Foreign Invaders: The Douglas Invader in Foreign Military and US Clandestine Service

FOREIGN INVADERS The Douglas Invader in foreign ~ilitary and US clandestine service

FOREIGN INVADERS The Douglas Invader in foreign military and US clandestine service

r r

J

FOREIGN INVADERS The Douglas Invader in foreign military and US clandestine service

Dan Hagedorn and Leif Hellstrom

Midland Publishing Limited

,

4

•

I

FOREIGN INVADERS

© 1994 Dan Hagedorn and Leif Hellstrom

First published in 1994 by Midland Publishing Limited 24 The Hollow, Earl Shilton Leicester, LE9 7NA England Tel: 0455 847 256 Fax: 0455 841 805 North American distribution by Specialty Press Publishers & Wholesalers 11481 Kost Dam Road North Branch, MN 55056, USA Tel: 800-895-4585 Fax: 612-583-2023 ISBN 1-85780-013-3 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photo-copied, recorded or otherwis~, without the written permission of the publishers.

J

I

Editorial layout by Midland Publishing and Stephen Thompson Associates. Printed in England by The Alden Press, Oxford

Typeset in ITC Cheltenham Book and Bramley

j I

I

Title page

Invaders of GB.I/19, I'Armee de I'Air, line the apron at Cat Bi in 1953, during the French war in Indochina. ECPA ref. A 537714

j

FOREIGN INVADERS

5

Contents Introduction and Acknowledgements Brief overview

r

r

't-

6 7

Chapter I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 IS 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

PART ONE: FOREIGN MILITARY USERS Great Britain Turkey Mexico France: Indochina France: Europe and Africa Peru Chile Colombia Saudi Arabia Cuba Brazil Dominican Republic Indonesia Guatemala Nicaragua West Germany Portugal Biafra EISalvador Honduras South Vietnam Other Potential Users

9 10 15 19 21 35 53 57 61 65 68 72 81 84 89 92 97 99 105 111 116 119 120

23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

PART TWO: US COVERT OPERATIONS Operation Haik: Indonesia 1958 Operation Pluto: The Bay of Pigs 1961 ProjectMi/l Pond: Laos 1961 Project Farm Gate: Vietnam 1961-1964 Anstalt Wigmo: The Congo 1964-1967 Operation Steel Tiger: Laos 1966-1969 Other CIA operations Private Enterprises

121 122 126 132 137 148 156 169 175

FOREIGN INVADERS IN COLOUR

177

APPENDICES Invader Warbirds Notes on Designations Douglas A-26 Invader Production List

185 189 190

Abbreviations Sources Index

192 194 197

A B C

FORE[GN [NVADERS

6

.1

Introduction and Acknowledgements Considering its long and very chequered history, the Doug[as Invader is without doubt one of the most unsung combat aircraft of all times. Its military career spanned nearly forty years and during this period the aircraft type was used by some twenty different air forces around the world - not counting a host of clandestine and para-military users - and took an active part in well over a dozen wars, armed conflicts and coups. It served not only as a bomber and attack aircraft, but also in the photo reconnaissance, night-fighter, crew trainer, courier, test-bed and target' towing roles, in addition to artillery spotting, maritime surveillance, glider towing, transport, air-sea rescue and airborne command post duties. Even in civilian life the Invader had its fair share of adventures, and in 1962 a B-26 very nearly became the first corporate bomber in aviation history. A few years later, during the war in Southeast Asia, another ostensibly civilian Invader became the first aircraft ever to use terrain-following radar on combat missions. The publications and articles dedicated to the Invader are few and far between, and the Invader has not received nearly as much attention as that accorded several decidedly less important aircraft types. The Invader is most well known for its service with the USMF in the Second World War and the USAF in the Korean War, and those particular aspects of its military career are usually the only ones given any appreciable coverage in histories published to date. This book will instead concentrate on the aircraft in foreign military service, and its use in American clandestine ventures around the world; the line between these two categories was often very fine indeed, as witnessed in for example the Congo and at the Bay of Pigs. With some air forces the Invader saw almost constant combat, sometimes participating in campaigns that made the history books and sometimes in skirmishes not even making the local newspapers. [n two cases, it was used by both sides in a conflict, and the B-26 is one of the very few aircraft ever to exchange fire with an opponent of the same type. [n other parts of the world it had a more peaceful service life. This book covers not only the battles, but also the more humdrum everyday use of the aircraft. Foreign Invaders was originally planned as

a series of articles for the Small Air Forces Observer magazine, but developed into its present shape during four years of extensive research. The authors are indebted to the great number of persons who have all contributed valuable information, illustrations or advice for this book. They include: Anthony Alaribe; Ronald L. Allaire; Jacques Amalric; David P. Arneson; Dr. H. Chr. Bachem, Prakla-Seismos; Gaston Bernal; Frank C. Bonansinga; Barry L. Bonwit; Michael J. F. Bowyer; Lee Bracken; Guido E. Buehlmann; Philip Butler; Hubert Cance; Jack N. Coleman; Kenneth Conboy; Lawrence J. COUI;J.tS; Robert V. Cross; George W. Cully; Ted Damick; John M. Davis; William R Davis; Henri Demaret; James J. Dias; Christian-Jacques Ehrengardt; Edwin H. Eckholdt; Jeffrey L. Ethel!; Norman Evans; Matias Farias; George G. Farinas; Pedro Ferreira; Peter Fletcher; Victor Flintham; Santiago F[ores; Clive Frith; Clarence Fu; James R Galluzzi; Harry Gann, Douglas; Peter-Michael Gerhardt; Laureano Gomez M.; J. M. G. Gradidge; John H. Grier; Daniel F. Grob; Gordon B. Hamilton; Charles R Harper; David E. Henry; Eldon Hunter; Jimmy A. Ifland; Enrique [barguen; R James [smail; Mario Jahn B.; Me Jansson; Jacques Jost; John Kerr; Dr. James H. Kitchens III, USAFHRC; Leo J. Kohn; Dr. Gary Kuhn; Dr. Ajun Kurter; David C. C. Lau; Duncan Laird; Prof. William M. Leary; Miles Lechtman; Fred Liu (Liu Wen Hsiao), Wings of China; Lars Lundin; Bob MacArthur; Paul M. Marschalk; W. W. Martin; Robert C. Mikesh; Janusz Morkowski, Muzeum Polskie w Rapperswilu; Howard L. Naslund; Col. Jose Francisco Nico, FAPor; Brian O'Farrell; Auguste Okpe; Merle Olmsted; Douglas D. Olson; Col. Erol Orta<;, THK; Garry R Pape; Carlos Planas; Gustavo C. Ponzoa; Leon J. Poteet; Jay Quintero; Michael Reed; Maj. Laura N. Romesburg, USAFHRC; Lawrence Ropka Jr; Marc Rostaing; James V. Sanders; Leonard M. Scruggs; Joseph L. Shannon; J. A. Shovlin, Air Historical Branch (RAF); David Smith; FlU. R A. Smith, A&AEE; Ken Smy; Jean-Pierre Sonck; Lt.Col. Sukawan and staff, TNI-AU Museum; Robert C. Sullivan; Chris Thornburg; Carlos L. Vazquez H.; [ng. Enrique Velasco; [ng. Jose Villela, Jr.; Patrick Vinot Prefontaine; Mike Walton; Nicholas J. Waters III; Peter Williams; Biilent Yilmazer and

Gisela Zumbach. Further names will be found in the photo credits. Very special thanks are due to a few individuals, without whom parts of this book would have been impossible to write: Albert Grandolini and Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Chenel, M, who provided a wealth of information on the Armee de I'Air; Eng. Mario Canongia Lopes and Colonel Manuel Bessa Rd'Azevedo, FAPor, for their assistance with the Portuguese chapter; Michael Robson, for sharing his great knowledge of the Biafran Air Force; Captain Rene Garcia, without whose help the Congo story would have been bare indeed; Ole Nikolajsen, for access to his material on Turkey; Roger Eberle, Captain Edward B. Ferrer, Gustavo Wetsch and William C. Wolfinger, for helping with various aspects of the Latin American history; and last but not least Brigadier-General Harry C. Aderholt, Colonel Roy C. Dalton, LieutenantColonel Robert L. Schultz and lieutenant-Colonel Thomas L. Wickstrom - all USAF (Retired) - who put the authors straight on the Air Commando story. The authors also would like to place on r~cord that the CIA has not provided any kind of assistance, despite innumerable Freedom of Information Act inquiries; all requests for information being either refused or still 'pending,' in some cases since more than two years.

Publishers Note

The photographs in this book have been painstakingly acquired over many years of research by the authors, from a great variety of sources. In many cases they were taken at locations and times when photography was decidedly difficult, or to put it mildly, not encouraged. Some photographs are therefore included for their historical and reference value and to ensure as complete as possible coverage though they may be less perfect than we would wish to include.

I I

FOREIGN INVADERS

7

The Douglas Invader: A Brief Overview 'Believing that the A-20 series of light bombers would not meet the latest combat requirements in Europe, the Experimental Engineering Section, Wright Field, in November 1940, gave first priority to the Douglas Aircraft Company for designing and developing a new plane. It was desired that the new plane be faster, have greater defensive armament, have greater design strength, require shorter landing and take-off distance than the A-20, and provide for crew interchangeability. Eventually, it was hoped that this model would also replace the B-25 and B-26.' The above paragraph, taken from AFLC Historical Study No.3, gives the background to the Douglas Invader in a nutshell. The design work went ahead at full speed, and in January 1941 Douglas submitted a proposal for two versions of the aircraft: a light bomber with a bomb bay (the XA-26) and a night fighter with a gun pack under the fuselage (the XA-26A). The first mock-up of the XA-26 was ready for inspection by the USAAC in late April of that year and in June a contract was placed for one prototype each. of the XA-26 and XA-26A, as well as a prototype XA-26B 'destroyer,' which was basically an XA-26 with a 75 mm gun in the nose. A first production order was placed with Douglas on 31 October 1941, covering 500 A-26s at a unit price of about $134,000, which was only $3,000 higher than the cost of the Martin B-26 Marauder. The design work and prototyping were done at Douglas' plant at EI Segundo, California, which was the former Northrop plant taken over by Douglas in the late 1930s. One of the more innovative aspects of the design was the laminar flow wing, which had so far only been tried on a few aircraft types. The XA-26 first flew on 10 July 1942, and was found to be an excellent aircraft. An additional 500 A-26s were ordered in March 1943. But difficulties in design and tooling meant that manufacturing was delayed and not until 10 September 1943 did the first production A26B leave the Douglas factory at Long Beach. By this time the night-fighter version had B-26B 44-34139 seen at the Le Bourget air show in 1953, white serving with the USAF 38th BG(L) in France. Two years tater, this aircraft was transferred to Saudi Arabia. L. Hellstrom collection

been cancelled, and efforts were concentrated on the A-26B with a 'universal' gun nose, capable of taking various combinations of 37 mm and 75 mm guns, as well as .50 calibre machine guns. In practice, only machine guns were ever used in unit service. A second production version was to be the A-26C, with a bombardier/observer nose. The rate of delivery was painfully slow at the beginning. Up to the spring of 1944, each aircraft was virtually a handmade article, due to the many changes carried out on the production line: up to thirty-five change orders a day at one point. The USAAF were less than impressed with Douglas' efforts to speed up production and on 13 March 1944, by which time only twenty aircraft had been delivered, General 'Hap' Arnold wrote in exasperation: 'I want the A-26s for use in this war and not the next war.' Despite this, a further 2,700 Invaders were" ordered in late March 1944, with A-26Bs now being built at Long Beach and 'Cs at Tulsa. At the beginning of May 1944, four very early A-26Bs departed the USA for combat trials in the Southwest Pacific with the 5th Air Force. The preliminary evaluation report that came back in late July indicated that the A-26 was unsuitable as an attack aircraft in its present configuration, mainly due to the poor visibility from the cockpit. By July 1945, the Invader would be fully accepted by the USAAF in the Pacific, but until then the focus changed to Europe, with deliveries to the 9th Air Force commencing in June 1944. A few of these aircraft were transferred to the Royal Air Force, which became the first foreign user of the Invader.

o

Due to the slow introduction into USAAF service, the Invader had only partly replaced the A-20s, B-25s and B-26 Marauders by the end of the Second World War, but enough experience had been gained by the several squadrons using the type to conclude that it was superior to the other light bombers. An additional 4,000 aircraft had been ordered in December 1944 and April 1945: these were to be A-26Ds and A-26Es, which were basically the A-26B and 'C with different engines. But with the end of the war imminent, production was halted and the last standard Invader to be completed (A-26B serial 44-34753) was delivered to the USAAF on 31 August 1945. The total number of A-26s actually built, including prototypes, was 2,529. An improved post war model, the A-26Z, was never proceeded with, and a proposed version with an extra jet engine in the fuselage only flew in prototype form, as the XA-26F. After the war, the A-26 was selected as standard equipment for the light bombardment squadrons of the new USAF, and the designation of the type was therefore changed to B-26 in 1948. The Invader also became standard equipment for the bombardment squadrons of the Air National Guard, with all other light bomber types quickly disappearing from first-line service. A number of aircraft were transferred to the US Navy as JD-ls, mainly for target-towing duties. This period also saw the Invader's introduction into service with the Turkish Air Force: the first service outside the US armed forces to use the type in squadron strength. During the Korean War the USAF made widespread use of the B-26, flying some

8

12,000 sorties between 1950 and 1953. The number of aircraft lost was very large, however, and it was clear that the Invader was no longer modern enough to fulfil the USAF's requirements on a first-line aircraft. The first half of the 1950s also saw more than a hundred B-26s employed by the French Air Force in Indochina, and this marked the beginning of the Invader's use in a more 'limited' type of war. Beginning in 1954, large numbers of Invaders were released to foreign air forces in Latin America and elsewhere, while the remaining USAF B-26 squadrons re-equipped with more modern aircraft. The last US combat unit to use Invaders in the 1950s was the 149th Squadron of the Virginia ANG, which traded its B-26Bs and 'Cs for F-84Fs in 1958. Other Invaders remained in use as hacks or target-tugs by various USAF and ANG units

FOREIGN INVADERS

until 1960, when even most of these were retired. Large numbers of ex-USAF Invaders were released onto the surplus market in the late 1950s, where many were converted into high-speed executive transports by different companies. The beginning of the 1960s might well have spelled the end of the Invader's military service with the United States, but at this point the type was resurrected for use in various clandestine projects run by the CIA and the USAF. Smaller numbers of B-26s had been involved in covert operations as far back as the 1940s, but it was really the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 that put it back in the limelight, even though the operation itself was a failure. Project Mill. Pond in Southeast Asia around the same time also contributed, and in April 1961 the B-26 was reintroduced into squadron service by the USAF. In the hands of

the USAF Air Commandos, the Invader including the improved B-26K/A-26A remained in first-line service until the end of the decade. The 1960s also saw several smaller air forces acquiring the Invader, which was still a potent weapon by third-world standards. Although the total number of aircraft involved was modest, several of them were employed in the type of 'brush-fire conflict' where even one or two obsolete bombers could make a difference. But by the 1970s the Invaders still flying in military service were becoming very tired indeed. Replacement aircraft could no longer be bought for a pittance, and maintenance costs soared. Even the smallest air forces found it hard to justify their continued use of the B-26s, and one by one the aircraft fell into disuse. The USAF was - surprisingly - one of the last to retain the Invader, with the final straggler not being struck off charge until 1974. With the retirement of the Chilean, Indonesian and Nicaraguan survivors in the last years of the 1970s, only the single Honduran B-26 remained in military service into the 1980s. Considering its unique past history, it is appropriate that this particular Invader - which still survives - should have had the honour of being the last pistonengined bomber in first-line military service anywhere in the world. Although there are still many former B-26 pilots who swear they would not hesitate to fly it into battle, the era of the Douglas Invader as a combat aircraft is ended, but it is likely to continue to fly as a 'warbird' for many years to corne.

Typical of the many TB-26s employed on second-line duties during the 1950s, 44-34401 served in Europe until being retired by the USAF in France in 1957. Note what appears to be target-towing gear under the rear fuselage. The Invader was resurrected by the French Air Force in 1959, for use in Algeria. via J. M. G. Gradidge A-26A 64-17657 of the 605th ACS, USAF, being worked on at Albrook AFB, in the Canal Zone. The bomb bay doors and lower fuselage show signs of patched bullet holes, possibly inflicted during the aircraft's deployment to Venezuela in mid 1966. The nose section of '657 is currently on display at the Booker Aircraft Museum in England. D. Hagedorn collection

A singularly important Invader, 'G-5' was the ground instructional airframe at the InterAmerican Air Forces Academy at Albrook AFB, CZ, on which hundreds of Latin American B-26 ground crewmen were trained over a period of many years. Seen here in November 1970, the aircraft (44-35232) was immaculate. D. Hagedorn

I

r

Part One

FOREIGN MILITARY USERS

With the exception of West Germany and, to a certain extent, Mexico - both of which are somewhat special cases - the B-26 users coveredin Part One of this book are (or were) all air forces in the traditional sense, Le. they form a permanent part of the national military forces of the respective countries. The USAAF, USAF and USN are not included, since they fall outside the scope of the publication, although details of a few covert USAF operations are given in Part Two. The chapters are arranged in chronological sequence, after the year of acceptance into service of the Invader into the respective'air forces. Broadly speaking, the users fall into two groups:

Those who acquired their first Invaders before 1958 (up to and including Brazil) usually did so as the result of various US aid programmes, and the number of aircraft involved was often fairly substantial. Air forces receiving B-26s after 1958 more often than not did so through less regular channels, or through civilian dealers, and normally only obtained a few aircraft. Not surprisingly, the amount of information available varies considerably from country to country, and this is reflected in the extent of the respective chapters. Although the length and level ofdetailing may differ, each chapter follows the same basic layout, with the text describing the respective country's use of the

Invader in roughly chronological order. For each country there is also a table giving - as far as possible - details of each aircraft used, with cross-references to other tables when appropriate. Every effort has been made to achieve a high level of accuracy and to avoid perpetuating old myths - and there are quite a few surrounding the Invader! - which means that in some cases 'well-known facts' of dubious origin have been left out. Despite these efforts, it is likely that some errors still remain, and the authors would be grateful for any corrections or additions submitted through the publishers.

This B-26B of GB.2/91 was one of five Invaders to see French service in both Indochina and Algeria. The markings,are typical of those used during the last years of the Algerian war, although not aU Invaders carried the coloured (probably orange) wing tips obvious in this view. ECPA ref. ALG 6/ 76 R 66

10

FOREIGN INVADERS

1

Chapter One

.

l

Great Britain Due to the negative impression created by the first Douglas Invaders dispatched to the USMF in the Southwest Pacific theatre in May 1944, the majority of the aircraft produced over the next several months were instead sent to Great Britain, for service with the US forces stationed there. The first A-26 for the 9th Air Force was 4139132, an A-26B-1O-DL departing the USA on 23 June 1944. Three A-26B-15-DLs followed on 28 June and a few additional aircraft during July and August, but it was not until September 1944 that Invaders in any larger numbers became available. One of the three A-26Bs leaving the USA on 28 June was 4139158, which arrived in Great Britain two days later. This aircraft was lent to the Royal Air Force for testing and arrived at the Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE), Boscombe Down on 11 July. Although later transferred to the RAF and struck off charge by the USMF in early August, it was not allocated an RAF serial number.

The evaluation of the Invader began on 14 'The cockpit layout is, in general, very good, July and continued until 24 August. A total of though some of the engine instruments do thirty-five hours and ten minutes flying were not come readily to eye. logged in this period. The result was a 'There are too many obstructions to the detailed report, covering a number of differ- pilot's view such as switch panels and thick ent aspects. The part of the report dealing cockpit framework, and only directly ahead with the handling trials included the follow- and to port is the view good.' ing conclusions: The highest level speed attained was 348 'The aircraft is easy and pleasant to fly and mph at 16,000 feet, which was eight miles per no undesirable characteristics exist. hour higher than the speed given in a corre'It is considered that the rudder and eleva- sponding USMF report. tors are rather heavy, resulting in badly The design of the aircraft was also studied harmonized controls. In the rolling plane the in some detail and two engineering features characteristics and manoevrability are very . ofparticular interest were found. good, though the ailerons become rather The first were the double-slot wing flaps, heavy at high spee.ds. which 'employ linkage assemblies, whereby 'The single engine characteristics are very an increased extension is obtained, and good, even at maximum load. deflectors come into place automatically 'The stick force per 'g' required to recover when the flaps are lowered, thereby making from trimmed dives with the centre of gravity the flaps more effective.' near the forward limit is very heavy (102 lb.) The second novelty was the 'quick-release and on the aftmost limit the value is still fairly engine vvrapper cowl,' which had a number high (28 lb.) This would be rapidly tiring for of spring-loaded hooks linked together by continuous low flying and evasive action. rods in the top half of the cowling. These held a similar number of locking pins on the lower half, and could be quickly disengaged by turning a single nut on each side of the engine cowling. The aircraft was found to be well laid out from the maintenance aspect, although eight minor modifications were recommended. The armament installation was only given a brief evaluation at this point. One thing commented on, however, was the periscopic sighting and hand tracking used to control the two gun barbettes, which was seen as inadequate. The armament had not yet been finally standardized, and the A&AEE centre of gravity calculations were all based on a nose armament of either one 75 mm and one 37 mm cannon, or one 37 mm cannon and two .50 calibre machine guns. The option of six .50 calibre machine guns was apparently not considered to be of interest to the RAF, although this was how the aircraft was configured during the tests. Neither was there any mention made of the optional bombardiernose. I

The very first Foreign Invader: two views of 41-39158 at Boscombe Down in the summer of 1944. Although officially transferred to the RAF, the aircraft kept its USAAF markings and serial. Crown copyright - A&AEE Bascombe Down

r

I

GREAT BRITAIN

The A&AEE evaluation was cut short and there is a mention in the report of the aircraft 'being required elsewhere urgently.' It departed from Boscombe Down for No.12 Maintenance Unit, Kirkbride in the last week ofAugust and from there immediately passed to 2 Group of the RAF, for further evaluation. This group formed part of the 2nd Tactical Air Force and was equipped with a mixture of Mosquitoes, Mitchells and Bostons. The latter type was well liked by 2 Group, but by mid 1944 it was approaching obsolescence. Since additional Mosquitoes were not readily available, Air Vice-Marshal Basil Embry - AOC 2 Group - was keen to find out whether this new Douglas product was suitable as future equipment for his squadrons, and had therefore requested the loan of the Invader. The trials were very brief, however, since 41-39158 crashed on 4 September, reportedly at Swanton Morley airfield in Norfolk. The cupola of the dorsal gun barbette suddenly came adrift at 4,000 feet and embedded itself in the fin, greatly reducing the effect of the elevators and rudder. Even though the a,ircraft became almost unmanageable, the pilot, Wing Commander Mitchell, succeeded in lining it up for landing, when suddenly he lost control and the Invader careered into some Nissen huts. Squadron Leader Wilson was killed and Flight Lieutenant Chandler was injured in the crash, which totally destroyed the aircraft. Before this, 2 Group had thought the Invader had shown promise, but the accident understandably diminished their interest in the type. On the same day, 4 September, a summary of the requirements for US aircraft during the period of January 1945 to June 1946' was ' drawn up by the Air Ministry, in preparation for a forthcoming Anglo-American conference on Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid. Although the level of American aid during 1945 was planned to be only about 75 per cent of that received in 1944, the volume of supplies for the Royal Air Force and Fleet Air Arm was expected to increase by some ten per cent, to $2.2 billion. This total included no less than 5,196 aircraft for the RAF, representing a value of about $1.4 billion. Of these aircraft, 480 were planned to be Invaders. However, it had been found that the planned size of the RAF would have to be cut back, in order to balance the national manpower budget. The document therefore went on to give the position on each of the various aircraft types involved. The comments on the Invaderwere as follows: 'These aircraft can only be used as tactical light bombers in lieu of Mosquito fighter

A revealing shot of the dorsal gun barbette of the A-26, with its cover removed. Note the blisters on the gunner's window; these were deleted on later production batches. Crown copyright - A&AEE Bascombe Down

bombers. The Air Staff prefer the latter, but the requirements . . . are expected to be much reduced from previous estimates, and we may have considerable surplus capacity for the fighter bomber version of the Mosquito ... So far as can be seen at present there is no need to press for any allocation of Invaders.' There was one other aspect taken into consideration, apart from the operational demands of the RAF. According to the LendLease terms, Britain was not allowed to export items being 'like products' to items received from America, but it was feared that this definition was to be changed to 'products oflike capacity,' as a result of strong domestic lobbying in the USA. If any Invaders were received, Britain might therefore be unable to capitalize on the considerable export market expected for the Mosquito during 1945-46. Despite these comments, it was decided by late September to ask for enough Invaders to equip four RAAF squadrons and three RNZAF squadrons during the first six months of 1945. This meant allocating 240 Invaders to Australia and 180 Invaders to New Zealand. A further 120 aircraft for each country were expected to be needed for the second half of 1945 and similar numbers for the first half of 1946. Since no further mention of these allocations has been found, it appears that the plans were short-lived. By late October, the Invaders were instead scheduled for the Mediterranean, where the light bomber squadrons were becoming increasingly dependent on. repaired aircraft.

II

No more deliveries of Baltimores, Bostons and Marauders were expected and some 150 Invaders were therefore urgently needed as replacements. On 10 November 1944, General Arnold of the USAAF formally agreed to release 140 A-26s to Britain during the first six months of 1945, with twenty to twenty-five aircraft per month to be delivered from January. No allocations were expected for the second half of 1945. These 140 aircraft were all to be A-26C bombers, and the type was given the designation Invader B.I by the Air Ministry. The serial number range KL690 to KL829 was also allocated. But during November the plans for the RAF use of the Invader were changed once again. Instead of going to the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, the Invaders were to be allocated to 2 Group, despite their previous negative experience during the evaluation. They were to replace the Bostons used by 88 Squadron of the RAF and 342 Squadron of the Free French Air Force, whose former aircraft would then presumably be sent to the Mediterranean as replacements. Since the unit establishment for a light bomber squadron was only sixteen to eighteen aircraft, one of the 2 Group Mitchell squadrons would possibly also be re-equipped with Invaders. The RAF was anxious to try out the Invader again as soon as possible, to work out the best tactics for their use on operations. On 25 November, the USAAF were therefore requested to lend two aircraft from their own

12

stocks in Britain. The USAAF were still short of A-26Cs in Europe, but by 18 December two recently received aircraft had been allocated and were to be delivered to Boscombe Down 'as soon as weather permits.' The two Invaders were not lent to the RAF as originally requested, but transferred as part of the British allotment. The RAF serials TW222 and TW224 - allocated to the aircraft on 23 December - were therefore not taken up, and instead the Invaders became known as KL690 and KL691, which were also the serials used when they were officially taken on RAF charge in early February 1945. In the event, it was not until New Year's Eve 1944 that KL690 arrived at Boscombe Down, for evaluation of the bomb and pyrotechnic installation. Instructions were initially given to postpone the trials until it had been established. whether or not the aircraft was representative of the Invaders to be delivered to the RAF, and the tests did therefore not begin until 10 February 1945. Since the aircraft was 'without any trace of an electrical circuit for the wing bomb carriers,' only the internal bomb stations could be used. Eight different types of bombs ranging from 250 to 1,000 Ibs were tried out, and dropped in both level flight and in thirty degree dives. The conclusion was that the bomb installation was acceptable for service use, subject to a few minor modifications. It was found, however, that only six 500 Ib GP bombs could be carried, which was two less than in the Boston or Mitchell. A coriference with strong 2 Group representation was held around the aircraft on 27 February, to determine what modifications were needed before the Invader could be accepted for service. Four major modifications were considered essential: - The fitting of Gee and GH radio navigation aids; - The re-positioning of the bomb switch panel from the cockpit to the bomb aimer's position; - The provisioning for two additional 500 Ib bombs; - The fitting of flame damping equipment. It was estimated that these modifications would take six months to design, test and introduce. Whether or not the requested changes were based solely on operational considerations is not quite clear. Air ViceMaJ:shal Embry of 2 Group had developed a dislike for the Invader, which he thought had too many unnecessary gadgets, and the conference may partly have been used as a way to stall the introduction of the type into service. A&AEE later also carried out a quick evaluation of the two remotely controlled gun barbettes, but once again the tests had to be cut short. One of the few things established was that the ammunition tended to jam in the ammunition ducts for the lower barbettes.

FOREIGN INVADERS

These armament tests were terminated on 11 appears the former British aircraft took up the March and two days later KL690 departed for first part of the sequence. Most of the sur12 MU. From there it was supposed to go to 2 vivors were 'stricken' (US Navy terminology) Group for continued trials, but it is uncertain in 1960-1961, but a few survived to be redesigwhether these ever took place. nated UB-26J in mid 1962. The second Invader, KL691, apparently KL690 and KL691 made brief appearances went more or less directly from the USAAF at Boscombe Down during the summer and depot to the firm of Cunliffe-Owen for 'trial autumn of 1945, but were then put into storinstallations' of some unspecified type. The age with 12 MU. In June 1946 it was decided to company had likely been appointed 'sister return the two aircraft to the USA and after firm' to Douglas by the Ministry of Aircraft being crated by 47 MU they departed Britain Production, with responsibility for any main- by SS Manchester Division on 11 February tenance and modification work needed on 1947. They almost certainly became JD-ls the Invader in RAF service. The aircraft numbers 80621 and 80622, described as 'misremained with them until after the end of the cellaneous incorporations' by the US Navy in war in Europe, but arrived at Bascombe June 1947. The two Invaders were allocated Down for armament demonstrations on 19 to the aircraft pool at Naval Air Station Norfolk July 1945. but probably saw little or no service before Meanwhile, the first of the Invaders manu- being stricken in 1949 and 1948, respectively. Although not directly related to the RAF use factured for the British order had been delivered from the Douglas plant on 19 of the Invader, there is one other aspect of the February. Several more aircraft became A-26 history that it is fitting to mention here. In ready in March. They were all held at Tulsa, early December 1944, it was decided to try out pending modification according to British the top secret British Highball bouncing specifications. bomb installation in a USAAF Invader. The But by early April 1945 the RAF was having . basiC idea behind Highball was to use spherisecond thoughts about the whole Invader cal mines, made to back-spin at up to 1,000 programme as explained in a report to the rpm before being released over water from Assistant Chief ofAir Staff: low altitude. The rotation made the mine 'I suggest that in view of the changed war bounce along the surface of the water for situation, the air supremacy which we now some considerable distance, which theoretienjoy, and the imminent collapse of cally made it a very useful anti-ship weapon. Germany, there would be no objection to The Highball system was originally designed retaining the Mitchell and Boston in service, for use with the de Havilland Mosquito and triuntil the end of the war if there are sufficient als had been going on with 618 Squadron stocks available. I also suggest that it would since April 1943, with the intention of using be unwise to introduce a new type at this the weapon against the German battleship stage ... I therefore recommend that if our Tirpitz. But in the event, the weapon was stocks of Mitchells and Bostons are sufficient, never used on any operation. The concept we should seek release from our commit- was similar to that used by the Lancasters of ment to the Invader aircraft.' 617 Squadron, which used a heavier installaOn 7 April it was decided that only twelve tion code-named Upkeep. Invaders were required and that the type No details of the Highball installation in the would not replace the Boston or the Mitchell. Invader are available at present, but since the Of the two squadrons previously intended to work was completed in a few weeks it seems receive the Invader, 88 Squadron had dis- likely that it was similar to the one in the banded the day before, and 342 Squadron Mosquito. If so, it would have consisted of two was in the process of re-equipping from mines carried in tandem in the bomb bay, Bostons to MitchelllIls, still being received in with the bottom half of the mines protruding modest numbers from the USA. Shortlyafter- below the aircraft. Vickers-Armstrong was wards, the Invader requirement was reduced the company which had done the Highball to just two aircraft - those already at hand - work on the Mosquito, and on 4 January 1945 for use by the Controller of Research and the unidentified USAAF A-26 used in the preDevelopment. liminary trials was present at their Wisley By the time word of the cancellation airfield. Afew days later the aircraft flew to the reached Douglas, thirty-three Invader B.Is USAAF base at Bovingdon, where the actual had already been completed (not counting installation was carried out. KL690-KL69I), the last two of these having The Invader was test flown at Bovingdon been delivered on 13 April. A few weeks later around 7 February and then returned to they were flown to Sacramento for storage, Wisley, where the modification kit was until being handed over to the US Navy during removed, to be airfreighted to Wright Field in August-September 1945. The USN designated the USA. Meanwhile, twenty-five inert mines the Invader JD-1 and used it for target towing had been shipped to Wright Field. The most and general utility duties. In addition, 53 stringent security measures were taken along USAAF A-26Cs were transferred around the the route, on the insistence of Marshal of the same time and the two groups were given the RAF Sir Charles Portal, the Chief of Air Staff. In USN Bu numbers 77139 to 77224, although it the USA, the kit was installed in an equally

.1

~ I

I-

i

'-

f

[

GREAT BRITAIN

13

Two nice publicity shots of the first Invader purpose-built for the RAF. Like the rest of the British batch, it was diverted to the US Navy. The small number on the nose is the DouglasTulsa fuselage number. Douglas ref A37-4-1 &-2

unidentifiedA-26C, which was then used for test flights at Eglin Field, Florida. Although no test reports have as yet surfaced, a letter of 16 May 1945 to the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington mentioned that the US tests had shown results comparable to those attained by the Mosquito. An average range of 4,850 feet had been achieved in calm weather, and 3,800 feet in rough conditions with waves of between four and ten feet. Release altitudes ranged from fifteen to thirty-five feet, and at speeds between 360 and 400 mph. The Invader had been found to be suitable for use with this type of weapon, even though the tests had ended in a fatal crash, after a mine had bounced into the tail of the A-26. The USMF decided, however, that they did not have any requirement for Highball at the present time, although they planned to 'keep it in mind.' Plans to use the weapon in B-25s, B-26 Marauders and Avengers were also shelved. The main reason for this was that there were strong fears of the Japanese copying the idea, and by 1945 there were few Japanese targets but plenty of Allied ships for Japan to use the weapon against. For the same reason, 618 Squadron - which by then was based in Australia - was disbanded in the summer of 1945.

ROYAL AIR FORCE

'-

RAF Serial

Version

Previous identities

(none)

A-26B

41-39158

TOC

SOC

12 Jul44

II Oct 44

Remarks

Tested at A&AEE Jul to Aug 44. Destroyed in an accident on 4 Sep 44 during evaluation by 2 Group RAF. KL690 A-26C 43-22479, TW224 3 Feb 45 8 Feb 47 Used for armament and handling trials at A&AEE Jan to Mar 45. To USN as JD-I BuNo 806217 in Jun 47. KL691 A-26C 43-22482, TW222 3 Feb 45 8 Feb 47 Initially to Cunliffe-Owen. Jul to Sep 45 with A&AEE for armament demonstration. To USN as JD-l BuNo 806227 in Jun 47. KL692 A-26C 43-22604 (not taken up) Not delivered, although SOC USAAF 14 May 45 with the comment 'to Brit.' To USN as JD-I in Sep 45. TW222 A-26C 43-22482 (not taken up) Serial allocated in Dec 44 but never used. See KL691. TW224 A-26C 43-22479 (not taken up) Serial allocated in Dec 44 but never used. See KL690. The USAAF serials of the other A-26C Invaders built for Britain were: 44-35283, -35284, -35290, -35291, -35297, -35298, -35304, -35305, -353 11, -35312, -35318, -35319, -35325, -35326, -35332, -35333, -35374, -35398, -35414, -35422, -35438, -35446, -35454, -35462, -35470, -35478, -35486, -35494, -35502, -35510, -35511 and 44-35518. Their RAF serials were in the bottom end of the KL693 to KL829 range, but not necessarily in consecutive order. They were all diverted to the US Navy as JD-I s.

14

FOREIGN INVADERS

A former British Invader, still in RAF markings, comes in for a landing at Mines Field, Los Angeles, on 20 May 1946. The USN Bu number 77154 is visible on the fin. W. T. Larkins KL690 was one of the two A-26Cs evaluated by the RAF in 1945. These, too, kept their US markings - at least initially - but had an RAF serial added. Both Crown copyright - A&AEE Bascombe Down The instrument panel ofA-26B-41-39158. Crown copyrightA&AEE Bascombe Down

FOREIGN INVADERS

15

Chapter Two

Turkey The Turkish army has the dubious distinction of being the first military force in the world to be subjected to aircraft bombardment, during the war with Italy in 1911. The Turks did not have any military aircraft at this point, but in 1912-13 a small army aviation section took part in the Balkan Wars. Bombs were dropped by Turkish aircraft on several occasions during the Balkan Wars and during the First World War, but it was not until May 1921 that the first dedicated bomber aircraft arrived, in the shape of ten Breguet 14s. These were later replaced by Breguet 19s, which formed the main equipment of the bomber units up to the mid 1930s. As the threat of war in Europe grew stronger in the second half of the 1930s, the Turkish air units were re-equipped with more modem aircraft, purchased from several different countries. At the same time, Britain also took over most of the advisory functions previously fulfilled by France. For the first years of the Second World War, the bomber force consisted of a motley mix of Bristol Blenheim Is, Fairey Battles, Heinkel He IIIFs, Martin 139Ws and Vultee V-lIs. From 1944, these were supplemented by Martin· Baltimores and a few interned B-24 Liberators. A major organizational change took place on 31 January 1944, when the Turk Hava Kuwetleri (Turkish Air Forces) was formed as a separate Army command. It would take several years, however, before the Turkish General Staff - described in a British Air Attache report as a 'most reactionary organization' - would get used to the idea of an independent air force. The THK therefore in effect continued to be treated much as any other branch of the army. The old, army-style organization was also kept for the time being, and this was reflected by the designations Alayi (Regiment) and B6lUgu (Company) used in the unit names. The THK had well over a hundred bombers in service at the end of the war, but many of them were obsolescent, and the use of several different types of aircraft put a severe burden on the maintenance organization. A

Awell-known view of THK Invader 7441. The aircraft carries no unit designator or badge, probably indicating that it was photographed soon after its arrival in Turkey. via A. Kurter

total of 132 Mosquito FB.Vls were therefore ordered from Britain, to equip three bomber regiments of thirty-six aircraft each. A fourth bomber regiment was to continue to operate with Baltimores, while all other bomber types were to be phased out. Delivery of the Mosquitoes began in January 1947, but political events in the area had by then already necessitated a change of plans. During 1946, Turkey had come under increasing diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union to give the latter at least partial control over the Bosphorus and the Dardenelles straits, which could easily be blocked to deny the Soviet Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean. There were also suggestions that the area around Kars and Ardahan in northeastem Turkey ought to be part of the Soviet Union. Since Britain was unable to give sufficient help to counter these new threats, the Turkish government turned to the United States in early 1947, with a request for military aid. At the same time, the worsening situation in Greece was also becoming a matter of concern for the US government. These two cases of communist expansion plans were the triggers of the special message delivered to the US Congress by . President Truman on 12 March 1947. In brief, the aim of the Truman Doctrine was to provide assistance to any country threatened by communist take-over or infiltration, and as a result the Congress allocated $400 million in aid to Turkey and Greece on 22 May of that year. Of this amount, $1 00 million was a security loan for an initial one-year programme to modernize the Turkish armed forces.

Even before the aid programme had been formally approved by President Truman, a survey group had been dispatched to Turkey to determine what assistance was needed. A comprehensive report was issued on 15 July, recommending that $26,750,000 was to be used for the strengthening of the THK, including an estimated $4,894,000 for the supply of the following aircraft: 180 30 16 66 8 100 127

P-51 Mustangs A-26lnvaders P-61 BlackWidows C-47 Skytrains OA-I0 Catalinas AT-6Texans AT-II Kansans

There were some doubts whether there would be sufficient spare parts available for the Mustangs, and before long the P-47D Thunderbolt was seen as a more suitable candidate for supply to Turkey. A proposed THK Order of Battle from the autumn of 1947 listed a total of six fighter regiments equipped with a mix of Spitfires and US fighters, three bomber regiments with Mosquitoes, and a composite group with Invaders and Black Widows. The P-61s were intended for a planned night fighter company, but before the end of the year they had been dropped from the supply list, together with the OA-l Os. It was decided that the P-47s, A-26s and C47s were to be taken from stocks in Europe and flown to Turkey, while the trainers were to be shipped from the USA. The figure of thirty A-26s had also been broken down into fifteen each A-26Bs and A-26Cs. In late 1947 a

16

corresponding number of aircraft were selected from those held at Oberpfaffenhofen and Filrstenfeldbruck outside Munich in southern Germany and allocated to project TUR-3. Some had seen service during the war, but many had arrived too late and had gone directly into storage. USAF Headquarters in Washington ordered that the Invaders were to be given a thorough reconditioning before delivery, and also specified certain modifications, such as the installation of new-style canopies in all aircraft and the fitting of wing guns. These demands were complied with, but USAFE were unable to convert four of the Invaders to dual-control TA-26s as requested, due to lack of materiel. Five of the Invaders were fitted with target-towing winches, however, and these aircraft probably had their ventral gun barbettes removed. The other A-26s were all delivered with both barbettes still in place. The first group of six A-26Bs and six A-26Cs was ferriedto Turkey under the command of USAF Major Garnet B. Palmer, and reached Ankara on 16 March 1948. A second group of fifteen Invaders arrived on 26 March. The delivery dates of the final three aircraft of this first delivery batch are not known, but they almost certainly followed shortly afterwards. The first THK units to be equipped with the

FOREIGN INVADERS

The underwing racks clearly visible in this shot of aircraft 7405 were fitted to many Turkish B-26s, but it is not known what type of payload they carried. Probably belonging to 2. Hava Ussii, this Invader carries not only the skull and crossbones of 121. Filo, but also the eagle badge of 223. Filo. The propeller hub bosses and cowling fronts are painted red. THK History Branch via B. Yilmazer

B-26B 7403 of 121. Filo, snapped during a display at lzmir on 1 October 1951. At this time the type was still the most modern in the THK inventory, but a year later it had been replaced in first-line service by F-84Gs. via O. Nikolajsen

Invader were the 1. and 2. Bolilgil (Companies) of the B-26 Taburu' (Battalion): an independent formation set up at the Etirnesgut air base outside Ankara, primarily as an operational conversion unit. The first operational unit to receive the Invader, by now officially redesignated the B-26, was the 1O. Ke~if Alayi (Reconnaissance Regiment), formed at Afyon on 23 August 1948. This unit reported directly to THK 'The name was apparently 8-26 Tabruru from the very start, even though the Invader was still officially known as the A-26 at this point.

Headquarters. They probably took over most, if not all of the B-26Cs delivered to date. The regiment also operated two companies of Beaufighter TF'xs for Navy and Army cooperation, as well as a few Spitfire PR.XIXs. It is questionable how effective the Invaders were in the reconnaissance role, since there are no indications that the aircraft were ever converted to RB-26s. However, the THK did receive shipments of aerial photographic equipment from the USA in 1948-49 and it is therefore possible that a number of Invaders got some kind of makeshift camera installation, but their main task was probably long-range 'eyeball' reconnaissance and patrolling. In addition, the regiment had a small survey company, using two specially equipped C-45s, a couple of Airspeed Oxfords and a few B-26Cs. A second and final batch of fifteen Invaders was delivered to the THK in the summer of 1949. Only two B-26Cs were included in this batch, probably as replacements for aircraft lost by the THK during 1948. The Invaders were delivered under project TUR-24D and, .as b~fore, had been drawn from stocks in Germany. During 1949, the B-26 Taburu was disbanded and some of its duties taken over by the Bombardimen ve Ati~ Okulu (Bombing and Gunnery School) at Eski~ehir,which consequently also received some B-26s. The remaining aircraft of the B-26 Taburu, as well as the newly delivered Invaders, were used to re-equip the 1. and 2. Bolilgil of the 2. Tayyare Alayi (Aircraft Regiment) at Diyarbakir, about 100 km north of the Syrian border. These companies, which formed the 1. Taburu, had previously been equipped with Baltimores which were now retired, while the 2. Taburu was using Mosquitoes. The B-26s at Diyarbakir primarily served as bomber aircraft, but by 1950 six of them were listed as being reserved for use by THK Headquarters in some unspecified capacity, possibly target towing. The following year, 10. Ke~if Alayi was disbanded, and on 10 May 1950 most of its 8-26s were taken over by the Irtibat Nakliye U<;us Grubo (Independent Air Transport Group) at Eski~ehirin northwestern Turkey, where they formed the 2. Bolilgil and continued to be used for reconnaissance and survey duties. But this was by no means the last organizational change the Invaders were subjected to. The American efforts to do away with the old army-style organization of the THK finally succeeded, and in 1951 the unit structure was completely changed, to conform more closely with USAF practice. The regiments became known as air bases (corresponding toa USAF group), the battalion level was done away with, and the four companies were reformed into three squadrons. Most of the air bases were in turn subordinated to either the 1. or the 3. Hava Kuweti (Air Force) oftheTHK.

!

TURKEY

Under the new system, the 2. B61ilgti of Irtibat Nakliye U~us Grubo became 223. Filo (Squadron) of 12. Hava Ulastirma Ossti (Air Communications Base) on 27 April 1951 , and at the same time moved to Etimesgut outside Ankara. This base was under the direct command ofTHK Headquarters. At first, the B-26s were still used for reconnaissance missions, but they soon tended to be used more and more for second-line duties, such as target towing. The B-26s of 2. Alayi at Diyarbakir now formed 121. Filo of 2. Hava Ossil (Air Base) of 3. Hava Kuweti, and continued to be used as bombers for a period. The aircraft were still flown extensively, and the total number of flying hours clocked by the THK Invaders during the second quarter of 1951 was 928. The THK use of the B-26 as a first-line aircraft had so far been somewhat half-hearted, and the Invaders had never become more than just a complement to the Mosquitoes already in service. But even this was soon to come to an abrupt halt. The THK had received its first jet aircraft, two T-33s, in December 1951, and a number of Turkish pilots had been sent to the USA and to USAF bases in Germany for jet training. The decision to convert to an all-jet air force had already been taken by the time Turkey became a member of NATO in February 1952, at which point the British Air Attache described the THK as a 'mediocre force equipped with a mixture of obsolescent aircraft.' He went on to say that, 'it is doubtful whether it could give any appreciable sup-

The only known photo of a THK 8-26C, showing number 7420 of 223. Filo, circa 1953. This unit used the Invader as a target-tug and all armament has been removed, although the barbettes are still in place. THK History Branch via B. Yilmazer

port in a land battle, or indeed whether it would survive longer than did the Polish Air Force in 1939.' The new plans called for twelve squadrons of jets to be operational by the end of 1954, and an all-out effort to implement this commenced immediately. In March 1952 an initial eight F-84Gs arrived: the first of 479 Thunderjets to pour into Turkey up to 1958. Within a few months, piston-engined bombers had become a thing of the past, and on II July 1952 the 2. Hava Ossti at Diyarbakir disbanded to make room for the jets. The 121. Filo had around nineteen B-26s on strength at this time, and these were transferred to the 1. Hava Ossti at Eski~ehir, apparently being attached to the Mosquito-equipped III. Filo. But this was only a temporary solution, and when I, Hava Ossti converted to jets in early 1953 the Invaders were handed over to the bombing school. The B-26s of the THK were now employed solely on second-line duties by the two units still operating them. The original Bombardimen ve Ati~ Okulu had been reformed into the Hava Alet Atis ve Bombardimen Okulu (Air Instrument, Gunnery and Bombing School) on 3 January 1953, and it mainly used the Invaders for target towing. The new school was initially based at Eski~ehir, but moved to Adana on the south coast in 1954. The second unit was 223. Filo at Etimesgut, which by now also employed the B-26 primarily as a target tug. At this point, the THK began phasing out the Invaders from service. At least thirteen aircraft had been lost in accidents up to the end of 1952, and a further four were struck off charge on 28 February 1953. Others were placed in short-term storage, as reserve air-. craft, and from the summer of 1953 only between eleven and sixteen B-26s were reported 'active' at anyone time. Once the introduction of the F-84G was completed, USAF back-up for the B-26 was discontinued and from the last quarter of 1954 they ceased

17

to be listed as MDAP-supported aircraft. It appears that a further dozen or so B-26s were struck off charge at around the same time. By this date the US aid to Turkey had totalled some $1.3 billion, and the THK was a far cry from the organization it had been in 1947. Not surprisingly, there was also a sharp decrease in the number of hours flown by the Invaders, and they only clocked 592 hours during the last six months of 1954. The final chapter of the Invader's unremarkable service with the Turkish Air Forces began in 1957, when all remaining aircraft were transferred to the Harita ve Man~ Kitaati (Aerial Survey and Target Towing Detachment) of the Havel Harp Okulu (Air War Academy) at Ye~i1k6y outside Istanbul. Here they remained for about a year, until the fifteen last B-26s of the THK were finally withdrawn from use on 20 August 1958, their duties taken over by C-47s. There was little or no interest in aircraft preservation in Turkey at this time and, like those withdrawn a few years previously, the last fnvaders were all scrapped. The THK had no particular policy on aircraft camouflage during the 1940s and 1950s, aM tended to accept whatever paint scheme was used by the country delivering the aircraft. The B-26s therefore kept their natural metal finish, with anti-glare panels in black or Olive Drab. The engine cowlings were also often partly or wholly painted in black. Blue was to become the traditional colour of aircraft belonging to 3. Hava Kuweti, and it is therefore possible that the Invaders of 121. Filo had blue trim. The III. Filo, on the other hand, belonged to 1. Hava Kuweti, which often used red trim, but this colour had previously been used by other units on the cowling fronts and propeller hubs of their B-26s. Other colours were apparently also in use. ATurkish flag was applied to the fin and the national insignia usually appeared in six positions, although in some cases the markings under the wings were obscured by weapons racks.

FOREIGN INVADERS

18

The last two digits of the aircraft's THK serial number were applied to the rear fuselage in black paint, usually prefixed by a two or three letter abbreviation of the unit's callsign. Unfortunately, not much is known about these, and only the following unit designators used on B-26s have been identified: C;:BK = C;:ubuk (the name of a dam north of Ankara): used by 223. Filo, who may have inherited it from its predecessors.

OK = Okulu (School): used by aircraft of the bombing school as well as some other trainingunits. Unit badges were sometimes also worn on the aircraft. These included the skull and crossbones of 121. Filo, and the eagle thought to originate with 223. Filo. But from photos it is evident that the insignia often did not match up with the unit designator on the aircraft, so it is likely that neither was necessarily changed when the aircraft moved between units.

CL = Ceylan (Gazelle): used by 2. Tayyare Alayi and later on probably also by 2. Hava Ussii (including 121. Filo). TURK HAVA KUWETLERI (Turkish Air Forces) THK Serial

Version

Previous identity

Delivered

SOC

7401 7402 7403 7404 7405 7406 7407 7408 7409 7410 7411 7412 7413 7414 7415 7416 7417 7418 7419 7420 7421 7422 7423 7424 7425 7426 7427 7428 7429 7430 7431 7432 7433 7434 7435 7436 7437 7438 7439 7440 7441 7442 7443 7444 7445

B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26B B-26B

43-22611 43-22627 44-34418 44-344.30 44-34443 44-34472 43-22623 43-22663 43-22289 43-22637 43-22683 44-34421 44-34436 44-34444 44-35321 43-22667 44-34452 43-22285 44-35684 44-35313 44-35683 43-22624 43-22651 44-34453 44-34426 43-22291 44-35268 44-34398 43-22664 44-34425 44-34395 44-34414 44-34460 44-34461 44-34466 44-34468 43-22643 44-34447 41-39584 44-34485 44-34433 43-22284 43-22659 44-34469 44-34445

16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 .16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 16 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 26 Mar 48 9 Mar 48 9 Mar 48 18 Jul 48 17 Aug 49 17 Aug 49 21 Ju149 21 Jul49 20 Ju149 21 Jul49 21 Jul49 20 Jul 49 17 Aug 49 21 Jul 48 21 Jul49 17 Aug 49 17 Aug 49 22 Ju149 17 Aug 49

1 Sep 48 54? 20 Aug 58 26 Nov 48 54? 4 Mar 50 1 Sep 49 20 Aug 58 20 Aug 58 15 Nov 48 4 Mar 50 20 Aug 58 54? 4 Mar 50 25 Ju148 20 Aug 58 20 Aug 58 23 Jan 57 20 Aug 58 54? 26 Sep 51 54? 20 Aug 58 13 Jul 51 8 Sep 50 20 Aug 58 54? 8 Sep 50 20 Aug 58 54? 20 Aug 58 54? 54? 20 Aug 58 20 Aug 58 54? 54? 20 Aug 58 20 Aug 58 18Jan51 54? 28 Feb 53 28 Feb 53 28 Feb 53 28 Feb 53

Remarks Wfu? CL.03; Wfu CL-05; Wfu?

Wfu Wfu

Wfu Wfu?

Wfu Wfu Wfu <;BK-20; Wfu Wfu? Wfu

Wfu Wfu? Wfu Wfu? Wfu CL.32; Wfu? Wfu? Wfu Wfu Wfu? Wfu? Wfu Wfu Wfu? Wfu? Wfu? Wfu? Wfu?

Note: 'Delivered' date for 7401 to 7427 is the date the aircraft arrived in Turkey, while from 7428 onwards it is the SOC date given in the USAF aircraft record cards.

FOREIGN INVADERS

19

Chapter Three

Mexico Mexico's air force benefited tremendously from the US Lend-Lease programme of the Second World War era, and it can be fairly said that the nations' air force came of age during the period, gaining substantial numbers of modern, efficient aircraft, as well as training and organizational guidance from a small but active US mission and operational experience in the world arena. Curiously, one of the less obvious but most immediate effects of the large influx of modern aircraft into the hands of the Fuerza Aerea Mexicana (FAM) between 1942 and 19,45, was a rather embarrassing over-abundance of aircraft and lack of sufficient trained crews to not only man them, but maintain them in anything more than open storage. Among the aircraft received by Mexico were two Beech AT-7 crew trainers and four Lockheed C-60A Lodestar transports, received in 1942 and 1943 respectively. The Munitions Assignment Board in the USA had been notably reluctant to allocate these much sought after types, citing crying needs in other Allied war theatres - but finally bowed to the considerable political issues involved, and the aircraft were delivered'. These deliveries almost immediately precipitated a controversy when, in April 1943, various Mexican government ministers commenced issuing requisitions for examples of the aircraft for use as personal, 'VlP' transports - all in the name of 'supporting the war

effort.' By the end of 1943, General Maximino At the same time, it was becoming fashionAvila Camacho, brother of the president, who able for corporate and government was Secretary of the Ministry of executives to acquire and operate expenCommunications and Public Works, had sively refurbished and plushly appointed snatched one of the C-60s and one of the two former wartime fast aircraft, a considerable AT-7s, while another AT-7 was detailed for business having been generated for such duruse by the Secretary of the Navy and a C-60 for ing the late 1940s and early 1950s. the Presidential General Staff, all over the Thus it transpired that the President of strenuous but futile objections of General Mexico, through his agent and personal pilot Salinas, CO of the FAM. Major Jose Vasquez, arranged to purchase, This practice, although certainly not following modification to three-passenger unique to Mexico, started a custom which VIP configuration, a single Douglas B-26 from continues in Mexico to this day - in fact, the Westland & Son, Inc., of Los Angeles, aircraft operated on behalf of the President California, in September 1949. and his staff under the acronym UTAPEF is At this juncture, the aircraft operated for the almost certainly the largest dedicated execu- President of Mexico did not carry FAM tive VIP transport fleet for a national leader in insignia but were, rather, entered onto the the world. Mexican civil register in either the 'XC-' (govOddly enough, it was this very fact which, ernmental) or 'XB-' (private) civil registry at an early stage, witnessed the entry of the series. Presidential aircraft, probably for very first Douglas B-26s into the inventory of security reasons, were also seldom regisany Latin American air force - predating the tered in the name of the executive or his next deliveries by no less than five years, although the aircraft in question were somewhat less than they would appear, as will be In civil colour scheme and registration, VIPseen. After the Second World War, the FAM configured XB-PEK (usually given in error as XB-PEX) is very much Fuerza Aerea Mexicana entered into a period of relative inactivity and . (FAM) property at this point. Note the FAM gentle decay, and gradually the wartime 'bor- Vampires and C-45 in the background in this rowed' AT-7s and C-60s were returned to the Mexico City military cantonment area view on FAM fold, where they eventually served out 28 December 1963, and the name Sierra their lives, for the most part being replaced by Hermosa (possibly followed by a Roman numeral I or I I) on the nose. Dr G, Kuhn more comfortable DC-3 conversions.

FOREIGN INVADERS

20

office, and over the years the registered 'owners' of such aircraft have been variously officially listed as the Procuradoria General de la Republica, the Banco de Mexico and simply Gobiemo de Mexico. The Invader's initial registration remains unknown, although by the late 1950s it was carrying a quasi-civil executive colour scheme and the civil registration XB-PEK and was named, on the nose, Sierra Hermosa. The registration on this aircraft has frequently been reported in error as XB-PEX, which was aMartin B-26C Marauder. The aircraft was kept and maintained by FAM personnel, alongside C-47, DC-6 and DC7 aircraft, as well as other transport types, at Mexico City, and was seen still as XB-PEK missing parts at that location circa December 1960. Meanwhile, in keeping with a rather curious custom almost unique to Mexico, a rich industrialist named Jorge Pasquel acquired three executive-configured Douglas B-26s (as well as a Convair PBY Catalina) and arranged with the Mexican Presidency to

operate and maintain these aircraft within the overall umbrella of the Mexican executive fleet. Named EI Fantasma, Ellndio and Jarocho, these aircraft carried quasi FAM markings (and, it is believed, serials ZOOI, 2002 and Z003, respectively) and were painted with distinctive yellow, red and blue colour schemes respectively. While strictly speaking not 100% FAM aircraft, they were available to the Mexican leadership and senior military as needed - when Senor PasqueI wasn't using them. At least two of these were later sold to France. In December 1962, the original, legitimate Presidential B-26 Invader was replaced as executive aircraft by a specially modified Martin B-26C which later crashed in November 1965, being registered XB-PEX, causing no little historical confusion with the earlier Douglas B-26 XB-PEK. By 1962, the Invader had passed into full FAM markings as the Commander's aircraft, serial FAM 1300. FAM 1300, so far as can be authenticated, ,was the sole Wholly owned Mexican governmental or military A-26 and, contrary to other

published accounts, absolutely no confirmation can be made for the existence of B-26Bs FAM 1301 or 1302, the latter alleged to have become XB-SIJ (which is in fact given as Manufacturers Serial Number 1302!). However, the possibility that these serials may have been carried on the Pasquel B-26s cannot be discounted at this writing. The first Latin American Invader - and the sole Mexican military example - FAM 1300, was last seen operational at Mexico City circa October 1971, but was reported derelict and in poor condition there by November 1975, when it was last seen. The aircraft was seldom operated, according to retired FAM personnel, as there were serious concerns over the safety of the dignitaries in the rear cabin in the event of an emergency. It has been reported that the aircraft was in fact being held in open storage for display at the Museo de Talleres de la Fuerza Aerea Mexicana, but no information about the fate of the aircraft has been forthcoming.

FUERZA AEREA MEXICANA (Mexican Air Force) FAM Serial

Version

Previous identities

1300 ZOOI Z002 Z003

8-268 8-268 8-268 8-268

?, N65121, X8-PEK ? ? ?

Used from

Used until

Sep 49 c.53 c.53 c.53

Apr 53 Apr 53

?

?

Remarks Derelict by 1975. Named EI Fantasma. To French CEV. Named Ellndio. To French CEV. Named Jarocho. Fate unknown.

Probable USAF serials for FAM 1300, and possibly also the others, include: 44-34764, -34771, -34772 and -35951. These are the only ones of the Invaders going to surplus in 1946 for which no US civil registration numbers are known.

FOREIGN INVADERS

21

Chapter Four

France: Indochina With over 200 aircraft in service at one time or another, France is by far the largest user of the Douglas B-26, next to the US Armed Forces. The type was in continuous service with I'Armee de l'Air (the French Air Force) from 1951 to 1968, but the story is not as straightforward as it may appear at first glance. There were actually two completely separate groups of aircraft involved: one in Indochina and another one in Europe and North Africa. In order not to complicate the history unnecessarily, it has therefore been divided into two separate chapters. At the end of the Second World War, France began efforts to regain control of its colonies in Indochina. This part of Southeast Asia, which covered the present Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, had de facto been under occupation by the Japanese since 1940, although left under nominal Vichy control until the French authorities were removed by the Japanese in March 1945. By this time, the communist-dominated Viet Minh nationalist movement under the leadership of Nguyen That Thanh - better known as Ho Chi Minh had established itself as the dominant antiJapanese organization, and was ironically given a lot ofAmerican support. When the Japanese forces surrendered, the Viet Minh took control of Hanoi in Tonkin' and promptly proclaimed the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At first, Photographs on opposite page: FAM or not FAM? This highly modified B-26B, ZOO1 El Fantasma, has been linked - with two others - to the Mexican Presidency, and may in fact have operated for certain Mexican VIPs under FAM jurisdiction. At least two of the three were later sold to France, as seen in this 1953 photo. MAP An earlier view of El Fantasma showing the Mexican flag on the fin but serial/registration obscured. Ing Roberto Vargas Cruz

XB-PEK became FAM 1300, and received a unique colour scheme by 1968; note the curtained passenger windows and the arrangement of the antenna loops on the upper fuselage - reminiscent of that seen on the Dominican VIP configured aircraft, FAD 3206. MAP Port side shot of FAM 1300. Ing Roberto Vargas Cruz

there was a certain degree of co-operation of the French air forces in Indochina, General between the French and the Viet Minh, and Hartemann, had already requested addialso some half-hearted attempts to resolve tional fighter-bombers as well as bombers. the situation by diplomacy, but by the end of The pre-Second World War Armee de l'Air 1946 French troops had ousted the Viet Minh had placed great importance on bomber and from Hanoi and other cities previously under bomber/reconnaissance aircraft, and several their control. For the next few years, the Viet Free French bomber squadrons had also Minh waged a limited guerrilla war against been set up under RAF and USAAF control the French, while quietly building up their from 1943 onwards, using Wellingtons, strength. The Viet Minh offensive began in Halifaxes, Bostons, Mitchells and Marauders. February 1950 and met with considerable These units were transferred to the AA in success. By the end of October that year they 1945, but within a year or two all of them had had taken control of almost all of Tonkin, disbanded or had had their aircraft converted except for the Red River delta and a narrow for transport duties. A few Mosquito bombers strip along the coast. were used in Indochina for a period in 1947, The AA (Armee de l'Air). strength in but were withdrawn when it was discovered Indochina was rather weak for the first years that they were literally becoming unglued! By of the conflict, and by the end of 1948 the only 1950, the only bomber-type aircraft still active aircraft available for air strikes were eighteen with the AA were a number of Halifax transSpitfires plus a few transport aircraft used as ports serving with GT.1/25 at Bordeaux'. But makeshift bombers. In addition, the Aero- as it was only four years since its bombers nautique Navale (Naval Aviation) had some had been phased out, the AA still had quite a Dauntless and Seafires operating from the few experienced bomber crews in its ranks, carrier Arromanches. The·AA ground attack capable of forming the nucleus of any new capability was considerably enhanced in the bomber units. second half of 1949 with the arrival of several Since there was no opposition in the air, dozen Kingcobras, but when the Viet Minh and the Viet Minh anti-aircraft defences were launched their offensive in early 1950 it soon . still almost non-existent, aircraft perforbecame clear that additional air support was mance was a matter of only limited needed. importance. Indeed, the Armee de I'Air was At this stage, the French government not to deploy a single jet aircraft to Indochina tumed to the USA for military assistance. The at any point in the war. What was needed in Americans had so far tried to stay clear of the Indochina was a piston-engined medium Indochina war, but the communist victory in bomber, and the USAF had intended supplythe Chinese Civil War a few months earlier ing a bomber group of either B-25s or B-26s. had changed President Truman's attitude Despite the situation in Korea, it was decided towards Asia. On 8 May 1950, it was that enough Invaders for one squadron could announced that the USA would provide an be spared, and in November 1950 a group of initial ten million dollars in Grant Aid to the French air crews - all with previous bomber French in Indochina. This was only the begin- experience, mainly on the B-26 Marauder ning, and the volume of the aid quickly began training on Invaders belonging to USAF increased to hundreds of millions of dollars. units stationed in France. The following The initial re-equipment plans for the AA month they moved to Indochina and on I provided for F-51D fighter-bombers, but after January 1951 Groupe de Bombardement 1/19 the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 these plans had to be revised. A Military 'While under French rule, Vietnam was divided Assistance Advisory Group was set up in into three separate colonies: Cochin-China was Saigon in August 1950, and in October a ship- the area to the south of Cambodia, Tonkin ment of 40 Hellcats (rather than Mustangs) covered most of the area north of the 20th arrived as replacement for the few remaining parallel, while Annam was the area in between, and by far the lar~est of the three. Spitfires. These were the first aircraft delivered under the PAM-EO (Plan d'Assistance 'During the Viet Minh offensive in early 1950, Militaire pour l'Extreme-Orient, or the Far small numbers of Ju 52s in Indochina were East Military Assistance Plan). But this was adapted to carry 50 kg bombs; but did not really only a stopgap measure, and the commander qualify as 'bombers' in the true sense of the word.

22

FOREIGN INVADERS

Gascogne was officially re-formed on Base along Route Coloniale (Colonial Road) 4 feet, and fifty M112 flares, for release at 3,500 Aerienne 193 at Tourane (later known as Da between Lang Son and Cao Bang near the feet. Nang) in central Annam. GB.1/19 had been Chinese border. Apart from the two crew On 15 October 1951 the M also began flyequipped with the B-26 Marauder until dis- members Capitaine Dieudonne and Adjutant ing night-time bombing missions in banded in May 1946, and was therefore a Durengues, the aircraft also carried General Indochina, initially employing MC.l s fitting recipient of the new B-26 Invaders. The Hartemann and a female journalist by the (French-built Ju 52s) of GT.2/62 and NC-701 s initial establishment of the squadron was name of Balesi as passengers. The death of of ELA.52. From November, B-26s and twenty-five aircraft, and on 3 January 1951 a the general was a severe blow to French Aeronavale Privateers were also cornmitted~ total of seventeen B-26Bs and eight B-26Cs - morale. It was never established exactly what the B-26s being temporarily based at Gia Lam refurbished in Japan before delivery - were happened to the aircraft. The Viet Minh outside Hanoi for these operations, since the officially handed overto the M by the USAF in claimed that they had shot it down, but the Cat Bi runway was closed for extension work a ceremony at the Tan Son Nhut airfield official French position was that one of the each night. The night missions soon ceased, (BA.191) outside Saigon'. cluster bombs carried by the B-26 had acci- however, due to a shortage of flares. After a short working-up period, GB.I/19 dentally exploded in the bomb bay. Years The Viet Minh resumed their offensive in was declared operational on 1 February, fly- later, a repatriated soldier of the Foreign early October 1951, when the 312th Division ing its first combat sorties the same day. The Legion, who had been a prisoner of the Viet made repeated attacks against the French unit's home base was Tourane, but there was Minh in that area, reported having seen a B-26 positions at Nghia Lo in western Tonkin, but also a detachment of six B-26s at Tan Son with engine problems around the time in without success. Of the 1,000 or so sorties Nhut and another one of seven aircraft at Cat question. The pilot had attempted an emer- flown in support of the garrison, 150 were Bi (BA.195), between Hanoi and Haiphong. gency landing, but the aircraft had crashed flown by Invaders. A few weeks later, on 14 The 2,400 metre long runway at Tourane was into a mountain. November, the French parachuted three batquite adequate for the Invader, but the living During the rest of the 1951 monsoon sea- talions into the town of Hoa Sinh west of conditions at the base were poor, with water son, up to October, the fighting died down, Hanoi, during Operation Lotus. Ground being rationed most of the time. GB.I/19 had .while both sides consolidated their forces. troops advancing from the Red River delta been placed under the direct command of The reinforcements received by the M dur- quickly opened up a corridor to the town and CAEO (Commandement de I'Air en Extreme ing this period included five RB-26Cs, taken 'the operation was initially a success. Orient, the Far East Air Command) and its air- on charge on 19 August and initially attached The drop on Hoa Binh met with little resiscraft were available for operations over the to GB.1/19. The black-painted RB-26s were tance, but the B-26s and other M strike whole of Indochina, flying more than 2,500 soon given the nickname 'Corbeaux' aircraft flew numerous missions in support of sorties during the squadron's first year of exis- (Ravens) in the M, a name that was later the advance along RC.6. At one point, the tence. But in practice most of the fighting extended to any overall black Invader. Before French used a ruse which proved very effectook place in Tonkin and the northern parts of the RB-26s arrived, the only photo reconnais- tive. A large number of sandbags hanging Annam and this was where the bulk of the M sance unit in Indochina had been EROM.80 at from old parachutes were dropped from Ju effort was concentrated. Bien Hoa, which had some NC-701 Martinets 52s, creating the illusion of a major air assault. From late March to mid June 1951, the Viet and a few F8F-1 P Bearcats, recently received When the Viet Minh troops advanced on the Minh forces under General Giap made from the USA. drop zone, out into open ground, they were repeated attempts to break into the Red River It was quickly decided to create a separate pounded by bombers and fighter-bombers and Day River deltas in Tonkin, and the B-26s unit to operate the RB-26s, and on 1 which inflicted heavy casualties. The Viet in company with Kingcobras and Hellcats November 1951, Escadrille de Reconnais- Minh soon massed several divisions against inflicted heavy losses on the 304th and 308th sance B-26 (ER.B-26) Armagnac was officially Hoa Binh and RC.6, and by late December the Divisions. The first major battle in which formed at Tourane. The flight continued to be land route was cut. For about two weeks, Hoa GB.I/19 took part was at Mao Khe on 23-24 under the administrative command of Binh had to be supplied by air until the road March, with the B-26s flying a total of 138 sor- GB.l/19, however. The unit's missions were could be reopened, once again with the help ties. This battle also saw the first operational normally scheduled directly by CAEO. One of of massive air support. But the situation was use of the Bearcat by the French. the RB-26s was lost on 17 November, which becoming increasingly untenable for the One particular problem encountered with left only four aircraft to cover the whole of French positions along RC.6, and on 22 the Invaders was their prodigious ammuni- Indochina. They were often detached to February 1952 the ground forces began a tion consumption (some aircraft having as other bases as needed, including a more or withdrawal towards Hanoi. many as eighteen machine guns), and the less permanent detachment at Cat Bi. The The success of GB.I/19 during 1951 had led reserves quickly decreased from three to two RB-26s were mainly used for photo recon- to a decision by the M to set up a second B-26 months' stock. By 1 October 1951, the B-26s naissance, but also for aerial mapping. In this bomber squadron in Indochina. The unit had already dropped 1,767 tons of bombs and latter task they were joined in mid 1952 by selected was the previously mentioned 218 napalm containers, and fired 1965" rock- civil-registered LeO 453s and B-17Gs of the GT.1/25, still flying Halifax transport aircraft. ets and 1,150,000 rounds of .50 calibre Institut Geographique Nationale. These were now retired and in the last days of ammunition. The RB-26C was appreciated for its long October 1951 the air crews left France for The first French Invader lost in Indochina endurance, frequently flying missions Indochina, ferrying over a large number of was B-26B 44-34558, which went missing on exceeding five-and-a-half hours. For the first C-47s intended as replacement for the vener28 April 1951 during a reconnaissance flight year of operations ER.B-26 had problems able MC.l s which had so far been the obtaining good films for their cameras, and mainstay of the M transport squadrons in the often had to make do with the outdated Far East. On arrival, fifteen crews began the 'Some reports claim that an initial four Invaders British 17B/450 film which required up to conversion onto B-26s, using the aircraft of were received at Tan Son Nhut in November three times the normal exposure time. Night GB.1/19, and in January 1952 the squadron 1950, and provisionally assigned to GT.2/62 photo missions were sometimes under- was officially renamed GB.I/25 Tunisie. Franche-Comte and GT.2/64 Anjou for training taken, using K.19 cameras. For this purpose The first four B-26Cs for GB.I/25 arrived on purposes. Similarly a training detachment at the aircraft could carry a number of flares in 5 March 1952, followed by a further five on 10 Tourane is also said to have existed, run by the bomb bay, the load options including March when the aircraft were officially GT.1I64 Beam. If this is correct, the aircraft used were probably USAF B-26s on temporary loan. twelve M46 flares, to be dropped from 7,000 handed over to the M, again in a ceremony at

FRANCE: INDOCHINA

Tan Son Nhut airfield. Four more B-26Cs arrived a couple of days later and a final three aircraft were received on 18 April, giving GB. 1/25 a strength of sixteen B-26Cs. In April the squadron moved to Cat Bi, which became its home base for the duration of the war. Since the unit initially had no B-26Bs, it was used mainly for level bombing, leaving GB. III 9 to carry out most of the Invader strafing missions. For level bombing, the normal procedure was to use elements of three Invaders in a Vformation. Only the lead aircraft needed to be a B-26C with a Norden bomb sight, while the others dropped on cue from the formation leader. Due to weather conditions, some 80 per cent of the bombing missions had to be carried out from an altitude of less than 4,000 feet, with most missions flown at around 2,000 feet. This made the formations veryvulnerable to AA fire during the three-to-four minute bomb run, and also meant using the Norden sight in the 'fixed angle' mode, which gave poorer precision. Experience in Indochina showed that an experienced bombardier could achieve an average precision of thirty metres with this method, while an inexperienced one would average 150 metres. The Invaders were also used for dive bombing, in which case the pilot did the aiming with his gun sight. The run was usually started from 4,000 feet, with the pull-up beginning at 2,300 feet, the bombs being released just before the aircraft returned to a horizontal attitude. About 50 per cent of the bombs could be expected to fall within an area of 60 by 150 metres, which was considered the ideal target size. Due to its inaccuracy, dive bombing was seldom used during close air support missions. The main underwing ordnance used by AA fighter-bombers from December 1950 on was napalm, and this was at times also carried by the B-26s of GB.l/1 9, but rarely if ever by those of GB.1/25. General purpose bombs were the most common load carried in the bomb bay, and these included the M30 100 lb, M57/M57Al 250 Ib, M43/M64/M64Al 500 Ib and M65/M65Al 1,000 Ib GP bombs. Other types of ordnance were also used, including M47 100 Ib incendiaries as well as M4Al 100 Ib and M81 260 Ib fragmentation clusters. Some experiments were made with parachute-retarded bombs, but these were not very successful. Most aircraft could also carry fourteen rockets under their wings, or eight rockets and two bombs (eight rockets only if gun packs were mounted). All Invaders used

An early photo of one of the first Invaders in Indochina, taken over Tonkin in March 1951. No code letter or unit insignia have yet been applied to the aircraft, which carried an unusual underwing load of two bombs and one rocket. EePA ref. TONK 5103223

23

in Indochina (the RB-26Cs excepled) therefore usually operated by flight mechanretained their dorsal and in most cases also ics without any special training. It was, as a their ventral gun barbettes, although guns French report stated, fortunate that no air were not always fitted. If the dorsal barbettes opposition was ever encountered! were armed, the guns would usually be In August 1952, the two B-26 squadrons locked in a forward-firing position. To com- ceased to be under the direct control of pensate for the lack of nose and wing CAEO, and their aircraft were instead placed mounted machine guns (many AA B-26Bs under the command of the different regional had six .50 guns in their wings), the B-26Cs of Tactical Air Commands (GATAC) in IndoGB.1I25 usually had under-wing gun packs china: these worked in close co-operation fitted, each one with two .50 guns. It took with the local ground forces' headquarters about twenty minutes to re-arm a B-26 with (at least in theory) and were responsible for light bombs, rockets and machine gun all close air support of army units in its area. ammunition, while the loading of eight 500 Ib For this purpose, the Invaders were often bombs took forty-five minutes. detached in small sections at various airSeveral French sources refer to the B-26B fields, which improved the response time. under the name 'Strafer,' while the B-26C is Until now, the B-26s had been used almost called 'Leader.' A letter, or letter-number exclusively in support of ground troops, but combination is added (for example 'Strafer from mid 1952 they also occasionally began D-l' or 'Leader C-3') depending on the num- to be used in the interdiction role, in formaber of machine guns and under-wing tions up to six or sometimes even twelve ordnance attachment points fitted, resulting aircraft. One of the first such missions was in at least eight different designations. Operation Gruyere in which the Invaders Whether these were official Armee de I'Air bombed Viet Minh depots in the vicinity of designations is unclear, and there is no indi- Dong Dang, where weapons received from cation that any other air force, including the China were stored. Some SCR-584 anti-airUSAF, ever used a corresponding system. craft radars had been received from the USA By mid-May 1952, GB.1I19 had begun and one of these was set up at Song Tay (later receiving its first replacement crews from being moved to Gia Lam) and used to direct France. Unlike the original crews, which interdiction strikes in Tonkin during bad were mainly Second World War veterans, the weather. A single night bombing mission of new pilots had been through a special bomb- three B-26s was also flown under radar guiding course at the CIET training centre at ance. A number of Invaders were delivered Mont-de-Marsan using MD-311 aircraft, fol- with APN-3 Shoran radar navigation equiplowed by B-26 conversion with USAF Invader ment installed. But since the CPN-2 ground units. The bombardiers w~re also trained at beacons were not available, the AA was C1ET and at the bombing range at Cazaux, but requested to return the airborne equipment each pupil only got to drop 50 bombs, even to the USAF. In very remote regions, notably in northern though it was estimated that 200 bomb releases were necessary to get proficient on . Tonkin and in Laos, a number of B-26s fitted the Norden bomb sight. Getting air gunners with SCR-300 radios performed standing for the Invaders proved to be a problem since patrols, often in support ofMeo guerrilla units the AA no longer had a gunner training pro- working for the French intelligence service. gramme. In Indochina, the guns were In these cases the Invaders were in direct

24

contact with the ground troops, making strikes under their direction, and would also serve as a FAC if additional aircraft needed to be called in. The B-26s with SCR-300 were also used as flying command posts, and on rare cases even as artillery spotters. But the Invader was not very successful in these roles, and by 1953 all SCR-300s had been removed from the B-26s. Like all armies fighting a war thousands of miles from their home country, the French forces in Indochina faced logistical problems that were at times insurmountable. This was particularly true for the Armee de I'Air. General Chassin, who had replaced General Hartemann as the M commander in Indochina, summed this up in an article he wrote in 1952: 'The wounded can be encouraged to make a supreme effort, and exhausted men galvanised into action. But a broken-down aircraft cannot be galvanised, and not even the most eloquent of speeches can make an engine run when it has no fuel.' The hostile climate of Indochina coupled to a shortage of spare parts led to a low serviceability rate. During 1952, the M Invaders required 50 to 60 man-hours maintenance for each flying hour. At the same time, the delivery time for B-26 spare parts was generally around 45 days, a situation that did not improve until early 1954. Once the evacuation of Hoa Binh had been completed, both sides began regrouping for the post-monsoon operations later in the year. On 17 October 1952, the Viet Minh attacked the French positions at Nghia Lo, between the Red and Black Rivers, and were soon advancing westwards towards the Laotian border. The weather was poor during this period and the lack of effective air support for the French defenders was cited as one of the main reasons for the Viet Minh success, even though a substantial number of B-26, Bearcat and Hellcat strikes were in fact flown. During the battle for Nghia Lo the Invaders were again used for night-time strikes, with their targets being illuminated by 'Luciole' (Glow-worm) flares dropped by C-47s. It was the first time this technique had been used by the French. Later on, the B-26s were sometimes to carry up to twelve flares of their own, with two aircraft taking turns dropping flares and bombing. In exceptional cases, when no flares were available, napalm could also be used to illuminate the target. These night missions were always flown as level bombing strikes, using the Norden bomb sight, and required clear weather and a good knowledge of the target area. Later during the war, the Invaders were also used in support of isolated outposts who used lamps or flares to indicate their position, similarly to the techniques used by the US forces in Vietnam some ten years later. The French military commander in Indochina, General Salan, decided to strike

FOREIGN INVADERS

out from his positions in the delta, cutting north into Viet Minh-held territory, behind their advancing divisions. The idea was to upset General Giap's plans and hopefully force him into a decisive battle on terms favourable to the French. The operation, code-named Lorraine, began on 29 October, but the French plans did not work out and in mid November 1952 their troops began withdrawing back to the delta. Soon afterwards, the Viet Minh offensive petered out, as their supply lines became overextended, and repeated attack against the French garrison at Na San were repulsed with the help of extensive air support. A major interdiction operation, named Ouragan (Hurricane), was carried out by GB.I/19 between 19 and 26 January 1953. In twenty-three sorties, six B-26s based at Cat Bi dropped fifty 1,000 Ib and sixteen 500 Ib bombs against the waterways in the Vinh region, destroying two bridges, a tunnel and a dam. The Armee de I'Air had lost six or possibly .seven B-26s and one RB-26 by February 1953, and during March and May of that year a total of eight B-26Bs were received as replacement aircraft, being divided equally between GB.I/19 and GB.l/25. These were the only Invaders delivered to Indochina during the year. Up to this point, a total of 49 B-26s had been delivered (not counting the five RB-26s) at a total cost of $8,741,287. A further seventeen aircraft had originally been scheduled, but were delayed due to a shortage of Invaders in the USAF inventory. In early 1953, the Viet Minh forces invaded northern and central Laos. Laos had been granted independence in 1949, but retained strong ties with France. The French were forced to divert parts of their forces from the Tonkin to protect the royal capital of Luang Prabang and other Laotian towns. To support the ground troops, a detachment of B-26s from GB.l/19 was based at Seno in central Laos, together with some Aeronavale Hellcats. A Bearcat detachment was added later on. The Seno runway consisted of PSP (Pierced Steel Planking) and was only 1,600 metres long. With a full bomb load, the B-26s could only carry enough fuel for a 300 km combat radius, compared to the usual 600800 km. In a total of 390 sorties, the Invaders helped defeat the Viet Minh at Xieng Khouang, and also flew strikes against their overextended lines of communication. Although most of the Viet Minh troops had been withdrawn towards the Tonkin border by the summer, they now had freedom of movement in northern Laos and the threat to Luang Prabang remained. As a result of this invasion the French signed a treaty with the Laotian government in October 1953, promising to defend the country against foreign aggressors. The only major French offensive operation in Tonkin during the summer of 1953 was

Operation Hirondelle (Swallow), in which two battalions were parachuted into Lang Son near the Chinese border on 17 July. This was a major transshipment point for supplies delivered to the Viet Minh by the Chinese, and the objective was to destroy the depots in the area. Ten B-26s of GB.1/25 bombed and strafed the landing zones before the drop, together with some 50 Bearcats. The operation was a success and the ground troops were withdrawn back to the delta on 20 July. Later on, GB.1/25 also flew independent strikes against Viet Minh depots, including Operation Fiacre (Coach) in the Lao Kay region and Operation Mouette (Gull) directed atPhu No Quang. 'Pacifying' missions were sometimes flown against villages in the Tonkin delta suspected of aiding the Viet Minh, and this type of mission became increasingly common during the last years of the war. Unless the village was a confirmed Viet Minh base, leaflets would usually be dropped before the strike, to warn the inhabitants. But due to the Viet Minh's successful infiltration of French intelli'gence, many strikes were directed at villages loyal to the French rather than the Viet Minh. Although most of the fighting took place in Tonkin, the B-26s also took part in several of the anti-guerrilla campaigns launched in Annam and Cochin-China. One of these was Operation Camargue, which was carried out between Hue and Quang Tri from 28 July to 4 August 1953. The ground troops were supported by twenty-two B-26s based at Tourane. In September of the same year, GB.I/19 dropped 400 bombs in 50 sorties flown during Operation Picardie, aimed at the Viet Minh around Ha Tinh in the Vinh region. During the second half of 1953 the same unit was also ordered to attack the water buffaloes of Annam, as part of the efforts to cut off the Viet Minh food supplies. By early 1954 Viet Minh had been forced to disperse and camouflage the animals, to protect them against strafing and bombing. These operations in the central and southern parts of the country were rather different to the large battles of the north, not to mention the battles in Europe during the Second World War. General Chassin gave this description: 'Here there are no columns on the march, no lines of sharpshooters more or less well camouflaged, no convoys of vehicles advancing in single file along the roads. Once outside the controlled zone, there is not a soul to be seen in the fields. When an aircraft flies over a village, the latter empties itself completely, even the domestic animals take cover. It needs an unusual degree of skill and experience to detect the presence of Vietminh troops in the mountain and forests where they live ~nder perfect camouflage.' Only when the French troops managed to draw the Viet Minh out into the open could their air forces be fully effective. ER.B-26 was still soldiering on with its four

FRANCE: INDOCHINA

RB-26Cs, which by this time were known as 'Les Quatre Mousquetaires' (The Four Musketeers) and had been given individual names after the characters in Dumas' famous novel. The increasing Viet Minh use of antiaircraft guns had forced the Invaders to fly at higher altitude, and during the last stages of the war they were forbidden to operate between 50 and 1,000 feet. By late 1953, the unit had finally begun receiving more modem films. Colour film was also used on a few occasions, with good results. But processing was a problem, since there was only a single laboratory in Indochina able to handle colour. In September 1953, a few pilots were sent to Groupe de Chasse 1/21 for conversion to Bearcats, and in October two F8F-IPs (usually referred to as RF8Fs by the French) joined ERB-26, although technically stilI on GC.1/21 strength. One of the main routes from Tonkin to northern Laos led through the valley of Dien Bien Phu, some fifteen kilometres from the Laotian border. The new French commander, General Navarre, decided to recapture the area and make it into an offensive base, even though it lay far from any other French bases and could only be supplied by air. On 20 November, in Operation Castor (Beaver), some 3,000 paratroopers were dropped from C-47s and soon cleared the immediate area of Viet Minh troops. The C-47s were escorted by 8-26s during the assault, and the Invaders flew standing patrols over the valley, giving

l

The first B-26Cs earmarked for GB.I/25 Tunisie were officially handed over to the Armee de l'Air at Tan Son Nhut on 10 March 1952. The unit initially used its aircraft mainly for level bombing. ECPA ref 552-4015

close air support to the garrison. The long distance from the airfields in the delta meant that the 8earcats needed to use drop tanks to reach the area, preventing them from carrying underwing ordnance. Until the Dien Bien Phu airstrip could be repaired sufficiently to allow six Bearcats to be permanently based there, the bulk of the air support missions was therefore flown by B-26s and Aeronavale Hellcats. At this point, the Armee de l'Air had twenty-six Invaders based in Tonkin. General Giap responded by ordering the 308th, 312th, 316th and 351st Divisions to advance on Dien Bien Phu. The 8-26s and other strike aircraft (including C-119s used to drop napalm) flew hundreds of sorties in an attempt to interdict RC.138 and RP.41, which were the main roads used by the Viet Minh troops during their advance. These missions were initially flown by formations of three aircraft carrying 500 Ib bombs, later increasing to six B-26s. But although the bombing often destroyed sections of the roads, the damage was always quickly repaired by local villagers and by late December the Viet Minh had encircled Dien Bien Phu in force. At the same time, the Viet Minh also launched a new, limited offensive in central Laos, which captured the town of Thakhiet near the Thai border. By 23 December, a detachment of five B-26s of GB.1/l9 as well as eight Bearcats (later increasing to six B-26s and fifteen Bearcats) had been deployed to Seno. These aircraft supported the counteroffensive carried out by' the French 6'me 8ataillon Parachutiste Colonial between 2 and 6 January 1954. B-26B 44-34530 crashed on take-off at Seno during these operations and was the onlyInvader to be lost in Laos.

25

By early 1954 the French air units in Indochina were becoming seriously overextended. Despite the improved delivery times for spare parts, the AA B-26s could still not generate the same average number of flying hours as their counterparts in the USAF (36 hours/month compared to 43 hours 50 minutes/month). Since the end of the Korean War several months earlier, the US government had taken an increasing interest in the French struggle in Indochina, and it was decided to supply large numbers of additional aircraft to the AA. An initial six 8-26s and one RB-26 arrived in late January, followed by sixteen more B-26s in mid February. These aircraft were used to bring the squadrons already in existence up to an establishment of twenty-five aircraft each, and to cover the attrition calculated at twelve aircraft per year. Unlike the Invaders delivered in previous years, the majority of those supplied during 1954 were not officially transferred to the AA but remained on USAF charge, their individual record cards listing them as belonging to the Far Eastern Air Forces in Korea. Indeed, the US Department of Defense was instructed to deliver the aircraft 'without regard to MDAP fund status,' since the original plans only called for a total of fourteen Invaders to be provided in the 1954 Fiscal Year period. Some 200 USAF mechanics were also lent to the AA to help service the B-26s and C-47s in Indochina, on the understanding that ,they were to be based on airfields secure from capture by the Viet Minh, and in February 1954 a special B-26 repair unit was set up at Tourane. The increased number of Invaders in each squadron, together with the assistance given by the USAF mechanics, helped

26

FOREIGN INVADERS

increase the total number of B-26 flying hours aid, homing on the beacon installed at the air from 830 hours in November 1953, to 1,860 strip. A precision of at best 400 metres could hours in April 1954. be attained at distances of five to fifteen kiloViet Minh attacks on French airfields were metres, but it was not unknown for the target rare, but on 6 March 1954, a Viet Minh unit to be missed by as much as two kilometres! infiltrated the airfield at Cat Bi, sabotaging When the weather cleared on 17 March, the four Invaders of GB.l/25 as well as four C-47s Armee de ['Air and Aeronavale arrived in and six MS.500s. Only one of the B-26s was force, bombing the Viet Minh fire bases and completely destroyed, while the other three the French positions already fallen to the could be returned to service after repairs. enemy. By 26 March, 1,000 tons of bombs had The 351 st Viet Minh Division brought with it been dropped in 750 sorties. considerable numbers of artillery pieces to The airfield at Dien Bien Phu was now all Dien Bien Phu and a first barrage of 75 mm but unusable and all supplies and reinforceshells were fired on 3 February 1954, in cele- ments had to be dropped from the air. This bration of Tet (the Vietnamese New Year). produced additional problems and hazards, The Armee de l'Air responded by sending not only on the ground but also in the air: on Bearcats and B-26s to drop a total of 158 one occasion, a B-26 very nearly collided with bombs on the suspected gun emplacements, a bulldozer dropped by a C-119! Since there causing only minor damage. Sporadic was a shortage of transport aircraft, experiartillery fire continued to be directed at the ments were carried out with cargo French positions, and on 11 March a C-II9 containers carried in the bomb bay of was destroyed on the ground. By this time the Invaders and dropped at low altitude, but the Viet Minh had brought up a total of thirty-eight results were not encouraging. Nevertheless, field guns and howitzers of 75 mm and 105 . 125 supply drop missions were flown mm calibre, as well as sixteen (later increas- between 24 and 30 April. From April the B-26s ing to eighty) 37 mm anti-aircraft guns and also became increasingly engaged in the supone-hundred .50 anti-aircraft machine guns, pression of Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns, and sited on the hills surrounding the valley. each supply drop of the C-47s and C-I19s was In the late aftemoon of 13 March 1954, the often preceded by a strike by three B-26s or Viet Minh began their assault on Dien Bien Aeronavale Privateers on the gun positions. Phu. The weather over the delta airfields was One of the weapons used was the Lazy Dog poor, and the M was unable to give much 500 Ib cluster bomb, which was greatly support during the initial fighting. By this date, feared by the Viet Minh. The Lazy Dog was a shortage of crews had become the biggest designed to burst at 5,000 feet, spreading its problem for the Invader units. On 13 March 11,200 finned bullets over a large area. The there were only thirty-four crews available for attacks forced the Viet Minh to disperse their a total of fifty-eight aircraft on strength, thirty- guns more, diminishing the effect of their fire. four of which were operational. The shortage The anti-aircraft suppression flights were of qualified B-26C 'Leader' crews was partic- usually based on information collected by the ularly grave, which led to some mistakes and RB-26s during their numerous photo reconaccidents during level bombing missions. At naissance missions over the area, one night, between four and six B-26s would usu- RB-26C being permanently assigned to cover ally be detailed to provide air support, each Dien Bien Phu. The former ER.B-26 had been aircraft staying on station for one hour, straf- renamed Escadrille de Reconnaissance ing and bombing at random along the Photographique 2/19 (ERP.2/19) Armagnac perimeter. In some Cases, the ARN-7 radio on 1 January 1954, still with Tourane as its compass in the B-26 was used as a bombing home base. One additional RB-26C had been

supplied by the USAF on a temporary basis in January, replaced by three permanently transferred RB-26s in April, but since one aircraft was lost during this period only six RB-26s and two F8F-I Ps were on hand by mid April 19544 • A B-26C was also available for crew training. Some experiments with infrared films were carried out during the Dien Bien Phu operations. A USAF team had arrived in Tonkin on 22 January to brief the French personnel on the use of IR films, and a few days later a first IR photography mission over Dien Bien Phu was flown by an NC-701. On 26 January, the RB-26s also began flying IR missions. Two aircraft would usually take part - one with IR film and one with ordinary black-and-white film - but the results were disappointing. Despite desperate resistance by the ground troops, and massive air support, the situation for the French at Dien Bien Phu continued to deteriorate as the weeks went by. On 27 April, General Navarre launched the Operation Condor, sending a relief column from Laos to fight its way through to the besieged garrison. This plan had been discussed for several weeks, but had been delayed in the hope that the USAF would intervene with massive B-29 bombing against the Viet Minh positions, in an operation called Vulture. It had now become clear that the US government would not involve itself directly in the Indochina war, even though the US aid by this time covered some 78 per cent of the cost of the war. An alternative scheme called for fifteen B-29s to be transferred to the M, but this idea was dropped since it demanded that some thirty B-26s, C-47s and Aeronavale Privateers be stripped of their crews. Another suggestion - possibly inspired by the use of US C-119 crews in Indochina - was to set up a squadron of twenty-five B-26s flown by American volunteers, recruited from CIA sources. The plan called for the aircraft to carry Vietnamese markings. Like the similar proposal for a US-crewed Bearcat squadron put forward as early as 1951, the 'Vietnamese' B-26 unit never left the planning stage. Before the relief column could reach Dien Bien Phu the French positions were overwhelmed, and by 8 May the whole valley was in the hands of the Viet Minh. The defeat had a disastrous effect on the morale and prestige of the French and did in effect settle the outcome of the whole war, despite the fact that the French ground troops lost in the battle only represented some ten per cent of the forces available in Indochina. Nearly thirty per cent of the M air crews were grounded after the end of the battle, due to fatigue problems, and the proportion was even higher in the transport units. From 'One source claims that two additional RB-26Cs were received in May and July 1954, respectively, but this is unconfirmed and probably incorrect.

