FINANCING TERRORISM
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Financing Terrorism Edited by
MARK PIETH University of Basel, Switzerland
Partly reprinted from European Journal of Law Reform Vol. 4, No. 2, 2002
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS NEW YORK, BOSTON, DORDRECHT, LONDON, MOSCOW
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Contents
Editorial: The Financing of Terrorism – Criminal and Regulatory Reform Mark Pieth
1
Articles Globalization, Terrorist Finance, and Global Conflict – Time for a White List? Jonathan M. Winer
5
How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help Prevent the Misuse of Financial Institutions in the Financing of Terrorism? Charles Freeland
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Financing of Terrorism – A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering? Armand Kersten
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Obstacles in Company Law to Anti-Money Laundering International Co-Operation in European Union Member States Ernesto U. Savona
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Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? Michael Levi and William Gilmore
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Financing of Terrorism: Following the Money Mark Pieth
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Documentation FATF Cracks Down on Terrorist Financing
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FATF Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing
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Financial Action Task Force Guidance for Financial Institutions in Detecting Terrorism
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vi
Contents
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
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Council Common Position of 27 December 2001 on the Application of Specific Measures to Combat Terrorism
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Customer Due Diligence for Banks
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Wolfsberg Group Pledges Anti-Terrorism Support
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The Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism – Wolfsberg Statement
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Editorial: The Financing of Terrorism – Criminal and Regulatory Reform
1. The first shock of 11 September, the disbelief and the emotional turmoil, led many politicians and experts to conceptualize the events of that day as something totally new, different from anything experienced thus far. Accordingly, reactions had to be phrased in superlatives. The use of the imagery of an all-out ‘War against Terrorism’ did not immediately generate the sceptical reactions that the much abused formula of ‘War on Drugs’ is currently provoking – especially amongst Europeans. And at least for a month or so after the event, one even accepted a drastic step-up in security measures. Many legislators hastily enacted new laws, some of which have primarily symbolic value; others, however, will seriously restrict civil rights, especially those of foreigners. Gradually over time, once things had settled down and ‘normality’ had been restored, it became evident that politics and political interest groups took over the discourse on terrorism as they tend to do on all issues. It appeared logical at first to fight terrorism with all available means including controlling and blocking access to the financial markets and institutions. Eventually, it became evident that fighting terrorism was to be set apart in a different category from other topics of equal gravity. This became particularly apparent when the US and some US-inspired international fora requested international support to combat terrorism whilst, at the same time, the former attempted to block serious efforts to create a standing International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity. Of course, all the issues at stake are much more complex, yet the public discussion in the media does beg the question why one should be tough on terrorism and rather less than consistent on genocide. Returning to our topic concerning the financing of terrorism, the cracks in the coalition against terrorism have become more and more visible over the last few months. First, the states leading the fight against terrorism refused to give an abstract definition of terrorism, instead they preferred to blacklist individuals and organizations in an ad hoc fashion and solely on the basis of information supplied by intelligence agencies, thereby by-passing any democratic discussion. National financial supervisors mirrored this abstention by refusing to give financial institutions appropriate guidance on what they regarded as terrorism: M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 1–3. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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the banks have been required to carry the risks and distinguish between freedom fighters and terrorists. To illustrate this with a complicated example, how – for instance – should the banks deal with a charity fund for family members of jailed IRA members? Is such a fund now to be considered support for a terrorist cause or a legitimate charity? Refusing to give clear guidance and then to criticize financial institutions for not having taken precautions seems unfair. The Financial Action Task Force against Money Laundering (FATF), the UN, the EU and other organizations have recently enacted binding instruments and recommendations to combat the financing of terrorism; however, professional bankers in particular are doubtful whether the ‘red flag’-lists are of any real practical assistance. Even if it is clear that money laundering and the financing of terrorism should not be confused, one post-September 11 outcome has been the political compulsion finally to enact legislation against financial crime and money laundering even in countries and territories that have so far fallen short of international standards. And here I am not only talking about the so-called ‘non co-operative countries and territories’ defined by the FATF, but also the rather reluctant countries within the FATF, like the US, who are now using the socalled ‘Patriot Act’ to fill the gaps in their ‘KYC’-policy. 2. It is therefore no coincidence that this volume, in the context of the financing of terrorism, addresses some of the traditional core issues established in 1990 to combat money laundering with the emergence of the first set of rules by the FATF. Just how far are the existing rules against money laundering helpful in preventing the financing of terrorism? Armand Kersten, Senior Compliance Officer of a bank that is active worldwide, warns us that it would be unwise to mix the issues of the financing of terrorism and money laundering. However, he does not doubt the logic of identifying funds related to terrorism, and rightly points out the difficulties of so doing when examining transactions. Charles Freeland, Deputy Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and co-author of the new Customer Due Diligence guidelines of the BCBS, rightly indicates that ‘CDD’ and ‘KYC’ procedures are a key component in preventing the misuse of the financial sector by terrorists. The package offered by the BCBS – a long outstanding supplement to the AML standards – is an antidote to a broad array of risks confronting the commercial banker. Ernesto Savona, Professor at the University of Trento (Italy), founder and director of Transcrime, focuses on another issue that for an astonishingly long time was left on the back-burner: the use of ‘corporate vehicles’ (including IBC’s and trusts) as a much-used means to evade identification of beneficial ownership and a handy tool for money launderers to frustrate legal and administrative co-operation in anti-money laundering investigations. Michael Levi, Professor at the University of Cardiff (UK) and expert on
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financial crime, and Bill Gilmore, Professor at the University of Edinburgh, critically explore the mechanisms of peer pressure (monitoring) that have enabled the expansion of international standards on money laundering to the world of financial centres over the last decade. Similar monitoring mechanisms are now being used to enforce compliance with the rules against the financing of terrorism within the world community. Myself, I locate the reactions to September 11 within the development of regulations in the financial sector and raise a few critical questions regarding the direction that the most recent moves are taking. Jonathan Winer’s text, the first in this volume, could also appropriately be placed at the end. Even if the different aspects of macro-crime (e.g. organized crime, terrorism, money laundering, grand corruption and embezzlement of State funds by dictators) raise diverse legal issues, they are accurately set in context. The standards gradually developed into a global body of rules, attempting to regulate multinational financial institutions, since national regulators are no longer able to oversee the worldwide business of transnational corporations located in their territory. He offers a series of concrete suggestions to be picked up in the current discourse on banking regulation, sparked off by the BCBS, the FATF and also by a group of private banks, the ‘Wolfsberg-Initiative’. Mark Pieth
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Globalization, Terrorist Finance, and Global Conflict: Time for a White List? Jonathan M. Winer*
I.
11 September 2001: Global Financial Transparency Under Construction
When the terrorists trained by Osama bin Laden destroyed the two World Trade Center towers, their actions revealed both the globalization of terrorist finance, and the potentially Herculean task facing governments seeking to combat both it and other serious trans-border problems involving flows of money from illicit sources or for illicit purposes. Relying on a mere 500,000 USD in total expenditures, nineteen terrorists were able to enter the United States repeatedly, train as commercial pilots, engage in intercontinental air travel, rent cars, establish personal bank accounts, obtain ATM cards, and generally live adequately funded lives in the months prior to the attack. After 11 September, some of the funds involved were traced to an account in Dubai, a country that houses not only its own banks, but major US and European banks, banks from throughout the Islamic world, purely Islamic banks, alternative or underground remittance systems (hawalas), gold dealers, and myriad financial institutions handling transactions to such States as Iran and Iraq. While little had been done to implement the standards at the time, Dubai was actually one of the very few countries in the Middle East (the others being Cyprus and Israel) to have even basic money laundering legislation in place. In theory, since the previous year, financial institutions in Dubai had been prohibited from taking anonymous funds for anonymous accounts, which previously had been lawful. By contrast, if one wanted to place funds for a terrorist from Saudi Arabia, for example, or from Bahrain, Yemen, Malaysia, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China, the
* The author was US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Law
Enforcement from 1994 through 1999. He currently practices international financial services law at the firm of Alston & Bird LLP in Washington, DC and can be contacted at
[email protected]. An earlier version of this paper was undertaken in late 2001 and early 2002 with the support of the Norwegian FAFO Institute in Oslo, Norway. M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 5–40. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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Philippines, Nigeria, or Somalia, to name only a few, opportunities for anonymity would be wide-open. In these countries, there were effectively no limits on the anonymous placement of money, either in law or in practice, and indeed several of them retained a legacy of large numbers of anonymous accounts that could be freely traded as needed to practically anyone. Sources of funds for terrorism were also little constrained. For Islamic terrorists, vast sums were available to those carrying out charitable work, including militant resistance, in Islamic outposts under siege – such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Kashmir, and Chechnya – donated by wealthy Gulf State Muslims giving zakir. Further funding was made available by siphoning off donations for more ordinary charitable work in many other jurisdictions within Islamic communities. These funds merely added to the seed money available on an ongoing basis from the proceeds of narcotics. Alternatively, terrorists have had numerous opportunities to generate revenues through fraudulent conversion of social benefits, migrant smuggling, document fraud, stealing cars, gun-running, or even working for the money. Thus, money, the life-blood of all kinds of organized crime, and regardless of its involvement in terrorist deposits and withdrawals has coursed rather freely through the veins of the global financial infrastructure. Long before 11 September, other forms of financial scandal had demonstrated the ease with which criminals, drug traffickers, illicit combatants, guerrillas, and other persons and entities engaged in socially condemned behaviour have been able to launder their money. And repeatedly, governments, regulators, law enforcement agencies, and the most important and prestigious international organizations have found themselves unable to trace illicit transactions after something goes radically wrong. Thus, terrorist finance can be seen from this perspective as a subset of a larger problem, that of non-transparent movements of money in a system to which much of the world has easy access. Financial non-transparency has facilitated not only terrorism, but also many of the world’s more significant social ills, including civil war and civic instability. For example, the laundering of the proceeds of crime is a necessary means to carry out the trade in diamonds that has fuelled civil conflict in Liberia, Angola and Sierra Leone, together with their accompanying arms deals and payoffs. The narcotics trade has long been understood as a massive generator of illicit money to be laundered, as well as a generator of corruption and weakened governance. Drug trafficking is also closely associated with conflict, and one of the enduring factors in such conflict is the fact that drug funds sustain combatants in civil wars. It is no accident that each of the three countries which produce most of the world’s opium and coca crops – Afghanistan, Burma, and Colombia – have ongoing insurrections fuelled by drug money, in which terrorist acts (or their equivalents) have become a common element of daily life. The global attention focused on terrorism and terrorist finance as a result of the 11 September attacks on the United States provides a fresh vantage point on what has become an increasingly longstanding, significant problem. As an increasing number of significant global problems became linked to illicit finance, money
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laundering was recognized in the 1990s as a global problem requiring a global response. Prior to 11 September, this response included new international instruments, such as the 2000 United Nations Convention to Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the Second Money Laundering Directive, issued by the European Union in late 2001. It has also included the rapid movement of ‘name and shame’ sanction programmes. Most prominent among these has been the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) against ‘non-co-operative countries and territories’. In the first two years that the FATF threatened to limit market access to jurisdictions not meeting international standards, most of the nearly twenty targeted jurisdictions enacted new anti-money laundering laws. A similar exercise against ‘unfair tax competition’ undertaken by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is having a similar impact on ring-fencing, the strategy by which jurisdictions offer non-residents unregulated financial services, which they deny to their own citizens. Major self-regulatory organizations, such as the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BGBS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) also focused on extending standards for international regulation to cover transparency issues.1 The new standards were designed to respond to the major failures of existing financial regulation to provide protection against illegal activities. Each organization focused on major gaps in the international regulatory system that translated into injuries to domestic supervision and enforcement. These gaps included: Fragmented supervision within countries by sector and among countries by national jurisdiction. Exploitation of differences in national provisions for regulatory arbitrage to circumvent more stringent national laws and international standards. Secrecy laws which impede the sharing of information among countries and between regulators and law enforcement. Inadequate attention to electronic payments in existing anti-money laundering supervision and enforcement, including ‘know your customer’ rules that focus on currency, even as the world’s financial services businesses rapidly continue their move into e-money. The lack of international standards governing key mechanisms used in transnational financial transactions, such as international business companies (IBCs), offshore trusts, offshore insurance and reinsurance companies, and offshore funding vehicles, including but not limited to hedge funds.
1
See, e.g., Statement of the G-7, 18 June 1999; ‘Strengthening the International Financial Architecture’, Report of the G7 Finance Ministers, 18–20 June 1999; ‘Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money-Laundering’, UN ODCCP, New York, May 1998; and numerous recent analytic documents of the Basel Committee available on the website of the Bureau of International Settlements (BIS).
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Minimal due diligence by company formation agents, attorneys, and financial institutions in the process of incorporating and licensing of new financial institutions and shell companies and trusts owned by their affiliates. In response, there has been a convergence in the standards of protection in many countries against various simultaneous threats. In essence, the standards have begun to require a form of ‘know your customer’ at both the front end and the back end of any transaction. At the front end, bankers and other financial facilitators are now required to know with whom they are dealing, and at some level, what their customers have been doing with their money. At the back end, those permitting withdrawals of funds need to know not only who has been getting the money but also where it came from. That way, should something go wrong, it should be possible to trace the funds. Despite these efforts, the globalization of money makes tracing increasingly more difficult. Thus, the need to establish uniform standards, end bank secrecy, create mechanisms for the exchange of information between national regulators and law enforcement organizations with their counterparts, and the decision to ‘name and shame’ jurisdictions that failed to adopt and live by the new rules. In 1989, when the FATF was created, there was some scepticism about the ability of even OECD countries to agree on common standards, let alone to live by them. A decade later, when the FATF’s non-co-operative countries and territories initiative began, common standards became comprehensive, and the consensus existed that they should be made universal. Thus, by 11 September, the name and shame exercises were well on the way to universality. Over time, the existing international initiatives in response to these problems began to create a new global code articulating new international standards for transparency. And yet, these initiatives failed to do much to prevent the September terrorists from carrying out their plans. One could argue that these regimes are too new and incomplete to have had an impact, especially in a world where the proceeds of the world’s largest extractive industry, oil, remained largely opaque despite all of the transparency initiatives. In this view, objectives are long-term and the belated response to the globalization of the financial infrastructure cannot be expected to fix long-standing problems overnight, especially in such regions as the Middle East, which only began to adopt the regulatory standards of more established international financial services centres. However, it is also possible that the basic idea of a universal standard for all governments, given our global diversity, is inherently flawed. Each of the new initiatives has been based on the promise that national financial service regulators have the capacity to determine whether their own ‘local’ institutions meet the standards or not. Under the principle of consolidated supervision, the home-country regulator of any international financial institution is solely responsible for exercising oversight over the global operations of that institution. Over the past ten years, the principle of consolidated supervision has proven helpful but far from infallible in protecting safety and soundness by requiring multi-jurisdictional financial institu-
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tions to take at least their home regulators very seriously. In turn, these home regulators are increasingly subject to a common set of standards, such as those established by the Basel Group of Bank Supervisors (Basel Group). Over time, these standards have come to promote global financial stability by promoting good practices for banks in their lending and investment practices. However, the same system has to date demonstrably failed to do much to protect the world from money laundering or terrorist finance.
II. The Capacity Problem Can governments that stop at borders regulate financial activity that crosses borders at the speed of light amid billions of electronic ones and noughts? Even if one does not consider the special problems posed by terrorist finance and the inadequacy of financial transparency regimes in the Middle East, there is mounting evidence to justify questioning whether global banks, operating transnationally to move money instantaneously across national borders, can be readily regulated or supervised by any one country. While such financial institutions may have their headquarters nominally based in a single country – typically one of the G–7 countries, the EU, or Switzerland – they generate profits and carry out activities at a global level involving dozens of UN Member States. As a result, they are for many purposes beyond the capacity of any single state to police. The current ‘name and shame’ exercises have had the salutary effect of forcing some of the world’s least-adequately regulated jurisdictions to abandon traditional notions of bank secrecy, and to begin insisting that their financial institutions carry out due diligence and know their customers. But these exercises have not and cannot create any capacity at a national level to assess the meaning and integrity of cross-border financial transactions. It is not reasonable to expect a small jurisdiction that houses a subsidiary of a major international financial institution to fully understand the cross-border transactions engaged in by the subsidiary, let alone by its affiliates or far-away parent. In practice, even the most sophisticated and best regulated financial centres, including those of the G–7, European Union, and Switzerland, are similarly incapable of exercising adequate oversight over the global enterprises they license. In recent years, the proposed solution has been a mixture of public sector regulation and private sector self-regulation. Self-regulation has been advocated as a means by which private institutions subject to market forces will, as a matter of good business, avoid transactions that are exposed on that institution or its reputation to undue risk. However, it is not clear that this approach has been effective. Indeed, the combination of both government regulation and selfregulation has not to date effectively discouraged abuse of international financial institutions by drug traffickers, terrorists, major financial criminals, corrupt officials, arms smugglers, or sanctioned regimes, not to mention those engaged in
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local civil conflict, timber theft, or other criminal activity. Today, there is no list that evaluates whether international financial institutions have complied with basic rules of transparency or integrity. On the ‘name and shame’ side, there is no compilation ranking major international institutions according to their involvement in the laundering of proceeds from drug trafficking, corruption, terrorist finance, illegal logging, toxic waste, human trafficking, or corporate fraud, although such a ranking might be compiled from court documents, public investigations and press reports. Nor has there been a list involving a ‘seal’ or ‘certificate’ system by which an institution can be endorsed as having put into place a series of best practices to promote transparency. Every year, many billions of dollars flow from international organizations and international financial institutions through the world’s major international banks. These public funds are deposited and held in these private-sector institutions without considering if these institutions have put into place excellent transparency policies and procedures, or minimal ones. Indeed, such funds are deposited and held in private sector institutions that have had no due diligence or knowledge of a customer’s principles, if they happen to be located in jurisdictions where such principles are either not required or are minimally enforced. The value of such deposits to the private sector financial institutions is substantial, generating not only substantial fees but the ability to engage in further lending activities of their own, due to the multiplier effect of bank deposits. To date, the only limitations placed on those holding or benefiting from such international funds has been the obligation of the institutions to account for the uses of those funds adequately. Broader obligations, such as a requirement that a particular bank implement strong guarantees of financial transparency or protective measures against money laundering, have not been demanded of private sector banks by the international organizations and international financial institutions that deposit their funds in such institutions. Rewarding private sector institutions who agree to meet high standards of transparency for the funds they process on a global basis could create a significant incentive for banks, providing additional weight to existing national efforts. At the same time, access to the international financial services infrastructure by regions and institutions that have no controls on placement increases the world’s vulnerability to terrorism. The post–11 September co-operation of Middle Eastern and other Islamic countries in tracing the funds of particular terrorists represents an important development in responding to the threat posed by terrorism in the financial context. However, ‘back-end’ reconstruction of particular terrorist events after they have taken place is vastly insufficient, so long as the front-door remains wide open. Controls on placement, including rigorous ‘know your customer’ standards, are as essential as they are culturally unlikely in many countries. Thus, carrots and sticks need to be developed to ensure that private sector institutions in those regions have just as many incentives as do private sector institutions in countries such as Switzerland where, despite a history of bank secrecy, the need for financial transparency is now accepted. There is an obvious opportunity in this for world policy makers. The question is whether they can accept the fact that
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globalized money requires not only globalized standards, but also an agreement on globalized incentives for the private sector not merely to adopt but to enforce these standards as a means to ensure their own survival.
III. Structural Consequences of the Globalization of Money It may be self-evident that globalization has changed many practical elements of banking and financial services. However, the political consequences of globalized financial services are often not spelled out.
Prior to Globalization Money was local. Prior to globalization and since the days when money based on something real, like shells or gold, was replaced by state-created ‘fiat money’, money in circulation in most countries has generally been issued by sovereign states. Alternatively, it has been issued by private sector financial institutions regulated by the sovereign state in which the institution was based. The stored value that money represents has been a value determined locally by the people within the jurisdiction that issued the currency in relation to the value of other commodities traded in that individual economy. Money was trusted locally to the extent that others would accept it in the society. To the extent that the national currency was valued at a distance by other countries, that currency would tend to be discounted, given that its principal value for the purchase of goods and services was local. Banks were local. Although international finance is certainly not a new phenomenon, with international lending a substantial and familiar activity by the third quarter of the 19th century, most banking prior to the era of globalization and securitization was done at a local level by local banks. These local banks were largely dependent on their local community, and vice-versa, with the respective fates of the local banks and the local communities at least moderately interdependent. To go beyond the community was potentially dangerous for a bank, because of the substantial impediments to enforcing a financial obligation at a distance. Cross-border transactions were costly and slow. Prior to the establishment of comprehensive electronic-payment systems in the last two decades, cross-border financial transactions were largely conducted on paper that required physical transport. For most transactions, the efficiencies of conducting such transactions locally would outweigh the benefits of obtaining a broader market of buyers or sellers, depositors or borrowers beyond the particular jurisdiction. In particular, uses of the offshore sector, such as the Caribbean or the Channel Islands, were limited to very large financial institutions for tax structuring and trade finance, or alternatively to small-time operators specializing in tax and creditor avoidance schemes. Access to the offshore sector was not something available to the ordinary business or citizen.
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For corrupt heads of state, money moving abroad was typically hand-carried to Switzerland. Regulators could monitor local financial services. In an environment in which most money was generated and spent locally, and not readily substituted for by other currencies in other jurisdictions, regulators were free to develop local regulatory regimes for local purposes. Some of these regimes were minimalist, others were comprehensive, and few would have met what, today, constitute the basic standards for safety and soundness. However, subject to local politics and the corruption factor, the regulatory regimes were inherently enforceable as an expression of national sovereignty. A financial institution definitively found to have engaged in unacceptable misbehaviour could be fined, lose its license, and be closed. While bank runs, bank frauds, and bank collapses remained an enduring part of the economic life of any free-market jurisdiction, enforcement at a local level was possible, and a recognized fact likely to have a substantial impact on market behaviour within the regulated institutions. Taxes were collected at borders. Prior to globalization, the preponderant mechanism for governments to collect revenues was not by taxing income, but by tariffs, levied on goods at point of sale and, especially, when crossing borders. In such a tax regime, strong controls at the borders, including currency controls, were vital to the survival of the state, as revenue collection required the border to be a barrier before it could be a crossing. In this environment, barriers at the border, including barriers to unregulated cross-border finance, were an essential element of preserving and protecting national sovereignty.
After Globalization Money is a global commodity. Although a government can give its currency a name and a putative value, the actual value of a currency in a globalized world is determined by global markets, private sector assessments of its value in comparison with other forms of stored value. Similar valuation is given to any particular currency the world over, regardless of location, making money a commodity whose value can be affected by the actions of the government that issued it, but not controlled by it. The loss of local control over money has meant that the valuations given to it locally may be less relevant to its strength as a durable commodity – an object that stores value – than the valuations given to it by those who have no particular stake in that currency. Being a global commodity, money may also be less susceptible to local control and regulation. As Alan Greenspan, chairman of the United States’ Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, has observed: ‘In the international arena [...] no overarching sovereign exists to decree what is money. Instead, a myriad of private agents must somehow reach agreement.’ 2
2
‘The euro as an international currency’, speech given by Alan Greenspan before the Euro 50 Group Roundtable, Washington, DC, 30 November 2001.
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Banks are international. Where local banks were once dependent on local economies, international banks invest their capital wherever opportunities may present themselves, whether they are in New York, Jakarta, or Moscow. Home regulators cannot confine them, and indeed, neither can home regulation. If a local regulation appears inconvenient, it can be avoided by structuring some of the elements of the financial activity offshore. In many instances, transacting financial services offshore is more efficient and less expensive than conducting similar services on-shore. The offshore sector’s minimal regulation reduces transaction costs.3 Regulators cannot monitor international financial institutions. The principle of home-country consolidated supervision notwithstanding, home-country regulators do not in practice audit international financial institutions internationally. They more largely rely on self-regulation and reporting by the institutions they regulate. A financial institution that does not tell the truth to its regulator about its offshore activities runs the risk of eventual exposure and punishment. In the meantime, however, there is little effective supervision. As a consequence, there has been the opportunity (and perhaps the market imperative) for financial institutions with cross-border operations to behave with relative impunity, especially in the operations they carry out in smaller, less fully regulated jurisdictions. Borders do not block transactions. With tariffs largely gone and electronic money able to move across the planet at the speed of light, control of money at the border is largely anachronistic. Electronic currency is essentially incapable of cross-border monitoring. Cross-border movements of currency can be monitored, and countries can impose cross-border currency declaration requirements, but these requirements can be readily circumvented through alternative remittance systems that substitute netting for cross-border currency movements. To the extent that domestic regulations impose burdens involving obligations to maintain certain levels of liquidity, transparency, or payment of taxes, those with money may circumvent domestic regulations entirely through capital flight. The ineffectiveness of borders means flight capital need not truly flee. Russian oligarchs have vividly demonstrated that after illicit proceeds have been laundered elsewhere, they can be readily brought back into the home jurisdiction for reinvestment with no practical impediments to its integration into the formal financial system.
3
For a detailed treatment of the development of globalized finance through the 20th century, see Michael D. Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, and Doulas A. Irwin, ‘Is Globalization Today Really Different Than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?’ in Brookings Trade Forum, vol. 2 (Susan M. Collins and Robert Z. Lawrence, eds.) (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 1–50; the short answer to the question in the study’s title is ‘yes’.
