knowledge in a manner that, from the perspective of Euroarnerican traditions, creates nev.- possibiliria for working through old problems-at the very least we will find opportUniries to become more acutely aware of our own peculiarities in framing such issues. If instead we choose a more fam iliar term 5u ch :as ~tnlth " or ·V2l i di ry~ to tr:anslut.: priimti!,J4. rh~ ~~ihilirirs 2nd opponunilies. which arise fro m the very unfamiliarity of me context. will p rove~. tndttd. we may instead decide that Saum Asian thinkers were simply nther confused about -truth" or ·validity" and dismiss their efforts as unwonhy of serious consideration. The twO terms I have JUSt mendoned-"(ruth" and · validity"- have been propo»ed and frequentl y used :u tr:lnJi,u .ioru of !mim.~J"'. ~ their particubr inadequacit.:5:Kid 5ignific:anuy to me need for an :dtemacive Ir:InS_

bcion. One obvious problem wim the translation " tru(h~ is that. as Tillemans has noted. Dharmakini himself does not offer any clar theory of truth; Dharma1Un i's disclWion of !,4m4?1J" is more closely :dlied with questions of jusrificadon. and such may well be the C2$C: for most Pf'2II1i1)a lne:oriSts.1 But me lack of a cleu-cut meory of [ruth is a relatively minor w ue comp:iud [0 o lher problem, Ihllt we confrO nt w hen ~ tr:an,la lc p,imd'!Jl' as "truth." For e::umple. according to:ill Buddhist Pnmil)a The:orists, we can identify many cognitions mat we would consider "true." and ytt those same cognitions would nor be considCTC:d insrrumcnu of knowIedge V"llmR{IIlS) . For e::umple. a correct pcrttptu:U judgment is "truc" in that its contents correspond [ 0 some actual stue of affairs in the world. Nevenhel~.

we will ue II\;tI , uch

:I.

cogni tio n i, ~':l.n instrument of

knowledge: fO r Dharmakini; hentt, iI manifests "truth":1.$ correspondentt, but not "truth" as p,imd!')d.l Moreover, on Dharmakini's peculiar view of 2 rtlkmans (1199:0-' 1).

) I am rderrins 10 the: notion of a -ddinitM dnmninalion following upon a punjilion"

r,"""I!J!b-"''''''''''mktlJtl}. _tllm I wtU!De1lSl

In JOInt.:

detail below (1.I7fl).

II U worm

noOng dUI, wben DlwmaIrJni"1 lhnMy of jilfttplion il CDI\SfNtd in ImtU of Epmnnic

l..tli

fO U NDATION S Of DHAL'.IAKJRTrS PH ILOSOP H Y

yogic percq nion (yofiprlltytl*",), the content of some yogic cognitions aTC' false in that their contents aTC' no mort Mtrue" th:tn a hallucination. NeveTIheles.s, such cognido ns ti4 havC' prlimli1JJIl bec:all5C' they pl"C'dictably lead to desirC'd outcomes.' In anorhC'Tcoma l, Dharmakirti discusses IhC' well known position mal, in IhC' case of SC'Ilsory percrption, Ihe sensory organ is the instrument of knowlC"d~ {prmnfi'JA}, and as such, it has prlimll,!J4. Dharmoorti rC'jecu this pmilion. but hC' is obligC"d to takC' it seriously bec2use it is a plausible approach 10 the issue of prlimll'.'JIl. Can We". however, plausibly maimain that a sensory organ has Mtruth -? How can a ph)'$leal object rhat does nOI haVe" anything like a propositional or senll:nrial u ructUTC' be" considcrC"d eitheT"true" or "faIse-? Clearly. then. We" run the risk of considerable confusion when We" translatC' pnl1nl1'!J1l as "(fUm.'" When v.'C' tum to "validity: anomer common translation for pramli!lJll. we encounter many of the same problems. On this translation. a pramR'JA is a "valid cognition" or "means of valid cognition," and although the C'X:llct meaning of "vaHd" here is nol of'ttn cl.ariflC"d. in most cases "validity" in pan means "vcridic:aJity." Again. in the case of a percq>lual judgment. we 'WOuld think thai "validity" should apply: if I sec Ihe color blue, and on the basis of that pcTCq)tu:li CO ntCn! I form the judgment. "that is blue: should we not consider this judgment "valid"? Even though it SC'tms ve:ridical in itself, fo r Dharmaldrti that judgment is nelt "valid " bec2use il is n OI a prllm4'JA' O n the other hand. an adept fJotin) can induce a mental perception in which he dirKtly intuits Ihe conc~pl of impermanence. bur since the

Idnlitrn. M I>(Ja pl:K.n is "mJe: in dw Ihty arc all aff~ by the "internal distortion" (."ury.,tn.). ~ the coriti.-.: ~ in puapl:ual """ilion appall moneousIy 10 ~ Q tcmal h~ PVJ,lS~>,11. For a lre~unen l of ,uc.h iuua in rd~>on etp«ially 10 Kamalatila', appropNtion ofDturmUini', Ihc-o:wy, _ Funayun.-a (Im1 .

.( This up«I oiDtwnWdni'J Ihrofy of yosk per«pl'ion (ill found al PVJ.lII-lI6) Iw ra' 10 be adeqlUld y diKwKd. TIw: Uy _ ilNJ.l1S: -rhnd'orr. mUlo whid!. On( rnrdia. ti..-dy conditioN onacIf, wbnhc. i, be real or ",nreal. will ~I in a c:ku. I'IOnon to d.t:i. phenomnW col'llmu alone. yocic pcrorpcionI on.. M(>IC _ dy. Woo {zooJ1 loucha on thc:K i _

",rue::

,Acrordlns 10~. the nodon lhal lhe

ImJ(

facultkI:on: th=ueivu ,.._~

is raiJed by Dhannakirti II PV:t..J (PVP:Jb7ff, I « bdow. n.7s).

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUST l fY1NC THE SOU ftCES O F KNO WLEDGE

117

concept Mimpcrmanencc" docs nOltruly ain, the phenomenal content of his vision is no more "valid" than an obsessro lover's lullucinalion of his belovtd. Yet a JOti" 5.sttmingly hallucinatory experience ofim(,(rmanence is indeed a p r.m4'!4. and if ~ use the (erm "valid" to refer to such cogni. tions, then it will be valid. And finally, in the CUI! of a sense organ, what could il possibly mean 10 say that, ror example, one', ocular faculty is "valid" ~

11ua, the traruiation of primli!'JIf:lS "validity" r.liscs many of the wne problems :lS "mlm," in m :1I it tOO eqwtcs veridicality with prim4~' A far

greater problem, however, confronu the ~ or "validity" in this context: it is a term already in US(: among Eutoamcrican philosophers, and irs techni· cal meaning is such thai we create tremendous confusion when we employ il :IS a mrulation of priM4!l)'4. In irs philosophical usage. "validity" refm almost exclusively to the structUre or an argument whereby trum is always, p~rved. Most commonly, philosophm speak of deducrivt arguments:lS Mvalid" in thai, if the premises arc trut , the conclusion must be true. In the conrt:J:t of Euroamcrican philosophy, validity is thus wholly divorced from contenl, and an argument can therefore be l/fI/Ulin terms ofiu muaurc but "1UD,,nJin (erms of its content. This distinction clearly will I10t do for any thMty of inference (1l""nuiNl}. how could one have an unsound but v:alid .""nuitui The matter is even worse in the CUI! or perception. Given the aforementioned and widespread wage of "valid" among contemporary philosophers in me academy, the notion of "va.!id perception" is literally norucnse:. Indeed, talk about "valid pcteqKion" is probably sufficient in iadf to end any comparative philosophical endeavors, in that the: phrase 6 Of (:ou.w. tht ~ ' vaIid- doa oftU KlInt tmlpQ", (and vny b.>d) puN when _ con· Jidc:r dx nocioo mat t~ ICNC orpna Ihctmd_ can pbu.ibly ~ CDNItufti as In,u>:W' if I haft ClwactI and .... um., hai.., u",~, my cyc:s ...., invalid bn:::t.u. I am an innlid.. If I COfpIC IMdICfUC orpm dx)' ~ would no!: be: valid. Whr. lkaUK they would Ju,¥I: paMCd theil expiration date. 7 Sec Porttr

(,,--.,,.6). wIxte 1x .........1u:

".,u /i.e:., an insuncr oi, copUOOn for wt.ich I ~ ill tht inlllUnx'lI) may noo: c:ormpoad...;m tIw llatlln of thinp {it ill -CIDftIp"ubk.n1h nn:w," as MolwlI), ~ il). "WIxdw:r or noc ,,.,u!'J'6 is c:onfincd in ics appIiallion 10 l~fOQKI wt.ich mribuu: 10 theil colllmt propmia which an ob;«t COI lcspolldin& 10 mat con· mil amWIy Iw II noo: I mat'CI"ofthtddinition of ~ {u il ;,Wcm 10 bc: I mal · ler of !he dcliniUon of ·,.... th· in WQlmI eo(I\~II}. bul corutirulft ram.:r fiuthn dxoty aboul .,J,fd, rwarmesK:I Alisf'y 1M putpolCl motiYlri"l'Ixm. • •• I

N~

cJ lim,," lhcoty .....kh r
118

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAItM .... "'IRTI'S PHILOSO PHY

presents such a terminological mismuch that one might wrongly believe it impossible to find common ground on fUndamental issues of epislemology. If ~ think il valuable to make the works of Pl'lU1lina Theorists available within an expanded notion of whal one mighl profitably study in a department of philosophy, then dearly "validity" is nOI a useful translation of prlmi!'JIIL And for the wm reason, "valid cognition," "means of valid cognition," and other such chom are also unhelpful n~nslati ons of prilmi!'JL The problems cited above may in Ihemsclvcs be sufficienl to warnnt the translation of prlm4!,J'I as "instrumentality," for in doing so one at least avoids the most obvious difficulties associated with "validity" or "truth," especially the mistaken equation of primi!'J4 with veridia.lity. But following Karl Potler, l would funher suggest that "instrumentality" captures an important component of the priimA!']II debate mat ohen escapes attention. In a bid to ":accommodate wh~1 all Indian systems ... can agr« on as a meaning for prinui?tJ4." Potier has argued mar a central element must be the notion of purpose. On Potter's analysis. a chMaCter1stic of any cognition thai has prtlnui!']ll is that it apprehends an object in accordance with the purpose that motivatC'$ me cognition.' With this analysis in hand, POllet proposes thar in every context. Buddhist or nOl, ~ translate priim4!'ftl as "workability," a lerm inspirM by the pragmatism of William James. In choosing this translation, Poner may ~Il be dcliber.udy overstating the case in a rhetorical attempl to counter the frequent usc of "lTUlh" for prtlm4!,ya. [n a less polemical conto::t. we might judge thaI the blatanl pragmatism implied by ·workability" stac.ks the deck against those theorists, such as the Mimiquakas, who tis maintain that p,Im4!'J1' musl enrail veridia.liry. Likewise, "workability" does not elicit the peculiarities of Ihe

of....nnw

8 Ponei' ill ~ primarily with the question u\lm ill. r.. ' pry <»ndirion for a copi.ion [() I,c, • ,,..,,,., i.~.. the reruh of the application of I , ......'!"'- H~ noIQ (' ~)1I1.

To d«i.c:k ..Mthn uum ill •

condirion lOr an a.....-.rmeM [() I,c, a, ...... OM m.... ardUIIy IWHI the rdation whid! a fN"" mwr beu 10 iu OXItcn •. W~.nnt a .cU.ioo. R.. whid! holds bd"cu. any ,rlI1Nland iu CDntcnl,' rdcion which can Iw admiutd by C'<'n'f Indian phi~ to Idd bduuo, a".,uand iu «>nlfti. ~ ­ kfII of the pouDc:ubr theory M 01" any od>cr Indian philotopher prop
anal,.,..

nealAl)'

or

UU","C 10 repracnr «>nl<:flt and 10 "'PI_III the cosniOOn {i.~.. j /U"'" "'mcm!hal Rbe Khmwized UUII (I~}n): R iff J apprehe...... (Ii•• " _ ..to. 0... 1 C in o.cc<>rdaac.

J mor;"ltd J.

-i.n

iudi. POIIH

,h. P"o-poH 'M'

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

229

;j;UIlmatical is~ue~ that are the typical poi~t of ~epar:ure for extended dislttssions on prama1}ya. Nevertheless, Potter s baslc pomt should not be lost: i~1fpose does indeed playa significant role in all theories of priimii1}ya. ence , with both the notion of purpose and the importance of grammat~ concerns in mind, we will translate priimii1}ya as "instrumentality"m~t which warrants the claim that perception, inference, or some other ~didate is an instrument of knowledge or pramii1}a.

a

c:;purpose and Instrumentality ~When

we focus on the role that purpose plays in discourse on instrumen;taIity, we are in effect asserting that any instrument of knowledge must be ~good for something"-it must contribute to the attainment of the goal ;iUat one seeks. As such, an instrument of knowledge occurs in the context ~fa cognizer's desire to accomplish the human purposes of obtaining the ~esirable and avoiding the undesirable. 9 In speaking of instrumentality, lframana Theorists often frame their discussion in terms of a general notion ~f mu~dane purposes. For example, in discussions of inference, one ubiq~aitous example is the inferential knowledge of fire gained when the per~eption of that fire's smoke is adduced as evidence. And when discussing ire distinction between perception and perceptual illusion, Pramal).a The~rists frequently cite the mistaken belief that one is seeing water when one ~~in fact seeing a mirage. The purposes suggested by these and other such ~'xamples are clearly mundane: to obtain warmth, to slake thirst, and so :~n. Buddhist thinkers in particular present their arguments for what con~titutes instrumentality almost uniquely in relation to these and other such Jnundane goals. ~, Nevertheless, for Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike, discussions of pur~bse in general presuppose an overriding concern with a specific type of purpose: namely, the ultimate purpose or goal whose obtainment is meant ~o result from the proper practice of a tradition's "path" (marga).!O If part ijf what one means by instrumentality is that an instrument of knowledge i!£-<;,>

;9 In Dharmakirti's work, rhis notion is best illustrated by rhe metaphor of rhe eunuch (see :!lVI.2IO-2II and PVSV ad cit.; translated below, 3IO). See also the discussion of purpose in ,fhapter I (45ff). ;to The highest goal attained through such spiritual practices is variously described by terms §uch as mok!a ("liberation"), naifreyasa ("rhe highest good"), svarga ("heaven") and so on. See the fine study by Chaltravarrhi Ram-Prasad (200I) for details.

l}O

FOU NDATIONS OF D HARMAKUtTn PHILOSOPHY

must be -good for something,~ one pre$umably will show a sp«ial concern for verifying the instrumenta.l ity of an alleged instrument of knowledge that is meant to be good fOr the obt:linmcnt of ooc's highest purp
oo;cas

With the IrmI " mnOi'C- DlwmakJoi is: rmn-iII(I: to m-, obj«u lhat, .kilo: nO!' paQ:pt;. bIc. arcamtNblc to bcin&known mlOlJ!;h ir.f~ldia. ~ob;ecuuc known ' empiricaly" in that ouch infttmce. my diRCUy 01' indit«lly on the n'idma: of lhe ICNCS; hma:. such infnrncft 0oprr.ilt; by the 10m. of ~ rhinp' (~~ In (Qfllrwl:. &II "atmndy rnnotr" ~ U 0 - 1....1 is -tnnwmpiric:aJ. - in d,," it ~nOI' be known throosh either pth:tpc:ion 01' infermce. S« o..ryfuI (Im:l9S) and liIlemans (Im:1I--}1) fOr rurthtt diIaas&ions. Wr will w.., up lhe;- of lCrip"raJ inltlma: in the

nest...rnon.

12 OM obviow aampk of Dlutll1lllorti·, ~ roncaninl cauin aJp«U of bud·

dhabood u found in his S4""1l4~ whtt~ his atzumml fWftwally oompdt him to claim thai the ~'.knowIcdgc: iI'i~' "'SIa). 13 Sec. fOr aampk, Tl1kmant (I99P9). Conca-nins the norion thai the dnailed wotltinp of karma U1: nanaanpirical, ~n (JOOI:J70) R«Irdo mil ...,I· known ftIlC !'mm dw ~,,;.w.-.,. of VNUbandhU: "The toUlity o( 1M Q~ &alII"" of;ll _ . pcacodt fathn 'l qc U nOI' knowIbk cxcqM by &II omnilc:icnt onc. IOc- lhe knowIcdfr of dw ill tJw,

,......... ..t .......~.• {AK8h

un, _ , , - , . . ........!'>""" .....,.. ~rJ'?'~~~ 1ti~_" I"

~,. I

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTI FYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLE DGE

131

empirical entities. whether those t'fuities be in the form of an ultimate PUIpose or some: other enci()' whose existence' is requimd by tht: procedures or practices one is to follow in orot:r to obwn ritat u1tim,ue goal. At the same tirnc:. Pr:unil:'a 1beorisa dearly fed that they must dt:monstrate how it is that Wt: an know thai such tranKmpiriaJ entities aist; in other words, the traditions engaged in this style of di.scoulK argue for some instrument of Icnowit:dge (pranUtwJthat will mabie ordinary pmons to confirm (or deny) that such trarucmpirical entities exist. The paradigmatic form of such an instrument is lruti or .ita""" both of which Wt: may refer to as "scripture."

At the risk of tl'ivializing the notion o( scripture. let w alee a mundane oample in order to underst:md the special relevance of argumenu about insuumentaii(), in the: COntOt of claims that scripture an ~ as an instrument of knowledge (or tl1uuempirical objcca. For the purpoKS of our aamplt:, let us suppo~ that we art: standing in a v:tlley, and that I have a spttial instrument ofknowledgc-4 pOlirof digitally enhanced videogr'aphic binoculars. We arc interested 10 know ..... hat might be on the dinant top of the motlnrain abovr. and poinling Ih", binoculars upw:ard, I rcpon tbat I clearly sec an enormous purple house. You art doubtful, since the mounWntOp secms too remote for any houses, and in any case, purple seems an unlikely color. Spurred on by doubt. you ask for mort derail. I then describe circular windows, triangular doors, a roof made of crysal, and other such oddities, aU of which I can clearly sec in the video image pracnred to me by w binoculan. You :lR nill lk~cical , bul as long as I d~riM ~tures that arc al kasl pouibk (even if improbable), you cannot definitively reject what I claim 10 sec and know. Suppose funher that you gain access to my instrument of knowlcdge-I give you the binoculars-and then you also dearly Itt Ihest: slnnge sigha on the mountaintop. Wilhout the binoculan, tht: peak is tOO f.u- away to make any definitive judgmenl. u cept for .. he binoculars th~mSl!Iw:s. you h~ ~ no way to vrrify whal t~ binocubn show you, and the rugg~ [t:rrain prevents any attempt al climbing doser. If you wish to doubt: Ihe dear video image presented by the binoculars, your only recourse is to ask: are these: digial binoculars rdiable? Migln they have been tampered with in some fashion ? Has me software been manipulated to crcue strange dist~ t sighl$? The point, in any case, is ,hal if the dan (ha( __ p in from (hiJ i nnrum~( ofknowlM~ ato" to ~ qu~rionM . our sole rccourv is to aamiM the rdiabili(), of that instrument itself.

232

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Our example illustrates an important shift that occurs when Pramana Theorists take scripture as a means to gain knowledge about transempiri~al entities. In the (;ase of empirical entities, one can always resort to other perceptions and inferences to confirm (or reject) the alleged knowledge gained from some supposed perception or inference. One can always resort to other perceptions and inferences because Prama.r:a Theorists clearly expect that any empirically knowable object should be amenable to many different acts of perception or inference: for them, it would be anomalous indeed to claim that, for example, an object is generally perceptible (d.rfya) and yet known through only one act of perception, or only in the perceptions of one person. But an appeal to scripture as an instrument of knowledge amounts to the claim that there is but one instrument of knowledge-the scripture in question-that will give one access to the transempirical entities in question. And since we can neither confirm nor deny the scripture's claims about the transempirical, our only way to contest those claims is to contest the reliability of the scripture. To return to our example, if we are joined by fifty other observers in the valley, and if I claim to see with my own eyes some house in the distance, each of those fifty persons can test my claim through an act of perception unique to each person. But if I claim to see the house only through our one set of special binoculars, my claim can be tested only by passing the binoculars around, which may not be much of a test at all. And of course, PramaIJ-a Theorists were not contending with just one scripture-each tradition had its own scripture (or body of scriptures) that presented its own version of the transempirical. Adding these competing scriptures to the mix is akin to finding other binoculars that we might use. In lieu of just one pair of binoculars, we would now have five or six, but each set of binoculars presents a different (or even incommensurate) picture of the scene on the mountaintop. Although our example may be crude, it has the advantage of presenting in rather stark terms the issues that Pramal).a Theorists face in sorting out the competing claims about the transempirical that they encounter in the various scriptures or scriptural traditions of South Asia. Since each tradition's ultimate purposes focus on transempirical goals, the Prama.r:a Theorists in each tradition cannot simply ignore scriptural disparity because scripture alone gives ordinary persons access to the trans empirical. To ignore the competing claims of scripture would be to ignore one's highest purpose or goal. And since the scriptures provide the sole access to the transempirical, when thinkers from different traditions debate the transempirical, they cannot overtly begin with the assumption that any given scrip-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

233

"e is true. Otherwise, debate would be reduced to tautological assertion. 14 ce, although Pramal}a Theorists argue directly about the claims made ripture, they focus most of the debate about scripture on the question ." strumentality: what is it that makes any scripture an instrument of ",ledge? And the style of argument employed across traditions tends to ssuch debates on one critical criterion of instrumentality: the origin of ipture. In brief, one aims to show that the content of one's scripture is ble because its source is flawless. examining this issue, Pramal}a Theorists prior to DharmakIrti employ general strategies that are well known in this style of discourse. First, may argue that a scripture is the "speech of a credible person" viida), and as such, its instrumentality is derived from the extraordiqualities that make that person credible (apta), Second, one may argue a scripture is eternal and not of human origin (apauru!eya); its instrutality is somehow innate to it. Of these two options, most Pramal}a rists, including Buddhists, follow the former option, and this in turn s two questions: is it possible for a person to be or become "credible"? second, can we determine that a specific person is indeed credible? makIrti's own answers to these questions are important because they his apparent attempt to ground instrumentality in a seemingly cirappeal to the Buddha's credibility.

academic study of Buddhist Pramal}a Theory, some scholars have that DharmakIrti's notion of instrumentality rests ultimately on of circularity. Specifically, in arguing for the instrumentality of perand inference, DharmakIrti appears to make an appeal to the of the knowledge derived from reading or listening to the a "credible person," namely, the Buddha. It is this appeal that leads which in its most general and trenchant form, is as follows: 15

attitude toward scripture in debate is a recurring theme in PV4 (see TilleOf particular interest are two passages: PV4. 48 (Tillemans 200078-79; see comments thereon) and the related discussion of iiptatava (Tillemans ~U~U"Llily

sketched here is the most defensible version of a set of positions initially by Nagatomi (1959) and Vetter (1964); for a clear summary of their actual positions, (1999). Hayes' version of circularity (1984), while loosely resembling that of

1}4

FOUNDATION S O F OHARMAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

As innrumenlS afknawledgc, pc:rcq}[ian and infe~nce allow us to demanstrate that the Buddha has certain CJ:uaordinary qualiries. Since he has those qualities. he is c~ible (,IPll1). Since he is credible, his teachings can tx used as a source of instrumental knowledge. Since his teachings arc a source of instrumental knowledge. we can usc Ihem 10 demonsuale thaI perception and inference a.rc instrumenu of knowledg.:. This cird.: moves from th.: instrumentality of perception and inft:rtnc.: as im:futable evidence (E) for the credibility (0 of the Buddha., and thar credibility then justifies th.: iluuumentality of his teachings l..ik1N'~, the teachings themselves justify the instru!mntality of perception and inference, but these arc already adduced. as evidence (E) far the Buddha's credibility. As a matt.:r of convenience, let us ~fer to mil argumeDl as the -ECTE- circle. It should tx dear thar. in terms of th.: ('YI() questions about credibility !mntioned a~, the ECTE circle ~uires an affirmariv.: a.JUWeJ to bom. That is, on.: must affirm that it is ind«d passibl.: to obtain th.: extraordinary qualities fhat make a penon crc
m.

He has becom.: an instrument of knowlcdgc. and inl':Ol on th.: weal af the world. he is the tcacher. the SlIltllll. the protcctor. Bowing to him. I will collect h~ in this text my theories scattered in various works 50 as (0 establish the instruments of know\~. "

Naplomi and Vmrr. it koo rdcnnllOr our purpoMS. Smnkdl"" (I~l) laler mlen~ and arJII"d for Veun's petition. bul lit: Iw N.naoplcd (Slonkdlner 100) for a IUbdcr vnsion 01 circularilY I~I we wiD dilaua bdow. 16 I'S ( ••OJ d . H.....n a,), , _ ~' Ao';"".1'-~.~':W ,-':W~ u.- nop"".1'- ~.., I

, ..,,"~.,',/,J¥ j ~dt ~.~ luNtJt-

",,..,uJ ooluw/! /.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING n-tE SOURCES O F KN OWLEDG E

1}S

Variow interprctert ancienl and modem have shown mal Dharmakini devotes the enlirc PrIlINi~i dupter of his PralNi!",wimika to the unpaclcing of Ihis verse. Specifically. the chapter is structured so as to dcmonstratcmat me Buddha is wonhyofthc primV)' epithet in Digniga's praise-that is, Ihe Buddha can be correctly praised as Mone who has become an innrumenl of knowlcdge (praml'Jllbhiiu). Dharmakini ckmonnrates lhal the 8uddtu is wormy of this prinury epithet by arguing that he is also correctly described through the four subsidiary epithets in lhe vcm: "he who is iment on the weal of the worid (ja:adJhiui,in), Mlhe tcachcr- (ldsrr), "the one who has weU underttood" (suKau), and "the protector" (tAyin). 11 We need. not address thr details of dUs inuicate argumrm, but we should note that after he has argued that the Buddha is indeed. WOf* thy of the subordinate epithetS. Dhannakirti concludes with a set of state* menu that might easily suggest ECTE circularity: M

M

of compassion (da,.) he scues whal is best (for his lislenert), and through his knowledge (jMnll) he SlII)'S what is lrue. And since he is imrm (llbhiyDxalldnl) upon staring th,u which is bcsl and true :along with Ihr m~5 10 realitc it. he is an innrumrnt of knowledge. Hr is praised as an instrument of knowledge in thaI his tcaching is of thaI kind, and thr purpose of praising him in that ruhion is 10 establish the nature of the instrumenu of knowledge through mat tcaching." OUI

I.n relation 10 Ihe notion mat me Buddha is Monr who has become instrument of knowIMW"" tpram4!",hhii14). rhl': comml':nr.ubl rl":ldirion u:nl':f:ally interprets these lines as simply rescuing Ihe long argument Ihrough the four epithcu thai precedes this VCt5C. That is, (I) our of his compassion (44,.), rhr Buddha "sedcs the wc:aI of the world,- and (1) because ofhu knowledge {jfi4IUl)conccrning what i.s lrue, he is "One who has wdl under* srood," Since (J) he rcaches nOI only that truth, but also a means (wihalUl) 10 realiu il. he is the -reacher. and sinu (4) hr i~ rffortfuJ (ahhiyofIlIN!lITt) in that taSk, he is me MProtector" (Iayin;' And thw, as one who has these M

17 Set- T.tlenw1s and Irwni (1916) and FmICO (1m) lOr diKl ·qioos of 1M IClUCTUre or ,he Pr.tfIJ/WI;,uJ,i duPlu. 18 PV"L"'a-"')C

~my.""""'rw- ~'!'

M . M _ ... u _~~ .... -t"":,,

..

JIfUII4IlIItI,,"'~" / M~"~.muis ";,,,' ,(*"" f~

236

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

four qualities-compassionate, knowledgeable, informative and effortful_ the Buddha is. therefore one who has become an instrument of knowledge

(pramatzabhuta). How might these statements lead us to ECTE circularity? First, following Franco, we interpret the term pramatzabhuta ("one who has hecome an instrument of knowledge") as a synonym of apta ("credible person"). We would certainly be within our rights to make this interpretation; indeed, it is difficult to imagine why DharmakIrti's contemporaries would not themselves immediately see his use of pramatzabhuta as a reference to credibility.19 Thus, the argument by way of the four epithets becomes an argument about the qualities tha~ make the Buddha credible. And once we are in the context of credibility, we are de facto concerned with the instrumentality of the Buddha's teaching. What role does the teaching play here? The verse maintains that through the teaching (upadefatap), we establish that perception and inference are instrumental. And what is the relevance of perception and inference? The verse is not explicit in this point, but it is clear that, on DharmakIrti's view, an acceptable and convincing argument must employ instruments of knowledge as its warrants. Hence, presumably we accept the long argument concerning the four epithets because it proceeds through a rigorous application of perception and inference. In short, the statements that we have just cited seems to invoke an ECTE circle: 20 Using perception and inference, the long preceding argument has demonstrated that the Buddha has four extraordinary qualities, and since he has those qualities, he is an instrument of knowledge-that is, he is credible (apta). Moreover, we praise him as an instrument of knowledge precisely so as to demon-

19 Franco (1997:29) offers a convincing comparison on Dharmakirri's approach to

pramiirtabhuta and Vatsyayana's discussion of iiptatva. Certainly, it seems that the characteristics evoked by the four subsidiary epithets resemble in significant ways the extraordinary qualities that, for Vatsyayana, constitute credibility. See also Silk (2002). 20 We should note here that the question of whether the Buddha is an instrument of know1edge literally or only metaphorically actually makes litde difference to the issue of circularity. I have earlier suggested (1999) that the literal interpretation of the epithet pramiirtabhuta is highly problematic, at least on the interpretation of the earliest commentators, and Krasser's work (2001) strongly supports this conclusion. Nevertheless, the key issue here is whether the term pramiiflabhuta should be taken as essentially synonymous with iipta. I think that it must be.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIfYING THE SOUII. CES Of KNOWLEDGE

1}7

ur.ne that his teachings a~ also inSifumenw, and we usc the teachings ro establish th:u pc:lctption and infercnct ;lie insrrumen" ofknowledge. And of c.ounc, it is pnupcion and inkrroc:c dut have allowed us to demonsu':lte in the previous argument tb,l[ the Buddha h:u the extraordinary qualities in question. If we acupt this tCStalcmcnt of the Yenc:s that conclude Dharmakini's argument for the Buddha as prllmd!fAbhiitA, we obviously mwt accept dut his argument evinces EcrE circulariry. And on my view, any straightforw:ud rnding of the statements in question willicad 10 some venion of an ECfE argument!' Henct, if we:uf: 10 avoid this circulariry, we musl suggCSt how we an read those ltaternenu in a manner that is not nraightforw:ud. and we must likewise provide sufficient grounds for doing so. We an accomplish both of these taSks by anending 10 [he wider conlC'Xt that informs these vcnc:s and the long argument mat they conclude. To suggest bowwc might read the verses in a manner that is not circular, we an rely on Franco's interpfC1ation: 21 Fnnm (Im:6sj arpa; apinst the ima ptt......... of the ¥aX • roottd in • drwbr ~ As a lnllU't offXt, the immed.i.alt mmco!! of Iht vnx does ncx Mlppon Vmer', and

N.-ni', inwpetcac>oo [~. Iha, doc~. 1>0:,., it; rimJ1uJ ......,,'C OharmaI
ncx tha • ....,.. an.-ilid bea..... ofhim. Nor doa thecommmwOf$' in.~ cion Juppor1 Vetter', or Nap-Iomi', h)'JlOthcxs, (Of none: of OIwnulr..ini', commml1lon dnccu hat I~ ciK,,]..uil)' ptrccivN by Vmcr or !he: rmproO,y daiJMd by Nap.omi. Whik K mly be lfIK dIa,.he vnx (which it; aawIJy a ¥ftX and a IWf) is not twapribk w doc vrniono of rin:uWi1)' "'M MN by Nac;o.omi and Vmcr. it iI diffi..."".o ckfmd >ipinn doc rirculuinsm,eed by ~ flC! that.he: Bud· diu. who if; • Cftdible ",",.non.,. 0 . . . uch .......- . .....d ........ (cf. Fnnco '?99:U). And of couno:, we t.."" alrady UIIed paupeion.nd infcmKo"'o dcmonan.~ that.he: Buddha iI . CRdibk ",,!hori'1 on web m.lRcrL FitWly, while Iht tonuncntaton do not mention any such rircubril)', docU "lena on the maLler rnit;:hl Jimply Ix an 1.1Cftlp! 10 avoid an intnaabk dauc. Hmot, 1douIx Wolwe CIIl diam;' d..- amninsIY circu1u Irpmcn. Jtl!F'Ie.t by the _ illS! on the '-is of iu QOr\. ICIII alone. InckaL if anyt/llilfi. iNsmum IS ....,.. oocur " the end of an argLimml for o:ht Bod· dha', e'Nibilil)' at "._~u.,., the ¥ftX'. immcdi.atr to,lIa' lUpp<'lru cirrulu ..p ........ loMcMl, .. f.1Ul<.U..Lou ..tru ...... it io u",b.... ·I;'.'"~", uf .... iptlAni io,{CfnlU: u... allow. UI 1O.qca mon: ddinimdy lhe: ..:cua.1oo of ci1rulari1)'. .. we will...., below.

wac.." . _

.ha.

z}i

f OU NDAT IONS O f DlIARMAKIRTI"S PH Il.OSO PHY

Th~ fram~rIc

in which theK SDtmlenU are ma({(: is clearly apologetic, as Dharmakirti aims at anchoring his own epistemology in {h~ original message of the Buddha.. Thus, according [Q DharnWdni. Digniga praises the Buddha for be:ing a teacher not only in rdigious maRm, but also in maRers of tpistemology. TheK apologetics, however, an: to be: distingui5hcd from the actual procedure by which Dharmakirti reach~ the conclusion that th~ Buddha is a mons of knowledge. Ev~n if th~ uggc: of perce:ption and infef'1!nce has bttn obsc:.rvcd in the: Buddha's tc:achingot and servcs as a modd for cst:ablishing their (Jue: charKtffi.stia, one can tCSt and independently use: them to csl2b1ish, among other things, the validiry of Ihe Buddha', teachings, and from it the authority of the Buddha himself. Pe:rce:ption and inference: within this ~omot ate certainly nOI established from the OUt5c:l just because: of the Buddha's authority. Nc:vcrthdc:u, one: is jUJliflcd [Q claim later on, in an apologetic comal, tha.t Ihe means which iuve provro so succc:ssfuJ wcre a1re.ady discovered by the: Buddha and taught in his leiChings,u In dfc:ct. Franco 5UggC:515 that the: steming circularity of th~ st:uementS is a produa of their rhetorical oonlal. Dharmilirti strikes a ddibc:ratdy apologetic stance: dUI allows him to make Ihe type: of claims about the Buddha lhatthinkcrs in othe:r traditKJn5 routindy assen in rc:ialion to their own founde:rs. This inte:rpretation resu on Franco's larger argument that Dharmakini's discussion of thc: Buddha as pranui!"lbbwt4 is ,u.scc:ptibl~ 10 a "double re.ading" wh~rc:by·wc on rad the tOt as a proof lhal the Buddha is pr.mtl~lIbhiit4 in the Buddhill or more: spc:cifica.lly in Digniga's sense, but also as a proof that he is an tlpla (i.e. , credible: pcr50nJ in the: Nyiya ·Vai~ ik:a or SiJpkhya-Yoga sense."u R.eca.lling (he "sliding scale: of analysis" discussc:d pm'K>usly, we might rtadily accc:pt that Dhannaldrti adopts here: a sliding scak in rc:iation to the question of cmLibility, such thaI he is willing 10 argue: provisionally in a manne:r that leads to ECfE circulariry, only 10 abandon that argument 301 a higher Ic:vcl of his scale. Nevertheless. 10 claim that Dhannakini escapes ECrE circularity in thil fashion, we must have good reason 10 do so: we mUSI mow that a Straightforward

22

F~

(1999'66),

2.J franc.o (1997'19). ~ at... McOinrodt ( IOO~J~I.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYIN G TH[ SO URCES O F KNOWLEDGE

1} 9

tnding of the S(2temenu ciled above (with their anendam ECfE circularity) art superseded by a clearly amcuLned position in Dharmakirti's work that sea the fauh in an appc:tl (0 credibility! ' ~ it rums out, we can point to a dearly articulated position of thu kind, :tnd to do so, we mwt turn to Dhannaltirti's comments on another of Digniga's S(2lemena , mu time concerning credibility and the innrumentality of scripture,

Scriptllrllll,,/trt1t« 11M Dhamut.iirtii /Uj«tis" o/CnJibi/ity At the beginning of his U'e:ttment of scriprural inference, Dtwmakirti cilC$ a short but crucial sruement from his prMcc.cssor Digniga: ~S inc.c the satemenu of a crtdible person a~ generally trust'NOnhy. a cognition arising from them is :tn instrumental infcrcnu ,"" Dignliga's scucmem ccrtainly appears to evoke the typial argument for scriprural instru menl2lity that on our malysis would lad Dharmakirti to ECTE circularity, Thus, when

~ i......, II Iw.d in¥Okt:s ow Iwrrntnnnko of duncy. whKh ill thil CIIC rem on. hypolhnKal anicwuion ofDtwmWlti', impticit method to.orden"' ............. oIid.in, oalc If _ _ • P" 1'5 0< pot;.;.,.. ..... don not ~ wi,h l1li' ~ vitwofDhmnKirtf l chougIl, _ rmrsmrnlly ~ our vitw aIons eithuof (WO!ina: by inansing ow ""picion dw Dlwmaldrti'l ~k io in.:o-

2
.Ion,_

of.....,-.

bmnt. or by NWminS_ cunmdrobKuft' ~ in OW' ~ 1£, booo"tr,. wdI micubud pa'nS" 01' poWon deuty con.radicu _ (Xbn, eoq..wlr wdI aniculatfti p4lngt or ~,ion, tMn lhc ~ principk 01 hc:"hCIIC'''Q cIwity 1M _ ~ adopccd will prompt: us to rank u- paMtioru aIonf; I hicTatdlial Jak: the: Iowtt position, while con.atuaIIy apcdienc, it ...pcnednI by tho: hipr poUlion br vim. of pl.MillS a r:I.ionaI lor m. tho: "-'" pOOlion &.ilo. confonN: /nOll: dotdy 10 Dlwmumi". '<'mioo of lilIima.c truth. To employ this hcrmcnaIlQ.«hniqllC, _ mUit Ix abk 10 opecif'y boIh tho: 0I)n1ClnW CIIpcd~1IC)' in q-..ion and I.... opecillc buh in tho- Iowrr po$irion oha. Otw-mUrni camca if! dw hishn" JlCl'ition. I wgs dIM _ an II'IOtI boIh of u- condllioN: the: apedicnq wilma of lhc rhctorial mllmpNJiun dac:ribcd by Franco (an CIIpcdXncy ml! in>'Ol_ a w* ""ntr of Wuos, indudinS imli1l11iona! identify and w.rvinO, and the f.wJ, dw ~ hi(!;bcr fJO'ilion dclibcntdy <:riri.q.... and abandon. io ..... Iowtt potirion'l :appeal to crrdibiJicy, .. 1 apt.in;u.. below,

mx.

15 PSLsab: ~~_",.. .",,1fWJw:.l, NOIt. lint. Wot altbour;h the pbmc -. DD(!;JliDon ....... &om them" ..... Ix .... ppIiod br QOn~. ~ cbrIy IIndmand thio .wantnl in tN.t Whion (ttt PVI.1.I6, u'amla!cdaJon& with thot tell of~ JcCtion on acrip11m in lhc appcndix). Nexc abo thai I prd'cr to .-.ok! !ht in~ 01 1bV""" aI "lhc _ ." or "WnJb, to." Akhour;h my in.c'l"tUOOn it not diro:nly "'pponcd by ~ Tibetan mmolarion mmpound of dw form "»1iI""" an arulnly have IN II"Ie:lnins of "".in smrnI" or "a smrnI ~ 01. (c-l- ' PVw .d,.w., ,...,.." whcK i. 1WIdi

r""*/IfI,..J..

in ....." . - ... ...-..uq., Si ....., 0.1", ...."""uf· ;..

1I""1<'1"r ,,,,Kkn, doc QJlmncnu. by J~

dhi, Kan;tWpnill, and ~i ~ inldlJsibk. I loa." d>o..cn dut ~

240

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Dharmakirti unpacks Dignaga's statement, we should expect him to focus his argument on the credibility of the Buddha, since credibility is the decisive issue in this approach to the instrumentality of scripture. Surprisingly, however, Dharmakirti does not argue for the instrumental_ ity of scriptural knowledge by arguing for the credibility of the Buddha' moreover, we can readily justifY the stronger claim that he explicitly rejec~ any appeal to credibility as an acceptable means of grounding the instru_ mentality of scripture. To demonstrate how this is the case, we need nOt present a detailed analysis ofDharmakirti's approach to scripture, since both Tillemans and Franco have already provided such studies. 26 Instead, let us offer a brief summary and then cite his explicit rejection of credibility. In sum, Dharmakirti's discussion of scripture falls into eight significant parts: 27 1. An initial reference to Dignilga'swords that emphasizes the context in which an appeal to scripture is permissible [Preamble to PV1.214]. One can only make such an appeal if (a) the issue at hand is wholly transempirical (atyantaparok!a) in that it cannot be adjudicated on the basis of empirical instruments of knowledge; and (b) it must be settled in order for one to advance in one's spiritual exercises. 2.

The general characteristics that a scripture must have ifit is to be a candidate for use in a scriptural inference [PV1.214 and PVSV ad cit.]. The scripture must address the concern mentioned in (I) above in an intelligible and practicable fashion.

3. The "threefold analysis" that a candidate scripture must pass ifone is to

use it as the basis for a scriptural inference [PV1.215 and PVSV ad cit.]. To be used for a scriptural inference, the passage must pass three tests: (a) it cannot be contradicted by empirical knowledge acquired through perception; (b) it cannot be contradicted by empirical knowledge acquired through inference; and (c) it must not contradict itself concerning transempirical matters. 4- A restatement ofDignilga's words [PV1.2I6 and PVSV ad cit.]. This

almost literal restatement's rhetorical location suggests that 1-3 can be considered a complete account.

26 Tillemans (1993) and Franco (1997 and 1999). 27 See the translation in the appendix (J61ff). See also Tillemans (1999).

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

241

5. An alternative test that obliquely refers to the extraordinary qualities of the scripture's author (i.e., the Buddha) [PVI.2I7 and PVSV ad cit.]. This test either supplements or perhaps replaces (3) the threefold analysis. According to this test, one may employ a scriptural inference with regard to transempirical matters because the "important topics" (pradhanartha) of the Buddha's teachings, i.e., the Nobles' Four Truths, can be confirmed on the basis of an ordinary person's empirical instruments of knowledge alone. Hence, since his teachings are known to be trustworthy in this regard, one trusts them with regard to other, empirically inaccessible matters. To trust the teachings in this manner, one must also maintain that the scripture's author (namely, the Buddha) had knowledge of matters that are transempirical to us, and that he had no reason to deceive us.

6. A denial that scriptural inference is actually an inference [end of PVSV on PVI.2I7]. Dharmakirti says that it is "not without problems," and his commentator Sakyabuddhi describes such an inference as "not actually instrumental."28

7. An explicit rejection of the appeal to credibility [PVI.218-219 and PVSV ad cit.], which we will cite below. 8. And finally, a reaffirmation of the possibility ofattaining the kind of

qualities that, ifit were possible for others to know them, would make one credible [PVI.220-223 and PVSV ad cit.]. Here Dharmakirti cites many of the issues that he will take up in greater detail in the aforementioned discussion of the Buddha as "one who has become an instrument of knowledge" (prama~abhiita). _ A significant feature of this argument is the tension that it evinces ~~tween an appeal to one's own empirical knowledge as opposed to trusti-ig in another's (i.e., the Buddha's) trans empirical knowledge. Dharmakirti ~~~gins in an empiricist vein by avoiding any reference to credibility (1-4), i~d the rhetorical structure of this portion of the argument suggests that we ,iiay consider it a complete account of scriptural inference, if we were so

'}n other words, the Acarya [Dignagal did not say that knowledge from scripture is a type of instrumental inference by claiming that it is actually or truly (bhiivika) instru~mental. Rather, it is instrumental with regard to the way in which a person should proceed.

242

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

inclined. Perhaps, however, Dharmakirti recognizes that in the context of Dignaga's notion of scriptural inference, one cannot fail to speak of the Buddha as credible-i.e., a person with the extraordinary qualities required for direct epistemic access to the transempirical. Dharmakirti therefore supplements the initial account (1-4) by referring somewhat obliquely to the Buddha's extraordinary qualities and transempirical knowledge (5). Even here, however, he manages to cast the issue in an empiricist light: he affirms unequivocally that one can determine the "important topics" of the Buddha's teaching just on the basis of one's own, ordinary perceptions and inferences. Nevertheless, despite this claim's empiricist tones, Dharmakirti is apparently troubled by his own appeal to the Buddha's transempirical knowledge and concomitant extraordinary qualities. How else can we explain the fact that he immediately backpedals by denying that scriptural inference is really an inference at all (6)? Moreover, he then proceeds to reject explicitly any appeal to credibility (7). Nevertheless, he apparently has qualms about implying that, by rejecting credibility, he means to reject the notion that it is possible to obtain the kind of extraordinary qualities attributed to the Buddha. He therefore reaffirms (8) that if one follows the Buddhist path to its completion, one can attain the kind of extraordinary qualities that would make one credible, even if ordinary persons cannot definitely know whether any specific person has done so. Overall, the argument thus exhibits an ambivalence that oscillates almost wildly between an appeal to the trans empirical knowledge of an extraordinary person (i.e., the Buddha) and a staunch affirmation that even as ordinary persons, we can confirm and know the important part of the Buddha's teaching just on the basis of our own empirical perceptions and inferences. I would argue that this ambivalence is certainly part of what contributes to the appearance of EeTE circularity in the PramiiIJ-asiddhi chapter. Below we will also see that this ambivalence is an important thematic issue that must inform our examination of the Buddhist approach to instrumentality. Let us first settle, however, the question of whether Dharmaldrti is indeed caught in EeTE circularity. We have noted that we seek a clearly articulated position in which Dharmakirti rejects the appeal to credibiliry that would be required for him to be committed to an EeTE position. We find a clearly articulated rejection at PVI.218-219, which on our account is the seventh section of the argument on scriptural inference. To be clear that Dharmakirti is indeed rejecting any appeal to credibility, it is worth citing this passage in full:

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

243

Others [such as the NaiyayikasJ think that a statement dependentfor its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathartha). [PVI.2I8ab) According to others,29 a credible speaker (apta) is a person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yatharthadarfana); that person's teachings are trustworthy. This point is admitted ifone is able to know that that person has that superior quality. 3D [PVI.218ed] Every judicious person who wishes to act analyzes statements to determine what is and what is not scripture (agama); he does so as one who wishes to act [effectively], and not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should be put into practice from the scripture, he thinks, "Having acted accordingly, I might realize my goal." On the basis of the trustworthiness of that scripture with regard to things that can be experienced [through perception or empirical inference], that person acts with regard to other things [i.e., the supersensible objects described in that scripture] because such is the case for most practical action in the world. But if one is to act on the basis of examining the person, one would not act at all because one cannot know whether or not that person has those kind of extraordinary qualities. It is not the case that persons such as us would not act because of not accepting that there are some persons with those qualities, since that kind of person does indeed make true statements.31 In other words,

1:.··

SakrabUddhl (247a) does not identify who these others might be; K(96) glosses apareas

;~ainafJ, while Manorathanandin provides

naiyiiyikiiilayafJ.

i.Sakrabuddhi (247b3) comments: ~.We accept the point that has just been stated-we do not reject that kind ofidea. But e.it is accepted only if one is able to know that superiority, defined as the experience of ~.·things as they truly are, etc., as being a defmite aspect of that person. But one is not !~able to know that. [bshail ma thagpa'i don gangyin pa de nyiil ni kho bo cag 'aodpa kho

~•.na yin

te / kho bo cag ni de Ita bur gyur pa spong bar byed pa ni mi byed do / 'on kyang Ita ba bzhin du mthong ba fa sogs pa'i mtshan nyiil can gyi phul du byung ba .de skyes bu'i [D.: busJ nges par shes pa nus na de yang shes par mi nus so 1].

~gal te don)i

6) preserves this statement almost entirely:

'yam anantarokto 'rtha sa it!O Smiikam / ki1J'l tu fakyeta )fziitu1J'l pU7Ufanaiyamyena yo .ayo yathiiilarfaniidifak!atJo na tu fakyafJ [S~ayana reads: yathii ilarfanafak!atzasYa fakyafJ; this has been emended ex con). to accord with PVT: fak!atJo na tu '" in ord with SakyabuddhiJ . . he portion corresponding to Sakyabuddhi (2483.2) ... de Ita bur gyur pa'i don)i Ita ba

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

Othtn !_mtl]. _ Buddhists.} hrow t}JIlt it u txtrtmt" diffi" C'Uit 10 /mow (d~riHNIh4) whit,," Olbm haw: fo.Jts or IIrr foultlm. lIS whtn ont rnpon4s t(1 tIN fJ«tti(1", -Ir thu P"W" liltt ,hu or not!-/t uc;t"mt" diffiCNit u/mow IHatMSt tht instrumtnllli rot" nilioN for ullrminin, l~ch W Utl illY lIim(1U unobt.i_bk (durlAbhll).Jl(PVI.1J91 The: truthful {SIIMJIW and deceitful actions of persons arc: due: [0 [heir good me:ntal qualitics and the:ir me:ntal naws, Th05C mc:nw attributcs arc: supcrsc:nsible:. and mey would have: to ~ inkrrcd from the: physical and vocal ~havior that arises from [hem, And mon bdlavior can also be performed ddibcr.ndy (bwl4hipiil'llllm) in a way omc:r man me mc:nw state mey ser:m to reflect because ch05C behaviors occur as one desires and because: mose bdlavion may be imended for various aims.II Thus. mere is an overlap of me alleged evidcn~ for f.aults and faultles.sncss. Therefore. not having made a definitive demmi" nation, how is one 10 otablish thai me author of me scrip(Ure is flawtCSl?~

/dilll "III

..w-, .. IiI,.",. i JM ,.,. ""I """ ,. j MJn .. '" Jw. 1M ,.i "'" ". ..,u It,;

#.hould (l((IIt afio:r iiI!' ~I!' ~ WJ- ,.~ in KC,j)6.J)-u;). .)2 The pm...... if onm nnWtcd simply as "difficWt,' ~ this Enpoo word if roo wak fOr .ht-lmKtN. dx prda mI"c)l.ln ncarty~c:&tC, ~cxprencI ~ins_than Eitpish "difficult" but nof ~ qw~,.. RTidmI" 'im~ibk:

Noc( mac, aocotdI"Ito ~i (Z4ia)"K(m), tlJ,rIwIhJ(lIJ if l'anini.w nornina.iw sinsubr wbm ~ with "w.,ui but muculinc nominative plural wbm ~ with

.T,

u,Yt...

JJ Iu UI Cl<2IIIpk, ~i (J..48b).K(J97)) _ -nut it, penoN who have dctirc may makr .bo:rmdvct appa.i' .. ir they ~ dcsirdca. and dairdas ~ rn.y rnab Uwmwm. appear .. if they had dnOra.. • IMIN iii ~ . . .,,~ mu-,. ~",; I "Illrip/ {.

Ml7'ip_".

34 PVSV "" rVI.u8-'J"

(G :H)9.1)-UO.I.4): ""~I!' ,.,hJn/M",

,.,~uJip~,.,.

.,.,., ~ I

qus w,u~'" niIIIIfI..w. i1'7.~ f w.

",,~ ~ jUn.IfI» '~J*Ij lIulll ,.,..,."

.,.,. nofp_,. •...,,,""',,, H"'~

',,~ ~,...,.-.nu f .';*-I"H!!''''''' _ ~ ".~". mr"H" IJ'#'"

iti f_~~...,.",.~IdJ'i,_ f ~lH1~ 'Lb~,. f,.~ ftllN"fTIh .,,.~'.,... f ~ ",thi~j~",...,.1Hl ~ f~ :1\ ' ''IIM f uthi It; f .,.. ,...", ... ...". .TJ .1'1' ,unlq,.,. M f "'rlIlMtt,

me•.•

",., prnU!li1fti'Jf •• ,

.

iIH".,.,., "

~ (PVu191

(G...,.Mr J.i l"'?'"{ J UJ4 ~

_,,.Iolw .. rA.,..>1.,.,, ... hri,,.....,,.,b ...,..J,J,.. "'""!" £'1.:1-" ,..,...""w'l"i_

u"",",,,.,.,.,.,,.~ r.'i~ .,.... •• t.M N,.J) { .. U_~

~"" f "'" .,.",IiIfpu~,."

u.'" ."ikiIf".,. ".tI~

~ f

~


INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

245

The above passage leaves little doubt that, for Dharmaklrti, one cannot demonstrate that scriptural statements are a reliable source of knowledge on the basis of the claim that their author has the kind of extraordinary qualities that constitute a credible person. For Dharmaklrti, one cannot use this procedure for the simple reason that one cannot reliably determine whether the person in question has the requisite qualities or not. On my view, the above passage constitutes the kind of clearly articulated rejection of an appeal to credibility that allows us to discount any apparent ECTE circularity in Dharmaklrti's thought. On this interpretation, the seeming ECTE circularity of the statements' that end Dharmaklrti's discussion of the Buddha's extraordinary qualities (i.e., the qualities that make him pramii1}abhiita) must reflect a calculated excess of apologetic rhetoric along the lines suggested by Franco. Whatever else Dharmaklrti may be up to, his affirmation of the metaphorical instrumentality of the Buddha as "become an instrument of knowledge" (pramii1}abhiita) is not meant to suggest that the Buddha's words are what literally prove the instrumentality of perception and inference. We might think that the passage cited above, which has also been discussed most notably by Tillemans, would put an end to all talk of circularity, but it has not. Instead, it has prompted Steinkellner to reassess the issue of circularity in terms of a far subtler issue, namely, the relation between Dharmaklrti's conception of ultimate goal and the need to define the instrumentality of perception and inference in a manner that suits that ultimate goal. This subtler approach creates an important interpretive context for our study of instrumentality, and it especially helps to clarifY the curious ambivalence-the oscillation between the empirical and the transempirical-in Dharmaklrti's discussion of scripture.

Axiological Concerns: Mutual Restraint ofPath and Goal At the humble and amusing outset of his recent article, "Once More on Circles," Ernst Steinkellner remarks, "At a certain stage of life one's research work seems to oscillate between three options: correcting old mistakes, repeating old mistakes, and making new mistakes."35 This self-effacing quip introduces Steinkellner's abandonment of the notion that Dharmakirti espouses a form of ECTE circularity, and Steinkellner emphasizes that change by citing and agreeing with the interpretations offered by Franco and 35 Steinkellner (200J:323).

46

FOUNDATIONS OF QHAI.MAKIRTI ·S PHILOSOPHY

TilklNlU. Steinkdl~r, howevn, does not mcrdy sum:nder his earlier posi. tion; inst(ad, be aho s«ks to explain t~ un
INIClltul).

As we shall 1«, Dharmakini's notion of a cognition's insuume"ntality (which Steinkdlne"r calls "validity") resu on me cognition 's tfUSrwonhi· net$ or reliability, lind Ihal IfUStwOrmine.s is largely connilun~d by one', accomplishment of a goal through me knowledge supplied by that cogni· tion. Stdnkdlne"r'. point hel'(' is mat, if we do not have a notion of what constitutes our goal. how CUl we appeal to the accomplishment of a goal as a cental criterion of a cognition's instrumentality? And if. as a good Bud· dhist, one UrivCl toward the ultimate goal of "imi!'ll. will not all omC'f goals be defined in terms of it? Likewise. if all OUf goals at(' defined in terms of that ultimate goal. then since only the Buddha (or some other IIrhllnt) has Icnowlcdgcof mat goal. we must IPpeal 10 his words (i.e., the Buddhist scriptures) in oukr to posit it as the u1timatC' tournuonC' for a cognition's innrumentality.R Finally. Steinkellner draws a hetmeneuticalleuon hefC"onC' th;lt is dearest whC'n he refers 10 the parallel Ca.5C' of Varpg:lI~ya 's s",!iulntrll, an early S2'!lkhya ([earise that discu.uc:s the instruments of J6 Sicinkdlntt (1OO):J~). J7 See Strinkdlncr'1 filnhn dOOcbtion (UIO}:U9):

bf a pp of IW;\m>C$l on !be: part of Dlwmaldrti,.."...I] .. the whole tr.odilion Iv: rrprelftlU c:onarning 1M analysil of,~ il doa; 001 Kml to Iu"" '-n Clptc:Md in any oontC:1I that I''""'' (UJJhi) in auaini", (..,uJuJ or aYOidi", (w-). ""' ........ O«ti.....,. p (-m.J i. dact-rNnai in £.eo, if only indirudy, in ...,. opinion by the ckIlnition of the "wtimate pi: for atWnmml of..-hid. all ~

'J'hcft _

10

INST.UMENT ALlTY: JUS TIF YI NG THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

1..47

knowled~.

Spoking of rh.e sn't:n forms of "connection· (SilmbanJht.) 0 0:eswy for V~y.a'$ mtOry of inlml\«. Sreinkdln.ef notes: All thcK ~n kinds of conneclion arc dnrly conceived in I Uch a way thaI me logical theory which u.sa lhem for explaining me necessiry of me logical conncaions only allows for such inferences mal arc able 10 accomplish what il exp«tfed of them. And tku is a d.erivation of the Silplthya system with its principia and all io corollary dements.In other words, V~ya Sttks to Pre5(:nt an rpistemology that all othen will aeapt as a n.euer·a1 account of knowing, but he has unwittingly 5tacked me philosophical deck: if we accept his account ofinfereoce. wc will Ix Jt /tKt(J obliged 10 .1.oc:.ept th.e ~ khya system and the ultim.1.te goal toward which it is directed. In other words, "the syst.em is eJt2blishfed with m.e help of such means of (instrumental] cognition whose presuppositions art taltt:n from the system iuclf."" This amounu to wh2t Stcinkellnu calls 2 "true circle," and he suggats that Dharrmkini's notion of instrumenwiry is caught up in [h.e same problem. This is 2 rcm.arbbly valuable insight whose full force will rae some rime to ho:ome tvident. W.e will artempt' 10 make some contribution in that direction by unpacking and modifying Stcinkdlner'J .argument. As I see it, at m.e core of Steinkdlner'J argument lies a recursive definition of instrumenraliry. Simplifying Srd nkellner', approach, we will rcphr2SC m.1.t recursive definition as follows:

anainmcnfl Of lvoidmaa an: eoruidcral eilhcr u """""''1 Rep Of as impedimcnlL BIll only if we kno.. !hedinaion to SO. do_aho kncrw!he di/fu",o: bd " t(ii ri&hl ltId WfOrI&. plOd and " il. or bdm, wholesome (JnJ.J.)and WlwhoiaoI,iC (~). Evi
""_

{I""

3S Sttinkdlnn (l 00J:))O). )9 Sfeinkdinn

(~J:JlI).

f OUNDATIONS O f D HA1MAKIRT I 'S PHILOSOPHY

RI: Any cognition that leads to the obrainment of me ultimate goal is instrumental (i.e.• is a pram4!'4).

R1: Any cognition that leaw [0 the obtainment of a goal that leads to the obtainment of the ultimate goaJ is instrumental. R}:

No other cognition is instrumental.

Wortcing with this recursive definition, we would condudc. for aample, thar any cognition that appeared to directly apprehend an absolute self (4I7Mn) would not be instrumental, sintt one obtains the ultimau: goal ("jmi~) by diminacing the bd~ in me self. Lilttwisc, we' 'NOuld claim that any cognition-such as the belief in ultimately real univcrsaJ.-that led to the belief in the self would alto not be instrumental, In effect. ,his recursive ddinirion 'NOuld adudc the instrumentality of any cognition whose content directly or indirectly aplCSkd any philosophical position that contradicted Dharmakini's notion of "irWIJIL Thus, all cognitions toen the:: most ordinary ones would haw: to contribule either directly or indirectly to my progress IOward "irlNl!IL 1'h«: problem, hoWC'Vtr, is that as it stands, this uipanile recursive ddlnition also exdudts a good many cognitions that Dharmakini dea:rlywoukl. taltc to be instrumental. For example. if I en joy smoking cigarettes, men in order ro Atisfy desi~, I must be able to COCfC'Ctiy identify something ,hat' can US(' .0 ligh. my cigarette, Presumably, 'would do so by rdying on one or more acu of pcraption and inferentt such thai, for example, I identify the Rarne of a candle burning on the table in front of me. Surely, Dharmakini would agrcc that at tc:a.st some of ,he cognitions involved in my finding the candle's Harne arc instrumental, but he surely ......ould also a5Sl"rt ,hat the goal accomplished by .hose cognitions-i.e., smoking a cigalene cannot in itsdflcad me either directly or indirtttly to "jmilJlL Thus, the rtCWSivc ddlnition ~ abow: it OVttIy rt$Ulct~ 1Kc&usc= R} incorrccdy diminates many irutanttS of irulrumcntal cognition. Ncvcnhcless. in its auemlX to apply to alJotdirwy instrUmental cognitioru. the def· inirion sugesu a crucial insight that is well worth preserving: for Dharmakini, at bst JIJ",t of an ordinary penon's instrumental cognitioll5 can indeed lead eimu direcdy or indirectly to "imiJ;f4 This is the gist of daiming that an ordilW)' person can determine the truth of the "important pan" of me Buddha's teaching just on the basis ofher own puccptioru and empirical inkrmccs. That is. those mgnitions that c:ktermine the [rum of W impoitlnl pan of thc Buddha's teaching in thansdvcs c:onscirult the first step

mat

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

~toward

249

nirvtirta: once one has established the real possibility of nirvtirta, one

!has already set out on the path. At the same time, Dharmakirti clearly means ~'that except for their objects and results, there is nothing distinctive about the

~Qrdinary perceptions and empirical inferences that lead us, however increfihentally, toward nirvtirta. In other words, in their nature they are the same ,lis every other perception and empirical inference. Hence, when he presents ffhe instrumentality of ordinary perception and inference, his discuSsion must !~pply to all such cognitions, not just those that lead directly or indirectly to l:nirviirta. Dharmakirti thus has two concerns: that some instrumental cogni~ons of ordinary persons be capable of knowing the truth of nirviirta, and ~at his account of instrumentality construes these cognitions to be the same in their basic nature as every other ordinary instrumental cognition. When these two concerns are combined, we arrive at a clear constraint ~!bh the way that Dharmakirti must approach instrumentality. That is, since isome ordinary instrumental cognitions move one toward nirviirta (by givliing one access to the important part of the Buddha's teaching), those coglhitions cannot be inimical or contradictory to the obtainment of nirvtirta; l!"ltherwise, they would be moving one away from it, not toward it. At the ~~ame time, his general account of instrumentality must apply not only to ~fhose cognitions, but to all ordinary perceptions and inferences; otherwise, ll)rdinary instrumental cognitions could not do the work that he claims they t; ~$ll do. In other words, if the ordinary instrumental cognitions that lead us ~toward nirvtirta are not identical in nature to all other ordinary instrument~al cognitions, then Dharmakirti would in effect be asserting that those ~erceptions and inferences are not ordinary. Hence, since the account of !tnstrumentality must apply to all ordinary cognitions, and since that genaccount must also apply to the specific cognitions that lead to nirvtirta, !l)harmakirti's general account of the instrumentality of perception and :tnference must avoid any features that would be inimical to the obtainiment of nirvtirta. In short, the nature of all ordinary instrumental cognitions ~ust be compatible with nirviirta, but those cognitions must also be capapie of establishing the important part of the Buddha's teaching without reference to scripture or transempirical knowledge.

!eraI

:I..:· ;.

From an interpretive standpoint, this "compatibility-capability" con-

~traint may help to identifY and explain a number of features of Dhar-

_,~1nakirti's thought. He must give an account of inference, for example, that

l~nables inference to be a powerful analytic tool extending far beyond the I.'f.ange of our perceptions, since inference is our .primary means of estabIlishing the truth of the teaching's "important part." Dharmakirti must, ~f

lSO

FO UNDATIONS O f DUAII.MAKJRTI 'S PH JLOSOP HY

however, thoroughly critique not only inferences that a11~y apprehend an absolute sdf (4mum), but he must also refute any :wcrtioru mat would indirectly lead. to the affirmation of luch an entity, Hence, his account of infelenCt' must deny the rwity of all universals, of which the self may be coruidercd a special cue. TIna, intm:ncc must at once be fu -rcaching in iu 5COpC and utterly shorn of any Ontological commitment ro entities whos.: existence would directly or indirecdy contradict Dharmakin i's conception of ninW!UL Employed in this fashio n, the compatibitiry-capabiliry constraint suggcsu a hermeneutic of suspicion, such that we will tend to suspect mat, despite Dharmalcirti's empiricist rhetoric. his approach to insrrumenraliry is in f.act guided by the nem to ddend his ultimate, transcmpirical goal.O r to PUI it another way, we may suspect that in me background ofDharmakini'l theory ofinstrumenraliry operates an unadmowtcdgcd axiom: · if by accepting a particular position, one would be led (0 conclude [hat "irvtl'.fll is indefensible or unobainable, men that position cannot be correct: In broad terms, I would char.tctcrilC such an axiom as ·axiologictl: in that it ainu (0 preserve primarily mat which Buddhisu value in their final goal (be it the rcmov:tl of sufi'erin", tilt attainment of happiness, the survival of BuddhiSt inStitutions, or some other such conettn)." The probable role of this rype of implicit axiology is surely not to be dismissed at least some of Dharmakini's philosophical choices arc likdy guided by the need to dd'cnd the values embodied by " in'ti'.fll. even if at this point we cannot sptcify which chokes those might be. Ncvenhdess. we should make an additional specification: th.atthe goal neW not be the only sour«: of value, since the mnns nuy also be. To explain fully what I mean by this last rcm:uit would dnw us tOO f.u away from our already
r nioiopol Ilrin (WOI), <12

nalu~« JUdI_raiI!u Iw b«n lnAumud

s... Ed.

by KIp-

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFY ING THE SOU RC ES OF KNOWLEDGE

lSi

sary to Dharmakini's thcory of inferential reasoning, this means that, stricdy ~ng. a buddlu docs not employ reasoning (PIttl}. If his notion of innrumem:ality were designed sim ply [ 0 lead us to that cond usion, we .,,'QuId apcct him to emphuiu: perception or experience over reason. But in fact. OUt best way to read Dharmwni is the i n~nc: fo r him. apcriencc is clearly subordinate to reason, as is illUllloued. for cwnplc. by the argument- made aplicit by the earliest commentators-that only inferencc is intrinsically instrumental. while perception on many occasions is only extrinskally so.-IJ The prick of place that inference rakes in Dlutmwni's theory of irutrumcntality indicates the crucial role that reason plays not only on the Buddhist path. hut also as me mark of the prt~Wlnt, the "rational" or -judicious person ..... For Dhannakirti and his fellow Buddhist thinkers. reason is crucial to obtaining nirvi(UL and that goal is thUi obtained by judicious. rational persons. In shon , nirwi~ is nOt beyond reason- it is ,.'.fi.tly in amJrJ with rtastJn.'\ By raising this example I do not mean to indicate only th:.at Ihe ultimate goal, nirwl!"'. must be defined in a way thaI is plausibly compatible with the empirical. Mere comp:.tibility with me empirical would sull be I2tisficd by an emphuis on an irr.nional or ttans-rational vcru through faith . for t:nmple. I mean 10 suggest fUrther thOlt Dh:.arm:.akini's conception of "irvl!W is also constrained by the importance that he places on reasoning and debate as practices in and of [herruelves. On this interpretlnion. Dharmakirti sought to define and oplain his ultimate goal in terms that prt:SotrvN the centrality of those pfXtKu. Hence. in thil regard. it il not just the values inherent in the goal that constrain the means, oot also the valU~ onf' ~ in th~ m~n~ th:u cOnJtnin thf' pI. h is the importance of such 2 reciprocal marion-of mutual colUlr:Um and comparibility-pcrtaining Ixtwecn "irvi~and iu means thaI I derive u th~ central lesson of Steinkellner's -!rue eirde. ~ O n my view, this reciprocal tcltraint likC\Visc underlies the ambivalcnce in Oharmakini'. 2CCOum of scriptural inference. In short. he must nrike a delicate balanc~ bcN.un . h",

~I'in<:um

.h... h,. "",1" eI n n rh., r 3rh .. nd .h.,

".~td j n'..'Y

,)":oli,;",,,

of buddhahood, his ultimate goal. In his aucmpt to strike th2t balancc. Dharmakirt i mw oscillatcs berween 1 denial of the relevance of the <13 Xc below, 117«. «Xc McOi,"odt (z.ood. -4 5 I ....,

dd.il:~n
. ~t).

Xc ~ Edd

,be "Pi";"", vi' JIUI~t.I ... (S.~....

(t~.

.oMoo"'. 4; r...1d

l Sl

FOU NDATION S O F DHA.MAKIRT I' S PHILOS OPHY

Buddha's Cltraordinary qua1iti~n«: an appeal to their rdevance would endanger his emphasis on empiricism-and an affirmation of thc* qualities, since they arc precisely what make that goal valuable. At (his point in (he nudy of Dhannakirti'l thought, ho~r, I do not know how to make good hermeneutical usc of the implicit uiological concerns raised by Strinkdlner's analysis. Certainly fOr me, and perhaPJ fOr the fidd at large, Dharmakirti's highly complc:a: theory of insuumentality often does nor lend itself easily to what we might aU an ~ uiologica1 anaIysis~ through which we may uncover the values in path or goal thou may sway Dharmakirti in lOme of his philosophical choices. The difficulty is not only knowing when a consideration of axiological issues may give w our best aplanation of the topic at hand, but also determining which pole in any given case is regnant: path or goal? Probably conceiving the question in this fashion is already far tOO simple. For these reasons my analysis of iruuumentality below will only make a passing attempt at such an analysis. We mW( instead be sarisfied with the lmowkdgc. first, m.u Oharmwrti does not facik:ly jwtify the instrumentality of perccption and ink-n:nee by rooting (hem in the Buddha's mrucmpiricallmowlcdge, which we would then access through scriprurc; SoCCOnd, that axiological considerations likely play an as yet unclear role in his notion ofinstrument:l.lity; and firully, trult we may hcutistK:a.J.ly bracket axiological considerations fOt the moment, sina' tbe values of path or goaIlikdy mnd in a relation of murual constraint, such that an account that ignores axiological concerns, while incomplete, will ncvcnhdcu not be grossly misleading.

4.2 Ohat7lUlltirti on Instrummt4lity: tIN &,lint ummmtlZriAl Account The preliminary condwions on the general issue ofin.urumentality that we have jwt sketched leave w free to artcmpt a dose reading of Oharmwni's argumems, Ncverthdess. even with this freedom, we immediately &cc an intractable problem: Oharrnaltini's own account of instrumentality is so dliptical and brief mat an interpretation based upon his works alone would be eimer trivial or excessively speculative. Hence, to seck a more substantial reading we have no choke but to focus on comment:lries. Each gener· ation of commemary, however, introduces an ever-thicker layer of philosophical accretions deposited by each commcnt:ltor's attempts to plug pcrcrived holes in Oharrnwni's theories or to respond to new issucs with

INSTII.UMENTA LlTY: JUST I FYI NG TH E SOURCES O F KNOW LEDGE

1S}

which OharmaJdrti could OOt MW contended. GiYal our inlertSt in a his· torica1 reading. the besl compromise is 10 col\$ult the earliest layer of com· mentary: namely, the work of Devendrabuddhi, along with occasional references 10 Ihe sub-commentary of Sikyabuddhi."' Of CO UI'S(:, while Ikvcndrabuddhi's comments will give us a richer sen5C of what Oharmakirti migtll mean by iNtrumentality, he tOO adds his own byer ofidca5. Indeed, the philosophical cre:niviry required to fill out Dharmakirti's aooount rcndm Dcvtndtabuddhi's inlerprcution nearly as much an i n~ pendent work of philOJOphy as a way of accessing DharmaJdrti's viev.rs. This is nOI, howa'Cf, entirely problematic, for pan of our aim here is also to present Devcndrabuddhi'. views in their own right,.incc many of them reappear in the works of later Buddhist philO5Ophm. The same qualificatiON must also be applied to Sakyabuddhi'. rcmaoo. to the CXlenl that we will rely upon them_

s-u &uk oqn.ititl1U For Ikvendrabuddhi and Sikyabudct.i, Dharmakini's definition ofinstrumentality is found primarily in me fitst sa vcnc:s of the PrllmAflIZwlrtti/Ul S JKDnd chapter, the · PrIl~iJJhi. · Subsequent Buddhist commentators (as wdl as more rco:nl interpretcn) tend to sec this section as the i«Ju d4sIUw for Dharmaldni's viev.rs on instrumentality. 80th Devcndrabuddhi and ~buddhi comment cxtemively on mi. series of verses (i.e., PV1.J--6), and a full accOUnt of their rich and intricate analysis would require more space than is ava.ilable here. I will therefore rcstria mys<:lf 10 the more n1icnl points of Iheir interpretation.

To lay the groundwork for our discussion, in this first lCCtion we will focw upon some basic definittoN . An oaminauon of the deails and conttoYefSies alluded to here will be deferred to me following scaions of this presentation. In Dharmakini's analysis ofinstrurnents ofknowkdgc in PVLl-', one of .hoe rn,o,r. N Jioe .. M fuM"m",nnJ ~him l iJ fOUM in the n ...~ •• h..o. opens (he discussion:

1(; In lhc dim..;"" thI.. tollowl, only anain ~ will be chosen OUr of. IMp diJcwoiuu. Tu o-l. II,", C Il Un: ................ (PV .... -
~. tc'C lhc tnnloIM~ in lhc oppcndilI (n4ffl,

254

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

[Defl..l:] An instrument of knowledge is a trustworthy awareness [PV2.Ia-bl ] Y Devendrabuddhi understands this statement to constitute the initial and most salient part of the definition of an instrument of knowlerlge. On Devendrabuddhi's view, this initial statement must be supplemented with a remark that DharmakIrti makes near the end of this section on instrumentality (i.e., at PV2.5c). This latter statement concerns the "novelty" of the cognition, and according to Devendrabuddhi, it must be added to Defl..l in order to form a complete definition of an instrument of know1edge that covers all possible cases. The statement reads: [Def1..2:] Moreover, an instrument of knowledge is that which illuminates an unknown object (artha) [PV2.5c).48 Thus, on Devendrabuddhi's view, the full definition of an instrument of knowledge is an awareness that is both trustworthy (Defl.l) and also "novel" (Defl.2) in that it "illuminates" or makes known an unknown object. 49 If we combine our bipartite definition, we can restate the definition of an instrument of knowledge more concisely. In doing so, let us also take advantage of the fact that, for DharmakIrti, an instrument of knowledge is always a cognition (jfiiina). Hence, by way of a terminological shorthand, 47 PV2.Ia-b l : pramii1Jam avisa7]'lviidi jfiiinam. Note here that jfiiina has been translated as "awareness." The general question of translating the term jfiiina is of greater importance than it might first appear. Potter has remarked on this issue in a somewhat different context. Questioning whether "knowledge" as "justified true belief" is applicable to Pramar,a Theory, Porter has noted: A jfiiina is ... an act of awareness. It does not name a disposition (say, to respond in a certain way when meeting a certain sort of thing). A jfiiina is ... an occurrent. If it involves belief, it does so only in the sense of a believing as a fleeting act of awareness. A jfiiina is not a belief in a dispositional sense .... Any act of awareness which has intentionality constitutes ajfiiina. (1984:309-310) This aspect of Potter's argument supports the point I am making here: namely, that a jfiiina need not involve the determinacy implicit in the term "knowledge." This is especially

the case ifwe understand the "beliefs" that constitute dispositions to be necessarily determinate, or even propositional, in nature.

