Food Safety and International Competitiveness: the Case of Beef
JOHN SPRIGGS School of Agriculture Charles Sturt University Wagga Wagga Australia and
GRANT ISAAC College of Commerce University of Saskatchewan Saskatoon Canada
CABI Publishing
CABI Publishing is a division of CAB International CABI Publishing CAB International Wallingford Oxon OX10 8DE UK Tel: +44 (0)1491 832111 Fax: +44 (0)1491 833508 Email:
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© CAB International 2001. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronically, mechanically, by photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owners. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library, London, UK. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Spriggs, John. Food safety and international competitiveness : the case of beef / John Spriggs and Grant Isaac. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-85199-518-7 (alk. paper) 1. Food adulteration and inspection. 2. Food industry and trade--Safety measures. 3. Competition, International. 4. Beef industry--Safety measures. I. Isaac, Grant. II. Title.
TX531 .S67 2001 363.1926--dc21 2001018451 ISBN 0 85199 518 7 Typeset in 10/12pt Photina by Columns Design Ltd, Reading. Printed and bound in the UK by Cromwell Press, Trowbridge.
Contents
Preface
v
Acknowledgements
vii
List of Abbreviations
viii
1. Introduction Whose Role is it Anyway? Institutional Arrangements for Food Safety Objectives of the Study
1 1 4 12
2. International Institutional Arrangements International Drivers International Institutional Arrangements Analysis of International Institutional Arrangements
15 15 17 24
3. The United States of America Introduction Drivers for Change Institutional Arrangements Implications of these Developments
27 27 27 32 52
4. Canada Introduction Drivers for Change Institutional Arrangements Implications of these Developments
55 55 55 58 81
5. The United Kingdom Introduction Drivers for Change Institutional Arrangements Implications of these Developments
83 83 83 93 105
iii
iv
Contents
6. Australia Introduction Drivers for Change Institutional Arrangements Implications of these Developments
107 107 108 114 142
7. Towards an Optimal Food Safety System Introduction Strengthening the Drivers for Change Strengthening the Food Safety Meta-rules Improving the Institutional Arrangements for Food Safety Conclusions
145 145 145 151 158 166
8. How are they Doing? Introduction Harnessing the Drivers of Change Choosing the Right Meta-rules Developing the Institutional Arrangements Conclusion
167 167 167 171 174 178
9. Epilogue
179
Bibliography/References
183
Index
191
Preface
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a fatal bovine disease thought to cause a similar fatal disease in humans. Recent headlines screamed ‘BSE Panic Spreads Across Europe’ (The Guardian, 27 November 2000). It is clear from such statements the acute concerns of BSE have spread well beyond the shores of the UK and have now engulfed most of Europe. But BSE is more than just a concern in Europe. It, along with Escherichia coli and a few other microbiological nasties, have helped generate a more broadly based concern about food safety that has now engulfed most of the developed world. Not only that, they have been a lightning conductor for change around the world in the attitudes of government, industry and consumers towards food safety. The initial impetus for this book was to explore the nature of this change. A food safety dynamic has been around for a long time. Upton Sinclair was one of the early influential writers on food safety. His most famous book, The Jungle (1906), detailed the unsanitary conditions of the Chicago meat plants and was a powerful driver for the implementation of the US Pure Food and Drug Act (1906). However, the onset of the BSE crisis in the late 1980s signalled a new era of change. What is particularly special about this new era is that, running alongside this food safety dynamic, has been an unprecedented interest in the globalization of trade. The advent of the computer age and the information age, along with the growth of new arrangements to facilitate international trade have led to a drive by countries to be internationally competitive. It is only natural that food safety would become an important dimension of this drive for international competitiveness. Thus, even countries that had no strong domestic reason to improve their food safety, had an international imperative to do so – if they wanted to gain and maintain access to international markets. It is drawing out the link between food safety and international competitiveness that underlies this book. Very early on, we decided to focus on beef. This was a natural because beef has been at the centre of a number of highly publicized food contamination crises, including of course BSE, and it has been at the centre of attempts v
vi
Preface
to improve food safety systems. We chose four countries for study that have been caught up in one way or another in the drive to improve beef food safety. They are the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia. Our approach was to examine the institutional arrangements for food safety in each of these four countries. Institutional arrangements are the rules (broadly defined) that constrain individual behaviour. We thought this approach would offer the best prospect of drawing out the link we wanted to explore between food safety and international competitiveness. We were particularly interested to see if there were significant differences between these countries in their institutional arrangements and to see if some institutional arrangements might be better than others. Our intended goal was to provide a framework for improving the institutional arrangements for food safety. Following an introductory chapter, Chapters 2–6 describe what we saw in our tour of the four countries under study. Then, in Chapter 7, we present our framework for improvement, which consists of three elements: 1. Harnessing the drivers for change; 2. Choosing the right public and private decision-making systems (or what we call the meta-rules); and 3. Developing good institutional arrangements. In Chapter 8 we examine how the four countries have fared with respect to these three elements. Our conclusion is that, overall Australia has probably progressed the furthest. However, the USA remains a very important anchor on progress, particularly in Canada and Australia. We do not expect you will agree with everything, or even most things, we have said in this book. But, we do hope you will find the material and ideas presented in this book stimulating and useful in your own thinking about food safety. To this end, we have tried to write it in a way that is as widely accessible as possible. John Spriggs Wagga Wagga, New South Wales Australia Grant Isaac Saskatoon, Saskatchewan Canada 14 December 2000
Acknowledgements
This study emerged from a research project, sponsored by the Donner Canadian Foundation, on The Role of Government in Food Inspection. We are grateful for the support and understanding of the Donner Canadian Foundation during this research. The country chapters benefited enormously from the insights of many individuals who gave very generously of their time. It is impossible to name all those who contributed to our understanding, but we would like to single out a few. They are: David Addis, Julie Caswell, Philip Corrigan, Les Fearn, Andrew Fearne, Bob Ford, Spencer Henson, Frank Herd, Jill Hobbs, Neil Hooker, Linda Horton, David Hughes, Dennis Laycraft, Christine Majewski, Steve McCutcheon, Neil Maxwell, Gardner Murray, James Northen, C.M. Palmer, David Palmer, Peter Pauker, Vic Prow, Paul Ryan, Richard Roth, Andrew Simpson and Mike Wildman. Accompanying this study was a conference held in April 1999 in Banff, Canada. We would like to acknowledge the financial and marketing support provided by the Alberta Value Added Corporation and in particular Dan Fullerton, as well as the invaluable administrative assistance provided by Iris Meck and Pauline Molder in organizing the conference. And, of course, we would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of all conference participants. We would also like to acknowledge the administrative assistance provided by the University of Saskatchewan – both the Department of Agricultural Economics and the College of Commerce – as well the School of Agriculture, Charles Sturt University during this research. Special mention also must go to Tim Hardwick and CABI Publishing for generously accommodating our need for ‘just a little more time’ to ensure this study is as up to date as it could be. We wish to dedicate this book to our wives, Barbara Chambers and Shannon Isaac. Their support, encouragement and patience during the writing of this book has been invaluable.
vii
List of Abbreviations
AAFC ABM AFFA AIRS AMH AMI AMLC AMS ANZFA ANZFRMC AoA APHIS AQIS ARMCANZ BCMS BQAP BSE CAA CAC CBEF CCA CCPs CDC CFIA CFIS CFIS-IG CFSAN CJD COAG Codex
Agriculture and AgriFood Canada Assured British Meat Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – Australia Automated Import Reference System Australian Meat Holdings American Meat Institute Australian Meat and Livestock Corporation Agricultural Marketing Service Australia and New Zealand Food Authority Australia and New Zealand Food Regulation Ministerial Council WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Australian Quarantine Inspection Service Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand British Cattle Movement Service Beef Quality Assurance Program bovine spongiform encephalopathy Consumers Association of Australia Codex Alimentarius Commission Canada Beef Export Federation Canadian Cattlemen’s Association critical control points Centres for Disease Control and Prevention Canadian Food Inspection Agency Canadian Food Inspection System CFIS Implementing Group FDA’s Centre for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Council of Australian Governments Codex Alimentarius viii
List of Abbreviations
CTS CVM DFO DoH EDI EED EFSIS EHOs EIO EIRP EIS EPA EU FABBL FAO FAS FASL FDA FDAT FERP FFDCA FID FMIA FORCG FPMIC FRCC FSA (UK) FSA (USA) FSANZ FSEP FSIS (Aust) FSIS (USA) GAPs GATT GMOs GMPs HACCP HAD HAS HC HGPs HHEs HHS HUS ICFR
Cattle Tracing System Centre for Veterinary Medicine Department of Fisheries and Oceans Department of Health Electronic Data Interchange USDA’s Evaluation and Enforcement Division European Food Safety Inspection Services Environmental Health Officers Enhanced Import Operation Enhanced Importers Responsibility Program Export Inspection Service Environmental Protection Agency European Union Farm Assured British Beef and Lamb Food and Agriculture Organization Foreign Agricultural Service Farm Assured Scotch Livestock Food and Drug Administration Food, Drink and Agriculture Taskforce Food Emergency Response Program Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetic Act Food Inspection Division Federal Meat Inspection Act Federal Outbreak Response Coordination Group Federal/Provincial Meat Inspection Committee Food Regulation Consultative Committee Food Standards Agency Food Security Agency Food Standard Australia New Zealand Food Safety Enhancement Program Food Standards Implementation Sub-Committee Food Safety Inspection Service Good Agricultural Practices General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Genetically Modified Organisms Good Manufacturing Practices Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points Health of Animals Division Hygiene Assessment System Health Canada hormone growth promoter Health Hazard Evaluations US Department of Health and Human Services haemolytic uraemia syndrome Interdepartmental Committee on Food Regulation
ix
x
IDS IIC IIS IPCs ISO ITS JASANZ JIFSAN LACOTS LATS LRC MAFF MFN MHS MISB MIU MKP MLA MLC MRAs MRC MSA MSEP MSQA NAP NCBA NCF NDS NFA NFHS NFSI NFU NLIS NRs NSFS NSFWG NTB OFIS OFS OMB OPHS OTM OVS PACCP
List of Abbreviations
Import Decision System Inspector-in-Charge Integrated Inspection System Import Primary Contracts International Standards Organization Import Tracking System Joint Accreditation Services of Australia and New Zealand Joint Institute for Food Safety Local Authority Coordinating Body on Food and Trading Standards US Government’s Long-term Agricultural Trade Strategy long-run competitiveness Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food most favoured nation Meat Hygiene Service Market and Industry Services Branch Meat Inspectors Union Marketlink Key Program Meat and Livestock Australia Meat and Livestock Commission Mutual Recognition Agreements Meat Research Corporation Meat Standards Australia Meat Safety Enhancement Plan Meat Safety Quality Assurance National Audit Program National Cattlemen’s Beef Association National Classification Framework National Domestic Standard National Food Agency National Food Hygiene Standard National Food Safety Initiative National Farmers Union National Livestock Identification Scheme Non-Compliance Report National Safe Food System National Safe Food Working Group non-tariff barrier Office of Food Inspection Systems Office of Food Safety Office of Management and Budget Office of Public Health and Science over 30 months Official Veterinary Surgeon Palatability Assured Critical Control Points
List of Abbreviations
PARS PBP PCS PEM PF PHSA PIP PPMs QA QFA QSA RAM RMG RSPCA SBM SCARM SCFR SEAC SMAs SOPS SPS SQBLA SRC STA SVS TBT UKAS UN USDA vCJD VCP VMA VSD WHO WTO WVQMS
Agricultural Pre-Arrival Review System Anglo-Beef Processors Preferred Calf Suppliers Political Equilibrium Model Preferred Feedlots Public Health Services Act Product Inspection Program production and processing methods Quality Assurance Quality Food Australia Quality Standards of Australia Rational Actor Model Residue Management Group Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals specified bovine material Standing Committee on Agriculture and Resource Management Standing Committee on Food Regulation Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee State Meat Authorities Standard Operating Procedures for Sanitation WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary (Agreement) Scotch Quality Beef and Lamb Association short-run competitiveness Supermarket to Asia State Veterinary Service WTO’s Technical Barriers to Trade (Agreement) UK Accreditation Service United Nations US Department of Agriculture new variant CJD Voluntary Code of Practise Victorian Meat Authority Veterinary Services Division World Health Organization World Trade Organization Woolworths Vendor Quality Management Standard
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Food safety is an issue with which most of us can easily identify. Eating is one of the most basic aspects of everyday life and we value highly the peace of mind that comes from knowing that the food we, or our loved ones, eat is safe. When a food poisoning outbreak occurs it undermines our confidence in the food safety system and we are quick to react. So whose role is it to ensure that the foods we buy are safe?
Whose Role is it Anyway? Traditionally, we have relied on governments to ensure that the food we eat is safe. But, why? One commonly held perception is a belief that a benevolent government acts in the best interests of society as a whole. If we accept for a moment that the policy makers (politicians and bureaucrats) are benevolent, it does not necessarily follow that policy decisions will be made that are in the best interests of society as a whole. There is no magic formula saying this is the way to achieve food safety. The political process is typically messy with lots of information, much conflicting, on what really is in the best interests of society in general. Even if policy makers wanted to do the right thing, they do not have an easy job. They are bombarded with information and must struggle to disentangle fact from fiction. An even greater problem is that governments are likely not benevolent. We should remind ourselves that government is not a single anthropomorphic entity. Rather, it is made up of individuals, the politicians and bureaucrats, and it is they who make the policy decisions. Typically, policymakers have a more limited objective than maximizing overall social benefit and instead they pursue narrower objectives relevant to the particular department or ministry they serve. Lobbyists representing particular interests attempt to influence policy makers by appealing to the limited objectives. The result is decisions that often favour special interests over the general interest. 1
2
Chapter 1
The response of the British government’s Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) to the unfolding BSE crisis (‘mad cow disease’) is a case in point. Over a number of years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, MAFF consistently denied and covered up the known risks of BSE to the consuming public because it feared revealing such risks would devastate the beef sector and an objective of MAFF was to support the beef sector. If government will not or can not ensure food safety who will? Can the individual food firms be relied upon to do it? The short answer is no. Left to themselves, individual firms have a built-in incentive to underspend on food safety. For one thing, some firms in a food industry will be tempted to ‘free ride’ on the efforts of others to improve food safety. But, if this is true for some firms it is also true for all firms. And so, less would be spent on food safety than would be socially optimal. Another problem is individual firms may well undervalue the costs of not instituting an effective food safety system. These neglected costs include compensation for victims of a food poisoning outbreak. The firm may choose to neglect these, figuring it would be less costly to declare bankruptcy. One way around the problems of leaving it up to individual firms is to let the industry as a whole develop the food safety system. Perhaps an industry body could exert enough pressure on individual firms to prevent the ‘free rider’ problem and perhaps they could even set up an insurance fund to be used in the event of a food poisoning outbreak. Its job would be made simpler if the government gave it the necessary powers to get mandatory compliance of all food firms in the industry. Yet, even here there are problems. The industry’s representatives will face a dilemma not unlike that of the individuals in government. They will typically focus on the limited objective of maximizing industry competitiveness and this could affect their decision making and cause two important problems. The first is the industry’s representatives may be motivated more by short-run competitiveness than by long-run competitiveness. This raises the prospect of cutting corners on food safety, with possible dire long-run consequences. A short-run focus is more likely if the industry were under severe economic pressure and in survival mode. The second problem is that as representatives of all firms in the industry, they may believe they have a responsibility to develop a food safety system that is acceptable to all these firms. As a result, the industry-led food safety system may sink to the lowest common denominator, rather than establish high standards based on competitive market leadership. As a society we face a dilemma. Neither government alone, nor industry alone is likely to provide for an optimal food safety system. In the past, conventional wisdom has been to place more faith in (domestic) government than in industry to look after our food safety concerns. And when the government has been found wanting, as in the immediate aftermath of the BSE crisis, modifications have been made to increase the role of government in order to plug the holes and keep the public food safety system afloat.
Introduction
3
In recent times another phenomenon has come along which has exacerbated the social dilemma by forcing a complete overhaul of food safety systems around the world. The increasing internationalization of food production and consumption is a force that has led to intense international competition among alternative suppliers of food products. As a result, food safety has become a truly transnational issue because consumption bundles invariably contain imported products. And food safety is fast becoming an important element in the drive of food industries to be internationally competitive. Implementing and maintaining a food safety system is costly, so if one country’s approach to providing food safety is less costly than another’s this can create a source of competitive advantage. Alternatively, if one country can convince international buyers that its food safety system has more integrity than another’s, this can create another source of competitive advantage – product differentiation. The internationalization of the food safety issue can also create competitive advantage through encouraging greater vertical coordination. For example, food retailers may push for closer coordination of the supply chain as a way of ensuring food safety all along the chain. But as they do so they may also realize other benefits of closer coordination that add to international competitiveness. On a negative note, the food safety issue may be used as a kind of trade barrier. Some importing countries may be tempted to restrict imports to only those exporters able to offer what they consider to be ‘enhanced’ food safety systems. This suggests an important role for international institutional arrangements to combat this temptation. Food safety is a real social concern and must be addressed. But it must be addressed in the context of the pressures for international competitiveness. National food safety systems that fail to account adequately for the global context are a commercial threat to the competitiveness of domestic food industries and may also lead to the fragmentation of international food markets into divergent national food safety jurisdictions. In light of the imperative of international competitiveness, it is clear that industry must play some role in the development of the food safety system. After all, international competitiveness is the domain of business, not government. When it comes to achieving international competitiveness, industry should easily outperform government. But, for the reasons already mentioned, industry cannot be trusted to do it alone. Government must also have a role. The basic question then is: what roles should government and industry play in providing for an optimal food safety system? Answering this question is the basic purpose of the book. The way we approach this question is to take a look at how the roles are evolving in a number of important food producing and exporting countries. To keep the study manageable we have limited the scope of the study to just beef. Beef seems like a good choice because it has attracted so much attention in recent years. It has been a flashpoint for change in food safety systems in many parts of the world.
4
Chapter 1
The study involves a cross-country comparison where the countries chosen for study include the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia. The logic of including these countries is they are all significant producers of beef and they represent a group of countries that are evolving similar consumer preferences. There is a growing literature on the international convergence of consumer preferences. For example, Conner (1994) found that European consumption patterns for a range of processed foods correlate highly with North American consumption 5–10 years earlier. He suggested that as incomes, prices and demographic factors in Europe catch up with developments in North America, so food consumption patterns will converge. In another study, Traill (1996) found evidence for increasing convergence of food consumption patterns within groups of countries. One such group is the Anglo-American one. This consists of the four countries included in the present study (plus New Zealand, Ireland and South Africa). The emergence of the Anglo-American group of consumers could lead to increased competition between the producers in these countries to serve the needs of all consumers within this group. One of those needs is for food safety. One thing about such an examination; one soon realizes each country concerned is going through an intense process of discovery. Different countries are experimenting with different ideas. Some ideas appear to be working and others are not. We call these ideas institutional innovations in food safety. There are institutional innovations being implemented by governments, by industry, and by government and industry working together. In the next five chapters, we are going to outline the more important institutional innovations in beef food safety affecting the four countries concerned. Chapter 2 is concerned with recent developments in international institutional arrangements, while Chapters 3–6 are respectively concerned with the domestic institutional arrangements in the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia. Before we proceed to these chapters, let’s explain in more detail what we mean by institutional arrangements for food safety and discuss the process of their evolution.
Institutional Arrangements for Food Safety North (1990, 1991) defines institutional arrangements to be the set of formal and informal rules that constrain the behavioural relationship among individuals, groups of individuals or more formal organizations. And as Mahe (1996) points out: ‘The necessity to supplement free markets with … (institutional arrangements) … has been recognized to ensure efficiency in the presence of market failures’. Market failure is a term widely used in economics to cover situations in which the free interplay of market forces will not generate socially desirable outcomes (Antle, 1996). Monopoly is often
Introduction
5
thought of as one potential source of market failure. Externalities, like pollution, are another. For example, if I have a smokestack factory and can get away without having to pay the cost of pollution, then I have successfully ‘externalized’ the cost. But, as far as society is concerned, the cost is not external and hence the free market outcome will be less than desirable. Another reason for market failure is asymmetric information between buyers and sellers where, say the sellers know more about the characteristics of the product than the buyers. Think of the case of a used car where the buyer has less information about problems with the car than the used car dealer. Asymmetric information can lead to opportunistic behaviour by the dealer – perhaps withholding significant information about the car in order to make a sale. This type of market failure is particularly troublesome in the case of food safety since food safety is a credence good. Consumers do not know the real safety risks of the good either before or even immediately after purchase. They make purchase decisions on the basis of trust, which can take a long time to build up and yet which can be so easily knocked down. A set of institutional arrangements designed to ensure food safety in a particular jurisdiction is what we mean by a food safety system. More precisely: A food safety system is a set of (governmental and non-governmental) institutional arrangements or a ‘governance structure’ providing formal and informal rules to ensure food safety.
Institutional arrangements on food safety are important and it is crucial they evolve, as needed, in order to remain consistent with new technological innovations and changing consumer preferences. One problem here is that institutional arrangements are difficult to change. There is such a thing as institutional inertia. In some ways, this inertia is good. Imagine how difficult and costly life would be if the government decided to change the rules of the road. One day we would be driving on one side of the road and then the next day we would be asked to switch over to the opposite. The cost of informing us about this change in rules would be very costly, and then if some of us did not get the message, life could be pretty difficult too. So, institutional change is not something we as a society contemplate lightly because it is typically a costly and difficult exercise. In fact, institutional inertia is usually so strong, that institutional change often requires strong drivers for change. In the food safety area these are perhaps best exemplified by highly publicized food poisonings. Drivers for change are what provide the windows of opportunity for change in the institutional arrangements. Of course, having strong drivers for change is no guarantee we will get institutional innovation of the kind that will be consistent with social objectives. As North (1990) points out there is no ‘invisible hand’ at work to make this happen. For example, in their years of impoverishment following the First World War, the German people turned to a leader, Adolph Hitler, who promised to restore their country to greatness. He was a strong
6
Chapter 1
driver for change, but the resulting institutional arrangements were terrible: they resulted in the Second World War, the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity. In retrospect, it is hard to see how these outcomes would fit any reasonable person’s perception of a social objective. The extent to which an institutional innovation is consistent with a social objective depends in part on the nature of the drivers for change, but also it depends on the nature of the relevant government and non-government policy (decision-making) processes. The policy process can be thought of as higher-level institutional arrangements which we call meta-rules. Suppose there is a highly publicized food poisoning. This typically constitutes a very powerful driver for change. Government and industry of the particular food supply chain may respond by setting up a commission of inquiry. This is a meta-decision, which may, in turn, lead to decisions on how to respond to the crisis. Of course, one option is to do nothing, in which case there will be no change in the institutional arrangements. Another option is to do something positive (i.e. consistent with the social objective). A third option is to do something negative (i.e. inconsistent with the social objective). But what exactly do we mean by social objective in relation to food safety? For a start, we need to be clear that there are only individual perceptions of what is the social objective. Different people will have different views on what it should be. Some might argue the relevant social objective should be: maximization of food safety
or, recognizing the imperative of international competitiveness, some might argue it should be: maximization of food safety subject to meeting some minimum level of international competitiveness.
We argue (in Chapter 7) that the relevant social objective should be neither of these, but rather: maximization of the food industry’s long-run international competitiveness, subject to achieving some generally agreed, scientifically based minimum standards on food safety.
The key point of our argument is that maximizing long-run international competitiveness is compatible with food safety, not antagonistic towards it. However, maximizing food safety is not compatible with international competitiveness. Because the above social objective has an economic dimension to it, we refer to this as the socio-economic objective. Let’s now elaborate on the nature of the drivers for change and the institutional arrangements. These will be the two basic categorizations of information presented in Chapters 2–6.
Introduction
7
The nature of drivers for change Broadly, we can think of two categories of drivers: international and national. International drivers are common to the four countries under study. These are the market mega-trends that are working to encourage higher standards for food safety in most developed countries. They are discussed further in Chapter 2. National drivers are specific to particular countries. Each country faces specific and unique national drivers, and identifying the national drivers allows us to understand better why individual countries have moved differently with respect to their domestic food safety systems. The national drivers for change are discussed for each of the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia in Chapters 3–6, respectively. National drivers can be divided into external and internal drivers. External drivers are like international drivers in that they both involve the influence of non-internal drivers on the domestic food safety system. However, the distinction is that external national drivers impact mostly or totally on only one country while international drivers impact simultaneously on a number of countries. External drivers include the concerns or actions of ‘external’ actors such as foreign consumers, industries or governments focused on the particular country concerned. For instance, the high degree of integration of the US and the Canadian food markets means that a food contamination crisis in the USA would have a special impact on Canada. This crisis may impact the access of Canadian food exports to the USA and be an external driver for change in the Canadian food safety system. Internal drivers are the concerns or actions of ‘internal’ actors such as domestic consumers, industries and government to influence the restructuring of the domestic food safety system. These drivers are specific to particular countries and may reflect, for instance, concerns arising from domestic food contamination crises or government efforts to reduce public expenditures. Differences between countries in their internal drivers for change create differences in pressures for international competitiveness and food safety. For instance, if a country experiences a severe food contamination crisis, this is likely to generate a much stronger political focus on domestic food safety and consumer protection than on international competitiveness. On the other hand, another country, which has not experienced a severe food contamination crisis, is likely to focus much more on international competitiveness. These variations in foci mean that changes to the food safety system in different countries can be very diverse. Note that the international drivers for change have a harmonizing effect on the food safety system in different countries and cause their domestic rules to converge, while the national drivers tend to have a differentiating effect, causing domestic rules to diverge between countries.