FRANCE: INDOCHINA

Top left: Invader 44-34109 was for some reason listed as a B-26B in USAF records'both before and after French service, but this photo taken during the Olen Ben Phu operations clearly shows it to be a B-26C. Note the sun protection installed in the nose, and also that the French roundel was only carried in four positions in Indochina. ECPA ref. NVN 5450 R 91 Top right: B-26B 44-34564 'K' of GB.1/19 is being bombed up with GP bombs in preparation for yet another sortie against the Viet Minh, circa 1954. The black nose decoration was introduced by the squadron in 1952 or 1953. SHM ref. B883970 via A. Grandolini

A B-26C belonging to GB.I/25 flying over a typical Indochinese landscape. Although the unit badge - carried on the left side only - is difficult to make out here, the Invaders of this squadron are easily identified by the yellow background to the fin code. SHM ref. B80 992 via A. Grandolini

Only a few black-painted B-26s were delivered to Indochina up to 1953, but this was to change in 1954 when many reinforcement aircraft came direct from Korea, like 41-39473 of GB.I/25 seen here. The code letter on the nose - just behind the squadron badge - is in red. Also note the gun pods and antennae under the wings. ECPA ref. NVN 54 50102

Opposite page: A poor but interesting shot of B-26B 41-39594. Not only is its ventral barbette still armed - unusual for French Invaders - but it also seems to have two gun pods under the left wing. Furthermore, the code letter on the fin is painted above rather than below the serial number. SHM ref. B84 062 via A. Grandolini

27

28

the day Operation Castor was launched until the day Dien Bien Phu fell, the AA Invaders had flown 2,003 sorties, including 265 at night, totalling 5,059 flight hours. The AA lost a total of seven Invaders from 13 March to 7 May 1954, most of them in connection with operations against Dien Bien Phu. Four were shot down over the besieged garrison itself, with a fifth crashing in Laos due to damage received over Dien Bien Phu. No less than forty Invaders were also damaged by anti-aircraft fire. But these aircraft losses were more than compensated for by the twenty-five additional B-26 bombers received from the USAF in early April. They had been requested by the French in January, and were intended for a third B-26 bomber squadron in Indochina. Finding the crews proved one of the biggest problems; most of the air crews for GB.I/19 and GB.1/25 had been transferred from transport units, but this time only a few transport crews could be spared. These had to be supplemented by ten former fighter pilots and five complete crews transferred from the Aeronavale. Named GB.1/91 Bourgagne, the new unit was officially formed at Tourane on 1 June 1954 and became operational a few weeks later. Its main task was the support of operations against Viet Minh infiltration in central Annam, particularly around Pleiku and Ban Me Thout, but relatively few missions were flown before the armistice.

FOREIGN INVADERS

In the north, the French troops withdrew in the face of a renewed Viet Minh offensive in the delta and had to evacuate Phat Diem on the coast, in Operation Auvergne. The town was heavily bombed by B-26s, Bearcats and Corsairs on the entry of the Viet Minh troops in late June. On 15 April 1954 the bomber squadrons had been formed into a separate Bomber Sub-Command (Sous-Groupement de Bombardement), and began to be used in massive bombing operations for the first time. These missions regularly involved formations of up to twenty-four aircraft. The Sous-Groupement 'also created a special operational training flight with GB.1/19, to give additional training to all newly arrived crews. The last major ground support actions involving Invaders of the AA took place in support of GM.I00, a mobile force that included the volunteer battalion that had fought in Korea. During a retreat from An Khe in southern Annam on 24 June, the unit was ambushed by Viet Minh forces and was only .able to extract itself with the help of air support. A second ambush followed a few days later, and once again GM.l 00 - together with GM.42 - was sa.ved by B-26s based at Tourane. On 17 July, during Operation Myasatis, which was an attempt to halt the Viet Minh advance to the south ofAn Khe, the two units were lured into yet another

ambush. A number of B-26s were again sent in support, but were not able to prevent the virtual destruction of GM.l 00. During the final stages of the war, the RB26s of ERP.2/19 were used for roaming visual reconnaissance in central Annam with good effect. The missions were flown at below 100 metres, and numerous Viet Minh trails, camps, depots and units were located. A request was made to arm the RB-26s with rockets and light bombs to enable them to attack targets of opportunity, but this was never implemented before the end of the fighting. The signing of the Geneva Accords on 21 July 1954 was followed by an armistice on 1 August. The war in Indochina was over, at least for the time being. The B-26 units had flown a total of 33,000 hours in 15,000 missions since 1951, delivering 18,500 tons of ordnance. There had been plans to set up a fourth bomber squadron, and the final eight B-26Cs delivered to Indochina on I July were probably destined for this unit. As it was, most of them apparently never saw service with any squadron before being returned to the USAF. The French withdrawal from Indochina was a gradual one and the AA Invaders were to remain in the country for more than a year after the armistice. During the autumn of 1954, all the B-26 units were concentrated at Tourane, from where routine surveillance and training missions continued to be flown. Three fi.Jrther Invaders were to be lost in accidents up to June 1955. Due to the crowded conditions at Tourane, GB.1/19 soon moved most of its aircraft to Tan Son Nhut, before finally ending up on BA.199 at Cap SaintJacques (later known as Vung Tau) on the coast southeast of Saigon. All crew training with B-26 units of the USAF in France had ceased, and all conversion training was now carried out in Indochina. The first Invader unit to be disbanded was GB.1/91, which stood down at Tourane on 1 November 1954, after only five months' service. By this time a first group of thirty-two B-26s had already been returned to the USAF. The other units were kept operational, in case the Viet Minh should take advantage of the French withdrawal from Tonkin and renew their offensive towards the south.

Unusual view of RB-26C 44-35741 of ERP.2/19, about to touch down at Tourane. The red serial and buzz code are all but invisible, while the code letter - painted in a lighter shade of red - stands out clearly. This aircraft carried the name Milady in red on the left side of the nose. J. Lebourge collection via A. Grandolini Note that the nearest of these B-26Cs of GB.1/91 (almost certainly 44-34109) still carries its former GB.1/25 code on the nose. SHAA ref. 885 1615 via A. Grandolini

FRANCE: INDOCHINA

There was even some apprehension of a Chinese involvement, and contingency plans were drawn up which relied on the US 7th Fleet to provide air cover against the MiG- I5s until two French fighter units could be rushed in from Europe, while the AA B-26s were to be used for night-time strikes against the communist air bases. GB. 1/25 and ERP .2/1 9 eventually disbanded on I August 1955, also at Tourane, most of their aircraft having passed to GB. III 9 at Cap Saint-Jacques. By the time it was disbanded, ERP.2/19 had flown a total of 3,169 hours in 1,021 missions. Finally, on 1 November 1955, GB.1/19 was disbanded, ending the Invader's four years and ten months' service with the Armee de l'Air in

Indochina. Several B-26s still remained on AA charge by this date, but by 17 November the last three flyable ones were gone, leaving only an engineless hulk in the inventory. This was officially handed back to the USAF on 3 December 1955, but was in reality scrapped by the French. Contrary to previously published information, all surviving Invaders were returned to the USAF and not a single aircraft was purchased by the AA for use in FranceS. Some of the Invaders handed back in 1954 were subsequently used by USAF units, the last one remaining in service in the USA until 196 I, when it was allocated to a classified project: most probably the Bay of Pigs operation. Another one became involved with the CIA

The pendant-type squadron badge introduced by GB.lf19 towards the end of the Indochina war. Unlike the previous badge, which was totally different in every way, the pendant was carried on both sides of the nose. SHM ref. 8883977 via A. Grandolini A good close up of the nose of a French B-26C, showing details of the Norden bomb sight and sun protection drape. ECPA ref. NVN 5450067 The flight line of GB.lf91, probably in July 1954, with at teast twenty-five of its twenty-six Invaders lined up. The squadron was the shortest-lived of all the French B-26 units and saw only limited combat duty. The third aircraft in the line, which appears to be 44-35411, still sports the yellow trim of the last USAF squadron to operate it in Korea. via M. Rostaing

29

operations in Indonesia and later saw use in Vietnam with Project Farm Gate, and at least ten subsequently turned up on the US civil register. The 52 Invaders returned in late 1955 fared less well. Having been accepted back into the USAF inventory, they languished at Clark Field in the Philippines for over a year before being struck off charge on 28 December 1956. Most were scrapped over the next two or three years, but eleven aircraft survived to join the US civil register.

Sin late 1956 and early 1957, the USAF supplied five former Indochinese 8-26s to the Armee de l'Air for use in Algeria, but this was more a matter of coincidence than design.

30

FOREIGN INVADERS

Typical of the B-26Bs in Indochina, this Invader of GB.1/19 photographed during Operation Picardie had no less than sixteen forward-facing machine guns (including the two in the dorsal

The colour schemes carried by the AA Invaders were the ones the aircraft were delivered in: either natural metal (with or without black nacelles) or overall black. Many B-26Bs of GB.I/19 had their noses decorated in black (in some cases possibly in red) from 1952-53 onwards. Several of the Invaders delivered to GB.1/91 had come straight from the USAF 3rd Bombardment Group in Korea, and kept the trim colours used by them. The national insignia on the AA Invaders consisted of rudder stripes and roundels, the latter carried in four positions, USAF style. The Armee de I'Air did not allocate any new serials to the Invaders, which continued to carry their USAF serials in black or red (on black aircraft). They often also kept the USAF 'buzz numbers' on the rear fuselage, consisting of the letters 'BC' and the last three digits of the serial. The colour was again black or red.

barbette) and could also carry fourteen rockets under its wings. ECPA ref. A 53 7710 via

c.-J. Ehrengardt Each AA Invader unit was allocated a range of call-signs, which looked much like civilian .registrations. The last letter(s) of each aircraft's call-sign appeared on the fin, and sometimes also on the nose. The application varied somewhat from unit to unit: GB.I/19 (F-UHlA to F-UHIZ; from 1954 also FUHJO to F-UHJZ): The last letter was painted directly onto the fin only in black (or, on black aircraft, in white). When GB.I/19 took over Invaders from other units in late 1954 and in 1955, it is likely that those aircraft were normally left in their original markings and kept their original call-signs.

B-26B serial 41-395.. (possibly 41-39586), F-RBLR, showing GB.1/91's practice of displaying the last two letters of the call-sign on the fin, rather than the last letter only. The red disk around the letters is clearly visible in the original print, as is the unit badge on the nose. via M. Rostaing

GB.I/25 (F-RASA to F-RASZ; from 1954 also FRATA to F-RATZ): On the fin, the last letter was painted in black on a yellow disk. Later on, the letter was often also applied to the nose of the aircraft, in black (or, on black aircraft, inred). GB.1/91 (F-RBLA to F-RBLZ): The last letter of the call-sign, preceded by an 'L' in smaller size, was painted on the fin in white on a red disk outlined in white. It appears that codeletters were normally not carried on the nose of the aircraft. ER.B-26/ERP.2/19 (F-UHJA to F-UHJZ; last part of range used byGB.1/19 from 1954): The last letter was painted on the fin in white or, in one or two cases, in red.

The aft part of the Invader bomb bay. SHAA ref. B79 2984 via A. Grandolini

Each squadron had a coat of arms which was often carried on the nose of the aircraft. In late 1954, GB.l/19 replaced this with a pendant of a different design, incorporating the SAL.58 and SPA.79 unit insignia dating back to the First World War. With the exception of the names carried by four of the RB-26Cs, individual markings were seldom if ever applied to the Invaders in Indochina.

1 FRANCE: INDOCHINA

31

L'ARMEE DE L'AlR (French Air Force): INDOCHINA Based on research by Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard Chenel, Musee de !'Air, Paris. The 'Remarks' column include details of unit service, as far as possible in chronological order. Due to space limitations, only the last letter in the call-sign has been given. This rneans that an aircraft listed as 'GB.1/91 (R)' had the call-sign F-RBLR, while 'GB.I/25 (A)' could be either F-RASA or F-RATA (usually only the last letter is known).

'",

AASerial

Version

41-39407

Previous identity/users

TOC

SOC

B-26B

23 Mar 53

14 Oct 55

41-39447

B-26B

16 Feb 54

14 Oct 55

41-39454

B-26B

16 Feb 54

Apr 54

41-39473

B-26B

16 Feb 54

7 Oct 55

41-39489 41-39490

B-26B B-26B

16 Feb 54 16 Feb 54

Sep 55 Oct 55

41-39492

B-26B

16 Feb 54

54

41-39494 41-39561

B-26B B-26B

16 Feb 54 16 Feb 54

7 Oct 55 17 Nov 55

41-39582 41-39585

B-26B B-26B

23 Mar 53 23 Mar 53

10 Nov 55 Oct 53

41-39586

B-26B

18 May 53

16 Nov 55

41-39594 41-39598 43-22346

B-26B B-26B B-26B

23 Mar 53 18 May 53 6 Apr 5"4

7 Oct 55 Aug 54 4 Sep 54

43-22458 43-22459 43-22747

B-26B B-26B B-26C

23 Mar 53 18 May 53 10 Mar 52

7 Oct 55 14 Oct 55 May 54

44-34109

B-26C

18Apr 52

7 Oct 55

44-34147

B-26C

I Jul54

31 Aug 54

44-34162

B-26B

16 Feb 54

7 Oct 55

44-34230 44-34320

B-26C B-26B

16 Feb 54 26 Jan 54

22 Oct 55 22 Oct 55

44-34329

B-26C

I Jul54

31 Aug 54

44-34364

B-26C

I Jul 54

31 Aug 54

44-34390

B-26C

16 Feb 54

10 Nov 55

44-34487

B-26C

16 Feb 54

May 54

44-34496

B-26B

26 Jan 54

54

44-34505

B-26B

3 Jan 51

16 Nov 55

44-34528

B-26B

3 Jan 51

53

44-34530

B-26B

3 Jan 51

54

Remarks Served with GB.1/91 (call-sign Y) and GB.1/19 (call-signs Y and T). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.IIl9 (S?), GB.I/91 (V) and GB.I/19 (V?). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.IIl9 (E). Crashed on take-off (u/c collapsed) II Mar 54. GB.I/25 (N). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/91 (W) and GB.1/25 (T). Accident 9 Feb 55. GB.I/19 (C and N). Crashed 29 Aug 54 at Cap St Jacques; not repaired? GB.I/25 (U). Shot down by AA 17 Jun 54 near Thai N'Guyen. GB.I/25 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/25 () and GB.1/19 (). Returned to the USAF. Became N6837D. No longer extant. GB.I/19 (Z). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/25 (V). Shot down by AA 29 Sep 53. Crashed 8 km SE Hanoi. GB.I/91 () and GB.I/25 (). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/25 (T). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (V). Crashed I Jul 54 at Tourane. GB.I/91 (J and P?). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.I/25 (S). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/25 (Z). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/25 (G). Destroyed 6 Mar 54 by sabotage at Cat Bi. GB.I/25 (Q), GB.1/91 (E?) and GB.I/25 (Q). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/25 (G). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.I/25 (I). Incorrectly shown as '41-39162' in some AA records. Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (Q). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/91 (U) and GB.1/19 (R). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.1/25 (U). Returned to the USAF. Became N6836D. Probably no longer extant. GB.I/19 (R). Missing 14 Mar 54 between Dien Bien Phu & CatBi. GB.I/19? (H) Shot down 4 May 54 at Dien Bien Phu. GB.I/19 (L and N). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/19 (V). Shot down 6 Jan 53 between Na San and Haiphong. GB.I/19 (M). Crashed on take-off 3 Jan 54 at Seno in Laos.

32

FOREIGN INVADERS

AASeriaI

Version

44-34536

Previous identity/users

TOC

SOC

B-26B

3 Jan 51

51

44-34538

B-26B

3 Jan 51

22 Oct 55

44-34539

B-26C

I Jul54

28 Aug 54

44-34545

B-26B

3 Jan 51

51

44-34552

B-26B

26 Jan 54

14 Oct 55

44-34554

B-26B

3 Jan 51

22 Oct 55

44-34555

B-26B

3 Jan 51

10 Nov 55

44-34558

B-26B

3 Jan 51

May 51

44-34564

B-26B

3 Jan 51

22 Oct 55

44-34565

B-26B

3 Jan 51

53

44-34568

B-26B

3 Jan 51

16 Nov 55

44-34569

B-26B

26 Jan 54

22 Oct 55

44-34575

B-26B

3 Jan 51

27 Oct 55

44-34577

B-26B

3 Jan 51

27 Oct 55

44-34579

B-26B

3 Jan 51

27 Oct 55

44-34583

B-26B

3 Jan 51

51

44-34585

B-26B

3 Jan 51

11 Jul55

44-34591 44-34686

B-26C B-26B

16 Feb 54 26 Jan 54

7 Oct 55 16 Nov 55

44-34693 44-34713

B-26C B-26B

16 Feb 54 26 Jan 54

22 Oct 55 10 Nov 55

44-35202

B-26C

12 Mar 52

17Nov55

44-35228

B-26B

9 Apr 54

31 Aug 54

44-35235

B-26B

10 Apr 54

4 Sep 54

44-35239

B-26C

12 Mar 52

54

44-35267

B-26B

7 Apr 54

4 Sep 54

44-35307 44-35315

RB-26C B-26B

10 Apr 54 7 Apr 54

22 Oct 55 28 Aug 54

44-35331

B-26C

18 Apr 52

54

44-35345

B-26B

7 Apr 54

27 Aug 54

44-35357

B-26C

10 Mar 52

May 54

44-35366

B-26B

6 Apr 54

10 Jul54

Remarks GB.I/19 (2). Lost 3 Nov 51 near Nhat-Ny. Crew MIA. GB.l/19 (N and W). Returned to the USAF. Became N6839D, later N34538. Still flying 1992. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Later to Operation Haik and Project Farm Gate. GB.I/19 (0) Missing I I Sep 51. Wreck later found near Tuyeng Quang. Crew killed. GB.l/19 (0 and X). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/19 (X), GB.l/25 ( ) and GB. 1/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/19 (P). Returned to the USAF. Became N84, N841W, N5BP, N550 and later N26HK. In storage, Florida, in 1991. GB.l/19 (R). Missing 28 Apr 51 near Cao Bang. Crew of two plus two passengers missing. GB.l/19 (K and H). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/19 (1). Exploded in mid-air 6 Nov 53 near Sud-Laie. GB.I/19 (U). Returned to the USAF. Became N202P and later AP-AW (unconfirmed). Derelict at Karachi 1992. GB.l/19 (I), GB.I/91 (I), GB.I/25 (I) & GB.I/19 (). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/19 (Q), GB.I/25 (D) and GB.1/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/19 (T), GB.I/25 () and GB.I/19 (0). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (S and D). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (Y). Crashed on landing 31 May 51 at Cat Bi. Crew survived. GB.I/19 (W), GB.I/91 (E) and GB.I/25 (). Accident 21 Jun 55. GB.I/25 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/25 (W) and GB.I/19 (I). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/19 (0). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/25 (X and K) and GB.I/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Became N706ME, N36BB, N26MR and later N26WB. In Museum, New York, in 1992. GB.I/25 (K) and GB.I/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/91 (R and X). Returned to the USAF. Later to M in Europe. GB.I/91 (S). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.I/25 (Y). Shot down 26 Apr 54 at Dien Bien Phu? Also listed as destroyed on the ground, same date. GB.I/91 (U). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s. Became N8034E. Scrapped early 1970s. ERP.2/19 (A). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/91 (D). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.I/25 (P). Crashed II Apr 54 into Mekong near Ban Tanoun in Laos, due to M hits at Dien Bien Phu. GB.I/91 (). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s. Became N8031E. Scrapped early 1970s. GB.I/25 (H). Crashed on landing 10 Apr 54 at Haiphong. GB.I/91 (L). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped.

FRANCE: INDOCHINA

33

TOe

soc

B-26B

6 Apr 54

28 Aug 54

44-35372

B-26B

6 Apr 54

28 Aug 54

44-35382

B-26C

1 Jul54

28 Aug 54

44-35391

B-26C

1 Jul54

28 Aug 54

44-35401

B-26B

9 Apr 54

3 Jul54

44-35405

B-26B

9 Apr 54

31 Aug 54

44-35411

B-26C

1 Jul54

31 Aug 54

44-35413

B-26B

6 Apr 54

3 Jul54

44-35425

B-26B

6 Apr 54

31 Aug 54

44-35426

B-26B

9 Apr 54

3 Jul54

44-35431

B-26B

7 Apr 54

4 Sep 54

44-35439

B-26B

6 Apr 54

4 Sep 54

44-35440

B-26B

16 Feb 54

22 Oct 55

44-35520

B-26B

9 Apr 54

4 Sep 54

44-35541

B-26B

7 Apr 54

10 Jul54

44-35586

B-26B

9 Apr 54

7 Jul54

44-35609

B-26B

9 Apr 54

28 Aug 54

44-35610

B-26B

9 Apr 54

8 Jul54

44-35615

B-26B

9 Apr 54

28 Aug 54

44-35643

RB-26C

10 Apr 54

22 Oct 55

44-35654

RB-26C

10Apr 54

14 Oct 55

44-35660

RB-26C

26 Jan 54

Apr 54

44-35671

B-26B

6 Apr 54

31 Aug 54

44-35696

B-26B

6 Apr 54

3 Jul54

44-35705

RB-26C

19Aug 51

May 54

44-35708

B-26C

18 Apr 52

10 Nov 55

44-35726

RB-26C

19 Aug 51

51

44-35727

B-26C

12 Mar 52

Nov 53

44-35729

B-26C

18 Apr 52

22 Oct 55

44-35740 44-35741

B-26C RB-26C

10 Mar 52 19 Aug 51

May 54 14 Oct 55

AASerial

Version

44-35369

Previous identity/users

Remarks GB.I/91 (M). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Became N8028E. In museum, Tucson, 1990. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.1/91 (T). Returned to the USAF. Later to AA in Europe. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.1/91? (H?) Returned to the USAF. Later to Operation Pluto? No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Later to AA in Europe. GB.1/91 (Q).Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s. Became N3427G.Crashed 1976. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Later to AA in Europe. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Later to AA in Europe. GB.1/91? (Y). Returned to the USAF. Became N74833. Still flying in 1992. GB.I/19 (G). Returned to the USAF. Became N6838D and later C-FMSB. On display at Travis AFB in 1990. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.1/91 (E). Returned to the USAF. Became N8032E. Scrapped in early 1970s. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.I/91 (G and R). Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s. Became N8030E. Scrapped in early 1970s. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. ERP.2/19 (F) and GB.1/19 (). Returned to the USAF. Became N6481D, C-GCES, N8015H and later N226RW. Still flying in 1993. ERP.2/19 (G) and GB.1/19 (). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. ERP.2/19 (F). On temporary loan only. Returned to the USAF. SOC late 1950s and scrapped. GB.1/91 (K). Returned to the USAF. Became N8033E. Scrapped in early 1970s. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Became N8036E. Still registered in 1992. GB.1/91 (), ERB-26 (C) and ERP.2/19 (C). Named Porthas. Crashed on landing 10 Apr 54 at CatBi. GB.1/25 (0), GB.1/91 (0), GB.1/19 () and ERP.2/19 (D). Returned to the USAF. Became N5530Vand later C-GXGY. Still flying in 1992. GB.1/91 () and ERB-26 (B). Missing 17 Nov 51 off Hue harbour after engine problems. Crew MIA. GB.1/25 (V). Fate unknown; possibly SOC due to accident 4 Apr 53. GB.1/25 (R), GB.1/9l (R), ERP.2/19 (C) and GB.I/19 (R). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/25 (F). Shot down 26 Apr 54 Dien Bien Phu. GB.I/91 (), ERB-26 (E), ERP.2/19 (E) and GB.1/19 ( ). Named Milady and Aramis. Returned to the USAF. Scrapped.

34

FOREIGN INVADERS

TOe

soc

B-26C B-26B

5 Mar 52 6 Apr 54

7 Oct 55 54

44-35770

B-26C

12 Mar 52

10 Nov 55

44-35774

B-26C

5 Mar 52

3 Dec 55

44-35785

RB-26C

19 Aug 51

22 Oct 55

44-35787

B-26C

5 Mar 52

10 Nov 55

44-35798

B-26C

3 Jan 51

22 Oct 55

44-35811

B-26C

3 Jan 51?

51

44-35819

RB-26C

19Aug 51

14 Oct 55

44-35826

B-26C

10 Mar 52

22 Oct 55

44-35828

B-26C

3 Jan 51

7 Oct 55

44-35829

B-26C

3 Jan 51

17Nov55

44-35831

B-26C

3 Jan 51

14 Oct 55

44-35837

B-26C

5 Mar 52

10 Nov 55

44-35891

B-26C

3 Jan 51

14 Oct 55

44-35892

B-26C

1 Jul54

23 Aug 54

44-35911

B-26C

3 Jan 51

22 Oct 55

44-35927 44-35991

B-26C B-26C

3 Jan 51 16 Feb 54

53 10 Nov 55

AASerial

Version

44-35747 44-35748

Previous identity/users

Remarks GB.l/25 (B). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/91 (T). Crashed on landing 9 Jun 54 at Tourane. GB.l/25 (1) and GB.l/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.I/25 (C) and GB.1/19 (U). Returned engineless to the USAF (not taken up). GB.l/91 (), ER.B-26 (D), ERP.2/19 (D and H) and GB.l/19 ( ). Narned d'Artagnan. Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/25 (A? and D), GB.1/91 (D) and GB.l/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (G) and ERP.2/19 (P) (used by GB.l/19). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (H). Crashed on take-off 19 Jun 51 at Tourane. GB.l/91 (), ER.B-26 (A), ERP.2/19 (A and D) and GB.l/19 (). NarnedAthos. Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/25 (M) and GB.l/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (B), GB.l/91 (F) and GB.I/25 (). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (C and U), GB.1/91 (B) and GB.1/19 (V). . Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.1/19 (D) and GB.1/25 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/25 (E) and GB.1/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Scrapped. GB.l/19 (F) and GB.1/25 ( ). Returned to the USAF. Became N34962. No longer extant. No known unit service. Returned to the USAF. Became N4811E. In museum, Pueblo, CO, in 1988. GB.l/19 (E and V). Returned to the USAF. Became N6840D. Stilillying in 1992. GB.1/19 (A). Lost 6 Nov 53 at Hon Dau island. ERP.2/19 (S) and GB.1/19 ( ). Returned to the USAF.. Scrapped.

Loading up an Invader of GB.1/19 at Tourane -later better known as Da Nang - during the early years of the Indochina war. ECPA ref. INA R 56

FOREIGN INVADERS

35

Chapter Five

France: Europe and North Africa

t

As mentioned in the chapter on Indochina, the B-26s operated by the French Armee de l'Air (AA) in Europe and North Africa were a completely different group of aircraft from those used in the Far East. There was not a single case of an Invader being transferred directly from the AA in Indochina to the AA in Europe, or vice versa. The first five B-26s obtained by the French for use in Europe were not intended as combat aircraft, nor were they supplied by the US government under any aid programme. Strictly speaking, they were not even Arrnee de l'Air aircraft, since they were initially delivered to the CEV (Centre d'Essais en Vol, or Flight Test Centre) at Bretigny-sur-Orge near Paris. The CEV, which reports directly to the Ministry of Defence, is an experimental establishment similar to the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Great Britain. It conducts testing of aircraft, engines and equipment for military aviation, including the Navy and the Army air services, but concentrates on evaluation of concepts rather than routine evaluation of new aircraft types. The Invaders . were therefore in effect purchased to be used as flying test beds for electronics and other' equipment. None of these B-26s had seen any US military service, since they belonged to a batch of A-26Bs transferred straight from the factory at Long Beach to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) in late 1945, after the USAAF had cancelled the contract. The RFC, and the later War Assets Administration (WAA), were organizations set up by the US government to handle the disposal of surplus equipment once the war was over. At least four of the five Invaders going to the CEV had been sold as surplus at Kingman Field, Arizona in February 1946, at a price of $2,000

A real 'mystery ship,' this unidentified Invader was snapped at Paris-Orly on 7 September 1951. It may well have been the first French Invader in Europe, but its origin and fate are not known. The serial on the fin is 'X9 . .' (possibly X938). B. Chenel CEV number 161 seen at Rabat, Morocco in August 1955. This Invader, which had its bomb bay replaced by a cabin, was one of the aircraft acquired in 1951-52 for use as test beds. The colour scheme is believed to have been blue with yellow trim. via M. Rostaing

each. The FAA file of the fifth aircraft, believed to have been N67159, was destroyed in 1967, so its identity and history cannot be completely verified. The buyer of the Invaders was the Charles H. Babb Company, one of the largest dealers in surplus aircraft after the Second World War. Babb soon resold the aircraft to various civilian buyers in the USA, and one of them even served as a survey aircraft in Venezuela for a period in early 1947. In 1951 and 1952, the air attache of the French Embassy in Washington bought the aircraft one by one from their respective owners, apparently with Babb acting as an intermediary in at least some of the cases. Since there are few records available on the CEV Invaders, it is not known exactly when the first one arrived in France, but it was probably around July 1951. Judging from photographs, the B-26s were left in their civilian colour schemes. Three of them simply retained the last three digits of the US civilian registration as their CEV serial numbers, while a fourth was given the serial 052, which coincided with the last three digits of its con-

struction number. The fifth Invader - the one not positively identified - used the serial 779, which apparently did not coincide with anything. A poor photo - taken at Orly airport in September 1951 - also exists of a French B-26B carrying a serial that seems to read 'X938' or perhaps 'X939,' possibly indicating the existence of a sixth CEV aircraft at this early stage. The B-26 was well suited to the requirements of the CEV, and in the spring of 1953 two additional aircraft were added to their fleet. Both of them had previously belonged to a wealthy Mexican industrialist, and on delivery they carried the respective names El Fantasma (The Phantom) and Ellndio (The Indian). Their original serials in French service were ZOOI and Z002, which were apparently the serials previously carried in Mexico. Unlike the first five CEV B-26s, which all survived in service until 1968, these two additional aircraft disappeared from sight immediately after arrival, and there is no trace of them in French records. In early 1953, the French air attache in Washington had begun negotiations with the

36

B-26C 157 was another early CEV Invader, used for armaments trials. It had a brief past with an American survey company in Venezuela, and the cryptic legend 'COASTAL LUCK' under the windscreen may have been a relic of that period. The aircraft was mainly yellow, with the nose decor most likely painted in black. via 1. Mutin

Eastern Aircraft Sales Corporation in New York for the purchase of seven other B-26s. The contract was signed on 10 March 1953, and a few days later an export licence was issued by the US State Department'. The seven Invaders had all been authorized for reclamation' by the USAF in 1950, ending up with a junk dealer by the name of Alex Oser, before being purchased by the Texas Railway Equipment Co. in Houston, Texas, and registered in early 1952. This company sold the aircraft to Eastern Aircraft Sales, and Eastern sold them to the French for around $144,000 each. The aircraft were given the serials Z003 to Z009 and were delivered from late 1953. These new B-26s were not destined for CEV, but for two Armee de ('Air units. Three of the Invaders went to CEAM, the military aviation evaluation centre at Mont-de-Marsan in southwestern France, while the other four were allocated to the station flight of Base Ecole (Training Base) 706 at Cazaux, on the Atlantic coast to the northwest of Mont-deMarsan. With BE.706 - which housed the CTB, or Centre de Tir et de Bombardement the Invaders were used for target towing. Like the previously delivered Invaders, these aircraft seem to have kept whatever civilian paint schemes worn on delivery. Due to a legal wrangle over ownership in the USA, the last aircJ;aft was not received into service until November 1954. By this time the war in Indochina had ended, and some of the B-26s used in that theatre had already been handed back to the USAF. Under happier circumstances, this might have been more or less the end of the Invader's history in French service, but by now France had already

FOREIGN INVADERS

become involved in another colonial-style war, this time closer to home. Algeria was invaded by French troops in 1830, and in 1848 the territory was declared to be an integral part of France. This fact· was later to complicate the things immeasurably, since Algeria was not seen as 'just another colony,' even though the situation over the next hundred years developed in much the same way as in colonies elsewhere in Africa, with white settlers and companies gradually taking over much of the land and wealth of the country. The events of the Second World War had fuelled the hopes of the non-white Algerians, who expected their status to be raised to equal that of the whites. Some reforms were promised by the French government after several thousand people had been killed during riots and reprisals in 1945, and elections were held for an Algerian assembly, with the nine million Arabs and Berbers allowed to elect a number of representatives equal to that elected by the white settlers. But the results of both the 1948 and the 1951 elections were blatantly rigged, with most of the seats being awarded to proFrench rather than nationalist candidates, and by the early 1950s an armed resistance movement had formed in the Kabylia mountains to the east of the capital Algiers. In April 1954, the various extremist nationalist organizations joined forces and formed a revolutionary movement that was soon to be known as the National Liberation Front, the FLN; its armed branch being called the National Liberation Army, or the ALN. The first attacks on barracks, bridges and other targets throughout northern Algeria were carried out on 1 November 1954. The results were generally poor, and during the winter the French Army pushed the ALN back into the mountains. Despite this, the popular support for the FLN increased steadily during 1955. Many of the attacks were now aimed at pro-French Algerians and the properties of white settlers. A massacre of whites in the Philippeville area in August, and the resulting bloody reprisals against the Moslem popula-

tion by French troops, greatly diminished the hopes of any peaceful solution to the conflict. By early 1956, the strength of the ALN had reached nearly 20,000, and in February the French government decided to increase the number of troops in Algeria to 500,000, compared to the 57,000 servicemen available in 1954. The Armee de l'Air strength in Algeria had so far been relatively weak. At the end of 1955, the only M aircraft in Algeria usable for ground attack were the two squadrons of Mistrals (French-built, improved Vampires) of the 6" Escadre de Chasse based at Oran. Four further Mistral squadrons were based in Morocco and Tunisia. Both these countries became independent in March 1956, but France retained the right to continue to operate from some of their military bases. In addition, the Aeronavale had two squadrons of Hellcats and Corsairs in North Africa. The Mistrals, which were basically intended for air defence, were quickly found to be unsuitable for the ground attack role, due to their limited endurance, high speed and vulnerability to ground fire. From the spring of 1956 a large number of EALAs (Escadrilles d'Aviation Legere d'Appui, or Light Air Support Flights) were formed with MS.733s, T-6s and other light aircraft equipped with rocket pods and machine guns, and capable of carrying light bombs. These small units were based at fields all over Algeria, and worked in direct co-operation with the local army units. In April 1956 the 20e Escadre de Chasse was added, with two squadrons of Thunderbolts at Oran. Meanwhile, the M had proposed to deploy bombers to Algeria, to provide a capability to hit ALN troop concentrations and other targets requiring concentrated air support'. Some critics maintained that bombers were not suitable weapons against the lightly armed ALN, which seldom operated in formations larger than a 11 O-man 'Katiba,' and to prove that bombers could be effective in Algeria the M formed the Escadrille de Bombardement 77 at Oran in May 1956. The flight's equipment consisted of six MD-311 navigation trainers, which were ill suited to the role, but the results were sufficient to press home the Armee de l'Air arguments. 'The export licence actually covered nine Invaders, the additional two aircraft possibly having been added in anticipation of future sales. One of them (41-39527/N65Y) crashed near Burbank in January 1954, while the other (41-39479/N71Y) was still registered in the USA in the late 1980s. "Authorised for Reclamation' was a term used by the USAF to describe that an aircraft had been struck off charge and could be stripped for parts, or otherwise disposed of. "In the early months of the conflict some Ju 52s had been pressed into service as bombers, but only a few such missions were flown.

Since the end of the Indochinese war had once again left the AA without bombers, it was decided to set up two B-26 squadrons as a temporary solution, pending the availability of the Vautour jets then under development in France. The United States were requested to supply the necessary aircraft, and in July 1956 an initial thirty-six B-26Bs and B-26Cs were allocated to MDAP project 6B541, followed by twelve more in August and a final two in September. The Invaders were overhauled in the USA before being ferried to France by civilian crews employed by Fleetways, Inc., of Burbank in California. The deliveries progressed slowly at first, and only five B-26s had accepted into AA service by the end of September. It had initially been intended to use EB. 77 as an operational conversion unit, but instead this flight was disbanded and a new unit, the CIE.B-26" created at Oran in August 1956, receiving its first Invader on the 16th of that month. Most of the crews were veterans of the B-26 operations in Indochina, with a few more being taken from transport units. As additional aircraft were received during the autumn of 1956, the training was stepped up, and some operational reconnaissance sorties were flown with the MD-311 s taken over from EB. 77. Two bomber squadrons, Groupe de Bombardement 1/91 Gascogne 5 and GB.2/91 Guyenne, were officially formed at Oran on I September but, since they possessed no aircraft of their own, remained paper formations only for several weeks. GB.2/91 received their first B-26s in December 1956, while GB.1/91 took over many of the CIE.B-26 Invaders in January 1957. Around the same' time, CIE,B-26 was disbanded, and the task of training Invader crews was taken over by C18,328; a new bombing training centre formed at Bordeaux on 1January. The AA had received 42 B-26 bombers by the end of January, one of which had already been lost in an accident, while two others had been lost during the ferrying from the USA. The six last stragglers eventually arrived in February and March 1957. Most, if not all of the B-26s retained their dorsal gun barbettes, fully armed, while only a few had the ventral one still in place, without machine guns. 'By some sources called ClB.329, but CIE.B-26 was the designation used in the unit's records. 'Under the complicated French system of unit lineage, GB.1/91 Gascogne took over the traditions of GB.1/19 Gascogne that had used B-26s in Indochina, while the former GB.1/91 Bourgogne - which also used B-26s in Indochina - was re-formed as EB.1/92 Bourgogne in 1958 and equipped with Vautour bombers. 'Douglas at EI Segundo had a third series for the A-26 prototypes, but they only built three aircraft. 'On delivery from England, each RB-26C carried a number in the sequence 'F-01' to 'F-12'; these were probably removed soon after arrival.

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

37

All B-26s delivered in 1956 and 1957 were overall black, except for the top of the fuselage which was often painted white. The national insignia consisted of the usual rudder stripes, plus roundels in six positions. The individual aircraft code letter (actually the last letter of the call-sign, as explained later on in this chapter) was painted on the fin in white. The fin also carried the aircraft serial number but, unlike the B-26s in Indochina, those in Algeria initially did not use the USAF serial. The Armee de I'Air instead chose to use the fuselage number as a serial. This number, which should not be confused with the construction number, was assigned by Douglas; each of the two plants building Invaders using a series starting at number I and working their way Up6. This meant that there actually were two Invaders built with fuselage number 123, for example, but the odds were heavy against both of them being delivered to the AA, and no such duplications occurred before the system was dropped. To this serial was added a letter showing the aircraft version, e.g. '250-B' for a B-26B or '1 082-C' for a B-26C. While the training of the bomber crews was being carried out in Algeria, an RB-26 reconnaissance squadron had been formed at Cognac in southwestern France, in August 1956. The unit was called Escadron de Reconnaissance Photographique 1/32 Armagnac, thereby taking up the traditions of ERP.2/19 Armagnac which had operated RB26s in Indochina. The USAF had allocated twelve RB-26Cs under MDAP project 6B541 in July 1956, and on 9 August four French pilots were sent to Lyneham in England to pick up the first aircraft. All twelve RB-26s were taken from stocks in England, where most if not all . had been overhauled by Fairey Aviation Ltd, at Ringway. Eleven of the aircraft had reached ERP.1/32 by late September, with the final aircraft arriving in late October. They were painted similarly to the B-26s but - to complicate things further - appear to have carried the last three digits of the USAF serial rather than the fuselage number on their fins 7•

A detachment of three aircraft was sent to Blida in Algeria on 19 November 1956, while a single RB-26 was dispatched to Fort Flaters in Chad during the same month, to survey the Fezzan area. The following month the whole squadron deployed to Blida. Most of its missions were flown in Algeria, but some reconnaissance missions were also flown along the border between Morocco and Spanish Morocco. The two bomber squadrons became operational in early 1957, and were placed under Groupement de Bombardement (Bomber Sub-command) 481 of the 5e Region Aerienne (Air Region), created on I February. This organisation had mainly an administrative and technical responsibility for the squadrons, while the operations were normally controlled by the three regional Tactical Air Commands in Algeria (GATAC I in Constantine, GATAC 2 in Oran and GATAC 3 in Algiers), who 'leased' the bombers for specific missions. GB.2/91 remained based at Oran in western Algeria, while GB.I/91 moved to Bone in the eastern part of the country on I February 1957. During the first year, most of the B-26 missions - each usually involving three to six aircraft - were flown in support of operations in the Constantine region in northeastern Algeria. The Invaders were used for level bombing, as well as dive bombing and strafing. In the latter cases they operated under the direction of a FAC, who marked the targets with white phosphorus markers. The most common FAC aircraft in Algeria was the

ZOOI and Z002 were two French Invaders about which very little is known. Their Spanish names had been added during their previous service in Mexico. This photo of Z002 El Indio (the name is just visible on the nose) was taken at Jamaica, New York in the spring of 1953, at which time the aircraft was red with trim probably in blue and white. The flags on the nose appear to be those of the USA, Cuba, Guatemala, EI Salvador and Nicaragua. W. Steeneck via J. M. G. Gradidge

38

Cessna L-19, but Piper Cubs and a variety of French-manufactured light aircraft were also employed in this role. Patrols were also flown over 'free fire zones,' which were areas from which all civilians had been evacuated and where no French ground units operated. Anything moving on the ground was therefore considered hostile, and could be fired upon without a FAC. The ALN never developed any real anti-aircraft capability inside Algeria, and the only danger was that somebody would get lucky with a rifle or light machine gun. Combat losses were therefore relatively light compared to Indochina. But the ALN did at least develop a system of aircraft spotting and reporting, giving easily remembered names to the various French types. The T-6, for example, was usually known as 'the yellow plane,' the Piper Cub as 'the plane which doesn't make noise' and the H-19 and H-34 helicopters as 'the aircraft that lands.' The B-26 was normally just called 'the black aircraft with two engines,' but unlike the other types it was sometimes also referred to by number. Strangely enough, the ones used were 'B-29' and even 'B-51', rather than B-26. The most demanding missions of the early period were flown in the Aures mountains. The ALN guerrillas would often hide in caves on the hillsides, and could only be attacked by aircraft flying down the narrow valleys between the mountains. Some of these missions were carried out by B-26s firing rockets, while others were flown by MD-311s of GOM.86, using wire-guided AS. I I missiles. The first deployment of B-26s outside Algeria took place on 19 March, when a few aircraft were sent to Marrakesh in Morocco

FOREIGN INVADERS

for a show of force, after several French resi- Colomb Bechar near the border to Spanish dents had been assassinated during pro-FLN Morocco on 5 February 1957. The bulk of the patrols over the Sahara desert were flown by demonstrations. The increasing cost of the war in Algeria the venerable AAC.I s (French-built Ju 52s) of was soon to affect the Invader units, and GSRA.76 and 78. In the rare cases when a ERP.I/32 was disbanded on I May 1957 for smuggling caravan was spotted, the B-26s budgetary reasons. Most of its RB-26s were were called in to strafe it. The camel drivers re-a1located to GB.I/91 and GB.2/91 who now would normally have fled by the time the took responsibility for the reconnaissance bombers arrived at the scene, leaving the air missions, while a single aircraft went to .crews to attack the luckless animals which often literally exploded when their ammuniCIB.328 for training purposes. Apart from their employment in close sup- tion loads were hit. But most of the supplies for the FLN came port of ground operations, the B-26s were also at times used for independent missions. from newly independent Tunisia, which also Most of these were directed by the GATACs, allowed the organization to set up training such as GATAC I 's Operation Blanche Neige camps in the country. Since it was impossible (Snow-white) against three villages south of to keep up a constant surveillance of the Letourneux on I July 1957, where eight B-26s northern part of the border, where the mounof GB.1/91 - together with four T-6Gs, two tainous terrain gave plenty of cover for any MD-311s and three MD-315s - attacked a infiltrators, the French decided to build an reported meeting of some FLN leaders. In electrified fence from the Mediterranean to some cases Groupement de Bombardement the Sahara, a distance of over 200 miles. 481 initiated interdiction missions on their Mines were planted on both sides, and senown. One of the first of these took place from sors enabled the 80,000 troops deployed 13 to IS June 1957, when GB.I/91 bombed along the border to detect any attempt to cut suspected ALN positions around Mecharia; the wires. This imposing structure became the nineteen B-26s involved dropping a total known as the Morice Line after the French of 154 bombs and firing 30,400 rounds of .50 Minister of Defence at the time, and was calibre ammunition. completed in September 1957. It became the The B-26s were also briefly engaged in scene for most of the fighting between the leaflet dropping missions during 1957, but this task was soon handed over to the transport aircraft of the AA. During the war, detachments of B-26s were Most of the Z-serialled Invaders had a spartan natural metal finish, like Z007 seen while to be temporarily based in southem Algeria serving with CEAM in the late 1950s. Note the on several occasions, to support the attempts belly radome and split bomb bay doors: to counter weapons smuggling to the FLN. apparently the aircraft was used during the The first such detachment, consisting of a development of the B-26APQ13 radar trainer. few Invaders from GB.2/91, arrived at J. Lebourg collection via A. Grandolini

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

t

39

French Army and the FLN in late 1957 and early 1958. A similar fence was later constructed along the border with Morocco. The Morice Line was kept under constant surveillance by light aircraft of the EALA units during day time. At night, patrols were mounted by the B-26 squadrons, as well as the Aeronavale Flotille 28F flying Privateers and Escadrille 4S using Lancasters (the two latter types later being replaced by Neptunes). C-47 and Noratlas aircraft were also employed. When an attempt to cross the fence was discovered, the aircraft would immediately be directed to the spot. The normal practice was to allow the infiltrators to get into the free fire zone some distance from the border before they were attacked, to avoid accidental strikes on the French troops in June 1958, when General de Gaulle was and installations along the Morice Line. In Four of the 8-26s delivered in 1954 - including returned to power, after threats of a military these cases the Invaders would sometimes ZOOS - were allocated to 8E.706 for target function as airborne strike controllers for towing, in which role the survivors continued coup by officers of the French forces in fighter-bombers scrambled to attack the FLN to serve until 1964. via 1. Mutin Algeria. During the rest of the year de Gaulle was busy with his political programme, while units. They were also employed to illuminate the FLN regrouped after their setbacks the the area with 'Luciole' flares, at times circling for hours while army units attempted to killed, including a number of women and previous winter and spring, which meant that round up the guerrillas. During these mis- children. President Bourguiba of Tunisia there was a lull in the fighting. During this sions, the Invaders were guided by the air immediately demanded that the French period, B-26s of GB.2/91 deployed to Atar in defence radars at Bone, Jean Rigal and Bir EI evacuate all their remaining bases in his Mauritania, while a single RB-26 was Ater. Initially it normally took between thirty country, and the resulting uproar in France detached to Fort Trinquet for surveillance minutes and one hour thirty minutes for the and abroad over the bombing was one of the work over southern Algeria. The aircraft was aircraft to reach the scene, but by 1959 this main reasons behind the fall of the French hit twice by ground fire. By the end of 1958, small detachments of Invaders were based at government on 15 April. had often been reduced to ten minutes. The Sakiet incident was a serious miscal- B1ida, Colomb Bechar and Mecheria in There were a number of border incidents between French Army units and soldiers of culation in the otherwise largely successful Algeria, as well as at Lahr in southern the Tunisian Army. On I I January 1958 an French campaign along the border. The FLN Germany. In December 1958, Armee de PAir General ALN unit crossing the fence near the town of tried every conceivable way of breaching the Sakiet in Tunisia to ambush a French patrol Morice Line, but the French claimed that dur- Maurice Challe arrived in Algeria to take over was reportedly driven to the border in ing January 1958 some thirty-five per cent of as Commander-in-Chief of all French forces, Tunisian military trucks, and a few days -later . the infiltrators were killed, a figure that had with orders to crush the ALN. Unlike his prea T-6 on patrol was shot down by anti-aircraft increased to sixty-five per cent by March. In . decessors, who had attempted to pacify the fire from Sakiet. Another T-6 was damaged by the last days of April some 820 men managed whole country at once, Challe's strategy was gunfire on 30 January, and the French author- to cross the fence near Souk-Arras, but were to clear one area at the time. To accomplish ities issued strongly worded warnings that immediately pinned down by French troops this, he relied heavily on quick-reaction further 'provocations' from the Tunisians flown in by helicopters. For almost a week, troops deployed by helicopter. The new techwould lead to reprisals. When a patrolling the ALN positions were pounded by Invaders, niques were tried out during Operation MD-315 was damaged by ground fire from Mistrals, Thunderbolts, Corsairs and Texans, Oranie in the Ouarsenis mountains to the Sakiet on 8 February, and had to return to its and 620 of the guerrillas were killed or cap- southeast of Oran from February 1959, with base with one engine on fire, the French tured. lt became the last major attempt to great success. cross the line. Increasing losses of assault helicopters led decided to retaliate. The fortunes of the FLN were at a low ebb to a decision to soften up the landing zones Based on reconnaissance photos taken by an RF-84F, eleven B-26s bombed Sakiet three hours after the MD-315 had been hit, with six Aeronavale Corsairs suppressing the Tunisian anti-aircraft guns and eight Mistrals covering the strikes (despite the fact that Tunisia did not have an air force). The Invaders' main targets were the military barracks and depots in the town, but a school, a hospital and several other civilian buildings were also hit and some 80 civilians were The Algerian sand and dust frequently took its toll on the paintwork of the AA Invaders, but 702-8 appears to be in a particularly sorry state. The photo was possibly taken during the aircraft's service with CIE.8-26 in late 1956. via 1. Mutin

40

before their arrival; a task often given to the B-26s or the F-47s. This was a novel role for the Invader crews, and new tactics were quickly worked out, the main problem being to time the strikes to immediately before the arrival of the helicopters. Once the troops had arrived, the B-26s remained in the area to give close air support if needed, either under the control of a FAC or by directions from the ground force commander, who often directed the battle from an A10uette II helicopter. During the Challe offensive, the B-26s were also used for massed bombing missions against cornered ALN units, and it was not uncommon for as many as eighteen Invaders to carry out a formation bomb release. By April, the Ouarsenis was declared cleaned up, and Challe now launched Operation Courroie (Strap) south of Algiers, followed by Operation Jumelles (Binoculars) in Kabylia from July to October and Operation Pierres Precieuses (Precious Stones) north of Constantine in November. Coupled with th~ increased use of native commando units, these operations seriously weakened the ALN and the French forces were on the verge of a military victory in Algeria. But de Gaulle favoured a political solution to the war, and in late 1959 the offensive slowed down. During this new lull, GB.2/91 were able to spare two B-26s for a show-of-the-flag tour in French-speaking Africa. Between 11 and 23 December, the two aircraft clocked up 99 hours 30 minutes, with stops at Niamey in Niger, Bangui in Central Africa, Bunia in Belgian Congo and in Djibouti. A similar tour by three B-26s was also flown in October of the following year. The operational readiness rate of the B-26s was usually.between 70 and 80 per cent during 1959, while that for the RB-26s was normally about ten per cent higher. Unlike the situation in Indochina a few years earlier, the bases in Algeria were well-equipped and

FOREIGN INVADERS

well-staffed since they were part of the NATO base system. By 1958 no less than sixty per cent of the AA manpower was deployed to Algeria, despite the fact that only twenty per cent of its aircraft were there. The proportion of Invader combat missions declined sharply at the end of 1959, and in December each aircraft of GB.1I91 only flew an average of 3.9 combat sorties. On 15 February 1959, each of the two bomber squadrons had sixteen B-26s, four RB-26s and one NC-701 Martinet on charge, but the attrition was slowly eating away at the reserves. The Armee de l'Air had lost a total of ten Invaders up to the end of June 1959, so far without receiving a single replacement aircraft from the USA. But on 27 July 1959 the AA took on charge the first of an additional twenty-six Invaders to be added to its strength up to early 1961. Without exception, the aircraft were ones that had been authorized for reclamation by the USAFE in 1957 and 1958, mainly at the Chateauroux Air Depot in central France. Whether these Invaders were supplied under MAP is unclear; at any rate, the USAF aircraft record cards do not give any indication that this was the case, as they usually would. Since the war in Algeria was a sensitive matter, it is possible that the French were just told to help themselves, while the Americans turned an official blind eye. A report from the USAF 2704th ASDG at Davis-Monthan claimed that ten or more B-26s were being prepared for delivery to France in mid 1960, but it is most unlikely that any of them actually found their way to the Armee de l'Air. Instead, they were possibly diverted to the CIA for use at the Bay of Pigs and elsewhere. The use of fuselage numbers as serials for the Invaders had been discontinued on 17 March 1959, and during the spring the previously delivered B-26s (the CEV, CEAM and BE.706 aircraft apparently included) were re-

marked with their USAF serials. The second batch of B-26s kept their USAF serials from the beginning. It was standard practice in the AA to paint the fiscal year prefix and the two first digits of the serial in smaller numbers, with the last three digits painted in larger size. The version letter was now often painted under the serial. Apart from the obvious Band C (also used on the RB-26C), the letter Z was used on the CEAM test-bed aircraft. This was no doubt due to their original French serial numbers, and served as an indication that the aircraft were in a non-standard configuration (many of them e.g. lacking a bomb bay). The CEV, on the other hand, did not usually paint any version letter on their Invaders, even if some of the aircraft they used for radar tests were at times referred to as B-26Rs. One of the most concentrated bombardments by the Armee de l'Air in Algeria took place on 6 and 7 April 1960, during Operation Promethe I at the edge of the Sahara. A French Army force landing by helicopter on Hill 1705 was ambushed by Katiba 13 of the AL!'J, and had to withdraw under fire. The ALN positions were then subjected to bombing by both the B-26 squadrons for almost twenty-four hours, with GB.2/91 flying forty sorties and GB.I/91 probably a similar number. On 7 April, the hill was taken by a second French assault. Other attack aircraft also took part in the strikes during this operation. The T-6 was still the mainstay of the light units, but began to be supplemented by T-28s during the year, while the Thunderbolts were finally retired and replaced by Skyraiders. Other ground operations supported by the Invaders during 1960 included Operation Cigogne in the Ouarsenis mountains, and Flameche in the Hodna area, but the aircraft tended to spend more and more time on the ground. General Challe had been transferred in April 1960, and his successor did not conduct the offensive against the FLN as vigorously as Challe had. Although no large-scale crossings of the Morice Line were attempted by the FLN after 1958, smaller groups still tried to get across from time to time and - when discovered were attacked by the B-26s and Privateers. In 1960 these strikes began to be directed by the French Army Cotal radars installed at Bir EI Ater and Megrine. The Cotal was primarily intended for ground surveillance but also had a limited ground-to-air capability. By switching from 'ground' to 'air' mode when the bombers arrived, they could be guided to the target with fairly good accuracy. A few minutes were lost during the switching

The ordnance carried by the B-26s in Algeria included GP bombs of various sizes, fragmentation cluster, French-made rockets and napalm canisters. The GB.I/91 badge is just visible on the nose. 1. Lebourg collection via A. Grandolini

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

41

Close-up of the C18.328 unit badge. The background was flag blue while the eagle was mainly in black and white, with brown legs. Like the badges of GB.I/91 and 2/91, it was carried on the left side only, while ERP.l/32 often applied it on both sides of the nose. ECPA ref. PAR 224 M via C.-J.Ehrengardt RB-26C number 457 over the Algerian city of Constantines, circa 1958. Like many of the RB-26s in Algeria, it carried gun pods under the wings. SHAA ref. 875 124 via A. Grandolini

,

r

(

procedure, however, and the strike therefore had to be directed against a spot some hundred metres ahead of the last known position of the infiltrators. Since crossings were very rare by this time, only a few strikes were ever flown under radar control. During 1960, two new versions of the B-26 were developed by the Armee de !'Air. The first of these was an improved reconnaissance aircraft, referred to as the RB-26P. It differed from the RB-26C in having Frenchmanufactured cameras: one Omera 30, two Omera 31 s and three Sephot-Omera II s. The main external difference was the redesigned, more rectangular camera window on the left side of the nose. The prototype RB-26P was completed in August 1960, and was followed by six more conversions in early 1961. These were based on B-26C airframes, plus a single 8-26B. No armament was carried, and all gun barbettes were removed. Eight of the nine surviving RB-26Cs were later also modified into RB-26Ps, the last one being delivered in mid 1962. All fifteen conversions were performed by the company of Union Mromaritime de Transport (UAT). The aircraft initially continued to be operated by GB.I/91 and GB.2/91 and carried the version letter P on the fin. The second new version was a radar operator trainer, known under the unwieldy designation B-26APQ 13. As the name implies, it was equipped with an APQ-13 radar, mounted in the front part of the bomb bay, with the aerial and its dome protruding from the underside of the fuselage. The bomb bay doors were shortened, allowing a reduced load still to be carried in the aft section. Two pupils could be carried: one in the nose and the other in a rearward-facing seat on the left side of the cockpit, in the position normally occupied by the co-pilot. In addition, a radio operator position was provided in the former gunner's compartment. No armament was mounted. The first two conversions, delivered in the early summer of .1960, were evaluated by CEAM before being passed on to CIB.328 in November. A further four aircraft were converted in 1961 and 1962, all going to CIB.328. All B-26APQ 13s were based on B-26Cs or RB-26Cs, and retained the glass nose. The version letter used on the fin was C, but some of the aircraft carried no letter at all.

In September 1960, all AA bomber units participated in a major exercise in Europe code-named Flash Back. Some twenty-five B-26s of GB.I/91, GB.2/91 and CIB.328, together with Vautour bombers and F-84F and F-IOOD strike aircraft, attempted to penetrate French airspace in a series of mock attacks against targets defended by AA jet fighters. This was very likely the last time the B-26 was ever called upon to perform as a bomber in a conventional war situation. In Algeria, the French forces still had the upper hand in the armed struggle against the

FLN, but certain officers were becoming increasingly disenchanted with de Gaulle's willingness to negotiate with the FLN about a semi-independent Algeria. In April 1961, four Generals - including General Challe - carried out a coup in Algeria. The intention was to seize Paris with paratroopers, but the Air Force and Navy stayed loyal to de Gaulle and their transport aircraft were flown empty to France, to place them out of reach. At Oran, GB.2/91 grounded its Invaders, while Skyraiders of the 20 e Escadre patrolled over the base to discourage the paratrooper units

42

FOREIGN INVADERS

One of the nineteen Invaders to be lost by the Algerian units during the war, 290-C of GB.1/91 came to a muddy end in a crash-landing on 10 March 1959. SHM ref. B882282 via A. Grandolini The Invader may have been many things. but it wasn't fireproof ... Not much was left of French RB-26C number 359 after this violent hangar fire at Oran in September 1958. SHM ref. B882290 via A. Grandolini

Aircraft 424-C 'E' at Le Bourget in October 1958, showing the style of red-shadowed code letters used by GB.2/91 for a period. This Invader was later converted into a B-26N night-fighter. B.Chenel

deployed outside the fence. GB.1I91 at Bone also suspended operations, while Lorraine crosses and 'Vive de Gaulle' slogans started to appear on the hangars. The coup collapsed within a few days, some of the rebelling officers slipping away to set up the Organisation Armee Secrete (OAS) to continue the fight for a French Algeria. The coup all but ended the French military operations in Algeria, and by the summer virtually all daytime B-26 operations had ceased. The Invaders continued to be used for night-time patrols along the Morice Line,

while T-28s and Corsairs provided close air support for the ground troops. With the continuing build-up of ALN forces in Tunisia in late 1960, the AA had begun flying an increasing number of daylight reconnaissance missions across the border. A few RB-26 missions were flown during the fighting around the French bases at Bizerte, Tunisia in July 1961. In September 1961 the RB-26s also began flying regular night missions ranging as far as Kasserine, some 60 kilometres across the border. These missions continued until May 1962, with an average of two sorties per week. They were flown at 4,000 feet, and only one pass over each target was allowed. From February 1962, the RB-26s of GB.1/91 also flew daylight sorties along the border buffer zone, which enabled the French to locate numerable ALN camps and depots. As early as 1956, French intelligence sources indicated that the FLN had begun air~ lifting supplies into Algeria by chartered aircraft, a practice that increased after their defeats along the Morice Line in early 1958. To counter this threat, two radar-equipped MD-315R light transports were detached to Tebessa in Algeria from 20 March 1958. After successful trials, four MD-315Rs were permanently based in Algeria from August, in Operation Beyrouth. These formed the nucleus of the new Escadrille de Chasse de Nuit (Night Fighter Flight) 1/71 set up at Tebessa on 10 October 1958. The unit took over the traditions of the former ECN.1/3 disbanded during the Second World War, and was placed under the command of Zone Defense Aerienne (Air Defence Zone) 903 at but seldom with any 'results. The few B-26 Constantines. Its complement was gradually strikes carried out during the rest of 1961 increased to eight MD-315Rs, and from were mostly small-scale missions, like the November 1959 it also operated three (later one on 4 September when an aircraft of six) Meteor NF.lls in response toreports that GB.2/91 destroyed an ALN mortar position the Egyptians might lend a few MiG-ISs or near the Tunisian border. The last major air MiG-I 7s with pilots to the ALN. strike in which the AA Invaders had a part was In 1960 the ALN was thought to have Operation Boutoir 52, which took place in acquired some light aircraft to be based in October 1961. In the largest French offensive Morocco, and also to have sent a few recruits of the year, formations of up to twenty-one abroad for pilot training. In September of that B-26s, together with Skyraiders, pounded the year the French air defence in Algeria was remains of an ALN Katiba and two regional reorganized to meet the increasing intrucompanies with 500 and 1,000 Ib bombs, sions, and Secteur de Defense Aerienne

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

43

The engine nacelles of this B-26C of GB.1/91 at Bone in July 1960 appear to be painted light grey, but the change in colour is in fact caused by the engine exhaust gases. The different style fuselage roundel on the aircraft in the background is also noteworthy. B. Chene!

10/951 set up La Reghaia to co-ordinate all air defence efforts. It was soon discovered that the MD-315R was too slow and had too short a range for the task at hand, and in early 1961 it was therefore decided to convert a small number of Invaders into night fighters, known asB-26Ns. As with the RB-26P and the B-26APQ13, the modification work was carried out by VAT, the prototype (41-39579) being completed in January 1961. This aircraft was field-tested at Bone in Algeria from 28 February to 17 March, during which period it also flew some strafing missions. Deliveries to ECN.1/71 began on 9 May 1961, after which the Meteors were gradually withdrawn, since the fears of MiGs were believed to have been false'. The only other night fighters in Algeria were a few Vautour lINs of EC.2/6 deployed to the country in mid 1960, but their main task was the protection of the French nuclear test centre at Reggane in the Sahara. All eight B-26N conversions were based on 8-26Cs, which had their glass noses replaced by a radome containing a British AI Mk.x radar, taken from Meteor NF.11s. The B-26Ns had the version letter N painted on their fins, together with the ECN.1/71 badge, but did not carry any code letters. The armament consisted of four .50 machine guns, mounted in under-wing gun packs, as well as two Matra type 122 rocket pods, each containing nineteen SNEB air-to-air rockets. These could only be fired in one salvo, after which the two expendable pods were automatically dropped. The rockets had only limited penetration power, a fact which proved most fortunate when four of them were accidentally fired on the ground during re-arming and landed on top of the Bone ammunition dump! Up to January 1961, ECN.1/71 had carried out thirty-eight interceptions and nine aircraft had been forced to land. The first interception attempt by a B-26N took place on 18 August 1961, when a low-flying helicopter was pursued without result. A few more sorties against suspected intruders took place over the next year, at times on the Tunisian side of the border, but they were becoming increasingly rare. By late 1961, the B-26Ns were

r

'It was subsequently found that ALN had in fact received a few MIG-17Fs from the Soviet Union and China in 1961, and that these had been based in Tunisia during the next couple of years, without taking any part in the fighting. They were released to Algeria immediately after independence.

therefore often employed for flare dropping and military units began immediately, even along the Morice Line, or even daytime straf- though France was allowed to keep a limited ing missions. number of bases in the country for several A cease-fire between the French and the years. GB.1/91 left Bone for Bordeaux on 27 FLN was finally signed on 18 March 1962. The August 1962, only to be disbanded on 30 last operational use of the Invader in Algeria September, most of its B-26s going to GB.2/91 came in late March 1962, when some B-26s and CIB.328. Most of the night-fighters had made low-level passes over the OAS strong- returned to France inApril, and ECN.1/71 only hold at Bab el Oued in Algiers, before it was kept one B-26N and two MD-315Rs in two stormed by army units supported by Texans small detachments at Tebessa and Oran. On and Skyraiders. The Invader units continued 31 August the unit moved to Reims where it to fly training missions while awaiting their was disbanded in September. The seven surrepatriation to France, and GB.2/91 with its viving B-26Ns were transferred to the Vautour twelve B-26s and six RB-26s still flew an aver- liN-equipped Escadron de Chasse de Nuit age of 700 hours per month during this 1/30 Loire at Creil, ECN.2/30 Normandieperiod. The units also remained ready to Niemen at Orange and ECN.3/30 at Reims, to implement Operation Caroussel against be used for training. On 2 September, GB.2/91 moved to Cazaux selected ALN targets, should fighting break in France. Including the aircraft taken over out again. Algeria became independent in early July from GB.1/91 , it now had twenty-one 1962 and the evacuation of French civilians . Invaders on strength. The new task of the unit was to maintain a cadre of trained bomber crews for possible use in overseas territories, The B-26APQ13 radar trainer was a version of and for this purpose GB.2/91 was placed the Invader unique to France. The radome of under the direct command of the Forces the AN/APQ-13 radar mounted under the front Aeriennes Strategiques. The squadron part of the bomb bay is clearly visible in this remained operational in this role for a numview of 44-35565, warming up at Bordeaux in ber of months before disbanding on 1 July 1964. via i.Mutin

44

FOREIGN INVADERS

A GB.2/91 Invader over the rugged Algerian terrain in the early 1960s. Amazingly enough, an old style canopy' is still installed, despite the fact that the aircraft was completely refurbished before taken on charge by the French in 1959. SHAA ref 8843376 via A.GrandoJini

Nose detail of an RB-26C belonging to GB.I/91, which operated a total of five of these aircraft. Under the cockpit are the remains of what appears to be an ERP.I/32 badge. SHAA ref 886 /053 via A. GrandoJini

19639• During this period GB.2/91 suffered the worst accident to befall the B-26 in French service, when two Invaders collided in bad weather near Trensacq on 4 March 1963. A third one got into an uncontrollable spin while trying to avoid a collision. All three aircraft were destroyed, while five crew members were killed and five others injured. But at the same time as these units left Algeria, ERP.1/32 Armagnac was re-formed at Oran on 1 September 1962. It took over the RB-26Ps formerly operated by the two bomber squadrons, as well as a single TB-26BIO. The main task of the unit was aerial mapping of the Sahara desert in connection with oil exploration work, and it remained in Algeria until the bulk of the squadron transferred to Strasbourg on 1 December 1963.

It shared this base with the AA's only tactical

reconnaissance wing, at the time equipped with RF-84Fs and Mirage IIIRs. A detachment of RB-26Ps remained in Algeria until 16 June 1964, however. The Invaders were now nearing the end of their useful life with the French military. The first B-26 to be withdrawn from use was 4139512 (formerly ZOOS), which was struck off charge in early April 1962 and handed over to CAR Paris. This was a staff institution, and the aircraft was probably used for display purposes for a period, before being scrapped. One additional B-26 was struck off charge in August 1963, followed by thirteen more in April 1964. Several others were placed in storage with EM.601: an air force depot at Chateaudun southwest of Paris.

In October 1964 BE.706 retired the last of its target-towing B-26s into storage, followed by the last B-26Ns of ECN.2/30 and 3/30 in April and May 1965. The last operational deployment of the Invader took place in mid December 1964, when ERP .1/32 were ordered to send four RB-26Ps - each hastily fitted with underwing gun pods - to Fort Lamy in Chad. They were the first French 'combat aircraft' to be based in the country since 1960. Their mission was to subdue groups opposed to President Tombalbaye and to carry out aerial mapping of the mineral-rich Aouzou area on the Libyan border. On 18 January 1965, ERP.1/32 was ordered to disband as of 31 March. The Chad detachment retumed to France during March, but a few of the Invaders continued to be nominally allocated to the squadron for a few months. A number of RB-26Ps were transferred to CIB.328, who continued to use them for aerial mapping in France. While these reductions in the Armee de l'Air B-26 force were taking place, one additional unit, the CIEES.343 at Colomb Bechar in Algeria, was allocated two Invaders for second-line duties. CIEES.343 was a test centre for guided missiles set up in 1956, and Colomb Bechar was one of the bases the French had been allowed to keep after the Algerian independence. The first Invader was RB-26P 44-34493, used from 7 April 1965 to 3 February 1966, and the second one was B-26B 44-34758, allocated from 2 March 1966 until CIEES.343 officially disbanded on 30 June of that year, after which the aircraft passed into storage with EM. 60 1in August. In late 1965 or early 1966, a new system of aircraft coding was introduced on the AA Invaders. Until now, the last letter of the aircraft call-sign had been displayed on the fin, but under the new system the two last letters were painted on the fuselage sides, preceded by the unit or base number. A B-26 of CIB.328 with the call-sign F-UKEO was therefore marked '328-EO', while F-SDIY of CEAM

,

"The two bomber squadrons were subsequently re-formed on Mirage IVs, as EB.I/91 Gascogne and EB.I/94 Guyenne, respectively. "The TB-26s of the AA were sometimes known as B-26DCs, for 'Double Commande'.

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

(based at BA.118) carried the markings' 118IY'. The aircraft marked according to this new system also had their rudder stripes painted out. CEV had never carried code letters on its Invaders, and continued to mark the aircraft with the serial numbers only. The same was apparently true for the two aircraft of CIEES.343. The call-sign ranges used by the various units between 1951 and 1968 were as follows: F-TEMA to F-TEMZ F-SDBAtoF-SDBZand F-SDDA to F-SDDZ and F-SDIA to F-SDIZ CEV F-ZJNA to F-ZJNZ and F-ZJOA to F-ZJOZ and F-ZLAA to F-ZLAZ CIB.328 F-UKDAto F-UKDZ (1957-1959) F-UKEA to F-UKEZ (1958-1967) II CIE.B-26 F-UIYA to F-UIYZ CIEES.343 F-SDKAtoF-SDKZ ECN.I/30 (Unknown) ECN.2/30 F-UKDA to F-UKDZ(?) ECN.3/30 (Unknown) ECN.I/7I F-UIJA to F-UIJZ (shared with GB.2/9I) ERP.1/32 F-UKBAto F-UKBZ (1956-1957) F-ULVA to F-ULVZ (1962-1965) F-UIWA to F-UIWZ GB.I/91 F-UIJA to F-UIJZ GB.2/91

BE.706 CEAM

f

CIB.328 finally relinquished its last Invaders in May 1967, before being renamed CIFAS.328 and becoming the training centre for the new strategic bomber force of the Armee de l'Air: apparently the B-26 was not considered suitable when training crews for the supersonic . Mirage IV nuclear bomber! Since around 1959, the unit had used the Vautour in parallel to the Invader. After an initial eight-week course on the Invader, the crews would be sent to serve for a year with one of the B-26 squadrons. The pilots would then transition to jets with the Fighter School at Meknes, before returning to CI8.328 to be checked out in the Vautour, together with the navigators and navigator-bombardiers. Following a year's service in a Vautour squadron they might then again be posted to an Invader squadron, to ensure that they remained current on both types. On average, the M had 1.25 pilots available for each B-26. Of the eleven B-26s still on Armee de l'Air charge at the end of 1967, ten were in storage with EAA.60 I, and these were all struck off charge on 27 March 1968. The very last M Invader was 44-35512, an RB-26P that served its final years with CEAM. It was flown to the gunnery range at Cazaux on 2 July 1968, where it was subsequently expended as a tar-. get.

"Other call-sign ranges were apparently also in use at times, on a temporary basis.

45

It is thought that CEV still had five Invaders on strength by 1968, but the information available is somewhat unclear. As mentioned before, CEVis not a part of the Armee de I'Air, and their aircraft are therefore not listed in M records. Four of the five were probably struck off charge during 1968, while the last one may have remained on CEV strength, since it was still airworthy in 1970. This aircraft, 44-34773, was one of two Invaders that had been designated B-26TMR during laser rangefinder tests earlier in the 1960s, but had now been restored to B-26C configuration. Wearing 1940-style Armee de I'Air camouflage and posing as a Douglas Boston, it participated in a film called La Promesse de ['Aube (The Dawn Promise) before being delivered to the Musee de I'Air in 1970. This was most probably the last flight of any French military B-26. It was not the first time

French Invaders had had a part in a film, however, as B-26Cs had also been used in John Frankenheimer's The Train a few years earlier. Almost all the M and CEV Invaders were scrapped after being withdrawn from service. Five RB-26Ps and one B-26R found their way onto the civilian market (two of them subsequently ending up in Biafra), but none of these survived more than a few years. Another four were preserved in France, although one of these was destroyed by a hangar fire at the Musee de l'Air storage facility at Dugny in 1990. Of the three survivors, one is a B-26C also stored at Dugny and another one is a B-26APQ 13 displayed at Bordeaux, while the third is the B-26B reportedly being restored to airworthy condition at Tremons, for the Musee de I'Air.

For comparison with the RB-26C illustrated on the page opposite, this photo of 43-22615 clearly shows the modified camera window of the RB-26P version. The ERP.1/32 badge was a red lion rampant on white with 'Armagnac' in yellow on a black title bar. via J. Mutin

The B-26N was one of the least numerous Invader versions, only eight being so modified. This particular aircraft served as a night fighter trainer with the Vautour lIN-equipped ECN.2/30, based in southern France. J. Lebourg collection via A. Grandolini

FOREIGN INVADERS

46

L'ARMEE DE L'AIR (French Air Force): EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA Based on research by Lieutenant-Colonel Bemard Chenel, Musee de l'Air, Paris. The 'Remarks' column include details of known unit service, as far as possible in chronological order. Due to space limitations, only the last letter or letters in the call-sign have been given. This means that an aircraft listed as 'C18.328 (EK)' actually had the call-sign F-UKEK, while 'BE.706 (B)' was F-TEMB. See call-sign ranges in the chapter text. Up to 1959, there were basically four different numbering systems in use for the French Invaders, as explained more detail in the chapter text. In the first part of the below table, the aircraft of the various series are listed together in alphanumerical order. ANCFN Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

TOC

SOC

052 088-B 095-B?

B-26C B-26B B-26B?

44-34773, N67944 43-22339 43-22346?

5 Oct51 30 Oct 56 16 Nov 56

(c.Mar 59) (Mar 59) 57

157

B-26C

517

B-26B B-26C B-26B RB-26C RB-26C B-26B RB-26C

44-34756, N67157, YV-C-CTV 44-34767, N67161 43-22497 43-22412 44-35216, F-02 44-35223, F-03 41-39349 44-?5256, F-08

161 182-C 201-B 216 223 250-B 256 257 259-C

RB-26C B-26C

44-35257, F-II 41-39358?

275-B 278-B 284-B 290-C

B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C

43-22445 43-22446 43-22448 41-39389

9 Nov 56 30 Nov 56 21 Dec 56 9 Nov 56

321-C

B-26C

43-22578

16Jan 57

322-B 332-B 338-B 358-C

B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C

43-22579 43-22464 43-22466 43-22609

12 Dec 56 4 Dec 56 4 Mar 57 14 Dec 56

359

RB-26C

44-35359, F-09

14 Sep 56

364-C 377-C 383-C 405-C 412-C 424-C 447-C 457 480-C 490, 490C

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C RB-26C B-26C RB-26C

43-22615 41-39476 41-39482 43-22656 41-39511 41-39523 41-39546 44-35457, F-OI 41-39579 44-35490, F-05

26 Feb 57 9 Nov 56 2 Jan 57 7 Feb 57 10 Nov 56 I Dec 56 10 Dec 56 4 Sep 56 30 Dec 56 10 Sep 56

500 512 531-B 533-B 570-C 583 599 607 613-C 616-C 617-C

RB-26C RB-26C B-26B B-26B B-26C RB-26C RB-26C RB-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

44-35500, F-06 44-35512, F-07 44-35228, AA Indochina 44-35230 44-34167 44-35583, F-IO 44-35599, F-04 44-35607, F-12 44-34210 44-34213 44-34214

13 Sep 56 14 Sep 56 26 Dec 56 4 Dec 56 14 Sep 56 14 Sep 56 14 Sep 56 Sep 56 3 Jan 57 27 Nov 56 4 Mar 57

620-C 664-C

B-26C B-26C

44-35317 44-35361

16 Oct 56 13 Oct 56

699-C

B-26C

44-35396

27 Dec 56

51 27 Nov 56 2 Nov 56 3 Sep 56 31 Aug 56 21 Dec 56 20 Aug 56 Oct 56 7 Dec 56

'-

Remarks

CEV (call-sign AA). CIE.B-26 (Y) and GB.1/91 (Y). CIE.B-26 (U) and GB.2/91 (). Lost at Sebka, Algeria on 5 Dec 56. USAF serial unconfirmed. (c.Mar 59) CEV ( ). Named Santa Maria. Used for weapons tests. (c.Mar 59) CEV (OR). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (M), GB.2/91 (M) and C18.328 (DM). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (V) and GB.I/91 (V). (Mar 59) ERP.l/32 (BA) and GB.1/91 (N). (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BB) and GB.I/91 (). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (R). 2 Dec 57 ERP.132 (BC) and GB. 2/91 (N). Destroyed on landing Casablanca 25 May 57 (Mar 59) . ERP.l!32 (BD), CIB.328 ( ) and GB.2/91 (N). (Mar 59) C18.328 (DJ). USAF serial should possibly be 44-34152. (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (W) and GB.I/91 (Wand P). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (M), GB.2/91 ( ) and GB.I/91 (M). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (Y) and GB.1/91 (U). 59 CIE.B-26 (1) and GB.I/91 (1). Destroyed in crash-landing on 10 Mar 59. 57 GB.2/91 (A?) and GB.I/91 (A). Lost at Ouargla, Algeria on 12 Sep 57. (Mar 59) CIE.B-26? (S) and GB.2/91 (S). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (S) and GB.2/91 (S). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (W). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (B), GB.2/91 (B), C18.328 (DB) and GB.2/91 (Q). 8 Dec 58 ERP.1/32 (BE), GB.I/91 () and GB.2/91 (). SOC after fire at Oran on 13 Sep 58. (Mar 59) C18.328 (DF) and GB.1/91 (C). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (L) and GB.2/91 (L and B). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (I) and GB.I/91 (H). (Mar 59) CIB.328 (DC). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (K) and GB.I/91 (K). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (E). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (C). (Mar 59) ERP.I/32 (BF) and GB.2/91 (K). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (I), CIB.328 (DI) and GB.I/91 (A). 58 ERP.1/32 (BG), GB.2/91 (K) and C18.328 (EA). Lost at Rouffiac on 27 Oct 58. (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BH) and GB.1/91 (0). (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BJ) and GB.1/91 (M). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (Z). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (R) and GB.2/91 (R). (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (C), GB.I/91 (C) and GB.2/91 (F). (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BK), GB.2/91 (L) and C18.328 (EI), (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BL) and GB.2/91 (M). (Mar 59) ERP.1/32 (BM) and GB.2/91 (L). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (B and S). (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (P and D). (Mar 59) qB.328 (DH). Incorrectly listed in French records as 44-34274. (Mar 59) CIE.B-26 (G) and C18.328 (DG). 58 CIE.B-26 (H) and GB.I/91 (H). Lost on 12 Aug 58. (Mar 59) GB.2/91 (F) and GB.1/91 (D).

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

TOe

soc

44-34299 44-35401, AA Indochina 44-34308 44-34312 44-35413, AA Indochina 44-35426, AA Indochina 44-35431, AA Indochina 44-34763, N67159? 44-35504 44-35565 44-35592 44-34493 44-34758, N67908 44-35632 44-34584

16 Nov 56 19 Dec 56 19 Oct 56 3 Dec 56 18 Jan 57 27 Oct 56 7 Nov 56 51? 13 Sep 56 14 Sep 56 18 Dec 56 17Jan57 4 Feb 52 Dec 56?

(Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) 58 (Mar 59) (c.Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (c.Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Not taken up)

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

44-34679 44-35900 44-35926 44-341 52?

31 Aug 56 21 Feb 57 26 Sep 56 9 Aug 56

(Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59)

8811-B?

B-26B

44-35750?

X938? ZOOI Z002 Z003 Z004

B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B? B-26B?

? ?; Mexico ?, Mexico 41-39531, N64Y 41-39505, N67Y

51? 13 Apr 53 2 May 53 17 Dec 53 54

? ? ? (Mar 59) 4 Mar 57

Z005 Z006

B-26C B-26B

41-39512, N68Y 41-39539?, N70Y

8 Feb 54 18 May 54

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

Z007 Z008 Z009

B-26C B-26B? B-26B

41-39162, N72Y 41-39154, N73Y 41-39223, N74Y

15 May 54 4 Mar 54 Nov 54

(Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59)

ANCFN Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

702-B 704-B 711-C 715-C 716-B 729-B 734-B. 779 807-C 868-C 895-B 896-C 908 935-C 987-C

B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26C

1082-C 1203-C 1229-C 7077-C?

(Not taken up)

47

Remarks CIE.B-26 (T) and GB.l/91 (T). G8.2/91 (Q and T). CIE.B-26 (I) and GB.I/91 (I). CIE.B-26 (N) and G8.2/91 (C). G8.2/91 (Y). CIE.B-26 (Z) and GB.1/91 (Z). Lost 6 Aug 58. CIE.B-26 (X) and GB.1/91 (X). CEV ( ). CIE.B-26 (E) and C18.328 (DE and EE). CIE.B-26 (D) and C18.328 (DO). GB.2/91 (X). G8.2/91 (L and H). CEV ( ). CIE.B-26 (Q), GB.2/91 (Q) and CI8.328 (DQ). Crashed in the sea off Grindavik, iceland 22 Aug 56 during delivery. CIE.B-26 (B) and GB.I/91 (B). GB.2/91 () and GB.I/91 (L). CIE.B-26 (F) and GB.1/91 (F). CIE.B-26 (A), C18.328 (DA) and GB.2/91 (I). USAF and AA serials are uncertain (see 259-C). Crashed near Sam, Scotland, on 13 Aug 56 during delivery. USAF and AA serials unconfirmed CEV? Seen at Orly on 7 Sep 51. Serial uncertain. CEV ( ). Named El Fantasma. CEV ( ). Named El Indio. CEAM ( ). BE.706 (). Destroyed by in-flight fire near Isle sur Tarn on 21 Jun 56. CEAM (DN). BE.706 (A). Listed in French files as 41-39538, but '539 is likely the correct identity. CEAM (BM). BE.706 (B). BE.706 (C).

From 17 March 1959, the Armee de l'Air began using the USAF serial as its own serial for the Invaders, abandoning the various series used to date. CEV also changed to USAF serials around the saine time. All surviving Invaders were therefore renumbered as per the following list.

41-39105 41-39154 41-39162

TB-26B B-26B? B-26C

N73Y, AA Z008 N72Y, AA Z007

14Jan 60 (Mar 59) (Mar 59)

4 Feb 64 29 Apr 65 29 Dec 67

41-39223

B-26B

N74Y, AA Z009

(Mar 59)

20 Oct 65

41-39349 41-39358

B-26B B-26C, B-26N B-26C

AA250-B AA259-C?

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

Feb 64 16 Sep 65

AA 377-C

(Mar 59)

16 Sep 65

B-26C, B-26N B-26C, RB-26P

AA383-C

(Mar 59)

29 Apr 65

AA412-C

(Mar 59)

61

41-39476 41-39482 41-39511

41-39512 41-39523

B-26C B-26C, B-26N

N68Y, AA Z005 AA424-C

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

5 Apr 62 16 Sep 65

41-39531

B-26B?, B-26R B-26B

N64Y, AA Z003

(Mar 59)

25 May 66

(Mar 59)

8 Apr 65

'41-39538'

41-39539?, N70Y, AAZ006

/('.-

C18.328 (EK)Wfu Aug 63. BE.706 (B)Wfu Jan 64. CEAM (BR and IR), C18.328 ( ) and CEAM (lR). Wfu Dec 65. To AC Touraine. Displayed at Blois. To Musee de l'Air Sep 78. Destroyed 17 May 90. BE.706 (C) and CEAM (IS). Wfu Sep 65. Became gate guardian at Saintes. Under restoration to airworthy condition at Tremons, for Musee de l'Air. G8.2/91 (V). Wfu Aug 63. GB.2/91 (I), ECN.1/71 () and ECN.3/30 (). Converted into B-26N Jul 61. Wfu Dec 64. GB.2/91 (B and G) and C18.328 (EG). Wfu Mar 65. GB.I/91 (H), ECN.I/71 (N) and ECN.3/30 O. Converted into B-26N May 61. Wfu Oct 64. G8.I/91 () and GB.2/91 (L). Converted into RB-26P Jan 61. Lost at EI Haouanet, Algeria 29 Mar 61. CEAM ( ). Wfu. To CAR Paris. Later scrapped. GB.2/91 (E), ECN.1/71 (D), ECN.I/30 0 and ECN.3/30 (). Converted into B-26N Dec 61. Wfu May 65. CEAM ( ) and CEV (AC). Wfu. To N12756 and later to Biafran Air Force. BE.706 (A). Wfu Feb 64. Serial number 41-39538 used by AA, but '539 was likely the correct identity.

48

FORE[GN [NVADERS

TOe

soc

AA447-C

(Mar 59)

26 Aug 66

B-26C, B-26N

AA480-C

(Mar 59)

29 Apr 65

43-22339 43-22412

B-26B B-26B

AA088-B AA 201-B

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

59 29 Apr 65

43-22445

B-26B

AA 275-B

(Mar 59)

4 Feb 64

43-22446

B-26B

AA 278-B

(Mar 59)

14 Jun 65

43-22448 43-22464

B-26B B-26B

AA284-B AA332-B

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

4 Feb 64 29 Apr 65

43-22466

B-26B

AA338-B

(Mar 59)

28 Dec 64

43-22478 43-22489

B-26B B-26C

13 Nov 59 9 Mar 60

4 Feb 64 25 Oct 65

43-22497 43-22537

B-26C B-26B

(Mar 59) 15 Jul 60

16 Sep 65 61

43-22546

B-26B

4 Dec 59

19 Sep 60

43-22579 43-22609

B-26B B-26C, B-26N B-26C, RB-26P

AA322-B AA358-C

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

12 Jun 65 12 Feb 64

AA364-C

(Mar 59)

10 Feb 66

43-22656 43-22692 43-22744 43-22746 44-34152 44-34167

B-26C B-26B B-26B? B-26B B-26C B-26C

AA405-C

(Mar 59) 31 Jul60 31 Ju160 22 Jul60 (Mar 59) (Mar 59)

16 Sep 65 4 Feb 64 7 May 62 4 Feb 64 25 Oct 64 25 Oct 65

44-34186

TB-26B

12 May 60

27 Mar 68

44-34210

B-26C, B-26N

AA613-C

(Mar 59)

62

44-34213

B-26C, B-26N

AA616-C

(Mar 59)

14Jun 65

'44-34274'

B-26C, B-26APQI3

44-34214, AA 617-C

(Mar 59)

27 Mar 68

44-34299 44-34308

B-26B B-26C, RB-26P B-26C, RB-26P

AA 702-B AA 711-C

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

5 Sep 60 27 Mar 68

AA 715-C

(Mar 59)

10Aug 66

17 Dec 59

68?

44-34411

B-26B, B-26R B-26C

2 Feb 60

62

44-34449

B-26C

21 Apr 60

25 Oct 65

44-34493

B-26C, RB-26P

(Mar 59)

27 Mar 68

44-34503

B-26C

30 Jan 60

27 Mar 68

ANCEV Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

41-39546

B-26C, RB-26P

41-39579

43-22615

44-34312

44-34401

AA 182-C

AA 7077-C? AA570-C

AA896-C

Remarks GB.2/91 (A and P), ERP.1/32 (P) and CI8.328 (EC). Converted into RB-26P Mar 61. Wfu Feb 66. To F-BNTM, 2S-EUT and F-BLCM. Scrapped c.1970. GB.1/91 (), ECN.1/71 (R), ECN.2/30 (A), ECN.1/30 () and ECN.2/30 (1). Converted into B-26N Jan 61. Wfu Jun 64. GB.1/91 (). Destroyed 24 Mar 59. GB.1/91 (V), CI8.328 (ER) and CEAM ( ). Wfu Jan 64. GB.1/91 (Wand P) and GB.2/91 (Q). WfuAug63. GB.1/91 (M and W), G8.2/91 (V) and CI8.328 (EM?). Wfu May 64. G8.1/91 (U) and CI8.328 (EN). Wfu Aug 63. GB.2/91 (S), GB.1/91 (S), GB.2/91 (P) and CI8.328 ( C). Wfu May 64. GB.2/91 (W), CI8.328 (EE) and CEAM ( ). SOC after accident 13 Aug 64. GB.2/91 (U). Wfu Aug 63. GB.2/91 (G and D) and CI8.328 (ED). WfuMar65. CI8.328 (OM and EM). Wfu Mar 65. GB.2/91 (R). Lost at N'Sirda Fouga, Algeria 25 Mar 61. GB.1/91 (Y). SOC after accident at Bone 1 Jul 60. GB.2/91 (R) and CI8.328 (E). Wfu Jun 64. GB.2/91 (), CI8.328 ( Q), ECN.1/71 () and ECN.3/30 (). Converted into B-26N Aug 61. Wfu. GB.1/91 (C and 0), ERP.1/32 (0) and CI8.328 (0). Converted into RB-26P Feb 61. Wfu. To F-BMJQ. Scrapped c.1970. CI8.328 (EC?). Wfu Feb 65. GB.1/91 () and CI8.328 (EP). Wfu Aug 63. GB.1/91 (V). SOC after accident 22 Nov 61. GB.2/91 (2). Wfu Aug 63. C[8.328 (EJ). SOC after accident 28 Apr 64. GB ..2/91 (C and F) and CI8.328 (EL). WfuApr65. CI8.328 (EL), ERP.1/32 (YV) and CI8.328 (EN). Wfu Feb 67. GB.2/91 (G) and ECN.1/71 (). Converted into B-26N Aug 61. SOC after accident at Randon, Algeria 6 Mar 62. G8.2/91 (D), ECN.1/71 (), ECN.1/30 (), ECN.2/30 () and C[B.328 ( ). Converted into B-26N Aug 61. Wfu Nov 64. CI8.328 (EH, EU and '328-EU'). Converted into B-26APQ13 in 1962. Wfu May 67. Sin 44-34274 used by AA, but alc was really '214. GB.1/91 (). SOC after accident at Bone 8 Feb 60. GB.1/91 (C), ERP.1/32 (VC) and CEAM (IT). Converted into RB-26P Aug 60. Wfu Feb 66. GB.2/91 (), G8.1/91 (), ERP.1/32 (VI) and CI8.328 ( ). Converted into RB-26P Feb 61. Wfu Jan 66. To F-BMJR and later to Biafra. GB.1/91 (2), CEAM ( ), GB.2/91 () ahd CEV ( ). Used for testing Antilope and Rafal radars. Wfu. GB.2/91 (D). Lost 28 Nov 61 (collision with 4435765 during night patrol over Morice Line). GB.2/91 (C and A) and CI8.328 (EA). Wfu Mar 65. G8.2/91 (0), ERP.1/32 (VA) and CIEES.343 (). Converted into RB-26P Jan 61. Wfu Feb 66. At one point marked '44-43493'. GB.1/91 (G), GB.2/91 (G) and CI8.328 (ET and '328-ET'). Wfu Jan 67.

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

ANCEV Serial

Version

44-34521

B-26C

44-34608 44-34679 44-34729

TB-26B B-26C RB-26P

44-34756

B-26C, B-26TMR B-26B, B-26C? B-26B B-26B B-26C, B-26TMR RB-26C, RB-26P RB-26C, RB-26P

44-34758 44-34763 44-34767 44-34773 44-35216 44-35223

Previous identities/users

TOC

SOC

10 Mar 60

63

27 Jul 59 (Mar 59) 6 Mar 61

25 Oct 65 60 27 Mar 68

N67157, YV-C-CTV,

(c.Mar 59)

68?

N67908, CEV 908

(c.Mar 59)

27 Mar 68

N67159?, CEV 779 N67161, CEV 161 N67944, CEV 052

(c.Mar 59) (c.Mar 59) (c.Mar 59)

68? 68? 70?

M216

(Mar 59)

25 Oct 65

M223

(Mar 59)

10 Jul63

M 1082-C

44-35228

B-26B

M Indochina, M 531-B

(Mar 59)

63

44-35230 44-35257

B-26B RB-26C, RB-26P

M533-B AA257

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

4 Feb 64 62

44-35316

B-26C

15 Apr 60

60

44-35317

B-26C, B-26APQ13 B-26C

M620-C

(Mar 59)

27 Mar 68

M699-C

(Mar 59)

10 Jul63

B-26B, TB-26B B-26B B-26B RB-26C, RB-26P

M Indochina, M 704-B

(Mar 59)

29 Apr 65

M Indochina, M 716-B M Indochina, M 734-B M457

(Mar 59) (Mar 59) (Mar 59)

4 Feb 64 4 Feb 64 17 Mar 66

44-35396 44-35401 44-35413 44-35431 44-35457

44-35500

RB-26C

M500

(Mar 59)

29 Apr 65

44-35504

B-26C, B-26APQ13 RB-26C, RB-26P

M807-C

(Mar 59)

27 Mar 68

M512

(Mar 59)

2 Jul68

M868-C

(Mar 59)

21 Nov 67

M583

(Mar 59)

16 Sep 65

44-35512

44-35565 44-35583

B-26C, B-26APQ13 RB-26C, RB-26P

44-35592

B-26B

M895-B

(Mar 59)

29 Apr 65

44-35599

RB-26C, RB-26P

M599

(Mar 59)

21 Nov 67

44-35607

RB-26C, RB-26P

M607

(Mar 59)

19 Aug 66

44-35632

B-26C

M935-C

(Mar 59)

10 Aug 64

44-35718

B-26C

30 Aug 60

16Jan 64

44-35762 44-35765

B-26C B-26C

18 JuI 60 28 Jul60

4 Feb 64 21 Mar 62

49

Remarks GB.1/91 (J) and GB.2/91 (J). Lost 4 Mar 63 (collision with 44-35228 and 44-35953). CIB.328 (EA). Wfu Apr 65. GB.1/91 (). Lost 18 May 60. GB.1/91 (T), ERP.1/32 (VT) and CIB.328 (EF). Converted into RB-26P before delivery to M. Wfu Feb 66. CEV (AE). Used for weapons tests.. CEV 157Wfu. CEV (NB), CEAM (IS and IZ) and CIEES.343 ( ). WfuAug 67. CEV (NK). Wfu. CEV (OR). Wfu. CEV (M). Wfu. To Musee de l'Air in 1970. Stored at Dugny. GB.1/91 (N and D) and ERP.1/32 (VD). Converted into RB-26P 1962. Wfu Mar 65. GB.1/91 () and GB.2/91 (D). Converted into RB-26P 1962. SOC after accident 10 Dec 62. GB.2/91 (Z and S). Destroyed 4 Mar 63 (collision with 44-34521 and 44-35953). GB.2/91 (R and T). Wfu Aug 63. GB.2/91 (J?), CIB.328 ( ) and GB.2/91 (H). Converted into RB-26P 1962. Crashed into the sea near Nice 2 Oct 62. GB.1/91 (I). Lost at Bir Latrousse, Algeria 14 Sep 60. CIB.328 ( I, EVand '328-EV'). Converted into B-26APQ13 in 1962. Wfu Apr 67. GB.1/91 (D) and GB.2/91 (H). SOC after accident at Cazaux 4 Feb 63. GB.2/91 (T) and CIB.328 (ED). Also CEAM (BT)? Converted into TB-26B Dec 61. Wfu Jun 64. GB.2/91 (Y). Wfu. GB.1/91 (X). Wfu Aug 62. GB.2/91 (K) and ERP.1/32 (YK). Converted into RB-26P Nov 61. Wfu. To F-BMKT, . ZS-ESX and F-BLCN. Scrapped c.1970. GB.1/91 (0), GB.2/91 (L and B) and CIB.328 (EK). Wfu Sep 64. CIB.328 (DE, EE, EWand '328-EW'). Converted into B-26APQ13 in 1962. Wfu Apr 67. GB.1/91 (M), ERP.1/32 (VM), CIB.328 ( ) and CEAM (lR and '118-IY'). Converted into RB-26P Sep 61. Expended as target at Cazaux. CIB.328 ( D, EX and '328-EX'). Converted into B-26APQ13 in Jun 61. Wfu Apr 67. CIB.328 (EI), GB.1/91 (R), GB.2/91 (L) and ERP.1/32 (VL). Converted into RB-26P 1962. Wfu Mar 65. GB.2/91 (X and G?) and CIB.328 ( G). SOC after accident 21 Ju164. GB.2/91 (M), ERP.1/32 (VN) and CIB.328 ('328-EO'). Converted into RB-26P Jan 62. Wfu May 67. GB.2/91 (L), ERP.1/32 (VB) and CIB.328 ( ). Converted into RB-26P JuI 61. Wfu Feb 66. To Societe Carta as F-BNTN. Scrapped c.1970. CIB.328 (DQ and EB) and GB.2/91 (H). SOC after accident 21 Ju164. GB.1/91 (), GB.2/91 (I) and CIB.328 (EI). WfuAug 63. GB.1/91 (K) and GB.2/91 (K). Wfu Aug 63. GB.2/91 (H). SOC after accident 28 Nov 61 (collision with 44-34411 during night patrol).

