Fighter Command
1936-1968
Fighter Command
1936-1968 A N OPERATIO NAL A ND HISTORICAL RECORD
KEN DELVE
x
Pen & Sw...
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Fighter Command
1936-1968
Fighter Command
1936-1968 A N OPERATIO NAL A ND HISTORICAL RECORD
KEN DELVE
x
Pen & Sword AVIATION
First published in Great Britain in 2007 by PEN & SWORD AVIATION an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street Barnsley South York shire S702AS Copyright © Ken Delve, 2007 ISBN I 84415 613 9 The right of Ken Delve to be identified as Auth or of this Work has been asserted by him in accorda nce with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP cat alogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset by Concept, Huddersfield, West York shire Printed and bound in Gr eat Britain by CPI UK
Contents CHA PTE R O NE
D evel opmen t , R ol es an d History
CHA PTER T wo
Operations
CHAPTER T H REE
O pera tiona l Groups
183
CHAPT ER F OU R
Airc rew T rainin g . .
214
CHAPTER FI VE
O pera tio n al Ai rc ra ft
245
For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England. E-mail: enguiries@pen-and-sword .co.uk Website: www.pen-and-sword.co .uk
98
ANN EX ES
A: B:
C: D: E: F: G: H: I:
J: Pen & S word Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Wharncl iffe Local History, Pen & Sword Select, Pen & Sword Militar y Classics and Leo Cooper.
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K: L: M: N: 0: P:
Q: R: I N D EX
AO C -in- C Fighter Com mand . . . . . . . . . . Battle of Britain Squadrons Battle of Bri tain : Galland 's View Order of Battle Jul y 193 6 Order of Battle September 1939 Order of Battle Au gu st 194 0 . . Order of Battle February 1941 Order of Battle Apri l 1942 Order of Battle April 194 3 Order of Battle July 1944 Order o f Battle J uly 1945 O rde r of Battle Apri l 1953 Order of Battle Janu ary 1961 Order o f Battle January 1968 C laims W orld W ar T wo . . . . . . . . . . . D efiniti o ns of Operation T ypes Fighter Com mand Battle Honou rs G erm an Night Attacks on C ities . . . . . . . . .
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3 10
313 316 322 323 325 327 329 332 . 335 . 337 . 339 341 . 343 . 344 . . .
348
351 356
358
Fighter Command Badge
P
ER ONE
Development, Roles and History ~,
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'In front of a Portcullis a sword erect' (elements of the Badge were subseq uently used by Strike Command) . The sword is indicative of the Command's offensive operations and the Portcullis symbo lises its defensive role; this duality it also shown in the motto of 'Offence Defence' . The Badge was approved by in March 1945.
or a few short months in late 1940, Fighter Co mmand of the Royal Air Force was pitted against the might of the German Luft waff e in a struggle that wou ld help determ ine the course of the Second World War. The Battle of Britain will always remain the Co mma nd's ' Finest Hour ' but it comprised only a few months of a war that lasted nearly six year s - and Fight er Co mma nd was involved in active operations for muc h of that time. As with all history the benefits of hind sight and access to previousl y classified doc umenta ry so urces has to be balanced by the researcher's removal in time and conte xt from the period under study. To trul y under stand decision s, policies, actions and att itudes is all but impossible. This book covers the entire period of Fighte r Comma nd from its origin in 1936 to its demise - into Strik e Command - in 1968. Whilst all periods of the Co mmand a re covered it is inevita ble that the major focus is on the period of World War Two. The book has been divided into five main sections: an Introduction and Overview, which sets the fra mework for the development of Fighter Co mmand and includes both policy and politics; an Operati ons chapter, which focuses on the combat operations of the Co mma nd; a brief look a t each of the opera tiona l Gr oup s; an overview of aircrew tra ining: a nd, finally, an Aircraft cha pter, lookin g in chronological sequence at all operational aircraft types. The a nnexes provide a variety of historical data . The chapters frequen tly qu ote extracts fro m the Operati on al Record Book s (O R B) of va rious squadro ns; these have been selected as typical of the type of mission s being flown. It would be impossible in a book of thi s sort to research every squadro n record for Fighter Co mma nd and there a re similar accounts, and perh aps better ones, in man y of the ot her ORB s - if a reader believes ' his' squadron has been ignored I can assure him that that was not the intent ! Origins a nd doctr ine Fighter Co mma nd was form ed on 14 Jul y 1936, und er the comm and of Air Mar shal Sir Hugh Dowding, as part of a general reorganisation of the RAF, a nd headqua rtered at Bentley Priory, Middlesex. Th is reorgan isat ion saw the Met rop olitan Air Force split into thr ee operat ional Com man ds (Fig hter , Bomber and Train ing). At the time of its forma tion Fighter Co mma nd's equ ipment comprised a var iety of biplane fighters, the mos t modern of which was the Gloster Gl ad iator. As the first RA F fighter with eight machine-guns a nd an enclosed cockpit, the G ladiato r rep resent ed a major adva nce on previous types and despite its obvious limitati on s was a ble to distinguish itself during the Battle of Britain. Since the early 1930s two key issues had plagued RAF plann ers - the percentage of bomber to fighters in the overall strength of the RA F and the types of weapo ns they sho uld car ry. There had been a glimmer of hope in the early I920s, a period of doldrums for the RAF when its very existence as an independ ent service was und er
2
DEVELOPME
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
T, ROLES AND HISTORY
The Siskin lI'as one of the inter-war agile bill poorly-armed fighters equipping the RAFs fighter fo rce. Fighter doctrine and tactics IIwe developed in the latt er part of World War One. with aircraft such as the Sopwith Cam el.
question and its main 'strength' was in remote parts of the Empire such as Mesopotamia. In April 1923 the Steel-Bartholomew Committee on the Air Defence of Great Britain led to Government approval in June of a plan for a Home Defence air strength of 52 squadrons, to include 17 fighter squadrons 'with as little delay as possible'. As a percentage of the total strength the fighter element was poor - but this was the period when air strategists were con vinced that bombers were the way to win war s. In December Map of the /923 Air Def ence Plan.
When the Gladiator entered service it lI'as a major improvement on the previous biplanes but lI'as still f or from being a modern fighter, alth ough it remain ed in fro nt- line service with the RA F in the early part of the lI'ar. I II
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1925 the Government's interpretation of 'as soon as possible' changed to 'by 1935-1936. Air Marshal Sir John Salmond had taken over as Air-Officer-Command ing Air Defence of Great Britain in January that year and he had firm views on air defence, which in his view - and his experience from World War One - included searchlights and anti -aircraft guns. In this study of Fighter Command only occasional reference is made to the other elements that made up the UK' s air defence network. primarily because they were independent Comm and s. It is worth noting that the 'a ctive defence' planned for the UK. and to be in place by 1939. comprised 2.232 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 4,700 searchlights
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3
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
and 50 squadro ns of fighter aircraft . However, on the outbreak of war there were only 695 heavy and 253 light anti-aircraft guns and 2,700 searchlights. In December 1929 and agai n in May 1933 the Government slipped the programme back, the latt er revision takin g it to 1939-1 940. Thi s reluctance did not change until 1934, a year after Hitler had come to power in Germany and there was a realisation that peace in Euro pe was by no mean s a cert aint y. Th e next few years saw a change of atti tude and a series of Expansion Plan s, albeit still dominated by strategic bombin g. Th e 'bo mber first' mentality that had dominated the Expansion Plans of the early 1930s did not change unt il Scheme M, which was approved in November 1938 (after the Muni ch Crisis), with an effective date for completion of March 1942. Th is scheme envisaged 163 squad rons to be based in the UK, of which 64 were to be fighter squadro ns (14 of these being Auxiliar y Air Fo rce), each with an establishment of 16 airc raft. Th e table below presents the deta ils for the Plans put forward between 1934 and 1938.
RAF Expansion Sc hemes, t934-1938
Fighter
UEfighter
Scheme
Appro ved
Effecti ve
Squadrons
squadrons
squadron
A
18 J ul 1934 21 May 1935 25 Feb 1936 14 Jan 1937 22 Dec 1937 14 Mar 1938 27 Ap r 1938 7 Nov 1938
31 Mar 1939 31 Mar 1937 31 Mar 1939 31 Mar 1939 Summer 194 1 31 Mar 1941 31 Mar 1940 31 Mar 1942
84 123 124 145 154 145 141 163
28+5 35+5 30+5 34+9 38+9 38+9 38+9 50+ 14
12 12 14 14 14 14 16 16
C F H J K
L M
Note: Approved - Date the scheme was approved by the Cabinet; Effective - Date at which the scheme should be com plete; Squadrons - Total home-based squadrons; Fighter squadrons - Regular squadrons + auxiliary squadrons: UE fighter squadron - Aircraft establishment.
Th is was of course only a paper air force; the desire to have 64 squadrons, each with 16 aircraft - and with the requisite pilots, gro und staff, equip ment and airfields - had to be transferred into reality. Tha t mean t takin g short cuts with the aircraft types, 'form a squadro n with whatever was 10 hand and re-equip it later' and pressure to find pilots, and train them in the minimum period of time. Both of these aspects would cause the Command pro blems. Role of the Fighter Th e concept of the fighter aircraft had been born in World War One, when manoeuvrab ility was one of the key perfor mance criteria; for the Royal Flying Corps! Royal Air Fo rce, the experience with monoplanes had been an unh appy one and the war ended with small, single-seat highly-agile biplanes, armed with two 0.303 in guns, as the sta nda rd day fighter. The situation did not change over the next 20 years and the RA F's fighter squadrons conti nued to fly a range of delight ful little fighters that by the late 1920s had all but lost to uch with the realities of a future air war - but the RA F' s doctrine, tactics and training had also not changed. It was not until the ear ly 1930s that a more realistic specification for a futur e fighter was issued. However, Specification FIO/35 still enca psulated the 1930's fighter doctr ine; the following extracts illustrate the major points.
S pecification FlO/35. Requir ements for Si ngle-Engine S ingle-Se ater Day and Night Fighte r General. Th e Air Staff require a single-engine single-seater day and night fighter which can fulfil the following conditions: a. Have a speed in excess of the contemporary bomber of at least 40 mph at 15,000 ft. b. Have a number of forward firing mach ine guns that can produce the maximum hittin g power possible in the short space of time ava ilable for one attack. Performance. a. Speed. The maximum possible and not less than 310mph at 15,000 ft at maximum power with the highest possible between 5,000 and 15,000 ft. b. Climb. Th e best possible to 20,000 ft but secondary to speed and hitt ing power. c. Service ceiling. ot less than 30,000 ft is desirab le. d. Endurance. Y. hour at maximum power at sea level, plus one hour at maximum power at which engine can be run cont inuously at 15,000 ft. Thi s sho uld provide \I, hour at maximum power at which engine can be run continuously (for climb, etc), plus one hour at the most economica l speed at 15,000 ft (for patrol), plus Y. hour at maximum power at 15,000 ft (for atta ck). Armament. Not less than 6 guns, but 8 guns are desirable . T hese should be located outside the airscrew disc. Reloading in the air is not required and the guns should be fired by electrical or mean s other than Bowden wire. It is contemplated that some or all of these guns should be mounted to permit a degree of elevat ion and traverse with some for m of control fro m the pilot's seat. Ammunition. 300 rounds per gun if 8 guns are pro vided and 400 rounds per gun if only 6 guns are installed. View. a. The upper hemisphere must be so far as possible unobstructed to the view of the pilot to facilitate search and attack . A good view for formation flying is required. b. A field of view of about 10 degrees downward s from the horizont al line of sight over the nose is requ ired for locat ing the tar get. Handling. a. A high degree of man oeuvrabilit y at high speeds is not required but good control at low speeds is essential. b. The aircraft must be a steady firing platform . It is interesting to look at how the fighter requirement had changed during the 1930s as this explains the developmen t of both the aircra ft's cap abilit ies and the tactical doctrine. During the 1930s the basic concepts were still tho se that had been developed in the latter years of World War One; with no significant combat experience in the 1920s
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
and in the absence of conflict (and funding) no appreciable development of techn ology or tactics this was not really surprising. The main fighter specification that eventu ally led to the new generation of fighter s was F7/30 for a 'Single-Seater Da y and Night Fighter.' Thi s Specificati on was dated Oct ober 1931 and the General Requirements paragraph included sta tements such as 'a satisfactory fighting view is essenti al and designers sho uld consider the ad vantages offered in this respect by the low-wing mon oplan e o r pusher. The main requirements for the aircraft are : a. b. c. d. e.
Highest possible rat e of climb. Highest possible speed at 15,000 ft. Fighting view. Capability of easy and rapid production in quantity. Ease of maintenance.
This was a lengthy document and am ongst the key provi sion s was that the 'a ircraft must have a high degree of man oeu vrability.' By the time ofFI0/35 this requirement had been toned down as being ' not required '. The aircraft was to have provision for four 0.303 in Vickers guns and a total of 2,000 rounds of ammunition, with a minimum suppl y of 400 rounds per gun, as well as being able to carry four 20lb bombs. It sta ted that two of the guns were to be in the cockpit, with interrupter gear if required, and the other two in cockpit or wing. There was no requiremen t for an enclosed cockpit and the pilot's view was a prime concern: ' the pilot 's view is to conform as closely as po ssible to that obtainable in 'pusher' aircraft .' Virtually all of these requirements could be said to a pply to an aircraft that suited the latter part of World War One , such as the Sopwith Camel or Bristol Fighter but with (slightly) improved performance. If the manufacturers had followed these requirements to the letter then the Spitfire and Hurricane might never ha ve been born . In term s of overall air doctrine the emphasis was on the bomber - the 'wa r-winning' weapon that will always get th rough no matter what the defenders try and do, but it was not until the mid 1930s that a fighter specification add ressed the problem of shoo ting down these 'wa r winners'. Whilst the basic pro vision s of F7/30 could be said to describe an agile, man oeuvrable fighter, th ose of F5/34 (da ted 16 November 1934) tipped the balance to what is best described as a bomber destroyer. Th e intr oduction to this specificati on sta ted that : 'the speed excess of a modern fighter over that of a co ntempo rary bomber has so reduced the chance of repeated attacks by the same fighters(s) th at it becomes essential to obtain decisive results in the short space of time offered for one attack only . Thi s No t only the aircraft but also the tactics remained out-of-date ill/a the 1930s; Hawker Demons of 23 Squadron; the Squadr on did 1I0t re-equip f rom Demons until December 1938.
Hurricane prototyp e K5083 flew ill November 1935 - the modern age had arrived and 600 had alread y been ordered 'off the drawing board'.
specification is issued to govern the production of a day fighter in which speed in overta king the enemy at 15,000 ft, combined with rapid climb to this height , is of primary import ance . In conjunction with this performance the maximum hitting power must be aimed at, and 8 machine guns are con sidered adv isable.' No menti on here of man oeu vrability; what is needed is to catch the enemy (bomber) and hit him hard in a single atta ck. All of this was encap sulated in FI0/35 but with the added provision s under ' Ha ndling' that emphasised the requirement for the fighter to be 'a steady gun platform ' in which a 'high degree of man oeuvrabilit y at high speeds is not required.' Of course, the British were not alone in th is fighter theory and in Germany the Bf 110 came from a similar bomber-destroyer requ irement. The latter proved a disaster in day fighting and if the RAF's new da y fighter had been of a similar ilk then the Battle of Britain would have been sho rt-lived - and lost. Rather than entering the ann als as one of the great fighters, a Spitfire to this requirement would have followed the Defiant into the records as a glorio us failure (as a da y fighter). From its first flight on 6 November 1935 the Hawker Hurricane showed every indication of being a winne r; tru e it did not have the agility, a nd some would argue bea uty, of the older biplanes bu t it look ed the part of a modern fighter - and it had eight guns. An order for 600 was promptly placed and two yea rs later the first Hurricane s entered squadron service, going to III Squ adron at ortholt to replace G auntlets; by summer 1939 the number of sq uadrons had increased to 12 and the Hurricane was the mos t significant fighter in the Order o f Battle. By th at time it had been joined by the Supermarin e Spitfire , which had first flown five months after the Hurricane but had been slightly slower in production development , the first machines not joining 19 Squ adron at Duxford until August 1938. The Spitfire too was an immedi ate hit with those who saw it and cert ainly with th ose who flew it; true , both types had teeth ing troubles and both were lacking wha t would soon be con sidered as essent ial operational equipment, but they were nevertheless an indication of massive progress. Two other aircraft types entered service with the Command in respon se to doctrine that called for a 'turret fighter ', as a bomber-destroyer, and long-range fighter. It must be remembered too that at this time the threat was perceived as bombers from Germ any bombers th at would have to fly such a dist ance that single-sea t fighter escort was not an option. The Boulton Paul Defian t was the turret fighter with its four Brownings in a rear;
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6 - 19 6 8
DEVELOPMENT. ROLES AND HISTORY
bomber. wou ld fly straight and level while the fighters que ued up to att ack it! The three main attacks. as directed in 1938. were: No. 1 Att ack was a succession of single aircraft attacking a single bomber from astern. with Sections stepped down in line astern behind the target. The Section Leader opens fire at 400 yards and maintains his fire on the target at this range until he decides to break away. with the procedure then followed by his umber 2 and umber 3. o. 2 Attack was pretty much the same except that the Sections were not stepped down but fanned o ut to rear and flanks of the bomber. o. 3 Attack was an attack by a vic Section of 3 against a vic of three bombers. with the normal plan being for two Sections ab reast to engage two groups of bombers. one Section breaking left after completing the attack and the othe r breaking right.
The Spitfire prototype flew in early 1936 but did not enter squadron service until August 1938 - only a year before the war.
the pro tot ype flew in August 1937 and the type entered service with 264 Squadron in December 1939. by which time the concept was already being questioned. The Bristol Blenheim was the long-range fighter and sta rtled the RAF when it flew in 1936. as this privat e venture for a bomber had far better perfo rma nce tha n any of the fighters in service. Fighter Command was d uly impressed and an order for 150 Blenheim fighters was placed. the main role being long-range bom ber-destroyer. for which a forward-fi ring four-gun armament pack was added. Hawkinge-based 25 Squadro n was first to equip with the Blenheim IF day fighter. December 1938. Despite the arrival of new aircraft . the basic tactics remained uncha nged and in 1938 doct rine was still based on a limited number of well-rehearsed - but unproven - Fighter Command Attacks. which seemed to be based on the premise that the target. a lumbe ring Blenheim of 600 Squadron at Manston mid 1940; the Blenheim entered service with Fighter Command as a long-range fig hter - in which role it would hare been a disaster.
There were numero us other set att acks for single-engine and turret fighters but these three encapsulate a number of the major problems the fighters were to encounter when the shooting war sta rted. Firstly. the determination that 400 yards was the optimum range to open fire and that the fighter sho uld maintain this range until out of ammunition (or shot down). Whilst there was some varia tion on this directive. they still involved an erro r of appreciation of the real optimum harmonisation and engagement range . Secondl y. the rigid nature of the tactics was totally unsuited to the fluid nature of 'modern' air combat. These lessons were soon to be learnt. War almost came in autumn 1938 with the so-called Mu nich Crisis; if it had done so then it would have foun d Fighter Com mand in a parlous state in terms of airc raft and its Control and Reporting (C&R) organisation. The Comman d needed the extra year that came following Prime Minister eville Chamberlain's meeting with Ado lf Hitler and the Catterick March 1940. Blenheim 219 Squadron; although the Blenheims saw some service as day fig hters it was in the night role that they became an important element of Fighter Command.
9
10
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
now infamous 'peace in our time' agreeme nt. During that year more modern fighters entered service and their pilots gained experience , the C&R organisa tion grew in size and experience and the airfield building programme sta rted in earnest. Control and Repor ting - and integrated defence There is one line in the 1965 ' Battle of Britain' film where Dowding is asked if he is 'trusting in radar and praying to Go d' , to which he replied that he was 'trusting in Go d and praying for rada r' . It is a well-esta blished part of the Battle of Britain story that radar was the secret weapo n that saved the day. How tru e is this? Th e early 1930's British Air Defence Plan was based upon that employed during the First World War and comprised an Aircraft Fighting Zone 15 miles wide and 150 miles long, from Duxfor d and aro und London to Devizes in Wiltshire. Th is was divided into ten sections, each 15 miles wide and with one or more dedicated day fighter sq uadro ns, with associated searc hlights and anti-aircraft guns. Th ere was an additional ring of searchlights and guns aro und Lond on . Th e Aircraft Zone was positioned 35 miles from the coas t, a distance based upon the time it would ta ke the fighter to climb to 14,000 ft. Initial detection of raiders depended upon visual sighting by the Observer Co rps, plus a limited numb er of 'acoustic mirror devices'. Each HQ received informatio n from the observation units and displayed raids on a plottin g table, thus allowing the overall picture of the air situation to be seen by the contro ller. However, it was not until new radios, such as the TR .9, were intro d uced in 1932 that reasonable gro und-to air radio communicatio n, as opposed to wrr, was possible; even then the effective range was I only 35 miles. The weak link remained that of detection - it was a big sky so how did you find the enemy? If the enemy could not be accura tely located, it was almost impossible to effect an interception. This was borne out in the July 1934 annual air exercise, when at least half of the day bomber forma tions reached their targets without being intercepted by fighters. If the fighters could not find bomber forma tions in good weather by day, wha t cha nce would they have at night? ot that this was of any concern at the time. The radar stations around The coast were a vita! element in Fight er Command's COII/ro! and Reporting network.
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
At the first meeting of the Co mmittee for Scientific Survey of Air Defence, in Ja nua ry 1935, the problems highlighted by the previous yea r's exercise were discussed, as were the prospects of any scientific break-thro ugh that might provide an answer. Th e Committee members consulted Robert Watson-Watt , head of the radio research branch of the atio na l Physical Lab orat ory, as to the feasibility of using radio waves. A mon th later he presented his tho ughts on how to use such rad io waves to detect aircraft , the principle being to 'bou nce' the waves off the aircraft and pick up the echo. Within a matter of weeks an experiment had been arra nged using the BBC' s transmitter at Daventry. Th e idea was for an aircraft to fly thro ugh the centre of the tran smittin g beam while Watson-W att and his colleagues attempted to detect its presence on a cathoderay oscillogra ph. It worked as planned, the passage of the aircraft causing a blip on the equipment. All that was needed now was high-level support for development of the technique, and that came from Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, the Air Member for Research and Developm ent. The rad io research station at Orford ness became the experimental site for the development of RD F (the name was not changed to rad ar until 1941), and throughout the summer a numb er of trials were conducted. Trackin g ranges of 40 miles were soon being achieved, and it was obvious that here was the solution to the problem; all that was needed was time to develop and introduce the equipment, and integrate it into the Fighter Co mmand system. In September 1935 the Air Defence Sub-Committee acquired Treasury fundin g for a chain of RDF sta tions along the east coas t; a remarkable achievement so earl y in the development of the technique. The next three years saw a number of technical developments of the eq uipment, many individuals making invaluable contributions to the work, so that by mid-1938 the completed statio ns were functioning reasonably well Since the initial proving of the RDF principle in 1936, progress had been fairly rap id, although many problems still remained. By mid- 1937 thr ee stat ions were in operation, at Bawdsey, Canewdo n and Dover, along with an experimental filter station at Bawdsey. Th e developm ent of the last of these added a new dimension to the system by providing, as the term implied, a filtering of the mass of inform ation from the various so urces so that the cont rollers could be provided with a simpler, more accura te air picture on which to base their operat ions. Th e earlier problem of track discrimination had virtually been solved, but height prediction remained a significant problem . The system's first major test came in the 1938 Home Defence exercises, and in general terms it appeared to work well, some 75% of atte mpted interceptions (day and night) proving successful. New RD F stations (codenamed Cha in Home - CH, and Cha in Home Low - CH L) were constructed in a plan to create unbro ken coverage aro und the east and southern coasts of Britain . At the same time an extensive programm e for the const ruction of Comma nd, G roup and Sector operations roo ms was under way. The enemy could now be located by day or night; radar made no real distinction between the two. Defendin g fighters could be positioned so that by day they could acquire the bombers visually, but what about the night situatio n? Would the fighter be able to pick up its tar gets? Among his early prop osals, Wat son-Watt had included tho ughts on an air borne version of RD F to prevent reliance on searchlights or good visibility. However, becau se priority was given to the gro und stations, little work was carried out on developi ng equipment sma ll eno ugh to be carried by aircraft. June 1937 saw an experiment whereby the 'fighter' had a receiver that could pick up the transmissions (and echoes) of the CH sta tions. The principle appeared to work, but it was not a satisfacto ry solution and was aba ndo ned. Not until late that year was Airborn e
II
12
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Barrage ) Group within Fighter Command. With extension of the balloon barr age concept to other cities and important installati ons, three further G roup s were formed and brought under the control of Balloon Command. By the outbreak of war there were 624 balloons flying over the UK. The main aims of the balloon barrage were: I. Strengthen public morale. 2. Make att acking aircraft fly too high for accurate bomb ing and prevent a long run in to the target. The London Balloon Barrage ...as established in / 937 and the system II'OS rapidly ex tended 10 other key cities, ports and industrial installations; the Barrage Balloons, many of ...hich lI'ere 'manned' by WAAFs ...ere another important part of the air defence net...ork.
Fighter Ops room ...ith WAAF plott ers; ...hilst the fig hters ...ere the 'sharp end', it lI'as the ,..hole Control and Reporting system that made the air def ence effec tive.
