Filippo Strozzi and the Medici: Favor and Finance in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Rome (Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History)

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY Editors J. H. ELLIOTT

H. G. KOENIGSBERGER

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN HISTORY Edited by Professor Jf. H. Elliott, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, and Professor H. G. Koenigsberger, King's College, University of London The idea of an 'early modern' period of European history from the fifteenth to the late eighteenth century is now widely accepted among historians. The purpose of the Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History is to publish monographs and studies which will illuminate the character of the period as a whole, and in particular focus attention on a dominant theme within it, the interplay of continuity and change as they are represented by the continuity of medieval ideas, political and social organization, and by the impact of new ideas, new methods and new demands on the traditional structures. The Old World and the New, 1492-1650 J. H. ELLIOTT

French Finances, 1770-1795: From Business to Bureaucracy j . F. BOSHER

The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries Wars GEOFFREY PARKER

Chronicle into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century Chronicles LOUIS GREEN

France and the Estates General of 1614 J. MICHAEL

HAYDEN

Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century JOHN FRANCIS GUILMARTIN JR

Reform and Revolution in Mainz 1743-1803 T. C. W. BLANNING

The State, War and Peace: Spanish Political Thought in the Renaissance 1516-1559 J. A.

FERNANDEZ-SANTAMARIA

Altopascio: A Study in Tuscan Rural Society 1587-1784 FRANK

MCARDLE

Calvinist Preaching and Iconoclasm in the Netherlands 1544-1569 PHYLLIS MACK CREW

The Kingdom of Valencia in the Seventeenth Century JAMES CASEY

Rouen during the Wars of Religion PHILIP BENEDICT

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Favor and finance in sixteenth-century Florence and Rome MELISSA MERIAM BULLARD Assistant Professor of History, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS London

Cambridge New York New Rochelle Melbourne Sydney

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521223010 © Cambridge University Press 1980 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 1980 This digitally printed version 2008 A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data Bullard, Melissa Meriam, 1946Filippo Strozzi and the Medici. (Cambridge studies in early modern history) Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Strozzi, Filippo, 1489-1538. 2. Florence History - 1421-1737. 3. Rome (City) - History 1420-1798. 4. Medici, House of. 5. Bankers - Italy Florence - Biography. 6. Florence - Nobility - Biography. I. Title. DG738.14.S8B84 945'.51 [B] 79-51822 ISBN 978-0-521-22301-0 hardback ISBN 978-0-521-08816-9 paperback

Contents

Preface List of abbreviations

page vn viii

Genealogical table

X

i

Introduction

i

2

Filippo Strozzi's Florence

9

3

Marriage intrigues

45

4

Rise to favor

6i

5

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber

9i

6

War finance and Florentine public funds

119

7

Financier to Clement VII

151

8

Epilogue

173

Sources

179

Index

187

Preface

My work on Filippo Strozzi began as a doctoral dissertation submitted to Cornell University. The archival research which forms its heart and core was made possible by funds from the Gertrude A. Gilmore and Theodor Mommsen fellowships and by a grant from the Center for International Studies at Cornell. I am grateful to the staffs of the various archives I consulted who made the treasures in their trust available to me, and to the personnel of the American Academy in Rome, my home during the final stages of research. I appreciate Richard Goldthwaite's sharing his interest in Filippo Strozzi with me at the project's inception. Special thanks go to my dear friend Reina Barile who made her home mine whenever I was in Florence. For awakening in me a deep appreciation of the value of works in my life, express thanks go to Ira Progoff and the Intensive Journal. In preparing the manuscript for publication I benefited greatly from Felix Gilbert's suggestions and from John H. Elliott's thoughtful reading and incisive comments which guided my footsteps on the path from dissertation to book. My gratitude to Helmut Koenigsberger reaches beyond these pages. The generosity and cheerful encouragement he extended me despite often discouraging barriers of time and distance buoyed me along the way. Most of all I wish to express appreciation to my helpmate and husband Jim to whom this book is dedicated. Were it not for his unwavering faith and support to hearten my faltering stride, this book would never have materialized.

M.M.B. Chapel Hilly North Carolina,

igj8

vn

Abbreviations (Unless otherwise indicated, all archival references are to the Archivio di Stato, Florence) A.A.S.G.F. A.S.C A.S.F.

A.S.I. A.S.R. A.V. B.N.F. B.V. C.S. Camerale Conv. Soppr. Dieci, Mis. Died, Resp. Div. Cam. Int. et Exit. M.A.P. Magi. Monte Comune Otto, Cond. et Stant. Otto, Delib. Otto, Dieci, Leg. e Com. Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib. Otto, Entrate e Uscite Otto, Resp. Otto, Stant. Sig., Cart., Mis.

Archivio della Arciconfraternita di San Giovanni dei Fiorentini, Rome Archivio Storico Capitolino, Rome Archivio di Stato, Florence Archivio Storico Italiano Archivio di Stato, Rome Archivio Segreto Vaticano Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana Carte Strozziane Archivio Camerale, Archivio di Stato, Rome Conventi Soppressi Dieci di Balk, Carteggi, Missive Dieci di Balk, Carteggi, Responsive Diversa Cameralia, Archivio Segreto Vaticano Introitus et Exitus, Archivio Segreto Vaticano Mediceo avanti il Principato Magliabecchiana, Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence Monte Comune, periodo repubblicano Otto di Pratica, Condotte e Stantiamenti Otto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, Partiti, Condotte Otto, Dieci, Legazioni e Commissioni Otto di Guardia e Balia, Partiti e Deliberazioni Otto di Pratica, Entrate e Uscite Otto di Pratica, Responsive Otto di Pratica, Stantiamenti Signori, Carteggi, Missive viii

Abbreviations Sig., Cart., Resp. Orig. Sig., Died, Otto, Leg. e Com. Sig., Died, Otto, Mis. Orig. Sig. e Coll., Delib. Ord. Vat. Lat.

Signori, Carteggi, Responsive Originali Signori, Died, Otto, Legazioni et Commissioni Signori, Died, Otto, Missive Originali Signori e Collegi, Deliberazioni, Ordinaria Autorita Vaticani Latini, Biblioteca Vaticana

IX

Selective genealogy of the Strozzi

Mattco (1397-14-35) ^.Alessaniradi Fillppo Maclnghi

Tiltppo (14-28-1491)

w,. (I) Fiammetta dl Donate Adimarl (a) Selvaggia di Bartolonuo Cji&nfujliazzl

(l) Fiammetta (l) Alexandra rrv. Tommaso m. Klccolo Soderlnl Capponi

Piero

(^.1558)

Leone W.1554)

m. Laudomina di Tierfrancesco de'Medici

MatUo

Lorenzo 04-33- H-79) m,. Antonia di Francesco BaronceUi

(l) AlftWso (i) Maria rrv. Sirrwrm d i (1467-1534) ^t-. (i) Francesco dl Jaorpo Rldolfv Bernardo Wasi )

Vlnxxnzo Lorenzo Maria 1lx>berto w. Lorenzo (<£ 1566) (cf.1537) (d.1571) Ridolfi m. *\3udda\&n& dl Pierfrancesco d

Lorcrtzo (z) m.Qino (1482-1549} Capponi itt. Lucreziadl Bernardo RjjccUai

| Luisa

Fiii ( wt. Clarice diPiero d;Mdi

| | | A-les^andro MaddaLena Qialio ( f ) m. Flaminio C^ W.154O) Ccmtedett! m. udqi dtt Avyuillara, Capponi sionore dl S&bbio

Introduction

An army of ragged exiles defeated at Montemurlo in 1537 by Duke Cosimo de'Medici of Florence and a suicide note echoing the words of Cato found beside his body in the duke's prison a year later are the images most closely associated with the memory of Filippo Strozzi the Younger. When not confused from the outset with his father who was also named Filippo, builder of the magnificent family palace in Florence, Filippo the Younger is most often remembered as a tragic hero, defender of the lost Florentine Republic against her new masters the Medici dukes. But for most of his adult life Strozzi could hardly be called a champion of Florentine liberties against Medici hegemony. If anything he was one of the staunchest supporters of the Medici both in Florence and at the papal court in Rome, personally profiting from his association with them and the favor they bestowed. He unhesitatingly abetted Lorenzo di Piero de'Medici's machinations to make himself sole ruler of Florence and obligingly diverted the commune's money into the pope's war chest. Basking in the sun of Medici favor, he enjoyed a reputation for power, wealth, education and magnanimity befitting the brilliance of his age. As a merchant-banker and speculator he amassed a fortune of legendary size and built an international financial empire rivaling that of the famous Fugger of Augsburg. Only at the end of this long and profitable career as a financier and ally of the Medici and only after the death of his last great patron Clement VII in 1534 did Filippo find himself feared and hated by the new dukes of Florence. Only then was he forced into his celebrated role as leader of the Florentine exiles, defiant captive, and heroic suicide. Over the centuries Filippo Strozzi has suffered the unkindly fate of having been remembered more for the circumstances of his death than for the accomplishments of his active public life. His last four years as exile and political prisoner have almost completely eclipsed the earlier phases of his career. Despite the survival of hundreds of his private papers which portray his earlier years, few historians have ever taken note of them. We owe this one-sided view of Filippo Strozzi and his place in sixteenth-century studies to nineteenth-century historians and dramatists who, caught up in their own nationalistic and patriotic fervor, imagined that Strozzi in his final

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici struggles against the tyrannous Florentine dukes in the sixteenth century foreshadowed the political spirit of their own day. Filippo Strozzi achieved wide popularity among historians of the last half of the nineteenth century, and more was written about his final days by Italian, German and English writers of that period than before or since. The first important publication about Strozzi to influence the tone of subsequent treatments was the widely-read historical drama of G.-B. Niccolini entitled Filippo Strozzi, tragedia which depicted the last few years of Strozzi's life leading to his romantic and tragic death. The play was published in Florence in 1847 together with an edition of the apologetic biography of Filippo written by his brother with an appendix of letters and documents edited by Pietro Bigazzi relating to the years treated in the drama.1 After the appearance of Niccolini's play and the documents, Filippo Strozzi became a favorite romantic figure whom T. Adolphus Trollope introduced to an English audience in i860 with the publication of his Filippo Strozzi: A History of the Last Days of the Old Italian Liberty. Even the great Leopold von Ranke produced a Strozzi piece, his ' Filippo Strozzi und Cosimo Medici, der erste Grossherzog von Toskana.'2 Italian historians of the same period, notably L. A. Ferrai, Carlo Capasso and Alessandro Bardi, published works treating Strozzi's resistance to the growing power of the dukes in Florence.3 The author of the only recent biography of Strozzi, unfortunately a derivative account, closely followed the pattern established by his nineteenth-century predecessors and repeated the now familiar refrain extolling Filippo Strozzi the tragic hero of lost Florentine liberty.4 The present work attempts to redress the balance of romantic historiography by looking at the beginning rather than the end of Strozzi's career and by setting him into the courtly environment of favoritism and financial patronage where he properly belongs. It is the Medici favorite and financier, and not the tragic hero, who steps forth from these pages - unless one can say that there is heroism and tragedy even in account books. 1

2 3

4

A popular account of Strozzi's life had already been published in the eighteenth century, Angelo Maria Bandini's,' Vita di Filippo Strozzi,' Magazzeno toscano cTistruzione e dipiacere, II (i755-1756), r 7-33> 49-66, which was perhaps inspired by the first published edition of Lorenzo's biography as an appendix to the 1723 edition of Benedetto Varchi's Storiafiorentina. Many manuscript copies of the biography existed in private libraries and helped keep the memory of Strozzi alive beyond the sixteenth century. Sdmmtliche Werke (Leipzig, 1875-1900), XL-XLI, 361-445. L. A. Ferrai, Filippo Strozzi, prigioniero degli Spagnuoli (Padua, 1880); idem, Cosimo de* Medici, duca di Firenze (Bologna, 1882); idem, Lorenzino de^ Medici e la societa cortigiana del Cinquecento (Milan, 1891); Carlo Capasso, Firenze, Filippo Strozzi, i fuorusciti e la corte pontificia (Camerino, 1901); Alessandro Bardi, 'Filippo Strozzi (da nuovi documenti),' A.S.I., Ser. v, vol. 15 (1894), 3-78. Luigi Limongelli, Filippo Strozzi, primo cittadino dy Italia (Milan, 1963).

Introduction Filippo Strozzi was born 4 January 1489, the third and youngest son of a wealthy Florentine aristocratic family. His father, Filippo the Elder, died in 1491 leaving his widow Selvaggia to care for her two small sons, Lorenzo aged nine and Filippo then aged two. By his first wife he had had another son Alfonso who divided his share of the estate from that of his younger step-brothers in order to go his separate way. Lorenzo and Filippo were always very close, but Alfonso never shared their intimacy, and a series of disagreements over the settlement of their father's estate and the building costs of the family palace clouded the relationship for much of their lives. The earliest accounts of Selvaggia's two sons come from scattered letters and account books, from the life of Filippo written by Lorenzo and from a biography of Lorenzo composed in 1529 by Francesco Zeffi who was the tutor of Filippo's children.5 The two biographies emphasize the nobility, education and elegant manners of the two brothers and were composed to glorify the family for the edification of later generations of Strozzi. Zeffi claimed that Lorenzo and Filippo were undoubtedly among those eminent Florentines of their day who so exemplified civic virtues and good citizenship that any prince would desire to have them in his state. He noted that Filippo was renowned for his exceptional good looks and intelligence and for his wealth. Lorenzo was even more fulsome in praising his brother, for, according to him, Filippo 'demonstrated humanity with his equals and reverence to his superiors and was modest in his every word and deed, and since he was graced with nobility, a handsome appearance, letters and good manners and the largest fortune in Florence, he was without doubt held in higher esteem than any other young Florentine.'6 As youths the brothers moved freely in the circles of young patricians who occupied themselves mainly with their studies, festivities, football and amorous adventures. From a letter of October 1500 describing a party Lorenzo gave on the feast of San Donino at the family villa of Santuccio, we find that their guests included young men from the Buondelmonti, Canigani, Capponi, de'Nobili, Ricci, Pandolfini and Rucellai families.7 Their mother Selvaggia sought to strengthen these aristocratic ties by arranging a series of marriages which took place after her husband's death. In 1493 Filippo's sister Fiammetta married Tommaso Soderini, nephew of Piero Soderini the future gonfaloniere-a-vita.s In 1497 Alessandra, another 5

6 7 8

The letters are strewn throughout the Carte Strozziane in the Archivio di Stato, Florence, and the account books are in C.S., Ser. v, 87 and 90. Zeffi's biography of Lorenzo forms the foreword to the Landi edition of Strozzi's own work, Le vite degli uomini illustri della casa Strozzi (Florence, 1892). G.-B. Niccolini, Filippo Strozzi, tragedia (Florence, 1847), p. xi. C.S., Ser. in, 145, fol. 94. The gonfaloniere di giustizia, or standard-bearer of justice, was the chief executive in the Florentine

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici sister, married Niccolo Capponi who much later was elected the first gonfalonier e of the Third Republic in 1527. In 1502 Caterina married Neri di Gino Capponi, and after the marriage arrangements were concluded, Neri wrote a letter from Lyons to Lorenzo Strozzi expressing his satisfaction with the strengthened union between their families: ' God has seen fit to give both of us that joy which we desire. Even though the engagement brings us no closer tie since our families are already so intimately related, first through my mother who was born among the Strozzi and then through Niccolo [who married your sister Alessandra Strozzi], still it is a bond between us reaching beyond the intimate friendship we had with your father.'9 In 1503 Lorenzo married the daughter of Bernardo Rucellai. The engagement had been arranged ten years previously while Lorenzo was a still a child. Selvaggia, then recently widowed, was particularly eager to secure the friendship and help of Bernardo on whose sage counsel the family came to rely for many years. She was quite content to make the match even though Lucrezia Rucellai brought with her only a small dowry. The wedding feast alone cost the Strozzi over 1,500 florins. The groom and his attendants dressed themselves elegantly in yards of velvet, damask and taffeta. To demonstrate their grandeur and generosity, the family distributed food and drink to the crowds waiting in the piazza outside the Strozzi palace. Contemporary sources bear witness to Florentines' fascination with spectacles and feasts, and one of the major pastimes of the rich was to stage elaborate celebrations and processions during Carnival and on various holidays. Filippo was no exception and took particular pleasure in festivals. For Carnival 1506, along with his friends Antonfrancesco and Antonio degli Albizzi, he staged a mime in the house of Prinzivalle della Stufa. The painter Piero di Cosimo designed the tableau which depicted Dovitia, played by Antonfrancesco who held a cornucopia and wore a headdress of various fruits. Dovitia was led by two youths, Filippo and Antonio, attired in garments of yellow silk stamped with black velvet with sleeves made up of multicolored silk leaves. Their hats were of black velvet embroidered in gold, their boots yellow with gold laces. After them followed three singers and twelve attendants. Filippo's close friendship with his two companions in this mime, Antonfrancesco and Prinzivalle, assumed greater importance in the years to come when both men became adamant Medici supporters. During the next year's Carnival Filippo and his brother took part in the famous Carro di Morte (Cart of Death), again designed by Piero di Cosimo,

9

government. Under the Republic a new gonfaloniere was chosen every two months. In 1502, however, the constitution was changed, and Piero Soderini became the first standard-bearer of justice-for-life {gonfaloniere-a-vita). He stayed in office until 1512 when his government fell with the return of the Medici. C.S., Ser. HI, 145, fol. 95.

Introduction which Vasari described in his life of that painter. The figure of Death brandished a scythe and rode on top of the buffalo-drawn cart. He was surrounded by men dressed as skeletons who hid themselves in coffins. At every halt in the procession they sprang from their sepulchers and sang songs about death. Other persons disguised as corpses and accompanied by torchbearing attendants on foot rode behind Death's cart astride emaciated nags. This masque so impressed the spectators that on the following day, the first day of Lent, preachers praised it from their pulpits. Although festivals were a favorite pastime, they were not the only occupation of young Florentine aristocrats like Filippo, for he also devoted many hours to his studies. Filippo's later career as a successful merchantbanker was not based on formal mercantile schooling in book-keeping or with the abacus. Instead, his early training concentrated on the study of manners and letters as befitted a young gentleman of his time. As a boy he spent many months at Santuccio where he pursued his elementary education in Latin letters under the tutelage of domestic preceptors, much as his own children did later. Filippo's family noticed his proclivity for study, and Selvaggia encouraged his interest in letters. In choosing teachers for her sons she valued education in manners more than erudition, and both brothers later lamented that their early tutors had not been more eminent scholars. When Filippo was old enough, he selected his own teachers, and, at the recommendation of Bernardo Rucellai, he attended the lectures of Niccolo da Bucine in rhetoric and began the study of mathematics. He studied Latin with Marcello Virgilio and Greek with Fra Zanobi Acciaiuoli.l ° We can establish at least a few of the books he read from several account-book entries of purchases he made between 1508 and 1511, and they included works of Cicero, Lucretius with commentaries, various Greek translations, a Greek grammar by Frate Urbino and one by Demetrio, and works of Poliziano and Leonardo Bruni.11 His interest in Greek and Latin letters and in music continued throughout his life even while he was occupied with his business affairs and political intrigues. Like his brother Lorenzo, he composed madrigals and songs, and together they sang in various celebrations and on feast days in Florence. Once, when Lorenzo de'Medici forwarded a new French song to the papal court in Rome, Filippo snatched it from the hands of a secretary so that he could present it to 10

11

C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 46; Niccolini, p. xi. Marcello Virgilio was a disciple of Landino and Poliziano, and both he and Bucine taught poetics and rhetoric at the Studio Fiorentino. See the exhaustive study of the Studio by Armando F. Verde, Lo Studio Fiorentino, 1473-1503 (Florence, 1973), 11, 476-477, 502-503. C.S., Ser. v, 90, fols. 4, 12, 17. He also purchased sheets of music paper and a book designated, 'problemati diversi' which was perhaps a mathematics book. Other entries are for football expenses, and there is one payment for his lessons from a duelling master, ibid., fols. 3, 9.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Leo X in person. He was always seeking fresh reading material and had his friend the Florentine ambassador in France search out new books for him there. Borrowing books to read or copy was a common practice of the time, and in this way Filippo became familiar with Alberti's Delia pittura and Dioscorides' De materia medica in translation. In 1516 he recorded payments for purchases of a De temporibus of Eusebius, a book of proverbs by Erasmus, a new edition of Ptolemy, an unidentified book in French, and one in vulgar Italian, as well as two Latin grammars, and copies of the Donatello for his sons. 12 In 1526 while he served six months in prison in the Castel Nuovo in Naples as a hostage for Clement VII and contemplated a revolution of the government in Florence, he mentioned in his letters that he was reading Livy and Aristotle for his political and moral instruction. He also had a life-long interest in natural philosophy, natural history and astrology and composed various commentaries and translations of Pliny and Demosthenes. In 1537, once again a political prisoner, this time in Florence, he passed the long hours of solitude by making a translation from Greek into Tuscan of Polybius' Delli ordini della romana militia.13 In many ways then, Filippo Strozzi was the proverbial Renaissance man, a person of artistry, talent, education, and wealth whose reputation and influence always went before him. He was the accomplished humanist scholar who translated Polybius in his prison cell and the brilliantly successful, often unscrupulous financier whose purse strings stretched beyond Europe into the New World. He served popes and potentates as a loyal, trusted companion and political confidant and was a man who conducted himself with as much assurance and aplomb trysting with the courtesan-poetess Tullia of Aragon in her chambers as picking his way through the political intrigues which hung thick as fog about the elegant society at the papal court. It is easier to get a feeling for the texture of Filippo Strozzi's life than to come to an understanding of the man himself. Autobiographical self-revelation seems foreign to his nature. But although his personality is often obscured and hidden behind the crush of business and political matters which dominate his correspondence, brief glimpses of his complex character do shine through. The carefree innocence of his early years and youthful zeal for his studies soon gave way to a bold ambition which alternated with consuming doubts about his proper course of action, especially at the time of his marriage in 1508. Barely beyond adolescence, 12 13

M.A.P., 112, fol. 38; C.S., Ser. HI, 108, fol. 4; 121, fol. 108. Niccolini, p. cxx. A volume of his miscellaneous translations and notes is in C.S., Ser. v, 1221, vol. in. Two seventeenth-century copies of his translation of Polybius are in Ser. 11, 50 and 50 bis. At least two other copies exist, one in the Vatican Library and the other in Naples. See P. O. Kristeller, her italicum (London, 1963), 1, 68, 432.

Introduction the political turmoil that arose from his betrothal to Clarice de'Medici thrust him into a turbulent political arena to do battle with the head of state, Piero Soderini, a role for which his tender years had not adequately prepared him. In 1513 when Clarice's uncle was elected Pope Leo X, the pomp and elegance of the papal court captivated his imagination and drew him to Rome. But once inside the inner sanctum of the court, his enthusiasm quickly diminished when he discovered that his pursuit of power and wealth necessitated his continuous attendance at an endless round of festivities and banquets. According to his brother, Filippo was tall, had graceful features, and could be immediately identified by his quick lively step, an outward expression of his inner impatience and need to keep himself constantly occupied. When friends commented on his vigorous pace, he reportedly replied that he knew no greater waste than the waste of time, and therefore he moved from place to place as speedily as possible. But although Filippo attacked whatever task he had on hand with energy and zest, he always made sure that each day included time for all three of his favorite activities, business, study, and pleasure. While still a young man and confidant of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici in Florence, his letters show him to have been impressionable and liberal with his affections. His intimacy with Giulio de'Medici, later Clement VII, may have surpassed the bounds of simple friendship, and his night-time escapades earned him considerable notoriety. Armed with ladders and keys, he and his companions made themselves the scourge of local convents, and he used a little house outside the city walls for his assignations. Only the fury of his headstrong wife on discovering some of his love letters put a stop to these activities, and then only for a time. 14 The high-spirited abandon with which he pursued his personal affairs permeated his whole approach to life. Calculated ambition was second nature to him, whether in his decision to pursue the politically risky marriage to Clarice de'Medici, or in speculative financial schemes to sell clipped coins and poor grain at inflated prices. But his arrogance was tempered by intelligence, a witty sense of humor and a penchant for earthy metaphor. His loyalty to his family was beyond reproach, and he furthered Strozzi political fortunes in Florence to the best of his ability. He was also extremely devoted to his Medici benefactors, whose interests he promoted unceasingly. If his brother-in-law Lorenzo wanted to annex Piombino or make himself captain general of Florence, a step which flew in the face of the city's constitution, Filippo gave him unquestioning support and counsel. When Clement VII needed a hostage in 1526, Filippo went 14

Reference to these escapades is scattered throughout Filippo's correspondence with his henchman Francesco del Nero. See also L. A. Ferrai, Lettere di cortigiane del secolo XVI (Florence, 1884).

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici willingly in his stead, fully cognizant of the dangers to his person and to his purse. His relationship with the Medici was not, however, totally one-sided. In return for his loyalty and services he fully expected and received his due recompense of special favors, offices and lucrative financial contracts that formed the foundation of his considerable fortune. He could be as cunning and clever as Machiavelli's fox, and these qualities served him well, helping him survive the changes of fortune he had to endure. He skillfully rode the wave of Medici power and influence to its crest and found himself swept far beyond the shores of Florence. Yet when Clement VII was a helpless prisoner in the Castel S. Angelo following the Sack of Rome in 1527, Filippo, ever sensitive to the tides of change, flirted briefly with the newly independent Republic of Florence. Two years later when Clement was restored to the Vatican and the Republic seemed doomed to defeat, Strozzi ingratiated himself anew with his old friend and remained on intimate terms with him until Clement's death. Filippo Strozzi's relationship with the Medici shaped his entire adult life. The years 1508-1534 which encompassed that relationship and form the time limits of this study mark out a definite period in his career in which he enjoyed Medici patronage in Florence and at the court of the Medici popes in Rome. The period began with his marriage to Clarice de'Medici, the granddaughter of Lorenzo il Magnifico and niece of Leo X, and ended with the death of Strozzi's last Medici friend and benefactor, Clement VII. In these twenty-six years Strozzi's career as a trusted adviser and promoter of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici in Florence and of Leo and Clement in Rome unfolded and reached its apex. And during this same period he accumulated his immense fortune as a banker in their service. This study of Strozzi concentrates on the period in his life most heavily influenced by his connections with the Medici, and does not claim to be an exhaustive biography of this intriguing character of the High Renaissance, but rather an investigation of the milieu in which he so successfully operated and of his modus operandi itself. Strozzi's rise to fame and fortune is incomprehensible without an appreciation of the personal and financial patronage which dominated sixteenth-century social and economic life. And in the same way, the finances of the Medici governments of Florence and papal Rome are never so clearly understood as when seen through the eyes of Filippo Strozzi, their prime manipulator. The fortuitous corroboration of church records in the Vatican by public and private papers in Florence gives us a unique opportunity to delve into the inner workings and interrelationships between Florentine public finances and those of the pope's Apostolic Chamber in the early sixteenth century.

Filippo Strozzi's Florence

Although the Medici regime established in Florence after 1512 was heir to the earlier governments of Cosimo il Vecchio and Lorenzo il Magnifico of the fifteenth century, important differences between them show that the city, once so fiercely proud of her republican traditions, had moved decidedly towards a principate. The evidence that Medici patronage determined a person's political and economic position within the state indicates that they had consolidated their power in the city and had secured the acquiescence of the Florentine aristocracy in their hegemony. In the sixteenth century, as the Medici extended their control over the government, they distributed political offices and influence to their friends and supporters and denied them to their opponents. This growing dependency of the Florentine aristocracy on the Medici had an economic side which served to win them devoted adherents such as Filippo Strozzi. A comparison of Strozzi's situation in the sixteenth century with that of his father in the fifteenth shows the relationship that obtained between his banking success and the favor he received. Back in the 1430s the Strozzi family had been ostracized as adversaries of the Medici. Strozzi's father, Filippo di Matteo, was exiled as a child from Florence following the exile of his own father and other members of the Albizzi faction who had opposed the return of Cosimo de'Medici to the city. He lived in Naples where, unmolested by his political enemies, he was able to make his fortune as a banker at the Neapolitan court. Eventually in 1466 Lorenzo il Magnifico welcomed him back to his native city. Filippo the Younger, like his father, found success in banking and was even reputed to be the richest man in Christendom after Jacob Fugger.* But within the changed context of the sixteenth century it is inconceivable that he could have accumulated his great wealth without Medici support. For unlike his father, Filippo implanted himself deeply within their party at an early age. Through Medici favor and protection he was appointed depositor general of the papal monies 1

This was Rabelais' observation: Francois Rabelais, Les Lettres escrites pendant son voyage tfltalie (Brussels, 1710), p. 6. Bernardo Segni, a contemporary Florentine historian, gave further testimony to Strozzi's reputed wealth in his Storie fiorentine (Milan, 1805), 11, 7, 213, in which he compared Strozzi to Crassus.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici in Rome and depositor in Florence, and through them he established personal and financial contacts with other ruling houses of Europe. Like his father in the previous century, Strozzi also suffered exile when he fell from favor with the dukes of Florence, but unlike his father who had founded his fortune in that undesirable circumstance, Filippo nearly lost his. During the last decades of the transition of Florence from a republic to a dukedom, the patriciate was the group of families most intimately affected by the changes in government which took place in those years. Contemporaries designated the Florentine aristocrats by such terms as primi, grandi, ottimati, uomini da bene, uomini principally or nobili (first among

citizens, the great, the best, the good men, principal citizens or nobles) which emphasized their elevated position in society.2 They possessed wealth, education, experience and the strength of family tradition, embodied in names like Acciaiuoli, Bardi, Pazzi, Pucci, Rucellai, Salviati, Soderini, and Strozzi. Upper-class Florentines held public office, conducted diplomatic missions, loaned money to the state, and controlled a large share of the wealth of the city and its commerce. Since Florence was a city-state, her ruling elite was not a feudal aristocracy because, in contrast to traditional feudal societies, membership in the patriciate was not strictly determined by noble birth. In Florence, already in the thirteenth century, members of the great magnate families who were held suspect by the communal government had been deprived of their political rights, and it later became a form of political persecution to have undesirable families declared magnates and then disenfranchised. Another distinctive feature in the formation of the Florentine aristocracy was that entry into the ruling group might be made through political avenues. Some of the families such as the Del Nero and Serristori who had been gente nuova, or new men, in the fifteenth century, were by the sixteenth recognized among the pritni. They were then raised up to eligibility for the major political offices and favored by the Medici as a reward for their loyalty to the regime.3 The Florentine patriciate was also a mercantile aristocracy, for most of the money in these families derived from investments in manufacturing, commerce and banking. Despite a slow-down in the Florentine economy in the late fifteenth century, they were far from being an idle class of rentiers, and many still maintained active business interests. 2

3

We find these terms in the contemporary works of Guicciardini, Cerretani, Parenti, Nerli, Pitti, Machiavelli, Nardi, Segni, and Varchi, to name the most important authors. Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton, 1965), pp. 23-28, 49, provides a short discussion of such social terminology based mainly on the writings of Guicciardini. Nicolai Rubinstein, The Government of Florence Under the Medici (Oxford, 1966), pp. 44, 62-63, 214-216, 244.

10

Filippo StrozzVs Florence The Strozzi were one of the ottimati families which rose to financial and political prominence out of what had originally been old popolano stock which dated back into the thirteenth century. Several Strozzi households in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries became rich through commerce and banking and achieved political eminence.4 Although the Strozzi were out of political favor and thus out of office under the Medici in the fifteenth century following their alignment with the Albizzi faction, they were still recognized as one of the more prominent Florentine families on account of their wealth, size and aristocratic manner, on a par with old magnate families such as the Bardi. The Medici, too, were from the ranks of the ottimati. Although in the course of the fifteenth century Cosimo and his descendants had asserted themselves as the leading family of Florence, they did so with the cooperation and support of other ottimati families like the Tornabuoni, Guicciardini and Pandolfini who joined with them for mutual profit and security. This theme of cooperation between certain aristocrats and the Medici was basic to the functioning of the Medici system of government from the fifteenth century. But as that family increased its hegemony in Florence in the sixteenth century, the relationship turned more into one of dependency, wherein the ottimati were eventually reduced to an essentially bureaucratic nobility,5 and, as an embittered contemporary phrased it, young Florentines of good family were being taught to become courtiers rather than citizens.6 FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND Much less attention has been devoted to the economic condition of the Florentine upper classes than to the city's institutional and cultural life. And without more extensive data for large numbers of individual families, it is especially difficult to come to satisfying conclusions about the general economic growth or decline of the ottimati in this period.7 Patrician wealth extended over such a wide spectrum that on the one hand we find that a Filippo Strozzi made a staggering fortune which reached into hundreds of 4

5

6 7

On the origins of the Strozzi family see P. J. Jones, 'Florentine Families and Florentine Diaries in the Fourteenth Century,' Papers of the British School at Rome, xxiv (New Series, xi) (1956), 186-196. Jones discounted claims made by the family to feudal origins. See also Lorenzo Strozzi, Le vite, and Pompeo Litta (ed.), Lefamiglie celebri italiane (Milan, 1819-1902), fasc. XLIV, dispensa 68. Rudolf von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato: Storia e coscienza politica, trans. Cesare Cristofolini (Turin, 1970), p. 183. Lodovico Alamanni, Discorso, published in Albertini, Appendix 4, pp. 35, 383. The recent studies by Richard Goldthwaite, Private Wealth in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1968) and Francis William Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence (Princeton, 1977), though helpful, do not provide a sufficient basis from which to draw general conclusions.

II

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici thousands of florins, while on the other a man like Bernardo Rucellai from a very respectable ottitnati family was having to borrow on his real estate.8 Even in the instance of particular families, it is impossible to generalize about the economic status of a whole lineage from individual cases because some households within the wider family fared better than others. Whereas Bernardo Rucellai had to borrow money, distant Rucellai cousins in Rome were doing quite well in the banking business. The Strozzi, too, are a case in point. Already by 1321 they constituted one of the largest lineages in Florence, with twenty-eight households.9 By the sixteenth century their fortunes varied considerably. Filippo was what would now be termed a multimillionaire, but some of his poorer relatives whom he employed as clerks in his banks earned only a living wage. Even within Filippo's own immediate family there were significant differences. His half-brother Alfonso, who had inherited the major portion of their father's estate and who was himself a banker, lost money in the course of his career. He could not keep up payments for his half of the Strozzi palace and at his death left only a small estate to his daughters. Filippo's brother Lorenzo participated for a while in Filippo's banking companies, but from 1522 he chose to withdraw his capital from the business and reinvest in land. 10 Those fortunes that Florentines built in the early sixteenth century came with few exceptions from banking and were made outside Florence, often as the result of some connection with papal finances. Filippo's career provides an example of this, for although he inherited a handsome sum, his fortune only began to grow spectacularly after 1515 when he entered Leo X's service as depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber. From that beginning he built a financial empire stretching from Naples to the Atlantic. Though none were as wealthy as Strozzi, other Florentine bankers such as Jacopo Salviati, Bindo Altoviti, and Luigi Gaddi enjoyed similar success. Their wealth came primarily from investments in foreign money markets such as Naples, Rome and Lyons. Extensive Florentine investment in banking and commerce abroad had been for several centuries a mainstay of the city's economy, but we should not allow the happy circumstances of a small financial elite to color our perceptions of the general economic picture of all the ottitnati. The sixteenth century brought a polarization of wealth to the ottimati of Florence. Thanks to Medici favor and to their 8

9 10

C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 229. Bernardo's father Giovanni had been one of the richest bankers in fifteenth-century Florence, but he had withdrawn from business before 1470 because of losses. See Raymond de Roover, The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, 1397-1494 (New York, 1966), pp. 374, 484Jones, p. 186. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fols. 83, 132. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 75"76> 104-105. Lorenzo gradually decreased his business investments over a ten-year period. After the death of their mother Selvaggia in 1525, the two brothers made a final division of the property they held in common, CS., Ser. HI, no, fol. 221. 12

Filippo StrozzVs Florence own engagement in large-scale business, especially banking, the richest families like the Strozzi and Salviati were getting richer. The others either lived off what they had without bettering their status or indeed actually found themselves becoming poorer.l1 The traditional pillars of the Florentine economy were textiles, commerce, and banking, all of which experienced considerable upheaval in the early sixteenth century.* 2 Evidence of trouble is particularly clear in the textile sector. The wool industry, foundation of so much Florentine wealth in earlier centuries, never regained its lost vigor. Despite a brief flutter of activity after 1550, it almost totally collapsed in the seventeenth century. 13 Although the development of the silk- and luxury-cloth industry in Florence had in some measure compensated for the depressed wool industry, the recovery had been only partial, and already by the latter fifteenth century silk manufactures suffered hard times, as seen in the collapse of five companies in November 1464 alone. 14 By 1513, according to Florentine government documents, the silk industry and its guild, Por Santa Maria, were in such disarray that the guild consuls petitioned the government to set up a commission of six to oversee the guild for five years for the following reason: 1!

12

13

14

Various authors have suggested that there was a general weakening of the Italian nobility in the sixteenth century. On Venice see James Davis, The Decline of the Venetian Nobility as a Ruling Class (Baltimore, 1962), pp. 34-53; on Rome, Jean Delumeau, Vie economique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde mottte du XVF siecle (Paris, 1957), 1, 457-485; in general, Gino Barbieri, Ideali economici degli Italiani alPinizio delPeta moderna (Milan, 1940), pp. 263-268. The situation in Florence is slightly different from most of Italy because her aristocracy maintained its mercantile traditions and continued to invest in business well into the sixteenth century. My interpretation which suggests that there was a polarization of wealth among the Florentine nobles accounts for the effects of the economic decline on the majority of the aristocrats while it recognizes the very special situation of a few ottimati, mainly bankers, who were able to become rich by providing credit to powerful patrons. Anthony Molho has demonstrated in his article on 'The Florentine "Tassa dei Traffichi" of 1451,' Studies in the Renaissance, xvn (1970), 89-92 that even in the fifteenth century the wealthiest Florentine aristocrats were the merchant-bankers. Although they disagree about its causes and duration, most historians have viewed this upheaval in the context of a long-term decline in the Florentine and Italian economies in the sixteenth century. See for example, Gino Luzzatto, Storia economica delPeta moderna e contemporanea (Padua, 1955), pp. 56-70; Barbieri, pp. 296-297; J. M. Kulischer, Storia economica del Medio Evo e delPepoca moderna, trans. E. Bohm (Florence, 1955), 11, 295-296, 347-354; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds (New York, 1972), i> 3 i 2 - 3 5 2 ; 11, 826-835. See the results of Carlo Cipolla's research on the wool industry in his Storia delVeconomia italiana (Turin, 1959), pp. 17,605-623 where he also makes more general conclusions about the failing health of the Italian economy. Florence Edler de Roover, 'Andrea Banchi, Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in the Fifteenth Century/ Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, 11 (1966), 285. See also Raymond de Roover, pp. 358—360. The Florentine silk industry has been the subject of historical debate similar to that surrounding the health of the whole economy, some historians arguing that it fully compensated for the depressed wool industry in the fifteenth century, others that the recovery was only partial. See Luzzatto, p. 61; Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 218; Alfred Doren, Storia economica delPItalia nel Medio Evo, trans. Gino Luzzatto (Padua, 1936), p. 609.

13

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Since in the silk business and its guild and among its members there have been, and continue to be, serious troubles, unless precautions are taken, they will surely increase and multiply to the point where this guild and industry, one of the principal sustenances of the citizens and of the poor, will totally collapse and bring dishonor to the city and great public and private damage.15 Over the next two decades the situation of the textile industry only grew worse. The Venetian ambassador, Antonio Suriano, who served in Florence from 1528-1529, said in his report to the Venetian Senate of August 1533 that Florence at one time had produced yearly over four thousand fine woolen cloths, panni di San Martino, and between eighteen and twenty thousand cloths of Spanish wool, panni garbi, but now produced very few of either and that the silk and gold cloth production had declined as well, partly because of the wars which interrupted transit routes to Lyons and Flanders.16 It would seem, then, that for those ottimati interested in textiles the opportunities for investments were shrinking and that they lay exposed to substantial risks in the first part of the sixteenth century when the Italian peninsula was wracked by war and invading armies. Although depressed, the textile industry continued to contribute to the Florentine economy. But by the sixteenth century the city's financial and banking interests, which had originally developed alongside the wool industry and catered to its needs, represented a larger capital investment and produced higher percentage profits than textiles. 17 Banking was by far the most active sector of the economy in our period, and because the finance industry retained its vitality it breathed new life into the city and delayed her economic decline until the second half of the sixteenth century.18 An increase in the intensity of international trade in the early part of the century 15

16

17

18

Balie, 43, fols. 102V-103. Guicciardini expressed a similar opinion in his Dialogo del reggimento di Firenze, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1932), pp. 107, 264-265. Arnaldo Segarizzi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato (Bari, 1916), 111, 112-113. Panni di San Martino, made of English wool, were of the highest quality and sold in the 1520s for 60 ducats apiece. Panni garbi, made of Spanish wool, sold at 22 ducats apiece. Foscari in his report of 1528 gives a lower estimate of 14,000 for the production of panni garbi, ibid., p. 26. The easiest and most common way to make a profit was not in industry but in high-risk, high-yield credit operations, Luzzatto, pp. 46, 75. Large banking companies such as the Strozzi banks at Rome and Lyons might be capitalized at 20,000-25,000 florins, whereas wool shops were organized on a much smaller scale with a capital investment of 2,000-6,000 florins. See Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, tables 11 and 12, pp. 92, 95; and pp. 87, 88, 126-127, !72> r73> 2oo, 215, 228 and the bibliography on p. 47, note 33. Later in the sixteenth century the capital of textile companies increased. In 1561 the Capponi silk company had over 23,000 florins in capital, and in 1554 their wool company had an invested capital of 8,000 florins, ibid., pp. 225-227. Because of its vital role in the Florentine economy, the finance industry has been the most disputed element in arguments over Florence's economic decline. Doren and then Robert Lopez found the beginning of the end of Florentine banking already in the second half of the fourteenth century, Doren, pp. 609 ff.; Robert Lopez and H. A. Miskimin, * The Economic Depression of the Renaissance,' Economic History Review, Ser. 2, vol. 14, no. 2 (1961), 408-426. Raymond de Roover, however, saw only a long period of depression in the fifteenth century, pp. 358-375.

14

Filippo Strozzi''s Florence stimulated enterprise and afforded financiers expanded opportunities to accumulate fortunes rapidly. Gino Luzzatto held this flowering of the banking industry to be a European-wide phenomenon so that for him the Fugger of Augsburg and the Chigi of Siena were representatives of a new age, the age of the great merchants, whose heightened spirit of enterprise and combined industrial, commercial, and especially banking interests made them capitalist giants.* 9 Merchant-bankers such as the Fugger and Chigi or Filippo Strozzi from Florence were the great financiers of their times, men who wielded unprecedented economic power and controlled vast quantities of capital. But it would be exaggerating the case to say that the Fugger were not exceptional, and that tens of other families both in Germany and Italy had almost equally extensive business interests. The very scale and nature of their businesses differed enormously from the activities of most European merchants and bankers at this time. Jacob Fugger was banker to Charles V, and the Chigi and the Strozzi made their money at the papal court. Their large-scale credit services to princes were high-risk ventures offering the prospect of spectacular yields. These bankers might be better described as creatures of the great rulers whose ordinary financial resources provided for only a portion of their expenses making it necessary for them to seek loans and additional credit from their bankers. They were the unique products of the political and economic structure of the early modern period, creations of princely patrons whose credit needs they filled on a grand scale. When applied to Florence, the argument for the sixteenth century's being the age of the great merchants lends support to the idea that during this period a polarization of wealth took place in the city, if first we accept the caveat that there were not as many merchant-bankers on the scale of the Fugger as Luzzato would have us believe. For in the first third of the sixteenth century Florence saw a late flowering of rich financiers such as the Strozzi, Salviati, Gaddi, Altoviti, Antinori, and a few others who, as products of a system of patronage and privilege available only to a few, were able to increase their wealth to a level far beyond their previous worth or the worth of other Florentine patricians. Suriano, the Venetian ambassador, in attempting to give some idea of the status of the richest Florentine families, named seven of the estimated eight or ten families whose worth exceeded 100,000 florins.20 All seven were financiers who operated on an international scale and were heavily involved in credit operations with heads of state. Tommaso Guadagni and Roberto Albizzi had extensive operations 19

20

Luzzatto, pp. 44 ff. Ehrenberg's much earlier work, Capital and Finance in the Age of the Renaissance, trans. H. M. Lucas (London, 1928), is based on a similar premise that the end of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries was best characterized as an age of great merchant capitalists. Segarizzi, in, 114.

15

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici in Lyons and were creditors of Francis I. The Antinori, Bartolini, Salviati, Soderini and Strozzi were papal bankers in Rome. 21 Suriano also mentioned that approximately eighty families had a worth of at least 50,000 florins. Although he did not name them specifically, they would undoubtedly have included those Florentine ottimati who were involved in business and finance outside of Florence in Rome and Lyons, the two centers of foreign investment for Florentines in this period. But since Florentine commercial activity was more intense abroad than at home, it would be mistaken to generalize from the example of a few successful and wealthy international merchant-bankers that in Florence the ottimati were generally prospering and that the city itself had a healthy economy. We have already seen that the textile industry was in trouble and that the huge fortunes in the finance industry were those of an upper crust of wealthy bankers who were providing credit to princes and popes. But the economic disruption in Florence was only made worse by the series of devastating wars which took place in Italy from 1494 to 1530. More than any other single factor, the Italian wars hastened the erosion of all but the largest Florentine fortunes. Ever since Charles VIII of France had invaded with his army in 1494. Italy had become the arena for the almost continual conflicts between France and the Empire. Attacks of plague and bands of marauding troops in the countryside interrupted the cultivation of crops and forced cities to import grain from outside their territories or from abroad at inflated prices. 22 Florence was only one of many cities that attempted to control prices and the distribution of grain in this period to prevent runaway inflation, especially in the 1520s when the blows of the Italian wars struck her harshly. High food prices touched everyone, but these wars and the siege of Florence in 1529-1530 cut deeply into the profits of aristocrats who owned much of the income-producing farm land around the city - land which now lay uncultivated.23 Guicciardini's letters attest to the sad state of affairs in the countryside for landowners and peasants 21

22

23

Marc Bresard, Les Foires de Lyon aux XV* et XV* sticks (Paris, 1914), pp. 281-283; Marcel Vigne, La Banque a Lyon du XV6 au XVIIIe siecle (Lyons, 1903), p. 177; Coriolano Belloni, Dizionario storico dei banchieri it a Ham (Florence, 1951), pp. 194, 211-213. The Bartolini, Salviati, and Strozzi also had banks in Lyons. Suriano's figures have been cited numerous times, but no one has ever before made the obvious connection between the wealthiest families and the source of their money in international banking and in loans to princes. See Luzzatto, p. 67 and Barbieri, p. 297. The only study of Florentine prices for this period, beginning in 1520, shows a particularly steep jump in the price curve during the time of the Italian wars, Giuseppe Parenti, 'Prezzi e salari a Firenze dal 1520 al 1620,' I prezzi in Europa dal XIII secolo a oggi, ed. R. Romano (Turin, 1967), pp. 215-216. Segarizzi, in, 119. Wealthy Florentines who owned large estates and farms in the countryside cultivated the land not just to produce food for their families, but also to sell the surplus. In 1526, Filippo Strozzi and his brother Lorenzo held jointly forty-four separate income-producing properties valued at over 32,000 florins, including 22 farms (poderi), various fields (terre), mills (mulini), forests (boschetti), foundries (fornact\ vineyards (vigne) and meadows (prati). In that one year these possessions produced a net profit of over 1,200 florins, which represented better than a 3 percent return on their investment, C.S., Ser. v, 1221, vol. 1, fols. 1-7.

16

Filippo StrozzVs Florence alike after the siege: 'The citizens and their means of livelihoods are exhausted; for miles around Florence and in many places in the dominion houses are in ruin; the number of peasants has greatly diminished and hardly a poor soul remains; there will be scarcely enough grain to live on this year and little hope for the next.' 24 For those ottimati who had business investments, the most hurtful effect of the Italian wars was the disruption of the normal trade routes to the North which were the vital link between Florence and her markets in France and Flanders. At one point during the Last Republic when the route through Genoa, an ally of the Empire, was closed to Florentines, merchants were forced at great hardship to seek entirely new routes, and they either shipped their goods by sea skirting Genoa on the west, or else they shipped to the east from Ancona to Trieste and then overland to the North. Because so much of the wealth of Florentines engaged in commerce and banking lay outside the city itself, the political and military situation in Italy during the first decades of the sixteenth century also exposed them to the threat of economic reprisals for political reasons. In the summer of 1521 the French king ordered the arrests of the leading Florentine merchants in Lyons and Milan, had their possessions inventoried, and threatened to seize them. This action in turn made it very difficult for those ottimati in Florence who were obligated to loan money to the state for the war effort because they depended heavily on the Lyons money market. In 1529 the Swiss requested Francis I to confiscate the possessions of Florentine merchants in Lyons as compensation for the 18,000 ducats owed them by the pope and guaranteed by Jacopo Salviati who had reneged on his commitment. Later that year members of the Florentine Nation residing in London faced seizure of their goods because the government of Florence had not paid its yearly tribute of £450 to King Henry VIII. 2 5 Increased taxation constituted by far the biggest burden of war. From 1512 to 1527 when Florence was under Medici domination and a party to all papal military alliances, the city spent outright almost 4,000,000 ducats for the Medici cause. Duke Lorenzo de'Medici and his uncle Giuliano who had been unofficial heads of state from 1513 to 1519 cost the city 60,000 ducats a year alone. 26 In Rome the papal treasury was empty, and the Medici popes depended heavily on subsidies from Florence to support their joint armies in the field.27 By January of 1527, things had come to such 24 25

26 27

Cited in Agostino Rossi, 'Studi Guicciardini,' A.S.I., Ser. v, vol. 5 (1890), 23. Sig., Died, Otto, Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 11; Sig., Cart. Resp. Orig., 42, fols. 169, 182V, 206, 220 236. Segarizzi, in, 112. Florentines were well aware of this burdensome financial obligation. In July 1521, Jacopo Guicciardini wrote,' I do not know where the money which is absolutely essential is going to come from. The pope has no more, and here the city will likewise be entirely emptied,' Sig., Dieci, Otto, Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 11.

17

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici a pass that no money was left in Florence to hire additional soldiers, buy grain, or mend the fortifications of the city threatened by the Imperial army of the Connetable de Bourbon which was thought to be heading in her direction. The Balla, the special plenipotentiary council of state, discussed new extraordinary measures to raise money because the city was financially exhausted, future incomes already obligated, and the purses of the citizens severely strained. Collecting assessed taxes had always been a problem in Florence, and the city records contain elaborate discount schemes and penalty schedules devised to induce delinquent citizens to pay up. However, already in 1524 Balla officials had voiced an additional complaint, that many citizens were simply too poor to meet their tax obligations from the previous year.28 By 1529, even members of respected ottitnati families went into debt in order to pay their taxes. Roberto Acciaiuoli, former ambassador to France, was imprisoned for failure to pay. Francesco Guicciardini borrowed money to meet his obligation, and Francesco Vettori who lacked the money to pay his tax bill was forced to sell household possessions and even his clothes. 29 Although in previous years special interest-bearing forced loans had been considered a good investment, the demands of the state for money in both taxes and loans from 1512-1530 were so pressing that the majority of the ottimati found their wealth inexorably drained. A few very rich and favored men had the liquid capital to profiteer from the state by making these high-interest war loans, but most of the ottimati and the rest of the citizens had to struggle just to meet their tax assessments. They found themselves getting poorer as they first consumed their surplus capital, then withdrew money they had invested in business, and finally were forced to sell their possessions. The cumulative effect of years of heavy taxation and the disruption of business and agriculture brought by the constant wars in Italy forced most Florentines other than the super-rich to their knees. Writing in 1530 to Bartolomeo Lanfredini in Rome, Francesco Guicciardini described their ills as follows: The city is very exhausted. Those men who used to be wealthy are now all afflicted. Shops are closed and if you should pass through San Martino, you would be frightened to see that of 64 shops that used to be open before the war, only 12 remain, and even they are severely weakened. The same is true in all the other businesses where men used to turn a profit.30 28

29

30

The records of the Balla are full of tales of taxpayers' woes, for example, Balie, 43, fols. 11, 14V, i5> 72, 146, i55v, 184, 192V, 193V. Cecil Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (New York, 1925), pp. 65,79; Rosemary Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, Florentine Citizen and Medici Servant (London, 1972), pp. 203-204; Albertini, P- 438. Cited in Rossi, p. 29.

18

Filippo StrozzVs Florence Guicciardini considered the ruin of the members of the monied class the draining of Florence's lifeblood and thought it essential to preserve their financial potential by not overtaxing them. His solution to the problem was heavily tinged with class interest. By protecting the ottimati and encouraging their investments in business and trade, the government would, as in the past, be able to call upon them for future loans. But by overtaxing them, they would have nothing to lend later on. Unfortunately Florence never recovered from the financial consequences of the early sixteenth-century wars. Even Filippo Strozzi who had profited immensely from his association with the Medici found that his fortune had declined and that his investments abroad were less secure than they had been before 1530. Men who, like Francesco Guicciardini and Francesco Vettori, had no surplus to fall back on cemented themselves more firmly than before to the new Medici regime and became totally dependent on Clement VII for money and favors in return for their political allegiance. The increased concentration of power in Florence during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries gave the Medici greater opportunity to help their friends and eliminate their rivals. As far back as 1434, Palla Strozzi, who had been the wealthiest and one of the most respected citizens in Florence, died a pauper in exile because of his opposition to Cosimo. Leaders of later attempts to supplant the Medici, like the Soderini, also suffered economic and political reprisals. After the Medici returned to Florence in 1512, Piero Soderini's possessions were confiscated and sold. To ensure that no one missed the significance of the moment, the proceeds from the sale went to purchase silverware for the table of the Medicean Signoria.31 If in the aftermath there was no example quite so dramatic as the fall of Palla Strozzi, the explanation can be found in the unwillingness of ottimati families who were potential rivals of the Medici to challenge the regime. Simply put, the alternatives available to a failed opponent had decidedly diminished. Whereas, for example, in the latter fifteenth century, Francesco Pazzi, who hated the Medici and later fomented the Pazzi Conspiracy against them, could choose to live in voluntary exile in Rome and prosper as a banker under the protection of his ally Pope Sixtus IV, after the election of Leo X in 1513, Rome with its important market for Florentine capital was controlled by the Medici and ceased to offer a safe haven. Furthermore, in the sixteenth century the vast majority of ottimati merchant-bankers who were able to prosper in those difficult times, and particularly those few who amassed sizable fortunes, did so in Medici service. It became increasingly in their own interests to support their patron. 31

Balie, 43, fol. 49.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Public finance was a prime area affected by favoritism from the Medici. Guicciardini and his friends considered the control of the city's fiscal policy the natural right of their class, and indeed long before Cosimo de'Medici laid the foundations for his family's hegemony in the city, wealthy patricians had been investing heavily in loans to the state and profiting from them, especially in times of war. Even during the republican interludes of 1494-1512 and 1527-1530, the well-to-do ottimati were the major creditors of the state since they were the ones with capital to lend. 32 With the consolidation of Medici control in Florence this trend was only reinforced, and public finances came to be almost completely dominated by aristocratic friends of the regime. The Council of Seventy, a creation of il Magnifico, had the power to appoint the officials who looked after the public debt, the Monte. Between 1482 and 1494, men from only twenty-six families all friendly to the regime were appointed to these offices.33 This same exclusiveness persisted as part of government policy after 1512 when Medici allies served repeated terms as Monte officials. Filippo Strozzi served four times, in 1516, 1518, 1519 and 1532. And in 1526, 1531 and 1532, he made loans to the city under the names of other Monte officers.34 Buying stock in the public debt was not considered a bad investment. In 1518 when the price of bills of exchange to Lyons was slightly depressed because of an oversupply of money in Florence, Filippo Strozzi thought it prudent to put his capital in the Monte.*5 But by far the biggest profit for wealthy investors came from special short-term loans. When the normal tax revenues of the city were insufficient to cover its ordinary financial expenditures, which happened continually in our period, the government sought money directly from its citizens, either in the form of loans from the officials of the Monte, or from extraordinary taxes imposed on a small number of citizens. These taxes, called accatti, were in fact high-interest, short-term loans paying 12 percent or better. They were secured through the future ordinary tax revenues of the city and were considered safe as 32

33

Marvin Becker, 'Problemi della finanza pubblica fiorentina della seconda meta del Trecento e dei primi del Quattrocento,' A.S.I., vol. 123 (1965), 437-453; Gene A. Brucker, ' U n documento fiorentino sulla guerra sulla finanza e sulPamministrazione pubblica,' A.S.I., vol. 115 (1957), 168; Anthony Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge, Mass., W 1 ) * PP- 153-190; L. F. Marks, 'The Financial Oligarchy in Florence under Lorenzo,' Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, i960), pp. 123-147; also his 'La crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,' A.S.I., vol. 112 (1954), 40-72; Antonio Anzilotti, La crisi constituzionale della Repubblica Fiorentina (Rome, 1969), pp. 18-19. Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, pp. 199-203; Marks, ' T h e Financial Oligarchy,' pp. 123-127, 140-141.

34

35

The lists of Monte officials for our period are in Tratte, 84 and in the surviving books of the Entrate e Uscite del Provveditore del Monte, Monte Comune, 2292, 2293, 2287, 2099, 2132, and 2036. I am very grateful to Professor Molho who allowed me to use his personal inventory of the Monte archive which made it possible to consult these documents. In 1527 Strozzi provided money for Giovanbaptista di Marcho Bracci, and in 1531, he loaned under the names of Palla Rucellai, Filippo di Niccolo Valori and Lapo della Tovaglia, Monte Comune, 2132, fol. 181 sin.; 2036, fols. 182-184. C.S., Ser. in, n o , fol. 89V. 20

Filippo StrozzVs Florence well as lucrative because they received high priority in repayment and because the creditors themselves were usually given control of the collection of the revenues from the sources assigned them. 36 Such financial tactics helped the rich get richer and benefited friends of the regime, but the city paid a stiff price in return. The size of the public debt increased, and the regular interest payments to small investors in the Monte had to be deferred in favor of payment to the high-priority creditors. In addition, the normal tax revenues of the government were committed for years in the future to pay off these loans. The papal court at Rome provided an even more fruitful field of economic patronage for Florentine ottimati than did investments in the city's public debt. From the time of the Avignonese period Florentines had traditionally provided financial services to popes. But never had they had their own pope. Thus in 1513, to judge from the excitement and expectations of profit voiced by her citizens, the election of Giovanni de'Medici as Leo X was seen as one of the most propitious events in Florence's whole history. The Medici popes, like so many of their predecessors, grouped their countrymen around them at court and patronized their friends. Papal nephews became cardinals with handsome provisions, and Francesco Guicciardini and others made their entire careers in papal administration. Others could count on a yearly pension. Florentine bankers and businessmen in Rome came in for a sizable share of papal business under both Leo X and Clement VII. Given the state of the Italian and Florentine economies during this period, the election of the first Florentine pope had particular significance for Florence. Coming as it did at the beginning of the sixteenth century when Florentine industry and finance were struggling to recover from the long depression at the end of the previous century, the election created a wider market for textiles, mainly luxury cloths, and provided a stimulus to Florentine banking. According to the Venetian ambassador, in the 1520s Florentine banks in Rome generated 8,000 ducats per week in profits.37 Although some doubt remains about the actual number of Florentine 36

37

I n N o v e m b e r 1512, t h e g o v e r n m e n t needed money to pay 40,000 florins to Maximilian I for Florence's contribution to t h e league with t h e E m p i r e . 25,000 florins were to be paid immediately, so t h e Balia imposed an accatto of that a m o u n t which paid 14 percent interest to its contributors. Since t h e income from the salt office was already pledged to pay back other forced loans, the r e i m b u r s e m e n t of the contributors to this accatto was not to begin until t h e following S e p t e m b e r . T h e y were empowered to select their own administrator of the salt tax, and should t h e salt incomes prove insufficient, the administrator of customs tolls would pay t h e m t h e difference, Balie, 4 3 , fols. 57V-58. N o t all accatti were interest-bearing. Accatti a perdere or balzelli, used frequently in the Last Republic, were direct taxes for which contributors were not r e i m b u r s e d a n d from which they received no interest. Balzelli were u n p o p u l a r with the u p p e r classes w h o naturally enough preferred to loan to the state at interest. T h e Venetian ambassadors Foscari and Suriano discussed the city's budget and sources of income in this period, Segarizzi, i n , 2 9 - 3 4 , 106-112. Ibid., p . 112. Similarly, Suriano reported that Florentine business in Naples produced 3,000 ducats weekly in profits. 21

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici banks in Rome and whether it increased significantly after Leo's election,38 evidence abounds of their participation in papal finances, making loans and administering various papal incomes and tax revenues in Rome and in the Church States. For chosen Florentines, such as Filippo Strozzi, who had the money to invest with the Apostolic Chamber, opportunities for profit in Rome far surpassed any money-making possibilities at home. The papal court provided a solution to the major problem that beset the Renaissance banker: how to reinvest large quantities of movable capital in an economy where profits tended to stabilize at modest levels. In addition to the return on loans to the pope and the income from administrative offices or from individual contracts for provisions, the income from specially created colleges of venal offices and the papal Monte della Fede attracted investment money. The papal bankers provided indispensable credit operations for the Medici popes, who were constantly in need of extra money to finance their dynastic ambitions, wars, and elaborate building projects. The symbiotic relationship that existed between those Renaissance popes and their creditors produced a special breed of banker. Just as in their other appointments, the Medici chose their bankers from among their relatives and political allies, and in papal finance, just as in Florentine public finances, they advanced their friends. Since the credit operations in which these bankers engaged required heavy outlays of money, only wealthy ottimati merchant-bankers could really profit from their association with the Medici popes. It is not surprising then to discover that the biggest Florentine financiers in Rome came from distinguished patrician families like the Altoviti, Bardi, Bini, Gaddi, Pitti, Pucci, Rucellai, Salviati, Strozzi, and Tornabuoni. On the other side of the coin, we can also expect to find these same families among the most loyal supporters of the Medici. Looked at from the standpoint of Florence, the economic opportunities provided by papal patronage tended to promote the polarization of wealth in the city, because patronage primarily benefited those aristocrats, mainly bankers, who were already wealthy and who had found favor with the Medici. From the standpoint of the Medici, the election of Leo X helped ensure the ottimatfs support for the regime in Florence. Until the financial connection between Florence and Rome was severely threatened, no leading aristocrat attempted to challenge Medici rule. While the presence of the Medici popes in Rome in the early sixteenth century had two beneficial effects for Florence, namely, to reinforce the financial connections between the two cities and to prolong the life of her credit industry, it entailed certain dangers as well. Under Leo X Florentine bankers over-committed their assets in loans to support papal military 38

Melissa M. Bullard, * Mercatores Florentini Romanam Curiam Sequentes in the Early Sixteenth Century,' 'Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vi (1976), 51-71. 22

Filippo Strozzi's Florence diplomacy. They built up huge credits with the pope which made them increasingly dependent upon his good faith to honor his debts. In 1521 when Leo died unexpectedly, his Florentine bankers found themselves left holding unsecured loans worth thousands of ducats which the Flemish pope, Adrian VI, was none too anxious to honor. Fortunately in 1523, another Medici was elected pope as Clement VII, and he made good many of his cousin's debts. But in return he entangled the Florentine bankers ever more deeply in papal monetary deals. When the army of the Connetable de Bourbon sacked Rome in 1527 and held the pope in virtual captivity, Florentines had little to fall back on and suffered disastrous losses in merchandise, personal possessions, and credits. The Sack crippled those ottimati friends of the Medici who had grown accustomed to, and depended upon, the papacy for their livelihood. In addition, the Sack brought about a severe economic dislocation in all of Rome and the Papal States. All forms of business practically ground to a halt. Despite his willingness, Clement found it impossible to cover his debts in the normal fashion by consigning tax revenues and ecclesiastical incomes to his creditors because they were reduced to a trickle, and he had no collateral with which to launch a new cycle of loans. Even the largest and best capitalized banks suffered from the Sack and its aftermath, and they were able to rebuild their businesses only gradually, if at all. To make matters worse, at this time the close Florence—Rome connection was broken. The new republican government in Florence which was strongly anti-Medici was allied with France against the pope and the Empire. It forbade its citizens to go to Rome and punished ottimati who were suspected of Medici leanings. The death of Clement VII in 1534 dealt a decisive blow to the already weakened Florentine business interests in Rome. At one stroke the special favors they had received from the two Medici popes disappeared. Under Paul III, Genoese bankers began to take over the prize patronage assignments from the Florentines, and though Florentine banking interests remained strongly in evidence in Rome and Florentine banks continued to provide credit to the new pope, the much smaller scale of their activities signified the end of an era of Florentine domination of papal finances. Up to this point we have seen that the general economic picture in Florence by the 1530s was not encouraging and that the financial position of the ottimati had considerably weakened. Opportunities for investment in industry and finance were shrinking because of competition from the North for the textile business and because of the general disturbance of trade resulting from the Italian wars between France and the Empire. Finally, the development of Medici hegemony in Florence helped, over the long run, to bring about the economic decline of the aristocracy. Attractive profits could be made from investments in public finance in Florence and 23

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici in Rome at the papal court, but these opportunities were reserved for a small group of friends who came to rely heavily upon them. That the majority of the ottimati stood only to suffer became all too clear by the 1530s. Medici domination plunged Florence into the struggles between France and the Empire, and through Medici papal politics the city was forced to meet financial demands on an international scale. Florentines were taxed unmercifully to support the Medici until 1527, and then, during the Last Republic, they were taxed again to defend their city against her former masters. The Sack of Rome and the death of Clement only exacerbated the setbacks of those who had come to depend on papal patronage. Florentine business in Rome which had expanded widely under the Medici popes was forced to contract at precisely the time when Florence badly needed new markets to revitalize her economy. POLITICS AND THE MEDICI REGIME The progressive weakening of the ottimati and their growing economic dependence on the Medici ran parallel to another development in Medicean Florence important for our understanding of the period, namely, the political submission of the aristocracy to the ruling family. Both types of subordination, economic and political, began in the fifteenth century in the form of cooperation inspired by mutual interests. The outlines of the political and constitutional changes which occurred in Florentine government under the Medici in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries are well-known through contemporary histories which emphasized political events, and through modern studies of institutional history and political theory.39 They will be treated here only in so far as they contribute to understanding the development of the Medici hegemony in Florence and the political structure that Filippo Strozzi supported and through which he operated. Florence was one of the last medieval Italian republics to develop into a Signoria, or despotism. In the fifteenth century the Medici had established themselves as primi inter pares while maintaining, at least in outward form, Florence's republican institutions. Not until the sixteenth century did they create a dukedom in the city and cast aside the traditional republican councils. Only twice during the nearly one-hundred-year period from 1434 to 1532 were there governments in Florence not dominated by the Medici, the Republic of 1494-1512 and the brief Republic of 1527-1530, and after each such attempt at non-Medici government, the family returned to power 39

The major contemporary historians of our period are Cambi, Cerretani, Gianotti, Guicciardini, Machiavelli, Nardi, Nerli, Parenti, Pitti, Segni, Varchi and Vettori. Albertini, Gilbert, Devonshire Jones, Roth and Rubinstein have produced the most important modern studies.