FOREIGN INVADERS

50

ANCEV Serial

Version

44-35859

B-26APQI3

44-35900 44-35926 44-35953

B-26C B-26C, B-26N B-26C

44-35957

B-26APQI3

44-35975 44-35989 44-35996

Previous identities/users

TOC

SOC

1 Jun 60

27 Mar 68

(Mar 59) (Mar 59)

61 16 Sep 65

7 Jul60

63

7 Jun 60

21 Nov 67

TB-26B B-26C

7 Aug 59 17 Nov 60

4 Feb 64 29 Apr 65

B-26C

120ct60

29 Apr 65

AA 1203-C AA 1229-C

The nose B-26N 44-35926 of ECN.2/30, which was the only French Invader known to have carried a shark's mouth. The ECN.2/30 badge was carried on the left side only, while the fin still had the ECN.1I71 badge on both sides. J. Lebourg collection via A. Grandolini

Close-up of the GB.I/91 squadron badge. The elephant is grey and green, on a red background. The wolf's head is black on a blue background. ECPA ref. ALG 57407151

Remarks CEAM ( ) and C18.328 (EYand '328-EY'). Converted into B-26APQI3 before delivery to AA. Wfu Jan 67. Preserved at BordeauxiMerignac. GB.1/91 (L). Missing at sea 31 Dec 60. GB.1/91 (F), ECN.1/71 0 and ECN.2/30 O. Converted into B-26N 1962. Wfu Apr 65. GB.2/91 (A). Lost 4 Mar 63 (collision with 4434521 and 44-35228). CEAM ( ) and C18.328 (EZ and '328-EZ'). Converted into B-26APQ 13 before delivery to AA. WfuApr67. C18.328 (EF). Wfu Jan 64. GB.1/91 0, GB.2/91 (F) and C18.328 (EF). Wfu Mar 64. GB.1/91 (B), GB.2/91 (E) and C18.328 (EH). Wfu Feb 64.

One of several Invaders lingering at the Chiiteaudun depot in 1969, this B-26APQ13 was subsequently put on display at Bordeaux. via R. Besecker

FRANCE: EUROPE AND NORTH AFRICA

The last Invader of the Armee de l'Air on its last flight: RB-26P 44-35512 being ferried to Cazaux on 2 July 1968, where it was destined to be expended as a ground target. The markings are representative of those carried by most Invaders during their last years in AA service. via B. Chenel

An unidentified CEV Invader, warts and all. The aircraft was possibly one of those used as chase planes during French trials with submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Note the windows in the side of the fuselage. 1. Lebourg collection via A. Grandolini

For a brief period in the 1950s, the RB-26Cs of ERP.1/32, like 44-35599 seen here, carried no individual markings other than the call-sign letter on the fin. The colour was likely yellow, although blue has also been reported. The wing tips were apparently painted the same colour. MAP via P. Buller

51

52

FOREIGN INVADERS

s

Formerly one of the BE.706 target tugs, 4139223 spent the last eleven months of its AA career with CEAM. Note the version letter Z on the fin: the aircraft was sometimes referred to as a B-26Z. It is currently under restoration to fly again. B. Chenel

Another CEAM veteran, 41-39162 survived as a display aircraft, only to be destroyed in a hangar fire in 1990. It carried the CEAM badge in black and aluminium on both sides of its nose. MAP via P. Butler

The rugged Algerian terrain often favoured the small ALN guerrilla units, as seen in this view of B-26C 43-22746 trying to spot any targets along the Oued Kalal in the Nementcha Mountains in 1961. via 1. Mutin

FOREIGN INVADERS

53

Chapter Six

Peru Following the highly successful deployment of modern US aircraft to virtually every Latin American air force during the Second World War, and the subsequent, visionary 'hemispheric air force' concept championed by none other than the wartime Commander of the US Army Air Forces, General Henry Arnold, the US recognized that the investment to that point was money very well spent. Lend-Lease was succeeded by the Interim Allocation Program, more often known as the American Republic Projects. Under this 'Hap' Arnold creation, more or less state-of-the~art aircraft were provided each eligible nation in proportion to its needs and ability to field the aircraft as part of what was somewhat optimistically organized as a Hemispheric scheme. Each US-supported tactical element was referred to as a 'Tab Force' - a reference that found birth literally in the index tab in the overall plan, a rather large and complex document. The 'Tab Forces' were, by bilateral agreement, intended to fulfil purely defensive roles, and were expressly forbidden to be used in 'internal' or neighbourhood disputes.. Needless to say, this precept quickly went by the wayside, and in fact ultimately was the undoing of the concept of the original plan. However, enough benefit had been gained from the transfer of significant numbers of P-47 Thunderbolts and B-25 Mitchells (as well as other, ancillary types) that US planners, with the birth of the Mutual Defense Assistance Programs ('MDAP' in its various incarnations) and the end of the US Korean War involvement, found it expedient to offer replacements to the original Lend-Lease and ARP recipients. The earlier equipment, by 1954, was in many cases very tired and wellworn. By various processes of elimination, the USAF settled on either the North American F-86F or Lockheed F-80C as the designated replacement for P-47s and F-47s - and Douglas B-26 Invader variants as replacements (or supplements in some cases) to the B-25s. In the meantime, European nations with active aircraft export ambitions (notably England and France, but to a lesser extent Sweden and even Canada) sought to capitalize on what was a potentially rich market, and fielded numbers of dedicated sales missions

to the Latin American region, with some notable successes in what had been virtually an exclusive US field for the preceding twelve years. The favourable terms offered by European firms were not lost on the US planners, and thus a special form of MDAP, entitled Grant Aid (GA) , was created. Under GA, qualified recipient national air forces could receive a wide variety of surplus US military aircraft, including basic Inspection and Repair as Necessary (IRAN) overhaul, and delivery to a designated point - all practically at no cost. With the English Electric Company chalking up notable sales successes in Venezuela, and with presentations and negotiations pending in Peru and neighbouring Ecuador, the US Air Force Missiol) to Peru pushed for an early allocation of eight B-26Cs to the Fuerza Aerea del Peru, even, if necessary, ahead of the planned concurrent delivery of similar aircraft to Brazil, Chile and Colombia. (Ecuador could not show that it could field the type with available resQurces, the service being - supposedly - fully occupied in keeping its ARP and MDAP Thunderbolts in the air. Thus snubbed, the FAE promptly ordered six Canberra B.6s from England, at great· expense, to strike a balance with bordering, hostile Peru. The USAF Mission there had predicted just such a response, and had suggested that even a token number of B-26s would placate the Ecuadoreans, but HQ USAF played the wrong hand.) Thus Peru was the first Latin American nation to receive a meaningful number of combat-capable Invaders, and all eight B-26Cs, still sporting overall black intruder schemes and USAF insignia, were flown in to Lima by USAF MATS crews on 28 October 1954. The aircraft were quickly repainted in FAP national markings and flown to Chiclayo the next morning, to prepare for formal handover at ceremonies on 5 November 1954. Initially, the B-26s were assigned to the 21 ° Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero (21st Light Bomber Squadron) at Chiclayo, which also mounted the FAP's surviving six B-25Js and two Lockheed PV-2 Harpoons. These first eight FAP B-26s were amongst the very few that went to Latin America thatat least initially - had fully armed and functional turrets. However, as these were rather maintenance intensive items of equipmentand because there were no trained crews to

man or maintain them - they were quickly stripped of their guns, although the turrets remained in place. When the unit's two PV-2s were transferred to photographic duties, two more B-26Cs were MDA supplied in December 1956 and, with the transfer of the tired B-25Js to create another Escuadron, the unit received replacements in the form of four additional B-26Cs on 13 December 1957 and yet a further four on 27 March 1958. Finally, two attrition replacements were received in June 1960, for a grand total of twenty FAP Invaders. A look at the offensive strength of the FAP may prove useful at this juncture. The FAP's bomber units, by 1957, included the 21° Escuadron at Chiclayo, together with the 23° Escuadron with the surviving B-25Js and the 22° Escuadron de Bombardero at Lima with English Electric Canberra B(I).8s, all under the overall command of Grupo 21. By June 1958, with eighteen aircraft on hand and training well advanced on type, the B-26 operating unit had flown not less than 1,816 hours during the preceding twelve month period, without incident. This achievement was representative of a tradition of efficiency and competence on twin-engined equipment that started prior to the Second World War with Caproni Ca-135s, Ca-31 Os and continued through the B-25J and PV-2 era. Although the FAP had experienced few problems with the aircraft to this point, it had been recognized for some time that transition to the aircraft for new crews would be eased considerably if type-specific training could be afforded. Consequently, with the assistance of the US Mission, a Reimbursable Aid Program request had been initiated in March 1955 to secure the materials necessary to convert one of the B-26s into a dual-control trainer. Unfortunately, it is not now known exactly which aircraft underwent this unique field transition. The subsequent safety record and serviceability on the type were, however, at least in part attributable to this very timely conversion. In 1960, the FAP decided to rationalize its somewhat arcane serialling system, and all surviving B-26s were re-serialled in the range FAP 214-230, a range bracketed by Canberras and other bomber types.

54

FOREIGN INVADERS

Then, on 16 February 1961, a B-26 piloled by Tie Gallirgos Javier was losl seven kilometres north of Bagua, at Quebrada de Tambillos, and the cause was attributed to main spar cracks that were tuming up in other Invaders throughout the world at about the same juncture. This event resulted in the issuance ofT.O. IB-26-1 which set forth specific flight restrictions for all serviceable and unmodified B-26s. As a result of this accident, and the very specific flight limitations imposed on the FAP (and other Latin American) B-26 fleets, crew qualification and participation in training and exercises suffered. The spar problem manifested itself at a particularly poor time for the FAP, as the service had tentatively planned to deploy the operating unit to the far southeastem Madre de Dios Province in the early 1960s to combat the emerging Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria (FIR) ofTrotskyist Hugo Blanco. Instead, the unit was virtually stood down from 1962 until 1965 while the fourteen best aircraft were rotated to A1brook Air Force , Base in the Panama Canal Zone to be completely re-sparred. While pending rotation through this programme, another B-26 was lost at Piura on 17 May 1963. Yet another was lost the following day at Hacienda Papayal (given as being assigned, for some unknown reason, to Grupo 13 at the time) while another, damaged in a non-spar related incident, was dropped between January and June 1963, leaving the FAP with fifteen airworthy (but restricted) B-26s. At this point, after nearly nine years of service with the FAP, it may prove useful to students of the MDAP programme to examine the ebb and flow of FAP B-26 usage to this date. Starting with delivery of the first eight, by 31 December 1954 they had amassed 419 flying hours between them. Following is a summary by US Fiscal Year of this, the peak period of FAP B-26 utilization:

\

Virtually all of the FAP's Invaders were at Lima (Las Palmas) at the time this photo was taken in 1972, and had gathered a fine coat of dust in the process. Aircraft 2 I 7 had originally had a serial in the 570-range. G. E. Buehlmann

possibly indicating use as a trainer, and is probably the single example so converted locally commencing in March 1955. G. E. Buehlmann It is not generally known that some - but not

Although all FAP Invaders were delivered as glass-nosed B-26Cs, sin 221, seen here at Las Palmas near Lima in 1972 has clearly gained a B-26B 'solid' nose, and has lost both turrets,

all- FAP Invaders carried the insignia of the 721 0 Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero, shown here on the port nose of B-26C sin 223 at Las Palmas in 1972. G. E. Buehlmann

- By 30 September 1955, eight were still air worthy, but they had flown 1,603 hours, cumulatively, since the beginning ofFY56. - By 31 December 1956, two more had been added for a total of ten and by 30 September 1957 these had flown 1,816 hours in FY58. - Four more aircraft were on hand by 31 March 1958, and the total had risen to eighteen by 30 June. By 30 September 1958, 2,137 hours had been flown in FY59. - One aircraft had been lost by 31 March 1959, but the remaining seventeen were all airworthy. Another was lost by 30 June 1959. By 30 September, sixteen were still airworthy. - Peak period of utilization of the sixteen aircraft on hand came at the end of September 1960, when 2,376 hours were flown cumulatively in FY61. Strength rose again to eighteen in December 1960 but

PERU

dropped to seventeen in March 1961 ,and remained constant at this number of airworthy and on hand through 30 September 1962, when 1,671 hours had been flown year-to-date in FY63. - Strength dropped to fifteen on hand and airworthy by 30 June 1963. During this period, the FAP also realigned its organizational structure, and the operating Command was retitled as the Grupo 7, the operating Escuadron being retitled the 721 0 Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero, now stationed permanently at the refurbished FAP permanent base at Piura, near the border with Ecuador. Meanwhile, although the FIR movement in Madre de Dios had been crushed completely, by 1965 similar movements had emerged in Ayacucho, Cuzco and Junin provinces in Central Peru. Again, the FAP would very much liked to have had the 721 0 Escuadron available for this very aggressive Peruvian military action, but by the time the revolt was crushed in October 1965, the unit was effectively at zero strength due to the re-sparring programme. As ofApril 1965, only two aircraft had completed the programme, and the fifteenth was not due to be completed until October - the same month the insurrectionist movements were crushed. Thus, the FAP B-26s missed what was probably the opti mum scenario for their particular capabilities, due to age and earlier intensive training. Ironically, the FAP's North American F-86F fleet was undergoing wing spar modifications at the same time, and thus most of the FAP involvement against the insurgents fell to Canberras and AT-33s. The unit managed to keep up limited tactical training but, for example, could only put its aircraft in the air 257 hours during the first three months of 1965 - flights being limited mainly to navigational training 'and flights which placed little stress on the wings.' The Operational Status of the unit was lowered accordingly to C-3 (the lowest USAF code for operational readiness). Only three aircraft were actually being flown. The Escuadron did enjoy seventeen trained crews, however, which, for FAP manning, meant one pilot per aircraft and two extras, as they operated the aircraft with oneman crews at the time. Timely return of the first two modified aircraft from Panama enabled the unit to be rejuvenated somewhat between April and June 1965, however, when a detachment A disgruntled US contractor's pose implies 'What next?' as he surveys the damage to recently re-sparred FAP B-26C sIn 218 at A1brook AFB, CZ in 1964. Mer being wheeled out of the large hangar in the background, the left main gear collapsed. It was repaired and returned to Peru, somewhat later than its sister ships. D. Laird

from the USAF's 605th Air Commando Squadron visited to give a course in counterinsurgency combat. Similarly, the supply unit that supported 721 0 Escuadron was visited during the same period by a USAF Mission supply team, which greatly improved the FAP's procedures for requisitioning parts and supplies for the aircraft through MAP. This combination of training was sorely needed, as the unit had experienced severe attrition of trained personnel as the FAP attempted to field ever more aircraft without any concurrent increase in authorized manning levels. Unfortunately, at the outset of the training, a USAF T-28 crashed, killing the US and FAP crew, but the remainder of the course was conducted on the two newly overhauled FAP B-26s, no fewer than twenty-three FAP pilots were exercised in gunnery, rocketry, night operations, short and sod field landings, resupply, bombing, infiltration and exfiltration. By October 1965, although the wing spar programme had been completed, the FAP seized upon the relative inactivity of the unit to undertake the overhaul of many of the B-26s' R-2800 engines at the Las Palmas Maintenance Depot, although this work was slow and, in the words of the USAF Mission 'did not meet operati~mal requirements for this engine.' The following months showed a marked improvement in flying hours on the type, but the restrictive potential of t)l.e aircraft at high altitudes essentially negated its employment in what by now had become its designated role -"Counter-Insurgency. Instead, the FAP turned more and more to 'hardnose' AT-33s, where loitering capability above the 17,000 foot level was required. On a happier note, by December 1965, the Non-Operational for Repairs or Service (NORS) rate for the unit had dropped to zero,

55

although another aircraft was lost to unknown causes in October, further reducing the number of aircraft on hand. By March 1966, although fourteen aircraft were still on hand and essentially airworthy, only nine were actively being flown, and only 246 hours were flown between January and March. This was directly attributable to a drop in available crews, now down to ten, with eight others in training. In July 1967, in an effort to improve the flagging capabilities of the tired old Invaders, the USAF Mission proposed a Class V modification programme be funded to install AN/ARC-44 FM radios in all fourteen surviving FAP B-26s. It was proposed that the FAP Depot could actually perform the work following a prototype demonstration. While this programme would indeed have improved the unit ability to coordinate and communicate with Peruvian Army ground based units in COIN operations, it fell into protracted difficulties as it was discovered that the mounts for the radios no longer were available and would have to be fabricated from scratch by the USAF at its Ogden, Utah Depot! The programme was still limping along into 1969. However, the unit operational readiness status, although still given by the USAF as C-3, was given a morale boast by another USAF COIN training team which was highly complimentary regarding the unit's training, status of equipment and readiness to perform their mission. By June 1968, incredibly, the USAF raised its readiness reporting code on the unit to C-2 (meaning fully combat ready but with some limiting deficiencies), and reported that the unit had twenty-three crews (twelve pilots in operationally ready status and eleven in training) with fourteen aircraft on hand, although one (FAP 215) had not flown, due to wing over-stressing, since December 1966. A long period of safe operations ended,

56

FOREIGN INVADERS

however, in November 1968, when FAP 214 crashed due to unknown causes. The unit achieved no less than 982 flying hours during the same quarter, however, and this was without question the peak operational period for the unit during the entire employment of the type in FAP service. Ironically, the continued inability of the USAF Mission to bring urgency to the question of the AN/ARC-44 radio installation caused much disenchantment within the FAP. It should be noted that, up to this time, each of the aircraft had only one MX-1646 adaptor installed, and it was located on the pilot's interphone control box. Installation of the ANIARC-44 would require two other such positions, and the parts for these were simply not forthcoming, despite very strenuous communications.

Although the radio and other simple modifications were eventually completed, the FAP had in the meantime decided to opt for other than US supplied MAP equipment, and the decision was taken to set steps in motion to replace the aged B-26s with more modern types. During the nearly nineteen year service life of the B-26 in Peru - the type was finally replaced at Piura by Cessna A-37Bs commencing with a MAP programme signed in 1973 - the operating units, first at Chiclayo and later Piura in Northern Peru, had as their primary mobilization mission a strike threat against Ecuadorean territories. From Piura, the aircraft, with a one-man crew and maximum ordnance load, could easily reach Guayaquil, Ecuador's vital port city and commerce centre and, with auxiliary tanks, could

even reach Quito, the capital, with some loiter time. This fact was not lost on the Ecuadoreans, with whom Peru had conducted open hostilities as recently as 1941. So far as can be determined, no overt incidents involving the FAP B-26s and Ecuador occurred, but fairly frequent armed reconnaissance missions were flown along the border, and the potential for friction was certainlyever-present. At the time the B-26s were stood-down at Piura (given variously as late 1974 or early 1975), only five aircraft were still airworthy, down from eight in 1971, the others having long since succumbed to 'hangar queen' status for parts. As of the end of 1975, several were still to be seen sitting derelict in the FAP compound at Piura.

FUERZA AEREA DEL PERU (Air Force of Peru)

TOe

soc

43-22588* 43'22699* 43-22666* 43-22674* 43-22530* 41-39345* 43-22564* 41-39299* 44-34199*

28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 28 Oct 54 Dec 56

7 7 7 7 (607) 7 (607) 7 (Oft 65)

44-35928 43-223087 43-227257 44-342127 44-346627 41-394337 43-226807 44-353767 44-353917

Dec 56 13 Dec 57 13 Dec 57 13 Dec 57 13 Dec 57 27 Mar 58 27 Mar 58 27 Mar 58 27 Mar 58

7 7 18 Dec 58 7 7 7 7 7 7

FAP Serial

Version

Previous identity

570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

Remarks

To FAP 215 in 19607 To FAP 214 in 19607 44-34199 was reported as a loss this date by USAF Mission; new FAP serial unknown.

The serial linkages between the FAP and USAF serials marked '*' are not confirmed, but believed to be approximately correct. Those marked '7' are more uncertain. In early 1960, the FAP re-serialled all surviving B-26s into a new series which ranged from 214 to 230. It is believed that this new series included the last two aircraft received, acquired under MAS in June 1960, which never had 'old' 500-series serials assigned. 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229, 230

~

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

43-22564 43-22530 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

(60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60) (60)

Dec 66 Nov 68 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

Ex FAP 5767 Ex FAP 5747

New spar c.1965.

•

New spar c.1965.

FORE[GN [NVADERS

57

Chapter Seven

Chile Somewhat surprisingly, Chile eventually operated the largest number of Invaders in Latin America - exceeding even the total received by Brazil. Chile's air force, like that of Peru, also had a rather protracted familiarity with multiengined bomber equipment, having equipped its first dedicated bomber unit with tri-motored Junkers R 42s in 1926, several of which survived in service until 1944. Chile became one of the first Latin American countries to field truly modem twin-engined medium bombers, in 1938, when sufficient Junkers Ju 86s were acquired in Germany to equip a bomber Grupo. Beset by spares difficulties because of the Second World War, these were replaced by the obligatory ARP-supplied North American B-25J Mitchells in 1946-47. Neighbouring Argentina, which had traditionally gone its own way politically, and with whom Chile had long-standing border and territorial disputes, was literally armed to the teeth by the early 1950s. Her air force, in particular, had significant numbers of heavy, four-engined Avro Lancaster and Lincoln long-range bombers, as well as jet fighters and an array of support types. Chile had supported the Allied war effort during the Second World War and had received significant Lend-Lease aircraft deliveries, all with an unstated but obvious goal of at least balancing out the threat of Argentine territorial or fascist-inspired aggression. This atmosphere and orientation continued into the post-Second World War period, with obvious benefits accruing to the Chilean armed forces. Chile, being a signatory with the US to the MDAP agreements of the late 1940s and early 1950s for hemispheric defence involvement, thus found itself beneficiary to the B-26 replacements for its aged B-25s, following close on the heels of the Peruvian deliveries. [n fact, the first ten Invaders ~ere handed over to Chile commencing 18 November 1954 (although the aircraft had been in-country since September), a scant thirteen days Displaying the unit insignia of Grupo 8, Chilean 8-268 sin 846 also features red/white/blue prop tips and a unit commander's pennant. Note that the dorsal turret is positioned facing forward. FACh

after initial Peruvian acceptance of a similar power problems associated with mounting number. two separate major units at the same station The first ten FACh aircraft are interesting for soon led to the abandonment of this idea. By a number of reasons. All ten were apparently 30 June 1955, however, only seven of the inidrawn from stocks at McClellan AFB, and all tial batch of ten B-26s were fully airworthy, were converted from B-26B to B-26C stan- evidence that the initial work-up period had dard prior to delivery, leading some taken its toll, the aircraft having flown 367 historians, who relied upon USAF serial num- hours, cumulatively, since acceptance. bers alone, to conclude that these aircraft By September 1956, the FACh had suffered were all 'hard-nose' aircraft. its first 8-26 loss, but all nine remaining airAssigned FACh serials in the bomber series craft were fully airworthy, and the operating following the B-25s (FAC 812 to 821), the air- unit had amassed some 2,438 flight hours craft were assigned to Grupo 8 at year-to-date. Four more aircraft joined the Antofagasta, joining eight surviving B-25Js, six fleet between September and December, Beech AT-II s, a Beech C-45 and a T-6 hack in bringing the total on hand to thirteen. that rather remote, far northern Chilean city, Atotal of fourteen more 8-26Cs were delivmore than 750 miles north of the capital, ered between September 1956 and March Santiago. The seat of much of Chile's mineral 1957, followed by ten more in March 1958, wealth (copper and nitrates), it is also an bringing the total received to that time to important communications centre and effec- thirty-six. Attrition had been unusually light up tively controls - among other things through June 1957, only one aircraft having neighbouring Bolivia's access to the sea. The FACh was very pleased with the capa- been lost to any cause to that time, but by bilities of its new B-26s, <;:ompared to the June 1958 another had been lost and two rather tired ARP B-25s, which in any case more followed between September 1958 and were becoming maintenance and spares June 1959. [n that same period, the FACh 8-26 problems. By the end of 1956, only two of the force saw its peak period of utilization, some Mitchells remained airworthy with Grupo 8, . 5,790 hours having been flown in the type in and the US Mission recommended that addi- the nine month period ending 30 June 1959. tional B-26s be provided under MAP-Grant To this point, the unit had a mobilization Aid (GA) to not only replace the B-25s, but assignment as a light bombing and intruder also the other variety of aircraft within the unit and, as a result, retained the all-black unit. USAF intruder scheme in which they had Originally, the FACh had intended to assign been delivered - a scheme that most carried the Invaders to a reconstituted unit, Grupo 2, clear into 1965. and leave Grupo 8 intact on B-25s, both at Another loss of an FACh 8-26 occurred near Antofagasta. However, logistics and the man- Antofagasta itself in November 1961, when

58

the inevitable wing spar failure problem first manifested itself. Like all Latin American 8-26 operators, the FACh was enjoined to process its sizeable fleet of Invaders through the Wing Spar programme at distant Albrook AF8 in the Panama Canal Zone. The FACh had received a total of thirty-four B-26Cs and four 8-268s by 30 June 1962, but this total had ~been reduced by that date to twenty-two and two respectively by attrition. Of the not fewer than twelve 8-26Cs that had been attrited, five had been salvaged during Fiscal Year 1961 and cannibalized for parts and a T8-26B (FACh 838) had been lost at sea with all three crew members on 10 May 1962. The cause of this loss was never determined. The salvage of five aircraft had alleviated the spares problem that had handicapped the operating unit, but a high maintenance rate prevented the group from achieving progress toward a combat-ready status. During Fiscal Year 1961, seventeen of the aircraft had been processed through a PARC (Progressive Aircraft Reconditioning Cycle) at the FACh's depot. A minimum of aircraft were kept out of commission for the maintenance cycle at one time so that the Grupo was able to fly 136 instructional missions and 68 'miscellaneous' type missions during April and May 1962. Total FACh 8-26 utilization between January and June 1962 saw B-26Bs fly a total of 146:10 hours and the B-26Cs 753:45. The process of upgrading the spars, as in Peru and elsewhere, seriously eroded the

Grupo 8 8-26s during a deployment to Puerto Montt in southern Chile, far from their home base at Antofagasta. Nearest is 8-268 sin 824 (dorsal turret removed), then 8-26D 845 and 8-26C 816. FACh

FOREIGN INVADERS

effectiveness of the unit during the period . Chilean 8-268 sin 846 again after the 1966 involved, and was a cause of some concern. reconfiguration to six-gun nose as a locally As a result, MAP planners agreed to supply modified 8-26D. The prop tips are now yellow Chile with two 8-268s in 1963, followed by and it shares the ramp at Cerro Moreno AF8 (Antofagasta) with FACh Hunters and an four more in April 1965, although in the event SA-16B. This aircraft was finally retired ,in one of the latter was lost in an accident on 30 1973. FACh April 1965 at Lima on delivery. It appears that perhaps three more aircraft were supplied as replacements after this date, making a poten- result, when the aircraft were surveyed for tial grand total of 43 FACh Invaders, although wing spar crack evidence, the joint US-FACh only 40 have been confirmed. Some of the team almost immediately grounded not final examples may have been acquired from fewer than fifteen of the B-26Cs and two of non-MAP sources. the B-26Bs. Further, they ruled that the spar The Chileans had flown their mounts very deterioration was so advanced that the airaggressively and intensively in the interven- craft could not even be economically ing years around the bleak, arid coastal included in the wing spar refurbishment promountains that surrounded its base area. As a gramme in Panama! Virtually overnight,

CHILE

, (

FACh Grupo 8 strength plummeted from thirty-eight to only twenty-one aircraft, with four others possibly able to return to selVice. During the crises with the wing spar problem, two of the aircraft had been found to be in sufficiently good condition to be converted for 'light duties' as high-speed courier aircraft and, as a result, were re-assigned from Grupo 8 to Grupo 10 at Santiago by July 1963, that unit's primary equipment at the time consisting of ten Douglas C-47s. The nature of conversion is unknown, but probably involved removal of all weapons and ordnance delivery equipment and removal of the black paint scheme. Also, sometime in the 1960s, a number of B-26C aircraft were converted in-country to a semi-hard, six and sometime eight gun nose and designated locally as B-26Ds. The age of the aircraft began to manifest itself again beginning in June 1968 when, although confidence in the wings had been renewed, other systems began to succumb to the ravages of time. FAC 849, a B-26B, had to make a gear-up landing when it lost all hydraulics and suffered damage which was eventually repaired. FAC 817, a B-26C, was not so lucky, however, when it was lost 13 August 1968 at sea in the Pacific. Three other Invaders had been lost to equipment-related accidents in the preceding three years. By the middle of 1968, the FACh's sole light bomber unit could count twelve B-26Cs and two B-26Bs, two other Invaders still being assigned to Grupo 10 as transports, for a total of sixteen aircraft. Strength dipped to ten aircraft in the early 1970s, by which time the FACh had finally redefined the role of the unit to COIN and, although some training was carried out in such tactics and the aircraft received US Southeast Asia type camouflage, flying hours dwindled rapidly as the useful lives of the aircraft approached their ends. There is little evidence of any actual operations by FACh B-26s, although they may have conducted some limited border patrol activities during the heightened border tensions with Argentina during 1965 - a time at which FACh Invader strength was at its lowest ebb due to the re-sparring programme in Panama. Unusual line up of Invaders at Albrook AFB, CZ in 1965, with Chitean B-26C sin 840 nearest, followed by Peruvian sin 226, a second Chilean aircraft, a Nicaraguan and another Peruvian! D. Laird

Chitean B-26B sin 846 following retirement in 1973 minus her engines. This aircraft was restored and exhibited at the Fiesta del Aire in March 1984, but is also reported to have been sold into the US. 1. Ethel! Another view of Chitean B-26B sin 846 showing the gun port positions and another derelict Invader in the background, circa 1974. J. Ethel!

Grupo 8 may have flown some 'intimidation' sorties during the 11 September 1973 coup against Allende, but there is no evidence of any actual ordnance having been delivered - Antofagasta, although the second most populated region of the nation, being somewhat removed from the political turmoil in Santiago. By 1974, Chile's relationship to the USA (and consequent impact on MAP deliveries) had essentially emasculated Grupo 8, and the unit dropped its combat role, becoming nothing more than a selVice unit for the now

59

co-located Grupo 7, second element of the Ala 1 (First Wing) at Antofagasta, performing target-tug and communications duties for the Hawker Hunter-equipped unit. Finally, Grupo 8 was reformed on the former Grupo 7 Hunters and the last of the operational B-26s were scrapped in 1979. Several Invaders sulVive in Chile as gate guards or museum display items, at least one of them ('FAC 863' on the gate at its old base at Cerro Moreno, Antofagasta) bearing an apparently fictitious serial number.

FOREIGN INVADERS

60

FUERZAAEREA DE CHILE (Air Force of Chile) FACh Serial

Version

Previous identity

TOC

SOC

812

B-26C

41-39337*

18 Nov 54

16 Nov 62

813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26B

41-39563* 41-39592* 43-22526 41-39565 44-34131 44-35906 44-34168* 44-34099* 44-34170* 41-39263* 41-39327* 44-35753

18 Nov 54 18 Nov 54 3 Nov 54 11 Nov 54 18 Nov 54 10 Nov 54 10 Nov 54 11 Nov 54 18 Nov 54 28 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57

? ? ? ? 13Aug 68 ? ? ? ? ? 21 Mar 64 ?

825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842

B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C TB-26B B-26C B-26C, B-26D B-26C B-26C, B-26D

44-35856* 41-39391 * 43-22436* 44-34124* 41-39208* 44-34128 44-35538* 43-22268 44-35919 44-35877* 44-35754 44-35382* 41-39580* 44-34739 43-22751 41-39537 44-35730* 43-22728

Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 Jan 57 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58

? 3 Sep 57 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 10 May 62 ? ? ? ?

843 844 845

B-26C B-26C B-26C, B-26D

44-35410 44-35220* 44-35908

9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58 9 Mar 58

? 9 Apr 64 16 Nov 64

846

B-26B, B-26D

44-35937

Mar 58

?

847 848

TB-26B TB-26B, TB-26D TB-26B

43-22476* 44-34741

Mar 58 Feb 60

? ?

44-34735

Feb 60

?

849

Remarks Collided with 845 which survived. Serial may have been re-allocated, since a FACh 812 was re-sparred in Panama in 1965. Lost before 30 Sep 56. Given as '41-39992' in FACh records. Re-sparred in 1965. Re-sparred in 1965. Re-sparred in 1965. Later written off. Re-sparred in 1965. Given as '44-39099' in FACh records. Actually on hand by 31 Dec 56. Lost when its bombs exploded in flight. Resparred in 1965. Derelict at Antofagasta by late 1974. Written off. Given as '41-34128' in FACh records. Given as '41-39206' in FACh records.

Given as '44-22268' in FACh records.

Re-sparred in 1965.

Lost at sea. Crew of three killed. Re-sparred in 1965. Re-sparred in 1965. Derelict Santiago by Apr 80; camouflaged. To Confederate Air Force in Mar 80 but not delivered? See also 846. Re-sparred in 1965. Survived collision with FACh 812. Re-sparred in 1965. Re-sparred in 1965. Reported to CAF but a B-26 marked 846 is now at Santiago museum (see also 842). Reported as gate guard at El Bosque AB, Santiago, with Gmpo 6 badge! Re-sparred in 1965. Derelict Santiago by Apr 80; camouflaged.

Serial '863', now on a B-26D at the gate at Cerro Moreno AB, Antofagasta, is believed to be spurious; possibly is actually FACh 824. Where marked with a ,*, the FACh/USAAF serials links are not confirmed.

Line-up of two Grupo 8 B-26Cs, sin 835 foremost, and two B-26Bs. All still have both turrets and 835 has the antennae under the outer wing similar to those seen on French B-26s, probably radar altimeter gear. FACh

FOREIGN INVADERS

61

Chapter Eight

Colombia Although seldom accorded the same military significance as wealthier mainland South American nations like Peru, Chile and Brazil, Colombia has managed to field a competent air arm since the earliest days of aviation in Latin America. With an unbroken lineage of multi-engine utilization since 1932, Colombia's air arm progressively phased through a single Consolidated P2Y-3 patrol bomber acquired in that year to Dornier Wals, Curtiss BT-32 Condors, Junkers Ju-52/3ms, exotic Bellanca 77-140s, and Ford Trimotors - most of which served under very trying conditions clear through the Second World War years. Lend-Lease and the subsequent ARP programmes were very beneficial to the FAC, as US planners considered Colombia's proximity to the strategic Panama Canal to be a valuable asset to be nurtured and, after deliberate preparation, developed into an ally capable of aiding in its defence. Few of the aircraft mentioned above of the 1933-34 Peru/Colombia border conflict known as the' Leticia Affair' survived by 1947, when Colombia finally re-equipped her rather motley collection of 'bomber' types with three ARP North American B-25Js and seven Beech AT-II s, to form a light bombing unit deemed suitable to the nation's limited needs. Always concerned with control of her coast and waterways, the FAC's small bomber element gradually evolved into an instrument to counter what were viewed as border incursions by neighbouring, oil-rich Venezuela, which had charted its own diplomatic and military course following the Second World War. US planners, always sensitive to the host of very real regional rivalries involved in dealing with Latin American nations, attempted once again to match, as closely as possible, ARP allocations of aircraft to Colombia and Venezuela. Each national air force got three B-25Js, an almost equal number of P-47Ds, AT-lIs, etc, on a delivery schedule as nearly One of the last Colombian B-26C in service, sin 2504 visited Howard AFB, Canal Zone in April 1967, at which time it was in immaculate condition. Identified as an RB-26C, the aircraft had undergone wing spar upgrade in 1964 and has since been retired to display status. D. Hagedorn

equalled as hard-pressed schedulers could Colombia, however, posed a unique politiachieve. cal challenge. Sending in an effective Venezuela, of course, grew weary of this number of B-26s could be viewed with alarm measured benevolence and finding the by Venezuela, although Colombia could money and polilical climate favourable, set arguably make a case for being in need of a out to bolster its air force with strictly cash- balancing force of some kind. and-carry acquisitions. to Consequently, harkening back Colombia, in the meantime, watched with Colombia's long-standing interest in protectsome alarm as Venezuela acquired signifi- ing her coastlines and waterways - and cant numbers of surplus P-47Ds, Canadian avowed interest in participating in the B-25Js and then British Canberra and defence of the Panama Canal - US advisors, Vampire jets. As a result of this apparent in concert with FAC leaders, agreed that the buildup (Colombia viewed herself as the only dedicated mission of the bomber element practical antagonisl) Colombian officials, as would be, henceforth, anti-submarine and early as April 1951, had submitted a lengthy maritime reconnaissance. This rather thinly 'wish list' of their own to US military aid offi- disguised vehicle was, therefore, the pretext cials. Colombia requested specifically that under which Ihe first seven B-26s were delivshe be provided with nine Douglas B-26s to ered 10 the FAC at its Villavicencio base in late beef up her depleted bomber force. 1954; a combination of hard and glass-nosed Reluctant to nurture an arms race between versions, all somewhat misleadingly referred Ihe two rival nalions, which had in fact almost to in MDA-GrantAid files as 'RB-26s.' come to blows in September 1952, US policy Delivery schedules, originally, called for a makers held Ihe Colombian bomber request total of twenty-one Invaders for Colombia, in abeyance, while granting delivery of addi- with three more to arrive in November 1956, tional F-47s for, mainly, co'unter-insurgency four in December 1956 and the balance of employment, in mid-1953. seven later. In fact, only eleven were on hand During that same year, MDAP officials had by December 1956 (see below), but four decided to re-equip all designated 'Tab' . more were added by June 1958. The final bomber forces Ihroughout Latin America total of nineteen delivered aircraft was with B-26s, and as evidenced by the earlier achieved in late November 1957, when the Peruvian and Chilean deliveries, had set last five 'new' ones arrived. forces in motion to do likewise with other eliThe FAC pilots who crewed on the new airgible air forces. craft, some of whom had served on the old

62

FOREIGN INVADERS

Close-up of the unit insignia of the 1st AntiSubmarine Warfare Squadron on RB-26C sIn 2504 in April 1967. D. Hagedorn One of the earliest known photos of a Colombian 8-26C, prior to adoption of the unit insignia on the vertical fin. SIn 2504 had also not had its coloured rudder stripes added yet at this point. Note the access door open under the nose, and an FAC P-47D in the background. FACol

Very rare action view of an FAC Invader making a low-level strike against suspected bandit hideout in the interior of Colombia. Note the contrails being pulled off the wingtips. FACol

B-25s, AT-lis and even Ju-52s, were elated with the nimble Invaders and felt that it was the ideal aircraft for the kind of operations envisaged for the unit. Initially, the FAC aircraft had both gun turrets with guns in place, although there is no record of any training having been effected for aerial gunners. It must be assumed, there. fore,· that the guns were intended for any actual operations as forward-firing weapons, to augment the other fixed armament. Later on, most aircraft seem to have had the ventral turret removed altogether. Sporting standard USAF intruder black colour schemes, the operating unit was eventually designated formally as the 10 Escuadron de Contra-Submarino (I st AntiSubmarine Warfare Squadron), although, again, there is little evidence of any dedicated training suited to this announced role, nor any specialized equipment or radars. Colombia was racked by chronic internal strife from 1948 through most of 1958, a period retroactively termed 'La Violencia,' and various FAC aircraft were involved from time to time in what amounted to counterinsurgency work. The FAC itself reported the Invaders as having been involved in support of Colombian Army and Marine units against such targets in Llanos Orientales, Marquetalia, EI Pato and Guayabero, and in fact these operations may have accounted for some of the early losses. First losses occurred during what were officially referred to as 'wide-ranging navigational training exercises,' when FAC 2505 crashed at Cartagena on II November 1955. This was followed by the loss of FAC 2502 at German Olano Air Base (near Palanquero) on 9 November 1956. FAC 2512 crashed at Madrid Air Base on 29 April 1958, and by June of that year, the FAC Invaders had flown 1,696 hours during the fiscal year. US Mission assistance and additional training, plus a limiting factor on certain manoeuvres following discovery of the wing spar problem, resulted in a lengthy period of accident-free operation, until 20 March 1963, when another aircraft (FAC 2508) was lost at Crespo.

COLOMBIA

The 10 Escuadron was scheduled to receive Grumman SA-16Bs to replace the

B-26s by June 1962 (although these apparently never did materialize), still stationed at Base Aerea Apiay, but was restricted to visual daylight search operations. Logistic support for the aircraft had been extended until 1970 for nine aircraft, in hopes that the SA-16Bs would by then be available, to be followed by a gradual decrease in support as the new aircraft gained operational status. The unit did, in fact, participate in the December 1962 joint Operacion Unitas 1lI exercises, deploying four of its best aircraft and crews, these supported by a C-47 and a Hiller UH-12. Atotal of twelve B-26s remained on strength, and had flown 950:55 hours during the first half of 1962. Later, the Invaders also participated in Operacion Halcon-Vista and OperacionSolidaridad as well. By the end of 1963, the FAC's operating unit found itself with a scant eight operational aircraft, but rated 'C-l' (the highest USAF combat readiness rating) by the USAF Mission. Two other aircraft on hand were undergoing protracted rebuild and overhaul, until one was finally returned to service. All nine operational FAC B-26s were phased through the Wing Spar programme at Albrook Air Force Base, Canal Zone in 196465, in groups of two or three, so that the operating unit could muster some operational aircraft at anyone time. Two newly refurbished aircraft were lost in early 1967, one on 31 January and the other on 7 April, further eroding the number of effectives in the unit. By 1968, the FAC decided to deactivate its bomber force in favour of expanded emphasis on its air transport activities. This decision was prompted in no small part by a relative lack of organizational depot-level overhaul capability within the FAC, compared to Peru and Chile where very capable establishments of this sort were to be found, with the result that the B-26s were non-operational for long stretches of time for relatively minor deficiencies. Two were kept airworthy beyond the nominal 11 July 1968 unit stand-down - when five aircraft were formally declared surplus - until one of these was damaged at Bogota on 18 March 1972, while serving as a courier aircraft. The survivor was flown only a few times after this date, and finally ended its days on static display at the FAC Museum, marked as FAC 2504 as she appeared in 1983 following retirement and display outside Luis F. Gomez Nino Air Base (Villavicencio), the career-long operating base for Colombia's Invaders. G. E. Buehlmann Aircraft 2519 was Colombia's last Invader and is now displayed (minus the unit insignia of its only operator) at the FACol's open-air display near Madrid AB, Bogota. G. E. Buehlmann

FAC 2519 - not coincidentally the penultimate FAC B-26 serial number. A summary of FAC B-26 strength, by US Fiscal Year through March 1963, follows, and may give readers a better understanding of the ebb and flow of a typical MDAP-supported Invader Tab force element during this time frame. - By 31 March 1955, the first seven aircraft had been delivered, training had commenced and, since delivery, some 392 hours, total, had been flown on the type. - As of 30 September 1955, seven were operational and total utilization had climbed to 1,326 hours year-to-date. - FirstIoss had occurred by 31 December 1955, but all six remaining aircraft were operational. - Six were still on hand as of 30 September 1956 and had flown 1,245 hours since the start of the Fiscal Year in July. - By 31 December 1956, total on hand had jumped to eleven and, by31 March 1957, to twelve. This remained constant through 30

63

September 1957. - Between September 1957 and 31 December of that year, four more aircraft were added, for a total of sixteen, the peak 'in service' on the type at anyone time. By 30 June 1958, one of these had been lost, but the remaining fifteen were all operational. - Utilization as of30 September 1958 with fifteen aircraft (year-to-date) was 1,670 hours. For the same period in 1959 it was 2,155 hours (peak utilization), still with fifteen airplanes. However, for 30 September 1960 it was 1,548, but with only twelve aircraft operational. - Between 30 September and 31 December 1961, two aircraft were lost, decreasing the total on hand to ten, but utilization was 2,036 hours. - As of 30 September 1962, twelve were still operational, but three had been lost by 31 December and another by 30 March 1963. Attrition continued until the type was withdrawn from service.

64

FOREIGN INVADERS

FUERZA AEREA COLOMBIANA (Colombian Air Force) FACol Serial

Version

Previous identity

2501 2502 2503 2504

B-26C B-26C B-26C RB-26C

44-34122 44-34201 44-35501 44-35508

2505 2506 2507 2508 2509 2510 2511 2512 2513 2514 2515 2516 2517 2518 2519

B-26C B-26C B-26B B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C TB-26B B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C

43-22629 43-22718* 44-35776 44-34287* 44-35932* 44-34190* 44-34158 44-35404 44-35412* 41-39475 41-39316 43-22669 44-34316 44-34348 44-35778

25 25 25 25 25

TOC

SOC

54 54 54 54

9 Nov 56 31 Jan 67

54 54 54 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 57 Nov 57 Nov 57 Nov 57 Nov 57

Remarks

?

?

11 Nov 55

Written off at German Olano Air Base. Still in service Aug 67. Preserved at Apiay Air Base. Written off at Cartagena.

? ?

20 Mar 63

Written off at Cartagena.

?

9 Sep 56 7 Apr 67 29 Apr 58

Written off at Palanquero. Written off at La Victoria, Caldas. Written off at Madrid, Cundinamarca.

? ?

4 Mar 68 ? ? ? ?

Written off at Apiay, Meta. Still in service Sep 66. Still in service Nov 64. Last airworthy FAC B-26; to Museum at Eldorado Air Base.

Serial link-ups marked ,*, are not confirmed, although the USAF serials are all believed to be those of Invaders going to Colombia.

Colombian B-26C sin 2503 at A1brook AFB, CZ in December 1963, completely minus her wings, while undergoing the re-sparring programme. The FACol's Invaders all bore the gloss black 'intruder' colour scheme. Contrary to previously published information, the unit insignia carried on the vertical fin was not that of the 'Grupo de Bombardero'. P. Fletcher

Listed by the FAC as its last flight of the type, FAC 2519 rolls out after landing. FACol

FOREIGN INVADERS

65

Chapter Nine

Saudi Arabia 'The amount of intrigue surrounding this business is now worthy of the Arabian Nights.' These words were induded in a report by a somewhat frustrated British diplomat, involved in the creation of a Royal Saudi Air Force in 1950. The Saudis had acquired their first military aircraft in the mid 1920s, but the minuscule air unit had remained completely in the hands offoreign advisors up to the end of the 1940s. The increased revenues from the oil production now made it possible to create an air force worthy of the name, and the Saudis were anxious to staffit with indigenous personnel, rather than foreigners. . The British still had considerable influence in Saudi Arabia at this point and the Foreign Office decided to go along with the Saudis' wishes, in order to avoid them 'obtaining possibly unsound advice elsewhere.' The US government had reputedly been pressing King Ibn Saud to accept a gift of a few F-51 Mustangs, and there were also other interested parties waiting in the wings, eager to cash in on what promised to be a lucrative deal. The Foreign Office plans to help build up the RSAF met with little enthusiasm from the Royal Air Force, however. HQ Middle East Air Force bluntly called the idea a 'wildcat scheme,' and went on to say that, 'At present the Saudis are incapable of running even the smallest air force.' But they somewhat grudgFive of the RSAF's Invaders at Jeddah in January 1976, in varying degrees of decay. The fourth aircraft in the line is overall natural metal, while the others apparently are - or at least originally were - painted all black. 1. Wegg

ingly conceded that a small number of aircraft employed in the internal security role 'might be a useful, though not an essential, asset to Saudi Arabia.' By November 1950 a five-year plan had been worked out by the British. It was called 'The Black Scheme,' after its creator, Mr Black: a Briton employed as Technical Director of the RSAF. The plan called for a gradual build-up of the air force, with aircraft being delivered according to the following schedule: 1950-1951 12 Mosquitoes (Spitfires and Fireflies were mentioned as possible alternatives) 10 Chipmunks 5 Ansons 1951-1952 10 Balliols 5 Chipmunks 2 Ansons or equivalent (e.g. D.H. Heron) 1952-1953

5 Balliols 5 Chipmunks 3 Ansons or equivalent

1953-1954 14 Vampires 5 Balliols 2 Chipmunks 2 Ansons or equivalent A further twenty-eight Vampires were to be delivered in the 1954-1956 period, together with additional trainers and communications aircraft, as required. The Black Scheme was therefore rather ambitious, calling for a three-

squadron jet fighter air force to be built up from scratch in five or six years. The Saudis had sent nine pupils to England for civilian flying training by Air Service Training in mid 1949, and by the end of 1950 the student pilots had an average of 270 flying hours, induding 50 on twin-engined types. These men were to form the core of the new RSAF. But Mr Black never got a chance to implement his scheme, since the Americans were soon to take over from the British as air advisors to Saudi Arabia. In August 1945, the USAAF had received permission from the Saudis to use the airfield at Dhahran as a staging post. The airfield had previously been used by the ARAMCO oil company and was fairly small, but it was still of great importance to the USAAF which had no other bases in the region. An extension of its use had been granted in 1946, and this agreement expired in 1951. The Saudis were well aware of the strategic importance of the Dhahran Field and, being shrewd negotiators, they pressed the Americans hard for reciprocal favours. When a new five-year treaty was signed on 18 June 1951, the US government had, among other things, agreed .to set up a training mission to the RSAF. The first aircraft delivered were ten TEMCO T-35A Buckaroos which arrived in 1952, followed by a number ofT-6 Texans. The Saudis were anxious to obtain operational aircraft as soon as possible. One reason for this was probably the border dispute with Oman over the Buraimi Oasis, which had been occupied by Saudi settlers in August 1952. But the US-Saudi Military Aid Agreement did not provide for any armed air-

66

craft to be delivered in the initial stages of the programme' and, in addition, the agreement expressly forbade the arms supplied to be used for aggressive purposes. Nevertheless, the US Military Assistance Advisory Group came under increasing pressure from the Saudis to deliver strike aircraft. They specifically asked for eighteen B-26s, and in the spring of 1953 the MAAG passed this request on to Washington. The Korean War was still raging at this point, and the reply was that the USAF B-26s were at present totally committed. Only in cases of 'unusual military requirements and/or overriding political considerations' could B-26s be transferred to MDAP recipients. If this was the case, up to six Invaders might possibly be released from the USAF inventory. The B-25 was mentioned as an alternative, but the B-26 was preferred by the RSAF as the type was still in combat use by the USAF, the Saudis being 'desirous of establishing a Tactical Air Force according to their comprehension.' After the end of the Korean War the US Department of State relented to Saudi pressure, and in December 1953 the British government was notified that six B-26s were scheduled for delivery to the RSAF. The first aircraft, B-26B serial 43-22679, was taken from storage in the USA, arriving at Hill AFB on 23 December for reconditioning before leaving for Europe. When in mid February Prince Misha'al of the Saudi Royal family expressed concern over the delay in delivery, he was informed that the Invader was presently at Wiesbaden to pick up two mechanics and some spare parts before proceeding to Saudi Arabia, where it finally arrived on 18 February 1954. The aircraft remained on USAF strength for the time being, allocated to the 1414th Air Base Group at Dhahran, and probably also kept its USAF markings. It was officially transferred to the RSAF under project MDAP-403 in 1955. Once the first B-26 had been delivered, the pressure from the Saudis apparently relaxed someWhat, and the MAAG took no immediate steps to deliver the remaining five aircraft they had promised. The border dispute with

FOREIGN INVADERS

Oman ended in August 1954, after a blockade crews who were supposed to fly the of the Saudi settlement by RAF aircraft. The Invaders. An initial six pilots were expected to Invader at Dhahran was presumably used to have reached 'the minimum standard' by give some familiarization flights to RSAF per- July 1955. This simply meant that they could sonnel, but no serious efforts were made to take off, fly and land the aircraft satisfactorily, train any Saudi pilots on the type. and not that they could use the aircraft on The US relations with Saudi Arabia had operations. 'It would be a long time before reached a low point in 1954, and in early 1955 any of the men would be trained up to comthe Americans began an effort to patch things bat efficiency,' the Americans predicted, and up. One main reason was that the Dhahran they also informed the British government treaty was once again due for renewal, and that the MAAG was 'under no illusions about negotiations were scheduled to begin later the probable eventual fate of these aircraft in that year. Following the Oman incident, the Saudi hands.' British were against the supply of armed airThe B-26s were not supplied free of charge, craft to the RSAF, and had turned down Saudi although delivered under the Mutual Defense orders for Vampires and Venoms. Although Assistance Program, and the Saudis had budmindful of the British reservations, the US geted a total of $1, II 0,000 for the purchase of government decided they had to show the the first six alone. The Department of State Saudis that they were honouring the terms of had also informed the Saudi government that the Dhahran agreement, and on 22 March the USAF was not prepared to service the 1955 a further six B-26Bs were assigned for Invaders at Dhahran. The only airfield in delivery to the RSAF, under project MDAP- Saudi Arabia where the aircraft could be 3594. This time the aircraft were taken from given even minimal maintenance was at the inventory of the 38th Bombardment Jeddah, and this became the main base of Group (Light) at Laon in France, which was the B-26s during their brief career with the due for re-equipping with B-57s. . RSAF'. The Americans suggested to the RSAF One of the new aircraft was held back in that they should employ a commercial firm to Europe for a few weeks, pending conversion maintain the aircraft and the Saudis decided to dual control, but four of the others were to follow this advice. officially handed over to the RSAF on 16 April From the few photos available of the RSAF 1955, together with the Invader that had Invaders, it is likely that most were originally arrived the previous year. All five Invaders, painted overall black, but at least two had a flown by USAF pilots, participated in a fly-past natural metal finish. Some of the black airbefore King Saud to celebrate the delivery of craft may later have had their upper surfaces the RSAF's first combat aircraft. The sixth of painted a dark sand colour, while the underthe B-26s drawn from the 38th BG(L), B-26B sides were left black, but this is not serial 44-35784, had probably been assigned confirmed. RSAF roundels were probably to Saudi Arabia by somebody unaware of the carried in six positions, together with a Saudi Invader already present at Dhahran, and the . flag on the fin. The aircraft numbers 301 to aircraft was therefore reinstated in the USAF. 309, which were obviously not allocated in During a visit to Saudi Arabia in April 1955, order of delivery, were applied to the rear the US Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. fuselage. The number was painted in red, but Talbott had authorized the delivery of a fur- may have been black on the unpainted airther three B-26Bs, and these, too, were taken craft. The USAF serial was initially kept on the from the 38th BG(L) at Laon. They were fin, again in red, but this was later replaced by assigned to MDAP project 6B252, and handed the RSAF serial. In most cases it was written over to the RSAF in late June 1955. in the same style as on the fuselage, but at Once the TB-26B had arrived, it became least one aircraft (number 303) had it written possible to give some training to the Saudi in Arabic. The same aircraft also had the offiRSAF 309 as seen in 1976, still basically intact but decidedly worse for wear. The Saudi Invaders were evidently scrapped a few years later. J. Wegg

'A total of twelve T-28As were scheduled, however, and these could conceivably have been employed as light strike aircraft. In the event, the T-28s were deleted from the programme in favour of the B-26, although some were subsequently delivered under the 1957 training programme. 'One source claims that the B-26 unit was known as 3 Squadron, but this has not been confirmed.

SAUDI ARA81A

67

Aircraft 303 had markings that differed slightly from most of the other RSAF 8-26s. Note the name of the air force in Arabic on the fuselage side, and the serial repeated on the fin in Arabic digits. The Invader was basically natural metal, but probably with black nacelles. J. Wegg

(

cial name of the RSAF, AI Quwwat AIJawwiyaAssa'udiya, written in Arabic in front of the fuselage roundel. Very little is known about the actual use of the 8-26s by the RSAF, but most indications are that they were used hardly at all. The shortage of qualified pilots remained a problem over the next few years, and it is most unlikely that the Invaders ever became operational. 8y April 1957 there was also a severe shortage of spare parts, and it is quite possible that the Invaders were more or less grounded from this point on. The civilian contractors who handled the maintenance at Jeddah performed very poorly, which further reduced the serviceability of the aircraft. American efforts to train the Saudis in logistics met with little success: 'We tried to develop a depot at [Jeddah] for spare parts for their airplanes,' the commander of the USAF Training Mission recalled. 'They had no warehouse for them. They just dumped them in the sand, and the goats came around and ate all the tags off of them, and they never knew what they had.' In addition, the RSAF was about to move into the jet age. The Egyptian government presented four Vampire F8.52s to the RSAF in July 1957, and these were later joined by at least a dozen additional aircraft. Under the' terms of the new Dhahran treaty, the MAAGsoon to be elevated to a US Military Training Mission - now began to train the RSAF in earnest, and new equipment started pouring into Saudi Arabia during the second half of 1957. A complete training programme was set in motion, with the Saudi pilots progressing from basic trainers to T-33s, and finally to

F-86F Sabres. The transport squadron was also augmented by C-123B Providers. Most of these new aircraft were supported under MAP; the new name for MDAP since November 1956. The 8-26s, significantly, were not MAP-supported. These changes almost certainly spelt the end of the Invader in RSAF service, although it is possible that a couple of them lingered for a few years as trainers or hacks. For some unknown reason, B-26B 43-22679 was transferred back to the USAF at Dhahran in the summer of 1958, being listed as a 'special activity aircraft.' On 13 January 1959 it was once again delivered to the RSAF under MAP. It is not known when tbe Invaders were finally struck off charge, but in 1960-61 several 8-26s were spotted in the 'boneyard' at Jeddah, looking abandoned and disused for. some time. Nothing much seems to have happened to them until February 1966, when the RSAF announced its intentions to sell off all non-operational aircraft, Le. the B-26s, Vampires, T-6s and T-35s; all located at Jeddah. The T-28s and T-34s of the RSAF Training Section at Jeddah also fell into dis-

use around this time and were expected to be sold off as well. Some inspections were carried out to assess their value, and Pakistan was reportedly interested in buying at least a few of the aircraft. But the whole scheme fell through for some reason and no sales were ever made. At least seven former RSAF Invaders were still sitting in the desert near the old Jeddah airport in 1976, in conditions ranging from mere hulks to virtually complete aircraft. One other B-26, the above-mentioned 43-22679, was spotted in a scrapyard in Riyadh around the same time. The fact that only eight out of the nine original B-26s could be located at this point may possibly indicate that one was lost in RSAF service. Most if not all of the Jeddah aircraft were still there in 1980, but they were probably scrapped when land developers took over the closed-down airport soon afterwards. One Invader, 43-22679, has surVived to be used as a gate guardian at the King Faisal Air Academy near Riyadh, after being rescued from the cutter's torch.

AL QUWWAT AL-JAWWIYA ASSA'UDIAYA (Royal Saudi Air Force)

RSAF Serial

Version

Previous identity

Delivered

SOC

301 302

TB-263 8-268

44-34671 43-22679*

May 55 16Apr55*

? ?

303 304 305 306 307 308 309

8-268 8-268 8-268 8-268 8-268 8-268 8-268

44-34103* 44-34113* 44-34114* 44-34139* 44-34138* 44-34144 44-34194*

16 Apr 55* 16Apr55* 16 Apr 55':' Jun 55* Jun 55* 16 Apr 55 Jun 55*

? ? ? ? ? ? ?

Remarks Derelict at Jeddah in 1976. Arrived 18 Feb 54, but not officially handed over until 1955. 43-22679 preserved near Riyadh. Derelict at Jeddah in 1976. Derelict at Jeddah in 1976. Derelict at Jeddah in 1976. Derelict at Jeddah in 1976.

" The link-up between the RSAF and USAF serials is not confirmed. The delivery dates are linked to the latter. Two more aircraft were at Jeddah in 1976, but remain unidentified.

68

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Ten

Cuba Cuba might seem, at first glance, to be a poor candidate for US Mutual Defense Assistance Program Grant Aid deliveries. However, any student of the turbulent politics of the Caribbean basin during the 1950s will quickly point out that geographic size, political orientation and military necessity were seldom figured into such decisions during the epoch. Cuba's armed forces, by the mid-1950s, were a strange combination of very well trained, professionally oriented careerists, political appointees, grossly inept leadership at some levels and truly amazing adaptability at others. Cuba's air arm, still a stepchild to the national Army, seemed to gravitate between feast and famine when it came to new equipment, budgets, training and status within Cuban society. Through the entire postwar period leading up to the Castro revolution, the FAEC was favoured with a very active, though small USAF Mission, which laboured tirelessly to do more with less. The Mission was instrumental in pulling the FAEC out of the post Second World War slump into which it had fallen. Between 1946 and 1952, for all intents and purposes the FAEC had almost zero combat capability, aside from some armed AT-6s and a few questionable Lockheed P-38s seized from an armed group bent upon invading the neighbouring Dominican Republic. For the first time, however, Cuba could also boast a multi-engined bomber force in the

form of the Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero Cuatro de Septiembre, outfitted with six

North. American B-25s of mixed ancestry received around 1947. Through the efforts of the US Mission, this small unit actually achieved some limited combat capability, although flying hours were rather restricted due to the excessive maintenance and spares problems associated with operating various versions of the Mitchell. As Cuba became a signatory to the MDAP agreements, and eligible for 'Tab' force status due to her surprising successes with the B-25 unit, the government submitted a lengthy 'wish list' of major equipment items it would like to acquire under the Grant Aid provisions of the MDAP law, in February 1952. The list included a request for 'either nine B-25s or twelve B-26s, plus spares and equipment for at least one years' operation.' Ultimately, the request was granted for four of the B-25s but, due to the Korean War, the B-26s could not then be made available. However, with the hemisphere-wide Grant Aid programme to re-equip 'Tab' force units with the B-26, Cuba was nominated to supply of this type for delivery commencing in November 1956. In fact, transition training from B-25s was reported as 'under way' between July and December 1955, and it must be assumed that the USAF Mission had managed to obtain a B-26 or TB-26 for this purpose prior to the arrival of the FAEC's own

aircraft. Other crews were trained in the USA. Initially, the plan was to deliver eight B-26B and eight B-26C variants, to allow the Escuadron to conduct both attack and horizontal, conventional bombing operations. Additionally, Cuba was programmed to receive a dedicated dual-control TB-26B and TB-26C under GA, the only such deliveries in SouthAmerica. Like most other GA B-26 deliveries in Latin America, the FAEC's aircraft were, initially, all painted intruder black and - possibly in an attempt to confound her enemies - the FAEC found it expedient to assign its own serial numbers in a stuttered sequence, perhaps to give the impression that a larger number of aircraft were in service. The first sixteen aircraft were in fact flown in from the US in November and December 1956, followed by two replacement aircraft in December 1957 which, oddly, were configured differently than the earlier aircraft and may thus have been FMS-acquired 'as is/where is.' All of the aircraft, together with virtually every other combatant FAEC aircraft, were ·stationed at Campo Columbia outside Havana, where at least twelve were usually kept on-line at anyone time - a very impressive sight to Cubans who came to the field to watch the flying on a lazy afternoon. Two aircraft were lost to accidents prior to the Castro revolution in late 1958, one of these due to the loss of an engine on take-off, the B-26C crashing into a nearby country club. In the relatively brief time that the FAEC operated its Invaders prior to the success of the Castro insurgency, (the first shots of which are usually cited as having been fired on 17 January 1957) it can be fairly reported that the service never truly became comfortable on the new mounts. US sponsored Mobile Training Teams, scheduled to arrive after the service had completed basic famil'Genuine' Fuerza Aerea del Ejercito de Cuba Invader photos are very rare. Here, B-26C FAEC 917 runs up in front of the Campo Columbia headquarters building during a search and rescue operation being mounted in the area of Las Villa on the north coast of Cuba. Note that the wing guns are in place, a practice seldom noted on Latin American Invaders. 1. Quintero

CUBA

(

(

iarity training with the aircraft, were overtaken by events. Likewise, an aerial gunnery course, scheduled by the USAF Mission to commence in August 1957, was cancelled when all FAEC units were placed in full-time 'alert' status. Fortunately, the Mission did manage to complete a B-26 Transition Training programme in August 1957 for twenty-three pilots, all of whom were rated 'qualified' for flight duties on the type. On 5 September 1957, the FAEC took part in the crushing of a rebellion by the Cuban Navy at Cienfuegos, with B-26s and F-47s strafing and bombing the naval base and the city. Some pilots refused to carry out the attacks and were subsequently imprisoned, further reducing the effectiveness of the Invader unit. The problems applied not only to air crew, but to the somewhat overburdened ground crews as well, many of whom had no formal training on the new and somewhat complex aircraft - compared to what they were used to dealing with. Poor maintenance soon manifested itself in low serviceability. The single TB-26, which was also used as a target tug (equipment for which was received in March 1958) for the FAEC F-47Ds and T-33s, was unserviceable from early 1958 through at least July, due to a defective wing fuel cell, which the FAEC depot maintenance personnel were unable to deal with locally. Operational utilization of the aircraft was further inhibited by the almost total lack of coordination between Cuban Army units on the ground in what was termed the 'Zona de Operaciones' in the eastern half of the island.. Actual B-26 operations against the various rebel factions commenced in early 1958, but were almost always flown as individual sorties against what amounted to targets of opportunity, as the intelligence on rebel positions and units was usually so old as to be useless by the time a mission was mounted. One such attack, by B-26C FAEC 903 at 0715 hours on 21 June 1958 is typical. Carrying a mechanic and 'artillero' (artillery observer seconded from the Army) as was usual, Teniente Perez Martiel attacked a rebel column on a mountain trail near La Esmeralda with 100 pound bombs and his six wing guns. The pilot, however, in his debriefing report reported that he 'did not see any of the enemy down.' As the crews received 'combat pay' for every flight into the 'Zona de Operaciones' ($25.00 per mission for pilots and $10.00 for other crew members) this 'incentive' prompted sorne less-than-enthusiastic crews Another rare photo of a genuine FAEC Invader. FAEC 921 appears to be wearing the light grey scheme when photographed at Campo Columbia in 1958. Note the antenna above the canopy frame. 1. Rivas via G. Farinas

to attack virtually any likely-looking bohio or unfortunate peasant they came across, further eroding, in the process, the popularity of the Batista central government. The B-26s were also involved in a significant number of abortive interdiction missions along the northern coast of the Republic. The Rebels were believed to be supplied by air and sea along this coast, and Government attempts to stem this almost constant flow were almost completely frustrated. These interdiction missions were not popular, however, as the crews did not receive the Combat Pay bounty, and may account for the general lack of enthusiasm with which they were carried out. Had the FAEC benefited from USAF Mission experience, counter-insurgency operations, coordinated with spotter or FAC aircraft, could certainly have had a more telling effect on the insurgents - and conceivably have affected the outcome of the revolution. However, US MAP-assistance, in the face of growing criticism of the US role in supporting the Batista regime, shipments of arms and related military supplies not already 'in the pipeline' were unilaterally suspended in November 1957, leaving the Mission somewhat in limbo and unsure of just what assistance to render to the FAEC. Needless to say, this suspension also adversely affected spares and parts shipments. By August 1958, the FAEC was experiencing a rash of fuel tank leakage problems similar to that experienced by the TB-26. The problem was found to be that the cells were literally coming apart where they had been galvanized. The local Cuban Goodrich representatives finally contributed to the solution to the fuel cell problem, gaining information from the home office on how to properly cure the rubberized fuel cells. However, by the time this solution had been found, the majority of the aircraft had been ruled unsafe to fly and a

69

consequent decrease in In-Commission! Operational aircraft could not have come at a worse time for the Batista regime. During this hiatus, the USAF Mission did at least manage to arrange a Caribbean Air Command B-26 Mobile Training Unit's equipment (but with no instructor personnel, aside from one from the School for Latin America at Albrook Field, Canal Zone) to assist the FAEC in at last establishing a course of instruction on the type. The six week course, commencing in June 1958, was constantly interrupted by operational necessities and student absences to take part in actual operations, but the vital engine and ignition phases of the course were finally completed, using Cuban instructors who completed 100 hours of instruction to thirty students. As the situation became ever more confused and rumour abounded, the FAEC's light bomber squadron found itself unable to intensify its operations, due mainly to the nagging spares, fuel cell and ordnance shortage problems. This was in spite of exhortations from the Cuban leadership and morale, which had been cited as 'high' in the unit as recently as June 1958 by the British air attache, plummeted. As the Command and Control structure of the Cuban Government and Armed Forces became ever more paralyzed, divided and indecisive, the successes of the insurgents became magnified all out of proportion. Inevitably, the B-26 crews, who were 'marked men' because of their attacks on the 'citizenry,' in many cases deserted their posts and, by December 1958, the unit was effectively grounded. From the time that Batista has seized power for the second time in 1952, the Cuban military became the central element in the nation's politics. Essentially, it was used as a personal force - loyal to Batista rather than the country and, to ensure its loyalty, Batista's old comrades from the ranks replaced the

70

former professional officers in the Army and the FAEC. As opposition to the government grew, due to its excesses and gross corruption, during the 1950s, the Army and FAEC were pressed into ever more ruthless attempts to squelch the opposition. Corruption and ineptitude, sadly, were often found liberally sprinkled throughout the ranks of what was otherwise a well trained, patriotic rank and file - and led to the inevitable fall of the regime. Out of all proportion to its actual role in the rather lacklustre military campaign against the opposition, the FAEC's bomber element (and the crews of its only mounts, the B-26s) bore the brunt of the vengeance of the postBatista revolutionary governments. For all intents and purposes, when Batista fled the country to the Dominican Republic on 1 January' 1959, the Constitutional Army and the Fuerza Aerea Ejercito de Cuba ceased to exist as a viable military force although technically it wasn't dissolved as such through actual governmental action for sometime. In its place, the Revolutionary Militia, with a strength greatly exceeding the 3,000-odd guerrillas who had represented the insurgents maximum field force in the war against Batista, and the nucleus of what was initially known as the Fuerza Aerea Rebelde of the Segundo Frente Oriental Frank Pais technically absorbed the organization and equipment of the former FAEC. In fact, however, the FAEC had left precious little intact that could be called an effective air force. Many of its most skilled and able personnel had either evaporated into the hinterlands and abroad, or, believing perhaps that the new regime would recognize those who had 'only been doing their job' had attempted to carry on in the face of pervasive uncertainty and contradictory pronouncements from the factions attempting to consolidate power. Some minor and uncoordinated sabotage had also been unleashed. For example, virtually all of the aircraft batteries had been removed (for use or sale on the civil market, where there was a ready dollar for them). Similarly, the radios on many of the aircraft had been arbitrarily smashed, including nearly all of the B-26s'. On paper, the FAR inherited a formidable force. All but three of the B-26s, most of the F47Ds, Sea Furies and T-33As and all but three of the C-47s were still intact, as were a host of ancillary types. The fact is, however, that very few of the aircraft could be made airworthy. Former FAEC transport and civil airline pilots, who were considered 'politically correct,' were hurriedly called into service to man and operate the former FAEC fleet. Not a few opportunists also jumped on the bandwagon, many with questionable preparation

FOREIGN INVADERS

to handle powerful military aircraft types. At first, a large and mobile armed force was believed essential to the preservation of the revolution, mainly to repel the numerous anti-Castroists who attempted to invade the country, and some who remained at large in the interior after the fall of Batista. During this so-called 'anti-bandit campaign,' 179 bands ofinfiltrators or insurrectionists (especially in the Escambray Mountains of Las Villas Province) were alleged to have been destroyed. FAR B-26s, still adorned in the Cuban olive drab of the FAEC (with which most aircraft had been painted sometime in 1958, replacing the all-black schemes carried previously) but with modified FAR national insignia (a white star on a red triangle, with blue/white/blue 'wings') had attempted to aid in this rather hectic series of 'emergencies' which had all the characteristics of the classic witch-hunt. However, rarely could more than three of the Invaders be made airworthy, and usually only one was ever in the air at one time. The inexperience of the crews soon took its toll, a young former C-47 pilot (Tte Devales) crashing in a B-26 aJ: Camaguey in 1959 when he lost control of the aircraft, which went over on its back at low altitude on take-off and crashed into the ground. In point of fact, peak FAR B-26 serviceability probably occurred on 26 July 1959 when, in a review to commemorate Castro's offensive to gain power, FAR (and 'volunteer' civilian crews) managed to get nine of the Invaders into the air for the parade, alongside eight Sea Furies, four T-33As, two F-47Ds, four C-47s, a C-54 and a single C-46. As it gradually became obvious that the Castro revolution was truly Communist in nature, the US government through the aegis of the Central Intelligence Agency mounted a series of operations to attempt to 'retake' the island before Castro could consolidate his revolution. Beginning with an untold number of infiltrators as early as late 1959, tasked to destroy sugar cane fields, mills and industrial targets, the plans evolved into (eventually) Operation Trinidad, an aborted invasion force of 400 with a target of the city of the same name, which had an airport and with whom the insurgents operating in the mountains were to linkup. Unfortunately, the FAR and the Revolutionary Army proved far more capable of dealing with these hastily trained insurgents than Batista's Army had been, and they were neutralized before the operation could be launched. An alternate plan to capture Isla de Pinos (now known as Isla de Juventad) was also frustrated when Castro garrisoned the island with a large mobile force. Then came Operation Pluto, which was the code name for the massive, CIA-backed invasion of the island at Playa Giron by a Brigade

of Cuban expatriates, backed with their own 'air force' (see Chapter 24). At the time of the launch of this classic military catastrophe, the FAR could muster a scant twelve aircraft capable of mounting armament. They included six airworthy B-26s. Castro had the foresight to disperse his air force early in his regime, although this move was not purely strategic as many have been led to believe. It was a politically motivated reassignment, to preclude a centralization of the still suspect airmen who had gone over to the new government, as well as a means of placing his few airworthy resources at locations around the island from which they could carry out reconnaissance and other missions in support of the revolution. One of these involved a very long range mission to the Dominican Republic in 1959, from Santiago de Cuba. The mission of this little-known flight was to ascertain the location of units of the Dominican Navy, which was actively engaged in mopping up the remnants of a Dominican exile group that had attempted yet another invasion of the Dominican Republic. The FAR pilot on this very long-range mission, during which he overflew several Dominican ports, discovered to his alarm that two Dominican Air Force Mustangs had been scrambled and in fact shadowed him back to Cuba. Many of the surviving former FAEC aircraft, still intact, made excellent decoys, and were spotted at Campo Columbia near Havana and at other large Cuban airports to project the impression of a much larger force to pryingeyes. CIA intelligence on the FAR during the . preparation for the invasion was miserably bad. Reconnaissance overflights, which spotted the FAR aircraft staked out on the various fields, led the Agency to resort to guessing how many were airworthy. On only one count did the Agency prove accurate, and this dealt with how many reliable pilots could be called into action. They failed, however, to predict the few foreign 'observers' in the country who would later fly for Castro, and to predict that pre-Castro pilots with little or no orientation on the B-26, Sea Fury and T-33 would commit themselves admirably. As has been noted in the Bay of Pigs chapter, the FAR Escuadron de Bombardero, under the command of Luis Silva-Tablada (a former comrade and FAEC officer of many of the Liberation Air Force pilots), had a total of six B-26s on hand. Silva-Tablada was aided, ironically, by Executive Officer Jacques Lagas, a Chilean who had gained training on the Invader in the FACh under USAF tutelage. Five of the airworthy B-26s were at San Antonio de los Banos airfield, south of Havana, a former Second World War US air base, where most of the FAR's airworthy aircraft were based. The other flyable example, painted black, was at Santiago de Cuba, together with several grounded examples.

71

CUBA

During the initial strike by the Liberation Air Force on Saturday, 15 April 1961, the single black B-26 at Santiago was definitely destroyed by Captain Gustavo Ponzoa, flying Gorilla One. Meanwhile, at San Antonio de los Banos, Linda flight had claimed two FAR B-26s as 'disabled,' leaving the FAR with but three operational Invaders. With all Liberation Air Force air strikes that had been planned for the sixteenth cancelled, the remaining FAR aircraft, which figured so prominently in the events that followed, escaped almost certain destruction. This, of course, included the remaining three airworthy B-26s. The paratroop drop by the Liberation Air Force on the day of the initial landings, flown by five C-46s and a C-54, was code named OperationFa/con.

During this exercise, one of the C-46s was intercepted at very low level by a genuine FAR B-26 - certainly a scenario that the aircraft designers could not have foreseen in their wildest dreams. The FAR B-26 was at first misidentified as a Liberation force aircraft but, when the Invader fired on one of the C-46s, the Commando crew, although startled by the fire, quickly reacted and turned into the attack, thereby probably avoiding certain destruction. The two aircraft passed each other nearly head-on at very low level over the Bay of Pigs itself, the pilot of the C-46, Captain Eddie Ferrer, having the good judgement to seek the security of the invasion support ships' anti-aircraft protection. This

proved to be a smart move, as the B-26 promptly left the area. Around noon on the 17th, another FAR B-26, again piloted by Captain Silva-Tablada and a full crew (Martin Torres, Jesus Noa and Gonzalez Garrinaga) attacked the invasion support vessels themselves. The Invader was hit almost immediately by the intense AA barrage put up by the ships, however and, losing a wing, cartwheeled into the ocean with the loss of all on board. This FAR B-26 (reportedly FAR 903) thus gained the dubious distinction of being the only Invader known to have been lost to hostile fire in the service of a national conventional air force in the Western hemisphere. Finally, on the 18th, one of only two B-26s in the FAR inventory remaining, piloted by the Chilean Jacques Lagas, overflew some of Castro's own columns heading towards the combat zone - and was almost shot down in the process by trigger-happy Communist troops on the ground, who had suffered badly at the hands of the same type flown by the Liberation Air Force. One can only imagine the morale of FAR B-26 crews at this point. That last sortie on the 18th is the final known instance of an FAR (and former FAEC) B-26 being flown, and marked the very last twin-engined bomber/attack aircraft to fly in Cuban markings to this writing. Some notes on FAR B-26 markings and paint schemes. It is certain that the FAR merely remarked the surviving FAEC B-26s with 'FAR,·tities in place of the 'FAEC' and retained the old serials. Jhe revolutionary

national insignia was also adopted and carried in the traditional positions, and it is reported that the olive-drab paint was removed from the operational aircraft, although this has not been conclusively proven in all cases. At least one of the aircraft destroyed in the initial Liberation attack on Santiago was reliably reported by the pilot, Captain Ponzoa, to have been painted black. A light grey overall scheme was adopted, but apparently this was very arbitrary and little or no standardization was in being at this point in time.

Although displayed in full FAR markings at the open-air DAAFAR Museum, 'FAR 933' almost certainly never served with the FAEC or FAR, and is believed to be an ex-Portuguese Invader brought home from Angola as a war prize! Its markings are very crudely applied. R.Mak

FUERZA AEREA DEL EJERCITO DE CUBA (Air Force of the Army of Cuba)/ FUERZAAEREA REVOLUCIONARIA (Revolutionary Air Force) FAEC/FAR Serial

Version

Previous identity

901 903 905 907 909 911 913 915 917 919 921 923 925 927 929 931 933 935

TB-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C TB-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26C B-26B TB-26B

41-39274* 41-39429* 43-22440* 43-22542* 44-34110* 44-34147* 44-34271 * 44-34326':' 44-34429* 44-35691* 44-35697* 44-35763* 44-35818* 44-35930* 44-35945* 44-35988" 43-22576* 43-22455':'

TOC

SOC

Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 ov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Nov 56 Dec 57 Dec 57

Apr 617 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 617 7 7 7 617 7

Remarks To FAR 9037

Converted from B-26B

To FAR 925.

To FAR 933.

AB-26 with the serial FAEC 937 has been reported, but has not been confirmed, and seems most unlikely. .:. Aircraft with the above USAF serials are believed to have been delivered to Cuba in the months shown, but tie-ups with FAEC serials are not 100% confirmed.

72

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Eleven

Brazil At first glance, it may seem odd that giant Brazil was the last of the mainland Latin American nations to acquire Invader variants for its air force, in this case all under the auspices of the Military Assistance Sales (MAS) provisions of the MDAP programmes. Brazil had, however, benefited greatly from the wartime Lend-Lease programme, and the subsequent American Republics Projects. Its air force could boast units equipped with adequate numbers of Douglas A-20Ks (the last of which were finally witI-jdrawn in 1953), Lockheed PV-I Ventura and PV-2 Harpoon (B-34/B-34A) variants (in service as late as 1960), Boeing B-17Gs (which kept going until 1969) and not fewer than 96 examples of the North American B-25 Mitchell medium bomber. These served until 1974. The FAB found the B-25s, which were modified for a variety of roles, ideally suited to its needs, and two generations of careerists saw them through their service. As the last of the A-20s, Venturas and Harpoons became spares problems, however, it was recognised that an interim dedicated attack aircraft was needed in numbers sufficient to equip a single unit. Brazil had plans to acquire state-of-the-art jet attack aircraft, but needed an aircraft to bridge the gap until these could become available. The B-26 seemed the ideal choice.

The US had offered Brazil B-26s in 1954-55, along with the other Latin American 'Tab' Force participants. At the time, however, Brazil had sufficient numbers of B-25s to fulfil its limited attack needs, as well as dedicated mobile units with armed T-6s. By late 1956, however, with US MDAP support of the B-25 type at an end, it was clear that a switch would have to be made, and the FAB accepted an inexpensive US offer under MAS for a batch of (initially) fourteen B-26Bs and an equal number of B-26Cs. These were later supplemented by three additional attrition B-26Cs (which had been built as B-26Bs) and a single impounded hybrid. The bargain llS offer came at a time when Brazil was actively negotiating in Britain for the purchase of twelve English Electric Canberra B.8s and two TA trainer variants, which were ultimately found to be too expensive, in the face of other longer-term FAB acquisitions plans for T-37s and Macchi MB-326GBs. At any rate, the US offer was accepted and Brazil arranged for the selected aircraft, stored at Davis-Monthan, to be overhauled by the Fairchild facility at St. Augustine, Florida and Hagerstown, Maryland. The first flight of four left for Brazil and reached Parnamirim in September 1957. The remainder were all flown down in batches of four, ending in a final delivery in February 1958, and were

operational with the 5° Grupo de Avia<;ao at Natal, Rio Grande do Norte on the far northeastern coast of Brazil by I June 1958, replacing that unit's B-25s. The 5° Grupo had two operating units: the 1°/5° GAv and the 2°/5° GAv, both nominally equipped with fourteen aircraft each. The mission of the Grupo, among other things, was to carry out twin-engine instruction for Aspirantes (a temporary cadet rank under 2nd Lieutenant) and for students coming out of the Escola de Aeronautica (the FAB's academy). The training role lasted till 1963, when the B-26s low combat readiness rates led to their replacement in the instruction cycle. The next year, 1°/5° GAv centralised all remaining B-26s, becoming a dedicated medium bomber/attack unit while 2°/5° GAv began to perform the training duty with recently introduced Beech H18S trainers. Although the mid to late 1950s was a period of considerable political instability in Brazil, it was also one of renewed development for the FAB. A Comando Aerotatico Terrestre was formed in March 1957 for the express purpose of co-operating with the Brazilian Army, and the 1°/5° GAv exercised frequently in this role, following US doctrine in attack and close support tactics a first for the service. The 1°/5° GAv moved to Base Aerea do Recife (capital of Pernambuco state) in 1971, where they continued to operate in this mode until the unit was disbanded two years later. The final FAB B-26 operating unit was 1° Esquadrao do 10° Grupo de Avia<;ao (J 0/1 0° GAv), located at Base Aerea de Sao Paulo. This unit, seldom reported in the popular literature, flew nine B-26s from 1971, performing attack, photo recon and maritime recon missions until the type's retirement in 1975. Throughout its rather mundane existence with the FAB, the B-26 never saw action, although the operating unit was consistently rated 'C-I ' by the US Mission for its aggressive standard of training and efficiency. This The very first Brazilian Air Force B-26B, sin 5145, lifts off on its delivery flight to Brazil from St. Augustine, Florida, in September 1957. Note that at least two of the nose guns are in place, as are fourteen underwing rocket stubs, but the ventral turret has been removed. Fairchild via W. C. Wolfinger

BRAZIL

Two Brazilian B-26Cs and a B-26B at St. Augustine, Florida, in 1958 prior to delivery. Note the presentation of the designation and serial on the vertical fin: 'B26-C-5166' on the nearest aircraft. The B-26Cs had only four rocket rails, but also sported multi-gun underwing pods. The antenna on the canopy is almost unique in Latin America to Brazilian Invaders. Fairchild via W. C. Wolfinger Line-up of Brazilian B-26B and B-26Cs following overhaul at St. Augustine, Florida, just prior to delivery. Nearest is 'B26-C-5166' which arrived in 1958. Note the operative dorsal turret and the fact that all FAB Invaders had dorsal and ventral radio tear-drop antennae on the rear fuselage. Fairchild via W. C. Wolfinger

inevitably led to accidents, however, and a number of aircraft - especially B-26C variants - were lost in the first few years of operation. The operating units had a secondary mission of maritime reconnaissance along Brazil's long coast, and participated in several air/sea rescue operations as well. The aircraft were poorly suited for this role, however, due to the need for the pilot and - in the case of the B-26Cs - the crew chief to serve two functions while trying to observe the ocean surface from very cramped and tiring positions. FAB Invaders received service designations, which were considered an integral part

of the individual aircraft sfrial number carried (usually) on the vertical fin on each aircraft. Initially, these were presented as (for example) 'B-26B 5152' or 'B-26C 5164' but were later modified to read either A-26B or A-26C. The single, hybrid transport conversion, described later, was designated 'CB-26'. For reasons that are not clear, but possibly involving Brazil's wish to programme available MAP funds for other purposes, Brazil's B-26 fleet did not take part in the mass Project Wing Spar programme along with 53 other Latin American Invaders in 1964-65 in Panama. The operational life of the fleet was undoubtedly shortened by this phenomenon, and the weakness started to manifest itself as early as 1966, when a very large crack was found in the spar of an Invader that had just had a hard landing. Later inspection of the whole fleet revealed that a further seven aircraft had similar failures. Delays in new acquisitions, however, prompted Brazil to contract with Hamilton Aircraft Company at Tucson, Arizona, to refurbish the best sixteen remaining aircraft, starting as early as June 1967. This included a mix of twelve B-26Bs and four B-26Cs, which were in the minority amongst surviving aircraft. The work also included upgrading of the radio, fuel system, etc. Although it has been frequently stated that these aircraft were brought up to B-26K stan-

73

dard, this is not correct. Most of the changes involved IRAN to avionics, communications and weapons systems, as well as some work on structural components and glazed canopy and nose areas. At least two of the aircraft that arrived as B-26Bs returned marked and configured as B-26Cs. The paint scheme selected, also, gave rise to the reports that the aircraft were brought to B-26K standards, as it was essentially identical to that worn by most early USAF B-26K conversions. This may have been an intentional ploy. Fifteen aircraft were returned to Brazil, plus three 'new' aircraft acquired via Hamilton as replacements for in-country losses. One aircraft, which was found to be so badly corroded as to be unsafe to fly, was apparently struck off in Arizona and replaced by another. The others returned to service with the 1° Esquadrao, 5° Grupo de Avia<;:ao at Natal from August 1968. Apparently, surviving aircraft that remained in Brazil through this period were withdrawn from service by the FAB to serve as a spares source and to free aircrews for other duties. The last of these old, original configuration aircraft was lost on 17 July 1967 when B-26B 5146 crashed on take-off at Natal. During the ensuing years, the 1°/5 0 GAv (and later 1°/10 0 GAv) continued to operate and train on its 'new' B-26s from its home base at Natal, although by mid-1974 only

74

twelve were still airworthy. The units dedicated mission had since been changed to that of counter-insurgency, and several USAF Mobile Training Teams had visited to aid the unit significantly in adjusting to this type of aerial warfare. The MTTs invariably were highly complimentary of the unit and its aircrews, although they also lamented the historically poor depot-level maintenance support accorded the units' aircraft. The FAB redesignated the surviving aircraft to A-26B and A-26C starting in 1970. In spite of the Hamilton-rebuild, however, main spar cracks were found again during 1972 - and this led inevitably to the gradual retirement of the type from FAB service, the withdrawal stretching between 1973 and December 1975. The unit re-equipped onto EMBRAER-license built variants of the Macchi MB-326GB light attack aircraft, and the A-26s were retired with honour. Two aircraft from the original MAS supplied batches have survived: A-26C 5159 (but fitted with an A-26B 'solid' nose) andA-26B 5156. . However, the FAB operated one other Invader that has received scant attention. This, a highly modified B-26B, was impressed into the FAB as its sole CB-26 on 21 June 1966 following its seizure at Brasilia while engaged

FOREIGN INVADERS

in illegal activities - probably smuggling of contraband. Although seized in 1966, it remained semi-derelict at Brasilia until 1970, when the FAB finally took it on charge formally. This unique aircraft, actually built up from components and arbitrarily assigned the identity of a B-26B, one of two aircraft used in its resurrection, by R. G. LeTourneau, Inc. of Longview, Texas in 1954, had a number of highly unusual and very expensive modifications over the intervening years. This has led some Invader watchers to speculate on its 'VIP transport' utilization. Registered to LeTourneau - which had several other Invaders as well - as NI15RG, the aircraft that emerged from initial modifications had a large window on the right fuselage side between the main spars and an airstair door opening down just aft of the main wing spar. Described in registration documents initially as an A-26, it was later modified to add another similar window on the left side of the fuselage. Other modifications included the placement of six metal tanks in the wings, removal of the upper tur: ret and installation of a floor in place of the original bomb bay doors, as well as two 'baggage'doors.

Subsequently, the aircraft underwent a series of further unusual modifications by the Texas owner, including addition of a jump seat in the cockpit at station 48, a two-place side-facing divan at station 152, one rearfacing two-place seat at station 205, one front-facing two-place seat at 248 and one similar seat at station 289, making the aircraft potentially capable of seating not fewer than nine passengers in addition to the pilot. The aircraft also had not fewer than four radio transceiverslreceivers and associated antennae and a host of other sophisticated avionics. Registration documents by August 1961 listed the aircraft as an A-26C and, although impounded and incorporated into the FAB inventory in 1966, the aircraft was not finally cancelled by the FAA until September 1971! This aircraft was not assigned to the 10/50 GAv, however, but rather was based at Recife (Pernambuco) and nominally assigned to the Parque de Material Aeronautico de Recife (PAMARF) during its service with the FAB. PAMARF overhauled the rather tattered aircraft and used her subsequently as a cargo aircraft, her particular lot being that of hauling parts and technicians to FAB air bases at Porto Alegre and Pirassununga, and others, where the PAMARF was charged with such support duties. It was finally offered for sale in January . 1975 and eventually ended up in the hands of a private museum in Bebedouro, Sao Paulo state. One source claims that the aircraft was subsequently sold to an unknown foreign buyer.

One of the earliest known photos of a Brazilian Invader displaying the large red numeral '5' (for the operating unit, the 5° Grupo de Avia\;ao) on the vertical fin. Sin 5146, the FAB's second Invader, suffered a wheelsup landing at Base Aerea Natal during a night landing on 23 June 1959. via G. Wetsch Illustrations of the unit insignia noted on Brazilian Invaders. On the left is the badge of the 1° Esquadrao do 5° Grupo de Avia\;ao (l °/5° GAv), with the 5° GAv insignia on the right. Usually, the Esquadrao insignia was noted on the starboard side of the nose of most aircraft, while the Grupo badge occupied the port side. G. Wetsch

Opposite page top: A fully armed 1°/5° GAv B-26C (designation presented as 'B26-C' on vertical fin), sin 5170 at a display in June 1967. The Esquadrao badge is just visible behind the '70' on the nose. M. Roberto vaz Carneiro

BRAZIL

75

FOR<;AAEREA BRASILEIRA (Brazilian Air Force) FAB Serial

Previous identities

B-26B 5145 B-26B 5146 B-26B 5147 B-26B 5148 B-26B 5149, B-26C 5149 B-26B 5150 B-26B 5151 B-26B 5152 B-26B 5153 B-26B 5154 B-26B 5155 B-26B 5156

41-39246 43-22469 43-22496 43-22597 44-34163 44-34196 44-34207 44-34208 44-35235 44-35405 44-35415 44-35586

B-26B 5157 B-26B 5158 B-26C 5159, B-26B 5159

TOe Sep Sep Sep Sep

soc

57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57

75 14 Jul 67 75 5 Aug 65 Apr 74 75 9 Aug 65 Jan 75 75 13 Jun 58 28 Sep 65 Dec 75"

44-35610 44-35713 41-39288

57 57 57

Dec 73 Aug 72 Dec 75

B-26C 5160, B-26B 5160 B-26C 5161

43-22271 43-22415

57 58

Dec 75 Jun 68

B-26C 5162 B-26C 5163 B-26C 5164 B-26C 5165 B-26C 5166 B-26C 5167 B-26C 5168 B-26C 5169 B-26C 5170, B-26B 5170 B-26C 5171, B-26B 5171

43-22456 43-22457 43-22461 43-22472 43-22477 43-22605 44-34120 44-34329 44-35264 44-35790

58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 Feb 58 Feb 58

75 Oct 67 Jun 68 Oct 67 Jun 68 10 Jun 63 Jun 68 Jun 68 Dec 75 Dec 75

B-26C 5172 B-26C 5173 B-26C 5174

44-35902 44-34615, N4817E 44-34749, N4823E

Feb 58 Jun 69 Jun 69

Dec 75 c.74 Dec 75

B-26C 5175 CB-26 5176, C-26B 5176

44-35969, N8628E 44-34134, NI15RG, N4974N

Jun 69 70

Dec 75 Jan 75

Remarks Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Crashed on take-off at Natal. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. W/o at Natal. Refurbished 1968 into B-26C. Wfu. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. W/o at Natal. Wfu. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. W/o at Sao Jose de Mipibu, SP state. W/o at Niquelandia, GO state. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Was displayed at FAB Academy in 1°/1 0° GAv markings. Transferred to Parnamirim in 1987. Alleged to have last been designated as a CB-26/C-268. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Refurbished 1968 into B-26B. Wfu. Now displayed at Museu Aerospacial near Rio de Janeiro. Refurbished 1968 into B-26B. Wfu. To have been refurbished 1968, but found to be too badly corroded. Wfu. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Wfu. Wfu. Wfu. Wfu. W/o at Caravelas, BA state. Wfu. Wfu. Refurbished 1969 into B-26B. Wfu. Refurbished 1968, still as B-26C, but later reconfigured in Brazil into B-26B. Wfu. Refurbished 1968. Wfu. Wfu between 1973 and 1975. Wfu. Originally preserved at ESPAer near Sao Paulo. Sold back to USA as N4823E c.1984. Wfu. Civilian aircraft, impounded on 21 Jun 66. Used as a transport aircraft. Wfu. Preserved with Museu de Armas e Veiculos Motorizadas Antigos, Bebedouro, SP.

Note that the type designation was an integral part of the FAB serial. Beginning in 1970, these were changed from B-26 to A-26, with e.g. 'B-26C 5173' becoming 'A-26C 5173' (aircraft 5176 being an exception to this rule).