Intercept (AI) equipment developed , using the technique of lobe switching to deter mine the azimuth of the target. Alth ough this worked , there were still probl ems to be overcome, mostly concerning the receiver part of the system, and it was mid-1939 before a successful airborne installation was under trial. By September 1939 twenty CH (Chain Home) stat ions were operational with detection ranges in excess of 100 miles, The additiona l system of CHL (Chain Home Low) was also well underway, A post-war Fighter Command report summarised the import ance of the nonaircraft elements: 'how valuable this system was to be, was proved in the Battl e of Britain, for without its help the courage and determin ation of the pilots and the devotion and hard work of the ground staff would have been to little avail. This system of radar allied with the reports by sight and sound of the Royal (from 1941 ) Observer Corp s developed rapidl y through the war.' It is also import ant to realise that radar was only one of the elements that made up the integrated defence network , which comprised a Reporting, cont rol and command chain , balloon barrages, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns, It was the combin ation of warn ing systems, including the Observer Corp s and grou nd intelligence, as well as radar. analysed by Filter Rooms and then acted upon by Sector Controllers that made the system successful and reasonably rob ust against attack. Another key factor was integration of command, with Dowding controlling the Observer Corp s, Balloon Command (from its format ion in ovember 1938) and units of Anti-Airc raft Command. The London Balloon Barrage was estab lished in 1937 and within a year had four Balloon Centre s and ten Balloon Squadrons under the command of No . 30 (Balloon
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
This total had increased by September 1940 and balloon barrages were flying over most key cities and installa tions. Shooting down runaway balloons became a routine task for Fighter Co mmand. Th e elements of an integrated but still unproven system of high-perform ance fighters with RDF direction and gro und cont rol were in place. The ultimate test was not long in coming. Outbreak of War In the last week of August 1939 the Auxiliary Air Fo rce squa drons had been embodied into the RA F - in other words they were called up to full-time service - and the role these VR (Volunteer Reserve) pilots were to play in the first years of the war was of great import ance. Fighter Command statistics for 4 September 1939 show 39 squadro ns of fighters, comprising: 30 single-engine squadro ns with 570 aircraft and 659 pilots 7 twin-engine sq uadro ns with 131 aircraft and 107 crews 2 squadro ns with Gauntlet/H ind. The aircra ft numbers relate to serviceable aircraft and not establishment and the pilot figures relate to 'available ' pilots; what is inter esting, especially in the light of subsequent events, is the pilot/crew to aircraft ratio. With only 89 'spare' pilots for the single-engine fighters the Command was ill-equipped to cope with expan sion or losses and with more aircraft than crews for the twin-engined types the position was even more desperate . The Auxiliary Air Force supplied a cad re of trained and motivated pilots who provided a majo r boost to the RAF's front-line capa bility. On 13 August 1939, the Spitfires of 6 11 Squad ron arri ved at Duxford for their annual training camp and it On 13 August 1939. the Spirjire.s of 611 Squadron arri ved at Duxford fo r their annual training camp and tt was here. their designat ed lrar sta tion. that they received notification on 26 A ugust of their call-up.
DEVE OPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
was here, their designated war station, that they received notification, on 26 August of their call-up. The Squad ron had 13 Spitfires available from a not ional establishment of 21 aircraft (16 IE [Initial Establishment] plus five CR [Command Reserve] aircraft); pilot esta blishment was eleven officers and ten airmen, with two officers and 140 airmen making up the gro undcrew com pone nt. Despite being a well-established station, Duxfo rd was short of accommoda tion and the airmen of 611 Squad ron had to live in tents, although in October they moved into newly-completed brick H-type barrack blocks. At this time. Fighter Comm and had three operatio nal groups - o. II Group (HQ Uxbridge) covering the South of England and the South Midlands , o. 12 Group (HQ Hucknall ) covering the North Midlands, W England and orth Wales, and No. 13 Group (HQ NewcastIe-upon-Tyne) covering NE England, Scotland and the Ork ney and Shetland Island s. The defensive organisation was oriented to counter the perceived thr eat posed by long-range bombers from Germ any, which would not be escorte d by single-engine fighters as these did not have the range. Squadron equipment remained a focus of concern during the first month s of the war. Although the focus was on gettin g as many Hurri cane s and Spitfires into service as qu ickly as possible it was still policy to form sq uadro ns with whatever equipment was ava ilable; for example, 263 Squadron formed at Filton in October 1939 with the Gloster Gladiato r, a type with which they were to achieve a measure of fame in spring 1940 over orway . The Squadron diari st was one of tho se who recorded useful snippets for later historia ns: 14
ovember 1939: 'The Squad ron re-equipped with Browning 303 on all aircraft; these are a great asset to the unit.' 25 ovember 1939: 'Owing to the outstanding success and capabilities of the Squad ron they have been o rdered to take-over the air safety of the western part of England . The y are the only squad ron detailed for this area . which speaks very highly of its sta nda rd considering that it was formed seven weeks ago and 18 of the pilots were straight from Flying Trainin g Schools.' Is this sarcasm or genuine pride? 22 January 1940: Summary of a report on gun harm onisation and air firing: 'Th e experiments conducted have shown concl usively that guns installed in Glad iat or aircraft have not the spread of bullets that have been previously calculated , and it is estimated that gun spread is approximately one foot per 100 yards up to a range of 300 yards. It is understood that experiments were conducted by the Air Fighting Development Unit in determ ining bullet spread by mean s of photograph ing tracer ammunition. It is suggested for consideration that the trajectory of tracer amm unit ion is not so accurat e as ball ammunition.• The interesting point s from these extracts are the fact that the Gladiator was still a front-line fighter - and that its arma ment was still not operationally fit - and that the Command was stretched thin and only able to pro vide a single squadron of biplane fighters to cover a large geographi c area . Th e situation would only slowly impro ve over the next few mon ths - imagine how it would have been if the war had sta rted with the Munich Crisis in late 1938.
15
16
DEVELOPMENT,
F IG H T E R COMMAND 1936-1968
Spitfire K9987 of66 Squadron, the Squadron had re-equipped with Spits ill October 1938 at Duxford.
In February 1940 a memo was issued stati ng the 'decision to rearm nine fighter squa drons from Blenheims, in the following orde r of priority: with Hurricanes (601, 229,245, 145 squadro ns), with Spitfires (64,222,92, 234 squadro ns) and with Defiants (141 squadron). This is to be complete as near to 31 March 1940 as possible.' (Sa M 109/40 dated 13 Feb 1940). Fra nce and Dunkirk Under the terms of the alliance with the French an expeditionary force was despatched to France, and this included an air element; the Fighter Command contribution being six Hurricane squad rons, altho ugh this was later raised to ten. On 7 July 1939 Dowding wrote to the Air Ministry complaining at this massive reduction in his fighter force, with ten squadrons equalling a sizeable chun k of his force. War came on 3 September 1939 and the Comm and du ly sent the first four Hur ricane squadro ns (I, 73, 85, and 87) to France. In Fra nce there was little to do except carry on training, patrol up and down the border and take in a spot of French culture, as well as attempt to co-operat e with their Allies. The first success came on 2 ovember but for Dowding the downside was the call for two more squadro ns that same month , altho ugh the Gladiat or-equipped 607 and 615 squadro ns were sent, bot h moving to Merville on 15 ovember - and both eventually re-equipping in France with Hurri canes (spring 1940). The so-called ' Phoney War ' tha t lasted for six months ended with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in Apr il 1940, the rapid success of which was followed by the Blitzkrieg attac k on France via the Low Coun tries on 10 May 1940. Fighter Comma nd's involvement in the Scan dinavian cam paign had been the commitment of two squadrons, 46 and 263 to the Narvik region of orway; the heroics of Glad iator operat ions from frozen lakes and the tragic loss of pilots with the sinking of HMS Glorious are covered in the Oper ations chapter. From the perspective of the Fighter Command story the French experience is of more interest as it revealed both the good and the bad about aircraft, pilots and tactics.
OLES AND HISTORY
Hurricane of 73 Squadron being rearmed ill France; the dispatch ~f Hurric~/e squadrons 10 France lI'as a mixed blessing - it pro ..ided ..ital operational expenence bill 11 also cost a large num ber of aircraf t.
In the meantime , with the beginning of the campaign agai nst Holland , Belgium and France on the 10 May 1940, the L uf twaf f e became involved in a new sen es of attacks. The objects of these attacks, based on previous battle experience were: I. The destruction of the enemy's Air Fo rces and their sources of supply. 2. Indirect and direct support of the Army. 3. Attac ks on enemy harb ours and shipping.
These tasks were entrusted to Luftfiouen 2 and 3. Out of a streng th of 5:142 aircraft, the Luftwaffe had 3,824 serviceable aircraft availab le at tha~ urne, (Out of an average of 3,824 serviceable aircraft there were 591 reconnaI ssance aircraft, 1,1 20 bombers, 342 Stukas, 42 ground attack aircraft, 248 T. E. fighte.rs. 1,016 S.E. fighters, 401 tra nsport aircraft and 154 seaplanes) . Compar~d WIth this, the Allies (including the Belgian and Dutch-Air Forces) had 6,000 alrcr~ft, of which 3,000 were at contin ental bases. Right at the outset of the campaign the full weight of the German air offensive simultaneously hammered the ground organisations of the etherl ands , Belgium and No rthern Fra?~e. Th.e Dutch and Belgian Air Forces were destroyed and the Franco -British Air Forces were hard hit and forced to use bases in the rear. (Survey by 8th Abteilung September 1944) In addition to the units operating from France , the Command .sent dail.y reinforcemen ts that went out and returned to their home base at dusk. Typical of this effort was that by 253 Squadron, which had only been declared operational on .27 Apnl. The six aircraft of' B Flight' went to Fra nce on 16 May, with 'A Flight' and a Fhg~t fr~m I II Squadron forming a composite squadron the following day at Kenley. Their bnef was to move to Poix, patrol from there and return to Kenly at dusk . Over the next two
17
18
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPME
T, ROLES AND HISTO Y
Hurricane L1831 of 87 Squadron; the Squadron moved to France the day after the declaration of war and remained there until 22 May 1940 when the remnants arrived at Debden.
days the Squadron lost six aircraft, although all four pilots 'lost' on 18 May subsequently returned. On 16 May Dowding had sent a letter to the Under Secretary of State for Air expressing in unequivocal terms the dangers posed to the defence of the UK by the drain of fighters to France. This letter has been seen as one of the most significant in RAF history as it - may - have influenced Churchill , who saw it, to moderate his response to the endless calls for more aircraft from the French . The letter is shown in full at Annex A. Engagements with fighters and bombers, attempts to support Allied bombers, the effective German flak, all provided a series of lessons for commanders and pilots. Some of the pre-war breed stuck rigidly to the rules and tactics that had been drummed into them, others started to recognise that they were being outclassed, out-gunned and out numbered. Furthermore, it was discovered that the standard harmonisation on the guns of 400 yards was no good against the fighters and that 250 yards 'achieved far more lethal results'. But every lesson learned cost a few more aircraft and pilots, some caught on quicker than others, those that didn't usually were not around for very long. The Hurricanes certainly gave a good account of themselves and the Luftwaffe crews grew to respect the tenacity and skill of their latest opponents. Many of the RAF pilots involved believed that a few more squadrons would make all the difference and why didn 't ' they' send across more of the chaps - even a few Spitfires. This, however. was total anathema to Dowding who. by the middle of May. was fighting against a French request for ten more squadrons . .. 'the Hurricane tap is now full on and you will not be able to resist the pressure to send Hurricanes to France until I have been bled white .. .' he said. The period from 16 to 26 May saw ever more Fighter Command squadrons being dragged into the conflict in France. but on a rotational basis of up to three squadrons a day - a useful way to broaden the experience level, but unfortunately each squadron seemed to have to learn the lessons for itself and so the same mistakes and losses occurred .
Armourer work ing on the Brownings in a Hurricane Iring; standard armament of the Hurricane and Spitfire lI'as eight 0.303in Colt Browning machine-guns. four in each wing.
19
20
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Squadrons had begun to move back to the UK as ear ly as the 19 May but not until the French request for an Armistice on 17 June did the last ones leave. In the meantime the ' Battle' of Dunkirk had been fought - over a period of nine days the evacuation of Allied troops had been carrie d out in the face of intense air attack. Despite popular belief amongst the troops waiting on the beaches, the RA F were present and trying to hold off the waves of attacking German bombers. With an average of 300 sorties a day from the UK it was a great strain on Fighter Command and yet another source of concern for Dowding as just over 100 Spitfires and Hurricanes were lost - alo ng with another slice of experienced pre-war trained pilots . Th e net result of the campaign in Fra nce was loss of almost 1,000 aircraft , roug hly ha lf of which were fighters; it is now genera lly agreed that the period 10 May to 3 J une (the end of Dunkirk) cost 432 fighters , plus the losses over Dunkirk. On 4 Ju ne Dowding sent a short message to squadrons that had been involved in the fighting over France: lHy Dear Fighter Boys. I don 't send out many congratulatory lett ers and signals, but I f eel that I must take this occasion, when the intensive fighting in Northern France is for the lim e being Ol'ef, to tell yOIl how proud I am ofyOIl and the lI'ay in which yOIl havefo ught since the 'Blitzkrieg ' started. I wish I could have spent m), time visiting .1'011 and hearing YOllr accounts of the fi ghting, but I have occupied myselfin work ing fo r .1'011 in oth er .mys. l want .1'011 to kn oll' that m), thoughts are always with .1'011, and that it is .1'0 11 and )'ollr fighting spirit which lI'iII crack the morale of the German Air Force. and preserve our Country through the trials which ye t lie ahead. Good luck to )'011.
The RAF fighters could have taken some comfort from a later German assessment : 'Of all the enemy air forces ope rating in 1940, the British Air Force was the most formidable in battle. Encounters of German units with British Spitfire and Hurricane formations during the Western campaign, and above all along the Channel at the time of the British retreat to Dunkirk, had been the hardest so far. In supporting the BEF, and also their French Ally in France , the British had brought only parts of their Royal Air Force into operation.' (Lecture by Hptm. Otto Bechtle at Belin-Gatow, dated 2 February 1944, hereafter simply listed as Bechtle). How much of this was a true realisation of the new enemy and how much was a look-back from 1944 is of course debatable. The Germ an occupation of Norwa y, the Low Countries and France gave Fighter Command an increased front age to defend as the Luftwaffe now had add itional bases over a wider geographic area. Consequently the Comm and's existing o rganisation had to be modified to prov ide additional cover for the North-East and South -West of England to ' re-dispose and strengthen the country's defences as a matter of paramount import ance.' The AHB summary of this critical period continued 'the Fighter Command organisation was extended with the intenti on of protecting the West and South-West of England , and the number of sq uad rons in the Command was increased as quick ly as aircraft, pilots and ground facilities became available. G reater effort s were made to hurry the moment when No. 14 Group in the North of Scotland could assume an operational role, the area of No. 10 Group was extended as quickl y as possible to include Cornwall and No. 9 Group was formed to cover the West.' No. 10 Group had been formed on 31 Ma y 1940, becoming effective on 13 July. The Group HQ was at Rudl oe Man or , Wiltshire and most accommodation was in tent s pending the construction of hut s.
Northolt's camouflaged hangars with a Hurricane of 253 Squadron, spring 1940; the Squadron only received its Hurricanes in February.
No.9 Group formed on 9 August at Barton hall, Preston, when it became apparent that the geographic area assigned to No. 12 Group was too unwieldy, but did not assume operational control until I December. The final operational Group to form was No . 14 Group, which was announced in June 1940 to form at Inverness by I August , although it was actually 25 Augu st before Hornchurch Allgllst 1940. Defiant of 264 Squadron; the Defiant was the RAF' s 'turretfig hter', a concept intended as a bomber-destroyer when no fig hter opposition lI'as expected.
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DEVELOPME
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
the HQ was in place at Drummossie Hotel, Inverness. On I Sept ember the Group too k opera tio nal contro l of Castletown and Skeabrae as well as the Sector Stati on at Wick and Sector HQ at Dyce. ' But the orga nisatio n necessa ry for the exploitation of fighter defences takes time to prepare. Meanwhile, all defensive opera tions were carried out by the four fight er gro ups already esta blished.' The need for additional airfields - not to ment ion aircraft and pilot s - put a severe strain on the already limited resources.
Sq uadro n strength, 28 ;\ Ia)' 19-10 Operational sqns
Spitfire Hurricane Gladiator De fiant
Blenheim Totals
Sqns
IE
Streng th
19 19 1 1 6 46
3M 306 16 16 96 738
351 315 13 21 11 9 819
NO/ ~
Sq ns
IE
Str ength
Total
Sqns
IE
Str ength
352 400 16 32 154 954
396 334 13 37 154 934
3 6
48 96
45 59
22 25
I
16 32 192
16 35 155
2 8 58
I
2 12
Pilot strength UK
Aircraft strength in UK
Op sqns Non-op sqns Tot al
Non-operational sqns
IE
Strength
656 192 848
647 132 779
Pilot establishment UK Pi10l strength UK
1,268 932
Establishment based o n 25 pilots per squadron and 16 aircraft per squadron .
On 16 Jun e 1940 Fighter Co mman d strength was 549 aircraft immediately availa ble for opera tions, which comprised 260 Spitfires, 182 Hurricanes. 88 B1enheims and 19 Defiants. Th is was a significant decrease fro m the 730 that had been serviceable and ava ilable on 28 May a nd was an ind ica tion of the losses suffered in the France/Du nkirk operatio ns. A new type, the Westland Whirlwind, entered service with the Command in early Jul y bu t it was man y months before the type was opera tional. Th e forth com ing day light air battles for contro l of the skies over the Channel and Sout hern England wou ld primarily be fou ght by the Hurricane a nd Spitfire squadro ns in the No. II Gr oup area, a nd as Wellington said after the Battl e of Waterloo in 1815 it was 'a close run thin g'. When the Germ an switched their bomber effort to night bomb ing the RAF faced a second major challenge. Th e last six months of 1940 were amo ngst the most dramati c in history. In the words of that overused statement - ' the Battl e of France is over, the Battl e of Britain is abo ut to begin.' T he Battle of Britain In Jul y 1940 the Germans estima ted that Fighter Command strength stoo d at 50 squad rons equipped with 900 fighter s, of which 675 were serviceable - 40% of these being Spitfires and the rest Hurricanes, T his intelligence assessment was remarkably accurate, as on 10 Jul y the Comm and 's sta tistics were 54 squadro ns eq uipped with 864 aircraft, of which 656 were serviceable , a good recovery from the low point of the previou s month.
T, ROLES AND HISTORY
The percent ages of types was in error as Spitfires made up 35% of the tot al, Hurricanes 50% and the remainder comprised Blenheims and Defiant s, both types having been ignored in the German assessment. Th e impo rtance of the Germ an figures is their use by the Germans to assess the strength of Fighter Command in the light of Luftwaffe claims after each da y's combat. By combining this with an assessment of British fighter prod uction cap acity the planners could a rrive a t an opera tional ava ilability figure and thus work out the combat effectiveness of Fighter Com ma nd. However, as we shall see, it did no t work quite as simply as that ! The Initial Establ ishment (IE ) of a fighter sq uadro n at this period was 16 aircraft; this was the establishment to which the squad ron was entitled and at which it was supposed to be maint ained . However , the reality was often different and actu al strength, rat her than establi shment , could vary from 12 to 20, whilst the number of servicea ble aircra ft was even more variable. It is interesting to note that of the 54 Fighter Comm and squadro ns, 43 were equ ipped with Hurri canes (25) or Spitfires (18) in early Jul y, which would give a notion al IE of 688 aircraft. Ho wever, sta nda rd tactics involved a 12-aircraft forma tion, so in theory only 516 of th is 688 would be airbo rne for a full-strength sho w. An organ isati ona l memo dated II July outlined a temporary increa se in unit esta blishments: 'add four Hurricane s to IE of 30 squadro ns and four Spitfires to six squadro ns. Addi tional pilots will not be pro vided as the aircraft in question are to be regarded as an emergency force. Thi s is a temporary measure and aircraft will be withd rawn and formed into squad rons later' (SOM 655/40). The dates for the Batt le of Britain a re usually accepted as 10 July to 31 October 1940, a nd during these 15 weeks the course of the war took a major turn, with the Germa ns postp oning their plan s to invade the British Isles. As the Batt le inten sified a few hundred RA F fighters opera ting fro m 20 or so airfields in SE England were pitted agai nst a n air a rmada that had previou sly been unbeaten . The morale of the Lu ftw affe, boos ted by easy victo ries over Poland a nd France, was high, some might even say Pilots of 603 Squadron at rest; 1II0St personal accounts of the Bou le of Britain talk of long periods of doing nothing - sleeping. play ing cards. writing a diary and generally enj oying the hot summer of 1940.
23
24
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 verging on arrogance - certainly mo st of the German pilots believed that the RAF would soon be destroyed . On 16 July Hitler issued Directive o. 16, Operation Sealion, the invasion of England which came with the pr oviso that 'the British Air Force mu st be elimin ated to such an exten t that it will be inca pa ble of putting up any sustained oppos itio n to the invading troops. ' After a lmo st a year of war, the RAF was a very different organisation to that of September 1939, more fighter squad ro ns with modern aircraft (Spitfires and Hurricanes), but its control system, using rad ar and Sect or HQs, had yet to be put to the test. The Battle of Britain is usually split into four phases: - Earl y July to 12 August, attacks on coastal shipping and install at ion s, plu s limited attacks on radar sta tions and airfields. II - 13 August to 6 September, attack s on airfields and associated installation s. III - 7 September to late Sept ember, initial attacks on London . IV - Late September to 31 October, da ylight fighter sweep s and fighter-bomber raids, increased weight of night bombing on London . At this stage, the tactical advantage lay very much with the Germans as the Luftwaffe could choose the time, place a nd size of any attack. It was able, on paper, to mass overwhelming force at anyone point whilst mai ntain ing a threat to other areas that would prevent any attempt by the RA F to concentrate its force s. The German bomber force was capable of reaching over the entire UK land area and surrounding waters, a massive geographic are a for the defenders to cover. It was, of course, realised by both sides that the decisi ve conflict wou ld have to take place in SE England but the ability to stretch and weaken the British fighter force was a significant tact ical ca rd to pla y. The fact th at the Luftwaffe failed to take full ad vantage of this was, as we shall see, one of the main fact ors in the failure of the German ai r campaign.
Spitfire R6597 of 152 Squadron 1940; during the Battle of Britain the Squadron claimed 61 victoriesfor the loss of20 Spitfires.
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY Th e relative strength of the two air force s at the outbreak of the Battle ha s been a source of debate. An RA F estimate of GAF strength gave the following breakdown: Long-range bombers Dive-bombers Single-engine fighters Tw in-engine fighters Long-range reconnaissance Short-range reconnaissance
1.200 280+ 760 220 50 90
In addition to the se numbers for France a nd the Low Countries, were 190 aircraft orway ( 130 long-range bombers, 30 twin-engine fighters and 30 long-range in reco nnaissa nce types). Together this gave a total of 2,790 combat a ircra ft and it was estima ted that the bomber force had 69% serviceability whilst the fighter force had an impressive 95% serviceability. German records (fro m VI Abteilung] show that the estima tes were reasonably accurate in terms of the total but that the breakdown was in er ro r: Bombers Stukas Single-engine fighters Twin-engine fighters
981 336 839 282
These figures a re for serviceable ai rcraft. With its superiority of numbers, tactical disposition and greater experience: The Command hoped that it would not require more than fo ur days to smash the enemy fig hter def ences in South ern England. Once this goal was reached, the offensive I\'as to be extended northwards , secto r by sector across the line King 's Lynn to Leicest er until aI/ England was covered by dayattack. At the beginning of the daylight attack , the pr inciple of giving bomber forma tions the minimum necessary fighter escort so as to leave the maj ority offig hters f ree to pursue their real task of destr oy ing the enemy in open comba t was generally accepted. (Bechtle) On 8 Jul y 1940 the first maj or air battle took place when Fighter Command scra mbled five squad ro ns to intercept a large enem y force a tta cking a con voy: the fight eventually invo lved over 100 aircraft. Co nvoy attacks of thi s type , vary ing in intensity an d so metimes limited to sma ll numbers of unescorted raide rs using cloud cover, was the pa tte rn of the Battle for the first few weeks. Mo st activity centred on shipping off Dover. During Jul y the average number of defensive so rties was 5-600 a day, the highest rate occurring on 28 July when 794 so rties were flown, during which the RAF claimed ten air cra ft for the loss of five of their own. Da y-fighter strength grew during Jul y, enabling the Command to field 49 Hurricane and Spitfire squad ro ns by earl y August - the number o f Spitfire units remained at 18 but an additional four Hurricane unit s were now in the line. August 1940 August 13th 1940 saw the opening of the a ir offensive against England , carried out by Luftfionen 2, 3 and 5 from bases in France, Belgium, Holland and orway. Th e Luftwaff e had, a t th at date 4,632 a ircra ft, o f which 3,306 were serviceable.
2S
26
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
DEVELOPMENT , ROLES A
D HISTORY
(Of an average of 3306 serviceable aircraft there were 390 reconnaissance, 98 I bombers, 336 Stubs, 34 ground attack, 282 T .E. fighters, 839 S.E. fighters, 288 transport aircraft, and 156 seaplanes). The strength of the British air defences had remained unimpaired by the campaign in the West. The RAF had over 675 fighters, 860 bombers and 402 reconnaissance aircraft available in Jul y 1940. (8th Abt eilung survey) There was great vari at ion in the RAF's daily so rtie rates for Augu st, from as few as 288 to a high of 974. The latter took place on 15 Augu st as part of the Luf twaff e's concerted a ttacks on the RAF's airfield s under the so-called Adler Tag (Eagle Day). Thi s new strategy to destro y Fighter Command's combat potential consisted of a series of attacks on radar installations and fighter airfields and was launched on 12 August. The first raid s were on Hawkinge, Man ston and Lympne , the latter being hit twice with the result that by the end of the seco nd attack, the airfield was pockmarked with craters and there was barely a clear space o n which to land. Hawkinge was hit at a round 1700, with Ju 88s destroying two hangars, workshops a nd other buildings, as well as leaving the airfield sur face badl y damaged . Overn ight the craters were filled, the unexploded bombs dealt with and the airfield was declared operat ional again within 24-hours. It was a similar story at Mansi on. with 65 Squadron's Spitfires tak ing off as the bombs fell. This pattern of airfield attacks continued to the end of the first week of September but , with a few notable exceptions, there appears to have been little in the way of overall co-ordinati on of the strategy. Th at sa me da y Goering held a conference a t Karinhall in which he made a number of point s concerning the development of the Battle: 'The fighter escort defences of our Stuka form ation s must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuk a opera tions. It appea rs necessary to allocate 3 fighter Gruppen to each Stuk a Hurricanes of 17 Squadron; the Squadron fl ew Hurricane Is fro m JUlie 1939 to February 1941 and claimed 42 victories during the Ball/e.