24

Filippo StrozzVs Florence more forcefully than ever before. While the path towards a principate was not always clearly marked, it was continuous. The Medici system of government in the fifteenth century was informal and not strictly constitutional. It consisted of a delicate coalk'on of amici, or friends, mostly from among the ottimati who constituted majorities in the various offices and councils of the city. As Professor Rubinstein has shown, the actual process of filling offices was carefully influenced by the Medici through a body of election officials called the accoppiatori. These men determined which names from among those eligible for office would go into the election bags for the extraction of new officials. By this method it was possible to elect amici to the top councils of the state or to reward other individuals whose friendship the Medici desired. Under the Medici, ottimati interests were well represented in the government, especially after 1480 when, in the wake of the nearly successful Pazzi Conspiracy, Lorenzo il Magnifico instituted a powerful new governmental body, the Council of Seventy, which became essentially a patrician senate with permanent tenure. The Settanta together with the already existing Council of One Hundred supplanted the traditional Councils of the People and of the Commune in the vital areas of finance and legislation. The list of members of these two Medicean councils reads like a Florentine social register. On it were represented the best Florentine families who were considered among the closer friends of the Medici, the uomini sicuri, men on whom they could count. 40 Though they did not always agree with Lorenzo and were at times capable of strong opposition, the ottimati who participated in the government were generally content as long as they received the offices and favors they desired. After his death in 1492, the coalition which Lorenzo il Magnifico had forged with the leading aristocratic families of Florence broke apart, and in 1494 the very ottimati who had been his close advisers turned against his son Piero, casting him into exile in November of that year. The forty-year period from the exile of Piero until the establishment of the principate represented a time of crisis for the Florentine aristocracy. In the course of the several revolutions that followed 1494, the role the aristocrats played in each new government depended on the nature of the regime, whether republican or Medicean. They found their position of political eminence threatened on the one side by advocates of a republic such as Savonarola and his followers, and on the other by the Medici and their supporters whose commitment to a Signoria grew stronger with the passage of time. Though most ottimati favored an oligarchy in which their class would benefit and play the dominant role, they could by no means agree among themselves on the exact form an ideal government should take. In the 40

Rubinstein, The Government of Florence, pp. 30-52, 116, 199—205, 309-310, 316-317.

25

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici constitutional crisis of 1494 divisions in their ranks became apparent.41 Some ottimati advocated a broadly-based structure, a governo largo, with a large legislative body headed by a smaller aristocratic senate. Others favored a governo stretto, an oligarchy of a very few families who would rule through small legislative councils. In the ensuing discussions on the reform of the constitution, at first the idea of a stretto government seemed to carry the day. In effect this would have left political power in the same hands as before the exile of Piero. The proposal, however, met opposition from other aristocrats discontented that they had been excluded from power in the past and determined that this should not happen in the future. These men joined with a growing number of citizens, the popolani, who desired a significant democratization of the government and who agitated for the institution of a single Great Council, an idea championed by Savonarola. The Great Council was to be composed of all citizens eligible for political office. It would assume legislative and financial jurisdiction formerly enjoyed by the smaller councils of the One Hundred and the Seventy under the Medici. Agitation for the Great Council became so intense that it was inaugurated in December 1494, less than a month after the exile of Piero. With the loosening of requirements for membership and the inclusion of a number of new members never before favored with office, the Great Council allowed more citizens to participate in the main legislative body than had been permitted even prior to 1434. But the government of Florence did not lose its aristocratic character, for ottimati families were amply represented in the Council. Since the requirements for membership were based on a man's eligibility for office in the past, those same patrician families with a long tradition of government service and those who had participated in the previous regime continued to be included. They made their presence in the Council known in any case by virtue of their education, experience and reputation, all of which gave them a decided advantage over other less well-known citizens in elections to the Signoria and to the other offices filled by vote.42 Aside from a natural inclination to protect their predominance and financial stake in the government which set them apart from the popolani in the Council, the ottimati were divided among themselves by conflicting separate interests and had no political program of their own. Despite their 4T

42

The best discussion of the political and constitutional developments following the revolution of 1494 is by Rubinstein, * I primi anni del Consiglio Maggiore di Firenze (1494-1499),' A.S.I., cxn (1954), 151-194. See also his 'Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century,' Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, i960), pp. 148-183. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini, pp. 49-51. Lauro Martines in The Social World of the

Florentine Humanists (Princeton, 1963), pp. 18-84 also discusses the criteria for status in Florentine society.

26

Filippo StrozzVs Florence numbers and their domination of the highest offices, no sense of political solidarity bound them together into a powerful block. The variety of political factions which grew up in the Great Council around the figure of Savonarola not only testifies to the friar's impact on Florentine society, but illustrates as well the wide divergences in the views of the ottimati in each faction. These bitter divisions among the citizens which grew out of the 1494 experiment profoundly impressed political writers of the day such as Guicciardini and Machiavelli, both of whom blamed the city's troubles on factionalism, which the latter in particular saw as characterizing the whole Florentine experience.43 The broader forum offered by the Great Council fostered this factionalism and promoted the formation of special interest groups. Sensitive issues such as city finance, the new decima scalata, or graduated tax, and the conduct of the War of Pisa widened the gap between ottimati and popolani which made it increasingly difficult to govern the city. The persistent economic crises which thrust these issues before the Council prompted a constitutional crisis which came to a head in 1502 and was only resolved with the reform of the government and the institution of a gonfaloniere-for-lik. Reform came at a time when there was general agreement as to the need for a stronger executive power to lend stability to the Great Council. But the ottimati continued to be split, and the divergent alignments ranged from those who preferred the abolition of the Council to those who supported it. They joined together in the creation of the new executive in much the same way as they had summoned support from various groups for the expulsion of Piero de'Medici in 1494. The acceptance of the gonfalonierea-vita was in itself a move away from the previous constitution. It represented a victory for the aristocrats who were content when one from their own ranks, Piero Soderini, was elected to fill the position. But the aristocrats did not remain satisfied for long with this new arrangement either, for Soderini proved ungrateful to the very ottimati who had engineered the reform which created his office. Instead, he turned to the popolani for support for his policies, with the result that once again an increasing number of oligarchs feared that their voice was not being heeded by the government. Opposition to Soderini grew. At first there was no thought of bringing the Medici back to Florence because Piero de'Medici was universally hated for his various attempts to reinstate himself by armed force. But after Piero's death in 1503, when leadership in the family fell to his brothers Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano, both of whom were 43

Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine dal 1378 al 150Q, ed. R. Palmarocchi (Bari, 1931), p. 242 and the Dialogo, pp. 29, 32, 107; Niccolb Machiavelli, Istoriefiorentine(in, 1) ed. F. Gaeta (Milan, 1968), p. 169; idem, II Principe e Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, (1, 4, 8), ed. S. Bertelli (Milan,

1961), pp. 105, 119. See also Rubinstein, 'Machiavelli and the World of Florentine Politics,' Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), p. 26.

27

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici appreciated for their civil rather than seignorial bearing, the prospect of a Medici return became less unattractive.44 A series of political marriages during this period, notably Filippo Strozzi's to Clarice de'Medici, which was in direct defiance of the gonfaloniere\ will, pointed to the strength of the opposition to Soderini's rule. The growing enmity to the regime which led finally to the revolution of 1512, the exile of Soderini, and the reintroduction of the Medici materialized as in the past as a coalition of mixed interests that came together conveniently on one issue. There were those who hated Soderini more than the Medici, others who loved the Medici more than they hated him, and finally those who favored a change of government simply in order to remove the gonfaloniere-a-vita with the help of the Medici if they would agree to come back to Florence as private citizens. 45 For the next twenty years after 1512, with the exception of one brief interval in 1527-1530, the Medici controlled Florence, ever intent on strengthening their dominion. During this period the ottimati played an ambivalent role in Florentine politics. The rough distinction between adherents of either a largo or stretto political philosophy remained as before, but it was not always possible to identify political groupings solely on that basis. If anything, the highly independent character of these aristocrats predominated. Jacopo Salviati and Lanfredino Lanfredini were among the opponents of Soderini and loyal Medici partisans. The first in fact was a brother-in-law of Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano. Yet they were at the same time among the most adamant advocates of a governo largo and opposed many of the measures taken by Lorenzo di Piero to whom the city was entrusted in 1513. 46 Others, however, who had served willingly in the republican government before 1512 came to be included within the circle of the closest Medici friends. Filippo Strozzi, like Salviati a parente of the Medici who had personally benefited from their favor, unlike Salviati preferred a restricted government. However, he encouraged the anti-Medici revolution of 1527, whereas Salviati opposed it. Strong personal reasons overcame political ideology and motivated each man's actions in that turbulent event. The Medici, too, although committed after 1512 to maintaining their position in Florence, were still uncertain how to tame their unruly subjects. 44

45

46

Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, p. 323; Filippo de'Nerli, Commentari de* fatti civili occorsi dentro la citta di Firenze da IP anno 1512 al 1537 (Trieste, 1859), 1, 158-162, 168-172; Devonshire Jones, pp. 55-59Guicciardini, Istoria d* Italia (Milan, 1803), vi, 26-27; Cerretani, Dialogo della Mutatione, B.N.F. Ms. Magliab. 11, 1, 106, fol. 149. Ibid.y fol. 150; Nerli, 1, 159; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p. 137; Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 123, 245-247, 272, 327, 330. Salviati had originally favored the institution of the gonfaloniere-a-vita and the election of Soderini, ibid., pp. 246, 251.

28

Filippo StrozzVs Florence Throughout this period they were careful to solicit opinions from among the ottimati regarding the best way to run the government. The number of treatises on the constitution commissioned by Leo X and Clement VII attests to their concern.47 The old issues and political questions that grew out of the events of 1494 were thus kept alive, even if the Medici did not always heed the recommendations given. Though the constitution remained practically the same as it had been in the fifteenth century, their grip on Florence after 1512 tightened. The political, social, and economic scene in Florence and Italy had essentially changed after 1512, making it impossible to revert to the Florence of before 1494 when Lorenzo il Magnifico had been her first citizen. Three factors helped shape the course of the Republic towards the principate: the loss of diplomatic independence caused by the presence of French and Imperial armies in Italy; the election of the two Medici popes; and the subtle political changes within the Medici government itself. Charles VIII's descent into Italy in 1494 to pursue his claim to Milan and Naples marked the beginning of a new political and diplomatic era for the Italian city republics and Signorie. The age of balance-of-power politics among the various Italian states ended with the first footsteps of Charles and his army on Italian soil. The French and Spanish armies repeatedly invaded Italy to contest the eternally disputed dynastic claims of the Habsburg and Valois families. Florence, like the other Italian powers, found that in the altered military and diplomatic situation she had lost freedom to determine an independent foreign policy. It became necessary to maintain an alliance with one or the other superpower which in turn entailed spending large sums of money to meet treaty obligations. The presence of foreign armies in Italy also affected the city's internal politics. In 1494 a by-product of the French invasion of Italy had been the exile of Piero de'Medici and the institution of the new Republic whose spiritual leader, Savonarola, sang the praises of the French king as the savior of the city. But Florence's alliance with the French brought nothing but trouble in the years that followed. By yielding to French pressure to allow the abortive Council of Pisa to meet in Florentine territory, the city so irritated the irascible Julius II that he thereafter supported the Medici's bid to return to Florence. In 1512 Cardinal Medici arrived at the gates of the city at the head of the army of the pope's ally, Maximilian I. Once the Medici were re-established, in a certain sense, their rule was bulwarked by their alliances with first one, then the other of the big powers. Opponents of the Medici made various attempts during this period to unseat them, but since they 47

Albertini's book provides the context and an analysis of these reform proposals, also Gino Capponi, (ed.), 'Discorsi intorno aliariformadello stato di Firenze (1522-32)/ A.S.I., Ser. 1, vol. 1 (1842), 413-477.

29

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici had to negotiate their own outside alliances to secure a counterpoise to the Medici's foreign allies, they were hindered in their efforts to revolt. This was true in 1515 and 1537 when Medici opponents sought French aid to liberate the city, and in 1527 when they appealed to the Imperial army at the time of the Sack of Rome. After each attempt at revolution, the Medici used their allies to regain mastery of the city. In 1529-1530, Clement VII went further than had his cousin in 1512 and actually allowed the Imperialists to lay siege to Florence to reduce her to submission and to reintroduce his family as rulers. The one new event after 1512 which more than any other changed the course of Florentine history in the early sixteenth century was the election of the Medici popes, of Cardinal Giovanni de'Medici as Leo X in 1513 and of his cousin Giulio as Clement VII in 1523. The capture of the papacy by the Medici for a period which extended over twenty years, even more than the intrusion of the Northern European powers into Italian affairs, cost Florence her political independence and represented a clear step toward the principate. For under both Medici popes, Florence became not only the keystone of their family's position to be preserved at any cost, but also an instrument of papal policy. As the popes' permanent ally, Florence was dragged into papal alliances with France or the Empire and forced to foot the bill. The Medici also drew Florence into papal wars which were not strictly in her own interest. In 1515 she had to send troops into Lombardy against her traditional ally, France; in 1516-1517 she paid for much of the papal war of aggrandizement against Urbino; and again in the 1520s she committed money and troops to fight first the French and then the Imperialists before the Sack of Rome. The papacy determined not only the city's foreign policy during these years, but her internal politics as well. When Cardinal Giovanni went to Rome as pope in 1513, he continued to maintain a tight rein on Florentine affairs. He installed his brother Giuliano and then his nephew Lorenzo as actual, though not constitutional, heads of government, and he decided much of the city's policy at the papal court.48 The Medicean papacy had a more subtle impact upon Florence as well. More than anything else Leo's election buttressed the regime by winning the allegiance of those citizens who hoped to benefit from their alliance with what was now the papal party. For the Florentines themselves, and especially for those upper-class citizens who expected to be favored, the election of Leo meant a sudden expansion of patronage opportunities. The more honorific and lucrative positions were to be found with the papacy, and consequently Florentine ottimati as well as members of the Medici family turned their aspirations towards Rome. Giuliano, Leo's brother, was 48

C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fols. I2v, 24V; Piero Parenti, Istorie fiorentine, B.N.F. 11, iv, 171, fols. 87-88V.

30

Filippo StrozzVs Florence not content to remain in Florence after the election and moved to Rome at the first opportunity in the summer of 1513, leaving his nephew Lorenzo in charge of the city. But even Lorenzo recognized where real power lay and made repeated, extended visits to the papal court to be near his uncle.49 Those Florentines who were relatives of the pope or his close political allies, such as Jacopo Salviati and Filippo Strozzi, received papal patronage, and others, such as Giovanni Salviati, Luigi de'Rossi, and Niccolo Ridolfi, nephews of the pope, sought careers within the church. For those ottimati who had banking interests in Rome the special favor granted them by the Medici popes provided unprecedented opportunities for profit in papal service. However, from the standpoint of those who felt it more necessary to consolidate control in Florence, papal patronage entailed two drawbacks. On the one hand, it drained from the city some of the ablest and most loyal supporters of the regime at the very time when the Medici could well have used their talents in stabilizing the government which was not even a year old at Leo's elevation. On the other hand, by increasing everyone's expectations of favor when in fact only relatively few stood to benefit, it gave occasion for much grumbling and discontent from those individuals who were not gratified. These discontented citizens were often people whose support the Medici would have been wise to have cultivated. Clearly, once the Medici became popes, Florence became a tool of papal policy rather than the sole object of their attention as she had been under the Medici governments in the fifteenth century. Leo now expanded his dynastic ambitions for his brother and nephew and used Florence as a pawn in the various bargaining schemes he offered to the ruling houses of Europe. He manipulated Florence as part of his plans to combine territory to form a principality for Lorenzo.50 Both Medici popes treated the city's revenue as a financial reserve on which to draw when they needed extra money to fight a war or support their family. The existence of a Medici pope hastened the development of absolutism in Florence as well. Since Leo considered her his family's personal territorial possession and the basis of his own political power and wealth, it was doubly important to him that the government there should be under control. This consideration underlay much of the Medici popes' policy towards Florence in our period. Once Leo X was elected, his papacy had a steadying effect on the government in Florence and helped alleviate two critical problems that the Medici had found confronting them on their return in 1512: how to consolidate their victory in the city, and how to reward the friends who 49

50

Francesco Vettori, ' S o m m a r i o della storia d'Italia dal 1511 al 1527,' ed. A. von R e u m o n t , A.S.I., Ser. 1, A p p . vol. 6 (1848), 300. Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino e Jacopo V d'Appiano,' A.S.I., Ser. iv, vol. 8 (1881), 222-238; Adolfo Verdi, Gli ultimt anni di Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino (Este, 1905), pp. 28, 90-101.

31

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici had helped them return. The emergency government which had been set up upon Soderini's exile had to be discarded. It offered the Medici no special status in the city or guarantee of safety. The close friends of the Medici among the ottimati feared that the Medici's as well as their own position in the government was not sufficiently assured. They encouraged the Cardinal and Giuliano to take steps to strengthen their hold on Florence, or, as one close observer said, to remove the government from the people and put it in the hands of the patricians.51 They counseled altering the government in the usual way, by calling a parlamento and creating a Balla with extraordinary powers to restore the pre-1494 constitution, and this was duly accomplished. The Medici supporters first abolished the Great Council and re-established in its place the old Medici Councils of Seventy and One Hundred together with a gonfaloniere with a two-month term. Although the institution of the Balla permitted a tighter hold on the government, it created two conflicting problems which plagued the Medici in the first years of the restoration. Their first problem, that of forming a party of trusted allies and of winning new friends for the regime, was complicated by two stumbling blocks. Before the Medici could distribute favors and offices to citizens they hoped to win over, they had first to satisfy relatives and old friends who were clamoring for attention. The Medici had a long list of political debts which dated back to before 1494. To that list were now added the names of those who had risked themselves in the recent revolution against Soderini. The second stumbling block was the resistance from one side of the ottimati to any notion of enlarging the government. These aristocrats, men like Paolo Vettori, preferred to see political power concentrated in the hands of a very few advisers such as themselves. 52 The second problem was to handle those discontented citizens who, after eighteen years of the Great Council, had become accustomed to participating in the government of the city, but who now found themselves excluded from the Balla. If the Medici yielded too much to the desires of these men and expanded the governing circle too far, they faced the danger of losing control of the state from within. In this way the security of the Medici regime was threatened by pressures from two opposite directions. At first, some concessions were made to those who had been initially excluded from the government. On 21 September a body of fifty citizens was appointed to conduct a new scrutiny of all offices, and a month later because of continuing complaints, its number was enlarged by two hundred. The reason given in the records of the Balla was plainly enough stated, '. .. with the desire, as is fitting, to benefit and honor a greater 51

52

Parenti, fol. 81; also Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-152; Vettori, Sommario, p. 293; Nerli, 1, 179, i83. Paolo Vettori wrote a treatise for Cardinal Medici on how to govern the city published in Albertini, App. 1, p. 358.

Filippo StrozzVs Florence number of citizens and especially those who by reputation are welldeserving.'53 In actuality, however, the underlying trend in the new government was toward a more restricted rule. Made anxious by the persistent opposition to the regime and an abortive conspiracy, the Medici preferred to govern through the Balia. They increased its membership by eleven friends to be completely sure of its loyalty and ordered arms removed from those citizens they did not trust. The promised scrutiny was a long time in execution, and the reopening of the Council of Seventy and One Hundred was put off for over a year until November 1513. In the meantime the Balia took almost total charge of the government, and it filled the magistracies and regulated finance. A decree extended its life for another year on 25 August 1513, 'to insure more control and stability.' It was renewed again for another three years and thereafter in five-year increments, and all the while continued to function alongside the other councils of state. 54 The prolonged existence of this body with extraordinary legislative powers, unprecedented in Florentine history, did much to undermine faith in Florence's republican institutions and their effectiveness. Government by Balia showed how the Medici intended to use a small group of friends to run the state after 1512, a scheme which served to reinforce the already aristocratic character of the regime. We have previously noted that the success of the Medici system in the fifteenth century depended in large measure on the cooperation of a group of mainly ottimati friends whom they used to fill the highest offices and run the government. After 1512 with their overriding concern being the need to safeguard the regime against the opposition and discontent of those who preferred the Great Council, the Medici opted for an even more restrictive government which concentrated power into their own hands and in the Balia. As a result, the position of 'amico* became more selective, and those who entered into the inner circles of Medici councils shared a like-minded devotion to the Medici cause. During this period the Medici compiled lists of citizens carefully grouped into various categories that reflected the gradations of political reliability. Typical designations were 'principal citizens,' 'faithful citizens of popular origin,' 'friends among the well-born,' 'reliable youth yet to be tested with office,' 'secure citizens suited for office,' and 'citizens who should be rewarded.' They designated undesirables 'enemies,' 'doubtfuls,' or 'last of all.' 55 From these lists they selected office holders, sometimes as rewards to old friends, or when 53

54 55

Balie, 43, fol. 25; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 154V. T h e Balia was enlarged on 19 September. A list of members is in Balie, 43, fol. 5v. See also fols. 149-150; C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fol. 19V. Balie, 43, fols. 134, 156V, 171. Piero Parenti, fol. 130, mentioned one such list that was left with Goro Gheri who controlled the city in Lorenzo's absence in 1516. Devonshire Jones discussed a similar listing, pp. 71-72. I am grateful to Dr Humfrey Butters for calling my attention to yet another list ofamici in B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti 988 from which I have taken these various categories of friends.

33

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici possible, to new ones. Naturally the number of petitioners always exceeded the number of posts, and the Medici correspondence for this period contains dozens of requests for offices from friends and friends of friends who wanted a sign of favor.56 In addition, the Medici had to balance the composition of the Signoria artfully. For example, in 1516, if they made Leonardo Bartolini, a devoted confidant, gonfaloniere, it would then be safe for them to have as priors Andrea Niccolini and Antonio Pazzi who were not molto sicuri (not terribly secure). But if they designated another man gonfaloniere whose loyalty was less certain, they would then have to choose different priors.57 Even among the amici there was a differentiation. An inner circle of select intimates such as Filippo Strozzi, Benedetto Buondelmonti and Francesco Vettori was set apart by their special relationship to the Medici. For them there was a difference between just any amico and a close atnico, and they felt that in return for his deeper loyalty the close amico should enjoy special rewards. The words of Filippo in a letter of advice which he wrote to his 'prince,' Lorenzo de'Medici, epitomize the outlook of this small group of aristocrats: In my opinion, Your Magnificence should consider surrounding yourself with men of your choice who are devoted to you. Give benefits to these men because the regime has need of partisans, and partisans are not won except through extraordinary benefits. Ordinary favors make a friend, but in order to make him willing to sacrifice his life and his possessions for you, you must give him something Basically their view coincided with the ideology of those who advocated a governo stretto, with the one difference that these men had in addition accepted and encouraged the primacy of the Medici. Although it would be too soon to call them courtiers, they did consider that their own positions and futures lay in service to the Medici, and they bound their destiny inseparably to that of their patrons.' I believe that in all of their [the Medici] benefits we will also participate,' wrote Benedetto Buondelmonti.59 Many of the treatises on the Florentine constitution commissioned from among the ottimati reflect this same current of thought about the rights and privileges of the close amico within the regime. Within the Medici system of government which sought to centralize power and which relied upon a small number of friends, individual Medici attracted their own personal retinues. The members of the immediate 56

57 59

At one point in 1513 L o r e n z o received so m a n y letters of r e c o m m e n d a t i o n from Cardinal M e d i c i and Giuliano that h e begged t h e m t o indicate discreetly which m e n were in t r u t h to be favored, C.S., Ser. 1, 3 , fols. 7V, 8. 58 Devonshire Jones, pp. 305-306. M.A.P., 108, fol. 123, Rome, 12 September 1514. Ibid., fol. 147, to Filippo Strozzi, Rome, 17-18 May 1515.

34

Filippo StrozzVs Florence family - Lorenzo il Magnifico's three daughters and their families, Cardinal Medici, Giuliano, Giulio and Lorenzo di Piero - all had their adherents. The presence of several members of the family in Florence after the restoration made this type of factionalism practically inevitable because of the growing importance of individual attachments and individual channels of patronage. The two groups that formed around Giuliano and his nephew Lorenzo respectively in the winter of 1512 provide a good illustration. The groups were originally founded as companies of men who got together for competitions and festivities, but they soon acquired distinct political overtones that reflected the rivalry existing between the two Medici. Giuliano's company, the Diamante, was composed of several dozen men whose fathers had been associates of his father, Lorenzo il Magnifico, and some people claimed that he wanted to use this group to rule the city. Lorenzo was encouraged to form his own separate company by those who thought that he, as Piero's son, should have first place in the state. His group, the Broncone, which took its name from his father's device, consisted of younger men from the best houses in Florence.60 Giuliano attracted many of those ottimati who preferred a broader power base in Florence. Lorenzo's group of young aristocrats thought that their political future was tied to his person rather than to the public institutions of the city. Once Giuliano had moved to Rome to be near the papal court and Lorenzo had taken over as head of the family in Florence, the influence of Giuliano's followers declined, and the men around Lorenzo such as Gherardo Bartolini, Benedetto Buondelmonti, Bartolomeo Lanfredini and Filippo Strozzi began their ascent. Clearly they owed their rise to their friendship with Lorenzo, and after his death in 1519 their status abruptly declined. The regime took on a new character in the spring of 1515 when Lorenzo had himself elected captain general at a generous stipend of 37,000 florins with the right to command five hundred men. He became captain over the opposition of some members of his family and of those citizens who thought he was trying to make himself signore of Florence.61 According to the terms of the constitution, a Florentine could not hold the military command of the city, but, as a result of the adroit maneuvers of his supporters, and because the Councils of the Eight (Otto di Pratica) and the Seventy were submissive to his will, his election was approved. Contemporary historians detected a notable change in Lorenzo from this period when he became captain general. He adopted princely airs and attracted a train of followers 60

61

Jacopo Nardi, Istorie della citta di Firenze (Florence, 1856), 11, 16-17; Giorgio Vasari, Opere, ed. G. Milanesi (Florence, 1881), vi, 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 158. T h e provisions for this appointment are in Otto, Cond. e Stant., 11, fols. 8-1 iv, and Otto, Delib. 6, fol. 24V. See also A. Giorgetti, ' L o r e n z o de'Medici Capitano Generale della Repubblica,' A.S.I., Ser. iv, vol. n , 199-209. Devonshire Jones, pp. 110-111 follows Giorgetti's interpretation.

35

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici from among young nobles who began to imitate his style of elegant dress. Lorenzo and his adherents clothed themselves in gold brocades and sported beards. He conducted all business, public and private, in the Medici palace, so much so that the Palazzo delta Signoria remained virtually abandoned.62 Beyond the centralization of executive power in the hands of the Medici and the personal character of Lorenzo's regime, yet another extraconstitutional factor radically altered the conduct of public business in Florence. This factor was the new prominence enjoyed by the private secretary or personal agent. Previously, secretaries had achieved their greatest influence through service in the chancellery, men such as Machiavelli during the Republic, and Niccolo Michelozzi under the Medici. But now that public business was being transacted more and more through private channels, the confidential secretary assumed a new role. For example, Lorenzo de'Medici wanted his own personal representative in Rome apart from the regular Florentine ambassador. Since he did not care to rely on other members of the Medici family or papal secretaries for information from the court, he asked Leo X to allow him to send Baldassare Turini da Pescia to Rome as his secretary, 'a man whom I can trust and who will keep me advised of daily occurrences there.' 63 In Florence, Lorenzo's secretary was Goro Gheri. He conducted the Medici correspondence and was privy to matters of policy which could not be trusted to the public officials. Francesco Vettori, the Florentine ambassado o France, kept two sets of correspondence, one to the Otto di Pratica in charge of foreign affairs to which he wrote perfunctorily, and the other to Gheri or Lorenzo to whom he voiced his true opinions. Vettori confided to Gheri that to him he could write without reserve, whereas, when he reported to others, he had to be more cautious.64 During the absence of their Medici employers from Florence these private agents could become almost a government in themselves. Ignoring the gonfaloniere and the many government councils, the Medici commissioned them to oversee their household and all important business, public and private. During 1514 and 1515 in the months when Lorenzo was in Rome, Galeotto de'Medici, a twenty-four-year-old cousin, acted in the capacity of overseer. At that time Lorenzo had him appointed depositor of the Signoria, but that was his only official position in the city government. In 1516 when Lorenzo was away again, his mother Alfonsina Orsini and 62 63

64

Niccolo Guicciardini, who was alarmed at the election, compared Florence under Lorenzo to ancient Rome under Julius Caesar, Discorso in Albertini, p. 370; Piero Parenti, fols. 115-116. M.A.P., 141, fol. 9V, Florence, 14 March 1514. Lorenzo's mother Alfonsina had strongly recommended that Lorenzo keep his own man in Rome, O. Tommasini, La vita egli scritti di Niccolo Machiavelli (Rome, 1911), 11, 1008. C.S., Ser. 1, fol. 9r and cited in Devonshire Jones, p. 122.

36

Filippo StrozzVs Florence then Goro Gheri took charge of the city. 65 Although Gheri basically shared the views of the amici about the Medici system of government in that he considered them necessary for the security of the state and therefore to be placated, tensions mounted between the secretary and the amici which enhanced their distrust of his power and his distrust of them. In his correspondence Gheri often cautioned Lorenzo against those amici, especially parenti (relatives), whose too great ambitions threatened the state. The ottimati in turn grumbled that Lorenzo did not trust his own citizens because he had left everything in the hands of Gheri, an outsider from Pistoia.66 The fact that a foreigner with no government position held power in Florence threatened the delicate balance between the Medici's desire to centralize executive authority and their need to satisfy the amici. The resentment against Gheri pales when compared with the animosity which arose against another outsider, Cardinal Silvio Passerini, who came from the subject town of Cortona as caretaker of the government after Lorenzo died and who returned in 1524 as governor.67 Even the ottimati who had long been faithful allies of the Medici, such as Francesco Guicciardini, could not countenance this obvious disregard of the amici. He criticized Passerini for trying to run the government single-handed and further complained that he ran it badly. 68 General dislike of the cardinal and his mode of government acted as a catalyst which precipitated aristocratic opposition to Medici rule in 1527, inciting them to revolt and make another attempt to govern themselves. So far our discussion of the centralization of power and the increasingly personal nature of the Medici system after 1512 has focused on extraconstitutional elements, such as the use of private ministers, and on the more subtle process of bending the constitution to extend the life of the Balia or to permit the election of Lorenzo as captain general. But the same developments were in progress inside the very structure of the government. Control of elections and office holding had long been an integral part of the Medici system. The practice continued after 1512 along much the same lines, although perhaps more blatantly than before. Lists 65

66 67

68

Piero Parenti, fols. 105, 130. Galeotto served as depositor from December 1514 to June 1515, Otto, Cond. e Stant., 11, fols. 59, 78. Piero Parenti, fol. 130, cited also in Hilde Reinhard, Lorenzo von Medici, Herzog von Urbino (Freiburg, 1935), p. 68, note 169. Anzilotti, pp. 95-97; Piero Parenti, fol. 130, reported that of all the citizens the grandi were the most upset that a man from the subject town of Pistoia should presume to govern them. Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 145,165. Already in October 1521, ottimati were expressing their disdain for Passerini. Sig., Otto, Dieci, Mis. Orig., 10, fol. 124, Niccolo Guicciardini to Luigi Guicciardini, Florence, 8 October 1521. Guicciardini, Opere inedite, ed. G. Canestrini (Florence, 1857-1867), v, 420, 427-428. His derogative term for Cortona was * corpassone^ fatso.

37

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici for the various magistracies were circulated among family and amici for discussion and approval.69 But whereas in the fifteenth century the Medici had been content to control only the most important councils and offices, now they began to fill even the less significant ones. The historian Parenti noted that in 1516 the administrator of the officials in control of meat supplies, the administrator of the Otto, and the Consuls of the Sea whom the people had formerly chosen by lot were now hand-picked by the Medici. Also it seems evident that during this period the total number of citizens who held political offices decreased while the reverse held true for the ottimati. Parenti claimed that some aristocrats held multiple offices, as many as five at once.70 In addition, the Medici filled the most important magistracies again and again from the same group of friends. Between June 1514 and December 1518, only thirty-two citizens filled a possible seventy-two positions on the Otto di Pratica, and some were members of the board four and five times.71 The heavy representation of ottimati in office confirmed that Guicciardini's belief, shared by many others of his class, that the best governments were oligarchies run by a small group of qualified men equal to the task, had been accepted by the Medici as their philosophy for running the government. As the Medici tightened their stranglehold on the government, they gave greater authority to selected offices. Two such offices were the Otto di Pratica and the Depository of the Signoria. The Otto originated in 1376 during Florence's struggle against the papacy when a special short-term board was created with extraordinary wartime powers, the Otto di Guerra (Eight of War) known as the Eight Saints. In 1423 it resurfaced under the name of Died di Liberia e Pace (Ten of Liberty and Peace), known also as the Died di Guerra e Balia (Ten of War). Under Cosimo de'Medici the Died continued to function on a quasi-permanent basis. In 1480 when Lorenzo il Magnifico reformed the constitution and created the Council of Seventy, he also established a new magistracy, the Otto di Pratica, which he placed in charge of foreign policy and military affairs.72 At first the Otto only supplemented the Died di Balia. But after the Otto replaced the Died, it came to be so associated with the Medici system that following the revolutions of 1494 and 1527 it was abolished. In both instances the new Republic re-established in its stead the Died di Liberia e Pace which had 69 70 71 72

C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fol. 24V; M.A.P., 141, fols. 69-70, 73V, 84. Piero Parenti, fols. 113, 123V, 129. Rosemary Devonshire Jones, * Lorenzo de'Medici, Duca d'Urbino " Signore " of Florence ?,' Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), p. 307. O n the evolution of the Otto di Pratica, see Abel Desjardins (ed.), Negociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane (Paris, 1859), I, pp. lvii-lviii and Demetrio Marzi, La cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. Casciano, 1910), p. 775. Molho, Florentine Public Finances, pp.

164-166 discusses the role of the Died in financing war in the early fifteenth century.

38

Filippo Strozzi's Florence the same functions, but was in name less tied to Medici institutions. After the restoration of the Medici in 1512, they suppressed the Died, and they reconstituted the Otto in 1514. 73 When Lorenzo de'Medici took control of Florence in 1513, Leo X drew up a list instructing him how to govern the city. In that set of instructions he identified the Otto, then still the Died, as one of three critical magistracies in the city, the others being the Signoria and the Otto di Guardia (Eight of Ward). The Died di Balla [Otto di Pratica] is terribly important for external affairs and also internal matters regarding the hiring of mercenaries and spending money and making other necessary provisions that are required from day to day. You must fill all three of these magistracies with men as loyal to you as possible.. , 7 4 The report goes on to say: Because the election to the Died [Otto] is of greater consideration and because the office is of greater reputation, it requires a certain sort of individual who is capable and is a person of standing because in that magistracy all the affairs of consequence are deliberated. You can choose someone who is not your confidant if he is capable and has merit, but nonetheless make sure you always have control, that is, at least seven votes so that you can obtain your reasonable desires and block those proposals you do not approve.75 Primarily the Otto had jurisdiction over external affairs, dispatching ambassadors, handling diplomatic correspondence and hiring mercenaries, but, as Leo said in his letter above, it dealt with some internal matters as well. Internal responsibilities ranged from directing the provisioning of the city with grain from abroad to enforcing the order to remove arms from the citizens after the Medici returned to power. In 1515 Lorenzo arranged for his election as captain general with the Otto before he sought pro forma approval from the Council of Seventy. 76 Much of the Otto's prominence, however, derived from the change in Florence's foreign policy after 1513 when the city had to participate in various papal alliances following Leo's election. Since the Otto handled the payments required by treaty obligations, hired mercenary troops and, together with the Signoria, made recommendations for the city's defense needs, it became more and more involved in city finances. In fact, during wartime, the Otto controlled over half the city's budget. Although the Medici decided most questions of foreign policy and simply passed their decisions on to the Otto, it was still the instrument trusted to administer and implement those decisions. One of Guicciardini's complaints against Cardinal Passerini was that he closeted himself with the 73 74 75 76

Otto, Cond. e Stant., n , fol. i. A.S.I., Ser. i, A p p . vol. i (1844), 2 9 9 - 3 0 0 . Ibid., p . 303O t t o , C o n d . e Stant., 11, fol. 8, and Piero Parenti, fol. 115.

39

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 77

Otto all day. Vettori realized that in 1526 as the threat of invasion by the Imperial army increased, the Otto di Pratica bore the whole weight of the government.78 The magnitude of the Otto's responsibilities explains why the Medici showed such circumspection in selecting its members. Since the Otto had broad discretion in financial and military matters, it gave leaders of the regime the power of the purse and control of military forces, freeing them from the necessity of seeking prior authorization for their projects from the communal councils. For example, tucked among the expenses compiled by the Otto for Leo X's state visit in 1515 we find a record that the city also paid 2,500 florins for the silver plate furnished to Cardinal Giulio de'Medici for his mission as papal legate to Lombardy.79 In the war-filled years following 1515, the Otto di Pratica was the agency through which Florentine funds were channeled to support papal military expenses. The two powers shared the costs of hiring condottieri, and Florence gave outright subsidies to the Medici popes. 80 The services of the Otto were essential for the smooth procurement and administration of those monies. The actual procedure for payment was quite simple. The Otto requested funds from the central credit agency of the state, the Monte Comune, which paid them to the Signoria who held the Otto's accounts. Often the Otto overspent its account in which case extra money was deposited.81 Had the Medici been forced to follow the practices which had prevailed until 1458 and seek approval from the communal councils, they would not have found such ready acquiescence. After 1512 the Otto's requests for money or for additional funds to cover overdrafts were never refused as had happened in 1500 during the Republic when the Otto's financial initiative was sharply curtailed.82 The office of the depositor was officially designated the depositor of the Signoria, and as the name implies, was simply a central place to deposit and disburse the Signoria's funds. The exact origins of the Depository are unknown for no separate records for it have survived. Whether it was a part of the Medici government before 1494 is not clear. The only study we have of Lorenzo il Magnifico's fiscal system did not examine the administrative side of public finance and did not address the problem of 77 78 79 80

8!

82

Guicciardini, Opere inedite, v, 427-428. F . Vettori, Sommario, p . 370. Camera del C o m u n e , Depositario dei Signori, 1686, fol. 27V. Examples of assignments of condottieri, cavalry and infantry are in Otto, Cond. e Stant., 11, passim. In the fall of 1521, the city paid over 200,000 florins to L e o X , vol. 12, fol. 116-126V. M a n y more such payments are in vol. 13, passim. Examples of assignments of money to the Otto di Pratica from the Monte are in O t t o , Entrate e Uscite, 2, fol. 1; 3, fol. 1; 7, fol. 1; and in M o n t e C o m u n e , 2292, fols. 104-105. T h e s e monies were loosely designated ' t o be spent where and how the Signoria and Otto shall determine.' At that time still the Died. See Marks, ' L a crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,' A.S.I., vol. 112 (1954), p. 44.

40

Filippo StrozzVs Florence 83

actual payments. Quite conceivably the Depository had its origins during the Republic of 1494 when, at the time of the war against Pisa, the Great Council attempted to rein in the fiscal initiative of the Died (the Otto) in financing the war. In April 1496, the Great Council provided for the election of a treasurer to keep accounts for the Died, and in 1500, when they reconstituted the Died after a year's suspension, they made its payments dependent on the prior approval of the Signori, Collegi and the Otto di Guardia e Balia.*4 The idea in each case was to establish the principle that the financial activity of the Died should be subject to the Signoria. After 1512 the depositor of the Signoria had a dual function. He acted as depositor for both the Signoria and the Otto di Pratica. A few scattered account books of a depositor of the Signori from the period after Soderini's election as gonfaloniere-a-vita record payments similar to those made later by the depositor under the Medici, and they include the stipends of condottieri. One book dated just prior to the revolution of 1512 was kept by a Gientile di Francesco Cortigiani who identified himself as ' one of the signori and depositor of the other signori?*5 Nardi in his Istoria confirms that at this time the office was held for a two-month term by one of the current signori.*b Prior to the restoration of the Medici, some aristocrats tried to free the depositor from the Signoria, but they were unsuccessful. However, once the Medici regained control, they made the Depository a separate office and appointed the depositor for a minimum of six months. Several men held the office much longer. Giovanni Tornabuoni is listed in the city records as depositor for seven years from 1520-1527 and was removed only by the revolution in that year.87 In his capacity as the central payment agent of the state, the depositor formed the link between the Monte and the Otto di Pratica. Under the constitution, the depositor had no discretionary powers. He received funds requested from the Monte and paid them out only on the order of the Otto or the Signoria. But in fact, under the Medici, he possessed considerable latitude. For example, he was sometimes empowered to seek loans from private citizens in the name of the Otto, and his disbursements were not restricted to payments previously allocated.88 He usually ran the office at a deficit and covered it by advancing his own money or by taking in loans, especially in wartime when expenses were heaviest. Accounts were balanced by having the Signoria assume his credits, and there is no evidence that 83 84 85 86 87 88

Marks, ' T h e Financial Oligarchy,' p p . 123-137. M a r k s , ' L a crisi finanziaria,' p . 44. Camera del C o m u n e , Depositario dei Signori, 2795. N a r d i , 1, 4 1 5 - 4 1 7 . Otto, C o n d . e Stant., 12, fol. 70V; M o n t e C o m u n e , 2132, fol. 131 sin. I n D e c e m b e r 1522, t h e depositor was authorized to borrow 150 marchi. O t t o , Delib., 7, fol. 8 v ; also Otto, Cond. e Stant., 13, fol. 44; Otto, Delib., 6, fols. 151-152.

41

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici they ever rejected them. In 1527, to settle the accounts of the depositor, the city paid him the impressive sum of 164,000 florins.89 Small wonder then that contemporaries considered the office financially rewarding for its holder. Together with the Otto di Pratica, control of the Depository enabled the Medici to dispose of the city's resources at every stage, from the requisition of funds to their actual payment. Paolo Vettori, who wanted to be appointed depositor, addressed some advice to Cardinal Medici in 1512 in which he clearly drew the connection between the depositor and the security and independence of the regime. He predicated his argument on the premise that, though in the fifteenth century Cosimo de'Medici had been able to control Florence by ingenuity (industria) rather than by force (forza)y Cardinal Medici would have to employ more forza than industria. To maintain order it was necessary to deploy armed guards in the city. And to guarantee the loyalty of the guards, there should never be any delay in providing their pay. Vettori then suggested that the cardinal have a provision passed in the Balia which would authorize the Otto (then still the Died) to allocate money and direct it to the depositor of the Signoria who would pay the guard as necessary. In this way payments could be made quickly and secretly. Aware of the credit functions of the depositor, Vettori also recommended that above all he be a man of great personal wealth so that in emergencies he could use his own money for the office and afford to await repayment at a later time.90 The Medici entrusted the office of depositor only to their closest and most dependable amici. In 1514, when Lorenzo went to Rome and left Galeotto de'Medici in charge of the city, shortly before his departure he had Galeotto appointed depositor. In 1515, the office went to Roberto de'Ricci and in 1520, to Giovanni Tornbuoni, both close amici. However, these last two men were depositors in name only. The real depositor, acknowledged in contemporary sources and known by the fact that he drew the depositor's salary, was an even closer personal ally of Lorenzo de'Medici, his brother-in-law, Filippo Strozzi.91 If we would understand the operation of government in Florence as it developed under the Medici after 1512, we have to bear in mind its two essential characteristics. The first is the alliance of mutual interest between the Medici and the Florentine aristocracy and the employment by the Medici of an increasingly smaller number of aristocratic amici to rule the city. As in the fifteenth century, their method lay in controlling elections and office holding; but in the sixteenth century their control was tighter 89 91

90 Monte Comune, 2132, fol. 131 sin. P. Vettori in Albertini, pp. 357-359. Piero Parenti, fol. 115V; C.S., Ser. in, 121, fol. n o .

42

Filippo Strozzi's Florence and more extensive than before. Increased centralized power put greater emphasis on personal relationships and personal channels of influence for favor and advancement, as in the case of Lorenzo's coterie of young nobles who rose to prominence with him as he took command of the city. The second characteristic is the Medici's gradual subversion of the Florentine constitution by creating a separate executive apparatus which did not reflect the constitutional structure of the city. Executive rule through the Balia, the use of personal secretaries or agents with special executive functions, the expanded role of small plenipotentiary committees such as the Otto di Pratica, and the creation of a central financial ministry out of the Depository were all a part of this process. These basic features of the Medici government after the restoration of 1512 present a problem to those who would study the period because there is no necessary correlation between position and power, between title holders of offices and the real executors of their functions. Political and constitutional studies of Florence have traditionally emphasized office holding as the key for determining the leaders of the government and the composition of the ruling faction. The Florentines themselves stressed position. Families kept lists, or prioristi, of their members who had held important offices and counted, for instance, the number of times they had attained the office of gonfaloniere. Modern scholarship has quite naturally continued this interest in office holding. Professor Rubinstein refined this approach in his study on the Medici government in the fifteenth century, for which he made extensive use of the election records in the Florentine archives.92 He concluded that the cornerstone of the Medici system of government was its faction of supporters and defined that faction in terms of those individuals and families who repeatedly sat in the highest offices, the priors, the accoppiatori, Balia and Councils of One Hundred and of Seventy. Control of elections through the accoppiatori was the means whereby members of the party were brought into office and through which they maintained a majority on the various councils. But however useful this method of investigation of titular standings is for fifteenth-century studies, it is not a reliable indicator of the underpinnings of the political structure of the Medici government after 1512, when extra levels and channels of power which did not depend on the electoral process had been superimposed. The official records of the city from this period must be used with caution as they do not necessarily provide sufficient information to reconstruct the chain of command in the government, or even to gain a reliable picture of the Medici faction. Nothing in the election, or tratte, records would indicate that Goro Gheri or Cardinal Passerini were in fact executive heads of the government instead 92

Rubinstein, The Government of Florence Under the Medici.

43

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici of the gonfalonierey nor, for that matter, that Lorenzo de'Medici had any more influence in the regime than in his capacity as captain general or as an occasional member of government councils. The lists of members of the Balla give a good indication of Medici sympathizers in 1512, but the Medici themselves admitted privately that other deserving individuals were excluded. The record of the Baud's decrees is essential for understanding the executive action of the new government in its first years, but even these documents do not reveal the true power structure around the Medici household and the importance of patronage there. Nothing in the records of the Otto di Pratica shows that Francesco Vettori was sending different and more complete reports to the Medici than to the Otto. Although the documents of the Otto indicate that the city paid out large amounts of money to finance wars, they provide very little information as to how the financing was done, at whose command, and how close the financial tie was between Rome and Florence. Even the books of the depositor, those few that were not destroyed to protect the managers of the city's finances after the Medici were expelled in 1527, do not reveal that the title holder of the office of the depositor was no more than a figurehead. Nor is there any government document which shows that Filippo Strozzi, who held only an occasional minor office and whose highest position in the government was as an official of the Monte, was in reality one of the most powerful and important men in the city, one who provided the credit behind the Depository, who was Lorenzo de'Medici's closest friend and counsellor, and of whom the young Medici once wrote, ' without you, Filippo, I am without myself.'93 93

M.A.P., 141, fol. 19V.

44

Marriage intrigues

The path that led Filippo Strozzi into the Medici family orbit was not clear-cut. Nor was the significance of his marriage in 1508 to Clarice de'Medici for his later career immediately perceptible, since at that time the Medici were out of power, exiled from Florence. In fact, until 1508 Filippo himself had had no immediate contact with the Medici, and no one would have suspected then that they would consider a parentado (betrothal) for the granddaughter of Lorenzo il Magnifico with a member of the Strozzi family which they had abused and exiled not so many decades before. Filippo had been too young to have known the Magnifico and his system of government. He grew up instead under the republican regime and had been only five in 1494 when Piero de'Medici, the father of his future bride, was exiled from Florence and the new government set in his place. Piero's two children Lorenzo and Clarice were raised in Rome in the family of their mother Alfonsina Orsini, and no evidence exists that Filippo was acquainted with them before 1507 when Alfonsina came to Florence to seek out a husband for her daughter. On the surface it might seem unlikely that a marriage alliance between the Strozzi and Medici would ever have occurred, given the long tradition of enmity between the two families which had its roots in the persecution suffered by Filippo's father and grandfather at the hands of Cosimo. Nor had the Strozzi endeared themselves to the Medici in the more recent past. In the early 1490s Filippo's brother and sister contracted marriages of which Piero de'Medici openly disapproved. When Piero was himself exiled, Filippo the Elder's widow Selvaggia and his eldest son Alfonso were among the first to acquire confiscated Medici property which was pawned to settle the family's debts with the commune. l The Strozzi were closely associated with znti-Palleschi (anti-Medici) groups during the Republic, and in 1497 when eminent Mediceans among the aristocracy plotted an uprising to restore Piero to Florence, part of their plan was to sack and raze to the 1

In November 1494 the city assigned 600 pounds of silver confiscated from Piero de'Medici and Cardinal Medici and valued at 5,840 florins as follows: 3,400 florins' worth to Alfonso Strozzi, 1,440 to Madonna Selvaggia Strozzi, 1,000 to Battista Pandolfini. The money they paid was treated as a loan to the city to be repaid in four months, C.S., Ser. 1, 10, fol. 191.

45

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici ground the palaces of the Strozzi and other aristocrats known for their unrelenting opposition to the Medici.2 Rumor of these troubles reached the ears of the Ferrara branch of the family, and Giovanni di Carlo Strozzi wrote anxiously to his brother Michele about the fate of the Strozzi should a revolution succeed in restoring Piero.3 However, despite their reputation of being anti-Medici, like other big Florentine families, the Strozzi did not present a united political front. Although no Strozzi could be found among the ranks of the Palleschi, within the family a broad political spectrum ranged from avid support of Soderini's government to an indifferent lack of opposition to the Medici. The heads of certain Strozzi households reflect the range of the diversity. Guicciardini named two men whom he considered leaders (capi) of the Strozzi family at the time of Filippo's parentado.4 One of them, Antonio di Vanni Strozzi (1455-1523), was a prominent lawyer distantly related to Filippo. Although he had received his legal training and his appointment to teach on the faculty of the Studio di Pisa under Lorenzo il Magnifico, he accommodated himself quite well to the Republic under which he held the most important political offices of his career including those of prior (1494), gonfaloniere di compagnia (1497), and ambassador for Soderini to Rome (1511).5 The other, Matteo di Lorenzo Strozzi, was Filippo's first cousin, though eighteen years his senior, and had helped Selvaggia administer and invest the estate of Filippo the Elder. Matteo was less enthusiastic about the republican government and stayed in the background politically. Before 1512 he served only twice as Monte official in 1505 and 1510 and as gonfaloniere di compagnia in 1511. Both Antonio and Matteo originally opposed Filippo's prospective marriage to Clarice but changed their minds and eventually worked to help bring it about. This acceptance of the Medici resulted for Matteo in a long political career after 1512 when he held nearly every major political office. He was considered {veduto) for gonfaloniere in 1519 and served as a trusted political adviser to the Medici until his death in 1541.6 2 3 4 5

6

Nardi, I, 106-110. Other candidates for such treatment included the Nerli, Valori, and Giugni. C.S., Ser. in, 88, fol. 122; Ser. m, 139, fols. 64, 66. Guicciardini, Storie, p. 327. The sixteen gonfalonieri di compagnia, or standard-bearers of the militia companies, four from each quarter of the city, served as an advisory college to the Signoria. A complete list of Antonio's offices is in Tratte, 177, Santa Maria Novella; Tratte, 94, fols. 31, 76; Tratte, 84, fols. 1, 105; Tratte, 83, fols. 38, 84. Under Soderini Antonio Strozzi was among the opposition in the pratiche (consultative commission) called to advise the government. See Sergio Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini "Vexillifer Perpetuus Reipublicae Florentinae",' Renaissance Studies in Honor of Hans Baron, ed. Anthony Molho and John A. Tedeschi (Florence, 1971), p. 349. At the age of sixty-seven in 1522, a year before his death, he received the honor of being veduto for prior, although he had held no important offices under the Medici, Tratte, 343, fol. 101. Record of Matteo's positions before 1512 are in Tratte, 83, fol. 32; Tratte, 177, Santa Maria Novella; Tratte, 354, fol. 136. In 1508 he also filled the minor office of massarius camerae armorum

46

Marriage intrigues Alfonso Strozzi, Filippo's half-brother, must also be considered an important family leader in this context. Although he was more closely related to Filippo than either Matteo or Antonio, he maintained a rigorous opposition to the Medici and never completely reconciled himself to Filippo's marriage. Alfonso had been one of the Arrabbiati, the political faction which had strongly opposed Savonarola, and he had even served as one of the examiners of the friar. He was a good friend of Soderini and had supported his election as gonfaloniere-a-vita. He was consistently anti-Medici, and in 1501, according to Cambi's history, during the height of Cesare Borgia's campaign against Florence which would have returned them to power, Alfonso personally hired five hundred infantry for his own protection.7 Because of his opposition to the Medici, Alfonso did not serve in public office except under republican regimes. He was twice a Monte official under the Second Republic in 1496 and in 1511 and achieved his greatest political eminence under the Third Republic when in 1527 he was a major contender with Niccolo Capponi for election as thefirstgonja I'oniere of the new government. He served as Prior, as a member of the Died di Libert a e Pace, as bank official and as Monte officer.8 During the Republic the outlook of Selvaggia's two sons differed from that of their older, more established relatives. Although definitely not Medici partisans, they counted among their close companions young men who were, notably Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Prinzivalle della Stufa and Marco Antonio Colonna, all of whom later were instrumental in restoring them to Florence. Two of their closest family friends, Filippo Buondelmonti and his son Benedetto, also approved of the Medici. But perhaps the decisive influence on the family was wielded by Bernardo Rucellai whose daughter had married Lorenzo and on whom Selvaggia depended heavily for advice. Bernardo had once been an intimate friend of Lorenzo il Magnifico but became estranged from Piero. However, after the election of Soderini whom he bitterly and openly despised, he joined the group of aristocrats who, disenchanted with the gonfaloniere, would welcome the Medici's return.9 Accordingly it was Bernardo who encouraged Selvaggia to consider a marriage for Filippo into their family.

7 8 9

(administrator of the arms room), Tratte, 177. Matteo held many more offices after 1512 of which the most important were: member of Council of Seventy and Balia, 1514; member of Otto di Guardia, 1514, 1532; prior, 1513, 1519, 1526; member of Twelve Procurators, 1515, 1517, 1519, 1521, 1523, 1524, 1526, 1534; member of Set di Mercanzia, 1517, 1523; official of the Monte, 1505, 1510, 1515, 1521, 1524, 1531, 1533, 1538; official of the Monte di Pieta, 1515, 1524; accoppiatore, 1522, 1524, 1532-1539; conservator of laws, 1534; member of Otto di Pratica, 1533; Balia, 1530; Council of 48,1532; counsellor of the duke, 1532, 1535, 1538. Tratte, 84, passim; Tratte, 85, passim; Tratte, 83, fol. 32; Tratte, 354, fol. 446; Tratte, 94, fols. 34-36; Tratte, 354. Giovanni Cambi, Istorie fiorentine, ed. Idelfonso di San Luigi in Delizie degli eruditi toscani (Florence, 1785-1786), xxi, 163. Tratte, 83, fol. 3; Tratte, 84, fols. 44, 48V, 69, 70, 71V, 204; Tratte, 94, fol. 36. Niccolini, p. xiii; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 327; Nerli, 1, 160; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321.

47

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici From Selvaggia's point of view, the parentado with Clarice would be advantageous to her sons and to herself. An alliance with Clarice's family would secure their friendship and protect the Strozzi from a repetition of past political abuse should the Medici ever return to power. Though the prospect of the Medici seizing power seemed unlikely in 1508, it was always a possibility given Cardinal Medici's popularity and the influence he had with Julius II. The Medici cardinal had made himself very dear to the old man, and rumor spread that he was a likely choice to be the next pope. Selvaggia was also on the lookout for a large dowry for Filippo to help fortify the family coffers, since Lucretia Rucellai had contributed practically nothing. Much of her late husband's capital was being eaten up in constructing their palace, while the investments of her sons' share of the inheritance had in the ten years since her husband's death yielded little beyond the sums needed to cover their heavy expenses. 10 Clarice's dowry was reported to be six thousand florins and made a match with her very desirable financially. Common opinion held that suitors would have thronged around her had they not feared the grave political risks involved in such a union. Less generous people claimed that Filippo, one of the richest of the young eligible bachelors, considered himself too good to pursue an engagement with any other Florentine family. In the old days before Piero's exile, the likelihood of the marriage would have been slim. But in the years leading up to 1508, the Medici had gone through many changes of fortune. After his expulsion from Florence, Piero de'Medici's attempts to return by force had had the unintended effect of rekindling the Florentines' aversion to his family and of actually strengthening the republican government. And after the election of Soderini as gonfaloniere-a-vita in 1502, the fortunes of the Palleschi (Mediceans) ebbed even lower. The government put a price on Piero's head, forbade Cardinal Medici to stay in the Medici palace, and restricted their dealings with other Florentines.11 But if Piero had not been able to succeed in life, at least his death by drowning in 1503 removed a formidable obstacle to the Medici's chances. Leadership of the family now passed on to Cardinal Giovanni and Giuliano, who had never shared their older brother's military designs on Florence. Though they were no less driven than he to restore the Medici to their former dominance, they conducted a subtle campaign designed to woo Florentines rather than subjugate them. This new strategy was put into practice at Cardinal Medici's court in Rome where many Florentines I

° From 1492 to 1502 the income from Selvaggia and her sons' portion of the estate was barely sufficient to meet their expenses. There is some evidence that by 1500 they were doing better, but still they needed the cash to invest. See tables 7-10 in Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 78-92. II Guicciardini, Storie, p. 322.

48

Marriage intrigues met him and departed favorably impressed. The cardinal peddled his considerable influence with Pope Julius II to his countrymen, especially to the Florentine merchants who had business dealings with the curia. The Medici court in Rome also became a gathering place for a growing number of Florentines who were ill-disposed to Soderini's government. Young men such as Bartolomeo Valori, Piero Martelli, Gino Capponi, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, and Prinzivalle della Stufa whose fathers had opposed the Medici before 1494 eagerly sought out the cardinal, and others such as Bernardo and his son Giovanni Rucellai and Filippo Buondelmonti found themselves drawn towards the Medici, not out of any intrinsic desire for the primacy of their house, but out of their own dislike for Soderini.12 At the time of Filippo's parentado with Clarice, many of these Florentines in Rome rallied openly to his cause without regard for the adverse reaction by the government at Florence which their support was bound to provoke. In addition to the increase in Cardinal Medici's popularity among Florentines, the growing enmity between Soderini and Julius II greatly strengthened the cardinal's hand at court and rendered Julius still more willing to promote his aims. This positive response by a growing body of Florentines encouraged the Medici to entertain serious thoughts about how best to effect their return to power. First it was necessary to test the ground in Florence itself and establish a foothold. Alfonsina Orsini, Piero's widow, began negotiations to reclaim her dowry which was legally owed her out of the Medici possessions confiscated by the republican government.13 She came herself to Florence in early 1507 ostensibly to settle the matter and to inquire after other Medici possessions. At the same time, however, she began to negotiate surreptitiously for a husband for her daughter Clarice. One might wonder why Alfonsina did not prefer to find a husband among one of the Roman baronial families, since with the help of her Orsini relatives she could easily have arranged a prestigious match for her daughter. Her motives behind seeking a Florentine parentado for Clarice could only have been political, a necessary ingredient in the family's plan to reinstate themselves in Florence. For Alfonsina the marriage of Clarice in Florence was a step in promoting the claim of her son Lorenzo as rightful heir to his father and grandfather. As the stateless son of an exiled father there was no place for Lorenzo in Rome, and the marriage of Clarice to a Roman would have brought him no political advantage. Her marriage in Florence, however, 12

13

Ibid., pp. 324-325. Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi is a good example of a young Florentine who frequented the Medici court in Rome. Cardinal Medici had intervened for him in some litigation, Nardi, n, 11-12, and in 1512 we find him among the eager young men who plotted the ouster of Soderini and the restoration of the Medici. Letters concerning the lengthy negotiations for her dowry worth 12,000 ducats are scattered throughout Sig. Cart. Resp. Orig., vols. 31 and 32. See also Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 316.

49

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici would not only strengthen the Medici's connections there, it would also secure the support, or at least nullify the opposition to their cause, of a powerful ottimati family. The Medici had already attempted to find a husband for Clarice in Florence, first in 1506 with Francesco di Piero Pitti, a member of a highly regarded family which counted itself among the Palleschi. Soderini got wind of the parentado and had Pitti charged with treason. Since Francesco was in Ancona at the time, Soderini had his father Piero dragged three times before the dreaded judicial tribunal, the Quaranta (the Forty). The tribunal absolved him only after he had disclaimed any knowledge of a parentado with the Medici. According to Guicciardini, Soderini hoped that his rigorous prosecution of the case would discourage any further attempt to marry Clarice into a noble Florentine family.14 Supposedly the Medici had proposed at one point to marry Clarice to Soderini's own nephew, Giovanbaptista di Paolo Antonio, but without success, most likely because the gonfaloniere did not dare risk the ire of the people which that much hypocrisy would assuredly have aroused. Filippo was doubtless aware of the grave political risks inherent in a parentado with Clarice, and only after many months of careful deliberation and negotiation did he agree to sign a marriage contract in July 1508.15 In the contract, written in his own hand, Filippo promised to present Clarice with a wedding ring within eight months' time or else pay a two-thousand-ducat penalty, and the Medici were bound by the same fine should they break the compact. Filippo kept the agreement secret even from other Strozzi, and to protect himself against exposure he left Florence accompanied by his mother in mid-September ostensibly on a pilgrimage to Loreto. According to plan, he would then continue alone to Naples,16 and, after a decent interval, go on to Rome where the engagement would be announced. Unfortunately for Filippo, by November rumor of the parentado leaked out in Florence, and he could no longer remain silent. When Alfonso Strozzi heard the news he flew into a rage. Immediately he wrote to Filippo in Naples and had Lorenzo write also demanding that he explain himself. Only one letter Filippo wrote in reply to Lorenzo has survived from this exchange, though it refers to another earlier response. 14

15

16

Guicciardini, Storie, p. 326 and Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 309. Both historians claimed this was just a pretended parentado, but since the case went all the way to the Quaranta there must have been some basis in fact to the charge. Filippo spelled out its conditions in a letter to Lorenzo on 9 December 1508 in C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 50. See also Guicciardini, Storie, p. 326; Niccolini, p. xiv. Lorenzo Strozzi said that the negotiations were arranged through some Dominican friars, probably from San Marco, Niccolini, pp. xii, xvii. See also C.S., Ser. m, 134, fol. 51. Niccolini, p. xiv. He must have left in the middle of the month judging from the dates on two powers of attorney which he gave to Lorenzo to use in his absence, C.S., Ser. v, 87, Ricordo section.