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IV. Practical Impact of Globalized Illicit Finance on Political Stability and on Areas of Conflict The integration of electronic financial payments systems into a globally ubiquitous network is of remarkably recent vintage, gathering speed in the 1980s and only reaching widespread coverage at the consumer level with the rapid proliferation of internationally linked automatic teller machines in the mid-1990s. The benefits of this integrated payments system for international businesses and travellers have been immeasurable. However, these same benefits have simultaneously worked to the advantage of those exploiting the dark side of globalization. The Money Launderer’s Common Financial Infrastructure. Global banking has provided continuing technical services to a wide range of practical destabilizers. Periodic eruptions of scandal have shown that drug and arms money launderers, diamond and timber smugglers, traffickers in people, terrorists, and corrupt officials chose a similar range of institutions to move and maintain their funds. These institutions typically include (a) small international business companies or trusts, established in jurisdictions of convenience, which establish (b) bank accounts at local financial institutions, which have correspondent banking relationships with (c) major international financial institutions, which (d) move funds willy-nilly throughout the world without regard to the provenance of the funds. Thus, over time, a taxonomy of scandals shows money laundering activity to have been facilitated, at one time or another, by Bank of America, 4 the Bank of New York, 5 Barclay’s Bank, 6 Chase Manhattan (now J.P.Morgan-Chase), 7 Citibank, 8 Crédit Lyonnais,9 Crédit Suisse, (now CSFB)10 Daiwa,11 Deutschebank, 12 Swiss Bank Corporation 13 (now part of UBS-AG), and Union Bank of Switzerland (now UBS-AG). 14 In some of these cases, the financial institutions may have been acting knowingly or negligently. In other cases, the institutions themselves did nothing wrong under existing laws and
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13 14
Handled proceeds of money laundering for a suspect Antiguan financial institution. Handled funds of Benex, which laundered billions of dollars from Russia, including some for Russian organized crime. Handled terrorist funds for Al-Qaeda. Handled proceeds of Colombian cocaine trafficking. Handled proceeds of Colombian cocaine trafficking, and drug-related funds from Mexico’s Raul Salinas. Involved in massive financial frauds in connection with French political scandal. Involved in handling stolen funds from Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos; reportedly indicted by the Swiss government in connection with its handling of the funds of Sani Abacha of Nigeria 6 December 2000. See ‘CS to be indicted in Abacha inquiry’, Financial Times, 7 December 2000. Laundered funds in the Caribbean to cover trading losses. Handling terrorist funds for Al-Qaeda. Handling stolen funds from Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos. Involved in handling stolen funds from Philippines of Ferdinand Marcos.
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frameworks. The fault lay not in the institutions, but rather in a system of international regulation that created neither legal norms nor regulatory mechanisms to prevent abuse. The infrastructure for non-transparent international finance has nodes that have specialized in particular kinds of services. For example, until recently, the Bahamas and the Virgin Islands have been among the world’s principal creators of anonymous international business companies (IBCs). The Channel Islands, Gibraltar, and the Dutch Antilles have been world-class centres for the establishment of trusts to hide the true ownership of funds. A single firm in Liechtenstein laundered political slush funds for ruling political parties in France and Germany; arms purchases for civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone; drug money for Ecuadorian cocaine trafficker Jose Reyes-Torres, and stolen funds for various West African dictators. 15 The Liechtenstein example is not unique. Financial nodes that initially provide services for one purpose, such as tax evasion, over time attract more sinister illicit purposes. Case Study: Cyprus. Since World War II, Cyprus has provided trade finance and related services for a variety of cross-border trade and commercial activities throughout the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Many operating in this region have had practical reasons to avoid regulations in their home jurisdictions, as well as high taxes, bribes, the risk of nationalization, and political instability. Accordingly, Cyprus developed a strong financial secrecy regime, available through banking services, company formation, trusts, and related mechanisms. By the 1970s, this system had come to be used by terrorist organizations, arms dealers. Middle Eastern drug traffickers, Italian mafias, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Israeli criminals, among many others. By the mid–1990s, as Cyprus sought to put into place a more transparent financial regime to prepare for entry into the European Union, many of the traditional illicit interests left the jurisdiction. Even then, elements of Al-Qaeda and much of the illicit finance that sustained Slobodan Milosevic’s control of Yugoslavia and his sustained war in Bosnia and Kosovo remained embedded in Cyprus’ financial institutions. Systems for transporting illicit funds, once established, become difficult to close even for a jurisdiction with strong incentives to do so. Import and Export Fraud: Key Elements of the Financing of Illicit Timber and Conflict Diamonds. Illicit exploitation of a country’s natural resources is a common feature of jurisdictions experiencing serious failures of governance. Such cases typically involve both failures of legitimacy and of capacity. The complex political question of who has the right to control a country’s natural resources devolves into the simpler question of who has the capacity to exercise such control in practice. The power to gain access to natural resources, to strip them, to transport them out of the country, and to reap the financial benefits becomes the major practical requirements 15
See, e.g., extensive material on money laundering allegations involving Liechtenstein, including excerpts from a German government report, on website: < http://www.marcosbillions.com >.
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for those seeking to exploit them. The financial benefits are the major point of the asset stripping. Given the weakness of national currencies in such jurisdictions, obtaining money from beyond the jurisdiction, is the sine qua non of the entire enterprise. Much of the money may, in turn, remain outside the jurisdiction, functioning as a political slush or retirement fund, or returned to the jurisdiction to pay for weapons, bribes, or luxury cars. One of the most widespread mechanisms for laundering money is the use of false import and export documentation. Through the technique of under-invoicing, corrupt exporters declare a smaller quantity of the exported good, and then typically share the proceeds of the additional ‘invisible’ export with their partner, usually either the importer or the shipper. Through over-invoicing, a corrupt exporter can pretend to ship goods that do not exist, as a cover for reimporting and legitimizing previously earned profits from other illicit activities. Both techniques provide effective mechanisms for facilitating trafficking in illicit commodities, such as conflict or stolen diamonds and timber. The corrupt payments, false documentation, theft of resources and evasion of controls, domestic and international, are an integrated set of criminal activities. For example, in the logging of Burma’s frontier forests, the chainsaws and woodsmen would have no business without the simultaneous participation in the trade of corrupt officials and transnational logging companies, who make substantial payments through financial institutions to pay for the illicit timber.16 Similarly, money laundering is an integrated component of all other major cross-border environmental crimes, such as CFC smuggling and toxic waste dumping.17 Each component of the activities is essential to the success and continuation of the overall enterprise. Thus, disruption of any element of the total activity, including the ability to move funds in and out of the jurisdictions involved, becomes a substantial impediment to its viability. Case Study: Sierra Leone. It has been said that the point of civil conflict in African countries such as Sierra Leone is not to win the war, but to ‘engage in profitable crime under cover of warfare’, with the major opportunities involving
16
17
See, e.g., Bangkok Post, 26 March 1999, ‘Massive Kickbacks Alleged;’ ‘Business Indonesia’, ‘Two Sawmills owned by General Assembly Member buys Illegal Logs’, 2 February 2000. Within the US for example, smuggling of CFCs from outside the US into the US was estimated by a US government study to amount to 60 million pounds of CFCs between 1994 and 1997 from such countries as Mexico, Russia and Venezuela. In a series of cases, the US indicted the smugglers for money laundering violations, as well as environmental crimes. See EPA Enforcement Actions Under Title VI of the Clean Air Act, ‘Texas Man Arrested For Smuggling Freon Into US – Arrest Underscores Federal Crackdown on Black Market in Ozone-Depleting Chemicals’, 24 June 1999. Currently, China and India, both countries with essentially no money laundering laws, are the world’s major source of illicit CFCs, especially to countries in the European Union, in violation of the Montreal Protocol. Detailed information on the illicit CFC trade has been brought together by the London-based NGO, the Environmental Investigation Agency.
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diamonds, illicit timber, narcotics, and weapons smuggling. 18 As a consequence of the work of the British non-governmental organization Global Witness and other groups since December 1998, there has been widespread recognition that ‘conflict diamonds’ were fuelling civil wars in Sierra Leone and Angola. When international sanctions were put into place, the normal revenues from international trade for the participants in each country’s civil wars were eliminated. Diamonds became the key currency for the criminals. The value of the diamonds increased exponentially once they were smuggled out of the region and into Western Europe for processing. Thus, the laundering of the proceeds of the diamonds was an essential component in sustaining the conflicts. In response, a system has been established that requires a series of certificates to follow diamonds as they are transported, in an effort to establish a chain-of-custody that documents the legitimacy of such diamonds and thereby makes it more difficult for diamond sales to support civil war and vice-versa. Yet, while it has been recognized that the conflict diamonds have been largely purchased and processed in Antwerp, Belgium, home to numerous international banks, there is literally no public documentation on the nature of the money laundering involved in the conflict diamond trade. What is evident, even in the absence of data, is that banks in Belgium – not just banks in Western Africa – handled the proceeds of conflict diamonds without impediment, thereby making the business viable. Were financial institutions operating in Belgium effectively prohibited from laundering the proceeds of illicit diamonds, the value of such diamonds in Antwerp would be necessarily reduced, given the heightened risk to any financial institution processing the proceeds. The money flows continued unimpeded until DeBeers, the largest buyer of the conflict diamonds, determined that the risk to its reputation substantially exceeded any profits from transactions, and moved to create impediments to the illicit business. Money laundering regulation in Sierra Leone and Belgium, among other countries, was so weak that it never became a factor in the suppression of the business. Case Study: Liberia. The Liberia of Charles Taylor has sometimes been termed ‘a criminal state’, in which the president, an escapee from an American prison, presides over a series of criminal businesses that include indiscriminate logging, looting of diamond mines, systematic theft of public funds, drug trafficking, and extortion. 19 Few substantial sources of revenue in the country have remained outside the control of Taylor and his corrupt associates. Throughout Liberia’s civil war, Liberia has also remained a tax haven, offering ‘flag of convenience’ services in a variety of sectors,
18 19
Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazelton, ‘The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds and Human Security’, Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000. There is no authoritative estimate of Taylor’s illicit wealth, although it is widely understood to come from the sale of iron ore and timber within Liberia, and diamonds obtained from Sierra Leone. See, e.g., ‘Liberia stokes African gem war’, Financial Times, 10 July 2000. The Sierrra Leone UN Expert Panel Report of 2000 describes Taylor’s use of diamonds from Liberia as a source of personal revenue.
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with the revenues being used to sustain control of the country by former dictator Samuel Doe, and currently, by Taylor. Liberia’s commercial laws allow businesses from anywhere in the world to register in Liberia, with no requirement they have any physical presence in the country. Liberia’s financial regime included corporations with no capital requirement, issuance of shares that need not be reported or recorded in Liberia, companies with no obligation to file annual reports, tax forms, or audit statements, bearer shares, and similar freedoms that in effect make the creation of an entity in Liberia a guarantee of worldwide anonymity and non-accountability. The US dollar is legal currency in Liberia. For years, Liberian diplomatic passports have been advertised (and actually made available) on the Internet, reflecting a regime that protects criminals outside of Liberia as well as within the jurisdiction.20 Liberia’s connections with the international payments system broke down during its civil war from 1991 through 1997. The most prominent non-Liberian financial institution, Citibank, left the country. Settlements among Liberian banks, and movements of funds from Liberia to other countries, were handled on an ad hoc basis. Yet throughout this period, Liberia’s armies have been able to generate and use funds from beyond the country, with President Charles Taylor accumulating substantial personal wealth in the process. This phenomenon has continued to the present. For example, in November 2001, the government of Singapore sought information from the UN regarding financial and weapons transactions involving payments for weapons deliveries that used the Chase Manhattan Bank in New York to transfer some 500,000 USD to a Singapore arms trafficking company. Significantly, the firms involved in the arms transfer have also been alleged to be involved in illegal timbering in Liberia and Malaysia.21 Separately, in looking at the impact of Taylor’s involvement in prolonging Sierra Leone’s civil war, the UN Panel of Experts discovered that Liberia secured weapons and made payments for weapons destined for Sierra Leone through accounts at the Standard Chartered Bank in Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates.22 Case Study: Cambodia. Corruption in Cambodia is pervasive and systemic, extending from low-level policemen to the top of the government. Important criminals have close links to Cambodia’s government. For example, Theng Bun Ma, Chairman of the Phnom Penh Chamber of Commerce and a major financial supporter of Prime Minister Hun Sen, has been identified by the US as a major drug trafficker. A second important criminal figure associated with the Prime Minister, Yeay Phu, is chairperson of the Phea Pimech Company, Cambodia’s biggest salt producer and most destructive logger.23 Cambodia’s own financial services sector is
20 21 22 23
Personal inquiry by the author in 1997, during his service in the US Department of State. ‘Singapore to probe alleged involvement of company in arms smuggling in Liberia’, Singapore Business Times, 6 November 2001. Sierra Leone UN Export Report, December 2000. ‘Cambodia’s Hun Sen embracing new tycoons’, Phnom Penh Moneakseka Khmer, 21 September 2001, pp. 1, 2 (Report by Chan Chamnan).
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extraordinarily weak. Some money laundering in Cambodia nevertheless goes through its rather specialized banking system: most of Cambodia’s banks are private institutions, not open to the public, existing mostly to move and launder money.24 Other funds from illegal logging (as well as other criminal activities) are laundered in Cambodia’s neighbours, particularly Thailand. Notably, Cambodian financial institutions have correspondent banking relationships with major financial institutions all over the world, including some based in Canada, France, and the United States, as well as in Korea and Thailand.25 Case Study: Thailand. The impact on the larger society of illicit finance can become broader than the illicit activity initially involved. In Thailand, illegal timber sales have for many years been a substantial source of funds for both politicians and corrupt law enforcement officials. Indeed, scandals involving such sales are frequently reported in the Thai press, and are elements in Thai political jockeying. In 1996, the government of Thailand began to recognize that non-drug money laundering was creating problems, and the government introduced comprehensive anti-money laundering legislation. For the following three years, the legislation stalled over a single issue: the inclusion of illicit timbering as a predicate offence for the prosecution of money laundering crimes. Finally, in 1999, Thailand’s government reached a compromise and passed comprehensive money laundering legislation. The price of compromise was the elimination of illegal timbering as a money laundering crime, permitting corruption involving that activity to continue without restriction. Drug Money and Civil Conflict. Areas where opium and coca are grown include regions where many of the world’s longest-enduring civil wars and internal conflicts are taking place. Opium production has fuelled destabilizing guerrilla and paramilitary movements in Afghanistan, Burma, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey. Coca has done the same in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. In each case, proceeds from narcotics production and trafficking became a mechanism for relatively unpopular governments, militia, or rebels to control the territory where the narcotics were produced, thereby sustaining themselves and perpetuating conflict with other forces in the jurisdiction. In each of these countries, the political and military forces have systematically taken ‘tithes’ or regular payments as protection money for the illicit crops, thereby gaining a resource advantage over any force that has not similarly accepted drug protection money. 24 25
‘Paper: Banks in Cambodia involved in money laundering’, Phnom Penh Samleng Yuveakchon Khmer, 30 March 2000, pp. 1,3 (Report by Sophal). For example, the Cambodia bank Canadia, Ltd., has correspondent banking relationships with the Bank of America, Republic National Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, and Banque Nationale de Paris; the First Overseas Bank of Cambodia has correspondent banking relationships with HSBC, which in turn has branches and subsidiaries around the world. Given the absence of any controls on money laundering in Cambodia, it would be difficult to imagine how such correspondent banking accounts could be protected against laundering the proceeds of narcotics, illegal logging, and other criminal activities.
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Case Study: Burma. In Burma, opium has perpetuated the rule of an entirely nondemocratic junta, while providing the means for ethnic warlords to arm their local soldiers. At the same time, Burmese officials have used opium profits to invest in partnerships in legitimate businesses in neighbouring countries, such as Burma, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, reducing regional pressure for more democratic governance. Burma’s repressive government has continued to generate international sanctions and impede foreign investment. Yet Burmese banks are thriving and experiencing rapid growth, fuelled primarily by funds generated from the opium trade. Prominent among Burma’s 21 domestic banks are the Asia Wealth Bank, whose chairman and vice chairman are alleged to be former drug lords; the Mayflower Bank, established by Kyaw Win, a partner of the drug warlord Khun Sa; and the Kanbawza Bank, closely tied to the ruling junta and alleged to launder the proceeds of ruling party corruption. 26 Thus, the drug economy and the political control exercised by Burma’s unelected leadership have proved mutually reinforcing. In turn, this economy has been sustained by Burma’s ability to readily move funds to and from the rest of the world. Despite the allegations of its ownership by drug lords and its involvement in money laundering, the Mayflower Bank apparently maintains correspondent relationships with the Marine Midland Bank and American Express Bank in New York. 27 It is difficult to imagine that any US institution is not well enough situated to assess the provenance of funds from the Mayflower Bank. 28 EU sanctions against Burma were toughened in 2000, theoretically freezing the funds belonging to members of the junta and those associated with them. However, the state-owned Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank currently reports a network of over 120 correspondent banking relationships in 58 countries, so that ‘banking transactions can be made with almost any country in the world’.29 Burma’s repressive government retains access to international financial institutions, irrespective of the sources of Burmese assets or international sanctions. Case Study: Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, decades of tribal conflict have been fuelled by opium funds, with each of the major forces, including the Northern Alliance and the Taliban, taking drug money to finance their military campaigns. Opium’s impact in acting as a regional destabilizer extends beyond Afghanistan. Drug-related corruption has been an ongoing problem within the Pakistan military. According to a recent French analysis, from approximately 1983 through 1998, Pakistan’s military intelligence agency used heroin trafficking from Afghanistan to 26 27
28 29
‘Above it all, Burmese banks are thriving even as the country’s economy suffers its worst slump in years’, Maung Maung Oo, the Irrawaddy, 2 February 2001. For example, Hamsa Travels and Tours of Yanon, Myanmar, which offers tourist services for Burma, currently specifies on its web-pages the use of these institutions to make payment to its account at the Mayflower Bank from the US. Existing US sanctions against Burma prohibit new investment but do not prevent financial transactions for such purposes as tourism. Myanmar Financial Structure and Exchange Arrangements, published by the Government of Myanmar, < http:/www.myanmar.com/gov/trade/fin.html > .
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fund secret operations aimed at destablizing India through Muslim rebellion in Kashmir.30 While much of the opium trade at the local level is cash-based, opium money arriving to Gulf State financial institutions from Pakistan is then transformed into electronic funds, which can be used not only to pay bribes further afield but to support terrorist activity around the world. Case Study: Colombia. For many years, the Colombian terrorist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), has funded its military attack on the Colombian government by taking protection money in coca-growing areas. A map of regions controlled by FARC shows that they constitute rings just outside and around each of the major coca-growing regions, thereby placing the group in a position to exact a toll for the transit of the drugs by any route. The FARC has used the drug money for arms purchases, as have the major Colombian smuggling organizations. In turn, both the Colombian traffickers and the FARC use the weapons funded by the drug trade to protect themselves in their respective struggles against Colombia’s elected government, perpetuating the civil war in that country. The traffickers have heavily penetrated Colombia’s financial institutions and purchased a substantial number of legitimate businesses, facilitating their ability to corrupt elements of the Colombian government and reducing the efficacy of the government’s efforts to enforce Colombia’s laws. As drug influence increases and government capacity is weakened, the legitimacy of the Colombian government is further eroded, in turn providing a greater base for political support by disaffected Colombians for the guerrillas and the civil war. Again, as with drug money from Afghanistan and Burma, Colombian drug money exercises a negative political impact well beyond Colombia itself. For example, both Manuel Noriega of Panama and the military junta that ruled Haiti in the mid–1990s sustained control of their respective governments through drug-related corruption. International Money Laundering and Grand Corruption. The world’s kleptocrats, whether Marcos, Mubuto, Abacha, or Sukarto, have used a common financial services infrastructure to steal national wealth.31 Grand corruption has been a prominent feature of political and social conflict or civic breakdown in Albania, Argentina, Burma, Cambodia, Congo (Zaire), Colombia, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Liberia, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia, and Zimbabwe, among other jurisdictions. In each case, the looting of
30
31
1998–1999 Report on Drug Trafficking in Asia published by the Observatoire Geopolitique de Drogues or OGD, a French academic institute. Separately, former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif told the Washington Post in 1994 that Pakistan’s army chief and the head of its intelligence agency had proposed a detailed blue-print for selling heroin to pay for the country’s covert military operations in early 1991. See ‘Heroin Plan by Top Pakistanis Alleged’, Washington Post, 12 September 1994. This phenomenon has been labelled ‘indigenous spoilation’ by N. Kofele-Kale, who defines this act as an ‘illegal act of depredation which is committed for private ends by constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’, in the International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes (Kluwer Law International 1995) at p. 10.
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government treasuries has involved funds or resources residing within these countries being moved from the countries to other jurisdictions through the world’s major international banks. In some cases, the theft of national treasuries has been accompanied by other harmful activities, whose proceeds have been laundered by the same mechanisms. These include costly or illegal arms deals (Angola, Colombia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan), the smuggling of diamonds used to purchase arms deals in civil wars (Angola, Liberia, and Sierra Leone), grand-scale theft of oil and timber (Burma, Cambodia, Nigeria, Russia, Thailand), illegal dumping of environmental toxics (Guyana, Suriname), and embezzlement or other abuses of funds lent by international financial institutions such as the World Bank (endemic). Countries that during the 1990s saw their national wealth disappear to other jurisdictions at the direction of ruling kleptocrats include (from A to Z): Albania, decapitalized by a pyramid scheme that moved its funds to Italy and Western Europe; Angola, whose immense national resources vanished amid the ongoing civil war between President Dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi; Burma, where funds generated by narcotics, jewels, and illicit timber were exported for covert reinvestment in more business friendly environments, such as Singapore and Hong Kong, by people working with the junta; Cambodia, which featured similar characteristics of first generating illicit funds and then having them become flight capital under Hung Sen; Estonia, which found substantial amounts of its national wealth apparently transferred to Russia in the mid-1990s in a pyramid scheme arranged by a prominent banker with close ties to Latvia’s then government; Gabon, whose oil revenues were sent offshore and handled by US financial institutions on behalf of the senior leaders who had stolen the proceeds; Indonesia, where billions of dollars disappeared offshore in connection with grand corruption under former dictator Suharto, with some 9 billion USD ending up in a nominee account maintained at an Austrian bank; Kazakhstan, where funds from oil revenues were laundered offshore for the benefit of senior leaders; Mexico, where the brother of president Carlos Salinas, Raul Salinas, was found to have moved hundreds of millions of dollars, representing either stolen government funds, bribes, or the proceeds of narcotics trafficking, to Switzerland; Nigeria, where General Sani Abacha stole billions that were then stored in major banks in Luxembourg, the U.K., Liechtenstein, Switzerland and the Channel Islands, among other locations;32 32
See, e.g., ‘Swiss banks criticised over Nigerian funds’, Associated Press, 5 September 2000, describing findings of the Swiss Federal Banking Commission regarding the handling of some 670 million USD of funds stolen by Sani Abacha and his ‘entourage’ from Nigeria and held by 19 Swiss banks. According to the article, the Government of Nigeria says the total funds stolen by Abacha amounted to some 3 billion USD, some of which remained in other accounts in Belgium, Germany and France.
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Pakistan, where military rule replaced democratic civilian rule after hundreds of millions of the proceeds of corruption were found in Swiss banks, discrediting the elected Prime Minister and her family; Russia, whose financial system collapsed in 1999 amid massive money laundering overseas through the Caribbean, the South Pacific, New York, and London; Serbia, whose wealth was converted to the control of Slobodan Milosevic and his wife through such jurisdictions as Cyprus and Lebanon, while Serbia was subject to global sanctions by the United Nations; Ukraine, where substantial stolen assets of the state under the control of a former prime minister were found to have been laundered to the United States, after being handled by a number of Swiss banks; 33 Zaire (Congo), whose national wealth was exported by the late dictator Mobuto to Swiss banks. Thus, a wide variety of serious problems of governance have been facilitated by illicit finance, which in turn leads back to the problem of the 11 September terrorist attacks, where money from apparently legitimate sources, such as wealthy Muslims in the Persian Gulf seeking to support Islamic charities, was turned to horrific ends after passing invisibly through the pipes of the world’s global financial service infrastructure.
V.
Terrorist Finance and Civil Conflict
International terrorism represents an obvious threat to global security, just as domestic terrorism does to many individual nations. In every case, terrorist organizations need to generate, store, and transport funds, often across borders. While not every domestic terrorist organization needs to launder money through cross-border transfers, over time, many such organizations choose to locate portions of their infrastructure at some distance away from planned terrorist activities. To do so, they establish cells to operate in jurisdictions separate from those where their political base is or where their operations will be carried out. In recent years, multinational movements of terrorist funds, involving the use of major international financial institutions, have been traced to terrorist movements based in Afghanistan, Burma, Chechnya, Colombia, Israel, the Palestinian Territory, Kosovo, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Somalia, Sri
33
See US v. Lazarenko, Northern District of California, superceding indictment, 23 July 2001, describing Lazarenko’s use of SCS Alliance, Banque Populaire Suisse, Crédit Suisse, Crédit Lyonnais (suisse), and European Federal Credit Bank in Antigua to launder 21 million USD stolen from Ukraine.