8
Chapter 1
The nature of institutional arrangements There are two basic aspects of institutional arrangements: the food safety policy process; and the institutional arrangements for food safety. The food safety policy process The food safety policy (decision-making) process determines how a driver for change is transformed into an institutional innovation. It involves both government and non-government (supply chain) decision making. What is critical is the nature of the decision-making process employed by both the governmental and non-governmental actors involved. In the case of government policy decision making we can distinguish two basic models: the Rational Actor Model (RAM) and the Political Equilibrium Model (PEM). The RAM is the model commonly used in research organizations, businesses and commissions of inquiry. It will be quite familiar to professionals such as scientists, engineers, economists and lawyers. A RAM process focuses on a single substantive problem (e.g. that the local beef industry will not produce safe food) and the decision objective is to solve the substantive problem in the most efficient and effective way. The PEM is a common model used in government. A PEM process attempts to deal with multiple substantive problems at any one time (i.e. balance the competing interests of various policy actors). The decision objective is to achieve a workable and tolerable compromise between the various parties who have a stake in the identified issues. That is, to achieve a political equilibrium by reaching agreement between the players with divergent interests. The differences between the RAM and PEM processes of decision making manifest themselves most clearly in the nature of the institutional innovations that result. A policy process dominated by the RAM typically recommends change of a fundamental, perhaps revolutionary nature consistent with some underlying socio-economic objective. However, a policy process dominated by the PEM typically recommends small incremental changes consistent with a political (rather than socio-economic) objective. In any country, the food safety policy decision-making process will generally lie somewhere along a spectrum between the RAM and the PEM, where some will be closer to the RAM end of the spectrum than others. We will have more to say about this in Chapter 7 when we examine what a country needs to do if it is to move towards a socio-economically optimal food safety system. In the case of non-government (supply chain) decision making, the nature of the institutional arrangements that emerge depend on whether individual firms involved in the decision making have a long-term focus and on the extent to which the supply chain is well coordinated. At the individual firm level, a number of writers (e.g. Hooker and Caswell, 1996a; Roberts et al., 1996; Caswell and Henson, 1997; Caswell et al., 1998; Fearne, 1998a; Hobbs, 1998; Holloway, 1999; Segerson, 1999; Unnevehr et
Introduction
9
al., 1999; Westgren, 1999) have all argued firms are willing to adopt measures to ensure food safety because a contamination crisis could destroy the firm. The implication is that food safety is in the long-run competitive interest of firms (Heal, 1976). Long-term benefits include assured market access, expanded customer base, price premiums and more economically efficient production. Yet, there are important factors that limit the willingness of individual firms to ensure food safety. With no external regulation, the decision on whether or not to enhance a firm’s food safety system is ultimately an investment decision. While there may be long-term benefits to enhancing food safety, there are also significant costs. And most of these costs tend to occur early on. As such, different managers may well make different benefit–cost calculations depending on their individual assessments of the information they have on the benefits and costs, their attitudes to risk, the individual rate of time preference and so on. In the absence of a requirement to do so, they may come to different conclusions about whether or not to implement an enhanced food safety system (see also Holloway, 1999). One of the difficulties is that expected benefits are particularly difficult to measure. They are largely a function of what the entrepreneur thinks the consumer perceives as the benefits. But these perceived benefits are tied up with the publicly perceived risks of the food being unsafe which can be quite volatile. As we have already said, food safety is a credence good. Given these uncertainties about the expected benefits of enhanced food safety, it is little wonder that different food firms will have very different perceptions of the benefits of investing in food safety. Hence, left to themselves, some firms would choose to implement enhanced food safety programmes while others would not. Another factor limiting the willingness of firms to invest in food safety is the existence of the so-called free rider problem, a kind of opportunistic behaviour. Consider the hypothetical situation facing the chief executives (A and B) of two local meat plants. Suppose A installed an enhanced food safety system but B did not. Now when the meat from the two plants reaches the retail counter, the consumer doesn’t know whose product they are buying. That allows B to free-ride on A’s investment. B will benefit from the perception of safer meat created by A’s efforts, even though B has not incurred any of the costs. But, what is worse, B’s lack of investment in food safety could lead to a food poisoning outbreak which could damage sales of meat from both A and B. The upshot is B has an incentive to underinvest in food safety, but if this is true for B, it must also be true for A. The actions of B as a free rider adversely affects A’s expected benefits from enhancing food safety and so should cause A to scale back food safety investment too. In aggregate, the free rider problem may encourage companies to underinvest in food safety, unless they are required to do so, say by government, their industry body or their customers (e.g. the retailers). There are basically two ways to stop free riding: legal regulation and market regulation. Legal regulation may come directly from government or from an
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industry body that has been given the power to regulate by government. Market regulation involves the development of coordinating mechanisms (e.g. vertical and horizontal alliances) to supply differentiated products. For example, a supply chain leader may introduce measures to restrict its vertical alliances to include only those firms that agree to the disciplines imposed by an acceptable food safety system. Also, a horizontal alliance of firms operating at a particular level of the supply chain (e.g. a producer group or cooperative) may guard itself against free riders by establishing a code of conduct of its members. One other important influence on the food safety policy process is the difference between real risks and perceived risks. The food supply chain responds largely to its understanding of the publicly perceived risks, and to the extent that government is motivated by the PEM of policy decision making, it will also base decisions on its understanding of the publicly perceived risks. In the long run, public perception may be expected to converge to known reality. But in the short run, perception and reality can diverge substantially. In the short run, publicly perceived risks may exceed real risks as the result of media sensationalism or the activity of influential non-governmental lobby groups. On the other hand, the publicly perceived risks may also understate the real risks as the result of government cover-up or industrial secrecy. The best way to eliminate the potential divergence between perceived and real risks is to encourage transparency of the food safety policy process. Transparency means that the entire process is open to public scrutiny. Institutional arrangements for food safety Institutional arrangements are the outcome of the drivers for change and the meta-rules (the higher-level institutional arrangements of the policy process). In Chapters 3–6 (the specific-country chapters) we divide the various institutional arrangements into two categories: governmental arrangements and nongovernmental arrangements. This follows the classification of Caswell and Henson (1997).1 They noted that governmental arrangements are, in most cases, mandatory measures imposed on industry. But, there are also voluntary governmental measures whose influence upon the domestic food industries essentially make them de facto regulations. With regard to the non-governmental institutional arrangements, they are voluntary safety measures which Caswell and Henson saw as operating above the minimum mandatory government regulations and aimed at gaining or protecting consumer confidence and market share. This classification sees food safety as a shared responsibility between government and industry where ensuring food safety is not necessarily through the use of mandatory standards and regulations imposed by government. Instead, industry may play a role through market regulation where safer food production practices are mandated by customers rather than by government. We will have more to say about what is the appropriate role of government and industry in ensuring food safety in Chapter 7.
Introduction
11
Of all the institutional arrangements we will consider in the next few chapters, one that stands out is HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points). It has been a focus of attention in each of the four countries under consideration. Hence, we will introduce it here as an industry-led programme to ensure both food safety and international competitiveness. The introduction of HACCP has been widespread, particularly in the beef industry (Hooker and Caswell, 1996c; Kaferstein et al., 1997; Majewski, 1997; Roberts et al., 1997; Caswell et al., 1998; Bundy, 2000; USDA/FSIS, 2000). It was perhaps the most revolutionary institutional innovation to ensure food safety of the 20th century. According to Majewski (1997) ‘the application of quality assurance systems, using the Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) approach as a tool, is seen as the best means of delivering safe food products to the consumer’. HACCP moves from the objective of ‘inspecting problems out of meat’ to the objective of ‘preventing problems from occurring in the first instance’. Essentially, HACCP makes willing firms better able to achieve enhanced food safety. The rise in prominence of HACCP has emerged from an underlying paradigm shift in food safety regulation from a prescriptive approach to a risk-based approach (see National Academy of Science, 1983). The risk-based approach integrates scientific analytical procedures into the regulatory development process in what is called a Risk Analysis Framework. The Framework consists of three components: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The purpose of risk assessment is to develop objective risk information according to a sound scientific basis using accepted scientific analytical methods. The purpose of risk management is to use the risk information to decide on an appropriate regulatory response in order to prevent or reduce risk. The purpose of risk communication is to ensure the two-way flow of information between both the risk assessment and risk management activities and between the Risk Analysis Framework and all the relevant stakeholders. HACCP, and its focus on preventing hazard, is very much a product of this underlying paradigm shift. The function of HACCP is based on seven principles: 1. Conduct a hazard analysis; 2. Identify critical control points; 3. Establish critical limits for each critical control point; 4. Establish critical control point monitoring requirements; 5. Establish corrective actions; 6. Establish record-keeping procedures; and 7. Establish procedures for verifying the HACCP system is working as intended. With a HACCP system hazards are identified before production and processing, and methods are employed to minimize the risk (Caswell and Hooker, 1996). This system requires industry involvement and increases the food industry’s responsibility and accountability for food safety (Caswell et al., 1998; McCutcheon, 1998; Unnevehr et al., 1999).
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Although acceptance of the HACCP approach to ensuring food safety is widespread, this does not mean the detail of HACCP implementation is without controversy. As we will see, the approach to HACCP implementation varies between countries and this has given rise to a number of issues for debate. We will discuss these issues in Chapter 7.
Objectives of the Study The basic premise of this study is that changes in food safety systems around the world are driven by the simultaneous interaction of domestic concerns over food safety, the desire to be internationally competitive, de-regulation and international market access issues. As countries upgrade their own food safety systems, this puts pressure on other supplying countries to ensure their food safety system does not lag behind. 1. The first major objective of this study is to describe the major drivers for change in a number of important beef producing countries. These drivers for change lead to institutional change. Some drivers are international and give rise to a change in international institutional arrangements. These, in turn, may impact on domestic institutional arrangements. Other drivers are national and give rise to changes in national institutional arrangements. 2. The second major objective of the study is to describe the institutional arrangements governing food safety internationally and in some important beef producing countries. Objectives one and two will be addressed in the next five chapters (Chapters 2–6). Chapter 2 deals with international institutional arrangements while Chapters 3–6 deal respectively with beef food safety in the USA, Canada, the UK and Australia. The purpose of describing the institutional arrangements in these various countries is to discover the ingredients of an optimal food safety system. According to our perspective, this is one that meets the socio-economic objective of maximizing international competitiveness subject to achieving some generally agreed, scientifically based minimum standards on food safety. There is no invisible hand to automatically guarantee that institutional arrangements will be consistent with this socio-economic objective. To a large extent it depends on the nature of the decision makers whose job it is to determine the institutional arrangements. 3. The third objective of the study is to discover the ingredients of an optimal food safety system and to evaluate the institutional arrangements in the various countries against this benchmark. In Chapter 7, we discuss the concept of an optimal food safety system and in Chapter 8 we evaluate the institutional arrangements of the various countries under review. In Chapter 9 is a summary and a discussion of the conclusions of this study.
Introduction
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Note 1. Caswell and Henson further disaggregated the institutional arrangements as follows. Government arrangements were disaggregated into direct regulation (i.e. standards and regulations to address food safety preventatively by specifying how products may be produced) and product liability (i.e. regulations to deal with identified instances of non-compliance by industry firms). Non-government arrangements were disaggregated into self-regulation (efforts undertaken by firms to ensure enhanced food safety through management schemes) and certification (accreditation, by an independent third-party, of a firm’s effort to enhance food safety).
Chapter 2
International Institutional Arrangements
International institutional arrangements have had an important influence upon the development of food safety systems in the countries examined in this study. The most important of these arrangements include the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) as well as the Codex Alimentarius (Codex). These arrangements attempt to standardize the rules for establishing domestic food safety regulations while simultaneously discouraging their use as an unwarranted barrier to trade. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the main international institutional arrangements and explain their subsequent influence upon domestic food safety systems. While these international institutional arrangements are important drivers of change for domestic food safety systems, they themselves have their own drivers of change. The drivers of the international arrangements are discussed in the next section, followed by a description of the international institutional arrangements themselves. In the final section is an analysis of the institutional arrangements as well as a discussion of the prospects for the establishment of an international food safety system. As we shall see, the prospects are not that good. This suggests the future focus of attention should not be on the international harmonization of food safety regulations. Instead, it should be on the development of food safety systems within individual countries followed by the integration of these systems among divergent countries.
International Drivers The development of international institutional arrangements and rules governing food safety regulations has been prompted by international drivers common to the four countries under study. These drivers are market mega15
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trends originating on either the demand side or the supply side of food product markets. On the demand side, there are two important international drivers. First, consumer preferences are becoming more exacting as incomes continue to grow in many parts of the world. Consumers are showing an increased willingness to pay for an assurance of food safety. Second, the globalization of media information allows for the rapid dissemination of sensationalized news stories of cases of food-borne illness, which can adversely affect consumer confidence and consumer demand for food products across international borders. As a result, the perception of consumers that food products are unsafe may be affected on a much greater scale than ever before, even though the actual risk may be quite low. On the supply side, there are also two important international drivers. First, technological improvements in all phases of processing and production as well as in packaging and transportation have made enhanced food safety systems possible. For instance, the adoption of HACCP systems allow firms proactively to identify, verify and minimize the presence of food safety hazards. Also, newer packaging techniques allow for the possibility of endproducts being irradiated after packaging, so there is no other handling of the product. This can reduce the potential for contamination being introduced to the product during further handling at the packing firm, during transportation or at the retail level. The second important supply-side driver is the improved coordination among the various participants of the beef supply chain. These have encouraged enhanced food safety procedures to extend all along the chain to provide an integrated food safety system. Such a system involves food safety controls at every point in the supply chain and product traceability back to the primary producer. Increasingly, supply chain participants are viewing themselves as interdependent operators in a customer-responsive food supply chain. This is beginning to replace the traditional view they had of themselves as independent rancher, feedlot operator, abattoir or retailer. Together, the demand- and supply-side international drivers have made food safety an important international issue and have encouraged the establishment of international food safety rules. For instance, producers want international food safety rules that are consistent, stable and predictable in order to ensure access to foreign markets. Consumers want international food safety rules that ensure that all food products for sale in domestic markets achieve an acceptable level of food safety, because the internationalization of food production increases the potential range of ‘mass contamination’ to include many national markets. It will be argued below that these drivers have resulted in a discernible convergence in food safety rules across countries characterized by adoption of the Risk Analysis Framework and Quality Assurance schemes.
International Institutional Arrangements
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International Institutional Arrangements As mentioned above, the drivers have encouraged the establishment of internationally standardized food safety rules under the jurisdiction of international institutional arrangements. The most important set of international institutional arrangements is the Codex, a joint agency of the United Nation’s (UN’s) World Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), whose mandate is to develop international standards, guidelines and codes of practice on issues of food safety and food quality. The creation of the WTO has led to two other important sets of international institutional arrangements: the Agreement on Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Standards (SPS Agreement) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). In the next section, the WTO and the relevant trade agreements will be discussed first followed by a discussion of the Codex. WTO As part of the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of multilateral negotiations on international trade, the WTO was created as a permanent institution administering several international trade agreements as well as dealing with cases of international trade dispute. The international trade agreements that are particularly relevant to the issue of meat safety are the SPS Agreement and to a lesser extent the TBT Agreement. By way of background, the international trade regime has been built on the traditional principle of non-discrimination. Essentially, there are three important aspects of this principle. First, is the ‘like product’ concept implying that products which serve the same end-use are considered like products and treated equivalently regardless of any differences in their process or production methods. Second, is the concept of National Treatment whereby foreign products must face the same regulatory standards as like domestic products. Third, is the concept of most favoured nation (MFN) whereby all like foreign products must face the same market access requirements as those foreign products from the MFN. The non-discrimination principle has been applied to ensure that government reactions to producer pressures for trade protectionism are constrained by trade rules and obligations. The traditional principle of non-discrimination has been used successively to reduce border-type trade barriers such as tariffs as well as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as quotas, variable levies and quantitative restrictions. Indeed, the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which focused on these types of trade barriers, offers the prospect of real international discipline on agricultural trade. Such measures can no longer be established in a unilateral manner and must meet the principle of non-discrimination.
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Yet, disciplining these types of trade barriers should not be interpreted to mean that the political pressures for protection have disappeared. In fact, a new type of NTB has been emerging, which is less transparent yet potentially as effective as the older more familiar NTBs. These new measures for protection include domestic regulatory standards and technical rules for consumer and environmental protection. Emerging simultaneously as the regulatory barriers to trade, are calls for protectionism not from producers but from civil society. In other words, two new challenges face the international trade regime. It must deal with new types of trade protectionism as well as new sources of trade protectionism. Food safety is at the vanguard of these two challenges. Domestic regulations that diverge from regulations in other countries have been enacted which delay and sometimes prohibit market access. Also, some segments of society call for public intervention to ensure not just safety, but also product quality and to ensure that new products have socio-economic benefits. Beyond regulatory standards applying to the product, there are also growing calls for governments to regulate the production and processing methods (PPMs) used to create products in order to ensure that they do not have adverse environmental or animal welfare impacts. From a trade perspective, divergent food safety rules among trading nations can create market access barriers for foreign products. This trade threat has encouraged the development of international agreements to provide standardized rules for establishing domestic regulations so that the various national standards and regulations do not provide fertile ground for NTBs (Hooker and Caswell, 1999). Therefore, while the AoA addresses traditional agricultural trade barriers, the SPS and the TBT Agreements both address the potential NTBs created through the use of domestic regulations. The SPS Agreement constitutes a considerable strengthening of rules governing the legitimate use of domestic health regulations to restrict food trade. At the heart of the SPS Agreement is the tenet: no member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.1
Thus, the SPS Agreement specifically allows for the establishment of NTBs on food imports, but only where there is a proven, scientific risk to human, animal or plant life or health. The main contribution of the SPS Agreement was to standardize the procedures for determining a proven, scientific risk to human, animal or plant life or health (WTO, 1999a). In this way, it reduces the opportunity for using food safety measures for other (inappropriate) reasons. The SPS Agreement established the following principles to be applied by all WTO Members to any domestic regulations concerning human, animal and plant health. In order to be legitimate the regulations: ●
must be appropriate to the risk involved, based on scientific proof and the trade impacts should be minimal while achieving the desired level of SPS protection (the principle of proportionality);
International Institutional Arrangements
● ●
●
19
must not involve arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members (they require a scientific justification for discrimination); should ideally be based on international standards, namely Codex for food safety, the International Plant Protection Convention for plant safety and the International Office of Epizootics for animal safety (countries are permitted to exercise more stringent standards than the ones set by these international institutions, but only if they can demonstrate a scientific justification for doing so); and should be transparent (members are obligated to provide notification during the development, implementation and alteration of relevant regulations).
These principles serve to strengthen the role of international standards. However, a country can still maintain or introduce SPS measures that exceed the international norms if there is scientific justification (Article 3), and provided that science-based reasons are given (Article 12). According to Article 12, the burden of proof in such cases lies with the exporter (Article 4). But even without sufficient scientific proof, Members are allowed to adopt temporary measures to deal with short-term safety concerns (Article 5(7)). Thus the SPS Agreement is one of the few WTO Agreements to observe the principle of precaution. In short, the SPS Agreement allows WTO Members to impose additional food safety regulations and to discriminate against imports on the condition there is an acceptable scientific justification to do so. Of course, this raises the important issue of what constitutes acceptable scientific justification. According to WTO case law (Salmon Case – WTO, 1998b), there are three important criteria. The country’s regulations restricting imports must: 1. Explicitly identify the diseases whose entry, establishment or spread the Member wants to prevent and must describe the potential biological and economic consequences of entry; 2. Evaluate both the likelihood of the entry, establishment or spread of the disease and the economic and food safety consequences according to a risk assessment procedure under the Risk Analysis Framework; and 3. Be those that minimize the trade impact. The objectives of the TBT Agreement as stated at the beginning of this chapter are: to ensure the quality of exported products, protect human and animal health, preserve plants, protect the environment, prevent practices which may mislead consumers (economic fraud) and ensure national security.
The TBT Agreement is thus broader in scope than the SPS Agreement. Whereas the SPS Agreement focuses explicitly on food safety issues, the TBT Agreement is concerned with all (mandatory and voluntary) technical standards that apply to internationally traded products including food. When a dispute arises, it is first necessary to verify whether the technical issue falls
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within the scope of the SPS Agreement. If it does not, it immediately goes to the TBT Agreement. The technical standards considered under the TBT Agreement include technical performance standards a product must meet to be imported or exported – for example, energy efficiency standards for washing machines. The performance standards include product quality attributes, packaging requirements, labelling rules, as well as advertising and marketing claims. They may also include environmental, health, labour or other standards a product must meet during its life cycle (e.g. that forest products must come from sustainably managed forests). The TBT Agreement dictates when such barriers may be allowed and what conditions must be met (notification, transparency in developing the rules, the use of international standards when appropriate, and so on). It applies fully to all government standards, including most levels of government. Non-governmental, non-mandatory standards are less strictly covered under what is called the Code of Good Practice. The principles underlying the TBT Agreement are: ● ● ● ● ● ●
avoidance of unnecessary obstacles to trade; non-discrimination and national treatment; harmonization; equivalence of technical regulations; mutual recognition of conformity assessment procedures (these are procedures which ensure imported products conform to domestic technical regulations and standards); and transparency.
Hooker and Caswell (1996b) point out there is a blurred distinction between food safety and food quality issues and hence, in the case of food, there is opportunity for jurisdictional overlap between the TBT and the SPS Agreements. This is problematic because while SPS Agreement attempts to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate trade barriers according to scientific justification, the TBT Agreement is not limited to a scientific justification. As a result, the TBT Agreement appears to be softer on allowing import trade barriers against specific products. For example, a country wishing to protect the domestic food industry may successfully appeal to the TBT Agreement on the grounds of environmental and ethical requirements on food PPMs where such grounds would not be available under the SPS Agreement. This is not to say the TBT Agreement allows open season on PPMs because a country cannot simply discriminate against imported products which serve the same end-market as domestic products based on differences in the manner in which they were produced.
Codex From the discussion above, it is clear that while the international trade regime is an important institutional arrangement impacting food safety, underlying
International Institutional Arrangements
21
this regime is the Codex Alimentarius (Latin for Food Code, Codex for short), an equally important international arrangement. The need for a consistent and non-fragmented international approach to food regulation after the Second World War culminated in the creation, in 1962, of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). The objective of the CAC was to develop the Codex. The Codex was intended to provide universally applicable food safety guidelines that would facilitate international trade in food products and ensure international consumer protection. Although the initial intent of the Codex was to focus on food safety and consumer protection, its mandate has broadened to include food quality issues. Given its objective of facilitating international food trade, as well as the inclusion of Codex standards and standards-setting principles into the SPS and TBT Agreements, the CAC has found it difficult to ignore such issues. Administratively, the CAC is a joint agency of the UN’s FAO and the WHO created under the UN’s food standards programme. As a result, all member countries of the UN may be members of the CAC. Assisting the CAC is the Codex Secretariat and the Codex Executive Committee. The Codex Secretariat is located in Rome and is administered by the FAO. The purpose of the Secretariat is to provide day-to-day support for member countries as they attempt to interpret, develop and implement national food regulation congruent with the Codex Alimentarius. The Codex Executive Committee meets yearly and, unlike the CAC, is organized according to principal regions (Europe, Africa, Asia, the South Pacific, Latin America and North America) not according to subjects. Hence, the Codex Executive Committee is a regional coordinating committee providing a regional perspective on food safety. The CAC is composed of committees organized around commodities, general subjects, regions (which were indicated above), and around expert groups providing supporting advice and guidance. Committees are chaired by a member country and they may be active or dormant. The 14 worldwide commodity committees cover the following product categories: cereals, pulses and legumes; vegetable proteins; tropical fresh fruits and vegetables; processed fruits and vegetables; fats and oils; processed meat and meat products; meat hygiene; fish and fishery products; milk and milk products; sugars; cocoa products and chocolate; edible ices; soups and broths; and nutrition and foods for special dietary uses. The eight Codex General Subject Committees are: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
Residues of veterinary drugs in food; Import/export inspection and certification; Food additives and contaminants; General principles; Pesticide residues; Food labelling; Analysis and sampling; and Food hygiene.
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Finally, the Codex group of expert committees includes the expert group on fruit juices and quick frozen foods. Other joint FAO/WHO agencies that provide expert advice and consultation to the CAC and the various committees are the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives and the Joint Meeting on Pesticides. The process of introducing, developing and adopting food safety standards into the Codex Alimentarius can be cumbersome. A Codex food standard includes several elements: ● ● ● ● ●
a description of the product and the essential composition and quality factors which identify the product (from close substitutes); identification and analysis of any additives and potential contaminants; the Codex product hygiene requirements; the Codex labelling requirements; and a description of the scientific procedures used to sample and analyse the product during review.
Determination of the safety of the food product is based on scientific risk analysis and toxicological studies of pesticide residues, microbial contaminants, chemical additives and veterinary biologics. A Codex food standard is adopted only after eight stages or steps of consultation have been completed. These eight steps are as follows. 1. A food safety issue is identified by the CAC, the Codex Secretariat or the Codex Executive Committee and presented at a CAC plenary session (every 2 years), where, if it is determined that a Codex food standard ought to be elaborated, the CAC assigns the issue to either a commodity or a general subject committee. 2. The committee presents its elaboration, based on Codex food standard elements, to the Codex Secretariat who produces a Proposed Draft Standard. 3. The Proposed Draft Standard is sent to all member governments and relevant non-governmental international organizations for review and comments. 4. Comments from step 3 are returned to the Committee which initially elaborated the food standard. 5. The committee amends the Proposed Draft Standard subject to the review and comments and the amended Proposed Draft Standard is presented to the CAC by the Secretariat at a plenary session where it may be adopted as a Draft Standard. 6. The adopted Draft Standard is sent to all member governments and relevant non-governmental institutional organizations for further comment. 7. Comments are returned to the Committee through the Secretariat for amendments to the Draft Standard. 8. The amended Draft Standard is presented to the CAC for adoption as a Codex Standard to be sent to member governments for acceptance. Generally it takes about 6 months for each of steps (1)–(6) while steps (7) and (8) take 2 years each. However, it is possible for the Proposed Draft
International Institutional Arrangements
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Standard to be adopted at step 6 as a Codex Food standard, instead of being sent for further review, if consensus has been achieved. In this case, it can take 4 years for a Codex Food standard to be adopted. Decision making in the CAC can be by vote if consensus cannot be achieved as was done in the beef hormones case. Once a Codex food standard is adopted, member countries are encouraged to incorporate the standard into any relevant domestic standards and legislation. There is a dynamic aspect to this multinational institutional arrangement since the CAC may continuously develop food safety standards. In turn, member countries who wish to harmonize domestic measures with Codex standards also must continuously react to the new standards. Essentially, the Codex attempts to develop universally acceptable food standards through its elaboration and consultation procedure that may be aligned with domestic food safety standards. However, under the principles of Codex, each contracting party maintains the right to establish its own appropriate level of food safety and consumer protection and to act unilaterally to ensure this level of protection. It is anticipated that when countries do deviate from the Codex food standard, they do so in a scientifically justifiable manner. The Codex is perhaps the most influential institutional driver for change in beef food safety now that its principles are enshrined in the SPS and TBT Agreements of the WTO. Although the original intent of Codex was to develop international food standards, it has now taken on a very important trade function. The SPS Agreement requests that all parties harmonize their domestic standards with Codex standards, guidelines and other Codex recommendations. In the case of trade disputes, Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations are to be employed under the SPS for WTO dispute resolution procedures. Along with trade issues comes other domestic objectives and the danger is that these other objectives may obfuscate the initial objective of improving worldwide food safety. Further, new food safety issues, which are brought to the CAC for elaboration as possible Codex food standards, may be motivated by concerns other than food safety, such as political or special interests. The most divisive issue facing members of the CAC is the debate over scientific risk assessment in Codex standards-setting procedures. It has been the traditional stance of the Codex that risk should be assessed according to scientific evidence of risk to human health. However, recent efforts by the EU to include ‘risk to other legitimate factors’ such as political–economic–social factors have created controversy (Codex, 1999). In fact, at the 21st Session of the CAC (3–7 July 1995, Rome) four amendments to the Codex Procedural Manual were made pertaining to the role of science in the Codex decisionmaking process. They were: 1. The food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of the Codex shall be based on the principle of scientific analysis and evidence, involving a thorough review of all relevant information, in order that standards assure the quality and safety of the food supply.
