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Additional comments on Forging Environmentalism: “Forging Environmentalism takes up cutting-edge questions from the ‘greening’ of China to environmental justice to questions of good governance in the environmental realm and helps readers see the complexity and urgency of the underlying issues.” —DAN ESTY, Yale University “The comparative study of values is as difficult as it is essential. Forging Environmentalism is a feast for everyone attracted to this necessary project, and required reading for all those who want to understand the complex values driving environmental degradation in Asia and the United States.” —DALE JAMIESON, New York University “This remarkable study compares environmental values, local mobilization and policy, via case studies from diverse countries. It does so by close observation in communities, by in-depth interviews, and by tracking environmental mobilization on the ground. . . . These rich studies will be insightful to the environmental scholar and this book should become a unique resource for graduate seminars on the global environmental movement.” —WILLETT KEMPTON, Coauthor, Environmental Values in American Culture
The Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs is the world’s leading voice promoting ethical leadership on issues of war, peace and global social justice. The Council convenes agenda-setting forums and creates educational opportunities and information resources for a worldwide audience of teachers and students, journalists, international affairs professionals, and concerned citizens. The Carnegie Council is independent and nonpartisan. We encourage and give a voice to a variety of ethical approaches to the most challenging moral issues in world politics. The Council promotes innovative thinking, intellectual integrity, and practical guidance featuring specific examples of ethical principles in action.
Justice, Livelihood, and Contested Environments
FORGING ENVIRONMENTALISM
Joanne Bauer Editor
An East Gate Book
M.E.Sharpe Armonk, New York London, England
} An East Gate Book Copyright © 2006 by Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Forging environmentalism : justice, livelihood, and contested environments / edited by Joanne Bauer. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7656-1535-5 (alk. paper) 1. Environmentalism—United States—Case Studies. 2. Environmentalism—Asia—Case studies. 3. Environmental ethics—United States—Case studies. 4. Environmental ethics— Asia—Case studies. 5. Environmental justice—United States—Case studies. 6. Environmental justice—Asia—Case studies. I. Bauer, Joanne R., 1962– GE197.F67 2005 333.72—dc22
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Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984.
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Contents
Contributors Acknowledgments Editor’s Note
vii xi xv
Introduction Joanne Bauer
1
PART I. ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN FOUR COUNTRIES 1.
2.
3.
4.
China: A Foreword Judith Shapiro
25
The Politics and Ethics of Going Green in China: Air Pollution Control in Benxi City and Wetland Preservation in the Sanjiang Plain Liu Yu, Pan Wei, Shen Mingming, Song Guojun, Vivian Bertrand, Mary Child, and Judith Shapiro
31
Japan: A Foreword Jeffrey Broadbent
103
From Kogai to Kankyo Mondai: Nature, Development, and Social Conflict in Japan Kada Yukiko, Tanaka Shigeru, Aoyagi-Usui Midori, Arakaki Tazusa, Watanabe Shinichi, and Steven Hoffman
109
India: A Foreword
Paul Greenough
183
Rethinking Indian Environmentalism: Industrial Pollution in Delhi and Fisheries in Kerala Amita Baviskar, Subir Sinha, and Kavita Philip
189
The United States: A Foreword
257
Keith Kloor
Two Faces of American Environmentalism: The Quest for Justice in Southern Louisiana and Sustainability in the Sonoran Desert David Jenkins, Joanne Bauer, Scott Bruton, Diane Austin, and Thomas McGuire
263 v
vi
PART II. UNDERSTANDING VALUES CROSS-NATIONALLY 5.
6.
7.
8.
The Value of Legality in Environmental Action Sheila Jasanoff
329
Environmental Transformations and the Values of Modernity Arun Agrawal
347
Evaluating Environmental Justice Claims Robert Melchior Figueroa
360
Framing Shared Values: Reason and Trust in Environmental Governance Clark A. Miller
377
PART III. REFLECTIONS ON THE STUDY OF ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES 9.
How Shall We Study Environmental Values? Joanne Bauer and Anna Ray Davies
Index
395 407
CONTRIBUTORS
vii
Contributors (in order of appearance)
— Editor — Joanne Bauer, director of studies at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs in New York until 2005, is the founding editor of Human Rights Dialogue (published by the Carnegie Council), and coeditor (with Daniel A. Bell) of The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights (1999). She currently consults to non-profits and foundations. — China — Foreword: Judith Shapiro is distinguished scholar in residence, American University, and author of Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (2001). Chapter: Pan Wei (research, Sanjiang study) is an associate professor of political science at the School of International Studies, Peking University. He is a specialist in comparative politics and the author of The Politics of Marketization in Rural China (2002). Shen Mingming (research team leader) is a professor of political science at the School of Government and the director of the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University. Song Guojun (research, Benxi study) is a professor of environmental economics in the School of Environment and Natural Resources, Renmin University. The China research reports were adapted and developed for this chapter by Judith Shapiro and Liu Yu, PhD candidate in political science at Columbia University, specializing in the politics of transition in China; Vivian Bertrand, program associate at the Carnegie Council (until 2003), and environmental policy researcher and analyst for the Canadian government; and Mary Child, a writer, editor, and publishing consultant in New York. vii
viii
CONTRIBUTORS
— Japan — Foreword: Jeffrey Broadbent teaches sociology at the University of Minnesota and is the author of Environmental Politics in Japan: Networks of Power and Protest (1998). Chapter: Aoyagi-Usui Midori (research) is a senior researcher in the Social and Environmental Systems Division of the National Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan and coeditor of Culture and Sustainability: A Cross-National Study of Cultural Diversity and Environmental Priorities Among Mass Publics and Decision Makers (2003). Arakaki Tazusa (research, Kumamoto-Minamata study) is a researcher at the Environmental Health Science Division of the National Institute for Environmental Studies. Previously (until March 2001) she was employed at the National Institute for Minamata Disease. Steven Hoffman (research) is an independent consultant on environmental issues and U.S.-Japan relations. Kada Yukiko (research team leader, Lake Biwa study) is a professor of sociology at Kyoto Seika University, whose research focuses on the Lake Biwa region, as well as Malawi and the Great Lakes of the United States. She was a chief architect in the design of the Lake Biwa Museum, where she is a senior researcher. Tanaka Shigeru (research, Nagara River study) teaches sociology at Ryukoku University. Watanabe Shinichi (research, Niigata Minamata study) is an associate professor at Nara University of Education. The Japan research report was adapted for this book with the help of Mary Child and Jilan Kamal.
— India — Foreword: Paul Greenough teaches history at the University of Iowa, where he is also chair of the Global Health Studies Program. He is the coeditor (with Anna L. Tsing) of Nature in the Global South: Environmental Projects in South and Southeast Asia (2003).
CONTRIBUTORS ix
Chapter: Amita Baviskar (Delhi study) does research on the cultural politics of environment and development. She has taught at the University of Delhi, Cornell University, and Stanford University. She is currently a visiting fellow at the University of California, Berkeley. Kavita Philip (Kerala study) is an associate professor of women’s studies at the University of California, Irvine. Her current research areas are environmental history, postcolonial and feminist science studies, globalization, and new media technologies. Subir Sinha (Kerala study) is a lecturer in institutions and development in the Department of Development Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. His current research focus is decentralized development in India, early postcolonial planning, and the global fishworkers’ movement.
— United States — Foreword: Keith Kloor is senior editor of Audubon magazine and author of a number of articles published in Audubon and elsewhere, including “Restoration Ecology: Returning America’s Forests to Their ‘Natural’ Roots” (Science, 2000). Chapter: Diane Austin (research) is an assistant professor at the Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona, and an assistant research anthropologist at the Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology (BARA), University of Arizona. Thomas McGuire (research) is an associate professor in Anthropology and an associate research anthropologist at BARA, University of Arizona. Erin Dean, Trenna Valado, Allison Davis, Candice Clifford, Jane Moody, and Colin Seay, all then University of Arizona graduate students affiliated with BARA, participated in the research of the Sonoran Desert case. The BARA research report (available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/ forgingenvironmentalism) was adapted and developed for this book by Joanne Bauer, David Jenkins, the executive director of the Roundhouse Institute for Field Studies, and Scott Bruton, PhD candidate in history at Rutgers University, specializing in American Indian history. Vivian Bertrand and Anna Ray Davies also contributed to writing of this chapter.
x
CONTRIBUTORS
— Commentators — Sheila Jasanoff is the Pforzheimer Professor of Science and Technology Studies at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She is the author most recently of Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States (2005) and coeditor (with Marybeth Long Martello) of Earthly Politics: Local and Global in Environmental Governance (2004). Arun Agrawal is an associate professor at the School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, author of Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects (2005), and coeditor (with K. Sivaramakrishnan) of Regional Modernities: The Cultural Politics of Development (2003). Robert Melchior Figueroa is an assistant professor of university studies and program coordinator for environmental studies at Colgate University. He is the author of the forthcoming Whose Environment? Which Justice? Social Philosophy and Environmental Justice and coeditor (with Sandra Harding) of Science and Other Cultures: Issues in Philosophies of Science and Technology (2003). Clark Miller is an assistant professor of public affairs, environmental studies, and science and technology studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is coeditor (with Paul N. Edwards) of Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance (2001). Anna Ray Davies is a lecturer in geography at Trinity College (Dublin), and author of “What Silence Knows: Planning, Public Participation, and Environmental Values” (2001). In 2000–2001 she was a Carnegie Council Environmental Values Fellow.
Acknowledgments
This study could not have been completed without the help of many hundreds of people—in Minamata City, Niigata City, at the mouth of the Nagara River, in the towns along the shores of Lake Biwa, in Benxi City and the Sanjiang Plain, in Delhi and throughout the fishing villages of southern Kerala, of the community of Civano (Tucson) and Grand Bois and its surrounding communities—for so generously agreeing to share their time, their homes, and their insights with researchers throughout the study. This research was possible only because of their willingness to include us in the events marking their communities and their lives. We are also grateful to the many scientists, doctors, journalists, religious leaders, and current and former local, provincial, tribal, state, and national government officials who were involved in the events related in these studies and were willing to share with us their experiences and perspectives. They helped us understand the complex histories of these places and the challenges and choices facing the communities described in this book. The study and this book would also not have been possible without the generous financial and moral support of the United States-Japan Foundation, former program officers Allan Song and James Schoff, and current program officer David Janes; the Ethics and Values Studies and Political Science Programs of the National Science Foundation and Rochelle Hollander, directorate for social, behavioral, and economic sciences; and The Henry Luce Foundation and Helena Kolenda, program officer for Asia. Very special thanks is due to the Carnegie Council and its president and vice president, Joel Rosenthal and Eva Becker, for demonstrating their belief in this project and in me by so generously and patiently supporting me through the long process of completing it. Thanks to all the people who participated in the planning and research workshops for the enthusiasm that kept the project moving forward and the insightful comments that informed the project and these chapters: Kenneth Acks, Sanjeev Ahluwalia, AoyagiUsui Midori, Arakaki Tazusa, Diane Austin, Tariq Banuri, Vivian Bertrand, Jeffrey Broadbent, Edith Brown Weiss, Robin Cantor, Bruce Chadwick, William Clark, Ken Conca, Anna Ray Davies, Timothy Finan, James Greenberg, Dipak Gyawali, Hao Bing, Hu Dayuan, Peter Haas, Steven Hoffman, Honzawa Kenji, Dale Jamieson, Sheila Jasanoff, David Jenkins, Kada Yukiko, Liu Shuqin, Roger Kasperson, Willett Kempton, Ma Zhong, Thomas McGuire, Clark Miller, Nalini Narayan, Indira Nair, R.K. Pachauri, Talbot Page, Pan Wei, Chandrika Parmar, Kavita Philip, Steve Rayner, Gene Rochlin, xi
xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Mark Sagoff, Savyasachi, Seiki Katsuo, Judith Shapiro, Shen Mingming, Robert Socolow, Leena Srivastava, Richard Suttmeier, Tanaka Shigeru, Sarah Trainor, Robert Weller, Brian Wynne, Shyama Venkateswar, Shiv Visvanathan, Song Guojun, Zhang Haibin, Zhang Jianyu, Zhang Lubiao, and Zhao Jimin. I would like especially to acknowledge Sheila Jasanoff for her intellectual leadership in the early phases of the project. Dale Jamieson, Roger Kasperson, Steve Rayner, Kavita Philip, and Judith Shapiro provided essential guidance as advisers to the project at and between project meetings. I am grateful to all those who took the time to read and comment on select chapters, including Robert Albro, Elizabeth Cole, Mary Lea Cox, Anna Ray Davies, Elizabeth Economy, Richard Franke, William Hurst, Dale Jamieson, Keith Kloor, John Kurien, John Laswick, Madeleine Lynn, Emma Mawdsley, Clark Miller, Andrew Nathan, Hari Osofsky, Steve Rayner, Timmons Roberts, Joel Rosenthal, David Schlosberg, Ajantha Subramanian, Joe Tharamgalam, Lydia Tomitova, and Charles Zerner. In addition, the project was featured at panels of the International Human Dimensions Open Meeting in Rio de Janeiro (2001), at the International Studies Association meeting (2002), and at three Carnegie Council-sponsored faculty development workshops at Columbia University (2001), the College of the Holy Cross (2003), and New York University (2004). Thanks to the individuals who attended those sessions for their interest and feedback. I am indebted to Katie Mastriani, Rachel Locke, and Vivian Bertrand and interns Deborah Matzner, Karen McGuire, and Josh Seidenfeld, who worked with me at the Carnegie Council, ably handling the myriad details that arise in managing a multiyear project of this scope, and who have all since moved on to important new challenges. When faced with the daunting task of consolidating the country research reports into a single book manuscript, I was fortunate to have close by Kavita Philip, Vivian Bertrand, Jilan Kamal, Mary Child, and (by e-mail) Anna Davies, whose enthusiasm and sharp insights kept the project alive. Mary and Jilan, along with Lauren Osborne and John Tessitore, lent their keen editorial skills in assisting with the chapters, while Rebecca Kraley, Anahita Marker, Zornitsa Stoyanova, and Yesim Yemni provided valuable help in checking facts and preparing the manuscript for publication. Special thanks also to Alice and Will Theide of DBA/Carto-Graphics for their skillful work in creating the country maps, and to Shefali Verma, Nancy Joyce, Yumiko Shimabukuro, and Yin Zhijing for their able transcribing and translating of Malayalam, Japanese, and Chinese interviews and data. I am deeply grateful to Patricia Loo, executive editor for Asian studies at M.E. Sharpe, for her belief in the project from early on. Both she and Angela Piliouras at Sharpe gave the manuscript the benefit of their expert attention and guidance. This book is the product of more than seven years of collaboration—a far greater time commitment than the participants made when they signed on to the project. I am grateful to all the project researchers and advisors who stuck with me for the duration despite the competing demands and pressures of their lives.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xiii
Finally, I wish to acknowledge my wonderfully supportive family. I am grateful to Oliver and Isabel for putting up with my absence as I disappeared on evenings and weekends for “Mommy’s project.” The peace of mind indispensable to a project of this complexity was provided by Lucie Bittnerova, my peerless babysitter. Most of all, I thank my amazing husband, Andrew Nathan, for his unflagging support, invaluable editorial help, steadfast willingness to make sacrifices, and endless patience. For you, Andy, no expression of gratitude is strong enough. In the final phase of writing this book, three of the communities who opened their doors to us and agreed to be interviewed for this study—the fishers of Kerala, the Houma of Grand Bois, and the people of the Sanjiang Plain—suffered terrible losses when each was struck by a major disaster (the natural disasters of the Asian tsunami in 2004 and the Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the manmade disaster of the Songhua River toxic spill in 2005). We extend our deepest sympathy and support to them and to all in the surrounding areas who were affected. In the hope that this book may in some small way help us to better understand their loss and how to prevent and mitigate it, this book is dedicated to them.
Editor’s Note
All Chinese and Japanese names in this volume appear with family name preceding given name. The conventional system of transliteration for Japanese is used. Terms from mainland China are rendered using the Pinyin system of romanization. Currency conversions for the Japan, China, and India chapters are based on historic exchange rates between the dollar and the foreign currency in the particular year in question. In cases where rates have fluctuated greatly, even within a single year, as in Japan, we have taken the year average as a basis for calculation. Numbers in dollars have been rounded off. An on-line companion to this volume containing supplementary information, further reading, related links, annotated bibliographies, discussion questions, and an online-only commentary, “On the Distinction Between Resource Use and Industrial Pollution,” by Steven Yearley (York University, Department of Sociology), is available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/forgingenvironmentalism.
xv
FORGING ENVIRONMENTALISM
Introduction Joanne Bauer
In a talk at the Carnegie Council about his book Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment,1 James Gustave Speth, a world-renowned expert on and leader in combating environmental problems, recited the grave threats facing the planet and lamented the failure of the international community to make progress against them in the past twenty-five years. He concluded that the solution rests largely with ordinary citizens “because the politicians have let us down.” Speth warned that “if citizens don’t take the helm, we will lose this fight.” In order to achieve Speth’s vision of “a new movement of consumers and households committed to sustainable living,” we need to understand what motivates people to act. We need to understand the social and cultural values that people bring to bear on environmental problems and how they mobilize those values to forge environmentalism—to create and sustain programs and movements of environmental action in their communities and their countries. The aim of this book is to enhance our understanding about environmental values and their expression in different social and cultural contexts around the globe. Although much of the environmental literature focuses on institutional capacities and available environmental technologies, little of it examines the experiences of communities trying to define environmental values in the context of struggles over livelihoods and lives. This book presents new case material that links the scientific analysis to policy analysis and then goes one step beyond to do what few studies do: to exam the values of all the stakeholders and their processes of interaction. This holistic approach provides a basis for understanding how people in different parts of the world define environmental goals and objectives, how their values related to the environment are shaped by lived realities, cultural contexts, and political struggles in which they forge their ideas about nature and the environment, and whose values matter and whose don’t in setting environmental priorities. This volume draws upon fieldwork conducted at ten sites in four economically, politically, and environmentally important, yet highly disparate, countries—the United States, China, India, and Japan—to analyze community responses to environmental degradation and to government policies that address the degradation. Our studies of growing competition over scarce resources, shifting government policies, 1
2
INTRODUCTION
and communities grappling with environmental crisis reveal some of the ways in which people make sense of their physical world and act upon it. In these stories we encounter the lived experiences, perceptions, and values that underlie competing claims regarding human interaction with the natural environment, and how those claims get articulated and negotiated within different political, economic, and social contexts. We also gain a clearer picture of how government policy contributes to the creation of environmental values: how it influences people to take steps to value and protect the environment. Part 1 of this book develops a rich empirical base that brings to light the cultural assumptions, standards, and analytic techniques implicit in environmental values, actions, and policies. We build this base for the four countries both as a foundation for action and a model for future studies that might fill in the tableau of the rest of the world. Because values are complex, we did not try to separate them out as a sole focus of inquiry. Our goal is to report thoroughly on the cases, not to draw any specific conclusions about the relationship between values and policy. Part 2 provides a comparative perspective on the ways in which, in different societies, values come to be publicly “environmental” in the first place. Taken together, the empirical base and the comparative perspective help us to identify what policymakers can do to secure public support for and trust in environmental policies. In addition, the comparative perspective enables us to identify a wide range of factors that contribute to changes in environmental values and behaviors, and to explore the possibilities for a convergence of environmental norms across diverse cultures. In documenting how the communities we studied make sense of the environmental problems they face and what environmental discourses prevail within them, we draw out the relationships between individual values and collective action and how values are interwoven with power and politics. Our studies demonstrate the fact that not all environmental values are accorded equal weight within the public domain, just as not all expressions of environmental value are seen as legitimately or properly “environmental.” Some values enter into environmental debates, policies, and legal decisions, while others are screened out or remain silenced. Rather than treating environmental values only as a distinct identifiable set of green values, therefore, the studies in this volume treat them as dynamic, and contingent on specific social, legal, political, and economic conditions. Seen this way, environmental values are, in the words of commentary author Clark Miller, “dynamic elements of community relationships and dialogues, shaped by the ways people attribute meaning and importance to scientific facts, weave them into broader social narratives, and to embed them in the tacit assumptions and day-to-day practices of institutions and the broader social order” (p. 380). Context is important because it shapes the ways in which people apprehend and value the environment, and how their environmental values are expressed. Our efforts to contextualize environmental values are aided by cross-national comparison, which helps to avoid essentializing difference, while clarifying particularities and commonalities across different societies and cultures.
INTRODUCTION
3
The Origins of the Book This book dates back to early 1992, when under the auspices of the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs and with the support of the then newly formed Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, I organized a series of meetings with Japanese and American environmental policy makers and their close advisers involved with the Earth Summit that was taking place that year in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The purpose of what we called the U.S.-Japan Task Force on the Environment was to enhance the efforts of government officials, scientists, and civil society to assemble an action program on the environment by exploring the moral assumptions and ethical principles underlying environmental policy decisions in both countries. The dialogue resulted in two 1993 reports that focused on this theme: Whose Environmental Standards? Clarifying the Issues of Our Common Future and The Politics and Ethics of Global Environmental Leadership. It engaged with policy debates about American and Japanese leadership roles and responsibilities for global environmental protection, about the U.S.-Japan relationship itself, and about opportunities for both countries to work together to solve shared environmental problems in a rapidly changing context for the conduct of international relations. The choice of the two countries was significant: whereas Japanese officials had recently and very publicly pledged Japan to be a global environmental leader, among U.S. officials there was much less consensus about what priority to place on environmental issues or whether the problems were even serious enough to warrant that kind of priority. By the time of the summit it had become increasingly clear that a cautious American approach to the environmental negotiations would win out. As a result, Japanese officials were faced with a dilemma: whether to maintain their traditional position of deference to the United States in international diplomacy or break with their American partners. Within the Japanese delegation—and within the very robust contingent of Japanese civil society present at the summit—there was a good deal of frustration with the American position, and our hope was that the task force could help to clarify the points of difference and agreement, and diffuse the tension. Among the many observations made by task force members, three stood out. First, a hypothesis was put forth that American individualism and Japan’s community and consensus orientation had significant implications for the way each country approached environmental issues. For example, in the case of ozone layer depletion, one participant observed that Japan tends to accept general scientific consensus and act on it without insisting on absolute certainty. U.S. policymakers, on the other hand, tend to pay more attention to the dissenter if there is no strong consensus. The practical effect, in terms of the ozone issue according to participants, was that the Japanese favored a strong ozone protection treaty, with stronger controls on the chemical industry, while the Americans did not. Second, we observed that U.S.-Japan dissonance at the Earth Summit was attributable in part to the way each delegation regarded the other. Just as the Japanese delegation members felt that the Americans showed little respect for other cultures, the American delegates felt that the Japanese
4
INTRODUCTION
placed too much emphasis on the “extractable value” of natural resources—the pecuniary benefits realizable from their exploitation—rather than value the eco-systems themselves. Finally, our task force pinpointed the problem of international dissatisfaction with the American failure of leadership, which, according to several Japanese participants included a lack of willingness to listen to the ideas of others. The task force was a valuable opportunity to candidly discuss tensions between American and Japanese negotiators in a private setting. But a seminar by its nature allows for the presentation of only a limited range of views—those of the seminar participants; missing was a clear sense of the range of views and debates going on within these societies at large, among citizens, activists, educators, scientists, and local policymakers. Once the hard work of fighting out the language of treaties and conventions is done and diplomats return home, the next task is to convince their publics of the need to make good on their commitments. Similarly, after the Carnegie Council task force reports had been written and sent to the press, questions remained: To what extent do the cultural, social, and economic priorities that the task force identified for each nation’s team of environmental negotiators accurately represent the priorities of U.S. or Japanese citizens? Do they reflect the values of ordinary Japanese and Americans whose lifestyle choices affect the environment and who are affected by and must respond to local, national, and increasingly international environmental policies and regulations? What kinds of policies should be adopted at home that can convince publics to embrace the Earth Summit agenda? These questions led us to want to better understand the dynamics of environmental politics in each country and the ways in which values towards the environment could be expressed and acted upon within a policy context. Considering the conclusions of an important study of environmental negotiations that had just been released,2 we reasoned that to improve the quality of communication between parties involved in international environmental negotiations, researchers and policy makers need better information on the differences and similarities of environmental values of the constituents of various countries and the political landscapes that shape the expression of those values in coping with similar environmental problems. Two years after the release of the task force reports, I initiated the Carnegie Council project upon which this book is based to explore these questions. We expected that the project would find a gap between citizens’ values and public policy, and we decided to explore the gap in each cultural context, why it developed, and how to bridge it. We were particularly interested in how increasing international economic, cultural, and political integration—a phenomenon commonly known as “globalization”—was affecting the ability of local actors to manage the environmental consequences of growth. In addition, we wanted to understand better the impact upon environmental values of both globalization and the internationalization of environmental standards. Along with the United States and Japan, we believed it would be valuable to bring into the study India and China—two environmentally, economically, and politically significant developing countries that were coming to be viewed as success stories of globalization.
INTRODUCTION
5
The participants in the planning phase were motivated by the possibility that such a study could prompt new thinking about approaches to environmental protection in their own country. The Americans emphasized the importance of providing insight for the domestic environmental policy community working both at home and abroad about the kind of technological and analytical assumptions embedded in American policies. Similarly, the Japanese researchers wanted to promote a new way of thinking in Japan through comparative study. The Chinese researchers wanted to demonstrate to an international audience the particular environmental challenges they face and thereby improve international trust and cooperation with China. Observing that the average citizen and policy maker in India is alienated from national policy, the Indian participants sought in the project a means to incorporate local people and their values into policy making. They also wanted to understand better what prompts people to adopt change either more or less eco-friendly lifestyles and they sought to do this through an exploration of the processes of technology transfer, technology absorption, and the values attached to them. As a group, we also wanted to scrutinize the school of thought promoted in both environmental policy and academic circles that says that people—poor people in particular—are chiefly concerned about their economic well-being, as distinct from their environmental well-being.3 And considering the tensions at Rio, we hoped that a comparative study of environmental values could point to ways of better promoting international cooperation. The Study This project can be seen as an experiment in collaboration. A Millian comparative “method of difference” or “method of agreement” did not fit our purpose, which was not to test explicit theories or hypotheses. Rather we aimed to get a fuller picture of local values, the transactions among stakeholders at different levels, and the interaction of community values and public policy. Like our research foci, our research method privileged the local: We decided to rely on country-based teams of researchers to select the cases, choose suitable methods, and conduct and analyze the fieldwork. We reasoned that research teams using the qualitative methods appropriate to the sites and the research traditions of each country could most effectively carry out this research. Yet while the research teams in each country were closer to the local scene than a foreign researcher would be, the gap between the foreign researchers and the researchers on the country teams was replicated by a gap between the researchers and their local informants, which had to be mediated in the field and in the chapters that appear here. To make the project comparative, we used a two-pronged strategy of approximate standardization and continuous interaction. Standardizing the methodology provided the structure needed to keep all the country studies moving in the same direction, while continuous interaction among the research teams enabled us to successively draw the project together by identifying common themes. At eight project meetings
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INTRODUCTION
that took place at intervals throughout the research and writing phases,4 we shared ideas, methods, and insights from our fieldwork, worked towards a common vocabulary, and made necessary adjustments to the research design. By bringing into relief the distinctiveness or commonness of what we were encountering in the field, this process informed each team about the findings of the others and influenced the way each team approached the fieldwork and the writing up of findings. In the intimate settings of these meetings, broad cultural and disciplinary differences were magnified, confronted, and usually understood through attention to the cultural context in which they were observed. The similarities and differences that we discovered in our methods and approaches helped shape the analyses of the research findings.5 Like the project, the book itself is a product of collaboration, with multiple analysts bringing their distinctive disciplinary and cultural perspectives to bear on the material. Part 1 is the product of researchers who selected the cases and carried out the studies; the chapter authors, who in certain cases are the same as the researchers and in other cases are writers who drew upon and expanded the original field reports; and the experts in environmental politics of each country who introduce the chapters. In Part 2, specialists in environmental justice, law and science policy, environmental politics, and global environmental governance analyze issues across the case material. Drawing upon their own theoretical concerns, they provide insights that might not be apparent to the researchers, and with which indeed the researchers might not always agree.6 This book, then, is intended to be a sourcebook and an invitation to others to use the material in a similar way. The country chapters in Part 1 have a common structure. Each begins with an introductory explanation of the significance of the selected cases, a statement of the research biases, and a description of the methods and line of inquiry pursued in the chapter. The case studies follow, first an industrial pollution case and then a resource use case. Each case study section contains a historical narrative of the case and an analysis based upon field interviews of stakeholders—people and groups interested in and affected by the environmental problem detailed in the narrative. The chapter authors frame the studies with a comparative analysis of the stakeholder responses to the two (or, in the Japan chapter, four) cases, developing insights into values and value change and relating these insights to broader trends of environmental policy and political action in the country in question. Immediately preceding each country chapter is an introductory essay by an expert on the environmental politics of the country, who situates the cases within the broader national context. The Four Countries Readers will recognize the four countries we cover in this book as four of the countries most responsible for industrial pollution and global resource management and whose cooperation is most required if real progress toward environmental sustainability is to be achieved.7 Together these four countries account for half the world’s population and economic output. They are also responsible for half the world’s emissions of
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carbon dioxide. In 2000, the four countries were among the top five in terms of total carbon emissions, and with GDP real growth rates in China and India continuing to soar, at 9.1 percent and 8.3 percent, respectively, their carbon emissions are expected to rise. Beyond this quintessentially global challenge, which Speth calls “the most serious issue of them all,” these countries face serious local resource and pollution concerns that often have cumulative regional and global effects.8 For the purpose of comparing and understanding how values are created in different contexts, however, the significance of these four countries lies not in what they have in common but in what makes each distinctive. As Clark Miller notes in his chapter, the four countries were not chosen at random: Economically, the four span a diversity of approaches to bridging markets and government planning and the three largest economies in the world. They include the widely regarded icon of Western, laissez-faire, liberal, free trade economics and the intellectual leader of the nonaligned movement. Politically, they are four of the world’s current great powers, including the last remaining communist great power, the world’s oldest democracy, and two countries whose current forms of governance have been adapted from legacies of occupation by Western countries with noticeably different notions about how to construct a democratic polity. Their inhabitants include some of the world’s richest and poorest peoples, not to mention large, influential populations of many of the world’s major religions, including Buddhism, Protestant and Catholic Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, and Shintoism. Last, but certainly not least, each possesses a highly regarded, well-funded environmental science community. (p. 392)
Thus, these countries present both interesting parallels and important social, cultural, political, and economic differences that affect the relationship humans have with nature, the character of environmental action, patterns of political mobilization, and responses to post-industrial change. In selecting the case studies within each country, project researchers sought to capture a wide range of variation within their country by including different socioeconomic classes, climates, and ethnic groups. We decided that each team would pick at least one case that involved the environmental impacts of industrial development and at least one case of natural resource protection; yet, while adhering to this rule, the study allowed the research teams to select cases that are particularly salient in the society they were studying, rather than insisting upon strict comparability across the cases. (The full criteria for case selection are described in the final chapter, “How Shall We Study Environmental Values?”) Our decision to distinguish two case types—resource use and industrial pollution —had its basis in the environmental studies literature, where this distinction is widely encountered.9 Because of their contrasts—in the most basic sense, between nature protection (“backward thinking”) discourses and development (“forward thinking”) discourses—the two case types would enable us to capture different human-nature interactions as well as the experiences of both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, we expected that the ways in which conflicts develop and are resolved would differ significantly in the two case types. In resource use cases, the resource is always seen to
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INTRODUCTION
be a public good; the conflict involves a competition of values over how the resource should be used. Pollution, on the other hand, except in its commodification through tradable permit or recycling schemes, is always a public bad, but one that is sometimes ignored. When part of a community ignores pollution and part tries to eliminate it, value differences emerge, and conflict erupts. Thus, whereas solutions to the resource use cases involve resolving a competition over values, we hypothesized that environmentalist solutions to industrial pollution would require facilitating a convergence of values over time by raising awareness of the pollution and its consequences. Still, we recognized that the distinction between the two kinds of cases, which is widely encountered in environmental policy literature, may not in fact be the most analytically important distinction, and thus we endeavored to examine its usefulness in the study.10 The China chapter describes two instances of ostensibly progressive policy initiatives to protect the environment undertaken or backed by China’s central government. Recent studies of Chinese environmental politics document the rise of public concern for the environment in the form of government-sanctioned environmental civic associations.11 In our two cases the government’s green initiatives provoked a quiet backlash—quiet because of the persistent limits on freedom of speech and organization in China. The pollution study is set in Benxi, a city known for its steel production, in Liaoning Province in China’s industrial belt. The air in the city became so polluted that by the 1980s Benxi had earned a reputation as “the city that cannot be seen by a satellite.” Reactions from the Benxi public to the effort to turn Benxi into a model environmental city underscore the class stratification taking place in China as a result of the transition to a market economy begun also in the 1980s: whereas the new white-collar class was happy to see blue skies return, the growing number of residents struggling to cope with a transitional market economy betrayed cynicism and contempt for the environmental measures. Our Chinese resource use case is the Sanjiang Plain wetlands, in the extreme northeastern corner of China, where economic development has been at odds with recent wetlands conservation efforts. Here, public resentment of the environmental campaign has been even greater than in Benxi. For nearly five decades, out of concern about food scarcity, the central government promoted the Sanjiang Plain as a frontier for agricultural production and lured many migrants to the wilderness region to reclaim and cultivate the land. In the late 1990s a sudden about-face of government priorities led to a moratorium on land reclamation for agricultural development and other restrictions on land use. With the designation of a nature reserve in the Sanjiang Plain, initially by provincial authorities, there was growing awareness among both Chinese officials in Beijing and slowly also local officials of the importance of wetland preservation as a way of protecting wildlife and plant species and bringing other benefits—including the national security the sustained forest cover would provide from neighboring Russia. Nonetheless, local officials and residents alike felt betrayed by the more severe restrictions that came when the wetland was upgraded to a national level wetland and designated a “wetland of international importance.” While
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nature reserve officials were optimistic about the possibilities for ecotourism and other forms of economic activity the wetland might bring, the failure to fund the reserve adequately, along with corruption among local officials, fueled anger among most interviewees, who had experienced the damage to their livelihoods and their futures resulting from the upgrading of the wetland. Still, a contingent of stakeholders at each site were convinced that something needed to be done to clean up Benxi’s pollution and preserve China’s wetlands, and that doing so would bring other benefits (such as attracting foreign funding) to both locales. The influential political scientist Robert Putnam has coined the term “two-level game” to describe a situation in which international pressure enables government leaders to shift the balance of power in their domestic game in favor of a policy that they privately support but previously felt powerless to undertake.12 One might expect that, with the Chinese authoritarian system, China’s leaders would not need to play the two-level game, but our cases demonstrate that international pressure did provide needed legitimacy to the government’s policies. The Japan chapter presents two industrial pollution case studies and two resource use case studies—in each pair a primary case and a secondary case for comparison. For the pollution cases, the sites are Minamata, a city in Kumamoto Prefecture, where factory effluent caused severe mercury poisoning, leading to intense social and political conflict; and along the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture in northern Japan, where there was a second incident of mercury poisoning, which came to be known as NiigataMinamata. In contrast to Minamata, where victim suffering slowly gave rise to a powerful citizen’s movement, in Niigata, because of a greater social and physical distance between polluter and victim, value and policy changes were not as pronounced, despite the severe human harm and social conflict that also occurred there. The resource use case sites are Lake Biwa, Japan’s largest lake, where the national objective of increasing water resources to serve rapidly industrializing cities downstream, led to massive public works projects (including dam construction), which over three decades radically changed the landscape and lifestyles of the lakeshore; and the Nagara River, where a diversified social movement of leisure fishers and nature enthusiasts with conflicting motives mobilized to fight the construction of a dam on Japan’s last remaining natural river. As the Japan chapter shows, a shift in the terminology used to describe environmental problems from kogai (literally, “public nuisance”) to kankyo mondai (environmental issues) tracks a change in Japanese conceptions of human-nature relationships. When the Minamata City and Lake Biwa studies begin, in postwar Japan around the 1960s, Japanese society is at what the Japan team refers to as the “embedded whole” phase—“where environmental values do not translate into a valuing of specific elements of nature or into a discrete concept of nature” (p. 171); rather, in this phase humans are viewed as being at one with nature. The authors trace how, with large-scale and rapid industrial development, marked environmentally by the outbreak of Minamata-like kogai crises, most Japanese saw themselves as apart or “abstracted” from nature. Over time, however, each community began to reconnect
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with nature, thereby approaching what the authors call the “balanced whole” phase, in which the physical environment becomes valued again (“re-embedded”) as a fundamental part of human existence. This stage of environmental consciousness is marked by civic environmental movements—in our cases, the anti-detergent movement, or soap movement, taken up by the lakeshore residents of Lake Biwa in the late 1970s, an anti-dam movement at the Nagara River in the late 1980s, and the Moyainaoshi Campaign, the government-led initiative to heal Minamata begun in the 1990s. While the Minamata victims’ movement of the 1960s brought Japan’s kogai problems into the public eye for the first time, these later movements were all carried out in the name of kankyo mondai. What became lost in the terminology shift from kogai to kankyo mondai, however, was the claim of victimhood, which is implicit in kogai problems. The new terminology thus represents the influence of elites—in fact, the soap movement was engineered by the prefectural government and the anti-dam movement by a group of leisure fishers—and the obscuring of social injustice in environmental policy decisions and outcomes. Our India pollution case centers on Delhi, which in 2000 was rated as the world’s fourth-most-polluted city,13 and where, as in Benxi, environmental politics is dominated by a new, politically powerful middle class. Unlike Benxi, where the conflict between environmental policy and livelihood may be more perceived than real, in Delhi the policy solution to industrial pollution—namely, the closure of thousands of factories around the city—directly affected the livelihoods of residents, from industrialists to casual workers, while bringing little if any reduction in air pollution. Even before the legal action that led to the factory closings, poor working conditions rendered factory workers more vulnerable to the toxic burden of the city’s polluting factories, and they are also the ones who had to bear the cost of the new green agenda. The study points to the politics of labeling—the politics surrounding what set of values gets labeled as “environmental” and therefore receives national and international recognition and support. In this case the judge who ruled in favor of the factory closings was hailed as the “green judge,” and the lawyer who sued to relocate the factories received a prestigious international award. Meanwhile, the middle-class elite regarded the plight of the displaced workers, who mobilized to fight for their rights to earn a living wage, as the unavoidable cost that must be borne for the sake of lessening the city’s pollution. The study demonstrates the interrelationship between the two forms of environmentalism, with the green agenda of the rich leading to greater social and economic marginalization of the poor and their concerns over fair distribution of resources and safe working conditions. The Indian resource use case concerns fisheries in Kerala, the Indian state with the highest rate of literacy, where international aid helped to modernize the fisheries almost six decades ago, presenting fishers with a fundamental choice with which they are still grappling today: whether to maintain their traditional fishing practices, which are more sustainable, or to adopt mechanized technology at the risk of depleting marine resources. The Kerala study brings to light the local effects of technology transfer (in this case, outboard motors and large fishing trawlers) in particular, the ways in which
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Kerala fishers made sense of their lives in light of the new choices. Contrary to romanticized images of traditional communities defining their identity in terms of indigenous practices, the authors point out, the artisanal fishers (the local moniker for those who use traditional crafts) shared many of the same interests in access to markets, capital, and technology as their “capitalist” rivals. As a result, the authors argue that the case demands a more complicated account of the material and symbolic relationships between people and resources than is represented by the familiar narrative of “a superior group . . . usurp[ing] the business terrain of a disempowered tradition” (p. 192). As the title of the chapter on the United States, “Two Faces of American Environmentalism,” indicates, the two U.S. cases represent the principal cleavage within U.S. environmentalism: the environment justice movement and its concern with fair distribution of resources and toxic burdens, and the mainstream environmentalist agenda of resource preservation. The cases are thematically linked by the country’s addiction to cheap energy supplies. The tiny town of Grand Bois in southern Louisiana, which was sickened by oilfield waste deposited in a nearby pit, is the site of the U.S. pollution study. In the aftermath of the health crisis that results, Grand Bois’s Houma Indian and Cajun communities must make sense of their allegiance to their fellow community members, their generations-long commitment to the land, and their ties to the oil industry that has come to sustain them. This incident of a major oil conglomerate, Exxon Corporation, poisoning the community—an act which was entirely acceptable by national and state laws—is representative of many instances of environmental injustice in rural areas in the United States that depend on natural resource extraction for their economic livelihoods. The residents of Grand Bois contrast with the affluent and mobile families who moved in search of community to the focal point of the U.S. resource use case, Civano, on the outskirts of Tucson, in the desert region of southern Arizona. Civano was a high-profile state- and city-financed housing experiment designed to be a national model of sustainable development. A growth area of the United States, the region had long contended with the multiple threats that population growth and urban sprawl brought to this dry and ecologically sensitive region. While most of Civano residents were originally drawn to the development from both inside and outside Arizona by its promise of community and energy efficiency (which translated for many as lower utility bills), they soon became aware of and committed to the project’s conservation goals, seeing themselves as pioneers of sustainable living. The case reveals the values —community, economic, social, and cultural—underlying competing visions of sustainability, the difficulty of shifting from efficiency politics to sustainability politics, the compromises that had to be made in order to maintain an economically sound venture, and how people defined themselves in the process. The case shows that when policy makers create models of sustainable living, they can raise environmental consciousness and promote environment-friendly behavior. Yet the failure of the project to meet many of its original environmental goals and to consider the impacts of continued sprawl produced a limited notion of environmentalism that in the end had limited impact and support.14
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Understanding Values Cross-Nationally In Part 2, commentators weave thematic threads through the country chapters into commentary chapters that provide cross-national analysis across these very rich cases. They identify similarities across the cases, that while unsurprising, are nonetheless important: that environmental degradation and environmental policy have similar impacts on the poor and disenfranchised; that rich and poor people respond differently to environmental problems; and that environmental crises trigger social mobilization and social and value change. Yet they also identify significant differences from country to country in social relations and political culture, which affect the ways in which values are articulated and conflicts resolved or not resolved. Sheila Jasanoff examines the use of the law in the case studies, both as a culturally specific expression of a society’s political and moral values and as a reflection of a universal commitment to lawfulness. She focuses on the formal and informal uses of the law by citizens and government bodies “in their attempts to navigate the contrary currents of environmental protection and resource appropriation” (p. 330). Jasanoff compares the cases across five areas of the law: resource allocation and planning; victim compensation; environmental standard-setting; the mobilization of science in service to the law, or “knowledge-making”; and resistance to unjust environmental actions and policy. Jasanoff does not address the problem of non-adherence to the law (as Robert Melchior Figueroa does in a later chapter on environmental justice); yet her commentary is shaped by the understanding that adherence to the law is itself a value that “structures the expression of environmental values everywhere” (p. 330). Jasanoff sees convergence across the cases in the ways in which the authority of institutions is undermined by interest-driven science (i.e., the manipulation of science by government and industry), the demand of courts and policymakers for indisputable scientific proof of harm, and the inadmissibility of “nonscientific” forms of knowledge, even when people’s lives are being ravaged by pollution. But she is even more interested in how the strikingly different and sometimes conflicting values influence both the content of the law in each society and the way it is used, including methods of dispute resolution, the emphasis placed on particular types of legal standards, community building strategies, and social contracts. All of these differences in legal cultural have direct implications for the disparate ways in which environmental values are expressed and negotiated across the cases. The aspiration to be modern—to attain technology-driven development and to establish democratic societies—motivated many of the people in the studies to accept or reject environmental policies and sometimes to seek to change them. Indeed, probing the communities’ aspirations to be modern, and the various meanings they ascribe to the notion of modernity, is one way project researchers assessed environmental values in the field. The authors of the Japan study, who most directly
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address the modernity drive, observe modernization as manifested in the processes of separating, or “abstracting,” humans from nature, and in Japan’s democratization, and attribute these processes to the strong aspiration among postwar Japanese to be modern. Notably, they cite one informant who takes issue with the critics of the proposed dam on the Nagara River. “It’s just emotional sentimentalism to want a river to remain just as it is,” the informant says. “Such thinking has no place in modern society.” In “Environmental Transformations and the Values of Modernity,” Arun Agrawal identifies three values of modernity that influence approaches to the environment in all the case studies: the pursuit of progress; reason, based on scientific knowledge; and the belief in equality. All of the cases evolve under the rubric of progress: we see little questioning of modern forms of development except from a key actor in the Minamata case, Ogata Masato. While Jasanoff identifies a conscious effort by some people in the conservation cases to define themselves apart from this trend—what she calls an “antimodern” (as opposed to “premodern”) position—Agrawal stresses that these cases are nonetheless driven on both sides by the pursuit of material goods (e.g., economic benefit, flood prevention, and diplomatic leverage). Further, Agrawal observes that all the studies document people on both sides of the disputes engaging in the act of classifying the environment as a distinct policy domain that can be studied in isolation from other social processes. This manifestation of modernity does more than explain environmental problems; such classifications, says Agrawal, can also be seen “to constitute our views about [our relationship to] the environment.” Finally, Agrawal notes that in each case an environmental crisis prompted a social movement that revealed modern democratic values. Often, however, this democratic impulse is challenged and even “trumped” by political economic realities—that is, by a competing claim about modernity, as the above-cited quotation by the critic of the Nagara Dam protesters illustrates. Justice constitutes a central theme in this volume. By examining environmental values in the context of specific policy actions, the studies reveal the varying degree to which people and groups have the power to order their lives—in other words, the degree to which their values matter. Robert Melchior Figueroa proposes an “environmental justice paradigm” that includes distributive justice and recognition justice, and he uses the cases in the book to illustrate the various modes of injustice that often characterize environmental controversies. In the case of Benxi, for example, he asserts that in implementing their green campaign, city officials did not adequately take into account the needs of the many people who have suffered the skyrocketing unemployment that has resulted from the changeover to a market economy. Similarly, he argues that the Civano development project failed to account fully for the interests of those harmed by Tucson’s further expansion (the Hopi and Navajo Indian tribes to the northern and inner-city Mexican Americans). This is environmental injustice even if these communities were unaware of the Civano project or had never considered its impact on their lives.