76

FOREIGN INVADERS

The 5° GAv insignia on the nose of B-26B sin 5156 at Howard AFB, CZ in November 1967. Note that the insignia as worn here differs considerably in detail from the 'approved' version shown on page 74. D. Hagedorn

Shown on the starboard side of the nose of FAB B-26C 5170 in February 1968, this insignia is thought to be that of the seldom seen 2°/5° GAvthe second Esquadrao within the Grupo. The similarity in design to that of the 1° Esquadrao, illustrated elsewhere, is obvious. D. Hagedorn Brazilian B-26B sin 5145 at Howard AFB, CZ en route to the USA for refurbishment in February 1968. This aircraft is odd in that it did not bear any trace of the operating unit insignia. The presentation of the designation was also nonstandard, as was the placement of the antennae over the nose. The gun ports in the nose had been very crudely covered. This was the FAB's oldest Invader. D. Hagedorn

In contrast to B-26B 5145, B-26C sin 5162, also in the February 1968 batch heading to the USA for rebuild, bears full 5° GAv insignia and markings. The upper turret had been removed, however. D. Hagedorn

BRAZIL

Brazilian B-26C sin 5162 poses in the sun, minus her props, awaiting work at the Hamilton Aircraft Company facility in Tucson, Arizona. Other ex-USAf and civil B-26s (and a B-25), used as parts sources during the overhaul programme, littered the area.

via R. Besecker One of the few Hamilton-refurbished Invaders to show any signs of nose gun ports, FAB 5171 had gone to the US as a B-26C! It is seen here at Howard AfB, CZ on its way back to Brazil in June 1969. J. Mercier

Although it had gone to Hamilton on overhaul as a B-26C, sin 5159 returned as a B-26B! The basis for Brazil's Invaders frequently being cited as 'B-26Ks' is obvious in this view, as the overhauled aircraft returned with colour schemes very similar to those worn on On Mark-rebuilt USAF B-26Ks. This was one of.the first aircraft to return, seen here at Howard AFB, CZ in March 1969. D. Hagedorn

77

78

FOREIGN INVADERS

With almost everything either open or hanging down, Brazilian B-26C sIn 5173 shows the placement of antenna arrays, vents and crew egress hatch to good advantage at Howard AFB, CZ in June 1969. D. Hagedorn

FAB B·26C sIn 5175 was one of the three 'new' Invaders acquired from Hamilton as replacements for aircraft that were beyond repair in June 1969. Although at first glance seemingly identical to the other FAB aircraft overhauled, this aircraft does not have the ventral antenna array and seems to have an unusual transparency on the right rear fuselage side. 1. Mercier

The last two Hamilton refurbished Brazilian Invaders at Howard AFB, CZ in August 1969. FAB 5172 was later reconfigured as a B-26B in Brazil. This aircraft also did not have the ventral antenna array. D. Hagedorn

BRAZIL

When the FAB finally decided to re-apply operating unit insignia to the refurbished Invaders, the 5° GAv badge was frequently noted on both sides of the nose of some aircraft, such as B-26B 5160. This aircraft was finally retired in December 1975, and had originally served the FAB as a B-26C. 1. Wegg Collection Seldom seen is the unit insignia of the last Brazilian B-26 operating unit, the 1°/10° GAv. Here, B-26C 5149 is seen bearing the badge on its port nose just before deactivation in April 1974. Note that the upper portion of the nose glazing has been painted white to reduce heat and glare. At this point, no fuselage national insignia is carried. MAP

A detailed view of the 1°/10° GAv unit insignia. The outer band is black, inner band red, lion and crown red with blue balls on top of crown. The banner is blue with white letters. via G. Wetsch

79

80

FOREIGN INVADERS

Although the application of the 5° GAv's red numeral '5' on the vertical fin is open to question, this preserved B-26B, sin 5156 was originally displayed at the Brazilian Air Force Academy as A-26B 5156 in 1°/10° GAv markings. It is shown here at the FAR's CATRE at Parnamirin, NT, in July 1987. A. Camazano A. via T. Sapienza

Near the end of their service lives, surviving Brazilian Invaders were redesignated A-26B and 'C and, contrary to some reports, actually flew as such. Here, A-26C 5173 bears not only the unit badge of the 1°/1 0° GAv circa 1972, but also the large red number '10' (outlined in white) on the vertical fin, as well as the national insignia on the rear fuselage. via G. Welsch

The last Invader acquired by the FAR, CB-26 5176 with the Parque de Material Aeronautico de Recife (PAMARF) badge on its nose, fires up at its Recife base. via G. Welsch

FOREIGN INVADERS

81

Chapter Twelve

Dominican Republic j

During the 1950s, the Dominican Air Force of dictator Rafael Trujillo was, unquestionably, the largest military aviation organization in the Caribbean basin and, in fact, one of the largest in all of Latin America. The FAD operated an amazing array of piston and jet-engined equipment, in significant numbers, amounting to a force that, to even the most casual observer, was out of all proportion to the defence needs of the comparatively small island republic. Although largely defensive in nature, the force did include small numbers of bomber types - including two Boeing B-17G Flying Fortresses, fully armed and combat capable. These fairly efficacious bombers, although seriously outdated by world standards of the 1950s, none the less caused serious concern amongst Trujillo's neighbours. The first FAD interest in the B-26 type was innocent enough, and involved a request, generated in October 1956, for the delivery of a single aircraft equipped with tow-target equipment. Part of an MDA package that also was to include a C-54 and two C-47s, the FAD withdrew the supplemental part of the request for the target-tug B-26 in April 1957 for. unspecified reasons. More than twenty rnonths later, when the FAD approached the US in December 1958 with a request for a Government-toGovernment sale of twelve Douglas B-26Bs on a cash (Military Assistance Sales or MAS) basis, the US State Departrnent was in something of a quandary. The Dominicans took the position that the Invaders were needed to fill the gap left when the last of the MDAP-supported Republic F-47D Thunderbolts were withdrawn, due to the termination of US Earliest known photo of Dominican Invaders. Although of poor quality, this image reveals that the FAD B-26s were initially painted in USAF Korean War-style 'intruder' colours, with a red petal design around the leading edges of the engine cowls. Visible are (from left) sin 3202, 3203 and 3205. This photo dates from circa 1959, with F-47D Thunderbolts - which were withdrawn from service in November 1957 - still in evidence. L. Engerby By May 1965, surviving FAD Invaders had been painted light grey overall. Here, FAD 3203 is seen head-on, displaying an odd three-gun nose arrangement, and only one hard-point under each wing. G. R. Pape

spares support infrastructure. The US responded by stating that the Dominicans withdrew the otherwise airworthy F-47s voluntarily, complaining that the service could not afford to operate them via commercial spares support sources. At any rate, the State Department deferred the request, citing 'lack of programmed resources in MAS funding' to support the sale, and suggested that the Dominicans try any number of civilian brokers, which were buying lots of serviceable Invaders from the hundreds then becoming surplus to the USAF andANG. Not missing a step, the Dominicans responded a month later, in January 1959, when Florida Aerocessories, Inc. of Miami, Florida, applied for an Export License to deliver twelve B-26B 'training aircraft' in a 'demilitarized condition' to the FAD, the total sale being valued at $500,000. The US Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo heartily recommended approval. The very next month, working apparently through the offices of lawyer E. K. Gubin, the FAD requested that the total number of aircraft to be included on the Export License be increased to fourteen or sixteen aircraft. The State Department started asking rather pointed questions about why the Dominican

Republic needed sixteen former bombers as 'trainers.' Oddly, this deal fell through - with little or no official comment in existing State Department files. It was probably at least partly due to the deterioration in DominicanUS relations that had included, amongst other things, the attempted invasion of the country by Dominican exiles backed by Castro's Cuba during January 1959. With paranoia running high, Trujillo, never at a loss for contacts with prospective arms dealers, feverishly concluded a deal with Manhattan Industries, Inc. for five Invaders at a unit price of $15,000 each. Denied an export license once again, the broker managed to arrange an amazingly quick sale of the exact same aircraft to an unidentified Chilean aerial mapping firm. Incredibly, at the request of the Chilean Embassy, the State Department issued an Export Licence for the five aircraft for export to Chile. To no one's surprise, all five made 'forced landings' in the Dominican Republic during what was labelled as their 'ferry flight' to Chile and were interned by the Dominican Government as undocumented 'warplanes'! The five new aircraft were quickly integrated into the FAD inventory and, in view of the turmoil facing the regime during the suc-

FOREIGN INVADERS

82

ceeding two years, could not have come at a more opportune time. Some difficulty was experienced in militarizing the aircraft, which were a rather odd lot, but the FAD maintenance organization managed to at least paint all five black, and make the bomb bays operational. All lacked turrets, which was probably just as well, as they were needed more as long-range patrol aircraft than as attack aircraft. Utilization of the aircraft, following the death of Trujillo and the fall of his regime in 1961, dropped dramatically, and one had been lost to an accident by that year. By January 1963, although the other four still survived, only three were operative, the fourth serving as a spares source - and all three were now MAP-supported for spares! An additional aircraft was acquired from unknown sources between 1963 and 1965 (one unconfirmed source claims that a Cuban FAR B-26C defected to the Dominican Republic, with the pilot being granted political asylum, and this may be the source of this additional aircraft; however, the FAD is not

known to have operated any B-26Cs), and the FAD did not receive any B-26Ks under during the Dominican Crisis of 1965, three MAP, and in fact the aircraft did not even have were still airworthy. These were nominally provisions for rocket rails or wing guns - only assigned, together with surviving airworthy one ordnance station outboard of the ex-Swedish de Havilland Vampire F.l sand engines finally being instaJled on two aircraft. F.B.50s, to the Escuadron de Caza- All had non-standard 'hard' gun noses, Bombardero. Additionally, one aircraft (FAD mounting a variety of two, three or four .50 3206) had been converted to a VIP transport, calibre weapons, depending on availability. Ironically, prior to the 1965 civil war (during and this was also still on strength. As the country attempted to settle down which the B-26s were inactive), the FAD was following the end of the Trujillo excesses and actively lobbying for an expanded B-26 force the 1965 civil war, the importance of the - and in fact volunteered to take additional armed forces was considerably diminished, examples under MAP 'regardless of condiwith resulting budgetary and personnel cuts. tion.' The FAD had benefited (as had many During calendar year 1965, the FAD's B-26 Latin American air forces) from a USAF fleet, for example, flew only a total of twenty- Counter-Insurgency Mobile Training Team six hours, cumulatively. and, as a result, formed its own COIN unit With restructuring (and eventual MAP re- (formally designated as the Escuadron de equipment) of the FAD during the mid to late Reconocimiento, or the Reconnaissance 1960s, the tired old Invaders were amongst Squadron), mounted on the four surviving the first to be offered for sale, starting in B-26s and six armed T-6s. Never entirely December 1967. So far as can be ascertained, . operational (rated, at best 'C-3' by the USAF no takers were found, and the aircraft were Mission), the unit suffered from a loss of interest in the COIN programme at command eventually scrapped. Contrary to many contemporary accounts, level.

FUERZA AEREA DOMINICANA (Dominican Air Force)

Despite the best effort of the authors, the previous identities of the Dominican Air Force Invaders have evaded discovery. FAD Serial

Version

Previous identity

3201? 3202 3203 3204 3205 3206 3207?

B-26B? B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B, VB-26B B-26B?

? ? ? ? ? ? ?

TOC

SOC

59? 59 59 59 59 61? 61?

Dec 67 Dec 67 Dec 67 Dec 67 Dec 67

?

?

Remarks Existence unconfirmed.

to VIP transport by 1965. Existence unconfirmed.

Conv~rted

Different view of FAD 3203 at San Isidro Air Base in May 1965. By then, the distinctive rudder stripes had gone, although the national insignia was still carried on the rear fuselage and wings. No turrets were in place. G. R. Pope

Left side view of FAD 3203 and 3204 on the

ramp at San Isidro in May 1965, followed by several FAD de Havilland Vampires. These were the only two Invaders noted intact on the field at this time. G. R. Pope

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

A very derelict FAD Invader, still bearing black intruder colours, on the perimeter of San Isidro Air Base in May 1965, flanked by an equally derelict T-6 and a semi-intact FAD C-54. The aircraft had probably served as a spares source to keep the remaining airworthy examples in service. G. R. Pape

VIP-configured FAD 3206, of uncertain origins, sits for sale in Florida circa December 1967. No evidence of national insignia could be seen on the aircraft. The fate of this aircraft is

unknown.DrG.Kuhn

AURllnvader M-266, photographed at Oakland, California, on 19 May 1960, prior to being ferried to Indonesia. All markings, including the Skadron 1 badge, have already been applied. L. Kahn

=

83

84

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Thirteen

Indonesia The embryo of what was to become the against these early uprisings was only spoThe AURI saw only a modest growth during Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, or the radic, however. the first several years of its existence, Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia, was Relations between Indonesia and the USA although substantial numbers of C-47s and created in 1946, during the liberation war were initially good and a Military Assistance T-6s were obtained, to supplement those left against the Dutch. Its first equipment con- Advisory Group was established soon after behind by the Dutch. The only major sisted of a few dozen aircraft salvaged from independence. Aviation was initially given a strengthening of the air force took place in wartime airfields: most of them were low priority, however, and no USAF person- late 1955, when eight Vampire T.55 jet trainJapanese, but there were also one or two nel were assigned to the MAAG. When in ers were acquired from England and used to relics surviving from the British units based in 1951 the AURI expressed an interest in form Skadron II. A report by the British Air Attache in early the Netherlands East Indies in 1941-42. These obtaining Invaders there was therefore aircraft had all been grounded by late 1947 nobody on the spot qualified to deal with the 1958 was not overly complimentary on the and were replaced by a motley collection of request. The Chief of the MAAG, a Lieutenant effectiveness of the combat units. Most of the basically civilian types acquired from the USA . Colonel in the US Army Signal Corps, referred US MAAG personnel had been expelled in during 1948. the matter to the Department of Defense, .mid 1954 by President Sukarno, and the trainFollowing Indonesian independence in adding that 'assistance to Indonesian ing programmes had suffered accordingly. December 1949, the ML-KNIL (Military Government in oQtaining satisfactory equip- The twenty-one surviving Mitchells were said Aviation of the Royal Netherlands Indies ment is ... highly desirable to foster good to suffer from corrosion and a lack of spare Army) was disbanded on 21 June 1950 and relations.' But this was the time of the Korean parts, and flights over open sea were not most of its installations and aircraft handed War and the USAF had no B-26s to spare. allowed. The training standard was not conover to the AURI. The 215 or so ML-KNIL air- Soon afterwards, around twenty USAF sidered to be good, but the unit was 'capable craft included forty-one B-25C, 'D and 'J instructors were incorporated in the MAAG, of some strafing and bombing.' The Mustang Mitchells and twenty-seven F-51D and 'K to help train AURI C-47 and B-25 pilots. unit's performance against the rebels was Mustangs, which had formed the first-line By 1952 Indonesia was in deep financial said to be 'unimpressive.' Despite the US involvement in the 1958 equipment of the force at the time of its dis- trouble, and a decision was taken to cut the bandment l . The best of the B-25s were used armed forces by a third, to save money. This rebellions, the Indonesians still maintained a to form Skadron (Squadron) I, and by the was one of the main reasons behind an army preference for American and Western spring of 1951 the unit had eighteen B-25Js on coup attempt in October 1952, which was European aircraft. The embargo imposed by strength as bombers and strafers, with six only narrowly averted by President Sukarno. the US government nevertheless prompted B-25Cs serving in the photo reconnaissance The situation was soon to deteriorate further the AURI to turn to Eastern Europe for supand VIP transport roles. and in late 1956 large parts of Sumatra were plies, and from late 1958 substantial numbers From the very beginning, there was unrest taken over by arrny officers. The events that in different parts of the country and the army followed over the next two years are One of the Indonesian Invaders in the was kept busy fighting various rebel groups, described in more detail in Chapter 23 on standard markings of the early 1960s, carrying guerrilla armies, bands of Dutch deserters Operation Haik, which also covers the CIA's gun packs and rockets under its wings. and plain bandits. The AURI's involvement role in these operations. via R. 1. Ismail

INDONESIA

of MiG-15UTls, MiG-17s and 11-28s began to arrive in Indonesia, later to be supplemented by further batches of increasingly advanced Soviet types. But old habits often die hard, and the AURI evidently had a high opinion of its pistonengined combat aircraft. Once the US sanctions had been lifted, the Indonesians obtained permission to purchase twenty Mustangs and fifteen Mitchells from the USA. Most if not all of the Mustangs were eventually delivered (mainly from civilian dealers), although several were used only as sources for spare parts. No additional B-25s were purchased, however, and in early 1959 the AURI instead decided to send sixteen of its remaining Mitchells to Hong Kong for refurbishing by a civilian firm. The CIA's use of B-26s in Indonesia was also to inspire the AURI to obtain some Invaders themselves, to supplement their other bomber types. One of the AURI B-25 pilots flying operations against the rebels in 1958 was Major R. James Ismail, who was impressed with the performance of the AUREV Invaders. He therefore suggested to the Air Force Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Suryadarma, that a number of Invaders were to be procured for their own air force. The suggestion was approved and a request was forwarded to the Indonesian Supply Mission in the USA to purchase eight aircraft. The Indonesians originally hoped to buy the aircraft directly through the Pentagon, but their contact man Lieutenant-Colonel Stackhouse informed them that they would have to take their chances with the other presumptive buyers of USAF surplus aircraft, and buy the aircraft in one of the auctions at' Davis-Monthan AFB. A bid was entered in August 1959, but the prices were a bit higher than originally anticipated and the allocated funds were eventually found to only be enough for six rather than eight aircraft. After refurbishing by a civilian firm in the USA, the aircraft were ferried to Indonesia by Skyways Aircraft Servicing, Ltd. They were flown over one at the time and all had arrived safely by mid 1960. On delivery, the aircraft were overall natural metal, with just a small anti-glare panel in front of the cockpit. The individual aircraft numbers consisted of the prefix 'M' (used for all AURI bomber types), followed by the type number '26' and a sequence number. For some reason the numbers 261 and 263 were not used in AURI service, but since a photo exists of an aircraft marked 'M-26 I' (see page 87), it seems very likely that these numbers had been allocated to the two additional IAbout ten surviving Curtiss Kittyhawks were also handed over to the AURI, but were never taken on charge. In addition, there were eighteen Spitfire Mk.lXs which belonged to the Dutch Air Force rather than the ML-KNIL, and therefore returned to Europe.

M-267 as it looked around 1970, wearing the gaudy colour scheme carried by the Indonesian Invaders during their last years in service. via T. Postma An unidentified B-26 taxies past a mixed bag

of AURI aircraft types during Exercise Cant; Yudha in 1970: with the exception of the helicopter, the selection would seem more appropriate for 1950 than 1970. Note the placement of the codes on the Invader in the background. via T. Postma .

Invaders not eventually delivered. National insignia were carried in four positions, USAFstyle, plus a small Indonesian flag on the fin and the titles 'AURI' under the left wing. The Skadron I badge appeared on the fin and a simplified version was painted on the nose: the latter consisted of the numeral' I' in black with a yellow deer superimposed, outlined in white. The unit badge, which was first used on the B-25s, has an interesting background. It was designed during the period when the armed forces received little support from the government, and the squadron was left to fend for itself. Apart from scrounging leftover Japanese supplies for sale to local Chinese merchants, some officers took to hunting deer in the area around their airfield, to provide food for the unit personnel. The

85

deer was therefore seen as a fitting symbol for the squadron! From the start, the AURI Invaders were allocated to Skadron I at Abdurachman Saleh, near the town of Malang on southeastern Java. The unit had moved there from Halim Perdanakusuma outside Jakarta in 1958. The main equipment of the squadron was still the B-25s, but these had been supplemented by twelve old Tu-2 bombers in November 1958. The latter were decidedly unpopular with the crews, however, and saw little use. The AURI used its Invaders for tactical air support, interdiction and long-range reconnaissance. At times they were also employed for relief and evacuation duties. Their first operational use was in the final stages of the operations against the rebels, whose forces were estimated at 17,000 as late as April 1961. By the autumn of 1961 most of the rebels had surrendered, although mopping-up operations continued to around 1964 in some areas. Together with the Bay of Pigs operation, the Indonesian rebellion is thus unique in seeing the use of B-26s by both sides, although in the latter case they were not in service simultaneously. Once the rebellions on Sumatra and elsewhere had been more or less quelled, President Sukarno turned his attention to Netherlands New Guinea, or Irian Jaya as it

FOREIGN INVADERS

86

was known to the Indonesians. This had remained a Dutch colony, despite the claims of the Indonesians that all parts of the former Netherlands East Indies should be transferred to Indonesia. By 1960 Indonesia threatened to take military action and the Dutch hurriedly reinforced their military forces in the area. The only Dutch air units hitherto deployed to their Biak air base had been equipped with obsolete Fairey Fireflies and a few C-47s used for maritime reconnaissance, but when Indonesia broke off diplomatic relations in August 1960 these were augmented and soon replaced by Hawker Hunters and Lockheed Neptunes. When it had become obvious that the Dutch were not about to hand over Irian Jaya voluntarily, Indonesia launched an invasion known as Operasi (Operation) Trikora on 15 January 1962. The amphibious landings and a paratroop drop were covered by the B-26s and B-25s of Skadron 1 and the F-51s of Skadron 3. On 25 March, an unidentified AURI bomber attacked and damaged a Dutch landing craft, killing three members of the crew. The fighting remained rather low-key, however, as negotiations were quickly entered into by the Dutch. The only air-to-air combat took place on 15 May, when a Dutch Neptune shot down an Indonesian C-47. Neither side is known to have lost any aircraft to ground-fire. The Dutch military units began evacuating the area in the autumn of 1962 and in May 1963 the Netherlands New Guinea was incorporated into Indonesia. Afew months after this operation, in August 1962, the AURI suffered its only B-26 loss, when one aircraft was lost over the island of Buru during a tropical storm. All crew members were killed in the crash. Having taken over West Irian, President Sukamo now tumed his eyes to the north. In 1961 the Malayan government had formally launched the idea of a federation of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei and the British colonies of Sabah and Sarawak - the latter three all situated on northern Borneo - to be known as Malaysia. This proposal was in direct conflict with Indonesian ambitions to form the same

Invader M-265 standing at readiness in February 1971. This particular aircraft made its last flight on 7 December 1977, making it the last fully armed B-26 in military service anywhere in the world. via N. 1. Waters III

territories, together with Indonesia and the Philippines, into an Indonesian-led federation. In an attempt· to disrupt the Malayan attempts, the Indonesians began supporting a liberation movement, the TNKU, which in December 1962 started a revolt in the Sultanate of Brunei. When this revolt was quelled by British troops called in by the Sultan, the Indonesians changed their strategy, and in April 1963 Indonesian 'volunteers' posing as members of TNKU began sporadic attacks against targets in Sarawak. After the proclamation of Malaysia in September 1963 (Brunei having withdrawn from the scheme), attacks against Sabah were also instigated. Soon afterwards, B-25s and possibly also B-26s of Skadron I were rebased to Pontianak near the Sarawak border, and began overflights of Sarawak. These flights were mainly intended as a show of strength and no strikes were carried out. Despite this, the British considered the threat serious enough to base small numbers of Hunters and Javelins in Sarawak and Sabah. The conflict led to a new embargo on Western arms supplies to Indonesia. This led to further deliveries of aircraft from the Soviet Union. It appears, however, that the Soviets restrained the AURI from using these for offensive purposes, and the old pistonengined aircraft therefore continued to be used on first-line duties. Finally, in early March 1964, Indonesia dropped all pretence that TNKU were responsible for the attacks on Borneo, and openly committed regular Indonesian military units to the fighting. The war was a limited one, and became known as the Malaysian Confrontation. The Indonesian military named it Operasi Dwikora. Large military forces from both sides were soon involved, but the individual battles were still

usually fought by formations no larger than companies. The British made good use of helicopters and light aircraft in their operations, while the Indonesian forces had little or no air support. Not until September 1965 were single AURI B-25s and B-26s employed for air strikes, usually against isolated villages of little military importance, causing relatively minor damage only. None of the bombers were ever intercepted by the RAF jet fighters. On 1 October 1965, a group of pro-communists seized power in Indonesia, and fighting between pro- and anti-communist groups soon broke out in different parts of the country. After a period of confusion and riots, in which several hundred thousand people were killed, the army under General Suharto carried out a counter-coup in March 1966. A few months later President Sukarno was officially deposed and on 11 August 1966 a peace agreement was signed, ending the Malaysian Confrontation. The AURI now once again turned to counter-insurgency duties, during the mopping up of pro-communist groups. From 1966 . to 1969, the B-26s took part in Operasi Saber Kilat, against the PGRS and PARAKU guerilla movements in western Kalimantan (the Indonesian name for Borneo). They were also employed in Operasi Trisula, a combined operation launched in 1968, aimed at the communist insurgents in southern Blitar. At some undetermined date in the late 1960s, the B-26s had their noses and rear fuselages decorated in dark blue and were given shark's mouths in red, white and yellow. The result was rather garish. The Soviet support for Indonesia ended after the 1966 coup and the air force experienced increasing problems with spare parts. By the time the AURI was renamed Tentera Nasional Indonesia - Angkatan Udara, or Indonesian National Armed Forces - Air Force, on the Armed Forces Day, 5 October 1971, virtually all Soviet-made aircraft had. been grounded. Once again the Mitchells, Invaders and Mustangs of Skadron 1 and 3 became the main equipment of the air force. So popular were the Mustangs that six Cavalier-rebuilt examples were obtained in 1972, as reinforcements. The only other firstline aircraft acquired during this period were eighteen CA-27 Sabres donated by Australia and taken on strength by Skadron 14 in 1973. But not even the Indonesians could keep the ancient bombers flying forever, and gradually they were relegated to less strenuous second-line duties. The B-25s were withdrawn from service around 1974 and by this time the B-26s also saw relatively little use, a couple of them apparently being cannibalized to keep the others in the air. In April 1975 the Chief of Air Staff ordered that three of the Invaders - numbers M-264, M-265 and M-267 - were to be restored to combat readiness, to provide the TNI-AU with some strike capability. By the early 1970s the Indonesians had

INDONESIA

built up a large maintenance complex at the Husein Sastranegara air base on Java, capable of carrying out major overhauls in-country, with four technical squadrons specializing in various tasks. These included Skadron II, which was responsible for airframe maintenance of 8-26s, 8-25s, F-51 sand some other types. The last operational use of the Invader by the TNI-AU - or, for that matter, by any air force - took place in late 1975 and early 1976, during Operasi Seroja, the Indonesian invasion of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor. The missions were mainly patrol and escort flights, and it is doubtful if any air strikes were carried out. B-26s were temporarily based at Kupang airfield in East Timur as late as the spring of 1977. When the TNI-AU purchased OV-IOF Broncos in 1977, the B-26s were finally

87

retired. Skadron I was deactivated on 29 July 1977, by which time only two' out of the three remaining Invaders could take to the air at anyone time. For the last few months of their service they were transferred to Skadron 3 at Abdulrachman Saleh, which by August 1977 had seven Mustangs (all non-operational) and fifteen Broncos on strength, apart from the two flyable Invaders. They were rarely if ever flown by Skadron 3, however, since the TNI-AU only had two qualified B-26 pilots at this point. As one of the pilots was attending Staff College and the other one was on temporary detachment to Surabaya, there was in fact nobody left to fly the Invaders on a regularbasis. Aircraft M-265 made the last flight of any TNI-AU Invader when it was flown to the Air Force Academy in Yogyakarta on 7 December 1977, to be preserved in their col-

lection of historic aircraft. In 1984 it waS transferred to the newly established TNI-AU Museum in the same city. It is interesting to note that the aircraft kept its two gun barbettes armed throughout its service, and was also left unmodified in most other respects. Not even the. avionics were updated to any appreciable degree and M-265 is therefore one of the few surviving 8-26s to remain virtually as it looked in the Second World War. An aircraft that never was ... According to

Indonesian sources, the AURJ never had an Invader serialled M-261, yet that is clearly the serial carried on this aircraft snapped at San Fernando, California, on 31 January 1960. It was likely intended for the AURI but never delivered. On the nacelle, the former registration N3489G can barely be made out. D. D. Olson via J. M. G. Gradidge

ANGKATAN UDARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA (Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia)/ TENTERA NASIONAL INDONESIA - ANGKATAN UDARA (Indonesian National Armed Forces - Air Force) It has unfortunately not proved possible to ascertain the previous identities of the Invaders purchased by the AURI. No records have survived in Indonesia, and to date none have been located in the USA. TOC

SOC

?, N3489G? ?, N ..... ? ?, N ..... ?

60

(Not taken up?) c. 74 (Not taken up?)

B-26B B-26B B-26B

?, N ..... ? ?, N ..... ? ?, N ..... ?

60 60 60

77 7 Dec 77 Aug 62

B-26B B-26B

?, N ..... ? ?, N ..... ?

60 60

c.74

AURJrrNI-AU Serial

Version

Previous identities

M-26I M-262 M-263

B-26B B-26B B-26B

M-264 M-265 M-266 M-267 M-268

77

Remarks Apparently never delivered. Cannibalized for parts and scrapped. Apparently never delivered. The aircraft at one point marked 'M-263' while on display at Yogyakarta was almost certainly M-265. Retired and scrapped. Preserved with the TNI-AU Museum, Yogyakarta. Lost in tropical storm over Buru Island. Capt. Sutarno and crew killed. Retired and scrapped. Cannibalized for parts and scrapped.

88

FOREIGN INVADERS

80mb bay of M-265 as preserved with the TNIAU Museum, with auxiliary tank stilI in position. Note the access hatch from the cockpit at the front end. L. Hellstrom

The bottom section of the dorsal gun barbette, protruding into the rear part of the bomb bay. The ammunition boxes are not fitted. L. Hellstrom

The gunner's compartment of M-265, showing the gun sighting periscope and the bomb bay access hatch. L. Hellstrom

Standard twin .50 calibre underwing gun pack, used by many of the air forces equipped with the 8-26. L. Hellstrom

Underwing air-to-ground rockets, as installed on the Indonesian Invaders. This type of rocket was normally not used on 8-26s by other air forces. L. Hellstrom

FOREIGN INVADERS

89

Chapter Fourteen

Guatemala Ever conscious of the small but politically approved, and cabled the US State important balance of military power in the Department in December 1958 asking for a volatile Central American region, the deci- quotation that he could present to the sion by US Military Assistance Program Guatemalan Government on six 8-26s and planners to supply the small Guatemalan Air ten 8eech T-34As. As it happened, the Ambassador rather got Force with eight Douglas B-26 Invaders under the 1960 Fiscal Year MAP allotments came as ahead of himself, forgetting that the FAG had a curious surprise to many interested only recently received a substantial number of freshly refurbished North American T-6G observers. Although Guatemala had operated a num- Texans, and thus the T-34s, which seemed ber of Douglas C-47s and five Beech AT-lIs 'like a good idea,' would actually be excess to (configured as light bombers) since 1947, the the immediate requirements of the FAG service had never operated anything with the training establishment. In February 1959, discussions on the propotential of the Douglas attack planes. In fact, this rather surprising MAP alloca- curement of the six 8-26s were suspended tion, which the small USAF Mission in when tensions over fishing rights boiled over Guatemala City had advocated but frankly between Mexico and Guatemala, and the US did not expect to be approved, was greased feared that selling the aircraft to Guatemala at through with the background support of the that time would precipitate a local clash CIA, which had very specific reasons for between the two countries. 8y April 1959, with the Guatemalan wanting Invaders in Guatemala (no pun Government pressing the US Ambassador for intended). Guatemala had requested 8-26s as early as explanations for the delay of action on the March 1958, after watching the growing num- original offer, the Sta,te Department ber of air arms in the region that were attempted to float a solution to the dilemma receiving the type. With its own 'bomber' by offering to sell the Guatemalans six force of aged AT-lIs something of an embar- . Douglas C-47s 'which they could surely use rassment, the FAG not only wanted the 8-26s, more effectively' and without inflaming Mexico's ire. but additional F-51 DMustangs as well. The Guatemalans, replying rather sharply, The US ambassador in Guatemala City was anxious to see the Guatemalan request emphasized that they had quite enough

C-47s for their own needs, and renewed demands for expeditious handling of their request for Invaders. At this particular juncture, as fate would have it, the true colours of the Castro revolution in Cuba were crystallizing, and the CIA was already hatching a plan for an exile invasion force to 'retake' the island while internal turmoil presented a potentially favourable climate. Thus, much to the surprise of the Guatemalans, the State Department suddenly brushed aside the seemingly insurmountable obstacles standing in the way of the sale and the FAG found, to its surprise, that now the US Ambassador was not only willing to provide six 8-26s 'in excellent condition and minimum maintenance requirements' but a camera-equipped RB-26 and 'plushed-up VIP job' for the use of the FAG's CO as well! 8y early 1960, the sale under the provisions of the Military Assistance Sales (MAS) provisions of MAP was struck, and eight various Things are not always as they appear. While sporting full Guatemalan Air Force insignia and serial, RB-26B FAG 420, when this photo was taken, was actually serving as a training aircraft for the Cuban liberation Air Force crews. CPT E. Ferrer

90

Invaders were selected for overhaul at DavisMonthan Air Force Base and offset for Guatemala, these actually departing on delivery in July (three) and August (five) 1960. The official date of sale for the aircraft was 30 June 1960. The USAF Mission had, in the meantime, arranged for a Mobile Training Team to transition five FAG pilots onto the type. Major Leslie Lyons and TSgt Antonio Pomales, USAF, were selected for this task, and arrived on 25 August. Skilled in what was then termed Special Air Warfare (SAW) tactics, they trained the five FAG pilots, who had actually received B-26 conversion in the US, in these operations. In actual point of fact, however, although the aircraft were immediately marked in FAG markings and assigned FAG serial numbers, at least six of them were, soon after arrival in Guatemala, flown to the remote airfield at Retalhuleu ('Rayo Base') where, still in full FAG markings, they served as training mounts for the Cuban exile members of. Brigada 2506 (Operation Pluto), the CIA organized and equipped invasion and deception force for the retaking of Cuba! The Cuban crews trained on the aircraft extensively at 'Rayo Base' until early April 1961, when they departed for Puerto Cabezas ('Happy Valley'), Nicaragua. (For more on Operation Pluto, see Chapter 24) Not entirely happy with the condition of 'their' B-26s after having been wrung out by the Cubans and Americans, the FAG, following a November 1960 uprising during which most service members had remained loyal,

FOREIGN INVADERS

finally got a chance to actually commence fully run up and displayed on the line at La realistic training on the aircraft, all eight of Aurora, the five remaining airworthy examwhich had somehow survived the rapid train- ples had flown less than one hour each ing pace set at Retalhuleu. during the preceding three months! Working up to operatjonal status, initial The following year the B-26s - having now operations were fairly routine, and the USAF surpassed US spares support capability Mission was generally pleased with the per- while still nominally on strength and paraded formance of the aircraft and crews, although at La Aurora on the ramp, were in fact totally spares problems manifested themselves inactive and, by September 1968, had not early on. flown at all during the calendar year. By December 1963, one aircraft had suf- Although the official strike-off date for the fered a crash landing at La Aurora Air Base FAG Invaders is not known, they had become near Guatemala City and was reduced to a redundant, for all intents and purposes, by spares source to support the remaining seven this time. airworthy examples. Another accident in One of the aircraft was preserved at a early 1964 further reduced the number of poorly maintained outdoor FAG museum at available aircraft, when the VIP configured La Aurora in a completely spurious chocoaircraft was withdrawn from service for late-brown overall colour scheme as late as unexplained reasons; probably main spar 1974. During the course of their comparatively brief FAG service lives, the aircraft had failure. The six remaining aircraft were all transi- worn a combination of colour schemes. At tioned through the Project Wing Spar least two of the aircraft were received in overprogramme in the Panama Canal Zone in all intruder black (one had a white fin tip and 1964-65, and by December 1966 five were still the other a yellow one), while two others operational. A footnote to the USAF Mission were natural metal and one - probably the report stated that the operating unit, called . VB-26 -light grey overall. Later, after the wing 'the Special Air Warfare Strike/Recon spar programme, all five surviving aircraft Squadron,' had designated four of the aircraft were painted an overall light grey. as dedicated bombers, while the fifth was the single RB-26 which was noted to be armed, oddly, with .30 calibre machine guns. The other three aircraft were all now being cannibalized for spares. By December 1967, personnel problems in FAG B-26B sIn 428 being readied for an Air the bomber unit and other budget and man- Force Day display at La Aurora Field, with its ning challenges had forced the FAG to tighten ordnance load being displayed beneath it. By its belt and, while the B-26s were still faith- now, it was light grey overall. Maj R. Ibarguen

GUATEMALA

91

FAG 404 in yet a different scheme, here lurking behind a gaily painted FAG Waco VPF-7. At this point, the only visible markings, aside from rudder stripes, was the serial on the rear fuselage. Maj R. Satterfield via F. Strnad

Although it only received eight aircraft, the FAG's Invaders wore an unusual array of colour schemes during their career with that service. Here, FAG 428, a B-26B, bears gloss intruder black while undergoing wing spar upgrade at Albrook AFB, CZ in December 1963, at which time it carried its serial in vertical tail, rear fuselage and nose positions! Sister ship FAG 408, in the far background, was natural metal at the time. P. Fletcher One of the few known photos showing the FAG B-26 fleet in a 'standard' colour scheme. Noted here are FAG 420 at the far right, FAG 408, FAG 428 and FAG 424. The aircraft in the background cannot be identified. viaR. Hanes

FAG 404, a TB-26B, on the chocks at La Aurora. At this point, the national insignia was carried on the rear fuselage, and the aircraft was painted silver. Large character 'FAG' titles were carried on lower left and upper right wing outer extremities. The only concession to colour was the red cone-end on the rear of the nacelle, the nose junction fixture and the main gear wheel centre. G. E. Buehlmann

FUERZAAEREA GUATEMALTECA (Guatemalan Air Force) FAG Serial

Version

Previous identity

400

B-26C

404 408 412

TOC

SOC

44-35863*

I Jul60

?

TB-26B? TB-26B? B-26C

44-35620* 44-35931* ?

I Jul60 I Jul60 I Aug 60

68 68 c.63

416

TB-26C

44-22717

I Aug 60

c.64

420

RB-26B

44-34676*

I Aug 60

424 428

VB-26B? B-26B?

43-22707* 44-35306*

,I Aug 60 I Aug 60

? 68

Remarks Last noted wfu at La Aurora, nose down, painted light grey. Survived until wfu 1968. Survived until wfu 1968. Believed first loss; reduced to spares source about 1963. Believed second loss; reduced to spares source 1964. USAF buzz code still visible. Modified prior to delivery as dedicated PR aircraft. Was probably the VIP configured aircraft. Painted black at one point and later light grey. Survived until wfu 1968. This is possibly the aircraft sold to EI Salvador.

USAF serial numbers marked '*' are not confirmed link-ups with FAG serials. Only one aircraft, FAG 400, is known to have retained a glass nose· throughout its FAG service, while two others had glass noses at one point but later had solid noses attached.

92

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Fifteen

Nicaragua The Somoza dynasty in the poor Central American Republic of Nicaragua got a late start in establishing a lasting national air force - an arm of the Guardia Nacional not gaining official, permanent status until 1938. From the beginning, succeeding Somozas' enthusiasm for the FAN remained undiminished, and only in the early 1970s, when the dictator feared his air force might tum against him, did budgets see anything but comparatively lavish benevolence. For all intents and purposes, the FAN was a 'country club' style air force, loyal to the dictator rather than the nation, and was, as an inevitable result, filled with a mixture of political hacks, playboys and a minority of well-trained, professional officers and NCOs. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the FAN, never larger than 290 personnel all ranks, operated a wide variety of Second World War vintage aircraft, including twenty-six exSwedish P-5lD Mustangs, four F-47N Thunderbolts, two Douglas A-20 Havocs, P-38 Lightnings, and even two Convair B-24 Liberators! With all his faults, Somoza, who was a graduate ofWest Point, was staunchly pro-US in his public pronouncements and, in the tenor of the times, this was often enough to ·cause the US government to wink and look the other way when the excesses and corruption of his regime inflicted themselves on the long-suffering people. Brother Tachito Somoza himself became the Commander of the FAN in July 1956, and set about modernizing the air force. Having

With the failure of the invasion attempt in received his own pilot's ticket in the US two years previously, he was something of an avi- Cuba, Nicaragua ostensibly inherited all of ation enthusiast, and saw no reason why the the Liberation Air Force's B-26s left in the FAN could not become the strongest air force country. However, as these were 'without papers,' and in some cases damaged through in the region. Having aided the US in its anti-Communist, action or accidents, the best four were the CIA backed insurgency into Guatemala in selected and quickly flown to Las Mercedes 1954 (Operation Success), and having been airport, near Managua, where they were rewarded with some of the arms spoils from incorporated into the FAN. This presented the small USAF Mission to that campaign (including the left over F-47Ns), it is not surprising that Nicaragua Nicaragua, which was of course aware ofthis covertly aided the CIA once again when the unorthodox arrangement, with a most awkward circumstance. The Mission was, at the Bay of Pigs invasion was planned. In fact, most of the operational air missions . time; attempting to standardize - once and in support of the invasion were flown out of for all - the FAN's chaotic maintenance, Nicaragua by Cuban exile and US pilots, flying spares and training procedures to conform to B-26s. This arrangement, which was arrived MAP and USAF formal procedures. These, of at via direct agreement between CIA case course, were rather rigid, methodical steps to officers and Somoza himself, included the (among other things) acquire spares through provision that, at the conclusion of the opera- MDAP channels for aircraft in the inventory tions, Nicaragua would receive an (at the that were to be 'MAP- supported.' Since for all intents and purposes the airtime unspecified) number of the B-26s for its craft had appeared on the FAN ramp air force. It has frequently been reported that the overnight, in a 'sanitized' condition (i.e. FAN operated a single Invader as early as minus papers, log books and even manufac1958 or 1959, acquired from unknown turer's data plates) the USAF Mission was left sources. Intelligence documents, however, to.conclude, at least initially, that these could do not support this and, in fact, it is more not possibly be MAP-supported aircraft! In fact, through June 1963, the quarterly likely that the aircraft being quoted was one oftwo Douglas A-20G Havocs acquired in July Mission reports invariably described the four 1949 - one of which (GN 60) was definitely aircraft as 'on hand, airworthy and in good still in service by August 1959. Actually, this condition except for discoloured canopies aircraft, which had rendered good service to but not eligible for MAP support.' The FAN the FAN, served as a transition aircraft for therefore fell back on the expensive necestwin-engine pilots who would convert to the sity of procuring parts, manuals and the countless small bits and pieces necessary to Invaders later. keep the fairly complex aircraft airworthy by scavenging from the ex-Liberation aircraft at Puerto Cabezas and by purchasing spares (and especially engines) from civilian outlets in the USA. The Mission did project MAP support for the four B-26s, however (it usually took several budget years to justify inclusion of 'Country Acquired' aircraft in MAP budgets), and Rrojected that they would be the nucleus of what it termed 'the Light Bomber Squadron of the FAN.' While the Mission was getting organized to support the windfall B-26s, it continued to Eight-gun nosed, ex-Liberation Air Force B-26B FAN 400 at Las Mercedes Airport in June 1966. The very large inboard underwing hard point pylons are noteworthy. R. MacArthur

NICARAGUA

lament the bizarre personnel policies of the FAN, which made any formalized on-type training most difficult. With a goal to make the small force into a 'combat operational state,' they were continuously frustrated by the fact that the national air line, LANICA, was at the time operated by the military, and twinengine qualified pilots were on call to fly the airline's routes on a moment's notice. Furthermore, virtually all of the FAN's pilots held separate jobs on the economy during the afternoons and, during season, nearly all of them departed 'official' duties to participate in the lucrative crop spraying operations for local plantation owners! Somoza condoned these unusual procedures, as he felt that he could not otherwise afford to pay his aircrews enough to maintain their comparatively good lifestyles. Nicaragua had actually attempted to acquire 8-26s much earlier through normal govemment-to-govemment surplus procedures. In June 1954, when Somoza was Taken just after the departure of FAN 400, this ramp scene at Las Mercedes Airport in June 1966 clearly shows five more Invaders in the distance - four on the left and one on the right. There is considerable variation in the presentation of the rudder stripes on all five aircraft in the original. R. MacArthur

B·26B FAN 400 thunders out for an ordnance delivery training exercise at Las Mercedes in September 1966, with FAN 403 and 422 just visible in the background. Hagedorn Collection

attempting to establish some sort of standardization in his motley air force, he had requested that the US government sell (at 'bargain surplus prices') ten Republic F-47s, ten liaison aircraft and four 8-26s. This request was disapproved for a number of reasons - including the fact that at that time the 8-26s on hand in US service were still being used by active duty USAF and ANG units in some numbers - and so Nicaragua turned to other sources to acquire the aircraft it sought: notably Sweden, who sold Nicaragua twentysix P-51 0 Mustangs. Following acquisition of the ex-Liberation Air Force Invaders, however, and recognizing that having only four aircraft posed inevitable serviceability problems, the US Mission recommended that the FAN acquire at least two more Invaders as part of a package deal in 1962, when the FAN decided to divest itself of most of its P-51D fleet, the remaining F-47Ns and several 8eech C-45Fs. The company which was eventually to pro-

93

vide the FAN with some additional Invaders was the MACa Corporation, of Chicago, USA. ane of the owners of this company was Will Martin, who spotted one of the advertisements the FAN placed in US aviation magazines. After lengthy negotiations directly with General Somoza and other highranking Nicaraguan officials, a deal was finally struck. In exchange for the surplus FAN P-51s, F-47s and C-45s, MACa were to deliver seven North American T-28As and two 8-26s, leaving the FAN with six operational Invaders. The MACa package also stipulated that a certain quantity of 8-26 spare parts were to be delivered. To this end, MACa delivered a third 8-26, which was used as a 'hangar queen.' When ferrying one of the B-26s from the USA to Nicaragua in November 1963, Will Martin of MACa and his wife had the bad fortune of landing at a small Mexican town just hours after the news of President Kennedy's murder had been announced. The local

94

police chief, convinced they were 'gringo assassins' making their escape, arrested the couple on the spot. To add insult to injury, Martin had to pay for a taxi to the jail, since no police car was available! The matter was resolved in a day or two, and the Invader and its crew reluctantly allowed to continue on its way. By July 1965, the US Air Attache reported that the FAN still had six B-26s, four of them acquired 'locally' and two others acquired from US civil sources. At least four of the FAN's B-26 fleet benefited from the Project Wing Spar programme sponsored by the US MAP programme in

FOREIGN INVADERS

Panama during 1964-65, although the contractors at AIbrook AFB were puzzled when, upon examining the aircraft, they could not establish their exact identity or block numbers for accounting purposes. The FAN also benefited'from several USAF Mobile Training Teams, which tailored their curriculum to fit the needs of the FAN's B-26 and T-28 mainstays. One of these, in August 1965, trained twelve FAN B-26 pilots in gunnery, bomb and rocket delivery and four others were trained in aerial photography using the B-26. FAN utilization of its limited B-26 fleet was enhanced considerably when the US Mission

organized a ground school for the type's systems, emergency procedures and ground handling. A programme for R-2800 engine repair was also initiated, and although this represented a saving to the host government, it never fully met the needs of the rather heavily utilized B-26 operating unit. With a goal of maintaining at least three of the aircraft in a 'combat-ready' status at all times, in practice this was usually achieved only about half the time. During 1966, the FAN, at the urging of the US Mission, retrofitted four of its Invaders with common high-frequency RTAL-B radios, the aircraft previously having been equipped with a bewildering array of various odds and ends. In March 1967, the FAN suffered its only operational loss of a B-26, when FAN 422 one of the Invaders bought from MACO crashed. With the loss of this aircraft, the USAF Mission suggested that the former 'hangar queen' which had served as a spares source be brought up to operational status and, after a very lengthy gestation, this was finaily accomplished around 1970. At around the same date, all surviving Invaders were re-serialled in the 600-series. A spanking clean 8-268, FAN 402, serves as a backdrop to USAF Colonel Walter Hardee, Jr. and Master Sergeant David Serge, Jr, together with a recently graduated class of FAN 8-26 ground crewmen. FAN 402 had been their 'training aid.' USAF Another view of FAN 400 (with FAN 422, the service's 'newest' aircraft at the time) at Las Mercedes in September 1966. Note the different configuration of the nose guns on FAN 422. Hagedorn Collection

NICARAGUA

The reason for this is not known, but seems to have been part of a general reorganization of the FAN serialling system. Civil unrest within Nicaragua, never completely absent, saw a rebirth in 1962, when the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN) was created. Handled easily by the Guardia Nacional for nearly a decade, by the mid 1970s, the movement, fuelled by excesses on the part of Government forces, had gained considerable public support. Although the FAN's B-26 element conducted numerous patrol missions that could be characterized as COIN during the early, low-intensity phase of the civil war that ensued, these consisted in the main of displays of force and aerial escorts of ground forces. Further, while a number of strafing, rocketry and napalm strikes were conducted, the FAN found extreme difficulty in communicating exact target locations with ground forces and in evaluating the effectiveness of its B-26 efforts. The FAN eventually recognized that the B-26s were, for the most part, poorly suited to the tasks being set for them - as well as becoming ever more expensive to maintain and operate. As a result, the vast majority of the COIN missions in support of ground forces were, from 1974, flown by FAN T-28s, Cessna 337s and T-33As. By 1976, the four remaining B-26s were all grounded for unspecified modifications which, in fact, were never to be accomplished, as the FAN found itself beset by ever mounting demands from the regime and the increasingly menacing FSLN. With its organic training fleet (mostly T-6s and BT-13s) by this time reaching the end of their useful lives, the FAN decided in 1977 to trade its four B-26s, along with other types, for

a fleet of used but fairly fresh Cessna 172 Skyhawks. Dave Tallichet of Kansas acted as the broker of this deal, and the serials arrived at to cover this transaction have since caused a number ofwarbird enthusiasts no little trouble - all of the numbers used having actually belonged to USAF aircraft that had long since been attrited. Needless to say, the true identities of these aircraft will probably never be known. Unfortunately, when the actual exchange was to take place in March 1977, one of the B-26s was found to be non-airworthy and was thus left behind at Managua. A second aircraft was also left behind, at least for a while, but has since disappeared from the FAN/FAS boneyard. . Then, suddenly, oh 17 July 1979, with fighting in the streets of Managua itself, Somoza bolted, leaving his loyal Guardia NacionaI to fend for itself in a very rapidly deteriorating situation. At the time of the fall of the 43-year Somoza dynasty, the FAN still nominally possessed one or two more or less intact Invaders, although these were non-airworthy. They

95

By 1971, when this photo was taken, additional ex-liberation Air Force Invaders had joined the strength of the FAN. Here, FAN 602, in fairly good condition, displays the unique 'service insignia' on its rear fuselage at Las Mercedes. G. E. Buehlmann via R. Eberle i

The former FAN 602 as seen at Managua in February 1978 following sale as N99422. Supposedly traded in on Cessna 172s, it was found non-airworthy and left at Managua. Its fate is unknown. Cpt G. Farinas

were either missing parts, engines or had suffered damage that was beyond the ability or interest of the country's inheritors of power to repair. A reliable report suggests that at least one B-26, however, did in fact survive to bear Fuerza Aerea Sandinista (FAS) insignia. This aircraft was noted on the FAS junk heap at Managua in August 1990 marked as serial 3681 To add further confusion to a complex story, this aircraft still bears remnants of FAN fuselage markings.

FOREIGN INVADERS

96

FUERZA AEREA DE NICARAGUA (Air Force of Nicaragua). FAN Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

400

B-26B

401

TOC

Wfu

?, Pluto

61

?

B-26B

?, Pluto

61

?

402

B-26B

?, Pluto

61

?

403

B-26B

?, Pluto

61

?

420

B-26B

44-34104, N9484Z

7 Sep 63

(c.70)

422

B-26B

44-34206, N86479

c. Aug 64

Mar 67

601

B-26B

'162', Pluto,

(c.70)

c.76

c.70

c.76

(c.70)

c.76

(c.70)

c.76

FAN 40..

*

602

B-26B

43-22668, N3691G§

603

B-26B

'398', Pluto,

FAN 40.. * 604

B-26B

44-34104, N9484Z, FAN 420t

Remarks Last known airworthy in 1966. Possibly re-serialled in 600-series. Fate unknown. Possibly re-serialled in 600-series. Fate unknown. Possibly re-serialled in 600-series. Fate unknown. Possibly re-serialled in 600-series. Current in 1966. To FAN 604. Crashed. Wfu by 22 Feb 78. To N99425 in 1977 trade, but last noted still at Managua, missing parts. Also given as c/n 6875 (= sin 4 I-39162), but this went to France. Believed to be the former 'hangar queen,' delivered in Nov 63. To N99422 in 1977 trade, but found not airworthy and abandoned. Also given as 41-39423, but this was SOC by USAFE in Germany in 1960 and most probably scrapped. Included in 1977 trade but not given US civil registration. May be alc marked '368' (see photo below). Last seen at Managua May 77. Became N99420 in 1977 trade. Still flying in 1992.

* No aircraft with a USAF serial, construction number or fuselage number matching the identities given in the FAA files for the former FAN 601 and 603 (162 and 398) appear likely to have gone to Nicaragua. They are both almost certainly ex Operation Pluto. The USAF serial given in the FAA file for FAN 60 I is pure guesswork. § The link between the FAN serial and the previous identity is not confirmed but is likely correct. The aircraft with this previous identity is known to have gone to Nicaragua. The identity '423' given in the Bill of Sale for FAN 602 does not fit any B-26 likely to have gone to Nicaragua. t The Bill of Sale in the FAA file for N99420 gives the c/n or sin for FAN 604 as 'SOT. The aircraft was initially registered as the former 41-39507 (which was scrapped by the USAAF in 1947), but this was later changed to 44-34104 (which has the fuselage number 507). The latter is known to have been sold to Nicaragua. .

A mystery aircraft. Although bearing vestiges of the old style FAN 'service insignia' on its rear fuselage, this very derelict 8-26, photographed in the grass at Managua in August 1990, bears the traces of number '368' on the vertical fin! Unless assigned this serial arbitrarily by the Fuerza Aerea Sandinista, this aircraft, which does not feature any of the antennae or loops common to former FAN aircraft, is unidentified. Cpt G. Farinas

FOREIGN MILITARY USERS

97

Chapter Sixteen

West Germany The Invaders operated in West Germany were not military aircraft as such, but there were certain military and paramilitary connections, which warrant at least a brief mention of their use. In May 1962, an RB-26C with the US registration N9658C was purchased by a Mr Walter Rail of Eningen in West Germany. By coincidence, the aircraft (44-35622) had been used by the 66th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing in Germany from 1953 to 1955. It was surplused by the USAF in the summer of 1958, and had last been owned by Skyways Aircraft Ferrying Service, Inc. The purchase price was $15,000'The Invader was initially given the German registration D-BELE (the 'B' indicating an air- . craft with a weight of between fourteen and twenty tons), but in March 1963 this was changed to D-CELE (aircraft between fivepoint-seven and fourteen tons); the normal maximum take-off weight of the Invader was around nineteen tons, but for the RB-26 which did not carry ordnance - fourteen tons was enough, even when carrying fuel for up to ten hours' flight. A Certificate of Airworthiness was issued on 2 April 1963, listing Walter Rail as owner, but Prakla-Seismos AG in Hanover as operator. Prakla-Seismos was (and still is) a survey company, which had previously used various smaller aircraft for aerial surveys. The Invader was mainly intended for aeromagnetic surveys or, in other words, finding ore deposits by measuring changes in the earth's magnetic field. For this purpose, the RB-26 was equipped with a PM-22 proton magnetometer, which included a bomb-shaped sensor towed behind the aircraft. The main navigation aid was a Radan-Doppler 502 navigation system with an on-board TNC-50 computer. There was also an RCAAPN-I radio altimeter. The camera equipment included an LK-20 flight path camera, which recorded the position on a strip of 35 mm film. A few months after purchasing the first RB-26, Walter Rail bought another Invader, given the German registration D-BELI in early March 1963. This was changed to D-CELI only three weeks later. The C of A was issued on 23 August 1963, but this time the operator was D-CELE was the first RB-26C operated by Prakla-Seismos, mainly for aerial survey work, but also on certain paramilitary duties. via M. Franzke

given as Photogrammetrie GmbH in Munich. This company, which also still exists, was in the same business as Prakla-Seismos, and it is likely that their Invader carried equipment similar to that ofD-CELE. The two RB-26s were mainly employed abroad: the Prakla-Seismos aircraft being used in Africa, and the Photogrammetrie Invader in the Middle East. D-CELE was lost on 14 November 1963, when it stalled during a failed night landing at Cotonou in Dahomey and crashed into a lake off the runway, killing the crew of four. Six months later Mr Rail bought a replacement aircraft through a broker in Nuremberg, paying DM 76,500 for it. This new RB-26C, which had also served with the 66th TRW, was given the registration D-CADU, its C of A being issued on 19 September 1964. The operator was once again Prakla-Seismos and the aircraft was mainly based in Nigeria. The Invaders were periodically hired by the West German Ministry of Defence to check navigational aids and to carry out certain photo survey work. They tnerefore sometimes carried a large assortment of military camera equipment, which was maintained by the Luftwaffe Erprobungsstelle (Test Establishment) 61 at Manching near Munich. According to one source, Walter Rail was a former Luftwaffe officer in the employ of the Bundesnachrichtendienst: the German Federal Intelligence Service, with its headquarters outside Munich. The BND is said to have financed the purchase of the Invaders, with the aim of using them for clandestine

photo reconnaissance missions in Africa and the Middle East. To what extent any such missions were in fact flown is unclear, as is the involvement (if any) of the registered operators of the aircraft. The German RB-26s did not remain in service for very long. The C of A for D-CELI expired in June 1965, at which time the aircraft was located on the Luftwaffe base at Erding. The registration was cancelled a year later, and the Invader was probably scrapped soon afterwards. D-CADU was last used in South America, where it was flown by Walter Rail. It was sold to Trans-Peruana in Lima for $2, I00 on 13 May 1967, and its German registration was cancelled a few days later. The fate of this aircraft is unknown. Trans-Peruana never operated any Invaders and the RB-26 was never entered on the Peruvian register, nor as far as known - any other civilian register. The Luftwaffe took delivery of three Canberras in the spring of 1966, and these aircraft took over some of the duties previously performed by the Invaders.. In December 1968 Walter Rail reserved the registration D-CAFY for a fourth Invader: N67160 (44-34765), which was an On Mark Marksman conversion. But the registration was never taken up, and the following year the aircraft was impounded at the Antwerp airport, while being used to fly lobsters from Turkey. It is now in a museum in Brussels. The fifth and final Invader on the German civil register, D-BACA, had no connection with Walter RaIl.

FOREIGN INVADERS

98

WEST GERMANY

Registration

Version

Previous identity .

D-CADU

RB-26C

D-CELE

RB-26C

D-CELI

RB-26C?

C of A issued

Regncanx

44-35682, N5181V

19 Sep 64

19 May 67

44-35622, N9658C, D-BELE 44-35638, N7824B, D-BELI

2 Apr 63

22 Nov 63

23 Aug 63

14 lun 66

Remarks Replacement for D-CELE. Used by PraklaSeismos AG in Africa. 13 May 67 sold to Trans-Peruana, Lima. Used by Prakla-Seismos AG in Africa. Crashed at Cotonou, Dahomey on 14 Nov 63. Used by Photogrammetrie GmbH in the Middle East. C of A expired 6 lun 65. Probably scrapped 1966.

Another view of D-CELE, showing the white trim applied to various parts of the aircraft. via Prakla-Seismos

A selection of cameras and other equipment carried by the Prakla-Seismos aircraft. via M. Franzke

N91356 was one of the Invaders earmarked for Portugal that were embargoed in the USA. This photo from April 1968 shows the aircraft still in the intended, plain delivery scheme, but with an experimental spray bar arrangement added under the wings. via R. Phillips

FOREIGN INVADERS

99

Chapter Seventeen

Portugal From 1956 onwards, the French, British and Belgian colonies in Africa were granted independence one by one and nationalist feelings ran high throughout the continent. But Portugal, the fourth major colonial power in Africa, had no intention of pulling out. The Portuguese possessions around the world had had their status changed to overseas provinces in 1951, and were officially viewed as integral parts of Portugal rather than as colonies. This policy of assimilation, and also the attitude of many of the Portuguese settlers, meant that there was less racism than in the overseas territories of most other colonial powers, even though there were various special laws governing these provinces and especially their indigenous populations. The situation was therefore somewhat less tense than in other parts ofAfrica. Nevertheless, the changes taking place on the rest of the continent eventually resulted in the formation of liberation movements in all three of the major Portuguese territories in Africa: Guine in the extreme west, Moc;ambique on the east coast, and Angola. The latter bordered on the Congo (Za"ire) in the north, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) in· the east and Southwest Africa (Namibia) in the south. It was the largest of the Portuguese overseas provinces and potentially also the richest. Angola was where open war first broke out, in early 1961. The Portuguese had some 3,000 troops in Angola at this time and, although not taken entirely by surprise, were caught off guard by the extent of the uprising. Even so, the first revolt was quickly and ruthlessly put down by the Army during the next six months and additional military forces were sent to Africa from Europe. But despite this initial setback, the guerrilla forces continued to operate in northern Angola. The Forc;a Aerea Portuguesa (FAP) presence in Africa was very weak in March 1961, when the revolt began, although most of those few aircraft available were actually based in Angola. The first combat unit had been formed in mid 1960, when five Lockheed PV-2 Harpoon bombers had deployed to the civilian airport at Luanda in northern Angola, to form Esquadra 91. The construction of military facilities at Luanda was commenced in October 1960 and they became operational in May 1961, although the airfield continued to be used by civilian

traffic as well. The FAP designation for down by the US State Department, which Luanda was Base Aerea 9 (BA 9), and this refused to issue an export licence. became the main base for Grupo It was clear that other methods had to be Operacional 901, initially consisting of used and in the autumn of 1964 the firm of Esquadra 91 with Harpoons and Esquadra 92 Luber SA in Geneva, Switzerland, was comwith six Noratlas transports. There was also a missioned to obtain the aircraft. This was the minor air base at N'gage, with an establish- beginning of a rather involved chain of deals ment of eight armed T-6s as well as some that ultimately did provide the FAP with some Dornier Do 27s, Austers and Broussards. B-26s. The process is probably representative It was obvious that additional air units were of many other similar deals involving the supneeded in Africa, but there was precious little ply of surplus aircraft to foreign countries, and available as reinforcements. The FAP had it is rather instructive to study it in some i been expanded tremendously during the detail. Second World War, as a result of British aid, Since Luber had no aircraft of its own, their and it received additional aircraft from the President, Lucien Bernard, hired a FrenchUSA in the early 1950s, after Portugal had man named Henri de Montmarin to locate become a member of NATO. But by 1961 the and secure the Invaders for the company. De only reasonably modem first-line aircraft type Montmarin was a former pilot with the Free was the F-86, serving in the interceptor role. French in the Second World War, and he had Apart from the F-86, PV-2 and T-6, the only subsequently been involved in certain airother combat aircraft in the FAP inventory craft deals for the French Government. For was the F-84G Thunderjet. This type had his work with Luber, he was to receive a fifbeen retired from first-line service in 1960 but teen per cent commission on the selling price still remained in use with a fighter training of each aircraft. De Montmarin initially tried to obtain some unit at Ota in Portugal. As 'an interim measure, twenty-five Thunderjets were sent to Invaders in Europe, and through some forLuanda to form Esquadra 93, commencing mer contacts of his in the USA, but without . result. Eventually, in November 1964, he got operations in August 1961. During 1963 and 1964 respectively, hostili- in touch with a certain Gregory R. Board of ties also commenced in Guine and Tucson, Arizona, who told him that he did Moc;ambique. The FAP's slender resources have a number of Invaders available. The were now being stretched almost to the number of aircraft initially discussed was breaking point. Virtually all of its sixteen twelve, with an option for a further eight, but remaining Harpoons (out of a total of thirty- there was apparently also some talk of thirtyfour received between 1954 and 1957) had six aircraft in all. After meeting him, de been sent to Angola and Moc;ambique by Montmarin recommended to Luber that they 1964, together with several dozen T-6s. Eight deal with Board. F-86Fs had been based in Guine from 1961 to Board was originally from Australia; and 1964, but were withdrawn after US protests had served in the RAAF during the Second against NATO-committed forces being World War. After the war he moved into the deployed to Africa. The same comment had air transport business. Later on, he became a also been made on the use of the MDAP-sup- US citizen and began dealing in second-hand plied F-84G in Angola, but this was resolved aircraft, ultimately setting up his own comby the Portuguese government purchasing pany, Aero Associates, Inc., in Tucson. But the Thunderjets outright and removing them Board did not own any Invaders either, so he from the NATO inventory. in turn got in touch with Gordon B. Hamilton, In 1964, or possibly even earlier, the FAP also of Tucson. decided that the B-26 would be a suitable airGordon Hamilton was the owner of the craft for use in Africa. By this time, however, Hamilton Aircraft Company, which had a lot international protests against the Portuguese of experience with the B-26. The company military campaigns in Africa had also resulted was located near Davis-Monthan Air Force in a United Nations embargo on arms for the Base and by the mid 1960s they had Portuguese colonies. An official Portuguese processed nearly 200 Invaders for military request for the purchase of twenty-nine and civilian clients around the world. In the Invaders on the civilian market was turned late 1950s they had received some liS civil-

100

ian-owned surplus Invaders for storage; a few owned by the company itself, but the majority belonging to various investors around the country. The holding had dwindled to around 60 by late 1964. Board and Hamilton first discussed the deal in November 1964, and then in more detail in February and March 1965. The number of aircraft had now been fixed at twenty. It was agreed that Aero Associates would purchase the Invaders directly from the owners, whereupon Hamilton Aircraft would carry out the necessary maintenance before delivery. On I April 1965 Luber SA formally ordered twenty B-26s from Aero Associates. Some three weeks later, Luber also opened a Letter of Credit to the amount of $694,550.50 through the United Overseas Bankin Geneva. Under the terms of the Letter of Credit, Aero Associates would receive $28,900 for each of

FOREIGN INVADERS

the first three aircraft, and $27,000 for each of the remaining seventeen, on presentation of certain documents to the Southern Arizona Bank in Tucson. The first aircraft was to be delivered by 30 April 1965, and the last by 21 January 1966. The balance of the amount $148,850.50 - was for spare parts and accessories. Board immediately began purchasing an initial ten Invaders: some from the stocks held at Hamilton Aircraft, and some from elsewhere. Throughout this period, Board remained evasive about the destination of the aircraft. Hamilton asked him if he wanted help in obtaining export licences, but this offer was declined. When pressed, Board claimed that the Invaders would go to France, to be converted to turboprop executive aircraft. Later on, he would also claim that they were part of a consignment of forty Invaders for Saudi Arabia. Confronted with these somewhat

unlikely explanations, Hamilton wrote to US Customs in early May and informed them of the contract, but got no reaction. Hamilton Aircraft began working on the first Invader in May 1965. Each aircraft was stripped down and a complete IRAN carried out. The switches for the bomb and gun circuits were removed to comply with FAA regulations, but the actual circuits were left intact. A few aircraft also had their noses changed. For this work, the company was paid $13,300 per aircraft. In some cases longrange tanks and new HF radios were also fitted, and other extra work carried out. Some thirty-five to forty extra employees were hired to carry out the work. Meanwhile, Board had been looking for a pilot to ferry the B-26s to Portugal. The man finally hired for the job was John Hawke, an Englishman recommended to Board by his friend Martin Caidin. Hawke had formerly flown with the RAF, but was currently earning a living selling encyclopedias in Florida. He was paid $3,000 for each delivery flight. The original plan was to initially fly the Invaders to a field near Bordeaux in France, in keeping with the cover story, but this detour was never used in practice.

A shot of FAP 7104 outside the OGMA facilities at Alverca, Portugal, probably not too long after its delivery. Note that the window over the gunner's position is still in place. The aircraft number on the right wing is just visible. OGMA via M. C. Lopes The sole B-26C of the FAP in Angola, number 71 02, being prepared for a mission, most likely 'in mid 1973. To compensate for the lack of a nose armament, the aircraft carried six guns in the wing positions. Despite this, it was mainly used for visual reconnaissance. 1. F. Nico

PORTUGAL

(

(

101

The first B-26 became ready on 28 May 1965 shipment of B-26 parts which Board was edly went on to fly for Air America in Vietnam and was flown out of the USA on 2 June. The preparing down in Florida. They were to be before moving back to Australia. aircraft flew over Newfoundland, and from flown out on a C-46 (N67934), which had There was quite a lot of negative publicity there to Portugal via the Azores. Since Hawke made at least one previous trip to Portugal a around the smuggling of the B-26 to Portugal, did not report in when passing through month or so earlier. US Customs swung into once the arrests had been made, and the Canadian airspace, a search operation was action at last, and on 16 September Hawke case was even discussed in the United mounted, but this apparently led to no further and de Montmarin were arrested in Florida. Nations in December 1965. All this attention, action. Board himself was not found, however, and plus the fact that only seven aircraft had been The US authorities were also very slow to he was believed to have gone to Jamaica on received, made the Portuguese shelve their take action. During the delivery of the second the day before, with a considerable amount plans for the deployment of the Invaders to aircraft, Hawke accidentally overflew the of cash in his luggage. Angola. Esquadra 93 at Luanda just had to White House in Washington, which resulted It had become obvious to Hamilton that no continue to make do vvith their steadily in a report but no further investigation. On the more funds would be forthcoming from decreasing number of surviving F-84Gs. following day, 24 June, an FM Inspector at Board. But he had already sunk a lot of money The FAP had also found another supplier in Portland, Maine, delayed the aircraft for two into the venture, and the three Invaders cur- the West German government, which was hours, after becoming suspicious about the rently on the production line represented a apparently not overly concerned with the UN lack of an export permit. He was told by his considerable investment. After some con- embargo. Discussions for the supply of exsuperiors and by the FBI that it was out of tacts with the State Department, Hamilton Luftwaffe Sabres began in January 1965, but their jurisdiction, and again no action was therefore got in touch directly with the this was later changed to Fiat G.91 RJ4s. Forty taken. Portuguese Air Attache in Washington on 11 of these aircraft began arriving in Portugal However, it was obvious that the cover was September, offering to sell the remaining air- from December 1965, and were later wearing a bit thin already. In order to explain craft (which were under a mechanic's lien) deployed to Guine and Mo<;ambique. the flights to Canada, Board made out dupli- to the FAP. Amazingly enough, the State The FAP Invaders were initially sent to the cate Bills of Sale from the third or fourth Department had agreed to such a sale, pro- OGMA maintenance facility at A1verca, northaircraft onwards, showing a Mr Woodrow vided the Portuguese undertook not to use east of Lisbon, for the fitting of armament, Wilson Roderick in Winnipeg as the official the aircraft outside Portugal itself. But the additional radios and certain other equipbuyer (no licence was needed for exports to Portuguese refused and the rest of the B-26s ment. Some additional nose-swapping was Canada). Roderick was paid $1,000 per air- were eventually disposed of to various buyers also carried out at some point, resulting in a craft for his part in the scheme. in the USA. final mix of six B-26Bs and one B-26C Another person involved in the deal was The following year, de Montmarin, Hawke, (although this, too, was called a B-26B by the Keith Griggers, who went to the FAP airbase Roderick and Griggers were tried on a charge FAP, for some reason). The FAP serials BA 3 at Tancos in Portugal, to train some of illegal export of military aircraft and parts. ranged from 7101 to 7107, in the 'Search and Portuguese mechanics from the OGMA facil- Hawke claimed that everything had been Rescue, and Miscellaneous Aircraft' serial ity at A1verca, and to check out a number of done with the tacit agreement of the US number sequence, which had been chosen FAP pilots on the B-26. Most ifnot all ofthe air- Government, and there were some rather for security reasons. The first three numbers craft had been delivered with dual controls, lame attempts to show a CIA involvement. actually duplicated ones previously used for to facilitate the training. But Griggers accom- The indictments against' Roderick and three HU-16A Albatross aircraft struck off plished relatively little during his short stay in Griggers were ultimately dismissed by the charge in 1962. . court, while de Montmarin and Hawke were Portugal. On 9June 1966, the PAIGC liberation moveBy mid August 1965, Aero Associates had acquitted by the jury. Gregory Board was . ment in Guine claimed that '10 bombers drawn a total of $296,010 under the Letter of never brought to trial, and the charges against (B 26) and 4 fighters (Fiat)' had attacked the Credit, but Board was getting very much him were dropped in June 1973. He report- village of Djagali on 5 June, in an attempt to behind on his payments for the overhaul of the aircraft. De Montmarin, who was supervising the work on the Invaders, therefore promised to arrange for some funds, and Hamilton grudgingly permitted the seventh B-26 to depart. A couple of weeks later de Montmarin arranged for Board to receive a further $35,000, but this money never reached Hamilton. By now the US Customs was finally taking an interest in the deal. In late July, Washington had asked the Customs Office in Nogales to visit Hamilton Aircraft to see what was going on, and they eventually did, on 20 August. By then the seventh and - as it turned out - last Invader had departed for Portugal, and Hamilton had suspended further deliveries pending payment. On 7 September, Hamilton tipped the Customs off about a The instrument panel of one of the FAP B-26s, showing the slightly modernized layout and the Portuguese labelling. Compare this photo with the British example on page 14. 1. F. Nico

102

FOREIGN INVADERS

One of the FAP Invaders following a minor mishap somewhere in Angola. The unusual, flat-fronted nose suggests that this is one of the two 8-26Cs converted into B-268s by OGMA. The serial number on the nosewheel door appears to read 7107, which would confirm this. via 1. Correia The minuscule national insignia carried by the camouflaged Invaders - here, unusually, without the normal white background - can barely be seen aft of the gunner's entry hatch. Although this view of FAP 7101 suggests that its nacelles were painted black, they are in fact only badly discoloured by exhaust stains and oil. via J. Correia An unidentified B-26B - most probably either 7103 or 7106 - displaying the small underwing roundel used on some olive drab Invaders. Mais Alto magazine

kill the PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral. This statement was quite false, at least as regards the aircraft involved. No Invaders were sent to Guine, and the total FAP offensive force in Guine at the time consisted of twelve T-6s, two Neptunes and an armed C-47. From 1966 onwards the Invaders were all based at BA 3 Tancos in central Portugal, where they were used for weapons trials. Aircraft were also detached to Madeira or the Azores from time to time, for the same purpose. During this period, the B-26 unit became known as the Esquadrilha Os Diabos (the Devils Flight). It appears that utilization was low, with only one or two aircraft in service at anyone time. The only accident ever to befall a FAP Invader took place during a training flight in Portugal, when an aircraft had to land with the nose gear retracted, but the damage was soon repaired. The Biafran Air Force approached Portugal in 1967, with a request to buy a few Invaders, but this was turned down even though the B-26s were of little use to the FAP at this time. A single B-26 was deployed to Guine for one month, probably in 1969, on a trial basis. Since no deployment followed at the time it has to be assumed that the trials were not very successful, but no details are known at present. The campaigns in Guine and Mor;ambique were not going well for the Portuguese and the air support situation was again becoming problematic by the early 1970s. In Guine, there was one squadron of Fiat G.91 s, while Mor;ambique had two squadrons. There were also several squadrons of armed

Texans and Harvards. These units represented the bulk of the FAP forces and there were few reserve aircraft available in Portugal to make good losses in Africa. But the Portuguese forces in Angola were still holding out fairly well, mainly due to the effectiveness of the Portuguese military operations and social development schemes, but partly also because the three rivalling liberation forces spent a good deal of their energy plotting against each other. As a consequence, Angola had the lowest priority when it came to air support. The Thunderjets of Esquadra 93 had definitely come to the end of their useful career by the early 1970s and urgently needed to be replaced, but no Fiats could be spared and all surviving Harpoons were already in Angola.

Left with little choice, the FAP decided that the time had come to deploy the B-26 to Africa after all, pending the procurement of more modern aircraft. One Invader had severe corrosion problems and was not considered fit for first-line use, but the remaining six aircraft were given a major overhaul in 1971 and prepared for operational deployment. The armament consisted of the .50 guns in the nose of the aircraft, plus bombs and rockets carried on pylons under the wings. Bombs could also be carried internally, but in practice the bomb bay was often taken up by a 14,000 litre long-range fuel tank. The first B-26 was flown to Luanda in Angola in December 1971. Due to difficulties in obtaining landing permits elsewhere in .Africa, it had to fly over the Atlantic most of the way, with stops at Cabo Verde, GuineBissau and Cabinda. The other aircraft were evidently deployed to Angola over the next few months'. On arrival, the Invaders were allocated to Esquadra 93, which retired its last four F-84Gs into storage soon afterwards. The armed Harpoons of Esquadra 91 had all been transferred to the Esquadra Operacional at Henrique de Carvalho (AB 4) in eastern Angola in 1971, which meant that the six Invaders were now the only combat aircraft at Luanda. Apart from the squadrons at Luanda and Henrique de Carvalho, the only other FAP combat unit in Angola was the Esquadra Operacional at N'gage (AB 3), with Harvards as its main equipment. In addition to its B-26s, Esquadra 93 also operated one or two Harpoon transports (which may officially still have belonged to Esquadra 91) and some Do 27 liaison aircraft. While serving in Portugal, the Invaders carried the standard FAP white and aluminum paint scheme with dark blue trim, which

'One unconfirmed report states that all Invaders except 7106 were spotted at Alverca as late as March 1973, but this is probably incorrect.

PORTUGAL

.

I

103

made them look more like executive trans- March 1972, and the FNLA played only a from July 1975. The situation in Angola was ports than attack aircraft. Several of the minor role in the liberation war after this. In more complex. Cease-fires had been aircraft were subsequently repainted overall the east, UNITA had some 500 active guerril- declared by both UNITA and MPLA by olive green - using an anti-radiation paint, to las, but by the early I970s the movement was October, and the war against the Portuguese make them less vulnerable to IR-seeking mis- concentrating on political rather than military had more or less stopped, but it proved diffisiles - but at least one B-26 kept its original action. The main foe of the Portuguese in cult to get the different liberation movements colours for the whole of its service in Angola. Angola was the MPLA, also operating in the to form a joint govemment. An agreement The olive green B-26s had their national eastern part. They had several thousand men was signed by all parties in January 1975, insignia reduced from 75 cm diameter on the in Angola and gained quite a lot of ground in granting Angola independence from 11 fuselage and 100 cm on the wings, to 20 cm 1971-72. However, a series of Portuguese November of that year. But within a few diameter in all positions. The flag on the fin offensive sweeps during 1972 and 1973 months of the signing, civil war was raging was also usually reduced from 75 x 50 cm to pushed the MPLA back, and it eventually had throughout Angola and troops from several 30 x 15 cm, while the serial numbers on the to evacuate some of its forces to safety in foreign countries had arrived in the country. wings, fin and nose gear doors remained Congo (Brazzaville). By 1974, the Portuguese The Portuguese recognized the futility of furunchanged in size (75 cm, 20 cm and 20 cm, forces in Angola had the upper hand in the ther negotiations and on 10 November they respectively) . fighting. quietly hauled down their flag and left. The Luanda-based Invaders were used Meanwhile, the population of Portugal was In all three former colonies, large quantiover the whole of Angola, including the becoming increasingly disenchanted with ties of unwanted equipment were left behind Cabinda enclave in Congo. Esquadra 93 had the Caetano government and its inability to by the departing Portuguese forces. The FAP around nine pilots - who, with one or two solve the problems in Africa. There was also was no exception to this rule, and only the exceptions, had converted to the B-26 in unrest in the Armed Forces, although this was Fiat G.91s, A10uettes and Pumas were Portugal - and a ground staff of sixty or so. initially centred on differences in pay. Finally, brought back to Portugal. The rest, including The unit flew an average of three B-26s sor- on 25 April 1974, there was a left-wing military the B-26s, were abandoned at the former FAP ties a day. Most of these were armed coup in Lisbon, followed by a second, more airfields. The last FAP Invader mission had reconnaissance missions, with only a smaller radically communist coup in September. been flown in August 1975 and all the aircraft number of close support and interdiction One of the main objectives of the new gov- had survived their tour in Angola. Some transmissions, the latter mainly in the northwest ernment was the earliest possible with- ports and light aircraft were put into service and in Cabinda. The single B-26C, although drawal from all overseas provinces. by the new governments, while the rest were armed, was mainly used for visual reconnaisWhile awaiting the outcome of this new simply left to rot away. All aircraft left behind sance. Only once was an Invader damaged development, most of the units in Africa by the Portuguese had had various vital parts by ground fire, being hit over Cabinda by ceased operations and withdrew to their bar- removed or destroyed, making it difficult to small-calibre bullets which did not hit any racks. Local cease-fires were negotiated restore them to airworthy condition. Several where necessary, and the guerrilla forces former Portuguese T-6s were recovered by a vital parts of the aircraft. 'As a jet fighter pilot, at the beginning I were left to roam the countryside more or group of South Africans in the late 1980s, but didn't appreciate very much my posting to less at will. The air units remained in place, nothing definite was ever heard of the former the B-26,' Colonel Manuel Bessa R. but flew mainly reconnaiss~mce flights. Forc;a Aerea Portuguesa B-26 Invaders and d'Azevedo recalls. During 1973 to 1975, while The number of hours flown by the B-26s several of them may well remain at Luanda to a Major, he was the CO of Esquadra 93. 'But while in Angola is not known, but the PV-2s this day. this was just in the beginning. As time went by . totalled only 208 hours in 1974 and the A B-26B currently on display in Cuba is I learnt to understand the plane and how to Invaders almost certainly also saw less use almost certainly a former FAP aircraft, howuse it. Nowadays Iconsider the B-26 as one of than before. During the year, Esquadra 93 ever: the unusual antenna and beacon the best and most trusty aircraft that I ever maintained a permanent detachment of one arrangement carried at one point is identical flew. Despite those marvellous engines the B-26 at Santo Antonio do Zaire, followed by a to that of at least one of the Portuguese airmajor problem was normally the take-offs, similar detachment to Cabinda in 1975. Many. craft (7101). It was probably spirited away by when heavily loaded. We always needed of the Harpoons were struck off charge in the Cuban air force personnel during their stay in long runs. autumn of 1974, and it is possible that some Angola, or perhaps donated by the new 'Even now, after all these years, I think that Invaders also fell into disuse around this time. Angolan government. this type of aircraft was one of the most In September 1974 the new Portuguese Major sections of 7104- struck off charge in appropriate to our kind of operations in that Government recognized the independence Portugal due to corrosion - were transferred particular theater. Not difficult to maintain, of Guinea-Bissau and in the same month also from the FAP to the Museu do Ar in 1976 and with adequate performance, and a remark- agreed to grant Moc;ambique independence are currently in storage at A1verca, Portugal. able weapons platform with the long range we needed for those reconnaissance flights all over that enormous country.' The war in Angola was being fought on two fronts. In the north, the FNLA had some 6,000 men. But they only engaged in limited operations at this point and spent most of their time in idleness at their camps in Za'ire. In fact, their low morale resulted in a mutiny in FAP 7101 in the company of several G.9IRs, with parts of the extensive Luanda aircraft graveyard in the background. The fin carries the aircraft serial and fin flash, although these can only just be made out in the original photo. Mais Alto magazine

FOREIGN INVADERS

104

The bomb bays of the Invaders used in Angola were sometimes taken up by extra fuel tanks and in those cases the bomb load had to be carried under the wings, as seen here on FAP 71 05. J. F. Nico

The end: FAP 7105 and another B-26B stand abandoned at Luanda in October 1975, just before the Portuguese withdrawal from Angola. J. Wegg

FORC;:AAEREA PORTUGUESA (Portuguese Air Force) FAP Serial

Version

Previous identities

Arrived

SOC

7101

8-268

44-34535, N8020E

Jun 65

75

7102

8-268, 8-26C

44-34328, N9422Z

Jun 65

75

7103 7104

8-268 8-268

44-35631, N91346 44-34726, N3152G

Jul65 Jul65

75 c.73

7105 7106

8-268 8-26C, 8-268

43-22427, N91350 41-39517, N91349

6 Aug 65 Aug 65

75 75

7107

R8-26C, 8-2"613

44-35363, N91347

Aug 65

75

Remarks Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola. May be the aircraft now on display in Cuba. Converted from 8-268 to 8-26C by OGMA. Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola. Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola. Wfu due to corrosion problems. The fuselage (mounting a 8-26C nose) and other sections are stored with Museu do Ar at Alverca, Portugal. Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola. Converted from 8-26C to 8-268 by OGMA. Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola. Caineras were not fitted. Converted from R8-26C to 8-268 by OGMA. Wfu and abandoned at Luanda, Angola.

The thirteen aircraft not delivered included the following: 41-39398/N9131 7, 41-39422/N91357, 41-39468/N91354, 41-39483/N91358, 43-22357/N91348, 43-22559/N91359, 44-34344/N91356, 44-35365/N91353, 44-35385/N91352, 44-35676/N91355 and 44-3590I/N91351, plus two more, as yet unidentified.

r

FOREIGN INVADERS

105

Chapter Eighteen

Biafra While war in the nearby Congo was still raging, unrest had also broken out in Nigeria. A sequence of events had started that would ultimately lead to the Biafran war: a war that would claim some one-and-a-half million dead, making it one of the bloodiest in the history of Africa. Just as in the Congo, the background was complex and had its roots in the colonial period. When Nigeria was made a fully-fledged British colony in 1914, little or no consideration was given to the tribal differences between the various parts of the territory. The North and the South had never been united in pre-colonial times, since there were really no common interests between the two. The South was later divided into three separate regions: the West, the Midwest and the East. The same division into a four-region federation was kept when Nigeria became a republic in 1963, after gaining independence in 1960. The Eastern region was the home of the Ibo tribe, which had a particular flair for business and administration. Many Ibos had settled in the other regions of Nigeria, where they often controlled a large part of the local business. Because of this, they were often . being eyed with suspicion and mistrust by the local tribes, especially in the North. A large part of the officer corps of the armed forces was also made up of Ibos and other Easterners. The civilian government elected in 1960 soon showed itself to be incompetent and corrupt. The situation came to a head in late 1965, when the ruling party was widely accused of rigging an important local election. In January 1966, a group of junior officers attempted a coup - Operation Damisa - in which the Prime Minister of the federation and several other high ranking politicians were killed. Although the coup failed, an interim military government was formed in order to prevent civil war. Before long, the military government under General lronsi was advocating the abolishment of the federation and the introduction of a more centralized government, claiming The B-26R that was to become the first Invader of the Biafran Air Force, photographed towards the end of its career with the French CEV. The nose radome was fitted during trials with the Antilope radar. viaG. Kamp

that 'regionalism' was one of the main reasons behind the previous troubles. There was a lot of displeasure over this and during May 1966 a series of violent riots occurred in the North. Several thousand people, mainly Easterners, lost their lives. In late July a second coup took place and lronsi - who was an Easterner - was killed, as were hundreds of other officers and men from the East. The new leaders under Lieutenant-Colonel Gowon took control of the Federal government, the Northern, Western and later also the Midwestern region. But they were treated with more reserve by the Eastern region and its military governor Lieutenant-Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, of the Ibo tribe. It has been argued that the first military government formed after the January coup was constitutional, while that resulting from the coup in July was not. At any rate, it was never formally recognized by the Eastern region. By late summer 1966, the East began importing some small arms to build up the meagre stocks of the local forces. The evidence also suggests that tlie Easterners had begun casting around for some heavier equipment, to be available at short notice in case of war. This included obtaining an 'option' on a B-26 Invader. France was one of the few countries still operating the Invader at this point, but even its fleet was shrinking rapidly. A B-26R with the serial 41-39531 - one of the Invaders used by the CEV test centre - was put up for sale on II July 1966 and became the property of the Pan Eurasian Trading Company, Luxembourg, on 2 August. The price paid was 9,720 Francs. According to the company manager, the aircraft was bought as an 'investment'

and was never actually operated by Pan Eurasian. A few weeks later, on 22 September, the B-26 was officially resold to a Mr Ernest A. Koenig - a German-American residing in Luxembourg. It seems very likely that Mr Koenig acted as an agent for Eastern Nigeria, and one source claims that the real buyer was a 'French company, which paid good money for the aircraft.' It has been claimed that the Biafrans (who had purchasing agents in France) ended up paying as much as $320,000 for it, which certainly made the aircraft a good investment for somebody. Although there is no direct evidence for contacts between Mr Koenig and the Eastern Nigerians at this stage, it should be mentioned that he was later also involved in the sale of ex- Luftwaffe C-47s to Biafra. In late October, Mr Koenig had the Invader entered on the US civil register as N12756, after which it was flown to the airfield at Courtrai-Wevelghem in Belgium and put into storage. The situation in Nigeria became increasingly tense during the autumn. New riots broke out, claiming tens of thousands of victims, again mainly Ibos and other Easterners. Hundreds of thousands of others became refugees, who flocked into the Eastern region. Various attempts were made to reconcile the differences between the regions and to find a mutually acceptable form of government. All of these failed. By this time most Easterners were deeply suspicious of Colonel Gowon and his supporters. Gowon had begun to hint of military action in early 1967, and in early May the government initiated a

106

postal and telecommunications ban against the Eastern region, which had ceased paying Federal revenue a few weeks earlier. On 30 May 1967, Lieutenant-Colonel Ojukwu declared the region an independent state, under the narne of Biafra. Although the Biafran armed forces were considerably smaller than the Federal ones, manpower was not the major problem. With a population of some fourteen millions, Biafra had no shortage of potential soldiers. There were always more than enough volunteers for the needs of the army. They also had a sizable cadre of well-trained officers and NCOs, which meant that the influx of mercenaries into Biafra was comparatively small. All told, probably less than a hundred ever arrived in the country, and of those only a dozen or so stayed for more than a few weeks. Biafra's main military problem lay in the shortage of equipment. With only limited quantities of small arms and light mortars, and no anti-tank weapons, they stood little chance against the relatively well-equipped Federal forces. Neither side had an air force with any real offensive capability at this point. The Nigerian Air Force had been formed in January 1964 and a flying school - using Piaggio P.149D trainers - set up at Kaduna, with the help of a West German training mission. Some Domier Do 27s and Westland Whirlwinds were later added to the fleet, but negotiations for the purchase of Fiat G.91Rs and Fouga Magisters came to nothing. Two Jet Provosts were, however, obtained from the Sudan in May 1967, but these were in poor condition and saw only limited use.

FOREIGN INVADERS

The Biafrans had obtained their first aircraft in April 1967, when a Nigerian Airways Fokker F.27 "Friendship was hijacked to Enugu during a domestic flight. A DC-3 and a de Havilland Dove were impounded soon after independence, as Were several light helicopters ofvarious types. By early June 1967, the B-26 in Belgium had been taken out of storage and preparations were made for its delivery to Africa. The aircraft was given a thorough inspection and some additional avionics were fitted, before it was ferried to Lisbon in mid June by a Belgian pilot. Meanwhile, the Biafran agents had also secured the services of a pilot for the delivery flight. His name was Jacques Lestrade, a Frenchman who had been with the CEV for several years, after previous service as a fighter pilot with EC.4 of the Arrnee de l'Air. Being one of the few pilots in Europe to have a civilian rating on the B-26, he was paid 10,000 Francs for the flight (slightly more, it will be noted, than the original selling price of the aircraft). Accompanying Jacques Lestrade was Jean' (originally Jan) Zumbach, also known as 'Johnny "Kamikaze" Brown,' or simply 'Mr Brown.' At the age of 52, Zumbach was a highly experienced pilot, who had flown with the Polish Air Force and the RAF during the Second World War. Since then, he had been involved in various more or less legal civilian flying ventures, and had also served in the Katangese Air Force earlier in the I960s. The Invader also carried a third, unidentified mercenary, who apparently spent most of the flight consuming vast quantities of whisky.