50

Marriage intrigues In the extant letter, dated 9 December 1508, Filippo acknowledged his predicament and sought his brother's advice: Now what can I or should I do? If I sever my ties with the Medici, which seems impossible, aside from the penalty to pay, we would bring down their whole-hearted hostility and I would be dishonored. However, if I go through with it, you say that I and all of us will be ruined, and you depict an inferno so black that it scares me. And finally to you, Lorenzo, I will speak in the following way: Examine [the case] if you will - whether to go or not to go to Rome; if you wish, make us liable for the fine and break every link of parent ado without the least regard. Finally, put me where you will, and I will stay there, provided, God willing, I hold to my present opinion. But think it over carefully, and watch out that you are not frightening yourself needlessly and that you do not put too much faith in someone who, instead of showing you the moon as it really is, has shown you its reflection in the bottom of a well, because if we decide to renege now, we will find ourselves caught in a high sea where we will surely drown. I am not writing to you like this for my own sake, and my opinion remains unchanged; but rather because of the danger to you, I do not want you to lose on account of me anything that I cannot restore to you.17 When Filippo's engagement became public knowledge, most of his Strozzi relatives vigorously opposed the idea. To them the betrothal presaged a break with seventy-five years of proud family tradition of opposing Medici rule, and further they feared it would jeopardize their good relations with the present republican government. The acerbic reaction on the part of the other Strozzi indicates how far Selvaggia and Filippo had set themselves against the sentiments prevailing in the family. The greater Strozzi family, far from being just a number of loosely connected households who shared the same surname, intimately involved itself with Filippo's decision and undertook to discover what stance they should adopt on this matter of common family interest. Summoned by Filippo's half-brother Alfonso and first cousin Matteo, members of the family met together in council on 3 December. Heartfelt distress and genuine indignation that Filippo should ally himself with the Medici after all the injuries suffered by the Strozzi at their instigation dominated their feelings. 18 But they were also determined to orchestrate their public reaction to the bethrothal carefully in order to lessen the danger of political reprisals to the family from Soderini. In particular this latter sentiment explains why at the meeting they decided to send a group of family representatives to protest their ignorance of the marriage negotiations and 17 18

C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 50. Typical reactions to the parentado can be found in C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 49, 52; 180, fol. 95; Niccolini, p. xiii. See also Melissa M. Bullard, 'Marriage Politics and the Family in Renaissance Florence: The Strozzi - Medici Alliance of 1508,' American Historical Review, LXXIV, 3 (1979), 681-687.

51

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici their discontent with Filippo's actions. By publicly demonstrating their displeasure with the parent ado they hoped to clear themselves of suspicion with the gonfaloniere.19 Members of the family went before the Signoria to declare their innocence and promised to do everything possible to prevent the marriage. With the consent of the Signoria they dispatched a special messenger, Benedetto di Giovanni Strozzi, to present Cardinal Medici a petition signed by all the family pleading with him to cancel Filippo's contract on pain of bringing the hatred of the Strozzi down upon his head. 20 The cardinal would hear nothing of this threat; and Benedetto left for Naples to bring Filippo messages from the family advising him of his grave danger and urging him to back out. Alfonso Strozzi even volunteered to pay the two-thousand-ducat penalty for him if he would only break the contract. The case dominated the correspondence of distant Strozzi relatives. Giovanni Strozzi in Ferrara was kept informed daily of developments and he in turn advised other Strozzi in Ferrara and Mantua. Giovanni's nephew, Marco Strozzi, wrote him news of the parentado from Rome where every last detail was known, and even as far away as Venice, Strozzi associates could talk of nothing else. 'What an odious matter and one so prejudicial to everyone in the family,' and 'We know how much grief it is causing on many accounts, and we agree that such a betrothal is hardly appropriate in the Strozzi family' typify the reactions of those distant kin. Filippo's engagement even found its way into the correspondence of both Machiavelli and Guicciardini.21 The revelation of Filippo's betrothal precipitated a virulent scandal in Florence, and the whole city down to her meanest citizens gossiped about nothing else. The impact of the case reached far beyond the simple fact of Filippo's engagement to Clarice. It exploded into a volatile political issue, a caso di stato, over which the city divided itself into two camps; the supporters of Soderini who opposed the marriage and his antagonists who favored the match. Once Soderini made up his mind to use the issue to squelch suspected Medici sympathizers and rally the populace behind him, the marriage question became a test of his strength. At the same time his opponents were equally resolved not to let him manipulate the case to his own ends. 22 To Soderini it was obvious that Filippo had not acted alone, and he suspected that the parentado was part of his opponents' grand design to 19

20 21

22

C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 52. Lorenzo would have us believe that he had been kept ignorant of the parentado, Niccolini, pp. xiii-xv. More than likely he maintained that posture in his own defense until Soderini's reaction became clear. C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 52. Ibid., fols. 49, 52-55, 61; 180, fol. 95; Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. Francesco Gaeta (Milano, 1961), p. 203; Francesco Guicciardini, Carteggi, ed. Roberto Palmarocchi (Bologna, 1938), 1, 23. Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 326-327, 330-331; Niccolini, p. xx; Jacopo Pitti, 'Apologia de'Cappucci,' A.S.I., Ser. 1, vol. 4, part 2 (1853), 314.

52

Marriage intrigues destroy the republic and reinstate the Medici. To him the issue of Filippo's engagement was from the very beginning a grave political affair. He aired the case before the Signoria, which promptly issued a summons for Filippo to appear in its presence by 25 December or else be banned in exile for ten years in Naples. At the same time the Signoria commanded that Filippo's mother and brothers should not provide him any financial or material aid on pain of a ten-thousand-ducat fine.23 Soderini would have preferred to condemn Filippo outright in absentia, but the law required a hearing before sentencing. Still, he could hope that Filippo would be too frightened to show his face in Florence and thus ipso facto be forced into exile. Next Soderini began to cast about among the leading opponents of his government for those who he suspected were the real perpetrators of the betrothal. In a charge placed before the Otto di Guardia which handled security matters, twelve citizens were named and others implicated as sympathizers with the match. Heading the list were Bernardo Rucellai and his sons Palla and Giovanni.24 Lucrezia de'Medici, sister of Cardinal Giovanni, and her husband Jacopo Salviati, a rich and powerful aristocrat who had grown disenchanted with Soderini, were also suspected as participants in the affair.25 Elections for the Signoria and other top city councils were scheduled in December and Soderini planned to exploit Strozzi's betrothal to influence their outcome in his favor. Malicious gossip including reported instances of Filippo's flagrant disrespect for the popular government already swirled through the streets. In his pre-election address to the Great Council in which he branded the parentado part of a plot to overthrow the republic, Soderini tried only to fan the flames higher. Public sentiment against Strozzi climbed to such a fever pitch that he was denounced repeatedly in the tamburo, the receptacle for anonymous 23

24

25

According to Guicciardini, Storie, p. 328, m e m b e r s of the Valori faction including Alfonso met in the house of Alessandro Acciaiuoli to advise Soderini, and they recommended the government action which in fact took place. T h i s is not confirmed by any other source. T h e two decrees are in Sig. e Coll., Delib. O r d . , n o , fols. 124V-125. See also C . S . , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 5 2 ; Niccolini, p. xvi; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 3 2 1 ; Cambi, xxi, 222. T h e s u m m o n s was sent to the Florentine ambassador in R o m e who was to forward a copy to the consul of the Florentine Nation in Naples, Sig. Cart., Mis. 56, fol. 127V. Pitti, 'Apologia,' p . 3 1 3 ; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 3 2 1 ; Guicciardini, Storie, p p . 328, 331 said that the principal opponents of the match among the Arrabbiatt included Alessandro Acciaiuoli, Antonio Canigiani, Pierfrancesco Tosinghi, Niccolo Valori, and Alfonso Strozzi. Both Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331 and Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 322, reported a r u m o r that the Arrabbiati, or according to Guicciardini, specifically Alfonso Strozzi, suggested that the only way to heal the city was to cut off the heads of Bernardo Rucellai, Archbishop Pazzi, Filippo Buondelmonti, and other perpetrators of the parentado. Bernardo wrote to the Signoria in his own defense, Sig. Cart., Resp. Orig., 3 1 , fol. 255. T h i s letter confirms Guicciardini's account, Storie, p . 3 3 1 . Bernardo's son Giovanni was rumored to have made secret trips to Rome. Others implicated included Cosimo Pazzi, archbishop of Florence, Filippo Buondelmonti, Giovanni Corsi, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Antonio Giacomini, and Giovanbattista Ridolfi. Filippo had also sought advice from Niccolo Orlandini and G i n o Capponi, his brother-in-law, C . S . , Ser. i n , 134, fols. 50, 5 1 ; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 330.

53

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici accusations placed against citizens with the Otto di Guardia, the magistracy charged with the prosecution of criminal cases.26 From faraway Naples Filippo had no idea as to his best course of action, and his letter to Lorenzo of 9 December reveals the quandry he was in. Even though the automatic penalty of exile and confiscation of property for not answering the Signoria's summons was compelling enough reason to come back to Florence, it was not clear to him whether he could in fact return safely and receive a fair hearing. On 12 December, the same day that the first charges against him for marrying the offspring of an exile were lodged with the Otto di Guardia, Filippo left Naples, travelling incognito to Rome to consult with Cardinal Medici, who received him the very evening of his arrival. The ferocity of the reaction in Florence against the marriage made it imperative that each party reassure the other of his willingness to adhere to their agreement. Probably at this time Cardinal Medici promised to pay any fine imposed by the Soderini government. Filippo slipped out of Rome and continued north to Quercia Grossa in Sienese territory close to the Florentine border. In his company came Giulio de'Medici, the future Clement VII, who had been sent by Cardinal Medici to make sure nothing went awry.27 Their close association during these suspenseful days probably laid the foundation for Filippo's life-long friendship with Giulio. From his hiding place Filippo received reports and secret visitors from Florence and waited for advice on whether or not to appear on the 25th. The energetic moves of Soderini and the early opposition to the parentado from among Filippo's family comprised only the first act in this drama. The second unfolded during the legal struggles over Filippo's right to marry Clarice. The delicate and complex strategies and counter-strategies which accompanied the proceedings laid bare Soderini's deteriorating strength, which encouraged others to raise their voices in support of Filippo, and the Strozzi to make a calculated change in their position. At first sympathizers with Filippo's predicament had hesitated to defend him for fear of alienating Soderini or of being labeled Palleschi, and they had to wait to gauge the strength of Soderini's forces before taking any step. But soon a growing number of citizens rallied in support of Filippo. Not just Palleschi, they represented a mixed group, opponents of Soderini, friends and clients of the Strozzi, and even some who sympathized with Filippo just because they did not approve of what they considered to be Soderini's excessively autocratic manner in handling the case. They charged that the gonfaloniere was treating Clarice in exactly the same way Lorenzo il Magnifico had treated the daughters of the Pazzi family after 26

Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 143, fol. 23; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 329; Nerli, 1, 161; Cerretani, 27 Niccolini, pp. xvii-xviii. Istoria, fol. 321.

54

Marriage intrigues the Pazzi Conspiracy by hampering their engagements. 28 A number of Savonarola's old party, the Frateschi, lent their support to Filippo's side, and because of their popularity with the lower classes, they helped calm some of the more rabid hostility to the match. 29 There was no love lost between the Frateschi and Soderini who had been supported in his election by the anti-Savonarolian party, the Arrabbiati. Additional backing came from Dominican friars who had helped negotiate the marriage contract in the first place. Even Pope Julius intervened to defend Filippo's parentado for the sake of Cardinal Medici. Very little sympathy existed between Julius and Soderini, and the pope sent a pointed brief to Archbishop Pazzi of Florence for presentation to the Signoria. In the letter Julius ordered the Signoria to accept the parentado because Clarice was fatherless and still a child, and therefore under his special protection. Once again the precedent of the Pazzi daughters was called to mind, since back in 1478 Pope Sixtus IV had made them his special wards under similar circumstances.30 In his angry reply Soderini told Julius to mind his own business: Since this matter is important for the general quiet and peace in Florence and since only disorder and scandal can result from it, we are certain that if only His Beatitude had full information on all the circumstances and the bad effects that could result from it, he would never have wished to arouse the displeasure and discontent of every person in this city by seeking such a thing from which only evil can result... And certainly Cardinal Medici with all his good qualities will be able to provide honorably for his niece elsewhere.31 Sensitive to the winds of political change shifting in Filippo's favor, the Strozzi held another family council and decided to abandon their public opposition to the parentado and do everything possible to defend him in the legal battle ahead. Family and friends busied themselves canvassing officials to find out how safe it would be for Filippo to answer the summons. Lucrezia de'Medici Salviati, acting upon instructions from Rome, even hastened to Soderini to plead on Filippo's behalf for clemency.32 The family wanted a guarantee from a majority of the Signoria that the question of the parentado would be treated as an ordinary judicial matter and not as an affair of state before they would advise Filippo to enter Florentine territory. Once reassured, Filippo travelled to the villa of his close friend Lorenzo Cambi at San Gaggio, less than a mile from the city. His first cousin Matteo and Antonio di Vanni Strozzi, the well-known lawyer, came to visit him in secret. Together they examined every legal aspect of the case before finally counselling him to answer the summons and prepare his defense. 33 28 30 31 33

29 Guicciardini, Storie, p p . 3 3 0 - 3 3 1 . Niccolini, p . xviii. Sig. Cart., Resp. Orig., 3 1 , fol. 244; Sig. Cart., M i s . , 56, fol. 128; C . S . , Ser. i n , 134, fol. 5 1 . 32 Sig. Cart., Mis., 56, fol. 128. C . S . , Ser. ill, 134, fol. 5 1 . Niccolini, p p . xviii, xix.

55

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Filippo slipped into the city quietly at sunset on Christmas day, and, flanked by members of his family, presented himself to the gonfaloniere and Signoria in assembly. Soderini tried to muster enough votes to have Filippo confined outside Florentine territory, but the measure went down to a miserable defeat. Since charges against him were also pending before the Otto di Guardia, the Signoria decided to have the case adjudicated there first. This meant in effect that final jurisdiction would pass into the hands of the newly elected Signoria to be seated in January, among whose members was a Strozzi in-law, Neri Capponi.34 Soderini was well aware of his declining strength. He too had canvassed the Signoria before the hearing and found insufficient votes for a harsh sentence. He had tried to influence the elections to the Signoria, but the reward for his effort had been a group that was even less willing to pursue the case than the old one. In fact, in January the new Signoria voted to drop all previous charges connected with the original summons. 35 Since the Signoria had proved uncooperative, the remaining hope for the Soderini party was prosecution through the Otto di Guardia, so fresh charges against Filippo were placed in the tamburo on 2 January. Should the Otto purposely delay action on the matter, Filippo would face real danger. By law the case would then be automatically transferred to the feared Quaranta, a much larger judicial body whose members tended to be more sympathetic to Soderini.36 At the hands of the Quaranta Filippo would probably be treated roughly because, given its size and more popular composition, it was less subject to political pressure than the smaller, more easily influenced Otto di Guardia. However, the original charges with the Otto on 12 December had barely missed the deadline for transfer to the Quaranta and had to be held over for the new Otto to be seated in January. Just as in the case of the new Signoria, Soderini was much less sure of the loyalty of the entering Otto than he had been of the old. 37 In the days before his new hearing, Filippo's supporters led by Jacopo Salviati set out to protect him by blocking any attempt to remove the case from the hands of the Otto. Filippo himself wasted no time but made the rounds of leading citizens to plead his cause. Filippo appeared before the Otto on 5 January and again on 12 January. He was charged with violating a statute dating from 1393 which prohibited contracts with exiles by virtue of his marrying the daughter of Piero de'Medici who had not only been declared an exile in 1494, but had 34

35 36

37

His appearance on the 25th is certified in Sig. e Coll., Delib. Ord., n o , fol. 125. See also Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329-330; Niccolini, p. xix. Sig. e Coll., Delib. Ord., i n , fol. 8. C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 53, 54; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329, 332. Nerli, 1, 161, gave a good description of the political make-up of the Quaranta. Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331.

56

Marriage intrigues afterwards made three armed attempts against the Republic. In his defense Filippo cleverly denied trafficking with any exiles since in his negotiations he had dealt only with religious persons of the Dominican order and with Alfonsina Orsini, Cardinal Medici and Giulio de'Medici, who had never actually been declared exiles. He then appealed to more recent statutes than the fourteenth-century one under which he had been charged, to a series of laws which exempted the daughters of exiles from the restrictions placed on their fathers and made their husbands liable at most to limited confinement away from the city, confiscation of property, and payment of a fine.38 Finally Filippo defended himself against the accusation that he had made the marriage out of disrespect for the Republic in order to disrupt the peace and help the Medici to return. He reminded the Otto that he could never forget the hardships his family had endured at the hands of the Medici, and that colonies of exiled Strozzi, spread all across the peninsula, were sufficient reminders of their past persecutions. First and foremost a Strozzi, he would be the last in-law the Medici could turn to for help should they try to re-enter Florence. Little did he know at the time that those words would be tested not once, but twice in the following three years. Once again the opponents of the marriage went down to defeat. The case was never transferred to the Quaranta, and even though new charges were hastily placed in the tamburo on 15 and 16 January, the Otto settled the matter in Filippo's favor and voted against his exile. He was permitted to marry Clarice but made to pay five hundred gold florins and ordered confined to the Kingdom of Naples for three years. As a warning to the Medici the Otto declared Clarice's brother Lorenzo di Piero an exile. 39 Despite the Strozzi's uncertainty about Filippo's punishment and their fears that his case would end up with the Quaranta, other evidence suggests that Filippo was never in any great danger of being exiled. Quite probably the outcome of his case was a compromise worked out in advance with Soderini, and his appearances and trial before the magistrates a mere pretense designed to cool tempers and maintain the gonfalonier eys reputation. Filippo would not have answered the summons of the Signoria without first having had every assurance of safety; according to Guicciardini, several days before the hearing Soderini communicated with him through the 38

39

The charges are reported in the text of the sentence which is in Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 143, fols. 23-25. T h e sentence has also been published in Pasquale Villari, Niccolb Machiavelli e i suoi tempi (Milan, 1927), 11, 548-552. See also C.S., Ser. i n , 134, fol. 51; Niccolini, pp. xx-xxii; Guicciardini, Storie, p. 329; Pitti, p. 315; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321. Filippo's line of argument can be pieced together from the official report of the sentencing, from letters and from statements in Lorenzo's biography. Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331. Giuliano was also included in the ban. Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 143, fols. 23-25.

57

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Strozzi telling him to appear, something Soderini would not have done had both sides not been in close contact.40 Basically Filippo had too many powerful ottimati friends and family behind him to have been in serious danger of exile. Even the transfer of the case from the Signoria to the Otto seems to have been a planned, face-saving device for the gonfaloniere. Once it was clear that the old Signoria would refuse to punish Filippo severely, Soderini gave way to the inevitable and had the case sent to the Otto where a lighter sentence would be less personally embarrassing. Lorenzo Strozzi and Guicciardini agreed that even the threat from the Quaranta was not so grave, for both believed that the gonfaloniere had intimated to the Otto that they should settle the case themselves.41 But even if these suspicions of Soderini's complicity in the maneuverings behind the scenes were to prove unfounded, the implications of the Strozzi case for his political health were ominous indeed. At the outset he had staked his reputation on openly opposing the marriage but had had to shift ground early in the game when he detected inadequate support in the Signoria. By late 1508/early 1509 when Filippo's case was before the magistrates, Soderini's control over the government was already slipping badly and the number of his opponents, especially from among the ranks of the ottimati, continued to increase.42 Although Filippo's trial would not in itself have caused a wholesale desertion from Soderini's camp, it was a readily available issue over which Florentines took sides and therefore serves as a measure of Soderini's weakening political muscle. Though none were as celebrated as Filippo's betrothal, other incidents revealed that Soderini's control was slipping. He was powerless to prevent several other marriages which he opposed on political grounds. And just when Filippo's marriage plans were unfolding, he had proved unable to halt the election of the Medici's candidate for archbishop, Cosimo Pazzi. 43 When seen together with the election of Pazzi, the marriage of Filippo to the daughter of Piero de'Medici could not fail to emphasize the growing influence of the Medici in Florence in 1508 and their attempts to unite with a number of aristocratic Florentine families which had traditionally been their enemies. When Filippo received his sentence from the Otto, he quickly paid his fine and left for Rome accompanied by an old family friend messer 40 41 42

43

C.S., Ser. in, 134, fols. 51, 53; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 321; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 329, 332. Guicciardini, Storie, p. 331; Niccolini, p. xxiii. Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 147; Nerli, 1, 160; Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 322-332; Pitti, 'Apologia,' pp. 313-314. See also Bertelli's, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 347-351 and his articles 'Machiavelli e la politica estera fiorentina,' Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), pp. 29-77, a n c l 'Machiavelli and Soderini,' Renaissance Quarterly, xxvm (1975), 1-16. Francesco Guicciardini successfully married the daughter of Alamanno Salviati, a friend turned opponent of the gonfaloniere. Later Alessandro Sachetti, who was accused in a case similar to Filippo's of making contracts with exiles, was absolved, Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 149, fol. 155; Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 320; Nerli, 1, 162; Piero Parenti, fol. iov.

58

Marriage intrigues Michelangelo Biscioni. 44 Although Filippo wrote several letters back to Lorenzo from Rome, only one letter from Michelangelo, dated 3 February, has survived in which he tells of their arrival and describes the difficulties they had maintaining a low profile and trying to avoid the crowds of Florentine well-wishers. We arrived Wednesday in good time, and that night while the [Florentine] ambassador was with us, the Reverend Monsignor [Cardinal Medici] sent for Filippo. Because many Florentines had come to the house to see him, he withdrew into an antechamber and waited there until a good part of them had gone away, but he could not prevent some from following him to the Medici palace. From there the party slipped away by a spiral stair that leads out of the [cardinal's] room, and so by their exit they evaded all those people who had come to the palace to demonstrate their support. They then went to see the bride, and even there quite a number of Florentines had gathered. Once again they effected their disappearance by withdrawing into a small salon leaving the crowds in the hall. . . And as for Filippo on the other hand, he has done everything not to make a scene, and if you should hear otherwise in Florence, know that he has not made a single move without the advice of the ambassador. I have written about this to Matteo, and Filippo will inform you directly as well.45 Filippo had in fact been very careful to pay his respects even to Cardinal Soderini, who had received him graciously. On the morning of 3 February Filippo and Clarice heard mass together and that evening celebrated their nuptials without fanfare. That very night, leaving his wife behind, Filippo departed for Naples in order to begin his sentence promptly. His good friend Giulio de'Medici accompanied him as far as the Neapolitan border. Michelangelo's letter reveals how eager both families were to smooth over old rancors and demonstrate good will on the occasion of their union through Filippo and Clarice. They attended to business matters before the ceremony and signed contracts which arranged for payment of Clarice's dowry, two-thirds in cash and one-third in Monte stock and gifts, and for Cardinal Medici to reimburse Filippo for his fine. Michelangelo had also been charged with delivering letters to the Medici, one from Lorenzo to Cardinal Medici and Alfonsina, and one from Selvaggia to Clarice. Filled with exuberance that everything was proceeding so smoothly, he joyfully reported to Lorenzo,' Cardinal Medici received your letter with the greatest pleasure and said, " I do not look upon, nor will I ever look upon Lorenzo as any different from Filippo, as time will reveal; and [I will think of] Madonna Selvaggia as a m o t h e r . . . " ' 4 6 Madonna Alfonsina who had shown great contentment with the whole affair admitted to him that, even 44 45 46

The payment of the fine is recorded in a seventeenth-century copy in C.S., Ser. in, 97, fol. 56. Ibid., 145, fol. 103. See also ibid., 134, fol. 55; Niccolini, p. xxiii; Otto di Guardia, Part, e Delib., 143, fol. 24V. C.S., Ser. in, 145, fol. 103.

59

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici had the Medici been in their rightful place in Florence, they would not have married Clarice to anyone other than Filippo. Giulio de'Medici, too, offered proof of his good-will and sent back his special recommendations, telling Lorenzo to count on him as if he were one of his very own men. 47 Michelangelo's report included a physical description of Filippo's new bride,'.. . your sister-in-law has a pleasing appearance. She is tall, goodlooking, well-proportioned, and the rest is not bad either. Nor does she have an owl-like beaked nose as was rumored in Florence.' 48 During Filippo's absence in Naples, his mother and brother did their best to welcome Clarice into the family. They sent her gifts of a splendid ruby and pear-shaped pearl, and, after waiting a decent interval of several months to allow things to cool down in Florence, with the consent of the Signoria they invited her to join them in Florence and live in the Strozzi palace.49 Giulio de'Medici accompanied her to Petrucci in Sienese territory where Lorenzo together with many Strozzi relatives and friends came out to greet her. They brought her into Florence at night as the gates were closing to avoid any trouble, and none occurred. Not long after Clarice had settled in, there was a movement afoot to recall Filippo from Naples. If we are to believe Lorenzo Strozzi, Clarice's modest and respectful conduct aroused great compassion, and townsmen openly lamented that such a young bride should have to stay without her husband. It is, however, probably more accurate to say that her presence in Florence created a rallying point for those citizens discontented with the government and that it was pressure from them, or at least Soderini's fear of further embarrassment, that made the gonfaloniere amenable. With his approval the Signoria ordered the Otto to summon Filippo back to Florence without risk of violating the terms of his confinement and voted to allow him to remain for the entire month of December 1509. 50 Even though he had stayed in Naples less than one year, Filippo never had to return there, for he continued to receive a series of licenses to extend his leave until the expiration of his sentence. 47

48

49

50

Conspicuous at the time, however, was the absence of any letter or communication from Alfonso, and apparently other Strozzi still found Filippo's marriage hard to swallow. Marco Strozzi encapsulated this sentiment in a letter written from Rome on the day of the wedding,' I have become a perfect and good Ghibelline. I had been a Guelf, but this [marriage] has caused me to change in desperation. Enough of this. From these horns it is impossible to escape,' C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 55Ibid., 145, fol. 103. Malicious gossip that Clarice was unsightly had been circulating in Florence. Marco felt the same need to reassure the Ferrara relatives about her appearance, ibid., 134, fol. 55. On 26 March 1509 Lorenzo sent the jewels to Matteo in Rome who presented them to Clarice on 31 March, C.S., Ser. v, 87, Ricordo of 26 March 1509. Lorenzo Strozzi said that Soderini would not have permitted her to come had the majority of the Signoria not been in favor of it, Niccolini, p. xxiv. Nerli, 1, 162; Niccolini, p. xxiv; C.S., Ser. m, 220, fol. 99.

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4

Rise to favor

For Filippo, the conclusion of his marriage to Clarice de'Medici despite the opposition of Soderini was a personal victory. He had gained for himself a rich wife and for his family an important alliance with the Medici. He had escaped the clutches of the Quaranta and received a relatively light punishment at the hands of the Otto. The Signoria had lessened his sentence by allowing him to come back to Florence, and he was permitted to remain there under probation. But he had been back in Florence barely a year when his new-found security was seriously threatened. His boyhood friend, Prinzivalle della Stufa, with whom he had staged the Dovitia mime in 1506, tried to involve him in a plot to murder Soderini and overthrow the government to reinstate the Medici. One night, a week before Christmas 1510, Prinzivalle arrived in Florence from Bologna where he had frequently visited Cardinal Medici, papal legate to that city. l He came straight to the Strozzi palace to confide in Filippo, who he supposed would be sympathetic to the plot, since Strozzi was a Medici parente and had ample reason to dislike Soderini. Prinzivalle informed Filippo that their mutual friend and childhood companion Marco Antonio Colonna, now a condottiere in the pay of the pope, was waiting outside the city's gates with a band of loyal men ready to enter Florence and strike down Soderini at some public event during the holidays. Filippo flatly refused to participate in the plot. He reacted quickly, first by warning Prinzivalle to leave town immediately, and then by reporting the incident to Leonardo Strozzi, who was a member of the Council of Ten, and to his first cousin Matteo. The next morning they all went to Soderini and revealed the previous night's events.2 Filippo's refusal to cooperate with Prinzivalle and his disclosure of the plot to the government not only effectively terminated the conspiracy, but probably saved Soderini's life. Presumably he considered involvement in 1

2

Prinzivalle was one of the young Palleschi. His father Luigi had been a close friend of Lorenzo il Magnifico, Guicciardini, Storie, pp. 77-78; Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 352-353. The accounts of the conspiracy in contemporary histories include: Cambi, 11, 243-248; Cerretani, Istoria, fols. 355V-362; Nardi, 11, 11—13; Nerli, 1, 167-168; Piero Parenti, fols. 45-47; Niccolini, pp. xxvi-xxix; Luca Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. Iodoco del Badia (Florence, 1883), pp. 304-305; see also Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' pp. 352-356.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici the scheme too dangerous. Nor did he have complete confidence in his friends' ability to succeed in their plan. By reputation neither Prinzivalle nor Marco Antonio was the sort of man to be trusted with such a risky venture, and Filippo who had known them intimately was well aware of their deficiencies. Twenty-six-year-old Prinzivalle was commonly considered hot-headed by nature and possessing only mediocre qualities, and Marco Antonio was thought rather bizarre and crazy.3 A second equally important reason why Filippo refused to cooperate must have been his decision not to jeopardize his own delicate legal position in Florence. He was still subject to the terms of the three-year sentence imposed by the Otto, and to have joined in Prinzivalle's scheme would have meant violating the terms of his probation at the risk of permanent exile and confiscation of his property. Soderini reacted to the report of a plot against his life in much the same way as he had reacted to the news of Filippo's parentado with Clarice. He tried to use it to his best political advantage to bolster his party and to influence the coming elections in the Great Council, but this time he met with even less success than before. For despite his heated denunciations of the plot and his best efforts to capitalize on the public outcry, his political opponents were still potent enough to prevent more than light punishment for the Delia Stufa family and to insure that no one else was prosecuted. Not even the Medici in-laws, obvious suspects, endured more than routine questioning. Perhaps the most significant outcome of the conspiracy was that it marked a complete breakdown in relations between Soderini and the pope, whom Soderini implicated as Colonna's employer and Cardinal Medici's benefactor.4 Soderini sent troops to the Florentine borders and renewed a provision of 1495 which prohibited any Florentines in Rome from associating with the exiled Medici. Not long after this, he bowed to pressure from both the French and his brother the cardinal of Volterra and effectively sealed his own fate by permitting the schismatic Council of Pisa to meet on Florentine soil. Filippo's conduct regarding Prinzivalle's conspiracy left him in a paradoxical position. On the one hand his prompt move to expose the plot should have ingratiated him with the gonfaloniere, but he was never entirely freed of suspicion because the facts remained that he was still a Medici parente, that he had been considered a likely comrade by the conspirators, and that when Prinzivalle approached him he had purposely delayed long enough to allow his old friend to escape before going to the authorities. On the other hand Filippo found his relations with his in-laws strained, 3 4

Cerretani, Istoria, fol. 355v; Niccolini, p. xxvi; C.S. Ser. HI, 134, fol. 162. Cardinal Medici swore his innocence to the Florentine ambassador, Dieci, Resp. 102, fol. 455, cited in Bertelli, 'Pier Soderini,' p. 353.

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Rise to favor for by his actions he had saved Soderini's life and prolonged the regime the Medici hoped to replace. The galling irony of the situation did not escape public attention, and Tosinghi, the Florentine ambassador in Rome, taunted Cardinal Medici with the fact that his own relative, one whom he regarded as a son, had thwarted the conspiracy designed to reinstate the Medici in Florence.5 Whether Cardinal Medici was angered is difficult to say, but Filippo's refusal to participate in the plot did make it clear at the time that he was not yet willing to risk his life and well-being for the sake of his wife's family. And the question remained open, just what would he be willing to do to help his in-laws in the future? In August 1512 when, at the urging of Pope Julius II, Cardinal Medici made his return to Florence by force, Filippo had no part in the ensuing revolution and expulsion of Soderini.6 He was quite obviously not among those Palleschi the Medici consulted about their plans, nor was he one of that group of young men who plotted fifth-column activities inside Florence. Was it reluctance on his part, mistrust by the Medici, or was Filippo still too vulnerable as a result of the 1510 conspiracy? According to Lorenzo Strozzi, his brother's opposition to Prinzivalle's plot was precisely the reason why the leaders of the 1512 schemes, Paolo Vettori, Bartolomeo Valori, Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, and Giovanni and Palla di Bernardo Rucellai, did not include him in their plans to overthrow the government and why even Filippo's good friend Giulio de'Medici had cautioned the young men against seeking Filippo's confidence.7 Although the Medici did not trust Filippo to help in their restoration, neither did Soderini consider him a safe ally. The Spanish army led by Cardinal Medici and his brother Giuliano had made its way from Bologna through Florentine territory towards Prato. On 26 August ambassadors 5 6

7

Died, Resp. 102, fols. 461V-462. Of all the contemporary authors who wrote on the events of 1512, not one mentions that Strozzi had any part in the revolution. Giulio de'Medici had held secret meetings with Paolo Vettori and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi near Siena, Niccolini, p. xix; Pitti, 'Apologia,' p. 311. According to Nardi, 11, 10-11, Giulio maintained a correspondence with the conspirators in the city by means of a contadino who would hide the messages in the most private parts of his body and deposit them in a chink in the cemetery wall of Santa Maria Novella. Niccolini, p. xxix. The conspirators were from noted Palleschi families and included several of Filippo's good friends such as Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, Niccolo Orlandini, Gino Capponi with whom he had confided about his marriage, and Benedetto, son of Filippo Buondelmonti. Other members of the group were Francesco and Domenico di Girolamo Rucellai, Giovanni Vespucci, Simone Tornabuoni, and other Tornabuoni relatives. See Guicciardini, Carteggi, ed. Roberto Palmarocchi (Bologna, 1938), 1, 95; Nardi, 1, 427-428; Pitti, 'Apologia,' p. 311, his 'Storia fiorentina,' published in A.S.I., Ser., 1, vol. 4, part 2 (Florence, 1853), 99-102; and especially Nerli, 1, 172-175 who identifies the young men with the well-known group of literati who had met together in Bernardo Rucellai's garden. Nerli's association of the political opponents of Soderini with the Orti Oricellari group has inspired modern scholarship on the subject, in particular Felix Gilbert's article, 'Bernardo Rucellai and the Orti Oricellari? Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, xn (1949), 101-131; Devonshire Jones, pp. 56-59; and Albertini, pp. 67-85.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici from the Spanish viceroy Cardona outlined their peace terms to Florence. Nothing short of the removal of Soderini from office and the restoration of the Medici would satisfy them.8 In Florence Soderini stood firm against capitulation, but his resolution engendered increasing criticism, especially from those who saw in his reluctance to step down a needless exposure to attack and plunder by the Spanish. This mounting unrest coupled with the sabotage of an ammunition shipment designated for the defense of Prato prompted Soderini and the Signoria to order the imprisonment of forty citizens suspected of being Medici sympathizers, among them Filippo Strozzi.9 Their imprisonment lasted only a few days because on 29 and 30 August the Spanish took and sacked Prato, increasing the pressure on Soderini to abdicate in order to save Florence from a similar fate. By Tuesday, 31 August there was no other alternative to surrender. The band of youthful conspirators, led by Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, who had been plotting to oust the gonfaloniere seized the square in front of the palace of the Signoria, entered the palace and persuaded the exhausted Soderini to leave, offering him a guarantee for his safety. Under pressure from these men the Signoria authorized the release of the prisoners, and shortly thereafter Soderini was voted out of office.1 ° With the removal of the gonfaloniere, the main obstacle to settlement with the Spanish disappeared, and the first action by the Florentines in control of the Palazzo was to summon the Palleschi and other leading citizens together to appoint ambassadors to the viceroy and papal legate to arrange the restoration of the Medici and payment of an indemnity to remove the Spanish army from Florentine territory.11 Filippo accompanied the three ambassadors who went to Prato to greet Cardinal Medici and the viceroy and sue for peace. It is doubtful that he had any significant role in the negotiations, but as a relative of the Medici it was proper that he be included among the citizens who escorted 8

9

10

11

Landucci, p. 322; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 148; Nerli, 1, 174-175; Nardi, 1, 420-421, 426-427. Soderini had tried to make a settlement with the viceroy who desperately needed food and money for his troops, but the negotiations broke down over the amount of money Florence would have to pay and over the problem of Soderini's remaining in office. From one of Filippo's letters we learn that Soderini had offered 130,000 ducats to the viceroy to withdraw his army, C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 67. Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 148; Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 101-102 identified Bernardo and his son Giovanni Rucellai and members of the Tornabuoni among those imprisoned. Filippo described how Soderini was ' check-mated' that day in a letter to Lorenzo in C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 67 and Bardi, p. 33. Bernardo Rucellai, Archbishop Pazzi, and Paolo Vettori were the three ambassadors. Filippo reported, ibid., fol. 67, that they had some difficulty agreeing on the indemnity. The Florentines wanted to pay as little as possible, but since Soderini had previously offered 130,000 ducats, the viceroy was unwilling to settle for anything less. Filippo wrote on 4 September that the final agreement would be for 120,000 ducats or more, which figure is confirmed by Cerretani. See C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 69 and Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 149. Nardi, 11,13 said that the viceroy was eventually paid 150,000.

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Rise to favor the city's emissaries. For his own private reasons, too, Filippo was anxious to present himself to the cardinal and congratulate him on his imminent return to Florence. Even after the ambassadors had struck the accord and had committed the city to pay 120,000 florins ransom to the Spanish army,12 Florence's troubles had barely begun. The resignation of Soderini had left the city without an executive head and the terms under which the Medici were to return to Florence were still unclear, so that the most difficult problem now facing the citizens was how to reform the government to reflect the new political realities. In fact, the uncertainties of the critical first two weeks after Soderini's departure only resolved themselves on 17 September when the Medici resorted to the drastic measure of calling a par lament 0 to abolish the Great Council and impose their own government by Balia.13 The problem of factionalism among the ottimati which delayed a political settlement and which was a primary cause of the instability of Florentine institutions in this period has been discussed in a previous chapter, but at this point it will be helpful to focus upon its effects on Filippo Strozzi and his family. Not only is their case well-documented, but also in many ways the Strozzi's reactions during this period of flux were typical of other Florentine noble families. At best, Filippo's family was uncertain as to the 12

13

According to Filippo, the agreement required the city to pay 40,000 florins immediately, made up of 30,000 in cash and 10,000 in cloths, C.S., Ser. HI, 178, fol. 69. Piero Parenti, fol. 80 describes the difficulties the city had in raising the money and how even after imposing several accatti, it had to borrow on the exchange from Florentines living in Rome and Naples at a loss. In the space of four months between August and November Florentines were forced to raise over 175,000 florins in accatti and on the exchange, Balie, 43, fols. 6v, 7, 27V-28, 57V-58. Officials experienced considerable difficulty in raising the money. Despite the large contributions of families like the Strozzi for the two accatti of 21 August and 21 September, over two thousand citizens had to be asked to contribute, some of whom were still delinquent in their payments over a year later, ibid., fols. 146V, 155V. Lorenzo and Filippo had been picked for the August accatto, C.S., Ser. m, 143, fol. 7, and in October members of the family paid 2,000 florins out of a levy of 17,500 florins. In addition, among another twelve parties who raised 12,500 florins are included Matteo, Lorenzo and Filippo, Balie, 43, fols. 40-41 v. Still, despite such a tremendous burden of forced loans, the taxes kept coming. In February 1513 the Balia approved a one-quarter decima and arbitrio to be levied six times during the coming year to raise money for the city, ibid., fol. 95V, and the new Monte officials were requested to loan 10,000 florins at 12 percent, ibid., fol. 99V. By April there were still some delinquents to the September accatto, fols. mv-112, and five new officials of the Monte for the year 1514 had to be appointed twelve months in advance to loan up to 25,000 florins, fol. 108. These revenues were just the beginning of a long line of taxes and loans needed to support the financial burdens imposed on the city by the Medici after 1512. In theory a parlamento was the means whereby in times of crisis the populace could meet in assembly in the Piazza delta Signoria to approve or disapprove by voice vote any proposed changes in the government. The Medici had first used a parlamento successfully in 1434 to recall Cosimo from exile, and in 1512 it was an easy matter to control the entrances to the Piazza with armed guards and to admit only their partisans who readily acclaimed the institution of government by Balia. See Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 153V; Nerli, 1, 185; Niccolini, pp. xxxii-xxxiii; Piero Parenti, fols. 81-82; Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 106-107. Nardi, 11, 5-6 said there were more Spanish soldiers and foreigners than citizens present at the parlamento.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici course of action to follow, and Filippo's correspondence clearly illustrates just how acutely they felt the ambiguity of the political situation even though they had a parentado with the Medici. The Strozzi, like many other ottimati, played a waiting game, for they were anxious to evaluate the new turn of events before committing themselves too firmly to what might turn out in the long run to be a losing position. It was a foregone conclusion that as soon as Soderini stepped down the Medici would become the dominant political force in any new government, but no one knew whether they would be content to exercise their influence in the guise of primi inter pares on the model of Lorenzo il Magnifico or be outright rulers, and no one knew how tolerant they would be of their adversaries. The uncertainty of the political situation meant that many ottimati found themselves straddling the fence for an uncomfortably long time. The Strozzi's position was further confused by the diverse political allegiances within the family which had already complicated Filippo's marriage negotiations with the Medici several years before. Filippo's half-brother Alfonso remained sympathetic to the Soderini government. Other family leaders such as his cousins Matteo and Leonardo would have favored reforming that government while still preserving the Great Council. Similarly, Filippo's brother Lorenzo, and at this point Filippo himself, favored the Council and certainly did not advocate a limited government imposed and controlled by the Medici.14 In the first few days after the revolution, Filippo clearly downplayed his parentado with the Medici and restrained himself from associating too openly with his in-laws. Upon his release from the Palazzo della Signoria on 31 August, he refused to join the group of Palleschi holding the palace and hurried home, not to emerge again until the disturbance was over. On 4 September Filippo wrote to Lorenzo, who had fled to Lucca with Alfonso immediately after Soderini's surrender, that the Medici had reproached him for not exerting himself more on their behalf but that he had refused all their requests that he join with the armed guard.15 Filippo's reluctance to commit himself completely to the Medici cause followed from his own cautious assessment of the political situation in that first week after their return. In his opinion, under the moderate political reform then being propounded, those men who had shown themselves strongly in favor of the 14

15

C.S., Ser. in, 143, fols. 6-7; 178, fol. 68. This was also the belief of men like Jacopo Salviati, Bernardo Rucellai, Piero Alamanni, Giovanbattista Ridolfi, Lanfredino Lanfredini and Archbishop Pazzi who, although they had supported the return of the Medici, developed into a more moderate wing of the Palleschi party in opposition to those who wanted to abolish the Council altogether and institute a very restricted government. See especially Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-153; Nerli, 1, 179, 183, 191-194; and Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 104-106. C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 69 and Bardi, p. 36. The Palleschi maintained their guard and controlled access to the Palazzo during the first week after Soderini's ouster. See Landucci, p. 325; Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 103-104; and Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 150.

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Rise to favor Medici would be unpopular in the new government, or in his words, 'he who has toiled [travagliato] the most, I believe now will wish to do less.' 16 Filippo's decision to remain neutral with his in-laws met with Lorenzo's approval: Since you are too young to participate in the deliberations of the city, I would counsel you to exert yourself [travagliare] to the least possible extent, because you have the advantage of always being accepted willingly; and [do this] especially until such time as the situation becomes stabilized. I know you are prudent, and if your ambition does not overrule your reason, you cannot go wrong. But do not be surprised, for affairs like these can bring ruin (and God help us that it does not happen now) and I understand there are some others who are exerting themselves more than seems wise to me. 17 He also warned Filippo not to contribute more to the accatto, or forced loan, than other citizens so that he would not appear to be over eager. 18 In the short run, the Strozzi's choice not to encourage the Medici openly and to support the retention of the Great Council seemed proper, especially when the moderate reform program keeping the Great Council was actually approved by Giuliano de'Medici. But unfortunately for its supporters, this government was destined to be no more than an interim measure. When the new gonfaloniere Giovanbattista Ridolfi dismissed the Medici's armed guard from the Palazzo, this so upset those Palleschi who had committed themselves openly to the return of the Medici that they scurried to consult with Cardinal Medici in fear for their own and his family's safety. 19 A debate ensued among the Palleschi with Cardinal Medici over whether to call a parlamento and restructure the government. Between 9 and 15 September Filippo was in attendance at the Medici court in its movements between San Antonio, Campi, and Prato where a series of sessions with relatives and friends took place. 20 Filippo had kept Lorenzo informed of developments and at one point felt sure that Cardinal Medici would approve the existing government with the Great Council. 21 16

17 18

19

20

21

C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 69 and Bardi, p. 36. Filippo's analysis is supported by Nerli, 1, 183, who said that the ardent Palleschi feared that once the Spanish army left the area, they themselves would be thrown out of Florence and totally ruined. C.S., Ser. i n , 143, fol. 7. Ibid., fol. 7. Lorenzo had already paid 150 florins to the August accatto, and he wanted Filippo to be sure he did not pay more than an additional 150. Later, in fact, they paid much more. Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 150-152; Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 104-105; Nerli, 1, 183; Niccolini, pp. xxx-xxxi. Filippo was well aware of Palleschi dissatisfaction, C.S., Ser. i n , 178, fols. 67V, 69V. T h e earliest meeting between disgruntled Palleschi and the cardinal occurred in Prato within only a few days of the ejection of Soderini, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 150. Since Filippo had been in Prato with the ambassadors he probably obtained his early impressions of Palleschi discontent at that time. Further discussions over the next week were held at Campi and S. Antonio del Vescovo just outside the city walls; C.S., Ser. i n , 178, fols. 68, 90. Also Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 104-105. C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 68.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici But what he saw in the course of these meetings soon made it abundantly clear that he had better change his own stance and exchange his previous aloofness for cooperation with his in-laws. He began openly to seek out the company and counsel of his friend Giulio de'Medici and of Clarice's brother Lorenzo. To please the Medici he even entertained the duke of Traietto and other Spanish officers in the Strozzi palace when they came to Florence at the cardinal's invitation. He also began to worry about his brothers' conspicuous absence and wrote them to prepare to return to the city for the sake of their family: As soon as I have heard the outcome I will let you know so that you can return immediately, and then it will look as if you left [Florence] to escape the tumult and not out of fear of the Medici. But even though now there seems to be no reason for us to fear their hatred any more so than that of any other well-placed person, still, while we are able, it is better to avoid it altogether. Tell Alfonso the same, and beg him to come back for his own and for our sake.22 The final stage in Filippo's change of heart came when he agreed to do for the Medici what previously he had refused. On 17 September he took up arms and came to the Piazza della Signoria together with Palleschi and Spanish soldiers to hold it for the Medici during the parlamento. A week before Filippo had not believed it possible, but now he witnessed the Palleschi assembly in the Piazza abolish the Great Council and institute government by Balia. In a letter the next day to Lorenzo, strongly hinting at his own acquiescence to the inevitable, he explained that the cardinal had decided to stage the parlamento only after securing the approval of a majority of the citizens he had consulted.23 Filippo renewed his plea that his brothers return immediately and reassured them it was safe because the Medici had ordered no reprisals, or, to use his expression,' not one chicken has had its head chopped off.'24 When the list of the members of the new Balia was made public, no Strozzi were among them. Nor, to their intense consternation, were any added several days later when the Balia's numbers were enlarged, even though the Strozzi were a more prominent family than many of those appointed. They could not have expected to be heavily represented in the new Medici government, but, given both their prominence and Filippo's parentado, they certainly did not anticipate being completely excluded. Baroncello Baroncelli, long-time trusted employee and friend, wrote to 22 23 24

Ibid., fol. 68. Ibid., fol. 90 and Bardi, p. 37; Niccolini, pp. xxxii-xxxiii. The Medici continued to maintain a guard in the Piazza and installed four big artillery pieces outside their palace, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 154.V. C.S., Ser. in, 178, fol. 90 and Bardi, p. 37. Filippo was not the only one to exhort Lorenzo and Alfonso to return at this point. Baroncello Baroncelli and Donato Bonsi, close family friends, wrote to the same effect on 20 September, C.S., Ser. m , 134, fols. 76, 77.

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Rise to favor Lorenzo on 20 September: 'In truth it seems strange to me that there is no one from the Strozzi [on the Balia], but perhaps one could venture to say there are reasons since the family showed itself to be a bit cold, or rather slow to respond to their [the Medici's] favors.'25 Lorenzo Strozzi recounted a revealing incident in which one Strozzi relative accosted Filippo in front of the Strozzi palace after the nomination of the Balia and said,' Since with this Balia your Medici have shown us that they do not consider our parentado with them to be worth anything, if I were you, I would pack that wife of yours Clarice off home to them.' 26 The Medici had evidently not forgotten the Strozzi family's long tradition of opposition to their house, nor did they entirely trust them either. A glance at the records of the Balia in the first month after its creation shows that no Strozzi was appointed to any of the major councils, not to the enlarged Balia of 19 September, to the Otto di Balla of 18 September, to the Twelve Procurators of 28 September nor to the accoppiatori or the Died di Liberia e Pace named on 19 October. Nor was Filippo included in the group of young men who, in reward for aiding the Medici, were declared eligible for public office despite their youth. 27 The Medici had vaguely promised that the Balia would be enlarged again to satisfy more citizens, and apparently the Strozzi still hoped to have a family member within its ranks then, for Baroncello wrote: ' People say that they will make another addition [to the Balia] and perhaps sometime someone from the family could be included. If only one person should be chosen, perhaps it would be messer Antonio; if more than one, I believe it would fall to Matteo and Leonardo.' 28 The Strozzi were not the only ones disappointed to find themselves excluded from government. Parenti reported noticeable discontent in all the noble houses who had enjoyed a place in the Great Council for the past twenty years but who were excluded from the smaller Balia.29 But once it was clear that the Medici meant to retain control of the city, these ottimati hastened to ingratiate themselves with the cardinal and Giuliano. Within three days of the parlamento, on 20 September, Filippo led a delegation of six Strozzi from different branches of the family to call on the cardinal 25

26 27

28

29

Ibid., fol. 76. The list of members is in Balie, 43, fols. 2v, 5V. Those appointed from the Strozzi's quarter of Santa Maria Novella included representatives of the most prominent ottimati families residing there, making the Strozzi conspicuous by their absence. Niccolini, p. xxxiii. Balie, 43, fols. 2, 5V, 4V, 15V, 3or, 3ir. It came as no surprise that the list included many of the young men who had forced the resignation of Soderini. The seven were Bartolomeo Valori, Giuliano de'Medici, Maso di Luca degli Albizzi, Benedetto Buondelmonti, Giovanni Vespucci, Antonfrancesco di Luca degli Albizzi, and Francesco Antonio Nori. C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 76. Matteo was not added to the Balia until May 1514, Tratte, 52, unnumbered. Leonardo made it on the Council of Seventy that year, but Filippo's brother Lorenzo did not become a Balia member until July 1522, Tratte, 54, vol. 6v. Antonio never got on the Balia. Piero Parenti, fol. 83 and likewise Pitti, 'Storia,' pp. 107-108; Nerli, 1, 191-194; and Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 153, 157.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici and rejoice in the name of the whole Strozzi clan over Filippo's parentado with Clarice and the Medici's return to Florence. Leonardo and Matteo Strozzi had already presented themselves earlier, apparently to discuss the Strozzi's political role in the new regime to judge from the good words and promises they received in return.30 For their part, the Medici realized the necessity of placating the citizens and winning new friends whose allegiance would help buttress their regime. The cardinal and his brother Giuliano patiently endured hours of interviews to reassure families like the Strozzi of their good intentions. After the Strozzi delegation had their interview, Baroncello reported to Lorenzo Strozzi, I understand that he [Cardinal Medici] received them willingly and made a show over them. He told them he had not given it [the parentado] just to Filippo but to the whole family and that they should feel free to call upon him at any time and that he would be most prompt to do everything in his power for them. He said many words of great affection to them and it seems they came away highly satisfied.31 Filippo began to frequent the Medici palace regularly and was often seen in the company of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici and of his good friend Giulio. The bonds of friendship among them seem to have been unaffected by the recent political events. In the first days after the Sack of Prato, Giulio took it upon himself to ransom a Strozzi relative, Zaccheria Strozzi, from the Spanish for thirty ducats. 32 Giulio had guided Filippo's rapprochement with the Medici in the last days before the parlamento, and, according to Lorenzo Strozzi, he had even offered to intercede with the cardinal on Filippo's behalf to have him appointed one of the new Otto di Balia, although technically he was too young to be eligible for office.33 Filippo, however, was not included on the Otto, and in the aftermath of the revolution of 1512, neither he nor his family held any special position in the state. His importance to the Medici had decidedly diminished in comparison to 1508 when his parentado with Clarice had signified for them both a reconciliation with a powerful family of former opponents and a step forward in their efforts to return to the city. In 1512 the Medici had achieved their goal of returning without the Strozzi's help, and their 30 32

33

3I C.S., Ser. HI, 134, fol. 76. Ibid., fol. 76. Another Strozzi, Marcello, was not so fortunate when he fell into the hands of the Spanish soldiers. Filippo wrote on 2 September, C.S., Ser. 111,178, fol. 67, that he was doing all he could on Marcello's behalf, but that the case was complicated because it was not clear just who was holding him captive and because even though Marcello was not wealthy, his in-laws were. On 3 September, a friend wrote to Lorenzo and Alfonso that the price of Marcello's ransom had been set at 1,000 gold ducats but that some scoundrels had informed his captors that he was really worth 30,000 ducats, C.S., Ser. i n , 134, fol. 75. This is undoubtedly the Marcello Strozzi whose capture at Campi before the Sack of Prato is described in Nardi, 1, 422-423. Niccolini, p. xxxiii.

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Rise to favor coolness toward them had not gone unnoticed. Furthermore, Filippo's closest personal friends among the Medici, Lorenzo and Giulio, were not at the center of family power at the time. They could not exert as much personal influence on his behalf in comparison with Giuliano, who with Cardinal Medici headed the government and worked aggressively to benefit his own special friends in the early months of the regime. In fact, it was not until mid-October 1512 that we find any Strozzi in political office, and then Filippo, his brother Lorenzo, and Federigo Strozzi were only included in the enlarged body of over 200 citizens added to the Balia for the purpose of conducting the new scrutiny. Apparently this was no special honor because the number of members was so large that every reputable Florentine family was represented at least once. 34 Clearly after 1512 the price of political position was going to be cooperation with the Medici, and Filippo's family had barely begun the struggle to re-establish itself among the ottimati who could expect to enjoy high office. The progress they made in the years that followed the revolution of 1512 came largely as a result of Filippo's ascent at the Medici court. Filippo's rise within the ranks of the Medici party did not begin immediately. But two events took place in 1513 which catapulted him into the forefront of special Medici favorites, a position he was to enjoy for the next twenty years. The election of Cardinal Giovanni de'Medici to the papacy as Leo X in March 1513 and Giuliano's transfer from head of the government in Florence to the papal court at Rome the following summer altered the course of Filippo's life. The election of Leo X caused a shift of power within the Medici family and brought about the rise of young Lorenzo de'Medici to head his family's interests and the regime in Florence. Lorenzo's new prominence created the occasion for Filippo's sudden access to political power and financial reward. Filippo's relationship with Lorenzo de'Medici, commencing in 1508 at the time of his marriage, blossomed into an intimate personal friendship which lasted until Lorenzo's death in 1519. Their friendship shaped Filippo's adult career in several different ways. It thrust him into the innermost circles of the Medici's political power and patronage in Florence; it involved him directly in the financial affairs of the regime through the office of the Depository of the Florentine Signoria; and it introduced him to the French court, providing him with associations which were later to prove useful to his career as an international financier and papal diplomat. But most important for his later career, Filippo's close friendship with Lorenzo de'Medici secured him in effect an exit visa from Florence and 34

Balie, 43, fol. 25; Nardi, 11, 6. Finally that same month Matteo Strozzi received recognition by being named ambassador to the pope together with Jacopo Salviati, but, according to Nerli, 1, 191-192, his appointment was made only at the insistence of Salviati, who was engaged in a serious campaign to have a greater number of qualified citizens participate in office to enlarge the governing circle.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici an entree to the papal court and the world of papal finance where he could expand his interests and experience well beyond his native city and eventually beyond all Italy. Filippo accompanied Cardinal de'Medici to Rome in late February for the conclave summoned to elect Julius IPs successor, and he sent back to his family several reports of the exciting goings-on. Five days after the opening of the conclave, Filippo informed his brother of the agreement between Cardinal de'Medici and his one-time opponent Cardinal Soderini which made Medici the favorite candidate. Bookmakers that day placed Medici's chances at one to four and those of his nearest competitor at less than one to five. Filippo felt sure that either his cardinal would be elected or else would come so close that all would marvel at his great success. 35 The next day Medici's odds had fallen nine percentage points, but Filippo still held firm to his previous predictions.36 The proclamation on 11 March of the election of Cardinal de'Medici as Leo X was greeted with shouts oVPalle, Pallet37 and Florentines present in Rome were beside themselves with joy. The news reached Florence in only thirteen hours, and the city went wild with celebrations which lasted several days. Bells tolled continuously and bonfires flared. The sacred image of the Madonna da Impruneta was brought into the city in solemn ceremony, and allegories of the victory of peace over discord, war, and fear were displayed in triumphal carts.38 People considered the election of Leo X the best news Florence had ever received. Filippo exclaimed, 'How fortunate we are to be born in this century,' and his friend Francesco Vettori 35

56

37 38

C.S., Ser. in, 178, fols. 70, 84. Cardinal de'Medici was only thirty-seven years old and quite ill at the time of the conclave, reportedly with an abscess in his leg, which some said improved his chances of being elected because he was not expected to live long. See Paolo Giovio, Vita Leonis Xy in, p. 56, cited by William Roscoe, The Life and Pontificate of Leo the Tenth (London, 1876), i,35iC.S., Ser. i n , 178, fol. 84. Filippo listed the percentage odds of various candidates as follows: Cardinal San Giorgio, 18; Grimanni, 16; Strigonia, 13; Medici, 16; Flisco, 10; the rest from six on down. Betting on the outcome of papal elections was quite common and was often handled by the banking houses in Rome which employed sensali, or messengers, to scurry back and forth delivering betting slips. Bettors watched the odds closely, and on this day, for example, when Filippo quoted Cardinal Grimanni's odds at 16 in Rome, he requested his brother in Florence to place two bets for him there on Grimanni if he could get them at ten. He did this probably to cover another bet in Rome. Palle refers to the Medici device featuring six golden balls. Fifty-five hours and 500 miles later the news reached Lyons where there were great celebrations among Florentines. Sanuto, xvi, col. 36, says news reached Florence in just ten hours. On the celebrations in Florence following Leo's election, see Piero Parenti, fols. 8 5 - 8 7 ; Cerretani, Dialogo, fols. 161V-162; Landucci, pp. 335-336; Nardi, 11, 24; Nerli, 1, 197-198. On the special powers and cultic significance of the Madonna da Impruneta, see Richard C. Trexler, * Florentine Religious Experience: the Sacred Image,' Studies in the Renaissance, xix (1972), 7 - 4 1 . In a letter Baroncello wrote to Lorenzo Strozzi on 19 March 1513 reporting on the festivities in Florence, C.S., Ser. HI, 134, fol. 83, he mentioned that the Madonna had nine special vestments and other elaborate trappings. For a description of the triumphal carts, see Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 162 and Vasari's life of Jacopo Pontormo, Opere, vi, 250-255.

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Rise to favor wrote to Machiavelli that the election should bring Florence great honor in both public and private affairs. Leonardo Bartolini, one of the new pope's creditors, gushed,' For me it is enough that we have the most splendid pope in the last 400 years of the papacy.'39 In the midst of the jubilation few people were clairvoyant enough to recognize the full consequences for the city of the elevation of a Medici to the papal throne. With that election, Florence virtually ceased to be an independent entity pursuing her own separate political destiny, but found herself drawn into an extensive web of papal and ecclesiastical interests. Only a few citizens stood to enjoy the privileges of expanded patronage and career opportunities the election of a Medici pope brought them. But the city from now on had to shoulder the burdens which Leo's election entailed - above all, the crushing weight of providing continual financial support for papal wars. These negative effects were not seen in that glorious spring of 1513 when Florentines for the most part were too busy trying to twist the election to their own advantage to worry about such things. From the point of view of the Medici, the election had the immediate effect of solidifying their control over Florence and of diminishing the residual opposition to them among some of the citizenry. The Boscoli Conspiracy in which Machiavelli was implicated had been thwarted in the days before the conclave, and no other conspiracy against the Medici surfaced until 1522 following Leo's death.40 Initially at least, after Leo's election the Medici received no trouble from Florence. Their friends and foes alike were too intent on celebrating. The Strozzi were well represented at the festivities in Rome and were in close company with various members of the Medici family. Filippo, who was already present in the entourage of Cardinal Medici, took part in the coronation procession through the streets of Rome on 11 April. His brother Lorenzo travelled from Florence in the company of Giulio de'Medici, and even Alfonso Strozzi was among the forty young men outfitted in elegant suits of clothing worth over three hundred ducats apiece who made up the retinue of Giuliano de'Medici at the coronation.41 39

40

41

Letter to Lorenzo Strozzi, Rome, 17 March 1513, C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fol. 2. Similarly Vettori to Machiavelli, Rome, 30 March 1513, published in Niccolb Machiavelli, Lettere, ed. Franco Gaeta, Opere, vi (Milano, 1961), 237; Bartolini to Niccolo Michelozzi, Rome, 18 March 1513, B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 30. Nerli, 1, 196-197; Landucci, p. 334. That winter before the election the situation in Florence was tense, and the Otto had ordered arms to be taken from all citizens, Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. i6ov. Luigi Alamanni staged the unsuccessful conspiracy of 1522 against Cardinal Giulio de'Medici. See Cesare Guasti, 'Documenti della congiura fatta contro il cardinale Giulio de'Medici nel 1522,' Giornale storico degli archivi toscani, m (1859), 121-150, 185-232, 239-267. C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 83; 220, fol. 106. That April Archbishop Pazzi of Florence died, and Leo appointed Giulio in his place and also made him cardinal in June with the title of Santa Maria in Domenica.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici The festivities were not the only reason why Florentines scrambled to Rome at this time. Contemporaries quickly noted that the ecstasy of the Florentines over Leo's election was in large measure attributable to their gleeful anticipation of what they as fellow countrymen and some as relatives of the new pope could hope to gain out of this fortuitous event. The election opened the way for Florentines to profit in various ways, in ecclesiastical dignities, in merchant affairs, and from other business in Rome. Many Florentines moved there just to seek favors and benefices, and in pointed satire Pietro Aretino commented: Since the time of Constantine never have so many Florentines come to Rome. They travel from Florence shouting, 'Palle, Pallet each a relative of the pope.. .There are those who think to capture the bark of St Peter, others hisfisherman'snet or some great merchant venture. Among them are still more, willing to make themselves priests in order to obtain a benefice.42 The same ambitions were shared in high government circles, and the Council of the Ten expressed the wish in its official correspondence with the Florentine ambassador in Rome that,' His Holiness will be able to enjoy his pontificate in peace and we Florentines to enjoy those good things we expect to issue from it.' 43 Yet the Florentines' initial exuberance over the possibility of personal gain from the papacy could scarcely be matched in actual patronage awards. Consequently many were to be disappointed. In fact, the Florentine favor-seekers had never been realistic in their expectations, and there were simply too many requests for the limited number of posts and titles available. Leonardo Bartolini, who was handling Leo's personal finances in Rome, realized this within two weeks of the election and wrote back to Florence on 24 March 1513, 'Such a brigade has arrived here that there is no satisfying them all, and even if we wanted to gratify a mere ten percent, we would soon go bankrupt.'44 Two months later Francesco Vettori, the ambassador, conveyed the same message to his brother Paolo who was frustrated in his attempts to secure some income-producing office from the new pope:' If you considered how many relatives, how many servants, and 42

43

44

The sonnet is published by Domenico Gnoli in Giornale storko delta letteratura italiana, xxn (1893), 263. Ludovico Ariosto also composed a delightful satire on the same subject, Satire, ed. Mario Ferrara (Florence, 1932), pp. 44-45. See also Nardi, 11, 24; Piero Parenti, fols. 85-86; and Pitti, ' Apologia? p. 321 for similar comments. Acquisti e Doni, 353, fol. 92. Nerli, 1, 197-198, saw the Florentines' hope for gain as the explanation for the political calm in the city. He is also the only contemporary historian who told of any discomfort over the election in the minds of a few citizens who feared so much greatness in the one family of the Medici. B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 31. In the same letter Bartolini also noted that some Florentines who were anxious for positions and titles were bidding higher and higher for them against each other.