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Figueroa traces the theme of justice through the cases to show that in every one of them a community is forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of a harmful industrial practice or an environmental policy, or is unjustly deprived of a resource. Compounding these inequities is a keen awareness within the victim community that their voices are not heard and that their values, interests, and identities are not respected. Those communities that are repeatedly denied a fair hearing within the policy process are often left feeling despair or anger, which they sometimes convert into social action in the form of an environmental justice movement. Figueroa also stresses the importance of public recognition of the damage to environmental identity—cultural identity as it relates to one’s environmental surroundings —by both environmental assaults and insensitive policies, which is typically overlooked in remedies to environmental injustice. Damage to environmental identity can be devastating and irreversible, and justice measures that do not account for it are only partial. Among our cases, such damage is most severe in Grand Bois, Minamata, and Kerala, although Figueroa suspects that the environmental identity of traditional herders and hunters who live in the Sanjiang Plain and the residents of Benxi may also have been harmed in ways that are not fully explored in the cases. Clark Miller concludes Part 2 by examining the implications of the case studies for global environmental governance. Miller advises that our project be understood as an instance of “comparative globalism,” probing the ways in which people in local settings are jointly “confronting and interpreting key elements of a global environmental agenda.” Miller proposes three lenses—framing, styles of reasoning, and trust —through which to view environmental values related to governance while taking into account the culturally grounded ways in which people come to hold environmental values. Framing, Miller writes, is the process by which “people are taught to interpret and value what they see happening around them in new ways.” Styles of reasoning are the ways in which people connect their observations about the world to these broader frameworks. And trust in institutions is the crucial element in establishing standards, or “shared styles of reasoning,” that can achieve public legitimacy. Starting with framing, Miller uses two pairs of contrasting examples—first, China and Japan and, then, India and the United States—to show how differently people confront similar environmental challenges. In discussing the first pair, he underscores the distinction between top-down and bottom-up initiatives for environmental improvement. Meanwhile, in the case of the United States, the principal antagonists are corporate interests and activists, whereas in India the sharpest conflicts are drawn in class terms. Furthermore, the United States study frames the problems in terms of consumer choice, whereas the authors of the India case studies are “staunchly critical of consumerism” (p. 385). It is noteworthy that the particular frames Clark identifies are in fact those of the national research team, which in turn reflect local framings. Miller goes on to discuss the lenses of styles of reasoning and trust, explaining that “only as specific frames begin to get taken up and made use of in individual and collective decisions do they begin to have real bite in terms of social and environmental outcomes” (p. 386). He concludes with a lesson for global governance: we need to
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build institutions of global environmental governance that are able to acknowledge and legitimize the expression of plurality in the world system. Forging Environmentalism across Cultures Within the human rights field, there is substantial scholarly debate over whether rights belong to the group or the individual person and how to reconcile the two sets of rights bearers in the implementation of human rights principles. By contrast, in the case of environmental issues, as these studies demonstrate, the line between individual environmental values and community values is blurred. While many social scientists maintain that values do not matter, that individuals may talk about values but act on the basis of interests, these studies show that values are an integral part of a process of identity formation and social mobilization.15 In all the places we studied —among the Kerala fishworkers, the Minamata disease victims, the Houma and Cajun of Grand Bois, the housewives of Lake Biwa, the Delhi factory workers and owners, the fishers of the Nagara River area, and the residents of Civano—it is by forming attachments to communities that people find ways to confer legitimacy on their values, invoke them, and convert them into action. By documenting this process across the cases, these chapters show how values are synthesized to form discourses, social positions, and shared community norms that influence reactions to environmental conditions and policies, and sometimes bring about policy changes. We find that the environment is a meeting point for a range of policies and actions. How and when people recognize environmental degradation to be a problem, and how they respond to the problem and to government efforts to address it reflect not only values concerning the natural world, but also values concerning work, health, religion, family, and community. As David Jenkins observed during his work on the United States study: Environmental values are deeply embedded in other values, and to separate them does not reflect the lives and concerns of people. . . . Follow the thread of any environmental value—from wilderness preservation to sustainable development—and what one finds is a tangle of politics, science, economics, nature, technology, and individual agency, all informed by local culture.16
In other words, we see no distinct sphere of environmental values that stands apart from other values. This does not mean, however, that talk about sustainable development is merely a smoke screen for self-interested politics. To the contrary, it is evident that people hold deep feelings about the physical world they inhabit. One of the most poignant examples in the book is the reluctance of the Minamata fishers to accept the fact that the fish in Minamata Bay were contaminated, which would mean abandoning their traditional way of life and sustenance. Their belief in the beneficence of nature brought a devastating consequence: some went on eating the fish and suffered the crippling and often deadly disease as a consequence. As a Minamata poet fisherman movingly wrote:
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No one can understand why I love the sea so much. The sea has never abandoned me. The sea is the blood of my veins.17 Similar feelings underlay the ambivalence of many fishers in Kerala about adopting new fishing technology because they fear its impact on Kadalamma, Mother Sea. They reasoned that they have been blessed in the past because they have never disturbed her. Nobel laureate in economics Amartya Sen lent his weight to the global debate over sustainable development when he argued that the concept should be broadened beyond the narrow “needs” focus given to it back in 1987, when it was first conceived and popularized by the Bruntland Report (also known as Our Common Future).18 Referring to the oft-cited line in the report that defined sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs,” Sen wrote: Certainly, people have “needs,” but they also have values, and, in particular, they cherish their ability to reason, appraise, act and participate. . . . We are not only patients, whose needs demand attention, but also agents, whose freedom to decide what to value and how to pursue it can extend far beyond the fulfillment of our needs. . . . Should we not be concerned with preserving—and when possible expanding—the substantive freedoms of people today “without compromising the ability of future generations” to have similar, or more, freedoms? Focusing on “sustainable freedoms” may not only be conceptually important. . . . It can also have tangible implications of immediate relevance.19
Our cases describe both realized and unrealized attempts by people to exercise their freedom to choose how to value the environment. They each give rise to the question of who has the freedom to express their values, and produce remarkably similar conversations regarding fairness, justice and privilege that bring into relief class divisions. India, for example, has seen the evolution of two distinct forms of environmentalism: a green agenda for the new middle class and a resource scarcity agenda for the nation’s chronically poor, with the former winning out over the latter. While these two forms of environmentalism are very different, they are hardly isolated from each other: the green demands of the rich increase the marginalization of the poor, forcing them to defend their livelihoods. In this political environment resistance to the middle-class-supported environmental campaign is regarded by elites to be an immoral, as well as illegal, act. Similarly in our China cases, we see widespread support for the government’s resolve to act upon new scientific evidence of environmental degradation among the new middle class, and cynicism toward the government-led environmental agenda among the widening ranks of the unemployed and the peasant class. The phenomenon of divergent environmentalisms cuts across de-
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veloping and developed countries. In the United States in the 1980s social justice advocates gave birth to an environmental justice movement to challenge mainstream environmentalism’s preoccupation with resource preservation at the expense of the serious toxic pollution concerns facing poor, disenfranchised communities.20 Our two U.S. cases are emblematic of this divide. And, in Japan, in all the cases lower-class fishers and residents repeatedly lose out to powerful corporate interests. Across the cases the international environmental movement is a powerful force in conferring legitimacy on a particular set of environmental values—in deciding which of these voices will enjoy the favor of environmentalists. When local groups forge alliances and build networks internationally, they bring about an intentional convergence of values and approaches that can fuel political mobilization and strengthen their movements, as in the cases of the Kerala fishworkers and the Nagara anti-dam movement. We also see the positive impact of international standards on political mobilization, as in the case of Lake Biwa, where the lawyers who filed suit to halt public works projects used human rights language, which they claimed as “Japanese” because it was enshrined in their constitution during the U.S. Occupation. Yet often times, international involvement has the unintentional effect of silencing or radically altering local movements. In the Nagara case, for example, the recreational fishers succeeded in bringing international attention to their cause through the international networks they forged at the 1992 Earth Summit and later through the World Commission on Dams. However, as they succeeded in popularizing their own movement, they drowned out the local commercial fishers who had first protested the planned dam. As a result, the opportunity was lost for a robust public debate on environmental justice that could have taken the fishers’ voices into account. Similarly, international environmentalists ignored the plight of the Delhi workers while praising the Delhi authorities’ efforts to clean up their city. The media took notice only when many thousands of protesters took to the streets, bringing traffic to a halt for several days in November 2000.21 Yet even then, the media framed the problem in terms of worker protests against environmental measures rather than as a different expression of environmental values, one that promoted a healthy working environment and better living conditions for all. In the Sanjiang Plain case, local farmers and recent migrants to the region hardly stand a chance of having their voices heard in the face of intense international pressure for China to preserve her wetlands. In reaction, some communities intentionally avoid terminology associated with the international environmental movement. In Grand Bois, Delhi, and Kerala members of the affected community showed reluctance even to define their problems in terms of “the environment.” Indeed, victims and movement leaders saw “the environment” as carrying an agenda that stood in opposition to their own environmental values. In Grand Bois and Delhi the reaction against the term is visceral. In Kerala, a mark of the advancement of the movement was the movement leaders’ ability to articulate clearly their problem with the term, which they associate with resource conservation as an externally imposed environmental ethic. The term entered their radar when international
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INTRODUCTION
environmentalists developed ecolabeling schemes and promoted a proscription on turtle exclusion devices, which the fishworker leaders regarded primarily as means for foreign powers to safeguard market access. Instead of such an “imposed and restrictive form of international environmentalism” (p. 243), they characterized their movement as defending sustainable livelihoods, with a priority on the well-being of vulnerable humans, which they maintain is not the same as resource conservation. Thus, we find that in many instances local vocabularies do not reflect the international discourse, and vice versa. Such a schism also occurs between local and national levels, creating a roadblock to pubic recognition of certain environmental problems. The national and international attention the Kerala fish workers and Nagara dam protesters gained through NGO networking was absent in the oilfield waste contamination case in Grand Bois, Louisiana, for example, where there was initially no national movement to champion the cause of the affected residents. In fact, because oilfield waste is “nonhazardous” by law, even the American environmental justice movement did not at first notice the problem. Much has been written about globalization’s homogenizing effects and the damage it does to local cultures. With the loss of control for many individuals and communities at the local level has come, paradoxically, a greater attachment to place, a quest for cultural belonging, and a rise in the desire for cultural identity.22 In Kerala, following the national and international expansion of the fishworkers movement, the fishworkers returned to an appreciation of local roots, leading to revisionist thinking about the value of anything foreign. Calls for local autonomy and a say in the policies that affect one’s community also accompany growing environmental awareness in Delhi, Minamata, Nagara, Lake Biwa, Civano, and Grand Bois. As time passes, we may well also hear them in Benxi and in the Sanjiang Plain. The environmental advocate William Shutkin underscored the intimate connection between values, community, and environment and the imperative of sustainable freedoms when he wrote: The environment is the sum of all those places in cities, suburbs and rural areas that play an essential part in constituting our sense of ourselves as individuals and members of a community that demand our care and attention if they are to enhance, rather than diminish, that sense. To ensure the production and protection of a healthy environment requires the participation of those whose quality of life ultimately depends on it: ordinary citizens.23
One way to call attention to the global environmental crisis and build a movement that can lead to the large-scale citizen environmental activism sought by Speth is to acknowledge the various ways that people make sense of their world by publicly recognizing environmental and cultural identity. A lesson of all these studies is that we cannot adjudicate resource use and pollution conflicts solely on a scientific and technological basis or through “one world” approaches to environmental problems. In our quest for a solution to the crisis we need to resist a single narrative—as the India study underscores. Rather, we need a “fusion of horizons,” where “the moral
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universe of the other becomes less strange,” to borrow the words of the philosopher Charles Taylor.24 A principal ethical concern of environmental policy should be to devise systems of governance that hear the voices of all affected citizens. The democratic space must include room for communities to forge environmentalism consistent with what they value in their lives. Some political systems more than others allow people to freely express their values, yet even in the most open systems the right of free expression is circumscribed for certain groups. The convergence of environmental discourses across nations and locales and the silencing of local discourses reminds us that too often movements get valorized as local when they are not only. The multiple scales at which even a seemingly local problem occurs in terms of causes and effects complicate existing ethical questions regarding, for example, who sets the environmental agenda, whose voice counts, who bears the risk, who decides, and who pays? There are and will be conflicts of value frames surrounding such questions locally as well as internationally. Our hope is that in its focus on grounded understandings of the interplay between values and knowledge, this book might help guide us toward ways to resolve those conflicts justly, improve global environmental governance, and ultimately protect our cherished earth. Notes 1. A transcript of the talk is available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/viewMedia.php/ prmTemplateID/8/prmID/4469, accessed 15 December 2004. See also James Gustave Speth, Red Sky at Morning: America and the Crisis of the Global Environment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), ch. 9. 2. Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K. Jacobson, eds., Engaging Countries: Strengthening Compliance with International Environmental Accords (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000). 3. See Ragnar E. Lofstedt, “Why Are Public Perception Studies on the Environment Ignored,” Global Environmental Change 5, no. 2 (1995): 83–85; Raymond M. Duch and Michael A. Taylor, “Postmaterialism and the Economic Condition,” American Journal of Political Science 37, no. 3 (August 1993): 747–79; and Ronald Inglehart and Paul R. Abramson, “Economic Security and Value Change,” American Political Science Review 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 336–54. 4. The meetings took place in New York City (in April 1998), where the protocol was agreed upon and the project launched; Kusatsu, Japan (July 1999); New York City again (October 1999); Wuxi, China (January 2000); Beijing, China (July 2000); Udaipur, India (January 2001); and Tarrytown, New York (September 2001). Before or after the formal meetings in Kusatsu, New York (October 1999), Beijing, and Udaipur, researchers also visited one of the sites of the host research team (Lake Biwa, Grand Bois, Benxi, and Delhi/Agra). 5. The research meetings included the principal researchers from the four country teams. In the case of India, however, the researchers who selected the case studies and participated in the process of collaboration across research teams did not submit a chapter for this volume. Thus, after the final project meeting in September 2001, I commissioned the authors—Amita Baviskar, Kavita Philip, and Subir Sinha—to write the chapter that appears here using the research protocol developed by the project. They drew upon fieldwork they had previously conducted in Kerala and Delhi and supplemented it with fieldwork conducted specifically for this study. Despite the change in authorship, the case studies and the approach to the case
20
INTRODUCTION
studies remain generally consistent with those of the Indian researchers who attended the project meetings and submitted fieldwork reports for group discussion. 6. Project participants considered the idea of allowing chapter authors to respond to the commentary authors within this text, but space did not permit it. As editor, I facilitated dialogue between the commentary authors and the country chapter authors and queried authors when I suspected possible disagreement or misreading of the case material. 7. Steven Gardiner argues that it is wrong to think that climate change can ever be successfully addressed without the full cooperation of China, India, and the United States. See Steven Gardiner, “The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto Protocol,” Ethics & International Affairs 18, no. 1 (2004): 28. 8. For example, according to the United Nations Environment Program, the air in Asia’s cities, including Beijing, Shanghai, and Delhi, is among the worst in the world. In China, contaminated drinking water is arguably the country’s most serious environmental problem, with as much as 25 percent of the population lacking access to an “improved water source.” India is doing only a little better than China, with 16 percent of the population lacking such access. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency found that “forty percent of surveyed rivers, lakes and estuaries are not clean enough to meet basic uses such as fishing or swimming because of non-point specific pollution.” And in Japan the quality of lake water in a number of areas is deteriorating. For documentation on carbon emissions and all of these statistics, see www.carnegiecouncil.org/forgingenvironmentalism. 9. For a discussion of the distinction in the literature, see Steven Yearley, Sociology, Environmentalism, Globalization (London: Sage, 1996), 43–51. 10. Steven Yearley does precisely this in a paper written for this project, available at www.carnegiecouncil.org/forgingenvironmentalism. Unfortunately, space limitations prevented its publication in this volume. 11. The China Environment Forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars has done extensive documentation of the development and work of environmental civic organizations in China. See especially, Elizabeth Knup, “Environmental NGOs in China: An Overview,” China Environment Series (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), 9–15; Jennifer Turner and Wu Fengshi, eds., Green NGO and Environmental Journalist Forum (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2002), available at www.wilsoncenter.org/cef. See also Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), ch. 5; and Nick Young, “Searching for Civil Society,” Civil Society in the Making: 250 Chinese NGOs (Beijing: China Development Brief, 2001), 9–19. 12. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1998): 427–60. 13. This statistic has been cited widely and attributed variously to the World Health Organization and the World Bank. 14. Advocates of Civano are quick to point out that the Civano experience did pave the way for future, more successful sustainable development projects in Tucson. For example, Wayne Moody, the city planning director during the development of Civano, built on the experience to develop Milagro, a similar, albeit much smaller, demonstration project in inner-city Tucson. Not only does this project directly serve the less well off, but also it was more successful at incorporating environment-friendly features than was Civano (Moody, e-mail communication, 14 July 2004). 15. Of course many social scientists agree with this. See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); and Charles Tilly, Marco Giugni, and Doug McAdam, How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). 16. David Jenkins, United States Research Report to the Carnegie Council Understanding Values Project, Carnegie Council, May 2001, 3–4. 17. Cited in Douglas Allchin, University of Minnesota, Resource Center for Science Teach-
INTRODUCTION
21
ers Using Sociology History and Philosophy of Science, available at www1.umn.edu/ships/ ethics/minamata.htm, accessed 2 September 2004. 18. The Bruntland Report, published as Our Common Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), is the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, led by Gro Harlem Bruntland, then prime minister of Norway. Barbara Rose Johnston, Life and Death Matters: Human Rights and the Environment at the End of the Millennium (Walnut Creek, CA: Altimira Press, 1997), 9–12, 330–39. 19. Amartya Sen, “Why We Should Preserve the Spotted Owl,” London Review of Books 26, no. 3 (February 2004). 20. Environmental justice advocates and scholars disagree on the role of race and class in the victimization. See for example, United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites, 1987; Environmental Justice: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 103rd Congress (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994); Bunyan Bryant and Paul Mohai, “Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Factors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards,” University of Colorado Law Review 63, no. 4 (1992): 921; as well as Bryant and Mohai’s edited volume Race and the Incidence of Environmental Hazards: A Time for Discourse (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992); Robert D. Bullard, “A New ‘Chicken-or-Egg’ Debate: Which Came First—The Neighborhood, or the Toxic Dump?” The Workbook 19, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 60. 21. For example, see “Delhi Pollution Protest Spreads,” BBC News, 21 November 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1032513.stm, accessed 3 January 2005. 22. See John Tomlinson, “Globalization and Cultural Identity,” in Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, ed. David Held and Andrew G. McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), 269–77. 23. William A. Shutkin, The Land That Could Be: Environmentalism and Democracy in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), xv. 24. Charles Taylor, “Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights,” in The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 136. The phrase “fusion of horizons” is originally that of the philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer, whom Taylor credits.
THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF GOING GREEN IN CHINA
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PART I Environmental Values in Four Countries
China: A Foreword Judith Shapiro
Since the death of Mao in 1976, China’s relaxation of Maoist dogmatism, its explosive economic growth, and its integration into the world community have fostered significant and obvious changes in values at all levels of society, including the state. The Communist Party’s increased ideological flexibility has permitted the reemergence of some traditional values, such as filial piety, respect for scholarship, and appreciation of traditional Chinese cultural symbols. At the same time, however, the market, the state, and the international community are introducing powerful new values, some of which are in conflict with traditional values, Maoist values, and one another. China is still recovering from thirty years of intensive government control over thought and behavior. During the Mao years, it was dangerous to hold or express any value or opinion that deviated from official slogans touting the primacy of class struggle, the “eat bitterness” spirit (or, willingness to suffer in the name of state goals), and “serving the people” (which all too often meant serving local officials). A misspoken word or careless deed could lead to criticism, ostracism, or exile; placing a cushion on a hard chair could be construed as counterrevolutionary; and listening to foreign broadcasts like Voice of America or the BBC could mean death. The state determined values, communicated them through propaganda and meetings in which everyone had to “express an attitude” (biaotai), and rewarded those who acted in most strident accordance with these exhortations. Because public values sometimes shifted without warning (as after the 1971 Lin Biao incident, when Mao’s chosen successor, Lin Biao, a military man, was suddenly labeled a traitor, and the fashion for all things military ended overnight), people became adept at sensing the political winds and adjusting their statements and behavior to match. They grew mute about their values as a matter of survival. Indeed, there was such a profound split between people’s internal experience and their public statements that some now say they no longer knew their own thoughts and feelings or how to speak the truth. While those years are now more than a quarter of a century past, China is still experiencing the “crisis of values” that they left in their wake. Remarkably, the traditional Confucian emphasis on family ties and advancement through educational achievement quickly reappeared after Mao died, as people rekindled ties with relatives sent into exile or political disgrace, and the young vied for precious spots in universities. But the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution produced such profound 25
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disillusionment with public goals and exhortations that China’s older intellectuals sometimes complain that the country has lost its ethical compass. Individualism, materialism, ambition, and faddish superstitions dominate the national ethos. Meanwhile, government efforts to use the old propaganda apparatus of media, billboards, and institutional meetings to influence people’s values and behavior, even for the best of purposes, tend to be met with skepticism. In this context, China’s environmental leaders have a singularly difficult task. China’s leaders, like those of many other countries, have experienced a major awakening to the importance of environmental issues during recent decades, beginning even before Mao’s death with the country’s participation in the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm. Their awareness of environmental issues intensified with the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, when China signed several major international treaties and adopted Agenda 21’s blueprint for action on environmental issues. During these and other international meetings, Chinese officials were exposed to world scientific knowledge and concern about growing environmental problems, and they engaged actively in writing the protocols and treaties that the conferences produced. At the same time, they began linking with international environmental organizations and donor institutions that were seeking permission to conduct projects in China, which gave them a hint of the intensity of the world’s interest in China’s ongoing loss of biodiversity, its carbon emissions, and its use of ozone-depleting substances. Meanwhile, they were learning from their mistakes, as great floods, intense pollution, blinding sandstorms, and other environmental problems forced China to reevaluate its development path. National pride, a sense of global responsibility, and the wish to leverage environmental issues to achieve other foreign policy goals have all contributed to the central government’s strong commitment to environmental protection. During the 1980s and 1990s China developed a large body of environmental laws, and in 1998, the central government elevated the National Environmental Protection Agency to a ministry-level state administration, renaming it the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). However, the post-Mao decentralization of power to the provinces and the emphasis on economic growth at the local level create enormous challenges for those charged with implementing national environmental policies. Moreover, SEPA’s ability to oversee implementation is limited by its tiny national-level staff of 270 (compared with 6,000 staff at the U.S. EPA headquarters in Washington). China’s opening toward environmentalism has also been complicated by its turn away from ideological Maoism toward “Market Leninism” and its integration into the global economy, which have brought economic growth beyond the coping capacities of China’s environmental protection apparatus. China’s adoption of market principles has allowed it to break its “iron rice bowl” commitments to provide lifetime employment and social welfare, while promoting a get-rich-quick mentality that hinders enforcement of environmental regulations. State-run enterprises, with their promises of lifetime safety nets, are shutting and collapsing, leaving millions of unskilled older workers without a livelihood and creating tension between the public
CHINA: A FOREWORD
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goods of social stability and environmental protection. Uncertainty over the stability of land leasing policies, especially in the years immediately following the 1978–1979 “responsibility system” reforms, whereby households contracted with the state to farm assigned lands, led households quickly to exploit their natural resources out of fear they would soon be taken away. Other recent developments, however, have supported China’s nascent environmentalism. Self-reliance in grain has been a goal for China during much of its history, and grain supply has been a perennial source of anxiety owing to the country’s large population, its vulnerability to floods and drought, and its long periods of international isolation. But China’s integration into the global economy has permitted the country to feel secure about its food supply for the first time in memory. This in turn has allowed policy makers to rethink their emphasis on aggressive land reclamation for agricultural development, while advances in science and technology have allowed farmers to use less land for similar output. Moreover, devastating floods in 1998 and 1999 sparked much Chinese scientific analysis of the role of logging, erosion, dikes, and wetlands in-filling in promoting floods, leading the government toward a new appreciation of the environmental services provided by forests and wetlands. China’s culture of pragmatism helps promote the understanding that conservation and restoration are means of hedging against similar future risks. Thus, “wastelands” have been redefined as wetlands, to be respected as “the kidneys of the planet,” and logging has been banned in the upper reaches of China’s great rivers. In some regions, land reclamation for agriculture has been replaced by wilderness restoration. Moreover, China’s popularity as a tourist destination has shown some local people the possibilities of ecotourism as a new source of revenue, and hence allowed them to see their way toward supporting nature preservation. Meanwhile, China’s opening to the outside world has brought intellectual ferment and exposure to environmental writings. The openness is remarkable, considering that a mere quarter century ago contact with outside ideas was still politically risky, and it was considered dangerously bourgeois to read any but a handful of approved writers. Since then, China has published the environmental classics Silent Spring, Our Common Future, A Sand County Almanac, Only One Earth, and many other writings on environmental challenges, the global interconnections among environmental issues, and the urgency of rethinking development paradigms. Another source of energy for contemporary environmentalism lies in Chinese philosophical traditions, which emphasize principles of sustainability and reverence for nature. These ideas and the wish, particularly among educated young people, to reach out to the world community, coupled with revulsion and sadness at China’s heavy pollution, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and other environmental harms, have fueled a small but significant environmental movement. Participants include mature intellectuals, college students, independent activists, government think-tank scholars, and foreign donors and partners. Chinese universities are introducing environmental studies into the general curriculum, and basic environmental education is being brought even into elementary schools.
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ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN FOUR COUNTRIES
Despite the intense environmental commitment of certain sectors of the Chinese population, institutionalized avenues for activism remain limited. Chinese nongovernmental organizations remain tightly controlled, and they tend to restrict their activities to those that do not threaten the government, such as afforestation, volunteer trash pickup, endangered species protection, and environmental education. Student environmental clubs are administered under the aegis of the Communist Youth League, limiting their potential for independent action. And the level of activism varies greatly by region, with some areas of the country, such as the Southwest, teeming with environmental groups and others, such as those described in this chapter, remaining relatively quiescent at the grassroots level, perhaps because of their remoteness from institutions of higher education. Despite these limitations, the great passion for environmental issues in certain sectors of educated Chinese society provides an important counterpoint to the dominant ethos of consumption and wealth-acquisition, and could be an important source of support for the Chinese government’s goals were the Party to relax its fear of the institutions of civil society. A key mechanism that remains available to the government to communicate values related to environmental protection is China’s centralized propaganda apparatus. Media broadcasts of foreign and domestic nature shows have become everyday fare throughout China. News stories about environmental problems and successes are common, and environmental accidents are covered more frequently than in the past. While billboards sending messages about picking up trash may have little effectiveness, news coverage of international Earth Day and other such events, as well as opportunities for public participation in their Chinese versions, provide occasions for the transmission of environmental values in a social context. Finally, public protests about environmental harms such as high local cancer rates or highly polluting factories, and legal actions and protests calling for the redress of such harms, are on the rise, contributing to increased public awareness of the importance of environmental issues not only on a global scale but also on a personal one. Meanwhile, however, other values that tend to contribute to China’s environmental problems resound more loudly still: globalization and economic development, and their coverage in the media, send messages about material success, status symbols, short-term pleasure, automobile ownership, and the Western model of development, energy use, and consumption. In contemporary China, after decades of ideologically enforced abnegation, materialistic calculations often dominate people’s thinking to the exclusion of other social values and goals. Naturally, at a time when the developed world has taken few steps to reduce its own overconsumption, most Chinese are skeptical about arguments that the developed world’s model should be off-limits to them because the planet’s environmental health depends on their taking another path. Moreover, much of China remains poor. In some regions and strata, people are even worse off than they were during the Mao years because of the withdrawal of social safety nets like guaranteed jobs, pensions, and government-provided health care. For broad swaths of the population, survival is the only value that matters.
CHINA: A FOREWORD
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Under the economic reforms, power has devolved from the center, with the result that local conditions vary greatly, and individual bureaucrats can make an enormous difference in determining whether environmental goals are emphasized in their region. It is thus extremely difficult to generalize about the status of environmental values in China. Even where there are no indigenous environmental movements, environmental concerns may come to the forefront; moreover, China’s long-standing penchant for developing models for emulation, whether at the level of the individual person, the town, or the entire region, has meant that some parts of the country have been publicized as ideals for the rest of China to copy. China’s central government now understands that environmental sustainability should be integrated into the country’s economic development. There are numerous motivations for environmental policy action, for environmentalism is linked to flood protection, restoration of falling water tables, national energy security, public health, diplomatic leverage, and national prestige. Chinese leaders’ pragmatism has even led them to consider the economic costs of China’s environmental behavior, and to begin to implement a “green GDP” that would give the country a better picture of the real costs of development. Beijing’s challenge is to persuade local officials that these priorities are important, and success in this area varies. The cases described in the coming pages show that the promise of grassroots organizations and public support for the protection of China’s environment has yet to be fully realized. In the case studies of the polluted city of Benxi and the Sanjiang Nature Reserve, local officials have made an effort to clean up and to protect, and in this sense the case studies are partial success stories. However, resources and staff for significant central support remain limited, and endemic corruption contributes to a general feeling among the local populations that they are being asked unfairly to make sacrifices from which elites are exempt. Moreover, weakening safety nets and increasing economic insecurity make it difficult to persuade ordinary people of the merits of environmental action, and local young people have yet to organize themselves into a force for the promulgation of environmental values. The question remains, then, whether China’s central government can succeed in transmitting environmental values to the myriad sectors and parties whose activities affect the environmental health of China, especially in the face of so many other conflicting social messages.
0
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30 ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN FOUR COUNTRIES
THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF GOING GREEN IN CHINA
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1 The Politics and Ethics of Going Green in China Air Pollution Control in Benxi City and Wetland Preservation in the Sanjiang Plain Liu Yu, Pan Wei, Shen Mingming, Song Guojun, Vivian Bertrand, Mary Child, and Judith Shapiro*
When faced with the choice of developing the local economy or putting resources behind environmental protection, most Chinese local officials choose the former. This is the case despite the devastating extent of Chinese environmental destruction. Sixteen of the twenty most polluted cities in the world are in China. Air pollution alone is responsible for three hundred thousand premature deaths per year. More than 70 percent of the water in five of seven major river systems is unsuitable for human contact. More than 25 percent of China’s land is now desert, with the desertification rates twice those of the 1970s. Eight to 12 percent of China’s GDP is being lost due to environmental degradation.1 In this chapter, however, we examine two instances where local officials chose to pursue progressive environmental policies: in Benxi City in Liaoning Province (historically known as Manchuria) and in Fuyuan County on the Sanjiang Plain, in Heilongjiang, China’s northeastern most province. Benxi is a midsized industrial town, which was fabled as a place whose smog was so thick that the city had disappeared from satellite images. The Sanjiang Plain case involves the issues and conflicts surrounding the creation of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve, a wetlands preservation site. Both cases represent environmental campaigns that began in response to the central government’s growing commitment to environmental responsibility; both were executed by willing officials on the ground. Both are routinely touted as success stories: Benxi has become an environmental model, while the Sanjiang Nature Reserve’s designation as a wetlands site of global environmental importance has brought international attention and approval to China’s new wetlands protection initiatives. Probing how officials came to take action at the two sites and the local reactions to these efforts reveals the complexities of environmentalism in China. What distinguishes Benxi from other highly polluted Chinese cities is that local officials there 31
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took advantage of a negative label, transforming the stigma as “the most polluted city” into a source of local identity and cachet. The decision of Benxi officials to step up investment in environmental policies at a time when the city faced economic decline and large-scale unemployment has not been sufficiently explored and explained. Here we qualify the city’s success story, as touted by government officials and reported in the Chinese media, by adding in the views of residents, some of whom both resent and question the priority of environmental concerns at a time when economic reform has already jeopardized their livelihood. The Sanjiang Nature Reserve case also began as a local initiative, but it was heavily influenced by Beijing and its new international obligation to wetlands preservation as a signatory to the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, an international treaty providing the framework for national action and international cooperation on the wise use of wetlands and their resources. Ultimately, the Sanjiang Reserve case evolved into an instance of central government oversight of a nature reserve and related environmental policies. The central government’s sudden interest in the ecological value of the Sanjiang Plain wetlands in the 1990s, fueled in part by international pressure, ran counter to the region’s strong agricultural reclamation mandate, which dated back to the Cultural Revolution. In the area surrounding the reserve—and indeed within the reserve itself—90 percent of Sanjiang residents are farmers who migrated to the region in order to farm, and who have seen their livelihoods threatened by the creation of the reserve. In Sanjiang, we see evidence of the important role that external parties can play in introducing a new awareness among local people. We explore the dynamics of topdown policies (those that flow from political elites to ordinary citizens) and their impact on local engagement with environmental issues. On-site awareness of the material benefits of the wetlands has grown since the establishment of the nature reserve, which has brought new professional opportunities and the promise of foreign funding for nature preservation. The reserve also has brought new responsibilities to various local actors— even the People’s Liberation Army. At the same time, we see resistance, even antipathy, toward the environmental campaign on the part of many residents, especially those who, like people in Benxi, feel insecure about their economic future. Both of these cases are famous in China, as Chinese officials are quick to point out. We knew about the cases when we selected them, and through previous research and cooperative projects, we had already built relationships with the local authorities involved in them. We chose to reexamine them because we wanted to emphasize a dimension relevant to Chinese policy-making as a whole: how various stakeholders interpret government-mandated environmentalism, and whether and how the differing values of these stakeholders are articulated within the policy process. We had three aims: to understand the nature and causes of the environmental conflicts and find potential solutions; to help make decision makers more aware of, as well as informed and concerned about, conflicts over resource use so they are better equipped to resolve them; and to increase international awareness of the particular problems that China faces and its efforts to resolve them.
THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF GOING GREEN IN CHINA
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In Benxi, interviews were conducted during two site visits in December 1999 and November 2000 with local service personnel, factory workers, engineers, administrative staff of the local government, local researchers, government leaders, provincial government officials, and national and international researchers and aid agency personnel. Our interviews also included revealing conversations with ordinary residents. In the Sanjiang case, we conducted in-depth interviews with people who worked in nearly all trades and professions in the Sanjiang area during a two-week site visit in October 2000. While we were influenced by the work of Ma Zhong, a Renmin University professor working to save the wetlands, whose views are discussed in this chapter, we balanced his viewpoint by reporting sympathetically on the local people who perceive environmental protection measures as unfair and unwelcome interference with established land-use practices and their livelihood. In addition to our visits to local government departments, our fieldwork team went to farmers’ houses and ate and boarded with the farmers. They told us their stories of daily life, their feelings and concerns about the nature reserve, and their views on the ways in which it was managed. In this way we learned about the local people’s attitudes toward the reserve and the values that are bound up in environmental discourse. These two cases present some useful contrasts—in terms of their dynamics (the Benxi process was locally driven; the Sanjiang case was externally managed), economic impact (with Benxi a brighter picture), and local attitudes (local residents across the board express resentment toward the nature reserve, while Benxi residents reveal mixed feelings about the clean air campaign). At the same time, both cases partake of a common trend, one that other observers have noted: the Chinese population has been experiencing a rise of environmental awareness since the early 1990s.2 Government (both local and central) has been the engine of environmental initiatives in China, ensuring an efficient but not always democratic environmental campaign. At the same time, political decentralization has introduced energetic bureaucratic bargaining into the new environmental politics. Since the early 1980s, when political decentralization began in China, government interests have become differentiated and fragmented at different levels and among departments, impeding the smooth transmission of environmental and other policy priorities from Beijing to the provinces and beyond. Decentralization has created bureaucratic conflict, rivalry, and ultimately the need for negotiation and compromise. By distributing power and interests vertically, political decentralization transformed local governments from puppets of the central government into independent actors maximizing their interests. Rather than relying directly on the central coffers, local governments now had both the right to levy their own taxes and a new need to lobby the central government for additional funds. This bureaucratic lobbying, absent the sort of citizen lobbying conducted in Western democracies, is the major driver of the environmental campaigns we examine in Benxi and Sanjiang. Different economic actors in these two cases—not only officials and industrial leaders but also everyday citizens—show different levels of commitment to environmen-
34
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN FOUR COUNTRIES
tal protection based upon what they could gain from the political bargaining that surrounds Chinese environmentalism. These environmental campaigns are but two local initiatives spurred by the central government’s policy shift toward a new emphasis on the environment. Since the late 1970s, the central government of China has demonstrated an increasing commitment to environmental protection. As represented by the budget alone, the central government’s investment in environmental protection increased from RMB200 billion (US$34.68 billion) for the 1991–95 period to RMB360 billion (US$43.2 billion) for 1996 to 2000—an 80 percent increase. The total environmental investment for 2001 to 2005 will reach RMB700 billion (US$84 billion).3 This rate of increase nearly matches the rate of increase of China’s GDP, demonstrating that the Chinese government believes that the growth of the economy and the protection of the environment are mutually dependent. In 1998, Li Peng, then chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) reportedly told an audience that the current environmental situation is “very grim” and that China will pay more attention to environmental protection as a fundamental national policy.4 It is against the background of this national trend that our two cases emerged. Benxi: “A City That Cannot Be Seen by Satellite” China adopted its first national air pollution control law, the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, in 1987 in response to public pressure, growing awareness of the health effects of air pollution, international attention to acid rain and climate change, embarrassment that China’s cities were being labeled among the world’s most polluted, and increasing official recognition that environmental considerations should be integrated into economic planning. This legislation established the responsibilities of emitters (“polluter pays”) and government agencies in dealing with air pollution and ambient air quality. It stipulated that local governments are responsible for integrating air pollution and quality management into economic development plans. Amid China’s campaign to reduce air pollution emerged the case of Benxi, a selfproclaimed environmental success story. In 1979, officials of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) discovered that Benxi, a city in eastern Liaoning Province, in northeast China, could not be seen on an American satellite image of the region because of heavy smog. With the help of local and national media, government officials carefully tended the story until it became famous throughout China. Local leaders and the central government collaborated to make Benxi, a relatively small Chinese city of 1.5 million people, a test site for new pollution prevention policies.5 Soon, a number of international organizations, governmental and nongovernmental, recognized Benxi’s commitment to pollution control and chose to aid its pollution reduction projects. Benxi is widely known as one of China’s most polluted cities6—a significant title, considering China’s reputation for having some of the world’s worst air pollution. Until the 1990s, however, few cities in China regularly monitored air pollution or
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kept data on it. By the time a 1998 World Health Organization study revealed that seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities were in China, Benxi’s air pollution had already improved, and it had escaped the list.7 Benxi’s industrial pollution problems are typical for Chinese cities. Much of Benxi’s pollution is caused by the burning of coal, China’s main source of energy. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Benxi’s air pollution was at its worst, the coal was low grade, with high sulfur and ash content, and it often burned inefficiently. Local officials in Benxi, like their counterparts in other Chinese cities, faced the need to control pollution during a period of transition to a market economy. A city in China’s rust belt that had grown up around steel production, Benxi has seen a number of its stateowned enterprises (SOEs) shut down, resulting in vast numbers of unemployed workers in the city, a source of social unrest in recent years. Yet Benxi is distinct among polluted cities in China for the media attention and financial assistance for environmental remediation it attracted. The central government made an unprecedented move not since repeated for any other city when, between 1988 and 1995, it invested RMB74 million (US$12.8 million) in Benxi’s pollution cleanup. This case reveals how a midsized Chinese city came to place priority on the environment despite economic constraints and how it was able to attract significant attention and funds for pollution remediation. It provides insight into how support for environmental protection can be mobilized in China. Benxi’s Air Pollution: The Science Story The beginnings of Benxi’s air pollution story are typical for urban China. Benxi is one of China’s oldest industrial cities. As home to the Benxi Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. (known among locals as “Bengang”), one of China’s ten largest steel plants, the city produces more steel per capita than any other Chinese city.8 It is also a center for heavily polluting industries. The largest contributors to air pollution in Benxi are ferrous metallurgy, steel processing, the cement industry, and coal production. The major polluting industries are concentrated in the urban area, which is surrounded by mountains, creating a thermal inversion, whereby air pollution becomes trapped in the river valley.9 Benxi’s industrial base was a key part of China’s economic development before 1979. In turn, economic growth had a significant impact on Benxi. With increased industrial activity, air pollution in Benxi escalated during the 1970s.10 The main air pollutants included suspended particulates, sulfur dioxide, falling dust, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen oxides.11 In the 1980s the Benxi economy was booming, a result of the central government’s massive investment in Benxi’s local enterprises during the period 1975–78. It was then, according to Zhao Zhenyu, chief of Benxi’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) at that time, that the city’s residents and its political elites, who felt economically secure during Benxi’s “golden years” in the 1980s, turned their concern to the pollution and its impacts. Respiratory illness in Benxi had increased with rising air pollution levels, according to data collected by the city’s public health bureau from local hospitals, particularly from
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the clinics affiliated with large industrial enterprises like Benxi Iron and Steel Company. Under Zhao Zhenyu, the Benxi EPB publicized this data, which showed a significant increase of air pollution–related respiratory diseases from the mid-1970s to the mid1980s. According to a Benxi EPB study conducted in the mid-1990s, the average death rate from respiratory diseases was as high as 9.3 per 100,000 population in 1975–85, and from 1971 to 1982 mortality from lung cancer in Benxi increased 2.3 times.12 In Beijing, concern about Benxi’s negative international reputation was growing, and senior leaders like Song Jian became determined to help solve Benxi’s problem. Song Jian, then minister of the State Science and Technology Commission, ordered that Benxi be made part of a commission study on the health effects of air pollution during the period 1985–92. This study, carried out by the Center for Environmental Studies at Peking University and the Institute of Labor and Health at Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation,13 became the first systematic investigation of the linkage between air pollution and health ever conducted in China. The results showed that lung cancer mortality had increased in industrial areas since 1986, but remained lower in areas with less pollution, even though both industrial and nonindustrial areas had similar rates of smoking and similar occupational exposures. These findings were incorporated into a 1995 report that was made available to Benxi city officials, who frequently cited it. After the Benxi government embarked upon pollution remediation in the late 1980s, Benxi’s air began to improve by most measures. Days when the visibility was 10 kilometers or more increased from an annual average of two to three in 1985 to twentyseven or twenty-eight in 1995.14 From 1994 to 1998, sulfur dioxide emissions decreased by 28.4 percent, and falling dust decreased 22.4 percent. By 2001 Benxi was no longer ranked as the city in the province with the highest air pollution; instead, it was the third most polluted, after Anshan and Fushun.15 However, the air quality in Benxi still did not meet the minimum standard for urban areas. Meanwhile, the central government continued to carry out public health studies. One recent study, undertaken by the Ministry of Health in 2000 and released on June 15, 2001, concluded that lung cancer and other respiratory disease in Benxi result not only from smoking but also from high air pollution levels.16 To eliminate the statistical disturbance of smoking and occupational exposures, the study looked at Benxi children ages eleven to fourteen. The results showed a statistically significant relationship between the degree of air pollution exposure and incidence of respiratory illnesses. With such scientific evidence in hand, Benxi officials could continue to justify their spending on environmental improvements. Together with officials from the Liaoning Province department of health and NEPA, they would present the reports on pollution and residents’ health as classified material to the Central Committee of the Communist Party and to China’s cabinet, the State Council. Benxi Captures the Attention of Beijing and the World Like many other Chinese cities, Benxi set up its first environmental protection office in 1973, following the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm,
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in order to implement state regulations passed at the first National Conference on Environmental Protection, in August 1973.17 The Benxi city leadership further demonstrated its commitment to environmental issues in 1979, when it upgraded the office to bureau, an independent agency of the city government. In 1983 Benxi’s Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) was again upgraded, to a department under the municipal government.18 It was then that the role of the EPB became significant, reflecting the top city leadership’s decision to assign environmental issues priority on the city’s agenda. The upgrade took place under Lian Chengzhi, the mayor of Benxi from 1981 to 1983, a key actor in the Benxi story. Mayor Lian first heard the satellite story in 1982, when he received a letter inviting him to make a presentation on Benxi’s air pollution problem at the World Cities Conference in Rome. He ultimately declined for fear of losing face in an international setting. But the satellite story prompted him to act: in 1983 he said in his speech to Benxi’s first Conference on Environmental Work that as mayor of Benxi he had a duty to take action on pollution control. He also set out to reorganize the EPB. All ranking officials and managers of state-owned enterprises attended the convention, and by the end of his term as mayor, among other achievements, Lian had institutionalized the convention as an annual meeting for all city- and bureau-level government leaders in the city. Lian’s successors have since repeated Lian’s public pledge, and several have also played pivotal roles in addressing Benxi’s air pollution. Another important figure in Benxi was Zhao Zhenyu, director of the city’s EPB from 1983 to 1988. During Zhao’s tenure, the Benxi EPB became the most visible bureau in the city, and through his vigorous public campaign, which showcased data from the Benxi Public Health Bureau, he brought the health effects of Benxi’s pollution to the attention of city officials and the public. He organized citywide environmental education campaigns, invited members of the Benxi People’s Congress to inspect the state of pollution in Benxi, rewarded enterprises that met environmental standards, and promoted a “green schools” program. The green schools initiative led to the opening of the Lixin Primary School in Benxi in 1991, China’s first experimental environmental school.19 From April 1987 to July 1988, Zhao, in cooperation with the central government, held seven news conferences in Benxi and Beijing, inviting journalists from major newspapers and television and radio networks to publicize the satellite story. By 1987, when the municipal government began to take environmental matters seriously, Director Zhao’s EPB had assumed an influential role as technical adviser to Benxi decision makers on matters relating to institutional arrangements, personnel, resource allocation, operational plans, and educational campaigns. Zhao, with his relatively high profile, contrasted sharply with past EPB officials in Benxi, who had held little power. Zhao and his bureau also had a higher status than most other EPB officials in China, where the EPB typically did not have its own listing in government directories, but rather appeared as a subdivision of the bureau of construction. Likewise, at the level of the State Council, the function of environ-
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mental protection was weak (as it remains today), and bureaucrats with environmental mandates wielded little power. The change in priorities within the Benxi municipal government was an important start for Benxi’s cleanup, but city leaders could not remedy the problem on their own. City governments in China generally function as implementing agencies of the central government. Thus they have little authority over the large-scale, state-owned enterprises that produce much of the air pollution, which are controlled by the ministries in Beijing that are in charge of raw materials production, steel, cement, and coal. Therefore, it is critical that local leaders gain the attention and support of Beijing when addressing major pollution problems. In addition to concern over the city’s international reputation, Benxi leaders also developed a scientific argument for central government financial support. In 1987, EPB head Zhao Zhenyu had ordered research on the exact sources of pollution, possible solutions, and plans for pollution control. According to the report, the city’s total investment in pollution control from 1979 to 1986 amounted to RMB140 million (approximately US$37.7 million). At this rate of investment, it would take another twenty to thirty years to bring fifty-six major sources of pollution into compliance with state air quality standards. Using these figures, Zhao argued that Benxi could not control its pollution without help from the central government. City officials argued that they were entitled to central government funds on the grounds that Benxi was suffering the negative effects of centrally mandated economic reforms, a view that was shared by Benxi’s public and industry officials. A sense of abandonment by Beijing had started brewing in Benxi as early as the late 1970s, as in many other Chinese cities with heavy industries. The people of Benxi had made a great contribution to China’s development under state planning, but they were not getting the help they needed to control industrial air pollution, and the city was left bearing the cost, both in terms of health and environmental deterioration. A popular local saying at that time was, “Benxi gave its natural resources to the state but kept the pollution for itself.”20 According to Yu Chuanjia, an assistant manager of Benxi Iron and Steel: “The Benxi Steel factory was like a cow in the planned economy era; what we ate was grass, but what we produced was milk. The milk was taken away by the state, and we were left with the excrement.” In July 1988 an elite group of journalists from major national media,21 including the official Xinhua (New China) News Agency, visited Liaoning Province to report on environmental issues in Benxi and elsewhere. Their visit inspired many media accounts of Benxi’s pollution problems, bringing national attention to them. The director of the Liaoning Province EPB, Yu Yuefeng, also persuaded a Xinhua News Agency reporter to write a confidential report on Benxi’s pollution for the top leaders in Beijing. In keeping with Xinhua’s common practice, the report, marked “confidential,” was written specifically for the Central Committee of the Party. In addition, many accounts appeared in the press and on the air with headlines like “A City That Cannot Be Seen from a Satellite.” Thanks to this coverage, the city became a national symbol of China’s pollution problems.
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One month after the journalists visited Benxi, Chen Yun, who along with Deng Xiaoping, was one of the party’s most influential elders, was drawn to the Benxi case after reading Xinhua’s confidential report. Zhao’s EPB had also tried to influence Chen Yun by producing for him a video on Benxi’s environmental challenges. On July 23, 1988, Chen penned a note to Premier Li Peng at the top of the report that read, “Improving the environment in Benxi should not be delayed. The State Council should take measures to solve the problem.” Chen Yun thereby instructed the State Council to take action, which led to the approval of a major pollution reduction program for Benxi, the Seven-Year Environmental Pollution Control Program. Song Jian, who by then had become the high-profile state councilor of the State Council Environmental Protection Commission (SCEPC), the top environmental oversight body at the time,22 subsequently made personal inspection visits to Benxi and worked with state and provincial leaders to formulate a pollution control program for Benxi. Benxi’s success in capturing Chen Yun’s attention can also be credited to a concerted campaign by then mayor and deputy mayor Yu Guopan and Shen Yucheng. In 1987 and 1988, with other leaders from the Liaoning Province and Benxi governments, they traveled to Beijing twelve times to report on Benxi’s air pollution. Yu Yuefeng, then director of the Liaoning EPB, arranged for the director of the National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA), Qu Geping, to visit Benxi in April 1987. Qu’s comment, made during his visit, that he had visited many cities in China and in the world but had never seen a city with such serious air pollution, was made public in Benxi and later made the nationwide news. His visit put Benxi’s pollution problem on NEPA’s agenda, allowing the Benxi EPB to report directly to NEPA. (It was unusual for the central government to get directly involved in municipal level issues; more typically, this kind of problem would be managed by the provincial government.) The visits to Beijing for meetings with the central government environment and industry ministries and the resulting inspection visit of SCEPC officials to Benxi helped pave the way for funding for pollution control in the city.23 With these exchanges, the Liaoning Province EPB director, Yu Yuefeng, was able to convince the provincial government to invest in pollution control in Benxi. In March 1988, the Liaoning government appropriated RMB5 million per year over eight years for pollution remediation in Benxi. At the end of 1988, the SCEPC issued a document titled “Decision on Pollution Control in Benxi,” which called on the Benxi government to bring local air quality up to national air quality standards by 1995, or within seven years. The municipal government then endorsed the seven-year anti-pollution program for Benxi. With this program in place, Beijing considered Benxi a demonstration city for pollution prevention and control in China. The program announcement, while stopping short of stating that economic development had caused the pollution, admitted that the problem stemmed from the city’s having ignored pollution for so long: Benxi is an important raw material production base that has made a great contribution to China’s economic development. But because environmental protection has been ignored in the course of economic development, the city’s air is seriously polluted, and Benxi has
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been called “a city that cannot be seen by satellite.” Waste materials from coal mines and steel plants are piled mountain-high. The Taizi River is black and brown, with almost no fish or shrimp. Pollution has damaged residents’ quality of life, and it also restricts economic development.
With a total budget of RMB388.9 million (US$46.9 million), Benxi launched fiftysix pollution control projects under its seven-year program, with the aim of reducing sulfur dioxide emissions by nine thousand tons per year.24 Of these projects—all of which used pollution control technologies such as dust-removing devices, electric precipitators, and sulfur-removing engineering—twenty-three focused on Benxi’s air pollution, with a total budget of RMB311.57 million (US$37.5 million).25 Benxi’s investment in the project was significant: about RMB150 million (US$18 million), or roughly 39 percent of the total cost. Such high-level investment from a local government was a prerequisite to financial support from the central and provincial governments. Various government sources at the national level provided a total of RMB153 million26 and according to Yu Yuefang and EPB official Yang Huijan, the Liaoning provincial government contributed RMB40 million. In addition, “special policies”—exemptions Beijing granted only to some favored cities—allowed enterprises such as the Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation and the Benxi Coal Company to sell a certain amount of their products at higher, market prices. (At that time, the prices of iron and steel were still controlled by the government, which intentionally set prices below the market to facilitate and subsidize the development of heavy industry in China.) The companies were then allowed to use the excess profits to cover the costs of pollution control projects.27 By the end of the seven-year pollution control program, Benxi had spent a total of RMB488.3 million (US$58.5 million), 26 percent more than had been budgeted. Once the central government got behind the seven-year program, it became a “national special industry program.” This designation meant that it was no longer a local initiative, but a piece of the central government’s overall environmental strategy. As such, the program was carried out under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Finance and the National Audit Office via expert groups, thus ensuring that Benxi would use the money for the intended purpose of environmental protection. With the program’s new status, the central government acquired a greater stake in its success and launched a major publicity campaign. In 1989 the Benxi Daily, Benxi Radio, and Benxi TV sponsored a citywide campaign to expose the city’s ten worst polluters—a list that came to include Benxi Iron and Steel and other big industrial firms. The central government also helped Benxi to launch Environment News, the only local newspaper in China that focuses on the environment. The requirement under China’s Environmental Protection Law that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) invest in pollution control was key to the seven-year program’s success. In fact, much of the Benxi government’s funding for pollution control came from the SOEs themselves. The law assesses pollution levies, fees paid by industries whose discharge of pollutants exceeds the limit set by the state. The size of a given company’s levy is based on the quantities and concentration of the pollutants that the company releases. This system is used in most of China to channel funds from pollut-
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ing industries to government for pollution source control, comprehensive cleanup projects, pollution monitoring equipment, environmental education, and institutional development. Any money that SOEs paid to the Benxi government in pollution levies was thus tantamount to money from the central government in the view of the Ministry of Finance, since SOEs were under the control of the national government.28 As a sign of Benxi officials’ determination to control pollution, the seven-year program doubled the levy for polluting industries in Benxi and enforced this decision strictly. This had symbolic as well as financial benefits: the higher levies helped raise local enterprises’ consciousness about the environmental problem, and in the end, pollution levies paid for roughly a quarter of the seven-year program. The plan’s success was also owing to the decision that the ministries in charge of raw materials production, steel, cement, and coal—the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of Coal, and the State Bureau of Construction and Materials—would have a part in the plan’s drafting and implementation, a decision that ensured their support for the plan. The seven-year program set a precedent and became a prototype for programs in other regions with special pollution problems.29 In addition to the seven-year program, in early 1989 the State Council approved Mayor Yu and Deputy Mayor Shen’s proposal to designate Benxi as a “national heavily polluted recovery city” and to promote the enforcement of pollution fees.30 The State Council’s decision to supervise pollution control in Benxi directly allowed the Benxi municipal government to apply the pollution levy policy more strictly than any other city and to use its leverage in this regard to seek other economic supports from polluting industries in Benxi. As the seven-year program neared its end, city officials worried about where they would find funds to continue pollution control efforts. They knew they could not rely solely on the central government, since its direct investment in the program had been an exception to its usual practice. Much of the funding would have to come from the enterprises themselves, through such measures as upgrading equipment. Still, there would be a gap, and the city turned to international aid agencies to fill it. Officials from the Benxi Science and Technology Committee, aided by their contacts with scientists in Beijing, persuaded China’s Agenda 21 office, the national office created to implement China’s international commitments under the Agenda 21 program agreed upon at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, to provide funds for research. In 1994, the city proceeded to establish its own Agenda 21 office, the Benxi Agenda 21 Administrative Center, to promote sustainable development. Benxi was one of only a handful of Chinese cities to create such an office. In 1997 the central government chose it, along with fifteen other provinces or cities, to pilot China’s Agenda 21. With Agenda 21 on the table, Benxi officials decided to promote clean production31 —an innovative alternative to end-of-pipe treatment whereby production inputs and processes are altered to reduce pollution at the source. This process, developed in the 1990s, has been used throughout the world. Yet Benxi industries lacked the technical capacity, including a computer-based decision support system, needed to use clean production. With the cooperation of the central government, including the State Plan-
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ning Commission,32 the Ministry of International Economy and Trade, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, and SEPA, Benxi sought help from international organizations. The first international organization to work with Benxi was the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in 1996 agreed to help create and fund a clean production project. The project cost roughly US$1 million, with half provided by the municipal government and half provided by the UNDP. Its main objective was to reduce air pollution by introducing production modifications, restructuring industry, and strengthening the municipal capacity for clean technology promotion.33 In addition to the UNDP, in the mid-1990s the World Bank, the U.S.-based nongovernmental organization Environmental Defense, and the government of Japan contributed to Benxi’s pollution control initiatives. Between 1995 and 1999, the World Bank lent US$12 million to pollution control projects in China, which included Benxi.34 From 1994 to 2002, Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) provided loans totaling US$81.5 million to support eighteen air pollution reduction projects. Starting in 1997, Environmental Defense began working in partnership with Benxi, along with Nantong, a coastal city in Jiangsu Province, to develop new cap-and-trade legislation for controlling sulfur dioxide, making Benxi a pilot city for emissions trading in China.35 In addition, Liaoning officials purchased clean production technology from Japan and Europe, where the provincial governments in northeast China had established relationships with manufacturers of pollution control equipment.36 Benxi officials even began to turn down some investment opportunities because the proposed investments did not meet pollution control standards, Wang Zhen, deputy director of the Benxi Planning Commission,37 explained to interviewers. In 2000 an armaments military factory wanted to move to Benxi, but, according to Wang, the city turned it down because of fear of pollution. As he told interviewers later that year: Everyone (in the city government) now agrees that environmental protection must be an important component of the city’s development plan. In the draft of the next five-year plan, for example, there are more than twenty items about environmental protection and improvement. Any new investment must go through the environmental review process. We turned down several projects because of environmental concerns. This shows we are in the stage of environmental management rather than simple end-of-pipe treatment.
Meanwhile, efforts to reduce Benxi’s air pollution continued. In January 2002, Beijing announced a new five-year plan for environmental protection and committed nearly double the funds it had spent on pollution control projects nationwide in the previous five years—a record US$84 billion (RMB700 billion), or US$16.8 billion per year over five years (approximately US$13 per capita).38 However, the central government provided only RMB65 billion for five years (US$7.9 billion over five years or US$1.6 billion per year), with local administrations and taxes on polluting enterprises expected to finance the bulk of the plan. For Benxi’s part, the municipality continued its investment in environmental protection. In its tenth five-year plan (2001–
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5), Benxi committed RMB800 million (US$96.65 million) to environmental protection, under a program called the Environmental Protection Project for the New Century —twice the amount spent in the seven-year program. This is a significant investment, constituting about 5 percent of Benxi’s 2000 local revenues, which is notably higher than the corresponding figure for many other Chinese cities.39 The Project for a New Century included a Blue Sky Program for the reduction of key industrial air pollutants. As part of this program within two years, ambient dust removal programs were to begin at ten of the city’s biggest polluters, and energy controls applied, while other heavy polluters were to be closed or moved.40 Other controls and timelines were established for other sources of pollution, including vehicular emissions. Other components of the Project for a New Century included a clean water project designed to reduce water pollution at the source and treat pollution in the Taizi River, as well as a “green plan” and a “quietness plan” to improve the environmental quality of Benxi’s commercial and residential life.41 The project was supported in part by a UNDP grant of $600,000. In addition to government appropriations, the plan relied upon municipal government borrowing and revenues from pollution levies. SEPA estimated that Benxi enterprises would contribute about RMB200 million (US$24.18 million) or one-quarter of the RMB800 million total. As of this writing it is too soon to tell whether the plan’s goals were met, although typically the government will set very high goals that it fails to meet.42 Balancing Economic Growth and Environmental Cleanup As noted above, it seems strange that Benxi officials decided to step up investment in environmental policies just when the city was coping with economic reforms and rising unemployment. In this section we further explore the financial and social pressures facing Benxi officials and industries. These pressures—and the financial relationships between the central and Benxi government, on the one hand, and the central government and SOEs, on the other—help to explain the multiple motives for Benxi’s pollution reduction campaign. In the early stages of the market reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping, Beijing lifted state price controls on light industry products.43 This policy harmed raw material-producing cities like Benxi, which had been selling their products at lower prices to support national industrial development; Benxi’s economy began to lose strength relative to the economies of cities with light industries that could now sell their products at higher, market prices. Faced with this predicament, Liaoning officials saw poor environmental conditions as a perfect reason to ask for state compensation, using the argument with the Central Committee of the Party, the State Council, and the National People’s Congress at almost every national conference they attended. At the same time, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which had their own channels to Beijing leaders, also used environmental arguments to ask the central government for funds. Technically, these companies are responsible for treating their own pollu-
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tion. The standard mechanism is for the EPB to charge them pollution fees, of which the government then refunds 70 to 80 percent with the stipulation that the refund be used for environmental improvements. Yet because of their patronage relationship with the central government, SOEs were able to demand additional funds for pollution control, citing economic hardship under the dual-pricing system of the 1980s. When, in 1996, the State Council set emissions standards for the country, it stipulated that industrial enterprises in any city that could not meet the standards by the end of 2000 would be shut down,44 a remarkable departure from the Communist Party’s policy of prioritizing development, seemingly at any cost. It is all the more remarkable that such a strict environmental policy would be put in place at a time that coincided with skyrocketing unemployment in many parts of China. Although the officially reported estimate of unemployment in Benxi during 1996 was 5 percent, many scholars believe it was in fact much higher, around 50 percent.45 Under the State Council’s new policy smaller plants were closed more often than large SOEs because they did not have the money to purchase pollution control technology. In an effort to contain the unemployment rate and to maintain social stability, the state seemed to accept the argument that SOEs as major employers deserved preferential treatment. As a result, the pollution control funds that the central government gave Benxi were allocated mainly to the large state-owned manufacturers of steel, namely Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation—the city’s largest employer, and one of its largest polluters—and cement. Beijing also favored such enterprises over smaller enterprises through preferential loans and even through the handpicking of SOE heads to be municipal leaders. Of the fifty-six engineering improvement projects designed to reduce pollution under the seven-year program, nearly all were located within Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation, the Benxi Cement Plant, the Gongyuan Cement Plant, and the Benxi Coal Company—all SOEs managed by ministries of the State Council at that time. In 1999, it looked as though Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation, the city’s largest employer, which accounted for approximately 70 percent of the municipal government’s tax base, would not meet the State Council’s environmental standards; but the company managed to save itself through a combination of measures. At the end of 2000, it purchased a new blast furnace and pollution control equipment46 and secured a loan from the Deutsche Bank to buy American-made equipment to modernize the steel plant.47 The government also invested RMB30 million (US$3.6 million) in a high-pressure dust-flushing system, and the company obtained RMB115 million mainly through subsidies and tax breaks, to construct a dust-storing dam that reduces effluent to the nearby Taizi River by 2.9 million tons every year. By enabling modernization, the support Benxi Iron and Steel and other large enterprises received from Beijing not only gave them the means to meet tougher environmental standards, but also allowed them to increase their production efficiency. In 2000 the State Economy and Trade Commission arranged for Benxi Iron and Steel to be outfitted for continuous casting.48 By the company’s own calculation, the energy they saved in one year as a result of the new technology was equal to 1.25 million tons
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of standard coal. The added income in 2001 from their more energy efficient products surpassed RMB4.8 billion (US$542 million). Although some SOEs benefited from close relationships with the central government, most were not immune to economic hardships. In 1997, the central government began a campaign to make its debt-ridden SOEs profitable within three years.49 Liaoning Province had more SOEs than any other province in China, and in 1997 most of them were in debt. As a result of the three-year campaign, approximately 15 percent of China’s SOEs went bankrupt or were shut down.50 Benxi Mining Bureau, with approximately fifty-four thousand staff and workers, was one of them.51 Although Benxi Iron and Steel was not shut down, it laid off 1,100 workers during the three-year campaign, and twenty-two of its branches separated to become subsidiary corporations.52 As a result, the company’s per employee steel production doubled in 2001, to more than 100 tons. Small enterprises have been particularly vulnerable to the squeeze of reform and environmental regulation, since closing one of them does not significantly contribute to unemployment and poses a low political risk for authorities. The story of small coal mines is a prime example of small enterprises falling victim to the environmental campaign. Beginning in 1998, under the orders of the State Council, the Liaoning provincial government criticized the “three smalls” of Benxi—small coal mines, small plaster pits, and small stone pits—and set deadlines for improvements.53 Those enterprises that did not meet the deadlines, would be closed. The primary criticism involved these enterprises’ harmful environmental impacts, although the State Council also took them to task for inefficiency, negligible revenue, and faulty safety mechanisms. The State Council’s demands on Benxi’s small enterprises were part of a nationwide campaign, in the case of small coal mines reversing a 1980s policy of opening privately managed coal mines under license. Despite the State Council’s deadlines, some coal mines in Benxi were repeatedly closed and reopened: when inspectors came, they stopped running, but after the inspectors left, production resumed. It was rumored that in June 2000, the Liaoning party secretary was offended by the sight of the mines operating on the road to Benxi within sight of visiting officials and international visitors and ordered their immediate closure, resulting in the Benxi government’s bombing or closure of eighty-six mines. In August 2001, another sixty-two illegal coal mines in Benxi were bombed. Official reports indicate that a total of fifty enterprises, including small coal mines, were shut explicitly for environmental reasons, affecting approximately 1,200 workers—a small number in comparison to those laid off due to economic reforms. Still, the closure of coal mines intensified the economic strain on Benxi. In 2003, of Benxi’s remaining five hundred coal mines—none of which are state-owned “key” mines—more than a hundred were running illegally. One method local governments have used to balance the demands of environmental protection and economic development is to guarantee loans to enterprises for pollution treatment. Again, these loans come more easily to large state-owned enterprises than to small enterprises—which are already more cash-strapped. According to Wang Zhen,
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the deputy director of Benxi’s planning commission, “The EPB and the planning commission would prefer to give loans to large, stable enterprises, such as Benxi Iron and Steel and the two cement factories, rather than give them to small enterprises.” Enterprises both large and small have sought and received loans for environmental improvements from international agencies and private lenders. Yet these loans put the municipal government at considerable risk. As Mr. Gong, a deputy director of the municipal fiscal bureau, explains, it is the city government that is usually most affected by companies’ failure to repay their loans. In fact, since the early 1990s the State Council has prohibited any local government from sponsoring a loan. As Mr. Gong told interviewers: Benxi pays much attention to environmental protection, making efforts to get a “green passport” to the 21st Century; these are efforts we should support. But environmental protection must match the level of economic development. Getting loans means you have to pay back at some point. The central government deducts money from the provincial government, and the provincial government does the same to the municipal government, which puts a lot of pressure on us. Environmental projects mostly have only social benefits. If the enterprises cannot pay back the loans, the financial burden will be all on us. This is a huge pressure on our fiscal bureau.
“Benxi’s case is common,” according to Dan Dudek of Environmental Defense, the U.S.-based NGO that worked with Benxi officials on controlling sulfur dioxide in the early 2000s. “Five to seven years from now, there will be a climax of debt pressure all around China.”54 Benxi officials saw a means of integrating economic development and environmental protection in the environmental management approach of the International Standards Organization (ISO) in ISO 14000, a program that supports sustainable development by unifying and coordinating the environmental management standards among states, thereby reducing nontariff trade barriers.55 China has taken these standards seriously, regarding ISO 14000 designation as the means of securing the “green passport” that will allow enterprises to trade on the global market. Benxi submitted an application to SEPA to become the first demonstration city for ISO 14000, and in 1997 the request was granted. To observers both inside and outside China, this was an innovative request, since ISO 14000 was new and usually applied to an enterprise rather than to a city. But in 1999, Benxi became the first city in China to become ISO 14000-certified. Citing changing “values” Mr. Tong Jun, the director of the Municipal Clean Production Center, a unit of the Benxi EPB, explained the positive impact of ISO 14000: Through ISO 14000, our values have changed a lot. We try to integrate environmental protection into economic policy-making. First, we improved government capacity in policymaking. Second, the working style of the EPB changed a lot, too. We used to work all alone, having troubles with all other departments and enterprises; sometimes we had to resort to the courts to ask for enforcement. Now we cooperate. Third, our work is more standardized. Fourth, financial resources have also increased. Prior to ISO 14000, funds for pollution reduction came from pollution levies and appropriations from the govern-
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ments, but now we can ask for money from thirty-nine departments. . . . If all departments work in the ISO 14000 framework, the final solution to Benxi’s environmental problems is within sight.
Not all agencies cooperated smoothly to promote environmental protection, however, and there was a growing rift between the public and the promoters of environmental values within the Benxi government. In the next section we examine the reason for the rift and the outcomes of these conflicts. Environmental Values: Reactions of the Stakeholders Up to this point, we have described how the environmental campaign in Benxi was begun and carried out. Now, we explore views of the campaign held by stakeholders from their varying political and economic positions. There was no shortage of pro-environmental rhetoric surrounding Benxi’s rise to the status of model environmental city. Media reports repeatedly suggested that Benxi citizens and officials alike demonstrated their awareness of environmental damage in the 1980s when they reportedly asserted that “whoever can solve Benxi’s environmental problems deserves to be mayor of Benxi.”56 Interviews suggest, however, that different actors prioritize environmental quality differently and according to their political and economic positions. Furthermore, all the stakeholders use the rhetoric of environmentalism in the service of (and often as a standin for) different interests and commitments. Generally speaking, the pro-environmental values expressed by government officials derive from their need to survive in office and to draw public funds, and thus environmentalism contains an element of bureaucratic opportunism. Industry leaders were split; fully state-owned and subsidized industries promoted the environment insofar as they could position themselves to attract investment for technological improvements. On the other hand, small industry officials and their municipal government representatives cast the government’s environmental reform mandates as an obstacle to economic development. Finally, while many Benxi residents acknowledge that environmental action is needed, we encountered many, particularly the swelling population of laid-off workers, who also feel that government spending on environmental protection has received attention at the expense of the economy. In this section we examine the ways in which stakeholders—Benxi officials, EPB officials, SOE industry, small-scale industry, and finally the residents of Benxi—both endorse and reject the new environmental policies. We pay close attention to what their reactions reveal about what environmentalism means to them, and the ways in which they value the environment. Benxi Municipal Government Officials Like their counterparts around the world, Benxi municipal officials endorse environmentalism mostly because they can use it as a mechanism for channeling much-needed financial support to the city from central and provincial governments and even inter-
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national organizations.57 For individual officials, there is a careerist motivation for aligning oneself with the new environmental policies. Bureaucrats are also sensitive to environmentalism as an international norm, bound up with other norms of modernity and scientific progress; their environmentalist accomplishments thus garner prestige. Environmentalism also opened up new career opportunities for officials who were able to showcase their environmental achievements before the highest levels of government. This was aided by Benxi’s ability to attract attention from officials from other parts of China as well as international visitors: from 1997 to 2002, about twice monthly, Benxi officials made presentations on the city’s environmental protection experience to visitors from other cities and sponsored seventeen major exhibitions of environmental technologies. Promotions and other benefits awaited officials within Benxi’s environmental bureaucracy. When the environment office was upgraded to a bureau, its officials were promoted, too. The increased size and power of the EPB meant that environmental officials had greater leverage in economic decision-making, and increased city attention to environmental protection translated not just into more money for the bureau but also into new benefits for its employees, such as bonuses and improvements in housing and office conditions. Nevertheless, some EPB officials betrayed a deep personal and professional commitment to environmental protection in their willingness to risk political capital in supporting environmental projects resisted by other offices within the municipal government. When Environmental Defense worked with city officials to develop sulfur dioxide legislation based on the U.S. acid rain model, the head of the Benxi EPB at that time, Song Kecheng, pushed for the legislation.58 The local people’s congress passed the proposed legislation, but it was subsequently rejected by the mayor’s office. After having invested much time and effort into the legislation, the Benxi EPB issued only a “management decree” (guan li tiao li), which is less powerful than a law. In casting about for Chinese cities to work with, a top priority for Environmental Defense was to find policy makers who were genuinely concerned about air pollution. They chose Benxi because the local officials demonstrated an interest in working with a foreign organization to deal with this challenge. In addition, according to Dan Dudek of Environmental Defense, Benxi “officials understood the severity of the task.” On a professional level, EPB officials were motivated by Benxi’s obligations to the central government under the ninth five-year plan not only to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions but to meet total emission controls standards59—standards made even more stringent during the tenth five-year plan. In field interviews with us, EPB officials routinely and proudly recited the success of their work in pollution reduction. In doing so, they did not mention economic considerations. Here, for example, is how the deputy director of the municipal EPB, Mr. Zhao, described the success of some of the policies enacted during 1996–2000: During the ninth five-year plan period, we tried to control pollution within the standard. The sources of pollution in the whole city are 838 enterprises. All except twenty or so have reached the standards under our supervision. . . . In addition, we promote clean production, which contributes a lot to the environment. . . . On one hand, we try to implement the policies of the party and the state; on the other hand, we make our own policies.
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Yet, despite some EPB officials’ dedication to the bureau’s mission, debates continued among jurisdictions about how to balance environmental protection and economic goals. Several agencies outside the EPB were trying to maintain a balance between environmental protection and supporting the state-owned enterprises struggling in a transitional market economy. Mr. Gao, director of the Benxi Coal Bureau, which represents the area’s independent mining operations, emphatically condemned the closure of coal mines in Benxi as an example of environmental priorities having upstaged economic and social considerations. Mr. Bi, deputy director of the city’s Economy and Commerce Commission took a more nuanced view, however: It’s not reasonable to say there is no relationship between environmental pursuits and unemployment whatsoever. But the effects are not strong because most employees in Benxi are in big enterprises. The enterprises that closed because of environmental concerns are mostly small enterprises that have a relatively small number of employees.
In closing the coal mines, Benxi was following an order from the central government. In general, the municipal government’s enthusiasm for protecting the environment rarely translated into according first priority to the environment when such measures were perceived to be in conflict with economic development. Mr. Wang, deputy chief of the municipal planning commission, explained the struggle of balancing environment and development in these words: We feel that between environment and development, development should come first. They shouldn’t be reversed. Replacing development with environment in the first place is not feasible. The environmental problems brought by development should be gradually explored and solved in the development.
Naturally, many EPB officials were frustrated by this attitude. Because each district EPB office is under the control of the district government, the latter’s views tend to hold sway, and execution of EPB intentions can be thwarted at the district level. As Mrs. Gao, the director of the EPB of Xihu District, explained: It’s really hard to work at the grass-roots level. It’s an institutional problem. We are a part of Xihu District government, governed by the district government, instead of the municipal EPB. . . . Therefore, when we have problems, we have to make concessions to the district government, especially if our job conflicts with the economic interests of this district. If we were governed by the municipal EPB, things would be much easier for us. Environmental concerns would be emphasized.
Industry Officials Industry officials in Benxi differed in their attitudes toward environmental protection according to the cleanup campaign’s economic impact on their enterprise, the size of the enterprise, and the amount of pressure or support an enterprise received from the
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government. Officials at state-owned enterprises, for example, tended to support environmentalism when it led to subsidies for new equipment and resisted it when environmental policies—derived from new “polluter pays” economic models—placed new burdens on industry. Like the municipal bureaucrats who use environmental values as the basis for their demands for greater funding, SOEs endorsed environmentalism and its policies opportunistically. If environmental investments can help increase efficiency and profits, they are usually welcome in factories. Engineer Wang of the Gongyuan Cement Plant described the dual benefits of environmental initiatives: Because of the nature of dust pollution in the cement industry—that is, recycled dust can be put into the production line again—our enterprises want to do a better job in environmental protection. On the one hand, the profit of enterprises can be increased, and on the other hand, it’s good for the health of workers, too. Now every year, recycled dust accounts for one-third of our output value, or RMB10 million (US$1.2 million).
The Benxi No.2 Textile Factory shared a similar experience of success, according to the director of its environmental protection department: If the interests of enterprises are hurt, they won’t be willing to [make environmental investments]. As a matter of fact, it’s beneficial for us to conduct clean production. For example, since we began using low sulfur and high quality coal, our factory has saved tens of thousands of tons of coal. . . . Clean production also reduces the waste of production materials. It saves production costs and increases our profits.
Yet few industries found themselves in such a win-win situation. Even Benxi Iron and Steel felt the economic pinch of implementing pollution control. As Mr. Ren, director of the company’s environmental department, explained: Now the state has begun to stress the environment. In old times it was a problem if your factory didn’t smoke, and now it is a problem if it smokes. . . . The enterprise is pushed to the front line. You have to live on your own,60 pay salaries, keep running, and take money out to treat your own environmental problems. This creates a lot of troubles for the enterprises.