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2. When elaborating and deciding on food standards the CAC will have regard, where appropriate, to other legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of consumers and for the promotion of fair practices in food trade. 3. In this regard, it is noted that food plays an important role in furthering both of these objectives. 4. When the situation arises that members of the CAC agree on the necessary level of protection of public health but hold differing views about other considerations, members may abstain from acceptance of the relevant standards without necessarily preventing the decision by the CAC.2 While the first amendment clearly enforces the important role of science, the fourth principle creates an opt-out clause so a country may abstain from the Codex food standard decision, and the standard may still be adopted. This runs directly counter to the original intent of adopting standards by consensus and promoting the international harmonization of food standards. The fourth principle allows member countries legitimately to institute unilateral food standards different from Codex standards by opting out of a CAC decision. This appears to undermine the role of Codex standards and standards-setting principles in establishing the legitimacy or otherwise of trade barriers under the SPS Agreement.
Analysis of International Institutional Arrangements The various international institutional arrangements discussed above attempt to ‘de-politicize’ international trade (WTO, 1995). Rather than subjecting trade flows to the divergent normative preferences of various member countries, they attempt to subject trade flows to universal, scientific determinations of safety or hazard or to universal principles of non-discrimination. The SPS and TBT Agreements along with the Codex attempt to ensure consumer protection while disciplining the use of unilateral food safety regulations as non-tariff barriers to trade. In the case of a food safety issue, the basis for a legitimate SPS measure is the scientific evidence of a risk or hazard, proven through credible scientific methods congruent with either Codex standards (if they exist) or Codex standards-setting principles. In the case of a non-safety issue, the basis of a legitimate TBT measure is the traditional trade principle of non-discrimination. That is, the measure must not violate the MFN and the national treatment principles and must be the least trade distorting measure available. All other justifications for unilateral trade barriers are considered to be illegitimate and in contravention of international trade agreements. International institutional arrangements have significant implications for the restructuring of the domestic food safety systems under study. Hence they may be considered as a special class of drivers for change. The international institutional arrangements are broadly consistent with our socio-economic
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25
objective. They have helped to standardize the international rules governing food safety, and in so doing have lowered the transaction costs involved in the international trade in food products. Of course, they have not eliminated differences in standards between countries, and neither should they. The Codex provides an acceptable minimum standard of food safety as stipulated in our socio-economic objective. However, allowing for differences between countries (subject to this minimum) allows different countries to explore changes to their food safety systems, which may enhance international competitiveness. This ability is enhanced by the concept of ‘mutual recognition’ which is enshrined in the SPS and TBT Agreements and in the Codex. Thus, for example, domestic food safety systems, when deviating from the Codex food standards, must show that their standards yield the equivalent effect on overall food safety. Allowing for differences between countries (subject to the minimum standards provided by Codex) raises the cost of difference between countries. However, a country may choose to do this for socio-economic reasons provided it can justify the differences on scientific grounds. As such, we believe this is consistent with our socio-economic objective. The international institutional arrangements have also helped to lower the enthusiasm of special interest groups (either from industry or civil society) to seek economic protection through the inappropriate use of food safety rules. The present international institutional arrangements are unable to completely solve this problem. However, they do raise the political costs to errant country governments, and for other governments these arrangements provide international support to resist this form of economic protectionism. It is important that the SPS Agreement remains based on scientific risk assessment and that it does not entertain social concerns as a basis for allowing a trade restriction. Allowing the consideration of social concerns would considerably enhance the prospects of special interest groups seeking economic protection from imports. These international institutional arrangements also contribute to the ability of countries to move towards an optimal food safety system because they attempt to move the process of dispute resolution from one of negotiation to one of adjudication. In a process of negotiation, might is right. Hence the most economically powerful countries will tend to achieve the most gains. This power imbalance tends to limit the ability of other countries to achieve what would be, for them, an optimal food safety system. By contrast, a process of adjudication reduces the impact of power imbalances on dispute outcomes. Of course, the present international arrangements do not completely remove the effect of power imbalances on dispute outcomes. A good case in point is the recent trade dispute between Canada and the USA on the one hand and the European Union (EU) on the other over the use of hormones in beef production. This practice has been a source of controversy in Europe for over 20 years; first arising because of misuse by French farmers. In 1988 an EU Directive banned the use of six hormones in beef production (oestradiol 17B, progesterone, testosterone, trenbolone acetate,
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zeranol and melengestrol acetate or MGA) applying a zero-tolerance policy. This ban pertained to both domestically produced and imported beef products and effectively banned a vast quantity of North American beef products. When the WTO came into force on 1 January 1995, Canada and the USA were able to challenge the legitimacy of the EU’s safety ban under the scientific principles of the SPS Agreement. The dispute panel ruled against the EU ban, and the EU promptly appealed. The appellate body also ruled against the EU ban. It held the ban was not based on an appropriate scientific risk assessment and hence, was not scientifically justifiable. The EU was ordered to bring its domestic measures for meat safety into conformity with the SPS Agreement by 18 May 1999. Failure to comply would permit Canada and the USA to impose trade sanctions against any EU goods imported into North America in order to offset the economic costs created by the EU trade barrier. As of December 2000, the EU has not complied with the WTO ruling; in this instance it appears that a powerful actor in the international trading system can effectively remain in contravention of a WTO ruling. Let us now examine the important drivers and subsequent institutional arrangements in each of the countries under review and then return to this important issue in Chapter 7.
Notes 1. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Measures, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Legal Texts, pp. 69–84. Preamble. WTO Secretariat, Geneva, Switzerland. 2. Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) (1995) Report of the 21st Session; Rome, 3–7 July (ALINORM 95/37 Appendix 2). FAO, Rome.
Chapter 3
The United States of America
Introduction We begin our four-country world tour in North America; starting with the USA. From there we cross the 49th parallel into Canada, before heading across the Atlantic to the UK and finishing up in Australia. The USA is by far the largest producer and consumer of beef in the world, producing and consuming over 11 million tonnes in 2000. The nearest rival would be China, which produced and consumed less than half this amount. The USA is also the largest importer and exporter of beef, accounting for about 1 million tonnes going in each direction. The most important export destinations for US beef are Japan, Mexico, Korea and Canada. The USA is the logical place to start our tour not just because it is the largest player in the world beef market, but also because it plays a dominant role in the trade relationships involving Canada and Australia, two of the other countries under study. The USA is the largest destination of Canadian beef (and live cattle) and is the second-largest destination of Australian beef behind Japan. This means that the US approach to food safety is of critical importance to these other countries providing them with perhaps their most important external drivers for change. This chapter is divided into three sections: the drivers for change; developments in the institutional arrangements in the US food safety system; and the implications of these developments.
Drivers for Change While recent restructuring of the US food safety system has been motivated by both external and internal drivers, the internal drivers have been the more influential and include several severe and well publicized domestic food safety crises as well as pressures for deregulation. The pressures for deregulation 27
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have stemmed from both a government policy to reduce budgetary outlays and a desire to increase industry competitiveness.
External drivers for change The main external driver for change is competitiveness in foreign markets, where one of the more important issues for market access is perceived to be the US food safety system. Three recent governmental initiatives highlight this external driver. First, there was the US Government’s Long-term Agricultural Trade Strategy (LATS) announced in 1995 by the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), US Department of Agriculture (USDA). The objective of this strategy was to increase exports of foodstuffs to high-growth regions such as Latin America and South-East Asia. Explicit in this export strategy was a requirement that US exporters be more sensitive to demand-driven concerns in foreign food markets including demands for food safety. The second governmental initiative involved bilateral negotiations between the US and foreign governments to establish Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). The objective of the MRAs is acceptance by each country of the other’s food safety system provided the outcomes are the same. MRAs establish the principle of equivalence rather than equality of the different food safety systems. Thus, even though the US food safety system may differ in form from that of a particular foreign country, if the level of food safety achieved in the two countries is the same, then the two systems are deemed to be equivalent. Third, there is the proactive involvement of several US government agencies in the development of international Codex principles, standards, regulations, codes of practice and guidelines of food safety. These include the USDA’s FAS and Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS), and the FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition (CFSAN) and Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM). Currently, the US Codex Secretariat, in the FSIS Administrator’s Office, coordinates the involvement of these government agencies. In 1996, an FDA Report entitled Reinventing Food Regulations identified significant impediments to the US Government’s efforts to harmonize international food regulations (Horton, 1997). These impediments included differences in both economic and social factors leading to either honest differences of opinion on food safety regulation or to disguised protectionism. The international harmonization of food regulation aims to overcome these impediments. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, the Codex provides an internationally consistent framework for addressing food safety concerns by encouraging the adoption of health and sanitary standards only when they can be scientifically justified and internationally accepted. The exports of US food products are affected by the standards, regulations, codes and guidelines in place in foreign markets to address foreign food safety concerns.
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The efforts of US government agencies to harmonize international food regulations is supported by non-governmental bodies including the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (NCBA), the US Meat Export Federation (USMEF) and the American Meat Institute (AMI). They all have initiatives designed to ensure export market access for beef products including information and technical analysis on the market access requirements of foreign food safety systems as well as information for foreign consumers on the safety of US beef. Together, these governmental and non-governmental initiatives aim to ensure that the structure of the US food safety system enhances the export prospects for US foodstuffs.
Internal drivers for change Despite the influence of the external drivers, the internal drivers have been the most influential catalysts for structural change in the US food safety system. The internal drivers include both the recent food contamination crises affecting domestic consumer confidence and the broader government efforts at deregulation (in order to reduce costs, eliminate overlap and duplication and to increase the competitiveness of the food industry). While the deregulation driver was important in the early to mid-1990s, this impetus for change appears to have evaporated in more recent times as the trend has been an increase in government spending on food safety. The major internal driver for change has been a series of well publicized food contamination crises. These have combined to rock consumer confidence in the safety of the US food supply, but more importantly, they have led to a political motivation to restructure the food safety system. Indeed, the Under Secretary for Food Safety, USDA, indicated in a public address that the real driver for the restructuring change of the US food safety system was the domestic outbreak of E. coli (O157:H7) in 1993 (Wotecki, 1998a). Some of the most recent and well publicized crises include: ● ● ● ● ● ●
In 1985, a Salmonella contamination of milk in Chicago affected between 169,000 and 198,000 people. In 1991, an outbreak of Salmonella in 23 states was linked to the consumption of cantaloupes, affecting approximately 400 people. In 1993, an outbreak of ground-beef- (minced-beef)-related E. coli (O157:H7) attributed to a fast-food franchise affected more than 500 people and killed four children in Washington and Nevada. In 1994, another outbreak of Salmonella affecting 600 people in 41 states was attributed to ice cream transported in an inappropriately cleaned truck. In 1995, lucerne sprouts were blamed for a Salmonella outbreak that affected 242 people in 17 states. In 1996, imported raspberries infected with Cyclospora affected 1000 people in 20 states.
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In 1996, an outbreak of Salmonella traced back to eggs, contaminated a batch of homemade mayonnaise, which affected 242 patrons of a restaurant in Greenville, South Carolina. In 1996, an unpasteurized apple-juice related outbreak of E. coli (O157:H7) affected 70 schoolchildren in Washington and Colorado. In 1997, oysters were responsible for the illness of more than 400 people in Louisiana who were infected with the Norwalk virus. In 1997, imported Mexican strawberries, served through the federal government sponsored school lunch programme, were responsible for an outbreak of hepatitis A that affected 100 schoolchildren and 130 other people. In 1997, another ground-beef- (minced-beef)-related outbreak of E. coli (O157:H7) in Colorado affected approximately 55 people but resulted in no deaths. In August 1997 an outbreak of E. coli (O157:H7) at the Hudson’s Meat Packing plant in Columbus, Nebraska, caused 17 cases of illness in the US north-west.
The above instances of food contamination indicate three things. First, many crises have a domestic origin and are not simply caused by imports from countries with ‘less-effective’ food safety systems. Second, meat is not the only source of food contamination although meat products are often identified as particularly unsafe foods. Finally, the general public and the public media are particularly sensitive to the adverse effects of food contamination problems because they most affect the vulnerable in society; young children and the elderly. These food contamination crises have led to an increased focus by both governmental and non-governmental agencies to improve the institutional arrangements for food safety in order to regain consumer confidence. Restructuring of the US food safety system has included efforts by government to protect consumers from unsafe food, both domestic and foreign, through increased emphasis on inspection and monitoring activities for the presence of pathogenic microorganisms. It also included efforts by meat industry firms, particularly at the slaughterhouse/processing stage, to voluntarily adopt safety assurance programmes, such as HACCP, before it became mandatory to do so. In addition, leaders of the beef supply chains (e.g. processors and retailers) began to develop their own food safety codes for their suppliers. This is a form of market regulation, in which suppliers adhere to the food safety codes voluntarily as a way to achieve and maintain market access. Such measures were taken before governments insisted any action be taken. Restructuring of the US food safety system has also been driven by the broader internal goal of government budget restraint. When President Clinton came to power, he pledged to operate government in a more costeffective manner and to eliminate areas of federal overlap and duplication. His catchphrase was: ‘the era of big-government is over’. And, in fact during his
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first administration (1993–1996), government spending went down for the first time (in real dollars) since 1973. Government food safety programmes were not immune from this spending squeeze. Hence the budget squeeze became an important driver for change during these years, resulting in fewer government food safety inspections. During President Clinton’s second term in office, government spending (in real dollars) resumed its upward path. This was reflected in new budget allocations for food safety based on the President’s National Food Safety Initiative which was announced in January of 1997. This initiative will be discussed further below. Together, the internal drivers have influenced the restructuring of the US food safety system including: the reorganization of the USDA to include an Under Secretary for Food Safety in 1994; the 1996 release of the MEGAREG by the Under Secretary for Food Safety; the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act; and the President’s 1997 National Food Safety Initiative. While all four initiatives will be discussed in the next section three common themes may be noted. 1. An increased focus on domestic consumer protection through government monitoring of industry practices. 2. An increased governmental role in inspection and monitoring at domestic food processing plants and at import inspection points. 3. An increased emphasis and focus upon science, such as the detection of microbial contamination through science-based sampling techniques during processing. In short, these developments essentially increased the role of government in the activities of inspection and monitoring. This suggests that since a major issue in the US is depressed consumer confidence, the institutional remedy has been to provide more direct governmental involvement in order to regain consumer confidence.
Relationship between external and internal drivers The internal drivers have been more influential than the external drivers in generating structural change of both the governmental and the non-governmental institutional arrangements of the US food safety system. Although export market access remains an important part of the meat industry’s strategy, domestic markets are a major destination for output. These domestic markets have experienced food safety crises negatively affecting consumer confidence. As concern over the safety of the US food supply increased, both the industry and the federal government sought to restore consumer confidence. The industry voluntarily adopted market regulations while the government sought to crack down on the meat industry through mandatory food safety legislation that led to an increase in government involvement in the food safety system.
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Institutional Arrangements Governmental arrangements The main federal government agencies in the USA responsible for food safety are the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the USDA, while the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) plays a supporting role. Under HHS are the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Generally, the FDA is responsible for risk assessment and the subsequent development of risk-based food safety policies concerning both domestic and foreign foodstuffs. Risk management activities, designed to achieve the food safety policies, are allocated according to the type of food product. For example, the FDA is responsible for risk management in the fruits and vegetables sectors and the USDA is responsible for risk management in the meats, eggs and dairy sectors. This section will begin with a description of the evolution of the governmental arrangements followed by a more detailed description of the current risk analysis activities of various federal government agencies as well as state and municipal government agencies. Evolution of the governmental arrangements in the USA While internal drivers have been the major force behind the recent restructuring of the US food safety system, internal drivers have not always been the most influential. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the USA was driven by export interests to introduce food safety regulation. (See Horton, 1997, for an excellent account of this and other aspects of the historical evolution of US food regulation.) At the time, European laws and consumer doubts about the safety of US meat products were a threat to US meat exports and led to the proclamation of the 1890 Food and Drug Importation and Exportation Act. This Act established stringent requirements for animal quarantine and meat hygiene on export products. The same requirements also applied to products for domestic consumption, although budget appropriations were not provided in the 1890 Act to pay for this. As a result, the most stringent US food safety regulations were targeted at US meat exporters. According to Horton (1997), the US regulations began to converge on European regulations with the 1906 Food and Drugs Act and then exceeded those found in Europe during the inter-war period with the 1938 Federal Food, Drugs and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA). These regulations enhanced the access of US meat products to the European market. The Second World War presented an opportunity for US meat producers to increase exports because of the devastation to the domestic European meat industries. At the same time, imports from Europe decreased and substitutes from Latin America and Africa had difficulty meeting the new, more stringent regulations of the 1938 FFDCA. Hence the US industry was allowed to grow with decreased competi-
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tion. By the end of the war, US food safety regulations were the most stringent in the world and became the de facto world standards. At about the same time, the regulatory focus in the US food industry shifted from a concern about export market access to the protection of domestic consumers from imported products. European food products, produced within a seriously damaged agri-food infrastructure faced difficulties meeting US regulations for such things as sanitation, insect infestation and bacteriological contamination. In 1965 the US focus on domestic consumer protection was reinforced with the US Pure Food Act. Among other things, the Act introduced measures to regulate animal slaughter and processing. For instance, it specified there must be veterinary control over the inspection of meat products and specified construction standards for the slaughtering facilities including the use of potable water. An important aspect of the 1965 Pure Food Act was the requirement of ‘equivalent’ food safety regulations in the home countries of meat exporters to the USA. In the years following 1965, the spotlight of US food safety regulation has remained on domestic consumer protection. However, in recent years a new concern has arisen, namely microbial contamination. This new concern has arisen in response to the many domestic food contamination crises identified earlier. Before these crises, all players in the beef supply chain (government regulators, industry and consumers) accepted the notion that microbial contamination was an inherent part of food consumption (Kramer, 1989). However, the severity of these internal drivers and the ensuing media attention made this view unacceptable. As a result, government food safety policies have targeted the reduction of microbial pathogens in the food supply through a science-based risk analysis framework. In the early 1990s, the increasing attention being given to microbial contamination together with increasing government budgetary pressures led to the 1994 Department of Agriculture Reorganization Act. Food safety was considered to be an increasingly important political issue, as evidenced by the creation of a new appointment, the Under Secretary for Food Safety. According to Wotecki (1998b), the broad mandate of this Under Secretary was: 1. To protect domestic consumers by directing the various USDA food safety agencies under its control towards the reduction of the instance of food-borne illness; 2. To base food regulation policy upon appropriate science-based risk assessment procedures; 3. To promote risk management through safe production, processing and preparation techniques among the meats, eggs and dairy sectors; and 4. To coordinate food safety among both other government agencies and non-governmental agencies.
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With the 1994 USDA reorganization, the Under Secretary for Food Safety became responsible for the USDA’s food safety agencies including the FSIS, the Office of Public Health and Science (OPHS), the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). In July 1996, the FSIS was reorganized in an attempt to direct government food safety resources at the most prevalent food safety and consumer protection challenges, especially microbial contamination of meats, eggs and dairy products. According to the reorganization strategy, the activities of the FSIS were to be focused on science-based risk assessments while the risk management roles and responsibilities were streamlined to improve administrative efficiency and effectiveness. For instance, between July 1996 and October 1998 the FSIS sought to centralize policy development and programme delivery by reducing the number of FSIS divisions from 13 down to seven, reducing nonline personnel by 20% and reorganizing the field operations. On 25 July 1996 the FSIS of the USDA released the ‘Final Rule on Pathogen Reduction and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points’, a risk analysis-based regulatory framework for ensuring food safety, also known as the MEGAREG. This legislation was designed to achieve the mandate of the Under Secretary for Food Safety with particular reference to the meat and poultry sectors. The four broad objectives of the MEGAREG covered two risk assessment and two risk management functions. The two objectives concerned with risk assessment were: 1. To develop performance standards and tolerance limits for pathogenic microorganisms, especially Salmonella and E. coli. 2. To develop effective yet expeditious detection techniques for microbial contamination. The remaining two objectives concerned with risk management were: 3. The mandatory adoption of HACCP by meat industry processing plants and slaughterhouses. The time frame for adoption of HACCP was made contingent on the firm’s size. Under HACCP, firms are extended greater responsibility and accountability for: ● the reduction and prevention of microbial contamination through science-based self-monitored control processes; ● achieving performance standards for contamination; ● improving traceability; and ● adding to the base of knowledge about food contamination hazards through detailed documentation and record-keeping. 4. To target the entire meat and poultry supply-chain through the ‘Farm-toTable’ strategy. The approach involved promoting the voluntary adoption of HACCP-type procedures at both pre- and post-processing stages. The MEGAREG legislation mandates the FSIS to perform both risk assessment and risk management functions to ensure food safety in the meat and poultry sectors. Hence, there is no institutional separation between the two risk analysis functions.
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In the same year as the unveiling of MEGAREG (1996), the Food Quality Protection Act was passed. This Act, aimed to streamline federal regulations on the use of pesticides in food production, including special provisions for the protection of children from pesticide use. The Act applied to all foodstuffs whether domestic or foreign. Under the Act, the federal government has enhanced powers to control domestic food production as well as to oversee imports of food products that may be contaminated with non-acceptable pesticide levels. On 25 January 1997 the President’s National Food Safety Initiative (NFSI) was announced. This initiative emerged from the increasing public concern generated by seemingly more frequent and more complex instances of food-borne illness from microbial contamination. The NFSI, co-chaired by the USDA’s Under Secretary for Food Safety, the Assistant Secretary of HHS and by the Administrator of the EPA, is a multi-departmental federal government initiative to develop risk assessment procedures for the entire supply chain of each food sector including food production, processing, packaging, transportation, storage, distribution and preparation stages. The NFSI emphasized the need for government regulators and private industry to work towards the reduction of microbial pathogens by improving the ability to identify when and where the risks are greatest. On 12 May 1997 the Vice President announced (in a report entitled Food Safety from Farmto-Table: a National Food Safety Initiative) a number of objectives of the NFSI relating to both short- and long-term risk analysis activities. The short-term food safety objectives were: 1. To increase government inspections in domestic processing plants and for imported food products because the report identified staffing and budget constraints and increased imports as a major reason for the decrease in government inspections of food products (risk management). 2. To develop the FoodNet active surveillance early warning system (formerly the 1995 Sentinel Site Study) to monitor the incidence of foodborne illness through the use of ‘cutting-edge detection technology’ (risk communication). 3. To develop the Federal Outbreak Response Coordination Group (FORCG) increasing surveillance sites, personnel in sites and electronic linkages between these sites and other federal, state and local health agencies in order to provide for rapid, efficient management of outbreaks and minimize their spread (risk management). 4. To develop a coordinated public/private national education campaign, known as the ‘Partnership for Food Safety Education’ to improve food handling in homes and in retail outlets. This was to build upon the earlier work of the Fight BAC Education programme (announced in October 1994) designed to teach consumers about in-home microbial food safety and risk reduction (risk communication).
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The longer-term food safety objectives were: 5. To increase government research into developing and improving sciencebased tests to detect food-borne pathogens (more invasive than traditional organoleptic techniques) and to assess the risks of food-borne illness (risk assessment). 6. To encourage the voluntary adoption of safety assurance programmes by firms at all stages of the food supply chain other than those required under the MEGAREG (risk management). The NFSI was designed to be an ongoing, dynamic initiative encouraging increased coordination and efficiency of the federal government’s risk analysis activities. On 4 March 1998, the President built on the NFSI through a food policy statement entitled ‘Safe Food, Healthy Families’. This statement had two primary focuses. The first promoted the development and voluntary adoption of Good Agricultural Practices/Good Manufacturing Practices (GAPs/GMPs) by domestic food industry firms. The second focus was on improving import inspections by the FDA and the FSIS. The statement called for new food safety legislation to be developed requiring that foreign foods be produced under food safety systems at least equivalent to the US system. The policy built upon earlier (June 1997) FDA regulations prohibiting the use of mammalian protein in the manufacture of animal feed driven by the external BSE crisis in the UK (see Chapter 5). Under these regulations, the FDA effectively denied access to imports from foreign countries which did not have at least the same prohibition. According to the ‘Safe Food, Healthy Families’ policy, those foreign foods unable to meet the equivalency criterion, were to be denied access to US markets. Thanks largely to some highly publicized domestic food contamination problems the US Government was highly motivated to refocus US food safety policies on the scientific risk analysis framework and to reorganize the institutional arrangements around the risk analysis activities of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. The major changes included the reorganization of the USDA to include a high profile role for a new Under Secretary for Food Safety, the subsequent development of the MEGAREG Legislation and the broader President’s NFSI. Four underlying themes are discernible in the US restructuring. First, food safety policies have supported science-based risk assessment procedures to target and identify the risks of microbial contamination in the food supply-chain. Second, the risk assessment-based food safety policies have set performance standards for both raw and processed products at the processing stage. Third, food safety policies have developed risk management rules that make industry more responsible and accountable for the prevention or reduction of microbial contamination through science-based techniques beyond the traditional organoleptic inspection activities. Fourth, the restructuring has also promoted governmental risk management through partnerships at all levels of government and with other stakeholders such as industry and consumer associations.