48 PV2.5c: ajfiiitiirthaprakiifo vii. 49 Both Dreyfus (1997:291) and Franco (1997:47) maintain that Devendrabuddhi understands these two statements to be taken separately, but Devendrabuddhi explicidy construes them together at the end of this discussion when he remarks: "[A cognition] which by nature

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

255

our discussion will often translate prama1Ja as "instrumental cognition." With this in mind, we can restate the definition as follows:

Def1.I & 1.2: An instrumental cognition (prama1Ja) is a trustworthy awareness that illuminates an unknown object. This way of defining an instrumental cognition dearly gains favor among Dharmakirti's commentators beginning with Devendrabuddhi. The exact place of novelty in this definition is a matter of some contention, but let us [eave that discussion for a later point. Instead, let us continue with these basic definitions by citing Dharmakirti's explanation of trustworthiness. On Devendrabuddhi's interpretation, the explanation reads:

[Defl:] Trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function (arthakriya) [PV2.Ib-c].50 leOn the most straightforward reading, Defl means that, if perception and [ir:nference are instrumental, then they must be cognitions of that which ~accomp1ishes the desired goal. Devendrabuddhi notes that as such, percepi'tion and inference are trustworthy, for they are what "cause one to obtain lI(prapaka) the desired object (artha). "51 As we shall see, on Devendrabuddhi's tview, the obtainment of the desired object consists in the activation of a %ognition in which there appears the accomplishment (kriya) of one's aim 1~r tdos (artha). Within the context of this interpretation, Devendrabuddhi irefers to a statement from Prama1Javinifcaya, where Dharmakirti remarks:

i~ntains the aforementioned two kinds of characteristics is an instrument of knowledge; the mlessed One is an instrument of knowledge like that [cognition]." [PVP (6b4): ji skad du l~shad pa'i mtshan nyid rnam pa gnyis brten pa 'i ngo bo can gang yin pa de ni tshad rna yin no / bzhin bcom /dan tshad ma nyid. Cf. PVV where -yukta (ms.: ukta) is read for brten pa r~apekta): yathoktadvividhafak!a[layukta1J'l yat pramii[lam [I] tadvad bhagaviin pramii[lam .... ] for more on the dispute concerning this bipartite definition, see n.qo and also Krasser (2001).

te

§(J PV2.Ib 2-c: arthakriyiisthitifJ / avisa1J'lviidana1J'l. Note that the interpretation of 't:thakriyiisthiti as "cognition (rtogs pa .. J;ratipatti) of arthakriyii" is provided by Deven~buddhi (PVP:2a2-3) and explained by Sakyabuddhi (nye:73~: ~/ '

Dt

1;,

Ii,

'1 I*" I' ~~' 1;:'

tt

An artha is burning and so on. The "accomplishment" of that means the arisal of it. The sthiti of it means the cognition of it because the verbal root [i.e., sthii] has various meanings. [don ni sregpa fa sogs pao / de'i byedpa ni skyedpao / de'i gnas pa ni rtogs pa ste khams kyi don ma tshogs pa nyid kyi phyir ro]. PVP:2aI-2, translated below, 280.

lS6

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAII.MAK IRT I' S PH ILOSOP HY

Thue are two menu of conect knowledge (I4'!1J'1DIi4N1;' perception and inf~mCC'. They are corrta because, one who determines {he object (.nN) by means of one of those two and then acts on tbat knowledge is not deceived ("If ... viu",lIIiI1pu) :about dlllt object', telK: function (lIrth4kri]l),1J In this pawgt:. whctt ·COrrttl knowledge" (SIf'!'Y"IJ;ulN1) is synonymous with "instrumC'nta! cognition" (prIlN'.I4), DharmaIOrti C'mploys a ~rbaJ mrm (i.e., IIA .•• JlWt1!UJMlyatrl of lluiJA'!Iv.iU.. the rum so fu trambted as "trustwOrthiness." 'n the pus::a&,! JUSt citC'd. thC' VC'fbaI form has bun U':lIUiarC'd as "is 1\0( ckcdved." This translation, wbich rdlecu the Tibetan interp~[ion (m; 11M bal. in part merely nems from the alncncc: of an appropriate VetbaI form of"lTl1StwOrthy." But it :also serves to c:mphasiu the fact that. in Ibe above p:wage. the notion of llviSlf1!'VtlU is placed unambiguously within thC' con tat of action . In short. an aware:nm is .JIiur""ddifJ-trustworthy Of" non-dc.uptive-in that if onC' aea, mC' object obtainC'd through ooc's action will be inF.illibly capable of the desired or apectC'd rdie function (a,.,~}.1J This raises the queStion of what we mean by "!die function ." a nOlion clul we shall now examine.

Any anempc to understand Dharmaldrti's nodon of rdie function is complicated by the ambiguiry of the Sanskrit term. 1Irth.. Dharmakirti usa.rtha in four serue:s thaI onen overlap: "aim" (i.e.• pr.JiljllNt or "purpose"), "objea" (or "tbingj. "meaning.... :and "refC'rtnL"14 Whtn using .,.,"" in the sense of "aim; Dharnukirri admia twO basic '}'pes of aim: :acquisition and avoKlanoe. One can speak of obtaining W2rmm, for c:umpk, or :avoiding the cold. ThC' senSe" of as aim. OOwn't't, may:also <m:rIap wirh in sense as object (.,.,""). The objc:cu of pcruption and inkcC'ncc arC' onen called .rth4s, but an -ob,ic:ct- here may iudfbc: an -aim" because of in rdeva.nce

.,.,hIl

'2 PVin,., , .......'!" ,.'!'J'#tiU-' ~'" .,.........'!" «Ii "" ., • ..,... .n6.'!",..,.. ~" ..., ...1JIh# ,*If~ ~M.

5J Thil foIJowa dw ilMnpml Uon of~i, c:sp«iaIIy in Innu of1"'".,mIM. s..e bdow, (161). }t: EnmpIosof a111O.u marunpabow1d.. bw in DhannaIc1ni'l mmmmwyon!he fine YaK cI ,., .... Nt............. Alone. one can find . . . _d ck&rl, in thlU mean. aim (Col" ' C"-,, etb4V,.u".,;__-,.,._. . 1Id~_~. . . ... ), meaninl

umy-,., rM,i,,.,,,,-,.rm

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

257

to some further aim: the distant fire that is the object (artha) of one's perception may also be one's aim or purpose (artha) in that one wishes to obtain the warmth that is one of its property-svabhavas. This overlap between "aim" and "object" appears to be based upon the degree to which causal efficiency is linked to purpose: considered just in terms of the causal efficiency of producing perceptions and (indirectly) inferences, an artha is an object. And considered primarily in terms of purpose, an artha is an aim. 55 Although artha as "aim" and "object" may thus be distinguished, even 'when the term artha is best rendered as "object" it retains some connection to the notion of a purpose or goal. Such is the opinion of Devendrabuddhi, :is is apparent when he comments upon Dharmakirti's statement at the Outset ofPV3 that the illusory "hairs" or "flies" perceived by a person with ¢ataracts cannot be considered "objects" (arthas).56 As noted earlier,57 the of the problem here is that Dharmakirti might be obliged to posit not ~nly particulars and universals as objects of knowledge (jneya), but also a third type, namely, illusory objects. Commenting on this problem, Devendtabuddhi raises an objection and offers his reply:

trux

"Well, in the awareness of a person with defective vision there are false appearances such as hairs, flies, two moons and so on. Those

;~~g., G:2.6: siimarthyiid arthagatau pratipattigauravaparihiiriirtha1J1 ... ); and object (e.g., ~~2..19-20: svabhiivapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham na vyabhicaratt). In the context oflan-

g~age, the verb pra4vrt regularly appears with artha (in locative), where the latter has the ~~nse of referent. For one of many examples without pra4 vrt, see PVSV adPVI.62 (G:34.1-2:

'lsmiin na sarvatra dharmadharmiviicinor fabdayor viicye 'rthe nifcayapratyayavi!ayatvena kafi{fjvife!ab) .

~;This way of understanding artha is closely related to

Nagatomi's analysis of the com~{9:ynd arthakriyii. See below (259). While unambiguous examples of artha as object or aim ~~Stlot difficult to find, some of the more interesting cases are those where artha is used as ~and object within the same statement. See, for example, PVI.93 (cited by Nagatomi ~;2~7-68:56): api pravarteta pumiin vijfiiiyiirthakriyiik!amiin I tatsiidhaniiyety arthe!u ;!?iftiyojyante 'bhidhiiyakiibll. More interesting yet again are the numerous cases where the between "aim" and "object" is not at all clear. Consider, for example, PVI.III-II2: . titatkiiritulyariipiivabhiisinim I dhiya1J1 vastuPrthagbhiivamiitrabijiim anarthikiim II nty apy atatkiiriparihiiriingabhiivatab I vastubhediifrayiic ciirthe na visa1J1viidikii matii II. harmaltirti's statement (PVpd) reads: ~111usions such as the hairs that appear in the visual perceptions of a person with

gataracts are not objects (arthas) because there is no consideration of them as objects :C~efiidir niirtho 'narthiidhimok!atabl.

l~~ee chapter 2, 87-88.

l Si

fO UNDATION S OF DHA ..... IAKIRTI·S PHILOSOP UV

faIK

a~

do nOI accomplish any purpose (IilniM) al all: henet'. they are not COUnted as particulars. But even though they are devoid of tdic efficacy. thq;m not included among universals because they appe21 dC2ny and because they are nOI distribUted ovt:r anything. Thus, since they are nOt subsumm under the Clltegorits of paniculars and universals, they;m another kind of object. Hena, il is nOI correa m:u m('re are JUSt rwo kinds of objtttS. ~

No, il is nOI me c::a.K that ow view is not com:ct. To bt' spt'cific. hairs and so on are nor objectS (IIInhAs). Why? &cIllMJt tINy art not MnsUinnJ,. bt objND [PV}.ld j. That ii, persons engaged in practical action (lIJ4/1t1hanr" do not consid('r th('m to bt' objectS. The intmtion of this statement is as follows. If the flies and so on that are perceived by a person with cataractS and so on wen: to be objects, then one: would invcstig:ne the situation. asking. ~Is it a particular, or is it me other li.e.. a univt:rsa1W But they are nOI objectS in thaI &shion because, with regard to an awareness in which there is me appearance of Aies and so on. persons engaged in practical aaion do not have the intention. "This is the objta of dut awarmm ."~

sa In Dtw-nWdn.i". pbilooupb,. the:...., of thr SMWit Inm .,....IM... iI ~I a.mpia. In the: d"';""1 SMWiI of DharmDirti'. ti_. thc: lerm _ wed oulJidc, of ptta.:.ph, in thc: _of. ~1'«"0(1K,' · tnIUKIion.- ·litiption.-·Irp ",oc.«dinp- and oW.- Mlcd tmKS (Itt 86bdinsk- . . til.l . s.cn maninp VI: alJo found in BuddIUst lila' anm. One eumpk is thc: lerm ~..Jtm. one of thc: thirty "~ ttplatcd by 1OrfeilUIT' (...,~ ~ iI clear &om the: M~ivida Vi...,,";~ (t S)a--IJ4b; cf. Homer. ~Iit.. II:J06R), the: '~nn ."....J.b. in thil ~ ~ a "bu.ifICN as;rcrmm'" or ·mnsxdon.· ap«iaI!r_..twr~ .1S""1 ia inwol~ 1l\,e meaJ\''''of.,.iAtlbbwu m . . «" .... ,' IaHAICI with wIw mq ~ thc: bcsc known Im5t" of""...w....in Buddhist phi. bophy--nundy• .,....hb. in ~ KfLK of I ~convmUoo. · In Dharrnakini', eaK. "conVtiI.ion· iJ unainly one of ~ mnninp of .,....JJln. bu. Iw; mot~ ohm uses ~ .am in :anQlha, .mIN _ · prKtial aaion." which iDduda all of tht; acU";Uc.. such u communialion. dw au orimled roward _ pl. All of thctc mcaninp of 1IJIII"",J,h" can ~ d.rrivftI Ioimply (rom dIC ..mou. conmo:tI in which thr unn iI usal. bul one can abo find p..a in the QOr'ilJt>maty of~. such u "....,,;,."'" "action" or "impkmmtalion· {PVT:uJ'7. K:J70.1-4-11}.

INSTRUMENTAUTY, J USTI FYIN G THE SO URCES OF KNOWLEDGE

lfj

r:>cvendrabuddhi', comments make it dear Uul, on his view, Ihe term ttrth.t. ~ when uxd in W$MIC: of"objca: has a rdation to lOme goal or M purpose thaI beings pursue through their Mpr2Ctia.l aaions {IIJilIlllhiN}. When 6nh. is construed wiiliin a linguiscic or conceptual context (i.e., as refemu Of mClllins), the plxe of purpose is even more prominent, for we have already SC'etL that a pc:iuivu's apectacions play:l. role in the determill2tions that she draws in rdation 10 an ob;cct. In other words, an entity's causal characo:riscia. while independent ofa penxiver's experu.tions, are conccpru:alized by me pc:,ui.'a" wiiliin die context of expc:ct:uions concaning some goal." The :ambiguiry in Dharmaldrti's we of the term IInha becomes panicuIarly salient in the compound lerm IIrtIMhiy4. As we have secn, in the contelt of innrumcnralilY IInh.kriy4 is applied to the objects of a trusrworthy :l.wareness: that :l.warenw is trustwOnhy because it is a cognition of IInhilltriyl. This m:l.y seem :I. straightforward char.teteriution of lru5rworrhinCSl, but when we uy to sp«ify exxrly wh:at IInhll!triy4 means here, we encounter the :l.foremenlioned :ambiguity. In:l. semin:a! anic!e on the IOpic, N:agatomi describes our dilemma as a a.oicc between IWO interprct.:ltions of the compound IIrthll!triy4:

m,a

M wc 10 analyze Ithe compound IInhamy.tJ as padanmu,a 'Ule :action of:l. thing, its caw:a.l cfficiency,M or as IIrtNtllofri . prllJOillMlth'l4 1triy4 Maction that scrves a purpose, purposive or useful :K:tion -?'"

7"JoJ.. .... 'J.. M; "hPT tk pJ rJ-" 1M' p"", - I pJ . -.. IMl'7'> ",. 1M - Ji,. _ • .... I ",j rip,. _ ",. ~ I iii Ju, •• shU J.IIIf1 Mit ",ilf /W I rii ""', Jw NI l Mit J.._

-',.i,., ..

,. - " # ,.1. " ""' • ..",. ,..t",tk I. ... J.. _,. I...". ,.,,; iii I pi ~ ..j rij WI I. ,." ,.. tb.itr ,. j __. , _ I. ,." ,. J,..J .. #II; I ri #II ..'" ti ",,... ..,.." ......", tP""*,,., ~ ..." .. NI l iii IsIlT .I... ,.; .... 1","1 ti ,.,., .."" ito tIM ~ ""',.,. tk .., Ii J.n ,. P"I I. .......,. .... J.,.",. ..../If ... i ,;".,. tk; pJ J,n tk Ut J. - , . .... ]1,. _ a: P'VV-n

"It ",

'*,.If ""

"If •

. 1.

'Ji,.,. ""

(m. n. I ), ._, ' I,,} r~ _ J . . Hr~ ~"·.,,.,.....,....,,·trII~'!'''' iti

".,.,.,_,.l/JtmI

3 PVP: plM.. -Jilt. bul PVV·n (III , ft.

"If,... :ow

"""""''''''''

*- ~'"""""'" ~

60 S«chapur I (U.4-1,) &nd Dhumaluni'. commmo ift PVSV u'PVI.IJ7- 14J. tn~ in dw appmdix tlWfJ. II it worth nocinc tN.! dw indcpt-1IIknor of an ob;M:'. (:IUJaI fUn,;tioNJilJ' from dw;!dic ~ ofdw; !'CIeri", rnaka il d.i.ffic~h 10 a«IIflItdy ~rxKritc: DIwmaIdni', phiIotopby ... anyl'orm of pncr!YliJm. dopil( «nain 'pragmatic OOtllOl'G' ift hU philotophy. a: ~ (1m). 61 Napromi (' 967-61:H-~4).

260

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

In other words, if we say that an awareness is trustworthy because it is a cognition of arthakriya, does this mean that that object of that cognition functions so as to fulfill a specific purpose, or does it mean that the object is simply causally efficient, i.e., that it produces effects simpliciter? To demonstrate that both the telic meaning (i.e., "purposeful action") and the causal meaning (" causal efficiency") can apply to the term arthakriya, Nagatomi cites various passages that illustrate each meaning. Although some of the passages chosen by Nagatomi may not fully suppOrt his readings, there seems little doubt that the term arthakriya does range over a scale of meanings bracketed by these two extremes (i.e., the telic and the causal). 62 It is important to note, however, that Dharmakirti's philosophy probably would not support an interpretation of arthakriya solely in terms of either extreme. This is certainly the case with the interpretation of arthakriya in terms of purpose or aim, for to fulfill an aim, an object must be causally efficient. & for the interpretation in terms of causal efficiency, we have seen that for Devendrabuddhi and most subsequent Buddhist commentators, the content of awareness is an "object" (artha) only if it is interpreted within the context of persons engaged in practical action (vyavahara). However, as a speculative interpretation, we should note that in at least one context-that of reflexive awareness {svasarrzvedana}-the notion of arthakriya may be applicable only in terms of sheer causal efficiency, since it is difficult to see how practical action (vyavahara) makes sense within this context. Whether this latter interpretation be plausible (or implausible), it is nevertheless the case that all passages where a telic meaning is stressed still contain some appeal to causality, and the vast majority (if not all) passages that stress the notion of causal efficiency still rest on some notion of a telos within the context of practical action

(vyavahara). 63 Instrumentality (pramat}.ya) in Terms of Two Effects Nagatomi's identification of the two different emphases-i.e., the telic and the causal-that may be applied to the term arthakriya is highly signifi62 See Nagatomi (1967-68:55-57). Among the passages cited by Nagatomi, it is not at all clear that in PVp-3 arthakriyii is used primatily in the sense of causal efficiency.

63 Among the passages cited by Nagatomi (1967-68:56), one is PVI.98-99ab {}fiiiniidyarthakriyii1[l tii1[l tii1[l dntvii bhede 'pi kurvatap / arthii1[ls tadanyavifle!avi!ayair dhvanibhip saha II

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

161

ant, ror rhcsc two differmt emphases mrrcspond to two different ways of undc:rsWlding Dhannwn:i', norion ofinmumentaliry, csp:cially as int~r· pm~ by lkvendrabuddhi. To Itt how this is dK ase, ~ need to tim rcca.Il me definition of an insuumcnl ofknowledgc within tbe /d'4kA I)'S'" tem as the:: -most prominent ooor'" (s41ih4Jr4l11lff4) in me production of me resulting activiry (ItriJl}. specifically, thai rcsulwlI :teriviry is the insnu· menml dkc:r r,m"u!'Ap".IA), which most Pf':lmiJ;l~ Th~rimI oekfi~:u thoe resultant act of knowing (pn.",;ti) .... On ~endrabuddhi 's vi~, Dhu· makini proposes two al{~rnaliv~ inlerprc:tations of wbat constitutes the instrumental dfc:ct. H~ claiffil dllll -... there :ll'C two kinds of inslrumc:n· tal effccu: one call~ a -human aim (pJl11if4nha), - which is a medialed (dNJJ,. • II]IllNlhilll) ~ffcct, and a distinctive on~ (lthytuJ,.r w, - viI;'.III) that is not mediated. ~ When Ocvendn.buddhi speW of a human aim as the mediated (.".Vllhilll) instrumental cffw: resulting from d~ application of an inslru· menl of knowiedgc. he docs nOt explicitly define what is meant by "medi· ated- (1I]Il/)"";III). Neverthdess, his point is dear: me effect is medialed (IIJIIVllhilll) in mal there is an -intem.r (.".wu/h.iM; betw«n the func.tioning of thoe iNiu'Um~m (the: ItIflTIfl!fA. i.e.. the P"IflMli':'lfl) and the dfc:ct. In o th~r Vo'Ords, th~ ~ff«:t is separated (vpllllhil4) from the: insuum~m by vinuc of other intervening causes and conditions that mwt be in place for the: cffw: to occur. The: cffw: is tbw -remo(~" (."..,.u,illl) rdativ~ to the instrument. and since: some obstruction can therefore occur bctwttn tbe functioning of me instrument and th~ production of the effect, me dfca may not neceuari1y occur. even if the innrummt functions corru:dy. Thw. although the Engluh term - meciiued" bat conveys th~ notion that the prodUCl»on of me cffw: rcqu.irc:s other causes and conditions subsequent to me functioning of the instrument, ~ could as easily refer to thit dfttt as -remote," "separated" and so on. In contrast [0 the mtdiated dfca, the unmedialed effect is "distinctive" in

.... 1J'fiJ- ""'jU,..'!I ..".. ." "",..,rUM). Evm in Ihia cue• .-hm: ""_ h I}oI is axucnaed mady with rhr pn.xiu<:Don all ftauI awarmat, rhr dUau.ion of iUwion bin inthr:po B ....... (d,citindim:dyj doat_norianolplorpwpooe " ... iric"" limply duifyins rhr KaNl or 00(' . ~ia.iU

mevanl.

64 oS« chapm I, 1.1. 6) Onn.dnbuddhi (t'YP:Jb4ff): .. Iur~_'i ..... '"' IN

din .". .. dI.J,. -.." ~,., (". d.t/,. ~,. ..

mao,.,.,..

ti l .."..,",;"

161

FOUNDATI ON S O F DHARMAKI RT r S PHILOSO PHY

mat, as ~i not"ca:, it "nca:u:arily OCCUR..... This is so because the dfca is not separated (tI"FvU;u) from the inruument; it is, in faa , i
Dcvendrabuddhi develops this thea!)' of mediated and unmediated instrumental effea in order to ducidare Dharmwni's theory ofinstrumentality as found in PVl..l-6. Staning at PV1.}b, Dharmalcini focuses upon the claim that an awareness is the innnunent of knowing. Dharmalcini offers rwo rea50ru for this claim, and according to Devendrabuddhi, the notion of human aim (pllnq.irrhaJ as mediated dfc.cr is the focus ofDharmwrti's first reason for the instrumentality cL awareness: (PVl..Jb-d:1 Awareness is iruuumental because it is the primary ooor in one', action toward an entity that one wishca: to obClin or avoid." Pan of Dharmakirti's motivation here is to defend Dignaga's claim that awareness aJon~nd nOI the Knsc faculties o r any other faCtor in the proec:u of knowing- is instrumental." But in comparison 10 his Brah66 ~i (f"VT, IIJf=nb1-J) sJo-t tlUtittm·w .. rManins thai il ·wiU Wonitdr occur" flJM"';,.. NT Pjw). H~ mnarb: NY'.tA, ic is '~"1M ,Ji.unruo.. io ....., i, ..iD
rtnM,. ..

r",.,.,.r

~,., ~"" n". JNt Itrj.J M ,., ".; u Nr Ow" ,.i 1tJt:,tuI ""yO" t. "" '""' ,.; ,.,., ~ ,.r r." ... 1rJW _ )'.J ... ,..,. ".; .coo NT phM ,.,. rMfJ,., Door ~,. --',.,

"'" "'" ,.1IIMtI_ mi,..,;,,;, ,.JJ. If'

fIJ1ir" I ~,., ..,." h".... JI" If' t-r' ~

67 1u ~ nons (PVT, IIJIr.nbd: ""l"M ',"unocmled' iI an ~ thai ;,doepmdml on rrwrdy rho: innnurwnal eornion, and no< an)' other ~. An campk b a cosnition of an il\SU\lnlCnlal ob;ca.' 1m..',. __ ,., JNt.". .. ,,; t. 'IIJ' yO.,,; T!"pIM.oU "i m.J,. -JUt If'J,n upJ.J""...",., Iu "' fIj .See bc:Iow, 161ft'.

PAt'" __

68 PVL}b-d: tiIJi"....!U.. 1"''7'UI'S W,nJbilfll""w ....,,, i/ .,.._,,;.

69 See 1'S1.I.Jm..IO and ..,.)C-d with PSV J til.

t...,.

INSTP.UMENTALlTY, JUSTIFVI N C T HE SOURCES OF KNO WLEDGE

16}

manical countcrpam. Dharmakini', dd'efU(: involves a significant shift in me way instrumentaliry is being defined. SpecifK:ally, r.uher than consider an instrument or knowledge to be instrumental rebtive primarily ro the resulwlt act or knowing, Dharnukini construes an instrument or knowl· edge in temu or another resulting action. namdy. the ~rttiv«'s activiry (prllll{tti) in rdalion to whal is to be attained or avoided. This is the dkct thai ~ndl":lbllddh i conJidll!n: ro be a human ::lim (p """.r4'1'fM). a d aim wamnttd by W fact that. dstwhere. Dharrnakini ~ uates a human aim with thai which is to be either attai ned or avoided." In speaking or activiry (prllurtti) as the mediated dfea: thaI is a human aim , Devend rabuddhi proposa a specifi c inlerpret:ation or "activiry." Describing the manner in which the instru mentali ry or cognition applies to ~ contell of a

hum:a.n :aim , h~ s:ays:

H aving known through awareness an ai m (IInJu) Ihat should be done, a person implemenls i[5 mearu and thereby atai ns the

70 Ie iI-.onh notinsdw Uddyou.Ic:an (NY f1.ill) mW:s I JirniJ.u ~ whm dc:a.li", with a probkm in Vliuylyana'l ~wion 01' i~. To Ix prKiK. 1M problem here 1I1h.11• ... inf...",,,,,, i> • m.an. <0 11a~ Ju..:",...Ic..~. men .in"" i"fr"""." ;. ;todf a ~e"" of &II ob;ea. i, c:ouId Iu~ not Iu..,. "",,;,..,., r,r.",i ti) .. iu rQU/t fI,..~bta,*;1I obi«t Iw alrady brcn """iud. After lim propoti", apmlNlkalIlMUI""'. Udd)'OQhn t\lI'flt to. pIUIotoophiaI......, WI haI_ reonanc.c,.;m DharmaJdrti'. approKh: .~

... MlppG'<' chae the IUlcmHll in dw tat tw t1w 1OIIowi", man.ing: inf...mu is • ropIirion thaI involva thaI wlUch is marka! by an infnmliallicn (J.itipi). Bul in chal QK, dIuc would Ix eM huh olh.1vi1l& no IUIIllanc aa olJcno.,..inS-" W~..,.dw ~"I'

1'1ti. io.-~ ~ ~~ ...... oftlwoh;eco .. w+u..

_ .bouId J'/'Oid, employ, or ig>or~ ;oK tho: 'T"Uh. MO«'O\'TI'. in ITpfd 10 iu own object. any iruu ummtal """ilion runaioru II dw wabaJ aaMty, JUCh due "inscru-

mn\1 ol~· mnru ·,ftUlti. . . .tion fln ...,'ti)." With ~ 10 aMdIn ob;ea, all ,..._~ fVnaioo II t1w inmumcm, luch thaI ""..'!"i' lnQRI "thal by rMIIII of which eM obj«t ("..~ iI known r,r.",/ytI,,)." If dw; won! ',~.~ funnioftl II eM ..mw xtivity. chen wNol would M eM mulcanl ..:tmcr.1'hm: could be no ..-Ir bta....., the: ob;ea it; alrndy "'I7'i....t.Viuyiyana] huoUd ...... dw: C05"i....... of dwoOjcct ....... whOch one ohouId .¥Oid, employ or isnorr lIT raull boaill<' ....ben eM ob;oa it;1mown. onr

[In

rcopona<'

m.

tw me- copUDona. nut is. ....ben t1w oO;ca is known • ......, hal. duu IcindJ of meN lioll' 0"" copiza dw: ob;.ct II mae which .. 10 tw 1MIidod, ""'piorrd "';~

....".._

[Mw.nt NJ- __ t...+J.ti ,,.n,.m~ iii f ...... (}I ~6htIw..,. ~ !f ...... " ' ' ' #.4~".", ~mh f ~ u ,...Ii~"., " ...iti!l , ...w-,. iii I ~.,.",.. ".,. ....~_ I

'''''';,.'' '' ' ' ; ,r••

,,..,u!f6'!l_"'''

,-1.",.

!",,,, I ,.A Mbw'USw..~ "."..~u"" J.i". ",""F) *"I-Y rtNU ! Iiku,!, ,,., ~'!' 1M....·.. iti I pt." .,<Mw..., 1frw" 1tJN,J",.,. triJJ,i.wUhir M.nwti ~ ",,! i t.,. ~/I'" _ 1,

,ur.n,.

264

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

activity defined as the direct apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not directly apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one activity with regard to a real thing that one should obtain or avoid [PV2.3b-d]. That is, it is the primary factor-awareness is the primary factor-in the activity whose object is a real thing which one should obtain or avoid and which is thus called a "human aim." Therefore, since awareness is the primary factor, awareness is instrumentaL71

s

Devendrabuddhi's interpretation suggests three phases in the process of employing an instrumental cognition to obtain a human aim. First, one has a cognition that apprehends some entity as what one needs to obtain or avoid, i.e., as that which fulfills one's aim. Second, one implements the means for obtaining or avoiding that entity. And third, one obtains the "activity" or "activation" (pravrtti) of another cognition, namely a perception in which that entity is experienced as fulfilling one's goal. Thus, on Devendrabuddhi's view, at PV2.3b-d, Dharmaklrti uses the term "activity" to refer to the activation of a perception of that entity. To be specific, it is a perception that Devendrabuddhi elsewhere describes as one "in which the accomplishing of one's goal appears" (arthakriyanirbhasa)'72 From a lexical standpoint, the interpretation of "activity" (prav.rtti) in this fashion is certainly legitimate, since Dharmaklrti often uses this term to speak of the "activation" or occurrence of an instrumental cognition,l3

71 PVP (3b5ft): shes pa blang bar bya [bal 'i don shes nas de sgrub par byed pa nan tan du byed pas mngon sum du byed pa 'i mtshan nyid can gyi Jug pa skyes bus thob par gyur ro / de bzhin du dor bar bya ba shes nas de sgrub par byed pa nan tan du mi byed pas / de mngon sum du mi byed pa 'i mtshan nyid can gyi Jug pa thob par gyur te / blo ni tshad ma nyid / bfang dang dor bya'i dngos po yi / Jug fa de gtso nyid phyir dang / bfang bar bya ba dang dor bar bya ba'i dngos po 'i yul can dang / skyes bu'i don zhes bya ba can gyi Jug pa de fa / de gtso bo nyid kyi phyir te shes pa gtso bo nyid yin pa 'i rgyu 'i phyir / blo ni tshad ma nyid yin no.

n Devendrabuddhi first uses the term arthakriyiinirbhiisa explicitly at PVP:2b7 (ji ltar 'dod pa'i don byed par snang ba can = yathiibhimatiirthakriyiinirbhiisa), but this notion is dearly what he has in mind when he refers repeatedly (starting at 2a3) to cognitions such as "a perception whose object is the sensation of warmth of a fire" (de'i dro ba'i regpa fa sogs pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum), "a subsequent cognition whose object is burning, cooking, etc." (4<13: sreg pa dang 'tshed pa fa sogs pa'i yul can gyi phyis kyi shes pal, and so on. 73 Perhaps the best known example is the negative statement in the context of nonperception (PVI.3a apravrttib pramiiIJiiniim apravrttiphaliisatz).

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLE DGE

16S

And from a commonKnsc sandpoint, Dcvendnbuddhi's description makes good ~nsc. In 1M contat of wishing to obtain heat, first one app~­ hmds SOnK heat-souIU: one sees, for aample, that a fi re is burning in the fireptace across the room. Second, one implemenb the means to obtain that entity: one walks across the room. And third, one apprehends the fulfillment of one', goal; one experiences warmth. On rhie modd. whal then does it II"IaJl for an iruuument:a.l rognition such as a perttpt;cm to be the ~primary factor in one's activity with regard to a rea.I thing that one showd obtain or avoid?" In brid', it means that the pcrc:ept'ion is an instrument (ItllrIl'!Jl) in that it enables one to act in a manner mat ruulb in the accomplishmcm of one's goal; in orner 'NOrds, it is what -makes one: obtain" (pni,.J...) an object thaI accomplishes that goal. obviouJ: rroblem~ r.h ~1 rhi~ r.a.i~ $lJch » th~ fact that ont"" activity might be hampe.red---60me intervc:ning turn of ~nb might pteYml one from reaching the fire. For the momCf'll let us simply acknowledge dUI this 'NOuld be a plausible way 10 ddint" an instruBdow _ will

eJrrlo~ Klm~

mental cognition in tmru of a human aim (p~f'U!4r1h';' Although this intaprmtion nuy be plausibk, it does not strike me: as the man straightforwud re:>ding ofPVl.}b-
to (dutt" the notion that rht" ~nse faculties and such are also causes for activity. That is.:a penon who has facultia and so On does not thtttby n«cssarily cn~ in aaMty toward somt" smsc objca:; orherwi.tc, one WOI.IJd have ro o;ond ... dc dl:tt o ne enRcs

in activity mt"reiy by virtue of their existencc. Instead. it i5 as

dvol prompc me to ..wn~ that dU. _ is~. Fim , Drvcndr-MNddhi'. din.-a po.. of ,._ptA; in tho: yux rd'-.n only ro in tIN: _ of the "aaMtion" of:an in&uwDM1II copiOon (J'VP:)bs-4). S«ond, in • •btc:qolt:l'll poillll in 1m oommmu on I'VLI-ti, h .. dw nrlkr InUO: mar .. apln mlCl'llttd, and n(IC thc ~ of ".",m ... penon'. aaion IOW:tfd :an ob;ca. 74 ~ an::

twO /'CQOnS

p..,m

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKUlTrS PH ILO SOPHY

follows: having known what should be obtainro md avoided, a penon who is that knower applies himsdf accordingly. That in temu of which a judicious ~non (prrk,JpiirwUri,,) is initially promptro to act is the cause of action toward the intended objta (IIrt"'). Since Other awarmesscs arise by dim of that inicial awarent'$S or have thai in itial awal'Ul(SS as their objca, only that initial awarrot'$S is imtrumental!'l These commenu immediately follow Devendrllbuddhi's interpretation of -activity- r,,-.vrni) as the activation of a pc:tc.eption in whKh one a.:~ri ­ ences the accomplishment of OM " goal. But here. a difJ"C1ent interpl'tt.ltion of activity is suggested: it is the pttttiver's initial aaivity toward the go.!. In tM aampk cited a~, activity would be the first moma u of sening out acros.t the room to reach the: fire, or mort sp«ifacally, the tirst moment of the intention to do so. Thw. on this interpretation a cognitton is an iru:trumem of knowledge whose application resultl not in a pcKeption of the accomplishment of one's aim. but rather in one's aaivity toward an entiry tbat is capable of accomplishing that aim. In shon, such a cognition is an instrument (Jt.,-.tI/I) because: it is "that which causes one to act" (p'-lIlMuUItIl) toward the fulfiUment of one's aim. That Ocvendntbuddhi is here speaking of an insuumental cognition as that which initwly motivates action wiUbt-come panicub.rly dear when we rerum to a discussion ofinstrumennlity in terms of human aims. In brief, Devcndrabuddhi is oblip to see an instrumental cognition as a "motivator of aaion" (Prllll4rt11ltlf) in order fO avoid the conclwion that certain forml of dtltrminate Itnowltdge rh:u are nor inferences would :llso be instrumenul, as we will see. The kq- ovetall issue is tlut, in the conta t of the mcdiatcd innrumtntal effect that is a human aim, Dcvcndrabuddhi conSfruts an insuumenul cognition as an iru:trument (1t6'-6!U') in (trnu of (W() rdared but undtniably different "actions-: (I) in the primary ItOSC, the action is the cognitive aa of having a perception in which appears the

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

267

:aocnmplimm.-:nr nf nn.-:'s aim: :md (2) in a .K!COndary se:ns.-:, th.-: action is rh.-: initial action of Sttting out to accomplish thai aim. Before moving on ro the notion of an unmroiated effect, we nttd to make one final obscrv:arion: namely, that on DcvendlOlbuddhi's imerprel1ltion, Dharmwni accrpu the notion that, from at least the perspective of attaining a human aim, an iruuument ofknowlcdgc and its effect may be conuru~ H diuinct. ThiJ i~ indiotM morl 5f::"kly hy ~ndr.abudclh; 'J claim that contrD)' Mon may imef'YC:ne bctwttn the instrumental cognition and the effect, such that the eff«t is not necesArily attained. in each case. At first glance, this separation of instrument and instrumenra! effect (pmM'.I4ph414) might not s«m problematic, inasmuch as both Dignaga and Dharmwni t'ltplicidy note that such a distinction may be made in conventional ~rms .'" But Digniga =d Dlunn21cini', ~plicil n:uemcnu about such an imputed orconvenrional sepat:l.lion rest upon the claim that the inruumcnt and its cffi:ct arc u1rimatdy a single cntiry-: the cognition that is the "instrument is iuclf the "effCCt," It is difficult to s« how this approach [() the singularity of instrument and effect can apply to Devt-ndnbuddhi's notion of a mediated instrumental effect, since the sensation of warmlh , for example, that is obtained wr approa.ching a h~ dearly cannot be considered identieal in:my f.u.hion with the initial perception of that hre from a distance. It would thus appear that Dcvendrabuddhi's notion of the mediated. effect, if it is not to contradict Digniga and Dharmwrri's claims about the ultimate identity of instrument and effect, must be construed as conventional in a difWenr f.ashion . Specifically, rather than :a conceptual diffe n :nti:l.lion of the l ingul:l.J" "nliry thaI is awaren,," inlO a cliitinci instrumenl and effect, for Devt-ndral>uddhi an emirely differem comext must be aslumed whereby entities dlllt arc u1tim:ncly distinct arc related through ausaliry-: the dfect (whctheraction as initial motivation or action as subsequent perception) is auscd, even ifindircctly, by till: instrurnenw W

c.ogrmlon.

How useful i. this :aspect of Dcv.-:ndr.abucldhi'. interprct:&tion of Dlwmakirti's theory ofinstrumcnraliry? For many sub5cqUCnt comment:UOB, the answc:r might wdI be "nOi at all,· inasmuch as the subsequent tradition of Buddhist PramiJ)lI Thcorisu, which often relies quile squarely upon Dcvendrabuddhi's commentary, has largely abandoned this portion

FOUNDATIONS O F DHARMAK IRTI 'S PH ILOSO PHY

of his interprrtation,l'I' But dcspiu: this later R:j«.tion, Devendrabuddhi's approach does provide a pia wible and attractive interpretation of Dhar~ malcin i's explicit construal of irutrumenmliry in turns of an awarencss as '" the primary !?clor in action toward a human aim: And even though Dcvendrabuddhi'$ intcrpret:ltion may appcu to comradia some aspccu of Dharmakini'$ philosophy, the commenmrial gymnastics thaI an abandoomem of Devendrabuddhi', view prompu in bter commcnt:ltors suggests that the flaw may lie in Dhumwni'$ theory, rather than Dcvcndrabuddhi's intcrprrtation.1I I NSTaUMENTALITY IN TERMS OF TIlE UN MED IATl.D EFFECT

Dcv... ndrabuddhi notcs that Dharmakirti does not argo... for the instrum..-nwity of aWllR:ncss $Oldy on the basis of its primacy in aa;on, in wbich COntext 1M norion of a mediated instrumental df«.t is panicularly relevant, Instead. imm
tive im",e; this is the case beause that cognition only oa:urs when that obj«.tive i ma~ is pn:st:nt.1f For Dcvc.ndrabuddhi, this scrond argument CimblishCi tbe instrumentality of aWllrenw not in temu of a mediated dTect, but rather in temu of an

n Dha,mOll3n, fur a:ampk, rmka ~I,>C;III'" oll>o:wndrabudcihi'l rommcnla, bul M

appnr 10 rntn.ion ~ ~ 1M _ion of a medialed iMllummw d'fKt, He inslad _b (with klmc: dilf..:ulry) 10 esplain iMlNmcnW cosn ilion in IC'I'TTII ofbuman .i.......itt-.I Ulumin•• ,emote dira, Thil rn.oka: i. difl"c"h ..... him 10 rcconcik the unlion Mf'At<" the blln alwnmcnl of a ~ich iI dnrIy the pIll'pOfe of employins an iNirumenw wsni1ion in tho: eotIlat of human ailN---4nd .M rcNaJ 10 sdmil dull the tfr«t could bt 1Cp&nIO: &om Iho: illllNmemrJ cosnidon. 5«, fut n:ampk, 1M JOmtWha. IOfIUfed in le'p~a ' iolU of nd , .... in LPI' (e'I-, "W.) ; lrand... ed in

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78 The f.,ult in OIurmaklrri 'l rheoty is specil1cally dull, in PV}. he oonsO!krs.., inItrummW wsnilion only in fa" .... of an u.. mediaRd irutrummw dim: with link rden,," 10 human ~ms ~ bon his preICfIwioa in PVl..-6, wt.id! dearlyeon.rrucl an iJuuu... menial WJPition in _ ofhuman ai..... 3ppcars.o rntui~ ~'I notion of a medialM illlmUl1tllai dI"ect. In "-t, DlwmM!rti'l atmsm unrmml ofirumunmw dfm (,'.",.!W~ in pvJ doIS IMII cormpond wdl 10 hil accou.nc of inwummeaI nilion in PVl.l-6.

cos-

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I NSTRUM ENTALITY: JUS TIFYI NG T HE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

169

unmcdiarcd (tlvyavahitlJ) one. Interpreting PV1.41-C. Devendnbuddhi Il!marlu: The [mere] cognition of an object (Jon rIOfS jHI- IJrthi.tJhit4m4) is an unmcdiatcd inStrumental effect.- That is, dut through which, when aU other causes are in place, the convention of "Imowing"' (rt"Sl /UZ • fJl"llhp.tti) il utidiffl wirhOLlt funher mediation iJ an irutrumem ofknOYllcd~. And nothing but the simulxnam li.e.• image] of the object has that lack of media· don, for it iJ through that image that irutancc$ of knowing are distinguished from each other, even though th(}' are indistin· guishable in terRU of their naNre of being experiences. Hence, JIlL In tiN Ji./.forr ..tU.hn.. nfth, "I,·,..nw i .....g.o-i ..... due ( 0 m:u quality of the cognition-dle awareness, i.e., the kntlwint. is tlif ftrmtiAtd And tina this effect c:mu wlNn tlutt is p1'Nn~i . e.. when the object. image is presem-awareneu is therefon: ilUuu, mental If when "," iJ present, ..x·comes into aistencc, it makes seosc that ",-is the most efficient ClUSC of "x, .., But if at some point there were no ruch dfect {i.e. . "x·j when .y - W'U pracnt.

then one would rdiu that " x" depend& upon JOme other mediating causal OOOr. That being the cue, since that former cause • •y. is mediated by something else on which it depenm 10 produce.lf, ]would not be the most prominem caus:al factor. There· fore. it would not be the instrumental ca~. Even when the seruc faculties and so on arc present, they do not [n«.cssarilyJ have the causal f'unaion of producing an ~ bca..s.e rhey au mediated by the object-sjmulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is ncceuarily known because it is not medialed by anything dsc for that knowing to occur. Sintt it is of the nalure of awarencss, it is the basiJ for positing an effect that does not depend on anything funhcr for ju presena: ....u BOThe Tibaan (I'VP--4Ul n:ao:b a!,.J _i ..... h _rlW,.,-",M.......",. Ji" _ H_ ew!. Ihit_.pill fO bc_ of!he lIWIy cuaof IUbjea/prrdiar., in'mSion in a TIbnan tnnsbtion fix. Suukri, KI1(metll!N1 -..u probably: . 7 di...,.......,!"9L,..~. ~ Noce rNI hne I ~ .... to _rdy marki"l lhor pmiial(.

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170

FOUNDATIONS OF OHAkMAkIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

From the viewpoinc of Dharmakini's BrahmaniaJ counterparts, the above argument for me instrumenrality of awareness (as opposed to the sense filcuhies, ere.) follows an analysis more typica.l to this style of discourse, for the instrumenra.l effect (;rllmdlJ4phllta) in question is not the attainment of some human goal, but rather the mere act of knowing (prllmiti) itself. But even here Dharmakini adds a significant twist [0 his argument, for his analysis does not roUow the typica.l kJrllkD-theory discw.sed earlier." On (hat meory, an instrument of knowledge would be me instrument (k41'1l!fll) for the production of a resulting aerion (Ini]tl) that is an instrumental effect (prllml1~ph4illJ consisting of the act of knowing (pr4m;ti) . There is thus a cause-cffea relationship between an instrument ofknowl~ and the instrumental eEtta that arises from it, and as such , the: instrument ofknowledgc and the innrumenCli dfca arc disrinct. Likewise, on lXvcndrabuddhi's inre:rpr«ation, an inStrument of knowledge construed in terms of a mediated efftct is also bued on a cause-cffect relationship; an insuume:mal cognition is the cause, and the resultant activity (prllvrm) is the effect. In con{fa5[ to the klirak,o..theory and the context of a human aim 'fUll medi.ted effect. Dharmakini', analysis of an innrumem ofknowled ~ in [emu of what Devcndrabuddhi calls an unmediated effect does not employ a causa.l modd, in part because Dharmakini follows Digniga in rejecting the distinction between ill5lrument (kllrll{IAJ and effect (1my4. p'"'ta) as found in the klr41.theory." Dharnukini thw rqc.ru the notion of understanding instrumentality in terms of a causal relationship betwu:n two dis-

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INST RUMENTALI T Y: JUSTIFYIN G 111£ SOURC ES O F KNOWLEDGE

2.71

tinct entities---the instrument and its dfcct. He instead maintains that instrument and action are idc:mial.; spccifial.ly. they arc: the awarc:nml' objective aspect (.fT4hy4)and subjective aspect Wtih4kwm), respectively." Dharmakini's ultimate rejc:aion or the .tamA-theory's differentiation or innrwnent and action becomes clear when he mums to mis issue later in me Pra1Ni!f4Vtimil4. Responding (0 me claim that instrument and instrumenw dfca arc: actually identical. his objector rc:marb. - It is contndictory fOe aaion and instrument to be: identical.- And Dharmakini ~rs: This is not true bcca~ WI!' admit th:at there is a {concc:ptu:ally constructed] dilfcrc:nce berYluu these qualities lof awareness, i.e.• the objccth-e and subjective aspects] . But ~ maintain that the: real thing [i.e.. :aw:arenc:ss itself] is undilfcrenriatcd.1l' Such is the a.se fo r :any establishment of action :and causa! factors bc:ca~ even when dw: real things construed as the instrument :and such arc: considered to be dilfcrent, the establishment of them as instrument and such ocrurs through imputation (tinlpa).8S T aIU"fj ..... pooi ................. "..,., . ..... wlt.id. io ... I.e -.bIioheci (~by ..... i .......mmt (Iu,.!y a Wihtuu), Dlwm:alcJni intnpml lht tyiJMltlu", u m( niyi beaUK il is ~isbcd in IftmI: of the ~ whid. is thus the ;rutrumml. 'fhQ, is d", basil lOr the claim !luI ~ :and ~ a:and in the ..dation of ""'~"7"_t/:.qd"M.hwo. Set. lOt aunpk. PV'.JI4- )l S:

W( do IlOI acap! Ow thnc ill diR'uma benocu. Uw objea of the acnon and Uw objm ofUw iNmIment. Iftlx:y hac: dx:$UlCoO;m (nrJ,.). dono !hi: notion !luI thty an: aaually rwo ditkmll cnliries is mo:aninpe... M..,w.(t. if lhey 1u.¥'C ~ ob;ca. chq Jhould IlOI ocau ~lially. l( tMy OCCUr III~ Aim lime, !hen IlItre is no rdatiorl oftlx:", u tbc cttabIilhinl mnN (uJtD.NI) and the cstatMiIhcd (nliry (~ rSur on our new]. tho: .... bjutm:: and vbj«tin: ~ of tho:.OOo ~ ddined u tIx: em.biishinl mearu and ew.b1Wx:d mriry braUM: establishment (~ IIW) of subjcaM Mpea iI bued upon tIx: obj«ti.., up«t. r ~.;,.".. MnU .,.~.~ Jdbrb.M....,.". ."."..". ow ,.. f1ir !r._1Ihhi1J II 'w, 'd1H... rM.w.~ ~ Jh?- ~ J WIIJi'_IMir.,..- ~

me:

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me:

_L ,-,L N, I. . "'Im"!'

Nocc "- aI"-'&/I ~.b."Uhi here (rYl':l1i1b~) ....d cb>ewtx:n:..den "" tho: __ "PMU· (.".u)of awata'IftI (Jbi.ftC.) u tIx: -objea..imubcrwn" (~)and tho: "copilion of tIx: objca" (~). I u.ndcnu.nd tbcK (WI) 10 ~ Iynonyma for ,..~ and

,......- ......."". 86 PV)lbb l ,

a.

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tAn"'''i

87 ~ (1I,.,)' 'Ji'~"lpJ..J"'; """ .. tt?JU"lM.. ,...",. tW u. UJ"l>'''lfot ,. tk HMt 1m,. ..,.. ~i u.,,. 'i u. UJ,., "".., - " , . Ji- ON. 88 PV).JIIb,."" C- tIx: critialllOla in Touki. ,J rir. ), _ tI Jh,.",..H
171

FOU NDATI O NS OF DHAlMAKIRTI'S PH ILOSOPH Y

To suppon the claim mat innrument and instrumental dfect are actually identica.l, Dhartllak.ini effectively proposes an enrirdy n~ way of un~r­ sl1Inding what constitutes an instrument: rather than being the aUK of some t('$uitant activity (1m,.,). it il instead that which is unmediated (IIvyaWlhitJl) with regard to me activity. Al Devendrabuddhi explains in the comments cited a~. when the activity (kriy4) in question is an indubit.lble cognition (prllmiti), the instrument is thus -that mrough which, when all other causes are in place. the convention of 'knowing' is Atisfied without runher mediation. ~ In shon, it is that which requir('$ nothing furmer in order for one to be cunently having a cognition of the objta. In emblishing the innrumc:ntality of an in.mumenw cognition in these: temu , Dharmalcini (as interpreted by Dcvendnlbuddhi) rccogni-z.es that one must be able to distinguish between cogrurioru. That is, if an irutrument of knowledge is mat which enabl('$ one: to claim that a cognition of an objta is occurring, one must be able to distinguish the case: where a cognition of that objta is occurring from a CIS(' where such a cognition is not occurring. With this in mind. Dharmalcini also claims that the irutrurnefl[ of knowledge is the "final diffe:l'C'ntiator~ (a"tyabhui4It1t) of cognidoru. Thus. nex only ~ it provide [he basil fo r claiming that a cognition is occurring. bUi it also accounts for the differences between the contents of cognitions."' As Devmdrabuddhi points our, on Dharmakini's vi~ the only Dcer of knowing that can meet thc:sc: critena of an instrument of knowledge is the "objtaive image- WJ/ry.HJ'II) or "object-5i mulacrum ~ ("~nya~i . e .• the appearance: (pratibh4.sa, pnnibimbll) in a cognition. Funhermore, since the image is actually an aspect of me mind arising in the form of an image:. and since the mind is ultimately undifferentiated. the instrument is uhim:uely nothing but the mind (i.e., the cognition) iudE. Thus. for an entirdy different reason than the one proposed in the COntext of a human aim. an instrument of knowledge is once again shown to be nothing but the awareness itself, i.e.• the instrumental cognidon.

Two SENSES OF ARTHAK~YA At the beginning of our discussion on insrrutnentaliry in terms of mediated and unmediated eff<:as, I mentioned that Nagatomi's division between twO THE Two EFFECTS AND THE

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u""'_ ~'!fJtl,iti!1 1 MMwr. Mf",uMn-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

~eflses

273

of arthakriyii is relevant here, for it parallels the distinction between :pevendrabuddhi's two types of instrumental effects. More specifically, it ~eems likely that something akin to Nagatomi's two senses of arthakriyiiare ~resupposed by Devendrabuddhi in the formulation of his theory: the lhotion of a mediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthakriyii ~"telic function" (Nagatomi's "purposive action"), while the notion of an ~l1mediated instrumental effect presupposes the sense of arthakriyii as liriausal efficiency." In this section we will explore how this might be the ~e, with the important proviso that, since Nagatomi's categories are not ?ecognized per se by Dharmaki:rti and Devendrabuddhi, we are necessarily ~p'gaged in a somewhat speculative enterprise. ;t;To understand the relevance ofNagatomi's two senses of arthakriyii, we Aeed first to recall that when a cognition's instrumentality is defined in ~~rms of a mediated effect, it is an instrument (kararza) because it is the ~ost important factor in the production of a subsequent effect, namely, the \l:ftainment of a human aim (puruJiirtha). As we have noted, the instru~ent's effect is "mediated" (vyavahita) because even though the cognition ~sjnstrumental, its function must be supplemented by later conditions and aevelopments, if the desired effect is to be obtained. :~ The fact of being mediated indicates that this way of defining instrubentality emphasizes the first of Nagatomi's interpretations of the comlound arthakriyii, i.e., arthakriyii as "telic function" or, to use Nagatomi's ~term, "purposive action." As noted above, arthakriyiiis relevant to an instru~ental cognition's trustworthiness. Specifically, an instrumental cognition t(pramiirza) is always trustworthy, and that trustworthiness is described as ),rthakriyiisthiti, which Devendrabuddhi interprets as a cognition of arthao/etiyii. Now, if arthakriyii is understood as telic function, this means that an ;:i~strumental cognition is trustworthy in that it results in a cognition of ~dic function. Or, to put it another way, the instrumental cognition is ~rustworthy because it results in the activation of a cognition in which the ~ccomplishment of one's goal appears. This is, as we have seen, Deven~rabuddhi's way of construing an instrument of knowledge in terms of a ;mediated instrumental effect. Thus, by interpreting arthakriyii as "telic function," we arrive at Devendrabuddhi's notion of an instrumental cog~ition in terms of a mediated instrumental effect: the cognition is instru:!pental in that it is a cause for the resulting "activity" that is a cognition of !the accomplishment of one's aim. •. In contrast, when understood in terms of an unmediated instrumental ~ffect (avyavahitapramiirzaphala), the instrumentality of a cognition involves

274

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

no appeal to a causal relation between instrument and effect. On this approach, a cognition is instrumental not because it is the most important factor in the production of some goal, but rather because it is that which is the primary factor in establishing that an "effect"-i.e., the pramiti itself_ is already in place. Since the instrumental cognition is thus occurring at the same time as the instrumental effect (pramartaphala), there can be no question of mediation, whether causal or otherwise. But although neither Dharmakirti nor Devendrabuddhi is specific on this point, it appears that when an instrumental cognition is defined in this fashion, one likewise cannot construe its trustworthiness in terms of a cognition of arthakriya as "accomplishment of a goal" (i.e., "telic function"). The reason for abandoning this model of trustworthiness is that it would lead to an infinite regress. That is, consider the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition that "results" in an unmediated effect-i.e., that cognition itself is the manifestation of the desired effect that is one's goal. If the trustworthiness of such a cognition were to consist of it leading to some subsequent cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's goal, then no such cognition would ever be trustworthy, for no cognition would be trustworthy in and of itself without appealing to a later result. 90 It can be argued, however, that the trustworthiness of at least one type of awareness whose effect is unmediated can (or perhaps must) be interpreted in this fashion, i.e., in such a way that its trustworthiness consists of its resulting in a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyanirbhiisa). To be specific, such a cognition would be one that is the latter cognition itself, i.e., one in which the accomplishment of one's aim already appears. An example would be the sensation of heat when, after seeing. a fire from a distance, one finally reaches it and feels its warmth. Here the perception-the sensation of warmth-is itself the fulfillment of one's aim; hence, no further mediation is required in order for one's aim to be accomplished. The instrumental cognition, in short, would be its own effect, which is exactly what is meant by an unmediated instrumental effect. If this interpretation is correct, such an instrumental cognition may be counted as having an unmediated instrumental effect at the same time as involving the notion of resulting in the accomplishment (kriya) of one's aim or telos (artha}.91 90 Although Devendrabuddhi does not discuss it specifically, Sakyabuddhi notices that the problem of infinite regress must be addressed (PVT, nye74a5-6 and 74bz). 91 This certainly becomes the opinion oflate commentators. See, for example, Dharmottara's comments to that effect (Steinkellner and Krasser 1989:13.3ff).

INSTRUMENTALI TY, JUST ifYIN G TI-I£ SOU RCES Of KN OWLEDGE

17S

h would thU1 appear that 50me notion of aim or td05 is applicable to the interprcution of IInhttlrriyJ as the crilerion for trwtworthincu even in this particular type of cognition with unmcd.iated effect, namely, a cognition in which the accomplishment of one's aim already appcan. But even if this is the case, ~buddhi's discussion of unmcdiated inmumenw dfCCland Dharmakirti's initial devdopmenl of the idea-is probably also intended to account for in.strumenralilY in another fa.shion. Specifically, the norion of an unmediared effect also enables one 10 understand a cognition's insuumentality without any concern for human aims at all. O n this a1tcrnalivc inttrprctation, one can claim that III/cognitions arc instrumental in a minimal sense. Although neither Dharmaldni nor Dcvcndrabuddhi is explicit on this i.uuc, il would appear that an allemarive interpretation of IIrtlMltriy4 must also be applied on this imerprct:u ion, since the entil>t poim here is to cvalWlC a cognition without reference to goals. Following Nagaromi, the a1ternalivc interprcation suggcsted-bUt nCVff ckarly statcd-by Dharmooni or dlC: earliest commentators is that of IInhUriy4 as mere causal functional icy: an emiry has IIrthttlrriy4 in the simple sefUC that il has effect!. On this interpretation of IInhllkriyJ. an ""'~1!1$ would ~ tnllrwnnhy in th~ minim,.1 v:n~ th.:u it i~ ,. rr:al m~ _ tal ~nt: it has ~iti in thot ~ seruc thu it is ~r.tbliJhed (,u,jlll) as a causally dFiciem moment of coruciousncu. This minimal trustworthincu amounu to the claim that, reg.ardkss of the determinate interpretation of a cognition', contem, one can always reliably know that one is cognizing. Since mis minimal truStworthiness is applicable to III/ awarencues, all awarcncs.scs can be coruidcrcd trUStworthy. Although ;1 m:ay U\"m odd to m,unmin t"'", ~'Y ;nst:llla of ,.W:lten~n is trwtwonhy in the minimallCl1SC discussed abovr, this interpretation helps 10 aplain £WO other nOlions proposed by Dharrnak.ini. The first is one we have discussed previously, namriy. mat illusory objras such as the hairs ICCn by a person with cataracts are not "objecu· (IInhlls) bccaU5C they arc not considered such by persoru engaged in practical action (lIJIIwthtJrll); in other WONk from the ~pcct:ivc of ~lc.in8" hum,.n ,um flU.,},.,) . th,., visual cognition of "hairs" in the mind of a person with cataractS is not inslrumental. BUI for thai penon, those "hairs" IIl'tobjcct!l when consKictcd simply as mental cvenu.'1 If we undel'5tand Dcvendrabuddhi', twOfold explanation of instrumentality in terms of thr twO afon!mentioned sensc5 of IIrthllltriJ4. the perception of those hl.irs is not instrumental on the dcf-

276

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

inition in terms of a mediated effect (i.e., puruflirtha) because they do not lead to or are not themselves the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyii). But that cognition is instrumental in terms of an unmediated effect (i.e., the mere fact of having an awareness) because that moment of consciousness is real, i.e., it is causally efficient (arthakriya) in that it is a mental product and will itself lead to other mental effects. This way of defining the unmediated instrumental effect in terms of causal efficiency helps to explain a second, related notion: namely, reflexive awareness {svasa'flZvedana}, the "self-cognizing" or "self-presencing" of every cognition. Reflexive awareness itself is an exception to the rule that the object of a perception (pratyakfa) is the cause of the image in the perceptual cognition. 93 Hence, if it is to be considered instrumental, it clearly cannot be considered in terms of a mediated instrumental effect, since this would require an appeal to causality that is not possible in the case of reflexive awareness. And it likewise difficult to imagine how reflexive awareness can fit into a scheme of human goals; hence, unlike a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim, one cannot appeal to some unmediated experience of telos, except the restricted telos of knowing that one knows. It seems likely, then, that the instrumentality of reflexive awareness cannot be established in terms of a mediated effect, and even as an unmediated effect the issue of arthakriya as telic function is nonsensical in this case. Thus, if we are to accept reflexive awareness as a trustworthy cognition, and ifwe are to maintain that trustworthiness means arthakriyiisthiti, we must again turn to an alternative interpretation of arthakriya, namely, that reflexive awareness is reliable in that it reveals the mere fact of experience, which is the same as saying that it reveals the mere causal efficiency (arthakriya) of awareness. If we close this section by returning to the notion of a cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's aim, we can now add an important 93 That reflexive awareness is noncausal follows from its simultaneity with its object, namely, the awareness that is reflexively perceived itself. Indeed, what can be most confusing about reflexive awareness is the notion that it is a cognition distinct from its object. This distinction is clearly the case for all forms of perception, including mental perception (manasapratyak!a), for in all cases the object (grahya) of perception is its cause (see, for example, PV3.224). The same is true of inference, since it too arises indirectly from its object (see the succinct statement in PVSV adPVI.I; G:3.8: avyabhicaraf canyasya ko 'nyas tadutpattep, where tadutpatti is meant to apply to both effect- and svabhava-evidence). In contrast, what Dignaga first identifies as the three aspects of an awareness-namely, reflexive awareness, the objective aspect (grahyakara), and the subjective aspect (grahakakara)-are all ultimately identical and hence simultaneous. The notion that reflexive awareness is cognizing the subjective-

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

277

;4ualification to the way we have characterized it so far. That is, even if such :"icognition combines a telic meaning of arthakriya with the notion of an !~nmediated instrumental effect, it also places greater emphasis upon ;;rihakriya as ca~sal efficiency, in comparison to instrumental cognitions :that are considered trustworthy in terms of mediated effects. In the case of ~ese latter cognitions, trustworthiness means that they lead to some sub-

~:ind objective-aspects is merely a way of conceptualizing the process of knowing (see the locus ;classicus in PSI.I.IO: yadabhiisa1J1 prameya1J1 tatpramti/}aphalate punap I griihakiikiirasa1J1vitti ;triiya1J1 niitap p.rthak k.rtam). Although Dignaga maintains that External Realism can propose :i:similar way of analyzing cognitions (PSI.I.9), this way of explaining cognitions assumes the Epistemic Idealist position. Dharmakirti accepts and elaborates upon Dignaga's opinion in Hie following verses [PV3-333-339]:

"If we maintain that an external object is experienced, what would be wrong with that claim?" There is nothing wrong with it, but what is the point of saying this: "An external object is experienced"? [PV3.333] If awareness has the image of the object, then it must have something that distinguishes [each] image [for each awareness]. [PV3.334] It would be wise to look into whether that differentiation must come from something external, or whether it might just as easily come from something else. [I] There is no apprehension of an object devoid of qualification by the experience of it; and [2] when that experience itself is apprehended, the object is apprehended. Therefore for these two reasons, the cognitive appearance of blue is the experience (darfana) of blue. There is no independent (kevalap; cf. PVP:223a7) external object. Instead, something activates the internal imprint for some experience. It is due to that awakening of an imprint that there is the restriction [of a particular image] to a [particular] cognition; that restriction is not dependent on an external object [PV3-335-336]. Therefore that one awareness which is experienced and remembered in that fashion has two aspects (dviriipa); the instrumental result is the reflexive awareness of both aspects [PV3-337]. When the object is considered to be other than the mind and established with a nature that is desired or not desired, then the object is the cause of the representation and the effect is the experience of that representation in that way, i.e., as desired or not desired [PV3-338]. If awareness includes the object (yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1) due to the positing (vyavasthiti) of the object as an aspect (a1J1fa) of awareness [and not as actuallyexternal], then the determination (vinifcaya) of the object is just the awareness' experience ofitself. [PV3.339] [yadi biihyo 'nubhiiyeta ko dOfO naiva kafcana I idam eva kim ukta1J1

syiit sa biihyo 'rtho 'nubhiiyate II yadi buddhis tadakiirii siisty iikiiravifefi1}i I sii biihyiid anyato veti viciiram idam arhati II darfanopiidhirahitasyiigrahiit tadgrahe grahiit I darfana1J1 nilanirbhiisa1J1 niirtho biihyo 'sti kevalap II kasyacit ki1J1cid eViintarviisaniiyiip prabodhakam I tato dhiyii1J1 viniyamo na biihyiirthavyapekfayii II tasmad dviriipam asty eka1J1 yad evam anubhiiyate I smaryate cobhayiikiirasyiisya sa1J1vedana1J1 phalam II yada nifpannatadbhiiva iHo 'niHo 'pi vii parap I vijftaptihetur vifayas tasyiif ciinubhavas tathii II yadii savifaya1J1 jftiina1J1 jftiinii1J1fe 'rthavyavasthitep I tada ya iitmiinubhavap sa eViirthavinifcayap II].

2.78

FOUNOATI ONS OF DHARMAKIRT I'S PHILOSOP HY

~~n(

cognition in which the- accomplishment of one', aim appears. Thus it is not their caUAI funCtional ity as mere cognidolU that makes them trust· worthy, but rather meir causal functionality in rdation to some subsequent effect. But in the ~ of a cognition in which appears me accomplishment of one's aim, it is the causal functionality of that cognition it5df-t~ vtty fact of its appearance-that makes it lrunwonhy. In other words, the- trustwonhinm of the visual ~rttption of fire is that it leads one: to ha~, for example, a subsequent sensation of warmth. But the truStwOnhiness of mat Kruaoon of warmth is nothing but the fact of mat Knsation itself. In this Knse, the tlllStWOnhiness of a cognilion in which appears the accomplish. ment of one's aim (Ilrthatmy4"irbhJu) is, much like rdlaive awareness and me perception of illusory hairs, based primarily upon its IlTth4ltriyfh,s the mere: causal efficiency of the cognition itself. THI! PRIMACY

or

PURU$ARTHA

There is much more to explore in Dcvendrabuddhi', notion or twO types of instrumc:nral effect, including the way mat his interpmation has been partially adopted (and hma paniaUy abandoned) by me commenwial ua.dition.'" But one more limited question that com~ to mind is the role pla~ in Oha.rmwrti'. philosophy by tbest: twO ways of defining instrumentality. More sp«illcaUy, should one way of connruing inStrumentality be consideud primary and the otha KCOnda.rr. If Devendrabuddhi', presentation of irutrumentality in terms of {W() types of instrumemal effeet (eRects some distinction betwttn instrumentality in terms of sheer Clusal efficiency and instrumentality in terms or tdie function . it nevertheless mnains the ~ mat Ohllmakini hinudf docs nOt expliciuy tell us whether we dJouid favor one approach or another, such a distinaion is only inchoate in Dha.rmakirti's work. primarily In more n:a:nt tim~, h~, Nagaromi and Srdnlcdlner ha~ noted that Dharmakirti tends to employ the term tlr1httltriJii primarily with the emphasis on its meaning as Mtdic function, and not primllily with me

wusc

R

!U Lint;erin& quc:Riont indtwk how ~ '. inlft'J'ftUUon tdalD 10 what ~ and lun commmlllon all 1M dun "'fWIioru" (~of iN!:.wnnu.u dfca (ore, C'I- ' PVJ':u}bdr and PVT. OI)II':u~. How, lOr ~arnpk, doD thilll\llpU ttblC 10 Dfwma.killi'. acnW ptaalraOoo in I'V) and I);gnJp'J initial My (PSI.I.kdR)! Conc::unincDewmdrabuddhi'. impaa upon laIn com.rnmcatOfl, his wonh ohm appear "'I:matim in their oornmcnwia., bu. 11\,"'1: rn 10 find Illy ~ClhX bier chan ~ who aoppc:wu ,he .-ion of. medWt«I inouwncn .... drccc. A ....dy oft- and..t.y ..... -'on _ ccj w! ...-.uk! ...my hdp '" 10 wwktsIand dw WOfb of otwa-wa. ~~ and cxhns.

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING T HE SOU RCES O F KN O WLEDGE

179

meaning of cauul efficiency," If we arc correct in maintaining th:1.I these two dilttrent scrues of the term ""Jultriya correspond lO lhe twO different ways of construing the insuumcntality of a cognition, then the emphasis on the relic sell5C of suggests thaI the definition of an instrumental cognition in temu of a mediated effect- i,e" in terms of a human aimwill abo be the principal one in Dharmakirti's work. Although neither Devcndrabuddhi nor Sikyabuddhi offers any explicit answcr to this qua. rion. they roo appear to consider the establishment of instrumentality in tcrms of a human aim to be of primary importance, for when presenting Dhannalcirti's theory of insrrumemality, they spmd far more time on this way of defining an instrument of knowledge. At the pricc of moving beyond Ihc usual hislorical limiu or our interpret::Hion. we can al~ rum 10 the opinion of a b,er commentllrnr, Dhn. motW'::l. In a &shion that is closely rdated (bur nor identical)" to IJcvtndrabuddhi's imerprecuion, Dharmott:lr.l draws a distinction betv.un an instrumental cognition as ~ the appearance of the accomplishment or onc's a.im~ 6lrthaltriy4nirblNIsa) and an inmumen(2l cognition as · what motivates aaion toward an object capable of the accomplishment of one's :ai m- (4nJ...~ ..." n;" 1".'MrtAlt;t...). He rhen not" th,.t the type or instrumental cognition '1nalyud by Dh,.nn:alc:ini i$ the I,.(fcr, ror it i, thi. type of instrumental cognition mat a judiciow person (p"/qA£wnt) seeks in order to anai n his goal, In shon , for Dharmottara as well, Dharmakirti's primary concern is with establishing the innrumentality or a cognition as a mcaru to obtain a human aim.'II Assuming mar such is the case, let w now examine a few issua that becomc evident when onc dehn~ the insuumen r::a.li ty o r cognition in lerms of human ai ms, especially as presented in Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of PVl.l-6.

",,""ltriJt1

95 5« N;If;lIlomi (1 ~7-68:!9) ~ Slrinkdlnn (' 971:.81, n.9). 96 O/wmom.ra!loa; lICK appear 10 xupc DrwndDbuddhi',

IICKion of J mediufll dim: in anrofhi. manr wrilinp on inanuncnuJify (~e.. NBT, LPP, ~and PVinn. Ho:tI(e, dlot COIIIIWI he drloWi ~I"'«n rduiw 10 ,"rMiJn1u and mere ~,.;~ a1thou&h panIId 10 D.veDw:abuddhi', appro¥h, is ck:uly lICK lMl:lItle.

'''''"1'''

,., N&T I, .,ft". FOf a nady Idmllalarpimnu In rVinT, _

(1989:16-1.9)·

SlrinkdLna and JCn.ua

280

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Instrumentality in Terms ofHuman Aims: Some Problems and Solutions

As noted above, if an awareness is instrumental in terms of the mediated effect that is a human aim (puru!iirtha), then it is the primary factor in activity (pravrtti) toward an entity that is to be attained or avoided. For Devendrabuddhi, the resulting activity in question is secondarily one's initial activity toward the object; primarily, activity means the "activation" (pravrtti) of a cognition to which appears the accomplishment of one's aim (arthakriyiinirbhasa). When an instrumental cognition is construed in terms of this latter activity, its trustworthiness consists of the fact that it results in such a cognition. We can refer to this as the "confirmation-model" of trustworthiness. Devendrabuddhi explains: A cognition is deemed trustworthy because it does not deceive people; this includes 98 perception and inference, which have the characteristic of causing one to obtain ("" priipaka) the intended object. 99 To comment on that, [Dharmaki:rti] says: "trustworthiness is a cognition of telic function. '100 This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim (artha) that is to be accomplished by the object (artha) that is determined through the instrumental cognition. 101

As Devendrabuddhi goes on to explain, the context here is one of action: one acts on the basis of an initial cognition, i.e., the instrumental cognition, and one obtains the desired result: a cognition of the accomplishment of the desired goal by the object of that instrumental cognition. As we shall see in greater detail below, Devendrabuddhi is at points obliged to abandon this model. Nevertheless, in many instances, the fact that an initial cognition results in a cognition of the accomplishment of one's goal by that object is

98 PV-D: khyad par byed pa-> khyab par byed pa (ex.conj.). 99 See parallel Skt. passages in Steinkellner and Krasser (1989:3I). 100 PV2.1bff: arthakriyiisthitip / avisa?pviidanam.

101 PVP(2aI): skyes bu ma bslus pas na mi slu ba ni mngon par 'dod pa'i don dangphrad par

byedpa'i mtshan nyid can gyi mngon sum dang / rjes su dpag pa 'i khyab par byed pa yin no / de nyid rnam par 'grel pa 'i phyir don byed nus par gnas pa ni / mi slu yin te zhes bya ba smos te / tshad mas yongs su nges pa 'i don gyis bsgrub par bya ba'i don byed par rtogs pa '0.

INST RUMENTALITY: JUS TIFYI NG THl SOU RC£S OF KN O WLEDGE

181

prccisdy what makes that initial cognition instrumental. In other words. the subsequent cognition in which appears me desired tel k function (i.e., me accomplishment of one's goal) confirms the trunwonhincss of the initial awarencu. A3 such, it confirms the fact Ula[ me instrumenal cognition is -Wt cawes one to obtain" (;r4jH1J:IIJ an object that acco mplishes one's

goal.'" Thc oonfirmnion_modcl and !'ducd claim) :loom trus(WOrthineu

l~

Devendrabuddhi inw a .series of problems and attempted solutions. We will now consider a Few of these, first bycxamining [W() general WUC5, and then by turning to problems that arise in the specific COntcm of ~rc:cprion and inference. Although many of these problcnu and solutions resurface in the works of subsequent Buddhist commentators, I wiU restrict m~f to occuion:.i Icft"mcc o nly to the lub.
DI SPARJTV I PoI

Tu.n.

In our discllSsion of ontology we remarked upon the connection between momcnwincu and cawal efficiency in Dhannak:ini'. theory of the panicular. To rt:iterate, Dharmaldni maintairu mat paniculars are momentary because: t) panicu.lars necessarily have the minimal effect of producing a cognition of themselves; 1) only emicies mat change: may produce effttts; and ,) by its narur.::, an entity that changes must alwaYl be chanpnS; oth· erwise, mat entity would never change. To this we should add the observation mat, when one is in purs uit of a human aim , one is interested specifically in puticulan, for only panirulars are cawally efficient; bence, only mcyan be employed to accompluh one's aim . '~ Thus, in conteXt ofinsttUmcntality in ttm1S ofa human aim, one scda 10 ;a.<;t ;n rcsud 10 momcnuzy puticuLu-s. and the nu.s~rth;ncu of an instrumental cognition is that it makes one obtain the (die function of the expected or required paniculars. The problem, ho~, is that in the case of pclttplion, sina: objca (r;rihJtl) of pcla:pcion is me panicuJ.u{s) that

me

me

101 See Pvp( ...pJ) tnnob.ecI in elM "!'podi. uwI. hotIow......

10) Set; PVI.1.ID-1II,..;m PVSY .J
111

FOUNDATIONS OF D HA.MAKII.TI 'S PHI LOSOP HY

caused it, the object of peiCxpcion has a:ascd at the time mat the perception occurs, The same applies ro inference, inasmuch as me indirect objccu of inkrencc:s art: abo partku!us,IM Thus, the crux of the problem is th2t th~ instrumental cognition.t----pt:rc.eption and inference---aIf: meant to be instrumental for 2 hunun :aim beausc: they take:as their direct or indirect objeru panieulars that art: capable of the n!'!Cnnry tdie functions, But precisdy b«J,ug th~ p:articulus CUI function in 2 causally efficient ITl2Ilner, they haY!! ncccsnrily cc:ascd to aist: by the time one has acted upon them. For Devcndrabuddhi, this problem of.1. rime-I:ag is most acute in the contat of the confirm.1.tion-modd: when one acts upon some initial cognition, the instrumentality of mat oognition consists of its raulting in 2 cognition in whkh appears the required tdie function (,1rthtthiyt1"irbh4Sllj, i,e., one in which appears the accomplishment of one's :aim. As noted prevWusly, the subsequent, confirming cognition would be the sensation of warmth, for a:ample, that one has when, having Ittn 2 fitt from 2 dinana, one draws near to il. On Devendrabuddhi's view, this !)'pC of subsoequent cognilion is panicularly important, for he d:aims that it establishes [he trunwonhincss of the firsl, Although we wiU rttWtl [0 this notion of oonfinruuion below, the foUowing poISS2gt' offers a dear summary ofDevendrabuddhi's position: For one who acts through being prompted to act by a f.lulry cognition that apprehends something that is not fitt as fitt, a subsequent awareness that has as its object burning and cooking does not arise. That awareness docs not arise beausc: an aware-ocss in which the expected tdie function .1.ppears is b:ased on a real thing. If Uur subsequent awvencss docs arise, Ihen the former can only be Itwrwonhy because: I) one obtains a tdie function in accord with one's OIpcaatioN and because 1.) the cause of just th.1.1 kind of .1.wareness of tdie function is a rea.I thing. Therefore, if the latter has a re:aI thing as iu object, rnen the former is ttwtwonhy with rtgard to it, '"'

104 Thu. u. Iht 1On:c of Dhannaldrti'l dain Ihal Ihcr-c il only OM iruuumcnw object (J>V",~-d):

..,.",,.,q'!' 1. .w.,.!fM'L

_ iW"1" UPIqi 1..,1"'''''1'' w / k1"imt1",ullf 'nMr/". J. -rr 1" i yoJ .,." ai ~ ItJiIiwf ~ ~ ... ,.J1" - Ji" '" / ... III ;",.. ,.; ""' .,." """:fl" ,. j #,. /"" .... JDff"'; liM .. iJ. .... Ji" r / ji Iu, "'''P'' 1'" 'MIl,. kJ,;" lOS PVPbb)R): _ -'1"~

." ." .".,. . .,.,JI1JIr " " ' . " III tk ...'" oi 'JJ'" ",up" ,. i fhIi, ,. / tk lui, ". JIhp' _ ;",.. ,. i pJ .,." ",oJ:fl" ". / sttp _ '" u ,..; "" ... r.",." _

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIF YING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

18,

Thi_~

:lppm=h rn rmuwon:hinf!U involves rwo cognitions: :In initi:al instrumental c;ognicion , and a subsequent cognition, which is:also instrumental. In mar latter cognition appem: me tdie function (such as producing heat) o f me object (such as a fire) :apprehended by m e initi:al instrumental cognition. ~ IUch the latter cognitio n confirms--or even constirutcs--the trustWOrthiness of me initi:al instrumental cognition. With mil CIOn t~ in m ind. t::HvO!f\dnbuddhi d~bes the rime-hg ['..mlem as follows: Someone objccu: - The latter in.s trumental cognition in which appears the telic funaion of object apprehended by me former awareness docs nOI cognize me objcci (IlnlNl) t hat was apprehended by the fo rmer. If ch:u if the cue. how can it luve:lS its object me celie function of an object apprehended. by former awareness such that the former awareness is an instrumental cogni tion because it docs nex deceive: one about that tdie funaion?"'"

w

mat

Dcvendrabuddhi answers:

This is not a problem. lkings engaged in practic:al :action ("1"""-

INrnr)

act on those

objccu without diffe rentiating them. Henu. in acmrd with such practical action (lIJIlwWarll), we say beings act o n objccu mat occur in temporal sequence as if those objccu were a singk thing.'" In re:ality (J1Jf!J1n4 • ~), the former and latter objectS arc distinct. Ho~r , the re:al thing that ~ the objca: of th e latter instrumental cosni tion would no t aist if the object of the former instrument:al cognition had not been existent. H enc.e. we metaphorically say that the latter cognirion has as iu object juSt due object o f me former cognition. ['NO

mat

106 PVP11h4If}: pi ~ InF" mil!' ...j .... ' " ' " 9i "'-' _ ""I:J'" ..... yi.. _ , u ji ltv_ tin 1"'l' 1M wu1" i J,n, ~ , . i 7fd UJf P"I:U IV f u j _ ~1" u ,.. ".; ,u, ... i fbfo '" '" nNJ _ Ji" YiN .... 1f11 Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J'"'71b1H) comtnmU that tht formtr and bner ~ an: ddindfterm~ (~ti~

itivdy

..