The enterprises never passively accept government policies; instead, they try to delay the payment of pollution fees, or negotiate with or threaten the government. Sometimes the government has to plea for enterprises to cooperate with environmental regulations and policies. Mr. Lu, the director of the municipal environmental supervision department (a part of the EPB), talked about the recalcitrance of some enterprises: According to the national policy, we should charge the pollution fee in proportion to emissions . . . but it’s impossible to get the money all at once. Our policy is to allow delays but not to grant exemptions. This year, the fee is RMB1 million (US$120,000), and you can turn in half of it at first, and owe us another half. . . . To get the money, we have to go to the enterprises more than ten times. It is useless to call them, and it is only worthwhile
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to talk to the director of the factory. Deputy directors are of no help to us. In old times, we only needed to talk to the directors of environmental departments, and things got solved. . . . Not now. . . . Sometimes the boss hides from you because the economic situation of the factory is not good.
Speaking of the potential conflict between development and environmental protection, an environmental engineer at the Gongyuan Cement Plant said, “The production equipment of our enterprise is backward, and our scale is not big, either; buying a lot of new environmental equipment will increase our financial burden, driving us into a hopeless situation.” Although as SOEs the cement companies are protected by the state and would not be closed, environmental cleanup requirements can put a strain on the enterprise, which affects workers’ bonuses and fringe benefits as well as job security. At smaller industries, managers resisted the environmental campaign almost wholesale, viewing it less as a means to modernization than as an obstacle to development and prosperity. They felt unfairly treated when it comes to the distribution of government subsidies for environmental remediation. Small industries saw little of the “green money” for which the EPB and other municipal agencies lobby. Because they employ fewer people, their closure is less politically destabilizing for China than the closure of an SOE. This gave rise to a justice claim on the part of smaller industries; they felt they shoulder a greater part of the burden of environmental policies on the basis of the inappropriate criterion that it is politically efficacious. For the small factories, the cleanup of Benxi caused economic hardship including closure or production restrictions. The Xihu District EPB director, Mrs. Gao, talked about their predicament: The enterprises face their difficulties. It’s not easy for them to squeeze out more money. For example, there is an electricity plant in our area; its name is Xihu Electricity Plant. This year, we got complaints from some people about noise and dust pollution [from the plant]. . . . After measuring and investigating, we found it did exceed the environmental standards, so we ordered the enterprise to stop running. . . . This is difficult for the enterprise. They have no money, but still they have to guarantee environmental quality. What are those unemployed going to do?
Mr. Gao of the Benxi Coal Bureau described similar unemployment problems caused by the coal mine closures. The coal bureau represents the independent mining operations encouraged by the government to go into business only a decade or two ago. Now that they do not conform to the new environmental standards issued from Beijing, and because they are not under the direct auspices of the state, they are left to fend for themselves—and the state is not held directly responsible for their failure. As Mr. Gao pointed out that the government’s compensation for loss of livelihood is routinely inadequate: When we protect the upstream forest, requiring the residents there to revert the agricultural field back to forest, we cut off the livelihood of the people there. Basic livelihood is
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threatened, and the government doesn’t give reasonable compensation. Thirty-four coal mines have assets of RMB3 million (US$360,000) but the compensation given by the government is only RMB30,000 to 40,000. . . . Closing the mines causes a lot of unemployment problems.
Not only do smaller industries not receive subsidies to install new green technologies that would help them remain economically and environmentally sound, but they are also saddled with the same pollution fees as the SOEs. And smaller industries do not have the clout to evade these fees as easily as the SOEs do. In 2000, an assistant manager at the Hangang Benxi Beer Factory described the factory’s difficulty in securing government support: A lack of funding is still a big problem. For example, our new [pollution control] equipment, cost more than RMB8 million; we have still not paid the construction team. We need support from the environmental department. We transferred some money from technical reform funds of our factory to do this. We were originally told we could get loans from the EU [European Union], but it seems unpredictable now. The refinancing from the pollution fee only amounts to RMB600,000 or so; it’s far from what we need.
Residents Before we conducted our interviews, one member of our research team, a longtime resident of Benxi and a former EPB official, had believed that the campaign had widespread support not only among the city’s professional class, but among all residents. After all, unlike lavish projects such as skyscrapers, he and his friends and colleagues reasoned, the benefits of Benxi’s pollution cleanup are enjoyed by everyone. The interviews the team conducted, however, revealed that Benxi residents hold multiple and conflicting opinions about the new environmental policies. On the one hand, no one we interviewed challenged the idea that Benxi’s air was bad. On the other hand, respondents—particularly factory workers and laid-off workers—did not accord much priority to the environment and even spoke disdainfully about the campaign. They routinely shifted the topic of conversation from the environment to job losses and their immediate economic hardship. As an unemployed female worker stated: Now the environment is much better than before. It was once a city invisible from a satellite, but now we can see blue sky. . . . Our governments put so much money toward protecting the environment, but why does nobody take care of our lives? People matter the most. If people are starving, it’s meaningless to have a good environment.
Although the Benxi municipal government, particularly under EPB director Zhao Zhenyu, made considerable effort to enlist public support for Benxi’s environmental campaign, our interviews suggest that many residents are unenthusiastic participants. In a fragile economy where unemployment has soared, basic livelihood needs, health care, and pensions are overriding concerns for many, with environmental degradation often a secondary priority. Similarly, although residents granted that Benxi’s air had
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improved, many of those we interviewed said they believed it was owing to the factory closures—no production, no pollution—and not to new technology in factories or to regulation of factory emissions. While the government characterized improvements in air quality using scientific quantifiers and chemical measurements that signal progress to the international community, Benxi residents gave the improvements mixed reviews on the basis of how (and whether) the improved environment had improved their day-to-day life. This public distrust of the campaign was fueled, in part, by corruption in the SOEs. In a widely publicized case, Bai Shangxian, the former party secretary and member of the board of directors of Benxi Iron and Steel, was arrested in July 2000 for “arbitrarily extending the period of a promotional price” for some clients and providing fake evidence for counterfeit contracts, and sentenced to five years in jail. Around the same time two other members of the board, Zhang Wenda and Li Zhida, were also found guilty of corruption for personal gain. Corruption charges reached beyond the upper ranks, as twenty-one lower officials of the company were charged with involvement in similar cases of economic crimes. In the early 2000s the company fell from China’s fifth-largest steel enterprise to its tenth-largest. It is widely believed that this was due to the corruption cases, which harmed the interests of the company and damaged worker-management relations. More to the point, these cases gained notoriety for a company that has been favored by the environmental campaign; this in turn fostered public cynicism toward the campaign itself. Those who lost their jobs or businesses in the national campaign to close the coal mines were particularly cynical about the campaign. The owners of those mines were poor local peasants who were ordered to close their mines without any compensation— for the sake of the environment. To many coal mine owners, the Benxi EPB was heartlessly preoccupied with executing the orders of the central and provincial governments. As Mr. Gao, director of the Benxi Coal Bureau, explains: After shutting down the small coal mines, our revenue shrank by RMB10 million. Many people lost their jobs because of this. With the revenue decreasing, salaries of government employees are reduced, too. Protecting natural resources should be combined with the protection of social resources. So much unemployment and so much salary arrears are causing social disorder. This is a loss, too.
An unemployed worker who was looking for a job in the local labor market when interviewed also expressed discontent regarding public spending on the greening of Benxi: We have nothing to eat. Who cares about the environment? At the Benxi Steel and Iron Company, so many people are laid off, and given no living expenses. We don’t know where the money has gone. It’s not easy to find a job, but you still have to try; otherwise nobody cares about you even when you starve to death. About the look of the city, have you seen the lawns along the streets by the train station? They reconstructed it three times this year, demolishing and then reconstructing, and then demolishing, and then reconstructing. What the hell are they doing!
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When asked if he knew the story of “the city that is invisible from a satellite,” one old man who used to work at a factory of Benxi Iron and Steel said, “I know. Everyone knows. Benxi’s environment is not good—our factory was very big before, and then it [was closed and] became grassland. The land is green now, but we also lost our jobs. We have nothing to live on now. I’m so old, but still have to go out to look for odd jobs.” When asked if money should be put into cleanup or development, a Benxi Iron and Steel employee responded: “If people can stand the current [environmental] situation, I think the money should be put into economic development. After all, the benefit of economic development is quick and obvious, whereas environmental protection is a long-term and less productive effort.” Nonetheless, some residents see an economic rationale for a clean environment. As an unemployed woman pointed out, “When a company comes here to invest, they look at the city’s environment, and that will be one of the factors in their decision. Who will invest in a place with a disgusting environment? Every time there is a trade show or other big event, the city is cleaned up, and Benxi looks beautiful.” Residents have also made a link between their health problems and Benxi’s environment, and it is through this link that residents’—particularly workers’—environmental concerns are expressed. Liu Ningrong’s novel Angry Earth contains the following passage, now well known to many in Benxi: “The white-dressed surgeons . . . don’t need you to tell them; they know from looking at your lungs: ‘You must be from Benxi.’”61 William Hurst, an American who has researched unemployment in Benxi and elsewhere in China, recalled his interviews with unemployed workers who attribute their health problems to pollution: Among all the unemployed workers that I have interviewed in Benxi and elsewhere, many have mentioned that it is a shame that the environment is so degraded or have talked wistfully about fishing or bathing in what now are filthy or dried-up rivers. . . . Several have even spoken about serious illnesses (most often cancer) they have contracted, they say, because of pollution-related problems.62
There have even been instances of workers taking a stand within their companies: some employees of Benxi Steel and Iron, for instance, told us they refused to work in the heavily polluted workshops, such as the benzene and coke furnace workshops, regardless of how much they were paid. Mr. Kang, head of the company’s coke factory, explained that workers in the factory did not live beyond age sixty-five due to past pollution exposure, and some of the workers even died at age forty-five. The director of the company’s environmental department, Mr. Ren, also expressed concerns regarding the health impacts of environmental problems: Those who came to Benxi only a decade ago, 70 to 80 percent of them have pharyngitis, and it’s getting worse now, developing into brain tumors and lung cancer. . . . In our fireproof material factories, most of our old workers died of lung disease. If you don’t treat environmental problems, what troubles will we bring to our children?
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Yet ordinary residents play only a minor role in environmental policy. This is in part a matter of priorities: environmental values are still a luxury for many residents who feel vulnerable to rampant unemployment; people are simply not motivated to fight for the environment, as they are for other concerns, such as their right to their pensions.63 The low level of citizen environmental activism can also be explained by the Chinese political system, which restricts public participation. As a young, unemployed woman we interviewed put it: The major responsibility for environmental protection lies with the government. No one else can do this. There is a dedicated phone line for the mayor. If you can inform the mayor, the problem can get solved pretty quickly. But sometimes the executive level does not act efficiently. The channels for normal people to report their concerns and problems do exist, but they do not work very smoothly.
The residents do complain, however, and do use available channels to make their complaints heard by local officials. One channel is the local people’s congress; residents can contact their deputies directly in the hopes that their complaints will be presented at the annual meeting of the municipal people’s congress. From 1981 to 1989, for example, the deputies of Benxi’s people’s congress made forty-three motions and draft resolutions requesting that the government take actions to reduce pollution. During this same period there were fifty-three environmental suggestions or complaints, a substantial number for one issue area, filed by residents at the sessions of the city’s political consultative conference.64 It is, therefore, clear that local environmental concerns over pollution existed, were growing, and had been expressed well before government officials imposed air quality improvement policies via the seven-year program and other programs. This suggests a climate of support for environmental policies among the people’s congress representatives and their constituents, the residents. A second channel for public input, which the young woman above referred to, is the environmental hotline that was set up during the first year of the Seven-Year Pollution Control Program. EPB officials report that through the hotline, they received a flood of complaints about bad air quality and power plants that emit black smoke—an indicator that the plants are out of compliance with pollution standards. Although it took some time for the hotline to catch on, by 2000, the Benxi EPB chief Song Kecheng boasted that as many as three hundred calls were being logged per month. In addition to using the hotline, citizens can write letters or visit government departments to complain about pollution. In 2001 alone, 2,445 complaints (compared with 1,667 the year before) were lodged, primarily through the hotline but also by mail and in-person visits. Our analysis of the number and content of the public’s complaints over the period 1982 to 2001 suggests three things: (1) the residents are much more concerned about their local environmental problems than they were in the 1980s (or at least more likely to express their concern through the available channels); (2) the targets of environmental complaints are often smaller-scale commercial ventures such as hotels,
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restaurants, and public bathrooms; and (3) air pollution and noise pollution were the top two categories of complaints (outranking water pollution). The increased level of public participation via the hotline indicates that the environmental campaign in Benxi has heightened awareness of environmental problems among ordinary people. It also suggests some level of confidence that the government will actually respond. Furthermore, it is evident from a review of the proposals for environmental clean up made by the representatives of the Benxi people’s political consultative conference, who are charged with representing public concerns, that citizens’ consciousness of environmental protection grew during the period from 1990 to 2000, a period that included the years of the seven-year program. While the number of proposals increased, particularly in the years 1990–93, the content had shifted: the number of suggestions targeting individual polluting factories had decreased relative to the number of proposals for dealing with citywide environmental problems. These proposals suggest that Benxi residents want to see broader and longer-term approaches to resolving the city’s environmental problems. Stakeholder Evaluations of the Government’s Pollution Reduction Efforts Benxi residents and officials agree that air quality was formerly very poor and has improved. Elites and nonelites, however, measure the improvement differently. Whereas the public tends to rely on personal experience, government officials use scientific measurements. The deputy director of the municipal EPB, Mr. Zhao Liancheng, for example, said: We have basically treated this problem. After the seven-year plan, we continued to emphasize environmental protection to consolidate the results. Now, for the first time, the air quality of Benxi has reached Grade III national ambient air standards.65 Falling dust is 35.8 tons/square kilometer every month. We have reached all the standards, some even ahead of plan.
A young unemployed woman, on the other hand, offered the street-level perception when she said, “The current environment is much better than before. There was a time when every time you walked in the street, your shoes would be covered with a layer of dust, or if you hung your laundry, it would be dirty in a few hours. The environment has become much better.” Along with this acknowledgment, however, comes a sense that the government’s priorities may change with the political winds, and that the job of improving the environmental quality in Benxi remains incomplete. The young woman continued, “But this problem depends on the specific leader. If the leader changes, no one can predict how much attention the government will pay to the environment.” A salesman at a pharmacy agreed: “I’ve been here for five years. The environment here has been much improved, but it’s still dirty here.”
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Government officials see the improvement as a result of a years-long fight against pollution through policies, investments, and campaigns. The deputy director of the municipal economy and commerce commission, Mr. Bi, stated: Now Benxi is quite different from what it was like at the end of the Seventh Five-Year Plan: after so many years of treatment, the problem of dust blowing in one’s face has changed. Our municipal party council and municipal government and all government departments took all kinds of measures to achieve this.
Many ordinary residents disagreed with this analysis, however, attributing the improved air quality to economic recession. A fruit vendor, Mr. Gen, expressed disdain for what he perceived to be an excessive emphasis on pollution cleanup amidst rising economic insecurity: “The factories have stopped running; where is the [supposed] pollution coming from? What do we treat now?” A doctor, Mr. Ren, echoed this sentiment: “The factories were running normally before, and the chimneys gave out dust and smoke constantly. The environment was of course bad . . . but now the factories are going bankrupt. [With] no emission of smoke and dust, the environment gets better automatically.” To such residents, who remain cynical about government policy, the equation is simple: no more belching smokestacks—a sign of prosperity— no more pollution. Both elite and nonelite perceptions of why the Benxi environment has improved may have some validity. Later in this chapter we provide further analysis of the tension between perceptions and values as expressed in both this case and that of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve. The Sanjiang Nature Reserve The story of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve offers a particularly instructive window on the complex dynamics of Chinese environmental politics. In Sanjiang, the tension between the competing values of environmental protection and economic development is even more powerful than in Benxi. Where the Benxi case offers an example of an urban area plagued simultaneously by choking pollution and state-sector unemployment, the case of Sanjiang illustrates the challenge of protecting nature in a remote and poor yet growing district of China where many local farmers and immigrants strive to make a living off the land. Where Benxi shows how local officials lobbied the central government for funds and other help to combat their pollution problem, in Sanjiang a different scenario unfolded. There, local officials undertook an environmental project— the establishment of a nature reserve—in the hopes that the central government would support and fund their efforts. Instead, the central government assumed the management of the reserve, and the funding did not match its own policy pronouncements about the importance of wetlands to China’s environmental preservation. International pressure played a strong role in the central government’s decision to become directly involved in, and to co-opt in a sense, the management of the reserve.
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The case study below examines the changes in values and other factors that led to the creation of the reserve; the individual people and government entities that have played major roles; and the ways competing interests and values obstruct and facilitate the management of the reserve and the pursuit of environmental protection. The core of this case study is an examination of the bureaucratic conflicts and local resistance facing the Sanjiang Nature Reserve as it tries to carry out its work of protecting biodiversity. From a broader perspective, this account of the reserve shows how changing values at the national level are translated into local policies and actions. Ecological Significance and Environmental Degradation The Sanjiang Nature Reserve is located on the Sanjiang Plain in Heilongjiang Province, in the extreme northeastern corner of China. This region was historically known as the Great Northern Wilderness (beidahuang). Until the mid-twentieth century, it was a remote, heavily forested wetland area, full of birds, fish, foxes, tigers, wild pigs, and black bears. In the early 1950s the Sanjiang wetlands comprised 5.36 million hectares, about 80 percent of the Sanjiang Plain. Today the wetland areas total less than 1.9 million hectares—less than 30 percent of the plain. The swamp forests have declined dramatically66 and many species, such as the Siberian tiger, that were once plentiful are endangered, if not extinct. The Sanjiang Plain is a low-lying floodplain at the confluence of three rivers—the Songhua, Heilong (Amur), and Wusuli (Ussuri) Rivers67—hence the name Sanjiang, or “three rivers.” It is a triangular area of land that points into Russia, with the Heilong and Wusuli Rivers forming the natural boundaries between China and Russia. The Sanjiang Nature Reserve preserves a small section—about 5 percent—of the total plain, in the far northeast corner, along the Russian border. Today there are several national nature reserves in the Sanjiang Plain, and two—the Sanjiang and the Honghe— are listed under the international Ramsar Convention on Wetlands as “wetlands of international importance.”68 The convention seeks to preserve biological diversity by protecting wetlands, which contain more than 40 percent of the world’s species.69 As a party to the international Ramsar Convention, China is required to designate one or more wetland sites as wetlands of international importance and take special actions to maintain the ecological character of these sites. A wetland is deemed internationally important if it meets certain criteria outlined in the Ramsar Convention relating to ecology, botany, zoology, limnology, and hydrology. The Sanjiang Nature Reserve is significant because it meets seven of these criteria, more than any other Ramsar Wetland in China.70 It also contains the largest freshwater wetland in China. The wetlands of the Sanjiang Plain are northeastern Asia’s most important breeding ground and migration route for migratory waterfowl. They provide habitat for numerous species of wildlife, including 232 species of birds, thirty-eight species of mammals, seventy-seven kinds of fish, and five hundred rare plants.71 Many of these are listed as endangered species in national and international conservation law documents.72 The Sanjiang Plain is the main breeding area of the red-crowned crane (grus
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japonensis) so beloved of Japanese birdwatchers. It also hosts other rare migratory birds such as the hooded crane, Eastern white stork, black stork, white-tailed eagle, and Steller’s eagle.73 The Sanjiang Plain wetlands, concentrated in the Sanjiang Nature Reserve and the neighboring Honghe Nature Reserve, the plain’s second national-level nature reserve, also perform other important environmental functions, such as water purification, climate moderation, and flood mitigation for the region. However, drainage, overuse of water resources, deforestation, conversion to agriculture, illegal hunting, overharvesting, siltation, and pollution, including pollution caused by agricultural runoff, have severely degraded the wetlands. A 1983 Chinese scientific study of environmental deterioration in the Sanjiang Plain74 indicates “a serious decline in environmental quality and resource productivity,” including decreased rainfall and increased drought severity, decreased groundwater levels and river discharge, and increased wind and soil erosion, salinization, and sedimentation.75 While wind erosion was not a factor in the region before land reclamation drained the wetlands, now more than 60 percent of cultivated areas are affected by it. Changes in vegetation cover have been similarly dramatic. In 1962, 3.16 million hectares of Sanjiang, accounting for almost 30 percent of the region, were forested. By 1976, forests covered only 2.25 million hectares, or about 21 percent—a loss of 916,000 hectares of forest in just fourteen years.76 By the year 2000, more than 60 percent of Sanjiang wetlands had been turned into farmland, at a rate that would see the wetlands disappear entirely within a little more than a decade. The loss of swamp forests had a major effect on species diversity, abundance, and distribution. Siberian tigers once inhabited the region. Lu Bingxin, the director of the Heilongjiang Province Wildlife Institute, in Harbin, estimates that there were eightyone Siberian tigers in Heilongjiang Province and neighboring Jilin Province in 1976 and that only approximately ten to twelve remained in Heilongjiang in 1991 (and none in Jilin).77 Before the dramatic decline in swamp forests and wetlands on the plain in the latter half of the twentieth century, one could easily catch musk deer and fish there. Fish catches dropped from 22,000 tons in 1960 to 3,200 tons as early as 1970.78 National and international attention and funding have helped to prevent the final destruction of the wetlands, however. By 2003, twenty reserves, including the Sanjiang Nature Reserve, covered about 30 percent of the wetlands in the Sanjiang Plain.79 Land Reclamation The Sanjiang region is a Chinese frontier. Before the 1949 Communist revolution, only 3 percent of the province’s land had been converted to agricultural use.80 Its harsh climate and poor soil quality—the wetland is covered with a very thin layer of black soil, which sits atop a layer of saline soil—made it unfit for farming. There were few families living in the region, and most residents relied on fishing for survival. Since 1949, the region has experienced four major waves of “land reclamation.”
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The army pioneered the opening of the Sanjiang Plain in the 1950s, starting the cycle of wetland destruction. From 1956 to 1958, a hundred thousand demobilized soldiers were relocated to the area to “settle the border regions” (zhibian), establish control over territories that had been contested during the anti-Japanese and civil wars, and increase China’s grain supply. These soldiers founded the state farms that still exist in the region today. The second land reclamation wave occurred during the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s. From 1969 to 1973, 450,000 “educated youths” from cities all over the country joined the Heilongjiang Production-Construction Corps to reclaim the Great Northern Wilderness; this quasi military force was charged with opening the wastelands (kai huang) while defending the motherland. During this time agriculture became more important than fishing in the Sanjiang Plain. Security concerns about a possible Soviet invasion were high, as were the “war preparation movement” and the drive for food security.81 Guided by the Maoist dicta “take grain as the key link” and “man must conquer nature,” security-driven nature-conquest campaigns dominated the domestic agenda. From 1969 to 1979, the educated youths “reclaimed” 310,000 hectares of wetlands in the region, destroying local forests for housing and fuel and building drainage ditches to convert wetlands to farmlands.82 Ma Zhong, the director of the Beijing Environment and Development Institute of Renmin University and a former educated youth recalls his experience in Fuyuan County in the Sanjiang Plain: From the first, we cut many trees, mostly poplar. We formed woodcutting teams to look for the biggest trees, going by tractor as far as twenty kilometers away. We formed a logging camp during the second winter for about three months. . . . I spent a lot of time alone in nature then. I saw lots of animals—foxes, rabbits, a snow hare, wild pigs, some black bears, roe deer. Nature seemed vast, the snow deep, the trees straight and tall. . . . My feelings for nature date from that time. . . . During my five years in the county, beginning in 1969 when I arrived, the old forest was almost completely cut down and some animals were wiped out. . . . It was only when I went back in 1988 [and even more environmental destruction had occurred] that I understood what we had done. Before, there were so many trees that you couldn’t see the river from the road. But in 1988, the whole forest was gone. There was nothing to eat but farmed fish—the wild fish were gone. Today, there is a tiny bit of forest left in the Great Northern Wilderness, there’s a little wetland in the northeastern-most counties. I’m working to protect it, but some people still talk about “opening the wasteland.”83
This formative experience influenced Ma Zhong to become one of the Sanjiang wetlands’ most influential environmental advocates, helping to bring the wetlands to national and international attention. The third great wave of land conversion took place in the late 1970s, when the state made the Sanjiang Plain a test site for agricultural mechanization, and large state farms were consolidated, with permanent workers who came from all over China. Fuyuan County, which, along with Tongjiang City and Raohe County, has jurisdiction over Sanjiang Plain, became one of only two counties in China that were totally
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“socialized,” with farmers and fishermen earning fixed wages as state employees. To this day, some older farmers there are still enjoying state pensions. The Heilongjiang provincial government launched the fourth land reclamation effort from the late 1980s until late 1990s when, due to advances in farm machinery, Sanjiang became a major food grain supply base for China. Again the government encouraged migrants to move to the region from other parts of China to farm. In Fuyuan County, this phase led to dramatic increases in population. In 1985, the county registered only twenty-seven thousand residents. By the end of 2000, that number had grown to just shy of fifty thousand, not including people employed by state farms, who accounted for an additional seventy thousand residents, or 60 percent of the county’s population.84 As Fuyuan County welcomed new farmers, its agricultural output grew impressively. In 1999, the area achieved a record yield, contributing 9 million tons of food grain to China’s total production of 500 million tons. It was during the high tide of this fourth phase, from the late 1980s to the late 1990s, that the Sanjiang Nature Reserve was created and developed into a national priority. In the late 1990s the government had a change of heart about its aggressive agricultural development of the region, shifting policy in a way that has radically affected the disposition of lands there. The Heilongjiang provincial government decided in 1998 to stop the development of wetlands for agriculture, and in 2000, the Heilongjiang Land Reclamation Bureau announced that no more farmland would be opened in Sanjiang and that in three years 180,000 hectares of the farmland would be restored to wetland. The reasons for this shift, and its consequences, are examined below. The Wetlands and China’s Shifting Priorities Like many other countries, China until recently viewed its wetlands as “wastelands” (huang) that should be drained and converted to arable land. A number of domestic and international factors encouraged a shift in attitude and government policy toward wetlands. Song Li, a Chinese environmental protection official at that time, attributed the change to six factors: China’s opening to the outside world, government officials’ willingness to assume leadership in this area, government officials’ willingness to learn from China’s environmental failures and mistakes, the role of donor agencies in providing incentives for wetlands preservation, the role of international nongovernmental organizations in promoting preservation, and twenty years of development and rising living standards. The shift in government priorities toward preserving wetlands was bolstered not only by China’s late participation in two major international treaties—the Ramsar treaty (coinciding with the Rio Earth Summit, 1992), which emphasized migratory bird habitat and environmental services, and the Convention on Biological Diversity (which China joined in 1993)—but also by a new understanding of the importance of wetlands in flood control. Changes in international funding priorities, which we dis-
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cuss below, also played a significant role in changing China’s attitude toward wetlands and development programs in the Sanjiang region. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of International Importance was adopted in Iran on February 2, 1971, and took effect at the end of 1975. It held that coordinated international action is necessary in order to preserve wetlands and the seasonal migratory waterfowl that rely on them.85 China has the largest area of wetlands in Asia and the fourth largest in the world, and it is the world’s eighth most biologically diverse country.86 Naturally, then, the treaty countries pressed China to join. Pressure to join Ramsar also came from NGOs interested in wetland preservation. Western NGOs had been active on biodiversity issues in China since 1979, when the World-Wide Fund for Nature began its panda conservation activities. Since then, the Nature Conservancy, zoos, and other groups have become involved. Several NGOs took a particular interest in the Sanjiang wetland: Wetlands International, the International Crane Foundation, and the Wild Bird Society of Japan. China had created its first wetland reserve in the 1970s,87 but it did not join the Ramsar Convention until 1992. For years, the Chinese government ignored international calls to join Ramsar because of its preoccupation with feeding its huge population. With the threat of famine, the country’s vulnerability to flood and drought, and long periods of international isolation, the grain supply issue was a great source of both anxiety and national pride. By the early 1990s, China had achieved grain oversupply, and this was a key factor in changing China’s position on the Ramsar Convention. The other key factor was the need to overcome the diplomatic isolation China faced following the Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989, when the Chinese army brutally suppressed a massive pro-democracy demonstration in the center of Beijing before the eyes of the world’s media. By the time of the Rio Summit, in 1992, China was actively seeking diplomatic interactions and recognition from the world community. The Chinese premier, Li Peng, widely considered responsible for ordering the Tiananmen crackdown, had a personal stake in repairing his reputation and chose to lead the Chinese delegation to the summit. He and Song Jian, the state councilor in charge of environmental affairs, had come to place a high priority on international environmental cooperation as a way to improve the country’s diplomatic standing— another motive for joining the Ramsar Convention. China increasingly recognized that its rich natural heritage and its conduct on other environmental issues, such as carbon output, were of great global concern and that its clout on these matters could be a source of leverage on other issues. Thus, on July 30, 1992, seventeen years after the treaty took force, China ratified it and designated six existing nature reserves as Ramsar sites.88 By ratifying the Ramsar Convention and the Convention on Biological Diversity, China publicly committed itself to including wetlands in national planning, establishing reserves, and participating in international environmental cooperation. Compliance with convention requirements is monitored by international consensus, and countries that fail to meet them are put on a blacklist. Ni Hongwei of Heilongjiang Province’s Natural Resource
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Research Institute stated in 2002 that, by participating in Ramsar, China had put enormous pressure on itself to conserve wetlands.89 Serious concerns about flooding also encouraged the growing emphasis on wetlands protection. Flooding, a perennial problem for China, reached disaster proportions in several locales in 1998, among them the Songhua River, which runs through the Sanjiang Plain. After the 1998 floods, the State Council developed a framework for ecological conservation for the Yangtze area that included wetland restoration and protection.90 For example, in the basin of Dongting, a large freshwater lake in the middle of the Yangtze River basin, officials initiated a “grain for water” program meant to increase the lake’s water storage capacity in an effort to mitigate future floods.91 The central government, through policy measures such as this one, showed that it realized that the 1998 flooding had been intensified by unsustainable agricultural development, deforestation, and the uncontrolled development of wetlands.92 Official newspaper reports carried frequent stories that mentioned the role of wetlands in controlling floods, an alternative to the costly processes of excessive lakedrainage, diking along riverbanks, and moving people out of the floodplains of major rivers—a measure that is nearly impossible to enforce. When water levels in the surrounding rivers rise or when the rivers flood, most of the water is caught by the wetland in the reserve, thereby preventing damage. Greater awareness of the importance of wetlands for flood prevention helped lead to increased funding for wetland protection in the Sanjiang Plain. In addition, at the end of 1998, following the flood disasters, the Heilongjiang provincial government, under the newly appointed party secretary of the province, Xu Youfang, decided to stop all cultivation within the wetlands province-wide, decreeing that the Sanjiang wetlands should be protected and acknowledging the importance of wetlands as natural reservoirs that prevent flooding.93 Then, in 1999, the Heilongjiang Land Reclamation Bureau announced that 180,000 hectares of farmland in the region would be reconverted to forest, pasture, and wetlands.94 The director of the Nature Conservation Department of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), Zhang Guotai, gave a scientific explanation for the policy change, which alluded to the significance of the 1998 flood incident: Wetlands are vitally important in the ecological sense in that they can act as enormous sponges to absorb, hold, and slowly release water that would otherwise cause flooding. . . . They also purify the water and influence local climate. . . . With wetlands greatly reduced, parts of the reclaimed land have become arid. This contributed to the severity of the 1998 floods along the Songhua River basin in Heilongjiang province.95
In 2000, the State Forestry Administration put into effect a plan for protecting China’s wetlands, and the Ministry of Agriculture declared that all natural wetland previously listed as reserved arable land resources would no longer be considered for agricultural use—actions that the China Daily attributed to the government’s having “woken up to the disastrous consequences” of ecological damage.96 On June 20, 2003, the provincial government gave its support for the reserve when the provincial congress passed the
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Heilongjiang Wetland Protection Regulation. This law does three main things: (1) it defines the wetlands protection responsibilities of different administrative departments; (2) it defines legal and illegal activities in the wetlands and sets penalties for illegal activities; and (3) it outlines the procedure of establishing a wetland reserve. International Influences and Shifting Priorities International funding has influenced China’s activities in the Sanjiang Plains for decades. Bilateral and multilateral investors such as the World Bank and Japanese transnational corporations have invested more than US$200 million in agricultural development in the Sanjiang Plain since the 1950s.97 Beginning in the 1980s, international lending and development agencies began to change their focus in Sanjiang from agricultural development to wetland conservation. By the mid-to-late 1990s, international organizations had become active in conserving the wetland biodiversity in Sanjiang Plain. In the 1990s, international funding priorities came to reflect changing values. After having contributed to the loss of the Sanjiang wetland, international agencies reversed their priorities and began assisting China with its commitments under the Ramsar and Biological Diversity Conventions. In 1990, the Heilongjiang State Farm Bureau applied for a grant to the World Bank for a $400 million loan, but this time the World Bank refused.98 Instead, in 1994, the China Biodiversity Conservation Action Plan, which had international funding from the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) of the World Bank through the UNDP, singled out the Sanjiang Plain as a place where wetland conservation could be integrated with agricultural and other development activities,99 and in December 1999 the GEF awarded China US$11.5 million to support its initiatives in the Sanjiang Plain and three other representative sites. In the mid-1990s there were other signs that the balance of international support was beginning to tip in favor of wetlands preservation over agricultural development. From 1995 to 1996, with the support of China’s State Planning Commission and the Heilongjiang Provincial Planning Commission, two U.S.-based organizations —Ecologically Sustainable Development, Inc., and the National Committee on U.S.China Relations—and two Russian organizations—the FEB-RAS Institute of Aquatic and Ecological Problems and the FEB-RAS Pacific Geographical Institute—conducted a study of sustainable land use in the Sanjiang Plain. In its final report, the study team recommended “only highly selective conversion of remaining Sanjiang Plain wetlands to farmland,” and urged investment in productivity improvements in existing farmland. Because of its international importance to waterfowl, it further recommended Ramsar status for the wetlands, and their preservation as the core of a 914,500-hectare Three Rivers Plain International Peace Park and Wildlife Refuge.”100 The first provincial decree to protect the Sanjiang wetlands, mentioned above, followed in 1998. In 1996, at the same time that this international collaborative was studying the
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Sanjiang wetlands, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan funded an environmental impact assessment (EIA) for an agricultural project in Sanjiang Plain sponsored by NEPA. The Japanese agency helped to modify the project to include a wetland conversion component. This was the first EIA of a natural resource exploitation project in China. The Japan Wild Bird Society and the International Crane Foundation provided expertise in making the assessment. Apparently in reaction to the ongoing shift in priorities, that same year in a report to the State Council, the Ministry of Agriculture stressed the importance of coordinating wetland conservation and agricultural development in the Sanjiang Plain.101 The Creation of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve: From County-Level to National-Level Management In its earliest phase, the Sanjiang Nature Reserve was planned, built, and managed at the county level. At the time, Fuyuan County was in its fourth phase of land reclamation and at the high point of the agricultural push, but the agricultural yield of the farmland that is now a part of the reserve was never very high. The soil quality was, after all, poor for farming, and the land’s flatness made it difficult to drain. Local officials, therefore, initially saw the creation of a reserve as an alternative means of attracting central government and international funds for local development. Members of the local department of forestry, for their part, also saw a career opportunity in establishing a wetland reserve. In mid-1993, the Fuyuan County government submitted its proposal to the provincial government to build a nature reserve in the Sanjiang Plain. The EPB team that reviewed the proposal for the provincial government argued in its report that it was an ideal piece of unexploited land to be preserved. The provincial government readily approved the proposal and charged the director of the county forestry bureau, Zhang Xixiang, with setting up an office and establishing and managing the reserve, tasks he began in 1994. By the time Zhang Xixiang was first assigned to establish the reserve, he had already read an article entitled “Saving the Last Wetlands in the Sanjiang Plain” by the economist and environmentalist Professor Ma Zhong. By his own account, Zhang was deeply impressed with Ma Zhong’s call for attention to the wetlands and was enthusiastic about taking on his new duties. Director Zhang was key at the local level to raising awareness of the reserve among area residents and gaining the support of the county and the province for its creation. His enthusiasm for his duties and the energy with which he carried them out were readily apparent in our field interviews. Having worked in forestry for over thirty years, he showed deep commitment to saving forests and expressed delight at having attained a position that allowed him to bring about real changes. He was very proud that the Sanjiang Reserve has received widespread attention and was likewise proud of his staff. “My team,” he told us, “is very well-managed. They are highly self-motivated and self-confident. From them, one can see the great strength of good spirit.”