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Lanka, Sudan, and Turkey. Although the terrorist organizations based in each of these countries have some level of minority popular support, their power and effectiveness have been leveraged by their ability to hide, invest, and transport their funds through the world’s international financial institutions. A summary of the nations whose banks have been used to handle funds for Al-Qaeda’s attacks on the US is instructive in this regard. Available public sources show Al Qaeda and related groups to have been able to move funds to institutions in the following countries: Albania, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, the Caymans, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Kosovo, Kuwait, Libya, Macao, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, the Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen. Significantly, where these jurisdictions are used by Al Qaeda, they also tend to be used by other criminals and corrupt officials, as the case of the United Arab Emirates demonstrates. Case Study: United Arab Emirates. The UAE houses the Middle East’s most sophisticated financial services sector, which is intensely competitive and lightly regulated. It is also a cash-intensive society, with Dubai constituting the regional gold centre. Cash transactions at restaurants, hotels, nightclubs, money-exchange houses, and investment firms remain common and effective mechanisms to launder money throughout the world from the UAE.34 Trading in precious metals, especially gold, has been simultaneously implicated in tax frauds, money laundering, organized crime, and the smuggling of stolen cargo from the UAE. 35 Islamic banks, once a conservative mechanism for relative low-cost entry into the international financial system, have expanded rapidly, remaining little regulated beyond the requirements of Islamic shari’a. Alternative remittance houses, such as hawalas, have been abundant, and scarcely regulated. The results for global security were evident in the 11 September terrorist attacks. One hawala based in Somalia, Al Barakaat, with major offices in the UAE, was found to have been heavily involved in funding Al Qaeda’s global operations. Another unnamed money changer was found to have transferred funds to Marwan Al-Shehhi, a UAE citizen who was the suspected pilot of United Airlines Flight 175, the second plane to hit the World Trade Center on 11 September.36 In addition, funds were allegedly wired between three of the terrorist attackers and one of Bin Laden’s financial chiefs, Shaykh Said, also known as Mustafah Muhammad Ahmed, who resided in Dubai until 11 September, according to numerous press accounts.37 Subsequent press accounts traced the funds to the Al 34 35 36 37
‘Dubai Police Study on Money Laundering’, Khalij Times, December 10, 1999. ‘Duped banks get wise to crime’ Lloyd’s List, January 8, 2001. ‘UAE Central Bank Withdraws License of Money Changer’, Wall Street Journal, 2 November 2001. See, e.g., ‘In Emirates, An Effort to Examine Bank System’, New York Times, 15 October 2001; ‘$100,000 trail links hijackers to Al-Qaeda, sleuths say’, Dubai Gulf News, 12 October 2001.
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Ansari Exchange branch in Abu Dhabi.38 Another account cited an unnamed US intelligence official as stating that two of Bin Laden’s sisters used the UAE as a transit point for shuttling cash to Bin Laden and his hide-out in Afghanistan.39 Long before the 11 September terrorist attacks, the UAE’s financial system was repeatedly linked to terrorist finance. Al Qaeda also used the Dubai Islamic Bank as a mechanism to process funds used in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.40 UAE financial institutions were central to the 11 September terrorist attacks on the US financed by Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. UAE institutions were also reportedly used by other Bin-Laden terrorist finance operations based in Malta. 41 This terrorist finance infrastructure overlaps substantially with other money laundering operations. For example, the same networks in the UAE have been used to launder drug money42 and to handle the proceeds from Russian criminal activity, in one account, laundering some 300 million USD in Russian funds in the month of January 1999 alone.43 The UAE has been home to the Russian arms merchant Viktor Bout, implicated in black market weapons sales to Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and Angola. False end-user certificates were delivered from the UAE to provide a veneer of legality to Bout’s illicit arms sales, according to a United Nations report. Bout’s illicit arms shipments were carried out from the UAE through his UAE-based air transport company, Air Cess, whose operations would clearly require financing through the UAE.44 Even as Bout engaged in smuggling activities to these jurisdictions in conflict, UAE financial institutions handled the proceeds to finance terrorist and criminal activity. For example, Al Qaeda used diamonds purchased in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DROC, the former Zaire) to fund its activities, in turn laundering these commodities through Dubai.45 Ironically, throughout this period the UAE had one of the Middle East’s best anti-money laundering regimes, as well as a good reputation for co-operation in particular cases arising from investigations in other countries, including the US. Yet
38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45
‘UAE Central Bank Withdraws License of Money Changer’, Wall Street Journal, 31 October 2001. ‘United Arab Emirates emerges as key link in money trail that led to attacks’, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, 2 October 2001. ‘UAE Bank Sources Deny Knowledge of Bin-Ladin Dealings’, London Al-Sharq al-Awsat (in Arabic), 9 July 1999, p. 5. ‘Malta’s Central Bank Asked to Investigate Possible Bin-Ladin Financial Assets’, London Al-Sharq Awsat, 16 November 2000. Financial Times, 24 February 2001. ‘Capital Flight, Money Laundering Eyed’, Moscow Noryye Izvestiya (in Russian), 5 March 1999. ‘The Great Small-Arms Bazaar’, Cox News Service, 6 July 2001; ‘UN Report: Former Russian KB Officer Arming African Rebels’, London Guardian, 23 December 2000. ‘Al Qaeda’s Road Paved With Gold, Secret Shipments Traced Through a Lax System in United Arab Emirates’, Washington Post, 17 February 2002 (Douglas Farah), citing US and European intelligence sources and investigators.
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the rules had proven to be largely helpful in reconstructing money laundering or terrorist finance after a crime had taken place, rather than deterring it in the first place. Moreover, the UAE had a wide range of financial links to other jurisdictions, from Pakistan to Iran, that had essentially no anti-money laundering regimes in place, making it easy for illicit funds to be placed elsewhere before moving through the UAE and into Western Europe, North America or Asia. Further, Dubai, the most developed financial centre in the UAE, was the world’s centre for trading in gold, as well as a central component of the hawala alternative remittance system. With gold trading, drug-money launderers and terrorist financiers alike could move funds through the UAE. With hawalas, the same interests could move money to wherever they needed it without the funds ever having to move across international borders.
VI. The Commingling Problem The world’s networks of non-transparent financial services not only commingle licit with illicit funds, thus rendering the illicit funds more difficult to detect, but also provide vessels for the intermingling of different forms of illicit activity, which have the common element of being both destabilizing and involving similar persons and institutions. The ubiquity of offshore havens such as the Caymans, Channel Islands and Liechtenstein for common use by drug, arms, and people traffickers as well as kleptocrats is reasonably well understood. The interconnections between Al Qaeda’s terrorist finance and the illicit sale of diamonds mined by rebels in Sierra Leone is less obvious, although increasingly well-documented and tied to other terrorist finance of groups such as Hezbollah. Within the region, the diamonds are transferred to the terrorists in return for weapons or for cash. The terrorists then transport the diamonds to diamond processing centres such as Belgium, and thereby launder their funds anew for further terrorist activity. 46 Neither the diamond dealers of Antwerp nor the financial institutions that serve them currently have in place any trip-wires that would alert them to the possibility that either the diamonds, or their owners, were involved in funding destabilizing conflict in western Africa or global terrorism. The problem is not necessarily one of witting intention on the part of the parties who populate the vast infrastructure supporting many of the world’s most destabilizing illicit activities. Rather, the global money-laundering problem is a structural consequence of globalization, putting bankers, banks, and banking accounts in constant contact with people and businesses that they do not know.
46
‘Al Qaeda Cash Tied to Diamond Trade’, Washington Post, 2 November 2001 (Douglas Farah), citing US and European intelligence officials.
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Instead of having relationships with people they trust, these institutions have accepted the notion that they should trust only in the money itself, with no further obligation. Twenty years ago, the risks posed by ‘no-questions asked’ banking practices were not universally evident. Now the need for greater transparency, accountability, and traceability of financial transactions, regardless of their provenance, destination, or the mechanics of their movement, is widely accepted. Within the past two years many countries, in some cases threatened with possible loss of access to major financial centres, have enacted comprehensive measures to combat money laundering and to promote financial transparency. These countries have included Antigua, Austria, the Bahamas, the Channel Islands, Israel, Japan, Liechtenstein, Panama, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates. The 11 September terrorist attacks on the United States have led to a further wave of legislation and regulation. The result has been closer financial scrutiny of many Gulf States, a number of countries in Southeast Asia, and of the placement of funds in jurisdictions in the Americas and Europe. This new scrutiny has included the first comprehensive efforts to understand, register, and regulate alternative remittance systems or hawalas. Yet, governments whose jurisdictions begin and end at their own borders may be poorly placed to exercise effective oversight of private sector financial institutions whose activities may extend through many dozens of jurisdictions. If individual nations are incapable of exercising authority over the global operations of the financial institutions they license, there is an obvious question as to who is in a position to exercise such authority. One answer – the market shall rule – is clearly incompatible with other important social, economic and political goals. A second answer, that the institutions will regulate themselves, has to date not proven very effective. Soft standards (typically guidelines), imposed by self-regulatory organizations such as the BCBS, IOSCO, and the IAIS, have given national regulators responsibility to decide on sanctioning cases of institutional misbehaviour, and this too has not proven very effective. Each of the many exercises seeking to improve international financial regulation and to oppose illicit finance has adopted one core principle, a principle of particular import in an age of globalization. This principle, sometimes summarized as ‘know your customer’, suggests merely that the obligation of knowing with whom you are doing business, a matter of prudence in a local economy, becomes even more essential in a global economy. There is no disagreement on this core standard, only a clear failure to date to impose it on a universal basis. Assessing the existing and potential mechanisms for implementing this principle take up the remainder of this paper.
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VII. Existing Initiatives As Brookings Institution economist Robert Litan has recently stated, successful international efforts to regulate cross-border finance generally only emerge in response to crises.47 The sheer scope of the existing anti-money laundering initiatives provide some evidence of the depth of the global financial transparency crisis. The major financial services jurisdictions, including the countries of the G–8, the EU and Switzerland, have already begun to implement financial regulatory regimes based on the premise that the best possible protection against being victimized by financial crime of any kind is to know the true identity and business of any party to whom one is exposed in a transaction, from one’s customer to one’s correspondent bank. This principle is embedded in the work of the G–7 Financial Stability Forum, of the EU’s Second Directive on Money Laundering, agreed to in October 2001, and in the USAPATRIOT Act, enacted by the US to counter terrorism and terrorist finance in the wake of the 11 September attacks. These new legal regimes no longer treat all bank accounts as inherently equal, but require those who handle the funds of others to know who the beneficial owner of an account is, regardless of the nature of the account. In cases where an account is established through a jurisdiction that is inadequately regulated or designed to hide beneficial ownership, these regimes would shut off access entirely, as the new law in the US has required them to do since the end of 2001. Know Your Customer. The principle of ‘know your customer’ is now true not only for banks but for all financial intermediaries engaged in transnational financial activity, especially that which is electronic. In the age of the Internet, no other approach is workable. If merely banks are regulated, and their non-bank competitors are not, the competitors will engage in unregulated bank-like activity. To be effective, the ‘know your customer’ requirements of the original Basel Committee recommendations of a decade ago are now slowly being updated and broadened to cover those who offer banking-like services. Jurisdictions that lag behind in undertaking this approach, either through self-regulation, government regulation, or a mixture of the two, are finding themselves and their financial institutions at risk of having reduced access to other jurisdictions. The result has been a jurisdictional regulatory ‘race to the top’, instead of a race to the bottom. Nevertheless, the emerging new international instruments, standards, and initiatives have yet to have a substantial impact in reducing global conflict. Naming and Shaming Jurisdictions. A common feature of the major initiatives undertaken to date by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations, such as Transparency International, has been a focus on reforming governments, and through the reform of the governments, enhancing regulation and oversight of the private sector. Existing international instruments to combat money laundering include the 1988 United Nations Vienna Convention 47
Litan, id, p. 197.
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Against Illicit and Psychotropic Drugs, the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, the 1998 OECD Convention Against Illicit Payments (covering bribery), and numerous instruments enacted by the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States, and other regional groupings. Over time, these international instruments have come to create a body of international standards, embedded in the increasing number of mutual assessment mechanisms. The first and most successful of these remains that undertaken by the FATF and its progeny. In recent years, failures to meet these standards have even come to have consequences, as specific jurisdictions have been named, shamed, and in effect forced to change their laws in order to avoid risks to their economies, political regimes and reputations. However, in many countries, governments simply do not control the private sector, and globalization has made cross-border control inherently impossible even for the most powerful governments. International regimes that direct governments to regulate private sector institutions that may be more sophisticated, more international, wealthier, and larger than the governments purporting to regulate them have inherent practical limits. The nature of these limits is already visible, as the name and shame exercises have taken hold. While individual jurisdictions have been forced to change their rules, individual institutions have been able to continue to engage in regulatory arbitrage, pushing their riskiest and least attractive transactions to jurisdictions that require the least transparency. For example, during the last half of 2001, the tiny Channel Island of Jersey was found to house millions of dollars stolen from investors in the Gulf States by a Hong Kong-based investment company;48 200 million USD allegedly looted from Brazil in a major political scandal, deposited in a branch of Citibank; 49 and some 300 million USD in accounts belonging to the late Sani Abacha, his family and entourage. Jersey was in compliance with all of the FATF anti-money laundering criteria, and most of the obligations required by the OECD tax haven exercise. Yet the persistence of Jersey’s use to conceal financial crime reflected the reality that anyone who deliberately structured their transactions across multiple jurisdictions was still able to protect their illicit activities from scrutiny for a very long time. The problem may not in fact be with Jersey’s ability to enforce its antimoney laundering regime, but with the inadequacies of regulators and law enforcement agencies the world over to keep track of the transnational activities of the private sector entities that they purport to oversee. Just as globalization has caused even the smallest, local financial jurisdiction, such as that of Jersey or Liechtenstein, to be accessible for use by any and all of the world’s businesses, legitimate and illegitimate, the same phenomenon has required the extension, bit by bit, of regulation from its initial application to limited problems in limited sectors to universal problems in all sectors, as the evolution of the FATF and the OECD Harmful Tax Practices initiatives have demonstrated. 48 49
‘UAE: Investment Firms Defraud Investors’, Dubai Khalej Times, 21 August 2001. ‘Brazil scandal hits Citibank’, The Observer,9 September 2001.
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The Financial Action Task Force. The FATF was established during the French presidency of the G-7 in 1989 in response to the G-7’s recognition of the threat posed to banking and financial systems by drug money laundering. At the time, drug money laundering in the Americas emanating from Colombia were fresh in the minds of policy-makers, following the crisis between the US and Panama that ended with the removal and arrest of General Manuel Noriega. The FATF’s initial mandate was to examine the methods used to launder criminal proceeds and to develop recommendations for combating them. These 40 Recommendations, developed during the FATF’s first year, in turn, became the basis for what was then an innovative system for implementation. The FATF, which had a tiny secretariat and was not a chartered international organization but only a voluntary association, initiated a system for self- and mutual assessment. Under this system, each member of the FATF would first assess its own compliance with the FATF’s 40 recommendations. Then, other FATF members would visit the jurisdiction, question authorities from the assessed jurisdiction, and reach their independent determination of where the jurisdiction was failing to meet the standards of the 40 recommendations. This approach had several ground-breaking aspects. First was the notion that technical experts could develop standards which over time would bind their countries in practice even in the absence of their entering into a formally binding international agreement. Second was the concept of mutual evaluation, in which a country would submit to peer review as a means of improving its domestic capabilities. Each of these developments faced potentially substantial risks. For example, the withdrawal of any FATF member from consensus on the standards could have had the impact of undermining both the legitimacy and effectiveness of the entire initiative. Similarly, the politicization of the mutual assessment process, either to exculpate unfairly or to criticize unfairly any jurisdiction, could also have fatally impaired the FATF’s legitimacy. Both risks were avoided largely because of the technocratic nature of the staffing of the FATF by member governments. The FATF process was driven by technocrats from finance ministries, regulators, and law enforcement, not by foreign ministries or political figures. Its standards were neutral, and its judgments, initially confidential, were recognized to be fair. Moreover, the FATF proceeded slowly, first evaluating jurisdictions with robust regulatory and enforcement regimes, criticizing them, and only then moving to jurisdictions that diverged further from the 40 recommendations. The FATF moved forward steadily but slowly during the 1990s, in the process taking on two major changes to its original mandate. In 1996, under the US Presidency of the FATF, the organization expanded its mission beyond reviewing capacities against narcotics money laundering to cover all money laundering involving all serious crimes. It also agreed to take on new developments in money laundering trends, especially those involved with electronic fund transfers. Secondly, the FATF decided that the ability of its member jurisdictions to protect themselves against money laundering would be undermined if non-member jurisdictions did not adopt and implement its 40 recommendations as well. Accordingly, it chose to move beyond its initial mandate to assess its own members to develop a ‘black list’ of other
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countries whose practices were deemed to facilitate money laundering and therefore be ‘non-cooperative’ with the objectives of the FATF. The development of a black list reflected a dramatic change in approach by the FATF, necessitated by the growing recognition of the interdependence of the global financial infrastructure, and the inability of any jurisdiction to protect itself in the face of bad practices in other jurisdictions. Both the FATF’s standards and its selection of non-cooperative jurisdictions illustrate the nature of transnational money laundering and the practices most likely to facilitate it. Core FATF standards include:
1. 2. 3.
4. 5.
Criminalizing the laundering of the proceeds of serious crimes and enacting laws to seize and confiscate them. Obliging financial institutions to identify all clients, including all beneficial owners of financial property, and to keep appropriate records. Requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions to competent national authorities and to implement a comprehensive range of internal control measures. Putting into place adequate systems for the control and supervision of financial institutions. Entering into agreements to permit each jurisdiction to provide prompt and effective international co-operation at all levels, especially with regard to exchanging financial information and other evidence in cases involving financial crime.50
In general, these standards have been little changed since their development in 1990. Nevertheless, they remain incompletely implemented internationally, prompting the FATF to develop in 2000 its list of ‘Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories’. Four of the countries on the original list, Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Liechtenstein, and Panama, enacted comprehensive money laundering regimes rather than face the risk of possible loss of market access to FATF Member States if they failed to take action. Others, such as Israel and Russia, enacted legislation, but failed to put in place an anti-money laundering system sufficient to meet FATF standards. To date, the FATF has threatened a number of jurisdictions with the sanctions of facing enhanced scrutiny or greater regulatory barriers, but has imposed them on none. The simple threat has been enough to cause any country targeted with immediate action to change its laws, as Austria, the Seychelles, and Turkey demonstrated even prior to the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories initiative. Currently, 19 countries and territories are on the FATF black list, facing the risk of potential sanctions, termed ‘countermeasures’ by the FATF in the near future. The list of these jurisdictions, with annotations by the author about the type of money laundering involved, is as follows: 50
The full text of the FATF’s 40 Recommendations is available at the FATF’s website online at
.
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
17. 18.
Cook Islands, used by Russian criminals to loot Russia. Dominica, providing false identities, passports, and banking services to Russian criminals and drug traffickers. Egypt, a centre for financial fraud and possibly terrorist financing; has had no transparency or anti-money laundering laws, so data is extremely limited. Grenada, false identities and banking services to financial criminals and drug traffickers. Guatemala, exploitation by drug money launderers. Hungary, comprehensive banking secrecy exploited by Russian organized crime involved in trafficking of women, alien smuggling, and contraband smuggling. Indonesia, money laundering for illicit timber, massive corruption and fraud. Israel, money laundering for Russian organized crime, including trafficking in women. Lebanon, laundered funds for sanctioned regimes including Libya and Serbia, as well as for various terrorist organizations; handles proceeds of drug trafficking from Middle East. Marshall Islands, used by Russian criminals. Myanmar (Burma), wide open to narcotics money laundering, arms trafficking, illicit timbering, precious gems smuggling, and the funding of private armies. Nauru, principle launderer for theft of Russian national resources. Nigeria, drug money laundering, major financial crime, terrorist finance. Niue, handled Russian money laundering. Philippines, laundered funds for Al Qaeda. Russia, wide open to money laundering by Russian, Colombian, and Italian organized crime, including the proceeds of corruption, theft, drug trafficking, trafficking in women, people smuggling, stolen motor vehicles, intellectual property crime, extortion, and massive fraud. St. Kitts and Nevis, handled drug money laundering. Ukraine, laundered proceeds of corruption, trafficking in persons, theft of national resources, drugs.
Notably, none of these jurisdictions is as yet isolated from the world’s major financial markets, although a few, especially those in the South Pacific, no longer have relationships with some large international financial institutions since the exposure of the Bank of New York/Benex scandal in the fall of 1999. The OECD Harmful Tax Practices Initiative. As of the late 1990s, the growing recognition that lack of transparency was creating substantial problems even for the most affluent countries as a result of globalization began to embrace the area of taxes. Finance ministries of the OECD countries had come to conclude that they were losing exceptionally large amounts of revenue due to individuals and companies engaging in systematic tax evasion through structuring their activities cross-border and taking advantage of banking secrecy regimes. Previously, the OECD had
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focused on eliminating regulations that could impede international trade or impose market distortions. Its senior officials came to see what it termed ‘tax poaching’ as a practice increasingly undermining the revenue base of governments throughout the world, reducing their ability to raise revenues and provide fundamental services. In short, the OECD saw that globalization led to tax evasion and, in turn, undermined fundamental governmental capacities to govern. As the OECD studied the problem, it also came to recognize that international tax evasion was linked to a host of other serious threats to the global system. In the words of OECD’s Secretary General, Donald J. Johnston, ‘there are strong links between international money laundering, corruption, tax evasion, and other international criminal activities. These illegal activities are widespread and involve such sizeable sums that they can pose a threat to the stability of the global system of finance and even the global trading system’.51 Notably, the OECD was not focused on weaker jurisdictions involved in civil conflict, but on the impact of financial secrecy in the tax arena on the world’s strongest jurisdictions. In May 1998, the OECD governments issued a report on ‘Harmful Tax Competition’, which led to the creation of a ‘Forum on Harmful Tax Practices’, a set of ‘Guidelines for Dealing with Harmful Preferential Regimes in Member Countries’, and finally, a series of Recommendations For Combating Harmful Tax Practices. The initiative was built, in many ways, on the parallel work of the FATF, and, in particular, three elements of FATF’s approach. First, the OECD developed a set of agreed standards to combat a set of agreed problems; secondly, the OECD put into place a system for the multilateral assessment of each jurisdiction’s implementation of the agreed standards; thirdly, the OECD adopted a ‘name and shame’ approach, creating a black list of jurisdictions that would face loss of market access or other sanctions if they did not take action. Despite vigorous protests from smaller jurisdictions that had been engaged in ‘ring-fencing’, the practice of promising little or no regulation and taxation of funds from overseas, as distinct from the regulation and taxation of the funds of their own citizens, targeted jurisdictions rapidly enacted new regimes. To avoid being placed on a prospective black list, six prominent tax avoidance jurisdictions, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San Marino, committed themselves in June 2000, in advance of their assessments, to embrace international tax standards for transparency, exchange of information and fair tax competition prior to the end of 2005. It may be useful to list the fundamentals of the OECD standards, as each of them applies to the lack of transparency common to all money laundering, not merely those pertaining to tax crimes: 1.
51
Ensuring that information is available on beneficial (that is, actual) ownership of companies, partnerships and other entities organized in the jurisdiction.
‘Introductory Remarks of the Honourable Donald J. Johnston, Secretary-General of the OECD, High Level Symposium on Harmful Tax Competition’, 29 June 2000.
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2.
3. 4.
Requiring that financial accounts be drawn up for companies organized in the jurisdiction in accordance with generally accepted accounting standards, and that these accounts be appropriately audited. Putting into place mechanisms so that the jurisdiction is able to share information pertaining to tax offences with corresponding authorities in other jurisdictions. Ensuring that its regulatory and tax authorities have access to bank information that may be relevant for the investigation or prosecution of criminal tax matters.
The OECD’s insistence that such fundamental, common sense principles be adopted has produced substantial controversy in many historic tax havens, including a number of smaller jurisdictions in the Caribbean and South Pacific. The resistance to their universal adoption is itself evidence of how badly their adoption is needed, and of the degree to which basic elements of financial transparency have yet to be put into place at the international level. The Wolfsberg Principles: A Private Sector Alternative. Abuses of private banking by corrupt officials became substantially exposed in the late 1990s, in the course of changes of government and exposures of individual kleptocrats as described above. In each of these cases, highly-placed political officials were found to have laundered inexplicably large sums of cash through major international financial institutions that had been, at the least, incurious as to whether the sources of the funds involved were legitimate. In response, twelve of the largest international banks and the anticorruption organization Transparency International (TI) undertook an initiative in 2000 that led to their development and adoption of ‘Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking’. These guidelines, endorsed by the participating global banks in October 2000,52 were intended only to apply to private banking, that is, to the accounts of the extremely rich, those with deposits of 3 million to 5 million USD. Lacking any oversight mechanism, they were to be self-regulatory guidelines to which each subscribing institution would adhere. The lack of an oversight or assessment mechanism for the Wolfberg Principles has led to some criticism. However, the eleven Wolfberg Principles established for the private banking sector by the twelve international banks are themselves of great significance, illustrating both potential solutions and aspects of the nature of the continuing problem in discouraging the criminal and the corrupt from taking advantage of world’s global financial infrastructure. They are: 1.
52
Adopting client acceptance procedures so that the banks accept ‘only those clients whose source of wealth and funds can be reasonably established to be
The participating banks, known as the Wolfsberg Group, consist of ABN Amro N.V., Banco Santander Central Hispano, S.A., Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., Barclays Bank, Citigroup, Crédit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, J.P. Morgan Chase, Société Générale, and UBS, A.G.