~

umc IxaIlK "lhq- ClIIK a OJSIIilion with a

lillJk

imagt;"

em the buR of tbiJ deunnination tht""'lltkl posiu- thtm .. the tanV

ob;ca (ttrrIM). and thil happetu Ixa..uc tht po.itin@:ofan iruuumenw rosnition iI con_Donal [.-...1",n, ""'1"; 'U" W#Ji"1'" pJtJi, p, ....... I"""1a' n"fu·j 1Jftnl ~ _u (1m....",,., 111"]1" ~ / 1IhU _ 'i mPlI"" y.,1"

..,-,.,.Jllt7itrit ttl..,..,

,,; ,;", I1t)'t'i (111 W# )'i.. ,. i ,;,,;, .. tlNJ bJu.. 1"" Dw,,.j·

284

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was established prior to the cognition in which its telic function appeared, that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the latter cognition engages with the telic function (arthakriya}.108 Devendrabuddhi's answer to the time-lag problem does not deny that such a lag exists: in reality, the object of the instrumental cognition on the basis of which one initially acts is not the object whose telic function one experiences as the fruition of one's action. Nevertheless, when beings act to obtain some human aim, they believe that the former and latter objects are the same, and beings thus behave accordingly. The crucial outcome of this answer is that, if the trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition is in at least some cases constituted by this model involving confirmation by a subsequent cognition, then the determination of an instrumental cognition's trustworthiness is in fact based upon an error, namely, the false belief that the object of the instrumental cognition and the object of its confirming 108 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nyq5b6fl) comments on the last sentence: Thus, in saying therefore he means: "since the latter instrumental cognition is impossible without the object of the former instrumental cognition." Therefore, since the real thing toward which one acted was etablished prior-i.e., prior to the latter cognition whose object is the telic function-that initial cognition is instrumental. That is, since it is the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function, the initial cognition is instrumental, and it is such because it too has a real thing as its object. Otherwise, if it were to have an unreal thing as its object, it would not be the cause for that kind of subsequent cognition; he says: because through it that very cognition engages with the telicfimction. Here, through itmeans "through the initial cognition." In other words, the initial cognition is instrumental because the initial cognition is itself the cause of the latter cognition whose object is the telic function. [de'i phyir de

bas na zhes bya ba 'di smos te gang gi phyir tshad ma snga ma 'i yul medpar tshad ma phyi ma 'i yul mi srid pa de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa las sngar yang ngo I dang po nyid tshad ma yin te don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma'i rgyur gyur pa dang po 'i shes pa yang tshad ma yin te de yang dngos po 'i yul can nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro I de Ita ma yin na ni de dngos po medpa 'i yul can yin na de Ita bur gyur pa 'i shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid du mi 'gyur ro I de nyid ni de las don byed pa la Jugpa'i phyir ro zhes bya ba smos tede las zhes bya ba dangpo'i shes pa nyid las tedang po'i shes pa ni don byed pa 'i yul can gyi shes pa phyi ma'i rgyu nyid yin pa 'i phyir ro zhes bya ba'i don to Il. The Tibetan of the passage from Devendtabuddhi (PVP:zb5fl) reads: ma yin te tha snyad 'dogs pa po dag tha dad pa med par Jug pa 'i phyir tha snyad kyi rjes su 'brangs nas I dus snga phyir 'byung ba can la gcig tu Jug par brjod do I dngos su ni tha dad pa nyid yin no I de ltar na phyis kyi tshad ma'i yul gyi dngos po ni I tshad ma snga ma'i yut med na med pa'i phyir de yangde'i yul can nyid yin no zhes nye bar brtags pa yin no I de bas na sngar dngos po grub pa 'i phyir dang po nyid tshad ma yin de I de las don byed pa la Jug pa 'i phyir roo

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

285

;~ognition are identical. That Devendrabuddhi is willing to accept this ';rtotion suggests that, at least in the context of a human aim, trustworthi~ness concerns the results of actions initiated by instrumental cognitions, ~1Irtd not the exact, isomorphic correspondence of a cognition to reality. We ;shall see that this way of understanding trustworthiness in terms of its ~esults-rather than correspondence-is also applicable to inference.

~hBSTRUCTED ACTION ~ addition to the aforementioned difficulty involving time, a second gen~ra1

problem persists with the notion of instrumentality in terms of a human aim, and it concerns the identification of an instrumental cognition "that which makes one obtain" that aim {artha} by virtue of obtaining an gbject {artha} that accomplishes it. This issue is broached when Devendrabuddhi notes, "Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition ~hose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such ~e not instrumental."109 In response, one may ask: "But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be instrumental."l1o

d'he objector here believes that, on Dharmakirti's view, what distinguishes in instrumental cognition from a doubtful cognition is that the former nec~ssarily leads one to an object that can accomplish one's goal; in contrast, instance of doubt might lead one to that object, but it will not necessarily ~~ so. Devendrabuddhi responds:

in

That trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object {artha} through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts,111 the instrumental cog-

;;i.p9 PVP (3aIff): ~tshom za

mi sLu ba de dang de nges pa gang yin pa de ni tshad ma yin pa 'i phyir / the bat shes pa La sogs pa ni tshad ma ma yin no. Note the typical subject/predicate inver-

:sion in the Tibetan translation.

~UO PVP (Ja2): gaL te skyes bu'i jugpa La yanggagsyodpas / tshad ma yang sLu basridpa'i phyir tshad ma ma yin no zhe na. ~lll Sakyabuddhi notes (PVT, nyq6bI-2), "By implication one supplies (adhyiihiira): 'In all

1B6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTr5 PH ILOSOPH Y

nilion is whal makes one obtain the objcci. Thus, an inurumcnal rognilion's insuumcnaliry consins ofia caJNUity to make one: ob(;lin the: desired objccl, and nOI thai it docs make: one obtain it. Since JUSt mal capxity is said to be Ihe truslWonhinm of the: inmumental cognition. there is no problem concerning obsuucted :taion.'11 As the TIbeta.n translation ofSikyabuddhi's commenwy suggeslS, this argument amounts to a placemcot of the Sanskrit restrictive particle nNl in the phruc Ilhhim4tiirtharya pri/Hl!"lM. · obtainment of Ihe intcoded aim." The opponent would have us understand this phmc as Ilhhimatiinhasya prtipa!fllm n i l, "only the obtainment land not the non-obrainmentl of (he inlcndcd IInIM. -where anita may be construed as either "aim" or "object:. "'I) In sho" , if an innrumenr.al cognition's truslWO"hinm consisa of the bet thai it leads us to the obtainment of the intended objttt or aim. and if that means that an instrumental cognilion leads only (nIfI) to the obtainment, then in cases where one's actions are obstructed, the instrumental rognition in qumion would no longtt be insuumenr.al. In Ihe comat of seeking to slake my mint, if I have correctly idcolified fresh waltr from a distance and yet my attempt to tc2Ch it fails, mat petuption would nor be imlrumental because I have fai led to obtain my aim. Devendrabuddhi's above-citcd aruwtt is 10 place the restriction noc upon the obtainment, bul upon me objc:ct. From an insuumcntal rognition there is thus IIhhi""'14n~ pripa!lJlltI, - the obIllinmem of only the intmdcd IInha land not something dsc}." Iff act on the basis of an instrumental cognition. and if my actions art not OOslructed. I will obtain only the result that I apcct; if my perctprion of fresh walU was an instrumental cognition, then the objc:ct I obtain will slake my thirst. The poinl here is to dislinguish the: imtrume:nDl cognition from a doubtful cognition, for even if such a cognition may lead me: to what I apcct in $Orne: ClSC5, in othe:r casc:s it will not do so: in some: ~ a doubtful perception might lead me: 10 wate:r, but

aKI

when Of>( is I>]tJ ". 'j '17"' - " ...

rhn.,.

N

..... - a,."" ..... "t" f'D MJ,. j " If ""I pImuI,. If; _ Jilf IW 1 ; ... n p" ,;" ... 1M £U "'''P'' 1M 'J.JJI4 wpJ4."lfhuJ,. Ji,. ... I M,.,.J ... ohM - fh-I I'D I>]tJ JI4 ..,;JJilf ,. M Wr ... ~ I'D - JI4 ohM - ..,uIJi. 0' fhuJ ,. tt]iJ ,.i yilf ... I ."',. M",.. iii;"'; do. Np,.,.. lwjM,.i pJtyi, sJr,.,. ~,. _ yi,. _ 112 PVP {)a.I.fO: M If; nlNJ _

II J 5«

PVf, "J""7'a7ft

INSTRUM ENTALITY: JUSTIFYING T H E SOURCES OF KN OWLEDGE

1.117

in orner ca.so: I will find only th~ hO( sand of a mirage. In short. what distinguishes an instrummtal cognilion is not that it n('('N S1 ri1y leads one to me result, but ramer trun it has me ~"parilJ to lad one to mat rault if all omer conditions are: in platt. An. important outcome of the definition of insftum~n taliry in terms of capacity is dlllt it amounts to a rejection of Devendrabuddhi's earlier ·confirmalion-model- of trusrworthiness in mt'! m nrar nf a human aim. Tn reiterate, me confirmation-model is: with some goal in mind, one h:as an instrumental cognition of an object thai has the capacity to fulfill mal goal; one implements the means ro obtain that object, and one Ihm has a cognition of the fulfillment of one's goal. On this mood, the trustwOrthiness of that initial inn rumenw cognition consists of Ihe fact thaI it leads to anothr:r innrum~t:al cognitinn whmr m ntetlf i. rht'! ~i roi fdie runction. i.e.• the ach i~menl of one's goal BUI if trustwOrthiness is redefined in terms of capacity, then the production of thal rubsequt:nt, confirming cognition is irrdevanl to nustworthiness. Why does Devendrabuddhi find himself in such a muddle? Cenainly, part of wh.at aplains this tension is limply mal Dcvendrabuddhi h:as b:adct'!tl hinudfinm rhecoOW'!". ~dr:1lbuddhi 's ~nition of an instrumenw cognition in lerms JUSt of the ~1l"'L.'ilJ to result in the aehievC'm~", of one's goal comes after his initial presenation of the confirmation-modd, and it IIrikcs me :as an attempt to avoid a claim made in Ihat conlat: namdy, thai a trustworthy cognition acru.aJJy thn lead one 10 accomplish one's aim.'" BUI although the move to mctt capacity is a aaKal rettcat in hiJ argumenl, for our purposes it serves 10 highlight another, implicil :aspect ofDev.endnbuddhi'. accou nr. n2lTlCi y • the bipanit" norio n of extrilUic and intrinsic instrumentality. To see how mis is the case. let w now rum 10 Devcndrabuddhi's discussion of me confirmation of the inslrum~tality of perception. Pt:rUpWJ" "lUi u".firmtltN"

In his commentary on Dharmaltini', presemation of insrrumenality in PVl.I-6, Devendrabuddhi devotes considerable effOrt to the analysis of perception, probably because the issUC$ surrounding perception prove the most probknllltic. One major difficulty is accounting for the: observed dubiety of perception-the faa that we cannot always determine what it iJ thai 114 5« his inilial aQ:OUnl of confirmation 0 1", abo~. :tJo.

188

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHAkM AKIRTI'S PH I LOSOPH Y

we are lensing-and the consequent nero for confirmation. This mue begins with a passage that we have already cited:

Something is trusrworthy if it does not dC'CC'ive people. This includes'" both pcrception and infcrmce. both of which arc what CiUJC one to obtain CtmipU6) the desired obj«t. (."';"'). To a>mment on that. IDh.armalclniJ says: -tnutworthiltaJ is. t:tIK1'iliolt of "fir fonrtiolt. ~This means that one has a cognition of the accomplishing of one's aim by the object (art;") that one has definitively determined through the insuumenral cognidon.1Mo ~

we have nored. Dcvcndrabuddhi here presenu a notion of trwrworthiness (and hence. of an insttumcnral cognition) that f.t[ls within the context of a human aim. This becomes clear when. immediately after the above Sllltemcm, Devendrabuddhi clarifies his point in a pas5:lgc that concerns anions that arc inirially motivated by perceptions: For example, for the person who. having cognized a fire through PClUprion, then actS (j~r ptt) on fire',1II capaciry to bum. rook and 50 on. there is the activation of a pclccprion whose ob;ca is the sensation of w:ltmth and such. Or, for aampk. on ccnain oc:x:asions there might be a cognitive error due 10 something which has a form similar.o fire and so on; at that rime, there is for tha. person the aaivarion of an inference through smoke which definitively determines the firc..(Dcpmding on the motal, one of thcst: twO-{hc engagement of a subsc'Quent pcn:cprion or infttenoeconfirmsl the tn&$lWOnhincss of a pciOepcton.n. lkawe various causes of error ate possible in the case only of pcrcc:ptton, it is known to be instrumenral through the activation of a 5UbscqUCOI if\$trulllCnral cognition thai h.a.s as iu objca that thing's (.rtIM) · 1: __ • 'It IeIIC runctlon .... li S PV-D: ~,.,."..,. ->

116 Fat 117

~

fthJ-,,.r~,.

(4tMj.).

Tibru.n , Itt .bo¥f, n.IOI.

_ - >_

I' (atfIfjJ.

118 Sikyabuddhi (PVT, .,.-:]1b1) mUa it dear dut talifJ of ptJupcion. 119 PVP (u.pJ):ji fur ",,,,"IIl,,, oiI,J,n

tho. P'lUS" OOhCOh, the iruuumcn-

__ i trrt" *.., 1 'nINJ,. J. ,.",.1 ..1U,.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KN OWLEDGE

119

In thiJ puugt!. n.:v.. ndr::ahuddhi .q-.r:alu nf rwn C25l'!l involving :action thu is motiv:atcd by an initW petceptton tim requires confirm:ation. In the fin;( c:ase, :an initial perttption of an object capable of the desired tdie functi on motiv:ates one to :act tow:ard th:at object. For enmple, one perceives wh:at one believes to be:a fire , :and intent upon obtaining he:u , one walks toward th:at fire. In this first c:ase, th:at :action results in the :acrir.ltion (prlllJ!fti) of :I poerC\'f'tion wh~ conr<ml ;1 t~ de
J",u.",,,,,,,, t. ,..';pJ r"" or "'''P'''''''' """I fllji _ W]iJ t. ........ ,.. "'.......,. ,. t. ..,.,.. i. 'r.m, r;U i .. .. 1M

t. k,..

»f'

fur

p 'rhit ti aM

iImJ,. -1tflS ,., "'" ,.; 'in ,.. ..,,. j i"l'" "'; J.. '" Ji" ... / ","P' ' '"'" ..y;4 t. j YD" ,,,,, nMrr ,. ..yUI *fo J.. '" .nJ ,. i !hJirJ, i .... 0' u .. b]t.J,. j pJ Col" gj I1h.J "'" !hJi "'" PI'" aJ..J "",,,,oJ tI.. ,.,.."" "" •.... See also PVT ( ..,...7 )b.if) uanamd ;n W: approdix.

7thnJ,..

120 For

me rd..liowh;p ~ ,, «n ,roll]oliqq!y",WJhttNk.,. i&IId ;nstrumulI:lli()', I « PVP

u.~FJ) . d~-d

beIo-. ' 91

12 1 Sft PVP (s.aVf) and PVT (")".7 6n- )).

190

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRT I'S PHI LO SO PH Y

cq>tions. ~end rabuddhi proposes that instrumentality in this conteJ:t be confi r m~ by a subsequent instrumental cosn ition ~ pccificall y. an instrumental cognition in which appears the accomplishment of one's goal. or more simply mnsl at~. one in which the des.ir~ relic funaion appears. A1 not~ JUSt above, that su~uent instrumental cognition will be either another perception (such as rhe KfIurion of the fire's warmth) or an infer· ence (such as the: inferential cognition of the firc from its smoke). If one actS and one Ius an innrum... ntal cognition in which th ... desired rdic function appears. then the initial p..-~ptjon th:lt prompt~ action W25 instrum ... ntal. On the other hand. if one experi... nces no such confirm ing cognitionwhether perceptual or inf... rential-then one cannO( cb.im mat the initial p..-~ption was innrumental.III On... key point h... rc is that. if the instrumentality of that initial poception i.s (0 be co nfirm~ by a subsequ...nr p..-tcq)tion. th:u subsequent perception must itself not require further confitmation; otherwisc:. one would f.all into an infinir... regJcss.'1:I One cannot wonder. fur cumple, whether one i.s fedi ng warmth from £he fire or ' imply experiencing hI)( Rashes. ThiJ distinction berwttn a perception that r..-quires confirmation and on ... mat doc.s not require confirmation is fcwgni7:ed by Devcndrabuddhi. but Silcy.abuddhi fenders it more explicit. Sikrabuddhi fim focuses upon this distinction by noting that lXv..-ndnbuddhi's argument concerning confir· mation implies that, in it l..-ast some cues, activity is ptompted not by an unconfirmed percepcion, but by o~ that is sclf-confirming. Sikyabuddhi remarks:

Activity tlUt is Ixu..-d on pe:rttption is 1W0fuld: initial and habitual. One has dear and habitual perception of those things to which one is habituated. When that pnception arises, it arises dctamining its image in accord with O~'J habitU2tion in a manner that avoids all causes for error. And that awareness producu a subs..-quent verifying aw.ueness of that kind: hence, the person am on that objm. Therefore, in that c:ase the awareness itself determines its own instrumentali£),. Since it does not depend on In Noce llul I un noc deaJin& hen: wilb dw:qlUllion in.. ;n ....,d~ _ ....Ii............ (_, ....

PVr. II;"'.7)~ff).

'

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUSTIFYING HIE SO URCES OF KNOWLEDGE

19 1

the activity of lOme su~uent inmumenw cognition, it is not inappropriate to say. Mdet:ermines the object .. .. "'m h is nOi me case m at all perceptions are determi ned to be insttumenw mrough something e1.se, In the CI5C of acting due to an initial perttption (Le.• one which does not involve IubiruationJ, if one has not definitively apprehended the objeds identity ('1J'I mtlhtt" .. nimina), '~ one actS OUt of doubt,'·

12-4 ~i Me rekn ro PVin 1.1, ciled~. l S6,

125 The "definirivf; ~nsion or lilt object'. idallhy" ('lI'"' ",. ." "'",.., p"f iw) appan '0 ~ ~ Ilr.Uguforward ,d;",,,« .0 !he Abhi<.llufm.ic definilion of ..'!"iU ill *.JJ.!fII. T'hc lerm ";,,,jrw in Inis ClOmCllI U .:mICtima {f'llJu.!atcd ill "cfutinl"ishin, .....n..."bu. 'j,dc..n.y- ......;c. _
If."';'"

Rn.pjrWr! ill, 1IlIlIi" dN -p~. #{thu/Jjf"i iMroti'J (,u".;rw). 1lu.1 is, KWfi' nilion ia the appnbcnaion of an ob;.a ,.. blue or Jdlow, Ion&: or.bon, WOITWl or man , friend or tnany, pkasanl or u.npkaanl (~and.o on.. [..",U ";"",,... r.JM~iH [, ..., -d[ ,.."" u.,iuuli~""""",;"",,,.~~~­

t/i,,;"'iItMItr_!W"' ..... "",!,j~~ .

"'''''''''''l''!"

1261'V1' t"Y7:ta6ft), 1trJM,.. "',.,.""'111", nm U tI tI' y..,,.. wilt"",. .,oJ-J.,...._ ,. r... _ I J" J...- ,. -J.", IJ.. ,. ~~",.. J. .hi" ......_ ,. pJ k ,.." oi "'''r'' no". ~ ,.. _ ji /u k 1Izhi" J" p..u ,., _ ~ lJJnJ,.; """' ",tJWr. ~"I''' Of• •, -Dis1''''' '" kM/ _ sk]r k..", 1J" /u "" 0"'''';# "",,,, .. j rttn , . .,., .".,. 'i ~, J" ,. • h j ",,., llyN M I J" j ~, J" ,. Of"l "JiJ t;,f ,.J",J -1tftl,.,i'}J" J #~1tJi

nJ-I ...

niWt IIfj

k,,.,. u.,. P" ... / ..",.. '''..

,.w14~."~,,,. i ~, _

rhuu - ' " j pIM" 1M ,.IMJ Ji .... 1,ultf,..,;J 11ft ;..,,. PltfJi" " IM"}II", 'lI'"' "'..,..,. .,...14' P"f k """,. tsIH .. IfJiJ .,. -'P _ y",,., .". M 1 CD.rlln.:nli", on the DOUO" dul. penon who aas on an i",uummw mgmuon .. ,II4i' ciovs, and thar am", OUI of daub! would noc br judicious., S1kyabuOdhi alto IIOICI (PVT. ".. It. j '

'# MJ,. ...

-.,...,.,:zIwc,. - *

, . . " 1M juJ _

•

"J'I"71bUf):

"If one ia aaillJ 001 of doubi, how is;1 COl,eo 10

Ay

,Iw p«lpk who do .o are 'judi-

(ious' ~!*,.,.um"J.'

~

A penon who inYCSIiptCI dw AlUIrioft bdOn aain, is noc. prnon ....... am JUS! DUr of. dcfini~ Mt«minarion [.... cmainry: .,... ,. • rUI,.,..!. n .... tt-.. _ r-o c.o_....t.ic:h ODfftpd one to o.n, doubt ohou.... object (.m..)and the dd.... i';~ ck"" "'i .....ion of an object (.,.,;,.). I ~I)' alto has !'NO aUKS: daub! due t:hcK is no ttnIM (_ ,.w,.J and definirive dccmnination tNl ~ is no objea (.......). A penon who XII .... I of the 6.. !'NO QUM:I and. penon who doa nor.a oul of tIK KCOnd!'NO is ..""1 the world mcaJU: by ~ i,,,Jiriou, per_ JOn. Ir actin, wilboul defini,;~ cktennirwion is JO unWU&i, then il would ~ CDRrradia....,. for fatmen to work in !be (.doh and JO on, for they havoe no ilUlrwDmw oosnition whid! tu. ddinimdy cktennincd dw:ir IUR.ln:: ...ne.1 and -..en will srow. fr/ Whal is dlt ClORlradiaion

~ ......... ' " If" - J-t.,. fl" - ft lui, ""f" "'P" "" ...., H ~." Utn ",. • 'Ji ,. 'pi'" ri ,-J 1pltf ih. - "f"I ,. i 'P . . ;..,,., 0-'" .,u ..,,. "'l""

*

191

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKI RTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

Siky2buddhi's point here is rhar not all actions butd upon perttprions are tentative, for in some cases one's action is ~habitual ~ ("bhjNis4lN1ti), in me sense thar the one has undergone Mhabituation M or · conditioning M (.bhytIu). In such cases, one's perctption is able to Mdet'ermine its image,M which means that the perctption itself is capable of directly producing a subsequent correct judgment that can guide one's actionY1 Somrone might, for ewnple, become sufficiently familiar with the fire-like flower that she can easily distinguish fires from a d ump of such flowers, and she is thus able to determine without hC$itation that the enti ty on the far side of the field is ind«d a fi re. Sakyabuddhi later goes on to specify that this distinction amounts to one between petuptions that have intrinsic instrumentality (lWub pr4m1i!'JAm) and amnsic instrumentality (pttrtlltll; prlmJ!'J'Zm), He comments; Hena:, a percq>tion whose object is ca.pable of accomplishing an aim (1011M), sina: it is devoid of any causes of error, is ascertained r,-"fI III bcJUi 14" pllriahi"lIA) by reflexive awareness as being by nature insuumenta.!. It produces a correct judgment of that objea: in aa:o rd with the way that it was aKertained. H ence,

fu,,..,

i .. ...'" N ..... ".., ]i..... 1tk k ~ iJtJ,. '" ... '" ~ ..... N .."' .... "'",...,., '17" ".."',. p]iI Ji- ... J1Mr,. JUt """ twJ ,. '" u" nh.", U N J "-..N ~ 1tft1,.pyis ...... ]i.. ,.. , . 1t]i 'l)W pyU ftrU k,."

"1tf

",..,.,,..,uJ 9U 1Mf,., ;po,

Dw' N p1JfJi.. ,.....,,.,., MM,. pfo N p1Jf';' J¥ '" ,.; "., , . utpII i .. -r N .... Ji.. 1M' j~ ".." ... "'iM M Jpi ... "'" ,. ,.,w 1t]i 'P - k ,., iJtJ,., Dw' N "t' ..oJNo]i" 1U J;, .....i zhi1tfJ¥ "',.,.,,. zhi", "'''''''' '" kIM iJtJ,. p1Nr p, .... ..,"'".., ."",.;)'" '" ""',. p,. '" ~,.;

"tn'"

nNJ ".., ~,. ".., ]i.. ,.,.j,

127 ~ (PVT, 9"-7-tbUfl nocct: I .. • ,M.-..-.-tn [och«) cua of pcrccpion--ladU", habilUJ.OOn, w capmmu (",dJ.,., N • J.rlMw) U noc cku. 10 IIx panicIIIu idenutY (~,., • .w,.) of me obj«l is IlOI dcfinilivtly cklmniMd; Ibil apWru the aK wncn one: il initially prompied loaa [uoppoKd 10 habit\latnl aaion.o IoI:c ~J, AI tNlUmc, OM aIao .:u OUI of doub!. By implicaDon mis IWCI W.I if, d~ 10 iI.:IbilUOllion, OM ckhnitiwly appehmdJ (.,,.,,P"f ~!he panicuIu identity. e-om paotption docs nor Ikpcnd I,lpoD !he n\~1 of a sub.cq\ln\1 awumca, 1pooJ,. - ',., N pi N

-'-t

,.;0

j..,,.,

JlbJir ItI.,.J,., "l'" ,. twJ,.".. ... 1 'Jis ..i ..,.,,. ..,..1t]i iJtJ pM _ " MIIII M I J, 'i nJ... oil A::-t kIM'''''' M JP"'I" Ie A::-t

, . __, . j'

* ....

~ "'"~,....,~ .. ~ .... ,.,... J,yJ ..J-I_ i ,. "..,]i.. ,. ziN1 ..... ~,., ~,

oU

Dw'"

M'" J.. ""'r" _,..., J_

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

293

it is intrinsically instrumental, and therefore, there is no infinite regress. 128 Sakyabuddhi'sargument stems from a particular concern: namely, that no infinite regress ensue in Devendrabuddhi's notion of confirmation. 'Clearly, part of his concern focuses upon confirmation through percep'non, since if a subsequent perception is to confirm an initial perception, :that subsequent perception obviously must be self-confirming. , But Sakyabuddhi is also concerned with inference, such as the cogni:cion of fire from smoke, where the cognition of the evidence (smoke) is a ?perception whose certainty could be called into question. While Dharma'/drti himself maintains that the evidence may be ascertained through infer:~nce, 129 if no form of perception were self-confirming (i.e., intrinsically (instrumental), then in no case could one ever establish one's evidence ithrough perception. That is, one could not appeal to one's indubitable per~eption of smoke when inferring fire from smoke, for one could always ask, ~.How do you know that you are seeing smoke?" Sakyabuddhi apparently ~els that this would lead to an insurmountable infinite regress in Dharma~:rri' s system, and his discussion of intrinsically instrumental perception is ~Rpart meant to prevent any such problem. 130 Having presented this notion of an intrinsically instrumental percepP

~B PVT (nye:y5a6ff): de 'i phyir don byedpar nus pa 'i yul can gyi mngon sum ni 'khrul pa'i rgyu 'fitshan medpa'i phyir tshad ma nyid kyi bdag nyid du gyur pas rang rigpas yongs su beadpa yin ,'ii}lji Itar yongs su bead pa bzhin du de la nges par skyed par byed pa de Itar na rang nyid kyis ~d ma yin pa de 'i phyir thug pa med pa ma yin no. :~~,

.