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While Director Zhang was laying the local groundwork for the administration of the reserve, in Beijing the momentum was building for more serious attention to wetland preservation from the central government. In 1994, Ma Zhong submitted a report to NEPA detailing the risk of wetland damage and argued, using economic analysis, that farms in the eastern part of Sanjiang were not economically viable. He also outlined the benefits of wetlands—flood prevention, biodiversity, and water storage—and argued on economic grounds that preserving the wetland was a better decision than developing the area as farmland. A push for central government support for the reserve also came from the nonprofit group Wetlands International, which met with NEPA officials and urged them to support the reserve. NEPA passed Ma Zhong’s report on to the Environmental Protection and Natural Resources Committee (EPNRC) of the National People’s Congress, China’s legislative body. The committee instructed NEPA to investigate the Sanjiang wetlands matter. In 1995, in response to this request, Wang Yuqing, vice minister of NEPA, led a team of experts from NEPA and the Ministry of Finance to Sanjiang. Before the mid-1990s NEPA, already burdened with the overwhelming task of reducing China’s industrial pollution, had paid little attention to preservation. As a result of the investigatory trip to Sanjiang and the trip report that resulted, however, NEPA officials became enthusiastic about wetland protection. In an unusual sign of bureaucratic cooperation, the Ministry of Agriculture sent a memorandum to China’s cabinet, the State Council, recognizing the ecological damage to the wetlands and stating their official agreement with the NEPA report that laid out the risks of wetland degradation and the economic and ecological benefits of protection. In 1995, the State Council ordered the central and local governments to take further measures to protect the Sanjiang wetlands. The EPNRC sent official requests to the central government ministers of agriculture, forestry, and NEPA, the Heilongjiang provincial government, and Director Zhang requiring them to study the NEPA report, reassess development projects, and devise a plan for strengthening the conservation of the Sanjiang wetlands. In the same year as the State Council order, the central government also established a National Wetland Coordinating Committee involving seventeen ministries and other government agencies. This committee prepared a National Wetland Conservation Action Plan (NWCAP), which laid out the government’s goals regarding wetlands: the sustainable use and better protection of important wetland sites, an increase in the number of designated Ramsar sites, and the reform of policies for wetland protection.102 That same year, the municipality of Jiamusi, the largest city in the region, formally approved the creation of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve Management Bureau, though with an annual budget of only RMB200,000 (US$24,000), barely enough to pay the meager salaries of its thirty-five employees. Five years later, in April 2000, with the strong support of the Heilongjiang provincial government, the State Council named Sanjiang a national-level nature reserve, one of 140 reserves in China with this status.103 With this change in status, the reserve management bureau came to report directly to the central government,
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rising to the same level of authority as the county government. It also acquired some modest financial benefits: that year, the bureau received RMB1.5 million (US$180,000)104 for the construction of a headquarters and other administrative buildings in Fuyuan. The following year, the provincial and national governments provided another RMB3 million (US$360,000) to finance additional construction and equipment purchases.105 With the change of status for the reserve, the county government found itself in the position of taking orders from the reserve management bureau on all matters relating to wetland protection within the reserve; and by cutting out several layers of bureaucracy, the new status empowered the reserve to consider county wishes even less than before. Three parallel administrative institutions, the county government, the reserve, and the state farms thus came to coexist uneasily within the same general geographic area. This has been the source of some of the conflicts that have, as we see below, challenged the management of the reserve. Funding is another source of discontent within the reserve management bureau. While, as mentioned above, the national government paid for the construction of buildings and the purchase of equipment, it has not contributed any money to the reserve’s annual operating budget. Funds for the reserve’s operating costs (US$109,000 in 2001) must be covered by the local government, in this case the Jiamusi government, and through other mechanisms. In 2001, local government funds covered only 22 percent of the reserve’s operating budget; the reserve made up another 56 percent of its budget through agricultural activities such as rice production. In other words, in 2001, the reserve was operating in the red.106 Thus, central government bureaucratic oversight has not translated into money for the staffing and day-to-day operations of the reserve. Some central government officials apparently have noted the dissatisfaction among reserve staff with this arrangement, the economic tensions it causes for local governments, and the obstacles it presents to implementing preservation policies. Several of the relevant ministries are circulating a draft Nature Reserve Law, which proposes that the government should set aside funds for reserves at the national level. As of this writing, in mid-2004, the draft law is still under consideration. Today, the Sanjiang Nature Reserve comprises approximately 198,100 hectares and, in accordance with the State Council decree that covers national-level reserves, it is divided into three zones: a core zone of 30,000 hectares where hunting, fishing and farming have been completely banned; a buffer zone of 150,000 hectares where there is still some scattered farmland; and an experimental zone of 20,000 hectares where economic activity is allowed. There are still villages within the experimental and buffer zones. Commercial farming (except in the core and buffer zones, where it is prohibited) is the predominant economic activity—51 percent of the reserve’s population in 2001 was involved in producing crops such as rice, wheat, corn, and soybeans.107 The State Council decree of 2000 lacked the force of law, and despite the subsequent Heilongjiang Wetland Protection Regulation of 2003, enforcement of wetlands
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protection policies remained a big problem, as we will see below. Thus, while there have been no large, official development projects launched in Sanjiang since 1998, it is widely known among locals, officials, and researchers that there continue to be unofficial, small-scale stealth projects. Cooperation and Conflict: Managing the Sanjiang Nature Reserve China’s wish to engage with the world, pride in its rich natural heritage, and concern about floods compete with other priorities, such as food production, and with attitudes toward nature as a resource to be conquered and bent to human wishes. This competition among values has played out at the local level in the Sanjiang Plain as the reserve management bureau tries to carry out environmental protection policies, and it intensified when the administration of the nature reserve was elevated to the national level. When the reserve was under local jurisdiction as a branch of the Fuyuan County government, competing interests among stakeholders could be reconciled and coordinated more easily. After the reserve was made a national reserve and became independent from the county government and answerable to the central government, there was rising antagonism between, on the one hand, supporters of the reserve and its preservation policies and, on the other, county officials, who had lost control of the reserve (and thus the tax revenue from it), and local people whose economic activities were restricted by the reserve law. This section first describes the reserve bureaucracy, its version of environmental values and its methods for managing the reserve, thus providing the necessary background for understanding the reserve’s encounters with other agencies and individuals that challenge or aid its policies and agendas. Next, we discuss the role of the People’s Liberation Army as a facilitator of the reserve’s work. Finally, we explore the reserve bureaucracy’s conflicts with its four main challengers: the Fuyuan County government, state farm employees, local residents, and new migrants. As we present the claims and positions of the stakeholders, we will pay special attention to the values to which they are committed. Bureaucratic Cooperation The Reserve Bureaucracy The work of reserve officers is hard. They patrol the reserve, record animal activities, burn fishing nets, destroy fishing boats, and catch hunters and loggers. They have serious conflicts with local villagers and unregistered migrants, and are sometimes threatened at gunpoint. In interviews in November 2000, they spoke of the special hardships of patrolling the reserve in winter. The bureau had access only to one car for a two-year period, and Zhuaji Station, one of the reserve’s five patrol units at which we spent the most time, owned just one motorcycle. For the most part reserve officers patrolled the wetlands on foot, walking each day in the icy water. Officers
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who worked in the local observation stations, such as Zhuaji, lived in nearby farmers’ houses, seeing their own families only twice a week. They performed all their work under the stress of inadequate staffing: the reserve had only thirty-five employees, far short of the fifty employees that were deemed necessary according to the March 2001 management plan.108 Finally, their meager salaries often arrived late. Sanjiang Nature Reserve officers nonetheless professed to be committed to their jobs. Their view of Beijing’s environmental push is bound up with their job: to enforce the new environmental values that led to the creation of the reserve. They defended their work and commitment to the bureau by citing modernity and international norms, career ambitions in a burgeoning new field, and socialist values that emphasize restraint and self-sacrifice. Kinship values also play a role both in the politics surrounding the administration of the reserve and in the desire to protect the values and interests of family members who were among the first migrants to settle the area during the Cultural Revolution and have witnessed the devastating effects of the Maoist value of conquering nature on the place they call home. The high morale among the Sanjiang Nature Reserve officers rested on Director Zhang’s administrative style, which called for iron discipline, but also his promise of a bright and modern future as wetland preservation workers. “Environmental protection is a sun-rising sector in our country,” Director Zhang reported he would tell his employees. “The state will give us millions for our important job; tens of millions of U.S. dollars will be available from the Asian Development Bank [ADB] if negotiations in November 2000 are successful, and each local reserve station will get a new building in a few years. All of you will become senior officers when we expand.” He managed to build the most beautiful office building in town, a project to which he likes to say his employees even loaned their own money. This building is a symbol of their rising authority and hope for the future. Director Zhang’s own commitment to the reserve has been strengthened by the prestige that his international ties have brought him. One of his favorite topics of conversation was his exchanges with Russian colleagues. He told interviewers that the Chinese consul general in Khabarovsk had written a letter to the Heilongjiang provincial government proposing that he cooperate with Russian officials in charge of the three nature reserves on the Russian side of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers. Following our field site visit, on July 30, 2001, the Sino-Russian Joint Reserve was announced, making big news in the Chinese official media.109 Reserve staff appeared to share Director Zhang’s view that their environmental commitment would pay off. Twenty-nine-year-old Chen, head of Zhuaji Station acknowledged that he was underpaid. In spite of this, he insisted that he was committed to his work. He tactfully told interviewees: “My work to preserve wetland is significant for future generations. The reserve has a bright future, and my own future in the job is good.” In addition to the promise of a bright career, officers’ acceptance of poor working conditions was a function of self-sacrifice and austerity, values that Director Zhang had inculcated in his staff by managing the reserve like an old-fashioned Communist-style institution. Director Zhang, we were told,
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even patrolled with young colleagues in the icy and muddy wetland, sometimes for a week at a time. The bureau’s interest in seeking new forms of revenue for the area—as reflected in the ecotour component of the agreement with Russia and the local support for the anticipated ADB grant110 that would help fund new buildings—is a sign that the reserve officials were motivated, at least in part, by economic considerations. The reserve administration’s deputy director, Feng Wenyi, claimed that the reserve attaches great importance to encouraging local economic development and improving the living standards of the local people in order to improve relations with the county, townships, and villages. For instance, he explained, the bureau helps farmers on existing cultivated lands with technical advice. Kinship values of loyalty and mutual favors among relatives by blood and marriage often play a role in nature protection work. The two officers posted at the Zhuaji Station maintain good relationships with the local villagers because one of the officers is the son in law of the village party secretary and the other is his nephew. The party secretary uses his authority to guarantee their safety and effectiveness, something he would be unlikely to do without the blood relationship. As with other Chinese institutions, corruption affected the reserve. Though the corruption may well have been an adaptive strategy to obtain resources for the task with which reserve staff were charged, certain of their corrupt behaviors damaged popular perceptions of the bureau. For example, the head of the reserve management bureau’s police department owned a used car obviously smuggled into China. When two of our researchers were traveling on foot from Dongsheng to Donghe— two villages in the Zhuaji District of the Reserve—the officer accompanying them hailed a Jeep Cherokee emerging from the core zone. When the researchers got in, they found a hunting rifle on the back seat with blood on it and overheard the driver say to his colleague, “These days, [we] have not seen ducks, and today [we] haven’t shot even a single duck.” The researchers inferred that the two men may have recently been hunting wild ducks, which is illegal, and later they learned that the Jeep owner was a local official. Such examples reveal that despite the new preservationist rhetoric among officers, old values of personal privilege still persist. While reserve officials acknowledged the long-term importance of preserving the Sanjiang wetland, the constellation of values that guides them also includes ambitions for a modern life and international engagement, career aspirations, socialist values of discipline and dedication to a cause, and kinship values resting on networks of loyalties and mutual favors. Yet their enthusiasm for their work suggests that there is more than opportunism involved in their support for the reserve, and that the reserve itself has come to have value for them even as it is embedded in their hopes of advancement. Zheng Zhigang, the head of the administration office of the reserve management bureau, spoke favorably of the progress, albeit slow, that the reserve, together with local and county officials, has made since 1997 in educating the peasants in environmental protection. This modest achievement in itself holds value for the reserve staff.
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Foot Soldiers for the Environment: Cooperation from the People’s Liberation Army There is today a major military presence in the Sanjiang Plain region because the reserve extends 169 kilometers along the Russian border at Khabarovsk, just across the river from the Fuyuan County seat. Because of this, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has played an unusual role in the reserve, not only as an enforcer of government nature protection policies but also as a champion of the new environmental values, by pursuing environmental activities such as planting trees and making nests for birds in their leisure time, rescuing animals, and participating in environmental education projects. Their endorsement of environmental policies is nuanced, however, and it has several different motivations. First, for the military, the new environmental values are related to larger issues of national security. Similarly, as we will see, environmental values are linked to patriotism—to the land itself as part of Chinese identity. Finally, the hierarchical military structure promotes the value of topdown dissemination of ideas and actions, which ingrains and reinforces norms handed down from the top of the command structure. During the Cultural Revolution, when soldiers began opening up the Sanjiang Plain, the military played a key role in the exploitation of the Sanjiang wetlands. Today, on the other hand, environmental protection has become a surprisingly large part of the military’s responsibilities. The local PLA contingent emphasizes cooperation with the Sanjiang Nature Reserve Management Bureau, and officers are recognized and promoted for strong performance in environmental protection. The military instructs soldiers that land use is connected to border defense. One example involves local civilians’ practices of using riverbank sand for construction work and riverside bushes for fuel. Now, because of the reserve, these practices are prohibited. Soldiers reported that they have been instructed to explain that “when the riverbank on the China side becomes eroded, the river’s central line moves toward China. Digging sand means selling our homeland for private gain.” A similar security rationale justifies the local military’s role in afforestation within the reserve: According to the head of one outpost, “The Russian side is full of forests, and their observation stations are hidden in the big trees. Our side has few trees, and our observation stations and military moves are exposed.” He went on to tell the story of how in the winter of 1998, a nearby state farm sent a truck full of workers to cut trees in the reserve. The reserve station had only six officers then, and they could not stop the workers from cutting trees, but the station head called for military help, and twelve armed soldiers brought the situation under control. The link between environmental protection and protection of the country is further strengthened by the sharing of resources between the reserve management bureau and the PLA. Military boats, telescopes, manpower, offices, and observation stations are often made available to the cash-strapped bureau, and the army joins bureau officers in periodic visits to local villages to teach about environmental protection and the importance of the reserve. Mr. Wang, commander of Haiqing township’s first battal-
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ion, second company, explains that the army coordinates its work with the reserve at every level: Every year, we work together on propaganda and education. Actually, the reserve uses army resources to reach their goals, and those resources are a great asset to the work of the reserve and create helpful working conditions. . . . The army uses its patrol duty system to assist the reserve in checking fishing activities. At the same time, they can protect the shoreline of the river. And, every year, army members volunteer to do tree planting and reforestation work.
The PLA border patrol is also responsible for animal rescue and monitoring and deterring illegal activities, such as fishing and cutting trees, in the reserve. It cooperates closely with the reserve management bureau and has an impressive record of carrying out these duties. Environmental duties have become more important to the border patrol as the security situation has relaxed. Every soldier is given a notebook in which he is required to write a diary of environmental observations. The army also requires officers and soldiers to take turns receiving training at the reserve management bureau, as a result of which nearly all soldiers can identify the animals, birds, and plants of the region. The military’s centralized hierarchical structure provides a critical example of how new values are transmitted down from the government to the people through propaganda. In the case of the Sanjiang PLA contingent, the norms of environmental protection motivate commands and assignments. As a result, the soldiers become environmentalists “on command.” These values, however, extend beyond merely following orders, as evidenced by the volunteer work the soldiers do in addition to mandated environmental protection duties. Indeed, the local military in Sanjiang has become a model for the Chinese armed forces as a whole. Their environmental protection work was publicized in the July 18, 2000, issue of People’s Liberation Army Daily, in an article that boasted, “Every soldier is a soldier for environment protection.” It is also noteworthy that Chinese soldiers serve in the military for only three years, after which they return to their hometowns. This gives them the chance to spread the environmental awareness that they gain during their service in the border area. Bureaucratic Conflict The case of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve shows how complex a job it can be to implement environmental policy in a biodiversity-rich region as multiple administrative units carry out their competing missions and mandates. As noted earlier, the central Ministry of Agriculture continues to operate huge state farms in the area near the reserve, some of which were converted from wetlands to farms, or “reclaimed,” with World Bank and other foreign donor support. The presence of these farms limits the area of wetlands available for restoration. Similarly, the provincial-level Heilongjiang Land Reclamation Bureau operates according to an outmoded mandate dating from the “grain first” campaigns of the Mao period. In the wetland this approach has been
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suspended since the provincial government’s December 1998 decision to stop the expansion of any existing agricultural areas in the wetland—a policy created under pressure from the central-level Ministry of Water Resources to restore more wetlands to help control flooding after the devastating floods of 1998. Meanwhile the State Forestry Administration, through its oversight of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve Bureau, tries to implement wetland preservation as best it can with limited funding. At the local level, the reserve management bureau has had conflicts with the Fuyuan County government, one of five municipal jurisdictions in the plain. The Fuyuan County Government The Sanjiang Nature Reserve, as mentioned earlier, actually lies across three different counties. However, we have concentrated on Fuyuan County, because the reserve headquarters is located there, and because it is the only county with shared jurisdiction over the reserve that touches the Russian border. Moreover, because the reserve constitutes a third of the land of Fuyuan County, the conflict between environmental and economic agendas is especially pronounced here. All local government officials interviewed for this case study—four officials of Fuyuan County and four officials of Dongsheng village—acknowledged the necessity of preserving the wetlands, demonstrating that environmental protection values had gained official legitimacy. Gao Fazhang, a former director of the Fuyuan County State Farm Bureau, who had helped to open up the wetland for farms, expressed his values vis-à-vis the preservation of what is left of the wetlands: When I arrived, Fuyuan was very desolate—forest, swamp, grassland, and lakes everywhere. There were only ten villages in Fuyuan, and Fuyuan town was one of them. The local residents were living on fishing, since natural resources were very rich. . . . We absolutely cannot cut down what little is left. Not only do we have to protect the forests, but also the wild animals living in them.
Despite this general recognition of the problem of endangered wetlands, the Fuyuan County government often comes into conflict with the reserve. In one case, the central government had allocated funds to the county to restore waterlogged farmland, a project that involved digging drainage ditches that needed to pass through the reserve. When the county government and the bureau failed to agree on a plan for digging the ditches, a deputy director of the reserve management bureau ordered police to detain the ditch-digging contractor and confiscate his vehicles. The county government then threatened to obstruct preservation work, even hinting that it would stir up the local people. The crisis was resolved, and the contractor released, only when Director Zhang returned from a conference in Germany to talk things over with the top county leader, a close relative. The EPB, the water bureau, the forestry bureau, and the land reclamation and cultivation bureau have overlapping areas of responsibility at the local level in Sanjiang, and at times these bureaus work at cross-purposes with the reserve.111 The Fuyuan
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County EPB director, Yu Xichen, contrasted the thorny situation of the Sanjiang Reserve with that of a second reserve that neighboring Tongjiang City also has jurisdiction over: In Tongjiang City there is also a reserve, but they didn’t form a special reserve administration. The EPB grabbed the job early, before the area was cultivated and opened up, and established a reserve area in order to prevent outsiders from cultivating that land. Later, they opened some parts to cultivation, and the contract fees were used for reserve construction. So the duties in Tongjiang were organized well among departments, and their job is easier. But now, our reserve is a national reserve; thus there are duty conflicts between the reserve and the county.
He went on to acknowledge the inherent value of the Sanjiang wetlands. In the entire Sanjiang Plain, this is one of the few areas of natural ecology left, so protecting it is very important. But it cannot be at the cost of economic development. Environmental protection is not only protection, but should also fit with the development of opening-up lands, forestry, the fishing industry, and township enterprises.
Yu Xichen’s comment points to the most frequent source of conflict between the county government and the reserve: the perceived tension between preservation and economic development. Although officials we interviewed were aware of the scientific importance of the wetland and expressed bitterness about the exhaustion of fish, wild animal, and forest resources, their positive feelings about the reserve were tempered by their perception that it is a barrier to local economic development. Another official, Mr. Sun, deputy director of the Fuyuan County government demonstrated the conflict in priorities: This summer, we were in the western part of Nongqiao112 when we got in trouble. Actually, we were only cutting down trees, and . . . only twenty here and thirty there. But the reserve arrested my men and fined me. That section isn’t in the core zone. For the local government, whose primary job is to develop the economy and develop agriculture, the central government gives us funds to help increase farmers’ income and increase production. So whose job is more important: mine or the reserve’s? . . . If there was no reserve, we could reclaim more land, expand fields for growing crops, and we could have greater income from farming, but the reserve leaves something for our grandchildren.
Since the early 1980s, the official central task of the party-state has been economic development, and economic performance indices have decided promotions. Moreover, because of the bloated government there is great pressure to keep salaries low. In September 2000, retired government officials had not received their monthly pension in half a year. Without administrative reform, economic development is the only way to decrease the pressure. With aspirations for their county to become a growth region—in interviews local officials referred to Shenzhen, in south China, which had grown from a village to a city of 4 million in only fifteen years—Fuyuan County officials want to encourage,
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rather than restrict, migration. To this end, the government is seeking a change of administrative status from county to city, a move that would require Fuyuan County to increase its locally registered population by a factor of ten, increase its water supply capacity, and build more schools, roads, sewage pipelines, and electric facilities. Officials also talked about constructing an airport for small tourist planes and turning the town into a major port city for trade with Russia and Japan. The reserve management bureau and its goals represent an alien agenda that stands in the way of the county’s growth. In the words of the deputy mayor, “What is the sense of preservation if it leads to worse lives for the local people?” Farming is essential to Fuyuan County’s economy, and because of the poor quality of the local soil, land area counts for everything. Thus, farmers use all possible means to open farmland within the reserve. The reserve bureau, in turn, looks to the county for help with law enforcement; yet the county has no interest in helping the reserve enforce the law. Rather, it is interested in collecting more taxes by increasing the acreage of farmland under its jurisdiction. The farmers’ economic gain means more tax revenue for local government and more promotions for local officials. One county official did at least suggest alternatives to existing agricultural development models. Duan Hongguang, director of the Fuyuan County State Farm Bureau, believes the reserve should provide some economic benefits for the county and its farmers, and proposes new economic activities that are more sustainable than current agricultural practices, including tourism and growing rice: We need to see policies that give something back to the farmers. Fuyuan wants economic development, so we need to look at what bonuses come out of your reserve. For example, the policy of expanding tourism, how can it work if you don’t allow people to enter? The wetlands are protected in the national interest; our county wanted to develop our economy, but both are for the same purpose. . . . We should have some projects in the wetlands . . . Farmers getting out of poverty is a good thing, right? And we are simultaneously protecting the wetlands. For example, assist a few villages on the perimeter to dig wells, and we contribute a few rice paddies; this is also wetlands, right?
Despite the priority placed on development, there have been recent attempts to reconcile the values of economic development and those of preservation. The local government, for example, has supported the efforts of the reserve management bureau to obtain funds that will be spent in the county. Because of the national importance of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve, Fuyuan County gained national attention; in fact, county officials argue that the reserve should have been named the Fuyuan Nature Reserve.113 Whenever reserve management bureau leaders are willing to help the local economy, the two parties cooperate better. As Duan Hongguang mentioned in our interview with him, Fuyuan County is trying to build a new agricultural base of rice, instead of beans and wheat. Transforming dry land into paddy field is expensive, so the wetland is seen as a better test ground, an idea that is agreeable to both the bureau and the county. As Director Zhang pointed out, “My job is to restore and preserve the wetland, so I have no problem allowing paddy fields into my buffer zone, for it is a kind of artificial wetland.”
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Resident Resistance Although environmental protection has, since 1992, been a core element of China’s official development rhetoric, the shift to a market economy has unleashed forces that challenge this commitment. Environmental protection continues to be overshadowed by economic development at the national and local levels. The national government, for example, has thus far allocated no budget for the daily operations of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve; what money has flowed in has come from the province.114 Most Fuyuan County residents, moreover, perceive wetlands preservation to be incompatible with economic development. In Sanjiang the challenge is to create sustainable livelihoods that will not conflict with preserving the wetland, but outside of studies being funded by international agencies, such new initiatives have received little serious attention in China. Although there are no state farms within the reserve, activities such as fishing and water drainage on farms surrounding the reserve harm the reserve’s ecosystem, causing conflicts between the reserve and the state farms. At the provincial level these conflicts pit the reserve against the provincial state farm bureau, which sponsors the state farms. Local residents, particularly long-term migrants and state farm employees, also come into conflict with reserve officials. Even the small population of Hezhe minority people, who are native to the Sanjiang Plain and once supported themselves by fishing, must struggle to adapt to the new agricultural lifestyle and seek a better way of life. The Sanjiang Plain is an important source of livelihood for local people. “Mr. Z.” is a typical example. A new migrant from Huanan County (also in Heilongjiang Province), he survives by doing odd jobs or fishing. Before the reserve was established, he frequently fished in areas that are now in the reserve. Despite the prohibition on fishing within the reserve and the fact that reserve officers have burned or otherwise destroyed his boat and nets, he continues to fish there, sneaking back into the reserve, but he only makes around RMB10, or US$1.25, a day from fishing. In this section, we examine the attitudes and interests of the residents of Fuyuan County—people who arrived and settled in the area during all four of the phases of land reclamation—and the ways in which their activities and outlooks conflict with the management of the Sanjiang Nature Reserve. Long-Term Migrants and State Farm Employees Long-term migrants and state farm employees constituted the first wave of agricultural settlers in the Sanjiang Plain. Their attitudes toward the new preservationist emphasis and policies emanating from the central government cover a broad range. Some, raised on the Maoist drive for agricultural development in that region, recognize that their past activities have led to the loss of the forests and streams that once supported a prosperous life. Despite the economic hardship that the preservation policy has caused them, these residents recognize the nonmaterial value of what remains of
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the Sanjiang Plain habitat, and they endorse its protection. However, others who settled the area under the aegis of the same drive for agricultural development do not believe environmental preservation should be a policy priority, particularly given the new burdens resulting from the transition to a market economy. Among these state farm workers, a view of reserve land as a resource to be exploited predominates. Others view the executors of new environmental protection policies as opportunists using the new vogue for environmentalism to enrich their own government agencies. Long-term migrants came to Fuyuan between the early 1960s and the late 1980s, when the county government stopped distributing land to newcomers. They included the state farm workers, who arrived throughout the Mao period. As children, these workers had been taught pre-Communist traditional values, which emphasized family ties and patron-client loyalties, but in the new spirit of Communist selflessness, they answered the call of the party-state and moved to Fuyuan to “construct socialism,” “serve the people,” and “eat bitterness”—that is, suffer hardship. Then they experienced yet another change when, after the turbulent years of the Cultural Revolution, the new government under Deng Xiaoping told them their Maoist fervor had been a terrible mistake: they were told, as the early 1980s slogan put it, that “to get rich is glorious.” Farmer Sun Jiefang, fifty-six, a typical long-term migrant, is a retired worker from the Donghe village state farm. Sun told our interviewers that his best years were in 1969, when he became a farmer in the local people’s commune; at the time Fuyuan was one of just a few counties in China where all farmers were treated as state employees. “We farmed and fished, and our income was handsome,” he recalled. “Thirty yuan a month, higher than urban workers. We were told to join the great transformation—there would be guaranteed pension, free medical care, labor protection, housing, and child care.” Although many of these promises were not realized, Sun became a party activist and a production team leader. Among a few rare individuals like Sun, the “socialist values” of self-sacrifice and contribution to the state (in exchange for social welfare guarantees) remain strong, and they contrast sharply with new values such as individualism and materialism. Despite his career as a farm worker, Sun Jiefang supports the reserve. “The reserve is a good thing,” he said. “There needed to be administration. Before, there were lots of swans and wild geese . . . many people even killed swans for food. Then, for a long time there were none, but now they are back. Now you can go see them; it’s really interesting to watch them!” Many workers who still farm disagree with this view of the reserve. With the economic reforms, some of the state farm land was contracted to individual farm workers, many of whom live by herding, and the reserve offers the area’s best pastureland. On a typical day, hundreds of cows illegally graze within the reserve, destroying the grasses. There are only three officers in the region of the reserve that borders the Qianshao State Farm and their law enforcement capabilities are useless in the face of that many cows and the strong workers who oversee them. Moreover, they have no way to prosecute farmers, for state farms have their own court system. Eventually,
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through their personal ties, Director Zhang and the state farm party secretary arrived at a compromise, in which Director Zhang agreed to set aside several hundred hectares of wetlands for cattle grazing. State farm workers have few connections with the local political life in Fuyuan or with the reserve management bureau, since they are sponsored by the provincial state farm bureau and do not fall under the jurisdiction of Fuyuan County. Conflicts over grazing and hunting in the reserve are the main form of interaction. Interviews with state farm workers revealed cynicism regarding the reserve and perceptions of government mismanagement. In particular, they cited the government hypocrisy about publicly stated goals such as reforestation, and its lack of flexibility in allowing local people to engage in practices that would provide even modest economic benefits as reasons why they could not support the reserve. In one case, an official from the Qianshao farm complained that the forestry management bureau, which is part of the state farm bureau, required workers to grow trees, with annual quotas for each family, usually four hundred bureau-provided saplings. The work is “voluntary,” but the trees belong to the state instead of the growers. “We agree that trees should be preserved and forests restored through our efforts,” the official said. “However, even if the trees are not for sale, cutting a few to build our own houses should be allowed; after all, we are the growers.” Another worker complained: Last year, we had to grow trees in front of our residential center, but the trees were neither well planted nor well cared for afterwards. The leaders are only interested in fulfilling the quota; they don’t really care about the trees. The year before, we planted trees, and many survived. This year, the leaders decided we needed a livestock farm and cut down all the trees we had planted. We have been planting trees for quite a number of years, but not a single forest has emerged. Why should we care about protecting trees?
In fact, it is not uncommon for state farm workers to steal trees from the reserve. Another state farm worker, who was harvesting beans when we interviewed him, also complained about corruption: What is the purpose of wetland preservation? Protecting animals? There are few animals left anyway. There are rules that we cannot fish in the ponds and rivers in the reserve, but if you have money to pay the reserve bureau, they allow you to fish there. Why does the reserve bureau prohibit grazing inside the reserve? They exaggerate the number and kinds of wild animals in it to get state funding. Why do they prohibit fishing? They want the fines. Why do they prohibit cutting trees? They want the fines. But what do they do with the fines? Every year, the grassland has major fires, but what do they do about that?
As he was talking, as if to illustrate his point, a tractor emerged from the reserve carrying a load of logs belonging to someone who had connections with the reserve management bureau. Having done their best to believe in socialist ideals of integrity and selflessness, long-term migrants are deeply offended at what they see as the corruption of reserve officials.
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Up to now, it has been too expensive and politically unpopular to move local residents out of the reserve. The long-term goal for the reserve has been to create new sources of income—including work with the reserve itself—so that people living there no longer need to depend on livelihoods that degrade the reserve. Ma Zhong, the Beijing economist who first drew the attention of Beijing officials to the Sanjiang wetlands, worked with the provincial government to draft the Heilongjiang Wetland Protection Regulation, which since its enactment in 2003 has banned economic activities such as agricultural conversion. The provincial government also plans to create a program to reduce human impact on the reserve by controlling the size of villages, preventing the expansion of farmland within the reserve, and encouraging ecologically friendly activities.115 More recent master plans for the management of the reserve take this agenda a step further, calling for the resettlement of people living in the core and buffer zones. Recognizing the political difficulty of resettlement, the government plans to link it to the creation of sustainable livelihoods and new employment in the area both inside and outside the reserve.116 Local officials with whom we spoke before this plan was announced described why such a transition would be problematic. The party secretary of Yanan Township explained to interviewers that when the buffer zone around the reserve was established, farmers had a total of 530 hectares of land under cultivation within it. The reserve allowed the farmers to continue to farm their land, but they no longer paid land tax to the township government; instead, they paid rent to the reserve. As a result, he explained, the government lost about RMB200,000 (roughly US$24,000) of income annually. In his opinion, the reserve would not restore these farms to wetland in the near future, because to do so would mean a double loss: the reserve would have to pay the farmers to leave their land while also losing the rent paid by the farmers. By decree, farmers did not have to compensate the local government, but they violated the decree by farming within the buffer zone of the reserve. Another top cadre leveled more serious charges: “Reserve officers open up virgin land inside the reserve to rent to local peasants.” The attitudes of long-term migrants and state farm employees emerge out of the historical context of Maoist economic development; more important, they respond to how the new environmental policies are being manipulated by corrupt officials, a subject discussed in more detail below. As agricultural laborers lured to Sanjiang to pursue a particular livelihood, they resent forces that threaten their livelihood. Few of them, other than the elderly retiree Sun Jiefang, acknowledged or cited the disappearance of the natural habitat as a problem. Most expressed cynicism towards the new environmentalism because of the way it is being exploited for personal gain by those who enforce environmental policies. New Migrants Recent settlers in Fuyuan share their government’s hope that one day Fuyuan might become an economic miracle. In the immediate post-Mao liberalization of the 1980s,
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Sanjiang represented a land of hope, fortune-seeking, risk-taking, entrepreneurship, and self-reliance, with a view of nature as a supplier of raw materials for a better life. The nature reserve challenges the view of the frontier as cornucopia by putting a third of the land of Fuyuan County off-limits. Many recent migrants are poor, having left their hometowns in search of a better life. Until the late 1990s they were encouraged to come to Sanjiang to farm; and their priority is to farm the Sanjiang wetland. Zhang Hongjin, a new migrant who lives on the edge of the reserve, commented: “The best thing would be to open [the reserve] up and cultivate it so that we could grow more crops.” Their need to survive lead them to exploit the Reserve’s resources in any way they can. As a local reserve officer stated, We don’t worry much about the old migrants, but the new migrants, especially those without land and registration,117 are the most threatening group. Older migrants identify with this place, and they know how Fuyuan once had rich resources, vast land, plentiful fish, and dense forests. But the new migrants are desperate. They make money from all kinds of risky things, and we might suffer from their crazy retaliation if we strictly enforced the laws.
This officer, an old migrant himself, states the problem in terms of the ability of the new migrants to be good stewards of the land, but the comment also reveals an underlying sense of threat from these new occupiers as economic competitors who bring with them alien values. The Wang family migrated to Fuyuan County in 1990, settling beside what is now the reserve’s core zone. Before leaving home, they sold their single hectare of farmland so they could buy a house in Fuyuan County. They live as hired laborers, earning RMB20 (US$2.40) per day to harvest beans. They also fish illegally in the reserve, and, like many families, they sell fish to survive the seven-month-long winter, when there is no farm work. “Reserve officers burn our nets, but if we didn’t fish, how could we live?” they told interviewers. When asked why they did not return to their hometowns, Mrs. Wang replied, “We came here to make money. How could we face people if we came back with empty hands, unable even to buy back our house?” Many families survive on fish during the winter, and they depend on firewood to warm their houses because they cannot afford coal, which has to be transported from afar. Sometimes they cut reserve trees in winter and leave them to be picked up in the spring, since harvesting dead trees is subject to lighter punishment than felling live ones. Another couple moved to Fuyuan County in 1989 with three children. They rented land to grow rice, but their crop failed. Then they raised three cows, but two of them soon died, and anyway the reserve prohibited grazing inside the wetland. Now they, too, labor for others, illegally fishing and cutting trees to survive. Reserve management bureau officers have twice burned their fish net, and each time the couple has made another. They told interviewers that they hate reserve management bureau officers. New migrants not directly involved in farming also express disapproval of the reserve. A tavern owner told interviewers:
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The nature reserve has no benefits. Besides, establishing an office [the Sanjiang Nature Reserve Management Bureau] to manage it is a waste of human and material resources. . . . It [the bureau] should grow more trees [instead]. It is unnecessary to build a reserve. When peasants are still having trouble surviving, building a reserve is a waste.
Even those residents not yet in the labor force share a deep cynicism about the reserve. As a high school student in the town of Haiqing put it, “The reserve is unnecessary because it only manages common people. The people who have power and money can cut the trees and capture the birds whenever they want.” Pan Jun, thirty-one, a former textile worker, migrated to Yanan Township in 1996, when his state-owned factory collapsed. He borrowed RMB300,000 (US$35,970) to invest in Fuyuan farmland, hoping to make a fortune. Of his eighty hectares, he has dredged twenty hectares of ponds in which to raise fish. The reserve management bureau asked him to pay a RMB50,000 (US$5,995) fine for illegal operations. After negotiations, they reduced it to RMB15,000 (US$1,798.50), still an enormous sum in China. “I don’t know where the border [of the zone] is,” he complained. Nevertheless, he admitted that he often fishes in the reserve and traps wild animals for food. Interviewers found that Pan had a good basic knowledge of environmental issues (which he said he acquired from watching television), but with fifteen hectares of farmland within the reserve, he cared much more about using his farmland. The Zheng family migrated from Shandong Province to a nearby state farm in 1977. When, in 1994, Fuyuan encouraged people with livestock-raising skills to settle in the region, Zheng moved to a local village, expecting to earn more money than at the state farm. He purchased a house three kilometers from the village and raised twenty cows. When the reserve was established, however, he could no longer raise the cows since his land was on the reserve, and had to sell them at a loss. “I used to be a state employee, and I understand the importance of the nature reserve,” he said. “But I quit my safe job for a better life, not to lose money.” Now he has raised two hundred ducks, hoping to sell eggs. He has some income, but the future is not bright. His duck farm is in the core zone, and there is no electricity. By candlelight, his wife spoke of their hopes to return to Shandong once their son had started his own family. But she also had hopes for life near the reserve. “Maybe someday we will open a little inn here for tourists,” she said. When the choice is between basic livelihood and nature preservation, there is little contest, but there is also a sense that the reserve may eventually be a source of revenue from ecotourism. Not all recent migrants suffer, however, and a few acknowledge the legitimacy of preservation even in the face of the need for economic development. Their solution is to adapt by switching to more sustainable forms of agriculture. Zhu Wanchang, fiftytwo, migrated to Fuyuan in the early 1980s. He owns 120 hectares of paddy field outside the reserve and sells organic rice, marketing it as chemical-free “green food.” He has received national publicity as a “model farmer.” When asked about wetland preservation, he expressed support: “I don’t want to live in a big city; the pollution is unbearable. Here I will turn my own ‘wetland’ of rice into a garden of pines and flowers.” The government has supported him with loans and agreed that the trees he
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has planted can be cut and sold as long as he surrenders 10 percent of the revenue to the local government. Zhu Wanchang’s support for the reserve, to the extent that it is genuine and not simply a case of spouting the official line to interviewers, suggests that aesthetic values may emerge when basic survival needs are no longer so pressing, and that even new migrants may become supporters if it will serve their interests. One group banking on this hope in various parts of China is the Trickle Up Foundation, a small American foundation that has made small grants to poor people, often women, near Chinese nature reserves to encourage them to find sustainable livelihoods that won’t harm the local environment. So far they have had their greatest successes in the Caohai Nature Reserve, in Guizhou, also a crane habitat. The Global Environmental Fund/UNDP project is also working to encourage alternative livelihood schemes for local communities around wetland areas. The Expression of Environmental Values in China Environmentalism amid Political Transition The environmental campaigns in Benxi and Sanjiang reflect the traditional modus operandi of the Chinese Communist Party: achieve a goal by deploying political, economic, and human resources toward it over a short period of time; and create policy models, such as Benxi, the model city for pollution control. The campaigns also reflect a more modern policy approach, however. At the same time that the central government sought to make a model of Benxi, as it has famously done with many other cities (as well as communes, factories, and towns) in the past, and to position the Sanjiang wetland as a national wetland, it was making broader efforts to institutionalize environmental protection by, for example, legislating environmental laws, establishing environmental bureaucracies, and stabilizing environmental funding. Thus, our two case studies reflect an interesting transition point, or blending, between the old and new approaches, neither of which is likely to supplant the other any time soon. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the environmental cases of Benxi and Sanjiang also have played out against the backdrop of another political transition: decentralization. To the extent that they have been implemented, the central government’s environmental policies have been filtered through the local governments’ capacity, resources, vision, and interests, as well as their political power and limitations. The different attitudes of the Benxi and Fuyuan County governments towards the new environmentalism emanating from Beijing can be largely explained by what each was able to gain from political bargaining. The Benxi government won two things in return for its support of the environmental campaign: central government and international funding that enabled it to modernize equipment in its factories; and designation as a national model city in treating pollution, a source of political capital
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for local politicians, who use the environment field as a new stage to demonstrate their achievements and gain promotion. Thus, despite the escalating unemployment of the 1990s, which raised the political and economic costs of environmental action, Benxi leaders persisted in their support of the pollution cleanup campaign, partly because they still had something to gain from it and partly because they had become “path dependent,” having set themselves on a course that was institutionally and politically difficult to reverse. In contrast, once the Sanjiang Nature Reserve attained national status, in 2000, the Fuyuan County government perceived that it had little to gain from echoing the central government’s commitment to wetlands: it had lost its tax base to the independent reserve, and the region’s agriculture, forestry, and fishing—the major sources of its revenue—became strictly controlled and restricted. Moreover, even though Sanjiang has become famous for wetland preservation,118 the political capital resulting from that achievement belongs to the reserve, not the county government. Fuyuan officials’ main hopes rest on seeing the county upgraded to a city, meaning a brighter career path for local leaders, but these hopes will be dashed if the reserve maintains its prohibitions on development. Economic actors have responded to decentralization in much the same way as government officials: by taking more individualized and self-interested actions.119 Generally, enterprises with greater financial security and more government patronage support the environmental campaigns, while smaller private and town-and-village enterprises tend to resist environmental protection measures. In Benxi, larger industrial interests benefited from the pollution cleanup in the form of an inflow of resources to modernize equipment, whereas in Sanjiang, wetlands preservation has mostly impeded economic development. While some economic actors in Benxi supported the campaign, very few Fuyuan County residents and farmers do. The cases reveal, that apart from those who can gain politically from the environmental campaign—the Sanjiang Nature Reserve Management Bureau officials and Benxi politicians and EPB bureaucrats—environmental commitment among local government officials is highly contingent on the financial flows the campaign can bring to them. Environmentalism as a Means to an End A primary objective of this study has been to reveal the motivations behind progressive environmental policy in China. Our emphasis on the official sector is owing to the undeniable fact that the government, as well as government-affiliated scientists and researchers, has been central to the development of China’s environmental policy and values. At the same time, however, it is clear that understanding the values of the local people is essential to ensuring the success of any policy, even in China. In this section, we discuss our findings about the motivations of the central government, local governments and officials, industry managers, and local residents in their engagement with environmental policies at both study sites.
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International Influence and Diplomatic Motivations Analysts have attributed the central government’s interest in the environment to at least two factors. First, there is the country’s environmental crisis, as revealed by a succession of environmental disasters that had direct economic effects. These disasters include the floods of 1998, frequent sandstorms in northern China, and the shrinking of arable land at an alarmingly rapid pace.120 From such experiences, Chinese leaders learned that China’s development had reached the point where it could not be sustained if the country did not incorporate environmental concerns into its economic blueprint. The second motivation for environmental action is the central government’s desire to become a full and respected player on the world stage. China’s leaders have seen progressive action on the environment as a means of avoiding diplomatic isolation, particularly following the Tiananmen Square incident. International pressure, particularly organized international pressure, has had a key role in jump-starting China’s efforts to protect its environment, and consequently some stakeholders, particularly central government officials, associate a commitment to the new environmentalism with full international citizenship for China. A critical force in the central government’s environmental push in the 1990s was Premier Li Peng, the senior leader internationally regarded as responsible for ordering the crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in 1989. Li Peng subsequently led the Chinese delegation to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro and made implementing Agenda 21 a priority of Chinese policy. In Benxi, the UNDP was the first agency to draw attention to the city’s air pollution, and Benxi’s subsequent designation as an environmental policy “model city” has made it one of China’s environmental showpieces for visiting foreign delegations. In fact, locals believe that the central government order to close China’s small mining operations may not have been executed in Benxi had it not been for the fact that they lined the major road leading into the city and thus were declared offensive to visiting foreign and Beijing delegations. Similarly, in the Sanjiang case, the wetlands’ ecological significance was impressed upon Beijing by international NGOs and nonprofit organizations such as Wetlands International. Foreign organizations, including multilateral development agencies, international aid organizations, and conservation groups and their members often provide funding, launch programs, and offer advice that affects policy and behavior on the ground in China. Many of the foreign organizations and individual donors who have an interest in China are not physically present in the country, and some will never set foot anywhere near the regions they seek to protect. But by responding to the prodding from the international NGO community, Beijing has effectively signaled the legitimacy— and ultimately, desirability—of its greater integration into the international community. It is with this in mind that we should recall Director Zhang’s pride in his collaboration with his Russian counterparts, and the international network of scholars, researchers, and policy makers with whom he is now in contact.
