Fighting Techniques of the Colonial Era: 1776-1914 Equipment, Combat Skills and Tactics

Z*M f

a®

TECHNIQUES OF THE C O L O N I A L

ERA

1 776 - 1 91 4 EQUIPMENT,

ROBERT B. BRUCE

COMBAT

PHYLLIS G . IESTICE

SKILLS,

STUART REID

AND

ROB S. RICE

TACTICS

FREDERICK C . SCHNEID

FIGHTING

TECHNIQUES

OF THE C O L O N I A L

ERA

FIGHTING TECHNIQUES OF THE C O L O N I A L ERA 1 7 7 6

- 1 9 1 4

EQUIPMENT, COMBAT SKILLS, AND

TACTICS

ROBERT B. BRUCE PHYLLIS G . JESTICE STUART REID ROB S. RICE FREDERICK C . SCHNEID

THOMAS DUNNE BOOKS

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS # NEW YORK

Thomas Dunne Books. An imprint of St. Martin's Press FIGHTING TECHNIQUES OF THE COLONIAL ERA.

Copyright ©Amber Books Ltd 2009. All rights reserved. For information, address St. Martin's Press, 175 Fifth Avenue, N e w York, N.Y. 10010. w w w . thomasdunnebooks .com w w w . stmartins .com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data on file at the Library of Congress ISBN-10:0-312-59092-X ISBN-13: 978-0-312-59092-5

Editorial and design by Amber Books Ltd Bradley's Close 74-77 White Lion Street London N1 9PF United Kingdom w w w . amberbooks .co.uk Project Editors: Michael Spilling Design: Jerry Williams Picture Research: Terry Forshaw Maps:JB Illustrations and Peter Bull Printed in Thailand First U.S. Edition June 2009 10

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 PICTURE CREDITS:

All illustrations & maps © Amber Books Ltd. Alamy: 73 (North Wind Picture Archives), 121 (North Wind Picture Archives), 233 (Ariadne Van Zandbergen) Art Archive: 58/59 (Buffalo Bill Historical Center, Cody, Wyoming), 212 Art-Tech/Aerospace: 223 Art-Tech/MARS: 21,34,47,61,108/109,115,194,237 Bridgeman Art Library: 135 (Lauros/Giraudon), 206/207 (Royal Exchange Art Gallery, London), 219 (Collection of the New York Historical Society), 220/221 (Peter Newark Historical Pictures) Cody Images: 46,84,96,244/245,249 Corbis: 9 (Bettmann), 140 (Hulton-Deutsch Collection), 210 (Bettmann) De Agostinl Picture Library: 74 (M. Seemuller), 150/151,156 Brandon Durwood: 99 Getty Images: 6/7 (Charles Edwin Fripp/Bridgeman Art Ubrary), 10 (Time & Life Pictures), 152 (Hulton Archive), 166 (Hulton Archive), 190/191 (Hulton Archive), 228/229 (Hulton Archive) Tim Giddlngs: 51 Kepi Blanc/French Foreign Legion: 122 Library of Congress: 50,63,67,88,89,162,169,204,227,234,235 Mary Evans Picture Library: 38/39,44,110/111,132,146 Photol2.com: 11 (ARJ), 14/15 (ARJ), 78/79 (Oronoz), 138 (Hachede), 139 (Hachede), 197 (Hachede) Photos.com: 36,45,91,93,103,116,128/129,145,159,180,211 Joe Rawlinson (www.pepeschile.com): 213 Public Domain: 30,57,216 TopFoto: 86 (Granger Collection), 199 (Granger Collection)

CONTENTS CHAPTER 1 The Role of Infantry

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CHAPTER 2 Mounted Warfare

58

CHAPTER 3 Command and Control

110

CHAPTER 4 Siege Warfare

158

CHAPTER 5 Naval Warfare

206

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

250

INDEX

251

CHAPTER 1

THE

ROLE OF INFANTRY

As in every era of conflict, it was the foot soldier that made up the bulk of armies in the age of colonial warfare. In the service of the colonial powers, the infantryman carried the weight of battle upon his broad shoulders. Not only did the colonial powers of the age have to mobilize armies, they also had to project those forces across thousands of kilometres of ocean, desert, jungle and mountain. The ubiquitous infantryman, with his relatively light equipment and ability to march through even the most unforgiving terrain where neither horse nor cannon could follow, was the ideal choice for use in colonial warfare.

n opposition to the colonial forces, the armies of the indigenous peoples of Asia, Africa and the Americas tended also to be overwhelmingly made up of foot soldiers. There were, though, notable exceptions to this rule, including the Arabs of North Africa and the American Indians of the Great Plains.

I

SELLING THEIR LIVES DEARLY. In this painting by C.E. Fripp, British infantry of the 1st Battalion, 24th Regiment of Foot, make their final stand as swarms of Zulus close in for the kill at the battle of Isandhlwana, 22 January 1879.

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T H E

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I N F A N T R Y

From the late fifteenth century, the era of discovery and exploration, many European powers obtained colonial empires and waged numerous conflicts overseas. Yet by the golden age of colonialism, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, the armies of Britain and France were by far the most heavily engaged in colonial warfare. The armies of these two Great Powers would conquer and control the largest overseas empires of the era, so they are the main focus of this chapter. The first colonial conflict for Great Britain in this era marked the end of the first British Empire. The American War of Independence (1775-83) was an ultimately successful revolt against British power. Its success was the result of poor governmental policies that sparked the revolt in the first place, and the generally poor leadership in the higher echelons of British command. For his part, the rank and file British 'redcoat' infantryman was the finest fighting man of the war.The professionalism, skill and courage of the individual British soldier were proven time and again on the battlefields of North America. Infantry made up the vast bulk of the British forces in North America. Trained in the linear warfare tactics of the eighteenth century, the British foot soldier relied upon his venerable Brown Bess' musket as the weapon of decision. Massed volley fire with this weapon (which shot a .75calibre/18mm ball) was devastating at close range. Disciplined volleys delivered in the heat of battle could be achieved only with years of rigorous training and harsh discipline, and the British infantry BRITISH LIGHT INFANTRY, OFFICER A N D SOLDIER,

1780. The British Army was very quick to adapt its training and equipment to meet the demands of colonial warfare, as illustrated by these soldiers (based on sketches by De Loutherberg) with caps and shortened coats although some considered these garments more showy than useful. These men were armed with the 'Brown Bess'percussion cap musket.

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were superb at it. After the enemy had been well softened by musketry, the infantrymen would fix bayonets and then advance with a machine-like precision that was almost unstoppable. Indeed, the British won most of the battles of the War of Independence, in large part due to the marked superiority of their infantry in comparison to their opponents from the Continental Army and, in particular, the militia. Regulars versus Irregulars There is a popular image in the United States of American soldiers taking advantage of natural

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y cover to pick off British troops wearing bright uniforms in the open. Actions such as the battle of Concord and the subsequent British retreat to Boston (1775) gave rise to this national myth, but the image has little basis in reality. The hard truth is that in virtually every pitched battle of the War of Independence the British Army bested the Continental Army in the field. It was not until the Continentals learned from experience, as well as from the hard hand of European drillmasters such as the Prussian Baron von Steuben, that the American infantry developed into an effective fighting force capable of fighting the British on something approaching equal terms. They did so by adopting European-style linear tactics and refining them in the furnace of war.

exact same size as the barrel in order for it to catch the rifling grooves. Since all weapons of that era were muzzle-loading, a rifleman had to use a mallet to hammer his ramrod down in order to load his weapon. This process became even more difficult and time-consuming over the course of a battle, as the barrel became fouled with black powder from repeated firings. In addition to their slow rate of Are, early rifles could not be fitted with a bayonet. Morgan's riflemen carried hunting knives and/or tomahawks for close fighting, but these lacked the reach of a bayonet-tipped musket, which meant that a rifleman was at a distinct disadvantage in

As a rule, the British infantry was the superior force on the battlefield, but for every rule there are exceptions. Fine Continental Army regiments were developed over time, one of the earliest and most successful being the regiment known as 'Morgan's Rifles', recruited from the frontier of western Virginia. Led by Daniel Morgan (1736-1802), a veteran Indian fighter, they were a ferocious lot, wearing a distinctive uniform of white buckskin. While the bulk of infantry on both sides were armed with smooth-bore muskets, Morgan's men were armed with the Kentucky Long Rifle, the weapon of choice on America's western frontier. The rifling in the weapon's barrel spun the ball, giving it three times the range of a smooth-bore musket and making it far more accurate, so much so that individual marksmanship was prized and volley fire disdained in the rifle regiment. On the downside, the rifle was slow to load, taking on average three times as long to reload as a musket. This was due to the necessity for the bullet to be almost the LEADER OF MORGAN'S RIFLES. General Daniel Morgan is portrayed in the buckskin gear of the frontiersman. Morgan's unit of500 proved invaluable at battles such as Saratoga (1777) and Cowpens (1781).

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THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y hand-to-hand combat. Nevertheless as elite skirmishers riflemen were without parallel on the battlefield and they played a critical role in some of the most notable American victories of the war, including the decisive series of engagements known as Saratoga (1777), the turning point of the revolution. The British took these tactical lessons to heart and by the beginning of the nineteenth century deployed rifle-armed skirmisher regiments of their own. Colonial Adventures With the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, peace returned to Europe, where a rough balance of power was established between the great nations. While conflict between the Great Powers would not happen again for almost four decades, the armies of France and Britain, in particular, were actively engaged around the globe in colonial wars to defend and expand their overseas holdings. Eager to recover la gloire of its past military exploits, France turned its attention to North Africa. It was an area in which the French had become increasingly involved during various expeditions against the piratical activities of the Barbary corsairs. After years of growing animosity, the French

10

emissary to Algiers was publicly humiliated in 1827. The French responded first with a naval blockade and then, when further depredations occurred, an invasion of Algiers in 1830. The newly established constitutional monarchy of King Louis-Philippe (1773-1850) recognized that in the volatile world of French politics the government must appear decisive and act with strength. In addition, opportunists saw in the conflict a chance for France to acquire territory and riches, as well as reclaim its status as a leading military power in Europe without upsetting the delicate balance of power on the continent. The French captured Algiers as well as several important inland towns but failed to break Arab resistance. Abd el-Kader (1808-1883), a charismatic ..l Arab chieftain who was known as the 'Desert Hawk', proclaimed a jihad against the French invaders, and led a powerful alliance of Arab and Berber tribes to resist them. In the Camels provided the French infantry with greater mobility for long patrols across the deserts of North Africa. The French Foreign Legion eventually developed a cavalry \ regiment for these missions.

CAMEL-BORNE LEGIONNAIRE.

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY Bugeaud's methods of combining wise government and civic improvements as part of his campaigns were highly successful in conquering North Africa for France. GENERAL T H O M A S ROBERT BUGEAUD.

carried out a protracted guerrilla campaign against the French. In such a conflict, atrocity became commonplace. Abd el-Kader's men were ruthless towards any who supported the French regime, and tortured and murdered civilians as well as captured French soldiers. The French Army of Africa responded with raids on Arab villages, carrying out massacres of their own, and soon the guerrilla war in Algeria turned very ugly indeed. The protracted conflict took its toll on the French soldiers. By this point, after more than a decade, they seemed to lack direction. They had proved that they could win battles in Algeria, but they had yet to win the war. Morale dropped precipitously, battered by the frustrations and horrors of years of guerrilla warfare and indifference at home. Neither their government nor their senior leadership appeared to have any answers. A succession of French generals had seen their reputations tarnished in the vain attempt to subdue Abd el-Kader, and the war had become a source of both frustration and embarrassment for King Louis-Philippe's regime. Something had to be done.

bitter war that ensued, a succession of French generals failed to bring Abd el-Kader to heel. Years of battle ended with the negotiation of a fragile peace that left the French in a vulnerable position. And so, in an attempt to secure France's foothold in North Africa, the French Army then captured the important coastal city of Constantine in 1837.Abd el-Kader took this as a violation of the treaty and open warfare resumed once more. The French Army, now stretched even more thinly by its conquest at Constantine, once more faced a relentless opponent that remained as elusive as ever. Abd el-Kader's forces were lightly armed and consisted mainly of mounted warriors who moved swiftly across the desolate terrain that was their home. Raiding deep into French territory, but avoiding pitched battles, these forces

General Bugeaud The turning point for France came in 1840 with the appointment of General Thomas Robert Bugeaud (1784-1849) to command the French Army of Africa. Arriving in Algeria at the head of 65,000 reinforcements, he was determined to win this war and make France the master of North Africa. In his youth he had been an ardent Bonapartist, but was now a confirmed Royalist. King Louis-Philippe considered him to be both politically reliable and militarily skilful - a rare combination indeed. Bugeaud had joined the French Army in 1804 and was a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars. His first experience had been in the bloody guerrilla campaigns in Spain, where he served under Marshal Suchet (1770-1826). Bugeaud studied and learned well the methods of Suchet, who won his baton in a brilliant campaign in Aragon which had

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lit

T H E

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I N F A N T R Y

French Foreign Legionnaire (1844) This soldier is a private from the conquest of Algeria. He is armed with an M1842 percussion-cap musket. The percussion-cap firing system was more reliable than the old flintlock and was the final evolution in musket technology before the widespread introduction of rifles in the 1850s. The Foreign Legion was composed then, and now, of foreign volunteer enlisted men commanded by French officers. The legion's uniform differed little from that of French line infantry, as their distinctive white kepi was a much more recent innovation. The legion was forged in the furnace of combat in Algeria, and played a leading role in the storming and capture of Constantine in 1837. In spite of this, Marshal Bugeaud was not fond of the legion and at one point even argued for its disbandment. However, the legion hardened into an outstanding fighting force in the final stages of the war in Algeria. Its excellence in combat overcame its critics and the legion's regiments became elite units in the French colonial wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

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T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y The most identifiable of the n e w French successfully pacified the troubled region even infantry regiments were the Zouave units. They when the rest of Spain flared in revolt against were initially formed of North African enlisted French rule. Bugeaud learned in Spain that brute men commanded by French NCOs and officers. force alone could not defeat guerrillas. Instead, it They performed very well in battle in Algeria and was essential to provide good government, their colourful dress and reputation for ferocity in including the proper administration of the battle led them to be considered elite infantry. The territory, and to judge when to be harsh and when Zouaves w e r e instantly recognizable in their to be lenient. At a tactical level, he learned the exotic uniforms of baggy red Moorish trousers and wisdom of employing light, highly mobile turbans, and they became emblematic of the formations to fight the guerrillas rather than French Army of Africa. They would later serve using conventional military forces. All these as elite infantry in the lessons, plus ideas of his armies of the Second own, were to be utilized in 'My friends, we shall split the Empire, and in 1852 Bugeaud's campaigns in Napoleon III (1808-1873) North Africa. Moorish army as a knife dramatically increased their Soon after his arrival, numbers and officially Bugeaud set about forging does butter. I have only formed three permanent a new French Army in one fear, that they may regiments of Zouaves. Algeria, a force designed Although they originally not only to fight overseas anticipate defeat and escape consisted of North Africans, but also to absorb the the Zouave units began culture and identity of the our blows.' accepting French soldiers North African tribes it — BUGEAUD AT ISLY, 1844 into their ranks at an early fought against. The Armee stage in their development. d'Afrique had already As the reputation of the begun to adopt a certain Zouaves grew, the best officers and enlisted men identity before the arrival of Bugeaud, but he in the French Army vied with one another for instilled in this force a sense of pride and honour admittance into their exalted ranks, and by the and forged it into a formidable weapon. This new 1840s the Zouaves were the finest infantry in the force would produce some of the finest officers French Army. and soldiers in the French Army, w h o would win brilliant reputations in the decades to come. The French Foreign Legion Bugeaud also set about formally incorporating Another elite infantry force that emerged during North African regiments into the French Army. The the conquest of Algeria, and whose name would be French had a long history of foreign units serving forever linked with colonial warfare and the in their armies, most recently in La Grande Armee burning sands of North Africa, was the French of Napoleon I (1769-1821), which had contained Foreign Legion. King Louis-Philippe created the regiments from all over Europe. Under Bugeaud's legion by royal decree in 1831, and committed it steady guidance and inspiring leadership, the new to battle in Algeria. Commanded by French foreign regiments of the Army of Africa became a officers, the rank and file was composed of foreign new Imperial Guard for the French Army, rivalling volunteers, many of w h o m had questionable the soldiers of that illustrious formation of the backgrounds and lacked proper military training. First Empire, and surpassing in quality and The legion learned its lessons in Africa the hard performance the Guard of the Second Empire. way: after five years of enduring Arab ambushes Forged in the furnace of Algeria, the Army of Africa and disease, it had developed into a competent became an elite force that would prove its worth military force, if not yet the elite formation it on the battlefield time and again in Africa, Asia, would later become. North America and Europe.

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T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y After service in the Carlist Wars in Spain (1834-39), the legion was reorganized into t w o full battalions, making it a real regiment in the French Army. In 1837, it was sent back to Algeria. This 'new' legion was battle-hardened and played a decisive role in the French victory at Constantine, where its battalions led the assault waves that stormed the city and w o n a crucial victory for the French. It was during this period that the French Foreign Legion became an elite lighting force. It also made Algeria its home, where it would remain for the next 125 years, serving at the forefront of France's colonial wars. Bugeaud was not particularly enthralled with the legion, but it eventually w o n his grudging respect and remained an integral part of the Army of Africa. Throughout much of the war in Algeria, the French had been a reactive force, with the initiative lying almost completely in the hands of Abd el-Kader's forces. That changed under Bugeaud. He established solid military bases well stocked with armaments and supplies, and from these issued 'flying columns' designed to take the fight to the enemy. These columns did not rely upon heavy artillery and cumbersome baggage wagons as previous French forces in Algeria had done. Instead, the men carried their rations and ammunition with them; only light guns were taken, if any at all; and the combined infantry and cavalry forces that composed these columns were just as mobile as their Arab adversaries. With these flying columns, Bugeaud penetrated deep into the enemy's territory. Bugeaud argued that the best way to keep the Arabs from attacking convoys and towns was to keep them so busy defending their o w n bases and population that they would have neither the time nor the resources for offensive operations. Bugeaud's strategy worked, and attacks on isolated outposts and convoys travelling between the main French-held cities dropped precipitously. Over a period of four years, Abd el-Kader's forces were slowly driven westwards. Then, with the war all but w o n by the French, Abd el-Kader retreated This painting by an unknown artist of the French school shows Bugeaud's 'boar's head' formation in action. The work is on display in the Musee de I'Armee in Paris. BATTLE OF ISLY.

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with his army into Morocco. The Emperor of Morocco, Abd er-Rhaman, gave him support and allowed him to use Moroccan territory as a base to raid into French Algeria. Bugeaud protested, at which point the emperor proclaimed a holy war against the 'infidel' French, and hurled his armies into the fray. Bugeaud instantly recognized the danger. The declaration of a jihad and the entrance of a Moorish army into Algeria could undo years of pacification in a single moment. What was needed was swift and decisive action, and Bugeaud

if-,

JM

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y undertook just that. He formed a small column of a few thousand soldiers, mainly infantry, and invaded Morocco. It was a bold and audacious move, but in keeping with his overall strategy of maintaining the initiative and taking the fight into the heart of the enemy's country. Battle of Isly The Moors responded with a powerful force that numbered approximately 60,000 men. Bugeaud headed straight for it, determined to end this campaign with a stunning b l o w that would

destroy the main enemy army and avert a protracted guerrilla war in Morocco. However, many of the officers in Bugeaud's army were nervous at the prospect of battle. A defeat, or even a less than decisive victory, could fan the flames of insurrection into a conflagration of revolt that would sweep throughout North Africa and be impossible to control. Bugeaud realized the risks, but also believed that a decisive blow against the Moors could not only shatter their military might but also cast a pall over the revolt. If France was tired of the war, so too was the Arab and Berber

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THE ROLE OF INFANTRY under strict orders to maintain silence. The French forces crossed a bend in the winding Isly River in the darkness, and then just before dawn ascended a hill opposite the Moorish encampment. The Moors were spread out in a massive series of seven major camps, and for the first time the French soldiers truly realized the numbers of the host facing them. The French troops burst forth with a defiant shout of triumph as they moved down the slope to ford the final bend in the Isly in order to close with the enemy. The startled Moors leapt from their tents and mounted their horses. Almost their entire army was cavalry, and small contingents rushed down to the ford to attempt to stop the French crossing. But these attempts were poorly coordinated and lacked support. The leading French battalions easily repulsed these attacks and Bugeaud's army Surprise Attack moved relentlessly forward in its 'boar's head' Surprise was also a key factor in Bugeaud's plan. formation. As the French reached the broad His forces moved out at 1 a.m. on 14 August 1844, plateau of the Moorish encampment, the Moorish BOAR'S HEAD. A schematic cavalry formed into massive waves and began a representation of Bugeaud's series of cavalry charges against the flanks of the famous formation. Bugeaud 'boar's head' formation. The infantry brigades described it thus: declined to form square, but instead faced to the 'I arrange my little army I GENERAL in the shape of a boar's flank in line formation. They allowed the Moorish I PELISSIER head. The right tusk is horsemen to come in close, and then unleashed Lamoriciere, the left devastating volleys of musketry at close range. tusk is Bedeau, the Firing in volley with machine-like precision, muzzle is the disciplined French infantry drove off Pelissier, and I •• every attempt by the Moors to drive in the am between wm the ears.' flanks of the 'boar's head', and the cavalry failed to stop its slow and relentless progress into the heart of the Moors' positions. Shouting war cries, the am Moorish horsemen reE33 formed their ranks and GENERAL CAVALRY • I CAVALRY GENERAL crashed once more into the BEDEAU'S LAMORICIERE'S i sides of the formation, but BRIGADE , BRIGADE mm still could make no H BAGGAGE headway. French musketry TRAIN •• thinned their ranks with each successive attack and the frustration of the Moorish horsemen mounted with each unsuccessful charge. They swirled about in confusion, looking for a weak spot to strike at in this moving block of infantry driving through the population, and their morale could be shattered by a decisive victory This was an opportunity that was not to be passed up. On the eve of battle, a small contingent of reinforcements arrived, swelling the ranks of the tiny French force to approximately 6500 men, mainly infantry. Nevertheless their confidence in General Bugeaud knew no bounds, and morale was high. Bugeaud appeared amongst his officers on the night of 12 August 1844 and told them, 'The day after tomorrow, my friends, will be a great day.' He informed them that his intelligence estimates placed the Moorish prince's strength at over 60,000 men, 10 times the size of the French force, but that he did not fear such numbers, since he employed his infantry in the 'boar's head' formation.

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THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y midst of their army - but could find none. The French infantry maintained their superb discipline in the face of these repeated charges, which might have unnerved less experienced or less welltrained infantry. An Arab horseman serving with the French remarked that the French army was 'like a lion surrounded by a thousand jackals'.

In Bugeaud's official report, he singled out his infantry for special praise. The infantry had indeed been the driving force in the battle and had ultimately proved themselves the masters of the battlefield. Bugeaud returned in triumph to France, and a peace treaty with Morocco was signed shortly afterwards. Though the war in Algeria would sputter on, the revolt was ended at Isly. Abd el-Kader formally capitulated to the French in 1847, and France would rule over Algeria for over a century.

Cavalry Counter-attack As the French formation approached the centre of the Moorish line and the prince's camp, Bugeaud unleashed his cavalry from within the 'boar's head' and New Weapons sent them slashing through 'The infantry displayed Technology the Moorish horsemen. The The French infantry serving imperturbable coolness. French cavalry attack was in Algeria had been armed carried out with great with smooth-bore muskets. The four angle battalions were ardour and skill, and a Indeed, the infantry of the vicious cavalry fight erupted great colonial powers attacked by 3000 or 4000 around the prince's tent, continued to be armed with horse at once, and nothing which the French won. The muskets throughout the infantry brigades had early nineteenth century. shook them for a moment.' continued their relentless Despite the proven accuracy assault even while the and extended range of the — BUGEAUD AT ISLY, 1844 cavalry did its work, and rifle, the weapon's slow rate now they overran the of fire caused professional Moors' small artillery park and completed the rout of military men to shun its use as an infantryman's the Moorish army by breaking through the centre of standard arm. Then, in 1847, French Army Captain its line. Claude Etienne Minie (1804-1879), a veteran of the conquest of Algeria, developed a bullet that As the Moors began to retreat, the French expanded when fired to catch the rifling grooves cavalry pursued them a little too vigorously and a of the -barrel. This breakthrough allowed a rifle small group of French horsemen were cut off and bullet to be loaded as easily as a musket ball and surrounded by enemy cavalry. Bugeaud recognized gave the infantryman the best of both worlds: a the danger and immediately dispatched an infantry musket's rate of fire combined with the accuracy brigade to advance at the double and break and range of a rifle. Two years later, Minie through to the cavalry. The French infantry brigade developed a new rifle to fire this ammunition, and gave a great shout and rushed forwards with fixed the French Army swiftly adopted it as the standard bayonets, cutting a wide swathe through the arm for their infantry. The British rapidly followed swarm of Moorish cavalry and opening a path that suit and then developed their own rifle, the allowed the French cavalrymen to safely extricate M1853 Enfield. themselves. As the Moorish army streamed over the horizon, Bugeaud and his staff settled in at the This breakthrough in small-arms technology prince's tent to enjoy the breakfast that had been ushered in an age in which rifle-armed infantry prepared for the prince and his entourage. It was a dominated the battlefields of the world. Since this sweet moment of victory that not only destroyed technology remained almost exclusively in the the power of Morocco but also ensured that the hands of the colonial powers, it gave their armies war in Algeria was now, to all intents and a decided edge over indigenous forces, which purposes, over. carried smooth-bore muskets, if they possessed

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T H E ROLE OF

INFANTRY

Battle of Isly 1844

In 1844, after a long guerrilla war, Bugeaud had subdued the rebellion led by Abd el-Kader and brought most of Algeria under French control. However, Abd el-Kader and his army retreated into Morocco and used it as a base to continue the war. The situation became more complicated when the Emperor of Morocco, Abd er-Rhaman, declared a

Small groups of Moorish cavalry come down to the river bank to contest the crossing of the Isly, but are easily brushed aside as the French advance continues.

3

holy war against France. Bugeaud realized that all his efforts in putting down the Algerian insurrection could vanish in an instant. He therefore invaded Morocco with a small army of 6500 battle-hardened troops. Soon after he crossed the border, he encountered the main Moorish army, led by Prince Mulai Mohammed, made up of 60,000 cavalry, encamped near the Isly River. Bugeaud's combined force of infantry, cavalry and artillery was formed into what he called a 'boar's head' formation. As Bugeaud advanced, the Moors counter-attacked.They launched dozens of cavalry charges against the flanks of the 'boar's head' but each time were repulsed by steady volleys. Bugeaud's formation cut through the centre of the Moors' line, and he then unleashed his cavalry to seal the victory.

f *

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The Moorish. army, having now suffered grievous losses and been cut in two, collapses and retreats in disarray.

The French victory at Isly ended Moroccan support for Abd el-Kader's Algerian resistance. He was soon forced to come to terms, thus completing the French conquest of Algeria,

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At 2 a.m. on 14 August 1844, Bugeaud's army advances on the Moorish camps under cover of darkness. ,

O F

I N F A N T R Y

I

OUJDA

As dawn breaks, Bugeaud forms his army into a 'boar's head' formation as his men cheer and bear down on the enemy encampment.

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4

The Moorish cavalry launch a series of charges against the French, but each attack is repulsed by volleys of musket fire delivered at close range.

Upon reaching the main camp, Bugeaud unleashes his cavalry to finish off the Moors. The French horsemen overrun and capture the Moorish guns, but some are cut off and have to be rescued by a brigade of infantry.

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firearms at all. This set a pattern in which small, professional armies of the colonial powers, armed with superior weapons, were pitted against numerically larger indigenous foes whose armies tended to lack discipline and modern weaponry. The result was the ability of the armies of the colonial powers to win most engagements they had with indigenous peoples through the use of their superior training and firepower. In 1871, British infantry were equipped with the Martini-Henry rifle and it became one of the signature weapons of the imperial age. The Martini was a breech-loading, single-shot rifle, lighter and shorter than the cumbersome Snider-Enfield it replaced. Designed from the ground up as a breech-loader, it was a much more reliable weapon with excellent accuracy even at long range. It fired a heavy .45-calibre (11mm) bullet with a powerful powder charge that gave the weapon a ferocious kick when discharged. The early models used a rolled brass cartridge with a soldered base. That cartridge proved unreliable, however, causing jams and other malfunctions, and was replaced by a single-piece brass cartridge by the mid-1870s. The Martini-Henry rifle was as good, or better, than anything used by the armies of the Great Powers, and gave British infantry a decided edge in firepower over any indigenous forces they might face. British infantry tactics reflected this and were designed to maximize this advantage. Britain's infantry were trained to fight

20

The Snider (A) was a breech-loading conversion of the muzzleloading M1853 Enfield and was soon replaced by the Martini-Henry (C) in British regiments. The Westley-Richards carbine (B) was used by British cavalry, including Durnford's Natal Native Horse in the Zulu War of 1879• THREE BRITISH RIFLES OF THE COLONIAL AGE.

in the open, in line formation to maximize their firepower, and to fire by volleys to enhance the impact of that fire. Disciplined volley fire from a British battalion was a truly fearsome thing, as would be proved time and again in the years to come. The British emphasis on firepower was well founded upon sound principles that seemed borne out in the recent wars in Europe and America, where rifle-armed infantry dominated the battlefield. Not as well studied was the ability of an opponent to withstand heavy casualties from rifle fire in order to close with the enemy. This had already been demonstrated, during the FrancoPrussian War (1870-71) in particular, but most theorists did not believe such principles could be applied to colonial warfare. After all, so their argument went, the Prussian Guards could not be compared to 'savages' who lacked training, discipline and modern weaponry. Yet unlike in European warfare, indigenous armies often enjoyed a vast numerical superiority over their imperial foes. If an enemy force possessed overwhelming superiority in numbers and the courage to close in

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y for hand-to-hand combat, an outnumbered body of riflemen could be overwhelmed - as would be shown in the Zulu War of 1879Battle of Isandhlwana The British first came to southern Africa during the Napoleonic Wars, capturing the colony of Cape Town and gaining control over the Cape of Good Hope as part of their vital sea-lane communications with their colony of India. A succession of aggressive colonial governors expanded British rule in the region over the course of the early nineteenth century, and as the British pushed north and east into the interior of Africa they encountered the Zulus. The Zulus were a militaristic warrior society, who had been expanding their control over southern Africa for some time before they encountered the British. By the 1870s, Britain had extended its control of southern Africa to include the colony of Natal on the southeast coast of Africa. The colony

bordered Zululand, and the new British governor, Sir Henry Bartle Frere (1815-1884), became increasingly paranoid of the powerful tribe's intentions. He believed war between Britain and the Zulus was inevitable, and increasingly felt that the proper course of action was to launch a preemptive war designed to break the Zulus' military power. This, he believed, was preferable to allowing the Zulus to swoop down upon the colonists of Natal at a time of their choosing. He bombarded the Colonial Office in London with increasingly strident missives regarding the Zulu threat and the need to destroy it. London was at first sympathetic to these calls. Interpreting this as tacit blessing for his enterprise, Frere ordered Lord Chelmsford (1827-1905) to begin assembling an army in Natal. Requests submitted to Britain for In 1816 charismatic war chief Shaka organized the Zulus into a militaristic empire. His successors expanded Zulu territory, creating the most powerful native empire in southern Africa. SHAKA'S LEGACY.

21

.

T H E

R O L E

OF

-ft

I N F A N T R Y

capabilities. The Zulus were not the ignorant reinforcements to bolster this army were denied, savages' some British officers believed them to be, however, due to fears of war with Russia and the but rather were highly skilled and led by able rapidly deteriorating situation along the Northwest commanders w h o could manoeuvre large Frontier in India. Indeed, officials in London grew numbers of warriors. increasingly cool towards Frere's calls for a preChelmsford had made an intensive study of emptive war in Africa, especially when war was the Zulus during his time in Natal. He had, as a already breaking out in Afghanistan and seemed to result, developed a certain respect for them but be looming elsewhere. Frere was ordered to seek believed their reputation to be exaggerated, a diplomatic solution to his problems with the based on the fact that they had hitherto faced Zulus, but these instructions arrived too late. inferior opponents. When recommended to laager Under Governor Frere's orders, on 11 January his wagons, for example, 1879, Lord Chelmsford's Chelmsford argued that a army of 17,800 men 'Then it's Tommy this, an' British army was not the invaded Zululand, intent on same as a wagon train of striking a heavy b l o w ' Tommy that, an' Tommy Boer families, and had the against the Zulu forces means to resist Zulu attacks led by King Ceteswayo "'ows yer soul?" without resorting to such (c. 1826-1884). But it's "Thin red line of 'eroes" measures. Chelmsford failed, however, to appreciate the Three-pronged when the drums begin necessity for keeping his Approach forces in tightly packed Chelmsford advanced into to roll.' concentrations in order to Zululand with his forces resist the massed attacks of divided into three columns — RUDYARD KIPLING, 'TOMMY' (1890) Zulu warriors. Like the War - a northern, centre and Office in London, he was southern column, all of confident because the Zulus were not equipped roughly equal strength, although the centre was with firearms. Their main weapons were an the largest of the three. Chelmsford accompanied assegai, or stabbing spear, along with a couple of the centre column and slowly advanced towards throwing spears. Disciplined volley fire from a Isandhlwana Hill, a large promontory that rose British infantry battalion in line formation would, abruptly from the relatively flat ground around it. he assumed, decimate such a poorly armed force The plains of this region of Africa were riddled in short order. Far from being concerned about with ravines and dry gullies, which the Zulus were Zulu aggressiveness, Chelmsford stated on several masters at using to hide their forces and shield the occasions that his only real fear was that the Zulus advance of their warriors from prying eyes. These would avoid battle and draw the campaign out. facts were communicated to Chelmsford by Boer On 20 January 1879, Chelmsford and the scouts w h o accompanied his headquarters, and centre column arrived and established camp at the w h o also advised Chelmsford to laager his wagons base of Isandhlwana Hill. It was a curious every night w h e n he halted. The Boers had geographic formation that bore a vague learned the hard way to fortify a camp when in resemblance to the sphinx emblem of the 24th close proximity to the Zulus, and to expect an Regiment of Foot, which was to be the principal attack at any moment. In their wars with the British unit engaged in the coming battle. Zulus, the Boers had learned to respect the skill Chelmsford was anxious to locate the main Zulu and ferocity of these warriors, as well as their army, and when he received reports of a powerful aggressiveness. The Zulus would not wait idly for Zulu force to the west, he determined to go after the enemy to attack, but rather would maneouvre it. In reality, the British scouts had sighted a small aggressively themselves. The Boers also told force of Zulus sent to divert Chelmsford's Chelmsford not to underestimate their military

22

- liWini

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY

Zulu Warriors (1879) These Zulu warriors are armed with their

to engage the enemy before closing to hand-to-

traditional weapons. The warrior on the left

hand fighting. In the Zulu War some Zulu

carries a knob-kerri, a heavy wooden club.

warriors were equipped with firearms but still

The man on the right is armed with the

carried their traditional

famous assegai, a short stabbing spear used in

Both men carry a cowhide shield, the

close combat, as well as throwing spears

markings of which would define their rank

weapons as well.

and status. Two types of shield were used by Zulus in combat - the isihlangu was a large man-sized shield, while the umbumbuluzo was smaller and easier to carry.

23

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y attention from a massive force of some 20,000 Zulus bearing down on his camp. Chelmsford took the bait, and on the morning of 22 January 1879 he moved from Isandhlwana, taking the bulk of his centre column out in pursuit. To guard the main camp, he left behind a force of approximately 1300 men (of both British and native contingents) and t w o guns, under the command of Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine (1838-1879), a staff officer with no battlefield command experience. Assisting Pulleine was Colonel Anthony Durnford (1830-1879), w h o commanded a detachment of mounted Natal Natives. Durnford arrived in camp amidst reports that Pulleine's scouts had seen a large force of Zulus approaching the camp. Unlike Pulleine, Durnford had great experience of fighting in Africa and was actually senior in rank to Pulleine. Yet in spite of his experience, Durnford took his Natal cavalry out of camp to ride forward and engage a body of Zulus that had been sighted on the move near the camp. Durnford's small force rode straight into the massive Zulu army that had n o w moved within striking distance of the camp. Battle is Joined Durnford's horsemen beat a hasty retreat and found a solid defensive position in a dry gully, w h e r e they dismounted and engaged the

24

advancing Zulus with rifle fire. Meanwhile, the Zulus, somewhat startled by the appearance of Durnford, launched their attack on the camp.They expertly manoeuvred their units to form a battle formation known as a 'water buffalo'. This formation launched a frontal attack on an enemy force to pin it down, while two great 'horns' of advancing warriors struck around the flanks in a double envelopment. Pulleine n o w saw the attack coming. However, rather than gather his force into a tight compact defensive position, he shook his infantry out into a broad skirmish line, deployed well in front of the camp. This forward deployment did increase the effectiveness of his rifle fire, as the advance position had a much clearer line of sight than the ground around the camp. Pulleine must have planned on using his infantry to engage the Zulus at long range with their Martini-Henrys, assuming that the firepower generated would stop even the most powerful Zulu assault in its tracks. In fairness to Pulleine, the tactics worked at first, but the ' W A T E R BUFFALO'. This was the classic formation adopted by a Zulu impi when engaging an enemy. The success of this formation relied on the speed with which the Zulus could envelop their foe: the centre, or 'loin', ivas intended to hold the enemy in place; the flanking 'horns' had to move quickly, and tended to be made up of younger regiments.

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Zulus were just too numerous: there were perhaps as many as 20,000 warriors engaged in the battle. In addition, his rifle volleys struck the 'loin' of the 'water buffalo' formation, but the horns were unscathed and they were soon lapping at both his flanks and threatening to encircle and destroy his overextended command. As the battle was joined in earnest, Pulleine was also able to use his two light artillery pieces to good effect. However, they were simply too f e w and too small to have any real impact on the Zulus, which meant that the defence of the camp relied upon the riflemen. Disciplined, experienced and battle-hardened veterans of the wars against the Kaffirs, they unleashed deadly volley fire into the Zulus at long range. Each man carried approximately 70 rounds of ammunition, more than adequate for a soldier's load. Last Stand The British units held their ground and inflicted grievous losses on the Zulus, but the ability of the Zulus to flank the position proved the defenders'

Z U L U WARRIORS. Trained mainly for close combat, Zulus used their shield to protect their blind side as well as outflank an opponent. Here a Zulu exposes his opponent's flank with his shield before stabbing him with a short spear, or iklwa.

undoing. Both flanks w e r e turned almost simultaneously and the British infantry n o w found themselves surrounded by Zulus, w h o w e r e rushing in on all sides. Many of the native troops serving with the British broke and ran, but the British infantry of the 24th Foot continued to hold their ground, breaking into small clusters and fighting back to back against the swarm of Zulus that engulfed them. Now, cut off and isolated, their ammunition did begin to fail, yet still the British fought on with bayonets against the onrushing Zulus. It was an uneven contest, but the British troops sold their lives dearly and took many a Zulu down long after the contest had already been decided. The British force at Isandhlwana was wiped out, with both Pulleine and Durnford going down fighting alongside their men. The camp was ransacked by the victorious Zulus and then put to

25

T H E ROLE OF

INFANTRY

Battle of Isandhlwana 1879

A British army led by Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand in January 1879. Eager to make contact and unsure of Zulu intentions, Chelmsford divided his army into three columns. Chelmsford accompanied his centre column, which marched north to a hill

4

Brevet LieutenantColonel Henry Pulleine deploys his infantry forward, in a broad arc, in order to make maximum use of their long-range rifles against the spear-armed Zulus.

known as Isandhlwana. On the evening of 21 January, he received reports of Zulus to the southeast of his position. He was convinced this must be their main army and the following morning took the bulk of his forces in pursuit. He left behind a force of British and native infantry totalling 1300 men. In reality the force Chelmsford was pursuing was a diversion: the main Zulu army of 20,000 was closing in on Isandhlwana from the west. Mid-morning Durnford's Natal Native Horse arrived at Isandhlwana. Durnford went out in search of the Zulus and bumped into the right wing of Tshingwayo's army. As Durnford's command beat a retreat, the Zulus attacked. Pulleine threw his infantry forward in a broad arc, intent on exploiting his superior firepower. This only made his position more vulnerable to the Zulu flanking movement.When the British flanks were turned by the Zulu 'horns', their defences collapsed.

NAT* ISANDHLWANA DURBAN

Isandhlwana is just north of the Tugela River. Lord Chelmsford sought to engage the Zulu army swiftly and defeat them, so bringing the war to a rapid conclusion.

26

' p|C 'Eulus completely ? ^if Surround and overwhelm the JlHtish who, though l^&iked and running low on ammunition, fight to the end.

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- J A Zulu army under * < JL the command of fshingwayo gathers to ' "< k make a surprise attack against the British camff" at Isandhlwana. •

The Zulus assupa^/. their *water buffalo' attack „ formation, distracting the British with their centre force, while the horns move rapidly against both flanks.

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Colonel Anthdny ' Durnford's- Natal Native Horse, in search of an isolated Zulu columqi^ unexpectedly rtins jiuo

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the main Zulu ariftf, rfnd" beats a hasty rctrrat to a if

27

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Private, lst/24th Foot (1879) The regimental crest of the 24th was a sphinx, which bears an eerie resemblance to Isandhlwana Hill. This soldier is wearing the traditional

redcoat of the British soldier, and

a white pith helmet for protection from the harsh African sun. Soldiers used tea to stain their helmets and provide some camouflage. He is armed with the Martini-Henry

rifle. A single-shot

breech-loader, the Martini was known for its accuracy, range and ferocious kick. Firing in volleys over open ground, the British infantry

inflicted

grievous casualties on their Zulu opponents at Isandhlwana, but facing odds approaching 20 to 1, they were overwhelmed by numbers. The men of the lst/24th fought to the last cartridge and then engaged the Zulus with their bayonets before succumbing.

28

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y the torch before they withdrew. It was a costly victory, for the Zulus lost about 2000 warriors killed in the battle.The British lost approximately 1400 troops - essentially the entire force left to defend the camp. Chelmsford received reports of the Zulu attack on his camp shortly after the battle began, but he reacted slowly, convinced that he was on the trail of the main enemy army. He realized too late that the camp at Isandhlwana was in desperate straits. He turned his army about and headed for the camp but did not arrive until dusk was settling and the battle long over. The British troops were shocked to see that their dead had been viciously mutilated. Their stomachs had been ripped open, heads had been severed and genitals had been cut off. The scene was one of horror, made all the more macabre by Chelmsford's decision to bivouac that night on the battlefield. The British troops spent a nightmarish night surrounded by the dead - the corpses of the Zulus and the mutilated bodies of their unburied comrades. It was a devastating defeat. Yet Chelmsford was able to recover from this disaster, thanks in part to the incredible defensive stand put up at Rorke's Drift the following day. There a handful of British soldiers in an improvised fortified camp withstood the fury of assaults by the Zulu reserve force that had not been engaged at Isandhlwana. Chelmsford regrouped and continued his invasion, eventually defeating the Zulus at Ulundi on 4 July 1879, where he utilized dense, closely packed formations of infantry instead of elongated lines to engage the Zulus, breaking their military power once and for all. Defensive Principles The successful defence of Rorke's Drift proved that if the British w e r e in sound defensive positions and had ready access to ammunition for their rifles they could defeat a Zulu army many times their size. The reasons for defeat at Isandhlwana had been Chelmsford's failure to appreciate the ability of the Zulus to manoeuvre their regiments with professional skill, and his decision to allow an element of his command to become isolated and destroyed by the main Zulu force. Given the casualties inflicted by the British

D

L)

Z U L U HAND-TO-HAND WEAPONS. A) Assegai (short stabbing spear); B) isihlangu (war shield); C) iklwa (stabbing spear); D & E) throwing spears; and F) knob-kerri (a type of club).

on their Zulu opponents, it could readily be deduced that had the British numbers included Chelmsford's main force, they could have turned the tables and inflicted a grievous defeat. Besides the operational mistakes made by Chelmsford, there was also a breakdown in British tactics. They underestimated the ability of the Zulus to absorb tremendous casualties of an extent that would have deterred the most elite regiments in Europe from pressing home their attack. Once in close-quarter combat, the 'thin red line' of British infantry was swarmed by a vastly

29

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY

Zulu monument to their warriors who fell in battle at Isandhlwana. Although the Zulus won a great victory, it cost them dearly as around 2000 warriors were killed in the battle. ISANDHLWANA TODAY.

more numerous enemy skilled in hand-to-hand combat. This did not disprove the effects of rifle fire; to the contrary, the disciplined and accurate fire delivered by the British infantry at Isandhlwana was truly devastating and Zulu losses were severe. However, it did prove that firepower alone could not overcome poor command decisions, bad tactical dispositions and a courageous foe willing to accept heavy losses. Afghan Campaigns At the same time that the British Army was fighting the Zulus in southern Africa, it was simultaneously engaged in a war in Afghanistan. Britain's conquest of India provided the empire with tremendous wealth and prestige. By 1815, this crown jewel' was the cornerstone of a new empire destined to embrace the planet. However, in order for a small

30

island nation to control an area the size of India, massive expenditure and a heavy commitment of armed forces was necessary. From the earliest days of British involvement in India, the East India Company was given tremendous independence in its affairs, including providing for the defence of the colony. Large numbers of native troops were employed to defend the vast region and, indeed, native regiments greatly outnumbered British regiments. That system all changed in 1857 during the Indian Mutiny. Native troops turned on their British officers and in a spontaneous uprising massacred British civilians, endangering British rule in India more gravely than any threat before. Loyal regiments and British soldiers were eventually able to put down the uprising, but it left a lasting impact on how the colony was to be defended in the future. Although numerous native regiments had remained loyal, the British were forced to completely rethink their views on imperial

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Havildar, Madras Native Infantry (1820) A havildar was equivalent to a British sergeant, as designated by the chevrons on his right arm. All of the great empires of the colonial age relied heavily upon indigenous soldiers to defend and expand their

colonial

possessions. The first Madras regiments were organized by the British in the late eighteenth century and they were among the oldest Indian regiments in British service. The East India Company hired these Indian soldiers and controlled British troops assigned to the region as well. The East India Company handled affairs in India for the British Government, including

waging

war and making peace in the region. This arrangement collapsed after the Indian

Mutiny

of 1857 when many Indian regiments, mainly from the Bengal Army, revolted. After the suppression of the mutiny, the British Government dissolved the East India Company and established direct control over the colony. Even after the mutiny, though, Indian

regiments

remained an integral part of the defence of the colony.

31

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y defence. As a result, they deployed far larger numbers of British forces to the region to maintain order and defend the colony. The problem of defending India from outside threats was, in many ways, simplified by India's geography. The towering Himalaya mountains to the north and northeast of the colony represented an impenetrable barrier to any invasion from that direction, while the dense jungles of Burma and the lack of any threat from that area kept it secure. But the Northwest Frontier of India, which bordered Afghanistan, was a danger spot in the eyes of imperial planners. On the other side of Afghanistan lay the immense Russian Empire. The Russians had been expanding into Asia since the 1600s. By the nineteenth century, Russia's powerful position in Europe and its expansion into Central Asia was increasingly viewed as a threat. In British eyes, the importance of Afghanistan lay not in the country itself but in its proximity to India and the potential for Russian armies to appear on the border. Afghanistan was the glacis of fortress India and needed to be held or, at the very least, maintained as a friendly buffer state. Disaster and Withdrawal Early attempts by the British to intrude on the maelstrom of warring tribal factions in Afghanistan led to the First Afghan War of 1839-42. It was a disaster for the British, and led to the withdrawal of their forces from the country. In spite of this, the frontier remained relatively stable for the next three decades. Nevertheless, the British and Russians vied for influence in the region by alternately supporting and opposing various factions in Afghanistan, a power play that became known as the Great Game. In 1877, the Russians scored a coup when they established a mission with the new Afghan ruler, Shere Ali (1825-1879). The British responded by attempting to place a mission of their own with the Afghans, but Shere Ali rejected it, and then signed a formal treaty of friendship with the Russians in 1878. Increasingly fearful of Russian domination of the country, the British demanded that a legation of their own be seated in Kabul. When the Afghans refused, the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton (1831 -1891), ordered

the British armies under his control to invade Afghanistan and forcibly install a residency in the Afghan capital. Forces and Weapons The British Army in India was a formidable fighting force by 1878. The British infantry regiments were the backbone of the organization. However, the Sikh and Gurkha infantry regiments had fine reputations and would prove excellent soldiers in the Second Afghan War. The British soldiers had just begun adopting a more appropriate uniform at the time of the war. While the British soldiers who fought the Zulu War still wore the traditional scarlet, British forces in India had adopted khaki uniforms, or wore khaki overcoats over the top of their famous redcoats. They also used tea to stain their bright white pith helmets a darker colour, and thus they blended in far better in the dusty hills of Afghanistan.Although such measures could not be considered camouflage in the modern sense, they were still major improvements for the time. The French Army, for example, would still be wearing bright red trousers on active campaigns for another 35 years. British infantry carried the Martini-Henry rifle, while native regiments were equipped with the recently decommissioned Snider. This was in keeping with the policy of making sure that British regiments had better weaponry in the event of a repeat of the 1857 mutiny. It was also a cost-efficient way to muster large numbers of indigenous forces to support the campaign. British artillery in India was badly outdated, and Afghan guns tended to be as good as, or better than, their British counterparts. British and Indian cavalry would have their moments during the conflict, but throughout the Second Afghan War the real striking power of the British Army was the superb infantry. March on Kabul The advance on the Afghan capital of Kabul was led by Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts (1832-1914). Born in India, he was the son of a British officer and, by the time of the Second Afghan War in 1878, he had established a good reputation in the British Army, winning the Victoria Cross during the Great Mutiny. He displayed a

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y good knowledge of tactics, and demonstrated a generous spirit towards his men, who referred to him affectionately as 'Bobs'. Roberts' column was based in Peshawar, and advanced on Kabul by way of the Khyber Pass. He defeated the Afghans at Peiwar Kotal on 2 December 1878, and then occupied Kabul. Shere Ali fled to Russia, where he later died, and his son and successor Yakub Khan decided to make peace with the British by signing the Treaty of Gandamuk. By this agreement, Britain annexed territory from Afghanistan, and established an informal protectorate over that country. Major Sir PL.N. Cavagnari (1841-1879) was installed as the British Resident in Kabul, and then British forces were withdrawn back to India. Roberts feared that the withdrawal of British forces was premature.The main Afghan army had not been engaged and destroyed. The Afghans' resentment towards foreign intruders was In colonial campaigns regular infantry were required to navigate difficult terrain that would break up their battle formations. This schematic drawing, taken from a nineteenth century French manual, shows how infantry in line could traverse a defile by moving into single file columns, then returning to an attacking formation. M O V I N G THROUGH A DEFILE.

legendary, and many of them still basked in the glow of their victory over the British in 1842. Roberts believed that a more forceful demonstration of British power was needed to ensure Afghan compliance with the treaty. His misgivings proved accurate. Just two months after the treaty was signed, rebellious Afghan soldiers of the Herat tribe, despising the peace treaty and disdainful of Yakub Khan's rule, staged an uprising in Kabul. The rebels stormed the British mission and, after a brief but intense fight, slaughtered Cavagnari along with his escort of Indian guides. Back to Afghanistan Back in India, Lord Lytton's reaction was swift and bold. He ordered Roberts' column, which was the most intact from the original campaign, back into Afghanistan, with instructions to make the Afghans pay in blood for their treachery. Roberts moved through the Khyber Pass with unexpected ease, but endured constant sniping and small ambushes along the way to the Afghan capital. On the outskirts of Kabul, he encountered a large Afghan force, which he promptly outmanoeuvred and defeated at the battle of Charasia on 6 October 1879. He then marched triumphantly into the city,

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THE ROLE OF INFANTRY where he made the Afghan population feel the heavy hand of British rule, hanging 87 Afghans suspected of involvement in the murder of Cavagnari. The Afghans were not dissuaded by these actions, and Roberts fought a desperate battle of Sherpur in December 1879, repulsing a massive attack of Afghans. Guerrilla warfare then became the norm in the countryside of Afghanistan, and atrocity begat atrocity as the Afghans viciously fell upon outlying outposts and murdered British soldiers.

Roberts organized reprisals and ordered Afghan villages to be burned. Soldiers under Roberts' command, though not necessarily under his immediate direction, executed Afghans in retribution for the attack on the residency or for other atrocities committed during the campaign. Such measures were deemed reprehensible by Liberal politicians, as well as later historians, but for the soldiers who had seen the remains of their comrades horribly mutilated by the merciless Afghans, Roberts' actions were appropriate and, if anything, restrained. BrigadierGeneral Charles Gough (18321912) wrote home: 'There have been no atrocities, the executions that have taken place have been in retribution of the attack on the residency, or of people concerned in cutting up our wounded.' General Roberts' actions reflected the insoluble problem of counter-insurgency warfare. Indigenous forces committed unspeakable atrocities against the soldiers of colonial powers on a regular basis, yet what was the correct response to those actions? A harsh policy of retribution was the norm, but such a policy could alienate the civilian population even further from the conquering power. Rather than cowing the enemy into surrender, draconian measures often resulted in making the region even more hostile, and the population even more receptive to the entreaties of the insurgents, swelling their ranks with fresh recruits and FIELD MARSHAL SIR FREDERICK ROBERTS, 1ST EARL ROBERTS OF KANDAHAR.

Affectionately known as 'Bobs' to his troops, Roberts was born in India, the son of a career army officer. He was a brilliant tactician and master of colonial warfare.

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Private, 30th Bombay Native Infantry

(1880)

Like all Lndian soldiers in the Second Afghan War, this private is armed with the Lee-Snider rifle, an outdated breech-loader used to equip native regiments. After the Indian Mutiny the British were careful not to allow Lndian units to possess the same advanced weaponry as British soldiers. Even though the majority of Bombay regiments had remained loyal during the mutiny, they were subjected to this rule as well. The 30th Bombay Native Infantry had a large number of ill-trained recruits, and very few British officers attached to it. Even so, it served well in the early campaigns in Afghanistan. However at Maiwand in 1880, the regiment fell apart under the heavy shelling of Afghan artillery, and broke and fled from the battlefield. The regiment's retreat exposed the flank of the British force and set in motion the events that led to the disastrous British defeat there.

.

.ft

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y making the military problem even more difficult integrity of the empire itself, rested on the ability of than before. Heavy-handed actions could also the British Army to handle this crisis. arouse indignation at home and turn public opinion against the war. The British press was able to March to Kandahar provide a record of Roberts' actions and provoked Lieutenant-General Donald Stewart (1824-1900) criticism of his handling of the campaign. was organizing the withdrawal from Kabul when news of the disaster arrived. He formed a relief The executions caused a stir back in London, column and placed Roberts in charge, with which the Liberal opposition exploited in their orders to march from Kabul to Kandahar and save political campaign in 1879- William Gladstone made Major-General Primrose's command. It was a Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli's policy of dangerous situation. Roberts would have to march aggressive imperial expansion a major issue in the campaign, and the defeat at 480km (300 miles) with no Isandhlwana, the massacre supplies other than those 'If any prisoners have been in Kabul and Roberts' which his column carried 'excesses' in putting down and what it could scrounge shot, I can only say it was a from the countryside, for the Afghans were all cited as the bloody price of a failed Kabul was to be abandoned mistake making them foreign policy. Gladstone and the remainder of the pronounced the invasion of prisoners, [the Afghans] never British forces withdrawn, Afghanistan to be a 'war even while Roberts made spare.... They are the most with dishonour', insisting his arduous march. that Britain had no right to Nevertheless, morale was bloodthirsty villains going.' invade Afghanistan. high. The soldiers had been informed that they were The criticism stung - BRIGADIER-GENERAL GOUGH, LETTER setting out to save their Roberts, w h o thought that fellow British and imperial his actions in Kabul had soldiers, and also that they were not to garrison been mild, considering what he believed should Kandahar but would be returning to India once have been done in retribution for Cavagnari, as the mission was complete. well as for the debacle of 1842. That sentiment was shared by the majority of the men and officers of Roberts had a handful of cavalry and a f e w the British Army serving in India and Afghanistan. artillery batteries, but the strength of his column But the public back home looked with disdain on lay in his elite infantry regiments. The 92nd such 'barbarous' practices. The Liberals w o n a Gordon Highlanders and 72nd Seaforth majority, and Gladstone became the new prime Highlanders were both battle-hardened outfits, minister, much to the dismay of the British Army in t w o of the finest regiments in the British Army. Afghanistan. Gladstone decided to negotiate a Armed with Martini-Henry rifles, they were a peace with the Afghans and promised to withdraw superbly equipped and trained force. Along with all British forces from Afghanistan. them came the native contingents composed of Then disaster struck: a British column operating Indians, Sikhs and Gurkhas. out of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan was Although, as per British policy, native regiments ambushed and an entire British brigade wiped out did not carry the latest weaponry, their Lee-Snider in the disastrous battle of Maiwand. The survivors rifles were still good weapons, and the men that fled to Kandahar, where with the rest of the city's carried them were loyal, well trained and ferocious garrison, under the command of Major-General fighters. Roberts would later write of the 'fierce Primrose, they were promptly besieged by a large OPPOSITE: PEIWAR K O T A L . The 5th Gurkha Rifles and force of Afghans. Britain's withdrawal from 72nd Seaforth Highlanders storm Afghan defences Afghanistan n o w had the makings of a rout to it, at the battle of Peiwar Kotal during the Second and the prestige of the empire, perhaps the Afghan War.