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legitimate’. These procedures are supposed to include: (a) taking reasonable measures to establish the identity of its clients and beneficial owners before accepting money; (b) demanding adequate identification before opening an account; (c) determining the source of wealth, the person’s net worth and the source of the person’s funds; and (d) requiring two persons, rather than just one, to approve the opening of an account. 2. Engaging in additional diligence or attention in cases involving the use of numbered or alternative name accounts, high-risk countries, offshore jurisdictions, high-risk activities, or public officials. 3. Updating client files when there are major changes in control or identity. 4. Identifying unusual or suspicious transactions, following them up, and then deciding whether to continue the business relationship with heightened monitoring, ending the relationship, or advising authorities. 5. Monitoring accounts through some means. 6. Developing and implementing a ‘control policy’ to insure compliance with bank rules. 7. Establishing a regular method of reporting on money laundering issues to management. 8. Training bank employees involved in private banking on the prevention of money laundering. 9. Requiring the retention for at least five years of bank records that might be material to anti-money laundering matters. 10. Establishing an ‘exception and deviation procedure that requires risk assessment and approval by an independent unit’ for exceptions to the previous nine principles. 11. Establishing an anti-money laundering unit at the financial institution. The head of TI, Peter Eigen, introduced the principles at the time of their adoption in terms that highlighted the historic problem of bankers being willing to handle the proceeds of corruption, describing the creation of the Wolfsberg Group as a ‘unique event’ because ‘few would expect the leading anti-corruption organization and the leading banks to be standing on the same platform’. Dr. Eigen further stated that the Wolfsberg Principles ‘state unequivocally that banks agree they should not be used by corrupt crooks and that it is fully incumbent on individual banks to put into place fully effective systems to ensure that their institutions are not money laundering vehicles. The language is blunt. The burden for monitoring the implementation and day-to-day operations of the guidelines rests squarely on the banks. Their reputations are at stake’. 53 In short, the Wolfsberg Principles would have an impact because an institution that had subscribed to it would have its reputation hurt if it failed to then meet its public commitments.
53
Opening Statement, Dr. Peter Eigen, Chairman, Transparency International, 30 October 2000, available at < http://www.transparency.org > .
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The universal adoption of each of the above principles, with the exception of number 10, would contribute to making it harder for corrupt officials or drug traffickers to establish accounts with funds of unknown provenance. Yet in specifying their agreement to adopt these principles, the signatory international banks are necessarily implying that, previously, such principles may not have been adopted by them on a universal basis, although each has already been either expressly or implicitly required by the 40 recommendations of the FATF. Notably, the banks subscribing to the Wolfsberg Principles did not commit to applying them to all of their accounts, but only to their private banking departments. Moreover, principle number 10, exceptions and deviations, contemplates the possibility that such principles as knowing the customer, reporting suspicious transactions, or maintaining records might not be followed if the bank decided there was an appropriate reason for ignoring the rule. Left outside the parameters of the Wolfsberg Principles entirely are such other areas as correspondent banking involving high-risk jurisdictions. Also left outside the parameters of the Wolfsberg Principles are the hundreds of large international banks that have yet to endorse them, as well as the thousands of mid-sized financial institutions with multijurisdictional operations. Important components of the world’s financial services sector are also missing from the members of Wolfsberg Group, which does not include a single institution based in China, Russia, Latin America, Africa or the Middle East. The absence of outside assessment or oversight for the Wolfsberg Principles and its members, illustrates the limits of this initiative, and the distance yet to be traveled before there is general acceptance of universal anti-money laundering standards among the world’s interlinked financial institutions. 54 Nevertheless, the Wolfsberg Principles remain an important development: lacking the mutual assessment mechanism and the comprehensiveness of the FATF mechanism. They demonstrate that, in the absence of globally-applicable agreements by private sector institutions, even widely accepted principles such as those of the FATF may remain incompletely adopted. So long as regulatory arbitrage remains available on an international basis, general agreement among most countries to adopt standards does not prevent private institutions from adhering to the standards
54
See, e.g., editorial of the Financial Times, 30 October 2000, ‘Banks Clean Up’, stating that ‘it may be surprising that 11 of the world’s biggest banks should find it necessary to declare that they are opposed to the use of their networks for criminal purposes. Yet a series of scandals has shown how corrupt politicians and other criminals have found it easy to launder their loot through the international banking system[. . .]The bad publicity stemming from such disclosures has persuaded the 11 signatories that the damage to their reputations of becoming involved, however inadvertently, in money-laundering is greater than any financial benefit[. . .]but ending the flows needs the involvement of the whole financial services industry including the host of other institutions whose transactions can help hide criminal plunder. The next step is for the financial regulators to adopt the Wolfsberg principles for the organizations they supervise and closely monitor their enforcement’.
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only in those jurisdictions that require them. Broader, global adoption of the standards requires commitments from the private sector institutions that these standards apply everywhere, not merely where there is a good local regulator. A set of mandatory rather than optional principles, adopted by the world’s major financial institutions on a global basis, would have the potential of transcending the limits of individual national regulators, especially were it to become applicable to all financial service sector operations, rather than only to private banking, and to become subject to assessment and oversight mechanisms by outsiders on a global basis. Indeed, the UN already relies on the principal of private sector implementation and co-operation in its handling of sanctions. 55
VIII. Global Standards for the Private Sector: Adopting A White List Regime The largest financial institutions of the world operate in dozens of jurisdictions. Even smaller financial institutions are networked in practically all jurisdictions. This networking appears to be largely viable, even when countries face international sanctions, as either sympathetic jurisdictions or financial institutions provide ongoing financial services to those theoretically sanctioned and off-limits. The largest international financial institutions remain the most important nodes in the world’s financial service infrastructure. Yet to date these institutions and those competing with them have continued to take advantage of the substantial regulatory and enforcement arbitrage afforded by the differences in government laws and capacities to launder the illicit proceeds of the world, and thereby to facilitate the circumvention of national laws. Each of the major existing initiatives to promote financial transparency fails in part to address this problem. The FATF and OECD exercises focus on jurisdictions, not institutions, and create black-lists, but no ‘white lists’ of jurisdictions that have met the highest standards of best practices. Even if every country and territory in the world were to agree upon their standards, local failures of governmental capacity to regulate or to enforce would preserve the ability of private sector financial institutions who were so inclined to circumvent the standards. The Wolfsberg Principles focus directly on financial institutions, but are limited in scope to private banking, in membership to twelve banks, in principles to basics only, and in enforcement to self-regulation. The Wolfsberg Principles create an implicit ‘white list’ of subscribing institutions, but without any mechanism for outside audit or assessment, reducing the pressure for comprehensive implementation. 55
The Targeted Financial Sanctions Project of the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, < http://www.WatsonInstitute.org/tfs > contains extensive evidence for this proposition, as a member of the research team on the project, Professor Sue Eckert, has observed.
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The foregoing initiatives have been innovative and recent. The question remains whether they will be sufficient, or whether additional mechanisms should be developed that combine their best features into a regime which further attenuates regulatory and enforcement arbitrage, holds the private sector financial services infrastructure accountable, and provides incentives to institutions that adopt best practices. The World Bank, and the other International Financial Institutions (IFLs) are each among the most important international institutions operating in the world today, controlling many billions of dollars in resources that are, in turn, allocated for lending around the world. These institutions each have a large number of correspondent banking relationships and deposit funds for use in recipient countries, not only in central banks but in commercial ones. Similarly, the United Nations and its constituent elements direct substantial sums in development assistance, which also are necessarily deposited in banks in the countries where the activities are carried out. Trade finance activities undertaken by government-sponsored entities such as export/import banks also rely on private sector banks to handle the funds. National and international development programmes place their funds in private banks. And government and international organizations alike, when they borrow and issue notes, also select international banks to act as agents and issuers. Today, financial transparency is not a criterion for the selection of one financial institution over another to be the holder, processor, or handler of the funds of governments, development organizations, international financial organizations, or the United Nations. An international bank that is involved in numerous money laundering scandals or terrorist financial transactions has approximately the same chance of obtaining a lucrative source of government resources as does an international bank that has imposed the highest standards of transparency and anti-money laundering policies and procedures. Despite the existence of the FATF, OECD, and Wolfsberg models, there is no ‘white list’ to which governments, international organizations, or non-governmental organizations that wish to foster transparency can turn as a principled means of selecting a bank to handle their funds. The lack of such a white list may constitute a missed opportunity. As Robert Litan has observed, these institutions, especially the IFIs, have ‘accumulated power akin to a domestic sovereign government’, and have the means to enforce terms of their agreements with other countries.56 With such power in relationship to sovereign states, these institutions surely have equal power should they care to exercise it in relation to private sector institutions. Creating an additional incentive for financial institutions to adhere to a comprehensive, global code of conduct to combat money laundering and protect against illicit finance would seem to be a logical goal for an international community increasingly focused on the risks created by financial
56
Litan, id, at 199.
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secrecy. It would supplement the work of nations by asking institutions that operate in many jurisdictions to adhere to the same standards in all of them, even in cases where the governments themselves have little ability directly to regulate or enforce these standards. To make a white list system work, the United Nations could, for example, take the recommendations previously made by the FATF, OECD and Wolfsberg Group and ask financial institutions to agree to adopt them on a global basis throughout their institutions. Such institutions could further agree to be assessed by a multinational team of experts who would make reports on the implementation of the principles by those institutions they assess. An institution that has agreed to an assessment and passed it would be credentialed and rewarded with a preference for selection in processing the funds controlled by the UN and by other international organizations. Other, non-white listed institutions would not be denied the opportunity to handle the funds of international organizations. However, they might well be limited to handling such funds in areas where there is no ‘white list’ institution available. To insure the integrity of the system, the white list would need to be updated regularly, with periodic inspections and reviews of any institution placed on such a list. Such a system would retain the mutual assessment and oversight elements of the FATF and OECD exercises, while adding the universality promised by the Wolfsberg Principles, and combating the problem of regulatory arbitrage. Each white-listed institution would be required to agree to maintain its know-yourcustomer and other anti-money laundering policies and procedures regardless of whether it was located in a well-regulated jurisdiction or one with a lax regime. It would accept the principle of having others conduct period external assessments of its compliance with the standards and the publication of comprehensive reports describing how it had met the standards. To ensure fairness and the opportunity to improve anti-money laundering programmes over time, white-listed institutions would be given a period allowing them to correct following each evaluation before being placed at risk of losing white-list status. Other institutions, not white listed, would be given the ability to sign up to the white list at any time by providing a public specification of their methods of complying with the standards, and agreement to submit to an outside assessment at the earliest convenience of the multilateral experts group. Given the magnitude of the potential commercial benefit to white-listed financial institutions, it would be important to have the standards appropriately tailored by sector, size of operation, and nature of risk. This approach would be similar to that currently undertaken by the Basel Group in the area of risk-based capital standards for financial institutions. To be effective, anti-money laundering regimes need to be structured so as to account for the actual mechanisms by which failures of transparency are most likely to be exploited. Effective tailoring of a white list would require further development of money laundering typologies by the FATF and other organizations. However, even a base-line set of standards, based on those already adopted by the FATF, the OECD, and reflected in the Wolfsberg Principles, might
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provide a suitable place to begin. A white-listed institution might still find itself being used to transport terrorist funds. But it would have powerful incentives for preventing such use in the first instance and for swiftly responding to abuses upon discovery incentives that today, with all of the name and shame exercises and the terrible costs of financial crime (including the financing of terrorism) to civilization, nevertheless remain largely absent.
How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help Prevent the Misuse of Financial Institutions in the Financing of Terrorism? Charles Freeland*
When the author first joined the Basel Committee Secretariat in 1978, the idea that bank supervisors had a role to play in the prevention of money-laundering would have been greeted with astonishment. Some ten years later, when Basel first discussed the topic in earnest, there was still a body of opinion that this was a matter for law enforcement and supervisors should stick to the core tasks they were charged with. Nonetheless, the Basel Committee (BCBS) agreed, principally at the insistence of the United States, to issue a statement alerting banks to their ethical responsibilities in the prevention of the criminal use of the banking system. At that time the principal concern was to make it more difficult and costly for drug gangs to launder the proceeds of their crimes. That statement, 1 relatively short by today’s standards, laid down four principles that banks should follow: Identify their customers Refuse suspicious transactions Co-operate with law-enforcement agencies Train their staff and introduce compliance procedures. This statement exerted quite wide influence at the national level in the major industrialized countries and was additionally one of the triggers for the formation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). With the creation of the FATF, the BCBS took the view that the baton could be passed over to a body with the necessary wider competencies. Although invited to participate in the FATF, the BCBS declined on the grounds that its views could be adequately represented by the individual bank supervisors who became members. But times change. In 2000, one of the BCBS’s specialist task forces, the working
*
1
Deputy Secretary General, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Charles Freeland is writing here in his personal capacity. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the views of the Basel Committee or the Bank for International Settlements. The prevention of the criminal use of the banking system (1988).
M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 41–48. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
41
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group on cross-border banking, decided to revert to the issue principally as a result of a series of scandals involving banks' relationships with corrupt dictators such as Abacha and Salinas (now termed ‘Politically Exposed Persons’ (PEPs)) as well as with the Russian Mafia. The working group on cross-border banking is something of a hybrid animal – it was originally created as a joint working group of the BCBS and the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors (OGBS) to discuss issues relating to the implementation of the Basel Concordats that govern the responsibilities of bank supervisors in their supervision of international banking groups and their cross-border establishments. As a result, it is co-chaired by the OGBS chairman, Colin Powell, and the author. Its deliberations focus mainly on practical issues such as exchanges of supervisory information, cross-border inspection rights and corporate structures that impede banking supervision. A key product of this work, which will be reconsidered at the end of this article, is the creation of a platform for information exchanges between bank supervisors that is designed to improve supervisory coordination and enable home-country supervisors to exercise consolidated supervision. Such information exchanges have always been impeded by bank secrecy legislation and practices that are regarded by some private banking centres as a competitive necessity in order to prevent information on customer accounts in cross-border entities from being passed to home-country tax authorities. Hence, the supervisory Concordats developed by the Basel Committee have had to balance the need for adequate gateways with the need for adequate protection of information received. The reason why the cross-border group became concerned about the risks to banks in this area was not only its concern about PEPs (initially called ‘potentates’). A survey of know-your-customer (KYC) standards around the world revealed that, despite the FATF’s successful initiatives in its member countries, many countries still had no KYC standards at all. The BCBS has the ability to set rules for banks and bank supervisors that, through its influence as a standard-setter and with support from the IMF and World Bank, can have a much broader reach than the FATF. In addition, the FATF’s focus is on criminal activity, in its early years especially those activities involved in laundering the proceeds of drug sales, whereas the BCBS is concerned with the risks to banks from a much wider range of unsuitable customers – the PEPs issue is a case in point. Moreover, the BCBS saw a need to respond to the call by the G-7 to strengthen defences against abuse of the financial sector by producing a benchmark for Customer Due Diligence (CDD) standards for banks, as well as a need to act on requests from many emerging market supervisors for guidance in this area. The BCBS’s working group on cross-border banking’s expertise in offshore centres and international banking meant that it possessed the qualifications for identifying the risks being posed to international financial institutions. Several of its members are FATF participants. The BCBS therefore agreed with the group’s proposals that it address KYC rules for banks. This title was subsequently amended to Customer Due Diligence (CDD) standards to reflect the wider and continuous duties of the banker in protecting a bank’s good name. The working group was producing a draft set of standards at exactly the time that
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the Wolfsberg Group‘s first document was being prepared. In each case, the principal trigger was the Abacha affair. The BCBS’s consultative paper2 did not address money-laundering or suspicious transaction reporting directly. Rather its focus was on risk management for banks in their customer relationships. The paper focused on four specific risks; reputation risk, legal risk, operational risk and concentration risk (essentially liquidity/funding risk). Plainly, the most sensitive of these is reputation risk. A key distinction was drawn between initial identification of each new customer and ongoing monitoring of existing account activity. The reaction of the supervisory community to the BCBS’s draft was wholly supportive, including enthusiasm from some countries that one would not have put high on the list of those interested in probity. The FATF was also supportive and the Wolfsberg Group provided constructive comments. But some banks and banking associations were less enthusiastic. They raised two principal concerns that we sought to address in the final version of the paper that was issued in October 2001. One was the regulatory burden issue – and that is a very justifiable concern. We tried to respond to that by introducing a risk-based approach – identifying higher-risk customers or customer activities that merit heightened due diligence, and reducing the burden of monitoring the identities and activities of ‘ordinary’ retail clients. Indeed, the paper makes clear that while customer identification procedures are needed, they should not be so restrictive as to deny banking services to people who are financially or socially disadvantaged – and the same for ongoing monitoring. A second concern related to the clause requiring banks to backdate their customer identification procedures to existing clients. This could be very burdensome for banks serving small retail customers. Although there is still in the final version a requirement to undertake regular reviews of existing records and to monitor the activities of long-standing clients, there is now no obligation for banks to demand customer identity documentation from existing customers. So what has all this to do with the fight against terrorist financing? Well, first, the bank needs to know who its customers are if it is to be able to respond to requests from law-enforcement or intelligence authorities concerning accounts in the names of known terrorists or terrorist organizations. By definition, however, terrorists may be reluctant (and that reluctance is likely to be greater in the future) to open an account under their true names. They will thus try to hide behind anonymous accounts or ‘fronts’ making use of trusts, charities, nominees, corporate vehicles, profession intermediaries, and so on. The CDD paper gives clear guidance to banks on how to prevent such fronts from being used by criminals, including of course terrorists. This is a complex area in practice, but the principle itself is clear: the bank must make every effort to establish the beneficial owner(s) of all accounts and persons who conduct regular business with it.
2
Customer Due Diligence for Banks, January 2001. Although the document was targeted at banks, it expresses the view that similar guidance needs to be developed for all non-bank financial institutions.
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The key to preventing terrorists from using banks has to be in the initial customer identification process. Once an account is open, it will rarely be feasible for a bank to identify unusual account activity by a terrorist. The patterns of account activity by the Al-Qaeda perpetrators of the 11 September tragedy are by no means abnormal for a person with an irregular source of income such as a consultant, or a student with occasional parental support. Account profiling is therefore unlikely to identify a terrorist customer. What would of course help would be a tip-off from another source, maybe an intelligence source, or the observation by an alert staff member that the customer's behaviour is suspicious. Another pointer could be that the origin or destination of funds is a terrorist organization. However, one cannot expect banks to monitor every transaction of what would likely be classified as a low-risk customer. What one can do, and what the BCBS’s CDD paper does, is to insist that banks maintain account and transaction records for at least five years so that the audit trail can be followed and the origins or source of funds followed if required. The BCBS paper lays down clear guidelines for customer acceptance and customer identification procedures to be followed by banks in the opening of new customer accounts. It advises individual supervisors to establish strict standards for the documentation that should be required – and prohibits the use of anonymous accounts. It does not specifically list the categories of documents that banks should demand to see. There was an annex attached to the January consultative paper that gave examples of the types of documentation that could be admitted. However, the working group excluded this from the final October version because it felt that more attention was needed to the issue. It is now planning to provide more detailed guidance on customer identification procedures in due course, and to use that opportunity to update the October paper with any further guidance on CDD that has emerged from consultations in other bodies. To take one example, the FATF and the Wolfsberg Group have made certain proposals for the completion of the field for the originator‘s name in the transmission of wire transfers. The BCBS will probably want to establish a best practice guideline for that issue in due course. Nobody should be under any illusions that conducting customer due diligence is a simple task – it is one that is full of contradictions. The culture of banking is engrained in the desire to attract customers and profit from providing banking services. As with retailers selling products that are not suitable for all, there needs to be a highly-developed social conscience to prevent banking services falling into the wrong hands. Ex post, it can be relatively easy to judge that a customer should not have been accepted – ex ante, with the pressure on to welcome and even reward new customers, the task is more challenging. There are behavioural differences to respect, for example, in relation to well-heeled customers from other countries. The compliance officer or risk manager in charge of customer due diligence will be in constant conflict with the incentives provided to customer service units dedicated to personal, private or offshore banking. There may also be conflicts of culture with regard to what may or may not be regarded as acceptable behaviour by foreign customers. This may go way beyond the bank – for example the UK is currently grappling with the diplomatic ramifications of the freezing of an account linked to a
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Qatari Minister who received ‘facilitation payments’ for a UK defence deal. The UK’s Treasury and Home Offices are apparently in favour of the freeze, while the Defence and Foreign Ministers oppose it. One can only sympathize with a bank that gets involved in such a tug of war. Fortunately, conflicts of this kind are not likely to arise with regard to terrorist financing. However, there are other aspects that complicate the issue for the financial sector. One of the difficulties in providing guidance to banks in the fight against terrorism is to define what is a terrorist or a terrorist organization. There is often a thin line between terrorists and freedom fighters and a good number of current and recent Heads of State were once regarded as terrorists. The EU definition is more subtle ‘persons who finance, plan, facilitate or commit terrorist acts’, and it goes on to define a terrorist act. Nonetheless, it is a difficult issue on which the private sector needs guidance from the authorities, and it is not guidance that the supervisors can easily provide. Rather, the financial sector needs to receive information from police and intelligence as to the terrorists and terrorist organizations on the ‘black list’. This is even more true in the case of charities and foundations. Many innocent-sounding organizations that may raise money from legitimate sympathizers who believe they are contributing to a humanitarian cause have, in the past, been channelling at least a portion of the funds they have raised to terrorist uses. Much has been made by the media and by professional writers of the fact that terrorism is different from money-laundering because it is the use of the funds that is criminal not their source. However, it may be wrong to place too much emphasis on this factor to explain why banks are unable to identify customers engaged in terrorism. There has not, to the author’s knowledge, been a significant terrorist organization to date that has funded itself wholly from legitimate means. Al-Qaeda has been heavily involved in the marketing of drugs as well as other lesser crimes such as credit card fraud. Terrorist organizations are certainly not beyond robberies, kidnapping, extortion, and so on as a means of financing their illegal activities. Building and maintaining an effective terrorist organization costs a great deal of money – in the case of Al-Qaeda hundreds of millions. Hence, successfully denying all criminals access to the financial system will hit the terrorists too. What may be more challenging will be the identification of charities and other fund-raising organizations that support terrorism. Many of the contributors to what are usually set up with innocent sounding titles may not be aware that their money is being channelled into a terrorist organization. One concern that arises in the present hunt for Al-Qaeda money is that the terrorists will turn increasingly to parallel underground banking systems. Attention has been focused on the Hawala system – but it is by no means the only one for money transmission. Western Union type transfer systems, travellers cheques, even credit cards can be an effective means of financing individual terrorists if not whole terrorist cells. Much has also been made of the need to crack down on correspondent banking relations. Effectively, a respondent bank is relying on its correspondent to have conducted due diligence of each of its customers, because there is no way the respondent bank can monitor the probity of all transactions originating from sources
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that it does not know. The principles enacted in the USA PATRIOT Act prohibiting a bank from maintaining a correspondent relationship with a bank located in a ‘noncooperative’ jurisdiction appears to be a sound – if not necessarily watertight – precaution. But there is a risk that countries without developed banking systems, whose banks need their correspondent relationships to link with the principal world markets or whose (innocent) citizens are active users of Hawala to transmit funds abroad, may be harshly penalized through no fault of their own. Indeed, there are countries, such as Somalia, that have no banking infrastructure and whose banking system is based entirely on Hawala-type relationships. The BCBS paper does not go so far as to ban correspondent banking relationships (except with so-called ‘shell banks’). But it says that banks must decide whether they can rely on a correspondent to conduct adequate due diligence of its customers in the same manner as an introducer3 – and hence it must apply the criteria that are laid down for eligible introducers in determining whether to enter into or to sustain a correspondent relationship. It is a legitimate question to ask what the BCBS itself has been doing since 11 September to support the anti-terrorism efforts of the US government and others. First, it accelerated the issue of its CDD paper and, in doing so, took pains to ensure that it represents a response to the newly-identified threat (though, in truth, few changes were made to the document). Second, the BCBS’s Secretariat has been assisting the authorities in the transmission of the US ‘Control List’ of suspected terrorists to banks in the major countries. It has not been creating the list directly, but has acted as a conduit in taking the initial US list, adding additional names identified by non-US authorities and circulating a consolidated list to the authorities that make up its members. Those authorities have then passed on the list at their discretion to the financial institutions within their jurisdictions. The lists were also made available via the European Central Bank to countries in the European Union that are not members of the Basel Committee. Not all supervisors have been enthusiastic about this process – some have expressed doubt about the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the list, and have voiced fears that circulating lists will create complacency among banks about customers that do not appear on the list. An important issue in this context and one that is of considerable interest to the working group on cross-border banking is the extent to which the monitoring of customer due diligence needs to be applied on a global basis. The four risks identified in the CDD paper apply to a bank wherever it is operating – certainly to its overseas branches and very probably to subsidiaries under its effective control. There is a section in the paper that addresses the need for banks to be able to implement the CDD standards imposed by their home-country regulator on a global basis, and for home-country supervisors to be able to ensure that the standards are being adequately applied through on-site examination on equivalent verification procedures.
3
An introducer is an entity that channels suitable customers to a bank. In some countries, this is a regular and frequent source of new customers. The BCBS paper sets out strict criteria for the acceptability of introducers.