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Local Interests and Environmentalism On-site stakeholders in our two cases embraced and promoted environmental policies to varying degrees, sometimes at the cost of economic priorities but most often as a means of pursuing economic, political, and/or career motives. Likewise, the local residents in our case studies embraced and supported environmental policies to varying degrees, usually depending upon their level of economic security. Our interviews in Benxi and Fuyuan County elicited a surprising degree of disaffection for environmental policies and projects—what might be termed an “environmental backlash”—from people with more immediate concerns about economic survival. At the same time, however, and over the longer term, environmental awareness and concern have been growing among local people. This is evident in attitudes expressed by Sanjiang Nature Reserve officers, PLA officers, and those in Benxi concerned about health, and from the level of support among the Benxi middle class for the progressive environmental policies, as evident, for example, in the growing use of the environmental hotline. Our interviews with industry and government officials in Sanjiang and Benxi reveal varying and sometimes idiosyncratic motives and rationales for their response to environmental policies. In Sanjiang, for example, the People’s Liberation Army’s conception of environmental protection as an instrument of national security (e.g., preserving the forest cover along the border to obstruct surveillance from the other side) was not a concern of other stakeholder groups. In Benxi, since the green money was not uniformly distributed and favored the large SOEs, smaller enterprises cast environmentalism as an impediment to modernization because it checked the enterprises’ ability to generate revenues that could then be put towards modernization. Thus, we can see that individual actors and institutional actors (i.e., industry and government officials) can often have diametrically opposed views of environmentalism as it relates to one particular good (modernization, for instance). At the same time, certain motives transcend interest groups, pushing all groups either to embrace or reject the environmental campaign. Perhaps the most widespread motivation for endorsing the new environmentalism stems from an agency or individual’s ability to manipulate environmental policies for political advantage. In Benxi, apart from the Environmental Protection Bureau’s mandate to carry out environmental policies, maintaining the priority of environmental concerns also meant entrenching the relevance and power of the EPB itself as a force in municipal politics. Although some of Benxi’s EPB bureaucrats have acknowledged the clash between the new green regulations and the need to increase industrial output, this has not stopped them from calling for greater environmental emphasis in Benxi municipal planning and resource allocation. Those Benxi municipal officials who found their political prestige increased by environmental achievements also touted the new environmentalism. Owing to Benxi’s designation as an environmental model, these officials have enjoyed direct contact and political leverage with the central government —unusual for a city of Benxi’s size and administrative status. As a result, they have
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continued to pursue and expand the environmental campaign, despite economic difficulties and widespread unemployment in Benxi. Similarly, the Sanjiang Nature Reserve’s bureaucrats and officers saw their political prestige grow owing to Beijing’s 1990s’ reversal of course from a development agenda to a preservationist agenda in the Sanjiang Plain. Many cited prestige as a reason for taking a job with the reserve. Career ambition, coupled with assurances from reserve director Zhang that environmental protection was the wave of the future, made the new environmentalism seem like a sound profession for young bureaucrats. This idea could not help but be reinforced in October 2002, when Director Zhang himself received a public commendation from SEPA for his effort to protect the wetlands, an event publicized in the Xinhua News under the headline “Loyal Wetland Guard—Zhang Xixiang.”121 And nature reserve officers are not the only ones in Sanjiang who have viewed the new environmentalism as a smart career choice. With promotions awarded in part on the basis of environmental volunteer work and service, the PLA was making environmentalists of soldiers hoping to advance their careers. The ambitions of nature reserve officials conflicted with those of other local officials, however, most of whom resisted environmentalism. In Fuyuan County, where the economy is based almost exclusively on agriculture, county officials rely on agricultural tax revenues. It would be economic suicide for county officials to endorse preservationist policies when such policies threaten the county’s tax base. Thus, the county officials had a careerist motivation to tout the development value of the land in the reserve over its ecological importance. Career motives and economic values were thus intertwined for these local officials. At times, however, environmental protection, rather than working at cross-purposes with economic development, dovetailed with economic goals. In many cases, good environmental policy was good economic policy in the eyes of local planners. Benxi’s enforcement of pollution fees, for instance, and the resulting adoption of new, cleaner technologies promised to, and did, bring modernization, industrial efficiencies, and higher productivity at a time when state-owned enterprises were under pressure to streamline their operations. Similarly, Fuyuan officials’ proposal to create the Sanjiang Nature Reserve by converting a portion of the county that was otherwise difficult to farm into a nature reserve was expected to bring an inflow of domestic and foreign investment their way. Residents, Values, and the Environment China specialists may be surprised that the oft-cited claim that China’s problems result from “too many people” (ren tai duo) does not surface in these studies. This suggests that China’s population problem, which is publicized by the government to justify its one-child policy, may be a minor concern to people directly affected by pollution, resource degradation, and the policies that address them than the conventional wisdom would have it. Benxi residents’ concerns about the environment were asserted in connection with
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their concerns about health. The local saying that surgeons could identify Benxi residents by the blackness of their lungs (even though the same thing has been said of some of China’s other most polluted cities) resonated with the residents’ personal experience of choking pollution and their encounters with pollution-related illnesses such as cancer and respiratory diseases. Their deep concern over health has fostered both support and criticism of the government’s cleanup efforts. While many of our interviewees noted improvements in the air quality, suggesting a degree of approval for the campaign, others expressed skepticism that enough was being done. Measures to clean the air (a form of preventative health care, in a sense) are more important than ever at a time when medical care and health insurance are unavailable to many. Health values compete, however, with the more immediate concerns of many Benxi residents about economic survival, concerns that stem from massive layoffs, loss of pensions, and the disappearance of the social safety net. Thus, despite residents’ personal experience of the ill health effects of breathing polluted air and scientific evidence of a link between pollution levels and the incidence of cancer and respiratory disease—evidence that was used by Benxi leaders to build provincial and central governmental support for its anti-pollution campaign—discontent with the campaign runs deep among certain sectors of the population. The environmental concerns of the residents in both our cases have been similarly overtaken by livelihood concerns. While official media reports lamented the destruction of the biodiversity of the wetland and the landscape of “our beloved Benxi,”122 few residents we interviewed voiced such sentiments. Instead, we heard practical anxieties about livelihood and complaints that environmentalism is a poor substitute for job security. In Benxi, more stringent emission laws and fees, along with insufficient government funding to meet these standards, have hurt industries (and thus the labor force) already struggling under the economic reforms. Furthermore, the perception that green funds (huanjing qian) are being spent to improve the landscaping along roads—rather than being invested in job creation or training—creates cynicism among residents about the environmental campaign. While in 2000 other cities in China were attracting foreign direct investment to shore up their economic base, leaders in Benxi, where employment was estimated to be as high as 50 percent, were attracting investment in the environmental cleanup. Similarly, in the Sanjiang Nature Reserve case, the preservationist mandates of the provincial and national government put off-limits the resource at the heart of Fuyuan County’s economy: land for agricultural development. On the whole, the recent migrants’ attitudes toward the reserve lends credence to the Kuznetian notion that until livelihood and survival needs are met, environmentalist agendas that promote the intrinsic (or scientific, or ecological) value of nature have a hard time taking root. In the eyes of local residents at both study sites, their government officials were adopting a strategy of attracting foreign investment for environmental protection, while in most other parts of China local governments were attracting foreign investment for production and economic expansion. Benxi officials have assumed large risks by taking out international loans to support the environmental cleanup at the
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same time that many in Benxi are worried about jobs and social programs. In Fuyuan County, local farmers witnessed the erection of a beautiful new office building paid for with provincial and central government funds—just when officials were cracking down on agricultural and fishing practices in the reserve. In both cases, local critics denounced environmental projects as out of step with local needs. There are few avenues in China for converting this sort of discontent into political action, however, which leaves the public with little power over decisions about their local environments and little direct accountability to the public on the part of the government. And without accountability, policy-making becomes arbitrary and law enforcement unequal; the people in Benxi and Sanjiang, for example, were left to bargain over how policy directives—over which they had had little or no say in the first place—would be implemented. Stories of big corporations delaying or averting polluter levies in Benxi and people paying bribes for the right to fish or open land in the Sanjiang reserve reveal the abnormal way in which people express their values when democratic channels are unavailable. While new migrants to the Sanjiang Plain have other tactics of subversion— they fish and cut trees in the reserve despite the law—not all stakeholders can interfere in the process in this way. As for the political influence wielded through corruption, it is only an option for the economically and politically privileged, and in both the Sanjiang and Benxi cases we have seen how this practice creates growing resentment among residents, which can in turn undermine public support for environmental policies. Weak support at the local level puts greater pressure on the government to enforce environmental laws, but funding for environmental administration and law enforcement has been inadequate throughout China. In October 2000, the official People’s Daily reported that 44 percent of China’s one thousand–plus nature reserves had no administrative organ and 35 percent had no management staff. Furthermore, only 22 percent of reserve supervisors had received technical training in environmental protection.123 Poor enforcement has encouraged unlawful practices such as hunting, logging, and agricultural development in China’s nature reserves. As a sign of its concern over weak law enforcement, in October 2000 SEPA announced that its approach to the management of nature reserves would change “from a quantity-over-quality mentality” to one favoring ecological benefits over speed of reclamation. The Future of Environmental Values in China The Value of Sustainable Development The idea of sustainable development, despite the central government’s rhetorical commitment to it, has been conspicuously absent on the ground in this debate. In Benxi, the emphasis on remediation, which poured funds into new clean technologies, overshadowed the need to diversify the city’s economic base. In 2003 Benxi’s government did have plans to retrain workers formerly employed by polluting industries and shift them into new sectors, but these had not yet been broadly tested and implemented. Meanwhile, in Sanjiang, with Fuyuan County’s economic base in agriculture
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and its plans to expand to become a major port city, the conflicting mandates of environmental preservation and economic development form a zero-sum game. Unfortunately, the rhetoric of environmentalism-as-nature preservation creates a dichotomy, with environmentalism on one side and development on the other. But this may well be changing, with the aid of international grants for sustainable development initiatives. In 2002, Chen Yangkai, the party secretary of Fuyuan County, was quoted in the Heilongjiang Daily as saying, “Wetland protection and economic development complement each other. Now that we have seen the opening of two customs passages to Russia, more domestic and foreign tourists will come and inspect whether we have a sound ecological situation; if not, they will not come back.”124 Similarly, during our field interviews in 2000 we encountered one resident—a recent migrant—who had changed his agricultural practices, owning a paddy field outside the reserve, using only green technologies, and orienting his crops to the organic market. Although he has been rewarded by the government with loans and publicity, his singular success gives rise to the question of why other residents were not being given the money to start such ventures. It appears that those residents who arrived in waves during the Mao years, for whom devotion to the old-style farming practices runs deep, have neither the opportunity nor the mind-set to undertake a new venture. The discourse of environmentalism as a threat to development overwhelms the notion that environmentalism may lead the local economy in a different, even prosperous, direction. The central government does not see the need to fund development in the Fuyuan economy in ways that would not clash with the reserve’s preservationist mission; instead, it views the antagonism between the reserve and local livelihoods as a given and considers it resolvable through education. Though the Chinese government may not see the need for them, sustainable development initiatives are being supported by ADB and GEF initiatives throughout China. A five-year GEF wetland project begun in July 2000 covers eleven reserves, including the Sanjiang Nature Reserve, and has a distinctive new vision for development that includes the development and encouragement of alternative, sustainable livelihoods in and around wetland areas as part of a program of poverty eradication.125 Likewise, an ADB initiative begun in 2003 has the explicit goal of promoting “conservation of wetlands and terrestrial biodiversity in Sanjiang Plains employing integrated approaches to conservation and development to ensure ecologically sustainable production activities, reverse degradation, and reduce poverty.”126 Commercial forestry is one area the ADB has been studying as a potential sector for investment in sustainable development.127 In supporting such initiatives, international lending institutions have attempted to introduce a new vision that encourages development with “green” characteristics—economically successful commercial activities that at worst will not harm and at best will help preserve and restore the environment. This vision, however, has not yet become a local priority in Sanjiang as well as other parts of China.
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Yet, as Secretary Chen suggests above, county and reserve officials have expressed interest in marketing the reserve for ecotourism. Similarly, a recent migrant family that found its hopes of agricultural prosperity shot down by new reserve regulations, nonetheless spoke about possibly opening an inn if and when their duck farm (located in the core zone) was ordered to be closed. The government, however, has been slow to take the lead by supporting sustainable economic endeavors. If it rewards them at all, it is only after they do succeed, and most observers admit that, with the weakness of the local economy, the chance that they will take off without outside investment is slim at best. In China, it is widely believed that basic needs must be fulfilled before it is possible to appreciate nature or value environmental goods like clean air. And many of the residents we interviewed in both Benxi and Sanjiang conveyed the view that this “necessary” level of prosperity has simply not arrived. This priority placed on economic or material concerns by people in Sanjiang and Benxi is representative of attitudes in China as a whole. According to a survey carried out by SEPA and the Ministry of Education in 1998,128 ordinary Chinese citizens have low environmental awareness. Survey respondents were asked what priority they placed on each of five developmental goals—economic development, progress in science and education, population control, social justice, and environmental protection. Environmental protection came in last, while economic development came in first. Political Limitations, Public Participation, and the Future of Environmentalism in China Government-led environmental campaigns in China have been hindered by three conditions: economic hardship; historical values; and ordinary citizens’ political impotency and resulting dependency on the government, such that social problems are seen as a matter for the state to deal with, and not a matter of individual concern. In the 1998 survey, when asked to identify the best way to deal with environmental problems, only 10 percent answered “promoting citizens’ participation,” and only 3.8 percent answered “increasing the role of environmental NGOs,” while almost all others provided answers related to education, investment, law-making, and law enforcement, all of which require government action. The problem of political impotency is compounded by a skepticism, fueled by government corruption, about the government’s commitment to resolving environmental problems. Rampant corruption frustrates residents in both Benxi and Sanjiang, and many suspect that corruption has infected the two areas’ environmental campaigns. Some residents of Sanjiang talked about how fishing was still allowed in the forbidden zone, but only for those who bribed the officials. In Benxi, we heard from people wondering where the “environmental money” went. Thus, we can infer that residents’ passive or even cynical attitude toward environmentalism is not really rooted in their environmental knowledge, but in their general distrust of and frustration with their government.
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Economic hardship, as we have pointed out, also contributes to the low priority many residents accord to the two environmental campaigns. In effect, both communities posed the question: “What is the point of a nice environment if people have nothing to eat?” Only 33 percent of respondents to the SEPA survey agreed that “it is acceptable to slow down the growth of economic development in order to protect the environment,” while 44 percent disagreed. Thus, the high priority the people of Benxi and Sanjiang assigned to economic development as compared to environmental protection reflects the views of many people across China. The third factor limiting environmental awareness is the historical value, developed during the socialist era, that “man must conquer the nature.” Even today, a majority of Chinese still hold fast to the belief that the conquest of nature made possible the splendid achievements of Chinese socialism—swift industrialization and food security for a country with an enormous population. Thirty-four percent of respondents to the 1998 survey believe that humans must ”conquer” nature to achieve happiness, while only 11 percent think people should “conform to” nature, and 28 percent think people should “utilize” nature. Ironically, an environmental notion that helped foster China’s economic development for fifty years is now endangering its future development. Despite the challenges posed by all three of these factors to the future of government-led attempts to protect and preserve the environment across China, our cases reveal signs that some of the attitudes expressed in the 1998 surveys are beginning to change. There is evidence—including the increasing public use of Benxi’s environmental hotline and the Sanjiang Nature Reserve and PLA officers’ official commitment and volunteer work to maintaining the reserve despite insufficient funding for daily operations—that some local environmental awareness and initiative exists apart from (or in addition to) the central government’s proclaimed environmental policy priorities. This sort of environmental initiative seems promising, but the promise will largely remain unfulfilled as long as channels for public input into policy-making remain limited. Our case studies of Benxi and the Sanjiang Reserve do not reflect the growing emergence and activity of NGOs elsewhere in China over the past decade. Their numbers have increased from nine in 1994 to more than 250 in 2002, most of them student-founded and -led. An increasing proportion, however, are being founded by other concerned advocates for the environment, particularly journalists.129 These Chinese NGOs differ in some respects from environmental NGOs active in other countries (for instance, if non-student-led, they must register with the government and follow a set of regulations limiting the scope of NGO activities; also, they tend to eschew politically confrontational or provocative tactics), but they engage in the same sort of educational, preservationist, and advocacy activities as environmental NGOs elsewhere. Typically nonprofit volunteer groups, they seek to protect endangered species and natural environments, and to educate and engage citizens in environmental cleanup, restoration, and protection programs. Some have played active roles in raising public awareness of the ecological dangers of major development projects such as the Three Gorges Dam; others have called for immediate attention to endangered
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wildlife, such as the South China tiger or Tibetan antelope. At least one—the Center for Legal Assistance to Pollution Victims—helps pollution victims take legal action against polluters.130 These groups have been allowed to flourish (and many unregistered groups also operate under the radar of regulators) because of Beijing’s shift to a new set of environmental priorities and policies. As long as the groups function in the service of these policies (particularly at the local level, where it is often difficult to enforce environmental policies), their continued existence is assured. As political scientist Guobin Yang has pointed out, the spread and success of NGOs have also been promoted by three other factors: the Chinese media, which generally approves of these groups’ watchdog roles and educational initiatives; the Internet, which allows them to communicate, educate, and cultivate membership on a large scale; and the influence of international environmental NGOs, many of which have opened China offices, provided funding and expertise, and formed partnerships with local NGOs.131 The government-led environmental campaigns in Benxi and Sanjiang could become more successful with the aid of local NGOs, which could, through their work on the ground with neighborhoods and communities, help change people’s minds about the importance of protecting the environment at all costs, help give residents a sense of individual responsibility for the future of their environments, and engage them in cooperative projects to protect their local environments. NGOs, in conjunction with the media and international environmental organizations, can also bring the sustained, high-profile attention and resources necessary to resolve an environmental problem. In Benxi and Fuyuan County, these are functions that until now have been the domain of government. Unfortunately, some of the social and economic factors that foster NGO formation and activities are absent from these two parts of China. NGOs are more likely to emerge in major urban areas with large populations of students and other educated and civic-minded residents. And the digital divide (the byproduct of an economic/ educational/employment divide) leaves many of the people who resist environmental policies, such as those who are living hand-to-mouth on the Sanjiang Plain, out of the reach of NGOs’ efforts to raise awareness and recruit members via the Internet. But the largest obstacle to any effort to instill environmental values at the local level in these two cases continues to be the lack of jobs and people’s uncertain livelihoods—large-scale unemployment in Benxi and the lack of alternatives to ecologically destructive farming, fishing, and game-hunting on the Sanjiang wetlands. A healthier employment picture may emerge in Benxi—and also in Sanjiang, depending upon the success of incipient sustainable development initiatives for the wetlands, and that would greatly ease the task of inculcating environmental values. In the meantime, there are signs of the potential for NGO activity in both of our cases. In Fuyuan County we saw the beginnings of individual involvement in environmentally responsible farming in the example of farmer Zhu, who engaged in organic farming on the Sanjiang Plain (albeit with economic support from the local government). In Benxi, we saw precursors to the sort of collective action typically
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undertaken by NGOs. In the data on the number and content of hotline complaints, we saw that during the period 1999–2001, residents across several neighborhoods banded together to complain about environmental problems: one hundred people collectively complained to the government about a pig yard polluting the drinking water in their area, for instance, and apartment dwellers and block residents joined together to lodge complaints about smog in their neighborhoods created by nearby smokestacks. But even absent the formidable economic obstacles highlighted by this study, other conditions must exist for the government to succeed in its environmental campaigns. These include a restoration of trust in local governments (in the wake of corruption), an increased sense of civic responsibility on the part of residents, and even a modest measure of political initiative. Notes *Research for this chapter was conducted by Song Guojun (Benxi study), Pan Wei (Sanjiang Nature Reserve study), and Shen Mingming (research team leader). Their field reports and analyses were adapted and developed for this chapter by Liu Yu, Mary Child, Vivian Bertrand, Judith Shapiro and Joanne Bauer in consultation with the researchers. Special recognition is due to Ma Zhong, president of the Beijing Environment and Development Institute, who selected the cases, initially led the project, and made himself available to answer questions through the writing process. 1. Elizabeth Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 2. For example, in August 1996, CNN ran a special story on rising environmental awareness. See “Environmental Awareness Takes Root in China,” available at www.cnn.com/EARTH/ 9608/14/china.environment. 3. These figures are from the Eighth Five-Year Plan (1991–1995), the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996–2000), and the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2001–2005), respectively, and are published by the State Environmental Protection Agency. 4. Available at http://dawning.iist.unu.edu/china/bjreview, accessed 11 September 2003. 5. Benxi is one of 250 prefectural-level cities that report directly to the province. Only four cities (classed as municipalities at the provincial level)—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjian, and Chongqing—report directly to the central government. The prefectural-level rank is the third of four administrative levels, following the provincial-level rank and the subprovincial-level rank. 6. According to the Asian Development Bank, Benxi is still one of the most polluted cities in the world. Asian Development Bank, “Report and Recommendation of the President to the Board of Directors on a Proposed Loan to the People’s Republic of China for the Liaoning Environmental Improvement Project,” November 2004, Appendix 2, 25. 7. Energy Information Administration, China Country Analysis Brief: Environmental Issues, 2003, available at www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/chinaenv.html. Available data show that in 1982 and 1985, Benxi, had a higher level of falling dust than selected major cities in China (National Environmental Protection Agency, China, China Environmental Yearbook [Beijing: China Environmental Yearbook Press, 1987, 1992]). 8. “Benxi Cold Rolled Steel Facility, China,” Steel Industry Web site, www.steeltechnology.com/projects/benxi, accessed 1 October 2002. 9. World Bank, “Reducing Air Pollution in China,” available at www.worldbank.org/nipr/ china/pix/index.htm, accessed 13 September 2005.
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10. In the worst month of 1973 at the most polluted monitoring point in the city, falling dust was approximately 130 tons/month/km2, and the average yearly dust fall far exceeded the provincial control standard of 8 tons/month/km2. Falling dust is mainly emitted by industrial production plants and coal boilers. It is defined as particulate matter larger than 100 microns. 11. Benxi Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau, Environmental Quality Report (1991–1995), May 1996, 69. 12. Evaluation Report on Benxi’s Seven Year Pollution Control Program (Benxi: Benxi EPB, 1996). 13. The name changed from Benxi Iron and Steel Company to Benxi Iron and Steel Corporation in the late 1980s, when the entity changed from a state-owned enterprise to a private enterprise. 14. UN Habitat and Together Foundation, “Benxi’s Sustainable Development Demonstration Zone,” Best Practices Database, www.bestpractices.org/cgibin/bp98.cgi?cmd=detail&id= 18627&key=rpybfkbfe, accessed 4 March 2002. 15. Bulletin of Liaoning Environmental Quality in 2002 (2002 nian Liaoning huanjing zhiliang gongbao), Liaoning Environmental Protection Bureau, 2003. 16. Ministry of Health, Report on the National Project of Scientific Investigation and Research on Asthma, June 15, 2001. 17. This office, called the Office of Industrial Wastes Management, was located within the city’s construction commission. In 1978 the name was changed to Office of Environmental Protection. 18. It was the first environmental protection bureau (EPB) in Liaoning Province to be granted a full-bureau rank. Today every Chinese city has an EPB at full bureau rank, and giving full departmental rank to EPBs has now become a common practice nationwide. 19. The school later became one of the first members of the GLOBE program, an international initiative for promoting environmental education in the classroom. 20. In Chinese, (Benxi ba yuancailiao gongxian geile guojia, ba wuran liugei leziji). 21. The group included People’s Daily, CCTV, Economic Daily, CP Radio, Science and Technology Daily, and China Environmental News. 22. The State Environmental Protection Commission was the ministerial-level environmental body until 1998, when the National Environmental Protection Agency was promoted to the ministerial level, at which time the commission was dissolved. 23. In June 1987, a team led by Deputy Mayor Shen Yucheng went to Beijing to report to NEPA on Benxi’s pollution status. The team included EPB director Zhao Zhenyu and managers with responsibility for environmental concerns from the Benxi Iron and Steel Company and the Benxi Cement Plant. Director Qu Geping, together with chiefs of relevant NEPA departments, after listening to Shen Yucheng’s report, agreed that Benxi could not deal with the pollution using its own resources. However, NEPA was short on funds, so he suggested that Benxi appeal to the State Council for special grants to cover the costs. In a subsequent visit to Beijing in January 1988, Deputy Mayor Shen led a team from Benxi to report on pollution to NEPA, the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of Coal, the State Planning Commission, the State Economic Commission, and the Ministry of Finance. Following this mission, the SEPC sent an inspection team to Benxi, including representatives from NEPA, the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of Energy, the State Bureau of Construction Materials, and Liaoning Province. 24. In addition to air pollution, the seven-year program also addressed water pollution, industrial waste, and green space. For example, the program created a park around the city. 25. Review on the Seven-Year Pollution Control Program (Benxi: Benxi EPB, 1996). 26. The Ministry of Energy and the State Bureau of Construction and Materials also contributed RMB9 million, the State Council contributed RMB74 million, and Premier Li Peng contributed RMB70 million from the Premier’s Fund. The Premier’s Fund is used primarily for emergencies such as floods, earthquakes, and forest fires but also for some local programs such
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as Benxi’s environmental program that cannot be listed under the regular national budget. 27. These revenues helped to fill the gap in the RMB388.9 million (US$46.8 million) budget for the seven-year program. 28. SOEs, which were key to China’s centrally planned economy and continue to have their own channels to Beijing leaders, were directly administered by central government ministries, including the Ministry of Metallurgy, the Ministry of Coal, the Ministry of Energy, and the State Economy and Trade Committee until March 1998, when this function of ministries was given to industry associations or other government offices, called specialized economic management departments (SEMDs). 29. Following this precedent, from 1998 to 2001, the Baotou of Neimenggu (Inner Mongolian) Autonomous Region received central government financial support of RMB32 million to control its air pollution. 30. The Chinese pollution levy system, a method for charging polluters for emissions, was adopted in 1979 and officially incorporated into law in the early 1980s. A nationwide policy for air pollution levies issued by China’s State Council came into effect in 1982. Almost all cities in China now use this economic instrument. 31. Department of International Cooperation, China Economic Information Network, “China to Formulate New Law on Clean Production,” available at http://ce.cei.gov.cn/enew/new_g1/ pg00g313.htm, accessed 5 November 2002. The UN Environment Program first coined the term “cleaner production” in 1990. European Topic Center on Waste and Material Flows, European Environment Agency, available at http://waste.eionet.eu.int/prevention/2, accessed 19 November 2002. 32. China’s State Development Planning Commission, responsible for developing and implementing the national economic strategy, was renamed the State Development and Reform Commission in 2003 when it took over functions from other departments. 33. The UNDP project was called Extensively Promote Clean Production and Enhance the Capacity of the Benxi Municipal Government to Control Air Pollution. United Nations Development Programme project brief, available at www.unchina.org/undp/ee/CPR96307.htm. 34. The World Bank, “Reducing Air Pollution in China,” available at www.worldbank.org/ nipr/china/pix/index.htm. In Benxi, the project sought to eliminate emissions from four coke ovens and two blast furnaces, establish a district heating company that will deliver heat in the form of hot water, and improve the efficiency of two blast furnaces. 35. By 2003 Environmental Defense had expanded the project to include a number of other cities, including Shanghai. 36. Environmental Technologies Industry, Market Research, China, “Opportunities for Solid Waste Companies in China,” available at http://web.ita.doc.gov/ete/eteinfo.nsf/vwQFbyCountry. 37. Municipal planning commissions apply the national five-year and one-year plans locally by setting targets for various government economic units and programs that are consistent with the national plan and ensuring the implementation of these targets. Since the local economy is integrated and interdependent, their work involves forward-looking coordination of different offices and sectors. The official rank of the municipal planning commission is usually a half-level higher than other functional departments of the government. Although some of the local commissions have recently followed the lead of the State Planning Commission by changing their names (in 2003 the State Planning Commission was renamed the Reform and Development Commission) to reflect the new economy, their function remains essentially unchanged. 38. “China Sets Five-Year Plan for Environmental Protection,” People’s Daily Online, 13 January 2002, available at http://English.peopledaily.com.cn/200201/12/print20020112_88510 .html, accessed 4 October 2002. 39. Economy, The River Runs Black, 117–18. 40. As of 2004 no factories were known to have been closed under this policy. 41. The Green Plan had the goal of creating fifteen green factories, fifteen green residential
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communities, fifteen green schools, a thousand green households, and ten green hotels and shopping malls in two years. The Quietness Plan had the goal of creating fifteen model “quiet communities” in Benxi’s downtown; this would involve controlling work at construction sites so as not to disturb the communities, and shutting down seventy karaoke rooms. 42. Since 2000, environmental protection investment by Chinese enterprises, in terms of technical improvements, has averaged about RMB100 million (US$12 million) annually, while the pollution levy has been about RMB17 million (US$2 million). See Benxi EPB, “Benxi Environmental Protection Five Year Plans,” 2000–2003. 43. This is known as the dual-price system. 44. U.S. embassy, “Curbing Chinese Pollution: A Tale of Two Cities,” available at www.usembassy-china.org.cn/sandt/Liaoningweb.htm, accessed 17 October 2003. See also James A. Edmonds, Shi Yingyi, and Kay Storck, “Mid-and Long-Term Strategies for Technological Deployment to Address Climate Change in China,” 6–7 May 1999, available at www.pnl.gov/gtsp/conferences/beijing.pdf, accessed 4 October 2002. 45. Zhou Lukuan, a director at the Labor and Personnel Institute at People’s University in Beijing, estimated in 1997 that Benxi’s unemployment rate was 15 to 20 percent. See Pamela Yatsko, “The Great Job Hunt: Help for China’s Jobless Is Patchy at Best,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 October 1997. According to William Hurst, a PhD candidate in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, in a December 9, 2003, e-mail message, “The government uses several figures: one that counts only ‘registered unemployed’ (5 percent) and other, more inclusive statistics. Probably one can best estimate the true rate of unemployment in Benxi by comparing the number of workers employed in the city around the beginning of the period in which most job losses took place with the number of workers actually ‘on post’ (zai gang) in a recent year. In 1994, there were 612,000 workers in Benxi city. In 2000, only 287,000 workers were ‘on post’ there. This means that a total of roughly 325,000 jobs have been lost and not replaced. Thus, somewhere around 53 percent of Benxi’s workforce is likely unemployed, according to official statistics (Liaoning tongji nianjian [Beijing: Tongji chubanshe, 1995 and 2001]). Almost the same figure is reached if one takes the simple ratio of workers listed as ‘not on post’ (bu zai gang)—i.e., workers still associated with their original factories but reported and registered as being out of work through one of a number of mechanisms (this figure probably captures at least half—but certainly not 100 percent of all the workers actually unemployed in Benxi)—to workers listed as ‘on post’ in 2000. Alternatively, one could say that 35 percent of all Benxi workers not yet retired were listed as ‘not on post’ in 2000. Complicating any attempt at making such estimates is that officials often do not use consistent indicators to report from one year to the next, and therefore clear or reliable unemployment figures simply do not exist.” For more on why calculating any precise rate of unemployment in a Chinese city is difficult, see Dorothy J. Solinger, “Why We Cannot Count the ‘Unemployed,’” China Quarterly, no. 167 (September 2001): 671–88. 46. “Benxi Iron and Steel Co. (China) No. 5 BF Successfully Restarted after Major Revamping,” available at www.paulwurth.com/e/chap5/news/BenxiIronSteel.html. 47. “Benxi Hot Strip Mill Modernization, Liaoning, China,” Export-Import Bank, 2 January 2001, available at www.exim.gov/press/jan0201a.html, accessed 27 September 2002. 48. Until that point Benxi Iron and Steel was the only one of China’s top ten steel companies that did not have continuous casting. Continuous casting is the process whereby molten steel is solidified into a “semi-finished” billet, bloom, or slab for subsequent rolling in the finishing mills. Prior to the introduction of continuous casting, steel was poured into stationary molds to form “ingots.” Continuous casting results in improved yield, quality, productivity, and cost efficiency. 49. This was called sannian tuokun (“getting out of difficulties within three years policy”). 50. “Official Sure State Firms Can Turn Around,” People’s Daily, 16 August 2000, available at http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200008/16/eng20000816_48307.html, accessed 9 April 2003.
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51. Li Yan, “Nearly 1000 SOEs Drop Out of Market in Past Three Years,” People’s Daily, 22 December 2000, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200012/22/ print20001222_58550.html, accessed 4 October 2002. 52. In that process 5,700 non-production staff were rehired in subsidiary companies, which, like the majority of SOEs, became shareholding companies through joint ventures, listed on the stock market or changing their bank debts into shares. See “Official Sure State Firms Can Turn Around,” People’s Daily, 16 August 2000, available at http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/ 200008/16/eng20000816_48307.html, accessed 9 April 2003. In 1997, Li Dahong, a company official, claimed that Benxi Iron and Steel Company had laid off, trained, and reemployed sixty thousand workers to meet the new market needs. However, Li later admitted that the company had not retrained the workers. Instead, it had simply reshuffled most of the workers who were now idle. See Yatsko, “The Great Job Hunt,” 56. 53. See Wang Qingyi, “Coal Industry in China: Evolvement and Prospects,” 1999, available at www.nautilus.org/energy/eaef/C5_final.pdf, accessed 5 December 2005. 54. Phone interview with Daniel Dudek, 3 February 2003. 55. It is a system by which all aspects of the production process—extraction of raw materials, energy use, equipment, production, safety and auditing—are evaluated for their environmental impact. 56. See, for example, Li Song, “Give Me Back Benxi’s Beauty,” China Environment News [Zhongguo huanjing bao], 23 July 1998; and Wang Yadong, “Where Is Benxi? Boundless Smog Covers Benxi—Citizens Say: Whoever Can Clean Up Our Pollution We Chose as Our Mayor,” Economy Daily, 9 August 1988. 57. While Benxi was one of the first in China, it is not the only city that was successful in channeling funds to their pollution control effort. The China Urban Air Quality Control project launched by the UNDP in 1997 included Benxi, as well as Xi’an, Guangzhou, Guiyang, and Beijing in its first stage, and the second stage now includes thirty experimental cities in China. By the end of 2000 about 113 cities in China accepted financial support for environmental programs from international organizations, NGOs, and funders such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. 58. Dudek interview. 59. The total emission controls (TECs) policy sets national emission standards rather than placing fixed emission limits on individual polluters. This method of pollution control is designed with a view to establishing market-based emissions trading, thereby promoting socioeconomic development and industrialization by allowing some enterprises to emit more pollution than others. After China adopted a TEC policy in 1996, “the central government allocated the total amount of pollutant discharge for each province based on estimates of the provincial-level emission discharges in 1995. Provincial governments in turn began to assign the pollutant quota to various prefectures and cities within their jurisdictions.” Dudek et al., “Total Emission Control of Major Pollutants in China,” China Environment Series, no. 4 (2001): 43. 60. The author is referring to the fact that under the new system factories no longer provide housing. 61. Liu Ningrong, Fennu de diqiu [Angry Earth] (Beijing: Zhongguo gongren chubanshe, 1991), 114, 199. 62. William Hurst, e-mail communication, 20 October 2002. 63. See William Hurst and Kevin J. O’Brien, “China’s Contentious Pensioners,” China Quarterly, no. 170 (June 2002): 345–60. 64. The data referred to here and below is unpublished data provided by the Benxi EPB. Today filing complaints before the political consultative conference is the least likely means of political action. Now, the three main ones are sit-ins and other demonstrations, petitions (collective petitions, especially) and class action lawsuits. As of 2005, there have been no suits or sit-ins that we know of to protest pollution in Benxi, although such suits against polluters are proliferating elsewhere in China.
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65. “Grade III” refers to the maximum concentration of various pollutants allowed in intensive industry areas under air quality standards issued by SEPA in October 1996. 66. According to national statistics, which go back only to 1952, the forest stock in Heilongjiang Province was 0.92 billion cubic meters in 1952, and 0.57 billion cubic meters in 2000. 67. The Heilong and Wusuli Rivers are better known internationally by their Russian names: Amur and Ussuri. 68. A directory and map of China’s wetlands sites, along with a description of characteristics and preservation measures for each, is available at www.wetlands.org/RDB/asia/ china_sites.html. 69. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, “Reservoirs of Biodiversity,” available at www.ramsar.org/info/values_biodiversity_e.htm, accessed 15 January 2003. 70. According to the Directory of Wetlands of International Importance, Sanjiang meets criteria 1,2,3,4,5,7,8; available at www.wetlands.org/RDB/Directory.html, accessed 29 May 2003. 71. SEPA Annual Report, October 2002. 72. Eight animals found there are listed as top-ranked species in the annex of the China Conservation Law of Wild Animals, and twenty-three are second-ranked. Six species are identified in the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), Appendix I, and thirteen species are identified in Appendix II. Out of 227 migratory bird species protected by the Sino-Japanese Government Agreement on Migratory Birds, sixty-four have been recorded in Sanjiang, of which forty-three breed in the wetlands. 73. Ma Zhong, “Sanjiang Wetland Conservation in the Context of Agricultural Development” (paper prepared for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, November 1999). 74. The study was funded by the United Nations University. 75. Liu Xingtu et al., “The Wetlands of Heilongjiang Province, North-East China,” in Land Resources in the People’s Republic of China, ed. Kenneth Ruddle and Wu Chuanjun (New York: United Nations University Press, 1983), available at www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/ 80349e/80349E06.htm, accessed 19 September 2005. 76. Ibid. 77. Bruce Marcot, “Report on Tigers and Leopards of the Russian Far East and Northeast China,” July 21, 1994, available at www.plexusowls.com/PDFs/report_on_tigers_and_leopards.pdf, accessed 19 September 2005. 78. Liu et al., “The Wetlands of Heilongjiang Province, North-East China.” 79. It is difficult to calculate the precise coverage of the wetlands because the boundaries are unclear and changing. 80. Liu et al., “The Wetlands of Heilongjiang Province, Northeast China.” 81. Shi Weimin and He Gang, Educated Youth Memoirs: The Production-Construction Army Corps in the Rustification Movement [Zhiqing beiwanglu: Shangshan xiaxiang yundong zhong de shengchan jianshe bingtuan] (Beijing: Zhongguo shehue kexue chubanshe, 1996), 12–14. 82. Ma Bo, A Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of the Chinese Cultural Revolution [Xuese Huanghun], trans. Howard Goldblatt (New York: Viking, 1995). 83. Judith Shapiro, Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 167–68. 84. It is difficult to count the number of state farm workers, who are seasonal workers. Moreover, there may be as many as five thousand additional unregistered migrants, many of them desperate job-seekers. 85. The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, available at www.ramsar.org/key_conv_e.htm, accessed 26 March 2003. 86. China is ranked as the eighth most biologically diverse country according to the National Biodiversity Index produced by the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity and as having the fourth-largest area of wetland in the world by the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance.
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87. WWF China, available at www.wwfchina.org/english/sub_loca.php?loca=39&sub=91, accessed 3 January 2002; “Save Our Earth’s Kidney,” China Daily, 1 July 2002, available at www.china.org.cn/English/2002/Jul/35902.htm, accessed 3 January 2002. 88. The six reserves are Hainan’s Dongzhai Harbor Nature Reserve, Qinghai’s Bird Island Nature Reserve, Heilongjiang’s Zalong Nature Reserve, Jilin’s Xianghai Nature Reserve, Hunan’s Eastern Dongting Lake Nature Reserve, and Jiangxi’s Poyang Lake Nature Reserve. In 1992, the Sanjiang Nature Reserve had not yet been established. 89. “China Invites Pressure to Help Curb Shrinking Wetlands,” People’s Daily, 3 February 2002, available at www.china.org.cn/English/DO-e/26353.htm. 90. “College Students Help Restore Ecological Cycle in Wetland,” People’s Daily, 5 July 2001, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/20010705/eng20010705_7433.html, accessed 26 March 2003. 91.“China Restoring, Preserving World’s Wetland ‘Kidneys,’” China Daily, 28 September 2002. 92. GEF, “Project Concept Paper for the Songhua River Flood and Wetland Management Project,” available at www.gefweb.org/COUNCIL/GEF_C14/pipeline2/ADB/China%20Songhua .pdf, accessed 29 May 2003. 93. The 1998 decree was entitled Decision of Heilongjiang Communist Party Committee and Heilongjiang Government on Strengthening Wetland Protection. Before his appointment as party secretary of Heilongjiang Province, the most powerful post in the province, by the central party authorities in Beijing in 1997, Xu Youfang was the minister of forestry. In China, the Ministry of Forestry has traditionally held authority over wetlands protection. Thus, it is reasonable to infer that in selecting Xu Youfang, party authorities must have considered his experience and interest in protecting wetlands. His selection demonstrates a shift in priorities for party authorities: Xu’s predecessor, Yue Qifeng, had proposed to reclaim 5 million mu (roughly .33 million hectares) of land for cultivation in the Sanjiang Plain when he was made the province’s top leader in 1994. 94. Zhang Jing, “Wilderness to Reclaim Farmland,” Asia Times, 16 May 2000, available at www.atimes.com/china/BE16Ad01.html. 95. Ibid. 96. “China Restoring World’s Wetland ‘Kidneys,’” China Daily, 28 September 2002. 97. Ma Zhong, “Sanjiang Wetland Conservation in the Context of Agricultural Development” (paper presented at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, October 1999). 98. We have been unable to confirm whether the sole reason for denying the agricultural loan was because the bank recognized the region’s environmental significance, but it is safe to assume that was a reason. Just four years earlier, in 1996, the bank had lent state farms $70 million for agricultural development. 99. GEF, Project Concept Paper for the Songhua River Flood and Wetland Management Project, 1994, available at www.gefweb.org/COUNCIL/GEF_C14/pipeline2/ADB/China%20Songhua .pdf, accessed 29 May 2003. 100. “A Sustainable Land Use and Allocation Program for the USSURI/WUSULI River Watershed and Adjacent Territories (Northeastern China and the Russian Far East), A Cooperative Project of: Ecologically Sustainable Development, Inc. (USA), FEB-RAS Institute of Aquatic and Ecological Problem (Russia), FEB-RAS Pacific Geographical Institute (Russia), Heilongjiang Province Territory Society (PRC) National Committee on U.S.-China Relations (USA),” November 1996, 10. 101. GEF, Project Concept Paper Songhua River Flood and Wetland Management Project available at www.gefweb.org/COUNCIL/GEF_C14/pipeline2/ADB/China%20Songhua.pdf, accessed 29 May 2003. 102. Ma Zhong, “Sanjiang Wetland Conservation in the Context of Agricultural Development”; the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, “National Report of China for COP7, 1999,” available at www.ramsar.org/cop7_nr_china.htm, accessed 29 May 2003.