Spitfire I of 72 Squadron: the Squadron operated f rom Biggin Hill and Croydon during the Batt le of Britain. Gruppe, one of these fighter Gruppen remain s with the Stuk as, and dives with them to the atta ck; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude and engages the fighter defences: the third protects the whole atta ck from above. It will also be necessary (0 escort Stuk as returning from the attack over the Channel. . . . I have repeatedl y given orders that twin-engined fight ers a re only to be employed where the range of other fighters is inadeq uate, of where it is for the purpose of assisting our single-engined aircraft to break off combat. Our stocks of twin-engined fighters are not great, and we must use them as econ omically as possible. .. . It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks 011 radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of operation: In order to protect the vital airfields, Fighter Comm and had to use valuable assets on sta nding patrols a nd within a matter of weeks the damage to the airfields and associa ted facilities, plus fighter losses and the general strain of const ant opera tional flying, were having a n effect. It was a t this point that the Battle of Britain was most finely bala nced. However, the Luftwaffe was also having difficulties, morale was suffering and every aircraft lost over England also meant the loss of trained aircrew. Hpt Bechtle's 1944 lecture continued: 'in the first few day s of the air war it became a pparent that the numerous dogged British fighter pilots who were supplemented by forma tions of volunteers from nati on s co nquered by German y made o pera tions by bom bers and Stuk as so difficult that it was necessary to have a n esco rt of two or even th ree times the strength of the forma tion which was being escort ed: Du ring the critical period of 12-1 9 August the German Official War Communiques claimed that 624 RAF airc raft had been destroyed a nd admitted to a loss of 174 aircraft . At a con ference on 19 August Goering sta ted: To S lllll up: I r e ha ve reached the decisive period of the air war against England. The vital task is to tum all m eans at our disposal to the def eat of the enemy Air Force. Our firs t aim is the destruction of the enemy's fighters. If they 110 longer take 10 the air, Ir e shall at tack them 011 the gro und, or force them i1l10 battle by directing bomber attacks against targets within range ofour fighters. At the sam e
27
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F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
DE
ELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Fighter combat; close. jire and get-away - keeping an eye out for the Hun sneaking up. time. and on a growing scale, we must continue our activities against the ground organisation of the enemy bomber units. Surprise atta cks on the aircraft industry must be made day and night. Once the enemy Air Force has been annihilated. our attacks lI'iII be directed as ordered against other vital targets.
Amongst the individual points he had made were: VII/il furth er notice, the main task of Luftllotten 2 and 3 lI·iII be to inflict the utmost damage possible on the enemyfighter for ces. With this are to be combined atta cks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers, conducted however in such a manner as to a void all unnecessary losses. I will return later 10 the question of operations against the enemy aircraft industry. As long as the enemyfighter def ences retain their present strength, atta cks on aircraft fa ctories must be carried 0 11/ under the cover of weather conditions permitting surprise raids by solitary aircraft. Such operations demand the most meticulous preparations, but can achieve I'ery satisfactory results. The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next f ell' days must be exploited fo r such atta cks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the mat erial supplies of the enemy Air Force, by the destruction ofthe relatively small number ofaircraft engine and aluminium plants. These atta cks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried 011/ by night. Should it however not be possible 10 locate an industrial target because of poor visibility or bad weather conditions, some other worthwhile target must be atta cked. It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations 10 allocate to units particular areas, which they will come to knoll' well during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result and flights will not be wasted due 10 fa ilure of the aircraft 10 fi nd one particular target. There can no longer be any restriction on the choice oftargets. To my self I reserve only the right to order atta cks on London or Liverpool.
Bf 109 wreck; SOli/hem England lI'as littered with the remains of German aircraft, all of which lI'ere guarded and then removedfo r investigation and recol'ery of anything useful.
On 20 August 1940. Goering ordered his units to 'con tinue the fight against the British Air Force until furthe r no tice with the aim of weakening British fighter strength. The enemy is to be forced by ceaseless attacks to bring his fighter formatio ns into operation: This undoubted ly correct tactic was. unfortunately for the Germans. not followed through and whilst airfield attacks conti nued into early Septembe r. the bombing of London on 24/25 August and the British retaliatory raid on Berlin. changed the nature of the Battle. with Hitler declaring that he would destroy the British capital. For the next few weeks. London was to be the focus of numerous large-scale German attacks. and the Battle took on a new significance. Statistics for the last week of August 1940 (from the Figh ter Command Diary) show the intense nature of the Batt le at this period : Losses, 25 August- I August 1940 Da te
25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug 29 Aug 30 Aug 31 Aug Totals
German losses
55 47 5 28
RAF losses
13
RA F pilots saved
62 88
15 0 14 9 25 37
4 II 0 7 7 15 25
296
113
69
II
29
30
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
The column that shows RAF pilots saved is also very significant as the two factors in maintaining operationa l capa bility were aircraft and pilots; as we shall see, the former was never a probl em, whilst the latt er reached break ing point.
London and the final shifting of the main weight of atta ck f rom daylight to night raids. In September, these had been carried on simultaneously with daylight attacks. (Bechtle)
September 1940 The Battle reached its climax in September, with the Luftwaffe seeming to be on the verge of victo ry - at least by their accounting of RAF losses - and the RAF struggling in the early part of the month to maint ain the fighting strength of its squad rons. The rotation of sq uadrons between the main area of the Battle and quieter zones helped, as did throwin g in pilots when they were not truly combat ready (see below for comments of pilot shortage). New squadrons continued to form, but not all were thr own into the Battle . When the Luftwaffe launched its surge of offensive ops in the middle of the month it expected low levels of resistance; instead it was met by a determined RAF that had actuall y recovered somewhat from the hamme ring of the previous weeks. On 15 September, which is now marked as Battle of Britain Day, Fighter Command had 17 sq uadrons airb orne to meet the midday attack. This day's opera tions are covered in detail in the Operations Chapter. The first 'E agle' squadro n (71 Squadron) formed at Church Fenton on 19 September: 'pilots will be Amer ican citizens commissioned or enlisted in the RAFVR . Th e ground personnel will be RAF. Establishment will be 16 Brewster Buffalos' (Sa M 875/40). Th e choice of equipm ent must have come as shock for the keen volunteers from America but , fort una tely, Fighter Command's dalliance with this unsuitabl e fighter was short-lived and the Americans were flying Hurricane Is by November. The Germ an tactic of dr ainin g the strength of Fighter Command were beginning to pay off, although this does not appear to have been recognised by the German air planners and a decision was taken to switch the focus of the attack .
The night camp aign is covered late r.
The batt le against the British A ir Force lI'as continued on the lines ofthis directive without a decision being obtained. Recognising this fac t, the German High Command decided in Septe mber to switch the main ,..eight of the air offensive to London, the heart of the enemy pOl r er. Incomparably greater success than hitherto could be anticipated from this policy. For while the main objective of wearing down the British fig hter fo rces lI'as not abandoned. economic 'rar from the air could be embarked upon with fu ll fury. and the morale of the civilian population subjected at the same time to a heavy strain. The fell' daylight attacks by strong bomber forma tions (200-300 bombers of all types '..ere ol'er the target e,'ery time ) achie..ed good results against dock and supply installations along the Thames. Maj or conflagrations caused ex tensive devastation. These attacks lI'ere continued until the 27th September . Losses suffered by formations led thereaf ter to a reduction of the forces engaged on any single daylight attack to one Ju.88 G ruppe, and from the beginning of October to the use of fighter-bomber formations only ( Me 109's each carrying one Sc.250 (250 Kg) bomb. The individual bomber Gruppe as ,..ell as the fig hter-bomber for mations with a strength of up to 120 aircraft , lI'as escorted in its outward and return fligh ts by 2-3 fighter Geschwader. When the weather situation did not permit attacks by regular forma tions in the prescribed form, use lI'as made of cloud-cover for nuisance raids by single aircraft. The month of October sail' the continuation of the lI'ar of attrition against
Aircra ft and Pilots Great play has been made by some historian s of wastage rates and supply of fighters and whilst it is true that during the height of the Battle, the situa tion did deteri orate, it never became critical. The weekly situation in respect of wastage rates along with output fro m manufacturers and, a significant element in the equati on, Cat 2 aircraft repaired and ret urned to service, were highlighted in an RAF anal ysis. In RAF record s Cat 2 mean s repaira ble but not at unit level and Cat 3 is a write-off. The low point occurs in the first week of September when the wastage rate was 270 aircraft. 112 of which were Spitfires, against an ASU (Aircraft Storage Unit) stock of8 6 Hurri canes and 39 Spitfires. A 1945 Air Historical Branch (AHB) stud y summarised the position: 'wastage in aircra ft during the fighting in July and early Augu st was more than offset by output. Less than 300 aircraft were lost in the period 20 July to 10 Augu st whereas j ust over 500 were produced or repaired . But as soo n as heavy fighting began , wastage leapt ahead of output and remained practically twice as high until the second 56 Squadron pilots at North Weald September / 939; the Squadron lost 22 aircraft in combat and pilot turn-over to casualties and postings '..ere average.
31
32
ORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
week in September. It is appa rent that the two weeks from 25 August to 7 September con stituted the crisis o f the battle as far as a ircraft suppl y was concerned. There is only one inference to be dr awn ; that despite the great labours of all th ose con cerned with the supply and production of aircra ft, a disastrous situation would sho rtly have been reached if the German s had maintained the scale of their atta cks:
Strength and serviceability. 10
Jul~'-25
September
Dat e
Squadrons
Torai lE
S erviceable
10 Jul 15 Jul 20 Jul 25 Jul 30 Jul 5 Aug 10 Aug 15 Aug 20 Aug 25 Aug 30 Aug 5 Sep 10 Sep 15 Sep 20 Sep 25 Sep
54 52 50 53 54 56 56 54 57 59 57 58 60 61 60 61
86-1 956 920 976 996 1.036 1.036 996 1.060 1.096 1.060 944 960 976 960
656 655 605 631 662 719 709 670 711 721 710 710 668 652 698 665
A class sq uadro ns o. II G roup plus the Du xford and Middl e Wallop secto rs. B class squa d rons - mainl y No. 10 and o. 12 G roups. C class squadrons - mainl y o. 13 Group. The idea was to keep the A class squa drons at 19-20 opera tiona l pilot s by dr awing on the C class squad rons. Th e B class units. and there were only five of the se when the scheme was introduced, were potent ial replacements for any A class unit that had to be withd rawn from the battle. 'The implicatio n [of this scheme) is that pilot casu alt ies so far exceeded output during this critical fortn ight th at almost half of the squadrons in Fighter Co mmand had to be reduced to a semi-operational state in order to devote their best energies to producing pilots for the sq uad rons that were actively engaging the enemy . Insofar as the battle was la rgely confined to south-east Eng land , the scheme was practicable and prudent. But it starkly reveals how dangerous was the pilot position ' (A HB). For the period 10 Jul y to 31 October the Command lost an average of four pilots a day Killed In Action (KIA), with an average o f 28.9 per week.
One th ing that is immediately apparent from the figures in this table is the con sistent level o f servicea ble aircraft - never less than 600 and often j ust over 700 aircraft, despite the inten sity of the conflict at various times during this period. On 6 Oct ober Churchill as ked the Secreta ry of State for Air for ' figures of total losses of Hurricane s and Spitfires during the months of Augu st a nd September: The following day he received this reply: Sept ember 1940
August 1940
With an establishment of 24 pilot s per sq uad ron, the Comm and sho uld have had 1.200 pilot s on strength a t the end o f August but it was 201 short of th is. Add ed to which a furt her 160 were classified as non- ope rati on al, the majorit y . . . 'becau se they had no t reached a sufficiently high sta nda rd of training. There was. therefore, an average deficiency of six or seven opera tional pilots in each sq uadro n.' It was this deficiency, plus the difficulty of replacing tired squadro ns by co mplete and rested squad rons - a policy that had been empl oyed earl ier in the battle - that led Dowding to introduce his Stabilisation Scheme. Under this squa d rons were ca tegorised A, B or C:
Reas on fo r loss
Hurricane
Spitfire
Total
H urricane
Spitfire
TotaJ
Enemy Action
Accidents
238 15
143 II
381 26
228 15
134 8
362 23
Total
253
154
407
243
142
385
Co nclusion The last o f the massed da ylight raid s took place on 30 September and was given a very rough handling by a Fighter Comm and th at was now much stronger th an it had been at a ny point in the Battle . From then until the end of the accepted Battle period (31 Oct ober) the main Luf twaffe effo rt comprised sma ll forma tions o r lone aircra ft (the latte r often fighter-bombers) - und ert akin g as man y as 1,000 so rties a day. Whilst the damage they inflicted was small they represented a majo r probl em for the defending fighters and the Comm and had to resort to sta nding pat rols. The end date for the Battle is somewha t a rbitrary as these types of raid continued well into 1941. The following sta tistics o n German losses were given in answer to a Parli amentary ques tion o n 14 May 1947: Luft.-affe I""ses Period
It is usually accepted th at Fighter Co mma nd's weak link was its supply of pilot s. Despite the fact that it was fightin g over home territory a nd therefore pilot s who were sho t-do wn could return to the frontline, there is much truth in thi s asserti on. The AHB summa ry concluded: 'During August 304 pilots had become casualties; during the fortnight 25 August to 7 September 125 pilots were killed and 133 wounded . Thi s casua lty rate, plus the small number of pilots posted to instructional work , repre sented wastage of some 400 pilots a month . Output from OTUs in August, however, was 260 pilots - the Comm and , in sho rt, was wasting away:
19 Ju l-7 Aug 8 Aug-23 Aug 24 Aug -6 Sep 7 Sep-30 Sep I OcI-31 Oct To tals
RAF estimate
German estimate
Admitted
188 755 6-13 846 260
192 403 378 435 325
63 213 243 243 134
2.692
1.733
896
Not e: Columns show: RAF claims: From Genn an records: and admi tted by Germans at the time in comm uniqu es.
33
34
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968
The RAF post-war record of the Batt le admitted losses of 9 15 aircraft (Spitfires, Hurricanes and B1enheims) in aeria l combat , plus losses of othe r types such as Defiants. This total was broken down as: Hur ricanes Spitfires Blenheims
564 339 12
A further 42 aircraft of these three types were admitted as destroyed on the gro und by enemy action. Just fewer than 3,000 pilots, from 14 nationalities, fought on the RAF side in the Battle, and of these some 507 were killed. The RA F claimed to have shot down 2,692 German aircraft , although postwar research has reduced this figure to 1,733. The Luftwaff e claimed to have shot down 3,058 RAF aircraft , but subsequent analysis has reduced this to 915. 'The Few', as Churchill described them, had won a stunning victory . The airfields of southern Englan d and the aircraft that flew from them had replaced the wooden walls of the Royal Navy as 66 Squadron pilots; throughout the Battle Britain's main line of defence. Many in the Luftwaffe the main problem fo r Fighter Command was shortage ofpilots. were not convinced that they had been beaten: The struggle for mastery of the air, when discontinued by German y, had not been fough t through to a conclusion.' (Hpt Bechtle). In 1953 Adolf Ga lland wrote an appraisal of the Battle of Britain for the RAF's Air Historical Branch, extracts from this, and commenta ry on those extrac ts. is at Annex C.
Dowding - Architect of Victo ry The eldest of four children, Hugh Dowding was raised in the strict atmosphere of St Ninians's School, Moffat, which his father had founded in 1879. In 1895 he went on to Winchester Schoo l and after his four years there, entered the Royal Militar y Academy at Woolwich, destined for the Royal Engineers. Th e course at Woolwich had been halved to 12 months because of the pressure of the South African War and when Dowding graduated he was posted to the Garrison Artillery and assigned to Gibraltar. In the Hugh Dowding was quite rightly called the Architect of Victory in respect of the Battle of Britain. mainly because of his pre-war role in Research and Development and his determination to resist political pressure.
following year, 1901, the Co mpany moved to Colombo where the social life was somewha t improved - but to Dowd ing, the prospects seemed equally limited and so he applied for a tran sfer to the more active Mountain Artillery . His request was gra nted and he went to No. 7 Mountain Artillery Battery at Ra walpindi. He spent the next six years in India, tran sferring to a Nati ve Battery where he was in his element with an independent command, often working in remote area s with infantry units. In Janu ary 1912 he entered Staff College and it was at this point that his interest in aviatio n really began . One task he led involved the use of six aircraft in support of his ground forces, and it became ob vious to him that few people in the Arm y knew how to employ aircraft. Dowding considered it import ant to under stand this new element and so decided to learn to fly. He arranged his lesson s at the Vickers Flying School at Brooklands so that he could be back for college classes at 10am. After only one hour and 40 minutes of flying he was given his licence! Dowding followed this with a three-m onth course at the Cent ral Flying School after which he received his wings. Returning to the Mountain Artillery, he applied for a Royal Flying Corps (R FC) Reserve post. In 1914 he went back to the Garrison Artillery with a posting to coastal defence on the Isle of Wight, but only hour s after the outbreak of war, Dowding was called up as an RF C Reserve pilot. His first appointment was as Commandant of the Dover assembly point for squadrons en route to Fr ance. Within a matter of weeks, however, he went to Fa rn borough to join the newly-form ing 7 Squadron. He was eager to get to Fr ance and so pestered for a posting to an active squad ron. His wish was granted - but not quite as he desired - with a posting as an Observer to 6 Squadron at Ostend . This did not last long as heavy losses and a series of rapid moves led to a pilot shortage and he was soon back in the front seat. By the end of the year he had moved to 9 Squadron, a specialist 'wireless' unit. Because of his experience he was posted back to Farnborough to create a wireless experimental establishment. By the summer of 1915 he was back on the Continent as Commanding Officer of 16 Squadron . He was now aged 33 and a Major, but his career to date had not been parti cularly remark able. To improve sq uadron training and morale he introduced a bombing contest on the airfield. Thi s was brought to a hasty conclusion when the one and only bomb ended up in a canal next to the airfield! During his time as CO, the Squadron operated in the support roles of bomber, recce and artillery observation. Dowding was prom oted to Lieutenant Colonel and returned to Farnborough to work up a unit with Sopwith One-and-a-half Strutters, before taking command of 9th Wing, a unit attached to the Comm ander- in-Chief for reconnaissance duties . In Jun e 1916 Dowding arrived at Trenchard's HQ at Fienvillers for the Battle of the Somme. During this bloody battle his units carried out not only their recce duties but also played a part in trying to achieve local air superiority over parts of the battlefield. Anoth er prom oti on and back to England once more , this time to the Sout hern Tr aining Brigade at Salisbury. In spring 1918 Dowding heard that he had not been listed to join the small post-war permanent Royal Air Force and was to return to the artillery. Fortunately, his CO, a Vice-Admiral, disputed this decision and, with the added support of Tren chard, it was revoked. Dowding went to Kenley as Group Commander.
35
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Over the next ten years he had a number of staff and organisational posts in the UK and Middle East, eventually becoming Air Member for Supply and Research the post in which he first made his stamp on the forthcoming conflict. It was his job to shape the future RAF. He energetically threw his weight behind a number of projects du ring the critical period of the 1930s, when there was still cons iderable opposition to any expenditure on rearmament. Among his interests were the use of materials othe r tha n wood for aircraft construc tion, the development of a land-based design of the Schneider racing aircraft, and the development of radar. On balance this was perhaps his most crit ical period , as witho ut a strong stance being taken in the 1930s it is certa in that the RAF would have entered the Battle of Britain in a very poor state. In 1936he took the post for which he is best known - head of Fighter Command. His new HQ opened at Bentley Priory on 14Ju ly 1936, and his theoret ical Command consisted of 30 squadrons along with 600 guns, searchlights , and barrage balloons. He increased this to a planned 53 squadrons, but had to fight for every scrap of equipment. Dowding's previo us range of d uties fitted him well for these mammoth tasks and slowly but surely his air defence system took shape. At the time of the Mun ich Crisis in September 1938 there was still considerable disorder, the RAF was certai nly not ready for war; 12 months later Figh ter Command was very much a 'go ing concern'. Upon the ou tbreak of war he had 39 squadrons fit for duty and fought ha rd to preserve the bulk of these for the defence of the UK, despite pressure to send squadrons to ot her Commands and, more especially, to F rance. The Hu rricane fighter squadrons tha t deployed to France suffered heavy losses alt hough they also achieved a great deal. not least by gain ing valuable experience tha t cou ld be passed on to ot hers and which led to changes in tac tics and eq uipment. However, as Dowding rightly saw, the Batt le for Fra nce was being lost and to have con tinued to put fighter squa drons across the Cha nnel, especially his precious Spitfire units. would have courted disaster in the next round of the conflict. His foresight in preparing Fighter Com mand for the Battle was in large measure responsi ble for its success. although the dogmatic determined way in which he dealt with those who opposed his views, especially Churchill. undoubtedly led to his eventua l downfall. Perhaps the only criticism that can be levelled at his cond uct of the Battle of Britain is the failure to make the Group Commanders of No. I I and No . 12 Group work together. the con flict between Park and Leigh-Mallory could have had dire consequences. After fou r years of running Fighter Command. Dowding was moved out in November 1940. The Battle of Britain had been won and he was exha usted. but many have seen this move as a shamefu l political act motivated by Chu rchill. Given a number of 'special' assignments but no real jo b. Dowding resigned in 1942. His place as a great air commander cannot be denied. Big Wing s? One of the most acrimonious debates of the war was that which took place between AOC No . I I Group, AVM Keith Park, and his counterpart in No . 12 Group, AVM Trafford Leigh-Mallory. However. before briefly discussing that debate it is worth out lining No. I I Group's tactics as stated by Park to Hugh Dowding: The general plan adopt ed was to engage the enemy high-fighter screen with pairs of Spi tfire squadrons f rom Ho rnchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
and the coast, and so enable Hurricane squadrons f rom London S ectors to attack bomber fo rmations and their elose escort bef ore they reached the line offig hter aerodromes East and South of London. The remaining squadrons f rom London S ectors which could not be despatched in time to intercept the first Il'al'e of the atta ck by climbing in pairs, fo rmed a third and inner screen by patrolling along the lines of aerodromes East and South of London. The fight er squadrons from Debden, Tangm ere and some times Northolt, were employed in wings ofthree or in pairs 10 fo rm a screen S outh-East of London to intercept a third wal'e of the attack coming inland, also to mop up retreating fo rmations of the earlier Il'al'es. The Spitfire squadrons were re-disposed so as to concentrate three squadrons at both Homchurch and Biggin Hill. The primary role of these squadrons was to engage and drive back the enemy high-fighter screen, and so protect the Hurricane squadrons, whose task II'(JS to atta ck close escorts, and then the bomber fo rmations, all of which flew at much lower altitude.
The nature of the pro blem centred on' the support given by adjacent Groups to the hard -pressed o. I I Group. This came into particular ly sharp focus in August when the Luftwaffe offensive was at its most intense and when the Group's airfields were being attacked. Numero us documents issued by No . II Group duri ng this period show Keith Park's ire at what he perceived to be a lack of co-operation from his counterpa rt in o. 12 Group , whereas No . 10 Group, on the other hand, received nothing but praise. Typical of these is the 'No. II Group Instructions to Controllers' dated August 27,1940: 'T hanks to the friendly co-opera tion afforded by No. 10 G roup. they are always prepa red to detail two to four sq uadro ns to engage from the West mass attacks ap proaching the Portsmouth area . The AOC No . 10 Group has agreed that once his squadrons have been detailed to intercept a gro up of raids coming into Tangmere Sector . his controllers will not withdraw or divert them to some other task withou t firstly consu lting us.' 'Up to date, No . 12 Group, on the other han d, have not shown the same desire to co-operate by despatching their squadrons to the places requested. The result of this attitude has been that on two occasions recently when 12 Group offered assista nce and were reques ted by us to pat rol our aerodromes, their squadrons did not, in fact, patrol over our aerodromes. On bot h these occasions our aerodromes were heavily bombed, because our own patrols were not strong eno ugh to turn all the enemy back before they reached their objective.' Park and his supporters considered that whilst the ' Big Wing' of three of more squadrons put up by No. 12 Group might look impressive, its failure to arrive in time made it worse than useless. In an effort to clarify its own position, Fighter Command issued an instruction, dated 24 October, concerning the ' reinforcement of No. 11 Group by No. 12 G roup ': 'As a result of recent discussions the following principles are laid down . No . II Group must always give No. 12 Group the maximum possible notice of probable intention to call on him IAOC No . 12 Group] for assistance. It will be seldom that No. I I Gro up can diagnose from preliminary symptoms that the first attack will be on a scale so lar ge as to necessitate assistance being called from No . 12 Group. It may, however, often happen that the first raid has been met in strength by No. II Group and the assistance of No. 12 G roup is req uired when it is seen tha t further raids are building up over the Straits of Dover.' ' In any case No . II Group must remember 12 Group's requirements with regard to warning, and, even if it is dou btfu l whether assista nce will be req uired, warning should be given to ena ble 12 Group to bring units to readin ess and stan d-by. No . 12 Group should
37
38
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
not send less reinforcement than the amount asked for if it is in a position to meet the requirements, but he may send more at his discretion.' The tone of this is very much supportive of the stance taken by Leigh-Mallory, and it is perhaps equally indicative of where Dowding stood on the matter that Keith Park was replaced as AOC No . II Group in December 1940- by Trafford Leigh-Mallory. In his August 1941 report to the Air Ministry, Dowding stated : 'I am personally in favour of using fighter formations in the greatest strength of which circumstances permit .' However, he qualified this in respect of the Battle of Britain by adding: 'I think that, if the policy of big formations had been attempted at this time by No. II, Group, many more bombers would have reached their objectives without opposition.' Sholto Douglas replaced Dowding in November and made it clear where his support lay and by doing so dictated the Command's policy for 1941 : 'I have never been very much in favour of the idea of trying to interpose fighter squadrons between enemy bombers and their objective. The best, if not the only, way of achieving air superiority is to shoot down a large proportion of enemy bombers every time they come over . . . I would rather shoot down 50 of the enemy bombers after they have reached their objective than shoot down only 10 before they have done so.' Sentiments that would not have pleased many citizens of British cities and would perhaps have caused them to have a different view of the 'heroic Few' . This is one debate that will continue to rage as long as historians examine the Battle of Britain! However, as we shall see below, by early 1941 Big Wings were policy within No . II Group. Night Att acks As noted above in the statement by Hpt Bechtle, the main weight of Luftwaffe attacks, with London as the main target, had shifted to night by October, which gave the RAF a whole new set of problems. At the first meeting of the Night Interception Committee, 14 March 1940, Air Marshal Peirse had stated that: 'defence against night attacks was one of the biggest problems we had to face. Even if the enemy began by raiding in large numbers by day , our good defences would force him to adopt night bombing.' Recognition of the threat and the capability to do anything about it were two very different things. Fighter Command had realised in the late 1930s that night interception would be required and in November 1938 Air Fighting Committee Report No. 57 addressed this issue: 'A few recent experiments carried out at night have indicated that it should be possible to navigate fighters by means of D/F intercept techniques to within about 4 miles of an enemy - providing sufficient information regarding track and height of the enemy is available. The accuracy of interception by D/F at night will be such that fighters will usually be unable to sight the target unless the latter is illuminated by some means or unless further detection aids are provided.' The report went on to look at the options for such detection aids: Use of AI - it is suggested that at least one aircraft in the fighter formation should have AI equipment in order to determine whether this apparatus would enable the aircraft to make visual contact with a target which is not illuminated. Searchlights - on a clear night, the intersection of searchlight beams should be sufficient indication of the position of the target. Experiments should be made to determine, under various conditions of visibility and at various altitudes, the range at which the intersection of searchlight beams is visible and the range at
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
I
Blenheim of 23 Squadron at Witt ering, January 1940; this was the fir st squadron for £6730. which ,rent on to serve with No.54 Operational Training Unit and 256 Squadr on before fi nishing its career with No.12 Pilots Advanced Flying Unit.
which a target illuminated by searchlight beams is visible. Owing to the limited number of fighter units which can be operated by D/F techniques, it would seem desirable for fighters to fly in formation at night; therefore, aircraft will need to be equipped with station-keeping lights and IFF [identification friend or foe]. The trials did not take place until the following spring and summer. The first series were flown between 12 April and 4 May, with a 38 Squadron Wellington as the target and a III Squadron Hurricane as the fighter, the bomber being finished in the latest night camouflage scheme of matt black. After a number of sorties the general conclusion was that: 'the range at which pilots can see an unlit bomber whose position has been indicated, depends upon the experience of the pilot concerned. The upper limit appears to be about 600 yards astern and below, and 3,000 ft directly below. Aircraft engine exhaust can be seen up to one mile away. The average range for detecting searchlight intersection is 15-25 miles and 8-15 miles to distinguish an aircraft being held by searchlights.' So far, so good . The second phase was conducted between 8 May and 7 July , the same aircraft being involved: It is likely even under good conditions that searchlights will only help the fighter by 'flick-overs', to close with and attack a bomber in the dark. If, however, the lights continue to hold the bomber or make a series of 'flick-overs' without dropping behind it while the fighter closes until he can see the bomber itself, it is practically certain that the fighter will be able to deliver an attack. The approach to and attack on both a lit and unlit target should be made from behind and below, fire probably being opened at a maximum of 200 yards. Fighter patrols should be placed at least IO miles behind the front line of searchlights in order to avoid confusion and to allow the fighter to go forward to intercept when a pick-up has been made. Use of the aircraft landing light as a searchlight did not prove successful.