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Since the Control Lists began to circulate, this debate has become more pertinent because it has raised questions about a bank’s ability to respond on behalf not only of its head office and domestic banking network, but also of its offices abroad. Some banks seek to ensure that they maintain a centralized customer database – if only to save on IT costs – and hence are in a position to ‘search’ for identified customer names across their global customer base. Some do not make that attempt – and, even if they do, there will be individual units which for various reasons may not wish their own customer base to be accessible from the head office. Others may use a numbered account system to disguise the names of, say, their private banking clients in offshore centres or their high net-worth clients in a private banking centre such as Switzerland. It is clear, however, if a CDD principle is to be effective, that a bank should be in a position to respond to an official request as to whether it has the account of a named customer in any of the locations in which it operates. This means that its offices abroad must be capable of responding to enquiries from head office about named account holders. In the specific case of the Control List, many banks have circulated the List to their offices abroad and asked for notification of any matches. This means that the Lists have reached some outlying countries whose supervisors/central banks have not received them. Another issue relates to the ‘search’ capability. One of the lessons learnt since the Control Lists have been circulating is that, while all banks would normally have their account-holders in an electronically searchable form, relatively few banks have the beneficial owners so recorded. It seems that many banks have the supporting documentation to identify the recorded beneficial owner separately from their principal customer base. Hence a search of the Control List can be extremely timeconsuming if banks are to search, as they should do, the beneficial owners of accounts that they hold. There is also a question about the means by which banks should react with respect to matches with the Control Lists. This involves the legal area, because in most cases some form of confidentiality legislation will apply and any exchange of information will be subject to treaties or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Where there are suspicious transaction reporting rules and Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to which suspicions can be reported, the gateway would seem to be clear-cut. However, some FIUs may not have the powers to communicate directly with FIUs in other countries, such as FINCEN in the United States. It may, in such cases, be more efficient if the banks respond to their own supervisor, who can communicate suspicions to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. This channel may also be required in the case of countries which have not yet established FIUs (though these are becoming fewer). However, as a general rule, the supervisory information channel is not well suited to suspicious transaction reporting, since it is designed for the communication of problems concerning the bank’s own activities and is often subject to a series of criteria designed to protect the confidentiality of any information transmitted concerning individual customers and accounts. As often in the case of information-sharing, the most sensitive issue, as mentioned earlier, is the matter of tax confidentiality and the need to protect information about customer
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accounts from being passed to home-country authorities. But that protection can, at the same time, inhibit the bank supervisor from passing information to other official bodies, such as the FIU. The author’s view on the prospects for success in the fight against terrorist financing is that co-operation is needed on an unprecedented scale, not only between the private and public sectors, but within the public sector too. It is no secret that different official entities within the United States had information which, if pooled, would have alerted them to the 11 September terrorist attacks. Such information was not shared with others who could have added to it, partly for reasons of professional jealousy between the different agencies. Now, in the United States and elsewhere there is unprecedented collaboration at the official level with at least two major US inter-agency task forces. This effort is leading to intelligence successes, which have thankfully, at the time of writing at least, contributed to the absence of further terrorist events, though there have been some close calls. But, at the financial level, it seems that success has been more limited. While some quite substantial sums have apparently been frozen, many of the audit trails have petered out in impenetrable areas in the Middle East or in financial centres, often at a high political level. It is not surprising that the financial trail is not a simple one – Osama bin Laden reputedly went to Afghanistan originally to advise the Taliban on the best means of marketing and laundering the proceeds of their opium crops. He is known to operate a sophisticated financial machine and to have associates well versed in underground banking methods. In the future, it is going to be even more difficult to identify or to track the financing of terrorism, for the perpetrators have now been warned. Only so much can be done by the private sector – it needs to develop closer links with and receive tip-offs from the public sector on an ongoing basis. It has been said that customer privacy will not be the same again after 11 September, and this trend is being reinforced by initiatives by the OECD and others to increase fiscal transparency and force offshore financial centres to adopt stricter prudential and disclosure standards. Banks must certainly remain alert to terrorism – just as they must remain alert to all forms of criminal activity by their customers – but they can only supplement the efforts being made by the intelligence and police authorities, and not substitute for them. If there is to be real coordination, the public sector needs to share information more readily with the private sector than it has traditionally been willing to so. It has in the past been very much a one-way information flow and banks making Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) to FIUs have often wondered whether they have ever been investigated. The sharing of Control Lists with the financial institutions is an encouraging sign that the public sector is willing to be more open, and appreciates that it needs assistance from the banks and other financial institutions if it is to defend properly its people against these terrible threats. It is necessary, though, to close on a sombre note. Banks and bank supervisors have rarely faced a responsibility as grave as they do now. Failing to conduct due diligence in present circumstances could have deadly consequences, putting thousands or conceivably hundreds of thousands of lives at risk. There is no place to hide on this issue.
Financing of Terrorism – A Predicate Offence to Money Laundering? Armand Kersten
1.
Introduction
On 30 October 2001, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) agreed to a set of Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing.1 Recommendation II provides: ‘Each country should criminalise the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money laundering predicate offences.’ (emphasis added, AJK) These Special Recommendations were agreed upon at a FATF ‘extraordinary Plenary’, at which the FATF extended its mission beyond money laundering. 2 The 11 September 2001 attacks on America triggered drastic legislation aimed at suppressing the financing of terrorism, 3 appearing to depart from the legal apparatus, classically used in the fight against money laundering. For instance, the significant part of the USA PATRIOT Act package is the International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001. In the Act, the American Congress finds that money laundering permits transnational criminal enterprises to conduct and expand their operations to the detriment and safety of American citizens, and that money launderers subvert legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and terrorism. By making a brief tour d’horizon of relevant source materials from international (institutional) organizations, this paper shall address whether, from a methodolo-
1 2 3
FATF news release of 31 October 2001, FATF cracks down on Terrorist Financing (available on the web at . See the news release mentioned in ibid. Two of the highest profile laws in this category being the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (‘the USA PATRIOT ACT’) and the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.
M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 49–56. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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gical perspective, it makes sense to legislate to suppress financing of terrorism on the basis of analogies with money laundering.
2.
Money laundering
Whilst the United Nations Convention against illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances of 19 December 1988 (‘the Vienna Convention’) created momentum for the attention to money laundering as a global phenomenon,4 it only required the prohibition of the ‘laundering’ of drug proceeds.5 Note that the FATF, in its initial 40 Recommendations of 19906 took the‘definition’ of money laundering from the Vienna Convention. The Council of Europe7 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime of 8 November 1990 (the Strasbourg Convention), takes this a step further, by giving its Article 6 the title: ‘Laundering offences’. Whilst repeating constituent elements already contained in the Vienna Convention, it widens the circle of ‘predicate offences’ beyond drug trafficking. In so far as is relevant for the purposes of this article, it provides that the parties must establish as offences under their domestic laws: a.
b.
c.
4 5 6 7
8
the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is proceeds, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his actions; the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights with respect to or ownership of property, knowing that such property is proceeds and subject to its constitutional principles and the basic concepts of its legal system; the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, that such property was proceeds. (emphasis added)
The term ‘money laundering’ as such seems to have been introduced in the US Money Laundering Control Act of 1986. It is noted that the Vienna Convention does not explicitly refer to (the term) money laundering. Later in this article, it will be seen that the 1996 revision aimed at widening the scope. The Council of Europe should not be mistaken with the European Council. The Council of Europe is an international institutional organization, whereas the European Council is an organ of the European Union. Available on the web at .
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The Strasbourg Convention defines ‘proceeds’ as: any economic advantage from criminal offences.9 It goes on to define ‘predicate offence’ as: any criminal offence as a result of which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in the ‘laundering article’.10 This yields an entirely open-ended range of predicate offences, hinging on the definition of ‘proceeds’ as any economic advantage from criminal offences. Perhaps the only limitation is hidden in the fact that it is left to the Member States to incorporate the convention’s requirements in their domestic criminal laws, which leaves them discretion to draw the circle themselves. The Commission of the European Communities labelled the methodology of the Strasbourg Convention: ‘an approach to combating the laundering of the proceeds of a wider range of criminal offences than required by the Vienna Convention’ (emphasis added).11
I now turn to the European Union (and the European Communities) itself. The Council of the European Communities Directive of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 12 provides: ‘Whereas for the purposes of this Directive the definition of money laundering is taken from that adopted in the Vienna Convention; whereas, however, since money laundering occurs not only in relation to the proceeds of drug-related offences but also in relation to the proceeds of other criminal activities (such as organized crime and terrorism), the Member States should, within the meaning of their legislation, extend the effects of the Directive to include the proceeds of such activities, to the extent that they are likely to result in laundering operations justifying sanctions on that basis.’ (emphasis added) The 1991 Convention thus envisages and recognizes that terrorism is a criminal activity potentially resulting in proceeds in relation to which money laundering may occur. From a logical perspective, however, it seems that this approach presumes the criminal activity preceding the laundering of the proceeds. In 1996, the FATF strengthened its 4th Recommendation to state that ‘each country should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences’, done so as to extend the ambit of the predicate offences beyond that of the Vienna Convention.
9 10 11
12
Article 1, sub a. Article 1, sub e. Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive, amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, Brussels, 14 July 1999, COM (1999) 352 final, explanatory memorandum. OJ 1991 L 166, p 77 et seq.
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In 1998, under the auspices of the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention,13 the report Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering 14 was published. Under the header ‘issues for consideration’, this report addresses ‘predicate offences’15: ‘The time may have come to end the artificial division of criminal money into categories depending on the nature of the crime. . . . One possible approach would be to have member countries agree that any funds that are derived through criminal activity are funds that can give rise to a charge of money-laundering.’ From the context of the report, it can be inferred that the term ‘artificial division’ is used to point to distinctions sometimes made between criminal tax offences and tax offences classified otherwise. On 9 December 1999 the General Assembly of the UN adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. 16 Article 2 provides, in so far as is relevant here: ‘1
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out:
[...] (b) Any other act [subparagraph (a) refers to acts constituting offences under a list of treaties] intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do so or to abstain from doing any act.
[...] 3. For an act to constitute an offence set forth in paragraph 1, it shall not be necessary that the funds were actually used to carry out an offence referred to in paragraph 1, subparagraphs (a) or (b). 4. Any person also commits an offence if that person attempts to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article.’ (parentheses added) Article 1 paragraph 3 defines ‘proceeds’ as: any funds derived from or obtained, directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence set forth in Article 2.
13 14 15 16
Based in Vienna, this office created the UN Global Programme against Money Laundering (GPML) and the GPML Forum. See the website mentioned in footnote 14. Available on the web at . At pages 73 and 74 Available on the web at – entry into force was 10 April 2002.
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In its Article 8, the Convention refers to ‘proceeds’ by providing, in so far as is relevant here:
‘1.
2.
Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture. Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, for the forfeiture of funds used or allocated for the purpose of committing the offences set forth in article 2 and the proceeds derived from such offences.’ (emphasis added).
The Convention does not make any explicit reference to money laundering. The closest it comes to an analogy (if it is one) is in Article 18, which provides: ‘1. States parties shall co-operate by adapting their domestic legislation, including: [...] (b) Measures requiring financial institutions and other professions involved in financial transactions to utilize the most efficient measures available for the identification of their usual or occasional customers in whose interest accounts are opened, and to pay special attention to unusual or suspicious transactions and report transactions suspected of stemming from a criminal activity. For this purpose, States Parties shall consider: [...] iii) Adopting regulations imposing on financial institutions the obligation to report promptly to the competent authorities all complex, unusual large transactions and unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or obviously lawful purpose, without fear of assuming criminal or civil liability for breach of any restriction on disclosure of information if they report their suspicions in good faith.’ Thus, for instance, proceeds arising, by whatever means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, from collecting funds with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they will be used, in full or in part, to carry out a terrorist act are within the scope of the convention. It is not clear how the required element of ‘unlawfulness’ must be related to the collection of funds. It is clearly possible that the method used for collecting funds is not unlawful as such. On 15 November 2000, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.17 This Convention is intended to close the major loopholes blocking international efforts to crack down on those engaging in illegal activities ranging from money laundering to trafficking in human beings. 17
Available on the web at .
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The Convention contains definitions of a wide range of terms. Thus, for instance, it defines ‘serious crime’ as: ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.’ 18 Article 6 of the new Convention addresses the ‘Criminalization of the laundering of proceeds of crime’.19 The ‘definition’ of money laundering itself is extended quite a bit further than that in the Vienna Convention of 1988. Notably, in this Article 6, the new Convention provides: ‘Each State Party shall seek to apply widest range of predicate offences;
its definition of money laundering to the
Each State Party shall include as predicate offences all serious crime as defined in article 2 of this Convention . . . ’ (parentheses and emphasis added). It should be added that the new Convention explicitly provides for a so-called dual criminality test.20 Hence, the UN seeks to use and define ‘serious crime’, as well as ‘organized crime’. We are approaching the point of an ‘all crimes’ ambit of predicate offences. This brings one back to the EU. On 4 December 2001, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted the second money laundering prevention directive. 21 Both the EU Council of Ministers and the European Parliament had called for additional measures to enhance the 1991 EU anti-money laundering Directive. 22 On 14 July 1999, the EU Commission presented its proposal23 (the Proposal). The main changes to the 1991 Directive are a widening of the prohibition of money laundering to embrace not only drugs trafficking but also all organized crime, and an extension of the obligations of the Directive to certain non-financial activities and professions. It is this ‘widening’ of the prohibition of money laundering that shall now be the focus of the rest of this paper. The explanatory memorandum expresses it thus: 18 19 20
21
22 23
Art. 2(b). Thus, this Convention makes an explicit reference to the term ‘money laundering’; contrast the absence of such reference in the Vienna Convention of 1988, as was noted supra. Thus, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a party constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a criminal offence under the domestic law of the country where it is committed and would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the party applying the Convention, had it been committed in that party’s jurisdiction, viz. Art. 6(2)(c). Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 December 2001 amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, OJ 2001 L 344, p 76 et seq, available on the web at . See, supra, note 12 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive, amending Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering, Brussels, 14 July 1999, COM (1999) 352 final.
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‘The 1991 Directive only requires the prohibition of the laundering of drugs proceeds, as required by the Vienna Convention, but encourages Member States to apply the approach of the Strasbourg Convention,24 namely of combating the laundering of the proceeds of a wider range of criminal offences (often referred to as ‘predicate offences’). The FATF strengthened its relevant recommendation in 1996 to state that ‘each country should extend the offence of drug money laundering to one based on serious offences’. This corresponds to a growing trend based on the dramatic increase in non-drugs based organised crime and on the realisation that having a wide range of predicate offences should improve suspicious transaction reporting and above all facilitate international co-operation between judicial and police authorities in different countries.’ [parentheses and emphasis added] As to the concrete question whether it would also be appropriate to base the prohibition of money laundering contained in the (updated) Directive on the same concept of ‘serious offences’ as in the Strasbourg Convention, 25 the Commission interestingly distinguishes between, on the one hand, the criminal law treatment of money laundering (i.e., the definition of the crime of money laundering) and, on the other hand, the specific obligation to report suspicions of money laundering as imposed upon the financial sector. It stresses that the Directive addresses the obligations of reporting. The Commission then writes: ‘The anti-money laundering defences thus depend to a large extent on the goodwill and efforts of, in particular, the financial sector. The financial sector has expressed considerable reticence concerning any reporting requirement that would extend to an excessively wide range of offences, even including relatively minor ones.’ Which leads the Commission to conclude: ‘The Commission has concluded that for the purposes of the Directive, and its extension to certain non-financial activities, a reporting obligation based on serious offences might be too broad. The Commission is therefore proposing that the reporting obligation under the Directive should be based on activities linked to organised crime or damaging the European Communities financial interests.’ (emphasis added) Concretely then, the Proposal now defines ‘criminal activity’ as encompassing ‘participation in activities linked to organised crime’, and ‘fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity damaging or likely to damage the European Communities’ financial interests’.26 24 25 26
See, supra, note 8. See, supra, note 8. Proposal, Article 1(E).
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For the Directive, the Commission has knowingly thrown out ‘serious offences’, and opted instead for: ‘organised crime’. In the Proposal, ‘organised crime’ means exactly what it says: ‘involvement of an organised crime group’.27 This clear choice was made in the face of the noticeable ‘trend’ among the EU Member States to extend their domestic legislation to outlaw the laundering of the proceeds from a wide range of ‘serious crime’.28
Conclusion Where does all this lead? One thing is clear: Money laundering and financing of terrorism are two completely different concepts. As is implied by the term ‘laundering’, its intent and purpose are to have moneys, derived from crime, assume an apparent legal role in the financial system without this being known to the bona fide participants in the financial system. Logically, this presumes the criminal offence preceding the laundering. Ultimately, if the laundering succeeds, it is instrumental in having those taking an interest in the crime enjoy its financial benefits. Money launderers will seek to hide the funds and their origin from detection. Surely, those contemplating to finance terrorism will strive to hide the funds and their origin devoted to their cause from detection, too. This may well mean that they resort to similar techniques to those used by money launderers. It is precisely here that the strongest analogy between the two phenomena can be seen. Where financing of terrorism is concerned, possibly no criminal offence preceded the introduction of the funds in the financial system. Of course, there will be criminal intent, but it makes no sense to construe the funds used to promote the cause as the ‘proceeds’ of that criminal intent. Arguably, money laundering, to some extent, engenders the predicate offences. Clearly, few would commit predicate offences if they did not perceive an opportunity to ultimately derive the monetary benefit therefrom. Money laundering, however, does not occur so as to bring about, or facilitate the criminal offence itself (although, of course, some proceeds may be used to finance criminal operations). It is suggested that it makes no sense to designate the financing of terrorism as a money laundering predicate offence. Rather, it should be recognized and distinguished as a separate category. This is not to say that, in legislating for the consequences of cases involving the financing of terrorism, one should not draw upon inferences taken and developed from the classical money laundering apparatus.
27 28
Proposal, explanatory memorandum, p. 7. See European Commission, Second Commission Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of the Money Laundering Directive, XV/1116/97-rev.2 – En, III, 2
Obstacles in Company Law to Anti-Money Laundering International Co-Operation in European Union Member States Ernesto U. Savona
1. Introduction The misuse of corporate vehicles or entities or structures for money laundering purposes has come to the attention of international organizations and the general public together with the issue of offshore countries. In 2000, Transcrime’s Euroshore report pointed out the ‘domino effect’ of company law on other laws and regulations such as criminal, administrative and banking. 1 Depending on the type of regulation, company law makes a financial system more transparent (or more opaque), thereby influencing other sectors of regulation and the effectiveness of police and judicial cooperation. If company law seeks to maximize anonymity in financial transactions by facilitating the creation of shell or shelf companies whose owners remain largely unknown (because other companies own them), such anonymity could be transferred to other sectors of the law (criminal, banking, tax). Therefore, the names of the real beneficial owners or beneficiaries of financial transactions remain obscured, thwarting criminal investigation and prosecution. This conclusion has produced two consequences. The first is the need for a better understanding of the role played by legal and non-legal structures in facilitating crimes. Furthermore, given that the conclusions of the Euroshore report are addressed to European Union Member States, the second need is to better understand which regulation and/or insufficient/ absent implementation of regulation, where it exists, obstruct anti-money laundering international co-operation.2
1
2
‘Euroshore – Protecting the EU Financial System from the exploitation of Financial Centres and Off-shore facilities by Organised Crime’ (Trento Transcrime-University of Trento 2000) at p. 16 (Final Report prepared for the European Commission, Falcone Programme 1998). The first case is dealt with in the ‘OECD Report on the Misuse of Corporate Vehicles for Illicit Purposes, which covers offshore and onshore jurisdictions’ 9 May 2001; the second case dealt with in this Report initiated in 2001 (contract JHA b/2000/B2 of 25 January
M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 57–85. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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The Tampere European Council of October 1999, in agreement with the conclusions of the Euroshore report, considered the role of corporate law to be important and in Recommendation 58 it invited the European Commission ‘to draw up a report identifying provisions in national banking, financial and corporate legislation which obstruct international co-operation. The Council is invited to draw necessary conclusions on the basis of this report’. As a consequence the European Commission launched a tender (JHA B/2000/B2/01 of 20 July 2000) and in January 2001 Transcrime at the University of Trento was awarded the Study of the regulation and its implementation, in EU Member States, that obstruct anti-money laundering international co-operation (banking/financial and corporate/company regulative fields). The Report ‘Transparency and Money Laundering’ is the result of this study and was presented by the European Commission at the Jumbo Council of 16 October 2001, one month after the events of 11 September.3 The report does not mention terrorism, but the financial investigations for tracing and stopping the financing of terrorist groups have always come up against the wall of opacity erected by the corporations that deal with the financial transactions of criminals. Terrorists make use of the same instruments as other criminals for their laundering purposes. The aim of this article is to contribute to the understanding of how corporate law could affect the opacity/transparency of a financial system. It presents, in an abridged version, the second part of the report which covers corporate/company4 regulation. In this field the report covers ‘legal and non-legal structures’ that are susceptible to being used in EU Member States in money-laundering operations. Before moving on to the analysis some definitions are necessary: Legal and non-legal ‘structure’ is defined as an ‘organization with an economic or patrimonial vocation’;5 ‘Regulation’ is defined as ‘the whole group of those laws and provisions in the corporate/company regulative fields relevant to anti-money laundering international co-operation’. In fact, the existence of a legal provision could increase, either directly or indirectly, the effectiveness of the performance of law enforcement, judiciary and financial authorities in the investigation of money-laundering cases. First, it may be carried out directly by encouraging active collaboration in supplying information relevant to criminal investigaCont 2001) the main aim of which is to highlight, in EU Member States, those regulations and or implementations thereof that – in the banking/financial and corporate/company fields – constitute obstacles to anti-money laundering co-operation. 3 The research carried for the production of the main report was directed by the author, coordinated by Sabrina Adamoli with the co-operation of Andrea Di Nicola and Alessandro Scartezzini, all researchers at Transcrime-University of Trento. Eddy Wymeersch professor in Ghent (Belgium) acted as general consultant 4 The first part of the report refers to the banking/financial field. This part has been excluded from this article. 5 The term ‘patrimonial’ is intended as meaning ‘relating to somebody’s estate’.
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tions, and secondly, it may be carried out indirectly by increasing the transparency of a financial system through mechanisms identifying the subjects involved in their operations; Two types of obstacles are identified: ‘Obstacles to regulation’ preventing international co-operation in anti-money laundering activities are defined as ‘the lack of regulation’. They are explained by the variable ‘existence of regulation’ (R), The answers follow two modalities: yes or no. ‘Obstacles to the implementation of regulation’ inhibiting international cooperation in enacting measures against money laundering are defined as ‘the incomplete/absent implementation of regulation’. They are explained by the variables: a) existence of structures which enable the implementation (I) (modalities: fully implemented, partially implemented, not implemented); b) existence of controls for the implementation (C) (modalities: yes/no); c) existence of sanctions against non-compliance (S) (modalities: serious sanction, lenient sanction, no sanction).
2.
Main assumption
The main assumption is that the less regulation there is at a national level in the corporate/company regulative field, and the lower the implementation of the regulation under consideration, where it exists, the greater the obstacles to antimoney laundering international co-operation. That means that in order to remove these obstacles, countries should be called upon to change their regulation in the field. Following this assumption, this article intends to answer the following questions:
1.
2.
What regulation and/or implementation thereof, in the corporate/company regulative field, create obstacles to international co-operation between EU Member States to prevent money-laundering? What is the dimension of the obstacles in these fields?
The following steps have been followed: analysis of the regulation in order to identify which of the specified transparency variables involved in international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering are lacking; analysis of the implementation of regulation in the corporate/company regulative fields in order to identify which of the transparency variables involved in international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering specified in 1) are lacking; evaluation of the results of the two analyses of 1) and 2) in order to identify,
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quantify and cross-compare obstacles to international co-operation between EU Member States for the prevention of money laundering.
3.
Methodology and data collection procedures
In order to identify the transparency variables and obstacles involved in international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering in regulation and/or in its implementation, primary and secondary sources were used:6 the primary sources were: the replies to a questionnaire designed to select the legal and non-legal structures susceptible to being used in money-laundering operations. This questionnaire was sent to experts in the financial police units and the Financial Intelligence Units of the fifteen EU Member States; the replies to a questionnaire designed to study the regulation and its implementation in the corporate/company regulative field and sent to company law experts (professors and auditors), and to members of the IOSCO, in EU Member States.7 secondary sources consisted of a variety of both published and unpublished documents.8 These sources were utilized for the selection of the transparency variables subsequently used in the analysis.