The aircraft took off from Lisbon on 26 June, arriving at the Biafran capital Enugu three days later. Here Lestrade (who immediately returned to France) learnt that his two passengers had been there to keep an eye on him, ready to take over had he shown signs of 'cold feet.' A bill of sale was filed with the FAA a couple of weeks later, showing that Koenig had ostensibly sold the aircraft to a Mr Moises Broder, Port Gentil, Gabon. The first shots of the war were fired on 6 July and two days later the Nigerians launched their first infantry attack near Nsukka, in northern Biafra. The Biafran Air Force was soon involved in attacks against Federal troops in the border area and against Nigerian lines of communication. These early raids were carried out by the BAF DC-3 and Dove, which had been converted into makeshift bombers-cum-gunships, since the B-26 was still not ready for operations. The aircraft were flown by Biafrans, but Mr Zumbach sometimes came along as supervisor, due to his experience from similar operations in the Congo. At this point in time, some Alouette helicopters were also operated in the strike role by the BAF and were used to drop hand grenades on Federal infantry positions. The results were mainly psychological - bolstering Biafran morale and eroding that of the Nigerians - but the attacks also helped slow down the pace of the Federal advance. The Federal offensive in the north soon bogged down, after some initial successes. Then on 25 July the Nigerians made a surprise landing on the island of Bonny off the southwest coast, capturing the oil terminal located there. This cut off the sea route to Port Harcourt, the largest Biafran city and also its principal port. The BAF now had to divert some of its meagre resources to counter this new threat. By this time, the B-26 was finally ready for operations. It had been camouflaged in a swirling pattern of dark green and dark brown, with azure blue undersides. A Biafran flag was painted on the upper part of the rudder, but it is uncertain if any other national insignia were applied. A shark's mouth was also painted on the nose of the Invader, soon earning it the nickname The Shark. CEV had used the aircraft for radar and radio trials and the modified nose had no provisions for .50 calibre machine guns, which were unavailable to the Biafrans, anyway. A single, Czech-manufactured infantry-type machine gun on a tripod was therefore fitted in the nose radome. In the absence of an electrical firing system, the gunner had a cord tied to his The first BAF B-26 seen soon after its arrival at Enugu Airport in late June 1967, with the Biafran flag proudly streaming in the foreground. The civilian registration N12756 has already been removed, if indeed it was ever carried. 1. Lestrade via M. Rostaing

BIAFRA

arm: one tug from the pilot meant 'open fire' and two tugs 'cease fire .. .' A second gun was also fitted at the rear end of the bomb bay, firing downwards. Although some bomb bay fittings remained in place, there was little hope of obtaining suitable bombs on the open market. Instead, a local fireworks manufacturer produced large numbers of simple but quite serviceable devices - known as 'Willy bombs' after their designer - to be primed and heaved out from the bomb bay by one or two 'bombardiers.' The landings on Bonny had been covered by the frigate Nigeria, and on 26 July the ship was attacked by the Biafran B-26 and DC-3, using bombs made out of oil barrels, but with disappointing results. This was very likely the first operational sortie flown by the BAF B-26. The frigate was later to be attacked by the B-26 on several more occasions and evidently enough damage was inflicted on the ship to put it out of commission for an extended period. By Mr Zumbach's own account, he ran the French mercenary pilots Jean Zumbach (left) BAF almost single-handedly during his stay in and Jacques Lestrade pose in front of the B-26 Biafra. While it is true that he did fly most if they delivered to Biafra. J. Lestrade via not all the early BAF Invader missions and M. Rostaing also acted in a general advisory capacity, he was by no means the only qualified pilot in Biafra. The DC-3 and Dove gunships were'S' Brigade captured the whole of the usually flown by all-Biafran crews and the Midwestern region within a week, outflankBiafran co-pilots of the B-26s also played a ing the bulk of the Nigerian forces. By 20 more significant part than generally given August they had covered two thirds of the discredit for. One of these Biafrans was Captain tance to the capital Lagos, with little (later Major) Godwin Ezeilo, who had opposition on the way. Despite this, a few received training in Canada on the T-33 Silver B-26 missions appear to hQ.ve been flown in Star and the CT-114 Tutor. His place was support of the offensive. Butat this point the sometimes taken by Jimmy Yates, a commander of'S' Brigade, Brigadier Victor Luftwaffe-trained Biafran of mixed British . Banjo, halted the advance. He and his coand Ibo parentage. Lieutenant Oraeki usually . conspirators had worked out a plot to served as navigator, while Corporal Peter assassinate President Ojukwu and end the Akachukwu and Sergeant Anthony AIaribe secession. Having been given a hero's welfulfilled the combined gunnerlbombardier corne by the Federal government, they would function. Other Biafrans occasionally also then depose General Gowon and take over flew in the B-26 on bombing missions, includ- power themselves. The traitors were found ing Lieutenant Felix Ayinotu and Lieutenant out by Ojukwu and eventually executed, but Akitu. the opportunity to take Lagos was lost and the A second foreign pilot, a gold-toothed Biafrans later withdrew from the Midwest. Frenchman using the name Durang, arrived The B-26, the DC-3 and the Dove were all at Enugu on 17 July. During his first weeks in slightly damaged in a Nigerian air strike one Biafra he apparently did little or no flying, but morning in early August. Acting on a tip-off from August onwards he was the pilot on from a local informant, a Jet Provost of the most of the missions flown by the Invader. Nigerian Air Force attacked Enugu field, rakJean Zumbach gradually faded from the ing it with machine gun fire. The BAF aircraft scene and had left Biafra by early September. were at that time bombed up in readiness for Some Biafrans suspected him of having gone a strike on Lagos. They were all hit by bullets over to the Federal side, but there are no indi- and the mission aborted. A few days later the cations that he did. B-26 and the Dove managed to take off withIn earlyAugust the Invader was also used to out incident, and"the dock yards in Lagos bomb the oil storage facilities on Bonny, but were bombed with some effect. this time employing 50 kg bombs recently The B-26 soon became a well-known sight obtained from Portugal, but no serious dam- over Nigerian-held territory and the aircraft age appears to have been inflicted in these achieved a reputation out of all proportion to raids. its actual military value. Since the Biafrans The Biafrans had so far mainly been on the still had to rely heavily on locally produced, defensive, but on 9 August they counter- improvised armaments and munitions, the attacked. In a totally unexpected move, their firepower of the BAF Invader was but a

107

shadow of that deployed by B-26s in the Congo and Vietnam a few years earlier. But the Nigerian Air Force was also receiving reinforcements. As a temporary measure, five or six Nigerian Airways DC-3s were impressed and employed as bombers. Since no local pilots would undertake to fly them on missions, about ten British, South African and Rhodesian mercenaries were hired. They were told that their prime objective was to knock out the BAF B-26, but it appears the mercenaries preferred undefended targets and no DC-3 attacks against the BAF airfields are known to have been carried out. In its efforts to find a definite answer to Biafran 'air superiority,' the Federal government reached an agreement with the Soviet Union for the supply of jet aircraft. Beginning on 13 August, some ten MiG-17s, six MiG15UTIs and twelve Aero L-29 Delfins arrived in Nigeria and these were soon followed by a number of Egyptian pilots. When the Biafrans became aware of the deliveries, they used the B-26 to attack the airfield at Kano in northern Nigeria, where most of the new NAF aircraft were based. Anthony AIaribe, the gunner of the B-26, has the following recollections from one of these missions, which probably took place on 20 August 1967: 'The greatest fight of my life was the attack on Kano airport, where it was now confirmed that the MiGs and L-29s were being assembled; the L-29s by the British and the MiGs by the Russians. We took off for Kano in the B-26, ready to do or die. 'The weather was fine at first, but between Makurdi and Lafia dark clouds closed in and the pilot gained altitude to avoid them. We got to Kano after almost two hours' flight, keeping a vigilant look-out for interceptors from any direction. We now sighted Kano's old terminal building, with the jets already parked in front of it. 'We went into a dive, levelled off and on

108

FOREIGN INVADERS

Good detail shot of The Shark, showing the single nose-mounted machine gun and the crudely applied shark's mouth. The nosewheel blow-out was to ground the aircraft for about a week in mid-July 1967, until a spare tire could be obtained from France. J. Zumbach via C.-I Ehrengardt

our first pass strafed the aircraft, hitting their engines and landing gears, before they passed out of sight. On the second pass we nearly ran into an anti-aircraft gun, but the pilot outsmarted the gunner. We came in again, this time from the rear, and I blasted that gun position with bullets, leaving nobody to man it. 'We then climbed and dropped our bombs, aiming at the aircraft. One bomb hit a wing of the terminal building. The bomb blasts left many of the aircraft completely destroyed. On that pass, when we pulled away again we narrowly escaped colliding with the side of a building, as we were still trying to avoid the many anti-aircraft guns, Russian Oerlikons that fired bursts like machine guns. We did not want to run short on ammunition, as there might be jet fighters waiting for us on our way home. 'Now we headed for hOTDe. Captain Ezeilo told us to observe radio silence and to listen, since the pilot, Mr Durang, did not speak any little bit of English. But he was very good at showing you what he wanted and for sure you would understand him. The listening enabled us to intercept the discussions between two NAF jet pilots who were wondering which way we may be coming from. We immediately turned away towards Cameroon and spent about thirty minutes waiting and observing, keeping away from Nigerian towns. We knew that the endurance of most Nigerian jets meant they could not spend more than one hour in the air. We then again headed for Enugu and home, and finally landed safely with the aircraft.' At some point around the second week of August 1967, the Biafran Air Force had received its second B-26, ferried to Enugu by two American pilots (who, incidentally, were paid more than twice the amount Lestrade

Meanwhile, work on the assembly of the NAF jets had continued at Kano and they were first used against the Biafrans on 30 August, in a raid on Onitsha. However, the Egyptians were soon found to be rather poor pilots and were later supplemented byadditional white mercenaries, who did not prove much better. A large proportion of the NAF jets were to be lost in accidents and not until a number of East German 'volunteers' arrived later in the war was there any marked improvement in the NAF's performance. Only one or two Nigerian pilots are thought to have become operational on the jets during the whole war. And, as far as known, no airto-air combat between Nigerian and Biafran military aircraft ever took place during the . received for delivering the first aircraft). This, . conflict. The new BAF B-26 continued to strike at too, was a former French Invader, and almost certainly the former F-BMJR: one of five Nigerian positions around Nsukka and Opi, RB-26Ps sold to the aerial survey company and also attacked the Nigerian gun boat Societe Carta by the Armee de l'Air in 1966. Ogojo, which was shelling Biafran defences F-BMJR was last seen at Creil near Paris in near Bonny. When returning to Enugu after a June 1967, while the others were still there in raid on Nsukka in mid September 1967, the 1968. It was sold to Biafra through the French B-26 was suddenly fired upon by Biafran arms dealer Pierre Laureys, who had also troops under the command of Major Ifeajuna, been involved in the sale of the first Invader'. who was one ofBrigadier Banjo's co-conspirAfter arrival at Enugu, the aircraft was ators in the abortive coup against Ojukwu. immediately being prepared for operations. The Invader diverted to Port Harcourt, which Home-made rocket launchers, with a total of became its new base from that day. For the forty-eight light and six heavy rockets, were time being, it continued to fly in support of the installed under the wings, as main arma- Biafran troops in the north. Around this time, the Federal army finally ment. The same type of launcher may also have been fitted to The Shark. Quite proba- broke through the Biafran defences on the bly, a machine gun armament similar to that northern front. By late September Enugu was of the first aircraft was fitted, although the within artillery range. Two B-25s of obscure second Invader reportedly also had guns origin had arrived at Enugu during the month installed in the wings. It was painted in a but, like the B-26s, they needed a considerscheme similar to the first Biafran B-26, but able amount of work before being ready for operations and were therefore not used in without the shark's mouth. The modifications to the new Invader were the defence of the city. September also saw a new volunteer pilot completed by the end of August and its first mission was an attack on Federal troops near enter the BAF ranks. His name was Friedrich the town of Nsukka. The pilot was 'Captain 'Freddy' Herz: a forty-year-old West German Mike,' one of the Americans who had deliv- who had become friends with some of the ered the aircraft to Biafra'. By this time The Eastern Nigerian pilots before the war, during Shark had become unserviceable and was to their training in Germany. Herz arrived at take no further part in the fighting. Instead it Enugu in time to help ferry the surviving airwas stripped for parts to keep the second air- craft to Port Harcourt, together with Major Ezeilo. The Shark was grounded and had to craft operational. be left behind. The Nigerians entered Enugu on 4 October 'Some reports claim that an Invader carrying the 1967 and the abandoned Invader was capbogus registration NI888T was delivered to Biafra. tured more or less intact. Three days later the There might possibly be some connection with BAF lost another aircraft, when their Fokker this RB-26P. Friendship exploded in the air during a bombing attack on Lagos. The Biafran gov'Several sources mention a Cuban pilot flying ernment had by then moved to Umuahia, B-26s for Biafra. It is possible, therefore, that 'Captain Mike' was a US citizen of Cuban origin. which became a provisional capital. Two

BIAFRA

weeks later, Calabar on the southeast coast was taken in an amphibious landing by the Nigerians, who soon managed to cut off all major roads going from Biafra to Cameroon. The Biafran Air Force now had Port Harcourt as its main base. The two B-25s became operational a few weeks after their arrival at Port Harcourt and they joined the B-26 in missions against Nigerian land and naval forces advancing from the southeast. Other targets were located in the Midwestern region. Durang was now flying the B-26, while Freddy Herz and 'Captain Mike' piloted the B-25s. At some point in November, one of the B-25s developed engine problems and had to be grounded, but the remaining B-25 and the B-26 kept up the attacks on the Federal forces. During this period, the BAF Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Chude Sokei was killed at the front in the Abagana Sector and Godwin Ezeilo was appointed Acting Commander. The Biafrans were anxious to supplement their minuscule air force and in November they contracted Larry Moye, a British arms dealer, to go to Portugal and buy four additional B-26s for the BAF. Although the FAP's seven B-26s were more or less surplus to requirements, it is unlikely that the Portuguese showed much interest in the proposal. They had had enough political problems obtaining the aircraft, and the last thing they needed was yet more trouble over these bombers. In late November the Nigerians shipped in large numbers of armoured cars and artillery pieces as reinforcements for their troops at Calabar, obviously in preparation for an offensive. The Biafrans immediately used their B-26 and B-25 to knock out as many vehicles as possible, while the build-up was still under way. The aircraft made up to three strikes a day against Calabar. But these missions could not stop the preparations and before long the situation became even more critical, as told by Anthony Alaribe: 'On 2 December 1967, late in the afternoon, a Federal signal was intercepted, informing us of planned, massive air and ground attacks in the Calabar sector and against the Port Harcourt airfield. A few minutes later a situation report came from our ground forces positioned at Calabar, reporting that at least six jet bombers and fighters had landed at Calabar airport, the only airbase fallen to the Federal troops in that sector. The BAF air staff The distinctive camera window unique to the RB-26P is clearly visible on the second BAF Invader. Standing from the left are Kevin Aneke, armament specialist Larry Obionu, French mercenary Jean Zumbach and Captain Ernest Ike, who was later killed piloting a BAF DC-3. The man with sunglasses is the navigator Sam Ezunor - killed in the B-25 crash on 2 December 1967 - with Lieutenant Inyang on his right. l. Zumbach via C.-l. Ehrengardt

109

and other high-ranking officers held a meet- gave us great joy, as we were all sure that ing and came out with a well-planned none of those jets could be airborne for a very counter-attack. longtime. 'Both the B-26 and the 8-25 were now 'Approaching Port Harcourt, where the scheduled for a midnight operation.. The runway lights were on, we spotted the posiB-25, with Captain Herz as pilot, Major Ezeilo tion lights of Captain Herz' aircraft. As we held as co-pilot, Captain Sam Ezunor as navigator behind them and they were not descending, and Peter Akachukwu as gunner/bom- we broke the radio silence that we had all bardier, took off first to drop incendiary type been observing, reporting that our landing bombs, which would light up the whole area gear was damaged and that we intended at that time of night. The B-26, being much belly-landing on the grass runway, and asking faster than the B-25, took off fifteen minutes if they also had landing gear problem? Major after the departure of the 8-25 from Port Ezeilo, co-pilot of the B-25 and Commander Harcourt airport. The aircraft was flown by Mr of the BAF, said that their landing gear was Durang, with Captain Onuorah as co-pilot, now extended and ready for landing, but Captain Ochulor as navigator and myself as asked us to go ahead and land. The gunner/bombardier. We were to strafe all the Commander expressed some fears, but Mr parked jet bombers and fighters with Durang told him he would do it perfectly. As machine guns and to fire rockets at all visible we descended, Durang throttled back the military hardware. two engines almost as we touched down on 'As we got airborne we flew some distance the grass runway. The technicians helped to away from Port Harcourt towards Calabar push us clear of the runway and the and turned out to sea, doing all we could to Commander was very happy that we had come in towards Calabar from the landed safely, without any fire. unguarded flank. We could now see the B-25 'Herz was now descending for landing, bombing and being shot at, though it was at a when suddenly there were flames from the safe altitude. Their effective bombing had engines. We ran in that direction only to disalready set many of the installations on fire, cover that Captain Herz had come in so low and it was now easy for us to come down to that the propellers of the two engines had tree top level to hit our targets without mis- struck the top of the palm trees below, and take. As the enemy concentrated on the that the wings had pulled down several trees homeward bound B-25, we in the 8-26 came in their path. The engines had come off and in low firing rockets at our targets and raining lay beneath the fallen palm trees and the bullets on the parked jets. The armoured cars wings had also been torn off the fuselage of that were not already on fire we fired rockets the plane. We heard the voice of the at and also at an anti-aircrp.ft gun position, Commander from inside the crushed cockwhich nearly made us crash into an unno- pit, while Herz was already unconscious, ticed beacon mast and a tall palm tree. their legs and hands entangled in the control . Though it was almost a suicide mission, com- cables. The plane had fallen just behind the ing in as low as we did on such a dark night .residence of the Catholic Reverend Father and inside enemy territory, the operation and we ran to get tools from him. The time

FOREIGN INVADERS

110

was between two and two-thirty AM. With axes, iron bars and shovels we rescued all the crew, except the navigator who was found dead beneath the open bomb bay.' The loss of these two aircraft was a disaster of major proportions to the Biafrans. In a single mission, the BAF had lost half its strike force, and the best half at that. The B-25 was a total write-off, not usable even as a source of spare parts for the other B-25, which remained grounded for the rest of the war. The B-26 was not too badly damaged, and some attempts were evidently made to repair it. But the lack of spares once again made this impossible. During April 1968, the Nigerian 3rd Marine Commando Division from Calabar linked up with the Ist Division coming from the north. The Ist Division also consolidated its positions in the northeast, forcing the last Biafran forces in the area to retreat south. The Nigerians now held a wide strip ofBiafran territory along the northern and eastern sides, but were still held at bay in the west, across the Niger. In fact, the Nigerians only managed to cross the Niger in strength at the very end of the war. Meanwhile, the 3rd Division was also pressing west from Calabar, crossing the Imo river in late April. By 18 May, the Nigerians had reached Port Harcourt, capturing the airport soon afterwards. The B-25, the B-26 and DC-3

were left behind by the retreating Biafrans while the Dove was evacuated, ending up at Uli. Soon after the capture of Port Harcourt, the Nigerian Air Force began repairing the former BAF B-26, to use it against its previous owners. The Biafran became aware of this when they intercepted Federal radio messages requesting spare parts. A commando unit of the BAF Regiment was therefore quickly sent to Port Harcourt to destroy the aircraft left behind. The raid was largely successful and the B-26 was destroyed or at least damaged beyond repair. By the end of July 1968 Biafra was completely cut off from the sea. The only major airfield left was the provisional strip near UIi, which was mainly used for relief and supply flights. With the increasing number of refugees in Biafra, and the steadily diminishing food supply, starvation was now the main enemy. In the early summer of 1968, it was estimated that some 3,000 people starved to death each day. From October, the military situation stabilized. The Nigerians launched a number of offensives over the next year, gaining some territory here and there, but in other sectors the Bjafrans counter-attacked, taking some ground. Owerri was recaptured in April 1969, and became the new Biafran capital. May 1969 saw the re-birth of the Biafran Air Force, when Count von Rosen carried out the

first of the famous 'Biafra Babies' raids, using MFI-9B aircraft. It has been suggested that one of the NAF 11-28s claimed during the Enugu attack on 26 May was, in fact, the hulk of The Shark. A couple of T-6s were later added to the BAF inventory, but the days of the twin engined bombers were definitely overby now. The Biafran southern front finally collapsed in early 1970. A unit of the war weary and exhausted Biafran 12th Division northwest of Aba suddenly decided that they had had enough, and soon large parts of the division had quietly faded away into the bush. Meeting little resistance, the Nigerian 3rd Division rolled north towards Uli. President Ojukwu left the country on 10 January and three days later Biafra surrendered. After the war, no reports ever appeared of the ultimate fate of the Biafran bombers. Most probably, they were scrapped by the Nigerians, who did not want any reminders of the BAF successes. NI2756 was officially deleted from the US register by the FAA in April 1974, with the terse comment, 'Exported to Africa.' Of the BAF air crew involved with the bombers, Godwin Ezeilo was killed in a DC-3 crash later in the war, while Lestrade, Zumbach and Herz passed away in the 1980s. Anthony A1aribe survived the war and currently lives in Lagos. The others remain untraced.

Seen tucked away in a comer of the Creil airfield outside Paris, this RB-26P of Societe Carta was smuggled to Mrica in August 1967, to become the second Invader used by the fledgling Biafran Air Force. P. Butler

BIAFRAN AIR FORCE BAF Serial

Version

(none)

B-26R

Previous identities/users

41-39531, N64Y, N12756

Arrived

Lost

29 Jun 67

4 Oct 67

Aug 67

19 May 68

AA Europe,

(none)

RB-26P

44-34312, AA Europe, F-BMJR

Remarks

Known as The Shark. Abandoned at Enugu in damaged condition. Grounded after accident on 2 Dec 67. Abandoned at Port Harcourt in damaged condition.

FOREIGN INVADERS

III

Chapter Nineteen

EI Salvador Tiny EI Salvador seems to be a most unlikely ing followed in Honduras. The deciding candidate to have operated the long-legged match was played in Mexico City, and again Invader and, had it not been for a brief but the Salvadorean team won. Tensions continued to increase, and on 4 bitter war with neighbouring Honduras, the type would surely have never graced the July Honduras complained through diploskies over this crowded Central American matic channels of Salvadorean Air Force violations of her airspace. Salvador made a Republic. By 1969, nearly 350,000 Salvadoreans had sharp response and the following day diploillegally migrated into comparatively sparsely matic relations were severed and troops populated Honduras, attempting to escape from the respective armies were rushed to the difficult situation in their homeland. The the border regions. The tiny Fuerza Aerea Salvadorefla (FAS) , circumstances that led the two countries to conflict in what has come to often be called numbering only thirty-four pilots as of the 'The Soccer War' were, as usual, far more . time of the conflict, was totally and comcomplex than merely the 1969 Football pletely dominated by the Army, with such World Cup, in which the two were to play thoroughness that the service was relegated to nothing more than an 'Air Quartel,' enjoyeach other. As it happened, unfortunately, the first ing roughly the same status in the national game, which was played in the Honduran hierarchy as one of the other Army Quartels, capital, Tegucigalpa, was won by Honduras- or Divisions. Indeed, Lieutenant Colonel and the second, played in San Salvador on 15 Henriquez, Commander of the FAS at the time, ranked one grade lower than Army June, was won by the Salvadoreans. Unhappy with the alleged improprieties of Quartel commanders, who were full the officials during the game in San Salvador, Colonels. The situation was aggravatea by the fact rioting and anti-Salvadorean immigrant bashthat, while the FAS pilots were very good technically, eager and extremely familiar One of the earliest known photos of Fuerza with their tiny country's terrain, there had Aerea SaIvadoreiia (FAS) Invaders, taken never been any joint operations of any kind shortly after the end of the 1969 war with between the two arms of service. The CO of Honduras. Five 8-26s are on line (the grey, exthe FAS had little or no autonomy, and moveGuatemalan aircraft is to the right) and no two ments of FAS personnel and aircraft had to be were painted the same. In the centre of the literally approved by the Ministry of Defence. photo is FAS 602. A. Baldocchi

Until 1969, the only twin-engined 'bomber' aircraft ever operated by the FAS was a single Beech AT-II acquired under the American Republics Project in 1947 - and which was subsequently converted to transport configuration. The FAS was viewed as a purely defensive establishment. The only multi-engined equipment in service at the time of the war was the FAS fleet of venerable Douglas C-47s, and a single example of the Canadair DC-4M. Although numerous sources have cited the FAS as having conducted one of the first attacks against Tegucigalpa with a B-26, a C-47 and a DC-3, these were in fact all carried out by C-47s literally rolling the bombs out the cargo door at the signal of the pilot! The FAS Cavalier F-51D Mustangs and Goodyear FG-I DCorsairs were considered to be a match for the Honduran Chance-Vought F4U-4 and F4U-5 Corsairs. The new Mustangs, however, with drop tanks, could achieve seven to eight hours' endurance if needed, but the fact that the Salvadorean coast was only 140 miles long seemingly lulled the FAS into a rather smug self-assurance. As a result, patrols of the coast and border with Honduras were seldom, if ever, conducted until the outbreak of the fighting. One of the FAS' best-kept 'secrets' was that it had a rather informally organized Air Force Reserve, consisting of some twenty civilian pilots, both men and women. All held the

112

honorary rank of Captain, and all had been through the full airborne training course, as well as - in some cases - having had specialized flight training in Guatemala, which had always had very good relations with Salvador. This organization was to prove valuable in procuring and manning the Invaders that the FAS acquired later. During the opening days of the war, some 12,000 Salvadorean troops crossed over the border near EI Poy and EI Amatillo, and continued to advance, although somewhat hesitantly (they had no clear idea of what objective they intended to achieve) over the next few days. The FAS, using its five Cavalier F-51Ds and five FG-I0s that were airworthy, supported the offensive by bombing targets at Santa Rosa de Copan, Gracias and Nueva

FOREIGN INVADERS

Ocotopeque in the north and also Nacaorne, San Lorenzo, Ampala and Choluteca. The FAH retaliate-d by attacking 1I0pango, the home field of the FAS, on 15July, and the subsequent air action became very widespread, considering the numbers of aircraft available to the combatants. In fact, the FAH appears to have lost as rnany as four F4Us to Salvadorean ground fire, while the FAS lost two FG-lDs and a Mustang to the FAH in airto-air action. Aware that the small offensive force on hand would be inadequate for any protracted engagement, and that losses would surely occur, the FAS leadership, aided by the influential Reservists now called to the colours, set about procuring additional aircraft where they could - with price being no object. This resulted in acquisition and entry into the

country of at least eleven 'stock' North American F-5IDs, and two 8-26s - all quite illegally. An Organization of American States (OAS) cease-fire came into effect on 18 July and, although sporadic fighting continued on the

Photos of Salvadorean Invaders actually operating are virtually non-existent. Here, two Invaders - probably FAS 600 and 601 - roll out on the primary at llopango in September 1970. The aircraft on the right appears to have an odd checker-board pattern or damage to the lower rudder area. Dr G. Kuhn The second FAS B-26B was the former N86482, which was spirited out of the US illegally prior to October 1969. This is how it looked at the time of delivery. R. Esposito

EL SALVADOR

ground - and in the air - until 29 July, the first two ex-US civil Invaders did not reach the country until after hostilities had ended. One of these had flown to Salvador direct from Midland, Texas, with the aid of large auxiliary fuel tanks mounted in the bomb-bay. The FAS had dispersed to alternate airfields at the outbreak of hostilities, including Santa Ana, San Miguel and two other 'secret' fields that were believed to be unknown to the Hondurans (in fact, neither was ever attacked). By October 1969, the FAS was still on a seven-day-a-week alert status, and still had many of its Reservists called up - as well as five mercenaries, who were flying the Mustangs, and the two B-26s. These had now been assigned serials FAS 600 and 601, and painted in Vietnam-era camouflage colours. To that time, no FAS pilots had been checked out in the type, although Colonel Vicente Sanchez (none other than the brother of the President of the Republic, Fidel Sanchez) and Roque Velazquez, a junior officer, were in the process of being checked out on the aircraft. Efforts were ongoing to acquire more aircraft for the FAS as well. The plan called for acquisition of an additional six Mustangs (although this in fact never occurred), as well as some surplus German North American F-86Ks, which were also never acquired. Four additional Invaders, however, were located and purchased: three in the USA (again illegally) and one acquired from a 'private Guatemalan citizen' - this actually being an ex-FAG aircraft. The Invaders were receiving a lot of attention from the hard-pressed FAS engineering . personnel, as they were all in rather poor condition, suffering from a wide variety of ailments. Not the least of these were constant exhaust-system burnouts. All but one were B-26B configured variants and perhaps, significantly, the first two had eight-gun and

113

six-gun noses. The FAS also activated the wing gun positions on each of these, and mounted three .50 calibre guns in each wing.. The FAS had great expectations of these aircraft if hostilities renewed. Taking the advice of the Reservists called up, the FAS also took pains to acquire spare engines for the Invaders, five of them having arrived as freight cargo on civil flights by October, and was manufacturing 1,000 pound bombs locally for use by the Invaders and aboard the Mustangs. The ex-FAG aircraft (the only FAS B-26C) turned out to be in very poor shape, and was reported to have just barely made it to 1I0pango. Although it was supposedly assigned an FAS serial, the aircraft did not in fact ever don FAS insignia nor any other markings. The other three later aircraft acquired in the US were also bedevilled by a number of maladies, including the necessity to almost immediately replace the rudder on one of them. According to one former FAS pilot, the first two aircraft took part in 'observation missions only,' although they did train with live ammunition by 'shooting up the side of a vol-

cano'! They were always crewed by at least two, and the bomb-bays were not operable, the under-wing hardpoints being the main ordnance delivery capability. All six of the B-26s were nominally included on the strength of a new unit within the FASand the only such unit to ever be so namedthe Escuadron de Bombardero, although in fact by September 1970, only three were ever made fully operational. Three aircraft were still nominally opera.tional, but noted in poor condition at 1I0pango by February 1972. As tensions with Honduras continued to ease, and as keeping these aircraft operational became ever more difficult and expensive, the FAS took the decision to sell them off, together with most of its surviving F-51 sand FG-1 Os. Two of the aircraft were in fact sold back into the US - the same first two acquired and the others were put out to pasture alongside war-weary F-51s and Corsairs. It is understood that negotiations are underway to bring one more of them out at this writing. The FAS 'bomber' force, hastily assembled and manned, never fired a shot or dropped a bomb in anger.

FAS 600, a former TB-26B, at it appeared at I1opango in 1972. It was one of only two FAS B-26s to receive nose guns - but only after considerable efforts by the FAS maintenance staff, and after the end of the war with Honduras. G. E. Buehlmann FUERZA AEREA SALVADORENA (Salvadorean Air Force) FAS Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

600 601

TB-268 8-268

44-34722, N3222T 41-39472, N86482

602 603 604

8-268 8-268 8-268

?, N .... ?, N .... ?, N ....

605

8-26C

?,FAG

Toe

soc

Aug 69 Aug 69

8 Nov 74 Apr 74

70 70

74 74 (Not taken up?) (Not taken up?)

Remarks To N62289 and N3222T. Sometimes given in error as a 8-26C. To N26VC. Derelict at I1opango. Derelict at I1opango. Serial assigned but believed never actually worn. Vietnam era camouflage. Serial assigned but believed never actually worn; probably never flown after delivery. Light grey overall.

114

FOREIGN INVADERS

Rarely photographed, the all-grey exGuatemalan B-26C was probably assigned the serial 605 but in fact never wore this or any other markings. It was a monumental main~enance nightmare. A. Baldocchi

The FAS 'boneyard' circa October 1974, showing five Invaders together with a Canadair DC-4M and numerous FG-IDs and F-5ID Mustangs. Visible, in order, are FAS 602, (604),600,603 and 601. via N. J. Waters III

FAS 600 as it appeared at San Marcos, Texas, in March 1975 after being sold back into the US as N62289. The aircraft is now back with the Confederate Air Force, having regained its former registration N3222T. L. Bracken

EL SALVADOR

The empennage of FAS 602 as it appears today, very derelict, at I1opango. The FAS has been trying to interest 'warbird' buyers in the hulk, but the paper trail on the aircraft is highly suspect. Hagedorn Collection Nose-on view of derelict B-26B FAS 602 at I1opango. Note that the inboard wing root area remained unpainted on both upper and lower surfaces about half the chord of the wing from the leading edge back. Hagedorn Collection FAS 603 in 1972 while still very much airworthy, with just the nose of the exGuatemalan B-26C in the background. This aircraft only mounted four nose guns in a home-made arrangement. G. E. Buehlmann Another view of FAS 603 in 1974, by which time it had not moved for nearly two years. The exGuatemalan B-26C, arbitrarily assigned serial 605 (but not worn) never actually gained any markings with the FAS and was never flown after delivery so far as can be determined. G. E. Buehlmann

115

116

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty

Honduras The last Latin American air arm to acquire a verted to a bomber/transport configuration. Salvador was frantically scrambling to Later, after the Second World War, acquire not only more F-51 Mustangs, but BB-26, and the last air force in the world to place the type in active combat-configured Honduras took pains to purchase, from a 26 bombers as well. The realities of aerial bombardment had service, Honduras also holds the distinction number of sources, a number of Beech of being the very last air arm to operate the AT-I Is, which were also quickly configured been brought home to the Hondurans during as light bombers, as well as a single Martin B- the war when several FAS C-47s embartype anywhere. The Hondurans came by their single 26 Marauder, the only example of the type to rassed the FAH by flying full tilt over the Invader as a direct result of the brief war with ever serve with any Latin American air arm. Honduran capital, flinging bombs of various El Salvador in 1969. While the Fuerza Aerea This aircraft was used primarily as a VIP trans- sizes onto the main FAH base at Toncontin (Tegucigalpa) and its environs. Visions of Hondurena (FAH) was somewhat larger than port, however. the FAS, and about evenly matched in terms Honduras also acquired three ex-US Navy what real bombers could do were the subject of personnel qualifications and aircrew profi- Convair PB4Y Privateers, and, although these of no little speculation. Honduras responded to the Salvadorean ciency, it too lacked a truly dedicated . were demilitarized and used as transports offensive capability, being concerned hereto- and freighters during most of their service , purchases by casting about for countermeafore mainly with defence and internal lives, at least one of them was configured as a sures. These eventually took the form of a motley collection of North American and security. bomber for a time. By 1969, however, Honduras relied entirely Canadair-built F-86 Sabres of various subUnlike Salvador, however, the Hondurans had considerable experience with multi- on its veteran force of Chance-Vought F4U-4 types (the first dedicated jet fighters in engined types, aside from the inevitable fleet and F4U-5 Corsairs to carry the war to the Central America) - and a single B-26. The B-26, as it turned out, was none other of Douglas C-47 transports. The FAH had Salvadoreans and, while these did a credoperated the very first twin-engined bomber itable job - including at least three aerial than the venerable 'Bacardi Bomber' (see in any Central American air force as early as victories by Major Soto - something of a Chapter 30), last registered and living a shady 1936, when a former airline Curtiss-Wright minor arms race developed after the cease- existence in Costa Rica as TI- I040L. CT-32 Condor had been acquired and con- fire when the Hondurans learned that The Hondurans, unaware of the several incidents that had previously damaged this well-travelled aircraft, were assured via a Honduran middleman that the aircraft (essentially a jury-rigged B-26B, built as a 'C) could easily be converted to offensive capability. Registered initially to the broker in Honduras on the civil register as HR-276, the aircraft was first seen in the FAH compound on jacks, bare metal, with the 'HR-' prefix of its civilian registration scrubbed out in late 1969, the 'civil identity' obviously something of a fiction. The FAH maintenance organization was apparently having quite an interesting time trying to get the bomb bay doors to work, fit under-wing rocket rails adapted from old Corsairs and figure out how to mount guns in the nose. Following completion of most of the modifications that could be locally accomplished, No end of maintenance problems, the Fuerza Aerea Hondurena's single Invader, FAH 510, reposes ingloriously on her tail circa 1970 following one of several landing accidents. Note the odd circular objects under the wing near the nacelles. via C. Planas FAH 510 after gaining a fierce 'shark's mouth' making a low pass at Tegucigalpa in March 1976. via C. Planas

HONDURAS

the aircraft was painted intruder black overall, with complete FAH national insignia - and adorned with a fierce 'shark's mouth.' Paraded at virtually every opportunity alongside FAH Corsairs, crowds were invariably told that the aircraft was a veteran of the 'Soccer War' while in fact the more obvious reason for its public display was to remind Salvadorean agents that the Invader had the implied capability of reaching San Salvador at night. On 16 March 1971, the B-26, now re-seriailed (for unknown reasons) as FAH 510 - a completely out-of-sequence serial for the FAH - experienced a partial main landing gear extension while on a flight to San Pedro Sula, a testament to the never-ending hydraulic problems experienced by this aircraft. Due to the complete lack of crash-rescue equipment at San Pedro Sula, the FAH Duty Officer ordered the crew to return to Toncontin. After finally extending the gear by

117

emergency means, the crew fired off all ammunition aboard on a nearby range and approached for landing. During the final approach to Toncontin, a total electrical failure was experienced and the wing flaps stopped extending at about twenty degrees. The aircraft proceeded to land with a 'safe' gear indication on the instrument panel, but much faster than normal due to the partial flap setting. Immediately upon touchdown, the pilot activated full emergency air brakes and smoke was observed coming from the landing gear. The aircraft drifted off to the right, off the runway, and all three gear members collapsed as it skidded to a stop. US intelligence sources cited the aircraft as a complete write-off as a result of this accident but, miraculously - and to the credit of the FAH maintenance staff - the aircraft was in fact resurrected and flew again, although with rather restricted enthusiasm. Following yet another extended rebuild,

the aircraft was further modified and painted in Vietnam-era camouflage colours, and was noted at an anniversary celebration at Toncontin in 1979 still essentially airworthy but with wooden broom handles simulating guns in the nose! By October 1980, after more than ten years' service with the FAH, the Invader had amassed a rather modest total of not more than 70:20 hours flying time, and was starting to elicit the interest of the emerging US warbird movement - few members of which, if any, had an appreciation for the interesting previous existence of this tired old warrior. Finally, the aircraft was sold to US buyer David Zeuschel of Van Nuys, California and returned home as N2781G shortly after its purchase on 7 December 1982. It is now on display at Lackiand Air Force Base, Texas, in USAF colours, in honourable retirement. 44-35918 has come home at last.

FUERZA AEREA HONDURENA (Honduran Air Force) FAH Serial

Version

Previous identities

510

B-26B

44-35918, N7953C, 'N79580', TI-I040L, HR-276

The nose of the former FAH 510, now N2781G, showing the unusual lights fixed in the nose and the former positions of the gun ports. J. R. Kerr

FAH 510 on the alert ramp in July 1976 during one of many 'emergencies' with neighbouring EI Salvador. At this point, the aircraft was painted in the same overall blue/black as the service's F4U Corsairs. It also carries small calibre rockets under the wings. via C. Planas

FAH 510 in war-paint, and with what appear to be four guns in the nose (they were in fact pieces of wood) and unidentified, gun podlike devices and tubes under the port wing. Date of this photo is not known. via C. Planas

Delivered

Sold

69

7 Dec 82

Remarks

Originally serialled '276'. Became N2781 G. On display at Lackland AFB, Texas, in 1992.

118

FOREIGN INVADERS

Honduras' sole Invader at the FAH's 50th Anniversary celebration at Tegucigalpa in April 1981, when co-author Hagedorn examined the aircraft first-hand. Although clean and well painted, the 'armament' all appeared to be fake! D. Hagedorn

Although not readily apparent from the photo, this shot from Nha Trang in 1972 actually shows three of the five A-26As given to South Vietnam as instructional airframes. W Van Dyke via T. Wickstrom

FOREIGN INVADERS

119

Chapter Twenty One

South Vietnam As early as 1954, Vietnamese markings were intended to be used on the Invaders of a proposed French-controlled mercenary unit in Indochina. And, as related in the chapter on Project Farm Gate, plans existed to supply B-26s to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) in the mid 1950s, to supplement the handful of Bearcats forming its only operational squadron at the time. These plans never came to fruition, although the USAF operated the aircraft themselves in South Vietnam from 1961 to 1964, using Vietnamese national insignia. But in early 1970, more than eight years after the arrival of the first B-26s in South Vietnam, the VNAF finally received some Invaders of their own. By this time the VNAF had grown into an air force worthy of the name, with seven squadrons of strike aircraft, most of them A-37 jets. A few old bombers were not likely to make much difference anymore and, indeed, those received were not even intended as operational aircraft, but as instructional airframes. After the A-26As of the USAF in Thailand had been withdrawn from service in November 1969, they were temporarily stored with the 6200th Air Base Wing at Clark Field. Most of them had been ferried to DavisMonthan in the USA by mid January 1970, but five aircraft were still left in the Philippines, and these were transferred to the VNAF under MAP in late January and early February. Four of the A-26As were apparently flown directly to Nha Trang Air Base and handed over to the TT HL KQ, the Air Force Training Center of the VNAF. The fifth aircraft initially went to Bien Hoa, but joined the others at Nha Trang on 23 May 1970. The crew on this flight were USAF Captain Peter Van Etten (pilot) and Major William Van Dyke (navigator). Although the aircraft officially no longer belonged to the USAF at this time, it should

probably still count as the last recorded combat mission of any USAF Invader. There have been some rumours that these A-26s were subsequently used on missions in support of the Riverine forces in the Mekong Delta, but these are untrue. Once arrived at Nha Trang the A-26s did not fly again, although at least one was kept in flyable condition up to 1972. It is probable that the rumours are the result of some mix-up, and that the aircraft in question were in fact OV-I 0 Broncos of the US Navy's VAL-4 squadron, which operated extensively in the Mekong Delta up to April 1972. It is not quite clear why the VNAF would want any A-26s as instructional airframes. The aircraft are said to have been assigned to the Reciprocating Engine School of the TT HL KQ, but in 1970 the only other aircraft of the VNAF with similar engines (R-2800s) was a South Vietnamese A-26A 64-17652 at Nha Trang in the early 1970s. The small Vietnamese flag on the rudder is clearly visibl~. via G. Kamp

single DC-6B. However, the VNAF did receive large numbers of C-123Ks - also with R-2800 engines - from the spring of 1971, and possibly the A-26s were part of a training package for these new transports. The Invaders remained at Nha Trang until the end of the Vietnam war, and were apparently never given full VNAF insignia. The only change in their markings, compared to when in service with the USAF, was that the 'AF 64' prefix to the tail number was removed and a small Vietnamese flag painted on the rudder. They were seen after the war, with their engines blown off. In all likelihood, this act of deliberate destruction was carried out by VNAF personnel during the last days of March 1975, just before the base fell to the advancing North Vietnamese troops. It is most unlikely that any of them were ever flown by the new Vietnamese People's Air Force, following the unification of the country. The remains of the aircraft were reportedly still left at Nha Trang as late as 1986, in very poor shape.

KHONG-QUAN VlET-NAM (Vietnamese Air Force) VNAF Serial

Version

Previous identities/users Term.USAF

64-17644 64-17645

A-26A A-26A

44-35451, FAC 644 44-35546, FAC 645,

64-17652 64-17654 64-17677

A-26A A-26A A-26A

Mill Pond? 44-34361, Mill Pone!?

41-39491 44-341087 (44-352057)

Lost

Remarks

29 Jan 70-: 30 Jan 70

Mar 75 Mar 75

Blown up at Nha Trang Blown up at Nha Trang

2 Feb 70 7 Feb 70 4 Feb 70

Mar 75 Mar 75 Mar 75

Blown up at Nha Trang Blown up at Nha Trang Blown up at Nha Trang

120

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty Two

Other Potential Users Since the Second World War, there have been erroneous reports of Invaders used by air forces other than those already described. There were also some cases where Invaders were planned to enter service with other countries, but did not quite make it. As early as 1944, Douglas released information that, 'An undisclosed number of this new Douglas whip-fast medium bomber have been sent to the Soviet Union.' In fact, no A-26s were ever delivered to the Soviet Union, nor were any such deliveries even planned. The claims were quite likely just an attempt to bring confusion to the enemy. In April 1949, an application for the export of a civilian B-26B to Mexico was turned down by the US Department of State, who suspected that the Mexican buyer was a front for the Israelis. Whether these suspicions were correct or not is unknown, but it is quite likely that the Invader was one of the aircraft types on the Israeli 'shopping list' at this time. None were ever delivered, however. Unlike most other countries in Latin America, Argentina received only modest numbers of military aircraft from the USA in the postwar period, instead relying mainly on imports from Great Britain and elsewhere. Despite this, Argentina was at one point in the early 1950s scheduled to receive no fewer than 60 B-26s under the RAP aid programme! If these deliveries had been made, the country would likely have been the first B-26 operator in South America - and the third largest user of the Invader in the world - but they were cancelled for unknown reasons. Ecuador was another Latin American country that sought to obtain B-26s in the early 1950s but, as related in the Peruvian

chapter, eventually purchased Canberras decided to buy twelve ex Royal Navy AD-4W from England instead. Skyraiders instead. RB-26C number 44-35654 was assigned to Rumours of B-26s in South African or an MDAP project and terminated from the Rhodesian Air Force service in the 1960s are USAF in February 1954, the destination being without foundation. Two former French Air given as 'YOGOSLAVI.' Alas, the Yugoslavian Force RB-26Ps did operate in South Africa for Air Force never received any Invaders, but a period, but they were civilian survey aircraft the aircraft may possibly have been the one and had no connection with the SAAF. known to have been used briefly by a US Air Several publications have claimed that a Mission to that country. Invader '654 later number of A-26As were handed over to the went to Indochina, entering service vvith the Laotian Air Force. These claims are probably the result of some confusion over the aircraft French Air Force in April 1954. There have been various vague reports of used by the Air Commandos in Thailand, or Invaders used by the Nationalist Chinese Air . the five aircraft going to South Vietnam as Force during the 1950s. A number of B-26s instructional airframes, and there are no indiwere in fact suppJ.ied to Taiwan for use by the cations at all that any Invaders ever operated CIA and it appears that at least some of these in Laotian markings, or by Laotian crews. An American modelling magazine did pubdid carry Taiwanese national insignia. A single B-26C was also used by a CNAF general lish a drawing of a fully armed B-26B in for a period as his personal aircraft. But since Cambodian Air Force markings, allegedly these Invaders had more to do vvith the CIA based on footage included in an Australian than the Taiwanese military, their use is TV programme. The aircraft, which carried the serial number '28' on the fin, was claimed described in Chapter 29. The rumours of B-26s operated by the to have escaped to South Vietnam in 1975. Bolivian Air Force are untrue, and there are However, it is most unlikely that any B-26s not even any indications that any scheme were ever used in Cambodia, either officially ever existed to supply Invaders to the country. or unofficially. The aircraft might conceivably On the other hand, it does seem that Uruguay have been an old wreck from the Project was slated to receive some B-26s in 1955 as Farm Gate operations of 1961-64, spruced up replacements for their ageing B-25s, but for some obscure propaganda purpose, but these plans were short-lived. the most likely explanation is that the whole In 1960, the Royal Swedish Air Board began thing is either a mistake or a hoax. looking for a replacement for its Fairey Firefly The lists in this book include all the InvaTT.l target-tugs. The aircraft were operated ders listed in their USAF record cards as being by a civilian company, Svensk Flygtjanst AB, delivered to other countries under MDAP or but were owned by the Swedish government MAP, with two exceptions. These two airand used in the training of army and navy craft, B-26Bs 44-34596 and -35428 of the 605th gunners. The initial intention was to purchase ACS at Howard, were both struck off by the a number of B-26s, but it was eventually USAF in mid July 1964, with the note 'To MAP.' But in late September of that year they were reinstated, shown as received 'From MAP,' and subsequently ended up at DavisMonthan, where they lingered until 1969. It is not known where they spent the ten weeks they were gone, if indeed they ever left the USAF other than on paper. Possibly there was some connection vvith the re-sparring programme then under way at Albrook AFB,. also in the Panama Canal Zone.

One of the six RB-26Cs to survive the war in Indochina, 44-35654 awaits disposal at Clark Field, circa 1956. USAF records show it as going to Yugoslavia in 1954! M.Olmsted

Part Two

US COVERT OPERATIONS

In addition to its regular military service with numerous air forces, the Douglas Invader was also used in a multitude of clandestine and covert operations. The operations covered in this part of the book fall within one of the following three categories: CIA operations Covert USAF operations Private enterprises Regarding the USAF operations, it has been necessary to limit the coverage to those

instances where the aircraft did not carry US national insignia, and in effect posed as foreign or 'unidentified' aircraft. There were several other more or less covert USAF operations involving Invaders, such as the RB-26 reconnaissance missions against targets in East Germany, but these were all flown by regular USAF aircraft. The chapters are basically in chronological order, after the date of introduction of the Invader into the respective operation. The layout of each chapter is basically the same as for those in Part One. In the case of private enterprises, only those involving a paramilitary use of Invaders

are included. The 8-26' has also been employed in a variety of smuggling-for-profit efforts, which usually had little to do with covert operations. For obvious reasons, information on clandestine and covert operations is usually less accessible than information on regular military use. It has been possible to cover some of them in detail, while others have been described in little more than outline form, simply because nothing more is known about them at present. For the same reason, the aircraft tables are somewhat varied in quality.

A second view of the same aircraft, escorting a Ranch Hand defoliant flight over South Vietnam in 1963. DoD ref. 99297 USAF

FOREIGN INVADERS

122

Chapter Twenty Three

Operation Haik: Indonesia 1958 CIA's operation in Indonesia in 1958 was the first one in which Invaders were used in an offensive role. It was in fact only the second CIA operation ever to make use of strike aircraft: the previous one, code-named Success and using F-47s, having taken place in Guatemala in 1954. Although the Indonesian operation was blown while still in progress, the CIA has never officially admitted that it took place. Even today, some thirty-five years later, personnel who were involved are usually most reluctant to give any details. The information available is, therefore, somewhat sketchy. The background to the CIA involvement was the usual cold war story: it was felt that President Sukarno's Indonesia was turning communist, and something had to be done about it. These fears have since been shown as somewhat exaggerated, but were taken seriously enough at the time. As was normally the case, the CIA chose to use existing opposition groups as a front for their activities. And there was certainly no shortage of opposition to Sukarno's government during the mid and late 1950s. From the day Indonesia gained independence, various groups around the country had been constantly fighting the authority of the central government on Java. There was a growing dissatisfaction in some parts of the armed forces, for several reasons. A major one was

the drastic cuts in the armed forces' budget, and another one was the government's unspoken policy of promoting the interests of Java over those of the other islands. Many also felt that the government did not take enough action against the rebels, and was too soft on the communists. By 1956, the military commanders in some of the remoter areas, notably on Sumatra and Sulawesi (the former Celebes), had turned themselves into virtual warlords. They supplemented their government appropriations by income from direct export of local produce. In some cases the amounts diverted from the govemment were very substantial, and it was estimated that a third of Indonesia's rubber production was smuggled out of the country. In late December 1956, two Army Colonels announced that they had taken over the administration of Central and Northern Sumatra. The situation quickly deteriorated further, and in March 1957 a state of emergency was declared, but little or no military action was taken. Soon afterwards the rebels contacted US officials with requests for assistance. The matter was referred to Washington, where it was put on ice for the time being. Most of the year was spent in negotiations between the rebels and the government, with limited result. In December, President Sukarno began a policy of sanc-

tions against the Dutch remammg in Indonesia, with the intention of forcing them to leave. This split the country even more and the communists were quick to take advantage, openly siding with Sukarno. Although the rebellion on Sumatra was the largest one, there was also a similar movement in northern Sulawesi, known as PERMESTA. The grievances of the Sulawesi rebels were similar to those on Sumatra. Other groups were also in existence, such as the fundamentalist Darullslam organization. 0l! 10 February, the rebel leader in Central Sumatra issued an ultimatum to the government in Djakarta to resign. Five days later they formed a Revolutionary Government, the PRRI, with Padang on Sumatra as its capital. The PERMESTA group joined the PRRI on 17 February. The CIA had spent considerable time planning for an intervention in Indonesia, and some camps had been set up in the Philippines for the training of rebel cadres. One of the first Invaders used by the CIA in Indonesia is having its engines run up at Clark Field, the Philippines, on 20 March 1958. Note the total lack of any markings. This particular aircraft - 44-34376, late of 6th Tow Squadron at Johnson Field - survived to see service with Project Farm Gate a few years later. L. Hellstrom collection

OPERATION HAIK: INDONESIA 1958

Representative of the second group of B-26Bs despatched to the rebels, this aircraft seen in May 1958 has an eight-gun nose and a largely natural metal colour scheme. Pencil-type drop tanks were used on all CIA Invaders in Indonesia. There is a possibility that this is the B-26 in which Allen Pope was shot down. L. Hellstrom collection

The operation had reportedly been given the code-name Haik. Military supplies were also shipped to the PRRI and the PERMESTA, but no Americans had as yet been directly involved in Indonesia itself. It was now decided to prepare some air support to the rebels. In late February 1958, two TB-26Bs and one B-26C were taken out of the 'boneyard' at Clark Field in· the Philippines and prepared for combat. These aircraft were part of a batch of 73 Invaders which Were struck off charge by the USAF at Clark as 'obsolete' between September and November 1957. Many had been in storage since returned by the French in Indochina, while others were former reconnaissance aircraft, target tugs and hacks retired from bases in Japan and elsewhere. The three Invaders were fitted with six-gun noses and six wing guns, and were painted overall black without any markings. For the time being, they remained in readiness at Clark. During March, three F-5ID Mustangs were received from the Philippine Air Force and stripped of their markings. These, too, were kept at Clark Field. Meanwhile, the CIA had begun to assemble the air crews needed for the operation. The original idea was to recruit Indonesians, but it proved difficult to find pilots with enough experience. The few that participated in the operation therefore served mainly as copilots or radio operators. Instead, a small number of US pilots - probably less than half a dozen - were assigned to the operation. Most if not all were former Civil Air Transport pilots, who had flown B-26 missions out of

123

The first mission was flown on the morning Taiwan. The only ones positively identified to date are Allen Pope and Jerry Barnes, who of 13 April, when a single B-26 attacked the was killed in an aircraft crash in Laos some airport at Makassar on southern Sulawesi, shooting up the runway with machine guns. years later. To supplement the Americans, some Several further attacks were made against Eastern European exiles were also brought other government airfields and installations in. They belonged to a group that was training on Sulawesi over the next few weeks. At in Wiesbaden, West Germany, on the RB-69: seven in the morning on 17 April, one aircraft a CIA-developed, low-level reconnaissance attacked Balikpapan on the east coast of version of the Lockheed Neptune. Their Borneo, sinking an oil tanker, bombing oil RB-69 training was carried out by D Flight, storage tanks and badly damaging a C-47 of 7405th Combat Support Squadron, USAF. Royal Dutch/Shell. Five days later, the three This squadron had intelligence gathering as government airfields in the Halmahera its main mission. The BFlight of the same unit Islands came under attack, and on the same was at the time flying RB-26s on photo recon- day the town ofTernate, capital of the Central naissance missions along \he air corridors Moluccas, was also hit. The results of these and other similar into Berlin, and the new recruits could there. fore be checked out in the Invader on the attacks did a lot to bolster the morale of the spot. Most of the pilots were Poles who had . rebels, even if the actual damage inflicted flown with the RAF in the Second World War, was not too serious. Most if not all strikes but there were also some Hungarians. A were directed at targets on Sulawesi and surcouple of them had previously flown B-26s rounding islands. No attacks against Sumatra and C-47s for the CIA in Greece. Once their were reported. According to government transition was completed, they were put on a reports, one B-26 was shot down or crashed during one of the early attacks on a governDC-6 and flown to Clark Field. On 21 March, President Sukarno ordered ment airfield, but this claim is almost AURI, the Indonesian Air Force, to attack the certainly incorrect. Meanwhile, Sukamo's government had rebel radio stations in the towns of Padang and Bukittinggi on Sumatra. The strikes were launched an offensive against the rebels on carried out by B-25s escorted by Mustangs Sumatra. On 18 April a paratroop drop was and achieved their objective without causing made at Pakanbura, followed by an amphibiany casualties. Soon afterwards, targets in ous landing near the rebel capital of Padang. The operation was successful and the rebel Sulawesi were also attacked. These attacks prompted the CIA to deploy leaders withdrew, some of them fleeing to their own aircraft and the first three B-26s Sulawesi which became the scene of the departed from Clark Field for Sulawesi on 12 heaviest fighting during the rebellion. Back at Clark Field, four more Invaders April. The rebels used several different bases, but the main ones were at Manado, including two RB-26Cs and a WB-26C - were Mapengat, Morotai and Tasuka. Apart from removed from storage on 13 April. The airthe Invaders, the rebel air force - known as craft of this batch were fitted with eight-gun the Angkatan Udara Revolusioner, or noses and stripped to a natural metal finish Revolutionary Air Force - also acqUired and with black engine nacelles. No wing guns operated a number of transport aircraft ofvar- were fitted. While the B-26s were still being ious types, and one report claims that a prepared for action, two of the F-51s captured AURI B-25 Mitchell was also taken departed Clark on 20 April, followed by the third one about ten days later. on strength.

124

The rebel setbacks on Sumatra prompted USA to consider more direct action against Sukarno's forces. On 21 April, the British Air Staff in Singapore were approached by a US Navy liaison officer, who requested permission for US aircraft to use the RAF base at Changi. The first proposal involved staging twenty-two P2V Neptunes and C-119s through Singapore, thirteen of which would not return. An alternative suggestion was for twelve Neptunes to be based at Changi for sustained operations, flying six sorties per day. The scheme was never put into effect, however. The AUREV had so far met with little resistance from the AURI, whose operational strength in early 1958 stood at fourteen B-25s and thirteen F-51 s, with further aircraft of these types in storage or used on second-line duties. These figures were quite irrelevant, however, since only five qualified crews were available for the Mitchells and at the most ten pilots for the Mustangs, of which only three had training in air-to-air combat. Even so, in emergencies the AURI could generate about half a dozen strike sorties a day for several weeks. On 16 May the AUREV base at Manado was raided by three B-25s and two F-51s and the government claimed that three rebel Mustangs and one Catalina were destroyed. The claims were quite possibly correct, since three more ex-Philippine Air Force F-510s were delivered to Clark Field the following day and quickly had their markings removed. The CIA reacted to the attack on Manado by flying out two additional B-26s to the rebels on 17 May, and a third aircraft on 18 May. These were all from the batch pulled from storage in mid April. In the meantime, a further six B-26Cs had been taken from storage on 12 May. Four of them were fitted with gun noses, while the last two kept their plexiglass noses. On 18 May, an AUREV B-26 flown by Allen Pope was shot down during an attack near Ambon in the southern Moluccas. Air Vice Marshal Ismail of the AURI, at the time the officer in charge of the air operations against the PERMESTA, gives the following account of the events:

FOREIGN INVADERS

'Pope was sneaking in to attack the convoy A view of the Clark Field storage area in May of ships on its way to make the assault on 1958, showing mainly former French aircraft. Morotai. He had just left Ambon after a brief The two ex-M Invaders in the middle attack on the harbour. He was smart enough foreground - 44-34505 and '575 - have both donated their eight-gun noses to Operation to make use of the terrain by flying on the Haik Invaders and have had them replaced by deck, with the intention of not being easily RB-26C noses; the mis-match in paint scheme detected. However, he made one fatal mis- is clearly visible. The flanking aircraft are both take. Most people aboard a ship leaving 'genuine' RB-26Cs. L. Hellstrom collection harbour usually keep on looking towards land, until they cannot identify any details anymore. August of 1958, the USA had begun regular 'So, Pope was duly sighted and flew supplies of weapons to the Indonesian govstraight into the barrage thrown by the ships' ernment. Pope was sentenced to death by a guns and all the troops' fire arms. His aircraft military court, but was eventually released in got crippled and he could not outmanoeuvre 1962. the oncoming Captain Ignatius Dewanto in After the cessation of ALJREV's activities, his F-51 [number F-338], who gave Pope, or the Indonesian government claimed to have rather his B-26, the coup de grace. Both Pope destroyed a total of three B-26s, five F-51 s, and his wireless operator J. Rantung bailed one C-47, one Catalina and one unspecified out. That was north of Ambon. In the landing Lockheed aircraft. These claims were clearly Pope broke his leg. Both were picked up and exaggerated, particularly as only a total of taken by the convoy to make the assault on three Mustangs were delivered to the AUREV, Morotai. After the assault mission Pope was the other three remaining at Clark until brought back to Ambon and I flew him in a returned to the Philippine Air Force on 2 July C-47 to Jakarta, to hand him over to the 1958. authorities.' The five Invaders kept in reserve at Clark Pope has frequently been said to have Field had their guns removed and their US bombed a church or a marketplace during markings restored between 9 and 13 June, his attack on Ambon, causing heavy civilian and at least four of them departed for Japan in casualties, but this appears to have been no early July 1958. It seems likely that they then more than a propaganda statement by the continued to Taiwan, for storage with Air Indonesian government. Asia. Several of these aircraft turned up on the Operation Haik ground to a virtual halt after Panamanian civil register in 1961 and three of Pope was shot down, and the capture of them eventually returned to USAF charge Morotai on 21 May. The Indonesian Navy with Project Farm Gate in South Vietnam in reported one B-26 as shot down on this date, 1963. but this claim probably referred to the downThe fate of the B-26s delivered to the ing on 18 May. Afinal reinforcement was sent AUREV remains somewhat obscure. on 26 May, however, when the two Although Pope's aircraft was likely the only B-26Cs were flown out of Clark. But these had one shot down, at least one more Invader only been prepared for a one-time flight and was damaged on the ground and subsewere intended solely as a source of spare quently captured by Indonesian ground parts for the previously delivered Invaders. troops. One aircraft 'found' on Clark Field in Tl)e capture of Pope caused considerable 1961 (see Chapter 26 Farm Gate) was almost embarrassment to the US government, certainly a former AUREV Invader, which which had so far denied any involvement in indicates that some may have been evacuthe rebellion. When the Indonesians pre- ated after the operation was terminated. But sented documents to prove that Pope was a at least a few more were probably left behind former USAF and CAT pilot, the Americans in Indonesia and in all likelihood destroyed hurriedly lifted their embargo on Indonesia on the ground by the CIA personnel when and the CIA operation was dismantled. By they withdrew.

/

OPERATION HA/K: INDONESIA 1958

125

The two B-26Cs delivered to the AUREV as spare part sources had a unique colour scheme: the upper surfaces were largely sprayed black, while the lower parts were given an uneven coat of green over a natural metal base. As before, no markings were carried. L. Hellstrom collection

A rebel B-26B captured at Mapengat, Sulawesi, by government forces after the end of the fighting. The damage was probably sustained in a landing accident. via TN/-AU Museum

This wing section, reportedly from an AUREV B-26, clearly shows the 'PERMESTA' titles carried by at least some of the CIA aircraft. via TN/-AU Museum

OPERATION HAIK Serial

Version

'Previous identity/users

(none?) (none?) (none?) (none?)

B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B

44-34268 44-34376 44-34690 44-35221

(none?)

B-26B

44-35441

(none?) (none?)

B-26B B-26C

? 44-34643

(none?)

B-26C

44-35968

(none?)

B-26B

44-35242

(none?)

B-26B

44-34346

(none?)

B-26B

(none?)

B-26B

44-34539, Mlndochina 44-34620

(none?)

B-26B

44-34682

Delivered Departed/Lost 12 Apr 58 12Apr58 12 Apr 58 17 May 58?*

Remarks

c.lun 58 c.Jun 58 c.Jun 58 18 May 58?

Fate unknown. To HP-323. To Project Farm Gate in 1963. Fate unknown Possibly the aircraft in which Allen Pope was shot down. 17 May 58?* May 58? Possibly the aircraft damaged and abandoned at Mapengat. 18 May 58?* c.Jun 58 Fate unknown. 26 May 58 c.Jun 58 Delivered as spare parts source only. Most likely abandoned in Indonesia. 26 May 58 c.Jun 58 Delivered as spare parts source only. Most likely abandoned in Indonesia. (Not taken up?)* Kept in reserve at Clark Field? To HP-318 and HP-322. (Not taken up) Kept in reserve at Clark Field. Fate unknown. (Not taken up) Kept in reserve at Clark Field. To Project Farm Gate in 1963. (Not taken up) Kept in reserve at Clark Field. To HP-318-P. To Project Farm Gate in 1963. (Not taken up) Kept in reserve at Clark Field. To HP-319? To Project Farm Gate in 1963. ,.'

* Only three of the four aircraft in this group are positively identified, and it is unclear which one was kept in reserve and which of the others were delivered on which date. In addition to the five reserve aircraft mentioned above, TB-26B serial 44-34391 was also recovered from storage, and stripped for spares.

126

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty Four

Operation Pluto: The Bay of Pigs 1961 The events surrounding Operation Pluto, the locate and negotiate for training and opera- which, among other things, recruited Cuban failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba by CIA- tional bases in at least two foreign countries aircrews for the operation and 'Zenith backed and trained Cuban expeditionaries, and (d) train this diverse group to actually Technical Enterprises, Inc.' which performed reads like a Hollywood movie script. carry out a very difficult exercise. This was specialized support functions. Ironically, the B-26 Invader played a pivotal truly an achievement, considering the Initially, the Cuban crews were quespart in the drama that is seldom appreciated diverse factions involved, although not with- tioned, during the course of being rec;ruited, by historians of the event. out even more expeditious parallel within the about the types of aircraft they had been Much has been written about the Brigada operational history of the CIA. checked out in. While it had originally been 2506 forces in the intervening years, and no To be sure, the CIA had a lot of previous planned to support the invasion force with attempt will be made here to address the experience, and was not without resources. Vought F4U Corsairs or North American overall preparations, concept or execution of But it should be noted that the decision to uti- F-5 ID Mustangs, it quickly became apparent the operation: it has been thoroughly, per- lize the B-26 as the primary mount for that the available pilots had very little familhaps exhaustively, documented. Indeed, one . supporting the invasion force had to have iarity with single-engined, high-performance of the most readable first hand accounts of occurred very early in the concept stage. ,fighters of any type, let alone these fairly comthe operation is Captain Edward B. Ferrer's As noted in Chapter 14 which details Guat- plex and sophisticated types. Some did, excellent Operation Puma: The Air Battle of emalan use of the.Invader, the CIA managed however, have twin-engined and, more the Bay of Pigs, which is highly recom- to orchestrate the MAS sale of eight B-26s to importantly, B-26 experience. mended as additional reading associated that country under MDAP so as to have them The selection of Guatemala and Nicaragua with this subject. iwcountry in time to be almost immediately as the launch sites further gravitated in favour One of the most glaring aspects of the pressed into service as trainers for the Cuban of a twin-engined, dedicated attack aircraft entire episode is the relatively brief time span exile crews. Indeed, the selection of sub-vari- one capable of making the long (more than in which it all occurred. Reflect, for a ants of the TB-26, far in excess of what would 1,400 mile round trip) flight between moment, that Castro gained power, essen- normally be expected for the FAG's own Nicaragua and Cuba which, allowing for tially, from January 1959. By 7 September needs, suggests the CIA as the guiding hand about a one hour loiter time over the targets, 1960, a scant nineteen months later, the CIA throughout this entire acquisition. made for a seven hour average mission time. had concluded the direction of his revolution, Never at a loss for almost tongue-in-cheek Much has been made of the shortcomings resolved that any 'corrective' action would subterfuge, the CIA created a number of of, the 'aged and obsolete' B-26 mounts need to be undertaken post-haste and, in 'front' organizations to expedite the aviation selected for use. In fact, given the circumfact, had set the complex wheels in motion related portions of the overall operation. stances of the plan, and the objectives hoped during this period to (a) recruit a Cuban exile These included Southern Air Transport, to be achieved, the CIA and Cuban exiles force to man the undertaking, (b) organize which carried out prodigious feats of aerial would have been hard pressed indeed to the resources, which were considerable, (c) logistics, the 'Double-Check Corporation' have found a more ideally suited aircraft type. Further, the aircraft delivered to 'Rayo Base' (Retalhuleu, Guatemala) and 'Happy Valley' (Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua) were the very best of a lot of Invaders sitting in open storage at Tucson and Davis-Monthan AFB. These aircraft, at least twenty having been tentatively identified by the authors (a number at variance with the rather wild totals frequently cited, no two of which ever seem to agree: these range from a low-side total of sixteen to a high of forty-eight!) were, for the most part, ostensibly 'purchased' as surplus for unspecified work by the CIA front Intermountain Aviation on behalf of the recorded

Unique photo providing confirmation of the use of 'nose art' on some of the Liberation Air Force Invaders prior to the commencement of the actual attack on Cuba. Vl-RA-TE was the aircraft of Captain Raul Vianello, and the name was a contraction of his family members' first names. Happy Valley, April 1961. via G, Ponzoa

OPERAT[ON PLUTO: THE BAY OF PIGS 1961

127

end-user, CARAMAR - the Caribbean Marine Viern.. 28 d. Abril de 1961' AVANCE Aero Corp. The aircraft were definitely not drawn from the strength of the 117th Reconnaissance Wing of the Alabama Air National Guard, as has been frequently cited, although some instructing personnel did come from that unit. The actual expectations for the Invaders were, but for the fatal direct orders of President Kennedy to limit the initial air strikes against Castro's air forces, achieved. These included a number of very successful, pre-invasion overflights of Cuba of up to eight-and-a-half hours' duration, flown from Rayo Base to drop leaflets and probe Cuban defences. Frequently, a B-26 would be sent in to fly a particular flight path, and US listening stations in Florida and up the Eastern seaboard of the US would note reactions and changes in signals traffic, etc. their date with history. Diversion was an important, though less 'FAR 933,' the Liberation Air Force B-26B that The decision to restrict this initial, critical successful secondary goal. The legendary made the deception campaign landing at embarrassment of US Ambassador to the UN Miami at the very beginning of the assault on strike force to only eight aircraft - instead of Adlai Stevenson, who displayed the now- Cuba in April 1961. The CIA planners had done launching sixteen or seventeen, as had been a reasonably good job of replicating known originally planned - almost certainly, in retrofamous photo of a B-26B in full 'FAR' insignia, FAR B-26 markings - except that most spect, doomed the entire operation. serialled 933, almost worked. The aircraft, surviving genuine FAR aircraft were glassWhile some accounts of the aerial portion doctored with bullet holes and landing at nosed B-26Cs! 'Auance' of the operation have emerged (including the Miami with the starboard engine feathered at previously cited Operation Puma), in the 08:21 on 15 April 1961 was, according to pilot Mario Zuniga, freshly arrived from Cuba, the FAG of the 'borrowed' aircraft, the total course of a number of interviews for this pilot having decided to defect and, at the remaining offensive force at Happy Valley book with other B-26 pilots who actually took same time, take the opportunity to strafe and totalled some seventeen aircraft - most of part in the operation, different viewpoints bomb some of Castro's air force before head- themB-26Cs converted to 'hard-nose' eight- have emerged that bear documenting in gun B-26B configuration, although there are these pages. ingnorth. One of the very first missions flown was This cover story actually held up better than some indications that one or two aircraft crewed by Captain Gustavo Ponzoa and C. most accounts report. Despite Castro's vehe- were glazed-nosed B-26Cs. The exile crews, prior to "the actual com- Pujol in 'FAR 931', accompanied by Captain ment protests to the contrary, few, if any, qualified observers, before or since, have mencement of the operation, had decorated Gonzalo Herrera and A. Lopez in 'FAR 933'. [n taken note of the fact that the aircraft that . some of their otherwise featureless aircraft his own words, Gustavo Ponzoa relates how, arrived at Miami was an eight-gun-nosed with a variety of nicknames and 'nose art.' .as he prepared to launch on the very first misB-26B, minus turrets. While it had semi- These included at least one ferocious shark's sion, 'Everything was pitch dark as I walked authentic, FAR-style national insignia and mouth on Captain Rene 'Baldy' Garcia's air- towards my B-26 standing aloof and proud a markings, it was otherwise natural-metal craft, while Captain Raul Vianello's B-26B few yards away from my wingman's aircraft,' overall- while the real FAR Invaders were vir- carried the name Vl-RA- TE: a combination of at around 07:15 Zulu time on the morning of tually all glazed-nosed B-26Cs, with turrets, his wife's, son's and daughter's names ('Vl' 15 April 1961 , at Puerto Cabezas. He continues: 'In a few minutes Iwill be airand bearing (for the most part) Cuban olive- for Vilma, his wife, 'RA' for Raul, his son and borne, flying towards Santiago de Cuba's drab camouflage, light grey or (in at least one 'TE' for Teresa, his daughter). These morale-building markings were, airfield ... my target. While going through the case) intruder black colours! According to a CIA officer involved in the however, completely removed prior to com- checklist in my cockpit, my mind was a whirl operation, the reason for the CIA using mencement of actual operations, and were of details carefully planned in the past two B-26Bs rather than B-26Cs was that they were replaced on most of the tactical aircraft by full days. Everything has been included, from the unsure what version the Cubans actually had FAR markings including actual known FAR first pass to the last, the amount of ammuniin service. The CIA did arrange for an agent in serial numbers: eleven different serials have tion that will be used, what position each Cuba to photograph the FAR Invaders, but been identified from photos and log books. aircraft will keep during the attack runs and because of sun reflexes off the noses of the However, several of these had to be used how we will protect each other over the taraircraft, the version could not be established more than once, since the exile B-26 fleet out- get.' numbered the FAR's by at least eleven The range for this mission was not less than from these photos. 1,400 miles, the in-bound flight being flown at Mario Zuniga was subsequently flown out operational aircraft. Flying with F-84' underwing drop tanks, 8,000 feet at 2,000 rpm and 33 inches of manito Guatemala and on to Happy Valley. His 'battle damaged' B-26B was subsequently enabling them to carry as much as 1,590 gal- fold pressure, giving a cruise of 200 mph for a flown to Eglin AFB by a USAF pilot and later lons of fuel (although on actual armed gross weight of 38,000 pounds. 'We keep a went to Davis-Monthan for storage, but its missions they seldom carried this capacity), tight formation for two hours, with only our the initial strike force, detailed to 'fake out' blue formation lights on. At dawn, with the eventual fate is not known. Meanwhile, having thus reduced the effec- Castro's air force at Havana (Campo first rays of sunlight we catch our first glimpse tives by one B-26B, and with at least two Columbia; renamed Campo Libertad), San of the mountains of Santiago de Cuba sloping others having been badly damaged in train- Antonio de los Banos and Santiago de Cuba, down along the south coastline. After passing ing at Rayo Base following the return to the took off in the morning of 15 April 1961, for Montego Bay (Jamaica) NW check point, we

Llegada a Miami del B-26 que bombard

(

128

Empennage of 'FAR 933' at Miami with a US Customs sedan in close attendance. The proportions of the Cuban national insignia under Castro weren't quite right, however. 'Avance'

let down to 50 feet above sea level at approximately 70 miles southwest of Santiago de Cuba, in order to avoid being tracked by the enemy radar. By now it is broad daylight. 'About 15 minutes before reaching the target, I distinguish a small white ship of about 70 feet length on the left, the ship in my opinion an enemy navy coastguard. I immediately realize we have been spotted. I start a slow, 60 degree left turn until I reach a 360 degree North heading. The ship, always aiming at us, follows our movements interchanging light signals with the airport control tower. The flight to this point has been carried out in complete radio silence, this will keep on until opening fire. 'Now, at 10 or 20 feet above sea level, my wingman follows me in a wide, open turn, seeking a favorable position for our first bombing run. Here we go!' After selecting full rich mixture, 2,400 RPM and 42 in. of manifold pressure, and activating the gun, bomb and rocket switches, the two aircraft swept up over the coastal reef and pulled up sharply to reach attack position. 'My wingman reaches a position 1,500 feet at my left in order to strafe the multiple AAA emplacements. In the meantime, I start my bomb run from 3,000 feet on a 240 degree heading in order to place two 500 pound demolition bombs on the ramp where there are underground fuel tanks. I pull out in a sharp tum to the left, diving towards the sea to build up speed and protect our aircraft from the enemy guns. Half a mile from the target, I climb to reach the position for my next run.'

FOREIGN INVADERS

At this point, FAR 933, Captain Herrera's aircraft, started a bomb run with ten 250 pound fragmentation bombs while Captain Ponzoa dived in to give him cover. Ponzoa launched two HVAR rockets and unleashed his forward guns at a multiple AAA emplacement. Again they pulled up in a steep left tum and dived towards the sea. By now fully alerted, the return AAA fire was very heavy, and flak was bursting all around the two aircraft and the ocean surface was frothing with geysers from the barrage. The crews of the two aircraft stuck close to the surface while positioning for their third sweep. 'The view on the way back although terrifying is excellent. My first bomb hit approximatelywhere planned. An immense fountain of smoke and flame belches forward and fragments are hurtling in different directions. The second bomb, as far as I can determine, did not explode. One Cubana Airlines C-47 ICU-T172) is burning as well as a Navy PBY and several light aircraft.' The bombs from Captain Herrera's B-26, in tum, had hit the target area perfectly and had exploded about 250 feet apart. Dismayed by the dud second 500 pounder, Captain Ponzoa started his third run and selected six 250 pound fragmentation bombs for attention to the military aircraft parking area where a few genuine FAR B-26 Invaders remained in plain view. Herrera, meanwhile, was strafing the parked aircraft with his guns in a long run, also hitting some of the adjacent ground installations. By now, with the impact of the attack finally hitting home, Captain Ponzoa admitted that, 'This is my first experience in combat and I must say it is appaling. The sky is hell itself. Millions of red dots and lines of fire seem to pursue you from out of space. The violent cracking sound of the anti-aircraft shells is like thunder and you can notice the difference between 20 or 37 millimetres and the .5 cal. machine gun fire. Writing this now, everything seems to be happening in an almost peaceful pattern, but believe me, one is flying like crazy, diving, rolling, sometimes almost upside down.'

Incredibly, the pair ofB-26s started in for yet a fourth pass from the south, diving down from about 2,000 feet to right at sea level, Ponzoa aiming at a still intact, all-black FAR B-26, which moments later burst into flames after a concentrated burst from his nose guns and two rockets. 'I realize that the first rocket is going to be a bit short. I correct my aim and raise the nose a little, launching another rocket, knowing that this one is perfect. On a left steep bank roll I see it explode inside, tearing the bomber to bits ... Istill have three rockets left.' He pulled up for his next attack but, in so doing, saw Herrera's aircraft southwest ofthe airfield at about 3,000 feet. Ponzoa told him to remain at that altitude, which they believed was out of range of the AAA, as Herrera informed him that he had been hit several times. Captain Ponzoa next attacked the control tower itself, from the southeast, and what was left of the radio shack, which was already burning briskly. He had, in fact, been hit also, as a noticeable vibration had set up in the control column, although all instruments looked normal. He had by then exhausted all gun ammunition, rockets and bombs. Incredibly, they had been over the target for twenty-three minutes! The two aircraft left the Santiago de Cuba airfield a shambles, and claimed to have destroyed every FAR aircraft (as well as some unfortunate civil aircraft) on the field. Four large fires were seen as they turned away, including the vital fuel tank storage area. On the return flight, they flew right 'on the deck' for over an hour, later climbing to 7,000 feet. During the return flight, they inspected each other's aircraft, during which Captain Ponzoa noted several large holes in the bottom of Herrera's B-26, while his nose gear door was hanging half open. He had to

Another view of the empennage of 'FAR 933' showing the strange 'splinter' shading on the engine nacelle and the 'FAR' lettering under the port wing. 'Avance' via Cpt G. Farinas

\

OPERATION PLUTO: THE BAY OF PIGS 1961

reduce speed to stay with 'FAR 933'. The pair landed safely at Happy Valley at 14:40 Zulu, but only after Captain Herrera had blown down his undercarriage with the emergency gear. While 'FAR 931' and '933' had been beating up Santiago de Cuba, other B-26s had hit Libertad airfield and San Antonio de los Banos. Two of these had sustained ground fire of such severity that they were forced to land 'at different emergency alternate airfields' (one at Key West, Florida and the other probably on Grand Cayman Island), while one aircraft, piloted by Captain Daniel Femandez-Mon, was shot down off the north coast of Havana after having attacked Libertad airfield. Meanwhile, the actual support for the landing forces was being organized, and the element of surprise was no longer on the menu. Captain Matias Farias was the pilot of one of two B-26s of Chico Flight, which launched from Happy Valley at 03:45 hours on 17 April. His navigator was Eddie Gonzalez, and they flew B-26B 'FAR 935'. 'It was 06:45 and we were coming in from the south as the previous Liberation crews on station were leaving,' Captain Farias recalls. 'When we arrived, Castro's planes had already sunk one of the ships, and soon after arriving, I saw an FAR Sea Fury come in and launch rockets at the Rio Escondido that was outside the bay. The ship started to go up in flames almost immediately, and crewmen headed for the lifeboats. Another Sea Fury arrived and came in strafing the crew and the burning ship; it was a mess - bad! 'We headed for one of the Sea Furies and attempted to engage him. We got a shot off at him when we were turning in towards each other; when he was close enough, I fired. Then the other Sea Fury appeared on my right and another came up on my left but, fortunately, they didn't shoot at me, as they apparently could not decide if I was genuine FAR or not. The FAR markings paid off, as. they began trying to raise me on the radio: "Hey, 935 ... "! 'One of the Furies, which I believe was flown by Major Enrique Carrera-Rolas, turned away from the scene and headed north, and we attempted to pursue him. Of course, he was faster, and about three kilometres in front of us. He then gained altitude and turned in the direction ofVeradero, I assume to land there. When he drew abreast of Matanzas, Iput on more power and started to close on him. He apparently was completely unaware that we were on his back; he was flying straight and level and we were below and behind him. I closed to about 300 metres, maybe 400, and opened fire. I could see the tracers hitting the cowling, because some of them were bouncing off to the right, so Iknew I must be hitting his engine. He put on power and pulled away from us, still flying straight ahead.

'Suddenly, he put down his gear and went into a landing approach to Veradero. I said aloud, "Now I've got you!" and started to close on him. But when Iwas coming up parallel to the field, I saw anti-aircraft guns firing all over the place. He must have radioed the tower and told them he had an enemy aircraft on his tail. I thought, "Oh well, he's finished for today anyway" and turned away. 'We flew back to the Playa Giron area. It was around seven o'clock by now and our accompanying B-26 had departed the area, although he certainly should have been able to stay on station considerably longer. We stayed over the beach until 10:35, when we were shot down. In the meantime, we had supported the landing at Playa Larga and strafed the highway from Cienfuegos, when the first Communist troops were coming down. We also gave support near Soplillar and Yaguaramas, where our paratroops had jumped and where Castro's troops were already closing in on them. We tried our best to be everywhere, provide air support on our own. We weren't sure when our relief was due, and the Commander on the ground asked us not to leave. 'Throughout all of this, we also saw a real FAR B-26 several times, FAR 903, which was later shot down in the Bay. During one of these encounters, we exchanged fire briefly. 'By nine o'clock, I realized I did not have enough fuel to recover to Happy Valley but figured I could still make Grand Cayman or Jamaica, if need be - or even Miami. The problem, of course, was that in.order to reach Miami, we would have to cross the whole island, and we were already aware of the anti-aircraft defenses at Matanzas! In order to avoid the T-33s, we would have to fly very low and, if we had stumbled across just one of those AA batteries, we would be finished! I considered flying an easterly course, crossing the island away from where we knew the heavy AA concentrations to be, but we didn't know what to expect there. By this time, they were shooting at anything flying so I talked to my navigator and, in the end, we elected to land right there. We commanded a small airfield near the beach, and believed we could get fuel there. 'At almost the precise moment we had taken this decision, another Sea Fury showed up on the scene - it would have been about ten o'clock. He came in and made a pass at us, then for some reason he left and never came back to finish us, so we thought maybe he was too low on fuel to continue the action. He flew off to the north and disappeared, so we dismissed him. 'Then, suddenly, I started to smell smoke. Flames were coming out of the circuit breakers, and Itried to put them out with my glove. I yelled at Eddie, "What the Hell is happening?" but he did nQt know either. The controls seemed OK, as did the engines. To this day I don't know the source of that fire; we had

129

Customs and INS agents off-loading the ammunition from 'FAR 933' at Miami following its seizure. The fate of this aircraft is not known with certainty. via Cpt G. Farinas

been over the scene of action almost four hours: maybe we had been hit by AA, by one of the Sea Furies or even the B-26 - we didn't know, and hadn't felt a thing up to that moment. 'While I was shouting back and forth with Eddie, flying the plane and attempting to beat Ol1t the flames, I suddenly saw a T-33 [since known to have been flown by Lieutenant Alberto Fernandez] climb away after making a firing pass on us. Eddie had been hit in the head and was clearly gone - it happened that quick. While I was trying to keep the T-33 in sight, the starboard engine began to sputter and packed up within ten seconds. Peering out at it, I could see it had a hole the size of my fist on top with oil and thick smoke streaming out. I don't know what he hit: maybe one of the oil hoses. The instruments showed that it was dead, so I feathered it - just as flames and smoke erupted from one of the instruments on the panel. 'I swung around and headed for the singlestrip runway. However, while I was staggering along parallel to it, some high palm trees loomed up in front of me. Iwas, by now, too low to overfly them and had zero power to climb. So, I gave it full right rudder and little by little I turned away. I managed to turn again, out over the Bay, at no more than 150 feet and then turned in towards the runway a second time. When I started to enter the last part of that final turn, the T-33 made another pass - this time from the rear. This time he didn't try to climb, but flew straight

130

over the runway. I continued through the turn, assuming he had missed. But I was wrong! 'As I approached the runway, I tried to line up as best I could with the rudder - but got no response at all! The plane started to roll and I fought to keep it straight, but I had zero control: no rudder, no elevators - nothing! So I grabbed the throttles and, cutting power, started to level off a bit. By now, I had veered off to one side of the runway and knew I'd never make it. I cut the power more and more and then hit, a few feet to the left of the runway, just as Ireached up and yanked back the canopy. I had put the gear down on the approach, but only the nose gear and the left main had actually extended. 'The plane bounced mightily and started to run along the ground. Then the left wing hit a palm tree, pivoting the whole thing around just as the nose gear collapsed. I continued along on the one remaining main gear and then the right wing came down, and the left gear collapsed. The speed was down to, say, 75 kilometres per hour, when we hit some cement-filled barrels. I didn't have the safety belts on - I never used those - and when we hit the barrels, I felt like I had just jumped from a springboard. And that is the last thing I remember.' Farias was thrown some twenty-five feet from the cockpit. He was pulled away from the burning wreck by Brigade personnel and survived - with two cracked ribs, a smashed elbow, seventeen stitches in his head and a burned ear. Two days later, he was evacuated by air to Nicaragua. The remains of his trusty aircraft, 'FAR 935', has frequently been pictured following the debacle with Fidel Castro examining its charred remains. As can be seen from this and other encounters, recognition of aircraft from the ground as well as in the air - was a genuine problem. Aside from the blue bands painted outboard of the engine nacelles on the wings of at least a few FAL invaders, it was virtually impossible to tell who was who. This led, apparently, to the decision to hastily remove the fake FAR markings from some of the Liberation force aircraft during the closing hours of the air support activities. Aerial action in support of the invasion lasted a scant six days (for the Liberation Air Force; the FAR saw action on only the last four of these days, as far as can be ascertained), 15 through 20 April. The FAR admitted to the loss of only two aircraft, while claiming nine, although other sources differ widely. One source, otherwise authoritative, has gone so far as to claim that sixteen Liberation B-26s were lost. The actual total is almost certainly eight, leaving the remaining aircraft to languish at Puerto Cabezas following the hasty withdrawal of the dazed survivors after the failure of the enterprise. Many of these battle-weary aircraft eventually joined the ranks ofSomoza's FuerzaAerea de

FOREIGN INVADERS

Nicaragua (which see), although some apparently were returned to Davis-Monthan. While it I"s not the objective of this narrative to proclaim the political correctness of the decisions made during this tragic affair, it is clear, after an exhaustive "analysis of the literature and interchanges with survivors, that it could have been at least more successful had the aviation assets available to the Brigade forces been employed more decisively at the outset. The advantage of surprise, although Castro was alleged to have been tipped off by informers within the Liberation forces, was still clearly on the side of the B-26 crews. This account should not conclude without a few words about the claims made by the defenders: the pilots and men of the FAR. In truth, the performance turned in by these airmen, who numbered not more than ten during the battle, also deserves praise, no matter what their politics. According to the Cuban Government publication Granma, these men and the missions they flew during the battle were (see table on opposite page). While this summary will prove difficult to ' contest, the fact is that of the nearly 70 missions claimed b~ the FAR, few seem to have been flown over the invasion scene itself, although those that were flown proved crucial - especially Alberto Fernandez' T-33 mission, his very first baptism of fire, in which he sank one of the crucial supply ships with his rockets and guns. The invasion forces on the ground, from available reports, saw nothing like this total of FAR missions over their positions. The claims shown were those made for aircraft 'destroyed in action.' Actual FAL B-26 losses seem to have totalled eight aircraft, of which one was lost to AAA, and are at odds with the FAR claims. They are summarized as follows:

The remains of Matias Farias' 'FAR 935' at the Playa Giron airstrip following the failure of the expedition. via G, von Roitberg

(I) A B-26 flying as Puma Three was shot down by AAA on 15 April during an attack on Campo Columbia, and pilot Captain Daniel Fernandez-Man and navigator Gaston Perez were killed in action. (2) B-26 Lion Two was lost on 17 April, probably to Major Enrique Carrera-Rolas in Sea Fury number 541, with the loss of pilot Captain Crispin Garcia and navigator Juan Gonzalez. (3) B-26 Paloma One was lost on 17 April and was almost certainly shot down by Captain Alvaro Prendes in T-33 number 711. The pilot, Captain Raul Vianello was killed, but navigator Demetrio Perez bailed out. (4) B-26 Puma Two was lost on 17 April when it was shot down by Lieutenant Rafael del Pino in T-33 number 703, with the loss of pilot Captain Osvaldo Piedra and navigator Jose Fernandez. (5) B-26 Puma One was badly damaged by a Sea Fury piloted by Lieutenant Douglas Rudd and ditched in the sea short of base on the 17th also, killing pilot Captain Jose Crespo and navigator Lorenzo Perez-Lorenzo. (6) B-26 'FAR 935' flying as Chico Two was shot down by a T-33 flown by Lieutenant Alberto Fernandez, wounding pilot Captain Matias Farias and killing navigator Eddie Gonzalez. (7) Two of the US 'advisors,' Major Riley Shamburger and navigator Wade Gray, were shot down on the 19th by Captain Alvaro Prendes in T-33 number 711, while flying as

!

MadDog.

(8) The last FAL loss also saw two more US advisors killed - Captain Thomas W. Ray, pilot, and his navigator Leo Baker - while flying as Mad Dog Four on the 19th. They were shot down by Major Enrique Carrera-Rojas in T-33 number 709. The FAL crews are fairly well documented, and thus the FAR claims for three for Alvaro Prendes and two for Rafael del Pino must be viewed with some reservations. The only possibility is that the FAR allowed them a 'whole' credit for an aircraft in which thFY

1 .I

T OPERATION PLUTO: THE BAY OF PIGS 1961

shared the claim with another pilot. Although the Cuban press extolled the 'young anti-aircraft gunners,' and they did in fact influence the course of events, only one loss can be definitely attributed to them. Given the density of Cuban forces approaching the landing zone and defending the airfield, many with fourbarrelled Russian weapons, this is a testament to the durability of the venerable Invaders and the evasive tactics of the crews. FAR Pilot Alvaro Prendes Rafael del Pino Alberto Fernandez Gustavo Bourzac JaquetLagas Enrique Carrera Douglas Rudd Ernesto Guerrero Luis Silva Carlos Ulloa Total

Missions flown 17Apr 18 Apr 2 2 2 3 2 2 1

19 Apr

Today, a single 8-26 is known to survive in Cuba, on display in good condition at an open-air museum at, appropriately, Playa Giron. This is a hard-nosed 8-268, the serial number on the nose, 933, being - whether by accident or design - the fourth presentation of these marks. It has been alleged that this aircraft is, in fact, a war prize returned to Cuba from Angola and painted to com~orate the events of 1961. /

20 Apr

4 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 3 1 3 4 2 2 2 (shot down on his (shot down on his

2 1 17

20

24·

Total

14 10 9 8 8 7 7 4 2nd flight) 1st flight) 3 1 1 1 2 1

9

67

131

Although of low quality, this shot of B-26C sIn 933 is a true mystery photo. This is the aircraft that allegedly landed at Key West, with damage, following the initial attack at the Bay of Pigs. However, it seems more likely that it is a genuine Cuban B-26C, as the 'Indian Head' insignia of the FAEC Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero can be just seen on the fuselage side below the cockpit! Note also the canopy frame antenna (compare with the photo on page 69). via J. Quintero

B-26 Claims 3 2 1 2 1

9

OPERATION PLUTO For the record, the tentatively identified Operation Pluto aircraft were as follows. Positive link-ups with prior USAF serial numbers are, perhaps forever, unattainable, as no such records are known to have been kept. 'FAR' Serial

Version

Previous identity/users From USAF Retn to USAF

B-26

44-34338

22 Feb 91

B-26

44-34415

13 Oct 60

?

B-26

44-34590

13 Oct 60

? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26

44-34637 44-34730 44-35411, M Indochina 44-35420 44-35554 44-35574 44-35641 44-35698

15 Feb 61 15 Feb 61 15 Feb 61 6 Oct 60 23 Feb 61 31 Aug 60 23 Feb 61 3 Sep 60

B-26B

44-35714

23 Feb 61

15 May 62

B-26 B-26B

44-35732 44-35782

23 Feb 61 12 Oct 60

3 May 62

Remarks

Later to N5002X. Possibly one of the aircraft damaged in training at Rayo Base. Later to N5000X. May possibly have been the deception aircraft, 'FAR 933.'

Later to N5001X. Possibly one of the aircraft damaged in training at Rayo Base. Returned USAF at Hill AFB. May not have reached Happy Valley. Reclaimed at DavisMonthan 1969. Returned USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate.

B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26 B-26B

44-35789 44-35821 44-35830 44-35839 44-35845 44-35896

6 Oct 60 2 Sep 60 30 Aug 60 .. 9 Sep 60 9 Sep 60 6 Oct 60

15 May 62

Returned USAF at Hill AFB. Later to B-26K 64-17640.

It is not clear exactly when the fake 'FAR' markings and serials were painted on the Liberation Air Force aircraft, although it was probably done

some time in early April 1961 at 'Happy Valley.' Known or believed to have been used were numbers 900, 911, 915, 917, 920, 924, 925, 931, 933 (twice), 935 and 940. CIA case officers obviously can't get an 'A' for effort, as 900, 920, 924 and 940 were nonsense numbers not actually used by either the FAEC or the real FAR. Some of these may in fact have been CIA fleet numbers, however, and not intended to represent FAR serials.

132

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty Five

Project Mill Pond: Laos 1961

I t

The second large-scale use of B-26 Invaders by the CIA, after the Indonesian operation in 1958, also took place in the Far East. This time the target was Laos. It was to become the last covert air strike force project initiated by the CIA, before the responsibility for this kind of operations passed to the Department of Defense in July 1961. The Kingdom of Laos had been part of the former French colonial empire in Indochina. The country had been granted independence in 1949, but remained under French influence until their departure from Southeast Asia in the mid-1950s. The 1954 Geneva Accords stipulated that Laos was to remain neutral and that all foreign troops were to leave the country. But by this time the northeastern part of the country was already under the control of the communist Pathet Lao, who continued to be actively supported by the new North Vietnamese government. There was intermittent fighting between the Pathet Lao and the Armee Nationale du Laos (ANL) until a coalition government was formed in late 1957. An uneasy peace remained in effect until May 1959, when fighting again broke out in northeastern Laos. The United States had taken over the former role of the French in Laos, and had granted large-scale economic aid to the country. In response to the renewed fighting, US military advisors under civilian cover started to arrive in July 1959, tasked vvith the reorganization of the Laotian Army. The Laotian prime minister since 1958 was the pro-western General Phoumi Nosavan, who had led a bloodless army coup in Vientiane. In April 1960 he was officially elected to the post, in a reputedly rigged election.

The increasingly rightist leaning of the Laotian government was seen by some as a threat to the neutrality of the country, and on 9 August 1960 elements of 4Re-ANL's ze Bataillon de Parachutistes under Captain Kong Le ousted General Nosavan from power, replacing him with Prince Souvanna Phouma as prime minister. Prince Phouma had led the original government up to 1958, and he now attempted to create a new neutral government. He was only partly successful, however, and the country quickly became the scene of a civil war between three major factions: the Neutralists under Prince Phouma, whose forces were under the command .of Captain Le; the Royalist forces of General Nosavan, who had regrouped in southern Laos; and the communist Pathet Lao forces. A fourth force was the Meo guerrillas under Lieutenant Colonel Vang Pao, operating against the communist forces in northeastern Laos vvith the support ofThailand and the CIA. The political and military situation in Laos became increasingly complicated during the autumn of 1960, and in early December Captain Le once again occupied Vientiane, this time in co-operation vvith the Pathet Lao, only to have the city recaptured a few days later by General Nosavan's troops. The Pathet Lao and Captain Le had received increasing military help from North Vietnam during the autumn, and by December the Soviet Union had started to airlift equipment and supplies to the communist forces in Laos. At the same time, the United States continued their support to the Royalist and the Meo forces. It was obvious that Laos was in danger of becoming the scene of a superpower confrontation.