39
40
F IGHTER COMMAND 19 36 - 1968
During the trials 143 attempted interceptions were set up, of which 43 resulted in visual pick-up and 'combats'. An experimental A I set was fitted to a Fairey Batt le in May 1939 and trials with a Harro w as a target proved the concept of the system, despite it being difficult to use and subject to equipment failure. Air and ground-based radar was indeed the solution to the night war and the progress of the RA F in this respect over the next few years was truly remarkable - for which much credit must be given to the behind the-scenes 'boffins' and the RAF technicians who battled to keep the sets serviceable. The Chain Home stations (radar) were of course effective both day and night but vectoring an ai rcraft close enough to pick-up a single raider at night was different to putting a fighter in a position to pick-up a formation of enemy aircraft by day . The principles were the same, as indeed were the Filter Rooms and all the other elements of the system; what was needed was more practice and appropriate night-fighters , ideally with ai rborne rad ar (A I) - both were lacking in mid 1940. Experimen ts and trials con tin ued into 1940, with a number of the Command's Blenheim squadrons now involved a nd despite the comment that the 'Mark I equipment is of no operational value a nd is being used for training' prog ress was generally forward. With the formatio n of the Nigh t Interception Unit (soo n renam ed Fighte r Intercepti on Unit) at Tangmere in March 1940 the Com ma nd had a unit eq uipped with six AI Blenh eims and a remit to make it work. By the time AI Mk II1B was introd uced in May 1940, with a maximum ra nge of 9,000 ft and minimu m ra nge of 600 ft - along with grea ter relia bility - a practical set had at last arrive d. AI MK IV was unde r tria l the following mo nt h and was even bett er, with a min range of 400 ft a nd bett er a nti-clutter, although it was not in full produ ction until September. Mean while, the first night attack took place on 18/19 Ju ne, the German crews of KG .4 having been told that the RA F had no night-fighters; the main targets were the airfields of Honington and Mildenhall, with a diversionary raid on Sout hend. However, the RAF did have fighters ready, a mix of Blenheims and Spitfires and the night was to end with the loss of six German bombers and four RA F aircraft. A summary of this first night battle is included in the Ope rations chapter. Bot h sides appear to have forgotten this episode as attention turned to the day sphe re and the Batt le of Britain and it was August before matters became serious, statistics for the month showed 828 sort ies by Fighter Command on 26 nights, with claims for four enemy aircraft destroyed (only three were eventually credited); a further 20 aircraft fell to othe r causes, mainly the antiaircraft guns . The fighters were active, the tar gets were there - but there was a distinct lack of success. The first phase of the night blitz on London lasted from 7/8 September to 13/14 November and the Csin-C of Fighter Command was worried that the Germans would be 'able to bomb this country with sufficient accu racy for his purposes withou t even emergi ng from cloud s. The most depressing fact which has emerged from the past weeks is that the Germans can fly and bomb with consi derable accuracy in weat her in which our fighters canno t leave the ground. Their naviga tion is doub tless due to the excellence of their radio aids.' In pa rt it was also due to the German use of KG . I00 as a specialist and 'pathfinder' force. The rad io aids, Knick ebein beams, were a problem bu t the British knew of their existence and a co unter-measure was being developed to ja m the radio aids; this unit, o. 80 Wing was opera tio nal in a ut umn. With the AI Mk IV production und erway and a commitment to install these sets in Beaufighters (when the aircraft were avai lable) the future looked promising but in the mea ntime the Blenheims sold iered on and overa ll strength was increased by moving thre e Defiant squadrons (73, 85 and 151 ) a nd three Hurricane squadro ns to the night role,
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Charm)' DOlI'n, 87 Squadron pose with black-painted Hurricane; the Squadron became specialists in the night role.
although the la tter did not ta ke place unti l October. That same mon th Dowding wrote 'o ur task will not be finished unti l we can locate, pu rsue, and shoo t dow n the enemy in cloud by day and night , and AI must become like a gun sight .' The first true GC I station, at Durrington, became operational in October and added a vita l link in the chai n of engaging enemy aircraft at night (and by day). The second phase of the German night offensive saw a broadening to include other targets, which further st retched the defences. 'From the middle of ovember the massed night attacks were extended to the industrial cities and ports of the midlands. The central feature of the prosecution of the war remained the attack on London, however, attacks by day being continued as already described . The tactics of air war by night developed during the ensuing winter months. Only those details of tactics, which differ from those, now applied will be mentioned here. Concentration of attack in one place and at one time was not necessary because of the weak defences. The individual units proceeded to the targets along separate courses. To increase the strain on the morale of the population the duration of the attack was prolonged as much as possible . Only the weather rendered it necessary to concentrate the attack. On the other hand attacking those parts of the target area where the most important economic and industrial targets were allocated to units in each attack. To facilitate locating of targets and the individual objectives within the target areas themselves, the major attacks were carried out by moo nlight. London, offering a large target area, was attacked chiefly during moonless nights. . . . The month of November saw 23 major GAF attacks on vital British centres . In each attack 100-600 tons of bo mbs were dro pped on these targets. During the period of I-1 5th ovember 1940, 1,800 bombers dropped 1,900 tons of H.E.'s and 17,500 incendiary bom bs on Londo n alone. Of the tow ns attacked, Cove ntry, a centre of the British aircraft indus try, mus t be mentioned. Du ring the night of 14/15th Nove mber, 454 aircraft ra ided this town, dro pping 600 tons if H.E. and incendiary bombs. Coventry has become a by-word wherever operationa l air-war is discussed as a result of the extensive dam age caused by this raid.'
41
42
DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND HISTORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
The atta ck on Coventry on the night of- 14/15 November was indeed partic ularly effective - and worrying to the RAF. It was estimated that over 300 enemy aircraft took part and although the RAF flew 110 night patr ols there were no comb ats. Th is attack is examined in more detail in the Operations chapter. When Air Marshal Sholto Douglas took-over as C-in-C or Fighter Command in late November one of his first concern s was to address the problem of night defence. His report of 8 December also stated that: 'I am con vinced that the main obstacle to frequent intercepts by night is the lack of accurate tracking inland from the coast , and most important of all, lack of accurate information with regard to the height of the enemy bomber.' He summed up the requirements for a good night fighter, stating that : 1. There should be at least 20 night squadrons equipped with AI. They would
2. 3. 4. 5.
then provide a semi-circle of night-fighters from ewcastle to Devonshire, with a squadron each in the Birmingham and Coventry area. There should be night flying airfields wi th AI homing beacons, Loren z blind landing and other facilities. There should be at least one large regional cont rol airfield with a proper flying control sta ff to ensure the safety of night flying aircraft. Special train ing using the AI by day with crews wearing dark glasses should be carried out. Later practices by night could commence. Crews selected for night fighting should be specially tested for vision.
All of these point s were addres sed over the next few months; the training element led to the formation of a special night-fighter Operati onal Tr aining, with No. 54 OT U duly formed at the end of December. The selection of crews was also put in hand and many a pilot found himself destined for night-fighters because his vision was assessed as better than normal. It would be some while, however before any of these measures became effective. The first success for an AI Beaufighter came on 19120 ovember. falling to John Cunningham of 604 Squadron; there were still only 47 Beau fighters in the Order of Battle and re-equipment has only sta rted in October. However, the night war was starting to turn in favour of the defenders.
The 194I letter also stated that provision had to be made for 'early withdrawal of those of less robust constitution and for extension of the operational tour for fighter pilots from areas where enemy fighter opposition was weak or absent.' In November 1941 the 200 hours was confirmed but it was made clear that defensive sorties only ranked as 50% value when calculating the 200 hours. This remained the case to March 1943 when it was further stated that only half the flying hours spent on convoy protection and interception patrols beyond the range of enemy short range fighter cover would count towards the 200 hours . The tour length for night fighter pilots, including Intru ders, was set at 100 III March 1941 the Air Council issued a hours or a maximum of 18 months; the letter that laid down a general rule that tou r for Intr uder squadro ns was changed ·S O Jar as the general war situation in December 1943 to give a First To ur of permitted, personn el should be relieved from operational fiying after a maximum 35 sort ies and a Second To ur of 20 sorties, oj200 hours ill one tour oj operational which could be increased to 30 sorties at flying.' the discretion of the AOC. The RAF' s statisticians collected data on losses and came up with predicted survival rates for each ope ratio nal role; survival was an unfortunate choice of term and 'cha nce of completing a tour' would have been a better option! For the FighterCommand roles, all with 200-hours as the length of Operational Tour, the percentage chances of survival were:
Role
Loss Rat es and Tour Lengths In March 1941 the Air Council issued a letter that laid down a general rule that 'so far as the general war situation permitted, personnel shou ld be relieved from opera tional flying after a maximum of 200 hou rs in one tour of ope rational flying.' This decision had been made after a great deal of debate, which the AH B report summarised: The difficulties in establishing such a datum line were considerable because whatever factors were used, the question of degree of stress arose . For example 100 hours operational flying in one Group of Fighter Command cou ld easily be considered equal to 200 or more of similar flying in another Group of the same Command. It was evident that the datum line when estab lished should not be so low as to cause a rapid turnover, leading to a shortage of experienced pilots, not sho uld it be so high as to be impossible of attainment by the average pilot. At the same time it was plain that act ion cou ld be taken immediately by moving fighter pilots to quieter sectors or other pilots to opera tiona l tra ining units.'
After (%)
Da y Fighter AI Night Fighter Twin-engine Intruder
27Y2 51
Single-engine Intruder
2
13
0"''' tour
Af ter Iwo tours (%) 71,1:
26 I If:
oJa
Notes: I. Twin-engine intruder includes Fighter-Bomber and Bomber-Reece. 2. Single-engine Intruder includes Fighter-Bomber and F ight er-Reece.
The losses suggested by this survival statistic included prisoners of war and it was estimated that 20% of fighter pilots tha t were casualties became PoWs. A quick look at the table would suggest that AI night-fighte rs were the place to be! This RAF table is dated January 1943 and would therefo re be a reasonable reflection of what was hap pening, altho ugh the single-engine intruder figures look a little suspicious. Out of interest the highest survival rate prediction was for the Catalina flying-boat with 55Y,% in a tour of 800 hours .
43
44
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
It was clear from all the facts a t the Air Mi nistry's d isposal that the chances of compl eting two tours were not good in most classes of squadron . On the other hand it was difficult to see where Squ ad ron and Flight Comm and ers were to come from if the second tour was vetoed. Th is was a crucial factor as the sq uadrons needed expe rienced pilots in these key posts - and they could only come from those with ope ra tional experience. One suggestion was for a second tour of ha lf the sta nda rd length . but only for selected personnel in the same roles. altho ugh this restric tion was not placed on AI night -fighter squa drons.
post ings, some 1.300 pilot s, or rough ly equivalent to its enti re strengt h. Alt hough some of the casualt ies were newcomers. so that a back-bone o f vetera ns remained. these casualties included many of the most experienced pilot s in the Co mmand. Replacements were drawn almos t entirely from men who had been hurried th rough the OT Us in the a utumn a nd whose operat iona l training had been ha mpered by winte r weath er. It was hardly to be dou bted that th is han dicap would outweigh the extra exper ience gained since August of the few veterans who had gone right throu gh the fighting an d were still in the Co mma nd.'
4
~.:::;
tI't
1941 - Consolidation and new strategies Wh ilst defend ing the skies over Britain remained the primary task for Fig hte r Co mmand thro ughout the war , it was no t long before thought s turned to ways of ta king the war to the enem y. Unde r various code-names such as M osquito, Circus, Ram rod, Rodeo an d Rhubarb (see An nex P for definitions of code-na mes) the Command waged an increasingly o ffensive wa r. As we sha ll see, in its ea rly month s it was not witho ut its critics. Whilst the most interestin g as pects of the Comma nd 's work were increa singly connected with offensive operations, the defen sive element still occupied the majorit y of effort throu ghou t 1941 a nd into earl y 1942; for example. in Jul y the Com mand flew 6.200 offensive and 9,924 defensive sorties. It is also interesting that 6,475 of the defensive sorties were connected with protection of coastal shipping . Before looking at the offen sive aspect , we will review the defensive ro le and a number of general problems faced by the Co mma nd . One of these was the qu estion of pilot experience. a problem neatly summed-up by the AHB narrati ve. ' It was estimated th at nearl y half the opera tiona l pilot s in the squadro ns on August Ist. 1940 were seaso ned men , most of who m had fought successfully in May and Jun e. Between that dat e a nd March 31st, 1941 the Comm and lost, as a result of comba ts, accidents an d
.~
"" . ~
•.-. _ 1
.J/-
..
~;. .-:'
("" " aURCH)
".
Hurricane lIC of l Squadron; the cannon-armed Hurricanes became early exponents ofnight intruder ...ork.
" fop showing Fighter Command Sectors. / 94/
C'&r: '... ~
KIAKWAlL
45
46
Sholto Douglas was requesting an ' immediate' force of 80 da y and 20 night squad rons as the 'crisis would come in spring and summer (194 1) and that thereafter it would be unnecessary to increase the size of the fighter force and might even be possible to reduce it in order to build-up other Commands: However, 1941 was a time when everyone wan ted more - and immediate ly, and the emph asis was being firmly placed on Bomber Command . The Air Staff approved an increase to 81 squadrons, to be effective as near to Ap ril 1941 as possible; by Febru ar y the Comm and 's strength was 76 squadrons, with a further five in process of formation, not all of which were in place by the I Apri l date. In fact the C-in-C had n o;, sq uad rons for the comin g 'battle' and not the 100 he wanted. Th e Command was also cont inuing to reor gan ise, which included a new Sector for No. 9 Group, based on Valley and effective from I April. A summary also stated that ' the Hebrides, Western Highland s and the Minches remained outside the shelter of the Fighter Comm and umbrella, which now extended its protecti on to every other part of the UK: The C-in-C had also imposed a restructuring based on his belief in the Wing concept - he was a supporter of Leigh-Mallory's point of view, and Leigh-Mallory was now AOC of o. II G roup. Th e intenti on was for Spitfire Wings in the Hornchurch and Tangmere Sector s, a Hurricane Wing in the Kenley Sector and another North of London, and mixed Wings in Duxford, Middle Wallop and Wittering Sectors. Approval was also given for appointment of a Wing Commander at 15 of the principal stations to act as Wing Leader. These would pro ve a crucial role and the RAF employed some superb leaders in this role, many of whom had been junior pilots in the Battle of Britain. A memo was issued by o. II Group on 17 February 1941 detailing the 'employment and training of Wings and Circuses' and it is worth qu oting extracts from this as it encapsulates the defensive plan for 1941. Du ring the air battle in the autumn of 1940, the enemy employed mass formations of bombers and fighters with the object of destroying our fighter defence. and inflicting damage at vital points. It is probable that an even heavier scale of atta ck may have to be countered in the spring of 194 1. To meet these large enemy form ations it is inadeq uate to dispatch small form ations of fighters that are unlikely to succeed in sto pping the enemy bombers. It is therefore necessary to meet this type of attack with large formations, which are capable of providing protection aga inst the enemy fighte r screen for those fighters whose role it is to break up the enemy bomber formations and destro y the bombers. It has been decided to o rganise Wings thr ough out o. II Gr oup, which will be composed of two o r three sq uadro ns. These Wings will. on occasion, operate in Circu ses. which will be comp osed of two or more Wings. The object of employing Wings and Circuses in defence is to engage powerfu l enemy formatio ns with sufficient large numbers to: a. b. c. d.
Stop the enemy bombers reaching their objectives. Break up the enemy bomber formations. Annihil ate the enemy when the breakin g up process has been achieved. Have sufficient aircra ft to pro vide protection against enemy escorting fighters.
The object of emp loying Wings and Circuses in offensive operations is to pro vide the necessary number of fighters, work ing in co-operation and giving mutual support, to establ ish air superiority over the enemy in his own count ry.
IS""ORY
DE
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
April also bro ught a change of tactica l structure in the squadrons, with official ado ption of a Section of two aircraft as the smallest tactical unit: th ree such Sections made up each Flight and two Flight s made up a Squadron . There had been a long and drawn-out debate on such tact ical matt ers. with some preferring this more flexible tactic whilst o thers maintained that the existing tact ic was perfectly good, alth ough there was general agreement - as well as the Command directive. However, 'adopti on of the threesquadron Wing as a tactical unit was very different. It would be hard to think of a tactical measure in the whole field of air defence whose utility was more widely debated or which caused livelier controversy' (AHB arrative), In late Jun e the Air Ministry agreed to a furth er increase in Fighter Comm and strength to 94 day and 30 night squad rons - to be achieved by the end of the year. Progress on expansion was steady both in terms of numbers of units and equipm ent ; as the table below shows, the numbe r of Spitfire sq uadro ns had grown significantly between April and July, and this was now the dom inant type in the Com mand.
S umma r)' of squ adrons. April a nd J ul)' 194t I July 1941
8 April 1941 Op erational
Hurricane I Hurricane II Spitfire I Spitfire II Spitfire V
Defiant Tomahawk Blenheim Beaufighte r Bien/ Beau BIen/H avoc Whi rlwind
Havoc Boston Total
26% 12 4 18 I 7 I
Non-op It,
2
4
I I I I I 781/ 2
3%
To ttll
Ope rational
27 12 6 18 I 7 I I
II 18 5% 20 7 7
4 I
6
I I I I 82
2 I 3
801/ 2
Non-op
6% I
4
To/al 12 18 12 21 7 11
6 I 2 2 3 14'1',
93
Notes f or Jul y OR HAT: + Havoc only. .. Squadrons 96. 151. 255 and 256 also have four Hurricanes (N) and 92 Squadron has an additional two Spitfires (N) ( =stand ing fo r Night ).
Th e July figures are also interesting for the number of non-operational squadro ns, the bulk of which were newly-formed squadrons with Spitfires or Defiant s. It was also significant that the Spitfire V was sta rting to appear in larger numbers, with seven operational squad rons by July. Thi s new vari ant of the Spitfire gave the RAF pilots the edge over the majorit y of 109 variants - but that balance was to change later in the year when the Germans int roduced a fighter that was to cause the RAF major prob lems; the Fw 190 entered service in late summer and by the end of the year it was clear that the RAF' s fighters were being out-classed. The Fw 190A was being operated by JG26 and had the edge over the Spitfire V in a number of crucial performance areas.
47
48
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
D
D H STORY
Clipped-wing Sp itfire V; the M ark V ,\"Os sem as all interim measure bill served ill large numbers. 'A t present the Spitfire V has insuffic ient reserves ofpower 10 stay ill combat with the .If E 109 at 35.000ft. The latter definitely has greater speed at that height 0 11 the level, climb or dire. .
Pilots of66 Squadron at Perranporth in 1941 - as with many squadron pictures there is. of course, a dog! The Squ adron was at Perranporthfrom April 1941 to the end of the yea r.
The Air Ministry's interrogat ors took every op por tunity to record the views of cap tured German aircrew and from time to time the results of such interroga tions were circulated . One such document was Tact ical Bulletin o. I issued in July 1941; this outlined the view of a Bf 109F pilot in respect of its comparative performance in respect of the Spitfire. 'This pilot believes the MelO9F is superior in every respect - except that the new Spitfire (the Mark V) might, when hand led by an equally good pilot, be superior to the 109F in steep turns at high speed. This difference, however, can be more tha n counter-bala nced if the German pilot is better.' The report also included other related commen ts. 'The outstan ding disadvantage of the Me lO9 is that the wings are not as stable as they might be. At least two German pilots have been killed within the last three weeks by tearing the wings off their 109s when trying to follow Spitfires in a snaking dive. After a fast dive pilots have to pull ou t fairly grad ually. The new arrangement of guns in the nose of the I09F enables pilots to fire very accurately whilst in a turn and to open fire at a greater range. This pilot, however, usually opens fire at 100 yards, closing to 50 yards.' One of the key tactical lessons from the Battle of Britain was that the fighters with height ad vantage at the start of a combat were well-placed; this was expressed by a senior pilot at Hornchurch in July 1941 : 'diving attacks are always the most effective as the element of surp rise is achieved' - but he also sta ted that the ab ility to get higher should not be at the expense of other performa nce elements. '. . . but turnin g radius and acceleration are equally impo rtant. At all heights a Spitfire can turn inside an Me 109, but the 109 appea rs to have quicker initial acceleration in a dive and also in climbing.. . . Reserve of power and manoeuvrability are the foremost requirements for efficient
fighting at great heights. The superiorit y in this respect of the Me 109, part icularly the Me 109F, must, to a large extent. be due to its light weight. At present the Spitfire V has insufficient reserves of power to stay in combat with the Me 109 at 35,000 ft. The latte r definitely has greater speed at that height on the level. climb or dive.' It appeared, therefore. that the Spitfire V was on a par with or even slightly better tha n its main opponent. the Bf 109E and 109F , with pilot experience and tactics of more importance than aircraft performance. The Spitfire V was not the only 'new boy' with the Comma nd in 1941; the Bell Airacob ra and Tomahawk. and the latest Hawker offering. the Typhoon, became operational during the year. The Airaco bra went to 60I Squa dron but despite some operational flying was a quickly rejected, whilst the highly promising Tiffie suffered development probl ems but eventually went to 56 Squad ron as the Typhoon IA in September 194 I. It was not the happ iest of introducti ons as problems with the Sabre engine and various other snags limited the initial employment of the type. By the end of the year the plan for 94 day and 30 night squadro ns had not been achieved. There were only 75 day squadrons and of the night units only 23 were true night-fighter units, along with 10 Turbinlite Flights and two night-intruder squadrons. Defensive Operations 1941 The main daylight war over England had almost come to an end by early 194I. The Luftwaffe fighter-bomber and fighter sweeps had more or less ended in mid December and did not resume until mid February, and even then on a relatively small scale. Between Feb ruary and the end of March the main day enemy activity was fighterbomber attacks on airfields in the o. II G roup area, such as Hawkinge, Lympne and Man ston . From I April to 29 May the RAF recorded 283 day and night attacks on airfields, raids that were referred to as ' pirate raids' and that were hard to counter. The AHB narrative neatly summa rises the problems these caused : 'the favourite objectives for such raids were airfields and aircraft factories and, during the winter of 1941, a number of successful enemy low-level, daylight attacks were car ried out. These showed evidence of careful plan ning and were norm ally carried out by aircraft operating either singly or in pairs. They were, moreo ver, difficult to intercept and. although special
49
50
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Spi tfire formation of 81 S quadron; the S quadron acquired Spi tfire Vs at the end of 1941 and operated the type to October 1942 when they departed for North Africa.
measures were taken to deal with single raiders - such as the use of AI fighters by da y when ~he weather was bad - the problems remained unsolved at the end of the year.' FIghter C~mman~ ~ad its ' Big Wing' tactic ready to counter any resumption of large -scale daylight activrty - but it never came. There were a number of fighter sweeps between February and May but they were small -scale and 'gave Fighter Command no chan.ce of using the large wing formations . .. and the problems of interception was thus, as WIth the long-range bombers, unsolved in July , when both the low-le vel attacks and fighte~ swee~s w~re d.iscontinued' . The main rea sons for the virtual ending of such ?ffen~lve acti on I.n mid 1941 were the reorganisation of German air power for the mvasion of Ru ssia and the increasing pressure of the Allied daylight air offensive. Indeed, a plan to rotate elements of JG2 and JG26 to Russia had to be cancelled as the Allied offe~sive grew in magnitude. The initiative had firmly passed to the RAF (and soon t.heJOint RAF-USAAF offensive) in terms of daylight operations, although there was stili a hard fight ahead . The main combat activity over the U K in 1941 was by night. Night Defence The problems of night defence had sta rted to becom e increasingly appa rent in the latter months. of 1940 - a nd there was little immediate improvement in the early months of 1941. FIghter Command ORS Report 0 .235 summarised the 'trend of air defence at night'. The following extracts of the report highlight its main points: 1.1. F.ighters had practically no success in intercepting enemy bombers by night from October 1940 until February 1941 inclusive.