6
7
8
Given the complexity of the identified transparency variables, and the necessity to gather information regarding the implementation of regulation in EU Member States, in collecting information, preference was given to the answers of the experts to the questionnaires submitted to them. The criteria used for the choice in case of differing answers by experts of the same country to the same question is explained on page 144 of the methodological appendix to the report. The list of experts contacted can be found in the acknowledgements at the beginning of the main report. As the results are based on their answers to the submitted questionnaires, some degree of error is due to the opinions expressed by the experts on single transparency variables. The criteria used for the choice in case of differing answers by experts of the same country to the same question is explained in the methodological appendix. ‘Report on the Misuse of Corporate Vehicles for Illicit Purposes’ (Paris OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance 2001); R. Thomas, Company Law in Europe (London Butterworths 2001); Company Law in Europe: Recent Developments (mimeo) (Manchester CLAB University of Manchester 1999); M.J. Oltmanns, European Company Structures (London-The Hague-Boston Kluwer Law International 1998); ‘Prevention of Organised Crime: The registration of legal persons and the international exchange of information’ final report (T.M.C. Asser Instituut 2000); Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy (mimeo) (London DTI London 1998); A.J. Oakley, The Modern Law of Trusts (London Sweet and Maxwell 1998); A. Sydenham, Trusts (London Sweet and Maxwell 1997); M. Lupoi, Trusts (Milan Giuffrè Editore 1997); D.J. Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts
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Analysis of the corporate/company regulative field
This section describes the model utilized to analyze data collected for the corporate/company regulative field, and sets out the conclusions. The assumption made here was that obstacles to international co-operation in response to money laundering depend either on a lack of regulation in the regulative field considered, or in the incomplete/absent implementation of the regulation where it exists. The purpose of the model is to show where these obstacles are (in which EU Member State, in which thematic area and at which level), to assess the dimensions of these obstacles in order to cross-compare them at an EU level, and to propose remedies that might remove them. The following steps were taken in developing the model for identifying obstacles to anti-money laundering international co-operation and assessing their dimensions: STEP 1: selection of the legal and non-legal structures susceptible to being used in money laundering operations; STEP 2: Identification of thematic areas and relative transparency variables; STEP 3: Analysis of the regulation at the national level; STEP 4: Analysis of the implementation of the regulation at the national level; STEP 5: Cross-comparative analysis of the results;
4.1 Selection of the legal and non-legal structures susceptible to being used in money laundering operations The first step of the Study was that of selecting the legal and non-legal structures susceptible to being used in money laundering operations in EU Member States. A questionnaire was drafted, starting with a list of legal and non-legal structures used in an earlier study,9 and sent to a maximum of three experts from financial police
Cont. and Trustees (London Butterworths 1995); F. Galgano, Diritto commerciale: le società (Milano Zanichelli 1999/2000 ed.); The Opacity Index (Price Waterhouse-Coopers 2001) available on the Internet at , last visited on 1 June 2001. 9 ‘Transparence des structures utilisées à des fins économiques et/ou patrimoniales: Présentation succinte de la situation actuelle dans les Etats Membres, document de travail des services de la Commission’ of 5 October 2000 EC DOC. 12088/00. The list was comprised of the public limited company, the private limited company, the société de droit civil and its equivalents in other EU Member States, the trust, the società fiduciaria, the limited partnership on shares, the ordinary partnership, the limited partnership, the cooperation, the association, the foundation, the association momentanée, the private limited company with one shareholder, the unlimited company, the European Economic Interest Grouping, the etablissement public, the association internationale, the groupement complementaire d’entreprises, and the association en participation.
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units and Financial Intelligence Units in the fifteen EU Member States. With the cooperation of Europol, the experts were chosen from units which specifically deal with economic crimes on the basis of their experience and knowledge of money laundering investigations. The experts acted as a virtual panel to whom responsibility was given for the selection of the structures susceptible to being used in money laundering operations. 10 According to the results of this survey, the structures selected for further analysis were divided into three groups. Three structures were selected as most susceptible to being used in money laundering operations by at least 30 per cent of the EU Member States. The regulation and its implementation in relation to these structures were, therefore, analyzed in all the EU Member States where they exist. They are: the public limited company (reported as susceptible to being used in money laundering operations in 40 per cent of EU Member States and existing in all of them); the private limited company (reported as susceptible to being used in money laundering operations in 67 per cent of EU Member States and existing in all of them); the société de droit civil and its equivalent in other Member States (reported as susceptible to being used in money laundering operations in 37.5 per cent of the EU Member States where it exists).11 This article covers only the first two company structures, leaving the third to the main report. Furthermore, the analysis covers the regulation of trusts, selected as susceptible to being used in money-laundering operations by Ireland, and also analyzed in the United Kingdom. 10
11
On the basis of their experience and knowledge of money laundering, experts were asked to select which legal and non-legal structures are susceptible to being used in moneylaundering operations in their countries and to weigh up their involvement in such activities using a scale. The structure was selected according to the evaluation of this panel. For the remaining structures in the list, the regulation and its implementation were only analyzed in the single countries where they were reported as susceptible to being used in money-laundering operations. The following structures are not part of this article but are analyzed in the main report: trusts in Ireland and United Kingdom; the società fiduciaria was analyzed in Italy, the only country where it exists; the limited partnership on shares was analyzed in Belgium and Italy; the ordinary partnership was analyzed in Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden; the limited partnership was analyzed in Sweden; the co-operative was analyzed in Belgium; the association was analyzed in Ireland and Sweden; the foundation was analyzed in Austria and the Netherlands; the association momentanée (unión temporal de empresas) was analyzed in Spain; the single member private limited company was analyzed in the Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom.
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4.2 Identification of thematic areas and transparency variables in regulation and in its implementation The second step of the Study was to identify thematic areas and related transparency variables involved in the regulation and its implementation. The following thematic areas 12 were selected because of their relevance to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering: Incorporation; Company activity; Identification of the real beneficial owner. For each thematic area a set of constitutive elements (called ‘transparency variables’), involved in the regulation and in its implementation was identified. The existence of each of these variables ensures greater transparency of the corporate/company regulative field. The idea behind this choice is that, in order to prevent and to combat money laundering both nationally and internationally, it is essential to guarantee the transparency of the financial and corporate systems of the EU Member States. The less transparent the national financial and corporate systems are, the less effective and efficient international anti-money laundering regimes become. This is one of the conclusions reached by the Euroshore Report,13 which states that corporate/company law conditions the level of a financial system’s transparency/opacity. Depending on the type of regulation, it generates greater/lower transparency of a financial system, thereby influencing the other sectors of regulation and conditioning the effectiveness of international police and judicial co-operation. Three thematic areas and the relative transparency variables were identified in discussions with company law experts, who advised and co-operated throughout the development of this Study, supplemented by the existing literature on this topic and by the content of the existing European Union instruments. 14 12 13
14
Their relevance for anti-money laundering international co-operation is explained in sections from 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 of the main report. Transcrime – University of Trento, in co-operation with CERTI – Bocconi University (Milan, Italy) and Erasmus University of Rotterdam (The Netherlands), Euroshore; ‘Protecting the EU Financial System from the Exploitation of Financial Centres and OffShore Facilities by Organised Crime, Final Report Prepared for the European Commission’ (Trento Falcone Programme 1998, January 2000) at pp. 75–77. The most relevant in this context are: First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community, OJ 1968 L 65/8; Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, OJ 1977 L 26/1; Fourth Council Directive
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In each of the three identified thematic areas, the above-mentioned transparency variables were turned into a number of questions, in order to verify the existence of regulation in the area and to evaluate the level of its implementation in the area. The questions were collected in a questionnaire, which was sent to company law experts (professors and auditors) and to members of the IOSCO in all EU Member States.15
4.2.1 The thematic area ‘Incorporation’ Incorporation is the initial phase of the ‘life’ of legal and non-legal structures, in which the structure itself is established through a series of acts aimed at making it operational. The relevance of this thematic area for international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering lies in the fact that a lack of scrutiny during the incorporation phase results in greater opacity in company law, which might obstruct the acquisition of information regarding the physical persons participating in its establishment. The less opaque (or the more transparent) the process of incorporation is, the more available the information concerning the incorporation of the structures will be. This facilitates the investigation of their activities and of the persons controlling them at both national and international levels. In 2000 the FATF stressed the importance of this area for international cooperation for the prevention of money laundering. The existence of ‘inadequate commercial law requirements for registration of businesses and legal entities’ is one of the twenty-five criteria used to identify detrimental rules, which impede international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering in non-cooperative countries or territories.16 Criterion 12 relates to the existence of ‘inadequate means for identifying, recording and making available relevant information related to legal and business entities (name, legal form, address, identity of directors, provisions regulating the power to bind the entity)’. According to the FATF Report on Money Laundering Typologies, 1999–2000, ‘varying company formation procedures, along with a lack of transparency for the process in some jurisdictions, are factors of which the money launderer may take advantage through the company formation agent. The solutions to these problems then, according to the FATF experts, fall into two major areas: increasing
cont. 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the annual accounts of certain types of companies, OJ 1978 L 222/11; Eighth Council Directive 84/ 253/EEC of 10 April 1984 based on Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on the approval of persons responsible for carrying out the statutory audits of accounting documents, OJ 1984 L 126/20. 15 The researchers drafted the variables, subsequently turned into questions and sent in the questionnaire, keeping in mind the features of legal structures. The same variables, for analogy, were extended to non-legal structures. 16 FATF, ‘Report on Non-cooperative Countries and Territories’ (Paris FATF 2000) at p. 4.
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oversight of company formation agents and insisting on minimum standards for company registry and administration, as well as transparency for the process’.17 The FATF also underlines the role played by company formation agents,18 who are the experts or agencies offering consultancy services in the incorporation of legal entities. These experts can advise their clients on the choice of jurisdiction or jurisdictions in which incorporating a legal entity is the cheapest and has the least legal requisites. The FATF in fact states: ‘Structures created by company formation agents to facilitate legitimate business activities might also be attractive as a cover for money laundering’. Consequently ‘without the ability to determine the true owner of these companies, government authorities investigating a particular money laundering scheme will be unable to establish the necessary links from the funds to the criminal’.19 The Financial Stability Forum, convened in April 1999 to promote international financial stability through information exchange and international co-operation in financial supervision and surveillance, has also highlighted the importance of scrutiny in the incorporation phase of a legal entity.20 Another problem, mentioned by the OECD in its ‘Report on the misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes’,21 is related to the creation of ‘shelf companies’.22 Therefore a policy aimed at reducing opacity in this area should include a series of elements which, in this study, are identified as transparency variables in regulation. Transparency variable 1 (existence of legal provisions requiring a statutory authorization to incorporate a company) makes it more difficult to use a structure for
17 18 19 20
21 22
FATF, ‘Report on Money Laundering Typologies 1999–2000’ (Paris FATF 2000) at p. 10 (available on the Internet at ). Ibid, at p. 8. Ibid, at p. 9. Specifically, the ‘Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres’ highlighted how the integrity of financial systems is hampered by the presence, in offshore financial centres, of opaque regulation concerning the incorporation and activity of legal entities and of insufficient control of them. A ‘light and flexible incorporation and licensing regime’ resulting in ‘inadequate due diligence in incorporation and licensing of new financial institutions and shell companies’ creates the risk that legal entities are incorporated with illicit proceeds and are subsequently used in money laundering operations. See ‘Report of the Working Group on Offshore Centres’ (Financial Stability Forum 5 April 2000) p. 12, available on the Internet at . ‘Report on the misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes’ (Paris OECD Steering group on Corporate Governance 2001) at p. 13, available online at . According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 1999, a shelf company is ‘a company that has already been incorporated with a standard memorandum and articles of association and has inactive shareholders, directors, and secretary. When a shelf company is subsequently purchased, the inactive shareholders transfer their shares to the purchaser and the directors and secretary submit their resignations. Typically, the authorities need not be notified when a shelf company is sold’. The end result is that there are companies whose real beneficial owners and directors are unknown and not checked on by the authorities.
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illicit purposes, as it makes it mandatory to supply information to a controlling authority, which supervises the process of incorporation. Transparency variable 2 (existence of legal provisions requiring background investigations into the founders of a company) has the aim of requiring checks on all the persons who intend to set up a structure in order to prevent it from being used as a shield for criminal activities. Transparency variable 3 (existence of legal provisions setting a minimum company incorporation capital) increases the costs incurred by criminals when misusing structures for illicit purposes. Transparency variable 4 (existence of legal provisions requiring verification of the legal origin of the incorporation capital) requires verification of the legal origin of the capital invested in the structure in order to avoid illicit proceeds from being introduced into the financial system. Transparency variable 5 (existence of legal provisions requiring that the incorporation capital is deposited at a credit institution) aims to make the control and verification of the origin of the capital easier by making the use of an intermediary obligatory. Transparency variable 6 (existence of legal provisions requiring a minimum incorporation period, in order to verify the information regarding the founders) makes it possible to accurately investigate the persons incorporating a structure and the documentation involved, in order to detect any anomalies and avoid the structures being misused. Transparency variable 7 (existence of legal provisions prohibiting the incorporation of ‘shelf companies’) is aimed at prohibiting the use of structures, which have already been incorporated with a standard memorandum and articles of association and inactive shareholders, directors and secretary. Authorities need not be informed when such structures are sold and their shareholders, directors and secretary are replaced. This makes it more difficult to thoroughly verify the true beneficial owners due to their very flexible incorporation procedures. Transparency variable 8 (existence of legal provisions requiring that a registered office/agent is domiciled in the country of incorporation) has the aim of linking a structure to a physical location, because this makes eventual criminal investigation of its activities more effective and facilitates the acquisition of information. Transparency variable 9 (existence of legal provisions requiring that the company be registered in a public register) makes information concerning the incorporation of structures readily available to third parties and law enforcement agencies by requiring that they are made public. Transparency variable 10 (existence of legal provisions requiring that a central controlling authority collects, maintains and verifies the information required for registration), is necessary in order to centralize data, quicken access, and verify the accuracy of the documentation presented, thus making it more difficult to misuse structures.
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4.2.2 The thematic area ‘Company activity’ The ‘Company activity’ area refers to the activities of an operational legal and nonlegal structure aimed at achieving its economic or patrimonial goal. This area is relevant for international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering because a lack of controls on the activities of the company increases the opacity in company law and makes it difficult to monitor its behaviour and exchange this information with other foreign authorities. The greater the possibility of gaining information about the management and the activities of a structure, the more the names of shareholders are accessible to other parties. The more closely accounts are audited, and the greater the obligation to disclose relevant information, the more information concerning the activities of structures is available to law enforcement, judiciary and financial authorities and can be exchanged, when necessary, with their counterparts for anti-money laundering purposes. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)23 has underlined how harmonized regulation of the operations of legal entities in the securities market is necessary to guarantee the integrity of financial markets, stating that ‘accounting principles and auditing standards are necessary safeguards of the reliability of financial information’.24 The importance of scrutiny of company activity has also been emphasized by the OECD in the discussions regarding the creation of a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines. A set of non-binding principles, developed in 1999, covers five areas, one of which is disclosure and transparency, directed at ensuring ‘ [ . . . ] that timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company. [...] Information should be prepared, audited, and disclosed in accordance with high quality standards of accounting, financial and non-financial disclosure, and audit. An annual audit should he conducted by an independent auditor in order to provide an external and objective assurance on the way in which financial statements have been prepared and presented. Channels for disseminating information should provide for fair, timely and cost-efficient access to relevant information by users’.25 A policy aimed at reducing opacity in this area, therefore, includes a set of elements, identified as transparency variables of regulation in this study: Transparency variable 11 (existence of legal provisions requiring the regular updating of data in the company register) makes it compulsory to communicate all changes in the structure. This makes it possible to improve knowledge of the structure and more difficult to use it for criminal purposes.
23 24 25
Available online at . IOSCO, Objectives and principles of securities regulation, p. 4. ‘OECD Principles of Corporate Governance’ (OECD Ad Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance 1999) at pp. 19–22, available online at , visited on 25 July 2001.
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Transparency variable 12 (existence of legal provisions requiring systematic examination of the data held in the company register in order to detect inconsistent or missing data) requires that the accuracy of the data is checked and possible inaccuracies, anomalies or lack of information identified; this should indicate misuse of the structure. Transparency variable 13 (existence of legal provisions requiring the maintenance of a shareholder register) is a means of making the names of the shareholders public. It includes the names of the shareholders in alphabetical order and information on the shares held. This makes it possible to acquire information on the persons in control of the structure for law enforcement agency investigation. Transparency variable 14 (existence of legal provisions requiring the regular updating of information in the shareholders register) requires that information regarding shareholders is regularly updated in order to detect anomalies and to connect the structure to the physical persons in control. Transparency variable 15 (existence of legal provisions requiring the maintenance of a share register) is aimed at making it compulsory to collect and keep up to date information on share ownership. This makes the activity of the structure more transparent and information readily available to third parties. Transparency variable 16 (existence of legal provisions requiring the regular updating of information in the share register) requires that information concerning shares is updated in order to detect anomalies and to make it possible to connect the structure to the physical persons controlling it. Transparency variable 17 (existence of legal provisions requiring the filing of the minutes of the annual meeting) requires the filing of a formal document summarizing the main decisions taken during the meeting regarding the activities of the structure. This requirement is aimed at facilitating the scrutiny of the activities of a structure, in order to ensure that they are not fictitious and to make its use for illicit purposes more difficult. Transparency variable 18 (existence of legal provisions requiring the filing of accounts) requires further verification as to whether a structure carries out a real economic activity and is not used only for documentary purposes. Transparency variable 19 (existence of legal provisions requiring the keeping of accounting records for at least five years) makes it possible to keep records of the economic activities conducted in order to be able to examine the accounts at a later date. Transparency variable 20 (existence of legal provisions requiring an external auditor) reduces the risk of fraud and other illicit activities involving the falsification of documents and increases the transparency of corporate/company law by requiring an independent examination of the activities of a structure. Transparency variable 21 (existence of legal provisions requiring the depositing of company documents with a competent authority) makes these documents readily available for investigation of the structure and increases the transparency of the information concerning its activities by making it more difficult to falsify company documents.
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Transparency variable 22 (existence of legal provisions requiring the keeping of tax records) reduces the risk of fraud and other illicit activities making it possible to exercise checks on the economic activity of the structure.
4.2.3 The thematic area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’ The area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’ refers to rules aimed at identifying the person or persons who are actually in control of a structure and its activities. In this thematic area, the opacity created by the impossibility of ascertaining the identity of the shareholders and establishing a connection between a structure and the physical person or persons running it obstructs effective investigation at national and transnational levels. The importance of the introduction of controls in order to ascertain the identity of the real beneficial owner of a structure has recently been emphasized by the OECD in its ‘Report on the misuse of corporate vehicles for illicit purposes’. The OECD states that ‘any jurisdiction that provides mechanisms enabling individuals to successfully hide their identity behind a corporate vehicle while excessively constraining the capacity of authorities to obtain and share information on beneficial ownership and control for regulatory/supervisory and law enforcement purposes is increasing the vulnerability of its corporate vehicles to misuse’.26 However, ‘certain jurisdictions [...] allow corporate vehicles incorporated or established in their jurisdictions to employ instruments that can be used to obscure beneficial ownership and control, such as bearer shares, nominee shareholders, and nominee directors, without devising effective mechanisms that would enable the authorities to identify the true owners and controllers when illicit activity is suspected or to fulfil their regulatory/supervisory responsibilities. Some of these jurisdictions further protect anonymity by enacting strict secrecy laws that prohibit company registrars, financial institutions, lawyers, accountants, and others, under the threat of civil and criminal sanctions, from disclosing any information regarding beneficial ownership and control to regulatory/ supervisory and law enforcement authorities’.27 Furthermore, the G–7 in July 2000 stressed that ‘corporations are sometimes established simply in order to gain access to the financial system. If there is obscurity about their ownership, banks and other financial institutions may not be able to discover the identity of the beneficiary of the account and will be unable to meet their “know your customer”obligation. The combination of market access and obscurity of ownership can facilitate money laundering and market abuse’.28 Scrutiny during the incorporation phase, therefore, can make it easier to ascertain the identity of the founders and the aims that the structure intends to achieve, thus facilitating international co-operation. 26 27 28
OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, op. cit., p. 2. OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance, op. cit., p. 7. ‘Actions against abuse of the global financial system’ (Okinawa G-7 Financial Ministers 21 July 2000) available online at .
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A policy aimed at reducing opacity in this area should, therefore, include a set of elements which in this study are identified as the transparency variables of regulation: Transparency variable 23 (existence of legal provisions prohibiting the issuance of bearer shares) is aimed at making it possible to identify the physical persons who hold shares in the structure itself and possibly in control of it, thus preventing criminals from controlling structures without disclosing their identities. Transparency variable 24 (existence of legal provisions requiring that participation in a company is communicated if a certain (share) threshold is exceeded) is aimed at making it possible to identify the physical persons with significant shareholdings in a structure and at increasing the transparency of its ownership. Transparency variable 25 (existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee shareholders) is aimed at preventing a physical person from controlling a structure by means of nominees (e.g. stockbrokers) who appear in the shareholder register but make it difficult to establish the identity of the real beneficial owner of the shares. Transparency variable 26 (existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee directors) is aimed at making it possible to establish a connection between a structure and the physical person running it by avoiding that the real beneficial owner uses a director for its formal management. Transparency variable 27 (in case a legal entity is a shareholder, existence of legal provisions requiring that complete information is supplied, so as to identify the real beneficial owner) is aimed at making the ownership of a structure more transparent. When a legal entity holds shares in another legal entity, the chain of corporations thus generated makes it difficult to ascertain the identity of the real beneficial owner. Transparency variable 28 (existence of legal provisions prohibiting legal entities from acting as directors) is aimed at making it easier to understand who holds control of a legal structure. When a legal structure is a director of another legal structure, the chain of corporations thus generated makes it difficult to ascertain the identity of the real and final power-holder. Transparency variable 29 (existence of legal provisions requiring the disclosure of the identity of the real beneficial owner of a structure to the authorities) is aimed at obtaining the identity of the real beneficial owner of a structure on request, by the public authorities. This makes the ownership of a structure more transparent and harder to hide behind a corporate shield.
4.2.4 The transparency variables involved in the regulation of trusts In its latest annual report,29 FATF highlighted how ‘trusts, along with various forms of corporate entities, are increasingly perceived as an important element of large-scale or complex money laundering schemes, despite their legitimate use and long tradition in many jurisdictions. [. . .] the concern for anti-money laundering authorities is the
29
‘Annual Report 2000–2001’ (Paris 2001) at p. 16.
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seemingly impenetrable anonymity which a trust may provide to the true owner or beneficiary. This anonymity is enhanced by the fact that documentation of trusts is not public information. [. . .]possible solutions range from establishing a strict regulatory regime for trust formation agents (i.e., subject them to licensing, customer identification, record keeping and reporting requirements) to imposing some sort of public or semi-public registration requirement on trust creation’. The reasons why trusts could be used in the money laundering process was highlighted in the typologies report of February 2001.30 In Ireland and the United Kingdom, where trusts exist,31 the more trust law is transparent, the more it is possible to establish the identity of the parties of the trust and to scrutinize the activity of the trustees. Law enforcement authorities can avert the use of trusts as shields for illegal transactions and exchange significant information at a transnational level. Given the diversity between trusts and other legal and non-legal structures, appropriate indicators of transparency were selected for the analysis of the regulation of trusts. They were identified by studying the available literature on their regulation.32 A policy aimed at reducing opacity in the regulation of trusts should contain a set of elements which, in this Study, are identified as indicators of transparency in regulation: Existence of legal provisions requiring written constitution of the trust. This indicator of transparency has the aim of ensuring the existence of written 30
31
32
‘It should be pointed out that a trust is not the same as a company or other form of corporate entity. When a company is established, it has its own “legal personality” that is separate and distinct from the natural persons that serve as directors or shareholders. Property held by a company is owned by the company as a legal person and not individually by the company directors or shareholders. Property held in trust, on the other hand, is legally owned by the trustee and no longer by the settlor nor by the beneficiary. Therefore, when dealing with certain trusts, the work of an investigator may be further complicated by the fact that the trustee may be a legal person (a trust company for example), and the beneficiary or beneficiaries may also be trusts (or corporate entities). Establishing whether there are real persons behind the legal arrangement and that the trust is a sham is a difficult if not impossible task. Furthermore, trusts differ from corporate entities in that they generally have no registration requirement or central registry, and there is usually no authority responsible for oversight of such legal arrangements’. ‘Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2000– 2001’ (Paris FATF 2001) at p. 10. As already mentioned, in the other EU Member States, trusts are not recognized as a separate legal form, but are recognized if incorporated in accordance with the law of the ‘home’ country, such as Ireland or the United Kingdom. A.J. Oakley: The Modern Law of Trusts, (London Sweet and Maxwell 1998); A. Sydenham, Trusts (London Sweet and Maxwell 1997); M. Lupoi, Trusts, (Milan Giuffrè Editore 1997); D.J. Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and Trustees, (London Butterworths 1995); M.R. Sancilio, ‘La disciplina del trust’, in Ricerca sul riciclaggio nel contesto dei rapporti tra economia criminale edeconomia legale. Rapporto sull’attivita’ di ricerca 1 June 1998–31 May 1999 (Rome Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi 2000); S. Gardner, An Introduction to The Law of Trusts Oxford Clarendon Law Series Clarendon Press 1990).
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evidence that a trust has been set up, granting law enforcement authorities the possibility to obtain information on trusts and their specific features. Existence of legal provisions requiring registration of the trust deed in a public register. This indicator of transparency requires that data regarding the main features of a trust be centrally registered and publicly accessible. This would make information about the trust easier to access by the general public and law enforcement, judiciary and financial authorities, and easier to exchange at a transnational level. Existence of legal provisions requiring that the personal particulars of the settler be included in a public document. This indicator of transparency is aimed at avoiding the possibility that the settler remains anonymous, by supplying the general public and law enforcement, judiciary and financial authorities with information regarding the identity of the original owner of the capital held in trust. Consequently, this diminishes the anonymity surrounding the trust. Existence of legal provisions requiring that the personal particulars of the beneficiary be included in a public document. This indicator of transparency is aimed at avoiding the possibility that the beneficiary remains anonymous by supplying the general public and law enforcement agencies with information regarding the identity of the person entitled to the benefits derived from the investments of the trust fund. Consequently, this diminishes the anonymity surrounding the trust. Existence of legal provisions prohibiting the settler from also being the beneficiary of the same trust. This indicator of transparency is aimed at preventing criminals from exploiting the possibility of formally separating themselves from the ownership of the proceeds of crime by conferring the goods to a trust, and receiving the profits thereof by nominating themselves as the beneficiaries of the same trust. Existence of legal provisions prohibiting the beneficiary of a trust from being another trust. This indicator of transparency is aimed at prohibiting the beneficiary of a trust from being another trust, thus preventing a supplementary layer of secrecy from being added to the trust and enhancing the possibility of detecting the identity of the beneficiary. Existence of legal provisions requiring a public register of trustees. This indicator of transparency requires that data regarding the identity of trustees be registered and publicly accessible, thereby making trustee information available to both the general public and law enforcement agencies. Existence of legal provisions requiring an authority to supervise the activity of trustees. This indicator of transparency grants the possibility of scrutinizing the activities of the persons and companies managing the trust fund and so making it easier to detect any criminal misuse.