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Rise to favor how many friends the pope has, you would realize how impossible it is to get anything at all from him. . .' 4 5 Even when Leo had been willing, in some instances it was simply not possible to grant the requests received. In March he had apparently toyed with the idea of enlarging his household staff by bestowing extra titles of familiares on deserving petitioners. But many of those appointments could not be carried out because the proposed expansion in the number of familiares would have decreased the value of the already existing offices and was vehemently opposed by the clerks of the Chamber who deemed the proposal uneconomical.46 Many Florentines had unrealistic hopes of receiving curial offices and titles without having to pay commensurate prices for them. Even some of those Florentines who were most deserving of patronage in terms of their political assistance in the Medici's return to Florence in 1512, such as Paolo Vettori and Antonfrancesco degli Albizzi, could not afford the cost of the offices they desired. Vettori had wanted part interest together with Antonfrancesco in the pope's alum mines at Tolfa, or the decima scalata of the English clergy strictly for himself, but could not raise the necessary money to purchase rights to them. 47 Albizzi learned the hard way how difficult it was to acquire ecclesiastical tax farms. He had negotiated secretly with Leo for the rights to the dogana of the Patrimony of St Peter held by the Sauli bank under Julius II, which no one else had thought to request since the Sauli's contract did not expire for another two-and-a-half years. Albizzi obtained Leo's signature on his supplication for a three-year contract for the dogana which included the unusual provision that he would not have to pay anything for it in advance. But as soon as word of his prize leaked out, the Sauli, and others as well, began to offer the pope much better terms along with the promise of immediate payment. In an unheard of procedure, Leo revoked his signature on the supplication and took the office away from Albizzi. He offered to compensate the disconsolate man with 4,000 ducats which the Florentine at first refused, and then, when he finally decided to accept the offer, found it reduced by a quarter.48 45 46

47 48

C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 2i8v, letter of 13 May 1513. Vettori revealed this information in his letter to Machiavelli of 30 March 1513, Lettere, ed. Gaeta, pp. 236-237, to explain why his brother T o t o did not get the place on the pope's household staff he had been promised. Even the colleges of venal offices, such as the College of the Janissaries and later the College of the Knights of St Peter which were specially created to pay regular dividends to their title holders, had assigned incomes from ecclesiastical revenues to fund them. Any growth in the number of title holders which was not matched by an increase in assigned revenues decreased the value of each title or share. C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fols. 218, 229; B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 31. Filippo gives a very entertaining description of Albizzi's predicament in a letter to Lorenzo Strozzi of 18 May 1513, C.S., Ser. i n , 178, fol. 57, only part of which has been published in Bardi, p. 16. According to Vatican documents, the Sauli retained control of the dogana for another term beginning in October 1515 and paid 20,000 ducats for it and the Treasury of Perugia, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 144V. Filippo estimated that Albizzi would have been able to earn 12,000 ducats

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Favor and offices were quite obviously not given to just anyone nor to just any Florentine. Several criteria had to be met. First and most advantageous was to be a close relative of the pope, like Jacopo Salviati married to Leo's sister, or Filippo Strozzi married to his niece. Second, one should have been politically sympathetic to the Medici during the period of their exile before 1512. A third very important consideration in winning papal patronage was wealth.49 Particularly these last two considerations, and above all the third, help explain why so many Florentine bankers established in Rome did find favor and successfully acquired church offices. Francesco Vettori considered Jacopo Salviati the perfect example of the type of man who succeeded at court. He was the pope's brother-in-law, but he was also wealthy and did not have to stoop to beg for special favors. In addition, Salviati knew how to demonstrate his long-standing loyalty to the Medici in their presence, and, if the occasion called for it, his sympathy for their detractors behind their backs.50 Competition for offices was intense, and even Filippo, who filled the requirements of being a parente of the pope and of having money and who, together with his brother Lorenzo, was doing all he could to affirm the commitment of the Strozzi to the Medici cause, still had difficulty acquiring anything substantial. Quite obviously the Strozzi clan anticipated that Filippo would receive special treatment. As soon as the news of the election reached Ferrara, Giovanni Strozzi wrote a letter of congratulation to the Strozzi in Florence in which he assumed that Filippo would soon be doing business in Rome with partners of the Medici's choosing. Only half-jokingly he added that Matteo and Lorenzo Strozzi would now be well advised to study for the priesthood.51 Within days of the election, reports of patronage rewards had already begun to arrive in Florence, but much to the Strozzi's dismay, none of them included any mention of Filippo. In a letter of 14 March Lorenzo

49

50

in three years from the dogana had he been able to keep it, C.S., Ser. i n , 178, fol. 57. Albizzi received the governorship of Narni but eventually had to resign that too in favor of Cardinal Bibbiena, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 68, fol. 129. Leonardo Bartolini in a letter to Micheolozzi of 1 May 1513, B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 44, categorized three types of favor-seekers who thought they had legitimate claims on the pope: those who felt they deserved rewards for past friendships, others for having helped in the take-over of Florence and others because of their close blood and marriage ties. H e concluded that since his own chances for position and wealth were small, he was better off returning to F l o r e n c e : ' And with all this, I have been forced into the background and nothing is left over for me, neither titles, nor financial gain, such that I see myself forced to return to Florence'. ['Sono comparsi tanti in poste e per l'ordinario et chi gli pare meritare per amicitia e chi per havere renduto lo stato e chi per parentado in modo che anche di qua sono restato adrieto et non ci resta per me, ne titoli ne guadagno in modo sono forzato rivoltarmi di costa. . .'] Bartolini later came to understand the real power of money in obtaining favor. H e continued to be one of Leo's major creditors and by 1517 was able to purchase part interest in the very profitable three dogane of the city of Rome, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 172. 5I C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fols. 218, 219. C.S., Ser. m , 145, fol. 107.

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Rise to favor Strozzi gave Filippo some brotherly advice on how to be forthright and bold in his requests for patronage: Here it is rumored that the alum mines [of Tolfa] have been granted to Jacopo Salviati, although the source of that news is uncertain. The Depository [General] is said to have gone to the Sauli and it is the same for many other offices. But of you there is not one word; this astounds me and disturbs all our relatives as well. Some wonder whether your politeness is not getting in your way, for in such matters you must put aside conventional manners and be forthright. Do not hold back on anything that can help you get what you seek most of all. And since you are who you are and in other qualities you are equal to any other, it does not seem you should be denied your just demands. But remember this well: do not discuss your plans with too many people since each person is trying to further his own interests over those of others. Do not be afraid to go after the really big deals because you will not lack the support of either men or money... I have nothing else to tell you now other than to remind you to be bold and to abandon your usual good manners. Otherwise, according to Madonna [Alfonsina], with whom I spend part of each day, you will have nothing. Here in Florence I am constantly in the company of one or the other of them [the Medici], and I solicit them as much as seems appropriate.52 The Strozzi's expectations, like those of many others, were not fulfilled quite as easily or quite as quickly as everyone had assumed they would be. Filippo had made several attempts to approach the pope, but a week after the election he wrote to Lorenzo Strozzi that he still had nothing definite in hand. He had set his sights on the office of depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber but had learned that Leo was disinclined to remove it from Julius IPs appointee, the Sauli bank of Genoa, because he was too indebted to Cardinal Sauli for help in his election. Furthermore, Filippo discovered that the other revenue-producing offices such as farmer of customs tolls or treasurer of a province in the Papal States and the like had all been contracted out under Julius II and would not be free for at least a year or even two. Still he felt optimistic that something would come his way. Yet by mid-May Filippo had nothing and did not know whether he would be staying on in Rome or returning to Florence empty-handed. 53 Filippo was not to acquire any offices or tax farms for another year, and for the time being at least, his future lay in Florence, not in Rome. By the end of May it was decided that he should accompany his brother-in-law 52 53

Ibid., vol. 134, fol. 82. Ibid., vol. 108, fol. 2; 178, fol. 57. He hoped that when his mother-in-law Alfonsina arrived in Rome she would be able to assist him. Others felt Filippo at least was in a favorable position because he received a number of petitions seeking his aid in obtaining patronage. He was able to help his and Lorenzo's close friend, Lorenzo Cambi, acquire a title and income from one of the papal fortresses, vol. 108, fol. 150V.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Lorenzo de'Medici back to Florence in time for the June celebrations of the feast day of the city's patron saint, John the Baptist. No significant change occurred in Filippo's position within the power structure of the Medici family until later that summer of 1513 after Giuliano departed for Rome, leaving his young nephew Lorenzo in charge. The attractions of the papal court were too compelling, and Giuliano was not content to remain in Florence so far from the wealth and power that were his brother's in Rome.54 In Filippo's case the course of events showed that before he was able to acquire the less accessible but more prestigious and lucrative posts at the papal court which he desired, he first had to establish himself with the Medici family as a trusted and loyal partisan and build a firm base of support and favor within one branch of that family. In this sense, the preparations for his long career as a papal financier were begun not in Rome but in Florence, with the help of his brother-in-law Lorenzo. Beginning in the fall of 1513 there was an immediate improvement in Filippo's status and political fortunes and in those of the whole Strozzi family. Despite his youth, already in September Filippo's name was drawn as a candidate for the highest political office, gonfaloniere digiustiziay a sure sign of favor. The next month his older cousin Matteo had his name drawn for the priors, and the subsequent February Filippo's was drawn for the same office. Leonardo and Matteo Strozzi were the first family members actually to hold high office in this period when they were appointed to the newly reconstituted Council of Seventy.55 In the months that followed, the Strozzi continued to enjoy political favor, often at Filippo's request. In April 1514 Matteo Strozzi was added to the exclusive Balla, and Filippo wrote Lorenzo de'Medici a letter of thanks for obliging him in this way.56 Filippo himself served as one of the Festaiuoli di S. Giovanni51 to organize the city's celebrations of her patron saint in June which Giuliano and several cardinals attended as special honored guests. In August Leo was 54

55

56

57

Even the aging Bernardo Rucellai hankered after the position of Florentine ambassador to enable him to transfer to Rome, M.A.P., 108, fol. 127. Lorenzo de'Medici, despite his promotion to head of his family in Florence, would have also preferred to stay in Rome near his uncle the pope. In a letter of 29 October 1513 to Giulio de'Medici who had by then been promoted to cardinal and archbishop of Florence, Lorenzo described the expectations of a papal nephew, C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fol. 13: 'One sees so many examples of the good fortune of those who have been brothers or nephews of p o p e s . . . and because I am young and a papal nephew, I would be extremely upset were I not sustained by this hope.' Tratte, 52, unnumbered; 342, fols. 6v, 8v. The Council of Seventy was revived by the Balia on 22 November 1513, Balie, 43, fol. 149, and the election of its members took place 1 January 1514. On the Seventy, see Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 80-83. H e was added on 19 May 1514, Tratte, 84, fol. 6v; Tratte, 52, unnumbered. Lorenzo had agreed to give Matteo a personal letter, M.A.P., 141, fol. 22. Filippo's letter of thanks dated 21 April 1514 is in ibid., 116, fol. 285. M.A.P., 141, fol. 30; Tratte, 84, fol. 3.

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Rise to favor actively considering Filippo's brother Lorenzo for the position of Florentine ambassador to Rome to replace Francesco Vettori, and the same month Filippo requested Lorenzo de'Medici to have Carlo di Niccolo Strozzi seen for the Signoria, and so he was. 58 In fact, a survey of election documents shows that under the Medici regime from 1514 on, members of the Strozzi family continued to be considered regularly and to be seated in the top councils of state together with other friends and supporters of the regime. 59 In Lorenzo de'Medici's government which lasted until his death in 1519, Filippo enjoyed unrivaled prominence in Florence. No person was held in greater esteem, nor was any citizen in the city more important than he, so wrote his brother Lorenzo. 60 He was second only to Lorenzo de'Medici and his favorite among all the citizens. Filippo's marriage to Clarice in 1508 now took on a new hue, for it drew him into the very heart of Medici power in the city. No longer just one of a number of Medici in-laws, he was the close companion and only brother-in-law of the new leader of the city. Other Strozzi quickly recognized Filippo's unique status, and as early as January 1514, a distant relation Andrea Strozzi wrote to his son Piero, who was soon to return home from the Far East, the following appreciation of Filippo's stature in Florence: Filippo Strozzi has for his wife Clarice, niece of Pope Leo and sister of the Magnificent Lorenzo de'Medici, leader and master of this whole city. They love Filippo very much for his virtue and goodness and regard him highly because he is a parente. And our Strozzi clan continues to render good account of itself as you will see upon your return... You would be wise tofindsome souvenir to bring to Filippo, for such observances stand to benefit anyone who wishes to remain in Florence.61 58

59

60

61

M.A.P., 108, fols. 124, 128. Obviously the Medici did not regard the post of Florentine ambassador to Rome to be more than honorary since it did not require a ' homo fatto.' On 28 August Carlo Strozzi was selected for the Signoria, Tratte, 342, fol. 16. See Tratte, 342, for the extractions for the Tre Maggiori and Tratte, 177, for lists of office holders between 1500-1535 by quarter. The Strozzi lived in the gonfalone of Lione Rosso of Santa Maria Novella. On the list oiamici in B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 988, Matteo, Leonardo, Lorenzo and Filippo appear most often under headings of cittadini amici, cittadini che e bene remunerargli, confidanti, and principali cittadini delta citta. Niccolini, p. xxxv. Lorenzo Strozzi did not hesitate to attribute the Strozzi family's return to political good graces to Filippo's friendship and favor with Lorenzo de'Medici and to his constant efforts to have his family included in the political councils of the city, ibid., pp. xxxiv-xxxv. In 1517 Filippo requested that Lorenzo be seen for gonfaloniere and again in 1520, Copialettere di Goro Gheri, 11, fols. 300V-301; C.S., Ser. HI, 108, fol. 40. Tratte, 52, unnumbered, shows that Lorenzo was seen for gonfaloniere in October 1520. Other Strozzi drawn for the highest office included Leonardo in February 1516, Matteo in June 1519 and Antonio in October 1522. Filippo even tried to get his half-brother Alfonso back in Medici good graces and in 1519 was able to arrange for the return from exile of a distant relative, Giovanni, C.S., Ser. i n , 143, fols. 11, 15. Filippo's correspondence contains numerous requests for favors or for his intercession with the Medici from friends and dependents which only increased in number in later years. Florence, 29 January 1514, ibid., 82, fol. 96.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici But Filippo's eminence did not derive from the official channels of office-holding and membership in the political councils of the city. Rather it stemmed from what was of even more weight in this period, namely the less clearly delineated, unofficial channels of Medici family power. As we have already discerned, in Florence after 1512 office-holding indeed signified favor, but not necessarily power in the regime. The modern historian could search to his heart's content through all the Florentine election records and still not find any substantial evidence that Filippo Strozzi was any more influential in the government than those members of his family such as Matteo and Leonardo, and later Lorenzo, who frequently served in the top political councils. In fact, a study of the election records would seem to indicate that, if anything, Filippo was less important than his relatives, for his name never appeared among the members of the Council of Seventy, the priors, the Died or the Otto. At twenty-five years of age in 1514 he was really too young to be considered for those posts, and the only political office he did hold in Lorenzo's government was that of Monte official in 1516, 1518, and 1519, and then only when the city needed to borrow his money. 62 Furthermore, the very important financial function that Filippo exercised in the regime as depositor of the Signoria and Otto beginning in 1515 was performed de facto and not ex officio. No, in order to get an accurate appraisal of Filippo's position in Florence under his brother-in-law, we must look beyond the political records of the city to the private correspondence that has survived, particularly to Filippo Strozzi's own letters which are essential for the study not only of his own life, but also of the period in which he lived. These private letters provide the key to understanding Filippo's relationship with Lorenzo de'Medici, for they show that their friendship reached beyond a purely formal connection imposed on them by Filippo's parentado with the Medici family. They became genuine friends with a mutual affection for one another of the sort only possible between two contemporaries of roughly the same age who shared many similar interests. The seeds of their friendship had been planted at the time of Filippo's engagement to Clarice, and it ripened after the Medici returned to Florence in 1512. In 1513 when they were both in Rome to celebrate Leo's election and coronation, Filippo confided to his brother that he and Lorenzo de'Medici were so close that it seemed they had known each other from the cradle.63 Lorenzo for his part was equally devoted to Filippo. He 62

63

Tratte, 84, fol. 69V; Tratte, 177, unnumbered. On the list of amici in B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 988, fol. 87, Filippo's name appears under the heading of'Citizens to be appointed Monte official when there is need of money.' Filippo to Lorenzo Strozzi, Rome, 18 May 1513, C.S., Ser. i n , 178, fol. 57V. See also, M.A.P.,

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Rise to favor constantly desired his company and when Filippo was in Rome in 1514, Lorenzo sent him insistent messages begging him to hurry back.64 The two remained close during the whole period of Lorenzo's rule in Florence, and Lorenzo always required his brother-in-law at his side on all state occasions. In 1515 Filippo accompanied Lorenzo on his diplomatic mission to Francis I after the French victory at Marignano. Although he had been selected as one of the Florentine orators to the king of France, Filippo made it clear that his going to Milan with Lorenzo to pay respects to Francis I was prompted more by the wishes of Lorenzo than by those of the Otto di Pratica.65 In April 1517 when Lorenzo lay grieviously ill in Ancona suffering from a head wound he had received in the midst of the fighting around Urbino, it was Filippo he wanted near him. 66 The following spring Lorenzo chose Filippo to accompany him on an extended trip to the court of Francis I for the christening of the dauphin and to escort his French bride Madeleine d'Auvergne back to Florence. 67 And in 1519 during

64

65

66

67

108, fols. 131, 138; 116, fol. 285. Writing to Lorenzo on 8 November 1513 Filippo described his eagerness to return to Florence to be with his brother-in-law, M.A.P., 108, fol. 145: 'I am so impatient, I feel myself melting like wax. You are in my thoughts in my every waking moment and in my dreams at night. My body is here, but my soul there with you.' M.A.P., 141, fols. 19V, 22, 25V; Niccolini, p. xxxiv. The close companionship they enjoyed did not mean, however, that their relationship was similar to one between two close friends of equal standing in our modern sense, for it was very much in keeping with sixteenth-century hierarchical social patterns and with patron and client associations. Filippo always maintained a position of deference to Lorenzo's more elevated position as head of his family and of the state in Florence and was ever mindful of the importance of being in his good graces. Filippo addressed Lorenzo as ' Vostra Magnificenza^ in his letters, and in 1516, when Lorenzo was made Duke of Urbino, Filippo referred to him as 'Your Excellency.' See his letters to Lorenzo in M.A.P., 108, and Lorenzo's letters in

MAP., 141. M.A.P., 105, fol. 232V. On the embassy itself, see Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, pp. 117-120. A copy of the official instructions to the Florentine ambassadors, Filippo, Francesco Pandolfini, and Francesco Vettori, is contained in C.S., Ser. i n , 103, fols. 101-103. Filippo also kept account of his expenses as ambassador in C.S., Ser. v, 91. Filippo's introduction to Francis I in 1515 and this trip to the French court in 1518 were instrumental in the development of his business affairs in France and in involving him in the highest levels of finance at the French court through loans to Francis I and his finance ministers called 'the Generals.' Filippo opened a Lyons branch of his bank in 1517 and later stayed there during his self-exile from Florence in 1528. By 1520 he had over 26,000 scudi invested with the Generals, ibid., 99, fol. 86. By 1533 when he became Clement's nuncio to France, his loans to the French monarch had reached over 30,000 scudi, and Clement had a brief sent to France for Filippo trying to safeguard his outstanding credits with Francis I, A.V., Arm. XL, vol. 47, fol. 95. In a listing of his credits made before his death, those with France had climbed to 59,000 scudi, Niccolini, p. 338. In a letter of 7 April 1517, C.S., Ser. m , 49, fol. 35, Clarice instructed Filippo to take good care of her brother since his condition was further weakened by the 'malefranzese.1 Filippo remained with Lorenzo in Ancona for over a month until he was fit to travel. They arrived in France in April 1518 and did not return to Florence until August, ibid., n o , fol. 94; 108, fols. 9-10. Filippo had to stay with the bride in a small isolated castle at Ambois for weeks while Lorenzo was off hunting with Francis I in Brittany. He became bored with the idle life and courtly manners and the daily language lessons he had to give to Madeleine who knew no Italian, ibid., 180, fol. 109; n o , fols. 98, 101, 95, 96-97, 100; 108, fols. n - 1 2 , 9-10.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Lorenzo's lengthy final illness he permitted only Filippo and a few other intimates to attend him at the Medici villa of Poggio a Caiano where he died 4 May 1519. 68 Filippo's growing intimacy with Lorenzo showed itself most clearly in his changing political sentiments. His new posture after 1513 as Lorenzo's ' cosa' (man) and ' amico' marked a turning point in the evolution that had taken place in his relations with the Medici since 1508. After Lorenzo's ascent to power in Florence when Filippo became part of the small group of privileged friends and clients who surrounded him, he openly adopted the views appropriate to his role as amico stretto. He advised his brother-in-law how always to protect his own interests, to favor his friends to solidify their support and, whenever possible, to hurt his enemies in order to annul any opposition. Filippo's admonitions to Lorenzo are reminiscent of the counsel Machiavelli gave him in The Prince and included such injunctions as to maintain a golden mean or via di mezzo as a commander; to evaluate cautiously the actions and not just the words of men who claimed to be his friends; and, when expediency required it, to say one thing but to do another.69 Filippo also abetted Lorenzo's designs to increase his hegemony by enlarging the territory under his dominion. In 1514, prompted both by Filippo and by his mother Alfonsina, Lorenzo tried to wrest Piombino from the hands of its hereditary ruler Jacopo d'Appiano V. Leo X, however, preferred to secure the loyalty of d'Appiano through a marriage alliance with one of his nieces, Emilia Ridolfi. But when both the bride and groom fell deathly ill with fever, Filippo quickly saw the advantage to Lorenzo in this unforeseen bit of fortune. 'The matter is not yet closed; may God look out for us,' he wrote.70 With enthusiasm Filippo began to describe his grandiose vision of a domain for the young Medici. It would comprise not only Florence and Piombino, but also a state in the Kingdom of Naples which would come as the dowry payment of a yet-to-be-named Spanish 68

69 70

A month before his death when Lorenzo desired a change of surroundings, Filippo readied his own villa of Santuccio to receive the ailing man, ibid., n o , fol. 117. A week before Lorenzo died, his wife Madeleine also passed away after giving birth to Catherine de'Medici, future queen of France. Still the best critical treatment of Lorenzo is Hilde Reinhard's Lorenzo von Medici, Herzog von Urbino. See also A. Verdi, Gli ultitni anni di Lorenzo de'Medici; Rosemary Devonshire Jones' very good article on Lorenzo and the government of Florence, 'Lorenzo de'Medici, Duca d'Urbino,' pp. 297-315; and Giorgetti's articles in A.S.I. Franceso Vettori wrote a short laudatory life of Lorenzo for Clarice, 'Vita di Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino,' published in Francesco Vettori, Scritti storici e politici, ed. Enrico Niccolini (Bari, 1972), pp. 259-272. M.A.P., 108, fol. 123; 116, fol. 302; 105, fol. 150. M.A.P., 108, fols. 121-122. For a fuller account including documents of Lorenzo's maneuvers to acquire Piombino, see Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino e Jacopo V d'Appiano; also Devonshire Jones, 'Lorenzo de'Medici,' pp. 308-315.

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Rise to favor bride. Included in his schemes was a comfortable income of three or four thousand ducats from the states of the church. 71 In 1515 when Lorenzo next aspired to election as captain general of the Florentine forces, Filippo again gave him full support and worked in both Rome and Florence to realize their common goal. The election of a private citizen of Florence, and more especially of a Medici, to the supreme military command violated the city's constitution, and the prospect aroused the jealousy of other Medici parenti in Rome who feared Lorenzo would make himself signore of Florence in the same way as Francesco Sforza had seized Milan. Because Filippo was a driving force in the plan, he became the butt of their angry gossip. 72 Filippo's participation in Lorenzo's plottings to aggrandize his rule in Florence and subvert the constitution reveals how willingly he cooperated to further his brother-in-law's schemes and how closely he identified himself and had come to be identified with Lorenzo's interests by 1515. 73 Filippo fully understood the implications of this aspect of his life as a supportive and devoted client to his patron, and he acknowledged in a letter that he was willing to do his master's bidding. 74 However, the relationship was not entirely one-sided, for Lorenzo's growing power brought greater 7!

72

73

74

The possibility of several Spanish parentadi was being considered for Lorenzo at this time. One was an alliance with a nipote of Ferdinand of Spain, possibly with one of the daughters of his daughter Joanna, whose dowry would include a state in the Kingdom of Naples. The proposed parentado played a part in the treaty negotiations between Leo and Ferdinand in 1514. See Ludwig Pastor, The History of the Popes, trans. Ralph Francis Kerr (London, 1923), v n , 100-111. Failing that arrangement, Leo was also prepared to negotiate with Cardinal Luigi d'Aragona, Ferdinand's natural son, probably for one of his female relatives. In the letter of 10 September, Filippo informed Lorenzo of the proposed parentadi, M.A.P., 108, fol. 121. Another possibility Leo had been considering since the previous spring was a marriage to the daughter of Ramon de Cardona, viceroy of Naples, * I manoscritti Torrigiani,' A.S.I., xix (1874), ° 2 - I n January 1515 the arrangements were still being worked out, ibid., pp. 225, 227, but when Louis XII of France died the same month the diplomatic climate of Europe altered and they never took effect. See also Tommasini, 11, 77-78. Benedetto Buondelmonti reported the dissatisfaction among the Medici parenti in Rome in a letter of 19 May 1515, M.A.P., 108, fol. 146. Among those opposed to the election were Giuliano, Lucrezia and Jacopo Salviati, Contessina, Piero and Luigi Ridolfi, Giovanni Vespucci and Cardinal Bibbiena. See also Giorgetti, 'Lorenzo de'Medici Capitano,' p. 204. The gossip included reports that Filippo was not to be trusted because he was a member of the Strozzi family who were long-time opponents of the Medici and that he and his brother Lorenzo had had a falling-out over the issue of the election. They also raised last-minute opposition to his appointment as depositor general. At the time of the election of Lorenzo as captain general, there was criticism in Florence of his power-hungry favorites, 'whose thirst not even the Danube could quench,' Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 170. See also Piero Parenti, fol. 115 for a similar view. Letter to Matteo Strozzi, Rome, 17 December 1519, C.S., Ser. i n , 143, fol. 15: 'Hora sono chiaro in tutto, et sono aconcio a legare l'asino dove vuole el padrone.' ['Now everything is crystal clear to me, and I am ready to obey docilely.'] He actually wrote this line a few months after Lorenzo's death when Leo X and Cardinal Giulio de'Medici were considering loosening the reins of their control in Florence. Filippo, who was satisfied with the existing mode of government, hoped there would be no change, ibid., 108, fol. 14 bis.

83

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici opportunities to his deserving dependents to find rewards for themselves and for their own followers. A client's expectations of favor and profit in return for services to his patron was fundamental to the whole patronage network, and when Benedetto Buondelmonti wrote to Filippo that his own benefits derived from those of his signore, Lorenzo de'Medici, he was only enunciating the appropriate attitude of a client who anticipated some sign of favor in return for his devotion. 75 After Lorenzo gained control in Florence, Filippo began to reap tangible benefits from his loyalty. He successfully promoted the political fortunes of his family who returned to membership in the highest government councils in greater numbers than since before 1434; and, as he reached new heights within the regime in Florence, he found himself in a better bargaining position for the posts at the papal court which previously had been denied him in the early months after Leo X's election. Already in the fall of 1513 Filippo recommenced his quest for the Depository General of the Apostolic Chamber. But this time he had the very able support of his mother-in-law Alfonsina Orsini and of the new Cardinal Giulio de'Medici. Those seeking favor from Leo had to take into account the factions among the pope's close relatives whose foci were his sisters, Lucretia Salviati, Contessina Ridolfi, Maddalena Cibo, his sisterin-law Alfonsina Orsini de'Medici and his brother Giuliano. Each of these family members had relatively easy access to Leo and strove to further his or her own interests and to take care of the requests of their many clients. Frequently open competition broke out among them over a coverted position which gave rise to petty jealousies and bitter opposition to their rivals' designs. Filippo found himself in the middle of these intrigues when he began negotiating for the Depository General and for portions of several ecclesiastical tax farms. Since he belonged to Lorenzo's camp and was under the protection of Alfonsina and Cardinal Giulio, he was thrown into battle with two Medici in particular, Lucretia de'Medici Salviati and Giuliano. Lucretia fought Filippo tooth and nail for what she thought rightfully belonged to her husband Jacopo. Giuliano was jealous of Lorenzo and apparently wanted to thwart Filippo's designs for no other reason than because they reflected Lorenzo's own rise within the ranks of the family. These rivalries among members of the pope's family made it a tricky business to obtain patronage, and at the same time made it essential for Filippo to have a major advocate within the family with constant access to Leo X who would vigorously push forward his suits. Alfonsina Orsini filled that role of chief advocate for Filippo. However, 75

M.A.P., 108, fol. 146. For an appreciation of sixteenth-century client-patron relationships see Helmut Koenigsberger's article, * Patronage and Bribery during the Reign of Charles V,' Estates and Revolutions, Essays in Early Modern European History (Ithaca, New York, 1971), pp. 166-175.

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Rise to favor she promoted his candidacy for the Depository General in 1513 and 1514 for one ulterior purpose, and not at all because Filippo was her son-in-law and a favorite of Lorenzo. Rather, because Lorenzo was constantly short of money in Florence and his 400 ducat per month allowance from the pope barely sufficed to pay his household expenses, she wanted the Depository General under Filippo's control as a means of supplementing Lorenzo's income. 76 She advanced her schemes personally and through the offices of Cardinal Medici at every turn. She even made plans to move her household closer to the Vatican, because her normal residence, the Palazzo Medici, now Palazzo Madama, located in the center of Rome a mere mile's distance, kept her, she felt, at too great a distance from the pope. 77 But even with the best of intercessors and even though Leo had promised both Alfonsina and Cardinal Medici that Filippo should have the Depository, actually securing it proved still a thorny and protracted affair. For in the spring of 1514 new difficulties arose. Lucretia Salviati pleaded with Leo to award the Depository to her husband Jacopo so he could leave Florence and move to the more prestigious papal court. Rumours that Leo had agreed to oblige Lucretia sparked frenzied efforts by Alfonsina on behalf of Filippo and Lorenzo. The uncertainty delayed Filippo's departure for Florence in May for several weeks. 78 Leo himself, however, remained undecided what to do. Not only were Lucretia and Alfonsina hounding him with their separate suits, but he still did not feel ready to take the Depository away from the Sauli bank until he had compensated Cardinal Sauli with a substantial benefice. Finally Alfonsina's plea prevailed that the Depository was not merely for Filippo, but would help sustain Lorenzo as well, and in May Leo reassured her that Filippo would have the position pending compensation to the Sauli, but he made no firm commitment. That same spring Filippo saw the chance to invest in another ecclesiastical business venture, this time a tax farm. With the help of Alfonsina he tried to secure rights to portions of the salt tax of the papal province of the Marches, again for both his and Lorenzo's benefit. He calculated their investment would yield a healthy 2,000 ducats per year in profits and over an eight-year-contract period they would each glean a neat 8,000 ducats 76

77 78

M . A . P . , 114, fol. 23. Lorenzo's letters to R o m e in this period are filled with requests for money for his personal needs and to buy back Medici possessions and property in Florence that had been confiscated and sold when his father Piero was exiled twenty years earlier. See C . S . , Ser. I, 3 and M . A . P . , 141 and 107 passim. Alfonsina explained that the reason why she particularly desired Lorenzo to receive revenues from the Depository was because they were reliable income, 'Believe me, 4,000 florins income from R o m e are worth more than 10,000 from elsewhere because they are stable,' M . A . P . , 114, fol. 23V. Ibid., fols. 23V-24. Filippo's letters to Lorenzo de'Medici, R o m e , 2, 6, 8 (?) M a y , M . A . P . , 108, fols. 138, 137, 139. At one point L e o considered giving the Depository to Jacopo Rucellai and Jacopo Salviati and at another to Jacopo Salviati and Filippo.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 79

apiece. Leo, however, had promised the salaria to Piero del Bene, a Florentine banker in Rome, who was openly reluctant to diminish his profits by admitting any more partners.80 The animosity between Filippo and Del Bene over this issue grew so acrimonious that Filippo feared that should he and Lorenzo invest in the salaria under Del Bene's management, he might well do his best to mismanage their share. Del Bene, for his part, had obtained Giuliano de'Medici's support against Filippo and had tried to win over to his side Cardinal Pucci, later the grand penitentiary, a powerful figure at court and a favorite of Leo X. Pucci, however, when informed that the salaria would actually profit Lorenzo de'Medici and not just Filippo, declined to get involved. Both the issues of the Depository General and the salt monopoly of the Marches were settled that summer of 1514 in Filippo's favor. In July Del Bene lost his case and Leo pledged to revoke his contract for the salaria, promising Filippo a share. By that time, too, the pope had finally been able to compensate Cardinal Sauli for the Depository, and in early August Filippo could write to Lorenzo de'Medici that Leo had told Alfonsina that the office was his beginning in November. 81 Shortly thereafter in a remarkable show of favor towards Filippo, Leo personally baptized his and Clarice's new-born daughter, named her Maria, and chose two cardinals, Flisco and San Vitale for her godfathers.82 Had it not been for the important consideration of Lorenzo's income and interests, Filippo would never have fared so well. The year 1515 brought yet another important step upward for Filippo. Not only did he actually begin to operate the Depository General in Rome through the new banking company he opened there expressly for that purpose, but he also gained control of the Depository of the Signoria and Otto di Pratica in Florence. His appointment as depositor in Florence was an integral part of Lorenzo de'Medici's plans to increase his personal power, crowned by his election as captain general of the Florentines that May. Lorenzo aimed at placing men like Filippo who were loyal to him alone in positions of responsibility in the regime and removing the last of Giuliano's minions. We can trace the unfolding of this plan in the events leading up to Filippo's taking charge of the two Depositories in the summer of 1515 when Lorenzo phased out both Paolo Vettori and Galeotto de'Medici. Paolo Vettori, a friend of Giuliano's, had played a major part in easing the Medici's way back to Florence in 1512. In gratitude for his efforts, Leo 79 80

81

Ibid., fol. 136. M.A.P., 141, fol. 43; M.A.P., 107, fol. 45. This angered Alfonsina who complained to the pope about Del Bene's 'asinine behavior' and lack of devotion to the Medici house, ibid., fols. 45, 49. Lorenzo de'Medici urged that Del Bene be reprimanded and used as an example to others who presumed too much, ibid., 141, fol. 45V. 82 M.A.P., 108, fol. 134. C.S., Ser. m , 108, fol. 3.

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Rise to favor had appointed him depositor of the ecclesiastical decima in Florence, the proceeds of which he had granted to the city in November 1513.83 Paolo who was debt-ridden seems to have used the funds of the decima to shore up his own sagging credit. He proved recalcitrant when Lorenzo badly needed the decima funds for his own expenses and for those of the regime. Lorenzo complained to Cardinal Medici, who as archbishop of Florence had authority over the collection of the decima, that Vettori was making it impossible for him to get at the money. He had proof that the clergy had paid Vettori over 8,000 ducats, and yet only with great effort had he been able to pull 2,000 ducats away from him. Lorenzo charged openly that Vettori was misappropriating the commune's money, and in August he requested that the decima be paid straight to the Monte officials, bypassing Vettori. Filippo, who approved circumventing Paolo, spoke hotly against him with Lorenzo and other members of the family.84 In revenge, that summer when Filippo was making the final arrangements in Rome for the Depository General and for the salaria of the Marches against Del Bene, Vettori spread rumors in Florence that Filippo would not be getting the Depository and was in for a nasty surprise. Enraged by the reports of Vettori's lies that reached Rome, Filippo spitefully retorted to Lorenzo that he would enjoy nothing more than to be able to tell Paolo that he had come to Rome for two equally important reasons, to get the Depository of the Chamber for himself and to see that Paolo's Depository was taken away from him.85 Filippo succeeded on both counts. He obtained his Depository and got the pleasure of seeing Paolo's control over the decima funds severely restricted, greatly diminishing his influence and prestige.86 The case of Galeotto de'Medici paralleled that of Vettori in its outline and results. In August 1514, at the behest of Leo and Cardinal Medici, Galeotto was left to take care of Medici interests in Lorenzo's stead during his extended stay in Rome that fall and winter. Lorenzo also had Galeotto appointed depositor of the Signoria, according to Parenti, so that he could enrich himself at the same time as he kept watch over the commune's expenses.87 But when Lorenzo returned to Florence in May 1515 bearing 83

84 85 86

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C . S . , Ser. 1, 3, fol. 2ov; Piero Parenti, fol. 94V, mentioned that in July 1513 t h e Florentine ambassador had requested permission of the pope that Florence be allowed to keep the decima revenues. M . A . P . , 141, fols. 12, 15, 2 8 ; 107, fol. 2 5 ; 108, fols. 124, 128. Ibid., fol. 124. Ibid., fol. 128. T h e first 30,000 ducats collected from the decima would be paid to a separate depositor selected by the Monte officials, and then, from any money left over, u p to 5,000 ducats would go to Paolo. Paolo p u t himself further out of favor with L o r e n z o in F e b r u a r y 1515 when he said in public that L o r e n z o intended to make himself signore of Florence and had held secret meetings in R o m e with the pope a n d Cardinal Medici to that end. O n t h e 14th Pietro Ardinghelli wrote to Giuliano on behalf of L e o X and Cardinal Medici that he should r e p r i m a n d Paolo for his loose tongue, ' I Manoscritti Torrigiani,' p . 2 3 1 . Piero Parenti, fol. 105; M . A . P . , 108, fol. 27. L o r e n z o kept in close touch with Galeotto regarding

87

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Leo's reluctant approval of his plan to become captain general, he not only dismissed Galeotto as overseer but also replaced him in the Depository with Filippo. 88 Contemporaries were astounded at Galeotto's sudden fall since he had been well liked in the city for his benevolence, fair play, and wise counsel. But Lorenzo had been dissatisfied with him for not carrying out all his instructions from Rome. Also he probably suspected that Galeotto, because of his popularity, might become a rallying point for the many disgruntled citizens who disliked his own seignorial demeanor, his recent election as captain general, and his tightening grip on the government. Lorenzo wanted to have someone like Filippo whom he could trust and who was devoted to his personal interests in the position of depositor since, in his new dual role as captain general and head of state, he would need convenient access to the financial resources of the city, especially should there be war. Like Paolo Vettori, Galeotto was embittered against Filippo, calling him a man filled with flagrant vices who was not to be trusted despite his parent ado and pleasing manners.89 Contemporaries suggested that Galeotto, once having tasted power, was loath to relinquish it to someone else. 90 Galeotto's bitter reproaches confirmed that at last Filippo had worked his way to the very heart of the regime to the point where he had even replaced a member of the Medici family in Lorenzo's confidence. But more than a sign of favor, control of the Depository of the Signoria meant that Filippo had attained new power and responsibility in the state, for now he could manipulate the purse strings of the city. And as we shall see, he unhesitatingly manipulated them to serve Lorenzo's personal and political needs. Aside from being a ready cash box for Lorenzo, the Depository served as a device for concealing the liberal recourse of the Medici to communal funds, since the formal summary accounts presented by Filippo's agent to the Otto for approval frequently disguised the extent to which the public monies in his care had been used for their needs and those of their friends. The operation of the Depository was set up to protect Filippo because he exercised control over it two steps removed, through his business associate

88

89

90

the composition of the magistracies and other matters pertinent to the government and Medici interests. His letters to Galeotto are in M.A.P., 141, fols. 64-116. Leonardo Guidotti had been reappointed depositor in J u n e 1514, but by December Galeotto had replaced him, Otto, Cond. e Stant., 11, fols. 20, 2 1 . O n 28 January 1515 when he first wrote to Galeotto about his ambition, M.A.P., 141, fol. 94V, he said that Florence was to be the foundation of his realm and likened her to a breast he would suckle. Benedetto Buondelmonti to Filippo, Rome, 17-18 M a y 1515, M.A.P., 108, fol. 147. Buondelmonti's source of information was Bartolomeo Valori and not Bernardo Rucellai as Devonshire Jones claimed, Francesco Vettori, p. 112. Rucellai had died the previous year. M.A.P., 108, fol. 147.

Rise to favor and vice-depositor Francesco del Nero, 91 and behind the name of the titular depositor, Roberto de'Ricci. Throughout the difficult times of the war in Lombardy in 1515 and the War of Urbino in 1516-1517 when Florence had to spend hundreds of thousands of florins for military expenses, Filippo and Francesco ran it together. Through Filippo the Florentine Depository was drawn into the vast credit mechanism of the Strozzi bank, which in turn tied it in an open-ended fashion to the financial network of the church by way of Strozzi's control of the Depository General of the Apostolic Chamber in Rome. Having the two Depositories of Florence and Rome in the hands of one man made possible the transfer of war monies between the two governments and enabled large debts belonging to the pope to be written off onto the books of the commune. As long as Lorenzo was alive, Filippo's position in Florence was secure and his financial practices in the Depository remained unquestioned. When Lorenzo died in May 1519, not only did Filippo lose a close comrade and his most influential patron, but his death also opened the floodgates to an angry backlash against his regime and against his favorites, most especially Filippo. He became the subject of nasty rumors about how he and another favorite Francesco Vettori had hired extra guards, ostensibly to keep the peace in the event of an uprising after Lorenzo's death, but in fact as a pretext to insure their own personal safety. They were blamed for having urged Lorenzo de'Medici to make himself signore of Florence, again for their own aggrandizement.92 In the aftermath of Lorenzo's death, Filippo and Francesco del Nero met resistance in operating the Depository, for the Otto, emboldened by the loss of control at the center of the government, was reluctant to accept accounts of Lorenzo's debts and write them off onto 91

92

Francesco del N e r o (i 487-1563) is one of the more picaresque personalities with w h o m Filippo associated for both business and pleasure. Francesco was Filippo's cosa who devoted himself to furthering his interests and overseeing his financial affairs from 1515 on. H e is first mentioned in Filippo's correspondence in 1514 as a friend to w h o m Filippo loaned a cape, C . S . , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 3, b u t by September of that year Filippo already referred to h i m as his braccio, or right-hand man, M . A . P . , 108, fol. 118. Filippo brought him to Lorenzo de'Medici's attention in D e c e m b e r 1514 when he recommended him for the position of provveditore of the Studio Fiorentino in Pisa, C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 3, and Lorenzo subsequently ordered Galeotto de'Medici to see to his appointment, M . A . P . , 141, fol. 82. Filippo employed him as vice-depositor in Florence the entire time he controlled that office and had considered making him depositor in name as well, b u t decided in 1515 that at the age of twenty-eight Francesco was still too young to hold the title, C . S . , Ser. i n , 110, fol. 15. By nature impatient and quick to temper, Francesco tangled not only with Roberto de'Ricci in the Depository, M . A . P . , 115, fols. 395, 52, b u t with Clarice over his and Filippo's amorous escapades. Filippo and Francesco worked hand in glove in the Depository where Francesco began building his own fortune and investing capital in various Strozzi enterprises. I n Filippo's absence he assumed equal status as a maggiore, or partner, C . S . , Ser. i n , n o , fol. 153V and Ser. v, 99, fol. 8 i v , and Filippo acknowledged that their profits grew from the same source, ibid., fol. 176, 14 April 1520. C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 231.

89

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici the books of the commune.93 For his own added safety in those uncertain times, Filippo even rewrote debts in Francesco del Nero's name.94 He moved his family to Rome and made plans for an extended trip to Venice and possibly even to England and Flanders to avoid Florence until he would be more kindly received. The death of his mother-in-law Alfonsina Orsini in February 1520 intervened and prevented the trip.95 The death of Lorenzo followed shortly by that of Alfonsina ended a significant period in Filippo's life. He had known Lorenzo since 1508 when he first became connected with the Medici family and they had grown to be close friends and companions over more than a decade of intimate association. Filippo was Lorenzo's trusted confidant and unfailing backer in Florence, and Lorenzo in turn had made Filippo second only to himself in power and distinction in the city. Lorenzo and his mother had been Filippo's steadfast promoters and had attained for him the positions at the papal court that after 1519 became his consuming interests. With their deaths Filippo lost his two most influential patrons who more than any other persons had shaped his future. However, fortunately for him their deaths did not in the long run cause permanent hardship. Because he had already established himself at the papal court and because of his continuing friendship with Cardinal Giulio, he was able to remain in the Medici's inner circle. He shifted the focus of his financial endeavors to Rome and left his associate, Francesco del Nero, increasingly in charge of his affairs in Florence and of the Depository of the Signoriay which he continued to head at the pleasure of the cardinal. After 1519 Filippo devoted most of his energies to his business in Rome and to the Depository General of the Apostolic Chamber which opened the way to a new chapter in his career, as favorite and financier of the Medici popes. 93

94 95

T h e i r affairs were still not straightened out six months later. See Filippo's letters to Del Nero of 18 and 26 November 1519, C.S., Ser. i n , 110, fols. 122-124. T h e y also had trouble with Goro Gheri, who remained in charge of the city until Silvio Passerini, cardinal of Cortona, took over at the behest of Cardinal Medici and L e o X. Filippo labeled Gheri a scoundrel for creating unnecessary problems for Francesco in the Depository, ibid., fol. 124V. Ibid., fol. 114. Ibid., n o , fol. 153. Filippo, like many others, showed little grief at Alfonsina's death, and he suggested to Francesco del Nero in jest the following epitaph, ibid., 143, fol. 160: 'Alfonsina Ursina cuius obitum nemo vitam deflevunt omnes iocundissimum in humano genere saluberimumque depositum.' ['Alfonsina Orsini whose death no one, whose life everyone mourned, and whose burial is most pleasant and salubrious to mankind.']

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Clearly Filippo's career as a papal banker is one of the most significant parts of his life, but one which historians who have concerned themselves with Strozzi have consistently ignored. Rather, they have been content to regard Filippo in terms of his Florentine experiences culled exclusively from Florentine sources. They have ignored this other side of his life and have been unaware of the wealth of evidence in the Vatican and other Roman archives which recalls not only Strozzi'sfinancialactivities, but the financial involvement of other Florentines in Rome as well.1 For too long historians of Florence have been somewhat chauvinistic when it comes to recognizing important influences on the city's history which have come ab extra. They have never fully appreciated that in our period, for two decades after the 1

Part of the problem lies in the fact that there is no comprehensive study on papal finances in the early sixteenth century. The best specific works by Adolf von Gottlob, Aus der Camera Apostolica des is.jfahrhunderts (Innsbruck, 1889) and W. von Hofmann, Forschungen zur Geschichte der kurialen Behorden vom Schisma bis zur Reformation (Rome, 1914) are outdated and concentrate mainly on the fifteenth century. Delumeau's treatment of papal finance in his Vie economique et sociale de Rome dans la seconde moitie de XVIe siecle is sparse for the first half of the century since his main interest lies in the period after 1550. Aloys Schulte's work on Die Fugger in Rom, 1495-1523 (Leipzig, 1904) provides helpful information but is limited in scope. Luigi Nina's three-volume general study, Le finanze pontificie nel Medioevo (Milan, 1929-1932) is of minimal use and lacking in documentation. Clemens Bauer's article, 'Die Epochen der Papstfinanz,' Historische Zeitschrift, cxxxvin (1928), 457-503, provides the best summary of the development of papal finance. See also his * Studi per la storia delle finanze papali durante il pontificato di Sisto IV,' Archivio della R. Societa Romana di Storia Patria, 50 (1927), 319-400. There is nothing in English which covers the period save Peter Partner's overview, Renaissance Rome 1500-1559 (Berkeley, 1976). William E. Lunt's Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages (New York, 1934) and Partner's The Papal State under Martin V (London, 1958) concentrate on earlier centuries. Also Partner's, 'Camera Papae: Problems of Papal Finance in the Later Middle Ages,' Journal of Ecclesiastical History, iv (1953), 55—68 and the 'The "Budget" of the Roman Church in the Renaissance Period,' Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F.Jacob (London, i960), 256-278 and E. Goller's ' Untersuchungen iiber das Inventar des Finanzarchivs der Renaissancepapste (1447-1521),' Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle, v (Rome, 1924), 227-272. One contemporary Italian scholar, Michele Monaco, has treated aspects of papal finance in our period in a very creditable fashion. See his La Situazione della Reverenda Camera Apostolica neWanno 1525 (Rome, i960) and his articles, 'II primo debito pubblico pontificio: II Monte della Fede (1526),' Studi Romani, anno 8, no. 5 (i960), 553-569 and 'Le finanze pontificie al tempo di Clemente VII (1523-1534),' Studi Romani, anno 6, no. 3 (1958), 278-296. One frequently cited reason for the lack of scholarship on papal finances in the early sixteenth century is the loss of documentary material in the Sack of Rome and later in the transfer of the Vatican Archives to Paris by Napoleon. But despite the lacunae, thousands of volumes yet remain in the Vatican and in other archives which can provide useful and illuminating information on the problem of papal finances.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici election of Leo X in 1513, decisions on Florentine political life were taken from the papacy at Rome. We have already noted how in the area of the city's finances Leo X (and later Clement VII) regarded Florence's resources as a supplementary fund for papal wars and diplomacy. Filippo Strozzi was the central figure in this Rome-Florence connection, but even the fact that he ran the depositories of both Florence and Rome at the same time and manipulated and transferred funds between the two cities has gone virtually unnoticed. There are thus two good reasons why Filippo's activities as a papal banker merit our attention, first because this important side of his life has never been systematically studied, and second because an appreciation of Strozzi as a banker and financer at the curia contributes to a better understanding not only of the office of depositor general and the inner workings of papal finance, but of the links between Florence and the Vatican in this period as well. When Filippo began doing business in Rome, he joined an established community of Florentine banking companies which had a singularly long tradition of serving the papacy. Florentine business relations with the popes dated back into the early thirteenth century, and by the fourteenth century during the Avignon Captivity, Florentine merchant-bankers dominated papal finance.2 The activities of Florentine bankers at the Avignonese curia, however, came to an abrupt halt in March 1376 when Pope Gregory XI placed Florence under interdict and ordered the entire Florentine colony expelled from Avignon. Pistoiese and Lucchese merchants stepped in and replaced the Florentines as favored papal bankers. But by the end of the fourteenth century a new group of Florentines established themselves in Rome, and from 1378 when Urban VI restored the papacy to the Eternal City, the Florentine community built itself up to over two hundred strong.3 In this period the Florentines were steadily increasing their business with the curia, and companies like the Alberti, Medici, Ricci, and Spini distinguished themselves at the papal court. In the early fifteenth century the Medici were patronized by Baldassare Cossa, elected Pope John XXIII in 1410, and began to supersede other Florentine companies in their financial dealings with the curia.4 Their unrivaled leadership as papal bankers and the great fortunes they amassed resulted from the special consideration they received principally from John XXIII, Eugenius IV, and Martin V. As the Medici's secret account books have shown, papal banking 2

3

4

Lunt, 1, 51-52; Yves Renouard, 'Le compagnie commerciali fiorentine del Trecento,' A.S.I., vol. 96 (1938), 41-68 and his Les relations des Papes d? Avignon et des compagnies comtnerdales et bancaires de 1316 a 1378 (Paris, 1941), pp. I2iff. Arnold Esch, 'Florentiner in Rom um 1400,' Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken, 52 (1972), 482, 496-525. Since Esch used primarily notarial sources to compile his data, one would expect them to exhibit a high concentration of businessmen. George Holmes, 'How the Medici Became the Pope's Bankers,' Florentine Studies, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, 111., 1968), pp. 357-380.

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber could be highly lucrative, for Giovanni di Bicci de'Medici's company at Rome produced over 50 percent of the total earnings of all the operations of the Medici Bank.5 Throughout the rest of the fifteenth century the Florentine business community remained a permanent fixture in Rome, although it expanded and contracted depending on the favor of particular popes. By mid-century the Florentines had founded their own confraternity 'della Pietdy and had organized themselves into a separate nation complete with its own statutes similar to those of other Florentine commercial communities abroad. Those firms which did business with the papacy are designated in Vatican documents mercatores romanam curiam sequentes, merchants following the Roman curia. At one time banks had followed the peregrinations of the papal court, and the term sequentes had had a literal meaning, especially in the fourteenth and first part of the fifteenth centuries when the papacy moved to Avignon and for a time stayed in Florence. But by the end of the century the popes and their bankers had permanently settled in Rome, and even during periods of long papal absences such as at the beginning of Adrian VFs reign in 1522, bankers continued to conduct their affairs at the Vatican. Vestiges of the old practice remained, however, and business languished when the pope was away from Rome, even if for just a brief visit to his hunting lodge at Magliano.6 Bankers such as Strozzi might even accompany the pope on his trips and conclude business transactions with him while away from Rome since the pope habitually travelled with one or more earneral clerks who recorded his fiats. The Florentine colony and business community in Rome concentrated itself in the district of Ponte, which was the area adjacent to the Ponte S. Angelo directly across the Tiber from the Vatican. Already at the turn of the fifteenth century the major Florentine companies were located in the parishes of S. Orsola and SS. Celso and Giuliano surrounding the short street Canale di Ponte which took its name from its origins as a drainage canal for the river. In the early sixteenth century the Florentine colony still remained centered in the district of Ponte, and the crowded Canale di Ponte, later renamed Via di Banco di S. Spirito, continued to function as the Wall Street of Rome. At least eighteen of the approximately thirty Florentine banks in operation squeezed their offices into the crowded narrow-faced buildings on that one block-long street. The desirability of its location and the role it played as Rome's exchange mart and clearing-house for information helps explain why Filippo Strozzi had difficulty finding quarters for his bank on the Canale di Ponte in the winter of 1514-1515. 5 6

Raymond de Roover, p. 202. During one such papal absence in October 1517 Filippo wrote to Francesco del Nero about the pervasive torpor which would cease only upon Leo's return. C.S., Ser. m, n o , fol. 63.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici In regard to the size of the Florentine settlement in Rome, modern historians such as Albertini have followed the path taken by Schulte and Pastor and have numbered in battalions the Florentines who flocked there after the election of Cardinal Medici. By and large that assessment is based on the opinions of contemporaries such as Aretino who so beautifully satirized what he perceived as a great influx of Florentine favor-seekers eager to overrun the Vatican. Also, as we have seen, in 1513 many Florentines themselves gave way toflightsof hyperbole in their anticipation of profit and favor from the first Florentine pope. Neither should be taken literally. In fact, a closer look at the Florentine business community in Rome which could be presumed to exhibit the most obvious effects of a great Florentine invasion and an overflow of patronage after Leo's election, reveals that, contrary to everyone's great expectations, no remarkable increase in its size took place. The number of Florentine banks attached to the curia remained constant at between twenty-five and thirty both before and after Leo's pontificate.7 However, if the Florentine companies in Rome did not dramatically increase in number after the election of Leo X, they did expand the volume of their business with the curia. Both Leo and Clement VII gave preferential treatment to Florentines and directed a good deal of business their way.8 In a bull of 1515 Leo gave legal recognition to the Florentine Nation in Rome, later granted it certain privileges and exemptions, and placed it in charge of the papal mint.9 He also permitted Florentine firms to enter areas of papalfinanceformerly controlled by banks of other nations. For example, the Sauli bank which had enjoyed special favor with Julius II found that under Leo they had to be satisfied with less lucrative appointments. He not only ejected them from the office of depositor general, which they strenuously sought to retain, so that he could award it to the Strozzi, but he also forced them out of the very desirable Treasury of the Romagna which he passed on to his brother-in-law Jacopo Salviati.l ° 7

8

9

10

Several lists of Florentine bankers contained in Vatican safe-conducts, the 1526 tax census of Rome, as well as figures gleaned from documents of the Florentines' confraternity in Rome combine to substantiate this finding in my article ' Mercatores FlorentiniJ pp. 55-59 where their names have also been published. For the involvement of various Florentine banks in the business of the curia under the Medici, see ibid., pp. 60-71. The Florentine Nation was given official sanction in the bull Eas quae pro commodo of 12 June 1515, and the privileges and immunities of its officials were extended in 1519. Delumeau, 1, 209, note 2, published a list of the elected consuls of the Florentine Nation from 1515 to 1620. However, one should exercise caution in using the list because of all the errors in transcription. Filippo Strozzi served twice as consul in 1523 and 1533. As might be expected, the consuls were regularly the most prominent Florentine bankers in Rome. On the removal of the mint from the hands of the Fugger, see Schulte, 1, 208. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 88; vol. 65, fol. 40; vol. 63, fols. 89 and 90V; vol. 66, fol. 3. The Sauli received confirmation of rights to the dogana on livestock in the Patrimony and the Treasury of Perugia instead, ibid., vol. 63, fol. 144.V.

94

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber The Medici popes did not originate the practice of bestowing special papal blessing upon bankers from their own or friendly nations. A new pope could choose from a large number of different banking houses. Notably since the fourteenth century, banks of different national origins had been drawn to Rome and had proliferated. In fact, most of the companies that dealt with the curia were not owned and operated by citizens of Rome but were branches of parent companies located in other Italian cities, principally Florence, Genoa, Siena and Lucca. Otherwise they came from the main financial centers of Europe outside Italy, such as Augsburg which was represented at the papal court in the early sixteenth century by both the Fugger and Welser firms. The diversity in the national origins of these banks on the one hand stands witness to the absence of a significant merchant class among the Romans, but on the other it reflects the outcome of the long tradition of the various popes who had penchants for bankers of different nationalities. Appointments to the position of depositor general serve as a case in point. To name but a few, beginning in the late fifteenth century, Innocent VIII Cibo preferred to deal with companies from his own city of Genoa and selected the Usumari firm as his depositor general. Alexander VI, a Borgia, appointed the Sienese firm of the Spanocchi as his. Julius II, a Delia Rovere from Liguria, favored the Sauli from nearby Genoa with the same office, and as we know, the Medici popes chose Strozzi from Florence to be depositor general. In our period changes in the administration of the papal mint in Rome likewise illustrate the different preferences of individual popes and the short-term cycles in office-holding they could produce. The German firm of the Fugger gained control of the mint in 1511 under Julius. Leo removed it from their hands and, as a special gift to the Florentines, awarded it not just to one firm but to the whole Florentine Nation in Rome. When Adrian Floriszoon, Charles V's old tutor, became Pope Adrian VI in 1522, it surprised no one when he handed the mint back to Charles V's bankers, the Fugger. But in 1524 after Giulio de'Medici became Clement VII, direction of the mint returned like a bouncing ball to the consuls of the Florentine Nation.11 With the Medici popes, beyond a predictable preference for their countrymen, other factors help explain the privileges given particular Florentine merchants. Long before Leo's election to the papacy when he was still a cardinal in Rome, he had cultivated and maintained a close relationship with the Florentine community. Common gossip held that, when elected, he was a relatively poor pope who had many debts and far too many relatives to satisfy.12 But even before 1513 during the long years 1T

12

Record of Adrian VI's action to restore the mint to the Fugger in 1522 is in A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 73, fol. 7, and of Clement VIFs returning it to the Florentines in September 1524 in ibid., fol. 113. See also E. Martinori, Annali delta Zecca di Roma (Rome, 1917-1922). Marino Sanuto, / Diarii (Venice, 1879-1902) vol. xvi, col. 28 reported that at his election Leo had incomes worth only 10,000 ducats and that, the bull of Julius II notwithstanding, the reason he

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici of his family's exile when they lost much of their wealth through the confiscation of their money and property, Cardinal Medici must have relied considerably on the credit of Florentines in Rome. He had had to borrow to finance his election, so much so that Lorenzo Strozzi thought his need for Strozzi credit the major reason why he invited Filippo to accompany him to Rome for the conclave.13 Unfortunately no account books for the Medici or for any of the banks concerned have survived which could tell us to what extent Cardinal Medici or other members of his family availed themselves of the credit of Florentine bankers in Rome during the years before 1513. However, some tantalizing evidence hints at the Medici's financial involvement with Florentine bankers, and the early correspondence of Lorenzo de'Medici reveals that one of the prominent financiers at Leo's court, Leonardo Bartolini, was already handling Cardinal Medici's private accounts before 1513 and that he managed loans for the cardinal with the banks of at least two Florentines, Simone Ricasoli and Niccolo Antinori.14 It was not just coincidence that the same Simone Ricasoli and Bernardo Bini, another wealthy Florentine banker in Rome, were elected from among the members of the Florentines' confraternity to present to Cardinal Medici in person the group's traditional candle for Candlemas in 1508. The cozy relationship which Cardinal Medici maintained with the Florentines in Rome stirred the republican government of Florence twice, in 1495 and 1511, to issue proclamations against any citizen who lived or worked with the exiled Medici in Rome, but the city could actually do little to prohibit these associations. For the Florentines, particularly the merchants, the cardinal was a valuable avenue through which to approach the pope with petitions and requests, especially as he became more and more influential with Julius II. To win the support of Florentines, Cardinal Medici acted freely on their behalf at the curia. Parenti claimed that the cardinal had personally interceded with Julius for the safe-conduct granted Florentine merchants in Rome when Florence was under interdict in 1511.15

When we pause to consider Filippo Strozzi against the backdrop of the Florentine banking community and of Leo X's firm friendship with it, we

13 14

15

was not elected entirely by simony was because he had very little money to spend on bribes. See also Vettori's letter, Niccolo Machiavelli, Lettere, p. 237; E. Rodocanachi, Histoire de Rome. Le pontificat de Leon JV, 1513-1521 (Paris, 1931), p. 22. Contemporary historians all stressed the close ties between Cardinal Medici and the Florentines in Rome, e.g., Piero Parenti, fol. 47; Cerretani, Dialogo, fol. 147; Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, pp. 323-324. Niccolini, pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. C.S., Ser. 1, 3, fols. 2iv, 185-186. Such loans paid lasting rewards after 1513 as shown by Lorenzo de'Medici's later statement in a letter, M.A.P., 141, fol. 38, that he would do anything for Niccolo Antinori. Bartolini expected to be reimbursed from the public treasury in Florence for the credit he had extended the Medici, B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 29, 92, fol. 44. Piero Parenti, fol. 79.

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber can better evaluate the role papal patronage had in setting him up as one of the biggest and most important bankers in Rome. For we cannot help but notice that despite the prior existence of a whole colony of wellestablished and eager Florentine bankers from which to appoint a depositor general, Leo decided at the urging of Alfonsina and Cardinal Giulio de'Medici to fill the position with his niece's young husband who was not an experienced curial banker, who had no ready banking facilities in the city and who would have to open a brand-new company to exercise the duties of the office. Not that Leo's appointment of Strozzi was unusual or unexpected, for in the sixteenth century it was commonly accepted that position and privilege should rest more on favor than merit; but contemporaries certainly understood that Filippo Strozzi was entering the world of papal banking at the most exalted level primarily because of hi* claim to advancement as a Medici parente. This becomes even more apparent when we consider that Strozzi's was one of the few new Florentine companies to be established in Rome after the election of Leo and one of the fewer still to have a significant share in the conduct of papal financial affairs. Curial bankers avidly sought the office of depositor general since it was the most prestigious of the few positions in the Camera Apostolica, the administrative wing of the Vatican, that had banking duties. The Depository General was in such great demand that another Florentine banker told Filippo to accept the office even if he did not want it. Then he would run the Depository in the Strozzi name and give Filippo half the profits.16 But profit was not Filippo's only or necessarily even his most pressing motive in pursuing the Depository. A principal attraction of the office of depositor general was the honor it conferred. One cannot underestimate the motivating force of 'honore' in this period, and when Leo asked Filippo whether he wanted the Depository General or the rights to the salt monopoly in the Romagna, he hesitated not a moment before replying that he much preferred the Depository General precisely because he considered it the more noble of the two.* 7 However, despite his fortunate status as a papal relative, and despite Leo's promises, nonetheless Filippo had quite a tussle before finally securing title to the Depository General. As early as August 1514 during his stay in Rome to help prepare for Lorenzo de'Medici's arrival, he had entered into what he thought were thefinalnegotiations to replace the Sauli. On 13 August he had even written to his brother that he intended soon to move to Rome and to transfer his business there too.* 8 Five days later he wrote confidentially to Lorenzo de'Medici that when Leo had allowed him to choose between the Depository General and the salt monopoly the 16 17

M.A.P., 108, fol. 148. Ibid., fol. 126.

I8

97

C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 3.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici pope had forecast he could take office in about six months. 19 Although in fact he had only Leo's word and no written agreement for his appointment, Filippo obviously thought the matter settled, for during that fall and winter while he remained in Rome in the company of his brother-in-law, he began to make the necessary arrangements for assuming the duties of depositor. First of all, Filippo had to open his own banking house which would administer the Depository and take care of other business that came his way. Although his appointment as depositor general represented an unprecedented high honor for Filippo and for the Strozzi clan, the actual business of banking at the papal court was hardly new to Filippo's family. Back in 1482 his father Filippo the Elder had opened a firm in Rome which in the space of only ten years produced the largest share of the profits of his total investments. 20 After Filippo the Elder's death in 1491 his bank continued to operate for a while under the management of Berto Berti, who apparently by 1494 had left the Strozzi to form his own company.21 Filippo's older half-brother Alfonso appears to have taken over his father's company, changing its name to his own. Filippo and Lorenzo Strozzi continued to invest capital in the bank, and they received profits as late as 1502 after which time it seems to have closed. 22 It is difficult to say whether the Strozzi's prior contacts in Rome in any way eased Filippo's task of opening his own company in 1515. He did seek his clerks from among the Florentine community, and his letters suggest he lured some of the best talent away from other firms. His chosen manager and distant relative, Antonio di Ser Michele Strozzi, was in Rome in early 1499 and in 1501, 23 but unfortunately we do not know whether he had worked for the original Strozzi company or for someone else. It seems unlikely that Antonio had owned a company, since among the records of Florentine banks operating in Rome at that time none carry his name. On 1 November 1514 Filippo signed a five-year contract founding a banking company entitled 'Filippo Strozzi e Chompagni' which would begin operations at the start of the next Florentine fiscal year on 25 March 1515, presumably when his term as depositor general would also commence. The company was capitalized with 25,000 cameral ducats of which Filippo would contribute 21,000 and Antonio Strozzi, his resident manager, 4,000. Profits were to be distributed 80 percent to Filippo and 20 percent to 19 20 21

22

23

M.A.P., 108, fol. 126. Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, pp. 57, 60, table 4, 61. Domenico Maffei, II giovane Machiavelli banchiere con Berto Berti a Roma (Florence, 1973), pp. 25-26. Alfonso Strozzi's name appears in the 1494 list of Florentine bankers in Rome in A.V., Reg. Vat., 869, fols. 204-205. On the profits from Filippo and Lorenzo's investments in the company, see Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p. 78, table 7. He is listed among the members of the confraternity of S. Giovanni dei Fiorentini for those years. A.A.S.G.F., vol. 357, fols. 70V-71, 122-123.