36

T H E R O L E OF I N F A N T R Y

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y warrior races' that were natural soldiers in his native infantry regiments, a reference to the Sikhs and Gurkhas. All told, they made a colourful lot, reflecting the strength of the British Army, and some observers pronounced Roberts' column to be nothing less than the finest Anglo-Indian force ever put together for a campaign. The column set off on the march to Kandahar on 8 August 1880. Thanks to favourable alliances with Afghan tribal leaders w h o were as anxious to see the British go

38

as they were to deal a blow against Ayub Khan, their rival for power in Afghanistan, there was no significant Afghan resistance to the march. That said, the column was occasionally subjected to random attacks by guerrilla forces that hovered around the flanks and tail of the column. The main problem was thus not enemy forces, but the gruelling conditions endured by the men along the march. The advance was made in blistering heat. Although food and fodder could usually be

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y found or purchased from the locals, fresh water was in short supply for much of the march. Temperatures hovered around 35°C (95°F) throughout the long advance, and the dense cloud of dust raised by the marching column as it pounded south through the bleak countryside choked men and animals. The chronic water shortage turned each day's march into a test of endurance. Roberts tried to alleviate this somewhat by beginning the daily slog in the pre-

dawn darkness and halting around noon, but the hard fact was that there was no escaping the blistering heat and thirst which dogged each man. Roberts moved his column at a fierce pace, at times covering as much as 34km (21 miles) in a single day. Supporters claimed his haste was based upon his desire to save the garrison at Kandahar. Less generous critics countered that he was trying to outdistance a second relief column under Major-General Robert Phayre, who had also been dispatched to relieve Kandahar. In fact, some observers dubbed the dual relief marches the Race for the Peerage'. In reality, Roberts was probably motivated by both duty and a quest for glory, motivations that were hardly a vice in a soldier of empire. Heatstroke and disease weakened the force along its arduous path, and at times there was some confusion in the column, leading to delays, but there was little straggling in spite of the conditions. Part of this was because Roberts had a force of soldiers deployed at the rear of the column to keep any stragglers from wandering. Camp followers and indigenous workers helping with the supply wagons were the worst offenders, but very few soldiers fell out of the march. These men were veterans and, besides their discipline, they all knew what fate awaited a straggler in the hills of Afghanistan. The fear of a death that would be as certain as it was hideous kept many a man moving forwards on the march to Kandahar. The Battle of Kandahar: 1 September 1880 At last, Roberts' column reached the village of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, about 80km (50 miles) from Kandahar. There it rendezvoused with a small British garrison, obtained ample supplies of water and food, and enjoyed the first real halt since the march had begun. While his army rested, Roberts received news that Ayub Khan had learned of the relief column and had consequently lifted the siege of Kandahar and withdrawn his army to a defensive position in the hills west of the city. Roberts was pleased that Ayub Khan was British Royal Horse Artillery retreat during the battle of Maiwand. British artillery was often outclassed by Afghan gunners during the Second Afghan War. GUNNERS WITHDRAW.

39

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Private, 2nd Gurkhas

(1880) This is a Gurkha of General Roberts' Kabul-Kandahar diminutive

Field Force. The

Gurkhas were recruited from

their native Nepal to serve in the British Army. They were superb infantry with a well-earned reputation for ferocity on the battlefield. They were absolutely loyal to the British, which they demonstrated during the Indian Mutiny of 1857, which they helped suppress. In Afghanistan the Gurkhas were armed with the Martini-Henry

rifle, the same weapon

carried by British infantry, a testament to their loyalty. Gurkha infantry also carried a large curved knife, the famous kukri, which ivas worn in a scabbard attached to the back of the belt. The Gurkhas preferred the kukri over a bayonet for close-quarter combat, and made good use of the weapon at Kandahar, where the battle ivas decided by hand-to-hand

40

fighting.

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y apparently offering battle. He absorbed the stone houses loop-holed and prepared for garrison at Khelat-i-Chilzai into his column and defence.There was thus only one way to clear the then moved his reinforced army at a much more village, and that was at the point of a bayonet.The leisurely pace. He entered Kandahar unopposed big Scotsmen and small Gurkhas made for an odd on 31 August, having covered 480km (300 miles) pairing, but together they were the finest infantry in just three weeks. in the world. Pressing home their attack through a Roberts was senior in rank to Primrose and so hail of Afghan rifle fire, they closed with the assumed command of the British forces in enemy in hand-to-hand combat. Afghan resistance Kandahar. On 31 August, he sent out a was broken by 10.30 and the village fell to the reconnaissance in force west of the city, and the British. Without a moment's hesitation, the 1st probe revealed that the strength of the Afghan Brigade recommenced its advance, rushing on to forces was concentrated to continue the turning deny passage through the movement. Baba Wali Pass in the centre. 'When you 're wounded and Meanwhile to the south, Roberts therefore dismissed the 2nd Brigade, consisting left on Afghanistan's plains, the idea of a drive up the of the 2nd Sikhs and the centre. He opted instead for 72nd Seaforth Highlanders, And the women come out to a turning movement against met stiffer resistance at the Afghans' right flank. He Gundigan. They had first cut up what remains, would then sweep around to advance through a maze fest roll to your rifle and blow of walled orchards and the ridgeline and drive north up the western irrigation ditches, which out your brains slopes to stormAyub Khan's were easily defended and camp. Ayub apparently broke up the momentum of An' go to your Gawd like noticed the potential the attack. The 72nd's a soldier.' weakness of his position, commanding officer was for during the night of 31 felled by an Afghan bullet, - RUDYARD KIPLING, August he strongly but the regiment pushed reinforced the villages of on. Once more, the issue 'THE YOUNG BRITISH SOLDIER' Gundimullah Sahibdad and was decided not by rifle Gundigan, which anchored fire but by bayonets in his right flank. close-quarter fighting. The Afghans could not hold Gundigan either, and by 11.15 it too had fallen to the British. The Assault Begins At 9-30 a.m. on 1 September 1880, British heavy artillery began pounding the Afghan positions dominating the Baba Wali. As the British guns duelled the Afghan artillery, Roberts sent a force of Indians in a feint attack towards the Baba Wali Pass. With the attention of the Afghans fixed on this point, he sent his powerful infantry contingent of three brigades in an attack on the Afghan right flank. The 1st Brigade, composed of the 92nd Gordon Highlanders and the 2nd Gurkhas, attacked the village of Gundimullah Sahibdad. The Afghans were strongly established in the stone houses of the village and put up a stiff fight. Rifle fire was ineffective against an enemy in

The two attacking infantry brigades rounded the right flank of the Afghans' defensive line, pausing only briefly to organize before rushing into the attack against the village of Pir Paimal, the last bastion between them and their objective. Without artillery support, the infantry had to go it alone and once more the decision was made to rush the Afghans and seize the fortified village at bayonet point. In a f e w desperate moments, the fight was over and the British infantry brigades found themselves in possession of the village. Roberts' flanking attack had been successful and, indeed, had unhinged the entire Afghan position. He n o w ordered his 3rd Brigade, previously kept in

41

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY

Battle of Kandahar 1880 As the British prepared to withdraw their army from Afghanistan, a column was ambushed and wiped out at Maiwand.The survivors fled back to Kandahar where they and the British garrison were besieged by an Afghan army under Ayub Khan. The British high command feared that the defeat and impending disaster at Kandahar could turn the planned British withdrawal into a rout. Therefore Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts was ordered to take a column of British and Indian troops from Kabul and relieve the garrison in Kandahar. On 8 August 1880 Roberts began an epic march in which he covered 480km (300 miles) in three weeks. Just before the arrival of Roberts at Kandahar, the Afghans raised their siege and retired to a strong defensive position along a ridgeline to the west. On 1 September Roberts began his attack with a diversion against the Baba Wali Pass, which controlled the road west. With the Afghans engaged, he then sent his assault force in a flanking movement. The infantry brigades stormed a pair of fortified villages, Gundimullah Sahibdad and Gundigan, followed by the village of Pir Paimal.The British then overran the camp of Ayub Khan and routed his army.

AFGHANIS^ PERSIA

KABUL KANDAHAR BRITISH INDIA

Kandahar is one of the main cities in Afghanistan and the key to control of the southern region of the country.

42

The Afghans' resistance evaporates and they are routed from the field. Though the British cavalry pursuit is weak and ineffectual, the Afghan army has suffered a severe defeat.

5

T H E R O L E OF

BABA WALI VILLAGE

INFANTRY

4

The British infantry brigades, including Scots, Sikhs and Gurkhas, charge through a hail of musketry and cannon fire to storm the final Afghan position.

B A B A W A L I PASS

Both infantry brigades turn north and assault the village of Pir Paimal, which falls after a fierce struggle, thus turning the flank of the Afghan army. >

3 PAIMAL

mris N•

WWW*

Roberts sends a force of Indian infantry against the fortified Baba Wali Pass to distract attention from his main assault against the Afghan right flank.,

1

GUNlfiMffUiH S VIIMFWB' • 1 *

GlNDrGAN BRITISH

CANTONMENT In the main assault, two | British infantry brigades ' storm the villages of Gundimullah Sahibdad and Gundigan in bitter hand-to-hand fighting, then rush onwards

2

around the Afghan flank.

43

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

The 92nd was one of the finest regiments in the British Army of the Victorian era, and the Scotsmen added to their reputation during the Second Afghan War.

T H E 9 2 N D HIGHLANDERS AT K A N D A H A R .

reserve, forward to Pir Paimal to provide a fresh force for the final drive into the heart of the Afghan position and the seizure of Ayub Khan's camp. Highlander Assault The British forces were by now exhausted, but they faced a final defensive line that was the strongest of all. An elongated ditch was held in strength and backed up by a fort and a small knoll, swarming with Afghan regulars and supported by powerful artillery. This included the heavy guns deployed along the Baba Wali, which were now swung round and trained on the British infantry brigades. The best Afghan infantry units defended this final position, and unlike the mass of irregulars routed from the previous villages, they were armed with better weaponry, including captured Lee-Snider and Martini-Henry rifles. Major George

44

White (1835-1912), who would eventually become a field marshal of the British Army, now seized the moment and led the 92nd Highlanders forward in a wild charge. They were closely followed by the 2nd Gurkhas and the 23rd Bengal Native Infantry They moved swiftly through a hail of rifle fire and bursting shells, overrunning the Afghan defensive positions in such a bold attack that the enemy was completely unnerved. As the infantry drove into Ayub Khan's camp, the Afghan position collapsed and the battle was lost. Ayub Khan's army began streaming off the battlefield, and should have been decimated by pursuing British cavalry, but the British horse were poorly handled in this battle and failed to pursue properly. The brunt of the battle had been borne by the hard-marching and hard-fighting infantry, which had been at the heart of the action from the opening march out of Kabul to the final denouement at Kandahar. Roberts was showered with accolades and medals, and emerged from the campaign as one of the greatest generals of the

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y British Army. His arduous march and triumphant victory silenced his critics and, already beloved of his troops, made him one of the great heroes of the Victorian age. The battle of Kandahar ended the Second Afghan War on a high note for the British and allowed them to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan with honour. They had proven once more that discipline and training could overcome numbers, and that their armies were capable of undertaking large-scale incursions into the most desolate and isolated reaches of the earth. Unlike in the Zulu War, British infantry had relied far more upon shock action than rifle fire to decide battles. This had worked against an ill-trained opponent of roughly equal strength. At Kandahar, the training, discipline and courage of the British infantry to close with the enemy in hand-to-hand combat were the factors that decided the day. Still unresolved, however, was the harder problem of h o w to subdue a region and assert a colonial power's authority over a tribal society whose hatred for foreigners was exceeded only by their hatred of their rival tribesmen. Britain kept the Northwest Frontier out of unfriendly hands, but a long-term solution to the quandary of Afghanistan remained beyond the reach of even the greatest imperial power of the nineteenth century.

had become masters of fighting colonial wars.The major problems in such conflicts usually revolved around logistics and the ability to project British military power into the farthest reaches of the globe. The battlefield was rarely the problem setting aside notable setbacks like Isandhlwana. The superior leadership, training, discipline and weaponry of the British infantry allowed them to overcome vast numbers of indigenous forces lacking in those essentials. However, the string of victories racked up by the British Army in the latter half of the nineteenth century inspired a false confidence in its military tactics. Weaponry was evolving dramatically in this era, and the introduction of the magazine-fed

The Boer Wars As the great century of imperial expansion began to wane, weapons technology was beginning to disseminate. Native Americans, Afghans, Abyssinians and Sudanese w e r e among many indigenous forces now equipped with firearms and cannon, though their quality remained inferior and their troops' training poor. By 1899, the British Army Botha was a charismatic leader and the principal Boer commander in the Second Boer War. He eventually made peace with the British and later became the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa. GENERAL LOUIS BOTHA.

45

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y bolt-action rifle dramatically increased the amount of firepower available to the infantryman of the age. While such advanced weaponry remained beyond the reach of most indigenous forces, one group was to acquire these weapons and use them to deadly effect against the British in the largest and bloodiest colonial conflict waged in the era the Second Boer War of 1899-1902. The Boers (the Dutch word for 'farmers') were the original white settlers in South Africa, having arrived in the 1600s during the first great age of European exploration and colonization. The British took the region from Holland during the Napoleonic Wars, and brought British rule, but f e w British settlers, to the region. The Dutch inhabitants accepted this state of affairs until the 1830s, when Britain outlawed slavery throughout the empire. The Dutch refused to comply and thus ' W H I T E TRIBE OF AFRICADescendants of Dutch settlers, the Boers were devoutly religious, and learned to ride and shoot from an early age. They lacked discipline, but were formidable adversaries.

46

began the Great Trek as they migrated into the heart of southern Africa. They encountered powerful warrior tribes and had to fight every step of the way. Out of necessity, Boer men were trained from childhood to ride and shoot, and they made formidable opponents for the African tribes they encountered. British attempts to bring the Boers back under British rule failed. When force was used in the First Boer War, the British suffered a stunning defeat at Majuba Hill in 1881, where Boers armed with rifles but no heavy weapons routed a powerful British force from its hilltop position.The resulting peace treaty recognized Boer independence and the Boers eventually formed two separate nations, the Republic of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. They might have been left alone, were it not for the discovery of vast amounts of gold in their new nations. This, along with the diamonds they also found, made the Boers very wealthy indeed. Leading British imperialists such as Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902) cast covetous eyes upon the wealth

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY

of the Boers and began to set in motion events to provoke a war, its aim being to bring the Boer wealth into their own hands.

The superior infantry tactics of the Boers helped them inflict a series of shocking defeats on the British Army in the opening stages of the Second Boer War.

Boer Weapons and Tactics The Boers recognized the danger from Britain and spent money throughout the 1890s purchasing modern weaponry, including artillery, from various European powers.Their artillery would prove to be very good during the coming conflict, but it was the Mauser rifles they purchased from Germany that made the Boers such formidable soldiers. Already expert riflemen, the Boers found in the Mauser Ml889 a superb weapon, ideal for their style of fighting. With a five-shot magazine and reliable bolt action, the Mauser fired a heavy 8mm (0.3in) round with deadly accuracy. On the open veldt of southern Africa, the Boers were able to deliver lethally accurate rifle fire at incredible distances. Virtually every Boer rode to battle on horseback, but they did not fight as cavalry. Instead, they fought as mounted infantry. Riding into position, they dismounted to engage the enemy. With their horses tethered nearby, they could easily remount and manoeuvre quickly to take advantage of an enemy mistake, seal off an enemy breakthrough or make a rapid withdrawal if necessary. They were trained to fight in

dispersed open order and make good use of natural cover, firing from concealed positions. They relied heavily upon the firepower of their rifles to stop an enemy attack or support their own advance, rarely seeking to engage in close combat. Such tactics, combined with superb marksmanship and a naturally aggressive fighting nature, made the Boers some of the finest infantry in the world. By anyone's estimation, the 'White Tribe of Africa', as the Boers were sometimes known, made a formidable opponent. The Boers did have their weaknesses, however. Unlike other indigenous armies that had fought the British, the Boers were heavily outnumbered by their British opponents. They were a fiercely democratic society, and did not readily lend themselves to military discipline. Boer commandos (militia units) were difficult to control, and at times would leave a battlefield on their own initiative, heedless of their commanding general's orders. They were also about to engage in a full-scale war against one of the Great Powers of Europe. Britain had global reach, undisputed control of the sea lanes and the ability to take the battle right

BRINGING IN BRITISH PRISONERS.

47

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y into the heart of the Boer republics. With the resources of a massive empire behind them, the British held significant advantages at the strategic level of warfare. However, at the operational level, Boer generals would prove themselves to be wily adversaries, and at the tactical level, the Boer mounted infantry would reveal themselves to be tough and tenacious opponents.

Methuen was courageous, but he was also a career staff officer w h o had never before held a field command. He denigrated the abilities of the Boers, dismissing them as a bunch of Dutch farmers w h o would scatter under the impact of regular British soldiers. The reality, he would soon discover, was very different.The Boers fought from entrenched positions, in some cases with barbed- wire entanglements in front of them. Methuen's tactic was to attack such positions Boers Strike First head-on. He bunched his infantry into dense column With war imminent, the Boers struck the first formation, intent on crashing blow, invading the Britishthrough the defences and held areas of South Africa. closing with the bayonet. In short order, they cut off 'We are not interested in and besieged British forces The Boers stood their the possibilities of defeat; holding the strategic cities ground, and delivered of Kimberley, Mafeking and deadly Mauser fire that they do not exist.' Ladysmith. Fortunately for shredded the ranks of the British, a powerful army attacking soldiers. Then, just — QUEEN VICTORIA, SPEAKING IN of over 47,000 soldiers, as the British had at last DECEMBER 1899, DURING 'BLACK WEEK' including some of the waded through the hail of finest regiments in the bullets to close, the Boers British Army, was already en disengaged, mounted their route when the Boers invaded. The force was horses and rode away. The pattern was repeated at under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir other battles as the Boers bled the British advance, Redvers Buller (1839- 1908), a hardened and at Magersfontein the Boers set up a final line to campaigner with over 40 years of experience resist any further British advances. Methuen hurled fighting in the colonial wars that had built and the elite Highland Brigade into a frontal attack defended the vast British Empire. The Second Boer against the entrenched Boer riflemen ensconced War should have been the crowning achievement behind barbed-wire barricades.The Scotsmen were of Buller's splendid career. Instead, it would be his massacred and the survivors were driven into an ruin. For in South Africa Buller would find an ignominious retreat. The Boers were proving that opponent far different from any he had they had mastered a new form of warfare, which encountered, and he w o u l d be continually would be repeated on a much larger scale, and frustrated in his efforts to bring this enemy to with even more horrific results, on the battlefields heel. of the Western Front in World War I. Methuen would not be the last general to attempt to With his forces landed, Buller launched them overcome barbed wire and rifle fire with the forwards under the blazing sun of southern Africa. bodies of his infantry. Buller sent a column of 8000 troops under Lord Methuen (1845-1932) to raise the siege of Kimberley, where no less a personage than Cecil Rhodes was besieged. The column was then to proceed to Mafeking and raise that siege as well. Meanwhile, Buller would take the main army through Natal, force the Tugela River and relieve Ladysmith. However, there was precious little communication and no coordination between the t w o widely separated forces.

48

Colenso and Black Week' Meanwhile, Buller, w h o knew next to nothing of Methuen's defeats, attempted to cross the Tugela River and relieve Ladysmith. With the larger force, and a much shorter distance to go, Buller was confident of an early success. He was badly mistaken. At Colenso on 15 December 1899, his troops experienced what Methuen's had already

I mil

m

i

n

i

^

,

1

—

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY

Boer Soldier

(1900) Organized into 'commandos' named after their home town or district, Boers wore their civilian clothes, rather than a military uniform, even during the conventional war phase of the Second Boer War. The broadbrimmed hat worn by this Boer is typical of the early-war period, while later in the war the Boers tended to pin up one side. Young Boers were clean-shaven; however, the older they were, the more facial hair they sported. This Boer is armed with a German-made Mauser Ml895 rifle and carries his ammunition in his pockets. The magazine-fed bolt-action Mauser was lethal in the hands of the Boers, who were superb marksmen. Boers fought as mounted infantry. They rode to the scene of battle but then dismounted and fought on foot, making good use of entrenchments and barbed wire to defend their positions. After the defeat of their main armies, the Boers resorted to guerrilla warfare, in which their individual initiative, skill with weapons and mobility made them formidable opponents.

49

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y Roberts of Kandahar, w h o was appointed the new General Officer Commanding British forces in South Africa. Buller, meanwhile, was demoted, essentially to the position of a wing commander, controlling British forces in Natal. Buller accepted the death knell of his career with stoic calm. As for Roberts, he found no joy in his new assignment. He was taking over a losing campaign, and knew that he had to bring order from the chaos and win this war swiftly or suffer the same fate as Buller. And as if these problems were not already daunting enough, Roberts sailed to South Africa with a heavy heart: his only son had been killed in action at Colenso.

DEFENSIVE POSITION. Royal Munster Fusiliers at Honey Nest Kloof, south of Kimberley, South Africa. Trenches and high casualties suffered by attacking infantry were hallmarks of the Second Boer War.

encountered - namely, the ferocious accuracy and apparent invincibility of entrenched Boer riflemen. Unlike Methuen, however, Buller broke off the attack before his men were massacred. He then deftly disengaged from the Boers and withdrew to a solid position to regroup and reassess the situation. The repulse at Colenso was the culmination of the infamous black week' of 10-17 December 1899, a period of traumatic defeats and heavy casualties suffered against what had been deemed an inferior foe. Nor did the British have anything tangible to show for the losses. For his part, Buller was confident he could recover the situation, but London was not. He was replaced by Lord 'Bobs'

50

Spion K o p Buller was determined to redeem himself by breaking through to Ladysmith. Roberts recognized the necessity to strike a blow across the Tugela, and therefore sent reinforcements to Natal. By mid-January 1900, Buller had gathered a force of over 30,000 troops. He believed this force was more than sufficient to break through the Boer defensive line along the Tugela and reach Ladysmith, which was 32km (20 miles) away. Buller determined to make a turning movement against the Boers' right flank, but inexplicably decided to delegate command of this vital operation to Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Warren (1840-1927), rather than taking command of the operation himself. He directed Warren to advance up the main road and seize Tabanyama Hill, thus turning the Boer flank. When that was done, he would launch the rest of the army forward. At this point, he believed, the Boer line would collapse and Ladysmith would be relieved. There were problems from the outset. Warren moved very slowly, and the Boer army was

THE ROLE OF INFANTRY commanded by one of their most skilled leaders, General Louis Botha (1862-1919), who shifted his troops to meet the thrust. By the time Warren launched his attack on Tabanyama, the Boers held the hill in strength and knocked back his clumsy frontal assaults. Buller was furious with Warren over the delays and now the repulse, and ordered him to resume the attack immediately. Warren demurred, saying that the Boer right was too strongly held. He argued for the attack to be launched in Buller's sector, a suggestion that was rejected. At length, the two men reached a compromise and decided to have Warren attempt to break the Boer position along the Tugela by taking a hill right of the centre of the Boer line, which was known as Spion Kop. Spion Kop, or Spy's Hill', was the highest point of ground in Botha's defence line. It was obviously a critical position, but neither Buller nor Warren developed a clear idea about what to do with it once they had it. It could serve as the focal point of an attack to rupture the Boer line, leading to a SPION KOP. General Louis Botha's Tugela Line was anchored in the centre by this hill, known as Spion Kop. In 1900 it saw a bloody attempt by the British to crack the Boer defences and relieve Ladysmith.

general breakthrough. Alternatively, it could be taken and fortified, turned into a thorn in the side of the Boer position. Botha would not be able to maintain the integrity of his defensive line with such a position in the hands of the British and would have to launch immediate counter-attacks up its steep slopes, where he would suffer heavy losses against a properly entrenched British force. British Assault In the foggy darkness of the night of 23/24 January 1900, a British brigade led by Major-General Edward Woodgate (1845-1901) crossed the Tugela and advanced up the slope of Spion Kop. The force surprised and easily brushed aside the small Boer garrison there.Then, taking a leaf from the Boers' book, Woodgate ordered a small team of sappers that had accompanied the infantry brigade to dig a trench to shelter the riflemen. Labouring in the darkness, the sappers tried to construct a proper fighting position, but the rocky soil proved hard going. In the end, the trench' they dug was barely a few inches deep. To make matters worse, as light broke on an abysmally hot summer day it was revealed that the British had occupied only one of the three main peaks of Spion Kop, and that

51

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

Private, British Infantry (1900) This British soldier's uniform, is khaki, as the famous redcoat was no longer worn in the field, but his pith helmet is only slightly modified from the time of the Zulu War. He is armed with the magazine-fed boltaction Lee-Metford rifle, which was the principal

rifle used by British

infantry

in the Second Boer War. The LeeMetford was the equal of the Boers' Mauser, but British

infantry

tactics were outmoded. In the early battles they attacked in dense formations

over open

ground, made little use of marching fire, and failed to properly coordinate

artillery

support. This resulted in disastrous defeats. But the British infantry adapted quickly, learned to advance in open formation,

take

advantage of natural cover, and maintain proper fire support for their advances.

52

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y In spite of the opportunities offered by they were badly exposed to fire from either of possession of Spion Kop, as well as the desperate the other crests should the Boers decide to make situation confronting the troops there, neither use of them. Warren nor Buller were in any hurry to assist. To General Botha recognized the danger if the make matters worse, Major-General Woodgate and a British exploited their hold on Spion Kop, and number of other senior officers had been killed in shifted artillery to the location. His mounted action. There was thus considerable confusion infantry w e r e quick to arrive as well. They about w h o exactly was in command on Spion Kop. occupied the higher ground overlooking the A desperate plea was semaphored to Warren: British position and began to pour a heavy weight Reinforce at once or all is lost. General dead.' of artillery shell and Mauser fire onto the position. Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Thorneycroft then The shallow trench was worthless against fire assumed command. from above, and British soldiers began to fall thick Warren could not be 'In the shallow trenches where moved to launch a n e w and fast. Although the Boers were inflicting heavy attack against Tabanyama [the British] had fought the losses on the British forces, Hill to relieve pressure on Botha believed he had to soldiers lay dead in swathes, Spion Kop, nor could he evict the British from Spion bring himself to commit his and in places they were piled full force to the battle. He Kop before their high command recognized and did send a reinforced three deep.' exploited this golden infantry brigade to help out opportunity to shatter his at Spion Kop. Meanwhile, — DENEYS REITZ, BOER SOLDIER fragile line. Buller, following the battle AT SPION KOP through dispatches, sent runners forward to The 'Murderous Acre' promote Thorneycroft and Boer infantry swarmed into place him in overall command of the beleaguered the attack, racing up the hill towards the British. British force on the summit. In some ways it was a The British infantry, having suffered under galling decision that made sense, but once again it fire for some time with no way to respond, delegated responsibility for the conduct of the welcomed this opportunity to hit back. They battle to a subordinate. N o w the battle hinged on unleashed a deadly fire from their Lee-Metford and the decisions of a lieutenant-colonel w h o was not Lee-Enfield rifles, which staggered the Boer assault in full contact with his superior headquarters and force. Still, the Boers came on and in the end had w h o had no authority to acquire reinforcements to be repelled in hand-to-hand combat. But or properly conduct the battle beyond the amazingly the British held and the Boers retreated. immediate tactical situation on the hill. Indeed, some of the Dutchmen w e r e so demoralized by the repulse and the heavy losses that many commandos wandered off, convinced that the British position on the hill was impregnable. In spite of this tactical success, all the British had to show for their victory was the same bad position they had been in since morning. The trench that was supposed to shelter them had become a charnel house, littered with shattered bodies. Since the area they occupied was approximately one acre (0.4 hectares) of ground, the blood-soaked position would later be dubbed the 'Murderous Acre'.

N o Surrender Thorneycroft was, in fact, exercising command before Buller's message ever arrived, and he needed all his skills to hold the command together. As the Boer gunfire, as well as the brutally hot African sun, beat down upon his men, small groups began to wave white flags and attempted to surrender. Thorneycroft swiftly intervened, cursing both his men and the Boers w h o advanced to accept the surrender, telling them that he was in command and that there would be no capitulation

53

T H E ROLE OF

INFANTRY

Battle of Spion Kop 1900 General Sir Redvers Buller moved north to raise the siege of Ladysmith but found his advance blocked by a strong Boer defensive line along the Tugela River. He attacked and was defeated at the battle of

Botha recognizes the danger Jmt posed by the British occupation of Spion Kop to his defensive position along the Tugela River. He moves infantry and artillery to the scene and occupies high ground i »Werlooking the British position.

Colenso in December 1899. Buller then regrouped and in January tried again. Frustrated, Buller decided to break the Tugela Line by capturing a hill in the centre of the Boer position known as Spion Kop. British forces seized the hill in a night attack. The British attempted to entrench and turn their position into a stronghold, but the rocky soil made their efforts futile. To make matters worse, daylight revealed that the British position was overlooked by three pieces of high ground, all soon occupied by the Boers. The Boer forces delivered murderous fire on the British. Nevertheless, the British attempted to capture the Boer positions overlooking their entrenchments, but they were repulsed. After repeated attacks and counter-attacks by both sides, the British ran low on water and ammunition. As darkness fell, the exhausted British, with no orders from headquarters, withdrew.

KOP

DURBAN

Spion Kop is a hill north of the Tugela River in South Africa, which the British needed to cross to raise the Boer siege of Lady smith.

54

^

J iifL

fife"! « i British General Buller v A orders General Warren ,t«Y break the Tugela Line by capturing Spion Kop. Warren sends an infantry brigade in a night attack that drives off the Boer garrison on Spion Kop. The British infantry

T H E ROLE OF

INFANTRY

A* T o LADYSMITH

BOTHA'S

from the h convinced are losing the

The Boers unleash a torrent of rifle and artillery fire on the exposed British position which becomes known as the 'Murderous Acre'

3

H Q

TWIN

4

The Boers launch a major attack to drive the British off Spion Kop but are repulsed.

The British \ receive modestX reinforcements and \ \ counter-attack, but fail to seize the dominant hilltops overlooking their lines, and retire back into their exposed position.

5

LYTTELTON

Exhausted and low on water, British forces on Spion Kop withdraw on their own initiative without permission from the high command, not knowing that the Boers have alreadys given up the fight.

7

BIJLLER'S H Q

FL

THE ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y this day. When the reinforced brigade arrived, Thorneycroft was able to launch a series of local counter-attacks against the surrounding high ground, inflicting heavy loss on the Boers. However, he received no communication from Warren regarding the general's ultimate plans. As darkness BRITISH SIGNAL TROOPS USING A HELIOGRAPH. The heliograph sent messages in Morse code by means of flashing sunlight off a reflecting mirror. The heliograph was a very effective method for field communication in the age before wireless radio.

56

drew near, the Boers made one more assault and got within close range, almost overrunning his position before at last being thrown back. Premature Withdrawal With his men low on ammunition and water, and nearing a state of complete exhaustion, Thorneycroft abruptly ordered a withdrawal from the hill under cover of darkness. Unbeknownst to him, Warren was at last moving his main force towards the summit of Spion Kop, having resolved to take advantage of the breakthrough. Also unknown to Thorneycroft, the Boers had had enough. Having suffered heavy casualties in their attempts to dislodge the British, they now began to drift off. The battle had actually been won by the British, but Thorneycroft now threw away this success with his decision to withdraw and leave the field to the Boers. It was a defeat that was as embarrassing as it was costly. British casualties amounted to approximately 1500 while the Boers lost 335. Lord Roberts severely reprimanded both Buller and Warren. Thorneycroft was also heavily criticized, but was excused by that fact that, in Roberts' opinion, he should never have been placed in a position of authority where he could have ordered the withdrawal. Certainly, the British high command had failed miserably at Spion Kop. But in addition, tactical mistakes had also greatly contributed to the eventual defeat. The British infantry had failed to properly dig in, and their tactical positions were poorly chosen. They had nonetheless put up a magnificent fight under the most trying of conditions and had, in fact, won the hill, only to see their officers throw it all away. Thorneycroft could perhaps be forgiven since he had been thrust into command of a desperate fight and left without direction from higher headquarters. However, Warren and Buller's • -- handling of the battle was dreadful. They had no clear plan from the outset as to what they wanted to accomplish, failed to recognize tactical opportunities and failed to do

T H E ROLE OF I N F A N T R Y

The British position atop Spion Kop offered little protection from Boer gunfire, and by the end of the battle the British dead lay in heaps in the shallow scraping that became their grave. T H E 'MURDEROUS A C R E ' .

enough to support the force on Spion Kop. Indeed, an army of over 30,000 British soldiers mainly stood idle while a force of essentially two infantry brigades fought the decisive action. That they still almost w o n the battle was a testament to the skill, courage and endurance of the common British soldier. After Spion Kop, Buller would eventually bash his way through to Ladysmith, relying on the heavy numerical superiority of his force and never displaying any real finesse in handling operations. The British were able to defeat the Boers through weight of numbers and materiel. A final victory would elude them for some time since the Boers ceased conventional operations and began a

protracted guerrilla war against the British. This would result in many horrors enacted by and against the guerrilla forces, which forever stained the conflict. If the early phase of the Second Boer War heralded the trenches of World War I, the guerrilla conflict of the latter stages was a grave portent of the bloody colonial wars of the twentieth century. The evolving nature of warfare and the mass dissemination of advanced infantry weaponry to otherwise impoverished peoples, tied in with the rise of nationalism in Africa and Asia and the decline of the European order, resulted in a complete change in the balance of p o w e r between infantry of the colonial empires and their indigenous opponents. Yet in the great age of colonialism it was the infantry of the imperial powers that had held sway on the battlefield and which built and maintained the vast empires of that bygone age.

57

CHAPTER 2

MOUNTED WARFARE In the years from 1776 to 1914, the horse brought the soldier equipped to use it one vital asset: mobility. That alone was worth all the difficulties and expense posed by the horse's presence in warfare, and explains all variations of the mounted warrior, from the heavy dragoon of the British Army in the American War of Independence, to the Cheyenne 'Dog Soldiers' leading the Colorado Militia into long, exhausting and fruitless pursuits. Kitchener's lancers and Henry Lee's 'Partisan Legion' were able to exploit unexpected vulnerability or a foe's retreat, thanks to the horses that could move them and their equipment at speeds many times those of their unmounted counterparts.

t is the mobility of the mounted soldier that joins together different and evolving fighting techniques in the colonial frontiers of this study. Serious military use of the cavalry in Europe passed soon after the Napoleonic Wars, the American

I

with the remnant of his portion of the 7th Cavalry held the imagination of the world in the years after the 1876 debacle. Custer's men had left their sabres behind and fought with carbines and sixguns against hordes of Sioux and Cheyenne, who inflicted the worst defeat ever suffered by the US Army in the Indian Wars. Custer and 268 of his men perished. CUSTER'S LAST STAND

MOUNTED WARFARE

Natal Native Horse (1879) This member of the Natal Native Horse fights

found themselves trained to ride on British

in a way his ancestors had never dreamed of

horses and sent forth to scout out and fight

in Britain's conflicts in Africa. Native

their traditional Zulu enemies. This particular

knowledge of the terrain was too precious an

trooper carries a breech-loading M1871

asset to be wasted on the infantry, and

Westley-Richards carbine. His canvas

members of the Sotho and Mponso tribes

bandolier holds more .45X55 Peabody Martini ammunition

than that issued to his

tribal counterparts in the native infantry. Slung over his back he has his traditional tribal spear, which can function

as a lance in

a charge or dismounted combat. Rawhide stirrups protect feet more comfortable bare than they would be in the Europeanstyle jackboots of the period. His khaki uniform provides more camouflage than the British regulars enjoyed in their traditional red.

60

MOUNTED WARFARE

of the 14th Murray's fat Lancers. The 'Bengal Lancers' used their carbines to fight at a distance, employing the mobility of their horses to get into range and quickly away from the retaliatory fire of longer-ranged enemy rifles. ELITE TROOPERS

variant had its moments of significance during the Civil War, but the vast distances of the colonial frontiers made the mobility of the mounted soldier indispensable even after this time: a government can enforce its will over a large area only if it has the ability to undertake rapid travel. The modern reader is likely to have seen a surviving example of a mounted agent of government - the police rider, patrolling the open spaces of a city or using the mount for force and mobility during a riot, is the heir to a long tradition. Rebels and Natives versus the Army The horse is central to the Indian Wars along the American frontier, to the clash between the Khalifa's Dervishes and the British-backed Sultanate of Egypt, to the ambitions of Simon Bolivar. Both the Sioux and the Khalifa's Dervishes wished to assert their control over large tracts of territory, the prospect of plunder and religious satisfaction offering additional incentives to raid American frontier towns or to obey the Quran's

injunction to enter the Dar-al-Harb (the world of war) and despoil the infidel. Simon Bolivar (1783-1830) and the Continental Congress wished to replace one system of government with another, and needed mounted combatants to assert their authority and oppose the forces of the regimes they sought to displace. Two of the four battles described below, the Little Big Horn and the campaign of Omdurman, involved combat against native peoples whose way of life depended on the horse. Since Arabic culture and lifestyles boiled out of Mecca in the years after 622, the Arab way of life - and the sturdy horses bearing the same name - had permeated much of northern Africa. Only part of the northern Arab' portion of the Sudan had long acquaintance with the horse and saddle, but from such a small portion of the whole came thousands upon thousands of skilled and aggressive horsemen. Debate continues about the role the ancestors of the Native American tribes played in the extinction of the horse in North America, where it had evolved, but after its reintroduction by the Spanish in the years after 1500, it flourished in its original environment. Taking their cues from the Spanish, the Plains Native Americans soon had a horse-oriented lifestyle, in which some farming

61

MOUNTED WARFARE tribes became nomads, following and subsisting upon the game flourishing on the North American prairies. Indeed, the Plains tribes produced what was described by George Armstrong Custer (1839-1876) as 'the finest light cavalry on earth'.

their escape to assist other survivors. When the British sought to disarm the Sothos later that year, the result was an intense series of skirmishes called 'The Gun War', in which the Sothos retained their firearms and a degree of their independence.

Buffalo Soldiers Cavalry life was tremendously physically demanding - as was life as a slave in the antebellum American South. Simply staying alive under heavy pressure from the Zulus rendered the warriors of the Basotho and Ama'ngwane people similarly resilient. Thus both the American government and the British Empire, fighting hostile native peoples, began to use locals in the ranks of their cavalry. In neither case were these recruits experienced in mounted warfare, but they learned quickly.

Seizing the Moment Movement on horseback - or the spectre of such movement - determined the techniques of fighting in the other two battles of our study. The British in the American War of Independence sought to employ Alexander's strategy in Afghanistan - immobile forces scattered in penny packets across the disputed territory. Kitchener would later use the same tactics in the Boer War. Such outposts certainly restricted the movement of American rebels in the northern colonies, but they also enabled a mobile force that had amassed temporary superiority to swoop in - with disastrous results at Paulus Hook. Similarly, at Ayacucho in 1824, General Antonio Jose de Sucre yAlcala (1795-1830) saw the Royalists thrusting his forces back and used the mobility of the Colombian lancers to launch a disrupting attack directly into their front. Holding his hussars in reserve, he was then able to mount a surprise onslaught that fatally disrupted the Royalist army. For any organization to take advantage of an opportunity or to respond to an onslaught, information is as vital a factor as mobility - and mobility allows the transmission of vital news and a prompt response to it. The role of horsemen in battle is as much to prevent intelligence of their side's actions as it is to acquire knowledge of the position, strength and intentions of the enemy. Henry Lee (1756-1818) dismounted his dragoons at Paulus Hook for a sudden descent on his target garrison - while screening forces along the roads stood ready to limit British awareness of his raid. Crow scouts on horseback shadowed their Cheyenne and Sioux foes and brought to Custer the news of the 'big village' he sought to find and attack. The lack of precision in that report might have worried a more cautious commander.

In the United States, the 9th and 10th Cavalry of freedmen became the celebrated Buffalo Soldiers', a term that referred either to their physical appearance or, more probably, their demonstrable toughness. Overcoming racial prejudice, inferior supplies and the harshness of their western campaigns, the troopers of the 9th and 10th Cavalry earned the respect of both the Indians and their white counterparts. Their indefatigable efforts against the Plains tribes and the Apaches likewise secured promotion for their commanders, including Ben Grierson (1826-1911), the most successful Union cavalryman of the Civil War, and Black Jack' Pershing (I860-1848), eventual commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I.The Buffalo Soldiers of the 9th Cavalry were the rescuers of a detachment of the celebrated 7th, trapped in a valley by angry Sioux at White Clay Creek in 1890. Their counterparts in South Africa also performed sterling service. The British chose to arm and equip the Sothos and Mponsos of the Natal Native Horse with better equipment than the native levies in the infantry, the result being a fighting arm of proven ability and loyalty. At the great disaster of Isandhlwana in 1879, Lord Durnford (1830-1879) released his mounted Africans and gave them a chance to save themselves. Even so, they paused in the course of

62

The Horses In the colonial period, varying geography, varying opponents and varying objectives required

MOUNTED WARFARE improvisation and flexibility for the projection of force in the outreaches of governments and empires. About the only constant was the horse, and even the breeds of the mounts varied, which had significant results in the course of the fighting. Arabian horses in the Sudan could travel long distances under conditions that would slaughter large European warm-bloods, but - just as their ancestors had discovered during the Crusades - it was difficult for the smaller Arabian mounts to withstand the shock of larger horses putting their weight and short-term strength behind the point of their riders' lance. Indian Buckskin ponies likewise had a great deal of endurance and the ability to survive on the plains under horrible conditions of forage and weather - but they were not able to carry the equipment and supplies that the US Cavalry and

its baggage trains of pack mules could bring to bear upon the target they sought to attack. General William H. Crook (1839-1915), himself mounted upon a mule, convinced the Army to deploy the baggage train against the Indians, the mules having a much easier time in rough terrain than the wagons they replaced. The Quarter Horses favoured by the United States Cavalry were good for one fast chase or one terrific charge - after which the smaller size and of Custer's command. 'Comanche' was the only cavalry horse left on the Little Big Horn battlefield by the Indians, whether because of his wounds or his dead master's hand still clutching his reins. Captain Myles Keough had refused to shoot his mount as a final breastwork before his own death. The animal lived until 1891, one of only two US horses to receive full military funeral honours. LAST SURVIVOR

63

MOUNTED WARFARE

greater endurance of the Paint and Buckskin ponies would begin to tell. Both sides in the wars of liberation in South America, themselves the fusion of the Old and N e w Worlds, employed the sturdy feral ponies of the South American pampas, whose descendants were eventually refined into the sturdy breed n o w called the Criollo. Geography as much as the desires of human masters determined the diversity of the equine breeds - the horses that could survive in a given environment tended to be the horses bred and employed there. Weaponry Of uniformity in equipment and weaponry throughout our period - there was almost none. The British cavalry employed both lance and sabre from its origins in medieval chivalry down to the final great charge at Omdurman - and later still in skirmishes in 1914.The United States Cavalry, and its revolutionary forebears, never employed the lance, and the sabre very seldom, but almost always made use of the carbine, the pistol and even the shotgun, the last an almost exclusively American weapon in organized warfare. In May 1857, Colonel E.V Sumner (1797-1863) on the

64

RAPID-FIRE WEAPONS. These increased the cavalry's firepower. The Spencer Carbine fired a powerful .56 rimfire cartridge. The 1860 Henry cocked itself with every pull of its lever. The Remington was one of the most popular designs of the late nineteenth century, as the British found out at Omdurman.

banks of the Republican River faced 300 proud Cheyenne in their first open defiance of Federal regulars. The Cheyenne had found additional courage in a charm furnished by one of their shamans against the expected bullets of the cavalry. In the event, the charm proved redundant: for the only time on the Great Plains, the cavalry launched a sabre charge that so startled and bewildered the Cheyenne they fled with little loss of life, leaving Sumner to burn their village in an additional act of intimidation. Custer's contemporary artists did not let the 7th Cavalry's lack of sabres at Little Big Horn interfere with their romantic depictions. Native peoples had no arsenals to equip them with M l 8 4 0 sabres. The same was true for those hastily cobbled together units of rebels, at least in the early years of colonial rebellion. Traditional weapons prevailed: the bows the Cheyenne and Sioux used to hunt buffalo could kill men, while

MOUNTED WARFARE although the marks on a Zulu shield, for example, the Sudanese could make crude firearms or - like offered as precise a unit and sub-unit designation the Native Americans - capture, steal or buy more as a European-style serial number. The Native sophisticated weaponry if a source could be Americans awarded special decorative insignia found. Spanish colonial troops in the N e w World to their mounts - a red hand upon the animal's carried a leather shield as protection against the flank meant that it had brought a wounded rider Indians' arrows and tomahawks, and w e r e to safety, while scars suffered in battle were proficient in the use of the lance - out of a painted before action, in recognition of the necessity imposed by a lack of powder. animal's valour. The classic firearms of the mounted trooper are The gap in understanding between warring the carbine and pistol, for the simple reason that in cultures on the frontier could have the age of the muzzle-loader those varieties significant consequences. were the only ones a Understandably white horseman had the slightest chance of reloading or 'The principle value of cavalry colonists were unaware of the difference in native handling while riding. For is derived from its rapidity and cultures between war troops dismounting to fight and hunter (heavy or light dragoons), a ease of motion.... The proper parties groups - both bands were larger weapon might make armed and mounted, but sense - although the animal time and manner of bringing only one constituted would, of course, have to cavalry into action depend an immediate threat, its bear the weight of a intentions usually signalled weapon regardless of h o w upon the ideas of the by native tradition. Just as a it was ultimately employed. Baron Antoine Henri de commander-in-chief the plan soldier off duty might wear his uniform for show or for Jomini (1779-1869), author of the battle, the enemy's lack of better clothing, a of The Art of War, one of the Native American with Western world's most movements, and a thousand feathers and breastplate influential military manuals, might well wish to put on considered firearms of any other things which cannot be his best appearance for a description to be relatively mentioned here.' relatively friendly parley. useless for cavalry. From Such mistakes could be experience, he knew that — BARON ANTOINE HENRI DE JOMINI disastrous: the Boers in accuracy from a moving horse was beyond the skill of nearly all riders. The horseman who reined up to take aim with his carbine would present, with his vital mount, a large target to an infantryman with steadier footing and a larger, more powerful, firearm. Clothing Uniforms are not a luxury in any kind of combat they offer at least a very basic defence against the undesirable outcome of being shot by one's o w n side. Rebels at the onset of the fighting have one initial advantage - the side in uniform is likely to be the enemy! Tribal and regional dress and art served native peoples in lieu of formal insignia,

South Africa would bedevil the British by melting into civilian populations, hiding their Mauser rifles in the straw and leaving the pony that had an hour earlier carried a kommando n o w grazing peacefully in its paddock by the time that the avenging British cavalry arrived. Battle of Paulus Hook: 19 August 1779 George Washington appreciated the value of intelligence, and ran a sophisticated espionage network that kept him aware of British movements and vulnerabilities, much to the profit - and survival - of his cause. The advantages offered by mounted soldiers were too obvious to

65

MOUNTED WARFARE be ignored, and by the summer of 1779 there were enough rebels on horseback to become a considerable part of the strategic equation. Bloody Ban Two earlier incidents in the war show the versatility of the mounted combatant. Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Bloody Ban'Tarleton (1754-1833) of the 1st Dragoon Guards was perhaps the finest British cavalry officer of the war: skilled, resourceful and legendarily ruthless. His favoured use of his troopers' mobility was to spread terror and anxiety throughout the rebellious colonies. More than one incident prompted the phrase 'Tarleton's Quarter', meaning that prisoners would not be spared. Luck enhanced his reputation: in a duel with George Washington's distant cousin, Colonel William Washington (1752-1810), Tarleton escaped after Washington's sword broke at the hilt; in the process, he wounded Washington and his horse with a pistol shot. Tarleton also favoured what would now be called decapitation strikes'. In March 1781, he launched a raid on Charlottesville, Virginia, in the hope of capturing Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826), then governor of the state. As a Brigade Major in 1776, he diverted a scouting party under his command to capture Colonel Charles Lee (1732-1782) in a New Jersey tavern. Lee was one of the very few American officers who had ever served the British crown - in the very regiment that captured him! Tarleton may have, inadvertently, done the Americans a favour: Charles Lee was a dour and pessimistic officer and, after an exchange secured his release, he nearly lost the battle of Monmouth in 1778 out of his conviction that the Continentals could never prevail against British soldiers. Another Lee was the far more capable Henry Lee, Light Horse Harry' to his peers and his soldiers. Lee made his reputation from his own ability to appreciate and take advantage of an opportunity - a trait for which his considerably more famous son Robert E. (1807-1870) is legend. In perhaps the strangest use of cavalry during the war, Lee and his Virginian Dragoons were instrumental in feeding the Continental Army during the terrible winter of 1777-78. Washington

66

forbade the confiscation of forage from the friendly Pennsylvania farm country, and his men suffered greatly. An early and heavy run past Valley Forge of small, fatty fish called shad offered hope more, certainly, than was offered by Washington's desperate letters to Congress asking for food. Men plunged into the water with nets, buckets, pitchforks, anything to toss the shuddering fish on shore. Seeing that the shoal was about to move past the desperate Continentals, Lee ordered his dragoons to charge into the Schuylkill River. The churning of the horses' legs in the water frightened the fish back into the nets and the clutches of the starving soldiers.There was even a surplus, which would help in the lean weeks that were to follow. A String of Outposts By 1779, the War of Independence had entered nearly its final phase. Washington's army, including the infant cavalry arm, emerged from Valley Forge with a confidence and level of drill that enabled them to face the regulars of General Sir Henry Clinton (1730-1795) in pitched battle - as they demonstrated despite Charles Lee's misgivings at Monmouth. Clinton accordingly held his army in the port and city of N e w York, the most economically and strategically valuable territory in the Colonies, with a chain of outposts to secure communications and movement throughout eastern New York and New Jersey. The British offensive effort in subsequent years would be concentrated in the southern colonies, with 'Bloody Ban'Tarleton leading British and Loyalist forces on raids throughout the South until Tarleton's conclusive defeat at Cowpens in January of 1781. Defended enclaves can pacify a considerable portion of surrounding territory if they can support each other - as the United States has recently demonstrated in the urban environments of Iraq. The difficulty lies in establishing how far apart such outposts can be placed, in order to maximize the area of territory while still leaving them capable of mutual support and rapid relief in the event of a major attack. In August 1779, Major Lee, then 23 years old, took advantage of the absence of Nathaniel Greene (1742-1786),

M O U N T E D WARFARE Washington's quartermaster at Valley Forge, to approach Washington and express his belief that Clinton had made a major mistake in the positioning of his outposts. A Penny Packet The modern site of the battle of Paulus Hook is a street corner in Jersey City, N e w Jersey. In 1778, it was a peninsula jutting out from the N e w Jersey

shore, directly opposite N e w York City and the Hudson. That July, Clinton led out a powerful force from the peninsula towards the American bastion of West Point. General 'Mad Anthony' Wayne (1745-1796) had earlier captured the British outpost at Stony Point after Clinton retreated back down the Hudson. Lee suggested to Washington that a similar such sudden onset might take an additional bastion directly under Clinton's nose. The fort at Paulus Hook was essentially a fortified beachhead on the N e w Jersey shore, onto which the British could land and from which they could move out to exert their control over the nearer countryside. The fort's garrison consisted of 200 men of the British 64th Regiment, under Major William Sutherland, plus 200 Loyalists, enclosed within tremendously strong fortifications. Traffic could ford the creek in front of the peninsula at only two points. As a second line of defence, British engineers had cut a moat across the neck of the isthmus, the only access being through a barred drawbridge gate. In between the drawbridge and the actual stockade itself were the entanglements of the day, abatis lopped trees felled and cut in a manner calculated to impede or halt an attacker's movement under the garrison's fire. Behind that were three batteries of cannon, commanding the Hudson and the countryside, as well as a central bastion with barracks, plus the fort's magazine and six cannon. At some distance, there w e r e an additional infantry redoubt and a blockhouse.The British rear lay safe under the guns of the British fleet in the Hudson, and in his veins. 'Bloody Ban' Tarleton's ferocity and hair's-breadth escapes left a legend that still resonates in the American South. After the war, Tarleton was a major supporter of the slave trade. ' N O T BLOOD, BUT ICEWATER'

67

MOUNTED WARFARE

Continental Dragoon (1779) 'Those amphibious animals called dragoons',

personnel carrier. The vastness of the New

was one expert's description, and men who

World required fast mobility.

rode to battle and fought on foot

This soldier wears the traditional

light

characterized cavalry in the United States

helmet of the dragoon, meant as much for

from the age of the horse to the armoured

protection

against the odd tree branch as

against an enemy's sabre. Lack of proper carbines and the expectation that dragoons would fight against infantry with the same weapons is responsible for the Frenchmanufactured Module 1763 Charleville slung against his horse's side. A 'horse pistol' with its longer barrel takes the place of a lance or sabre as the dragoon's mounted weapon. One hand is needed to control a horse which might be more or less inured to the noise and smoke of gunfire. His wooden canteen, saddle bags, and bedroll are the means of his own comfort in the field, a bag behind his hip carries oats for his horse as insurance against scanty or unsuitable fodder.

68

MOUNTED WARFARE Clinton had established a set of lantern codes and signal guns to summon aid from New York. Transmitted Intelligence Lee's plans for a swift descent upon the fort were fleshed out by a diet of information provided by Captain Allen McLean, commander of a force of mounted rangers. These long-range scouts lurked in the salt-water marshes at the base of the peninsula and transmitted a fairly accurate ongoing report of the numbers and status of the fort's garrison. Even today, a horse's ability to traverse swamp, water and road compares favourably with mechanized transport. An additional example of the efficacy of horses in difficult terrain is provided by the career of the legendary 'Swamp Fox' - General Francis Marion (1732-1795). He earned his sobriquet by lurking in the South Carolina swamps. With his troopers using and feeding their own horses in the course of their raids and forays, Marion made British control of the region uncertain even after the disastrous American capitulation at Charleston in May 1780. Eventually Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805) sent Tarleton himself to bring the 'Swamp Fox' to bay, but Marion's intelligence network, and his use of the rivers to move and conceal his cavalry, proved more than Tarleton's celebrated ferocity could overcome. Washington approved of Lee's raid, on certain conditions: there would be no effort to hold the post. Lee was to capture the garrison, disable the cannon, blow up the magazine and retreat to a fleet of pontoon boats in the nearby Hackensack River before the British could counter-attack. Lee accordingly dismounted his own dragoons and used McLean's mounted rangers to control the roads leading into Paulus Hook. Colonial horsemen would prevent warning of Lee's attack from reaching the bastion, or any messages for aid from reaching any British detachments on the Jersey shore. Lee's choice to put his troopers on foot was a difficult call, but one necessitated by his bargain with Washington. The circular route planned for the attack was a 22.5km (14-mile) march through the marshes into the post, then a shorter rush with the prisoners out to and across the river and

safety. Ferrying horses under pursuit was too great a risk for Lee's own command, and his mounted forces were relegated to screening and reconnaissance duties. Captain McLean's surveillance had been quite intensive, but the aftermath of the battle revealed that his scouts and one disguised spy had missed two vital elements in the situation. The first, which would hinder Lee, was the arrival of a force of 40 Hessians sent over from New York to bolster the garrison. The second determined the ultimate success of the onslaught, for on the night of Lee's attack Major Sutherland sent 132 of the Loyalists in a foraging party out into the Jersey countryside. The British sentries, accordingly, were expecting a large number of men coming stealthily towards their post - friendlies. Chest-high Water By 1779, the Americans had captured considerable cavalry equipment from the British, which they used to equip their own units. A great many of the heavy sabres taken from British troopers in 1778 wound up in American hands. The British had provided their own forces with lighter carbines and musketoons, which meant that Lee and his men carried full-size British Brown Besses' and French Modele 1763 Charleville muskets. Lee divided his force of approximately 400 men into three columns delineated by their origins: a force of McLean's dismounted rangers, a company of the 16th Virginia and two Maryland companies. The three forces were to arrive simultaneously at the objective by three different routes, an early example of the traditional American preference for columns converging on a single objective. In the event, optimism and synchronicity failed. The combined force set forth with a wagon train in the early evening of 18 August as a deception aimed at lurking British spies. The hope was that they would mistake the formation for a supply convoy. The three columns divided once they entered a woodland, and the Maryland force and the Virginians got utterly lost in the darkness, reducing Lee's forces to the 200 men under his own direct command. Long experience of travel had its uses, for Lee's horsemen continued on towards the distant garrison while avoiding the

69

MOUNTED

WARFARE

Battle of Paulus Hook 1779

The British grip on New York, won at a staggering cost to the Americans in a series of battles in late 1776, remained a hindrance and a threat to the

» • i pr | § g

Continental cause until the final British withdrawal in November of 1783. British vessels of war prowled up the Hudson as far as the great American bastion of West Point, while soldiers and supplies took advantage of Manhattan's superb harbour and transportation system. Neither Washington nor his subordinate commanders were willing to leave matters as they stood. The isolated British and Loyalist bastion

Sv*m ' M J'*''!)'

across the Hudson allowed the British to control access to the river, but it also offered an inviting target. 'Light Horse Harry' Lee's brilliantly successful raid on the outpost at Paulus Hook kept the British nervous and uncertain in the very heart of their strongest position in their former colonies.

6

The returning Loyalists attack Lee's forces as the latter return. They are driven off by the fire of the regrouped Maryland and Virginian columns.

PAULUS HOOK

YORKTOWN Lee moves out under the cover of escorting a wagon train, and divides his forces into three to converge on the British post. The Maryland and Virginia contingents get lost in the woods, but collect near the road. Lee's own force marches directly into the British post.

3

The vast fjord made by the Hudson River into the heart of eastern North America was perhaps the most vital waterway of the American War of Independence, with defended bastions at either end marking the limits of each side's control.

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MOUNTED

WARFARE

Having collected his forces, Lee sends out McLean's mounted rangers along the area roads to prevent word of his operation from reaching Paulus Hook.

»»»

__

•

•

Ignorant of the impending attack, British Major Sutherland dispatches 132 Loyalists on a foraging expedition. Not only does the move weaken his garrison, the noise of the approaching Americans is mistaken for that of the returning foragers.

2

BARRACKS/ HOSPITAL

MAGAZINE

BLOCKHOUSE (HESSIANS)

4

British sentries belatedly realize their mistake and begin firing. Lee's men fix bayonets and charge up the parapet and force the drawbridge. Sutherland and 26 Hessians hole up in a small blockhouse and send alarm signals to the British across the river in Manhattan.

In possession of the post, Lee forbears firing the magazine to spare the sick and soldiers' families huddled in the nearby hospital. He collects his 159 prisoners and three wounded and moves back up the road before ships putting out from Manhattan can cross the Hudson.