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FDA The FDA is a government agency located within HHS and is responsible for administering the 1938 FFDCA and the Public Health Service Act (PHSA). Together these two Acts comprise the legislation governing US consumer protection and public health policy. Under the FFDCA, the FDA establishes safety policies for all food, drug and cosmetic products in terms of their impact, both in the short term and the long term, upon human health, safety and nutrition. Through the PHSA, the FDA also has legislative authority over the prevention of the spread of communicable diseases. The genesis of the FDA lay in the old Bureau of Chemistry, which had responsibility for administering the FFDCA. The Bureau of Chemistry resided in the USDA until the 1939 Reorganization Act, whereupon it changed its name to the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration and moved over to the Food Security Agency (FSA). The FSA was responsible for consumer protection and public health and later became the HHS. The basic role of the FDA in the food safety area is to develop food safety policies for all food products based on objective risk information within a risk analysis framework. The various steps in the process are as follows (Williams, 1998). The first step is the risk assessment, which the FDA performs through the CFSAN. The objective is to develop risk assessment procedures that can be consistently applied across all the food industries in order to set risk management regulatory responses proportional to the actual risk. The FDA’s risk assessment procedures are based on assessing the scientific risk to human safety. In this sense, the scientific evidence is limited to natural sciences such as toxicology, biochemistry, food microbiology and nutrition. Further, safety refers to both the absence of contaminants causing immediate, short-term illness and the absence of any long-term adverse nutritional influences. The second step is to use the risk information from step one’s risk assessment to identify performance standards for acceptable risk tolerance levels. The third step is to identify possible risk management regulatory options and to evaluate each option according to a benefit–cost analysis. The performance standards developed in step two are then applied to the identified options as a way of testing the potential risk reduction and prevention. Combining the first three steps creates a set of risk reduction policy options for the decision makers. The fourth step is to engage all stakeholders in the evaluation of the risk management options in order to identify an acceptable policy option. Once an option is chosen, the fifth step is to ‘operationalize’ this option through legislation establishing the necessary regulations, standards, guidelines or codes of practice. The sixth and final step of the FDA’s risk analysis framework is the validation step where the regulatory response is evaluated according to: 1. The efficacy of the performance standards established in the second step; 2. The effectiveness of the option chosen in the fourth step in terms of achieving the performance standards; and
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3. The effectiveness of the risk management activities of both government and industry personnel in terms of implementing the chosen option and in the reduction and prevention of risk. Risk analysis generally refers to the triad of risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. As mentioned above, the FDA performs risk assessment through CFSAN on all food products. However, the FDA performs risk management for some food products but not others. Thus, the FDA is responsible for inspection and monitoring of fruits and vegetables, seafood, pharmaceuticals, neutraceuticals and cosmetics. However, with respect to the meat and poultry, eggs and dairy industries, the USDA has responsibility for risk management. For these products, the FDA’s legislative jurisdiction is restricted to the scientific risk assessments and the development of the food safety policies. For those products that are subject to FDA risk management, there are seven areas of interest: personnel; plants and grounds; raw materials; equipment and utensils; manufacturing process; sanitation; and product distribution. Under each area are mandatory inspection duties. For instance, in the manufacturing process area, inspectors must examine the ingredient handling, product formulations, food additives, colour additives, packaging and labelling and the overall safety control. The overall food safety control scheme must be demonstrably effective at reducing the incidence of contamination through the proper monitoring of critical points of production, proper personnel training and through accurate laboratory sampling based on scientific principles. Except in the case of seafood, the FDA does not require the adoption of HACCP. Instead, the FDA encourages the development and implementation of risk management practices through GAPs/GMPs and through assistance with information on the evaluation, application and availability of new safety enhancing technologies. The FDA also provides information on appropriate risk management controls to reduce the incidence of chemical and pesticide contamination of foodstuffs. The FDA provides risk communication through consumer-oriented informational and educational campaigns. For example, it has developed a national Food Code to be applied to every food, drug and cosmetic product in the USA. The Food Code is intended to present consistent, clear and concise information to the consumer on a range of health related issues including the use of ingredients (i.e. additives, preservatives, process aids or reworks), potential contamination hazards, processing techniques, nutritional composition and safe preparation or consumption procedures. CDC The CDC, like the FDA, is an agency of the HHS. The CDC has approximately 6900 employees in 170 occupations. It is involved with the US food safety system through surveillance for food-related diseases or illness. It is not
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concerned with long-term nutrition issues, which are the responsibility of the FDA. At the earliest indication of illness, the CDC’s role is to identify the illness, determine its source and control any further outbreak. Thus it plays an important role in risk management of food-related illnesses. The CDC notifies the FDA as well as the USDA when a food product is the source of illness. The CDC’s approach to risk management is firmly rooted in scientific procedure. All public health decisions are based on scientific data, generated through open and objective risk assessment procedures. In doing this, it aims to prevent the development of ad hoc and non-science-based health regulations in the food safety system. USDA The USDA has had a long history of involvement with the US food safety system. Its original mandate came from the 1906 Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) when it was given responsibility for the inspection, monitoring and enforcement of food safety regulations on US meat. According to Horton (1997), promulgation of this Act was driven by export market access concerns and was designed to reassure European regulators and consumers that US animal quarantine and meat hygiene activities met the prevailing European standards. After the 1939 Reorganization Act, which saw the FDA move into the FSA, the USDA retained legislative authority over meat (as well as eggs and dairy products). At the time, it was felt the USDA had a proven record of maintaining foreign consumer confidence and market access and, in the face of increased demand for these products from the Allied countries, the USA did not want to jeopardize its market position by handing the regulation, inspection and monitoring of these products over to a new agency. The USDA’s role in meat inspection was reaffirmed in the 1967 Wholesome Meat Act. This Act required individual States to harmonize their inspection protocols with federal inspection standards if they wanted their meat businesses to be allowed to engage in either interstate or international trade. Within the USDA, responsibility for food safety and consumer protection is vested with the Under Secretary for Food Safety who administers the OPHS, the APHIS, the FSIS and the AMS. These agencies are discussed below. OPHS. The OPHS is focused on public health and safety where food safety refers to the short-term effects of consuming meat, egg and dairy products, not the long-term consequences of poor dietary choices. The OPHS, along with the FDA, conducts scientific risk assessments of microbial contamination in meats, eggs and dairy products. These scientific risk assessment procedures are viewed as crucial in facilitating the end-point performance testing performed by the USDA inspection personnel. The OPHS also assists with risk
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management by providing technical advice and recommendations to both the FSIS and to firms in the relevant sectors on how to reduce or prevent contamination. Finally, the OPHS provides risk communication through public information and education campaigns regarding the prevention of microbial contamination. APHIS. The mission of APHIS is to protect the food supply by protecting the inputs to the food supply. It contributes to public health and safety by ensuring the health and welfare of the livestock used in the food supply and the health of the plants composing the livestock feed. With respect to the beef industry, APHIS is concerned with live animal health and welfare through the Veterinary Services Division (VSD). VSD veterinary surgeons and animal health officers are responsible for risk assessment and risk management of breeding/genetics firms, feed industry firms, ranches and feedlots. The risk assessment activities include:
1. Ensuring veterinary biologics (medicines) are safe, pure, potent and effective, and that their impact on both animals and humans is understood; 2. Providing science-based research on SPS measures designed to protect domestic animals; 3. Ensuring the safety of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and other products of agricultural biotechnology which may affect livestock through the feed supply. Risk management activities include the inspection and monitoring of both domestic and foreign animals for disease and pests as well as providing industry assistance for the voluntary adoption of on-farm quality assurance schemes. VSD veterinary surgeons and animal health officers generally operate under state authorities for the inspection and quarantine of livestock as well as monitoring for new threats and responding to emergencies which may affect animal health, and consequently the food supply. FSIS.
The FSIS takes over responsibility for food safety from APHIS once the animal is ready for slaughter and where it enters a slaughterhouse/packing plant involved in interstate or international commerce. Its legislative authority comes from the 1906 FMIA, the 1967 Wholesome Meat Act and the 1996 MEGAREG legislation. Together, this legislative authority guides the FSIS in performing its mandate of ensuring safe, wholesome and correctly labelled and packaged meats, egg and dairy products. To achieve this mandate, the FSIS is involved in all three types of risk analysis: risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. However, its role in risk communication is not large and is limited to the conduct of seminars and information campaigns designed to build consumer confidence in the safety of the US meat supply and the effectiveness of the US food safety system. The major part of its work lies in risk assessment and risk management and it is to those activities we now turn.
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FSIS risk assessment activities are based on scientific evidence and include the development of quantitative risk assessment models to identify risks and their correlation with certain foods. These risk models aim to enhance the detection, isolation and eradication of microbial contaminants such as Salmonella and E. coli. Given these risk models and the risk information generated from them, the FSIS assists the FDA in developing acceptable food safety standards. The FSIS also evaluates the risk assessment procedures adopted in foreign food safety systems used to restrict the trade of US meats, eggs and dairy products. As noted in Chapter 2, the WTO requires member countries to implement only science-based SPS measures. As a result, the FSIS is involved in the development of scientific research procedures necessary to prove compliance with this rule and to promote the international harmonization of the principles, standards, regulations, codes and guidelines of food safety through involvement in the CAC. The US Codex Secretariat is established in the Office of the Administrator, FSIS. With respect to risk management activities, there are approximately 7500 FSIS inspectors in domestic slaughtering and processing plants. Risk management activities include: 1. Setting industry standards and monitoring for industry compliance with limits on food ingredients, additives and compounds, controls on plant facilities and equipment, label regulations and controls on sanitation and thermal processing; 2. Encouraging and monitoring the industry’s implementation of the relevant food safety policies; 3. Ante- and post-mortem inspection, monitoring and scientific sampling of production in domestic plants; 4. Inspection, monitoring and scientific sampling of foreign/imported food products at the retail level; 5. Inspecting the label and packaging techniques of both domestic and foreign products at the retail stage; 6. Providing industry information, technical advice and education; and 7. Enforcement, such as pursuing prosecution, for violation or noncompliance. The FSIS also has some involvement in risk management activities to improve food safety downstream from the slaughtering and processing plants. Here, it has a mandate to develop voluntary guidelines of ‘best practice’ for personnel training, hygiene, and proper handling of food products and their inputs. The nature of FSIS inspection at the slaughterhouse or processing plant is still essentially visual-based. Under the 1906 FMIA, the FSIS is responsible for:
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1. Inspection of all meat sold in interstate and foreign commerce, including imported products; 2. Visually examining over 125 million (1996) livestock carcasses per year; 3. Examining/inspecting the slaughtering, processing, handling and packaging of meat products; 4. Testing for the presence of pathogenic microorganisms, violative drug and chemical residues; 5. Grading of the carcasses and beef cuts; 6. Evaluating the effectiveness of its own programmes through systematic and special reviews; and 7. Enforcing industry contravention and non-compliance with food safety policies pertaining to the meats, eggs and dairy industries. FSIS inspectors perform both ante- and post-mortem inspections for abnormality or any evidence of disease that may indicate that the animal is in poor health. With respect to ante-mortem inspections, those animals determined to be unsuitable for the food supply are segregated and then more thoroughly inspected by a government veterinary surgeon in order to determine the reason for the animal’s apparent poor health. The veterinary surgeon must decide whether the animal can be allowed into the food supply straight away, removed and medicated for introduction at a later date or whether the animal will be completely excluded from the food supply. Postmortem inspections involve visual inspection of the carcasses after the primary slaughter cuts (post-evisceration) have been made but before the removal of specialized meat cuts. Any carcasses appearing unhealthy or abnormal are removed from the food supply and at the inspector’s discretion may be tested for contamination. Apart from its role in the risk management of domestically produced beef, the FSIS is involved in two risk management activities associated with foreignproduced beef to ensure that imported products meet the US safety standards. The first is the Oversight Initiative involving on-site inspections of the production processes in foreign plants. The purpose of this initiative is to develop risk assessments of imported products before their arrival in US markets. The foreign inspection controls are reviewed and assessed according to their congruency with those of the USA. Unlike the inspection of domestic processing plants, foreign plant inspections are periodic rather than continuous. The second initiative is the re-inspection of the foreign food products when they enter the US market. Currently this inspection is a combination of both organoleptic and scientific sampling procedures administered either at the point of entry into the USA or at the retail stage. The inspection and monitoring activities of the FSIS in the meat and poultry sectors were restructured as part of the July 1996 USDA Pathogen Reduction Rule, also known as the MEGAREG. The MEGAREG led to more industry responsibility for the management of food safety risks through the mandatory adoption of a HACCP-based risk management system. Yet, at the
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same time, it also increased government review, monitoring and inspection of industry efforts to ensure food safety. The MEGAREG represents a highly significant development in the US food safety system and because of this country’s importance in the world of beef, it has had a significant influence on the other countries under study, particularly Canada and Australia. The MEGAREG imposed three mandatory risk management activities on domestic meat and poultry establishments. They are: 1. To implement Standard Operating Procedures for Sanitation (SOPs). This was to be completed by 1 January 1997. The SOPs involve risk management activities including sanitation procedures before, during and after processing, pest and contamination control procedures as well as procedures for daily record keeping, for corrective actions if necessary and for the identification of responsible personnel at all control points. The SOPs developed and implemented by the firm are subject to review and verification by FSIS inspectors and once implemented are subject to FSIS monitoring for compliance. The SOPs form the basis for the firm’s mandatory HACCP system. An interesting development is that despite the USDA’s efforts to harmonize the international standards around Codex, the SOPs mandated under the MEGAREG are not required to be consistent with the Codex SOPs; the internationally standardized prerequisites for a HACCP system. 2. To develop and implement a HACCP system, where the SOPs serve as prerequisites. Large meat processing firms (500 or more employees) were required to have a fully implemented HACCP system by 26 January 1998; while for medium firms (10–500 employees) the deadline was 25 January 1999; and for small firms (fewer than 10 employees) it was 25 January 2000. Each firm’s HACCP plan is subject to review and verification by FSIS through in-plant inspection and monitoring. For those firms that develop acceptable SOPs and HACCP system, the FSIS awards a ‘Grant of Inspection’. Essentially, this grant acknowledges that the plant has achieved a particular level of facility sanitation and pest control, operational standards and appropriate management of the hazards and critical control points. Meat products from those plants achieving Grant of Inspection are eligible for the USDA’s Mark of Inspection necessary for interstate and international trade. Together, the mandatory SOPs and HACCP system are intended to make the firm more responsible and accountable for the risk management of its output. Actual inspection activities are performed by the firms while government FSIS inspectors ‘check the checkers’. The role of the FSIS inspectors is to monitor and verify the efficacy of the inspections performed by the firms to ensure compliance. 3. To test for the presence of generic E. coli and Salmonella. The MEGAREG required firms to begin testing for generic E. coli by January 1997 while the FSIS began monitoring and verifying these tests in July 1997. Samples were to be collected from the flank, brisket and rump of at least one in every 300 beef carcasses. Firms failing to administer the test faced withdrawal of FSIS
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inspection services (i.e. loss of the Grant of Inspection) while firms failing to meet performance criteria on the tests faced intensified FSIS inspection, testing, review and verification. Repeated failure to meet the performance criteria would lead to a loss of the Grant of Inspection. Testing for the presence of Salmonella was required to be done by FSIS rather than the firm and testing was to begin on the date of the firm’s HACCP implementation. A first time failure of the sample lot to meet the performance criteria requires immediate corrective action by the firm. A failure of a second sample lot requires a reassessment of the firm’s HACCP plan and corrective action. Finally, a failure of a third sample lot incurs a withdrawal of the Grant of Inspection. The MEGAREG also imposed conditions on foreign meat and poultry slaughtering establishments exporting to the US market. They were required to: 1. Develop and implement a HACCP system equivalent to the US-endorsed HACCP system; and 2. Establish equivalent performance standards for microbial contaminants. AMS.
The AMS performs a food quality or producer promotion role in the grading of US beef. AMS grading is performed according to the 1995 Beef Grading Standards. This service is based on user fees, which are set to a costrecovery level. The grade used to identify particular cuts of meat is determined during post-mortem organoleptic inspections of the whole carcass or after one or two primary cuts. The purpose of the grading is to differentiate the quality of the meat yield. While this is primarily a quality role (by the time a carcass is ready to be graded, it should have already achieved a minimum level of safety) meat grading can have an indirect effect upon meat safety because the AMS grading personnel are also empowered to remove suspect carcasses from the food supply for the FSIS inspector to take a closer look. The USDA’S Evaluation and Enforcement Division (EED) is responsible for enforcing all cases of industry non-compliance with the 1906 FMIA, the 1967 Wholesome Meat Act, the 1996 MEGAREG, the broader food policies established by the FDA under the 1938 FFDCA and with other Acts pertaining to food safety such as the 1996 Food Quality Protection Act. The EED may use administrative, civil or criminal sanctions against non-compliant firms. Administrative sanctions include the withdrawal of inspection services; civil sanctions include monetary penalties; and criminal sanctions include prosecution for negligent or unsafe actions. The EED is responsible for investigating any cases of non-compliance and the EED’s ruling is then referred to the USDAs Office of General Counsel which undertakes any necessary litigation. Under the original 1906 FMIA USDA enforcement action was warranted in violations such as unsanitary plant conditions, the inhumane treatment or slaughtering of livestock, failure to destroy any USDA condemned products, or the interference with inspection personnel. The 1996 MEGAREG built on this foundation and added violations such as failure to develop and implement
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SOPs, failure to collect and analyse samples for E. coli and Salmonella, and meet Salmonella performance standard requirements, failure to collect and record testing results as well as failure to develop and implement a preventive HACCP risk management system. USDA enforcement has traditionally focused on catching firms that commit offences. With the MEGAREG the enforcement focus has been broadened somewhat. Non-compliance no longer just includes instances where firms are caught producing contaminated food. Now firms may be in non-compliance for improperly developing preventive control measures even if there is no evidence that this has resulted in contamination. In the event of any non-compliance at the slaughterhouse or packing plant, the plant’s Inspector-In-Charge (IIC) files a Non-Compliance Report (NR) notifying non-compliance. The IIC can also retain any products as is deemed necessary. The firm in question must immediately take corrective action considered appropriate by the IIC. The NR is filed with the plant’s HACCP documentation and is reviewed weekly by the IIC and the plant management. If the firm fails to take immediate and appropriate action to correct its procedures, the IIC must notify the plant (and the FSIS Compliance Officer) and withhold the FSIS’s Mark of Inspection. Withholding the Mark of Inspection temporarily affects the marketing of products since the Mark is required for commerce. The Mark may be withheld from specific products or, depending upon the violation, all products produced by the firm. The Compliance Officer then investigates the case and may recommend either to expand the withholding writ to include all products or, based upon a satisfactory Corrective Action Proposal by the plant, release the Mark of Inspection. The former case may hold if there are serious food safety violations, repeated NRs or failure of the plant to produce a satisfactory Corrective Action Proposal. The FSIS may file a Complaint to withdraw the Grant of Inspection which suspends inspection activities at the plant and hence, suspends all production since processing cannot continue without inspector supervision. The Administrator of the FSIS must sign-off on such action, which ensures that the food safety situation will be brought to the attention of the highest level of the FSIS. In the case of serious violations of food safety, the FSIS may refer the case to the appropriate US Attorney’s Office to pursue criminal prosecution which can involve both monetary penalties and perhaps imprisonment. If the latter case holds, the Compliance Officer issues a Consent Decision so the plant may resume operations. Once this happens, a third-party independent auditor periodically monitors for proper implementation of the firm’s Corrective Action Proposal and reports to the IIC and the Compliance Officer for a period of 60 days. The Consent Decision is considered valid for a period of 10 years so that if another violation occurs within this period the FSIS can withdraw inspection without an NR or an investigation by a Compliance Officer.
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The USDA is pursuing a number of new initiatives to expand or enhance its role in the food safety area. Prominent among these are the following. 1. It is seeking authority from Congress to recall product from the retail market. Currently the USDA’s authority to act in the face of a food contamination outbreak is limited to withdrawal of inspection and monitoring services in meat plants. But this does little to stop contaminated food, which has already found its way into the retail sector. It can and does use persuasion at the retail level, but is seeking enforcement powers at this level which will provide for civil penalties. 2. It is seeking to expand the adoption of HACCP to every stage of the food supply-chain. This is in line with the ‘Farm-to-Table’ strategy of the MEGAREG, which promotes the adoption of risk management plans based on HACCP among all food industry participants. USDA involvement in this initiative includes the training of both government staff and industry personnel on the correct development, implementation and monitoring of a HACCP-type risk management system. 3. An important issue for the FSIS is that of user-fees for government services such as in-plant inspections. Currently, the FSIS can only charge user-fees for inspectors who perform overtime duties, and these fees make up about 15% of the FSIS budget. However, pressures to move to a complete user-pay system of government inspections have emerged from both domestic and foreign sources. The public good rationale for not charging the industry for inspection services is being seriously questioned. For example, why should vegetarians be required to pay for such services through their tax dollars? Domestically, other areas of government, in the face of the government budget reductions in the early to mid-1990s, have moved to a user-pay system. And, other countries, such as Canada, have adopted a user-pay, cost-recovery programme for government inspection services. 4. The FSIS recognizes that small plants face constraints of economic scale in developing the mandatory HACCP plans. To assist these plants the FSIS has established the ‘Small Plant Demonstration Project’ which includes 13 generic HACCP risk management plans to serve as guides to developing low-cost plans that address the concerns of the small operators while simultaneously meeting the mandatory MEGAREG requirements. 5. The USDA is seeking to become more involved in consumer-oriented risk communication. Improper risk communication is seen to lead to two undesirable situations. First, the consumer’s perception of risk may exceed the actual risk of a particular food product, which can distort the market for US beef products. Second, the consumer’s perception of risk may be less than actual risk so that the consumer does not take appropriate care while preparing the food product. With regard to the latter, the USDA favours increased consumer education on the dangers and risks associated with food storage and preparation and on how these dangers and risks can be reduced.
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EPA This federal agency is generally concerned with the broader issues of environmental protection, but it does also play a role in ensuring food safety. The EPA is an independent agency of the federal government whose authority is derived from the EPA. It is responsible for protecting both the environment from significant biodiversity risks (usually those caused by human intervention) and protecting the US public from significant ‘environmental’ health risks (which, indeed, may have been caused by human intervention in the first instance, such as toxic waste pollution). Its role intersects with the US food safety system in two basic ways. First, it aims to ensure that the inputs, processes and by-products of food production do not contaminate the environment. For instance, with respect to intensive livestock operations, any wastes such as waters or solids are monitored to ensure they do not contaminate groundwater used for other growing processes or for animal and human consumption. Second, the EPA aims to ensure that environmental contaminants do not contaminate the food supply. Thus, the EPA conducts risk assessment research to establish tolerances and maximum residue limits for pesticides, veterinary biologics, GMOs and other inputs used in food production. The EPA assesses the risk to both public health and the environment from the use of these inputs. Once the EPA has established the acceptable tolerances and limits for these inputs, it is the responsibility of the FDA and the USDA to enforce the established limits with respect to the particular food products under their jurisdiction. Joint institute for food safety (JIFSAN) JIFSAN is a federal governmental initiative established in 1997 at the University of Maryland to advance the science of microbial risk assessments in the food supply. JIFSAN’s Risk Assessment Consortium provides a forum for coordinated scientific research and the sharing of risk assessment and risk management information and expertise with federal and state government agencies. The federal agencies involved in this initiative include the FDA, USDA and the EPA. State and municipal governmental arrangements As mentioned earlier, the USDA’s FSIS is responsible for inspection and monitoring of firms producing meat, eggs or dairy products for interstate or international commerce. Firms producing only for intrastate commerce are under the jurisdiction of state inspection authorities. Under the MEGAREG legislation, state and municipal authorities are responsible for ensuring that all meat plants producing only for intrastate commerce meet the MEGAREG risk management requirements for the adoption of SOPs, HACCP and microbial testing. To carry out this mandate, the state authorities may receive risk management
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assistance from the FSIS such as training of state inspectors on the federal standards (MEGAREG), sharing of equipment and technology and sharing of information and inspection results. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) OMB is the federal governmental agency responsible for assessing and analysing proposed new federal government regulations and legislation. One of the areas included in the OMB’s mandate is the assessment of food safety regulations. Through this mandate, the OMB can help shape the regulatory development process for food. The OMB assesses proposed regulatory action to ensure that it will generate desired outcomes and is not the product of political objectives. A guiding principle is to ask whether the proposed regulatory action is proportional to the risk. According to the OMB, any proposed regulatory action must be based on a credible cost–benefit analysis that is independently verifiable, and it must clearly and concisely identify regulatory options. The broad assessment framework utilized by OMB when analysing regulatory action involves four steps. The first is to identify ‘market failure’ to justify regulatory intervention. The second step is to analyse the impact of market failure to determine if it exists and whether it is significant enough to warrant intervention (e.g. competition, equity, employment, diversification impacts). The third step is to analyse existing laws and regulations to determine if the market failure may be addressed without new legislation. Finally, the fourth step is to analyse all regulatory alternatives presented in an attempt to identify an optimal regulatory intervention policy. With regard to the MEGAREG legislation, there is some question of whether it was effectively scrutinized by the OMB before it became law. According to Belzer (1998), the OMB claims the FSIS improperly identified market failures and did not adequately address why market failure, if present, would be a concern. Also, the FSIS did not analyse the existing laws or regulations such as the two Executive Orders for Generic HACCP Models (1982 and 1991) that are supposed to be used as the basis for any mandatory HACCP legislation. Further, the FSIS analysis failed to provide any regulatory alternatives to the MEGAREG Final Rule. As a result of these deficiencies, the OMB was unable to validate the FSIS analysis used to support the MEGAREG and was unable to determine if the regulatory action was indeed proportional to the food safety risk. Unlike the policy development strategies of the FDA and the USDA, the OMB believes that engaging the stakeholders at every stage may actually adversely affect the policy development since stakeholders will influence the policy development to include their desired outcomes. Instead, the OMB suggests that food policies and regulations should be developed according to the principles of establishing regulatory action proportional to the risk, basing it on credible cost–benefit analysis, which is independently verifiable, and providing clear and concise regulatory alternatives. Developing food regulation
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according to these principles will probably result in regulatory action capable of achieving socially desirable outcomes while avoiding excessive political influence. Non-governmental arrangements NCBA The NCBA claims to be a producer-led, consumer-focused industry association whose objective is to create ‘a dynamic and profitable beef industry, which concentrates resources around a unified plan, consistently meets consumer needs and increases market share’. The NCBA, created from the merger of the National Cattlemen’s Association and the National Livestock and Meat Board, is the marketing organization and trade association for over one million US cattle farmers and ranchers. Its focus on food safety is a function of the fact that after several domestic food-safety crises, US consumers have demanded an assurance that domestic meat products are safe. Hence, the marketing activities of the NCBA recognize the importance of consumer safety concerns both at home and in foreign markets. Activities of the NCBA include policy making and lobbying, support for science-based risk assessment research and development as well as the administration of both industry and consumer risk management and risk communication education programmes. Members must adopt the two principles of humane treatment of livestock and the responsible handling of meat products laid out by the NCBA’s Statement of Principles. One particular risk management and risk communication initiative of the NCBA is a coalition with the USDA, HHS and the US Education Department. The purpose of this coalition, known as the ‘Partnership for Food Safety’, is to develop consistent and memorable food safety messages and a comprehensive education campaign to teach both industry and consumers about the dangers of food-borne illnesses and the importance of good risk management production and preparation practices. One initiative, led by the coalition’s Coordinating Committee on Animal Production Food Safety aims to encourage the adoption of HACCP by ranches and feedlots where it is currently not mandatory. Another initiative under this banner is led by the NCBA’s National Food Safety Education Alliance. This Alliance promotes adoption of the FDA’s Food Code definitions by industry as a method for achieving consistency in the provision of consumer information. The NCBA has established a Regulatory Affairs Committee comprised of a Beef Safety Sub-Committee and a Beef Quality Assurance Program (BQAP) steering committee. The purpose of the Beef Safety Sub-Committee is to develop national policies for food safety and nutrition based on scientific risk assessment procedures, which are then presented to legislative authorities. For instance, a current policy of the NCBA is to support beef irradiation (also called cold pasteurization) for enhancing the safety of US beef products by
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reducing the incidence of microbial contamination. The BQAP steering committee seeks to promote the voluntary adoption by industry of quality assurance schemes consistent with the principles of HACCP and to facilitate the adoption of new technologies reducing the risk of microbial contamination. BQAP seeks to exceed the direct public regulations of the FDA and the USDA. USMEF USMEF is an industry trade association concerned with the export market access of US meat products, especially market barriers created by foreign food safety concerns. The USMEF represents livestock producers, meat packers, processors, purveyors, export companies and secondary supply-chain companies such as grain promotion groups, farmer organizations and agribusiness companies. It promotes US beef as both safe and high quality through risk communication activities such as foreign market promotions, trade seminars and foreign consumer education programmes. National Meat Association (NMA) The NMA is an industry association with a mandate to advocate the interests of the meat industry in the development of federal legislation and regulations impacting the meat industry. With the recent restructuring of the governmental regulatory framework in the US food safety system, the NMA also provides member firms with assistance in understanding and complying with the new standards and regulations. The NMA plays a useful role as liaison between industry participants and USDA inspection personnel. Despite recent efforts by government inspectors to communicate their issues better with meat plants, some conflicts still arise. The NMA intervenes to help resolve such conflicts by facilitating changes in plant operations and procedures to bring them into line with inspection standards and regulations. Other services and activities of the NMA include: providing information and assessment of the potential effects that government policy or regulatory developments might have on the industry as well as distributing weekly newsletters and publications discussing relevant and recent issues in the industry, providing technical resources and support for scientific risk assessment research, hosting seminars and workshops, and administering scholarship and internship programmes for educational research activities. AMI The AMI is an industry association dedicated to research, education and information on current issues relevant to the US meat industry. It provides regulatory and legislative advice, offers public relations services, conducts
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scientific and economic research, offers marketing and technical assistance, and sponsors education programmes. You may recall we talked earlier of the USDA’s desire to obtain legislative authority to recall food products from the retail sector. One recent initiative of AMI has been to oppose such a move. Its slogan is: ‘food safety starts in the lab, not the legislature’. Through an industry consortium (which also included the Grocery Manufacturers of America, National Broiler Council, National Food Processors Association and the National Turkey Federation), the AMI argued that research, education and continuous improvement in industry practices would do a better job of ensuring food safety than widespread recall authority of the USDA. AMI further argued that more punitive product liability measures would not make food any safer and that the federal government’s effort should focus on enhancing proactive measures not reactive measures. Rather than granting the USDA widespread recall authority, the consortium offered the following suggestions to reduce risk: ● ● ● ● ●
a comprehensive, coordinated and prioritized approach to food safety research (to assist risk assessment); sound animal health commitments on the farm (risk management); careful management of initial slaughter practices verified by scientific monitoring (risk management); commitment to the approval and subsequent adoption of the latest food safety innovations such as irradiation (risk management); and educational activities for consumers focused on food preparation techniques (risk communication).