DEVELOPME
T. ROLES AND HISTORY
1.2. The month of March saw the beginning of effecti ve operations by the GCI system, and the use of ' Fighter Nights' over target areas. The success of fighters rose month by month ; 24 enemy aircraft were destroyed in March, 52 in April, and 102 in May. In particular, on the night of 10/1 Ith May, over 8% of the enem y aircraft employed on an attack on London were destroyed by fighters. The tot al losses of the enemy were nearly 10% . 1.3. During the peri od M arch, April, May 1941, a bo ut 40% of fighter success was obtained with GCI/AI technique. Since then the enem y has made onl y slight, dispersed raids , ideally suited to the GCI/AI technique, and the percentage has risen considerabl y, so that at the present time AI machines carry out practicall y all the night interceptions of the se dispersed raids. 1.4. The present limitation of the GCI/A I technique lies in the difficulty of obtaining visual contact in the final stages of the ch ase. A significant difference exists between the mo onlit and mo onless hours of the night. With existing skill o f the average G CI sta tion a nd average AI squadron, it can be co nserva tively estima ted tllat during moonlit hours of the night one atte mpt in 8 will go to co mba t; and that during moonle ss hours o f the night one attempt in 20 will go to co mbat. These att em pts can be made by pre sent GCI stations at the rate of 4 to 5 per hour if sufficient night fighter s are av ailable. The combat s will result in 3 o ut of every 4 enem y aircraft being destroyed o r probably destroyed. 1.5. An improvement in the efficienc y of the GCI/AI technique has occur red, that may be a tt rib uted mainl y to incre ased skill of the flying per sonnel. 1.6. A not iceable co mponent of the rising success of night fighters is a much grea ter leth alit y of co mbats by Beaufighters. which is not likely to have been caused by the prol ongati on of twilight in he Summer. The report made a number of interesting point s, especi ally those relating to the ca pacity of the system - the number of targets that could be handled by the GCI system a nd the availability of fighters - and the increased leth alit y brought about by improved ski lls and the int roduction of the Beaufighter. The GCI network was rapidly expanding; by Janua ry 1941 six sites were operatio na l (Avebury, Durringt on , Orby, Sopley, Walding Field and Willesborough) and in the first six months it was estimated that 100 German aircra ft fell to int ercepts controlled in thi s way. The rep ort also 's peculated ' on a numbe r of othe r techniques; it pr op osed that AI fighters sho uld be allowed to free-lance rather than a lways bein g closely cont rolled by GC I, and it commented on Long Aerial Mines and a irbo rne searchlights. 3.3. Lon g Aerial Mines. They sho uld not be regarded as a competitor to GCI/AI or free-lance AI, but as a supplement. They will be useful in the ca se of very high den sity raids. They sho uld be used on long-durat ion aircra ft in o rde r th at the y may be used to overco me wea ther limita tion s tha t affec t norm al fighte rs. Th e sketchy evidence available a t the moment is qu ite insufficient to either damn or to pr a ise LAM s. 3.4. Sea rchl ight aircraft. A much better rati o of co mba ts to a tte mpts wo uld be obta ined if illumina tion of the tar get from the ai r ca n be obtai ned a fter clo sing in on AI. Thi s a ssumes, of course, that the enemy is un abl e to ado pt successful countermeasur es, a nd th at the 'forma tion flying' needed does not affect the overa ll efficiency by a great er amo un t than the sea rch light im proves it.
51
52
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Beaufighter of 255 S quadron at Honiley; the A l -equipped Beaufighter "'as the fi rst Indyeffective night-figh ter ill the Command; 255 Squadron operated Beaufighters fro m July 194/ , mo ving to Honiley ill JUlie 1942.
LAM s were to have little future - but the sea rchlight idea was persevered with. There was a steady increase in the number of night sq uadro ns in late 1940early 1941. albeit man y of these were initially eq uipped with Defiant s: for example. 255 Squadron. which formed a t Kirt on- in-Lind sey in ovember 1940 a nd becam e opera tional the first week in January . Fighter Command was better equipped to cope with the thr eat . having six AIeq uipped sq uadro ns. five with Beaufighters. The more capable AI Mk. V a nd improved training also helped to make the defences more efficient. However. there was still a shortage of aircraft a nd coverage of the UK was patchy. with gaps in coverage. The third phase of the German night offensive ran from the middle of Februa ry to the middle of May and was essentially an offensive on British ports. with 36 of the 61 a ttac ks being on port town s in the South-West. British cities were still on the target list: The heaviest night atta ck on Lond on was made in April. with a total of 711 aircraft over the target (the opera tion co nsisted of a double attack) dr opping a bomb load of 1.026 tons of H.E. and 150 ton s of incendiary bom bs. Also worthy of menti on a re the two heavy attacks on Glasgow in May 194 1.' (Bechtle) 'On 12th May. the day the great enemy night assa ult came to an end. the C-in-c' Fighter Comm and told the Night Air Defence Co mmittee that " AI with GCI was the most profitable means of night interception. not with standing the successes obtained by Cats Eye fighters" . He demand ed acceleratio n in the provision o f Bea ufighters. On 11th June he wro te "the expansion of the ight Fighter force is now in sight. and we expect the supply of GCI sets to come forwa rd at a qu icker rate in the future." Indeed. four mo re squad rons were formed in June ( 125. 409. 4 10. 456). although all initially had Defiant s. The German s had reduced their scale of effort in the summer as part of a reorganisa tion of air assets fro m West to East for the invasion of Ru ssia rath er than in respon se to any increase in the effectiveness of the British defences. However. the latter had been recognised and the L uf t waffe began to ado pt various tactics to co nfuse the
DE
ElOP"1ENT RO
defenders. such as low approach and erratic courses. Th e decrea sing scale of losses was no ted by Fighter Command and in a report of 19 Novembe~ was put down to 'vi.gorou s evasive action had become a ro utine measure with enemy pilot s when approachin g our coasts. and they flew low over the sea in the knowledge that by doing so the y could not be "seen" by our radar .' It was not only the GCI rad ar s and Chain Home that had problems of seeing low-level tar gets. as the AI rad ars were inva riably ineffective below 5.000 ft beca use of ground returns masking the target. It was intended to bring the C~ain ~ome Low stations into play to provide better cover and it was hoped that new tactic s With AI Mk. IV would improved performance down to at least 3.000 ft - and new radars under development would be even better. . . By the end of the yea r the Comm and had flown 11 .980 night defence sorties. WIth 4.967 being by Al-equipped aircra ft. The fighters had claimed 258 enem y aircraft out of the estimated 25.334 aircraft that had flown over the UK in thi s period. with a further 131 falling to anti-aircraft guns and 44 to 'other' cau ses. The busiest period had been March to June . both in term s of sortie s and successes. The Fighter ight operations were cons ta ntly under review as they seemed to 'produce few result s but occupied sq uadro ns that cou ld have been used for other purposes. A summary for the period Janu a ry to May 194 1 sho wed 17 Fighter Nights and claims for 41 aircraft. the most successful night being 10/1 1 May when the target was Lond on and 12 aircraft were claimed. The latter appeared to prove the belief that 'close protective patrols by Car 's Eye fighters was only profitable in good moonlight and in clear weather. . . . Thi s form of patrol was only profita ble in highly concentrated a reas of enem y activity.' Defiant crews of264 S quadron; after its disastrous day light career ( despite early promise ), the Defi ant was used by a significant number ofsquadrons for night-fi ghter ops, with 264 Squadron perf ormillg this role to July / 942.
53
54
FI G H T E R COMMAND 1936-1968 , The per formance of the a nt i-aircraft guns had stead ily im proved. and the figure of _0.000 ro unds to down an ai rcraft (Septem ber 1940) had fallen to 2.963 rounds by February 194 I. The guns had a lso been redistributed following the increase in attacks on target~ ot her than London ; by May 1941 AA Command was fieldi ng 1.691 Heavy and 940 LIgh t Guns. suppo rte d by 4.532 sea rchlights . Whenever Fig hter ight opera tions were.underway - the .b right moon light when day fighte rs were employed _ the guns were restnc~ed to burst height s 2.000 ft below the lowest level a t which the fighters would be opera ting.
ight-fi~hter streng t.h was increased with the decision to form specia list Flight s to opera te modl~ed Al-equipped Havocs. the modificat ion being the addi tio n of a highpower se~rchhght (The Helmor e sea rchlight). Each of the se Fight er Fl ight s was to have a.n esta ~hshment ? f 8 + I Turbinlit~ Havocs in wha t on paper look ed like the brillian tly simple Idea ~f taking a se~rc?hgh t mt o the air to help tum night int o day. In essence the system was ~1I~~le. a Turbinlite Ha voc would work as a pair with a sing le-seat fighter and both would initi ally be vecto red to the target by a ground controller. On ce the Havoc A[ ~perator h.ad acq uired the target he would home it. position the fight er and when the time was right , turn on the searchlight to allow the fighter to mak e his attack. . 0.93 Squ adron carried out initial development work. having virtua lly given-up its previ ou s ~ork with the LAM. but it was the formation of No . 1451 (Fighter) Flight at Hu.nsdon m May 1941 that really got the project underway. The Flight was tasked with training four other Turbinlite Flights and it was one of the se. No. 1452 Flight that developed the sta nda rd tacti c. On 6 ovem ber the CO . Sqn Ldr J E Marshall submitted a progress rep ort in which he detailed thi s tact ic; ' In this a ttack. the parasite. when given t~e wo.rd . di ves forwa rd so as to lose a bo ut 500 ft. The A[ opera to r keeps the Turbinlite pIlot.di rected on to the target. a nd gives the pilot the word to illumin at e when he ca n see by his tube s that th~ par~site is appro xima tely 300 yards behi nd the target. Th e para site then ~s the ta~get illuminat ed shghtly a bove him an d is able to make a well-timed and er:ecuve a tta ck. A follow-up rep ort sta ted : 'success in the scheme depe nd s amo ng o ther th ings on eac h member of the crew ta king the co rrec t actio n a t the appropria te moment. As orde rs are passed fro m one to anot her. and as the condition s of the intercept will Turbinlh e team - Ha voc and Hurricane; one of the less successful att empts 01 boosling the night def ences of Fig/lie, Commond
55 seldom be ident ical on two nights. it is clear th at a com plete understanding mu st exist between eac h member of the team . The sa tellite pilot sho uld a lways wo rk with the same Turbinlite pilot .. . it is pa rtic ular ly easy in the first few seco nds to miss an illum inated target .' The original concept was for the Flight to wo rk with single-sea t squad ro ns. alt ho ugh Marshall was con vinced that the fighter needed to be part of the Turbinlite unit. All ten Flights had formed by the end of the year (see ta ble) a nd a ll were eng aged with inte nsive train ing to try and make the system wo rk; it was 1942 befo re they were tr uly part of the night-defence Orde r of Battl e.
Turb inlite Flights Flight no.
Formed
Airfield
1451 FlI 1452 Fh 1453 FIt 145-1 FIt 1455 FIt 1456 FIt 1456 FIt 1458 Fh 1459 FIt 1460 Fit
22 May 1941 7 Jul 1941 to J u1 194 1 27 J un 1941 7 Ju 1 1941 24 Nov 194 1 15 Sep 1941 6 D
Hunsd on West Mailing Wiu ering Co lerne Tangm ere Hon iley Co leme Middle Wallop
Hunsdon Acklington
S hipping Protection After Jul y 1941 the main German da ylight offensive was aga inst shipping. with rou ghly two -thirds of the total effort dedicated to thi s. Before we look at the situa tio n in lat e 1941 it is worth reviewing the overa ll ro le to date of Fighter Co mma nd in the protection of shipping. In the early months of the war the Command had been mounting an average of 1.000 so rties a month in defence of shipping; thi s had risen to 2.000 so rties by earl y 1940 and ove r 3.000 sorties by Jul y. The basic po licy was one of pro vidin g fighter cover rather tha n sta ndi ng esco rt ; the policy was dictated by lack of ai rcra ft but there were occasio ns when sta nding escort was mad e ava ilable. The ea rly battles over the Cha nnel. that were precu rso rs to- the Battle of Brit ain . have been covered above. In ovember 194? the Luftwaffe once more mou nted heavy a ttacks on ship ping. with the.Ju 87s a lso m ~ km ~ a renewe d appearance. O n 6 March 1941 Figh ter Co mma nd received a new Direct ive stating th at the primary task was now de fence of the Clyde. Mersey and Bristol Channel a reas and was told to make 'such cha nges in deployment of his resources as was necessary.' . . T he German view was that the yea r had been pretty successfu l: 'Attacks on shipping targets were carried out making full use of the elemen t of surprise in d ~~time . at da~vn and du sk or d uring nights of good visibil ity acco rd ing to weather conditions. Bom bing a ttacks were made-at I~w-Ievel or in a shallow dive with bombs of 250 kg or 500 kg. The successes achieved in [94 1 with small losses to o urselves were good . As an example the results for the mo nth of overnber ma y be given : these were sunk - 82.100 gross register tons. probably sunk - 49.000 tons. and damaged - 66,000 ton s' (Bechtle) . T his must relate to the ea rly part of the year, before Fighter Command had increased its efforts to counter the threat; in March 18% (2, 103 sorties) of the Co mmand's defensive sorties were on shipping protection an d the enemy sank 21 ships within 40 miles of coast during day light an d a further two a t night. Th e following mon th - after the Directive.had taken effect - the effort was 49'% (7.876 so rties) a nd the losses were down to ten ships. Shol to Dou glas sent a mem o to the Chief of the Air Staff: 'you will be pleased to hear th at for once the Navy is pleased with Fight er Co mma nd.' In Jul y they would have been even more pleased as o nly one ship was sunk in the a rea covered by Fighter Comman? Th ere is one specific con voy pr ot ecti on act ivity that deserves sepa ra te men non the l\lerchant S hip Fighter Unit (M SFU). Debate had been und erway for so me time concerni ng a ship-bo rn e fighter. as the lack of ai rcra ft carriers meant that it was not
56
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
possible to provide this expensive type of air cover. The Chief of Air Staff submitted the following note to the March Chiefs of Staff Committee: ' I am con vinced that neither shore-based aircraft in the numbers that we can hope to provide in the next six to nine months nor gun arm ament can secure our shipping in the Atlantic against the scale and type of long-range air attack that we must now expect . . . the only method of protection likely to be effective is the ship-borne high performance fighter operating from specially con verted ships which must accomp any every convoy in the danger area. I urge that these ships . . . sho uld be given the highest possible priorit y.' The outcome of this was the MSF U, which formed in May 1941 as a 0.9 Group unit under the command of Wg Cdr E S Moult on-Barrett. In essence this called for a single-seat fighter to be mounted on a catapult rail such that it could be launched 'a t an appropriate moment ' to engage the enemy - and then ditch , the pilot being picked up out of the water. The Hurricane was the chosen type, for both its sturdiness and avai lability, and in May sixty aircraft were converted; the overa ll plan called for 200 aircraft, 50 of which would be stored in Dartmou th, ova Scoti a (the ot her end of the Atlantic convoy ro ute) for use on the return trip. . Pit Off H J Davidson made a trial laun ch from the SS Empire Rainbo w on 31 May, which was almost a disaster when his wing-tip touched the water. Further trials pro ved the basic concept and the first operational aircraft were at sea in early June aboard the SS Emp ire Rainbow (Pit Off Davidson) and SS Empire Mo on (Fg Off ARM Campbell) . On I ovember , some 6550 miles West of Achill Head, Fg Off G W Varley laun ched from SS Empire Foam to intercept an Fw 200 Kondor. However, the enemy aircraft man aged to hide in the cloud and Varley was unable to inter cept. After a 2-hour patrol at 3,000 ft, in which the Kondor stayed away , he ditched and was picked-up, after fou r Fighters at sea aircraft.
011
merchant ships; all emergency measure to counter German long range
STORY
minutes in the water, by a destroyer. The fact that the enemy was not engaged was less important than the fact that it had been chased away from the convoy. The avy was also engaged in similar activity with the Catapult Armed Merchantmen (CAM) but this is o utside of our story of Fighter Command. The first success for the MSF U did not come until 25 May 1942 when Fg Off John Kendal sho t down a Ju 88 inside the Arct ic Circle, but in poor weath er he baled o ut too low and was killed - the only fata l casualt y for the MSF U in actio n, although aircraft and personnel were lost when their ships were sunk. A number of combats were flown over the ensuing 15 months unt il the disbandment of the Unit on 7 September 1943, the fina l successful combats having taken place on 28 July. But we have now moved ahead of the Fighter Command stor y. Whilst the Germ an s had been reasonably pleased with the results in 194I, the change s made by the defenders soon altered this view: 'the position changed surp risingly at the beginning of the year 1942. AlA defence aboard the vessels and protecti on of the con voys by fighter aircraft had been strengthened considerably; for instance, K.G.2 lost du ring 5 weeks (FebruaryMarch 1942) 13 crews after scoring only slight successes.' (Bechtle) Offensive Op erations 1941 On 8 December 1940 a Fighter Comm and Order for 'Sector Offensive Sweeps' was issued: these were to made by three sq uadrons in the afternoons and flown above 20,000 ft, the intenti on being to : 'harass the Germans by daily " tip and run" operations, to make them feel flying over Northern France or Belgium is unsafe, and so force them to some system of readine ss in order to protect themselves.' Th is was not the only type of offensive o peration and was not actually the first flown: the first acknowledged offensive mission was flown on 20 December, when two Spitfires of 66 Squad ron attacked Le Touquet airfield, a ' Mo squito' (a code-name that was changed to ' Rhubarb' on 17 Janu ary 194I). The 0, II Group order for these operations sta ted: 'On suita ble days a selected Flight in one Sector is to be " Released" for Mosquito raids. Each Sector is allotted in rotation one day per week on which they are, when the weather is suitable, to Release a Flight for this purpose. Should it be impossible due to weather or any other reason for a Flight to operate on their selected day, their opportunity to do so will be lost for that week and the next named Sector will take over on the day following in accorda nce with he roster. ' Mosq uito raids are only to be undertaken when the weat her is suita ble, that is when cloud cover is ava ilable to enable our fighters to fly in or above clouds, dart out from cloud s to attack hostile aircraft and return immediately into the cloud s. These raids are not to be made when the cloud s base is below 2,000 ft. If conditi ons are found to be unsuitable on approaching the French coast, the task is to be aband oned and aircraft are to return to base. 'The Squad ron Comm and er of the Squadron which is to car ry out a raid is to decide on the number of aircra ft to be employed and on the detailed meth od of car rying out the operatio n. Only experienced pilots are to be detailed. They are not to take unnecessary risks and they are to be told that the object of these raids is to inflict the maximum casualties on the enemy withou t loss to themselves.' The order also gave the rotation of Sectors, starting with orth Weald for 22 December, the first official day of M osquito and then rotatin g through Tangmere, Horn church, North olt, Debden, Biggin Hill, Kenley and back to orth Weald. In the period fro m 22 December 1940 to Jun e 1941 the Command ordered 149 such missions, of which 45 were not completed, usually because of bad weather. Fighters
57
58
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
engaged in 18 combat s. claiming seven victo ries. and also attac ked 11 6 gro und targets. Thi s was a reasonable result for a loss of eight aircraft. The code-name Circus has cau sed some confu sion as it was app lied to fighter and bomber operation as well as a lar ge-scale fighter sweep. These Circus operations. during which a bomber force would attack target s in France. aimed to 'raise and engage that por tion of the Luftwaffe fighter strength based on the Western Front' (Figh ter Comman d operational memo) . The tactic was amplified in the ope ratio nal order of 24 December. which stated that the intent of these missions was to 'take offensive action which will harass the enemy. force him to adopt a defensive preparedness and enab le our patrols to meet him in the air with the tactical advantages of height and surprise.' It continued. ' norma lly not less than six fighter sq uad rons will be employed with o r without the co-operation of a sma ll bomber force. Periodically. to carry out offensive sweeps over occupied territor y with lar ge fighter forces. the fighters opera ting on occasions in company with one of more bom ber squadrons.' It also stated that should no enemy aircraft be encountered then the Hur ricane Wing 'may, on occasions . come down low to attack targets on the grou nd.' Interestingly. the same freedom of action was not permitted to the Spitfire Wings. The first of the fighter sweeps was flown on 9 Janu ary. with I Squad ron and 615 Sq uad ron pat rolling at 21.000ft from Ca p Gri z ez to near Ca lais. and three squadrons (65. 145.615) patroll ing at 22.000ft from Boulogne to St Omer. either formation saw any enemy aircraft. Th ere was a genera l belief that the Lu ftwaffe might prove relucta nt to engage the fighter sweeps. which was why the bombe r option had been included . The first of the Circus missions with bombe rs was flown on 10 Jan uary 194 1. with Bomber Command Blenheims to 'harass the enemy on the ground by bombing the Foret de G uisne, to destroy enemy aircraft in the air or. should insufficient or no enemy aircraft be seen. to ground strafe St Inglevert aerodrome. with pa rticular atten tion to aircraft gro unded and petrol ta nkers.' Th e second such mission was flown on 5 February the target being the airfield at St Omer/Longuenesse. but it was no more successful in provokin g the desired reaction . A few days later the Comman d reaffirmed the aim of these missions as being to 'bomb selected targe ts. and to take advantage of the enemy reaction to shoot -down his fighters under conditions favourable to our own fighters .' A Bomber Comm and an alysis Spitfire of306 Squadron; this Polish squadron fo rmed in August 1940 with Hurricanes but f rom July 1941 10 April 1944 it flew Spitfires.
DE
STORY
showed that alt hough bomber losses were low for this type of mission . at aro und 3%. the associated Fighter Command statistics were not so good. In 9.486 sorties Fighter Command claimed 118 enemy aircra ft - but for a loss of 166. Thi s should not really have come as any grea t surprise. as in essence the tactic was little different from that employed. without success. by the Luft waffe over Britain in 1940. A review of offensive ops to mid Feb rua ry suggested tha t all was not well; Sholto Douglas stated that. 'ou r idea was to fly over the othe r side and leap on the enemy from a great height in superio r numbers; instead of which it looks as though we ou rselves are being leapt on.' The main fighter op ponents were JG 2. with bases to the So uth of the Seine. and JG2 6. with bases in the Pas de Ca lais. both were equip ped with the latest Bf 109 variants and both continued to display skill and aggressiveness. As early as March the suggestion was being mooted that the fighters should carry small incendiary bomb s in makeshift contai ners fitted to the flare tubes as a way of addi ng to the 'offens ive firepower' . Th is was rejected as not being worth the effort. but the concept of giving the fighters a bomb-load was by no means forgotten . Arou nd the same time. approval was being sought for clearance to attack moving trains. which were still forbidden targets. Th is was rejected and it was not until October tha t such clearance was finally given for attacks on moving Goods trai ns; train-busting (Cha tanoogas to the Americans) became a major task for the roving fighters. especially in 1944. In the first six months of M osquito/Rhubarb the Command flew 336 such sorties. 45 of which were abortive. mainly because of weathe r. The most frequent tar get types attacked were ships. airfields. gun and searchlight posts. and road tra nspo rt. with 110 attacks on these types of ta rget. The fighters made claims for seven enemy aircraft shot down and the Command lost eight pilots. The number of Rhubarb sorties more than doubled in the second half of the year. with 886 sorties. October being the busiest month (246). Th e number of target types increased and 297 targets were attacked. with trains and the railway system top of the list (74). for the loss of 19 pilots. Claims were made for 14 enemy aircraft. On 8 October 1941 Fighter Command took over respon sibility for Channel Stop from o. 2 G ro up of Bomber Comma nd; these anti-shipping ope rations were designed The Bailie of Britain had cost the RA F 448 pilots. offensive ops in 1941 cost it 462 pilots. orer halfof these occurring during the Circus operations. Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 731 enemy aircraft. Spitfire BL479 of 316 Squadron.
59
60
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
to prevent German military and merchant shipping using the Channel. Two squadrons, 402 and 607 with Hurr icane bombers were allotted to this task. supported by other units of No. I I Group. The Battle of Britain had cost the RAF 448 pilots. offensive ops in 1941 cost it 462 pilots, over half of these occurring during the Circus operations. Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 731 enemy aircraft (540 of these during Circus ops) but postwar research in German records suggested the real total was only 135. As examples of the discrepancy, on 21 June the RAF claimed 27 victories. whereas German records show only seven. and on the following day the difference was even more marked - 31 claims against two actually lost. This is not to say that the RAF pilots were attempting to inflate their claims; the RAF had a very rigorous process for determining such things. but it was obviously going wrong somewhere, even allowing for some errors in the German reco rds. However, this is not to say that the offensive campaign was ineffective; indeed it was proving very effective both materially and for morale. The material effect was felt with shipping, evidenced by a red uction in coastal shipping activity and the allocation of greater resou rces for protection, ind ustrial production, and military capabil ity. Amo ngst the latter was a direct effect on the combat capability of the two main fighter units, JG 2 and JG26, as combat capabi lity involved more than j ust losses. At the height of the year's offensive, August. the two unit s had only 97 serviceable aircraft out of an estab lishment of 248 aircraft. Th e fact that this was at least in part due to the RAF offensive was proven by the way the units recovered after the scale of the offensive was reduced from mid August; by the end of September both were almost back to full strength. Night Offensive On 21 December 1940 the first night intruder miSSIOn was flown. Blenheims of 23 Squadron ope rating over enemy airfields. This was the start of a campaign that would eventually see Fighter Command notch -up over 11,000 such sorties and make claims for over 500 enemy aircraft destroyed . Fo r most of 1941 it was almost a lone war by 23 Squad ron, who flew 488 of the 559 Intruder sorties in the year. The Squadron acquired Havocs in March to replace the Blenheims and increase the offensive capability and flew the first mission with the new aircraft in April. The scale of the offensive increased with the employment of single-seat fighters; the Hur ricanes of 87 Squadron flew their first mission on 14/15 March, two aircraft 'visiting' the CaenlCarpiquet where they found 20 aircraft on the ground but due to poor weather only managed to claim one . Defiantsjoined in on 7/8 April with 141 Squadron flying their first Intruder. Other squadrons also took part during the year. In ovembe r 1941 the Fighter Command ORS produced a report into the 'relative effectiveness on intrusive efforts' with the conclusion drawn from statistics for January to June and J une to October. The figures were: Jan-J un. 180 sorties with 29 Y, enemy aircraft destroyed . Juri- Oct. 263 sorties with I I \I, enemy aircraft destroyed.