5

71

MOUNTED WARFARE barracks and fire the fort's magazine, they found roads where detection would be the most likely. the families of some of the garrison and sick men Instead they waded chest-high through creeks and cowering inside the buildings. Lee accordingly canals until they reached the British moat, their rounded up his captives and made for the main cartridge belts and muskets utterly soaked. The road out of the post, only to find that his plans time was n o w 3 a.m. continued to go relentlessly astray. Lee availed Lee broke his remaining men into a vanguard himself of a horse and rode ahead to the appointed and reserve, and ordered his men to fix bayonets rendezvous with the boats on the Hackensack. N o and ford the British ditch at a shallow spot located boats waited there, the commander having by one of his lieutenants. The initial force struggled assumed as the sun rose that the attack had been through the water, up the slope, and into the abatis, cancelled. Lee rode back to his men and their through which they pried their way with their prisoners on the road, bayonets. As the British finding 50 of the missing sentries began to realize that this was not their Resolved that the thanks of Virginians on the way, their cartridges still dry. foraging party and began to Congress be Given to Major Lee had no choice, fire, Lee's reserve column accordingly, but to retrace rushed up through the area Lee for the Remarkable the original route of the cleared by the vanguard attack. This was exposed and carried the gate into prudence, address and in the daylight to British the fortification with a bravery Displayed by him in observation and interdiction, bayonet charge. About 12 of the British w e r e killed the Action & that they approve potentially trapping Lee's force: the Loyalists were before the bulk of the garrison surrendered. the Humanity shown by him returning from their foraging expedition and the Hessians in Circumstances prompting to and Major Sutherland were Success and Withdrawal from the fort, while Major Sutherland and 26 of Severity, as Honorable to the pursuing reinforcements were already the Hessians managed to barricade themselves into Arms of the United States and on their way across the Hudson. The Loyalists, under the smaller of the t w o Correspondent to the Noble the hated Colonel Van infantry redoubts. From Buskirk, met the column at there, they peppered the principles on which they the ferry road and opened Americans with largely fire, drawing a return volley inaccurate fire and sent were assumed.' from the Virginians and alarm signals to the British — THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS. 1799 from the 200 reinforcements in N e w York. These were answered by ships in the Hudson and cannon from Manhattan, and Lee knew that his time was running out. Lee found his men surrounding 156 surrendered British soldiers and three officers. Darkness, confusion and the need for haste kept Lee from disabling the post's cannon, a procedure usually performed by thrusting a bayonet into the gun's touch-hole, rendering the cannon briefly or permanently unable to fire. Humanity frustrated t w o more of Lee's objectives. As his men moved to burn the British

72

providentially sent to Lee by the American commander in N e w Jersey, General William Alexander (1723-1786). Lee's prisoners could march, and his own casualties were extremely light: two killed, three wounded. McLean's horsemen had done their work well in restricting information of the raid. (The descendants of one little girl would later record her memories of being detained by the rangers screening Lee's movements as the assault force passed.) Coming down the road from the fort, Major Sutherland ran into Lee's reinforced

MOUNTED WARFARE rearguard and retreated back to his empty bastion, concluding the raid in the Americans' favour. The fort at Paulus Hook would be re-garrisoned and held until the final British retreat from North America, but from now on it was a beleaguered liability, not a useful foothold. 'Light Horse Harry' would receive a medal from the Continental Congress and further opportunities for daring exploits in the successful War of Independence. Battle of Ayacucho: 9 December 1824 Over much greater distances, with all the more need for mobility, the people of South America fought their own long war for independence in the years after Napoleon's conquest of Spain. A series of three revolutions culminated in the great battle of Ayacucho. The American War of Independence electrified the world by proving that an existing government, and even monarchy itself, could be replaced without its society collapsing into anarchy. Also, the titanic shadow of

George Washington loomed over the age - a man skilled in war and vital in peace, who retired from battle and government in near-universal esteem and regard. New World against the Old By contrast, the French Revolution left only a legacy of anarchy and terror. And in the place of Washington the final convulsions of the French Revolution produced Napoleon, a man who had considerably greater military ability but no desire to retire from battle or power - much to the cost of his own nation and the rest of the world. Washington demonstrated what a good man could POWDER SOAKED BUT FEROCITY UNABATED. Lee's picked force of dismounted dragoons takes advantage of the garrison's confusion to force the drawbridge at Paulus Hook with clubbed muskets and the bayonet. The British had previously sent out a foraging party of their own, for whom Lee's advancing force was mistaken - with disastrous results.

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MOUNTED WARFARE and should do for his nation; Napoleon demonstrated what a leader could accomplish, at least for himself. It was Napoleon's career that provided the final impetus for the third of the great revolutions, which culminated in Ayacucho. When Napoleon marched through Spain in 1807 to conquer Portugal, the Portuguese court removed to Brazil and set in motion the process that resulted in a relatively bloodless cessation of European control there. In 1808, Napoleon captured Ferdinand VII

74

and his father, the recently abdicated King Charles IV at which point the Spanish government declared Spain's Latin American colonies to be equal members of the kingdom. It was a move intended to encourage the use of their resources Although untrained as a soldier, Simon Bolivar was blessed with two priceless assets - the ability to motivate thousands upon thousands of people with his words and example, and the ability to select and delegate to talented subordinates. NATURAL A N D INSPIRING LEADER.

MOUNTED WARFARE typical European allotment of two. Throughout the continent, large herds of semi-feral animals flourished in the plains and valleys, for the easy use of herdsman, drovers and warriors. In an agrarian culture where the very word for gentleman' (caballero) also means rider', horsemanship was the basic mark of anyone even El Libertador half a step above the lowest levels of a stratified At such a time came a man who was aware of both society. An American observer mentioned the Washington's accomplishments and Napoleon's practice of a traveller on a long journey rotating glory. Simon Bolivar had witnessed Napoleon's between three horses during the course of the campaigns and rule in Europe at first hand, while ride. Young men provided reading the works of the on their own account with same thinkers that had 7 am more than ever of the a plenitude of fit horses inspired the Americans in anyone who could their war of independence. opinion that it is indispensable offered employ them a potentially Having sworn on the Mons superb cavalry arm. Sacer of Rome to liberate all to complete the expulsion of Such a man was Jose of South America, the the Spaniards from the entire Tomas Boves (1782-1814), Venezuelan returned to who dealt Bolivar two of South America in 1807, and continent. We should draw his earliest and most by 1810 he was the disastrous reverses in 1814. emissary of a revolutionary closer together and agree to A taller and more savage junta. Soon he held a engage with the new enemies version of Napoleon, military post in an Boves received a vague independent Venezuela, and with the new means commission from a Spanish other leaders falling by the field marshal as the wayside as El Libertador which they can employ....' Spanish government of (The Liberator) became Venezuela collapsed in — SIMON BOLIVAR dominant. The restored 1813. Henceforth, he Bourbon monarchy of operated on his own Spain, crippled by the account, vaguely royalist in sentiment, but Peninsular War, did manage to send some soldiers plundering and accumulating forces loyal and viceroys to contest Bolivar's efforts, but the primarily to himself. In a time of chaos, it was largest and most difficult opposition for Bolivar possible to do very well by plundering and and his vision of an independent, united Spanish attacking indiscriminately, and Boves' success continent came from Royalist forces within South came from seeking a base of power where no one America itself. had thought to look. Both Bolivar and the Spanish were using the Jose Tomas Boves and Light Cavalry Napoleonic model of cavalry. At the Battle of Apure From the perspective of mounted warfare, the in 1821, a Spanish regiment of hussars strictly wars of South American liberation are almost followed the European model inspired by Polish unique. In almost no other military environment and Hungarian cavalry. Each wore a silver helmet, were horses as available and so little regarded as a wool tunic, and carried a lance, sabre, carbine they were in Latin America. An Argentine census in and two pistols - with disastrous results.The heat 1810 recorded 180,000 horses and 90,000 mules and humidity of the South American climate was in the Pampas region alone. Spanish regulations for hardly the same as that of the Hungarian steppe in their colonial troops allocated no less than six which their models had flourished. horses per mounted combatant, in contrast to the to free Spain. Instead, the Creoles, colonists of pure Spanish descent, began to consider freeing themselves from all European control - whether that of Napoleon, or even of their own original monarchy, which had been restored after 1814.

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MOUNTED WARFARE By contrast, Boves turned to the 'plainsmen' of Venezuela, w h o became the dreaded llaneros. With a lifestyle similar to their c o w b o y counterparts of North America, and the gauchos of the south, these herders lived for months on the plains, using lassos and lances, for lack of gunpowder, to provide for themselves and protect their cattle. To motivate these poor but fierce horsemen to follow him into battle, Boves had to do little more than hold out the promise of loot. Ferocity, the odd pistol and a cockade in his straw hat marked the military llanero. This lightest of light cavalrymen rode into battle with a lance but without a saddle, straddling himself over the back and neck of his horse, and balancing the lance with one hand on the animal's shoulder. In the charge, the llanero"s lance would strike the neck or chest of the opponent's horse, with horrific, and fatal, results. Trained cavalry mounts w e r e more valuable than a llanero's freshly broken mustang, and a heavily encumbered hussar on foot would find himself at Boves' mercy LIGHTEST OF THE LIGHT CAVALRY. A South American llanero traditionally lacked all but his lance and perhaps a pistol to mark him as a combatant. His target in battle was the mount of his enemy, his own fresh-caught horse from the vast herds of the pampas much easier to replace than a veteran cavalryman's trained and heavier mount.

which was non-existent. Another tactic of the llaneros was to catch hold of the enemy's horse's tail and yank the animal off its feet while galloping past. Such tactics, effective as they were brutal, were as clear an indication of the cheapness and expendability of horseflesh in South America as were the huge iron rowels on the llaneros' spurs. Spanish colonial troops had worn the cuera, a heavy surcoat of layered buckskin, as a form of armour, which earned them their nom de guerre, soldados de cuera. European hussars, particularly the Polish variety, could wear a back-and-breast plate that would not have looked out of place on Pizarro's conquistadors, but by the Napoleonic Wars a soldier so equipped would more properly be called a cuirassier. One reference to the equipment of the cavalry of the revolution notes that a 'square Blanket, t w e l v e feet [3.7m] in diagonal, is provided (some w e r e w o n t to cut off the corners, and make it circular): in the centre a slit is effected eighteen inches [46cm] long; through this the mother-naked Trooper introduces his head and neck; and so rides shielded from all weather, and in battle from many strokes (for he rolls it about his left arm); and not only dressed, but harnessed and draperied.' Such was an account of the military manifestation of the poncho in South American cavalry.

MOUNTED WARFARE until Sucre's murder in 1830.The northern regions Bolivar's hussars fell before Boves and his of Spanish South America were irrevocably lost to irregulars in a series of battles in 1813- The Spain by the time the last viceroy, Jose de La Serna Liberator retreated into Colombia and raised e Hinojosa (1770-1832), led Spain's last great another army (but this too was destroyed, this effort to retain control of at least the southernmost time by General Pablo Morillo, at Santa Mara, on portion of the N e w World. De La Serna was a 14 June 1815). Ironically, Boves' victory may have dangerous and competent opponent. In January done more good for the cause of Bolivar's 1821, he deposed his predecessor with the help of revolution: his own lawlessness and the activities the officers of the Spanish army in Peru, w h o felt of his llaneros did much to alienate Venezuela that a decorated veteran ofWellington's campaigns from the Royalist cause. Relief came when Boves against the French in Spain would be a better fell in battle in 1814. And Bolivar, w h o lingered in choice for the final struggle exile in Haiti and Jamaica against the rebels. De La until 1815, was able to raise a large number of British 'A man like me is a dangerous Serna, w h o had escaped from French captivity, and Irish mercenaries, w h o citizen in a popular was a strong supporter were seeking work and a of a liberalized imperial cause after the final end of government. He is an dominion, holding out the the Napoleonic Wars. Along possibility of pardon and with these men, still more immediate threat to national negotiations if only the volunteers were drawn to sovereignty. I want to be a rebellious colonies would Bolivar's person and his return to their obedience cause. With llaneros of his citizen in order to secure my to the Spanish crown. own, the Liberator n o w began to recover the De La Serna suffered a own freedom and the freedom fortunes of his revolution. series of reverses at the of everybody else. I prefer the hands of Jose de San Martin (1778-1850), a man w h o Antonio Jose de Sucre title of citizen to that of was Bolivar's main rival - in A feature Bolivar shared with both Washington and 'Liberator', because the latter both reputation and reality - for the title of South Napoleon was an eye for comes from war and the America's liberator. Since talent. In the choice of his 1812, Argentina had second in command and former comes from law.' launched some of the first planned successor, Bolivar successful revolutionary did very well indeed. — SIMON BOLIVAR campaigns in the south, and Antonio Jose de Sucre y had done much to weaken Alcala proved tremendously the Spanish hold on Peru, Chile and Argentina. talented at tactics and campaigns, and by 1824 he After a meeting with Bolivar in Guayaquil in 1822, was Bolivar's most trusted and skilled commander. San Martin abandoned his o w n role in the Just 29 in August 1824, Sucre was the Creole son of campaign against de La Serna in Bolivar's favour. a colonel in the Spanish colonial infantry. The The Royalists in Peru, however, had time young man came of age, as he put it, 'in the midst to regroup and rearm in the respite allowed by of revolution and of war'. His military career began, Bolivar's lesser expertise in the art of like Napoleon's, in the artillery.Through a series of Andean warfare. campaigns, Sucre earned his rank of general from the president of Venezuela, unknown to Bolivar. When the Liberator ordered a boat carrying 'General Sucre' to shore for investigation, the two began a close and successful friendship that lasted

By the summer of 1824, de La Serna and his second in command, General Jose de Canterac (1779-1835), had brought some 10,000 Royalist troops to a high level of training and equipment.

77

MOUNTED WARFARE Many native South American loyalists swelled the Royalist ranks. Such loyalty may be have been the result of de La Serna's prudence; he made certain that his men were paid fully and regularly, an extremely rare state of affairs in the era. The Battle of Junln In June, Bolivar and Sucre renewed San Martin's war, moving south into Peru with an army of some 9000 veterans, which included the remnants of the old mercenary troops. De La Serna and Canterac moved to prevent the rebels from taking areas still controlled by the Royalists. A mutinous garrison surrendered the important port of Callao to Canterac in February, drawing some Spanish forces out of the central highlands and - significantly d o w n to sea level. Canterac's force of 2700 infantry, shielded by a screen of 1300 cavalry, was a prime target for Bolivar's larger force of 8000 with an advance force of approximately twice as many horsemen.

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One of the f e w strictly cavalry battles followed w h e n Bolivar's advance force of horsemen encountered Canterac's horsemen as they covered the retreat of the infantry towards de La Serna in Cuzco. On 5 August 1824, the two forces clashed in the Peruvian plain near Lake Junin. Contemporary witnesses record that the battle was fought to its conclusion without a shot being fired, the weapons being the lance and sabre.The advantages and disadvantages of each weapon caused debates that were still ongoing in 1914, when the era of the machine gun began to banish the horse from the battlefield. The reach of the lance was its great advantage, as well as its concentration of the entire momentum of the mass of horse and rider upon a single penetrating point. Both horses and fleeing infantry could be speared by trained lancers. The sabre, the weapon of the hussar, was shorter, but also of use as a thrusting weapon. Its advocates argued for its superiority in the melee (the close

MOUNTED WARFARE combat in the aftermath of a charge), during which the lance went from useful weapon to useless encumbrance. Canterac led his lancers in a headlong charge into Bolivar's lighter troops, the rebel llaneros more deadly in attack than when thrown into disorder by an enemy's onset. Canterac's timing was perfect, for he hit Bolivar's cavalry before they could form a proper line and at least offer the discouragement of ranked lances to his onset. It was a squadron of Bolivar's hussars, under Colonel Suarez (1799-1846), w h o saved the day for the Liberator. Left off to the side of main scrum of combat, the swordsmen fell upon the Spanish rear and shattered Canterac's formation. The Royalists withdrew after an hour's hard lighting, with 345 dead to Bolivar's loss of 150 men. Bolivar chose not to follow Canterac into the Royalist bastion at Cuzco, and took a smaller force to the coast. Sucre remained in the central highlands with approximately 9000 troops.

The stage was set for the final climactic struggle at Ayacucho that December. Both sides expected the battle to be decisive, and neither was in a hurry to engage. From the beginning of the campaign, Bolivar had kept his followers in the uplands to acclimatize them to the altitude and the winter weather of the Andean highlands, while de La Serna methodically prepared infantry, artillery and helmeted cavalry for a set-piece extirpation of the rebels in Peru. While it is dangerous for a rebel army to stake their cause and success upon a single large-scale engagement, it is also dangerous to refuse such a battle. Legitimacy often depends upon the ability to face and defeat the old regime upon its o w n terms. In October 1824, Generals Canterac and Valdez combined their armies under de La Serna's personal command at Cuzco.The combined force of approximately 9000 infantry and 1300 cavalry began carefully manoeuvring towards Sucre's position in the highlands, Sucre moving out to meet them. Each side had its o w n goal in selecting a battlefield. The Royalists moved with the objective of positioning themselves in between Sucre and the coast, which would cut off reinforcement and resupply. De La Serna also wanted a position where his vastly larger artillery train could be brought into the fighting, and where there would be no retreat and reorganization for the rebels. Sucre had his o w n priorities, twice offering battle in plains where rivers could protect his men. H y p o x i a Heights De La Serna did not allow himself to be rushed into battle on the enemy's choice of ground. Instead, he chose a battlefield that enabled his horsemen to cut off and destroy whatever parts of Sucre's forces could be caught away from the main army. Some accounts suggest that he isolated Sucre entirely by destroying bridges and placing V I C T O R Y O N THE HEIGHTS. Martin Tovar y Tovar's painting depicts the aftermath of Ayacucho. The savagery of the actual fighting was a marked contrast to the humane treattnent of the defeated and wounded de La Serna, who lived to return to Spain after signing terms ending Spanish political control of South America.

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MOUNTED WARFARE roadblocks across the routes leading out of the Plain of Ayacucho, where the final battle took place. More mention should perhaps be made of the altitude of the battlefield: it takes its name from the heights that dominate it, which are known by a Quinoa Indian word meaning 'the corner of the dead'. Near the village of Quinoa, where the actual battle took place, the elevation is 3353m (11,000ft). It is worth noting that US flyers in World War II were expected to don oxygen masks at a lower altitude - 3048m (10,000ft). At such an elevation, hypoxia becomes a factor. The body's inability to secure oxygen to replenish depleted haemoglobin has an effect on the physical and mental performance of both man and beast. Alert to the problem, Bolivar ordered Sucre to keep his men in the mountains: over the course of weeks, the body can produce enough extra red blood cells to mitigate the effects. Cuzco, where de La Serna had consolidated his forces, is at approximately the same altitude as the Plain of Ayacucho, but any Royalist troops drawn up from the Pacific coast are likely to have suffered some physical impairment in the battle. Sucre's horses had suffered in the Andean winter, to the extent that some companies of cavalry had to be mounted on hardier mules from the baggage train. Both rebels and Royalists were low on supplies and morale, the rebels suffering during their longer sojourn in the high country from the attacks and harassment of what remained of the local Indian population. Guarded Friendliness The final disposition of battle could not have looked particularly appealing to Sucre and his subordinates when both armies drew up against each other on the night of 8 December. De La Serna sent a battalion of his own light infantry to the base of the Condorcanqui Heights overlooking the battlefield, with the intention of occupying the advantageous high ground the following day. Sucre drew up his own line of skirmishers opposite and there was some initial sparring as well as some fraternizing between family members and acquaintances on the opposing side. Both armies had suffered from desertion to the extent of surrounding their bivouacs with a picket line. On this occasion, perhaps, both Sucre and de La Serna

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might have hoped for some advantage from lastminute changes of heart. On the morning of 9 December, the Royalists began the movement of men and artillery onto the heights from which they could descend onto Sucre's line of three divisions. The left was led by General La Mar (1778-1830); de La Serna himself led the centre, his cavalry reserve in the rear led by the British expatriate General William Miller (1795-1861); and on the right was a force of cavalry commanded by the Colombian General Jose Maria Cordova (1799-1829), supported by infantry. Up and Into Battle De La Serna had his own plan for the battle. General Valdez, two battalions of infantry and two squadrons of the Royalist cavalry moved out under cover of the night northwards to a position from which they could fall upon the rebels' left. Sucre's approach was correspondingly brilliant: as the Royalists began arranging their line on the heights, he sent Cordova's combined division, cavalry foremost, pounding uphill in a spoiling attack. With the advantage of height and a clear view of the enemy, the Royalists moved to engage, but in a disordered formation that allowed the rebel llaneros and hussars to inflict serious damage and prevent any attempts at re-establishing formation. Cordova himself was a legendarily fierce and inspiring leader, who killed his own uninjured horse just as his cavalry engaged, declaring to his troops that, since he could not escape, the only choice was for commander and men to fight it out together. In the middle, Sucre and de La Serna threw their infantry at each other, both sides venting at the enemy the rage resulting from years of protracted warfare and months of an Andean winter. In Sucre's ranks were the last of the British and Irish mercenary units, their ranks largely filled out, over the course of the years, with South Americans trained and commanded by the surviving European officers. The shock of close infantry combat largely negated the Royalist advantage in artillery, and in the course of the fighting de La Serna himself was incapacitated by a wound as the rebels moved grimly up the hillside. With a resulting lack of central leadership,

MOUNTED WARFARE

Spanish Colonial Soldado de Cuera (1820) The seldom paid and always vital 'Leather

soldado de cuera more typically fought

Coat' of the Spanish colonial system was the

horseback with a lance and an adarga, a

main means of extending Spanish control and protecting Spanish and Creole settlers throughout Spain's possessions in the New World. Officially a dragoon, a

from

shield copied from Spain's ancient enemies, the Moors. Lack of powder for his musket prompted proficiency

with the lance and short

sword, while the shield and his heavy buckskin cuirass offered some protection against the weapons and tactics of the natives. By law equal in status to regular Spanish troops, a soldado de cuera received a triple allotment of six horses and a mule to support his duties in the defence of the Spanish frontier

presidios and in the long

patrols in small detachments along the roads in between.

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Battle of Ayacucho 1824

Setting the stage for a final, decisive battle, both the Royalist de La Serna and Antonio Jose de Sucre y Alcala, Bolivar's most talented subordinate, gathered

Both armies decide on battle . and encamp near the foot of the heights. Sentries surround both camps to prevent a surprise night attack and to stop fraternizing between friends and family on each side.

I

ililj

their forces and manoeuvred against each other in the Andean highlands around the town of Ayacucho. Both sides took their time in selecting a proper battlefield. The Royalists occupied the high ground with well-equipped cavalry and artillery, factors which have determined more than one military victory for the side possessing them. Sucre, however, had the remnants of Bolivar's cadre of British and

Now in position, Valdez threatens to roll up the entire rebel army with his flank attack. General Miller throws the rebel cavalry reserve at Valdez. The Royalists fall back. „

5

other European mercenaries, and experienced and well-motivated officers of his own. When the Spanish got ready to make their assault, Sucre launched a spoiling attack that negated the Royalists' artillery, and with a powerful reserve of his own was able to defeat a long-maturing Spanish flank attack towards the battle's end.

As the Royalists form a forward line of battle on the heights, Sucre sends Cordova's mixed infantry and cavalry division in a headlong spoiling attack into the Royalists.

3 Its distance from Bolivar's earlier victories and Spanish access to the coast made Peru the final battleground of the long, grinding war for South America's liberation from Spain.

82 k.

K

ttli

MOUNTED

WARFARE

The next morning, General Valdez takes two battalions of Royalist infantry, two squadrons of cavalry and supporting cannon on a flanking attack. They move stealthily downwards from the heights during the course of the fighting.

2 ROYALIST CAMP ( D E LA S E R N A )

6

Sucre continues 'TO his advance, crushing the Royalists' efforts to maintain a line and bringing victory to the Rebels.

CONDORCANQUI HEIGHTS

P L A I N OF AYACUCHO

Sucre's units close with the Royalists, who respond with equal fury. In the shock of close combat, the Royalist's advantage in artillery disappears, the gunners unable to fire into the mass of the struggling armies.

4

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MOUNTED WARFARE returned to Spain, where his conduct of the war the Royalist centre gave way, men scrambling back won him the court's approval despite his defeat. up the steep incline of the heights with their He died there in 1832. Simon Bolivar found his backs to the rebels' musketry and lances. dream of a united South America fading under the At that dramatic moment in the fighting, Valdez revolts and distrust of his followers, including and his encircling force fell hard upon the rebels' Cordova, who rebelled against his authority in left, having marched several kilometres in 1829- After the news came in 1830 of Sucre's preparation for exactly that possibility. Sucre's assassination while riding home to Ecuador from a impending victory teetered on the edge of defeat, summit in Venezuela, Bolivar remained in exile in with his own troops thrown into severe disorder Colombia until his own death from tuberculosis by the fighting and the subsequent pursuit of the later that year. The lasting achievement of both men Spanish up onto the high ground. Fortunately, was the end of Spanish General Miller, in charge of control of South America. Sucre's still unengaged 'The battle of Ayacucho is the cavalry reserve, had enough Big Horn: courage to act without climax of American glory, and Little 25-26 June 1876 orders in an emergency, and There is a certain charged his men, mules and the work of General Sucre. symmetry to the history of horses into Valdez's The arrangement for this battle the wars between the unprotected flank. The last States and the organized body of Royalist was perfect, and the execution United assorted peoples of the troops on the field collapsed. divine.... fust as the battle of North American continent. A constant theme in the Waterloo decided the destinies struggle was a clash Final Victory between two incompatible When Sucre and his army of European nations, so did styles of existence. Indian reached the summit farmers in New England of the heights, they found the battle of Ayacucho decide practised a sustainable, General Canterac prepared the fate of the nations of simple form of agriculture to negotiate surrender, that allowed them to plant having taken command of Spanish America...' and then leave their what remained of the combinations of crops Royalists. Only a few — SIMON BOLIVAR which the feral hogs of the Royalist holdouts remained Massachusetts colonists in Peru, which Sucre set uprooted when they were about reducing after turned loose into the areas in which the Indians' receiving the congratulations and admiration of crops were growing. Both sides resented the Bolivar upon the Liberator's return. Casualties at consequent destruction of their food supplies; the Ayacucho were approximately 2000 killed and the Indians killed the animals, while the damage to viceroy and his generals captured, with 1100 rebel their crops literally threatened their survival dead testifying to the ferocity of the fighting. The during the winter. These simple but contrasting rebel cavalry could be seen in the aftermath of the methods of farming made it inevitable that the battle searching the lines of the Royalist retreat for Europeans and the North Americans would come the silver helmets of the enemy hussars, such into conflict. prime booty disappearing into the haversacks of the conquering llaneros. On the very day of the battle, de La Serna had Different Ways of Living and Killing been created Conde (Count) de los Andes by King Fighting in Indian territory began long before the Ferdinand VII. Recovering from his wound, he first settlers landed in Jamestown and built the

84

MOUNTED WARFARE first English fort - as a protection against the Spanish. The Virginia and, later, Massachusetts colonies inserted themselves into an overall culture where it was quite customary for one tribe to invade and lay claim to the territories of another. At Martin's Hundred in 1622 and in the course of King Philip's War of 1675-76, the Indians made the customary response to such incursions: attacks upon the nearest representatives of the trespassing ethnic group, accompanied by profitable looting and traditional mutilation of the enemy dead. In many Indian cultures, raiding a hostile ethnic group offered profit and glory. In most of the colonized areas, Indians quite often lacked any recourse but violence to avenge robbery, assault or murder by the Europeans. The European concept of 'non-combatant' was unknown: any European was, in effect, a member of the hostile tribe, and as such, a target for action. Glory and loot were a part of the Indian wars with each other; the property of

the Europeans was usually even more desirable and a reason for fighting. The European response to the Indians became correspondingly savage, their counter-attacks gaining additional ferocity from the colonists' outrage at their enemy's style of fighting and their o w n superior military techniques. That said, military technology was only part - and by no means the most important part - of the Europeans' edge, all the way down to Little Big Horn t w o centuries later, and beyond. In close combat, the colonists found themselves adopting the Indian tomahawk as a superior weapon, while EASY T O MOVE, HARD T O FIND. The tipis of the Plains Indian tribes evolved quickly along with the nomadic lifestyle allowed by the horse's return to the North American continent. Buffalo hide and 'lodge pole'pines made their construction light and simple, but they offered only limited protection from the winter cold and none at all against the White Man's bullets.

85

MOUNTED WARFARE from a relatively early period the Indians stole or even bought firearms from their enemy. Colonial groups learned over the decades to match the Indians' tactics of ambush and forest warfare. Renegades such as the infamous Simon Girty gave the Indians valuable insights and direction in their attacks upon the American frontier, while the colonists learned early on the old Roman principle of 'divide and conquer'. Tribes fighting the Europeans had traditional enemies of their own, who were almost always delighted to assist the newcomers by scouting against their hereditary foes, and sometimes even by fighting them. Cabin versus Tipi What ultimately gave the colonists the decisive advantage was the very nature of their own civilization - expressed in the military area in the form of logistics. The colonists made permanent, intensive use of hitherto unoccupied, or at least under-utilized, territory: their substantial homes and barns may have offered valuable targets for Indian raiding or vengeance, but they could also become improvised blockhouses, enabling the colonists to resist and rally. Later, the central governments of the new colonies, and then the United States, were able to extract from distant areas men and resources that no single tribe could match, moving them against the Indians through a network of road and river transportation. Nor were confederacies of tribes a match for the United States. The favoured tactic of the colonists in attacking the Indians was to set forth for the nearest large native community in overwhelming force. Trying to stop individual small raiding parties was, to quote a phrase, 'hunting a wasp all over the farm'. If a general such as Anthony Wayne or William Henry Harrison (1773-1841) wanted the Indians to stand and fight - as, respectively, at Fallen Timbers in 1794, and Tippecanoe in 1811 the obvious course was to attack a target the natives had to defend. Winter stores and habitation were no less vital to the Indians than to the Americans, and not to defend them was to invite disaster. Little Big Horn was one more effort to bring native tribes to bay by a sudden strike upon

86

a community and a vital pony herd, which the Indians were certain to stand and defend. In the eastern regions, the large permanent settlements of tribes such as the Iroquois and Shawnee were inviting targets. The more nomadic culture practised by the Plains tribes allowed the Indians an asymmetric advantage. Every Cheyenne Dog Soldier knew where Denver grew at the confluence of the Platte and Cherry Creek, with its fringe of outlying ranches and farms. Raiding parties from that military society never camped twice at the same place, and then disappeared into the larger mass of their tribe, whose villages of lodges moved regularly after the buffalo herds. The establishment of any sort of order or detente was undermined by constant reprisals. Upon hearing of theft or murder on the part of the Americans, the Plains Indians would launch raids in retaliation upon farm or ranch people, who were almost never connected to the perpetrators of the original atrocity. Indian raiders drew similar responses by the colonists against hunting parties and even trading parties that were often uninvolved, and which were quite often from tribes hostile to the raiders themselves or from the camps of older 'Peace Chiefs' who had urged their uncontrollable young men towards the exercise of restraint. With the Americans having their own full share of the murderous and the lawless, it was very easy for the entire frontier to explode on the slightest provocation. The Road to Little Big Horn Matters in the plains would converge horribly and disastrously - for the 7th Cavalry in June 1876. In the years before the American Civil War, what there was of the US Army busied itself protecting the scattered settlements in the plains, operating out of a series of small forts such as Fort Philip Kearney in South Dakota. When the fighting between the Union and Confederacy erupted, amazed Indians watched detachment after detachment of the Federal dragoons moving out of their posts eastwards. The Plains warriors, who had long wanted to believe that the Americans had overextended themselves, saw in this the evidence to support that wishful thinking.

I

M O U N T E D WARFARE

Nez Perce Warrior (1876) Until pushed too far by encroaching settlers, the warriors of the Nez Perce tribe had assisted Lewis and Clark in 1805 and previously boasted that they had never killed a white man. That all changed after the son of a murdered warrior initiated a series of raids that killed at least 18 settlers in 1877. Led into flight by Chief Joseph, 150 warriors and 550 of their families sought refuge from white vengeance and

A

deportation in Canada. Colonel Nelson Miles intercepted the cold and starving survivors near the border after a 2735km

(1700-mile)

retreat in which they had fought off every attack by the Army. A buffalo robe warms the warrior and the hardy Appaloosa horse that the tribe had bred. War paint, feathers and fine beadwork mark this warrior's wealth and status, and his fighting equipment consists of a short bow and a rawhide shield with markings to indicate his career and achievements. Miles and General Howard were able to secure better treatment for the tribe, which returned to a reservation in Washington after a disastrous sojourn in Oklahoma Territory.

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MOUNTED WARFARE Even as war raged in the East, and in some parts of the West, the flow of miners, settlers and fugitives from the fighting continued unabated through and into territories the Indians considered theirs. In fact, in many areas, such as eastern Colorado, they had written guarantees to prove it. Protests by the Peace Chiefs availed nothing, but retaliatory and simple pillaging raids by disgruntled Arapaho and Cheyenne war parties set in motion a fatal series of events. Sand Creek John Francis Chivington (1821-1894) was a failed Methodist minister and a subordinate sharer in the glory of Glorietta Pass, the 1862 battle that saved Colorado and the western gold and silver mines for the Union. A crazy preacher who thinks he is Napoleon Bonaparte' was one contemporary's

accurate and unflattering portrait, but the laurels of the Glorietta Pass enabled Chivington to raise the 3rd Colorado Cavalry from Denver and its surrounding area; the ongoing raids of the Dog Soldiers left behind spectacularly mutilated corpses for display. The news that the Cheyenne had closed the road to the East through Kansas stoked anxiety to a critical level in June of 1863. It seemed that Denver was an isolated outpost of civilization that was about to be engulfed in a flood of warring braves. Black Kettle (c. 1803-1868) was a Cheyenne chief of considerable prestige in one of the more organized tribes. He was now doing his best to preserve his people and reduce tensions by moving his band of 500 Cheyenne to an agreed 'safe area' on the banks of Sand Creek, 64km (40 miles) from the nearest Army post at Fort Lyons. Undoubtedly, raiding parties had their origins among the 200 increasingly angry braves of the camp. Just as unquestionably, Chivington's onslaught with the 700 members of his command found few 'hostiles' among the women, elderly and children they butchered at Sand Creek as mothers pleaded in vain for their children's lives. Chivington's order had been to 'Kill and scalp all, nits make lice!' Surviving Indians, including Black Kettle, had the mutilated corpses of their own people to remind them of the increasing savagery of the American colonists. After initial uninformed praise for his 'victory', Chivington resigned, escaping discharge and arrest by the Army for exploits that horrified even so grim a cavalryman as the celebrated Philip Sheridan (1831-1888). The damage was done, however, as the infuriated Cheyenne and Arapaho turned the trans-Mississippi West into a gigantic war zone. The Bluecoats Return The end of the Civil War did not engulf the warring tribes in a flood of veteran soldiers - the ' Y E L L O W H A I R ' . Last in his class at West Point, Custer had an at times sloppy command style but did not lack for dash and flamboyance. He combined courage and enterprise with a deplorable lack of attention to detail that killed many of his command and ultimately himself.

88

MOUNTED WARFARE Sitting Bull's vision of 'bluecoats'falling into the camp along the Little Big Horn River prompted the stand of the Sioux and Cheyenne that destroyed Custer. Surrendering to the Army in 1881, Sitting Bull argued against the sale of Indian lands and toured with Buffalo Bill before his death in 1889 in the prelude to a massacre of the Sioux at Wounded Knee. A DREAMER, NOT A WARRIOR

US tradition of dissolving a victorious military reduced an army of hundreds of thousands down to 54,000 men by 1866 and just 27,000 by 1874. The soldiers choosing to stay in the service were men who could not find or chose not to seek work elsewhere, some because they had few skills, others because they had become supremely skilled at a fascinating and dangerous job. The veterans of battlefields such as Shiloh, the Wilderness and Nashville, who did leave the Army, found employment that made use of their skills. When Indian raiding parties descended upon construction crews laying the tracks of the transcontinental railway, they found that the crews simply turned to the long racks of'Armory Cars', which held scores of surplus Model 1863 Springfields. These they used to repel the attackers with a practised ferocity. As had been the case in the fighting on the East Coast, the railway brought the US Army a considerable advantage: once the rail lines had met at Promontory Point in May 1869, it would never have to operate prohibitively far from the supplies and reinforcements available at a railhead. The railway also made possible largescale exploitation of the buffalo herds upon which the Plains Indians depended, and the great slaughter began. Tactics and Massacres Broken treaties, traditional raiding and American incursions into Indian land provoked additional troubles to the north and south of Sand Creek's bloody killing field. The great Dakota chief Red Cloud (1822?-1909) fought one of the few victorious wars against the United States from 1865 to 1867. In addition to the hit and melt away' tactics favoured by the Plains tribes, Red Cloud and the Sioux who fought under his leadership developed successful tactics of their own. One was simply to wait for the new arrivals

to move out from prepared defences in a small enough parcel for the warriors to take full advantage. The arrogance of Captain William Fetterman (1833?-1866), who boasted that he could ride through the entire Sioux nation with 80 men, prompted him to take out a wood-cutting party of 81 soldiers and three civilians far beyond the protection of Fort Philip Kearney's walls. A small force of Indians appeared, led by a young Crazy Horse (c. 1840-1877). Pursuing these, Fetterman found himself lured into an effective prepared ambush that left not a single member of the party alive. Another favoured tactic of the Indians was to goad the whites into firing and then to rush in on horseback for extremely close combat, in which their bone breastplates and leather shields could still offer protection.The most honourable form of warfare among the Plains tribes was to 'count

89

MOUNTED WARFARE

G O O D GUN, BAD CARTRIDGE Early recipients of this US M1873 carbine in the .45-70 (10mm) government calibre found the gun quick to load, accurate and powerful but with a tendency for the cartridge's brass head to separate from the copper casing.

coup' with one's hand or a special short stick, the touch of which upon an enemy's skin brought great glory to the warrior w h o survived such potentially fatal proximity. Humiliation proving insufficient to stop the blue columns, the Indians were capable of employing stone maces, knives and the tomahawk with considerable effect. At point-blank range, even the Neolithic b o w and arrow was sufficiently lethal. Moreover, abandoned wagon wheels left iron rims from which the Indians were soon forging improved and lethal arrowheads. Technology played a trick upon Red Cloud's warriors when they charged another wood-cutting party the year after Fetterman's disaster.There were far fewer foragers than there were Sioux, estimated at 1000. The bluecoats fired and the Sioux charged in. The 37 men under Captain James W. Powell had no more protection than a circle of wagons and what looked like issue muskets.They were the issue muskets, but these were Model 1866 Springfields, which fired a tremendously powerful .50-calibre (12.5mm) cartridge from a hinged breech. With the protection and ammunition in those wagons, Powell and his men withstood the attacks of the Indians until a force from Fort Philip Kearney rescued them and completed the repulse of Red Cloud's men. The government nonetheless evacuated Red Cloud's territory under treaty, and in 1868 Red Cloud had the satisfaction of burning Fort Philip Kearney to the ground. Battle of the Washita In that same year, the US Army finally hit upon the tactic that doomed the Indians of the plains, even if it likewise doomed George Armstrong Custer and much of his command. The rigours of the prairie winters were severe enough for the white settlers in

90

their 'soddies' of turves or in the framed wooden buildings of the towns of Wyoming and Colorado. For the Native Americans, in lodges of skin and pine poles on the treeless plains, winter was a perennial trial of basic survival: their fuel and fodder, scarce enough under good conditions, were further restricted by the white settlements that were springing up in the wooded and sheltered areas. In addition, at such times, the Indians left tell-tale traces of their movements in the snow, compromising their celebrated ability to manoeuvre. George Armstrong Custer had twin distinctions before his most celebrated claim to fame. In 1861, he graduated from West Point at the very bottom of his class, and in 1863, at the age of 23, he became the youngest brigadier-general in American military history. Custer's exuberance and daring won him the patronage of Philip Sheridan. On one occasion Sheridan, wondering at the depth of a river, found Custer riding into it up to his neck and answering, This deep!' Sheridan's sponsorship survived the Civil War, even after Custer rode into the Confederate Lines near Appomattox Courthouse and personally demanded the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia from a bewildered and outraged General James Longstreet (1824-1901). General Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885) disliked the presumptuous young cavalry officer, a feeling that would endure into Grant's presidency and after Custer's infamous death. The end of the Civil War found Custer reverting to his permanent rank of lieutenant-colonel. During November 1868, he led the 7th US Cavalry along an Indian trail that, by its presence off a designated reservation, automatically classified the village at the trail's end as hostile. At dawn on 26 November, Custer and his troopers entered the sleeping camp and opened a pitiless fire. As luck

MOUNTED WARFARE would have it, the encampment was that of Chief Black Kettle, w h o perished along with 100 of his remaining people. Custer's success in tracking and destroying the village did much to restore his old image of the dashing cavalryman, but those under his command in the 7th would not forget in the years to come the deaths of Major Joel Elliot (1840-1868) and 19 of his command. Custer had not carefully scouted the entirety of the battlefield, and enraged warriors boiling out from neighbouring encampments drove Custer and the 7th into withdrawal and the abandonment of Elliot and his men, w h o w e r e slaughtered by the avenging Cheyenne. Greasy Grass Gold had largely drawn the miners and settlers to Colorado and infuriated the Cheyenne: the rumour of gold drew more miners and settlers into the Black Hills of South Dakota and stimulated the powerful Sioux tribes into renewed uproar. In 1874, Custer led the 7th to investigate the situation in the Sioux's sacred Black Hills, and

returned with the news that there was indeed gold to be found in the lands that were guaranteed to the Indians by treaty. Traditional differences between the Indian tribes faded under shared outrages and a sense of wrong, and the Northern Cheyenne and much of the Sioux tribe left their reservations in arms for the Montana Territory. In the summer of 1876, General Alfred H.Terry (1827-1890) led an infantry column in pursuit, the 7th given the traditional scouting role of cavalry in the vanguard. A second infantry column under General George Crook was to converge with the other two bodies once Custer had located the main concentration of the hostiles. With a third column under Colonel Gibbon (1827-1896) also dispatched, the Army had sent a total of 3000 men against the collected Indians.The Army had no real Indians with Winchesters chase panicked troopers in the sketchbook of Amos Bad Heart Buffalo, produced sometime after 1894 while he was serving as an Army scout. His drawings represent an Oglala Sioux's early understanding of the wars that ended the tribe's way of living. ARMS RACE.

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MOUNTED WARFARE

7th Cavalryman (1876) Forged in Civil War, the cavalryman

returning

to the Western plains after 1865 was a betterequipped and better-led combatant than the Sioux had driven from the Bozeman Trail just a few years before. This sergeant carries a breech-loading

carbine

firing a 405-grain soft lead bullet with tremendous range and stopping power. His issue Colt revolver is reliable and rugged, if slow to load. Cartridges for both at this time could be carried in a hand-stitched cartridge belt or the more traditional cartridge box on the trooper's belt. His bedroll probably contained a 'housewife', a sewing kit containing

thread, patches, needle and

cloth to mend clothing in the field. A map case hangs from a strap around his neck; a canteen and tin cup from the saddle. Model 1859 saddle bags hold his rations, eating utensils and possibly a book or two for comfort in the field. He sits on the legendary McClellan saddle, I \

an early invention of the celebrated general. Designed to be more comfortable for the trooper's Quarter Horse than for the rider, it completely fulfilled that design specification.

92

MOUNTED WARFARE misgivings. He called his battalion commanders way of knowing that Crazy Horse and Sitting Bull, together on the morning of 25 June and warned with other chiefs, had collected a force of them that they could be about to engage as many approximately equal strength, along with as many as 1500 warriors. as 10,000 of their families. This immense With his ammunition train left lightly guarded conglomeration, supported by a large pony herd, in his rear, Custer divided his single regiment into was camped at a bend of the Little Big Horn River. its four component but understrength battalions. The Indian name for the region - Greasy Grass He took two himself, putting Major Marcus A. Reno comes from the appearance of the vegetation, (1834-1889) in command of the next strongest which does indeed look greasy in the summer sun. and Captain Frederick On 24 June, Custer's Benteen (1834-1898) in Indian scouts located first 'Colonel Custer moved with his charge of the fourth. Custer the ponies, and then what ordered Benteen to the Indians reported as the immediate command on the perform a reconnaissance largest village they had ever to the regiment's left, seen. Custer dismissed his trail followed by Reno to a preventing the Indians scouts' misgivings, having point within about one mile of from dispersing to the been unable to see more south. Major Reno was to than isolated Indians the river, where he diverged to head directly into the previously. His orders gave village across the river in a him latitude to attack or the right (or northward) holding action, while wait for Crook and Terry as following the general direction Custer w o u l d move the he saw fit. When his scouts furthest to the west and reported that hostiles of the river to a point about complete the envelopment had spotted the 7th, and destruction of the an impression reinforced four miles below that assembled Sioux and when some Indians looted Cheyenne. an upset pack mule before afterwards taken by Major the animal could be As Reno moved down Reno, where he and his retrieved, Custer decided to into the valley of the Little rush into an attack before command were destroyed by Big Horn, he received a the village could disperse runner from Custer telling or Crook and Terry could him to move forward as the hostiles.' reach him. fast as prudent, and that - US ARMY COURT OF INQUIRY, the entire regiment would support him. Later that Four Battalions 1879 morning, Captain Benteen It is a basic axiom of received a hastily scribbled warfare that a commander message: Benteen - Come should never divide his on. Big village. Be quick. Bring packs. P.S. Bring forces in the face of superior numbers. Robert E. Packs.' Custer's request for support and Lee had got away with that in Custer's presence, ammunition was the last communication any but Custer had not found out to his o w n of the survivors of Little Big Horn w o u l d satisfaction the numbers of warriors in the village ever receive. he planned to attack. He might have found some evidence for his scouts' warnings in the actions of some on the night before he planned his attack, which included giving away their worldly possessions and painting themselves for death. And he does seem, belatedly, to have had

River, Timber, Hill Reno, like Custer, had received a brevet (honorary) commission to brigadier-general for his valour in the Civil War and had had a solid, if unspectacular,

93

MOUNTED

WARFARE

Battle of Little Big Horn 1876

Massacres of whites and Indians alike had taken the situation on the western Plains to a point where only decisive violence could provide a final resolution. The numerous and powerful Sioux tribes and the organized and militarily skilled Northern Cheyenne left their reservations in the late spring of 1876, with the unmistakable intention of resisting C

the US Government's authority. The Army's response consisted of a powerful force of nearly 3000 infantry and cavalry in pursuit, unaware that the total agglomeration of Indian warriors was approximately equal in number. Custer's orders and his own desires allowed him to rush into the attack with less than a third of the total force, the result being the most resounding defeat the United States Army ever suffered in the wars against the Indians and the

Either because of Custer's own death or his last command decision, the final remnant of his portion of the 7th stop their flight on 'Custer Hill', where the^ are butchered by the warriors ancI their wives.

3

Native Americans' final vengeance upon the hated 'Yellow Hair'.

CANADA

LITTLE BIG HORN 4*

• SALT LAKE CITY

V

SAN FRANCISCO With Custer forgetting his own promise of support, Custer's individual companies attack the village or encounter groups of Indians under their own war chiefs boiling out of the village in a ferocious response.

3

INDIAN CAMP

The drainage of the Big Horn River was prime country for buffalo or cattle, making even its empty prairie a source of contention between the Indians and settlers, culminating in a violent and conclusive resolution.

94

COY

MOUNTED

4

/

Custer's command begins to disintegrate as his movement towards the north becomes a rout and retreat. Individual units make their own 'last stands' as they try to escape destruction.

WARFARE

Drawing closer to the village along the banks of the Little Big Horn, Custer divides his regiment into three sections, sending Major Reno directly into the village, Benteen on a reconnaissance mission, and moving his own two-battalion force off with the idea of containing and flanking the village.

2

Generals Terry and Crook send Custer's 7th Cavalry ahead to locate the village and vital pony herd of the missing tribes. Custer's Indian scouts return with a report of the largest village they have ever seen, a claim Custer dismisses as exaggerated.

1

95

MOUNTED WARFARE career. With 175 men, Reno rode down to the river valley, crossed the river and advanced towards what Reno realized was an immense village some 3km (2 miles) in the distance. As swarms of warriors led by the Oglala Sioux chief Low Dog poured out to meet him, Reno sent reports to Custer of what he had encountered, and formed a skirmish line next to a clump of trees. There, one in four of his troopers held the battalion's horses

[tjtaCS

96

while they waited for Custer's promised support, realizing that their commander-in-chief had no understanding at all of the enemy's overwhelming strength. Within 30 minutes, Reno's command was outnumbered by a factor of five and in Keough received a wooden testimonial from his comrades before the permanent marble tribute marking the spot where his stripped but unmutilated body was found.

MYLES K E O U G H REMEMBERED.

MOUNTED WARFARE danger of being engulfed by the onrushing Sioux train into the perimeter saved the surviving 379 and Cheyenne. With his troopers and scouts men w h o had ridden forth with Custer. reporting Custer moving away from him and to the east, Reno tried to form a perimeter in the Custer's Last Stand clump of trees and then led his command in a The modern visitor to the battlefield can trace the disorganized retreat to the summit of the bluff final results of the battle. Shallow indentations still just across the river that still bears the name remain where Reno and Benteen's troopers lay in Reno Hill. a horseshoe-shaped depression around the A third of his men became casualties, Reno's summit of the bluff, behind ammunition and understanding of the situation hammered home ration boxes and the bodies of some of their when a bullet splattered the blood and brains of animals. Along the bluffs to the west, behind the senior scout of the 7th, which Custer led his final Bloody Knife (1840-1876), advance, a line of marble 'About the middle of the night markers testifies with a fair into his eyes. A small force of the Indians kept Reno's we heard a trumpet call, and amount of accuracy to the battalion pinned down on spot w h e r e this or that the men commenced to cheer, pocket of troopers and the bluff while the bulk of the warriors moved in the scouts fell, the line leading thinking it was Custer's men ever further away f r o m direction Custer had taken to the east. Reno had lost Reno Hill. Some 6km who were coming to our 40 dead and 13 wounded, (4 miles) from what including his unit surgeon. proved to be the only assistance. Major Reno defensible position on the ordered one of our trumpeters battlefield, a cluster of Benteen Moves U p markers and an obelisk Having received Custer's to sound a call, but it was marks w h e r e the burial final message, Benteen details found the body of observed Reno's repulse not repeated, so we made George Armstrong Custer and the size of the up our minds that it was and the last men of his Indian encampment from command. In the smoky a distance and moved a decoy on the part of distance, Reno and towards the point where Benteen waited in vain for the messenger and his o w n the Indians....' Custer's promised support, scouts placed Custer's t w o - JOHN M. RYAN, 1ST SERGEANT, hearing gunfire in the battalions. En route, his distance but finding only battalion encountered COMPANY M, 7TH CAVALRY more and more Indians Reno's men on the summit swarming up the side of of the bluff, finding them the bluff to take them digging rifle pits and under fire as the night of the 25th finally fell. wishing that spades had been part of their kit. The memory of what had happened to Elliot and Reports from warriors fighting under the his men when Custer had withdrawn from the leadership of Chief Crazy Horse and Chief Gall Washita could not have been far from the minds (c. 1840-1895), a giant of a man, reinforce the of any of the men, and Benteen, w h o had been at markers' evidence of the piecemeal disintegration the Washita, made no effort to conceal his disdain of Custer and his command. More and more of the for Custer. Benteen moved his battalion into the braves ran to the sound of the guns and completed line along with Reno's, while survivors from the the destruction of Custer and his men on what is valley fight joined them or were killed within called Custer Hill. Several companies of Reno's and their view. Benteen's decision to order the pack Benteen's commands did make an effort to move

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MOUNTED WARFARE towards the sound of distant firing, but got no further than the area called Weir Point after the captain w h o first set out in the attempt to reach Custer. Every man in the 7th faced a crisis of personal survival, which many of the Indian scouts met by arranging their clothing in Sioux fashion and exfiltrating from the battlefield. Repeaters versus a Single Shot Modern historians and archaeologists have made an exhaustive analysis of what time has left of the bones and equipment of Custer's men. Relatively large numbers of Winchester cartridge cases indicate that the Indians were in possession of Henry and Winchester Model 1866 and 1873 rifles, firing cartridges that were easily lethal at the range at which the Indians traditionally fought.The troopers carried the superlative Model 1873 Colt Reno Hill, to the upper right, proved the one defensible position on the battlefield, into which Captain Benteen took the ammunition train, which allowed slightly more than half of the 7th Cavalry to survive the carnage. BATTLE OF LITTLE BIG H O R N .

Single Action Army revolver, a powerful and accurate weapon. Indeed, its sole defect (as seldom depicted in any artistic representation) was the amount of time required for reloading too much, for Custer's troopers. Under showers of arrows and shots from Winchester or Spencer repeaters, a defect in the cartridges issued for the troopers'Model 1873 Springfield carbines became disastrously apparent. As the weapons' breeches heated, the composite copper walls of the case separated from the brass rim, leaving the weapon unable to fire until the ruptured cartridge could be removed - if the trooper lived long enough to do this. The carbine nonetheless saved the day on Reno Hill, for its powerful and accurate cartridge kept the Indians at a distance from Reno and Benteen's perimeter, with Captain Thomas H. French (1843-1882) digging out ruptured cartridge cases with his knife and exchanging repaired carbines for those disabled on the firing line. The diversion of the pack train into Reno's perimeter left the survivors of the 7th able to meet the attacks of the following day, 26 June, suffering 59 casualties over the course of the two days. The

Reno and Benteen's final position

Custer's last stand

Reno's advance Reno's retreat

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Issued to the troopers of Custer's command, this weapon becatne the 'Peacemaker' of many a real and Hollyivood gunfight. Its accurate ,45-calibre (lOmtn) cartridge was an immensely effective round; the revolver's only defect was the time its ejection rod required to extract and replace each fired cartridge in turn. THE M 1 8 7 3 REVOLVER.

victorious Sioux and Cheyenne finally withdrew in the evening behind the cover of a grass fire. On the 27th, Terry's column finally arrived and informed the dazed survivors of the fate of Custer and 209 of their comrades. Omdurman, 1898: A Dish Long Cold Revenge came almost immediately for Custer but waited some 13 years for General Charles Gordon (1833-1885). By September 1877, Crazy Horse had died in US custody; in July 1898, the Colonial Office was completing its preparations to avenge the death of 'Chinese' Gordon in January 1885. Prime Minister William Gladstone (1809-1898) had suffered Gordon to go to Khartoum, where the general died as the city fell, and Gladstone thought neither revenge nor the Sudan itself worth the costs required to obtain them. It was easier for the British Empire to ignore scores of thousands of hostile Sudanese than it was for the US Government to overlook the activities of 3000 or so Sioux and Cheyenne braves. The explanation comes from the differing natures of the American presence in the Western plains and the British presence in Egypt and the Sudan. The Americans wished to exploit a region and live there permanently, in great numbers. The British also wished to exploit a region, but there were not enough who wanted to live there to force military action to protect a large civilian population. In 1896, the situation changed. Robert Cecil, Lord Salisbury (1830-1903), became prime minister, and in Cairo Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916), the Sirdar of the Anglo-Egyptian Army, met Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902) to discuss

the building of a railway from Cairo to Cape Town. The native Egyptian government had begun a railway to Khartoum from the Nile port ofWadi Haifa, and this had reached Akasha in the northern Sudan. However, the same people who killed General Gordon tore up the tracks south of the frontier at Sarras for firewood, and it was clear that they would resist any effort to move the railway south again. Islamic Jihad In 1881, Muhammad Ahmad Ibn As-sayyid 'abd Allah (1844-1885), a Sudanese religious thinker, announced that Allah had appointed him to purify Islam and to strike down any government that opposed the rule of that faith. He claimed to be alMahdi, the prophesied saviour and vindicator of Islam, and moved at once against the government of Egypt. Since 1821, the Khedivate had asserted sovereignty over the Sudan and points still further south. By 1873, the British Empire had established a protectorate over Egypt, a response to the expense and strategic importance of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Also, the Khedive, directed by the British, made 'Chinese' Gordon the governor of the Sudan. Gordon set the stage for the Mahdi's success by disturbing a situation that has remained explosive to this day. The Arabic-speaking minority in the Sudan ruled the native black population and had made Sudan the largest remaining centre of the

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MOUNTED WARFARE African slave trade. Britain's aversion to the practice and Gordon's ability as an administrator allowed him to destroy the traffic in human flesh, and, incidentally, Sudan's existing economy. The Mahdi's call for jihad found scores of thousands of willing, desperate ears, including those of Osman Digna (1836-1926). A former slave trader, he proved to be a formidable general. His Beja tribe, with their unique hairstyles, became the redoubtable Fuzzy-Wuzzies' of Kipling's admiring poem of 1890.

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Abolishing the slave trade had been nearly the extent of Egyptian plans for the Sudan, and the Khedive n o w considered abandoning the province before being forced to defend it. With spears, shields and jihad, Osman Digna launched furious assaults that were more than the British-officered native Egyptian levies could withstand. At Sheykan, H E A D L O N G CHARGE T O DESTRUCTION. Warriors of the Ansar erupt from ambush, shields and swords adding to the terror created by bristling hairstyles and wailing battle cries.