Another food safety issue being considered by the AMI is foreign equivalency agreements or MRAs. These agreements are part of the FSIS ‘Farm-toTable’ initiative whereby FSIS officials are required to inspect the standards and regulations of foreign countries trading beef with the USA to ensure they are equivalent to US standards and regulations. The AMI supports the ability of the federal government to aggressively pursue MRAs through whatever means necessary (either bilaterally or multilaterally) to guarantee rapid market access for US products. The AMI argues this has a positive effect on the overall level of food safety because as market barriers are eliminated and as free trade is enhanced, all players will have to rise to the highest level of food safety. There will be a regulatory race to the top not a regulatory race to the bottom. International Meat and Poultry HACCP Alliance The Alliance was formed in March 1994 to promote and support the adoption of a uniform, consistent quality assurance programme to ensure a safer meat supply. The HAACP regime was chosen as the quality assurance programme best suited to meet the objective of the Alliance. The Alliance was formed under the auspices of the Center for Food Safety at Texas A&M University and
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provides a forum for interdisciplinary, intercollegiate study involving research, graduate education, extension and outreach. Working with industry, academics and government, the Alliance is developing a systematic and internationally standardized method for firms to implement a HACCP system. The target of the alliance is the entire supply chain; from ‘Farm-to-Table’. Some of the food safety issues being studied by the Center include the effects of microorganisms, nutrients, natural chemicals, industrial pollutants, residues and derivatives of biotechnology.
Implications of these Developments The dominance of the domestic food-safety crises appears to have set the restructuring of the US beef safety system on the following trajectory: To react to decreased consumer confidence through an explicit focus on consumer protection and an increased emphasis on direct governmental involvement in the food safety system.
Let us explain. The major driver for change in US institutional arrangements for food safety has been a number of highly publicized domestic foodcontamination crises. As a result, the major restructuring of domestic arrangements has been designed to regain lost confidence in the US food safety system. These crises appear to have been interpreted by the public as a failure of industry rather than a failure of government. As a result, governmental arrangements have been careful to be seen as ‘governing’ the industry in a diligent manner in order to ensure consumer protection. This has resulted in a governmental role that dominates, rather than partners with industry. Yet, it is important to note that while the USDA is championing food safety and consumer protection, it is also promoting producers, as there is no institutional separation between these two roles. The primary focus of US restructuring has been on the slaughter stage of the meat production process rather than on the pre-slaughter or the postslaughter stages. Thus, there is differential regulatory supervision along the entire food chain; the bulk of intervention coming at the slaughter stage. But interestingly, while there has been a shift towards more industry responsibility and accountability at the slaughter stage, the creation of the Under Secretary for Food Safety and the introduction of the MEGAREG legislation, has resulted in more direct government involvement, not less. Another important focus of the restructuring of the US food safety system is upon meat products intended for trade, either interstate or international. The highest safety standards are faced by those firms wishing to trade their products, not those firms who produce for the local (intrastate) market. Increasing government involvement in meat safety has been associated with an increased emphasis on a scientific risk analysis framework as a basis for food policies. This development is strongly supported by the US beef industry.
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Indeed, the beef industry has been very proactive in encouraging higher quality through the adoption of science-based quality assurance programmes and, hence, indirectly enhancing safety. Two important challenges lie ahead for those involved in restructuring the US meat safety system. First, the unions of government inspectors have resisted any change in the traditional role of government on the slaughter floor, especially the shift from government to industry inspections under the HACCP system, because such a move is seen as a direct threat to jobs. Second, while the political momentum generated by the domestic food contamination crises provided the impetus for significant restructuring, this momentum has decreased and it appears the impetus for restructuring has slowed and become simply a bureaucratic project rather than a national initiative to overhaul the entire system. Finally, there is the question of whether the US system is moving towards (converging) or away from (diverging) an international integration of food safety standards. It is too early to say decisively what direction the USA will take. However, one can say that the restructuring of the US system is certainly not bounded by international trends in the way the other countries under study are. The USA is by far the largest producer and consumer of beef in the world – and while international trade in beef is not insignificant, it pales in comparison to the domestic market. In 2000, beef imports amounted to 10% of consumption and beef exports amounted to 9% of production. This is not so with the other countries under study. In 2000, beef exports from Canada amounted to 45% of production, beef imports to the UK amounted to 29% of consumption and beef exports from Australia amounted to a whopping 62% of production! Restructuring of the institutional arrangements for food safety in the USA has been primarily focused on domestic issues and the subsequent changes have been made in order to deal with these domestic issues.
Chapter 4
Canada
Introduction Our second stop on the tour is Canada. Canada’s beef industry is about onetenth the size of that in the USA. Beef production in 2000 was pegged at about 1.1 million tonnes and nearly half of that was destined for export. Historically, Canada has had a close trading relationship with the USA, some would say, too close. Traditionally, Canada exports to the USA from the west (Alberta and Saskatchewan) and imports from the USA to the east (Ontario and Quebec). Trade between the two countries is in both beef and live cattle. The USA accounts for about 80% of Canadian beef exports and supplies about half of Canadian beef imports. Canada’s live cattle trade is virtually all with the USA. Canada exports over one million head of cattle to the USA with fed cattle for immediate slaughter representing about 80% of the total. It is clear that the Canadian beef industry is highly dependent on the USA as an export destination and moreover, is more dependent on the USA than the USA is dependent on it. This unique trading relationship colours the nature of the beef food safety system being developed in Canada. The layout of this chapter follows that of the previous one. There are three sections: the drivers for change; developments in the institutional arrangements in the Canadian food safety system; and the implications of these developments.
Drivers for Change The Canadian food safety system has undergone significant restructuring since 1996, motivated by both external and internal drivers. However, the main drivers are external. It should come as no surprise the main driver for change in Canada is the restructuring going on in the food safety system south of its border. With the Canadian beef industry so dependent on the US 55
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market, Canada is very sensitive to developments taking place in the US beef food safety system. This is not to say that there are no internal drivers for change. On the contrary, the government-wide focus on deregulation launched in the early 1990s also played a significant role. The external drivers will be discussed first, followed by the internal drivers.
External drivers for change The main external drivers for change in the Canadian food-safety system are the food safety crises and issues arising in other countries. Thanks to widespread media coverage, such crises and issues, especially those in the USA and in Europe, do not go unnoticed by the Canadian public. Indeed, this contagion effect could lead to a broadening of domestic consumer concerns to include, say, British concerns about animal welfare issues (discussed in Chapter 5). With a significant reliance upon export markets, the Canadian beef industry and the food safety system are well aware of the structural changes occurring in important export markets. These include both the legislated and market regulations adopted as part of the foreign food supply chain. For instance, recent domestic crises in the USA have motivated structural change in the US food safety system, which, in turn, has altered the market access rules for Canadian beef products. In order to ensure market access and industry competitiveness, the Canadian food safety system has had to restructure in a manner at least equivalent to the restructured US system. Further, while Canada is not the only country exporting beef products to the USA, its high level of dependence on this market means it will be highly sensitive to any restructuring of the US food safety system. Indeed, as will be shown later in this chapter, the restructuring of the Canadian food safety system is very much predicated on the restructuring going on in the USA.
Internal drivers for change An important internal driver for structural change in the Canadian food safety system was the federal government’s focus on deregulation in the early 1990s. This had two objectives; to reduce government costs and increase industry competitiveness. The first and perhaps more important objective was budget restraint among all levels of government. The desire of the government to reduce costs was captured in a Canadian Treasury Board requirement that government services be scrutinized according to whether they were legitimately essential ‘public goods’ or, instead, they were really ‘private goods’. Taxpayers would still pay for public goods, but private goods were required to be delivered on a cost-recovery basis. This produced a reallocation of resources, cuts in government services and/or shifts to a cost-recovery basis for some government services and activities. Of particular interest to us
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was the establishment of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in April 1997. We will discuss this important federal agency in detail later, but for now let us note that one of its stated objectives was to streamline the delivery of federal inspection services to make them efficient and cost effective. This had previously been a problem area for the government. Budget restraint impacts the overall restructuring of the food safety system by limiting or reducing the resources available for government agencies to perform food safety activities and services. The second objective of deregulation was to increase industry competitiveness. The aim here was to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of regulations, which for food safety regulations tended to encourage a shift towards the risk analysis-based regulatory framework. The most significant non-driver for change is sensationalized domestic food contamination crises. There have not been any. This is not to say there have not been any reported instances of food contamination, there have. But they have not been sensationalized by the local media in the way they might have been in other countries. It is not clear why. Perhaps the Canadian media believe their public is less hungry for such stories. This raises a potential problem for Canada – and that is complacency. Media sensationalization has been such a powerful driver for change in some other countries (e.g. the USA) that to not experience it could lead to vulnerability if and when Canada was to ever experience a major food contamination crisis. Complacency could also adversely affect Canada’s international competitiveness if its food safety system is not judged to be as advanced as its competitors’ food safety systems, which have been restructured in response to such domestic crises.
Relationship between external and internal drivers The absence of a domestic food safety crisis in Canada means that domestic consumer concerns cannot drive (or shape) any restructuring of the domestic food safety system. Instead, the most influential drivers in Canada include an external one (the restructuring going on in the US food safety system) followed by an internal one (pressures to reduce government expenditures). It is these drivers that will provide most of any impetus for change in the domestic food safety system. Not only will they dictate the pace of change but also the shape of any change. Whereas the prime motivation for change in the USA was the restoration of consumer confidence, in Canada it is international competitiveness. In the next section, we will discuss the sort of institutional arrangements that characterize Canada’s food safety system. The most significant of the institutional arrangements to follow directly from these drivers for change are the development of a national, harmonized Canadian Food Inspection System (CFIS) and the establishment of the CFIA. Proposals to establish a single
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autonomous food agency stretch back as far as 1970. However, it was not until 1996 that the idea was acted upon along with the CFIS. The timing was no accident, and coincided with the major restructuring going on in the USA food safety system. In the USA, the 1993 E. coli outbreak at a fast-food franchise in the Pacific-Northwest led directly to enactment of the US MEGAREG legislation in 1996. The Canadian government could not ignore these changes to the US food safety system and the challenge that this posed for Canadian exports. But the federal government was not only concerned that the Canadian beef industry be responsive to restructuring taking place in the US food safety system, but also that the whole process of meat inspection in Canada be streamlined with the financial burden of meat inspection being shifted from government to industry. The CFIS and the CFIA were institutional arrangements sympathetic to both these needs. They are discussed further in the next section.
Institutional Arrangements The Canadian food safety system is composed of both governmental and nongovernmental institutional arrangements. These are discussed in the next two subsections. The arrangements will be identified according to the type of risk analysis activities they perform; risk assessment, risk management or risk communication.
Governmental arrangements What is interesting about the Canadian food safety system is that the application of standards and regulations on meat and meat products depends upon the destination of the product. Meat and meat products intended for interprovincial or international markets are subject to federal standards and must be processed in establishments that are federally licensed and registered. Federal standards for export to the US market require that plant facilities meet the USDA regulations, detailed in the MEGAREG, including: ante- and postmortem inspection of slaughter animals managed by veterinary surgeons; monitoring for microbial contaminants, veterinary residues, toxins and chemical contaminants; inspection and monitoring of processing techniques and storage and transportation facilities; and perhaps most importantly, the adoption of a HACCP food safety system. Meat products intended only for intraprovincial markets are subject to standards and regulations that are specific to the particular province or region where the products are marketed. Common to all of the firms producing only for intraprovincial trade, is that they are not required to be federally registered. However, across Canada, these establishments may be inspected, monitored or audited by:
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the federal government through a federal–provincial agreement; the provincial government through Agriculture and AgriFood Canada (AAFC) or Health Canada (HC); or the municipal government through public health offices.
With respect to the federal government, inspection services may be provided by the CFIA as a result of ministerial agreements, on a cost-recovery basis. Provinces with such agreements include Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia. Therefore, firms in these provinces can voluntarily have federal inspection services. Not all firms choose to meet the federal standards voluntarily and instead are subject to provincial standards. Provincial inspection services are generally focused on slaughtering plants and processing facilities and may involve standards or regulations on the construction, processing techniques and methods as well as the type, frequency and cost of inspection. The provincial Departments of Agriculture or Health may have jurisdiction over provincial inspection services. There are differences in the provincial regulation and inspection of plants because the standards and regulations are not required to be nationally consistent and provincial inspection services are not mandatory in all jurisdictions. For instance, licensing of slaughtering plants is mandatory in all Canadian provinces, while licensing of processing plants is mandatory in all provinces except Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Inspection of slaughtering plants is mandatory in all provinces except Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Inspection of processing plants is also mandatory in all provinces except Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Finally, provincial inspection of meat products at the retail level is mandatory for all provinces except Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. There are no mandatory provincial inspection service standards and regulations for Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. Therefore, firms in Saskatchewan or British Columbia that opt out of federal inspection (which is voluntary for firms engaged only in intraprovincial trade) do not face any mandatory provincial standards and regulations. In both Saskatchewan and British Columbia some municipalities have by-laws requiring mandatory inspection services, either federal or provincial, in order to access some urban markets. In Saskatchewan, these centres include Saskatoon, Regina, Prince Albert and Moose Jaw. All firms which do not fall under any mandatory inspection services are subject to only one regulation; a sanitation inspection by a local health official. In Saskatchewan, the frequency of inspection by a local health official is once every 2 years. The result is that consumers in Saskatchewan, outside of Saskatoon, Regina, Prince Albert and Moose Jaw, may buy meat that is federally inspected, provincially inspected or not inspected at all. Therefore, as a result of the multi-jurisdictional nature of provincial, territorial and municipal governmental arrangements, the Canadian food
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safety system can be very inconsistent across the country. In fact, the only thing that is certain is that only exports from Canada have to meet the highest available standard (federal standard). The domestic meat supply does not have to meet the federal standard and may not be subject to the same level of food safety assurance as export products. Instead, domestic consumers choose from meat products produced under sometimes quite different meat safety systems, and these systems vary from province to province. Further, if the ‘National Treatment Provision’ is internationally interpreted to literally mean ‘the only standards that can be applied to imports within a province or territory would be those that govern trade within that particular province or territory’ then, with respect to Saskatchewan, consumers may purchase foreign meat products whose only mandatory standard was a sanitary inspection up to 2 years earlier. Over the last 30 years, there have been four separate government studies proposing that government involvement in food safety be through a single food safety agency. These include the Chapman–Osbaldeston Report (1970), the Cabinet Evaluation Study of Food Inspection (1975), the Single Food Inspection Agency Task Force (1979) and the Task Force on Program Review a.k.a. the Nielson Task Force (1985). The proposals were not adopted because it would have required too much regulatory reform and departmental re-alignment and coordination in order to work, and until there were strong external and internal drivers there was not the political motivation within Canada to make the necessary changes. After the Nielson Task Force Report in 1985 the Interdepartmental Committee on Food Regulation (ICFR) was established to: 1. Identify the roles of each department in the food safety system; 2. Examine the efficiency of the system; 3. Promote the coordination of food safety efforts; and 4. Promote the adoption of food safety enhancing innovations, including self-regulation, where appropriate. Thus, it is clear the inconsistency of food safety regulations across different jurisdictions was a major concern. The ICFR established a number of sub-committees to help carry out its mandate. According to a later review by the Office of the Auditor-General of Canada (1994) only one of these sub-committees was active. That was the Sub-Committee on Food Inspection, which attempted to coordinate inspection services across the federal departments and between the provinces and the municipalities. In 1987, concurrent with the work of the ICFR, HC established the Federal–Provincial–Territorial Committee on Food Safety. This was a coordinating committee with the objective of streamlining food safety initiatives and programmes among the federal health department and the provincial and territorial health departments. In 1990, AAFC also established a national coordinating committee, the Federal–Provincial–Territorial Committee on
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Food Safety independent of HC’s Committee with the same name. The mandate was to promote uniform food standards and streamline the food safety initiatives among departments of agriculture. It has been suggested by an HC official that AAFC formed its own national coordination committee to prevent ‘empire-building’ by HC in the area of food safety. In 1992, under its broader national coordinating initiative, AAFC established the Federal/Provincial Meat Inspection Committee (FPMIC) to examine the government role in meat inspection in the Canadian food safety system with respect to the promotion of interprovincial meat trade. The focus of this committee was on the inspection of meat slaughtering and processing across the various provincial, territorial and municipal regions in Canada. The FPMIC developed the National Domestic Standard (NDS) for meat plant facilities, processing techniques and inspection methods. Yet, the NDS was not adopted due to a lack of provincial consensus on issues such as plant facilities and inspection frequency and uncertainty about the economic costs of adoption. One of the main issues for the provinces was how the NDS would play out with the many small volume operators that dotted the landscape. Their argument was that the proposed stringent nationally harmonized standards would pose significant economic costs for these operators without providing equally significant economic benefits. In 1993, the AAFC Federal–Provincial–Territorial Committee on Food Safety presented the FPMIC recommendations on coordinating and harmonizing meat hygiene and inspection standards to the Canadian Ministers of Agriculture. It was this committee that first proposed the development and implementation of the CFIS and in 1994, proposed the creation of a CFIS Implementing Group (CFIS-IG). The proposal would link together the activities of ICFR with the activities of the national coordinating committees for HC and AAFC to create a nationally coordinated food inspection system. This idea for the creation of a CFIS-IG shocked HC, which was already undertaking its own coordinating work. However, the CFIS-IG was finally born 2 years later in 1996. Following the 1993 proposal for a CFIS and a CFIS-IG, the independent initiatives of HC and AAFC were combined, along with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), in a joint steering committee that sought ways to streamline standards and regulations not just across traditional departmental lines (i.e. Health and Agriculture) but also across local, provincial and federal jurisdictions. Closely following this amalgamation were two separate reviews of the government role in the Canadian food safety system. The first review, by the Office of the Auditor General of Canada, was published in the 1994 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Volume 8, Chapter 13 on the ‘Federal management of the food safety system’. The report concluded that a single department or agency should provide food inspection. It also concluded that the single food safety agency should focus on consumer protection by emphasizing human health/food safety issues, not producer promotion. This would require a
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separation between the government department that promoted food safety and the government department that promoted the agrifood industry. Further, the report concluded that the proposed food safety system should be implemented in a cost-effective/cost-recovery way, since the Treasury Board required government departments and agencies to provide cost-recovery services to ease budgetary burdens. Therefore, the food safety services were encouraged to adopt the risk analysis framework (risk assessment, risk management and risk communication) provided as ‘private goods’ on a costrecovery basis. The second review of the role of government in the Canadian food inspection system was the Program Review II of AAFC. This review was driven by the objective of identifying areas of substantial cost reduction within AAFC’s operations through institutional clarification and organization. There were two major conclusions of the review pertaining to food inspection services. First, inspection services should be performed in a cost-recovery fashion, consistent with the requirements of the Treasury Board to reduce government expenditures. Second, federal–provincial–territorial coordination and partnerships were considered necessary to improve inspection efficiency and effectiveness and to remove differential regulatory requirements across Canada. Some of the recommendations of the Auditor General’s Report and AAFC’s Program Review II were included in the 1995 Federal Budget. In this budget, the federal government called for the creation of the Office of Food Inspection Systems (OFIS) to examine the federal food inspection bureaucracy and identify areas of overlap and duplication. Out of OFIS came two initiatives: the CFIS and the CFIA. The CFIS was to be an integrated, national food inspection system responsive to the safety concerns of consumers and the competitiveness concerns of industry. This system was intended to improve inspection efficiency and effectiveness and harmonize regulatory requirements across Canada. To assist the development of CFIS, the CFIS-IG was established in 1996 with a mandate to harmonize federal–provincial inspection systems in order to achieve a national inspection system. It consists of federal, provincial, territorial and municipal government representatives from agencies such as Health, Agriculture, Fisheries and Oceans. In 1998, the CFIS-IG noted the goals of the CFIS to be: high quality, safe food supply, harmonized standards, cost-effective inspection system, enhanced access to markets for Canadian food producers, scientific risk assessment-based inspection and protection from economic fraud (CFIS-IG, 1998)
Functionally, CFIS-IG facilitates the development of sector-specific nationally harmonized food safety codes. National codes were developed for such sectors as dairy, meat, and poultry. With respect to meat, the CFIS-IG picked up on the work began by AAFC’s FPMIC to develop an NDS. This code,
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now known as the National Meat Code, is being designed to apply consistently across all provinces, territories and municipalities. The stated goal of the National Meat Code is to develop ‘one set of requirements for meat inspection which are reasonable and scientifically-based and will protect the public health, eliminate provincial trade barriers and protect Canada’s economic standing in the international marketplace’ (CFIS-IG, 1998). Although progress has been made on the development of the National Meat Code, at the time of writing the code had not been finished. The second initiative of OFIS was to propose an arrangement by which the CFIS could be administered. In the same year that the CFIS-IG was established (1996), the OFIS presented four options to the federal government and to national stakeholder meetings across Canada for an administrative arrangement. They were: 1. Maintain the status quo; 2. Strengthen the role of ICFR and retain its past responsibilities; 3. Create a new autonomous food inspection agency to focus on risk management while HC focused on risk assessment; and 4. Create a new autonomous food safety agency combining all current risk analysis food safety activities of HC, AAFC and DFO; risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. In the 1996 Federal Budget, the federal government announced it had decided on the third option; the creation of an autonomous food inspection agency to focus on risk management. On 16 September 1996 Bill C-60 announced the creation of the CFIA to be established on 1 April 1997. Essentially, the CFIA is a federal governmental Special Operating Agency administering and enforcing all federal food inspection legislation and providing all risk management activities and services. It consolidates all those federally mandated food inspection and animal and plant quarantine services previously performed by HC, AAFC and DFO. As a Special Operating Agency, the CFIA is administratively distinct from the traditional government departments such as HC and AAFC (although it reports to Parliament through the minister of AAFC). The agency is required to be open and transparent. And, with a projected initial budget of C$300 million for 1998/99, the CFIA is required to move towards cost recovery and to be managed in an increasingly commercial manner. In fact, the projected revenues for 1998/99 fiscal year were C$60 million for the inspection services alone. The current government involvement in the Canadian food safety system will be discussed in four sections below according to the governmental arrangement involved: (i) HC; (ii) CFIA; (iii) AAFC; and (iv) provincial, territorial and municipal governments. HC and the CFIA assume the major roles. HC establishes the food policies associated with human health, safety and nutrition where these policies are required to be based on scientific procedures for risk assessment and may result in food industry standards, guidelines, codes of
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practice or regulations. The CFIA provides the subsequent risk management activities of inspection, monitoring and auditing of the food industry for compliance with the food policies developed by HC. In the case of industry non-compliance, the CFIA is also responsible for the enforcement of the food policy. AAFC plays an indirect role promoting the domestic food industry through various programmes and initiatives while at the provincial, territorial and municipal level, there is a diverse range of government involvement. HC HC’s role in the Canadian food safety system is to ensure both short- and long-term consumer protection through the provision of both safe and nutritious foods. The specifics of its role are set out in its Food Program and deal with areas of food safety covered in the Food and Drugs Act. Principally, the role is to develop food policies based on scientific risk assessment procedures. However, HC’s mandate extends beyond risk assessment to include some aspects of risk management (e.g. the development and promotion of GMPs) and risk communication (e.g. consumer education and nutrition labelling). Let us take a closer look at the various components of its role, grouped under food policies and risk assessment, risk management and risk communication. FOOD POLICIES AND RISK ASSESSMENT. HC’s development of food policies is based on a six-step process involving: issue identification; issue prioritization; sciencebased risk assessment; policy option development; policy decision making; and, finally, policy implementation. One priority objective of HC in carrying out this process is transparency. The process is open to broad consultation at all stages where the consultation network includes all levels of government, food industry participants, consumers and health-care industry participants. To date, the consultations have yielded a number of important policy positions, namely:
1. All food policies must be determined using a risk analysis framework, which is based on scientific evidence where human health and safety impacts (not broader socio-economic considerations) are the element of concern. 2. The scientific evidence must be credibly obtained from peer-reviewed and internationally accepted research sources. 3. Other impacts must also be considered after establishing the health and safety impacts; where other impacts include economic, trade, social and environmental impacts. (In this sense, Canadian food safety policies must have a firm scientific foundation, but based on such a foundation they can then deal with broader non-safety issues.) 4. Ongoing, transparent stakeholder consultation must be an integral part of food policy development. Thus, the foundation of HC’s food policies is science-based risk assessment procedures where risk is associated with human health and safety risks
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only. Socio-economic risks are not a factor. The risk assessment procedures begin with the identification and characterization of hazards associated with a given food product. Hazards include pesticide residues, veterinary biologics, microbial pathogens, food additives as well as the nutritive fortification of food products. This leads to the development of a risk profile for that food product. A risk profile ranks the risk of the product to human health. It includes the probability of the occurrence of the risk and the establishment of maximum tolerance targets for the presence of microbial contaminants. An important objective of the Food Program is the establishment of consistent risk profiles across all products so the allocation of HC’s resources may be optimized. It devotes more resources to the more risky products. The risk assessment procedures and the risk profiles form the scientific foundation of HC’s services and activities. These include pre-market product reviews that focus on the human health and safety impact of the food product. Pre-market reviews are mandatory for both domestic and foreign products destined for Canadian markets. Product attributes, which are unrelated to food safety, are not considered during the pre-market review. These reviews involve a multi-disciplinary approach to determining the product’s safety according to its risk profile. HC’s interest in food policies and risk assessment extend beyond the borders of Canada. HC provides assistance in the development of international food policies. In particular, HC participates in the development of Codex standards, guidelines, codes of practice and recommendations to ensure that Canadian safety standards are reflected in international standards. Such participation also influences domestic standard setting. Finally, in the risk assessment area, HC is exploring the possibility that third parties may perform some of the scientific risk assessment activities in the future. HC would continue to be responsible for food policy setting and risk assessment decision making for the food safety system. However, non-governmental parties may be involved with the technical risk assessment activities. RISK MANAGEMENT.