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103. General Office of the State Council 2000, no. 30. 104. Of this, RMB1 million (US$120,400) came from the State Forestry Administration (SFA) of the central government, and the rest came from the province and Fuyuan County. Draft final report, field site visit of UNDP-GEF team, 20 September 2001, available at www.wetland-gef-cpr98.org, accessed 29 May 2003. 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. A year later, the Sanjiang Nature Reserve and the Khabarovsk Bolshekhekhtsirski State Nature Reserve in Russia held an inaugural conference and signed an agreement to preserve jointly the natural environment in the Wusuli River’s lower reaches. In particular, they agreed to work together to carry out scientific research in the area and develop international ecotours. See Zhang Tingting, “China, Russia Agree to Protect Wusuli River,” available at www.china.org .cn/English/2002/Aug/39055.htm, 9 August 2002, accessed 18 December 2002. 110. This particular ADB grant, which Director Zhang hoped would be forthcoming after negotiations in November 2000, did not initially come through as expected. A technical assistance grant of US$1.25 million co-funded by the ADB and Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was approved in 1999 to provide assistance to the Songhua River Flood and Wetland Management Project, but the Chinese government later decided to place a hold on funding the Sanjiang component of the grant. According to the ADB’s historical records, “In July 2001, a decision was made (with the concurrence of the Global Environmental Facility [which was cofunding these efforts]) to process the wetland protection component as an independent project, focusing on the Sanjiang Plain.” In November 2002 the ADB formally awarded a technical assistance grant of $600,000 toward a sustainable initiatives feasibility study for the Sanjiang Plains Wetland Protection Project. E-mail interview with Dr. Kyeong Ae Choe, senior project specialist, Asian Development Bank, June 1, 2004. See Asian Development Bank, TAR: PRC 35289, “Technical Assistance (Financed by the Japan Special Fund) to the People’s Republic of China for Preparing the Sanjiang Plains Wetland Protection Project,” November 2002 available at www.adb.org/Documents/TARs/PRC/tar_prc_35289.pdf, accessed 21 September 2005. 111. The conflict between the EPB and the reserve, at the local level, mirror in many ways the tensions between the State Forestry Administration (SFA) and SEPA, at the national level. According to the assignments of responsibility made by the State Council, SEPA is responsible for the administration of biodiversity conservation, and SFA is responsible for wetland conservation. SEPA and SFA each has its own reserve program, with SEPA administering its program through the EPB, and SFA administering its program through the forestry bureau. Both SEPA and SFA’s programs in Sanjiang are supported by the National Development and Reform Committee and the Ministry of Finance, but through different departments and channels. 112. Nongqiao is a town in Fuyuan County on the border of the reserve. See the map on page 30. 113. This comment does not acknowledge that Tongjiang City also has jurisdiction over the reserve. 114. In June 2004 we learned through the ADB office that the provincial government has committed more than US$26 million over a five-year period to fund not only the reserve but also activities such as land compensation to farmers being forced off the reserve, forestry management, and capacity building within the reserve bureaucracy (K. Choe, ADB, e-mail communication, 5 June 2004). While such sizable funding could well make a difference in local attitudes toward the reserve, at the time of our interviews and several years thereafter no such funding had been provided. 115. Phone interview with Ma Zhong, 24 January 2003. 116. Asian Development Bank, TAR: PRC 35289, “Technical Assistance (Financed by the Japan Special Fund) to the People’s Republic of China for Preparing the Sanjiang Plains Wet-
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land Protection Project,” November 2002, Section II, available at www.adb.org/Documents/ TARs/PRC/tar_prc_35289.pdf. 117. The reference here is to household registration, which is to say legal residence. Every Chinese is, in principle, registered with the police as living someplace, usually at the place of birth. In the past, to shift to another place of registration (i.e., legal residence) was impossible. Thus peasants were born in a place, registered there, and could not legally move to the cities. Today there are many migrant workers in the cities, but they remain legally registered where they came from and do not have full rights where they are living. 118. The lead of a 31 March 1999 Heilongjiang Daily article, “Jiansanjiang Land Reclamation Branch Protects Wetland Resource,” reads: “The Jiansanjiang Land Reclamation Branch (JLRB) of Heilongjiang Province, the location of the famous Sanjiang Nature Reserve, put 160,000 mu (roughly 10,700 hectares) of wetland off limits to its seven farms this year.” 119. For a helpful discussion of the impact of economic reform specifically on environmental protection see, Abigail R. Jahiel, “The Contradictory Impact of Reform on Environmental Protection in China,” China Quarterly, no. 149 (March 1997): 81–103. 120. See Megan Ryan and Christopher Flavin, Facing China’s Limits, in State of the World 1995, ed. Lester Brown et al. (New York: Norton, 1995), 113–131. 121. Xinhua News, 4 October 2002. 122. Li Song, “Give Me Back Benxi’s Beauty,” China Environment News (Zhongguo huanjing bao), 23 July 1988. 123. “China to Strengthen Control on Nature Reserves,” People’s Daily, 11 October 2000, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200010/11/eng20001011_52373.html, accessed 15 January 2003. 124. Li Mingyuan and Fan Yanhui, “The Return of the Beautiful Wetland—A Report on Sanjiang National Wetland Reserve in Huyuan County,” Heilongjiang Daily, 6 August 2002. 125. UNDP/GEF, “Wetland Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use in China,” Grant CPF/98/G32. See the Convention on Biological Diversity’s Web site, available at www.biodiv .org/financial/projects.asp?prj=1307. 126. Asian Development Bank, Country Strategy and Program Update, 2003–2005, People’s Republic of China, Appendix 2, Table A2.2, August 2002, available at www.adb.org, accessed 3 January 2002. As of early June 2004, the scope of the Sanjiang Wetlands Development Project had not yet been finalized. 127. Kyeong Ae Choe, senior project specialist, Asian Development Bank, interview via email, 2 June 2004. 128. The study was conducted by NEPA and the Ministry of Education in 1998 and published by the Chinese Environmental Science Press in 1999 as Report on the Environmental Awareness of the National Public. 129. Guobin Yang, “Environmental NGOs and Institutional Dynamics in China,” China Quarterly, no. 181 (March 2005): 46–66. 130. Ibid. 131. Ibid.
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Japan: A Foreword Jeffrey Broadbent
Traditional Japanese culture—with its ink landscape paintings, its nature poetry, and its cultivation of life-energy (ki)—viewed humans as part of an all-encompassing universe. The traditional Japanese words for this unity were “heaven and earth” (tenchi) or “all living things” (ikarumono). The concepts of tenchi and ikarumono did not set people apart from other “sentient beings,” including animals, plants and often even mountains and trees in that category. The Japanese aesthetic, as in the bonsai tree and Zen temple gardens, seamlessly merged the forms of rocks and plants with human artifice. The Shinto gods, too, existed around and within the mountains and trees. Matsushima, the array of tiny “pine islands” off the north-eastern coast, is one of Japan’s “three famous views.” The islands were so beautiful, wrote the seventeenth century wandering poet Basho, that he could not compose a haiku worthy of them. In 1980, when I first took the little tour boat out among the Matsushima islands, I, too, was entranced by their beauty. Barely clinging to jagged granite rocks, the islands’ crooked pines stretched out over the sparkling sea. “What could better express the Japanese aesthetic?” I thought. Then, looking southward, I saw about a mile away, amid the woods on the bay’s far shore, a giant power plant belching smoke. Why, I wondered, would Japanese authorities not better protect the setting of their precious analog to Yosemite? I eventually realized that Japan’s spiritual values and nature aesthetics are personal, not public or political—that is, they rarely become the rallying cry of popular movements that criticize government and corporate policy, nor do they have much effect on public policy. Public policy and public space have always been controlled by a small elite of officials in the government ministries, an elite that has generally favored economic growth over the preservation of nature. Accordingly, the strong nature aesthetic so evident in Japanese culture has remained largely expressed in personal space—temples and shrines excepted. In the West today, personal concerns readily translate into public action, but Japanese culture has until recently discouraged the public expression of personal preferences. The Japanese feudal system ended only in 1868. Before that, to a greater degree than in European feudal systems, the Tokugawa state forced the people to bend before, rather than stand against, the winds of power. Japan’s rulers instituted a rigid status system and demanded unquestioning loyalty, justifying this hierarchy as part 103
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of a Confucian ethic. Nor, with some notable exceptions, did Japan’s other spiritual traditions, Buddhism and Shinto, offer consistent criticism of the secular order. Nevertheless, over the past two centuries, popular movements have occasionally arisen in Japan. In the feudal era, peasant villagers and townspeople had a healthy disrespect for their samurai masters, often seeking to evade their control, tax collections, and status regulations. In times of famine, when rice merchants hoarded grain and the government did not stock the emergency granaries, nascent peasant resistance sometimes erupted into fierce revolts (hyakusho ikki). Following the arrival of Commodore Perry’s famous black ships (in 1853), the Meiji Restoration of 1868 overturned the ancien régime. Faced with the Western threat of colonization, the new government imposed a “social revolution” from above, destroying feudalism and introducing Western-style institutions, but centralizing control over the population and land. Over the ensuing 140 years, in its race to catch up with the West in terms of military, economic and technical power, the state kept a tight grip on public space in Japan. Its narrow focus on economic growth pushed the aesthetic moment so treasured in Japanese spirituality into ever-smaller private spaces. Though the government established national parks, urban and village public land steadily diminished. Today, Tokyo offers the smallest per capita area of public parks of any major city in the world. The lack of space for nature in Japan’s public infrastructure arises from its lack of another kind of public space—the political space devoted to civil society. The western term civil society represents the arena of free association and democratic opinion formation—the public sphere. In the feudal era, Japanese cities were allowed to develop an independent artistic culture that sometimes obliquely criticized the elite (a common phenomenon among authoritarian regimes), but this freedom did not extend to the political realm, to a sense of citizenship, with its civic rights and responsibilities. From the start of Meiji, the modernizing elites permitted only limited democracy, keeping the political reins firmly in their own hands. Popular movements in the Taisho Era (1912–1926) pushed open the door of democracy a bit wider, but rising militarism slammed it shut again. In practice, if not in their hearts, ordinary people remained largely conditioned to “leave it up to the ones above” (okami). The U.S. Occupation (1945–1951) refashioned many of Japan’s institutions in a democratic direction, but power relations and culture changed more slowly. After World War II, most Japanese people strongly supported rapid economic growth, seeing it as the only path to industrial jobs, prosperity, a “cultured life” (bunka seikatsu), and national pride. Many people believed that, in their resource-poor country, disciplined work and cooperation under state and corporate leadership was the way to attain these goals. This conviction only strengthened the long-standing Japanese reluctance to criticize government policy. When labor unions, students, and leftist parties protested too much, the authorities weakened or suppressed them. In the decades after World War II, the paternalistic government distributed some of the benefits of economic growth to all classes, but it did little to control the environmental costs. The government’s policy priorities were power plants and booming
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factories, not clean air and water. When polluting industries entered communities, they not only destroyed the old ways of life, they made people sicken and die. Such hardships left people disillusioned about the virtues of unregulated growth. In the 1960s and 1970s, popular frustration peaked. Throughout the nation, quiescent villages and neighborhoods erupted into environmental protest. Minamata was the site of one of the first and most potent of these movements. Photographs of its victims, crippled by mercury poisoning brought on by decades of negligent industrial practice, became symbols of the nation’s pollution problem. Disease victims and their supporters challenged the power of business and the state, and went on to win their cases in court. Starting in the mid-1960s and peaking in the early 1970s, a tidal wave of such locally based movements swept Japan, eventually forcing the government to pass effective environmental laws. This wave of environmental protest actualized the democratic potential of the new constitution introduced by the Americans in 1946, giving ordinary people a sense of political empowerment. Still, when people dared to protest publicly, political elites and even fellow citizens condemned them for failing to observe the traditional Japanese virtue of loyalty to the elites. Indeed, as we see in the chapter that follows, even while suffering the horror of mercury poisoning, the Minamata victims were criticized by society for daring to blame the polluter, a local factory of the powerful Chisso Company. In many pollution cases in other parts of Japan, local residents just grumbled around their dinner tables. Only after someone of high local status decided to take a leadership role would ordinary people band together in public resistance. Organizing a movement was not easy. Environmental movements usually had to contend with local conservative political “machines,” similar to those of old Chicago’s Daley machine or New York’s Tammany Hall. Local “bosses” (bosuteki sonzai), as the Japanese called them, doled out patronage from above: local construction projects, wedding and funeral attendance, and bribes placed on the family altar, all in return for votes and loyalty. If you joined a protest movement, the local boss leaned on your aunt to pressure you to quit. In short, as these examples show, Japanese society and culture posed many informal as well as formal obstacles to the emergence of local citizen advocacy groups. By the mid-1960s, however, concerns surrounding pollution’s effects intensified and overcame customary restraints on political protest. The number of protest movements grew rapidly, peaking in the early 1970s and resulting in a raft of new environmental legislation. With surprising efficiency and much more rapidly than in the United States, Germany, France, or England, these laws and subsequent regulatory action quickly reduced the most visible air and water pollution. This wave of protest movements permanently altered Japanese political culture; yet few young people adopted the environmental movement as a lifestyle or career. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese economy gained increasing momentum and most young male high school and college graduates were eager to join the ranks of the newly affluent “salarymen” and enjoy the new possibilities of self-indulgent consumerism. Only in the 1990s, after the vast bubble of prosperity collapsed, did the major-
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ity of Japanese people begin to entertain “post-materialist” values. Although support for such values was still not high in Japan compared to some other countries,1 the public became increasingly willing to sacrifice economic gain for the sake of preserving the environment. Moreover, more people recognized a public right to a healthy and beautiful natural environment. Public policy, however, often ignored this nascent environmentalism. Japan’s fiscal problems of the early 1990s led the country into the economic doldrums. The central government tried to revive the economy by spending vast sums on public works, but conservative politicians and general contractors, not the people, defined the character of these projects. As they had done since the 1950s, Japan’s huge general contractors used public funds to construct dams, seawalls, roads, tunnels, and buildings throughout Japan, many of dubious necessity and great ecological destructiveness. Moreover, according to one authority, “bid-rigging and political payoffs inflate[d] the cost of public construction in Japan by thirty to fifty percent.”2 Some of the added costs found their way into the pockets of industry-friendly politicians as an incentive to dole out additional dubious government contracts. This led to a vicious cycle that produced what many Japanese call Japan’s “construction state” (doken kokka), driving up the public works budget (in 2003, over ¥9 trillion, or US$75 billion) and leaving Japan with a government debt totaling 140 percent of its GDP, a world record. Construction projects on Lake Biwa and the Nagara River, described in this chapter, exemplify the results of this process—the radical transformation of Japan’s natural landscape. Pushed by such profit-minded elites, these projects went ahead despite reasonable criticism and popular opposition. During the 1990s, the government’s inability or unwillingness to protect the public interest became increasingly obvious. In one telling example, the government fumbled its response to the 1995 Great Hanshin earthquake, leaving much of the emergency aid work to volunteers. In this time of economic doldrums, the government protected big banks and corporations while small business bankruptcies skyrocketed. The Ministry of Health and Welfare allowed HIV-tainted blood into the national blood supply. Concurrently, new environmental problems emerged: the ubiquitous huge trash incinerators built by the government to eliminate consumer waste spewed forth dioxin-laden smoke, polluting the soil. Toxic waste seeped into the water supply, raising fears of human hormone disruption. Increasingly, the public blamed the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), with its strong ties to business, for these failures. All these problems, along with the end of the Cold War, weakened the rationale for further extending the long rule of a single political party. In 1993, for the first time since its founding in 1955, the LDP lost control of both the upper and lower houses of the Diet, the Japanese parliament. After a year out of government, the LDP returned to power, but only at the cost of forming a coalition with its old nemesis, the Japan Socialist Party. The resulting political turbulence opened the way for important new policies. In 1993, the government revised the basic environmental laws to include the new ideas of national and global sustainability, while the 1998 Nonprofit Law gave
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civil associations the right to incorporate. As a result of these changes, civil society took on a new shape. Japan’s educated, middle-class urban society gave birth to environmental groups more like their Western counterparts, concerned not just with the quality of their own neighborhoods but with citywide, prefectural, national, and even global environmental causes. Inspired by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro and supported by environmental activists nationally and internationally, the Nagara River protest movement, discussed in the chapter that follows, exemplified this new type of citizen activism. The complex political and institutional changes of the 1990s further weakened the Confucian tradition of obedience and added legitimacy to citizen activism as a way to participate in politics. A new sense of civic capacity and responsibility empowered citizens to act not only on behalf of global environmental ideals but also to express in political form their own deeply held spiritual aesthetics of nature. That such personal values should enter the realm of politics represents something new in Japanese culture. Turning away from wholesale acquiescence to a paternalistic state, people are increasingly getting used to thinking of themselves as citizens empowered by democratic principles, an ethic that can now legitimately support even the public defense of natural beauty. Notes 1. R. Dunlap, A. Gallup, and G.J. Gallup, The Health of the Planet Survey (Princeton: George H. Gallup International Institute, 1992). In this survey of citizens of twenty-two developed and developing countries, the portion that valued environmental protection over economic growth ranged from 72 percent in top-ranked Denmark to 43 percent in bottom-ranked Turkey. The figure for Japan was 58 percent, and for the United States it was 59 percent— eighth and ninth from the bottom, respectively. 2. B. Woodall, Japan Under Construction (Berkeley: University of California, 1996), 48.
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Minamata City, Lake Biwa, Niigata City, and the Nagara River, Japan A.
10 Miles 10 Kilometers
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CHINA
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.
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Minamata Disease outbreak
Oozuchi Dam
.
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As of 2001. See chapter for update. All dams are prefectural level unless otherwise indicated. GIFU
Lake Biwa area (see map A)
Ibi R.
Tokyo Nagara R.
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Lake Biwa
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Kyoto Kobe Yodo R. Osaka
SHIGA
Yoshino Movable Dam
Tokushima Minamata City
y i Ba nu ira h S
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st
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W
KUMAMOTO Minamata (See Map B)
0
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al R
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oad Route 3
Minamata Bay
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2 From Kogai to Kankyo Mondai Nature, Development, and Social Conflict in Japan Kada Yukiko, Tanaka Shigeru, Aoyagi-Usui Midori, Arakaki Tazusa, Watanabe Shinichi, and Steven Hoffman*
Japan is a nation shaped by water. Its cultural practices, economy, and worldview have been fundamentally influenced by the close proximity of bodies of water and— in the twentieth century—by the use and allocation of water.1 Over the centuries, floods have been the most frequent natural threat to livelihoods and property. Water is also central to the Japanese diet, in which fish and rice (which requires vast amounts of water to cultivate) predominate. Small rivers and lakes carve up Japan’s countryside, and the natural boundaries between watersheds have historically provided administrative boundaries for government. It is fitting, therefore, that the environmental cases we have selected for this chapter all center upon water. Focusing on the struggle of communities as they cope with transformations to their environments, and the resulting degradation, these cases exemplify the water-related issues faced by many Japanese communities in the postwar era of rapid development. During its race to industrial development in the latter half of the twentieth century, Japan experienced severe industrial pollution that cost many lives. Our first case—the outbreak of mercury poisoning (“Minamata disease”) in Minamata Bay in the 1950s (and, later, in Niigata Prefecture)—is probably the most extreme example of a pollution-related health crisis in Japan. In our case study we examine not only the devastating effect of mercury pollution on the people of Minamata but also the ways in which the community has sought to heal itself and its environment in the aftermath. Another outgrowth of the postwar development push was an emphasis on “efficient resource allocation.” Japan’s water policies were increasingly tailored to electricity generation, industrial production, and urban growth. Massive dam and water delivery system projects were planned, and many were built during this period. In our second case study we examine the evolution of Japan’s water policies and how they fundamentally altered the Japanese environment and raised awareness of the role of the environment in Japanese society and culture. This case study—of conflicts over government efforts to manage and control water supply at Lake Biwa, the Nagara River, and the Yoshino River—is typical of the water issues many Japanese communities faced in the era of rapid economic development. 109
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In short, the chapter examines the ways in which the communities in and around Minamata and Lake Biwa have been transformed by environmental struggles. We analyze the changes in how people define the environment and the values reflected in the evolving definitions, and how competing notions of the environment are invoked during conflicts among differently situated individuals and social groups. Japanese environmentalism, as the term is commonly understood in the West, is a very recent phenomenon. Before the 1980s the Japanese referred to problems associated with the destruction of nature as kogai (literally, “public nuisance” or “public harm”). This usage implies a clear distinction between polluter and victim, where a demonstrable harm affects specific individuals or groups. However, the term was soon found inadequate for many environmental problems. As we shall see in the cases of the Lake Biwa and Nagara River development projects, beginning in the 1980s there emerged “lifestyle-related” pollution, where household effluent was identified as a cause of environmental degradation but where claims of “victimhood” were absent. This new class of pollution problems came to be referred to as kankyo mondai (environmental issues). After 1990 the term kankyo mondai came into common use, and today kogai is seldom heard in the public domain despite the persistence of kogai issues and effects. As this study will suggest, such shifts in terminology are meaningful, particularly given that before the emergence of the cases presented here, the notion of “the environment” did not exist in the Japanese language. The cases we have chosen represent these two ways of viewing environmental problems—kogai and kankyo mondai—in the emerging discourse of Japanese environmentalism and environmental awareness. The kogai case, that of the city of Minamata (and Niigata-Minamata), involves mercury poisoning caused by the discharge of untreated industrial effluent. Characterized by government inaction, corporate denials, stigmatization, litigation, and ultimately the introduction of an elaborate bureaucracy for victim certification and compensation, it has played a pivotal role in the rise of environmental protection policies in Japan. In the water resource cases that exemplify kankyo mondai, we see how the effects of invasive natural-resource development policies—characterized by huge construction projects and increased agricultural and industrial activity in the lake region— galvanized local awareness of the importance of the natural environment. At Lake Biwa there emerged calls for “environmental rights” (specifically, the right to clean water) alongside a more spiritual discourse articulating the need for a “living, natural” lake. A related though not identical situation arose during the resistance to the Nagara River Dam project, which evolved from the livelihood-based protests of local fisherman to a conservationist claim taken up not just by local residents but also by nature writers, visitors to the area, and eventually national media. Of course, these brief characterizations of each case are themselves inadequate representations of the wide range of values and perspectives that shaped environmental politics of these places. Our study tries to attend to the multiplicity of voices, claims, and discourses that have shaped environmental policies and legitimized hu-
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man interaction with the physical environment. These attitudes and claims as they relate to the kogai cases are presented in a “Community Reactions” section; in the kankyo mondai cases, which treat Lake Biwa, Nagara Dam, and Yoshino Dam, these “voices” appear in the form of quotations that are interspersed throughout the text. Our attempt to track the development and articulation of environmental values—the attitudes and intuitions that inform lifestyle choices, cultural habits, and environmental policy-making—is reflected in our methodology. Several aspects are worth noting. First, our methodology reflects our response to the norms that govern social research in Japan, and the challenge of conducting inductive, values-oriented research in Japanese society. To secure both the trust of interviewees and the acceptance of research results in a society that emphasizes community and group membership, researchers must have prior research accomplishments in their field and research topic. A researcher will have great difficulty eliciting meaningful responses from a Japanese interview subject who perceives the researcher as ichigen-san (a one-time visitor). Thus, each researcher associated with this project had already studied extensively various aspects of each of these cases, and the researchers conducted interviews themselves (not via graduate students) at the sites. We conducted more than a hundred interviews with representatives from all stakeholder groups: the central government, the prefectural government, victims’ advocacy groups, and local residents. Highly abstract questions about social problems tended to elicit programmed responses from the interviewees, echoing viewpoints that had been widely disseminated in society through the mass media and government propaganda. Such behavior reflects a cultural feature of Japanese society: the desire to offer socially acceptable answers. Yet the repetition of such language is a form of self-expression, and we took it into consideration. However, we found that asking more concrete questions, situated in a particular context or in response to a particular stimulus such as an old photograph of the neighborhood, led us to a more precise understanding of people’s environmental attitudes. In addition to the environmental stories that unfold in this chapter, there is also a political story: the story of a national government increasingly centralizing control over local environments in the name of economic development, and the trouble this presents when people are denied a voice in decisions about local land and water. This theme of loss of control over local environments comes up repeatedly as a cause of disharmony in the case of Minamata Bay (where fishing grounds are transgressed by a major, government-backed industry) and in the Lake Biwa and Nagara River cases (where major public water works projects overrule local wishes to keep water clean and free-flowing). The water resource cases illustrate how central control of water resource planning and management transformed Japanese people’s relationship with water from a “nearby” relationship to a “distant” one, in which local people are divorced (in terms of access and a sense of responsibility) from their traditional water sources. This story comes full circle by the end of our chapter, as Japanese people concerned with these cases begin to voice their opposition to the government’s water resource development policies and eventually to regain a voice in decisions about their “nearby water.”
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Our political and environmental stories go hand-in-hand, and both are driven by the complex and sometimes conflicting values of clean water, health, nature-based livelihoods such as fishing and farming, social harmony, interpersonal obligation, and loyalty, among others. The chapter ends with a discussion of Japanese values and an analysis of how they have come into play in Japan’s environmental story. Industrial Pollution in Minamata Bay Introduction The case of industrial water pollution in Minamata, a small city on Japan’s southernmost island, Kyushu, is the largest and most emblematic instance of kogai in Japanese history. Hundreds of people living along the inland Shiranui Sea died and thousands were debilitated by a devastating neurological disease caused by eating fish tainted by methyl mercury, which had been flushed into Minamata Bay with industrial wastewater from the local chemical plant, Chisso Minamata. The methyl mercury was a by-product of its production of acetaldehyde, which had begun in 1941 and was finally discontinued in 1968. Even before World War II, there were signs of a growing problem of water pollution in Minamata Bay, including periodic fish kills and declining fish catches. For decades the Chisso company had periodically paid “gift money” (mimaikin) to the fishing industry in compensation for losses that resulted from pollution in the area near the plant. But it was not until the contamination moved its way from fish up the food chain—first, to cats and, then, to humans —that it began to arouse concern. Although not understood for decades, the mercury had become incorporated into methyl mercury chloride (mercury combined with carbon), an organic form that could enter the food chain. Humans can absorb it by ingesting it, and after it enters the bloodstream, it can cause brain damage. Further, high levels of methyl mercury in mothers can be passed on to their offspring, causing disfiguration and retardation. What came to be known as Minamata disease is characterized by severe convulsions, episodes of dementia, and in the worst cases, permanent coma before the onset of a high fever and death. Those affected came to suffer external disfiguration and internal, neurological malfunctioning. Although signs of the disease, known initially only as ki-byo (the strange disease) appeared as early as 1953, it was not officially recognized until 1956. Its earliest manifestations were in local cats, which resulted in a second name: dancing cat disease. The Minamata pets had begun to exhibit inexplicably strange behavior, writhing and twisting in the streets and in homes. When Hosokawa Hajime, a doctor at the community hospital affiliated with the Chisso plant, first reported the disease in humans and said its causation was unknown, the city government responded by isolating the patients, members of the fishing community, in hospitals. The quarantine marked the disease with a powerful stigma both within the community of fishermen and outside it, among other social classes. Minamata disease was thus, in a sense, a
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class-based disease. This unfortunate fact presaged an uphill battle on the part of the victims to get community support in their fight for compensation against the powerful industry-government alliance in Minamata. Disease victims also suffered discrimination in employment and other areas.2 Even when the pollution was stopped at its source, the after-effects remained with the community: Mercury remained in the sediment of the bay, and the disease victims and their families, mostly fishers, continued to cope with their personal and commercial losses as well as the social stigma attached to the disease. The now-infamous case of mercury poisoning in Minamata Bay, which has played out over almost five decades, continues to haunt, divide, motivate, and inspire the community. We selected this case in part because the decades-long story of Minamata is, in many respects, the story of Japan’s environmental “coming of age” at all levels of society and government over the past century. During the course of this ordeal (which by some accounts began as early as the 1920s, with a series of suspicious fish kills in the region), Japan has undergone several major value shifts along its path from traditional ways of life to modernization, technological and economic development, and beyond. Government and industry have had to come to terms with the excesses of industrial development and the resulting environmental damage, and to adjust their policy priorities accordingly; and Japanese citizens have acquired higher levels of political and environmental awareness and activism. It was the Minamata case, in fact, that served as a catalyst for many nationwide changes in environmental policy, in pollution regulations for industry and developers, and in legal innovations that provided recourse for pollution victims. This case also illustrates the real contemporary challenges to environmentalism and environmental policies in a community that was once at the epicenter of an ecological and social disaster. As of 2001, there were 2,955 government-certified victims of Minamata disease.3 Well over 1,700 certified patients had died.4 In total, however, more than two hundred thousand people were estimated to have suffered health effects from Minamata disease.5 A victims’ advocacy group, Soshisha, attributed the very large number of “latent” victims to intense social pressure not to speak about the disease and to the fact that many people died unaware that they had mercury poisoning. The story of the poisoning at Minamata is well documented. In contrast to earlier accounts that emphasize the industrial pollution incident, the cover up, and the impact on the victims, this study focuses particularly upon government and community efforts both to heal the community by remembering the past and to make Minamata, the very name of which once brought shame, a point of pride as an environmental showcase and an instrument for environmental education and awareness. There remain in Minamata, now a city of thirty-two thousand inhabitants, a number of obstacles—some the by-products of the poisoning itself—to the government-led campaign to prioritize the environment and promote environmental values there. Many of the principal figures in this case—including disease victims, activists, fishermen, and company employees—still live in the community. While Chisso ceased vinyl chloride production in 1968, the company still operates in Minamata, employing about
114 ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN FOUR COUNTRIES
two thousand people at the main office and in Chisso-related enterprises involved in the production of fertilizers, chemicals, and computer discs.6 Below, we look at how the community of Minamata was altered by this wellknown case, and how it has shaped the values and attitudes of the people there regarding community, government, and the environment. We also describe the role of key leaders in pursuing environmental justice and cleanup, and we explore the lasting legacy of the incident for the Minamata community and Japan as a whole. Then, in the “Community Reactions” section, we examine the attitudes and actions of the key actors, and evaluate the prospects for the reforging of community ties and for environmentalism in Minamata. Healing Disease, Distrust, and Environmental Destruction Moyainaoshi: Retying Community Ties In the early 1990s the government of Kumamoto Prefecture (prefectures are akin to U.S. states) initiated a campaign to reinvigorate Minamata City. Not only was the community politically and socially divided over the disease that had affected so many of its citizens, it had also suffered economically both from the contamination of its fish and the downsizing of the Chisso plant, which came as a result of its inability to compete effectively within the chemical field. In an effort to resuscitate the community, the local and prefectural governments undertook a pointed campaign of community healing. The campaign was called Moyainaoshi, a maritime metaphor that means “retying the moorings,” alluding to reforging community bonds. The Moyainaoshi Campaign emphasizes activities that bring the residents face-to-face to discuss environmental and other community issues and to cooperate together on resolving community environmental problems. It is seen by its architects as a way of healing both differences and the environment. The language of reconciliation surrounding the campaign was accompanied by government pronouncements that “the Minamata disease problem is important to all citizens of Minamata” and “the Minamata community cannot be revitalized until the Minamata disease conflict [that is, the social conflict connected with the disease] is solved.”7 We examine this local campaign and, later, the community reactions to it because it is widely believed within Minamata that its success is a prerequisite to a shift toward embracing environmental values whereby stakeholders perceive their lives as a part of the surrounding ecological system. In this view, harmony between humans and the environment cannot be fully restored unless community harmony is restored because environmental policies succeed only when the community can put differences aside and get solidly behind them. Moyainaoshi, originally a grassroots call for the community to come together to support the victims of Minamata disease, became the official, government-adopted name for a range of measures and campaigns to end prejudice and heal rifts, and to promote environmental thinking and values in Minamata and the larger community.
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Much of this campaign has played out on a 58-hectare landfill area in the inner bay that has been turned into a green park with the help of local citizens as part of the government’s pollution remediation efforts. The area took on symbolic importance as the site of many moyainaoshi events, including ceremonies and concerts, and community activists installed stone statues there in an attempt to turn it into a spiritual place where Minamata victims can be remembered. In addition to the memorial park, the government launched a program to “empower Minamata,” increasing the number of outlets for community discussion and victim-outreach initiatives.8 There have also been memorial services for those who died from the disease, the opening of the Municipal Minamata Disease Museum and two community centers, public education projects, neighborhood cleanups, exhibitions showcasing Minamata’s safe and healthful fish products, and international conferences that emphasize the environmental lessons of Minamata. The government even established May 1 as an official day for remembering the victims of Minamata disease.9 In the mid-1990s the Kumamoto prefectural government declared Minamata a model environmental city and a lesson (both a cautionary tale and a model of recovery) for the nations of the world. In keeping with the declaration, the city has engaged in a number of projects including a local government program, under the guidance of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to teach selected fellows from across Asia about Minamata’s methods of environmental cleanup and preservation.10 In addition, an environmental prize of 1 million yen (about US$8,500) was established for people or groups engaged in outstanding environmental conservation projects in Asia. In 2001, Minamata sponsored the Sixth International Conference on Mercury as a Global Pollutant, attended by five hundred scientists from forty countries. The local government moved further toward the goal of becoming a model city when Minamata achieved ISO 14001 status in February 1999.11 The city has adopted recycling as a collective environmental activity, and the municipal government proudly points to that project as one of the community’s environmental success stories. The municipal government went to great lengths to run educational programs about the program, which involves a rather extensive garbage separation practice. People are asked to separate twenty-one types of recyclables, which they can then deposit at one of about three hundred waste stations operated by local citizens’ groups. The city also has at least four recycling factories.12 In operation since 1993, the waste collection sites have not only become local gathering places, they have become a showcase of local environmental policy for visitors from Japan and abroad. If one of the goals of Moyainaoshi was to foster citizen involvement in environmental policy, then the recycling program stands out as an enduring accomplishment. The community healing campaign has also inspired some local citizens to come up with their own ideas about how to promote environment-friendly practices. In 1997, a consortium of sixteen women’s groups came up with a proposal for environmental safety and health guidelines for consumers and shops (e.g., avoiding overwrapped foods and products that pose environmental hazards, reusing shopping bags).13 While
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these developments are not tantamount to a wholesale absorption of environmental values on the part of local residents, they are signs at least of the beginning of a shift away from a focus on kogai toward a concept of the environment as a resource to be protected in its own right and not solely for economic or public health reasons. As far as community healing is concerned, the campaign has produced mixed results, as we will see from some local residents’ comments in the “Community Reactions” section, which follows. Although the campaign has been a top-down initiative, those charged with leading it involved themselves at the grassroots level. In their work on the campaign, Kamakura Takayuki, an official of the prefectural government, and Yoshimoto Tetsuro, a Minamata City official, went far beyond the administrative, bureaucratic tasks to which they were accustomed in their efforts to get people from various social groups to begin talking to one another. Kamakura went to various neighborhoods around the city, listened to diverse groups, and interposed himself—as a representative of the prefecture—as the mediator in their conflicts. He also sought to identify with the victims. As he explained in an interview, “Like the Minamata disease victims, I grew up eating the natural fruits of the sea, farm, and mountains.” By stressing the commonalities between the disease victims and the larger population, Kamakura has sought to reincorporate the disease victims into Minamata society. The victims and their families have experienced community ostracism since the outbreak of the disease five decades ago; today, many are still feeling the pain of too little compensation, offered too late. In 1995 the Kumamoto prefectural government set aside about $255 million in state subsidies and bonds to enable Chisso to compensate the worst-affected victims, while refusing to compensate any others. It was not until April 2001—twenty years after the victims filed suit in an Osaka Court—that a ruling was issued ordering the Chisso Corporationto pay $2.18 million in additional damages to the plaintiffs. It was not until the 1990s that the local government finally acknowledged the victims’ need for an official apology. On May 1, 1994, the mayor of Minamata, in a memorial ceremony speech, apologized for the local government’s part in the history of the disease, and called it a day to recreate moyai.14 Minamata: A “Company Castle” Town15 The extent of the social disruption caused by the pollution and disease in Minamata can only be understood when one considers the prominent role of the Chisso company in the life of the community. When Chisso opened the Nippon Chisso Hiryo (Japan Nitrogen Fertilizer) factory in Minamata in 1908 bringing outsiders to work for the company, fishing families from the region also moved to Minamata in the hopes that the new factory would bring an increased demand for fish. As a result, a social gap was created between people who had farmed the region for centuries or engaged in commerce (the longest-term residents were known as jigoro) and these migrant fishers (nagare), who occupied the lowest rung on the social ladder. The factory, which produced chemical fertilizers, acetic acid, vinyl chloride, and
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plasticizers, grew and as it grew, Minamata grew, from a village to a town, and from a town to a city. Over the decades Chisso became the major employer and taxpayer in the region; at one point in the 1950s it provided 60 percent of all city tax revenues and dominated social and economic life.16 This was not unusual in Japan, where large companies engaged their workers in practically feudal relationships when it came to things like loyalty and benefits. Chisso’s prosperity became the city’s, as its economic and political clout in the region was paralleled by its social standing. Chisso employees came to be called Chisso-sama (sama is an honorific title for a social superior). The factory was commonly referred to simply as Kaisha, meaning “The Company.” Many believed that Chisso had brought a yoi kurashi (a rich, modern life) to the small seaside town of Minamata. The people of Minamata thus began to understand themselves as sharing, on the community level, the destiny of the Chisso chemical plant.17 The plant’s future was assured as long as it enjoyed pride of place in the government’s postwar industrial development and modernization plans. The Minamata Chisso chemical complex was the only one in Japan that could produce a chemical used in a popular product and that otherwise had to be imported—polyvinyl chloride plastic. The production of acetaldehyde, which involved the mercury-based compound that was spilled into the bay, was a step in the manufacture of polyvinyl chloride.18 Between 1956, when Minamata disease was identified, and the early 1970s, Chisso Minamata employed almost 20 percent of the local workforce, occupied 68 percent of the city’s land area, and consumed 93 percent of its water supply.19 Employees from Minamata mostly worked in menial positions, while managerial jobs were largely filled by recruits from the main office in Tokyo. Even when the Chisso company began to downsize its Minamata plant in the early 1960s, the plant still had an overwhelming influence on the local economy and government, accounting for almost half of the city’s tax revenues.20 To understand the company’s grip on local politics, it helps to know that beginning in 1950 and for almost twenty years, the Chisso plant manager also served as the city’s mayor. According to the Kumamoto University sociologist Maruyama Sadami, “By identifying [the company] as ‘Chisso of Minamata,’ corporate leaders . . . encouraged the belief that the firm and the community shared a mutual destiny.”21 That the national government impeded efforts to determine more specific causes of the Minamata disease, as described below, is unsurprising given its emphasis on national development goals. In 1956, Japan was just entering a period of rapid economic growth. The economy was growing by more than 10 percent per year, and as a chemical factory, Chisso stood to benefit from the boom. As Japan’s top chemical company, Chisso’s government protection, prestige, and political influence in the region were guaranteed throughout the 1950s and well into the 1960s. Investigation, Denial, and Cover-Up Understanding the community’s need for moyainaoshi requires a look back at the history of Chisso and the government’s response to the disease. Through the 1950s,
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while the crippling new disease struck local fishing families, the medical research community and their government (at all levels) were failing them. In 1956 the local and national governments separately commissioned studies to investigate the disease. The Kumamoto University medical researchers initially tapped by the government of Kumamoto Prefecture to investigate ki-byo (strange-disease) determined in 1959 that organic mercury was the likely cause. The national government, however, had begun its own study, funded by the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and using professors from Tokyo-based universities, who put forward alternative claims about the cause that were widely publicized.22 Largely because of the Tokyo universities’ reputations as Japan’s premier academic institutions, it took many years for the Kumamoto University findings to be accepted, a fact that confused the policy process and delayed moves toward a solution. MITI’s minister at that time, Ikeda Hayato, who later became prime minister, even blamed the Kumamoto research group for causing social conflict by publishing their findings. Even granting the Kumamoto group’s theory that the disease was linked to heavy metal–contaminated fish, the absence of a scientifically proven link between the disease and its manufacturing processes allowed Chisso to deny responsibility, citing the support of the national government’s MITI-funded study. The company even issued its own report, countering the Kumamoto group’s finding.23 The company was also involved in an outright cover-up. Hosokawa Hajime, the doctor at the community hospital affiliated with the Chisso plant who had first reported the disease, secretly continued to pursue the Kumamoto findings, despite orders from the company to come up with evidence to the contrary. When, in 1962, Hosokawa confirmed the Kumamoto theory, the Chisso company ordered that his finding be kept secret. In 1963, Kumamoto University’s researchers publicly released a report linking the disease, methyl mercury in fish, and pollutants from the Chisso plant that had settled into the sludge of the bay. It was only in 1968, after five more years and a great deal of community rancor and activism, that the company stopped its production of acetaldehyde, as it had come to rely on the production of other chemicals as its main source of revenue. And it was not until that same year, that the government finally publicly acknowledged Chisso’s industrial waste as the cause of the disease. The Fight for Compensation While the modern chemical industry was secretly depositing poisons, some of my own people died a sudden and anguishing death, and through ten and twenty-year periods, parents, children and then grandchildren were more slowly murdered. However, these people, caught in an unprecedented disaster, saw through those who sought to destroy them with the penetrating sight of unseeing eyes at death.