The beginning of 1961 saw the situation in Laos more or less unchanged. General Nosavan's troops occasionally skirmished with the Pathet Lao forces, but no decisive battles were fought. The Pathet Lao had turned the town of Xieng Khouang, about 100 miles northeast of Vientiane, into their new stronghold, and there was talk of turning this into the capital of a Laotian Revolutionary Government. This lull in the fighting brought forth new attempts to solve the crisis by diplomacy. At the same time, the US government realized that there might be a need for a strike force vvithout obvious US connections. The only combat aircraft in Laos were three armed T-6 Texans delivered to General Nosavan's forces from the Royal Thai Air Force in early January 1961 (a fourth aircraft having been shot down on 17 January), and the CIA was therefore tasked with the creation of an air unit suited to possible covert operations in Southeast Asia. Around early March 1961, a certain Major Harry 'Heinie' Aderholt was ordered to work out immediately the detailed requirements for a unit capable of armed reconnaissance over Laos. Major Aderholt had begun his military career in the USAAF towards the end of the Second World War, but had soon become increasingly involved in various covert air operations. One of the more com-

Poor but unique view of the Mill Pond Invader fleet on the apron of the Royal Thai Air Force Base at Takhli. At least thirteen aircraft can be counted. The B-26s were all totally devoid of any markings which might link them with their CIA operators. via T. Wickstrom

I J

PROJECT MILL POND: LAOS 1961

,.

plex operations he had organized was the air The Royal Thai Air Force base at Takhli was supply of Tibetan guerrilla forces during the to become the home of Project Mill Pond, late 1950s. In 1960 Major Aderholt had been which was the name assigned to the unit on appointed chief liaison officer between the 21 March. The official, although still classified USAF and the CIA in the Far East, operating mission of Mill Pond was 'air defense.' They out of Okinawa. Within twenty-four hours, his shared the base with an RTAF light attack staff had worked out an initial requirements squadron equipped with T-6s. Takhli was list for the new unit, which was to be also one of the air bases in Thailand occaequipped with Invaders. sionally used by the USAF and other foreign The plan called for the aircraft to be flown air forces during exercises, and in early by pilots seconded from the USAF. One of March 1961 large quantities of supplies and these pilots was Captain Ronald L. Allaire, at equipment had been positioned at Takhli the time stationed at Griffiss AFB in Rome, during an exercise called AirBull. These were New York. 'Sometime in March, 1961,' Allaire now conveniently available to Mill Pond. recalls, 'I was interviewed by a General Apart from the USAF pilots, who were all Officer for a special assignment. He said that given commissions in the Royal Laotian Air the mission was of utmost importance to the Force, Mill Pond also had a few Air America United States, would take place under primi- pilots available. Air America was by this time tive conditions, and would be extremely already flying supply flights into Laos with dangerous. If I volunteered, I would be dis- C-46s, and these aircraft and their crews charged from the Air Force and the United were based at Takhli. The Mill Pond unit comStates would deny any knowledge of my mander was Major Aderholt, while CIA man activities should I become a casualty or pris- Bill Bloodworth served as case officer for the onerofwar.' project. The staff also included Captain Allaire did volunteer, and went to Warren Aderholt ('Heinie's' brother) as Washington for a series of personality tests morale and recreation officer and Major and an interview with a team of psychologists Roger Olds as maintenance officer, while the at the Pentagon. Since he was. a reconnais- servicing of the aircraft was performed by a sance pilot, albeit with experience of the group of seconded USAF ground crews. The RB-26C, Allaire was then sent to Field 3' at project was run directly from the CIA headEglin AFB in Florida for a very quick course on quarters in downtown Washington' and all the B-26B. Two transition flights on 29 March orders were sent to Takhli by radio. were followed by a few bombing and strafing All the aircraft operated by Mill Pond were runs at the gunnery range on the next day. He 'sanitized,' meaning that they had been was discharged from the USAF on 31 March, removed from the USAF inventory. It is theretogether with four or five other pilots destined fore difficult to establish exactly which B-26s for the same project, and given a first-class were used and where ihey came from ticket on Pan Am to Bangkok. On arrival, they (which of course was the general idea were officially signed on by a company called . behind the 'sanitization'). A few may have Bangkok Contract Air Services, before being come from the CIA stocks held by Air Asia in put on a USAF C-130 destined for Takhli in Tainan, on Taiwan, as there are some indicacentral Thailand. tions that one or two Invaders had been flown

133

to Takhli by Air America crews, before the arrival of the USAF pilots. If this is correct, those particular B-26Bs were almost certainly aircraft left over from the Indonesian operations in 1958. However, there is little doubt that the bulk of the sixteen or so B-268s used by Mill Pond were taken from storage at Davis-Monthan. By the time Mill Pond was formed, the B-26 had all but disappeared from the USAF inventory, and at the beginning of March 196I only twelve remained on charge as active aircraft'. A further thirty-five were still officially maintained in storage, but in reality many more were still sitting at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona, awaiting the cutter's torch. These had all been authorized for reclaimation (approved for scrapping, that is), in some cases several years previously, but were still in one piece. The 2704th Aircraft Storage and Disposition Group at Davis-Monthan held a total of 4,067 aircraft of all types by mid 1960, of which 1,369 were classified as 'carcasses,' and they simply did not have the resources needed to dispose of all obsolete aircraft 'Also known as Duke Field. The CtA made extensive use of this airfield over the years, and it was still occasionally used by them in the early 1990s. 'The CtA did not move to its new headquarters in Langley, Virginia until the autumn of 1961. 'In addition, the US Navy still operated a number of JD-1 s, but none of these was ever transferred back to the USAF or otherwise made available for clandestine use. One of the RB-26Cs (possibly 44-35813) used in Project Mill Pond, accompanied by several

B-26Bs. Most if not all the Invaders came from storage at Davis-Monthan AFB in Arizona. via A. Granda/ini

134

straight away. The exact number of Invaders in limbo is difficult to determine: there were at least 100, but the number may well have been considerably higher, several sources mentioning figures in excess of 300 aircraft. As explained elsewhere in this book, batches of B-26s had been taken from storage at Davis-Monthan from August 1960 onwards, being allocated to classified projects or diverted to 'non-USAF' organizations during late 1960 and early 1961. Most of them were very likely destined for the Bay of Pigs operations, although the odd one may have ended up with Mill Pond. A further batch of Invaders left Davis-Monthan in March 1961 for reconditioning at Hill AFB, and twenty-one of these were allocated to unspecified classified projects between late March and mid April. The majority of them probably went to MillPond.

Most of the USAF pilots arrived at Takhli in the first week of April. A few of them were checked out in the Helio Courier that belonged to Mill Pond. This aircraft was used for flights up to Vientiane in Laos, where Major Aderholt would meet with various people, and also for liaison flights to Udorn and Bangkok. A few days later the pilots were taken to Kadena AFB on Okinawa by a USAF transport aircraft, and on II April they returned to Takhli with a number of B-26s. The flight was made non-stop, with radio silence observed all the way. The balance of the aircraft were ferried in shortly afterwards. None of the Mill Pond Invaders carried national insignia or serial numbers. Some of

FOREIGN INVADERS

the aircraft were painted black and others were natural metal, but in either case they were totally devoid of markings. lt was found that several of the eighteen USAF pilots selected for Mill Pond had actually never flown the Invader before joining the project. A couple had flown the Martin B-26 Marauder in the Second World War, and apparently this had been misinterpreted by the people selecting the potential candidates. Others had flown the Invader on second-line duties, but few had any experience as attack pilots. A target range was therefore set up on the Gulf of Siam, to give the crews some training. There was no TB-26 available, but one of the more experienced Invader pilots would ride in the right-hand seat as instructor. Meanwhile, the attempts to solve the Laotian crisis by diplomacy had all but failed and the two superpowers had taken increasingly hard stances, each giving strong backing to their own allies in the country. On 19 March a vast mobilization of US forces in the Pacific was ordered, and on 29 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved Oplan X-61 for a' multinational contingency force for Laos. On the same day, the 3rd Marine Division submitted its plans for operations in Laos. The intervention force was known as Joint Task Force 116, with its headquarters at Camp Courtney on Okinawa. Some JTF-116 key personnel had already been placed on alert back in December 1960, during the fighting around Vientiane. By April a renewed Pathet Lao offensive

was slowly gaining ground on all fronts and an intervention by SEATO or US forces seemed imminent. One day in mid or late April, Major Aderholt was given orders to prepare for an air strike, and all aircraft were loaded up with napalm bombs. The planned primary mission of Mill Pond was a dawn attack on the airport at Xieng Khoung, as well as other targets on the Plain of Jars (commonly known by its French abbreviation 'PDJ'). The plan reportedly called for four simultaneous strikes, each one performed by a section of four aircraft led by an Air America pilot. There was to be only one crew member per aircraft. The pilots went to bed early, but when they got up the following morning they were told that the strike had been called off by Washington. Many of the people involved in Mill Pond suspect that the strike was called off because of the disaster in Cuba. 'If the Bay of Pigs operation had been successful,' General Aderholt claims, 'we would have invaded the PDJ. We were going to use the 130s, and use the 26s for cover, for close air support.' The three C-130s in question were also sanitized, and based in Thailand. In late April they were used to ferry two volunteer Thai artillery batteries to Laos, to help repel the Pathet Lao advance towards Vientiane. An overall btack Mill Pond B-26B loaded with napalm and rockets, probably in anticipation of the ultimately aborted strike on northern Laos in April 1961. The T-6s in the background belonged to the Thai Air Force. via A. Grandolini

PROJECT MILL POND: LAOS 1961

135

Mill Pond remained in readiness for a strike buildings, but no people. ably upset, and Major Aderholt was ordered but, as it turned out, none was ever sched'We were right over the town when there to have them out of the country 'before sunuled again. Considering the limited tactical was a load explosion in our rear. They had down.' They were not out by sundown, but experience of the pilots and the substantial opened up on us with a 37 mm cannon. Then they did leave Thailand over the next few anti-aircraft defences around strategic loca- we felt another explosion and the airplane days, the last aircraft being ferried out on 18 tions on the PDJ, they were probably lucky jumped. In order to get the pictures, we had August. At least one aircraft had been flown that they never had to carry out the attack, as had to climb up to around 500 feet, so we to Air Asia at Tainan prior to this, probably for it is likely that at least some of their aircraft dived and got out of there. I looked back and maintenance, but most of the others went to would have been lost. Instead, the unit began our left tailplane was just about shot off. We Okinawa. The USAF pilots also left at this flying reconnaissance. The first US reconnais- had very little movement in the stick, but time, and by the end of August Project Mill sance missions over Laos had been flown by could climb by adding power. So, we added Pond had ceased to exist. C-47s in late 1960 and early 1961, but were power and went straight back to Takhli. On The negotiations in Geneva were still going halted after the loss of an aircraft to ground the first approach, the pilot thought he could on at this point, but the US government had fire on 23 March 1961'. The vulnerable C-47s control the airplane with about fifteen reason to believe that North Vietnam neverwere replaced by an unmarked RT-33A, degrees of flap. We bounced very hard and theless continued to reinforce their positions beginning operations out of Udom in went around for another approach. We in Laos. The RT-33 flights therefore resumed Thailand on 24 April, under Project Field finally got the airplane on the ground by mak- on 4 October, and around the same time two Goal. In addition to its B-26Bs, Mill Pond had ing a long straight-in approach with no flaps.' RB-26Cs, numbered '236' and '745", returned later also received one or two RB-26Cs, and The aircraft did not merely bounce hard, to Takhli. This time the Invaders were flown towards the end of April began to fly missions but extremely hard. 'Heinie' Aderholt recalls only by Air America crews, in a project called over Laos. Only two of the Mill Pond pilots that the pilot of the Invader, 'couldn't get his Black Watch. The first crew members to were experienced on the RB-26 and they nose up, so it drove in on the nose gear and arrive were AI White and his co-pilot Fred were consequently selected to command the S-ed the spokes on the wheel; I'd never seen Riley, who was shot down in a C-123 over PDJ first missions, while at the same time giving that in my life!' After some makeshift repairs, in 1963. A few more pilots arrived soon afterinstruction to some of the other pilots. the RB-26 was ready for a test flight a few days wards. They did not fly on a daily basis, but The pilot on one of the first flights, around I later. It flew fine, but the abused landing gear only when ordered to check on a specific tarMay 1961, was Captain Allaire. On previous would not come down and the test pilot had get. The projed was commanded by Major missions the aircraft had only drawn scat- to land gear-up. The aircraft was eventually Aderholt, who also worked on other Laotian tered small-arms fire, but this time the repaired again, but probably not in time for projects at this point. any more reconnaissance missions with Mill RB-26 number 236, flown by Ed Eckholdt opposition was ready for them: 'I went in on the third or fourth mission. Pond. and AI White, took five hits from a 14.5 mm "Heinie" briefed us on what they wanted picPresident Kennedy and Premier Khrush- anti-aircraft gun west of the Mu Ghia Pass on tures of, but not who it was for. I was trying to chev finally reached an understanding that 2 November 1961. Leaking oil and fuel, and check out a SAC pilot: he was a KC-97 pilot Laos was not worth starting a major war over, with damage to the left engine, nose cameras and had no recce experience at all. By the and in early Maya cease-fire was announced. and radio equipment, the crew diverted to time we took off, he was wringing wet and Later that month, an international confer- Udorn where they landed safely. Four days kept shaking all the time. ence on Laos convened in Geneva, and after later, a detachment of four USAF RF-IOls 'Our target was Route 8 into North Vietnam, protracted negotiations was eventually to deployed to Don Muang airport outside on what was later to be known as the Ho Chi . reaffirm the independence of Laos, once Bangkok. Code-named Project Able Mable, Minh Trail. It went through the town of Nape, again calling for the withdrawal of all foreign this Voodoo unit took over most of the reconwhich they thought was the main supply base troops. naissance work over Laos from 10 Novemfor the rebels. We crossed the Laotian border Both the Mill Pond and the Field Goal ber, and the RT-33 was relegated to ferrying at Nakhon Phanom. Before we got to the reconnaissance missions were discontinued the films to processing in South Vietnam or Nam Theun river we got down on the deck, after the cease-fire in May, but the B-26s and the Philippines. The RB-26s were still flying somewhere between 50 and 500 feet. We did their crews remained on stand-by at Takhli missions over Laos in early December and visual recce up Route 12 to Nhommarath, during the summer of 1961, in case fighting possibly even later. They remained in and then we came up Route 8, doing visual should break out again. They also continued Thailand until the spring of 1962, when rerecce all the way. Route 8 was a jungle trail, to fly training missions inside Thailand. All deployed to South Vietnam. The aircraft basically. We didn't even see a car or a truck; these flights were logged and later entered on continued to fly reconnaissance missions had we done so we would have marked it in the pilots' flight records, but not as Invader or over Laos from time to time after that date, our log, but we saw nothing. We turned our Courier missions, and not in Asia. Each pilot but now as part of Project Farm Gate. cameras on at Ban Na Muong and kept them would choose a corresponding aircraft type on all the way through Nape. There is a high he was current on - such as the C-47 or the mountain range right there, and we flew the T-29 instead of the Invader, and the L-20 'This C-47, which was the first USAF aircraft shot RB-26 right up this valley. When we came in instead of the Courier - and his flight record down during the war in Southeast Asia, had the over North Vietnam, we decided we'd better would show that he had flown these aircraft serial 44-76330 and belonged to the 314th Air get out of here, so we turned around and with the 100 Ist Operations Group at Andrews Division at Osan. Seven crew members were went back. AFB, Washington, DC, while in the Air Force killed and one man captured by the North Vietnamese. 'I looked at our counter and saw that we Reserve. The American Ambassador to Thailand, had more than half our film left. We turned our cameras back on, and went down the U. Alexis Johnson, had apparently not been 'The numbers 236 and 745 do not tally with the highway again. When we went through the told about Project Mill Pond, despite standing last three digits of the USAF serial for any Invaders likely to have been available at this town there was nothing there that could be presidential instructions that ambassadors point. In fact, the two RB-26s were almost considered military equipment; there were were to be kept informed of all activities of certainly 44-35585 and -35813, later used by Farm no trucks, there were no revetments, noth- other US age~cies in 'his' country. When he Gate. 236 and 745 may have been Air America ing. We only saw one or two people. It was a learnt that there were US-crewed B-26s fleet numbers, ot the last three digits of a Chinese pretty good-sized town: lots of huts, lots of based in Thailand, Johnson was understand- civil registration.

136

FOREIGN INVADERS

·1I

PROJECT MILL POND Since no Mill Pond aircraft records are available, the below list is 'based on information in USAF records cards for B-26 aircraft, plus other USAF sources. The bulk of the aircraft listed did almost certainly serve with project Mill Pond, but some may in fact have gone to other projects. Conversely, a few of the aircraft listed as used by the CIA in Indonesia, at the Bay of Pigs, or for training in the USA, may have seen use with Mill Pond: until the CIA files are released (should any still exist), a certain degree of 'guesstimation' is unfortunately unavoidable. The 'Returned USAF' date does not imply that the aircraft was used by project Mill Pond until then (only the two RB-26s remained after August 1961), but is simply the next date shown on the USAF record cards, or the date the aircraft is known to have been received by Project Farm Gate. Serial

Version

Previous identity

(none?)

B-26B

44-34361

11 Apr 61

61?

(none?) (none?) (none?)

B-26B B-26B B-26B

44-34681 44-34718 44-35322

29 Mar 61 5 Apr 61 17 Apr 61

Jun62 3 May 62 61?

(none?) (none?)

B-26B B-26B

44-35335 44-35435

4 Apr 61 19 Apr 61

27 Apr 62 61?

(none?)

B-2681

44-35448

4 Apr 61

(none?) (none?)

B-26B B-2681

44-35507 44-35513

17 Apr 61 17 Apr 61

19 Apr 62

(none?) (none?) (none?)

B-26B B-26B B-26B

44-35514 44-35530 44-35546

17 Apr 61 29 Mar 61 19 Apr 61

19 Apr 62 Dec 61 61?

(none?) * (none?) (none?) (none?) (none?)

RB-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B B-2681

44-35585 44-35663 44-35692 44-35703 44-35707

10 Apr 61 17 Apr 61 29 Mar 61 26 Mar 61 5 Apr 61

May 62 27 Apr 62 Dec61 Dec61

(none?) (none?)* (none?) (none?) (none?)

B-26B RB-26C B-26B B-26B B-26B

44-35804 44-35813 44-35822 44-35855 44-35890

30 Mar 61 10 Apr 61 29 Mar 61 26 Mar 61 29 Mar 61

Aug 62 May 62 Jun 62 Dec 61 Aug 62?

From USAF Retn to USAF

Remarks To USAF at Davis-Monthan AFB. Later to B-26K 64-17652. To Project Farm Gate. To USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate. To USAF at Davis-Monthan AFB. Later to B-26K 64-17641. To USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate. To USAF at Davis-Monthan AFB. Later to B-26K 64-17642. Probably went to Air Asia on Taiwan; fate unknown. To USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate. Probably went to Air Asia on Taiwan; fate unknown. To USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate. To PmjectFarm Gate. To USAF at Davis-Monthan AFB. Later to B-26K 64-17645. To Project Farm Gate. To USAF at Hill AFB. Later to Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate. Probably went to Air Asia on Taiwan; fate unknown. To Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate. To Project Farm Gate.

I

r

* These two aircraft were almost certainly those numbered '236' and '745' with Project Black Watch in late 1961/eariy 1962.

,

An early Farm Gate Invader, probably snapped soon after arrival in South Vietnam. The nose armament has yet to be re-installed. From the markings on the cowling, it appears the aircraft - or at least parts of it - had been withdrawn from some surplus sale at the last moment. 1. A. Ifland

'

FOREIGN INVADERS

137

Chapter Twenty Six

Project Farm Gate: Vietnam 1961-1964 ~

I

T

In parallel to the events in Laos, the situation in Vietnam was also developing in a way viewed with concern by the US government. The Geneva Accords of July 1954 had temporarily divided the country into two parts, pending free elections to be held in 1956. The bulk of the Viet Minh forces withdrew to the North during the second half of 1954 and most of the French troops left the country around the same time. As it turned out, President Diem of South Vietnam refused to hold elections, claiming that his country was not bound by the accords since it was not a signatory. There was no immediate reaction from North Vietnam, which at this time was concentrating on building up its own economy and solving its own internal problems. In the South, there was growing dissatisfaction with the Diem government, which proved to be increasingly totalitarian and corrupt. Although the US government was at times rather less than enthusiastic about Diem, he still had their political backing. There were some sporadic guerrilla and terrorist activities in the South during 1955-1958 by stay-behind communist cells, although as yet with only limited direct support· froffi' North Vietnam. But by late 1958 it was becoming apparent to the North Vietnamese that Diem's government, although weak arid without popular support, was not about to collapse of its own accord. In May 1959 the Central Committee of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam therefore ratified a decision by the Politburo to intensify the campaign for reunification. This meant setting up training and guerrilla operations centres, and sending large groups of infiltrators into South Vietnam. The number of political assassinations increased dramatically during the latter part of 1959, and for the first time there were attacks on field units of the South Vietnamese Army. Finally, December 1960 saw the official creation of the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam, better known as the Viet Congo When President Kennedy came into office in January 1961, the Vietnam war was still largely a Vietnamese conflict, with virtually B-26B 44-35530, one of the four first Invaders allocated to Project Farm Gate, receives a hosing down at Bien Hoa. There is no disguising the well-worn condition of the aircraft. 1. A. lfIand

no direct US involvement. The Geneva Accords specifically banned any foreign troops or bases from Vietnam, and the US government had agreed to limit its military presence to a 685-man Military Assistance Advisory Group. Under pressure from the USA as well as from the Vietnamese themselves, the French had authorized the creation of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces in 1950. These were still of moderate size when the USA took over the military training duties from France in 1955, but by 1961 the army had grown to 170,000 men, organized along US lines and using US equipment. They initially outnumbered the Viet Cong forces by a factor of ten, but despite this the war was not going well for the South. Following the clandestine dispatch ofa few hundred additional advisors and Special Forces troops to Vietnam in the spring of 1961, the US government eventually decided to commit itself openly. Not everybody believed that the fall of Vietnam to communist rule would necessarily lead to the loss of the rest of Southeast Asia: but it was nevertheless felt that the time had come to take a firmer stand. Various proposals on the suitable composition of the US forces to be sent. to Vietnam were drawn up during the summer and autumn of 1961, and many of these emphasized the importance of air support. President Diem was reluctant to request US

ground combat units, but he too recognized the need for tactical aviation. The first Vietnamese air units had been set up by the French in 1951, as an integrated part of the Army. The Kh6ng-Quan Viet-Nam, the Vietnamese Air Force, usually abbreviated to VNAF, was formed on 1 July 1955. It initially consisted of 58 transport and liaison aircraft, organized into five squadrons. The 1st Fighter Squadron was created in June 1956, when twenty-three Bearcats were handed over to the VNAF by the French, and for the next few years this remained the only combat unit of the young air force, although kept at full strength by additional batches of Bearcats (for a total of sixty-nine, of which twenty-one were only used for spare parts). President Diem had also requested the French advisory team to create a B-26 squadron for his air force, but since both the French and the US advisors thought that the VNAF lacked the personnel and resources to equip and maintain a bomber unit, this request was refused. By the late 1950s the Bearcats were becoming increasingly obsolete and worn out, and finding a suitable replacement became a priority issue. Since the Geneva Accords in effect prohibited the introduction of jet aircraft into Vietnam, the 'replacement would also have to be a piston-engined aircraft. After once more considering the B-26 as a possible candidate, the United States finally

138

decided on the Skyraider, and the first of these began to replace the Bearcats from late 1960. In mid 1961, the VNAF could only muster a single combat squadron of twentyfive aircraft in the war against the Viet Congo A second unit, the 2nd Fighter Squadron, was due to be formed with T-28s later in the year, but there was little prospect of any immediate expansion of the VNAF beyond that, although several additional Skyraider squadrons were to be formed a few years later. This was the background to the initial deployment of US strike aircraft to South Vietnam. The USAF unit chosen for use in Vietnam was the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron of Tactical Air Command, also known as Project Jungle Jim. The squadron had been formed on the initiative of General Curtis E. LeMay in response to a presidential request for an increased US counter-insurgency (COIN) capability which was prompted by a Soviet pledge in January 1961 to support 'wars of liberation' and was tasked with the development of tactics for a COIN role. The official date of formation was 14 April 1961, which happened to be the day on which Brigada 2506 sailed from Nicaragua for the Bay of Pigs, with the support of another classified American B-26 unit. It was intended that the 4400th CCTS should be able to deploy anywhere in the world at short notice. In some ways, the squadron could be seen as a permanent version of the Mill Pond unit created in Thailand a few weeks earlier. It was likely to operate from primitive airfields with limited logistical

FOREIGN INVADERS

support, and of necessity had to use fairly US Ambassador to Vietnam, all Farm Gate unsophisticated aircraft. A total of twenty- aircraft carried Vietnamese national insignia, seven Invaders were taken out of storage at in order to keep a low profile. Davis-Monthan AFB between March and From the outset, the main base of Farm September 1961, and reconditioned at Hill Gate was Bien Hoa Air Base, some fifteen AFB for use by Jungle Jim. Once recondi- miles north of Saigon. This was a former tioned, many went back into temporary French base, taken over by the VNAF on forstorage, however, and by the end of 1961 the mation in 1955. It also housed the 1st Fighter 4400th CCTS only had some fifteen B-26Bs on Squadron of the VNAF. The Farm Gate airstrength. The unit also used T-28s and SC-47s, craft were initially maintained and serviced again with additional aircraft held in tempo- by Detachment 9 of the 13th Air Force. The rary storage. personnel of this unit were mainly drafted Jungle Jim had its main base at Hurlburt from the 6009th Tactical Support Group at Field, also known as Auxiliary Field 9 of Eglin Tachikawa, Japan, and had arrived in AFB, Florida. Hurlburt had seen extensive use Vietnam in late October. Later on, the mainduring the Second World War, including tenance personnel were seconded from training for Doolittle's Tokyo raid. Since 1945 Hurlburt Field. it had mainly been used as a test facility, but The initial main mission of Farm Gate was on occasion it had also served as a base for to provide training for the VNAF. There was medium bomber units. Under the command considerable confusion as to whether or not of Colonel Benjamin H. King, the ali-volun- the US crews could participate in actual comteer 4400th spent the next several months in bat missions, and Farm Gate received several training, with the first crews becoming ready conflicting directives from different sources. for operations in September. Although a few T-28 missions were flown in President Kennedy officially sanctioned support of VNAF Skyraider attacks, the main the sending of US forces to Vietnam on 22 . employment of the unit during the last weeks November 1961, but by this time the first air- of 1961 was to reconnoitre the junk traffic craft of Jungle Jim had already arrived in the along the Vietnamese coast, using SC-47s country. The President had authorized their andT-28s. When deployed to Vietnam, the detachdeployment on 11 October. On 5 November about half the squadron - some 150 men, ment had not brought any of its own B-26 together with four SC-47s and eight T-28s left Florida for Southeast Asia. This was Engine change at Bien Hoa, under primitive Detachment 2A of the 4400th CCTS, which conditions. Spare parts for the Farm Gate had received the project name Farm Gate for Invaders were scrounged from USAF bases all its service in Vietnam. It became opera- around the Pacific. Note the small, nontionally ready in Vietnam with some of its standard Air Commando badge on the fin tip T-28s on 16 November. At the request of the of this B-26B (possibly 44-34551). J. A. IfIand

PROJECT FARM GATE: VIETNAM 1961-1964

aircraft. But, in anticipation of the arrival of the first Invaders a few weeks later, PACAF immediately set about securing spare parts for the aircraft. During the middle of November 1961, instructions were sent to bases in the 5thAir Force area to ship urgently all B-26 spares and engines to Clark Field in the Philippines. All boxes were to be marked 'Project Farm Gate' and no formal shipping documents were required. After having arrived at Clark, the materiel was simply listed as 'found on base,' thereby neatly avoiding a lot of red tape and time-consuming paperwork. The total weight of the spares collected in this way was 64,404Ibs. Farm Gate was initially allocated four B-26Bs already in Southeast Asia. All four were almost certainly aircraft formerly used by Project Mill Pond. They were picked up at the Air Asia facility on Taiwan by Farm Gate crews and arrived at Bien Hoa around Christmas 1961. It should be noted that the USAF initially tended to refer to all Farm Gate Invaders as 'RB-26s' in their official releases, to imply that they were just harmless reconnaissance aircraft and therefore did not constitute a breach of the Geneva Accords. In reality, however, the B-26Bs were mainly used as strike aircraft, although equipped with one or two K-17C cameras for bomb damage assessment. A strike camera pod could also be carried externally, usually under the left wing. In January the personnel of 4400th CCTS officially adopted the title of Air Commandos, thus taking up a tradition dating back to the Second World War. During the first quarter of 1962, Farm Gate began gradually to increase' the number of combat sorties flown, although activity was still fairly low. Some night missions were also flown from January onwards, but at this early stage the 'flaming arrow' technique mentioned below had not yet been introduced, and the effect of these strikes was rather marginal. During February, an air operations centre was set up in South Vietnam and staffed with a mix of US and Vietnamese personnel, but there were a lot of problems before it was finally made to function properly. Several night incursions over South Vietnamese territory by unidentified aircraft took place during March and on at least two occasions B-26s were scrambled to intercept, but no contact was made with the intruders. These incidents resulted in the deployment of radar-equipped USAF and USN fighters to South Vietnam in late March 1962, as none of the Farm Gate aircraft were suited to air defence missions. An organizational change took place during March 1962, when the 4400th CCTS became the 4400th Combat Crew Training Group. The following month it was reformed as the 1st Air Commando Group, and Farm Gate now became Detachment 2A of the 1st

~, -

-

'- ---:.-- --'-

.~

-

.

,.- _-:- ,.. <~._. -~

An in-flight shot of '335, showing the lack of

national insignia on the wings. This was one of the reinforcement aircraft received in early 1963, which had been through the Big Fence IRAN program at Hill AFB and was painted overall grey, with black nacelles. J. A. ffiand One of the training aircraft at Hurlburt Field in Florida, showing off a selection of the ordnance that could be carried by the B-26B. This particular aircraft, 44-35525, later became the last 'stock' B-26 ever to be lost in combat, on 8 April 1963. via D. Henry

ACG. At this point there had already been a number of press reports in the USA of US pilots flying combat missions in Vietnam, and the training cover of the unit was wearing thin. After much debate between various high-ranking officers and politicians, the following classified Concept of Operations had been agreed upon: 'To develop and improve tactics and techniques for COIN operations and to train the VNAF in such operations. Fulfilment of this task will greatly enhance the RVN [Republic ofVietnam] in-country capability eliminate the communist threat. Operational tasks in RVN includ~ combat and combat support flights as an extension of the training mission. All FARM GATE operations are limited to

to

139

within the borders of South Vietnam. Combat missions will only be flown when the VNAF lack the capability to conduct the mission (because of lack of aircraft, pilots, training, equipment, etc.) and then only with a combined USAFNNAF crew aboard the aircraft. Such missions will be for the purpose of providing training for RVN personnel so that the VNAF can perform the missions required at the earliest possible time.' In reality, no training of VNAF personnel was ever carried out using the B-26s. To satisfy the call for a 'combined USAFNNAF crew,' any member of the VNAF - with or without flight training, and regardless of whether he understood English or not would be put. into the cramped jump seat behind the pilots. These Vietnamese airmen sometimes displayed a definite lack of enthusiasm for the proceedings and they filled no function during flight. However, on many occasions missions would be flown in cooperation with strike aircraft of the VNAF. In the second quarter of 1962, the number of missions increased threefold. The Farm Gate B-26s, like all other USAF strike aircraft in Vietnam, were subject to certain Rules of Engagement. In brief, these rules demanded that all daytime strikes were carried out under the control of a Forward Air Controller, except when returning enemy ground fire.

140

FOREIGN INVADERS

Friday21 September 1962:

The nose and canopy of RB-26C 44-35813, showing improvised repairs following its accident in October 1962. It was patched up to permit a low-level, gear-down ferry flight to Tan Son Nhut for overhaul. 1. A. lfIand

The FAC could be either airborne or on lhe ground. During the Farm Gate period, most airborne FACs belonged to the VNAF, which lead to additional problems. Not only were there relatively few VNAF FACs available, but many of them also had rather poor knowledge of English. This problem was commented upon in a report: 'The almost standard phraseology of the FAC is, "I drop smoke, you hit smoke." If the smoke grenade is dropped too high, Le. 1,000 to 1,500 ft, the grenade detonates in the air and the smoke blows off with the wind. It is not uncommon for a ten or twenty minute discussion to take place in an attempt to determine just where the target is in relation to the smoke.' The report drily concluded: 'It is at this point in the COIN environment that favorable endurance becomes a desirable factor.' To supplement the four RF-I0ICs of Project Able Mable, two RB-26Cs previously used in Thailand by Project Black Watch were reassigned to South Vietnam in April 1962, arriving at Bien Hoa during the following month. Like most of the CIA's 'sanitized' Invaders, they were devoid of manufacturing plates and documentation, and carried some

non-standard, civilian type equipment. The RB-26Cs - which, to confuse things, the Farm Gate personnel sometimes called B-26Cs could be used for both strike and reconnaissance missions. They carried. up to four internal cameras of different types, as well as an external camera pod. In many cases, the RB-26 was found to be more suitable than the RF-101 for the type of reconnaissance missions undertaken in Vietnam. During their first months in Vietnam, the RB-26s were, among other things, used to map the areas where new airfields were to be built in the years to follow. The former Black Watch aircraft also continued to be employed for reconnaissance missions over Laotian territory, and for this purpose were sometimes temporarily based at the Don Muang Airport just north of Bangkok in Thailand. But most of the Farm Gate missions involved air strikes, against Viet Cong positions throughout South Vietnam. The following entries are extracts from the personal diary of Colonel Roy Dalton, then a Captain and a B-26 pilot. They give an idea of what the Vietnamese air war was like during the early years ofthe conflict.

'No scramble last night but up at 0345 for a [C-]123 defoliation escort mission in the Delta. Very bad weather going down. Flew at from 200 to 800 ft, was dark, raining and low clouds ... Mter 123s left FAC stated he had targets for us. Huts and boats hidden under trees in VC training area. Destroyed about 7 boats and 2 huts. Coming back, when we hit the Mekong, weather got very bad. Flew up the river toward BH [Bien Hoa] at 100 ft and could just barely see the ground. Near BH weather cleared to about 500 ft. Runwaywas slick.' Monday 8 October 1962:

'Out on strike this morning. Terrain very difficult. A valley about 1y, miles long by Y, mile wide with one end closed by mountain and other open. Stream in the middle with rice paddies and houches. The steep sides of the mountains are covered with jungle. The FAC marked at each end and stated that all in between was target area plus one village on the rim. This was a reported VC Battalion training area. We destroyed the village and set lots of fires up and down the valley. Very difficult to get in close and pull up. We saw zip but FAC reported ground fire. The valley was very pretty. I sometimes wonder if we aren't making more enemies for the local government than we are doing good. Sure hope their intelligence was right. On the way back we lost # one engine. Feathered and returned home.' Monday25 October 1962:

'Strike this morning. Caught VC on the ground. Number killed unknown [later confirmed at thirty-onel. Mission in support of helicopter assault operation. We flew cover, T-28s flew prestrike sorties. We observed choppers coming and "Butterfly", our FAC, called and put smoke in and directed us to an area about Y4 mile from a bridge. We put in napalm on visible Vc. A guess would be 15 to 30. Second pass we strafed. We hit around bridge with napalm and guns as FAC called "many VC in area". Went back up and orbited for another hour and tacked onto a flight of three VNAF AD-6s. Put rest of our ordnance on their target. Headed for home and got call from L-28. Said I was right above him and he had VC on ground. Picked up four VC running and put in short burst, two fell and two made it to a ditch. A chopper hit the two in the ditch.' Captain IfIand with companions, posing in front of a Farm Gate RB-26 (possibly 44-35585) with a 'Big Eye' painted under its windscreen, on the left side only. The insignia - which was in 'natural' colours, including a few red veins! - referred to the thirty-six inch forwardlooking KA-I camera seen fitted in the nose. Unusually, this RB-26 did not have a camera window on the side of the nose. J. A. lfIand

PROJECT FARM GATE: VIETNAM 1961-1964

Friday 16 November 1962:

'Fri flew strike in Delta. Was giving close air support to ground operation when five hidden boats were found. Got three. Couldn't hit my butt. Everyone else busy so even though I have duty officer, Charlie and I pull alert. Got scrambled at 2300. Fort under attack at Can Tho. Covered it for two hours. Appeared to be good mission. Fort called flareship and told them to thank us. Had been up since 0600 Friday morning. Finally got to bed at 0330 Sat morning.' Saturday 17 to Monday 19 November 1962:

'Slept most of Sat. Duty officer Sunday. Poker Sun night. Lost $12. Flew mission # 100 Monday. Made a total of 25 passes on a large target area. Hit boats, houches and personnel. Word came in on Friday night's fort defense mission. 18 VC confirmed KIA.' Tuesday 20 November 1962:

'Zip today. Yesterday's mission. 6 structures, 14 boats and 25 VC confirmed KIA. They certainly were everywhere. Dave ... told me about one of their missions. The FAC directed them at VCs under trees. Just before they dropped Dave saw women under a tree. They didn't drop and pulled off. We agreed that it sometimes gets to be a gut call. The FAC, who is Vietnamese, is in a position to see and he directs the fire, still it's pretty bad sometimes. Some time I'm going to add up the total KIAs and destruction and then again it would probably be better if Ididn't.'

There were two 8-26 losses during the autumn. The first of these was R8-26C 4435813, seriously damaged at Bien Hoa on 10 October. 'My camera crew was uploading photo flash cartridges for a night photo mission,' Colonel (then Captain) Jimmy Ifland recalls. 'Although properly grounded, all cartridges ejected from their dispenser during camera preflight and exploded four seconds later on the ramp beneath the aircraft. As you can imagine, there was quite an explosion eye witnesses claimed that the aircraft was lifted off the ground four to six feet (I find that hard to believe). Fortunately, there was no fire, although the aircraft had just been fully fuelled. My two Camera Repairmen, who were both in the cockpit running the preflight, frantically climbed out of the aircraft and ran to the tip of the wings and then leaped to the ground - both suffering broken ankles, wrists, etc, and needless to say having the s - - - scared out of them.' The reason for the accident was never fully established, but was thought to be stray voltage across the flare firing pins due to a nearby thunderstorm. The Invader was eventually patched up sufficiently for a one-time, gear-down flight to the depot at Tan Son Nhut, where it was given further work and then flown to Clark Field for refurbishing. It was subsequently returned to service, but only after very extensive repairs. The two ex-CIA RB-26Cs of Farm Gate, at Bien Hoa in September 1962. Note the sharksmouth on the drop tank of '585. DoD ref. 96614 USAF

141

The other loss was a 8-268 shot down in the Mekong Delta on an outpost air support mission during the night of 4-5 November. The night sorties formed an important part of the Farm Gate mission in South Vietnam. The VNAF had no night-time strike capability at this point, and consequently the Farm Gate 8-26s and T-28s were the only aircraft available for air support between sunset and dawn. Most of the night sorties flown were in support of outposts, and this was a very demanding type of mission. Flares were dropped over the target by Farm Gate C-47s, or by VNAF C-47s with American co-pilots (a total of thirty USAF C-47 pilots, known as the 'Dirty Thirty,' were on loan to the VNAF), and the 8-26 worked under the flares, placing ordnance under the direction of a ground controller inside the outpost. Sometimes the 8-26 had direct radio contact with the ground forces, and sometimes the instructions had to be relayed by the C-47. In some cases there was no radio contact at all, and the drops were made by observing the flashes from the ground fire, or in the direction the outpost's 'flaming arrow' was pointing: most outposts were equipped with one of these arrows, consisting of flare pots or electric lights on a large platform which could be rotated to show the direction of the enemy. A simpler alternative consisted of straw or reeds laid out in an arrow shape and set on fire. In most cases, however, the Viet Cong broke off the attack as soon as the air support arrived.

142

Two reconnaissance cameras in the rear fuselage of RB-26C '585, in the space formerly occupied by the ventral gun barbette. Most RB26s also carried cameras in the bomb bay.

FOREIGN INVADERS

The former gunner's position in RB-26C 44-35585, now used by the camera operator. The roof window has been painted over. Both J. A. lfland

Invariably the tactic was to drop some another 47 and 26. At sun up JOC [Joint napalm first. This gave the pilot a better Operations Center] sent two VNAF AD-6s and ground reference and rockets, bombs and we sent another 47 to act as radio relay. Had guns could then be used as required. been up for 24 hours so went to tent to sleep. Working at night, under flares and using suc- Doyle went to area in L-28. Got up about 0900 tion gyros, with poorly lit cockpits and either and heard that one of the ADs was also down bad weather or light reflecting off water-filled and that the 26 had been located. Went to the rice paddies, was guaranteed to give the pilot . line about noon. The AD pilot had been killed a severe case of vertigo, and only extensive and also Bennett, Tully and the VNAF on training made such missions possible. But board. Bennett was my room mate. In a four they were still seen as the most rewarding man hut Charlie .and I have lost two room missions, since they challenged the skill of mates. Doyle had a meeting about 2000. the crews and also because the results were They, of course will never know exactly what immediately obvious. The provision for a nav- happened. Shot down or just flat flew into the igator in the B-26 was a decided advantage at ground. That's easy at night on napalm runs. night. The antiquated cockpit lighting system The VC had gotten to the NC and taken everyof the Invader often made it necessary for the thing available. The bodies were recovered.' navigator to use a flashlight, however, in This was the third USAF strike aircraft lost in order to find the armament switches. The Vietnam, the previous ones being two T-28s obsolete instrumentation also provided shot down in August and October. In addisome additional hazards, as a report tion, a B-26 was damaged when the observed: 'The navigator assists at night by undercarriage collapsed during a landing in giving the pilot a friendly tap on the shoulder July 1962, and another Invader lost an engine when approaching minimum altitudes.' to ground fire on 13 November. Several other 'Ops Duty officer tonight,' Roy Dalton wrote aircraft also received superficial damage in his diary for the night of 4-5 November from small arms fire. 1962. 'Things quiet until about 2015. One C-47 The serviceability of the B-26 initially left a and B-26 were scrambled to the Delta ... Got few things to be desired. During the second them off OK. Then at 2300 scrambled another half of 1962, only an average of 54.5 per cent 26. Bennett and Tully took this one. First 26 of the Invaders were serviceable at any given got back about 2400. At 0130 got word that the time. This was by far the lowest figure for any flareship had lost contact with the 26 and saw contemporary USAF aircraft in Vietnam. In fire on the ground. Called Lt Col Doyle [the comparison, the T-28s managed an average Farm Gate commander] and scrambled of 80.3 per cent serviceability.

In providing information for this chapter, Roy Dalton commented: 'I was surprised when Ireread the diary to note the difficulties we had with the aircraft and armament systems. Keep in mind that these were aircraft that had probably been used in WW II and certainly in Korea. They were old and had had little modification ... However, every man associated with the operation was dedicated to make it work. Therefore we had few qualms about flying aircraft that might not be 100%. Had we not done so, operating under the conditions with which we were faced, we would not have been effective.' The list below details the malfunctions encountered by him during a three month period in 1962: 16Aug 20Aug

Six bombs stuck in bomb bay Bombs in bomb bay failed to release 22Aug Could get only 50" manifold pressure on No.1 engine, No.2 engine backfired if throttle was moved rapidly. Gear handle came up only when manual detent button used (Aircraft flown anyway) 2Sep Rockets failed to fire 5Sep Airborne radio failure 20Sep Bombs fell out of bomb bay when battery switched on 26Sep Hydraulic line on brakes blew on landing 28Sep No.2 engine failed on pull-out from bomb drop 30Sep Brake failure on landing Left magneto failed on run-up 20ct Hydraulic leak in left wheel well on 70ct start-up Right generator out Right cowl flap inoperable Only two of eight guns would fire (Aircraft flown anyway) No.1 engine failed on return from 80ct strike; feathered 12Nov Unsafe gear indicator (bad switch) To a large extent, these problems were due to the age of the aircraft and the limited rehabilitation given them before being. sent to Vietnam. The Invaders had between 1,800 and 4,000 flying hours each, and had been through varied degrees of modification. A report from April 1963, at which point fourteen aircraft were at hand, remarked that, 'none of the 8-26s at FARM GATE are configured alike. Each IRAN depot and each work package change within each depot resulted in some variation in electrical wiring, comThe only known full-view photo of an RB-26L: probably the least known version of the Invader. Outwardly similar to the RB-26C, the 'L was packed with state-of-the-art reconnaissance equipment. The aircraft seen here, 44-35779, was retained in the USA for training, while the other two RB-26Ls built went to Farm Gate in 1963.1. A. lfland

PROJECT FARM GATE: VIETNAM 1961-1964

On ramp alert at Bien Hoa in October 1963. Two B-26s were kept in readiness at all times, and if one was scrambled a replacement was immediately bombed up and towed to the alert area. The nearest aircraft is loaded with 'wallto-wall nape,' Le. six napalm bombs.

143

i'"

;

D. Arneson

munications equipment, location of cockpit controls, etc. As one result, valid wiring diagrams do not exist for many of the aircraft ... Armament switches for the various stores and stations are placed in five separate locations in each of the four different armament switch configurations within the B-26 fleet.' These variations in aircraft configuration had caused exactly the same problems for the USAF squadrons using the B-26 in Korea. They, too, had received aircraft that had been in storage for several years, and only given a minimum of rehabilitation before being sent to the combat units. Apparently these lessons had been forgotten by the time the Invaders were wheeled out of storage for the second time. . But, all in all, the B-26s were still effective aircraft, and were considered definitely superior to the T-28s. Despite the slow start, Farm Gate had flown a total of 1,135 B-26 combat sorties by the end of 1962, and some crews had completed over 100 missions in less than four months. Four additional B-26Bs had arrived at Bien Hoa during the summer. The first two, ferried in from Kadena on Okinawa in June, were in very poor shape, and both had to limp in to Clark on one engine for emergency repairs before eventually reaching Bien Hoa. Farm Gate also received four Helio U-IOA (formerly L-28A) Super Couriers during the year, and on New Year's Day 1963 the total unit strength stood at twenty-four aircraft, or almost forty per cent of the total number of USAF aircraft in South Vietnam. This total included seven B-26Bs and one RB-26C. Although the whole of South Vietnam could be covered from the base at Bien Hoa, three B-26s were based further north at Pleiku from that day, to improve the response time. From February 1963, the strength of the detachment increased to six B-26s. On occasion, B-26s were also temporarily based at Da Nang. The military situation had remained fairly stable during 1962, with neither the Viet Cong nor the South Vietnamese forces achieving any decisive victories. If anything, the Viet Cong forces were somewhat worse off than a year earlier. The resentment of the Diem regime had deepened, however, partly as a result of the 'fortified hamlets' concept. Under this scheme, a large part of the rural population was more or less forcibly relocated to newly constructed villages under stricter government control. A half-hearted attack by a South

'--"'---..-Vietnamese regiment at Ap Bac on 2 January 1963 resulted in several casualties among the participating US advisors, while the Viet Cong troops escaped under cover of darkness. The incident was seen by many as an example of the low morale and general ineptitude of the South Vietnamese forces, and there were calls for increased US control of the war. But even before this battle, President Kennedy had approved a request for Farm Gate reinforcements made the previous September. General Anthis, the US air component commander in Vietnam, had asked for ten more B-26s and five more T-28s and these arrived from late January 1963 onwards. In fact, it appears that eleven rather than ten new B-26s arrived at this time. Unlike the previous B-26s and RB-26s allocated to Farm Gate, which had all come from other classified projects and had only received limited overhauls, the new arrivals had all been through a complete IRAN at Hill AFB under Project Big Fence. General Anthis later also. asked for a further B-26 squadron of twentyfive aircraft, but this never materialized. Two of the new aircraft reaching Farm Gate in early 1963 were rather special Invaders, known as RB-26Ls. They had been modified by General Dynamics at Fort Worth - with assistance from E-Systems at nearby Greenville - during 1962, under ProjectSweet Sue. Apart from the multitude of conventional cameras and associated equipment carried by both aircraft, one of them was also equipped with a Reconofax VI infrared aerial mapping system, which could be used for night-time surveillance of suspected Viet Cong lines of march and communication. The two RB-26Ls arrived at Bien Hoa on 3 March 1963 and from 5 March they were flown daily, on a maximum effort basis, virtually replacing··the RB-26Cs in the reconnaissance role. At this point they were the only aircraft in South Vietnam with any real night reconnaissance capability, apart from the single RC-97 of Project Brave Bull. Unfortunately, the infrared system was difficult to be made to work properly in the damp and dusty climate, and did not prove as effective as originally hoped for. A third RB-26L

was kept at Eglin in Florida, for training. It was also employed on a moose count project in Isle Royale National Park, Michigan! By I April 1963 the Farm Gate strike aircraft strength stood at twelve B-26Bs and thirteen T-28Bs. The number of personnel had more than doubled, to around 350, but there was still only one air crew available for each aircraft. Together with the two VNAF squadrons, which had a total of some fifty Skyraiders and T-28s, these twenty-five aircraft formed the only dedicated air strike capability in South Vietnam. The planning called for a further increase of Farm Gate strength, the target figure for the Invader being eighteen aircraft on hand in Vietnam, including the RB-26Ls. A further three Invaders were to be held in reserve within the Pacific Air Forces area. This target was reached for a brief period in mid 1963, but later the number decreased gradually to a dozen or so aircraft at hand, mainly due to the increasing aircraft losses during the year and the need to rotate aircraft to Taiwan for maintenance. The last four B-26s to be received by Farm Gate, arriving at Bien Hoa in the summer of 1963, were survivors of the CIA operation in Indonesia in 1958. They differed from all other B-26Bs in Vietnam in still having their wing guns mounted. As explained elsewhere, all the aircraft involved in Indonesia had been struck off charge as 'obsolete' in 1957, and officially they no longer existed. Three of those given to Farm Gate had been reserve aircraft during the operation, and had spent most of the time since 1958 in storage with Air Asia in Taiwan as CIA assets, until finally being allocated to Farm Gate in the spring of 1963. The fourth is probably the one that managed to intrigue even the Farm Gate personnel. In a report it is mentioned that one of the B-26s 'was "found" at Clark Air Base in 1961 and put into commission for a ferry flight to Tainan for limited clean-up. No historical records exist for the aircraft and the accountability of the aircraft itself remains a puzzle.' It is quite likely that the aircraft in question was 44-34376, which had participated in actual operations in Indonesia. When the operation was wound down it had presumably been

144

flown back to Clark, where nobody was terribly eager to get involved with this 'non-existent' bomber. So it was simply ignored and left to rot in some quiet corner of the field, until eventually brought to Taiwan in 1961. A report from 1963, titled 'Tactical Analysis of B/RB-26 Aircraft in Republic of Vietnam,' listed the various types of COIN missions undertaken in Vietnam, and analyzed the strength and weakness of the B-26 in each one. The following is a summary of the findings. The percentages given indicate the proportion of each type of mission, out of the total number of Invader combat missions flown during the first quarter of 1963. Interdiction (40%):

This heading covered all strikes against a predetermined target, with the exception of close air support, and was by far the most common type of mission. The B-26 was considered effective in this role, judging from the mission results reported by ground forces. Since the targets attacked were often buildings or structures in wooded or jungle areas, they were seldom observed directly by the B-26 crews. The crews had to rely totally on the directions of the FACs. Close AirSupport (I 8%): The B-26 was found to be suitable for air support of friendly ground forces, mainly because the variety and amount of ordnance carried permitted sustained delivery of firepower against multiple and varied targets. However, firing patterns generally had to be made to the left, since the pilot could not see his target in a right-hand turn. This rather

FOREIGN INVADERS

restricted the options in any given situation and made the strike patterns more predictable. But the Viet Cong apparently never caught on to this. As already mentioned, the B-26 was found to be particularly suitable for outpost defence at night, which accounted for about a quarter of the close air support missions flown. This was of major importance, since most Viet Cong activity took place at night. Air Cover (I 5%):

The long endurance of the B-26, giving it up to five hours over the target, made it effective in this role. A major problem, however, was the lack of compatible communications. The Vietnamese ground forces primarily used VHF-FM radios, while the Farm Gate aircraft were equipped with VHF-AM radios. This meant that all information had to be relayed through an airborne VNAF FAC, even if there was a FAC on the ground. From August 1962, VHF-FM was gradually introduced in the B-26s, but it was a very slow process.

Invader graveyard: the scene at Clark Field in the autumn of 1964, after the Invaders had been withdrawn from South Vietnam. Note the VNAF insignia partly repainted to resemble USAF insignia. The two black 8-268s in the foreground were both former CIA aircraft. via R. Besecker

pattern, always keeping within sight of the escorted vehicles. No attacks were ever carried out against any escorted vehicles, at least not up to mid 1963. The B-26 was less suited for helicopter escort, due to its poor lowspeed capabilities. ArmedReconnaissance (5%):

The long endurance of the B-26 theoretically made it suitable. However, since no strikes could be undertaken without a FAC, it was not much use flying this type of mission: even if a target was spotted it could not be attacked. Armed reconnaissance was therefore only carried out during deployment flights, seldom yielding intelligence and never resulting in strikes.

Photo Reconnaissance (I 3 %):

Around 70% of the photo targets assigned were not completed due to low cloud ceiling, particularly in the mountainous I and II Corps areas. Another problem was that the pilot could not sight directly over the nose of the RB-26, so the navigator had to move to the. nose position to direct him. Escort (9%):

Again, the favourable endurance of the B-26 made it suited for most escort duties. Escorting trains or convoys was accomplished by a slowly advancing race track

Visual Reconnaissance (0%):

Since the B-26s could be more profitably used on strike missions, visual reconnaissance was usually left to other types of aircraft. The B-26 could theoretically carry a total of 7,500 pounds of disposable armament. But in Vietnam they seldom carried more than 6,000 pounds, and usually even less. One reason was the condition of the runway at Bien Hoa. Up to April 1963, when a 10,000 feet concrete runway was built, it was only 5,300 feet

PROJECT FARM GATE: VIETNAM 1961-1964

long and consisted mainly of deteriorating pierced steel planking. Since many of the strike missions were carried out in mountain terrain, it was also important to have the extra climb performance given by a lighter load. A typical ramp-alert ordnance load consisted of two 500 Ib napalm bombs and two LAU-3A 2.75" rocket launchers under the wings, plus six 100 Ib GP bombs and six 120 Ib frag clusters in the bomb bay. In addition, each nose gun had 350 rounds of .50 ammunition, giving a total ordnance load of about 4,000 pounds. Other alternative loads included six napalm bombs under the wings and twelve frag clusters in the bomb bay. Or two rocket pods and four 500 Ib GP bombs under the wings, and six more in the bomb bay. The minimum release altitude for bombs was usually 1,600 feet, with a pull-out altitude of 1,000 feet to avoid bomb blast damage. Bombs were normally delivered in steep dives, and conventional straight-and-Ievel bombing missions were rarely if ever flown. Rockets and guns were fired at considerably lower altitudes, while napalm was dropped as low as 50-200 feet. Amajor problem was the two G load limitation imposed on seven of the Farm Gate B-26s after it had been discovered that the original waist gun optic sight mount, replaced by a plywood floor during previous IRANs, had been part of the load bearing Although frequently quoted as being the last Invader of the USAF, VB-26B 44-34610 was in fact outlived by thirteen A-26As and one 8-26B. It was, however, the last flying example when retired in 1972. In the early 1960s, the VIPconfigured aircraft was briefly used to train Jungle Jim crews. 1. G. Handelman via L. Lundin

structure of the fuselage. Most of the ordnance delivered by these aircraft therefore had to be released at a fairly high altitude, to permit a gentle recovery. The rehabilitation status of the B-26s improved during 1963, with aircraft being rotated to Air Asia on Taiwan, or to Clark Air Base for IRANs. Some of the in-country maintenance work was also contracted out to Air Vietnam. But there was still reason to agree with the report claiming that, 'to term the present B-26 an unsophisticated aircraft is to pay it an unwarranted compliment,' and the type was still seen as temporary equipment only, pending more suitable equipment, such as the Skyraider or the B-26K then under development. During 1962, most B-26 missions had been carried out by single aircraft, while the T-28s usually flew in pairs. But with the loss of two Invaders to ground fire in February 1963, and the near doubling of the number of available aircraft, it became common to use pairs of B-26s instead of single aircraft, so that one Invader could suppress the ground fire while the other one carried out the actual strike. Similarly, T-28 missions were often increased from two to four aircraft. In February 1963, General LeMay argued that it was now well known that Farm Gate was a purely American unit and that it was time to stop pretending otherwise: to continue to run it as a classified operation was just an administrative burden. The classification was dropped during the spring of 1963 and on 8 July that year the unit was reformed as the 1st Air Commando Squadron (Composite) of the 34th Tactical Group: a regular and official USAF combat squadron, dropping the pretense that they were in any.

145

way controlled by the VNAF. The Farm Gate aircraft were at this point officially assigned to 2nd Air Division Headquarters. This organizational change made little difference to the role of the unit, and missions continued to be carried out much in the same way as before. However, the two RB-26Ls and two RB-26Cs now operated under the direction of Detachment 1 of the 33rd Tactical Group at Tan Son Nhut. Now that Farm Gate was no longer classified, some attempts were made to drop the code name, but it had become so well-known throughout the USAF that it was finally decided to keep it. Around this time, the national insignia on most of the aircraft were also repainted to resemble USAF markings. But it appears that not too much effort was put into this change, and the result was often a mix between USAF and VNAF insignia. As before, they were usually only applied to the fuselage sides. The only other marking normally carried by the Farm Gate Invaders was the black serial number on the fin. Most of their early aircraft had a natural metal finish with anti-glare panels and engine nacelles in black. Later aircraft, which had been through the IRAN program at Hill, were overall grey (FS 595a 36373) rather than natural metal. A few Invaders, those received from CIA stocks at Tainan, were overall black and had their serials painted in red. The unit personnel received some official, albeit indirect recognition in November 1963, when the 4400th CCTS was awarded the Air Force Outstanding Unit Award for the period May 1961 to May 1962. Although the Farm Gate operations were not specifically cited in the award, they had no doubt been taken into consideration during the selection work.

146

FOREIGN INVADERS

The US military involvement in Vietnam especially as the aircraft initially had no G had continued to grow at a modest pace, but meter to tell the crew how rnany Gs they there were still formal plans for a phasing out were pulling. (G meters may have been fitted of the troops in the not too distant future. The after 1962, however.) After a B-26 had lost a total collapse of the Diem regime during the wing during a mission on 16 August 1963, last part of 1963, culminating in the murder of strict limitations were imposed on the stressPresident Diem himself in early November, ing allowed during missions. But when plus the successful Viet Cong offensive Captains Herman S. Moore and Lawrence L. towards the end of the year, finally led to all Lively were killed in B-26B number 44-35665 such plans for a US withdrawal being shelved on 11 February 1964, the decision was taken in early 1964. to withdraw the B-26 from combat altoMany members of the US government gether. Moore and Lively had been flying in a were convinced that the Viet Cong was fire-power demonstration at Eglin AFB range wholly dependent on aid and control from 52 when the left wing of their aircraft sepaHanoi, despite intelligence analyses to the rated during pull-out from a strafing run. contrary. A programme of covert operations When news of this second accident against North Vietnam was therefore put into reached Vietnam, one B-26 was airborne on a action in February 1964, in an effort to put strike mission. The crew was given orders by pressure on the North Vietnamese. However, radio to return immediately to Bien Hoa, these operations were unlikely to have any making sure not to put any undue stress on decisive effect, and on 17 March President the aircraft on their way back. From this day Johnson ordered that detailed planning for on, the Farm Gate B-26s were, for all practical more direct action was to be carried out. purposes, grounded. The conversion of B-26Bs into B-26Ks had These plans included bombing raids against . military and possibly also industrial targets in commenced in November 1963, with the North Vietnam, to be carried out by the VNAF ,intention of replacing the Farm Gate B-26s and by Farm Gate, the latter reinforced for during the second half of 1964, but there was this purpose by three squadrons of B-57s to no way the old, unconverted B-26s could be be flown in from Japan. The plans were never kept in service until then. The remaining thircarried out and it was not until a year later teen aircraft were flown to Clark Field during that the first USAF bombing of targets in North the first week of April, where they were offiVietnam took place. cially taken on charge by the Super The nose of RB-26L '779, showing the typical But even if the plans had been imple- Sabre-equipped 405th Tactical Fighter Wing. camera window also seen on most RB-26Cs. mented immediately, it would have made Four of them were to become involved in the 1. A. Ifland little difference to Farm Gate: time had finally Congo operations, and two RB-26s made it caught up with their B-26s. The heavy under- back to the USA to be reclaimed at Hill AFB, Seldom seen outside its hangar at Albrook, wing loads used by Farm Gate imposed high but the majority were scrapped in the 'G-5' (44-35232) carried the IAAFA crest on the negative G-forces on the wings when taxiing Philippines in late 1964 or early 1965. vertical fin and the underwing antennae the aircraft on the bumpy airfields in Vietnam, The T-28s of Farm Gate had also started believed to be a radar altimeter installation. and the structures were becoming increas- suffering losses from structural failures by the This photo was taken in 1971. The ultimate fate ingly fatigued. The fact that the aircraft were spring of 1964, and as a consequence they, of the aircraft - the last Invader on USAF used as dive bombers did not help either, too, were withdrawn, temporarily putting the charge - is unknown. G. E. Buehlmann unit 'out of business.' Beginning in May 1964, an initial twenty-five Skyraiders' were received as replacements for the B-26s and T-28s, and this type became the standard equipment of all the Air Commando squadrons in Vietnam for the next few years. The training squadron at Hurlburt Field, by now known as the 602nd Fighter Squadron (Composite) of the 1st Air Commando Wing, had also had their old B-26s grounded in February. By the end of April most had gone to Davis-Monthan for temporary storage or directly to On Mark for conversion to B-26Ks, with the last stragglers leaving Hurlburt in late June. This left only three B-26Bs (44-34350, -34596 and -35428) in squadron hands, with the 605th Air Commando Squadron at Howard in the Panama Canal Zone, but on 12 October 1964 the last of these also arrived at Davis-Monthan for storage. Thus ended the twenty years of first-line service of the B-26B/C and the RB-26 with the US armed forces. Although really outside the scope of this book, it may be appropriate to give some

PROJECT FARM GATE: VIETNAM 1961-1964

details of the few B-26s, other than On Mark conversions, remaining on USAF strength after this date. Five former Air Commando B-26Bs remained in storage at DavisMonthan until October 1969, when they were authorized for reclaimation, together with JB-26C serial 44-35627 used for testing in Detroit until July 1965, and B-26C N800W (44-35725) employed by the Weather Bureau

until February 1965. The three VB-26Bs of the Air National Guard Headquarters at Andrews AFB were struck off charge on: 19 November 1969 44-34665 10 December 1970 44-34360 12 October 1972 44-34610 But these were all outlived by B-26B serial 44-35232 used as an instructional airframe by the Inter-American Air Forces Academy at

147

Albrook in the Canal Zone since the 1950s. Admittedly, the aircraft had not flown for many years by the time it was terminated as 'obsolete' on 17 June 1974, but it had been kept in flyable condition and was not re-designated as a GB-26B (meaning 'permanently grounded') until November 1973. It did, in fact, even outlive the last A-26A on USAF charge by more than a year.

PROJECT FARM GATE

USAF Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

44-34376 44-34539 44-34551 44-34620 44-34681

B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B B-26B

Haik, HP-323

44-34682 44-347f8 44-35207

B-26B RB-26L B-26B

Haik, HP-319? Mill Pond?

44-35335 44-35507

B-26B B-26B

44-35514 44-35525

Arrived Departed/Lost

1 Ju163? 1 Ju163? 27 Jan 63? 1 Ju163? Jun 62

1 Apr 64 1 Apr 64 1 Apr 64 1 Apr 64 16 Aug 63

10 Ju163? 3 Mar 63? Jan 63?

4 Sep 63 1 Apr 64 7 Jan 64

Mill Pond? Mill Pond?

27 Jan 63? Jan 63?

21 Nov 63 6 Feb 63

B-26B B-26B

Mill Pond?

27 Jan 63? 27 Jan 63?

1 Apr 64 8 Apr 63

44-35530

B-26B

Mill Pond?

Dec 61

5 Nov 62?

44-35566 44-35585

B-26B RB-26C

27 Jan 63? May 62

14 Jan 64 1 Apr 64

44-35663

B-26B

Mill Pond?1 Black Watch Mill Pond?

Jan 63?

1 Jul63

44-35692

B-26B

Mill Pond?

Dec 61

3 Feb 63?

44-35703

B-26B

Mill Pond?

Dec61

1 Apr 64

44-35782 44-35804

RB-26L 8-268

Pluto? Mill Pond?

3 Mar 63? Aug 62

6 Dec 63 1 Apr 64

44-35813

R8-26C

May 62

20 Apr 64

44-35822

B-268

Mill Pond?1 Black Watch Mill Pond?

Jun 62

1 Apr 64

44-35855

8-268

Mill Pond?

Dec61

1 Apr 64

44-35890

8-268

Mill Pond?

Aug 62?

1 Apr 64

44-35912

8-268

27 Jan 63?

13 Oct 63

AA 44-34539, Haik Haik, HP-318-P Mill Pond?

Remarks

Scrapped at Clark Field. Scrapped at Clark Field. Scrapped at Clark Field. Scrapped at Clark Field. Wing broke off in flight. Capt. J. H. McClean, lilt A. E. Bedal and VNAF observer KIA. Wlo due to flying accident (mechanical failure). Scrapped at Hill AFB. Crashed during test flight, 10 NM south of Bien Hoa. Maj. H. D. Adams and Capt. C. W. Gordon killed. Terminated due to 'natural phenomena.' Criished after engine failure, following AA hit near Pleiku. Maj. J. E. O'Neill KIA, other two crew members bailed out. Scrapped at Clark Field. Crashed during strafing run, 20 NM west of Kon Tum. Crew of three KIA. Shot down during napalm run, Mekong Delta. Capt. R. D. Bennett, lilt W. B. Tully and VNAF observer KIA. (May possibly apply to 44-35692) Wlo due to flying accident? Scrapped at Clark Field. Transferred to Tainan. Scrapped at Clark Field Apr 64. Shot down during strafing run, Mekong Delta. Capt. J. P. Bartley, Capt. J. F. Shaughnessy, Jr and VNAF observer KIA? (May possibly apply to 44-35530) Transferred to Clark Field. To Congo? Terminated at Tainan. Transferred to Clark Field. To Congo? Scrapped at Hill AF8. Transferred to Oark Field. To Congo? Marked '25855' in error. Scrapped at Clark Field. Transferred to Clark Field. To Congo. Scrapped at Taipei.

The aircraft did not necessarily serve in Vietnam for the whole period shown above, many being rotated out to Clark Field or Tainan for maintenance and extensive overhauls. The versions shown for the aircraft are partly based on photographs and other 'hard' evidence, since those given in the USAF record cards for the Farm Gate Invaders are in many cases wrong or at least suspect. Furthermor~, no card entries were made before 1963. Nevertheless, the listing is believed to be substantially correct. For the record, the 8-26s, R8-26s and T8-26s used for training at Hurlburt Field at one point or another during the period 1961 to 1964 included the following aircraft: 41-39450, -39573, -39596, 44-34108, -34135, -34173, -34198, -34350, -34551, -34596, -34606, -34652, -35205, -35207, -35251, -35335, -35375, -35392, -35428, -35451, -35455, -35507, -35525, -35566, -35663, -35665, -35714, -35779, -35820 and -35912. Also, for a short period only, V8-268 serial 44-34610.

148

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty Seven

Anstalt Wigmo: The Congo 1964-1967 The history of the civil war which raged in the was far too late to train the Congolese to strike aircraft remained in the Congo. This was soon to become a matter of concern for Congo during the 1960s is very complex, and ensure a smooth transition of power. Consequently, when the Congo became both the Congolese and US governments. the fighting often saw the various forces and In early 1964, a rebellion broke out in the parties involved change sides during different independent on 30 June 1960, the country phases of the war. In fact, with the risk of was immediately thrown into chaos. Within a Kwilu province in southwestern Congo. The over-simplifying matters somewhat, the week, there was tribal unrest in various parts Congolese Army, the ANC, had little success period can be broken down into three more of the country, the army had mutinied and the in containing the spreading of the revolt, in or less separate conflicts: the Katangese white population had begun fleeing back to spite of their superior numbers and equipsecession of 1960-1963, the Simba rebellion Europe. On 11 July, the province of Katanga ment, and the rebels quickly gained ground. of 1964-1966 and the mercenary revolt of declared itself independent, under the lead- The United States had committed itself to 1967. The history of the B-26s in the Congo ership of Moise Tshombe. The Congolese support the Congolese government, and the mainly coincides with the second of these govemment appealed to the United Nations CIA was given the task of organizing a small conflicts, but their deployment was indirectly . for help, and within days the first peace-keep- air unit to support the ANC. Initial equipment caused by the events during the preceding ing troops had arrived in the country. Both the 'comprised a few T-6s, supplied by Italy for years. USA and the Soviet Union also took a great training purposes. These were quickly fitted The Congo officially became a Belgian interest in the country (the third-largest on with gun pods and rocket launchers. Since colony in 1908 and remained in Belgian the African continent) and before long it had there were still no Congolese pilots capable hands until 1960. The British and the French become the scene of much plotting and of flying air strikes, the air crews also had to had both taken steps to transfer large parts of manoeuvering between the superpowers. come from abroad. Political considerations the administration of their colonies to the Tshombe proved to be an astute politician prohibited the use of' T'" '\F pilots, and the CIA native people, beginning the process years and a skilled diplomat, and not until January therefore turned to anuther source: the group before granting them independence. But this 1963 did he finally admit defeat and end the of exile Cubans who had flown in the Bay of never happened in the Belgian colonies. The secession. The small but capable Katangese Pigs operations. The CIA had kept in touch Belgians expected to keep their African pos- Air Force had been completely wiped out with most of the Cubans, sometimes giving a sessions for decades to come, and chose to during the fighting and the Forces Aeriennes fill all administrative positions, from low-level Congolaises (the Congolese Air Force) still management up, with Belgians. There were existed only on paper, although an Italian air One of the first Congolese B-26Ks, armed with virtually no Congolese with higher education, mission had arrived to begin a training pro- four 2.75" rocket pods, seen at Kamina in or in positions of any influence. The decision gramme for the FAC. This meant that when Katanga. In the background is one of the two to grant Congo independence was only the last five 5MB J 29Bs of the UN forces B-26Bs, with the second aircraft just visible announced in October 1959, and by then it were retired in August 1963, no operational through the hangar door. 1. Noel via H. Demaret

ANSTALT WIGMO: THE CONGO 1964-1967

t

helping hand if needed. At first, only about eight pilots were hired, flying their first missions in April 1964. The unit commander was Joaquin Varela, who had previously commanded the B-26 squadron in the Bay of Pigs operation. The Cuban pilots who flew in the Congo usually did so for three reasons: firstly, because of the left-wing backing of the rebellion; secondly, the pay was relatively good (initially about $800 a month); and thirdly, as one pilot put it, 'I would rather fly aeroplanes than park cars at a hotel in Miami.' In early June, the T-6s were replaced by more modem T-28s, and by mid June there were reports of American 'civilian' pilots participating in operations, but the bulk of the missions continued to be flown by the Cubans. A number of Belgian 'advisors' had also arrived to fly C-47s and helicopters. By this time the situation had deteriorated further, and a second pocket of rebellion had broken -out in eastern Congo. If anything, the brutal reprisal actions taken by the ANC had served to enrage the population and increase the support for the rebels. In a surprise moye, the Congolese government recalled Tshombe from his exile, to serve as a uniting force. Within ten days of his return in late June 1964, Tshombe had been appointed Prime Minister. The original instigator of the Kwilu rebellion was Pierre Mule"-, Jformerly Minister of Education and Fine Arts, who had the support of CNL: a left-wing liberation movement based in the former French Congo. But to take advantage of the initially unrelated uprisings in eastern Congo, Mulele's backers toned down the political aspects of their revolt, and instead played on the rebels' general dissatisfaction with the Congolese government, reinforced with liberal doses of witchcraft. Two well-known fetishists were paid to dispense 'magic' water, known as 'Mai MUlele,' which was supposed to make the rebels immune to the bullets of the ANC. This initiation transformed the warrior into a 'Simba' (Lion) and soon the whole revolt became known as the Simba rebellion. The rebellion continued to spread, and on 4 August one of the military commanders of the Sirnbas,'Lieutenant General' Nicholas Olenga, captured Stanleyville in northern Congo. Among the thousands of hostages taken were several Americans, including the staff of the US Consulate in Stanleyville, and this fact would indire<.:t1y lead to the ultimate destruction of the Simbas. Within days, the US government had reached an agreement with Belgium to help Tshombe raise a force of mercenaries to spearhead the ANC's campaign against the rebels, and the CIA was also ordered to expand the air strike unit even further. With the arrival of the T-28s in June, the number of Cuban pilots had increased to around twenty to twenty-five. Again, most were Bay of Pigs veterans, but there were

149

Gustavo Ponzoa (left) and Joaquin 'Pupy' Varela - commander of the Cuban pilots in the Congo, and previously the CO of the B-26 squadron in Operation Pluto - at Leopoldville in September 1964, in front of B-26K The Boogie Bogey (RF646). via G. Ponzoa

The 'office' of a B-26K, as seen from the cockpit jumpseat. The layout offered several modifications and refinements over the older Invaders. T. Spencer

A group of Cuban and British armourers employed by Wigmo, loading the spacious ammunition bins of a B-26K with .50 calibre ammunition. A full load consisted of 2,800 rounds. T. Spencer

some exceptions. Many of the pilots had previously flown B-26s, and soon their CIA case officer was receiving requests to arrange for Invaders to supplement the T-28s. Although it was agreed that the B-26 would be suitable for use in the Congo, finding the aircraft proved something of a problem. Virtually all the remaining B-26Bs and 'Cs of the USAF had been grounded due to fatigue problems, and so far only a single B-26K had been completed by On Mark. As an interim measure, four of the least dilapidated Invaders of those previously operated in Vietnam were pulled from the boneyard at Clark Field in the Philippines and sent to Okinawa .for refurbishing. They were removed from the USAF inventory on 24 June 1964, listed as transferred to a classified project: the last USAF B-26s permanently assigned to the CIA for covert operations.

As it turned out, these B-26Bs were not to be the first Invaders to arrive in the country. After Stanleyville had fallen to the Simbas, the CIA operation quickly received a higher priority than before, and the United States ambassador had requested ten B-26s as reinforcements. It was decided to immediately divert three brand new B-26Ks to the Congo. They were delivered to Florida on 13 August 1964, straight from the On Mark plant at Van Nuys, and within twenty-four hours were on their way to Africa, flown by crews seconded from the 602nd Fighter Squadron (Composite) at Hurlburt Field'. The Invaders were accompanied by a C-130 carrying about 'All the B-26Ks that went to the Congo remained on USAF charge. According to their record cards, the Congo years were officially spent in storage at Hill AFB in Utah.

150

FOREIGN INVADERS

half a dozen mechanics as well as spare August, and another one was apparently left by another CIA operation. The other 8-26B parts. The delivery route went through Dutch behind at· Okiqawa. Possibly it had been was apparently never flown again, instead Guyana, Recife in 8razil, and Ascension found to be in too poor condition, or maybe being used as a source of spare parts for the Island, to N'Djili airport at Leopoldville in the one airframe had to be cannibalized for parts B-26Ks. Congo, where they arrived during the night of during the refurbishing. Either way, it seems So far, the maintenance of the CIA aircraft 17 and 18 August. The Air Commando crews only two 8-268s actually" made it to the had mainly been in the hands of Cuban were not quite sure what to expect on arrival, Congo, but were never to see much use. The ground crews, plus one or two mechanics of and it was with some trepidation that they got Cubans quickly found out that these very other nationalities, but the rapid expansion of out of their aircraft, weapons at the ready, same aircraft had previously been con- the air unit made it necessary to hire large into the African night. To their relief, they demned by the USAF, and were numbers of additional personnel. The CIA were met by members of the Joint Task Force understandably outraged that the Americans therefore formed Anstalt Wigmo', an estabLeopoldville: a small force of USAF C-130s nevertheless had no reservations about let- lishment registered in Liechtenstein on 21 and UH-18 helicopters which had deployed ting them be flown in combat by Cuban September 1964, to administer the recruiting to the Congo a few days earlier. pilots. Even their CIA case officer expressed of ground crews. The president of the comTraining of the Cuban pilots commenced surprise that his superiors should act in such pany was George L. Monteiro of Miami, immediately. Since many of them already an irresponsible manner. A written directive Florida, while the Congo end was managed had a lot of experience with earlier versions was immediately issued, ordering that the with an iron fist by Raymond Tolouse. Many of the 8-26, conversion into the 8-26K was rel- 8-268s were not to be flown on missions. of the new recruits were Englishmen, or atively straight-forward and the first combat One of the 8-268s was fitted with benches Poles living in England, but there was also a mission was flown on 21 August. Their first in the bomb bay, and was kept on stand-by as major engagement followed on 29 and 30 a means of escape for the Americans at the 'It has been claimed that the name Wigmo was August, when two Invaders gave support to base, should things get out of hand. It had an abbreviation of Western International Ground the ANC during their recapture of Albertville originally been intended that the Air Maintenance Organisation, but their is no on Lake Tanganyika. In fact, their perfor- . Commandos should only deliver the 8-26Ks mention of this in the company registration mance and fire-power impressed the ANC and give the CIA air and ground crew a quick documents. Another version has it that the name commander so greatly that when the 8-26s check-out on the new equipment, but in the 'was short for Wigmore Street, reputedly the landed at Albertville airfield after its capture event they were to remain in the Congo for location ofWigrno's London office. he refused them permission to take off again, around three months. Later on, the same having decided to keep them for his own per- aircraft was fitted out as a makeshift recon- A nice view of The Boogie Bogey over the jungles of Congo, probably in mid 1965. The sonal use! It took a day or two before the naissance plane and was still sporadically code has been changed to FR-646 and moved pilots managed to escape with their aircraft. used as late as 1966. It was sometimes to the rear fuselage. Note the unusual position Soon afterwards, the 8-268s finally arrived. referred to as the 'U-3', in a tongue-in-cheek of the Makasi badge: it was later moved to the One of them had crashed and burnt in Aden comparison with the somewhat more front of the nose, like on the other B-26Ks. on the way to the Congo, on or around 21 sophisticated reconnaissance aircraft used via R. Garcia

"

ANSTALT WIGMO: THE CONGO 1964-1967

large group of Swedes, several Germans, and the odd Dane, Norwegian, Spaniard, Finn and Belgian: altogether some 100 men. The German and Polish mechanics were held in high regard by the Cuban pilots, but they were less impressed by the English armourers, particularly after several instances where guns were found to be jammed due to faulty loading. Wigmo was officially under contract to the Congolese government to maintain the FAC's aircraft, and the personnel were issued with ANC passes. The first groups of Cuban pilots were apparently not hired by Wigmo, however, but by the Caribbean Marine Aero Corporation (Caramar) in the USA. All the aircraft operated by the CIA in the Congo were officially part of the FAC, even though the Congolese had little or no direct influence on their use'. The missions were in 'The CIA air strike unit has sometimes been referred ·to as 22 Squadron, or even 22 Wing. This may have been its FAC paper designation, but it was never known as such by the people who flew and maintained the aircraft. The Cuban pilots simply referred to themselves as 'EI Grupo Voluntario Cubano', or 'Cuban Volunteer Group'.

The Shit-House Mouse - alias RF644 - seen during a visit to Kamina. The first three B-26Ks were all given names soon after arrival, by the USAF Air Commando crews who accompanied them to the Congo. Alas, the no doubt interesting stories behind the names are not known. via R. Garda

reality scheduled by a succession of CIA case officers, under the guidance of the American Embassy. In rare cases, a USAF officer from the embassy would give a briefing based on reconnaissance photos, but usually the pilots would only be informed that the Simbas held such-and-such a village, and told to 'go shoot them up.' There was also close liaison with Lieutenant-Colonel Emile Bouzin, who was the commander of FATAC (the Belgian Air Force detachment in the Congo), as well as chief advisor to the FAC. The B-26s and the T-28s were both used for more or less the same types of missions, the main difference being that the B-26s had greater fire power and a longer range, and would normally be flown by a two-man crew. Since no internal load was carried by the B-26s in the Congo, they had a long-range fuel tank permanently installed in the bomb bay. The Invaders tended to be kept together at one of the main bases, except when supporting a particular ground operation, while the T-28s were based in small groups at different airfields around the country. Many of the missions flown were armed reconnaissance patrols over Simba-held territory, where any military target could be attacked without specific orders. Trains could also be attacked, but the pilots were requested not to fire at the diesel locomotives, which would be both expensive and difficult to repair or replace once the Simbas had been defeated. The Simbas themselves would not harm the

151

engines: they would just use them until the fuel ran out, and then abandon them on the track. In general, the Simbas had little understanding of logistics, and would often leave fuel dumps and other supplies behind, intact, when evacuating a town. The pilots were kept informed about the movements of the ANC, who were not supposed to enter any of the free-fire areas without prior notification to the air unit. But, inevitably, there were incidents where government troops were hit by friendly fire. On one occasion, an ANC unit had found a train at a station recaptured from the Simbas, and decided to go for a joy ride. Unfortunately, they headed into a free-fire area and were attacked by two B-26s, which inflicted heavy casualties. The Cuban pilots became a bit apprehensive when they found out who had been at the receiving end of their strafing, but an ANC officer told them not to worry: the troops should not have gone into the area to start with and, besides, this should teach them to keep their hands off the trains in the future ... Despite their small numbers (some ten to fifteen aircraft for a country almost ten times the area of Great Britain), restrictions on the ordnance carried (only machine guns and rockets were used; bombs were forbidden for political reasons) and obsolescence in design, the B-26s and T-28s were formidable weapons. There was no opposition whatsoever in the air, the Simbas had no anti-aircraft

152

FOREIGN INVADERS

guns or missiles, and the terrain was often flat symmetry in the way they acted: they had a " with limited protection against air attacks. modicum "of prQfessionalism, this particular The odds against the Simbas were heavy, and unit. I think there were two companies of they often took terrible losses. about 120 men each, that's whatitlooked like If the Simbas had been better organized, tome. .," 'I see all these soldiers dismounting from they could easily have taken advantage of the lax security at the airfields. Often there would the trucks and, despite our presence in the be only atoken guard detail, and a deter- air, marching on the road. In a Western army, mined attack would probably have enabled when someone sees an aeroplane, everythe rebels to destroy most if not all of the air- body disappears. But these soldiers did not craft on the ground. The pilots also had a disappear. No, no: they were just dismountfavourite restaurant called the 'Pizzeria,' ing from their trucks! I saw them perfectly where they used to hang out virtually every when I flew over, so I told Bouzin, "Colonel, I evening, and one or two hand grenades have a lot of troops over here, but they are in thrown through the windows would have the uniform of the ANC, and they don't look grounded the air force in one stroke. like a rebel unit." He answered, "They are Fortunately for the CIA, the Simbas had no enemies: they were shooting at you when training in guerrilla tactics. you flew over them." At times, the aircraft were also called in to 'From the airport, Bouzin had a perfect support ground troops during both offensive view of a big barge used to transport people and defensive operations. The first time the from one side of the river to the other. I kept B-26Ks were used to halt a major Simba the other B-26 high, and then I went down to attack was at Boende in northwestern have a look. There were several people in the Congo, in early September 1964. The town of . barge: about ten men in uniform, and a figure Boende is on the Congo River, and the in white clothing. This person had his arms Simbas were pushing in from the east. The open, and when Iwent really low I saw that it pilot commanding one of these missions was was a priest. The Catholic priests in the Rene Garda, who was to take over as Chief of Congo wore robes in a sort of cream colour, Operations on Varela's departure later that but from a distance it looked almost white. I year: told the Colonel, and he said, "Shoot, but try 'Colonel Bouzin told us that the airfield was not to hit the priest." Iwas about to answer, "I still in our hands, but the guys on the ground have eight machine guns here: this is not a would not be able to hold back the enemy shooting gallery!" but I realized that someover there - as usual. He would go in and body had to shoot. And, to a certain extent, land, and then direct us over the radio. He the priest was expendable: unfortunately, he landed in Boende in a C-47, and the enemy had been captured and was being used as a wasn't there yet, but they were just arriving. shield. I lined up the people in my gunsight; There was a long line of trucks, and the sol- just a little bit high, over the head of the whitediers were all in uniform: uniforms taken robed figure. With fear, I pressed my trigger, from the ANC. This was not usual with the and when I looked down I saw about three Simbas. Sometimes they had feathers and people falling; three people, and the priest things; good weapons, yes, but not uniforms. was not one of them. That priest should go to These were very well armed and there was church every day and thank the Lord! It was

just an act of God, Iguess. As far as Iknow, the priest was not killed by the Simbas: when they assassinated a priest, you would normallyhearall about it. 'After that, I called the Colonel and he said, "Shoot! Shoot!" Those were his orders. Bouzin was very good on the radio: he never used an extra word. So I called the other guy and we started a carousel with machine gun fire against the trucks across the river. Destroying tneir transportation was more important than killing the people. I didn't use rockets, because ... what for? I don't know how many there were; twelve, sixteen trucks - something like that. You could see the tracers going into them, but not a single one exploded. In the movies, everything explodes, but not in reality. But you could see that they were disintegrating. 'Once the transportation was wiped out, those two companies still stayed on the road. They were shooting at us and we were strafing them; sixteen heavy machine guns against two companies on the ground, and they ,did not move to take cover! Evidently, they were sold on the idea of Pierre Mulele and had drunk the Mai Mulele. I felt like yelling to them, "For God's sake, take cover!" but they were not taking cover. Finally, they were piling their dead and wounded on the side of the road, very methodically. We did not feel like shooting them while they were doing that, but whenever they were in the center of the road, shooting at us, we strafed them. I think we killed most of them, right there. The few that survived, survived because we were sick of the killing.' The Invaders returned to Leopoldville with their ammunition all but spent. Despite this massacre, the Simbas took Boende shortly afterwards. The ANC were still full of fear of the 'magical' powers of their enemy, ,and put up little resistance. Due to the small number of aircraft available in the Congo, the B-26s would sometimes also be used for search and rescue missions. In his book Congo Warriors, Michael Hoare relates an episode when a B-26 was used to drop a life-raft to the crew of a ship sunk on Lake Tanganyika, during his operations in that area. Another example was the search for a T-6, flown by a South African pilot, that went missing on 18 January 1966. Two B-26Ks were used in the search, finally locating the crashed T-6 on the second day. The only strike aircraft in the Congo not under the control of the CIA were the small numbers of T-6s previously flown by the Cubans. When these had been replaced by T28s, the Americans had handed back the remaining T-6s to the Congolese, for use as trainers. But Tshombe was a man who liked

RF644 also carried the name Cachita on the right side of the nose: the only Congolese B-26K with two names. via R. Garda

ANSTAL T WIGMO: THE CONGO 1964-1967

\.

153

to have an ace up his sleeve, and in late July 1964 set about recruiting mercenaries to fly these aircraft. After a few initial (and ineffectual) strikes, the unit officially became operational as 21 Squadron on 3 October, under the command of Jerry Puren: a South African who had served with Tshombe in Katanga. This provoked a suspension of all CIA-flown air strikes for a week in mid October, and an American threat to withdraw the T-28s and B-26s altogether. Tshombe relented and agreed to put the squadron under American control. The T-6s saw relatively little use, however, and some of the pilots later converted to T-28s instead. The Simba offensive had petered out in late September, by which time they controlled almost half the country. Some of the newly recruited mercenaries had been dispatched to shore up the ANC defences in the north, and by early October the Simbas began to be pushed.back at several points. In accordance with the American-Belgian agreement reached in early August, and since approved by the Congolese government, the Belgian Army Colonel Frederic Vandewalle had been appointed commander of the ground operation aimed at rescuing the hostages at Stanleyville. This operation was given the name L 'Ommengang and involved sending two motorized columns - Lima 1and Lima llin a dash across Simba held territory. Lima 1set off from Kongolo on 1 November, and four days later captured Kindu. Here they were joined by Lima ll, but it was not until 18 November that L 'Ommengang crossed the river just to the east of Kindu, and continued its march on Stanleyville, still nearly 300 miles away. During their advance, the columns . RUM DUM was the name applied to the third of Congo. The Simbas had received a severe . blow by the recapture of Stanleyville, but they were supported by the B-26s and T-28s, the the original B-26Ks, number 645. were by no means defeated, and huge areas which attacked and cleared pockets of via C. Heymans/i.-P. Sonck were still under rebel control. It now fell to Simba resistance along the route. The aircraft Some of the intrepid members of the Cuban the mercenaries to crush the rebellion. The were in constant VHF radio contact with the Volunteer Group in front of the sole flyable most well known of the mercenary units was ground units, using the call-signs Bravo and Congolese B-26B, mainly used for 5 Commando, under command of Major Tango for the B-26 and the T-28, respectively reconnaissance and jokingly referred to as the Michael Hoare, which had formed part of (these call-signs remained in use for the 'U-3'. via R. Garcia Lima 1. After a few weeks spent mopping up whole of the campaign against the Simbas). One B-26K would scout the planned route of November, when two B-26Ks made a pass on the area around Stanleyville, 5 Commando the column at dawn each day, while another the drop zone at Stanleyville airport, and 60 and attached ANC units went on the offensive Invader remained on stand-by at Baka air- seconds later the first paratroopers jumped in northeastern Congo. Other mercenary field, ready to intervene on short notice. They from their C-130s. No further air support mis- units in the Congo during 1965-1966 included were initially prohibited to approach sions were flown during the Belgian advance Denard's 6 Comrnando in the Stanleyville Stanleyville, in order not to provoke Simba into the city, which succeeded in rescuing area and along the border with Central Africa, reprisals against the hostages. On 22 most of the hostages held by the Simbas. As it and Schramme's 10 Commando in the eastNovember Lima 1 captured Lubutu, where it turned out, L'Ommengang reached Stanley- ern provinces, both acting more like garrison stopped to allow Lima II to catch up, before ville only five hours after Dragon Rouge, units than strike forces. The ground operations, particularly those the final dash. having received constant air cover during the While L 'Ommengang was making its spas- last 100-odd miles of its advance that morn- of 5 Commando, continued to be supported modic advance towards the objective, the ing. Two days later, the Belgians dropped on by the CIA air force. Two further B-26Ks had Belgian and American governments had Paulis in Operation Dragon Noire, which was been delivered from the USA around January become increasingly worried over the safety also largely a success. Again, two B-26s flew 1965, and there had also been an increase in of the hostages, as the columns approached ahead of the C-130s, but poorweafu.er made the number of T-28s available. The airfield at Stanleyville now became the major base for the city. It was therefore decided to dispatch the Cuban pilots unable to locate the target. a Belgian Paracommando battalion to drop Now that the main objectives of the air operations in the northeast. At some point in early 1965, a kind of unit on Stanleyville from USAF transports, in an L 'Ommengang and the Dragon operations operation code-named Dragon Rouge. The had been accomplished, the Belgian troops insignia was introduced on the B-26s. This attack was begun at 06:00 hours on 24 and most of the USAF C-130s quickly left the consisted of a large black bull on a white

154

FOREIGN INVADERS

background, together with the name Makasi; Invaders were still much in demand as supboth copied from the label of a popular brand port for mercenary and ANC sweeps. But as of beer produced by the Unibra Congo brew- Simba activity dwindled, the decision was ery. The name translates as 'very strong' or taken to gradually withdraw the CIA air unit. 'strong as a bull.' A similar, but much smaller The first B-26K returned to the USA in October insignia was applied to the T-28s. Somebody 1966, and the remaining folir were also withwith a sense of humour also painted a bull on drawn one by one. By late March 1967, they one of the unit's liaison aircraft, but this time a had all gone. The B-26Bs, on the other hand, more peaceful animal with a flower between were considered totally obsolete, and they its teeth. Furthermore, the name was were both scrapped at Leopoldville (by now amended to Makasi-te, meaning 'not very renamed Kinshasa) in late 1966 or early strong!' 1967'. There were therefore no Invaders left In late March 1965, 5 Commando captured by the time the mercenary revolt erupted on 5 Watsa, and the Simbas were by now losing July 1967, and all reports of B-26 strikes ground at a steady rate. During these opera- against the mercenaries at Bukavu and else' tions, the mercenaries did at times pursue where are incorrect. fleeing Simbas across the borders, and on Many of the CIA pilots had also left the two occasions there were protests by the country by the spring of 1967. The Cubans Ugandan government against bombing of were to predominate until the very end of the Ugandan villages by Congolese aircraft. One operations, but a few pilots of other nationaligroup of four aircraft also accidentally strafed ties had also joined the B-26 crews. These a town in the Sudan. The last major sweep by included two Colombians, an Englishman, a the mercenaries in the northeast was South African and a Swede. Despite these Operation Violettes Imperiales, which recap- additions, there was a shortage of aircrews tured Bondo and Buta by early June. These .during the final phase of the B-26 operations, were the last major towns in this part of and on occasion even missions of several Congo to have remained in Simba hands. hours' duration would be flown without coMeanwhile, the Simbas had received pilots. The hours Down by the B-26 pilots in Chinese supplies through Burundi and had the Congo were high by any standard, and at considerably reinforced their positions along least one Cuban logged around 3,000 hours in Lake Tanganyika. 5 Commando began a final less than two-and-a-half years. By this time, offensive against this region in late Wigmo had become an umbrella organizaSeptember, and on 10 October 1965 the Fizi- tion for all the CIA air activities in the Congo, Baraka area was declared secure by Hoare. including the hiring of some pilots. This marked the end of organized Simba The B-26Ks survived their tour in the Congo resistance, although small units were still relatively unscathed, and all five were later to roaming the countryside in various parts of serve in Southeast Asia, after a refit at the country, ambushing ANC troops when- McClellan AFB in the USA There were ever they got the chance. Soon afterwards, numerous instances when aircraft were hit Tshombe was felt to have outlived his useful- by small-calibre ground fire, or shrapnel from ness, and was once again sent into exile. their own rockets, but these never resulted in The mopping-up operations continued serious damage. The only major accident in throughout 1966 and into 1967, and the three years' service and several thousand

hours' flying was an incident in September 1965 where aircraft number 662 had its undercarriage retract on landing, but the Wigmo personnel had it returned to service within a few weeks. Another B-26K flew through some treetops after pulling out too late from a strafing run on a boat, and needed quite a bit of sheet-metal work before looking presentable again. Wigmo was on the distribution list for technical orders concerning the B-26K" and performed some major modifications, including strengthening of the wing spars. They also designed and filled extralarge carbureltor air intakes, to improve the B-26s' performance in the hot climate. All the Invaders kept their USAF colour schemes throughout their service in the Congo. The B-26Ks were Green FS595a 14062 on top and Gray 16492 underneath. The B-26B was overall Gray 36373 on delivery, and probably retained the same scheme until scrapped. National insignia were carried on the fuselage sides only. The FAC serial numbers for the B-26Ks were based on the last three digits of their USAF serials. The first three 'aircraft simply had the first two digits of their tail numbers replaced by the lellers 'RF', but from early 1965 or so, the number was moved to the fuselage sides and preceded by the lellers 'FR', in keeping with the style used on the T-28 and most other types. Both the serial and the prefIX were painted in white. At around the same time, a Congolese flag was painted on the fin and the serial number was marked on both nose undercarriage doors, in black. Later on, the prefix 'FM' was also used. The B-26B initially kept its five-digit USAF tail number '35890', but this is believed to later have been changed to 'FL-890'. The meaning of the various serial prefixes is not known, but they appear to have been different for each aircraft type in the FAC inventory. The T-28s were handed over to the'FAC in 1967, but Wigmo continued to operate with cargo aircraft until late 1969, when the was renamed Congolese operation SODEMAC. Anstalt Wigmo still exists as a paper company, however, and is currently administered by a Liechtenstein lawyer named Herbert Batliner.

'The Nigerian Air Force is reported to have sent two pilots to Kinshasa around late 1968, to procure these aircraft for the AF. But it is doubtful if even the hulks remained by this time. 'The designation of the B-26Ks in the Congo was officially changed to A-26A on 27 July 1966 (some ten weeks later than those based in the USA), but the aircraft continued to be referred to as B-26Ks until their withdrawal.

Cuban pilot Rene Garcia - who subsequently became the Chief of Operations of the CIA air unit - posing with three mechanics of the USAF's 602nd FS(C), on temporary assignment to LeopoIdville. Note the bullet hole in the rear fuselage. via R. Garcia

ANSTALT WIGMO: THE CONGO 1964-1967

There is a rather strange sequel to the story of the B-26 in the Congo. The Congolese were apparently very impressed with the aircraft and, when the CIA-supported Invaders were withdrawn, the FAC decided to buy some of their own. According toMr Gordon B. Hamilton, at the time owner of the Hamilton Aircraft Company in Tucson, Arizona, he was approached by a Congolese gentleman who wanted to purchase ten B-26s for his country. The Congolese, who was accompanied by a Greek translator, had brought with him $500,000 in cash as down-payment, and was eager to conclude a deal as soon as possible. Although the company had owned or processed quite large numbers of Invaders in the past, by 1967 they were all but gone, and Hamilton declined the offer. Rumour has it that the Congolese envoy was later robbed of his suitcase of money while attempting to find another seller on the West Coast, and was hanged on his return to Africa. Be this as it may, at least it is certain that no more B-26s found their way to the Congo.

Congolese Invader RF646 makes a low pass along the Karnina runway in January 1965. The effect of the B-26Ks against the Simba rebels was devastating. T. Spencer

ISS

Fine shot of aircraft 662 during the closing stages of the Congo operation. The details of the Makasi badge are clearly visible, as are the new air intakes on top of the engine cowlings. A. Klootwyk via M. Robson

L

ANSTALT WIGMO Arrived

Departed

64-17644, 44-35451

18 Aug 64

Jan 67

64-17645, 44-35546 64-17646, 44-35375 64-17649,43-22720 64-17662, 44-35458?

18 Aug 64 18 Aug 64 c.Jan 65 c.Jan 65 Sep 64

c.Dec 66 c.Mar 67 Oct 66 c.Feb 67 66?