Once a food safety policy has been developed and adopted, HC sets food safety standards, guidelines, codes of practice and, when necessary, regulations for the food industry. Thus, regulations are viewed as only one of several tools available to HC to implement the policy. They tend to involve specific rules with little flexibility in interpretation. And, they can be the most effective tool for ensuring minimum essential standards are met. Codes of practice, on the other hand, tend to be much broader and more open to interpretation. As a result they may be more effective at providing latitude and flexibility of response in the food safety system. In 1989, HC developed a programme for food manufacturers on GMPs. These are risk management strategies designed to identify those food-processing methods and techniques that minimize the risks to human health. GMPs are based on HC’s Voluntary Code of Practice (VCP) – General Principles of Food
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Hygiene for the Food Industry in Canada released in 1983. The VCP was based on the Codex codes of hygienic practice and, consequently, was designed to be internationally consistent. For a particular manufacturing operation, the degree of stringency of the GMPs is based on the risk profile of the food product being produced. According to the GMP guidelines, food manufacturers must keep detailed records commensurate with the product’s risk profile so they possess documented evidence that the products are safe and nutritious and that appropriate risk management efforts are being undertaken. The information generated in this way is assembled to create a public health intelligence network to monitor the incidence of human health risks associated with food products. Eventually, the goal is to link domestic and international government health agencies with domestic and international industry participants. This is intended to provide a comprehensive, accurate and timely set of information on the incidence of food-borne illness and thereby, to improve the accuracy of the risk profiles. The adoption and implementation of GMPs by food manufacturers is voluntary, although HC does encourage their adoption at all stages in the food supply chain. Currently, firms that process food products with a higher risk profile are targeted by HC. Further, HC has recognized that small firms face higher costs during the development, adoption and implementation of GMPs and so have instituted a staggered phase-in period for the establishment of GMPs depending on the risk profile of the firm’s product and the firm’s size. This initiative has not been without problems for HC. In particular, it has been the subject of a turf dispute with the CFIA. GMPs are a risk management tool, but CFIA views risk management as its area of responsibility. The jurisdictional dispute between the two federal agencies concerned has been a hindrance to the implementation of GMPs. HC has one other responsibility in the risk management area and that is to audit the risk management activities of the CFIA. The objective of the audit is to assess the effectiveness of the CFIA’s programmes and activities related to the inspection, monitoring, surveillance and enforcement of food safety and nutrition policies. RISK COMMUNICATION. HC is involved in several risk communication activities. One such activity is the National Partnership for Consumer Food Safety Education Program involving the CFIA and 20 other organizations including industry and consumer groups. This programme recognizes that consumers have an opportunity to limit food-borne illness. The objective is to provide accurate and timely information on those food handling and preparation techniques that minimize the risk of contamination. For instance, most microbial contaminants may be eradicated simply through cooking the food product at adequate temperatures. Consumers who are educated about health and safety risks play an important role in ensuring their own health and safety.
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Nutrition labelling is another risk communication activity of HC. HC believes that current label requirements do not provide enough information about inputs, production and processing methods and product attributes for consumers to make good nutrition decisions. Thus, HC is pursuing a strategy to encourage consistent labelling of food products that adequately signals standards of nutrition. There are four benefits of a consistent and widely used labelling system. First, it enables consumers to make informed consumption choices, aiding in consumer sovereignty. Second, it encourages producers to supply foods incorporating sound production and nutrition principles. Third, it prevents mislabelling that improperly identifies possible human health and safety hazards. Fourth, it prevents economic fraud where processors claim production techniques or nutritive contents that are not accurate. One additional dimension to the nutrition labelling issue is the development of US labelling regulations. US labelling requirements require the provision of more and different information from what is accepted in Canada. This has implications for Canadian food exports to the USA, which would need to abide by the US regulations. CFIA The CFIA is an autonomous Special Operating Agency of the federal government created in September 1996 and established on 1 April 1997. Its primary responsibility is to undertake risk management activities including the inspection and monitoring of domestic food establishments and enforcement of the food safety policies developed by HC. It has extensive jurisdiction over all the food industries in Canada as well as jurisdiction over imports into the Canadian food supply. Like HC, the CFIA may, if it chooses, permit other, non-governmental parties to provide these risk management activities. The CFIA pursues four general objectives. They are: 1. To ensure consumer protection from risks to human health. Apart from the inspection, monitoring, and enforcement activities, this includes promoting the adoption of safety assurance risk management schemes by food industry firms such as a HACCP system. 2. To ensure consumer protection from economic fraud arising from the mislabelling or misrepresentation of food products. 3. To promote market access for Canadian food products. Unlike the first two objectives, this role is a producer promotion role that involves the CFIA promoting the safety and quality of Canadian food products and the effectiveness of the Canadian food safety system both domestically and internationally. 4. To ensure the CFIA is operated in a cost-effective manner. This includes streamlining food safety rules through a coordinated national food inspection system built on a user-pay principle. It is interesting that the CFIA objectives include both consumer protection and producer promotion activities despite the Auditor General’s report specifying that these two objectives should be institutionally separated.
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The legislation governing its operation is the 1997 Canada Food Inspection Agency Act. This Act confers on the CFIA extensive jurisdiction over 13 acts of parliament as they pertain to food safety and inspection activities. These Acts include the Canada Agricultural Products Act; the Consumer Packaging and Labelling Act; the Feeds Act; the Fertilizers Act; the Fish Inspection Act; the Health of Animals Act; the Canadian Meat Inspection Act; the Seeds Act; the Food and Drugs Act; the Plant Breeders’ Rights Act; the Plant Protection Act; the Canadian Health Act; and the Agriculture and Agri-Food Monetary Penalties Act. This last act was created to establish monetary penalties for non-compliance of firms with the various food safety rules subject to enforcement by the CFIA. Administratively, the operational divisions of CFIA, which carry out the inspections and so on, are organized according to four regional areas; the Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario and the West. Of most concern to us is the Food Inspection Division (FID). In April 1998, the FID was re-organized into four new food directorates: (i) Animal Products (meat, poultry, dairy, fruit and vegetable divisions); (ii) Plant Products; (iii) Program Laboratories; and (iv) Policy Planning and Coordination. The first of these directorates is responsible for ensuring the safety of meat products. The FID focuses on two types of risks: 1. Contamination risks from pesticide residues, heavy metals, veterinary residues, microbiological pathogens or natural toxins; and 2. Misinformation risks from the mislabelling of allergens, additives, reworks, processing aids or preservatives which may have adverse health effects on sensitive consumers. To manage these risks in the Canadian beef supply chain, the FID, and in particular the Animal Products Directorate, undertake a number of activities in accordance with the 1985 Meat Inspection Act. They are: 1. Registration and approval of meat plants (slaughterhouses, meat processing plants, meat import and meat storage facilities) involved in interprovincial and international trade; 2. Inspection of the registered meat plants; 3. Administration of scientific tests at the meat plant; 4. Assistance with the voluntary adoption by registered meat plants of a CFIA-approved HACCP system – this initiative is known as Food Safety Enhancement Program (FSEP); 5. Enforcement of food safety regulations at the meat plants; 6. Inspection and monitoring of imported meat and meat products; and 7. Administration of scientific testing programmes and enforcement of labelling regulations at the retail level. Let us consider these activities in a little more detail.
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REGISTRATION AND APPROVAL OF MEAT PLANTS. The FID is responsible for the registration and approval of plants that produce for either interprovincial or international markets. According to the Meat Inspection Act, no firms may operate a registered establishment without a federal licence. And meat plants, which possess a licence, must apply for registration with the CFIA if they are involved in interprovincial or international trade. The application for registration must include a detailed account of the establishment’s processes, procedures and specifications, including a description of the plant’s structure, the grounds and the equipment used. Upon approval, the plant is issued with a verification number. INSPECTION OF REGISTERED MEAT PLANTS. Approximately 1500 FID inspectors perform mandatory inspections in registered meat and poultry plants across Canada. Federal inspection is not required in plants involved only in intraprovincial shipments of meat. But, in fact about 98% of the domestic industry’s output is federally inspected. Of the carcasses, which are federally inspected, about 0.5% are rejected from the human food supply. The inspection of domestic meat plants focus on slaughtering and processing facilities and involve both ante- and post-mortem inspection. There are two different approaches taken to the inspection of such meat plants in Canada. The choice of approach depends on whether or not the meat plant in question has adopted a CFIA-approved HACCP system. The inspection procedure used for firms, which have not adopted HACCP, is discussed immediately below, while the procedure for firms, which have adopted HACCP, is discussed in the section ‘Assistance with the voluntary adoption of HACCP’ on page 70. For those domestic meat plants without HACCP, inspection is visualbased, where veterinary surgeons or animal health officers use organoleptic techniques to identify potential health hazards and the possible presence of contaminants. At the slaughterhouse, ante-mortem inspection is carried out to ensure: (i) there is no evidence of abnormal behaviour or appearance among the live animals; (ii) that diseased or injured animals are segregated; (iii) that animals are not handled in a manner causing avoidable pain or avoidable distress; and (iv) that animals have not died before the controlled killing. All animals destined for slaughter must be inspected a maximum of 24 h before slaughter using a two-step process. The first step is to segregate the animals based on appearance of health, disease or abnormality. The second step is to provide a mandatory veterinary examination and diagnosis of all the segregated animals deemed unhealthy or abnormal. Following the veterinary examination, affected cattle may be either released for slaughter or further segregated. In the latter case, the veterinary inspector assesses whether the animal must be destroyed or may be returned to the feedlot and medicated to improve its health for slaughter at a later date. Post-mortem inspection of the carcass focuses on the muscle tissue, the lymph nodes and the internal organs, to ensure that all carcasses appear
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normal and free from disease (i.e. such as lesions that generally appear on the organs of a tuberculosis-infected bovine) and that all materials used from carcasses (e.g. blood, organs, etc.) are clearly identified. The federal inspectors also perform invasive chemical residue testing activities on products pulled from the supply chain in the processing plant or at the retail level. At the discretion of the inspector, samples taken randomly along the processing stages or samples that appear to be diseased or abnormal may be sent to the Program Laboratories Directorate of the FID for chemical residue testing. This can include samples from those animals that have been segregated and destroyed in order to determine the reason for the animal’s unacceptable health. It should be noted that all of the CFIA activities and services are provided on a cost-recovery basis and their frequency is a function of the firm’s history of compliance. Since each inspection and audit described above will cost the firm money, the CFIA has created an incentive for compliance among industry. For instance, if non-compliance is found, the frequency of inspection and audit will go up and the costs to the firm for ensuring food safety will also go up. ADMINISTRATION OF SCIENTIFIC TESTS AT THE MEAT PLANT. The FID’s Program Laboratories Directorate administers four scientific testing programmes for microbiological, chemical residue or natural toxin contamination. They are:
1. The Core Monitoring Program where samples are tested to determine the level of known residues such as sulphonamides, antibiotics, pesticides, hormonal substances and microbial pathogens, that is, substances on the critical list of contaminants; 2. The Exploratory Monitoring Program where samples are tested for the presence of any new residues currently not on the FID’s critical list of contaminants; 3. The Surveillance Program which is a traceback programme designed to match any samples that have been identified as contaminated with the herd of origin and the slaughterhouse; and 4. The Bacterial Monitoring Program, where programme inspectors monitor the meat processing at critical stages of production to verify that the plant’s processing methods and its safety control measures are adequate in preventing contamination of the food supply. The Program Laboratories Directorate of FID also provides an accreditation service to independent auditing firms and food testing companies. Accredited firms may then conduct laboratory tests for the federal inspectors. ASSISTANCE WITH THE VOLUNTARY ADOPTION OF HACCP.
Apart from the mandatory inspection activities, the FID also encourages and assists in the voluntary adoption of HACCP systems. If the slaughterhouse or processing plant has voluntarily adopted a CFIA-approved HACCP system, federal inspectors
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do not perform the front-line type of inspection services outlined above. Instead, the firm’s personnel are responsible for such activities while the federal inspectors monitor and audit activities at ‘critical control points’ in the food production chain to ensure the company-based inspection techniques are adequate to control the risk of contamination. The CFIA promotes the voluntary adoption of HACCP through the FSEP. This was designed by AAFC in 1996 and taken over by CFIA when it was formed in 1997. The FSEP programme is based on five steps. They are: 1. The firm develops a proposed HACCP system including details of critical control points, product flows and prerequisite programmes (e.g. Standard Operating Procedures) specifically tailored to the firm’s products and processes. The prerequisite programmes are required to be consistent with the international principles and standards of the Codex. Through the FSEP, the firm can receive a HACCP Curriculum Guideline as well as the four-part HACCP system manuals. 2. The CFIA assesses the proposed HACCP plan. If the proposed plan requires some refinement then the firm is assisted in achieving the FSEP requirements for a HACCP scheme. 3. Once the HACCP system is approved, the firm’s personnel are responsible for controlling, monitoring and keeping accurate records for each critical control point. Firm managers must review the documentation to identify deviations, discrepancies or problems requiring corrective actions. 4. The CFIA then reviews all plant records, assesses corrective actions where necessary, observes on-line processing at critical control points, takes samples as appropriate and verifies that the overall HACCP plan is being followed. 5. The CFIA inspectors monitor the company inspections and audit the HACCP documentation to ensure the firm is complying with the HACCP principles. One of the implications of the introduction of HACCP has been the need for training and upgrading of inspectors’ skills. All CFIA personnel involved with monitoring firm-based HACCP systems must complete a HACCP Certification Protocol Program. This programme provides information and training on how properly to verify prerequisite and HACCP plans. The CFIA personnel are also trained on how to monitor and audit the firm’s HACCP system effectively. However, this has provided a significant internal administrative challenge to the CFIA as it attempts to deal with the resistance of CFIA inspection personnel to change. It should be noted that, unlike the USA, the adoption of an HACCP system in Canadian meat plants is not mandatory. Rather, the firm chooses whether or not to adopt a HACCP system. Both small- and medium-sized firms may be eligible for funding to assist in the adoption of a HACCP system. The maximum amount for 1 year is C$5000 with funding renewal possible for a maximum of 3 years.
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ENFORCEMENT OF FOOD SAFETY REGULATIONS AT MEAT PLANTS. With respect to the issue of enforcement in the event of a company’s non-compliance, the CFIA has broad enforcement powers as outlined in the 1997 Canada Food Inspection Agency Act. This includes jurisdiction over the 1995 Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act. This Act was created in order to establish monetary penalties for non-compliance of firms with several federal Acts related to the agricultural food industries. This enforcement legislation applies to: the Canada Agricultural Products Act; the Feeds Act; the Fertilizers Act; the Health of Animals Act; the Meat Inspection Act; the Plant Protection Act; and the Seeds Act. If a violation of any of the Acts under the Agriculture and Agri-Food Monetary Penalties Act is identified or suspected, the violation must be ranked as a minor violation, a serious violation or a very serious violation. The CFIA may take one of four actions. It may require the recall of an unsafe food product, diseased animal or plant that poses a risk to the public, animal or plant health. It may apply to a court for an interim injunction to prevent further production or distribution of the unsafe food product; it may levy and collect enforcement fees for non-compliance; and it can withdraw or withhold services should a client fail to pay a prescribed fee. The severity of the enforcement is associated with the risk profile of the particular food product and the degree of contravention. Before a monetary fee is fixed, consideration is given to several factors such as the degree of negligence, the actual or potential harm inflicted, whether or not the violation was committed for commercial gain or benefit, as well as the individual firm’s history of compliance with the food legislation. The maximum monetary penalty for a minor violation is C$2000, for a serious violation is C$10,000 and for a very serious violation is C$15,000. In the event that the violation is found not to be for commercial gain then the assessed penalty is C$2000. At the time of writing, the CFIA had prosecuted or was currently prosecuting for non-compliance in 94 separate cases of violation. As a result, 65 firms have been assessed monetary penalties ranging from C$2500 to C$15,000. A firm found guilty of a violation may enter into a voluntary Compliance Agreement with the CFIA committing itself to ensuring future compliance. A commitment such as this by the firm may reduce the original monetary penalty levied. CFIA personnel would then monitor and audit the firm to ensure that the firm is complying with the usual standards and regulations as well as the Compliance Agreement. Another option open to the CFIA to assist enforcement is cancellation of a firm’s registration licence. Such an action would effectively prevent the firm from producing for interprovincial or international trade. This process involves first a written notice of cancellation summarizing the reason for cancellation, including a copy of the original inspection report that identifies all areas of non-compliance. The firm is offered a time frame to prove compliance and prevent the cancellation of the registration. But, failure to do so would
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result in a hearing involving the CFIA and the violating firm. If the firm is unable to show adequate commitment to compliance, then a Notice of Cancellation of Registration is delivered to the firm. INSPECTION OF IMPORTED MEAT AND MEAT PRODUCTS. The aim of import inspection programmes is to protect domestic consumers from foreign meat where the source country has an inferior domestic food safety system or has recently experienced a food safety crisis. The CFIA must coordinate with the Canada Customs and Revenue and clarify roles and responsibilities to ensure: that all import products comply with domestic health, safety and quality standards; that there is consistency across all products and all regions in Canada; and to ensure the expeditious processing of imports. The CFIA and Canada Customs Agency have undertaken a Joint Service Initiative providing opportunity for CFIA personnel to inform, educate and train Customs officials on what are the CFIA import requirements. For some imported food products, the pre-retail stage (i.e. when products are finished or market ready) may be the only opportunity FID inspectors have to carry out inspections. This is not the most effective way to ensure that imported products are safe. In fact, the current rationale is imports need to be controlled in a manner consistent with the way domestic production is controlled and monitored. For imports, this must occur before they are shipped rather than when they enter Canada. The CFIA applies three basic rules to imported food products:
1. They must originate from countries having product standards and regulations, and a system for inspecting processing facilities, at least equivalent to the Canadian system. Equivalency is determined by CFIA auditors who examine the food safety legislation and the industrial practices of the foreign producers. 2. They must meet the domestic grade requirement for similar products produced in Canada. 3. They must bear a product origin label and label information must be congruent with the Canadian Consumer Packaging and Labeling Regulations. The CFIA work with the administration of foreign governments to ensure these rules are met. One example is the Canada/United States Border Management Accord. The goal of this accord is to establish the framework allowing for the harmonization of import inspection activities, the sharing of facilities and resources and the exchange of information. The CFIA has introduced four initiatives to make the import inspection process efficient and effective. They are as follows. 1. The Product Inspection Program (PIP), which is the traditional, visualbased inspection service provided at the border on imported products that have not been pre-approved for import. 2. The Enhanced Import Operation (EIO), which is designed to facilitate thorough yet expeditious import inspection as it is too time- and resource-
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consuming to handle all imports under the PIP. Two initiatives have been implemented under the EIO to speed up the import inspection process. They are Import Primary Contacts (IPCs) and the Agricultural Pre-Arrival Review System (Agri-PARS). The IPCs handle approximately 94% of all food products imported into Canada. Agri-PARS is a special expedited import procedure for importers who have proven to be compliant, reliable and trustworthy. Through the Agri-PARS the importer is encouraged to secure pre-arrival clearance by sending the Import Declaration forms ahead of the shipment. Such importers are eligible for a Frequent Importers Release status implying that the history of compliance is exceptional and the import products are considered to meet or exceed Canadian standards and regulations. 3. The Enhanced Importers Responsibility Program (EIRP), through which products are ranked according to their risk profile as established by HC. Thus, PIP would be carried out with a high level of inspection frequency for products of identified high risk and from importers who do not have a history of compliance with Canadian standards and regulations. Products with lower levels of risk would be subject to lower levels of inspection frequency. 4. The National Audit Program (NAP), which is designed to ensure that inspectors across the country are inspecting and monitoring imports in a manner consistent with other imports and domestic products. Import declarations and the judgment of inspectors may be reviewed to determine consistency in the inspection results. Ultimately, the NAP attempts to harmonize the programme delivery of the CFIA inspectors. This programme is a way for the FID inspectors themselves to be monitored for both effectiveness and compliance with their duties; a case of checking the checkers. In addition, the CFIA has a number of other initiatives under development to streamline the import inspection process. These include: 1. The Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) System for electronic import inspection and import clearance programmes to ensure rapid decision making. 2. The Automated Import Reference System (AIRS) for timely and accurate information on Canadian import requirements for potential importers. 3. The Import Tracking System (ITS) for improved tracking of an imported shipment after import inspection. This is intended to enhance the CFIA’s ability to respond to any problems with an import product (e.g. through a product recall) before it reaches the Canadian consumer. 4. The Import Decision System (IDS) for consistent decision advice to the CFIA or Customs Canada personnel on the proper inspection action to be taken. This System would contain information on such variables as country of origin, particular foreign brand, seasonal factors and packaging types. ACTIVITIES AT THE RETAIL LEVEL.
At the retail level, the FID verifies that food advertising complies with requirements and it performs retail inspection to enforce labelling standards in order to prevent economic fraud. Retail
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inspection is designed as a reactive ‘spot-check’ test for safety and to ensure that the label accurately reflects the contents of the package. CFIA inspectors may collect samples to perform residual testing or to be weighed to ensure price accuracy (although this is also performed by Industry Canada product inspectors). As part of the Food Emergency Response Program (FERP), it is also responsible for instituting and monitoring the recall of unsafe beef when necessary. FERP is an interdepartmental initiative involving both the CFIA and HC and is responsible for conducting science-based Health Hazard Evaluations (HHE) following identified outbreaks of food contamination. It deals with any extraordinary food product emergencies such as product recall, sabotage, product-related illness, serious allergies as well as man-made or natural disasters threatening the safety of the food supply. The HHE of a food-related emergency are based on a three stage categorization (I, II, III) with I posing risk that the product will cause serious health consequences or death. In this case, the course of action may be to implement a widespread product recall. The CFIA also provides Emergency Response Manuals to industry designed to inform a firm of the procedures for when a mandatory food recall may be necessary and how the food recall will be administered. For example, between April 1997 and August 1998 there were 164 food recalls under the FERP where 46 recalls were stage I, 104 stage II and 14 food recall cases were stage III. As a new Special Operating Agency, the activities of the CFIA in the Canadian food safety system have been subject to an internal review of the CFIA legislation. This was undertaken by the Task Force on Legislation. Specifically with respect to the beef industry, the Task Force has identified several important areas where further consultation on the appropriate role of the CFIA is warranted. One issue was whether legislative renewal should consider more the role of voluntary codes of practice (i.e. market regulation) as opposed to the mandatory legal regulation. Codes of practice were seen to allow the industry more flexibility of interpretation. Another issue is the possibility of allowing third parties to perform accreditation, certification and verification activities, which include monitoring and auditing. The Task Force also argued that any legislative changes should ensure safe and nutritious food while not contravening industry competitiveness. However, with increased industry responsibility for food safety, the legislative framework must also be capable of dealing with industry non-compliance. The Task Force’s consultations on these issues resulted in some general objectives of new food legislation. The first and most inclusive is a consensus on the need to develop a Single Food Act harmonizing the legislation of the 13 Acts under the current jurisdiction of the CFIA. It was argued such an Act should: 1. Consider both food safety and industry competitiveness issues; 2. Be focused at every stage of the processing supply chain, rather than the current emphasis only on the processing stages; and
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3. Base all food policy under this Act on a scientific risk analysis framework applied in a uniform and consistent manner to all domestic and foreign products sold in the Canadian market. The CFIA Management Council meeting from 15 to 17 April, 1998 identified three key future issues facing the CFIA: 1. To improve risk management services and activities; 2. To implement an Integrated Inspection System (IIS); and 3. To update and streamline the CFIA’s organizational structures. The IIS is a proposal to extend CFIA’s risk management activities (inspection, monitoring and auditing) beyond meat plants to include the entire meat supply chain in an integrated risk management system. Its development would be based on a number of principles including: 1. An emphasis on a whole-of-chain, science-based risk analysis framework where HC performs the risk assessment and the CFIA performs the risk management; 2. Reliance upon government and industry partnering to ensure the IIS is congruent with both food safety and industry competitiveness concerns; 3. An extension of the focus of intervention beyond the processing stage of the food supply chain to encompass primary producers, processors, distributors, retailers and food preparers; 4. The identification of hazards along the supply chain through consultations with the various stakeholders including; food industries, government, consumers, the health-care industry and environmental groups; and 5. The harmonization of food safety systems across Canada so the IIS may be applied by governments at the federal, provincial and municipal levels as well as by private sector parties such as independent auditors and food production firms. The benefits of a harmonized IIS include an enhanced level of risk management efficiency and effectiveness in the Canadian food safety system and a consistent and equitable science-based method for determining a product’s risk level. These benefits result in a reduction of overlap and duplication, a more efficient allocation of resources and a uniform national approach ensuring market access for Canadian products. There are three challenges to the development of the Canadian IIS. First, the IIS should be flexible enough to deal with future risks to human health. To achieve this flexibility, it may be more beneficial to develop IIS codes or guidelines rather than legislation. Second, a nationally harmonized IIS may have to be mandatory, which requires some form of legislation to ensure adoption by the entire food supply chain across all product lines. Third, the harmonization of risk management activities across all levels of governments and across all provinces is viewed as especially difficult to achieve because of the differential levels of regulatory oversight that exist among these jurisdictions and the need to achieve consensus across these different jurisdictions. The CFIS-IG experienced similar difficulties in its work on the National Meat Code.