Th is may not at first sight look impressive but the report quite rightly pointed out that destruction of aircraft was not the main role of this type of mission, but rather it was the overall effect caused by the attacks on the airfields: '. . . the bombing of aerodro mes is not , however, the chief mission of Intruders, they car ry a very small bomb-load, and the bom bs they drop cause much greater morale than material damage; the bombing of o ur aerodromes by German intr uders substantiates this.' However, it also said that the 'o nly reliable measure of the utility of Intru ders is the num ber of enemy aircraft they claim to
The most unusual of Fighter Command's offen sive operations lras the deployment of tll'O Hurricane squadrons as No. J5 J ( Fighter) Wing to Murmansk, Russia ill August J94 J.
destroy.' With this it was pointed out that results were not always observed and that 'whatever the actual damage, the morale effect must be considerable. and some German aircraft may have become casualties by having to land on unfamiliar aero dromes after their home base had been attacked.' (ORS Report 0.267 da ted 8 November 1941). By the end of the year the total number of sorties had risen to 575, with 502 of those being flown by 23 Squadron, still the only dedicated night intruder squadron; the remainder were flown by Defiants and Hurricanes. Russian Interlude The most unusual of Fighter Command's offensive operations was the deployment of two Hurricane squadrons as No. 151 (Fighter) Wing to Murmansk, Russia in August 1941. The Wing was part of Force Benedict and formed at Leconfield on 26 July, comprising 81 and 134 squadrons, bot h with Hurricane IIBs. Moving to Hendon in August the Wing sailed for Russia on HM S Argus, landing at Archangel on 30 Augus t and moving to their main base at Vaenga on 7 September. The first missions were flown a few days later and brough t immedia te success, three Bf I09s and an HS 126 having been claimed by the end of the day for the loss of one Hurricane. The detachm ent rap idly added to its score, which soon stood at 15 claimed for one loss. Whilst opera tional sorties. including escort to Russian bombers, were an impo rtant par t of the task, equally impor tant was the training of Ru ssian perso nnel in the erection, maintenance and operation of Hurricanes, as Churchill had agreed to ship 240 cra ted Hur ricanes to Russia. By the time the Wing departed the Russians had three Hurricane squa d rons assembled and ready for action.
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6 -1 9 6 8
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Operation s for the RAF terminated in mid No vember and the RAF personnel returned to the UK, handing the remaining aircraft to the Ru ssians . On their return to the UK both squadro ns re-equipped with Spitfires. Sgt ' Wag' Haw was the top scorer with the det achment, and as such was one of four recipients of the Order of Lenin , the highest Soviet decoration .
1942 - Losing the edge Circus opera tions remained a key element of the Co mmand 's work during 1942, but it is worth noting a special opera tion that to ok place in August that year. On the 19th a raid on Dieppe was supported by the largest array of RAF squad rons yet empl oyed on a single o pera tion, some 68 sq uadrons being airborne. For man y unit s it was their most hectic time since the Battl e of Britain, with up to three sorties being flown during the day. The air battles over and around Dieppe were by far the largest yet experienced, and losses on both sides were rou ghly equa l. Whilst the genera l pattern of o pera tions remain ed the sa me, the RAF's losses on offensive daylight ops increa sed, one of the main reason s being the increa sed numbers of Fw 190s with JG2 6. The Focke- Wulf was bett er allround th an the Spitfire V, with the exception of turning circle, but German tact ics meant that dog-fighting turns were increasingly rare ; the aircraft also had a grea ter ceiling a nd combat s now tended to sta rt a t higher levels. The problems had been fore seen by Fighter Comm and in earl y 1941: in a memo dated 20 April 1941 the C-in-C Fighter Co mmander (Air Mar shal Sir W Sholt o Douglas) expressed his views in answer to the deb ate s on future Spitfire production. ' It is ag reed that we ar e heading for specialisation in fighters and this is inevitable . Specialisati on mu st be between the pressurised and unpressurised fighter. In other words, the dividing line must come on the limit of altitude which ca n be tolerated by the hum an bod y unassisted by artificial pressur e. Let us put this line at 35,000 ft. Below this there can be no specialisation and our aim must be to provide all aircraft (unpressurised) with a per form ance to make them reasonable for fightin g machines up to 35,000 ft. An other class of fighte r for employment up to, say , 25,000 ft, would place qu ite intolerable Fighter Command Group boundar ies and radar corer, 1942.
.... .
FIGHTER Cl:lMMPN;) c;;op IllJl.roCAA£S AJo() OF ACTX:lN FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATtQNS 1942 -:.. ~
.....
"':- ~~J.'
_
opera tional limitations on fighter o perations and could not be accepted as policy. Alth ough the Mk II has merged into the Mk V we mu st a nticipa te it being outclassed by 1942 when nothing below a maximum speed of 400 mph will be of much use to us.' Spitfires were the heart of Fighter Comm and and so the development of the type into specialisations - later designated by LF and HF for Low-Flying and High-Flying cha racteristics - was the direction the Command took , although 1942 was a year of problems and not solutions. In Jul y 1942 the AFDU was able to evaluate 'a Spitfire from an operational squadron' against an Fw 190 that had landed at Pembrey 'in error' the previous month , Acquiring a n intact operational enem y fighter stra ight from a war so rtie was a fant astic oppo rtunity - but it soon confirmed the superiority of the Fw 190 that Allied pilots had already discovered. The report concluded that: 'The man oeu vrabilit y of the Fw 190 is better th an th at of the Spit fire VB except in turning circles, when the Spitfire can quite easily out-turn it. The Fw 190 has better acceleration under all conditions of flight and this must obviously be most useful duringcombat. 'When the Fw 190 was in a turn and was attacked by the Spitfire , the superior rate of ro ll enabled it to flick into a diving turn in the opposite direction . The pilot of the Spitfire found great difficult y in following th is manoeuvre and even when prepared for it, was seldo m able to a llow the correct deflection. A dive from this man oeuvre enabled the Fw 190 to draw away from the Spitfire which was then forced to break off the attack . 'Severa l flights were carried out to ascerta in the best evasive man oeuvres to ado pt if " bo unced" . It was found that if the Spitfire was cruising at low speed and was " bounced" by the Fw 190. it was easily caught even if the Fw 190 was sighted when well out of range, and the Spitfire was then forced to take avoiding action by using its superiority in turning F\I' 190 'in service' with the RAF: 'S everal flig hts \\'ere carried 0 11/ to ascer tain the best evasive manoeuvres 10 adopt if "bo unced" . It \I'as fo und that if the Spi tfire \I'as cruising at low speed and \\'as "bounced " by the FW 190, it \I'as easily caught erel/ if the FW 190 \\'as sighted when well out of range, and the Sp itfire \I'as then fo rced to take avoiding action by using its superiority ill turning circles.'
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT,
OlES AND HISTORY
circles. If on the other han d the Spitfire was flying at maximu m cont inuous cru ising a nd was "bounced" under the same conditions. it had a reasonable chance of avoiding being caught by open ing the throttle and going into a shallow dive. providing the Fw 190 was seen in time. ' If the Spitfire VB is "bounced" it is thought unwise to evade by diving steep ly. as the Fw 190 will have litt le difficulty in catching up owing to its superiority in the dive. 'The above trials have shown that the Spitfire VB mus t cruise at high speed when in an area where enemy fighters can be expected. It will then, in ad dition to lessening the chances of being successfully "bounced", have a better cha nce of catching the Fw 190. particularly if it has the advantage of surprise.' Defensive Opera tions I 9~2 On the defensive front there were three main elements to counter: reconnaissance. ship ping attacks a nd night attacks. The Command flew a tota l of 49,793 interce ptio n sorties in the year , of which just over 14.000 were by night ; the busiest mon th was August, with j ust under to ta l 6,400 sorties. The basic day tactics ha d not changed for either side. a nd the rea lity was that the Luftwaff e was little more than a nuisance a nd co uld per form no real strategic task over land ot her than reconna issance, altho ugh the hit-and-run fight er-bom bers did occupy a grea t deal of Fighter Co mma nd resources, especially when sta nding patrols had to be inst itu ted. There was still the odd surprise, such as a lar ge(ish) a ttac k by Fw 190s and J U 88s on Ca nterbury and coasta l a reas in the evening of 31 October, with some 60-70 aircraft invo lved. Jamming of the British radar ca ugh t the defend ers unprepared a nd the attack was, by German standards for 1942. a success. Th e defe nding fighters claimed six dest royed. five of these to 91 Squadron. with a further five falling to the gun and balloon belt. The Spitfire VI was a specialized version (pressure cabin and a fe ll' other mods ) designed to COl/iller the high-flying reconnaissance aircraft.
Landing Ground at St Alary 's, Isles of Scilly - one of the most remote of the Command's operational airfields. Th e high-flying recce Ju 86Ps were a lmost imposs ible to cou nter and a specia list version of the Spitfire, the Mar k VI. entered service in April 1942 (with 616 Squadron). The entire squadron had re-equipped by early June a nd the comment made by the AFDU pilots on cockpit over -heating was supported by 616. who recorded that 'the major problem was that of excessive heating below 20.000 ft with the pilots gently frying and being unable to do an ything about it. As an interim solution a ban was placed on operational flying below 20,oooft' (616 Squadron O R B). The improved Mark VII entered service in September. The bread-and-butter routine became patrols a t 20.000 ft to 25,000 ft to prevent hit -and -run raids; this produced little result other than a signa l co mplementing ' the efficient patrols kept up by the Squadron which deterred an y enem y aircraft from reaching the SW coast.' Modified Spitfire IXs were also used in the attempt to get at the high-fliers, but the greater significance of the Mark IX was that it redres sed the balance with the Fw 190. The first aircraft went to 64 Squ adron in June but it was some months before it was ava ilable in significant numbers. and for most of 1942 the Spitfire V was the most numerous type with Fighter Command.
Night Defence A fundam ental change in the conduct ofair war look place from April 1942 when reprisals were called for as an answer 10 enemy terror attacks against the Reich which began at that time. Reprisal action opened with massed attacks on the cities of Exeter and Bath. For this all bomber units of Luftflotte 3 were called upon. Even training erell'S of the fourth Gruppen were unexp ectedly ordered 10 take pari. In the course of furth er raids. the latt er. which were still operating with
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
aircraft lik e the Do 17a and He III , sustained painful losses, Thus within a short time the train ing pr ogramme, the imp ortan ce of which lras constantly increasing, lost valuable training personnel instructors, Follo wing the tactics so successfu lly employe d by the enemy agains t Lubeck and Rostock, concentrated raids ofshort dura tion lI'ere carried 0 111 for the firs t tim e to minimise defensive act ion. Outward flights \I'ere made along a single appr ox imat ely com mo n course in stepped up fo rma tion. Incendiaries andflares lI'ere used to ligh t up the target as befo re. The raid on Bath had a really annihilating effect. During the night of the 25126th April, only 4 aircraft 0 111 ofa total of151 ( each aircraft making two flights ) lI'ere lost ( duration of raids 30 min each ) . In the period following. repris al raids Irere carried 0 111 on the lines of the Bath one while the m oon lI'asf ull. Amongst others, fo r ins tance Sunderland, Newcastle, York, No rwich, Bradf ord, Cant erbury and Weston-Super-Mare lI'ere bombed by an operational force of40- 70 aircraft. The enemy def ence, becoming increasingly effective with its single and twin- engin ed night fi ghters, made it necessary to reduce still f urther the duration of the raids ( to 10- 20 minutes by the end of 1942 ) , and each aircraft had in particularly dangerous zones 10 take continuous evasive action sudden changes of course and height smartly executed ). The lu 88 and Do 21 7 squadrons engaged exclusively in shallo w dive-bombing.
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(Bechtle) Despite the propaganda tone in much of the above, it was true that the offensive caught the defenders unaware s. Minor a nd ineffective raid s in late March and earl y April were followed by the first of the major atta cks, with Exeter being hit on 23 April and again the following night , alth ough accuracy was poor. The consecutive attacks on Bath (25 and 26 April) involved more bombers and were more accura te; with 246 bombers on the two nights dropping over 300 ton s of bombs and losing only five aircra ft to the defences . Annex R details the other urb an areas atta cked during this 1943 phase of a ttacks. The night-fighter force had reached a sta ble level by mid 1942, with an average of 25 sq uadro ns, the majority of which were AI-equipped twin-engined squadro ns, prima rily with Beaufighters but with the first Mosquit o unit s also opera tional. Th e Mossie had entered the night-fighter role in Janu a ry with 157 Squadron at Castle Camps, with 223 Squadron next to receive the type. The first opera tiona l sorties were flown on 27/28 Apri l and whilst the Beaufighter proved to be a reliable a nd effective night-fighter, the Mosquit o, especially with the cen timet ric radar (from ea rly 1943) was a tru e expo nent of the art. At the beginning of the yea r the Order of Battle still included six Defiant squad rons, but by the latter part of the year all had re-equ ipped . Better aircraft, the improved AI Mk . VII from spring 1942, better tra ining and a more effective GCI network and controllers all combined to make the night defence s increasingly potent. The Turbinlite Flight s were all operational by early 1942, which in theory boosted the night defence capability, a nd indeed all were upgraded to squad ron sta tus - as 530 to 539 squad rons - in September 1942. However, their operat ion al record was poor , with plenty of flying accidents but very few successes and in Janu ary 1943 they were all disbanded. Fighter Command flew over 16,000 night sorties in 1942, including intruder operations, and claims were made for the destruction of 182 enemy aircraft (43 of those by intruder ops), with a further 43 'Probables' and 137 'Damaged', The Comm and lost 40 aircraft destroyed in night ops over the UK. The Fighter Command Diary summa rised the night operati on s for 1942: 'the yea r was largely one of con solidati on
... Map of the German night offe nsive / 942 showing distribution of bomb tonnage. Note that most targets were close to the coast.
a nd unremitting patrol work. If there were no spectacular achievements, Fighter Command' s success must be measured not by the number of aircraft shot down but by the relatively few occasions on which British towns and industries were troubled by night air attack.'
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Offensive O perati ons At the end of January the Com mand had 55 squadro ns available for offensive operations, all but two of which had Spitfire VBs; most were now organised into Wings but there were questions as to the sta nda rds of training of some of the Wings. With the exception of the Kenley and or tholt Wings, which were considered well trained, and the Biggin Hill Wing, which was 'adequate'. the others were rated by the C-in-C as 'ha rdly fit for serious operations: Th is was qu ite a damnin g state ment and in part reflected problems of experience and morale, and during the year a number of Wing Leaders would be lost, including Bob Stan ford Tuck and Victor Beamish. Durin g the first three months of the year the main offensive operations were Rh ubarbs, with 46 being flown, and Rodeos. 17 flown. The RAF was seriously emba rrassed on 12 Febru ary when the Germ ans executed the 'Cha nnel Dash' when three major combat vessels (Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and S charnhorst ) moved thr ough the English Channel in daylight. Bombers, torped o-bombers, fighter-bombers and fighter escort all went hunting and in most cases failed to find the ships; those that did find the ships failed to do any serious dam age. In strategic terms it meant little as the German Navy had by this time adopted a defensive strategy but it was a morale victory for the Germans. On 17 March Fighter Com mand informed Nos 10, I I and 12 Gro ups that Circus opera tions would recommence, but it was stressed that fighter losses had to be avoided and that target s must be carefully chosen . The targe ts must take account of the radius of action of the fighters. an average of 150 miles, as experience had shown that losses increased close to the limit of range. A tot al of 58 targets were listed by the Air Ministry. The attacks sta rted on 24 March, the targets being the Comi nes Power Station and the The Norwegian 331 Squadron at Catterick; the Squadron fo rmed here in summer 1941.
DEVELOPMENT. ROLES AND HISTORY
marshalling yards at Abbeville. German single-engined fighter strength in the West was aro und 350 aircraft, with a further 80 or so with Reserve Training Units; this relates to units able to oppose Allied operations over France and the Low Countries. For Rhubarbs it was decided that . as previously, the priorit y target s sho uld be tra nspo rtation. including rail, road and river/canal traffic. The o. I priorit y was the destruction of locomotives and interference with fuel distributi on . Electricity switching and tran sformer sta tions were listed as seconda ry objectives. The situation in the middle of 1942 was one of stalemate. Fighter Comm and had the adva ntage of numbers but the balance was redressed in favour of the enemy by the superiorit y of the Fw 190. Until the Typhoon and the Spitfire IX could take part in operations. Fighter Command was faced with two alternatives. It could either maintain the offensive at the level of the previous few month s and accept the possibility of comparatively heavy losses as the price of holding the enemy fighter force. or it cou ld reduce the scale of the offensive, engaging in combat only when its formations possessed some tactical advantage . In either case it was unlikely that the chief aim of the offensive to destroy German fighters - would be effectively realised. (AHB Narrative). However, a major air battl e - the first since the Battl e of Britain - was soon to be fought. Dieppe August 1942 The ' raid' on Dieppe was made by a Combine d Arm s task force dominated by the Canadians and centred on the 2nd Canadian Army; it had strict ly limited aims and was intended to demonstrate the Allies abi lity to land in Europe , conduct a quick operation and then withdraw, with air power playing a vital role in protecting and supporting the atta ck. The brunt of the air comb at was borne by the Spitfire squadrons of Fighter Command. some 48 of which were available for use, including four equipped with the new Spitfire IX. Whilst fighter cover prevented any substantial Luftwaffe interference with the operation, and certainly kept the enemy clear of the vulnerable shipping , in the air comb ats it was the Luftwaffe that ended the day with the higher score, the RAF losing 106 aircraft to all causes and the Germ ans losing 48. The RA F flew some 3.000 sorties in the space of 16 hours on 19 Augu st 1942. In response, the Luftwaffe flewjust under 1,000 sorties. The lessons of Dieppe were to prove invaluable nearly two years later on D-Day but for the Canadians they had been costly lessons. Night O ffensive The night intruder offensive increased in scale as more squadrons were tasked with this activity, especially in the optimum period of April to August. Whilst much of the effort remained targeted against airfields in the first half of the year, the emphasis switched from Ju ne to marshalling yards and trains. The first Mosquito sort ie (by 23 Squadr on) was flown on the night of 5/6 July. but num bers of M ossies remained limited. By the middle of September the Intruder force comprised three dedicated squadrons: 23 Squadro n (Mosquito) and 418 and 605 squadrons, both with Bostons. Added to this were the single-seat squadro ns allocated by the Command when considered appro priate; this force was increased in December with the decision to employ the Typhoons of 609
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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
Squ adron for part-time intruder work. During the week or the full moon, two aircra ft were at read iness a t Man ston for opera tions in the area Walcheren-Lille-Arras-Am iens. The chief task or these aircra ft was to a tta ck enemy aircraft and airfields bu t railways were given as alterna tive target s. If a train was dam aged and halted, the pilot s were to retu rn and report the position to No. 137 Squ adron. Subject to the Co ntro ller's a pprova l. this Squ ad ron would then send a Whirlibomber to a tta ck the sta tionary train with bombs. 'Thus by the end or the yea r the night offensive. altho ugh sma ll in compari son with daylight operat ions , was becomin g a ca refully planned, econ omic way o r using at least a part or the night fighter force' (A H B a rra tive). During December Fighter Comm and received a number or Mon ica sets, which picked up German rad ar tran smissions, and Gee sets, a radi o aid to navigat ion . The Comm and was also lookin g forwa rd to a significant increase in the number or Mosqu itoes with which to extent the night offensive. A tot al or 1,508 night intruder sorties were flown in 1942, during which 299 enem y aircraft were seen and 48 claimed as destroyed, with losses or 38 or the intruders during the year, nine or tho se in June, which was also the month with the highest number or sorties (336). The AHB narrative summa rised the overa ll effect or the Intruder campaign at this stage or the war: ' the effects or intruder acti vity on the German Air Force are not precisely known but prisoner or war reports showed that such activit y cau sed the diver sion or returning bombers eith er to waiting areas or alternative airfields, the adoption or special landing procedures and the use or illuminated deco ys and dummy airfields. Enemy crews were therefore forced to operate with restricted fac ilities and at a higher than normal nervous tension. It is probable that the enem y accident rate was increased: This was an example or o ffensive defence - reducin g the enemy bomber capa bility - but the Intruders were pr imar ily a imed at night fighter airfields in suppo rt or Bomber Command and the sa me comments would apply to these airfields, as well as the shoc k or having aircraft sho t-do wn at the airfield.
1943 - Putting on the Pressure The pace or offen sive o perations co ntinued to increase throughout 1943, whilst the corresponding need for 'H ome Defence' , co ntinued to decline , with little in the way or daytime threat s but still a requ irement for a robust night defence. Th is was a lso the yea r in which two major reorganisati ons or the Comm and took place, one in Jun e and the o ther in ovember. Spitfire IXs became ava ilable in numbers later in the yea r, a nd with more aircra ft a nd more experienced pilot s and leaders, the Command was able to take the initiative and begin the fight for air superiority that would be vital for the invasion or Europe. Morale improved and there was a gener al reeling th at the battle was being won . The tabular summary or sq uadro ns for Janu ary 1943 shows the dominan t role or the Spitfire with the da y squadron s, although there were now eight Typhoon squadro ns, and with the Beaufighter and Mosquito as the main night types. Total establi shed strength was 1,268 airc raft and the Command had just over 1,000 available with crews. The Typhoon had done some good work in countering the hit-and-run raiders but by early 1943 it was generally agreed that it was not an ideal fighter but that its participation in offensive ground-attack ops had shown promise and it was in this role, especially when later equipped with Rocket-Projectiles (RPs) that the Tiffie made a name for itself with 2nd Tactical Air Force.
'Cocky' Dundas and pilots of 56 Squadron with Typhoon; the Squadron lI'as the fi rst to equip with the potentially effective - but initially troublesome - Hawker Typhoon.
War Room S umma r)" of Fighter Comma nd Strength, .Ianu ary t 943 Aircraft
Sq uadrons
Hurricane
I Fit
Spitfire T)"phoon Whir lwind Beaufighter Mosquito Boston
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Boston'H avoc Tota ls
8 Sqn s 2 Sqn s 12 Sqn s 8 Sqns 2 Sqns ? 79 Sq ns, I Fit
Establishment 4 752 128 32 192 128 32 1.268
A vailable with crew
30 633 80 26 151 8-l 19 20 1.063
Th e disbandment or Arm y Co-ope rati on Comm and (ACC) and the form ati on or the Tactical Air Force (TA F) on I June 1943 were part o r the restructu ring or Allied air power in preparati on for th e invasion or Europe; both or these chan ges affected Fighter Co mma nd. When ACC disbanded its components were reassigned to Fighter Comm and and the TAF, with the except ion or No. 72 G roup which went to Technical Tr aining Co mma nd . The Tact ical Air Force (redesignated 2nd TAF from 15 November) comprised os 2, 83 and 84 Groups but to make matt ers more complex it was initially placed in Fighter Co mma nd and was 'under the gener al direction or the Air Officer Command ing-inChief, Fighter Command: 0.83 (Composite) Group had formed on 19 March in order to 'provide racilities for tra ining ground unit s and squadrons to work together under field conditions, and to provide a mean s or working out the full requirements and
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F IG HT E R COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
The Mark XII was the fi rst of the Griff on engine variants and entered service in February 1943 with 41 Squadron. The Typhoon entered service as fi ghter bill was nerer truly effec tive in this role; by the time teething troubles had been resolved it had started to take-on the ground-attack role at which it was to excel,
organisation of a Composite Formation ' (AHB Narrative). The Group had been created out of the 'Z' Composite Group that had been brought together for Exercise Spartan in March and initially comprised four da y-fighter sq uadro ns, four Arm y Support squadrons and two Tactic al Reconnaissance squ adrons. The Group was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal W F Dicks on and was initiall y non-operational, although it did become operational under Fighter Command for its earl y involvement in offensive op s. It was originally intended th at No. 84 Group would form from the existing resource s of No . 11 Group and be commanded by that Group's AOC ; however , this plan was changed a nd when the Group formed in Ju ly it had its own AOC and was part of the Tactical Air Force, a lbeit still initially under Fighter Command. On 12 June Leigh Mallory issued his first directive to the TAF and sta ted that: ' until the preparatory operati on s for the assault across the Ch annel began , the TAF must play its part together with the rest of Fighter Command in the battle for supremacy over the Channel. For the time being he himself would control these offensive operations which were directed by the sta tic fighter Group organisati on (No . II Group). At the same time the Composite Group commanders would be given oppo rtunities to exercise their form ati on s in actual operations.' The result of all thi s was that all tactical a ircra ft in the South-East of England, with the exception of night fighter s, ended up do ing much of the same work which can make it difficult to sort o ut units, missions and sta tistics for the different Command groupings within the overall organisat ion. The form ati on on 15 November 1943 of the Allied Expedition ar y Air Force under Air Marshal Sir Tr afford Leigh-M allory brought the next major change for Fighter Command , includ ing its change of name . The instruction forming the AEAF sta ted th at : ' Headqua rters , Air Defence of Great Britain , is to form in Allied Expediti onary Air Force with effect from 15th November 1943, on which date are to be transferred to its control all such form at ions, stat ion s and unit s in Fighter Comma nd as have not at th at
da te been tran sferred on Air Ministry instruction s, to the 2nd Tactical Air Force or, as independent form ati on , to the Allied Exped itionary Air Force . The squadrons in A DG B and the 2nd TAF will be interch anged and readju sted , as necessary , under the instruction s of the Air Co mma nder-in-Chief.' Air Mar shal R M Hill was appo inted to command ADGB, with his HQ at Bentley Priory. In November Air Marshal Hill was issued with a new dir ective by Leigh Mallory sett ing out his responsibilities: I. To be responsible for the air defence of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . 2. To command the followin g form at ions: Nos 9, 10, II , 12, 13 Fighter Groups, RA F Northern Ireland (operationa l control of fighters), No. 60 Signals G roup, and No. 70 (Tra ining) Group. 3. To control operational activities of AA Command, the Royal Observer Corps, Balloon Comm and and other sta tic elements of air defence controlled opera tiona lly by Fighter Comm and . 4. To conduct defen sive and offensive operati on s which invo lved the use of squad rons of both ADGB and TAF until fur ther notice . 5. To develop air interception meth od s and apparatus for eventual use on ADGB and other theatres.
The prim ary role of ADGB was 's ta nding patrols over coa stal areas and as far as 40-50 miles South of the Isle of Wight' (Fighter Comm and historic al summa ry). Thi s task was dir ectly connected with the invasion preparation s and was intended to deny reconnaissance to the enemy as well as prevent any attempt at offensive action. The final change in the Command structure came on 17 December 1943 with the form ati on of No. 85 Group, which formed using six day and six night fighter squadrons from No . II Group. Its task was the defence of the 'base and lines of communica tion' of the Allied Expeditionar y Fo rce when esta blished in Fr ance ; however , until the Group moved overseas the opera tional control of its aircraft was assigned to the AOC of No. II Group.
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
The Spitfire IX was produced in large numbers [around 5.665) and was ..ital in clawing back the comba t advantage from the Fw 190.
Aerial photo of Biggin Hill, with rllmm y overlay, 1944; having been a key airfi eld in the Battle of Britain, by late 1941 Biggin Hill was on the offensive S ell ding its Wing ranging ol'er north ern France.
bomber units suffered heavy losses. A great number of opera tions had to be abando ned because of weather conditions. Fighter-bomber attacks which had been carried out fro m spring 1942 until May 1943on targets in South and South-East England and on shipping along these coas ts had also proved too costly in relation to the results achieved. Therefore nuisance raid s were carried out thereafter by night only by the two new highspeed bomber Gruppen, one being equipped with Fw 190s and the other with Me 410.'