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber 24

Antonio. Apparently Filippo had no intimations of his upcoming troubles in the spring of 1515 in actually securing the Depository, for the wording of the contract clearly reveals that he not only had every intention of operating the Depository, but that he held high hopes of entering into numerous other facets of the very profitable business of papal banking. The November contract specified that Strozzi's new firm would run the Depository General and, in addition, would have at least a one-third interest in any 'contracts, tax farms, treasuries, mints, or other similar concerns' which Filippo might acquire at a future date.25 The document confirms what Filippo had written to Lorenzo Strozzi in August, that he intended to reside in Rome, for it specifies that the living expenses of Filippo, his wife, children, servants, and one household administrator would come out of the profits of the firm and that in like manner Antonio Strozzi, the manager, would be allowed to maintain his family at the company's expense.26 The hardest problems Filippo had to resolve in opening a new company involved hiring staff and finding a suitable location in Rome's over-crowded financial district. By December he had chosen two 'giovani,' or clerks, Filippo di Simone Ridolfi, his nephew, and a son of Guglielmo Angiolini.27 But he continued to receive requests from friends seeking jobs, including one from Roberto de'Ricci, behind whose name Filippo later exercised the Depository of Florence, who begged him to hire his son. Securing a location for the bank proved the more difficult task, and even though in early December he informed his brother that he was in the final stage of negotiations, the matter was still not settled by February.28 He planned to assume the lease on part of a building on the Canale di Ponte rented by two other Florentine bankers, Bonaccorso Rucellai and Bernardo da Verrazzano, who had agreed to vacate. A third, Jacopo Rucellai, refused to move unless Filippo paid him compensation of nearly 1,000 florins for improvements he had made on the premises.29 Filippo, however, had no 24

25

26 27

28 29

C.S., Ser. v, 1250, u n n u m b e r e d . Filippo's brothers Lorenzo and Alfonso contributed to Filippo's share of the capital at least by the time the company was reorganized in 1516. According to the new contract dated 10 N o v e m b e r 1516, Filippo invested 11,000 ducats, Alfonso 7,000 and Lorenzo 3,000, C.S., Ser. v, 1164. C.S., Ser. v, 1250, u n n u m b e r e d . T h e only exception was the right to collect certain customs duties, the Dogana di Terra, which Filippo already controlled at the time, and whose revenues therefore would not be subject to any profit-sharing within the new firm. C.S., Ser. v, 1250, u n n u m b e r e d . Ridolfi was the son of Filippo's half-sister Maria who in i486 had married Simone di Jacopo Ridolfi. H e later replaced Antonio Strozzi as manager of Filippo's company in R o m e . C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fol. 5. Ibid., fol. 7. F r o m a tax record of 1525, A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 75, fols. 206V-207, we know the bank was definitely on the Canale di Ponte, and evidence suggests that it occupied part of the present-day Palazzo Niccolini on what is now the Via del Banco di S. Spirito. Although the documents published by F r o m m e l , Der romische Palastbau der Hochrenaissance ( T u b i n g e n , 1973),

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici intention of paying so much extra and decided to by-pass Rucellai by applying pressure directly on the owner of the building, a young Roman noble. Filippo's tactics in this instance are indicative of the single-minded determination with which he pursued all his business deals. First he offered to pay the landlord considerably more rent than the former tenants, and then he dangled an attractive loan before his eyes which made the young gentleman all the more anxious to accommodate him. Staffing and locating his new bank were not the only troubles that vexed him. Filippo complained how weary of court life he had become, yet felt trapped because he realized that to get ahead with Leo everything depended on putting in an appearance at an endless round of parties, banquets and 'musical evenings.' Despite the obvious advantages of being a member of the pope's family, the social obligations and pretenses inherent in his rank threatened to interfere with his business ambitions. His critics at court even dared to question whether banking was a sufficiently honorable occupation for Lorenzo de'Medici's brother-in-law and a close relative of the pope, as if oblivious to the Medici's recent rise from the merchant ranks and from the very same office of depositor general. The issue came up when Filippo was considering opening a branch of his company in Naples at the same time that the Medici were exploring a possible marriage alliance for Lorenzo de'Medici with the king of Naples. Filippo described the situation to Lorenzo Strozzi as follows: In addition to my problems here, I am now in another mess. I had already decided to open [a company] in Naples in my own name under the management of Filippo Ridolfi and with a substantial capital investment when the matter of the betrothal of the Magnificent [Lorenzo de'Medici] cropped up. The negotiations are well under way but not yet concluded, and some people think that as the brother-in-law of the Magnificent Lorenzo, prospective in-law of the king of Naples, it would not be fitting for me to practice the merchant trade in Naples. And many condemn my doing business here in Rome under my own name, although being depositor of the pope apparently dignifies that 'vile' profession and makes it honorable. All these matters are under dispute, and since the greatest difficulty is over the affair in Naples, I am inclined to give in to them. I am not sure yet under whose name to do business there - whether Filippo Ridolfi's or Antonio Strozzi's.30

30

ii, 198-201, record Filippo's purchase of that palace from Luigi Gaddi only in 1530, there is mention of a ' retrovenditione? or resale, as though Strozzi had already owned all or part of the structure. The palace itself is long and narrow and actually consists of two houses joined together with one interior courtyard behind the other, so it is conceivable that Filippo owned parts of it in 1515. A document of the Magistri Stratarum of 1524 published in Frommel, 11, 31, lists Strozzi and Gaddi as next-door neighbors. Sansovino rebuilt the palace for Gaddi in its more grandiose style which is still visible. After Filippo's death, his son Roberto, himself a banker, took up residence in the Palazzo Niccolini and hosted his friend Michelangelo there, ibid., 11, 203. The palace was decorated ornately with antiquities, some of the remains of which are still present in the courtyard. Today the palace is a sadly run-down apartment house. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 7. IOO

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber As the spring of 1515 progressed, Filippo's problems in Rome only increased. Although we do not know whether his new company actually opened its doors at the end of March in accordance with the contract, we do know that by then Filippo still had not completed the deal with Leo X for the Depository General, and that in May there was serious doubt that he would become depositor general at all. May 1515 was precisely the time when Lorenzo de'Medici was reaching the final stages in his plan to have himself elected captain general of the Florentine forces, and most likely the criticism against Filippo and against his becoming depositor general relates directly to his having encouraged and countenanced Lorenzo's ambitions. During the long months of negotiation in 1514 no one in the Medici family had specifically objected to Filippo's taking over the Depository, but in May 1515 when all Rome was buzzing with the rumor that Lorenzo de'Medici had returned to Florence to make himself captain general, the pope's brother Giuliano began to counsel Leo not to give it to Filippo but to continue the term of Julius IPs appointee, the Sauli company. Filippo's friend Benedetto Buondelmonti in fact wrote him the news from Rome that at the insistence of Giuliano, Leo had either already promised and confirmed the Depository to the Sauli or would do so shortly.31 Alfonsina, however, redoubled her entreaties with Leo on Filippo's behalf and enlisted the help of Cardinal Giulio. The matter remained unresolved for still another month, but finally on 14 June, Baldassare da Pescia, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary in Rome, wrote that Cardinal Giulio wanted Filippo informed that he had spoken with Leo X about the Depository General and that it was imperative that Filippo come immediately to Rome or send someone who could act for him.32 About that same time Leo issued a Motuproprio confirming his appointment. On 19 June in Florence at the little church of Santa Maria de'Ughi across the piazza from the Strozzi palace, Filippo signed the contract to assume the duties of depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber and thus officially embarked upon his long and eventful career as a banker and financier at the papal court.33 In the first year after his appointment, however, Filippo was forced to rely almost entirely on his manager Antonio Strozzi to conduct his affairs in Rome. He was detained in Florence first by Lorenzo de'Medici's military campaign in Lombardy in August 1515, by their joint embassy to Francis I at Milan, and then by the pope's visit to Florence on his way to Bologna to sign the Concordat with Francis that winter. Not until May 1516 was Filippo free to return to Rome for any length of time. 31

M A P . , 108, fol. 148.

32

M . A . P . , 117, fol. 60, 14 J u n e 1515. A copy of the contract is preserved in A.V., D i v . C a m . , vol. 6 5 , fols. 57—60.

33

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici The actual duties of the depositor general entailed providing specified kinds of banking services to the Apostolic Chamber. According to the general terms of the pope's Motuproprio awarding the office to Filippo, the function of the depositor was to receive and keep money on deposit at the pleasure of the pope and his Chamber and to have ' the honors, burdens, and earnings customary to that office.'34 The contract Filippo signed in Florence was more specific about the nature of his duties although there too we find that the depositor's function was essentially to advance money; to receive funds on deposit; to issue, accept, or reject letters of exchange; to keep accounts of transactions; to obtain apostolic letters for the expedition of benefices and other matters; and to perform any other necessary business activities.35 As the title of the office suggests, the Depository General was the central repository of cameral monies, but that is not to say that the depositor himself was the pope's highest financial minister. That honor fell to the camarlingo, or chamberlain, who was also chief administrator as head of the Camera Apostolica. Subordinate to him was the papal treasurer general who was accountable for the finances of the Papal States and various collectories.36 In fact, narrowly defined, the depositor general had few discretionary powers, and Vatican records of transactions involving Strozzi as depositor general show that he acted only on the orders of the pope, the camarlingo or the papal treasurer. Each of his actions was recorded and witnessed by one or more of the clerks of the Chamber who also audited and approved the accounts he submitted to the Camera.31

Even though the Depository General was part of the Camera Apostolica and the central place of deposit for cameral funds, by no means did all ecclesiastical monies going in or out of the Vatican pass through the depositor's bank, nor was it the only bank of deposit used by the pope. A number of other important money-handling offices within the curia kept their own records apart from the Depository General. They included the offices of the datary, the grand penitentiary, and also the pope's personal chamberlain and majordomo.38 The datario had charge of the sale of venal 34 36

37

38

35 Ibid., fol. 40. Ibid., fol. 58. O n the general make-up of the Camera see Gottlob, p p . 7 0 - 1 2 9 ; Monaco, La Situazione, p p . 2 7 - 4 1 ; L u n t , 1, 1 5 - 2 1 ; Partner, The Papal State, p p . 131-138. Payment orders for the depositor in our period are preserved in the Diversa Carrieralia series in Arm. xxix, vols. 63-100 of the Vatican Archives. T h e Introitus et Exitus are properly the accounts of the Camera although they deal mostly with the Depository. T h e r e are just a few Libri delta Depositeria, which were books kept by the Depository, in the A.S.R. O n e Introitus et Exitus volume for 1521 exists in Florence, C.S., Ser. v, 1170. Another for 1521-1522 during Adrian V I ' s reign is in A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1769, and one for 1531-1532, ibid., 1771. T h e rest of the Introitus et Exitus are in the Fondo Camerale of the Vatican Archives, of which Introitus et Exitus volumes 554-561 cover the period of the Medici popes. T h e one surviving account book of the Datary for our period is in B.A.V., Vat. Lat., 10599. T h e records of the Penitentiary have not been made available for study since they contain material

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber offices, and, as that practice rapidly expanded in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, he came to exercise control over a greater and greater portion of papal revenues which made the office of datary an increasingly powerful arm of the curia.39 The datary had its own bank of deposit, filled in our period by the Florentine firm of the Bini. Monies coming in to the datary from the sale of offices and from compositions passed through the Bini bank which then paid out these datary funds as they were allocated. The Penitentiary, headed by Cardinal Pucci under Leo X, controlled the revenues from the sale of indulgences and pardons deriving from the pope's powers of absolution as spiritual head of the church. Like the income from the datario, the revenues originating in the Penitentiary do not appear in the accounts of the Depository and were managed separately. The pope's private chamberlain, the camerario segreto, administered the Tesoreria Segreta, or pope's private accounts, while the maestro di casa who handled the spese minute di palazzo, or household expenses, drew his operating money in part from the depositor general but also from the pope, from the datarioy and even from the incomes of the city of Rome. Other administrative and political entities such as the College of Cardinals, the various colleges of office holders, the governor of the city of Rome, and all the provincial treasurers, collectors, as well as the tax and revenue farmers kept separate accounts of their own incomes and expenses. Any of their monies that show up in the income records of the depositor general were either fixed assessments or special subsidies and in no way represent the total revenues available to those particular bodies. Thus it is quite evident that the Introitus et Exitus series in the Vatican Archives which were the account books kept by the depositor general for the Camera Apostolica gives only a partial record of papal income and expenses and that the annual totals in those books could never be used by themselves as an indication of the whole papal budget.40 Before looking more closely at the functioning of the Depository General under Strozzi's management, it is well worth considering a further historical dimension to that office which helps delimit its boundaries within the larger sphere of papal finances. In the fifteenth century popes began to centralize their finances. One of the essential steps in that effort had been

39

40

concerning matters of conscience. Consequently, it is difficult to estimate the amount of revenue that office took in. Three volumes of accounts kept by Serapica, Leo x's camerario segreto, the Spese minute di palazzo are in A.S.R., Camerale, I, 1489-1491, and they register payments to the maestro di casa, or majordomo. T h e College of Cardinals had its own Camera and administrative officials. On the Datary, see L. Celier, Les Dataires du XVe siecle et les origines de la Datarie Apostolique (Paris, 1910); Hofmann, Forschungen, 1, 8off.; Felice Litva, 'L'attivita finanziaria della Dataria durante il periodo tridentino,' Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 5 (1967), 82-95. Hofmann, 202-204 lists the individuals who served as datario under the Medici popes. Bauer, 'Studi,' p. 328; Partner, ' T h e " B u d g e t " of the Roman Church,' pp. 256-259.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici fixing a single place to receive and disburse cameral revenues originating in many different sources and coming from many different parts of Christendom. Total centralization was obviously never achieved, and by the early sixteenth century its progress had been substantially retarded by the rapid expansion of auxiliary sources of revenue, particularly in the Datary, which were administered outside the Depository General.41 In comparison with the fifteenth century, even though papal incomes had increased overall in our period and the depositor general was handling larger amounts of money than ever before, he was, nonetheless, responsible for a smaller proportion of total papal revenues.42 The books of Introitus et Exit us reveal many aspects of the administration and operation of the Depository General which are not spelled out in the Motuproprio and the contract awarding the office to Strozzi. Regarding the types of revenues assigned to the Depository, we find in the introitus accounts that annates, common services and the census furnished the main 41

42

Holmes, pp. 364-365, rightly stressed the nature of the origins of the Depository. On the financial structure and increase in the Datary's receipts, see Litva, passim. The Datary was increasingly used to pay back loans contracted by the pope. Thus what had started out as only a supplement to the Depository, by the sixteenth century had widely surpassed it in both scope and flexibility. It functioned nearly like a private treasury for the pope who enjoyed more freedom over its funds than he could over funds under the scrutiny of cameral officials. We find, for example, among the records of the Datary in 1531 payments of monthly provisions to Clement VII's relatives, Cardinal Ippolito de'Medici (700 scudi), Alessandro de'Medici (750 scudi) and Catherine de'Medici (250 scudi) as well as many repayments of loans. B.A.V., Vat. Lat., 10599. The incomes handled by the Depository General in the Introitus et Exitus accounts varied greatly from year to year depending on, among other things, the political stance of the church. But by the early sixteenth century they still show an overall increase, especially after the revaluation of papal monies by about one-third under Julius II. Peter Partner gives several examples of Introitus et Exitus incomes in the fifteenth century drawn from his own work and from data compiled by Gottlob which show introitus totals of 114,385 cameral florins for the year 1426/1427; only 59,160 in 1436 at the time of the Council of Basel; 471,694 in the twelve months beginning September 1461 which included funds for Pius IPs Crusade; 218,068 for the year beginning August 1471; and about 130,567 ducats for the year beginning December 1506. See Partner, 'The "Budget",' PP- 259-265; Gottlob, pp. 260-265. When Filippo was depositor, for those years in which accounts for twelve-month periods have survived, we find the income handled by the Depository to be as follows: 246,353 ducats for the year beginning March 1516; 86,287 ducats for the year beginning April 1517; 206,843 ducats beginning April 1518; 80,712 ducats beginning April 1519; 111,085 ducats beginning April 1520; and 103,373 ducats beginning December 1523, A.V., Int. et Exit., vols. 555-561. Increases in the amounts of money managed by the Depository are small compared to the increases in total papal incomes according to the best available estimates, and the differences between the two reflect the expansion of income outside the jurisdiction of the Depository particularly from the sale of venal offices. Partner estimates the total incomes for 1426/1427 were 170,000 florins compared with 114,385 in the Introitus et Exitus accounts. The * budget' of the church for 1480-1481 published by Bauer,' Studi per la Storia,' pp. 349-392, shows a total income of 290,000 florins, and the similar 'budget' of 1525 under Clement VII which is discussed by Partner and published in its entirety by Monaco in La Situazione, pp. 70-127, represents an income of about 432,000 ducats. These ' budgets' do not give complete pictures of church incomes. Nor do they take into account the vast credit operations which composed a significant part of papal finances. Still, however, they do provide a useful break-down of church incomes and are the only attempts by contemporaries to create a composite financial picture of revenues and expenses.

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber portion of its regular income. These payments usually dribbled in at irregular intervals in amounts as low as five or ten ducats, which amply confirmed the wisdom of having the Depository General within the scheme of papal finance as a central place in which many small sums would accumulate. However, since these revenues from ecclesiastical taxes proved themselves increasingly insufficient to balance the regular expenditures of the Depository, special subsidies from other sources of income had to supplement them. In our period the Depository received a fixed allotment of 850 ducats from the revenues of one of the customs tolls of Rome which was earmarked for the salaries of the pope's Swiss Guard.43 Money also flowed steadily into the Depository from the datario through the Bini, starting at 1,300 and then by 1521 reaching 1,600 ducats per month.44 Beginning in June 1520 the Depository was assigned an increase from 300 to 500 ducats per month in the subsidy it received from three dogane of the city of Rome. At the same time it began to receive money on a regular basis from the judicial taxes in the province of the Marches.45 The rapidly expanding military needs of the church, commencing in 1516 with the War of Urbino, caused these special subsidies to become regular payments to the Depository, and their increase is evident in the growing number of expenditure entries in the account books allocating money to the papal armies. The Depository General also drew income from extraordinary sources such as the loan from the clerks of the Camera for 12,000 ducats in June 1517 or the one from the banker Antonio Gualterotti for 2,000 ducats at the order of Cardinal Medici in November 1516.46 In addition to its regular subsidy, the Datary sometimes provided single large grants of money, and on occasion the Depository was permitted the total sale price of certain offices. By and large, these extraordinary, usually one-time grants of revenue were called forth to meet specific military expenses.47 For example, in August 1521, 24,000 out of 26,000 ducats paid by Leo X's nephew Cardinal Cibo, probably as an installment on what he had agreed to pay for the office of chamberlain, were sent to Domenico Buoninsegni, the pope's financial agent with the army of the church in Lombardy.48 In November of that year, Ermellino, even more avid to become chamberlain, 43

44 45 46

47

48

T h i s was the dogana di merce. See for examples A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 555, fols. i2v, 39vff. and C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. iovff. A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 558, fol. 49V; vol. 559, fol. 9 5 ; C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol. iov. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 154V. A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 557, fol. 34; vol. 556, fol. 71. In the latter case, the money was actually paid to Strozzi's bank in Florence. In June 1519 the Strozzi bank received for the Depository General 7,172 ducats from the Sienese banker Agostino Chigi which the Strozzi paid to Paolo Vettori for his stipend as captain of the papal galleys. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 68, fol. 49V. C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. 48V, 182.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici topped Cibo's bid with 50,000 ducats, of which 20,000 went to the king of Hungary for the war against the Turks and 26,000 to Buoninsegni to pay the papal troops still fighting in Lombardy.49 Money designated for special purposes usually just passed in and out of the Depository General, but sometimes the gap between receipt and disbursement could widen over a period of time. In July 1524 Jacopo Salviati was paid 1,125 ducats as the share of profit due him as treasurer of the Romagna, supposedly out of income from the census of Pesaro, but the 1,125 ducats from the census were not actually received in the Depository until the following December.5 ° A similar case where money designated for a definite purpose arrived late to the Depository is provided by the example of income which the Kingdom of Naples owed the pope from the decima and a special subsidy. In February 1521 Strozzi's company received on deposit Neapolitan carlini equal to the value of over 27,500 cameral ducats which had been collected through his Naples branch, the company of Bartolomeo Ginori and Angelo Strozzi.51 The money paid in Rome, however, could not be used to offset the regular expenses of the Depository. It had already been pledged to the Bini bank towards the repayment of two of their loans totaling 33,000 ducats two years before.52 The exitus accounts of the Depository General, like the introitus, are divided between regular and extraordinary expenses. The largest share of regular payments went to meet the salaries of officials at the curia and of military personnel, but the depositor was also responsible for smaller items such as pensions assigned to the colleges of venal offices, the expenses of the pope's postal couriers, the provisions for the Sistine choir and musicians, monies for part of the building costs of St Peter's and for some papal household expenses such as linens for the pope's table and candles for his palace and the Sistine Chapel.53 Extraordinary expenses include 49

50 51

52 53

Ibid., fol. 58 and C.S., Ser. v, 101, fol. g6v. T h e Introitus et Exitus accounts reveal a number of other exceptionally large sums of money credited to the Depository and paid out the same day such as, for example, an entry in January 1517 for 240,611 ducats received from the sale of positions in the newly enlarged College of Scutifers and Cubiculars and immediately paid out to the pope. Nothing indicates what the money was used for although we may assume it went for the War of Urbino. See A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 556, fols. 85, 215. Ibid., vol. 561, fols. 121, 185V. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols., 5—6, 166-167. They actually reported that 42,561 carlini had been collected, but after deductions for expenses, only 75 percent of the total was sent to Rome. For lack of comparative data, it is hard to say whether or not 75 percent was a typical portion of collected taxes to be forwarded to Rome. Ibid., vol. 66, fols. 108, 142. A.V., Int. et Exit., vols. 55-61 passim. T h e 1525 ' b u d g e t ' published by Monaco, La Situazione, pp. 70-73 gives a list of typical regular expenses for the Depository in 1525 totaling 59,040 ducats for the year. I have found a copy of this same ' b u d g e t ' in Florence in A.S.F., Con. Soppr. 102, vol. 333 which is clearly labeled 'libro della Tesoreria 1524-1525,' indicating it was compiled by or for the treasurer general Ponzetti. Neither Monaco nor Partner, who used the untitled Vatican

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Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber both the large sums of money paid to individual bankers to reimburse their loans or to the pope's military paymasters to hire mercenaries, and smaller amounts which paid for the occasional provisioning of various papal nuncios, part of the pope's coronation expenses, or even a personal gift such as the gold chain Clement VII wanted to give Simone Tornabuoni in 1524 for which the Depository paid over 200 ducats.54 If we may take the figure of 59,000 ducats from the 1525 'budget' published by Michele Monaco as an average for the Depository's regular yearly expenses, then, when compared with the total exitus entries for the years for which we have records during the Strozzi administration, it becomes quite obvious that an ever greater portion of the total expenditures of the Depository General went towards extraordinary expenses, especially for the pope's military needs.55 Furthermore, a breakdown of the regular expenses themselves in November 1520, a month when expenditures were at their lowest that year and when there were no extraordinary payments, shows that of the total of 2,013 ducats spent that month, more than half went to support the normal military salaries and related expenses at the papal court, and two-thirds of these monies constituted the monthly allotment paid to the captain of the pope's Swiss Guard.56 It comes as no surprise that so much of the Depository General's money was committed to the pope's regular and wartime defense needs. Throughout the reign of the Medici pontiffs the Holy See was engaged almost constantly in the series of Italian wars that started in 1515 with the war of the Holy League against France over possession of Milan, followed by the War of Urbino, the protracted Wars of Lombardy and the reconquest of Parma and Piacenza for the church in the early 1520s, the conflicts culminating in the Sack of Rome in 1527, and finally the siege of Florence in 1529 and 1530. The accounts of the Depository General do not provide any sort of comprehensive record of the costs of those wars for the papacy, even though

54

55

56

manuscript, was aware of the exact provenance of the 'budget.' For our purposes, its origin in the Treasury General explains why the revenues it lists are cameral revenues and not just those going to the Depository General alone. E x a m p l e s of these various uses are found in A.V., I n t . et Exit., vol. 558, fol. 2 1 8 ; vol. 5 6 1 , fol. 170; C . S . , Ser. v, 1770, fol. 192; A.V., I n t . et Exit., vol. 5 6 1 , fols. 1 4 2 - 1 4 9 ; a n d A.S.R., C a m e r a l e 1, 1770, fol. 41. Exitus totals for t w e l v e - m o n t h periods for which accounts exist a r e : 259,717 d u c a t s for t h e year beginning M a r c h 1516; 85,288 ducats for t h e o n e b e g i n n i n g April 1517; 230,924 ducats b e g i n n i n g April 1518; 107,987 ducats beginning April 1519; 127,850 ducats b e g i n n i n g April 1520; a n d 216,471 ducats beginning D e c e m b e r 1523. A.V., I n t . et Exit., vols. 5 5 5 - 5 6 1 passim. Ibid., vol. 560. T h e b r e a k d o w n of those figures for N o v e m b e r 1520 is as follows: Ducats s. d. Regular Military Salaries and Expenses 1310 n Regular curial salaries 678 10 8 Misc. 24 2013 107

1

8

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici it had responsibility for many military payments, for it paid varying amounts of the total expenses. In this connection let us re-emphasize that while the Depository General was the most thoroughly centralized financial office at the curia, it was still only one of several agencies which had specialized but flexible functions depending on which accounts the pope chose to assign them. The payment of military stipends serves as a case in point because not all stipends were always handled by the depositor general. In his letters of 17-18 May 1515 to Filippo, Benedetto Buondelmonti had remarked that considerable profit as well as honor were the rewards of the depositor general who paid the pope's soldiers.57 The Sauli, Strozzi's predecessors, had held that charge which, according to a cameral document, also offered them the chance to remunerate themselves.58 But in Filippo's first years as depositor general, he never officially managed the military payroll.59 He did supply some of the provisions owed to the condottieri Annibale Rangone and Francesco Maria, duke of Urbino, as well as to the captain of the papal galleys, Paolo Vettori, but, since he did so unofficially, he had to be compensated under special arrangement.60 On a regular and official basis he paid only the stipends of the pope's guard and the Swiss Guard at the Vatican. During the War of Urbino, Cardinal Giulio de'Medici's correspondence refers to specific payments to soldiers, but not one of these appears in the Introitus et Exitus accounts. Nor is there any record in the depositor's books of those contracts for hirings shared between Florence and the church which appear regularly in the accounts of the Otto di Pratica in Florence.61 In 1521 when Leo X's army was in the field in Lombardy, the Depository General forwarded large sums of money designated for the war to Buoninsegni, but it still had no official sanction to pay specific provisions.62 However, after Clement VII's election in 1523 the Depository under Filippo did make sizable military payments. 57 58 60

61

62

M . A . P . , 108, fol. 148. 59 A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 6 5 , fol. 137. Ibid., fol. 137. A.V., I n t . et Exit., vol. 555, fols. i66v, i86v. O n 30 July 1519 Strozzi was repaid 2,069 ducats, 15 soldi, 8 denari for money he had provided in part for t h e stipend of Vettori, ibid., vol. 559, fol. 187V. A d o c u m e n t from 1516 also stipulated that Strozzi be compensated from other cameral funds since he was not handling the military stipends at that time, A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 65, fol. 137. T h e correspondence contained in the 'Manoscritti Torrigiani,' A.S.I., Ser. ill, vol. 20 (1874), 391 and Ser. in, vol. 23 (1876), 20-21, includes records of three payments in May 1517 totaling 59,000 ducats to Gascon troops and of an order in May 1518 to the Penitentiary, Cardinal Pucci, to send a letter of exchange through the Fugger bank for 30,000 ducats to pay the provisions of the Swiss soldiers. Examples of shared contracts between Florence and the Camera are in Otto, Cond. e Stant., vol. n . Obviously the Introitus et Exitus accounts are not reliable sources for calculating the total amount the pope spent on war. There is no satisfactory explanation of why Strozzi was not paying the military stipends during the War of Urbino as part of his duties as depositor general. However, the reason is probably related to his heavy financial involvement on the Florentine side of the war. His Rome bank, apart from its accounts for the Depository General, was busily aiding his Florence company in loaning money for the war effort. C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fols. 52, 58, 192.

IO8

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber At that time he began to disburse in regular installments the stipends of the chief condottieri and captain of the galleys together with lump sums earmarked for the War in Lombardy and the pope's military paymaster. In the exitus accounts for the year 1524 the Depository paid out nearly 50,000 ducats just in provisions to two condottieri, Guido Rangone and the Marchese di Mantua, and to Vettori.63 The Depository General's area of operations depended so much on the wishes and needs of the pope that it was never sharply defined but always remained rather flexible, as in the case of the military payroll. The smooth and efficient functioning of the office was contingent upon the solvency of the Camera and, to a degree, on the willingness of the depositor general to advance additional credit in times of shortages. Early in Leo X's pontificate when the Sauli company still held the Depository, considerable confusion prevailed over finances in the Camera and over settling the debts left by the deceased Julius II. In line with customary practice, Julius had pledged various ecclesiastical revenues to different creditors to repay them for their loans. But Leo wanted to regain control over those incomes for his own purposes and to regulate the repayment of his predecessor's debts. He ordered all creditors to register their claims and refused to allow any to be settled without his special mandate.64 All revenues whether spiritual or temporal should be assigned to the depositor general who would then make payments only when presented with a copy of the pope's order. These measures removed some of the confusion surrounding papal monies. But the Sauli claimed that the Depository was completely bereft of money, and they would not pay a number of regular salaries. Leo was compelled to order the Sauli bank to pay those stipends on pain of deprivation of office.65 Contemporaries tell us Leo X was indeed short of funds by the end of 1514. 66 But beyond the penury of the pope, the reluctance of the Sauli to advance the money necessary to cover normal expenses mirrors their wish to limit their credits with the Camera since they were nearing the end of their term as depositor, as Filippo Strozzi was originally scheduled to replace them in just three months, in March 1515. Leo's troubles with the Sauli in 1514 demonstrate two characteristic features of the Depository General: its chronic deficit and its constant need for more credit. The Depository rarely had enough funds to meet its ordinary expenses. It relied instead upon outside subsidies plus a steady flow of credit from the depositor's bank to maintain normal operations. In the Introitus et Exitus accounts, payments from the Depository regularly 63 64 66

A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561, fols. 151-221. This was in addition to the regular stipends he paid to the pope's Swiss Guards and crossbowmen. 65 A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 178. Ibid., fols. 183-184. Among others, Sanuto, xx, col. 341. 109

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici exceeded the rate at which income was received. A typical example from a two-month period, May and June of 1524, shows that whereas expenses totaled over 18,000 ducats, income amounted to barely 1,650 ducats. 67 An even more dramatic example of this disparity comes from the year 1519 when in January the Depository paid the pope more than 140,000 ducats in anticipation of the ransom of 150,000 ducats owed by Cardinal San Giorgio for his release from the Castel S. Angelo where he had been imprisoned after the 1517 conspiracy against Leo. But the Depository did not receive the 150,000 ducats from the Bini bank which loaned the ransom money to San Giorgio until a month later.68 The depositor's deficit accumulated throughout each accounting year and was registered periodically as a debt to the Camera. In June 1513 a deficit of nearly nine thousand ducats left over from Julius IPs reign was credited to the Sauli, and Leo had them reimbursed from monies in the Depository General.69 In the first eight and one-half months that Filippo served as depositor he quickly built up a deficit of 13,300 ducats for which he was to be repaid over a period of several years at the rate of 450 ducats per month out of the monies collected from the three dogane of the city of Rome, undoubtedly with interest.70 The years for which there are records show that Strozzi's yearly deficit as depositor ranged from a low of 11,500 ducats ip 1516-1517^ a high of nearly 35,000 ducats aggregated in 1518-1519. 71 Unfortunately the documents which would allow us to calculate the Depository General's total deficit during Strozzi's tenure are A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561. Ibid., vol. 558, fols. io8v, 2iov. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 202V, dated 18 June 1513. Ibid., vol. 65, fol. 202. The following is a summary of the deficits for the Depository recorded in the Introitus et Exitus:

Deficit Ducats

s.

d.

1

6 7

13,000 4 17 4

i4>057 34,953 17,660 10,803 7,100 6,891 1,709

10

47,145

11

1

15 7

4 10 (for 6 months) 9 9 (for 3 months) 8 8

Date 3/1516 3/i5i7 4/1518 4/i5i9 4/1520 10/1520 4/1521 7/1521 12/1523

9/1524

no

Source Div. Cam., vol. 65, fol1. 202 Int. et Exit., 557, jfol. 160 Int. et Exit., 558, fol. 161 Int. et Exit., 559, fol. 160 Int. et Exit., 560, fol. 160 Int. et Exit., 560, fol. 201V C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol. i 4 9 v C.S., Ser. v, 1770, fol. 170V Int. et Exit., 561, fol.140 A.S.R., Cam., 1, 1770, fol. 31 v

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber lacking, but for those years for which continuous records do exist and in which the Depository is specifically credited for a deficit, from July 1515 through March 1520, the total is over 91,000 ducats.72 The deficit registered periodically is, however, but a fraction of the total credit really advanced by the depositor during any accounting period. Frequently incomes assigned to the Depository at a later date would exceed normal expenses, and the surplus could be used to cover some of the depositor's credit. The deficit which was finally recorded represented only those portions of credit still outstanding at the time of balancing. In the case mentioned above in January 1519 when the depositor advanced 140,000 ducats to the pope, that amount of credit did not turn up in the yearly deficit accounts. It had been more than cancelled in February when the Strozzi bank received a deposit for Cardinal San Giorgio's ransom. A Motuproprio of 6 August 1516 provides a more commonplace example of how even special incomes assigned to the Depository to cover extraordinary expenses were often insufficient and forced the depositor to make up the difference out of pocket, which automatically inflated the deficit. The document is an order to the chamberlain and treasurer general to assign to the depositor's credit a total of 5,000 ducats which Strozzi had expended for the Chamber as follows: 1,800 ducats in Naples to the captain of the papal galleys; 200 ducats to the ambassador to France, Antonio Maria Pallavicini; and 3,000 ducats for the Genoese fleet to fight against the Turks. Incomes totaling 4,500 ducats from the vicariates of Vetere and Castro Anticoli were assigned to reimburse the depositor, but the remainder of 500 ducats eventually showed up on the Depository's deficit account at the end of the year.73 The depositor's total deficit varied from year to year, but within a given year, even one in which the deficit was small, the average negative difference between income and expenses was always more than twice any positive difference. In the year when the total deficit was lowest, March 1516February 1517, the average in the seven months when expenses exceeded income ran at 2,833 ducats as opposed to the average of 1,294 ducats for the five months when the Depository showed a surplus.74 Sometimes the accumulation of the ' normal' deficit was accelerated by special circum72

73

74

T h e s u m of the top five figures in the footnote above. C o m p a r e this figure with the actual difference between Introitus and Exitus figures for the same period which comes to only 85,600 ducats. If the discrepancy of close to 6,000 ducats is really hidden interest, then Strozzi received not quite 7 percent. A.V., Div., C a m . , vol. 66, fol. 86v. In another similar case in 1519, Div. C a m . , vol. 68, fols. 4 9 - 5 0 , Strozzi paid out over 9,000 ducats in stipends, took in only 7,000 and was left carrying a credit of over 2,000 ducats. A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 556. T h e breakdown for the year looks like the following:

III

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici stances such as the need to finance an army or the financial confusion following the death of a pope. This happened in the winter of 1523 in the early months of Clement VII's reign. The death of Adrian VI and the two-month vacancy before Clement's election caused curial incomes to plummet while the costs of supporting the war in Lombardy remained high, forcing the Camera to depend heavily upon the credit of the Strozzi bank to meet its expenses. In the three months from December 1523 through February 1524, the Strozzi paid out 51,000 ducats while receiving in income less than 4,000, thereby advancing over 47,000 ducats' credit to the Camera.15 As might well be expected, the bulk of those payments went for

Months Showing Surplus

Months Showing Deficit

Mar. Apr. Aug. Oct. Dec. Jan.

Feb.

Ducats

s.

-14,073 562

4 9 4

d. May June Jul.

-

549

-

i,349 i,757 1,099 444

12

6 5

6 6 6

-19,835

2

8

1

Sep. Nov.

Ducats

s.

+ 674 + 656 + 755 + 1,169 + 3,215

9 13 14 16

+ 6,471

16

d.

4

The corresponding averages for April 1519 - March 1520 when the deficit was highest are, —6,384 ducats and +2,987 ducats, and the monthly figures are as follows:

Months Showing Deficit

Apr.

May Jul. Aug.

Ducats

s.

-27,865 271 - 4,462

18

-

445

Months Showing Surplus

d. Jun.

7 8 5 8 11 6

Nov. Dec.

- i,452 — 12,662

12

Jan. Mar.

-

573 3,335

9

6

11

2

-51,071

18

7

2

*Sep. Oct. Feb.

Ducats

s.

+ 3,4i6 + 20,116 + 279 + 85

16 13 16 16

+ 23,899

1

d. 6

2

6

* The large surplus in September came from a credit of 23,915 ducats, 8 soldi collected from the Neapolitan clergy. 75 A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1770, fol. 31V. 112

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber military expenses, and on 30 January the Depository sent 24,000 ducats to Bologna to pay the troops engaged in the war in Lombardy.76 The question remains just how profitable did Filippo Strozzi find the office of depositor general ? The position was by reputation quite lucrative, but, as we have seen, more often than not the depositor was required to advance large amounts of credit and run the operation at a deficit. Moreover, if the Camera were tardy in providing compensation, the Depository General could cost the depositor more than it gained him. No figures exist listing the amount of profit made by Filippo or the other banks which ran the Depository General. We do know that the Strozzi bank in Rome as well as the Medici bank before it in the fifteenth century prospered greatly, but it is difficult to determine what percentage of their profits came strictly from their function as depositors general and what portion from their participation in other business deals at the curia. Nor do Vatican records always distinguish between the depositor's business qua depositor and his affairs as a Roman banker. That very omission suggests how the office of depositor general could be lucrative, precisely because it plunged its holder in so many different streams of papal finance where opportunities for profit abounded. Obviously no bank could afford to operate the Depository General gratis or at a loss, and we know from what Benedetto Buondelmonti wrote to Filippo that the depositor could expect handsome rewards. But neither Leo X's Motuproprio granting Strozzi the Depository nor his formal contract make any mention of how he was to be paid for his troubles, and we have only indirect proof of how it was done. From what proof we have, the commission he received from the salaries he paid to officials at the curia and in Rome, to the papal guards, and to the pope's mercenaries undoubtedly constituted the depositor's major source of profit.77 The actual commission or 'retensione* which he deducted from the stipends he paid was apparently between 4 and 5 percent. An entry in a small book of the church's military outlay for 1526 records a payment in account of the provvisione of the Genoese admiral Andrea Doria and states that the total included the depositor's commission, which in this case worked out to 4.96 percent. At that rate, from Doria's 34,500 ducats yearly stipend alone, the depositor would retain 1711 ducats.78 Further indication that 76 77

78

A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561, fol. 151. The rest of the money went for regular salaries, to the majordomo for the pope's expenses and to the Datary for part of Clement's coronation. A Motuproprio of May 1516 attests that the depositor did profit substantially from his salary accounts, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 65, fol. 137. Con. Soppr., 102, vol. 331, fol. 2v. This is the only statement of its kind I have discovered detailing the depositor's percentage from the provisions of ecclesiastical condotfieri. It is located in a small Libro di Provvisioni found together with several other volumes apparently kept by or for the treasurer general which somehow made their way into the archive of S. Maria Novella in Florence, now in A.S.F. The city of Florence set the terms for hire of condottieri to include a 7 percent standard

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici a 4 or 5 percent commission on stipends might have been standard comes from a comparison of identical entries in two account books for 1524, one the Introitus et Exitus book of the Camera and the other a ' Liber depositarii generalis anno 1524^ kept in Italian rather than Latin which was probably the record of transactions of the Depository General the Strozzi company maintained for its own use apart from the final cameral accounts.79 The entries in the Introitus et Exitus for the monthly stipends of the captain of the pope's bowmen and for the captain of the guard are higher by factors of 4.5 and 4.6 percent than the corresponding entries for the same stipends in the depositor's own book and thus probably include his commission.80 If we take 4.5 percent as an average rate of return, then we can estimate the depositor's yearly cut on salaries by using as our basis the summary of expenses of the Depository General in the 1525 'budget'. The expenses which went clearly for regular salaries of officials, excluding items such as clothing allowances, subsidies to the maestro di casay to various monasteries, individuals, and to the colleges of venal offices, total 2^,444 ducats.81 A

79

80

81

deduction by the depositor, for example, Otto, Cond. e Stant., n , passim. However, one does not know how much of that went to the depositor to cover expenses and how much to the city. In the case of Lorenzo de'Medici, when he became captain general in 1515 with a provision of 37,000 florins, it was stipulated that no commission would be deducted from his provision, ibid., fol. 8 2 : 'con soldo di R 37,000 necti d'ogni retentione l'anno con obligo di tener C C C homini d'arme oltre alia persona sua.' A.V., Int. et Exit., vol. 561 and A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1770. T h e s e two books are the only extant examples of overlapping accounts for this period. In the Introitus et Exitus account the stipend of the captain of the bowmen is listed at 365.5 ducats per month as opposed to 350 ducats, 12 soldi per month in the depositor's accounts which is a 4.25 percent difference. I n the 1525 ' b u d g e t ' the same salary is given at 362 ducats per month, Monaco, La Situazione, p. 70. In the Introitus et Exitus the captain of the guard's stipend is given as 157 ducats per month, whereas in the depositor's accounts it is listed as 150, a difference of 4.66 percent. In the 1525 ' b u d g e t ' the captain of the guard received 150 ducats. T h e stipend of the captain of the Swiss G u a r d shows only a 3 percent difference between the two accounts. A comparison of other entries reveals that for some items such as the regular provisions paid to the colleges of office holders or the monthly subsidy for the building of St Peter's there was no variance between the two records. O n other entries unrelated to stipends, such as for the repayment of a loan to Jacopo Cambi and another to Cardinal Farnese, the Introitus et Exitus entry is again 5 percent higher. Monaco, La Situazione, pp. 70-73. If the total in the ' b u d g e t ' already included the commission, then the Depository would have received only 1,225 ducats. F o r some reason the 1525 ' b u d g e t ' does not include under payments made by the Depository General those stipends paid out from monies assigned from the three dogane which include the following yearly s u m s : Ducats 10,200 Swiss G u a r d 1,800 camarlingo as president of the Camera 3,600 castellano of Castel S. Angelo 2,200 senator of Rome 17,800 A 4.5 percent commission on that total would add another 801 ducats to the above yearly sum for the depositor. T h e commission he would have received from the salaries of papal condottieri are also not included in the ' b u d g e t ' figures and would have further increased the depositor's earnings by a significant amount. 114

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber 4.5 percent commission on this amount would have yielded Filippo 1,280 ducats. In addition to his percentage from the salary accounts, it is more than likely that he also received a much smaller commission as a service charge on all the financial transactions and letters of exchange which his bank processed for the Camera through the Depository General.82 The depositor also profited from interest charged on loans he made to the Camera and on the accumulated deficit which was treated like a loan once it was officially assigned to the depositor's credit at the end of each accounting year. The payment of interest was of course a delicate subject at the Vatican because of the church's laws against usury, and in documents dealing with loans it was carefully disguised.83 In a letter he wrote to Campeggio in September 1518, Cardinal Giulio de'Medici admitted that the Camera did in fact take out short-term loans at interest, but only in times of special need. Judging from the records, however, those instances of extraordinary need occurred rather regularly.84 Although private Strozzi papers mention two occasions when 16 percent interest was earned, the average interest on loans was probably from at least 12 to 14 percent, which is consistent with the rates paid by the Signoria of Florence for large short-term loans to the city.85 In 1521 during the wars of Lombardy when Leo X had exhausted his credit everywhere and was desperate for money, the Venetian ambassador reported that the Strozzi bank refused him a loan at even 20 percent, but such a statement is unfortunately impossible to verify.86 Vatican documents show that Filippo was making two types of loans to the Camera. The first was in the form of advances to the Depository itself, to supplement cash shortages which were later absorbed into the 82

83

84

85

86

A fee charged for the many essentially banking operations performed by the depositor's bank for the Camera would not have been an unusual procedure. Even the statutes of the Florentine Nation in R o m e stipulated that a small tax of } per thousand had to be paid to the consul of that nation on any and all business transactions by its m e m b e r s . See A . A . S . G . F . , vol. 3 2 1 , chap. 25-30. A tax of £ per thousand was levied on any money paid by a Florentine for the expedition of a papal bull, brief or other document. A c o m m o n practice was to hide the interest in the official record of the loan. F o r example, a statement that the Camera was in debt for 12,000 ducats to a bank for a loan might actually mean that, if the rate of interest was 12 percent for a period of one year, then the actual loan would have been for only 10,715 ducats. ' I Manoscritti Torrigiani,' A.S.I., Ser. i n , vol. 24 (1876), 15. A standard phrase in many of the documents recording bankers' loans to the pope was, ''pro nostris et sedis apostolicae urgentibus necessitatibus? See for example, A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 74, fol. 9 8 ; vol. 75, fols. 96, 146V, 166; vol. 76, fols. 6 1 - 6 2 , 82, 103; vol. 77, fols. 195, 202V, 209V, etc. C.S., Ser. i n , 134, fol. 142; 110, fol. 183. In both instances the rate was considered unusually steep. For examples of interest rates of 12 and 14 percent on accatti paid by the city of Florence, see Balie, 43 fols. 57V, 100,108. T h e Florentine Nation in R o m e received 13 percent interest on a 10,000 ducat loan to Clement V I I in April 1527, A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 77, fol. 217. T h e Grimaldi firm of Genoa was promised 15 percent interest on a 100,000 scudi loan to pay Clement's ransom from the Castel S. Angelo in D e c e m b e r 1527, ibid., vol. 86, fols. i v - 2 . F o r a while even Agostino Chigi refused him loans, Sanuto, xxx, col. 3 1 .

"5

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Depository's running deficit and periodically repaid.87 The second type consisted of loans directed to the pope similar to those made by any other bank, usually in large amounts and for a designated purpose. Such loans would have commanded higher interest rates, and they carried special provisions for their repayment. We cannot always distinguish in the records between the two types of loans. For example, in May 1521, when the Strozzi bank provided the equivalent of 10,000 ducats cash to pay the Swiss troops, the record of the transaction does not specify in which capacity and under what terms the bank had arranged the loan but only stipulates that it should be entered in the books of the Depository to Strozzi's credit. 88 Loans were typically repaid either directly from the incomes of the depositor, as in this instance, or in assignments of various ecclesiastical revenues not normally controlled by the Depository. In May 1521 when the Strozzi bank loaned 30,125 ducats, Leo pledged all the income from the Penitentiary to secure the loan, and to repay it obligated Cardinal Pucci, his grand penitentiary, to pay the Strozzi 419 ducats per month for the next six years.89 As security for their loans, banks such as Strozzi's also took in jewels, silver plate, or sometimes the papal miter. And as the popes in our period greatly expanded the colleges of venal offices, it became common practice for them to grant their creditors titles and incomes of offices, or, after its foundation in 1526, shares in the papal funded debt, the Monte della Fede.90 The arrangements made to reimburse these loans sometimes opened the door to new profitable ventures. We have already noted how the Strozzi bank was repaid for the Depository's deficit of 1515-1516 from the income of the three dogane of Rome. The assignment of that deficit to the dogane must have provided Filippo with the requisite leverage to gain a controlling interest in the very remunerative dogane themselves. By 1517 he had been allowed to purchase the largest single share amounting to 20 percent of the rights to farm them, 91 and over the next decade his investment in the dogane 87

88 89 90

91

For example, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 145V, records a 1519 credit of 400 ducats for the Strozzi bank which it had previously paid out 'for the needs of the church.' In a similar instance, ibid., vol. 68, fol. 60, Strozzi loaned 2,800 ducats which were listed in the accounts of the Depository. See also ibid., fols. 49V-50. Ibid., vol. 70, fol. 8QV. B.V., Vat. Lat., 7109, fol. 97. Strozzi built up huge credits this way. T o cite just two examples, when he loaned together with the Bini bank 156,000 ducats to Leo X in 1521, the pope pledged them the income from the sale of all vacant offices, which totaled at that time more than two thousand, and for security they received the famous miter of Paul II as well as various jewels and silver plate, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 100-102. In 1529 Strozzi and Bindo Altoviti made a loan to Clement VII of 30,000 ducats which was to be repaid from the decima of the Kingdom of Naples. For security Clement assigned them titles to fifty-three venal offices with the provision that they could sell the offices if their loan had not been repaid within a year, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 83, fols. 106-107. Ibid., vol. 66, fols. 172-173. In a letter to Francesco del Nero of 10 October 1517 in C.S., Ser. HI, vol. 110, fol. 56, Filippo affirmed that his share was the largest. The three dogane, Ripa, Merce,

116

Depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber brought him a tidy annual return of about 14.5 percent.92 When his contract expired in 1521, Strozzi and one other partner, Bartolomeo della Valle, purchased a second five-year contract for the dogane and paid an advance of 36,000 ducats.93 As a further recompense, Filippo's bank served as Depository of the dogane. From a broader point of view, the Depository General brought Strozzi advantages reaching beyond the mere profits associated with its normal operations. It placed him at the center of cameral affairs, put him in close proximity to the pope, and gave him access to the highest levels of patronage. His office lent considerable prestige and attracted added business to the Strozzi bank in Rome which, beyond its dealings with the Camera Apostolica, carried on a brisk trade as a private company and counted among its clients prominent Roman citizens, members of the curia and foreign diplomats who frequented the papal court. In the space of just a few weeks in 1521, the Strozzi bank accepted deposits from a Spanish prelate, an apostolic notary, a papal chamberlain, a cardinal, Constantino Chumino titular duke of Macedonia, and a Roman gentleman.94 The Strozzi bank's large accounts with the Camera also increased its operating capital and had a rippling effect on other Strozzi banks in different cities. After Filippo opened a branch in Lyons in 1517, his Rome company regularly employed it as a correspondent for letters of exchange and for

92

93

94

and Grascia, constituted the single most profitable tax farm available in Rome, and the rights to them were highly coveted. In 1518 Strozzi's manager reported that they were making very comfortable profits from the dogane, lda contentarsi,' C.S., Ser. m , 134, fol. 138. The account books of the dogane for the sixteenth century have not survived, so it is difficult to obtain specific figures on the amount of profit Strozzi realized on his investment in them. There is a record in 1522 of a final settling of accounts with two of his other partners after the expiration of the contract in 1521, which gave them a credit of 14,619 ducats, 19 soldi, 10 denari for their seven-twentieths or 35 percent interest. If this figure represents their profits, as seems probable, then we can calculate the total profit received by all the doganieri for the contract period, which comes to 41,771 ducats, 7 soldi, of which Strozzi's 20 percent share would have been 8,354 ducats. Since the yearly rent the doganieri paid the Apostolic Chamber amounted to 57,000 ducats at that time, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fol. 172, the average annual yield would have been 14.6 percent. Unfortunately we do not know whether the profit figures were calculated before or after overhead expenses had been subtracted. Delumeau, 1, 126-127, calculated from the private accounts of Prospero Boccapaduli, who farmed the dogane in the 1560s and 1570s, that his annual profit was 22.6 percent. A manuscript in the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence, Ginori Conti, 27A, reveals that Bartolomeo della Valle, who was a partner for the same period as Strozzi, made a total profit in ten years as doganiero in excess of 90,000 scudi, but that figure cannot be substantiated. In the original document above recording the profit of the two partners with 3 3 5 percent interest, one suspects that the reason the amount owed them could not be paid immediately and had to be carried as a credit in the accounts of the dogane was that the funds of the dogane had been loaned to the pope and were in short supply at that particular time. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. 172-173. The yearly rent paid by the doganieri was increased from 57,000 to 58,600 from which the 36,000 was deducted over a period of three years. See Monaco, La Situazione, p. 77. C.S., Ser. v, vol. 101, fols. 81-86. Only this one account book of giornale e ricordanze of Strozzi's Rome company has survived. 117

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici the transfer of church funds destined for Rome. His bank in Seville handled the shipment of revenues from Spain which it passed on to Rome via the Lyons branch.95 His company in Florence received and disbursed many of the large subsidies sent from Rome through the Depository General to the papal armies in the north. And when the Depository General was assigned the income of the decitna exacted in the Kingdom of Naples, Filippo's bank in Naples received the commission to manage it.96 Filippo's bank used the Depository to engage surplus funds and to increase the circulation of capital through letters of exchange with branch companies in other cities. Since most of the Depository's payments were made at the end of the month, he could arrange to have his capital {mobile) from Lyons sent via Florence to Rome through several profitable exchanges and still have time to meet payments. With so many of the smaller payments, especially of stipends, in silver coins, his bank also engaged in moneychanging and speculation on the fluctuations in the value of petty coins in relation to gold.97 The primary advantage of the Depository General, however, for Filippo was the entree it provided into other lucrative areas of papal finance, an advantage that Benedetto Buondelmonti had been quick to point out back in May 1515 when he wrote Filippo: 'I see this [the Depository General] to be the ladder enabling you in time to enter into many different areas of church affairs.'98 Filippo's status at the curia afforded him unparalleled opportunity to employ his manifold talents as a businessman on the highest levels of international finance. In 1515 when he assumed the responsibilities of the Depository General he had reached a major juncture in his life. His new company in Rome together with his connections at the papal court which he began to exploit and expand were the keys to his future. They transformed him from just a rich Florentine aristocrat, the brother-in-law of Lorenzo de'Medici, into a highly privileged parente of the pope and high-powered international financier. 95 97 98

96 Ibid., vol. 1208, fols. 84, 109, 127, 144. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols. 5v—6. Filippo explained the procedures in a letter to Francesco del Nero, C.S., Ser. i n , n o , Fol. 148. M.A.P., vol. 108, fol. 148.

War finance and Florentine public funds

Before considering papal war finances and Filippo's role in them as conduit between the Florence and Rome depositories, we must first turn our attention to the broader context of papal banking and the financial predicament which engulfed the Medicean papacy. The papacy in the early sixteenth century faced the same fiscal problems we have already encountered in the Depository General, only on a much larger scale. Although the popes had regular sources of income from taxes on ecclesiastical possessions in all parts of the Christian world, substantial revenues from the Papal States, and income from the sale of offices and indulgences, these monies arrived at Rome too slowly and unpredictably to alleviate immediate needs for cash. The Introitus accounts illustrate how annates or common services and decima payments dribbled in often months late. The distance some monies had to travel whether as a cash shipment or in a letter of exchange added to the delays. Once the papal collector in Spain had managed to force payment which was sometimes years in arrears, it still took over four months to transfer the money from Seville through Lyons to Rome. Spanish monies collected by Giovanni Poggio from September 1532 through December 1533 were not receipted in Rome until the end of May 1534.1 Even the sale of benefices and offices, which became an increasingly productive source of revenue, was sporadic and sometimes at a standstill. A lack of vacancies such as that which occurred in August 1514 when money was in severe shortage in Rome caused Baldassare da Pescia to write Lorenzo de'Medici in Florence the following observation: ' In fact here there is not a quattrino. The datario has debts of 8,000 to 10,000 ducats with Bernardo Bini [depositor of the Datary] and there are no vacant offices.'2 We have already noticed this chronic lack of cash at papal Rome in the records of the Depository General where it showed up in the continual deficits carried on the depositor's books. Filippo frequently made mention of strettezze, or shortages of money, as in August 1514. This shortage had apparently occurred for no other reason than that the pope had spent what 1

A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 95, fols. 170-172. 119

2

M.A.P., 107, fol. 57.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici he had on hand at a time when there were no vacant benefices, and so he could not expect any more income in the immediate future. In such straitened circumstances the court impatiently awaited the death of wealthy prelates and crassly speculated about dividing up the possessions and benefices of the dying.3 The level of the pope's expenses similarly affected the supply of money in Rome in September 1515 during the War of Lombardy against the French when there was a strettezza in both Rome and Florence, while in October after the end of the war there was a brief larghezza when cheap money was available.4 In early spring 1517 during the War of Urbino another acute shortage developed, but by January 1518 it had been replaced by a new larghezza. In fact, Filippo was considering investing capital in the Florentine Monte rather than in the exchange market because so much ready money in Rome was depressing the exchange to only a 10 percent return.5 Extreme shortages could also be caused by an unexpected crisis such as the death of a pope. When Leo X died in December 1521, the crippling strettezza that ensued was prolonged by the deadlocked conclave and the long absence of Adrian VI from Rome. During those months,' the whole city, and not just the financial district, was locked up tighter than on Christmas Day.'6 Six years later the Sack of Rome together with the war and the imprisonment of Clement VII had an even more disastrous effect on the economy, causing a critical strettezza and economic dislocation in Rome that lasted well into 1529. At that time the 3

4

5

6

That August the whole court had been anxiously awaiting the death of Cardinal Carlo Carretto of Finale. But when he finally died that month, Leo X got no relief from his estate because he had willed away all his goods and had already resigned his benefices, M.A.P., 107, fol. 54. Berton, Dictionnaire des Cardinaux (Paris, 1857), p. 635. For the same reason Filippo bemoaned that another cardinal who was critically ill, Marco Vigerio bishop of Sinigalia, would profit them nothing by dying, M.A.P., 108, fol. n6v. M.A.P., 105, fol. 150V. 'There has never been such a strettezza, and it is the same or worse at Rome.' The shortage still persisted at the end of the month, ibid., 108, fol. 144. Jacopo Guicciardini reported that the subsequent larghezza was the financial effect the armistice had on Florence, C.S., Ser. in, 220, fol. 122. However, by December of that year there was another strettezza in Florence because of the pope's visit. Sanuto, xxiv, col. 143; C.S., Ser. in, 49, fol. 27; n o , fol. 90. The larghezza was still in evidence in fall 1518, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 108. Braudel in his The Mediterranean, 1, 496-497, has pointed to the shortage of precious metals in Western Europe as one of the most critical economic factors that created these larghezze and strettezze in the various money markets. See also his and Frank Spooner's article, 'Les metaux monetaires et l'economie du XVI e siecle,' Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale de Scienze Storiche, Storia moderna, iv (Florence, 1955), 248-249. Delumeau, 11, 687, 923-926, says that in the last decades of the sixteenth century the Rome market was characterized by tight money, and from my study of the documents, a general strettezza seems to have prevailed in the first part of the century as well. The documents indicate that there tended to be more larghezze in Florence than in Rome, perhaps because Florence received so much income from foreign trade; but in the period under the Medici when the cost of the papal wars was shared, but controlled from Rome, the money markets in the two cities seem to have operated more in synchronization and Florentines suffered more frequent strettezze. Sanuto, XXXII, col. 239, described the situation in Rome at length in the report of 5 December 1521. During the interregnum church revenues fell off steeply as well. 120

War finance and Florentine public funds exchange business ground almost to a halt. Only one broker remained, and he was sending less than three hundred ducats a week in bills of exchange in April 1529.7 The effects of this chronic shortage of money were only aggravated by the unrestrained spending habits of the pope, particularly those of Leo X. Leo spent money as soon as he received it, if not before, and frequently found himself without cash to cover his immediate expenses. Already in January 1514 Alfonsina Orsini reported to her son Lorenzo that, 'people are gossiping that here he [Leo] has been pope for less than a year, and even though he fell heir to a rich papacy, he still has to borrow against his future incomes to get enough money to spend a mere fifteen days away from Rome.'8 What made matters more complicated was that Leo's spending habits were also highly erratic. In August 1514 during the great shortage he had to delay sending Lorenzo de'Medici one thousand ducats to help defray the costs of his forthcoming trip to Rome until he received some more cash. However, just the week before in a burst of generosity he had given in to the entreaties of his sister Contessina Ridolfi for six hundred ducats for her son's wardrobe.9 Leo justly earned his reputation as a prodigal, leading one contemporary to jest that it was just as impossible for him to keep a thousand ducats together as it was for a stone to get up and fly.10 But even beyond the particular spending habits of a Leo X, there is very little evidence of financial planning or budgeting on the part of the pope and his ministers which might have alleviated the imbalance caused by intermittent incomes and expenses. The only semblance of planning in papal finances lay in the practice of obligating portions of specific incomes for specific purposes, such as the segment of the monthly rent from the three dogane of Rome which went to the Depository General, or revenues from certain taxes which were pledged to pay pensions and stipends. Neither Leo X, Adrian VI, nor Clement VII took steps to follow Julius IPs example of amassing a war chest in the Castel S. Angelo, nor were they able to maintain a cash balance for anticipated expenses. The machinery of papal finance operated in fits and starts and was subject to many little crises when revenues were delayed. And, as a result, the pope and his ministers consumed most of their time and energy in a continual scramble to find or borrow money to cover each new item. 7

8 9 10

C.S., Ser. v, 1209, fol. 34- The financial situation was complicated by the pope's long absence from Rome. After his escape from the Castel S. Angelo in December 1527 he remained in Orvieto and did not re-enter Rome until the following October. The city was deserted and in such ruin as ' to move a Nero to tears,' so wrote Filippo's agent Migliore Covoni 1 August 1528, ibid., fol. 154. M.A.P., 114, fol. 41, 18 January 1514. Ibid., 108, fols. 127, 122. Competition among papal relatives became especially keen over money. Vettori, 'Sommario,' p. 322. See also Sanuto, xx, col. 341; XXVIII, col. 576. 121

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici The persistent shortage became acute when the pope needed extraordinary sums to pay for an elaborate coronation or more often to support an army in wartime. Forced to resort to credit, he sought loans from bankers or members of his court, offering them his possessions and incomes as surety. Bernardo Bini gave a typical loan in 1519 for 20,000 ducats to be repaid from tax revenues from the Kingdom of Naples. Filippo, as depositor general, received an order in December 1519 to repay Bini from funds on hand and then to reimburse the Depository from anticipated revenues from Naples.11 A single loan to the pope could cause his debts and number of creditors to proliferate if money was in short supply when the loan fell due. The pope then had to borrow the sum needed for repayment from other bankers, to borrow from Peter to pay Paul as it were. In 1516 the Antinori company made a loan for 10,000 ducats and was also debtor to another Florentine bank, the Bartolini, for 2,000 ducats on the pope's account. In order to repay the Antinori the 12,000 ducats owed them, Leo had to borrow that amount from three other Florentine banks, the Delia Fonte, Gaddi, and Strozzi.12 A short-term loan pegged to particular revenues represents only one form of credit transaction between the pope and his bankers. The curial offices and administrative posts which these bankers held in the provinces and the various revenues and taxes belonging to the church were all farmed out and rights to them acquired through loans to the pope. To get the Treasury of the province of the Marches, Luigi Gaddi was willing to pay what was termed an anticipazione, or advance, of nearly 11,000 ducats. In effect, the advance constituted a loan in exchange for control over the revenueproducing office from which Gaddi as lender could then reimburse himself plus interest and profits over the designated period of his contract.13 In the same way Leo awarded the papal alum mines at Tolfa which the Medici themselves had farmed in the fifteenth century to two Sienese merchants, the Chigi and Belanti, for 75,000 ducats used for his coronation expenses. Each revenue farmer was obligated to pay a fixed amount of rent to the Camera each year from the incomes he collected, and various sums might be pledged to the colleges of officials at the curia. In the case of the three dogane of Rome, easily the most lucrative of the tax farms, Strozzi and his partners paid out in advance 36,000 ducats and an annual rent of between 57,000 and 59,000 ducats. From the annual rent was subtracted the monthly 11

12 13

A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. io8v, 142V, 166-167. Another loan made in July 15-20 by the Martelli and Capponi company for 10,000 ducats for a period of eight months had been guaranteed with the same tax money from Naples, but the actual revenues were insufficient to cover both loans, and Strozzi had to advance the difference of over 4,500 ducats, ibid., vol. 69, fol. 32. Ibid., vol. 65, fol. 124. Ibid., vol. 63, fol. 87V. Gaddi received instructions to pay the 10,800 ducats he owed for the price of the office to the Tornabuoni bank to reimburse them for certain credits with the Camera. 122

War finance and Florentine public funds subsidy which the depositor general used to pay the stipends of the Swiss Guard and officials including the chamberlain. Other allotments from the dogane went to the College of the Knights of St Peter, to the College of the clerks of the Camera and to the maestro di casa. The tax farmers themselves commonly subdivided their interests by selling shares to other investors. These shares were quoted as percentages based on the division of a lira into twenty soldi, and into 240 denari, so that, for example, a share of four soldi equaled a four-twentieths, or 20 percent, interest. Shares could also be divided further when a new investor bought an interest in a tax farm that was composed of fractional parts of several shares. Thus Jacopo Cambi held shares in the three dogane of Rome which were composed of a two soldi, or 10 percent, interest in Filippo's own portion of the dogane plus a two denari, or 0.83 percent, interest under Lorenzo Cambi's name which had been purchased from Alexandro Corsini.14 For the most part, the business of the curial banks with the papacy consisted of credit transactions, either making loans or administering offices. However, they also engaged in a variety of other activities which, while profitable to themselves, also rendered invaluable services to the church which she was not equipped to furnish alone, principally by enabling her to utilize their banking facilities and wide network of contacts abroad. The Florentine companies of the Gaddi, Strozzi, Altoviti, Ardinghelli and Capponi energetically pursued the indispensable but very lucrative trade of importing grain to Rome. No option for small fry, the grain trade required a large initial outlay of cash and representatives abroad to buy grain in Sicily, Ancona, Naples or the Marches, transport it to Rome, and then store it, before bankers could recoup their investment plus handsome profits from the sale price of the grain in the city. Other companies such as the Ricasoli, Bardi, Antinori and Frescobaldi imported and sold fine cloths and brocades to the papal court. Banks also functioned as international agents of transfer and exchange. The Strozzi handled church revenues from the Kingdom of Naples and Spain. The Fugger, because of their vast connections in Germany and Hungary, virtually monopolized the transfer of monies from those countries. And Florentine companies such as the Salviati transferred ecclesiastical payments from France through their agents in Lyons. 14

B.N.F., Ginori Conti, 27A. Needless to say, it is not always possible to tell from the official document awarding the rights to a tax farm who the real investors were. In the case of the salt farm, or salaria, of the Marches, awarded to the Sauli and Ghinucci companies in 1514, from Filippo's correspondence we learn that Ermellino, Leo's future chamberlain, held a secret interest of at least 50 percent, most of which he had hidden behind the Sauli's name. Once Ermellino was forced to give up his share, Filippo purchased 20 percent of the salaria for which he was obligated to pay 600 ducats a year for four years and from which he expected to make at least 100 ducats, or 16.66 percent, clear profit each year, M.A.P., 108, fol. 122.