Serial

Version

Previous identities/users

644

B-26K

645 646 649 662 890

B-26K B-26K B-26K B-26K B-26B

44-35890, Farm Gate, Mill Pond?

~

Remarks

RF644 and later FR-644. Named The Shit-House Mouse/Cachita. RF645 and later FR-645. Named Rum Dum. RF646 and later FR-646. The Boogie Bogey. FR-649. FR-662 and later FM-662. 35890 and later FL-890? Scrapped at Kinshasa

Three further B-26Bs (44-35703, -35804 and -35822; all ex-Farm Gate) were assigned, but one of these aircraft crashed and burnt in Aden in mid August 1964, en route to Congo, one was apparently left behind at Okinawa, and the third served only as a source of spare parts.

156

FOREIGN INVADERS

Chapter Twenty Eight

Operation Steel Tiger: Laos 1966-1969 The B-26 operations by Jungle Jim, Mill Pond transferred to On Mark, who immediately possible, airframes with low flying time were and Farm Gate in 1961 and 1962 indicated began work to convert it into the prototype selected, the average being around 800 that the Invader was still a potent aircraft, suit- YB-26K 1• Contrary to what has previously hours. able for operations in COIN and other 'limited been reported in various publications, the The work carried out by On Mark was very war' environments. But there was room for sole YB-26K was not assigned a new, Fiscal extensive, including, among other things, the several improvements, and also a need for Year 1963 serial: the number '35634' painted following modifications: standardization of the configuration of the on the aircraft was simply the last five digits of - Complete re-manufacture of the fuselage aircraft. Furthermore, most of the B-26 air- its original serial. The first flight of the protoand tail assembly, and the fitting of a frames still in existence were getting rather type took place on 28 January 1963 and was slightly larger rudder 'tired' and would benefit greatly from a thor- followed by initial testing by On Mark. The - Redesign and complete rebuild of the ough overhaul. When the type was designed YB-26K was officially handed over to the 1st wings, leaving only parts of the spar from during the Second World War, the life Air Commando Wing at Hurlburt on 1 June the original wing expectancy of combat aircraft was counted . 1963, for evaluation and weapons trials by the - Installation of2,500 horsepower P&W in months rather than years, and Douglas had USAF Special Air Warfare Center. . R-2800-52W water-injected engines certainly not anticipated that the Invader Because of its 'simplicity of operation, ease instead ofthe original 2,000 hp R-2800-79 would remain in first-line service into the of maintenance and early availability,' the - Installation of fully reversible Hamilton1960s. B-26K was appro~ed by the USAF, and in' Standard propellers with automatic Based on the reports forwarded to Tactical November 1963 On Mark was awarded a feathering Air Command, the USAF decided to build a $13,000,000 contract for the conversion of - Installation ofpermanent wing tip tanks, prototype for an improved B-26, incorporat- forty aircraft. The majority of the Invaders similar to those used on the T-33 ing many of the modifications suggested by selected for the programme were B-26Bs or - Installation of eight wing pylons, built the Air Commandos. The logical choice for a TB-26Bs, with just two B-26Cs, one JB-26C especially for the B-26K by Baldwin contractor to undertake this work was the On and the YB-26K thrown in to make up the Locomotive Mark Engineering Company of Van Nuys, required number. One aircraft - a relic of - Installation of heavy-duty brakes (using Califomia. Although the company had not some classified project - was located in Utah, KC-135 parts), an anti-skid system and previously built any aircraft for military use, ten came directly from Hurlburt Field, and the nose-wheel steering this was more than compensated for by their rest were selected from the 300 or so - Updating and standardizing the cockpit extensive involvement with civilian Invaders. Invaders still at Davis-Monthan, where they layout, fitting dual control and providing for When large numbers of Invaders for Jungle had been stored for periods ranging from a a full range of communication and Jim and various classified projects passed few weeks to more than nine years. As filr as navigation avionics, including FM, HF, UHF through the Ogden Air Materiel Area at Hill and VHF radios, and ILS, LF ADF, TACAN AFB in 1961, one RB-26C was left behind. This Snapped over the Pacific in late December andVOR Invader, serial 44-35634, was converted into a 1966, on its way to Nakhon Phanom in These changes increased the maximum B-26B in August 1961 and was employed as a Thailand, A-Z6A '664 retains the grey-painted cruising speed from 240 to 265 knots, the crew trainer and general 'hack' for the next undersides used on aircraft used for training standard combat radius from 210 to 500 nauyear or so. In October 1962, the aircraft was in the USA. B. L. Bonwit tical miles (allowing for one-and-a-half hours loitering time over the target) and increased the disposable armament· load from 7,500 to 12,000 Ibs. There were also significant improvements in the rate of climb, service ceiling and other performance figures. But the modifications also made the aircraft less stable, and it was no longer possible to trim it for hands-off flight. All B-26Ks had an eight-gun nose installed, which could be replaced by a glazed, B-26C type nose in about four man-hours. There I The version letters 0 to Hhad been used for various A-26 prototypes and projects in the mid 1940s, the letter Iwas not used to avoid confusion with the numeral I, and earlier in 1962 the designation B-26J had been assigned to the remaining JO-I s of the US Navy.

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

157

An aerial view of Royal Thai Air Force Base

Nakhon Phanom: the home of the Invaders operating over Laos in the late 1960s. via T. Wickstrom

The flight line at NKP in February 1967, showing some of the A-26As and C-123s based at the field. The Invaders still wear the last five digits of their serial on the fin, but all other markings have been painted out. B. L. Bonwit

were also provisions and wiring for the fitting of a complete reconnaissance package (based on that fitted in the RB-26L), ten of which were purchased by the USAF for use in the B-26K. But these options were very seldom used in practice, except during some operations in Central America where the B-26K was used for aerial mapping. When ordered, the B-26Ks were intended to replace, on a one-for-one basis, the ageing B-26Bs and RB-26s still operating in Vietnam. But as related in Chapter 26 on Farm Gate, these older models of the Invader had to be retired prematurely due to fatigue in their wing spars, and had been replaced by A-I Skyraiders. The B-26K was no longer urgently required in Vietnam, and it was therefore decided not to send the aircraft to Asia for the time being. The first B-26K (64-17640) was handed over to the USAF on 15 June 1964, immediately going to the Air Force Test Center at Edwards AFB for further testing. The second aircraft completed (64-17642) was delivered on 9 July, and taken on charge at Hurlburt by the 602nd Fighter Squadron (Composite) of the Ist Air Commando Wing on the following . day. The last B-26Bs and the YB-26K had left Hurlburt for On Mark only two weeks previously, so the Air Commandos' association with the Invader' remained virtually unbroken. A second aircraft was assigned to Hurlburt on 4 August, but the next three B-26Ks off the assembly line were rushed directly to the Congo, for use in the CIA's 'instant air force.' On Mark delivered the 40th and last aircraft to the USAF on 14 April 1965, and by the end of that month the squadron at Hurlburt - by now renamed the 6th FS(C) was the home of 26 B-26Ks. Atotal of five had gone to the Congo, two had crashed and the remaining seven were allocated to the 605th Air Commando Squadron at Howard in the Panama Canal Zone. The B-26Ks spent the first two years of their service on training duties in the USA and Central America. With the rapid expansion of the Air Commando forces, Hurlburt Field was soon becoming intolerably crowded and the

'Officially the B-26K was named the Counter Invader, but this was rarely if ever used. In the beginning, the type was just referred to as the '26K', or simply the 'K'

bulk of the B-26 training programme moved to England AFB, Louisiana, in mid December 1965. Around the same time, the Invader unit went through its umpteenth name change, to 603rd Fighter Squadron, soon in turn changed to 603rd Air Commando Squadron. But events in Southeast Asia were soon to demand the return of the B-26 to combat. The 1962 Geneva agreement on Laos had officially declared the country neutral and out of bounds for all foreign troops. But this was not how things turned out in reality. The North Vietnamese got permission from the Lao Government to build new roads into Laos, and these were soon linked up with the Ho Chi Minh Trail: a complex system of roads and paths that eventually extended along the southern half of the 1,300 mile border between Vietnam and Laos - mainly on the Laotian side - and continued into Cambodia. The Trail was used to move supplies and personnel from North Vietnam into South Vietnam, and was- defended by large numbers of NVA (North Vietnamese Army) troops. The North Vietnamese also supported the Laotian communist Pathet L-ao movement, which chiefly operated in the northern parts of Laos. The USA, on the other hand, gave support to the Meo forces under General Vang Pao, also operating in northern Laos, and to a

lesser extent to the forces of the Laotian government. But the US Government stopped short of any official deployment of military personnel to the country, instead largely leaving the operations in the hands of the CIA. The few US troops in Laos were often seconded from the Special Forces, serving mainly in a training and intelligence capacity, and the bulk of the in-country air support operations were carried out byAir America. By lQ.te 1964, the Ho Chi Minh Trail had become the most important route for ammunition and other supplies to the Viet Cong in the northern parts of South Vietnam. The Laotian Government initially showed relatively little concern over the existence of the Trail: they were content to let the communists control this remote part of the country and took only token action. Nevertheless, the first air strike on it was flown by Lao T-28s against the Mu Gia Pass, which was one of the major entry points into Laos from North Vietnam. On 14 December 1964, four F-I05s operating out ofThailand made the first USAF strike on the Ho Chi Minh Trail when they attacked a bridge at Nape. For the first year or so, these attacks against targets in the Laotian'panhandle' were mainly flown in daytime, by USAF jet fighter-bombers and bombers. From early 1966, they were joined by A-I Skyraiders and the newly developed AC-47s

158

FOREIGN INVADERS

An A-26A of Project Big Eagle taxies past one

of the SAR helicopters based at NKP. The canopy was often kept open on the ground, to relieve the heat and humidity in the cockpit. A. Shortt via T. Wickstrom The target: point Bravo on Route 911, near the town of Tchepone in Laos. This was one of several 'choke points' along the Ho Chi Minh . Trail;where the geography forced the trucks out in the open. The continuous bombing has turned the area into a lunar landscape. B. L. Bonwit

gunships - both operated by the Air Commando Squadrons - and the latter in particular soon showed itself well suited for the air war against the Trail. But as a result of the increasing effectiveness of the air attacks on the Trail, the NVA brought in an increasing number of anti-aircraft guns to southern Laos during the first half of 1966 and the AC-47 was really a bit too slow to make their circling attacks in the face of AA fire. And, more importantly, relatively few AC-47s had been converted to date, and these were all needed in South Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, the USAF Chief of Staff, General McConnell, therefore decided to deploy eight B-26Ks to Southeast Asia on a trial basis, for use against the Trail. This was seen as a temporary solution only, pending the availability of more gunships, and it was anticipated that the Invaders would be replaced by eight newly converted AC-47s by the end of the year. Since northeastern Thailand was much closer to the intended area of operations, the US Government secured permission for the Invaders to be based there rather than in South Vietnam. It was also agreed that, since the aircraft were

ostensibly intended to help defend Thailand against enemy attacks, they should be classified as attack aircraft rather than bombers, and for this reason the B-26K was redesignated the A-26A in May 1966. The USAF already had several units based in the country, including one Air Commando Squadron: the 606th ACS at Nakhon Phanom (usually abbreviated to NKP), just across the border from Laos and only 54 miles from the nearest section of the Trail. It was equipped with T-28s, C-123s and U-I0s; all used to support the war in Laos in various ways. The mission of the squadron was referred to as Project Lucky Tiger. The eight A-26As deployed to Southeast Asia under Project Big Eagle, which became a part of Lucky Tiger. They were attached to the 606th, but both the aircraft and their crews officially formed Detachment 1 of the 603rd ACS, on six months' Temporary Duty (TOY) in Thailand. On 11 June 1966, the eight Invaders were declared active. Since they were intended for operations over Laos, something the USAF officially did not do, they all had their national insignia painted out'. The operations of the A-26As in Southeast Asia were to remain

classified for the whole of their stay at NKP. Whenever news of a successful operation was released to the public, the name of their base and unit would be withheld and the target area would be given as 'North Vietnam,' despite the fact that only a small minority of the missions were directed against North Vietnam. The units flying over Laos usually had fixed call-signs. The one chosen for the A-26As was Nimrod, a rather appropriate biblical names. The NKP-based T-28s had the more prosaic name Zorro, while A-Is on SAR missions were called Sandy. The Invader call-sign also included a mission number, for example Nimrod 31. But Nimrod soon became a generic term used to describe the crew members, the unit and also the aircraft type itself. April to October was the period of the rainy season, when many of the roads along the Trail became impassable to truck traffic. The activity was therefore rather low when the Invaders arrived and the first missions flown were· only orientation and familiarization flights, sometimes accompanied by a T-28 or a Skyraider, whose pilots would give the A-26 crews a run-down of the enemy dispositions and tactics. Even these missions could be quite hazardous, however, and on the very first A-26 flight over the Trail the aircraft was hit in the fuselage and tail by anti- aircraft fire. The first loss of an Invader followed on 28 June 1966, when aircraft 64-17650 was downed in the Sleel Tiger area. Both crew members were killed, together with an 0-1

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

pilot who had come along to give the crew an orientation of the area. The part of Laos subjected to US air strikes had by this time been divided into three separate areas. The part of the Laotian panhandle along the North Vietnamese border was named Steel Tiger, while the area bordering on South Vietnam and Cambodia was called Tiger Hound (the name Steel Tiger South was also used on occasion)'. Different rules of engagement applied to different sectors of these two areas: some parts, particularly those closest to the border, were 'free fire areas,' while others could only be attacked under the direction of a FAe. The third area was called Barrel Roll, which by 1966 was used to designate a roughly circular area, of which the Laotian 'bulge' into North Vietnam formed the eastern half. There was also an extension to the northwest, to include the part of Laos directly southwest of Dien Bien Phu. In later years, as the fighting spread, Barrel Rolf was to extend over the whole of northern Laos, all the way to the Thai and Burmese borders. Steel Tiger was to become the main target of the A-26s, accounting for some three quarters of. the Invader missions flown in Southeast Asia. There were three main roads into Laos from North Vietnam in the Steel Tiger area: Route 8 from the Keo Neua Pass, Route 23 from the Mu Gia Pass and Route 912 from the Ban Karai Pass. These connected up with Routes 91 and 911, which went through the town of Tchepone opposite the border between North and South Vietnam. At Tchepone, the trucks could switch to Route 9, heading straight into northern South Vietnam, or continue further south to one of the many other roads leading into the coun-

159

try. Mu Gia was the most important of the TOY crews before these left. There had been three passes, and the bulk of the A-26 strikes two additional A-26 losses by the end of 1966, in Steel Tiger were directed against the area both due to accidents', but several replacebetween Mu Gia and Tchepone, a distance of ment and reinforcement aircraft had also some 75 miles. Up to 1968, the collective arrived at NKP, bringing the strength up to name for all missions against North twelve Invaders by early January. As of 21 Vietnamese troops and materiel in the Steel December, the aircraft ceased to be under Tiger area was Operation Steel Tiger. the formal control of 603rd ACS, and were Virtually all A-26 missions in southern Laos instead assigned to the 634th Combat were flown at night. The increasingly heavy Support Group at NKP. anti-aircraft defences along the Trail made Once the Big Eagle personnel had left it 'slow-movers' like the Invader too vulnerable became difficult to find mechanics proficient in daylight, and most daytime strikes were on the Invader, and for a period the maintemade by 'fast-movers,' such as the F-4 nance officer, Jim Galluzzi, had a lot of Phantom and the F-105 Thunderchief. There problems to cope with. Despite this, an averwere also a total of 617 B-52 sorties flown age daily sortie rate of 0.8 per aircraft was against the Laotian panhandle in 1966. The achieved for 1967. The ground facilities at large number of aircraft available for day NKP were rather primitive and there were no strikes had made it increasingly difficult for hangars to work in, only a 'nose dock.' the trucks to move while it was still light, and Unscheduled maintenance was not too big a most of the traffic along the Trail took place at problem, but during 1967 fifteen per cent of night. the aircraft would normally be grounded at At first the A-26s were not all that success- anyone time due to lack of spare parts. The ful. There had been relatively few night-time A-26 was generally seen as a relatively easy armed reconnaissance missions flown along the Trail before the arrival of the Invaders, The reasoning behind this is rather obscure and the tactics were still in their infancy. But since the opposition would have had little things improved as the months went by, and problem proving that any aircraft shot down was in December 1966 the A-26s claimed a total of American, had they wanted to. Besides, the 99 trucks destroyed or damaged during a USAF, USN and USMC jets flying over Laos in total of 175 sorties in Steel Tiger. This trans- daylight all carried US markings, which did not lated as 80 per cent of the total USAF claims seem to be a matter of concern to anyone. for the month, in only seven per cent of the 5 Genesis, Chapter 10: 'Nimrod ... was a mighty sorties. The results achieved by Project Big hunter before the Lord.' Eagle were therefore good enough for the 'In daytime, the name Cricket was used for an USAF to decide to base A-26As at NKP on a area covering southern Steel Tiger and northern permanent basis, keeping the AC-47s for use Tiger Hound. in South Vietnam. Replacement crews had 7 Only three of the original Big Eagle Invaders started arriving in November, giving them were to survive the war, the other five all being some time to absorb the experiences of the . lost by the spring of 1967.

The remains of four Viet Cong trucks caught in the open near a small stream crossing the Trail, somewhere in Laos. USAF via T. Wickstrom A typical underwing load for the Barrel Roll area, mid 1967: SUU-25 flare dispensers - each with six two-miUion Candela MK-24 flares - as well as M47 100 lb white phosphorous bombs and, on the inboard stations, CBU-14 cluster bomb units. B. L. Bonwit

4

160

aircraft to work on, but there were certain items, such as the instruments, that were a mechanic's nightmare. Anew commander had also arrived at NKP in December 1966, tasked with the mission of building up a new Air Commando Wing in Thailand. This was Colonel Harry 'Heinie' Aderholt, formerly of the 1st ACW in Florida. He had served as commander of Project Mill Pond in 1961, and had also participated in several other clandestine projects and operations in Laos and Thailand through the years. Aderholt was well-known for his ability to come up with unorthodox but nevertheless workable solutions to problems. The new 56th Air Commando Wing was officially organized on 8 April 1967 and at the same time a separate Invader squadron, the 609th Air· Commando Squadron, was formed (it took another few weeks until the A-26s were officially transferred to the new unit, however). The project name Lucky Tiger was dropped once the wing was established. The wing's components were the 602nd ACS at Udom . with A-I Es and A-I Hs, the 606th ACS with T-28D-5s, C-123s and U-10Ds, and the 609th ACS with A-26As; the two latter squadrons being based at NKP. The 56th ACW also had a Detachment 1at Udorn, using T-28Bs, 'Cs, 'Ds and 'D-5s to train Laotian pilots, and to fly tactical reconnaissance missions over Laos and North Vietnam. Detachment 1 was also the parent unit for the Raven FACs based in northern Laos. In addition, the NKP-based 0-1 and 0-2 FAC aircraft of the 23rd TASS, call-sign Nail at night and Cricket during daytime, were in effect attached to the 56th ACW, although not assigned to the unit. Some UH-1 helicopters were also available to the wing. One problem that needed solving quickly was that of finding the targets at night. When the Invaders arrived in the summer of 1966, it was still common to find trucks using their headlights at night, but after the first few weeks of Nimrod operations the truck drivers more often than not drove without any lights at all. It was sometimes possible to see moving vehicles by moonlight only, but the chances decreased to almost zero if there was a heavy cloud cover, or if the moon was in an unfavourable phase. In addition, the most lucrative targets were the maintenance and rest areas where the trucks would stop along the way. These areas were usually well camouflaged and could not be seen even under good conditions, unless someone on the ground got careless with a light. Virtually the only way to find any trucks on dark nights was to drop flares at different points along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, hoping to catch some vehicles in the circle of light. But each aircraft only carried a limited number of flares, which could quickly be expended during fruitless searches along the Trail. Another major drawback of searching with flares was that the truck divers would immediately drive

FOREIGN INVADERS

off the Trail into cover. Colonel Aderholt wheel well. The crew shut down the engine therefore decided to try out a new method, and tried to extinguish·the fire, but to no avail. using the AN/PVS-2 Starlight Scope originally Both A-26s now headed for NKP and the developed for use with the M-16 and other stricken aircraft jettisoned its remaining rockrifles: 'I knew if I asked 7th Air Force for ets and flares in a safe area. McCluskey then scopes I would get rebuffed, so I asked Dick tried to put out the flames by diving, again Secord - who was liaison with AB-1, the CIA without result. support flight at Udom - and he got me some The aircraft soon crossed the Mekong night scopes from the Agency. Before 7th Air River, and McCluskey and his navigator Mike Force knew about it, we were operational. Scruggs began to prepare for a crash landing at NKP, only a few miles away. At this point Pretty damn hard to argue with success!' The first experiments with the scope in the other Invader came up under them for a early 19678 met with mixed results, and it was new look at the damage, and the pilot immefound to be rather too cumbersome to oper- diately shouted, 'My God, your whole wing's ate from the cockpit of either the A-26 or the on fire! Get out! Get out!' Scruggs bailed out T-28. The first really successful use was in the first, but got caught on the cockpit canopy C-123, where an extra crew member would and had to be given a hard push by his pilot use the scope to scan the ground through a before finally getting loose. McCluskey then hatch in the forward, right-hand part of the immediately jumped himself, scraping along fuselage, and from March 1967 scope- the fuselage on his way out. equipped C-123s and 0-1 s were extensively They had barely cleared the aircraft when it employed over Laos. Later on, the scope was blew. The flash was witnessed by Colonel also mounted in the former gunner's com- Aderholt at NKP: 'They had called me and I partment of the Invader, enabling the was on my way down to Ops, and, God, I operator to scan forwards/downwards never saw anything light up the sky like that! It through the open bomb bay doors (there was , was' like an atomic bomb.' What nobody a hatch in the bulkhead between the gun- knew at this time was that debris from the ner's compartment and the bomb bay). An explosion had struck the other Invader, initial thirteen scope combat flights were which was also destroyed. Both the pilot, flown with the A-26 between 29 July and 6 Dwight S. Campell, and the navigator, Robert September 1967, with Major Tom Wickstrom L. Scholl, were killed. Scruggs had his foot as scope operator. These combat trials were broken, probably by flying debris, but landed very successful and the use of scope- safely. McCluskey broke both his ankles on equipped Invaders continued for the rest of landing. Both men were picked up by helithe year, using six Combat Controllers as copters after about thirty minutes. They were scope operators. Most of these missions were the last crew members to survive the loss of flown in Barrel Roll. The most enthusiastic anA-26 in Southeast Asia. operator was Airman 1st Class Paul Foster, The Invader was not an easy aircraft to bail who was killed in an A-26 lost in Steel Tiger on out from, a fact that prompted some pilots to 29 December 1967. Once the other Combat work out their own bail-out procedures. One Controllers rotated out, the programme was such pilot was Lieutenant-Colonel Robert L. discontinued. Starlight scopes continued to Schultz, who flew Invaders both in Korea and be used in other aircraft, however, and by in Southeast Asia. 'The wing root and the horiearly 1968 over 90 per cent of all truck sight- zontal and vertical stabilizer were so situated ings were made by scope operators. that if one didn't get you another one would. Atotal of five Invaders and nine crew mem- Just about guaranteed. The good news were bers were to be lost over Laos and Thailand that you would never spend time in the Hanoi during 1967. Two of the five aircraft were lost Hilton. I had, however, determined that if I on 22 February 1967; the only time two were ever to egress under distress, and if I A-26As were downed on the same day. had any control at all, I would have rolled The first aircraft involved had found a large inverted, roll full forward trim, bring it to a convoy in Steel Tiger, and had set fire to a near stall, kick the clamshells and release my number of trucks before being fired at by two lap belt. Then hope.' 37 mm guns, a ZPU-4 14.5 mm quad, and at It was estimated that there were up to least one .50 calibre machine gun. The sec- 10,000 anti-aircraft guns in Laos by 1967, ond Invader arrived to suppress the ranging in size from .50 calibre to 57 mll. anti-aircraft fire, but was unable to knock out When fired at by the larger weapons - such as the two 37 mm guns despite repeated passes the M1939 37 mm gun, which normally fired with bombs and rockets. After a strafing run full clips of tracers - it was often possible to on the convoy, the crew then tried to silence steer away from the rounds, provided the the .50 machine gun. The first pass had no pilot stayed alert and had quick reactions. effect, so on the second try the pilot, Captain The ZU-23 23 mm gun gave the air crews less James McCluskey, fired a very long burst at warning, since it usually did not use tracers. the gun, again without effect. But the NVA gunner had more luck with his 'It had actually been tried out in AC-47s during aim and the aircraft was hit by .50 tracers in March 1966, but these tests had not led to any the starboard engine, starting a fire in the recommendations for service use,

e

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

Ii

r I

The proficiency of the NVA gunners was not high, and most of their fire was wildly inaccurate. From time to time, however, a really good gun crew would appear in Steel Tiger, and the word would soon spread. The air strikes against the trucks were impersonal, and mostA-26 crews had no partici.Ilar ill feelings against the truck drivers themselves. Indeed, there was often a grudging admiration for the 'tenacious buggers' coaxing their blacked-out vehicles down the Trail. A good anti-aircraft gunner was a different thing altogether, and could sometimes be seen as a very personal matter by the Invader crews. Some would go to any length to knock that particular gun out quickly. But there were also occasions where a gunner earned the respect of the Nimrods. During a mission in Steel Tiger, one of the squadron commanders dropped napalm on a gun position, surrounding it with flames but narrowly missing the gun itself. The gunner could have fled, saving himself from almost certain death, but he continued to fire at the Invader. In the light from the burning napalm it would have been easy to wipe out the position with a second salvo, but the pilot turned away to find another target. He felt he could not kill a man showing such courage. The number of A-26s available to the 609th ACS had dropped to only seven aircraft in September 1967, due to losses and the withdrawal of aircraft back to the USA for maintenance. But new reinforcements soon followed, and in November the strength stood at thirteen Invaders. This coincided with the beginning of the dry season, with its heavily increased traffic. By this time, the 56th ACW had developed tactics and techniques' A greeting to the enemy, daubed in yellow on a napalm bomb. The undersides of the underwing ordnance were often painted black, in order not to compromise the camouflage. A. Shortt via T. Wickstrom An impressive line-up of at least fifteen A-26As

at NKP, in 1969. The nearest aircraft, 64·17653, was the normal mount of the Commanding Officer of the 609th 50S, and was given four tan stripes around the rear fuselage. A. Shortt via T. Wickstrom

that were to remain largely unchanged for the rest of the Invader's deployment. The USAF campaign in Laos was one of attrition: there were no large, decisive battles, but rather a constant wearing down of the enemy's resources. The A-26 Tactics Manual was very clear on this point: 'There will be no targets encountered during your tour which are of such strategic or tactical importance as to warrant the loss of an aircraft and the aircrew.' There were a number of different aircraft involved in the night interdiction programme against the Trail, each playing its own part. They were all under the direct or indirect control of Alley Cat: an EC-130E Hercules (EC-47 up to mid 1967) of the 7th ACCS at Udorn, working as an Airborne Battlefield Command Control Center and co-ordinating all air strikes. Other C-130s, using the call-signs Lamplighter and Blind Bat, were on airborne stand-by as flare ships, and would also perform some random, high-altitude flaring on their own. Once a target had been detected somewhere on the Trail, Alley Cat could direct a Lamplighter to illuminate the target

161

area. These aircraft carried a seemingly endless supply of flares and, unlike the A-26s, would normally drop a whole string at a time. The 56th ACW had also introduced their own flare ships called Candlestick in February 1967, by using the C-123s of the 606th ACS. They could remain on station for up to five hours, searching the roads with their Starlight scopes and dropping a few flares over suspected targets. There were many other aircraft searching for targets along the Trail. An increasing number of 0-2 FAC planes - mainly the Nails from NKP and the Coveys of the 20th TASS at Da Nang - would cruise around, ready to call in and direct a strike ifanything was found. OV-l Mohawks of the US Army's 225th Aviation Battalion sometimes made searches over Laos using their airborne radar, while EC-121R Constellations of the USAF would monitor the signals from the sensors dropped over the Trail in Project Igloo White. Many Invader crew members remain sceptical of the sensor programme, however, and it is unclear how useful it actually was in obtaining target information, at least during its first years of operation. On occasion, reports from

162

FOREIGN INVADERS

A normal load for Steel Tiger, 1968-69: two BLU-27 750 Ib and four BLU-23 500 Ib napalm bombs, and two CBU-14 cluster bomb units. L. 1. Counts A couple of rusty, Second World War vintage, M32 incendiary clusters, which was one of the most effective anti-truck weapons used in Laos. Four such 'funny bombs' could be carried in the A-26A bomb bay, in combination' with six i\nAl fragmentation clusters, seen in the foreground. A. Shortt via T Wickstrom

watcher teams on the ground would also be used to pinpoint targets. Until the arrival of the new gunships in late 1968, the only aircraft on night-time armed reconnaissance over the Trail were the Nimrod A-26s and the Zarro T-28s, both performing the same type of mission. Like in the Congo a few years earlier, the main difference lay in the limited endurance and ordnance load of the T-28. There would normally only be two or three A-26s and T-28s in the air over the Trail at anyone time, each operating singly or in a 'hunter-killer team' together with a scope-equipped spotter aircraft. It was left to the individual crews to decide which part of Steel Tiger they wanted to search, and each crew tended to have their own favourite spots, where experience had shown that trucks could usually be found.

Among these were the so-called choke points, where the number of alternative routes was limited by for example a river bend or a mountain, which often also forced the Trail out into the open. On the other hand, these points were usually heavily defended, and often itwould be necessary to call in jets to suppress the AA guns. Some crews therefore preferred to search other sections of the road network. There were any number of tricks used by the Nimrods to locate targets and to confuse the enemy. Certain crews, for example, would fly with their propellers unsynchronized, which they claimed made it more difficult for listening posts on'the ground to determine the bearing of their aircraft. Some of these tricks worked, and some probably did not, but either way they at least helped keeping the morale up. The A-26A of the 609th always had gun noses installed, arid the standard load was Armour Piercing Incendiary rounds, without tracers. Three or four glass noses were available at NKP, but were only used once or twice, in brief tests. The aircraft could also carry a very varied ordnance load under the wings and in the bomb bay. An underwing load for a mission into Steel Tiger during early 1967 might consist of two SUU-25 flare dis-

pensers (six MK-24 flares each), two LAU-3A rocket pods and four CBU-14 cluster bomb units. Later on, the rockets and flares were often replaced by 500 Ib BLU-23 or 750 Ib BLU-27 finned napalm bombs, and it became usual for the Nimrods to carry napalm on all eight wing stations. The BLU-I 0 unfinned 250 Ib napalm bombs were also in use, but were relatively ineffective due to their unpredictable trajectories. Other types of ordnance that could be carried under the wings or in the bomb bay included the M31 and M32 incendiary clusters of Second World War vintage (known as 'Funny Bombs,' they were one of the most effective anti-truck weapons, despite their age), the M34 and M35 incendiary bombs, the MIA4 fragmentation clusters (which had a tendency to go off prematurely, sending shrapnel into the tail of the aircraft), the M47 white phosphorous bombs ('WP' or 'Willy Pete'; often used as markers), and the CBU-24, -25, -29 and -49 cluster bomb units. The GP bombs used included the 250 Ib MK81,500 Ib MK-82 and 750 Ib M117, but these were not very effective over the Trail. The A-26A could carry a maximum of 8,000 Ibs under the wings, plus 4,000 Ibs of internal ordnance load, but the actual load carried on missions was usually a few thousand pounds lighter, to gain manoeuverability and reduce stress loads. The minimum release altitude varied through the years, before finally being officially set to 5,000 feet above ground level. In practice the crews would often fly lower, and there were instances where attacks were made down to treetop level. The wing and the squadron had only limited say in the choice of missions and ordnance. These were both spelled out in 'frag orders' issued by higher command on a daily basis. The orders, which usually arrived at NKP in late afternoon, detailed how many missions were to be flown in each area. The USAF had two air forces in Southeast Asia by 1967: the 13th AF in the Philippines and the 7th AF in South Vietnam, created out of the 2nd Air Division of the 13th AF in April 1966. But there was also the 7th/13th AF: a joint headquarters at Udom, set up in 1966 after a Thai request that all USAF units in Thailand were to be under the control of a commander actually in the country. In practice, this meant that the 56th ACW was under the operational control of the 7th AF, but reported to the 13th AF on matters concerning administration and logistics. However, Nakhon Phanom was sufficiently far out of the way for the wing commander to be able to 'interpret' his orders in a manner perhaps not intended back at headquarters. On occasion, missions diverted to Steel Tiger from Barrel Roll would still be reported as Barrel Roll missions, to circumvent frag order restrictions. By the time 'Heinie' Aderholt handed over command of the 56th ACW to Colonel Roland K. McCoskrie in November 1967, the wing had already established itself as an effective

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

weapon against the Trail. The Invaders were credited with a total of 1,281 vehicles destroyed or damaged during 1,156 sorties flown in 1967. With each sortie calculated at costing around $6,500, it cost the USAF an average of $5,900 to hit a truck with the A-26. The corresponding cost per truck for the F-lD5 was $118,000. The only aircraft over Steel Tiger to prove more 'cost-effective' during 1967 was the new AC-130A, which destroyed or damaged 51 vehicles in nine sorties in October-November, during trials for the Gunship 1/ program. Even so, a policy decision to withdraw the A-26s as soon as possible was taken in late 1967, but it was to be another two years until this was carried out. A truck would count as destroyed only if it was seen to burn, or if the wreck was still there by the next day. Alas, come morning, there would often be no trace of the vehicle, even if the air crew attacking it were positive that it had been destroyed. One reason was that the maintenance personnel along the Trail would normally try to dismantle the wreck and carry it off for salvage. Sometimes the crew of an aircraft flying over the Trail in daytime could actually see the truck disappearing piece by piece, and each time they flew over it yet another part would be gone. But the people carrying the pieces away would never be spotted and the air crews soon began to attribute the disappearing wrecks to the 'Great Laotian Truck Eater': a mythical beast lurking in the jungle, sneaking out to nibble at the wrecked trucks when nobody was watching! Most of the vehicle traffic on the Trail consisted of medium trucks, of two to three ton' capacity. There were occasional sighting reports of larger vehicles, including stories of a giant semi-trailer truck with a rotating beacon on its roof, acting as bait in a flak trap. In late 1967, the 56th ACW reported NVA tanks moving down the Trail, but the reports were not believed at the time. These PT-76 tanks were later used to overrun the US Special Forces detachment A-lDI at Lang Vei in the northwestern corner of South Vietnam on 7 February 1968, and participated in the siege of Khe Sanh over the following weeks. During the siege, a five-aircraft Invader daytime mission was flown in support of the garrison, when the weather was too poor for the jets to operate. As far as known, this was the only time the A-26A was used for strikes in South Vietnam. The Tiger Hound missions, the few that were flown, were often against troop concentrations around Tchepone, which was a major staging base for the NVA. The area was relatively open, with lots of rice paddies, which was a marked contrast to the jungleclad mountains (known as 'karsts') in Steel Tiger. On rare occasions, the Invaders would strike targets in the very southern parts of Laos, and once or twice they were directed

against targets the crews suspected were actually inside Cambodia. The beginning of the wet season in the spring of 1968 once again slowed the traffic along the Trail down to a trickle. Nevertheless, the 609th ACS continued to fly missions into Steel Tiger, although not as many as during the dry season. The squadron kept what was known as the 'Nimrod Comic Book,' an unofficial log book in which the crews would record some brief comments on their missions. The following descriptions are extracts from volume six of this book. 27May 1968 (Nimrod35): 'Worked with Nail 32 (Good FAC)9 near FOX-

TROT [one of the choke points]. After two free passes, the whole world opened up (four 37 mm and one 30 mm). They came as close as hitting us with all their firepower as I have seen since January. We both feel certain that some type of sighting device was utilized. They were firing at us coming down the chute. BOA: five trucks destroyed, one twin 37 mm, seven large secondary fires, three large explosions, and many small explosions.'

163

1July 1968 (Nimrod 39): 'I think I Speak for Nimrods 37 and 38 as well.

Have never been hosed that bad; so much ZPU and 37mm iliat it could not be counted. There is no reason why we should not be down in the trees someplace. It just isn't worth it, staying up there after even one speck oflight starts.' 11 July 1968 (Nimrod 35): 'Nail 39 had trucks that he couldn't mark. He

finally flared, and I dropped some hard bombs. He is pretty slow with trucks, but he is great with guns. He marked a couple and flared a couple and invited everybody to join in. Got one ZPU, but the odds were 8-1 in favor of the lions, so we came home.' 2 August 1968 (Nimrod 34): 'The mission worked with Nail 35 north of the

Y. No ground fire. Flew flak suppression for Yellowbird 44. He did the most outstanding job of delivering ordnance I've ever seen. After he was through, we proceeded to show him what it's like for a Nimrod to have three, count them, three dud funny bombs.' 3August 1968 (Nimrod32):

28 May 1968 (Nimrod32):

'Worked north of DELTA-79 with Candlestick 01; got three trucks with napes [napalml. Had to jettison bomb bay load for nothing would come out in either "train" or "select." It's just "Jim Dandy" to make three "no release" passes with five 37s and one ZPU popping each time.'

'We thoroughly enjoyed ourselves at FOXTROT making passes with dud ordnance. The presence of six 37mm and two ZPU made it even more fun. Two dud CBU-14, two dud M31s, and one dud BLU-27.'

11 September 1968 (Nimrod36): 'Struck at barges and transshipment area north of DELTA-57. Threw napes about 50 16June 1968 (Nimrod3J): metres on shore. Started POL explosion and 'Candle had 40 trucks across the border, but fires, which spread to shoreline, where we Alley Cat couldn't get 7th Air Force to let. got 10 equally spaced, oblong fires. They Nimrods go across; OK for Candlesticks and blew up, burned and finally started drifting jets, but not Nimrods; OK for making strikes at after 25 minutes. Never know what you'll find Ban Laboy, but not in the more permissive in Steel Tiger.' environment across the border.' 17June 1968 (Nimrod36):

'Weather closed in, and we had an interesting time diving through holes in clouds. Landing was even more interesting. Went around once because of no forward visibility in heavy rain and inside of windshield fogged up. Got her on the runway on the second try. No braking action. Reversed. Began to slide off side of runway. Prayed hard. Stayed on runway. Do not recommend landing on this runway in heavy rain.' The FACs were assigned personal call-signs, rather than mission numbers.

9

Lt Col Farmer, the CO of the 6Q.9thACS when this photo was taken in 1967, leaning against A-26A '662, which was adorned with a simpte girl figure in flesh and black. The aircraft went missing over northern Laos later that year, with the loss of both crew members. B. L. Bonwit

164

FOREIGN INVADERS

Taking off from NKP, with a mix of napalm and 'iron bombs.' A. Shortt via T. Wickstrom The Batplane, Invader '677, at NKP in 1969. The crew consisted of pilot AI 'Batman' Shortt and navigator Larry 'Robin' Counts (seen here), aka 'The Dynamic Duo.' The insignia was all-black with red eyes. The stencilling on the nose gear door was also in red by this time. L. J. Counts

One of the main tasks for the Invaders in Barrel Roll was the support of the Lima Site 36

The decrease in traffic in Steel Tiger meant that an increasing number of A-26s became available for missions against the northem parts of Laos. Barrel Roll operations were often very different from those in the south. The mission up here was not only armed reconnaissance along the roads into North Vietnam and on the Plain of Jars, but also close support of friendly troops; this was virtually unknown in Steel Tiger for the simple reason that the whole of southern Laos was under communist control. For the crews, there was also another major difference, as recalled byTom Wickstrom: 'The greatest problem in the North Laos target area was the tremendous feeling of being alone. The anti-aircraft guns, mountains that grew 1,000 feet overnight were not to be discounted, but it was the eerie radio silence that really got your attention. Used to the continual chatter in Steel Tiger on a usual mission, many a Nimrod crew found themselves talking to each other just to establish the fact that there was someone else in the world.'

CLS-36) airstrip at Na Khang, some 125 miles northeast ofVientiane. LS-36 served as a base for aircrew recovery operations and had the only US tactical air control system in that part of Laos. It was run by the CIA and defended by General Vang Pao's Meo troops. The CIA commander in 1967 was Jerry Daniels, who had worked with Aderholt in Laos in the early 1960s. The site was under repeated attack by Pathet Lao and NVA troops, and finally fell on 1 March 1969. When Daniels wanted to give weather reports and other messages to the 56th ACW, the proper procedure was for LS-36 to contact AB-l at Udorn, who would pass them on to 7th/13th AF for forwarding to NKP. To expedite things, an unofficial direct radio link was therefore established between Na Khang and Nakhon Phanom, but this later had to be shut down after it had been discovered by a USAF Major General visiting NKP. The Barrel Roll missions were suspended for several weeks after two A-26As had gone missing in northern Laos in late August 1967. One of the crew members lost was Lieutenant-Colonel Bruce Jensen, the commander of the 609th ACS. The Invaders going to Barrel Roll would sometimes cut across North Vietnamese territory, and there were suspicions that the aircraft had been shot down by North Vietnamese or even Chinese MiGs. But no proof of this was ever found, and . the missions were eventually resumed. Apart from LS-36, the Invaders also supported other bases-and ground operations in the north, as required. Since there was little support from other aircraft (the Rauen FACs rarely flew atnight), the Invaders usually car-

ried two or sometimes even four flare racks and served as their own FAC during Barrel Roll missions. The rest of the ordnance load usually consisted mainly of CBUs and fragmentation clusters, since the targets were often personnel rather than trucks. During 1967, the 609thACS would normally schedule two sorties a night to Barrel Roll, but if things were quiet during the early mission, the late mission would be diverted to Steel Tiger instead. From early 1968 they also began flying day missions in Barrel Roll. In the summer of 1968 all Air Commando Wings were redesignated as Special Operations units, and on 1 August the 56th ACW became the 56th SOW. The squadrons were given corresponding designations, the 609th ACS becoming the 609th SOS in August and the training unit at England AFB changing into the 603rd SOS in July. Considering the new abbreviations SOW and SOS, some suspected that the redesignations were a deliberate attempt to belittle the combat units still flying propeller-driven aircraft, by those lobbying for an all jet USAF. It was not unusual for more unofficial abbreviations to be used instead, such as SOWg or SO SQ. The maintenance situation continued to be fairly good, but there was one source of continuing technical problems with the A-26A: the carburettor air intakes on top of the cowlings. The deteriorating boot inside the air channel would sometimes collapse, starving the carburettor of air and causing the engine to lose power. The problem was eventually solved by deleting the original intake and air channel, and fitting a new air intake at the rear end of the cowling. This modification was gradually introduced from late 1968 and is clearly visible in photographs. Since it was based on a similar change made on the B-26Ks used in the Congo (although their new intakes were bigger), the modification was often called 'the Congo mod.' Another recurring problem involved a spring activating the green light showing that the landing gear was down and locked. From July 1968 to July 1969, no less than 62 unsafe gear indications were experienced by the Invader crews, all of which turned out to be false. One of the losses in March 1969 was indirectly caused by this problem: while the crew circled NKP at 150 feet trying to establish whether the gear was actually down, the left engine ran out of fuel and the aircraft rolled into the ground. The 1968-1969 'season' over the Ho Chi Minh Trail was to become the last one for the A-26s. President Johnson halted the bombings of North Vietnam in November 1968, and as a result there was an increasing number of aircraft available for operations against the Trail. This intensified offensive was called Operation Commando Hunt and began on 15 November 1968 10 • The geographical area was still officially called Steel Tiger, however. The 609th SOS had its strength increased to eigh-

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

teen Invaders in November, some of these being former 605th ACS aircraft which had been through a reconditioning programme after the A-26 operations at Howard had ceased in the spring of 1968. There were thirty-two crews assigned to the squadron at this point and the unit flew an average of fourteen sorties per night. Strikes on North Vietnamese territory were now prohibited. The only exception was when an AA gun position fired on the aircraft. Since the NVA gunners knew of this restriction, they seldom shot at aircraft on the Laotian side of the border. On one occasion, an A-26 crew observing a heavy AA battery firing at some B-52s decided that this was close enough and knocked out the gun site. There were probably a few other cases where Invaders hit targets in North Vietnam by'accident.' One effect of the increased number of fastmover sorties against the Trail was that napalm bombs for the Invaders were in short supply by 1969. Officially, however, there was no shortage: the 609th SOS was simply ordered not to request any napalm, which meant that the supply dumps were not put in the position ofbeing unable to deliver. The tactics were more or less the same as in previous years. One major difference introduced in late 1968 was that each mission over the Trail usually consisted of two A-26s rather than single aircraft, the two Invaders taking turns strafing and suppressing the AA fire. Another change that had been gradually introduced was the further decrease in the use of flares. Instead, it had become common to use ground marks, also known as 'bricks,' to mark the targets at night. This procedure had first been tried out in 1967, when Starlight Scopes were introduced, and had eventually been picked up by most nighttime FACs. The marks did not have parachutes and did not burn in the air. They ignited on impact with the ground, and would then give off a relatively small flame which was still clearly visible from the air. By dropping the marks some distance from the target, the FAC could call in a strike by directing the A-26s to drop their load a corresponding distance and bearing from the flames, which increased the chances of surprise. The Invader could carry up to three LUU-l ground marks in each SUU-25 flare dispenser, if operating without a FAC. There were a number of different methods used to deliver the bombs on the target once This was replaced by Commando Hunt /I in May 1969. Commando Hunt 1II in November 1969, and

10

so on at six months' interval. The nose of '648 Nother Trucker, with T-28Ds of the 606th SOS in the background. A. Shortt via T. Wickstrom An anonymous Invader, carrying what looks

like a rather macho-looking US Army 'grunt' on the nose. W R. Davis

it had been marked, and each crew used whatever way they found most effective. 'I used the same technique I used 18 years earlier in Korea,' states U Col Schultz, the CO of the 609th SOS from December 1968 to June 1969. 'I would maneuver until I had the target between my engine nacelle and the fuselage, slightly behind the propeller. At a well drilled position Iwould roll the aircraft past the vertical, pull the nose well below the target and gradually, but positively, bring the dot in the middle of my gunsight slightly below the target, make one or two minor adjustments for drift, bring the reticle towards the target, release bomb 1, as it crosses release 2. Using this method I acquired nearly 140 kills in 172

165

missions. Skip bombing was out and I don't know why the technique was even taught. 'You never released bombs under high G forces. Asure way to damage the mechanism and return home with a hung bomb, usually armed. That called for a most gentle landing. One bump and BOOM. 'Contrary to most beliefs the B-26 was fully aerobatic. It would perform maneuvers no other airplane could perform. It was without doubt the finest and most challenging flying machine a man could ever hope to fly. It was a cross between the old and sluggish props and the easy and agile jets. This was one of perhaps only a few aircraft that responded very well below a complete stall. I have flown

166

FOREIGN INVADERS

The crew chief of aircraft '667 marked his A-26A with the crest of Merrill's Marauders, in honour of his father who had served with that unit in the Second World War. L. J. Counts

The Maintenance Officer of the 609th, Captain Jim Galluzzi, admiring the busty blonde painted on Congo veteran '646 at NKP in 1967. The figure was flesh-coloured with light yellow hair, and with briefs and other details in red. via 1. R. Galluzzi

it as slow as 60 mph or even 60 KIAS. No, it would not fly straight and level this slow, but in a steep climbing tum (and I always made this to the left so I so I could keep my eye on the target after the release) the aircraft merely followed a trajectory much like a baseball would. But the phenomenal thing I soon discovered after a few high performance maneuvers was that the aircraft remained responsive to control movements way below the stall. It fell through without a shudder, cleanly and very smoothly continuing to give response to aileron, rudder and elevator movements. I could not tell you if Douglas' engineers deliberately designed this feature, or if they even knew what a responsive machine they had created. We boys of the night KNEW and many used it to the extreme. God how we loved it. 'During my tour encompassing 172 missions I took an estimated 15,650 rounds of ground fire. Of these approximately 5,200 were 37 mm and 146 were 57 mm. The rest were ZPU 23 mm. Fortunately none hit.' The greatly increased number of fastmovers over the Trail from late 1968 posed some problems for slow-movers like the A-26, and they were no longer free to roam the area as freely as before. This was one reason for the increase in missions flown in Barrel Roll during 1969, where there was heavy fighting between General Yang Pao's Meo troops and NVA units on the Plain of Jars. As already noted, the Barrel Roll missions presented some problems not encountered in Steel Tiger. 'Northem Laos was a nemesis,' Lt Col Schultz comments. 'Here the mountains were high and unreliably charted. It was foolhardy for 7th [Air Force 1to put the B-26 in

here. The airplane was designed for low level operations during WW 2. It was a poor performer above 12,000'. It could stagger up to 16,000' with a full load of bombs but it flew very sluggish at that altitude and lacked any semblance of maneuverability. In other words, fly straight and level and drop. Some areas on our chart were left blank (white) as unknown. On one occasion on a bright moonlit night while I was comfortably cruising home at 11,500', a mountain peak appeared to my right that was charted slightly over 10,000'. The top of the mountain was well above the altitude Iwas flying. This really got my attention. Single engine performance of the machine was 8,500'. I spent days over maps and actually flying routes to determine if there was a single reasonable exit from Barrel Roll with one engine. After extensive research I plotted two and only two routes out. Neither was worth a damn: well below the mountain tops in the dark and most of the time IFR (on instruments).' In October 1968, the first AC-130As of the 16th SOS at Ubon became operational. This squadron initially belonged to the 14th SOW, later passing to the 8th Tactical Fighter Wing. There is no doubt that the AC-130 was a very effective weapon against the Trail. During one of the first tests, in October 1967, the prototype was directed against a target under attack by anA-26. Tom Wickstrom was one of the crew members in the Invader: 'What I saw them do to the four trucks we had been trying to dig out of the weeds on route 911 when driven out of the area by Alley Cat for a 'very important test' was impressive. After arguing with the Cat and losing, he suggested we hold to the West and observe. The

gun ship was spectacular, and in a matter of minutes, had our four and four more we hadn't found yet buming.' A total of eighteen C-130As were converted into AC-130As up to 1970, being joined by eleven AC-130Es from late 1969. But despite hitting almost five times more trucks per sortie than the A-26 during the 1967 trials, the cost per vehicle was only slightly lower ($5,100). The main reason was that the Invader was a $350,000 aircraft with a crew of two or three, while the Hercules cost several millions and had a crew of fourteen. Still, the deployment of the A-26A to Thailand had originally been intended as a temporary measure, pending the availability of additional gunships. These gunships were now available. In addition to the AC-130s, there were also the AC-119Ks, scheduled to begin operations over the Trail by the end of 1969. Furthermore, there was no escaping the fact that the Invaders had taken severe losses during the operations in Southeast Asia. Of the forty aircraft produced, thirty had served at NKP at one time or another. No less than twelve, or forty per cent, had been lost to enemy action or accidents in Laos and Thailand by mid July 1969, while another four had been lost in accidents in the USA and in Panama. There were therefore only twentyfour A-26As in service worldwide: nine with the 603rd SOS at Hurlburt (the training operation moved back from England AFB in July 1969) and fifteen with the 609th SOS at NKP. The Nimrod crews still had confidence in the Invader, but keeping a logistics pipeline open for such a limited number of aircraft was becoming increasingly expensive. There had been some talk of putting the remaining air-

OPERATION STEEL TIGER: LAOS 1966-1969

craft through a complete reconditioning programme with Air Asia on Taiwan, including the fitting of a Yankee crew extraction system, but these plans were eventually abandoned and on the night of 9-10 November 1969 the 609th Special Operations Squadron flew its last missions over Laos. Some five months earlier, on 10 June, the .squadron had been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for 'extraordinary gallantry in connection with military operations from I Oct 67 to 30 Apr 68.' The last A-26 to be lost by the USAF flew into a hill in Barrel Roll on 8 July 1969, during a strafing run. According to one observer, the strikes of the incendiary bullets fired by the Invader walked up the side of the mountain until they met the point where the aircraft impacted. It is difficult to establish exactly how effective the A-26 operations against the Ho Chi Minh Trail really were. Although it is very likely that the 609th SOS destroyed more trucks than "any other squadron during the 1960s, it has been questioned whether this had any lasting impact on the campaigns in South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese personnel losses along the Trail were relatively light, and the vehicles and supplies lost would quickly be replaced by new deliveries from China and the Soviet Union. Some estimates claim that perhaps only a third of the supplies leaving North Vietnam ever reached their destination, but this was apparently enough. Before the 609th SOS ceased operations, the 603rd SOS at Hurlburt terminated its train: ing programme, their aircraft going to storage with MASDC at Davis-Monthan in late October. The few B-26Bs and 'Cs kept at Davis-Monthan as sources for spare parts were all authorized for reclaimation around

167

the same time. In mid November 1969, the exceptions. On 10 July 1968, all units belongaircraft of the 609th SOS were flown to Clark ing to Tactical Air Command were assigned Field in the Philippines, where most of them Unit Designator Codes, more commonly stayed for a few weeks before being ferried to known as Tail Codes. The code for the 609th the USA. Five were handed over to South ACS was 'TA', and this was painted on the fin Vietnam as instructional airframes, one in large black letters. The 603rd ACS used the returned to Hurlburt Field to be used as a code 'IF' painted in white. The presentation pylon-mounted gate guardian, and the rest all of the serial number changed to the last three went to Davis-Monthan, the last one being digits only, preceded by 'AF' for Air Force and '64' for the Fiscal Year, in smaller black charplaced in storage on 22 January 1970. Many of the Invaders were declared excess acters. At around the same time, it began to to requirements straight away, but ten were be common to paint the last two or three dignominally kept in readiness for possible its of the aircraft serial on the front of the nose future use, and not until 28 February 1973 was and on the nose gear door, usually in small the last A-26A (64-17678) dropped from the red digits. USAF inventory. Apart from the gate guardian Several examples of nose art and aircraft at Hurlburt, a further five have ended up as names began to appear in 1967, but these museum aircraft in the USA and in South were usually kept fairly small in order not to Korea, while one crashed in civilian hands in compromise the camouflage. In later years, 1978. A single A-26A, 64-17679/N4988N, is still some aircraft had large names painted on flying, but this particular aircraft never served both engine cowlings in black. During 1968 most A-26s at NKP had rows of red truck 'kill' in Southeast Asia. Before the first deployment in 1966, the marks painted on the front part of the fuseupper surfaces of all aircraft were repainted lage, sometimes covering almost the whole in the standard USAF Southeast Asia camou- nose section of the aircraft. Lastly, three flage: Tan 30219, Green 34079 and Green Invaders had diagonal, tan stripes added to 34102. Those A-26s going to NKP had their their rear fuselages at some point in late 1968 undersides painted Black 37038, while some or early 1969: four stripes on 64-17673 (and of those used for training in the USA were later on -17653) and five on -17660. These Gray 36622. These basic colour schemes were the aircraft usually flown by the remained unchanged for the rest of the Commanding Officers of the 609th SOS and the 56th SOW, respectively, but they were A-26's service. The Invaders used in Thailand usually car- also used by other crews at times. ried no national insignia, although at least some of the aircraft had slots on the side of the fuselage where insignia could be fitted, if necessary. The text 'USAF' on the fin was also Typical of the personal markings carried during the last year in SE Asia, Invader '649 painted out soon after arrival at NKP, leaving Sweet Therese was named after the wife of its the last five digits of the serial number as the pilot, Paul Marschalk. Charles Vogler's '651 only official markings on the aircraft. The ser-. Mighty Mouse (after his summer house on ial was generally black if the background was Mouse Island, NH) was similar. The photo is tan, and white if it was green, but there were from Davis-Monthan in 1970. via T. Wickstrom

FOREIGN INVADERS

168

OPERATION STEEL TIGER USAF Serial

Version

Previous identities/users Assigned DepartedILost

64-17641

A-26A

44-35322, Mill Pond?

3 Nov 67

29 Dec 67

64-17642

A-26A

44-35435, Mill Pond?

21 Dec 66

27 Aug 67

64-17643

A-26A

44-35392

II Jun 66

24Jul66

64-17644 64-17645

A-26A A-26A

44-35451, FAC 644 44-35546, FAC 645,

I Nov 67 6 Aug 67

12 Nov 69 10 Nov 69

64-17646

A-26A

20 Jul67

8 Jul 69

Remarks Shot down by AA in Steel Tiger area. Capt. C. R. Cruz KIA, Capt. W. J. Potter and NI C P. Foster MIA. Missing over northern Laos. Lt/Col. B. A. Jensen and Capt. F. E. Smiley MIA. Crashed on landing at NKP, probably due to fuel starvation. Maj. G. G. Duke and Capt. M. T. Tanimoto KIA. To South Vietnam. To South Vietnam.

Mill Pond?

44-35375, FAC 646

Hit the ground during strafing run in southern Barrel Roll area. Maj. J. E. Sizemore and Maj.

H. V. Andre KIA. Shot down by AA in Steel Tiger area. Capt. R. E. Pietsch and liLt. L. F. Guillermin MIA. A-26A 10 Nov 69 To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. 64-17649 43-22720, FAC 649 31 May 67 A-26A' 44-35766 64-17650 II Jun 66 28 Jun 66 Lost in Steel Tiger area. Capt. C. G. Dudley, II Lt A. F. Cavelli and one passenger KIA. 64-17651 A-26A 24 Oct 67 10 Nov 69 To storage at Davis Monthan. Later to museum 44-34119 in Seoul, South Korea. 44-34361 , Mill Pond? A-26A 64-17652 29 Oct 68 10 Nov 69 To South Vietnam. A-26A 64-17653 41-39378 29 Jul 68 13 Nov 69 To storage at Davis Monthan. Later to Pima CountY Air Museum, Tucson, J!\l. 64-17654 A-26A 16 Nov 67 10 Nov 69 To South Vietnam. 41-39491 64-17660 A-26A 44-35608 21 Dec 66 12 Nov 69* To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. A-26A 44-35433 64-17661 3 Nov 67 10 Nov 69 To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. A-26A 44-354587 (41-394627), 64-17662 2 Jul 67 22 Aug 67 Missing over northern Laos. Capt. J. C. Kerr and FAC 662 I/Lt. B. H. Morgan KIA. 43-22665 A-26A 64-17664 21 Dec 66 9 Nov 67 To I ACO WG at England and later to DavisMonthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. 44-34145 A-26A IO Nov 69* 64-17665 II Jun 66 To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. 64-17666 44-35483 A-26A 27 Nov 68 10 Nov 69 Preserved at Hurlburt Field, FL. A-26A 64-17667 44-35468 II Jun 66 23 Mar 69* Shot down by AA in Steel Tiger area. Capt. J. W. Widdis KIA and Capt. R. C. Davis MIA. 44-34652 64-17668 A-26A 8 Aug 66 22 Feb 67 Abandoned in mid-air near NKP after engine fire caused by AA hit. Crew of two picked up by helicopter. (May possibly apply to '669) 44-34606 64-17669 A-26A II Jun 66 22 Feb 67 Destroyed in mid-air when above aircraft blew up. Capt. D. S. Campell and Capt. R. I. Scholl KIA. (May possibly apply to '668) 64-17670 44-35634 29 Nov 68 A-26A 10 Nov 69 To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. 64-17671 44-35820 A-26A II Jun 66 10 Nov 69* To storage at Davis Monthan. Later preserved in a museum at Florence, Sc. 44-35251 64-17672 A-26A II Jun 66 14 Dec 66 Abandoned in mid-air near Thai-Laotian border after engine fire caused by AA hit. Crew of three picked up by helicopter. 64-17673 A-26A 44-34135 21 Dec 66 II Mar 69* Crashed at NKP due to undercarriage problems and fuel starvation. Capt. N. E. Monette and Maj. J. Callahan KIA. 64-17675 A-26A 44-34173 21 Dec 66 13 Nov 69* To storage at Davis Monthan. Reclaimed Dec 72. 64-17676 A-26A 41-39596 II Jun 66 3 Aug 67 To I ACO WG at England and later to DavisMonthan. Registered as N268G, C-GXTF and N22939. Subsequently preserved at USAF Museum, Dayton, OH. 64-17677 A-26A 44-341087 (44-352057) 22 Aug 67 10 Nov 69 To South Vietnam. 64-17678 A-26A 44-352057 (44-341087) 8 Aug 66 13 Nov 67 To I ACO WG at England and later to DavisMonthan. Reclaimed Feb 73. Aircraft with SOC dates marked '*' did not serve continuously in Southeast Asia, but returned to the USA for a period varying from a couple of months to over a year, at some point between the dates given. In these cases, the Assigned date is the start of the first tour, and the Departed/Lost date the end of the second tour. To complete the picture, the ten B-26Ks/A-26As never to serve in SE Asia were: 64-17640 (formerly 44-35896; to N267G and N2294B), -17647 (4435904; reclaimed Dec 72), -17655 (44-34184; reclaimed Dec 72), -17656 (44-35847; accident 22 Dec 64), -17657 (43-22649; to N62I04 and N99218), -17658 (44-35865; reclaimed Dec 72), -17659 (41-39564; accident 18 Aug 65), -17663 (41-39462 or 44-35458 (see -17662); accident 23 Apr 65), -17674 (41-39573; accident I Jan 69) and -17679 (44-34198; to N269G, C-GXTG aM N4988N). In addition, B-26Bs 41-39450, 44-34350, 44-34596, 44-35428 and 44-35714 remained in storage at Davis-Monthan as spare parts sources, until SOC in Oct 69. 64-17648

A-26A

43-22732

30 Oct 67

30 Apr 68

FOREIGN INVADERS

169

Chapter Twenty Nine

Other CIA Operations Apart from the large-scale operations and projects detailed in the preceding chapters, the CIA also used the B-26 in a number of smaller ventures during the 1940s, '50s and '60s. The following is a summary of the often fragmentary or contradictory information available on these operations, and some of it is admittedly little more than speculation. Hence the rather vague wording of certain passages. It is likely that there are other instances of CIA use of the Invader that have not yet come to light, and which may indeed never be known to the public. The first use of the Invader in clandestine operations took place in Europe during the Second World War. During the last months of the war, a number of black-painted A-26s based in England are said to have been used to drop agents into German-occupied territory. No specific details of these operations have yet come to light, but it is very likely that the aircraft and crews involved all belonged to the USAAF. The Office of Strategic Services - the US wartime intelligence and covert operations organization - was disbanded in 1946. But President Truman soon decided that a capacity similar to that of the ass was still needed and therefore the Central Intelligence Agency was created in July 1947. Shortly afterwards the Invader once again became involved in covert operations. One of the first conflicts the CIA became involved in was the Greek civil war, fought by the Greek government against communist guerrillas since 1944. American military aid began arriving in Greece in August 1947, supplementing the British military missions already in place. The situation looked bleak for the government during 1948, but once the guerrillas were denied the use of their former bases in Yugoslavia they were quickly defeated by the government forces, and by early 1950 the civil war was virtually over. The part played by the CIA in the Greek civil war was relatively minor and has received littie or no attention in histories of the conflict, but it did mark their first use of the B-26 in a clandestine role. A small number of Invaders The crew of one of the CIA-sponsored 'Technical Research Unit' B-26Cs operated from Taiwan in the 1950s, posing in front of their aircraft. Note the Nationalist insignia just visible on the rear fuselage. via Wings of China

The CIA air unit in Japan also employed the - possibly only one or two - were operated in Greece along with C-47s, reputedly being B-26 in various tests, aimed at finding new used to drop agents and supplies in guerrilla- methods of infiltration. One of these trials held territory. The same aircraft also made involved towing an L-20 Beaver behind a several drops in Albania, where the CIA was B-26. Since the L-20 did not use its own running another operation around the same engine until the target location was reached, time. The air crews were mainly Eastern the range of the aircraft was in effect douEuropeans in exile, including some Polish bled. Other concepts tried out during this pilots who had served with the RAF in the period included suspending a Piper Cub Second World War. No information has as yet under a balloon, but it is questionable surfaced on the source of the aircraft used: whether any of these schemes were ever they probably came from the large surplus used operationally. stocks held in Germany, but there are no One of the three B-26Cs was returned to the clues as to their probable identities in any of USAF in March 1956, but the fate of the other the USAF individual aircraft record cards two is not known for certain. It seems very likely, however, that they were absorbed into from this period. In February 1953, the USAF in Korea trans- the CIA operation run out ofTaiwan. By the early 1950s, the CIA had some 600 ferred three B-26Cs to 'anunnamed organization, under a Top Secret classification. There people on Taiwan, most of them ostensibly is little doubt that they went to the CIA, which being in the employ of a fictitious firm known is known to have operated Invaders in Asia as 'Western Enterprises,' or 'Western during the Korean War. They probably also International Company.' Their main task was had access to additional B-26s, on loan from to support anti-communist forces left in the USAF. Some crews of tre 67th TRW car- mainland China, to gather intelligence and to ried out a number of night-time training spread anti-communist propaganda. The missions, dropping people from the bomb transport aircraft and crews needed for penebays, and the same technique was very likely tration flights into China were initially used by CIA B-26 crews to infiltrate agents . provided by Civil Air Transport (CAT) on an ad hoc basis, but in the spring of 1952 a B-1 7 into mainland China and North Korea.

170

FOREIGN INVADERS

Invader '822' was used as the personal aircraft of the Taiwanese Director of Air Force Intelligence, General Yi Fu Eng. Although its past is somewhat murky, it most likely had some connection with the CIA operations in Indonesia in 1958. The B-26C was later taken over by China Air Lines, whose hangar at Taipei airport can be seen behind the aircraft. Wen Lian Yem via Wings arChina

was obtained especially for use over the mainland. Up till this point the Chinese Nationalist Air Force had also been using the B-24Ms of its 8th Bomber Group for missions against the mainland, but maintenance and spares problems caused them to be replaced by PB4Y-2s in 1952-53. Since the number of Privateers delivered was smaller than the number of Liberators they replaced, the resulting shortage of aircraft forced the 8th Bomber Group to concentrate on patrol missions and all but cease its mainland penetration flights, leaving these to be carried out by the CIA. One or two additional B-17s were soon provided to Western Enterprises for this reason, but this was not enough. After a successful trial mission flown by a B-26 on 15 February 1954, a small number of Invaders began to be delivered to Taiwan during the following month. Even though the programme was run by Americans, the aircraft were flown and maintained by CNAF crews seconded to the Special Operations Unit (Te Zhong Ren Wu Xiao Zhu), which was the Chinese euphemism for the CNAFcrewed CIA air operations from Taiwan. The CIA quota for Taiwanese-based Invaders was only two operational aircraft at any given time, but with replacement aircraft the total number of aircraft involved over the years was evidently at least four B-26Cs and one TB-26B. The deliberately uninformative identity numbers often used makes it difficult to establish the former identities or sources of most of the aircraft. The B-26s had their bomb bays converted to take a variety of loads and were mainly used to drop leaflets and counterfeit money and ration cards over the mainland, but would on occasion also be employed to infiltrate agents. The missions were mostly over the coastal regions between Guangzhou (Canton) and Shanghai, and more seldom further inland. Most flights were made during the six full moon nights of each lunar month,

Guangzhou. Entering China near Macao, they approached their target by following the Pearl River. Usually there was little or no ground fire since the communists lacked the means to spot and track low-flying aircraft, but to the great surprise of the crew the aircraft was this time fired upon from several light gun emplacements around the city, although no hits were registered. On returning to their base they found the reason: the formation light in the tail had inadvertently been left on during the flight! The aircraft surviving the programme were and operations would usually be cancelled if there was heavy cloud cover. Normal prac- returned to American hands in March 1959, tice was to fly at high speed and at 50 metres and probably went into storage with Air Asia (150 feet) or less, and the crews spent a lot of" at Tainan on Taiwan. The TB-26B was later time practising extreme low level, night-time used to train US crews at Tainan, but the fate flying. One aircraft went missing over the of the B-26Cs is more uncertain. Possibly they Taiwan Strait during such a training flight in were broken up for spares, or perhaps April 1955. An American instructor was ini- handed over to China Air Lines. The Invaders tially available to help with the training, but are said to have been painted overall dark later on the Chinese ran the training pro- blue (although overall black seems more gramme by themselves. On operations, the likely) while serving with the Technical Invaders would carry two navigators: one in Research Unit. Markings consisted of a small, the glass nose doing visual navigation, and white serial number on the fin, and Taiwanone in the rear compartment using LORAN ese national insignia were also carried on at least some of the aircraft. and other navigation aids. At least four of the spare B-26Bs standing by In mid July 1956 the cover name of the unit was changed from the Special Operations during the abortive CIA-supported insurrecUnit to the Technical Research Unit (Ji Shu tion in Indonesia left the Philippines in July Van Jou Xiao Zhu), but the missions contin- 1958, ending up on Taiwan at some indeterued much as before. For security reasons, the minate later date. They may have been joined personnel carried the unit badge of the 34th by a few of the Invaders actually used on Squadron CNAF, showing a bat and the seven operations in Indonesia. As related in the chapter on Project Farm Gate, one such airstars of the Great Bear constellation. B-26C '622' was lost on 5 November 1957, craft was 'found' at Clark Field in the during a mission into the Zhe Jiang province Philippines in 1961 and ferried to Tainan, but of China. The aircraft hit the ground and, it may have been preceded by other B-26s although the pilot managed to regain control flown directly to Tainan. Some of the and continue flying for a short time, the dam- Invaders used in Project Mill Pond possibly age was severe enough to cause a crash also found their way to Air Asia in the autumn landing on the mainland. Crew members of 1961. It appears that the Invaders available to the Zhang Ming Qin and Chen Yuen Bin were killed in the crash, while Wang Wei Zhe, CIA on Taiwan saw relatively little use after Kong Qiang Zhang and Li Fu Quan were cap- 1959, but some were employed in various Air tured. Surprisingly enough, the survivors America training programmes. The Chinese were repatriated via Macao in August 1958, Nationalist Air Force range at Tsin Chu was sometimes available for gunnery practice. after less than a year in prison. Another aircraft, number '862', nearly The aircraft were referred to as 'Blackbirds' came to grief during amission to Guangzhou by their crews, as a reference to their clanin July 1958. The first International Trade Fair destine nature as well as their predominantly in the city had just been opened by Mao black colour schemes. By late 1961 there Zedong and the Invader was likely sent to were possibly as many as a dozen Invaders of drop propaganda leaflets, to embarrass the various versions at Tainan, although a more communists. The B-26C and its crew of four probable number would be six or seven. One took off from Xin Zu airport and topped up of them was lost on 18 February 1962, when with fuel at Tainan before heading for an Air America pilot by the name of Jim

OTHER CIA OPERATIONS

171

Rasmussen crashed near Tainan during a TB-26B 44-34156 - were well-documented Since no records of any kind are available training flight. Four B-26Bs were handed over and innocuous, a number of others that on the aircraft used by the CIA during this to Project Farm Gate in South Vietnam in mid graced the privately owned 'XB-' Mexican period, it is not possible to give a definite list 1963, but at least one TB-26B, wearing the no civil register sequence seem to have had less of the Invaders used in each project or operadoubt false registration 'B-888,' was still used legitimate character. These have included tion, or what their fates were. However, the for training at Tainan as late as February 1964. XB-BUI, registered to Aerografica y Construc- Bay of Pigs operation and Project Mill Pond It was most likely withdrawn from use later tora SA and last reported derelict at Mexico certainly accounted for most of these aircraft. that year, after the Farm Gate Invaders had City in May 1970. This aircraft had been The bulk of the seventeen B-26s that do not been grounded. painted matt white (over its original intruder appear again in later USAF or FAA records One further Invader used on Taiwan is black) and had visible gun ports, crudely were almost certainly among the ones lost worth a mention here. This particular aircraft, patched over, in a B-26B nose - and no visible during Operation Pluto, or subsequently a B-26C serialled 822, is said to have been provisions for aerial cameras! taken over by the Nicaraguan Air Force, brought to Taiwan from Indonesia in 1958, via Elsewhere in Central America, at least five although a small number of ex-Mill Pond airthe Fu Nei Aviation Company. The Invader Invaders turned up on the Civil Register of craft were apparently not returned to USAF was reportedly given to the Taiwanese gov- Panama: a country long known to offer 'flag charge either. ernment by an Indonesian rebel group, who of convenience' registry to both ships and airThe CIA in all likelihood kept a few B-26s in intended it to be used in support of the craft. The registered owner of the majority of the USA, for use in training programmes at Indonesian rebellion. Most likely the aircraft them, Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gomez SA, Duke Field and elsewhere, and these were was a survivor of Operation Haik: possibly who registered several B-26Bs (most, if not all probably the ones returned to the USAF in one of the two B-26Cs supplied as spare parts of them being survivors of Operation Haik) mid 1961. One unconfirmed rumour also has sources. In the event, it never flew any mis- around 1961, just happened to also register it that the CIA provided a few Invaders to a sions from Taiwan to Indonesia, and was three Curtiss C-46Ds, two C-46Fs and a well known aviation personality in Texas later handed over to CNAF Intelligence Douglas C-54G at the same time; none of who was going to train pilots at his ranch for together with a C-54 of similar origin. which have ever been photographed, any- an attack against Cuba. If the story is true, this Normally based at Son Shan Airport in Taipei, where, and the intended function of which unlikely scheme was certainly a short-lived the Invader saw use as the personal aircraft of was never disclosed to the Panama Director one, but may have accounted for some of the the Director ofAir Force Intelligence, General General of Civil Aviation. aircraft and may conceivably have been the Yi Fu Eng, but after a couple of years or so it The last Panamanian Invader was HP-333, source of the B-26s that later received civilian was donated to the newly established China the registered owner of which was listed as registrations. Air Lines. CAL had at least two B-26s in their Aerovias Internacional Balboa. Again, signifiIn order to obtain registrations for the latter, fleet in the early 1960s, although little is cantly, the aircraft was cancelled as the CIA used a rather crude but obviously known oftheiruse and fate. 'damaged in Panama 20 October 1961,' effective method. Three of the Invaders on Meanwhile, ostensibly civilian Invaders although not a single 'old Panama hand' avia- the Panamanian register were - on paper were also available to carry out the odd mis- tor interviewed has any recollection of such sold to a company in Miami called Gulf Air. sion in Latin America. There are still a an aircraft anywhere in the Panamanian The serial numbers initially given were those number of low-intensity covert operations Republic! This last aircraft. had been autho- of former Operation Haik aircraft, but once that have escaped attention and which still rized for reclaimation at Davis-Monthan in they had been entered on the US Civil elude the curious. This brief summary may 1958. Aviation Register in the summer of 1962, the perhaps stimulate others to come forward . The rationale for using a Panamanian serials were 'corrected' to correspond to with 'the rest of the story,' as it were. cover is not altogether clear. At least some of . those of the B-26s the CIA actually wanted to With CIA activities in the Caribbean basin the Invaders involved were in fact based with register, neither of which is very likely to have rather widespread and condoned by a num- Air Asia on Taiwan both before and after been anywhere near Panama. Considering ber of governments during the 1950s and 1961, although it is possible that in between how this matter was handled by the FAA, they 1960s, it is difficult to trace the movements of they were in some way involved with the Bay were obviously aware of what was going on. various aircraft that were pre-positioned of Pigs operation. Another possibility could In early 1963, two of the Invaders- N5001X under the guise of sundry 'oil exploration' be that it was convenient to have civilian reg- and N5002X - were sold to Intermountain and 'survey' operators, which seemed to istrations 'on file,' should the aircraft ever Aviation in Phoenix, Arizona; a company freappear and then disappear with amazing reg- need to be sent off somewhere on short quently cited as being connected with Air ularity. notice. It is uncertain exactly how legal these America and the CIA. The third aircraft had its One of the first of these was B-26C YV-E- registrations actually were, however, since registration changed to N19777 before being GPA, registered in May 1959 to an unknown no traces of them remain in the Panamanian sold to the Continental Air Company of Miami 'special category' operator in Venezuela. records today: they were possibly allocated in November 1963. It is not known what conSince a CIA-operated Convair PBY-5A on a temporary basis only, by some govern- nection, if any, this firm had with the Continental Air Service flying for the CIA in Catalina was also registered in Venezuela at ment official given suitable enticement. Between October 1960 and April 1961, a Southeast Asia. N19777 was removed from about this same time (and the same Catalina was subsequently registered in Peru, total of forty-five USAF B-26s were allocated the civil register on 22 June 1965, officially Colombia, Panama and Honduras!) it does to classified projects or to unspecified organi- having been 'dismantled or salvaged.' But not require much imagination to picture the zations outside the USAF. Four of them came considering that a Certificate of Airworthiprobable fate of this aircraft, which was can- from the 4756th Maintenance and Supply ness had just been issued, after an FAA celled by the registered owners after being Group at Tyndall AFB, while the balance was inspection on 16 June, it seems rather 'written off in 1962, in an otherwise unre- taken from storage with the 2704th ASD GP at unlikely that the aircraft was scrapped. Davis-Monthan. All but two were refurbished Possibly it was flown abroad for use in some ported or documented crash. Further north, in Mexico, a number of by the Ogden depot at Hill AFB. Of these forty- other country. All the Invaders used by the CIA up to the Invaders have led anonymous and, frankly, five aircraft, twenty-five returned to USAF suspicious lives. While some of the aircraft, charge at different points between mid 1961 early 1960s had been standard aircraft, in like PEMEX's (the national, government- and mid 1963, while three others tumed up more or less stock military configuration. But there was nothing standard about the On owned oil company) XC-CAZ - formerly on the US Civil Register.

172

FOREIGN INVADERS

Two views of CIA B-26B '8797' (with only the last three digits painted on the fin), during a training flight over Taiwan in November 1961. The Invader was overall black and retained its eight .50 calibre machine guns in the nose. £. H. Eckholdt The .'Blue Goose' parked on the Air America ramp at Udorn, Thailand, in July 1967. This decidedty non-standard Invader was used for supply drops over Laos. The colour scheme was overall dark blue with white trim. via F. C. Bonansinga

Mark aircraft added to the CIA fleet in the mid-1960s. According to one of the CIA officers involved in the design of these aircraft, the main reason they were built was that his department had some money left over at the end of Fiscal Year 1963, ending 30 June 1963. The On Mark Invaders were therefore not built with any particular operation in mind, but rather as something that might prove handy to have available. The airframes used were the two above-mentioned aircraft owned by Intermountain, who officially sold them to On Mark in July 1963. In early 1964 the conversions had been completed and they were sold back to Intermountain, at which time the registrations were changed to N800V andN900V. There is some confusion over the number of aircraft built, with different sources mentioning anything from one to six aircraft. The original contract is said to have been for two conversions, with an option for a further two. Judging from the limited information available at the time of writing, it seems likely that only the first two were completed. The manufacturer's designation of these Invader derivatives, if indeed any was ever allocated, remains unknown. The crews who flew them referred to the aircraft simply as the 'On Mark,' the 'Blue Goose' or the 'Blivit,'

while some FAA documents give the make and model as 'Douglas B-26B Marksman.' From photos it would appear that the design was in fact externally similar to that of the On Mark Marksman. The engines, which had water injection, were R-2800-CBI6/17s, similar to those used for other civilian On Mark conversions. The wing structure was also basically the same as the Marksman. Some components, such as the windscreen and the wheels, were taken from the DC-6 and DC-7. But the most important changes were not visible from the outside. The cabin floor had rollers or tracks to take cargo loaded on pallets, which could be dropped over a ramp mounted in the position of the original ventral gun barbette. This operation was controlled by an Air Freight Specialist, more commonly known as a 'kicker,' who was a permanent member of the crew. As an alternative, seats could be fitted. In the front part of the cabin, just behind the pilot and co-pilot, there was room for a navigator. The cockpit was very difficult to get in and out of, and the three crew members in the front part of the cabin had to crawl under the wing spar to reach the airstair door and ramp at the rear of the cabin. In case of an in-flight emergency that required the crew to jump, it was therefore somewhat unlikely that anyone but the kicker would survive.

Following completion by On Mark, the aircraft passed to LTV's Temco Aerosystems Division in Greenville, Texas, for installation of the electronics. A large variety of navigation equipment was fitted, including a DHG 7094A1 radar altimeter, an ASN-25 amplifier computer, an EDO Loran system as well as VOR/ILS and even a sextant. Provisions were also made for something that was definitely not standard equipment in other On Mark conversions, namely APQ-99 and APN-125 radar sets. The communications equipment carried consisted of VHF, UHF and HF radios and an IFF set. Some electronic countermeasures equipment was reportedly also installed at a later date. Most of the equipment installation in at least" one of the aircraft (N900V) had been completed by November 1964, but this was then followed by an extended test period. Between August 1964 and March 1965; N900V was owned by Atlantic General Enterprises, Inc., of Washington, DC - presumably another CIA company - but then went back to Intermountain. At some point in 1965 or possibly 1966, one of the aircraft was used to train two Cuban pilots, veterans of the Bay of Pigs and the Congo, for penetration missions into mainland China from Taiwan. This training took place in Brownsville, Texas - probably at the

OTHER CIA OPERATIONS

remote, abandoned Mission Field - but the plans were cancelled before the training programme was completed. During this period, the aircraft involved reportedly carried various false civil registrations (possibly including N46358), and the name of an oil exploration company. It is possible that missions over China were in fact flown at a later date, using a different crew. A terrain following radar was installed in N900V, and probably in N800V as well, during early 1966. This radar, similar to that later used in the F-IIIA, was still on the prototype stage, and had been more or less hand-built by Texas Instruments. It allowed the aircraft to be flown at altitudes down to about 200 feet, even in zero visibility. There is every indication that the On Marks were in fact the first aircraft ever to be equipped with terrain following radar sets intended for operational use. Both aircraft then spent most of 1966 with LTV Electrosystems (as the former Temco Aerosystems was now known) for further testing. The test period was completed in early 1967: some three years after the aircraft had been delivered from On Mark. At this point N800V dropped out of sight, but a little more is known about its sister aircraft. After two months with the Pan Aero Investment Corp. of Reno, Nevada, N900V was officially sold to Air America in April 1967. At the same time, the registration was changed to N46598: most probably because it

173

was felt that a less easily remembered number was needed when the aircraft was used on operations! Soon afterwards, the On Mark was deployed to Udom in Thailand. After an initial period of test and development flights, it was used for low-level supply drops over central Laos. The drops were made over the Ho Chi Minh Trail, between the Mu Gia Pass and Tchepone, and were almost certainly destined for the road watcher teams. There was no radio contact between the people on the ground and the air crew, who were not informed who they were supplying. The only signal from the ground would be a pattern of lights in a small jungle clearing. The average number of missions flown was only one or two per week. The fact that the aircraft was similar to and had the same engine sound as the A-26A was sometimes an advantage since it did not attract undue attention to the drop zones. The disadvantage was that the aircraft attracted more ground fire than a normal cargo aircraft. Although stationed at Udom, the On Mark was serviced at Nakhon Phanom, which was the base of the A-26As operated over Laos. Even for a pilot with previous experience on the Invader, the On Mark could be quite a challenge, and was definitely not meant to be flown by novices. 'It was some kind of machine,' one pilot remarked. 'I liked it but it took all your attention all the time, even with all the goodies.'

The On Mark did not prove all that successful over Laos. Although the cruising speed was similar to that of the A-26A (about 260 knots), the minimum single engine control speed was 140 knots lAS, which was fifteen knots faster than for the A-26A. This was the lowest speed that could safely be used during low-level drops. The high drop speed, the low flying level, the poor forward visibility and the small drop zones all combined into making these missions very difficult to carry out. Nevertheless, the aircraft remained in use over Laos for a year or more. In late March 1968 it was transferred to yet another company, Overseas Aeromarine, Inc., of Seattle, who notified the FAA on 30 April 1968 that the aircraft had been 'totally destroyed or scrapped,' without elaborating further. But based on witness reports, it seems the On Mark was in fact operational at Udom after this date, although its eventual fate is not known. It is probable that the On Marks also saw use in other operations but no information is available on these at present, apart from rumours of unspecified missions flown from bases in West Germany and Taiwan. One of the aircraft - possibly N800V - languished at Norton AFB in California for some time before finally being scrapped around 1971. It was very likely the only CIA Invader to survive beyond the 1960s.

OTHER CIA OPERATIONS

The following list has been assembled from a large number of different sources, some more reliable than others. Many questions still remain and the list is therefore somewhat fragmentary and no doubt incomplete. One or two of the aircraft may in fact not have had any involvement with the CIA. Registration

Version

Previous identities/users Used from

Used until

(none?)

B-26C

43-22622

16 Feb 53

54?

(none?)

B-26C

43-22633

16 Feb 53

5 Mar 56

(none?)

B-26C

43-22634

16 Feb 53

54?

(none?)

B-26B

44-34350

31 Mar 61

61

(none?)

B-26B

44-34596

19 Apr 61

24 Jul61

(none?)

B-26B

44-34652

11 Apr 61

22 Jul 61

622

B-26C

43-22622?

Mar 54?

5 Nov 57

634?

B-26C

43-22634?

Mar 54?-

14 Apr 55

822

B-26C

Haik?

58

c.60

Remarks To 'Top Secret' from USAF in Korea. Probably used by CIA in Japan/Korea. To Western International 622? To 'Top Secret' from USAF in Korea. Probably used by CIA in Japan/Korea. Returned to USAF at Clark Field and scrapped. To 'Top Secret' from USAF in Korea. Probably used by CIA in Japan/Korea. To Western International 634? Used for training in the USA? Returned to USAF at Davis-Monthan. Used for training in the USA? Returned to USAF at Davis-Monthan. Used for training in the USA? Returned to USAF at Davis-Monthan. Used by Western International, Taiwan. Crashed in Zhejiang province, China, during night mission. Used by Western International, Taiwan. Missing over Taiwan Strait during training flight. The identity of this aircraft is very uncertain. Used by the Director of CNAF Intelligence. Handed over to China Air Lines and possibly given civilian registration. Fate unknown.

FOREIGN INVADERS

174

Registration

Version

Previous identities/users Used from

844

B-26C

?

56?

59?

862

B-26C

?

-56?

59?

888

TB-26B

?

56?

64?

8264

B-26B

Haik?*

58?

8434

B-26B

Haik?*

58?

?

8769

B-26B

Haik?*

58?

?

8797

B-26B

Haik?*

58?

?

HP-318

B-26B

44-35242, Haik

61?

61 ?

HP-318-P

B-26B

44-34620, Haik

61?

4 Apr 62

HP-319

B-26B

44-34682?, Haik?

61?

22 Sep 66?

HP-322

B-26B

44-35242, HP-318, Haik

61?

4 Apr 62

HP-323

B-26B

44-34376, Haik

61?

4 Apr 62

HP-333

B-26B?

43-22505, N9419Z

61?

61?

N800V

On Mark

44-35698, N5001X, Pluto?

Jan 64

7l?

N900V

On Mark

44-34415, N5002X, Pluto?

25 Feb 64

Apr 67

N5000X

8-26B

44-34590, Pluto?

4 Jun 62

63?

N500lX

B-26B

44-35698, Pluto?

Ju162?

Jan 64

N5002X

B-26B

44-34415, Pluto?

12Jul62

25 Feb 64

N19777

8-26B

44-34590, N5000X, Pluto?

63?

22 Jun 65

N46598

On Mark

44-34415, N900V, N5002X, Pluto?

Apr 67

Apr 68?

YV-E-GPA

B-26C

43-22712, N2880G

May 59

62

XB-BUI

B-26B

41-39322?

?

Used until

Remarks Used by Western International, Taiwan. Probably handed over to Air Asia in Mar 59. Subsequent fate unknown; possibly scrapped. Used by Western International, Taiwan. Probably handed over to Air Asia in Mar 59. Subsequent fate unknown; possibly scrapped. Used by Western International, Taiwan. Also used by Air America on Taiwan in 1964, quoted as 'B-888'. Probably scrapped at Tainan. Used by Air America on Taiwan in 1961. Identity number shown is probably Air America fleet number. Fate of aircraft unknown. Used by Air America on Taiwan in 1961. Identity number shown is probably Air America fleet number. Fate of aircraft unknown. Used by Air America on Taiwan in 1961. Identity number shown is probably Air America fleet number. Fate of aircraft unknown. Used by Air America on Taiwan in 1961. Identity number shown is probably Air America fleet number. Fate of aircraft unknown. Registered to Hermanos Sebastian y Gomez SA, Panama. Probably registered on paper only. To HP-322. .Probably registered on paper only. Officially to N500lX but actually to Farm Gate in 1963. Probably registered on paper only. Listed as 44-34672 but '682 (to Project Farm Gate in 1963) is likely correct. Officially w/o, location unknown. Probably registered on paper only. Officially to N5002X but almost certainly did not go to the USA. Probably wlo on Taiwan. Probably registered on paper only. Officially to N5000X but actually to Farm Gate in 1963. Registered to Aerovias Internacional Balboa, Panama. Damaged on 20 Oct 61. Usage and fate unknown. Development and testing of special On Mark covert operations version of the Invader. Scrapped at Norton AFB, 1971? Development and testing of special On Mark covert operations version of the Invader. To N46598. Serial first given as 44-34376, ex HP-323. Later changed to 44-34590, which went to classified project 13 Oct 60. To NI9777. Serial first given as 44-34620, ex HP-318-P. Later changed to 44-35698, which went to 'non-USAF' organization 3 Sep 60. To N800V. Serial first given as 44-35242, ex HP-322. Later changed to 44-34415, which went to classified project 13 Oct 60. To N900V. Registered to Gulf Air and Continental Air, Miami. De-registered as 'dismantled or salvaged' but possibly exported. Operated by the CIA in SE Asia 1967-68. Officially de-registered in 1968 due to accident, but probably'continued to serve beyond this date. Registered owner and usage unknown, Written off, location and circumstances unknown. Registered to Aerographica y Constructora SA, Mexico. Usage unknown. Derelict at Mexico City by May 70,

* At least some of these Invaders are most likely the same ones as those using HP- registrations, Aircraft 44-34346 (formerly with OperatioI1 Haik) and 44-35448, 44-35513 and 44-35707 (believed to have taken part in Project Mill Pond) are other possible candidates.

FOREIGN INVADERS

.'

175

Chapter Thirty

Private Enterprises Although most of the civilian-registered B-26s problem and, as with the Bay of Pigs attempt, used in various paramilitary ventures were the Cuban exiled gentry, who had lost so operated by, or on behalf of the CIA, there much in the fall of the Batista regime, were were some instances when Invaders were bound and determined to at the very least obtained and operated by groups not con- keep Castro in a high state of anxiety. So it came to pass that two of the Cuban nected with the US government. The Invader seems inextricably linked to pilots who had flown Invaders in support of the events in the skies over Cuba during the the Bay of Pigs were approached by a lawyer late 1950s and early 1960s and, while the named Pujals, who was connected with the FAEC of Batista, the FAR of Castro and the famous Bacardi rum empire. Bacardi had Liberation Air Force of the CIA all seem to very large interests still semi-intact on the have faced one another in a whirling series of home island, and wanted to mount a punitive events, two other B-26s almost made it on the operation to bomb one of the two critical Caribbean stage in these events as well. . major oil refineries on the island, which A surplus B-26, the identity of which is would have arguably put Castro in very diffiunknown, was purchased in 1958 by Carlos cult circumstances if successful. Bacardi put up the money for the rather Prio, the former Cuban President deposed by Batista, for a scant $4,500. Intended to sup- simplistic scheme, and the first step of the port the anti-Batista rebels of the Segundo plan c~d for the acquisition of a suitable Frente del Escambray (including, ironically, aircraft. AB-26 was the logical choice, in view Castro's group), it was to have had a of the recent experience of the crew. The airVenezuelan pilot. Although not known to craft selected for the operation was a B-26C have been armed, it was intended to be used bearing US civil registration N7953C. lt had to smuggle some $100,000 worth of arms Prio been sold by the USAF as surplus in June 1958 had purchased into the remote regions of and had passed through the hands of several Cuba where the anti-Batista forces were civilian owners before ending up with . Garwin, Inc., of Wichita, Kansas, in late 1960. operating. The aircraft had not flown for more than Garwin leased the aircraft to Beech Aircraft three years, and was reportedly in very poor Corporation, which used it for air-to-air refucondition. Although it apparently had tacit US elling trials from early 1961 until April 1962. approval for flights into Cuba from Florida, it The bomb bay was still more or less intact, is only known to have made one flight - and little work was needed to convert it back which was abruptly concluded when it to a functioning bomber. On 8 May 1962, the Invader was bought by a crashed upon landing at Trinidad, Cuba on 31 December 1958, the very day that Batista fled Mr. F. Daniel Bennett of the Bennett & the country. The second operation involving a civilian B-26 to be used against Cuba took place a few years later, after the failed Bay of Pigs invasion. While exiled Cubans, especially in the new colony of Miami and southem Florida, were bitterly disappointed at the failure of the Brigada 2506 and the Fuerza Aerea de Liberacion to liberate Cuba, there were those who still harboured hope that, with just the right impetus, something could be done to topple the Castro regime. Money was not a Unique shot of the 'Bacardi Bomber,' taken on the beach at La Uorona, Costa Rica, in July 1962. Nearest the camera is Cuban pilot Gustavo Ponzoa, with Gonzalo Herrera standing on the fuselage. The neatly applied registration was completely spurious.

via G. Ponzoa

Bennett Insurance Company of Miami for $14,000: he was only an intermediary, however, quite likely acting on instructions from Mr Pujals. About a week later, the aircraft was ferried from Wichita to Tucson, Arizona, and then on to Califomia for a refit. The reason for not flying it to Miami was to avoid being linked to any group of exile Cubans: any Cuban seen around a B-26 in the southern USA in those days would very likely have attracted undue attention! A special longrange tank was installed in the reworked nose, but despite constant tinkering this never did work properly. The refit also involved the fitting of magnesium wheels, as well as a few other extras. Once the modifications were completed, the aircraft was flown to Corpus Christi, Texas, in preparation for a flight to El Coco International Airport, San Jose, Costa Rica, via Limon. On 8 June, Mr. Bennett ostensibly sold the B-26 to Panefom SA of San Jose, and it left the US around the same date, using a phony flight plan: no Export License or even a valid Certificate of Airworthiness existed for the aircraft. The pilot on the illicit flight to Costa Rica .was Gonzalo Herrera, lately a C'aptain in the Liberation Air Force. The other Cuban pilot involved was Gustavo Ponzoa, also a Bay of Pigs veteran. While in Costa Rica, they posed as company pilots, and the aircraft was ostensibly an executive transport. Since the US civil registration had been officially cancelled on 15 June, and no Costa Rican civil registration

FOREIGN INVADERS

176

had been applied for, the aircraft was flown quite illegally, by any definition. The registration painted on -the aircraft was, at this juncture, modified slightly to read 'N79580,' to confound any casual observers. The actual operation was planned to be carried out some time in July 1962. The plan was to fly the aircraft to a secluded beach at La Uorona in Costa Rica, where it would rendezvous with a C-47 carrying six or eight bombs from Guatemala (it has been speculated that the bombs, and the aircraft carrying them, were supplied by the Guatemalan Air Force). The Invader would be bombed-up, carry out the attack on the refinery, and then continue on to Miami, where the two pilots would hold a press conference. On the agreed date, the B-26 was flown to the beach and landed without problems. It had been arranged that someone would come to the beach and aid the crew to winch the aircraft into cover in the nearby vegetation, but for some reason no-one came. The bomb-carrying C-47 was also overdue, and in fact never did show up. As the hours passei:i, the tide started rising, and in the end the Cubans decided to fly back to EI Coco to save the aircraft and attempt to regroup. AIl of this was a severe set-back to the plan, but the operation was still not cancelled. Later on, the Invader was flown to a plantation near the Nicaraguan border owned by a person sympathetic to their cause. The aircraft suffered a ground loop in a cane field at the plantation, but was judged to have not been too badly damaged at the time, and was soon - at least superficially - repaired. Meanwhile, the -Somoza govemment of Nicaragua learned of these goings-on and

r

_._.~

\i"

became concerned that the Invader was to been damaged in a landing in the hands of a be used in some ill-begotten attempt against pilot inexperienced on the type. The aircraft their regime. Enough information was was apparently bought at auction from the passed to the Nicaraguans via informal chan- government circa 1963 and, after repairs by nels to allay their fears, but it was thought best the registered owner, Frank MarShall, Jr, regto nonetheless move -the B-26 back to EI istered formally on the Costa Rican civil register as TI-I 040L; the 'L' suffix being a kind Coco. By this time, the operation was beginning of limited identifier usually associated with to fall apart. Ponzoa had the bad fortune to corporate-operated aircraft. The exact nature accidentally run into an uncle of his while of the activities of the aircraft between 1964 returning to Costa Rica by airliner after a brief and May 1970, when it was sold to unidentivisit to the US. The uncle, who worked for the fied buyers in Honduras (probably agents for Costa Rican government, became suspicious the Honduran Air Force) is not clear. when he found out that Ponzoa was flying a However, shortly thereafter the 'Bacardi B-26 again. Apparently this information fil- Bomber' once again, incredibly, donned wartered back to the US authorities who soon paint and joined the Honduran Air Force (see managed to figure out essentially what was Chapter 20: Honduras for the rest of the story afoot. The two Cuban pilots were visited by of this well-travelled aircraft). The Somoza government's apprehension officers of the US State Department, who informed them that the US government about the above aircraft was perhaps based would not allow the operation to be carried on a prior scheme also involving a B-26. That out. From this point on, they were also kept aircraft, which was Mexican-registered as under open surveillance whenever they went XB-TEL, disappeared from the civil register to the airport. about September 1961. While this aircraft The Costa Ricans would not allow the had a civilian paint scheme, and had been Invader to take off from the airport - the offi- converted to a partially complete VIP transcial reason cited probably being the lack of a port, it is purported to have at one time been valid registration - and, eventually, in August positioned 'on a remote corner of the La 1962, the pilots abandoned their aircraft and Aurora, Guatemala City airfield poised to returned to the United States. News of the strike at the heart of Somoza's power' in operation leaked to the local press in Costa Nicaragua. A hard-nosed B-26B, the regisRica, and the newspapers published stories tered owner, registration date and fate of this claiming that several B-26s were to have aircraft are unknown, although it was last been used in the attack on Cuba. Surprisingly, seen derelict at Mexico City missing parts. however, the story never seems to have been In 1966, dissident Haitians intent on liberattaken up by the US news media. ing the country from the iron hand of the The impounded Invader is claimed to have Duvalier dynasty were detected organizing been used for a few smuggling flights by and training in the Florida hinterland. They Costa Rican nationals, and is said to have . had plans afoot to acquire F-51s, B-25s and thus far undocumented B-26s to attack the island nation, take control, and then launch a further attack against Castro's Cuba. The ringleaders were arrested in Florida in January 1967 and the plot disintegrated. It is not clear how far the aircraft procurement plans of the expeditionaries progressed, but Invaders were certainly available cheaply at the time. listed on the civil register only as an 'A-26,' XB-TEL at Mexico City some time after 1961. It was implicated in a probable plot against the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. Note the crude metalwork on the nose where the eight-gun installation would have been. via Dr G. Kuhn

PRIVATE ENTERPRISES Registration

Version

Previous identities

N9424Z

B-26B

43-22729

'N79580'

B-26C

44-35918, N7953C

N.... 7

B-26

7

XB-TEL

B-26B

7

Used from

Used until

667

677

May 62

Aug 62

58

31 Dec 58 c.Sep 61

Remarks Possibly an aircraft involved in the Haiti attempt. Derelict at Miami in the 1970s. The 'Bacardi Bomber'; used in aborted bombing raid on Cuba. Later to TI-I040L, HR-276, FAH 510 and N2781G. Used to smuggle arms to Cuba. Crashed at Trinidad, Cuba. Reportedly involved in anti-Somoza plot.