;U9 See HB (2*.13-14): tatra pak!adharmasya sadhyadharmiIJi pratyak!ato 'numanato va prasid'i!r~r nifcayab, yatha pradefe dhumasya ....

~~~ Sakyabuddhi addresses this problem earlier in the argument (PVT, nye:y3b6ff) by rais~ti1m objection in the context of inferring fire from smoke: '~s

it not the case that, if smoke is apprehended through perception, then since there are causes for error, the evidence will not be definitively determined? That is, there are :#Ie causes for error that prompt one to wonder, "Is this a thing that has the appearance of smoke but is actually magically created by a yogin? Or is it coming from a ter:mite tower?" [du ba mngon sumgyis gzung ba na de la yang 'khrul pa'i rgyu yodpa'i phyir

!tags nges pa nyid medpa ma yin nam I de Itar na ci 'di ni rnal 'byor pas sprulpa'i du ba'i t;tam pa 'i dngos po 'am lei brgya byin gyi spyi bo las byung ba yin zhes 'khrul pa 'i rgyu yod 710 zhe na IJ. buddhi goes on (nyt,:? 4aIff) to argue that this is not a problem since the evidence can lImed by a perception that is "fully habituated" (shin tu goms pa), i.e., one that is ... sicaIly instrumental.

19-i

fOUNDATIO NS OF D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

tion, Sakyabuddhi goes on to conrl'Ul it wiln one tnal is extrinsically instrumental. Gting whal appears to be the asc of confusi ng the shimmer of a dimm fire for a pool of warer, he conrinUCI me passage jusr cited.: One might nor, hov.-cvcr, be habimarcd to an initial awareness with d'IC appear-.1nce of Arc or w:uer: in that asc, tMt awucness docs nOI have Ihe capacity 10 produce a definitive determination bcc:ausc, even Ihough that fire or W:ller has been apprehended by an indepcndem (roll'll rouJ- lWltllnlr4) instrumental cognition, there arc causes that inducc errors [which pm-em such a ddinitivc determination] . In that case, that initial awareness is established to be ;ns(Tumental by Ihe engagement of a sul»cquent iiUtrumental cognition. Hena . il is extrinsically insrtumenw . Howcycr, if onc has an awareness that involvCl Mbituation and darity, then iu insuumcnality if determined from iuclf ('4"l1m • Jl'Ittaj1), as was aplaincd abovc:.'" In Ihis w:ay, it remains Ihe casc Ihal perception is instrumental in some cases intrinsically and in somc cases a triiUica.lly.... ').I Whal is il Ihal distinguishes an intrinsica.lly instrumental perception from one that is arrinsica.lly instrumenal ~ II is me capacity [0 prod~ without any addiliorW condilions--a definitive dnermination of the object in question. Sikyahuddhi docs not go beyond ~ndr.lbuddhi 'l specifie statement:

fA perceptionl ... is a5$CT1ed to be instrumental conccrning that objective aspect (bunl N '; nil'" p4 a r;rihyiU'4) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination bc:causc it causes action toward that aspc:ct. II is nor insuu mema.l with rcg:a.rd 10 any orher aspect. Even Ihough there is no difference in lemu of being experienced, there is the ddl nitivc determination of thaI

131 Namdy. PVr, "JI"1sa6K. ci ted;we~. 131 PVT (""'-:1S-7ffi:

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aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions is not determined. 133 Although Devendrabuddhi is here discussing the more particular case of determining the instrumentality of an awareness from reflexive awareness, Sakyabuddhi understands this observation to be more generally applicable: a perception is instrumental specifically with regard to that aspect of its object for which it can produce a specific kind of correct perceptual judgment, namely, an immediately subsequent definitive determination

(pratyakJaPrfthalabdhanifcaya). We have already discussed the notion of definitive determination (nifcaya); in the context of perception, it is the conceptual cognition following upon a perception that interprets the content of that perception, which is necessarily nonconceptual and thus indeterminate. According to Dharmaldrti, a perception may be capable of generating a subsequent definitive determination of some aspects of its object, but not of all aspects. One might, for example, be able to determinate that one is seeing a water-jug, but one may not be able to determine, on the basis of that perception alone, that the water-jug is momentary (kJa1Jika). As noted earlier and as Devendrabuddhi remarks here, whether one determines one or another aspect of an object depends upon numerous factors, including the perceptual acuity of the perceiver. 134 Drawing out the implications of Dharmakirti's theory of definitive determination, Devendrabuddhi applies it to the instrumentality of perception in the aforementioned fashion. And expanding on Devendrabuddhi's analysis, Sakyabuddhi applies the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction: for a person who is seeking warmth, for example, a perception of fire that is intrinsically instrumental is one that can produce an immediately subsequent definitive determination of its object as "fire" or as a "heat source," and so on. A perception that is extrinsically instrumental cannot do so, and if its instrumentality is to be determined, one must depend upon confirmation by some later instrumental cognition.

133 PVP (5a5): ... bzung ba'i rnam pa gangyin pa dag fa yang nges pa skyed par byed pa de fa / Jugpar byedpa 'i phyir tshad ma nyid du 'dod kyi / gzhan du ni ma yin no / mthong ba las khyad par med na yang / rnam pa gang don du gnyer ba dang / goms pa dang skabs fa sogs pa nges pa 'i rgyu yod na de nges pa yin gyi / gzhan chod pa ni ma yin no. 134 See chapter 3 (n. 59).

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FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

And what of inference? Is it too sometimes instrumental intrinsically, and sometimes extrinsically? Continuing a passage that we cited earlier,135 Devendrabuddhi notes: Because various causes of error in the case only of perception are possible, it is [sometimes] known to be instrumental through the activation of a subsequent instrumental cognition that has as its object that thing's (artha) telic function; this is not the case with inference. That is, a property-svabhava used as an inferential sign and an effect used as an inferential sign are restricted to being the property-svabhava of the real thing in question and the effect of the real thing in question, respectively, and only they [i.e., a property-svabhava and an effect] are the causes for the respective sign-awareness. Hence, if that kind of thing [i.e., a property-svabhava or effect] is absent, there is no inference. Therefore, inference does not rely on the engagement of a subsequent instrumental cognition. 136 Unlike perception, inference is always intrinsically instrumental, and its instrumentality stems directly from the svabhavapratibandha, the invariable relation between the evidence and the predicate to be proven (sadhya). The svabhavapratibandha guarantees the presence of a predicate with a specific kind of nature, precisely because, if the predicate (or the subject that possesses that predicate) did not have that nature, the evidence could not have the nature that it is determined to have. Smoke, for example, can have the nature of smoke only if it has been produced by fire; a maple can be a maple only if it is a tree. 137 Thus, the dubiety that is possible in perception can never apply to inference, for if an inference is well-formed, it is indubitable. To dose this section, let us now see how this bipartite approach to instru-

135 I.e., PVP (2aIfi). See above, 280. l36 PVP (2a{fi): mngon sum nyid fa 'khrulpa'i rgyu sna tshogs pa nyid kyis slu basridpa'iphyir de'i don gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi tshad ma phyi ma Jugpas tshad ma nyid du rtogs par byat I rjes su dpagpa la ni ma yin no I de Itar de'i rang bzhin can nam I 'bms bu'i rtags dngos po'i rang bzhin nyid dang I dngos po 'i 'bras bu nyid du nges pa ni rtags can gyi shes pa 'i rgyu yin pas na I de Ita bur gyur ba'i dngos po medpar rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pa 'i phyir Iphyis kyi tshad ma'i Jugpa fa Itos pa ma yin no. 137 See above, chapter 3.

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memaiity-as intrinsic and (Xtri nsK:- rclates to the "muddle- th.:1.( closed the previous section. There, we noted that rHvendrabuddhi begins by claiming mat, in the como:t of a mediated instrumental eff«t. an instrumental cognition is "what makes one obtain" (prlipUllJ an object with th~ desired tdie function, and that the fact of obtaining such an object connirutes the instrumental cognition 's tNSt"N'Orthiness. But toward the ~nd of his arpment he must account for the possibility of obsnuat'd :action. and he is thus obligM to reddlne instrumentality simply in tttnu of an inurum~ntal cognition's ClfJ'iUi1J to make one obtain one's goal (i.e., an object with th~ desired tdic function). We can ICC this tension Ixrween actual and potencial obtainment of one's aim as paralld to the division ~n extrinsic and imnnsic instrum~n­ tality. Specifically. for an extrinsially instrumental perception (0 be known as insuumental, it musl 3Ctually lead to the accomplishment of one's aim , whe:rc this is defint'd as a cognition in which appears the desired telie function. This is 50 txau.sc: when a cognition's instrumentality is exninsic, it rc:quires confirmuion by a subsequent instrumental cognition whose con· tent is the desired (elK: function , which is the same as saying thai the confirmation requires mat one actually obllli n one', aim. In contrasl to the CISe of cxtriruic illSTnimenuliry, a cognit}on who$(" instrumentality is intrinsic requires no substquent confirmation, and mis amouna to the claim that the cognition is inmumcm:a1 even if one's aim is not: aaually obnincd. This notion oorresponds to the charact:eriz.u ion of instrumentality as the cognition's capacity 00 make one: obain one's aim (i.e., ia capacity to lead one to a cognition of an object with the desired ~Iie limo;","). If Om' urv:ierl'l':IodJ lM rerm ·C1 pacity~ (/A},';) to include cua where the goa1 is actually raliz.ed, one can inttfpm such a cognition as me trivial case of a cognition that contains the appearance of the desired telic function (IlrtJmhi]dllirbh4sJlJ, since th:tt ap pearance is c:quinlent to the obtainment of one's aim. But mo~ inte:restingly. such a cognition can also be understood as one that, even though it does not dir«t:ly contain an "Pf>e1r:m~ of the deircd tdie fi.mCtion. noevcnhelen is indubiubk :about ito: object', capacity for that [elic function. Although ~buddhi poina O UI that 5Om(: ascs of ~tion fall into mu category, [)(:vendrabuddhi places particular SU'CS$ upon inference as intrinsically instrumental. For as we have ICCn, a we'll-formed inference must be bucd upon a JlIIlbh4~'ilpr4tibandJu, pmaining bctwttn cvU:knce and prtd.icate. Sincc mat relation guarantees rru.t me encity inft'llcd h.n:a CftUin type of IU.ture, it Iilcewise guv:mc«c ch:i.r that entity is capable: of sptt:ific telic funaioru; this 50 because tdie funct}on

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FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

rests upon an entity's causal characteristics, and "nature" (svabhava) is a way of referring to the totality of those characteristics. There are, however, certain problems with the instrumentality of inference, but before we consider them, let us examine one more topic under the rubric of perception: namely, the notion of perception as motivating action. PERCEPTION AS MOTIVATOR (PRAVARTAKA): THE QUESTION OF NOVELTY

We have already mentioned the notion of the correct perceptual judgment that Dharmakirti calls a "subsequent definitive determination immediately following upon a perception" (pratyak!aPr!.thalabdhanifcaya). A key question, however, has yet to be raised: why is this theory introduced? The answer lies in a tension within Dharmakirti's philosophy: on the one hand, perception is necessarily nonconceptual, which is to say that it is indeterminate: it cannot determine its object as being "fire" or "water" or any other entity. Dharmakirti shows no willingness to relinquish this point, and on my view, he is in part motivated by a concern that I have cast as "axiological." Although Dharmakirti does not put the problem in this fashion, if perception were determinate, then universals would be ultimately real because universals would be the content of determinate perception, and perception apprehends what is ultimately existent. And if universals were real, then the arguments employed to refute them would be incorrect. These same arguments are employed against the self (atman), a distributed entity that can be considered a special case of a universal. 138 Hence, if the arguments against universals are incorrect, the arguments against the self are incorrect. Thus, since Dharmakirti's soteriology rests finally upon the negation of the self, his soteriology would be contradicted by the introduction of determinate perception. 139 On the other hand, if perception is to initiate one's actions toward the accomplishment of a human aim, then it should be determinate: if one has not identified some object as "fire," why would one seek its warmth? At 138 There is no doubt that on Dharmakirti's view, what he sometimes refers to as selfless (e.g., at PV2.135-13G) and sometimes as emptiness (e.g., at PV2.214d-215ab) is to serve as the "antidote" (vipak!a) to satkiiyadnti, and hence to all suffering. Dharmakirti does not, however, provide any extended refutation of the self in either PV or PVSV. But as with the Abhidharmic analysis of sa1f1vrti- and paramiirtha-satya (see chapter I, 41), it appears that his refutations of distributed entities-especially universals-are meant to serve as the arguments to be employed for refuting the self.

139 For more on Dharmakirti's soteriology, see chapter 2 (Goff).

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issue here is the notion that part of what constitutes the instrumentality of a cognition in the context of human aims is that it is a "motivator" (pravartaka) of action. As noted earlier, the notion of "action" (pravrtti) here is the secondary sense applied to that term by Devendrabuddhi when he addresses Dharmaklrti's claim that "awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one's action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid" (= PV2.3b-d). It is clear that Dharmaklrti himself is concerned with the argument that perception, as indeterminate, could not be instrumental because it could not motivate action. In his Pramii1}avinifcaya, he raises the problem with an objector's voice: "Well, now how can there be practical action (vyavahiira) from direct awareness, whose nature is not that of a definitive determination? One could not engage in practical action because one acts in order to obtain things that cause happiness and avoid things that cause suffering only when one has made the definitive determination 'This is [a thing that causes happiness, etc.] ."'140 To resolve this problem, Dharmaklrti must find a way to introduce a kind of determinacy into perception without actually claiming that perception is determinate. He does so with the following response: This poses no problem, since just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awareness that arises due to that perceptual awareness. Due to that mnemonic awareness, practical action occurs because ofone's desire [to avoid or obtain some aim]. 141 [PVin:I.I8] Although direct awareness is the bare perception (Ita ba tsam = drHimiitra) of an object, just when one sees the object, there occurs a mnemonic awarenesJ'-i.e., one that is immediately following that experience-and due to that awareness, purposeful action occurs with regard to what one has seen as being what is desired or what is not desired. 142 140 PVin ad 1.18 (58.I2ff): '0 na da ni mngon sum ma nges pa'i bdag nyid las ji ltar tha snyad du gyur I 'di'o zhes bya bar nges na ni bde ba dang ,-dug bsngal gyi sgrub par byed pa dag thob pa dang spong ba'i don du Jug pa 'i phyir ro zhe na. 141 PVinr.I8: taddnfiiv eva dmefU sa1?Zvitsiimarthyabhiivina~ I smara?Jiid abhiliifepa vyavahiira~ pravartate / /. 142 PVin adLI8 (58.I5ft): I skyon 'di med de I ganggi phyirl don mthongba nyid mthongrnam

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FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

The introduction of the theory of definitive determination allows Dharmaldrti to attribute what might be called a clandestine determinacy to perception without actually claiming that perception is itself determinate. In doing so, he can salvage the claim that, in terms of obtaining a human aim, perception is instrumental because it is a motivator of actions oriented toward such aims. 143 Nevertheless, while introducing the notion of a subsequent definitive determination may solve some problems, it creates others. Consider specifically what we know from our previous discussion about an instrumental cognition (pramarza): in brief, it is a trustworthy awareness, where trustworthiness in the context of a human aim means that it enables one to obtain an object that accomplishes one's aim. This way of characterizing an instrumental cognition can be reduced to one claim, namely, that it is "what makes one obtain one's aim" (prapaka). And to do so, it must also be "what motivates action" (pravartaka); otherwise, the question of obtaining an aim would be moot. . Since Dharmakirti maintains that only perception and inference are instrumental, he would have the description we have just given apply to those two types of cognitions, and only those two. We might grant that the description does indeed apply to perception and inference, but if no further specifications are made, a third type of cognition will also satisfy this description. Devendrabuddhi describes the problem in an objection: "You say that an instrumental cognition is that which is trustworthy with regard to the telic function when one acts having become aware of the instrumental object through that instrument. If that is so, then consider the case where one acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when one does so that conceptual awareness is also trustworthy with regard to the telic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that

la / myong ba'i mthu las byung ba yi / dran las mngon par 'dod pa yis / tha snyad rab tu Jugpa yin / mngon sum don la Ita ba tsam yin yang nyams su myong ba'i mthu las byung ba myong ba mtshams sbyor ba'i dran pa las / de mthong ba nyid na mthong ba rnams la mngon par 'dod pa dang cig shos dag gis tha snyad du 'gyur ba yin no. 143 See Dreyfus (I996) for an account of these issues; for the title, Dreyfus draws on Tibetan authors, one of whom compares the problem to "the fool leading the blind." The question here is how the "fool" (perception, which cannot think thoughts) can lead the "blind" (conceptual thought, which cannot directly see any objects).

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conceptual awareness would also be instrumental, but you do not accept that it is. Therefore, the definition of instrumentality is faulty."I44 This objection is clearly tied to one raised by Dharmaklrti himself: [PV2.5d-6a:] "The knowledge of a universal that follows the [perceptual] cognition of an object in itself (svarupa) would be instrumental." 145 The major problem here is definitive determination itself. That is, following upon a habituated perception of a water-jug, in the proper context one will have the definitive determination, "This is a water-jug." Since that perception leads to such a determination, it is considered instrumental. That is, in the case where one seeks the function(s) that a water-jug per'forms, that perception can (indirectly) prompt one to act in such a fashion that one will definitely obtain what one seeks, provided that nothing hinders one's actions. But clearly, the same is true of that definitive determihation itself: it can effectively prompt a person who seeks a water-jug to act in such a fashion that, provided there are no obstructions, she will definitely obtain the water-jug. 146 In short, it is both "what makes one obtain one's aim" (prapaka) and "what prompts (or guides) action" (pravartaka). We have already seen that Dharmakirti is unwilling to admit such cognitions as instrumental, in part because that admission would lead him down a slippery slope to determinate perception and, hence, the ultimate Jeality of universals. Thus, he must add some further specification that will disallow the instrumentality of definitive determinations. In a reference to Dignaga's work,147 he does so by maintaining that such cognitions are "con'144 PVP (3a7ff): gal te gang gis shes nas Jug par 'gyur ba'i don byed par mi slu ba de ni de fa :tshad ma nyid yin pa de'i tshe I bum pa 'i mam par rtog pa 'i shes pa las I bum pa fa Jug pa de'i :.aon byed par mi slu bar 'gyur ba de ltar na I de yang tshad mar gyur na mi 'dod pa de bas na mtshan nyid khrugs [ex con). for PVP-D: zhugsl pa yin no I zhe na. ,145 PVZ.5d-6a: svariipiidhigate{l para1'(l II priipta1'(l siimiinyavijfiiinam. 146 It is worth noting that, in terms ofDharmaldrti's apoha-theory, a definitive determination must therefore be a concept based on real things (bhiiviifraya), at least in relation to the :!Spects (iikiira) of the object relevant to the desired telic function. For the notion of expressions and concepts based on real things, see PVL205-206 with PVSV ad cit. (G:I05.24ff). 147 I understand Dharmaldrti's use of sii1'(lv.rtaat PVZ.3a-br (grhitagraha1}iin neffa1'(l sii1'(lv.rta1'(l) (0 be an allusion to Dignaga's use of sa1'(lvrtisatin the context of perception (PSLI.6cd-7ab:

JOl

FOUNDATIONS Of DHAlMAtr;;IRT I'S PHILO SO PHY

ventionar in that they art' -apprdlending whar has already been apprehended ~ (lfhi14trW!'ll); as such, they art' not instrumenru. ,.. Devendrabuddhi, citing Dharmakini's response, offers these commenrs: (The afo rementioned obj«tionJ ... is not a problem. Sinc~ amwnh'OrUll ct1f'Iirjon Ilpprrhmds tbllt which hiU Illt'ttuiy h«n apprthmMd. JIH Jo nDt clAim that ;1 is ;nstrJ4mmlaL (PV1..ja-b,] '" That is, conventional awaren= that have objects such as a watcr-jug. c:Wtemhood, number and upward movement are not claimed to be instrumental. Why? For mc reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehcnded. Here (Dharmalcini has aid mar) JUSt thc initial opcricnce of an object is instrnmtnta.l--it is what makes one act.'" The subsequent conceprual aware ness that comes from it arises rtalling mal object as it was apprehended. Hen«, it is not at all an awareness of a real thing that can aa:omplish a goal (arrha). So how can it be whal makes one act after Oot has known its object?'"

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INSTR UMENTALITY, J UST IFYING T HE SO URCES O F KN O WLEDGE

303

hending what has betn apprehended," Dharmakini means--at least in pan-chat these cognitions have undergone a conccptuali:r.:uion process whereby the initial, indeterminate comem of perceprion is filidy interpreted. Even in the absence of any aplicit statement to mis effect, we can thw hear an implicit claim in this argumen t: narndy. mat since conceptualization always involves error or ruslOrtion (bhrtlnti). a conceprual cognition cannol be considered instrumcnral if one does not demonstrate how that error tus been overcome.1II Devcndrabuddhi. however. largdyavoids this tack and inslC:ad rums the argument to a more specific description of what it means for an instrumental cognition to be ~ what prompts action ~ (prtJlHlrt.Wz). Al noted above, within the COntext of a human aim, a cognition's insuumentality is in part cnn.uimrcd by the faa that. by virtue of prompting one's acrion toward some aim, it is an instrument fo r the acco mplishment of th:u aim. Alluding to Dharrnakirti's HaubjruiM, Devcndrabuddhi he~:u1ds the spmfication that only the initial ntpnimct (4t/ytJJtJritJntJ) can be what prompu: action. Thus, since: a ddini tive detcnnination is foUowing upon such an initial experience. it cannot be insmunem:al in the context of obtaining a human aim ho!eall~ ;1 ... ~ not i 1liri41ly prompt one's action rOw:lM (h.:lt :r.im. With this :r.rgument, Dh:r.rmwrti (u intcrpmed by ~dr:l.buddhi ) may employ me theory of definitive determination to accoum for the determination necessary for perception to be instrumental while denying that a definitive determination is instrumental. But although these twO problems may thw be solved, me solutions have created a third problem. Specifically, by requiring that an instrumental cognition mwt p:w me test of not being wh.:lt :>pprehends the :r.lr~dy :tpprehendcd. Dharm:r.lUrti h:u: :r.ppu_ endy d iminated a whole cl:w of inferences from consideration as instrumental, even though he clearly mwt admit thaI those inferences "rt instrumental To under$land me cl:w of inferences in qucstion, we mwt recall mat, according to Dhumakirti's meory rX definitive determination, one has a det~min"rion immO!di.:l(cly fol lowing " pc~lion only o f th"t propcny_ sIIfIbhlfllfl of the perceived object for which the proper conditions arc in place. Since neither Dharmaltirti nor his commentaton offer w systematic for cumpk, pvJ.l}J ( _ _ ",,,,,,,,",,,,,uiJ ..vJt.Jpiviu~ I ,,;... ~."fN" ~~~ti ll).

"

fUl DI.... ".aJui. ;..fan"", '""" i .....Ioa ...... IU"... uf,,..... . IN. tiM: e....... ...-c...""''' t.y mo:aru: of tho: _~-'ku;",. Sec: chapter J. I ~)

FOU NDATION S OF D HA'-MA KIIlTl 'S PH ILOSO PHY

terminology ro rekr to this ryJX of p~rty-Wltbh.iWl, let w min our own term and call it a -perceptually determinable propeny-nwbh4"",,· In short. a pej(:rprually determinable propeny-svabJuiv.r is one for which ,he perception in question is capable of producing an immediatciy subsequent definitive determinadon in the mind of thr perceiver bcca~ aU the conditiofU for producing such a detcrmin:llK>n 2fe present. In COntrast to such cases whttt thr pt:rttption is capable of inducing such a definitive determination. in some ca.ses the propr.r condiciolU arc not in placc. and therefore the perceiver will not have an immcd.iatdy subsequent definitive: dctrnnination of the property-nwbh4v.r in question. We will o..Il this ryJX of propcny-lVAbhd"" a "perccprually indctcnninabk property-WIIblui""" " This is a prope:ny-lWI'bhJ;v.r fo r which the perception in question is MtClpable of producing an immcdiatdy subsequent definitive detennination in the mind of the perceiver because: one or morc of the conditions for producing such a determination arc absent. Let w now rtl:lU wme further specifications conettning the types of coBditions that are required for the production of a definitive determination immediatciy following a perception. !u noted earlier, some of the r~uircd conditions can be considered conlarual. The perceiver mWI. for aample. find hinuelfin the appropriate COntc::n (prullrll!'4}--one formed by interests and opecu.tioru-in order to have a determinacion of the aspect in question. ')< Thus. in some contots--as when the pe:rcciver is thinty-the perceiver may have the detenninalion. -This is a water-jug." while the s:amc perceiver may not have Iha[ determination in some other COntQtl, as when he is nol thirsty. But other conditions arc embedded. in a wider. morc stable contOl. in that they depend primarily upon ,he perceptual capabilities of the perceivel'. mind. For aample, Dharmwni nu.inctins that if a -dim -wincd~ (1NlwbwJJhi) pcrson ~ an obj«taisting in a homologow conrinuum (i.e.• nO( acrually disintegrating at a gross level). then mat percepdon annot directl y induce the determination that that obj«t is impermanent. Thw. when such a person perceives an in[2C( water-jug, that pc,ception cannot ncinduce an immcd.ialdy subsequent definitive determination of that waUf-jUg'S momentllriness AS 1D"t AS tht.l pnkJ" is ~dim-wilUJ. -With Ihis in mind. we can make the speciflCllion

INSTIlUMENTAlITY, JUSTI FYINC TH E SOURCES OF KNOWLEOC E

lOS

that this typt of propt:rty-lWIbh4W1 i5 perceptually indcterminable in prinripk for sudJ a pnwn. ,..

Mthough he is not explicit on this point, Dharmaldrti's reference to ·dimwined persons" appears to be an allusion to a typical division between ·ordinary persons" (p.nlMgjal'l4). whose pcn:quions an: rdatively limited by their weak mental capabilitits. in conU'a.u [ 0 -adepts" ~ns), whose pt:rccptiolU enable them to directly perceive objectS that an: inaccessible to ordinary persons. This allusion becomes especially dear when, in one of the passages where this issue is discussed, Dharmaldn:i COntrasts the dim-witted with ~ those of great intelJt:Ct ~ (~i}, '· Sikyabuddhi idemifics these latter as those ~ who Set what is bqond the senses- (IltiruliryaJari;" j, a rypical epithet for JOtim and especially buddhas.'" More specifically, in this contet they are those whose perceptions are capable of inducing a definitive dcrermination of lin) aspect of an object that they perceive. 'II Assuming that the distinction between ordinary persons and JOtins is indeed operative here, we can apply the nouon of a propeny-WIlbh4V4 that is perceptually indeterminable in principle 10 a soteriological COntext. That is, on Dharmaldrti's view, what makes the extreme perceptual acuity of )l'Dgim vallllllhl!! is not their ahiliry to 5« loog dinaoas. hut rather their ahiliry ro hav!! a oert::lin rype- of in~'mm!!nt:ll oognition: namely. a direc;r, nonconceptual experience of the si:l Ittn aspecu of the Nobles' Four Troths. '" These aspects include propeny-svabh.i1JllS such as emptiness and moment:lriness that ordinary persons arc unable to determine without recourse to inttrcnce.,II 1.5 we have JUSt Setn, Dharmakirti maintains that JOtim have perceptions that are capable of immediately producing definitive df'{!!rminuionJ of th~ and a~ orh!!! propl!ny_"""bM.,m of:l p"'rceived subject (dharmin) without recourse to inference, and this is prob2bly I SS 5ft pvsv tUiPVI.})ab (G:1I.6/l) and the doIcIy ,cblrd dixlWion I I PV). IOI-I 01. 156 PV). Ia,d. I S7 S« PVr h7Sa6): .1.".,

cbm,.. chn",.. .. ";......,,.

IS8 PVJ. IQ7Cd: "",~"d"'~""

W

...,,.;~,,

",,;,.,,, .. it.

,.,..,w,.." rNtbtUh~.

l S95ft D1wmWm'l loooum of"';~ {PV}. 181 47)' np«i.lly.,jlh dw; oontmc'nu

ofOcvaw:lr:lbuddhi (PVP:l lobJffl. 160 NOIC

mal alihou&h 1M oonlCl.l IJ,en, iI the appIicIIion of the propcny. ,..}JM.. JdfIe:M.

new to iIO enti!y on the b.is of 1M ~ of tNl mliJ)'. Ihil doa; noc rman dw KIf· anaa ' " '" iI pthxplible. ~ibtr. the di$rinaion hen, iI bth"UO the lbili!y 10 h~ I
)06

FOU NDATI O NS O F OHAilM .... ICIIlTI'S PHI LOSO PHY

pan of what Oharmakim mons in his discussion of tht "yogic perception" (yofiprllt}ll~).

The way a JOtin attains that c:xahed state, h~r, is prteisd y thaI, as an ordinary penon, she focused in meditation upon a con"'p,- i.e., one of {he siJrt~ n upccu-until she attained a direct, nonconcq)(ua.l cxperientt of th.at content.'" The !cry, bOW'eVn', is that in order for that mediative experience: to be insuumenr.&!, it musl be trust'wonhy. which Inf::Im that the original conct:plUaI cognition from which it is derived muSt ilsdf be indubitable. 'oW Sina Ihe only ooncqxual cognition Ih.at is guaranteed to be induhiable is an inkrt:ncc, this means th.at Oharma.ldni's sottriology u1timattiy rests upon the lISt of certain types of infereRca lhat enable ordinary JX'SOns 10 devdop truuwonhy m napa that. when meditated upon. willicad to the direct expcrlMces that arc sought on the Buddhist path. That is. beginning from a State in which one has no perceptions of tht entities in quc:nion. one uses such inferences to develop an initiaJ, unhabitwued perception. Finally, through repc2ted practice:. one develops a fu lly habituated pcrccption. whereupon the inferences arc no longtt needed. In Ihis way. ccm.in ink rcnca arc crucial 10 die Buddhist soleriological project, but many such inf~ are cndangcm:l by the principle of "apprehending what has b«n apprehended" (ghiUltrom.1J4J. With this in mind. Itt' US flOte four characterutia of these endangered ink rencc:s. First, the sub}ca (tlhttrmin) it pcrccivcd by the perceiver. Second. both the predia tt to be prOllC:n (~mu) and the eviden«: art proJ)(:tty-/wbh4v4S abstracted from that subjcci. Third. the propertyslMbluw adduced as tvidence is perttptually determinable for that perttiver. And founh. the propctty-slIllbh.ivoII' to be prov~n is in prineipk perceptually indcterminablt for that person. ~ all apply. For cumplt. to the C':llK where an ordinary JKf'SOn infers that a water-jug is momentary' bccaUR' it is produced: (t) she perceives the water-jug: (1) both momentariness and produahood (/trWttlIVoll'J art: prope:tty-slMbluv. of the waterjug; (j) she determines directly from perception that Ihe water-jug is Ibl !io« dw hoplyconcuUUOfnnmt offhu point II I'Vp.,: 'M'cfoir, ~ It ~ INC' or unn~, wh.al~ ;. "",.dit:llled upon will mull in • dar, no<..:tII,"pluai qnltion what

......,..,.,..nn un

IIw meditation is

~rfm:nL'

[tc""" MitlfM ...-",,,, .. ,.. ,.J tfIfIi/,iMtlo,." I

",",.tU..t,.JM"",u". /~.

162 PVj.l.S6:"Amons thew ~ ... _ . mcdl~fi¥dy indllClrd pcrupcion lhal i1 lnw:· wonhy ;' inwvmmw. ali is d"" caK with an ~ oflany of IIw ".Ieml reaJirln "W wm: ptc>lowIy cnmincd [in""" p,.,""(WitltlMchapcnl. TIw mnaindc:r, such u """ hII· ~ ola "' •• a ....! _ . U'C mOou.Iorn. -1 _ ,,-_!""!' ...",W.i1""'r"" " ; ' l " _ ,...., J f·*IJJ~ "."...". ~'" /qI ..,.~ I~.

INSTRUM ENT ALITY, JUSTIFYINC THE SOURCES O F KNOWLEDC E

}07

productd: and (4) as an ordinary person, she can nC'Vtt detennine jWt from ~rcrption that me water-jug is momentary. The impornm point to recall here is that, on Dharmakirti's view, a perccptton app~hends (lDthe a5p«tS of its object, which is simply to say mat iU\ obj«t contributes in its emimy to the produaion of a pctcqnion.·" This means mat alllhc: propcny-Jl4i'bhd_ of an object have been apprehended (ghiu), ("Ven if one has no determinate cognition of memo Hence. it iJ clear that if a definitive determination immediately following a perccptton is not iU\ insuumental cognition b«ausc ilapprdlends the already apprehended, men the instrumentalil)' of mis type ofinferencc should also be rejected. The reason for mis is mat me water-jug has already been ~r­ oreiVC'd: henore, c:vt:n if the ordinal}' penon did not d("(ermine from that inicial pertq)lion that the water-jug is momentaI}'. that propeny-1WIbhdV4 has tk fortD been app~hendcd by thal initial percqnion. Thus, as wim a defini(i~ d("(ermination immediatdy following a pelception, this type of i nfe~nce should not be instrumental because it apprehends what has already been apprmcnded. We have 5CCfl. however, tha, on our interpretation ofDhannakirti's soteriology. he is obliged to preserve: the instrumemaliry of such inferences. Hence. ht must ~pccify some additional mlerion ,har will ~how how inferences do nOI involve tht app~hcnsion of what has already been apprehended (KfhirRf/'Ilh/lJ;Ul). Dcvendrabuddhi maintains that Dharmwni establishes this additional criterion by claiming that. since the propertyIINIbhdva about which one is concerned is perceptually indeterminable in that case. irutrumentaliry an still apply to thai inference. N Oharmakirti put!; it. such inftrtn~ "illumin:!lt whn hu nnr yt'l ~n Icn(lw(l flfjfiillil,.u",prRktJJ.) (. Defl .2r in a case "when me particular has not been disc::trned" (tllljjfiilu '''''~!'t) wim respect to a propcrty-IfIftbh.i"" that is M'" "'ry for the fulfiUmem of one's aim.'" In shon. it is what has been called in recent rimes me ~novt:lty" of me knowledge offered by such an inference that prest:tVes its inscrumentaliry. Alluding to the casc where one infers the impcrmanencr of sound. from me fact of being produced, Dcvendnbuddhi offers us the above interprtation with an objection and response:

maw:

163 PVI ,,~ ""I'hc:rdotr• ..ncn a thins (lrbMJ iu:xpniroud th
16<4 Sec PV Lsc--'. •mulJ.fti in the appmdiL

JoB

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAl.\tAlrWlTl 'S PHILOSO PHY

Somrone objectS, -lnfertnce would not ~ instrumental because it is an awareness of what has already 1>«n observed, as when one infers that impermaocnce u a propeny-Jl.IQbhiw of sound." This is not so. Even tbough sound's unique nature, which is excluded from all other thinp. has already been apprehended, the object of practical action (1IJd1l4hJ1lI) can only ~ that aspttt with regard to which that perctption has produa:d a defini(i~ dC'tC'1lJlination and so on as iu dfect. 1berefore. sino: it applies (0 that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental.'" For Ocvcndrabuddhi, Dharmakini's argument amounts to the claim that, if a pc:rcq)(ion cannot induce a ddlnitivc determination of a propc:nyIWbb4W1 with which one is cof'lCC'rnn:i, then the object of that pc:rtrption has /for been " !mown" (jlf4u) or "discerned" (vijfi4l4J. II is still true that the property-n.wbhoiw in question has already been IIpprthmtUtl WhiU) in that it, being identical with the object iudf, has contributed to the produaion of pClttption. N~Iw. to bolTOl\l' ~i 'l phrase from a related context, it is i/U iftllllt propcny-nwblui.... had nOt been apprehended at all , since one can h:lve no indubitable determinate knowledge of that propeny-sWlblMw without tdying upon infertncc.". Thus, if we can combine Dcvcndrabuddhi's inrerprtr.uion with what we know of Dharmakini's sorerioiogy, nove1()' plays a crucial role in Dharmakini's thco(), of instrumentality, for it preKrvtS the instrumentality of a class ofinkrmccs that arc ccnrrailo his soteriology. This is cerainly Ocvcndrabuddhl', opinion, and for him the overall definition of an insrruITlC'ntai cognition thertfort has two aspccu: first , an irutrumental cognition is a trustworthy awareness; this ....'aIT:lfltl the daim that an instrumental cognition is -what makes one obtain" (priJNIJu.)one's aim. And SCCOfld. an insoumental cognition mUst "revcal Mut has nor been known" (Iljurirth.-

ria"""''''' oiMJ "'M l p''''1ff hhillloi ",i ""''''' ",w ...", .. *' "" i J#7i,,. ........ ,." "tIM .. r.s IMf ""; .,..; ""'r",w ""',. ..", _ Ji,. "" k.u.t ... ..;" ~ 1- "", 1"'" " ..,.,.,. ... tin TfS "" " . " "" 165 PVP (6aS): pi /Jt

.. ,..

_""'<111""

ali

"'IIfli Jr.. ... ,.,. ~ t,tJ "" *,.,¥ tIM.,,-J J.. "'", .. blff" F"f1i ttM" .... ,.,. "" M Iur ....... h..y" wyiJ" Ij4 "'.,,"",.; IIIMJ .... Ji" IW• ••• 166 For $iJry.buddhi'. pooibon, Xl' PVT, "Jf'!]6u-J. For an aampk 011 l.ua oommm· 1.OIOI...no doa.- cIi.c- ---uty in d;';ncUon fn>m .nwo o •• Kn..et (,", ..... '''JJ on DharmcloU:aB'. thmcy ofi...uwnmulity.

i-t""i"

h.i...,.,....,

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTIFYING THE SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

309

prakiifa); this warrants the claim that an instrumental cognition is what "motivates action" (pravartaka). This way of defining an instrumental cognition later comes under attack, ;for subsequent commentators, probably including Sakyabuddhi, maintain ~\hat, since only novel cognitions are trustworthy, an explicit statement of inovelty is not necessary. Without going into the details of such arguments, ~",e need only note that such interpretations do not abandon the criterion ~pf novelty; they simply subsume it under trustworthiness. The main moti~vation here is probably in response to Devendrabuddhi's somewhat vague ~pproach to trustworthiness: he is apparently willing to apply the term ~.'trustworthy" (avisa'f!lviida) to a definitive determination following on a ~erception, but he never explicitly states whether or not such ~ application ~ould be legitimate. By eliminating any such application, Sakyabuddhi ~(who himself is somewhat vague on this point) and certainly later com~entators forego the need to adjust the overextension of the term "trust~orthy" as a description of any pramii'(la; instead, they simply maintain ~~at what is trustworthy is necessarily novel in that it is a "motivator of f~ction" (pravartaka). 167 However, in contrast to Devendrabuddhi, these ~later interpretations obscure the likely motivations behind the various l~aims that Dharmaldrti makes. And since Devendrabuddhi's argument [firaws upon other portions ofDharmaldrti's work, his interpretation like~Wise suggests how Dharmaldrti's presentation of instrumentality accords fiwith other elements of his philosophy, most notably his theory of definiftive determination (nifcaya) as a means of re-introducing conceptuality into ~erception. For these reasons, and in view of its subsequent impact upon fthe commentarial tradition, Devendrabuddhi's interpretation strikes me as ithe most useful starting point for an interpretation OfPV2.1-6. In any case, Devendrabuddhi's work certainly helps to clarifY the reasons for citing both trustworthiness and novelty as essential characteristics of any pramii'(la. 168

li167 See, for example, PVT, nye:79a5ff, where Sakyabuddhi, by reducing the discussion of a

l~econd characteristic to a matter of worldly convention, seems to suggest that an explicit [~tement of novelty is not essential to the definition of an insrtumental cognition.

t1t68 Franco (1991 and 1997) has argued that Dharmakirti does not give a genetal definition Ipf an instrument of knowledge (pramii7Jll) anywhere in his works. This interpretation is ~argely based upon the argument that the particle vii in PV2.5 can only properly be con~i~l:rued as a disjunction. Franco's work, which seeks a historical reading that at points must !:resist the commentaries, has elicited considerable comment (see for example, the exchange ~~etween Franco and Oetke in Katsura 1999). Beyond Franco's insightful suggestions conferning the relation ofDharmakirti's work to the wider philosophical context of his time, one k

310,

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Inference, Error, and Trustworthiness

While the ,qualification of novelty preserves the instrumentality of certain forms of inference, other problems arise. These specifically focus on the fact that the objects of inference are unreal universals. As such, the objects of inference are incapable of any telic function, for since only ultimately real particulars can be causes or effects, only ultimately real particulars have telic function. 169 In their discussion ofPV2.I-6, neither Devendrabuddhi nor Sakyabuddhi consider this issue at any length. Their comparative silence is probably due to the way they understand the overall argument of the Pramtitzavtirttika-namely, that the entire preceding chapter (PVI) had already addressed these aspects of inference. Indeed, in the course of that chapter, Dharmaki:rti returns repeatedly to a crucial question: if conceptual cognitions-including inferences-take unreal universals as their objects, why would anyone bother with them? After all, reasonable or "judicious" (prek!tivant) persons seek to accomplish their goals, and to do so, they seek to obtain that which is capable of the desired telic functions. Why, therefore, would they concern themselves with cognitions whose actual content is incapable of any such functionality? Alluding to an answer, Dharmaki:rti employs a provocative metaphor to formulate the problem in the following verses: Through distinguishing the propositions that the thing in question is "real" and that it is "unreal," those who do not deny the utility of an expression's meaning analyze the real thing itself, for the production of an effect depends upon that real thing. Why would those who seek the goal in question bother to analyze something that is incapable of accomplishing that goal? Why salient outcome of this" vii controversy" may be the finding that, if we do not resort to commentarial interpretations, our conclusions on the matter are necessarily underdetermined by the available evidence, namely, DharmakIrti's laconic statements. This is not a problem in itself, but it is one that must be tolerated when we assay the difficult exploration of Dharmaklrti's immediate historical context in isolation from the commentarial tradition. When, however, we seek to situate DharmakIrti within the commentarial tradition that follows him, our task is less difficult. Indeed, we find unanimity on the notion that DharmakIrti does provide a general definition ofpramii1Jd- and also that both trustworthiness and novelty are components of that definition (the only question being the issue of whether both must be explicitly stated). Since I am thankfully concerned with this latter, less assiduous task, I have forgone any extensive discussion of the "vii controversy." 169 See chapter 2 (84ffl.

INSTRUMENTALITY: JUSTifYING THE SOU RCES OF KNOWLEDGE

, II

would a Iwrful woman bolht:r 10 Stt whttht:r a (:\lnuch is lxautiful or noe"' DtuImaldrti ad
mat

rhe 2Calm plW"n~r of rhar aim. ~lIch:L~ cnunrtnllCTing enid. And it does n(lt make ~nse for a ~l1On who ~b 10 accom plish some aim to C:Xen himst:lf toward something that is not capabk

of accomplishing il. Indeed, why would a sexually aroused woman strive to 5tt whtthcr a eunuch is lxaulifuJ or nOI?'1) 170 PVI.I lo-IU: ~ uWIoLJiJJMf"MlifltilJ , _ .... tiN]tI'" II, 1UN".mb i l L " .. H .~_nb.sy. ....",ijo iii". UiUnJn ... ' ,.~ ,.,._

..

'_1..1...,...

~

",;~ 1Ii~,.,.~ H.

17 1 ~ (14a,)oIfm:,Jlishdydifkmll imttpfnllion:

Ir iI«J _

-t? ..w-i, doo ~ aiH-

..;~ha,

i>o Iiw ...., Ih.u;. it

;-pun"", ""'"-

.... a ~ imapnalivdy drcmtlincl the npc -ion·, .... 10 be ~

bk of ao:omplWU"l dor [d fI- - mnM) i .. tiN II"'J u,., illImMIIy m., u .. in dor OQy Ihli dor partia.lu it ...bIiWd

tl- - n40'...v.

K{JII) tQ(IowI ~yabuddhl

firM p/u"aIf. bul 00 ttlt: I«'O!Id phruc he rmurb: 8«_ it it _ ilflnfMt/ i.. ,., _ ......,.1iNu It.,...u, nri,UI bec:wx dor ".,,;,. U noc akm u VI ob;cct by dor c:ap4s-t.~!W". ~!M'" fill ubiu" M~ktutfllltl . 172 ~u..n. wbieh ~ ((l.4u}.KClU)) c\oua <&II ~k.tM. 00 lhe

u'"

17) PVSV .J PVI.llo--lIl (C:I07. I....,l: ... hi

t.UJ.

i:.",." fIII"".m ,.~.

312

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Although Dharmakirti offers the above comments in relation to linguistic (fiibda) cognitions, his observation is equally applicable to all conceptual cognitions, including inference and definitive determination: one may infer, be told, Of determine subsequent to a perception that a fire is present before one, but the universal "fire" that is the actual content of all such cognitions cannot accomplish one's aims. In this passage, DharmakIrti responds to the problem by only briefly noting that the conceptual appearance is "ignored" (avadhirita). But this brevity is warranted, for he is simply alluding to his previous, lengthy presentation of the apoha-theory. In our own treatment of apoha, we have seen that this act of "ignoring" the conceptual appearance qua construction is a cognitive error or distortion (bhriinti, viplava, etc.). In part, this involves what Tillemans has called an "unconscious error," whereby the image is erroneously construed to be identical or "mixed" (sartZsr!ta) with the individual (vyakti, vastu) in which it is alleged to be instantiated. This identification (eki-Y kr) of image and individual is in part an epistemological error, in that it concerns the manner in which the universal is apprehended. But the error in question also involves an ontological imputation: namely, that the universal is construed as distributed in space and time. The universal "cowness" (gotva), for example, is understood to somehow qualifY all cows in all places at all times. 174 For Dharmakirti, the ontological and epistemological error in conceptual cognitions does not render inferences incapable of guiding one to entities that have the desired telic functionality. In the previous chapter, we have already examined at length how this is possible: the svabhiivapratibandha between evidence and predicate guarantees that the former is invariably indicative (gamaka) of the latter. But it is likewise essential to note that, from the standpoint of actually employing inferences in practical contexts, the aforementioned error is indispensable. 175 When one infers that that there

uparw}addhi samiidadhiiti vii / yathiibhinivefam atattviit / yathiitattvarp ciisamihitatviit / tad ayarp pravartamiinalp sarvadii sadasaccintiiyiim avadhiritavikalpapratibhiiso vastv eviidhi!!hiinikaroti yatriiyarp puru!iirthalp pratibaddho yathiignau fitapratikiiriidilp / na hy atra fabdiirthal; samarthas tadanubhaviiptiiv api tadabhiiviit / tad ayam arthakriyiirthi tadasamartharp prati dattiinuyogo bhaviturp na yuktalp / na hi v!,!asyanti !al}tjhasya riipavairiipyaparik!iiyiim avadhatte. 174 See the account of the apoha-theory in chapter 2 (II3fI). 175 The most concise statement of this notion is: "Even though they [i.e., the particulars] do not appear [in an awareness of a universal], the world engages in practical action through the error of imagining [that the conceptual image is the particular)" [PVSVadPVI.Io6; G:5P-3: atatpratibhiisinyapy adhyavasiiyavibhramiid vyavahiirayati lokam].

INSTR UMENTALITY, JU STIFYING THE SOU RCES O F KNOWLEDGE

) I}

is fire in me hearth by obsetving smoke pouring from me chimney, if one does nOt h.a~ the belief that thc concqn ~ fire" that is the object of this inferen« somehow participatC$ in the raJ (i.e., tdially efficient) fire in me hc:anh, one obviously will not go insilk to warm oncsdf. In other words, without connruing the concept "fire" as "mixed" (sa~!#)with the :actual fire. one will never be prompted to :act upon the raI fire . Likewise, even if one construes "fire" as participati ng in that individual fire . if one does nor also believe that that fire is thereby the same (t,hr) by nature as all fires (i.e.• that it bums, cooks and so on), OI\C will on« again have no reason to act on that individual fire. It is thus clear that both the epistemological :and ontologic:al aspccu of error (bhrJ"ri) are psychologic:ally indispensable for one to employ inference effectively in pursuit of a human aim. For Dharmaldni. this problem expresses irsclfin me tcnsion within the claim that at least one form of instrument.tl cognition- namely, infer· entt--is :at on« erroneous :and uwrwonhy. In fact, Dharmakini explicitly 5l2tC!l that even though me utility of such cognitions makes them instru· mental, they an neverthdess be chmcterittd by "f.Usity" (mirhy4rva). He commenu: Although all conC(pnl,-1 cogni rionJ such :IS inferen« ,-re con· fused, wt still define some as instrumental and some as spurious. We do so because we '-gree on the ifllended capacity or lack thereof for tdic function . We do so until wt arc fou ndationally transformed. fThc cognitions of sclAessness and such] arc: f.Use (bcausc they proceed from the imput2tion of unral universals]. N~rthM,. (My lI«' inffrum~r:oI <»gnirionJ bot!.ea~ they ue conducive to the pacification (of ncgarive ment2i StatC!l] .'1II An 176 rvr (usa1ffl' Sintc 11_ upon an imputtd univusaI, dwoognitions of ~ and...m ID'rfoJs... N~ liN] ~ ,.,.J.ri.... ,. ,...-ifit.,..". (hey an: ilUfNmmal. "p.ar.. ""....... .. .he ............ioo> of d..lnt ("'r') ...d oud.. H."""s app"I_ ~cod ....... thinr; u ~ imasc IMI il a univnsallUdl u Id~ one ~1.ltQ. Whm liM: media · Uon olmo.. who m..dicau:: in thai &ahion ir pnfm.ed, mq no Iongcr ~ tiM: par. lio:ular aha, iI tiM: ob;ca of dcsin; and sum. and dory mlli eiimUu.lc ~ and 5Uda. iii #'i .-...,.,." ,.i';";' wW 9i / til dti .... j# tJIw/""]i" ... / "'" til JIi I... ,,; iIMI m." ill ..,. ,. '14"" ,. f/!r / J"P' ,. ..., _ , . ill .,. ,.1f1i '; .....'" , . pM'" _sp'" ,..,.,.,. i 'P'" ,.".... NI / MJ tI..to J. ,,%",.; ...., Ii ",tJht,,, ",oJ "'''P'' til'" J.. ,...' ~,... ... ..." ito -"1''' ,,.,,,, Iw f pJtyir ,. / _ K:~" .JO' "'i.~ , srJ! I

He._

[u..rr _,. J..,.,.i Ihn,. .... 9ut,.,

"'".n-,.

ytUttyJU,.,.,,., ...~ .dllflMlijtJ,..,. ,.im,.tNlfI /

_1...,;"

""~ ~"".,.H.

314

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

example is the practice of having the attitude that a being that is not one's mother is one's mother [in order to eliminate desire].In Despite the fundamental error in conceptuality, one can still speak of some conceptual cognitions-specifically, inferences-as instrumental because they are trustworthy in that they reliably enable us to achieve our goals, such as the goal of pacifying one's mind and attaining spiritual liberation. But one admits their instrumentality until one attains "foundational transformation," which refers to the elimination of the form of ignorance (avidya) that underlies the errors in conceptual cognitions. 178 This implies that after foundational transformation, inferences are no longer instrumental for that person. In short, Dharmaki:rti appears to maintain that, from at least some rarefied perspective, inferences are not ultimately instrumental, for once a person has obtained the human aims for which such cognitions are useful, why would one continue to admit the instrumentality of such cognitions? Why would one continue to carry one's raft on one's back?

Ultimate and Conventional Pram3.I).a The metaphor of the raft, to which we have just alluded, is a well-known trope found in the Alagaddupamasutta. The Buddha instructs his followers that "the Dhamma is similar to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping."179 That is, just as it would be pointless to carry a raft on one's back after one has reached the far bank, so too it would be pointless to hold on to the Buddha's teachings after one has reached the ultimate goal. Taken to its furthest point, this metaphor

latviit priimiif/ya1[l praiamo riigiidiprahiif/a1[l / aniitmiidisiimiinyiikiirCfla vastu grhitvii bhiivayatii1[l bhiivaniini!pattiiv aniitmiidisvalak!af/apratyakfikiiref/a riigiidiprahiif/ii!l. Note the crucial difference between the ways Sakyabuddhi and Karl).akagomin interpret the results of the meditation. 177 PVSV ad PV I.98-99ab (G:5I.3-7): sarve!ii1[l viplave 'pi pramiif/atadiibhiisavyavasthii ii iifrayapariiv.rtter arthakriyiiyogyiibhimatasa1[lviidaniit / mithyiitve 'pi praiamiinukiilatviin miitrsa1[ljfiiidivat. Note that it is Sakyabuddbi «II5bo2)=K(2II.35» who maintains that the meditation upon beings as one's mother is for the purpose of eliminating desire. 178 See Sakyabuddbi's gloss (PVT:II5arff): gnas pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes paz 'khrul pa1 sa bon can no / gnas gyur pa ni sgrib pa dang bral ba'o [= K:2lI.8ff: iifrayo bhriintibijam iilayavijfiiinan tasya pariiv.rttir iivaraf/avigamarl.

179 Majjhimanikiiya 22. See the fine translation in NiiJ?amoli and Bodbi.

IN STilUMENTALlTY: JUSTifYIN G TH E SO UilC ES O f KNOWLEDGE

J IS

sUg&csts that. while the Buddha's leachings arc true to his followers, they :are not true to him. In this way, the met:l.phor appart:ndy pointS to the pragmatism of the Buddha', teachings: they are only to be :KUpted in rcb~ tion to a goal, :and oncc thaI go:aI has reached, the pragmatic truth of the teachings mould be abandoned, since they wac only (0 be considered true for the purposes of reaching that go:aI. This appeal 10 pr2gl'1t:l.tism, h~r, is in some Wll)'S mi5lc:1ding, especially when we consider Dharmaldni', notion of·conventional- (Ul",lIJilvahirilu.} :and · ultimale" {pirllmtinhiluj instruments ofknowtcdge, Dharmwrti', notion of convenlional and uhimale inllrumena of knowledge: falls within dtc EpiStemic Idc:alisl CriliqUC of pel<xption. AI mal level of analysis, not only inferencc, but also percqnion is distorted. or en oncous (bhr4Ifu) bcoUK perception involves an · internal distortion" (IInlllfllJHIpiaWl), This distortion. a form of ignorance. ntakes the cognitive image: in perception seem as if the objects of pcrcepcion :are external, evc:n though, according (Q Epistcmic Idealism, no such objccts exiSt ouuide Ihe mind. On :an tvcn stronger rtlding. the distortion :abo causes the ·varie~ ga.tKm'" (citrlltJi} of the object, such that it appears 10 have various attributes (Iuch H colnrs) :and dimen.!:inn~ (~ uda :Ill heighT :a nd widrh). Whether u nd.erllrnod in io Sirong or weal.: form , rhe error is nonconccpn.:al: rhe cognitive: im. iudf is distorted.'- If, hOWC'V(:t, evc:n perception is somc:how distorted, what distinguishes a rdiable or trustwOrthy cognition from one thai is nol? If all our ordinary cognitions are distonoed such that none actually !dim or rt:presttlt things the Wlly!hey uoly:uc, then would not all cognitions become equally unreliable~ In his PWM!"'w"ikitp, Dnarmakirti OOlUidel'f. (hi.!: U:IUe-: (OI - [Sinct they do nOI exist cxterna.llyJ all cognitioru' objeru are refuted. If thai is Ihe case. Ihen since there is no difference between cognitions in that all their (seeming) objeru are dis· toned.. how do you say that one cognition is confused while :ano.her ic oth e,....;~ (i.e .. i. is inJfMJmenr:aJp-

Sinct some cognition! have the fault of lacking a consisteD( imprinl for distortion (vipialJll), even the unskiUed say that some

180 5«

me, diJcv.ssion of ~uaI fttOf i~ dupen 1 (a

181 Mr .nd1n5 ullhlo ~ it inflllaKCd 1u..1~.

br

).

O harm
316

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

cognitions are not reliable for practical action (vyavahara); thus, it is said that a cognition of that type is not instrumental. The other kind of cognition has a stable imprint; hence, for as long as saYj1sara endures, it has an unbroken continuity. Having such an imprint, the cognition is in this context an instrumental cognition in terms of being trustworthy for practical action, and the nature of these conventional (saYj1vyavaharika) instruments of knowledge has been stated. Others are confused-and cause confusion-even in regard to these conventional cognitions. Hence, it is only those who cultivate the wisdom born of contemplation that thereby orient themselves toward the ultimate instrumental cognition that is devoid of error and immaculate. 182 Although all perceptions are distorted by the internal distortion, one can still distinguish between perceptions that are instrumental and those that are not. In effect, one can do so because the internal distortion is always present in an ordinary being's mind: for as long as a being is in saYj1sara, the defect that causes the distortion remains. Since all beings in saYj1sara have the imprint, they are all equally confused in this regard, and they thus can interact consistently within that mutual confusion. In a similar context, a later Buddhist thinker speaks of two persons who, because they have the same ocular defect, can hold an intelligent conversation about the two moons that they see. 183 Other, additional, errors are not "stable" (drdha) and all pervasive, and they therefore can be contravened by other perceptions 182 PVin adI.59 (roO.12ft): de yang shes pa thams cad kyi yul bzlogpa na bsfadpa dangcigshos su ji ltar smra ste / khyad par med pa'i phyir ro zhe na / nye bar bsfad pa'i bag chags mtshams sbyor ba medpa'i skyon gyis mi mkhas pas kyang tha snyad fa yid brtan du med par mthong bas gcig ni tshad ma ma yin par brjod fa / gzhan ni bag chags brtan pa 'i phyir 'khor ba ji srid bar mi 'bral bar rjes su 'breI pa ni tha snyad fa mi slu ba fa ltos nas 'dir tshad ma yin no /'di ni kun tu tha snyad pa 'i tshad ma'i rang bzhin brjod pa yin te / 'di fa yang pha rol rmongs pas Jig rten slu bar byedpa'i phyir ro / bsam pa las byung ba nyid kyi shes rab goms par byas pas rnam par 'khrul pas dben zhing dri ma med fa log pa medpa don dam pa 'i tshad ma mngon sum du byed do. Cf. PVin as collated against the fragments collected by Birgit Kellner: upapfavavasaniiniibhisandhido!iid aprabuddhasyiipy aniifvasikaY(l vyavahiiram utpafyann ekam apramiiIJam iicak!ita, aparam ii sa?psiiram avifli!fiinubandhad.r¢havasaniitviid iha vyavahiiriivisaY(lviiditpek!ayii pramiiIJam, sa1pvyavahiirikasya caitat pramiiIJasya riipam uktam atriipi pare vimii¢hii visaY(lviidayanti lokam iti cintiimayim eva prajfiiim anufifayanto vibhramavivekanirmafam anapiiyi piiramiirthikaY(l pramiiIJam abhimukhikurvanti. 183 Such is my liberal interpretation ofrhe metaphor as used by KamalaiJla (TSP adTS 908). The actual context here is rhe "unconscious error" required by rhe apoha-rheory. In order for us to apprehend language as related to rhe external world, we must misconstrue rhe mental

INSTRUMENTALITY, JUST I fYING THE SOURCES OF KN O WLEDGE

JI7

which lack those t.rrors. No pt.ra:ption of an ordinary being, howevt.r, cowd evt.r conmvt:ne mt. internal distomon, bt:caUSt. an ordinary ht:ing's ~fcq)tion is always distoned by it. Nevcrthdcss. beings :lilt. not (.tt.maIly doomed to distorted ~ra:ption . Thq mOlY "culcivatt. mt. wisdom bom of contt'mpI2tion: and ht'u, "con· templottion" dearly mearu tht' rigorous 2nalytic:al 2nd meditative protcticc: that I~ to "seeing things 25 they~" (yilthibh,;taMrWtulJ. To c:n~ in such 2 pn.cticc, one must h2ve 2 pro~r unckrstanding of how conven· tional ~fCCprion md inference o~rate. H2ving learned the correct (i.e., Buddhist) theories concerning the instruments of knowledge. md h2ving :applied one', instrumental cognitions to tht. malysis of reality itSelf, one then develops the contcmpbcion du.t leads ro the realiu.tion of the Wtim2tt. instrument oflmowledge. If we trUSt Siky.abuddhi's opinion. the ultim2te pr.m4!'4 would be the pure, non·dual, rdl.exive awauness of the mind itself.'" But while this ultimue instrumentotl cognition is the mans to Dhannaldni's finot! sotmological goal, it is nOt useful for prxtical 2C(ion in tht' world (i.e., SIIf!Wlrll). If the ultimate instrument of knowledge is indeed some pure fo rm of rcfIexive 2Wlrencss, then there ace no longer aternOl1 nhjK'L~r even m~nt21 mnr~nr---<>n whir.h '" act. Hence, it would seem rhn oonvcntiOn21 ~rctptioOJ 2nd inkrences ~ eventu2lly \t.ft behind, but in terms of cognitions for pn.aical 2Ction in tht. world, thtsc conventional cognicions are 25 IfWCWOnhy and irtcproachablt. as any such cognition could evt.r be. I have discussed Dha.nnakini's norion of ultimate and conventional cog. nition in order to bring us back to the iuues that o~ned the chapter, n:undy. the notion that the instrumentality orinference ill :accepted in rei:!..

rion to a final goal. Borrowing from Karl Potta's work, we made the over· all point that the ~nt'r.d notion of instrumenrality is tied to purpose, 2I\d thu South Asian minkc:n; ofDhamukini's time were especially concerned with some highest purpose. Drawing on Stt'inkc:llnt.r', work, I pointed to Dh:umalcirri', nttd to defend the value ofhis highest goal, but I also tug· gc:srl!d ch.:al his conception of what is dU2ble in the ,.,,,"Vto Uut goal like. wise provides an axiological contat fo r his thought. We find he~ a conltnQ of couap!uaI and IinsuOOc CGpIino... .....:h ~ ..-.:: e&kc dMlIC mmmtllO aomebow ~ idmOOd 10 dw; real, t:m::rnaI thinp chat they rcpiuu.t. lr anyone ~ DOl fa make dw error, !ben _ would ~ wubIc: IOspcak in~ with wr penon, but Una: all I&KQ ol~ do maU dw~, ..-.:: an 5PCaIr intdJiajblywidl achodlcr.bow rbc...,.id, Stt:abowor: (rl,). 1M Stt PVT .sJPV).U l.-u

J,

uarubtcd in the appendix.

}III

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHAIMAKIRTI"S PH ILOSOPH Y

rKiprocal rdalion of munW constraint and compalibiliry that pertains bctw«n pam and goal. To dOK this final chapter. I would funher suggest mar Dharmakini's nocion of ultimalc and convcnlional irutruments of knowledge may well embody !llllt relacion bctwccn pam and goal. If we well' good BuddhiSi sludt:ntJ of Dharmaldrti. we would .seck to be: as fully correct as we could possibly be: in our convcnuonaJ knowicdgc within S111fJSlr.. most par1KU. larIy when mar knowledge pem.ins to the Buddhisl pach. Ac the same lime. we would wish that scrupulous adhcrmct co COIttCt ways ofknowing-YCf. i6able through Ihe efficacy of our inter.Ktioru within S111JUIirlf-tO lead us (0 some higher way of knowing in an immaculate selle frtt of ignorance:. Our ordinary instruments of knowledge are conraminalcd by Ihe incemal dislOnion that is ignorance:, ytt they muse be: compatible with mat amor· dinary state of pUll' cognition in which ordinary objeru fall away. And tillIt same aahcd Slate, while uCterly free of Sil1!JSIin,'s impurities, mwt iut:!f remain accessible 10 those correct (but worldly) ways of knowing.

Conclusion

I tuve aim~ IOdcvdop a hislorial. reading of the g:n u;u i.»uo in Dhilrlllakini'l philwophy KI lUi tu pn..•vide an imerprtution of his work as it is prestnl~ by tht: earlieJI known commenalors. In doing 50, 1 hope [0 have contributed 10 the history ofidc::as embodi~ by a line ofimagincd Dharmakirtis found in the var· ious commenW'ies to Dharmakini's worb. BUII:also hope: thai an acc:oum of Dhannwni's thouglu from the perspective of a single commennri.al SlralQm will prompl questions that arc otherwl.K more difficuh to ask. For example. in.lOffiC comaa one nuy find it bcsl to examine a specific issue-such as the notion of insuumenlality--al various commentarial stnf:l. To do so, one would uace the imerprmcion of that issue through many centuries of commc.narics, perhaps including nOl only commentaton writing in Sanskrit, bUI a150 Ihose who compo5C their works in Tibetan. To be worthwhilt:, such a srudy would have ( 0 provide a history of the interprctalion ofinslrumentality, and one wculd therefo re hi! obIign!:also (0 notice and interpret the distinctions among various commcntarial interpretations. As a result, we will ccnainly learn a grt:al deal about the issue under examinarion, but we will also find it difficult to gain an undmtanding of the way in which that issue relata to other alpttlS of DhannakJrti's thought. Our difficulty in gaining such an undentanding siems largcly from the enonnity of the task in question: on the one hand, we wish to discuss the way in which various aspccu ofDharmakini's thought are intcnwin~ , but on the other, we have committ~ ountlvCli to aamining several centuries of com· mentary. To accomplish both mks, we would bt: compelled to give an accounllhat:addresses ICYerai aspccu ofDhannakini's thought in terms of ICYerai distina commentarial strata. The sheer quantity of m:ucrial and the diw~nt tendencies of the difft:rcnt commenr.uial sinra involYfti render that app~ impossible. both for iU2udicncc and iu 2uthor(S), AJ a rc:suit,

T

HROUCHOUT THIS BOOK

'"

FOU N DAT IO N S O F D HARMAKIRT I 'S PHILOSO PHY

JI0

tilt: prxtic:al

and intt:rprer:ive lirnit'2t1olU of a nudy mat ranges widdy across commenwia.llaycn will (end to avoid cenain queSliolU, The qUCllions I have in mind arc those Ihat involve an interprttltion focused on thc systcmaricity of Oharmakirti's work as it is pl'tsenled in caeh commcnrarial SU'2rum. In attending especially to systemaricity, ~ echo certain concerlU of the commcntarial uadidon, in mal itS method presumes such systematiciry: each po.1ition mUSI be fully compalible with, or ideally, implynoU)' other position.' Our appropriation of the commentatOI1' ancmion 10 S)'Stematiciry allows us to mort ~rly understand cerain choices that they have made, and by asking questions Ihal Ihe commenaron have IlOt asked, we abo highlight thc concerns that we bring 10 the tcn- whtthcr OUT conttrm be historical, philosophical, ethical, or of sorm other vanny, Certainly, it is not the case mat a J)'Stcmabc reading of this kind will respond 10 all of our interests: the IlOtion mat Dharmakini's views changed over the: coune of his life is one wue mat attention to SYSlcmaticity might obscure. Nnomhdess, il may give us a grtater appreciaciOllnot only for certain dcmems ofDhannakini's worX, but also for the tr.Wition of inlerprcution thai dc:sccnd5 from it. In discussing Dharrmkini'J "lOne through iu foundational poinu, I hope nOI only to have cncouraged questions that attend to systemaricity, but aho to haw raised some of themobliqudy. One aamp1c is my allusion to the place ofaxiological cona:ms in Oharmakirti', theory of instrumentality. This is a qucstion thai can only be asked in a way thai emphasizes the syuematicity in Dharmakini's thought. Along similar lines. I will conclude wilh the overall contOurs of an interprer::a.tion thaI springs from a simiw qucstion, namely. the rclationmip among three. issues in Dharmakirti'. thoughr: nature {lIJIIbhawt}, intrinsically ilUuumemal percqxion, and petson:a.l transformacion or rdinemcol. My argument on this point will rcmain only suggestive, but it will serve to C:lC'mplifY me: type of srudy that might e:mcrge from the: ime:rprc:t:uion I ha\'C ptc$Cllted.

Naturt, Pn'ttpt;on and Rtjinnnmt As mentioned above, Devcndrabuddhi and Sikyabuddhi maint'2in that, on Dharmakirtj'J view, a pe.ceprion is in.Slrumenw in mal it leads to a cornet I I II

<>
sko nor>«>n....d>aoty whok...toow para mwualy rrinfon:ceado..don.

*"

dot III..."duaion.

CONCLUSION

J"

judgment about that a5p«t of the object in question which has the expcaed tdic efficacy rabhimilurth.Itri]t1). In the cut of SOtnt ~r~tions . instrumentality may depend on a subsequent irutrumental cognition. For eumpic, when I see a bright color on the othtt sidt of the fidd, 1 may think that 1am seeing a fire, but that ~rcrpt:ion's lack of acuity will r~uirt that I 1M some other instrumental cognition to come to a dtfinirivc determil12Uon (nika;lll) conoernina this isslK': in such a cut, I will only know mat I am mng fire when, for example, I inkr its presence from mng the smoke ruing above that spot. The instrutntntality of this type of ~iCt:ption is considered lO be -o:mnsic- rpaTllt4f1). Undu other conditions, a ~rception produces such a determination direaly in the form of a correa ~lUprual judgment. A perception of this latter kind is considered to have -intrinsic insuumenrality" (SVtIIil/1 pribMlfYII). Sum pt:.ceptioru are instnuncntaJ only in that they direaly produce a definitive determination of (rhe capacity for) the expected tdic efficacy; hence, even though any such pe:rcrpt:ion is nCCt1suily MMDnaphull its iruuumentaJity rests on a correct amaphull cognition, namdy, the correct judgmenr (a definitive dtlerminalion or nilclIJ4) mal it immediatdy produces. Thai judgment, moreover, is correa in rMr if JlIII·Y'.,..crully ~ rn lm Im!iry fMr ruu the 6pc:crM. rdic dJic:aq. II ;1 in rd:nion especially 10 these bntt £lCl ccl"ions ,nd rhe judgmenrs [hey mUll produce mat Dharmakini's notion of I12turt (Wilbhlllll.) plays an a~ cialIy aucw role. The nOlion of nature ClplUre5 our attention when we note how the apoN-rheory accounts for a correa judgment'SsUCCC'Ssful reference 10 such an entity. Let us suppose lhal we h2ve a perception lha, immediately inGlIcu the judgment. -nil i. :I. w::I.tCf'_jllg. • R.eetlling our dU.curllon of me apoh.theory, we know that this determination cannot refer by way of its rdation to some real universals because Dlwmaldrti denies the ultimate eristencc of universab. Instead. Dtwmakini musl aca)unt for reference simply on the basis of particulars alone. He does so by appealing to the norian that each entity that ~ call a &water-jug" is the same as every other emiry wr -e call :I. w:ltcr_j ug in wr all those enrities I"ve the J:lI1l.e eff'ea.

One may thus differentiare them from other entilies thar do not have the dfttr in qucstion. Hence, even though every Imtity is entirely unique, one effectively ignores the uniqueness of "water-jugs" in reluKm ( 0 each orner and focuses on their distinction from tho« entities that do nOt have the effect in qucstion. One thus construcu a universal that, in the final analy.~. eGmin. o f th~ cxdwion of ~ entities that do not lu._ the (:;1.1.1.01 chatacteristia expected of what we aU II &water-jug."

FOU NDATIO NS O F OHAIMAKJRTrs PHI LOSOPHY

}1l.

Discussing the llpoh11-rheory, we nored me difficulty Dhannaldni faces in justifying tht: daim m:1II all the entities in question have mc same effect. ParadigmaticaUy. he appeals [0 the ~enes.s of the pclCCptw.1 image cawed by each particular -..tcr-jug. Thus, all "Woltcr-jugs" are: the: samc in that the:y a1l have: the same effect: mey produce the same image. Peruprual images. however. arc meow particulan. and Dharmwrti snictly mainrains that all panicu1an arc unique. How, then. can he claim that all those mental inugcs arc the same? It would Sttm that, JUSt as all the paniculars that we call "-..ter-jup" arc in fact diffen!m from each other, all me images produced by those entities should 1iJcrwis,c be unique. Dharmakini responds once again by appcaling to sameness of cf&ct. That is. ~n though all the emitia that we call "water-jugs" arc actually diff'en!nt from each other. we call them the same in that, with other conditions in place, they produce the same effect, which is a pcrctptual im• . Likewise, ~n though the pficcptual images produced by those cnciries arc acrually diffcrcm from each other. we may consider those images to be the same because. with other conditions in placc, they tOO produce the same effect. But what is this same effect all the images produce? It is a $eCOnd-ordC"r determination mat coruuues the entiry thar produced me imagt to be the samc as the other entities in question. Thus. all "'water·jugs: although actually unique. may be considered the same in that they have the same effect: a certain kind of perceptual im.; and all those imago:. alrhough acrually unique. rm.y be considered the same in that they all have the same effect: a certain kind of sccond-order determination. In our ~ier discussion of this appcal to a sccond-order dcrermination, I nOted that Dhannakjni's initial problem was an infinite regress: at each level, the: conceptually connructcd RmeOC$ll or a set or entities is warranted by the acrw.1 sameness or their effect. but those first-order elftct:s arc the same only inasmuch as wir effectS are also the same. Hence. in order 10 avoid this infinite rcgrca. Dharmwrri docs not argue that the aforemen. ttoned SttOnd-ordcr determinations arc the same because they all have the same effect. Instead. he :asserts that those determinations simply prescnt themselves in such a -..y due they sc:cm to be the same. But why do those: dC1:erminaoons.seem [Q be the same? The answer is suaiglufu rward: because: it is the natun! of their causes the perccptual irnap-to produce dcrermina,ions that seem the same. And why do me pero:prual images have that natun!? Because it is the nature of their causes-the perceptual objects in '1..~r;.,n--(I) rroduCJe ;m2~.,f rhar kind. F..-plainM in rhil way. Ohar_ malcini's theory roou ,he conccprually construaed sameness ,hat accounu

,ha,

CONCLUSION

for a correct judgment's reference in the nomological natures of causally efficient things. Returning now to the intrinsic instrumentality of habituated perceptions, we see that the notion of nature plays a critical role in Dharmakirti's theory. Such a perception is considered to be instrumental because it immediately produces a correct judgment concerning the relevant causal capacities of the object in question. And the correctness of that judgment is warranted by the very nature of the object itself. Read in this fashion, Dharmakirti's thought appears to be a fairly straightforward brand of realism, in combination with a nominalist stance toward universals. In the context of instrumentality, his thought appears to rest on a kind of internalist foundationalism, where knowledge is ultimately rooted in the indubitability of habituated perceptions. We come to such a conclusion, however, only if we ignore other contexts in which the notion of nature appears. In our analysis of svabhavapratibandha, for example, we saw that, for Dharmakirti, an entity's "nature" must be a conceptual construction that represents the totality of that entity's causal characteristics. While that construction is restricted by the causal functionality of the particulars involved, it is nevertheless mind-dependent, in that factors such as interest, acuity and habituation always playa role in the formation of concepts according to Dharmakirti's apoha-theory.2 Another way to express this point is to note that, if two persons are observing the same perceptual object, the images produced in the minds of those persons are unique particulars. As particulars, those images differ, and whatever might be the causal variations in the non-mental factors, the differences in the minds involved will make those images different. Hence, the "nature" of the object in question is in significant ways reflective of the mind in which that object is being perceived. 3 This dependence on the particular state of a being's mind might lead us to think even more strongly

2 See the discussion in chapter 3 (I84£). 3 Note that, on DharmakIrti's view, the particular conditions in the production of an effect will slightly alter that effect such that it may have a distinctive quality; hence, even if it may be counted as the same as other effects in a general sense, its particularity will distinguish it even from those other effects. This basic point is made in PVI.2I: "It is seen that substances have different kinds of capacities due to the differences in conditions, such as location. Because one has observed such a special capacity in a thing in one place, it is not correct that one is certain of the existence of that special quality in the same kind of thing in another place" [defadibhedad drfyante bhinna dravye!u faktayap I tatraikadntya nanyatra yuktas tadbhavanifcayap}.

}l.4

FOU NDAT IO NS O F DHAlMAK IATI 'S PHILOSO PHY

Ihal Dharmaldni is rc:soning 10 an inlernalisr found.arionalism rooted in irrerngable and prival~ se:nse: ciao, blU in fia, Dh:annakini clearly rejects the ultimai(' rdiabiliry of such data, The previow chapter ended with a reference ro Dharmaldni's norion of an "inranal diston ion," which applies only at the level ofEpine:mie Idealism, Through that diHonion, all the pe:rce:ptions of ordinary persons are conraminaled by ignorance. That distortion, moreover, operates in a manner analogous [0 orner casc:s of nonronttptual error, as in the tnmpl~ of the bent nick: when one visually examines a Slick that is panially submerged in water, one will ha~ Ihe visual impreuion thai the nick is bent, and any straightforward phenomenal accounl of one', peiCeption would have to include a tqX>n such as, -rru.t nide is bem." Thil tnmple demonStratcs thar, given the eircunutanccs (angle of vision, a panieular kind of visual faculty, and 50 on), the error will remain irremediable:; the cognitive image in the peiccption is one in which the nick will always: look bent, and an image produced unde:t thOiC circunutanCCS can ncver be phenomenally "straightened OUt" as il wcre.· Along these: same lines, Dharmaldni's Episternie Idealism maintains that the "internal distonion" applics to aU perceptions of all ordinary persons: all cognitive images involving me fiye sc:nse: faculties will always include an irremediable diS(onion whettby the perceprual object would appear to aisl ouuide: of mind. And JUSt as the nick is nOI actually bem, 50 [00 the object is nOI acrually extra-mental. Thus, in a significanl way. the sense data of aU ordinary persons arc fimdamenally flawed, and with rqard to at least 50me ontological issues, sense data therefore cannot be the foundation for one', knowledge. Our discussion of ulrimatc and conventional knowlccigc, howa>e(, indicated that Dhannaklrri docs not just dismiss Ihe peiCeptions of ordinary persons. despite me dislonion inhcmlt in them. Instead, he considm them to be ~convemional innrumenu ofknowiedgc" that we may we for vari ous purposes, including our progres5 IOward spiritual emancipatio n. Hence, even rnough the mind-dC?=ndency of a perceprual object's nalUfe in part means that an ordinary person's pcrttption of it will be: distoned, that dinonion docs nOI entirely vitiate the perception. We can understand this poim by rc:calling dlllt the imrinsie instrumentality of a percq)[ion depends on that perception's abiliry ro immediately produce a correct judg. m~nt of wm~ asP«' of the perceptual object that is relevant to the purpose

CONCLUSION

J"

hand. BUI 10 be insnumenw in mis fashion, the perttpdon need nOI produa ;I correct judgmenl aboul twry asp«!: of:lll objro:. Hena. my paotprion of a patch ofbluc: may lad directly ro lhe determirnuion, lnat is blue. - And if that judgment is rebant ro my purpose, then that peraption is intrinsically irutrumenw, Suppose, however, that I am concerned with me question of whether ,hal pen::cplual objro: endures for more than one iruwu. In my current scue. my perceptual d:atll. alone will not enable me (0 directly determine. -'T'hal is momentary-; hence, dUI perception is ".1 instrumental in rq:ud ro mome:ntarine:u. Likewise, if my purpose: rtquircs that I know whether that perctptual object is in faa extramental. then my perception wiU again not be instrumental, sina it is con· taminated by the: internal distortion that makes all of my sensory obje:cu srem extemal. Despite such dinon;olU and inadequacies. :lIl ordinary penon 's pttce:ptwIU have whal we mighl call a -quotidian instrumentality-; that is, they ;Itt insuummtal about numerous ordinary iuue:s. Indeed, most of our quotMiian conarns (Is mil teacup hOf: ~ Is this w:&ter cold?) are matters aboul which OUI pen:qKioru::lIe irutrument.al, despite:lllY internal distortion:llld ",her $1Id.. probll!mc. 111;$ 'l'U)fidi:ln in$f",menl'2liry i$ OO!rT:I. inly (':I" of wM.t Dhumakirti moIU when he tpeW of such perceptions :u rtJnvnlhOM/ in5trumenu of knowledge. Moreover, Ihe Sanskrit term 1I11!'1IJll1l4hlrill., the ·conventional,· suggesu that a perception iJ conventionally ac::c.epa.ble in thai it somehow cohercs with the distoned li~rld of ordinary beinp.' One pbyfu1 metaphor that applies in this amtext is the coherenl (if limited) conversation that two drunbrds may have about the (W() moon. dUl both 1ft. Both beine; eqiWly soused. dtey both see [WI) moon • . and they can each remm to the omer about mis remarkable even[. O r perhaps even more i propos is the example of the -pus-rive:rs" seen by IfthlS r hungry ghosuj . ThaI is, when humans and 1ft" gue at the ume Aowing substaoa:. humans see :II river of w:&ler, but 1ft" see a river of pw. The f.&a mal their perc:eptiOIlS cohe~ diffcrencly-humans aglU that it is w.uer, hungry ghom:agree th:u i, is pUlo--is a ray.h of the karma ,hal h:u shaped the likworld that they inhabit. From the perspective ofhumaru. the hungry ghostS' perttptwllS att dUlorted. :lIld from me point of view of :II hungry ghOSt. the humans see it wrong, Nevenhdess, the humans aglU ;II

~

I :un thinkinB "f'";,uy 01 thr.."y in wt.ido U{N'pd,,"u.. impl>er, U\lIUKIionaJ or ItllUlah", ou!l'1tNc furmt dv conl",,1 01000:" pr.ctial aaionIloward. pi. 5C't lbr p~ riow chapin. Il. st.

326

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

among themselves that what they are seeing is water, just as the hungry ghosts agree that they are seeing pus. 6 This cosmological example is useful for understanding Dharmakirti's notion of conventional perception. That is, even though the lifeworld experienced by ordinary persons is contaminated by the internal distortion and other such problems, they can usually agree on what they are seeing. In other words, their perceptions cohere in regard to most daily issues.? We might think, then, that we have returned to some admixture of internalist foundationalism, confirmed by an appeal to coherence. The ultimate arbiter of a habituated perception's intrinsic instrumentality amounts to the fact that our perceptual content appears a certain way to us, and in this sense the theory resembles an internalist foundationalism. But when we examine our perceptual process rationally, we uncover certain contradictions that point to fundamental distortions (such as the internal error) in that process. Concerned that our sense data may therefore be somehow compromised, we confirm our interpretations of our perceptions by appealing to what others report, and we find that everyone from whom we can receive a verifiable report is in agreement, at least to a degree that

6 Along the lines of Asa.ti.ga' s Mahiiyiinasal?lgraha (I5b-I6b), this case is raised by Vasubandhu in his Virrtfatikii, a text that Dharmakirti probably considered important. Sakyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi refer quite clearly to the Vil?lsatikii (see the translation in Appendix 7, especially notes 14 and 18). The point of the example is that the same locus is seen by different communities of beings in divergent ways. Vinltadeva (I77a) limits his interpretation to different communities of hungry ghosts; this is less striking (and less well known) than the notion that beings in entirely different karmic states are having radically different experiences of the same spatiotemporallocus. In Dharmakirti's time, Candrakirti refers to such a case (Madhyamakiivatiira 6.71), but a particularly clear account is offered much later by Asvabhava in his commentary (82b-83a) on a verse from Kampala's Alokamiilii: Due to the variety in their karma, when pretas look at one river, it is filled with pus, and it likewise has the scum of urine and excrement; that is, it has a scum that is a mixture of feces and urine. But when humans look at that same river, they see it as clean; and they drink it. ['las sna tsogs pas chu bo gcig fa yang rnag tu 'brub cing de bzhin du

bshang gcin rnyog pa dang /dan na / phyis dang gcin 'dres pa'i rnyog pa dang !dan par yi dags kyis mthong ngo / de bzhin du chu bo de nyid fa mi yis chu bo dri ma medpar mthong ba dang ni 'thung ba yang yin no I] 7 I will not discuss here the mechanisms of that coherence, but in addition to an obvious appeal to karma, Dharmakirti's theory also likely rests on some notion of intersubjectivity as briefly described by Vasubandhu (Vil?lsatikii I8ab and Vrtti): "Cognitive representations are mutually restricted due to mutual influence. That is, due to the mutual influence of their cognitive representations, all beings' cognitive representations mutually restrict each other, as is appropriate" [anyonyiidhipatitvena vijfiaptiniyamo mitha~ /r8ab/ sarve!iil?l hi sattviiniim any-

onyavijfiaptyiidhipatyena mitho vijfiiipter niyamo bhavati yathayogam}

CONCLUSION

~enables us to engage in practical actions about subjectively obvious sense

t~bjects, such as a glass of water. It would seem this confirmation need be terformed only b~ those who h~ve uncovered the rational inconsis~encies ~n our understandmg of perceptIOn, and once we know that those mconlistencies are irrelevant to our quotidian concerns, we can bracket out the Ja,istortion revealed by our rational analysis and rely on our habituated sense l~pressions-the ones that do not involve any doubt-to pursue our quolidian goals. Metaphorically, we might say that we are all wearing defective .lasses of a certain type. We find that the defects are irrelevant for quotidmatters, and since everyone is wearing the glasses, no one offers a diverlent report on obvious perceptual objects. Thus, even though we know ~at the glasses are somehow distorting our perceptions, we need not be ~ncerned with those distortions because they affect neither our daily goals lbr our known communications to other perceivers. We can thus rely on Ihose habituated perceptions at face value, at least for the purpose of daily

!lin

~~> ~atters.

Dharmakirti's notion of conventional instruments of knowledge sugIgests an account along these lines, but we need to add an important stipu0~tion: namely, that on Dharmakirti's view, we are all deeply dissatisfied :·th those daily lives. Thus, even though our perceptions are adequate to .jmd consistent with) the way we lead our lives, we would prefer that our :. ::~es were otherwise. In short, Dharmakirti's theory assumes that we seek :~ escape the lifeworld in which our perceptions are embedded. The possi~~Wity of escape is indicated by the very conventionality of perception itself: ':,though our perceptions are coherent in relation to that lifeworld, they I. in fact erroneous from an ontological perspective. It is thus not contra.t·ctory for hungry ghosts to see pus in one locus, while humans see water .' ~,. the very same locus. A contradiction is avoided because these perceptions ;o. not fully correspond to ontological realities, and to the extent that they " er, they are located within different conventions which are sustained by l~e beings within each world. Hence, inasmuch as some aspects of our pertption~ are err~neous, the ~y we perceive the :world does not r~flect an pntologlCal realIty. In part thIS means that, even If we feel and belIeve that ~'~r perceptions correspond to the way things really are, the lifeworld with .l.·•hi ..·•.. ch those perceptions cohere is not ontologically given. Leaving that life'prld behind therefore does not require some kind of radical ontological Jrakeover-a task that would seem impossible, given Dharmakirti's notion ';,causality. Instead, escaping that world is a matter of eliminating the per~,~Ptual errors that sustain it.

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328

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