123

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici In times of particular need when normal revenues proved completely inadequate to finance a war or a crusade against the Turks, the pope desperately sought new sources of income and credit. The need for extra money was acute in our period because of a combination of decreasing revenues from the protestant North and escalating expenditures attributable to the expensive life style at the papal court and to the increasing costs of papal wars and diplomacy. Add to this the virtual impossibility of augmenting existing revenues because most of the church offices and tax rights and even papal jewels had already been mortgaged to the hilt. Painfully aware of their dilemma, church officials explored three different avenues to offset the habitual insufficiency of funds which plagued the papacy. The first approach, taken by Julius II in 1506, consisted of revaluing papal coins in a proportion of 13.5 to 10, which increased his income since the revenues from taxes levied at the old rate but paid with the new coins effectively increased in value by about one-third.15 The measure was warranted at the time since papal currency was undervalued, but it did not provide a long-range solution to the problem of insolvency. In the short run, however, currency reform was a great boon to Julius because it helped him pay for his wars in the Papal States and to put aside a 200,000 ducat war chest in the Castel S. Angelo for his successor Leo X, who promptly spent it in the first two years of his reign.16 A second tactic to lessen papal financial difficulties was to make existing sources of income more efficient, especially within Rome and the Papal States, which were directly subject to the Vatican and which together contributed about one-half of the total income of the church. Clement VII tried this strategy and gained such a reputation for parsimony bordering on extortion that he was openly reviled by the Romans for his determined efforts to augment his incomes at their expense. He increased revenues from direct taxes by levying them more frequently, raised the sale prices and percentages due the Chamber from farms of indirect taxes, consolidated the administration of various smaller imposts, and even alienated church lands.17 But it is doubtful whether his hard-fistedness brought a lasting increase in real revenues since many of the rights to farm taxes as well as the tax increases themselves were pledged well in advance to pay off previous loans. In addition, the tax burden ultimately fell on the subjects 15

16

17

The Venetian ambassador, Domenico Trevisano, noted the revaluation in his report of April 1510 in Alberi, Ser. 11, vol. in, 33-34. See also Hofmann, 1, 287-288; Delumeau, 11, 658-659. Mention of Julius' treasure in the Castel S. Angelo appears in the early financial documents of Leo X's reign. One such document, dated 6 May 1513, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 63, fol. 53V, is an order to draw 20,000 ducats from the papal hoard {ex pecuniis erarii) to redeem the jewels the Sauli bank held as security for a 10,000 ducat loan to Julius II made in 1511 and another 10,000 ducat loan to Leo X. Numerous documents relating to increased taxation can be found in the Diversa Cameralia series in the Vatican Archive, in the Mandati Carrierali volumes in A.S.R., and in the record of the decrees of the councils of the city of Rome in the Archivio Segreto of the Archivio Storico Capitolino. 124

War finance and Florentine public funds of the church, and there was a limit to how many times they could be forced to pay a hearth tax, salt tax, horse tax or decitna. Over the years Clement had increasing difficulty collecting the taxes he had levied.18 A third approach to the financial crisis consisted of creating new sources of revenue through the sale of venal offices. Many historians have roundly condemned this much abused invention of the Renaissance papacy as bordering on or even crossing over into simony and, as such, detrimental to the church and her spiritual life. But from a purely financial point of view, making patronage profitable by selling titles to offices which had incomes guaranteed from tax revenues was a very creative way to raise money and expand available credit. Although the practice had begun in the fifteenth century, it was not fully exploited until the sixteenth. Leo X made extensive use of the sale of these venal offices. He increased the membership of the already existing colleges of the cubiculars, scutifers, and presidents of the Annona and reinstituted the College of the Janissaries which had been suppressed by Innocent VIII. 19 He even put a price tag on the most important appointive positions at the Vatican. As we have already seen, after Cardinal Riario's death in July 1521, Cardinal Cibo reportedly paid 40,000 ducats for the office of camarlingo \ but in September when Leo needed extra money for the War in Lombardy, he allowed Cardinal Ermellino to take over the office for 50,000 ducats borrowed from the Strozzi bank. Many of the thirty-one cardinals elevated in 1517 had bought their purple robes. Even Leo's closest associates had had to pay a stiff price. According to Sanuto, Ferdinando Ponzetti paid 30,000 ducats for his promotion, Silvio Passerini 20,000 ducats, and Ermellino 40,000 ducats. The aging Niccolo Pandolfini, bishop of Pistoia, had to fork over 20,000 ducats for his elevation. The prospect of a cardinal's hat for a relative was added inducement to the papal bankers to loan money to the pope. From among the prominent Florentine banking families Jacopo Salviati's son Giovanni was elevated in 1517 for an undisclosed sum. The Gaddi finally achieved their goal with the elevation of Niccolo Gaddi in 1527, reportedly for 40,000 ducats.20 The Bini practically ruined themselves in unsecured loans to Leo 18

19

20

Among the Vatican documents there is an increase in the incidence of complaints that the various tax collectors had been unable to collect the full quota of their taxes, and in some instances they were relieved of their duties, and rights to collect the taxes assigned to other individuals. In one case in 1531, Bartolomeo Spinelli was ordered to replace Alexandro Ungaresi as collector of the salt taxes in the Marches, Umbria, and Spoleto because Ungaresi had done a poor job and 'notabilis pecuniarum summa inexacta remanserit' A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 92, fol. 189. Other similar examples of reassignment of rights to collect tax residues are in ibid., vol. 88, ii, fols. 132V-133; vol. 92, fols. 72V-73, 134-135. Hofmann, 11, 5 6 - 6 5 ; Delumeau, 1, 774. T h e titles cubicular and scutifer meant literally ' b e d c h a m b e r attendant' and 'papal shield bearer' but had chiefly ceremonial importance. Sanuto, xxiv, cols. 451-453. Frommel, Der romische Palastbau, 11, 212. Giovanni Salviati was also a nephew of the pope and was elevated in 1517 at the same time as Leo's other nephew, Niccolo Ridolfi, and his relative Luigi Rossi.

125

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici with the same aspiration, and even Filippo Strozzi groomed his eldest son Piero for the priesthood in hopes of having him made a cardinal.21 In 1520 to reduce the debt left from the War of Urbino, Leo established the entirely new College of the Knights of St Peter, planning to raise 401,000 ducats from the sale of its offices. In 1526 Clement, responding to the cries of the papal army in Lombardy, created the first of a long line of papal monti, the Monte della Fedey which was a primitive funded debt in which investors bought shares. These colleges of venal offices, and especially the Monte della Fede, expanded the pope's credit and also stimulated the credit dealings of the greater business community which actively traded and discounted the shares much like bonds. For the pope, the sale of these offices and shares initially lessened his dependence on the papal bankers and their high-interest loans by providing a means to soak up debts and prolong their repayment. The institution of funded debts could have fortified the papacy with a great deal morefinancialindependence from private creditors had anyone at the curia been far-sighted enough to consider the Monte as a kind of endowment whose principal would be reinvested so that the interest could then have been applied to amortize the debt. Instead, the money derived from the sale of Monte stock was usually spent even before it was received, and a small number of large creditors was allowed to monopolize the market. In general, most of the efforts made to strengthen the financial capabilities of the papacy in our period were too limited and too late because they were instituted in response to a particular need at a particular time and not to solve the problem of chronic insolvency. Clement could not slip the bonds of dependence on his bankers, and, in fact, they boasted the largest collections of venal offices and Monte shares. When their loans were not secured directly in tax revenues or vacant benefices and indulgence monies, they received title to offices in the venal colleges whose yearly incomes or salaries functioned as interest payments and whose purchase price represented the investment of the principal. In 1521 the Bini and Strozzi loaned Leo 156,000 ducats, for which they accepted as security the papal miter, various jewels and silver plate, plus the right to dispose of all the vacant offices at the curia whose total number at the time exceeded two thousand.22 Ten years later in 1531, the Strozzi and Salviati banks raked 21

22

Piero's name was included on various lists of prospective cardinals from 1521 to 1534, Sanuto, XXXII, col. 236; XXXVIII, cols. 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 ; XLI, col. 286; Varchi, 1, 128; Nerli, 11, 216-217. Piero received his first benefice from the church of S. Jacopo in C a m p o at the age of eight in 1518, C.S., Ser. i n , 134, fol. 125; 49, fols. 46, 53-55. Despite his tender age of sixteen in 1526, he came very close to being elected. H e was also on the list of prospective cardinals in 1534 before Clement's death, but was never selected. H e chose instead a military career. Strozzi's copy of the loan agreement is in C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 100-102. See also Sanuto, xxx, col. 351.

126

War finance and Florentine public funds in 89,000 ducats worth of credits in the new Monte della Fede to secure their loans, and subsequently Filippo was appointed depositor of the Monte to administer his holdings.23 With this general picture of the papacy's financial predicament in mind, we can now begin to understand how the pope's dependence on his private creditors was directly proportional to the severity of his need for money. The financial documents in the Vatican bear this out because through them we can trace the really big accumulation of Florentine credits with the Camera precisely to the period when Leo X's expenses were heaviest and his finances on the verge of collapse, roughly from 1516 to 1521 when he had to support the crushing costs of the War of Urbino and the subsequent war in Lombardy.24 Florentine banks were committed to a concentrated campaign to loan him hundreds of thousands of ducats, and consequently it is to this period, too, that we can trace their dominance over papal incomes and the offices which had been assigned them as security. Among them the Frescobaldi bank had loaned over 20,000 ducats, the Bini by 1519, 35,000 ducats and an unspecified 'large sum,' followed by the Antinori, Gaddi, Rucellai, Ricasoli, Capponi, and Salviati with sizable loans.25 The Florentine branches of these banks were also providing credit. Leo, in addition, turned to his treasurer Ponzetti and to Passerini his datario for money, and his cardinal nephews, Cibo, Salviati, and Ridolfi, advanced noteworthy sums on their benefices.26 Filippo Strozzi, then both depositor general of the Camera Apostolic a and depositor of the Signoria, was already heavily involved in the war effort from the Florentine side. He added the lucrative three dogane of Rome, the Treasury of Urbino, the right to collect the decima from the Kingdom of Naples, as well as various venal offices to his burgeoning list of assignments to secure his credits.27 No accurate record tells the size of Filippo's credits with Leo, but even by 15 April 1517 he indicated to his associate Francesco del Nero that they were impressive,' I will not mention here how much money the Rome company has provided the pope, nor for how much we are his creditors in the 23

A.V., D i v . C a m . , vol. 8 1 , fols. 165V-166; vol. 92, fol. i i 2 v ; vol. 9 1 , fols. 75V-76.

24

G u i c c i a r d i n i , Istona d'ltalia, v n , 56, 62, 6 8 ; S a n u t o , x x m , col. 5 5 4 ; xxiv, cols. 143, 180, 274; Pio Paschini, Roma nel Rmascimento (Bologna, 1940), p p . 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 ; Verdi, p p . 7 0 - 8 8 ; Pastor, vn, 166, 211-212. F o r a s u m m a r y of these loans, see m y ' Mercatores Florentim,' p . 66. E n t r i e s in an a c c o u n t book of expenses of L o r e n z o d e ' M e d i c i covering 1 5 1 5 - 1 5 1 7 , M . A . P . , 132, fols. 80, 9 9 - i o i v , record F l o r e n t i n e m e r c h a n t s w h o furnished loans to L o r e n z o in F l o r e n c e for t h e taking of U r b i n o in 1516 and include F i l i p p o Strozzi, Pierfrancesco B o r g h e r i n i , J a c o p o Salviati, the L a n f r e d i n i bank, Z a n o b i Bartolini and B e r n a r d o Bini.

25

26

In one transaction Passerini loaned 32,000 d u c a t s , and in a n o t h e r P o n z e t t i p r o v i d e d over 20,000 d u c a t s , A.V., D i v . C a m . , vol. 6 5 , fols. 1 2 9 - 1 3 1 ; vol. 66, fols. 79, 144; S a n u t o , x x x n , col. 2 3 6 ; Paschini, p p . 4 1 9 - 4 2 0 .

27

A.V., D i v . C a m . , vol. 6 5 , fol. 4 0 ; vol. 64, fol. 183V; vol. 68, fol. 3 0 ; vol. 70, fol. 47V; vol. 66, fol. 82v; B.A.V., Vat. L a t . 7109, fol. 97.

127

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Depository of Rome. Both accounts are very substantial, but at the moment I do not know exactly how big they are.' 28 The connection between the war expenses of the papacy and the amassing of credits by Filippo and other Florentines did not end with the death of Leo in 1521 but continued for more than a decade through the reigns of his two successors, Adrian VI (1522-1523) and Clement VII (1523-1534), which were filled with almost continual fighting and marked by an incessant need for funds. In the last months of his pontificate Leo had stretched his credit to its limits, and his untimely death in December 1521 left the papacy bankrupt and in the midst of a protracted war in Lombardy. After Leo's chamberlain Ermellino and the College of Cardinals, which was sovereign during the interregnum, pawned the remaining papal jewels to raise just over 55,000 ducats from Florentine bankers to meet current expenses, there was no money left in the treasury to bury the dead pope. So Filippo joined with Piero del Bene and Sebastiano Sauli in a loan for 30,000 ducats to pay his funeral expenses.29 Despite Adrian VI's austere lifestyle he was still pressed for money and dependent on his creditors. Strozzi who continued to serve under him as depositor general advanced money to pay soldiers and the provisions of several papal nuncios as well as to buy back papal jewels from other creditors.30 The election of Clement VII brought another Medici to the papal throne, but he too was unable to keep church coffers filled despite earnest attempts to increase revenues. From the very beginning of his reign, to retain the good will of the Florentine bankers, he had to accept their loans left over from Leo X's and Adrian VI's pontificates.31 Then, too, his constant switching of allies in the struggle for Milan, now siding with Francis I, now supporting Charles V, and his commitment to campaigns against the Turk kept his military expenses at a disastrously high level. Even the institution of the Monte della Fede in 1526 which enabled him to soak up some existing debts and float more loans did not diminish his need for credit. In April of 1526 Luigi Gaddi loaned him 30,000 ducats on behalf of the College 28 29

30

31

C.S., Ser. HI, fol. 31. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 69, fols. 80-85; C.S., Ser. v, 101, fol. 102. Piero del Bene and Sebastiano Sauli each carried one-fifth of the loan. After Leo's death Filippo resigned eight titles to Knights of St Peter valued at 800 ducats apiece to the College of Cardinals and the Camera to be sold to repay other creditors. In return, for security, he received jewels which included the miter of Paul II with the condition that if he were not fully reimbursed in eight months for the price of the offices plus their assigned incomes, he could sell it, ibid., fol. 104. He returned the miter to Adrian VI in June 1523, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 73, fol. 91. A.V., Div. Cam., vols. 73 and 74, which list some of the debts Adrian assumed with the papacy, confirm that he continued to use Leo's bankers. Record of Filippo's credits with him are in ibid., vol. 73, fols. 74-77, 91, 98, 105; vol. 74, fols. 19, 36. The one surviving Introitus et Exitus account from Adrian's reign is in A.S.R., Camerale 1, 1769. A.V., Div. Cam., vols. 74 and 75 contain numerous examples of the debts Clement accepted from Leo's pontificate.

128

War finance and Florentine public funds of Cardinals to contribute to the Turkish campaign, and in July another Florentine, Lorenzo Pucci, grand penitentiary, ceded Clement titles to seventy-eight shares in the College of the Portionarii di Ripa, which when resold raised 31,200 ducats which were dispatched immediately to the war commissioner in Lombardy.32 In September of 1526 after the Colonna had ransacked the Vatican at the instigation of the imperialists and Clement had fled to the Castel S. Angelo, he was so hard pressed for money to make a settlement with the attackers that he had to offer as hostages his wealthy relatives, Filippo Strozzi and Jacopo Salviati's son Giovanni. Salviati put up a 30,000 ducat bond and Filippo, who actually served six months as hostage in the Castel Nuovo in Naples, eventually arranged privately for his release by posting a security of 50,000 ducats.33 No one knows what Clement's military obligations cost the papacy, but surviving documents at least adumbrate the magnitude of the sums in cash that had to be procured to support his various commitments. The sale of Monte delta Fede shares and ecclesiastical lands in one two-month period, November and December 1526, raised 55,000 ducats for the war effort.34 Between June 1526 and October 1527, Alexandro della Caccia, governor of Piacenza, receipted 549,791 ducats from Clement in account for the war in Lombardy.35 In 1527 after the Sack of Rome and his lengthy imprisonment in the Castel S. Angelo, Clement had to borrow 100,000 ducats from the Grimaldi firm to pay the first part of his ransom in December.36 By the end of 1529 Clement was already committed to another costly venture, the siege of Florence, and receipts from Bartolomeo Valori, papal commissioner in charge of the operation, show that in September 1530 alone he received 100,000 ducats from the pope and in the period between October 1529 and June 1531 a total of 553,286 ducats.37 Clearly the staggering amounts needed to finance these conflicts could not be generated entirely in Rome either from church revenues or from the pope's private creditors, although both were called on to their fullest. The burden of financing the military ventures of the Medici popes came to be increasingly borne by their dutiful ally, the city of Florence. The popes 32

33

34 35 36

37

Ibid., vol. 9 1 , fols. 29V-31; vol. 82, fol. 8 3 ; vol. 89, fols. 108-112. A document in the Florentine archives names some of the individuals who took over Pucci's titles and includes such familiar bankers as Filippo Strozzi, Francesco della F o n t e , Agostino and Hieronimo Sauli, Conv. Sopp. 102, vol. 332, fol. 4. C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fols. 93a, 107. Because he was away from R o m e so long, his bank reduced its activities for the Depository General, and another Florentine banker, Bernardo Bracci, took over the functions of the office unofficially as pecuniarum Santissimi Domini Nostri et suae Camerae Apostolicae receptor generalis, A.S.R., Camerale 1, M a n d a t i Camerali, vol. 863, fol. 30V. Conv. Sopp. 102, vol. 332, fols. 6 v - i o . A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157; vol. 8 1 , fols. i o v - 1 3 . A record of the loan negotiated 4 December 1528 is in ibid., vol. 86, fols. i v - 2 . T h e total ransom amounted to 400,000 ducats. See Delumeau, 11, 759-760. A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandati Camerali, vol. 862, fol. 71V; A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 82, fol. 9 1 .

129

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici had ready access to Florentine resources in this period, not only in terms of the private wealth invested in Rome by Florentine banks with branches at the curia, but also in terms of the commune's revenues which the Medici government of Florence regularly used to replenish the pope's till. Part of the city's funds had to be applied to papal war efforts in compliance with the treaty obligations which made her a member of all papal alliances under the Medici. But contemporaries testified, and surviving records substantiate their testimony, that Florence shouldered far more than her assigned share of the cost. Large subsidies from the commune were channeled into the War of Urbino, and funds raised in the spring of 1517 from the Monte officials and from forced loans went to pay for both the Florentine and papal troops engaged in the lengthy campaign against Francesco Maria della Rovere.38 Parenti complained that the possessions of the church were being defended with the money of the Florentines.39 When fighting in Lombardy recommenced over the rights to Milan and to Parma and Piacenza in 1521, Leo went practically bankrupt. The primary reason he sent Cardinal Giulio as legate to the war in charge of the papal army was that, as archbishop of Florence and effective head of the Medici regime after Lorenzo's death in 1519, he could more easily draw on the commune's funds to support the war.40 Even after Leo died in the midst of the fighting and throughout the long absence from Rome of Adrian VI, the College of Cardinals depended on Florentine funds funneled through Cardinal Medici to finance the campaign. Clement VII, as a Medici, naturally continued to use Florentine monies to support papal military maneuvers in the north. In 1525 when the defeat and capture of Francis I at Pa via obliged him to conclude an alliance with Charles V, he committed Florence to provide the whole 100,000 florins stipulated in the accord.41 38

39

40

41

Estimates put the total cost of the war at 800,000 ducats. Goro Gheri revealed in his correspondence that Lorenzo de'Medici was spending at the rate of 50,000 ducats per month in the war and that in just four months' time, in the spring of 1517,300,000 ducats had been consumed in the war effort, more than Charles V I I I of France had spent in taking the whole Kingdom of Naples, Copialettere di Goro Gheri, vol. 11, fols. 103-108, 249. Pitti in his 'Storia Fiorentina,' p. 119, reported that Florence's credit with the papacy by the end of the war amounted to 230,000 ducats. After the death of Lorenzo de'Medici in 1519, Leo granted Florence San Leo and Montefeltro in partial repayment of her credits. Piero Parenti, fol. 132V. He cited examples of Florentine money used for the war and stated that those citizens who had loaned money in the pope's account had their credits inscribed in the books of the commune of Florence, fol. 133. Evidence that this actually occurred comes from the one surviving book of Entrate e Uscite of the provveditore of the Monte for this period, M o n t e 2292, fol. 137, which contains an entry for 13,635 florins which had been used for the War of Urbino. Vettori, 'Sommario,' pp. 193-194. According to records of the Otto di Pratica, large amounts of money were supplied to Cardinal Medici's treasurer, Domenico Buoninsegni. For example, between 30 October and 7 December 1521 Buoninsegni received close to 200,000 florins, Otto, Stant., vol. 12, fols. 120V, 126V. Between August and December 1521 the Strozzi companies in Rome and Florence provided him over 100,000 ducats, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 149V-153. T h e accord with the imperial viceroy, Lannoy, was made in April 1525, and in June Florence paid the value of 97,650 florins, Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. n 6 v ; Otto, Entrate e Uscite, vol. 3, fol. 28. See also Vettori, 'Sommario,' p. 216. Florence had also sent thousands of florins to the war that

130

War finance and Florentine public funds In May 1526 after he switched allies and rejoined with France in the League of Cognac against the emperor, once again Florentine resources were heavily taxed. Between June and December of that year the city sent 260,780 ducats, and by June 1527 another 390,680 ducats, all to Alexandro della Caccia, treasurer for the papal armies with the League.42 In April 1527 Florence bailed out Clement with a promise to pay 150,000 ducats to appease the Connetable de Bourbon and stop the advance of his imperial army south from Bologna.43 The financial connection between Florence and Rome for raising, administering, and distributing common war funds would make a fascinating study in itself. Lorenzo il Magnifico's government in the fifteenth century provided ample precedent for the liberal discretion the Medici exercised over public funds for the diplomatic and military expenses of the city. The institutional machinery they had created for the effective control of communal funds through the Council of Seventy and the officials of the Monte had remained intact since 1480.44 But in the early sixteenth century, the new feature, brought about by the election of a Medici to the papal throne at a time when the family also ruled Florence, was the effective intermixing of Florentine and papal monies so that the commune's resources no longer served just Medici policy for Florence but primarily supported the needs of the church. But how and by whom were communal funds actually siphoned off and sent to the wars? Exactly how did bankers like Strozzi, who routinely handled both Florentine and church funds, carry out the movement of war monies raised in both Rome and Florence? The pattern for the use of Florentine finances to support a papal army was set in 1515 during the War of Lombardy against the French. In the previous summer Lorenzo de'Medici had maneuvered his tradition-breaking election as captain general of the Florentine forces. But when his uncle Giuliano, supreme

42

43

44

ended at Pavia. Records of the payments are in the correspondence of the papal legate, Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, in C.S., Ser. I, vol. 156, fols. 115, 116, 129, 150, 229; vol. 154, fols. 96, 224, 333, 3 4 1 ; vol. 157, fols. 177, 181, 276, 331. Otto, Stant., vol. 14, fols. iov, 14, 20, 23V, 27. Alexandro della Caccia received payments totaling 549,791 ducats between January 1526 and September 1527, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157; vol. 8 1 , fols. i o v - 1 3 . If the 390,680 florins from the Otto comprise part of that total, then Florence contributed over seventy percent of all the money sent to Delia Caccia. Vettori, ' S o m m a r i o , ' pp. 239-240. Otto, Delib., vol. 7, fol. 103V-104. T h e official document actually says that the payment by Florence would be made contingent upon the release of Filippo Strozzi, then serving as Clement's hostage in Naples. Once Filippo arrived in Rome, he immediately sent 19,000 ducats to Florence to be paid when the agreement with Bourbon became final, C.S., Ser. v, 95, fols. 45V-47. Bourbon, however, continued to advance south with his army and on 6 xMay sacked Rome. See chap. 2 above, and, for the relationship between military expenses and government loans in the previous century, Molho's interesting study, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaissance, 1400-1433, tables 1, 4, and 5, pp. 10, 6 1 , 62, which illustrates the correlation between the cost of the military payroll and the deficit.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici commander of the armies of the church, became incapacitated, Lorenzo went off to the war that August not only as head of the Florentine army, but as commander of the papal armies as well. Filippo Strozzi, his right-hand man, had been entrusted with the Depository of the Signoria of Florence in the name of Roberto de'Ricci in June to assure Lorenzo greater financial flexibility, and at the end of the same month he had taken up his duties as depositor general of the Camera Apostolica. Both depositories were providing money for the war so that even though funding originated from two separate sources, namely from the Apostolic Chamber and from the city of Florence, it was channeled through the same agent, the Strozzi bank.45 The actual ducats which were sent to a single destination and for the single purpose of paying the papal and Florentine troops could be passed very easily and quickly through the private channels of the bank using its branches in Rome and Florence. Furthermore, it did not really matter where the bank received the cash that was sent as long as proper accounts were maintained. Once established, the pattern was easily applied, so that in October 1515 when Filippo received a directive to pay 1,300 ducats to the papal legate Cardinal Giulio de'Medici in Bologna, he ordered his Bologna correspondent, the bank of Antonio Dati, to pay the sum and instructed Francesco del Nero who was both his agent and vice-depositor in Florence to make good the money to the Dati. Del Nero would then instruct the Rome company to remit 500 ducats to him to reimburse the account partially, and the rest he would receive from Filippo and his wife Clarice.46 The provisions and stipends of the Swiss troops and the condottieri, like Renzo da Ceri, Guido Rangone and Federigo Gonzaga marchese of Mantua, employed jointly by Florence and the church, could be treated in the same way. When the Depository General and the Strozzi branch in Rome held the contract to pay those military stipends on behalf of the church, and Francesco del Nero and the Strozzi bank on behalf of the Depository of Florence were responsible for supplying Florence's share, once again the payment became an internal affair of the Strozzi bank. As long as the condottierfs representatives received their pay on time, it did 45

46

On 18 August 1515 Filippo presented the Otto di Pratica with the pope's request for 10,000 troops to fight jointly for Florence and the papacy, M.A.P., 105, fol. 186. Filippo also took charge of organizing the hiring and paying of the soldiers, ibid, fols. 186, 207; vol. 108, fol. 132. C.S., Ser. in, n o , fols. 5, 8. Francesco del Nero operated the Depository for Filippo and stood by him throughout his career almost like an alter ego. Unquestionably he was the most important person and perhaps the brain behind Filippo's financial successes. He came to Rome in 1529 to look after Filippo's business affairs and Clement appointed him his treasurer general. Regrettably he is known to most modern scholars only in a relatively unimportant, but historically overshadowing, capacity, namely as Niccolo Machiavelli's brother-in-law. Francesco is buried in an elegant marble tomb in S. Maria Sopra Minerva in Rome, which his brother Agostino erected after his death in 1563. 132

War finance and Florentine public funds not matter where Strozzi procured the actual funds, whether from a surplus of capital from the Lyons branch of the Strozzi bank or from funds of the Florentine Monte entrusted to Francesco del Nero. Strozzi's correspondence with Del Nero throughout the period of the War of Lombardy in 1515, the War of Urbino and the wars in Lombardy of the 1520s is filled with complex instructions and arrangements to shift large sums of money through Bologna to the military paymasters to meet the quarterly pay schedules of condottieri and soldiers.47 Because Del Nero handled all the payments, it is very difficult to judge from the instructions in the letters whether any individual transaction or shipment of money was made in the church's or Florence's account.48 The flow of money between Rome and Florence and the jumbling of accounts already tested during the first War of Lombardy were only made possible by the credit mechanisms which were a normal part of banking operations. If funds happened to be more convenient and plentiful in Florence, they could easily and routinely be appropriated to fulfill the immediate demands of the church and later be charged to the pope's account. Thus in the fall of 1521 when the Strozzi bank in Rome procured and shipped over 70,000 ducats in cash to Bologna for the war, at least 21,000 ducats were actually put up by the Florence branch of the bank.49 The same general practice of providing cash and credit to the pope from the Strozzi's reserves in Florence obtained also with respect to the commune's funds which the Depository of the Signoria administered and which it diverted to the wars from 1515 on. One of the very first indications of what later became a regular habit of subsidizing the pope shows up in the books of the Otto di Pratica as a record of 786 large florins which the Depository had paid out between 10 June and 8 December 1515 to couriers, of which 450 florins were really spent not for Florence, but for the pope's own messengers between Rome and Florence and Florence and Bologna. In December the Otto approved the whole amount including the pope's share and charged it to the account of the commune with the provision that whenever the pope paid his part, his 450 florins would be credited as 47

48

49

C.S., Ser. i n , n o passim; Sig., D i e d , Otto, Leg. e Com., vol. 72 passim. In one case in October 1515 Strozzi had Francesco accommodate the mercenary Vitello Vitelli by paying him his quarterly stipend ahead of schedule, C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 10. See for example, ibid., fols. 6, 19, 122V, 130-131. In one instance in May 1524 Strozzi's Rome company made arrangements for G u i d o Rangone's provision, normally paid in Rome, to be paid in Bologna with a draft on the Florence company, Sig., Dieci, Otto, Leg. e Com., vol. 72, fol. 136. A similar case is recorded the following J u n e , ibid., fol. 161. Both Strozzi's Rome and Florence companies made shipments of money for the pope in fall 1521 to Bologna to his military treasurer Buoninsegni, C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 8 - 1 3 , 149-153. Records of money paid by the Florence company to Buoninsegni on behalf of the Rome branch are in ibid., vol. 102, fols. 50-52. See also Conv. Soppr, 102, vols. 327 and 331 passim. C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 149V-151.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 50

income. By 1521 it had apparently become a routine matter to shore up papal finances with Florentine money. The practice had even been incorporated into the city's regular accounting procedure. The books no longer detailed expenses made on the pope's behalf, but rather wrote off bulk sums of 50,000, or in one case almost 150,000 florins, with no indication when, if ever, they would be repaid.51 By 1525 Francesco del Nero, who as vice-depositor actually ran the Florence Depository for Filippo, had become so skilled in funneling the commune's monies to the papal armies that he had nearly exhausted its resources. As he admitted in a letter of 8 April to Cardinal Giovanni Salviati, then legate in Parma, '[in Florence] not a penny remains either in the pious foundations or in the secular institutions. And I have plundered everything, even the Jews, all to satisfy his Holiness the Pope.' 52 The Depository and Francesco del Nero were twin keys which gave almost unlimited access to Florence's money. Since the depositor was accountable for war expenses only to the Otto di Pratica and the Signoria, already in the hands of Medici partisans, Del Nero could channel money in a steady stream from the Monte through the Depository and on to the war. And theflowcould not easily be dammed up or halted by discontented citizens looking to charge the Medici or their friends in the regime with malfeasance. The Depository was the chief agency through which funds from the public treasury, including tax revenues and loans by the Monte officials themselves, were pumped out to the papal and Florentine armies. During periods of war when extra funds were needed, it sucked in money from accatti. Yet despite their relative safety, Filippo and Francesco del Nero were forever trying to augment the Depository's funds from sources which would be even less subject to supervision. In both 1522 and 1524 the Otto di Pratica voted the depositor extraordinary powers to seek loans at interest at his discretion.53 And Filippo regularly borrowed money on 50

51 52 53

O t t o , Cond. e Stant., vol. n , fol. 8 9 ; Camera del C o m u n e , Depositeria dei Signori 1686, fol. 32. T h e r e is no record that the a m o u n t was ever repaid. O t t o , Stant., vol. 12, fols. 120V, 126V. C . S . , Ser. 1, 156, fol. 115, 8 April 1525. Authorizations were granted 31 M a r c h 1522, 22 D e c e m b e r 1522, a n d 7 J a n u a r y 1524. O t t o , D e l i b . , vol. 6, fols. 151V-152; vol. 7, fols. 22, 34. T h e books of t h e Otto for J u n e 1522 list over forty

individuals and companies who received interest payments on their loans to the city. The creditors who received by far the most included such familiar ottimati as Giovanni Bartolini (34 florins), Camillo di Niccolo Antinori (40 florins), Heirs of Lanfredino Lanfredini (21 florins, 5 soldi, 16 denari, 8 piccoli), Lorenzo and Filippo Strozzi (21 florins, 6 soldi, 17 denari, 8 piccoli), Domenico Giugni and Co. (40florins),Carlo Ginori (42florins,2 soldi, 6 denari, 8 piccoli) and Pagolo de'Medici (58 florins, 2 soldi, 16 denari) Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. 44V. The Strozzi apparently continued to make substantial loans to the Depository because in June 1523 the records show that Filippo and Lorenzo Strozzi were paid 75 florins in interest, over three-and-a-half times the amount they had received in 1522, ibid., fol. 56V.

134

War finance and Florentine public funds the exchange market for the Depository and subsidized its deficit with funds from his bank.54 The depositor's accounts were reviewed by the Otto di Pratica together with the Signoria which had to vote approval before sending them to be entered into the books of the commune.55 Once the accounts were appropriated and removed from the depositor's books, he was no longer liable for them. During our period the Otto faithfully monitored the accounts and voted on them every six months at the end of their term of office in June and December. Yet despite the intention of the laws to maintain accountability through regular scutiny, they were easily circumvented in a number of ways. First of all, under the Medici the composition of the Otto di Pratica was artfully manipulated to ensure that friends of the regime, many of whom held the office repeatedly, dominated the voting.5 6 Through his correspondence with Francesco del Nero about the Depository, Filippo always kept a watchful eye on the make-up of the Otto. In the winter of 1517 when he was troubled about the delicate task of writing off the Depository's huge expenses from the War of Urbino, he advised Del Nero from Rome regarding the new Otto to be appointed in December: I must have several friends on the new Otto so that those matters we will not have finished with the present Otto can be expedited through them. In addition to Matteo [Strozzi] you will have Roberto de'Ricci [titular depositor] who could not be more to our liking. I believe he will appreciate the honor of the office greatly, and I have kept in mind your report that he desired it. Antonio Serristori, too, is a superb choice.57 54

55

56

57

C . S . , Ser. i n , 4 9 , fols. 19, 2 0 ; vol. n o , fol. 33V. Even F r a n c e s c o del N e r o took t h e liberty of borrowing m o n e y for t h e D e p o s i t o r y from friends, ibid., fols. 3 8 - 3 9 . F o r example, on Easter m o r n i n g w h e n all t h e banks were closed, D e l N e r o was still able t o raise 4,000 d u c a t s in gold at the urgent request of Goro Gheri, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary and effective head of the regime in his absence, ibid., vol. 49, fol. 24. O t t o , C o n d . e Stant., vol. 1 1 , fol. 138V relates a n e x a m p l e of a m e e t i n g of the Otto in M a y 1517 to approve all t h e accounts since t h e previous D e c e m b e r . T h e depositor was supposed to obtain the signature of two m e m b e r s of that council before making any p a y m e n t s , for example, Otto,Delib., vol. 6, fols. 4 8 , 56V, 79, 137V. B u t nothing confirms that this statute was adhered to. Certainly t h e t w o books of Entrate e Uscite of the Otto kept by t h e depositor give n o indication that payments were countersigned, n o r is there mention of this r e q u i r e m e n t in Strozzi's a n d D e l N e r o ' s correspondence. Rosemary Devonshire J o n e s in h e r article, ' L o r e n z o d e ' M e d i c i , D u c a d ' U r b i n o , ' p . 307, noted that between J u n e 1514 a n d D e c e m b e r 1518 o u t of a total of seventy-two possible a p p o i n t m e n t s less than half that n u m b e r of different individuals actually served on t h e Otto a n d that some m e n held t h e office four a n d five times over. C.S., Ser. in, 110, fol. 79, 29 November 1517. The following month Filippo reported to Del Nero with great satisfaction that even the old Otto had accepted his accounts with no questions, and he predicted that with the new Otto which was already full of' assai amici nostn' they would have no further trouble, ibid., fol. 86. Beginning in May and November of each year, Strozzi's correspondence was increasingly filled with references to the Otto and his preparations to have

135

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Even though the Otto had the power to disapprove the depositor's accounts, they never did so at any time from 1515 to 1527 when Filippo controlled the Depository. A glance at their records shows that their sanction was mostly pro forma and ex post facto. For example, in September 1516, in order to balance their books, the Otto accepted a debit statement for 30,000 florins for unnamed extraordinary expenses stemming from the War of Lombardy and from Leo X's visit to Florence the previous Christmas.58 In 1518 to Filippo's great relief the Otto accepted in good form all the accounts of money the Depository had loaned the pope for the War of Urbino, and again in 1525 they approved very generous unspecified subsidies to Pope Clement. By 1526 and 1527 the amounts of money the Otto approved after they had already been spent for the papal war effort in Lombardy ran into hundreds of thousands of florins.59 The accounts of the Depository voted on by the Otto are at best summary entries of large credits, and, although they give some indication of the volume of funds flowing into the Depository and out to the papal army, they do not paint a complete picture of how that money was manipulated inside the Depository. Filippo's letters describe the great volume of papal, communal and private funds passing through Francesco del Nero's hands and the Strozzi bank which are not revealed in the Depository's official accountsfinallyapproved by the Otto. In fact, the dominant impression left by the letters is the care with which Filippo, Francesco del Nero and their associates in the regime camouflaged suspicious accounts and doctored their records even before presenting them to the Otto. They also had recourse to 'retouching' the books to make them appear more acceptable. In one instance of April 1517, Lanfredino Lanfredini was worried that records in the books of the Monte of creditors of the commune such as himself were too explicit, and he advised Francesco del Nero that the books should be touched up because they revealed too much. However, because those particular accounts had already been inscribed in the books of the commune and in the books of some merchants who fronted for the Medici, to retouch them would only increase the possibility of embarrassment or disclosure, and it was decided to let the accounts stand.60

59

60

the Depository's records approved. Rarely did he not trust a particular Otto to accept his accounts, and then only at a time when opposition to the regime had surfaced briefly, such as in the spring of 1517 when the War of Urbino dragged on and Lorenzo de'Medici had been wounded. Rather than risk having some accounts not approved, he chose to hold them over for review by a more 58 Otto, Cond. e Stant., vol. 11, n g v . friendly Otto, ibid., vol. 49, fols. 15, 4. C.S., Ser. in, n o , fol. 88v; Otto, Stant., vol. 13, fol. 107. In December 1526 the Otto accepted the accounts for 260,680 florins that Francesco del Nero had sent to Alexandro della Caccia, ibid., vol. 14, fol. iov. In J u n e 1527 another 159,184 florins were approved that had been spent since the previous December for the same purpose, financing the war in Lombardy, ibid., vol. 13, fol. 159. C.S., Ser. i n , 49, fol. 20. From information in the letter it appears that they were seeking loans from private individuals for the Depository to send to the War of Urbino and then, on the sly, writing these loans into the books of the Monte so that the commune would assume responsibility for them.

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War finance and Florentine public funds One reason for doctoring the books was to maintain the facade that public monies were being handled legally and in conformity with the constitution. Money given to the pope could rightfully be approved as long as it appeared on the books of the commune as a loan by the city to His Holiness, even though in all probability it would never be repaid. An even more important motive for tampering with the accounts was to protect Strozzi and Del Nero from being held responsible later for any adjudged misuse of funds.61 Several artifices shielded them, the first of which was maintaining a certain anonymity in the records of the Depository. The books were kept in the names of the officially designated depositors, Roberto de'Ricci and his successor Giovanni Tornabuoni, who provided cover for Francesco del Nero who actually handled the business of the office. He in turn covered for Filippo whose name rarely appears in any of the Depository's official records. Filippo took such precautions as sending a draft for 4,000 ducats from Rome in May 1516 addressed to Roberto de'Ricci, depositor, but with express instructions that it be given only to Francesco del Nero without Ricci's knowledge.62 Even the sometimes sizable deficits of the Depository which properly were credits belonging to Del Nero and Strozzi were shrewdly written off in Ricci's or Tornabuoni's names, lest the Strozzi name and fortune be too closely linked with the city's finances.63 A second technique meant to disguise the true nature of the Depository's activities was the practice followed by Francesco del Nero of keeping two sets of books, one official and one private. He recorded all transactions first in his secret quaderni before making selected entries in the official books of the Depository. Had Del Nero's secret accounts survived, we would have a much clearer picture of how Medici finances operated.64 Yet a third protective device for Strozzi and Del Nero was to have the credits and expenses of the Depository accepted and transferred out of the depositor's books into the books of the commune as quickly as possible so that they could no longer be held accountable for them.65 To protect themselves and simultaneously maintain a high degree of flexibility in their use of public and private funds in the Depository for the 61

62 63

64

65

Back in M a y 1515 Benedetto Buondelmonti had told Filippo to be careful to protect himself' should the political winds change direction,' M . A . P . , 108, fol. 147. T w o years later Francesco del N e r o reported that Francesco Martelli had warned him how important it was for the books to appear clean since in the last twenty-five years t h e books of the Monte had been challenged so m a n y times, C.S., Ser. i n , 49, fol. 2ov. Ibid., vol. n o , fol. 24V. T h e huge a m o u n t s totaling over 400,000 ducats which the Depository funneled into the war effort in L o m b a r d y in 1526 were all recorded in the n a m e of Giovanni T o r n a b u o n i t h e titular depositor, O t t o , Stant., vol. 13, fol. 159; vol. 14, fol. iov. Filippo and Francesco del N e r o frequently referred to the quaderni kept separately from the Depository's accounts. See for example, C . S . , Ser. m , 49, fol. 15; a n d vol. n o , fol. 87. Obviously Del N e r o ' s quaderni were highly incriminating because when the Medici g o v e r n m e n t was overturned in 1527 both m e n were in danger of prosecution. Ibid., vol. 49, fols. 4, 6, 7, 1 iv.

J

37

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Medici's benefit, Filippo and Del Nero had to conceal many improprieties in their dealings. Because he transferred large sums of money from the Monte before any records were presented to the Otto, Filippo was especially eager to cover up just how much public money was passing through his hands. In November 1515, he instructed Del Nero to see to it that the records would not reveal him to have been too large a creditor for the pope's expenses should those accounts ever come to light.66 In April 1517, according to Francesco, the amount for which they were vulnerable could have reached 100,000 ducats. In December of the same year, Filippo was carrying more than 130,000 ducats in his accounts that he had furnished Lorenzo de'Medici. He was anxious to have the whole sum written off by the Otto since the matter, as he put it, 'weighs on my stomach.' Lorenzo de'Medici, mistakenly informed that the debt was recorded under his own name, and feeling similarly discomforted, wanted to make certain that it was rewritten in the pope's name. Filippo, however, assured him that the debt appeared under his name only in Francesco del Nero's private book and not in any public record. But he agreed that, for the safety of all, it would be a wise idea to lodge everything at Leo's door.67 The next month the appropriate entry was made in the books of the provveditore del Monte listing Leo X as debtor to the commune for 131,635 florins provided to him in the War of Urbino by the Signori of Florence through their depositor Roberto de'Ricci.68 Strozzi and Del Nero were also covering up the liberal application of the Depository's funds to the private needs of the Medici and their friends. Alfonsina Orsini, Lorenzo de'Medici's mother, not only received money but also made occasional loans to the Depository. Francesco del Nero paid individuals such as Benedetto Buondelmonti and Meo da Castiglione at the pleasure of Lorenzo de'Medici, and in one instance, in September 1515, Filippo was prepared to assist Jacopo Salviati with 5,000 florins taken from pledges to be collected from the new Monte officials so that Salviati could promote a private deal to supply salt to Milan.69 In May 1517 Francesco del Nero sent Filippo a list taken from his private records of debts in the Depository which had not yet been written off by the Otto. Although he did not indicate the purpose, legitimate or otherwise, for which money had 66

67

68

69

Ibid., vol. n o , fol. 13. Filippo's concern to protect himself was undoubtedly motivated by the outbreak of some discontent with the Medici government after Francis I's victory at Marignano. Ibid., vol. 49, fol. 20; n o , fols. 92, 87. Francesco del N e r o noted that the income and expenses of the Depository reported to the c o m m u n e for 1516 when Lorenzo de'Medici began the campaign against U r b i n o had amounted to over 300,000 ducats, b u t that they were really m u c h greater, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 11. Monte Comune 2292, fol. 137, 8 January 1518. Filippo's letter of 21 December 1517, C.S., Ser. in, 110, fol. 92, makes it clear that the order to write off the debt in the books of the Monte came directly from Rome and that Jacopo Salviati and Lanfredino Lanfredini had lent their assistance in seeing the matter through. Ibid., vol. n o , fols. 8v, n , 15, 53, 70, 86; M.A.P., 108, fol. 144.

138

War finance and Florentine public funds been provided to the individuals on that list, Francesco did note beside a number of names that they had been paid at the order of Lorenzo de'Medici or Alfonsina. When it came time to settle their accounts in the Depository, Filippo and Francesco dreaded that the delicate matter of those citizens who had received money (the cittadini serviti) as well as the accounts for Madonna Alfonsina might cause them headaches with the Otto.10 Apparently Filippo himself was not above dipping into the Depository's funds, for on several occasions he recorded a personal debt to the Depository. He also made scattered references in his letters to money and loans to Goro Gheri, Lorenzo de'Medici's secretary. Presumably the money usually came out of the Depository, for in one instance after a private loan to Gheri, Filippo pointedly instructed Francesco del Nero not to mix in any of the Depository's money because this was a private arrangement involving Strozzi's Rome company.71 Filippo regularly furnished money to Lorenzo de'Medici whose thirst for credit seemed insatiable. Del Nero kept a special account for these 'imprestanze del SignoreJ and after Lorenzo's death in 1519, he and Filippo wore themselves out getting Lorenzo's outstanding debts absorbed by the commune.72 Filippo's private loans to Lorenzo had a way of showing up in the books as public debts. In May 1517 when he was with his brother-in-law in Ancona, Filippo agreed to lend him one thousand gold ducats from the exchange market with the proviso that Gheri would repay him in Florence. Goro, however, preferred not to make restitution on the spot, probably because the public treasury was nearly empty, and suggested instead that Filippo should simply deduct the loan, and interest too, from the 5,000 florins he was obligated to lend the commune as one of the new Monte officials. The entire 5,000 florins should then be listed with the Monte according to regular procedure as a credit in Filippo's name to be reimbursed at additional interest from the city's tax revenues.73 70

71

72

73

C.S., Ser. in, 49, fols. 7, 8; n o , fol. 86. Some of the payments had been made at the order of Galeotto de'Medici who had been depositor before Filippo, and one entry for 2,900 florins had been paid to Galeotto himself at the order of Alfonsina. Others on the list who received money included such well-known Medici secretaries and atnici as Benedetto Buondelmonti (1,150 florins); Battista della Palle (300 florins); Giovanni da Poppi (418 florins, lire 2, soldi 5); Ser Bernardo Fiaminghi (100 florins); Piero Pucci (100 florins); and Bartolomeo Valori (259 florins). T h e total debt amounted to over 15,500 florins. Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vetton, p. 141 cites another case the following year where Medici amici helped themselves to communal funds which were written off in the accounts of the Otto. C.S., Ser. in, n o , fols. 13, 38V, 58. T h e previous March, ibid., vol. 49, fol. 27, Francesco wrote Filippo that he had provided Gheri with 4,500 ducats, and in November 1517 Filippo revealed that money he had given to Gheri was to be written off on the commune, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 79. Ibid., vol. 49, fol. 28; vol. n o , fols. 122-124. T h e debt was not settled until the following year, fols. 153-154, 157Ibid., fols. 51V-52. Perhaps this way he earned double interest on his original loan of 1,000 ducats. Piero Parenti, fol. 133, also noted the practice whereby private citizens provided money to Lorenzo de'Medici in account of the pope and wound up as creditors in the books of the commune.

139

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Manipulating funds within the Depository in Florence formed the kernel of Strozzi and Del Nero's work for the Medici. But they soon entered another area of war financing when they began to ship money from Rome to Florence and from Florence to Bologna for further distribution to papal and Florentine troops in the north. Filippo's involvement in this facet of war finance grew particularly intense during the extended conflict in Lombardy when Giulio de'Medici was cardinal legate in charge of the papal army. Filippo and Giulio had remained close through the years, and Filippo had always been generous with his credit to the cardinal and to his personal treasurer Domenico Buoninsegni.74 When Giulio was appointed legate Strozzi's bank took over both the cardinal's personal finances and those connected with the war.75 Already by June 1521 Filippo advised Francesco del Nero to do whatever Domenico Buoninsegni required of him, adding that the two stood to gain handsomely from such obligations.76 Reflecting all we have seen above - Filippo's passion for anonymity in his operations of the Florentine Depository and the overall inherent discontinuity in this period between official title and actual practice neither the official records of the Depository General in Rome nor those of the Otto di Pratica and the Depository in Florence openly tell of Filippo's extensive operations in providing the money sent to the papal forces. Evidence comes instead from two private Strozzi account books, the first of which, a book containing entrate e uscite and ricordi, shows that the Florence company received shipments of over 16,000florinsfrom the Rome company in the fall of 1521 and made payments to Buoninsegni between September and November of over 22,000florins.The second account book, 74

75

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I n N o v e m b e r 1515 when he had arranged for money to be sent to Buoninsegni for Cardinal Medici in Bologna, Filippo instructed Del N e r o : 'Satisfy h i m the best you can because you know how His Excellency's affairs are dear to my heart,' C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 15V. In February 1519 Filippo left word with his R o m e company that Cardinal Medici and Buoninsegni were to have unlimited credit there, ibid., vol. 134, fol. 142V. A brief account compiled in February 1523 of Cardinal Medici's personal assets and debts, some of which were for military expenses, shows that Strozzi was his biggest creditor for over 10,000 ducats, 8,400 of which had been provided by Strozzi's Florence company. See C . S . , Ser. 1, 10, fols. 286, 299. T h i s document was used by D . S. C h a m b e r s in his article on cardinals' finances, ' T h e Economic Predicament of Renaissance Cardinals,' Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History, ed. W. Bowsky, m (1966), 306, to demonstrate that Cardinal Medici was deeply in debt. However, the document is not at all a reliable statement of his personal financial circumstances since it includes so many extraordinary military expenses tied u p with his legation to Bologna, such as payments for the provision of the condottiere Alexandro Vitelli, that ordinarily would not come out of the cardinal's own pocket. T h e debts with Strozzi and nine other Florentine bankers could well be connected with expenses for the war in L o m b a r d y . T w o other brief lists of Cardinal Medici's expenses after he was elected pope Clement V I I show that the Strozzi bank continued to act for him as financial agents in various capacities, C.S., Ser. i n , 220, fol. 192 and Conv. Soppr., 102, vol. 327 passim. C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 191. I n April 1521 Filippo received orders from the cardinal regarding the payment of troops in Bologna, ibid., vol. 220, fols. 225a, 172, 173a. Fragmentary personal accounts show that Strozzi made a variety of payments for the cardinal which continued after his election to the papacy.

140

War finance and Florentine public funds one of giornale e ricordanze of Strozzi's Rome company, reveals that transfers of even greater magnitude took place. Between 7 August and 30 November 1521 shortly before Leo died, the Rome company sent Buoninsegni in Cardinal Medici's name over 103,000 cameral ducats. Of the total, the equivalent of over 17,000 florins was contributed by the Florence company in account of the Rome company, and another 20,500 ducats were advanced by the Rome company against certain creditors of the pope.77 The only Vatican document from this period which mentions that Filippo paid any money at all to Buoninsegni is a Motuproprio of 11 September 1521 which duplicates part of the information in one entry preserved in the second Strozzi account book. The Vatican document acknowledged receipt by the Strozzi company in Rome of 20,000 cameral ducats in account of the Depository General. It further recorded that the Strozzi company in Florence paid the equivalent in cash in four installments to Buoninsegni.78 What the Vatican document does not mention but which becomes clear from the more detailed record of the same transaction in the Strozzi account book is how the Strozzi Rome company rilled the order once it received the 20,000 ducats and the order to pay them to Buoninsegni. At that point it became an internal affair of the bank, and, in fact, the Strozzi bank in Rome sent only half the amount, or 10,614 ducats, to Florence and the remainder was paid to Buoninsegni out of the funds of the Florence branch.79 Once money had been collected from its different sources and various points of origin, courier or mule team still had to transport it wherever the troops were encamped. The main supply route north passed through Bologna, and Filippo's representative in that city, the company of Antonio Dati, acted as intermediary in transferring the funds. Dati's duties as an agent of transfer were more complex than meets the eye because often he received gold and silver bullion which had first to be minted into coin before it could be used to pay the soldiers' provisions. Bullion was easier to ship than bulky coins, and since the payroll requirements of the soldiers kept reducing the supply of available specie, new money had to be constantly minted.80 Payments to the papal condottieri and their troops, at least in the 77 78

79

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C.S., Ser. v, 102, fols. 3 - 8 , 5 0 - 5 2 ; 101, fols. 149V-153. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 66, fols. 180V-181. T h e only difference in the amounts recorded in the Vatican document and the Strozzi account book record is 1,386 ducats in the former which the Strozzi company in R o m e kept to pay the stipend of the Swiss G u a r d . C.S., Ser. v, 101, fol. 150. T h e Depository in Florence also provided money. After Leo's death Florence claimed to have over 144,000 ducats in credits with him, Otto, Stant., fol. 126V. Domenico Buoninsegni made the point that gold could be sent by courier, b u t the same value in bank, a silver coin, had to be sent by mule team which was slower and more cumbersome, Conv. Soppr., 102, vol. 332, fol. 2v. It also stands to reason that the operation of paying the soldiers became more efficient and cheaper the closer the bullion could be sent to the troops before it was minted. T h e export of gold and silver to meet the military payroll contributed to the periods of tight money in Rome and Florence at this time.

141

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 1520s, were commonly made in coins valued less than either the Roman cameral ducat or the Florentine florin. The coins most frequently paid were Florentine silver barili, Roman silver giuli, gold ducats of Mirandola called mirandolini, gold scudi di sole, and Modenese ducats, which were specially minted at Bologna, Modena and Mirandola.81 Filippo, Francesco del Nero and Dati collaborated to carry out the operation. The Strozzi provided money and credit to purchase the metals. Del Nero acquired gold and silver in Florence for shipment to Bologna, and the Dati had their own agent, Bartolomeo del Gambero, who supplied them with more of the same. In October 1523 Del Nero and Antonio Dati received a retroactive sanction and guarantee of immunity from the Otto di Pratica for the 830 pounds of silver and 400 pounds of gold they had purchased between 20 August and 26 October. Citing a shortage of money in the city as justification, the Otto gave them permission to procure another 300 pounds of silver and 300 of gold in the month of November. By April 1524 perhaps the volume of their purchases had diminished from its October level because Dati wrote Francesco he could accommodate fifty or sixty pounds of silver every two weeks for minting into giuli.*2 Payment in the newly minted ducats and scudi seems to have been forced upon the mercenaries to their disadvantage. In February 1524 Francesco del Nero consigned to the Dati representatives in Florence a certain quantity of gold scudi, cameral ducats, and Florentine large florins. He ordered the Dati company in Bologna to be prepared to pay the pope's commissioner Paolo Vettori monies up to the value of 15,000 scudi tforo di sole, some in scudi, some in cameral ducats, and the rest in mirandolini. Apparently in order to convince Vettori to accept the mirandolini, the Dati told him that they had been ordered by Del Nero to pay him his money, but that it would be more convenient to do so in Mirandola where the coins were being minted. What Dati then wrote to Del Nero suggests that all these maneuvers had been prearranged to foist the mirandolini off on Vettori. Once Vettori had been paid in these less valuable coins, Dati made out the receipts to the account of the Depository in Florence in the name of Giovanni Tornabuoni, depositor, but in the value of so many scudi, cameral ducats and largeflorinsand not in mirandolini.83 From lack of more complete evidence, we cannot tell exactly who profited from these currency manipulations and whether responsibility for them reached any higher than Francesco del Nero and Filippo Strozzi. However, after the revolution of 81

82 83

Sig., D i e d , Otto, Leg. e Com., 72 passim. O n the diversity of coins in the Papal States see Delumeau, 11, 6 5 3 - 6 5 6 ; Monaco, La Situazione, p p . 59—67; E. Martinori, Annali della Zecca di Roma (Rome, 1917-1922). O n the problem of controlling the provincial mints, see D e l u m e a u , 11, 664—665. Otto, Delib., vol. 7, fol. 24; Sig., D i e d , Otto, Leg. e C o m . , 72, fol. 120. Ibid., fol. 116.

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War finance and Florentine public funds 1527 some of Del Nero's questionable activities in the Depository came to light at the time he was examined by the investigative committee called the Tribolanti whose job it was to look into the abuses of the Medici government. An informant claimed that Del Nero was realizing as much as 10 to 14 percent profit by charging full value to the city of Florence for the cheap coins he had minted from the gold and silver metal and specie purchased with the Depository's funds. Several witnesses who had personally received payments on behalf of condottieri testified that Francesco charged them an extra agio of 2.5 or 2.75 percent if he had to pay them their mirandolini at their current value in Florentine large florins.84 The new coins minted by the Dati were not used just for military payrolls but were also sent back to Florence and Rome to offset shortages of specie. The Strozzi company in Rome placed large orders for mirandolini and Modenese ducats with Francesco del Nero. For example, on 11 February 1524 Migliore Covoni, manager of the Rome company, requested that Del Nero remit the value of the company's credits in Florence in mirandolini because they could be easily disposed of in Rome. Nine days later on 20 February the Rome company shipped 1,500 gold ducats to Del Nero to exchange for mirandolini which were to be sent back as quickly as possible, and seven days afterwards Covoni sent another 3,000 ducats to be converted and returned to Rome.85 Filippo apparently used the Mirandola ducats in a variety of speculative ventures. In one instance in April 1524, while in Rome, he ordered Del Nero to send 2,000 mirandolini to the Piccolomini in Siena with the idea that in three months' time he would be reimbursed in Rome with ' good' money of heavier weight. Filippo told Francesco that he was in gleeful high spirits over the scheme and already planning another similar trick with the imperial ambassador, the duke of Sessa.86 Not all the mirandolini flooding south, however, were up to par. Beginning in December 1523 and increasingly throughout the spring of 1524, enraged complainants filled the halls of the Signoria in Florence and the chambers of the Vatican denouncing the number of bad coins in circulation, especially mirandolini. On 8 December 1523 Galeotto de'Medici, 84

85 86

Balie, 46, fols. 203V-205. D e l N e r o was also charged with forcing p a y m e n t in kind a n d in script; sending t h e c o m m u n e ' s m o n e y on t h e exchange market a n d pocketing t h e interest; a n d with instructing his assistant Giovanfrancesco Baroncelli to b u y u p light-weight gold a n d old m o n e y which he passed off as good coin. H i s accusers further charged that his profits allowed h i m to b u y land a n d Monte stock, to invest capital in t h e D a t i c o m p a n y of Bologna a n d become a p a r t n e r in m o r e than one Strozzi c o m p a n y . I n his defense D e l N e r o asserted that he h a d n o t profiteered but h a d d o n e everything for t h e sake of H i s Holiness t h e p o p e , ibid., 202V-204. F o r other d o c u m e n t s related to t h e case, see ibid., fols. 157V-160; 186V-189, io.6v. Sig., Dieci, O t t o , L e g . e C o m . , 72, fols. 90—92, 100, 104. Ibid., fol. 121; C.S., Ser. m, n o , fol. 210. Even Jacopo Salviati wanted Filippo to provide him with mirandolini, ibid., fol. 210.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici the Florentine ambassador in Rome, reported to the Signoria his discussions with the pope about the damage being done to the economy by the circulation of the mirandolini in Florence.87 By May the situation had so worsened that Domenico Buoninsegni, now a papal finance minister, threatened to place an official ban on those coins, and carried out his threat in June. 88 The correspondence of Filippo, Migliore Covoni and Antonio Dati with Francesco del Nero in Florence in the spring of 1524 deals almost exclusively with the currency scandal. Although no corpus delicti in their letters indicts Strozzi or his friends of fraudulent dealings, sufficient evidence does exist to prove that they were willing participants in the production and distribution of the debased coins. In April when the mirandolini came under open scrutiny, Filippo grew apprehensive when his coins turned out to be 10 to 12 percent light rather than the 5 percent Del Nero had promised him. Since people had begun to avoid the mirandolini like the plague, he feared that those still in their possession would be worth scarcely more than play money.89 It had even been rumored in Rome that the Dati were engaged in counterfeiting. In view of the scandal, Filippo and his associates switched from dealing in mirandolini to Modenese ducats which had not yet been investigated. They had to move cautiously, however, since they were already under suspicion.90 The Modenese ducats themselves were at that time one-quarter grain short of passing for good, so Covoni pressed Del Nero to have them minted just a bit heavier so that they would be accepted. Covoni advised him in any event to vary the stamps on the dies a little to avoid suspicion, and to hold off sending too many of the ducats, especially of those light in weight, until they saw what happened with the last of the mirandolini. According to Covoni, the weight {peso) rather than the purity (lega) of the alloy in the coins was the more critical factor, so Del Nero was to make sure that of those he had minted, at least the first ones sent should be sufficiently heavy.91 By mid-May the danger of exposure and the probability of bans on the money had increased, and Filippo and Del Nero agreed it was time, if not to get out of the business 87

88

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Sig., Cart., Resp. Orig., 4 1 , fol. 63. H e implicated none other than the duke of Sessa, the imperial ambassador to w h o m Strozzi was supplying money. Sig., D i e d , O t t o , L e g . e C o m . , 72, fols. 132V, 156, I 6 I V ; and C . S . , Ser. m , n o , fol. 2 1 1 . T h i s was not the first time that action had been taken against bad money, for the circulation of bad coins was a frequent problem faced by governments at this time. I n 1515 the Signoria had placed a ban on bad coins because they diminished tax revenues and interfered with mercantile transactions, Copialettere di G o r o G h e r i , 1, fol. 210. Back in 1513 the Balia had passed a similar prohibition based on precedents in 1501 and 1509 against monies which were below value, Balie, 44, fols. 144V-145. O n the problem of bad money and clipped coins see D e l u m e a u , 11, 6 8 4 - 6 8 5 . Braudel, 1, 5 3 7 - 5 4 1 , placed the frequent appearance of false and debased coins in the Mediterranean 89 world considerably later. C . S . , Ser. 111, n o , fol. 210. Sig., Dieci, O t t o , Leg. e C o m . , 72, fols. 121, 124, 141. Ibid., fols. 122, 124, 126, 133.

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War finance and Florentine public funds of minting money entirely, at least to call a halt before their good fortune turned sour.92 Unscrupulous financial dealings of the sort practiced by Strozzi and Del Nero in the Depository and in their currency speculations undoubtedly occurred frequently in our period among powerful and well-connected persons operating at the highest political levels.93 The uniqueness of Filippo's position lay in his being simultaneously depositor of the Signoria in Florence and depositor general of the Camera Apostolica in Rome. The willingness with which he and his henchman manipulated Florentine public funds reflects the mentality of two dedicated Medici loyalists. For Strozzi and Del Nero were not so much obsessed with surreptitiously cheating or robbing the city of Florence for their own private financial gain as they were anxious to work covertly to keep their Medici patrons well-supplied with money which they after all ultimately commanded. It was out of their desire to serve their patrons that Strozzi and Del Nero secretly directed so much Florentine money to the papal armies and effectively disguised just how much they were actually sending. Contemporaries like Parenti and Vettori, of course, knew quite well that from the time of the War of Urbino onwards Florence increasingly supplied even more money for Medici military ambitions than she had been obligated for in the treaty alliances imposed on her by the Medici popes. We have noted Francesco del Nero's revealing statement to Cardinal Salviati that by 1525 he had wrung from the city and her ecclesiastical and secular institutions'every last denaro for the sake of Clement VII. But the financial situation in Florence had never been so bad as it became during the war of 1526-1527 between the League of Cognac and the imperialists when the impecunious Clement pressured the city unmercifully for money and still could not prevent the Sack of Rome. By that time the technique of funneling money to the war through the Depository in Florence had developed into a work of art. Several documents relating to the transfer of war monies in this period have survived in an obscure section of the records of the Convent of Santa Maria Novella in Florence. The documents consist of a brief register of letters, including several to Francesco del Nero, 92

93

C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 211. T h e Dati had already been subjected to a suit before the Otto in which Filippo and Del Nero had had to intervene, ibid., fols. 137, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145, 169. In this case the currency manipulations were undoubtedly carried on with the at least tacit approval of Clement V I I . We have already noted the distressing financial conditions that prevailed in Rome in early 1524 after Clement's election and the fact that very little income was received in the Depository General while expenses remained high. T h e absence of money in Rome explains how Strozzi could dispose of the newly minted coins so easily, and he must have been using them to cover the Depository's payments. Back in December 1523 when the currency scandal was first coming to light, Clement VII had summoned Francesco del Nero to Rome and had praised him highly for extending so much credit, ibid., vol. 108, fol. 59; Ser. 1, 136, fol. 23.