FOREIGN INVADERS

Foreign Invaders in Colour One of the longest-serving Invaders in Indochina, 44-34555 survived nearly six years with GB.1/19, until handed back to the USAF in late 1955. This photo was taken at Clark Field a few years later, before '555 was sold into civilian hands. Note the patches of zinc chromate primer, applied to limit corrosion. The aircraft still survives, registered as N26HK. viaG. Kamp

Typical of the French Invaders of the Algerian era, 41-39476 is seen after Its return to France, carrying the badge of the CIB.328 bombing school. Uke most black-painted B-26s to have served in North Africa, it had the upper part o'f its fuselage painted white. via P. Vinat-Pre/antaine

One of the French Air Force's B-26Ns getting ready for a mission from Lyon. The B-26N was the only fighter modification of the basic design, but did not prove very effective. Although still carrying the badge of ECN.l/71, this aircraft actually belonged to ECN.3/30 at the time the photo was taken, in July 1964. via G.Kamp

Some of the French Invaders lingered In storage long after being struck off charge, like these two aircraft at Chateaudun in October 1969. The nearest one - 44-34758, the last Invader to leave Algeria - carries the light blue-grey paint scheme applied to a few B-26s towards the end of their service. P.-M. Gerhardt

177

178

FOREIGN INVADERS

A Chilean TB-26B, sin 848 is shown bearing day-glow over natural metal at El Bosque, Santiago, in 1969, as well as the Grupo 8 insignia on the nose. G. E. Buehlmann

Rarely noted amongst Latin American Invaders, Colombian B-26C sin 2516, in flight circa 1965-66, carries both turrets armed, the dorsal one fixed to fire forward. W. R. Davis Colombian B-26C sin 2518 was the next to last FACol aircraft received in November 1957. Its glossy black colour scheme is very apparent in this 1960s Villavicencio air base view. The aircraft has training bombs and rockets on the under wing hard points. W R. Davis

Line-up of three Colombian B-26Cs, sin 25 11, 2504 and 2503, complete with unit insignia on the vertical tail, with a visiting Mobile Training Team USAF 605th ACS B-26K in the background at their Villavicencio base in the 1960s. W R. Davis

FOREIGN INVADERS

Noteworthy on this immaculate Brazilian B-26C, sin 5162, are the special VHF antenna arrays placed under the rear fuselage (as well as on top, ahead of the gunner's position - a 'flying' antenna also being added to the upper rear fuselage of most aircraft). Most of the 'C versions returned with the insides of the glass nose covered with brown paper to reduce heat and sun glare. D. Hagedorn Saudi Invader number 301 at Jeddah in 1976, after having spent at least fifteen years in the desert. The brownish tone on the upper surface is likely discoloured primer come to light when the original black paint was worn off by sandstorms, but there is also a possibility that the aircraft once had the top part painted a sand or earth brown colour. J. Wegg A-26B 5156 bears full 1°/1 0° GAv insignia and was photographed shortly after being retired and displayed (initially) as such at the Brazilian Air Force Academy. via CPT G. Farinas A line-up of 5° GAv B-26s in front of the famous Zeppelin hangar in Brazil. Nearest is B-26B 5149, followed by B-26Cs 5162, 5160, 5171 and B-26B 5156. Note that by this time the presentation of the type on the fin had been changed to 'B-26 B' etc. A visiting USAF B-26K is at the end of the line. W R. Davis

179

FOREIGN INVADERS

180

1-··

••

Top: A very battered and forlorn FAN 601 sits missing parts at Managua, Nicaragua in February 1978. Note the presentation of the 'service insignia' on the rear fuselage, compared to that exhibited on FAN 602. CPT G. Farinas Above left: FAP 7102 on readiness at the Portuguese BA 9 airbase outside Luanda in Angola. The B-26C is here still wearing its original aluminium and white colour scheme with blue trim, but was subsequently camouflaged. 1. F. Nico

Above: The Biafran Air Force's first Invader, nicknamed The Shark for obvious reasons, seen at Enugu in July 1967. Although slightly darker, its camouflage is similar to that on the tow-truck in the foreground. The Biafran flag can just be made out on the edge of the rudder. 1. Zumbach via M. Robson Bottom: Most of the Portuguese Invaders, like FAP 7101 shown here, were repainted an overall olive drab in late 1973. Although not very apparent in this photo, the paint had a slight greenish tinge. FAP 7105 in the background was to keep its original colours until the end, however.1.F. Nico

FOREIGN INVADERS

Salvadorean FAs 602 in poor condition, minus its guns and with its 'chin' damaged at lIopango in November 1977. S. Piercey

FAS 8-268 sin 602 fully armed with a six-gun nose configuration and in reasonably good condition at I1opango in 1972. G. E. Buehlmann A view of FAS 600 in March 1975 as N62289. The undersides were light grey and both nose and wing gun ports had been crudely taped over. L. Bracken

Honduran FAH 510 as she appeared shortly after her sale and return to the USA in January 1983 as N2781G. The camouflage pattern had by this time been embellished somewhat. 1. R. Kerr

181

182

FOREIGN INVADERS

Still looking ready to take to the air at any moment, this A-26A of the Vietnamese Air Force was actually only used for ground instruction purposes. The camouflage paint was beginning to look rather worse for wear. via G. Kamp

One of the CIA B-26Ks attracts attention by the local residents of Bunia, the Congo, in early 1965. The aircraft serial is still marked on the fin, in white. E. Waman! via H. Demare! B-26K FR-649, photographed at Stanleyville in late 1965, clearly shows the markings adopted by the Congolese aircraft earlier that year. The unit insignia - carried on both sides of the nose - was copied from the label of a popular local brand of beer! G. Verjans via J.-P. Sonck

An A-26A on the ramp at Nakhon Phanom in

1967-68, with pilot Bill Davis (left) and navigator Don Maxwell. Unusually, the aircraft carries mainly 'iron bombs' under the wings. W. R. Davis

FOREIGN INVADERS

Taken over South Vietnam in mid 1963, this photo shows one of the newly overhauled B-26Bs delivered to Project Farm Gate earlier that year. Like all these aircraft, it was painted overall light grey. J. A. If/and

A TB-26B seen outside the On Mark plant at Van Nuys in the summer of 1964. Judging from the sequence number '021' this aircraft was the former 44-35608, which had spent five years at Davis-Monthan after being retired from the 1st Tow Squadron in April 1959. The Invader had recently arrived when the photo was taken and the work to transform it into B-26K 64-17660 had only just begun. J. P. Slauson

The A-26As of the 609th SOS lined up in the autumn of 1968. Note that the camouflage scheme is slightly different on each aircraft. On the wing in the foreground, the USAF insignia is clearly visible through a thin layer of green paint. L. J. Counts

Two of the A-26A Counter-Invaders delivered to Southeast Asia in December 1966, seen at England AFB just before departure, still wearing USAF markings. The B-26K1A-26A is easily recognizable by its wing tip tanks and square propeller tips. B. L. Bonwit

183

184

FOREIGN INVADERS

At least three and possibly all of the initial batch of B-26Bs acquired by the Dominican Air Force were delivered in, essentially, Korean War era 'intruder' black colour schemes. These were retained for some time before gaining light grey overall schemes, and sported a variation of the Escuadron de Caza Bombardero unit insignia on the left side of the forward fuselage. When the aircraft lost their midnight black schemes, the unit insignia disappeared also.

Close up view of the Escuadron de Caza-Bombardero unit insignia which graced the port (left) nose of at least three of the FAD's B-26Bs. Over the years, a number of subtle variations have been noted in this unit insignia, and these are suspected of being linked somehow to the aircraft types bearing them in this huge unit.

The shark design carried by the Indonesian B-26s in the 1970s is certainly one of the most unusual decorations ever used on any Invader in firstline service. When retired in December 1977, by which time an eight-gun nose had been fitted, M-265 was the last fully armed Invader in military service anywhere in the world.

The last Latin American Invader to enter service, and the last to enter active service with any air force, FAH 510 had led a very nomadic existence prior to joining the FAH in 1969. Using the same deep blue paint used for their Vought F4U Corsair fleet, the aircraft was initially adorned with this colouring overall, with a fierce shark's mouth added early in its service life. Later, the aircraft was camouflaged in Vietnam era MDAP colours.

The second Invader of the Biafran Air Force, as it was painted in the autumn of 1967. Few photographs have survived of the BAF B-26s, and the camouflage pattern on the rear part of the aircraft is partly an estimation. The Biafran flag may possibly also have been carried on the fuselage sides for a period.

Colour drawings by Bob Boyd

FOREIGN INVADERS

185

Appendix A

Invader Warbirds Even though the last Invader was retired from military service in 1982, many are still flying in civilian hands and the type has become increasingly active on the warbird scene. The interpretation of the term 'warbird' has been gradually expanded over the years and is today sometimes taken to mean any former military aircraft in civilian hands, although most people prefer to exclude aircraft in purely commercial employment, such as the C-47s still operated by airlines. As early as 1946, a few Invaders began appearing on the US Civil Register. Ironically, these aircraft were mainly from a batch of twenty-eight A-26s going to surplus directly from the factory, and were therefore more modern than most of the Invaders remaining in USAAF service! At the time, and for many years to follow, the A-26 was just about the fastest twin-engined aircraft available on the civilian market, and most were put into use as executive transports. These early civilian One of the first, if not the very first civilian Invader to carry military markings - albeit somewhat non-standard national insignia! :was the Confederate Air Force's 8-26, snapped at Rebel Field, Texas in 1966. Three years later, the aircraft went to the Salvadorean Air Force. via R. Phillips

conversions were usually fairly rudimentary, and involved little more than fitting a few passenger seats and a couple of windows in the sealed-up bomb bay. The same was true for the small batches of additional USAF Invaders released into the surplus market from the early 1950s onward. The situation changed dramatically in the late 1950s, following the retirement of the Invader from the regular USAF and ANG squadrons. Hundreds of airframes in good condition suddenly became available at low prices, making it feasible to design more elaborate conversions for the civilian markets, and over the next few years several firms in the USA marketed civilianized versions of the B-26. Some, like the Rock Island Monarch 26, remained outwardly similar to a 'stock' Invader, while others would at first glance appear to have little in common with the original aircraft. The more extreme conversions included the Rhodes Berry Silver Sixty, the LB Smith Tempo II and the LAS Super 26, each of which. involved major redesign of the fuselage to make it more suitable for passenger carrying. The most well known and the most successful of the companies engaged in Invader conversions was On Mark, which had been formed in 1954. From the start, the main line

of work had been the modification, repair and overhaul of B-26 aircraft, and the company was also licenced by Douglas to manufacture spare parts for the B-26. On Mark's experience in civilian conversions culminated in the Marksman series of pressurized executive transports, receiving its FAA Type Certificate in January 1961. Several of the On Mark converted Invaders have survived into the 1990s, while those of their competitors have largely disappeared overthe years. Another field the B-26 was found to be useful for was forest fire-fighting, and by the mid 1970s several companies in the USA and Canada were operating sizeable fleets of converted Invaders, fitted with large tanks in their bomb bays. Up to the early 1960s, all civilian Invaders came from surplus USAF stock. Most of them had no background in foreign air forces, although twenty-odd B-26s handed back to the USAF by the French in 1954-55 subsequently turned up on the US civil register and a dozen of these have survived into the 1990s. But by the mid 1960s the USAF Invader stocks were all but gone and, with the exception of 'some A-26As sold off in the early 1970s, the aircraft remaining at Davis-Monthan were virtuallyail scrapped. Strangely enough, none of

186

FOREIGN INVADERS

l

j

NL67908, alias 44-34758, was one of the very first Invaders to be entered on the US civit register. The aircraft went to France in 1952. W. T. Larkins via 1. M. G. Gradidge The same aircraft, now in French service, during a visit to Bovingdon, England, in 1956. As can be seen, the Armee de I'Air did not waste any money on a new paint job! A. Pearcy

the US Navy Invaders (many of which were originally built for the RAF) ever made it to the civilian market or even to museums, all being scrapped after retirement. Since the mid I960s, about a dozen Invaders have received civilian registrations after being retired by various foreign air forces. Six of them came from the French armed forces, but none of these survived more than a few years. The air forces of Brazil, El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua each contributed one or two aircraft. At least one former CIA aircraft (44-35896, subsequently converted into B-26K 64-17640) also ended up in civilian markings. With few exceptions, the 'paper trails' of the surviving Invaders are reasonably straightforward, and the type has not been subjected to the wholesale forgery of documentation and serial numbers which is unfortunately so common for certain other warbirds, such as the Mustang. It is therefore in most cases not too difficult to follow the individual aircraft up to the present date, and

whenever possible brief notes about the subsequent fate of the aircraft have been included in the tables in this book. Of more than forty Invaders still airworthy in mid 1992, nearly twenty were still in use as fire-bombers, most of them with Air Spray Ltd in Canada, whose tanker number' I0' once fought at Dien Bien Phu with the French Air Force. One or two Invaders survive in use as corporate aircraft, but are unlikely to remain long in this role. Another twenty or so aircraft fly as dedicated warbirds, mainly in the USA. At the time of writing, only the single Invader of the Scandinavian Historical Flight (which never served outside the USAF) is permanently based in Europe, but at least two others-are undergoing restoration to flyable condition: one of these is an Armee de l'Air B-26B being worked on in France while the other one is a former US civilian aircraft (again without foreign background) under rebuild in England. Both are still in basically 'stock' military configuration. The Invader is still something of a 'sleeper'

on the warbirds market and is not commanding as high prices as e.g. the B-25, even though the number of survivors is about the same for both types (130-140 aircraft). This situation is likely to change before long and increasing numbers of B-26s will probably appear on the warbird circuit over the next few years. Spare parts are still relatively plentiful, but the R-2800 engines are rather expensive to maintain. One drawback is that many of the surviving Invaders have been extensively modified in civilian hands and the cost of 'de-civilianization' can be substantial. A few potentially restorable 'Foreign Invaders' are awaiting recovery from the far comers of the world, where they have stood abandoned for many years. These include a former French B-26B in Pakistan and some of the Salvadorean aircraft. One or two of the Nicaraguan Invaders, together with the five A-26As of the Vietnamese Air Force, may also still be in existence. In addition, several of the former Portuguese aircraft are likely to remain at Luanda in Angola: since two of them are still officially carried on the US civil register, nearly thirty years after being smuggled out of the country, one might even argue that they already are 'warbirds'!

APPENDICES

After its second retirement from military service, N3222T is now back in the USA. Unlike most other surviving civilian Invaders, it is still in more or less stock configuration and retains its bomb bay, as is evident in this view from Oshkosh in August 1992. R. Phillips Indochina veteran N26MR (44-34713) was typical of the many Invaders converted into executive transports in the late 1950s and early 1960s, in this case an On Mark Marketeer. The picture dates from 1974, when the aircraft was still active, but it has since been retired to the National Warplane Museum in Geneseo, New York. via R. Phillips Painted in somewhat fanciful Korean War markings when seen in 1992, 44-34538 actually spent most of the early 1950s with GB.1I1 9 in Indochina. R. Kennedy via R. Phillips

187

188

FOREIGN INVADERS

•r

Despite the reasonably accurate early 1950s French markings carried in this 1992 Oshkosh shot, 44-34313 (C-GHLK) never served in Indochina. It was in fact scheduled for delivery to France in 1956, for use in Algeria, but the assignment was cancelled. N. Lewis N4988N - formerly 64-17679, one of only ten A-26As never to serve in Asia - is the last of its version still flying. In 1991, when this photo was taken, the aircraft still belonged to Lynch Air Tankers in Montana. H. D. Lynch via T. Wickstrom Apart from the discreet civilian registration under the tailplane, only the slightly incorrect proportions of the national insignia (a common mistake on warbirds) reveals that this photo dates from 1992 rather than 1945. The aircraft is N99420, the only former Nicaraguan Invader currently airworthy. R. Phillips Former French Invader N202P (44-34568) has stood abandoned at Karachi, Pakistan, for twenty-odd years after being impounded in connection with a smuggling attempt. Seen here in the summer of 1992, it looks more than a little neglected, but reasonably intact and could be resurrected as a warbird: the airport authorities are open to offers. L. Hellstrom

FOREIGN INVADERS

189

Appendix B

Notes on Designations Since the various designations used for Douglas Invaders through the years is a rather complex subject, and a continuing source of misunderstandings, it might be in order to give some comments on their use in this book. When the Douglas Invader entered USAAF service in 1943, it was known as the A-26. There were two main versions built: the A-26B, which had a gun nose I, and the A-26C, with a perspex bombardier nose. (The A-26A was a proposed night intruder version, of which only a single prototype was built.) On I July 1948, ten months after the creation of an independent USAF, the aircraft were re-designated B-26B and B-26C respectively, taking over the designation formerly used by the Martin Marauder. Even the Air Force itself did at times find it hard to tell the two types apart: as late as the 1960s, official USAF documents on occasion referred to the Douglas B-26s still in service as 'Marauders'! To confuse matters even more, the B-26K version developed in the 1960s was re-designated the A-26A in 1966. Note, however, that this change did not affect the few unconverted B-26s still on charge, which continued' to be designated B-26B and B-26C. In time, large numbers of B-26s were converted into one of two 'new' versions, reference to which will be found in several places in this book: The RB-26 (prior to 1948 called the FA-26) was a reconnaissance version, which usually carried a number of cameras in the bomb bay and/or the rear fuselage.· Virtually all RB-26s were C-models, and in most cases one or more cameras were also fitted in the nose, using the original bombardier position as well as a camera window positioned on the left-hand side. However, it appears the configuration of the camera installation in the RB-26 was never standardized, and it varied considerably through the years. A number of Invaders equipped with various types of search radar were also known as RB-26s by the USAF, but there were relatively few such conversions. The TB-26 was the trainer version, and TB-26Bs as well as TB-26Cs appeared in great numbers from 1945 on (initially under the designation TA-26). By definition, the TB-26 should be equipped with dual controls and most TB-26s were indeed converted in this manner. But in some cases aircraft without

dual controls were also referred to as TB-26s, simply because they served on second-line duties. On the other hand, dual-control Invaders serving with combat units were on occasion listed as B-26s, thus reflecting the role of the aircraft rather than their configuration. In this book, the designation 'TB-26' has generally only been used to describe an aircraft with dual controls. In addition, there were several less common versions of the Invader, including the DB-26, EB-26, GB-26, JB-26, UB-26, VB-26 and WB-26, and even some with three-letter designations, such as the GDB-26 and JRB-26. Also, from 1945 to 1962 the US Navy designation of the Invader was JD-I. But, with few exceptions, these versions never served outside the regular USAF and USN, and are therefore outside the scope of this publication. When built, the designation of each aircraft also incorporated a block number, as well as a code for the manufacturing plant, e.g. 'A-26B-25-DL.' The block numbers, which for the Invaders ran from -I u'p to -71, indicated the modification level of the individual aircraft. Unlike certain other types in the USAF inventory, however, the block numbers of the. Invaders were not continuously updated as the aircraft went through various wartime and postwar modification programmes, and were seldom used in any aircraft records. They have therefore been left out in most of the tables in this book, since the actual configuration of an aircraft surviving into the. 1950s or 1960s would usually have little in common with the original, as-built configuration. From the outset, the fuselage ofthe Invader was built to enable the nose to be changed in the field in a matter of hours. A B-26B could thus quickly be modified into a B-26C, or vice versa, and this type of 'conversion' was very common in practice. It is important to note that the nose was the only real difference between the 'B and the 'C. When, for example, a B-26B nose was fitted to what had originally been a B-26C, the aircraft became a B-26B: to call it a 'B-26C with a B-26B nose,' or in any other way continue to refer to it as a B-26C - as some publications have done in the past - is not only misleading, but quite incorrect. When studying the aircraft tables in this book, it will be found that a great number of

aircraft are listed as being of a different version than when built. The designations shown are those known or believed to be correct for the aircraft at the time, based on documents and photos. For the as-built version of a particular aircraft, please refer to the production record in Appendix Three. The first batches of A-26Bs built had a sixgun nose, while later batches had an eight-gun nose. But, once again, these could easily be changed at a later date, and many early-model aircraft eventually ended up with eight-gun noses, or the other way around. Strictly speaking, the designations A-26 and B-26 should primarily apply to the Douglas Invaders while in service with the USAAF and USAF (from 1962 also the USN), and not those serving with foreign air forces. But in practice, the same designations were also used by many of the new owners of the aircraft, either officially or unofficially, and they have therefore been used throughout this book. Besides, the Invader never received a Douglas type number2, and even civilian Invaders are almost invariably shown as A-26s or B-26s in official records. A number of designations for special versions of the Invader, such as the Chilean B-26D, the USAF RB-26L and the French B-26N, are covered elsewhere in this book.

I During the design of the Invader, the designation A-26B had initially referred to a tank destroyer version with one 75mm gun, while A-26C was briefly used for a planned version with four 37mm guns. The final designation allocation was not made until 22 February 1943

The only number given to the production version by Douglas was the design specification number D5-543, but this was a strictly internal designation, used mainly during the planning stages. Later on, Douglas also referred to the Invader as the A-26.

2

190

FOREIGN INVADERS

Appendix D

Douglas A-26 Invader Production List Compiled from Douglas and USMF records. All designations are shown as delivered (or ordered, where applicable). Serial Number(s)

Version

41-19504 41-19505

XA-26-DE XA-26A-DE

1 2

1004 1005

41-19588

XA-26B-DE

3

1006

41-39100/39104 41-39105/39119 41-39120/39139 41-39140/39151 41-39152 41-39153/39192 41-39193 41-39194 41-39195 41-39196/39198 41-39199/39200 41-39201/39299 41-39300/39349 41-39350/39424 41-39425/39499 41-39500/39599

A-26B-I-DL A-26B-5-DL A-26B-IO-DL A-26B-15-DL A-26C-I-DL A-26B-15-DL A-26C-2-DL A-26B-15-DL A-26C-2-DL A-26B-15-DL A-26C-2-DL A-26B-20-DL A-26B-25-DL A-26B-30-DL A-26B-35-DL A-26B-40-DL

1/ 6/ 21/ 41/ 53 54/ 94 95 96 97/ 100/ 102/ 201/ 251/ 326/ 401/

43-22252/22266 43-22267/22301 43-22301/22303 43-22304 43-22305/22307 43-22308/22312 43-22313/22345 43-22346/22349 43-22350/22351 43-22352/22354 43-22355/22357 43-22358/22360 43-22361/22362 43-22363/22364 43-22365/22366 43-22367 43-22368/22369 43-22370/22371 43-22372 43-22373/22374 43-22375/22376 43-22377 43-22378/22379 43-22380/22381 43-22382 43-22383/22384 43-22385/22386 43-22387 43-22388/22389 43-22390/22391 43-22392 43-22393/22394 43-22395/22396 43-22397/22399 43-22400/22437 43-22438 43-22439 43-22440 43-22441

A-26B-5-DT A-26B-IO-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26C-16-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26C-16-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26C-16-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-15-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT

1/ 16/ 51/ 53 54/ 57/ 62/ 95/ 99/ 102/ 106/ 110/ 114/ 117/ 120/ 123 125/ 128/ 131 133/ 136/ 139 141/ 144/ 147 149/ 152/ 155 157/ 160/ 163 165/ 168/ 171/ 177/ 254 257 260 263

Fuselage number(s)

5 20 40 52 93

99 101 200 250 325 400 500 15 50 52 56 61 94 98 100 104 108 112 115 118 121 126 129 134 137 142 145 150 153 158 161 166 169 175* 251 *

Construction number(s)

6813/ 6818/ 6833/ 6853/ 6865 6866/ 6906 6907 6908 6909/ 6912/ 6914/ 7013/ 7063/ 7138/ 7213/

6817 6832 6852 6864 6905

6911 6913 7012 7062 7137 7212 7312

18399/18413 18414/18448 18449/18450 18451 18452/18454 18455/18459 18460/18492 18493/18496 18497/18498 18500/18502 18504/18506 18508/18510 18512/18513 18515/18516 18518/18519 18521 18523/18524 18526/18527 18529 18531/18532 18534/18535 18537 18539/18540 18542/18543 18545 18547/18548 18550/18551 18553 18555/18556 18558/18559 18561 18563/18564 18566/18567 18569/18573* 18575/18649* 18652 18655 18658 18661

43-22442 43-22443 43-22444 43-22445 43-22446 43-22447 43-22448 43-22449 43-22450 43-22451 43-22452 43-22453 43-22454 43-22455 43-22456 43-22457 43-22458 43-22459 43-22460 43-22461 43-22462 43-22463 43-22464 43-22465 43-22466 43-22467 43-22468 43-22469 43-22470 43-22471 43-22472 43-22473/22474 43-22475 43-22476/22477 43-22478 43-22479/22480 43-22481 43-22482/22483 43-22484 43-22485/22486 43-22487 43-22488/22489 43-22490 43-22491/22493 43-22494/22531 43-22532/22533 43-22534/22535 43-22536/22537 43-22538/22539 43-22540/22541 43-22542/22543 43-22544/22545 43-22546/22547 43-22548/22549 43-22550/22551 43-22552/22553 43-22554/22555 43-22556/22557 43-22558/22559 43-22560/22561 43-22562/22563 43-22564 43-22565 43-22566/22567 43-22568/22569 43-22570/22571 43-22572/22573

A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-20-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26B-25-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-15-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-20-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT

266 269 272 275 278 281 284 287 290 293 296 299 302 305 308 311 314 317 320 323 326 329 332 335 338 101 105 109 113 116 119 122/ 124t 127 130/132t 135 138/ 140t 143 146/ 148t 151 154/156t 159 162/ 164t 167 170/ 174t 176/ 250t 252/ 253 255/ 256 258/ 259 261/ 262 264/ 265 267/ 268 270/ 271 273/ 274 276/ 277 279/ 280 282/ 283 285/ 286 288/ 289 291/ 292 294/ 295 297/ 298 300 301 303/304 306/ 307 309/ 310 312/ 313

;...

18664 18667 18670 18673 18676 18679 18682 18685 18688 18691 18694 18697 18700 18703 18706 18709 18712 18715 18718 18721 18724 18727 18730 18733 18736 18499 18503 18507 18511 18514 18517 I8520/18522t 18525 18528/18530t 18533 18536/18538t 18541 18544/18546t 18549 18552/18554t 18557 18560/18562t 18565 I8568/18572t 18574/18648t 18650/18651 18653/18654 18656/18657 18659/18660 18662/18663 18665/18666 18668/18669 18671/18672 18674/18675 18677/18678 18680/18681 18683/18684 18686/18687 18689/18690 18692/18693 18695/18696 18698 18699 18701/18702 18704/18705 18707/18708 18710/18711

t

APPENDICES

43-22574/22575 43-22576/22577 43-22578/22579 43-22580/22581 43-22582/22583 43-22584/22585 43-22586/22587 43-22588/22589 43-22590/22751

A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT A-26C-25-DT

44-34098/3421 7 44-34218/34286 44-34287 44-34288/34296 44-34297/34298 44-34299/34322 44-34323 44-34324/34326 44-34327 44-34328/34330 44-34331 44-34332 44-34333/34334 44-34335 44-34336/34338 44-34339 44-34340/34342 44-34343 44-34344/34346 44-34347 44-34348/34350 44-34351 44-34352/34363 44-34364 44-34365/34367 44-34368 44-34369/34371 44-34372 44-34373/34376 44-34377 44-34378/34381 44-34382 44-34383/34386 44-34387 44-34388/34392 44-34393 44-34394/34398 44-34399 44-34400/34404 44-34405 44-34406/34408 44-34409 44-34410/34412 44-34413 44-34414/34416 44-34417 44-34418/34419 44-34420 44-34421/34422 44-34423 44-34424/34425 44-34426 44-34427/34472 44-34473/34477 44-34478 44-34479/34480 44-34481 44-34482/34483 44-34484 44-34485/34486 44-34487 44-34488/34489 44-34490 44-34491/34492 44-34493 44-34494/34495 44-34496 44-34497/34498 44-34499 44-34500/34501 44-34502 44-34503/34504

A-26B-45-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-51-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-51-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-51-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-51-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-51-DL A-26B-50-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL . A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-56-DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B- -DL A-26B-55-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL

315/ 318/ 321/ 324/ 327/ 330/ 333/ 336/ 339/

316 319 322 325 328 331 334 337 500

18713/18714 18716/18717 18719/18720 18722/18723 18725/18726 18728/18729 18731/18732 18734/18735 18737/18898

501/ 620 621/ 689 690 691/ 699 700/ 701 702/ 725 726 727/ 729 730 731/ 733 734 735 736/ 737 738 739/ 741 742 743/ 745 746 747/ 749 750 751/ 753 754 755/ 766 767 768/ 770 771 772/ 774 775 776/ 779 780 781/ 784 785 786/789 790 791/ 795 796 797/ 801 -802 803/ 807 808 809/ 811 812 813/ 815 816 817/ 819 820 821/ 822 823 824/ 825 826 827/ 828 829 830/ 875 876/ 880 881 882/ 883 884 885/ 886 887 888/ 889 890 891/ 892 893 894/ 895 896 897/ 898 899 900/ 901 902 903/ 904 905 906/ 907

27377/27496 27497/27565 27566 27567/27575 27576/27577 27578/27601 27602 27603/27605 27606 27607/27609 27610 27611 27612/27613 27614 27615/27617 27618 27619/27621 27622 27623/27625 27626 27627/27629 27630 27631/27642 27643 27644/27646 27647 27648/27650 27651 27652/27655 27656 27657/27660 27661 27662/27665 27666 27667/27671 27672 27673/27677 27678 27679/27683 27684 27685/27687 27688 27689/27691 27692 27693/27695 27696 27697/27698 27699 27700/27701 27702 27703/27704 27705 27706/27751 27752/27756 27757 27758/27759 27760 27761/27762 27763 27764/27765 27766 27767/27768 27769 27770/27771 27772 27773/27774 27775 27776/27777 27778 27779/27780 27781 27782/27783

191

44-34505 44-34506/34507 44-34508 44-34509/34510 44-34511 44-34512/34513 44-34514 44-34515/34516 44-34517 44-34518/34519 44-34520 44-34521 44-34522/34585 44-34586 44-34587/3461 7 44-34618/34753 44-34754/34759 (ntu) 44-34760 (nd) 44-34761/34774 (ntu) 44-34775 (nd) 44-34776 44-34777/34778 (ntu) 44-34779 (nd) 44-34780/35197 (canx) 44-35198/35357 44-35358/35557 44-35558/35562 44-35563 (canx) 44-35564/35655 44-35656/35782 44-35783/35937 44-35938/35947 44-35948/35952 (ntu) 44-35953 44-35954 (canx) 44-35955 44-35956 (ntu) 44-35957/35996 44-35997/36005 (nd) 44-36006/36009 (canx) 44-36010/36011 (nd) 44-36012/36025 (canx) 44-36026/36047 (nd) 44-36048/36060 (nd) 44-36061/36062 (canx) 44-36063 (nd) 44-36064/36097 (canx) 44-36098/36797 (canx)

A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-60-DL A-26B-61-DL XA-26F-DL A-26B-61-DL A-26B-66-DL A-26B- -DL A-26B- -DL A-26B- -DL A-26B- -DL A-26B-71-DL A-26B- -DL A-26B- -DL A-26B- -DL A-26C-30-DT A-26C-35-DT A-26C-40-DT A-26C-40-DT A-26C-40-DT A-26C-45-DT A-26C-50-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-55-DT A-26C-60-DT A-26C-60-DT A-26C-60-DT A-26C-60-DT A-26C- -DT

908 909/ 910 911 912/ 913 914 915/ 916 917 918/ 919 920 921/ 922 923 924 925/ 988 989 990/1020 1021/1156 1157/1162 1163 1164/1177 1178 1179 1180/1181 1182 1183/1600 501/ 660 661/ 860 861/ 865 866 867/ 958 959/1085 1086/1240 1241/1250 1251/1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260/1299 1300/1308 1309/1312 1313/1314 1315/1328 1329/1350 1351/1363 1364/1365 1366 1367/1400 1401/2100

27784 27785/27786 27787 27788/27789 27790 27791/27792. 27793 27794/27795 27796 27797/27798 27799 27800 27801/27864 27865 27866/27896 27897/28032 28033/28038 28039 28040/28053 28054 28055 28056/28057 28058 28059/28476 28477/28636 28637/28836 28837/28841 28842 28843/28934 28935/29061 29062/29216 29217/29226 29227/29231 29232 29233 29234 29235 29236/29275 29276/29284 29285/29288 29289/29290 29291/29304 29305/29326 29327/29339 29340/29341 29342 29343/29376 29378/30076

45-17343/19342 (canx)

A-26E-DT

2101/4100?

37329/39328

45-22393/22792 (canx)

A-26D-DL

1601/2000

36929/37328

45-53575/54824 (canx) 45-54825/55174 (canx)

A-26E-DT A-26D-DL

4101/5350? 2001/2350

41604/42853 40579/40928

*

odd numbers only even numbers only cancelled before completion completed but not delivered from Douglas; scrapped completed and delivered but never taken on USAAF charge; many sold to civilian firms

t

(canx) (nd) (ntu)

Production summary

Prototypes A-26B A-26C A-26D A-26E

Ordered!

Built

Taken on USAAF charge

4 1,799 1,900 750 3,350

4 1,381 1,144 0' 0

4 1,356 1,091 0 0

7,703

2,529

2,451

after amendments and order changes, but including subsequently cancelled aircraft at least two A-26Bs (41-39543 and 44-34100) were subsequently converted to A-26Ds

FOREIGN INVADERS

192

Abbreviations A&AEE M(I) M(2) AM AS

ACCS ACG ACS ACW AF AFB AFLC AG ALN ANC ANG ANL AOC ARP ASDG AUREV AURI

BA (I) BA (2) BAF BDA BE BG(L) BND BS BuNo CAEO

Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment (Boscombe Down, England) Anti-aircraft L'Armee de l'Air = The [French] Air Force Anti-aircraft Artillery Aer6dromo-Base = [Minor] Air Base (Portugal) Airborne Command and Control Squadron (USAF) Air Commando Group (USAF) Air Commando Squadron (USAF) Air Commando Wing (USAF) Air Force (USAF) Air Force Base (USAF) Air Force Logistics Command (USAF) Aktiengesellschaft = Limited Company Armee de Liberation Nationale = National Liberation Army (Algeria) Armee Nationale Congolaise = Congolese National Army Air National Guard (USA) Armee Nationale du Laos = National Army of Laos Air Officer Commanding American Republic Projects Aircraft Storage and Disposition Group (USAF) Angkatan Udara Revolusioner = Revolutionary Air Force (Indonesia; Operation Haik) Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia = Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia Base Aerea = Air Base (Portugal and Brazil) Base Aerienne = Air Base (M) Biafran Air Force Bomb Damage Assessment Base Ecole = Training Base (M) Bombardment Group (Light) (USAF) Bundesnachrichtendienst = Federal Intelligence Service (Germany) Bombardment Squadron (USAF) Bureau of Aeronautics Number (USN aircraft serial number) Commandement de l'Air en Extreme Orient = Far East Air Command (M)

Confederate Air Force (Texas, USA) CBU Cluster Bomb Unit Combat Crew Training CCTS .Squadron (USAF) CEAM Centre d'Experiences Aeriennes Militaires = Military Aviation Evaluation Centre (Mont-de-Marsan, France) CEV Centre d'Essais en Vol = Flight Test Centre (Bretigny-sur-Orge, France) CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA) Centre d'lnstruction du cm Bombardement = Bombing Training Centre (M) Centre d'lnstruction des CIE Equipages = Crew Training Centre (M) Centre Interarmees CIEES d'Experimentation des Engins Speciaux = Interservice Special Engine Research Centre (M) Centre d'lnstruction et C1ET d'Entrainement au Transport = Transport Training Centre (M) CIFAS Centre d'lnstruction des Forces Aeriennes Strategique = Strategic Air Forces Training Centre (M) CNAF Chinese Nationalist Air Force (Taiwan) CNL Conseil National de Liberation = The National Liberation Council (Congo) Commanding Officer CO CofA Certificate of Airworthiness Counter-Insurgency COIN CIB Centre de Tir et de Bombardement = Gunnery and Bombing Centre Entrep6t d'Armee de I'Air EM = Air Force Depot (M) EB (I) Escadrille de Bombardement = Bomber Flight (M) EB (2) Escadron de Bombardement = Bomber Squadron (M) EC Escadron de Chasse = Fighter Squadron (M) ECN (I) Escadrille de Chasse de Nuit = Night Fighter Flight (M) ECN (2) Escadron de Chasse de Nuit = Night Fighter Squadron (M) CAF

ELA

Escadrille de Liasion Aerienne = Air Liaison Flight (M) ER Escadrille de Reconnaissance = Reconnaissance Flight (M) Escadrille de Reconnaissance EROM d'Outre-Mer = Overseas Reconnaissance Flight (M) ERP (I) Escadrille de Reconnaissance Photographique = Photo Reconnaissance Flight (M) ERP (2) Escadron de Reconnaissance Photographique = Photo Reconnaissance Squadron (M) FM Federal Aviation Administration (USA) FAB For<;a Aerea Brasileira = Brazilian Air Force FAC (I) Force Aeriennes Congolaise = Congolese Air Force FAC (2) Forward Air Controller FAC (3) Fuerza Aerea Colombiana = Colombian Air Force FAC (4) Fuerza Aerea de Chile = Air Force of Chile FACh Fuerza Aerea de Chile = Air Force of Chile FACol Fuerza Aerea Colombiana = Colombian Air Force Fuerza Aerea Dominicana FAD = Dominican Air Force FAEC Fuerza Aerea del Ejercito de Cuba = Air Force of the Army of Cuba FAG Fuerza Aerea Guatemalteca = Guatemalan Air Force Fuerza Aerea Hondurefla FAH = Honduran Air Force FAL Fuerza Aerea de Liberacion = Liberation Air Force (Cuba; Operation Pluto) FAM Fuerza Aerea Mexicana = Mexican Air Force FAN Fuerza Aerea (de la Guardia NacionaI) de Nicaragua = Air Force (of the National Guard) of Nicaragua FAP (I) For<,;a Aerea Portuguesa = Portuguese Air Force FAP (2) Fuerza Aerea PeruanalFuerza Aerea del Peru = Peruvian Air Force/Air Force of Peru FAR Fuerza Aerea Revolucionaria = Revolutionary Air Force (Cuba) FAS (I) Fuerza Aerea Salvadorefla = Salvadorean Air Force

ABBREVIATIONS

FAS (2)

Fuerza Aerea Sandinista = Sandinistan Air Force (Nicaragua) FATAC Force Aeriennes Tactique au Congo = Tactical Air Force in the Congo (Belgium) Federal Bureau of Investigation FBI (USA) FIR Frente de Izquierda Revolucionaria = Revolutionary Leftist Front (Peru) Front de Liberation Nationale FLN = National Liberation Front (Algeria) FMS Foreign Military Sales FNLA Frente Nacional de Liberta<;ao de Angola = The National Liberation Front of Angola FS(C) Fighter Squadron (Composite) (USAF) Grant Aid GA GATAC Groupement Aerien Tactique = [Regional] Tactical Air Command (AA) GAv Grupo de Avia<;ao = Aviation Group (FAB) GB Groupe de Bombardement = [Independent] Bombardment Squadron (AA) Groupement Mobile GM = Mobile Formation (French Army) GmbH Gesellschaft mit begrenzter Haftung = Limited Company Groupe d'Outre-Mer GOM = [Independent] Overseas Squadron (AA) .GP General Purpose Groupe Saharien de GSRA Reconnaissance et d'Appui = [Independent] Saharian Reconnaissance and Support Squadron (AA) GT Groupe de Transport = [Independent] Transport Squadron (AA) Inter-American Air Forces IAAFA Academy (USAF) Indicated Air Speed lAS Infra-red IR Inspect and Repair As Necessary IRAN JTF Joint Task Force KIA Killed In Action Kilometres per hour Indicated KIAS Air Speed Military Assistance Advisory MAAG Group Military Assistance Program MAP MASDC Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center (Davis-Monthan, USA) Military Air Transport Service MATS (USAF) Mutual Defense Assistance MDAP Program Missing In Action MIA

ML-KNIL Militaire Luchtvaart- Koninklijk Nederlands Indische Leger = Military Aviation - Royal Dutch Indies Army MPLA Movimento Popular de Liberta<;ao de Angola = The Popular Liberation Movement of Angola Mobile Training Team (USAF) MTT Maintenance Unit (RAF) MU Nigerian Air Force NAF NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NKP Nakhon Phanom Air Base (Thailand) North Vietnamese Army NVA OAS (I) Organisation Armee Secrete = Secret Army Organization (France) OAS (2) Organization of American States OGMA Oficinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico = General Aviation Materiel Workshops (Alverca, Portugal) Pacific Air Forces (USAF) PACAF Partido Africano da PAIGC Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde = The African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cap Verde PAMARF Parque de Material Aeronautico de Recife = Aviation Material Depot of Recife (Brazil) PDJ Plain des Jarres = Plain of Jars (Laos) PERMESTA Piagam Perjuahgan Semesta Alam = Universal Struggle Charter (Indonesia) Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant POL PRRI Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia = Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia Pierced Steel Planking PSP Royal Australian Air Force RAAF Royal Air Force RAF Reimbursable Aid Program RAP Route Coloniale = Colonial RC Road Reconstruction Finance RFC Corporation (USA) RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force RSAF Royal Saudi Air Force Royal Thai Air Force RTAF Republic of [South] Vietnam RVN Sociedad Anonimo/Societe SA Anonyme = Limited Company South African Air Force SAAF Strategic Air Command (USAF) SAC SAR Search And Rescue SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Serial number Sin Struck Off Charge SOC

193

SODEMAC Societe d'Entretien et de Maintenance d'Avion au Congo = Company for Upkeep and Maintenance of Aircraft in the Congo Special Operations Squadron SOS (USAF) Special Operations Wing SOW (USAF) TASS Tactical Air Support Squadron (USAF) TOY Temporary Duty Turk Hava Kuwetleri THK = Turkish Air Forces TIl Tentera Islam Indonesia = Indonesian Islamic Army TNI-AU Tentera Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Udara = Indonesian National Armed Forces - Air Force TNKU Tentera Nasional Kalimantan Utara = Northern Kalimantan National Army (Indonesia) TOC Taken On Charge TRW Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (USAF) He Teniente = Lieutenant TT HL KQ Trung-Tam Huan-Luyen Khong-Quan = Air Force Training Center (VNAF) UAT Union Aeromaritime de Transport (France) Uniao Nacional para a UNITA lndependencia Total de Angola = The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola USAAC United States Army Air Corps USAAF United States Army Air Forces United States Air Force USAF United States Air Force in Europe USAFE United States Marine Corps USMC USN United States Navy VC Viet Cong Viet Cong Viet Nam Cong San = Communists of Vietnam Viet Minh Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi = League for the Independence of Vietnam [South] Vietnamese Air Force VNAF WAA War Assets Administration (USA) Withdrawn from use Wfu Written off W/o

194

FOREIGN INVADERS

Sources Some of the sources listed below do not give specific information on the Douglas Invader, but have nevertheless been useful in providing background information on countries, conflicts, milital)' units, etc. PRIMARY SOURCES The titles given below sometimes indicate the contents of the documents rather than their official title. The list only contains documents reviewed by the authors. In addition, many other prj: mal)' sources - notably in France - have been researched by contributors named in the introduction to this book. Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment, Boscombe Down, England: ReportsA&AEEJ823 (parts 1to 7) and/823a: Testing of the Invader I, July 1944 to March 1945. Air Force Historical Research Agency (formerly the USAF Historical Research Center), MaxwellAFB,AL, USA: K144.01: Histol)', Assistant for Mutual Security, Vol. 8: Major Items in FY1950-55 USAF MDA Program, July - December 1955. K200.8633-1: Tactics Manual, A-26A. AFLC, November 1968 (unpublished). K282.01-65: Histol)' of Headquarters, 2704th ASDG (AFLC), USAF, Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Arizona, 1July 1960 - 30 June 1961. K464.01: Histol)' of US Air Force Caribbean Command/Southern Command, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1963 and 1966. K570.9542: Various reports and correspondence on the Turkish Aid Program, 19471950. K71 7.131: SEA End-of-Tour Report, Colonel HarI)'C.Aderholt, USAF, 19 December 1967. K730.04-22: Fifth Air Force in the Southeast Asia Crisis of 1960-1961. HQ, 5th Air Force, c.May 1961. K750.8613-3: Final Report, Tactical Analysis Program 63-2: Tactical Analysis ofB/RB-26 Aircraft in Republic ofVietnam. HQ, 13th Air . Force, 11 May 1963. Mobile Training Team Performance Reports (Final), various countries and dates. AC, ACA, ACR, AVH and OACR series micro films: Individual Aircraft Record Cards

(or later equivalents) for USAAF/USAF Invaders, 1943-1974. Air Force SafetyAgency, NortonAFB, CA, USA: USAF AccidenVIncident Reports for selected Vietnam era aircraft. Bensen Center for Latin American Studies, University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA: Central Intelligence Agency Research Reports 1946-1976, Roll One; a microfilm publication of the University Publications of America, (Unclassified, 'Sanitized' copy), dated Februal)' 1964. Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC,USA: Various unreferenced documents released under the provisions of the Freedom of InformationAct, in particular those relating to EI Salvador, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Douglas Aircraft Company, Long Beach, CA,USA: Airplane Delivel)' Records, Records of Airplanes and other documents relating to A-26 production. AFLC Historical Study No.3: Case Histol)'of the A-26 Airplane, c.194 7. Federal Aviation Administration, Oklahoma City, OK, USA: Individual files for civilian Invaders N26VC, N64Y, N65Y, N67Y, N68Y, N70Y, N72Y, N73Y, N74Y, N115RG, N900V, N2781 G, N3152G, N4959K, N5000X, N5002X, N7953C, N8020E, N9422Z,N9424Z,N9484Z,NI2756,NI9777, N46598, N62289, N67157, N67161, N67908, N91346, N91347, N91349, N91350, N99420, N99422 and N99425. Headquarters, USAF, Washington, DC, USA: Milital)'Assistance Program V-12 Reports, Peru, various dates. US Air Force Southern Command (USAFSO), Command Historians Office, Mission Reports, USAF Mission to Nicaragua and Peru, various dates. Landgericht, Vaduz, lichtenstein: Company register extract for AnstaIt Wigmo. National Archives, Bayonne, NJ, USA: Criminal cases 8929-C and 9099-C, US District Court, Buffalo, NY: Excerpts from transcripts ofThe United States vs. Gregol)' R. Board et al.

National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, DC, USA: Record Group 59: State Department series 7xx.56 and 722.5MSP decimal files and RMA case files on aircraft exports, 1951-1959. Record Group 341, Box 63: MDAP Progress, November 1954. Record Group 341, Boxes 100 and up: USAF Milital)' Sales Case Files. Public Record Office, Kew, England: AIR 8/816 and /81 7: Lend-Lease of US aircraft. AIR 8/1236, AIR 20/995 and/1 093: Use of Highball bombs by USAAF. AIR 20/1775: A-26 Invaders for the RAF. FO 371 series: Various reports and correspondence on the air forces ofBrazil, Chile, Cuba, Indonesia, Peru, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, 1950-1960. Royal Air Force Museum, Hendon, England: Air MinistJY Form 78s: movement records of 41-39158, KL690 and KL691. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, MD, USA: USAF Intelligence service records. Private collections: Aircraft movement records, Clark Field 1958. Log books, etc., of pilots flying with AnstaIt Wigmo, Projects Black Watch ,Farm Gate and Mill Pond, Operation Pluto and with Air America. Records ofB-26 IRANs and modifications performed by UAT, France 1957-1962. Various orders relating to Air Commando and Special Operations units, USAF 1961-1969.

BOOKS AND ARTICLES A-26PilotPhaseManual. 1SOW, USAF,

September 1969. Abbot, Peter and Manuel R. Rodrigues. ModernAfrican Wars (2): Angola and Mor;ambique 1961-74. Osprey, London, 1988. 'Aeromagnetics'. Prakla Technical Review, May 1963 (No.8). Andrade, John M. Spanish andPortuguese Military Aviation. Midland Counties, Leicester, 1977.

SOURCES

---. U.S. Military Aircraft and Serials since 1909. Midland Counties, Leicester, 1979.

Ballard, Jack S. The United States AirForce in Southeast Asia: Development and Deployment ofFixed-Wing Gunships 19621972. Office ofAir Force History, Washington, DC, 1982. Berger, Carl (ed.). The United States AirForce in SoutheastAsia, 1961-1973: An /llustrated Account. Office ofAir Force History, Washington, DC, 1984. Bonds, Ray (ed.). The Vietnam War: The lllustrated History ofthe Conflict in Southeast Asia. Salamander, London, 1979. Brecher, Michael. The New States ofAsia. Oxford University Press, New York, 1966. Brugioni, Dino. Eyeball to Eyeball. Random House, New York, 1991. Carver, Michael. War Since 1945. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1980. Chant, Cristopher. Warfare ofthe 20th Century: Armed Conflicts Outside the Two World Wars. Viscount, London, 1988. Chapman, John and Geoff Goodall. Warbirds Worldwide Directory: An International Survey ofthe World's Warbird Population. Warbirds Worldwide, Mansfield, UK, 1989 and 1992 editions. Chenel, Bernard. 'Le Douglas Invader en Algerie'. Traitd'Union, September 1973 (No.3 I). ---. 'Le Douglas Invader en Indochine'. Trait d'Union, July 1973 (No.30). Chillon, Jacques. 'French Air Force in Algeria 1954-1962'. Air- Britain Digest, May-June 1975. The Counter-Invader from On Mark. On Mark: Van Nuys, CA,c.1963.

Crosnier, Alain. 'La Renaissance de I'Aviation de Bombardement'. AirFan, February 1981 (No.28). Crosnier, Alain and Jean-Michel GuhI. L 'Armee de I 'Air en Indochine: Transports et Bombardement 1945-1954. Sup Air, Paris, 1981.

Facon, Patrick. 'L'Armee de I'Air en Indochine: LesAvions de Bombardement'. Monfteurde/~eronautique,NovemberI980

195

'Invaders over Indo China'. Combat Report, January-February 1987 (Vol. I ,No.2).

(No.38).

Jackson, Paul A. French Military Aviation. Midland Counties, Leicester, 1979.

Ferrer, Edward B. Operation Puma: The Air Battle for the Bay ofPigs. International Aviation Consultants, Miami, 1982.

- - . German Military Aviation 1956-1976. Midland Counties, Hinckley, 1976.

Fischer, Louis. The Story ofIndonesia. Harper, New York, 1959. Flintham, Victor. Air Wars andAircraft: A Detailed Record ofAirCombat, 1945 to Present. Arms and Armour, London, 1989. Forsyth, Frederick. The Biafra Story: The Making ofan African Legend. Severn House, London, 1983. Francillon, Rene J. The Air Guard. Aerofax, Arlington, TX, c.1982. ---. 'The Douglas Invader Story' .Air Enthusiast, July-September 1978 (N0.7). Freemantle, Brian. CIA: The 'Honourable' Company. Michael Joseph, London, 1983. Fuerza Aerea. Chile, various issues

Futrell, Robert F. and Martin B1umenson. The United States AirForce in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Office ofAir Force History, Washington, DC, 1981. Gaillard, Pierre. 'Le B-26 Invader en "Indo'" (parts I to 3). Le Fanatique de I~viation, October 1978 (No.1 07) to December 1978 (No. 109). Garwood, Darrell. UnderCover: Thirty-Five Years ofCIA Deception. Grove Press, New York,1985. Gediz, Ergtider. U(akAlbiimii: TUrk Hava Kuvvetlerinin Kurulusundan Bugiine Kadar KullandigiU(aklar, CiltI!, 1923-1950. THKK, Ankara, 1984. Granma. Cuba, various issues.

Green, William and John Fricker. The Air Forces ofthe World. Macdonald, London, 1958. Green, William and Dennis Punnett. Macdonald World AirPower Guide. Macdonald, London, 1963.

Crozier, Brian. South-EastAsia in Turmoil. Penguin, London, 1965.

Haglund, Gunnar. Gerillapilot i Biafra. Alit om Hobby, Stockholm, 1988.

Demaret, Henri. 'On Mark Engineering Corporation (Douglas) B-26K "Counter Invader"'. La Lorgnette, 1985.

Harjo, John. 'Veteran ofThree Wars'. FlyPast, July 1992.

Effio, Alberto F. P.Aviacion en el Peru, Tm.2. CIMP, Lima, 1968.

Hersh, Burton. The Old Boys: The American Elite and the Origins ofthe CIA. Macmillan, New York, 1992.

Emme, Eugene M. (ed.). The Impact ofAir Power: National Security and World Politics. Van Nostrand, Princeton, NJ, 1959.

Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower and the CIA at the Bay ofPigs. Norton, New York, c.1987

English, Adrian J. ArmedForces ofLatin America. Jane's, London, 1984.

Hoare, Michael. Congo Warriors. Robert Hale, London, 1991.

Escuela Militarde Aviacion. FuerzaAerea Colombiana, undated.

Horne, Alistair. A Savage War ofPeace: Algeria 1954-1962. Viking, New York, 1978.

Ethell, Jeffrey L. /llustrated Classic Warbirds Buyer's Guide. Motorbooks, Osceola, WI, 1991.

Hughes, Peter. 'African Meltdown'. AirForces Monthly, October 1988.

Jamison, Theodore R. 'Nightmare of the Korean Hills: Douglas B-26 Invader Operations in the Korean War, 1950-1953'. AAHSJoumal, Summer 1989 (VoI.34, No.2). Kavelaars, H. C. 'Aircraft Operations in Indonesia by the Royal Dutch/Shell Companies 1934-1963'. AAHSJournal, Fall 1982 (VoI.27, No.3) Langford, David. L. 'B-26s from Alabama had Cuban Markings, flew off to Disaster'. The Birmingham News, 13 April 1986. Leary, William M. Perilous Missions: CivilAir Transport and CIA Covert Operations in Asia. University ofAlabama Press, 1984. Liu Wen Hsiao. 'InvaderAttacks Guangzhou at Night' (In Chinese). Chinese AirForce in Action, Series 1, Yun Hao, Taipei, 1990 Lopes, Mario c. 'Latin Harpoons: The Lockheed PV-2 in Brazilian and Portuguese Service'. AirEnthusiast, SeptemberDecember 1989 (NoAO). ---. 'Portugal's Fighting Thunderjets' . Air Enthusiast, July- November 1986 (No.3\). ---. 'PortugaI'sGinas'.AirEnthusiast, MayAugust 1988 (No.36).

---. Os Avi6es da Cruz de Cristo: 75 anos da Avia(Go Milftar em Portugal. Dinalivro, Lisbon, 1989. Macdonald, Peter. Soldiers ofFortune: The Twentieth Century Mercenary. Gallery, New York,1986. Mandala, Louis et al. 'Chronologie des Evenements: Politique Congolaise' (I June 1964 t031 December I 966). Etudes Congolaises, December 1964 (Vol. 7, No.1 0) to September-October 1967 (Vol. I0, No.5). Marchetti, Victor and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult oflntelligence. Dell, New York, 1974. Memoria del Ministerio de Defensa. Nicaragua, various annual issues. Memoria de la Ministerio de Guerra. Colombia, various annual issues.

Mesko, Jim. A-26Invader in Action. Squadron/Signal, Carrollton, TX, 1980. Mikesh, Robert C. Flying Dragons: The South Vietnamese AirForce. Osprey, London, 1988. Mockler, Anthony. The New Mercenaries: The History ofthe Mercenary from the Congo to the Seychelles. Guild, London, 1985. Moyes, Philip J. R. BomberSquadrons ofthe R.A.F. andtheirAircraft. Macdonald and Jane's, London, 1964.

196

Neel, Gilbert. 'L'Aviation dans La Guerre d'Algerie'. Le Fanatique de ['Aviation FebruaryI984(No.171). ' Nikolajsen, Ole. 'A History of the Turkish Air Force' (parts I and 2). Military Aviation Review, February-March 1981 and April- May 1982. - - . Turkish Military Aircraft 1911-1990.

(Unpublished manuscript, 1991.) adorn, Thomas P. Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo, 1964-1965.

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS,1988. Playa Giron: Derrota dellmperialismo.

Ediciones Revolucion, Havana, 1961. Ponzoa, Gustavo C. The Day 1Bombed Santiago de Cuba Airport. (Unpublished manuscript, 1961.) Portugal and Nato. Angola Comite, Amsterdam, 1972. Puren, Jerry and Brian Pottinger. Mercenary Commander. Galago, Alberton, RSA, 1986. Ranelagh, John. The Agency: The Rise and Decline ofthe CIA. Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1988. Reed, David. 111 Days in Stanleyvi/le. The Reader's Digest, London, 1965. Revista Aeronautica Colombiana. Various issues.

FOREIGN INVADERS

Ricklefs, M. C. A History ofModem Indonesia. Macmillan, London, 1981. Robbins, Christopher. AirAmerica. Corgi, London, 1988. - - . The Ravens: Pilots ofthe Secret War of Laos. Corgi, London, 1989.

Robinson, Anthony (ed.). AirPower: The World's AirForces. Orbis, London, 1980. R?th, MichaelJ. C. 'Nimrod: King of the Trail'. AirForce Magazine, October 1971. Roy, Jules. The Battle ofDienbienphu. Carroll &Graf,NewYork,1984. Schoeman, Mike. 'Guerre au Biafra' (parts I and 2). Aero Journal, Summer 1973 (No.5) and Autumn/Winter 1973 (No.617). Seagrave, Sterling. Soldiers ofFortune. TimeLife Books, Alexandria, VA, 1981. Sejarah Skadron I: Pembom TNI-AU 1950-

1977. TNl-AU,Jakarta,c.1980. Sheehan, Neil et al. The Pentagon Papers: The Secret History ofThe Vietnam War. . Quadrangle, New Yark, 1971. SmallAirForces Observer. Various issues Smith, David. 'Douglas B-26 Invader' . Aviation News, 8-21 December 1989 (Vol.18, No.15). StJarre, John de. The Brother's War. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1972. Sully, Francois. Age ofthe Guerrilla. Avon, NewYark,1968.

Thomas, Gerry S. Mercenary Troops in ModernAfrica. Westview Replica Editions, Boulder, 1985. Thomas, Hugh. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. Random House, New York, c.1977 Thompson, Robert (ed.). War in Peace: An Analysis ofWarfare from 1945 to the Lebanon. Orbis, London, 1981. Tickler, Peter. The Modern Mercenary: Dog of War, orSoldier ofHonour? Patrick Stephens Wellingborough,1987. ' Towle, Philip A. Pilots andRebels: The use of Aircraftin Unconventional Warfare 19181988. Brassey's, London, 1989. United States AirForce Statistical Digest. HQ, USAF, Washington, 1954 to 1963 editions. Verde Olivo. Cuba, various issues Wegg, John. 'Saudi Survivors'. Military Aviation Review, September 1976. Wickstrom, Thomas L. "'Nimrods": Truck Killers on the Trail'. Air Commando Association Newsletter, July 1988. . -~~. 'A-26's: The Rest of the Story'. Air Commando Association Newsletter

September 1988. ' Wise, David. The Invisible Government. Random House, New Yark, 1964. Zumbach, Jean. On Wings ofWar. Andre Deutsch, London, 1975.

... '''1 Tired USAF and CIA Invaders in bogus Vietnamese markings ut out to r . .. . . 8-26 operations during the 1950s and 1960s. via R. Besecker.' p g ass at Clark Fleld, the Phlhppmes; a base involved in several clandestine

FOREIGN INVADERS

197

Index JO Escuadron de ContraSubmarino, Columbia: 62, 63 1 Haua Ussii, THK: 17 1°/5° Grupo de AViGl;ao, Brazil:

225th Aviation Battalion, US Army:

161

72

3I4th Air Division, USAF: 135 405th TFW, USAF: 146 602nd ACS/FS(c), USAF: 146,

72, 73, 79, 80, 179

603rd ACS/SOS, USAF:

nul' Grupo de AviGl;ao, Brazil: 1st ACG/ACW; USAF:

139, 146,

156, 157, 160 1st ACS, USAF: 145 1st Fighter Squadron, Vietnamese AF: 137 2 Group, RAF: 11, 12 2 Hava Ussii, THK: 17, 18 2 Tayyare Alayi, THK: 16-18 2°/5° Grupo de AViGl;ao, Brazil:

72, 76 2nd Fighter Squadron, Vietnam:

138 2nd Tactical AF, RAF: 11 3 Squadron, RSAF: 66 3rd BG(L), USAF: 30 5° Grupo de Avia~ao, Brazil: 72 5th AF, USAAF: 7, 139 (J' Escadre de Chasse, AA: 36 7th ACCS, USAF: 161 7th Air Force, USAF: 160, 162,

·163, 164, 166 8th Bomber Group, USAF: 170 8th TFW, USAF: 166 10 Ke:jif Alayi, THK: .. 16 12 Hava Ulastirma Ussii, THK: 17 12 MU, RAF: 11, 12 13th Air Force, USAF: 162, 164 14th SOW; USAF: 166 16th SOS, USAF: 166 20" Escadre de Chasse, AA: 36 20th TASS, USAF: 161 2 JO Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero, Peru: 53 21 Squadron, Cuba: 152 22" Escuadron de Bombardero, Peru: 53 22 Squadron, Cuba: 151 2]0 Escuadron de Bombardero, Peru: 53 23rd TASS, USAF: 160 33rd Tactical Group, USAF: 145 34th Squadron, CNAF: 170 34th Tactical Group, USAF: 145 38th BG(L), USAF: 7, 66 47 MU, RAF: 12 56th ACW/SOyv, USAF: 160-164,

167 66th TRW; USAF: 97 67th TRW; USAF: 169 88 Squadron, RAF: 11, 12 III Filo, THK: 17 11 7th Reconnaissance Wing, ANG: 127 121 Filo, THK: 17, 18 I49th Squadron, ANG: 8 223 Filo, THK: 16-18

149, 154, 157, 160 157-159,

164, 166, 167 605th ACS, USAF: 8, 55, 120,

146, 157, 165, 178, 183 606th ACS: 158, 160, 161 609th ACS/SOS, USAF:

160-167,

183 617 Squadron, RAF: 12 618 Squadron, RAF: 12, 13 634th Combat Support Group, USAF: 159 721° Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero, Peru: 54, 55 lOOIst Operations Group, USAF:

135 I414th Air Base Group, USAF: 66 4400th CCTG/CCTS, USAF: 138,

139, 145 4756th Maintenance dnd Supply Group, USAF: 171 6200th Air Base Wing, USAF: 119 7405th Comba{Siipport Squadron, USAF: 123 AB-I, CIA Support Flight: 160,

164 Abdurachman Saleh, Indonesia:

85, 87 Able Mable, Project: 135,140 Adana, Turkey: 17 Aden: 150 Aderholt, Capt Warren: 133 Aderholt, Maj Harry: 132-135,

160, 162, 164 Aero L-29 Delfin: 107 Aero Associates, Inc: 99, 100,

101 Aerografica y Constructora SA:

171 Aeronautique Navale (Mronavale): 21, 22, 24-26,

28, 36, 39 Aeroplane & Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE): 10 Aerovias lnternacional Balboa: 171 Afyon, Turkey: 16 Air America: 101, 133, 134, 157,

170, 173 Air Asia: 124, 133, 135, 143,

145, 167, 170, 171 Air Bull, Exercise: 133 Air Service Training: 65 Airspeed Oxford: 16

Air Spray Limited: 186 Albania: 169 Albrook AFB, Canal Zone: 54,

55, 58, 59, 63, 64, 69, 91, 94, 120, 146, 147 Algeria: 36, 38-44, 177, 188 Allaire, Capt Ronald L: 133, 135 ALN, Algeria: 36, 38-43, 53 Alverca, Portugal: 101, 102 Andrews AFB, USA: 135 Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia (AURI): 83-88, 123,

124 Angkatan Udara Revolusioner (AUREV): 123-125 Angola: 71, 99, 100, 102-104,

180, 186 Antofagasta, Chile: 57-59 ARAMCO: 65 Argentina: 57, 120 Armee de l'Air, l' (AA): 21-52,

108, 120, 177, 186 Arnold, Gen 'Hap': 7, 11, 53 Arromanches, carrier: 21 Atelier Aeronautique AACI Toucan: See Junkers • Ju 52 Atlantic General Enterprises: 172 Austers: 99 Australia: 86 Auvergne, Operation:. 28 Avro Anson: 65 Lancaster: 12, 39, 57 Lincoln: 57

B-26 Taburu, THK: 16 Bacardi, company: 175, 176 Baker, Leo: 130 Bangkok Contract Air Services:

Bell P-63 Kingcobra.o 21, 22 UH-IB Iroquois: 150, 160 Beyrouth, Operation: 42 Biafra: 45, 105-11 0 Biafran Air Force: 102, 105-110,

180, 184 Bien Hoa AB: 137, 138, 140,

141, 143, 144 Big Eagle, Project: 158, 159 Big Fence, Project: 143 Black Watch, Project: 135, 140 Blanche Neige, Operation: 38 Blida, Algeria: 37, 39 Bloodworth, Bill: 133 Board, Gregory R: 99, 100, 101 Boeing KC-I35: 150 B-I7 Flying Fortress: 22, 72,

81, 169, 170 B-29 Superfortress: 26 B-52 Stratofortress: 159 KC-, RC-97 Stratofreighter: 143 KC-I35: 150 Bone, Algeria: 37, 42, 43 Bordeaux, France: 37, 43, 50 Boscombe Down, UK: 11, 12 Boulton-Paul Balliol: 65 Bourguiba, President: 39 Boutoir, Operation S2: 42 Brave Bull, Project: 143 Brazil: 57, 72-80, 179, 186 Breguet 14, 19: 15 Bretigny-sur-Orge, France: 35 Bristol Blenheim: 15 Beaufighter: 16 Burundi: 154

133 Barrel Roll, Area: 159, 160, 162,

164, 166, 167 Base Aerea de Sao Paulo: 72 Base Aerea de Recife: 72 Base Aerea Natal: 74 Batista, President: 69, 70, 175 Bay of Pigs: 8, 29, 40, 70, 71,

85, 126-131, 134, 135, 138, 148, 149, 171, 172, 175 BE. 706, AA: 36, 40, 44, 45, 52 Beech Aircraft Corp: 175 Beechcraft AT-7 Navigator: 19 AT-ll Kansan: 15, 57, 61, 62, 89, Ill, 116 C-45 Expeditor: 16, 19, 57, 93 HI8S: 72 T-34 Mentor: 67, 89 Belgium: 106 Belgian Congo: 40

Camacho, Gen Maximino Avila:

19 Camargue, Operation: 24 Cambodia: 157, 159, 163 Cambodian Air Force: 120 Campell, Dwight S: 160 Campo Columbia, Cuba: 68, 69 Canada: 107 Canadair CT-II4 Tutor: 107 DC-4M: Ill, 114 Canti Yudha, Exercise: 85 Caproni Ca-135: 53 Ca-3IO: 53 Caribbean Marine Aero Corp:

127, 151 Castor, Operation: 25, 28 Caroussel, Operation: 43 Castro, Fidel: 68, 126-128, 130,

175

198

INDEX

Cat Bi, Vietnam: 22-24, 26 Cazaux, France: 23, 36, 43, 45,

51 Cessna 172 Skyhawk: 95

337: 95 L-19/0-1 Bird Dog: 38, 158,

160 0-2 Super Skymaster: 160, 161 T/A-37B: 56, 72, 119 CEAM, AA: 36, 38, 40, 41, 44,

45, 52 Central Africa: 40 CEV, France: 35, 36, 40, 45, 51,

105, 106 Chad: 37, 44 Challe, Gen Maurice: 39, 40, 41 Charles H. Babb Co: 35 Chassun, Gen: 24 Chateauroux Air Depot: 40 Chic/ayo, Peru: 53, 56 Chile: 57-60, 178 China: 167, 169, 172, 173 China Air Lines: 170, 171 Chinese Nationalist Air Force (CNAF): 170, 171 CIA: 8, 26, 29, 40, 70, 84, 85,

Dalton, Col Roy: 140, 142 Damisa, Operation: 105 Dassault MD-311: 23, 36-38 MD-315: 38, 42, 43 Mirage 1I/: 44 MirageN' 45 Davis-Monthan AFB, USA: 40, 72,

85, 90, 99, 119, 120, 126, 130, 133, 134, 138, 146, 147, 156, 167, 168, 171, 183, 185 de Havilland Dove: 106, 107, 110 Heron: 65 Mosquito: 11-13, 15-17, 21, 65 Vampire: 19, 61, 65-67, 82, 84 Venom: 66 de Havilland (Canada) Chipmunk: 65 L-20 Beaver: 135, 169 Dhahran Field, Saudi Arabia: 65-

67 Diem, President: 137 Dien Bien Phu, Vietnam: 25-28,

159, 186

CIB.329, AA: 37 CIE.B-26, AA: 37, 45 CIEES.343, AA: 44, 45 CIET, AA: 23 CIFAS.328, AA: 45 Cigogne, Operation: 40 Civil Air Transport: 123, 124, 169 Clark Field, Philippines: 29, 119,

Dornier Do 27: 99, 102, 106 Wal: 61 Double Check Corporation: 126 Douglas AD/A-I Skyraider: 40-43, 120,

44 Commando Hunt, Operation: 165 Condor, Operation: 26 Congo: 99, 103, 105, 107, 146, 148-155, 157, 162, 164, 172 Confederate Air Force: 185 Consolidated/Convair B-24 Liberator: 15, 92, 170 PBY/OA-IO Catalina: 15, 20,

124, 128, 171 PB4Y Privateer: 26, 39, 40,

116, 170 P2Y-3: 61 T-29: 135 Continental Air Company: 171 Continental Air Service: 17l Costa Rica: 116, 175, 176 Counts, Larry: 164 Courroie, Operation: 140 Crespo, Capt Jose: 130 Cricket, Area: 159 Cuba: 68-71, 90, 103, 126, 127,

134, 175, 176 Cunliffe-Owen, Company: 12 Curtiss BT-32: 61 C-46 Commando: 70, 71, 10 I,

133, 171 Dahomey: 97

Aerea Dominicana (FAD) Dominican Republic: 68, 70, 8183

138, 140, 143, 146, 157, 158, 160 A-20 Havoc/Boston: 7, II, 12, 21, 72, 92 A-26/B-26 Invader B-26APQI3: 38,41, 43, 45,

50 B-26D: 59 B-26K/A-26A: See On Mark

B-26K!A-26A B-26N: 43-45, 50, 177 B-26R: 40, 45 B-26TMR: 45 B-26Z: 52 CB-26: 73, 74 GB-26: 147 JB-26: 156 JD/UB-26J: 7, 12, 13, 133,

156, 189 16, 22, 24-26, 39,40,41, 44, 51, 89, 90, 97, 120, 121, 124, 133, 135, 139-143, 145, 156, 189 RB-26L: 142, 145, 146, 157 RB-26P: 41-45, 51, 108-110, 120, 123 TA-26/TB-26: 16, 44, 58, 66, 68, 69, 91, 114, 123, 126, 134, 156, 170, 171, 183, 189 VB-26: 90, 145 RB-26B, -26C:

DC-3/C-, AC-, EC-47 Skytrain:

15, 17, 19, 20, 22, 24-26, 39, 59, 63, 70, 81, 84, 86, 89, 94, 102, 105-107, 110, Ill, 116, 123, 124,

Field Goal, Project: 135 Flash Back, Exercise: 41 Flameche, Operation: 40 Fleetways, Inc: 37 FLN, Algeria: 36, 38-43 Florida Aerocessories, Inc: 81 Fokker F.27 Friendship: 106, 108 Forqa Aerea Brasileira (FAB): 72-

80 Forqa Aerea Portuguesa (FAP):

99-104, 109, 180

40, 41

Diyarbakir; Turkey: 16, 17 Djibouti: 40 Dominican Air Force: See Fuerza

Cognac France: 37 Columbia: 61-64, 171, 178 Colomb Bechar, Algeria: 38, 39,

DC-7: 20 SBD Dauntless: 21 Dragon Noire, Operation: 153 Dragon Rouge, Operation: 153 Duke Field, USA: 133, 171 Dwikora, Operation: 86

de Gaulle, General Charles: 39,

89, 90, 92, 120-124, 126, 131133, 136, 140, 141, 143, 145, 148-150, 152-155, 157, 164; 169, 170,-172, 175, 182, 186 CIB.328, AA: 37, 38, 41, 43-45, 177

120, 122-124, 139, 141, 143146, 149, 167, 170, 177

128, 135, 138, 141, 142, 149, 152, 157-160, 169, 185 DC-4/C-54 Skymaster: 70, 71, 81, 171 DC-6: 20, 119, 123

EAA.601, AA: 44, 45 Eastern Aircraft Sales Corporation:

36 EB.1/91, AA: 44 E8.I/92, AA: 37 EB.1/94, AA: 44 EB.77, AA: 36, 37 EC.2/6, AA: 43 Eckholdt, Ed: 135 ECNI/30, AA: 43, 45 ECNI/7I,AA: 42,43,45,177 ECN2/30, AA: 43-45, 177 ECN 3/30, AA: 43-45, 177 Ecuador: 53, 56, 120 Eglin Field, USA: 13, 133, 138,

143, 146 Egypt: 67 ELA.52, AA: 22 EI Salvador: 111-115,116, 117,

181, 186 Embry, A V-M Basil: II, 12 England AFB, USA: 186 England AFB: 157, 164, 169, 183 English Electric Canberra: 53, 55, 61, 72, 97,

120 Enugu, Biafra: 106-108, 180 ER.B-26, AA: 22, 24, 26, 30 EROM.80, AA: 22 ERP.1/32, AA: 37, 38, 44, 45, 51 ERP.2/19, AA: 26, 28-30, 37 Erprobungsstelle 61: 97 Escuadron de Bombardero Ligero,

Cuatro de Septiembre: 68 Eski~ehir, Turkey: 16, 17 Esquadra 91, FAP: 99, 102 Esquadra 92, FAP: 99 Esquadra93, FAP: 99, 101-103 E-Systems, Company: 143 Etimesgut, Turkey: 16, 17 Europe: 35-52 Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar: 25, 26,

124, 166 C-123 Provider: 67, 119, 135,

140, 157, 158, 160, 161 Fairchild, company: 72 Fairey Battle: 15 Firefly: 65, 86, 120 Fairey Aviation Limited: 37 Falcon, Operation: 71 Farias, Capt Matias: 129, 130 Farmer, Lt Col: 163 Farm Gate, Project: 29, 119, 120,

122, 124, 137-147 155-157, 170, 171 Fernandez, Jose: 130 Fernandez-Mon, Capt Daniel:

129, 130 Fiacre, Operation: 24 Fiat G.91: 101-103, 106

Forces Aeriennes Congolaises (FAC): 148-155 Ford Trimotor: 61 Foster, Airman 1st Class Paul:

160 Fouga Magister: 106 France: 21-34, 35-52, 105, 108,

177, 186, 188 French Air Force: See Armee de

l'Air Frente de Izquireda Revolucionaria (FIR): 54 Fuerza Aerea Colombiana (FAC): 61-64, 178 Fuerza Aerea de Chile (FACh):

57-60, 70 Fuerza Aerea de Nicaragua (FAN): 92-96, 130, 171, 180 Fuerza Aerea Dominicana (FAD):

81-83, 184 Fuerza Aerea del Ejercito de Cuba (FAEC): 68-71, 175 Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana (FAE):

53 Fuerza Aerea Guatemalteca (FAG): 89-91, 176 Fuerza Aerea Hondureiia (FAH):

112, 116-IIS, 176, 184 Fuerza Aerea Mexicana (FAM):

19, 20 Fuerza Aerea del Peru (FAP): 53-

56 Fuerza Aerea Rebelde: 70, 82,

130, 175 Fuerza Aerea Salvadoreiia (FAS):

111-115 Fuerza Aerea Sandinista (FAS):

96 Fu Nei Aviation Company: 171 Fiirstenfeldbruck, Germany: 16

Gabon: 106 Galluzzi, Jim: 159 Garcia, Capt Crispin: 130 Garcia, Rene: 127, 152, 154 Garwin Inc: 175 GB.1/19, AA: 21-24, 27-30, 34,

37, 41, 45, 177 GB.1/25, AA: 26, 29 GB.1/91, AA: 28, 30, 37, 38, 40,

42, 43, 50, 187 GB.2/91, AA: 37-43, 45 GC.1/21, AA: 25 General Dynamics F-Il/: 173 General Dynamics, company:

143 Gia Lam, Vietnam: 22 Giap, Gen: 22, 24, 25 Gloster Meteor: 42

FOREIGN INVADERS

Gonzalez, Eddie: 129, 130 Gonzalez, Juan: 130 Goodyear FG-ID Corsair: See Vought F4U

Corsair GOM.86, M: 38 'Gray, Wade: 130 Great Britain: 10-14 Greece: 15, 123, 169 Grumman F6F Hellcat: 21, 22, 24, 25, 36 F8F Bearcat: 22, 24-26, 28,

119, 137 HU-I6Albatross: 58, 63, 101 TBF Avenger: 13 Grupo 2, FACh: 57 Grupo 7, FAP: 55 Grupo 7, FACh: 59 Grupo 8,FACh: 57-60, 178 Grupo la, FACh: 59 Grupo 13, FAP: 54 Grupo2I, FAP: 53 Gruyere, Operation: 23 GSRA.76, GSRA.78, M: 38 GT.I/25, M: 21-24, 27, 28, 30 GT.1/64, GT.2/62, GT.2/64, M: 22 Guatemala: 89-92, 112, 122,

126, 176 Guatemalan Air Force: See

lfIand, Capt Jimmy: 140, 141 Igloo White, Project: 161 I1opango, EI Salvador: 112-115 Ilyushin 11-28: 28, 11 0 Indochina: 8, 21-37, 120, 132,

187 Indonesia: 29, 84-88, 122, 136,

Haik, Operation: 84, 122-125, 171 Haiti: 176 HaIcon-Vista, Operation: 63 Hamilton Aircraft Company: 73, 77, 99, 100, 155 Handley Page Halifax: 21, 22 Hartemann, Gen: 21, 22, 24 Hawker Hunter: 58, 59, 86 Javelin: 86 Sea Fury: 70, 129 Heinkel He 11/: 15 Helio L-28/U-IO Courier: 134, 135,

140, 142, 143, 158, 160 127, 129, 175 Herz, Friedrich: 108-110 Highball, bomb installation: 12, 13 Hill AFB, USA: 66, 134, 138, 145, 149, 156

Herrera, Capt Gonzalo:

Hiller VH-I2: 63 Hirondel!e, Operation: 24 Hoare, Maj Michael: 152, 153,

154 135, 157, 158, 160-163, 165, 166-167, 173 Honduras: 111,116-118,171, 176, 180, 186 Honduras Air Force: See Fuerza Aerea Hondureiia Hong Kong: 85 HowardAFB, Canal Zone: 61, 77, 78, 120, 146, 165 Hurlburt Field, USA: 138, 146, 149, 156, 157, 167

Ho Chi Minh Trail:

Los Hermanos Sebastian y Gomez SA: 171 Lotus, Operation: 22 LTV, company: 172, 173 Luanda, Angola: 99, 101-104 Luber SA: 99, 100 Lucky Tiger, Project: 158 Luftwaffe: 97, 98

143, 170, 171, 184 Inter-American Air Forces Academy (lMFA): 8, 146, 147 Intermountain Aviation: 126,

171, 172 120

Israel:

Japan: 146, 169 Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: 65, 66,

67, 179 Jenson, Lt-Col Bruce: 164 Johnson, President Lyndon B:

165 Johnson, V. Alexis: 135, 146 Jumelles, Operation: 40 Jungle Jim, Project: 138, 145,

156 Junkers Ju 52 (Me. I): 21, 22, 36, 38,

61', 62 Ju 86: 57

Fuerza Aerea Guatemalteca Guim?: 99, 101, 102 Guinea-Bissau: 103 GulfAir, company: 171

199

Kadena AFB, Okinawa: 134, 143 Kamina, Congo: 148, 151, 155 Katanga: 153 Katangese Air Force: 106, 148 Kennedy, PresidentJohn F: 127,

135, 137, 143 Khrushchev, Premier Nikita: 135 King, Col Benjamin H: 138 Kupang, Indonesia: 87 La Aurora, Guatemala: 90 Laos: 24, 25, 28, 132, 134, 135,

137, 156-168, 173 Laotian Air Force: 120, 133 LAS Super 26: 185 Las Mercedes, Nicaragua: 92, 93 Las Palmas, Peru: 54, 55 Le May, Gen Curtis E: 138, 145 Leopoldville, Congo: 149, 150,

152, 154 Lestrade, Jacques: 106, 108,

110 LeTourneau, R. G. Inc: 74 Libertion Air Force: 70, 71, 93-

21, 116, 134, 189 B-57 Night Intruder: 66, 146 Mauritania: 39 MaxHolste Broussard: 99 McClellan AFB, USA: 57 McCluskey, Capt James: 160 McCoskrie, Col Roland K: 162 McDonnell F-4 Phantom JJ: 159 RF-IOI Voodoo: 135, 140 Mecheria, Algeria: 39 Mexican Air Force: See Fuerza

Aerea Mexicana Mexico: 19, 20, 35, 120, 171 Mexico City: 19, 20 Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-I5: 29, 42, 85, 107 MiG-I 7: 42,43,85, .107 Mill Pond, Project: 8, 132..136,

138,139,156,160,170,171, 173 Mot;ambique: 99, 101, 102, 103 Mont-Le-Marsan, France: 23, 36 Montmarin, Henri de: 99, 101 Morane-Saulnier M5.500: 26 MS.733: 36 Morice Line, Algeria: 38, 39, 40,

134,

Nakhom Phanom (NKP), Thailand: 157-160, 162, 164,

150, 153, 161, 163, 166 EC-I21 Constellation: 161 F-80 Shooting Star: 53 P-38: 68, 92 PV-I Ventura: 72 PV-2/B-34 Harpoon: 53, 72, 99, 102, 103

Natal, Brazil: 73 NATO: 17, 40, 99 Navarre, Gen: 25, 26 Nha Trang, Vietnam: 118, 119 Nicaragua: 92-96, 126, 176, 180,

P2V/P-2/RB-69 Neptune: 39,

Nicaraguan Air Force: See

86, 102, 123, 124 17, 55, 67, 69, 70, 95, 107, 129, 134, 156 L'Ommengang, Operation: 153 Too, RT-33:

Lopez, A: 127 Lorraine, Operation: 24

36, 38-40, 43, 57, 65, 67, 68, 82, 89, 95, 99, 102, 103, 110, 132, 133, 142, 148, 149, 152, 153 B-25 Mitchell: 7, 11-13, 21, 53, 57, 61, 62, 66, 72, 84-87, 108-110, 120, 123, 124, 186 F-86 Sabre: 53, 67, 86, 99, 113, 116 OV-IO Bronco: 87, 119, 161 pool, F-51 Mustang: 15, 21, 65, 84-87, 89, 92, 93, 111-114, 116, 123, 124, 126, 186 F- lOaD Super Sabre: 41 T-28 Trojan/Fennec: 40, 42, 55, 66, 67, 93-95, 138, 140143, 145, 146, 149, 151-154, 157, 158, 160, 162 North Korea: 169 Northrop P-61 Black Widow: 15 North Vietnam: 132, 137, 146,

157-160, 164, 165 Oberpfaffenhofen, Germany: 16 Office of Strategic Services (055):

169 OGMA, company: 100, 101 Ojukwu, Lt-Col Odumegwu:

105, 106, 107, 110 Okinawa: 133-135, 143, 149, 150, 155 Olds, Maj Roger: 133 Oman: 65 On Mark B-26K/A-26A Counter Invader: 8, 73, 77, 82, 118, 119, 145-

147, 149, 150, 152-160, 164, 173, 178, 179, 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189 Marketeer: 187 Marksman: 172, 185 On Mark, company: 77, 156 Oran, Algeria: 36, 37, 42, 44 Oranie, Operation: 39 Ouragan, Operation: 24 Overseas Aeromarine Inc: 173

42 Morocco: 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 Morotai, Indonesia: 123 Mouette, Operation: 24 Myosotis, Operation: 28

95, 126, 130, 131, 175 Liechtenstein: 150, 154 Liorl? et Olivier Leo 45: 22 Lockheed C-60 Lodestar: 19 Coo, AC-, EC-130 Hercules:

Macao: 170 Macchi MB-326GB: 72, 74 MACO Corporation: 93, 95 Malaysia: 86 ML-KNIL: 84 Malmo Flygindustri MFl-9: 110 Manado, Indonesia: 123, 124 Manhattan Industries, Inc: 81 Mapengat, Indonesia: 123, 125 Marschalk, Capt Paul: 167 Martin 139W: 15 A-30 Baltimore: 11, 15, 16 B-26 Marauder: 7, 11, 13, 20,

Nigerian Airways: 107 Nord NC. 70I Martinet: 22, 26, 40 NC.250 I Noratlas: 39, 99 North Africa: 35-52 North American AT-, T-6 Texan/Harvard: 15,

167, 173, 182

186, 188 Fuerza Aerea de Nicaragua Niger: 40 Nigeria: 105-100 Nigeria, Frigate: 107 Nigerian Air Force (NAF):

108, 110, 154

106-

Pakistan: 186, 188 PAMARF, FAB: 74, 80 Pan Aero Investment Corp: 173 Panama: 124, 171 Panefom SA: 175 Pan Eurasian Trading Company:

105 Pasquel, Jorge: 20 Percival Jet Provost: 107 Perez, Demetrio: 130 Perez, Gaston: 130 Perez-Lorenzo, Lorenzo: 130 Peru: 53-56, 61, 171 Philippines: 86, 122 Philippines Air Force: 123, 124 Photogrammetrie GmbH: 97 Picardie, Operation: 24, 30 Piedra, Capt Osvaldo: 130 Pierres Precieuses, Operation:

40

200

INDEX

Piaggio P.I49: 106 Piper Cub: 38, 169 Puira, Peru: 55, 56 Pluto, Operation: 70, 90, 96,

126-131, 149, 171 Ponzoa, Capt Gustavo: 71, 127,

128, 149, 175, 176 Pope, Allen: 123, 124 Port Harcourt, Biafra: 108, 109 Portugal: 98-104, 109 Prakla-Seismos AG: 97 Promethe I, Operation: 40 Prio, Carlos: 175 Puerto Cabezas (Happy Valley), Nicaragua: 90, 94, 126, 127,

129, 131 Pujol, C: 127 Puren, Jerry: 153 Rail, Walter: 97 Ray, Capt Thomas W' 130 Recife, Brazil: 74 Reims, France: 43 Republic F-, RF-84: 16, 17, 39, 41, 44,

99, 101, 102 F-105 Thunderchid

157, 159,

163 IS, 36, 39, 40, 53, 61, 69, 70, 81, 92, 93, 122

P-, F-47 Thunderbolt:

Retalhuleu (Rayo Base), Guatemala: 90, 126, 127 Rhodes Berry Silver Sixty: 185 Rhodesia: 120 Riley, Fred: 135 Rock Island Monarch: 26, 185 Royal Air Force (RAF): 7, 10-14,

65, 66, 106, 123, 124, 169 Royal Australian Air Force (RMF):

II Royal Dutch/Shell: 123 Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF): II Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF): 65-

67 Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF): 132,

133

5MB J29 Tunnan: 148

Saber KHat, Operation: 86 Salan, Gen: 24 Salinas, Gen: 19 San Antonio de los Banos, Cuba: 70, 71 San Isidro Air Base, Dominican Republic: 82, 83 Santiago de Chile: 59 Santiago de Cuba: 70, 71 Saudi Arabia: 7, 65-67, 100, 179 Scholl, Robert L: 160 Schultz, Lt Col Robert L: 160,

165, 166 Scruggs, Mike: 160 Seno, Laos: 24, 25 Seroja, Operation: 87 Shamburger, Maj Riley: 130 Shortt, AI: 164 Sikorsky 5. 55/H-I9: 38 S.58/H-34: 38 Skadron 1, AURI: 83-87 Skadron 3, AURI: 86, 87 Skadron 11, AURI: 84 Skadron 14, AURI: 86 Skyways Aircraft Ferrying Service, Inc: 97 Skyways Aircraft Servicing Ltd: 85 Societe Carta: 108, 110 SODEMAC, company: 154 Solidaridad, Operation: 63 Somoza, President: 92, 93, 95,

130, 176 South Africa: 120 Southern Air Transport: 126 South Vietnam: 118-120, 124,

137, 139, 141, 143, 157-159, 163, 167, 171 Soviet Union: IS, 107, 120, 132, 148, 167 Stanleyville, Congo: 149, 153, 182 Steel Tiger, Operation: 156-168 Stevenson, Adlai: 127 Success, Operation: 92, 122 Sudan: 106 Sud-Aviation Mistral: 36, 39 Puma: 103 Vautour: 37, 41, 43 Alouette 11: 40, 103, 106 Suharto, Gen: 86 Sukarno, President: 84-86, 122 Sulawesi, Indonesia: 122, 123 Sumatra, Indonesia: 84, 85

Svensk Flygtjanst AB, company:

120 Swanton Morley, UK: II Sweden: 120 Sweet Sue, Project: 143 Tainan: 133, 135, 143, 145, 170 Taiwan: 120, 123, 124, 133,

143-145, 167, 169, 170-173 Takhli, Thailand: 132-135 Talbot, Harold E, US Secretary of the Air Force: 66 Tancos, Portugal: 101, 102 Tan Son Nhut, Vietnam: 22, 23,

28, 140, 141, 145

120

Varela, Joaquin: 149 VAL-4 Squadron, US Navy: 119 Venezuela: 8, 35, 36, 53, 61,

171 Vianello, Raul: 126, 127, 130 Vickers-Armstrong, company: 12 Vickers/Vickers-Supermarine Seafire/Spitfire: IS, 16, 21, 65,

85 Wellington: 21 VietCong: 137, 138, 140, 141,

144, 159

Tebessa, Algeria: 43 TEMCO T-35A Buckaroo: 65, 67 Tentera NasionalIndonesia Angkatan Udara: See AURI Texas Railway Equipment Co: 36 Texas Instruments: 173 Thailand: 119, 120, 132-135,

140, 157, 158, 160, 162, 167, 173 Tiger Hound, area: 159, 163 Tirpitz, battleship: 12 Toncontin, Honduras: 116, 117 Tourane, Vietnam:. 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 34 Trans-Peruana, company: 97 Trikora,Operation: 86 Trinidad, Operation: 70 Trisula, Operation: 86 Trujillo, Rafael: 81 Truman, President Harry S: IS,

21 Tshombe, Moise: 148, 149, 152-

154 Tunisia: 36, 39, 42, 43 Tupolev Tu-2: 85 Turkey: 15-18 TUrk Hava Kuvvetleri (THK): 7,

15-18

Upkeep, bomb installation: 12 Uruguay:

.

Turkish Air Force: See Turk Hava

Viet Minh: 21-28, 137 Vietnam: 29, 107, 137, 149, 157 Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF):

119, 137, 139, 141,-146, 157, 182, 186 Villavicencio, Columbia: 61, 63, 178 Violettes Imperiales, Operation: 154 Vogler, Charles: 167 Vought F4U (FG) Corsair: 28, 36, 39,

42,111-114,116,126,184 Vultee V-II: IS BT-I3 Valiant: 95 Vulture, Operation: 26 Waco VPF-7: 91 Western Enterprises: 169, 170 West Germany: 97, 98, 173 Westland & Son, company: 19 Westland Whirlwind: 106 White, AI: 135 Wickstrom, Maj Tom: 160, 164,

166 WIGMO, company: 149, ISO,

154 Wright Field, USA:

12

Kuwetleri Udorn, Thailand:

134, 135, 160-

Yefjilk6y, Turkey: 17 Yugoslavia: 120, 169

162, 164, 173 Uganda: 154 Union Aeromaritime de Transport (VAT): 41, 43 Unitas 111, Operation: 63 United Nations: 101, 148

Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc:

126 Zumbach, Jean: 106, 110 Zuniga, Mario: 127

ISBN 1-85780-013-3 II11I11I1111111111111111111111 9 781857800135 >