MOUNTED WARFARE Anglo-Egyptian Army was able to forestall efforts of in 1883, the Mahdi's forces, the Ansar, slaughtered the Ansar to expand north into Egypt.The situation 10,000 Egyptians under the command of with regard to the Sudanese remained largely Lieutenant-General William Hicks (1830-1883), unchanged for the next 12 years. whose severed head became a trophy for the Mahdi. In the course of their assaults, the Ansar Fighting Techniques of the Sudanese Wars began to acquire a good number of Western breech-loading rifles, ammunition for which was Unlike for the Zulus far to the south, cavalry was a widely available on the world arms market, along known phenomenon to the Mahdi's Ansar, w h o with some modern artillery. fielded their own variety of horse-mounted troops w hen they had the means. At El Teb, For all his proclamations of humanitarianism, the Mahdi's horsemen had pursued fleeing Prime Minister Gladstone had always been Egyptian troops with their long spears, and came unenthusiastic about the abolition of slavery and close to completing the was supportive of the annihilation of an army of Sudanese revolt against 'We've fought with many men 11,000 men. In fighting Egyptian control. In January British infantry or cavalry, 1884, Gladstone sent acrost the seas, the Sudanese cavalry used a General Gordon with instructions - and little else An'some of 'em was brave an' tactic very similar to one employed by the Plains - to evacuate all British some was not: Indians of North America nationals and civilians w h o wished to leave the Sudan The Paythan an' the Zulu an' luring a detachment of the Westerners out from the and to withdraw all main body into a prepared Egyptian forces. Gordon's Burmese; ambush. reluctance to abandon the But the Fuzzy was the finest o' Sudanese infantry had Sudan to the Mahdi meant its o w n tactics for dealing that he hesitated to the lot....' with the British horse. withdraw those forces he Individual Ansar would had managed to raise, and a — R. KIPLING 'FUZZY-WUZZY', 1890 crouch in the brush or in month after he arrived in other hides while the the Sudanese capital of British rode over or through their positions, some Khartoum, Gordon was under siege by the Mahdi's feigning death if there had already been fighting. army. As Gordon may have intended, the Gladstone They would then try to hamstring the British administration found that his presence in the mounts, with some success, using one- or twobesieged city forced it into further involvement in handed broadswords and broad-bladed spears.The the Sudan. In August 1884, Gladstone grudgingly repeating handguns of the British troopers did, dispatched the 'Nile Expedition', which consisted however, make such close-quarter attacks costly, as of a slow infantry column of 5400 infantry and did repeating Lee-Metford cavalry carbines issued cavalry, some marching overland, others supported later. by a river fleet of cargo vessels and gunboats. Only with considerable difficulty did the expedition The disasters at Isandhlwana and other more overcome Ansar attacks and the desert, arriving at intense episodes of colonial fighting meant that, Khartoum two days after Gordon's severed head w h e r e possible, British officers and cavalry became the second of the Mahdi's trophies. Under troopers availed themselves of a class of handguns attack by some 50,000 of the Ansar, that w e r e appropriately known as 'Zulu the successful retreat of the Nile Expedition to Revolvers'. Examples of these were monsters such safety in Egypt represented a signal, if utterly as the Webley 'Pryse' of 1880 in .476 calibre useless, accomplishment.The Mahdi himself died of (10mm), or smaller but still massive handguns like illness six months after Khartoum fell, and the the Webley African' in .455 (10mm) Eley. There

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MOUNTED WARFARE

Trooper, 21st Lancers (1898) A weapon never employed by his American counterpart, the long, lethal lance of this British cavalryman concentrated the momentum

of his horse and himself into a

single pointed tip. The resulting force coidd shatter the body of an enemy rider or his mount, spear a fleeing foe, or even splinter an infantry formation. More often employed was his Lee-Metford carbine, firing the ,303-calibre (7.6mm)

round that served the empire with

black powder in 1889 through to cordite in the Korean War. The lancer's helmet is a superb design that keeps an insulating layer of air between the African sun and his head. The empire reached far for its horses, Boer ponies, American mustangs, and Australian Waters all finding themselves supporting the mounted arm of Great Britain.

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CHURCHILL'S LIFESAVER. Winston Chruchill found his C96 Mauser pistol a lifesaver in the great charge of the 21st Lancers in the closing moments of Omdurman. The removable buttstock extended the pistol's range and also functioned as a holster.

were similar largebore offerings from Tranter, while the American Colts and Smith & Wessons of the Indian Wars did their share of service in Africa. In his choice of handguns, as in many other aspects of his personality, Winston Churchill (1874-1965) was a non-conformist, for he availed himself of one of the very earliest self-loading pistols. His C96 Mauser fired a powerful, if smallbore, 7.63mm (0.3in) cartridge with a very flat trajectory. For such an early design, the Mauser C96 was outstandingly reliable, that factor and its 10-round magazine saving Churchill's life in the Omdurman fighting. In infantry-on-infantry combat, the Sudanese enjoyed success by working close under cover and then rushing in after the Egyptian levies fired. In such attacks, the Ansar inflicted severe casualties, able to use their hand weapons, such as longer, narrower spears, before the Egyptians could reload their Remington breech-loaders. British discipline and Martini-Henry Mk III rifles allowed for somewhat faster reloading, but there was nonetheless good reason for the shuddering praise offered in Kipling's poem. The celebrated 'square' of Waterloo fame made its modified final appearance in the Sudan. It was a formation that offered protection to baggage and non-combatants in the centre, while the straight 'thin red line' protected the individual soldiers, who were, of course, supported by as many reserve red lines as possible from within. The British had tried to augment their defensive firepower with a

hand-cranked Gardner machine gun at Tamai and Abu Klea, but jamming on both occasions had allowed the 'Fuzzie-Wuzzies' to force their way into the formation and break the British Square'. W h e n Kitchener's forces moved against the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa (1846-1899), they would have many and better machine guns. Rails and River One of the major issues to affect the Nile Expedition had been the problem of supply. N o railway existed into the interior of Africa by which an army could be moved, so it was the river - the older, perhaps even the oldest, transportation corridor - that availed. River support alone had not, however, been enough in 1884 to sustain an expedition roughly one quarter the size of that which Kitchener prepared to move southwards into the Sudan in 1896. Kitchener, after the meeting in Cairo, took a staff of competent railway engineers with him as he moved his column south from Wadi Haifa. Reconstruction of the line from Sarras to Akasha went quickly, as the Sudanese had

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MOUNTED WARFARE components of armoured gunboats carrying rapidfire artillery and Maxim guns. Three of these vessels came from two series, the stern-wheeled class of 1896 and the twinscrew class of 1898. Both, anticipating later warship design, carried nickel-steel armour around their vital areas, while steam winches, searchlights and ammunition hoists aided the combat efficiency of their crews. Their bow guns were quick-firing 12-pounder cannon, designed to repel the swift onset of torpedo boats on larger ships and capable of a previously unheard-of rate of fire. On the 1896 class, there were two 6-pound quick-fires amidships, and four of the new and supremely lethal 1888 Maxim machine guns, in the naval .45 calibre.The 1898 class had a stern quickfire and carried a 10cm (4in) howitzer in the bow. The oldest armed steamers had Nordenfeldt multibarrel cranked weapons from Gordon's time. Most of the year 1897 was spent acquiring stores and awaiting and assembling the gunboats. The 1898 class came in floating prefabricated sections, which incidentally functioned as

left most of the rails intact after extracting the ties. The tracks were laid in precisely the same, atypical 3.6m (11.8ft) 'Cape' gauge employed by Cecil Rhodes in his construction northwards. The Sudanese descended upon the track parties but into the guns of forces sufficient to protect them. A flood was more destructive than the Ansar to 19km (12 miles) of track, but the work crews made good the damage and troops and supplies continued to roll southwards. Nineteenth-century AFVs When his railway reached the Nile a second time, at Kosheh in June 1898, Kitchener deployed the advanced and integrated weapons system that would give him absolute victory. The desire for armoured fighting vehicles goes back to the Hussite Wars of the fifteenth century. In the nineteenth century, horse cavalry would do battle with powered armoured fighting vehicles carrying heavy weaponry, and suffer badly. Nathan Bedford Forrest (1821-1877) during the American Civil War suffered one of his worst defeats in battle with Union river ironclads. Kitchener's engineers at Kosheh set about bolting together the prefabricated

-

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GUNBOAT MELIK. This vessel was an integrated and lethal weapons system, a harbinger of things to come. Assembled on the Nile from prefabricated sections, the compartmented hull was as modern as the vessel's quickfiring artillery and Maxim machine guns firing through slits in the armour. Electric searchlights probed the darkness of the night before Omdurman.

MOUNTED WARFARE watertight separate hull sections - useful given that the Ansar had sown wire-controlled mines in the river. Assembling the gunboats at Kosheh, and at the fortified depot on the Atbara River further south, bypassed most of the Nile 'cataracts' that posed a threat to navigation when the Nile was at less than full flood. The four stern-wheeled survivors of the earlier wars against the Mahdi joined the fleet there, along with five steam transports. As each gunboat arrived or was assembled, Kitchener

Another advantage of Kitchener's leisurely march was that it gave the Khalifa a great deal of time to collect the largest possible number of defenders at Omdurman. Such a desire may seem paradoxical, but Kitchener and the British Empire were fighting a war of annihilation against the Mahdists and the Khalifa. In a pitched decisive battle that a commander feels certain of winning, more enemy troops left cold on the battlefield mean fewer to be fought later in mopping-up operations or guerrilla warfare. The Khalifa collected some 50-60,000 thrust them into action, warriors to defend the clearing the Ansar from 7 was under fire all day and Mahdi's sacred tomb, forts and batteries along outnumbering Kitchener's the southern Nile. By rode through the charge. You troops by a factor of three. September 1898, when his That Kitchener intended troops, transports and the know my luck in these things. to maximize the slaughter gunboats reached the I was about the only officer of the Ansar is indicated by Mahdi's new capital his actions upon arriving at of Omdurman, Kitchener whose clothes, saddlery or the battlefield. had 20 Maxims on cumbersome wheeled The gunboats landed a horse were uninjured. I fired carriages in his land force. battery of six 12.7cm 10 shots with my pistol — all (5in) howitzers, which His 10 gunboats carried 32 more at speeds of up to necessary — and just got to the commenced a terrifying 10 knots. bombardment of the city of Omdurman, lying some end of it as we cleared the D r a w n and Slaughtered 8km (5 miles) distant, with crush. I never felt the slightest high-explosive shell. The In the t w o years since Kitchener's column had guns soon blasted holes in nervousness and felt as cool the walls and smashed the begun its move southwards, the Khalifa had very dome of the Mahdi's as I do now...' his defences systematically tomb. Kitchener's 15,000 dismantled before the infantry lay behind a — WINSTON CHURCHILL, grinding Anglo-Egyptian semi-circle of brush, LETTER TO HIS MOTHER, 1898 advance, reports of this anchored on the Nile, and awaited the Ansar's success being sent back to response. It came at 6.30 in Britain through an the morning of 2 September 1898. umbilical cord of telegraph wire. To explain the leisurely pace of Kitchener's advance, there are several factors that should be considered. Given Cavalry at O m d u r m a n the predilection of the Ansar for traps and The manoeuvring on the part of the Angloambushes, the glacial pace allowed for such traps Egyptian force that took place that day was by the to be found and neutralized at the least possible cavalry, for the infantry and artillery stayed behind cost. The Khalifa's o w n cavalry, Egyptian levies and the brush defences under the guns of the river allied Arab horse moved constantly around and in fleet and never let the Ansar get closer to their front of Kitchener's forces, inviting attack and lines than some 640m (700 yards). The Sudanese locating potential danger points. moved as close as cover would allow them and

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Battle of Omdurman 1898 A R M Y OF THE

Imperial vengeance led Horatio Herbert Kitchener

BLACK FLAG

into one of the last great cavalry actions in Western military history. Horses were not the only conveyors of retribution for the Mahdi's slaughter of George 'Chinese' Gordon and his garrison at Khartoum in 1885. By 1898, a military railway, armoured riverboats and gunboats as well as camels carried Maxim guns, Lee-Metford rifles and quick-firing artillery to the very outskirts of the city of the Mahdi's tomb. The Khalifa, the Mahdi's designated successor, had taken advantage of the intervening years and the glacial pace of Kitchener's advance to rally a force of some 50-60,000 warriors to protect the tomb and capital of the Islamic empire's founder. Jihad and headlong attacks met searchlights and machine-gun fire, as Winston Churchill rode into battle with the 21st Lancers, clutching a Mauser automatic pistol.

2 1ST LANCERS

Kitchener's cavalry pursue the retreating Ansar toward Omdurman, the Infantry moving slowly behind them. Osman Digna's final ambush near a narrow defile near the city inflicts casualties upon the 21st Lancers, but in their first and last great charge with the lance, the British prevail and complete the destruction of organized Mahtlist resistance. .

5 CAIRO EGYPT

OMDURMANKF[ARR°L

I

SUDAN

Cecil Rhodes built northwards from the Cape towards where Kitchener's military railway moved southivards along the vital Nile River valley using the same size tracks and equipment in the ongoing 'Scramble for Africa'.

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MOUNTED

A R M Y O F THE'

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Kitchener sends Egyptian infantry towards Omdurman to provoke another Sudanese attack, which MacDonald awaits in an arrowhead formation. The Mahdist Army of the Green Flag duly launches an, assault into withering fire, suffering tremendous losses.

3

' .GRE^J FLAG

\k t- x

In the morning of the 2nd, the Khalifa's army begins to move towards the British position in response to bombardment by Kitchener's howitzers. Kitchene 's horse falls back and moves towards the flanks, under I cover of the artillery ayd j

2

jjt>

On the evening of 1 September, Kitchener's river flotilla lands his howitzers , while his infantry build a semi-circular barrier of brush. British cavalry and the Camel Corps screen the fortifications.

I

4

The 21st Lancers on the British left take a position on Kerreri Ridge, where Osman Digna's personal force of 15,000 cavalry attack them. Gunfire from the gunboat Melik comes to the rescue of the retreating Camel Corps. Other gunboats also engage, inflic ting severe *casu|ilties on the Sudanese. BRITISH GUNBOATS

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MOUNTED WARFARE made their rush. In response, the rifles cracked, the Maxims chattered and the dead lay in heaps a striking image that apparently did not linger in the mind through the years to Flanders and 1914. Shells from the gunboats blasted concentrations of infantry or the walls of Omdurman as their commanders saw fit, although fortunately some of them kept their field glasses trained on their o w n distant horsemen. An Anglo-British innovation of the wars in the Sudan had been the 'Camel Corps' of dragoons mounted soldiers exploiting the endurance, at a slower speed, of the animal most often associated with the African desert. This force had done fairly good service on patrol and screening duty, but in the actual battle it ran into nearly fatal difficulties. Kitchener kept his 'horse cavalry' under Lieutenant-Colonel Broadwood (1862-1917), as well as the Camel Corps, searching for the Ansar army. The cavalry found it within sight of Omdurman and withdrew towards the fortified beachhead, shifting quickly from the role of scout to that of lure. As the mounted troops approached the Nile, the gunboats took the pursuing Sudanese under fire. The Sudanese halted to regroup before the final attack, and the night passed with the searchlights of the patrolling gunboats stabbing through the darkness as they passed. A Final Charge While the Sudanese advanced on the beachhead in the morning, the cavalry, horse artillery and Camel Corps waited on the Kerreri Ridge, the Camel Corps having a narrow escape while moving through some rough ground closer to the main force. At that point, Osman Digna, with a cavalry contingent of 15,000, launched his assault on the Anglo-Egyptian horsemen. There was time for an exchange of orders by heliograph before Broadwood withdrew to the northwest.The Camel Corps, though, was unable to follow, since its troopers were dismounted and encumbered with many wounded. At that point, it was saved by ferocious firing - from the gunboat Melik, its four Maxims, t w o 12-pounders and howitzer filling the air with cordite smoke. The blizzard of fire halted the Ansar, and other gunboats raced to the scene, forcing Osman Digna to retreat

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with his o w n heavy share of the staggering Sudanese casualties. Kitchener's re-formed cavalry preceded the infantry towards the city of Omdurman after the final collapse of the Ansar's attack upon the beachhead. The Mahdist re-formed cavalry and the Khalifa's reserve fell upon the Anglo-Egyptian rear, as the column, some 15,000 strong, left the shelter of the beachhead and the gunboats' fire. British mule-drawn horse artillery thundered into position and the six Maxims of the rearguard once again turned the Sudanese attack into a slaughter. Once more, Kitchener had carried out his purpose with a slow movement. His midday march towards their capital concentrated the remaining Sudanese units for another round of annihilation.

i

^

MOUNTED WARFARE About 5km (3 miles) from the city, 700 mounted Sudanese horsemen appeared a short distance away from the remaining 400 men of Churchill's unit, the 21st Lancers. Upon their first, and last, full charge with the lance, the 21st found 2000 Sudanese under Osman Digna's o w n flag boiling up from a ravine, their attack inflicting 25 per cent casualties before the repeating weapons of the British prevailed. Yet again the Sudanese had ambushed the British. Churchill's Mauser pistol saved him and his horse from ambushing spearmen and swordsmen in the aftermath of the charge. The 21st Lancers would spend the next day and a half picking off defiant stragglers in the vicinity of Omdurman, although the Khalifa made good his o w n escape,

dying a year later when a British column overtook him and his final defenders. The missions of the cavalry - scouting, screening, exploitation and, above all, mobility would continue to remain important in warfare throughout the world. The future, however, would soon see the merciful departure of the horse from the battlefield, with mechanical transport, by land and air, supplying speed and flexibility in the animal's place. At the battle of Omdurman, the 21st Lancers turned Osman Digna's last ambush into a rout as Kitchener's army closed in on the Mahdi's capital. The unit was awarded three Victoria Crosses for outstanding bravery, for the loss of five officers, 65 men and 120 horses.

T H E CHARGE OF THE 2 1 S T LANCERS.

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CHAPTER 3

COMMAND AND CONTROL War in the age of colonial empires provided European military institutions and the continent's leadership with significant problems. States had to possess the ability to export their power overseas, and this required the construction and maintenance of navies capable of transporting and supplying expeditionary forces across vast distances of ocean. Furthermore, waging war beyond the European continent required substantial cooperation between the army and navy, where commanding officers in one branch had the authority to direct operations of the other.

ence,an admiral could dictate the strategy of a land and sea campaign, or a general determine the positioning of fleets to elicit strategic results on land. Indeed, the necessity of cooperation between these branches meant that in France, the colonial administration did not fall to the civilian bureaucracy, as was the case with Britain's colonies, but to the Ministry of Marine.

H

DABORMIDA'S BRIGADE AT A D O W A . Assailed front and flank, the Italians kept the Ethiopian forces of Menelik II at bay until their ammunition ran out. Note the bolt-action rifles possessed by the Ethiopian warriors.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

BRITISH GRENADIERS. The elite of European armies, grenadiers of the eighteenth century often wore mitres in the German style, giving them an impression of great height and stature on the field of battle.

The dynamic of civil-military relations therefore deeply affected the manner by which colonial wars were waged. Britain Wages W a r Great Britain served as both the standard and the exception to the rules of colonial warfare. The superiority of the Royal Navy by the eighteenth century had ensured the security of the home islands, the country's trade routes and Britain's ability to export power effectively a half-world away. Since the late seventeenth century, Britain had sent its armies overseas as a matter of course. Apart from the two Jacobite rebellions in Scotland

112

(1715 and 1746) and the maintenance of an army in Ireland, Britain's military power after was exported in the form of expeditionary forces. In Europe, the British armies were supplemented by German contingents supplied by Hanover and its neighbours via the German soldier trade. In the Americas, the British transported the largest contingent of regulars during the French and Indian War. The successful expansion of colonies in North America provided the British with a ready source of local military p o w e r in the form of colonial militias and indigenous Indian allies. Modest expeditionary forces could be rapidly expanded with the addition of colonial and Indian contingents. Such was the case in 1758, when an army of 13,000 men, only half of them regulars, attacked Fort Carillon (later Fort Ticonderoga) in northern N e w York, a position held by the French. During the

COMMAND AND CONTROL American War of Independence, the British significantly supplemented their army by employing large numbers of German regiments rented from their territorial sovereigns. The British perceived the employment of local forces as an effective and efficient means of projecting and maintaining colonial power. The foothold in India established by Robert Clive (1725-1774) in the mid-eighteenth century was furthered by successful diplomatic agreements, which included clauses providing allied Indian contingents to augment Clive's army. This was the case at Plassey in 1757, where two-thirds of Clive's forces were Indian. This pattern continued in India until the turn of the nineteenth century, when General Sir Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852), later to be created Duke of Wellington, scored dramatic victories over much larger Indian armies with the critical and skilful employment and integration of indigenous troops with British regiments. This pattern continued with great success throughout the century and was a vital component to the expansion and defence of

Britain's colonial empire, such that by World War I Britain could wage war on three continents, with armies in the millions, of which colonials comprised the majority. The integral nature of expeditionary warfare to British power and military culture meant that officers had no misgivings about commanding forces overseas, be it on the European continent, in North America or in India. In order to advance, to exhibit one's commitment to King and Country, to lead troops with distinction, overseas service for a British officer was virtually inevitable. Struggle in the Carolinas The southern campaign of the American War of Independence in the Carolinas (1780-81) ultimately decided the war. It began well enough for British forces under Lord Charles Cornwallis (1738-1805) at Charleston, but its conclusion at AMERICAN CONTINENTAL INFANTRY. The Continentals were professional soldiers trained in the European style. They formed the backbone of an army composed predominantly of local militias and volunteers.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL Yorktown in Virginia pushed the monarchy and Parliament to a decision.The war in the north had stalemated, with the British fought to a draw at Monmouth in New Jersey, and with the successful colonial campaigns in northern New York against Britain's Indian allies. Nonetheless, George Washington (1732-1799) failed to dislodge the British army in New York. Even with the arrival at Rhode Island of a French expeditionary force under the Comte de Rochambeau (1725-1807), its position was impregnable. What the final campaigns of the War of Independence demonstrate is the incredible difficulty of waging colonial war from a distance: Lord George Germain (1716-1825) attempted to coordinate a careful strategy from Britain but faced too many threats and theatres from Quebec to the Caribbean. The expansion of the war in 1778 and 1779 into a full-fledged global conflict with France and Spain complicated matters further. During the 18 months of Cornwallis' southern campaign, Germain contended with two strong-willed subordinates in distinctly different theatres of America: Cornwallis in the Carolinas, and General Sir Henry Clinton (1730-1795) in New York. Both argued that reinforcement would bring victory. Initially, the campaign began as a concerted effort to capitalize on Loyalist sympathies in Georgia and the Carolinas. Savannah resisted a Franco-American siege in late 1779, and the control of that strategic port enabled Lord Germain to use it as a base of operations against the Carolinas. A British fleet landed Sir Henry Clinton's army from New York along with troops under Lord Cornwallis.The army marched north to Charleston, with the intention of seizing the coastal ports and denying the rebels the opportunity to draw supplies and troops from their French and Spanish allies. Marching north from Savannah, Clinton besieged Charleston on 1 April 1780 with almost 8000 men. Within six weeks, he received the surrender of the city from General Benjamin Lincoln (1733-1810). The fall of Charleston was a disaster for the Americans, as 6000 men, including 10 regiments of Continental regulars, were taken prisoner. Clinton, for that matter, actively employed irregulars in the interior to prevent

114

communications with the city. Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Tarleton (1754-1833) made use of Tory irregulars to keep the local militias at bay. This further strengthened the belief that a campaign in the south would be accompanied by popular support, something that had confounded British operations in New England. Despite the apparent chance of success in the Carolinas, Clinton returned to New York, leaving Cornwallis with 4000 men to establish a clear presence in these colonies.The imminent arrival of a French army in the north worried Cornwallis and it led to the withdrawal of half his army. To be fair, Clinton and Cornwallis were confident that the poor showing at Charleston was a portent of rebel resolve. Lincoln's army had been the largest organized force with professional troops in the south. As he prepared his campaign, Cornwallis dispatched Tarleton to keep the rebel militias at bay, and raise Tory forces. Through much of the late spring, Tarleton succeeded in clearing South Carolina of rebel forces. The ease with which Germain and Clinton believed the colony would return to the fold was complicated by the emergence of several rebel leaders such as Thomas Sumter (1734-1832) and Francis Marion (1732-1795), known as the 'Swamp Fox'. The subsequent emergence of rebel bands - guerrilla or partisan - and their fighting with Tories gave a true impression of a civil war. Preparing for a Campaign Cornwallis kept many of his regulars, British and German regiments, in Charleston as he reorganized the colony and prepared for his campaign. In June, the Continental Congress, over the objections of Washington, appointed General Horatio Gates (1727-1806) as commander of the southern departments. Gates was held in high esteem as the victor of Saratoga - a decisive battle in 1777, which led to the surrender of British forces in northern New York under General Johnny Burgoyne (1722-1792). Gates arrived in North Carolina and began to organize what few forces were available. Virginia and North Carolina militias, braced by several weak Continental regiments, arrived at Charlotte, North Carolina, at the end of July, to

COMMAND AND CONTROL

British Regular (1780) The British soldier of the American War of Independence was a highly trained professional. By 1780 most had seen service in the North American colonies and except at Saratoga (1777) and Monmouth

(1779)

were more than able to defeat the Americans in the field. Their discipline and experience were evidenced throughout the war. At Guilford Courthouse, they found

American

resistance quite stubborn and costly. This infantryman wears a bicorn hat cocked over one eye, so as not to interfere with the firing of his Short Land Pattern flintlock musket. Britain's wealth permitted significant live-fire training, and a British regular was able to load and fire his musket as many as three times a minute. The tradition of renting German

regiments

(referred to collectively as Hessians) added veteran foreign troops to the British army in North America. The introduction

of

Continentals and later a French army provided the colonists with the professional force they desperately needed. An English infantry regiment consisted of 10 companies: two flank companies

(one

grenadier and one light) and eight line companies, each comprising a captain, a lieutenant, an ensign, three sergeants, three corporals, three drummers and 70-100 private soldiers. At full war strength a regiment varied in size from

700-1000 men.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL participate in Gates' counter-offensive. In August, Gates' army of 4-5000 men moved into South Carolina. Cornwallis left Charleston with his regiments and marched north to engage. On 16 August, he attacked Gates at Camden and despite having merely 2000 men, almost all regulars, he dispersed Gates' army, mostly militia, with great determination. The rout of the rebel army led to its utter dissolution. Gates fled north, leaving his men; only 700 North Carolina militia mustered again, the rest returning to their homes. The victory at Camden provided Cornwallis

with an opportunity to move into North Carolina against minimal formal resistance. Tarleton had done well to quell rebel activity in his rear. Supply lines from Charleston were lengthy, and it became evident that the population of North Carolina could be quite hostile too. Cornwallis requested reinforcement from Germain, and Clinton. Even a diversion by Clinton in Virginia would prevent Washington from sending troops south. Neither Germain nor Clinton agreed, and left Cornwallis to carry on. Their refusal resulted from the arrival of Rochambeau's French army at Newport, Rhode Island, relatively close to Clinton's headquarters in New York City. Cornwallis therefore probed north towards Charlotte in September but worried about his logistics. Indeed, Major Ferguson (1744-1780), commanding a large Tory force, was crushed at King's Mountain by rebel militia, threatening Cornwallis' lines of communications and supply in South Carolina.The British general decided to withdraw back into the colony and gather his forces for a proper offensive. Battle of Guilford Courthouse: 15 March 1781 Cornwallis felt sufficiently strong to move north by January 1781. His logistical issues were resolved by dispatching troops to seize Wilmington, North Carolina, a coastal town capable of supply by sea. In terms of securing his rear in South Carolina, Cornwallis sent Tarleton once again to hunt down rebel militia. The situation, however, had changed by the LORD CORNWALLIS. A thorough professional, Cornwallis' early successes in the Southern Campaign and the poor showing of colonial militias convinced him that Greene's army was no match for his regulars.

116

COMMAND AND CONTROL beginning of the year. Washington ordered General lines, the first two militia, the third Continentals. Nathaniel Greene (1742-1786), his first choice, to The easy rolling terrain, with its patchwork of defend North Carolina. Greene also possessed the woods, afforded the militia further security. One capable Daniel Morgan (1736-1802), an thousand men of the North Carolina militia took experienced colonial general. Morgan arrived in position in the first line, and some 320m (1050ft) the uphill of South Carolina with reinforcements, behind this was a second line of 1200 Virginians. including a f e w companies of Continental Posted on the flanks of the first line were picked regulars. They engaged and defeated Tarleton Virginia marksmen, and some Delaware at Cowpens on 17 January 1781, with roughly Continentals supported by cavalry under William equal numbers. Cornwallis moved his main Washington (1752-1810) and Henry Light Horse army up to catch Morgan, but he withdrew into Harry' Lee (1756-1818). William Washington was North Carolina with George's distant cousin, and Greene's army. Henry Lee was the father of the future Robert E. Lee Greene had a good 'The conduct and actions of (1807-1870). The third sense of his opponent, and the officers and soldiers that Continental line took up his own army. The militia, if well led, could stand composed this little army will position about 500m (1650ft) to the rear of the against the British army second and comprised 1400 including its German, or do more justice to their merit regulars from Maryland, Hessian, regiments - but than I can by words...' Virginia and Delaware. not for very long. They worked better at denuding The distance between — LORD CORNWALLIS SPEAKING OF BRITISH the formed battalions from the lines was a conscious a distance. Greene decided effort to prevent panic in FORCES AT GUILFORD COURTHOUSE that he would shore up his the entire army if one line forces by falling back upon broke immediately upon his supply lines and gathering reinforcements, the others. While distance could reduce the then choose his ground to face Cornwallis. Greene chance of panic, it also made control of the intended to wage a war of attrition in North battlefield nearly impossible for Greene, w h o Carolina. The British general obliged and played remained with the Continental line. He was thus cat and mouse with Greene for more than a more than 910m (3000ft) distant from his first month. By mid-March, Cornwallis had 1900 troops line. Indeed, the view was so obscured by the trees against Greene's 4400. The American general took that none of the lines could see the others; only up position at Guilford Courthouse, about 56km the sound of musketry and cannon would indicate (35 miles) south of the Virginia border. Cornwallis the progress of battle. Greene, however, knew that took the bait and attacked. the militia would not stop the British advance or close with the regulars. He asked them to fire two Daniel Morgan's victory at Cowpens had done volleys before retiring in good order. He hoped more than wound Tarleton's pride; it provided a they would do his bidding, withdraw behind the sound set of tactical principles that worked well second line, then re-form. This would further for the colonists. Greene's army included 1700 weaken the British as they came on. The plan was Continentals - professionals from the Colonial sound, but it did not develop as intended. Army - yet the large remainder comprised militia from Virginia and North Carolina. Morgan had The weather was overcast and rainy, typical of deployed his militia forward to wear away at the March in North Carolina, w h e n the British British, and then placed his regulars to contend advanced toward Greene's first line at 1.30 p.m. with them once the militia fled. Greene concluded The militia began to fire at extreme range, nervous that his superiority in numbers would lend itself at the sight of the oncoming regulars. A couple of well to this tactic. He deployed his army in three cannon blocked the road through the woods and

117

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Guilford Courthouse 1781

The southern campaign offered an opportunity to draw the southern colonies squarely into the British sphere.Tory militia supported by dragoons under Banastre Tarleton dispersed rebel militia throughout South Carolina.The arrival of a French army on Rhode Island, however, compelled General Clinton to return to New York with the majority of his army, leaving Lord Cornwallis with several thousand to continue the campaign. Horatio Gates, dispatch by the Continental Congress to thwart British operations, suffered defeat at Camden and abandoned his army. General Nathaniel Greene arrived in North Carolina to take over American forces. Combining militia and continentals, Greene assembled an army twice the size of Cornwallis' and waged a war of attrition. The gradual erosion of British forces took its toll and at Guilford Courthouse Cornwallis achieved a pyrrhic victory over Greene, but at the cost of abandoning the southern campaign. Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington to resupply, and marched north into Virginia, where he was later besieged at Yorktown.

NEW YORK

GUILFORD

-F-

ORKTOWN

The British campaign in the southern colonies was designed to break the stalemate that had developed in the north. Cornwallis and Clinton's success at Savannah and Charleston wrongly assumed a rapid victory.

118

Cornwallis sends his first line against Greene's North Carolina militia.

1

C O M M A N D

Greene's first line fires several volleys supported by two cannon, but break as the British approach the woods.

2

A N D

C O N T R O L

6

Greene orders _ a general withdrawal after inflicting heavy casualties on Cornwallis' forces.

GUILFORD COURTHOUSE

Greene sends the two Maryland regiments of his third line to throw back the British as they move into the open. Cornwallis orders artillery to fire into the mass to breakup the attack.

3 The second line is cleared JLby British and Hessian regulars, but as they emerge from the woods, they are harried in the flank by William Washington'^ ^ i m dismounted cavalry. j

Continental Delaware Light infantry fire on the British flank as it advances against Greene's second line of Virginia militia.

3

COMMAND AND CONTROL found their range on the British line.The fire from the Americans increased in intensity and accuracy as the British advanced to within 37m (120ft). Casualties began to tell but did not halt the movement of the British and German battalions. Cornwallis' horse artillery unlimbered and fired on the American guns. The first line began to waver, but held for one more volley at close range before running. The British charged and cleared the position, moving into the woods. The colonial riflemen on the flanks began to pick off the soldiers as they moved upon the second line. The Virginia militia held as the North Carolinians came running back through their position.The entire British army had advanced into the woods and became targets for marksmen on their flanks. Cornwallis moved his second line up to reinforce the first as the 33rd, Jaegers and light infantry turned to clear Washington's troops. Fighting slowed during the realignment, and the Virginians had a momentary respite until the new British line advanced upon them, Guards battalions and all. These veteran soldiers fought well in the wooded terrain, and a bloody firefight continued for half an hour as their discipline and numbers pressed the militia to their breaking point. Greene watched as the Virginians ran from the woods across the open field towards the Continental line. Some withdrew in good order, others in haste. The British battalions on his right emerged first, and without waiting for the rest of the army, still engaged in the U S DRAGOON. Colonial cavalry played little significant role in the American War of Itidependence, although at Guilford Courthouse a unit shattered a battalion of British Guards as they emerged from the woods.

120

woods, attacked across the open field. The Continentals of the 1st Maryland and Delaware poured deadly fire into the brigade and forced them back across the field. Pressing his troops forward, Cornwallis was shocked by the determination of the Continentals and their capable leadership. William Washington's cavalry surprised the light Guards battalion as it cleared the woods and his horsemen sent it into great disorder. Greene sent forward his regulars to take advantage of the situation. Fighting between the two Maryland regiments and the British of the first line weighed heavily. Cornwallis then ordered his artillery to fire into the mass of men. The British guns fired canister, which did not discriminate between Continental and Redcoat. But the situation was critical: if the Marylanders chased off the Guards battalion before the rest of his army cleared the woods, the battle might be lost. The gamble succeeded in clearing off the Continentals - but at great cost. Greene's army dwindled, although it remained engaged on his right. The appearance of the other British battalions, however, signalled a new phase of the battle if he

COMMAND AND CONTROL

decided to stand. He had already lost his militia and part of his Continental line, the 2nd Maryland. Greene held a single regiment, the 4th Virginia, in reserve. He determined to count the day over and ordered the last Continental regiment to cover a general retreat. Greene's regulars were in good order, whereas Cornwallis' army was thoroughly exhausted. After only two hours of battle, British casualties exceeded 500 men, for an army of 1900. Greene suffered far less: slightly more than 300 killed and wounded of 4400 men. A bit more than half the militia went home afterwards, but they had done their job. Cornwallis marched off to Wilmington and the coast for supply and security, having failed to take North Carolina. From Colonial to Imperial Service The French colonial experience differed greatly from Britain's. Although French kings pursued overseas empire in the seventeenth and

BATTLE OF GUILFORD COURTHOUSE. The desperate melee at Guilford Courthouse led Cornwallis to fire canister through his own troops. In this picture British troops engage the Continentals in the third line, seizing one of Greene's cannon.

eighteenth centuries, they were not compelled by geography to expand beyond the European continent - simply enticed by the commercial wealth that could be gained. There were no similar demographic pressures as felt in Britain with the population explosion of the eighteenth century. So while Britain became an imperial power, France was a Continental power, and any notion of exporting power beyond Europe was seen as an opportunity, or a distraction, not a central matter in state policy. To that end, the French developed a rather powerful standing army in the seventeenth century, and used it to great effect to expand their dynastic interests in Europe. The French Navy, although significant, never received the same

121

COMMAND AND CONTROL attention in terms of policy or, more importantly, funding, and thus suffered from neglect more commonly than the army. The ability of France to expand was limited by government interest. Thus, the establishment of French colonies in the Caribbean and North America were compromised when the state faced crises on the European continent. French regulars

were employed much more sparingly, and while they too were supplemented by colonial militias and Indian allies, they never received the same critical support from the state. The French presence in India was eliminated after the Seven Years War (1756-63), and its North American possessions were absorbed into the British colonial empire; only their Caribbean islands remained. The nature of the French officer corps throughout the eighteenth century was essentially incompatible with colonial warfare. Beyond the difficulties of dispatching significant military power across the Atlantic, the French officer corps was drawn exclusively from the nobility. The culture of command was tied inexorably to the concept of glory, honour and the martial spirit of the aristocracy - and there was little opportunity perceived for such things in the colonies. The chance to spend cold winters in Quebec was not regarded as a means of advancing one's station in the Royal Army. For that matter, the Caribbean possessions were not pleasure islands as they are now. Rather, they were hot, mosquitoinfested and malaria-ridden, meaning that service in the regiments coloniaux in Haiti or Martinique was not an enticing prospect. Military command on the Continent provided a shorter route to advancement, and certainly greater opportunity. It was not until the nineteenth century, after 1815, that colonial service became the only means of achieving martial glory, promotion and social advancement in the officer corps. LEGIONNAIRE. The French Foreign Legion, a critical military institution in France's bid for overseas empire, had its origins in the Carlist Wars in Spain in the 1830s. Within a decade, however, the Legion would be reorganized and deployed to Algeria, where it gained fame and reputation.

122

COMMAND AND CONTROL War on the Continent had ceased as a enlarged navy, and during the Napoleonic Wars the consequence of Napoleon's defeat, and the army was fractured in its loyalty to the Juntas, or settlement agreed at the Congress of Vienna. later the Cortes at Cadiz. Thereafter, no major Continental war occurred until 1856. The French Army of the nineteenth Anglo-Spanish Rivalry century, born out of the revolution and raised by The days of Spanish colonial conquest had ended Napoleon, had f e w outlets for promotion, and t w o centuries earlier, but war between Britain and became a rather stagnant institution, commanded Spain remained a centrepiece of colonial rivalries. by 'reformed' Bonapartists and their young Spanish colonial power suffered in 1762 with the successors, w h o w e r e bottle-fed stories of fall of Havana and Manila to British expeditionary Austerlitz, Friedland and Jena. In 1830, France set forces. The Spanish were, however, able to avoid similar humiliation in 1806 out on a renewed course of and 1807, w h e n British overseas expansion, with 'No more heavy artillery, no forces failed to secure invasion of Algeria. French military service more of these heavy wagons, Buenos Aires and the River Plate, although the victory during the period 1830 to was achieved largely by 1848 became the school of nor more of these enormous local militia.The dynamic of the French Army and its forage trains. The convoys will the Spanish viceroyalties officer corps. Thomas Robert Bugeaud (1784be on mule back and the only and captaincies meant that Spanish families sent their 1849), commander-in-chief sons to Spain for an of the French Army in cannons permitted will be education, and occasionally Algeria, redefined European light ones.' to the military academy. warfare in North Africa and They returned to command trained an entire generation — GENERAL BUGEAUD, 1836 colonial forces and assume of French officers and future positions within the local generals. administration. During the During the previous Napoleonic Wars, however, the desire to achieve century and a half, martial glory had been defined independence from Spain led to revolutions by service on the Continent, but in the nineteenth throughout Central and South America, and the century the French officer corps, from the most local armies w e r e led by Spanish-American senior marshals to second lieutenants, could not officers from local families, such as Simon Bolivar hope for promotion or social and political (1783-1830) and Jose de San Martin (1778-1850). opportunity without the pedigree of service in the Armee d'Afrique. Colonial wars in Africa, Asia and Britain's former American colonies maintained Central America became the vehicle for that a relatively close relationship with Great Britain martial glory into the twentieth century. after the War of 1812. Spain's inability to project Spain, the first of the European colonial sufficient power in the western hemisphere to powers, experienced a renaissance of empire reclaim its lost colonies assured the stability of during the reign of Carlos III in the eighteenth Anglo-American commercial and political influence century, but the dedication of state funds and the in that region. With the French Revolutionary and expansion of the Spanish Navy was compromised Napoleonic Wars settled, and a general European severely during the Napoleonic Wars. The advent peace established at the Congress of Vienna of Bonapartist Spain (1808-14) provided the (1814-15), British imperial interests in Asia well-entrenched colonial grandees with the continued to grow. The Great Game' for the control opportunity to move towards independence. The of Central Asia through the nineteenth century Spanish Army of the eighteenth century was involved military expeditions and diplomatic similarly affected, as it was reduced in favour of an missions. The greatest problem, however, was

123

COMMAND AND CONTROL defining whether the generals or diplomats had the final word on military actions. Tension in Kabul In the early nineteenth century, British expansion into India and what is today Pakistan ultimately involved Great Britain in local affairs well beyond the frontiers of its newly acquired south Asian empire. Russian and Persian encroachments into Afghanistan created potential crises on the Northwest Frontier. Internecine conflict among Afghan tribes and attacks from the Punjab further destabilized this region. In 1838, Britain entered into an official agreement with Ranjit Singh (1780-1839), ruler of the Punjab, and Shah Shuja (1785-1842), former ruler of Afghanistan. The Tripartite Treaty, of 29 July 1838, pledged restoration of Shah Shuja to the Afghan throne in return for a British diplomatic and military presence in Afghanistan at the expense of the Persians and Russians. In 1839, Sir John Keane (1781-1844) led the Army of the Indus, composed of British and Indian troops, through the Bolan Pass from Sind. Through the late spring and summer of 1839, Kandahar, Ghazni and Kabul fell. Dost Mohammed (1793-1863), the ruler of Afghanistan and a Russian client, was captured and taken to India. Shah Shuja returned to the throne after an absence of 30 years. A modest AngloIndian force remained to keep Shah Shuja secure, and protect Sir William Macnaghten (1793-1841) and Sir Alexander Burnes (1805-1841), envoys of Her Majesty's government. The events surrounding the fate of the Kabul garrison have become legendary - and considering the recent history of wars in Afghanistan, not unexpected. The success of the Tripartite Treaty gave a false sense of confidence to the government of Lord Auckland (1784-1849). The British army that arrived in Kabul with Shah Shuja was supposed to be temporary. The population of the city and the local tribesmen did not, however, find the presence of foreigners a comfort. The British, for that matter, ensured the security of their communications to India with a garrison in Jellalabad and the payment of tribute to the various tribal leaders w h o controlled the region through the Khyber Pass.The impressive military show during the invasion, the

124

regular monetary gifts to local tribes and a sizeable garrison in Kabul provided the right amount of influence in Afghanistan. Yet, Akbar Mohammed (d. 1842), son of the deposed king Dost Mohammed, was determined to undermine British influence and restore his father to the throne .The British response (or lack of it) provided Akbar Mohammed with the opportunity to strike. The British garrison at Kabul numbered 4500 British and Indian troops under General G.K. Elphinstone (1782-1842). The intent to keep a military presence in the city was abundantly clear to the population as the soldiers' wives and families gradually migrated to the capital during the t w o years of occupation. Originally the garrison was established within the walls of the Bala Hissar, the fortress housing Shah Shuja's palace. The shah, however, wanted to retain his o w n garrison and requested to Macnaghten that Elphinstone relocate his forces. The British general acquiesced, as this was a diplomatic matter. The military encampment chosen was located north of the city, some 3km (2 miles) from the fortress, but the choice of location was quite poor. It was lodged between the Kabul River and the Behamroo Heights, which overlooked the camp. A series of stockade fortifications, which ringed Kabul, were within rifle shot of the cantonments. General Elphinstone's military career included service in the Peninsular War, at Waterloo and as aide to George IV Contemporary accounts before and after the events at Kabul refer to him as a professional and competent officer. It is clear, however, that the general's command was complicated by several factors at the time of the crisis. He lacked energy, which some have attributed to his age, but he was only 59 at the time of his command. Several recollections refer to his indecision and passivity. Further, his orders were to maintain the formal presence in the capital, and protect Burnes and Macnaghten, the British envoys. This complicated matters, and Elphinstone tended to defer to the diplomats - a strategy that became fatal once the time for diplomacy had passed. Akbar Mohammed benefited from the growing tensions among the Kabul population and local

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Afghan Tribesman (1840) Great Britain and Russia vied for control over Afghanistan from the early nineteenth century. The subjugation of British India which included modern-day Pakistan - led Britain to secure the Northwest

Frontier

against raids by Afghan tribes and the infiltration

of the region by Russian agents.

The First Afghan War (1839-42)

led to the

establishment of a British mission in Kabul and involvement

in internal tribal affairs.

Britain's ability to maintain

its influence was

based on several garrisons in strategic towns, supported by regular bribes (tribute)

to

Afghan tribal leaders. The change in British administration

in 1840 led to

the end of tribute, and the growing animosity of Afghan tribes. Tribesmen, armed with long rifled muskets called jezails, were more than able to make quick work of British troops from a distance of up to 400m (1312ft), as they did in 1842 during the retreat from

Kabul.

125

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Battle of Kabul 1842

The Battle of Kabul was less a battle and more a siege of the British cantonment outside the city. The British diplomatic mission, led by Sir William Macnaghten, superseded the military commander of the Kabul garrison, General Elphinstone, and dissuaded him from taking position within the Bala Hissar, the fortress in Kabul. Hostile Afghan tribesmen paid byAkbar Mohammed, son of the deposed king, Dost Mohammed, gradually surrounded the British encampment.There, they began bombarding the British position. A British foray against the Afghans failed, and later, Macnaghten was killed when nogotiating terms. Akbar Mohammed offered safe passage for the British garrison, and General Elphinstone naively accepted. En route to Jallalabad, the 16,000 soldiers and civilians were savagely attacked on numerous occasions (see map page 130). After eight days and a 96 km (60 miles) march, fewer than 300 soldiers remained.They made their last stand at Gandamak, only 55km (34 miles) from safety in Jallalabad.

Afghanistan was the gateway to British India. Russian expansion into the region posed a threat to the British colony, hence a strong military and diplomatic presence was strategically vital for the security of the British Empire in south Asia.

126

BALA HISSAR

R

Pro-British Shah Shuja sends troops into the city to restore order, but they are repulsed by the angry mob.

3

6

In December, Macnaghten attempts to negotiate a settlement but is murdered at the meeting by Afghan envoys.

COMMAND AND

CONTROL

1 November 1841: After tension mounts against the British presence in Kabul, crowds gather near envoy Burnes' residence.

1

j Following General Jmd Elphinstone's indecisiveness, Burnes' house is attacked by the mob and all inside are killed.

BRITISH

A British column is sent to disperse the cannon, and encounters stiff resistance from Afghan cavalry, taking heavy casualties. Elphinstone fails to reinforce the British column, which retreats back to the camp.

5

(

ENCAMPMENT

BF.HAMROO HEIGHTS

4

In the weeks following the riots, Afghan tribesmen occupy the hills and villages around the British encampment. Afghan cannon begin firing on the British position.

127

COMMAND A N D CONTROL tribes towards the British presence. The cost of supplying the garrison fell upon the Afghan people, and this led to significant animosity. Furthermore, Sir Alexander Burnes had established a reputation as a scoundrel with women, and this merely incensed an already agitated T H E DURBAR-KHANEH OF SHAH SHOOJAH-OOL-MOOLK IN K A B U L , 1 8 4 2 by James Atkinson. Shah Shuja was the former ruler of Afghanistan until deposed by an internal rebellion led by Dost Mohammed. His return with the British in 1839 was not well met by the population of Kabul.

128

population. All of this enabled Akbar Mohammed to increase his influence in the city and insinuate spies and agitators. The situation escalates: November 1841 - January 1842 Elphinstone, Burnes and Macnaghten were well informed of the increasing tension in the city but refused to recognize the level of danger.The envoys believed the reports to be exaggerated, and Burnes, who lived in Kabul, believed he had a better understanding of the people than his informants

COMMAND AND CONTROL and friends. On 1 November 1841, crowds gathered near Burnes' residence, with the intention of causing trouble. News reached Macnaghten and Elphinstone, who immediately argued about the course of action. The general wanted to dispatch troops to disperse the mobs before they had a chance to build their courage. Macnaghten disagreed, and believed military action would only increase tensions. Elphinstone deferred, to the shock of his subordinates, and Burnes' fate was sealed. The Kabul mob attacked Burnes' home, and after a brief and violent struggle killed all inside.

The murder of Burnes did not lead to harsh reprisals; in fact, there was no response. Shah Shuja had hastily dispatched troops into the city, but they ignominiously retreated in the face of the violent mobs. Elphinstone failed to take any further military action, including dispatching troops onto the heights that dominated his encampment, or to occupy the forts within range of his tents. Unknown to Elphinstone, the British Government, wishing to pare down the cost of empire, had sought to reduce expenditure by ending tribute to the Afghan tribes: Macnaghten ceased paying the tribal leaders earlier that year. This offered Akbar Mohammed the opportunity to supplant British interests. Afghan tribesmen began to occupy the heights, forts and villages around the encampment during the three weeks following Burnes' murder. It was not until 23 November that Elphinstone finally acted. He was stirred by the deployment of two cannon on the heights, which proceeded to fire on the British camp.The general dispatched a flying column of infantry and cavalry, supported by one gun, to retake the heights and clear the village north of the camp. With relative ease, the Afghan cannon were put out of action, but upon passing beyond to the village, the column confronted Afghan cavalry. The British gun overheated and the infantry formed in tight squares suffered heavy casualties from Afghan musketry. Growing pressure on the column caused the men to break ranks, and while order was restored, the position on the heights became precarious. Several charges served to further unnerve the British and Indian troops, w h o ultimately f l e d in panic back to the encampment. The failure to reinforce this column, although the combat was in clear sight of the cantonments, reflected a severe weakness in command - which encouraged the Afghans and demoralized the garrison. Elphinstone and his subordinates discussed moving the garrison back into the Bala Hissar. This would have been the proper military decision, but again Macnaghten intervened. Shah Shuja was not inclined and found the situation quite troubling. The return of Akbar Mohammed meant the possibility of his overthrow, and the appearance of

129

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Last stand at Gandamak KABUL

Khoord-Kabul

ATTOCK PESHAWAR GIIAZNI KOHAT

AHMED KHEL

Jugdulak Pass

• British garrisons • Non-garrisoned towns

MAJWAND KANDAHAR

ROUTE OF THE RETREAT. A

garrison in Jellalabad secured the road from Kabul to Peshawar in British India. The distance, and nature of the terrain, tnade the route rather precarious, even in times of peace. maintaining power on the bayonets of the British would not have reinforced his position among the population. Macnaghten dissuaded Elphinstone, and again the general deferred. The forces arrayed against them exceeded 30,000 men. By the end of November, Akbar Mohammed had arrived at Kabul with a further 6000 men. For the next month, he strengthened his hold over the tribal leaders, kept Shah Shuja trapped in the Bala Hissar and tightened his stranglehold over the British encampment. Macnaghten, meanwhile, continued to hope for a diplomatic solution. He actively negotiated with the tribal leaders and Akbar Mohammed. At the end of December, the khan agreed to a personal meeting to decide the deadlock. Upon Macnaghten's arrival, the British envoy was seized, along with his retinue, and murdered. General Elphinstone's paralysis of command did not disappear with the death of Macnaghten. Instead,

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he became even more determined to negotiate a withdrawal of his garrison to India. As negotiations carried on through New Year 1842, Akbar Mohammed acquired a greater appreciation of the weakness of the British position. Macnaghten had given the impression of strength, but Elphinstone's disposition made it clear that the general would accept almost any reasonable proposal. In return for permitting safe passage for the garrison and their families to India, Elphinstone agreed to support the release of Dost Mohammed from British captivity. The March of Death On 6 January 1842, more than 16,000 soldiers and civilians from the Anglo-Indian garrison at Kabul marched off in the snows towards Jellalabad, the Khyber Pass and India. Jellalabad meant safety, but it was 150km (93 miles) to the east. Akbar Mohammed had no intention of keeping his word, and as the column moved off, it became clear that all bets were off. The Anglo-Indian army winding its way methodically through the snows became the

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Private, 44th Foot (1842) British regulars in India saw extensive service during their pacification

campaigns and the

First Afghan War. Their experience the backbone for an imperial

provided

army

supplemented by Indian (sepoy) regiments and irregular forces commanded by British officers, such as 'Skinner's Horse'. During the fighting in Kabul, and the subsequent retreat, the professionalism and skill of the British soldier was tempered by the indecisive and meek leadership provided by General Elphinstone. The 44th Foot led the advance guard during the retreat from Kabul, and its few survivors died at Gandamak, defending a hillock against Afghan tribesmen. The 44th was the only regiment of British regulars in the garrison at Kabul in 1842. British soldiers of the period were armed with the tried and trusted Brown Bess musket. However, the Brown Bess was designed primarily for infantry firing massed volleys, and was ill-suited for the guerrilla-style warfare of the Afghan landscape. It was effective at only 150m (492ft) and accurate at 50m (164ft).

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COMMAND AND CONTROL constant target of Afghan tribesmen. The advance guard led by the 44th Foot included Skinner's Horse and the 4th Irregular Horse.The main body, with it the civilians, consisted of the 5th and 37th Bengal Infantry and Anderson's Horse. The role of rearguard was left to the 54th Bengal Infantry and the 5th Bengal Cavalry. Impressive as these forces may sound, morale was terribly low, and the presence of families added to the soldiers' concerns. T w o days after leaving Kabul, the column moved through the Khoord-Kabul Pass, a narrow defile running 6.5km (4 miles) in length. There Afghan tribesmen took an enormous toll, firing from the safety of the heights. More than 3000 soldiers and civilians had been killed by the time Elphinstone cleared the pass. Akbar Mohammed met Elphinstone afterwards, claiming that the attack was out of his control. He promised to try his best to prevent further murder, and offered to take w o m e n and children to safety. For the next several days, however, the survivors

132

were subjected to attacks, and the weather too contributed to the disaster. On 13 January, the column approached Gandamak, some 55km (34 miles) west of Jellalabad, only to find its passage blocked. N o more than 2500 of the 16,000 remained. Of that number, fewer than 300 were troops standing with their colours. Elphinstone met with Akbar Mohammed once more, but found himself a prisoner. The survivors then took matters into their o w n hands, and tried to reach Jellalabad at night in two groups. They did not get very far. The larger group, many men of the 44th Foot and assorted Indian troops, made a stand on a hill near Gandamak. Refusing to surrender, they died where they stood. The smaller group made little progress and was soon overwhelmed. Only one survivor, Dr Brydon, managed to make it A T T A C K AT K H O O R D - K A B U L PASS. The road from Kabul to Jellalabad ran through the Khoord-Kabul Pass. Afghan tribesmen ambushed the column of soldiers and civilians, killing several thousand.

COMMAND AND CONTROL to Jellalabad, severely wounded but able to recount the tale of the doomed Kabul garrison. Elphinstone also survived but died in captivity some months after the debacle.

leadership. He had attended one of the half-dozen semi-private military academies established in the wake of the Seven Years War, and then the Ecole Militaire. During the Consulate (1799-1804), Napoleon established three military The French Officer Corps in the Age of academies to train officers: Saint-Cyr for the Colonial Empires infantry, Saint-Germain for the cavalry and the As with most European armies, the French officer Ecole Polytechnique for the artillery and corps in the first half of the nineteenth century was engineers. These schools produced many of born in the battles of the Napoleonic Wars. Indeed, France's future military leaders. Saint-Cyr in France this was particularly the case as veterans alone graduated Marshals Patrice de MacMahon of a quarter-century of war (1808-1893), Amable filled its senior ranks Pelissier (1794-1864) and overwhelmingly. Louis XVIII 'Yesterday it had been Francois de Certain(1755- 1824), restored to Canrobert (1809-1895) impossible to write the horrible during the 1820s, while the throne in 1814, replaced some of the officers with news of the day, and my soul Hubert Gallieni and Joseph royalists w h o had gone Lyautey graduated in into exile during the years the 1860s and 1870s is now filled with anguish at of revolution and empire, respectively. the melancholy catastrophe but the army remained Other future leaders largely Bonapartist. When climbed the ladder by which has overtaken the Napoleon (1769-1821) serving in the French escaped from Elba in 1815 Foreign Legion, as did Cabool Force - all are lost and returned to France, the Francois Achille Bazaine the force is annihilated to army joined him without a (1811-1888). Indeed, the shot being fired. Foreign Legion formed a man.' another path through Upon his second which French officers restoration, Louis XVIII — CAPTAIN BROCKMAN BACKHOUSE, could advance through the wisely bought the loyalty of JELLALABAD ranks in an army whose much of the Napoleonic military experience on the military leadership with European continent was titles and positions in the severely restricted between 1814 and 1849. The Chamber of Peers or with ministerial posts. Under legion was established in 1831 by King Louisthe monarchy, 13 Napoleonic generals w e r e Philippe (1773-1850). Algeria became its home for elevated to the rank of Marshal of France; there another 131 years. Many young officers, graduates were only a handful of royalists w h o had not of the military academies, saw the legion as an served during the empire. Indeed, the numbers of opportunity for promotion in a Royal Army whose junior and mid-ranking officers were educated regimental opportunities were stagnant. either on the battlefields of Europe or in the military academies established by Napoleon. For much of the nineteenth century, from 1814 Subsequently, officers in the French Army during to 1871, the French relied on a professional army, the Second Empire were the sons of senior officers whose ranks were fed by restricted conscription. who followed their fathers into the family business. The National Army of the French Revolution and Napoleon believed military education to be of the annual conscriptions of the Napoleonic paramount importance. Battlefield experience Empire ended with the return of the monarchy. A provided the practical lessons of command, but nation in arms', schooled in revolution and education provided another dimension to warfare, was not considered desirable by the

133

COMMAND AND CONTROL restored monarchs. Similarly, even Napoleon III felt extremely uncomfortable expanding the conscription system to First Empire standards.This meant an army limited in size, and therefore limited in officers. Furthermore, war - so familiar between 1792 and 1815 - had ceased between the major powers, and other than an expedition to Spain in 1823 and Algeria in 1831, all was quiet in France.The French Army would not be employed on the European continent again until the expedition to Rome in 1849, and then the Crimean War in 1854. The election of Louis-Napoleon as President of the Second French Republic presaged the coming of the Second Empire in 1851. Crowned Napoleon III, the new emperor reinvigorated the Napoleonic legend and Bonapartism in the army. It was then that the French campaigned in Europe once again. Yet, the Second Empire also saw the export of power to all corners of the globe, and military operations in Southeast Asia, China and Mexico, as well as the expansion of colonial rule in northwest Africa. Under the Third Republic (1871-1940), the French Army continued its colonial role in Central and West Africa and the Middle East.

troops against a Qing army of 30,000 men. The five-hour engagement ended with a clear victory for the Allied forces, and with Beijing (Peking) at their mercy. In the days following the battle, the Anglo-French forces seized the Imperial Summer Palace northwest of the capital and sacked it. The battle of Baliqiao was not, however, a victory of an army with superior technology against an antiquated foe. Indeed, the technological disparities were minimal; the victory went to the more disciplined army with a superior officer corps. As was the case in Afghanistan in 1842, technology rarely decided the victory in wars of empire.