Defensive Operations 1943 The expectation was that the established pattern of fighter-bomber hit-and-run raids would cont inue and tha t they would continue to be ineffective, other than on civilian mor ale. and would remain very difficult to counter. Fighter Command estimated that up to 200 fighters could be employed in this role, although the Joint Intelligence Committee believed that the scale of o peration wou ld be far less than this. The y both agreed that the Germans would operate in the same area as previously and with the same range of targets. Likewise, shipping would remain a primary target for the Germans. The RAF had resorted to the use of standing patrols to help counter these raids; this was never an ideal solution as it placed a strain on the defenders without providing an effective counter. The Typhoon sq uadro ns were tasked with much of this work as the Typh oon was believed to be the best fighter aircraft for intercepting the low level raider, but it had not yet pro ved altogether successful in this role and was under going teething troubles with its Sabre engine. Five Typhoon squadro ns - I. 257, 266. 486 and 609 - were allocated to this role by maint aining standing patrols or keeping aircraft at immediate readin ess. A number of Spitfire squad rons also held read iness - 122, 331, 332, 340, 4012 and 611- whilst the Spitfire Xll s of9 1 Squadron maint ained readine ss to deal with longrange bombers on day attac ks. and for con voy protection . The German conclusion for the year, as expressed by Hpt Bechtle in his lecture was that: 'The day-time nuisance raids were almost exclusively spread over the southern and south-east ern area of England, and from 1943 did not extend beyond the lat itude of London into the Midland s. In this type of operation. consisting of bombin g and strafing,
Night Defence 1943 The Germ an High Comm and was not impressed by progre ss of the night operations against the UK and in March 1943 a new sta ff organisation was created. Angriff afuehrer (England Att ack Comm and ) to control the bomb ing operations of Fliegerkorps IX. The total Germ an night effort against overland targets in 1943 was 2,055 sorties. flown on 133 nights. in which 1,985 tons of bombs were dropped . The greatest weight of bombs had fallen in the Lond on area. In the same period Bomber Comm and dr opped 136,000 tons of bomb s on Germ any. RAF defenders still compri sed a mix of AI-equipped and Cats Eye. although the latter only pro vided aro und 15% of the monthly effort and from June onwards this steadily decrea sed. RAF night-fighter claims for 1943 were 133 destroyed, 18 probab ies and 34 damaged, with the effectiveness of Al being shown by the fact that 131 of the 133 were by Al aircraft. The AHB arrative summary for the second half of 1943: 'After the raids on Hull and Grim sby in early July the character of the night bombing changed from one of occasional raids by heavy bombers to sporadic attacks by high-speed bombers such as the Fw 190 and Me 410; target s were found in southern and south-east England coastal towns rather than in the north-east. The British air defences were clearly more than a match for the enemy, for although the Do 217 was better equipped with defensive armament than other Germ an bombers. it could not. becau se of the greater weight, easily evade night fighters once they had marked it down . The two features of enemy night atta cks in the latter part of 1943 were attacks by intruder aircraft on air fields in the Midlands and East Anglia in retaliat ion for the increasingly powerful combined bomber
75
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
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.Fighter leadership consists not in scoring personal victories but in the achievement of success with the whole Wing. My job would be to lea,1and 10 fig ht. . Offensi ve sweeps by the Spitfire / Xs of Fight er Comm and 'I'OI/Id playa maj or role in securing air superiority.
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offensive and , secondly, renewed a ttacks on London by fighter-bombers in the autumn, accompa nied by the dropping of " duppel" [the German equ ivalent of " window"]. From July to December 1943 the enemy flew some 818 long-range bomber, 165 fighter-bomber a nd seven reconnaissance sort ies overland - a total of 990. The RA F claimed the destruction of 66\1, and the gun s another 20\1,: On a major raid , Bomber Command would be putting nearly 800 bombers over a single target in one night. Offensive Operations 1943 The majority of offensive sorties were escort for bomber form ati ons , the majority of these being the American da ylight bombers. with Fighter Comm and providing cover in the immed iate area of the UK and to the enem y coast. The range and combat duration of the RAF's fighters were incre asingly cau se for concern a nd was one of the major Typhoons of609 S quadron at Mansion. / 943; by Sl/mmer / 943 the Command \l'as spending virtually all of its day effort on offensive missions, albeit at a rising cost in aircraft and pilots.
Map of German night offensive /943 showing distribution of bomb tonnage.
77
78
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
HISTORY
limitati on s of the Spitfire - it was a great aircraft but there was not room for more intern al fuel and the only alterna tive was drop-tank s. The fighters eventu ally used two main drop-tanks, the 45-gallon and the 90-gallon , the concept being to use that fuel first and then drop the tanks when combat had to be joined . The idea was sound but the tank s were problem atical. At a time when USAAF P-51 Mu stangs were starting trul y longrange escor ts, includ ing Berlin, the RAF's fighters were look ing distinctly short-legged. One possible solutio n was, of course, to eq uip with Mustan gs; this option was eventually taken-up but for now the priorit y for P-51s was with the USAAF. Typical of the new Fighter Comm and form ati on s cha rged with this work was o. 127 Wing, which formed a t Kenley in May 1943, with a n initial strength of two Canadian sq uad rons (403 and 416) equipped with Spitfire IXs. Wg Cdr 'Johnnie' Johnson was one of the most effective Wing Leaders a nd later wrote ; 'fighter leader ship con sists not in scoring person al victo ries but in the achievement of success with the whole Wing. My job would be to lead a nd to fight.' Nig ht Offensive Operations The pattern of night offensive ops followed that of 1942 with Intruder, Ranger, Rhuba rb and Mahm oud so rties target ing airfields a nd tran sportation, especially rail facilities. There was a n increase in the use of the Mosquit o a nd mor e squadro ns being tasked , although not permanently allocated to the night role; for example , in Maya total of 395 sorties were flown by 17 sq uad rons; of this total 225 were Intruders, 166 Rangers a nd four Rhubarbs. A new type of ope ratio n co mmenced on the night of 15/1 6 June when five Beaufigh ter Serrate ops were flown as part of the wa r against German night-fighters. The equipment was initially fitted to the Beau fighters of 141 Squadron and intensive trails were flown at Drem from May 1943. The eq uipment was able to det ect enemy Al transmissions at up to 100 miles and it was to play an increasing role in the anti-fighter war , especially with No . 100 Group (Special Duties ) Group from late 1943.
Mosquito of 23 Squadron; the Squadron had recei..ed Massies ill JUlie / 942 but it \I'as some time before the type came 10 dominate the night-fighter strength of Fighter Command.
I
A Bf 11 0 was claimed on that first night a nd despite a high percent age (23%) of technical failures with equipment, the system was considered to be effective. Fighter Co mmand ORS report No . 494 examined the results of Serrate operations in the period to 617 September; on the 233 op s flown, 1,180 cont act s were establi shed of which 108 were con verted to AI pick-up; there were a total of 49 attempts at intercept, with 33 going to visual, which resulted in 20 combats a nd claims for 13enem y aircraft destroyed. The poor perfo rmance of the Beaufigh ter was co nsidered to be one of the main reasons for the low(ish) conversion rate; '. . . the classical curve of pur suit meth od of homing on to a Serrate contact irrespecti ve of its ran ge has had to be modified. The crews suggest that no intercept sho uld be attempted on Serrate cont acts more than 4-5 miles away, unless they are head on.' It was also commented that 'the Serr ate equ ipment is so sensitive in recording changes in azimuth and elevation of the target that the crews prefer to use it if possible for the whole of the intercept ion, using AI as little as possible for occas ionally checking the range .' The solutio n was to put the equ ipment in the Mosq uito. which took place in late 1943. The Comm and flew 3.278 night offens ive sorties in 1943, losing 60 aircra ft and maki ng claim s for 72 enem y destro yed, altho ugh it must be remembered that for man y sor ties destru ction of enemy aircraft was not the primary aim. The busiest, and most successful, month was August with 551 sorties claiming 12 aircra ft. This month included the first Mahmoud sortie (22/23 August); this type of mission was defined as: 'operations by night fighters against enemy night-fighters out side the radiu s of Bomber Comm and operations or on nights when Bomber Command was not opera ting.' By the end of the year 11 9 Mahmoud so rties had been flown.
1944-1945 - Invasion of Europe and the end of the war The command and control of squadrons, which had started to become confused with the crea tion of ADGB and the TAF continued to be confusing in the first half of 1944. It is ofte n difficult in the records to discern who a part icular unit was 'owned ' by. especially as aircraft types a nd roles often appear ident ical, So. we have ADG B sq uadro ns operating aga inst ground targe ts in France a nd we have AEAF sq uadro ns flying defensive ops in the UK! No. 85 (Base) Group, an AEAF organisation, still had all its squadro ns under the operational control of ADGB in the first half of 1944; this including os 141 , 142, 147, 148, 149 and 150 Wings. As we did for the latter part of 1943, the operations by fighter and fighter-bomber units are treated as a single organisation unless a defined difference can be made . At the start of Janu ary, ADGB's day squadro ns comprised ten ' long-range' Spitfires, nine Spitfire VB, two Spitfire VII, two Spitfire IXF, two Spitfire XII , ten Typh oon and three Mustang FR. In 2nd TAF's fighter element there were 15 Spitfire, nine Must ang and six Typhoon squadrons. Although ADGB flew 3,700 offensive so rties in Janu ary this was exceeded by the growing, and dedicated, fighter/ fighter-bomber strength of the TAF, who flew 5,430 such mission s. By March the ADGB contribution was down to 1,456 sorties - but even so this was still a significant figure a nd showed that the Command was not entirely defensive. Man y of the stati stical summa ries for this period include ADGB and 2nd TAF without splitting into the respective Commands; for example, in the period Janu ary to May 1944 the combined stati stics for offensive opera tions was a loss of 299 aircraft . with only four pilot s saved, and claims for 291 German aircraft destroyed. USAAF fighters claimed a further 1,226 for the loss
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
of 463 of their own. However. German records suggest a total loss of only 338 in air combat but with a significant number of aircraft being destroyed on the ground. for example . 124 in May alone. Interestingly, the Germans also had 407 non-operational losses in the same period, which is a reflection on the lower quality of pilots and training and the overall impact of the Allied assault on airfields. The latest. and in some opinions the best, Spitfire variant entered service in 1944. In January 1944 Spitfire Mk . XIV RBI4l was delivered to the Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford for tactical trials, although in the same month it was also issued to the first operational unit , 610 Squadron at Exeter. The general conclu sions from the AFD U were that : 'the Spitfire XIV is superior to the Spitfire IX in all respects. It has the best allround performance of any present-d ay fighter, apart from range.' One of the trials was flown against a Bf 109G. 'The Spitfire XIV is 40mph faster at all heights except near 16,000 ft where it is only 10mph faster. Climbing at full throttle it draws away from the Me 109G quite easily. The Spitfire XIV easily out-turns the Me 109G in either direction; it is superior to it in every respect.' The Fw 190 was more or a problem ; the trials involved flight against a 190 with a BMW 80 1D engine and concluded that : 'In defence, the Spitfire XIV should use its remarkable maximum climb and turning circle against any enemy aircraft. In the atta ck it can afford to "mix it" but should beware the quick roll and dive. If this manoeuvre is used by an Fw 190 and the spitfire XIV follows, it will probably not be able to close the range until the Fw 190 has pulled out of its dive.' Whilst escort and sweep remained a major task for the fighter squadrons, especially the Spitfires, there was an increasing call for ground-attack, a role performed by the Typho ons and Hurricane IVs. The Spitfires too began to take-on more of this role, Spitfire XI V RB146; 'the Spitfire XI V is superior 10 the Spitfire IX in all respects. It has the best all-round perf ormance ofany present-day fighter, apart fro m range.'
DEVELOP'1E
T
~OLES
ND HISTORY
81
initially with strafe but then as fighter-bombers with the additi on of under- fuselage and under-wing bombs - much to the disgust of some fighter pilots! .. A memo from General Arnold (Commander USAAF) to ACM Portal (British Chief of Air Stall) queried the Spitfire's combat ran ge and the British ' reluctance' to make best use of their substantial fighter force: Overlord hangs directly on the success of our combined aerial offensive and I am sure that our fa ilure 10 decisively cripple both sources of German air POIlW and the GAF itself is causing you and me concerti. I am afraid that Ive are not sufficiently alert to changes in the overall course of the air war. In particul~r I ref er 10 the f act that we are not employing our fo rces in adequate numbers aglll~,st the GAF in being, as well as his facilities and sources. On my part I am p ressing Eaker to get a mu ch higher proportion of his fo rces off the ground and put them where they will hurt the enemy. One of his main poin ts was the lack ,of fighter support for the daylight bombers: as presently employed it would appear that your thousands of fighter~ are not mak ing use of their f ull capabilities. Our transition fro m the defen sive 10 the offe nsive should surely carry with it the application ofyour largefi ghter fo rce offensively. Is it not true that we have a staggering air superiority over the Germans and we are not using it?
Arnold also made the point that the P-47's basic design had a shorter range than tha t of the Spitfire but when fitted with long-range tank s it was work ing well as an .escort. The implication was that the American daylight offensive could be far more effective and less costly if the RAF's fighters were used as escort s and emplo yed in an offensive ADG B Aircraft St re ngth, J une t 94-1 way. The RAF respon se was that attempts No. oj were being made to improve the range of Establishment squadrons Type the Spitfire but that an external tank only gave an extra 50 miles and besides, 'our 4+2 1 FIt Hurricane liB fighter force has been designed to obtain air 16+2 13 Spitfire LF.V 16+ 2 3 Spitfire VII superiority over northern France, for which 16+2 4 Spitfire tX it is eminentl y suitable .' 16+2 4 Spitfire LF.lX Between I April and 5 June ADGB flew 16+2 2 Spitfire HF.lX 18,639 sortie s in support of the Overlord 16+2 I Spitfire XII 16+2 3 Spitfire XIV plan, claiming II I victories for the loss of 16+2 2 Tem pest V 46 fighters. The total Allied air effort in this 16+ 2 1 Mustang III period was 195,255 sorties with 2,655 claims 16+2 2 T yphoon 6+0 and 1,987 losses - which put s the ADGB I FIl Typhoo n 16+2 1 Hurrican e li e effort into perspective! The June 1944Order 16+2 2 Beaufigbter of Battle for ADGB, including No. 85 16+2 9 Mosquito XI IIXIII Group, comprised 54 squadrons, as shown 16+2 4 Mosquito XVII 16+2 2 Mosquito VI (Intruder) in the table . By 10June fighters were operating from Noles airfields in France and increasingly from that I. Established for two Mosquito XXX squad rons (2 19 date the offensive was mounted from the and 456) but not yet re-equipped . 2. No t including three Seafire squadrons of Fleet Air Continent, as were defensive sorties over Ann under operational control. the area occupied by the Allies. Over the next few months the direct role of ADGB
82
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
continued to decline and its focus became much more a defensive one . By November, and the loss of No. 85 Group, the number of squad rons had decreased to 46Y:z, which still included five squadrons on loan from 2nd Tactical Air Force. Defensive Operati ons 1944 With the invasion of Europe all fighter assets were committed to suppo rt the invasion; for ADGB the role was two-fold - defending the home base and supp orting the offensive. Ensuring that the Germ an s were kept in the dark abo ut Allied dispositions the fighter force worked hard at keeping enemy recce aircraft at bay, as well as making sure that no bombers could att ack the cro wded marshalling and embark at ion areas. The offensive over Europe was so intense that the Germ an s had little o ppo rtunity to consider offensive action of their own, with the exception of some night activity. Night Defence 1944 A large part of the Germ an night effort was against airfields and followed the pattern of the night intruder raids flown by the RAF, with strafing and bombing of airfields and the attempt to shoo t-down aircraft in the circuit. These attacks were usually by loan Me 4 lOs or Ju 88s and between January and May 82 aircraft made attacks on airfields, with a further 33 attacks on dumm y airfields; April was the busiest month when 35 att ack s were recorded and the RAF had 13 aircraft destro yed. Att ack s were still being made on cities, with London receiving ab out one-th ird of the tot al tonn age, and the overall scale of effort was higher than in 1943; indeed the 1943 total had been exceeded by April. The first of the new att acks on Lond on took place on 21122 January with two waves of bombers, totalling 447 aircraft. A second major raid was mounted on 29/30 Januar y, with 285 aircraft. Both caused damage but losses were high at 57 aircraft (7.5% of the atta ck forces). Nuisance raids had been carried out on Lond on on six other nights in Map of German night offensive 1944 showing distribut ion of bomb tonnage. ~.'NC ON Gl'lEAT MtT.lN IN 1944
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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Janu ar y. The City was atta cked on seven nights in Febru ar y, by a tot al of 1,200 bombers with Germ an record s stating for the attack of 3/4 Februar y 'enemy night fighter defences were particul arly strong .' Alth ough Lond on remained the focus of attention in March, attacks were also made on Hull and Bristol The RAF's night-fighter force was now very effective and was almost entirel y Mosquito, with nine squadro ns of Mosquit o XII/X lii and four of Mosquito XVII, with the final two Beaufighter sq uadrons in the process or re-equ ipping. In addition the Command fielded two intruder squad rons with the Mosquito VI. Between January and June the Command flew 2,312 sorties and made claims for 145Y:z aircraft destro yed, plus 21 probables and 30 damaged . A further 70 bombers were shot-do wn by anti-aircraft fire. German records more o r less agree with this total of just over 200 losses. The RAF lost only three night- fighters in this period. The final night raid on the UK took place on 27/28 June, the targets being the USAAF airfields at Bungay and Seething. Thi s did not mean that Britain was safe from night att ack; the Germans o pened a second blitz - da y and night - using the V-I flying ' bomb. Second Blitz At 0418 in the morn ing on 13 June 1944, the peace at Swanscombe , near Gravesend, Kent , was shattered by a fierce explosion. The first of Hitler 's new ' terro r' weap ons had landed on English soil. Within an hour, three more of these V-I flying bomb s had come to earth - one crashing into a railway bridge at Grove Road, Bethnal Green , in Lond on , and causing six death s and a substantial amount of damage. Intelligence report s had been building since 1943 and it was evident that the weapon would eventu ally reach operational status, and that Lond on would be on the receiving end. Thu s, in December 1943 a series of studies were undertaken to determine the most effective air defence structure to protect the capit al. It was very much a return to the early days of air defence, with a plan for thr ee zones; fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and balloons. However, the problem could not have arisen at a wor se time, as the planning staffs were devotin g time and resources to buildin g the invasion force, and were reluctant to commit any additi onal aircraft and guns to the defensive scheme. The revised Diver plan of February 1944 called for eight day-fighter squadrons, plus a number of night-fighter units, but for a lower total of anti- aircraft guns. In the 24-hour period from 2230 on 15 June to 16 Jun e 1944, British record s show 151 reported laun ches, with 144 V-I s crossing the English coast. Of those, 73 reached the Lond on area . Th e defences notched up only a modest score, seven falling to the fighters, 14 to the guns and one shared, whilst a further eleven were shot down by the guns of the Inner Artiller y Zone. Th e Hawker Tempe sts of No. 150 Wing at Newchurch had been at readine ss for defensive patrol since dawn on 15 June . Early the following day the Wing Leader, Wing Comm ander Roland Bearnont , and his No.2 were airborne on such a patrol when they sighted a V-I. Giving chase, the fighters were eventuall y able to carry out an attac k, and Beamont scored his first flying bomb 'kill', the missile crashing near Faversham. Overall. however, it was an inauspiciou s sta rt. Too man y bomb s had reached the Lond on area, but there was no simple solution to the problem . The V-I. spanning a little over 17 ft 6 in, made a very small tar get, and it flew fast (300-4 00 mph ) and low. One first had to find this small target; then came the challenge of actua lly shoo ting it down. The
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
official RAF account of the campaign summarised the speed problem: 'as for the fighters, the short time in which interception had to be made , demanded that they should be quickly and accurately directed on to the course of the bomb.' By the third week in June the defences had started to settle down with guns and balloons in place and with eight single-seat fighter squadrons and four Mosquito squadrons deployed on anti -Div er patrols. It was also planned to increase the gun belts to include 376 heavy and 540 light guns and for an increase in balloons from 480 to 1,000. The initial aim for the fighters was to intercept the flying bombs over the sea, but there were numerous difficulties with this. The technique was one of 'close control' where the fighter was vectored to its target by one of the radar stat ions involved in this ro le Fairl ight, Swingate and Beachy Head. However , even on a good day the best pick-up was a maximum of 50 miles from the coast, which gave the controller and fighter a maximum of six minutes to complete the interception. Overland the technique was different because of the problems of radar tracking of the ta rget; here the technique was 'ru nning commentary' with the position and course of the bomb being broadcast to all fighters worki ng that frequency , it was then up to the fighter to work out his own intercept. The tracking inform ation came from radar and from visual reports, mainly by the ROC. Mustangs joined in the defence following a request from ADGB to 2nd TAF, with initially one Flight of 316 Squadron being transferred to this role on I July . This proved successful and a few days later an entire Mustang Wing was allocated, flying their first sorties on 12 July. The day fighter defences had now increased to 13 squadrons: four Mustang, three Spitfire XIV, three Tempest, two Spitfire IX and one Spitfire XI I. It was important to dedicate aircraft to this role rather than mix roles as they were stripped of unnecessary equipment and external fittings and even had camouflage paint removed so that they could be polished - all in an attempt to gain a bit more speed. Engines were also tweaked and 150 Octane fuel used. The net result was an average improvement of 15-30 mph. Tempests of 501 Squadron joined the fray in August, having re-equipped with the type in late July around a core of experienced pilots from the F lU; the first sorties were flown on 5 August and a week late r the Squadron was re-designated as a Night Operational Squadron - an even trickier role. However , it was one in which they achieved notable success (see 'Opera tions' chapter). The first phase of the flying-bomb campaign ended on I September 1944, with the Allied capture of those V-I launching sites within range of London. By mid August the ADG B effort was at its height, with 15 day-fighter and 10 night -fighter squadrons tasked with the anti -Dilw campaign. Although the campaign never resumed with the same intensity, from September 4 to 14 January 1945, the city was subjected to attack by V-Is launched from He III 'mother' aircraft of I/KG.53, from over the orth Sea. Defensive patrols remained in force, but there was even less warning of attack , so the ideal solution was to destroy the parent aircraft before they launched their weapons. A Wellington was fitted with ASV VI to act as an airborne radar and fighter control station, entering service in January. In the overall campaign the Germans launched some 9,252 flying bombs, of which ju st under 5,900 crossed the English coast and 2,563 of those reached the London area. Around 4,000 flying-bombs were destroyed by the defences, the Fighter Command summary claiming that 1,847 were destroyed by its fighters, with 1,866 falling to AntiAircraft Command 's guns, 232 to balloons and a mere 12 to naval gunfire .
DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
Meteor of6I6 Squadron; the RAF entered the jet age ill July 1944 with 616 Squadron acquiring Meteor Is.
The V-2 ballistic missile was a weapon that was impossible to stop once it had been launched - so no air defence system was possib le and the only effective cou nter was to destroy the production, storage and launch facilities. The Allies expended a huge effort on this type of site for all the V-weapons; ADGB/Fighter Command's part comprised 4,300 sort ies (and 1,000 tons of bombs) hunting for the sites - with a rocket that was about to be launched being the prime (but rare) target. These Big Bell missions were flown by most Allied fighters and fighter-bomber types. O ffensive Oper ations 1944 Throughout 1943 and early 1944 much of the Allied air effort had been dedicated to preparing the way for the invasion of German-occupied Europe. By spring 1944 the intensity of operations was increasing as the date for D-Day, 6 June 1944, approached. The directive issued to the fighter forces stated: The intention of the British and American fighter forces is to attain and maintain an air situation which will assure freedom of action for our forces without effective intervention by the German Air Force, and to render maximum air protection to the land and naval forces in the common object of assaulting, securing and developing the bridgehead. A veritable air armada of P-5l Mustangs, P-47 Thunderbolts, P-38 Lightnings and various marks of Spitfire was ranged ready for batt le as RAF units of Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) and the 2nd Tactical Air Force joined with the American VIIlth and 9th Fighter Commands. The overall plan was for the American units to provide the bulk of the escort and high-cover patrols, while the low cover , especially over the beaches , was provided by RAF Spitfires. The entire invasion area was to be given a layered screen of fighters - the first squadrons to be in position by 0425 on the morning of 6 June 1944.
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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
~ADlI or ACTION rOR OHENSIVE riGHTER OPERATIONS
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, A large number of Advanced Landing Grounds \I'ere constructed in southern England fo r the air build-up fo r the invasion of Europe; Merston, 1944.
The Allied fighter Order of Battle included the RAF pro viding 55 sq uadro ns of Spitfires, plus a number of Mustang and Mosquito units , out of an overall fighter strength of 2.000 aircraft. It was considered that the overcrowded airfields in England would make ideal target s for German tip-and-run fighter-bombers. so each airfield was required to maint ain a fighter flight on stand-by. The direct involvement of ADGB on D-Day comprised 91 Spitfires as part of the beachhe ad cover and a furt her 40 Spitfires on a sweep over airfields in Brittan y and atta cking any transport they found. In June ADGB and its associated form ations flew 8.474 offensive day sorti es. an increase of 1.000 on the previous month. This included 25 Circus and 21 Ram rod operations. with airfields, lines of communication and power stations being the main target types. The RAF claimed the destru ction of 61 aircraft during these offensive ops. for the loss of 36 pilots. It was also noted that the 'enemy had retaliated with such vigour tha t fewer aircraft were destro yed than in the previous month and losses were heavier'. In the period immediately after the D-D ay land ings. the ground forces were in danger of being bogged down , and in the absence of heavy weapons they had to rely on air power as ' flying artillery'. Th e Spitfire squadrons carried out a good deal of this type of work, and after a while became qu ite proficient. The 20 mm cann on pro ved to be a remark ably good air-t o-ground weapon against all manner of 'soft skinned' vehicles, alth ough it was unable to cause any serious damage to the average German tank. The night offensive throughout the year was still primarily aimed at supporting the operations of Bomber Comm and by disrupting night-fighter operations (intruder work) and engaging enemy night-fighters with RAF fighter s, with S errate playing an increased
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Map showing radius of Action for figh ter off ensive operations January 1943 to May 1944.
role. Alth ough the form ation of o. 100 Group in December 1943 provided a dedicated force for this work . ADGB units were still import ant and in February 1944 Air Marshal Harris stated that an increased effort was required to disrupt the main nigh-fighter bases such as Gilze-Rijen. Leeuward en and Venlo. By early July he was demanding a force of 100 night-fighters and the redoublin g of attac ks on airfields. The reply from the Chief of the Air Staff was that the UK's night defences could not be weakened; however. LeighMallory was informed that pro vided he did not neglect the air defence of the UK his squadro ns were to give full support to the bomber offensive. Th e majorit y of the night offensive effort in the earl y part of 1944 was against airfields. with the introduction (or more accurately renaming ) of the pat rolling of night fighter airfields as Flower ops. From Janu ary the Mosquito Vis of 0. 2 Group jo ined in the Flower ops and between January and May a total of 623 Flowers had been flown. 233 of these in May. However. May also brought an increase in atta cks on transport ation. including trains, barges. shipping and MT . Within the overall Allied strategy the invasion was of primary import ance in summer 1944 and both day and night missions were tasked with this in mind, the bulk of the night sorties being Intruders. It was not until November that direct support of night bomber operations was resumed . much of the Bomber Supp ort role becomin g the responsibility of a number of specialist Mosquito sq uadro ns with No. 100 Group of Bomber Command.