For Dharmakirti, it would seem that this elimination of error proceeds through a gradual process of refinement. Speculatively, we might say that the goal is to alter the dispositions that, from the perceiver's side, contribute to the construction of a perceptual object's nature. In other words, the transition from one lifeworld to a more refined one is facilitated by coming to see the world in a certain way, which in effect means learning to construct natures in a particular fashion. The construction of nature; however, is not a matter of manipulating sense data after they are in place; rather, it is creating a mental context in which sense data will appear a certain way, within the constraints posed by the causal characteristics of the objects in question. For Dharmakirti's purposes, perhaps the most effective way of shaping the mind in this fashion is reasoning. Consider, for example, the reasoning that leads one to understand that a seemingly perdurant entity-such as a water-jug-is in a constant state of instantaneous flux. Through the careful application of that reasoning and subsequent contemplation of the conclusions that one reaches, one eventually begins to see such entities as momentary. In other words, one starts with an unhabituated perception: the water-jug just looks utterly perdurant, and this perception is therefore not instrumental in regard to the water-jug's momentariness; indeed, the notion that it is momentary may seem so counterintuitive that it is at the very edge of what we can plausibly entertain. Applying, however, the appropriate inferential reasoning to that perception, one realizes that the water-jug is indeed momentary. Eventually, by using reasoning and contemplation to habituate the mind to the momentariness of such objects, one no longer needs to rely on an inference: the object now appears momentary when one gazes upon it; that is, one may immediately determine that it is momentary without appealing to any intervening inference. Gaining this insight, one has effectively left behind one faulty lifeworld-in which beings see and react to such objects as if they were perdurant-and moved on to a more refined one, in which at least that one error has been eliminated. 8

8 I am alluding again to the verse cited earlier from Santideva (BCA 9:3-4ab): "In this regard, it is observed that there are two kinds of persons, the spiritual adept (yogin) and the ordinary person. Among these, the ordinary person is refuted by the adept. And adepts are refuted by successively more advanced yogins through a distinctive quality of their understanding" [tatra

loko dvidha dmo yogi prak.rtakas tatha I tatra prakrtako loko yogilokena badhyate II badhyante dhivife!era yogino 'py uttarottarai{ll}. Prajiiakaramati provides the gloss of loka as "person(s)" (jana), but it is tempting here to translate it as a "lifeworld."

CONCLUSION

'"

If lOme such modd underlies Dharmakini', notion of rdinement. then reasoning p\;ays a crucial rok in the trmsition from an etTOntow lifcworld 10 a more rdined one. NcvcnhelCQ, tcaIOning is dearly not sufficient in irsdf: it mUSt be guided by certain interesu and questions, without which one could not conslrue an object's nature in the required fashion.' That is, 10 begin an inquiry into the ICCming pcrd urance of entities, one must be motiv:ued by some desire ro know (jij/ils;J) directed toward some p~ {JmtJojIlNlJ. Here, one central purpose is to eliminate the suffering associated with loss: when my favorite water-jug brcab, I am disturbed: as my body deays and dies, I fttl unhappy. But to:addm.s the problem oHm, I must ac:ccp1lhat I am suffering in that way. Liitcwise, I must believe thaI it is possible to eliminate thaI sufferi ng, and I musl agree that rational inquiry into my belief in pcrdurancc is It least pan: of the mcaru to do so. Numetow other Buddhist claims soon become crucial : contemplation enables reasoning to refine me mind: mora.! rectitude is a prerequisite for effective contemplation; a morality rooted in compassio n is the most eff«tive COnla 1 for such praaices. Dharmakini would surel y maintain that , without these and numerous other conditions, refi nement through rcaIOning cannot ~ begin. In shon. the procr:u of rdiOC'ml':flf reql1i r~ nor jwr Buddhist rc2JOning. hur a Buddhist w.ay of lik Oharmmrri's recommendarion that we refine: O UrsdVCli through rcaIOning and conte:mplation can thus be read as an indirect argument for the importance of Buddhist institutions. To PUt it baJdly, in order to become more refined one must learn to seC' me: world like a Buddhist. And $«ing the world in mat fashion requires me pcrvuive conta l provided by the Buddhi.u community. In other words, 10 see the wo rld :as a Budd.hUr, one must aJlow Buddhist irutitutiollJ [ 0 mold one accordingly. And we can thus swpcct that, wnatCVCf cbc they may do, Dharmakini's atgUmenlS arise from-and scrve to defend-thosc institutions, NcvenhelCQ, s.ctting aside our suspicion, we can draw orner lcuollJ from Dharmmn:i'l notion of refinement: to be rdined, one mUSt acknowledge the contingency of one's lifeworld. including iu institution•. Rcfinemenl also requires mat one accepl me possibiliry mal orner equally contingent lifcworids and inn.itu-

<-

9 To pul 11 anochn way, r:hc pi'obkm of aJUbjea-Wli in DhamWWti', norion of Nrul'C' 1OOffl, aIonl";d! hit nocion of r:hc conditioninc of pcrorpruaI judgnent (_ II4ffl .tquiru dul, ~ any rcuonin&an M:applied. one must fi,.. ~ r:hc ~b;m of one', inkrcna in 1M approptble fashion. If, for exampIt;. one annor I « that 01' .rtf II • JU.tbinl penon.. inlttenca concHn;ng r:hc QUIlt of dut $Wkring ~ M applied.

330

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

tions, whose otherness places them at the edge of our ken, may have resolved some of what we find unsatisfactory in our own. On this charitable reading, Dharmaklrti counsels us to seek out those institutions that accept contingency and the possibiliry of refinement, and he urges us to inquire into those other lifeworlds that, while not yet understood, may one day aid us in the goals that we seek.

App~ndix

of Translations

A Nou on tht Tramilltions

T

provide me larger comot of the poRioN cited in me body of this vrork. Where possible, me trotHSlations have been prepared from critical aiitions (I« the bibliography). In me case of some Tibetan tou-most noably the commentaries of Devcndrabuddhi and Sakyabuddhi-
u)

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}31

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTl'S PHILOSOPHY

implausible that no informed reader could accept its interpretation. It is particularly impon:lnt to note that the first criterion- i.e., a translation by way of a uniqudy Tibetan inrcrprctadon-bas no bearing whauocvcr on the quality of the rr.mslation. It u inuead the historical constraints that I have placed upon this work that limit the relevancc of such t~lations. In general, I have avoided specific reference to previous trarulatioru in the notes bdow, in part because ~ted mention of diugtttments would be both tedious and poindcu. I thus leave the t:adc of detailed comparison to me readt'f. II is, of course, my contention that where previous vcnions arc available, I have nwk: at least some incn:::mcntal improvement. in the hope truu this work tOO will be supcrscdcd before long.

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1. PVSVad PVI.34-37

1

;"\Vell, then, if observation and nonobservation are not the basis for knowIng the positive and negative concomitance, then how does one know that smoke is invariable as an indicator of fire?" One knows it since smoke is fire's effect because the characteristic of being its effect is distributed over all instances of smoke. [PVI.34ab] If a previously unperceived thing defined as perceptible is later perceived :when other things are perceived, and if that thing is not perceived when one among those other things is absent, then it is the effect of that thing. That kind of definition of an effect applies to smoke. If it exists even when the fire does not, then it is no longer causally arisen. [PVI.34cd] 2Smoke is established to be the effect of fire from being seen to be so just yonce because, were it not its effect, it would not occur even once from that which is not its cause. And if an effect were to exist without its cause, then it would be causeless. For that which exists without something else does not have that other thing as its cause. If smoke were to exist without fire, then fire would not be the cause of smoke. Someone objects, "It would not be causeless because something else could be its cause." Such is not the case because the same problem applies, since smoke occurs when fire is present, even if that other, alleged cause is absent. How, moreover, could smoke occur from that which does not have the property-

1 Unless otherwise noted, all translations from PVSV are based upon the interpretation of ;Siikyabuddhi. 32 Siikyabuddhi (PVT:50b) supplies: One might wonder, "One has seen that one instance of smoke came from a particular causal complex of fire and so on. But if that which one sees later is something different, how can one establish that it is the effect of fire by observing that smoke came from fire just once?"

335

J)6

FOUN DATIO NS O F D HA I.MAKIRTI 'S PH i l OSO PHY

IVilbh411t1 of producing smoke, whether it be fire or something else! If you do not admit mal the cause must have: the property-wabh4~ of producing smoke. then since an entity that does not have that propcrty-IWlbluiWl of producing smoke docs nO( produce Imoke, smoke would be causeless. · We are not saying thaI the smoke iudf occurs from something other than fire because we mean that something similar to smoke occurs from that orner ming.· How can an entity that is similar to smoke come from a cause that is dissimilar 10 fire:? This is not possible because an entity similar to smoke comes from an mtity similar to fire. If an dfta ,that is similar to some: Other dfta :r: were: to come from a cause thaI wu dissimilar to causc of x, then the causal capacities of thOle: dissimilar causes would nOI be restricted [0 producing dissimilar effttu. Hence, a difference in cause would not be detetminative of things as different.J Therefore. the diversity of the univeC1e would be causcless, or ~ anything ....,ould come from anything. 1be:rd"ore, since thOle: condusioru are unaccrpa.ble, it must be the case that the difference or nondiffe:rencc of efkcts is due: to the difference or nondiffe:rence of causcs. Hena:, smoke docs not come from an object (tmha) that is dissimib.r to iu observed source because one would be: forced to c;ondude that smoke is causeless. And thus, since that which is causeless does nOI depend on anything else. il would be either permanently existent or pe:rmanmtly nOnexistent. Things occur intermittently because: [h~ are: dependent. [PVI.3d

If smoke were causdess, then, since it would not depend on anything for its existence, it would never be nonexistent because there would be no incompleteness in the conditiON for its existence, JUSt as there is no incompleteness in the c;onditions (or its aiuence at the time that it is accepted to have been produced. O r dse it would not even occur at the time when one accepts that it has been produced because that time would not be distinct from the time when it is not aistmt. For it is by virtUe of their dependence Ion a completc causal complex at a specific time and placeJ that thingt are intermittcnt (ItllJiritlu.).

3 I.. ock. _..is. Oft< could ..... ..abIiah d.a. " ..... Y "'" d'n:..-. by ....,....t,,,& .0 w. x and , haft dilfncclI a .......

u.. r..c.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

337

Entities must be dependent in this fashion because the time [and place] en and where an entity does occur have the capacity required for that ".;. tity to occur, but the time [and place] when and where an entity does not !~cur do not have the capacity required for that entity to occur. This must \: the case because otherwise the time [and place] that are a locus of that ~1tity's occurrence and the time [and place] that are not such a loc~ would \t~ equal in terms of whether or not they had that capacity. As such, the fact being ~ locus for the occurrence of that e~tity would not be restricte~ [to "!pst the time and place that had that capacIty] and the fact of not be10g a OC~cus for the occurrence of that entity would not be restricted [to just the Itme and place that do not have that capacity]. And what else but the presi.!1ce of the cause could constitute that capacity? Therefore, a thing that is occurring in one time and place in distinction another time and place where it is not occurring is dependent upon the ~bnditions in the aforementioned time and place. In other words, its occur'ence in that fashion [i ..e:, in .a speci~c time and place] consti~utes its Jependence on the conditions 10 that tIme and place because a th10g that ~d not depend on the causal support provided by those conditions in that Ime and place could not be restricted in its occurrence to that time and Ilace. Hence, since smok~ is restricted to a s~ecific tim~ and place, ~e f,),ature-svabhiiva of smoke IS the product of that 10 whose tIme and location Loke is observed [at least] once and in whose absence it is then not 1&1;,: ~bserved. This must be the case because otherwise, smoke would not occur J.en once. And being restricted to that time and place where its cause is ~resent, how could smoke occur elsewhere [i.e., where its cause is absent]? mf it were to occur elsewhere, it would not be smoke because a particular ~roperty-svabhiiva of smoke is that it is produced by that cause . •1:, Likewise, the cause, namely fire, also has the property-svabhiiva of prot4ucing that kind of effect. If smoke were to come from something else, ~en the capacity to produce smoke would not be a property-svabhiiva of [lfe. Hence, fire would not produce smoke even once. Nor can that which lomes from that other thing be smoke, for it has come from an entity that ~oes not have the property- svabhiiva of producing smoke. And if that other (rung actually does have that property-svabhiiva of producing smoke, then ~at other thing must be fire. Hence, the relation between an effect and a fuse is invariable.

I

:.;.if.· ...

Ip

~\,,!

A termite tower is fire if it has the nature of fire. If it does not have the nature of fire [which is unique in including the prop-

3)8

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAR.MAKI RTI ·S PHILOSOPHY

erry-swblMva of producing smokel. how could smoke arise in me prcscncx of just a termite tOMr~ Smoke could not arise in that casc bccau.sc fire has the propcrry-slJllbhi,," of being the aUK: of smoke; its distinguishing characteristic (bhtJII) is to have the ausal potential [0 producx smoke. If smoke Mtc [0 come from that which is not the oUSt' ofsmoke. if would be ausdess. [PVI·36-37]

" A urmhc: wwu (Ukr...,;nJM..j .....y ..mctima em;' omoIu: due ,u ,he ........yinS nu.Lle' wed 1<'1 wum !he "1!1 du.mbas.

2. PVSV,d PVl.6IJ-75 Real mings are themselves diErertnt,' but in concq>wa1 cognition they appear as if nondifl'(~nt in that they appeu in SOIn( single form . Th(»(: dtingJ Olppe;u m:,u Wily in (h;;J' mldr diflerc:nti.nion

is obscurtd by VI obscur.ui~ cognition which obscures' the form of something else [-i.e., those distinct real things-J with its own form [i.c .• the fo rm o f a lingle image!. Th.:1.1 obscurative

cognition, although based on tho~ diff"crent mal things, has the cognitive appearance of a single obj«t. WVI.68-691 Due to the intention of that cognition, a universal is commonly said [0 aUt. BUI it docs nOI ultim:ndy exist in the way that it is conccptualit.ed by thai cognition. [PVl.]o] A conccptw.l awafcnm ari~ in dependence on things which arc aduded from what is other than those [that have the samcca~o r dttctl. In conformiry with the nature (prtUrrriJof its imprints, that awareness conaals the distinct fOrm of each of most things. and ascribes (0 them its own nondiffi::rent appearance. Doing so, thaI conceptual awareness conRares those things and presents them as nondiff"crent. Those things conceptual. Iud as nondiff'emlt arc adudcd frem othen in that thq< have the same effc.ca and causes; there is abo a cognitive imprint (1!dJ4/J1l) that induces one to conccptualiu those things in that fashion. The nature (prak[ti) of those distinct things themselves and the nature of that imprint are such that the cognition that arises from those things and that imprint appcan in this way li.e.• such that those things seem nondifferem J. That awareness is obscurative (u'!'''!ri),.J that is, it obscures the form of something d se (i.e., those distinct thinp ] with irs own form. In other words, th:tt cognition obscures

I Ncxt!hat ~ Sushil J)'fltaaical muaurc 01' theM: approximated in ~.

¥n1CI (PVt.~)

cannot

~

be

2 p~ 'lOa Iw bc-cn chanpllO active ~ fo. $yntlCtic .implicit)'. 3'l'De lam ,.".",ri UlcnlIr conveys dw IoetU< o( "w ub.o:uri"," or "me, action 01' obKu,· in,,· Hmec. the cosnirion is Utcnlly"an acrion oI'obKurin,,' Thil Iw bttn rmdcm:l with "obicunti",,· to.void unN ...,. qnta«icromplait)'.

JJ9

HO

FOUNDATIONS OF O HAIMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOS O PHY

the difference among those: things; even though they arc themselves differem , they appc=ar nondiffemlt in that they appear with some single form, In conformi ty with those things. appeanncc. we c:a.IJ Idle mentally con.structed image) the ~ univas:al~ of those mentally occurrent real things, which appear [Q be atcmal' due [Q being apprehended in ,he form of a specific kind of

.. .

cogn U iVC 1m•

•

- But how is it that a universal is an other-uclwio n?~ That lconcqxually oonsuuCled i~1 is itsdf an other..er;dwion.1 ConcrptuaI awareness apprehends that. and since conttpu are by nature erroneow, the aw.neness appart as ifi, ~re apprehending a raJ thing. That conceptual cognition occun only with regard [Q things that are excluded from othen Imat do not have the same ClUSC5 or effects) ; as such, that awareness is undernood to have an adusion as iu obiea.' "But the distinct things in quc:stion are a ternal. and concepu do not

.. Sikpbuddhi (PVf:I,.t.1lf. K:1".6A): MnoWiy __" " " " . j r1N"" mea", dK ioIlowin& H.";ns fl<.apc..ally apmmad ..... iaIlan. i.n ........... !ha. czpcria>ct dw:n:: arixs in one', car_ p<...l ~

wm.

unclnr ~ ol_ thinp ....:h .......IH. ;.... and _ thinb.. 1'hd iI I ......_;..,. and that ilalto I ..... In-jus. 01"lw univwAI PftWllfdirecdy (.111) 10 dIOK imIfCI. IN. i. Goa !>Of pauin IdiRCdyl to partitulan ba:al*' mq. do !>Of apfIQl in an lIeU wboK ob;m iI • uniYaul.

,-=

S ~i (PVT:I/'b" K:169-170) p~ Ihil KCUon wi.h.n oo;caion: "If.he uni~ich pma;", only 10 mmtaUy OCCVITmI muria Il.~. irnacalil , form (~pramtrd bycvn«JXt.W coplion, tMn how an wun~ ~an Ot~""""~ Yo.. have.u dw: D.d ....... 01 putiaalan "-a dw:U ~ ia .... u~ dw io of .... lWUre of panX:wus. ThaI ~ i~ of ~nc of _ menIal form,)'OO p'(.iowIy aid dUI tIIc.oamcncu ('Jr.,., tt]iI- llwoI..rl)of indi¥idualo I~". thoK ailed 'bI1H'1 !hal ha~ Ixm adu&d from thoeK {i.It.. tho« noc aIkd 'bllH'l iI rMt IIOII-rd.nion with thoeK CKher _ (i.It., lhe non ·bI~ indi¥id.....Js):

me...:

me...:

6 PVT (17b6 - K:' 70.6) The author ...y.. T1Nu •.•• Thai ~na INI Iw been pbud In concqxw.I ~

_ iI iMif the other-eul1Uion ~ it Iw come aboul throup. tbcapttima: of a n::aI thine (...,.,.. K: ,_.JtolMJth. ioaparaf( from odw:r minp. T1u1 io the d.ift'tt (J,.".III) obj«c of apt ;fK\l."T"Iw; non-c.onn«:tion lof any pva! PI"iculu with aU odIm] iI the Nmibrity (arnonsputiculan] in the "'''"''' mac il il lthcob;a:t ofClptoJions only) mruophorically, [When OIw-JnUi"i JaY' thil.J be: iI ~U",!hal individ.w. ftul" • IR; similar for jUl{ Ihillta50ll only,

.,..wJ

$+', dwdclhl·, in •• .,...... ;.,." ;. • cleu f"o.....,.,.... ro d..o ......,..;. of ,,~oll'e...! by ~~ ITS'")O..... OOS) and ICamaIaliI.a rrs p.J ri~).

APPEND IX OF TRANSLATIONS

,..

refer [dirttdy[ to aternal things. So howcan one luve a conceptual awarenw with ~ to them?" Those who att analyzing universals distinguish [the concqxuaUy consuuettG im~ from the objectl. but people enrged in practical action ("",v.hanr}do not. Thinking mat their percqn is capable of ,die function. those engaged in practical action unilY the visible object with the concepruaI obj«t. and havine doM so. they act. It u in terms of the intention of perlOllS c:npged in practical action mat the rdatioruhip between univasals and paniculan is explained in this way-i.e.• such th.u particulars: which. by vinuc of producing the (desiredl dftct. arc different from those: that do not produce mat dfea. are made known as such by an expression [whose direct object is necessarily a univmalJ. But those who ponder rd.ity do not consider the univcnal and the panicular to be nondifkrent because parDcu1ars luve distinct cognitive images lin perceptual awarcnwl and so on.' MBut if your Slllrement that m napa occur with regard to particulan conforms to the intention of the person knowing them, then the universal should flO( be an other-oclusion becawc it is not known in dut way by th05C persons." Not only is it nOI \mown in th,:1.1 w.Jy. hur it i~ :ilL., nm known :H l'ithl'f rhl' urne u or different !Tom iu insflInoes, Of u pnnu.nO\{. all pervuive. and SO on. Rather. awareness arises with JUSt a nondifTerent image. What is the basis for mat awarcncu~ We u.y dul ia basis iJ oml'f-oclusion, and we uy this because: (I] dult ocher-oc1wion does exist in rd. things: [11 thcrt it no contrad~ion lin claiming dut other-o.clusion is the basi.s for such cognitions] : and 131 practical action that is based on language is ~ (0 proo::ud in ,hu tn2n~_ Moreover, mere is no rd. univcn:al wha~cr that exisa in the way thai a conceptual or linguistic cognition appean, since the individuals (lIJiIktil thl'nuclves do not occur in many things; and nothing l'!5e thaI occurs in many things appcan. [PVI .71ab] 7 The objeaor'. paim ~ is !hal. on Dtwnukin i'IIh«wr. (OI>Olptl dilUdy rmr only 10 • c:onaptuaIIy CUI'UtJUCIcd ~ Hcnu. bowc:anOM aaouI\l eo. rdltl'Ula 10Klual. atft'naI thinp! 8 A«.ording 10 ~ (PVT:aIl1 - K:171.19ff). · and to on" indicaus

lWeI oeM rnIxaIU( _pea do 1\0( _10 aiIl.mm WKm: noobto..bk [pm'iaIbn) and bea..... lpanic:ulanl 11m: ,riM;: funaion. but loou"pul do noc:

JOnI: •• ••

9 ~hi (PVT:I~ • 1<.:1]).1)

&Ioua

"individual."

r..,u,.,.;) ... "putinllan·

}41

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAK IRTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

Individuals arc not distributed over each other. They annot be distrio. utcd because if they ~ there would be no distina individuals; henc:e, o~ would be forced to condude th:1l there would aho be no universal." Moreover, it is not the caK that something that is other- i.e., dininct from those individuals-----appears that way in awar~ness. And how c:an that which has no cognitive ap~ct: induce one to apprehend or designate somtthing dse as itsdP." Nor is it the caK that something is universal just because it is a ungle thing whim is connected to those [pmkulanl because one would incur an overextension. I have already explained this.It "A single univrnal is the wan-am for expressions and cognitions that construe many individuals as nondiffacnt. It is not the caK that aU [entitW::s that inhere in things, such as numbus, SJm'~ as wamnrs in that fashion! .But how c:an one have: a cognition of one thing from anoth~r thing~ "Because the on~ thing has a rdation to the other.~ Then one would be forced to conclude that number. effect-substance. and so on arc also univcn:al5.u "They arc not universals beause they do not have the nature of universah." Well, we should investigare what ,he nature of a universal might be. In this regard. SOnlC philosophen say that when a a:ruin kind of singular. real thing has a rdation fO multiple individuals, one has a cognition of those individuals as the same; thus, they c:a11 that rca.I thing a univrnal. But here, we say the: following. One could have a cognition of some individuals u the: same from effect-substance and so on. which arc also conncctcd to many Dtw-maldrti'. UK 01 rM ICrm · iIXliYiduali· probably tdkcu III mnnpt 10 adopt, for the. sake of NJ!.In>enI, the. rerminoIov ofNaiyiyib and VIi ' I·u authon. (_t.~rJ!,i).

10 NOIc ltoe M.tU ;. uxd as a CGUlu·noun r doonalhill,") ramn dw! an ab.:raa noun r diffttcntt"). 1M pain! here ;. mal I hypoatasiud uni¥CfAI ;. only poaibk if lheft arc inJu_ in ..... ich il is ilUruuiau~d. No~ lhal in Ibis Imfma:, !he pmn ,.,. (~lW) only adds nnphuU. and it Iw IlOI bftn diRCtly lrarubrtd. II '" Sakyabuddhi mUa deu (pVf:19b4If- 1(;17).ull). the noOon Iwrc;. dw in I «In • .,...,.ual ... li......iuic cop;lion. indmduaklNI pnMrM'" il'UWltial~ a ccruin uniwrul an: contmICd in ro:rmf 01 mal uniwnal For ~, aD indiYiduaiJ dw in.tanlia~ "wall:r-jUl_" an:appt~!daI:u · wam.jup" by~irt\IC of~ POQ(DCIC of"mal UlIi¥a$l.l in cad! indi.......w. 1M upunml ~ ;. lhal 10 do 10, W univuul mUlt aaually Ippear in _·1

....'-

12 Stt PVSV tlliPVI--40'-41 (G:l1..ffl. I) An ·drax..JUbKana:"

(i~",c)

.11IIb.cana Wtl'Clll!tI from

om.c. ...' - - .. ~1'01 )db IM",.-CO (,0., -

me «Injunction of

1<;'1+'1) oM Ietm often -..do ............nok.

(-:1"ltitt). Sft, for aunpk, iu IWIE II PDS (I l l).

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

343

individuals; one could have such a cognition because effect-substance and so on can serve as the warrant for such a cognition. Therefore, effect.substances and such should also have the nature of universals. Otherwise, the other case-the case of what you call universals-should also not be the warrant for a cognition of many things as the same because there is no distinction in this regard between what you call universals and what you call effect-substance, number, and so on. Thus, on these philosophers' definition the natures of substances, qualities and universals are all muddled. "Well, then, the universal is the appearance in a cognition; and since it is of the nature of awareness, it exists." That is not so, because of the following question: And how can that which is not different from awareness occur in another object? [pVI.7Icd] How can a universal allegedly instantiated in some objects have the nature of awareness? It cannot because that which has the nature of awareness does not exist in those objects. "The universal has the nature of awareness because one imagines that the mental universal has the nature of those external objects whereby one commits a cognitive error; it is through this error that one engages in practical action." What then causes awareness to arise in that fashion with regard to those particulars? If it arises without any basis, one would have such awarenesses with regard to everything. Alternatively, [if one ignores the problem of the cause, one can still ask:] how can a form which is not different from one awareness be the form of another awareness that comes from another thing? Therefore, how could that which does not pervade other awarenesses or other things be a universal? Therefore, the apprehension of a single essence (atman) in many things is a false cognition. [PVL72ab] Objects are not the same in terms of any essence present in all of them, whether it be distinct or not distinct from each thing that instantiates it. Therefore the apprehension of those things in that way is just a false conceptual cognition. The seed of this conceptual cognition is each object's difference

}....

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAkIRTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

from (his and that oth~r object; one ~ngagcs in the formatwn of linguisric conventions (SIIf!tjfil1)" for th~ purpoK of knowing that difference, (PVl.]lCC1J On~

forms linguistic convenlwns in order 10 have a cognition of a cer· tain type of difference such that, having known Ihal things which have nondifTtldlr efrccts are different from thost- which do not have m~ dkcu, p«SOns who undmtand th~ convenlions act by avoiding Ihose thingt that do nOI have th~ aforementwned eff«I. This difference from this and that is the seed for th~ false conceptual cognition in which those Ihings appear 10 have a 'ingl~ ~nce. Having appreh~nded that difference thai those things seem to share. the conceptual cognition appears in that way due to me nature of th~ imprint for it. "You maintain mal different things have a nondifferent effea, whereby those thingt are said fO share a nondifferenct: in that thq" can all be characteriud by a diA'ercncc from things du,t are other than those that have me aforemenrionc:d effm:. BUI how can this be the casc?~ The nature (prat,ti) of things is such that although Ihq are diA'erc.n[, by their nature (svabhdfltl) some of th~m ate rc:5tricted 10 the accomplishment of the same tdos (a"ha) such :as inducing Ihe same judgment Mrapratyallil' I'MrlAjfil1naj or producing an awareness of an object; the sense filculties and so on are an cxarnples. [PVt.])] For cxampk, the sensory faculty. the ob;cct. ligl'\l, and mentation (I'M"llIilc4ra}-or [according to orner philosophiesl. the self, the mulry. mind, the object, and contact-produce a lingle effect. namdy, an awareness of a visible form . Thq produce this one, same effect even though thq do not instantiate a univerWthal is restricted to ha:ving Ih~ nature: of producing (hat effect. Likewise. distinct instances of tKCS such as iif!I/Rp4s and so on by their very naNre produce the same cffi:ct. namdy, a rccognitional awareness that has an image of each instance as the same aJ the others, i.e., as a ~ Utt." All tree-instances have thosc same effects even though they are not distributed the one over the other. Or thq accomplish some other [die function Ihat is [0 be done by wood, such as combustion. housing, and so I"

~lIr.r"'..Idh;

(PVT:9.b. _ 1(,.",_...,) lion" (aw ~ ,. ~ ,.".m.~.

p.._

~,.. "fon.",.;",.,

,,(1;"8";..... """'_

APPEN D IX O F TRANSLATION S

'"

on. in accord wiili me oonditions. But even iliouth Wo:uer and such au abo not distinct from tl't'CS in that any entity is difftrent from all omen. water and so on nevcnhdCSli do not perfonn the afo~mencioned tdic funaions, JUSt as the ear and so on cannot produtt an awarenCSli of visible form. A further examples au cmain medicines which, aliliough they

au dilkrcnt from each other. art Sttn to eliminate bcr, eimer in oombination Of iodividually. Other things do not do so. (PVI.74J The Gu4uci herb, purgation and so on, either together or se:paralely. perform a single function such as me elimination of fever. Even though thCK things arc difftrenl , a univerul is not required fo r such to be the ea~ _e.. for ,hl':m m h:lW': ,hi': urnI': dkcr_ Meawe'. their narucc is such iliat iliey relieve fever. Even though they arc not different from iliose medicines in ,hal they are also unique (i.e.• dift"erenl from all other thingsJ, curds, lead,1) and such do not do so. But someone migiH say. "Some univeBal exists in those kinds of things; and it is due to that univeBal that they perform one funruon .~ Thit is not COrTl!Ct. The uniVf!rul it witMllt JiltiPlrhDPI. "T"hnrfo", t~ llnil¥nllJ is not (PVJ.7SaJ that which performs that funaion

because one would be forced to conclude that those: medicincs' performance of tha( function would not be distinct. even when there are differences among those medicines, such as being pfOo duced in different fidds . (PVI.7Sb-<j If the dfcct of alleviating fever and so on were performed through a uni· versaI. then sintt the univcBal is not distinct in any of its instances," the individuals, dcspite the difference in the fidds where they arc planted and such. wouJd also have no distinctions. such as bringing slow or quick relief. So tOO, the qualities of some plann would not be better dun omen. Alter· ~tivdy. if th~ uni_r.::tI h.:td SOJn~ dininetion in thi.c or th.u in(ttnu, th~n it would by its narurc-SJ.Whh4W1' be different in its V2J'ious instances; hentt. it would lose: [he nature orbeing a univcm..l (which is necessarily the same in all its instancesj. 15 Shah b96T-91) plU

tI ~

tnrubtion.

161n odICf words, thoe univerA! always mnaina lhe amc:. rq;trdkA ofthoe individo,gld\at

;lUWItiaU:S ;1.

346

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Also, the universal is not what pafOmu functions i1«lIug, since the universal iJ trlNtAnJ, it (linn!), (1l1lSll/Jy Jupport IllfJthilfl. (PYI.7Sdl [Sioclt it is unmanging,] a unMrsal a nno t bit augmltntw, so if it .....-c~ to provide causa! suppon , it would produtt all Onts dr«u at once. Otherwise, it would no t have the n~ lUre-llIIlbh4l11l of producing that effect. But individuals occur in diJ[incrivc waY' due to the time, place. and modifying conditions of their occurrentt. The~ is no contradiction if one says that those individuals produce distinctive effcas. likewise, even though they are by natu~ different, ttrtain things accomplish the g me telic function. sum as producing the same recognirional awareness (prillJllbhijfi4lfll). As such, they arc diltt~nt from other things that do not IX'rform that function. and they are therefore said to be nondifferenl. O r [hose variow things that arc produced by a single cause arc said to be nondiffe~nt beca~ they are different flom [hose Ihings that arc nOI produced by that cause. "Well, through the universal---which you have dcfinw as diffen:nce (from that which does not have the intended. telic function}-does one cognize the particular as the same as other particulars, or does one cognize something other than a paniculu in that falhion ? What problem comes from th is~ Well, if the particular is what one cognizes as the same, then how can it be an object of co ncq)(uality~ And if one cognizes something cIsc. then how could there be cdic fun ction fro m something other than a particu1ar~ And sino: one would not cognize impermanence and such in a particular, the particular would not have the nature of being impermanent and so on. Funhermo~, sintt they arc not cognized in paItKulan, those univenab such as impermanence would nOl be qualitic:s of real thinp;." This Dult does nOt apply lxau$C it is in reLuion to the :lppear.mcc in conceptual cognition that wt form conventions for univerWs, oo-refermti;&iity, and the subject-predicate mation. This type of aw:lf'enc:u arises in dependence on imprinu tru.t have been left by pclCCprual experience, which apprehends the natufCS of real things. The awareneu thar arisc:s in this fashion is conceprual; as sum. even though it docs not have those real, extr:amenw particulU$ U its objca, ronttptual cognition s«ms to have them u iu object. In other words, being conceprual, that cognition bas a nature such that iu obj«t is imagin«i (1lIiJryilINllil4) 10 have tru.t natun: [i.e., the nature ofbcing an extra-menw puticularl. Conoeprual cognition operateS in that fuhion bccau.sc it is by nature produced by imprints thar have been placed in the mind by e:lpcriences of those particulars [i.e.. the onc:s that prompt the concept in qucstiOrll. And sintt conceptual cognition is lindi-

APPEN DIX OF TRAN SLAT IONS

reedy] produttd by objccu (pllddnhta) that havc nondifferent t"ifecu, it has an aspect mat is ultimately the ume for aU ~ objecu--namcly. the difft'nnce from objecu or cognitions that are othC! Ihan those [mat havc the expectcd effccl] . H aving thai aspect, tach such cognition sccms (0 apprehend an [exlcmal] object that is nol different [man othcr objtttS of the samc dassl. Thc imqt which appem to (hc conceptual cognition I«ms to be extcr· nal, singular, and capable of tdic function. cvt:n though it is nOI capabk of il. It appcars this way beauS(' persons cngagcd in practical activiry ("",vaharin) proceed by imagining that an aspect of a conceplual cogni· tion 17 is mat way [i.c.• extcrnal, clc.j. Othcrwise. it would nOI be possiblc for them to cnvge in practical activity. 8ecawc: il appcars as somcthing mat is capablc of a relic function. thc cognitivc appearance seems to be different from that which does not have: mat tdic function , but il is not ulrimattly real becawc: it is nOI a &eror in a practical tCSt. as I will explain. Those mentally apericnctd objtttS [i.c.• thc imagcs that comc about through me particularsl " are apprehended as "the same~ by vinue of that uni venal because they appear in terms of an exclusion from some othcr Ihinp. Bur a particular is nor what is apprehended as ,he same because it does nor appcar to a c;onceptual awarenm. Th05C conceptual appeannccs appcar as nondiffcrcnr in that mey arc oduded from some min~, but they may also appear to Ix nondifferem in that they possess adusions from othcr things. Thcrcfore, although those appearances are nOI rcal in and of themselves. conc:q»tual cognition prc:scnu thcrn as jf they ~re; and onc Ihu~ fOrms Mnvl!nrionJ fOr univn5:>l~ ~nd cn--l"I'!r~n ri~ l ;ry ~n rhough th~ obj«t of mesc c;onve:ntions is faiS('. Funhermore, all of these and other such convenlions are erfOncoUl (IIipIA",,) in thaI mey are con.ruucred through the imprinu kft by aperi. cnCCl of particubrs. Thus, conc:q»lual oognitiolU whose production is c;on· ncacd to those real things by way ofimprinu arc u usrwonhy with rcgard ro ~ real'h ing. ~ ,hough rht: re:al'hing in quarinn d~ nor "p('\"'Ir in those conceptual cognitiolU. An c:x:ample is mc erroneous cognition of a 17 ~ikyllNddhi (PVT:,..h " Kall) "'gpo mat DtwmUirti is apc:akins of an "up«t of oosnirion" rtiu~.

(_,.,,,.,,.im. _

18 S~buddhj bsa,Jif - K:th.IJ) (",.;,..ur~)

slOMa hJJhi"i.m~ as "Those ~&a of objeas

u.... ......... 0>0'" obuu. d .......,. P""io:uI.o.<~ (_&l'r'~_.;,If4!I) ...>
conoep
J,48

FOUNDATI ONS OF DHARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

tewcl when ont" s«s the glimmer of the jewel. Other cognitioN are not trwrwonhy beca~, ~ though thq also arise from a disrinct;on of the real thing. these other cognitions Fail to determine" me distinctive qualities of me thing in accord with the way in which it waJ aperienccd through me serues; having Faikd to nuke that d«uminat;on. they impute some other distinaion onto the thing by apprehmding some slight (Iti~f) similarity,An example is the cognition of a jcwcl when one S('CS lamplight. The above response 10 me objectioN raised above shows that Ime capK· it)' forI performing (die functions docs nOI apply to things that are con· ttptual objKU. II also shows that it is nollhe ca.sc Ihat impermanence and so on do nOI pcnain 10 particulars. This is 50 because there is no imper· manCntt othtt than me' Ruauating lhing (II"J'U ~1t/4J INIIhl1UIf,) irself. Thai is, one apprehends a minI which is of mat kind Ii.e., impermanent] 10 ~ something that perdurcs for only an wan .. henet'. one has cognitions such as: ..,-nis is impcrmanem" or - Lmpttmanentt pertains 10 this," Focusing on the nalure (tihllmwt4) of the particubn in quotion, such conttpu prcscm various qualitio [conceptualized as aruibules of a single ming], single qualities iconcq)(ualiud as common to a group of thingsl . and qualities which are eonceptualiud as distinct [ho m what they qualify). ThOS( conceptual cognitions art nOt ground.l~ beca~ they are based on the experience of an asptcr (bhd4) of the rca.! thing.lI Nor are conttptualiud qualities such as impetmane'ntt nOI qualities of real things bttause: that which has thaI nature (uUVllbhilltl} appan in that way. However, it is still errontous to apprehend a real thing as having various distinct anribules, or as the same as Olhn' reallhings, or as distinct from me qualities abstracted from iL It is erroneous because: an indivKiual that performS:l function that is the $:ImC U lhe function perfonned by omer individuals or th;u pC'rforms many functions is defined in that way jwt for me purpose of making thOS( who wish 10 know aboUI such things aware that it has such a nature. One does nOI define it in that way bttause of me' real 19 !.ltpbouddhi (PVT''9NJ- IC ·.I) -....) po-. ...........!""':t< .'4-"J"'.

20 Noco:" tNt dw: term ~.....,. ia: not UKd 11m: in the _ of"uni'm1oll: at iI e'tidmt from ~i{pvr:?NJ).whomsJ*"",.rtnelcmibrdw:Ttbn:an iIn"andP rd · 'Ju H p/M" j ",tJIw .. ,.,;J 9i p. .... 21 ~j (PVT:96b .. 1(:1&4' P- '1; ' \oM at "an ~ of tJw, rW thins. ~{ aopca: bo:ins ddinnl. imp=nanrncc and iO on" (Jnp.,.. i w.,.J,.,,.; ".,.,.. ,.,;J t. """ ,.. 'i ",,,.,. ..,;J. ... a. Kaf~min. who modifia ~ 'Ilrnemcnl by rypia1Iy

"""/If'"

lnj«:....., • pure. -L.~JUI1If... l.

ck5K~

of mliam in,o ,I><: ........oon: __ ~,..~ ....~

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

349

nce of distinct aspects of real things because: [I] a single thing cannot anifold; [2] many things cannot be singular; and [3] we have already fed the distinction of an abstracted predicate from the subject from iJch it is abstracted. Since property-svabhavas are conceptualized as being ~}fpature di~erent from each other and from t~e subject of which the~ are p'i~icated, If one wer~ to acc:pt tha: t~e objects (art~as) of expreSSIOns '~1"esponded to real thmgs, co-mstantlatIOn (samanyadhtkara!lya) would be ~possible.

"'''~omeone objects, "Expressions for both quality-universals and dass-uni~~fsals

denote the one substance that possesses those qualities and univer-

~~sas its delimiting qualities. Hence, there is no such problem."

i""%~If the substance does not causally support a universal or any other alleged aelimiting quality, then that universal or other such entity is not that sub~;i;ihce's delimiting quality because that universal or other entity cannot ~i~end on that substance. If that universal or other such entity were ~4:jj>endent on that substance, then substance and universal, etc. would ~d in the relation of producer and produced. Hence, those two could not ,l!Jt'cur together [i.e., simultaneously], so one could not express both of them ;~~e;, whereby the substance is expressed as qualified by the qualifier that is ~X~'delimiting quality]. And if one [i.e., the substance] must be expressed ~~ough semantic implication (adhyahara) [by way of an expression that if~fers to a delimiting quality], then expressions do not have real things as ~lli~ir objects. 22 And if the expression for the substance has as its object a cog~itive appearance, then such should be the case for every expression. This ;iust be the case because, if the singular possessor of various delimiting ~::~ i!.talities is apprehended in that fashion [i.e., through conceptual imp uta':ign], then the delimiting qualities [which should be apprehended non;~~nceptually] would not appear in that cognition. 23 . The objector responds, "The delimiting quality and the substance that ",¥<~

:/15akyabuddhi (PVT:98a = K:r86) now inserts the following objection: Someone might think, "The [substance] that is qualified [by those delimiting qualities] has ceased to exist [because it has served as a causal support for the delimiting qualities; hence,] the expression whose object is that qualified [substance] has a cognitive appearance as its object. But the expression whose object is the delimiting quality, which exists, has as its object a real thing." ~~ r have followed 5akyabuddhi (PVT:98b) who says: ,"\

One must admit the following: the cognition that imputes the already ceased substance qualified by the delimiting quality in question is conceptual; the cognition that

3S0

FO UNDATION S O F D HARMAKIRTI' S PHILOSO PHY

possesses it are the causally suppon C'd and the causal suppo" ; :IS such. they occur together. TherefOre". me fiult you have raised does not hold true." No. mis response is not correct. Something which is already created is not de~ndc: nt on anything, so it could not be a delimiting quali[),. And something mat is not yet created cannot be a delimiting qualiry because its narure (IVIIriipa) is not esf1lblished (such that it could, by that nature", be a delimiting quali[),J. Thus. whC't her the delimiting quali[), be already aeated or not yet created, mere" is no d~ndena: whatsOC'Ver. H en ~, the convention fo r me qualiry/qualified m ation must be Qablished after one has conceptually imputed the existcna: of these emities. If (hat is me ClSC, why should conceptual and linguistic cognitions not occur in conformi[), to conventions mat have been consrructcd through conceptual imputn ion in all cases~)oI It has been prC'V iousiy stated that if a single expression or instrumental cognition rakes some quali[), of a thing as an object by the force of rnI things memsC'l vcs. men other expressions or instrumental cognitions would be useless because all omer qualities of the object would already be implied. But if such cognit)ons confo rm to convt:ntions in the aforementioned manner, this would not be the ClSC. Thai is, since the appearance in cognition is unreal. the problems that arisC' due 10 {the claim that me objects of such cognitions] are real do nOI follow. Therefore (uuJ),n a universal is not contradictory in accord with the way it is cogniud because me cognitive image appears in cognition to be nondifferent from some orner images. The relationship of qualifier and qualified (as in the expression -blue lotus"] is also not contradictory in Ihe way that it is cogniud for the following reason: even mough one aspect (1Iuir.) {such as ~ bl ue"J has b«n taken as an object, the other (such as ~ Iolus"l has not been determined; th:1f other aspect is what is apprehended by a cognition wh ich involveli lOme doubt or apcctation about mat Other aspect. [as puaiva w q.wiry. wbich iJ an [a1~1J ~a1thinK> if ocllnwiK--il iJ PC' "p'.w. 11 Q no< poooihlr fur ~iin5kCUKJlj.ion 10 pmxi.~ b:xh a raJ '1ualhy wd an unraI..,.... a:p
or

l S Th. COMpI;.,. •..! oynUJI . h. follo-in, s ....J.ri•• u . ...... en .. h... bo:.... ....... ""'sed a...od unncccaary complaily in English.

",

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

351

~n

the doubt, "there is a blue what?"]. Co-instantiation is also not contrain the way it is cognized because even though two exclusions are ~dicated (upasa'f!lhiiraJ6 to be objects of different expressions, they appear ~li1 cognition to be nondifferent [in that they seem to be instantiated in a sintile locus or subject]. . "'~. In addition to the conventions of co-instantiation and the like, the disiliinction of subject and predicate pertaining to the cognitive appearance in :}conceptual cognition is also not contradictory in the way that it is cogitiized. It is possible that a cognitive appearance be distinct from various ~bjects. That being the case, when some questioner wishes to know whether ifhat cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of ~ose objects (arthas), the respondent indicates that mentally occurrent27 ~eal thing having expressed it (sa'f!lcodya) as if it were a predicate separate itom the subject-since it appears that way in cognition-by means of a ~redicate-expression (dharmafabda) that precludes other distinctions [i.e., ~ther predicates]; he does so having established another property-svabhiiva s~f that mental entity as the subject without the distinction of precluding ;:6:ther predicates. 2s To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly (a'f!lsena) 2~:ifferent; hence, a conceptual cognition involving a subject/predicate con~truction appears in such a way that it seems to be differentiated. Cognition ~snot, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing ~ecause this would entail the problems discussed above. 29 Moreover, since persons express many differences of that kind such as ~~ictory

~"

~~(;

..

Glossed by Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99a = K:r87) as pratipiidana.

~7

Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99b = K:r88) suggests: tad eva buddhipratibhiisabhiita1J! vastu. ~I]akagomin offers a second interpretation in which the vastu is understood to be biihya. ,-hat is, instead of saying "The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive ~ppearance is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized," he says "The distinction ~~ubject and predicate pertaining to a real thing is also not contradictory in the way that it ]i.cognized." He then makes the apptopriate changes in his commentary:

yad vii dharmadharmibhedo 'py asya vastuno na virudhyata iti sambandhab / kuta ityiiha I anekasmiid arthiid biihyasya bhedasambhave sati tasyaikasmiid yo bhedas tasya vidhiprati!edhajijfiiisiiyii1J! kim anityab fabdo bhavati ciik!u!o na bhavatiti tad eva biihyam vastu pradarfyata iti sambandhab.

~'rhe complicated statement from dharmadharmibhedo to pradarfyate is difficult to render iD~intelligible

English, and I have therefore chosen to break the statement into more man-

[~~ble sentences.

~Sakyabuddhi (PVT:99b6ff = K:r89.II) claims that this complex passage treats two sepa~e cases of the subject/predicate relation: a predicate-expression (dharmafabda), such as "'IJp.bdasyiinityatvam, "and a subject-expression, such as "anityab fabdab." This interpretation

35 2

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

qualifier/qualified and subject/predicate, there is therefore a difference in an expression that indicates quality and qualified; there is also a difference between a predicate to be inferred and the evidence that indicates it, even when they are actually identical to the same undifferentiated real thing. These differences in the context of language and inference are drawn by means of conceptual differences that appear in cognition as predicates that are based on the property-svabhavas of the real thing. Such distinctions are drawn so that one might know that real thing's nature.

is weakened by the absence of a conjunction, and I have thus not followed it. One might suggest, however, that the current translation problematically suggests that a single statement can be both predicate- and subject-expressive. Since this objection is plausible, I will note here a translation based upon Sakyabuddhi's interpretation: The distinction of subject and predicate pertaining to a cognitive appearance is also not contradictory in the way that it is cognized. A cognitive appearance can be distinct from various objects (arthtts). That being the case, when someone wishes to know whether that cognitive appearance is established or rejected as distinct from one of those objects (arthtts), the respondent presents that mentally occurrent real thing having expressed it by means of a predicate-expression that precludes other distinctions that could be predicates. Thus expressed, it seems as if a separate predicate is expressed because it appears that way ro cognition. But he may also present it having established another properry-svabhava of that mental entiry as the subject without the distinction of precluding other predicates. To this extent, subject and predicate are slightly different; hence, a conceptual cognition of this rype appears in such away that it seems to be differentiated. Such a cognition is not, however, differentiated due to some differentiation in the real thing because this would entail the above discussed problems.

3. PVSV,d PV1.137-142 In order to point out that the things in question ptcrform me

(desired] cfkct. the ancient oncs assignrd dK W1'It aprtSS.ion to those dUngs which, allhough difkmu. perfonned lhe same Nnction: the semantic ause (nj",iftll}ci thaI expression u the ad usion from that which does nor have that cff«t. They did not assign an expression for each thing because an expression for each distiner thing would be impossible duc ro the difficulry of doing so and because it would be poimlcss. The ancient ones did not assign me same c:xpression (0:1 real un ivrnal bec::lluc:l.1I [hings:afr: siruated in their own propmy-wahh4v.a. [PVI.ll7-1)8] ]be euence of a Had"ord

u not a Jmcy's' euence, but mcadu-

sion from du( which docs not have the dkct of a cow exists in both of them. (PVI.1391 Withalll the nondifferr:ntt of

w obj«ts. a nondiffnencc of the

expression used fOr those things doa not make any KfUe. Therefore. we accept thu the capacity to ~rform the same effect is the difference from thal which docs not have that .:freet. IPVI.I40) For eumple. when

::1.( :I

«rt::lin time it i. poaible to

~ P"- that

the things such as the eye and so on, whose effect is an awareness of form, have that dkct as their nondiifucncc, somtonc forms a signifying cxprcuion so as 10 Ienow all of those things as caU$C!l of ocular awarcocss al once; that sign is fonned without a JCPilatc universal which would be theil essence:. {PVI.I-4I- I-41] Somtonc thinks the following. "Without a nondiffcrcnl cntity instanti· ated in each instancc, how could a single exprcuion [such as 'cow'] apply to many [individual cowsP A single o::pression could not refer to them all I "Hutkwd"1w beat wed (0 mnsiale "'..w,.....nilt "Jnwy" ~a ~ Tht_ otnioouI diff~ bot:fIOIccn 1 1tl~ and • NInI~ Ui tbn, ....ptd;ot colon. and II III for thl. reuoa!hac I N" ct-en ro .... lM _ familiar mlN "Hufford- and "Jnwy."

jj4

FOUNDATIONS O F O HAIMAK IRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

Ixcause: III rhey would have no similariry; 11J since they have no similariry, thar expression would refer to only one individual; therefore, that expression would not produce the cognition of anomer individual of that type: IjJ if:u1 awattness of one thing as the same: as another were to ariK without any semantic proximiry (praty4JAlti), then an overextension would occur; 14J the application of a single expression to them would be useless because one would not be applying me expression to a singlt thing (artha) (since they do not share a universal]: :and 1,1 if one were ro apply one apro-sion separately [0 each individual for the sake of cognizing' those individ· uah whose essential natures are diffirem from each other, one's listener would not know that those distinct things that have been expressed in that fashion (i.e., as distinct instances of the samt type of emiry1 are diff'trent: J (In this regard, there are two possibilitiC'Sj . Thinlcing, "that individual also has that single universal," peoplt apply an apression to it. Or a single univusal manifesu the expression just by iu capacity as a real thing (i.e., without any human agency] . But ntither of th~ possibilities is the case. Instead, a pt:t50n applies expressioN to something with some pu~ in mind. That is, if differenr things are usdUI for one telic function, persons concerned with that funetion ddinitdy (llwUyam) should express that efficacy of those: things with regard to that function. If one were to express that efficacy individually (i .e., with an expression for ach panicuJar] , it would be extremely difficult to communicatt. And in :u1y case, it is not possible [0 express the unique essence of a panicular; mt antmpt TO do so would also be useless. Instead, that pt:rson using language or conctpu should JUSt express those objecu that are capable of that fun ction. The s~er has autonomy in this regard: he can choose [ 0 express those things that are capable of that effect with one expression or with m:u1y. Therefore, it is simply by vinue of tht speaker's intenrion (abhipr4ya) that one expression could refer [0 many things, and that being so, it is nO! correct to object to the use of a single expression for many things. Moreover, it is not impoJ· sible fo r that one apression 10 bc wed for all those thiny because the capaciry to t"ekr to thinp depends on the speaker's wishes (icch4) [or needsl . If mc:ming is not mro by the wishC'S (icthl1) of the person using the apre:ssions. then how could :u1 expression refer [0 even one thing? And if inten2 Ao;onfinS

fO

$ikpbuddhi (PVT:lslb.t ~ K:1}4.11- 1J). putil"U]t";' 10 Ix: lUpplied by

COfIIClI (~.;•

.1 Utc,aUy, ".,..., would ...... KCOV'W: ,he di.un'ty (~) of ,he .h in", ...... had h-ecn

a pre.ccl .. NCb. "

APPE N D IX O F TRAN SLAT ION S

lSI

tion docs fix meaning. then who could pre·...ent this a p~ion from referring to many things? -But there wo uld be no purpose to wing aprmio ns lif there is nothing to which they rc2lly rckrl; therefore. one would nO[ usc expressions.I have al ready Aid th:u the purpose: is to know from one exprmion that diuinct pan Ktilars arc different from that wh ich docs not fu lfill the [expccrcdJ purpose. It is not the c:a.se d\a t one applics expressions because a p ro~ny-SW'bh4U4 of the things in qucstion is the A rne. And I have already asUd. '1ne propeny-W4bhi_ of rc2l things :ue SituatM rupeetivdy in their rupttt i~ real things, and as such. they are not disn ibutcd ~r each other; hentt. how could an expression for those distinct things have as iu sc:mamic ClU$C (" imift4) a single propeny-svabhdv.r occurring in all those th i n gs ~·· But evrn though things arr different. it is nO[ contr:adictory' for them to have an aelusion from thar which docs nO[ fulfill the [expected) purpose. Hence. let US consider this no ndiR'erencc of the things (,m h.t) to be the cause for the nondiR'Cf'COCe of the cxprcssions applied to them. Therefore. in saying, "'These arc whar fulfill that purpose. - those things arc Stated to be distinct from others that do nO[ ful611 thOlt purpose:. RU! rlv.: F....::r o ( tuvi ng 1M! t:ffin i~ nor U)m O!: qll!lliry !hu ;$ n rh e r rh:an rhO!: p:lnicul:ars them$d v~ : otherwise. they would nor be different fro m the other things which do not have that dfect.'

.. $ikpbuddhi (PVf:t6oa - K:169) r~ ... f(I !'VI~L

tM.,

tM , .........

ttJY ","", ... ,.'11 ~ Itti- z.. tb. . .,.. ,... ,.,.. ,. ; ",," ... This 5hooId ptoI.bly Ix: ammdcd 10 tM..., p.... which

, PYSV-O(1f9a} r-u:

IIi pJvtt J ..

..w..........a. ............... in I.... d

r.II

tIw: rmdinc.wr.--l byC ..... i and K. S«nndlr. ...... .t-.Id

raJix thai du. almoK cnWnIy r~prCKntJ a nNnl radins dial could Ix t«OftMruae4 all follows: "",._ qht IUIJlU'" ....,.,..",.,. 'Mo ' ,..nIh,.M ... II is F tkol ,..,. 1-Iruilh _ adokd by rht: TIbn.an Il"UIIobrors ro. dMilJ. In 'lIIr cue. Gnoli ia dearly izK:orKa when M rmwb dw such • radi", ·in lhiI aIfIlCD is wholly mnninpc..• for a rq;HM bn., ...ue.!nOR _ than Gooli'. rcadin&. Indmi. rho: abJmc,r oi. lIC:piM in Gooli'. readins rendcn it: hishlr problunaiK. Alrhou&to tht: roc oiK ..ppNtI Gnoli', rcadin& K rmwIu (169-170). "In othn.......w.

i*

,.r-....

....... P. ' f ~LI; ..... ;. -d.....lcdhm..v... ...;... ;. ....... ~·(-:I-o;J» ' ... .... n,uw-~. " 1 • ili,....,J. Thilocar.nncnl rd'rn obliqudy f(I PVI:J9. ~ I)hu. maklrti poinu oul dw an QCluoioo (. qualify or pmfio;arc) and tho: adudcd dUns (~ qual. if)'1lOlK_ OJ subi=.l Qt\Me Ix actually diflmnl; rMy ~ only ~ diRmnL AppIyi", Iht: same an.aI)'$is hue, one Qt\ rnnark tlu.I rht: "f:.ct oi Iu.";,,& duo, cffr(t" (~) OJ "thal~· (if 000: c:an ,okr;.u abr ~ ~) ClIUICM Ix tornnhinc diocina !Tom lhc pWcWus dw iW qtA!i6ed by · W I-df'eanaa. • If !how panieubn wm: distinct from rheir "dw~· thor would bt, aduckd &om " dw~"; • ad! doq wuukI &.II inco dw cWo of thins> which do CMM have w , dJoa., which mano dxy

would no Ionsn Ix: undmtood .. ddtina !Tom

mo..r rhi"51 ...m.:h dr> Me bicw dlat dIta.

f OU NDATION S OF DHAlMAK IRTl 'S PH ILO SOPH V

,,6

For aamplt. [accordi ng to Buddhists} tht qt, color, light and mentation all ha~ [undc:r cma.in conditionsl tht wnc tffm: ocular consciousnw. (According to others] the ~lf. tht f.aculty, tht objter and rhtir conjunaion have that ont df«t. WhatleVu theory ont proposc:s, it il possibtt 10 o:prc:u their sameness (s4~) in ttmU of having that dfca. as when someone asks., "From what docs coruciousnw of visible color arise" Thil ~ing the case.' in order to facilitale practical aaion (lIJilvttM,..uf./M~'finIMm). somtont applies a con~ncion-esttbli.shing (SiI~;) statement: "1l1e causes a~ such-and-such and $O-and-so." One uses these exprcssions such that the listener somehow knows all of the causes of ocular cognition and $0 on u once. HenCC', the~ il 00 essetlU that is distributtd over all of them. Rather, their nondiff'trenCC' iJ this diff'tmlce--namdy. that since they accomplish that leiOS (IInIM), things are differenl from [hose that do nOI accomplish that telos. To be specific, they, being all of such-and-such a kind. are expressed by expressions lhat inmate :I amin conglomu.uion (IIlmw), continuum (wnrlina), or State (1lIlIISthij . Those particulan thai whttl conglome:rated

m06e

This inmprmllion ma.krs lTIOft JnIit; dw! GnoIi's radin&. lOr illmtll 00r WI Dtwmaklni is rdan"110 1M iuua rWed II FYI:l', "ThII M is raisi"l It- iuua is Iimhu Npportal t". hiJdccWon IOdiKwa 1M pcoblun of dw: pm..: rd.llion, kw Ii...". !.alto. lOr W. is dw: AIm iswt- tha ht- rakes up II FYI:60. To Rippon IlKh an inmprewm. the aWII SansIuU. in bodI K and Cnoli can be limply amr:nded by dw: addirion of In In Oftbosn.phlc dmce W1 is ohm didcd in INIllllO'ipa, The m.anwaipi ofK. ro.- campk. is pcppcn:d wid! nUmmKII JUCh disions. 'The amended Sansluil would mIlS read ... ,..-r

-W-

qbI ~~ u~ / .~"~",._ . ~. Unfonunarcly. ~:obddhl (PVT:ot:c») "'- ..... pt""'ick .... y additional darlncooion, a1thour;h he aL.o oIJm the IlfualislxtOfJ n:adins ~ u..Jb J. J. liM,.i 1't1i~ r ) wKhoullM ....,._ Reader'I of dw: ~ have 1M additiofqJ and quile .. ~ p.obIem of :0. lup: portion of 1= WI it _I of onkr. 1"hiJ irnsului.,. ;. ' - d ... lD:o. buh ill tnnWtion.l"or ....tom eN _ "..." order ia Itst(ItN. Iht u:o.noIao:ion I"oIIows rucdy W Satukrii of K. Hcnoe, il tmnI in the K¥nII cmturia ber.tt .. lhe u:o.nWOon of riM: leO and !hot Cll'Yin& of dw: ScIe-df;e ....""..,"10011 ~ TdJewa .robe iNd· ¥maid)' copi.d I folio QUI of order. The order is. follow.: from afu:r tJ,. ... -tkip forwIrdlO llilb. and tqin at. -M ~ tlwtIM,. Rae! 10 16li1l. F/Om [6li1l mer J. '¥ ,. _ ... "Wp b.dt.o .6,bl and tq;.n at. "ritr"'u-.,.." Rad 10 16,b,. From 16.b. mer oft tu.- ....P:ip 10 16uII and tq;.n at. J.." From thia poinl eN fCXI is 110

SdMsr

r,.;.." P- m.

w.

.!iob.

-II'-.t.r,.,.,,.

--',..u.. ......

0......,,...,

·M..,..,..,• .,. ...

Ionca

of order, In ocher wonh.lM scaion of tal from [6tbl UN tIM,. -',."up to [6li1,'M J. '¥,..- ... ·needs 10 be iMmN I' 16Gb1 after "phtm "" 1M Ut

0111

-

OM"'"

""'..,..., J.n.,. ... .

,."." 6 -n.is bci"l,ht C:tJoI:"

~u dw Ioc:atM

of 1iU~1IIi~w.

APPENDIX O F T RANSLAT ION S

J!7

perform a sing.l~ cA«t ha~ no dinincrion from och other with regard to that cA«t_Th~reforc. it would be poindCS5 to express any such distinction. For this reason, in order (0 mcr (niJDjtmlf) to all of them at once. peoplc apply on~ expression to them. such as ·water-jug.· ThOK (i.e., th~ particulars that form a wat~r-j ugl arc all equally diffcr· Cnt from their respective homologues and hererologues. but since they contribute to th~ aa:ompl ishm~nt of that single purpoK !such as containing wat~rl. they a r~ distinguished from othm that do not do 50. H~nce, they arc cognized as non-distina due to that nondiffetence. fin regard to th~ point just raised, thc ClIpression · the color and SO on of a wat~r-jug· mcam that th~ color and such that arc the propt:rty-Iu.rbh.i~... of th~ water-jug arc capablc of an effect such as a specific:" way of containing watcr.Y Through thc exprcuion · color and so on- is indicated (,m' 7 ~ (PVf:.6ob. 1<:'71) rWa an oo;mion:

"Thut: ill j_ ookIr and 10 on; bul dIcft- is 110 wa~·iuI W,I is ..... ~ ~ rfOll! dw:C'OIoo: and lOon. So __ can ~ bot attpanlion Ibn .. oxn dw wan-j""and io proput1·nwM.I_11I in the _cmcnl, "The ..,.'er-j",,·. tdor and 10011 ... :r' Thoil mmmm. and ..... :IftIWft' du. Dlwmakirti prolkn rdy quit~ ckarly on dw analysis of

dx subjen-pmfiQlt malion prae!lltd in PYl:S,,",. and PVSY M n·t. 11W _ I I fi1nh« cvidMa tha,1he mdilllFvm byGnoIi (67)• • ")IWW~.". IiJ""""'}\IS( __ . m lin ...) til 'M - . __ aL ......... , II·S· II

W

mlISII

be~ 10..".

Sikpbuddhi (PVT:l60b6-7" 1<:171 .•1) P<-=I specific (.u.,.) 11 · tha, which caftOOl be

~ by non-w.un. jutp· rg,."u •.." t44yrw'!'J. II thUJ i!ppGtI dili CORca. II • synonym for rU]cu.

'0 be I.IKd in

!I ~i (PVT' I6cb7-.611l " 1<:17 •.1,) rctnarlu.: Thr::Ibovf: mans dw

fOIlowi"" 'Tbcaprmicnl "cokN '

and 10 on IndUtt lhc ..ndn-

fUndi,. dw color and 10 on an: nondiA'ea-., in dw they ate Cl!p'hk of ..... ~ dfm lhal ill '0 be aoc:om~ bycolor. But tMwonI"W::II..-iu!· GJriUICS!hac 1M coIor-pmida: in quarion an: specifiai (~by their dill'a-ma f'roI!Irhat color and 10 on dw an: P'OfKny• .-M.I- of. doch; lbot watn-ius', color and 10 on an: Ifl'«' i6ed in duol r..hion ~.....,. an: a.pahk d a IpOCiroc ~ (~). H rnu. dw: ltatnnmt"the walcr-iu!', c.oIor and 10 on' pl'oduca thrOUJh the: optnrion of ..... twO words an lwatmeM w1lh. COIIIil;"" i..... of ... ni ......... ("'-'1f)'I(J (i.e .. dUll of albl and I specif7inI diltinaion (1Ii/q4) (iA•• that of c:ontrib.tlins 10 ~ dfttu 6UCh u hoIdin,..atftl. 11x16oce. I rdarion (",M.h;) in whid:J dw: two manbcn an: diKinct ill appIiaIl0 aptta dw !d,tion of • Wli~ [i.e., color and...dl in ~ I and. sp«ik (oub-'t' "'"" i.e.. rhc: mIoc and RICh of I wuCl'-j"ll

smirm rmmaDal

(tJtM~.

in..

Nott duo" for K(l7U4) ..• shM";r-.ilq.MJ .. ",.~_liiu 1-Jt'iru Sikyabbddhi (PVf,,611.l) reads ... ' " tW.,ithJM,-oi J..,J.J,.i".." u"oi t/rwt,. 71'" - - »-'''J-rilq.dlol ... ?-".rt.{l'Yfl~ P-J"U-' I b."" ful.Luwa.I

w,., ...

~

,,,,",.1.

H8

FOU NDATI O NS OF DHARMAI"'lTI 'S PHILOSOPIIY

tiJJJN,) their naNn: that is wdl known (prasiJJh4) to be the means for producing a effect (uimi"J"kiry4 ,tThcy an: then specified (viIq!4) by the specification (vilqa) (i.e., "water.jug"j that indicatcs that they also have ttnain specific dfcct.s (vi1;"!Jlki1Jll) [such as conr.a.i.ning water]. Being so

gwm

specified. they an: called such [i.e., "the color and such of a water-jug"j. But ~r than dUll color:and such, there docs nOI o:ist here any subs-WItt thai has charactcrUlics in tht manner dC5Cri~ by those o:prcssions. It docs nOI exist b«ausc one docs not pcrctive Ihal kind of substance." The expression "warer.jug" is used. in the singular 10 indicate that those paniculars [i_c.• me many pan iculars that compose it] have mc causal potcntial to together produa- the wne cff«t [cvcn though then: is no such real causal potential aClually iosrantiated in all those particularsj." Or dsc, the singular is dependent on linguistic convention (Ill",,",,,). For irut:lOCC, ccnain kinds of causes and cffccts (i.e. , those that form a continuum] either produtt some single effttr or art produced by a single cawe. In order to cognize those causes and dfcct.s all at once, one expl'CS5CS them with an expression such as "rice" for which the linguistic convention has been formed . This should be explained as in the above expl:an.ation of o.prcssionl fOr conglomeratCi such as watcr.jugs. lJkewise, those particu. lars which arc dkctivc for somc single function cithcr separ.ucly or in combination an: expressed by expressions mat indicate a p;tnicular state; thcy arc exprascd in that way so that one might make thcm known aJi at once. Enmplcs ofsuch exprt:s.sioru art ·visible" or "obmuctivc." The paniculars in question can be expressed in mat way due fO me QIDCflCS$ of their dif· fercnce (bhdMimi"J") from other particulaT$ that an: not occurring in that kind of sau'. 10 ~ (PVT:,6'IJ _ K:'7l.1S) po.- "conunon dfm:" III "Ol>C'tha. ill ro btao:om=.7.~ICn: (lot" unq~wdJ color usd ,ud!- (. . .~".", "w,i.I£"w..mt,."I). i Wo 1'10(0 (,fI'l) • K:171.z&) ."", dw: ;lUuumnuai .pc iJ*r.u aD lot concilhn iaJ....Ithfi,.Wq.!M 01' In...., ~;, iaJ..,.IJJii,... Wq.~ Wi.h this ;NlNmnlW COlmrutd as. rt:UOfI •• "'" phraK would cad. "Sina: color and ...do ....... naturt thac .. nublW>t.d ... "'" dw: ......... for produci", ...... in cnmmon dffCtJ. thq an nude known by ""'" UpLwiON 'mIor' and iUCh:

RnoN

II

UI'-'-

""'n: ..

11 Aa:OfdinllO ~buddbi (PVTa6u .. K(171), ,hi, is a calC of dw ROnpCtUpCioCI of IOoInfthias diu iI by ddmilioa pnuJMibk. Ht Lhm ~ u.. irnpo.wn ..,Inr>m', "In tiM: thUd cNpu [DharmakJnil wiDapUln dw "I>Tf in which just infinilaimal panides;an: dwobject of I't.cqxion wilMoIi thm: bcin& an)' pm-IX ,.......,. [,ordJ.I Mi"~",-". ";-"14"'~'" tIW pw~ ~

....N!. 12 K(17J.): ... ,"IW ",..

a. fMrj, 1Niytu.r.

r.1M IJ'riJw IK ",ad,: ft,j1i:M ~ ".~­

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

359

In some cases, where some particulars have the same effect, in order to indicate that they have that effect, they are expressed by expressions such as "water-jug" through their difference from what is other than them; they .are so expressed provided that a suitable convention has been formed (krtasamaya). In the same way, in terms of having the same cause,one can express what is non-singular with a single expression in order to facilitate practical action. Examples are "Hereford," "Jersey cow," or "a sound arises immediately after effort," or "sound is causally produced." One can also express multiple things with a single expression as a negation of their ability to have the effect in question. Examples include: "sound is not visually perceptible"; or "impermanent"; or "essenceless {aniitma)." One can also use expressions in this fashion as negations of the notion that certain things have the cause in question. Instances include the expressions "unowned" (asviimikajI3 and "empty." One may also state other ways in which expressions are formed in accord with the theory presented above. In the case of expressions such as "empty" and "impermanent," expressions perform their semantic function (vyapadefa) by [first] inducing in cognition an image that is intended in accord with the interlocutor's concepts and then excluding that image. Expressions work this way because all the objects (artha) gf expressions have a distinctive aspect that is projected by cognitive intent. 14 13 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b2 ~ K:274.r3) remarks: Others assert that that which is controlled (adhiJthita) by an autonomous self is "owned," and such things are also asserted to be non-empty because they are controlled by that kind of controller (adhiJthiitr). The controller is what appropriates (svikararza) that which is controlled (adhiJthiitavya); otherwise, it could not be the controller. Therefore, others use words such as "owned" (sviimika) with respect to some self being a cause for such a relation. But there is no controller with an established essential nature who would control things that disintegrate instantaneously and exist in dependence upon a mere collocation [of conditions or parts]. There is no such controller in connection with which the mental conditions (sa1pSkiira) would occur. Therefore, "unowned" and "emptiness" are posited by refuting the existence of the aforementioned self acting as a warrant [for the designations "owner," etc.]. lor K(274.r4) iidhiJthiitii ciidhifphiitavyasvikiirarzam Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r64b3) reads bdag gi 'ryed pa nyid kyang bdag gir bya ba'i ryu yin gyi. The Tib. corresponds to iidhifphiitii ~dhiHhiitavyasya kararzam, but this reading seems problematic.

.4 Emend G(69.7) buddhisamihii sal!Jdarfita ... to: buddhisamihiisal!Jdarfitavibhiigatviit in .ecord with PVSV-D (299b6): sgra'i don thams cad ni blo'i rtogs pas bstanpa rnampar dbye 'a can nyid yin lJa'i phvir ro. Sakyabuddhi (Pvir65a ~ K:274) glosses buddhisamihii: buddhes samihii imam artham 'ropayiimiti sal!Jkalpab-"Cognitive intent is the intention, 'I will induce this object (artha) i~ that person's mind].'"

360

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Poor thinkers'15 bombasts which raise problems such as the assertion that there is no [real] contrary (pratipakfa) for expressions such as "essenceless" should be ignored.

15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:r65a

=

K:275) mentions Uddyotakara as the object of this critique.

4. PVSVad PVI.214-223 -[Dignlga} said, "lbc: testimony of a credible person is th~ 50w ce for an inkrtflCe b«a~ it is generally UUSlWOnhy.'0 In this way. he said mat scripture is a source of in fcrcn rial knowledge. But how can this be dlC asc?"j JA penon cannot proc«d without rdying on tht inst~ntaliry of scripture because: [IJ he has ha rd mat, in the case of some activities whIlSt dfecu arc nOI peiccpliblc. engaging o r not engaging in ,hose activities will have some txU'C:mdy pr.U.s.:wonhy Of disastrous' resuhs; and I1J there is no obsetwd contndiction in that being the case. He would thus act. thinking "If this is to be done. it is best that it be done thus." It i5 through ana!~" ing it in this manner mat (DignlgaJ sDud the irutrumentality of scripture. In this regard. A stHemen! liul is a wonhy subject of aaminauon is one [hal is oohcrent (JilmbtuitihttJ, offen :ll suicablc rnrtbod, and eifel lOme I 5« PS 1.p. 2 Sikpbuddhi (PVf:1,fw" 1(;,,0) ~II

ilII

ob.i«for'$ pG'irion;

.,..nm1

'Iran apt , ' m is noc inununmw for kllo.Ie" of tal thmp. Wn wN.! about [dw IUlemctll mMk by Diplp; namdy. lhad i1w IUlanalU of. cmIibk ~ an: dw buU for • ordl-lOrmed in(crmtt: bcaUK me,. an: pually UW(WOrtby' I""~'!"~ ........~ 1 ThaI ...No:h ill a ,,1<:mCft1 <Jtf. (mi. ibIe ~ ia inmnn..-niblr. an n2II'Ipk iI dot lUI.tmftV 'AlI .......nn...-:I min&< aft mommwy.· l1!m: aft abo ltaretnmll oi. cMibk penon COl ...... ..;'" a:.~mdy rmMMC objent; th.crd"oR. they aft aho inc:ontrovutibk. In dUi; IIWIncr. Iuoowkdsc dcriwoed from 1M .c:aimony oi. CftdibIc ~ ill • form oi inm.tntt beaoUK JUCh MI'~U aft ~u, ~. ThU$, .i.d.ry. Oi~ Wd th:u I~ dnnoed &om1~ ii, (1Orm of] inkmsa coaamin& atcm.1l ob;tc....To sate th:al mil conrndicu wha. hal ~ IIXI:pIcd {by DhamWdni. lbe ~ _,~..,." I -Btu ..... r.. tIJiI k ~-e_

""nose: ."......

Noec th:u the c• ..,... iI /'101 .0 M ClONtNC'd with the aantpk ,.tIM ...• IN. radon II the HI.tmm. oi.be,.,., in mil inlttmu.

3 Sikyabuddhi (PVT:~1h5 • K:J,o) offm the &in oiDhannaldn.i·II~ In othn words. the Ad.ya [Diglipl did /'101 Q'f duo. ~ &om Kripnm: iI an inlU ....... by daimi. duo. it iI ~y (oe Indy] (UhiUj inRl\lftWfti:al. R>.d.cr. i. iI instlumerual with reprd 10 the ""'y in which I ptrIOIIlhouId pt'ClCX'ed. .. for G(lof) .~,. fad ..,,,.,. pt'c~,.bk

wim

~i (rVT:~)a) . whidl K'CIN . he much

readinl-

,6.

}61

FOUN DAT IOt<S O F DHAII.M AKllI.T r S PHILOSOPII Y

human aim. Other srarcmcnu are not wonhy subjccu of aamination. [rYI .u.tl Coherena' means that the statemenu coaJes« (upRSIl,!,hil'lI) on a single topic. md by doing so they are helpful fo r understanding that topic.I This is nOi the CU(' wilh sratemenu such as -ten ard.amom podt- md so on, which arc incohcKnt. Otherwise. the ineptitude of the author would ensuc. Abo, a person who seeks a rc:sull should not bother to aamine trtatises Ihat propose the attainment of results through impossible means; nor should he bother to a:unine trearisa thai discuss results that arc: not human goals. Examples of the fOrmer include the iruuuction that one usc the jewel raken from the cobr.a-hood of the Naga king T ~ as an ornamenl in order to counler.w:t poilOn, and an example of the laner is the anaJ)'Iis of Ihe number of teeth flut a crow tw. In conlrut 10 that kind oftre:uisc, one may examine a treatise that hI is coh~m , 11) proposes possible means, and discu.sses a human goal. This is Ihe kind of trtaciK llut is wonhy of cumination because it is unreasonable to concern onc:sclf with those other kinds of trtatUcs. If when invcstip ted the trc:l.tise in qucstion is nOi liable to being unuustwonhy (rfisA",v.iJAbhdl). thcn it is good to PUt it into practice. But what constiwu:s iu uUSIWOn:hineu?

u]

fa austwOnhincss coruisa of nol being contradiaed by pcn:eprual

awal"Ct1CU and two kinds of inferena' with regard to bOlh the obsnvabk (dr!.u ) and unobscTv.ablc {tId.'!!"J Ihings (arthc)thal arc: the objecu (6rr1M)of those in.srrumcnral cognitions.' [PYI .u sl Not being contradicted by pcrctption means rhu Ihose things Ihat arc: considered to be perceptible according to me UCl(isc acrual.Iy are perceptible:. Exampln include: the: color blue:, plc:asure and displeasure. the: recognition of a characte:ristic, mental St1ltCS such :l5 desire, and awareneu. Also, things fhlu are nOl considered 10 hc perttptible should not be perceptible':. Exarnplell include: th~ claim that on~ can ~rceivt: plc:asure: and so on as a

' Sikyabuddhi (PVT:14)a) IIiI1)'1 thai ",.».mwu chat lht IU1I~mmu "poinl OWl" (-1M ~- ~.rir fL U )

that IOPic.. KOOI) oIrm no r;ka

6 ~i (PVT:14)b . K:",) pnMdcI tIw

po.- tOr 1M IWU leNS oi...-m..

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLATI O NS

j.j

oonjunClion ofform panicks such as sound:' and the nQlion Ih.:u ruhsr:mce. morion, univers:W, CC)nmcl, and SO on ate real, perc;:qxible things.- Likev.rise, tho.sc objectS mat au oonsidered to ~ infer.lble wilhout relying o n scripture mo uld be IO-lhe Nobles' Four Trudu are an example. And IhO$(: things that are considered no t to ~ inferable mu.$( not be---aamples include the self, This is :also the case for inftrentt based on scripture.' For elCI.mple. hllving ~ccqnM mn rht: a"",nr;lIl nnll.t: (rii/"l) of nt:g:u;~ ml!'n _ tal states such as desire is dlihamut, and having accepted that the origin of tho.sc negative memal H2les is tUihArmA [in the sense: of .h!'l'ma], the suggestion th:at o ne perform :ablutions and fire sacrifitt in o rder [Q d imin:a!e IltiJu,I7ftIl is not sound advitt. The scripture's purity [i.e., in lack of contradictions] in regard to all those objecu which can be determined in the lIbov.. mllnnt:r conu;rurl!':l its lruH'W'Ortltinl!':ll. (Digniga] said m:at, since: the statements of a credible person :are gcncuJly trustwOrthy,'· a cognition from such statements o f

.,.._.

7 ~i (PVI':144h .

K:)9})

8 ~uddhi (rvr:~ -Vailqilw and.o on,"

_ K:J,,)

I>O'ICI du.llw: d\C'01)'aiticQ.cd httt i, from IMSirpkhya " :"IaIL. ,I"" , ,I..: .icw 1~j«'W h.;,C u .h., uf'M

9 ~i (PVT:l-fsal:

s,.

Ahu purifying ~ .,;riP'''''' by means of eM rwo kinds orinStnllnmtal lXW'ition dull proceed on tho: IIMii of rallhinp (. , . ftJis Un.zr,." _htIMI.J~. OIl( .hal poUu mat .,;ripa= to ~ ••ubjcn of prcdialion (dw ( lUI" "'--i,,);u a ifni· ria mat hat bem oncpnd at instrUmmw, Thaa, due to infming • CO!Iu.diaion bw¥ccn JOnlC carlH:r and lara- past'V', when one mpsa in an an.oIyoiII of lhc dif· fUel"'"' be:t.w, p'mgo" Ihc.,;ripru!31 infcn:ncr-lhc inl1:rmabucd on Kriplun-t-hoWd I\0Il be: conuadicrW. 'l"hU Q!he conlQI of.....tu.l follows. [.;'''PI,. ..... Itfo Un.fI ,. 'i aJ",J _ pJilltfo I.mt """,. fNU """.; k # tsi»i _ & 1m ,.

m.o.c

...,..,,.i"""

..... gi "'_ b9i m./¥tlnMm fMb&i.t ....... 1...,.,;,,; pi 1M 'in 116 1PlOf fI' """ ~,., ..."....". uk,. tU 'i """ I.", u 11M,." 'in JM . . . , . , , . ~ 1 (II", Itt u. ,. i '" ... ...,..,,. M U l"p,j , . trW,. dJn .".., ... 'i .u", ,... 11#". Kb,,) oII'ers _ ... ~. lcoo helpfUl commuoo:

0"4' migtu invaripte . Kripru..., d"" to a conlradiction between earlia and laler r-Ages conumi", tho: rwo kind. of obj«a mal U( pu"" (in th.t they '""' 1>0'1 comn· dieted by ~n:qxual aWU'UlClii or in~!ICU !wed 0)(1 raI thinp] and QUl!'md,. rrmoIeobjecu. In Uw cut.;~ MsH.,. tni".." ';"""'."1>0'1 contradict dw KripNrC" _upplkd by conU:::II. [fIi~ ~""7I ''''''''''I'''~ (.l.-~ ~,,;~ JWrIi.. rill~ '-1IfI~'; _ ill dp~"'''' """"'n.". qi 1.bUlv.w", itj ,P,.q,.", ".

10 1nc: compound

"11"" 'ua.".~1t]ii an be rad in one of rwo

w:t)'I.

1'he lmn

16.4

FOUNDATION S OF DHAlMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

those St:uem~Q ' objca is a weU·fonne:d inference of that obje:cr. ~en though the object is C:pistemic::ally remOle. The cognition is said 10 be: an infe:rence: because !here: is no other Wily 10 know th.:II objea. [PVl.1I6) These: kinds of stalemenu of a ere:dible pe:rson-thosc: [described by Dignigaj and thO$C [accordingly ddine:ate:d abovej-a.re: genera.lly (1Ilm4"l") (tusrwonhy. Hence:. nO!: ()bse:rving those st:atenlenu to be: m~ leading. one infers [be: £nUtwOnhinC:S1 of a cognition of those:. st:uements' object, ~en though it is not knowable by pe:lceplion and empiric::al inference. One infers that IUch a cognition is rfUSt'NOnhy b«:ause: it is based on

lhtbtJt' may to. inlcrprftCd in dw.a- 0I"..mmc:ss.."In thil caK. dw ~I would to. WI dK INRWOnhinat f..r-,.fl44) of a Cft'diblc: pnlO'I'$ IUlcmcnll aboul ~bIc: ohjecn is rIN 161M U W ~ncu of die. Jalnnenll with rq;ud to unob.nvabIc obj«lJ. In otbn _1'Ch. me KJ~tJ I n tnlItWOrthy ptcc$::ly boaUK!hey _ me RlIIIeIMIItJ or. cmiiblc: penon. Thil 1ppc:al1 10 to. tho: imnprnllion Wen by Slkyabuddhi (PVT. p:~"",.

K:m):

codibkpaMn·..p•...cl. io .... _ i.n l.. ~ (_ ...."" H • . Il~ Thai is.;ua u cmiiblc pmon', IpCUh illrusrwonhy wilh rtprd 10 UI objm thai can to. dncnnincd [throuF f'C1"p'ion at>d ordinary ;nkrmoe}. Iike... BoM' .........

me

witoe il i! mlK'II'Oftby wilh lepro to an extmndy rtmOIt abita at- pR'riJdy bceo'llC i l it: the ~ or I cmiibIc: penon. [.,..,,. UtI,.'i 1Ihit.,,; ...i lift..., ...."" ,. i ~, _ I ri fur """".. ,.... J-r .;r, ...... ,.. .,; w.. Hi .." ~"f' III pJ"'" "III ,.IA It]tf , . uti,. 'i d.r ".; w.. H tit fur ,J,i.. no '"' no 0'",.,.'",.... r I .,.., ,. - ',.; lib;' ..,u,... ,.; """ .. K: , . " ....' ~1fI~~ 'rdJ.o .,111# ]hilozt!flMllM ~..~ ;;"".~ .... 4· fOSlrp~ ....... ~ ~~ __ ~~ 'T'kio" cJ-+y conup< and Iw b«n COIlecled t¥twtj. ro conform to PVT].

w".,.,. ....,

I

I,.,...

1lUe- in~ ~ 1M IfIWI1MI upon. ~ rwndy. ~ whidI .. tWn u."".".,01 ~""'"' PhiIoq>hiaIy.!his in~Don" poablcmaric. for Dtw· malUm lIinudE'dcnia !hal Oft( QIl dttmninc whaM Uly pWII indMduaI hu the qtWi· tics thai ww.Id ...- him credible. On • HCond inu;iPl CUDon, me f(fm QIl b.K to. undtntood in Inc IeIIIt of"in ~." For I panIJd IIJa&II: in PV. I ( ( PVi.IM. ~ On lhi! in,erpmo.bon. the argumml iI tNl. Ana 1M IUltmanl or. panicubr IUtJ- ~ been obocnN 10 to. 11Ua. wonhy in lmol of ~ objo:cu. thlI ~ uuarwonhincu may to. exlended 10 W>OOItfYIbIc: ob;«a.. 1M obviou:I poobkm with dtiI--.d inu.rprturion .. that;1 IIfU Ilypt ofl'Clll)f1inS mal Dlwmaldrti aplicidy rtjeaa. namdy, iq.I¥J~. wt.nmy the ~ co-omImna: ofIM m.knu in I probandum ttpboa I MO!SIIf)' marion to.",CUI the ..... • dmoe and !Ix- probandwn. How"". Ana: DhannUirti i! noc cor'IttfIIed wim rmdcrins Kriptunl inkrmcn NlIy inmumtnal. lhillml3l;VC ratonins may be adoquuc roc hi! pw •

_1bY..,.

. . - II ., Icuo hao .he adftn. . ol no< ""flicioly con~ ............... d.ao he malteo

only fWO

VCQ(!f

bll:f.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

.,those statements, just like the other cognitions based on those statements ~that can be verified by perception and empirical inference. Hence, even though that cognition comes from language, it does not make known just the speaker's intention like a cognition coming from ~[ordinary] language because in this case the cognition is also an inference '.of the statement's objects, since it is trustworthy with regard to those objects ~(artha). 11

Alternatively, we state in another fashion the fact that, due to its trust;Worthiness, the speech of a credible person is the basis for an instrumental Inference: Alternatively, since the true nature (tattva) of that which is to be avoided and that which is to be done along with the methods for doing so are well established, the statements of the credible person in question 12 are trustworthy with regard to the most important issues (pradhiintirtha). Hence, they are a source of inferential knowledge with regard to other objects. [PVI.2I7] That credible person taught what to avoid, what to do, and the methods for each; what he taught in regard to these issues is not erroneous, and ;hence, those teachings are trustworthy. An example is the Nobles' Four Truths, in the way that will be explained. 13 Since those statements are trustworthy, the assumption (upagama) that other statements-which are useful for accomplishing a human aim and suitable to be practiced-are also

11 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:246a '" K:394) remarks:

It does not indicate just the speaker's intention. [K The word just (eva) should be read in a different order [than what is recorded]]. Instead, since it is trustworthy in the manner just described with regard to an object (artha) that cannot be known by either perceptual awareness or [non-scriptural] inference, it is also an inftrence from the perspective of the intention of a person who wishes to engage in activity. [K: But it is not actually (vastutas) an inference because there is no relation between expressions and objects].

f'l2 We supply from context the phrase, "the statements of the credible person in question." i,That we are dealing with the trustworthiness of a credible person's statements is evident '.from the way that Dharmakirti introduces the verse (PVSV adPVI.217; G:I09.II-I2): "Alter"natively (atha vii), we state in another way the fact that, since the speech of a credible person }s trustworthy, [knowledge derived from that speech] is inferential." [athaviinyathiiptaviidasyiij~iJisa7(lviidiid anumiinatvam uryate]. 1;Y'

:13 Dharmakirti is referring to the discussion in PV2.

366

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

trustworthy with regard to other issues will not lead to one's deception because [1] there is no instrumental knowledge that contradicts that assumption, and [2] it is pointless for that speaker to make false statements without a purpose. !4Thus, in the two ways [described in these two verses]; it is said that a cognition coming from scripture is an inference since there is no other way for one to proceed, as is illustrated by the thought, "If one is to act in aCcordance with scripture, it is best to do it thus." However, this kind of inference is not without problems (anapaya), since expressions are not invariably concomitant with objects, as has been already pointed out. Others think that a statement dependent for its origin on a superior person is in accord with reality (yathartha). [PVI.218ab] According to others,!5 a credible speaker (apta) is a person with good qualities such as experience of things as they truly are (yatharthadarfana); that person's teachings (pra/:zayana) are trustworthy.

14 Introducing this next statement, Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a2-4; absent in K) raises an objection: "A person who is trustworthy and who acts so as to benefit others will necessarily not deceive others about any object or issue if s/he perceives the supersensible (atindriyadarlin), but one cannot be certain that s/he can perceive the supersensible. Therefore, his statements may be trustworthy with regard to a human aim that is knowable (bgrod par bya ba ~ gamya) through reason, but due to a lack of knowledge, his statements may be deceptive about extremely remote human aims or objects." [gal te skyes bu gtso bo'i don fa bslu bar [Po mtl byed pa yin fa / gzhan fa phan pas Jug pa dbang po

las 'elas pa 'i don mthong ba can yin na / gdon mi za bar 'ga' zhig fa gzhan mi slu bar gyur ba yin pa de'i dbang po las 'das pa'i don mthong ba nyid ni nges par nus pa ma yin no / de bas na rigs pas bgrod par bya ba'i skyes bu'i don fa mi bslu ba yin gyi mi shes pa nyid kyis na shin tu skog tu gyur pa la bslu bar yang gyur ro zhe na I] . The sense of this objection is clear: one cannot guarantee that the trustworthiness of such a person necessarily extends to extremely remote objects. Sakyabuddhi continues:

It is true that this is an issue (don ~ artha) concerning which one cannot be certain. But the Buddha is posited (bzhag pa) as such [i.e., as credible,] in terms of an individual's [soteriologicallyoriented] activity. In order to demonstrate this, [Dharmaklrti] says .... [nges par mi nus pa can gyi don 'eli nyid ni bden te / 'on kyang skyes bu Jugpa La ltos nas de ltar rnam par bzhag pa yin no / de nyid bstan pa'i phyir de dang zhes bya ba La sogs pa smos ... ]. 15 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:247a) does not identifY who these others might be; Karl!akagomin (396) glosses apare as vadina/:!, while Manorathanandin (PVV ad cit.) provides naiyayi-

kadaya/:!.

APPEND IX O F TRAN SLATION S

Thit point (Ilnhll) is :wmiliM {i,!Jl} if anI'. is :l.bll'. to know mat thu penon has that lupttior q~ity." [ PVI.1I8cd 1 Every judicious p«SOn who wishes to :l.et an3.lyzes SIlII~mcna 10 det~rm in ~ what it 2nd what is nOI scripture {4g.MIl}. he does so with the desire to:l.Ct cffi:ctivdy. 2nd not because of some pernicious habit. Learning what should ~ PUf imo pr:actioe from rhe ...::ripnJf"e. he rh in b . ~ H:lvi n g:acted :accordingly. I might raliz.e my 803.1." On me basis of me rrustwOrthiness of mat ICripture with ttprd to things that can ~ expetienttd [through percqnion or empirical inference] . mll! penon acu wim regard 10 other mings li.l'.., me supcn;ens i~e objecu discussed in me scriprure] bcc:aUS(' such is me case for most ptll.ctic:al action in me world. BUI if one is 10 act on the lnJii, of ex:unininS t~ penon. one would not :I.Ct :l.t all beaU51'. one cannot know- whtttKr or not Wt person has those kind of exuaordin:l.ry qualides. It is not the case thu penons such :I.J us would not :let bccaUS(' of nm :a.ccepring that th~re :a.rc som~ pef5(ms with ~ qualities. since that kind of ~rson docs make true (.."illlthtl) SllItements." In other words. Othen Irwndy. we Buddhisu.1 know that it is eJ:tremeiy difficult to know (JurbotihlJ) whether others h:l.ve faults or:l.re faultless, as when on~ responds to me question. ~ Is this penon like this or not ~· It is exuemcly difficult to know beawc th~ insuu-

16 ~buddhi (PV1':lo4"fo,) commmu: Weacapt W poinl ~ Iw jwt b«n 1U!td-_ do roof deny lhil kind oflpouibil. ifyJ. Bul it iI: KCep(aI only if OIl(' 10 know WllUptriorify. ddlnal. w ~ rima of thiflt;i • !hey lruly an:. eu~.. • bane' definile up«! of ~ pnson. Bul OIl(' is not abk lO know that. [J"J",J_ th.t,.i -P"fJi-,. MttpJ 'II. ...... MI ,. ~ _ Ji" (If I ~ .. <Wf II; M Iu .., D'" ,./fftI. NT 6yd ,. iii ,.,i 6yd .. I ... 9r"!"x.J (If"" ji Iu .. ftbi" J. ,.,,;,.,. .. t. .... ,.7..uJ.""p4,.." rJt,mJ J.

u.bIe:

"""'. *.

r,..

"fI"I,.,.,,.

""I 1111/" M]tUtf Ibn,., ... ""''' fl. Kart'ahpvnin U96J praoc. _ this IUInnml a1mou murdy: ~ i - _~ . ...... in- . .,., / ii". ,. ;u,rr.. j Mnl", ,""'!"ury.,,,,,-~ b1.Je ",~ ......t..". "" ,. ~ [For. ~ Jm.""I • .,.~ ". ~ rod _~

h 'i (D.:

_III ...

in xcon:!wid! ~I.

17 The: portion Wf.oponding to ~ (PVr:l4bJ,)...

* Iu w'D",,.. _ji Iu