H5

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici written by Domenico Buoninsegni.94 The arrangements Buoninsegni made with Francesco to set up the financial supply route to Alexandro della Caccia, treasurer of the papal troops in Lombardy, show how closely and with what great care he, Del Nero, and Delia Caccia worked together to coordinate their efforts to insure a steady stream of money to the war. From Rome Buoninsegni wrote to both Del Nero and Della Caccia to maintain accounts of income and expenses for the coming war and to keep him up to date. Alexandro would be receiving money from Rome and from Francesco in Florence and should keep his records with either of the other two men. Del Nero was to keep his accounts with Buoninsegni, beginning with an entry for 10,000 ducats furnished by the Strozzi company. Francesco thought it best that he keep two different sets of records, the primary set staying with his own private books. From his private books he would then transfer entries into the book of the Depository kept in Giovanni Tornabuoni's name.95 No special explanation for this procedure was necessary, for as we know, Francesco always kept secret accounts separate from the official books of the Depository to protect himself and Filippo from discovery and to afford himself greater latitude in his dealings. But probably there was an additional reason at this particular time. In light of the unprecedented amount of extraordinary funds he would have to scare up in Florence to forward to Delia Caccia for the new war, Del Nero was expecting difficulty and perhaps even open opposition in the city. In fact, in early June Machiavelli was already anticipating trouble among the citizenry if, as seemed likely, Del Nero tried to hold off releasing any Depository funds for the construction of badly needed new fortifications around Florence.96 By the end of June Buoninsegni reported that in Rome he and Clement had acceded to Jacopo Salviati's recommendation that all the funds for the war, not just those originating in Florence, be channeled through Francesco del Nero.97 Del Nero routed the money, part in cash and part in bullion, to his brother Agostino in Bologna who, together with the Dati company, forwarded it to Delia Caccia and supervised the minting of coin to pay the 94

95 96

T h e register is in Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, Libro contenente lettere e carteggi fatti da Domenico Buoninsegni agente in Roma di Clemente VII del is26. T h e earliest reference to Buoninsegni in Filippo's correspondence in the context of financing the 1515 war is in a letter to Francesco del Nero of 19 November 1515, C.S., Ser. i n , n o , fol. 15V. In 1527 Buoninsegni served as receptor et dispensator of the monies of the newly instituted Monte della Fede, in which capacity he was responsible for sending most of the money collected from the sale of shares on to the war. See A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandati Camerali, vol. 861, fols. 184, 185, 194; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 77, fols. 163-164, 166-169, 211, 213V. Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, fols. i v - 2 . Letter to Francesco Guicciardini in Gaeta, pp. 467-468. Only if the pope sent a special order would Del Nero agree to free the money. See also the letter of 1 J u n e 1526 to the Florentine ambassador in Rome regarding the same problem, Balie, 45, fol. 2, and similarly Filippo's letter of 19 May 97 1526, C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fol. 87V. Conv. Soppr. 102, vol. 332, fol. 2v.

146

War finance and Florentine public funds troops. In June all arrangements had been completed and Del Nero began shipping thousands of ducats to the war. Already by the 23rd, he had sent 42,000 gold scudi and 8,000 ducats worth of silver barili to Agostino in Bologna and by 3 July over 70,000 ducats.98 As it turned out, very little of that money came from Rome. By August Francesco was getting desperate after repeated entreaties to Rome to Jacopo Salviati, Domenico Buoninsegni and Filippo had turned up only 10,000 scudi. Filippo gave a grim assessment of the financial situation in Rome and, short of Clement's selling cardinals' hats, he saw no way the pope could lay his hands on the money required to wage a war. Filippo had very nearly exhausted his own credit. At the end of June he had already despaired of being able to forward additional money since, even then at the very beginning of the war, he had over 103,000 ducats in credits with the pope of which only 60,000 were secured, the other 43,000 unsecured and hanging on the slender thread of Clement's life. To meet the additional needs that would arise for the war he foresaw having to relinquish those securities he already possessed just to help the pope a bit more." In the end the problem of locating funds was dumped on Francesco del Nero in Florence who was going crazy with worry as Vettori attested: ' I tell you he hasn't a moment's rest. He is out of his mind, criticizes everything, and no one can even speak to him. Some people are stricken to the core by adversity and he most of all. Still I marvel how that brain of his guides him through the maze of troubles facing him right now.' 100 The only solution was for Del Nero to labor diligently in the Depository and the market place to squeeze out all the money he could. Alexandro della Caccia's accounts of his income and expenses for the war show that he received a grand total of 549,791 ducats between 2 June 1526 and 31 October 1527. His breakdown of that sum reveals that over eightyfive percent of the whole amount he receipted, or 458,428 ducats, came straight from Francesco del Nero in Florence!l °1 But what portion of those 458,428 ducats actually originated in Florence since, as we know, Francesco del Nero also handled funds from Rome? Within the Stantiamenti et Deliberationi of the Otto di Pratica several documents show that on 29 December 1526 the Otto accepted accounts totaling 260,680fiorinilarghi 98

99 100 101

Archivio Guicciardini, Legazioni e Commissarie, Carteggi, vol. xxi, fols. 205, 285. I owe thanks to D r Gino Corti for obtaining photocopies of these letters for me. Letter to Francesco Vettori, 30 J u n e 1526, published in Bardi, p. 46. Letter of 5 August to Machiavelli, Gaeta, p. 475. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 157. A breakdown of the total figure into income and expenses in vol. 8 1 , fols. i o v - 1 3 , reveals that the largest portion of the total, over 362,000 ducats, was used to pay Italian infantry, and the next largest amount, almost 79,000 ducats, was paid to the Swiss infantry in the pope's service. Vettori had estimated that the cost of the war to the whole League should run 160,000 ducats per m o n t h , of which Francis I would contribute 40,000, Venice 60,000 and the pope (and Florence) 60,000, Gaeta, p. 487.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici which Francesco had sent to Delia Caccia between i June and 9 December. A similar entry approved by the Otto on 7 June 1527 states that from 10 December 1526 until 7 June 1527 the Depository of Florence had provided Delia Caccia with 159,184 florins.102 Thus between June 1526 and June 1527 Florence had furnished Delia Caccia almost 420,000 florins, which equaled approximately 440,857 cameral ducats, or very nearly all of that 85 percent he received from Francesco del Nero. Quite obviously, even though Del Nero was supposed to handle all the money destined for the war, very little of it had come from Rome, just as Filippo's and his letters had already indicated, proof that Florence had shouldered by far the greater share of the financial burden of the pope's war in Lombardy. Francesco del Nero had raised the funds, and the Otto had dutifully approved their expenditure. The money which Del Nero forwarded to the papal armies had to be mobilized somehow in Florence, and much of it came from the purses of wealthy ottimati who either privately or as Monte officials contributed to high interest loans secured with the city's tax revenues. Although the records of the Balla are sketchy for this period, they do refer to accatti totaling 170,000 florins and to a series of special provisions passed in January 1527 designed to raise money and ease repayment to creditors by enlarging the tax rolls, collecting overdue debts, extending eligibility to purchase judicial pardons and increasing the price of salt by two denari.103 Citizens chosen as officials of the Monte to make their annual loans to the city were usually from the wealthiest families, and it is hardly coincidental that among the well-to-do individuals elected to this office in March 1527 were none other than Francesco del Nero, vice-depositor, and Giovanni Tornabuoni, titular depositor, followed by eight others, five of whom were among the most prominent Florentine bankers in Rome.104 The loans from the Monte officials and the money collected from the accatti were all administered by the Monte itself. One surviving account book of the provveditore of the Monte which covers the war period through December 1526 shows quite clearly that Francesco del Nero was receiving, or at best charging to the Monte, most of the money he sent to the papal treasurer in Lombardy from the commune's funds. From March to early December 1526 the Monte had given the depositor 290,000 florins. Another 102

103

104

Otto, Stant., vol. 14, fol. i o v ; vol. 13, fol. 159. T h e Otto approved an additional 710 florins for payments made in Florence to one of the League's infantry captains and for Agostino del Nero's expenses in shipping the money to Delia Caccia. Balie, 43, fols. 191, 192V, 193V. O n 18 January 1527 the Monte officials were empowered to inscribe into the tax rolls the names of u p to 400 people who had lived more than ten years in Florence or its suburbs, which in return granted those persons rights of citizenship. F o r fifteen days salt was to be sold at 6 quattrim bianchi per pound. T r a t t e , 84, fol. 70V. T h e bankers were Guidetto Guidetti, Pandolfo della Casa, Giovanni Bartolini, Ludovico Capponi, and Bindo Altoviti.

148

War finance and Florentine public funds Monte account book which has several entries beginning in April 1527 records that between 13 April and 5 July when some of Francesco del Nero's accounts of the Depository under the name of Giovanni Tornabuoni were settled, the Monte had provided him another 278,840 florins.105 The two sums together more than equal the amount that Francesco del Nero sent to the war out of the funds in the Depository. On 8 June 1527 the Otto approved the transfer of Delia Caccia's accounts with Del Nero from the books of the Depository to those of the provveditore of the Monte.106 Once the depositor's accounts were officially accepted, Filippo and Del Nero were freed from any responsibility for them and could no longer be held accountable for any of the hundreds of thousands of florins they had supplied the papacy. This protective device saved them in 1527 from the persecutions of the five tribolanti authorized under the Third Republic to re-examine the books from the Medici regime and prosecute any misdeeds. Francesco del Nero was investigated for his work in the Depository and in coining money, but he was condemned on 28 November 1527 on only two minor counts, one of mishandling funds of the Studio Fiorentino for which he had been provveditore, and the other for having credits of some 3,333 florins with Clement in his private accounts which properly belonged to the city of Florence.107 Filippo was never investigated, and Niccolb Capponi, Filippo's brother-in-law, who was the first gonfaloniere of the new republic, actually rescued Francesco del Nero before his trial by destroying one of Del Nero's private account books which dated back to the regime of Lorenzo de'Medici.108 The charges finally brought against Del Nero could be based only on evidence from a more recent book which showed Clement to be Del Nero's debtor for over 33,000 florins, and Alexandro della Caccia debtor for almost 30,000. The tribolanti also examined the records of the Otto and in one book found debts for Clement totaling over 212,000 florins.109 The account book in which the debts were found was the sixth in a series labeled ' F ' and was probably a book of Debitori e Creditori that contained accounts of still pending debts and credits for which Del Nero had not received approval. This would explain why they had not yet been entered in the Otto's records of stantiamenti. The tribolanti's condemnation of Clement VII for the debt of 212,688 florins which they issued on the day they sentenced Francesco del Nero raises the question why they did not charge the pope, or Del Nero for that matter, for any of the much larger sums that we know the Depository spent for the pope and the Otto approved on the basis of records which clearly 105 106 108 109

M o n t e C o m u n e , no. provvisorio 2099, fols. 131-135; 2132, fols. 130-131. I07 Otto, Stant., vol. 14, fol. 40. Balie, 46, fols. 157V-160. Segni, i n , p . 312; Devonshire Jones, Francesco Vettori, p p . 204-205. Balie, 46, fol. 132V.

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FHippo Strozzi and the Medici identified Clement as debtor to the city. The only logical explanation can be the one suggested above, namely, that those accounts which had been accepted, stanziato, by the Otto and transferred from the depositor's books and charged to the commune were considered closed and beyond review, and only items still pending could be used as a basis for indictment.11 ° In the final analysis, the protective devices which shielded Filippo Strozzi and Francesco del Nero from prosecution for misappropriation of funds also protected the pope. The hundreds of thousands of florins belonging to the commune that had passed through the Depository on their way to finance papal wars during the whole period that Strozzi controlled the Depository were basically nothing more than free subsidies to the Medici popes. The Otto di Pratica reviewed the depositor's accounts and approved his expenditures which were charged to the pope's debt, but there was never any indication those debts would be repaid. Even when the Medici regime in Florence had been overthrown and replaced by the Third Republic, only a token effort was made to assess the magnitude of the Medici's debt since 1512 and to hold accountable those of their friends who as members of the government had willfully served up the city's resources to satisfy the voracious appetite of the papacy. 110

The text of the condemnation of Clement VII has been published by Dr J. Stephens, 'Pope Clement VII, a Florentine Debtor,' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XLIX (May, 1976), 138-141, but he did not consider this very interesting question of why the tnbolanti were content to charge Clement with just the debts listed in that one particular account book.

150

Financier to Clement VII

Whether in Florence or Rome Filippo continued to stand by the Medici, ready to risk life and fortune in their service. The assistance he gave the family in war finance and through the depositories of the Signoria and of the Apostolic Chamber formed but part of his total financial involvement with the Medici papacy. In many ways, only after he had relinquished control of the Depository General in 1527 at the time of the Sack of Rome1 did he reach the peak of his career as a papal banker. During the subsequent period, 1529-1534, he made his biggest loans to the pope and took the greatest risks of his life. In the five years that ended with the pope's death in September 1534, he devoted his energies and his wealth unreservedly to his last remaining Medici patron and long-time friend, Giulio de'Medici, Clement VII. We have already seen in our discussion of the Depository General in Rome how Filippo's credit dealings extended his participation in church finance and administration well beyond the duties connected with the Depository itself. In fact, in the course of his career as a banker to the Medici popes, Strozzi held nine other administrative positions, had title at various times to at least 258 venal offices and possessed a minimum of 80,000 ducats worth of Monte shares.2 He was one of the powerful doganieri, or customs officers, of the three dogane of Rome for most of twenty years and served also as depositor of the dogane \ he was appointed treasurer of Urbino (1520); 1

2

The Sack of Rome, Clement's long imprisonment and his exile in Orvieto severely disrupted the financial transactions of the Apostolic Chamber. When Clement returned to Rome in October 1528, Filippo was given the opportunity to resume his duties as depositor general but decided against it. Migliore Covoni, Filippo's manager in Rome, wrote to him advising against continuing as depositor, C.S., Ser. v, 1209, fol. 33: 'Francesco [del Nero] and I have been discussing the Depository, and so that you will understand, since I have been back at the court, I have totally avoided using that title and have not paid out as many as six mandates in the whole time. In sum, the Depository is nothing any more, and because we are not earning you a soldo here, I have reasoned with Francesco in this way [to give it up].' Bartolomeo Lanfredini, another Florentine banker, took over the office and his appointment was confirmed by Clement's Motuproprio in A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 81, fol. 167; 82, fols. 118-119. In 1530 he received 40,000 ducats worth of Monte shares for his part of a loan to Clement together with Jacopo Salviati, ibid., vol. 81, fols. 165V-166. In 1533 for security of a loan he obtained another 40,321 ducats, 1 soldo, 6 denari in Monte stock and 39,600 ducats in vacant offices, ibid., vol. 82, fols. 156-159.

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici then doganiero of the Gabella dello Studio (1522); by 1526 depositario of the College of the Knights of St Peter; then in 1532 depositor of the Monte della Fede and treasurer of the province of the Marches; and he served as distributor for the Annona, or grain office, in 1532. His last official appointment at the papal court came in 1533 when Clement VII made him nuncio to France.3 Filippo's credits with the papacy brought him a wide variety of venal offices. At the institution of the College of the Knights of St Peter, Filippo received eleven titles to the office of knight which he placed in the names of his sons.4 In 1521 he received twenty-eight more titles for a loan of 24,000 ducats, and by February 1523 he held titles to thirty-four knights.5 In June 1524 he added to his list of venal offices five scutifers, one cubicular and three more knights worth 8,250 ducats.6 By January of 1529 he had titles to nine scutifers, and in August of that year in return for a loan of 15,000 ducats, Clement VII gave him rights to twenty-six offices including eight cubiculars, one protonotary, ten presidents of the Annona and seven scriptors of the Archive. In 1530 he received six more scutifers and two presidents of the Annona. In May 1533 for a loan of 30,000 scudi Clement granted him the income from the following offices: one apostolic secretary, thirty presidents of the Annona, eleven cubiculars and thirteen scutifers. And finally between July 1533 and September 1534 when Clement VII died, he received titles to seventy-eight portioners of the port taxes {portionarii di Ripa) and twelve more knights.7 3

4

5

6 7

C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 46; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 70, fols. 44,47V; A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, fols. 99-100; A.S.R., Camerale 1, 369, fol. 15V; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 91, fols. 75V, 76; vol. 92, fol. 229; vol. 88, ii, fol. 2v; A.S.R., Camerale 1, Mandati Camerali, 865, fols. 78, 158, 194; A.V., Arm. XL, 47, fol. 95. The last document also records that in 1534 Filippo had credits with Francis I worth 30,000 scudi. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 76, fol. 78V. In 1524 Clement sold him the offices free and clear for 9,130 ducats. He distributed the titles as follows: three each in the names of his sons Piero, Vincenzo and Roberto, and two in his son Leone's name. C.S., Ser. v, 101, fols. 123-124. The titles were discounted from their book value of 1,000 ducats each, and Strozzi got them in this particular instance at 857 ducats. On the eve of the Sack of Rome in April 1527 their market value had fallen drastically, and they were selling for 600 ducats apiece, C.S., Ser. in, 134, fol. 200. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 78, fols. 82V-83. Clement assigned him the offices to satisfy a deficit in the Depository General. Ibid., vol. 80, i, fols. 54V-55; vol. 83, fols. 106-107; vol. 84, fol. u6v; vol. 82, fol. 157; vol. 95, fols. 226-227. The offices he acquired in 1534 came in security for part of a loan to pay for Catherine de'Medici's dowry. The above listing of Strozzi's offices comes from cameral records and is not complete because fragmentary documents of the Datary for 1531-1534 show that Strozzi also held titles and incomes belonging to other offices ranging from registrator bullarum, procurator penitentiariae, scriptor penitentiariae, abbreviator parci minoris, registrator supplicationum, magister ostiariorum, collector taxae plumbi, notarius rotae, to corrector archivii, B.V., Vat. Lat., 10599 passim.

Strozzi also purchased for investment purposes offices which were not directly tied to his credits with the pope, such as the office ofplumbator (affixer of seals) he bought for 1,450 ducats in February 1520 during a period of larghezza when few profits were to be made in the exchange market, C.S., Ser. in, n o , fols. 158, 163. The lists of office holders in vol. 11 of Hofmann, Forschungen, which

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Financier to Clement VII These titles and positions came Filippo's way as a result of both the patronage he received from the popes and the credit he offered them. From 1515 when Leo X appointed him depositor general, Medici favor and Filippo's proximity to his patron retained their significance throughout his career. During the reign of Clement VII, if anything it increased because of his personal intimacy and long-time devotion to the pope. In February 1524, less than three months after Clement's election, Francesco Vettori described to Francesco del Nero Filippo's special relationship with the pope: Now that Filippo is consul [of the Florentine Nation in Rome], and as a papal relative holds court like a wealthy cardinal displaying his learning, his acumen and his judgment, I hardly see him any more, and he spends more time in the company of Pope Clement than Niccolo [Machiavelli] spends with Barbara.8 That February, in a move that symbolized the importance of maintaining physical proximity to the pope for anyone who stood to profit from the decisions and financial deals that could be finalized at his instant fiat, Filippo transferred his household to the very elegant Palazzo dell'Acquila designed by Raphael, a stone's throw from St Peter's.9 He had free and constant access to Clement and was literally at his elbow much of the time. Even after the plague broke out in Rome that same spring and Clement barricaded himself behind the doors of the Vatican, Filippo was one of the few people the pope allowed near him. While Filippo's friendship and access to the pope increased his opportunities, they also made him more dependent on the pope's good will. Already in 1524 Filippo described his livelihood as 'contingent on Clement's living breath.'10 The next year he told his brother that should Clement die he would be completely at the mercy of his successor because everything he had in Rome was locked up in future securities, principally in annates and offices, which could be stripped from him in an instant.11 By 1526 he had become so deeply and inextricably entangled in Clement's

8

9

11

is the standard work on offices and officeholding in the Renaissance church, provide useful but very incomplete data. Hofmann paid little attention to the elaborate behind-the-scenes financial deals that took place using offices as collateral, since such deals did not necessarily involve a change of titleholder. Thus in Hofmann's lists we find Filippo Strozzi mentioned only in connection with a handful of offices, vol. n, pp. 185, 196, 197. Elsewhere he did note quite rightly that bankers such as Strozzi became rich through the traffic in cameral offices, vol. 1, 218-220. C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 235, 16 February 1524. Machiavelli's paramour was the singer Barbara Raffacani Salutati. Sig., Dieci, Otto, Leg. e Com., 72, fol. 100. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 6iv. Frommel, 11, 13, 19, who was unaware of the above letters, assumed that Strozzi had only rented and not purchased the house back in 1522 shortly after its builder Giovanbattista dell'Acquila died. The 1526 census in Gnoli, p. 446 also confirms Filippo's residence in Borgo and numbers his household there at twenty-five I0 persons. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 61 v. Ibid., fol. 70.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici affairs that he had tied up all his credit in unsecured loans. 12 How close these financial and personal ties with Clement had become is perhaps best exemplified by Filippo's willingness to offer himself as a hostage in September 1526. The Colonna had sacked the Vatican, sending Clement and Filippo fleeing to the safety of the Castel S. Angelo. Filippo explained the motivation behind his decision to give himself as hostage for Clement by saying he simply saw no other alternative if he was to preserve his own financial interests with the church which were being threatened by war, and at the same time, help his friend and patron Clement who was in dire need. 13 Patronage and friendship, however, do not completely explain the extent to which Filippo became enmeshed in the financial affairs of the church under Clement. The character of papal banking changed substantially during Clement's reign when he began to rely on a smaller number of big banks for larger amounts of credit than had Leo X. The emergence from a field of many of a few very wealthy banks which controlled an enlarging sphere of papal finance was a consequence of the 1527 Sack and the ensuing economic chaos that threatened the survival of even the best capitalized banking institutions. The Strozzi along with the Salviati and Altoviti rose as the leading Florentine banks that had the capital and were given the chance to participate in massive credit transactions such as the one in which Filippo Strozzi and Jacopo Salviati loaned Clement 40,000 ducats and gained a major portion of shares in the Monte della Fede. Yet as Filippo Strozzi emerged as a sixteenth-century tycoon whose wealth and business ties at the curia brought him rewards of position and profit, still none of the titles and administrative offices he obtained in Rome and the Papal States were purely honorary, rather all required his advancing credit and loans. Even his appointment as papal nuncio to France, nominally a diplomatic post, had an ulterior financial motive. The appointment was arranged so that Filippo would be in France both to protect the interests of his niece Catherine, daughter of Lorenzo de'Medici, following her marriage in 12

13

There is plenty of other evidence in the Strozzi correspondence of unsecured loans which Filippo made to the Medici, such as two loans for 5,000 and 3,000 ducats that he made Leo X and Lorenzo de'Medici back in 1517, ibid., vol. n o , fol. 31. Unsecured loans were not necessarily recorded in official cameral records, another reason why the records of loans in the Vatican must be used cautiously and cannot be relied upon to give a total picture of the credit operations at the curia. The loans listed there are mainly those that were secured in church revenues. The Vatican records show that Filippo made only three loans totaling 60,000 ducats between December 1523 and August 1524 which were secured in offices and annates among other things, but since the last one was made almost two years before this letter was written, they could not be the same loans Filippo referred to, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 76, fols. 159-160; vol. 75, fols. 96V-97, 146. C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 92. Filippo became hostage to guarantee the pope's observance of the peace terms arranged with the Colonna and the imperialists. He clearly felt that had he not agreed to go as a hostage in person, or had he tried to make a payment of security like Jacopo Salviati, then the accord would have fallen through and Rome left to an even more terrible fate.

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Financier to Clement VII France to Henry, duke of Orleans, and by his presence to guarantee the payment of her dowry of 130,000 scudi which he had loaned to Clement. In our period the pope usually awarded positions such as that of customs officer or treasurer of a province to one of his creditors like Filippo who could reimburse himself for his loans from the revenues he administered. Once in office he also had the choice of using its revenues to finance still more loans to the pope. In many cases these new loans surpassed the value of the original loan which had equalled the purchase price of the office. Both the old and the new loans were guaranteed by the future incomes of the treasuries and tax farms. Examples of this practice abounded in the Depository General where a number of Strozzi's loans were repaid from the anticipated incomes of that office, and it held true while he was doganiero of the three dogane of Rome. For example, in May 1521 his loan of 24,000 ducats was to be repaid from revenues of the dogane as were new credits of 3,734 ducats and 6,000 ducats in July 1523 and August 1524.14 In this way Filippo's administrative positions such as depositor general, doganiero, or treasurer of the Marches became perpetual credit instruments which enabled him to multiply his loans to the pope and at the same time continue to have them fully guaranteed. With the return of Clement to Rome in 1529 following the Sack and his precipitous flight to Viterbo, the Roman economy slowly began to recover. In that same year Filippo and Bindo Altoviti, another Florentine banker at the curia, purchased a new contract for the three dogane of Rome for 46,000 ducats.15 As doganieri, Strozzi and Altoviti began a series of substantial loans to Clement which beautifully illustrate how Filippo's loans kept insinuating him into still further areas of church finance. In the two-year period between August 1529 and September 1531, Strozzi and Altoviti together loaned the staggering sum of 181,660 ducats to Clement.16 The first loan in August 1529 for 30,000 ducats, 15,000 each, was secured in the decima of Naples for 1528 and in a long list of fifty-three offices which the two bankers could sell after one year if the loan were not repaid.17 In October they loaned another 12,000 ducats which were secured with 14 15

16

17

B.V., Vat. Lat., 7109, fol. 96; A.V., Div. Cam. vol. 75, fols. 105, 146. Ibid., vol. 82, fols. 48-50. Clement had increased the purchase price of the dogane considerably, considering that Filippo and his former associate Bartolomeo della Valle had paid only 36,000 ducats for them in 1521. On Altoviti, see Coriolano Belloni, Un banchiere del Rinascimento, Bindo Altoviti (Rome, 1935). I have calculated the total in the value of cameral ducats. Those loans made beginning in 1531 were in the new gold scudi which replaced cameral ducats at the papal court. The scudo contained twenty-two rather than the twenty-four carats characteristic of the ducat and was therefore worth about 91.66 percent of the ducat. Beginning in 1539 the rapport between the scudo and the ducat was set at 109 to 100. On the introduction of the new scudo, see Monaco, La situazume, p. 64; Delumeau, 11, 636-658, 666; Varchi, 11, 309, 377. It first appears in Vatican documents in 1531. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 83, fols. 106-107.

155

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Spanish revenues to be sent to Rome by the Spanish collector.18 Their loan of 18,000 ducats in January 1530 was to be reimbursed in one year by an increase in the price of salt in the province of the Marches.19 In March 1530 Strozzi and Altoviti advanced 30,000 ducats cash which Clement would repay within twelve months' time from a 0.5 percent impost on all ecclesiastical property. The following January they loaned Clement 37,500 scudi in cash, and in return he granted them the fruits from two whole decime imposed for the year 1531.20 Five months later in June 1531 Strozzi and Altoviti handed him another 37,500 scudi which were to be repaid in revenues from a newly imposed hearth tax of one ducat per hearth in the states of the church as well as in income from additional decime imposed after those in January. The two bankers made their last loan together in September 1531 for 25,000 scudi. This loan was pegged to compositions of revenues in the provinces of the Marches and Umbria and from Spoleto.21 The Vatican records of all these transactions never state their purpose, but their timing coincided with Clement's siege of Florence which ended the Third Republic and saw the reinstitution of Medici rule. Filippo wrote after Clement's death that the money had been loaned specifically for the siege.22 Despite the guarantees for loans stated in the documents, Strozzi and Altoviti faced real problems in getting their money reimbursed in full. Tax revenue assignments were frequently delayed and often inadequate to cover their credits. Or the pope might decide at the last moment to divert them for another purpose. Strozzi and Altoviti took great pains to ensure that their loans to Clement were well-secured and that clear arrangements had been made for their repayment, but no records substantiate whether or 18

19

20

22

Ibid., fols. 108-109. Among the bankers in Spain who were to act as agents for Strozzi and Altoviti was Francesco de Lapi and Associates who in May 1532 became Strozzi's partner in the new branch bank he opened in Seville. O n his bank in Spain see Federigo Melis, ' I I Commercio transatlantico di una compagnia fiorentina stabilita a Siviglia a pochi anni dalle imprese di Cortes e Pizarro,' Fernando el Catolico e Italia (Institution ' Fernando el Catolico' del la Excma. Diputacion Provincial de Zaragoza) (Zaragoza, 1954), p p . 129-225. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, fols. 115V-117. T h e y also received security in titles to various offices. T h e loan was made in Bologna where Clement V I I met with Charles V from November 1529 until March 1530 to decide among other things the fate of Florence prior to the emperor's coronation by the pope. Francesco del Nero, then treasurer general, received the money in cash in Bologna, so very likely it played a part in fulfilling the terms of the treaty between pope and emperor ratified in January 1530. Ibid., vol. 84, fols. 171-173; vol. 82, fols. 84-85. A record of concession of the decime to them is in ibid., vol. 88, i, fols. 34V-37, dated 27 January 1531. F o r their greater security for this loan Strozzi and Altoviti received pledges of all the goods and incomes belonging to the pope, his chamberlain and datary. In the event decima revenues were insufficient, the treasurer general Del Nero pledged to repay them from future ecclesiastical revenues. In the records of this and of the other similar loans, there is mention that the two bankers received interest but no indication of what percentage they charged. T h e two decime in question were imposed supposedly to raise money to combat the 2I Turkish threat. Ibid., vol. 82, fols. 86-87, 100-103V. B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29, also published in Bardi, p. 7 1 .

156

Financier to Clement VII not the two bankers were ever fully reimbursed. It is clear, however, that their money was not repaid as scheduled and that Strozzi regularly sought additional guarantees. For in December 1531, three months after the last loan was made, Clement removed Andrea Calcagni from his position of treasurer of the Marches and gave it to Filippo for seven years beginning January 1532 for a price of 18,000 ducats. 23 Obviously Strozzi's appointment as treasurer of the Marches was related to the series of loans he and Altoviti had made because a number of the loans had been secured in incomes from that particular province. Following his appointment, Filippo repeatedly received special authority to collect the taxes in the Marches which were slated for repaying his credits. On 5 January 1532, barely a week after he had assumed the duties of treasurer, Clement issued a Motuproprio authorizing him to exact the hearth tax both in the Marches and in the city of Ascoli, whose revenues had been assigned him in June 1531 on the occasion of his and Altoviti's loan of 37,500 scudi. Five days later Clement issued a second Motuproprio granting him the two new decime in the Marches which he had been promised in January 1531. He was further empowered to collect the hearth tax and the decime in Umbria and Spoleto. Agostino del Nero, brother of Filippo's long-time collaborator Francesco, was appointed vice-treasurer to oversee the actual collections of the revenues. 24 The money that Filippo and Bindo Altoviti advanced Clement represented the largest integrated series of loans to the pope by individual curial bankers.25 Their loans of 1529-1531 clearly established Strozzi's and, with his help, Altoviti's pre-eminence among curial bankers, and the magnitude of their credits with Clement set them in a category apart from all the rest. The ability to mobilize that much cash over a brief period of time presupposed a substantial financial network from which to draw, and undoubtedly Strozzi called in profits and capital from his other banking companies in order to sponsor these loans to the pope. But even though repayment of these particular loans was still in progress for months after they were due, Filippo, having severed his temporary partnership with Altoviti, continued to advance other substantial sums to Clement up until his death. In July 1532 he loaned 39,600 cameral ducats 23 24

25

A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 92, fol. 229. Ibid., vol. 88, ii, fols. 8V-9, 1 9 - 2 1 , 3 6 - 3 7 , 66v—67. O n 21 D e c e m b e r 1531 Agostino was officially appointed vice-treasurer under Filippo, ibid., vol. 92, fol. 230. Earlier in 1515 Jacopo Salviati had guaranteed 100,000 ducats for Giuliano's ' d o w r y ' when he married Filaberta of Savoy, ' I Manoscritti Torrigiani,' A.S.I., Ser. i n , vol. 19 (1874), 228, b u t he probably paid only a portion of it himself. T h e largest loans to the church by other curial bankers usually did not exceed 20,000 or 30,000 ducats at any one time, and I have seen no other examples of an integrated series of loans like these made by Strozzi and Altoviti, where the record of each new installment included a careful resume of all credits in the series to date. Strozzi went on to make substantial loans to Clement after these made together with Altoviti, b u t not serially.

157

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici for the war against the Turks. 26 The following winter of 1532-1533 Clement met Charles V for the second time at Bologna, where they agreed to a defensive league with a number of Italian cities for the protection of Italy. Filippo opened his purse once again to Clement and brought forth 30,000 scudi as a portion of the 108,000 scudi needed to fund the league. He paid the money directly to Antonio de Leva, Charles' general and captain of the new league. For this loan Filippo received a variety of securities which included more Monte credits with a face value of 40,321 cameral ducats and income from vacant offices of up to 10,000 ducats. All together the value of these securities reached 39,600 ducats. In the event the loan was not repaid, Clement made provision that Filippo would receive the balance regardless, including up to 15 percent interest, in Monte shares.27 By far the largest single loan that Filippo undertook for Clement was for the dowry of Catherine de'Medici on the occasion of her marriage on 28 October 1533 in Marseilles to Henry of Orleans, Francis Ps second son and later king himself.2 8 Filippo agreed to provide the entire sum of 130,000 scudi in several installments. He paid the first 10,000 scudi immediately to the French king in Marseilles and was reimbursed soon thereafter out of the strongboxes which the pope and his datary had brought with them. Strozzi then paid 20,000 scudi in Lyons from funds drawn on a letter of exchange from his Rome company. Another 20,000 scudi fell due at the exchange fair of All Saints and were paid with money from Filippo's Lyons company. The Lyons company then drew a letter of exchange on the Depository General in Rome for the following January. The next 40,000 scudi fell due at the spring exchange fair of the Resurrection in Lyons and the final 40,000 scudi at the fair of All Saints the following autumn.29 The provisions Clement made to repay the loan within one year included pledges of 25,000 ducats from ecclesiastical incomes from Spain, one-half of all the incomes from vacant offices up to 25,000 ducats, and the remaining 80,000 in monies collected from two new decime to be imposed in the Papal States. 26

27

28

29

A.S.R., Camcrali I, Mandati Camcrali, 865, fol. 22V and 886, fol. 40. T h e loan was paid in seven installments during the month of July of which Strozzi paid 20,000 ducats in Rome for Cardinal Ippolito de'Medici, then legate to Hungary. T h e rest was paid in Ancona, Faenza and Bologna through agents for Strozzi. Agostino del Nero, vice-treasurer of the Marches, paid 10,000 ducats in Ancona, probably out of the provincial revenues under his control. A.V., Div. Cam., Vol. 82, fols. 155V-159. T h e offices included one secretary, 30 presidents of the Annona, 11 cubiculari, and 13 scutiferi. Later that year Francesco del Nero travelled to Lombardy and Umbria to collect tax monies that would be applied to Filippo's credit, C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 86. Catherine was the only child of Filippo's deceased brother-in-law, Lorenzo de'Medici. Filippo accompanied her to France, leaving Florence 1 September 1533. C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 86. A Motuproprio for 80,000 scudi of the loan is in A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, ii, fols. 177V-181. A.S.R., Camerali 1, Mandati Camerali, 865, fol. 74, dated 15 January 1534, records a payment by the Depository of 20,601 scudi in account of what Strozzi loaned in Lyons.

158

Financier to Clement VII In addition, by way of collateral, Filippo received 20,000 ducats worth of jewels and a Motuproprio guaranteeing him repayment of the 80,000 scudi from the decitne.30 Beyond the Motuproprio for that final 80,000 scudi, Filippo also demanded further security in case Clement should die before the debt was repaid. At Filippo's insistence Clement agreed to divide the risk into four equal parts which would be shared by himself, Filippo, Francesco del Nero (now papal treasurer general), and by Agostino Spinola his chamberlain. In this way Filippo's personal risk for the 80,000 scudi was reduced by three-quarters. For his part, Clement gave Filippo 20,000 ducats worth of jewels, and Del Nero and Spinola agreed to make good their shares should the necessity arise. Filippo had also suggested a novel plan whereby the latter three men, the pope excluded, would form a private monte built on the securities and income assignments due on the original loan in which they would each hold a one-third share.31 Catherine de'Medici's dowry put a wrenching strain on Filippo's finances, especially on his Lyons branch which discharged the actual payments to the French monarch. In order to bring together the sums of money needed for the dowry, Filippo had to draw on all his available resources in Rome and throughout his financial empire to aid the Lyons branch which was weighted down by this heavy obligation. Filippo instructed Benvenuto Olivieri his Rome manager to settle all accounts, call in outstanding debts and remit all available monies to Lyons. To free more capital he sent orders to delay the purchase of any real estate. Olivieri even had to ask Francesco del Nero to repay the 16,000 ducats Filippo had loaned him the previous summer so that the money could be forwarded to Lyons as well. At the end of December Strozzi instructed Olivieri to press Clement for repayment of 20,000 scudi which had been part of the first dowry installment. The Lyons company had so many burdens that it could not bear the additional strain caused by unnecessary delay.32 Filippo's 30

31

32

C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86-87, 9 1 ; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, ii, fols. 177V-180. Ibid., 187V-188 is a notification dated 29 October 1533 to Giovanni Poggio informing him of Strozzi's loan and of his part in the obligation to repay it. C.S, Ser. v, 1208, fol. 8 6 ; A.V., A r m . XL, vol. 47, fols. 255-256. Although it was a common occurrence much later, as far as I know, such an arrangement for a private monte was unprecedented in the early 1530s. While in France for the wedding, Filippo also provided money for members of the wedding party. At Clement's request he returned to him 8,800 ducats worth of jewels he was holding in security for other loans, among which were jewels from the miter of Paul I I . H e loaned Caterina Cibo, duchess of Camerino, one of Catherine de'Medici's attendants, 600 ducats for her expenses. H e also paid for his own expenses as nuncio which, excluding extraordinary expenses, ran normally ten scudi per diem. I n addition, Filippo had paid the cost to outfit Catherine and transport her to France, C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86, 9 1 , 92V; Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133; A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 84, ii, fols. 195V-196. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 86, 9 1 , ' R i p e t o spesso le m e d e s i m e cose p e r c h e la lingua va dove duole il dente.' ['I keep returning to the same things because the tongue goes where the tooth aches.'] At the same time, the Lyons company had to carry most of the weight of 31,000 scudi in additional credits which Francis I owed Filippo through his finance ministers, the 'Generals.'

159

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici obligation for the dowry of Catherine de'Medici exposed him to considerable risk. He had overextended himself and tied up so much of his money and credit with the pope that, should anything happen to Clement, he might never recover from the tremendous financial loss he would suffer as a consequence. Even in Lyons the riskiness of this venture and his dependency on the pope were so well recognized that Filippo reported back to Rome that his credit was no longer held in high regard.33 The possibility of Clement's premature death loomed as a constant threat to Filippo, and he knew well the disastrous effect it would have on him and his business. This awareness led him to take what extra precautions he could such as arranging the private monte scheme with Del Nero and Spinola. But a banker such as Filippo whose fortune was linked to one man could scarcely afford to alienate his patron and still hope to recover his credits. Thus, despite all the pressing financial obligations he had already incurred on Clement's behalf, in the year following Catherine de'Medici's wedding, while continuing to meet the payments on her dowry, Filippo made several more loans at the request of the pope. In January of 1534 he willingly loaned Clement 12,000 scudi for a period of one year, but demanded heavy security. Clement awarded him rights to the income from a new tax to be levied on the possessions of Jews in the states of the church and to portions of the decitna from Naples. In addition, a provision was incorporated in the record of the transactions rare in documents of this type. It stipulated that if the loan were not repaid on time, Strozzi could reimburse himself through bills of exchange to Lyons at the expense of the Camera.34 The following March Filippo made Clement a cash loan of almost 4,000 scudi, for which he was promised repayment in cash plus 12 percent interest. Like the previous loan, this one had double security, and in the event that repayment was not forthcoming, Strozzi would receive clear title to eight knights of St Peter which belonged to the Camera but were registered in the name of the datary.35 Clement was in his final illness when Filippo made him his last loan for 20,000 ducats on 5 September 1534, just twenty days before the pope's death. The loan was for a period of six months to be repaid by a 10 percent share of the annates and common services. For additional security Clement bound not only himself but also his successor to repay the loan and stipulated that from the revenues collected from the annates and common services Filippo had first claim to five-sixths of the money until fully reimbursed.36 33

34 36

Ibid., fols. 86, 91. When Filippo heard of Clement's safe return to Italy he was greatly relieved because, 'la vita sua al presente e congiunta con la salute mia.' ['Right now my well-being depends on his being alive.'] 3S A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 95, fol. 90V. Ibid., fols. 140-141. Ibid., vol. 94, fols. 308-319. Clement was so ill at the time that his nephew had to sign it for him in the presence of a notary. Another document dated five days later on 9 September, ibid., fol. 312V, tells us that the money was used to pay Cardinal Benedetto Accolti for giving up his position as legate to the Marches. 160

Financier to Clement VII At the same time as Filippo was paying off Catherine's dowry and making these other loans, he commenced another absorbing venture that was lucrative but potentially disastrous, namely provisioning the city of Rome with grain. Commerce in grain was not something new to Strozzi, and as treasurer of the Marches, one of the largest grain-producing areas inside the Papal States, he was quite knowledgeable about its trade.37 For several years running and at least in 1531,1532, and 1533, he had received contracts to import Sicilian grain.38 His agents purchased the grain abroad, usually in Sicily and Apulia, had it shipped to Rome, warehoused and then sold at current prices in the city. There is record of Filippo as official distributor {dispensator) of grain for the Grain Office in Rome in 1532, and at least once that year he received sole rights of distribution for a ten-day period during which time no grain other than his could be sold to the Roman bakers.39 In 1533 a severe shortage of grain struck the city, and the Motuproprio authorizing Filippo to purchase and import unusually large amounts of Sicilian grain that year includes testimony to the dire needs of the citizens. Witnesses bluntly swore that unless Strozzi imported substantial quantities of grain, prices would soon exceed their currently inflated level of fifty giuli (five scudi) per rubbio.40 To meet the crisis Strozzi agreed to bring in 30,000 moggia of grain which would be sold at six scudi per 37

38

39

40

Well before 1533, as early as 1516, records show that Strozzi received a commission from the Otto to buy, ship, and sell grain to Florence, C.S., Ser. in, 121, fol. 106. Vatican records show his periodic involvement in the same business with the Camera, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 6 9 ; iii, fol. 2 ; vol. 82, fols. 133V-134; A.S.R., Camerale I, Mandati Camerali, 863, fols. 129V, 138V. Rome was not at this time self-sufficient in grain and had to import large quantities, so that the grain business brought frequent speculative opportunities to merchant-bankers. Even Clement himself engaged in manipulating supplies and prices, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 80, fols. 218-219; v °l- 89, fol. 130. T h e r e are documented instances in both 1530 and 1532 when he prohibited the export of grain from the Marches during times of shortages so that he could sell it later at an inflated price in areas where the need was greatest, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 81, fol. 192 and C.S., Ser. 1, 136, fol. 158. On the problem of provisioning Rome in the sixteenth century, see Luigi Guasco, 'L'Archivio Storico Capitolino,' Quaderni di studt romani (Rome, 1946), pp. 16-22, and Delumeau, Vie economique, II, 521-539, 583-649A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 88, i, fol. 69; vol. 82, fols. 133V-134; vol. 94, i, fol. 125V-127. Prices of grain were subject to frequent vacillation depending on quality and supply. Ibid., vol. 88, iii, fol. 2v. Record of a similar trade restriction imposed on the city which prohibited sale and distribution of any grain other than a certain lot of Sicilian grain for the month of May 1530 is in A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 4. See also A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 65, fol. n 8 v for sole distribution rights granted to Giuliano Levi in 1516. Ibid., vol. 94, i, fols. 125V-127. Delumeau, 11, 626, noted that in 1539-1540 the price of grain from the Marches reached 5.35 scudi per rubbio which was considered very high. In April 1530 grain sold in the city for 4.5 scudi per rubbio, A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 4V, but according to Pecchiai, p. 289, during Clement's reign the price of grain was high when it reached even 2 scudi, 20 baiocchi per rubbio, which to me seems low. Certainly in the years after the Sack of Rome the price of grain remained high. In 1531 Strozzi contracted to import Sicilian grain to be sold at no more than 5.5 ducats per rubbio, A.S.R., Camerali 1, Mandati Camerali, 863, fol. 138V. In December 1559 during a shortage Pius IV was buying grain at 5 scudi per rubbio and selling it at 3. According to Delumeau's figures, a rubbio measured approximately 2.3 h which was about the equivalent of 200 kg, Vie economique, 1, 122; 11, 535-537, note 3.

161

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 41

moggio. Purchase of the grain required a heavy outlay of capital at a time when Strozzi's other commitments were depleting his resources. In addition to the dowry obligation, he was also serving as an official of the Grain Office in Florence and had a 30,000 scudi investment tied up there in grain purchases.42 Filippo's affairs began to slump in the fall of 1533 when he had to leave Rome for his extended trip with Clement for Catherine's wedding in France, where he remained afterwards as papal nuncio to the court of Francis I. Not long after his departure, for reasons beyond his control, the grain deal began to fall apart. International politics intervened and the imperial viceroy in Sicily refused to allow grain to be exported to Rome, probably to register Spanish displeasure at Clement's alliance with France through Catherine's marriage.43 From Rome Filippo received reports that the people were growing agitated over the scarcity of grain in the city and had begun to harass his agents, a situation predictably aggravated by the absence of the pope from the Eternal City.44 The shortage of grain had in the meantime grown so acute that Clement, while in France, arranged with Francis I to purchase French grain from as far away as Brittany and Picardy and to ship it all the way to Rome. He even tried to obtain Flemish and Spanish grain, though without success, since both were dominions of Charles V.45 Filippo dispatched an agent from his Lyons company to oversee the purchase and forwarding of the French grain, and by the end of November it was already being loaded aboard ships for the journey south. Filippo continued to solicit grain in Lyons, and by the end of December he anticipated hearing reports from Rome of better conditions. But in any event he had taken the precaution of writing to Spinola the chamberlain and Pietro Carnesecchi the protonotary to recommend his own actions in alleviating the shortage.46 While the arrival of the French grain helped defuse the immediate crisis 41

42 43

44 45

46

A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, i, fol. 125V; Niccolini, p. lxxi. As a measure of volume, the moggio varied from place to place but averaged around 5.8 hi as compared to the salma at 2.75 hi and the rubbio at 2.3 hi, Fernand Braudel and Ruggiero Romano, Naivres et marchandises a Pentree du port de Livourne {154J-1611) (Paris, 1951), 1, 84. T h e capacity of a small ship was 400 saltne, Tommaseo Bellini, ed., Dizionario della Lingua Italiana (Turin, 1861-1879), 11, i, 323; iv, i, 514. T h e Sicilian salma was slightly larger at 1.046 rubbio, Delumeau, 11, 536, note 3. Niccolini, pp. lxx, 192; Tratte, 85, fol. 199; B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 15. T h e viceroy at the time was Ettore Pignatelli, duke of Monteleone, Helmut Koenigsberger, The Practice of Empire (Ithaca, New York, 1969), p. 199; Niccolini, p. lxxi. Charles V had wanted Catherine to marry Francesco Sforza of Milan. See Pastor, x, 211-218, 228-229. C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 87. Ibid., fols. 86, 87. Filippo repeated an earlier report that Clement had successfully arranged for the purchase of 8,000 French salme of grain from Brittany and Picardy. At the end of December Sicilian grain was still priced far too high, so despite the greater distance it was cheaper for them to import French grain. Ibid., fols. 91-92. T h e price of grain in Rome must have been rising rapidly, because Filippo complained about having to honor a promise made previously to sell one hundred rubbia of grain to Ottaviano de Cesis at the old price.

162

Financier to Clement VII in Rome, it brought no lasting relief and eventually only contributed to Filippo's difficulties with the irate populace. His ships arrived late, some were lost at sea, and others sailed into the port of Civita Vecchia with wet and damaged cargo.47 Despite the threat of riots, Filippo's agents continued to seek as high a price as possible from the sale of the grain to cover the extra expenses in procuring it and, as sharp businessmen, to take advantage of the inflationary pressure caused by the shortage. His agents in Rome were able to command outrageously high prices for even inferior grain and by the end of the summer of 1534 were selling their stocks at more than twice the price they had originally contracted, for twelve scudi per rubbio rather than six.48 In August Benvenuto Olivieri wrote Filippo that the 2,000 salme of French and Flemish wheat they had remaining were of such poor quality they were unmarketable and that he needed to import another 3,000 salme of good grain to mix with the bad before daring to sell it.49 In early September supplies were short again, the pope was critically ill, and Olivieri wrote on the sixth of the month that Strozzi's agents were being threatened by angry mobs. Several days later a Strozzi agent reported from Civita Vecchia that their ship named Dolera carrying 900 salme of quality grain had arrived safely. Ignoring the hungry hordes but ever mindful of maximizing profits, he sent only 130 salme to Rome, reserving the rest. He feared that prices in Rome might fall since three other ships carrying grain belonging to other companies had also anchored in port.50 On 25 September 1534 Clement VII died after a lengthy illness. In Rome the death of a pope typically ignited outbreaks of lawlessness and violence. Rival noble families imported private guards to protect them, shops closed and business at the curia virtually ceased as everyone waited for the faction-ridden conclave to elect a successor.51 Clement had not exactly been loved by the Romans, either rich or poor, on account of the increased taxes 47

48

49

50 51

Taddeo Beni, Filippo's agent for the grain shipments, wrote several letters in the summer of 1534 reporting the arrival of their ships, cargo losses, and insurance claims for damages, ibid., fols. 102, 103, 107, 5. At the end of J u n e grain was selling for 6 scudi per rubbio. O n 5 July he reported the loss, 'perfortuna di mare'' (through misfortune at sea) of 185 barrels of farina aboard the ship Loatta, for which he sued the sailors and was to receive compensation. Marcello Alberini,' Diario,' ed. Domenico Orano, Archivio della R. Societa Romana di Storia Patna, 18 (1895), 379. Lorenzo Strozzi claimed the price was only 10 scudi, Niccolini, p. lxxii; however, a report from Rome by Gregorio da Casale to Viscount Rochford, dated 25 October 1534, confirms that grain was being sold at 12 scudi, cited Bardi, p. 67, note 1. Alberini, p. 379, who was serving in the municipal government of Rome as a representative (caporione) of the district of M o n t e at the time the case was investigated, charged Filippo with hoarding grain to inflate the price and suggested that Clement was a willing participant who shared in Strozzi's profits. C.S., Ser. v, 1208, fol. 117. Finally that summer they had been able to purchase grain in the imperial territories of Sicily, Spain and Flanders. Ibid., fols. 131, 133. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 97, fol. 95V. Pastor, x, 322-326 has a good description of his protracted illness. Added to the usual unrest following the death of a pope was the presence of corsairs sailing north of Gaeta and threatening the coast, and fear that the Colonna would foment disturbances in Rome, Alberini, p. 382. See also Niccolini, p. lxxi.

163

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici he had levied and for his attempts to strengthen papal control over the city by dismantling some of its traditional prerogatives. Tension had mounted for months during the pope's illness, and the shortages and swollen price of grain added to the ugliness of the mood. Word of Clement's death had hardly spread up the Tiber before the mob erupted and sacked Filippo Strozzi's grain warehouses in the Trastevere sending his agents scurrying in hasty retreat to the safety of the Castel S. Angelo. Extra guards had to be placed at the Strozzi palace in the business district. Filippo, who arrived from France in the company of the French cardinals a few days after Clement's death, took up residence in the Vatican for safety.52 Hatred of the dead pope quickly fastened on his favorites, and Filippo became the prime target of popular wrath that fall of 1534. In an unusual proceeding he was sued by the Romans for the unheard of sum of 700,000 scudi for his alleged negligence and failure to supply the city with adequate grain at a reasonable price. 53 Under the circumstances Filippo had scant hopes of contesting the suit, and three days after Clement died he agreed to submit to the binding arbitration of two cardinals chosen by the Romans, Alessandro Cesarini and Giovanni Domenico Cupi, archbishop of Trani, who were given two months to study the case before rendering their decision. In the meantime, he was required to put up as bond the assets of his bank in Rome including the building itself with a total estimated value of 100,000 scudi.54 On 5 December Strozzi went before the Conservatori, the city council of Rome, to plead his case. He pointed out that he had been in France the whole time as nuncio and should not be held personally responsible for the errors committed by his ministers in his absence. But that argument carried no weight; the Conservatori were most unsympathetic 52

53

54

Alberini, pp. 383-384. Niccolini, p. lxxi. Fifty guards were hired to protect merchants and their wares, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, fol. 326V, and the caporioni of Rome hired soldiers to keep peace in the streets, A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. xvn, fol. 2v. T h e merchants were taxed to pay for their protection, and the record of the distribution of the tax reveals that Strozzi had to pay by far the biggest share of the cost, 60 scudi. The next largest share was 20 scudi paid by the Genoese banker Sebastiano Sauli, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 94, fol. 333. B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 27 and Bardi, p. 68. In his letter to Vettori of 5 December, B.N.F., Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29 and Bardi, p. 70, Filippo summarized some of the charges against him, namely that the grain he had imported was so putrid that many people had fallen ill and died, and that the seed grain had arrived too late for planting so that the fields in the Roman countryside remained barren. The Roman people claimed 50,000 ducats in damages just for curative medicines. Most of the rest of the damages they claimed, up to the total of 700,000 ducats, were to compensate for the crops lost for want of the seed grain. In his chronicle Alberini, pp. 379-380, added the charges that Strozzi monopolized the market, hoarded grain, and sold only a portion of his stores in the city at double the price for which he had originally contracted. See also Niccolini, p. lxxii. T h e suit was entered in the name of all the people, but the prime movers behind the action were nobles and members of the City Council such as Alberini. Alberini, p. 384; Niccolini, pp. lxxii, 194. Included in the bond was his property at Lunghezza outside Rome. On Cesarini and Trani, see Berton, pp. 649-650, 784 and Pius Bonfacius Gams, Series Episcoporum Ecclesiae Catholicae (Graz, 1957), p. 934.

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Financier to Clement VII and quite brusque with him.55 He tried to win a delay to allow time for documents to arrive from Sicily supporting his arguments, and he also exerted pressure on one of the arbiters, Cardinal Cesarini, through his friends and fellow Medici parenti Cardinals Salviati and Ridolfi who were Cesarini's close friends.56 He even offered the Romans a private settlement of 10,000 scudi to drop the charges, but the other side, swept up in the excitement of cashing in on the Strozzi fortune, refused the offer and remained intent on pressing its advantage.57 Filippo won a delay through the month of January and a final delay through February, but on 27 February 1535 the two cardinal arbiters delivered their judgment against him and imposed the stiff fine of 17,527 scudi.58 The grain suit against Filippo was clearly part of a backlash against the dead pope with whom he had been so closely identified. Because it came at a time when his financial resources were already severely strained and his credit weakened following his patron's death, the suit by itself nearly ruined him. Yet it was only the beginning of a series of assaults on his fortune in the months ahead. From the time of his arrival in Rome until the end of February when his sentence was delivered, Filippo had been constantly pestered by the grain case with the Romans. But at the same time he had to arrange payment of outstanding portions of Catherine de'Medici's dowry and respond to other equally serious problems requiring his close attention, 'multiplying around him like heads of the Hydra.' 59 Starting in November, the Camera Apostolica began to review some of his accounts and demanded to audit his books. The principal matter in contention was the roughly 190,000 ducats which he and Bindo Altoviti had loaned to Clement VII in 1529-1531. Clement had settled the accounts with the two bankers privately through his camarlingo because he had not wanted the official cameral records to show how much money he had spent for the siege of Florence. However, once Clement was dead, the clerks claimed that Strozzi's and Altoviti's accounts were invalid.60 Strozzi 55

56

57 58

59 60

Letter of 5 December, B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fols. 29, 3 0 ; Bardi, p. 70 and Niccolini, p. 199B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p. 7 1 . Giovanni Salviati and Niccolo Ridolfi were both nephews of L e o X who had been elevated in 1517 together with Alessandro Cesarini. T h e three of them were closely associated with the Medici party. Niccolini, p. 199. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 101, fol. 3 4 9 ; C . S . , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133V. T h e fine was not the 175,000 ducats erroneously printed in Niccolini, p . lxxix and reported by Goldthwaite, Private Wealth, p . 99. An interesting series of documents regarding the various proposals and discussions between the municipal government of Rome and Paul I I I about how Strozzi's fine money should be spent is in A.S.C., Archivio Segreto, Credenza 1, vol. 17, fols. 23V-33. A proposal to let Strozzi be depositor of his own fine was overwhelmingly defeated, fol. 23V. Some of the money was used to pay for the celebrations to honor Charles V's visit to R o m e in 1536, fols. 3 5 - 3 7 . B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29 and Bardi, p. 7 1 . B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fols. 29-30. Francesco del N e r o ran into similar trouble for money

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici anticipated a dispute over the interest he and Altoviti had received and complained that the ministers of the newly elected Paul III were all prejudiced against him because they claimed he had amassed an infinite treasure solely from revenues belonging to the church. Strozzi's battles with the Camera ran into February 1535, and, his adverse sentence in the grain suit notwithstanding, he expected to be summoned into court regarding other old cameral accounts totaling at least 50,000 ducats.61 Filippo's financial troubles with the Camera and the Romans attracted other rapacious predators who went after him like harpies, revealing just how much Clement's death had left him vulnerable to attack. A number of private citizens including his fellow Florentine bankers joined the parade of those filing claims, some hoping to recover their own outstanding credits with the deceased pope by attaching Filippo's possessions. In one such suit the heirs of Domenico di Massimo contended that Clement had had a long-standing obligation to their deceased father worth 2,000 ducats on the Casale di Lunghezza owned by Strozzi, but that they had hesitated to bring up the matter before now for fear of Clement's authority. Conveniently, all the original documentation supporting their claim had disappeared in the Sack of Rome. In another case, Luigi Gaddi, one of the leading Florentine bankers in Rome, with whom for many years Filippo had shared the same palazzo in the business district of Ponte, claimed that mixed in with all the annates that Filippo had collected for the Camera over many years were some decima payments worth about 5,000 ducats which rightfully belonged to the Gaddi bank. He protested vigorously that Filippo should be required to make them good.62 Up until the end of the summer of 1534 repayment of Filippo's loan for Catherine de'Medici's dowry had been proceeding quite smoothly, in large part due to the heavy security he had demanded and to his friend Franceso del Nero's industrious efforts to collect the revenues that fell under the Treasury General. On 6 August Del Nero had written an encouraging letter that if all went well, in another month or six weeks Filippo would be free from the last of the dowry debt.63 However, the pope's death left Filippo with an estimated 80,000 ducats still due him, about 30,000 of which were unsecured and now unrecoverable because he had spent them on the voyage to escort Catherine to France and on her wedding finery. As late as the following February Filippo was still owed 50,000 ducats. He could not rely on the authority of Clement's Motuproprio unless it was ratified by the new pope, and Paul III understandably was none too anxious to reassign needed

61 62

he had handled for t h e war which d e b t C l e m e n t had settled privately outside t h e Camera. It was difficult for C l e m e n t to defend t h e siege of Florence on g r o u n d s of c h u r c h policy since it was a war fought to reinstate his family as overlords in their native city. Ibid., fol. 29 a n d Bardi, p . 7 1 ; C . S . , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133V. 63 Niccolini, p p . 196-197. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 114.V.

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Financier to Clement VII church incomes to pay the cost of a purely dynastic ambition of his predecessor. Filippo negotiated at length with him to salvage some part of his credits, and at last the pope lent him a sympathetic ear.64 In December 1534 Paul agreed to confirm his predecessor's brief for one of the three repayment guarantees for the dowry loan. He reconfirmed Filippo's rights to revenues from the Collectory of Spain but postponed consideration of the other two, rights to the decima and assignments on the datario.65 Unfortunately for Filippo, the papal collector in Spain, Giovanni Poggio, had sent back precious little even before Clement's death, despite the fact that the agent with Filippo's Seville bank, Rinaldo Strozzi, was working with him side by side. While Poggio had been seriously ill and unable to carry out his duties as collector, the Spanish clergy had proved remarkably healthy, and few sees had become vacant whose incomes could be diverted to the Collectory and on to Filippo. Filippo's agent informed his boss that collecting money in Spain was like trying to squeeze blood from a stone.66 Not only had Poggio procured next to nothing, but Rinaldo had in fact loaned him most of the money thus far submitted to Rome for the Collectory and had as well made personal loans to tide him over his illness. Filippo should have received 12,000 ducats from Poggio by the previous May but instead was sent less than 5,000 ducats which Rinaldo Strozzi, and not the collector, had provided. To make matters worse, Rinaldo fully expected the payments to cease completely once report of Clement's death reached Spain. In fact, by the end of November 1534 Poggio had still sent Filippo only 5,000 ducats.67 Thus, of the 25,000 ducats owed from Spain, Filippo received practically nothing. The decision on the other two guarantees for the dowry loan was not reached until January 1535. Paul III drove a stiff bargain in return for his promise to recognize Filippo's claim to the 50,000 ducat balance. He demanded that Filippo relinquish to him the offices and Monte stock with 64

65 66

67

C . S . , Ser. i n , 108, fol. 133; B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p. 72. According to Lorenzo Strozzi, Paul was well disposed towards Filippo because he had used his influence with the French cardinals to favor Farnese's election, Niccolini, p . lxxiii. Filippo's bank also loaned Paul money although on a m u c h reduced scale from what it had provided Clement, A.V., Div. Cam., vols. 9 8 - 1 0 6 passim. B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p. 72. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 127. Even when a vacancy did occur, there were usually long delays and other competing claims for its revenues. Such was the case with the money owed from 1523 from the vacant benefice of Saint J a m e s of Compostela which Poggio had still been unable to collect by 1534 because it concerned 'signon troppo grandi in spagna' (very powerful persons in Spain), including the Cardinal of T o l e d o , Giovanni V I I T a b e r a , ibid., fol. 144; G a m s , p . 8 1 . C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 127, 147. Poggio's accounts sent to t h e Camera for the previous year show that between S e p t e m b e r 1 5 3 2 - J a n u a r y 1533 he had collected less t h a n 5,000 ducats, A.V., D i v . Cam., vol. 95, fols. 170-172. I n the period between J a n u a r y and D e c e m b e r 1533 he collected almost 13,500 ducats, o u t of which a total of 4,235 ducats had been paid to Rinaldo Strozzi for Filippo Strozzi, ibid., fols. 172V-176.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici which Clement had secured the loan. For his part he promised not to disturb Filippo's rights to the tardy 20,000 ducats still due from the Spanish incomes nor interfere with the exaction of one of the two decime which would yield about 10,000 ducats. The remaining 20,000 were to be repaid in fruits from future annates but with the stipulation that Paul should receive all the income from the first year, 1534, and Filippo the income beginning only thereafter.68 Filippo was in no position to negotiate a more favorable settlement and had to be content with whatever Paul was willing to offer. He wrote to Vettori on 2 January 1535 the following: So as not to argue with my superiors I am ready to concede everything to His Holiness, offices valued at about 20,000 ducats and credits in the Monte delta Fede worth about 25,000 ducats which I had received in security for the 80,000 ducat loan. Now I am left with unstable assignments which are subject to a thousand accidents of fortune after having been stripped of all my good and certain securities.69 Exasperated and worn out from the pressure of the grain suit, Filippo exclaimed that he would prefer to live out his life a poor man, rather than as a rich man persecuted by so many.70 But Filippo's troubles were not over, and the next blow that struck him was the loss of the Treasury of the Marches. The Treasury was his last important administrative position which he had hoped to safeguard as a bastion of investment income within the ecclesiastical realm after Clement's death. By right Filippo still had another three years to serve on his contract as treasurer, but contractual obligations counted for nothing when he lay at the mercy of the patronage decisions of the new pope. Under protest Filippo was relieved of the office in March 1535, and Paul put the Treasury in Bindo Altoviti's name, although, in fact, Altoviti was acting as a front for the real owner, Luigi Gaddi.71 Filippo was not the only one who suffered as a result of the death of Clement. In November 1534 he heard a rumor that the Camera was preparing to investigate the four men who had had charge of church administration and finance in the Papal States, Francesco Guicciardini, Bartolomeo Valori, Agostino del Nero, and Bernardino della Barba.72 The 68

70

71

B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 30 and Bardi, p. 7 2 ; Niccolini, p. 200. Filippo also had to return some jewels to Paul including Clement's diamond pectoral made by Cellini, A.V., Div. Cam., 69 vol. 106, fol. 25. Niccolini, p. 200. Ibid., p. 200; similarly C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fols. 133V-134; and B . N . F . , Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 29, ' T h e r e is nothing left of me but skin and bones for my friends, my sons, my women and my masters now to pick clean.' Filippo protested his removal in court but to no avail, A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 105, fols. 163-166; C.S., Ser. i n , 108, fols. 134, 137. T h e Motupropno in Altoviti's name is in A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 72 106, fol. 12. Niccolini, p p . 198-199.

