Foreword Nelson Goodman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 63, No. 11, The New Riddle of Induction. (May 26, 1966), p. 281. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819660526%2963%3A11%3C281%3AF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..
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http://www.jstor.org Fri May 18 08:41:58 2007
MAY26, 1966
VOLUME L XIII, No. 11
THE NEW RIDDLE OF INDUCTION FOREWORD The three papers following are neither the first nor the last to appear concerning my book and articles on induction, but they represent an impressive amount of work by three serious philosophers with widely differing approaches. We need no longer listen to the charge that the new riddle of induction, or the problem of projectibility, is merely sophistical-a charge cherished only by those philistines who regard a color film of a physicist working in his laboratory as the ultimate truth about science. And no one who understands the problem hopes any longer for a purely syntactical solution. Responsible discussion thus usually concerns itself with critical (as in Mr. Wallace's paper) or constructive study of my admittedly rough and tentative formulation of a solution, or (as in Mrs. Thomson's paper) with the search for a better and somehow more essential solution to supplant or supplement mine, or (as in Mr. Jeffrey's paper) with relating my work to other work on confirmation. I feel that such discussion, whether right or wrong, can help us to see more clearly and deeply into the nature of inductive inference. NELSONGOODMAN BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
GOODMAN'S QUERY *
T
H E twenty years since the appearance of Nelson Goodman's "A Query on Confirmation" have seen important developments both in Goodman's ideas and in those of the confirmation theorists to whom the Query was addressed. Confirmation theory has changed more than Goodman has, for a t least two reasons: (1) Goodman is one, while the confirmation theorists are many, *Thanks are due to The United States Air Force Office of Scientific Research for support of this work under Grant No. AF-AFOSR-529-65. 1 In this JOURNAL, 43, 14 (July 4, 1946) : 383-385.
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@ Copyright 1966 by Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