A A

The Second Opium War The Second Opium War (1856-60) was brought to an end by the battle of Baliqiao (Palikao), which involved an Anglo-French advance guard of 4000 This illustration shows how infantry in line formation could move easily to a series of squares with effective interlocking fields of fire. Infantry square worked well to repel cavalry, and in larger formations broke the Zulu infantry at Ulundi and the Mahdists at Omdurman. BELOW: INFANTRY SQUARES.

134

manoeuvres such as this oblique worked well in Europe, but not necessarily in the diverse, broken terrain of Africa.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Rather, the key to victory was the European powers' determination, aided by domestic factors among the conquered peoples. The sacking of the Imperial Summer Palace in September I860 was not a foregone conclusion. As with many of the colonial wars, the Second Opium War had begun with a humiliating defeat at the hands of the indigenous armies. The Second Opium War began when the Chinese Imperial Government refused to comply with unfavourable commercial agreements forced upon them at the end of the First Opium War (1839-42). The China trade, in opium and other goods from India, was vital to Britain's burgeoning imperial economy. For France, the emergence of the Second French Empire meant the attainment of Bonapartist glory on the European peripheries,

MARSHAL T H O M A S BUGEAUD A N D COLONEL JOSEPH V A N T I N I

during the Conquest of Algeria, 1846, by Emile Jean Horace Vernet. Bugeaud is considered the father of French colonial warfare. He redefined tactics and operations and became a national hero by subjugating the Berbers of Algeria. as in the Crimean War (1854-56) or further extension of the empire in North Africa. At the moment a French military expedition prepared to sail for China in spring 1859, Napoleon III intended on committing the vast majority of his army to a major war in Italy.There were f e w troops to spare, and no more than a division was dispatched to Asia under General Count Cousin de Montauban (1796-1878). The French expeditionary force consisted of two brigades of infantry and a small cavalry contingent.

135

COMMAND AND CONTROL China since the seventeenth century. Its military might was impressive, and extended at one time from Xiangiang to Mongolia to Indochina and Burma. The organization of its armies through the eighteenth century provided well-trained men and highly skilled officers of a professional standing army. The primary forces of the Qing The Taku Forts were the Eight Banners armies. To police the The governments in Britain and France wanted a interior, and ensure provincial security, the Qing rapid conclusion to this commercial war. The created the Green Standard Army. Green Standard British and French commanders developed a troops were dispersed throughout the empire, and strategy of the direct approach, seizing the port of by the nineteenth century officers were rotated Tangku and advancing rapidly upon Beijing from garrison to garrison along the Peiho river, frequently to prevent them compelling the Chinese to 'Never did the interior of any from developing bonds accept terms. The British with their troops - a sent Lord Elgin (1811place testify... to the noble product of the paranoia 1863), and the French, caused by internal rebellion. Baron Gros to accompany manner in which it had the armies and offer terms The vast majority of the been defended.' as quickly as possible. Anglotroops under the command French hubris was fortified of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in were - LT-COLONEL GARNET WOLSELEY, by the speedy destruction Green Standard soldiers, of Chinese junks hardly supplemented by Banner SURVEYING TAKU FORT AFTER ITS CAPTURE capable of offering anything troops and cavalry. Unlike but targets to the combined the infantry of the Banner Allied fleet. armies, the cavalry remained relatively provincial The attempt to force their way past the Taku and largely Mongol. The weapon used by the Forts, protecting the port, was met with Chinese element of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's cavalry was unexpected fierce resistance, however, and a primarily the lance, but it had little adequate humiliating repulse. At the end of July I860, the battlefield training. For their part, the Mongols Allied fleets landed their expeditionary forces and rode smaller steppe ponies and used the b o w and laid siege to the forts, taking them after fierce lance. As the army withdrew closer to the imperial fighting, by the end of August. The Chinese capital, the prince was reinforced by troops of the Imperial Army, commanded by Mongol general Imperial Guard, whose yellow silk clothing edged Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, tried to disrupt the siege with black made a distinct impression on the but was repelled.The prince withdrew to the road battlefield. to Beijing, hoping to stop the Anglo-French army as The Chinese did not suffer from a lack of it advanced beyond the support of the guns of the firepower. They had invented gunpowder, and European fleet. their infantry carried muskets, but unlike their European contemporaries, both the Banner and The Qing A r m y Green Standard armies w e r e equipped with Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in was an experienced and flintlocks. Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's troops had, successful general w h o had w o n a number of until recently, been armed with matchlocks! The impressive battles against the Nien and Taiping flintlock provided an increased rate of fire over rebels. At the time of the Second Opium War, t w o the matchlock, but they remained smooth-bore, rebellions - the Taiping in southern China, and the and therefore limited in range and accuracy. They Nien in central and eastern China - wracked the did not, however, lack artillery. The prince's army country. The Qing (Manchu) Dynasty had ruled boasted more than 100 cannon to support The British committed a division as well, and drew forces more easily from India, where they maintained a significant military presence; their expedition was commanded by General Sir James Hope Grant (1808-1875).

136

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Qing Chinese Infantryman (1850) The Qing Dynasty descended from the

trained troops and inferior technology. The

Manchus, who conquered China in the

Green Standard Army was no better, and not

seventeenth century. The Qing forces were

trained properly for war. The Second Opium

organized into Banner armies, composed

War demonstrated the superior

largely of Manchu and Mongol troops. Those

European forces, who were well led and

Chinese who submitted willingly to Qing rule

equipped with percussion cap rifled muskets

were organized into the Green Standard

and breech-loading

Army, which was employed initially as a

professional

artillery.

Like the figure illustrated here, at the time

constabulary force. This military system found

of the Second Opium War, many Chinese

great success in the early modern era. At this

infantryman

were still armed with outdated

time the Banner Armies were armed with

matchlock and flintlock

matchlocks and artillery.

also carries a short sword for close combat.

muskets. This man

However, by the nineteenth century, the Banner armies had fallen into disrepair, with corrupt and inexperienced leadership, poorly

137

COMMAND A N D CONTROL approximately 20,000 cavalry, including 6000 Mongols, and 10,000 infantry. Victory at Chang chi wan: 18 September I860 After failing at Tangku, Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in withdrew his army to Tanjian and then to Chang chi wan. There he waited for the Allied advance guard to approach the open ground where he could take full advantage of his superiority in cavalry. The Allied commanders, Grant and Montauban, coordinated their march as well as one could expect of Anglo-French cooperation. The French had little cavalry, not more than a troop of Spahis and Chasseurs d'Afrique, and therefore advanced with the Peiho River on their

right and the British column to their left. General Grant's command included the brigade of cavalry, which guarded the Allied left as they advanced along the Peiho. Combined, Montauban and Grant's forces numbered 3000. Grant and Montauban marched on Chang chi wan. On 18 September, reinforced by the arrival of Michel's British battalions and more artillery, the Allies advanced towards Toung-chou (Tungzhou). A short distance before Chang chi wan, Grant and Montauban spied 15,000 of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's army deployed in a wide arc more than 5km (3 miles) in length. Artillery covered their front, with infantry in the town on the Allied left. The prince hoped to dissuade the Allies from continuing their advance. The British and French deployed their guns, which supported the rapid advance of the French and British columns. The Chinese possessed far more cannon, but their pieces were in a poor state, and the powder compromised. Accurate Allied gunnery, particularly from the British Armstrong rifled cannon, took a devastating toll on the cavalry. The infantry advanced with great discipline, and the combined effort of artillery fire, volleys and esprit de corps shattered the resolve of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's troops. His army fled, leaving 1500 dead and 60 guns on the field to 35 Allied casualties. Battle of Baliqiao (Palikao): 21 September I860 The victory at Chang chi wan over vastly superior lbrd.es gave Grant and Montauban even greater .confidence in reaching the capital. As the Allies were en route to Toung-chou, the 101st Regiment under General Jamin arrived, further increasing French strength. After spending the night ; encamped outside the walled town, Grant and Montauban followed a canal tributary of the Peiho towards Baliqiao and its stone bridge, which carried the metalled road to the imperial capital. On the morning of 21 M O N T A U B A N . Commander of the French "§; expedition to China in 1860, his performance at Baliqiao led Napoleon III to ennoble him. He served as French Minister of War during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870. §FS

138

COMMAND AND CONTROL

September, as the British and French columns moved out of their encampments past Toungchou, they found Prince Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's army, reinforced by Imperial Guard soldiers under General Prince Sengbaou, brother of the emperor. Some 30,000 strong, it stood in position before Baliqiao bridge. The Chinese position was formidable, with its left on the canal, reinforced by the village of Baliqiao, another village in the centre, and a third on the far right.The road to Beijing passed through the rolling and w o o d e d terrain and veered towards the canal and its stone bridge. Seng-ko-linch'in had brought order to his routed army, and strengthened its resolve with several thousand troops from Beijing. The prince's position was supported by more than 100 guns in the villages, across the canal defending the bridge, and along the entire front. His army included a division of Banner soldiers, but the majority were drawn from

General Collineau's column stormed Baliqiao bridge, which ivas defended by Qing Imperial Guard. According to all accounts, these Qing troops were the most determined and professional of the Chinese forces.

A T T A C K O N BALIQIAO B R I D G E

the Green Standard Army and assorted cavalry. The Imperial Guard were kept in reserve at the bridge, but the main army under Sengbaou was disposed with strong cavalry on the flanks deployed in depth of squadrons and interspersed between the infantry battalions in and behind the villages. The Chinese front covered a distance of 5km (3 miles) but lacked substantial depth. Yet, there were significant knots of trees, which obstructed the line of sight of both armies. Keeping to the line of battle used at Chang chi wan, Grant took the left and Montauban the centre and right with the canal to protect his flank. Montauban used the w o o d e d terrain to mask his paltry numbers, sending the first column in a

139

COMMAND AND CONTROL

slightly oblique attack against the Chinese centre. General Jamin would move to Collineau's right and against the Chinese left. Grant moved to the far left of Collineau, hoping to flank the Qing army with his column. General Collineau's advance guard comprised the elite companies of the 101st and 102nd Regiments, t w o companies of the 2nd Chasseurs a pied (elite light infantry), an engineer detachment, t w o batteries of horse artillery and a battery of 4-pound foot artillery. Montauban and Jamin commanded the 101st Regiment along with t w o more companies of the 2nd Chasseurs a pied, a battery of 12-pounders and a Congreve rocket section. Collineau's infantry advanced through the woods towards the Chinese centre. The rapidity of the movement startled Sengbaou, and he moved much of the cavalry from the wings to protect his centre. The French advance guard moved in

140

Anglo-French troops relaxing in a Qing fort. Note the antiquated cannon in the foreground. The Qing possessed large numbers of cannon, but mainly of a poor quality. A T EASE.

skirmish order, and formed out along the road towards Baliqiao. Montauban ordered Jamin's brigade forward. T w o large bodies of Qing cavalry, some 12,000 in all, charged each of the French columns. Collineau's artillery poured fire into the serried ranks of Mongol and Manchu cavalry, while the elite companies found security in the ditch that ran along the main road. Accurate fire took its toll on the cavalry, but Collineau soon found himself embroiled in hand-to-hand fighting around his position. Generals Montauban and Jamin also managed to deploy their guns and fire with devastating effect while their infantry formed two squares just before the cavalry hit their position. The French 12-pound battery was positioned

COMMAND AND CONTROL between Collineau and Jamin's brigades and continued to pour canister into the enemy. After some time, the cavalry broke off their attack, having failed to break the French squares or overrun Collineau's precarious position. The respite allowed Montauban to take stock, re-form and advance upon the villages held by the Green Standard battalions. Cavalry Redeployed Sengbaou and Seng-ko-lin-ch'in did not renew their cavalry assault, as Grant's column moved against their right. Montauban could not see the British advance because he was in one of the squares during the attack. Grant's appearance forced the Qing generals to redeploy their cavalry to the flank, thereby allowing Montauban to attack the village closest to the centre. With an abundance of cavalry, it remains unclear why Singbaou or Seng-ko-lin-ch'in did not leave a substantial body to retard the advance of the French. Grant's force was larger, had more guns and cavalry, and one can only surmise that they perceived this threat to the flank as a priority and underestimated the elan of the French assault. The 101st stormed the village of Oua-kaua-ye in the centre, dispersing with ease the infantry defending it, and suffering little from their ineffective artillery. Following up, Montauban ordered both brigades to attack the village of Baliqiao, which was defended by more determined troops. Qing infantry defended the road across which Collineau advanced. His elite companies made short and bloody work of these soldiers and continued towards the village. Large cannon in the streets and across the canal fired on the French columns. Jamin brought up his batteries to silence the Chinese guns while the infantry moved in from two directions. The village and bridge at Baliqiao were defended by the Imperial Guard. These soldiers did not give ground. Collineau brought his cannon up to form crossfire with Jamin's batteries. Collineau Storms the Village After tearing the Imperial Guard troops apart, Collineau formed his troops into an attack column and stormed the village. Fighting raged at close quarters for more than 30 minutes. Montauban led

the 101st to Collineau's support securing the village. Not wanting to lose momentum, Collineau re-formed his command and advanced rapidly upon the bridge, with the French batteries providing effective and deadly fire. The Chinese artillerists manning their guns were killed, and the Imperial Guard gave ground under the canister, followed by Collineau's attack. The bridge was taken. Grant's column helped the Chinese along as its attack on the left dislodged the Green Standard troops from their village, while the British and Indian cavalry rolled up the line, overwhelming Qing cavalry that tried to hold their ground. The British attack was swift, but hard-fought. Grant's line of attack brought him within sight of a wooden bridge that crossed the canal some 1.6km (1 mile) west of Baliqiao.The arrival of the British on Seng-ko-lin-ch'in's far right, and the collapse of his forces in the face of their attack, compelled the general to pull his army from the field before it was trapped on the far bank of the canal. By noon, only five hours after the battle began, Grant's British were on the far side of the canal across the wooden bridge, while Collineau's elite companies established a bridgehead at Baliqiao. The victory sealed the fate of the imperial government. The Allied expedition sacked the Imperial Summer Palace northwest of Beijing, and the emperor capitulated to European demands. Napoleon III, flush with victory over Austria the year before, rewarded Montauban with elevation to the rank of Count of the Empire, as Comte de Palikao'. Little did Montauban know that he would end his illustrious career as Minister of War in 1870, presiding over the collapse of the Second Empire and the fall of France to German armies. The Scramble for Africa: 1890-1914 Germany did not actively pursue overseas empire until the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II. The construction of a German high seas fleet, and the commitment of military power beyond the European continent, was considered a distraction by the former chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. The Iron Chancellor did permit the establishment of footholds on the African continent, but he refused to divert Germany's attention and foreign policy to

141

C O M M A N D

A N D

C O N T R O L

Battle of Baliqiao I860 The Battle of Baliqao was the culmination of the Second Opium War. An Anglo-French force of 4000 men soundly defeated a Qing Army of 30,000 east of Beijing.The allied victory was followed by the sacking of the Imperial Summer Palace northwest of the city, and the conclusion of the conflict. Prince Seng-ko-lin-Chin, one of the most successful Qing generals and Prince Sengbao, brother of the Emperor, blocked the road to Beijing with troops drawn from the Green Standard Army, reinforced by Imperial Guard troops of the Banner Army. Outnumbered and outgunned, the AngloFrench force led by French General Cousin de Montauban and British General Sir John Hope Grant attacked the Qing positions at the front and flank. After hard fighting the Qing cavalry was repulsed. The Imperial Guard held the bridge at Baliqao, but French artillery, and a determined bayonet charge by experienced infantry, dislodged them with heavy losses for the Chinese.

BEIJINC,

QING CHINA SHANGHAI

The Anglo-French expeditionary force landed and seized the forts at Tangku, then advanced up the Peiho River to Beijing. The combined AngloFrench force fought two successful engagements against overwhelming Qing forces, ultimately defeating them at Baliqao.

TO BEIJING

The British column turns the Qing flank and seizes a wooden bridge west of Baliqao and in the Qing rear, forcing the Chinese to retreat. ttimill

5

BALIQIAO BRIDGE

OUA-KAUA-

COMMAND AND

4

Collineau's column pushes into the village of Baliqao and after a half hour storms the bridge held r the Qing Imperial Guard.

CONTROL

Montauban and Jamin lead the second French column, and are forced to form squares against Qing cavalry charges. The Qing cavalry are repulsed with heavy losses.

2

^T it

J i

Z"#

v

%

V , . . .

Collineau's column advances down the road toward Baliqao and is attacked by Qing cavalry.

4

I m ' V « * 1

V

2 The British column under

4

^

^^^^

D

General Grant attack the Qing in the flank, forcing Seng-ko-lin-Chin to redeploy some cavalry, relieving pressure on the French.

143

COMMAND AND CONTROL

imperial rivalries. Wilhelm's global policy, Weltpolitik, altered the equation as Anglo-French rivalries over imperial expansion gave way in the face of an aggressive German imperialism. The establishment of German colonies in Africa juxtaposed them squarely against British and French possessions. The premier imperial states, however, had expended an enormous amount of resources and political capital competing with each other to grab territory, and the arrival of Germany, and its use of its African colonies to upset its rivals through the support of their enemies, notably the Boers, represented a growing threat. Britain's African empire was the product of determined political will and military campaigning. British expeditions suffered defeats against indigenous armies at Isandhlwana (1879) and Khartoum (1885), but these defeats did not deter Britain from continuing its pursuit of empire.Thus Isandhlwana was followed by a decisive victory at Ulundi seven months later. The British presence in

144

T H E BRITISH SQUARE. British infantry in square formation repel an attack by Sudanese warriors at the battle of Abu Klea, 17 January 1885. A British column of more than a thousand men was attacked while attempting to relieve the beseiged General Gordon in Khartoum. Massed British rifle fire proved too much for the Sudanese, who suffered more than a thousand casualties in an encounter that lasted not much more than 15 minutes.

Sudan lapsed for 13 years after Khartoum, but the British subsequently set out on a campaign of reconquest, which ended in victory at Omdurman (1898). The British presence in Africa was made possible by the campaigns of Sir Garnet Wolseley (1833-1913) and Lord Kitchener (1850-1916). Wolseley preceded Kitchener as the first general of empire in his expeditions against the Ashanti in West Africa. He came from a military family, and was commissioned by the Duke of Wellington. He served in Burma, the Crimea, China and Canada before leading a British expeditionary force in the Second Ashanti War (1873-74). Wolseley's

COMMAND AND CONTROL surprising victory over the Ashanti led to his command in Zululand after 1879, Egypt in 1882 and Sudan in 1885, reaching Khartoum two days after the city fell to the Mahdists. Wolseley concluded his impressive career as the commander of the British Army In the decade marking the end of the nineteenth century, Horatio Kitchener emerged as the senior imperial officer of the British Empire in Africa. He led the Anglo-Egyptian Army into the Sudan, winning a stunning victory over the Mahdists at Omdurman, and then sought the source of the Nile, meeting the French at Fashoda later that year. In 1899, he was dispatched to South

Africa, where he took charge from Lord Roberts and oversaw the Boer War to its conclusion. He was rewarded with promotion to commander-inchief in India, followed by a brief return to Egypt, before World War I. He served as Minister of War for Great Britain until his death in 1916. In the case of Wolseley and Kitchener, success in wars of colonial empire led to supreme command of the armed forces. The British Army in 1914 was thus shaped and led by the men who built the empire. African Resistance The battle of Adowa has a special place in the history of Africa and of nineteenth-century European imperialism. Historians portray it as a unique victory of African arms over European armies. For Ethiopia (Abyssinia), the battle was a triumph that guaranteed the independence of the African state until 1935. For that matter, the victory led to the collapse of the Italian coalition government of Francesco Crispi (1818-1901), and the ascendancy of a rival coalition of the left led by Giovanni Giolitti (1852-1928). In the context of Ethiopian history, Adowa represented yet another defence of the country's independence from foreign invasion. Two decades earlier, an Egyptian army under Ismail Pasha (1830-1895) suffered a similar fate to the Italians, at Gundat (1875), which was followed by a second defeat at Gura (1876). Ethiopia was, at its heart, a feudal kingdom in transition.Throughout its history, the state vacillated between a strong, centralized HERO OF EMPIRE. Lord Kitchener succeeded Sir Garnet Wolseley as the premier general of the British Empire. His victory at Omdurman in 1898 sealed his legend, and led to his eventual command in South Africa.

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CONTROL

COMMAND AND CONTROL government and decentralized authority spread navy retarded its imperial growth, but the among several Amharic-speaking kingdoms. The opportunity to establish a toehold in Africa came traditional centre of gravity had been in the north. about with the intercession of Great Britain. In Yet, over the course of the decades leading to 1885, London sought to encourage Rome to claim Adowa, the dominance of the north had waned the Red Sea port of Massawa in order to deny it to due to a host of political, economic and ecological the French. This Eritrean colony was Italy's factors.The rise of Shoa introduced a competitive entrance into the world of African empire. southern kingdom into the political and military The following years witnessed the expansion mix. Ethiopia was going through one of its periods of Italian territory along the Red Sea coast. Eritrean of centralization, but also of rejuvenation governor General Oreste Baratieri methodically following the ascendancy of Negus ( K i n g ) promoted the creep of Italian authority southwards Yohannes IV (1831-1889). into the Ethiopian highlands. He died defeating a Mahdist He used as a pretext the Sudanese army at the battle desultory raiding byTigreans 7 do so long for a complete of Metemma and was into Eritrea to extend Italy's victory that may make the succeeded by the Shoan possessions in northeast king, Menelik II (1844Baratieri had little world feel that England has yet Africa. 1913). The Italians had patience with his southern courted Menelik, and something left in her, and that neighbour, and led an supported him against invasion force into Tigre, Yohannes. Despite his her soldiers still have strength which defeated his former succession in 1889, and his ally, Ras Mangasha, in 1895. and courage....' claim to be 'Negus Negusti', In the meantime, Menelik, or emperor (literally king himself a former beneficiary — SIR GARNET WOLSELEY, 1882 of kings'), over the many of Italian patronage as well, peoples of Ethiopia, not recognized Italian colonial everybody recognized Menelik's legitimacy. Ras ambitions as a threat, and had spent a number of (Duke) Mangasha, the bastard son of Yohannes IV, years cultivating a relationship with the French. As found willing allies in the Italians of neighbouring a result, Menelik received a substantial amount of Eritrea, w h o wished to play Ethiopian kings off French arms, artillery and ammunition through the against each other and keep Ethiopia weak. French-controlled port of Djibouti. He n o w Italy was a latecomer to the age of imperialism. Its unification in 1861 placed it at a disadvantage compared with Britain and France, w h o had already considerable overseas empires. Public and political desires to establish empire were based upon the prevailing notion that Italy must compete with its European counterparts to be a truly Continental power. The French acquisition of Tunisia in 1881, which was initially pledged by international agreement to Italy, further fuelled Italian imperialists, w h o aggressively wanted to expand beyond the Mediterranean. Italy's small OPPOSITE: ETHIOPIAN EMPEROR. Menelik II ruled Shoa, a kingdom in the south. His rise to the throne was the result of internecine warfare that plagued Ethiopia for decades. His armies were perhaps the best equipped in Africa.

accepted the defeated Mangasha into his fold, and called his army together. His plan was to move from his capital at Addis Ababa against Baratieri's forces in the north.

The Armies C o m p a r e d Baratieri's army in Eritrea in 1896 was composed of both Italians and Eritrean askari, or native levies. As became the common practice of colonial powers, such local allies were equipped and trained in the European style and led by European officers. This system, which dated from the late eighteenth century, was used by the British with remarkable success in India and later in Africa. The French also employed substantial numbers of indigenous troops, which could be paid less than the cost of deploying and maintaining European

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COMMAND A N D CONTROL professionals. By contrast, while the British maintained a professional volunteer army, the French and Italian armies were composed of conscripts. In France, the growing cost of colonial wars, and the increasing reluctance of families to lose sons in the deserts of North Africa, the jungles of Indochina, or the plains of Mexico, led to the division of the army into the Metropolitan Army (a national conscript army) and the professionals, such as the Foreign Legion. Italy had yet to reach that point, and never did. Thus, many in the colonial army that marched to Adowa in 1896 were young men who were completing their national service. Menelik's Troops Menelik's army was a national army of sorts, but one based upon feudal levies and regional governors. There are no comparative ranks or organization of the Ethiopian army in relation to its European counterparts. The Rases called together their men, joined the emperor's own troops, and marched off to war. The officers were not, in fact, professional officers but held feudal titles from which came their military rank. The Rases and their subordinates divided their warriors into groups based upon their regional affiliations within their territories, and relied upon the local communal leaders to keep their men in line, and obey orders. It should be noted that the force of Menelik and his Rases was perhaps the best equipped, and best led, of African armies. Despite regional differences, and internecine conflict among the Rases, the Monophysite Christians of Ethiopia had proved their military prowess in their conflicts with Sudanese, Oromo and Somali Muslims, and their capture of territory from the latter two groups. Yet the campaign against Baratieri was not one of conquest. Menelik had no desire to bring Eritrea into his empire. He intended to push the Italians back into Eritrea by projecting his power 805km (500 miles) from his capital. Assembling his army was indeed a difficult political and logistical task. Previous attempts by Menelik's predecessor, King Yohannes IV, to move against the Italian colony had failed due to poor logistics. An army of 100,000 men eats a lot, and requires an enormous

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number of pack animals to ensure proper supply. For Menelik, the logistical nightmare was much the same, but he was keenly aware of the danger and prepared two supply lines: one that ran from Addis Ababa and another from Harar toTigre. The politics of assembling the Rases was also daunting. Rivalries and ambitions might have prevented such an assemblage, but the real threat of the Italians proved decisive for the emperor. Menelik was therefore able to rely upon Ras Mangasha, his former enemy; Ras Makonnen, who ruled the vital province of Harar; Ras Michael of Wollo; Ras Atichim of Amhara; Ras Alula of Hamasen; and Ras Sebat of Agame and Tigre. Including his own Shoan troops, Menelik's army numbered 100,000 soldiers, including 4-5000 cavalry and 46 pieces of artillery. The cannon were either Hotchkiss guns purchased from France, or an older variety captured from the Egyptians two decades earlier. More than 70,000 soldiers carried firearms, notably Remington, Chassepot, Gras and Mauser rifles, along with percussion cap rifled muskets.The remainder had buffalo-hide shields and spears. Menelik also employed foreign military advisors, or men of fortune, to help train his army. Artillerists, too, were drawn from European adventurers with military experience. Baratieri's Forces Against this impressive army, General Baratieri's expeditionary force, recently reinforced from Italy, included 20,000 men, divided into four brigades. The majority of the army, 12,000 men, were Italians, with the remaining 8000 being askari. Three of the four brigades - those of Giuseppe Arimondi (1846-1896), Vittorio Dabormida (1842-1896) and Giuseppe Ellena - were overwhelmingly Italian, while Matteo Albertone's brigade was composed entirely of Eritrean troops, with several hundred Ethiopians. Baratieri's troops were equipped with the latest Vetterli repeating rifles with magazine.The askari had not received these new weapons, and entered the campaign with the older Vetterlis. Baratieri's force outnumbered Menelik's in artillery, with 56 pieces, all breech-loading guns. Forty-four of these were light mountain guns, smaller than the standard

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Native Askari

(1896) The employment of indigenous troops in European colonial armies was commonplace throughout the nineteenth century. It offset the military cost of empire, and was often employed as a tactic to elevate one group of peoples over another. The askari raised by the Italians in Eritrea were, by all accounts, well trained and disciplined. Although they were not provided with the newest repeating rifles, it is clear their performance

at Adowa

exhibited a high level of professionalism. Likewise, the British Indian sepoy regiments were certainly professionals of the highest calibre, and French colonial troops, such as the Zouaves of Algeria or Senegalese Tiralleurs, were considered elite troops. The majority of Albertone's brigade at Adowa was composed of askari battalions, and while their formations

broke against

Ethiopian attacks, it was only after their ammunition

ran out and their position

became untenable several hours after the initial contact.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL field artillery but more difficult to operate. The remainder were rapid-fire breech-loaders. The Battle of Adowa: 1 March 1896 Baratieri's advance intoTigre province was initially successful, and he established several garrisons there. His confidence that Menelik could not possibly move north in any real force was shattered in December 1895, when the emperor's advance guard of 30,000 overran an askari

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contingent of 2000 at Amba Alagi, and besieged the survivors, who took shelter in a fort at Makalle. By January, Menelik offered terms to Baratieri, who took this act as a sign of weakness. Moreover, Francesco Crispi, the Italian prime minister, demanded Baratieri press on. The Italian general used the delay produced by negotiations to concentrate his army near Adigrat. The rough terrain offered an excellent defensive position. He was quite confident that he could

COMMAND AND CONTROL hold his o w n against a concerted attack by Menelik, if the discussions broke down. Indeed, Baratieri realized the size of the Ethiopian army was a potential problem for Menelik, and intended to use time to his advantage. His own supply line from Massawa was only 24()km (150 miles) in length. And although his army was not adequately equipped with animals and wagons, Menelik's army suffered even more greatly from its overextended position, and was overburdened

with the logistical problem of feeding 100,000 men. Baratieri wanted to wait out the Ethiopian emperor, hoping starvation and lack of water would defeat his enemy. If Menelik decided to attack, his position afforded him security. Baratieri's strategy was quite sound, but incessant telegrams from Rome demanded results. Crispi's patience had worn out. His political opposition had made gains in the public eye as a result of earlier military defeat.The prime minister, frustrated by Baratieri's seeming intransigence, dispatched General Baldissera to assume command of the army and bring the campaign to a victorious conclusion. Baratieri caught wind of his imminent dismissal, and under pressure from his generals, excluding Albertone, recommended an assault on Menelik's apparently decrepit army. The supply situation had not yet reached a crisis point for the Italians. Baratieri did place his men on half rations, but they were eating like kings compared with the serious problems the Ethiopian army was experiencing. Nonetheless, the thought of retreating into Eritrea or waiting for his replacement did not seem an honourable alternative to Baratieri. Thus, at nightfall on 29 February 1896, Baratieri ordered his army forward from their camp at Sauria towards Menelik at Adowa. Waiting Game Meanwhile, Menelik feared his ill-supplied army was about to disintegrate. Indeed, according to historian Thomas Pakenham, the Rases had already decided to break camp and withdraw that same day, before they learned of Baratieri's intentions. None of them conceived that the Italian general would leave the security of his strong defensive position, and believed he would simply wait them out. Nonetheless, their scouts reported news of the Italian advance in the middle of the night, and w o r d of the fortuitous development reached Menelik on the morning of 1 March. By that time, his army had been roused, and the Rases were GENERAL BARATIERI A N D ITALIAN OFFICERS. General Baratieri's reputation was tarnished by the defeat at Adowa. He favoured a Fabian strategy against Menelik, but pressure from his officers and Prime Minister Crispi led to the debacle.

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marching to engage the Italian force.The Emperor assembled his Shoan troops, and moved east to take advantage of this unexpected 'gift'. Baratieri's plan called for an advance by three of his four brigades to a position running from Mount Eshasho on the right to Mount Bellah in the centre, with Chidane Meret holding the left flank. This defence line, extending approximately 3km (2 miles), dominated a valley 1km (0.6 miles) wide, and offered a clear field of fire. The Italian commander kept a fourth brigade under General Ellena in reserve 2km (1.2 miles) to the rear along the hills of Rebbi Arienni. Baratieri's intention was to take up new forward positions, and entice the emperor to attack. The Italian army made significant progress in the night and, guided by locals, arrived at its

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The terrain in northern Ethiopia consisted of ravines and valleys passing between prominent peaks. The battlefield of Adowa, marked by such hills and valleys, prohibited clear line of sight and ensured poor communication between Italian columns. A D O W A BATTLEGROUND.

intended positions. General Albertone's Native Brigade, which consisted of four Eritrean askari battalions, four artillery batteries and 400 Ethiopian troops, had the responsibility of securing the left flank. The map that Albertone possessed clearly indicated the location of Chidane Meret, but his guide insisted that the hill was further forward. The Italian general, not confident in the accuracy of his map, relied instead upon his guide and led his brigade towards the hill of Enda Chidane Meret, which lay 5km

COMMAND AND CONTROL (3 miles) southwest of the intended position. The slight difference in name caused the confusion that would ultimately be fatal to Albertone and his soldiers. Baratieri, too, had no idea that the brigade on his left flank had travelled so far from its intended position. Battle Joined At sunrise .Albertone realized his error when he saw thousands of Ethiopian troops to his front, and no sign of General Arimondi's brigade, which should have been on his right. He deployed his batteries, and three battalions, along a crest northeast of Enda Chidane Meret; and threw his fourth battalion forward in skirmish line. Ras Atichim's soldiers along with a portion of Menelik's Shoans descended upon Albertone's skirmish line at 6 a.m. For an hour, a lively firefight raged. By 7 a.m., the weight of Menelik's forces, had overrun the askari battalion, and now surged towards Albertone's main line. Both artillery fire and ordered volleys tore into the Ethiopians, but still they swarmed over the hills. Next, they fanned out, and extended well beyond Albertone's flanks. The Italian commander refused his flanking companies, repelling repeated assaults against his position. All the same, it was only a matter of time before the Italian brigade would be enveloped. In the meantime, Menelik directed his own artillery on the Italian position.While the gunners lacked the accuracy of their Italian counterparts, their guns took their toll nevertheless. Baratieri's plan had unravelled almost as soon as he heard the sound of the guns. It was only then that he realized that Albertone was not at Chidane Meret. He immediately sent messengers to recall the errant brigade, but they failed to reach Albertone. Moreover, Baratieri's brigades had not moved in perfect coordination as planned but ended up staggering towards their objective during the night. The general

sent Dabormida's brigade forward to support Albertone's, but it got lost. It ended up winding its way to almost 3km (2 miles) beyond Mount Bellah, where it was equally distant from Albertone. Meanwhile, Ras Mangasha's soldiers marched up the valley of Mariam Shavitu, and met Dabormida's Italian battalions. The Italian artillery and rifle fire from prone positions sufficed to keep the Ethiopians at bay. For the moment, the real weight of Ethiopian numbers was to the south. The End for Albertone By 9 a.m., Albertone's situation was desperate. His askari held their ground, and took their toll on the Ethiopians with lethal artillery fire. Menelik had committed his Rases to battle but retained his Shoans in reserve. Encouraged by the Empress Taitu, who had accompanied him to the battle, Menelik sent forward his own troops as well as his royal bodyguard, some 30,000 men. With his ammunition running low, and fearing encirclement, Albertone began a retrograde movement covered by a rearguard. Yet his askari feared the worst, and began to break and run. In a matter of minutes, Albertone's battalions crumbled, and the commander perished along with his men. At 8.30 a.m., shortly before the destruction of his Native Brigade, Baratieri had tried to make sense of the unfolding situation. He brought Arimondi's six battalions and two batteries to Mount Bellah, in order to hold the centre, and he kept Ellena's The Ethiopians tuere organized by their various cultural groups and led by a Ras - a duke or warlord. Many possessed French or German breech-loading rifles, while a minority carried spears and shields. ETHIOPIAN WARRIOR.

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Battle of Adowa 1896 The battle of Adowa resulted in the destruction of more than 50 per cent of the Italian colonial army in Eritrea. General Baratieri invaded Ethiopia seeking to extend Italy's African empire into one of the few remaining independent kingdoms in the region. Emperor Menelik II called his Rases together at Addis Ababa, assembling more than 100,000 warriors. Facing modern rifles and artillery imported from Europe, and troops trained by European mercenaries, Baratieri was confronted by a force which few if any European armies could have defeated successfully. Although Baratieri preferred a Fabian strategy to wear down the Ethiopian emperor's army, Italian public opinion and pressure from his officers led to his ill-fated attack at Adowa. The terrain also worked in the Ethiopians' favour: the Italian army was divided and isolated into a number of smaller detachments amidst the rugged, hilly terrain, making them easier to defeat in detail.

Adowa is located not far from the Eritrean border. Baratieri had fallen back upon his supply line, while Menelik extended his further.

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Menelik's army takes up position in front of Adowa, with artillery on the high ground. Despite a deteriorating supply situation, Menelik refuses to be goaded into attacking the Italian force.

1

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DABORMIDA'S BRIGADE

ARIMONDI AND BARATIERI'S BRIGADE

4

Dabormida's brigade is dispatched to make contact with Albertone but gets lost and is isolated to the north. It is eventually surrounded after several hours of determined resistance.

ALBERTONE'S BRIGADE

Jiml leave their defensive positions and advance in three columns to engage the waiting Ethiopians. The advance is poorly coordinated and becomes disorganized. The discipline of the Italians and askari enables them to hold out for several hours, but as ammunition runs short, and their position is enveloped, several battalions break ranks, while others try to withdraw in good order.

5 Albertone's brigade became lost and confused, blundering into Menelik's forces. Far forward of Baratieri's position, the brigade is isolated and attacked from front and flank.

3

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COMMAND A N D CONTROL brigade in reserve. It was not long before the Shoans, fresh from victory over Albertone, began to assail the Italian centre. Menelik's army was now fully committed, and its weight began to fall like a sledgehammer on the Italians. Arimondi had a regiment of Bersaglieri, or elite light troops, who were the professionals among Baratieri's army. They poured fire into the Shoans, who lodged themselves on the spur of Mount Bellah. Arimondi Ordered Back Despite horrendous casualties, the Ethiopians' numbers continued to grow. By 10 a.m., most of Menelik's Shoans, reinforced by Rases Makonnen, Alula and Michael, stormed Mount Bellah from the front and flanks. Menelik brought up his guns, and added their fire onto Arimondi's position. Baratieri, dumbfounded at the situation, ordered Arimondi to withdraw upon Ellena's brigade, 2km (1.2 miles) to the rear. Under constant pressure, the battalions

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conducted an orderly retreat but suffered severely from Ethiopian assaults. Arimondi was killed in one of these rushes. The remnants of Arimondi's command reached Ellena on Mount Roja but were immediately assailed by Shoans and Amharans. Ellena's men, having observed the destruction of their comrades and the endless waves of Ethiopians, were completely demoralized. The speed of the Shoan advance further unnerved them. Baratieri, fearing the complete destruction of his command, ordered Ellena and the remnants of Arimondi's brigade to fight a rearguard towards his camp at Sauria. Menelik and Ras Makonnen harried these battalions for a short time, and then turned their Menelik accepts the surrender of the Italians following his victory at Adowa. The casualty rate suffered by the Italian forces at Adowa was greater than in any battle involving European troops on African soil. ITALIAN SURRENDER.

COMMAND AND CONTROL full attention towards General Dabormida, whose brigade still clung desperately to its position and was unaware of the fate that had befallen the rest of the Italian army.

something that Benito Mussolini would willingly take up in 1935.

Towards World War I Generalship in the age of colonial empires required a skilful leader, flexible and creative Dabormida's Brigade Disintegrates enough to use effectively what forces and General Dabormida's battalions and batteries held resources he had at any moment. The nature of their ground for much of the morning and into the wars of empire was that there were never early afternoon. Italian casualties continued to sufficient troops, or an abundance of supply. mount, but the soldiers managed to repel the The terrain was often inhospitable, and the local persistent waves of Ethiopians. By 3 p.m., almost populations hostile. The two hours after Baratieri conclusion of a general had moved east with peace in 1815 meant that Ellena's brigade, Dabormida's 'Within the German the majority of military position became untenable. boundaries, every Herero, experience during the Menelik's Shoans, and forces nineteenth century would belonging to his Rases, began whether found armed or be found beyond the to appear to Dabormida's Continent. The Crimea, Italy, rear, which indicated that he unarmed, with or without Austria and France were was fully cut off from the cattle, will be shot. I shall not campaigns of relatively short army. His ammunition was duration and extremely also critically low. Under accept any more women or violent, but limited within these circumstances, the the scope of accepted Italian commander decided children. I shall drive them European standards. upon a fighting retreat, with back to their people - otherwise his battalions covering each Wars of empire involved other in succession. While the domination of peoples I shall order shots to be fired the withdrawal began well and the transformation of enough, attrition and a lack indigenous societies. Local at them.' of ammunition led to the resistance to European — GENERAL THEODOR VON LEUTWEIN, gradual erosion and final expansion was fierce, and collapse of Dabormida's wholehearted, and European EXTERMINATION ORDER, 1904 brigade. All of his troops died reprisals were equally nasty. The Germans pursued a or surrendered. Dabormida particularly devastating himself perished in the Vernichtungskrieg, or war of annihilation, against retreat, as did most of his officers. the Herero in 1904-05. Wars of empire often led to Menelik's victory was complete. The Italian extremes, out of cultural imperatives or military army had ceased to exist. More than 50 per cent of necessity. The result, however, was that while Baratieri's army died at Adowa. For that matter, military service overseas was an exception at the Menelik's forces had suffered 17,000 casualties, beginning of the nineteenth century, it was a or roughly 20 per cent of his army. The victory requirement for promotion and command on the sufficed to solidify his power over the Rases, and European continent by the turn of the century.The secure his reign as 'Negus Negusti'. In Italy, tactics developed, the traditions established and Crispi's government collapsed with the news of the methods of war-making were inexorably the Italian debacle. Adowa became a national influenced by this century of colonial wars. They humiliation, one that would persist in the Italian would be tested, however, and fail in Flanders consciousness and would call, for many, for the fields and elsewhere in 1914. redemption of honour. Revenge for Adowa was

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SIEGE WARFARE Sieges might not seem to be an obvious facet of colonial warfare. They were, however, surprisingly common, especially in the early days of European expansion. Indeed, they were in many ways a far more important feature of colonial campaigns than set-piece battles in the open field. This was particularly true during the eighteenth century, when permanent fortifications were built in the East Indies, in Canada and in the Caribbean. In the very earliest days, European technology and military organization were both immeasurably superior to those of the indigenous populations, with the result that the colonization of islands, coastal areas and — in the case of Mexico — the interior was both swift and permanent.

he military problem that then faced colonial administrators was less one of internal security - adequately met by simple blockhouses and stockades - than the very real external threat from other European powers intent on expanding their own spheres of influence by

T

The American commander-in-chief and future president George Washington stands in the centre of the group of officers but it is unambiguously depicted as a French operation conducted by French engineers note the surveying instruments in right foreground. T H E SIEGE OF Y O R K T O W N , BY LOUIS COUDER.

SIEGE W A R F A R E seizing existing settlements, rather than founding new ones. Therefore the various footholds on the African coast, such as Goree, off the city of Dakar, capital of modern Senegal; the trading factories in India and Southeast Asia; and, above all, the larger Caribbean islands - all were soon being protected by large purpose-built European-style fortresses. Moreover, since the colonial garrisons were almost invariably outnumbered by any army sent against them, they rarely resorted to fighting battles in the open but instead promptly retired into the nearest fortress, there to be besieged just as they would in Europe. Made in Europe Consequently, any study of colonial siege warfare must begin with an outline of contemporary European theory. As w e shall see, not all of that theory turned out to be entirely appropriate to colonial conditions, whether in the building of fortifications or in the demolishing or capturing of them, but it underpinned everything that was done in the early days and so must form the starting point for this chapter.

T H E SCIENCE OF FORTIFICATION. The two examples of permanent fortifications set out below represent a theoretical ideal rarely achieved in practice and all too frequently defeated by geography.

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Until fairly late in the medieval period, it had been considered sufficient for a town or castle to possess a continuous circuit of stone walling that was high enough to prevent or at least deter any attempt at escalading. This relatively thin stone wall was referred to as a curtain or an enceinte', and unless it could be undermined, the only real alternative to starving the garrison of the fortress into submission was to gain control of a gate by surprise or treachery. The introduction of gunpowder, however, changed the face of siege work dramatically, for it was very quickly realized that heavy cannon had the power to bring those high, but thin, stone ramparts tumbling down like the walls of Jericho. The immediate answer was massively to strengthen the walls and to convert mural towers into blockhouses, but this was both expensive and largely impractical. For this reason, engineers devised the bastion instead, the earliest example of which is to be found at Sarzana in Italy. This was a solid wedge projecting from, or immediately in front of, a vulnerable stretch of walling and itself capable of mounting a sufficient number of defensive guns to suppress the fire of any battery erected against it. Although the castle of Sarzanello boasts but a single example, these bastions were soon being added at intervals all around fortresses, carefully sited so that their guns could mutually

SIEGE WARFARE

These more modestly proportioned fortifications show how a relatively small post, appropriate to colonial warfare, could be improved or expanded into a formidable defensive position.

ABOVE:THE PRACTICE OF FORTIFICATION.

support each other. The theoretical ideal, as developed in the seventeenth century by engineers such as Menno van Coehoorn (1641-1704) and Sebastian Vauban (1633-1707), was a pentagonal fortress with a bastion at each of the five angles. This was rarely realized in practice, though, and most older fortresses continued through a combination of geography and circumstances to occupy an irregular site. Ditches, Bastions and Glacis Over time, however, further and even greater protection was added in the form of ditches and ravelins. There was nothing new, of course, about ditches, and the most basic form of fortification is one constructed by digging a ditch and then throwing up the spoil to form a rampart behind it. The difference was that the spoil was now thrown on the outer side of the ditch and there sculpted into a 'glacis' - a long, gentle slope falling away towards the enemy from such a height and such a uniformly shallow angle that it offered near complete protection to the near vertical masonry walling on the inner side of the ditch while simultaneously denying any dead ground to cover an attacker.

Consequently, providing that the combination of ditch and glacis was such that, in effect, the walls 'sank' into the ground, any attackers might at best do some considerable superficial damage only to the upper parts of the works. They would not be able to tumble sufficient rubble into the ditch to create a practicable breach - that is, one that attackers could reach by scrambling up the

BASED ON AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MODEL, this illustration shows how bastions and hornworks could be combined with natural features such as a river to provide effective defences for a town or settlement.

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SIEGE WARFARE P L A N OF FORT W I L L I A M HENRY. This fort on the New York frontier was originally a small post serving as little more than a patrol base, but in the face of a French offensive in 1757 it was hastily expanded by the construction of a fortified camp on higher ground, which proved inadequate against French engineering and gunnery.

mound of rubble without resort to ladders or other contrivances. It was therefore sometimes necessary for the attackers to establish their batteries in the glacis itself. Inevitably, this was a slow, painful and horrendously expensive business, often rendered doubly so by the insertion of ravelins - detached triangular fortifications - into the intervals between the bastions, and forward of the main ditch. There was, in fact, no end to the combinations of walls, ditches, bastions and ravelins that could be devised according to the ingenuity of the engineer, other than the purely practical twin constraints of first finding sufficient money with which to build and maintain such an increasingly large and intricate set of fortifications, and then finding the weapons and the men to occupy them. Often, this could be a fine and delicate balance.

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By way of a practical example, in 1724 a survey of the East India Company's military establishment at Madras found that the picturesquely named 'gun room crew' then comprised some 46 Europeans, 52 Eurasians and 30 lascars, or Indian labourers. What the official charged with counting the crew neglected to mention presumably because this did not come within his remit as paymaster - was that this motley crew were between them expected to man a total of some 200 guns ranged around the walls! Not surprisingly, the French had very little difficulty in capturing the place just a few years later. Similarly, Fort William at Bengal was also constructed on a green field' site and laid out according to the best European practice, but when attacked in 1756 the tiny garrison of less than 200 men hastily employed by the East India Company proved inadequate. Siege Craft Practice: Entrenchments Ordinarily, from the attacker's point of view, the basic techniques of siege craft directed against a properly manned fortress were straightforward enough. All manner of early preparation was necessary, of course, including measures to throw a cordon around it in order to prevent - or, at least, hinder - the garrison communicating with the outside world, but the siege work proper began with the opening of the 'First Parallel'. As the term implies, this was a trench running parallel with the fortifications at the intended point

SIEGE W A R F A R E

a plan and elevation of part of a defensive battery. The gun would be positioned on a downward-sloping wooden platform for stability. ABOVE: THIS ILLUSTRATION SHOWS

of attack. Normally it was traced several hundred metres out from the defensive perimeter - and certainly at far too great a distance for any smallarms fire to be effective against those digging or manning it. It had two main purposes.The first was to provide protection for the one or more heavy artillery batteries that would be sited in or immediately behind it, lest the garrison should decide to sally out and disrupt the proceedings by killing or chasing off the gunners and spiking the cannon. Generally speaking, these batteries were capable only of inflicting minimal damage to the fortifications. What they could do was to nibble at the top of the glacis, lowering it in order to expose the upper parts of the walling behind, and clear

minor obstacles such as stockades. They could also harass the defenders generally, especially if the batteries included mortars or howitzers capable of lofting explosive bombs or shells over the walls. However, their primary role was to suppress the fire of the fortress guns, for the principal purpose of the parallel was simply to provide a secure starting point from where the engineers could sap forward to the point chosen for the Second Parallel'. While the First Parallel was normally traced out and dug in the open - and usually in the course of a single night - the Second Parallel was dug much closer to the fortress, often necessitating a series of saps, or zig-zag trenches, to be dug forward from the First Parallel, enabling the new parallel to be

of a typical fortification of the eary nineteenth century. 1) terreplein; 2) banquette; 3) parapet; 4) scarp revetment; 5) cuvette; 6) counter-scarp revetment; 7) palisade; 8) glacis. BELOW: A CROSS-SECTION

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SIEGE WARFARE

US NAVAL CANNON, UVTE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

By the eighteenth century, cannon tubes were comparativeily cheap items of capital equipment, and a single warship could carry far more gu ns than the average army could transport or' maintain. created by extending the heads of the saps to the right and left. Once the Second Parallel was completed, another set of batteries could be established behind it, and this time their fire was directed at the proposed point of attack, with the intention of doing some serious damage. Sometimes, depending on the size and strength of the fortress, it was necessary to sap forward yet again and dig a Third Parallel within the glacis itself in order to batter the walls properly. In practice, however, the Second Parallel was usually sufficient for this purpose. Indeed, if the attacker was in possession of the necessary resources, there was no reason why different points around the defences should not be approached at the same time, in order to force the defender to expend energy holding off not one but several attacks. For preference, it was often the bastions that were attacked rather than the enceinte itself, since an assault on a bastion would be exposed to less crossfire. If, on the other hand, there was a known weakness in the masonry, or an inordinate distance between the flanking bastions, it might actually be judged easier to achieve a practicable breach in the enceinte. In any event, the purpose of these new batteries was to create that breach and tumble a sufficient mound of rubble from it into the ditch to allow an assault column to climb up and force its way in. Once that crucial point was reached, convention decreed that the fortress should formally be summoned and the garrison offered a last

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opportunity to surrender, before committing both sides to the awful horrors of a storm. The garrison, meanwhile, were supposed to be conducting what was usually termed a 'vigorous defence' - most obviously by bringing down a heavy fire on the attackers to hinder their digging, but also by carrying out sorties or raids aimed at killing specialist personnel such as engineers, destroying tools and materials and even, if time permitted, infilling trenches. However, once a breach or a series of practicable breaches had been created and a formal summons delivered, the garrison essentially had two choices: either to try and fight off an assault, in the knowledge that failure could result in the massacre of the entire garrison, or to surrender, which offered the rather more agreeable prospect of being allowed to march out to their own lines. Indeed, there was a certain expectation that a fortress placed under siege would inevitably fall unless a relieving army could drive off the attackers. Some military engineers were even wont to boast that the whole business could be timetabled, from the moment the First Parallel was traced out, to the day (if not the actual hour) when the garrison hung out the white flag. Siege Warfare in North America: the Case of Quebec The reality was seldom quite so neat and tidy, of course, and this was particularly true when the siege took place in the context of colonial warfare.

SIEGE WARFARE In the first place, the attacker was always working against time. Unlike European sieges, there was rarely very much danger of a relieving army turning up to drive off the attackers, but weather was always a factor - whether the onset of a hot and sickly season in the Caribbean or the approach of winter in Canada. At Quebec in 1759, for example, General Wolfe (1727-1759) was forced to take the risky chance of a direct assault or escalade on unbreached walls in midSeptember simply because the imminent arrival of pack ice at the mouth of the St Lawrence would compel his withdrawal from the river within a matter of days. The Quebec campaign does, in fact, provide a number of examples of the unusual hazards facing armies engaged in siege warfare in the colonies not least the presence of the enemy in rear areas that had been secure. The city itself occupied a strong position on a headland between the St Lawrence and St Charles rivers, covered on the landward side by a modern stone-faced enceinte periodically strengthened with bastions. Nevertheless, the French commander, the Marquis de Montcalm (1712-1759), chose not to sit behind the walls but to defend the city with his field army, using it to prevent the British from landing near enough to engage in a formal siege in the first place. For his part, an increasingly frustrated Wolfe eventually managed to throw his army ashore at the very last moment, just upstream of the city. His intention was to carry out a coup de main, but his intelligence was faulty, and spectacularly so: instead of the insubstantial earthworks and palisades he was anticipating, he encountered stone walls complete from shore to shore. What saved Wolfe was Montcalm's disastrous decision to fight him in the open rather than stand a formal siege. It was a decision founded on the belief that the fortress was indefensible, for although it was adequately covered by stone walls, these were overlooked by high ground immediately outside the city. Moreover, the thin covering of soil over solid rock had precluded the digging of a ditch and glacis except for a very

short stretch at the northern end. And, to make matters worse, the guns were positioned on the walls to repel an infantry assault rather than engage in counter-battery fire, since the French engineer concerned had cheerfully concluded that there was no prospect of attackers being able to get heavy guns up there. Defences Revamped Not surprisingly, the first thing the rather bemused British engineers did after capturing the city was to cut new embrasures in the outer faces of the walls in order to remedy that curious deficiency a prudent move that enabled the city to withstand a French counter-attack very shortly afterwards and a subsequent siege by American colonial forces in 1776, despite the continuing lack of a ditch and glacis. Although they were not to be attacked again after 1776, the defences of Quebec are also a useful pointer to the way in which such conventional fortresses subsequently developed, with increasing emphasis being placed on outworks, or small outlying forts.As at the siege ofYorktown in 1782, these were erected as a means of hampering or disrupting operations directed against the fortress proper - by denying access to high ground or Not only were warships the readiest source of guns for colonial siege operations, but their crews were also skilled in moving them, with ropes, tackle and muscle power.

BRITISH NAVAL CANNON.

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SIEGE WARFARE covered approaches, for example, or simply by imposing additional delays on the attacker. Such was the thinking of the British engineers at Quebec.They concluded that no matter what they could do to improve them, the defences of Quebec were fatally compromised by the Buttes a Neveu, a ridge of high ground which overlooked the city to the west.To counter this disadvantage, they chose a simple solution: to erect a line of outworks in the form of circular Martello Towers along the crest of the ridge, in order to deny an attacker the use of it for as long as possible. Nevertheless, the enceinte retained its primary importance. Had the American army reached Quebec during the war of 1812 it would, once again, have been forced to conduct a regular siege with parallels, saps and batteries, to open the all-important breach. The Siege of Yorktown: 28 September—19 October 1781 At first sight, the siege of Yorktown was a straightforward affair, largely conducted according to the established principles of the time. As such, it provides a useful benchmark by which the other sieges discussed in this chapter may be judged, but there were nevertheless some distinguishing features peculiar to its colonial setting. In Europe, the primary purpose of a fortress was defensive. It was intended either to dominate an area that needed to be held, or to block a potential invasion route. Consequently over time ever more elaborate permanent defences were built up, either around an existing medieval core or, ideally, by levelling everything and starting afresh in accordance with the scientific principles laid down by the great engineers such as Vauban. Yorktown, by contrast, was a modest village of comfortable houses and tobacco barns, of no I

A N ORIGINAL MAP showing the siege of Quebec, 1776, from a French source. American colonial forces made an unsuccessful attempt to storm the city on 31 December 1775. Following an ineffectual siege, the Americans were forced to withdraw by the arrival of British reinforcements in May 1776. The city was defended by a small garrison who used the position's considerable defences to their advantage unlike Montcalm in 1759-

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strategic significance whatsoever until war caught up with it in the summer of 1781. The causes of the American War of Independence need not detain us. Suffice it to say that it began simply enough in 1775, as a rebellion in Britain's American colonies. At first, the campaign went badly for the rebels, but their commander, a Virginian aristocrat named George Washington

SIEGE WARFARE (1732-1799), succeeded in his primary aim of keeping the rebel army in the field. An unexpected victory at Saratoga in 1777 then encouraged France to intervene, offering the rebels first material assistance and then an army of regular troops commanded by the Comte de Rochambeau (1725-1807). The question was h o w best to employ this expeditionary force. To some extent,

the war had reached stalemate. N e w York City was firmly held by the British Army and there was no realistic prospect of its being recaptured, even with the assistance of the French. On the other hand, British authority outside the extensive defences was pretty well limited to the range of the Royal Artillery's guns. Particularly after the diversion of thousands of regular troops to deal

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SIEGE W A R F A R E with the French threat in the West Indies, Britain simply lacked the resources to do more. Further south, however, there was an opportunity, and British hopes of ultimately defeating the rebellion rested on mobilizing the substantial Loyalist population there. With regulars in short supply, all depended on raising enough local militias to do the job, but it soon became painfully apparent that they were unable to operate effectively without a good stiffening of regulars. Thus a hazardous strategy was embarked upon, w h e r e b y an expeditionary force led by Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805) was to seek out and destroy any American regular troops in the area and thereby facilitate the formation of Loyalist units, which could hold the southern states for the Crown. The strategy soon revealed its weaknesses. First, it was overly optimistic in assuming that large numbers of militia could be raised and, second, it was dangerous since relatively f e w regular troops could be spared and all of them were dependent on continued control of the sea for supplies and reinforcements. On 25 April 1781, Cornwallis left Wilmington, North Carolina, with just 3500 men and moved north into Virginia to rendezvous at Petersburg with Major-General Phillips (1731-1781). By the time Cornwallis got there on 20 May, he found that Phillips had died of typhoid fever and that the increasing heat was hampering military operations. The navy was not only called upon to provide artillery for besieging fortresses. At Yorktown, General Cornwallis had ships' guns like this one landed to assist in the defence.

NAVAL G U N , Y O R K T O W N .