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Financier to Clement VII first two were his close friends, and Agostino had been his vice-treasurer and chief administrator in the Marches. Filippo feared that Francesco del Nero's turn would come next. Francesco had been relieved of his duties as treasurer general soon after Paul III was elected, and like Filippo's, his accounts were closely scrutinized, particularly those dealing with war finances and the siege of Florence.73 Francesco wrote Vettori about his straitened circumstances on 27 February, the same day Filippo received his sentence in the grain affair. Above and beyond his obligation as guarantor of part of Catherine de'Medici's dowry, he had had credits with Clement for 38,000 ducats for the war against the Turks in Hungary, for the league with Charles V, and for the hiring of Swiss soldiers. All of these credits had been secured in various offices and assignments. However, because of Clement's illness, the incomes owed him had not materialized, and after Clement's death, he had been turned out of his office as treasurer general. In the space of three days he had had to liquidate his holdings to cover his debts and to return to Paul all the securities and offices that Clement had given him. 'Therefore,' he wrote, 'I am denuded of incomes, of money and of securities. And I believe I can say that had Clement only remained healthy until October, I would have been able to save myself more than 50,000 ducats.'74 The effect of Clement VII's death on men like Francesco del Nero and Filippo Strozzi cannot be overstated. For Filippo it brought to an abrupt end a long intimate friendship and association that had been mutually advantageous, both for Clement who had acted on Filippo's counsel and relied so heavily on his credit, and for Filippo whose position as the pope's relative and whose influence at the papal court had constituted the cornerstone upon which his thriving international banking business and princely fortune had been built. Clement's death would have adversely affected Filippo's fortunes in any event, but it struck at a particularly bad time when his affairs were already going poorly and he was absent from Rome. In 1533 he had overextended his credit in loans to Clement especially infinancingthe dowry and had been beset by problems connected with provisioning Rome with grain. His credit in France had sunk, and what should have been secure receipts of ecclesiastical income from the Spanish Collectory and the decima had proved themselves to be hollow reeds. In 73

74

Ibid., p p . 195-196; Nuovi Acquisti, 515, fol. 2 7 ; and Bardi, p. 69. Del N e r o had contemplated taking a trip to Venice to avoid his persecutors. C . S . , Ser. 1, 136, fol. 157. Both Filippo's and Francesco's letters to Vettori of 27 F e b r u a r y must be interpreted with some caution because they were undoubtedly designed to paint a very black picture of their financial situation which Vettori could pass along to D u k e Alcssandro de'Medici who was pressing them for money- T h e y stated truly enough the loss of incomes and the debts they had to bear, but they still had substantial wealth and were not reduced literally to penury as their letters would seem to indicate. Filippo himself said that he had enough in reserve in France to support a handsome if not princely life style.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Media addition, Filippo's earnings in the first part of 1534 had already fallen off to such an extent that in early September, at a time when Clement's health had taken a turn for the better and he seemed to be recovering, his Rome manager still had written a warning to his employer's sons to curb their expenses because their father's earnings that year had been next to nothing and his losses very heavy.75 Had Clement remained alive only until the end of October as Francesco del Nero had sorely desired, these troubles could have been tackled more easily behind the protective shield of the papacy. By then Del Nero expected to have reimbursed Filippo for most of the dowry loan, and the grain riot, the sack of Strozzi's warehouses, and the subsequent lawsuit by the Roman people might never have taken place. Or at least they would have occurred on a much milder scale had Clement been alive, or had Filippo been present in Rome to take charge of his affairs. Instead, coming when it did, the death of Clement precipitated a chain of unfortunate events with grave financial, legal, and political consequences from which Filippo never recovered. In order to appreciate fully the impact Clement's death had on Filippo, we must bear in mind that it had not come as a surprise or without warning, and that Filippo, with the help of Francesco del Nero, was really as prepared for that unhappy event as he could reasonably have expected to be. Back in November of 1533 Filippo had demanded the extra security of having Clement, Spinola and Francesco share the risk for the dowry loan with him in case the pope should die and the ecclesiastical incomes pledged in repayment be revoked. In February 1534 he had Clement issue still another Motuproprio reaffirming his credit for the remaining 80,000 ducats as an additional guarantee.76 Fortunately for Filippo, his invaluable associate Francesco del Nero was on hand as treasurer general to look after his interests with Clement during his stay in France. When Clement first became ill in June 1534, Del Nero began to issue a number of special orders that ecclesiastical revenues collected in various parts of the Papal States be paid immediately to Filippo's bank manager in Rome, Benvenuto Olivieri, who held the patents for them.77 At the same time Olivieri was working night and day to put Filippo's affairs at the bank in order. Both men sent Filippo regular reports on the state of Clement's health throughout the summer so that given the word he would be prepared on short notice to return to Rome. Even when the course of Clement's illness inspired the false hope in his associates that he would survive, Del Nero and Olivieri still continued to labor diligently to protect Filippo's credits.78 Business 75 77 78

76 C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 137V. A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 9 5 , fols. 195V-196. Ibid., vol. 94, fols. 237V-239, 243V, 245V, 255V, 279, 285. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 113, 117, 126, 134, 142. Olivieri had written Filippo on 4 August strongly advising him to return from France and devise a way to enter the conclave when the time came

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Financier to Clement VII in Rome was almost at a standstill, but Olivieri collected what debts he could, and Del Nero and Spinola discharged their respective obligations for their part of the 80,000 ducats due Filippo for the dowry.79 In the late summer Filippo's friends also began to have his appointments and credits with the pope re-registered in the books of the Camera in hopes of holding the new pope to them in the event of Clement's death. The document for Filippo's last loan to the pope stated specifically that Clement's successor would be bound to honor it, and a brief dated 4 August reconfirmed Filippo as treasurer of the Marches. On 26 September, the day after Clement died, Olivieri hurried to the Vatican to have the clerks of the Camera record and register that brief yet one more time.80 Francesco del Nero made special provisions for the security of the Marches and sent Captain Betto Rinuccini, a man who owed his allegiance to the Strozzi, to guard the fortress of Ancona should there be an outbreak of violence.81 During the summer of Clement's illness Filippo took one further step to safeguard himself. He redoubled his efforts to have his eldest son Piero created cardinal. Strozzi had first tried to obtain the purple for his son back in 1521 and again in 1526 when he served as hostage for Clement in Naples, but the events of 1527 and the Sack of Rome put the matter of Piero's elevation out of the question. Filippo maintained hope and tried again in 1534 using the good offices of Francesco del Nero and Clement's nephew Cardinal Ippolito who was on intimate terms with the Strozzi. Several cardinals had died that summer including Enkevoirt, Delia Valle, and Cajetan, increasing the likelihood of a new promotion. Clement himself had told Del Nero that Strozzi's prospects were good.82 A cardinal in the family would undoubtedly have strengthened Filippo's hand at the papal court and might have given him some leverage over the new pope. Clement, however, decided to delay any action until he recovered. As the summer wore on, Filippo, in desperation, lowered his sights to suggest that if Clement would only agree to the elevation, Piero would accept a poor cardinalate without any incomes attached.83 Unfortunately Clement never

79

81

82 83

to s u m m o n it. Filippo delayed his departure and planned to leave F r a n c e in the company of the F r e n c h cardinals on 26 August, b u t they hesitated again when they heard of the pope's improving health. T h e y finally departed Avignon 30 August. O n 25 S e p t e m b e r when Clement died, Strozzi had disembarked in Pisa but had been unable to reach R o m e in time. Ibid., fol. 117. Both Del N e r o and Spinola received statements from Clement releasing t h e m of any responsibilities for the dowry loan, A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 100, fol. 3 5 ; A r m . XL, vol. 47, fols. 80 255-256. A.V., Div. C a m . , vol. 94, fol. 329. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fols. 133, 135. T h e situation in the M a r c h e s was volatile because in early S e p t e m b e r Clement decided to make his nephew Cardinal Ippolito d e ' M e d i c i papal legate, forcing Cardinal Accolti to vacate his job. Filippo's final loan to Clement for 20,000 scudi was used to compensate Accolti. However, as the pope got weaker and nearer to death, Accolti became increasingly recalcitrant about leaving the M a r c h e s , and Olivieri and D e l N e r o anticipated trouble. Ibid., fols. 104, 113V, 114V, 118; Pecchiai, p . 48. C . S . , Ser. v, 1208, fol. 104. Another reason for C l e m e n t ' s delay in creating cardinals was that 171

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici created the new cardinals, so that Filippo's long-held hope for Piero finally came to naught. The death of Clement dealt a crushing blow to Filippo that toppled him from his coveted high place and hurled him into an unending sea of adversity. He had suffered setbacks and the loss of protectors and patrons in the Medici family before, but none had had so deleterious an effect on his career and life. The death of his brother-in-law Lorenzo de'Medici and mother-in-law Alfonsina Orsini in 1519 and 1520 had brought to an end a chapter in his life in Florence. Leo X's death in 1521 could well have signaled the loss of his elevated position at the curia. When his wife Clarice died in 1528,84 thus severing Filippo's original tie with the Medici circle, one might easily have foreseen the breaking apart of Filippo's close connections with their family. But these prior losses paled before the disaster of 1534, for on all the previous occasions Filippo had been able to rely upon the firm support of his friend Giulio de'Medici. As a cardinal in 1519 he had protected Filippo from the popular backlash in Florence against Lorenzo and Alfonsina, and he had promoted his career throughout the period of Medici domination of the papacy. But his death in 1534 removed the last of Filippo's circle of Medici protectors and patrons. For Filippo Strozzi it was truly the end of an era of power, prestige and access to the highest levels of political and financial success, an era which had begun in 1508 with his entry into the family and had flourished for more than a quarter of a century on the support and favor of Giulio de'Medici.

84

revenues assigned to the College of Cardinals were insufficient to support the additional titles. Filippo wrote to Pietro Carnesecchi about the matter, probably stating he was willing for Piero to be given a title with no incomes, something Del Nero felt would help them realize their goal, ibid., fol. 114V. Clarice died 3 May 1528, Niccolini, p. liv. She was already critically ill in the fall of 1527, C.S., Ser. in, 108, fol. 114. A copy of her testament, dated 24 December 1527, is in B.N.F., 11, iv, 194, fols. 74-76.

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8

Epilogue

As we have seen, following Clement's death, Filippo lost his privileged station at the papal court and the special protection he had enjoyed as one of the pope's favorites. Because Clement was no longer alive to shelter and shield him, the damaging grain suit by the Roman people and his continuing legal troubles of 1534 and 1535 fell upon him with ruinous force. At the same time he had to relinquish his most important administrative offices such as the Treasury of the Marches and most of the patronage awards and titles he had enjoyed under both Medici popes. Filippo could keenly appreciate how far Medici patronage had advanced his career at the papal court when in 1534 he was shorn of the special considerations, the guarantees of tax revenues, Monte shares and the venal titles that he had so willingly accepted throughout the years to secure his credits. And he lost them all in the same way he had originally taken them over, at the word of a pope, eager to tear them away from the grasp of his predecessor's favorites and ready to bestow them on others who pledged him their loyalty and treasure. After 1534 Filippo also lost the opportunity, and to some degree the financial capital, to engage in the same massive investments and loans he had undertaken for Clement. In the more than thirteen years between spring 1521 and fall 1534, Filippo had made secured loans to his papal patrons totaling over 530,000 ducats, and more than 85 percent, over 450,000 ducats, had gone to Clement VII alone.1 How much higher those figures would climb were they to include the unsecured portions of those loans, like the extra 50,000 ducats for Catherine de'Medici's dowry in 1533! How much greater the total would be were we able to add together all the thousands of ducats he loaned through the Depository General and personally to the Medici in Florence, especially under the government of his brother-in-law Lorenzo! From this point onward, Filippo's fortune no longer grew as before, and his heavy losses and burdensome political expenses began to eat into his 1

These figures represent the total of Filippo's loans recorded in Vatican documents for the period indicated. Those loans made after 1531 in scudt have been calculated in the value of cameral ducats.

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici 2

previous earnings. Under the new pope the nature of his business changed as well. Although his bank in Rome did not close, but continued to function as a curial bank, making small loans to the pope and trafficking in offices, with Paul Ill's papacy it undertook no operations on the scale of those under Clement VII. The bank's largest loans to Paul were for 20,000 scudi in June 1537 and for over 30,000 scudi in 1538 to build coastal defenses against the Turks.3 Because of his increasing political difficulties, Strozzi withdrew his name from the company and placed it in those of two of his younger sons, Giulio and Lorenzo, under the continuing management of Benvenuto Olivieri. The bank maintained a much more modest profile at the curia than in the past. Though it continued for a while as Depository of the College of the Knights of St Peter and of the Monte delta Fede, its status was eclipsed with the rise of other bankers such as Altoviti who now took over Strozzi's old post as depositor general and became the favored banker at the court. Besides costing Filippo his business with the curia, Clement's death also had a jarring political effect that left its stamp on the remaining four years of his life. For with the loss of his patron and protector he no longer had a political base available to him. The events leading to his tragic death in 1538 are beyond the compass of this present work, particularly since Filippo's role as papal banker and international financier now ceased to be of primary importance in his life when compared with the part he came to play as leader and financial backer of the Florentine exiles who aimed at liberating Florence from the clutches of her new duke, Alessandro de'Medici. However, it is instructive to summarize those events briefly in that Filippo's ultimate participation in them grew directly out of the change in his circumstances brought on by Clement's death. Always before when Filippo had lost one of his Medici patrons, Lorenzo de'Medici, Alfonsina, or Leo X, he had had Giulio de'Medici to turn to, as when he needed to leave Florence for a while after Lorenzo's death and had been able to find refuge at the papal court. But this time not only did he no longer have a high-placed champion and friend in Rome, he could not even return to Florence because he and his sons were mistrusted by Alessandro de'Medici whom Clement had placed in charge of the city following the collapse of the Third Republic. Initially Filippo and his sons had been on intimate terms with Alessandro, and Filippo even assisted him in ruling Florence. After the reform of the government in 1532 removed the last vestiges of the republican councils and officially recognized Alessandro as duke, Filippo held high political 2

3

In a summary of his expenses covering the period 1526-1537 which he compiled while a prisoner in Florence before his death, he estimated that just for extraordinary expenses, losses and debts he was 300,000 scudi poorer, document published in Niccolini, pp. 336-338. A.V., Div. Cam., vol. 98, fols. 158V-160; vol. 106, fols. 87-88.

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Epilogue office for the first time in his career. He became a member of the Council of Forty-eight, a small senate which replaced the old Medicean councils of Seventy and One Hundred. He also served as one of the four counsellors of the duke, a group which in effect replaced the old Signoria.4 Still, during Clement's life-time, government in Florence continued much as it had before 1527, namely on directions from Rome. Decisions of state and political appointments were made by the pope and relayed back to Florence, and Filippo, as the pope's good friend, was a frequent liaison between Florence and Rome. However, already in 1533, latent jealousies and suspicions between Alessandro and Filippo's family began to smoulder. Alessandro feared that a man of Strozzi's immense wealth, power and reputation with his large family of sons must be harboring secret political ambitions of his own, and a series of unhappy events - an amorous rivalry, a suspected poisoning, followed by a clash between Filippo's eldest son Piero and Alessandro's favorite, Giuliano Salviati, over the honor of Filippo's daughter Luisa drove home the wedge that irreparably alienated the two men and forced Filippo and his sons to depart. While Clement lived, he had preserved a superficial peace between Alessandro and the Strozzi, and Filippo and his family were protected. But following the pope's death, on top of all the other afflictions he faced in Rome, Filippo now had to contend with Alessandro's enmity as well. In the midst of his pressing legal troubles, he was forced to go about Rome heavily armed and accompanied by guards after an unsuccessful assassination attempt by two of the duke's henchmen. Because Alessandro accused Filippo's sons of consorting with Florentine exiles and other enemies of his regime, to avoid provoking him further, in November 1534 Filippo closed his palace near St Peter's where his sons had been staying and sent them to different parts of Italy. In December Filippo lamented that he had been unable to save his daughter as well, for that month he received news of Luisa's mysterious death in Florence. Since there was no possibility of a reconciliation with Alessandro, Filippo together with Cardinals Ridolfi and Salviati, Leo X's nephews, drew closer to Alessandro's rival for rule in Florence, Cardinal Ippolito de'Medici. A growing number of Florentine exiles ardent to return to their native city joined forces with them under Ippolito's banner and under the protective cloak of Filippo's bankroll. Since Charles V had agreed to guarantee the liberty of Florence under the terms of the treaty ending the siege in 1530, their plan was to appeal to him to prohibit Alessandro's marrying his 4

He also served as one of the officials of the Monte Comune, of the Monte di Pietd, of the Abbondanza, of the twelve procurators, of the Otto di Custodta, the Otto di Pratica, and the Mercanzia, Tratte, 85 passim. His credit had been of great assistance during the difficult period of reconstruction after the siege and restoration of the Medici in 1530.

175

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici natural daughter Margaret and to abandon the despotic duke. Through embassies financed by Filippo to Charles in Barcelona, they unmasked Alessandro as a cruel tyrant and offered Ippolito as an alternative head of state who would be more agreeable to the Florentines. Unfortunately in August 1535 Ippolito died in Itri on his way to meet Charles who was returning from the campaign in Tunisia. Charles had arranged for both Alessandro and his opponents to present their separate cases to him in Naples that September, but the exiles' cause was fatally weakened by Ippolito's death. Charles proceeded to confirm his endorsement of Alessandro and the parentado with Margaret, leaving Strozzi's party no alternative but to withdraw from Naples. At that point Filippo knew he could never return to Florence under current conditions. He quietly closed his company and tried to wind up his affairs since his estate in Florence included substantial land holdings that were vulnerable to seizure. For his own protection Filippo retreated to Venice under safe conduct from the Doge. After his arrival he received the news that Alessandro had declared him a rebel and that all his Florentine possessions including his part of the Strozzi palace would soon be confiscated. The following January 1537 Duke Alessandro was murdered, and the assassin and self-styled Brutus, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco de'Medici, fled straight to Venice to Filippo's house after committing his bloody deed. With the encouragement of Francis I who promised French troops and extra funds, the exiles began to assemble money and troops in Bologna to mount a military assault on Florence. With Filippo at their head, an advance party marched to Montemurlo in the hills above Prato. There in disorder and disarray after their long trek they were met with a surprise attack by soldiers sent out from Florence by the newly-chosen successor to Alessandro, Duke Cosimo de'Medici. The exiles' motley army was defeated and Filippo captured on 31 July 1537. He was held prisoner in Florence in the Fortezza da Basso for seventeen months before he finally took his own life in despair on 18 December 1538. In those last two years of his life when he was an exile seeking a way to return to his native city, Filippo believed himself a defender of lost Florentine liberties. Even after his capture, when his hopes of restoring an aristocratic republic had been dashed and he was a miserable prisoner in the Fortezza, a pawn between Cosimo and the imperial interests in Florence, he maintained that noble and tragic image. He modeled his suicide on that of Cato and left a damning epitaph penned in his own hand that read: Liberty, therefore, perceiving that together with him all her hopes had perished, having surrendered herself and cursed the light of day, demanded to be sealed up in his same tomb. Thus, O Stranger, shed copious tears if the Florentine republic 176

Epilogue means anything at all to you, for Florence will never see again so noble a citizen. . .whose highest command was: in dying for one's fatherland, any sort of death is sweet.5 These dramatic events at the end of his life are those best remembered today from Filippo's career. They captured the imaginations of historians and novelists of the nineteenth century who were living amidst the fervor of their own nationalistic and Risorgimento movements and who came to view Filippo as the noble citizen turned soldier, a precursor of Italy's own dramatic struggle to unite the fatherland in the name of liberty. Obviously this one-sided view of Filippo Strozzi as defender of freedom oversimplifies the life and career of this extraordinary man. Such a view obscures the significance of the earlier and more fertile phase of his adulthood from 1508 to 1534 when he supported with great dedication the very family he was later praised for opposing as despots. For the major portion of his life up until 1534, Filippo was no champion of Florentine liberties. Instead he was one of the ottimati who, in the crisis surrounding the Florentine oligarchs at the beginning of the sixteenth century, had chosen to side with the Medici after their return in 1512 and had prospered greatly by his choice. He had encouraged and seconded his brother-in-law's domination of Florence and manipulated the city's resources to his benefit. He had helped finance the siege of Florence that reinstated the Medici in the city for good and had been quite content to promote Medici interests whether in Florence, Rome, or outside Italy. He had taken a leading place alongside the Medici popes as their financier and had profited through his connections at the curia to become one of the wealthiest men in Europe. But all this had been possible only with the succor of his Medici patrons who had guaranteed him favored status. Once they were gone, severing Florence's special link with the papacy and Filippo's special standing at the curia, and once a collateral line of the Medici family who feared and mistrusted Filippo came to power in Florence, Strozzi was easily cast into the role of exile struggling to maintain a place for himself and his family, dangerous and powerful because of his great wealth. In many ways the last four years of his life as an outcast and adversary of the government were but an epilogue to what had been personal catastrophe for him when Clement VII died. More than any other 5

In a final letter published in G. Spini, Cosimo I dJMedici e la independenza del pnncipato Mediceo

(Florence, 1945), p. 172, Filippo identified Cato the Younger as his model: 'L'anima mia a Dio, somma misericordia, raccomando, umilmente pregandolo, se altro darle di bene non vuole, le dia almeno quel luogo dove Catone Uticense ed altri simili virtuosi uomini tal fine hanno fatto.' ['I commend my soul to God, who is the highest mercy, praying humbly that, if He can grant it no other gift, at least He will place it where Cato of Utica and other similar virtuous men have found their final end.'] The epitaph which Filippo composed for his memorial is published together with a fascimile in Niccolini, p. cxxiv.

177

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici single event, the loss of Clement sounded the death knell of the symbiotic relationship between Filippo Strozzi and the last of the direct descendants of the family of Lorenzo il Magnifico which had endured more than a quarter century encompassing the last decades of Florence's republican era and the splendor of Medicean Rome.

Sources

I. ARCHIVAL AND MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

The historian of Medicean Florence in the early sixteenth century cannot rely exclusively on the official government records. Because of the growth of extraconstitutional channels of power outlined in chapter 2, the records of the traditional councils of state prove woefully inadequate for a study of the inner workings of the Medici regime. Given this state of affairs, other kinds of documents must be used in conjunction with the official sources and merit proportionately more attention. Contemporary histories and chronicles such as those of Parenti and Cerretani provide useful interpretative data about the functioning of the government as they perceived it personally. Still more valuable as a source are the private papers that have come down to us from the sixteenth century. Florentines were notorious record keepers, and literally tons of letters and documents relating to various Florentine families have survived. In the volumes of correspondence of the Medici family (Mediceo avanti il Principato) and of their secretaries can be found the lists of friends of the regime, discussions of specific political schemes, as well as a wealth of material concerning various Medici and their associates. Likewise, the Strozzi family papers have particular value for this period. Filippo Strozzi left several thousand pages of letters, documents, and accounts, mostly unpublished, that detail his own life and his long association with the Medici. The main body of his letters and papers is located in the Carte Strozziane. Other letters are scattered among the Medici papers and in the Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence, Nuovi Acquisti, 515. A small body of business correspondence is contained in Signori, Otto, Dieci, Legazioni e Commissioni, 72. The documents which establish the nature and extent of hisfinancialconnections with the papal court and his duties as depositor general are in the Archivio Vaticano, the Archivio di Stato, Rome, and the Archivio Storico Capitolino. The difficulties involved in navigating through the largely uncharted waters of the Vatican Archives are well known. I have relied principally upon the Diversa Cameralia and Introitus et Exitus series as well as those cameral records which are now located in the Archivio di Stato. All these different types of records — public, private, and ecclesiastical — have contributed to this study.

179

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Florence

Archivio di Stato, Florence Acquisti e Doni Balie Camera del Comune Carte Strozziane Copialettere di Goro Gheri Conventi Soppressi Dieci di Balk, Carteggi, Missive Died di Balia, Carteggi, Responsive Mediceo avanti il Principato Monte Comune, periodo repubblicano Otto, Dieci, Legazioni e Commissioni Otto di Guardia e Balia, Partiti e Deliberazioni Otto di Pratica, Condotte e Stantiamenti Otto di Pratica, Deliberazioni, Partiti, Condotte Otto di Pratica, Entrate e Uscite Otto di Pratica, Responsive Otto di Pratica, Stantiamenti Signori, Carteggi, Missive Signori, Carteggi, Responsive Originali Signori, Dieci, Otto, Missive Originali Signori e Collegi, Deliberazioni, Ordinaria Autorita Signori, Dieci, Otto, Legazioni e Commissioni Tratte Archivio Guicciardini Biblioteca Nazionale, Florence Cerretani, Bartolomeo, Dialogo della Mutatione, Magi, n, I, 106 — Istoria fiorentina, Ms. n. in, 76 Ginori Conti Magliabecchiana Manoscritti Passerini Nuovi Acquisti Parenti, Piero, Istorie fiorentine, Ms. 11, iv, 171 Rome

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Filippo Strozzi and the Medici Rodocanachi,E., Histoirede Rome. Lepontificat de Leon X, 1513-1521 (Paris, 1931). Romano, Piero, Ponte (Rome, 1941). Roscoe, William, The Life and Pontificate of Leo the Tenth, 2 vols. (London, 1876). Rossi, Agostino, 'Studi Guicciardini,' A.S.I., Ser. v, vol. 5 (1890), 20-60. Roth, Cecil, The Last Florentine Republic (New York, 1925). Rubinstein, Nicolai, The Government of Florence Under the Medici (Oxford, 1966). ' Machiavelli and the World of Florentine Politics,' Studies on Machiavelli, ed. Myron P. Gilmore (Florence, 1972), pp. 5-28. ' Politics and Constitution in Florence at the End of the Fifteenth Century,' Italian Renaissance Studies, ed. E. F. Jacob (London, i960), pp. 148-183. 'I primi anni del Consiglio Maggiore di Firenze (1494-1499),' A.S.I., vol. 112 (1954), 151-194. Schulte, Aloys, Die Fugger in Rom, 14Q5-1523, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1904). Spini, Giorgio, Cosimo I de'Medici e la independenza del principato Mediceo (Florence, 1945). Stephens, J., 'Pope Clement VII, a Florentine Debtor,' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, XLIX (May, 1976), 138-141. Tommasini, O.,La vita e gli scritti di Niccolo Machiavelli, 2 vols. (Rome, 1883—1911). Trexler, Richard C , 'Florentine Religious Experience: the Sacred Image,' Studies in the Renaissance, xix (1972), 7-41. Trollope, T. Adolphus, Filippo Strozzi: A History of the Last Days of the Old Italian Liberty (London, i860). Verde, Armando F., Lo Studio Fiorentino, 1473-1503, 2 vols. (Florence, 1973). Verdi, Adolfo, Gli ultimi anni di Lorenzo de'Medici Duca d'Urbino (Este, 1905). Vigne, Marcel, La Banque a Lyon du XVe au XVIIF siecle (Lyons, 1903). Villari, Pasquale, Niccolo Machiavelli e i suoi tempi (Milan, 1927).

186

Index

accatti, 20-21, 134, 148 Acciaiuoli family, 10 Acciaiuoli, Alessandro, 5311. Acciaiuoli, Fra Zanobi, 5 Acciaiuoli, Roberto, 18 Accolti, Benedetto, cardinal, i6on., 17m. accoppiatori, 25, 43, 69 Acquila, Giovanbattista dell', i53n. Adrian VI, pope, 23, 93, 95, iO2n., 112, 120, 128 Alamanni, Luigi, 73n. Alamanni, Piero, 66n. Alberini, Marcello, i64n. Alberti bank, 92 Alberti, Leon Battista, 6 Albizzi, Antonfrancesco degli, 4, 47, 49, 53n., 63, 64, 69n., 75, 76n. Albizzi, Antonio degli, 4 Albizzi, Maso di Luca degli, 69n. Albizzi, Roberto degli, 15 Alexander VI, pope, 95 Altoviti bank, 123, 154 Altoviti family, 15, 22 Altoviti, Bindo: Florentine banker in Rome, 12, u6n., i48n., 168; loans with Filippo Strozzi, 155-157, 165-166 amici, 25, 33, 34, 38, 79n., i39n. Ancona, 17, 81, 123, 139, i58n., 171 Angiolini, Guglielmo, 99 Antinori bank, 122, 123, 127 Antinori family, 15 Antinori, Camillo di Niccolo, i34n. Antinori, Niccolo, 96 Apostolic Chamber {Camera Apostolica): and the Depository General, 109, 112-115, 117; finances, 109, 122, i28n., 151, 160, 16m., 165-166; functions, 102-103 Appiano, Jacopo d', ruler of Piombino, 82

Apulia, 161 Ardinghelli bank, 123 Ardinghelli, Pietro, 87 Aretino, Pietro, 74 Ariosto, Ludovico, 74n. Aristotle, 6 Arrabbiati, 47, 53n., 55 Augsburg, 95 Avignon, papacy at, 92, 93 Baldassare da Pescia, see Turini, Baldassare da Pescia Balia, 18, 2in., 32, 33, 37, 43, 44, 65, 68, 69, 78, i44n. Barba, Bernardino della, 168 Bardi bank, 123 Bardi family, 10, 11, 22 Baroncelli, Baroncello, 68, 69, 70 Baroncelli Giovanfrancesco, i43n. Bartolini bank, 122 Bartolini family, i6n. Bartolini, Gherardo, 35 Bartolini, Giovanni, i34n., i48n. Bartolini, Leonardo, 34, 73, 74, 76n., 96 Bartolini, Zanobi, i27n. Basel, Council of, iO4n. Belanti bank, 122 Bene, Piero del, 86, 87, 128 Beni, Taddeo, i63n. Berti, Berto, 98 betting on papal elections, 72 Bibbiena, cardinal, see Dovizi da Bibbiena, Bernardo, cardinal Bini bank, 103, 105, 106, n o , 116, 119, 126, 127 Bini family, 22, 125 Bini, Bernardo, 96, 119, 122, 127 Biscioni, Michelangelo, 50, 60 Boccapaduli, Prospero, ii7n.

187

i88

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Bologna, 61, 63, 131, 133, 176; and Leo X's visit in 1515, 101; and meetings between Clement VII and Charles V, i56n., 158; and payment of papal troops, 132, 14cm., 141, 142 Bonsi, Donato, 68n. Borgherini, Pierfrancesco, i27n. Borgia, Cesare, 47 Boscoli conspiracy, 73 Bourbon, Connetable de, 18, 23, 131 Bracci, Bernardo, i2Qn. Bracci, Giovanbaptista di Marcho, 2on. Broncone, 35

Bruni, Leonardo, 5 Buondelmonti family, 3 Buondelmonti, Benedetto: advice to Filippo Strozzi, 83n., 88n., 101, 108, 113, i37n.; Medici amico, 34, 35, 47, 63n., 84, 138, i39n.; and re-establishment of the Medici in Florence, 6gn. Buondelmonti, Filippo, 47, 49, 53n. Buoninsegni, Domenico, 105, 106, 108, i3on., i33n., 140, 141, 144, 146-147

Carnesecchi, Pietro, 162, i72n. Carretto, Carlo, cardinal, called Finale, i2on. Casa, Pandolfo della, i48n. Casale di Lunghezza, 166 Casale, Gregorio da, i63n. Castel S. Angelo, 8, ii4n., 121, 124, 129, 154, 164 Castiglione, Meo da, 138 Cato the Younger, 1, 176, i77n. Cellini, Benvenuto, i68n. Ceri, Renzo da, 132 Cesarini, Alessandro, archbishop of Trani, cardinal, 164, 165 Cesis, Ottaviano de, cardinal, i62n. Charles V, emperor, 15, i62n., i6sn., 175-176; and Clement VII, 128, 130-131, J56n., 158, 169 Charles VIII, king of France, 16, 29, i3on. Chigi, Agostino, 15, 105, nsn., 122 Cibo, Caterina, duchess of Camerino, Cibo, Innocenzo, cardinal, 105-106, 125, 127

Caccia, Alexandro della, 129, 131, i36n., 148-149 Cajetan, cardinal (Tommaso de Vio), 171 Calcagni, Andrea, 157 catnarlingo (chamberlain), 102, 105, m , ii4n., 123, 125, 159, 165 Cambi, Giovanni, 24, 47 Cambi, Jacopo, ii4n., 123 Cambi, Lorenzo, 55, 77n., 123

Cibo, Maddalena, see Medici, Maddalena (wife of Franceschetto Cibo) Cicero, 5 Clement VII, see Medici, Giulio clerks of the Chamber, 75, 125, 171 College of Cardinals, 103, 128-129, 130,

colleges of venal offices, 22, 103, 114, 116, 119, 125; Janissaries, 75n., 125; earnerario segreto, 103 Knights of St Peter, 75n., 123, 126, Campeggio, Lorenzo, cardinal, 115 I28n., 152, 160, 174; portionarii di Canale di Ponte, renamed Via di Banco di Ripay 129, 152; presidents of the S. Spirito, 93, 99 Annona, 125, 152; scutifers and Canigiani family, 3 cubiculars, io6n., 125, 152 Canigiani, Antonio, 53n. Colonna family, 129, 154, i63n. caporioniof Rome, i64n. Colonna, Marco Antonio, 47, 61, 62 Capponi bank, i22n., 123, 127 Conservatonof Rome, 164-165 Capponi family, 3, i4n. Corsi, Giovanni, 53n. Capponi, Gino, 49, 53n., 63n. Corsini, Alexandro, 123 Capponi, Ludovico, i48n. Cortigiani, Gientile di Francesco, 41 Capponi, Neri, 4, 56 Cossa, Baldassare, Pope John XXIII, 92 Capponi, Niccolo, 4, 47, 149 Councils: Forty-eight, 175; Great Cardona, Ramon de, Spanish viceroy in Council, 26, 27, 32, 41, 53, 62, 65, 66, Italy, 64, 83n. 67, 68, 69; One Hundred, 20, 25, 26,

Index

189

Died di Liberia e Pace, 38, 69

Farnese, Alessandro, Pope Paul III, 23, ii4n., i65n., 166-169 Ferdinand, king of Spain, 83n. Ferrara, 46, 52, 76 Fiaminghi, Bernardo, i39n. Flanders, Flemish 14, 17, 90, 162, 163 Florence: economy of, 13-16; Florentine communities abroad, see under individual cities', Last Republic (1527-1530), also called the Third Republic, 4, 17, 18, 2in., 23, 24, 47, 149, 150; Medici regime in, 24-44; papal elections and impact on, 21-22, 30-31, 72-75, 94; public finance, see also war finances, 18, 20-21, 23-24; Republic of 1492-1512, also called the Second Republic, 24, 29, 41, 45-60, 96; Revolution of 1512, 63-69; siege of (1529-1530), 16, 17, 30, 107, 129, 156, 165, i66n., 169, 177; taxation in, see also accatti, 17, 21, 24, 27, 65n., 67; war finances, see war finances Fonte, della, bank, 122 Fonte, Francesco della, i29n. Foscari, Marco, i4n., 2in. France, French: cardinals, i67n.; ecclesiastical incomes from, 123; Florentine ally, 30, 62; grain shipments from, 162, 163; and the Italian Wars, 23, 24, 29, 120, 131, 176; papal nuncios to, i n , 162 Francis I, king of France: and Florentine bankers, 16, 17, 158, i59n., 162; and the Italian Wars, 81, 101, 128, 130, i38n., 176

Dioscorides, 6

Frateschi, 55

dogane of Rome (tre dogane), ggn., 105,

Frescobaldi bank, 123, 127 Fugger bank, 1, 9, 15, 94n., 95, io8n., 123

Councils (cont.) 32, 33, 43, !75; Seventy (Settanta), 20, 25, 26, 32, 33, 35, 38, 39, 43, 78, 131, 175 Covoni, Migliore, 12m., 143, 144, 15m. Crassus, 9n. Cupi, Giovanni Domenico, cardinal, 164 currency speculation, 118, 141-145, 149 Datary (datario), 102-105, ii3n., 119, 158, 160, 167 Dati, Antonio, bank of, 132, 141-142, H3-I44 decime: in Florence, 87; in Naples, 106, 118, 127, 155, 160; in the Papal States, 156, 157, 158-159, 166, 167, 168, 169 Demosthenes, 6 Depository General of the Apostolic Chamber: appointments to, 95, 15m.; competition over, 77, 85-86, 97-98; deficit and profits, 109-116, 119, 155; duties and functions, 102-115; and Filippo Strozzi, see Strozzi, Filippo; history, 92, 95, 103-104; incomes, 104-106, 121, 122, i45n.; payments, 106-109 Depository of the Signoria: history and functions, 40-43; and Lorenzo de'Medici's regime, 36, 38, 44, 86-88; and war finance, 132-140, 14m., 145, 148, 149-150 Diamante, 35 Died di Guerra e Balia, see also Otto di

Pratica, 38, 39, 41, 61, 74

116-117, 121, 122, 123, 151 Doria, Andrea, 113 Dovizi da Bibbiena, Bernardo, cardinal,

England, English, 90 Enkevoirt, Wilhelm, cardinal, 171 Erasmus, 6 Ermellino, Francesco, cardinal, 105-106,

i23n., 125, 128 Eugenius IV, pope, 92 Eusebius, 6

Gaddi bank, 122, 123, 127, 166 Gaddi family, 15, 22, 125 Gaddi, Luigi, 12, ioon., 122, 128, 166, 168 Gaddi, Niccolo, cardinal, 125 Gambero, Bartolomeo del, 142 Genoa, Genoese, 17, 23,77,95,111,113,11511. Germany, 123 Gheri, Goro, 33n., 36, 37, 43, 9on., i3on.,

., 139

190

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Ghinucci bank, 12311. Giacomini, Antonio, 53n. Gianfigliazzi, Selvaggia, see Strozzi, Selvaggia (wife of Filippo the Elder) Ginori, Bartolomeo, 106 Ginori, Carlo, 134J1. Giugni family, 46n. Giugni, Domenico, i34n. Gonzaga, Federigo, marchese of Mantua, 109, 132 grain provisioning, 123, 161-165, 170 Gregory XI, pope, 92 Grimaldi bank, ii5n., 129 Guadagni, Tommaso, 15 Gualterotti, Antonio, 105 Guicciardini family, n Guicciardini, Francesco: economic and political circumstances, 18, 19, 20, 21, 58n., 168; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 50, 52; historical opinions, ion., 16-17, 19, 20, 24n., 27, 37, 38, 39,40 Guicciardini, Jacopo, i7n., i2on Guidetti, Guidetto, i48n. Guidotti, Leonardo, 88n. Henry, duke of Orleans, husband of Catherine de'Medici, 155, 158 Henry VIII, king of England, 17 Hungary, 106, 123, i58n., 169 Innocent VIII, pope, 95, 125 Italian Wars, see also Urbino and Lombardy, 14, 16, 17, 18, 23, 30, 107 John XXIII, pope, see Cossa, Baldassare Julius II, pope: financial policy, iO4n., 109, 121, 124; and the Medici, 29, 48, 49, 55, 63, 96; patronage, 75, 94, 95; and Piero Soderini, 55, 62 Lanfredini bank, i27n. Lanfredini, Bartolomeo, 18, 35, 15m. Lanfredini, Lanfredino, 28, 66n., i34n., 136, i38n. Lannoy, Charles de, viceroy of Naples, I on 3 Lapi, Francesco de, i56n. larghezzey 120

League of Cognac, 131, 145 Leo X, see Medici, Giovanni Leva, Antonio de, 158 Livy, 6 Lombardy: War of (1515), 30, 89, 101, 105, 120, 131, 133, 136; wars in (1520s), 106, 108, 109, 112, 113, 115, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 133, 136, i37n., 140, 148 London, Florentine Nation in, 17 Loreto, 50 Louis XII, king of France, 83n. Lucca, Lucchese, 92, 95 Lucretius, 5 Lyons, Florentine business in, 12, 14, 16, 17, 72n., 118, 119, 123, 158-160 Machiavelli, Niccolo, 36, 73, 75n., i32n., 153; historical opinions, 8, ion., 24n., 27, 52, 82 Machiavelli, Toto, 75n. Madonna da Impruneta, 72 maestro di casa, 103, 114, 123

Magliano, 93 Mantua, 52; marquis of, see Gonzaga, Federigo Marcello, Virgilio, 5 Marches of Ancona: grain from, 123; judicial taxes in, 105; salaria, 85, i23n., i25n., 156, i6on., 17m.; Treasury of, 122, 157, i58n., 161, 171, 173 Margaret, duchess of Florence and natural daughter of Charles V, 176 Marignano, Battle of (1515), 81, i38n. Marseilles, 158 Martelli bank, i22n. Martelli, Francesco, i37n. Martelli, Piero, 49 Martin V, pope, 92 Maximilian I, emperor, 2in., 29 Medici bank, 92-93, 113 Medici family: competition within, 84, 12in.; control of offices and elections, 20, 25, 38, 42, 134, 138; control over Florence, 9, 11, 19, 23, 24-44, 175; exile and attempts to return to Florence, 45, 48-50, 58, 61, 94-96; opposition to, 9, 19, 25, 45-46, 49, 73; patronage, see also individual family

Index Medici family {cont.) members, 9, 10, 19-20, 22, 32-35, 71, 74-80; restoration, 63-71 Medici, Alessandro, i04.n., i6gn., 174-176 Medici, Alfonsina (wife of Piero di Lorenzo): and Clarice de'Medici's marriage, 45, 49, 57, 59; death, 90, 172, 174; and Florentine public funds, 138-139; at the papal court, 121; patronage, 77, 82, 84-86, 97, 101 Medici, Catherine, 82n., iO4n., 154, i58n., i59n., 162; dowry, i52n., 155, 158-160, 165, 166, 169, 173 Medici, Clarice di Piero, see Strozzi, Clarice (wife of Filippo) Medici, Contessina, see Ridolfi, Contessina (wife of Piero Ridolfi) Medici, Cosimo il Vecchio, 9, 19, 20, 38, 42, 45 Medici, Cosimo I, duke, 1, 176 Medici, Galeotto: ambassador to Rome, 143-144; depositor of the Signoria and caretaker of the Medici regime, 36, 42, 86-88, 89n., 139^ Medici, Giovanni di Bicci, 93 Medici, Giovanni di Lorenzo (Pope Leo X) AS CARDINAL: and Filippo's marriage, 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, and Florentines in Rome, 48-49, 62, 95 — 96, and Julius II, 48, 49, 62, 96, legate to Bologna, 61, and re-establishment of the Medici in Florence, 27, 28, 35, 48, 63-67, 69, 70, 71 AS POPE LEO x: conspiracy against in 1517, n o , death in 1521, 120, 128, 172, election and coronation, 21, 22, 30, 71, 72-74, 94, and Ferdinand of Spain, 83n., financial troubles, 109, 115, i2on., 121, 124-128, 130, financing papal wars, 107, 126-128, 133, 138, and Florentine bankers, 21, 22, 23, 76, 93-96, 97, and the government of Florence, 29, 30, 31, 34n., 39, 42, 82, 83n., 87-88, 9on., 92, and music, 5, patronage, 74-75, 84-86, 101, 122, visit to Florence in 1515, 40, 101, 136 Medici, Giuliano: circle of patronage, 35, 71, 84, 86, 87n.; commander of papal

191

armies, 131-132; and coronation of Leo X, 73; marriage, i57n.; moves to Rome (1513), 71, 78; opposes Lorenzo de'Medici's election as captain general, 83n., 101; and re-establishment of the Medici in Florence, 27-28, 48, 57n., 63, 67-69, 70; and regime in Florence, 17, 30, 34n., 71 Medici, Giulio (Pope Clement VII): and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 57, 60; friendship with Filippo Strozzi, see under Strozzi, Filippo; and Leo X's election, 73; and re-establishment of Medici in Florence, 63 AS CARDINAL: aids Filippo's advancement, 97, 101, appointment as, 78n., 84, archbishop of Florence, 73n., 87, 130, conspiracy against (1522), 73n., finances, i4on., 141, and government of Florence, 83n., 9on., 92, 130, and Lorenzo de'Medici, 85, papal legate, 40, 130, 132, 140 AS POPE CLEMENT vn: and Catherine

de'Medici's marriage, 158, death and its impact, 24, 160, 163-174, 177-178, election and coronation, 23, 30, ii3n., 128, financial measures, 23, 115, 116, 124, 126, 128, 154-158, 160, 163-165, 169, and financing papal wars, 107, 108, 126, 128-150, and Florentine bankers, 21, 23, 94, 95, i4on., and grain business, 16m., 162, i63n., and the government of Florence, 19, 29, prisoner in Castel S. Angelo, 8, 120, 12m., 129, 151, and siege of Florence, 30, 129, reputation, 163-164 Medici, Ippolito, cardinal, i04n., i58n., 171, 175, 176 Medici, Lorenzo di Pierfrancesco, 176 Medici, Lorenzo di Piero, duke of Urbino: biography by Francesco Vettori, 82n.; captain general of Florence, 7, 35, 37, 39, 44, 83, 86, 88, 101, ii4n., 131; death, 82, 89, 172,

174; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 49, 57; financial situation, 85-86, 121, i27n., 138-139, 173; friendship with Filippo Strozzi, see under Strozzi, Filippo; marriage arrangements, 81,

192

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Medici, Lorenzo di Piero (cont.) 100; mission to Francis I (1515), 81, 101; Piombino affair, 7, 82; regime in Florence, 1, 17, 28, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 39, 42-44, 71, 78-79, 86-88, 177; trip to Rome (1514), 97; and War of Urbino, 81, i3on., i36n., i38n.; youth in Rome, 45 Medici, Lorenzo il Magnifico: and government reforms, 20, 25, 40; relationship with Florentine ottimati, 9, 45> 47> 54> 6in., 66; and use of public funds, 131 Medici, Lucrezia, see Salviati, Lucrezia (wife of Jacopo) Medici, Maddalena (wife of Franceschetto Cibo), 84 Medici, Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne, 81, 82n. Medici, Pagolo, i34n. Medici, Piero di Lorenzo: death, 27, 48; exile and attempts to return to Florence, 25, 27, 29, 45, 48, 56-57; opposition to, see also Medici family, opposition to, 47 Michelangelo, ioon. Michelozzi, Niccolo, 36 Milan, 17, 29, 128, 138, i62n. Mirandola, 142, 143, 144 Modena, 142, 143, 144 Monte Comune: and the Medici regime, 20, 21, 41, 87, 131, 136; and war finance, 40, 130, 133, 134, 136, 137^, 138, 139, 148-149 Monte della Fede, 22, 116, 126, 128; Filippo Strozzi, depositor of the Monte della Fede, 127, 174; Filippo Strozzi's credits, 129, 151, 154, 158, 168, 173 Montemurlo, Battle of, 1, 176

Napoleon, 9 m . Nerli family, 46n. Nero, del, family, 10 Nero, Agostino del, i32n., i48n., 157, i58n., 168-169 Nero, Francesco del: Filippo Strozzi's associate, 7n., 89n., 93n., n 8 n . , 127, 15in., 153; investigation by the Tribolanti, 143, 149; Machiavelli's brother-in-law, i32n.; treasurer general in Rome, i32n., i56n., i58n., 159-160, i65n., 166, 169, 170-171, i72n.; vice-depositor in Florence, 89, 90, 132-140, 142-150

Niccolini, Andrea, 34 Niccolo da Bucine, 5 Nobili, de', family, 3 Nori, Francesco Antonio, 69n. Olivieri, Benvenuto, 159, 163, 170-171, 174 Orlandini, Niccolo, 53n., 63n. Orsini family, 49 Orsini, Alfonsina, see Medici, Alfonsina (wife of Piero di Lorenzo) Orvieto, 12m., 15 m. ottimati (patriciate): divisions among, 25-27, 32-35, 45-46, 65; economic condition and investments abroad, 11-24; political prominence, 9-11, 24-38, 42-43, 66, 69, 177; and public finance, 18-20, 24, 148 Otto di Guardia e Balia: and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 53, 54, 56-58, 60, 61, 62; importance, 39, 41, 69, 70 Otto di Pratica: history and jurisdiction, 36, 38, 39, 16m.; and Medici regime, 35, 38-41, 43, 44, 81, 88-90, 135; and war finance, 39-41, 108, i3on., 13 m., i32n., 133-140, 142, 148, 149-150

Naples, Neapolitan: Castel Nuovo, 129, 13in.; Charles VIII's invasion of, 129, i3on.; ecclesiastical incomes from, 106, i n , n 6 n . , 118, 122, 123, 127, 155, 160; Filippo Strozzi's exile to, 50, 52, 57, 59, 60; Florentine business in, 9, 12, 65n., 100, 118; Florentine Nation in, 53n.; grain shipments from, 123; visit of Charles V to, 175-176

palaces: Acquila, 153, 175; Niccolini, 99n., 164, 166; Strozzi in Florence, see under Strozzi Pallavicini, Antonio Maria, 111 Palle, Battista della, i39n. Palleschi: and re-establishment of the Medici in Florence, 45-46, 50, 63, 64, 66-68; treatment by Soderini, 48, 54

Index Pandolfini family, 3, 11 Pandolfini, Battista, 45 Pandolfini, Francesco, 8in. Pandolfini, Niccolb, cardinal, 125 papal finances, see also war finances, 109, 116, 119-129, 154-155 papal mint, 94, 95 Papal States, 23, 77, 102, 119, 124, 161, 168, 170 Parenti, Piero, ion., 24m, 69, 87, 96, 130, 139"., 145 parlamento, 32, 65, 67, 68 Parma, 107, 130, 134 Passerini, Silvio, cardinal, 37, 39, 43, 9on., 125, 127 Paul II, miter of, n 6 n . , 126, i28n., i59n. Paul III, pope, see Farnese, Alessandro Pa via, Battle of (1525), 130 Pazzi Conspiracy, 19, 25, 55 Pazzi family, 10, 54-55 Pazzi, Antonio, 34 Pazzi, Cosimo, archbishop of Florence, 53n-> 55, 58, 64, 66n., 73n. Pazzi, Francesco, 19 Penitentiary, 102, 116, 129 Pesaro, 106 Piacenza, 107, 129, 130 Piccolomini family, 143 Piero di Cosimo, painter, 4 Pignatelli, Ettore, duke of Monteleone, viceroy of Sicily, 162 Piombino, 7, 82 Pisa: Council of, 29, 62; War of, 27, 41 Pistoia, Pistoiese, 92 Pitti family, 22 Pitti, Francesco di Piero, 50 Pitti, Piero, 50 Pius II, pope, iO4n. Pius IX, pope, 16m. Pliny, 6 Poggio, Giovanni, 119, i59n., 167 Poliziano, 5 Polybius, 6 Ponte, banking district in Rome, 93, 166 Ponzetti, Ferdinando, io6n., 125, 127 Poppi, Giovanni, da, i39n. Prato, 63; sack of, 64 Ptolemy, 6 Pucci family, 10, 22

Pucci, Lorenzo, cardinal, 86, 103, io8n., 116, 129 Pucci, Piero, i39n. Quaranta, 50, 56-58, 61 Rabelais, Francois, 9n. Rangone, Annibale, 108 Rangone, Guido, 109, 132, i33n. Raphael, 153 Riario, Raffaello, cardinal, n o , 125 Ricasoli bank, 123, 127 Ricasoli, Simone, 96 Ricci bank, 92 Ricci family, 3 Ricci, Roberto de', 42, 89, 99, 132, 135, 137, 138 Ridolfi, Contessina (wife of Piero Ridolfi), 83n., 84, 121 Ridolfi, Emilia, 82 Ridolfi, Filippo di Simone, 99, 100 Ridolfi, Giovanbattista, 53n., 66n., 67 Ridolfi, Maria (wife of Simone di Jacopo Ridolfi), 99n. Ridolfi, Niccolo, cardinal, 31, i25n., 127, 165, 175 Ridolfi, Piero, 83n. Rinuccini, Betto, 171 Romagna, 94, 97 Rome: Florentine banking community in, see also names of individual banks, 9-10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 21-23, 48-49, 76, 86, 91-97, 123, 125, 127, 128, 130, 148; Florentine confraternity in, 93, 96, 98n.; Florentine Nation in, 93, 94, 95, i i 5 n . ; grain provisioning for, 123, 161-165, 170 Rossi, Luigi de', 31, 83n., i25n. Rovere, Francesco Maria della, duke of Urbino, 108, 130 Rucellai bank, 127 Rucellai family, 3, 10, 22 Rucellai, Bernardo: adviser to the Strozzi, 4> 5> 47, 53; death, 88n.; economic and political circumstances, 12, 49, 53, 64n., 66n., 78n.; Orti Oricellari, di>nRucellai, Bonaccorso, 99 Rucellai, Domenico, 63n. Rucellai, Francesco, 63n.

194

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Rucellai, Giovanni, i2n., 49, 53, 63, 6411. Rucellai, Jacopo, 8sn., 99-100 Rucellai, Lucrezia di Bernardo, see Strozzi, Lucrezia (wife of Lorenzo Strozzi) Rucellai, Palla, 2on., 53, 63 Sachetti, Alessandro, 58n. Sack of Rome, 8, 30, 9m., 107, 13m., 145, 171; economic effects of, 23, 24, 120-121, 129, 15m., 154, 155 St Peter's, 106, ii4n. Salutati, Barbara Raffacani, i53n. Salviati bank, 126-127, 154 Salviati family, 10, 13, 15, i6n., 22 Salviati, Alamanno, 58n. Salviati, Giovanni, cardinal, 31, 125, 127, 129, 134, 145, 165, 175 Salviati, Giuliano, 175 Salviati, Jacopo: ambassador to Rome, 7in.; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 53, 56; Florentine banker, 12, 17, i27n., 138, i43n., 15m., 154, 157; Medici parente and patronage, 31, 76, 77, 85, 125, 129; political stance, 28, 66n., 83n.; treasurer of the Romagna, 94, 106 Salviati, Lucrezia (wife of Jacopo), 53, 55, 83n., 84, 85 Sansovino, Jacopo, ioon. Santuccio, Strozzi villa, 5, 82n. Sauli bank, 75, i23n.; as depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber, 77, 85, 95, 97, 101, 108, 109, n o Sauli, Agostino, i29n. Sauli, Bandinelli, cardinal, 77, 85, 86 Sauli, Hieronimo, i29n. Sauli, Sebastiano, 128, i64n. Savonarola, Girolamo, 25, 26, 27, 29, 47 Serapica, Giovanni, iO3n. Serristori family, 10 Serristori, Antonio, 135 Sessa, Luis de Cordoba, duke of, and imperial ambassador in Rome, 143, Seville, 118, 119, i56n. Sforza, Francesco I, duke of Milan, 83 Sforza, Francesco II, duke of Milan, i62n. Sicily, Sicilian, 123, 161, 162, 163, 165

Siena, Sienese, 95, 105, 122, 143 Signoria: abolition of, 175; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 52-58, 60, 61; jurisdiction, 39, 40, 41, 46n., 64, 115; and war finances, 134, 135, 144 Sistine Chapel, 106 Sixtus IV, pope, 19, 55 Soderini family, 10 Soderini, Francesco, cardinal of Volterra, 59, 62, 72 Soderini, Giovanbaptista di Paolo Antonio, 50 Soderini, Piero, gonfalonier e-a-vit a: conspiracy against in 1510, 61-63; election as gonfaloniere-a-vit a, 4n., 27, 48; enmity with Julius II, 55, 62; expulsion in 1512, 19, 28, 64-65; and Filippo Strozzi's marriage, 7, 50-61; opposition to, 27, 28, 47, 49, 52, 54-58, 60; and Strozzi ties, 3, 46 Soderini, Tommaso, 3 Spain, Spanish, 82, 83n., 162, i63n.; army and restoration of the Medici to Florence, 64, 65, 68, 70; ecclesiastical revenues from, 119, 123, 156, 158, 167, 169 Spanocchi bank, 95 Spinelli, Bartolomeo, i25n. Spini bank, 92 Spinola, Agostino, 159, 160, 162, 170-171 Spoleto, 156, 157 strettezze, n 9-121 Strozzi banks; Florence, 89, io8n., 118, i3on., 132, i33n., 136, 140-141, 176; Lyons, i4n., i6n., 8in., 117, 118, 133, 158-159, 162, i69n.; Naples, 100, 106, 118; Rome, i4n., 86, 89, 98-99, io8n., 112, 114-117, 122, 123, 125-128, i3on., i3 2 -i33, J39, HO, H 1 , H3, 154, 158, 174; Seville, 118, 156, 167 Strozzi family: attitude toward Filippo's marriage, 46, 48, 51-52, 54-55; history, 11, 12; marriages, 3-4, 45; opposition to the Medici, 9, 19, 45-46, 51, 57, 69; political divisions, 46-47, 65-67; political fortunes under the Medici, see also individual family members, 68, 69-71, 76-80; wealth and prominence, 10, 13, 19, 22

Index Strozzi palace in Florence, 1, 3, 4, 12, 48, 68, 69, 176 Strozzi, Alessandra, 3-4 Strozzi, Alfonso: economic circumstances, 3, 12, 98; and Filippo's marriage, 50-53, 60; friend of Piero Soderini, 47, 66; opposition to the Medici, 45, 47; political career, 47, 79n. Strozzi, Andrea, 79 Strozzi, Angelo, 106 Strozzi, Antonio di Ser Michele, 98-99, 100, 101

Strozzi, Antonio di Vanni, 46, 55, 69, 79n. Strozzi, Benedetto di Giovanni, 52 Strozzi, Carlo di Niccolb, 79 Strozzi, Caterina, 4 Strozzi, Clarice (wife of Filippo), 86, 132; appearance, 60; death, 172; and Francesco del Nero, 89n.; and Lorenzo de'Medici, 8in., 82n.; marriage to Filippo Strozzi, 7, 28, 45-61, 69, 79, 80 Strozzi, Federigo, 71 Strozzi, Fiammetta, 3 Strozzi, Filippo di Filippo: and Alessandro de'Medici, 174-176; banishment to Naples, 57; and Battle of Montemurlo, 1, 176; and Catherine de'Medici's dowry, 158-160, 165, 166, 169, 171, 173; and conspiracy of Prinzivalle della Stufa, 61-63; and currency speculation, 118, 141-145; depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber, 9, 12, 83n., 84-90, 92, 95, 97-98, 101, 102-118, 122, 127-128 129, 132, 140, 141, 145, 151, i52n., 155,

173; depositor of the Signoria of Florence, 10, 42, 44, 71, 80, 86, 88-90, 92, 127, 132-140, 145, 149, 150;

devotion to Medici, 7-8, 34, 145, 151, 153; education and youth, 3-6; and election of Leo X, 72-73; embassy to Francis I in 1515, 81, 101; exile, 1, 10, 174-177; and Giovanni de'Medici (Pope Leo X), 12, 63, 65, 72, 97, 172, 174; and Giulio de'Medici (Pope Clement VII), 7, 8, 54, 59, 68, 70, 71, 84, 85, 90, 97, 140, 151-160, 169, 172; and grain provisioning, 152, 161-165, 169, 173; historical reputation, 1-2,

91-92, 176-177; hostage for Clement VII, 6, 7-8, 129, 13m., 154, 171; impact of Clement VII's death, 164-178; imprisonment and death, 1, 174; investments in Florence, i6n., 120, 166, 176; investments in France, see Strozzi bank in Lyons; investments in Spain, see Strozzi bank in Seville; and jealousy of other Medici parenti, 83, 86, 101, 175, 177; loans to Giovanni de'Medici (Leo X), 127-128, 133, 138, 141; loans to Giulio de'Medici (Clement VII), i3on., i4on., 146, 147, 151-152, 154-160, 165, 166, 173; and Lorenzo di Piero de'Medici, 1, 7, 8, 35, 42, 44, 68, 70, 71, 78-84, 86, 88-90, 100, 101, i27n., 131, 172, 174, 177;

marriage to Clarice de'Medici, 7, 28, 45-61, 70, 76, 79, 80; Medici parente, 28, 31, 61, 62, 79, 97, 100, 118, 153, 169, 172; Monte della Fede credits, 129, 151, 154, 158, 168, 173; nuncio to France, 8in., 152, 154, 164 OFFICES AND POSITIONS IN FLORENCE:

Abbondanza official, 162, 175, Balia, 71, Council of Forty-Eight, 175, depositor of the Signoria, see separate listing above, Dodici Procurator}, I75n., ducal counsellor, 175, Festaiuolo di S. Giovanni, 78, Mercanzia official, I75n., Monte official, 20, 44, 80, i75n., orator to Francis I in 1515, 81, Otto di Guardia, i75n., Otto di Pratica, i75n. OFFICES AND POSITIONS IN ROME:

consul of the Florentine Nation in Rome, 94n., 153, depositor general of the Apostolic Chamber, see separate listing above, depositor of the College of the Knights of St Peter, 174, depositor of the Monte della Fede, 127, 174, depositor of the tre dogane of Rome, 151, grain official, 161, nuncio to France, 8in., 152, treasurer of the Marches 152, 155, 157, 161, 168, 171, 173, treasurer of Urbino, 151 papal financier, 15, 22, 90-93, 96-98, 101, 115-118, 126-128, 151-174, 177; and Paul III, 167-168, 174; political views, 28, 66-67, 82-83; promoter of

196

Filippo Strozzi and the Medici

Strozzi, Filippo di Filippo (cont.) Strozzi political fortunes, 7, 69-70, 76, 78-79, 84; and re-establishment of Medici in Florence, 63-71; rise to favor, 71-90, 97, 118; size of fortune, 11-12, 169; tax farms and venal offices, 85-87, 97, 99, 116-117, 122-123, I27> i28n., i29n., 151-152, 154-160, 166-170; trip to France in 1518, 81; trip to France in 1533, i59n., 162; and war finances, 1, 89, 108, 109, 118, 119, 127-128, 131-150 Strozzi, Filippo di Matteo (the Elder), 1, 3, 9, 45, 46, 98 Strozzi, Giovanni di Carlo, 46, 52, 76 Strozzi, Giulio, 174 Strozzi, Leonardo, 61, 66, 69, 70, 79n., 80 Strozzi, Leone, i52n. Strozzi, Lorenzo di Filippo di Filippo, 174 Strozzi, Lorenzo di Filippo di Matteo: advice to Filippo, 67, 77; biography of Filippo, 3, 63, 69, 70, 79, 96, i67n.; and Filippo's marriage, 50-51, 53, 54, 59, 60; investments and loans, 12, i6n., 98, i34n.; marriage, 4, 47; political career, 66, 69n., 71, 79, 80; rapprochement with the Medici, 73, 76 Strozzi, Lucrezia (wife of Lorenzo), 4, 47, 48 Strozzi, Luisa, 175 Strozzi, Marco, 52, 60 Strozzi, Maria, see Ridolfi, Maria (wife of Simone di Jacopo Ridolfi) Strozzi, Maria di Filippo, 86 Strozzi, Matteo di Lorenzo: and conspiracy of 1510, 61; and Filippo's marriage, 46, 51, 55; political career, 46, 66, 69, 70, 7m., 76, 78, 79n., 80, 135 Strozzi, Michele di Carlo, 46 Strozzi, Palla, 19 Strozzi, Piero di Andrea, 79 Strozzi, Piero di Filippo, 126, i52n., 171-172, 175 Strozzi, Rinaldo, 167 Strozzi, Roberto, ioon., i52n. Strozzi, Selvaggia (wife of Filippo Strozzi the Elder): acquires Medici property,

45; and Bernardo Rucellai, 4, 47; death, 12; and Filippo's marriage, 48, 50, 51, 53> 59 > guardian of Filippo and Lorenzo, 3, 5, 46 Strozzi, Vincenzo, i52n. Strozzi, Zaccheria, 70 Studio Fiorentino, 5n., 46, 89n., 149

Stufa, Luigi della, 6in. Stufa, Prinzivalle della, 4, 47, 49, 61-62 Suriano, Antonio, 14, 15, 16, 2in. Swiss, 108, 116, 132, 169 Swiss Guard, 105, 107, 108, iO9n., ii4n., 123 tamburo, 53-54. 5^, 57 Tesoreria Segreta, 103

Tolfa, 122 Tornabuoni bank, i22n. Tornabuoni family, 11, 22, 63n., 64n. Tornabuoni, Giovanni, 41, 42, 137, 142, 148 Tornabuoni, Simone, 63n., 107 Tosinghi, Pierfrancesco, 53n., 63 Tour d'Auvergne, Madeleine de la, see Medici, Madeleine de la Tour d'Auvergne (wife of Lorenzo, duke of Urbino) Tovaglia, Lapo della, 2on. tratte, 43 Treasury General of the Apostolic Chamber, 102, io6n.-iO7n., i n , 159, 166 Trevisano, Domenico, i24n. Tribolanti, 143, 149

Trieste, 17 Tullia of Aragon, 6 Turini, Baldassare da Pescia, 36, 101, 119 Turks, 106, i n , 124, 128-129, 158, 169, 174 Ungaresi, Alexandro, 125 Urban VI, pope, 92 Urbino: Treasury of, 127; War of and its financing, 30, 89, 105, io6n., 108, 120, 126, 127, 130, 133, 135, 136, 138, 145 Usumari bank, 95 Valle, Andrea della, cardinal, 171 Valle, Bartolomeo della, 117, i55n.

Index Valori family, 46n., 53n. Valori, Bartolomeo, 49, 63, 6gn., 83n., 129, i39n., 168

197

de'Medici's friend, 86, 87n.; papal commissioner, 141; patronage, 42, 74-75, 86-87; and re-establishment of the Medici in Florence, 32, 63, 64n. Via di Banco di S. Spirito, see Canale di Ponte Vigerio, Marco, cardinal, i2on. Vitelli, Alexandro, 14cm. Vitelli, Vitello, i33n. Viterbo, 155

Valori, Filippo di Niccolo, 2on. Valori, Niccolo, 53n. Vasari, Giorgio, 5 Venice, Venetian, 14, 15, 16, 52, 90, 115, 124, 176 Verrazzano, Bernardo da, 99 Vespucci, Giovanni, 63n., 69n., 83n. Vettori, Francesco: ambassador to France, 36, 44, 8in.; ambassador to Rome, 74; war finances: Florentine public funds and, J 7> 73> 89, 92, i2on., 129-150; papal, biographer of Lorenzo de'Medici, 82n.; see also under individual popes, 124-131, economic circumstances, 18, 19; 134, 136, 138, 140-142, 146-149 historical opinions, 24n., 40, 72-73, 75n., 76, 145, 153; Medici amico, 34, 89 Welser bank, 95 Vettori, Paolo: captain of the papal Zeffi, Francesco, 3 galleys, 105, 108, 109; Giuliano