g" '" ... ,.1,.,. 1ft IiMrf IMII ,. i' ~ tv tk • ,., . , "IIS,. 1t]i ,.,., tbould O«\U afta' iiI!' ~ and ,..,. , ..".,. in Ku,.s.J.I- 16). '" khr" "" • I

~

368

FOUN DATION S O F DHAIt.MAKIRTI 'S PH I LOSOPHY

mental cognitions fo r dctttmining such issues are almost unoo. tainable (JII,wb&tj." [PV,.2.191 The tnlthfuJ (SIlmytltJ and dcttitful anions of pmons arc dut: to their good mental qualities and their mental fla...,. Those mental attributes are super.sensible, and they would have to be infe' lcd from the physical and voc:aI behavior (flJlllI4hl,.) that arises from them. And most behavior can also be performed ddibcratdy (bwitihipiimz1lt) in a way other than the mental state they iCem to reflect bec:au$(' those behaviors occur as one desires and because those bduviors may be inrrnded for vWow aims." Thus. there is an overlap of the: evidence: for f2ulu md f2uldcssnes.s. Thcrd'ore, not having made a ddiniti~ determination, now is one to c:mblish that the: author of the scripture is flawle:u? -men is there no such a person who is f2uldcu?" l8The pma J.!t-. ohtn tnNbud ~ u "difficub," bu. rbit EnsIish word it 100 wak for Ihe ImK IhM Ihe prUu mnooryL In ncarlyroar cut, .6.!J. apnae JOmCthi,. matt !han Ens\ish "diffiaab' bu. fIOI ~=:t u ' imj)C*ibk: Nocc mal. KICOfdilllco . (PVr:14Io. K:ml, ",,~). fan,nine nominW"" IinFu when <:OnIlI1Kd wi
.. rued ....w. .>OJ .,.,

,.i. (i

.. buI muo:ullnc nonWJatj"" plwa when wn-

19 ~ an Q&lD.pk. ~j (PVT:l.4Ib - K:J97) ncxa: "Thu is, fIUIGN who ha~ d$n- ....y make thuNdW'Qi appear • if !her wen: ~, and daiWcM penoN may make tbantrIYa appc:u II if Ihq Iud daira:" IloIil4oI '" " '''- .yi '!'

'"""is"""" .,.,.....

""""'",; l ..uNpI U Ui"PN'.1. 20 Slky.buddhi (PVT:1
.J- .,...u;rift. lill«
~ .,jill

rIJm "-li""malt{"Ix). - Ma ..... "..,"*"""""' .. Throuch mal cr _

.,,._,.i# .

Sikpbuddhi (PVI":L4,M) ahrr .... duou&fa IIx _

, alto n-marIu:

In !he IIC"ClOOd cbaptu [DharmWni l shOWI tha. !he knowkdp of ~ mil. __ aU Ib_ Tk,,:§....<. it is nQC mal _ do nQC attqK m. dw:n: iI any .....:h prrlOCI. W( aft jus( ....ri.. ~ it is c:urandrdifficWllO know...-htthcr or noc ~ ptnon ..t.a iI _ '1 ~ is dJ:, o«t of&uJu.. [..,... 1M --. eM Itp' ,..-J,. UI/I.a J u.,

--',.. i"-,..,.·" _ .... kio,...,..,..

, . j . . . . .,.; [PVI"-D and -p: ...1

l.o._,. D-Jt,n.. 1*........_,.,...,,. _*11.

MJ,. _';. ~ J

hru-r 1M

,..

APPEND IX O F TRAN SU,T IONS

All Raws. being susceptible to decrease and incra5C. have coun· tcragcnu (vi,.ltpt); hence. due to having inculcucd the coun· [Cfagcnts through habitw.cing onc:sdf to them. at some point the ncgativities (IJrlIIltl) should be eliminated. (PVI .UO) However. it is a.rremely difficull 10 know whethcr someone elK haJ a"ailV(! rru.r .t:limil\lloon of ncg::nivitirs. IntW,d. in:nmuch as Raws h.:a\"r: rho.-: qualiry of unde:rgoing decrease and inc.c:asc. they demonstrate: Ihe: corre· sponding abundance or pauciry (U,ItIlf!Dpall1'!") of the: eradicuive force (lIbhiblNtJltl) of the coumcragc:nu. as is Ihe c:a.K with Gre. This is the case becau.sc. being produced from concrpruaJity. through habituating oncsdf to some positive mental quality. they wiD dccrcasc. even though their basic C:lldIt ( ,.pMlillA) it mil present. And wn.t:n that habiru:r.rion of onedf (0 tM countcragcnlJ becomes inte:rue. [bose fuws have the: quality of being dim· inaled without a mu. as is the: ~ with Are and such. Tlltrcfore:. someone: may ind«d be: flawless. ~Bul bow could someone: be Rawlc:u? No one could be for Ihe following reason: c:vc:n when me fuws' coumeragcm (vip"Jt,.) is infused (t4tnuIN) in a ~non's mind. £awes wowd Ulu ag:a.in in aecord wim the eoncUtiolU wr becom.t: availabl.t:. jtat u that counre:ragent arisa in a ~non whose mind

is infused with the: Raws." >I This is not a problem. sillCe

The nature of the mind is such that it is frtt of ncptiviry and by nature it has a real object (lJhiit4nIM);JJ as such, it cannot be

"*JUtl mn,.,A.·Iw,i" "'.*_"'T_,••/ Ncxr Ih"..", ...... MJ

MJ,.

,. .t.oWd bf f ....nckd 10 sIt]a ... ,.; in aeoord with K()9I), us ...... _ ••ut 'Ii ~,.~ ,.,.". NfJt'N NMI .. M~ III ", 'P~ J..ryu.. ;';1.

21 In orhn wonk, whm dw mind u fiIkd with 8... . one ~ mab: is flawkA: by (:OUlIrcraainl cbo.e R:awt with their IXIWICn,.nL 1M "counCn'IIf'Ic" of tUws iI J mmwlO.le thai ~FF =~. ICis ch. taliucion of Jd~ Buc;..c .. the - 'iutica

m.e

01 odflnancsa can (:OUlIlff'aCI m.e tU. . _ mipr c:bim chal chi:: R:awt could aIsu oounluaa: d.r -u...oion of1d.8_ m 1M poinl ~ is mal. on Ohamukini', W:-w. ch. realiuoion of.tdll .... Q(I _ all , IXIWIlerJFQt 1<1 the flaws bct::au.K chal taliQlica .nd IhooK fla.., . - I in cFFc.ioon 10 rachother.1'hoeobj«lOi pcW!a OW en.. dwopflQlidon..,.,.boxh..,.., ~ .. dw cWizarion of .dfIoanew an tupplant ch. fla_ ch. 0.. ... can IikcwQc wppbnl the realiution of.dlk:unca.

22 IIodI h«I:W..-hen il ,, !'QUInt in f'YJ.. this _o;ou.!d be undmtood to be rdi:ni", 10 rIw mind of. pn10II who hal JI kaR undmcood ~ ruhn dwI dw mind in tmaaI.

370

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

counteracted (badha) by what is opposite to it because, even if one were to attempt to do SQ, the mind is naturally inclined toward its nature. 23 [PVI.221]

It is not possible to alter the nature of the mind without making an effort, JUSt as a Brahman scholar (frotriya) who later becomes a kapalika cannot stop his disgust (ghnza) without making an effort. 24 And it is by seeing the good qualities in the nature-svabhava of what one seeks to obtain and faults in the nature of what aims to eliminate that one makes an effort to obtain or eliminate something. But it is not possible for one who has inculcated the counteragents of the flaws to see good qualities in the flaws because their opposites [i.e., the states that counteract the flaws] are free of negativity. They are free of negativity because [I] in them all flaws are eliminated; [2] they are devoid of the suffering that comes from negative orientations (paryavasthana) and birth; and [3] they never turn away from the taste of the bliss of peace. 25

Dharmakirti, as well as Sakyabuddhi and Devendrabuddhi, understands the realization of selflessness to be a state that is natural to the mind. On this verse, Sakyabuddhi (PVT:250b) comments: It is free ofnegativity because it is devoid of all the negativities of sa1J2sara. A real object (bhiitartha) means that its object (artha)-which is to say its object (vifaya) that are particulars such as the impermanent and so on-are real in that they are not distorted (aviparita). And precisely because it apprehends a real object, it is the path-state (marga) that is the nature of the mind. That is, in mentioning the real object, he refers to the mind's object (artha). In this regard, when the mind functions through superimposed images, it is confused; since that superimposed image is not the nature of the mind, the faults are adventitious since they are occurring through superimposed images. If even in the state where one has not yet cultivated the path it still makes sense for the path-mind (lam gyi serns) to be the nature of the mind because it is confirmed by an instrumental cognition, then why would it not be the nature of the mind when one has cultivated the path? As it says in the second chapter (PV2.2IOcd-2uab): The mind is by nature luminous cognizance (prabhiisvara). Defilements are adventitious. The defilements do not have the capacity to arise in the mind even [when one just intellectually understands selflessness] prior to [actually meditating on it]. So they obviously cannot arise in the mind that has the nature of that realization of selflessness after [one has perfected one's meditation on selflessness].

23 This verse is identical to PV2.212cd-213ab.

24 Sakyabuddhi (PVT:25Ia) reads 'dod pa for gh.r1Jii, but the sense of "disgust" seems more appropriate here.

25 These three are the opposites of the three "negativities" (upadrava). Sakyabuddbi (PVT:25Ia-25Ib) records them as follows:

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

'"

A mt:nral state that has an unrttl obt«1 (abhiiJ4nhll) arises due to a primary aUK (ufUitUNI) (i.e.• me: conceptual imprint for a fWe, conceprual cognition] . AJ a result of appropriating (updJdut) what opposes the conrinuum of that mental nare. mat menu! srate should not continue to exist. HO'NeV(f, a menwscue [such as an awareness of sdRcssncul trun has a real object cannot bot halted by cultivating its opposite b«au.sc: it arues due [0 real things themse:lves.· The Raws have: unreal objc:as. and as such. they cannot oppose a mt:nw sate in which their counteragcnt has bC'cn infus«!.. Therdo~, the Dults do not arise: apn. This is the case: bcc:au.sc: even if one were to strive to re-create (he flaWl in ,he mind. ,inee (he mind tends toward positi~ qualities (XW!l4). a judicious penon [who ,till has some Raws] will make an dfon only for wlu.t counteracu dum DullS. How much mo~ so i. £hi. the case: for a penon who is unRawcd. "But what i. the source of thoc naws such that by ioculcating that source', countcragcnt th()' can bot diminatc:d?~ All rypes of R.aws are born from the belief that the evanescent components of body and mind a~ the locus of an Clsc:ntial sdf (utlilyiuUrt.1IJI). ' gnon.nce is thai belief. When ,hal hc:lief ntturs. nne aperien~ clinging In that alleged ~Ir. and from lhat clinging comes an~r and so on. IPVJ.lu] A person who has neither the- nocion of "' - nor the- notton of "mine" is

without grasping. and as such, he- docs not ding to anybody or anything. And a dispwiolUtc penon cannot haw hatred for anybody or anything.

Tlw:1l' I« mm: rq.JtiYitic:t due 10 1M abtma of ....nich dw palh is comidered to ~ ~ of r>qiumty. ThaI..tUcb bilWh tht mind is tIv ~tivKy of d", fIa_ and by il !Ix mind it boo.u!d ....m that il QlInoI ~ in d.., Of"'ricnoe (tIItW,.,.j of rnl nbjtns TIw:.wpm1}' of IIIfkrinl and mtaul . . - ;, wt..l Clu.a bodily and """,. uI diocqlillibftun'l

(~And d..., 10 no!

'- ...... ro. -r "

~I

h..-i"lJNlcifiN COfIu.minMN F' . ,'Il'• ....., i.--tlUo ................,. oi .... " _ " 01 e>On""';_...l

-~.

26 ~ (PVT:Jflb-1J~ . ~I) iI ~ hdpNJ !'or this team. u u incI.i_ell by !Ix need 10 irucn ~ pamuheric:al ph..-s into IN: Inrublion. AI dw n>d of

hit COII\IMnl he mtWlu:

Ewm when !Ix flaws I«.un infiMd (I A . in !Ix mind. insuummul copiliont thai ~ real im,..a....c:h as dlC' imparmnal1 and 10 on induce d", palh-l11l~ (~ohu UlUDocnLU ~

i~ ("~.w) Is.

u..- n...-huw m ...... ......., .... ,hen. when

t-a infwed in dw mind1

372

FOUND ATI O NS O F DHAI.MAICIRTI'S PH ILOSOP HY

This is SO because hnred cannot occur if (h~rc is no harm being dolK [0 on~'s self, nor to what pemins to it. Nor can on~ hav~ hatred for a person or thing th:u opposes what harms one's allegro self. Th~rcfore. th~ bdief in :an cucnlializ.cd self (4tmM1#rWlUI). which arises from being mem:ally condilioncd to prrnow momcnlS of that same type ofbdief, gives birth to th~ fiution on what pertains to that .sdf (ihlfi]lltr4lu). Th~ two-namdy. the self-belief:and th~ woon on what pertains to it--givc:: binh to dinging ro th~ self, or self-I~ :and thn clinging or self-love gives rise ro anger and so on. In this way, all Raws arise from the bdief that th~ evanescent psych~ physical components arc the locus of an essential self (SAt~!i). And that very belief is called ignorance. Confusion (i.e., ignolllnce) is therefore said to be th~ fundamental cause (nwlUI) of the Raws. In other conrau, the causc is said to be the belief that the evanescent componenu of body :and mind :arc th~ locw of:an C$5Cntial self because when that belief is eliminated. the flaws arc diminated. (PVI.n)) [The Buddha) said that confusion is the run
APPEND IX OF TRANS LATIONS

l7l

Thus, it is possible that one might eliminate the Raws, which arise from the bdil!'f that the evanac.c:nt psychophysical componl!'nts atl!' thl!' locw of an essential self. One can d iminate the Raws by eliminating that belid; and onl!' eliminates mat belief by means of its COUntcragcnt , which is ml!' real· ization of I!'mprineu. But it is difficult to know (durllnll4J") whether thl!' person in :aa:ord with whose teachings onl!' might practice lw indeed dim· irnllti!'d thl!' Raws.

• Ioo:w of J.n cam.ia! KIf). This bdid". ho" hU. m.y 1M: alkd -iponna" (.m.Iyi), and i£norana may Ix alkd "coofUsion- (-'-1. ~. rvorn thouJh both -0. and ~ an: Wei !(11M: rhc aUK of the: fb_ no o;ontndKtion is involvni. sin« dwy may Ix Uft~ as synonymow: In dtlJ COOlo:D. DhlrmHirti d _ 10 anptwia: "'U,,J;lIi bccaUIC it ~ readily KaMlnu for his way of tpakinl about ibws and their dimm.uion.

5. PV2. /-6 with &l«tions from PVP lind PVT ' [b,troJuri"f tIN Vnn"Ill r~ ofrlN (hapUT, IRvnuIrabJUidhi rmuzrln:) He. n:uTldy rhe Bles.ced One. is:ln instnuTlern of knowledge beouse he is similar to an instrument of knowledge.I An objector asks. "But what is rhe

natllf't of an instrument ofknowkdgc such that you claim that he is similar

it ? ~

An instrument ofknowledgc is ~ trustwOrthyawarencss. (PV1.la]

[lHwNJrabwJJhi(lb4./JJ "our that thrn art two kinds ofrrustworthinns:) As for rhou trustwOrthincss,

- h~ving

determined the objttt. when one then

acu upon il .") thai thins'. c:ou$al copaciry iI ftlabli.hcdi hen ce. [in one

$C:n$C:Jthe trusrwonhiness i.s that th:l' thins has the lUnd of nature which it I S« Knuotr (1001) £ora numbottol usoeNI Sarukri, ~tJ, lTWIyofwbidl wnt' induded in. prniow -uo.. of til;.. l.....ul>un (Dunne 1999:4)6A). 2 Commmtinl on ~i'J SUtcn>ent, ~j (PVf, 1IJ""7lb]ff), ~ the following ~jtaionl and resporues:

"lnfm:nce and pacc:ption an! ilUuummw; thaI bring ,he cue, how an tbc BicsKd One. ..t.o docs no( ha~ the IWUtt oflinfm:r.a: and pcrcc:jlOOnJ be: called such (Ihal iJ., 'irmrummw' W H~ iJ c:alkd an "","rumenl of~· beaUIt' he is $imihr 10 ~ ("'0 kinds ofinJ"'In-cnc. ofk..IO~. In other 'A'Clnb. he (an be IU~ in 1M mcu.pbo., "iruc:nuntnw." ' Su, the B'-ni One Iw; the .... run: of the ~ nona>neq>rual, .mminl ..;.. dom thai atdots by fotu of kir medlUlicn. Hena. 'M BIeucd One ;.. actually by naNn: I perception, 10 why doa one nttd In n:ly on. mcu.pho.~"

Sikyabuddhi (PVT:rutH") mpnndl: rhiI ;.. no( I probkm beawc the qnthn ,"lIfh:MltlJifil is inrmded to n:kr 10 • ~ SUIt. But hcn:. the 0Dtta:I n:spotuc iI I i follows: Evm if the8ksKd OM Iw; tho: ....1Wl:' of lhe afomnmlioncd inlfrumml oIluoowkdst", he iI ~ DOl (Om..-dy kMwn II ouch. ~. he if metaphorically (Ompand

Some lily

[ hal

to ........., .. , ••

a-a. ..... """...., ofknowl<.l!,,-

17.

APPENDIX O F TRANSLATIONS

is aumcd ( 0 luve. This kind of trusrworrhiness is a quality of the obica. When one knows ir u such. the awareness is trustwOrrhy; this is a quality of the subject.'

[lHvrnJTIZ/nuJJhi (~IZJffJ TIZUa tlw "bj«tilln tiMt, sinn inftrrnu;s nnmtfJlI.1 (bhrinta), it wou/J nllt S4tUfj tlKtkfillinon of~rthi,,~t;i1X1l in PV~. I. HI rnnarh :)

·Sin« infertna does nor dcrermi nc the objccr in iudf, the definition of 'trustwOrthiness' does not includt it; hence. your definition is incorrccr." We respo nd that a cognition is trustwo rthy !>«aU$(' it does not dtctivt

"~buddhi (I'VT, ""':7~R) makes IOInc illlpom.rt.l ~u on dW point;

- If pclC.'tp!:ion. lIon...conapClw, il anrIOIIdnmnillor wt.ahon- [Inc puapl[ wam- and to OII:U~ tnlCOI' fabc. Hena. bow CUI Ont $aJ' W I one 'detmnilM:l dw l tf~'(iiI and

.,.

~ .

H_ _ ....y 1M IOIJowin&.. Ac:tMty thaI • baKd on puapbon • !wofoId: initial and hahin llOl. 0"., ..... 0::1""" . nd Iuhi ..... I I'*"""'I"inn nl""- .hih!' .n ..t.im """' io Iuni.... 1U1ed. Whm mal puaption an-.;I ariJeldeurm.inif\A ia irmsr in aoooni with onr', habii\Ullion in I ........... dw .¥OidIaU (:I.1UCI1Qr a'roO'. And lbar • .....uacu prodlKCi

I aWoeq"uu ..mfrins lW'UmeA of dial lind: hmu, me pmon aru on IMI oo;ca. 1'1w:n .......... in thac ~ dw . warmaa iudf dctmnilM:l iu own iNuumuualiry. Sina: il doa IlOl ckpmd on dw: actmry of ......., MJl..q1lnl' irul:rumcrlal ~ion, it ill NIl ilUflP'"",ialr 10 ay. "dnemilM:l W objm;.... " It is tI(M !he caK thai aU pnupcions an: dnmninni 10 be ~o:al dvourJ> .omrthi.ng doc. In !he a i r of acting d"" 10 III illilial pc,aplion [i.r.. one which does nOl in~ Nbituarion l. if OM baa not ~n;riYdy "i"I"'<'hoondr,d ..... obj«t· ........ ,iry ('PI' -mIw... iii.,;,..). ..... ~ ...., nl

........ ·WdI, hoor is il apptopr ial( 10 .... y. ' HM", oo(fmincd 1M ob;ea (..-m.p."

TIK 111m: prodlKlioo of dw ,,",' ap'''''' with dw '!lUI" oilbar objra is <;OI\,",n'" tionally dc:sis,nalcd in tN, f»bion, as hal a1rudy bern apbincd [PVSV _

PVI.J7b-dl. ~If _

isaainaOUI of doubt, how is itQ)l'T«l fOfI.y dul pc<)pkwbo do to ~ 'j\>di.

cious' ~Hri~' Wha . ...............-..di.:t..... he.ff A pn- ....... in_,;P''' ................ ~ ..,. inS ;''Il0l • ptnon who ~ i - 00' of. dtfi nitiw dnmnilWion. Th.., ,},.,'" :ur two

ClWCI thai compel OM 10 ICC daub!.bou! an objea (.nh.) 1UId'}'" dcfiroili,", drmminll1ion oian objea. lnac:tiYirya1to hallWOQWCI: doubc thal !fw.... ill noob;rn and ddini~ drcermi.Aalion tha, ,her<: ...... ob;c<;t.. A pmon who xu 001 of,},., JifA rwo QWG and a penon who docs 001 Xl 001oi lhc S«Ond JWO is wtw the world maru by. judiciouJ PC"""" If Klins withoul ddinil~ dacrminalion is to unwwl, Ibm it would br contodictOly for &rmrn 10 work in ,},., Iiddo and ... on. for tlwylur,", no iNm..""".... ""!V'i.ion which has drfini.;myoomnilKd lI"';r n..,,"' .........1and web

will pow.

} 76

FOUND .... TI O NS OF DH .... IlMAKI RTr5 PHILOSOPHY

people; this indudes' pcra:ption and inferucc, which have the cha~er­ istic of causing one to obwn the intended obj('Ct! To comment on that, (Dharmwni) says: fnUnvo"hi"m is II ctIf1'itiD" 6/ ulic fimctiD".7 T'hi$ means that one hu a cognition of the accomplishing of the aim that is to be accomplished by the obj('Ct that one lw delermincd through the insuuois bwuh JNlT bJII btl I" Jo" mental cognition (tsINuJ 1IW JD"fI1I4 "trf JNlI" b]uJP'I' 1'UJt1,. ;).' For example, for the penon who, having oognizcd a flI'C through perception, then acu (jMI/M) on fire's' capacity to bum, coole. and so on, there is the activation of a perception whoK: obj('Ct i$ the sensation of warmth and such. Or, for example, on certain ocasions there might be a cognitive error due to something which lw a form similar to fire and so on; at that time, there is for that person the activation of an inference through smoke which dc6nitively determines the fire . (Depending on the comat, one of these ~he engagement of a subsequent pcrccpc:ion or infcrence-
,'m

mal

,.->

5 pv. D: 1tb]M/,.,11:JtJ

~ ,.,~,.

{a tflljJ

6 See paWId Ski. p"'l &ts in Smnkdlnn and Krasacr (1989:)1). 7 PV.1.. IbfF, lI~tilJ l ..u.,.lIrIbu1ft. /I ~~hi (PVr. ~JLtfJ)

p..... ,hi< IrnTU.:

An ttnIM is bwnillS and.., on. 1lw ·ac.c:ompliulln~m· of dUI

-tI,.., mII"""",;J

meaN

dw arWI of it.

1lw um,;of il ~ dw cosniUon ofit bra" .. the..mw fOOI l~ '.• """ Iw nrioua maninp. (MIf ";.,,,. t. ~'i t,tJ,."j .,..,..1. ; f'W,."j"¥,. 114' iNwu 9i'" 9i fh1i',,). 9 _ -> _HatMj.). 10 Sikyabuddhi (PVT, ""..71h7) makai il dcardw!his puA&C cono;crm the inwvmcnta1ity of ptllXp!ton. 11 AaoniinSIO~ CPVr!7-4htl. die poinl hen is thai inkrma involva no infO.

m

APPENDIX OF T RAN SLATIONS

In other cases," one: may nOI be: ttrtain of the: difrcrrnce between a perception and a spurious perception when they occur, in IUch c:a.ses the actual perceptual aware:ness is known to be: trustwOrthy through the: e:ngagc:me:fl( of a subsequent instrumental oognition. "'Ine: latter and forme:r perceptions arc not distiner, so, since one might doubt that one: is not acting on a real thing. one: could not be: cert:a.in that it is not erroneous. -') This is not the: CI.S( lxcaW( both would not occur (JUt /'4) in the ab5c:nC( of a real thing. That is, for one: who actS through bring prompted. 10 act by a f.&ulty or dubiow cognition thai apprehends JOmcthing that is not fi~ as fi~, a subsequent awarmcss that has :IS its objc:ct burning and cooking docs not ariK:. It docs not arise: beaUS( du[ [awareness in which the c:xpcaed. £die f"unaion appe2lSl is bras«!. on a rea.I thing. If that substoquent awareness docs ariK:, men the formercan only be: trwtworthy lxcawe: [I] one obtains a [die function in accord with one:'$ expectations; and 1xcaW( III me: callS( ofjwl nile ~ (by virtue of requirin, ya anotha-lUbKqllCftl.~ for the oocnninaciDn of iQ ilUtnuncnuJity) '-''1M' inra-a- iI intriNiaJly inMnunmuJ (>jn 1M "I-l,. f!; ..", ",u ",.. tJ.M .... ~ "" ....... ,..., HIo.t,..)lif!,.. i ~, tht.t,.. .N,. .... )Ii.. ,.J. 12 ~ (PVT",otbiA) not""

If! ~ ~n oth«

of FK~ki"B Iubi[\Q,Iion.
u"",..ji:s

<:ala

IlOl

13 ~ I"IOfCI that dw; former and lauer I'W&rUICSICI an IlOl diffrl1:nl in W.I the: lal' IXIt"lIPC2" 10 Itt its he'llli~ and c:ooking. Thil dubiety or ~ dw; con· firmins iI'II'U"CTIrII wooId ~ il 10 be conhrrnoed by ya .....,u..". c:onflrrning - . and ON: mlYllIiYCI.t an infinite ~ I( on th. odwr hand. ON: admiCi w.t dw; latter ~ ter nrvn>eIII ofbumi,. and

naI

iI ...tr-conJirmi"" thm why nol admit tim

mr hnt OM iI u

well1 Stiryabuddhi

(PVT",,.b7-1?ll thm q _ rwo _ he onrihuta 10 KI.lmlrila, and which may wdJ be from dw; fJrIM.tfiH. Thry _ riled H 1'5 't¥. tJS~H:

JustIII'Ihc hfSl:.~ drpmdI upon that ~ [Rlppt;ecI by mr IIeCOftd OMj, in tbr -r ~ W3y that UUICWOfIIti_ {Rlpplird by mr 1IeCOftd] wooId:oL.o rcquil1: ya anomer uwtwOnhinc:u [wppIicd by JOfTlC thirdJ. lf, ho .. r..:r, onU'efr 10 .unil duo IOIfIC j.wuaxa in this ctwn] uillluumcnw inuUuiaUy [i.c.., on iu own]. tbm why _ you anpr abow tbr 1iI$I.~ bo:ins tbH W3y IUd! tIw )"011 will IlOl let il be toI !Jor'b.ri.... jU_", III'U",*"",1fI ~« f "''''~; "''''~

,-'--'to

, .. _, ...'fIG "'riM..... hi II

ar,.m

, .....- , . ..... U..... ,~ inu hn.IIol U.

nI ~ ,...,. n>tI , ... _..,..,.

I

}78

FOUNDAT ION S OF DHAlMAKlllTrS PHILOSOPHY

me

that kind of awarmcss of tdic function is a rc:a.I dUng. ThadOf'C'. if latter has a rc:a.I thing as its objm:. thrn th~ fonn~r is nusfworthy with regard to it. ,. Someone objects: "The lauer i nsuum~nral cognition [in which appears the tdic function of [h~ object determined by [he former aw.af'C':nessj doa I" Sikyabuddhi Rm.uio:a on !he tcaion, lUlling with ~i 'l lalemenr: TIN;' Nih K-lJ _ fItrIU (j"f JMJ i,. w .~ ". -' Sikyabuddhi eo~u (nalfl)!

_ UN

(_11«._

a.u.

un,.,.

!he I'tO'O ~ 11K a.ppem.ntt of fiR in the fOrm« aJ&IIiOOn md appannce of bumin& and such in flK Ianet. Although a. tapUtivc appc:amICC of fiR may apply 10 C"I'm unreal tbinp. ofbwningand wch wi.lInor. nu. il apresxd by !o.-ndnbuddhj·I] lOtemrtlr: for ..... """" «11 ki",1""',w

w

IIIQnS

wappcarana

"'""tit ,. lin i-y. fo .. hJ •• J..~ "'Pi';',. u,., ."",JwVt »-un,., thttt iJ _ fi" 10firr.•

hils ill Hjm "'"'"","'"' "riM. 't"-,.., 11«._._mom dJu.---.namdy. dK 1 _ tMI IlUeIw"h an ob,ea that Iw 1M ~

"'lwfW1lt

.IJN

.-.Mi", " - _

10

!die

funccion ofbumi"" cooking and to on-iJ""'",,, -' thi",. I/i, "- DiM. thnI UN~ ...,. ... ~ WtnlJ~tN.1 is, if IlUbtequenl ____ oflMob;ea (...m.) thaI accord. wilh OM', Clp«tatioru ....... in a paIOn who aeu through bcinS pron1p!"ro by dw kind of former lwaleral, Inm tN.1 ii Of conmluler W formt!" IwaKl'IQI' !nUlWOI"thi.....,.. ... TIWo is 10 M._ IN t.-.Jput tJ",t ~"" -/"lir fo1lttiH it . "'" thi,.,. Thai it. iioor: il acmmplisha: .. Irlo. (ttrth.) such as ""minI and ~ fiR is tM wtoidl aaompWher buminr.. cookinK and 10 on;

.r._NWfI

likewisr, ~Irr it tN.1 whidI it wrd

10

acoomplWl washing and drinking. This is so

b«aUK a rr.u dunS i. by ddinluon dllt willch II

~blt

of Irhe funel>on

(."b.~).

" Sui

done is WI kind ollruRWOnhinou with

~ 10

a lno. (ttrth.) ~n in a

d~ '

It is prd't1"IbIr mal theR be 1 reU thinS in tru.1 aoc; whm a-n. lhett is no other INUs (rrttd for pocirinS" reU thins. llIm dram· lwata'ICIaICI woukI be irunumrnal." Sin<:c _ admil this ;, the aso., mil is nor a flzw in ow ~nli. "How is ;llhal.".. art thaI an lwauneaa is nGI ;lUtlumcnlal?" BroaUK OM tbinlu, is trfOnc'OW.. • Hma, a prrupr>on whoK obj«t ;, ~­ bit- ofllCCOmpWhin& an aim (.nIM), Mn«;1 is dt-¥Oid of any C;Il11e1 of error.;' UCft· lain«! 0."1'''' ..... ,. 1tr rdiClivc aw::lR~ "" !xins by n.a'UR irmtumnlal. ]1 produca I dcfin~ drrmnirulion of mat objKI in aocord wilh the _ y ~t;' ...... ucmail\Cd. HPI(t:, il is intriruiaUy irmrummal. and thn-d"oR, IIKrr ;, no infinilr rqras.. O~ mishl nor . I........ cl. be habiru.nro 10 an iniriallw::llmCSll ...;.h ....... w-n ....... oJ r.~ '" _fff: in ..... " "'. ,h., ................. ~ .-- "-",,, ..... CII~ry 1(1 produu I dcfinitr.c dn .... mirwioon becawc, e-trn dw!u&h WI fin. or ""'t.... has bern appreMnded by an inckpmdm. (...,., 'fP'I/- _,..,,.,..; irurrumcnm cognilton, done I f ( a.IUCIIW. induce ~ !hat pmoenl MIC.h I ddinilm: dncrmirulion. In Wt caK. WI iniliallwaKl\Cll is mablmed 10 be iruuumcnal bylhtmptr;anml of 1 subtequem illlltUtnCf\m aJ&IIilion. Hena. il iI afriMia.lJy ;1lSII\UI\Cntal. Howtvrr. if OM Iw an Iw::IRnC:II WI involou llabitWlion and wriry. thm ill irmlUmmaliry is oktcrminc.t fiom irwlf (...,., W .. _~), "" _ apb.i1\Cd aboo.ot.. In!hil ....1, ;• •~ •.w.... oJ", ...... ,1_ JKlo.cptiu" is inK.W'OCI ..... ill .... 'IC c.oa ;'",i•...oc.Jj1 ,""t! in _ CUCI ClninsiallJ'. lnfddOCt ;, in.rumcnlal in lriruically.

wt

"'i,

,.rird,i,...)

APPEND IX OF TRANSLATIONS

'"

not cogniz.e me object. lIut w:lS apprehended by the former. If mat is the ColiC, how can it Mve as iu objea the ,elie function of an object. determined by mat former awareness sueh that Ihe former awareness is instrumental because it docs not deceive one about that object's telie function ~· This is flOt a problem. Beings engaged in pr:roctic:al action (1IJII1IQ}",,,,j act on those twO objeca: without differentiating them. Hence, in KO) rd with such practic:al action, we S2y that, beings act on objectS that occur in tempotal stquencc as if those objccu wete a single thing. In reality, the former and latter objectS arc distinct. However, the real thing that is the object of the latter ios((umental cognition would not aist if the object of the former instfUfflC:nw cognition had not been existent. Hence, we metaphorically say that che latter awareness has as its object ju.u thai object of the former awareness. Therefore. since the real thing toward which one aeted w:lS established prior [to the cognition in which iu telie function appeared!. that initial cognition is instrumental because through it the lalter awareness engages with the ,elie functwn . '~

(umlin,,;nl on IlK U1JU oftrustworthinm." Drvtwll/JuJdhi (1.bl/J) turnI 10 lin inl"p"uuUJn ;nlrmu D/Episumi.. /Jllllism.:) IS Sikyabuddhi (PVT'7'Ib6f1l mmmmu oa dw WI

ImIn'lCt.

Th
nrw m,-"l.""

'Ji.-"

l1li,,.,.,,.,,,

rl" "J*tip'",.'i';";r ..1M lu .... ri" ",,,, M,b,p1,."",.;,.,;,./<"lUI';" "" M lu jo" D"" ,. i sNr ,. ""'. _ 'i 'fY" 1f7iJ" .. j Owr .. 1M "Jii II; M t.. ... .,.,. III k,. i # .. .,.", ... 1_ " M 1M r.hn ",.. .. J.",,. i k ,. "J*ti t.a U' "-t ,.; k,., It; .." 'rN,. i pJ (."01 k,. fhyi _ i 'X)W "pi,.;",.i /'o/ir .. u,n

",.. .. 'i"" • ..,.

l(i Stu,u'''';'';''1 tiM; vbja;.iu".....J .~_ tI... I...." bun ......, (PVT", Jb1):

ha". S1J,.~""~!hi .......

]80

f O UNDATI ON S O f DHARMAKIRT r s PHI LOSOPHY

According fO those for whom c:r.:rcmal ob}ects do not exisI:. W obi«t which is dctamincd by the former iJl$[nunenral oognition is not iocontrovcrtibly the cause or me laner ilUuumenw cognition: howcvc:r, it is the cause or an aWllrcncss that has me appearance or the desired tdic function. Whatever docs not have mat appearance is not inmumenral. hence. there is no contradiction. Even ir there ~ no external objcas. [he aWllrmc:s5 that arises with mat kind or appearance is a human aim (JItyn 'j Jo" • PllnqArtM). Thus, with regard to meir theories of tfUSlWOrmincss, mere is u1timatdy no difference between those who maintain the existence of external objcas and mosc who do not.

"*

{lRvnuJrabwJJhi Mill txAminn tD ttlM Usun (fmcrmill: tnutwtmhillm: Joubt 111111 o/ntnU'tion. Ht rllUn 1111 obj«tjolf 11M III1J1«r1 it:!

SonxoIM: obj«u.. "Bul . ina: 1M formtt insuummtal copilion is whal cauKI dIO' actiYation (k,. """,. - ! '' ''taU) of dIO' uller inttrumcntal copiticon. tht: 1Orma illilrwnmtal mplilion is illltnllnmw only when dIO' urm inKnunmtal c:opidon " p.~. ,. .... 1\01 QtutMfltN. But u..t bfter ,,,"nrmental

_,,,,,.td;

aJ&nition docs

IIOf

lui...: the apacif)' 10 lUke

mal

t"onner IWVmC'# whkh docs not

ha...: [dK naNrc ofbri", inouwncntal ] into an~..........ao thai doco ha...: dIO' rwurcof bci,. ilUlrwnmw." AI Kumirit. hu aid: -Ln i. ~ known ~I all insuumm" of kno~ aft intrinsically ilUl~na.1. 1Ot lhal which doa 001 ha¥e the apacil)' W ~ al an ilUlf\/.ml:na.1 copliOOn OP i" own (anJ)O\; ~ made: Q pi' bk: 01 doinlllO by .mochtr IRlb.tquc,"1qnilion " I ~ ~~ ~ iii p...,m-

I .... ""'_ Wi ~ ",-_.""... ~ f1 (~V:

c..u,.., 47)1.

for Ih.~. [ ~dd.hiJ AJ'E Tbw. m.n.... ln othe-wonk. withoul dIO' obic'a of c ob;ctt of c Iura-.~ whoK obj«1 is dw: aa:omplisluMnl 01 1M [apeaed] Idol (.nJJ.). as MaCh tht f i n t . _ is iNtN' mental b«awe il also Iw. ~ thinllas iu object. 176a11rthal W01: 001 dw: ax, d.m lM fine twaftm. would Iu...: an IIIlreal!hi", u ia ob;ca: as would 001 bt: ..... au", oi ...... kiM '" ... ~..,.,., _ _ _ Ii ..... ...... wiv- ~ .. ,+... ___ plishrrooenl of d>c ap«Ied .doi]. This;'10 si~ .....p;t. (,rqr._".. • .,.,., wid, lIN ~t If'" {".,.-J} TIImIp;, tnanI "ml1Mll!h me, fint awarmc:n." In other words. this I!W:IlN' -since me, fUll ~ is the auK" of d>c lifter ....... tcIICSf whoec ob;«t is the aaomplidlllM:flI of tht [apmed] ldoc." TIu.1ItpfIIftI1 dmiorutnles d>c ~ When it ariICI from in own ClUICS, d>c I"ocmu twaft_ NiKI u lui""" only d>c IWUn: 01 an iruaumcow ODpIition bca...... • raJ minI {. , .- -'"'- ~ is pmkM. Howco~ •• if tbrn aft =-lQrftTO<• .... rely me JdU, •.;..., ck ..... ui ....ion of;. ao ;~ ...,.J io CZfH rh.roug...-l-.cr

"'"'IF

-n. ;.

w...

f

[subKqumt ]

cosnilMxl.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

Since an instrumental cognition is this or that cognition whose trustworthiness has been ascertained, doubtful cognitions and such are not instrumental. "But since a person may be obstructed in his activity, even an instrumental cognition may not be trustworthy, and it therefore would not be instrumental. " The trustworthiness of an instrumental cognition does not consist of the fact that one definitely obtains the desired object through that instrumental cognition. Instead, it consists of the fact that one obtains only the desired object through that instrumental cognition. When one acts,17 the instrumental cognition is what makes one obtain the object. Therefore, a cognition's instrumentality consists of its capacity to make one obtain the desired object. Since just that capacity is said to be the trustworthiness of the instrumental cognition, there is no problem concerning obstructed action.

[Dharmakirti next raises the issue oflanguage:} This instrumentality is also the case with linguistic awareness because it makes one aware of the intention [in the speakers' mind]. [PV2.Id]

[Neither Devendrabuddhi nor Siikyabuddhi offer particularly striking comments on this point. Van Bijlert, who understands this entire discussion to refer to the instrumentality ofthe Buddha and his scriptures, interprets the verse as referring to the Buddha as speaker. 18 A more likely interpretation would be to construe the verse as a defense against objections based on Dharmakirti's antirealist semantics. In other words, if Dharmakirti denies that expressions refer to real universals instantiated in substances, then language is ultimately meaningless. Why bother to use it? The response is simply that language does yield trustworthy knowledge, but only with regard to the linguistic intentions ofthe speaker:}

~l7 5akyabuddhi notes (PY[, nyq6b1-2), "By implication one supplies (adhyahara); 'In all 'cases when one is not obstructed' ... " [thams cad du gags byed pa 'i rKYu med na zhes bya ba

'khong nas dbyung ngoJ. 18 Cf. Van Bijlert (1989:130-131).

j81

fOUNDATIONS OF DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHI LOSOPHY

An a.:prcssion is insuumental in that it indicates the object that appears in awareness as the object of the spewr's linguistic inlention. BUI il is nOI caused by Ihe actua.Iiry of things. IPVl.l]

[TIN ot,," issw thar Ltnf'Ullt rllist:1 is ~nt thilt Ilpplits U1 CfJn«ptlUl/ ropiriorJI in p"IlL lJnJmJr.lnulJhi aprmn rlN probkm in tht foJ/.owinl obj«rion

(,.,}oJ

•An instrumental cognition is that which is uustwonhy wirh regard (0 the tdic function when one actS having become awa~ of the instrumental object through that insuumem. If mat is so, coruider the case whe~ one acts upon a water-jug through the conceptual awareness of a water-jug; when one does so that conceptual awarenm is also rrusrwonhy with regard to the relic function of acting in that fashion. Hence, that conccprual awar~ nm would also be instrumental, but you do nO( acccpl thai it is.. Therefore. the definition ofinsuumcntaliry is faulry.-

[A«ort/inl

UJ

lKw1uIr.buJJhi, Dharmll!tirti 's nca statmlnft rtlponris UJ this

issw:)

Since conventional aw,Hmess apprehends that which has aI~dy been app~hended , we do nOI cla.im thai it is instrumental. [PV1.ja]

Thai is, conventional awarcncsses that have objects such as a walcr-jug, cxiSlcnrhood. number and upward movement arc not cla.imed to be instrumental. Why? For the reason that they apprehend what has already been apprehended. Here IDharmakini has said thalj JUSt the initial experience of an object is me insuumcnral cognition," i.e.. il is what makes one :>Ct. The JlI~ue", co nttptll<11 <1W:O'~ef$ ,10.", com es fTom ir <1n~ rf!elll ing trull object as it W25 apprehended. Hence, it is not at all an awarcnm of a rcaI thing that can aa::omptish a tdos. So how can it be what nukes one act ah:u one has known its object?

19 This iI •• ddCiICC 10 HB:l ' .,1-'9. Set btbw.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

[In PV2.3b-4c, Dharmakirti defends an important claim made in PV2.Inamely, that awareness itselfis instrumental. This conflicts with many ofDharmakirti's Brahmanical opponents, and to introduce Dharmakirti's verse, Devendrabuddhi raises a typical objection (3b4).} "But why is an awareness with the aforementioned kind of image instrumental and not the faculties and so on?"

[The answer is Dharmakirti's verse.} Awareness is instrumental because it is the primary factor in one's action toward an entity that one wishes to obtain or avoid. [PV2·3b-d]

[To clarifY the point being made here, Devendrabuddhi (3b4./JJ makes an important innovation: he introduces the notion of "mediated" (vyavahita) and "unmediated"(avyavahita) instrumental effects (pramar:taphala). He begins by answering the question he posed just above-''Why cannot the sense faculties themselves be considered instrumental?,] Because it is not possible for the faculties to be instrumental. To be specific, there are two kinds of instrumental effects: one called a "human aim" which is a mediated effect and a distinctive one that is not mediated. 20 Having known through awareness an aim that should be done, a person implements its means and thereby attains the activity defined as the direct apprehension of it. Likewise, knowing that some thing is to be avoided, a person does not implement its means and thereby obtains the activity of not directly apprehending it. Thus, awareness is instrumental because it is the

primary factor in one's activity with regard to a real thing that one should obtain or avoid. That is, it is the primary factor-awareness is the primary

20 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:77h2-3) glosses distinctive as meaning that it "will definitely occur" (gdon mi za bar 'gyur ba). He remarks: [Devendrabuddhil says that it is "distinctive." The distinction is that it will definitely occur. Since that way of occurring is fulfilled (spyod pa = carita) by that kind of effect, it is called" distinctive." In other words, if there is an instrumental cognition, an instrumental object (j>ramrya) will necessarily be cognized (rtogs par 'gyur) because that object is not different from the instrumental cognition. This is not the case with a mediated effect because it is possible for something else to obstruct its occurrence.

)804

FOUN DAT IONS OF D HA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

ncmr- i" tM tICIivitywhosc object is a re;d thing which o~ should obtlli" or IlJIOUJ and which is thw ca.lled a -hullWl :tim. - Therefore, sina awarencs.s is ,he prim:a.y m(Ot, llWil""nj if in;trJlmrnUlL It is d:timed (:at PV2.jb-d) that awareness is instrumental so:as (0 rdl.LIe the notion that the sense faculties:and such:are abo cau.ses for :activiry, That is, a person who has ncultio:and so on does flO( mereby engage in activity I[ow:ard some sense obj«tJ: otherwise, one would haw: to conclude that o~ engages in activiry merely by virtue of their exlnence. Instead, it is :as fol lows: having known wh:at should ~ obaincd :and avoided, a ~n who is th:at knower applies himsdf :accordingly. That in terms of which a judiciow person is initially prompted 10 act is me cause of action toward me intended object. Sinct other awarenesses:arise by dint of that initw aw:areness or haw: that initial aW1lm)CSIi:as their object, only Uu!t initial awarrnCSli is instrumc:nt:al. {Dewn4f'1lbudtJhj thl4J "",jnuiN thaI, whrn DhaTntAltini JifmJs tM iNtrumnlulil] ofIlWilrtnm by &timi,,! that il is -1M pn'nnptllflUUJr in acrion, • M is rrftrrinx to II Milllttl instrummt4l1foa. Htrt II -mttli.tn/ tfficr- is 1]11onpllf)JI.S with II puruJ1rtha. /n tIN"at /H'rtilm ofW1W, DIM,."..ltin; prrsnrlS two """imulAl rrasom for tIN ciAim thilt IlfLWfflJtU jtstlJ is i1lStrflmmtAJ:/

Also, aw:areness is instrumental because a cognition is differentiau:d due (0 the difTerenti:ation of the awareness' objective imagt'; this is the case because mat cognition only occurs when th:at objective image is present. [PV1...p-C] /Hm, DtwndrtlbudJhj Undmtaruis DhlIrmalti,.,i tit IH riftrri,,! '0 ." Jlnmtdullttl iNtrummUl/ t/f«t. He rommmlJ {4b2J1):J The [mere] cognition of an object is an unmediatcd instrumental effect.l ' 'That is, that through which, when all [other] cau.ses:are in place, the convention of -knowing" is prisned without fimher mediation is :an imtrumenr:al cognition. And nothing but the simulacrum [i.e.• the cognitive image] of the object has that bclt of mediation, for it is through th:u sim-

21

Thc TIbmn(l"VP~re.b aIMJ_ i lrtih_d»J,.~_'-st,."" .....

How·

this xcmI apin 10 be: 00( of 1M many (aCI of ""b;«tIpralial~ in~ in ar.buan tra ..... ~ fO... s..n.Iui. _ ....",,,. d-a. _ P' ''~ b', . ...,.. •• ·...,.'~~I • '......... o4w-

~,

JJnp~

Noce thaI 11m: I uncImwMI ,... III nwrdy be: m:arlU"lI W pm,Uc::uL

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

;ulacrum that instances of knowing are distinguished from each other, even "though they are indistinguishable in terms of their nature of being experi'ences. Hence, due to the differentiation of the objective image-i.e., due to rrhat quality ofthe cognition 22-the awareness, i.e., the instance ofknowing, .is differentiated. And since this effect exists when that is present-i.e., when irhe object-image is present-awareness is therefore instrumental. If when :"y"is present, "x"comes into existence, it makes sense that "y"is the most ~fficient cause (shin tu sgrubs par byedpa = sadhakatama) of "X."23 But if at some point there were no such effect [i.e., "x'1 when "y"was present, then one would realize that "y" depends upon some other mediating causal facior. That being the case, since that former cause ''y''is mediated by something else on which it depends, it would not be the most prominent causal factor. Therefore, it would not be the instrumental cause. Even when the sense faculties and so on are present, they do not [necessarily] have the causal function of producing an awareness because they are mediated by the object-simulacrum. But if the simulacrum is present, it is necessarily known .because it is not mediated by anything else for that knowing to occur. Since it is of the nature of awareness, it is the basis for positing an effect that does :not depend on anything further for its occurrence. As such, the object-simulacrum is the cause of both kinds of effects. And since it is of the nature of awareness, awareness alone is instrumental . .{This all raises the question of how instrumentality is to be determined. . Devendrabuddhi briefly discusses and rejects the Mima1!lsaka solutionnamely, that all instruments ofknowledge are intrinsically instrumental (svataJ:t .pramal).yam). To show that the awareness itse/fcannot present its own instrumentality, Devendrabuddhi (sa3) cites Dharmakirti's next verse.}

The awareness' essential reality (svarnpa) is known through the awareness itself, [but not its instrumentality]. [PV2.4d] {Devendrabuddhi (sa3ff) comments.}

That is, through reflexive awareness, an awareness that is called "instru-

22 PVP (4a3) ex.conj.: zhes pa'i chos-> shes pa'i chos. 23 This complex relative construction has been represented using the variables for the sake of clarity in its English rendering.

'x" and

)"

386

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

mental" is established to be an extant awareness, but it is not thereby estab_ lished to be instrumental. "But on your view its instrumentality is not distinct from the extant awareness itself; therefore, that instrumentality is also apprehended when one apprehends the awareness as extant." This is true. Since a perception does not arise in a piecemeal fashion, that instrumentality should also be apprehended. Nevertheless, that awareness is asserted to be instrumental concerning that objective aspect (bzung ba'i rnam pa = griihyiikiira) with regard to which it produces a definitive determination (nifcaya) because it causes action toward that aspect. It is not instrumental with regard to any other aspect. Even though there is no difference in terms of being experienced, there is the definitive determination of that aspect for which there are the causes of definitive determination, such as interest, habituation, context and so on. What requires the mediation of other conditions is not determined. Therefore, although one has already apprehended the instrumentality when one perceives an extant awareness, it is as if one had not apprehended because there is no definitive determination of it. "How then is one to determine instrumentality?"

[To answer this question, Devendrabuddhi cites the first portion of Dharmakirti snext verse.} Instrumentality is known through practical action (vyavahiira). [PV2·5 a]

[Devendrabuddhi remarks (Sb6-7).} ... through practical action. That is, instrumentality is known through a subsequent awareness whose object is telically efficacious. 24 This leads to an obvious problem: if one can determine what is instrumental simply by acting, why would anyone bother to write a treatise? Dharmakirti anticipates this problem and responds.}

24 Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:79ar) notes: "Since it produces a definitive determination subsequent to itself, in that it is an instrumental cognition, perception is instrumental with regard to the objective image." [tshad ma'i phyis 'byung ba cangyi nges pa skyed pa'i phyir mngon sum

ni gzung ba'i rnam pa dag fa tshad ma nyid yin no J].

'"

APPENDIX Of TRA NSLATIONS

In this regard. U'Clltises arc For fusion . (PV1.sbJ

th~

purpose of dimin.aling oon-

Composing treatises is not wclw bcawc mlfrises tin for 1M pll~ of ~limj1Ulti"s m"jjnu,,.. ~n one iJ pmmptM to 2Ct. if Ont acu without knowing the ddining char.t.ctcrutK:s of an irutrumenw cognition, o~ ouy be deceivM. TherdOre. those who wish to act should know before they aa thc defining characteristia of an instrumental cognition and of a spurious onc. Those defining charaCrtr1s1ia thar one docs not know are lcarncd (ril ptt • "!lUI):u they arc taught in a treuilC', defined as that which tcaches the Dh..mtA, which is hen! typifiM by innnictlons on Pmr'" lmowIf!dge. Hn_ ing learned those defining charactaistia. onc will thcn :act in some appropriatc manner. It is for this purpose that treatises art composed.. Thai is, they diminate the audience'l confwion about whal il an innrumenw cognition and what is nor. In this SCIUt'. a ueatise is not poindw. Thus. those: who maintain thai a lfCllrisc would accomplish nothing are That if, the innrumenDi cognitiont 2rC n01 commonly en:ablished beawe. by w.ly of the mutuilly contndiaory ddlnitiont tiul :are presented, it is obKrvcd that evtn thoughtful scholars misunderstand what not

eor~.

constitutes an insuumcnlaJ cognition. How much more so is it the case for w world in gcner~H Hcnce, if one's aaions arc not pr«cdcd by an instrumental cognition, one will be dcccivcd. And it is abo nor al all accepcable that a cog.oilion be: considered nondcuptivc by virruc of (merel acci· dent:&l,u<Xfll.

{At this PO;III, INwrubabtlddhi (l4imJ tJutt Dh,mrukin; has finiJMJ his tlntriptio" ofthe first J4i"j"ldMrlllVrism (I"a) of." ;nstnlmmJaI cornilion. Ht t laimJ thlll Dhttmutltirt; "OW prtSttrtt. -s«oN4 Mfininf m.~

mVti(-:r 25 PV1"(sbs--.6'): "' ... utklurtJ...I_ i .uJ..u."pJ.,i "" N"",",I.'-''' I ,.; k .... oipi I,rJ AJ-:Iphtm ",oh- tt]iJ Jill ". /. ~ (PVT, ~) ..qeca dlC noOon tM INs acnAIIr rot'..aUlfei I tcaI!Id ddWrion: inRad lit- INinWIII tM ~. dnbudcIU is mo:ntr ~ of du. MIIo!ICOI'.Od "p:meraI ctwaa.::riaic"rp-IfIIlN1I.,wPJiI N"; Ii'I """oi .;.I,.,I,rJ,. iii,.; nY'·1I1. 1 iii,.; tJ- __ Jill ". . . .", N __ ,. JUt . 1""" IV pb.1I -J,. . . .", N ... ~ ,. """ _ w1 phtur - ..... J'""'I;y..y..I,. - Ji•• ,,.., fA ..w _ ~ ,. too ..,.,." ,.,uph- k,., Ow,. 1'Ji ,.,u ItJit tJ..J - pJill. ~ ,. ,.,u ?i,.,., ,...,.

I"J'I"

,. aha.,.

"Jill""",,,

,.pfo,. 7""

}Sa

FOUN DATION S OF D HARMAKIIlTl'S PHILOSOPHY

Moreover. an instrwnenal oognitton is th:u which illuminates an unknown object (tzjiUtJnIM). [PV.2..scj

cognition is Wo a cognition that iIIuminares-i.e.• makrs known--the reality of an obj«t-i.e.• a thing--
An

i nS(rum~ru21

/This j,1II1J I(). ftw problmu. StI"" htlw tD th wim ,IN possibk ;1Utnlmmtai· ity ojlNtUlKilUltWnJ. ilUlS",uch lIS thry Also "iUlimilUlu whttl hAS not b«n Jis· mnd "DrwnJrilbudJhi (JM) t/4irm IIMlmis notWn is tlvmN", tlx ~ til thr urm ../lniNt. .. • Drwnt/rtllnuJ;/hi Ju d4irm tlNr: tht tmn "/lrth4 .. nulbln tlnr I() rollnt ntlnprrrrptWn (/lnllp4l4bJhi) lIS inJtnlmtnlAl (Jb71U). BWI thr mtlJI imfX1rt1lnl tlbjrditln raisrJ hrrr is Ihr Imt t1JnlAinu/ in DJutmulti""; i nat SlAlmrmr:) "The knowl~ of a uni~rsaI that follows the [perttprual j cog. nition of an objKt in itself {w.rifMJl would be instrumental." [PVz·Sd-6aj

fDtvnrJrabuJJhi apl4inJ this objtrtilm (6arff):) "If an irutrumeru21 cognition is that whKh illuminates an unknown object. mt.n me awareness involving a universal that coma after th~ cognition of a thing', n:toture {lVIIri/"lJ would be instrumental. That is, me awareness involving a llOiversal that follows upon the cognition of a patticul:ar would also be instrumerual since it takes :IS iu object a univcrsa.l that was not apprchendal by the preceding perception. But yo u do not accept m is: hence. )'Our definition iJ erroncoWi."

U; Sec aOO h.ir; com~nts on PV). I (PVI':u)&4fl}.

m., IftrII I . , 'r hm.lUnnioN .. a synonym lOr n"L.q.!U- In Il1O« preax 1unu,IO apprdlmd m., ~of an objm is toapplmc.Kl it in its KtWlity. ThUJ,orUy po«ption "f'PrdKndo m., -.w,. of thinp. irwm..m »c:onapnW msniUona apptebcnd 27 In a kIott- _

objo:cu i... ,.._iJ'·/Uftion...........dy. ~ the mcdi.otion of. uni ........... Sec

and u.,,~ .. ol~ (•..,.hl.

1'\')-,,..,,

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

'fpharmakirti answers:} [Not all such subsequent conceptual cognitions are instrumental; only some are] because [the statement concerning the illumination of what is unknown] is intended to refer to an awareness in the case where some aspect of the particular has not been discerned. [PV2.6b-c]

rjpevendrabuddhi (6a2Jj) amplifies on Dharmakirtis response:} ~,

that criticism [raised in PV2.5d-6a] is not a problem. To be specific, when ~ perceptual awareness apprehends an object such as blue whose essential ~ature is excluded from this and that other thing, there may arise a innemonic cognition whose object is a specific aspect in accord with the ~ay the particular was perceived. Therefore, it is not making one cognize khat one has not yet cognized such that the definition would be erroneous ~ue to all subsequent conceptual cognitions being instrumental. And even ~we suppose that an awareness involving a universal cognizes what has not !been known, nevertheless it is not erroneous because [that second character-

~tuticJ is intended to refer to the case where the particular has not been discerned.

~'fhat is, an instrumental cognition is that awareness that cognizes as its !9bject a particular that one has not discerned. Since he states this definition Wong with a qualification, awareness involving a universal is not instru'mental. "Then inference would not be instrumental because it is an awareness of what has already been observed, as when one infers that impermanence is a property-svabhiiva of sound." This is not so. Even though sound's unique nature, which is excluded from all [other things], has already been apprehended, the object of practical action (vyavahiira) can only be that aspect with regard to which that perception has produced a definitive determination and so on as its effect. Therefore, since it applies to that which has not been apprehended, inference is instrumental. This has already been explained [in PVI]. "Why is it that only an awareness that cognizes a particular is asserted to be instrumental, and not any other?"

[Devendrabuddhi uses this question to introduce Dharmakirtis last remark in this section:}

390

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Because [judicious persons] analyze the particular. [PV2.6d]

[Devendrabuddhi (6a7jj) remarks.} Only the particular accomplishes a telic function. Hence, for the sake of that telos, a person seeks an instrumental cognition with regard to an object that is a particular, which is asserted to be the basis for [the desired] telic function. He does not seek an instrumental cognition with regard to another object that does not accomplish that telic function, because by accomplishing that kind of thing, the telic function is not accomplished.

6. PV3. / - /0 with 5
in ,he visual percqxions of a person with cu:uacuJ arc: nor objecu (IIn"-) bttau.sc they ate! !lOr consida«l to be objccu,' [PVJ.II I ~ndrabuddhi (PVP:u,P4ffi:

with ddi:aM Yiaion dxr,. ate &lK appc:annc:a ....J. iM 1....... 1\ia., , ...................J .... "'.. "..., r..t.c ~ ... _ ... .- _.pI .... any P'WP'* (.,.",.) II all; bomo., tMy U't' no! induoXd in [die alqpy 01] panicubn. Sui nm thou&h ,bey ate dc-toid of any fIlCh ,elie function. they all' noc inchKlcd ........ UD~ """UKthqappcu dearly and ba:awc thqan: noc diaribuu:d O¥'a' anydtins. n. .... ~ntt tMyate ROC..bswnetI wwkr [dwalcpiel oE) parricubnand u~ they anilllOlhcr kind of ot;m.. HclKlt, h is noc WI'«' tNllMrT arc [juMJ rwo kinds of ob;«u. • No, it is no!. dK ""* tNl OW' vir- .. not on ate noc objeta (If" '). Whr. t'PIWmI. H ~ 1I'V}.Idj. 1~1 ;., pa...... aoppl in pncUcaI ;oc..... (.,....;.",) 00 1Io)C~,.hem 10 be obj«t.. 1lw; inlenOon oidtit IUtMWllt is u IOlkrws. If tIw Aia and 10 on thai an ptla:i.ed by • ~ wid> QI~ and II> on 10 be objoas. dim one ......Jd invntipte 1M Jirualion. ukin& -11;1 a puUcuLv. Of it it • v.nivustlr Bu, Wy U't' not: ob;rcu in thai Whim ben· ...., wid> rcprd 10 an 2WU'CftCJI in whlch !haT is dlor appc:anna: offlics and 10 01'\, pmoru cnpgd in prxticaI aaiGn do noc Iu"" dw inlmrion, Ibis is 1M

·WdI. in IM......am1CII 0( a

pcrMNl

&WIM"."""

--=

ob;ea of mal lwaI'UKa. • ThUl, II in the cue oflhe IUbjeai~ »pea oflW2l'mCll. cvm lhoop IMy an: cktnminai. Ihq do nor hl~ II'Ic WIlli of bailS obJects 0( pncucal action. Hu t ahhoup • 1UIiva'AJ is nor IlIlirrwdy 1ft oijea. ~ mppl in pnaicaI action imaplllri-tdy ~o:rmint il 10 be I rnI thiDIS> and they a(t aeoordinsir. hrnu. il .. ptIIiK'd u 1ft ob;co. Thia will be t:lpbincd laIn. "The prooilUlm1m1 is as fOllows. 1luo: wt.icb is DOC 0DIUickred by pmona 10 be dw; ob;ea o f _ l-...an:nno docs ..... glisly ~ mn....,tion of brins dw; ob;ea of duol ~ An cumpk is the: .... bj«:ri.c a5fKCt of INt lwan:nctI. ~ ~ in pnaicalllCtion cIt> ..... cocu.lder the baln uwI oooa ""«;'00 hf PU_II wnh QtaraCU and 10011 IObeOOjo " "TheC.idellla: here is the: ... ~pUon of. ptopc,tr_Miwl tlutl oonlndicu a propel ry·""'Mbw tNl ~ W Mpndwn. "The Mlb;m~ aspcu ., d~ objM of ~ I~ dxrd"orc. lhc o:umpk it

..... eII.blishaL •

This. ftOIlO, MaUlt 1M a.b;a:ti~ aspea: ismpliKd (rit,. . wt/iyJ ]n dw it iudl"

an- 21 mIaiw _

•

• ~ (PVT• ..".IJWU):

This InQl\I me fOIIowins- r~l lwam-oc:M is ftOI JOmnhins odwr tN.n lhe Mibjcai~ IIJpta AJCh tNI ;a objta would be ~ ~~ upea. ~lher. I~ IUb;c:cli~

J9.

391

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAlMAKIRTrs PHILOSOPH Y

The~ arc rwo obj«u txausc some uc similar across irutanccs and omers

are not similar;

bcca~ SO rm'

are the objttu of words and others are not mr

objccu of words; and beea.wr the cognition of some occurs when mcre: an: causes othcr man Ihe object, and the: cognition of othcrs does nOl occur when me~ are causes orner Ihan (he object. [PV}.l) In this conlal, (hal which is capable of telie function is said 10 be: u1liImuely real. Thc other one is said to be: conventionally real. Th~ arc, respectively, me particular and the univenal.' [PV}.}) "But nothing is capable of relic function." Wc o~ truat rhinp such as seeds ha~ a capacity for relie function in tbe ~ of sprouts, and so on. ~S uch things a~ considcred to havt such a capacity conventionally. IlOI

ultimately:

Let it be so in the way as you have said

{1fJ~ l"thtl

tIlthtlj.' IPV) ...]

"That capacity for relie function is found in all obj«u."

;\IflC'Ct uoopimI ill WI ir uiJawim rhe 1U1U~ ~ .cfltxiw awarmea. I( rbeyarc IlOl distina, how ~ lho:rc Ix rhe rdalioll oI .... bjca and obim sud! !hat the: eumpIc

wooId IlOl be atabIished? 2 ~i

(I"VP:I ~

,,"fa the ruuo..i"l &Jc-: "- iii lrar hyi." Mi 1f:1tr/,..i

"'ItJtrI,..(.nIM/I4i",. WIJtI A,?-t1

,&_). a . Napromi 11"7-61).

) Dc¥md"b"ddhi (PVP:l14hl maka 1M foIlcrwi"C ",nwU: An objector Aflo 'BIU __", U ~ " " IN jiufmM. 'This ..-na, 1hc capaciv b- [die: hilKlion don not m. u1tirnatdy ...m1llX'm".' 'J1gt it. I rca! IMI U _ned w aile u1lil1Vtdydon not /u<w aJlrdwaam.cia (J.ip~wtu.IIiX .a . 'Thoe oarpmm! j,; 'J1g, wtudo. don I'lOl e:aist in .omahin& dx Unotl dwaaeritUe of duo! thine; ... cumpk is the: dwxtm.ic, °homN" ..ben applied 10 I borx. 'Thoe apaei", for tdio; funaion doa IlOl in dw whkh io _cd.o Ix rhe partioabr. This is III qumm. by fQIOII of aM nonpaaption of dw pcrvadi", quali(),. IDtwmaldni fCIJIOI'Wbl: W, fA m. rm"l' __ ... -Js '-r. rqM"iIJjiw uW fo..m... iff tiN UN I{If'"UI. .,.. ,. "'" Wkn he: Ars ~ the apKi", is obto:rmI.. be maN due ilII dr.xt iii ob.a ,ed. ThiI meanr aM f"oIIowi"" When one rNllI COITICI inco .,.iKmc:o: whc:n dw: otha- ul'fUmt. tMllann thi", .... a .-:ap;oci()' 10 pcvdu« the for· .................. 10 "" ....... bk of ..... ~ ............ ;u.. th... Ici....t of ",-..,..,,;.. 0.:. That (lI~'" U wI\" -.:U and .0 011 lui....: in rda.ion IO...-.U and M) _ . ,.,...., rhe

mms

I.

en..:

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

19'

It is not found in univmais. which art not o~rvro to have othe:t positive: concomitance (in which a universal necessarily aiJu when the:rc i.t a cognition of a univasal] or ne:garive concomiuncc [in which such a cognition also in the: prcsmcc only and merely of a universal] with the cognidon of a univc:rsa.l. An example in which these relations do occur is that of the qc: faculty and the: form perceived in relation ( 0 the cognition of that form . [PV.l.S]

tuIOII fOr tM objector'. argument is not esablW>ed. ~ ob~ III)": "The pfO> duaion of. spro.!t and 10 0<1 when. xed and 10 on aisu is. QK of c.onvmOonal produaion; ;t is DOl. ultinule prodllCtion. Tha&'",c. if tM ~'Y fOr Idie funcrion is mted in lemu of uhi/I'UU prodocrion iU w ddinilion of. rcaI thing. thrn ;1 is not iQ ddinition bcc::au« il does not COYer all ilUWlCa of w ddinimdwn. And if il is IClled in tnms: of c.onvmOonal production. uni¥Cf'Ah would alto M~ it; tM ddlnition 1fII'OUld dllll be innlid by reuon of O'¥I:IUlms>on." 1Dharm,.klrti raponds:) Ut it bt ~,... ...... ",iJ. We Illy thallMClpacity for INc Iimcrion ill not qualificcP- lu rimer ulaltUU: or c.onOftlcion.alJ. Bw: ~ kind of~. iry lOr ....i.e IUnmnn ...... ;. "'"1...,.;, ....,1 (-Il-t ~ _ Jm...) [by t...;"..! ;, i...:!i.,.. •...hIo>. and what cIwactaUa a particular is rhertfore thai kind of indisputable: ClpJdty for cdic Nnaion. We do not haft tM ka$I obj«tion 10 you caIIill! iI whaleva' you mip

....

MOreDvu. what is ;1 mat you aIlnt te be c.onvcntiorqJly cxiJtmt such chat )'00 111m QX\\'auionai produaion IUSl'1bull101 production in me otbtt..,."y (i.e.• ulaImfdy]! If tM c.onvul1iona1 is 111.11 which is utterly nonaiscmt in ;tiI mal:d ....t ...ct.. Hence. In it waujMed ;,. tb.n II.Wy n....., ,.. you. hs- ....", ;. ]. ,, ;. ...... .... • "' . _

~

... _y

u...., "the p<"O
produr:cd" bca....., then:: iI [obvioualyl noodwr fOrm of production. 3pyp (r1.4b6)

y"..,..,J,._>~,.

.,.,.

Cf. PVT. ~.1s-.b6.

~'I objeaor mpondi dw m.lCllcmeru"1,..c( it be II you haft Aid," "IOUId mean tN! ~ univuAk ha~ !die: f"unaiDn.1ouc ~i mpondi dw they do not bra...., they ~ not invariably cor:w:omiQn! with thoe OCCUrTellOe of In lwarmcsa of thnn.

He ~ ~ AI. tM -r Ievr. the !ciK: IUnaion of rnI rhinp ;'10 pnldua: In awa.rmc. dw thina ... i.. 00;....; unlvt:nm do rMX rvcn M..e tM ~ w produce awarmcw [tNliuvc u tbcir ob;ecu dv: 11Ilivt:nili:1."

I.... U..-

39..

f O UNOATIO NS Of OHAItMAKIATrs PHILOSOPHY

The fact that a uni . . ersaJ is not invariably concomitaru with the cognition of a univerul explains cognitions of suppos«lly exua-mental entities, such as substaruial wholes-i.e., a watcr-jug-projcctions. universals. numbers. etc. 1bey ate' also not invariably concomitant with their cognitions because:. like univmals, the cognition of them follows from the PJ'CS(:fn of other &ctors, such as signs and mental effort. [PV3.6] 'fhinF;!' such as me hairs [that appear to a person with cataractS] are not universals because they are not considered to be objects (by persons who act upon mem]. This fauh does not ensue fo r absences because: they are apprehended as knowable.1 (PV].7] The fault also does not ensue for thO$C hair-like appearances when they are apprehended in mat fashion (i.e.• as objects by some other awarmess]. This is so bccawc there is no reason to deny that they are apprehended as knowable objects. The clarity of the appearance of hairs in cognition is due to the

" o...-..!...b 'dd'" (PVP,,"'b) In,,od ...... tN. -.... with .10.. obj.ectloo>, "'You daim

!ho,. WI;ven.J .. ma, oiwhid. one: ...... ""'5"itiun ..ba. then: ale od>c.

faaon .ha. do no!: ckpend on an object (ndM). Bul ~ awamlCSi of mint;< wen .. ~ halrs lhal a penon with caWICII paw •.,. OC£\Irs without dx prClella of JWn and such mal art apabW ofldic: funcrion; rau.u. JUCh awarmeacs 0fXIU ...t.m ~ are odIC' causes....m .. eoptiti..e dfon r.M.p). "ThaI bci"l lhc cue. u.o.r halr-
Tbi"" JMdI. INti" p t _

"i_1I. Whf. &r..u, ~." _t i"";lIN. ,., HjNts. p~.,,;m <:aUnCQ do noc ~ in practical acrion by i~ning du.1hc hair-dut..

len and such duo, appear ill ma r own awumeu are objects. Hena, one sbould noc think of it as a WliO'el'Sl! or • discina objeer. Ra,ha. OM.t>ould haw this notion with ~ [0 1M, which is inusinni 10 be: III object by personJ cnpp in pnaic:al xtion. ... "If hain and JUCh art' IlOI univus:ais because peoplt do ROC cn~ in praaic:al """ioN in .cpnl '0 d>nn by ""'"'"' in..p>nl ,),.,." ,u L.:..u;........ ,)""" ..!hr..... "' ~ ..J.ou noc uniwnaIs. IUr lhtr are IlOI ima&incd 10 be: obj«ts. "

J. ;. noc thec::&IC dw. Ana abIcnca do no! haw the nature of" univcrub. one would be obIisaI.o admir dw thif Ibw abo appIIeIm ab.cnca. Whf. 8«_ dtq .,.,.,p~ ............ 6/,. Ewn thou&h i, is noc till: cate duo. one cnl'V" in praaiaI acriona in rcinm.o abtma:t throush n..Yi"l imapncd them [0 be: objcctJ. 0 114' nt¥Cnhdcsl nuy cnW in pnaiaI aaion throosh hmnB conwucd ablt,nas as know.obk. II ;,

duo only ad..... , thlne:o (_N}_I,no.,o..bI.. t.e.c." ... an objca in 101M fashion .

. - . . . . a.IC

au.. III

i., ............. ....

)1 ....

'9S

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLATIO NS

fact dun they are objects [j.e., paniculanl' in that they are of the nature of awarencu.

Hown'tt, thoughts such as "ibcsc art ha..in" have univmals as their obj«ts; but the appeannct ofha.irs does not have any object. (PY).8-9ab)

"If a univrnal is also a (reall object in terms of having the nature of awareneu, then you would have to conclude mat it is a particular: Sintt we do indttd ~n that a universal is a panicular/ your statement postS no problem for us. But in terrru of having the nat\lK of other obj«ts. it is a univcnaJ in that it has the same form for all (me objects that it secJlU to qualify). It hu that same form bec:au.sc it is based upon their exclusion [from orner objccu that do nOt have the expected cawal charactrnnia). [PY).IO)'

6 De¥mdrabuddh i (PVP:U7a). 7 ~ (PVP:UN'

su- the ....i....w .J.o ... by AMUN ~ '<MIr. _....,.,. ....... to ;. .~. Hence, dlCft iI 00 mntDdiction IrWrd by ow vppotlm. '. objtuio.. l. bh.. ,.j lIP N If]it/" .. ,. 'i fb7ir ¥':Iiy..." ,..'" ti ...arJ." If]it/:fl""" ....,. Un IV i.J N ...,J J.I.

*

8 SumrnarUinl chc point~,

~buddhi

(PYP:l17b1-l)

~

SJrw it. "-, ..,,.,. _ .... ' . ... it is chc ..............d is, it ia u.., _ bco;:r.... u.., rocn;lion 'ppeall in thai Whion by rim.e of ~nl upon chc adwion of ochn objecu.l. _OO.mc..;1 ia prod\KlC'd throtJ8:h OM'ltxptric,1U (......, ... .. ~ vi <.I.., c- d .. 1cd ,...a <.I............... ;''11_ MlCb, i. io rn..-....uYalid oflha. ubjca:. In mil war il ia defined u bod! , paniaIbt and I uniYUGl.

7. PV3.194-224 with &i«rionsftom PVPand p'fi ' ''That which is aggregll.(ed (lIl1'!,du) is :II congfomcntc (#z'"~)' and in that KIUC it is • universal (d ....'"P). [According to Buddhis[S su ch as VasubandhuJ. one has pcJ(cpcion of such mings. Furthermore, any cogni. tion of a universal is necessarily associued with conceptuality. [Ht'flCC, it is

wrong to say thai ~ption i.s frtt of conceptuality]: rpV}.1941 D~ to :II

rdadon with other things ,i.e., ocher particles). infinitesimal par-

tida thot arc different

thAn

their own p~iou.. momcnu: arUo:: (from their

own previoU$ mommu luch thatthq can produtt an aw.uencuJ. In mal

sense, they are S1id to be •aggregated: and as such, they art said to be :II condition for the production of awareness.) IPV). 19SI

Moreover, the distinctive quality thai particles obtain docs nOI OCOlr withQut the Q, hc r panicle. ""j,h _hid>

:lwarcnCSII docs not rn.vc any

I

~

.h~

n~

arc in proximity. H e nce. , ince

rduio n 10 a single panicle. aware-

(PVP:.I9a) prd'aas dlis ¥me with lht- f,;,Ilowin« ob~,

""TheKOA (.u~ofrbc h~Jwamw::Ml an; agepmiJUbewx:a. all isaptCMd in 11K phiIoIophical poNI>on, The corpw of ~ _r~'I" ha.-e 4ilw1el (."", ,.-,.n~ thW _ . Haw iI il apptIlpI'Wc. lhcn. roCOlKlCi •• oftt.o. *tpcs .. ~ """t!.k thinF F.,.- <~.bk V.......t.....dh ........ ·Ie .. II I,d.n... okCO<J"'" of fivoe a~ h:.n .. din. objecu _ -panicubn auc:h as ~, which iI apprehcn6rd by me ocular faculCY;'1 ia noo:;wmcd tim dq!aU ~partinobn u .heir objKU.' So ho-w iI ;. duo. their ob;.cu arc paniaI1an [in !he _ mQII[ by DipIf;l and DharmUirril ~ objtctl an:;we uN,...1, ' lei. PSI.I-4. quoc'ns AKBh on AKI_loJ_

..

n..:u

2 ~ (1'VP:119b1I'l0l' dw dwr an: disrina from

prmow: panic:ko in dw dq

1.r in prm:im.iry ro tad. othn: U I rnuh. thq pin I pUIf'lC1f)'- _"'1N f_ •• , ...Jwhich is

their c:apacity 10 prodUCJr ....... rmc.. Pn:.umabIy. pro:ocimiry to a patti •• r'. abo intmded heK_1M portion froon ~rabuddhi rndJ:

,dtnn.

IItIIfC

~ry if;

Ow • • ,..,.... tWJ,.u-~ d... to dK 1',...,,4 ofcoadiliona which ac:u. W poopm,........""." which is ao.,..my TO prodUCJr an ~ ;"foUuJi- ' ,hal haO't d... capacity 10 produa an ilWU'Cnca arUc from their out..Wllial aol,U(l, namdr. pohiow inl'in,ltSimal panicles ('n die IO\II'IOe QlIlI;n\l\lllli m.. do 11<0( ba.-e WI capaciry. 'The wonI "iIQ9cpted" ezpr_1hoM: panides dial bavoe dW aopKitia Ina. arr .tt-inn! wbrn !My Ire in proximity with thil and """ od...r panidc.

,.mnn

me.

"'P«I''''

,,.

APPENDIX OF TRA NSLATIONS

197

ness is said to luve a universal rin the sense of a group of aggregated partides)J as iu obj«t.'IPV3.1961 "Even though they occur in thc same perceptual field, if they do not form a new, diu inct substance. then those various panicles arc not observed simultancously.Then how does one apericnce the simulrancous apprehension of small dUnp: ruch as sesame seeds arc dUjunct [i.c_, thai arc not forming a separate cntiry is a wholeW IPV3.197)

mal

mat

, The word lOt univual it uh!fI""" bul thlI word an also man I "wholc· or I • compotilc ctlQIY." lnaunuch II chc reWiorI of. L1llMnaI II) i~ panicuhn PI*' many of the J;Une robk....... dw: rdul.on of. wt.o&c fO i.. pano. Dharnukinl coUap.co ~ of Of><' infO diKu.ion of anodla. Hue. DharmalUni rlw I ~lN ctluIY !NI ai&o ICfIU1'te from ill COftS(irucnu wouJd mIOUlII 10 an admiWon of. kind of raJ unmr_ ..I; Mnot. he UICS tfu, word "\IJ\iwm.a!" [i.e., "rompc:w.itectlo!)'"] 10 IWnC I ronporncmcof paniaIIan withoul mala", any ontolopal c:onun;lmctll to lhc aiacnct of thai compc:w.itc entity in diRincrion from the panicubn of...tUch ;1 iI rornpo;.cl ThU: point it clarified by ~i (PVP:II9b-I\lC»).

me

RCOpIz

4 ~i (PVP: I8gbJ rnnarb: "There .. no

~ (" ....;........J ") c:aJJed. "conp.meno •.,o ..... io ei ...... dUcina Of non-diKina from;1I pamlUCh wt.en _ illy thaI me ptrccpl it I l ie," me ~lIg~lion bas an opportuni!)' [10 mule w ]. ThaI is. [Dip\ip] aid. "It it in ~d 10 • xnsum-patticulat tNIMJ It,; rDtf Ii IIIfm- ..pJJ rlw """.tory awucnesa: is aid 10 ha.,..,. particuhr II ill objca; ;1 it IlOl in rqud 10 • ~

mil.

"CDnpom.:._

{sI:JtJ

particular" (a It,; "'ItfIi IIIftJM. ",;JJ. (S« PSI.I.4 and PSV IIJ riLl. In !his repnI. me opcciaI quality of producing rNU'CnCaCI !ha. ansa in infinita.i.!NJ panida; due 10 tbcir motion wid. odxr things ariJu from the lI'aIUionnarlon of tbcir former rupeertw: con.rinWl dul Ill' ill mlloW COfIjlll>Ction (phaI ohM" ",,'" ;r. Nj. TIw dif.. ri~ quali!)' wiU nor ariJc withoul cxMt panida that art occurring .. ithoul intend« IxaWII: tIw kind of pan:idc on ;11 -.. doa noc ha.,.., chc !WUJl: of prod"Ong _ _ Hmcr, siNr ~ "- Of/It ..... ..., 1II«mJII] ,.,t.r;... ,. II si"p ,.,mrf....-....iDtt a~ doa noc No.,.., the plopm)'-_MMwoi bcing MOeIAtiIy moted 10 me etUbliahmmt of a "'boana: which ill. lingle partkk, and lintt the CI~ria of thoK panidc:s I~ pooduttt • .inc1<=: .~ ... o:hcir dfttt. t:hcy all: aid 10 be the common ob;ea of an 1WIrrnt::$$.. A4 a IInivcnal (",".~). they Ill' all the objea of the lwamKII, bul t:ht- orwataIeU is nor n«cMariIy rdated (T''' • "7.,.j 10 Inylingle OM of rhrm. In odxr.....,.w, that awam>al is II,., ODIIlmon dfca of all of them. It is noc lhal t:hcy Ill' noc lhc common obF of 'WU'CIICIl b«3wc ~ appn:hmdI.tm.un \lJ\Mnal (9-~(~,.IwtJ "" 1f'JV.119C»I Sintt the _ _ t"it it no! by virtUe of. ~~" Ittn J!]fIJ to dispd the "".....,y molion of .warenCl! to .lingle ,,'l)
(1u".

5~; {PVP: I~.

398

FOUNDAT IONS O f DHAItMAKIRTI'S PHI LO SOPHY

The obteaion th:u awareness OCCUI'5 quickly and hence one mistakenly apprehends them as one entity has already been refuted [at PVJ.IH]. And why would sesam... S«ds and so on that are falli ng down Kqu ... ntially not b..- apprehended simuit2l1rousJy? Moreover. all cognirjolU art equal in duration. so why would some hav..- Kquential conceptual appeannca whik others art simultal1
7 n-: cumpkl.~ prori
APPENDIX OF T RAN SLATi O NS

obj«u and the other is a non.sequential cognition of a s ingl ~ obj~ct? (PV,p o}1 For w~ posir thar Ihings are variow because cognirions are various; [and when one sees a variegated or multicolored (eiml) object, the vuiegation remarked in cognition must reAect , wricry of things that produa: that cognition]' "The differena: remarked in cognitions does nor conuibutc [to establish· ing that things are different]," What men would establish thai thi ngs are different? [PYp04]

Because heterogeneous substances do nOI combinc co form [a distinct substan«. a whole], one would have no cognition of vuiegated color in me casc: of paintings and such. And the conjunction relation (SII~M") [whereby thc substances of the painri ng are hdd together] cannot iudfbe multioolored because it has no visible form,' Nor can conjunction scrv~ a.s :a 1ncm or a mttlphor bn::::nL~ (h~ is no v:ui~(io n in the individll2l [p:am of a painring] , h an nol serve:as:a metaphor also because there is no v:aricgarion in the individual [colorsl .' IPYpos- l.06a] 8tu Onmdn.buddhi (PVP:19u) noIet, Nai)iyibs and V:O.ifqiW ..wnwn thaI ~~ it • qual.ity.particular tlo
rec:otdI th.iI

mol'!

on the pu1 0( thr obj«Ior:

-Althou&h the obja:l (",.,) 0( the word 'mlilrico!or' is 001 a mlliricolon:d conjulK' lion, ~nhdc:u, dx contvnaion of the ckmcnu in • ~ntin, it ..unibr in quality to the mv.lricoloral fOnn 0( the whok thu is praml in mllll~ bvllcrilies and toOQ, The E .Me, the conjoit>cd colon in me painrin, ~ mcu.phoric::alIyalkd 'mullimIor' jwc &I OM ~ of the mLillicolorMnea of the bunttfly.· [DlwnukIniJ ~ °N-..ull. " ." 9 This inlapra:arion is buro on lJoevmdnbuddhi (PVP"9,b-19z.a). NOIe mIl on his inlcrpt'ewion. the phrase ninrnnU Jhould apparently .,., tq'Ialcd.. N~ilbcr ~i IlOl' Oc...ncirabuddhi offm putialbrIy dar commmu on Ihi. phruc, bvl IOOr commcnu on me argumml ill • whok uc: wotth norin" Dnmdrabuddhi (PVP:19z.a) commenu:

,""IJdM'"

Conjvncrion OJI.IIOI""

me object of a mcapbor in me InUt ofbcin8 o;:aIkd · mlllti.

color" Mini) bec:awc;1 is oimilar 10 (....... rw] mvlticolor, ""1 U. d>= is 00 mulUo:.uI.uoai (n'w.) wlouk ' " • t....unOy, ;and ,.hac .. AU . .......... a.I ..u
FOUNDATI O NS O F OHAllMAKIRTI'S P HI LOSO PHY

And things that have bttn

gr.upcd sequentially cannOt Ix c:onflated by a

cognition that c:onsuues mem as a 5ingular multicolor bc:causc [on your vi~l due which is non-singular cannot Ix grasped by a single cognition. (pYp06l>-
" In both CalIS. di$cina nnity is dor

ftUOfI

for dw rrwaphor."

~ (PVT• ..,.._, ........

"/.. NIh usn • tliJrmn mb" if tIN -for liN ~ I

I .·

1luc ;" dw objector cbims Wt 1M ani!)' whic.h it tho: whok 01 tl-w bunm\y and dw di$rinct entity thac it dw pvc lll 01. mulricolorocl {dw.} carper and such ~ dw muitic>oloml coLor 01 bor:h; u 1Udt. thq aft dw R:UOn f'« tho: metaphor fha, lIor con· junaion is multicolored.

Onmdrabuddhi (PVP:I,u) continua: Thil canOOl be dwcue bcawc thcR;. no muitirolomincM li.c., \'II'ilpriool in tl-w color 011 multicolomi bunafly. and ixn'lM' thcR iI no multicolored endry in the po.;nlinS and wch. ~i (M', "]W'wob) dari~

n,;, U1/Mlt N tIN ret _ _ rhrrr if .....~ j .. tIN rWw.j'• ..JM.I.mI ~ Thai iI, thcR iI no mukic>olomlnal [ i~, .,.,q.tionl in the aonc.qMualIy .........,'-"""011 ~~ en';.,. Ilwl .. the;..t.ok (~....,.. .....;. " . . i.ta. ............ ;, _ ,.,OJ.i...J.nJ j .. lIN ,.n"'"'r "",, ___ Thai io, .u- dwtt iI Iir$c of all no wftok, dM: oppoilCllf doc:. 001 .,,;q>C I~, mulciobecl enti", thai iI tIw wboIe. RatIwr, only tho: ooIonoi dw puul~ . 1lwy individ&W1ydo noc ~any muldw1otM·.! ...... and ...n.;.... diltina cokJn can/lOl. be dw bo.W ()ou .w, " .tip) lOr I meuphorical we 01 ·m~_· bra" ... opponmt doa noc aox:qx that on< an.appn::hcnd

t1IIi"

many minp Rmul~y.

I""

c..m.....n,i", nn ,.,~...rNirr.Nill.. o...-t:ndrabuddhi {PVP:19W nat ...)'I: MOI Khtr , _ _ mip;hl daim

mat pantinp and P.toeh...., mru.ph.oricilly calkd

"mukic:oloml" bcawc tht paru inbeu ill I si,.kconjunaioa, but dtil aJ"o doe. DOC maltt' KIUt'. T'lu;1 is, t~ iI no conjunaion thai ia I multic:oloml mu", in th.e indio .-idaW paru.1UCh as tIw coIorbllK, in ~of whidl rMn: itt said 10 be I conjuncDon. lrucnd, thoK paru ha." thcir own e-ncc orlwina blue: and 10 on: u fIlCh, they...., individually /101. multiooMN ed: !hc~~c, Met dwy aft DOC connccwd to lsinpoo;m: (.,.,Jw). Ih
.'"

APPENDIX O f TRAN SLATION S

"If sincularity is nor possibk in the case of objecu lsuch as a ooncrfly', wing] mat have varitg:utd appeannct:S, thcn how ca.n ~ be a linglc cognition whose cognitive appean.na is variegation?"" WVpoSJ

''Ibost who analyze reality makc a statemcnt that is cnt.liltd by real things tharudvcs-namdy, th.:at thc way in which mey think of obj«ts is thc way

in which those objecu disappear. "Might there be vutcg:ation in a singlc cog.nitiont

n.u iJ. jwc N mmc:ol ~ Itnds 10 apprcbMd many ...0;..:1:>. ~ wbaI con· uadicrion is that: if sauory awarmeA aIao appc:hcnda many ob;rcu [simulwocoudyll

Hma:. il is rIO( aI all ~ !OJ tmJOfy ~ 10 do to. T1UI is. ~ thouch tbn.:- .. no Mnp: muiricoioled or nmpud ~ in dw ~ bluc and 1O DC! of ~ painti"" dw . - . . - char arita Mm a multieolooed or 'f"Irirped ~ u tinpar. '....fo... " Ii"p . , btu ""rir", dw iJ. • sinp COSD;Uon chal has many ~~ t/· ' +Ii,.",lOoa:ur. Hma:.!hey aft' pn..d..,....I by maar nbjc:ca, on<'

ni, awlpwn. rn.rel u an ob;ea. Htrta, tina !hey timulWloellUSly apprdlCnd various obj«u. (dIN 1I1Ii .... _f{~ .... ""u~""" ~ ~I ' ....."".,.. Fin! of ~I. if bar ~Icady b«n apUined chal I concqxuaI copmion docs rIO( haw I dear CIDpIiri"l' appearanco!, bu.r since mil apIarwioa Iw noc ~ bteded, be 51)'$. . .... Iu- I ·un"","",] · [in .....

c:on .." .... ......, onurwy ......... n

..

.J1Q", _

+r (.,,;.;.

~

~

\'CIbr.

_ 1m ., .""",", · H ..... llimulWlCOlldy

'-ifl-'

Km

....nou.

objuo IUdI as ~ and 10 nn. when on<' K'CIN 10 M apprdxndinc jusc OIIC "bIuc· m..1 ia Cl)ImCCIC(i..nth io 1WnI:, II in the (poocaa of (O<MPC.wJy idmlifyins

u-

lIWly objeco _I·bh.c· and "bIuc· [«(.1. tbealbc: IIICfl: ~ob;ea (MfhIIJchat m.n oq>MaU! f'rom d..- /oohn . . . . ~ :III bI....] io ...... :u dw Ii"", mnjoiAM

with ia name b«auJc I nilll'lC and I

ODIMp'

do nor &rUe llmuIaneousIy.

]] $iJcyabuddhi (PYT. "T-10 U) cbri/la;: "... " - ' - MlII.w ~ • •

"""..,..m-.. . . .

~ "'-"1tC~ it

_..,..,.,u"'Tbe

objeaor minla lbe rotIowins: · You who "'P" .... mis dICory aboul per.....,.w.n aIio UIm chal mpirionl occur wid! cop!iri"l' inuf;a. Henu, I ~ed irnast' iI OKII· lioIIy d>c c.opicion ifJd{ (M. i ~ l1"''';' m..1 bri.. lbe (SR, you IODeJ'I

"'*' ••

..... ""'1"1.......... I.....q,..ed .....: ...... ....,.........." [And

..nc.. ~

(,,)U) oommmaJ. "n..../ ..., it;, ~.~ M I1ICaIU dw d>c oo;.no.lhinla d>c ~ Ihr IftIDn .lIIed ito. the bm. 'dw whid. '" ....ncpnd don loot t.- • tinrJc _rial nature' '" irKondwi~ bcuusc: ~n rhoush CIDpI;lkIn .. of I "nplu Ral\lft. il can ha"l' I ..,..;q.aud copiIM: apptaraIIOe."

11 Dewodnbuddhi (PVP:.I ~}a) inuoduca u..,

nal

ftQC

Mm tt-

ThiI cririciam appIiG 10 OM who maintains mal d>c ~ (_

~

,.J" u1limau, bul

II doD nor apply 10 1M b«:auK 1 do nor ICIOrpI thai 1M I. . . . aiIu in !hat faahion.

Tn okmoruuau IhiI poinl, [DtwmaldniJ AJ'I ..•.

¢l

FOUNDATIO NS OF DHAllMAKIRTI 'S PHILOS OPHV

There mould ~ no variegalion in the: cognilion as well, SUI if one is conI(:n! 10 havre this br: the: objects' euc:ncc:, who are we: to objttl to that? [PVp.Q9-2.Ioj " I] ~ndnbuddhi (PVP",)&} maka it dear lhal the ones !loins the aru.lyr.illl hm: afI: the Buddh.. H~ abo rnnatb:

*'

... * . . .,

j ,. wIncI! Ibi... f{Hj«rr. dial ia, wbr;n on.: ntiolWly anaIflCI than as cithn-lin&ular" multiple, thq tIisq~ Itt ckvoid of ainilll-in INI way, i.e., in INI faahion lu either anpbr or multipkJ. In oWr wotdJ, thty annoc M aabliohood in of any CSKmw narw~ ~.

,«....

~buddhj (PVT, ~.) makes lhac oommma:

... 1M ....., u. tuIHd. "-1 Ibid f{NjNrs tmn fO awnaJ bilK. rdlow and JO .... H~ (.m,.)to rdill~ the nocion!Nt ;1 ia disrlna fi-om ~ (lIijflhtt4) iudf. M is noc rdilrinc the nocion rNl ~ ;. by !\aNU,.,..tnIr& This will AYI "ob;ca~

abo Mcxplaincd w«. T1w ....,i,...M "~1i"rmeans thq art noc osabIiohood u rithtr .. ncuW" multiple. [Whm ~ndl'lobuddhi JaY'-1i,. _ f{.", mnoriM _ " ....1JM¥r; M means tNl thc oO;rn ann(lf bot esablUhed as aluna!. nor a n il bot _blUhed as !.m", thc ruNt
Ikomwi.m..ddhi (PVP:I')I) oominua:

AcccpIilll mal dharmu haYf b«n .no...n 10 be ~ il is from dIe~.,." of oWn thai hr IWa the opi...... of an ob;mor, "I, ~ "..~ #r""';'"

,.n- (ri~ u.. -1I(k t9pitiMr

~ (PVT, 11)0:10" ) ~ AJ for the statarw:nl tha.lqina. .0-.... IM_ Nt. sJ.- ,. N mtrttWn.. (oW nona· iscma (.1IIIcM _ , .J is noc the: CSKO-:r'n,II."of dharnw ........ ,... ono: would bot focud '11. c:ondu
_.iona! ..

~i

..m..

(PYP:I,)I) ~"inuc£

"If dw:tt tOmdtow ~ ullimal~ varicption or mu1UoolorcdncM in I • aw--. then in ulrimarc ICfIN dIU nriep.tcd 01" II>ultkolortd 1-.,." .... would aublish thaI the raJ mi", was Wo vvicplcd or mul.icoWnd. Likewix. il would be ""'.- This ill

"1" ~"..J.,.. -n..,.".-.' ..u_;,. .............. Si~:and YIritptiooImul~_

...1... oJ", '1uoUoo'" ;. ,;nu,. ~,. 1.. '<>f>U'-' oJ"' ....a~n-

oonmwiinOf}'. If ~ <:IOJI1ition it 1lnguIu. it ultimaldy doa noI ha.,." l.-ariq;;ucd 01" mullicolomi ftalW C; inl ncwnhcIcM appean with • r.uiepttd or mullicolomi cot" nul...: ~. thm mal OOJIliu.,." ~ doca . - ultimaldy aiR in !hoM c:opitioM. One mllll aa:qK this ptIIilMln bcaUIC otherwiJc" the .. ntuluitr of the oosnition would bot CIOUnlnmandcd. Otbcr than a di~rmt or nor>dilfcnm oosniri...: ~. thm: it ulrimatdy roo od>« - . foc the aabiiahtMrll of lOtI"Iftbins as or.e or llWly. In Ihis Rpfd. if ono: ~ to mainwn thaI CD&"'UOII " wnma.dy both one: llId

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS ~;4-:------

variegated, then the whole variegated world'would be one single substance, and that being the case, that position would incur flaws such as the fact that everything would be produced simultaneously. Therefore, if it is singular, then it cannot have a plural image. tSakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:20Ia-b) comments: [Devendrabuddhi says,] then in ultimate terms that variegated or multicolored awareness would establish that the real thing was also variegated or multicolored. This means the following. {20Ib} An ultimately singular cognition arises with a variegated/multicolored cognitive image due to that kind of object (artha). The external real thing that determines the cognition which apprehends that image is thereby established. Likewise-as is the case with the singular cognition that has a variegated/multicolored cognitive image-it would be real. !He (20rb) also comments on Devendrabuddhi's phrase, !f (the cognition) is singular, it ulti-

imately does not have a variegated nature: That is, it does not have a variegated essential nature because if its essence were variegated, then it would be contradictory for it to be singular. Instead, the cognition appears with a variegated cognitive image due to cognitive error. On Devendrabuddhi's comment, therefore, ifit is singular, it cannot have a plural image, he says (20Ib-202a): If cognition is singular, then it cannot have a plural cognitive image; rather, cognition {202a} just has the nature of mere reflexive awareness which is devoid of dualiry. Devendrabuddhi (PVP:r93b) also comments on the last part of the verse:

!fone is content to have this be the objects' essence-that is, even though they do not have that nature [of being external], they become apparent (gsal ba '" vyakta) in terms of that nature; if ultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness, why should we bother refuting it? The idea is that one should just let it be so. Sakyabuddhi (PVT, nye:202a) comments: "If there is no variegated external real thing, and if there is no singular cognition with a variegated image, then how does cognition appear with the color of the external object in a manner that is restricted to -a particular time and place?" In response to such a qualm, [Deveridrabuddhi] says, !fone claims.... One speaks of an "object" due to the imaginative apprehension of that which is by nature the cognizer's (sgrub pa po = pratipattr) cognitive error as being an object. Those appearances are not [actually] objects because the constructed nature does not exist at all. What is being asserted? [Devendrabuddhi] says, even though they do not have that nature, they become apparent in terms of that nature. The phrase even though they do not have that nature means "even though they do not have the nature of being external." They become apparent-they appear-in terms of that nature-in terms of being external. The phrase, ifultimately abiding in that manner is their suchness, means the following. Appearing as having a nature that they do not have is the way that they ultimately-really-abide because there is an instrumental cognition that establishes that appearance. Therefore, that appearance is not unmistaken suchness. The idea here is that since the cognition of them as external objects is contradicted by an instrumental cognition, that appearance of them as external is not suchness.

FOUNDATIONS OF DUAilMAKlIlTl 'S PHILO SOPHY

Therd'orc:, neither the objttU nor me awareness has a spatially extended appeannct: bca~, sinct that kind of propcny-lVo1'bhiv.rr [-namdy, spatial extension- l has already been disproved in the case of a singular emiry. it is also not possible in the case of what is many. [PVp.u )" It i. o:oma that

apel jellU of t:lUeiM objccu iI moncow; it if no! ..... Itd IG claim tha, m,,1 apujeha: ill no! M'OMOl& Btl! what iI coma ("iP,. - ~ li.~, thr: bet dut the atemal ~ iI an ~l is noc pn::ocnud in dIM [1CIIIOf)'1waJem~

MIl iaelfl; M¥mhtbs. we rd'ul~ wtw is ~ted by f:.IK cona:pruaI COIftirion mal is inMn.unmWly cootradicud. Hm«, as in the- caR ~ nonaislttl' thinp ~ as hairs and ~ to 1 penon whotc C)"$ ~ impalmi by CIWKU, an atcmal ob;«t. ~ rhousb nooc::tdttnt. appcan 10 t!loK w!loK qa all' ((I,,'ut by the ClWXlII of iponna. Siner if is "PP'''P' inc 10 pretml this noOon in thU aIfltat, the .... thor of tho: Ircati$e A)'I, "J_In;. H ... I.notI.u ir.'UjlituDon (-,.tri- '" _.., ...volmil-oon is. foIIo.wI. ~ pl\nw if oJti-':! Ifbiii", i" "-r _Ii ...... ;s thm ...m- mans dw; bet dw thinp whid! do no! ha~ chat IW.Uft appear 10 have Out naN" c:ome!I about throur;b an inMrurnmw COI1Iil:ion. '" tum. iI is no! confuxd; inRe1d. it iI ..Jtitn.t~ ThaI is, the bet tNotlhoK Ihings lICt~y aift at~ illhrir nonoolliOO_ MKhnaa. Hm«, what would Ill' IIll' point in my rd'utilll I ralionally rupponed obtea by thl. W1'U<'& idc.a.> Hena:, hu Wk.o. is: how an one.n- m,,1 whal is rc:uoNbk iI f:.IK [i.~. non· ..Jrim..JuJ?

rna

I. DcYmdrabuddhi [PVP:I , )b) c:ommmu on

_

111:

,hmt...,

BtIl .i1Klt thc ~ of the ob;«t., r.ocnitivc inuF is noc ttllUdtnca, ...mbn tIN ,~"a .. -IUCh ar~ daimai 10 be the ob;m-_.....--which iI daimod 10 Ill' the JUbj«t---N~ any Sf»Ody atmdai ~ in other word.. tIw which Ippatl ..-ith 1 'fWiaDy at~ ~itiw i""", does noc aUt either aterNIJy or inlunllly. ThaI is, dlal which appnn 10 be "",tiaDyUl~ndc-d mlLll be ~ithtt linpar .... plwaI. A ...ltfJ
.......

Sll:yalx.ddhi (PVT. E~

,.:,ow), diKuainlit the

nln1f1'

of ~tni mliriel, malus theJe

ir ir.finil6i.maI purida: arc mixed with OOMr inlinitesimal panM:la, !My do ooc

10K that naum ofball! infmitaimal panidca. E¥Crt in ~tion, thty would by iWUR bot infinitesimal panidtr. if auch if the caR. dw:n In ~ ..-hoK COSIIiUwor inur;or it "P"tia1ly at~ caniKiI haw: iMnitailMl "","ides. its obj«t. 1lw bcift8 .he aaoe. il c:anooc be do:n:o-rninni by. noln--c",Meoua awatmeII bealUC. COIftiUon (,..",...J IMI hal orw:oopU
APPENDIX Of TRANSLATIONS

Some umkilkd pmom A,. tIx fOIlowins: IlxR ;. no ~Iwl,. almckd ilmF ~ ~~,. or ;n.~,., and it .. ....,. t1x..a;.a of ~ Ralhcr, lhe: objm: of paa:plion it ilII infinitai.tNI puriek _toI.lIII.kd br other infinit$..w panidel IUd! dIM !hey _ atm"lldy dole wi~ bans InlurupmI by an objm:. infinjlcarnal ~ ho .. (>'tI. arc nO! mind tw."H' mirin& iI ....,. p""ible in tilhcr of tIx [WO ........hk arfWlCUM'llS: if they...., cunjoi.ncd II j ..... _ poUtl , tIxn tIx: pam.. del would llaw JWU and hma: almlion; and if thcy an: conjoined in their mtimy, dwn tIx: ..... prd dump would i_ be !he IDe 01 an inlinimirnal panicX. ~ ~. [tix obj«u of ptia:pUon an: infinilesU!W ~ WI arc] am:md,. dow 10 each other RKh tIw they an: noc inlUnlplCd by an,. hner..- p;wticX6 but dg haw &It intmla bavoun than. Moreowr, IIx apparar1O£ of. ~Iully a:tmdrd oopUlM: Urusc it I pndurilll conpommr.te .. o:nono'OUi tw..LIH' il ooWd nO! " - nm I minute inlmUor [bc""cu,1hc aroma cotIIpotrd il; il ..... bern "'-n

n-

w.

-'-------'- . .. ~ "'""" &It InIClJClltt .. "'"

n-

I" '7 .

w.

who a:prs dIiI qumcn. an: lOoIisb: I!1CdiIll their own words with their _ _ _ , th.y ... ......fU.od. [fic ic .................. ~.,( _ 'F ri_'Iy_ended ~ irnIF in an ewarmc:N..ned fO appdlClod infin~ putidelit all _ , then how can me IwvmtII dw ..... W.I lind of ipltialIy extmded imat;c ukc inliniIUinu.l panicks • m ob;ccu.' An ~ mal .,. one thin& .. ill oopitiw imasc ClnnOI boa." _hi",d.o: .. its ob;ta bea... othnwiw ...... would inau ilII own::I!_ 1mIion. 1'his Iw already bern explained. No mropic (rJt- ... . , Iw) per'

aosniri¥d,.

_could ~a:osnlzc 6-r"""~f"Jan _ _ whoK~ imacI:an ~ ~ (~n.. Wt, infinitesimal ~an:nO!tlxub;«lIof

paapUun. ...... _...,. .... ~ utiofaal io Ihc abKnot of tIx,wumat!Nt is tIx dMlloflhc aDqrd obja:lI]. Otha pmom mainDin dwe¥a\ dw; n::sultinsCOl N• ..,.... iI wprodua o,.";oIan int.enW impriDl; even ... the ~ would noc IU'f'C at: an inkrmtiaJ lip for tho.c imprinu • -n.. AJthout;h one an claim thai ; 1 docs occur. il K euy 10 I « thai: the sparialJy exwodrd oopUti." imat;c ...tudt ;.., i eN 10 be ...t..I one ClfA'iaoca doo:t ....,. ultinwdy CIlia Iwa"., when one anaI,.- ~ il • iin«uJar or pIunI. il doe ....,. wilhlUnd tuc:h an anaIyaiI.. 1lv cttmWI Ntuft: ("I"' . . . . .,. I Mh.) of infinitaimal poonido ia

ClUJalod,

rnncJI.~

io

me ~iouat, dauibnl

DliUlllD" .

Bu. io


j,.,

dmXd • .-:h, and thnc is no irwu1.uDcnQloopition thai ~it bcoo_....Lau, I JfNIW/y extended inuF il ia linplar by virruc: ofbri"l panIca. On !he other hand. one michl think. "Thm: it abo no inll.NmCnW c:opilion thai pi"O"a it. 1lw;lCtO.C. it .. doubtful Thai brine the~. it hat not b«ro indubiably dcmoowraK'd tha. doinp It(" in all _ xtResa. • To dIiI_ respond as rouo-. E.-m po-...be m..ab: tueh daimt mUll admil thai infinilclimal po.rtida ..... matmal tN"" (J.u nlf • ".;m.,) beaux if ;. ....,. poIIibk lOr an imtnamW tJuns 10 ~ an ,tthNiesurW parodc. ~. wh,......,.u.t one noc o:opUu m10d and mental fi.u>nioott. rnueriillif maco:rial thi... il n«ftWiI,. Iw distina Ada; and KCton beaux thai which ia ~ 01 discina Iidcs and ttaOn can....,. be • nwo:rial ihi. . . . . tho: cut.;u, _ And ifiOIIKtN"I ..... diRina Iidcs and ttCtOn. thm il ..... par1$. n,UCfOi .. ill iI dw cut .nth spatial exwuion, ..t.m OM analyxt: wt.nhtr infipitaimal J*tida an:.inp1ar or plunI, they dg 001 withRand audt an anaIysiJ. 'fhncforc, infiniluimal partida I f ( alto con· u.diatci by an irutrummaJ copiDoo. Thia Iw alto bem dart,. prewntrd by powcrfW thlnkcntuc:h at: Mallin Vlp ..... todhll; hmDt. CX'IcmaI . 1 1 do....,. aiR.

oornnhins".

,,06 This

fO UNDATION S Of O HA1MAKIRTI'S I'HILOSOPHY P~"

of awue:neu-namdy. the: one: that is established such that it SttOU oCle:mal-is diffCrmt from the inlanal dtte:rminarion [which is the: part of ~warencss that s«ou to be the subjectivity that apprt:hends th~t apparendyexternal panl. Awattfle5S is not differmri~ted, but itt appealWlce iJ diffCrmti~ted into twO. Th~t being the caM, thu dualistic appearance must be cognitive: confusion. [PV}.lU)'1

IS lX¥mdnbuddhi (1'VP:19)b): · E..... thoup lhut is nodlUM object. 1M awwmetlf dul haf mal duafutic appearana IIhinu.tdy pisu, • This abo doa: tKII maU IftlK for ~ fdlowilll raION. 1W ;.~ _ _/..uiM ma.tIJ the dcfinitivdy dctmnil>C'd PpCrimce or the Mibfea-ifN&'t which is infm131 (......,,, u., ttJ¥ .. ~and del:mnlnN (O Ill' a l l . rndt)'. This Is thr one Iiom.....nich Ihr odIU upcct istlijJirnu; doac odoer upca is ~ oar di.Jt is_MiIJW $WJ. Ib.I in ~ coruidrntiolu of childish bcinp i. _ mn-J. Whrther or noc dlrlNi ob;«u em.:, rfIIl'ilion haa I duallUlWr. but i. doa: noc IIItim.trly makr ImK kw I ain&k copition to haw two oopitive i~ beclwr the copiOOn would no Ioosel M Jinpbr. On ~othu hand. ir~appann« oliu objca:-imlFwen: noclcosniti¥Cappratana. !hen il ............ no 1onF" br dw eo&nitiw ilnafl' of tbr COJ"ition'l ob;ctt. thaI being the c:aw. OIK:mWd tKII Sly. " . . is ~ ~ oithat' just by dw men: bet of ~ Hmoe, OM mIlS! aro:pt mal lM oimilar 10 tbr c:or;nirion'l ob;«t (.nh4j. MIJI'C'O"ft", Ihrre is no similu im.asc ocher than what is inl~ to cot!:nibon. to copition iud( ill wha, appcan {O copition.

i....., '"

Sikyabuddhi (PVT• .-"r.v:>)a) <:Oo\mrIIU on thc pIuaIc 'childish bcinp': He A.,.' d!iJ,IiJ, M.". bcut-Ithc duali", of ob;«t and .ubjra) apvc:an in WI fuhion only {O IhoK who are conf'llstd. 1M bodhisattvN who haw tft!iud lnal " - uc rdfIeN only ~ (. . . . vj4#mcre tdlaiw 'wam>cU (NOIf rit,. u", .. _~~.....nich is dn>oid of dll&!ity.

S1ky.buddbi (P'VI'. "1""V:>}I) amtinuu: l:Nt- 10 thai: cosnili..., Ump tNl appru 10 bt external and internal. cosnirion iI duaiisUc, rrprdIcu of wbctber or tKII mere uc ammJ ob;cat. Hena:. rvcn ir thm: ~ encmaI objt
m.:

(--,..,k/»t,..

Sikyabuddh.i (PVT • .-"r.zo)b)

notCi

mQ