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Analysis of the regulation and its implementation in the corporate/company regulative field
The aim of the data analysis is to understand what are the obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering, where these obstacles are to be found and at what level (regulation and/or implementation), and what are their dimensions. Separate analysis was carried out for each of the structures in EU Member States identified as being susceptible to use as money laundering operations. The analyzed regulation and its implementation are summarized in a series of synoptic tables available in annex B of this report. The tables outline the obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering present in each EU Member State.33 For each of the structures selected for further analysis and for each variable of transparency, an index of obstacles to regulation and the implementation of regulation was calculated, with a view to understanding in which thematic area obstacles to international co-operation on anti-money-laundering activity are to be found.34 These indexes represent, on a scale from 0 to 100, the dimensions of the obstacles created by the absence of regulation and by their incomplete or absent implementation where the regulation under consideration exists. The higher this index, the higher the obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering. For each thematic area, these indexes have been subsequently aggregated in a ‘General index of Obstacles to Regulation’ (GOR index) and in a ‘General index of Obstacles to the Implementation of Regulation’ (GOI index). They are a quantitative expression of the obstacles created, in each thematic area and in each EU Member State, by the absence of regulation and the incomplete or absent implementation of the regulation under consideration, where it exists.
5.1 Results of the analysis: the regulation and its implementation for the legal and non-legal structures analyzed in all countries where they exist 5.1.1. Public limited company The above-mentioned Indexes, related to the obstacles to regulation and to its implementation, are summarized in the following table (Table 1).
33 34
The answers given by the experts used for the analysis have not been systematically crosschecked. For an explanation of the process of calculating these indexes, see section B of the methodological appendix (step 6).
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The EU average Indexes of Obstacles to regulation and to its implementation set out in Table 1 are graphically represented in Figure 1. As can be seen from this figure, the greatest obstacles to international cooperation for the prevention of money laundering seem to be found in the lack of regulation in the three identified thematic areas rather than in its implementation. Where regulation exists, it seems to show a high implementation level. The thematic area ‘Identification of the true beneficial owner’ is where obstacles to regulation are the most significant (GOR 62.2). The second area where obstacles to regulation are to be found is ‘Incorporation’ (GOR 43.8). The analysis conducted by applying the model shows which of the single transparency variables, in each thematic area, are the most problematic in terms of obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering.
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OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘INCORPORATION’
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Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Incorporation’ Transparency variable 6 (Existence of legal provisions requiring a minimum period for incorporation, in order to scrutinize the information regarding the founders) - index of obstacles to regulation 100.0; Transparency variable 7 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting the incorporation of ‘shelf’ companies) - index of obstacles to regulation 85.7; Transparency variable 4 (Existence of legal provisions requiring verification of the legal origin of the incorporation capital) – index of obstacles to regulation 78.6; Transparency variable 2 (Existence of legal provisions requiring background investigations on the founders of a company) – index of obstacles to regulation 73.3; Transparency variable 1 (Existence of legal provisions requiring statutory authorization to incorporate a company) – index of obstacles to regulation 46.7. 2.
OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘COMPANY ACTIVITY’
Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Company activity’ Transparency variable 12 (Existence of legal provisions requiring systematic
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examination of the data held in the company register in order to detect inconsistent or missing data) – index of obstacles to regulation 46.7; Transparency variable 15 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the maintenance of a share register) – index of obstacles to the implementation of regulation 26.7; Transparency variable 17 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the filing of the minutes of the annual meeting) – index of obstacles to the implementation of regulation 26.7. 3.
OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘IDENTIFICATION OF THE REAL BENEFICIAL OWNER’
Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’ Transparency variable 23 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting the issuance of bearer shares) – index of obstacles to regulation 80.0; Transparency variable 27 (In case a legal entity is a shareholder, existence of legal provisions requiring that complete information is supplied in order to identify the true beneficial owner) – index of obstacles to regulation 78.6; Transparency variable 25 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee shareholders) – index of obstacles to regulation 71.4;
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Transparency variable 26 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee directors) - index of obstacles to regulation 71.4; Transparency variable 29 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the disclosure of the identity of the true beneficial owner of a company to the authorities) – index of obstacles to regulation 64.3; Transparency variable 28 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting legal entities from acting as directors) – index of obstacles to regulation 46.7.
5.1.2 Private limited company The indexes, relative to the obstacles to regulation and its implementation, are summarized in the following table (Table 2).
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The EU average indexes of obstacles to regulation and its implementation set out in Table 15 are graphically represented in Figure 5.
As in the case of the public limited company, the greatest obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering seem to be found in the lack of regulation in the three identified thematic areas rather than in its implementation. Where the regulation exists, it seems to show a high implementation level. The thematic area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’ is where obstacles to regulation are the most significant (GOR 56.5), while the second area where obstacles to regulation are to be found is ‘Incorporation’ (GOR 44.4). The analysis conducted applying the model shows which of the single transparency variables in each thematic area are the most problematic in terms of obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering. 1.
OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘INCORPORATION’
Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Incorporation’
Transparency variable 6 (Existence of legal provisions requiring a minimum incorporation period) – index of obstacles to regulation 100.0; Transparency variable 7 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting the incorporation of ‘shelf companies’) – index of obstacles to regulation 85.7; Transparency variable 2 (Existence of legal provisions requiring background
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investigations into the founders of a company) – index of obstacles to regulation 73.3; Transparency variable 4 (Existence of legal provisions requiring verification of the legal origin of the incorporation capital) – index of obstacles to regulation 71.4; Transparency variable 1 (Existence of legal provisions requiring statutory authorization to incorporate a company) – index of obstacles to regulation 46.7.
2.
OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘COMPANY ACTIVITY’
Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Company activity’
Transparency variable 12 (Existence of legal provisions requiring systematic examination of the data held in the company register in order to detect inconsistent or missing data) – index of obstacles to regulation 60.0; Transparency variable 17 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the filing of minutes of the annual meeting) – index of obstacles to regulation 40.0; Transparency variable 15 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the maintenance of a share register) – index of obstacles to regulation 26.7.
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OBSTACLES IN THE THEMATIC AREA ‘IDENTIFICATION OF THE REAL BENEFICIAL OWNER’
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Main obstacles in the thematic area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’ Transparency variable 27 (In case a legal entity is a shareholder, existence of legal provisions requiring that complete information is supplied, so as to identify the real beneficial owner) – index of obstacles to regulation 85.7; Transparency variable 24 (Existence of legal provisions requiring that participation in a company is communicated, if a certain (share) threshold is exceeded) – index of obstacles to regulation 76.9; Transparency variable 29 (Existence of legal provisions requiring the disclosure of the identity of the real beneficial owner of a company to the authorities) – index of obstacles to regulation 64.3; Transparency variable 26 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee directors) – index of obstacles to regulation 61.5; Transparency variable 25 (Existence of legal provisions prohibiting nominee shareholders) – index of obstacles to regulation 57.1.
5.1.3 Trust The regulation of trusts was analyzed in Ireland (which mentioned them as susceptible to being used in money laundering operations) and the United Kingdom. In order to analyze the regulation of trusts, which differ from all the forms studied in this report, appropriate indicators of transparency were selected. Their relevance for international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering is explained in section 8.2.4. The following table highlights the results of the analysis in relation to the existence of legal provisions, which should ensure transparency of trusts.
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As can be seen in this table, the regulation of trusts allows for a high level of opacity. The basic rule is that no formalities are required, and so a trust can be constituted orally. The decision depends on the importance that the parties attribute to having written evidence of the transaction, and what is entailed. Even though the possibility of constituting trusts orally attributes flexibility to the instrument (allowing the creation of a trust whenever two subjects – the settlor and the trustee – voluntarily agree to create one), this might obstruct investigations into money laundering by the authorities. Official trust registers for registering trust deeds do not exist, even where trusts are incorporated in writing and the identities of the parties, therefore, remain unclear. Furthermore, there are no restrictions on who can be a trustee nor is there a register of the details of the identity of the trustees, and this makes tracing them very difficult. The same obstacles to identification appear to apply to the settlor, whose identity does not need to appear on any document. The beneficiary of a trust may be a company or another trust, not only a physical person or several persons. In the former case, there is an additional layer of confidentiality regarding the beneficiary. There is some opacity in the management of the trust as well. There is no authority that supervises the activity of trustees. The latter only have general limitations as regards the administration of the trust fund, but there is no actual examination of single investments by any person or authority. This difficulty in detecting the existence of a trust and the identity of its parties, together with the absence of supervision of the trustees and the possibility that the settlor or another trust might be the beneficiary, can be misused by criminals. In fact, money launderers can invest the proceeds from crime in a trust thereby formally separating themselves from the ownership of the money and assets, and exploit the confidentiality surrounding the trust to reduce the risk of being identified. Where a criminal is both the settlor and the beneficiary, he will formally separate himself from the ownership of the dirty proceeds by attributing them to a trustee, but actually obtain the benefits from the investment himself.
6.
Conclusions
The results illustrate that, as far as the public and private limited companies are concerned, the greatest obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering are to be found in the thematic area ‘Identification of the real beneficial owner’.35 The main obstacle is a lack of regulation requiring full information regarding the real beneficial owner of a public or private limited company, especially when a legal entity is a shareholder or director, or the issuance
35
The relevance of this area for anti-money laundering international co-operation is outlined at section 9.2.3 of the report.
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of bearer shares is permitted. Furthermore, some problems seem to arise from the fact that, in some EU countries, the regulation allows for nominee shareholders and directors. The thematic area ‘Incorporation’ also presents obstacles to international cooperation for the prevention of money laundering, even though to a lesser degree than the former. Lack of regulation in this area makes it more difficult to acquire information about the physical persons party to the creation of legal structures and increases the possibility that these might be used for criminal purposes. Scrutiny in this area would raise the costs incurred by criminals when using legal structures for money laundering and increase the amount of information available to law enforcement, judicial and financial authorities, thereby facilitating national and international investigation of the operations of those companies. Some EU Member States permit shelf companies, that is, previously incorporated companies with a standard memorandum and articles of association with inactive shareholders, directors and secretary. Often, authorities do not need to be informed when such companies are sold and their secretary, directors or shareholders are replaced. This makes it more difficult to thoroughly investigate the real beneficial owner, given that shelf companies are incorporated with a very flexible procedure. Furthermore, many EU Member States do not investigate the founders of a company or ascertain the legal origin of the incorporation capital. The European Commission might, therefore, consider taking action to define more specific and stringent guidelines for EU Member States in the thematic areas mentioned above, relevant to anti-money laundering international co-operation. This would increase transparency of the whole corporate/company regulative field and make information available to law enforcement, judiciary and financial authorities dealing with national money laundering cases, thus facilitating international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering. The analysis of regulation covering trusts has shown it as being characterized by great opacity and absence of all those provisions relevant for international cooperation for the prevention of money laundering. Their regulation and the confidentiality of their constitution hinder the gathering of information about the people setting them up and their management structure. This opacity creates obstacles to international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering because of the lengthy process in getting information. Corporate and/or company regulation, which today is undergoing extensive reforms in the area of corporate governance in the EU Member States, should pay more attention to the benefits that transparency would bring to international cooperation for the prevention of money laundering. The Euroshore report highlighted the strategic importance of this area for international co-operation for the prevention of money laundering and this article illustrates the associated obstacles and their dimensions. Until now, questions relating to corporate governance have mainly been restricted to the national level. It appears however that the European Commission launched a study in December 2000 on codes of corporate governance in the EU. A final report is expected by the end of 2001. In addition, the Commission
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has announced the setting up of a high level group of experts in corporate law who will produce a report by June 2002. There may be scope within these initiatives to tackle the issue of transparency as defined in the main report and in this article. Having a European Directive on banking and financial regulation, without a set of European standards on key issues in corporate governance, makes the whole antimoney laundering regime unbalanced and weak.
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Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise and Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control? Michael Levi* and William Gilmore**
Introduction The discourse of risk and globalization has become a very popular one, both among social analysts and within the business and intelligence ‘communities’. Implicit and/ or explicit risk judgments have long been central to the financial world and its policing: the key question is which risks are being considered and whether we have the knowledge and operational models to incorporate them. Bankers, lawyers and law enforcement personnel are forced by pressure of circumstances to live so much in the present that it is difficult to see how far we have travelled in the era beginning approximately in the mid–1980s since money laundering first became a term with which bankers and lawyers were expected to be acquainted. The authors crave the readers’ indulgence therefore for some historical development of the paradigm of banking and law enforcement to set alongside the other contributions to this volume. In making such a contribution, the authors want to clarify how far the risk paradigm has entered the general world of ‘law and order’, at least in the UK. 1 The allocation of scarce policing and surveillance (including private sector) resources inevitably entails the conscious or taken-for-granted allocation of priorities. Goal displacement is commonplace, as interest groups seek (consciously or not) to further their own objectives at the expense of the proclaimed objective. Nevertheless, resource allocators have to decide which are the most serious – in * Professor of Criminology, Cardiff University, Wales. Address for correspondence: Professor Michael Levi, Glamorgan Building, King Edward VII Avenue, Cardiff CF10 3WT, UK, [email protected]. The research on which this article is based was funded by the UK Economic & Social Research Council’s Future Governance Research Initiative. ** Professor of International Criminal Law, University of Edinburgh 1 It is easy to overestimate the extent to which policing paradigms travel at the same speed in the same direction. Those enforcement worlds in which transnational mutual assistance is commonplace may harmonize more quickly – though there are substantial variations even within the EU – but this may not touch significantly the general styles of policing. M. Pieth (Ed.), Financing Terrorism, 87–114. © 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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terms of both ‘objective’ harm 2 and media-constructed harm that turn into political and organizational priorities – current and future events with which they wish to deal in relation to the resources that they have available. This relationship is a naturally dynamic one, in the sense that left to themselves, organizations tend to focus on the short-term politically (with small or large ‘p’) pressed priorities and to neglect the longer term structural issues: in this human process, stated goals are often eroded except when organizations insist on the pursuit of their operational plans. The latter style is often condemned by pragmatists as ‘inflexible’ (and is one of the features of totalitarian centrally planned economies), despite the consistency that such adherence to policy brings compared with the legal dictum of ‘taking each case on its merits’, which latter can amount to little more than a justification for unselfconsciously erratic policy-making. In contemporary policing, for example, in making decisions about how much surveillance particular released sex offenders ‘need’, explicit risk assessments are made, though there may not be the resources to accommodate all those who need high supervision and therefore actual time devoted to each high-risk person may be scaled down.3 Public order policing similarly is riskbased, though not normally on the basis of clinical judgments about the risks from individual people. By contrast with modern banking, 4 the discourses of international bodies such as the Financial Action Task Force are primarily oriented not so much towards riskmanagement as towards national and institutional obligations to reduce crime facilitation. In this sense, though intended to be applied within the context of globalization, they sit securely within the absolutist ‘law and order’ control mode rather than with some other risk optimization mode. Despite the rhetoric of ‘financial crime risk management’, this is based on modest scientific foundations in many areas: despite typologies exercises, there is insufficient hard, systematically collected evidence of the extent and forms of fraud and, especially, of money laundering5 to enable sensible universally agreed judgments to be made. One should have sympathy for the inherent difficulty about the publication of advice on modi operandi of terrorism finance and on the laundering of other forms of crime, since the availability of information of this kind to financial institutions around the globe
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Some readers may not believe in the concept of objective harm but, by analogy with Bishop Berkeley’s refutation of the solipsistic fallacy, there are self-evident effects of terrorist attacks that are physically objective. This is so even though some might not define martyrdom as a ‘harm’ and the slaughter of enemies as not harming the innocent or even (as in genocide) not harming persons of the same human status as the perpetrators. M. Maguire, ‘Policing by risks and targets: Some dimensions and implications of intelligence-led crime control’ in (2000) 9 Policing and Society 1 See Charles Freeland, ‘How Can Sound Customer Due Diligence Rules Help Prevent the Misuse of Financial Institutions in the Financing of Terrorism’ in (2002) 4 European Journal of Law Reform 2, and the standard setting of most bank regulators See, for example, the current advice given to financial institutions by FATF on profiles of terrorism for anti-laundering detection purposes.
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inevitably gives rise to leakage to some offenders and thus serves as counterintelligence.6 Conversely, regulators and policing agencies should understand that if they cannot specify and/or are unwilling to specify the plausible forms of laundering – often on the expressed grounds that they do not want to constrain the identification and reporting behaviour of regulated persons – it may be unfair to expect financial institutions to do so. As money-laundering legislation shifts from criminal penalties for ‘failing’ to report crimes one did actually suspect to those for ‘failing’ to report crimes one ‘objectively’(?) ought to have suspected,7 this tension about reasonable expectations will become progressively greater. But these are not the only difficulties. For example, there are resource constraints that arise in relation to the ‘War on Terrorism’. Governments for whom terrorism risks against domestic targets are modest may be reluctant to divert resources away from local crime concerns (or non-policing needs such as health and education) to help to reduce terrorism risks in other countries; while Western countries such as the UK (since ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s) and, more recently, the US, more willingly divert resources from domestic crime issues which do concern the public8 to dealing with terrorist threats. A key motivator for this transnational transformation of defences against terrorism is the global reach of threats not just to embassies and other governance institutions overseas but also to corporate interests worldwide. Again, there is nothing new about this risk from globalization to the national economic interests of superpowers: as their role in defending the British East India Company and West Indian plantations illustrates, 18th and 19th century policing in colonies was usually directed towards the preservation of overseas assets, and such threats often contained a cultural or ideological component as well as any desire to take property for resale and economic gain.9
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This is so a fortiori if the information is placed on websites. The UK National Criminal Intelligence Service and some other European FIUs such as the Netherlands are developing limited access extranets, but counter-intelligence risks still remain. For such shifts towards ‘objective’ obligations, see the Second Directive on Money Laundering agreed by the EC and the European Parliament at the end of 2001, and the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in the UK. Rates of street and household crime have been falling since 1998 to the time of writing, but fear of those crimes has not been falling. Whether Enron employees and ex-employees in Texas (as opposed to New York and Washington) would be (now and in the past, with the benefit of hindsight) rational to fear terrorism more than to fear the collapse of their own pension funds and employment is a more complex issue that lies outside the scope of this article. Indeed, the tradition of the police serving (and/or being perceived as serving) the interests of the state rather than those of the local population and crime victims is one of the more unfortunate legacies of colonialism that community policing strategies have had great difficulty in overcoming. The fact that no-one then called these ‘anti-globalization’ protests (for the term had not been invented) does not make that any less accurate as an ascription.
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The regulation of economic élite and piratical behaviour trans-nationally involves ‘persuading’ formally independent nation states to adopt similar measures even though there sometimes may be no obvious benefit to them in so doing. To some extent, this constellation of self-interest is altered by terrorism in the abstract. However, those groups or networks threatening the US and other Western powers may be quite different from those threatening some Third World governments, while many small island economies may be affected by terrorism only indirectly via ‘trickle down’ from damage to global business levels. Furthermore, the behavioural boundaries of such global regulation are somewhat vague, given the flexible definitions both of terrorism and transnational organized crime. There is an inherent tension between, on the one hand, governmental and prosecutorial threats to the private sector for not succeeding in detecting or reporting possible money laundering10 and, on the other, the fact that the support of corporate actors is needed for ‘government at a distance’ to succeed: the state or rather, in the case of trans-national crime control, the total set of states11 cannot hope to monitor and control financial transfers directly. This monitoring must be ‘entrusted’ (under threat of penal and/or administrative sanctions) to the financial services firms and professionals in the front line of the ‘war on terrorism’ (and ‘war on organized crime’). Even if we knew how many jurisdictions were currently facilitating the movements of terrorist funds (which potentially is all jurisdictions involved in financial services business), the enforcement task would not be restricted to those, since the use of particular offshore finance centres is based upon a dynamic view of the costs and benefits of particular jurisdictions at any given moment.12 It is difficult, even with hindsight, to work out when and how the view developed that attacking the money trail was a key element in the fight against organized crime. Wechsler places it in the mid–1980s13 – which would be around the period that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies started to use the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) legislation passed in 1970 – but at least outside the US, the investigative resources devoted to financial policing have never reflected the rhetorical and political attention it has received. Even before the frantic and allconsuming financial search for terrorist funds in the wake of the air strikes against
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It is not suggested that this is simple game theory. Through ideological hegemony, the marshalling of political support and party and/or personal financing, corporate actors can wield enormous influence. The authors have avoided the tempting term ‘collectivity’ because it can be argued that this implies harmonious purposes among states: the extent to which the collaboration of all states is required differs by type of crime: fewer states need to co-operate to deal with maritime piracy than with money laundering or intellectual property violations, since technology makes the latter sites very portable with low capital costs. The authors are not positing an optimal or ‘rational’ model here. Every launderer has his or her own information set and contacts, and in an imperfect market of knowledge asymmetries, there is no one model that fits all. W. Wechsler, ‘Follow the Money’ in (July/August 2001) 80(4) Foreign Affairs 40.
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New York and Washington in September 2001 (and, for that matter, before the collapse of Enron in December 2001), there was widespread official fear of ‘the dark side of globalization’. The latter brings together a variety of themes and a variety of political positions from financial regulators concerned about unmonitored ‘off-thebooks’ (though often legal) transactions conducted by vast commodity hedging funds held in offshore finance centres; through law enforcement agencies bothered about ‘the’ Mafia and international terrorist networks; to aid agencies troubled by the ‘export’ (that is, theft) of funds by Third World potentates into covert individual and corporate accounts held in offshore finance centres. Terrorist finance generates a threat to the security of international capital and the lives of financial services employees as well; so (to a greater extent than with drug trafficking or tax evasion, for example) self-interest may reasonably temper profit maximization if institutions believe that the identification of terrorist finance can protect them or activities in which they have a stake.14 The ideological and value threat of terrorism thus constitutes a distinction from organized crime and other ‘threats to society’. One of the special features of terrorist fund laundering is that it explicitly aims to examine the proceeds of legitimate-source activity actually used or intended to be used for (rather than deriving from) a criminal purpose; in that sense, its closest analogues are (1) the corporate and political ‘slush funds’ used for transnational corruption and political finance, and (2) tax evasion on non-criminal activities. This broad approach is crucial if anything approximating a plausible effort is to be made in restricting terrorists’ access to funds; though on a harm reduction model, it may make some sense to restrict flows to particular terrorist groups from particular sources without necessarily having a major impact on the totality of terrorist finance.15 This article shall review how the international ‘community’ strives to counter the anomic, crime-facilitative effects of globalization by rowing against the tide of economic liberalization in the name of global crime control and financial stability. 16 Thus, there is a sometimes faltering attempt to create a new world anti-crime order (of which measures against terrorism are a part) as a component of, or supplement to, the New World Economic Order. There will be a review of the growth of ‘soft law’ instruments and cascading peer group pressures and their gradual transforma-
14
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This stake might include businesses or governments to which they have loaned money, whose security as well as whose business plans may be disrupted both by actual and fear of terrorism. Contrariwise, the reporting of suspected terrorist finance also can bring physical risks to staff should they be identified – directly or by logical deduction – as the source of the information. To avoid accusations of naivety, it is necessary to recognize that terrorist funding can come from the West as well as from the ‘rogue states’ defined by the US. A cynic might suggest that these controls are taken in the interests of Western capitalist security, but given the number of Third World countries devastated by the looting of both overseas aid and domestic assets by their corrupt potentates, the authors regard this as a very partial analysis.
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tion into a mix of raising consciousness of mutual interdependence with economic and political sanctions to act against transnational corruption and transnational laundering facilities.
Money-laundering and anti-crime strategies The regulation of the money trail relates to any crimes that require and/or generate significant crime proceeds requiring more than short-term storage. Drug trafficking was the precursor for international policing expansion by US agencies such as the DEA17 and by the military and intelligence agencies in the post-Communist era, but though proactive ‘special investigative methods’ have expanded everywhere, none of them can plausibly prevent all drugs, people, or contraband smuggling. Therefore the attempt to monitor financial transactions and confiscate crime proceeds beyond the borders of individual governments was the obvious next key strategy in the transnational ‘organized crime’ containment programme.18 Though it was never clear whether such monitoring and confiscation constituted a sufficient as well as necessary condition for success (nor how it would be identified if and when ‘success’ had been attained), success was believed to require a major global infrastructure of compatible legislation and mutual legal assistance both for financial investigation and for proceeds of crime restraint and confiscation. The US, supported from the start by Australia, France and the UK, was the principal enthusiast for antilaundering measures to attack kingpins of the drugs trade but, as Gilmore has observed,19 the extraordinary rapidity (less than two years) with which the 1988 UN Vienna Convention came into force is testimony to the power of drug issues in the political culture of nations around the world. Despite such political consensus, however, the G–7 took an early decision in 1989 to create a new (temporary) body, the Financial Action Task Force, rather than leaving it to the UN to serve as the efficient instrument of these anti-laundering measures. Since that date, measures to control the money trail have proceeded along two axes: 1.