He also found instructions to fortify the town of Portsmouth to serve as a naval base. Ordinarily the choice would have been a good one; the nearby town of Norfolk would later be developed into a naval yard serving the great anchorage of Hampton Roads. However, the local commander reported that even the existing light defences required 400 men just to maintain them and that the garrison was sickly and prone to desertion. Cornwallis therefore made use of a discretionary clause in his orders to establish himself at Williamsburg in the Virginia Peninsula, and instead fortify nearby Yorktown as his naval base. In itself, the choice was sensible enough. It was a healthier location than Portsmouth, and the York River offered a perfectly adequate anchorage. The problem was the arrival of a French fleet in Chesapeake Bay, which then proceeded to come off best in a confused naval action off the Virginia Capes on 5 September. The British commander, Admiral Graves (1713-1787), hauled off to refit at N e w York, and Cornwallis found himself completely cut off just as a large combined American and French army approached from the north. By 26 September, the Allied army was fully concentrated at Williamsburg, which had earlier been abandoned by Cornwallis, and two days later it set off for Yorktown. By evening, it was in front of the outer defences. A day of manoeuvring and skirmishing then followed as the Allies 'felt out' the British position. Next morning, they awoke to find that Cornwallis had abandoned his outworks and withdrawn within the main perimeter. Although afterwards criticized for doing so too precipitately, the British general had little alternative, for he was already outnumbered by three to one and a relief force was scheduled to arrive on 5 October. N e w Perimeter The new perimeter was, for the most part, occupied by Cornwallis' British and German regulars while the provincial troops, including the elite Queens Rangers, took on responsibility

168

SIEGE W A R F A R E

AMERICANS ASSAULTING THE FORTIFICATIONS AT Y O R K T O W N .

Attacks mounted by American and French troops on the British redoubts did not breach the main perimeter but served notice that the position was untenable and so induced Cornwallis to open negotiations for surrender. for Gloucester across the river. The intention was that, in addition to providing a garrison, this unit would be ideally suited to carrying out foraging operations to ease the supply situation. In the event, the rangers were just as surely penned up within the defences there as their colleagues across the river, by a mixed force of Virginia Militia and French marines and colonial troops. The real siege work nevertheless centred on Yorktown itself. N o sooner had the British abandoned the outworks than they were occupied by the Allies, w h o immediately proceeded to reverse them; that is, cut embrasures in the rear face of each, in which to mount guns directed against the town. Having achieved that with

relatively little loss, they then commenced their o w n works proper, the scale of which may be gauged by the fact that over the next week some 6000 stakes, 2000 fascines and 600 gabions were prepared, while the siege train was brought up from Williamsburg. At dusk on 6 October, with no sign of the British fleet, the Allies began their First Parallel to the southeast of the town. Covered by nearly 3000 men, lying down in battle formation, some 1500 workmen began digging a trench line about 600-800m (1970-2625ft) out from the southeast quadrant of the defences. The light sandy soil was easily dug and by morning the trenches were sunk sufficiently for the digging to continue in daylight, and for the first combat troops to begin manning them. T w o days later, four redoubts and five batteries had been added, and at 3 p.m. on 9 October the French began the bombardment with four 12-pounders and six mortars, while the

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

Siege of Yorktown

The main FrancoAmerican force arrives from Williamsburg and begins the siege b taking over Cornwallis' abandoned outpost line,

3

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Yorktown lies on the north side of the Virginia Peninsula fronting on to the York River, and since Cornwallis' arrival had been surrounded on the landward side by a defensive line of earthworks. The defences included 10 redoubts, two of which lay outside the main perimeter in order to cover the steep banks of Yorktown Creek and the road to Williamsburg. Nos 3,4 and 5 faced directly inland, overlooking a ravine at the rear of the town.Three more redoubts then faced southeast towards Wormley Creek, and the final two, Nos 9 and 10, stood outside the main perimeter to the southeast.

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Cornwallis digs in at Yorktown with his back to the York River. .

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The British attempt to evacuate Yorktown by way of Gloucester is frustrated by bad weather, leading to Cornwallis' surrender on 17 October.

With the completion of the Second Parallel French and American troops storm redoubts Nos 9 and 10 on the night of 14 October.

5 SECOND PARALLEL

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The First Parallel is opened to the southeast of the"' town on the night of 6 October.

171

SIEGE WARFARE 1 QUILTED GRAPE SHOT 2 CANISTER 3 SPHERICAL CASE W I T H ' S A B O T ' A N D WOODEN FUSE 4 BAR SHOT 5 C H A I N SHOT

Americans joined in two hours later with six, rather heavier, 18- and 24-pounders, four mortars and two howitzers. The Second Parallel On the night of 11 October, and under cover of these guns, work then began on the Second Parallel, just 350m (1150ft) out from the Yorktown defences. There were a number of false alarms during the night, but by dawn the trench was 750m (2460ft) long and 1.5m (5ft) deep.The lack of interference by the defenders was puzzling, and it later turned out that Cornwallis was hampered by the fact that a thousand of his men were sick. At this stage in the siege, he simply could not spare the men for a raid. Further work on the Second Parallel was, however, hampered by the existence of Redoubts Nos 9 and 10. Accordingly, the French were tasked with taking the first while the American light infantry, led by Colonel Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), were to go for Redoubt No 10 on the night of 14 October. Within 30 minutes, both were taken, and work immediately began on reversing them and incorporating them into the Second Parallel. This setback at last forced Cornwallis to act, and at 3 a.m. on the morning of 16 October, 350

172

with a number of different types of shot, depending on the intended effect. Grape shot (1) and canister (2) both consisted of lots of tightly packed objects or musket balls, which, when fired, would cause devastating casualties. A rudimentary high explosive (3) was often used when assaulting fixed fortifications. Bar shot (4) and chain (5) were more often used in naval warfare, although either might also be used on land against fixed defences and buildings. C A N N O N COULD BE CHARGED

men sallied out in an attempt to destroy the two batteries being constructed behind the parallel. Initially they were successful, getting into both batteries and spiking a total of seven guns with their bayonets, but the inevitable counter-attack tumbled them out again, and within six hours the batteries were in operation once more. The British position was now untenable, for the sandy soil used to construct the defences crumbled rapidly under the bombardment, and considerable destruction was also inflicted within the town itself. That evening, preparations were made to evacuate the position. Boats were sent across from Gloucester Point, and 1000 men of the Guards and the consolidated light infantry battalions were safely withdrawn by 1 a.m. the next morning. At that point, unfortunately, there

SIEGE WARFARE was a brief but violent storm, which delayed the return of the boats for the second lift for a vital hour. There was still time to evacuate another brigade, but by that point the Allies would have realized what was happening and a dawn attack would have overrun the thinned-out defences without difficulty. Recognizing that it was all over, Cornwallis therefore recalled those men who were already across and then, at 10 a.m. on 17 October, he requested a cease-fire to discuss surrender terms. In large measure, the siege of Yorktown had been conducted by European troops and according to the prevailing methods and tactics of European siege warfare. Even so, there were a number of differences. In the first place, of course, the defences were entirely composed of earthworks, rather than stone-faced walls and bastions. The fact that the soil was sandy and friable only accelerated the inevitable destruction. Secondly, the vast distances involved meant that the Allies were able to conduct their operations free from any fear of external interference; there was no relieving army lurking nearby, and the British strategy was predicated on resupply by sea, which failed even before the siege began. A third factor was the climate and the high levels of sickness accompanying it. Notwithstanding the availability of slave labour taken from adjoining plantations, the heat hampered the construction and repair of the works, while widespread sickness was even more debilitating. Both armies suffered, but the Americans and French were able to establish hospitals at some distance from the lines, and had unlimited access to fresh food and water, while the besieged British were, in effect, defending a hospital, with limited fresh water and no fresh food. Consequently, while the ultimate outcome of the siege may have been the same had it been conducted in Europe, it was accelerated by the conditions under which it was carried out. Indian Fortifications In India a similar reliance was placed upon permanent stone-built fortifications as in Europe, although these took two forms. As noted, Europeans proceeded to build bastioned forts at the earliest

opportunity, and took to besieging them in an equally conventional manner. In central India, however, the fortified cities of the native princes were still largely medieval in character, relying on massively constructed high stone walls. Despite their strength, such fortresses were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire - always providing, of course, that the necessary guns were available.They were also normally reduced by the conventional tactics outlined above, although an all-out assault on the breach or breaches opened tended to take place rather more frequently than might be the case if it were defended by a European army. Experience taught that the best way to deal with the numerically large but undisciplined armies generally encountered in India was by mounting an immediate attack, and there was also a far greater readiness in colonial warfare to assault native fortresses out of hand rather than rely upon more scientific methods. This was usually the consequence of inadequate resources coupled with a lack of time. In order to move reasonably quickly over harsh terrain in an equally harsh climate, armies were rarely able to bring sufficient artillery - especially as slow-moving bullocks were often the only draught animals available. Any delay in waiting while it was brought up, as at Delhi in 1857, could lead to unacceptably high casualties, both to disease and the rigours of the climate. Much better, therefore, to assault at the earliest opportunity, regardless of casualties in the short term. This direct approach was by no means confined to India, and was also employed in the Americas: at the Alamo in 1836, at Chapultepec in 1847 and at Puebla in 1862 - successfully in the two former instances, disastrously in the latter. In none of these cases, however, were the fortresses concerned conventional ones. The Siege of Delhi: 8 June - 21 September 1857 The siege of Delhi in 1857 was a curious affair insofar as it was often difficult to tell which army was the besieger and which the besieged.The city was still, notionally, the capital of the vanished Mughal Empire. Thus, when a mutiny erupted amongst the East India Company's troops at nearby Meerut on Sunday 10 May, the insurgents

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

BENGAL NATIVE INFANTRY, 1 8 5 0 .

By the nineteenth century colonial armies relied heavily upon locally recruited troops, initially dressed in Europeanstyle uniforms. One of the first acts of the Bengali soldiers depicted here was to discard the heavy trousers and shakolike turbans, although many retained their red coats. were drawn to Delhi by the prospect of turning a localized episode into an all-out revolt against British rule. For their part, the British were equally alive to the danger of allowing the rebellion to spread and hastily assembled a field force to retake the city. Unfortunately they were greatly hampered by three factors. The first was a shortage of troops, and initially all that could be assembled were two troops of the Bengal Horse Artillery, the regular 9th Lancers, the regular 75th Foot and t w o battalions of Bengal Fusiliers. Secondly there was a shortage of heavy artillery - and the bullocks to haul it - and an even more desperate shortage of ammunition. The army's arsenal and a magazine had been situated at Delhi, and when the city was seized by the insurgents the arsenal was blown up, but the magazine containing 3000 barrels of powder was captured. Consequently the insurgents w e r e abundantly supplied with ammunition while the British troops at the outset had only 20 rounds per man. Compounding both these difficulties was the familiar problem in colonial warfare: the sheer distances involved and the inhospitable terrain and climate, which hampered the assembling of sufficient troops, guns and ammunition.

174

Nevertheless, the little expeditionary force set off for Delhi on 30 May, and on 8 June, at Badli-keserai, it attacked and routed a large body of insurgents, estimated at up to 30,000 strong. Delhi was just 13km (8 miles) away, and moving rapidly in the fugitives' wake General Barnard took up a

SIEGE WARFARE good position on a long ridge overlooking the northern part of the city. Despite the small size of his force, Barnard was under considerable pressure to mount an immediate assault. Had he done so, it is just possible he might have carried the city in that first gallant rush. In the event, however, any prospect of mounting a successful coup de main was scuppered by poor staff work. The officer commanding the forward pickets, who would necessarily play a key role in the proceedings, received only verbal instructions on the morning of 13 June, and even then they were so vague that he refused to obey them and instead rode to headquarters for clarification. An unseemly row followed and by the time Barnard had succeeded in imposing his authority, the opportunity for a surprise attack had passed. Nevertheless, Barnard still considered that an assault of some kind was going to have to be made. As he explained later that day in a letter to the governor general, Lord Canning (1812-1862): 'The place is so strong and my means so inadequate, that assault or regular approach were equally difficult - I may say impossible; and that I have nothing left but to place all on the hazard of a die and attempt a coup-de-main, which I purpose

to do. If successful all will be well. But reverse will be fatal for I have no reserve on which to retire. But, assuredly, you all greatly underestimated the difficulties of Delhi. They have 24-pounders on every gate and flank bastion; and their practice is excellent - beats ours five to one. We have got six heavy guns in position, but do not silence theirs, and I really see nothing for it but a determined rush; and this, please God, you will hear of as successful.' Few Resources Make Resourceful In the meantime, Barnard had to face the fact that he simply did not have the necessary resources. While reinforcements gradually trickled in to the British camp, thousands more were flocking to the insurgents. And each new contingent of mutineers that arrived seemingly felt duty bound to announce the fact by mounting an immediate attack on the ridge. Each and every one of these badly coordinated assaults was beaten off, but it was Ships' guns were normally left on truck carriages when landed for use close to the shore, but if required further inland, as seen here in India in 1857, it was necessary to mount them on wheeled carriages and haul them with bullocks or horses rather than raw manpower. NAVAL GUN MOVED BY BULLOCKS.

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British Soldier, Colonial Dress (1850) Slightly paradoxically, while locally recruited

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such as Indian sepoys were initially clothed in European style uniforms, British and other European troops serving in the colonies were quick to adapt their own to local conditions. This soldier has replaced his heavy shako with a simple peaked forage cap, with a reflective white cover and neck-curtain and a pad inside the crown to protect his head from the sun's rays. The tight coatee worn on home service has similarly been replaced by a short lightweight jacket, and the heavy woollen trousers by lighter ones of blue cotton or dungaree.

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SIEGE W A R F A R E becoming increasingly difficult to decide whether Only the arguments of his chief engineer, Richard the British were besieging the insurgents in the city Baird Smith (1818-1861), dissuaded him from or the rebels were besieging the British on the advising the governor general that the city could ridge. Barnard died of cholera on 5 July, his not be taken at all. Instead, Baird Smith was charged successor collapsed t w o weeks later, and a third with devising a plan and he chose to concentrate commander was wounded the day after. At that on various points along the northern stretch of wall point, Archdale Wilson (1803-1874) took over between the river and the Kabul Gate. and succeeded in establishing a degree of order, The first battery was established opposite the but he could do nothing about the general Mori Bastion on the night of 7 September and situation. Reinforcements had brought the comprised t w o parts: five heavy guns and a notional strength of the army up to some 6600 howitzer trained on the Mori Bastion itself, and a men by the beginning of further four guns intended July, but this was quite to provide suppressive fire .. it is dreadfully slow work. on the Kashmir Gate 400m literally wasting away through a combination of (1312ft) further to the east. Our force is too weak for this casualties and rampant Once this battery was fully disease. The only hope lay operational, two more street fighting, when we have with the Punjab Field w e r e established directly to gain our way inch by inch; opposite the Kashmir Gate Force, a mobile column formed from the British and then a third, just 146m and of the force we have, garrison there, amounting (480ft) out from the to 4200 men and including curtain wall between that unfortunately, there is a large a very substantial number bastion and the Water portion... in whom I have no of loyal Sikh troops. Just as Bastion by the river. Now, importantly, a proper siege at last, progress was made, confidence.' train was also put together and with proper siege at long last, although it guns, directed by a — GENERAL ARCHDALE WILSON, would take another month competent engineer at DELHI 1857 to arrive. close range, the ancient walls began to crumble. Naturally enough, the insurgents soon learned By 13 September, reconnaissance established that the breaches were what was happening and tried to intercept the practicable - that is, they could be assaulted siege train, but John Nicholson (1822-1857), the without requiring the use of ladders or any other officer commanding the newly arrived Punjab artificial aids. Accordingly all the available troops contingent, received permission to attack the were told off into five columns, leaving the camp rebels. On 25 August, at Najafgarh, about 29km (18 and supplies to be guarded only by the cavalry. miles) from Delhi, he attacked. Despite being The first three, under Nicholson's command outnumbered by two or three to one, he routed and comprising nine battalions totalling 2800 them within the hour, capturing all their guns and men, were tasked with taking the Water Bastion stores and claiming to have killed upwards of 800 and the Kashmir Gate.The fourth, commanded by of the rebels, for the loss of just 25 killed and 70 Major Charles Reid, amounted to a further 850 wounded. It was certainly a splendid little victory men, nearly all of them Gurkhas and Pathans, and and spies reported great fear and anxiety in the was initially tasked with taking the suburb of city, but still a major assault could not be launched Kishangunj, lying just outside the Kabul Gate.This until the siege train arrived on 4 September. was essential to prevent the insurgents sallying out Even then, Wilson was still sceptical. The rebels by the Kabul Gate to take the main assault were estimated to be over 40,000 strong with plenty of ammunition for their numerous weapons. columns in flank. The fifth column was to remain

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

Siege of Delhi In 1857 the city of Delhi was largely confined within its 8km (5 miles) of medieval walls, forming a semi-circle on the west bank of the River Jumna. Some triangular bastions and general repairs had been carried out when the British first took over the city in 1804, but otherwise no attempt had been made to modernize the defences. Nevertheless the walls were some 7.3m (24ft) high and massively constructed, so that breaching them was difficult, even with ample heavy artillery and abundant ammunition. As was usual in Indian fortresses, the gates were formidable enough in themselves. The only real weak point was assumed (wrongly) to be the suburb of Kishangunj lying outside the Kabul Gate.The siege was eventually ended after an artillery bombardment breached the wall near the Kashmire Gate and the city was taken by regular infantry assault.

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Delhi was the old Mughal capital, and in addition to its central strategic location in the plains of northern India, as the seat of the nominal emperor it was still vested with considerable political importance, which made its early recapture imperative.

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British forces occupy Delhi Ridge on 11 June 1857, to provide a base for siege of the city.

2

1857

B R I T I S H CAMP

SIEGE W A R F A R E

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British forces work around the walls to take the Kashmir Gate and the Kabul Gate before turning into the centre of the city.

Mutinous East India Company sepoys seize control of the city and its well-stocked magazine. Reinforcements arrive from nearby garrisons.

1

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SIEGE W A R F A R E in reserve. The actual plan of attack was straightforward, but the awkward question of when to penetrate into the city itself was left to the commanders on the spot. N o one had much stomach for the notion of plunging into the labyrinth of narrow streets and alleyways, and the hope was that once the outer defensive ring was cracked the insurgents would break and try to flee the city. Nicholson himself, commanding N o 1 column, went for the central breach, between the Kashmir Gate and the Water Bastion. 'Man after man was struck down and the enemy, with yells and curses, kept up a terrific fire, even catching up stones from the breach in their fury and, dashing them down, dared the assaulters to come on.' Notwithstanding, Nicholson pressed on to take the breach, while Brigadier Jones with N o 2 column got in through the Water Bastion. As expected, the insurgents then fell back into the city itself, and Nicholson therefore tried to move along the inside of the walls towards the Kashmir Gate. T h r o u g h the Gate There, the assault was to be made not through the breach but via the gate itself. The storming party was preceded by a group of sappers carrying explosive charges to blow in the gate. Once again, the attackers were met by very heavy fire, but they nevertheless succeeded in laying their charges. As soon as the massive gates were down, Colonel Campbell led the 52nd Foot straight through just in time to meet Nicholson's men coming the other way. N o w it was time to work further along the walls to the Kabul Gate, where it was hoped Major Reid would be waiting with his N o 4 column. Unfortunately, the attack here had gone badly wrong.The suburb was defended by some 15,000 mutineers, all well trained and waiting behind proper defensive positions.To make matters worse, Reid was short of artillery and no sooner had he decided to go in anyway than he himself was badly The unusual viewpoint in this nineteenth-century illustration of a key moment in the 1857 siege of Delhi is from inside the city and shows British troops bursting though the gates and mounting the walls. The first British troops through the gates were the 52nd Foot. STORMING THE KASHMIR GATE.

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SIEGE WARFARE two more days before it fell, but that at last was the beginning of the end. Resistance generally started to crumble and while the streets remained unsafe for some time afterwards, an artillery salute marked the formal capture of the city on 21 September.

Indirect fire weapons such as this mortar were of considerable value in siege operations as they could drop explosive shells behind otherwise impenetrable walls. SIEGE MORTAR, EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY.

wounded. Confusion immediately followed, his subordinates giving conflicting orders, and when an irregular contingent of Kashmiris broke and ran, the mutineers launched a counter-attack, which threatened to break through on to the ridge. Only some determined artillery work held them at bay long enough for the cavalry brigade to come up. Nevertheless, Nicholson was still determined to work his way around the walls. His next objective was the Lahore Gate, but to bypass the defences he attempted to penetrate into the streets, and was quickly shot down. Other attempts to reach strongpoints within the city were equally unsuccessful, and by nightfall the attackers were still confined to the walls between the Water Bastion and the Kabul Gate. Horrified by news of heavy casualties, and in particular the loss of Nicholson, Archdale Wilson proposed to withdraw, but morning brought better news. The insurgents had evacuated Kishangunj under cover of darkness, and not long afterwards the magazine was taken and, with it, a very welcome supply of ammunition. Nevertheless there was still no sign of the general collapse for which the British were hoping and instead the city had to be taken street by street. This was a painfully slow and costly business, and an attempt on the Lahore Gate on 18 September failed because the troops refused to fight. It took

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European Fieldworks In Europe, fieldworks, as the term suggests, were originally conceived as temporary affairs erected to assist tactical operations by field armies - for example, to secure a bridgehead or other tactically important position, or simply to protect artillery batteries when acting on the defensive. In a colonial context, however, they might more commonly be erected to counter a specific threat against a town or settlement that had not hitherto warranted permanent fortifications. During the French and Indian War, posts such as Fort Ducquesne, at what would later become Pittsburgh, and Fort William Henry on the New York frontier were constructed as earthworks, and the War of Independence sieges of Savannah and Yorktown furnish similarly good examples. In all four cases, the fortifications were constructed of earthwork ditches and ramparts and embellished with wooden palisades, but they were still carefully laid out according to exactly the same scientific principles used for more permanent stone fortifications, and thus had to be approached by the besieging armies in just the same way. Nevertheless, such sieges became less common in colonial warfare after the French and Indian War and the War of Independence, and instead a much greater reliance was placed on improvised fortifications. By their very nature, these improvisations tend to defy classification. A very obvious example might be the ramparts of mealie (maize) sacks, biscuit boxes and wagons hastily thrown around the British depot at Rorke's Drift in Natal in 1879. (That said, it is debatable whether that particular engagement against the Zulus, desperately fought as it was, could properly be regarded as a siege in the present context.) Defensive stockades were generally formed from vertical log palisading. Blockhouses built up from horizontally laid logs also figured largely in frontier defence, especially

SIEGE WARFARE in the Americas, but they were rarely besieged other than by blockade, or - as in a number of instances during Pontiac's rising of the 1760s seized at the very outset by entry through carelessly opened gates. A more pertinent example, on the other hand, would be the Mexican defences erected at San Antonio de Bexar during the early stages of the Texian revolution in 1835: 'The town of San Antonio at that time was laid off in a square, with a row of rock [stone] houses around it, some twenty feet [6m] high; the streets passing through these buildings from different directions, were all closed by barricading as high FORT CHARLES, C A N A D A . Typical of many frontier posts, Fort Charles was designed to withstand attack by indigenous tribesmen rather than European soldiers. The simple timber stockade was ordinarily sufficient protection and the light cannon were intended to fire canister rather than roundshot.

as the tops of the houses, with wide and deep ditches immediately outside the barricading; portholes were made in these barricades and cannon planted there for the purpose of raking the streets in the event of an assault. The tops of the houses were flat, with rock breastworks around the edges of the roofs, intended to be occupied by their infantry. They had cannon mounted on pivots at the church and upon other commanding housetops (William T. Austin). The Alamo: 23 February-6 March 1836 The Alamo was a former Spanish mission station, situated just outside San Antonio de Bexar, which had latterly been used as a barracks by one of the presidial companies of tough frontier cavalrymen. In 1835, it was therefore natural that the Mexican General Cos (1800-1854) should repair and fortify the site when Bexar became his headquarters in the fight against an American-led rebellion in

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SIEGE W A R F A R E M O U N T A I N HOWITZER. This American gun from the 1840s was specifically designed for colonial warfare and could be used either as a howitzer or as a conventional cannon, albeit at comparatively short range. It was also light enough to go anywhere.

Texas. After Cos' surrender in December, it was equally natural that the Alamo should become the focal point of the town's new Texian, or AngloAmerican, garrison. Unfortunately, in conventional military terms, the whole position was indefensible. The adobe walls, reinforced in places with log revetments and earthen banks, were incapable of resisting artillery fire. Conversely, while there were some 20 cannon of varying calibres ranged around the walls, the garrison of some 150 men was inadequate to man them properly, even after a reinforcement of 32 men slipped in days before the final assault. However, when the army of General Santa Anna (1794-1876) first arrived in Bexar on 23 February 1836 it was at the end of a terrible march of over 560km (350 miles), across mountains and deserts in midwinter. Not only was the army exhausted after t w o months on the road but it was literally strung out along hundreds of kilometres. And the heavy artillery, which could have demolished the Alamo walls in a matter of hours, was far behind the leading elements. In fact, it arrived only after the Alamo had been captured. Initially there w e r e only t w o howitzers available, short stubby-barrelled weapons useful for dropping explosive rounds on top of positions but of no use whatsoever in battering at walls. On the second day, t w o 8-pounder cannon were

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emplaced, with the howitzers, in a battery about 400m (1312ft) west of the Alamo 'and a brisk fire kept up from it until the 18-pounder and another piece were dismounted'. The 18-pounder in question was formerly a ship's gun, painstakingly dragged up from the coast by the Texians a couple of months earlier, when they were in the process of capturing Bexar from the Mexicans. Ironically, it arrived too late to play any part in that siege and was now disabled at the outset of the present one. Just how much damage was actually done to it is unclear, for 18pounder ammunition was a priority item on a shopping list of supplies sent out by the garrison's commander, William Travis (1809-1836), later in the siege. Although there was no general shortage of ammunition discovered in the Alamo after it fell, the cannon available to the Texians was a pretty motley collection of pieces gathered from a number of sources. There were three other naval guns - a gunnade, used for firing grapeshot at short range, and two 'long nines' - but most seem to have been old Spanish guns, found either in Bexar w h e n it was originally captured or elsewhere in Texas. Some of the gun carriages had to be improvised, and one contemporary plan of the fort shows three gun tubes lying outside a workshop. Consequently, other than the odd harassing shot - probably fired to keep up the

SIEGE W A R F A R E

Mexican Infantryman

(1836) This soldado is from a regular

infantry

battalion. Infantry battalions were built around a core of veterans and divided into six centre companies (which provided the fighting heart of each battalion), two elite companies (which were often held in reserve) and a light company, which usually acted as skirmishers. The uniforms of the Mexican Army were heavily influenced by those of the French as demonstrated by this soldado. The singlebreasted jacket depicted here was normally of dark blue wool with red collar and cuffs, but white cotton fatigue jackets were generally worn in summer. The trousers would likewise be grey wool in winter or white cotton in summer and the boots might often be replaced with open sandals. On active service the shako would normally have a white cotton cover. Mexican regulars at this period were normally armed with British-made

India

Pattern muskets, purchased new in 1828. These were cheaper versions of the famous 'Brown Bess', and weighed 4.4kg (9lbs 1 loz) and came with a seventeen inch socket bayonet that itself weighed 450 grammes

(lib).

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

The Alamo 1836 The Alamo comprised three main areas: firstly, the plaza bounded by accommodation blocks and improvised gun positions; secondly, the former Alamo church and its campo santo, or burial ground, which jutted out from this compound to the east; and finally, nestling in the angle immediately to the north, was a square stone compound, originally intended to be the cloister of the mission's convento. To the north of this again was a second corral, within a slight stone wall or a wooden palisade. In addition there was a stone or adobe outwork, variously referred to as a lunette or a tambour, protecting the main gate. The overwhelming numbers ranged against the Texians meant that the outcome was virtually inevitable, especially once the Mexicans launched a multipronged assault.

The Alamo was originally a mission station before becoming a cavalry barracks outside San Antonio de Bexar, which was at that time the only real town in Mexican Texas. Its position on the Camino Real - the main road linking the Mexican interior with the United States - made a fight there inevitable.

186

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Meanwhile, General Cos' column swings around to attack the northwest corner.

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

Colonel Duque's .column attacks prematurely and is checked at the north wall; Duque himself is wounded.

"now commanded by Castrillon and reinforced by reserves and Romero's column, north wall.

Texian breakout attempts are intercepted by % V m** « ' * Mexican lancers • T and most of those While Texiarjgittention is fixed on the north wall three cazadore companies get in behind them and seize the main gate, leading to an immediate collapse of the defence.

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SIEGE WARFARE manned by trained artillerymen. The problem was that it was a field train, not a siege train, and although he had sufficient ammunition to fight a battle, Santa Anna could not afford to waste it in battering the walls with guns that were too light to do any real damage. Consequently although batteries were erected and regular siege works undertaken, the artillery was used mainly for harassing and fatiguing the garrison, as on the first day. On 3 March, however, Santa Anna received word from one of his subordinates, General Urrea (1797-1849), that he was finally closing in on another detachment of rebels commanded by Dr James Grant. This news must have come as a considerable relief to Santa Anna, for Dr Grant - a British agent - had been trying to coordinate a 'general plan of revolutionising' across northern Mexico. Urrea's news meant that the army's rear was now secure, and on the same day three more battalions arrived at Bexar, to give Santa Anna a total of 2370 men. He now had enough infantry to storm the Alamo, and so an assault was fixed for 4 a.m. on 6 March.

TEJANO VOLUNTEER. At the outset of the Texas Revolution many ethnic Mexicans, or Tejanos, joined in the revolt, not because they supported independence but because they hoped to overthrow the Centralist regime of Santa Anna.

defenders' morale rather than in any expectation of doing much damage - the Texian artillery was largely silent throughout the siege, held in readiness loaded with grapeshot, canister or even langrage in expectation of an assault. Conventional Force By contrast, Santa Anna had a proper artillery train, comprising two 8-pounder, two 6-pounder and two 4-pounder guns and the two howitzers, all mounted on Gribeauval-style carriages and

188

Order of Battle The operation was to be carried out by four columns. The first, commanded by General Martin Perfecto Cos, was to comprise the Aldama Battalion with three fusilier companies of the San Luis Battalion. The second column, under Colonel Francisco Duque (1807-1841 or 1842), was to consist of the Toluca Battalion and three other companies of the San Luis, while Colonel Jose Maria Romero, commanding the third column, had the Matamoros and Jimenez Battalions. All three columns, backed up by a reserve consisting of the regimental grenadier companies and the Zapadores Battalion, were intended to attack the northern end of the Alamo, where there were two small posterns or gates. The fourth 'column', commanded by Colonel Juan Morales (1802-1847), consisted of only three cazadore, or light companies, drawn from the Matamoros, Jimenez and San Luis, but it had the crucial task of seizing the main gate at the southern end of the plaza. In the event, the plan went badly wrong. All depended on surprise to achieve a simultaneous

SIEGE W A R F A R E coup on all three objectives, and therefore the assault was to be signalled by a bugle call once all four columns were in place and ready to go. Unfortunately, an overexcited soldier raised a cry of Viva Santa Anna!, alerting theTexians and forcing the signal to be given prematurely. Romero's column, still deploying into its attack formation, was hit by Texian canister fire at close range, causing it to shy away to the north, where 'the first charge was met with a deadly fire of shot and shell, the brave colonel of the Toluca Battalion, Francisco Duque, being among the first w h o fell wounded. His column wavered as a result of his fall, while the other three columns were held in check on other fronts.' The check was only a momentary one. Santa Anna immediately ordered forward his reserve, and this time all of the attacking units crowded right up to the base of the wall. A certain amount of confusion was inevitable. Romero's column seems to have merged with Duque's and the intervention of the reserve column under Colonel Augustin Amat seems to have had the effect of pushing many of Cos' men around on to the base of the west wall, although Sanchez Navarro blamed the Toluca Battalion for firing on them by mistake. Into the Breach Most Mexican sources indicate that the soldiers, once under the walls, were relatively safe from the defenders' cannon firing above them and that the escalade was brutally swift. Romero may have been pushed away from the eastern postern, but Cos' men burst through the northwestern one, while Amat and Manuel Fernandez Castrillon (died 1836), commanding in place of the wounded Duque, simply

escaladed the north wall. The sudden collapse of the Texian defence was also precipitated at least in part by Colonel Morales and his little band of cazadores. General Filisola (1789-1850) tells h o w they covered their approach using some jacales, or huts, by the southwest corner and then,'by a daring move', seized the gun platform there. This has previously been interpreted to mean that they suddenly escaladed the wall, but both their original orders and other Mexican accounts actually speak of their seizing the main gate. The 'daring move' may therefore have been a matter of first surprising the gate and then going on to take the gun position, not by climbing the external wall but by running up the ramp to take it from behind. Either way, Morales' swift and professional attack proved fatal to the Texian defence. Already overstretched trying to stem the main assault, they fell back, seeking refuge - either in the buildings that lined the plaza or in flight. Santa Anna had anticipated this, and General Ramirez y Sesma was waiting with his lancers out to the east of the Alamo. In fact, he subsequently described three separate breakouts: first from the right, then from the centre and finally from the left. The sequential nature of those breakouts from north to south is also consistent with the Mexicans working their way along from the north wall and the Texians successively abandoning their positions under that pressure, rather than carrying out a pre-planned withdrawal: '...many of them... This man is based on descriptions of the New Orleans Greys, wearing a sealskin hunting cap and grey jeancloth working clothes very similar to the uniform later adopted by the Confederate Army in the Civil War.

AMERICAN OFFICER.

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

190

SIEGE W A R F A R E came out in sufficient numbers that they were marching organized through the plain, trying to take advantage of the adjacent rough and brambled ground. As soon as I observed this, I ordered a company of the Dolores Regiment with my aides-de-camp, Lieutenant Colonel don Juan Herrera, Captain don Cayetano Montero, the Lieutenant [of the] Dolores [Regiment] brevetted Lieutenant Colonel don Juan Palacios, and Second Lieutenant don Jose Maria Medrano.. .charged them and stabbed them to death in moments, without the desperate resistance they [the Texians] were offering causing [the cavalry] to falter one moment.' The second breakout came from the for tin of the centre' - presumably the ruined convento that jutted out from the middle of the east wall. It was a much more serious affair, involving a party that Sesma reckoned later to be 50 strong. Although this was bigger than the first group, he must initially have underestimated their numbers for once again he first '...ordered the company of lancers of the Regiment of Dolores to charge them under the orders of brevet Lieutenant Colonel don Ramon Valera, Lieutenant don Santos Castillo, and Second Lieutenants don Leandro Ramirez and Don Tomas Viveros'. This single company of lancers quickly proved to be inadequate, for the Texians saw them coming and immediately 'took possession of a ditch [presumably the acquia, or irrigation ditch, which ran more or less parallel to the east wall], making a defence so vigorous that I had to order Lieutenant don Francisco Molino with twenty lancers of Tampico and twelve ofVeracruz to assist that force, which, although it never hesitated, I feared would be repulsed, and the Captain of the Rio Grande, Don Manuel Barragan, and the lieutenant of the same company, Don Pedro Rodriguez, with fifteen men of that company to flank them.' A third group is identified on Sanchez Navarro's map, trying to escape over the palisade THE FALL OF THE ALAMO, or C r o c k e t t ' s Last Stand, by

Robert Jennings Onderdonk (1903). Although the shakos worn by the Mexican itifantry belong to a later period, this is perhaps one of the most accurate depictions of the storming of the Alamo. The fate of Crockett, who may have been the garrison's de facto second in command, remains controversial.

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SIEGE WARFARE linking the church with the low barracks, but once again as Sesma reported:'.. .the Captains brevetted Lieutenant Colonels of the Dolores Regiment, Don Manuel Montellano, Don Jose Fato, and Second Lieutenant Don Jose Guijarro, were detained with another company to charge those who were emerging from the fortin of the left and who were also killed.' In the Alamo itself, the fighting continued a short while longer. By the end, at least 187 Texians were killed, either in the Alamo itself or while trying to break out, but some Mexican sources suggest that the true figure was actually higher and included some 20 local Tejano volunteers. For Typical of the colonial troops used to police the frontier, this presidiale trooper is armed with a lance, essential for use against indigenous tribesmen such as the Comanche. M E X I C A N LANCER, 1 8 3 6 .

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their part, the Mexicans reported an expensive 60 dead and 251 wounded. Improvisation Similar defences were erected in Lueknow in 1857, and at Puebla in 1862-63, when those otherwise open towns were hastily fortified with barricaded streets and loop-holed buildings.These improvised fortifications often proved surprisingly robust. Given the chronic shortage of heavy artillery on colonial campaigns, which might have blasted an entrance, they all too frequently required some equally improvised techniques to deal with them.

SIEGE W A R F A R E What was more, while there were numerous had to be transported great distances overland. examples of formal sieges of European-style Supply routes were often tenuous and fortresses in colonial settings throughout the frighteningly vulnerable to interdiction by eighteenth century, these became increasingly rare guerrillas and even bandits, let alone enemy after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It is true that forces. Inevitably this constrained offensive siege in Mexico the island fortress of San Juan de Ulloa, works by limiting both the number and weight of at Vera Cruz, was variously besieged by Spanish, artillery pieces available to commanders, and even French and American armies, but the general more critically the amount of ammunition for peace in Europe after 1815 meant that, by and them. It was often found that only the navy could large, the powers of the day were no longer supply the heavy guns needed for serious siege contending for each other's colonies. Instead, work and many British colonial campaigns were they w e r e fighting less undertaken with the conventional armies, as assistance of a naval often raised from amongst 'Travis ran across the Alamo brigade, dragging heavy 18insurgent settlers as from pound and 24-pound and mounted the wall, and amongst the indigenous cannon far inland to assault population. fortresses in India. Even as called out to his men, late as the Boer War of Remote Outposts "Come on, boys, the Mexicans 1899-1902, the British heavy artillery in South The alterations in scope are upon us and we'll give Africa comprised 12cm and tactics entailed by this (4.7inch) naval guns were essentially twofold. In them hell."' mounted on field carriages the first place, those and manned by bluejackets fortresses or towns n o w — JOE - THE ONLY KNOWN TEXIAN from HMS Terrible. being attacked or defended SURVIVOR, 1836 were almost invariably To some extent, this located far inland and particular difficulty could consequently remote from be partially offset by the any reliable source of supply, whether an arsenal or fact that armies increasingly found themselves a fleet. In Europe, and especially in the Low defending towns that could not be described as Countries, it was not unknown for armies to fortresses in the conventional sense, but which embark upon sieges little more than a day's march nevertheless paradoxically turned out to be far from their starting point. By and large, this was also tougher nuts to crack, thanks to advances in true to an extent of early colonial campaigns. In technology. This is therefore a convenient point to 1775, the American rebels succeeded, even in look at the weapons that were n o w available. midwinter, in dragging guns overland all the way from Ticonderoga to besiege Boston, but it was far I m p r o v e d Firepower more common for siege trains to be transported by Throughout the eighteenth century and, indeed, sea and landed just a f e w kilometres from their up until the 1850s, nearly all infantrymen were objective. Indeed, sea p o w e r could also be armed with muzzle-loading smooth-bore flintlock deployed even more directly during early muskets. These were cheap, simple and robust campaigns, as at Chandernagar in Bengal in 1757 weapons, but had an accurate range of only 50m and Louisburg in Canada in 1758, when naval (164ft) or less - though they could be effective gunnery support was a critical factor in British against massed formations in the open for double victories there. that range or more. Such a short range meant that, the existence of a handful of rifle-armed specialists After 1815, the focus shifted to the hinterland, notwithstanding, effective artillery bombardments which meant that everything necessary for of fortified positions could be carried out at ordinary military operations, let alone siege work,

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SIEGE W A R F A R E

Even as late as the Boer War at the end of the nineteenth century, the British Army found itself relying upon long-range naval guns to supplement the light field artillery normally used in colonial ivarfare. NAVAL C A N N O N , BATTLE OF COLENSO, BOER W A R .

frighteningly close ranges, while undisturbed by small-arms fire. During the first half of the nineteenth century, however, improvements in manufacturing technology facilitated a number of developments, leading to the widespread adoption of the more reliable percussion system and the general issue of rifled muskets, paired with the conical Minie bullet. The increased range and accuracy of these weapons - soon enhanced by the adoption of breech-loading rifles in the 1860s, and the invention of rifle-calibre machine guns such as the famous Maxim gun - had serious implications for the traditional culmination of a siege: the massed infantry assault on a breach.The set-piece storming of Delhi in 1857 was probably the last of its kind or, at least, the last successful one.This was a point that would be horriflcally underlined during the

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American Civil War, and at the battle of Puebla in 1862, when the French were bloodily repulsed in attempting to storm a Mexican fort out of hand. The implications of this dramatic increase in infantry firepower were, of course, even more keenly felt on the open battlefield - and were not properly understood until World War I. They did, however, lead to an immediate and indeed radical alteration in the conduct of siege warfare, which was only partly and inadequately mitigated by parallel advances in artillery technology.As hitherto unassailable gun crews could now be shot down at previously unheard-of ranges, by infantry weapons such as the splendid .577-calibre Enfield and its successors, the inevitable consequence was that gunners had to establish their batteries at such a distance as to render them ineffective at battering walls with solid shot. Moreover, as would be discovered - and to his cost - by General Charles de Lorencez (1814-1892) at Puebla in 1862, the newer rifled artillery that accompanied these rifled muskets may have been technically more accurate, but it was correspondingly more difficult to gauge

SIEGE WARFARE the fall of the distant shot and adjust it accordingly. This could be done, but it required new skills, which could not be gained overnight. New Artillery To some extent, developments in artillery paralleled those in small arms, but they also lagged behind to a surprising degree, and muzzle-loading cannon dominated arsenals long after the introduction of breech-loading rifles. There were sound reasons for this, as a slow and accurate fire was required in siege work - especially at the much longer ranges now imposed - and proper aiming took rather longer than the relatively simple act of loading the piece. Consequently the very heaviest guns used for coastal and fortress defence almost up to the very end of the nineteenth century were muzzle-loaders. Of rather more importance for siege guns were improvements in barrel-making technology. In the eighteenth century, brass - or rather, bronze barrels were the first choice for artillerists, largely because of their reliability. Iron guns were cheaper and lighter but in the early days had a nasty tendency to burst, which led to their being regarded as inferior, if not downright dangerous. Bronze barrels, however, were found to be unsuitable for siege work. In the first place, HOWITZER, EARLY NINETEENTH

Howitzers such as this were essentially small mortars mounted on field carriages, trading power for mobility and therefore more useful for colonial warfare, as Santa Anna demonstrated at the Alamo. CENTURY.

battering pieces needed to be capable of firing 18pound or, better still, 24-pound cannonballs if they were to inflict any significant damage, but bronze barrels of the requisite size were unacceptably heavy. Moreover, accuracy suffered over time as the relatively soft metal was subject to wear and even drooping of the barrel. Consequently, and notwithstanding their mixed reputation, there was no real alternative to the use of iron rather than bronze for specialist siege guns. By the 1850s, however, the production of iron guns had become much more reliable and techniques had been developed for producing them from cast steel, and it was also possible to rifle them. At the most basic level, this meant that the guns could, if required, be loaded with a much stronger charge of propellant, thus boosting the potential range, while at the same time the increased accuracy from the rifling ensured that it was still possible for the gunners to place their rounds on target. New Guns, New Ammunition The technical developments in gun-founding were accompanied by a significant change in types of ammunition. At the siege of Delhi, the artillerymen on both sides were literally pelting large cast-iron balls, which relied solely on kinetic energy for their

SIEGE WARFARE effect. Such balls, however, could not be forced into rifling, which left gunners with two options: they could either continue using smooth-bored barrels or else adopt a composite missile with a copper band, or sabot, which would grip the rifling and so impart the requisite spin. It did not take long, of course, to appreciate that this was best accomplished with an elongated projectile or bolt rather than a spherical ball, and that solid shot might just as easily be replaced by a projectile containing an explosive charge. Explosive shells had, of course, been used from the very earliest days of gunnery, normally comprising a hollow cast-iron ball packed with gunpowder and rather uncertainly ignited by a slowburning fuse. Indeed, smaller versions served as the earliest hand grenades, and while these were in vogue for a time as the weapon of choice for assault troops, they were most successfully used by defenders, who simply tossed them down from the walls, as they did at Calcutta in 1756. (Ultimately, of course, these also became the model for the bombs carried by cartoon anarchists.) The introduction of the percussion cap - a copper wafer coated with fulminate of mercury - led to the percussion fuse, which exploded on impact. European chemists soon developed 'high' explosives, which greatly increased the destructive power of shells, or at least the potential destructive power. In a colonial context at least - in areas with widely dispersed buildings this Following earlier experience in North Africa, French infantry like this chasseur, or light infantryman, adopted loose and sometimes very baggy trousers. Traditionally chasseurs had blue trousers and caps, as well as blue jackets. FRENCH CHASSEUR, 1 8 6 2 .

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potential destructiveness sometimes turned out to be a great deal less significant than might have been expected. Ringed Defences Consequently, where it was considered necessary to fortify a town, engineers now concentrated their efforts on building a vast ring of large self-contained outlying forts. These were not a mere adjunct to the main defences, as with the line of Martello Towers at Quebec, but rather were the primary defences, forcing the attackers to establish their batteries further out and at such a distance that it was no longer possible to fire directly into the town. Relying upon these forts as the main fighting line had a number of other important advantages. In the first place, they could be sited on the most advantageous ground available, occupying any isolated hills or other high ground in the vicinity and thus simultaneously denying that ground to an attacker while occupying a stronger position than if they were forced to defend the town more closely. Secondly, by physically separating the forts from the town they were intended to protect, it was possible to construct a 'pure' fortification - that is, one unconstrained by any need to adapt it to surrounding structures, and thus one that was much less likely to be compromised by subsequent urban expansion and the building of suburbs to mask its lines of fire. Thirdly, and just as importantly, the circumference of a defensive perimeter based on a ring of outlying forts was, obviously enough, dramatically greater than a conventional defensive circuit.This, in turn, had two important advantages from the defender's point of view. In the first place, it dramatically altered the balance of the forces necessary to defend such a fortress. The defender for his part did not need to man a continuous circuit, but instead needed only to fully occupy the forts, holding the rest of the garrison as a mobile reserve to counter specific threats.The attacker, on the other hand,

SIEGE WARFARE

This nineteenth-century illustration, while not an eyewitness depiction, usefully demonstrates the difficulties faced by the French as they found themselves having to take the city building by building. SIEGE OF PUEBLA.

needed disproportionately more men to cover this dramatically increased perimeter, both in order to seal it off properly and to resist any attacks mounted by the garrison, whether a simple sortie or even a full-blown breakout. Secondly, of course, and notwithstanding improvements in artillery and the art of gunnery, the increased range meant it was more difficult for the attacker to mount a successful bombardment of the town. Consequently his attention now had to be directed not at his primary objective but at one or more of these outlying forts. In theory, once the fort had been captured or abandoned, its

dominant position would allow the attacker either to move directly on the town, or to bombard it into submission. This certainly proved to be case during the Mexican-American War, when the capture of the outlying fort at Chapultepec proved the key to the capture of Mexico City. In practice, however, the matter was rarely so straightforward. The Two Battles of Puebla: 1862-1863 After the loss of Texas in 1836 and the rest of its North American territory following the MexicanAmerican War of 1846-1848, Mexico entered a period of crisis. This culminated in a civil war between conservatives and liberals, which ended in late December I860 with victory for the liberals. By this time, the Mexican economy, always precarious, was in a complete shambles and in July 1861 President Juarez (1806-1872) and his

197

SIEGE WARFARE

General Santa Anna had once declared that the Mexican people were not yet ready for democracy and required a dictatorship. Now, encouraged by the recently defeated conservatives, the French Emperor Napoleon III (1808-1873) decided to give them one in the form of the otherwise unemployed Archduke Maximilian of Austria (1832-1867). Establishing him in power would require the spilling of French blood, but in return

France would gain a vast new empire in America, with the prospect of dominating the entire continent at a time when the United States was being torn apart by civil war. In March of that year, General Lorencez had moved inland to occupy Orizaba, ostensibly because Vera Cruz was notoriously unhealthy. However, instead of withdrawing when the other foreign contingents departed, he moved inland again, defeating General Ignacio Zaragoza (1829-1862) at the Alcuzingo Pass on 28 April and forcing him to retreat to the fortified city of Puebla. This covered the approaches to Mexico City and had earlier, in 1847, been the scene of a full-scale siege by the army of Major-General Winfield Scott (1824-1886) during the MexicanAmerican War.

The French began the campaign by fighting their way inland to Mexico City - a route which was barred for a time by Puebla - but then found that the focus of resistance switched to the mountains of the north.

First Battle of Puebla: 5 May 1862 Lorencez was confident of victory and believed that his 6000 well-trained veterans could easily dislodge Zaragoza from the town. Not only did

Congress announced a two-year suspension of payments on all foreign debts. In response Britain, France and Spain (the principal creditors) sent a joint expeditionary force to seize the port of Vera Cruz and its customs house. Having made their point and enforced payment of at least part of the debt, the British and Spanish contingents left in April 1862.The French, though, had other ideas.

THE FRANCO-MEXICAN W A R .

198

SIEGE W A R F A R E T H E V I C T O R Y OF C I N C O DE M A Y O .

The

Mexican victory over the French (in red trousers) at Puebla in 1862 was considered so significant that 5 May is still celebrated throughout Latin America - including parts of the southwestern United States. also suggested that the population was pro-French and would aid in expelling Zaragoza's men. This assessment, however, was overly optimistic. The population might indeed be hostile towards Juarez and his liberal regime, but as so often in 1836 they were prepared to put aside factional differences when faced by an external threat.

they outnumber the defenders but they were significantly better equipped. The Mexicans were largely armed with smooth-bore muskets, including old flintlocks, while the French all had rifled weapons. More importantly, Zaragoza's artillery was unchanged from Santa Anna's day and largely comprised old Spanish tubes on Gribeauval-style carriages, firing only solid shot or canister. The French guns, on the other hand, had rifled barrels capable of firing explosive shells. Intelligence supplied by Mexican conservatives

With his rear secure, Zaragoza placed most of his 4000 men in an entrenched line, anchored by t w o hilltop forts, Loreto and Guadalupe, on the north side of the city. Arriving on 5 May, Lorencez decided to storm the Mexican lines forthwith, since he had no great opinion of the Mexican Army and assumed that a gallant rush would carry the position out of hand. Selecting Fort Guadalupe as his objective, he began shelling it at a range of 2000m (6560ft), well beyond the reach of the Mexican guns. His gunners were soon on target, but nevertheless, having been brought up in an earlier age of gunnery, he ordered them to close the range. Too late he realized that the new position offered a very poor angle of fire. There was no question of withdrawing, however, so instead he ordered an infantry assault on the fort. With inadequate preparation, French elan counted for little against a determined enemy that was well dug in. T w o French colonels were killed at the head of their regiments and although one man

199

SIEGE W A R F A R E succeeded in planting the tricolour on the 56 modern cannon and 2.4 million rounds of ramparts, he was immediately shot down and the ammunition of all calibres. flag contemptuously tossed back. Then, to make Instead of a precipitate assault, there was to be matters worse, as the French fell back, Zaragoza's a formal siege. Forey established his headquarters cavalry, commanded by Colonel Porflrio Diaz on high ground to the south of the town, then (1830-1915), sallied out and caught them in the spent five days having his men dig in around the open. Afterwards, the French admitted to 462 city. Only then did he begin his bombardment.This killed and eight captured. time, the objective was Fort San Xavier, on the Heavy rain then brought the battle to a close. western side, and the artillery preparation was Lorencez waited a couple of days in the hope that both thorough and effective. Some of the forward Zaragoza might be rash enough to come out and parallels were advanced to within 150m (490ft) of fight him in the open. It the defences before the was a forlorn hope, and he guns opened fire. Four days 'The main trouble was scarcity were allotted for the initial eventually w i t h d r e w to Orizaba. bombardment, and an

of arms. The guns were mostly

assault was mounted on 27 N e w Expedition old rejected muskets, and I was March. This failed dismally, This victory over the but a second attempt two told that during the siege leading European power of days later successfully the day bought Juarez some carried the fort. unarmed bodies of men waited time, and is still celebrated To French dismay, there throughout Latin America was no breakthrough. The to use the arms of the slain or as the Cinco de Mayo (Fifth Mexican defenders merely wounded... the cruel struggle fell back to the first of of May), but Napoleon was not about to let such a the houses, about 50m lasted two whole months.' blow to French ambitions (164ft) behind the fort. go unanswered. General Anticipating the fall of the — SARA STEVENSON, PUEBLA, 1863 Elias Forey landed in fort, they had barricaded Mexico on 21 September the streets and pierced the 1862 and moved to the forward French position at houses with loop-holes. This meant that when the Orizaba, but initially seemed in no hurry to French again advanced they found themselves recommence the campaign. In Puebla, meanwhile, bogged down in costly house-to-house fighting. Mexican General Jesus Gonzalez Ortega Progress was painfully slow and by 11 April seven (1822-1881) was doing his best to build up the officers and 56 men had been killed and a further town's fortifications, while General Ignacio 39 officers and 443 men wounded for negligible Comonfort (1812-1863) was bringing another gains. Unsurprisingly, some officers advocated force to the area, hoping to act as a mobile threat to breaking off the operation, but Forey was the eventual French advance. determined to continue. By February 1863, with still no sign of a French Meanwhile, the French had to maintain advance, Juarez himself went to Puebla to review themselves off the countryside. As in all colonial the progress and provide moral support. At the campaigns, the ammunition had to be dragged time, heartening news was coming in from other very long distances over hostile terrain, and fronts as French forces were forced out of the foraging parties were necessary to feed the men coastal town ofTampico to the north and Jalapa to and animals. These were vulnerable to harassment the west. Within days, however, the French began by a small Mexican field army commanded by their move and arrived before Puebla on 16 March General Comonfort. With only some 7000 men, 1863 with some 18,000 infantry, 1400 cavalry, 2150 gunners and 450 engineers. There were also

200

and many of them irregulars, he lacked the confidence to engage the French in open battle

SIEGE W A R F A R E but had the good sense to concentrate on interdicting their supply lines and cutting off foraging parties. On 14 April, the French struck back, catching one of Comonfort's detachments and hustling them back in confusion. Any expectation that they had thereby solved the problem was soon dashed, however. Later that month, the French sent a convoy up from Vera Cruz with three million francs in gold, materiel and munitions, and w e r e confident enough to assign only a single company from the Foreign Legion for its protection. It was intercepted by a substantial force of Mexicans under Colonel Milan on 30 April and only got through thanks to a sacrificial stand by the Legion at the Hacienda Camaron, an inn protected by a wall 3m (10ft) high. In the n o w legendary fight that followed, Captain Danjou (1823-1865) and his detachment quite literally fought to the last man, and the safe arrival of the convoy proved crucial to the successful prosecution of the siege.

recognized that the end was near. On 17 May, he ordered all weapons and ammunition to be destroyed - then communicated with Forey about surrender terms. With Puebla at last in their control, the French n o w had no serious obstacle barring their entry to Mexico City. Juarez had wanted to fight for the capital, but with only 14,000 men at his disposal, he and Congress instead retreated to San Luis Potosi. From there, they continued, and would

War of Attrition Meanwhile, supplies w e r e also becoming a problem within the town. Although much had been done in the way of improving the fortifications, little had been done to stock the town sufficiently. Then, on 8 May, one of the French commanders, General Achille Bazaine (1811-1888), spotted a large cloud of dust in the distance. Rightly assuming this to be a relief force, he led a detachment out that night and surprised Comonfort's camp, inflicting a thousand casualties and capturing another thousand. The defeat marked the beginning of the end. By now, the defenders had eaten every dog and cat in the town and were now reduced to eating leaves off the orange trees. Ammunition lasted longer: while there was powder, solid shot could be cast and langrage improvised for the obsolete guns - in contrast to the French w h o required factory-made shells, shipped over from France and laboriously carried up from the coast. However, on 12 May, Fort del Carmen fell and Ortega INFANTRYMAN, IMPERIAL ARMY, 1 8 6 4 . The Emperor Maximilian raised a Mexican army of his own, which as this figure shows was quite practically dressed but ultimately unreliable.

201

SIEGE W A R F A R E

First Battle of Puebla 1862 There was no regular enceinte around Puebla, but a relatively up-to-date ring of self-contained forts: Loreto and Guadalupe on the north side; Fort del Carmen on the south; and Forts San Xavier and Santa Anita to the west of the city. During the first attempt to take the city in 1862 a line of infantry trenches was dug between Forts Loreto and Guadalupe, but this was a temporary measure to provide a fighting position for the Mexican field army rather than an integral feature of the defences. The Allied frontal assault on this position was repulsed with significant French casualties, causing the assault to be called off. The Mexicans secured their victory with a cavalry foray. In the second assault in 1863 the French concentrated their initial efforts on Fort San Xavier, but it was not until Fort del Carmen was also taken that the defence was compromised, leading to a hard-won French victory.

TEXAS

The strategic significance of Puebla lay in the simple fact that it blocked the direct road through the mountains from Vera Cruz on the east coast to Mexico City. Consequently if the French were to take the capital they first needed to capture Puebla.

202

The city itself is manned by poorly equipped militia thinly spread along the perimeter.

2

PUEBLA

SIEGE W A R F A R E

The French artillery preparatory bombardment is concentrated on Fort Guadalupe. The guns are then moved up to closer rangefin the mistaken belief that they would be more effective.

3 Heavy crossfire from Mexican infantry in the trenches and artillery fire from Fort Loreto smashes the French assault.

5

/

4

Finding the new artillery positions inadequate, General Lorencez orders an infantry assault to take the fort by storm.

6 Zaragoza digs a line of trenches between Forts Loreto and Guadalupe, manning it with most of his 4000 infantry.

1

As the French withdraw, Colonel Porfirio Diaz counter-attacks with the Mexican cavalry.