~~~

.u-IM"'"

in the rcer>on WI lqin$ ... u,., Sikyabuddh, (l'VT. "J""1O}b-JO.4&) abo

Dn-cndnbuddhi iI adcimai"l thr .iniUr.lIMi..

AP PENDIX O F TR.AN SLATI ONS

.07

~IX objecu:

"If thcobjm: and IUbjea do IlOl aiK, then..nar would ~ left bur rhe IUchI1C$l of lwarmat iudP. CopUliwdy rnyopi( bcinp do IlOl 0l"'. iutc:c anydoin8 bu! doc: objc«iw and subj«ti~ cosni Lin ilNgCl. If they ....:n: to apericntt IOII>nhinS dR, doty would..., .uchne.. l104I l llv.1 bcinS doc: cue. beinp would ~ cfFonJe.Iy libmutd. llv.r aochMII QIIIlOf Ix ddinirivdy da"erminnl doroup. inference. Fim of all. an infnmcc by way of an GSCfIlW plopu f)' KlYinS u mdcncc is IlOI pouiblc in thar cue beg ..... its _nnal property hao: ~ 10 ~ proven. An infermot abo could IlOI rome from an dI"oct teMnc Q cvMtrn(C bcao ..... thc pacxptions WIlC)ft-pcrttpUons mal ..-ouId aablish thc norKiu:a1iry of IwumcA and doc c:aUAl rebtion n my lOr an infduoa: from an dfu:I an: no< ....,.bI.iohed. Nor QII one han the kind of proof of a c:aw.al relarion mal is ddinnl doroup. the .bscncx of doc dfcu .....twn doc c:awe is ab.enr becl\~ rhe dfea is IlOl c:nablilobai {in 101M paralkl cue tuch mal one could nexia iu abtmcx in thc cue in qualionl. Th.1 beill8 the c:aK, if doc non-duaJ JUChnca of doc Yopcira ill an d'fKt. il c:annex ~ -..bHshed insllummWly. The dlUlinic appearance it no< an dfC'CC .1 all bec:> ..... il is Iikc the horru of ........i •.•

To dW _ rapond Q foUows. n.- IWmlCIIlI b;a~ b«n made by rno.c who. d\IC 10 docir scupidif)". do no< undrntand dlUlif)". with the word "oubjcct. we do fOOl mean 10 cJIm' rdIa~ awaun~ imcmal cosnilion thai ariaa in '''It. iow fOmu JUCh Q thc pkaAnl and the Wlplc:awu-RKh thai by apratins il with Ibe term .tub;m:" we -..ld Ix ~yi", that il doa n(K cisI. btMr. we mean the /'01Iowin& Cosnirlv-r appeataIlCft JUCh Q bill( l«1l'i10 ~ alllfn;oiw IWlLmIGf, bul when one anaIyza whnhtt IhoK appc:aranca an: tingubt or plwaI. doty aft wubIe w wido$<3Dd du., anaI)"b; Iocna. ccon dw lappamHly t:lllemal ob;eaJ. II in "This is dw Ial enlif)" ("" N . ny.,hhu is the 1Ubj«f which apprdlmds mal object. which is doc rnl ena ry dou if COVOiza.· Since an arml and ill pariml aft c::onmuctcd in dcpmdcna upon each other. mac IWO (i.r.. ... b;ca Inc! objC'CC] aft poIi~cd in dependence on e.c:h orhcr. Thf apreaioo . ...b;ea. does IlOI apmlln<'tf ~ "warenas. which iI ,he _nlw narun: of qni-

Tha, "

...... iudt. n", .:.oKm;.) "".un:.,( "'5"-i, ;.,.. it ......

~

in mung] ~ on lI:IIIWthin8 dR bcao01K il aNa u su.c:h from ill own a wa. 1M CMUUW n.m'l"f of COV'ilion is oab&haI in rncrc rdIczm: ,,-=>elL Since il iI devoid ofthc ~

dacribtd obj«r and subjra.;1 u Aid 10 be non-dw!. AJ il Iw been Aid: "Thr appcarana: of bI"", rdlow and JUdo .. if doty WftC c:ncnullO ~ ia no! rnI: 11041>1tMrd"orc,;, ia Wd tU. the"".emaI doa I0OI cziA ulli ......dy. ""J1... ..... if)' ...... i •• Iu- ' r ' i ..........! ... I-... ,,,-, "'S"'...... ;ft ...,! . ...... ..,. d.... [apparuody a!cnul bur aaw.lly unreal obj«r); ulUd!, if it Wo nex ultimatr. Hmcx, il ia dd'inilM/y damTLined lIw. apc:lia~ is nono4.....• (. U"f '" MfI . -.. JJn t.J J# ..J hJr;" liM .,..", g.~ .. Jill iJ". _ ';" ill # fhl.. Jill..,.. liM NJ' Jill u./rytJ,. ,. 'i 1ft' N J rit f'U P"I ,.'" ,. Jill 1""1 ill ",u ".;,. ill ""'~ f PJU "."J "It' ;o..~ f J.

_at'" "'1"1"

""*' , . at

Since me aKIltW naNn: of awurnaII iJ established by ~ il iI nDI me cue tNt, OM U o;wnpdkd fa admil dw all beings would on: suchnao: lif me ob;ta IWlLm'OCSl,

and ... b;ca irna&a -.-.: unn:olJ. Thar iI. Cf'tft thoujVl doc I:IImliai natuft of IWIIrtI$

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness (tattva) of the awareness. [PV3.213] The definition (sarrzsthiti) of things as different is based on the difference

is apprehended as part!ess (eha medpa nyid kyi phyir= ana1[lfatvena) by reflexive awareness, as a result of its connection with the seeds of error, that reflexive awareness does not produce a subsequent definitive determination of the nature of cognition as nondual in the way that it has been perceived (rtogs pa ; pratipatti). Therefore, even though reflexive awareness has already apprehended the non-dual nature of cognition, it is as if it has not been apprehended. But this in and of itself does not establish that the cognition is not a general [i.e., unqualified] subject of predication. That is, the qualities (khyad par; vise!a) that one might wish to predicate of the subject "cognition" would be duality or non-duality. Even though these might be in dispute, no reasonable person would be able to say that since the reality of the distinct qualities (bye brag; bheda) under dispute are not yet determined, the mere subject of predication itself is also not determined. That is, when "sound" and such is established as a general subject of predication, one might argue about whether or not it is momentary; in that case, one would then use an inference to determine whether it is momentary. "If one cannot say that the mere subject of predication is not established just because the quality of being momentary and such is not established prior to the inference, then how could any evidence be unteliable by way of not having an established locus of predication? One would have to accept that a general subject is established in all cases of inference." If it were the case that one could say that, then when one had definitively determined the subject, one would also definitively determine the predicate that is under dispute. That being the case, it would be pointless to seek out evidence that had the three requisite characteristics. Therefore, in this context one has established through perception that cognition (rtogs ; pratipatti) is a predicate that has the quality of being pleasant and such. Nevertheless, due to one's cognitive error, one has not definitively determined its non-dual nature. Thus, in order to establish that, one employs an inference. The proof statement is as follows. That entity that is contradictory to some property-svabhiiva is devoid of that property-svabhiiva. For example, heat, which contradicts the property-svabhiiva of being cold, is devoid by nature of being cold. The essential nature of cognition contradicts the properry-svabhiiva of being dualistic in the manner discussed above. {205a} The evidence used here is the perception of a contradictory antecedent. Therefore, it remains the case that mere reflexive awareness is what constitutes selfless things (dharma) that are devoid of the aforementioned dualiry; it is not, however, devoid in all respects. When the Prajiiiipiiramitii and so on cites the refutation of things being essential singular or plural, and when it refutes production and so on, it does so in terms of the constructed nature; it does not do so in terms of the non-dual dependent nature. Hence, only awareness that appears dualistically presents distinct qualities such as production; mere reflexive awareness does not do so.

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS ~n

mose (i.e., the object and me subject]." If the aw:ucoCSI is crfO. ncous (lIjWpi4IN1), men meir dilfcno:nce is also erroneous. IPVp4]

There is no definition of mings outside: of the definition of mem as cime:r objcca or subjccu, rThosc: definitions do not uJrimatdy make scnsc;) merefore, since mings are empty of any definition, it is aplained mat they aJ'e cssencdc:ss. [PV},lJS] AU dlsdnaive definitions of things such as me ~tCJ arc: delimited by activity. nut activity is not ultimate; merd'orc, those mings arc: also devoid ofluhimatel ddinition. IPVpl6) 1I ~

is me cue with persons who have cuaraco. m05e who art by narurc confused by ignorance have cognitive presentations (IIijliAp,i) wim false images that arise in dependence on their fcsp«tive conditions. fPV).l.17) '" 16 ~ (PVP:I',.a):

TIw Mjilfi';'" (1II'f'l.mti)

.["""I' III t/;/for'ml iJ

NwJ." d. Jifo'rttn ~ " -.

'TlIa1 is, it has. iu (2ute Iht ditfdalClt bUiiCQ. objca and AIbjca. The ditfatiltC and noodifr",uo« of me copoilr...: ~ io the Q .... lOr d" Wonilion oi dunp at difftrml and nondilfmm" If theft Wtte nDthins II aU, Ibm on wIuol buU woWd ruI !hinp 1M: dilfMnl and not diffi:rmtll..iUwi.o:, d>e ~ ~I appta to !hiIII" &ris&l and 10 on. That it, mrWdtt d>e caKwMrt- 1 ptiupUon mac ..... pmwr IM)t praml Wti OCQUI; thai puapcioon io ..... dw ;1 apprd>e ClC>!l"iu.,,;....., oi III objea {"'*J. AI dw tUne, d>e dojcai." cosnilion of tNI objca arixI; wbcn ;1 bteoob"dnooid of d>e appeanntt oi d>e ptiupcion oithal c:opiri¥C ilNf1. il;' aid to Iuo." "a::ucd: Bul if bod! that which pcraioea ancI tNI wIUch is pticalo'f(\ do IM)t cUt, lbm theft is no IX,apcioft 11111 ba:awe dom: II no CIOpil;'" ~ of obj«t ancI aab;ea. 1lw IM:ins d>e C»e. if ia mo.u detomincd tNl aNal docs not Iuon perorption • ;rs - . .

17 Ikvmdtabuddhi (PVP:.94hl rrmaJb:

£Ym ifor>< ~ ~mUI ob;ecu. aU thinp (tit. .. J1M1'JIW) HiDhI"" no ddiniti<wt. For iNDntt. !be Jmi1lniwJqilfin-.[.,.,'l us;' rhac thq_ "hape:I up": "'1M, "1I'CpIC· " - d>e mranlns of ·~ heaped up: Abo d>e Imll " CXlaWoo" {1it]tJ IItdW _ ~Iw me_ ol"thu.hlch is cnmded": "fundammcal dancnl" (-"-' _ JIMN) .... the ICfIK of"-.ra:- of prodlKlion. • AU audI definitioN _ q....... ;fwd byaaMl)' {~ in m.lhtyare JIIi..mJ .,.mw'1- Aamry is abo. M1pU' impoAUon; lintt III dUnp ~ devoid oflCli";ty. il doe. IM)t ulrimudy aiR. 18 Bach Dew:ndrabuddhi {PVP:I~ and M~tharw!din (P¥V: ,J ri,) /\Ott thai the ipIontw:t- clled here it IlnaJHiaai iplontu. Slkyabuddhi (PVT. "J"' wsb) dd'inc!: it u the "the imaplAu." domrmwlion of objca: and p,bjcn" ("1-""" 1M -. - ]i" 1M j ,.; . . 1M ,.; P""K .. """ iQ:j" JMU ""'P" JMU . . . 1M .), lkvcndnbuddhi {PVP:I~ nioea I ~u.I probkm:

me

4JO

FOUNDATIONS OF OHARMAklllTI 'S PHILOSO PHY

11K: ultimate nature of the cognitive content (in perception) is not known by any [ordinM)' beings) whose vision is not supreme; they do nO( know that ultimate fiaNce b«:ause it is impos.sible fo r them to experiencc that content without the elror (WplrrllA) of subject and object. (PVJ.118) Therefore, (the buddhas), ignoring the ultimate (~ptJt,il4l4lhNirt""). close one eye like an r1ephant't and propagate theories that involve otema! objectS mrrt:ly in accord with worldly conceptions, (PV).219) A color such as blue in a variegated or multicolored awareness is a quality conringent on awareness O·U_pltihi,. and as such it does not panicipate in any other awareness [ruch as the awareness of just blue), Hence, it can-

"If. o;osnitivc P"'*'nUlUon does ROC dcpmd on In amnal ob;ca:, then..-by doc. il oaur wnh mpca fO. rw:d ~ioa...d 10 on ' "

11IiJ iJ .110 the problem raiK'd by vu ... bandh .... , the u-r.}.8A). ~i o&n an anrwtt

~nnillJ

of IW

Vi~,;U (V.I;

Even ~ it doa noc drpo:nd on amnal obj«u. I mplirivf: pracntlrion doc:. not oc.cur ind...ctlvc _ oS. cos' n;.iw: pnvnr.rinn it..",.,. ~ in dw, mmw conrin ... um. That IlnIlJ the aK. il ..... in..",.,. f>p«il\cl form in 1ClCXWdwith ~ofrbe ....u.bkc:ond'rion& nw is wtu. (DharmUJrti] india!CI lwith the phrut i. """"" "I.. 1M /Mit "".,mw_ JitNoul. h iI ROC the Oi( dw thi!: &h i.e.,~. pceKIllJltion Iw ftOlftd.. all; it iI jwt dw one canROC point it oo.n br SI)'i"" "11oit ill iu ..m' One cannot If'«ify the I«d in this fuhion Ma.\IJt i«d Iw dw ~
me

me ".,

w

S« ~i wvr, ''.I'C106b) for the bl3Chud phrata ruppliocd ben. ~ (.,pJ o;onunua:

"Irthe na~ oft:hc...nI cannoc br pointed OOt, lhen how doa. it m.tr' If it ~ nonaistcnt, then sinor then: lIT no diffio,u>cu amon, tbt nonc&iJum, all tbt con ...... tioftJ of birth, darh Ind JO on tNl arc pcreci¥cd of f'U'OII' wbo _ perotivcd in drums would ¥.o br ~ of!hoM: dream penonl when one _ - - . . . jwr Ii thtr- pncrivcd ro apply ro doc pcrJOII..no .. pua:i+in, tboeedtntn brinp. WIw difk,ulOX """,Id there br aIIlOrI8 thex nonaittmt pcr1'Onf! E+'UI utterly nonaisl:UII "Jllilkl oudIli • burm woman 'l MIn wooId be born and dif, tuM: Ii.,..;m. penon wbwc bini. and death an: .c:aprcd. Othnwisc, the penon ""'- birth and death arc acupad would aI.o not cUe. Het>(C, if thm: ~ ftO...nI fOr m'Of, then
S« alto ~i'l atmaM commma on du. Kerion wvr, ..,.,106I-b). 19 N Manonthanandin explains (.J riI.). an elephant', ryes;oK on the sides
..'

APPENDIX O F TRAN SLAT IO NS

not be K'Cn las distiOC1 from the varitgarionl bccawe when analyzing it las disciOC1) . one is focusing on the object (lin},.) [that producai the awarenc:u, not the awareness iudO. [PVpl0J" An awarcncu is experienced in which(Ver way that awareness appc:m." Therefore, indeed (Nimll), the variegated or multicolored image in awareness should be simple. rpVp2.t] If the colors of a d oth and such also formed a simple or single enti[}" then thq should not be analytically dininguishable from each other. And when the analyzed parts arc diminattd, a remaining unanalyzabk whole is nO( observed. (PVpnJI:! And what is the contradiction if many [panicles) that have the special characteristic (of producing awareness) when aggregated are not the awe of aw;irencss individually, as is the case with the senses and such ~ IPVj.11JJ And except fo r something being a cause, there is nothing else that could coru:lifUie ,hal thi ng's being Ihe apprehended objra. Thai is. the apprr_ h~nded objta of "n awa r... nen i5 u id 10 be um in the image of which

awarrocss arises. (pVPl.4J

21 Dnmdnbuddhi (PVP:I ~ noxcs:

In CKha- WOfda. whm

I ~

rtr--'r) throu&h

InoWr

copIition distinpWhc:l

WI inup ofbl~ and lOCh from otM", auc:h u ,..:IJo.-lhinkin(. ThiJ is bilK: "This is rdIow'--.thor. aNIyzillfi il in this Yi"i)'. is IlOl roauillfi on thai mullicolorlvviorprcd lwanness beauw thai IqIIRlt aHor is 1>0( of lhe IIInm of thai mullicol_ omIInricpmI awarmca. INlcad. sIM it fotwsi", M UN Hjm. In otha words. thaI [analyUalJ lwar"""" is mwillfi..ith jwI: the obj«t.

Manyofct- oonunPlQl aK~~ in ManontNnandin (PVV: .J ril.l. wt-1'mlIfkI au ckattt in this insu.noe. Sonw olhis conunenll ~ parUcuWty inrmsrins:

-,..

~ ~"S ...... bI_ r..- ""',..u-.~' ''""",,"'''pe'­ liaad thaI" csuobtilohina u.. the b/w: is diIkmIl fivm the: yd~ .. is IOOuiPf on only theob;ea--i.lt.. bI-.. the- anaIyricaI objea. AI tNt UItW. the ob;ea (1IrfIM) is I /'a1XKe r,.,.-,.J bI~. Bu. tN. wbich Iw 1M nanue 01 ~ is 1>0( mnoce. n-,.&'... c• ..tw is anaIp.cd is 1>0( aW'UUal. And what is ~ is 1>0( anaIyud. n..,.~

(__ ,,*,~W~ /";~"'''''''~"~ 22 Read _j~fJ " for p.d.iJ.""fo/lowinS ""Ml!,iI.~.. M. PVSV-D. and Dtvmdnbuddhi (PVP:.96bl. U Rae! bJ -{Vwliwith all ammmwit:s and PV-D.

8. Instrummtality in lIN Httubi"du (HB: 2·. 1~3·. 16) Nou: In tiN immttiiAuJJ p"utiin, ~'t oftiN Hetubioou. Dhamurltirti lNu ;"t7MunJ tM tblW up«tt (riipa) nl'ffSSll"Y fl, n>iJ"," 10 j., fnU~"" thy-NlmtiJ. tIN pDlitivt ctmcttmilIINY (anvaya). 1M n~ativt to1fctlmilllna (vyarirdca) . anti tlK tvidmn-subj«t rrlalion (pa~adhumati) . in ,hal disnmi,m. Dhamutkirti IHu bmJlJ mtnriDntJ tha, ~ relations mIlS' b.t J1initivtIJ tinnmiruti (nikita), anti tIN JNUI'IKt trrInsuuti !HJow "Tns wi';' a dimmion of what th(lI means in tm case of tlK tIIidntu-tMbj«t ,tLuwn (p;.kpdhannad.). Tbis illUis Dhllnrwltim' hi _N tmmJ torvUkratUrv ~,.­ ,""in, tiN dHtraatrinia ofan instr'M ..tnllll t'Of?Iition. Concerning what has jWt been said. me "definitive determination-I [of the evidence-subj«:t relation} is the common establishment (pNJitJdhi) through either perception or inkrence of a qwliry of the subject serving as evidence

0'"'

in the ... bjea ro be p........,n. Exa.nple. include the ckt-nmination thaI ..... is prescnc in a loau: or thac coruuuctedncss applies to sound. That is,

a person lim o:pc:rienccs through perception a smoke-pos5CSSing place whose: nature-swbh.nw is distinct from everything else as be:ing unique.' In that person who has perceived that place there $ubsequendy arisa a cognition of the evidence (liti,a";jfl41J11.); that awareness is a mnemonic cognition (smJIrtllm) whose: object is the difference [that distinguishes smotu: from non-smoke) in KCOrd with wh.tr has bcc:n pc;rccivcd.

In this rqard. only the initial o:periencc, whose: object is a unique thing. iJ an irulrumental cognition.J Wllen II thing of th2f kind has been aperiI Nap (HST::lO.,) dai..... ""'1 the Icnn

,,;x.,. is only bot:i", wed meapborically heK.

2 nor, pasl aai~ paf1icipk ~OIII/JrU!lIw bren inlnprttcd in an ~ _ to tXilialc brnki"l IhllIonJ Sarukril JmIC1lDe InfO fWO .nona eng!WlImtaKa. Thb putidc: II wed in ia pas! KIIK in the I"oUowins 1m(Q1(e•

.) Arcafa mnarks (HBT:I J.17): nac is. the dcfin ilion of an iruuummt:ilOO&Ricion is lb.' ....... objta was IlOl ~ viowIy known and WI ..hole objta ill mearu!Of u:lie: N.naion (....kri]J). This pmairu only co paa..... ua1 upcncn(.r. In Ibis the qualilicalion "the inilW" Upl"","" lbot: fan mal thai apcrima: Iw an ob;«t lbat baa not bcocn prcwiowJy known. And "..-hoIor; objta it Wliq\IC" ~ the I'a.:I char dial experiotnce Iw an

,.ro.

objoct mal io • meaN lOr • relie IUncrion .~ only • ~ an bot: • mc&nI lOr relie:

."

..,

APPENDIX OF TRANSLATIONS

eneed, there occurs a mnemonic cognilion thai represt:nts that thing's uniquefldl with regard [0 this and den other thing in terms of whkh il is unique. 11u1 mnemonic cognition represent! thai uniqueneu as a difftr* enee from those other things; as such, mat mnemonic cognition has as its Obj«ltM thing's adusion from thaI which it is not. This mnemonic cog* nilion arises by the force of that perception. Since it apprehends a cogni* ti~ im:l&C of the observed thing in the manner in which it was observed. that mnemonic cognition is niX ilUtrumenw. This is so because, one having first SCCJI a unique thing, the subsequent mnemonic awarencu repre5tnts the image gc~r.llled in poception :as Munique M ; I't:p~cing the object in that fashion, dut mnemonic awareness has no cognition of an object that was not prcviowly cognized. Also that mnemonic cognition is not inmu* mental because. since the previous perception o~ the ~rity Ihn iJ the means for {the ~peoedJ tdie funct ion, there is no cognition through thai c:onceprual awarenas of II prcvlowJy unseen particular that is by nature the means for m.u (die funaion.:as is the case with inference} u "1 The reason for this is:as foUows. Setking some relie funaion . a judicious person invenigatcs what is :and is not :an instrumental cognition. And a univ~1 iJ nm c:a[Uhloe nf 2oI'XI)mrliJhing :ony IdOl :01 :011. for it iJ wMr iJ apprehendc.-d by a conceptual aw;uencsi thaI. after the pcruption of:a par_ ticular, arises by the force of that perttption. An cxatnple is the concept, "blue," thaI appears in the conapcual cognition of a person immediately after he h:as.s«n blue. For il is only thai blue-particular thaI pcrfonns that kind of tdic function. and it is seen with that very naruf( by perception. However, the object of the conccprual c.opiition, ~ blue, ~ that:arises after the apprehemOon or thae putic uhr docs noc poertonn the rd.k fWKtOon which mould be accomplished by the color blue.' Ther~fore, ~n though it is

,,.._!""

tUt.aion. [whoi' I,; m'*~_ ~~",.", r. ~~,., I ..J "~;Nui Uff. MJ-o ;'7 ,,;}'oA_tMl,., .~u,., .:w~ .. ;t> _4. ' ,) ! .4-_""o-t_", I ! ' 11)01 .

.,.$ "'" ....16.<:-:1", .... ...

.,*1,

...v...tMI~ .

(HBT"1.ll-d.l) points OUt. ink.u.c.c (••• _..; q rnml~ u a counwnarnplc. In OIher words. ink«na iJ ilUttUll'lC!'lQ/ bcawc it docs inYOM rM c:osnibon of lOiIMthin& dw has noc ~ bun ~.

" N

~

S ~ P- ,,;t' •t ' A;LJ....,;.r. ~ ~ fine inMaru of .... {i.r.. 1IiJ. _ _.) is supplied from dw Tibnan tH.u}. Ho-r. HBT u p . ) rada only .jle~m,.L Thi. R:IIdina oecma ptch...blt:. G~ .f. .t..IM

\(7' '.Ij'~

ro.

i. ~ CO similar conKt\IClIons In I'VSY (~" .

+i"!+c:M'r]sho II~").

...

FOUNDATION S OF DHARMAK\RTI 'S PHI LOSOPHY

said, ~ an instrumental cognition has as irs obj«1 a thing that has not yet been cognized: one should add the qualification, -in casc the particular has not been cogniud,· But if the pan icular has been cognized, the conccprual cognition that arises by Force of that previous cognition in correspondence to the image lof the obj«1 in perception] is only a mnemonic cognition because that [perceived thing) is irs object only in tenns of that conceptual cognition's df«1 [which is to induce action directed toward the particubr].• !u such, that mnemonic cognition is not instrumental because: [II there is no cognition of a real thing that has nOI yet been cognized; and (1) the determination of a cognition as being instrumental is based upon rcaI things. This latter reason is the casc becawe the activity of persons who are intent on the [desired] rd ic function has as irs object a thing that is capa· ble of that tdie function. and a real thing is dchned as that which is capa· ble of lelic function. A further reaJOn why this mnemonic, conceptual cognition is not instrumental is aOO mat one acrs upon a real thing through that conttprual cognition by imagining irs obj«1 lo be the panicular, (The conceprual cognition uill guides one to the particular) because when one acu, Ithe obj«1ion of the conceprua1 cognition] has a coherence and continuity that is not different from Iwt previous object of] perception!

6A1eap (HBT:w ) PIlI! r ~ ~RIIt ,.. ,.,.tdnJ..~ / u.,.. 11"11 ,...t.'r~ '1U'I/f'OJII " ..._".. ",J".J""~ til. 7 A1ea~ (HBT:" ..) oIfm tM following commmtl!

me

"Sw if d\rou," thai imapnaIDredeu:.milUlion (~. penon aca on jWl mlthi"" dxn whT do you noIlikcwM odmil thai , tina: thai c:onapc..w coplilMKl ill ~ 1(1 be: apprrhmdins • ~ dw has noI ~ boom cogniud. il Wo has iu own dislillCl inwwnmt:ality'" [Dlwmakinil AJ'I. "&u_ """'" _ _ on fwI the ptlnicular, thai ........ tr..w copIitioo . . II ,.tUi""iIJ ttNI .... " I.... ~ W I ;, iON 4iJfrrmI ft.", dw II"" ",riM. namdr. the 'lisuailWalU'ial," H~ fJ-tcJiII obc:ainmmr (/qr it ddined it !he adwion ~ ollll ob;ea thar has /101 betn obained br (/ql p"rcqllion. C,1IIi" ..i l7 (~ mnru mainlmana. ddined II tontinuana: (,.".."..,..jof that tdie function. ~r of whieh!htrt' it nondilkmll conrin"uty and cohcrma: is ailed such [lot .. !he compoIllKI is. kbooll'rihrl, In thit rtpd. tM con· eqxuaI toptirion has a oohc:l tllOt dw is /101 dilkm!r from !he nonconapruaI peraprion bca.1IK it imaJina il.J ob;m to be: tM partiaIlu. II Wo has nondiffutnl continuil)' bca.1IK, II if ~ had acted du.e 10 the visual pnupcion. abo wbm ant IICU dUl' 10 rbe cou/Xptw.i tGpIition, one..:u ....-. JUSt the partiaIlu. fJorJ u_ ~­ ~ - . . , ..... 1*rtIflU1tI uthJ" 1-'*"pwJ1dIl,.,n• .,. ~ ,,.o..l prlwJo;o.,...,. Iti... ;,; -tJI'6'" j,; " ' I rib.. ,.....-,-.. .. ,/ ~ ~". ,rtt".,~ tIiK.M~Mi"""'l'P""""~1 I ~ .,..".". ~

.....4"."'...

me:

me:

,'."!'fU

"I""

APPENDIX OF TRAN SLH IONS

..,

~"~J.OI "..,ti~ I ~ ~""!fIM~!'4'f' ,.np4t.-", I .M;,,/MII ~ II1Jni III ,.~ 1_. MJr.1I-JII "im/w""wJ.~M;"1N ~ . -.t.. ..... !" , '1:Joo- !; '.~ I _M,'~ ~ """_"""'j'u,.u i_ ",·Ir~.,i 1W~!'4 ,..,. ".~ I

5 Bibliography Primary Sourr:es--Consulud Wo,b and EditioN Only (Brackets around an author's name arc: used to indicatc an author, whether actual or attriOOIM.. when that author u IKlllist~ as the autho r on ~ [ilk p~ of an edited or trmdated work.. )

(Arca!2I . (1949) Hnubindll,riU. In HTfu,i,,"pkl tlfBha!!4 Art'.," with tIN SIlb-Gtmmml4TJ Enridal Aio..... ofDwrwkAmiir.. Edited by S. Sanghavi and M.S. Jinavijayaji. Gaclcwad Oriental Scric5 If) . Baroda: Oric.na.l lnslirulc-

Asanp. (1991) Thtt/Wl rhnt po buUu JNl , . Mah4y.i1UlUl1J'ltrw/. Translated by Jinamiua. ~ilcndrabodhi and Ye mes sde. &111" Our. Sde dge ('({idon. Snru tum, Vol. Ri. la-.4jb. Reproduced in (1991), Vol. 40.

Baroc,

Asvabhiva.. (1991) S"'In: N '; ,hmlt IM'i pi JNI ,iii "til' 1M b~ /NI lAbJJtilm4Ilh,rd4UndltjilNl1l;,tiltl). Translated by Kumirakalala and Sikya '00. BsIllIl ~,.. Sdc. dge edition. D/n, mil, Vol. H.. 6u-I08b. Reproduced in Ibrber (1991), Vol. 36. Barber, A. W., editor in chief. (1991) TIN Ti!m.t" Tripitlllu..: T.i~i EJition.

Taipei: SMC PublWiing Inc. (Buddha Sakyamunil . (199S) TIN MitJdk Lmflh lhsctnInn: A N~ T'ilN-

LU;(m o! tht Mlljjhi"'" Nilt",.. Truulatcd. by Bhikkhu Sodhi and Bhikkhu jQ1z)amoli. Bosron: WISdom PublicniolU. (CandnJeiniJ . ( I '}O)-I}) PrauIJ1/Il~uJ.""..JJ,y4"",ltllllf1ti. In }.1r1rihy.'MIIlt4vrtti: MMI4I1UUihytt"."tIlUrilw (MtIJJry.miWutrllS) M Nitiljll1Ul 1111«" ' " PraulJ1UIpiU/4 mmmnrtll;" tk o.N1ntIrirti. Edi[cd by Louis de La VallCc Pouuin. Bibliothcca Buddhica + St. PClenburg: Imperial Academy of Scicnas. Rt-prinlcd OsnabriLck: Biblio Verlag. 197 0 . (Candn.kiniJ. (19
M(fa,..-.t4~Tlland M~IIIU4~

In MIlIihytl"ulll6lJittATIl JNlT C".J,"Itirri. "~" tihh4i". Ediled by "7

418

FOUNDATIONS OF DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

Louis de la Vallee Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. St. Petersburg: Imperial Academy of Sciences. Reprinted Osnabruck: Biblio Verlag, 1970 . Devendrabuddhi. (1991) Tshad ma rnam 'grel kyi 'grel pa [= Pramarzavartti_ kapafijika}. Translated by Subhutisri and Oge ba'i bio gros. Bstan gyur, Sde dge edition. Tshad ma, Vol. Che, la-326b. Reproduced in Barber Vol. 46. ' [0 harmakirti]. (1934) Saytzbandhaparikfa. Translated by Erich Frauwallner. Wiener ZeitschriJt for die Kunde des Morgenlandes 41: 261-300.

Dharmakirti. (1938-40) Dharmakirti's Pramarzavarttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin. Edited by Rahula Sarp!qtyayana. Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24/3-26/3 [Issued as Appendices). [Dharmakirti]. (1954) Nyayabindup Sridharmottaracaryakrtatikasametah. Edited by Sri CandraSekhara Sastri. Sri Kasi Sarps!qtagranthamala 2~. VaraI,lasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Book-Depot. [Dharmakirti]. (1955) Nyayabindu with Dharmottara 's Nyayabindupika and Durvekamifra's Dharmottarapradipa. Edited by Dalsukh Malvania. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 2. Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute. [Dharmakirti]. (1955) Saytztanantarasiddhi. Translated by Hidenori Kitagawa. Journal of Greater India Society (Calcutta) 14: 407-429. [Dharmakirti]. (19d "A Study ofDharmakirti's Pramarzavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramarzavarttika, Book I" [Pramarzasiddhipariccheda]. Translated by Masatoshi Nagatomi. PhD dissertation, Harvard University. [Dharmakirti]. (1960) Pramarzavarttikam: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Serie Orientale Roma 23. Edited by Raniero Gnoli. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. [Dharmakirti]. (1964) The Pramarzavarttika ofDharmakirti. Translated by Satkari Mookerjee and Hojun Nagasaki. Patna: Nava Nalanda Mahavihara. [Dharmakirti]. (1966) Dharmakirtis Pramarzavinifcayap: I. Kapitel: Pratyak-

!am. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Ubersetzung, Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Ubersetzung. Edited by Tilmann Vetter. Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Dharmaldrti). (1967) Dharmakirtis Hetubindub: Tibetische Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit- Text. Edited and reconstructed by Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. [Dharmaldrti). (I972a) Sa'Y}'lbandhaparik!ii. In Viidanyiiyab Sa'Y}'lbandhaparik!ii ca. Edited by Svami Dvarikadasa Sastrl. Dharmakirtinibandhavali 2. Bauddha Bharati 8. VaraI)asI: Bauddha Bharatl. [Dharmaldrti). (I972b) Viidanyiiya. In Viidanyiiyab Sa'Y}'lbandhaparik!ii ca. Edited by Svami Dvarikadasa Sastr!. Dharmaldrtinibandhavali 2. Bauddha BharatI 8. VariiI)asI: Bauddha Bharatl. [Dharmaklrti). (1973) Dharmarkirtis Pramiirtavinifcayab: zweites Kapitel: Sviirthiinumiinam. Edited by Ernst Steinkellner. Vol. I: Tibetan and Sanskrit Texts. Vienna: Osterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften. [Dharmaldrti). (1979, 1985) Pratyak!apariccheda of the Pramiirtaviirttika. In Bukkyo Ninshikiron no Kenkyu. Edited and translated into Japanese by H. T osaki. Tokyo: Daitoshuppansha. [DharmakIrti). (1984) Pramiirtaviirttika of ACiirya Dharmakirti with Manorathanandi's Commentary. Edited by Svami Dvarikadasa Sastri. Bauddha Bhararl 3. Second Edition. VaraI)asi: Bauddha Bharati. [Dharmaklrti). (1985) PVI.207-212 and PVSV ad cit. Translated into English by Hideomi Yaita in "On anupalabdhi: Annotated Translation of Dharmaklrti's Pramiirtaviirttikasvavrtti (II)." Journal of Chisan Studies, Taisho University 48: 1-14. [Dharmaldrti). (1987) PVI.213-2I7 and PVSV ad cit. Translated into English by Hideomi Yaita in "Dharmaklrti on the Authority of Buddhist Scriptures (iigama): An Annotated Translation of the Pramiirtaviirttikasvav,rtti adv. 213-217." Journal ofthe Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies 58: 1-17· [Dharmaklrti). (1988) PVI.2I8-223 and PVSV ad cit. Translated into English by Hideomi Yaita in "Dharmaldrti on the Person Free from Faults: Annotated Translation of the Pramiirtaviirttikasvavrttib adv. 218-223." Nanto Bukkyo Kenkyukai II: 433-445. [Dharmaklrti). (1989) The Pramiirtaviirttikam ofAciirya Dharmakirti: with

the Commentaries "Svopajfzavrtti" of the Author and "Pramiirtaviirttikav.rtti" ofManorathanan din. Edited by Ram Chandra Pandeya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

<410

FOU NDATIO NS Of DHA"MAKIRTJ 'S PH ILOSO PHY

IDlwmakirtil. (199la) Tshad mA nurm in1rJi 'trr/~ I- PVSV-DJ. TlUSIated by Subhumri and Dgc ba'i blo SJ'OI. 8mn Dur. Sde dgc: edition. Tshtui nut. Vol. U, llilb-]6Sa. Reproduced in Barber. Vol. 46. IDharmakinil. (199lb) Tshad mA nw", par"l"'11 (. PrIlm4!Uvinikll,.,J. T ranslatcd by Gwn la phan pa bung po and BIo ldan shes Tab. Bsllln Dur, Sde dgc edition. TJMJ """ Vol. U . l p.a--2}oa. Reproduced in Barber, Vol. <46. IDlmmaklttiJ. (199IC) ViJ.,,~ In DhIlnNIltirtiJ ViJIl"JIlJIlb. Edited and translated by Micbad Tonlcn Much. Vol. I: Sanskrit tat. Vol. 2: German translation and noteL Vienna: Ottcrteichische Akademie der

Wwcruchaften. Dh;ulllwru. (1 ~<4) NJilJt'bjNhlpr.urll~· A'Jf'vi"i~rf1W'IIu.­ /trtll.tilttibhyilfl Samupallf7flhiulI'I Prllty#flqa/H'ricdHtJaP"'JIl"1Il1fl ell AjliJllllltllrtrlt.rt.IlIIh4rmlJttIlrll!iltil!i'/H'J:fiuln4thll",. Edited by Svimi DvirikJdasa ~tri. Dharmaldninibandhivali ]. Bauddha Bh1nti 18. V~asi : Bauddtu Bhinn.

Dharmakini. (l997a) HnNbi"b Ie-tad . Prepared by Motoi Ono. hltp:1Iwww.logousukuba.ac.jpl- nag:uakiJdlumuJcinilhb.at. Dharmaklni. h997b) NJ4Jllbin4M Ic-textl. Prepared by Motoi Ono. hltp:1/www.logos.uukuba.ac.jpl-naganlr.ildharmakin ilnb.txt. Dharmaki:ni. (1997C) Pn",ul!f11Nmi}u, {c-totl. Prcpa.rcd by Motoi Ono. http://www.logos.uukuba.ac.jpl-naganki/dharmakinilpv.txt. Dharmaklni. (1997d) PrIIm4!UlNlmikllsvtlfNljlllllJ!Tri [c-tat] . Prepared by Motoi Ono. hnp:/fwww.logos.tlukuba.ac.jp/- naguaki/dharmakinil pvsv.txt. Dharmakirti. (1997e) SambllNihllparilq4 {e-totl . Prepared by Motoi Ono. http://www.logos.uukuba.ac.jpl-nagasaki/dharmakinilsp.txt. DharmakJnl. (19970 V4da"J4J4 (e-tOt] . Prepared by MOioi Ono. hup:llwww.logos.uukuba.ac.jpl-nwsakifdharmakinilvn.txt. Dharmakini. (998) MFound Prama@ln@2vinic@c:aya. Chaprer I IFragments of PVinl)." Collected by Birgit Kellner. hup:JI_.ipc. hiroshima-u.ac. jpl kdlnc:r/fo-pvini.htm. P

[Dh;umakini]. (2000) Dhllmutltirrl 's PrIlMll!Uwlmilt..· A" A""IJUlr~" TrllnsilllilJ" of 11K Fo~rth {pttrilnlM7fM"u,,';' T r.ul$lated by

Ou,'"

BIII LIOGRAP HY

Tom J.F. Tillemans. Vol I . (1u- 148). Vienn2: OSlerrcichische Ab· demie der Wwensch.aften. IDh.armoIt2l'll]. (19912) Rip pll'; Ih;p JUI'; "D" eMr fre/ pll f· NJlJIIbitulM!iIt4j. Tr2IlsLated by Jftinagarbh2 and Dh.armilob.. Edited by Sum.atUd" i 2nd Bio ld.an shes r.ab. Bst4n (rarr, Sde d~ edition. Tsh..J mil, Vol. Wt, }6b--9u. Reproduced in Buber, Vol. 49.

in/

(DhumonanJ . ('99Ib) T,hAJ mil nllZm p.r n!n JUlI b,btuJ fPrIlm4!U'villikilJ'l.tiltil). Tr2IlJLated by SumacikIrti and Blo Idan shes rab. Bstltn Dur. Sde ~ edition. Tsh4J ntA, Vol. TSM, 178a-195a. 2nd Vol. Du. Reproduced in Barber, Vol. .s. Dharmouara. h99IC) UPpr1m4!'J11JH1rilt,.i. In DlNum4lulriu hru UnkrSIIdnI"1 tkr GII/ntkrjl riMr Er!trnnhlis: Uthwprlim4!'J11J1lri/tf4. EdilN and translated by Helmut Kr.wtt. Vol. I : Tibetan text and Sanskrit materials. Vol . 2: German Trarularion. BKGA 7. Vienn2: O sterrcichische Abdemie der Wwcnsch:aftcn. Diurmon:ara. (1994) NpiJ4binJufiltii. In Dh.arm.akini (1994). Dignaga. (l~m-6la) Tshlui1flll kun iAJ btws JIl (. Prttm4!W'l"'uccllJ"!' Trarulated by Kmwvatm211 and Dul. p.1 'i shes rab. BstAn Dur, Peking edition. TshtuJ mil, Vol. Ct. Reproduced in Suru1c.i (19H~ I). Dignaga. ( 1 9SS~ lb) T,1HuJ mil /tun Lv jnu JHI 'j 'rrd JHI ,. Pnmul!fIIUmuruJIIIJfffi/. Translarcd by Kanwvarman and D.ad pa'j shes rab. &un pr, Peking edition. T,hAJ ntA, Vol. Ct. Reproduced in Suzuki (r9ss-6r). [Dignagaj . (1968) Ditn4111, on P~tptUm, Mil! tIN Pr.~paricrlx"" of o,"tnAtll i ~PrIlm4lJ1l111mua:IIJ11 ~ fiwm ,Ix S.n.sltril F,IIl"'tIIU lind ,Ix TiNW" Vrnio1U. Edited and translau:d by Masaaki H2UOri. Harvard Oriental Scries 47. <:.ambridge. M.assa.chusctu: H2rvard Univenity P~.

[Digni pJ . (1981) AwmblllUlpAri1t!4 2nd AwmblllUlp4rilt!4l/f1ti. In "Dig. naga'. AwmhANlJNIrifl#vrtti, ~ Edited and translated by Fem2ndo T ola .and Carmen Dnagonmi. JIP to; t05-1}4. Dignaga. (19912) TshtuJ mil Itun 1m bnu JUI f· PrIlm4!f'Uilmll«ilJII/. Trans· Lated by Vasucilur:mlqia. and Sc:ng rgyal. Bswn p,", Sde dge edition. TsINuI mil, Vol. Ct, tb-t}2. Reproduced in 8arbc:r. Vol. 46.

4n

FOUNDATIONS O F D HA IlMAKIRTI 'S PH ILOSOPHY

Dignag:a. h99lb) T1Juul nul JlIm 1m Imu pill' 'trtl pll l_ Prllmli~mut­ CIIJIIIJ!N;J. Tnnslated by Vasudhmrai4ita iU\d Se:ng rgyaI. &tAn Dur, Sde dgt edition. TslttuJ m4, Vol. 0, 1..,a--8Sb. Ikproduccd in Barber, Vol. 46. (GautamaJ . (1912.- 19) Tht NpJ" SUmu bfGIIUtAnuI ",ith 1M BIuJuII bf V4tsyoiJ11N111M tht Vi.rttikll sfUJdyol4lulrll. Translated by Gailginatha Jhli. Replilll edition. S Volt. Delhi; Motilod Ban...ai..b.t.5, 1984· Gautama. (198,) NJllyiIJiitriIJ. Reproduced in Nyiya-Tarkatinha and T arkadnha (198s). UMnagarbhaJ. (1987) SatytJdlNlJilvibIM,;:1I. Edited iU\d translated in Eckd (1987).

Jliinu rimitra.

(1987) ApolulprllkllTII!/1l. In jiilinlliri",itrilnibllntihillil/i.

Edited by AniU\talaI Th:lkur. Tibttan Sanskrit Wooo Series Kashi PrasadJayaswal Research Institute.

s. Parna:

KamaWila. (1968) Tht TlltllllUltlflr;r""" bfAciryll Sinumt1!itll w;th IN Commnrtllry Plllfjik4 of~ri /GrmaWt"" Edited by Srimi Dvirilcidisa Sistri. Bauddha BIar.nj I .

V~a.d :

&yJdlllI Bhir,lIi.

(Karl}:lkagominl. (1943) PrllnuIt;lIIlNlnriltiUtNlvrfflpltli: Actl'J" Dhamtaltim& PranuI':fllmrii4", (Sv4rth4mmwNljNlricrlN"4) SlItIjNljfUtvrttJillGtmlli4-

fOm;II;rlla'tIl]d TII!.riltllJ4 ell Sahitllm. Edited by Rihula Silplqtyayana. Allahabad: IGlib Mahal. Ikprintcd Kyoto: Rinsen Books, 1981.

Kumarilabhana. (1898) Mim4lf1SiJhltllvtIrriltlllfl N ilthiiAtllntrlipaflltllntraIrimlltpdnhas4rlllhimiJraprll!/ltII)I>1 NJ4JIITllmHllfdlthytty4 VydlthyllJ4nutlltll",. Edited by Rimuimi Tailanga. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Scries 3/ 11- 11, }hS-11 and 3/14. iknares; ChowkMmha SiU\skril BookDqx><. Kumarilabhana. (1940) SloltlllNirtiLvya,thyd TilfHlfJllfiki of BhII.fJQmlNltll. Edited by S.K. RamiU\atha Sanri. Mxlru Sanskrit Series 11. Mxlru: UnMrsity of Madru. Kumarilabhana- (198]) Sloltllvtlrtiltll; T rallJiAuti from tht Onti-' SRlIJmt with &trans fro m tlx o,mm~,. tllrin "lG1Jill" of SlUllritll Miirll IlNi WJilJllralnAkllrll " of PilrthllUrlllhi Milrll. Translaled by Gaoganltha }M. New lXlhi: Sri SatgUru Publications. IJkprint ofCaJauta edition,

19081.

11l8L10C RAPHY

" l

Kumirilabhanll. 11990) Mimi'!lS4f/oiIlWrriJUl", SWllritll",i/rllprll(litAy4 /Gl/ikiihyaJl!iUJi SIlwutlllJl. Edil~ by K Simbaflva.u stri. Trivandrum: CBH Publications (photo offset or 191] edition. T rivandrum San.tlui.1 Series 1). 19 and )1) . Kumirilabh.a~ (199) SbJltlllNirttilt"", Srimilquinhtu.irillhjmi/r""jrMilll]fi N]ti]4l'1lrTUiltllrilthy4y4 SIln4thll1ft.. Edit~ by Ganga Sigar Ray. ViriQaSl: Raina Publ.ic uions.

Uvy, Sylvain. h91f) V'IjRaptimllrr"wiJdhi. [RIC( trllilis tb VAJIlIMNihIl: Vi'!flittilttl rt Trif!llilul. Paris: BibliotMquc de I'took des Hautcs £tudes. frau incorporate appendix of corttCtions and revisions).

usro

Manoramanandin. (19)8-40)

p,."mA~lNirttiltllvrtti

In Dharmakirti (19)8).

Mkhas grub dgc Icp dpaJ bung. (1988a) rllNui mil mil", ,",.n! dKn rill ,. i' 'X'fi' ",nho. Lhasa; Mi rigs dpc duun khang. Mkhas grub dgc: Iq;s dpaJ !nang. (1988b) TsW mil Ilk bJll" tyi 'TJil" lid ftJi ",lIn ~l Sarnam, India: New light PublK::ations. [Nigirjun:tj. (J90J-IJ) M;;~"'If.Jhy."'lflt"lt.";"'A. In Gndl'2idrri (I90J-I}). (NigirjunaJ. (1981) Nit.4Tj1l1f4i RAhfiwJi. Edited by Michael Hahn. Bonn: Indica ct Tibcttca Verlag.

Nigirjul1:l. (1990) hrdwW (IfA~irytl Ntlgtlrjlltlll with tIN Q ",mnltIl? by AjitilmitTll. Edit«i by Ngawang Samtcn . Bibliotedu Indo-libttica Series :1.1. Samath: Ccntrallnstitutc or Higher libetan Srudies.

Nyaya-Tarkalinha, Tirin.itha and Amarmdramohan Tarkatinha. (1981) NJiJlll14ri1l1lllrtl; with V4"J4)W1IIl i BhitJa, UtidJDtIllurll 1 V4rttiltll, VtklUJHlti MiJrlll rilJNlfJIl[i1t4 6- YJw,n4lh1li

t.-:mi Ddhi: Munshiram

Manhoharlal Publishm. (Offset reproduction or o.owkhamba Sanskrit Series 18-19. 1936-....1. (P1td\adndUmiin). (179) SWu,1'4"";;"'~rllrdJr..r.. In Kumlrib (99)). (Prajftikiragupu j. (1953) Pramll!",lI4mikllbh4qtzm or Vtlrttiufll'!lu"b of Prttju1ta1'llfliPtA. Edi[ed by Rlhula Sarrak~yana. Pama: Kashi Prasad

Jayaswal Research Innitme. IPralastapida1. (1981) PtUUnhtuihamt.llJllntr""" of PrllilutllJNl-h' with 1M NJ"'}'IiltlfNiA/i .f~riJJu.rll. Tn.nll.ued by G:tnginiith" Jhi. V"n. nu;: Qowkhamba Orientalia.

.1.4

FOU NDATIONS O F DHAIlMAKUlTI 'S PHILOSOP HY

IPra.Wcapkb.l , (199.1> Word INlet 10 tIH Pr.ustilpilU~· A OJ",pkt~ Worti INia UI I~ Prinuti £ii,u,N 0111N PrtJ.rt4pid4bhJotz. Edittd and compil~ by Johannes 8ronkbom and Yves Ramc:Kitt. Ddhi: Motilal 8anarsidass.

Ratnaltini. (l97S) ApMtuU/Jhi. In &tNlltini"ilHtnJhilNlli. Edited by Anantala! Thakur. Second RcvUcd Edition, Tibetan Sanskrit Wooo Series J. l'ilUI.lI:

Ka.thi

1'~.u..d.Jayuw"" ~

111!Iciruu;:.

Sa~ruvimin . (198.) StiIHtT.b~ In J.i",i"iJt' Mim41fUtlbh4u& Ediled

by Yudhifthira MimirJuab. ... vols. Bahilagarb: lUmaliJ KapUr I;>ru{ P.... Sikyabuddhi. (19SS-6I) TsJwI 1M

i"11tyi '"' bshM/ /. Pr.""!fAIhirtti*.!;Uj. Tra.ru.btcd by Subhuljjri aoo Dgc b..' j blo gro». &141" g.,r, Peking edition. T,htuI".., Vob. Jr and NJf. Rcprodu«d in mAm

Suzuki h9SS-6I).

Sikyabuddhi. (1991) TshmJ

'rrri flJi

irr/ bslNuJ /. P,.,1IIi{tA""rttilut!iltlj. Trantlated by Subhuturi and Dge ba'j blo gros. Bt",,, ,Our, Sde dge edition. TslNui 1M. Vols. Jr, 1-3:18a and N~, 1- l.8U. ~produad in Bar~r (199'), Vol. "'7, 1M nul",

Sikyabuddhi. (199:1) A Srwl,

01 thr P",u!fAlNlrrtik4,tiltl '" Stilt;yttbNJJhi

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Ruegg. [hvid Sey{ort. (1001) "A Note on me Relationship Between Buddhi.SI iUld 'Hioou' Diviniria in iluddhm Lirer.ature.;meI loonology; The Laulcibllokottva Contrut and the Notio n o f an Tnd i.. n ' Rd ig.ioUi Substratum.'" In Torella et aI. (1001): 7)5- 7-+1-

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V~nna; Os(erreKhische Abdemie der Wi5SCnschalten.

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A~"

Sideria, Mark. (1991) IlIdU,1I Phik»Dph] IIJ Utllf'U'V: SlIldit:1 ill S&cud IJJIUS. Studies in Unguisda and PhilO5Ophy -+6. Dordrecht: K1uwcr AooJo;".io;:

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818L1 0G RAPHY

Sideriu, Mark. (1999) "Apohavida, Nominalism and Resemblance Theories.~ In KamuOl (1999): H9-361. SKteria, Mark.. (1003) "Deductive. Inductive. Both or

Neither~"

JIP )1:

}OJ-311 •

Sille. Jonathan A_ (1.001.) ~ Pouible Indian Soun::es for the T elm Tshati 1f'UI 'j sltyn bu as PrIlm4'!Y,"n4J1l ~ JIP 30: 111- 160. Skinner, Quentin. (1969) "Meaning 2nd Undcnanding in me HistOry of Ideas." Hist0'1.nt1 Thto'18: }-S}.

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j"

tIN BwJJhist EpistnnoUJticlfl

Trllliihon: Pro«tdinfJ Df tIN SmmJ bUtmlfh01Uli Dhtt1'11lilkirti CD"ftrmu: V'WI'M, lunt 11- 14. 1919. Vinlna: OstemichUche Akademie der Wwensdu.ften. Steinkdlncr. Ernst_(1968-69) ~ Die Entwiclclung des kpnibrvinuminam bO Dh:arm.2l1i"i ," WZKS I t.-I} : }61- }n . Sieinkdlner. ErnS(. (197 1) ·Wirklichkcit und Begriff bei Dharmakini."

WZKS IS: 179-1.11. Steinkdlner. Ernst. (1974)

~On

me Inletpl'Ctuion of the SlJIIbh4v.hnIl."

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",,6

FOUNDATIONS O f DHARMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

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TiI1c:mans, Tom

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SA,.,.,.·

JIP 18: Sj-So.

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XII .,uf XlII, with tht Co",mmtarin of DIMmillpi/4 .N1 y,.J1'IJk;m: l"troJ.urUJ", Tr.lI.I14tiJm, 5.lI.Imt, TibnA".nJ ChilltM Tem, NOln. 1 Vok WSTB 1+ Vienna: Arbeiukreis fut libetische und Buddhistische Studien. lillemaru, Tom J.F. (1991) "More OR P.r4nlNi"lImsiNl, Theses and Syllogisms." ASfEA
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Er,"nn"'isp",blnn~

INi DharmJlltirti, Vienna:

Osterrrichische Akade-mie der Wisscnschaften.

'u S

FOUNDATiONS OF DHARMAKUlTI'S PHILOSOPHY

VC'ItC'r. Tilmann. (1990) lJtT BwiJJNt 1In4 yjn~ uhrt in Dharm4lrirtil PrIl"u!'4v4rttilrll. DtT AbK'hn;n iilHr tint Bu4dha dit vitT tJlm W';',.J,cilnl i", PrrtmA!"'1iJJhi-K4pit~L WSTB 1"1, Vit.nna: ArbcitskKis fur Tilxtische und Buddhistisc:he Studien. Sc:cond and m>iscd edition. Finl edition publishtd in 1!J84.

II""

W~r. J05C'ph.

(1001) "Nigirjuna and [hC' Ra[nivaii: New Ways to Dare: an Old Philosopher." JIABS "lJ: 1~16"l.

Williams, Paul, and Anthony Trilx. ("looo) BuJdhut 'Thollf.ht: A eo",pIm

IntrwiflnitJn tb tIN InJiAn TnuJition. London: Roudc:dgc:. Woo, 1oon. (100]) "Dharmakirti and his Commc:maron on JDtip,."~,, JIP ]1: 439-+4B. Zwilling. Leonard. (1976) "Dharmakirti on Ap0h4.· PhD dissen:::uion, Uni· vc:rsiry ofW'J.SC(lnsin.

Zysk. Kenneth G. (1991) AJatiriJ", muJ H~,,/int in Anrimt IndiA.' Mtdirin~ in tIN BuJJhut M6NUt"J. New York: Oxford U ni~ni ry Pres.s. Z""k. Kennm G. h99.d IUlipw

MtJjD~:

tIN HUt6ry " n4 Ewilltion 6/

InJUtn MNiiri",. New Brunswick, New Jel'So/- Transaction Publishen.

Index

Due to the fm:Jucncy of meir cil1lUon, me worla of Dharmaldn.i, Dcvendrabud· dhi. and Sikyabuddhi are nor lined in lAc indo:. For major thcmQ, iH the I1Ibk ofcomenu, A

.MlN.. ~ nonexmml referent

Abhidhmna typOlogy. V=Sl. ~

Abh~ (Vuul».ndhu).

~

z! 81. 109087

UIn,* 5« inll:ntion

s8nl1• •tis n}7

"".t.o AMiJIM_hIMo<

II~,

Stt tu.biruuion absux cion

AMiJh.mwko"'~ (V"n.~ndhv)

u applyinr; 10 both luh;ect :one! precl ia~. Is6nl}, H9 and causal charactttisria.,

on a[>~heJuion of mliry, 19 10l1S

on bcginningkasncss. I n! on congIomer.ued partida. 79 o }1 on lunna as uaruem pirical,

17!=7}

and COfI(leJM formation, 197--99 of propenies. 2i! ~ li l., 119018, 100-101, Hs-..9

and

l)OnI}

on momcnrarinuo., 80<0"

JI...bhi~ 110,

.11)=11 .

)06

abstract ptcdicah~1

on prim..,. cause' and supporting condition, 16S0}7 Sauuintika theories in. ll1n.I2.,

as not baring qualities, z! !!Z :u not diJtina. from particulan. !L !Jb IS901l, 171-7J, ~

59"'}. 79n}!, 8onJ9

Sn .ts. abstraction

on 5eruC pclaoption, 14ftl}. 196nl on ICnR Iphcn IMnicuJan. 79n}8 :as JOUf'Ce for AbhkUwma fYPOloIy. ,8nll 1WU.t,.~ and MmA1f]"U",!", in,

accidcnta1/cucnfial diRinctxm , 11111-91, 100, 1111-11

Sn MJs. nccasity :Kcidcnal properties., il

"-

action (nTytl)

equated wilh wbj«five aspea or awareness, 171 in U,."g 'fI'u:m. !Z=!!z lQ, 161,

on noo tttlitics. 40=41. IS! ultimate raliry in, !l::::h A~~phll.lilnhtt~hytl

.'"

(ydomitra). IZ!!!! ."

+40

FOUNDATI ONS OF D HARMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

meaning in compound 1SC}-6o, 161. 17<4

tmhUriytI.

AlA:UJiiJM_n.. SSft.4. ) 14

~ (Kampab). )16D6 (II,.1ffII1II6,. aUo "analcJsical induaion"). lJ11lO, !M. 146 . ' 47n6

ana1o&Y

!'dation 10 i rutfUll'"lml. JQ, 1In .16, 4t;O, 1!.t 170""11 Sir .Jw activity; practical action action of knowing r,,.,,,iti: ,rIl1ffll) . ,8-19. l.Cl. 4HO, 1!

anal,."iJ. In.:b of. &t kvcU of analysis

aaiv:nion (prtl..,rri)

analysis. f'ftIuctive. SN f'ftIunive

of a cognioon in which

me

accomplidunC1'11 of ooc', pi appe1r1, 1'-4, 166, t.8o. 190. )Ion"

of an ilUlrument2l oopUtion. 16sn140 181-89

activity fiN",",) aW2l'C1lQS 11 primary baor in, 161. 16s-". 161, lAo. )lrI.. as d.ir«t~ to panicubn.I.tn4" 111 ~ "14"1

as dTta ofilUltummt2l cognition. 161, 116. 16;.-Q, 110. 119. lB-IJ9, 19" , ~ as guided by dctaminate

cogniliol1l, 16ft1. ~ !!i. }16 as mocivated by inderaminatc: ptrcqxlon. 191-JOlI. }86 ob5lrua~,

and ilUlruJnC1lwity,

1Is-17. 191.}81 as prompted by pis. 16n1, 4":19. ll~n98,

5« •

IS'

aaivalion; prxtical

~m",

~""* Sir &Ix dctmnin..OOn affirmation (rN/hi). lQ., !!!.!!1.

analysis

&t.dflc:unc:ss .tuIuul. 5« mulliplicity 6JIw,jlkJttlJlfJ.. Str Epiltcmic MJIIltJfl611.

ldealiun tUtU"',.,J. ... Str intanal dill'onion antiralism. B ~ 101. ~ )l1 6JuuNl,..,

Str iNcrcn«

...".&Whi. Strnonptt.... ption Str diwibudon tUt",.,.lf7l/1ri. Str concomitance. 611",.,..

P"'''~

1llIJ'I'"

Sec .,.".~

Ilf"h.. See .y.h.t-thcory>; ad......

.,w-""'",

u bucd on the narurc: of things.

!!Ll6a. and c:oruuuaion of lWMb., IS6=rz. 19S. 197:2t ncptivc and J*itive imuPfetlltioru of, 111ml. In-,s role of erro r in, 14O:1J . }lt, }16nlt}

1f1J11J ip __ Sir lCrip
and s:amcnca of dfca, 119-16.

1f.m4k"Jlbrll--- Str ICriptuni

StalUS of universals in, 1181 iUbjeaiw faaon: in, 114- 11. J1)

inkrrno:

I SI-6o. )1J-11

agent (hmr). !Z=!!! " H I , 401nlS agent of knowing (,r.1fI4t:J), !Z::!!t

JUmmary of, 116-19

iMl. 4.11n1l agrcpllon (,.",wU}tI: ,.",~. SN ;nhn; ....u..:o! ~ ~ Str cognitive image

thrtt

andnwMl~. !Q!

wa,. of ODlllUUin" !l!:::ll

Udd~'. ~ti.qUC' of,

l v-lI

5N.b. COO"'"'I""O; .,.duo..... ; uni~

«.

INDEX appearance {jmuiMiM, pr.rilti",b.). StrcognirM: irmgc appIicalion (II"~), .s«cvidcnccIubjm: !'da,ion l,tIl. SN ctcdibiliry l,tII'" SNcm:libiliry Alcala, '1n4J... nnl. 411n}. 4l)~.

"''''''7

..,~,. In,.. Str imputation

• nh.. SN PUrpoK

mated '0 goals. -4!S6 60, 178--79. 111- 81 role in concqH formation. 111ft9... l}4lU)l. 16oftl9. I]0n04S. ,J+4- 4S .

J.46. JS4. n6 td ie function . 1!: I". IS6-60. 164. 171-19.111. )7 6 rwo ~NeI of. 11'-'0. '71-71 uniYenals u \adO,,!- 81n.. 1. 86nSI•

;u

91=94- !!1z

~ rcausal d'ficicncy-; - ,die

dIicacy-; - tdie function "} wgnition in which the accomplilhmcnI of ont"s goal (~lIi~).

!il! l!!..t }<46

.rth4piuri. S« p«:SUmption .rwlrJ.rIill. Sn onlinalJ' pcno!U AJmga, )16n6 l/rqt.ptIrill'{1'ti Sn foundarional

ISS. IS9. 17J-76. 180. fl6-79.

transf'onm.don Asvabhlva. }16n6 .6",,* Str supttK!Uibk ob;«t 6ri'~I" Sn OVttCJ:tcruion ImIiUL !in self l~ Sn sdf-dinging

con«pnw a~ as tomning

6tyiU1U,.rWq.... Sn tramoempirical obj
appean

17,....... 117-190.197. }1I. };o,. }80nI6 cognition of as mark of

)n.

uusrwon hincs:s (.nh41rriJlsmiri).

",

w poueu. ' ,I-o. }4I . }47-...s AI criterion for knowkdgc. til. Is6, )11- 11, )'6 . .. I) as critmon for thc real, .Sft64, -,§-n. ' I ~I .

')-&6. 1]0n04} .

19Jft7 ... }]S. ~ .. 1.4 and Episcm-oic ldeilism. j80

apccted (,lIlhi_uin""!rriJl). !i.. ~ U]--' 9 ,

!H, ~ 116, 1,]nl.4, ~ ~ ~ 101, 111, l S6. 2.\11..... 1, 116. 2.119, )11, J.47. )n, }]Snl.... }Ion16. )9S . ..I) f:W.c appcuanca as bcki.ng.

m.

2J1--1f. )91 and infcfen«. !M. 196--98. )10-1) ;u mark- of particulars. 8)-4 iL 2L 116, Ill. 390. }91

as mere causal dftcicncy. 116=60,

of. 16.. f7nn. }9)n}

6111U/hi, S«ddimittr 61VJ6vin. Sn whole. 6tN¥ Sn ignot'ancc 6ttiNl!biIl/l,.iyfttu. Str ruk of unx· companied non-aming 6viu",1JtIJ... Sn tRlnwonhinC$l 6l1Jilbhidr&. Strcvidcncc. rdiabiliry

of 6~tII,r.ml"..phJ&

-

Sn irutru-

mental effect. unmcdiatro

;u caU5llly dlicicnl, In-?6 :u inlnltio...J, !S4n~7

l!.

as primary l'xtor in action. 161-:6;. 163. 199. JlJ--8.4 :u undiffi::r~rllia(cd, Ii! 161ft66. 163--71.)St . ..06-11

&r.Ju cognili'lt image-; cor.ctpu;

27J, 17S- ]S

:u flO( WlilNotC. )9l--9J pcn;cptibi1,ry AI m,niaW

authorial intent, :i=Z

rdlaM: awarencu ~iry

axio~ wna: ..... 141--1"" 19'8.

JI 7- 18

FOUNDATI ON S OF DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILO SOPHY

natufe-lfJIIbhilltf and, 167-Q, 170-

!li! !li

•

as nell separate from !hings

~...uI&

&>t E:J:[ttfU.] RnIiun

bepnningkss imprinl (.1IMIiIlllud). S« imprinl beginningk:unc:u. !. 140--41. 161, 1 9~ Bhatt, Govudhan, l}n1O, 16n19.

"""

W .... S« exUlenl !hing Bhinvivtb, Inl ~WIIl",.. &>t wnmcss. of diffaena

.s«

Mml"ti ermr Biudeau, MadeI.n ...., .8n. o, 91n'., 10ln74 &Jhk"ryi...lJln (Sintickva), i§.,

.

,,,,

Bronir.hom. Johanna, }Snp.

."""'"

aUlhori!)' of, I}Ml as ignoring the ultimare 10 Ic:ach brillgJo 110 41U as not employing reuonintl SO-SI pragmalism of. }14-1 ~ as kring the: trarucmpirical, )OS buddhahood. ~ 4S-1l Butun~lgtl . KlaUl, 161\4, )6n47

C Cabtt6n, JOK, ,)n4 Candralcini, rr. )61l.4i, S4n}. )16n6 capacil)' (,JIotIt4; /Ilk,;) of aggug:alcd partKks 10 produce a....artnall. 10M. .J96nl of caUJal compln:. 16)n)4, ~n l OO

of iruuumallal cognition 10 make one altain a goaI. l.86-I7, 111, !!L }I}.}SI of iruuumtnial tOp'Iilion to pmdua. ddinitivc dcielmin.:uioC'\. 194. )v. )7Ift!4

~Ives,

!!z

propmy-nwbh.b.r~.

176. lIL

H7. },tinl ClUAI compln: (~1PIIIfri) compkte (~~mqri). 180.

ll'

inoomplete (viJ:aJi MtNM1NItri). 16sn}8 narnre-nwbh.illtf and. 161~. 170. 17Sn.ti. !ilr 199. lQl participation of aggrq;ucd aloau in. 103-) . 10!. 108n. <>o caUAI cfficirocy. 5« .nbdriJi causal poc.trllial (1.Jrri)• capaci!)' ccnainry (lIik9"), }n6. 16n4. !lit lO6098, 191ft!16 S« .Js.definilive detamination caulion (";MIII). 86nn. i.L 97n68 S« .~ momentariness orr.. S« nrkFlion dass-sign (j4ri). St-t univeruJ cognilive im38C (~T'" ,rni/,;mlN.; ,,..tiMb.; also • appo:arancc·; • conc:qxual image 0)

.s«

as hom rnI and un real. 2Q, LI.6. 119=11 and conceptual ilhl.lion. ~ construed in Iemu; of I ncption, 94/'64. 116-+4. }40 correspondence: with pmkubn. 100-111.

u.a

ermneousl y coruuucd as ounmental objccu, M. 141 41.

116n}, 177n9}, l iS, ) 4. ).40,

,..6-47.)96. 401- 14 and wor in conceprua.l tOp'Iilion,

t!. 61l117.18)nl07. )11. HMl

"...,

ill

irurrnm(nt oflmowledge, 1710

.. m~nl.1 p&niculu. t!!t 116- 17.

!!2: UL

) 11

.,

INDEX

and pc.cePlu.aI illusion, •.1~ as produccd Ihroogh panKulm..

........,. u. U:2:. 1611 5t't Jw awarcnc:u: conapu; objcaivc image: subj«rivc imag.: ~nl:aria

reuoru for rdiulce on, 1:1 ccr.ai:Jb~n8 or tno:!i.ion:al, 7 - 11 , lP:- ,:}, ) 19-10

$I)'k of rcuanill! in, 1::L )10 commonsense: objccu. 6t-79 companli~

philosophical

roda,VOi'$. 117- 18

mmpassion. S4n), 66.. lu- J6, }19 mmpktc cr.URImmpkl.: (JllUU ~-zri). S« cr.wa1 (OII\pC:. compklc

moapu as Cfroncow, it 61n17. !..!2. L+O-4 J,

~

1.1'.

119

as mcnw images, n 9=,I. 117--19 as nol taking me u1limalc as an objca. l2.. i!.! )01, JS4 as 001 14n1S. iQ as obj«l of infcrmce. ~!11! lS(H:l . )06 rc:baion w the real, It 4Sn6+. Z!.

"vid.

'f. ' IrH. " 9=,.

l 57n1S. 1]'Oi\4J. )00=)01.

S« pcrttption, col"lCq)-

nul co ndWiion (IJipmA....... also "5ummation1. )4tI.4S. )S0-4S conconuuncc infm::nccs involving only nepli..... (1trWI~"",tirrh";. H0-4S. !:Q:i=:! inr,,",_ involvi"s on.,. pot.ii;.... (1trWI14..,.vi"J. JSR.4S need for cxampla 10 (SubIWt. 19=11. UYi 8

nqlli"" ("",nrrU). 11-19. )1OJ9. '48nll. ~ 1u01 04 ontolopcr.l Nsis lOr, j6n67 poiilM: (.IJ"""~), 1I-1,}, B

,I.

l!

as uansblion c:hoicc, lBnJ6 S« Jw rndcnce-plcWalC rdation conditioning (-bh]i.uJ. S« habiiw, ,~

JOj, jll=l-4

I'ormation of, 9va6+. u 6-16, 1u;6. 169-", 197=1OI, !Q:t. p .l. )}Hl illusion and. 1:z::::H kvd.t: Of onkn of in Dtwmald"i's thoughl. 199-101 as mcnJai COnleill. lon1O, 11jn1l1.