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AAFC When the CFIA was created in 1997 it took over many of the risk management activities previously performed by AAFC. But, despite the creation of the CFIA, AAFC will continue to impact the overall beef safety system in Canada in two main ways: first through the Health of Animals Division (HAD) and then through the Red Meat Section of the Market and Industry Services Branch (MISB). HAD veterinary surgeons and animal health officials continue to monitor the health and welfare of livestock animals on the ranch or in the feedlot. Their focus is on the eradication of bovine diseases such as tuberculosis, foot and mouth disease, anthrax and brucellosis as well as the prevention of the introduction of any foreign animal diseases such as BSE to Canadian herds. With its goal of prevention and eradication of livestock diseases, HAD performs several key functions including; laboratory research in identifying and diagnosing diseases; domestic herd monitoring and treatment for disease and abnormality; monitoring for the humane treatment of livestock; and import controls such as animal health tests before the import clearance of live animals. MISB performs an exclusive producer promotion role of assisting the industry to compete in domestic and international markets. Assistance to industry from the Red Meat Section includes; meat industry analysis, domestic and international market information and analysis on livestock and beef, updated information on the import standards from over 100 foreign destinations, red meat commodity strategies and meat technology development and adoption. The Red Meat Section also works as a liaison between foreign regulators and the Canadian food safety system to ensure that the domestic system continually meets import requirements. Provincial, territorial and municipal governmental arrangements As previously mentioned, the CFIS-IG is currently working on harmonizing the standards and regulations for the meat industry across all levels of government – federal, provincial, territorial and municipal. This initiative has emerged because of the differences between jurisdictions in the regulatory requirements for meat processing; especially the requirements for inspection frequency, inspection cost and physical plant facilities such as equipment, buildings and grounds. The differences result in two broad industry concerns. First, meat plants are concerned that these differential requirements provide competitive advantages to particular producers (i.e. those that face few food safety costs) or that these differences fragment the Canadian market and hinder equitable market access because of interprovincial limitations to trade. Second, there are industry concerns that differing federal, provincial and municipal standards and regulations might force the Canadian food safety system down to the lowest
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regulatory levels prevailing within Canada because of the ‘National Treatment Provision’ included in various international trade agreements. Some observers believe that Canadian markets may be exposed to imports that meet only the lowest standards prevailing in Canada. These would be the standards maintained by some small meat plants, serving only local (intraprovincial) markets, which are only subject to site inspections by a local public health officer, perhaps once every couple of years. The current Canadian government position would dispute this interpretation of national treatment. In the government’s view national treatment requires import standards to be the same as the federal standards (i.e. as required for the interprovincial and international movement of meat and meat products).
Non-governmental arrangements Along with the changes in the role of government in the Canadian food safety system, the beef industry has been undergoing developments of its own. Through a process of cooperation and coordination many industry associations are developing programmes designed to enhance, and in some cases replace current government activities in the area of producer promotion. In some cases, consumer protection issues are also addressed. Foremost among the industry developments is the new Canadian Beef Grading Agency, but other national industry associations include the Canada Beef Export Federation (CBEF) and the Canadian Cattlemen’s Association (CCA) where most provinces have at least one regional industry association for the cattle/beef industry. Some of the initiatives of these industry associations will be examined below. Canadian Beef Grading Agency The Canadian Beef Grading Agency was created when the government privatized its beef grading activities on 1 April 1996. This agency performs a producer promotion role in its attempt to develop and deliver a grading system based on objective/scientific standards of meat quality and retail yield to facilitate the marketing of domestically produced meat products. The early response from the industry is one of acceptance of the cost recovery nature of the service. Although the Canadian Beef Grading Agency is primarily focused on quality aspects of the meat supply, it does have an impact on food safety. Firms who wish to have their products graded must be federally registered and must achieve some base level of standards and regulations for food safety. Meat graders have the authority to refuse to grade carcasses or meat cuts which appear to be abnormal, diseased or contaminated even though they may have made it through the mandatory government inspection system.
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A current initiative of the Agency is the development and implementation of a new grade of beef. This new grade, ‘Canada Prime’ is to be conferred on those carcasses which achieve at least an AAA grade and show marbling equivalent to the ‘USDA Prime’ grade. This development represents an attempt to develop equivalency with the USA on quality standards as well as safety standards. CCA The CCA is an industry association with a mandate to enhance the competitiveness of the Canadian beef industry. It aims to carry out this mandate by: (i) providing a safe supply of beef products; (ii) providing consistent, highquality products; (iii) providing customer service; and (iv) promoting innovation in the industry. To assist in carrying out this mandate it has adopted the principle of attempting to improve the relationship between industry and consumers with minimum governmental intervention. It sees food safety as basic to achieving its objective of enhancing competitiveness. It has identified food contamination as a major challenge to the competitiveness of the Canadian beef industry because a real, or perceived, contamination crisis can adversely affect the entire industry. As a result, one objective of the CCA is to manage and reduce the risk of a contamination crisis upon the industry. To achieve this it has developed a strategy called the Integrated Food Safety Program. According to this strategy, the focus of the CCA should be on: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
establishing minimum food safety requirements for market access; assessing the environmental impacts of the beef industry; establishing standards for animal welfare; developing consistent and science-based labelling and nutrition information rules; assessing the application of modern agricultural biotechnologies in the beef industry; developing a traceback system; encouraging the development and implementation of ‘pasture to plate’ food safety and quality assurance programmes and initiatives; and establishing product handling procedures for maximum safety and quality at all points in the food chain.
Under the auspices of the Integrated Food Safety Program, the CCA is involved with several producer promotion initiatives that have implications for the goal of consumer protection. For instance, the CCA released a manual outlining ‘good production practices’ for ranch operators. This manual follows the release of a similar manual for feedlot operators. Together, these manuals, promoted under the CCA’s ‘Quality Starts Here’ programme, are designed to disseminate information to producers on how to maximize the value of their livestock proactively through control of those particular hazards that reduce
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the value of their livestock. These hazards may include the existence of tags on the animal’s hide (dirt and faeces), improperly administered veterinary biologics as well as undue stress to the animals brought on by the inhumane treatment. The principles on which these manuals are based are consistent with HACCP principles. In short, through the ‘Quality Starts Here’ programme, the CCA is introducing HACCP to a part of the supply chain where there is no mandatory federal governmental involvement. The CCA has also released a proposal for a mandatory National Beef Identification System; an industry-led traceback system designed to ensure consumer confidence in beef products. By tying good upstream practices with downstream products through traceability, the safety of the food supply is improved. The initial system calls for traceback from the processing plant/ carcass stage to the herd of origin. The long-term goal is to develop traceback abilities from the finished meat products to the herd of origin. The benefits from such a system include the ability to react rapidly to any identified contamination by identifying the herd, isolating the spread and finally eradicating the problem. Consumers may be confident that the meat they consume is produced in a supply chain concerned with ensuring the safety and quality of its product. As an industry association, the CCA suggests that strategies such as the National Beef Identification System are vital because they limit the need for government intervention and regulation of on-farm and processing firm practices. One initiative intended to improve international competitiveness while at the same time lowering food safety costs is the so-called North West Project. The CCA began this project in October 1997 in partnership with its US counterpart, the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association. The Project created an open trade corridor, which allows shipments of feeder cattle to be sent from Montana and Washington State to Alberta feedlots without having to go through the costly herd health tests normally required of such international shipments. These cattle are fed out and slaughtered in Alberta and the meat exported back to the USA. Only specifically registered feedlots can take the US cattle, which must continue to be segregated both before and after the controlled killing to ensure there is no introduction of any bovine disease to the Canadian herds. This Project has had a number of advantages. It provided the Alberta cattle feeding industry with access to more feeder cattle, it lowered transportation costs and it caused less stress and hardships to the livestock thus adding to the humane treatment of the animals. Finally, the CCA runs an informational network for beef industry participants called CANFAX. This system provides access to market information, intelligence and analysis and is a link to current issues facing the beef industry. The safety of beef products has been a common current issue. This has resulted in the availability of information on research dealing with the prevention of microbial contamination and with improvements in the systems for ensuring food safety. As well, information is available on the safety requirements of importing nations.
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Canada Beef Export Federation (CanadaBEEF) The Canada Beef Export Federation supports the export activities of the Canadian industry by providing it with information, intelligence and analysis on foreign market conditions including trade restrictions based on health or sanitary standards. It also provides information for foreign importers on the Canadian food safety system including the level of inspection and the various safety and quality assurance programmes to which the export products are subject. Indeed, while the primary objective is to increase the competitiveness of the Canadian beef industry, a consequence is the provision of information to increase foreign consumer confidence in the safety of Canadian beef products. Cargill Beef Alliance: BEEFWorks This was an industry attempt to integrate quality assurance programmes through the development of a brand-specific supply chain. Cargill operates feedlots, slaughterhouses, processing plants and distribution channels in both Canada and the USA. The objective of this programme is to achieve higher returns for all supply-chain participants by adopting production performance standards exceeding the required levels as well as those of other industry competitors. To do this, ranches that can prove their ability to adopt a highlevel of quality assurance earn the designation of Preferred Calf Suppliers (PCS) and can sell their livestock to Preferred Feedlots (PF). This programme attempts to utilize innovative, scientific methods to ensure a high-quality supply of cattle to PF. Although the BEEFWorks programme is focused on quality, safety is implicitly considered since quality products are necessarily safe products.
Implications of these Developments From this review, it is clear the restructuring of the Canadian food safety system is on a very different trajectory from that of the USA. The Canadian trajectory has been: To ensure international market access – especially to the US – by encouraging industry competitiveness in all areas including food safety. However, its ability to be internationally competitive may be constrained by the direction and pace of restructuring in the US food safety system.
The differences between the US and Canadian trajectories show up in subtle ways. For example, whereas the US MEGAREG made HACCP mandatory in all meat plants, in Canada it is voluntary. A mandatory programme is consistent with the need to restore consumer confidence, while this is not so important if the driving force is greater international competitiveness.
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Given the importance of the external driver to Canada, the restructuring of the Canadian meat safety system is bounded by the restructuring in the dominant export market, namely the USA. It is not surprising the main focus of governmental intervention in Canada is the slaughter stage, rather than the pre-slaughter or the post-slaughter stages. This mirrors the situation in the USA. The challenge for those attempting to restructure the Canadian beef food safety system is to move beyond the limits posed by US restructuring. In particular, other issues for Canada such as a harmonized, integrated food safety system and the development of a co-regulatory system of meat inspection (see Australia) are moving slowly. On the question of harmonization, this is not an issue for the USA. What is an issue for the USA is that Canadian meat export standards are equivalent to US standards. Hence, the Canadian system persists in having differential standards where the highest safety standards are required of firms producing for the export market and the lowest standards are faced by firms producing solely for the local market. Co-regulation is the partnering of industry and government to regulate the beef industry. Under co-regulation, responsibility for ensuring food safety is moved away from just the shoulders of government, and participants in the beef supply chain assume some of this responsibility. While the Canadian system is shifting in this direction, the speed of this shift is bounded to a large extent by how fast this is going on in the USA. Australia is moving much faster down this road. Looking to the future, there appears to be a loss of political momentum in the USA for restructuring the food safety system. For Canada, this translates into the loss of an important external driver for change. Given also, the lack of strong internal drivers for change, there is a danger of rising complacency about institutional change in Canada. This could pose problems for Canada to the extent that the quality of a food safety system is an important contributor to international competitiveness. This completes the North American leg of our tour. We now ‘cross the pond’ to take a look at the food safety system in the UK. This promises to be quite different from either Canada or the USA.
Chapter 5
The United Kingdom1
Introduction The British beef sector is not large by world standards or even by EU standards. Annual beef production in the UK is only 6% of that in the USA and less than 50% of that in France. What makes the UK so interesting to us in this study is its devastatingly bad experience with food contamination problems. If we wanted to study the experience of a country that had this driver for change in the extreme then Britain is it. The layout of this chapter follows the same format as the previous two. We begin with a detailed discussion of the drivers for change, followed by developments in the institutional arrangements in the British beef sector, finishing up with the implications of these developments.
Drivers for Change As was done for the USA and Canada, we divide drivers for change in the UK into two types determined by their source: external and internal. The main external drivers for change that are not common with the other countries under review (i.e. not international institutional arrangements) are the EU directives and regulations. At the beginning of 2000, the European Commission (EU) released a White Paper on Food Safety, which has generated considerable attention in the EU generally and also in the UK. This could turn out to be yet another important external driver for change in the UK. The internal drivers for change are the health crises arising from contaminated food, legal innovations associated with the so-called ‘due diligence’ defence for criminal liability, and the strong trend towards own-branded products by the major retailers. The ‘due diligence’ defence together with the rise in ownbranded products has led a drive by the major retailers to develop their own quality assurance programmes with heavy emphasis on traceability of product back to the farm. 83
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External drivers for change The EU Directives are legislation proposed by the EC and enacted by the EU Council of Ministers in cooperation with the European Parliament. Individual Member States are responsible for transposing or implementing the directives. There is no single central general Directive on food law. Rather, there has been a proliferation of (five) Directives covering different aspects of food law, some of which impinge on beef. These five Directives are discussed below. The Product Liability Directive This was adopted in 1985 with the principal aim of providing the ground rules for consumers in civil actions against producers of defective merchandise. It applied the rule of strict liability on all those involved in the production process. Thus consumers were able to sue for damages caused by defective products without the need to prove negligence. It was implemented in the UK by the 1987 Consumer Protection Act. Interestingly, Member States could choose to exempt primary producers from the Directive, and most (including the UK) did just that. The Directive only applied to those businesses involved in the production and sale of processed products (e.g. the manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers and distributors). However, in 1999, the Directive was extended to specifically include primary producers. Producers affected include farmers, fruit and vegetable growers and fisheries. Importers of such products from non-EU countries are also liable as producers. Others such as wholesalers and retailers are only liable if they fail to identify the producer to an injured person. The Official Control of Foodstuffs Directive This Directive was adopted in 1989 with the aim of achieving a consistent approach to enforcement of food law across all Member States in the lead-up to the Single Market, which occurred in 1992. Its main principles were that: ● ● ● ●
food should be inspected regularly at the point of production to avoid the need for border controls between Member States; inspection procedures should be harmonized between Member States; there should be mutual recognition of standards within the EU; and details of Members’ States food law enforcement programmes should be submitted annually to the EC.
This Directive was implemented in the UK through the Food Safety Act 1990. This has become a key Act in UK food law, in part because it gave rise to the ‘due diligence’ defence against product liability in criminal proceedings. It will be discussed further in the section on internal drivers in the UK.
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The Fresh Meat Directive This Directive was adopted in 1991 with the intention of laying down hygiene conditions for all red meat slaughterhouses, cutting premises and cold stores in the Single EU Market. The general principles of this Directive were to: ● ● ● ● ● ●
permit the functioning of all operations under hygienic conditions; provide a working environment that protects meat and offal from any risk of contamination during handling, processing or storage; permit clean operations to be carried out separately from those operations liable to give rise to contamination or pollution; produce a flow of products, waste material and personnel such that meat and offal intended for human consumption are protected from any risk of contamination; provide adequate space and facilities for the efficient performance of ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections; and protect the welfare of animals at, and during, slaughter.
The main implication of this directive for UK legislation was the requirement that all meat produced in the UK had to be fit to move anywhere in the EU. Premises were prohibited from trading unless they were licensed as complying with EU requirements. The implementing regulations in the UK were The Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1995. Under these regulations, the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS) was established in the UK. While the Directive was a step in the right direction, there was still a lot of dissatisfaction with meat inspection in the EU. This was highlighted in the EC’s White Paper on Food Safety (January 2000) mentioned previously. The White Paper called the existing EU meat inspection regime outdated and in need of replacement by a more risk-based system. There is considerable consensus within the EU that this should happen. However, for now, the UK must operate within the existing legislation. One area of contention is the requirement of 100% veterinary cover in all but the smallest slaughterhouses. Opponents feel this is a damaging imposition on the smaller slaughterhouses at a time when many are struggling to survive. The Directive on the Registration and Identification of Livestock This Directive was adopted in 1992. It required Member States to register and identify all commercial livestock, including cattle. The idea of cattle identification (via ear tags) had been around for a long time, to control tuberculosis and to record breeding herds. However, the idea of cattle identification for food safety was new. Under Article 4 of the Directive, legal holders of beef animals were required to keep a register stating the number of animals present in the holding and to keep an up-to-date record of all births, deaths and movements. In addition, they were required to supply their national
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government, upon request, with all information concerning the origin, identification and destination of animals owned, kept, transported, marketed or slaughtered in the EU. Under Article 5 of the Directive, all beef cattle were required to be identified with ear tags bearing an alphanumeric code (not exceeding 14 characters) making it possible to identify each animal individually along with the holding on which it was born. The response of the various EU countries to this directive has been generally slow. The UK was actually one of the first to respond, although this had more to do with the BSE crisis, which reached a peak when the EU instituted a worldwide ban on the export of British meat. One of the conditions for removing that ban was the implementation of a cattle identification system. The UK introduced its cattle passport system in July 1996. And 2 years later, it launched a computerized Cattle Tracing System for recording all cattle and their movements. These UK initiatives will be discussed in detail in the section on institutional arrangements. In other Member States, movement on this Directive has been much slower. In fact in April 1997, the EU Council lamented ‘experience has shown the implementation of the above Directive for bovine animals has not been entirely satisfactory’. The slow pace of reform prompted the introduction of EU Council Regulation 820/97 in April 1997 requiring Member States (with some exceptions) to institute a system of identification of individual beef animals (ear tags and animal passports) by 1 January 1998, and to have a computerized system in place by 1 January 2000. The Hygiene of Foodstuffs Directive The Directive on the hygiene of foodstuffs was introduced in 1993. It laid down general rules of hygiene covering the preparation, processing, manufacture, packaging, storing, transportation, distribution, handling and offering for sale or supply of foodstuffs not covered elsewhere by product-specific (also called ‘vertical’) hygiene directives. This directive required food businesses to take a structured approach to hygiene based on the principles of HACCP, but stopped short of actually requiring the introduction of HACCP. This directive allowed for and indeed encouraged the development of industry guidelines. As such, it was one of the first tangible indications by the EU of a desire to move towards industry self-regulation. In the UK, this Directive was implemented by way of the General Hygiene Act 1995, which required all food businesses to adopt a risk management tool, such as HACCP. According to Bredahl and Holleran (1997): The risk management tool requirement was significant because it marked a shift away from an end-product food safety inspection focus in Britain to a preventative, scientific food safety focus … the 1995 Act assigns ultimate risk management responsibility to the food business proprietor.
This Act applied to all premises that manufacture, distribute or sell (processed) meat products but not to primary production (including fresh
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meat production) that is covered by the ‘vertical’ Fresh Meat Directive discussed above. While these five Directives made useful advances in food safety, the EC had long harboured the view that much more could be done. In a 1997 Green Paper, it argued for the bringing together of all these directives into a single central general Directive on food law. This was followed by the January 2000 White Paper, which went much further. It argued for a new legal framework that would cover the whole of the food chain from ‘farm to table’ with the ability to trace products through the whole supply chain a key issue. Other features of this new legal framework were to include: (i) the use of scientific advice to underpin food safety policy; (ii) the ability to take rapid and effective measures in response to health emergencies; and (iii) to clean up the animal feed sector. The centrepiece of the White Paper was the establishment of an independent European Food Authority. According to the White Paper (page 3): This Authority would be entrusted with a number of key tasks embracing independent scientific advice on all aspects relating to food safety, operation of rapid alert systems, dialogue with consumers on food safety and health issues as well as networking with national agencies and scientific bodies.
Other elements of the White Paper include: (i) developing a comprehensive food safety monitoring system; and (ii) strengthening legislation in labelling and advertising so as to ensure consumers receive accurate information. Since its release, the White Paper has received considerable, and generally favourable, public comment by EU stakeholders. The generally positive reception was no doubt helped by the fact the White Paper was released on the heels of yet another food poisoning scare in the EU. This time it was the Belgian dioxin scandal. Dioxin is a cancer-causing chemical that had found its way into animal feed and biomagnified in the fat. Media reports alleged that an animal feed company near Ghent had deliberately or accidentally mixed in industrial oil with the feed.
Internal drivers for change It is not always easy to separate out the internal drivers for change from the external ones. Most food legislation in the UK originates from EU Directives or is bounded by the EU legislation. However, EU legislation may, in turn, be driven by events in the UK (as in the case of the BSE crisis). Further, while an EU Directive may provide the basis for implementing legislation in the UK, this legislation will often have its own particular characteristics that lead to its own drivers for change (as in the case of the Food Safety Act 1990). Notwithstanding this difficulty, the following is a list of what appear to be the more significant internal drivers for change in the UK. They include: (i) British legal tradition; (ii) the Food Safety Act 1990; (iii) the concentration of
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the retail sector; (iv) the strength of the environmental and animal welfare lobbies; (v) public health crises arising from contaminated meat (BSE and E. coli); and (vi) the (Tory) government deregulation initiative. British legal tradition British legal tradition emphasizes the ‘letter of the law’. This tends to distinguish Britain from other Member States that tend to follow the Napoleonic legal tradition that emphasizes the ‘intent of the law’. This can have a significant impact on the way food safety law is interpreted and enforced in the UK. The Food Safety Act 1990 This Act came into force on 1 January 1991. It was the implementing legislation for EU Council Directive 89/397 (The Official Control of Foodstuffs Directive), but it also reflected public health concerns following some highly publicized food poisoning outbreaks like the Salmonella outbreaks in eggs, which occurred in the late 1980s. The Act was intended to induce those involved in the UK food industry to improve their food handling practices by strengthening the powers of enforcement, introducing tougher penalties and increasing the legal responsibility for ensuring that food conforms to the provisions of the Act. In this sense it was a driver for change. However, it also forms an important part of the fabric of institutional arrangements covering the British food sector. Hence, it will be discussed in more detail in the section detailing the institutional arrangements. Concentration of the retail sector in the UK In the UK, five national retailers dominate the market (Tesco, Sainsbury’s, Argyll (Safeway), ASDA Wal-Mart and Isosceles (Gateway, Somerfield)). The concentration of retailer power in Britain is very strong and increasing over time. In 1975 the market share of the top five retailers was around 30%. By 1985 it had risen to around 50% and by 1995 it was 70% (Source: NatWest Securities, ACNielson, AGB). In 1994/95, 65% of all consumer purchases of fresh meat were made in UK supermarkets. Part of the phenomenon of retailer concentration has been the growth in own-label products. According to Bredahl and Holleran (1997), by 1996, own-label products accounted for over 30% of all supermarket stock. And for the largest retailers, this figure is much higher. For example, for Sainsbury’s and Tesco it is over 50%. It is important to emphasize that the own-label products in the UK are not aimed at the price-sensitive, quality-insensitive market. Generally, the products are seen as competing head-to-head with the major manufacturers’ brands in the same quality market. Again, according to Bredahl and Holleran (1997), ‘one consequence of the growth in own label is the emphasis it puts
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on the supplier/retailer relationships in the food industry’. The growth of own-label brands and the institution of the ‘due diligence’ defence have together created a strong driver for supermarkets to develop their own meat quality and safety schemes. As one example, consider Sainsbury’s beef partnership involving around 4000 beef producers who agree to supply cattle under a recognized farm assurance scheme (like the Farm Assured British Beef and Lamb (FABBL) scheme) on a pre-arranged schedule to a specified abattoir according to Sainsbury’s specifications (which cover hygiene, quality, animal welfare and environment standards). The specified abattoir will be one of nine belonging to ABP (Anglo-Beef Processors), the largest processor of livestock in the UK and an integral part of the partnership. The animal welfare lobby Animal welfare has been described as a ‘latent concern’ of consumers to which the major retailers have shown considerable sensitivity. It does appear to be the case that the UK has a long tradition of being an animal-loving nation. A recent survey of consumer attitudes found that British concerns for animal welfare issues were much stronger than in other EU countries (Bansback, 1995). In addition, there is a well organized and effective animal welfare lobby in this country. R. Harrison first elevated public concern in a significant way in the mid-1960s with publication of the book Animal Machines: the New Factory Farming Industry. Public reaction to this book led to the establishment of a UK Government committee to inquire into the welfare of farm animals (the 1965 Brambell Committee) and ultimately to the so-called ‘Five Freedoms’ that dominate discussions about animal welfare to this day. These freedoms are: (i) freedom from hunger and thirst; (ii) freedom from discomfort; (iii) freedom from pain, injury and disease; (iv) freedom to express normal behaviour; and (v) freedom from fear and distress. In more recent years, the main lobby promoting the welfare of farm animals in the UK has been the RSPCA (Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals). Beginning in the 1990s, it has undertaken a fairly aggressive advertising campaign targeted at the British educated middle class. One aspect of its programme was the Freedom Food programme which calls for farm animals to be treated in a way as close as possible to the ideal Five Freedoms. The animal welfare lobby in Britain has caused livestock production and transportation methods to be modified to take into account animal welfare concerns. Many of the farm assurance schemes being developed in the UK include codes of conduct for animal welfare. The effect of all this lobbying on consumers is difficult to gauge. An unpublished consumer survey by the Meat and Livestock Commission suggested that when consumers are asked what are the most important concerns they have when they purchase food, animal welfare did not register. However, when they are specifically asked whether animal welfare is an important concern, they will answer yes. This is why animal welfare can be
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described as a ‘latent concern’. Consumers may not, as a rule, worry about animal welfare when they are in the shop making their meat purchase decisions. However, they may decide to seriously adjust their meat purchases in response to highly publicized allegations of mistreatment of farm animals. It is similar to the effect that the highly publicized allegations of exploitation of workers in Indonesia, who were making Nike running shoes, had upon consumer purchase decisions. What has given added weight to this phenomenon of the ‘latent concern’ in Britain is the highly concentrated retail sector. They face high potential costs if these latent concerns become activated. In addition, through their beef partnerships, they have the wherewithal to protect themselves against such concerns. They have instituted stringent animal welfare codes on the livestock producers in the partnership agreements. Public health crises arising from BSE and E. coli O157:H7 BSE was discovered to affect UK cattle in the mid-1980s. The number of confirmed cases rose to a peak in 1993 of over 1000 new cases confirmed per week. The BSE crisis has been an important food safety issue because it was shown to be transmissible to humans and because of the potentially long incubation period (up to 20 years). However, the BSE crisis was also important because of what it did for the public credibility of the main participants in the crisis. In this section we will focus on four major participants in the crisis (the UK Government, the supermarkets, the abattoirs and the livestock producers). Of these four participants only the supermarkets appear to have largely retained the confidence of the consuming public. They reacted swiftly and decisively to the crisis as it unfolded. The UK Government was widely criticized for dragging its feet on the issue before 1996. In fact, in the early years of the emerging crisis, the UK Government attempted to downplay the risks to humans, a miscalculation that came back to haunt it. The government set up the Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in 1987 to advise on the risk to humans of the disease. It found that meat-and-bone meal used as a protein supplement in cattle feed was the likely means for transmitting the disease to cattle and so recommended a ban on such feed (which was implemented in 1988). However, it also downplayed the risk of transmission of the disease from cattle to humans, arguing that cattle were probably a ‘dead-end’ host for the BSE prion so that humans could still eat cattle brains without risk. In 1990, a scientific surveillance unit was set up to see if there was a connection between BSE and CJD (Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease), a human disease similar in appearance to BSE. This stimulated the first major food scare associated with BSE. The then Minister of Agriculture (John Gummer) downplayed the potential threat telling the National Consumer Council that UK beef was safe and there was no risk to human health. But, in 1992 as the German government banned UK beef and various schools banned beef in school
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lunches, beef consumption in the UK dropped to its lowest level since 1962. The UK Government dispatched experts to assure potential consumers that BSE was not a risk. In 1994, calves (born well after the 1988 feed ban) were found to be infected with BSE. This suggested BSE was transmissible through a second means (apart from feed) – to the calf through either the mother’s milk or via the placenta. This risk was initially denied by the UK Government, but then later accepted. As late as early 1996, the Health Secretary was claiming there was no conceivable link between BSE and CJD. But again, this position was soon reversed in light of scientific evidence. The BSE crisis reached a turning point on 20 March 1996. The UK Ministers of Agriculture and Health made statements to the House of Commons based on scientific advice from the government’s Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC) and its Surveillance Unit in Edinburgh. They reported on a new variant of CJD (vCJD) for which the most likely explanation was a link to BSE. SEAC recommended a series of measures including: (i) the disposal of carcasses of all cattle aged 30 months or more; (ii) a ban on the use of mammalian meat-and-bone meal in feed for all farm animals; and (iii) more rigorous enforcement of existing controls in slaughterhouses and other meat plants. The Ministers’ statements were a bombshell which immediately led a number of EU countries to ban imports of British beef and which led, a week later, to an EU announcement of a worldwide ban on British exports of beef animals, meat and meat products. A framework for lifting the ban was agreed by EU Ministers at the Florence Summit in June 1996. The requirements were: ● ● ● ● ●
implementation of a selective cull of all bovine animals (born between 1989 and 1993) in the same birth cohort as BSE cases; legislation for the removal of feed containing meat-and-bone meal from farms and feed mills; implementation of the over 30 months (OTM) rule in which bovine animals over 30 months at the time of slaughter must not enter the food or animal feed chains; improved methods of removing specified bovine material (SBM) from carcasses; and an effective animal identification and movement recording system with office registration.