203

SIEGE W A R F A R E BENITO JUAREZ. The Mexican president was of largely Indian descent and although his election was divisive and paved the way for foreign intervention and civil war, his tenacity led to the eventual defeat of Maximilian's intrusive regime.

ultimately win, the war, thanks in no small part to British gun-runners w h o landed thousands of modern Enfield rifles. Diplomatic pressure also came from the Americans, w h o had concluded their o w n civil war and were n o w able to demand the withdrawal of the French. Conclusion The abandonment of the traditional stone-built enceinte meant that the defender instead n o w relied upon earthworks and barricades to harden his perimeter. This development had a certain logic since there was no point in the attacker trying to breach the line with artillery or to break through with infantry unless one or more of the outlying forts had been taken or, at the very least, neutralized, but it presented a number of advantages to the defender. Because the forward defence of the position was confided to the forts, the actual perimeter could be very lightly defended. More often than not, it was manned by militia and other irregulars, allowing a substantial portion of the regular troops in the garrison to be

204

concentrated to meet the actual point of attack. The first battle of Puebla in 1862 provides a splendid illustration of this: instead of spreading his available men around the entire perimeter, the Mexican commander, General Zaragoza, was able to concentrate them in trenches flanking the fort that was the enemy's primary objective and then to counter-attack when that assault was shot to ribbons. This flexibility was also reflected in the form of the fortifications themselves. Once the traditional enceinte had been quite literally set in stone, it was difficult and expensive to maintain, enlarge or alter it. Trenches and barricades, on the other hand, could be rapidly improvised and just as rapidly dismantled or adapted as the need arose. Moreover, given the general shortage of heavy artillery on colonial campaigns, such defences could be more than effective enough for their purpose. In India, for example, the insurgents defending Delhi in 1857 largely relied upon its medieval stone walls while the British attackers concentrated on knocking them down, but when the actual assault was mounted, the breaches were carried relatively easily. Paradoxically the rebels in the barricaded suburb of Kishangunj not only beat off their attackers, but as at Puebla five years later mounted a dangerous counter-attack. As ever, there was nothing new about relying upon barricades rather than more formal fortification. The protracted house-to-house fighting in San Antonio de Bexar in 1835, at Lueknow in 1857, and during the second battle of Puebla in 1863 had its precedent in the Napoleonic siege of Saragossa, to cite but one example. However, it would be fair to say that once the various European powers ceased fighting amongst themselves, improvised fortifications became the defining characteristic of colonial siege warfare, and that barricades, simple trenches and even barbed wire ultimately replaced the enceintes, ditches and bastions of eighteenthcentury Europe and the early colonial campaigns.

SIEGE W A R F A R E

Mexican Infantrymen (1863) The French-style uniforms traditionally

worn

by the Mexican Army soon disappeared under the pressure of war, and most soldiers campaigned in simple white cotton jackets and trousers with blankets or serapes in place of greatcoats. In the later stages of the war a considerable quantity of clothing and equipment was purchased from the United States, and the kneeling soldier is wearing a Union Army dark blue jacket and light blue trousers over his normal

cotton

uniform. Weapons were likewise imported; British-made .577 Enfield rifles were most common, but a variety of American

rifles

were also purchased.

205

NAVAL WARFARE By the end of the eighteenth century, Europe's great naval powers — Britain and France in particular — had a technology at their command that eclipsed the naval capability of the states of Africa and Asia. Moreover, over the course of the nineteenth century a series of improvements in ship and armament design gave the imperial powers of Europe an ever-increasing advantage in the colonial race.

avies provided Europeans with a number of distinct advantages in the colonial wars. Ships were floating batteries, carrying a heavy armament to distant parts of the world.Their threat became even more ominous in the course of the nineteenth century, when iron- and then steelhulled ships were designed which could withstand bombardment from coastal fortifications. And as shallow-draught, steel-hulled gunboats were developed after the middle of the nineteenth century, European naval forces increasingly wound their way far upriver, reaching the interiors of hitherto impregnable countries. Navies also provided mobility, both for amphibious operations

N

painted by British artist Thomas Luny (1759-1837). Naval engagements were a popular subject for both British and American painters. T H E BOMBARDMENT OF ALGIERS, 1 8 1 6 ,

NAVAL WARFARE and for simple transport of land troops from place to place. And thus, although the colonial wars were marked by no great fleet actions, the navies played an integral and often decisive role in winning and holding new lands. An American Prelude The key to preserving or winning freedom from European aggressors was often determined by the strength and quality of the naval force that could be scrambled together to meet the attack. The task was difficult. Just to build a frigate, which was a fairly small warship by European standards (displacing 544-1088 tonnes/600-1200 tons), was a massive project, and one that called for a fully equipped shipyard capable of any task, from sawing wood to a consistent thickness to producing iron bolts and rope. Then guns had to be found - at least 36 for a frigate by the year 1800 ROYAL N A V Y GUNBOAT, CIRCA

1800.

Mostly used for harbour defence, early gunboats usually carried a single large gun. They were not meant for use on the open sea but could be very effective in close-to-shore operations.

208

- and powder and shot. And, of course, men were needed to operate the whole - at least 200 for a frigate - and they required a long and thorough training to be truly effective. They also required feeding and payment, and the ships themselves had to be maintained. Not least, the officers needed to know their trade and to be equipped with charts and navigational instruments. Even a single frigate was a complex mechanism, and only possible for a state that could levy large sums of money and politico-military will. This chapter focuses on two states that did succeed in resisting European colonialism: the United States of America and Japan. At the outbreak of the American War of Independence in 1775, Britain was already a mighty sea power. Its American colonies were already engaged in British-style shipping and able to build British-style ships. In fact, all but two of

NAVAL W A R F A R E the 13 rebellious colonies had their own navy. The And yet his was a considerable achievement: the ships were mostly small, with a shallow draught British flotilla had been crippled to the point that suitable for coastal work. But they were not it was forced to turn back to Canada, and the different in essence from British war vessels, a planned invasion was averted. circumstance that made the North American The Americans also proved themselves to be colonies very different from most victims of part of the European system of naval warfare by European imperialism. appreciating the need for commerce raiders. In The sense that the nascent United States was 1775, the Continental Congress took a number of firmly on the path of European-style navies is steps to convert schooners into raiders and to reinforced by one of the most decisive build several more vessels for the purpose. And engagements of the War of Independence, the in the course of the war Congress authorized an defence by Benedict impressive 1697 privateers, Arnold (1741-1801) of both American and Lake Champlain in 1776. European, w h o took about 7 wish to have no An American army had 600 British prizes connection with any ship rashly invaded British-held between them. America's Canada, and was soon most successful commerce that does not sail fast; for I forced back. Arnold's task raider commander was was to cover the retreat and John Paul Jones (1747intend to go in harm's way.' to prevent a British invasion 1792), an experienced — JOHN PAUL JONES by way of the lake. He called merchant captain w h o had in shipwrights and spent settled in Virginia in 1773. three months constructing a Congress gave him a sloop fleet' of galleys and small gunboats. When and a commission to harry British shipping. completed, his vessels mounted a total of about 90 American naval efforts were bold but of very cannon and were manned by 700 men. limited scope; a European-style navy could not be Confronting the Americans was a small British built overnight. But America was fortunate: a fleet; Captain Charles Douglas (1727-1789) had number of Western European countries resented assembled or carried overland a naval force that Britain's sea power and were very willing to do the surpassed the Americans in men, ships and guns. country a bad turn. Thus American diplomats were Douglas had a right to feel confident, both because able to negotiate a treaty with France in 1778, of his superior numbers and because of Britain's followed by Spain in 1779 and the Netherlands in long naval tradition. In his case, however, 1780. This alliance enjoyed naval superiority over confidence rose to the level of serious Britain, a reality that forced the British navy to misjudgment. When the British sailed southwards keep most of its fleet at home, fearing an invasion on Lake Champlain in October 1776, Captain of Britain. (The French did, in fact, make an Douglas did not bother to send scouts in advance. invasion attempt in 1779, but the plan was And thus the whole squadron unwittingly passed wrecked by disease and poor organization.) Arnold's fleet, sheltering behind Valcour Island. King Louis XVI of France (1754-1793) bought and equipped a heavy merchantman for American This British carelessness gave the Americans use, which John Paul Jones converted into a 40the weather gauge - the advantage of sailing with gun frigate, renaming it Bonhomme Richard (after the wind towards the enemy and thus of deciding the popular Poor Richard's Almanac). Jones led a the shape of a naval action. Arnold took advantage, French squadron that made a serious dent in the launching an attack on 11 October that turned small part of the Royal Navy active in the American into an all-day fight. He lost; there is only so much war. These efforts w e r e not always well that can be done with raw crews and hastily built coordinated. For example, in 1779 a large French boats. At the end of the action, Arnold burned his flotilla besieged Savannah, Georgia, at Congress' surviving ships and took to land with his men.

209

NAVAL WARFARE

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request. But in 1780 Charleston, South Carolina, fell because the four ships the United States had available could not even hope to raise the British blockade of the city. It was the French fleet that ended the War of Independence. In 1781, French ships blocked the entrance to Chesapeake Bay, keeping a relief force from reaching the sorely beset Lord Cornwallis (1738-1805) and his troops at Yorktown. The French drove off the British force in a battle off the Virginia Capes on 5 September, after which Cornwallis found his position untenable and surrendered. The United States went on after the war to create a small European-style navy of its own. Lacking the resources of a strong central government, the US Navy was not large, and the

210

French map of Washington's victory over Cornwallis at the battle of Yorktown in 1781, showing French ships blockading the mouth of Chesapeake Bay.

VICTORY BY BLOCKADE, 1 7 8 1 . /I

decision was made to concentrate on ships able to attack merchant shipping and small warships, rather than ships of the line for fleet actions. But the frigates that were built in US shipyards were more than a match for their British counterparts, as they proved in the War of 1812. The Greatest British Colony: The Case of India All the conditions were right for the young United States to enter the ranks of 'modern' navies. Not only did the US Congress successfully negotiate

NAVAL W A R F A R E several very useful alliances, but the former colonies were already members - albeit junior members - of the European military family Sometimes their successes could be replicated; for example, during the rebellion of Saint Domingue (modern-day Haiti) against France, Toussaint L'Ouverture (1743?-1803) was able to win the assistance of the British fleet against its traditional enemies, the French. It was a British naval force that forced the French fleet to break off its siege of the island in 1803. Most states, however, were not so fortunate and it is instructive to compare the naval situation in India with that of the rebellious colonists of America. India in the late eighteenth century consisted of a number of powerful states, well able to challenge the forces of the British East India Company - on land. However, their military power was traditionally land-based. Even a major state like

Mysore had only a small, lightly gunned fleet, which was unable to match British firepower. Indian rulers were not slow to realize that the key to their continued independence was naval development. Thus the Marathas created a naval squadron that tried to emulate the British. But in 1775 t w o British warships encountered the Maratha squadron at sea and easily blew up the largest of its ships. Mysore also attempted to compete with the British at sea. But in 1780, the Indians met a British flotilla under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Hughes (1720-1794), and found themselves at a severe disadvantage. The largest Mysore vessels carried 24 and 26 guns, Merchant ships like the one illustrated here often copied the look of the British navy to deter pirates. Protection of Indian trade was a central Royal Navy objective throughout the century. EAST INDIAMAN, MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY.

211

NAVAL WARFARE hardly a match for a British frigate even if the crews had been effectively trained in gunnery at sea. Hughes did not even engage the Mysore fleet ship to ship; instead, he used ships' boats to board the two largest enemy vessels, at which point the rest fled. Under such conditions, it is hardly surprising that Indian naval activity was rare. British naval power made it possible to win India for the British Empire and to hold it against both native resistance and the French. The British victory over France for control of India was in large part due to Britain's ability to move troops

rapidly by sea. Similarly, in the great Indian Mutiny of 1857-59, Britain responded swiftly and effectively thanks to its control of the sea. Reinforcements arrived rapidly from Asian bases such as Singapore and Hong Kong, besides naval vessels transporting troops already in India. Naval artillery also played a significant role in putting down the mutiny, most notably at the battles of Cawnpore and Lucknow. The Borrowed Navies Indian rajas of the late eighteenth century did not have access to European ships and crews. But states, or would-be states, with closer connections to Europe were in a very different situation. Most notably, in their bids to gain independence from Spain and Portugal, revolutionaries in Chile and Brazil were able to buy European ships, manning them largely with British and American crews. Men like Bernardo O'Higgins (1778-1842), the Supreme Director of the revolutionaries in Chile, were able to speak to Europeans in a language of diplomacy that they understood - and Britain in particular was not averse to dismembering Spain's great empire. Similarly, many educated Europeans felt a deep solidarity with Greece, leading several countries to lend naval aid to the Greeks in their war of independence from the Ottoman Turks. Revolutionaries in Chile had considerable success against Spanish land forces. Nonetheless, as O'Higgins proclaimed after securing a major victory at Chacabuco: This battle and one hundred more will be meaningless unless we control the seas.' But Chile had no naval tradition. Recognizing that it would be impossible to create a navy from scratch that could face the Spaniards, O'Higgins and his political allies began to recruit foreign sailors and to purchase foreign ships. By 1819, they had attracted some 1400 officers and men from Britain and North America. Thus almost all of the officers and two-thirds of the seamen of the first Chilean Navy were British or American; the 400 marines were Chilean. T H O M A S COCHRANE. Cochrane, 10th Earl of Dundonald, purposely cultivated an image of himself as naval hero, as shown in this painting by Peter Stroehling.

212

NAVAL WARFARE

Their most impressive find was one of the most flamboyant seamen of the nineteenth century: Thomas Cochrane (1775-1860), 10th Earl of Dundonald. Cochrane was a highly successful captain in the Royal Navy until 1814, when his career was cut short by disgrace: he was convicted of helping to rig the Stock Exchange. He lost his knighthood, was dismissed from the navy and was imprisoned for a time. Cochrane was still fighting to regain his captaincy in April 1817, when a Chilean envoy in England recruited him to lead the new Chilean Navy. Raid on Valdivia: 3-4 February, 1820 Clearly Cochrane did not think that the revolutionaries' chances of success were good, even against Spain's rather decrepit and badly trained navy. Before leaving England, he tried to even the odds by ordering an experimental ship for the Chilean Navy, an armed steamship

Niebla was one of the Chilean forts attacked by Lord Cochrane in the series of actions to seize Valdivia. The fort's weakness was that all the guns faced the sea. G U N EMPLACEMENTS AT NIEBLA.

eventually named Rising Star. Construction lagged, though, and Cochrane set out for South America without this vessel. When he reached Chile, Cochrane was given command of a total of three frigates, three brigs and one sloop. Only one of the frigates was very impressive, a 50-gun Spanish warship that had been captured recently and renamed O'Higgins. The strength of the Spanish Navy in the Pacific at the time is unclear, but it is likely that they had at least two frigates and several corvettes. In the event, Chile's new navy was sent against land objectives rather than other ships. Cochrane's first objective was the Spanish-held port of Callao, Spain's main naval base on the Pacific, which served as the port for Lima. Cochrane spent much

213

NAVAL

WARFARE

Raid on Valdivia

The Spanish garrison flees to Fort San Carlos, hotly pursued by Cochrane's men, who enter the fort in the confusion.

2

1820 To reach the town of Valdivia, Lord Cochrane's small Chilean and mercenary force had to deal with nine fortresses and emplacements guarding the entrance to the waterway, all held by the Spanish authorities. The attack began with a night landing by marines

FORT SAN

and sailors near Fort Ingles, after which Cochrane's

CARLOS

men assaulted the other forts from two points on the landward side. Creating a domino effect, they followed the fleeing Spanish soldiers from fort to

m%m s

fort, taking each surprised garrison in turn into the harbour entrance was secured. Meanwhile, Cochrane's ships entered the harbour and were ready to collect the land force at Corral castle and ferry it across to attack Niebla and the other fortresses on the eastern shore. After consolidating his position, Cochrane proceeded

4MHHII F O R T INGLES

»

J

upriver, where the town of Valdivia itself offered no resistance.

Lord Cochrane's I ^ JL force makes a night landing near Fort Ingles, then successfully assaults from the landward side

VALDIVIA

Valdivia in southern Chile was the last Spanishheld harbour in the rebellious colony. Its conquest effectively won Chile independence from Spanish rule.

214

As Cochrane forces seize the forts, the Spanish garrisons flee inland

NAVAL

WARFARE

Several days later, Cochrane's force sails upriver to capture Its ultimate target, the town of Valdivia.

5

ARMAGOS CASTLE BATTERY

NIEBLA CASTLE BATTERY

\1AN< ERA ' J

^

CASTLE

C O R R A L CASTLE

4

Cochrane's ships move into the harbour, and ferry his men across to attack the fortresses on the eastern shore.

NAVAL W A R F A R E of 1819 in increasingly frantic attacks on this strongly held base. The first, in February, was foiled by fog. When t w o Chilean frigates finally went into the harbour, they were stranded by light breezes and shot at by shore batteries for t w o hours. (Had Cochrane had his steamship, it could not have been similarly trapped.) In a second attempt in March, Cochrane sent a vessel filled with explosives ahead of his main force, but it was sunk and he had to beat a hasty retreat. After that, Cochrane blockaded the port and led a series of piratical raids along the coast. Finally, in October, Cochrane tried once again to break into Callao harbour, n o w protected by a boom. To overcome this obstacle, he sent in a A later artist's impression of Cochrane's night landing near Fort Ingles, which opened the Chilean assault on Valdivia, from the Naval History Museum in Valparaiso. N I G H T ATTACK.

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fireship first, to break the boom. But it was becalmed and sunk by Spanish shot. As for the Congreve rockets shot by the Chileans from rafts, these were for the most part wildly off course and landed in the sea. Clearly smarting from his failure at Callao, Cochrane, acting without orders, planned an attack on the southern port of Valdivia. He sent three ships back to their base and ordered others to watch Callao. Then he set out in his flagship O'Higgins to Valdivia, 800km (500 miles) south of Valparaiso. Valdivia was the last coastal stronghold of Chile in Spanish hands. It was a large anchorage with a narrow entrance protected by fortresses and guns. The town itself was fully 26km (16 miles) upriver. O'Higgins reached Valdivia on the evening of 17 January 1820, and Cochrane resorted to a series of ruses of war to spy out the position. His ship

NAVAL W A R F A R E flew a Spanish flag and remained outside the harbour while, very early the following morning, Cochrane had himself rowed around the harbour in a gig to survey the water depth and gun placements. When a pilot with a Spanish officer came out to guide O'Higgins into the harbour, the two were taken captive. Cochrane also had a windfall: the brig Potrillo, bringing pay for the garrison, was tricked by O'Higgins' Spanish flag and captured without a shot being fired.

arrived, citizens came out to say that the governor had fled. Cochrane was able to take control of the town, seizing a large quantity of military supplies in the process.

attack the forts on the eastern side of the channel, but their garrisons ran for the town of Valdivia without stopping to fight.

Cochrane went on to another discouraging time in the service of Greece before finally being reinstated in the Royal Navy. The Greeks, however, did not have to make do with the scrapings of other navies. The Greek War of Independence

Rewards and A w a r d s After Cochrane's splendid exploit at Valdivia, the officers and soldiers of the Chilean Navy received special medals, while Cochrane himself had his pay doubled and was awarded an 8000-hectare (20,000-acre) estate. But the sailors were not paid, for the simple reason Night Attack that the n e w Chilean After his reconnaissance, Cochrane set out to fetch 'Loyalty to the family must be Government did not have the money; it could not more men for the daring merged into loyalty to the afford even such a small raid he planned, returning fleet. However, after many with 250 Chilean troops, a community, loyalty to the of the sailors had deserted schooner and a brig. Valdivia was very strongly community into loyalty to the and Cochrane threatened to resign, the government fortified, with a garrison of nation, and loyalty to the finally scraped up the almost 2000 men and a money By 1822, however, heavy armament in four nation into loyalty to it had decided it could not principal forts. Cochrane afford a navy. had spotted their mankind. The citizen of Cochrane went on to weakness, though: the forts' the future must be a citizen take command of another guns were set up for an revolutionary navy in Latin attack from the sea. So of the world.' America, that of Brazil, from Cochrane planned a night 1822 to 1825. Directing a attack from the landward — THOMAS COCHRANE motley c r e w of seamen side. He landed 300 men on from several lands, w h o the night of 3/4 February, spoke different languages and had varying degrees driving off opposition from the shore. The small of training, must have been a disheartening force climbed in the dark to Fort Ingles, where one experience.The difficulties can be summed up by group made a diversion while their comrades Cochrane's first encounter with the Portuguese crept quietly to the back of the fort and launched fleet, on 4 May 1823. Cochrane was at sea with five a successful surprise attack. Brazilian ships w h e n he encountered 11 The garrison ran from the first fort to Fort San Portuguese warships. The British commander Carlos, but Cochrane's men got in the gate with boldly attacked the centre of the Portuguese line, them. The same happened at the third fort. At but his untrained gunners could not sustain their Corral Castle, the last of the fortifications, many of fire and failed to damage any of the enemy ships. the Spanish soldiers abandoned their posts, Meanwhile, Cochrane's other four ships ignored forcing the commander to surrender. Cochrane's their admiral's signal to attack. ships then entered the harbour to ferry the men to

On 6 February, the two small ships sailed upriver towards Valdivia with troops. Before they

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NAVAL WARFARE from the Ottoman Empire began in 1821, arousing interest and sympathy among Graecophiles in Western Europe and beyond. The Greek revolutionaries were nearly suppressed by 1826, but the Western powers intervened, an Allied navy defeating the Ottomans handily at the battle of Navarino Bay in 1827. North Africa: From Threat to Opportunity By 1800, European navies had a decisive advantage over the fleets of the Maghreb, a region under the loose authority of the Ottoman sultan but for the most part independent. Now the modern states of Morocco, Algeria,Tunisia and Libya, the region was known to Westerners as 'Barbary' - a land of savage barbarians. These Islamic states had targeted Christian shipping for centuries, practising holy war at sea - or, as the Europeans called it, piracy. These commerce raiders relied more on speed N O R T H A F R I C A N XEBEC.

The

Barbary pirates for the most part used heavily manned but lightly built ships like this xebec, which could be propelled by either sails or oars.

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than on heavy ships and guns; most of the Barbary pirates used galleys and xebecs (small threemasted ships with both square and lateen sails). The pirates were, however, numerous and ingenious in their attacks on Christian shipping. The Western European powers found it easier and more economical simply to pay tribute to the main Barbary rulers, most notably the Deys of Algiers and Tripoli. However, the Barbary states encountered an unexpected enemy: the infant United States of America. When the North American colonies won their independence from Britain, their ships in the Mediterranean were no longer protected by British treaties. American merchant ships were soon under attack, and more than a hundred US seamen were enslaved in Algiers. The US Government spent years trying to negotiate a ransom despite the combined difficulties of an empty treasury and political opposition that saw any compromise as a sign of weakness. So in 1794 the US Congress ordered the creation of a navy, specifically to fight the Barbary pirates. Construction began on six frigates (United States,

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Constitution, Congress, President, Chesapeake and Constellation), and American sea power was born. Nonetheless, the first United States warship in the Mediterranean, the converted frigate George Washington, was sent to pay tribute to the Dey of Algiers in September 1800 rather than to fight. The US even gave the Dey a frigate as part of an enormous tribute, in order to recover the captives whom the Algerines still held. Tribute, though, was only a temporary solution, and in 1803 war broke out between a small American force and the Barbary pirates. At first, things did not go well for the Americans. American ships were more formidable than their enemies' if they could draw the North Africans into close action. On 31 October 1803, the 36-gun frigate USS Philadelphia ran aground while chasing an enemy vessel outside the harbour of Tripoli. To the embarrassment of the American government, the frigate's commander, Captain William Bainbridge (1774-1833), surrendered his ship and

This dramatic contemporary watercolour by C.H. Waterhouse shows US Marines capturing the pirate fortress at Derna, Tripoli, in 1805, an action commetnorated in the Marine Corp hymn 'To the Shores of Tripoli'. T H E BIRTH OF THE U S M A R I N E CORPS.

crew without fighting. This calamity left the US Mediterranean squadron with only the heavy frigate Constitution, three 12-gun schooners and two 16-gun brigs. To make matters worse, the Tripolitans repaired the Philadelphia for their o w n use. The situation was redeemed only on the night of 16/17 February 1804, when the American officer Stephen Decatur (1779-1820) took a crew into the harbour, boarded the Philadelphia and burned her at her moorings, an event commemorated in the US Marine Corps anthem. In August 1804, the small American squadron blockaded and bombarded Tripoli, while a land force of about 400 men attacked via the Libyan Desert. There matters rested until after the War of 1812, but the United States did not forget the

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NAVAL W A R F A R E affront of Barbary attacks. Within days of the treaty that ended the War of 1812 - as soon, indeed, as it was safe for US ships to enter the Mediterranean the United States declared war on Algiers. Having enjoyed a series of frigate victories against Britain, the US Navy was more assured in its actions. And thus, on 17 June 1815, in the first engagement of the Barbary War, Stephen Decatur's squadron took the Algerine frigate Mashuda. It then sailed on to Algiers and threatened a bombardment. The Dey gave in almost immediately to force majeure, signing a treaty on 30 June that gave the United States the status of most favoured nation and eliminated US payments of tribute. The Barbary states simply did not have an answer to bombardment by heavy ships' guns, nor could their o w n vessels drive away European-style warships. Algiers faced an even more serious threat the following year, one in which European ships had a chance to prove their superiority. On 27 August 1816, Britain sent Admiral Lord Exmouth (1757-1833) to Algiers with five ships of the line and 16 smaller warships, accompanied by a Dutch frigate squadron. There he issued an ultimatum: Algiers was to end the enslavement of Christians or suffer the consequences. The Dey did not respond, and so the European warships began a bombardment of the city. For nearly eight hours, they pounded Algiers with 40,000 roundshot and shells. Algerine gun batteries responded, and there were 818 British casualties. But only a very lucky shot could cripple or sink a British ship of the line. Most notably, HMS Impregnable proved worthy of her name: she took 233 large shot in her hull but still remained afloat and was able to reach Gibraltar for repair. And the British gave much worse than they got. They destroyed the Algerine ships in harbour, the land batteries and much of the city, besides freeing more than 1600 Christian slaves. British squadrons returned to Algiers in 1819 and 1824. On both occasions, the mere threat of bombardment made the Dey yield to British The vessel was set ablaze by the Americans in the harbour of Tripoli, an event that prevented the Barbary pirates from using the captured US naval vessel for their own purposes. T H E BURNING OF THE U S S PHILADELPHIA.

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NAVAL W A R F A R E demands. Also in 1824, a British naval threat made less fragile and also clearing the space to allow the Bey of Tunis halt the sale of Christian slaves. In them to fire a full broadside of guns. 1828, Tangier was blockaded after two British The usefulness of steamships when attacking merchantmen were captured. It was clear that enemy harbours was clear by the year 1840, when British and Austrian navies went to war against European navies were in the ascendant, and the Mehmet Ali of Egypt. With technical support from Barbary rulers could not protect themselves from France, Mehmet Ali had created a large fleet in the aggression by sea. The lesson was driven home by 1830s, which included 10 large ships of the line. In the fall of Algiers. Relations between the Dey of 1840, the Western powers decided that action was Algiers and the French broke down in 1827, when necessary. A British squadron blockaded the the Dey struck a French emissary with a fly whisk. Egyptian fleet in Alexandria: the British ships had The French responded with a three-year blockade a modern armament that of the port, which included exploding shells, culminated in the invasion not to mention more highly that led to the creation of 'The nations of the West trained crews, and the the French colony of hope that by means of Egyptians did not venture Algeria. French naval ships to sea against them. Then were able to escort a 675steam communication all British and Austrian warships ship invasion fleet across and marines forced the the Mediterranean without the world will become as Egyptian Army out of Syria. incident, and proceeded to one family.' blockade the Algerian coast On 3 November 1840, British warships bombarded to prevent an anticipated — TOWNSEND HARRIS, US POLITICIAN the Egyptian-held city of Turkish rescue attempt. Acre. The steamships of the squadron were able to move far inshore, where The Steam Revolution their guns could cause serious damage to the walls Britain's 1824 threat against Algiers included a and buildings of the town. An exploding shell from novelty: HMS Lightning, a wooden steam-powered one of these inshore vessels detonated the fortress' warship with three guns. Lightning had been powder magazine.The British ships fired a total of launched in 1822, but this was the first actual about 40,000 rounds, after which the garrison deployment of a British steamship. The navies of evacuated Acre.Thanks to steamers, bombardments the developed world w e r e swift to see the were more deadly than ever. potential of steam-powered vessels that were not dependent on tide and wind. The first steam warship, USS Fulton, was built in 1814, and as w e have seen, Cochrane ordered a steamship to buttress the infant Chilean Navy as early as 1818. By 1822, the Royal Navy had two steam tugs, Monkey and Comet, to tow men-of-war out of harbours. But soon steam also served imperialist objectives, as the British navy ordered warships to explore African river systems. The first steamships were far from perfect. They suffered frequent boiler explosions and regular engine trouble, were slow and consumed vast amounts of fuel. Their paddle wheels were also vulnerable to enemy fire. By the 1840s, however, an effective screw propeller had developed for steam vessels, making them much

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The First O p i u m War Steamships allowed the coercive p o w e r of Western fleets to reach far inland. Their potential can be seen clearly in the First Opium War of 1839-42. Determined to force the Chinese Government to accept foreign trade, including the outlawed opium, Britain launched a large-scale campaign.They committed 25 ships of the line, 14 steamers, nine support ships and 10,000 troops. The navy proved essential to success. The traditional naval ships were essential because of their ability to move military strength to key points. They also blockaded major Chinese positions and were instrumental in the seizure of four coastal trade centres.

NAVAL WARFARE China had no ships that could stand up to a British ship of the line, or even a frigate, for that matter. Chinese junks, while impressively large, were not as strongly built as Western warships, and did not mount nearly as strong an armament. The lesson was driven home in 1840, when British frigates destroyed 74 Chinese junks in the Pearl River.

British battleships, with their impressive shipboard batteries, upriver. They made short work of a number of major fortresses, blocked the Grand Canal and threatened Nanjing itself before the Chinese Government agreed to a treaty that gave the foreigners very liberal trade privileges in their country.

Steamers were even more effective, because they could navigate rivers. They were also being fitted with iron hulls, giving them even greater security against enemy fire. Even acting alone, such vessels could destroy large numbers of Chinese junks. Thus the Nemesis - a British 635tonne (700-ton) paddle steamer with an iron hull, a vessel borrowed from the East India Company destroyed 11 Chinese war junks near Canton in January 1841.

A Mexican Interlude Steam power also proved helpful as the modern Western naval powers worked to keep Mexico in its dependent position. On 27 November 1838, a French force under Admiral Bauden bombarded Vera Cruz. His ships were towed into place by steamers and, once there, they fired explosive shells. The Mexican shore batteries were able to do little against this threat.

In 1842, Admiral Sir William Parker (1781-1866) decided on a decisive blow to bring the war to an end - an attack on Nanjing. The approach was by way of the Yangzi River. East India Company steamers were ordered to tow IRONSIDES. The East India Company's iron paddle frigate Nemesis, launched in 1839, was the first British iron-hulled warship capable of ocean travel, and played a major role in the First Opium War.

Even more clearly, the US Navy embraced the steamship as a necessary and useful tool of war in the Mexican-American War of 1846-48. The US Navy prepared to blockade Mexican ports in the Gulf of Mexico even before war was declared. Commodore David Conner (1792-1856) requested and received shallow-draught steamers capable of penetrating river valleys, as well as several heavy ships to attack Vera Cruz. Secretary of the Navy George Bancroft (1800-1891) purchased five

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NAVAL WARFARE

A United States ironclad steamer, typical of the 1860s. Note that steamships continued to be fully rigged and often travelled under sail to save money on coal. MID-NINETEENTH-CENTURY GUNBOAT.

steamboats being built by a New York shipyard at the time - on order from the Mexican Navy. Clearly the Mexican administration saw the need for a steam-driven defence but found it difficult to obtain the ships it needed to defend itself. By 1847, the Americans had a large and diverse squadron in the Gulf of Mexico. It included one ship of the line, two sail frigates, six sloops and two brigs - but also included a steam frigate and six small steamers. It was this force that supported General Winfield Scott's (1824-1886) assault on Vera Cruz on 9 March 1847. The action began with a naval bombardment from vessels that were able to approach the town closely thanks to steam power. Then 65 surf boats put an American army on the beach not far from the city; the Mexicans did not even try to hold the beach. In under five hours, the American force landed more than 8600 men without a single death.The navy continued to play a role, bombarding the city with naval guns that had been landed and were manned by sailors. Mexico was clearly a second-rate power in naval terms. During the entire war, the Mexican

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Navy never sent a ship into the Gulf of Mexico. Not even Mexican-commissioned privateers had a chance: only one privateer seized a US vessel during the war. Building a Better Gunboat Until 1840 most navy steamers were used as dispatch boats or to tow warships in and out of harbours. The pace of building and the complexity of armament increased in the 1830s, however. Thus, for example, HMS Gorgon, which was put to good use in the bombardment of Acre in 1840, mounted two 25.4cm (lOin) guns and four 32-pounders. The real development of steampowered gunboats came with the application of screw propeller technology, first applied to a British gunboat in 1845. A screw propeller was more efficient than a paddle wheel and, more importantly, it was far less vulnerable to enemy lire, especially if it was constructed with an iron hull. British designers saw the possibilities, and built, as a test vessel, HMS Fairy, a small, shallowdraught warship that could operate close inshore. Gunboats proved their usefulness in the Crimean War of 1854-56. The effectiveness of the British vessels led the French, Russians and Americans to improve their coastal defences,

NAVAL WARFARE seeing how vulnerable they were to the new class of warship. But South America, Africa and most of Asia did not follow suit, and soon proved how vulnerable they were to the new technology. Effective Bullying: The Threat of Blockade In both the First Opium War and the MexicanAmerican War, Western navies frequently employed a fearsome economic weapon: the blockade. Even a small Western-style naval squadron could close a harbour to trade, and the second- or third-rate powers of the world could not respond. An infamous case of a blockade in action was the Don Pacifico Affair of 1850. Greece had won its independence from the Turks but did not have the resources to create a modern army and navy, which made it vulnerable to Western pressure. In 1847, a Portuguese Jew named David Pacifico (1784-1854) suffered property damage in an antiSemitic riot in Athens. The Greek Government refused to compensate him, but he had recourse: he held a British passport. Pacifico took his complaint to the British parliament and in 1850 the Royal Navy blockaded Piraeus, the port of Athens, for two months until the Greek Government made amends. The Don Pacifico For a time, oared vessels like this continued to be employed as gunboats alongside more modern steam-powered boats. BRITISH GUNBOAT, CIRCA 1 8 5 0 .

Affair is an extreme example, but such blockades were a frequent element of imperial politics in the nineteenth century. They were one of the most effective tools of colonial war, although the ships of blockading squadrons rarely fired a shot. It should be noted, however, that even technological superiority could give way to human error. An instructive case is that of the British paddle sloop Bulldog, sent to protect British interests on the island of Haiti in 1865. The commander of Bulldog intervened between rival factions, only to provoke a strong reaction from the rebel leader, who attacked the British consulate and executed several fugitives found there. The ship's captain, Commander Wake then issued an ultimatum, and when he failed to obtain satisfaction, fired on a rebel-held fort on 23 October 1865. However, the harbour was badly charted and the commander perhaps too audacious for the circumstances. Bulldog struck a reef, within rifle shot of the shore. While lodged on the reef, the beleaguered ship still made good use of its guns and skilled gunners, sinking the rebel ship Valorogue and another vessel, besides exploding the fort's magazine with a lucky shot.An American warship tried to tow Bulldog loose but failed. Finally the commander burned his ship where she lay, the Americans assisting by carrying the survivors to safety. The Second Opium War: Fatshan Creek, 1857 Blockade was less effective against China, where Western powers were eager to open ports rather than close them. The goal of forcing China to

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NAVAL W A R F A R E accept European trade - on European terms appeared to have been accomplished by the end of the First Opium War. But the Westerners sought ever more favourable terms, and the conflict renewed. Again, the spark that ignited war between Britain and China was caused by someone claiming British protection, but with only a tangential claim to it. In 1856, Chinese officials boarded a Chinese-owned ship, the Arrow, which was apparently engaged in smuggling. The 12 Chinese subjects arrested claimed immunity because the ship was flying a British flag - which the Chinese officials had insulted by their action. Britain planned an attack and was soon joined by France (after the IMPERIAL CHINESE WAR JUNK.

Junks could be enormous and carry a heavy armament but were not strongly enough built to withstand Western naval artillery.

execution of a French missionary). The Second Opium War (1856-60) proved to be a confused series of clashes, largely between the British and French navies and their Chinese counterparts. The Allied navy opened the war with attacks on coastal fortresses, for which it had to wait for gunboats to arrive in 1857. Again, the Chinese had a large fleet but could not meet Western warships on equal terms. Instead, they attacked the Allied warships with fire rafts, without success. The main Chinese fleet, more than 800 war junks, took shelter 5km (3 miles) upstream at Fatshan Creek, with 20 more vessels posted 6.4km (4 miles) above that. The British command was in the hands of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour (1840-1929). On 1 June 1857, he took upriver a force of four gunboats and two hired steamers, all of which towed ships' boats filled with sailors and marines. Seymour stopped to storm a riverside fortress, sending Commodore Henry Keppel (1809-1904) ahead against the Chinese fleet. When Keppel's small force reached the enemy position, the Chinese held their ground and exchanged fire with the

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NAVAL W A R F A R E gunboats. Almost immediately, though, Keppel's vessels grounded dangerously on the river's mudbanks, but the commodore sent the ships' boats forward. The Chinese junks fired enthusiastically at the British sailors and therein lay their undoing: the boats reached the first rank of Chinese vessels and boarded before the Chinese gunners could reload. Instead of defending their ships, the Chinese crews jumped overboard and swam to safety. Keppel ordered the fleet of junks burned, and proceeded upriver to the last 20 vessels - a force that still outmatched the British in both firepower and size of crews. And the Chinese had prepared a trap. Their vessels were moored on the other side of some shallows, and the British boats grounded there, 366m (1200ft) from the Chinese position. The Chinese opened fire. Finding the situation untenable, Keppel beat a hasty retreat but then launched a second attack when the tide was higher. Again the Chinese fled from their vessels. The British force at Fatshan Creek suffered 13 dead and 44 wounded; Chinese human losses were probably not much higher, since they did not hold their position. But the loss of over 800 vessels was a staggering blow to Chinese prestige. Several factors help explain the British victory over such a large force. Foremost, the British sailors were able to reach the enemy, thanks to shallow-draught steamboats that could make their way up rivers. The other decisive factor was discipline. The navy squadron at Fatshan Creek was the product of over a century of growing professionalism in the Royal Navy. The crews had been trained to fire from on shipboard and to row and board together. The demoralized Chinese force, by comparison, lacked both training and a will to fight. Admiral Seymour went on with about 30 ships to bombard Canton on 28 December 1857, after which troops were landed and took the city. The

CHINESE MERCHANT JUNK, CIRCA 1 9 0 0 . By 1900, small sail-driven vessels like this had been outclassed in both war and trade by European-style ships like the one visible in the background.

British and French goal was to force the Chinese administration to meet with the foreign envoys and sign a new treaty. The British envoy Lord Elgin (1811-1863) made a demand to be heard after taking Canton, but was ignored. So he sailed to Shanghai and repeated his demands. Then Elgin's military advisors launched a plan to take the envoy to Beijing by force, by sailing up the Peiho River, which guarded the approach to the capital city. Chinese forces had advance notice that Elgin and his escort were planning an assault on the Peiho, so they strengthened the Taku Forts around the mouth of the river and planted bamboo stakes on all exposed parts of the riverbank. Since the navigable channel was only about 180m (600ft) wide, the defenders must have been confident that

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NAVAL WARFARE they could blow out of the water any enemy vessel that approached. But matters turned out differently when the British gunboats arrived and set to work. The Chinese tried to destroy the gunboats with fireships, guided from shore with gangs pulling ropes. But the British shot at the rope-pullers until that scheme was abandoned. Then, one at a time, landing parties took the river forts. The gunboats broke the barrier of war junks that were blocking the river. They then continued upriver, sending for Lord Elgin to join them. Confronted with the horrifying idea of a barbarian emissary forcing his way to Beijing, the Chinese signed a treaty at Tientsin on 26 June 1858. But one of the treaty's clauses was that it be ratified at Beijing within one year of signing. Chinese officials started a series of delaying tactics, and the Allies soon decided that they needed a new naval demonstration to impress China with Europe's overwhelming might. Reverse at the Peiho River Rear-Admiral Sir James Hope (1808-1881), who took command in April 1859, set out to force the mouth of the Peiho River again. But the forts had been strengthened since the embarrassing events of the previous year, and three stake barriers closed the river. The larger British ships had to stay at a distance because of shallows. When Hope sent his gunboats in, they found it impossible to manoeuvre in the narrow channel that was left to them, especially as they were under heavy Chinese fire - and they discovered that Chinese fire was as accurate as that of British gunners, when they were shooting from land positions. To counter that threat, Hope sent landing parties, but they were caught in the mud.The forts remained intact, their thick earthen walls absorbing the British shot. Finally the British withdrew, with 89 men killed and 345 wounded. The battle of theTaku Forts in 1859 is a salutary reminder that Europeans did not always win, despite their naval superiority. Success against a One of the forts after the successful assault by a combined Anglo-French force on 21 August 1860. The Chinese infantry who defended the forts were commended for their bravery and tenacity by the colonial troops. T A K U FORTS.

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Battle of Fatshan Creek 1857

A British force consisting of four gunboats and two hired steamers towed the flotilla's boats 5km (3 miles) upstream, to where a large fleet of Chinese junks was moored on Fatshan Creek. The British commander, Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, took the fort on the southern bank with a detail of infantry, while Commodore Henry Keppel steamed ahead. The Chinese vessels stood their ground, moored across the stream. During a heated exchange, the gunboats grounded on mudbanks, but the ships' boats were sent forward and boarded the junks before the Chinese could reload to reppel the attack. Keppel ordered the junks burned, then continued upstream. The British boats grounded again 366m (1200ft) from another body of junks, forcing them to retreat and attack again when the tide was higher. Faced with further British attacks, the surviving Chinese vessels fled upriver towards the vilage of Fatshan.

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NAVAL W A R F A R E determined foe required careful planning and organization besides technological superiority and training, as Hope's impetuous attack on the Taku Forts proved. The Chinese did not have long to gloat, though: in I860 a larger Anglo-French force moved against the Taku Forts again and, thanks to a simultaneous land and river assault, took them on 21 August I860. Lord Elgin reached Beijing and w o n his desired treaty. The Chinese administration was certainly aware of its technological disadvantage at sea and had the means to adopt competitive Western-style ships and naval training. What it lacked, with f e w exceptions, was the political will to do so. China did create a gunboat force that was instrumental in defeating the Taiping and Nien rebellions. Its most ambitious Westernization programme in naval terms was, however, the creation of the so-called Vampire Fleet in 1862. In that year the regent of China, Prince Kung (1833-1898), hired Westerners to fight pirates in the China Sea. The imperial government purchased a considerable force of Western ships from England - four sloops, two gunboats and a steamer to serve as storeship.This force, which reached Hong Kong in 1863, was put under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn (1822-1875) of the Royal Navy, serving on detached duty as Chinese admiral. But problems arose almost immediately, most notably because Osborn understood himself to have been engaged to act solely at the orders of the imperial government of China, while local nobles competed for control of what they considered to be a lucrative resource. The fleet was soon disbanded because the regent could not, in fact, These light, swift vessels were extensively used off the coast of northern Borneo by pirates who relied on speed and a large crew that could board enemy ships. D Y A K WAR PRAHU.

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keep the ships out of ambitious and unscrupulous hands, as the government spiralled towards its final overthrow. A W o r l d W a r o n Piracy As w e have already seen in the case of the Barbary pirates, the technologically advanced navies of the West w e r e no longer prepared to tolerate predatory sea practices in the nineteenth century. In many regions, raids on merchant shipping had been a part of life for centuries, from the Mediterranean to Malaysia. Pirate craft tended to be light vessels, relying on speed and a heavy crew of boarders to take enemy ships. These pirates knew better than to assault a Western naval vessel with its heavy armament and well-trained crew. So Western naval forces, especially those of Britain, had to hunt their enemies up rivers, along dangerous coasts and against the wind. Again, steamboats proved indispensable. Piracy was endemic in the Malay archipelago in the mid-nineteenth century. Much of the region's trade was based on rivers, and there was no strong central government to police the coast.The British naval policy was to attack pirates whenever they were encountered. In the late 1820s, a squadron of the Royal Navy fought pirates on the coast of Perak - not only did this protect shipping but it also promoted British interests in the region and gained valuable fighting experience for British sailors. In 1831, and again in 1838, the British fought supposed pirates w h o attacked the sultanate of Kedah, in a situation that may have had more to do with the British quest for influence in the region than any real pirate threat. Certainly pirate fighting helped the British spread their influence far beyond their settlements at Penang, Singapore and Malacca.

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Strategically sited on the Gold Coast, this fortress was an important centre of the transatlantic slave trade for several centuries. CAPE COAST CASTLE, G H A N A .

Often such pirate-hunting ventures seem to have been almost accidental, as captains identified a need for intervention and pursued it. In Malaya, a large number of such expeditions were at the behest of one of the most interesting adventurers of the nineteenth century, James Brooke (18031868), w h o was named raja of Sarawak in 1841. He waged war on pirates using his own native forces operating in Malay war prahus. But whenever possible, Brooke called on warships in the vicinity, particularly HMS Dido, which was stationed in the region from 1843 to 1849. Sailing ships had considerable success against pirates, whether in the South China Sea or in the Persian Gulf, where the British intervened in the 1830s to stop the piracy of the Qasimi Arabs. But it was all too easy for pirate bands to take refuge up rivers or behind shallows where a conventional sloop or frigate could not approach. To finish the job, the Royal Navy gradually introduced steampowered gunboats. Piracy on the South China

coast was gradually ended by using gunboats to penetrate pirate lairs. Even so, Western naval forces never completely stamped out raids on merchant shipping. Raja Brooke summed up the problem in March 1863, when a squadron of eight vessels were hunting pirates with little success off Sarawak: they were, he said, a herd of elephants looking for mosquitoes. The British did, however, enjoy enough success to give credit to the idea of a Pax Britannica, under which the Royal Navy kept peace on the seas. The W a r o n Slavery Steamships also proved essential in efforts to abolish the slave trade, a crusade conducted above all by the Royal Navy. Britain banned the slave trade in 1807. It was a highly profitable business enterprise, though, and merchants were quick to outfit sleek, speedy vessels that could outrun most sailing ships afloat. The only hope of catching slaving ships with the evidence of their illegal trade was to apprehend them on the African coast, a seaboard rife with difficult climatic conditions and small, awkward ports. Steamships operating

233

NAVAL WARFARE Matthew C. Perry, seen here in dress uniform, is best remembered for forcing Japan to open its doors to Western trade. COMMODORE PERRY.

on that coast provided the British forces with their most effective tool. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Britain's most important active naval force was based in West Africa, specifically to combat the slave trade. When a squadron took a slaveship, the men and women were freed and taken to Freetown in the British colony of Sierra Leone. Anti-slaving squadrons were also based in the Indian Ocean and East Asia. To cite just one example, between 1821 and 1823 the frigate HMS Menai attacked slavers from its base on the island of Mauritius. By the 1850s, the Preventive Squadron usually patrolled close inshore, a tactic made possible by steam power - and considered necessary despite the high death rate from yellow fever among the sailors. The Preventive Squadron acted not just against European slave-runners but also against native rulers engaged in the trade. Most notable was the 1851 attack on Lagos, now in Nigeria. Yoruba kings had engaged in large-scale slave trading for centuries, increasingly in the face of strong British censure. In 1851, the British Government backed a claimant to the throne of Lagos who supported a ban on slave trading. British support was worth obtaining: a large British squadron bombarded the port, destroying much of it and enabling the candidate to take the throne. The British steamship Penelope played a key role in the bombardment. Britain proceeded to annex Lagos as a British colony in 1861, going on to seize the rest of what is now Nigeria in 1887. Opening the World to Western Trade While many regions of the world welcomed Western trade, some countries were unwilling to open to their ports to the imperial powers, at least

234

under the Westerners' terms. Thus, from 1826, US ships were sent to Hawaii in a (successful) bid to intimidate the rulers into granting extensive benefits for American merchants. Britain in particular made a practice of sending gunboats to enforce 'proper' treatment of its merchants - so much so that Prime Minister Palmerston (1784-1865) was mocked at being unable to find on a map all the places to which gunboats had been sent. One of the most vigorous interventions, though, was spearheaded by the Americans - the opening of Japan.

NAVAL W A R F A R E The government of Japan had enforced a policy of almost complete seclusion from Western influence since the seventeenth century. But after the First Opium War had proved that even a great power like China could have a trade treaty rammed down its throat, Western speculators began to dream of the profits to be made from the Japanese market. Also, as trade with Asia picked up, the treatment of shipwrecked sailors in Japan became a controversial issue. So the United States Government decided on the need for a treaty with Japan - whether Japan wanted it or not. Matthew C. Perry (1794-1858) was named commodore of the US East India squadron in 1852 and given the mission of opening Japan to trade with a treaty that guaranteed good treatment of shipwrecked Americans. Perry was firmly commanded to use force only in self-defence, but a heavily armed squadron was clearly intended to impress Japan UNITED STATES GUNBOATS move up the Tabasco River, Mexico, 1846. Commodore Perry made his name with a foray up the Tabasco River during the Mexican-American War, as part of the U.S. Home Squadron's efforts to blockade the major Mexican ports on the Gulf of Mexico.

with the United States' power and greatness. Perry's force reached Edo Bay (modern Tokyo) in July 1853, and the Japanese were duly impressed. Indeed, they were particularly amazed by his steamers Mississippi and Susquehanna, dubbing them'black ships'. Perry delivered his message and left, giving the Japanese administration time to think about options. When the Americans returned in March 1854, the Japanese Government was ready to sign the Treaty of Kanagawa, thereby acceding to American demands. The story of the opening of Japan is often ended at that point, but in fact it took a decade and considerable force for the Japanese to embrace their fate as trade partners with the West. On 15 August 1863, a British flotilla bombarded Kagoshima in an effort to force compliance. This engagement proved indecisive. It was the British navy's first use of the newest technology - breechloading Armstrong guns - but many of the guns burst in action. The Royal Navy went back to muzzle-loaders for another 15 years, and the Japanese question remained unsettled. In the following year, however, a combined British, French, Dutch and American naval force

235

NAVAL W A R F A R E finished the job.The Prince of Nagato had closed the Shimonoseki Strait by constructing a series of coastal forts with strong batteries. The 18 ships of the Allied force launched a series of carefully coordinated attacks on the fortresses. In 1864, over a period of four days, from 5 to 8 September, they proceeded to each fort in turn, softening each up with a heavy bombardment that proved to be far more accurate and destructive than anything the Japanese defenders could offer in return. Once each garrison was disheartened or had fled, parties of marines and sailors were landed to spike or seize the guns they found. This completely successful forcing of the Shimonoseki Strait was the last stage of opening Japan to trade. U p the Rivers As early as the First Burmese War of 1824-26, the ability to take ships up rivers was an essential element of colonial war. In the Burmese case, the British naval force had a single steamer, the East India Company's Diana, a 90-tonne (100-ton) paddle tug with a 45-kilowatt (60-horsepower) engine. Diana proved her worth: her guns destroyed a number of Burmese warboats. More importantly, she towed the British ships up the Irrawaddy River to Mandalay, providing both firepower and men for a naval brigade. BRITISH COASTAL GUNBOAT. HMS Kite, an 'Ant' type gunboat, was a simple but effective vessel. Gunboats of this pattern were first launched in 1871, to defend Britain against possible invasion.

236

Even with a tug for propulsion, deep-draughted w o o d sailing ships found it difficult to sail up rivers. Thus in the Second Seminole War of 1835-42, US forces used flat-bottomed Mackinaw boats on the rivers of central Florida. These small, oared vessels could carry only 20 men each, but that was enough to preserve operational mobility in the Florida swamps. The American forces also used steamboats on the larger rivers. Steamers w e r e shallower in draught than ocean-going wooden vessels, and were increasingly constructed with iron bottoms so that even if they grounded they would not be seriously damaged. Once the improved types of steam-powered gunboats came into use in the 1850s, it seemed impossible to stop the Europeans and Americans. Asia came under attack by way of several river systems. We have already seen how the British made use of Chinese rivers, and how hard the Chinese found it to protect themselves from the new threat. In a longer endeavour, beginning in the 1850s, the Russians worked their way into Central

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Asia along the Amur River, on which they floated gunboats. In the 1860s, the French even attempted to invade Cochin China by making their way up the Mekong River, mistakenly thinking that the route would lead them to southern China. The most consistent and significant use of rivers during the colonial period was in the gradual seizure of most of the continent of Africa. The great challenge of the 'Scramble for Africa' was to penetrate inland, often through territory that seemed nearly impenetrable to European eyes, and despite the fact that the Europeans were not acclimatized to African heat or diseases. It was the rivers that answered the challenge. West Africa Both France and Britain were interested in West Africa for reasons that certainly had more to do with European rivalries and national pride than with trade. In the seventeenth century, the French

This vessel is carrying troops in Eastern Sudan in the 1890s. Gunboats played an essential role in conveying troops through dangerous African territory, and also provided a ready means of supply and communications. BRITISH RIVERINE GUNBOAT.

established a trading post named St Louis at the mouth of the Senegal River. St Louis became a major slaving port, but by the 1820s the slave trade had been outlawed and entrepreneurs had to search for other trade goods. This soon brought them into conflict with the inlandTukolor Empire, which controlled the Senegal River to the bend of the Niger. In 1852, the French Government authorized a drive towards the interior, the aim of which was to control inland trade to the exclusion of Berber and African middlemen. The commander of St Louis, General Louis Faidherbe (1818-1889), was left with a nearly free hand. In 1854, he began to establish forts along the Senegal River, which

237

NAVAL

WARFARE

French Campaigns in North Africa 1855-93

From his base at St. Louis, Governor Faidherbe

From the port of St. Louis, the French begin incursions upriver in the 1850s to protect their trade base.

I

moved his forces incrementally inland, taking advantage of the Senegal River for transport and access to the interior. The first action occurred in 1855, when French-commanded troops thrust far up the Senegal and established a fort at Medine; Faidherbe then secured the lower reaches of the Senegal with a series of forts. The French push inland raised the suspicions of Tokolor ruler al-Hajj Umar, w h o proclaimed an

BAKEL

anti-European jihad. A plan for the conquest of

.VJedim: (185

the Niger Valley was revived in 1876. In 1878 a French force destroyed the Tokolor fort at Saboucire. Their goal was the Niger River, to which they carried dismantled gunboats while planning for a railroad link.They built a fort at Kita in 1880. After suppressing rebellions, the advance continued in 1886 with the capture of several Tokolor centres. The final stage was the seizure ofTimbuktu in 1893.

SAHARA DESERT

-J- TIMBUKTU ST. LOUIS TOKOLOR ~ Y

EMPIRE SOKOTO CALIPHATE

The French Sudan, now the countries of Senegal and Mali, was created by a push up the great waterways of West Africa, the Senegal and Niger rivers.

238

In a bold stroke, / Governor Louis Faidherbe sends gunboats far up the Senegal to capture Medine, where he constructs a fortress in 1855 and breaks a siege in 1857.

2

©INGUIRA1

NAVAL

WARFARE

LOCAL MUSLIM STATES

TOKOLOR EMPIRE

4

The French advance is halted for several years by rebellions of supposedly 'pacified' peoples, as well as attacks I from the Tokolor Empire.

6

After 'showing the flag' on the upper Niger for a year, a small force takes Timbuktu easily in 1893. TIMBUKTU

(1893)

, ,» N I O R O

SABOUCIRF. (1878)

BANDIAGARA

^ X ^ KITA

1,1 J p f•l H K

(1880)

^

1

JENNE

HAMDAJUJ

SFGOU ( 1 8 9 2 )

XiJ3i ^ ^

BAMAKO

Jj

In the 1870s, the French survey the route for a railroad between the Senegal and the Niger, against strong . native opposition.

3

(1883) ' In 1892 the French ^ advance from Bamako (taken in 1883) to Segou, which they capture after defeating | the Tokolors in battle.

•t i

239

NAVAL W A R F A R E A second French thrust into West Africa began in 1876, when the marine colonel Louis-Alexandre Briere de l'lsle (1827-1896) became governor of Senegal. His plan to establish a French West African empire was based on the ability to move men and materiel swiftly to problem spots, a plan that utilized both river shipping and railways. In the 1870s and 1880s, both the British and the French pushed to control the Niger River, French Outposts administrators in each country fearing that the other By 1855, the French had established a fort would take advantage of the decline of the Tukolor at Medine, above the highest navigable point on Empire. In the event, it was the Senegal River, deep in the French who first Tukolor territory. In April succeeded in opening the 1857, Umar placed Medine A few days sail from our Niger River. French troops under siege. When word of shores there lie vast regions seized the fortress of Murgula this act reached Governor Faidherbe, he set out to watered by great rivers and on the Niger. They then carried a gunboat overland in relieve the place in an pieces, reassembled it and expedition that is a model great lakes, regions of launched it on the river. In of riverine warfare in this unbelievable fertility.... Shall 1891, the French added period. Faidherbe packed 95mm (3-7in) siege guns to 500 men into t w o armed not these regions provide their armament. These steamboats. The vessels weapons were able to fire sailed upriver until they unlimited opportunies for our shells with the new high grounded, whereupon he trade, inexhaustible supplies explosive melinite.This latest lightened the steamers by innovation could devastate disembarking the troops and unhoped for markets for the cities of West Africa. and marched them overland to rejoin the boats outside The last stage of the our industries?' of Medine. A combination of French conquest of Western — MAURICE ROUVIER, FRENCH an infantry charge and the Sudan was the capture of could be provisioned by boat and could control and protect shipping. The French offensive coincided with a major jihad in the Tukolor Empire under the leadership of al-Hajj Umar (1797-1864). The jihad's primary enemy was animists, but a religious agenda soon became mixed up with fighting the French too.

steamboats' cannonade drove the Tukolor forces

from the fortress. This was a common pattern. A steamboat with its shallow draught could penetrate far upriver, carrying troops and supplies. Above all, steamboats could easily transport cannon and even early machine guns that would have been impossible to convey by land. Perhaps the French in West Africa made so much use of riverboats because officers of the French Navy were so closely engaged in the colonial movement. During the Second Empire, it was French naval officers w h o got France embroiled in Indochina. In the Third Republic, it was above all the navy that promoted expansion in Africa, often by ignoring its civilian superiors.