17 18
19
The increased drawing of financial institutions into playing public functions, via the imposition of requirements (a) to report suspicions and – just as
E. Nadelmann Cops Across Borders (University Park Pennsylvania State University Press 1993). See for recent developed notions of this, e.g., Office of National Drug Control, National Drug Control Strategy (Washington DC Office of national Drug Control Policy 2002); State, Money-Laundering and Financial Crimes (Washington DC US State Department 2001); Treasury, The 2001 Money Laundering Strategy (Washington DC US Treasury Department in consultation with the US Justice Department). W. Gilmore, Dirty Money: The Evolution of Money Laundering Counter-Measures (Strasbourg Council of Europe Publishing 1999, 2nd ed.).
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significantly – to develop the capacity to form suspicions (via know-yourcustomer and other rules) on pain of imprisonment and corporate penalties, and (b) to report and not to deal financially with persons who appear on lists of ‘banned persons’, of which the most notable source is the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC);20 and The increased development of international norms for money laundering control at the level of the nation state via FATF and its regional complementary bodies in Asia-Pacific, the Caribbean, Europe and, most recently, Africa and South America, as well as via financial regulators.
There has been a shift from the initial exclusively drug focus in anti-laundering policy towards a focus on all-crime (though currently excluding tax crime) and transnational organized crime,21 to which terrorism has been added explicitly in the aftermath of 11 September 2001.22 As Levi23 and Gold and Levi24 observed in their
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Of the many other lists, perhaps the most significant are those issued under the authority of the UN Security Council requiring the immediate (and indefinite) freezing of the assets of stipulated natural and legal persons. See in particular the ‘Taliban’ lists made under the authority of Resolution 1267 of 15 October 1999 and the ‘Al-Qaeda’ list mandated by Resolution 1333 of 19 December 2000. As explained elsewhere in this article, these lists are legally binding on all member States because they are measures taken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Prior to 11 September 2001, the money-laundering nexus had only intermittently sought to bridge crimes for economic gain with terrorism. The UK Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 included several measures intended to clamp down on terrorist finance (and Northern Ireland legislation gave greater powers in the province), but the most explicit link came in June 1995 when President Clinton wrapped up terrorist threats with international organized crime when he told the UN that ‘the threat to our security is not in an enemy silo, but in the briefcase or the car bomb of a terrorist. Our enemies are also international criminals and drug traffickers who threaten the stability of new democracies and the future of our children’. (President Clinton, Address at the United Nations Fiftieth Anniversary Charter Ceremony, San Francisco, 26 June 1995. Text available at <www.defenselink.mil/1995/s19950626-clinton.html>) In Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] 42, dated 21 October 1995, President Clinton asserted that ‘ international organised criminal enterprises [. . .] are not only a law enforcement problem, they are a threat to national security’. In Executive Order 12,978 [21 October 1995, 1995 USCCAN B106], effective the same day and never rescinded, he declared a ‘national emergency to deal with that threat’. Federal agencies were directed to take ‘all appropriate actions within their authority to carry out this order’. The primary and over-riding common purpose of the Directive and the Executive Order was ‘to protect the welfare, safety and security of the United States and its citizens’, though there was some recognition of obligations to others. Prior to the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States, the issue of terrorist financing had not assumed a position of prominence in the activities of the FATF, though it had in some individual jurisdictions such as Northern Ireland (see Levi and Osofsky, 1995). On 24 September the Ecofin Ministers of the 15 EU members called for the mandate of the FATF to be broadened so as to cover the terrorist issue. On 6 October 2001, G-7 finance ministers called upon the FATF to include specific treatment of terrorist funds in
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studies of how suspicious financial transaction reports come to be constructed and followed through, few bankers know what types of crime – if any – their customers may be engaged in: with the exception of some ideologically or culturally sympathetic bankers and non-bank financial services such as money transmitters, this would apply a fortiori to terrorist finance. If clients fool bankers or lawyers into believing that at most, the funds constitute ‘merely’ tax ‘dodging’, then it is plausible that no suspicious transaction report will be made.25 Therefore, it is only if all crimes are included within the obligation to report suspicions that the layer of rationalizations falls away (save, perhaps, for labelling the behaviour tax avoidance). Conversely, representatives from some offshore finance centres have expressed the view (in discussions with the principal author) that it is only if the drugs issue is split off from tax evasion (and, especially, from OECD measures against ‘harmful tax avoidance’) that effective financial services co-operation with anti-drug law enforcement will take place. At the time of writing, in the summer of 2002, FATF Member States are far from agreement over whether countries should be compelled explicitly to include tax offences as a predicate for money laundering. One of the prime instruments of the New World Economic Order is the radical concept of mutual evaluation, which involves peer evaluation of both the enactment and implementation of legislation and other policy instruments. This represents a major departure from the traditional view that implementation of treaties and conventions was a purely domestic matter. Even though methodological coherence
cont. the current revision of the 40 Recommendations; to issue special guidance on the subject to financial institutions; and to develop a process to identify countries that facilitate terrorist financing and to propose a course of action to achieve co-operation from such jurisdictions. An emergency plenary meeting of the FATF was held in Washington DC on 29–30 October 2001. It agreed on eight special recommendations on terrorist financing and a plan of action ‘to secure the swift and effective implementation of these new standards’. A declaration by the EU heads of state and the commission of 19 October 2001 called for ‘effective measures to combat the funding of terrorism by formal adoption of the Directive on money laundering and the speedy ratification by all Member States of the United Nations Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. Moreover, the commitments made in the FATF, the mandate of which must be broadened, must be turned into legislative instruments by the end of the year’, i.e., 2002. 23 M. Levi, ‘Pecunia non olet: cleansing the money launderers from the Temple’, in (1991) 16 Crime, Law, and Social Change 217. 24 M. Gold and M. Levi, Money-Laundering in the UK: an Appraisal of Suspicion-Based Reporting (London Police Foundation 1994). 25 The 1999 FATF interpretative note tries to find an intermediate position and to get financial and other regulated bodies to report suspicions even when a ‘tax’ explanation is given, at least where it is not obvious that tax evasion actually is involved. This stales: ‘In implementing Recommendation 15, suspicious transactions should be reported by financial institutions regardless of whether they are also thought to involve lax matters. Countries should take into account that, in order to deter financial institutions from reporting a suspicious transaction, money launderers may seek to state inter alia that their transactions relate to tax matters.’
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and standardization remain underdeveloped, mutual evaluation has gained increasing popularity as a method; it holds out the promise of greater legitimation and ‘buy in’ potential than measures that are simply imposed, and thus it is not surprising that (with variations) such a process is built into all late modern regimes for dealing with corruption (Council of Europe ‘GRECO’ and OECD) as well as money laundering and proceeds of crime confiscation (Council of Europe, EU, FATF and the IMF).
Mutual evaluation and the Financial Action Task Force (1) The Context The increasing popularity of mutual evaluation processes at the international level owes much to the demonstration effect of the work of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF). Since this body was created by the 1989 Paris Summit Meeting of the G–7, its membership has expanded to include 29 jurisdictions representing OECD countries, financial centre jurisdictions and (more recently) selected strategically important states drawn from previously underrepresented regions such as South America. It meets in plenary session several times each year, including one meeting held in the country of the presidency (which rotates on an annual basis). Though located physically within the OECD (and being a significant component of its website), the FATF is not formally part of that or any other international institution, nor is it a creature of treaty. Rather it is the steering body of an ad hoc grouping of governments and others with a single issue agenda – moneylaundering controls – which can contain great complexity given the range of activities with which that agenda intertwines. Regulated laundering potentially includes the proceeds of all crimes for gain and even, in the case of terrorism and some cyber crimes, of the proceeds of both criminal and non-criminal activities committed for ideological rather than material gain. FATF attendees consist mainly of financial regulators and law enforcement representatives, alongside senior civil servants normally drawn from Treasury and Justice Departments. The FATF aims to give effect to three central objectives: the strengthening of the criminal law and securing other improvements in national legal systems; b) the strengthening of international co-operation; and c) the enhancement of the role of the private sector in efforts to prevent and detect money laundering. It has done so primarily by making and reviewing (in 1995–6 and again 2001–2) its 40 recommendations or action steps which were first elaborated in its 1990 Report.26 a)
26
See Gilmore supra note 19, and M. Pieth, Die Bekämpfung der Geldwäscherei – Modellfall Schweiz?, (Basel and Frankfurt am Main 1992).
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Monitoring implementation by FA TF members
In the conclusion to the 1990 report it was recognized that ‘a regular assessment of progress realised in enforcing money laundering measures would stimulate countries to give to these issues a high priority...’.27 Two principal procedures have since been developed to this end:28 1. a process of annual self assessment, originally based on two detailed questionnaires circulated to each member country or territory and then analyzed for compliance with the 40 Recommendations. The self-assessment system has been refined on several occasions, adding to the number of more objective items and then, after the general revisions of 1996, extending questions on the laundering of non-drug crime proceeds. ‘Enhanced selfassessment’ procedures were agreed to at the September 1999 FATF plenary, and two alterations are particularly significant, namely the removal from the self-assessment process of non-mandatory or vague recommendations and a more focused review on areas of partial or non-compliance. FATF also tried to simplify and streamline the process, shortening and combining the previous questionnaires. 29 The self-assessment procedure continues to contain divergent interpretations of some recommendations, but FATF members themselves consider there to have been a significant improvement;30 2. Unprecedented in international practice in the criminal law sphere at the time, FATF II decided to supplement self assessment with a system of mutual evaluation, examined by selected other members of the FATF, according to an agreed protocol for examination and agreed selection criteria. The initial round of mutual evaluation, the major purpose of which was to assess the degree of formal compliance with the recommendations, was completed in 1995. A second round, with a focus on the effectiveness in practice of the measures taken by members, was initiated in the following year and was completed in mid–1999. The remit here also included an assessment of ‘any follow-up action taken in response to the suggestions for improvement made in the first round’,31 The third round will focus ‘exclusively on compliance
27 28
29 30
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W. Gilmore (ed.) International Efforts to Combat Money Laudering, (Cambridge Grotius 1992) at p. 24. A third but little used device is known as a cross-country review. This is intended to provide an analysis of the implementation of specific recommendations by the membership as a whole. ‘FATF Annual Report 1999–2000’ (Paris FATF 2000) at p. 20. See, e.g., ‘FATF Annual Report 2000–2001’ (Paris FATF 2001) at pp. 13–14. The FATF has decided to complete an early self-assessment exercise to ascertain the degree of compliance by its members with the new recommendations on the financing of terrorist activities. See ‘FATF Annual Report: 1996–1997’ (Paris FATF1997) at p. 10. Although there were only 26 members in the relevant period, a total of 28 evaluations were undertaken; this
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with the revised parts of the recommendations, the areas of significant deficiencies identified in the second round and generally the effectiveness of the counter-measures’32 but because of the phasing of the evaluation cycle in relation to the revisions, evaluation criteria are always the product of the previous set of recommendations rather than the most recent agreed improvements. Mutual evaluation is, in essence, an international system of periodic peer review under which each member is subject to a form of on-site examination. 33 As Patrick Moulette, the current FATF executive secretary, has pointed out: ‘Each evaluation team usually comprises three examiners (four for the larger countries) of different nationalities whose expertise must cover all aspects of the fight against money laundering. Each team therefore comprises a legal expert (a judge or justice ministry representative), a financial expert (from a finance ministry, central bank or regulatory authority for the financial sector), and an operational services (law enforcement) expert (from the police, the customs or an agency receiving and analysing suspicious transaction reports, such as FINCEN in the United States).’34 Formally, the team of examiners is selected by the FATF president (in reality, by the secretariat), and thereafter, the country to be examined is advised as to both the composition of the team and the dates of the on-site visit. 35 While it is ‘an underlying principle of the mutual evaluation process[. . .]that all members should participate in the process’, this goal was not fully satisfied in the first round. In the second, all members provided at least one evaluator although efforts to secure a better balance in terms of overall involvement were not completely realized.36 The examination team visits the country in question, normally for three days,
cont. included assessments of Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are separate constituent parts of the Netherlands which is a member of the FATF. 32 ‘FATF Annual Report: 1997–1998 (Paris FATF 1998) at p. 8 33 For this reason (among others), the Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) being operated by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission of the OAS to monitor compliance with the anti-drug strategy of the hemisphere cannot be regarded as a system of mutual evaluation as that term is used in this paper. In the CICAD process, each evaluated country provides data in response to a standard questionnaire as well as a paper on its drug problem on the basis of which a governmental expert’s group, representing all 34 Member States, drafts jurisdiction specific reports including recommendations for improvement. There is no on-site visit element to the process (which also excludes sanctions of any kind). However, the process does include detailed coverage of the issue of money laundering and extends to the monitoring of the implementation of country specific recommendations. 34 P. Moulette, ‘The Mutual Evaluation Process of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering’ (PC-R-EV(98)1, 29 January 98) (Strasbourg Council of Europe 1998) at p. 25. 35 ‘Review of FATF Anti-Money Laundering Systems and Mutual Evaluation Procedures 1992–1999’ (Paris FATF 2001) at p. 37. 36 Ibid. at pp. 37–38.
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during which time it meets those ministries and institutions (public and private) with a mandate or substantial practical involvement in the anti-money laundering sphere. The team then prepares a detailed report, including the identification of deficiencies and suggestions for improvement, which is discussed in and adopted by a plenary meeting of the Task Force. Although each such report is and remains confidential, agreement was reached to make executive summaries public. These are contained in the annual reports of the work of the FATF, which can now be accessed by the general public on the Internet. Detailed procedures, rules and expectations have been developed to govern all of the stages of this innovative and intrusive process,37 the comprehensive exposition of which lies beyond the scope of this article. However, while the system has evolved over time, a significant effort has been made from the outset to ensure equality and consistency of treatment of evaluated jurisdictions and a recent internal review has concluded that, by and large, these goals have been met.38 Although the self assessment and mutual evaluation procedures were developed with existing Member States and territories in mind, they have been used in two situations which were not fully envisaged at the outset; in relation to institutional members and in the context of the recent limited programme of geographic expansion of membership. The European Commission and the GCC are full participants within the FATF, but – perhaps significantly for anti-terrorism purposes – while all fifteen European Union States are members, none of the six members of the GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are Task Force participants in their own right. Over time the absence of regular monitoring procedures for these countries emerged as a source of concern, connected at least in part to terrorism and the fear thereof. In May 1997 agreement was reached on how to carry out an evaluation of the measures taken by them. The first step was to distribute self-assessment questionnaires. Unfortunately the partial and incomplete nature of the subsequent returns made it impossible to form a view as to the state of compliance. Consequently, it was agreed that a high level FATF mission would be despatched to the Council Secretariat to seek further information and ‘to discuss how to improve the implementation of effective anti-money laundering systems in the Gulf region’.39 This mission eventually took place in January 1999 and resulted in a commitment to provide all outstanding information required for the selfassessment exercise. In addition, the discussions set in train a process which was to result in all GCC members save Saudi Arabia agreeing to undergo mutual evaluation.40 However, ‘given the unique position of the GCC[. . .]it was decided 37
38 39 40
Ibid, at 35–42; R. Sansonetti, The Mutual Evaluation Process: A Methodology of Increasing Importance at International Level’ in (2000) 7(3) Journal of Financial Crime 218 at 219–220. See FATF supra note at p. 13. See FATF supra note at p. 11. ‘FATF Annual Report: 1998–1999’ (Paris FATF 1999) at p. 30.
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that mutual evaluations of its member States should be a joint FATF/GCC process’.41 The series of on-site visits commenced in June 2000 and all five had taken place prior to June 2001. Similarly, the same five states have completed the self-assessment exercise and responsibility for future such surveys has been assumed by the GCC Secretariat.42 The second innovative context in which the process of mutual evaluation has been employed is in the vetting of new applicants for membership. In June 1998, the FATF decided to permit the first limited expansion of its membership since the early 1990s. Here the focus was to be on broadening the geographic base to include ‘strategically important countries which already have certain key anti-money laundering measures in place (criminalization of money laundering; mandatory customer identification and suspicious transactions reporting by financial institutions), and which are politically determined to make a full commitment towards the implementation of the forty recommendations, and which could play a major role in their regions in the process of combating money laundering’.43 The subsequently elaborated criteria for admission included a political commitment ‘to undergo annual self-assessment exercises and two rounds of mutual evaluations’.44 Pursuant to this policy of strategic influence, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which had been admitted to observer status in September 1999, had their anti-money laundering systems positively evaluated (on the limited range of ‘fundamental’ principles) the following year and were admitted to full membership in June.45 Surprising those sceptics who regard mutual evaluation as a ‘stroking’ cartel, the prospect of a mutual evaluation visit frequently acts as a catalyst for governmental action. As Dilwyn Griffiths, the then FATF executive secretary, noted in his address to the 1993 Oxford Conference on International and White Collar Crime: ‘I do not think that progress in implementing the recommendations would have been as swift and substantial without it. Countries are concerned to have a good story to tell examiners and there is thus an impetus to get things done which would otherwise be lacking’.46 The detailed reports indicate often quite extensive areas in which improvements in laws, regulations and practices could and should be made. One of the functions of the second round (which will also be a feature of the third) is to
41 42 43 44 45 46
See FATF supra note at p. 24. See FATF supra note at pp. 14–15; Saudi Arabia has since submitted a self-assessment to the Secretariat of the GCC. See FATF supra note at p. 8. See FATF supra note at p. 7. Potential new members include Russia, India, China and South Africa. A curious feature of this list is that Russia, as will be seen below, is presently on the FATF blacklist of NCCTs. D. Griffiths, ‘International Efforts to Combat Money Laundering: Developments and Prospects’, in Action Against Transnational Criminality: Papers from the 1993 Oxford Conference on International and White Collar Crime (London Commonwealth Secretariat 1994) p. 11 at p. 13.
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check on the measures adopted in response to the deficiencies identified in the earlier report.47 While these periodic reviews have been sufficient to secure substantial improvements in many FATF members, compliance with the forty recommendations is incomplete. For this reason, the Task Force has formulated a policy (unchanged since 1994) which reflects a graduated approach. At its most basic and frequently invoked level, this takes the form of a requirement for the country concerned to make periodic reports. As one insider has noted: ‘when a country fails to comply with a large number of FATF recommendations, we initiate a follow-up procedure, a major feature of which is the obligation to submit regular progress reports on the implementation of the recommendations. There would be no point in completing an evaluation and then ignoring the result.’ 48 When this tactic for increasing peer pressure fails, additional steps may be taken, as happened with Turkey in 1995—96. Its failure, inter alia, even to enact basic antimoney laundering legislation had placed it in a position of serious non-compliance with the recommendations. Accordingly, the FATF president first wrote to relevant ministers in that member country expressing concern. Subsequently, a high level mission was sent to Ankara to encourage the government to take urgent action or face the possibility of having more serious steps taken against it. Finally, on 19 September 1996, the FATF issued a public statement in which it invoked its so-called Recommendation 21 procedure against a member for the first time.49 This prospect of financial near-paralysis seems to have had the effect of stimulating the attention of policy makers and others in Ankara, and in November 1996 Turkey enacted and brought into force the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering. The Recommendation 21 measures were then lifted. Concerns over partial non-compliance by other FATF members have been frequently expressed. Of these, the most serious to date related to Austria, which had declined to abolish anonymous passbooks for Austrian residents in spite of the fact that this was regarded as a clear breach of the requirements of Recommendation 10. As a result, the FATF policy was triggered. The president first wrote to the Austrian Government about this matter, but when this did not lead to change, a high level
47
48 49
A recent FATF internal review reveals significant differences in the level of positive responses to such recommendations from the first round: ‘When averaged out across all the members[...], approximately the same number of suggestions were implemented as those that were not’ (see FATF supra note at p. 34). See Moulette supra note at p. 27) Recommendation 21 of the FATF states: ‘Financial institutions should give special attention to business relations and transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from countries which do not or insufficiently apply these Recommendations. Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies.’
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mission was dispatched to Vienna without success. The Task Force invoked Recommendation 21 and called on financial institutions to give special attention ‘to transactions with bank cheques issued by Austrian banks and denominated in Austrian schillings, as these funds might be the result of the closing of anonymous passbook savings accounts’. In the news release of 11 February 1999 which announced this measure, the FATF indicated that it would continue to monitor the situation. When even this robust (in international relations terms) stance failed to bring about the desired change in policy the Task Force, at its February 2000 meeting, took the unprecedented step of agreeing – and agreeing publicly – to suspend Austria from membership unless, by 20 May:
‘1. The Austrian government issues a clear political statement that it will take all necessary steps to eliminate the system of anonymous passbooks in accordance with the 40 FATF Recommendations by the end of June 2002. 2. The Austrian government introduces and supports a Bill into Parliament to prohibit the opening of new anonymous passbooks and to eliminate existing anonymous passbooks in accordance with the above paragraph.’50 Whether to mitigate public shaming or from fear of economic consequences, the Austrian government soon took the required steps, leading to the lifting of the threat of suspension.51 However, questions have been raised about the willingness of FATF to apply consistent principles to more powerful nations than Turkey or Austria: the prime candidate here is the US, whose 1997 and subsequent evaluations might appear to merit more severe treatment than it has received.52 The operation of the noncompliance policy ‘relies on a combination of the compliance findings under mutual evaluation reports and the self-assessment exercise’,53 though both the noncompliance strategy and mutual evaluation have had the original 1990 recommendations as the frame of reference whilst self assessment relates to the recommendations as amended in 1996. These should however be brought into alignment in the course of the third round (although as noted earlier, the next round will also be out of ‘sync’ with the new recommendations).54
ii)
FATF-style regional bodies
In governmental circles in the major economies, the FATF experience with mutual evaluation has been widely perceived as a success. A recent internal review concluded
50 51
52 53 54
OECD News Release, Paris, 3 February 2000. See FATF supra note at pp. 20–22; K. Alexander, ‘The International Anti-Money Laundering Regime: The Role of the financial Action Task force’ in (2000) 1(1) Financial Crime Review 9 at 19. The Economist, 23 June 2001, at p. 801. See FATF supra note at p. 43. See FATF supra note at pp. 17–18
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that the process had ‘proven to be, by and large, an effective and efficient one, which utilises relatively few resources to obtain significant results’.55 A broadly similar view has been taken in the literature. 56 Sansonetti noted that the process ‘is one of the cornerstones of the FATF and has proven to be the most successful element of its activities’.57 The Task Force has created an ever-growing number of regional antimoney laundering bodies, most recently in Africa and South America. These regional structures differ in practice, procedure and emphasis in response to regional needs, practical local realities and political sensitivities. Similarly, the nature and intensity of the relationship with the FATF itself differs from case to case, but there is always some involvement with the FATF secretariat, and such bodies as the Offshore Group of Banking Supervisors conduct joint OGBS/FATF evaluations. The rather awkwardly entitled Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (PC-R-EV) is supported by the Secretariat of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, and its processes of self assessment and mutual evaluation are undertaken against a more extensive set of anti-laundering standards than those applied to FATF members. Thus, in addition to the Forty Recommendations, participating countries are assessed in relation to their compliance with the 1988 UN and 1990 Council of Europe conventions, and the 1991 EC Directive.58 All members report back to a plenary meeting one year after being subject to mutual evaluation on their own progress made towards implementation of the recommendations contained therein.59 Members cannot be suspended, though the Recommendation 21 procedure for ‘special attention to transactions’ may be applied.60 At its January 2001 plenary, it was agreed that in principle the second round of evaluations, which has now commenced, should include at least one FATF evaluator in each team.61 Clearly, the political principle is to get Member States to ‘buy in’ to the legitimacy of the process and to the outcomes generated by that process under the watchful eye of FATF. The June 1996 annual report noted that ‘where a non-member has successfully gone through a mutual evaluation by an international organisation, using a methodology in line with FATF standards, and is in compliance with the FATF forty recommendations according to this evaluation, that non-member should not fall under the policy outlined in Recommendation 21’.62 Conversely, a mutual
55 56
57 58 59 60 61 62
See FATF supra note at p. 49. S. Morris, ‘Mutual Evaluation: An Approach to Achieving Fairness and Progress in Implementing International Agreements’ in (1999) 15(7) International Enforcement Reporter 285; S. Morris, ‘Mutual Evaluation Systems’ in (2000) 15(4) American University International Law Review 792. See R. Sansonetti (2000) at p. 218. ‘PC-R-EV: Annual Report 2000’ (Strasbourg Council of Europe 2000) at p. 41. Ibid, at pp. 5, 8. ‘PC-R-EV: Examiners Guide’ (Strasbourg Council of Europe 2000) at pp. 12–13. See Council of Europe supra note at p. 6. ‘FATF Annual Report: 1995–1996’, (Paris FATF 1996) at p. 17.
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evaluation by such a body which revealed substantial non-compliance could be expected to make the imposition of this measure by the FATF even more likely. However, the Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories (NCCT) initiative has called this into question. The Task Force established a working group which afforded priority to the elaboration of criteria to be utilized in defining non-cooperation and in establishing the process through which to identify specific jurisdictions considered to meet the criteria in practice. Central to it are some 25 criteria – a distillation from and adaptation to the 40 Recommendations – which define non-cooperation for these purposes. 63 It also established a review process which was intended to result in the production of a ‘black list’ of NCCTs. Finally, for present purposes, it identified a number of steps – including the i