The UK Government had already moved to introduce an OTM scheme (regulation 716/96) on 12 April with the reluctant backing of the farm lobby. By the end of 1996, over one million animals had been killed under the scheme. However, the UK Government balked at the idea of the selective cull, doubting its scientific merit. It only agreed to go ahead with the cull in December 1996. The remaining major requirement was the animal identification and movement recording system. Action to develop this began in April 1997 and the cattle passport system was up and running by July of the same year.
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The credibility of the beef industry also did not fare too well in the wake of the BSE crisis as the industry was seen to be dragging its heels. In many ways this is understandable as there were some large potential costs involved. However, media stories highlighted some abuses. For example, in 1988 the UK Government announced a compensation scheme, which offered 50% of market value to any producer for BSE-affected cattle that would be kept out of the food chain. Allegedly, some producers still put BSE-affected animals through for slaughter in the early years so as not to lose 50% of market value. And in the early 1990s some abattoirs allegedly still sold beef for export knowing it to come from BSEaffected herds. The UK Government responded much more quickly to the outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 infection that occurred in November 1996 in central Scotland. A total of 18 people died in the outbreak and around 500 people were made sick. Not only was there prompt investigation of the outbreak by representatives of the local Health Board, but the UK Government moved quickly to establish an Expert Group (headed by Professor Hugh Pennington) to advise on whether the existing meat safety systems were adequate. The Pennington Group was convened on 28 November 1996. It issued an Interim Report on 31 December 1996 and its Final Report was published in April 1997. One of the main recommendations of the Pennington Report was to introduce mandatory HACCP systems throughout the meat chain (slaughterhouses, cutting plants, meat transportation, food businesses). While it recognized HACCP was currently being negotiated into EU and UK legislation, the Pennington Group thought the UK should accelerate the process. Although the government responded quickly when the outbreak occurred, there were still accusations of a government cover-up. A 1995 report by the MHS entitled Red Meat had warned of the danger of dirty animals being presented for slaughter. According to the report as quoted in The Daily Telegraph (Thursday, 6 March 1997): Dirty animals arriving at the abattoir are a case of further contamination: organisms such as Escherichia O157 and salmonella can be introduced into the plant on the skins of dirty livestock. Most plants have no formal procedures to clean up dirty stock.
However, according to the same newspaper story, the government suppressed publication of the report. The upshot of the story, together with the E. coli outbreak in Scotland was the introduction of the MHS’s ‘Clean Livestock Policy’ discussed in the section on institutional arrangements. Government deregulation initiative In October 1992, the then Tory Government launched its deregulation initiative. This included the establishment of a number of taskforces includ-
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ing the Food, Drink and Agriculture Taskforce (FDAT). The FDAT issued its report the following year in which a central concern was the sheer quantity of detailed specifications relating to food law (FDAT, 1993, unpublished report). In 1994, the Cabinet Office Deregulation Unit was established with a view to sweeping away outdated rules and regulations, simplifying paperwork, encouraging consistent enforcement and according to Neville-Rolfe (1997) ‘striking the right balance between cost and benefit when making new regulations, whether domestic or European’. Furthermore, according to the same author, ‘Where new regulation is identified as the best option, (the aim is to) make the regulations goal-based to avoid unnecessary prescription.’ This was supported by Angela Browning MP (Parliamentary Secretary, MAFF) who said (1997, p. 14): The Government recognizes hazard analysis to be a fundamentally important tool in this area. It places clear responsibility on food businesses to manage their operations in a ‘hands on’, systematic and safe way. Hazard analysis provides a far greater assurance that safe food will be delivered than does reliance on prescriptive legislation which can serve to lull food business operators into a false sense of security.
Institutional Arrangements The main institutional arrangements impacting on the UK beef safety system can be divided into governmental arrangements and non-governmental arrangements. These are discussed in the next two sub-sections.
Governmental arrangements The Consumer Protection Act 1987 The 1987 Consumer Protection Act provides the ground rules for civil liability. It implements the 1985 EU Product Liability Directive (85/374/EEC), providing strict liability for those involved in the production and sale of food. This means consumers are able to sue for damages caused by defective products without the need to prove negligence. And, while due diligence may provide protection from criminal liability it will not provide protection from civil liability. At time of writing, the Consumer Protection Act does not cover primary farm products. Thus British farmers are exempt from the ‘strict liability’ rule and can only be sued if negligence is proved. However, this will soon change in line with a recent extension of the EU Directive. Under the extended directive, all those involved in the production process, including farmers, would be jointly liable for any defective food products.
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The Food Safety Act 1990 While the 1987 Consumer Protection Act provides the ground rules for civil liability, the 1990 Food Safety Act provides the ground rules for criminal liability. According to Hobbs and Kerr (1992), the 1990 Food Safety Act was introduced in response to: ● ● ●
increasing consumer concern with food safety; the need for harmonization of British law and European Community Law in preparation for 1992 (i.e. the Single Market Initiative); and existing laws that were ill-designed to deal with new and rapidly evolving technologies in the food industry.
The Act required all those handling food (or supervising those handling food) to undergo training in food safety procedures and practices. And vehicles carrying food would need to meet new standards of temperature control. The major legal change was the introduction of the due diligence defence in cases of criminal liability for ensuring the safety of food. According to Henson and Northen (1997, p. 89) due diligence is: a defence for the person charged to prove that he took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence by himself or by a person under his control.
This means those engaged in food handling must be proactive in their efforts to ensure that food in their possession conforms to the provisions of the Act. Previous legislation allowed buyers in the supply chain to use the so-called warranty defence. According to Hobbs and Kerr (1992, p. 577): The warranty defence required all those downstream in the food chain to prove only that the food did not enter into a state that contravened the provisions of the food safety legislation while it was under their control. Food purchased from others was deemed warranted, meaning that the seller assumed legal responsibility.
This means buyers only had to prove that the food was not compromised while it was under their control. This allowed a buyer to be passive about the food received in a transaction from an upstream supplier. Moreover, an invoice was deemed to be a warranty. Thus, after satisfying the court that the food was handled properly on the premises the firm simply had to supply an ordinary purchase invoice to fulfil its legal responsibility. In order for buyers to use the due diligence defence successfully they have to take all ‘reasonable’ steps to ensure that the food they receive from upstream suppliers is safe. The word ‘reasonable’ is of considerable significance here. It is sufficiently vague that according to Caswell and Henson (1997, p. 222) it creates an air of uncertainty in the minds of the buyer as to what is required:
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This uncertainty is a key facet of the ‘due diligence’ approach to food product liability which means that, in practice, suppliers implement standards well in excess of legal requirements in an attempt to ensure compliance.
Thus, the ‘due diligence’ defence has led to the development of private quality control systems for the major buyers (large processors and major supermarket chains) which far exceed the requirements of the publicly regulated food safety system (associated with the activities of the Meat Hygiene Service). These systems typically require upstream suppliers to participate in very stringent safety and quality programmes (typically involving the principles of HACCP and ISO 9000) and which involve third-party (independent) certification. As Caswell and Henson (1997, p. 223) point out: ‘Whilst these schemes are voluntary in a legal sense, they are fast becoming de facto standards.’ The word ‘reasonable’ also has dynamic content. What may be considered reasonable today may not be considered reasonable tomorrow. Hence, there is a built-in tendency for continual upgrading of the quality control system. In other words, this legislative restructuring has created a regulatory race to the top in the UK. The UK food sector is dominated by large retailers who make extensive use of own-branded products (see pp. 101–105). For such retailers, the ‘due diligence’ defence has a special significance. In the case of ‘own-branded’ products, the retailer is liable rather than the manufacturer. The due diligence defence in criminal liability cases can be distinguished from the US approach, which generally involves strict liability. For further details on this distinction, see Caswell and Henson (1997). The Food Safety (General Food Hygiene) Regulations 1995 The Department of Health (DoH) has responsibility for the implementation of these regulations. They are pursuant to the 1990 Food Safety Act and implement the ‘horizontal’ EU Directive discussed earlier. They concern food hygiene requirements not covered by the EU product-specific (‘vertical’) Directives. Hence, they apply to processed meat products and the retail and catering establishments, and do not apply to the livestock sector or to the fresh meat sector (which includes abattoirs, cutting plants and cold stores). The regulations require food businesses to adopt a risk management tool based on HACCP principles. However, they fall short of requiring a full HACCP system since there is no need for documentation. This is considered too onerous for small corner stores, which may only be selling frozen products. Enforcement of these regulations is at the district (town) council level through the environmental health department with inspections carried out by Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) and assistance being provided by the Public Health Laboratory Service in monitoring the microbiological safety of food. Overseeing and coordinating the enforcement of regulations is LACOTS
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(the Local Authority Coordinating Body on Food and Trading Standards). LACOTS provides guidance to the local enforcement authorities and advice to the central government on enforcement issues. As may be seen, this is a complicated, multilayered system and it has problems. According to Hobbs et al. (2000): Regulations under the FSA 1990 are enforced to varying standards between Authorities. This can cause problems for nationwide food businesses, despite the existence of the Home Authority Principle which means that the Local Authority within which a major food company has its headquarters is responsible for leading on issues of food law relating to that company wherever it operates in the UK. Food law enforcement competes for funding with other Local Authority responsibilities – such as education and social services. Priority differs across the country and in some areas enforcement suffers.
Not only are there problems with enforcement, but as mentioned already, this system is far from comprehensive in providing whole-of-chain food safety. It does not apply to the fresh meat sector, which is regulated at the government level through the MHS. MHS The MHS was created as an executive agency of MAFF in 1995. It came into being through the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1995. These regulations implemented earlier EU directives, which lay down health conditions for the production and retailing of fresh meat, and which was part of the EU initiative to implement a single EU market in 1992. The MHS was also introduced, for domestic reasons, to standardize meat inspections across the UK, which, like the food businesses discussed in the previous section, were under the control of Local Authorities. Being subject to Local Authorities, some abattoirs were inspected to EU standards while others were not. Thus the inspection protocols and inspection charges could vary dramatically between abattoirs that were close to each other but in different districts (boroughs). Partly, the differences in charges could reflect differences in the thoroughness of the inspections. But also there was a strong sense that the rates charged in a particular plant varied with the fiscal health of the local council, thus giving rise to unfair competition. The MHS is responsible for the inspection of slaughterhouses, cutting plants and cold stores to ensure they meet the government’s fresh meat hygiene regulations. In addition there are mandatory ante-mortem and postmortem inspections of each animal/carcass by an MHS inspector (either a veterinary surgeon directly employed by the government or under contract as a private veterinary surgeon registered by the state) who is paid by the taxpayer. The ante-mortem inspection is to ensure there is nothing obviously wrong with the animal and to ensure animal welfare. The post-mortem inspection involves an examination of the whole carcass and internal organs
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(to check for disease). At this point the inspector stamps the carcass to say that it is fit for human consumption. The MHS also inspects the treatment of the SBM to ensure it is disposed of properly (and hence to safeguard against BSE entering the food chain). Once the carcass passes inspection it is split and further processed. However, there are no further MHS inspections further downstream. According to one observer: ‘the weakness of the MHS inspection is it is quite possible to take a whole carcass which has been declared fit for human consumption and turn it into something that is unfit for human consumption’. Inspection of the meat further down the supply chain is the responsibility of the private sector. Apart from meat inspections, the MHS was given a mandate to raise standards in licensed slaughterhouses and cutting plants. In its first year of operation it established the baseline Hygiene Assessment System (HAS) scores for all licensed premises. The HAS score is a number between 0 and 100, with higher scores indicating better performance. The system was developed as an objective, risk-based method of assessing hygiene standards. Premises are assessed against performance criteria covering all significant aspects of production each weighted according to their relative risk. Assessments are carried out by an Official Veterinary Surgeon (OVS). These occur at least once a month at full-throughput premises and quarterly in low-throughput premises. Since September 1997, the HAS scores for all plants in the country have been published ‘so that the food industry and consumers can easily see the best and worst in the business’ (Meat Hygiene Enforcement Report, No. 5, September 1997). HAS scores are also used to allow the MHS to identify premises where additional supervision and enforcement action might be necessary. The MHS itself is audited by the State Veterinary Service (SVS). Any significant differences between the HAS scores obtained by the SVS and those produced by the MHS are investigated. In addition, MHS inspection staff are subject to disciplinary action if they approve contaminated carcasses or if they don’t enforce the hygiene regulations. Food Standards Agency (FSA) The proposal for a FSA arose from the British Labour Party in March 1997 as a part of its election platform. The idea was to introduce a major institutional cure for the catalogue of food scares that had faced the British public in the preceding 10 years and which had eroded confidence in the existing system. A request was made to Professor Philip James to produce a report on the function and structure of the proposed agency. The James Report was presented to Mr Tony Blair (leader of the Labour Party) on 30 April 1997. According to the James Report, the problem of ‘eroded confidence’ was not just one of public perception. Rather there were three institutional failings with the existing system. The first institutional failing was that MAFF appeared to have a conflict of interest. It had an important role to
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play in promoting the economic interests of the agriculture, fishing and food industries, but it was also responsible for protecting public health throughout the food chain (e.g. responsibility for many expert committees in the food safety area, veterinary monitoring and the MHS). Inevitably, there would be conflicts between concerns for food safety and the short-term economic needs of some industry sectors. According to James: What is needed, is a new body, which separates the role of protecting the public health and safety from that of promoting business. Such an Agency must operate openly so that decision-making becomes more transparent and the true balance of interests is subject to public scrutiny.
The second institutional failing was that there existed overlaps and gaps between MAFF, DoH and the other departments leading to fragmentation and lack of coordination in the monitoring and control of food safety. There is therefore a need for a single agency to act as a one-stop shop. The third failing was that the enforcement of food law was uneven throughout the UK. Regulations under the Food Safety Act 1990 are enforced to varying standards from authority to authority. In April 2000, the FSA was established as an open, independent organization with functions to: ● ● ●
provide advice and information to the public and to the government on food safety from farm to fork, nutrition and diet; protect consumers through effective enforcement and monitoring; and support consumer choice through promoting accurate and meaningful labelling.
The FSA is responsible to parliament through the Health Ministers. However, to safeguard its independence it has the unique legal power to publish the advice it gives to the government. With the creation of FSA, responsibility for food safety issues was transferred from MAFF. The MHS, which was previously accountable to the MAFF, was now made accountable to the FSA. Cattle Passports Scheme and computerized database The idea of cattle identification (via ear tags) has been around for a long time to control tuberculosis and to record breeding herds. However, the idea of cattle identification for food safety is relatively new. It began with EU Council Directive 92/102 of 27 November 1992 on the registration and identification of beef (and other) animals. However, the Cattle Passports Scheme was actually initiated as a precondition for lifting the EU beef export ban imposed in March 1996 following the UK Government’s admission of a possible link between vCJD and BSE. It was initiated under the Cattle Passports Order 1996 and came into force in July 1996.
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In September 1998, the cattle tracing system was modified following a new EC regulation (820/97) which required: 1. Animals born after 1 January 1998 were to be identified by an approved ear tag in each ear (double tagging). Double tagging involves a tag in each ear with the same unique identification code which makes it possible to identify each animal individually together with the holding on which it was born. Double tagging provides insurance in case one of the tags falls out. 2. Cattle passports would be compulsory in all Member States from 1 January 1998. 3. A computerized database was to be fully operational by 31 December 1999. 4. An up-to-date on-farm register was to be set up. In the UK, this new regulation was implemented through the Cattle Identification Regulations and managed by the British Cattle Movement Service (BCMS). BCMS was a new public sector organization, and a part of MAFF. It is envisaged that in due course it will move into the private sector or become an executive agency of MAFF. The BCMS maintains a register of births, deaths and imports of cattle, it issues cattle passports and it processes cattle movement information. It is expected to handle over 20 million cattle movements each year. With regard to the specific EU requirements: 1. All beef cattle in the UK are required to be double-tagged within 20 days of birth. There is currently no requirement for electronic tagging. 2. Britain’s cattle passport scheme was already in place in 1996. Farmers must apply for a passport from BCMS within 7 days of tagging. The passports contain information on the animal’s identity, origin and movement. 3. Information about the animal’s movements will be recorded on the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) and the keeper of the animal must report movements to BCMS. The CTS contains information on each animal’s: ● identification code; ● date of birth; ● sex; ● breed or colour of coat; ● identification code of the mother; ● identification number of the holding where born; ● identification numbers of all holdings where the animal has been kept and the dates of each change of holding; and ● date of death or slaughter. 4. Farmers are required to keep a register (either paper- or computer-based) that records the details of births, deaths and movements on to and off the holding.
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Beef Labelling Scheme The same EC Regulation (820/97) that introduced new requirements on cattle tracing also introduced the idea of a compulsory Beef Labelling System. All Member States of the EU were required to implement this regulation by 1 January 2000. The underlying principle of an efficient labelling system was held to be the possibility of tracing back any labelled beef to the animal or animals of origin. The compulsory Beef Labelling System was intended to require every label to contain: ● ●
a reference code ensuring ‘a link between, on the one hand, the identification of the carcass, quarter or pieces of meat, and on the other hand, the individual animal’; and the Member State or third country where the animal from which the beef derived was: (i) born; (ii) raised; and (iii) slaughtered.
The UK implemented the Regulation early (in 1998) through the Beef Labelling Scheme. Under this scheme, detailed labels on fresh and frozen beef must be approved by MAFF and verified by an independent body. The regulation applies to any label other than the basic information, which can be easily checked at point of sale or is already required by law (e.g. weight, cut, ‘best before’ date, storage conditions, cooking instructions, name of manufacturer). The regulation is designed to prevent giving consumers misinformation about the beef product. The following are examples of information for which approval is needed: ●
● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
where the beef comes from (i.e. where the animal was born, raised or slaughtered) – if it is desired to label the beef after a particular region, say ‘Scottish’, it is necessary that the animal be born, raised and slaughtered in that region; breed (e.g. Angus); age or sex; identification number of animal; method of production (e.g. organic, extensively reared, grass-fed); method of slaughter (e.g. Kosher); date of slaughter; method or length of maturation; and where a name is given to a product range (e.g. a quality assurance scheme).
The basic intent of the rules is to put the onus on the food business to prove that the information being applied is true and to employ an independent third party to verify the system for ensuring this. The scheme is administered by MAFF and approval will only be given once the required guarantees are given. MAFF personnel (Trading Standards Officers or EHOs) will carry out checks on retailers to ensure compliance.
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Non-governmental arrangements Farm Assurance Schemes Farm Assurance Schemes were developed in the early 1990s, partly in response to the BSE crisis and partly in response to pressure by retailers who saw this as a way of helping to satisfy the due diligence requirement of the 1990 Food Safety Act. The major farm assurance schemes covering beef production were Farm Assured Scotch Livestock (FASL), which began in 1991 and evolved into Scotch Quality Beef and Lamb Association (SQBLA) in 1995, and FABBL that began in 1992. In the beginning, these schemes were more popular among the processors and retailers than among the livestock producers. Many farmers did not see the value of them and resented having to pay the levies and the on-farm inspections. However, once the BSE crisis really started to bite, farmers became much more interested. In the early years, farmers were given financial incentives to join (by premiums and/or forgiveness of the levy). Once a critical number of farmers joined, these inducements disappeared. Membership of one of these schemes has virtually become a de facto requirement for gaining access to the market. For example, the major retailers buy their beef only through partnerships, and if a livestock producer wants to supply this market, membership in one of the recognized farm assurance schemes is essential. One example of a farm assurance scheme is SQBLA that sets standards covering: ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
origin of stock; stockmanship and animal welfare; feed composition and storage; housing and handling facilities; medicines and veterinary treatment; movement and record books; (animal) traceability; and livestock loading and transport.
Supermarket partnerships overlay these farm assurance schemes with their own requirements. For example, they might include additional quality criteria such as fat class, conformation, particular breed specification, and weight. Meat and Livestock Commission (MLC) The MLC was established under the Agriculture Act of 1967 to assist the development of the pig, beef cattle and sheep industries. It is independent of the government and (unlike the MHS) cannot operate on behalf of the government to determine whether a particular animal is fit or is not fit for human consumption. The MLC receives its funding from two levies plus fees
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for service. The general levy is payable in equal shares by livestock producers and abattoirs, while the species promotion levy is payable only by farmers. These funds are targeted at marketing, industry promotion, industry development, commissioned research, technology transfer and industry services. Most of the funding for the MLC comes from fees for service. The MLC carries out a number of industry services that are paid for on a full-cost recovery basis. These services include: livestock farm business consulting; independent carcass authentication service; quality assurance at all levels of the supply chain; and market information. The MLC has played a significant role in encouraging meat safety and quality in the UK. In 1991, it introduced blueprint programmes for British beef, pork and lamb. These blueprints contained a set of recommendations on the best way to handle animals, operate slaughterhouses, meat processors, etc. in order to get a quality commercial product. For example, the beef blueprint contained recommendations in seven areas: ● ● ● ● ● ● ●
standards for cattle procurement; standards for the loading and transport of live cattle; standards for abattoirs and cutting plants; specifications for carcasses and sides/quarters; specifications for primal and retail cuts; recommendations for cutting methods; and recommendations for labelling.
The major retailers were receptive to the MLC blueprints, which they used as a basis for determining the characteristics of their premium products. Building upon the blueprint initiative, and in response to reports of shoddy practices at some abattoirs, the MLC undertook two new initiatives to further enhance UK meat quality and safety. They were: (i) to develop the Assured British Meat (ABM) initiative, which is discussed in detail in the next section; and (ii) to provide independent safety and quality audits of meat plants. Let’s take a closer look at (ii) here. You may recall from earlier discussion, we said the MHS provided ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections at abattoirs to ensure some minimum level of food safety was attained. However, we also said it was quite possible to take a whole carcass, which the MHS had declared fit for human consumption, and turn it into something that was unfit for human consumption by substandard hygiene practices further downstream. The major retailers were particularly concerned about this because of the recently introduced Food Safety Act. They were looking for a way to audit their suppliers and hence show due diligence (as this could be used in a court of law as a defence against criminal liability for selling unhygienic food). After 1990, retailers began to hire their own food safety technicians to audit suppliers to ensure they (their suppliers) met their food safety and quality criteria. Each retailer developed its own set of standards of safety and quality. Then a few independent companies emerged to provide independent audits of the suppliers’ premises, procedures and practices against an approved standard.
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In 1994, MLC formed a joint venture with Campden & Chorleywood Food Research Association, which they called EFSIS (European Food Safety Inspection Service). EFSIS was one of the few independent auditing companies, which rose to prominence at this time. Apart from EFSIS, the main auditing firms include Law Laboratories, Total Legal Compliance and National Britannia. EFSIS became the largest of such auditing services in the UK with 65% of the UK market. EFSIS provides two levels of acceptance for food supply firms: ● ●
food supply status – where there is a guarantee of safe food; and accredited standard – where the firm complies with every element of the standard.
The ‘accredited standard’ takes into account other factors in addition to food safety, such as animal welfare, environmental impact and traceability. Actual requests for audits may come from manufacturers or from retailers. However, the manufacturer generally pays for the audit. Recently, EFSIS separated its association with the MLC becoming a completely self-financed company. This was to ensure no possibility of a conflict of interests between the activities of