240

Timbuktu in 1893- The city had declined sharply from its golden age but was still a formidable obstacle. In the event, the seizure of the city was a race between naval and marine forces. A marine colonel, Etienne Bonnier, proceeded against the city with two columns. Unwilling to share his glory, he ordered the two gunboats with the expedition, Mage and Niger, to remain at the anchorage at Mopti on the Niger. But Lieutenant Boiteux, w h o commanded the vessels, was eager for glory, too. Boiteux ignored his orders and sailed upriver to Timbuktu.The first troops in the city, on 16 December 1893, were a detachment of 19 sailors, w h o were welcomed as liberators.The army columns, rushing upriver in a fleet of canoes, reached the city later.

GOVERNMENT BUDGET COMMISSION

French Foreign Legionnaire (1890) Founded in 1831, the French Foreign Legion consisted mostly of foreign

(European)

volunteers under the command of French officers. The legionnaires fought in all major French wars but were most important in the French colonial expansion into North Africa, Benin, Madagascar and East Asia. In the French wars of empire, the legion's primary weapons were increasingly sophisticated rifles, which gave them a growing superiority over native African troops. Like most Africanbased legionnaires, the soldier to the right wears a kepi, a flat, visored hat with cloth drape to provide some protection from the sun. Such troops very often worked in conjunction with riverine gunboats in Western Sudan. He is armed with the Lebel Model 1886 rifle, a French 8mm (0.3in) bolt action weapon, which had a 10-round capacity and also mounted a spike bayonet. The Lebel remained the standard legion weapon for many decades afterwards, staying in service until World War II.

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Algiers 1830 Tunis

i

r

.» a

• In Salah 1901

• Taoudenni

4

1906

Tamanrasset 1902 Bilma

SENEGAL

Timbuktu 1893 Zinder 1899 Segou

Conakry

Ivory Coast 1891

The Scramble f o r Africa British and French competition for the Niger River valley led to a series of bitter territorial disputes. In the mid-1880s, the t w o nations decided on peaceable negotiation to divide West Africa between them. But the other European powers protested. The result was the Berlin West Africa Conference of 1884-85, which shared out much of Africa among the predatory imperial powers. However, an important point at the conference was that a nation could not claim inland territories without proof of effective occupation of the interior. The effect was to make gunboats on

242

Gabon

French incursions followed the paths of the Senegal and Niger rivers, greatly easing the problems of transport and logistics.

T H E FRENCH IN W E S T AFRICA.

the rivers, and naval forces in general, more essential than ever. Western naval forces were engaged in warfare through most of Africa, even in the absence of water. The reason was simple: navies contained large numbers of skilled artillerymen, since a warship was a large-scale floating battery. Navies were also quicker to adopt machine guns than were armies, because the weapons were heavy

NAVAL WARFARE between the Congo Free State and Swahili slave traders. It proved easy for the Free State's river fleet to reach the main Arab towns of Nyangwe and Kasongo. More examples can easily be presented, especially from the 1880s and 1890s, when a new class of shallow-draught armoured gunboat was developed. The light cruisers and gunboats of the German Navy made it possible to establish German control in Cameroon and Tanganyika. In the 1890s, when British forces penetrated the Niger Delta region (southern Nigeria), naval vessels bombarded villages as well civilization the as providing necessary only part of our globe which it transport. The 1892 French invasion of Dahomey was has not yet penetrated, to greatly assisted by the gunboat Topaz, which pierce the darkness which steamed up the Oueme hangs over entire peoples, is, River parallel to the army's advance. Even Portugal, in I dare say, a crusade worthy its conquest of Mozambique during the 1890s, made of this century ofprogress.' significant use of gunboats along the Incomati and — KING LEOPOLD II OF BELGIUM Zambezi rivers.

and difficult to transport on land, besides the fact that ships provided a fixed platform from which to fire. Thus, navies often provided special brigades to join army advances into Africa's interior. For example, sailors formed a rocket corps in the Second Ashanti War (1873-74) and manned machine guns in Sudan in the 1880s. Sailors and their large ship guns were also a major contributor to victory against the Boers in 1899-1902.Thanks to the steam-driven gunboat, it was possible to accomplish extraordinary advances on the rivers of Africa, travelling into regions hitherto deemed impenetrable. To open to The Congo region was particularly inaccessible, thanks to a lethal mixture of swamps, rainforests and diseases. Welsh explorer Henry Stanley (1841-1904) was sent there in the late 1870s to negotiate treaties and establish a series of military posts for the Belgian king, Leopold II. At the Berlin Conference of

1884-85, the European powers granted Leopold an enormous independent state, if he could conquer it. The royal administrators put in place did so by controlling the Congo's complex river system, creating a large fleet of river-going steamboats by the simple expedient of carrying gunboats overland. Stanley launched the first steamboat on the Congo in 1881; it had been carried overland about 400km (250 miles) in small, individually numbered pieces. Once reassembled, a gunboat could continue upriver 1450km (900 miles), to Stanley Falls, beyond which the Congo was navigable for another 800km (500 miles). Leopold's Congo Free State developed a very expensive river fleet, using 90 per cent of the capital invested in the territory in the period from 1887 to 1896.

Mastery of the rivers allowed the Belgiancontrolled forces to move troops quickly. This mobility was decisive in the so-called Arab Wars of the 1890s, a very bloody series of engagements

Egypt and Beyond: Bombardment of Alexandria, 1882 The British invasion of Egypt in 1882 perhaps displays at their best the many uses of navies in colonial war. The story hinges on commerce, specifically on the Suez Canal, completed in 1869. The canal cut about 9000km (5590 miles) from voyages between Britain and her colony of India. Clearly the stability of the canal was of prime interest to the British authorities. But in 1876, the de facto ruler of Egypt, Khedive Ismail (18301895), went bankrupt. England and France acted together to establish a protectorate that would make sure they were paid monies owed them. In a classic example of the domino effect, the protectorate then provoked a nationalist movement and a major governmental crisis. A general, Arabi Pasha (1841-1911), seized control and began to fortify Alexandria in an effort to keep the Westerners out.

243

NAVAL W A R F A R E A large combined British and French expedition was sent to Egypt in May 1882 to intimidate Arabi Pasha with a show of force. Belatedly, the French decided not to participate, so the British Government ordered Admiral Sir Beauchamp Seymour (1821-1895) to prevent Alexandria from strengthening its defences. He exceeded his orders, demanding the surrender of the city. Under Seymour's command were eight battleships and five gunboats, mounting 97 modern guns between them. Facing the British were 9.6km (6 miles) of fortresses, well equipped with guns, although less modern ones. Arabi Pasha refused to surrender and so, at 7 a.m on 11 July 1882, Seymour ordered the bombardment of the city. The British sailors were as methodical as a demolition crew. They fired on one cluster of forts, and when that set of guns fell silent, shifted to the next cluster. The British battleships had devastating firepower from a distance that the Egyptians could not match; the state-of-the-art HMS Inflexible had four 40cm ( l 6 i n ) guns. For their part, the shallow-draught gunboats could approach so close to the forts that the latters' defenders could not bring their guns to bear on the enemy, as happened w h e n the gunboat Condor approached Fort Marabout. The British bombardment devastated the Egyptian fortresses, which were abandoned overnight, and much of the city beyond. The British suffered f e w casualties. After making their point, the British turned again to diplomacy but landed an expeditionary force to take control of the country on 16 August 1882 after the desperate Egyptian Government threatened to destroy the Suez Canal. The story does not end there. British policy demanded British control not only of Egypt but also of Eastern Sudan to protect the canal. But intervention up the Nile provoked a jihad, led by Muhammad Ahmad Ibn As-sayyid 'abd Allah (1844-1885), w h o proclaimed himself to be al-Mahdi. The Sudanese wanted freedom from both Egypt and Britain, and fought hard against HMS INFLEXIBLE. Launched in 1876, the Inflexible was an ironclad battleship of 'modern' design, with massive guns mounted in centrally placed turrets. The Inflexible was the first Royal Navy ship to have electric lighting.

244

NAVAL WARFARE

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Bombardment of Alexandria 1882 The Royal Navy attack on Alexandria's fortifications began at 7 a.m. on 11 July 1882, with a bombardment of the Ras-el-Tin defences that front the palace and harbour. Intensive firing continued for two hours, the British offshore squadron passing back and forth before the fortifications, which were silenced after three vessels anchored at the western edge of Ras-el-Tin and poured continuous fire into the batteries.

4

HMS Condor, after assisting Temeraire, silences the guns of Fort Marabout with a closerange bombardment.

Meanwhile, HMS Temeraire and HMS Monarch engaged the Mex Forts and shore batteries further west. When those garrisons ceased firing, three vessels moved into close engagement with Fort Marabout to the far west. The bombardment concluded with an inshore attack on Fort Adda, whose magazine blew up after a lucky shell strike from the guns of HMS Superb. Following negotiations the following day, the Egyptian forces capitulated.The bombardment set off fires in the city which raged for days.

ADJEMI

MONARCH

MARSA^^TI!

•mM * j

Alexandria was strategically important to the European powers because it controlled access to the Suez Canal, which connected the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and thus on to Asia.

246

>L,

NAVAL

HMS Alexandra opens the attack at 7 a.m. with a bombardment of the Ras-el-Tin batteries.

WARFARE

1 Three ships anchor off Lighthouse Fort, concentrating their fire on Ras-el-Tin, which is silenced by 12.30 p.m.

2

HMS Invincible moves inshore to fire on Fort Adda, whose magazine later explodes r after a strike by Superb.

3

ALEXANDJ

Shmzi ZiS

SULTAN

SUPERB

- 1 •

INFLEXIBLE

ADDA

4 l

PHAROS

TtMERMRE

A L E X A N D R I A

HMS Temeraire and HMS Monarch bombard the Mex Forts and shore batteries. Firing is interrupted for a short time when Tenieraire runs aground.

..

3

LAKE

MEREOTIS

247

NAVAL WARFARE imperialist pressure. The Mahdi trapped General Charles Gordon (1833-1885) at Khartoum on the upper Nile, massacring Gordon and his men in January 1885 before assistance could arrive. In 1898, General Horatio Herbert Kitchener (1850-1916) marched on Khartoum, intending to avenge Gordon and destroy the Mahdist army. As was so often the case in Africa, Kitchener's land force was supplemented by gunboats, carrying cannon and machine guns, which sailed up the Nile.The boats had to be manhandled through the cataracts of the Nile, but they proved their usefulness in the battle of Omdurman. They bombarded the enemy, holding the army's left flank. Decisively, they protected the retreat of Kitchener's Camel Corps at a key moment, thanks to their quick-firing guns and Maxim guns. The Mahdists did not fare any better against the French force that had trekked all the way across central Africa from Gabon to Fashoda in Sudan. In the battle of Fashoda on 25 August 1898, the French were attacked by a Mahdist force that tried to equal Western technology - the attack took G U N TURRET OF H M S INFLEXIBLE A hydraulic system allowed the turret to swivel 360 degrees, eliminating the old difficulty of manoeuvring a ship until the guns would bear.

248

place in rowing boats towed by two steamboats that had been seized from Gordon's force at Khartoum. But the Mahdists never got close; French magazine rifles were too good. Japan and Western Technology Besides the United States, the only land to fully embrace European technology when threatened by Western imperialism was Japan. Japan learned its lesson well, and by 1876 was becoming an imperial power itself, copying Western gunboat diplomacy in Korea. The first generation of the Japanese Navy consisted mostly of warships purchased from Europeans, but the Japanese Government soon applied itself to the task of ship construction and naval training. The pay-off can be seen in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, in which Japan and China fought for control of Korea. Both navies had westernized to a considerable degree. The Chinese Navy included 12 major warships. Japan, the newer power, had only 10, with fewer guns and weaker armour than the three Chinese battleships. But the Japanese Navy under Admiral Ito (1843-1914) was much more thoroughly trained. And China had not mastered the logistical needs of a major navy: Chinese supply was so bad that many large-calibre

NAVAL W A R F A R E

Key to the success of Western navies were crews that could load guns swiftly and aim them accurately, as with this breech-loader from the 1880s. T H E BOMBARDMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

shells were apparently filled with cement or sand instead of explosives. The Japanese Navy seized several ports and the island of Taiwan. It was clear that the Japanese Navy had come of age at the battle of the Yalu, fought on 17 September 1894.The Chinese fleet was protecting a troop convoy heading towards the mouth of the Yalu River. When the Japanese fleet appeared, the Chinese Admiral Ting (1836-1895) offered battle. Both fleets fought in Western style, but the Chinese appear to have been about a generation behind the Japanese. The Chinese w e d g e formation suggests that Admiral Ting intended to rely on ramming. The Japanese depended on the most modern available artillery, guns with calibres under 15cm (6in) but extremely rapid-firing. The

Japanese, steaming in a tight line ahead, let loose a hail of fire on the Chinese vessels, damaging them badly before the Chinese got to close range. At the end of the day, only six Chinese ships were afloat and Japanese dominance of the sea remained unchallenged for the rest of the war. Conclusion Most of the rest of the world was unable to emulate America and Japan's success in adopting European naval technology and tactics. So, territory after territory, the states of Asia, Africa and Latin America, fell prey to Western domination of one form or another. As had been the case for many centuries, navies were the products of wealthy, centralized states with the resources and the will to create these complex military machines. It was naval power, more than any other coercive force, that marked the difference between the Europeans and the peoples they colonized.

249

Select Bibliography Books Alison, Archibald. History of Europe from the Commencement of the French Revolution to the Restoration of the Bourbons (14 vols). London: Blackwood, 1848. Amery, L.S., et al (eds.) The Times History of the War in South Africa (7 vols). London: 1900-1909. Atwood, Rodney. The March to Kandahar. London: Pen & Sword, 2008. Beeching, Jack. The Chinese Opium Wars. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1975. Blunt. Wilfrid. Desert Haivk:Abd el-Kader and the French Conquest of Algeria. London: Methuen, 1947. Buchanan, John. The Road to Guilford Courthouse: The American Revolution in the Carolinas. New York: John Wiley, 1997. Chandler, David G.Atlas of Military Strategy - The Art, Theory and Practice of War, 1618-1878. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1980. Churchill, Winston S. The River War:An Historical Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (2 vols). London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1899. Detaille, Edouard. I.'Armee Frangaise:An Illustrated History of the French Army, 1790-1885. New York: Waxtel, 1992. Edgerton, Robert B. Like Lions they Fought: The Zulu War and the Last Black Empire in South Africa. New York: Free Press, 1988. Farwell, Byron. Queen Victoria's Little Wars. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972. Fiske,John. The American Revolution (2 vols). Cambridge: The University Press, 1896. Forbes,Archibald, Henty, G.A., Griffiths,Arthur, et al. Battles of the Nineteenth Century (2 vols). London: Cassell and Company, 1896. Forbes, Archibald. The Afghan Wars. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1892. Furneaux, Rupert. The Zulu War: lsayidlivana and Rorke's Drift. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1963. Gray, John S. Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991. Hanna, H.B. The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80 (3 vols). London: 1899-1910. Hannah, W.H Bobs, Kipling's General. Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1972. Haythornthwaite, Philip J. The Colonial Wars Source Book. London: Arms & Armour Press, 1995. Hopkins, Peter, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha, 1992.

250

Ideville, Count d'. Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud (2 vols). London: Hurst and Blackett Publishers, 1884. Irving, Washington. Life of George Washington (5 vols). 1856. Jarymowycz, Roman. Cavalry from Hoof to Track (with a Foreword by General Donn A. Starry). War,Technology, and History Series, Robert Citno (series editor). Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008. Kruger, Rayne. Good-Bye Dolly Gray: The Story of the Boer War. New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., I960. Laurie, George B. The French Conquest of Algeria. London: H. Rees, Ltd., 1909. Lodge, Henry Cabot. The Story of the Revolution (2 vols). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898. Mackesy, Piers. The War for A merica 1775-1783• Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993. McBride, Angus. The Zulu War (Osprey Men-at-Arms series). London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1979. McElwee, William. The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974. Morris, Donald B. The Washing of the Spears. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. Pakenham,Thomas.The Scramble for Africa: The White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876-1912. New York: Random House, 1991. Pakenham,Thomas. The Boer War. New York: Random House, 1979. Porch, Douglas.'Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey:The Development of French Colonial Warfare', in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclears Age (ed Peter Pared). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion:A Complete History of the Legendary Fighting Force. New York: Harper Collins, 1991. Porch, Douglas. The French Foreign Legion. New York: Free Press, 1991. Reitz, Deneys. Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War. London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1929. Roberts, Field-Marshal Lord. Forty-One Years in India. New York: Macmillan and Co., 1897. Robertson, William Spence. Rise of the Spanish-American Republics as Told in the Lives of Their Liberators. New York: D.Appleton and Company, 1921. Robson, Brian. The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878-1881. Gloucestershire: Spellmount, 2007. Smith, Richard J. 'Chinese military institutions in the midninteenth century, 1850-1860', in Journal of Asian History, 8:2 (1974), ppl22-l6l. Snook, Mike.How Can Man Die Better: The Secrets of Isandlwana Revealed. London: Greenhill Books, 2006.

INDEX Urwin, Gregory J.W The United States Cavalry:An Illustrated History, 1776-1944. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003. Vandervort, Bruce. Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998. Wilkinson-Latham, Robert. Northwest Frontier, 1837-1947 (Osprey Men-at-Arms series). London: Osprey Publishing Ltd, 1977. Young, John Robert. The French Foreign Legion. N e w York:Thames & Hudson, 1984.

Websites http://www.britishbattles. com - Analysis and maps of British battles from the Norman Conquest to the Boer War. http://calisto.slv.vic.gov.au/latrobejournal/issue/latrobe68/fig-latrobe-68-004a.html - for detailed map of Siege of Delhi, 1857. http://www.nps.eov/libi/ - Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. http://www.pdavis.nl/China2 htm - For maps and a detailed account of the battle of Fatshan Creek.

Index Page numbers in italics refer to illustrations, those in bold type refer to information displays with illustrations and text. Abbreviations are as follows: (b) - battle; (NB) - naval battle; (S) - siege. abatis 72 Abd el-Kader 10-11,14,18 Abd er-Rhaman, Emperor of Morocco 14,18 Adowa, battle of 110-11, 145, 150-3,154-5, 156-7 Afghanistan 30,32-4,35,36,3 7, 38-9,124 artillery 44,127, 129 cavalry 127 Gandamak (B) 126,130, 131, 132 infantry 125 Kabul (B) 124,126-7, 128-30, 132-3 Kandahar (B) 39,41,42-3, 44-5 Akbar Mohammed 124,126,128, 129,130,132 al-Haji Umar 240 Alamo, siege of the 173,183-4, 185, 186-7, 188-9,190, 191-2,193 Albertone, General Matteo 148, 151,152-3,155, 156 Alexander, General William 72 Alexandra, HMS 247 Alexandria, bombardment of 243-4,246-7, 249 Algeria Algiers, bombardment of 206- 7, 221-2 Barbary War 219 cavalry 11 French invasion 10-11,13,14, 123,135, 222 infantry 13 ships 221 Alula, Ras 148,156 Amat, Colonel Augustin 189 Amba Alagi, battle of 150 American Civil War 59,61,62, 86,88-9,104

American War of Independence (1775-83) 8-10,62,66,73, 113-14,166-7,208-10 ammunition, artillery 172, 188, 195-6,201 Ansar warriors 100, 101,103, 105,108 Apure, battle of 75 Arabi Pasha, General 243-4 Arapaho tribe 88 Argentina 77 Arimondi, General Giuseppe 148,153,156 Arnold, Benedict 209 The Art of War (Jomini) 65 artillery Afghan 44,127, 129 American 164, 184 Alamo (S) 184,188,189 Guilford Courthouse 117, 119, 120,121

Yorktown (S) 169,172 ammunition 172, 188,195-6, 201

Boer 47 Spion Kop (B) 53, 55 British 165 Afghanistan 36,41 Alexandria, bombardment of 244,246-7, 249 Delhi (S) 174, / 75, 177,179, 182

Guilford Courthouse (B) 119, 120 Isandhlwana (B) 25 Louisburg (S) 193 Maiwand (B) 38-9 Omdurman (B) 104-5,106, 107, 108,248 Quebec (C) 165 Second Boer War 193,194 Second Opium War 138

Yorktown (S) 168 Chinese 136,138,139,140, 141 developments in 195 Ethiopian 148,153,154, 156 French Baliqiao (B) 140-1,142 Puebla (B) 199,200,201, 203 Quebec (S) 165 Yorktown (S) 169 gun turrets 244-5, 248 Indian 175 Italian 148,152,153 Mexican 188,199,201,203 siege 163-4,177,182, 193-4, 195,204 Spanish Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 Valdivia, raid on 217 Ashanti people 144-5 askari 147,148,152,153,155 assegais 22,23, 29 Atichim, Ras 148,153 atrocities 34 Aube, Admiral Hyacinthe 240 Auckland, Lord 124 Ayacucho, battle of 62,79-80, 82-3, 84 Ayub Khan 38,39,41,42,44 BabarWali Pass, Afghanistan 41. 42,43, 44 Backhouse, Captain Brockman 133 Badli-ke-serai, battle of 174 Baird Smith, Richard 177 Baldissera, General 151 Balikiao, battle of 134,138-41, 142-3 Bancroft, George 223-4 Baratieri, General Oreste 147, 148,150-1,152,153,154,156 Barbary War 218-19,220, 221 Barnard, General 174-5,177 barricades 204 bastions 160-1,162,172,178 bayonets 72, 73

Bazaine, Francois Achille 133 Bazaine, General Achille 201 Behamroo Heights, Kabul 124, 127, 129 Beijing, China 134,136 Belgium 243 Benteen, Captain Frederick 93, 95,97,98 Bismarck, Otto von 141 Black Kettle, Chief 88,91 blockade 225 Boers artillery 47 Spion Kop (B) 53, 55 Colenso (B) 48, 50,194 First Boer War (1880-81) 46 infantry 46, 47,48,49 Spion Kop (B) 53, 54-5 Isandhlwana (B) 22 Majuba Hill (B) 46 Second Boer War (1899-1902) 46,48,193,243 Spion Kop (B) 51,53, 54-5, 56-7 Bolivar, Simon 61, 74, 75,77,78, 79,80,82,84,123 Bonhomme Richard, USS 209 Bonnier, Colonel Etienne 240 Botha, General Louis 45, 51,53 Boves, Jose Tomas 75,77 bows 64,65,87, 90,136 Brazil 74,212,217 Briere de lisle, Louis-Alexandre 240 Britain Afghanistan 30,32-4,35,36, 37, 38-41,42-3, 44-5, 124 Alexandria, bombardment of 243-4,246-7, 249 Algiers, bombardment of 206-7, 221-2 American War of Independence (1775-83) 8-10, 62,66,73,113-14,166-7, 208-10

anti-slavery operations 233-4

251

INDEX artillery 165 riflemen 10 Afghanistan 36,41 Second Boer War 48,52 Alexandria, bombardment of Second Opium War 136,138 Spion Kop (B) 53, 54-5 244,246-7, 249 Yorktown (S) 169 Delhi (S) 174,175, 177, 179, Isandhlwana (B) 6-7, 21-2, 182 24-5,26-7, 29-30,36,62, Guilford Courthouse (B) 119, 144 120 Kabul (B) 124,126-7, 128-30, Isandhlwana (B) 25 132-3 Louisburg (S) 193 Kandahar (B) 39,41,42-3, Maiwand (B) 38-9 44-5 Omdurman (B) 104-5,106, Louisburg (S) 193 107, 108,248 Lucknow (S) 192 Quebec (C) 165 Maiwand (B) 35,36,38-9, 42 Second Boer War 193,194 Majuba Hill (B) 46 Second Opium War 138 Monmouth (B) 66,114 Yorktown (S) 168 Najafgarh (B) 177 Badli-ke-serai (B) 174 Omdurman (B) 61,64,105, Balikiao (B) 134,138-41, 106-7, 108-9,144,145,248 142-3 Paulus Hook (B) 62,65-7,69, Camel Corps 107, 108, 248 70-1, 72-3 cavalry 62,102 Peiwar Kotal (B) 33,37 Afghanistan 36 Plassey (B) 113 Isandhlwana (B) 24,27 Quebec (S) 164-6,167 Kabul (B) 129 Rorke's Drift (B) 29,182 Kandahar (B) 42, 44 Saratoga (B) 10,114,167 Omdurman (B) 64,105, Second Ashanti War (1873-74) 106-7, 108,109 144-5,243 Second Opium War 138 Second Boer War (1899-1902) Chandernagar (S) 193 46,48,193,243 Charasia (B) 33 Second Opium War (1856-60) Charleston (S) 113,114,210 134-6,137, 138,142,225-7, Colenso (B) 48,50,194 228, 229,232 colonial administration 111, Sherpur (B) 34 112-13,121,144-5,147,148 Sheykan (B) 100-1 Concord (B) 9 ships Cowpens (B) 66,117 Alexandria, bombardment of Delhi, siege of 204 243-4, 246-7, 249 Delhi (S) 173-5,177,178-9, Algiers, bombardment of 180, 181-2,195 206-7, 221-2 Fatshan Creek (NB) 226-7, Fatshan Creek (NB) 226-7, 230-1 230-1 First Boer War (1880-81) 46 First Opium War (1839-42) First Burmese War (1824-26) 222-3 236 gunboats 208, 225, 229,233, First Opium War (1839-42) 234,236, 237, 243 135,222-3,235 India 211-12 Gandamak (B) 126,130, 131, Nile Expedition 104-5,107, 132 108 Great Game 32,123-4 Omdurman (B) 104,105,108, Guilford Courthouse (B) 115, 248 117,118-19, 120-1 steam ships 222,223, 233-4 Indian Mutiny (1857) 30,31, Valcour Island (NB) 209 40,173-4,212 Virginia Capes (NB) 168,210 infantry 8, 112, 115, 131, 176 Spion Kop (B) 51,53, 54-5, Afghanistan 32,36,38-9,124 56-7 Baliqiao (B) 141,142-3 Sudan 99-101,103-5,144,145, Delhi (S) 174,177,180-1 237, 244,248 Guilford Courthouse (B) Ulundi (B) 29,145 118-19, 120 Valcour Island (NB) 209 Virginia Capes (NB) 169,210 Isandhlwana (B) 6-7, 22, West Africa 242,243 24-5,26-7 Yorktown (S) 114,158-9, Kabul (B) 127, 129 166-9,170-1, 172-3,210 Kandahar (B) 41,43, 44 Broadwood, Lieutenant-Colonel Paulus Hook (B) 67,70-1, 72 108 Peiwar Kotal (B) 37

252

Brooke, James 233 Brydon, Dr 132-3 Buffalo Soldiers' 62 Bugeaud, General Thomas Robert 11,12,13,14-16,17,18,19, 123,135 Bulldog, HMS 225 Buller, Lieutenant-General Sir Redvers 48,50,51,53,54,56-7 Burgoyne, General Johnny 114 Burnes, Sir Alexander 124,127, 128-9 Buskirk, Colonel Van 72 Callao, Peru 213,216 Camden, battle of 116 Camel Corps 107, 108,248 Campbell, Captain 181 Canada Fort Charles 183 Quebec (S) 164-6 Canning, Lord 175 Canterac, General Jose de 77,78, 79,84 Canton, China 227,231 carbines 20, 64,65,69,75,90, 92, 101,102 CarlistWars (1834-39) 14,122 Carlos III, King of Spain 123 Castrillon, Manuel Fernandez 189 casualties Adowa (B) 153,154,156,157 Alamo (S) 190, 191,192 Ayacucho (B) 84 Baliqiao (B) 141,142 Delhi (S) 177,182 Fatshan Creek (NB) 227 Guilford Courthouse (B) 119, 120,121 Isandhlwana (B) 25,29,30 Junin (B) 79 Kabul (B) 126,127 Little Big Horn (B) 97,99 Najafgarh (B) 177 Omdurman (B) 106, 107, 108, 109 Paulus Hook (B) 72 Puebla (B) 200 Spion Kop (B) 53,56,57 Washita River (B) 91 Cavagnari, Major Sir P.L.N. 33,34, 36 cavalry Afghan 127 Algerian 11 American 62,63-4,68, 92 Civil War 86 Guilford Courthouse (B) 119, 120 Little Big Horn (B) 93,94-5, 96-9 Paulus Hook (B) 69 Washita River (B) 90-1,97 British 62,102 Afghanistan 36

Isandhlwana (B) 24,27 Kabul (B) 129 Kandahar (B) 42, 44 Omdurman (B) 64,105, 106-7, 108,109 Second Opium War 138 Chinese 136,138,139,140-1, 142-3 dragoons 68 Egyptian 105 Ethiopian 148 French Isly (B) 17,19 Puebla (B) 200 Second Opium War 135-6, 138 Indian 61, 132 Mexican 187, 189,191-2, 199-200,203 Moroccan 16-17,18-19 Peruvian Ayacucho (B) 80,82-3, 84 Junin (B) 78 South African 62 Spanish Apure (B) 75 Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 Junin (B) 78 soldado de cuera 81 Sudanese 101,105,108-9 Venezuelan 76-7,79,80 Cecil, Robert, Lodr Salisbury 99 Certain-Canrobert, Marshal Francois de 133 Ceteswayo, King 22 Chandernagar, siege of 193 Chang chi wan, China 138 Chapultepec, battle of 173 Charasia, battle of 33 Charles, Fort 183 Charles iy King of Spain 74 Charleston, siege of 113,114, 210

Chassepot rifle 148 Cheyenne people 62,64,86,88, 91,93,94-5, 97,99 Chile 77 ships 213,214-15, 217 Valdivia, raid on 213,214-15, 216-17 China artillery 136,138,139,140, 141 Balikiao (B) 134,138-41, 142—3 cavalry 136,138,139,140-1, 142-3 Fatshan Creek (NB) 226-7, 230-1 First Opium War (1839-42) 135,222-3,225,235 infantry 136,137, 138,139, 141,142, 228-9 Qing (Manchu) Dynasty 136, 137

INDEX Second Opium War (1856-60) 134-6,137, 138,142,225-7, 228, 229, 232 ships 223, 226,227, 230-1, 232,248-9 Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) 248-9 Chivington, John Francis 88 ChurchiU,Winston 103,105,106, 109 Clinton, General Sir Henry 66, 67,69,114,116 Clive, Robert 113 clubs 23, 29 Cochrane,Thomas, 10th Earl of Dundonald 212, 213,214-15, 216-17 Coehoorn, Menno van 161 Colenso, battle of 48, 50,194 Collineau, General 140-1,142-3 Colombia 77,84 Colt Model 1873 revolver 98,99 Comonfort, General Ignacio 200-1

Concord, battle of 9 Condor, HMS 244,246 Congo 243 Congress ofVienna (1814-15) 123 Constantine,Algeria 11,12 Cordova, General Jose Maria 80, 82, 84 Cornwallis, Lord Charles 69,113, 114,116 Guilford Courthouse (B) 116-17,118-19, 120,121 Yorktown (S) 168,169,170-1, 172-3,210 Cos, General Martin Perfecto 183-4,186, 188,189 Cowpens, battle of 66,117 Crazy Horse, Chief 89,93,97,99 Crimean War (1854-56) 134,135, 224 Crispi, Francesco 145,150,151, 157 Crockett, Davy 190-1 Crook, General George 91,93,96 Custer, Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong 62,64,88, 90-1,93,94-5, 96-9 Cuzco, Peru 78,79,80 Dabormida,GeneralVittorio 111, 148,153,155, 157 Danjou, Captain 201 de la Serna e Hinojosa,Jose 77, 78,79,80,84 Decatur, Stephen 219,221 Delhi, siege of 173-5,177, 178-9, 180, 181-2,194,204 Denver, Colorado 86,88 Diana, HMS 236 Diaz, Colonel Porfirio 199,203 Dido, HMS 233 Disraeli, Benjamin 36

ditches 161-2,165 Dost Mohammed 124,126,130 Douglas, Captain Charles 209 Duque, Colonel Francisco 186-7, 188,189 Durnford, Colonel Anthony 24, 27, 62 East India Company 30,31,162, 173,179, 211,223,236 Egypt 99 Alexandria, bombardment of 243-4,246-7, 249 cavalry 105 ElTeb (B) 101 Gundat (B) 145 Gura (B) 145 infantry 107 Omdurman (B) 105,106-7, 108-9 Sheykan (B) 100-1 ElTeb, battle of 101 Elgin, Lord 136,227 Ellena, General Giuseppe 148, 152,153,156 Elliot, Major Joel 91,97 Elphinstone, General G.K. 124, 126,127, 128-30,132-3 enceinte 160,202,204 Eritrea 147 Ethiopia 147-8 Adowa (B) 110-11, 145, 150-3,154-5, 156-7 Amba Alagi (B) 150 artillery 148,153,154, 156 cavalry 148 Gundat (B) 145 Gura (B) 145 infantry 110-11, 147,148,149, 153,154-5 Metemma (B) 147 Faidherbe, General Louis 237, 238,240

Fairy, HMS 224

Fallen Timbers, battle of 86 Fatshan Creek, battle of 226-7, 230-1 Ferdinand VII, King of Spain 74, 84 Ferguson, Major 116 Fetterman, Captain William 89 fieldworks 182-3,192 Fillisola, General 189 First Afghan War (1839-42) 32, 125 First Boer War (1880-81) 46 First Burmese War (1824-26) 236 First Opium War (183942) 135, 222-3,225,235 First Parallel, siege 163,169,171 Forey, General Elias 200 Forrest, Nathan Bedford 104 fortifications 159-62 Afghan 44 American 186

barricades 204 Boer 48 British 50, 51, 53,54, 57, 67, 72,162,165-6,168-9,170, 172,178 Canadian 183 Egyptian 244 fieldworks 182-3,192 forts 196-7,202-3, 204 French 165 Ghanaian 233 Indian 173 Mexican 183,199, 202-3, 204 Spanish 213, 214-15, 216-17 France Algeria 10-11,13,14,123,135, 222 American War of Independence (1775-83) 114, 116,167,209-10 artillery Baliqiao (B) 140-1,142 Puebla (B) 199,200,201,203 Quebec (S) 165 Yorktown (S) 169 Balikiao (B) 134,138-41, 142-3 Carlist Wars (1834-39) 14 cavalry Isly (B) 17,19 Puebla (B) 200 Second Opium War 135-6, 138 colonial administration 111, 121-3,147,148 Crimean War (1854-56) 134, 135 Ecole Militaire 133 Franco-Mexican War (1861-67) 198 infantry 200 Armee d'Afrique 13,123 Baliqiao (B) 140-1,142-3 Foreign Legion 10, 12, 13-14, 122, 133,148,201,24/ Isly (B) 16,17,18-19 Puebla (B) 199-200,200,201, 203 Second Opium War 135-6, 138 Yorktown (S) 169, 172 Zouaves 13,149 Isly (B) 14, 15-17,18-19 Louisburg (S) 193 Morocco 14-17 officer corps in colonial age 133-4 Puebla (B) 173,192,196, 197-201,202-3, 204 Quebec (S) 164-6 Revolution 73 Second Opium War (1856-60) 134-6,137, 138,142,226, 229,232 Seven Years War (1756-63) 122, 133 ships 121-2

Virginia Capes (NB) 168,210 West Africa 238-9, 240 Virginia Capes (NB) 169,210 West Africa 237,238-9, 240, 242-3 Yorktown (S) 114,158-9, 166-9,170-1, 172-3 Franco-Mexican War (1861-67) 198 Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) 20 French, Captain Thomas H. 98 Frere, Sir Henry Battle 21,22 Gall, Chief 97 Gallieni, Marshal Joseph 133 Gandamak, battle of 126,130, 131,132-3 Gardner machine gun 103 Gates, General Horatio 114-15 Germain, Lord George 114,116 Germany colonial administration 141, 144,157,243 Hessian infantry 69,71, 72, 115,117 ships 243 Gibbon, Colonel 91 Giolitti, Giovanni 145 Girty, Simon 86 glacis 161-2,163,165 Gladstone, William 36,99,101 Glorietta Pass, battle of 88 Gordon, General Charles 99-100, 101,106,248 Gorgon, HMS 224 Gough, Brigadier-General Charles 34,36 Grant, Dr James 188 Grant, General Sir James Hope 136,138,139-40,141,142-3 Grant, General Ulysses S. 90 Gras rifle 148 Graves,Admiral 168 Great Game 32,123-4 Greece 212,217-18,225 Greene, General Nathaniel 66-7, 117,118-19, 120-1 Grierson, Ben 62 Gros, Baron 136 guerilla warfare 34,38,49,57, 114 Guilford Courthouse, battle of 115,117,118-19, 120-1 gunboats 207,208, 224-5,229, 233,234,236,237, 238,240, 243 Gundat, battle of 145 Gura, battle of 145 Gurkhas Afghanistan 36,38,40 Kandahar (B) 41,43, 44 Peiwar Kotal (B) 37 Haiti 122,211,225 Hamilton, Colonel Alexander 172 Harris,Townsend 222

253

INDEX Harrison, William Henry 86 Hawaii 234 heliograph 56, 108 Henry carbine 64, 98 Herero people 157 Hessians 69,71, 72,115,117 Hicks, Lieutenant-General William 101 Hope, Rear-Admiral Sir James 229,232 horses 59,61,62-4,69,75,136 see also cavalry iklwa 25, 29 Impregnable, HMS 221 India artillery 175 Badli-ke-serai OB) 174 cavalry 61, 132 Chandemagar (S) 193 Delhi, siege of 204 Delhi (S) 173-5,177,178-9, 180, 181-2,195 Indian Mutiny (1857) 30,31, 40,173-4,212 infantry 31, 35, 113,174 Afghanistan 32,35,36, 38,41, 43, 44,124,129,130,132 Delhi (S) 177,180-1 Kandahar(B) 43 Lueknow (S) 192 Maiwand (B) 35 Najafgarh (B) 177 Plassey (B) 113 ships 211-12 infantry Afghan 125 Algerian 13 American 8-10,113 Alamo (S) 189,190, 191-2 Barbary War 219,220-7 Guilford Courthouse (B) 117, 118-19, 120,121

Paulus Hook (B) 69,70-1, 72, 73 Yorktown (S) 169, 172 askari 147,148,152,153,155 Boer 46, 47,48,49 Spion Kop (B) 53,54-5 British 8, 112, 115, 131, 176 Afghanistan 32,36,38-9,124 Baliqiao (B) 141,142-3 Delhi (S) 174,177,180-1 Guilford Courthouse (B) 118-19, 120 Isandhlwana (B) 6-7, 22, 24-5, 26-7 Kabul (B) 129 Kandahar (B) 41, 43, 44 Paulus Hook (B) 67,70-1, 72 Peiwar Kotal (B) 37 riflemen 10 Second Boer War 48,52 Second Opium War 138 Spion Kop (B) 53,54-5 Chinese 136,137, 138,139, 141,142

254

Egyptian 107 Ethiopian 110-11, 147,148, 149, 153,154-5 French 200 Armee dAfrique 13,123 Baliqiao (B) 140-1,142-3 Foreign Legion 10, 12, 13-14, 122, 148,201,241 Isly (B) 16,17,18-19 Puebla (B) 200, 201, 203 Second Opium War 135-6, 138 Yorktown (S) 169, 172 Zouaves 13,149 Hessians 69,71, 72,115,117 Indian 31,35, 113,174 Afghanistan 32,35, 36,38,41, 43, 44,124,129,130,132 Delhi (S) 177,180-1 Italian 110-11, 148,149, 152-3,154-5, 156 marines 219,220-1 Mexican 184,185, 186-7, 188-9,190-1, 201,202-3, 205 Peruvian 80,82-3 Spanish Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 Junin (B) 78 Sudanese 100, 101,103,105, 106-7, 109 Inflexible, HMS 244,245, 247, 248 Invincible, HMS 247 Iroquois tribe 86 Isandhlwana,battle of 6-7, 21-2, 24-5, 26-7, 29-30,36,62,144 isihlangu 23, 29 Isly, battle of 14, 15-17,18-19 Italy Adowa (B) 110-11, 145, 150-3,154-5, 156-7 Amba Alagi (B) 150 artillery 148,152,153 colonial administration 147, 148 infantry 110-11, 148,149, 152-3,154-5, 156 Ito, Admiral 248 Jamin, General 138,140,141,143 Japan American opening of 235-6 SinoJapaneseWar (1894-95) 248-9 Jefferson,Thomas 66 Jellalabad,Afghanistan 126,130, 132-3 Jomini, Baron Antoine Henri de 65 Jones, Brigadier 181 Jones, John Paul 209 Juarez, President Benito 197, 200,201,204 Junin, battle of 78-9

Kabul,Afghanistan 32-4,36 battle of 124,126-7, 128-30, 132-3 Kandahar, Afghanistan 36,38-9 battle of 39,41,42-3, 44-5 Keane, Sir John 124 Keough, Colonel Myles 96 Keppel, Commodore Henry 226-7, 230, 231 the Khalifa 61,103,105,106-7, 109 Khartoum, Sudan 99,101,106, 144,145,248 Khyber Pass 33,124 Kimberley, South Africa 48 Kipling, Rudyard 22,41,100, 101,103,240 Kitchener, Lord Horatio Herbert 62,145 Nile Expedition 99,103-4,105, 144 Omdurman (B) 106-7, 108, 145,248 Kite, HMS 236 knob-kerri 23, 29 kukri 40 Kung, Prince 232 La Mar, General 80 Ladysmith, South Africa 48, 50, 54,57 Lagos, Nigeria 234 lances 64,75, 76, 78-9,81, 102, 136 Lebel Model 1886 rifle 241 Lee, Colonel Charles 66 Lee, Henry 62,66-7,69,70-1, 72-3,117 Lee, Robert E. 66,117 Lee-Enfield rifle 53,194,204 Lee-Metford carbine 101,102 Lee-Metford rifle 52, 53,106 Leopold II, King of Belgium 243 Leutwein, General Theodor von 157 Lightning, HMS 222 Lincoln, General Benjamin Chelmsford, Lord 21,22,24,26, 29 Little Big Horn, battle of 58-9, 61,63,64,86,89,91-3,94-5, 96-9 llaneros 76-7,79,80 Longstreet, General James 90 Lorencez, General 198,200,203 Louis XVIII, King of France 133 Louis-Philippe, King of France 10,11,13,133 Louisburg, siege of 193 Lueknow, siege of 192 Lyautey, Marshal Hubert 133 Lytton, Lord, Viceroy of India 32, 33 M1853 Enfield rifle 17,20 M1873 carbine 90

MacDonald, General Hector 107 machine guns 103,104,105,106, 108,194,242-3 McLean, Captain Allen 69,71 MacMahon, Marshal Patrice de 133 Macnaghten, Sir William 124, 126,128-30 Mafeking, South Africa 48 Maiwand, battle of 35,36,38-9, 42 Majuba Hill, battle of 46 Makonnen, Ras 148,156-7 Mangasha, Ras (Duke) 147,148, 153 marines 219,220-1 Marion, General Francis 69,114 Martini-Henry rifle 20,24,28, 32, 36,40, 44,103 Martinique 122 Mauser C96 pistol 103,106,109 Mauser rifles 47,49, 148 Maxim machine guns 104,105, 106,108 Maximilian, Archduke of Austria 198 Menai, HMS 234 Menelik II, Emperor of Ethiopia 111, 146, 147,148,150-1,152, 153,154-5, 156-7 mercenaries 77,80,82 Metemma, battle of 147 Methuen, Lord 48,50 Mexican-American War (184648) 197,223-4,235 Mexico 159 Alamo (S) 173,183-4,185, 186-7, 188-9,190, 191-2, 193 artillery 188,199,201,203 cavalry 187, 189,191-2, 199-200,203 Chapultepec (B) 173 Franco-Mexican War (1861-67) 198 infantry 184,185, 186-7, 188-9,190-1, 201, 202-3, 205 Mexican-American War (1846-48) 197,223-4,235 Puebla (B) 173,192,196, 197-201,202-3, 204 Michael, Ras 148,156 Milan, Colonel 201 Miles, Colonel Nelson 87 Miller, General William 80,82, 84 Minie, Captain Claude Etienne 17 Mississippi, USS 235 Monarch, HMS 246 Monmouth, battle of 66,114 Montauban, General Count Cousin de 135,138,139-40, 141,142,143 Montcalm, Marquis de 165 Morales, Colonel Juan 188,189 Morgan, General Daniel 9,117

INDEX Morillo, General Pablo 77 Morocco cavalry 16-17,18-19 French invasion 14-17 Isly (B) 14, 15-17,18-19 Muhammad Ahmad Ibn As-sayyid abd Allah (al-Mahdi) 99,100, 101,105,106,244,248 Mulai Mohammed, Prince 16,17, 18 mules 63,75,80 musketoons 69 muskets 193-4 Afghan 125 British 8,69,115, 131, 185 Chinese 136,137 Ethiopian 148 French 12, 17,68, 69 Mexican 185, 198 see also carbines Mussolini, Benito 157 Mysore 211-12 Najafgarh, battle of 177 Napoleon Bonaparte 73,74,75, 77,123,133 Napoleon III, Emperor 134,138, 141,198,200 Napoleonic Wars 10,11,74,77, 123,133 Natal Native Horse 24, 27, 60, 62 Nemesis, HMS 223 New Jersey 66,67,70-1, 114 New York 66,67,114 Nez Perce tribe 87 Nicholson, John 177,181,182 Niger River 238,239, 240,242, 243 Nigeria 234 Nile River 104-5,145,248 North Africa 218-19,220, 221-2 O'Higgins, Bernardo 212 Omdurman, battle of 61,64,105, 106-7, 108-9,144,145,248 Orange Free State 46 Orizaba, Mexico 200 Ortega, General Jesus Gonzalez 200,201 Osborn, Captain Sherard 232 Osman Digna 100,106, 107, 108,109 Pacifico, David 225 Pakenham,Thomas 151 Parker, Admiral Sir William 223 Paulus Hook, battle of 62,65-7, 69,70-1, 72-3 Peiho River 136,227,229,232 Peiwar Kotal, battle of 33,37 Pelissier, Marshal Amable 133 Perry, Commodore Matthew C. 234, 235 Pershing, General John Black Jack' 62

Peru Ayacucho (B) 62,79-80, 82-3, 84 cavalry Ayacucho (B) 80, 82-3, 84 Junin (B) 78 infantry 80,82-3 Junin (B) 78-9 Phayre, Major-General Robert 39 Philadelphia, USS 219 Philip Kearney, Fort 89,90 Phillips, Major-General 168 piracy 218,232-3 pistols 64,65,68, 75,92, 98,99, 101,103,109 Plassey, battle of 113 Portugal 74,212,217,243 Powell, Captain James W. 90 Primrose, Major-General 36 Puebla, battles of 173,192,196, 197-201,202-3, 204 Pulleine, Brevet LieutenantColonel Henry 24, 26-7 Quebec, siege of 164-6,167 Ramirez y Sesma, General 189, 191 Ranjit Singh 124 ravelins 162 Red Cloud, Chief 89,90 Reid, Major Charles 177,181-2 Remington rifle 64, 103,148 Reno, Major Marcus A. 93,95, 96-7,98 Rhodes, Cecil 46,48,99,104,106 rifles American 9-10,89,90,98 Boer 47,49 bolt-action 45-6 British 10,17,20,24,32,36,40, 44,52, 53,204 Ethiopian 148 French 17,198-9,241 Indian 32,36 Italian 148 Mexican 204,205 see also carbines river warfare 236-7, 238-9, 240, 242-3 Roberts, Field Marshal Lord Frederick Afghanistan 32-4,36,38-9,41, 42,43, 44-5 Second Boer War (1899-1902) 50,56 Rochambeau, Comte de 114, 116,167 Romero, Colonel Jose Maria 187, 188,189 Rorke's Drift, battle of 29,182 Russia 32,33 sabres 64,69,75,78-9 Saint Domingue (Haiti) 211 San Antonio de Bexar 183-4

San Martin, Jose de 77,123 Nile Expedition 104-5,107, Sand Creek massacre 88 108 Santa Anna, General 184,188, Omdurman (B) 104,105,108, 189,198 248 Saratoga, battle of 10,114,167 steam ships 222,223, 233-4 Scott, Major-General Winfield Valcour Island (NB) 209 198,224 Virginia Capes (NB) 168, 210 searchlights 104,106,108 Chilean 213,214-15, 217 Sebat, Ras 148 Chinese 223, 226, 227, 230-1, Second Afghan War (1878-80) 32, 232,248-9 45 French 121-2 Second Ashanti War (1873-74) Virginia Capes (NB) 168,210 144-5,243 West Africa 238-9, 240 Second Boer War (1899-1902) German 243 46,48,193,243 gunboats 207,208, 224-5,229, Second Opium War (1856-60) 233,234,236,237, 238,240, 134-6,137, 138,142,225-7, 243 228, 229, 232 Indian 211-12 Second Parallel, siege 163-4,170, Japanese 248-9 171, 172 Malay 232, 233 Second Seminole War (1835-42) river warfare 236-7, 238-9, 236 240,242-3 Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, Prince 136, Spanish 213,217 138,139,141,142 steam ships 222,223-4,233-4 Sengbaou, General Prince 139, shotguns 64 141,142 sieges 159-62,192-3 Seven Years War (1756-63) 122, techniques 162-4,169,172 133 Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) Seymour, Admiral Beauchamp 248-9 244 Sioux people 62,64,89,91,93, Seymour, Admiral Sir Michael 94-5, 96-7,99 226, 227, 230, 231 Sitting Bull 89, 93 Shah Shuja 124,126, 128, 129, slavery 233-4,237 130 Snider-Enfield rifle 20,32,36,44 Shaka 21 soldado de cuera 81 Shawnee tribe 86 South Africa ShereAli 32,33 cavalry 62 Sheridan, Philip 88,90 Colenso (B) 48,50,194 Sherpur, battle of 34 First Boer War (1880-81) 46 Sheykan, battle of 100-1 Isandhlwana (B) 6-7, 21-2, shields 23, 25, 29, 65,81, 87, 24-5, 26-7, 29-30,36,62, 89,100 144 ships Majuba Hill (B) 46 Algerian 221 Rorke's Drift (B) 29,182 American Second Boer War (1899-1902) American Civil War 104 46,48,193,243 American War of Spion Kop (B) 51,53,54-5, Independence 208-10 56-7 Japan 235 Ulundi (B) 29,145 Mexican-American War Spain (1846-48) 223-4 Apure (B) 75 Valcour Island (NB) 209 artillery Barbary 218 Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 Belgian 243 Valdivia, raid on 213, 217 British Ayacucho (B) 62,79-80,82-3, Alexandria, bombardment of 84 243-4,246-7, 249 Carlist Wars (1834-39) 14,122 Algiers, bombardment of cavalry 206-7, 221-2 Apure (B) 75 Fatshan Creek (NB) 226-7, Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 230-1 Junin (B) 78 First Opium War (183942) soldado de cuera 81 222-3 colonial administration 123 gunboats 208, 225, 229,233, infantry Ayacucho (B) 79,80,82-3 234,236,237, 243 Junin (B) 78 India 211-12

255

INDEX Junin (B) 78-9 Napoleonic Wars 74 ships 213,217 Valdivia, raid on 213,214-15, 216-17 spears 22,23, 25, 29, 100,101, 103 Spencer carbine 64 Spion Kop, battle of 51,53,54-5, 56-7 Springfield Model 1863 rifle 89 Springfield Model 1866 rifle 90 Springfield Model 1873 carbine 98 Stanley, Henry 243 steam ships 222,223-4,233-4 Steuben, Baron von 9 Stewart, Lieutenant-General Donald 36 Suchet, Marshal 11 Sucre y Alcala, General Antonio Jose de 62,77,78,79,80,82, 83,84 Sudan 99-101,103-5,144-5, 237, 240,244 cavalry 101,105,108-9 El Teb (B) 101 infantry 100, 101,103,105, 106-7, 109 Metemma (B) 147 Omdurman (B) 61,64,105, 106-7, 108-9,144,145,248 Sheykan (B) 100-1 Suez Canal 99,243,244 Sumner, Colonel E.V. 64 Sumter, Thomas 114 Susquehanna, USS 235 Sutherland, Major William 67,69, 71, 72-3 swords 100 Tabanyama Hill, South Africa 50, 51,53 tactics artillery Chinese 138 evolving 194-5 cavalry 65 Algerian 11 American 94—5 Moroccan 16-17,18-19 Peruvian 80 Plains Indians 89 Spanish 79 Sudanese 101 infantry American 9-10,69,70-1, 72, 73, 117,118-19, 120 Boer 47,48 British 20,24,41,43, 50, 52, 56,103,129 Chinese 138 defiles 33 Ethiopian 154 French 14,16,18-19, 141 Italian 152,153

256

Peruvian 80 Spanish 80 Sudanese 101,103,109 volley fire 20,24-5 water buffalo' formation 24, 27 Zulu 22,24,25, 26-7, 29-30 naval American 209 blockade 225 British 212,226-7, 230-1, 246-7 Chilean 214-15 Chinese 249 Japanese 249 siege American 169,170-1, 172 British 172-3,174-5,177, 178-9, 204 French 165,169,170-1, 172, 199,200,202-3 Mexican 186-7, 188-9,200, 202-3 Taitu, Empress of Ethiopia 153 Taku forts, China 136,227,228, 229,232 Tarleton, Lieutenant-Colonel Banastre Bloody Ban' 66,67, 69,114,116,117,118 Temeraire, HMS 246-7 Terry, General Alfred H. 91,93, 95, 99 Thorneycroft, Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander 53, 56 Tigre 147 Timbuktu 238,239, 240 Ting, Admiral 249 tipis 85 Tippecanoe, battle of 86 tomahawks 65,85,90 Toussaint L'Ouverture 211 training American 113 Boer 47 British 115,227 French 133 infantry formations 134 Zulu 25 Transvaal, Republic of the 46 Travis, William 184,193 Tripartite Treaty (1838) 124 Tripoli, Libya 219,220-1 Tugela River 48, 50, 54 Ulundi, battle of 29,144 uniforms 65 American 9, 189 British 8, 28, 32,52, 60, 176 French 12, 32,200, 241 Gurkha 40 Indian 31, 35, 174 Mexican 185, 188, 201, 205 Spanish 75 United States Alamo (S) 173,183-4,185, 186-7, 188-9,190, 191-2, 193

American Civil War 59,61,62, 86,88-9,104 American War of Independence (1775-83) 8-10, 62,66,73,113-14,166-7, 208-10 artillery 164, 184 Alamo (S) 184,188,189 Guilford Courthouse 117, 119, 120,121 Yorktown (S) 169,172 Barbary War 218-19,220, 221 Camden (B) 116 cavalry 62,63-4, 68, 92 Civil War 86 Guilford Courthouse (B) 119, 120 Little Big Horn (B) 93,94-5, 96-9 Paulus Hook (B) 69 Washita River (B) 90-1,97 Chapultepec (B) 173 Charleston (S) 113,114,210 Concord (B) 9 Cowpens (B) 66,117 early colonists 84-6 Fallen Timbers (B) 86 Glorietta Pass (B) 88 Guilford Courthouse (B) 115, 117,118-19, 120-1 infantry 8-10,113 Alamo (S) 189,190, 191-2 Barbary War 219,220-1 Guilford Courthouse (B) 117, 118-19, 120,121 Paulus Hook (B) 69,70-1, 72, 73 Yorktown (S) 169, 172 Japan 235-6 Little Big Horn (B) 58-9, 61, 63,64,86,89,91-3,94-5, 96-9 Mexican-American War (1846-48) 197,223-4,235 Monmouth (B) 66,114 Paulus Hook (B) 62,65-7,69, 70-1, 72-3 Quebec (S) 165-6,167 Sand Creek massacre 88 Saratoga (B) 10,114,167 ships American Civil War 104 American War of Independence 208-10 Barbary War 218-19,221 Japan 235 Mexican-American War (1846-48) 223-4 Valcour Island (NB) 209 Tippecanoe (B) 86 Valcour Island (NB) 209 Virginia Capes (NB) 169,210 Washita River (B) 90-1,97 Yorktown (S) 114,158-9, 166-9,170-1, 172-3,210 Urrea, General 188

Valcour Island, battle of 209 Valdez, General 79,80,82, 83, 84 Valdivia, raid on 213,214-15, 216-17 Valley Forge 66 Vantini, Colonel Joseph 135 Vauban, Sebastian 161 Venezuela 75 cavalry 76-7,79,80 Vera Cruz, Mexico 197-8,223-4 Vetterli rifle 148 Victoria, Queen 48 Virginia Capes, battle of the 169, 210

Wake, Commander 225 Warren, Lieutenant-General Sir Charles 50-1,53,54, 56-7 Washington, George 65,66,67, 69,73-4,77,114,117,158-9, 166-7 Washington, Colonel William 66, 117,119, 120 Washita River, battle of the 90-1, 97 Wayne, General Mad Anthony' 67,86 Webley revolvers 101 Wellesley, General Sir Arthur, Duke of Wellington 113 West Africa 237,238-9, 240, 242-3 West Point 88,91 Westley-Richards carbine 20, 60 White, Major George 44 Wilhelm II, Kaiser 141,144 William, Fort 162 William Henry, Fort 162 Williamsburg, Virginia 168,169 Wilson, General Archdale 177, 182 Winchester Model 1873 rifle 98 Wolfe, General 165 Wolseley, General Sir Garnet 136, 144-5 Woodgate, Major-General Edward 51,53 World War I 157,194 xebecs 218 Yakub Khan 33 Yalu, battle of the 249 Yohannes IV, King of Ethiopia 147,148 Yorktown, siege of 114,158-9, 166-9,170-1, 172-3,210 Zaragoza, General Ignacio 198, 199,200,202, 204 Zulus 21, 23 Isandhlwana (B) 6-7, 21-2, 24-5,26-7, 29-30,62,144 Rorke's Drift (B) 29,182 Ulundi (B) 29,145

Tactics, fighting techniques, weapons technology, and equipment of colonial forces explained by means of color and black-and-white artworks • Contains 20 full-color tactical maps and accounts of key battles, including the Siege ofYorktown (1781), the amphibious assault on Valdivia (1820), the battle of Isly (1844), the defence of the Alamo (1836), the retreat from Kabul (1842), Little Big Horn (1876), Omdurman (1898), and many more • Provides a detailed, highly-illustrated guide to colonial warfare from the American War of Independence to the Anglo-Boer War