This is how Ishimure Michiko, a novelist and housewife who became an important witness and advocate for the victims, described the injustice of Minamata disease.24 When the cause of the disease was still uncertain, victims were feared to be contagious (or genetically defective) and accused of harming the fishing trade; after the
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disease was confirmed to be linked to the Chisso chemical complex, it was feared that any threat to Chisso could destabilize the local economy, and thus the victims were shunned. Once the victims’ compensation claims and payments were under way, a cloud of suspicion was cast over them; some were accused of posing as victims (labeled “fake patients”) in order to collect money. These accusations and general community anger against the victims who chose to take the company to court for compensation grew in the 1960s, a decade when, for market reasons, the Chisso plant’s fortunes were waning.25 In the early years, Minamata disease victims and their families quickly fell into poverty. If the family breadwinner contracted the disease, a source of income was lost while family medical expenses skyrocketed. As a result of this dual hardship, many victims simply went untreated and died. Victims’ groups today bitterly recall not only those years but also the years after the Chisso Corporation was found to be at fault. The diagnosis and disease certification processes devised by the government to mete out compensation money were flawed from the start. The onus fell upon the victims and their families to prove (using narrow definitions of the disease, which manifests itself to varying degrees and with a wide array of possible symptoms) that their illnesses had resulted from mercury pollution in the bay. As a result, many victims over the years were left out of a succession of compensation arrangements despite multiple applications to be certified. This led to a series of bitter lawsuits brought by the victims against the company (and more recently, against the government), which have played out from the 1970s to the present. Local fishing families played an early role in the activism by demanding compensation from the Chisso company in 1959. The disease was killing their business as well as them and their neighbors, as fears of eating fish spread. After a violent demonstration against the plant by four thousand fishermen and their families, the Kumamoto government stepped in to broker a deal. The company, while still denying responsibility, agreed to make a one-time payment of mimaikin (gift money) both to the fishermen and to disease victims. This payment came with the condition that there would be no more inquiry into the cause of the disease. The payment process proved inadequate, as the amounts were small, and in the case of the disease victims, the clinical requirements for qualifying excluded all but the most extreme cases. Nine years after Minamata disease was named, the fight for compensation took a new turn. In 1965 a mysterious neurological disease appeared in another part of Japan —along the banks of the Agano River in Niigata Prefecture, in communities downstream from another chemical processing plant. The Showa Denko factory, which used the same acetaldehyde-based procedures as Chisso, was dumping untreated effluent into the river. The contaminated wastewater carried methyl mercury downstream to settlements along the river. The symptoms of the disease in Niigata bore a suspicious resemblance to Minamata disease. As in Kumamoto, those affected were predominantly fishers. Showa Denko, however, did not have the paternalistic, economic, or political reach of the Chisso Corporation. The economic life along the river was varied, and not overwhelmingly defined
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and influenced by the chemical plant. This fact, as well as the time lag between these two cases, would result in a speedier course of action on the part of the Niigata disease victims. As in Minamata, the industry and government attempted to obscure local research findings through manipulation and cover-up, but this time, they did not succeed as well. In Minamata, the Kumamoto University Medical Department, under pressure from supporters of the chemical industry, had kept to conservative, classic definitions of the disease, but in Niigata, careful epidemiological studies showed that methyl mercury poisoning could be manifested in a variety of neurological effects and symptoms.26 By scientifically demonstrating the causal link between industrial practices and the disease, these findings aided the movement in Minamata to assign responsibility for the disease to Chisso. In 1968 the national government officially accepted that the Kumamoto and Niigata diseases were pollution-based diseases caused by the same substance, organic mercury. Despite the differences in the two cases, the Niigata disease victims, like those in Minamata, felt enormous pressure to stay silent, not to “bring shame” on their families, neighbors, or towns, and not to hurt fish sales in the area. Victims who spoke out were subjected to slander and social discrimination, even threats and vandalism. Some lost their jobs. But the Niigata victims wasted little time in pressing their claims. In 1967, after Showa Denko was found to be the culprit, seventy-seven Niigata patients took their case to court. Early support from medical and legal professionals was critical in moving the quest for justice forward more quickly than in Minamata.27 Yet thereafter Minamata activism began to build momentum. From the time the Niigata victims began their lawsuit, in 1967, the story of Minamata disease activists played out largely on two fronts: on the streets (as demonstrators took their calls for justice all the way to Chisso headquarters in Tokyo) and in courts of law. After the government’s declaration in 1968 that Chisso’s manufacturing processes were to blame for the contamination, most victims signed an agreement to abide by the settlements to be reached by a government mediation committee, but a minority, distrustful of such processes because of the government’s past behavior, chose to pursue their own legal action. In June 1969 twenty-nine families (112 people) sued the Chisso Corporation for damages in the Kumamoto District Court, the first lawsuit in the Minamata case. Those who chose to sue Chisso faced huge pressures from the community to drop their legal claims. One fisherwoman, Sugimoto Eiko, said the lawsuit against Chisso worsened prejudice against disease victims and resulted in bullying by the company, Minamata residents, and even their own relatives. According to Sugimoto, Chisso used relatives of Minamata victims to pressure them to end the lawsuit. Her own relatives sided with Chisso despite strong evidence that the company was to blame.28 The plaintiffs in the Minamata lawsuit, with the aid of socially conscious lawyers (opposition political party members and supporters), pressed their case in the courts, however, and eventually prevailed. In 1973 Chisso was found professionally negli-
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gent in polluting Minamata Bay. This outcome opened the door for victims to pursue their claims based upon a legal judgment, rather than mediation with the company. The 1974 Pollution Health Damage Compensation Law entitled victims of pollution to compensation from the industrial polluter. That same year, the central government set up the Minamata Disease Certification Applicants’ Council to deal with these claims. However, many applicants were stymied by the red tape and medical reports required to become certified by the council.29 The same 1974 law relieved the polluting industry of having to bear the burden of remediation and victim compensation on its own: The damage sustained by the polluter was to be relieved in part socially, through tax money. In this context, victims’ claims for compensation were seen as a drain on and a possible threat to the rest of the community, increasing resentment against victims. Because of Chisso’s status as the single most important employer in Minamata, the citizens of Minamata shared with the government a concern over the company’s financial stability. These concerns were not entirely unwarranted. Large payouts and remediation efforts (wastewater treatment and dredging polluted sediment from the bay) threatened the Chisso plant’s operations. By 1978 the company was reportedly having trouble making payments to the victims, so the prefectural government stepped in, subsidizing the plant through bond issues, with the understanding that the money raised would be a partial loan. Under this government arrangement, Chisso received 18 billion yen ($86 million) in relief funds.30 The Minamata case has pushed Japan’s pollution policies, albeit slowly, toward protecting people and punishing polluters. Today victims of pollution are certified based on the Pollution- Health Damage Compensation Law, which bases certification criteria on medical science. In the case of Minamata disease, medical science has a much broader definition for the disease than in the days immediately after its discovery. Moreover, since 1992, the government has been conducting medical examinations of citizens in areas with high incidence of the disease, and has provided financial assistance for medical care to people exhibiting neurological signs of the disease.31 It has also established the National Institute for Minamata Disease for the continuation of research into chemical and clinical aspects of the disease. Cases, though far fewer now, are still being reported, and people are still being certified as suffering from the effects of methyl mercury poisoning dating back to the 1950s and 1960s. Collective Action and the Fight for Justice on the Streets Despite pressures on victims to keep their problems to themselves, from about 1968 onward, more and more people were beginning to see that the victims’ claims were about more than money. Local volunteer groups, Chisso labor union members, and researchers—inspired by Niigata victims—began to join together to support Minamata victims. Lawyers, doctors, leftists, university students, and journalists were drawn to the cause. The new Niigata cases brought media attention to the disease as something that endangered people beyond Minamata; they also widened the scope of activism,
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leading eventually (in 1971) to the largest sit-down strike in Japan’s history of social activism. Minamata disease became the poster-case for kogai pollution issues. At that time, an American photographer, Eugene Smith, who supported the Minamata disease victim advocacy groups, captured world attention by publishing a photo essay documenting the horrors of the disease with images of children who had been deformed in their mothers’ wombs.32 While the court cases moved slowly and the certification process frustrated victims and their families, some took their case to the streets. Sit-ins and imaginative demonstrations, some of which turned violent, also brought national and even world attention to the cause. In 1970, Minamata victims, dressed as Buddhist pilgrims, and a thousand supporters disrupted the Chisso annual shareholders meeting in Osaka. The following year a fisherman/activist named Kawamoto Teruo led other uncertified victims and their Tokyo supporters in a high-profile sit-in in front of Chisso headquarters in Tokyo. The sit-in, in support of the victims’ demands for direct negotiations with the company president, lasted eighteen months and brought international attention to the struggle of the victims. Their efforts paid off. Although Kawamoto’s group was unable to achieve direct negotiations, through negotiations mediated by the director of the Environment Agency, they were able to extract an agreement from Chisso to pay designated victims more than was provided by the court decision in March of 1973. Moreover, Chisso accepted responsibility and expressed regret for the first time. Frustrated that the Japanese government was not addressing the victims’ plight, activists appealed directly to the world: Minamata disease victims attended an international meeting of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Stockholm in 1972 in connection with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.33 Labor unions also played an active role in this social justice issue, but they were by no means united in their position on the Minamata victims. The Chisso conglomerate was large, and its unions, like the conglomerate itself, were geographically dispersed and diverse. While for historical reasons related to a wage freeze controversy one union, the first Chisso plant union, came out in support of the victims, other unions saw the victims as a threat to the company and opposed them, in a few cases with violence.34 The relationship between the labor unions and the Minamata disease victims, who were supported by leftist students and other antigovernment activists, played out against the backdrop of the general political struggle in Japan between the Communist and Socialist Parties and more conservative supporters of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. The history of the movement was also shaped by a number of key individual actors. Harada Masazumi, a doctor on the faculty of medicine at Kumamoto University, began to treat the first patients with Minamata disease–related birth defects in the early 1960s. Disturbed by these defects, which often included cerebral infantile paralysis,35 he began speaking out publicly, an unusual step for a medical professional at that time. Similarly moved by a sense of professional duty to address social injustice, Togashi Sadao of the Kumamoto University law faculty began to offer victims free legal advice. Journalists such as Takamine Takeshi brought the stories of the victims
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to a larger public, emphasizing the perspective of fishers, the victims whose livelihoods were most closely tied to the natural world. Ui Jun, a young scientist in the 1960s, inspired by the early findings of the Kumamoto researchers, went to Minamata to help compile chemical evidence of the connection between Minamata disease, mercury poisoning in the bay, and effluent from the Chisso plant.36 Most accounts, including this brief one, of Chisso’s misdeeds in Minamata owe a debt to Ui Jun’s chronicling of the scientific and political aspects of the story. Some leading activists, a few of whom we hear from them directly below, got drawn into the case through their personal involvement with the disease. That was the case of Ogata Masato, who became a leading spokesman. Ogata, the son of a prosperous fisherman who had died of Minamata disease in 1959, became involved in activism through his efforts to gain certification in 1974, and he soon began to help uncertified victims gain certified status as chairman of the Minamata Disease Victims Certification Association. He is credited with first applying the boating phrase moyau (which refers to two boats that link up with one another at sea) to the Minamata reconciliation effort. Like Ogata, Kawamoto Teruo, whose father had also died of the disease, was drawn into activism by the injustice of the certification process. He devoted himself to making the company accountable to victims. His dramatic staging of large public victims’ demonstrations in Tokyo brought the movement headlines. Ishimure Michiko, a poet who had worked on behalf of the victims, published in 1969 a book entitled Paradise of the Bitter Sea [Kugai Jyodo],37 which raised awareness of Minamata disease throughout Japan. Though not herself a victim, as a native of Minamata, Ishimure knew well the life and philosophy of the fishing community. She organized the first victim support organization in 1968 and helped to found a second organization in 1975, the nonprofit advocacy group Soshisha, whose goal was to end the victims’ isolation.38 Other advocates settled in Minamata and joined Soshisha, which helped mobilize victims during lawsuits and foster community awareness of the disease. Its members were derided as “newcomers,” and some locals warned that they were “violent students,” but some members stayed in Minamata for ten or twenty years, eventually gaining the trust of the local residents.39 Soshisha still actively supports disease victims and is committed to “clarifying the truth and meaning of the disease” by collecting and publicizing oral histories, operating the original Minamata Disease Museum, with exhibits that document the history of Minamata fishers lives, the Chisso Corporation, and Minamata disease, and educating visitors (especially school children from all over Japan) about Minamata disease. Healing the Bay: The Environmental Story The story of Minamata disease and its impact on people, public health, and the politics of activism has long overshadowed the underlying story of ecological damage to
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the sea and its impact on the fishing industry and fishing community life. In this section we look at efforts to clean the bay and to restore it for fishing. As we have noted, the fishing community was doubly hard hit by the water contamination. Disease victims were preponderantly from fishing families, which also faced devastating commercial losses due to the pollution. Today the fishing industry and families remain, but their numbers are reduced from the days before the disease emerged, when roughly two hundred thousand people along the coast made their living from the Shiranui Sea.40 Although the Kumamoto prefectural government did not take any effective steps to regenerate the fishing industry, the national government enacted industrial pollution controls designed to prevent such massive mercury contamination of sea life from happening again. According to the Ministry of the Environment Web site, the case of Minamata disease in Japan makes it clear that activities which give priority to economic goals but lack proper attention to the environment cause irreparable damage and bring undesirable results even from an economic point of view . . . since so many measures, huge costs, and a long time period are required to repair these damages.41
One of the first tasks of the Japan Environmental Agency, formed in 1971 and later upgraded to the Ministry of the Environment,42 was to clean up Minamata Bay. The agency set a temporary safety standard to guide remediation efforts whereby any sediment exceeding 25 parts per million (ppm) of contaminant had to be dredged. Nets dividing the bay and sea were put in place in 1974 to contain contaminated fish and keep other fish out of the bay while contaminated sludge was being removed, and fishing cooperatives were recruited to help catch and isolate the contaminated fish. Local residents knew that fish were getting through anyway, either through the nets themselves or through areas in the bay that remained open for the movement of ships. The sediment-dredging project was controversial among residents. On the one hand, it would help to regenerate the economy (in addition to the promised, long-term impact of the cleanup, the project itself could provide jobs and income at a time when the Chisso Corporation was increasingly cash-strapped); on the other, it could worsen fish contamination by stirring up mercury from the sea floor. With this opposition in mind, Kumamoto prefecture, in cooperation with the university, formed a committee to determine the safety of the dredging project. An opposition group of Minamata disease victims and local citizens sought a legal injunction against the plan, but they lost in court, and from 1977 to 1989 the government dredged and reclaimed 1.5 cubic meters of the bay floor at a cost of 48.5 billion yen ($346 million in 1989 dollars) to the national and prefectural governments and to the Chisso Corporation. It was only in 1997, more than forty years after the disease first appeared, that the fish and shellfish in Minamata Bay were declared officially safe for eating.43 This was a necessary step in the economic recovery of the region, for the area’s reputation for tainted fish not only paralyzed commercial fishing, it also thwarted
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the development of many shore-related businesses, including tourism. Soon after the bay’s fish were deemed safe for eating, fishing reopened in the bay for the first time in twenty-four years. Many residents and fishers remained skeptical, however, about the safety of eating fish from the bay; at the time of this writing they had yet to resume fishing—especially for large fish—aware of the possibility of the bioaccumulation of mercury. The official government position, however, remained that the dredging project had been an unqualified success. In a speech at the 2002 Johannesburg Summit for Sustainable Development in which he explained Japan’s experience with industrial pollution at Minamata, former Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro claimed that the average concentration of mercury in the bottom sediment was 4.65 ppm, well below the minimum standard adopted by the government.44 However, a healthy skepticism of government claims continued to exist in Minamata, as evidenced by the comments from people in the community featured below. Community Reactions In this section we look at how people’s views about the community, government, and the environment have been shaped by the mercury poisoning incident and by the policy effort to heal the social and environmental wounds. We draw upon our own interviews as well as published sources. The diversity of views expressed in this section suggests that while the government has made admirable efforts at environmental cleanup and healing, there remain political and social issues that must be resolved before the community can embrace its environmental goals. Views on the Role of the Chisso Corporation Minamata residents today remain conflicted about the role of the Chisso Corporation in the environmental disaster. Some hold bitterly to the sense of injustice they and their community suffered at the hands of the powerful company. Others, while they agree that the company’s actions were disastrous, take a more nuanced view about the company’s guilt, reasoning that Chisso’s misconduct dates back to a time when most Japanese people were preoccupied with economic development and were largely ignorant of the effects of mercury pollution. Little of the conversation about Chisso relates to its treatment of the environment and the ethical implications thereof; true to the Japanese casting of the Minimata incident as one of kogai, the discourse is mainly about Chisso’s relationship to individuals and to the community. Here, former employees, disease victims, and activists reflect back upon the Chisso company’s role in Minamata disease, its behavior during the years that followed, and the company’s place today in the community. Ogata, the prominent fisher and activist, described to us the warlike atmosphere between the company and the fishing community. He recalled first hearing about Chisso at age six, upon his father’s death from the disease:
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The whole of Chisso—the president, the factory managers, and the regular workers—became the enemy, because there wasn’t any way to specify blame. Of course the opposite was also true: From Chisso’s perspective all fishermen—the fishing community—were victims, and from the company’s profit-making point of view, all victims are their enemy. . . . If this happened in the yakuza [gangster] world, taking revenge would have been easier since the two parties would only need to kill off a few, but with Chisso, you’re up against a whole organization, “the Chisso gumi” [gang], so it’s nearly impossible to identify an enemy.45
Those working for the chemical complex at the time were able to see both good and bad sides of the company. As Yamashita Kikuko, a former Chisso employee and activist, commented: I think some of my bosses were pretty good people, and they did do some good things. But these types of people were not rewarded in their careers. Only those that were good at getting on in the world advanced in their careers. Many managers left Chisso. Chisso used to have a strong group of Tokyo University graduates, but they left . . . because [Chisso] lacked human compassion.
Yamashita saw a connection between the way Chisso treated its employees inside the company and how it treated the local community. The Fuji Film factory decided in 1934 to build a water treatment facility at its plant near the famous Mount Fuji on the principle that the company should return to society water of the same quality as that which it used. When asked whether Chisso would do something similar, she replied: Chisso doesn’t think like that. . . . If they had a conscience, they wouldn’t have caused Minamata disease. . . . Even when they expanded to Korea, it is said that they went in telling managers to not think about the laborers as human beings, but as cows. That way of thinking continues to this day. . . . The founder of Chisso, Noguchi, used to emphasize the importance of “having a human heart,” but this seems to have been lost. 46
Despite this jaundiced view of Chisso’s corporate culture, which is now fairly prevalent, many people do not want the next generation to suffer from the same, bitter divide between community and company. Kamakura Takayuki, the prefectural official spearheading the government’s Moyainaoishi Campaign, remarked that Chisso employees continue to face recriminations from society. “It is sad and unfair for those young employees in Chisso who are still treated as if they were to blame for what the company did in the past,” he said. There is an ironic sense, too, that, although the company long ago lost its position as a Japanese industrial powerhouse, its continued presence in Minamata is in the best interest of the victims and serves an important function for the community. As Kamakura put it: Chisso hasn’t filed for bankruptcy because, although it doesn’t have money, Kumamoto prefecture borrowed money from a bank to lend it to Chisso so that it can pay for compensation and damages. If we destroy Chisso, thousands of certified Minamata patients and others would suffer more.
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Yet many citizens feel that the company, because it is now so embedded in the community and vital to the local economy and because it has received financial protection from the government, has managed to escape the full consequences of its actions. Ogata explained how the company came to be in such a unique position: Around fifteen years ago, Chisso’s domestic market share in liquid crystal [screens for TVs] was around 60 to 70 percent. It was impossible to say to anyone that “I don’t have any memory of being helped by Chisso,” especially when so much of what we consume, including camera film, cassette tapes, televisions, and videotapes come from Chisso. Really, their market share is impressive, and their technical skills are remarkable, even to this day. That’s one of the reasons why [the government] makes sure Chisso doesn’t go bankrupt. Now we have all become Chisso. . . . For over twenty years now, Chisso has not been able to unilaterally manage its strategic planning, facility investment decisions, and act in other ways that normal independent companies do. It has to get approval from the Kumamoto prefectural government, the Japan Environment Agency, the Ministry of Finance, and so on. Without this approval, Chisso’s hands are tied. This is because they owe money to the government, which they are not able to repay. Meanwhile debts are ballooning, while they keep borrowing. . . . It’s now getting clearer that they will take all the money from the government’s general expense account. . . . Just like “Japan, Inc.,” the idea of “All Chisso” is outrageous because just like the national debt, no one is taking responsibility.
The journalist Takamine Takeshi47 expressed concern about what he called Chisso’s doctrine of innocence (seizensetsu). I heard [the view] from Chisso’s general manager that even to this day Chisso has not done anything wrong. By this he means that Chisso expressed sympathy through monetary contracts [mimaikin] even when the causes of the disease were unknown. After they found what was causing the disease, they compensated the victims. It could not have been prevented because Chisso didn’t know. Chisso was always innocent. This view of Chisso’s innocence is prevalent in the company and may end up leading the company to repeat its actions.
Despite the history of antipathy between the company and the victims, and the persistence of anti-Chisso sentiments, particularly among the older generation, efforts to heal have sometimes included representatives from the Chisso Corporation. According to Kamakura: There was a memorial ceremony . . . under the administration of Mayor Okada. . . . Because the event was held for everybody who suffered from the Minamata disease, Chisso also got involved. Chisso wanted to be recognized as a wonderful company, despite its problematic past.48
Chisso’s community involvement may be another sign that Minamata’s bipolar dynamic of the powerless, injured fisher-victims pitted against the powerful polluter, Chisso, over financial compensation has begun to shift. Restoring the city’s social
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harmony is a long-term project, and viewing all the parties as victims as well as agents in this incident—in terms of the excesses of industry, the discrimination against those who dared to speak out, the failure to value the environment for its own sake— may be a necessary step in the healing process. Some victims of the disease, having suffered enough already, don’t choose to put more energy toward blaming Chisso. Ogata Masato’s niece Hitomi, who has congenital Minamata disease, “is getting by,” said Ogata, “although her limbs are unsteady. ‘Don’t you hate Chisso?’ I asked, ‘No,’ she answered. ‘Because I’d rather focus on how I’m going to live in the future than on what happened in the past.’”49 Many Minamatans share this wish to move on. Ogata himself, once one of the most fervent anti-Chisso activists, eventually came to feel that the substitution of monetary compensation for responsibility had become a greedy game, no more morally supportable than the company’s behavior. Ultimately, despite his role as a pioneer in the advocacy efforts on behalf of the victims, he withdrew from the victims’ lawsuit. As he explained: I could no longer bear to be a part of it. . . . The idea of assuming responsibility is an illusion. Our legal proceedings are premised on this illusion. . . . It is not the responsibility of a particular person in a particular time and place but a deeper, more abstract responsibility, borne by the human race.50
Views on Discrimination Against Victims For victims of Minamata disease memories of discrimination evoke perhaps even more bitterness than the Chisso company’s misconduct. Sugimoto Eiko, a disease victim and activist whose mother succumbed to the disease in 1958, recalled how her family was shunned by neighbors. Her father had been a local fishery boss; after her mother fell ill, his employees left, and people in the village cut the family’s nets and used their boats without permission. “My most painful memory,” she said, “is the way we were treated by others in the hamlet.”51 As we have pointed out, the diversion of tax money to Chisso to help it make its compensation payments only increased the stigma Minamata society placed on the afflicted. To this day, Minamata victims are referred to in Japanese as “patients” (kanja), reflecting a persistent cultural predilection to avoid attributing the cause to a particular perpetrator. The casting of fisher-victims as “other” was promoted by the cultural gulf between the traditional fishing people and villages, on one hand, and the middle class residents of the newly urbanizing town of Minamata, the educated employees of Chisso, and the medical and legal communities, on the other. This cultural and educational gulf was poignantly on display at the compensation trials. Kumamoto University professor Togashi provided legal support to the victims during the first Minamata trial (1969–73) and in successive lawsuits. He said of their behavior at the trial, “the disease victims laughed in a loud voice, jeered and heckled others, and so forth; it often seemed utterly like a theater to them. . . . It seems that, at times, the trial took on a kind of [religious] festival atmosphere to the victims.”52
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As Mr. Kanasashi Junpei, the leader of one of the citizens’ movements, explained, “During the Minamata trial, I had the feeling that the people were not living in a democratic modern society. They didn’t seem to grasp the idea and framework behind legal proceedings. . . . Even after the preliminary hearing, Minamata people couldn’t really comprehend this.”53 From the victims’ perspective, the coldly formal courtroom context underscored the bias against them. A journalist-turned-activist, Mishima Akio, described how Ishimure Michiko, a prominent victims’ advocate, remembers one important trial in Kumamoto City in 1973: To Michiko, the trial had the brittle artificiality of a second-rate drama: the absurdity of ordering a woman out of the courtroom when the child she was holding, a congenital victim of Minamata disease, uttered involuntary cries; the courtroom histrionics, such as the anachronistic custom of prohibiting note taking; the pompous posturing of the defendants and their lawyers. There was something about the trial that got on the patients’ nerves.54
Tsuchimoto Noriaki, a well-known filmmaker who filmed Minamata in the 1970s, described the fears underlying the early phase of discrimination against the victims: What the people in the fishing villages without information were most worried about was whether or not . . . the disease was contagious or hereditary. It was a big problem back then when people would say, “Don’t marry into a family with Minamata disease, and don’t have them marry into your family.” Moreover, those with fetal Minamata were considered to have a malignant hereditary disease, and they were discriminated against strongly.55
Discrimination associated with the disease remains an issue with which the victims must contend even today. Kamakura, the prefectural official who has led the Moyainaoshi Campaign, said he sees persistent discrimination as the fundamental challenge that Minamata faces and the stumbling block to the success of moyainaoshi: Rich locals [gossip] among themselves that the Minamata disease victims who received compensation are [doing well] because now they can just spend all their time playing pachinko. . . . I asked these people what they mean when they say such things. . . . [The victims] are permanently disabled. They play pachinko because there is no joy in living; they cannot experience happiness through work, love, mobility, etc. . . . In my view it’s because of such vulgar comments and meanness that the Minamata community remains divided and unhealed.
Kamakura’s comments point to several aspects of the discrimination. In large part, it has been and continues to be class-based. The fishing community was already considered to be part of a lower social class by townspeople engaged in other occupations, particularly employees of Chisso. The disease outbreak widened this class divide. Kamakura’s remarks also suggest that there is lingering suspicion about the victims, particularly the suspicion that many of them are really “fake victims.” Finally, the remarks suggest some degree of envy of those surviving victims who are compensated and do not work—their moderate or severe disabilities notwithstanding. These
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residual feelings continue to impede the Moyainaoshi Campaign, which is designed in part to heal rifts between the victims and others in the community. Views on the Role of the Academic, Medical, and Professional Communities The actions of the local medical and academic communities—during the early phase of the poisoning epidemic, when they were pressured by the Chisso Corporation to support its position; and later, when some hindered the disease victims’ attempts to obtain diagnoses and certification—appear to many in the city to be more self-protective than professionally responsible. The ethical implications of this behavior are still felt and discussed. Harada Masazumi, the doctor who spoke out on behalf of victims in the 1960s and who has become a renowned expert and writer on Minamata disease, told us in 2000: The medical community is in disarray. It is still running away from the issue, and for this it should be blamed. . . . Although the disease was a social issue, the medical community would only speak about it in medical terms . . . It was stupidly confined to a study of symptoms. It was disastrous. People from the medical community molded the Minamata issue like a dumpling, but the victims’ movement broke this. From a professional perspective, it seems almost insolent and improper for nonexperts to venture into a specialist’s territory. But if they hadn’t, the Minamata issue would not have been able to emerge.
By contrast, according to Togashi, the Kumamoto law school professor, the law school encourages and nurtures discussion of the Minamata disease. He reports that he is free to do research on the topic, and he explains that his own involvement in Minamata disease cases was born of the great sorrow he felt when he saw child victims of the disease. The law profession’s history of involvement on behalf of the victims during the lawsuit meant that lawyers were closely exposed to the social justice issues created by the disease. Kamakura, the prefectural official leading the Moyainaoshi Campaign, noted that the government (like the medical community) was guilty of narrow-minded and socially neglectful behavior. For him, a Moyainaoshi Campaign that engaged directly with the Minamata victims was the only solution. He argued that the problem with the way Minamata was handled is that the local government was operating only from medical and legal perspectives. . . . But the problems are social, psychological, and macroeconomic, and their solutions need to be grounded in these understandings. . . . It was irresponsible for the government to ignore the pain of the Minamata people. . . . In the beginning [those involved in developing the Moyainaoshi Campaign] were in conflict with the pollution division that dealt with the certification and registration of disease victims. . . . But I told them that they had been working for forty years and had failed to solve this problem and so now it was time for them to be quiet and watch us do our work.
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When Yoshimoto Tetsuro, a Minamata city official, learned that a number of medical, legal, and sociological investigations had been conducted by outside researchers who had never shared their results with Minamata, he was also struck by the distant and disengaged attitude of the research community. In response, in the early 1990s he began a movement, which came to be called Jimotogaku, or “Community Self-Study,” whereby Minamata residents conduct their own research on their natural surroundings as well as their local history. As he explained: We have started to make study about our mountain, rivers, and local plants and wildlife by ourselves. . . . We have learned that the name “Minamata” means “water network,” that our land of Minamata had once been rich with the charm of mountains, rivers, and seas, with the vitality of many living creatures, and that our life has been historically and ecologically maintained by the profound and beautiful whole of our environment.56
At the same time, Yoshimoto also came to see that Japanese tend to place high value on that which is from “outside,” and to import ideas about development, particularly from entities with a wide reach, like the national government and major Japanese companies. In its call to people to look within their own locales for value and meaning, his Jimotogaku movement, which has now spread throughout Japan, is a counterweight to that tendency.57 Views of the Moyainaoshi Campaign and Environmental Cleanup The planners of the Moyainaoshi Campaign came to believe that in Minamata social healing and progressive environmental policies must go hand in hand. The policy rested on the idea that a society still divided cannot cooperate on the project of restoring and protecting the environment and revitalizing the economy. As we have seen, it is difficult to forget, even decades later, the deaths and the wrongs committed by industry and facilitated by the government. At the same time, most people wished to move beyond this case of kogai and Minamata’s infamy. Local views about the campaign were mixed. Many people supported the ostensible purpose and general goals, and applauded the government. The fishing cooperatives in particular took up the rhetoric of community restoration, supporting all efforts to neutralize the social stigma against fishing since the mercury contamination. Others resented the campaign’s topdown nature or thought it was belated and somewhat superficial. Despite its top-down origins, Kamakura, the Kumamoto government official who helped to initiate and coordinate the campaign, made great efforts to take this campaign to the people. To work successfully in the campaign, he said: You have to dress and eat like [ordinary citizens]. . . . You cannot just talk in pretty academic words and pretend you know everything because this is a real human problem that the residents are facing. When people recognize [that you feel a] moral obligation [to them], residents/victims will open up and talk honestly. An eighty-year-old man may say, for example, that he knew about Minamata, but he didn’t feel able to come forth and say what he felt about it when he knew his grandchildren were working at Chisso; honesty comes out in the end when you’re acting morally.
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Kamakura was proud of his accomplishments with the Moyainaoshi Campaign and feels that it is working. “People are coming to value the protection of the environment as part of city-building,” he explained. “It is still a work-in-progress, but it seems that people are shifting from being ashamed of the Minamata disease to building a supportive neighborhood.” A typical view of the campaign was expressed by a young woman working at a volunteer moyainaoshi center, who said, “Somehow or other, the government is doing its utmost, and what we are doing now has gradually become second nature.”58 Few local residents expressed doubts about the campaign. As the sociologist Maruyama explained, “Feelings run deep for most residents, and in many cases the feelings remained buried. So on the surface, people endorse Minamata’s effort to revitalize the environment. Given how strong the rhetoric of the value of the environment is, it is impossible to voice opposition.” Our research team had difficulty interviewing people who opposed the Moyainaoshi Campaign; those citizens seemed to fear having their views publicized and facing possible further ostracism. Yet some did forthrightly express their misgivings about the campaign. One source of bad feelings that surfaced surrounds the government’s decision to go ahead with its plan to build a landfill over the most contaminated part of the floor of the bay despite local opposition. In 1977, Mishima Akio, argued that the landfill in the bay added a permanent element to the injury to the bay environment, which had once been a “treasure-trove of fish”: The sea will probably never revert to its former pristine condition. In fact, the national government, the prefectural government, and Chisso have already spent 20 billion yen [$74 million in 1977 dollars] to dredge the bay and fill it in. The voices of happy children that once echoed along its shores have long since fallen silent. An evil spirit now resides in what was once a kind and gentle sea. A national policy of prosperity at any cost has allowed a single corporation to damage the environment irreversibly. The beautiful Shiranui Sea has been sacrificed to the pursuit of profit.59
Ogata Masato described why he felt the government’s having filled in the bay should be considered a continuation, rather than a reparation, of the environmental damage in Minamata: The reclaimed land in Minamata Bay illustrates the laws of karma. It demonstrates more clearly than any other place I’ve seen the relationship between cause and effect. Looking at the original topography of this region, we see first the ocean, then the tidelands. Hills lead into the mountains. Mountain forests are the source of our fresh water, which flows back down to the seas. Land and ocean are intimately connected. Here at the reclaimed land these natural links have been severed by concrete barriers and terraces. The reclaimed land is highly symbolic. It reminds us that Minamata disease represents the destruction of natural cycles.
Others argued that the government had no choice but to fill the bay. As Professor Maruyama said, they did it “to put closure on the problem and move forward. If they still had a polluted Minamata Bay to deal with, that would not have been possible; by cleaning and making landfills, they were able to do their job better.”
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Yet some still recalled with skepticism the government’s approach to measuring the safety of the bay that underlay the dredging plans. Takamine Takeshi, the journalist who followed the case beginning in the 1970s, remembered: The 25 ppm [safety level] was arrived at based on the amount of money Chisso Corporation had available to pay for remediation measures. After the monitoring of the bottom mercury level and deciding which areas needed remediation, the Kumamoto prefecture government decided [on the] 25 ppm level, and the bottom mercury of these areas was dredged, and the sludge was dumped in the inner, most-polluted area of the bay. Finally, 58 hectares of reclaimed land was created in 1990. This 25 ppm was not scientifically decided.60
It is not surprising, perhaps, in light of widespread misgivings about past government policies regarding the environment that some people were reluctant to embrace enthusiastically a government-led campaign to get people to commune with their neighbors, reach out to disease victims, and get involved in environmental cleanup and protection. Others resisted the campaign simply because it forced people to confront a traumatic past they would like to wish away. When we surveyed Minamata citizens in 1999 to gauge their attitudes toward the Moyainaoshi Campaign,61 70 percent evaluated it as “a step in the right direction” (toward healing the city), yet almost 40 percent still felt ashamed of the city’s association with Minamata disease. In interviews they made such comments as, “I’m tired of the disease problem” and “It’s [draining] to participate in events connected with Minamata disease.” This kind of fatigue was evident even at the start of the campaign. Upon first hearing about the campaign, citizens said they would prefer to spend the government money on a “theme park” or “something enjoyable.” Takamine Takeshi confirmed the ongoing public lassitude toward the disease when he explained that although his newspaper, Kumamoto Nichinichi, continued to report on Minamata disease “widely” and “independently from the government,” “the public is not interested and it’s not a major political issue.” For advocates of the surviving victims, the government’s role was more at issue than the actual goals and activities of the campaign. Kanasashi Junpei, the citizens’ movement leader, is resentful that the government usurped control over the Moyainaoshi Campaign, pointing out that the idea, which originated with the fishervictim activist Ogata, was co-opted by Yoshimoto Tetsuro, a Minamata city official and campaign planner. Kanasashi told us: Moyainaoshi should not have been an initiative of the top; it should have come from below. . . . Now the government is proudly projecting the image that they are building an “environmental city.” But the wind that is blowing at the top is different from that of the bottom. It’s completely different!
We encountered this view again with respect to the government’s recycling initiative. Although Minamata citizens widely participated in recycling, as do people in
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many other parts of Japan, some felt their participation is not a genuine reflection of the citizens’ newfound environmental values. Yamashita Yoshihiro, husband of Kikuko, whom we heard from above, and also a former Chisso employee and labor leader, said, “I think the idea is wonderful, but it seems residents are just doing it because the government says so. It’s not a self-sustaining movement backed by residents, and it doesn’t reflect what they want.”62 He admitted that the campaign had good intentions but added that the government’s top-down approach and the lack of a grassroots mandate posed a problem for a town torn by years of anti-industry and antigovernment activism. He went on to complain about the discriminatory nature of the Moyainaoshi Campaign in practice: Prior to the establishment of the [moyainaoshi community center], the administration listened to the residents; however, once it was set up, they acted completely differently. We [victims group members and advocates] held a meeting of those who were born of mothers with Minamata disease. They [the municipal government officials] built a coffee shop, and I proposed that they make it into a place where disabled people could work. Unilaterally and without justification, they prevented the disabled people from working there. Instead, they brought in regular, healthy people to work and just made it look like disabled people were working there. Later, at a meeting, I told the officials that we had been deceived. While I think these initiatives are needed, if it’s going to be a superficial moyainaoshi, it may be better not to have one.
This last observation may be another example of how the victims and the government continue to approach the history and issues surrounding Minamata disease from different perspectives and with different values, almost as if they were speaking a different language. Hatano Hideto, an active citizen supporter and a self-employed carpenter who for more than twenty years fought on behalf of uncertified disease victims in the NiigataMinamata case, likened the underlying value differences between the disease victims and industry and government officials to “the difference between the shakkan system and the metric system.” Shakkan is the centuries old Japanese system of weights and measures, based upon the size of various parts of the human body. (For example, one shaku is the distance between the elbow and end of the hand; one hiro is the length of both hands when fully spread out.) Certain values and ideas are lost with the adoption of new, modern systems; the language of economic and technological development does not have the terms to convey traditional ideas and perceptions, nor, for that matter, do the imported languages of environmentalism and law.63 Indeed, one of the differences between the government’s and the residents’ approaches, Kanasashi explained, is that Minamata residents are trying to cope with the emotional scars of the disease, so the topic of the environment seems to them beside the point: Right now, the emotional problems people are facing have been erased from the debate, and there seems to be no way to bring them in. . . . Because they believe that Minamata disease is a problem of the heart . . . if you shift to the subject of the environment, these people will not immediately get it.
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Kanasashi went on, however, to frame the “problem of the heart” in terms of financial worries: The reason why the wind that is blowing at the top is different from that at the bottom is that the most serious issues that the citizens are facing are economic concerns. Minamatans are very anxious about the economy. The garbage separation-collection effort has been driven under the guise of protecting the environment, but in reality the initiative is built around the notion that you can create monetary value from garbage. . . . The city is telling people to “build an environmental city,” but when they mobilize residents, they are doing so by giving monetary incentives. There’s an economic logic driving this. And this will leave residents without any sense of environmental awareness.
Kanasashi added that the process needs to be driven by the people, saying, “I told one of the city’s planning officers that I don’t think it is right for the city to ask the people to make reparations for Minamata disease. It should be a new era . . . a time in which those who wish to do something can do something. If people are not given the opportunity to decide for themselves what they want [rather than being told what to do], the town will never change!” Kanasashi said he believed that meaningful change would come only when residents begin to get past the injury to humans and recognize the Minamata incident as relating more broadly to the environm