"11>9+ .......

p,.,,~).

)I~I"

j8, Sec abo .""".".-chcory; cop!ilin image: dcfinidw detcrm ination; uni~

concqxual cxlcnoon. SH. 6.l S«.k. dU,";b."Oon conccprua.l perception (lIluikJ,.u

confusion (~. W\1. dn.Il, 61016. )7)n17 conlal (!rWM1)II). 4$ ...... 9, ~ !l:.tr Is.nlS. !!i. ,.snS9, 1S9-60. 19S. j04. ,d.}86 conti ngent reality. 5«convuuional reality conlinuity (_,,~. 5«dililrlbulMm convuuion (~rMhb..· ~pI"/UUUIM),

19n51. liI==£'!ll!

PI_u. 1s.nsl. ~n I 67. ,..6-47.

no. ) SI !in.Is. conwmional cop!irion; con""ntional rulicy; PfaCtic:al action: scmanhc con~ntaon con""'n.in""l cogni.inn (U",.,rijMIf4" sl",.",.). 87nS4. )01-1. H9, )81

&t _I. convcnlion: convcnlional rali'1 con""nttolUl pr_""!"'- 5« iNtrumcnl orknowlcdgc. convencional conventional reality (u"'~

444

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAlMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

prlljfiAptislll; abo - contin~n( reality· ) boddlw tcathing in a«ord with, Hns of di5tributtd cntitia;• .ih 76-]9.

!..U. 16?-zo kncrwtcdp: and pen:eprion within. J4- 1I

levels of anaIpis and. 61=-64, 61-61 oIlNbhi.... 19)--96. 19' 99 tdie: function :u. J91 of UOMBaU. 811l.41. 114=11. )91, 191n}

Vuubandhu on. 40-=11, "...,so

s,.,. lib. C'Onv.rntioornJ.,.,..,ition; realities; Kmanhc con~ntion coprcsence (s.JJ.rMt.h.a: abo-cotwO

oa:um:nce-), 1InJ6. 19n}l. }In}8.

""

co-n::fuuuiality, u 8nl0+ 12.8mI9. 1+1=41. J.46--.t7

..... ,a:. lu"""lc.¥ (-,ol"*&iIW_). .u.. 116

Sn-Js. il\SQUlll(nl of~ correa perccprual j~1

!J"u,.I,."".JJ.;'..

,.. pelttp-

~

definitive &termination. as

luai judgmem Conens, Andrew. S901) coumeraampk ( ...UJJ.~II(j. ~ 1110104

Sn- Js. eumpIQ

as prompting action. 1910116 , }u..

"'".

as 'Ubtcquenl petccpnw judgment

r".".;,.,,,,.w.;;,.,,,,,"J"i. lL

IS7n1S. usn). 117-')09. )11 delimiter (.. ~. -'imil,,). !.!L 118nl0,., ~ 160011 delimiting quality (1I~.Jhi). t)6nl)).

.uo

.....,0

desire ro know (ftjtwU). 161l.4.l.4Dl,. 188n6}. J19

.s« .Js. doubi

dctam.im.te cognition ("iIc~rillJ
,&,.oS9 nernn.y rault of an inArumcnt of knowkdg<.
SN ~ conccpu; ddinitive dclcn ..i".. uu..

detenninatc oontent. 16nl, LO.I ilh.mw. Sndcln('ntai qualiry; praii-

cue ro be: pl'O¥m; propcny ,u",,,,...uu,

Sn- predicalc-

apra:slOn J),.rMIlukil.. 4 .

Sn pn::d.iatc-

apfUSlOn ~mli1l.

Sno Jubt«t

or a plOpotJdon

Jh.nrcillkit.u" Sn lubjcaaPresllOn

Col:. Colk'll. l09n'7 cn::dibility (ipWlJJC). l}HS. )61-73 craiibility cr«libk: penoo (iI";'

.s«

o debale , L.!l! l}l-n. lSI 0.: Bitt(, Jan, SJD-4 ck6nitM dctamirulion ("nu,.J as a;mditioned by minckiqxndcnt (aaon, ~ 19.....-9S.)O
Dhannonua. !, 11101IS. 168nn. 11.fl191. 1711 n9", 179. )010167, }ISnISI

diA\orcnce io nanm

(SNbhi"",~,

ill Dignlp on craiibiliey, Ub!, )61, )6J--64

ailial ofNyiya Kntoe

mcory.

l)nU o n definitive determitutions. )01-1

on

etTQC.

'7nS.

on the inltnUMnU ofknowltdgc.

.,

INDEX

l.6l on pankulan (nwlc"t*!MJ. II-fh. 11, '4S-4',

of the Jdf. .wn61. 191

lOI:ericMogy as progrcuiYC rcjecrion

or, 61-61

Y.1a ) 97"4

on ,,..,,u!'4bbiu. 1M 19 problem of induction and. !.i! on rdlaive I~. 9OnS9. 1]6n9), l~J o n ..... _ _

of innnomcn, .lind

dfca, Sf!. 167, 170 and .,.,n, 18nH Uddyoaakara'. critique of. 19n)8. 1)7=}8

on lhc ultimate as inexpressible. 80 on unlversab (IAtdltJ""""~), 11-1). j6nl~ !!1. 199 on whoks. ,9nJ4. i!. lo}nn Set' abo P,._!;'4U"'N«~ PnuNl!flUilMwrltJilvrtti dim-wined penon (_~). l1lnlll . )04--S

dispoIition ;u

tattor in concept fonnllJon , III,

114=11. !1!. I~S9

~ u . 16 nl,

t!. 1J4n47

rttmcmcnt and. J18

.df-dincing as. 60 dUpoJitioNl PI'Op("y. 17'9-10 Stt tdu accidC"nWlcumtw distinaion: Il«Caity diAribufion (. I f , ,' abo

;u

+l=1 h

z!::::::!!

Stt tdu unillCr1a.l: whok doulx (M"u",.) at

prompting ;oaion. ' ? ' . ' ? :!.n117.

as prompting iDquiry. 16n4, Il8n6}. lSI diminaled by ttrtai.nay. 1Jn1.4 miJ.lading cviden« and. 106n9l.

Dravid. N.S., J6"41 hllJL Sn SUbsWKC

O..yfw.c-.,. lIonl9 on caution. 971168 on commentary. ln l4 on the ddinilion of a , rlllNlf.U,

IS4"49 on the iruuumcnulity of

pcroepuon. )OON4} on the plK1I: ofDburrWtini in Dsc lup pa. education, 1n} on Slkp Mchos kbn, 9n17. M..

,...,.

on the scak of anaiysia. nnl, ss. ~ 6ocz<J, IsnSI on Tibcun Yinn of un~ u

-conti nuity-; -Q:t(fUion-)

permanmt, 117nll 7

abient in the u1limardy re:aI. ~ zl-II as apparently required by l.IInK''''''''' n.. 80. IO'_IOJ

;u

117=111, ~

on naNialing n"Ic"t*!'4 and Mi"u"rL.~~

hll4s

t/milfl& Stte:amplC$

~ s,...1"'""'1"ii:>k 'hinS

dualiay. W'} . ti!. l9nsz. 401nJ}.

as c:onscruaed. !!z, lQl. }11 critique of. J7=.41, i!. ~ ?l-II}. .!J!, I"rzo, H9-f1, m~

and isnonncc. 6c:::& of rxptioru in conc;qmuJ ..... co ~" . t
spatial. lanponl or coooeprual.

406nJs. 407nJS. 401 Stt.u. cn.ra-mental objc:a ~h& Snsuffrnng E

" 1-) 1.

IlY16. 1)1- 19, 1f7n1.4. !l!

Edod, M . D.vid. 71n)7, l S'Il4S

IjO~

...6

FOUNDATIONS OF DHAIlMAK1RTI'S PHILOSOPHY

df"ttt-cvidcnu (Urytthnw), ~ 188-91. 108nloo, 116

I p.-j) ,

u lruubtion for wwMl""" ,610)0. l6,.njS. 1~101 , lll-17

SntW.(Y~

IIlI4MtlIlil,'lflilMNDJ",

U lraruialion for."".,,,, J.4}

production-mode of rIrt.,,,,IJtIJJff_rYjulfL Sn judgmcm of 5:lmC:na.J n..ul. s..,. .implicity: .in....larif)' Strsimpliciry; linplariry

t'.w....

ekmcntal q.wity (Jh.~ alto -de.mmwl hing1, ~ rr, s8m1. I1I\.4S. 14Onl '9

empiricism. 2..4J~ 150- "'. EpiHe-mie I
(t,nj~pri..wr~·

-..0, ,;pll

,.~ .",TO<

.....IIIMj~ criliqUC of pu u ptjon on. ,1S-17.

'"

definition of 1i. 6001... ncithcr-one-nor-manyarr;urrw:nu

and, M,

nO=I)

rdkxivc- ilwatmat and. 1n smK

fl9'

objtcu u rtd ooblt (0 mind

Realism 10 . ~ 68::69, n., z!, ISnSI. i2. lrunwonhineu and. In-80 oS« Ills. bds of analysis; YogIcln ExIC"tml

trror (Wml"ti; 1I,.,t.1JiI; .,;,.riujIU1III; 1II)/4N) oo~ . !rh. I.no!.!i.. 140=;1. )Ol, JIl-I ... .uC>. 14r.8 inmuITIe-nw coptil ion u rompat· ibk with, 117n7.14 }11-1".

m-80 nona:tRlXpfl.lal.

'7=19. JIS-17. )14.

191, )96-411 progrm;iw: rdi.JllItion of through the- K2k of analysis, n-§;. JI1-19 ~

;DCl:pras.ibk. }S4 u undiuribulod, n6 Sec also IWIW,.., U 1Uo1llfeU

_W~

aKncdama&. JS9, }60

essenlwism. ,1J=14. 11~7. J71 essential n.1ll1rt (wtlM4IJ11;";;p.). Sec wtllM4""" U natufe-SWMws. essencial propeny. 2l! 116, In- ,§. .... OJ }9. !.Y.. 171D41. ,11='1. 100. ~ 1 !r.I . 4Q 7 "' ~

Str If.iIIJ accidcnWiessenlW distinction; na::asity mdmoe (hm,;lilfpl.: p~ WlMM) uomainmmlof. 19}. 196 deKription of. 16-u. ~ !!1 incompalibilif)' wilh theoon tr.&dictoty of die prcdiale- 10

be prown (sMIhJR,,;~

in . ~

shifi from

~"U

notioN concaning. ;t, i!, lli 16n7 SN.IM m...ion; inlernal dinortion; spurious puuption

u t-uo onTOlogical basis for, 96n67. lSI rel iabiliry (.IIJ4~I1r';of. of lhe IImJeI, ZL 1 )01\11 thrttfold (~,;p). JSI\.4S, ~,,,,_~.

'S0=5'

1"7" 9

forms of. 11ld] Str .Js.Jdfca..mdcnce; 1IItIf1N.... IWO

"""'""

~-pn:dica~ rclalion

(I1Jtl!ti:

also -pnvuion-) dc.cripcion of. '1i--I1. l!. !!1 atabIishcd through a single obscrv,J.lion, lOll and identity.mode of mewwMtl".",.rilNtNilM, 101-11 U DOl established through mut" obscmllUon and nonob.crviilion. 1·t'l::U , !!!1. l}S-)a

and problem of indua ion, 1iII-:SJ

44'

IN DEX

and production-mode of the 1IIJI1JM.,.",.tiIMNIh.. 174=11 ~ .ls# c;oncomit2JlCe; ruk of unaccom~ied non-uisinl cvicfence..subjca m alion r.,.Ir[.Ivr",m~.: N""",,' abo

·application"). H-H. J5~S, ,,11

_ _ ,_ r'""

( L..~,.u ·

-:1.-'

,,414. ...""' . sl.o

. '

"cumplificarion'1 JlCCCSIi[), of in inference-for"""" l!Cll &, .Js.lXIWlll:ra:ampk; 5upponing example excluded mary (1IJbrtU), 80-81 . l2I. ~ I)QflU.~, 11I-n, !.H!

171f1+4. )119 ezdusion (VJllIIJTfi:~) at abttraaion. !..2Z u bucd on unique: particulan. !!L !.!it ~ ~ 170. 19s--96, J)9 :as both real and unreal, 1l'l=lO. )9sn8 aJ ~ "'ppann(C, !!L Ill-H. u!. ~. H7 as idcmieallo UUII which is

,,,...

adudcd {1IJl",""J. Ill-H. :as mere ezduding of other

(.1fJtI/!dM-J, Hl-U, IU-J6 ~ru~IWJ,lMIM u being. l.Il1:1 narutt-moIW""" U wamlnr for construaing. IS9-61 as negation, & !.!i. !..!l. ~ 1)1-". IU46

and 1Wbhiu. ~cc, 101" Sec al50 ..~ .. hcorr. ezduckd entity

or("mpliftCaoon (.uUh.r.!'4). SoT examples aistc:nl thing (M.il\ll; abo "erlliry"; "thingl opable of ......, func.ion, '.n.... as causing unique rognilioru. lUI

:u

as cxpcricnml in its cnli my in pcruption, }07m6.4 as h3ving 3 n.aru~ mal docs rIO( overlap. III ;and me real in Nyiya.Vmqw. 1, n6 1

as referring 10 extended mtilia, 76-78.!L!!l! 119m06 ClIPCCUUOIU ;and

ph. 2.S9.

roIc in conccpr folTlUlion. U7=-19. 11:4-2.1. 158 n2.5. !l! tolc in judgmc'l! subsequent to pcro:;plion. ~ )01 and 5C1'JUntic convaloons. IlBnll9. H I

Sec also Ilnh.kriJtl. apccttd apec1td wic efficacy (.bhiWW
from , lL ~

;ppcal IO. lb 11:4-2.1 initi31 alone as inJlTUmcnw , }Ol-J. )12., Jil-IJ

as neither permanent nor

;and karma, )2.,-16

imprrmancnr. nlO-lO :as ob;ca of apres&ions, 9-10, 118n101. !l2t!J!, 1]7=", }5)-60

ROnm~ual. )OS-1

proptny or ptcdiatc u cquivaknl 10. IS6-v

u

qualifying univmab.. "7=19.

I~J. ~

!.Ql.

JJ9'-Sl. J9S

role of .........c:Ul>ON in COnsmKting. 118-19. ~ 156, Jll

of things as [hey truly lI.fC fJluhln. ~~~h2.1},}66. )67D16

as .ubordinalc to InJOn. 2.S1 a lcrnal obtecu. Srt ClIU1I·mmw objccu Extcrnal Rcaliun (~) clacriplion 0(, 18--19. ft:::§2 dM::rgenl intaprctaooru 0(, 6?-Z9

fOUN DATI ONS Of DHA1MAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

rOC" adoptin" ~ ontology in, 79-111, !.11! 171, 199-100, 108nl00 percqxion in, 14fI16, 99:101, motiYllUons

Jhih to Epi,li,"fIlk Idealism &om, ~

8snSI, 98 99. no-I] .w .J. kvds arWp,is CXlnuion. .w diJuiburion c:lIU'a-mentai objecu acttptcd by boddhas to aid being, 6)n18,

or

or

as cause image in awacmos on third Icvd anaJpU., u nll, H.::1§.. M. !2!0 )4O-4J .. cnon-ty ooppc:ui,,! to be: the object cognition, ~ 141....1, u6n), lnn9), )IS-16. }14 lS. )4J--47. 401-14 ~ or oooc:xisteoo: as irrekYlItll to trwcwonhincss, }Io as infinitesimal panidcs, 2!: !Q9.,

or

f"oundalionallraruf'onnacion (Ur.,.,.rivrtri),

Franco. Eli on IN: Clrvab tradition. unl9

or a

on the: ddlnition pr.""'?f4, 1S4l149, }09nl68 on error, ,6n7 on Dhumilini'l critiq~ of'thr: self, +4"61 on Dhumaldni'l reduaive: method, 199n17 on the: Ny.lya mdition', usc

or

6~49nn

on the: Sttming circularity in

DhumalUni'llhcoryof insuumcnwity. l))nl', 1)6-)9,

,.,

or

'"

as obj«t of ncption at f"ounh

kvd or anaIysi$, sk,. ~ ~ 66. 1'9n)8, 8SnSI, UO-lL as 5patially c:lItcndcd, 6orz9. 98=100 exttcmdy temO'(c object ("",~. s..

Inrucmpirical object (:ZuUuic iruuumtnuJi'Y

r,.nub

prbNi'!Jl'm) . .w irunumenWiry,

=N< F f.ilic appannar;. 1S7-Si. J91 .w .Js. aTOr, illusion; Ipwlow pcrtqXion hlK dnnminarion r.Jhp~, !!l. ) IU\J 7S. )46, 414"17 .w 11M impulalion f"onnaliun. !1. l!! 1Z formal • . 5« Fonn&lilm foundalionalism . )n6. )1)-4. )16

)1)-14

Frauwallner, Erich, 1m Funayama, Toru, 87ns+ u6n) G

l"1NIU C indK:alor1· Strevidcna: ,6"'J1' n ndiaared j , S«plediaatc 10 be proven Gancri, Jonardon. ISnl Gauwna, !L !.i" um8. 13n u. ~ Gillon. Brendan. ~ 1' lm7, ISu1I8. 189n67, 1, 1"""'91, 108nl00

gill (.rrIM), .w ptupoJC God. .. Go rams pa bSod IUmI ten8 ge.

''''''

trilNlUUrll. .w MJbjective image Vllh]tUinl. S«objecrive image cnmmatica.l rdations.. 171,,", 17JA4.4, )S7n9 S« .Is. pcedialc-aptalion; Sa.nsk.rir gnmrnatK:aitradirioo; MJbject-oprcssion Griffiths. Paul, !..L )6~ G}'1Iuo. LobAng. ltl)

..,

INDEX

H habituation (.~) 10 coum~nu of Raws,}6f and inuinsk inwwncnta.liry of pcrccpoon, 190-91, 1514""91. J74l14> }n nn.. 378ft!4

HfflI.i"JM/iltJ(Arap),II1L4J. 411111, 411ft) . 40% 41-406, 4l-4J17 IN,..,.".""... SN causal compkx

hierarchy ol views. St'i kvds of ...Jym

role in conapl formalion. IslnlS.

highest bd. of ta..l ity. &r ultimate raJif}'

mk in puapnW judgment• .L linn. ~ IlS. ,14. jl6

hornologoua i....aN'" (~, ~ j lnl!" ' 4\1014 Hoy. David, 7nl)

,.,

Hadcin&o lan, I nlO Halbbs.. Wilhelm. tIn.f) . dn.n Hallilq. Charles, 11110.11 happiDQI, 4h1. 1" Harvey. Van, lJ0n40

HaltOn. MuaaJc.i, lJOll.

human aim "'M~' also

'h~go>I' II focus of uealises wonhy of invatigation. )61 insnumc:nwiry and , ~7' 1U, ) 11, )1', ) 14, )80 ~olasmmof credibility, "S. )66n4

~76.

101 n.71. l,on6, 1}4n16

Hayti. Richard on ac:cidm.u.1 and (:$$Cntial ptopcr-

as maw.!Cd iR$tl'Ul'lW:nw dfca, 1&1, J6~ , In, 179, )i}-8.t

ties, 119n67

on Mi.-and /fMMi .... IUm9 on circularity ofDha.rmU.ini', theory of iruuummWity. Inrus on Dhumakini's prwc, j on Dignip's UJC:$S1n(fl1 of

language. ~ on inductive UlWTIpc:aon in DisniP" !houshl. ,,.ann on inkreno: of "'pacity through

nwMiv.t-cvidena:, 108nl00 on inYUl'ion of puvada-pcrvadcd rebdon , U}l\I07 on llansLuion of tih.,.",;" and JJ,."".as qlolality-pc r.:.or and qu.ality, U on Ifsnwrw...

of

lW"'-wpnti.."JJ,. u ru.tunl rebtion. ISlnl7

Htgd. G.W.F.. 1lt4 hcrmc::nrutia of charity. 1L 1)9014 bmne:nnuia of wspicion. lSO

as ~uirinl dctenninate COntent, 16nl, 191 )00, )0) hungry gbo6t. See ,rru

1 idcntifiation. 191 , 100 identiry. modc of the 1H~"tuIh&.

swu.w,,.,ib.,,JJ,., identity. mod< of ignorance (Il~)

as aUK of subj«tlobject dualiry, 1!l }IS. }4. ¥:tn..,. ¢9 .. aute ol.wreri,... W'l, 6J. .. concqxu.aliry, 61"-'7. ll2» 4 equa~ with M~np. sI nn.. 60-61. )71-7) 5ff.ls. internal cful:otrion

illusion. }6n,.1, 17'=90. Jill SN .Is. error; illUlOfY ob;«u,

ilIUJOry ob;ecu. U 90. lJ7-SI, ln:,

hect~ut inm.nI;o: (vi~ l!!J ) I f t " , .... 1.Ojn,l, ~ ..,8

,ft...

hm.. SN evidena;

Stt

'"""

450

FOUNDATiO NS OF DHARMAK IIUI 'S PHILOSOPHY

Sn momcntar1MN imprint (v.rbItllll; aOO .. tendency"), impama~.

8snSI, 61nl7, 140-41, 1nn9), , 1}-16. H9. J.46-.47. ,, 1, ,.osnl" imput:llion (I"~ 1II11f4"JNr), 61 n17. 15]n1S, 111. lU- I), J.4HO Inmli. M .• USnJ ? iDdividu.al (~,;), §!. U. 8on41.

*'.

~9. , 1=9), 1 ~l i

dcmenu (....S") rhac m .... be

$lal<eG. )On}9 , 4snJ.4 cmpiricai (_rIIb.J./N~"W1lf4_). ~

1.4), + 49 for-OncKlf (nWnlMlfwWfIi_J. 11=16, H:. ~

(or-omc,rs rp.nnb4I1I1 _ _) , 11-16, ~1. h, ~

pounded in the

JIIfIM.ilJlllnr';b.1UIh., 1.......111 all having un~ all ilJ objcaJ.

!!..C!1 as including oc:hcr insnumcnu of

knowledge. li b ? lfl,-jl4,

)17,

)7.....,o. 4 1:a.-IS invomng only ncpl M!:

c:oncomitancJe (1m.J..IIJ
involving only positn-c a;mcomit;ll}(r (i~"t.tqi,,), 3SII.4S

lanJ'AlC. prtlumption. and analogy as fonnf of, 14 r 4 7 Wftd notioN; of, It=}t. 1! !W.Is. iruuumcntality; ilWrumenlJ of koowkdge; nvJJw".",..riIMNiIM infemJ«-for-ooadf

I'or-o nadf inkmK:e· for-othen r,.~JlWN_)

Sn inferen«,

IO,-
agtegarion of.

69-79. 98-111.

)96-97. i04Jl14. all

r,.,..tU(lv}

jJJ

basic buildine: blocks of mallcr.

"

infeR"" (.,,,I1ff4tM)

instrumen talj", of.

S« inkrmcc.

Iinguittic reference and. ~ Z!a 71=77. u6. reality of. i!! ~ 69-Z9. H and md"."", 16t-n, .96n!S.

S« .J. paniculu i..Jri}tt. S« seruc faculty induaion, ."'&-'142, 19' =:'11

all

(~JlII1IfIl_).

'n=&oo

Sn ..u. paniculu inmumcnl (Jut,..!"'). l7=u., 114!H. 170-'11 il'\Sinllncntal cognition (P,.1M!"'). 5N i,uuumcrli of~ inruumcntal dfe.ct (pf¥lJlU!",p/MiA) mediated {.,......m~. 161-61, 17B-n, }Iris

as I'lOl distinct from ilUtJ'Wl\Cllt of knowkdp:, 16,. l]O-'1l. Wmi notioN conccming. . He, i!! l ?O unmediated (.",.utJnu), 16 1=61,

......,.,"...,

iNtn.llncnwity (pri~

definition of. 1f)-S6 cxuUuic (,.,.."'" lrimll!'1""')' lSI, 191-97. )11 . )"snI4 immediacy 15 3 marlt of. 111 ofinfermcc, )10=14

intrinsic

(~ ,,411f1l?lJlfM), 151,

191=9']. j11- 16 and n(lYcity, l S4- SS, 1~ of pUCC}Hion. lI7-J09

and pwpc»C, 1)9-)1 ~m....:

ddlnition of, l1H

of Kripturc. 1)1- )), l)HS

xemins circubrlry of. l JJ-S1 in lemu of the mediated d&a,

INDEX

161-61.171-411.

Jh-ls

in W11U of the unmedi21ed dfc.ct.

'" inl(flc:ztuaiiry, 1..16:. Sl intrituic ilUtrummr;Uiry

161-61, 168-71. ",....as at

'''~'''). Sit itulTUmCntalily. intrinsic

tl'UUbtion for ,'I"u~

irreducibility

12)-19

Sit .u. tfW(WQrUti0C$5 inwumenw object snd tM rnl. 79=-14 . '4)=+4 ,

r,,..-,.;

and COmffiOnKnK ob;ccu. 1 1-14 ofinfinitoimal p2rtidcs. !:i. 5b 51 of pan>culus. 2! of the uhimatdy real. ]!, ib !Za

~

>8, shared ooOonl mncrming. 18-11,. lHS. ~

§!, Z!! n.. !h if

Sit II/u reduction; miuctiY'( an.aIy.

1!

instrwncnt ofknowkdgc (prw~. abo ~iNU\lmental cognition 1 convenrion.al. 18)nI01. )14-18.

W

fvuascna, .4Bmo. 149nl), 106n98 lwara. Tabhi, lO4l!fl. !!!:2... UII\I04, U}I\I I77. llJ-16 . llln u j

J~- 1 7

ddinition of. 1S4--,:6 and insmlnwn w dfc.ct

(p,.."up*,n.J..). ~1 bngu2lgt. ptcsumption :and

anaIos7 as. 14HZ U!nOSI p~t

f.ad:or in

produaion of aaivily. lOnl S. 1l..4.161. 169, JIIs Q motivator of :IClion (pnNuU). 16t-66, 168n1. 19i-}09. }ion16 rdation to action. 49:10. 110-11

J

JartlC$, William. u.I

jlri (cbss-si&n). &runivttW Jayatillch. J.N .• 111'16 Jh.a, Ganganatha. l,nu jijUL Sit
JliInalrim.im. 1J:llI.llI j "", s.. '""'""'" obi«< joog.mcnl of IiU1KnCIS

PNI1Iitj~), 1I'e16.

:and ptUpOSC'. f H9 KriptUft: as. llbS.

)61-'7)

sharaI norions concnning, !1:::l1o i!! !J:j, 110 ul!im2le. )'4- 18 u unmcdiated with rcgud 10 activiry. 111

as wh21 make. one obuin a pi

(p,Iptd4J. ~ l SS. 1li.4-65, 168nz. t!o-I7. t8S. 197. Jz6-77. }81 Sit.u. inurumenwiry intention (.wn,,~ umihl), }OO ) 0 1 .

)6,.

'46n,. ,W. "4, }81-11 inlcnw d m onion r.",.,.~pt.PC). ssn,. I19nsz. u,6n). JIJ-, I , )14- 11.

". Sit II/u error

(,....ub

(dApt1fIJilN~

uk!

judicious penon (p~1I#11It; prJt,4",nwhlri,,) at Kling for the sake of goW, 1751.

)'.

u aaing on pankulan. )90. 41) at acting through doubc. JiSll4 Q acti ng through inwurncmal rognitioru. 166. 191nu6. 38..

the mark cr. l SI and .aiprun::, 14), )67 as 5«king fOdiminate flaW$, 371 juscifJatian, 1:. us !iN.u. inmumo:nr.aliry raJOn as

K Kajiya ..... Yu ichi. 1, lnZO Kamabiila, lo nll. I09 nI7. 116n99.

-ip.

fO UNDATIONS Of DHAkMAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPHY

l.11nllO. 1}IOll6, 116n). }16nll}.

-'

Kampab. )z.6n6 Kapstc-in. Mallhew. 4OfISl. 41n·s; 1}Of11). 1Son41

Urili I)'Ilcm. 16=10, 161. 170-71 u~ 5« inurumem bnn., m 5« .1r4lwmic world .brmu,,!u motionl. J01 unu" lu objea]. 5« patinH Iwmic 'II'Orid (J.M). 186061. )1,--)0 Unr. 5« Igem IUryorhmI. SNdiKl-cvidma: K..uura. SMryil. s'n7 . l09ni7.

u6n99. l?9n8l1. 101-1. 171n19 IGty.iyalU,9}n61

KdIner. Birgjl. 86n5). 1.46"4, 316mb krv,JJ"HJi'" 5« inFerence. involving only pomive colKOmit
S« inl'CKI>CC. involving only Iq2live

1<eyI. C.M.. losnn, 109-10. ill IGrkham. Richard, 100R71

on pr#lftli~1tIti,.. l}6n:tO. 2.SSfl.i9, ' 74l'I,

on rdauYe dadng of South Asian

pbiJo.ophen. Inl Irri]i. 5« acrioa ~!,il.t1J4.

5« mommw1nc:A1

Kumirila as Dhannaklni'. intmocutor, J1i on dcmenl$ of:an in~. )Sf\-iS on aampic:s, JOn)9. }In}9• )1.n-i1

on ilUtrumcmal knowledge ;II dUtina from action. ~ on insrrumenta oflc.nowkdr;r, ~ on ;'\I,.;.nne ;n.. n..,n",n... liry.

)nm). }800l6 on pc:rttpllon, l.o4lI1S

on predia.l~ncc ..dation. 18nn . !!z }On}. on purpose and inmwncnllll

kncwIoI&<,o!

. ...

un IoCIIX urpla. ,).IIU. ',Il', .

on simplicity and the real. }7n50

* also Sln.lI4mik. Kun dga' rgya1 muhan

~

dtya

~ta, 97n61

""""'bk obi«< Q'?'J illusion and, 1Jr1sS, 394-95 u imcrnal, i!l all real and instnlmc:nm objea. ~ lli Unn types of, !l2. n.u 5«.lH iruuumcnllll objea

kncwIoI&< {fol-J 16n1 in Euroamerican qti,;rernolopcal theory, 11-19

approprQlCnc:Al;ll lum.

;II

evuJl, 18-19

u jlUtifJed uuc belief. 1W\-47

5«.lH ioslrumcnl oflmowkdgc; iNtrumcmaJiry Kru.on-. H~m'" on Dlurmo(Jan, IInll. ,6Inn. )081'1 16 7 ,

L LaC-pia. Dominick, 1. 5"9. u.n2.) J...".P1ri"y!'Jl'~

(DIurmottara). 2.6Inn. 1nn96 language (J.u.,;u/M.)

a:ntraliry to pursuil of spiritual freedom . 2.5n18 all having a neption;ll ita ob;ca. i::!Q, 116-2.5 . Il!> )S)-&I IS an in.nrument ofknowlai&c. 11S-:46 and the real. lZ::l2 ttkrC:llIial fUnc:tion (pr.lI(1ti)of, 6a. Zh:zs. 91-91 . !.!.it 113nlll.

,,,..,.,

requiring I disttibtlled ob;m:. 8g. @h 904fl6.4, !!Z

all

INDEX

as rcquirin«;t oorion of wnmru.

!!L tn. JlI as m:juiring;tll unchmp"lobject. 91-9', u.6 Sit.ls. linguistic cnsnilMxl;

.

.

.

scnprurt; 5Cm;tfIIIC ronvmuon Luic. Hom. 19ln71 Ieve1. of anaIyW. rt--79 . 91;-t9 Lindrntt, Qrinim, Inl /iJip.. SIt evi&nce

linguistic: cognition as crated through 5CnU.nlM: c:on~ntion, ' 71lJ.41

as Ilavi", a uni~m.I;as ob)ect. IOln7i> !!L )11- 11., W . MIDII as !cadin8 to panicubts. " 9-=+9 phenomc:.w content as image conjoined with ncption, ,~,

,,0

rtaliry of ob,i«1 in Mn-Buddhist Ihougln •• sO!S.t as spurious pcraf"ion. l7nS4 IinauistK: ronvendon (~~). SIt . . if:m;tIltl( c:onvenoon logic. focm.rJ. Sttfomulism W£ Sa Iwmic world lH.tur';UN&. Sn Il'U1tIXndc:nt .~

M Madhyamaka. S9nl). 1Oln90

4S' uJrul9. )66nl,. 409m8, 1'om2. 4Ilnu muaial implication. lSOCUl Mali1al, B.K.. tsm . ,6nl. t61\4, 17 n8, 18ruo, !..it ll. JSR4S. }7nSI. l00n8, manC!" (riJNl}. !L ~}i, ib. it ii..

zhl! Sit Ills. sub&tantt McO.intock. San. U! H:!!l! '09n'7. l}1nlJ. J.S'"+4

mediated inwumcnal cfTca. Stt iNtrumcnW dka. mediated menu.! fac.ulry (- -J. !.1. .9nS7 mcnw irru.ac. S«cognitive inggc mc~ ana/yIU. .t2a 4!:'i), 1!t 61.-6J. H

Sit.JH reduaive anaIyW Mimirpsi. L6. ~ 14l'1, ul. }Is m ind-depenckncy, ~ loon71. 111=J.1, IJ
MIdw pub "'" ... Dpol """" 2! __ S«confiuion

Mohanry. J.N" 14nJ.S. IsnJ.7. 17RJ1, )1J\40. JSI\.4S. )8RSl. 117R7 -'r S« spiriMJ fiudom. momeRwlncss ~!ljJwv.J. i!. IoR}9, 9t~7. lBl . J04-7, )IS. )lB, }6lnl ~

promincnl auW

raao.-

MaAp: .t.PllnupJi,.

(~.

(Bhivaviveb.). Inl M~lJIIdril (GancirUirti), J6It41, }16n6

knowledge. as ~ promlncnt faaox in .aion

u..",

...~

.u_~

(Candraldrri), )6'48 M.JM1JMu. (P;tmlijali). 17n7. 18nl0, 9)n61 M~MBuddhism. ~

MIIhl]tJ_",pbII (Asanp). )16n6 ",.whl/Jhi oS« dim·wincG pc.....,

Manor.ulwu.ndin, 8n1S. 8Snll .

S« irUUUmcnl of

Much. Micbad Tomen, IOID71, Mq,._d4p....LU~ (Nig.bjuna). 'RI. W) MilI..uaJvlsIirida, J.S8RS8 mulcipliciry (II~~J of the awes of II single perttpaual

,mage. 1 ~ 1I 1 of e:opUtiw imap:s. )96-111 and aimplicity. 11=
Sn 111m varicption

"14

FO UNDATIONS O F DHA1MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y non~ion

N Nigifjuna, 1m, +4n61., H Nagalomi, MuatOlhi OD

.rrhUriJtl. 8+n.49, l S7nSf,

1,!r60, 171-n. 17S, 171. OD

circularity in Dharnukirti',

theory of instrumentality,

....,

l}}fUS, l}7nl.l

on imptrmanen« and change, ~idmrJL

S« tdfks.mea

n,u ullll marion. Set

1IIIIM.i"",nuiIMMhtt nanlll: (,'Urri: ~,.. IfMWIItt),

See ,.."u...... ,..

-"".

(."lIp.1.6.hi),

91n60, llO-1.I, JsSnu, )88

fU .... rc-

"""'''Y M ..... . nd * Jim. 181-9 1

pctVUion rdatklnr:ll grounded in,

novelty of insuuma'lfal cognition, 1H-SJ. 198-m

",.,... Sr.. ratOning Nyiya, !L 17n)1

_w..u. (Vi..,."""

on analogy, 14~ n1 on desire to know and doubl • liin.., 1.4fl1S on r;oaIs. ~ on gnmlTW' and ontology, }8nS1 on indisperuibility of c:ocrea knowJcd&c for libcntion, 11n18 .u..... ,.,wyW "nd ,,._~ t6nl. ,8n9. 10ms on peroepiKIn. 1}n11, 1.4fl16, t04n78 o n p~ Theory, 11n17

NJII1tfbiNiIl.tiU (Dlwmouan).

19-jO. Id--JI, 1ZZ:91

S«.us. acridmtalll!SlCnrial

11.1n1l8, 179n96, 179"97

diRinaion ncprm: concom'QtK.C ("1",inu).

Nyaya mahoU, 16n..t ~,f>t..n. ($.upkansvimin),

S«concomilUCC. ncpt~ ncitw-onc-nor-many ugumcnt, iQ, f i 6l.-6J S« .us. mercologK;al analysis "i,ll_IlL Sffcondusion lIif1.lli!W- Sff ultimate goal Sftoecru.inry; dtfinilfvt

1)n11 NJ9tIiiitrw. (Gauwna), !L. !2I 11.n17. 11m8. 1Jnll, .u-..6, 14Sn1

"ik.,..

determination "ikilJil1~

Sff dctermilUle

oognilion lIiJt1-. Sff restriction

Nooks' Four Trutlu, 8l.

"4l}OS,

)6}. }6s nominalism. '9 nl}. 6l. ilz }1} nominal reality. Sn- convcmional

"'"~

nondisposilional proptny. 179-80 Sr.. "Js" XCidentallcssmliai distinction; nca:ssity ~rtffI. ,efi"",nf (.IJv..).

IJ7=lfI

Nyiya-VaiXfika, J7nso. UL ;J! N,.,.,,.11til. (Uddyoukan) o n the agent of knowing. son71 on analogy. '4Snl on me amnliry of purpose, .¢'n67. 47n68. 16}n70

on conapondcncc of gramlTW' 10 ontology, )SnSl critique of .pH.theoty, lon1O emplwi. on impottanCC ofinsuu· mtfll of~. lOftiS ,

1.Inl6 on ~-predtcar'" marion, 18n)s,19n jl, )On)9 on importance of knowkdgt for spirirual libcntion. 11m8 on in ~ u

grnund..:l i n

pctapuon. j1ll41

."

INDEX

on the object ofbnguagc, 101n74.

ofknowkdge (prllftl4twMwu), J.Jf=IS. ~I . 14S

lJ7nlH

on marion between action and inslfumem, 49n74. 49nnon ~ perception, 1Jnu, llIUl, 1.41114, LpllS, losn79 on Iharat philosophia.l principia:. :u nl 7

Sn Ill. ctedibili£), ontological miuction. Sn n:auaion orden of contq)lJ, ,~U)' ordinary persons (p,rthtt:j.tw. Iln.c,brli,,) bdidi of as ob;«t of rd'uu.OOn,

14- 17. fu. ~

on the whole (IIIIIIJ"'"" ), J9nS4. I01n72.. IIOn90

as capable of derermining the ~ lrine of Iwm:i. 1}C)=\1 ill ca~ble of determining tbe truth of 1Iirwl!Jl', ~ . }16-IS oognitiolU of ill erJOnootU, )6"'48,

o Obc:rlwnmer, Gcrhud. lBn}6 objca (uJ,.). 5« iruuumenul

obp;r, knowable obj«r, object or

~

""object (hrm.1I). SnPUlml

cognitions of as having quotidian instrumentali£)" )14-1.8 ill iIw::apabk of direa.ly pera:iving rnotnenlanncss, )04-7 infinitesimal ~rrida: ali not pc:~ived by, M... 99-100, lIll ali requiring KripfUfe 10 aa::as ,be

obj«tive ima&e ~r.. .Ju "objective aspect of 3wumcss"; "objcct-slmubcrwn"), 168. 169, 171-71, 176n9J. 194, )84, J8J-U obtea known (pr.",~). Sn in.nrwnental object object ofbnguagc (I.btUrrh.: ~ •object of an expression") as arising through imprinlJ. l4OnlJ9

as an a:dusion. t::!Q,. ltrl9,

,,>-<0 as including a univenal. 12. ~ as ncttSAriIy unchanging. 2Z Paalljali on, 9)n61 poc.itive interpretation of, l2. ill Uddyouhn. on. 101n74. ')7:j8 as u1rimardy rn!. 4Sn'-4 all

u1limaldy unrnl.. 11)"111.

)11- 11

object of negation. 66 object-simubcrum (Il~ ~~. S«obfc<:tive image' ~. ClaUJ,80nJ9.9~6J.97n68 ,

,,,,mo, '48nl1. ,Sins... lISnll), )01Inl68 am: who hu bt:come an innrumcnl

311-IS, )14. 410

IraJUmlpiric:al, 1}1. l.p.

Olher-a:dusion (.",.poh.). 5« Ilpo/M:-thcory; exdusion oven:xteruion (IltiprlUlllit.). 109-tO, )09, )41. JS4. J9)n). o404Il'4. 405"'4 p

PiUUrrhtuih.nIUSIl'!':nJM (PnJuupada) on d'fea' IuNlance, )41ll1) on evideno.--ptcdicue ,dation, 19n Jl on ;Mlnomental :aa;""n and iMino_ ment as dislina, 49n74 on instrumental ascnl u the Kif, sonn on inscrumtnu of knowI~, 147n7 on knowledge ill crucial for opiriruallibcn..ion. :u.n.I , ,.&n:ro on pwpote. 4Bn69

4 56

FOUNDATIONS OF D HARMAKIRTJ'S PHILOSOPHY

on ICnIC puccplion, 13n11. 14fu6,

1InJS ,..,.. Stnub;ea of a proposition; d~is

",Iq,JI,."r7/ffiUL ~ tvWkncc-JUbt«t .,mllon paradoJ: or malcrial impiicnion,

'son's

o
Sn tmIOtC objca

t'~niculu

(, ...t.~!"') basU for conccpruaI

1.$

confirmalion of, 117"-91 cpUlcmic Kblist a1tjquc of. )~JI

inference &$ ~ in, 1!.t E:! II inmumcmality of. 11]-)09,

inapres5ibility of, ~ 91=97. !is

I.$ llCking spatial extcnsion,

69=79. 81-i). t8=1I!

problem of dUparicy in ti me 0(, 1I1-flS

problem of oblUuctcd action in.

"""-'

dlarcd notioN concuning. 11- 1S. lL~ SI. ~

menw. !Q;, u6-II,1.lQ., I ~JI

morncm:uy, 2.!::!Z 1.$ putksa. 1on}9 pCiCl!plibility ~ 1.$ ukiouldy mal. 81R4J, 1.$ unlCluc, ill

and imunal dislortion, )6n.t8. ssns. l9nJ7, ) 15-17. 111-17 &$ a II)OIMlor of .erion, 198-J09 as nonco~ , !z::!!! 1.$ not nndom. IL !l, t6-9z and pcnonaIttanSfonnarion, '~jO

construction, u6=.t1 1.$ auWIr efficacious, ~

as undUlOncd rdIcction of rc:allty, Z
1.$

u vivid, ~ l!! ~

or.

Sn "- cognllM image; ~

pu1-pottaJOf (.~,,).

SNwhok PJ.talijali, 17n7, I'mo, 9)n61 !Nolie-nl (l."'''), !L lL
c.s.,

'70"" Sn.1s. infinilClimal!Notticlc; particular p"'OOp'ion r,~) 1.$

.tOUIISl

' 7 4-90

/M"'-!lN. ~infini[csimal partidcs ~",,_NI. S« infamcc, 1m

,.~

conceptual (III";k.tp.u p'""Jq.),

ClwaI. I;-is. i!.. 2i> 22

pcro:ptibk rhing perttptual illusion. S« el'1'Ol. nonconcepnW; illusion; $pUriow pciCxpuon ptlUplual judpncnl r,~­ ",.w.u;,."ik~. SnddiniiM determination, &$1Ub.cq1lCll1 puo:ptU1l judgmenl pcrdunnt entity, !!. ~ ?6-9z. I16-H. )11. P·9 Stt "- momclltmncw

Penon f!1In4jfl),

1Q

personal uuuformacion. )1)-140)10 pervaded encity (~ lBn)s. ~ !!L '110

pavading propcny (&rJit"Lsc'lwnru;

.,.,,..l.I; also

·p"'rvsdet"). 1in)s. !Z!, ~"

:u,.

."

INDEX

pcrvuion (l!;1l,ti).

5«cvidt:noe-

predic:lu: rdation PhilliP'> Stephen. ~

koowIatg< p,.Mi!"'bhiu. 5« one who has

Plancinga. Alvin, IIJnsJ. IISn60 plunlity (.,.Ju,d). 5« multipliciry; varicption . p<M.nve concomllan«"

.

.

(.,.~~ti).

5N oona;lIrumnce,

"""'~worlds, Ils-&6 poasibk Poner, Karl on usumpcions in p~ 11Koly. 1On1 4 on inmummality. n7n7. u8-19.

"7

on M
on the raI as neassarily knowable. )6"4' , 4sn6.t

n,

'"

and inlcrnai dinomon. 1+1-,11. ) 11, )1S-17. )1S-16 and Iinguinic convention, I:1ODl07. !!h J44. JS6, J" and penx plUai illusion. lS'-19, l n:, ),Inl. )94DS

prompted by pera:prioo, 199.

koowIatg< pN1fI4~ 5« irutrummtai

,/tta p,.".u!M"''''~ ( Di~

00 (X:mYaltionai ity of definitive determinations. JOlnl47 on aalibi.lity. !l2. )61 01 o n crror.17nS4, 9OnS9, o n ilUltumentai dfca . 167n76,

170nlt, 178 n94 o n language I.J Inference, l46ns on nonduality of awanncg, l n 09J o n KIUC pcrccplion.

l)OU . 2.401).

venoe of~. !Y Stt :Wo Pt.1fI4!MUmwrllJll",ni PrmM')iUiUrfwtllJlf",ni (Oignlga) 0 0 ilwanncg alone as ilUlrumentai, 16U169 on inaprcaibiJiry of panic;ulan,

10"", on iofertoce.for-om.:n, 147n, on illlluumcntai dfea, ,on76. 167n,6. 17Ofl8.4. 00 pruumption (.nhI1,.,m) as in~.I.¢n 6

on IctlJC pe.ctpuon. )97Il4 on the refutation of a wbok (."..,.,vi,.J. )905'1

Sec also Pn1fl4!WM'..roIJiI

)01. )79. )89 at . ... n ...... inn dw>~,

become an ilUlrurtKDt of

)9601,)970"

o n me [am knowkdge fo r jUu, 16nl, 1Jil1.47 pnctical action (IIJiIv.hlrtI: PrtnlfttlJ and conceprual cognition, IIsn'}l, !l!:. W. ~7. )son2.4, JS6. and in.nnunmtality, 160, 1IJ-I4,

I.J

p.Mi1J6.. 5« ilUuumenl of

1slnsl

$«.w aamry; convention; $CIlUl\cic c;oovmtion

prasmatism. fi... uB, l S906o, ) IS Pnljl\lbngupra. 9MS, 178 PnljlUbn.nuli, s6nl, )1Inl pntjfMptisAL Sn-convcrnional rcal.ity ,~,.. 5«conlc
Pn.,u ....rJntil..Il..Jtb. .

(Praj~pa), 90IS. "lion

fuN!",lItlrttiUurm (ManoratMnandio), SOl" SsnSI. I1ln ll9 .
Prw""!fIVi"ifntJtt,tild (Dhanno«an), 9016, 179n96.

"'7,n'7. ",n.8.

, rlMi!'Jl'- $« irutrwncnWity

..S8

fOUNDATIONS OF OHAIlMAKIRTI'S PHILOSOPHY

,,.wullf. Sn-apl of knowing ,rll~ Sn- inmumnual object

,,.,,,iri. Sn-aaion ofknowi ng

,r4pU.. 5« iruuwncnt of knowledge. IS wIlli makes 0flC' obWn I goal Pr_1IMptuU (CanciralUrti). S4lI) Pt;l.&~""]"ida . r& u nlit. lRnJf. !.2. ,,]=:11. i2! !2!. !fZ

Sec aIJo P~mfIIIII"'phII ,rltfi bbtlJ.. 5«cognilive image "lItit;", ... 5«c:opitive image ,,.tijtU. &r ches.iJ "IIry.bhij fUIW. &r reoognilion ,~ 5« pc:rcc:ptibk
-~"

-

,r.~1HMsL

&r Ipw-M,tus pcrttp-

".~.~IJ),."ikllJ&. Sn ddinil~ dnerminalion. 1S.5U'*'quent ~ua1 judgmenl Struuuumenl of knowitdgt. IS motivalor of action

,,.l1li",,"

,n""';" &r activation; activity; pracria.l Klion; refem'ltial runaion '~NL 5«puIpOlC predicale (tlh.nrt4). 5« propaty predialt-aprtuioO (JlN,,,,",,,,~ r/M,.",.,vid/II/¥J,). 117n1l9. l13nn9. Is6nl). 171n44. lO)nSl'" lS I . jJ1tl19

&r .Is. proptny predicate of a lubject (tiJMmg). .sn evidcncc'Iubjta rduion predicate 10 be- proven elk.,..' 'M." . ,o",nPI4; Jh.nrJII," VMJA). 16-zB, !.!i>. 148-11

&r III» tvidenc:t-predicale malion prrk,lpiinwUrill. &r judicious

"""'"

prr~IeL

.sn

judicious penon presumption C....hJf'6Jti.· abo ~pf\"­ lumprive indIJQw)tl"), 1)n1O, ~

pm. (" hungry' ghosl"). J!16n61, J1~-16

PrnJ, Ernst, l..anSl prirnaty cawe: (,.,..uMhrr..), 164-66. 181-81. J69-71 production-mock of

SWMillllprtUiHNIiM. Sec ....JJ.b.".li~ prntluoinn_ mode of proptfty (1ihIInru; alto ·predicate"), !l. 9s=J6, IU-fl, IS9nll, 16ul)). 171n.... , 18~. 197-101, 1Ot-U, l49 , )S1-51

-....

Set also 1IIff~ as proptny. ~ propaty-P0'YVN (tIM""i,,). $no wbjea of I proposition propaty-IllllbJM_ Sec IllllMiIlll, IS proptfty, sIWMi...

Plopat)' WI puvadc:s

(lIJIIp"ulb."",,). .sn ~ing propc:rty propertY 10 be prtJ\'al (t.#; 'VmI4). S« prtdiate 10

"'P~

prop06ition 10 be- p~n r,rlUijiU; ,./qA}. $no tha.is $no ordinary persons psychologism , 14n1S, 17n)1, lli !L.

,.rrhtttJiI-

...

prychophyUcal awegalCS (IU"';"), 6!Q. 61n17, j~, 409 ,wI~ rz!!!..! hJpiII"i~ (Vuublondhu). 1}Oftl)

pwpotC ("";",,. ,~ .. abo

"aim"; "goal": "tdos") centnliry 0(, 16n1. JI"11. "H9 , 1!.. J11-JO IXmccpu as requltlng. !.!1. ~ }44 , ,...s, JS4-5S. Jf7 ilUltumenaliry and, llB-p. ~ lSS-6ll, 17)-17. 197. l~)OJ.

)08. )Itrl) , J14- 1S. }8,..&4

INDEX

tclic function and. ~J-94, 1S'-'o, 211-78. )]6. )91 nl of a ueau.e or scriJlfUU". U::H! )61~1. )17 w limalC:. lsn1l. ~ 11.9-)1. !II . 4M2. )14-18

Stt.w human aim

!"~s,.P_n

! 1I"'fIlrth.. Sn hunun aim rye. Michad, 15"'4

'" la:ocnition ("ny.Mijfi41111; u'!'jlU), u..6.. UQ, lY!lJ}I, 161n19. 19 1n115. }44. }46

~ "" ,,/nil"''''''' ~ !Z1

reduction coocqxual, 215. u8 of atrnded (tIlities 10 panicuWs. ~ 7!ci'i . !la 21.t!.!lt :ull o nlologial, principk of, 199, J:OH, 101--11, 114. !!L 118 of propettics 10 p.1Inic:ulan, . 03-~

Q quaii[f. 17'-=21, 11 s«.w PrnUcatc of a proposilion: II1/IJMIwI, as ptopt:iiy-lI1/IJWJ.fw

quaiiry-pouasor. 17=11, n nso Stt ..huubjec1 of a proposition quali[f/qualificd tdalion. !.!J., ~ I1SnIl9. HB-Sl.)H Quine, W.V.• 2uml7

Stt.J. irrrducibiliry: reducti~ analysis m:1uaivc: ana.l)'$b ( III."."... 1IkbW,

. ..,....

aha ~reduaiYc rcuoningl of diKributed (fuilia. til

and kvds of analysu. ~

6t:79,

a.

70=7 6

~, ~ .p=-;).1t 6z.-6).

R Ram-I'ruad. OWuavanhi. ll9mo Ra.tnaltini, l}uull

oflhc real. l!t 2io.1!.

i8=-99.

R..ml,.,w (N1prjuna), W')

Sa ttl. irreducibiliry:

~

real (S/l.I) as dwxtcriud by Idie dfx:xy, 4sn6.t, ~

as COII t (tll oiindubitabk knowing. JH6, t!.o Lt-lz, 91-1I}

as inapret.5ibk. 12. i!.::iZ as momentary. i!:::!Z as simpk, }Z- i S, 11 79-81. 98-11 ) s«..Is. particular, IWO rcalilia: rnliml.. )61l4i. S!. S9nIJ. 'ZL

u6-1z. !l!, }lJ lUIOnins (1IJIIJIa.' ,un) as Buddhul practice. 1SI. )18-1.9 corxfilionals in, 1 ~15 and ICYds of analysis. 61 pwpoM' as a ~ ooor in, fl SN "'- inkn:ftCC1 redlK'ti"" an&iy-

w: 5I}'k o f rnsoning

anaI)"iI; reduaion ItfdcntW fi..maion r,"'''!"i), ih 195, I11n1l8

Stt (1M semantic convention rdino:mem. }10. )11-)0 rdkx.ive awarmcss (1lIIW'!'wtLut..) as arising as the: subj«tiYc asp«! of awum.el$. )9lnl insuummr.ality of as sheer ausal dJic:ic:ncy, 160. 176, 178 n"...dUl li.,. of, +07"IS role in UlXnaining in.n rumemaliry of pc.ception, 191, 195, )78",+ 3iS-36 sellks.snas as, 401n1 ) , .. 06nlS. ,.oSnl5 u uilimale p,,,1N1fU, ) 11 reI.lion., t!=1,.!1 rdiPOW subscratum, 10nl4

..60

FOUNOATIONS OF OHARMAKUtTrs PHILOSOPHY

><mO<' ""'"

(¥J'I'lNIhilll!"'m4!'A}IMJ.r). S« instrumental dfcct. mediated ranocc object f/'i',."q.; ,,;,~, I snp., 91n6o, 1)Onll. ~ 1D11 Srr Ifiso lnnscmpirial objca rtpeatability (IIIIIItItJtIl. Srr diuribulion fUlriction ("9wIJU; abo - invuiabk ruk")

in caUAI potentials (/Mti"iJtt-). 16oIU·9. 161-6~. !M! 19S. )44 inlcQubje«iVC'. j16n7 of pervasion !'dation. :zBn}6. !2z 149='" ZO'I J.06n,8. 2.09=10

of the rea/lo a spuiotCtnponi locus, 8L !!L m Srr IIiu rule of unacoompanicd

condition

Ulti.S«apacity IUM~. Srr ratric:rion. in causal polC'nliW S1Icya Mchos klan. 9n17. ~ 76-78 Mm4"rLr~!,& Srr univaul S« imputation

--

U"""''''

as conoqxuaI C'Xtcnlion. V;I, 6.a of difrc:rcncc (U. 1,Hm.i,?,,). IOz-!. }SI of dttas, !.92. 1I9=16, IHn) l . }1l-1}

as rtquired

non-aIUlDg;

IMbbi..,,.,,tiIM1f4IM Rony, Richard. sn9 Ruegg. DavMi Scyfon, 10014 rule of unaccompanied non-arising (1I";,uiHMJw"ry.-V, 14!Hj. 2.01, 100nl01

s Saban.. 146n j J.btUrth.. Srrobject oflanguasc

""""uu,. "" ""'"'"

!iMlJJMnNII"~ SSl1-4

~lJUtIJ&

the c:onuadictoty of the prcdicalC' to be: provC'n ~ Srrlimibrity ";"Ml"", Sncopl'C'SC'nOr; w..1tbip,..".".. S« supporting

Srr instrumcnl of

k.nowIedge. as masl prominenl aUAI factor in acrion sMIh.-. Srrmdcntt sM/h.,mj In,.",.. .wsupporting ~p"

-.Dryulh.mt& S« praliate 10 be p~

" Dr; dl",mrj,.. Srr Nbjca of. ' ''!'Y'I'';~ ~,..~

Srr nidenoe. incompuibility with

by language. 9 1-91.

116-17. !H Srr IIIH diuribulion; judgmcnl of

~1II'!fJfU.. S« recognition 1II~ S« $Cn\anUc convmtion 5aqlkhya. ti.t 1Q, 7jfl}l. 16u\}} 1II"u.,.. Sn doub! 1II1!'''!fisirr. S«c:onVC'lltionai reality lII1f'111tifUltll. S« correct koowkdgC" Sailgabbadra, I09nS7 1II""ihf".. S« $CIUIOty oonraa Sanskrit pmmacical tradition. 11010. }8nJ~ 9}n61

SturlllNl,,_iJJhiplei (Vjoliadna). 6ont4 Sinuralq:ira, il lln11. nnl, 109n87. 116n99. 111O U O. Ijlnl1.6. ).4on6 Sinrideva, ~ ~ }18nS ../"'~ Sa bomoJosow: insuna: SarviSlivida. i!. 5901}, 109017 $tqIiIll1lml (Virpgal:Iya), 1.46-0 ~"..mpiU, 1,nu

"" s..=l

-UJ*l.",. ("belief d>., Uw: P'}'ChophyUeal aggrepa ill'C' the

..s,

INDEX

lotus of I xlf'}. U. ~I.

as object of spiri tual adqJu.

1,.nl)8. }71-7) Sauuintib. 11 Sin.l " ~ Zh Ii!

.II •

79n}l, Ion)9. 9! IClk of analysis. 5« IcYds of

Vl~lpuuiy.a

..w,.;.

$dwf, Robert, 9)n61 , 10l n74 Schmid...-n , Lun!.en, l 'n7 saipNtal infcrmc.c (tlp~1Il/.mI), " ,.... S, ISI; l,

universal dwxteristic of elemental things.. 811\4S

poairion on, S7nll ACmanUc (l)l!.Yefllton (~. ",.uJ,4,~ abo ~linguisric conYm-

lion'

analogy:u 1Uociucd with, 141nl. as crucial to inference by IJW~. 11lAI18

)61-7)

saipnm (tlplM: /rwti)

,,.,

Oharmaklni'.IJIIlrin! citation of, Dhannkinr. aniNde loward in &:bate. Innl4

eight demen~ of Dharmakini'. dixwt.ion of, 40-41 instNtDenuliry of, lL 1)nlO, 11-4. lll- n . l)HSt )61-7) :If not

)05n16o. )69n11. 406nl'

of hl.UlWl origin

(""~. 1J) thredOkt analysis of. 14~ 5« .w. credibility; Kriptunl infer~

tetf (brrfIut) :If agenl

ofiruuumental knowing in Brahmankal thouJht. H! beliefin as diminated in 1I;nliflll,

"""" ,,.

.II distributed

entiry, +41161, 61n17.

as object oIbdicfin ~i. iL~ )71- 11

Iin9c

:If a eum«. )4). mini} ... uninr.,...,.hk. j6) tdf-dinging (h1tvIlSttthc). ~

J71-1l

sdJIesmeu (.I/IlhruI1I; ""i~) :u antidote to Alffaing. 6onlS. 191n1)l. )6In1O, }69n1l. }71 all a dist:ribuled entiry, ~1 AI inHnunc:no:ai ob;ca, ",. 4C)lnl}, 4O'Snl4, 408m1

indirectly refcrins 10 infinitesimal pa.nic:Ia. l!!

all

IlOnl07 :If rooted in odwion, )+4.

)H~

for Alb;ca and predicate. 117n1l9. l1.8n1l9. 17lIl44 ACNe cilium. ~ Sit .w. cognitive image ICnK faculry (i~. abo -1CftJC ocpn', 1'=14. 12.4. 116-17, 1.61, US , 169-7'0. }I)-Is sensible dement (l)Ioru..... abo -JeNe sphere', ~ ZO=71, 79nJl. 10l nn. I09 n87. J97"" JCmOf)' oontaCt (s.1r1rj~ sp.rt.), !J., 1!! 169",,0, )44. )6) Shah. Nagin. }
Sidmu, Mart. 116n99. 1}1Jl116. l..,nll, ls oru s Silk. Jonathan, 1)6n19

similariry (~ :If basis for error. ,6n7. 11-8g. !:i! of images to their obj«a. &.cls. .;mplici.,. ( .....6<1; ...... - ;

dwcd notions cona:ming.

JZ=-J9 .

"

Buddhist Yin.,: on, iCt"i'. 1!: 79nJ!. &0 Sit.u. Nngulariry

linsuJariry ('''u.' ,fun",) li"!,,ill;'; "k"1KC ....;thoul. m-60

,.61

FOUNDAT IONS OF DHARMAKI II.TI' S PH I LOSOPHY

of pcn:qllual imap. 101 II}, )96-,.11 5« .h.limplicity

sk.J>UIJM. 5« psychophysical ag:n:g1ilIcs $IciU in mnm (~~), 11 Skinner, Quentin, sn9 didina K1iIlc of analysu, &r kvds of analysis SJH.umril1ll (Kum1rib) on agem of knowing as the .td£,

on circularity in Dharmaki"ni',

thcoty of instrumentality, l~lS,

1.4S-"7, lSI;l, }17

on lhe compound stJiIMlwMrJ., I14fiHl on the compound tIlOlitlbh,#ViI. 1JInl04, 111

on the conu1ildiaory of Ihe prcdiale 10 be proven, 1 '9-11 on inferring an dttct from I ClUK, l78nSl problems io Oignip',

theory

~onn

DO

_.,

of inference. 1-+8010 , 1-+8011 on swJHMlIft., 1St=14, Is6nl),

on elcmCfltl of an jnfcrcnc:c. lS"'4S on grammatical instrumentality.

,6,")0.

,...,.

on Knse organs. Ip'U, 1)0l.),

Sou. Ernest. 18}1lsl IOtcriolozy, ..,.n61, i!:!.1t:::H! 60-61, 191. ~-8. )17 sfN'rlA. S«acnsory contxt ipUia.I mension (~). 12.. ~ s6-1l, 6l. 6crz<J. ~J, 98-111, .!1.L. ,.o,.. ,.osIU,. S« ~ dUtribution; whole

,pctdl of 1iI credible pcrIOn (4pllJlld.). &racdibi.lity; KriPlure 'pirilual adept ~1f). 1.4016, 1§.. !!i. l86n61. 116-17. 19)01)0,

)01-6, )18n8 $pirinaal excrciJcs, !lQ. '40 Ipiriulil frttdom (~), 11. lsn18.

4 . ~ ~ ll9nlO, )14 , )2.4 . IPUnow pcroeptlOn ~,.~bhtls.).

}6n.d. tzus •.

m

&rIlWcrror, illusion tquan: bnckcu, 11-1,

S.etnkdlnC"f, Ems. on the argumcnl for momentariness from exUtena', 97 n68

on IInIMhi]tl. 178-79

16~

' 70n'tl-. l86n61,

191-96, 101-1. 1090101, Ulnll l

on 1'IIIIJM4U11pnriiMlfIiht" lS I nl7 Slhiramati, !1 ,rbiit.tL S«spalial ClllcrWon uyle of R'IJOnins. }, 1: u. !.L tl. H !ubhagupta. "nl) IUbJ«l-a:prcsuon

(tihtI""il/tJdiJJbttII). 117f11l9 , ,18nIl9. 10)094, )S1019 lubjective image (,zrihtdliHrII; also ~wbjective aspca of awarencss~). 171, 176n9), J91, 407 aubjcalobjcct duality. S«duality subject of a pr0p05ilion (J),.,mri1.; ·idh],Jh.f1IIilt; , . . ). 1901 ). lkll, ~ 16cJ-n, 199, lOOn&,.

'"'='

aubjcct-predic::ue reblion. !£.o !..1§.. 171"'4-4, ).46-S1. 3S7f17 sutJ.;tanI;C ('/'IIIIJII). It-1+, J!. l2! J.4!>-SO. 1Q-S9. }6}. 196-99

su£rcring (~. ..6-..7. "" 60-61. 110, 19801)8. 199, )19 supcrimpolilioo (SlUlWI'OpII). Sn imput3tion lupcncnsibk objcn (116,",*) as amcnabk 10 perception of pti... z..tn~6

as the domain of Kri~. 1.4). }67

,6,

INDEX

as

ntH

anvnablr: to

Dignlga'J rhmry . ........9 Str ,Js, tvidtnu-predicttC

inr~

366n.4- J68

}11\41. ~ DOl: charaa~rWng

as

infinitcsimal

panidcs. l09nl] one who JCCI (.tiMriJiUMr/i,.). )OS. )66n ll

SIr "'- rnnxmpirical object IUpponing condition (.."d4n"6lJ9tI). '<4n6). 16,-61. 11'='1. Il4n~" lOImoo

mpponi"& enm.pIc (~"fi) "/."H4I1I11). lQ., WSn,s

mation: ncaviry nwld!ll!lll- Str panicular 11JIInh4,.M""'IUI. Stt inr~rmtt. ror oncselr IWIU,!,uwWlUI.

1UIIt4 prhul!'Ji'm. Str

inlCrumC"nwiry, inrriruic: ryllogUm. !l I)'It~matKiry. klL ~ a z!.

-"",*

''''

as C'.OfI.Kructcd. US-:t6. u6-p. 136-117. )1). ))9-1:1

as nature-IUIIM.f,., ISJ- n . 1sS-7J. 19)=1.01 and nccasiry. Illdl as propc:ny' IUIIMrI,., '1i=9'j. 11HZ. '70-7), 181.-91. 19t-101

two IICIUQ' of, ISH', 164nl4. 170-7). 1,)-U1 univaWs :and. ~

Sec abo IUIIMrllltlprlltiluMh. IUIIbhl,,,,MrJ.. StrdiflUmcc in nature IUIIMl~oa' (1UIIbh4~). '1n~, I 11:1l, f79 , 1O)-11

IUIIMJl1IIp,.tiIMtuih&, idmtiry. modC'of

Sec IUIIhbl~ntt

wdlMwpr.tilMMh. r n.anual rel.arion' gcntnl ddinition.. r;&;1 i .... ntiry.......... (wt.".".) o(. ' SM), lO t-l l and inUtMic: insuumentaliry or infCfcntt, 1,6. 197-98 maning of IJlllMolu. in. IU-SS. 19)- 101

production· mode

(~) or.

')~-SJ , I] M~

U

T

tMUlmJtL Stt IUllMiI14PrlltilMtUiJM. idmtiry·modt of uJ."..,tti. Sec IlWhbllWprlltihMht&. production. mode: of rAnlWbiMV.

("tMr·"",M.lJ).

111- 11

Tllm...sII,!,phiI (Stntanlqira). ,nliS. l09 nI7. l11nIlO. 1)lnu6, }¢n6. mn l)

TlIItMU1!'rlliMpdj iU (KamalaIala), I lllllIo. 1)lnn6, }16 n.I) , ,Hon6 tdK;: c:lJic:::lq/funaion. Scc IIrtJ,.~

Stt 11M ..-viden«:

IUII~

Stt ~

response to problems in

trW. Stt purpose (C'mporal alC'lUton. ih ~ il! ski, 6l.1l2. '4JliS), 111). 379

Str.JJ. distribution: ~=-

theory of unconsciow: aror. ~ )n .

),'n,' }

Str ills. aror theW (priltijU: ~ abo "propos.irion to be provtn "), !L ~.H! 106-7

thrWold (VideOtt (",,j~nJitit-J. Str (Vidmtt, thfC'C'foid Tibnon W

"UlK"llIIQn, b

l! 1l!

69-79. Ibn<4J, )OOnl<4). JI,

.6.

fOUNDATIONS Of DHAII.MAKIlHl·S PH ILOSOP HY

Tibttan translalions. !. 97n68. l09n86. 116, 169n80

Tukmans. Tom on.~

116n99 on Candraldni. )6"-41 on congruence, loon71 on the aaiibility of the Buddha, 11S. 117 ")1

on doubt as a na:x:sury dement of rcuoning. l88n6) on ckmcnu: of an inference. JS"45,

,06".. on cumpks, j lnj9 o n die ncitncr-one-nor. many ;&r8,m>a>I, 40n n

on scripnuc, Inn I.., 140 o n the ruuaurc of the PrtItd,!,,uj'dJ,j chapter, 115n17

on the theory of unconscious CI1l)I", ~ )11 on the Ir:uuempiria.l. l)Onll, 1)Onl} on lruth, US totality of CltuaI chanctcrW:ics, 161=V, 18s, 197=100, 1J1-1}, 198. l'l ""irii!JtW"'~. S«cvidcncc,

""""'~

Innsccndcn, aw:umeu fWolUlr.jfU""J. 4!n57 lranscmpiric:al objca (.".IIU}M",q.; abo • c:nremcly rt'fllOlC objca~), lJO:Jl, 140-"1,

L45, L49-S1,}61-67. ~nl.

Sir.1. supcnomsihk objca u~rulation .

11- 1], 1l}- z.8 transworld identity, 18t:" tl\lMWOlthineN r."u.".....) of conceptual togni liOlU, !.£ ofirutrumcntal tognition, ~ 1S
of yogic pcrorptioru, ul'i04, )06 inRrumcntality (ru th, snlo, !l. (Oln7J., us-lS s" als. conventional ruliry; IWO rea1ilicr. ultimarc reality twO rulilics, iO':+b ~ 10'"90 s".u.convenlional rc:aIiry; u!timlle ruliry IWO truths. Sn-twO rulilics

Sir.w

U wUh.r~

S«camplcs Ud
14ll14< 14ll1S. 101 on 5hated principles of Prami.r:la Theory. Unl 7, unl8 on univcnab, 101n74, ~

Sec also NJIlttviI'ttiU uhimalc goal ( lIj""'~ also · uhimatc purpo5C"). 11). U9-JI, 14'=11, 314 ul lioulc pr.td!.fIL S« innrumenl of Itnowlcdac, ul limalc ultimate rc:aIity rp.r.".,.nh.s.t) as abtem in Wlivcnab. 81041. 8snS1, 9}-9i. !.!i! n ·H I, ~

zt

}4s-.6, )9:--'4

buddhas as igDOring when luching bcinp. 11 ohjcna :and, §2....zq incJ:preuibility of, i2.@l,i.!:::2Z

COaunolU
..,

INDEX

as Iacki"l diruibu laon, Il0-l1,

J6. !.ll.t 169-70. bds of analysis and. 61-§4, "=11\. I U

6~,

)"U

70=79. 1)9n4

of mind as undiffemuimd. 171, 176"9). 401-14

mommwinal of. !!=!Z .... object of """",p<;,;", , ....., •• I2l>

1,s. )01- 1 of panicubn. ~ Z!z '!§, 81::14.

as combinarion ofinuge and c:xdwion. !!it 11cru. HZ- 19. J40- }4"-47 construction of, 94n64. «It 11'=16. 1Jt-+i. IJOfl4J. ,,s. H9-1"l

COIUlrutd

as 3 pmkular. ~ u§.

')0=" . '"

u convenlionally real, IQ, 'ID4I, !Q.,

~ ))9

Dharmalt:ini'l rcjtcrion of, S9m).

l 'O ~tyof, 1t Jimplicity of. 4WS • .".....ao. ~

61-6, as not an iluuuJnmw object. Ml!

Idie fimaioa and. lt-k !.!i.

19, 4l } as paradigmatic cue of conception

19J-"H, }IO. }9J

Vuubandhu on. 40-=<11, zt-8o &t tJu conventional reality; particular; two ralilics; univerul

unconscious (rror. theory of. &t theory of unconsciow enor untqucncu as a1lmon for tht u1timaldy rn.I, I
of images. 116-18. 110=-11, !lQ,!l!.

""w

of momentary partida. ~ ~ of panicularJ. 81=&4. l , nSI. IJO"-4J. }H

as a lheortticaI poUUon. 1. It of unique individuals (~). 111141 , J4S. 411-1) S-.J--d... M>n; .i ... pJkioy.

JillJUbrity univenal (uMl'7"lc"1'?U: jhi) as usoci31cd with conttpU. !02. as cawally indflCiml and u1timatdy unreal. ~ I lfl4I' I sn f1, ,,....,., !.!i. 11HIt Ml! j-4)-¢.

,.,!=I1

)0 1- ). JIG-I+ 318

C:Xleruion. 6J. questioo of heinz an object of Ia.ngwge (",lNIlnJMj. @2.2.1, !.Q!, ~ II7=11J.l!!.t m -6 0, }l1

qlJCSlioo of pennaocQClt or impermaneQClt of. z!, i!. 116-11 rcialion 10 individuals. 4.1, ti! IQ, 91-9), lIS 1.6. I1H) . W - 4) ~ Mdq: ldan on, 76-n

the ad( u a 1p«W iNUrla of. 191 lWilhlaw and. 2Jll=2. Ihrer rypc:s of. u.6 TIbetan undemandin! of as penn:mml. 77==71, 116-17 Vasubandhu on, 81-11. !l! 12lo

,.....,

'" Wo _"""'r. "'.."''',,''' awa.rmcu; adulion;

judvncnl

of_~

unmcdialal irullumen w dkct (...,...";';14", .. , #t:U~). SN

irutrumena.! dkct. unmcdUlai IlpiJl~ Stt primary caUK

,.,um,&tddimiling quality

IIlM1M1J4. &t amIogy II,.,..,.. &t~j«t rdalion

.fNlJ-Iu.J.J,.. Scr oIWI in mean.

466

FO U N DATI O N S OF DHAI.MAKIRTI 'S PHILOSOPH Y

V Vicaspafimilra, lOnl,

~ ~ ' 4Snl, 1}6nI9, 16}n70

Stt .... """'...,.

IWi4Mlift).ir1!41ftA. Sn

Vrdu, "4n1" ~

countucnmpk Viii,,*, slluu, 1.iM Viliqika, & }8nn. iii ,6nlo. ionJ9. l2L H1tl9, }ti}nl, J99n8

Verpu~n ,

Roger, 18sn60 vcridica1iry as truUbtion fo r ,riIUrrJ4. 16"'4, 116-11 Vetttr, Tilmann, Znnls, 1}]lI11

Sn.Js. Nyiya-V.ilqika vali.dily aJ' tramlation foe

W/hi. Sn aff'u:malion

,,.,,u!'Jl'.

om

1.11--2.1, ~

Van Bij1en, Vittorio, }l1

vuicplion (dt1W; em."; critique' o ( 5ingularity 0(, 101- 1h J96-411 .. produced by in.una! dia.omon.

"J

as wnding for all form. of multiplicity, tali

Sir.Js. mulripliciry Vi~ya,

uij;;.primlltrm. !in Epi.P(mic ldalui!J4 hmsJ"",¢. Sn caUJal compla:. inrompkt:e Vi~ (Vuubandhu).

}16n6, }16n7, 410nll Vi...t.tiJuI'rlti . . (Vuuban4J.,,) •

,1"'4l, 79n}8, }16n7 uinJ.!.. Strctss:nion

Vi,..,,-Mbiwtip, lS8ns8 Viniradeva, 6on14' }16n6 vi~

14hz

vbllI4. Sn imprint WPJ4H~"lJ!niIlllllff4q.

S«

vipuiuj""q. Str error 1Ii,,,,_ Sff t rror

.,.w;. Str indiyidual

on inttnubjca:iviry, }l&n6, }z6n7

koowkdge of the dttaikd workings oflwma. llOnl]

011

f1KrdogiaI analysis and, ~

IlJiipUMIhtt,.-"w. Sn puvading prop-my IIJIipri. Sn CYick~prcdicatc relation ~"..

o n momtntarinc:a. 1on)9 o n primaI)' caIUC and. lupporting conditions. 16Snp rqJramQ.ri~ or Abhidlwnu

typoIogy, ~

on • ms· aJ' the: ca~ or cog:niliolU, 410ml

on _

~~ion ,

Sn httaosencow ilUUl'ICC

,,;,nJt,.,fL Sn tClTI(KC obj«;1

inf"":
as

,In..p.,

J.4fIl)

Sn pervaded mliry

-=

"J#Irim.. SNcxmcomitanct,

"",uJt.lr.. Snconvention; praaic:al . . . actIOn; kmanuc conventIOn

"",UilhitllpnuM!",p/NJM. Sn inslJumcntal dl'ca. mediated ryJl!ft"'. Strexdudcd mliry ~urni, Sno:dusion

on I'¥'&"'~ and 1Il....~w,.!Y­

I1::Il. !1. lQl, }96 on two Icveb of n:iliry. 40-41, Z! Sec alsoAMiAI~ Abb~""" Viuipuniy.u , 52!!!! Viqyiyaruo. 17=-10. u. 2.4l11S. }8nsl,

W

Waher, Joscph, }4n) whole- (.,...,.";11; also -part. pm.....orJ

JJw,.,., .. u J7nso

roughly ..qui...,.kn.

'0.

INDEX dl'a;t-lUb$WK:r (~.",.)
sb.nding ror. J4UlI) I.J ob;ecr of negation
...

as paradigm foe distributed unities, 4a>-4), T1. ,,7ft) re)ectjoft of, 40. S7. 61.-li}, 66. 101- 11 , 109n86. J96-411 Uddynnka~ on, 19. 10 1, I04-J

Sn .J. distribution; rrw:reologic::al anaIyW: reductive anaIysu WillWns. Paul. ISft.1 Woo. Jctem. 116tl.4

,..'htirthMWrt...... Snapericnoe. of Ihinp as tbey Iruly an: Yogkira. 79n)!

Sn .u. Epinemk Idealism

yogic perceptioft fMiprll~ 14"1'. 1~17 ,~-6

Sn .J. spiritual adept

r-r;i'" s...- .piri ...... ...kpt ]#fi,rw~

Snyogic .... pt . cx'OP'p';." JllDllIIl. &r apviry JNm.Sn~in,

Y~,iU. 11ft1). l.4I114. -49. 13ft} . , ITl ft4}

z Zysk. Kcnne'l h, 10nl4

y y.uomirta. S7ft ll

so.