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August 1944-i\lay 1945 With the Allies ashore and established. further Command chan ges took place in the RAF with ADGB reverting to its Fighter Command title on 15 October 1944. still und er Air Marshal Sir Roderic Hill. The Command had been given a new Directive on 22 September that recognised the changed threat to the UK. recognising that there was no significant threat West of a line from the Humber to Southampton . Fighter defences supported by full radar and Royal Observer Corp s covers were to be maintained East of the line Cape Wrath- Falkirk-Leyburn-Tamworth -Brackley-Gloucester- Bourn emouth, including the Shetland s and Glasgow-Clyde area. Redu ced defences were to remain to the West of this line but those in orthern Ireland and in the Portree-Oban area could be withdra wn. Th is led to the disbandm ent of o. 9 Gr oup, which lost its opera tio nal commitments on 4 Augu st and the rest of its dutie s on 18 September. It also saw o. 10 Group become semi-operational. leading to disbandm ent in May 1945. A number of Sector HQs were also closed. At the end of December the Command fielded 31 day and nine night squad rons. The former included II units with the Mustang III whilst the latt er included a Tempest unit that specialised in night ops again st flying bombs. From autumn 1944 to the end of the Second Wor ld War the Comm and had four main roles: I. Offensive operations aga inst rocket s and flying-bombs; this primarily involved fighter-bomber attacks and armed reconnaiss ance against launch sites, storage sites and comm unications. 2. Defensive operations against attacks on bomber airfields and minelaying off East coast. 3. Long-range fighter to escort Bomber Command day o perations. 4. Night-fighter squadro ns for offensive ops in support of Bomber Command night operat ions. The final few mon ths of the war saw Fighter Command strength dr astically reduced from its high point in January 1943 of over 100 squadrons. In Janu ary 1945 it had 41 squad rons fiel ding a tota l esta blishment of 634 aircraft, which now included a large number of Mu stang Ills (234 aircraft) . Th is arrival of Mustangs was not always well received. in December 1943 Mustangs had arrived to re-equip 65 Squad ron: ' Men stoo d open mouthed with disbelief. This simply couldn't be true. Mustangs! P-5I s! American ju nk! To exchange our beloved Sp its for such rubbi sh! Had the blood y Air Ministry brass gone off their rockers? Th is was intol erable! How low could they sink? Th at evening the pilots gave vent to their anger in a drunk en brawl. resulting in fairly expensive repairs having to be carri ed out to the Mess.' (To ny Jonsson in Dancing in the Skies. Grub Street 1994) The last throw of the dice as far as German intruder operations over England was concern ed came on 3/4 March 1945 - Operat ion Gisella had been planned for some time and was intended as a mass attack on Bomber Comm and by following the bombers home and hittin g them over England and at their airfields. Over 140 Ju 88s took part and the first bomber shot down was probably a 214 Squadron Fortress. which crashed at Woodbridge in Suffolk. The operation lasted less than three hours and the RAF lost at least 24 bombers, but the defences were quick ly in action and eight of the att ackers were shot down. with three others flying into the ground and others being written- off to various causes.
DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND HISTORY
Day Fight er Operations Fighter Comm and remained heavily involved in air operations in the latt er part of 1944. initially still under the cont rol of HQ AEAF; this included suppo rt of the airborne assault on M ark et-Garden in September. However, when Bomber Com mand was released to return to its offensive camp aign. by day and night. the Comm and provided escort for the former and ' bomber support' for the latte r. The first of the daylight attac ks took place on 27 August when 243 bom bers attac ked the Rheinpreu ssen synthetic oil refinery at Meerbeck, near Homberg. Thi s was the first daylight atta ck on Germ an y since August 194 1 and it was escorted by nine sq uadro ns of Spitfire IXs - all of whom. had nothin g to do; the lone Bf 11 0 that was seen very sensibly made off in the opposite direction ! Despite intense flak over the tar get no bom bers were lost. Th is type of long-ran ge escort became a ro utine part of the Comm and 's work and up to 14 Mustan g and five Spitfire sq uadrons were eventua lly dedicated to this role. The Mustang was increasingly being used by Fighter Comm and for this role and by September there were seven squad rons of Mu stang Ill s. the four origina l squadrons. 129, 306.315.316 had been jo ined by 19. 65 and 122 sq uadro ns which had tran sferred from the 2nd TAF. Actu ally it had been an exchange deal in which Fighter Comm and also acquired four Spitfire IX squad rons. having given up five Tempe st and two Spitfire XIV squad rons. The number of Mustang units conti nued to increase as sq uadrons exchanged their beloved Spitfires for the American fighter. such that by the end of Apri l 1945 the Command included 16 Mu stang squad rons. Although the Mustangs had a better combat radius than the Spitfires they were still restricted as they had no fuselage overload tank s. The radiu s of action of these Mu stang s. after allowing 15 minutes at a fuel consumption of 60 gallons per hour for man oeuvring under combat conditi ons and a 10% fuel reserve. was not more 450 miles' (AHB Summary) . It was decided to fit extra tank s to the Mustang s and Spitfires despite fears Spitfire LFXV/ R 11'3 96 ill polished aluminium fini sh.
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FIGH TER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
that this wou ld affect combat performance, but the ideal solution according to Fighter Command was to have usable airfields for refuelling on the Continent. These restrictions do not appear to have concerned the USAAF to the same degree and their Musta ngs were regular visitors to the Berlin area. When airfields such as Ursel, Belgium. became avai lable the Command's Spitfires were ab le to provide escort 100 miles East of the Ruhr. In February 1943 the Air Fighting Developm ent Unit flew co mparative trials between a Spitfire IX and Mustang X. Th e Manoeuvrabilit y section had this to say: T he aircraft were compared a t varying height s for their powers of manoeuvrabil ity and it was found thro ugho ut tha t the Mu stang. as was expected, did not ha ve so good a tu rning circle as the Spitfire. By the time they were at 30.000 feet the Mu stang's cont rols were found to be rather mushy. while the Spitfire's were still very crisp and even in turns du ring which 15 degrees of fl ap were used on the Mustang. the Spitfire had no difficulty in out-turning it. In rate of roll. however. it found that while the Spitfire is superior in rolling qu ickly from one turn to another at speeds up to 300 mph. there is very little to chose between the two at 350 mph lAS and at 400 mph the Mustang is definitely superior. its con trols rema ining far lighter at high speeds than tho se of the Spitfire. When the Spitfire was flown with wings clipped , the rate of roll improved at 400 mph so as to be almost identical with the Mustang. The manoeuvra bility of the Mustang. however. is severely limited by the lack of directio nal sta bility which necessitates very heavy forces on the rudder to keep the aircraft steady.' (A FDU Report No. 64, Februa ry 1943). From mid October to the end of the year Fighter Co mma nd escorted 59 bomber raids. which amou nted to 6.794 fighter sorties. the majority of which were recorded as ar d uous but boring. In the few combats tha t occu rred claims were made for 15 enemy aircraft. for the loss of 20 RA F fighters to all causes. The escorts were largely successful and of the 124 bomber losses the vast majority were to fla k. During one escort mission of 5 December the escort s reported over 100 Ge rman fighte rs - by far the largest number seen for a long time a nd an indication. although the Allies did no t yet know it, of a reinforceme nt in preparation for the German offensive that was being planned (the Ardennes Offensive - the Batt le of the Bulge). From Janua ry 1945 to the end of the war Fighter Command flew a furthe r 102 bomber escort missions (8,878 sor ties) as well as 29 fighter sweeps over orth -West Ge rma ny. Th e level of bomber ops increased in March with the Allied prepar ations for the crossing of the Rhine a nd the fighters were kept busy - o r a t least they flew lon g so rties but usually with little to do except watc h the bom bing. T he table shows Fighter Com man d stre ngth had increased from 36 squadrons and 713 aircraft in 1939 to a high point of nearly 2.000 aircraft and 101 squa dro ns in 1943. The statistics in the latter part of this table are misleading a t first glance and suggest Fig hte r Command srreagt h, 1 939 -t 9~ 5 a massive and sudden decline after early 1943 but in reality this was prima rily a re-alloca tion OTU D a ll: Squadrons Strength s trength of squad rons following the formati on of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. with Fighter Jan \939 36 713 Command becoming ADG B and man y of Jan \9 40 51 888 85 Jan \941 73 210 1.362 its units being tran sferred to the new tactical 97+ 10 Fit s Jan \942 573 1.9\ 6 forma tions. Th is trend contin ued into early Jan \943 101+1 Fit 1.852 643 1945 with the decreasing thre at to the UK Jan 1944 70H Fits 1.365 899 and the movement of more squadro ns to the Jan 1945 4\ 815 637 Continent.
DE
ElOPMEN
ISTORY
1946-1968 - The Cold War As with all major wars there was a disba ndme nt process at the end of World War Two; indeed it had started in la te 1944 as the war a ppea red to be almost won. By 1946 the rundow n of RAF strength was in full swing and included saying farewell to man y of the Allied squadro ns tha t had form ed such a n impo rta nt part of the combat ca pability; many of these went home, with their aircraft, to build a peace-time air force. The re were also major changes in personnel as the RAF decided on its peacetim e structure and who it would keep and who it wou ld let go; some of those that stayed went down a number of ran ks in order to remain in uniform , By mid 1946 the Com ma nd had reached a low point in st rength with only around 500 opera tional aircraft. Late Mark Spitfires and Mu stangs were the major types bu t the num ber of jets was also on the increase as it was already recognised tha t the future lay with the jet. The concept remained that of dedicated day and night fighters. with the Mosquito continuing to shou lder responsibility for the night role. Fig hter Co mmand stre ng th, t 9~5- 1953
Totul with all units
Operat ional Sqns Dale
UE
Str ength
3\ 27 23 3\ 3\ 3\
929 6 12 496 533 603 712
1.032
May \945 Ju n 1945 May \946 Jan 1951 Jan 1953 Dec 1953
UE
Str ength
1.1 3\ 1.328 1.363
1.200
66\
496 59\ 605 585
1.339
1.277
Xote s I. The 'all units' column includes operational.communications. training and miscellaneous. The slats for December 1953 include 7121585 opera tional. 51182 comm un ication s. 5211523 training and 79/87 miscellaneous. 2. The slats for operational units 1951-1953 include squadrons of the RAuxAF. with an average of 160 UE and 158 strength o f aircraft in these units; the remaining aircraft were with the regular squadrons.
The first post-war Cvin-C, Air Marshal Sir James Robb (since May 1945). made it clear that all was not well and that his reduced force cou ld not defend the UK. especially as there was increasing realisation that peace meant peace with the defeated Axis powers but looming confrontation with an old ally. Russia. not that this directl y affected Fighter Co mmand (yet) as the Russia ns were unable to reach the UK and the immediate problem lay in mainland Europe. The Wing concept was still in use. with day-fighter Wings al Bentwa ters (56, 74 and 245 squadrons) and Boxted (222. 234 and 263 sq uadrons), both with Meteor F.3s. whilst the Odiham Wing (54 and 72 squadrons) had Vampires. The Command's final piston type, the Hornet, had entered service in 1946 but saw limited service. Auxiliar y sq uadro ns began to re-equ ip with jets and the M ossies too gave way to night-fighter variants of the Meteor a nd Vampi re as Fighter Co mma nd became a n all-jet force. Th e Wing concept was modified to have two day and o ne night squadro n. alt ho ugh this was not universally true. and the Control a nd Reporting system. including the a rrangement of Sector s. was changed.
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
DEVELOPME
T, ROLES AND HISTORY
tra nspo rts and the tension was high: additional Allied fighters were deployed to the area and Fighte r Command came to a higher sta te of alert. Th e Airlift lasted a year. ending in May 1949 but its end led to a stand-off across Eastern Europe with the formation of ATO and the Warsaw Pact. Hencefort h, Fighter Comm and 's main enemy was the Warsaw Pact and the thr eat from Soviet long-range bombers. with the added requirement to support ATO in other areas and the RAF in its world-wide com mitments. Th e communist threat expan ded in 1950 with the outb reak of the Kor ean War.
Pair of Hornets of / 9 Squadron; the Hornet was the Command's filial piston type but only sail' limited service
(Peter Green Collect io n).
By early 1951 the situatio n was stabilising in terms of organisation and eq uipment and strength had started to rise - and by then it had become clear that conflict was always a possibility. Berlin Airlift Th e RAF and USAAF had placed sizeable air forces in Germ any at the end of the war and tensions continued to increase. culminating in the Russian closure of land access to Berlin. The Allies decided to suppo rt their part of the city by air and the Berlin Airlift was born , the first flights being made on 28 June 1948. Russian fighters buzzed the Meteors of6/6 Squadron with post-war RA IV code; Meteors become the mainstay of the Command ill the post-war period ill both day and night versions.
Korea n War The RAF 's participation in the Korean War was limited. although a number of pilots flew with units such as the Meteor-equ ipped 77 Squad ron of the RAAF. and with USAAF F-86 Sabre units. The real significance for Fighter Comm and was that Korea was the first true jet air-war and the perform ance of Western and Soviet types could be com pared. Th e Meteor was fo und to be wanting whilst the F-86 Sabre gave a good showing - as did the Soviet types such as the MiG-15 . The RAF had swept-wing fighters in development but the only immediat e solution to a perceived capabi lity gap was the acq uisition of Sabre s from the American s. 'When the Korean War broke out. no fighter able to cope with the foreseeable thr eats was fully developed and the decision was taken to press ahead with the pro duction of the Superm arine Swift, alth ough in normal times this would not have been do ne without more thorough preliminar y trails. Despite strenuous efforts to overcome its defects. the Swift proved in the end unacceptable to the Service except for certain specialised roles.' In ovember 1950 a development contract and production order for 100 Swifts was signed as ' the Swift represented the only possible way of getting an up-todate fighter in service in the time available .. . but then beset by problem s.' Th is summary appeared in the 'Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates (1956-19 57) the Supply of Military Aircraft' . Th e pro totype crashed after only 3-hours flying and the first produ ction airc raft did not fly until August 1952. However. the prog ramme was persevered with and there was no cancellation of orders until 1955. The Russians jo ined the military atomic age in 195 1 and the need to defend UK airspace against Russian bombers became even more important. and was to remain the rationale of Fight er Command for the rest of its existence. As the bombers would be unescorted the fighter task was back to where it was in the I930s - a bomber destroyer with no need to dog-fight. although the lessons of the late 1930s and Korea were not wholly forgo tten. Tactics were once more to find the enemy and get behind him to use guns to effect his destruc tion. Th ose guns were now of heavier calibre. with the 30 mm Aden can non as the sta nda rd weapon. Fighter Command had three swept-wing fighters enter service in 1954. the Swift only went to a single squadro n and the Sabre to two others. although both types also served with units in Germ any, Of greater significance was the arriva l of the Hawker Hunter with 43 Squadron in July and although the early F.l s had their problem s. it was not long before the first of the classic Hunters, the F.6, was in service. Nevertheless. this was still a day fighter with no radar and limited ar mament of four 20 mm cann on. A 1955 plan called for Fighter Command to have just over 900 aircraft. with 75% of those being day fighters, including the Auxiliar y Air Force contribution of 160 aircraft. The thr eat was now very firmly identified as Russian long-range bombers. potentially armed with nuclear weapons and able to attac k in bad weather and at night. Th ere was an increasing
93
NO HISTOR
Meteors of 141 Squadron ar Co/tis/mil. 1953; Meteor NF.II s entered service I ..ith the Squadron ill August 1951.
need. therefore. for a missile-armed all-weather fighter. In addition it was also generally agreed that fighters needed more speed. ideally supersonic (over Mach 1) and more range . requirements that did not really go hand -in-hand in this era before the ad vent of air-to -air refuelling. All of these elements were under development in the early 1950s. alth ough it would be the latter part of the decade before they entered service as operational aircraft. Vellom night-fighter at Waterbeach.
Ja velin XA 636 ill company with Hunter XF440; the Javelin I I'O S the RAF's fir st true AIIWeather fi ghter.
Problems and future plans The 'Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates (1956- 1957) - the Supply of Military Aircraft' state d that in its deliberatio ns it had taken evidence from a wide range of experts. including the aircraft industry and military. In his interview with the Committee on 6 March 1956. Captain F Hopkins. Director of the Nava l Air Warfare Division stated that 'if we had much more money and greate r resou rces we would prefer.
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
in order to keep up to date, to introduce a new type of fighter, bomber and anti subm arine aircraft every two years . That would ensure that we always had pretty modern aircraft in service at any time. We obviously cannot afford to do that. and so we have to ma ke each aircraft as it comes into service last much longer in the front -line and in the latter half of its life it is obsolescent. ' Whilst this was a nava l comment it equally applied to the RA F and it was an economic factor that was to affect Fighter Command throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Shortly before this interview the Command's latest fighter had entered service, with 46 Squadron at Odiham receiving its Javelin FAW .ls. 'Colonia l Reinforcements' In addition to its primary role of defending UK airspace, Fighter Co mmand was also called on from time to time to contribute to reinforce ot her operational areas. This included involvement in the 1956 Suez conflict, with the Command deploying aircraft to Cyprus. However. the majority of such tasks. and they were fairly frequent were on a smalle r scale. Typical of the minor involvements was that of 65 Squadron in 1958 when they flew their Hunter F.6s to Cyprus to cover the withd rawal of British airborne forces from Jordan . Indeed, because of the troubled nature of the Midd le East , Cyprus became a regu lar detachment base . Later it was to become a routine destination for Fighter Command squadrons on Armament Practice Camp (A PC) to take advantage of the good weather factor for intensive aerial gunnery practice. Mi ssil e era The Select Committee report made depressing reading as it dealt with the problems of develop ing fighter aircraft and the 'suggestion' that manned aircraft may have a limited future . Some elements have been referred to above but the real pointer to future thinking stated tha t 'as aircraft become more expensive, complicated and difficult to maintain there would have to be fewer of them .. . moreover in modern warfare the stage was being reached when fighters wou ld no longer provide any pro tection, at any rate in the UK, and the place of conventio nal air weapons might be taken by ballist ic rockets.' All of Fighter Command 's re-equipment plans were thrown into confusion in the 1958 'Outline of Future Policy' statement by Defence Minister Duncan Sandys, which predicted a reduction in manned fighters in favour of surface-to- air missiles (SAMs). Decline of the operational fighter force had already set-in . with aircraft strength falling from 600 in 1956 to 326 in 1958; this decline accelerated over the next five years. reaching 272 in 1960 and a mere 140 in 1962. The SAM entered service in December 1958 with 264 Squadron setting up the first Surfa ce-to-Air Missiles became a central part of air def ence. with the main type in RAF service being Bloodhound.
DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND H STORY
Bloodhound site at orth Coates, pomting out into the North Sea ready to engage Soviet bombers day and night. Over the next two years expansion of the missile cover was rap id and by autumn 1960 there were ten squadrons deployed . However. the promised supersonic interceptor a lso entered service in June 1960. with the Lightning F.I going to 74 Squadron at Coltishal!. The Javel in force declined in the ear ly 1960s as the Lightning force expanded and Fighter Command's main operational strength for its last few years comprised Lightnings and Bloodhound SAMs. The growing threat of the Warsaw Pact in the la te 1950s led to reorganisation of NATO's air defences into a number of Air Defence Regions (ADRs). which included the U K AD R. Fighter Command now had a dual role of protecting the U K and protecting the UK ADR; however. the UK was seen as one of NATO's main air base locations for massive reinforcement from America and as such would become home to American fighters (and other aircraft) thus boosting the defence capability. Improvements in radar. the increased use of air-to-air refuelling to give the Lightnings a rea listic chance of engaging the enemy out over the sea, and better AAMs all helped improved the overall capability as the very real threat of a Co ld War turning into a nuclear war remained the prime co ncern . Fighter Command retained this posture to 1968 when a major reorganisation of the RA F took place and the old Command structure was scrapped in April that year. the four main operational commands being rolled -up into a new Strike Command. The first commander was the man who had undertaken the study a nd proposed the change, Air Ma rshal Sir Dennis Spotswood. Having been in existence since 1936, Fighter Command had made its name during the few months in 1940 when it fought the Ba ttle of Britain but that brief period carried with it a wealth of emotion and feeling. Strike Command cou ld never evoke the same feelings as Fighter Command. Lightnings of 56 Squadron at Wattisham, December 1963; the Lightning lI'as the last nell' aircraft to enter service with Fighter Command prior 10 its disappearance into Str ike Command in 1968.
97
OPERATIONS
CHAPTER
Two
Operations Ten Little Fighter Boys Ten lillie fighter boys Tak ing off ill line, aile lI'as ill coarse pitch, Theil there lI'ere nine. Nine lill ie fig hter boys Climbing through 'the gate' aile's petr ol wasn' t all, Theil there lI'ere eight.
Eight lillie fig hter boy s S cramb ling up to heaven aile "real'er' didn't, Theil there Irere sere ll. S even lillie fighter boys Up to all the tricks, aile had a hango ver, Theil there lI'ere six. Six lillie fighter boys Milling over Hythe. a ile's pressure wasn 't up, Theil there Irere fire.
Five lillie fighte r boys Over France's shores, a ile flew reciprocal, Theil there Irere four. Four lill ie fighter boys J oining ill the spree, aile's sight lI'asll't all, Theil there Irere thr ee. Three lillie fighter boy s High up ill the blue aile's rubber pipe lI'as loose, Theil there Irere tll'O. Tiro lill ie fighter boys Homing out of S UIl, FieII' st raight and level, Then there lras one. aile lillie fighter boy Happy to be home, Beat up dispersal, Theil there lI'as none. Tell lillie Spitfires nothing have achieved, A O C at Group is I'ery , I'ery
peeved. 'Fifty thousand smackers Thro wn down the drains 'Cos tell silly buggers Didn 't use their bra ills.
From its form ation in 1936 Fighter Command expected that in the event of war it would be combating slow. poorly-arm ed and unescort ed bombers over the UK in daylight. Its eq uipment and train ing were based on this threat premise. Four years later it was all to be very different. The outbreak of war in September 1939 put the Co mmand on high alert with the expectation that German bombers would appear within hours of the declarati on of war. Germ an aircraft did appear over the UK but the first significant
Formation of 85 Squadron Hurricanes out of Debden; the Squadron departed Debden fo r France 0 11 9 September 1939 and by N o vember had mo ved into LilleiSeclin, where it stayed until mid May - the Phoney War ha ving elided ill spectacular fashion with the German invasion 0 11 /0 May.
combat for the Comm and was from bases outside of the UK - on a small scale in orway and a larger. and more worrying. scale in France. The deployment of Hurricane squadro ns to France on the outbreak of war brought some cont act with the enemy in the remaining months of the year but all fairly small-scale. For the sake of ease, the April 1940 Norwegia n campaign is con sidered before the September 1939-June 1940 French campa ign. Norway Two sq uadro ns took part in operations from bases in orway in late spring 1940. It was Fighte r Comman d's oldest type, the Glad iator tha t first moved out to comb at the enemy in Norway; the Gladiat ors of 263 Squ adron left their base at Filton in late April and sailed to orway aboa rd HMS Glorious . Th ey were initially based at Lake Lesjeskog and Bardufoss but afte r a few days returned to the UK. only to come back again on 21 May aboard HMS Furious. along with a second carrier and a Hurricane squad ron. The Hurri cane Is of 46 Squ adron had been based at Digby since Janu ary 1940 with little to do other than train. and mount convoy patrols. On 9 May they moved to Abbotin sch to embark on HMS Glorious. three aircraft having been at Prestwick since 3 May for carri er-landing trials by Fleet Air Arm pilots. The carri er sailed on 14 May in com pany with HMS Furious (with 263 Squadron on their second venture to orway). An advanced part y was asho re at the Skaanland landin g gro und by 18 May and declared that it was not ready - so the carr ier sailed back to the U K. only to set-off once more on 24 May and eventu ally disembark the 18 Hurri canes on 26 May. Two aircraft of the first two Flights were damaged on landing so the rest were diverted to Bard ufoss. The first comba t pat rol was flown by a Flight of three Hurric anes from Skaanl and but the o rders were not to intercept unless their own airfield was thr eatened. A form ation of He II Is
99
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Wreck of 263 Squadron Gladiator at Lake Leskajog; the Norwegian expedition by t\\'o of Fighter Command's squadrons lI'as short-lived.
was spotted but as they were 'going the other way' no attempt was made to intercept. An uneventful sortie was followed by another landing accident so the Squadron reunited at Bardufoss on 27 May. The first patrol over Narvik, the main area of interest for the British, was flown that evening. again with no action, However, the following day the Hurric anes had their first success with Fg Off Lydall shooting-down a Ju88 and with two four-engined flying-boats being strafed on Rornbaksfjord. The following day brought six more kills for the loss of three Hurri canes with two of their pilots, The day also brought DF Cs for Fit Lt Jameson and Pit Off Drumm ond , The Glad iators of 263 Squadron had been flown aboa rd by FAA pilots on 12 May and having sailed in the convoy of 14 May the Squad ron was ashore at Bardufoss on 21 May, The main base was at Bardufoss but with a detachment at Bodo (where there is memoria l to the Squadron), On 22 May the Squadron mounted 54 sorties and reported three combats, one of which ended with the loss of Pit Off Craig-Adams , alth ough as an He III was found near the crash the conclusion was made that the two aircraft had collided in cloud . In its 13 days of operations the Squadron had flown 389 sort ies, had 72 combats and claimed 26 enemy aircraft , One of the Gladiators still survives; N5641 has been restored and is in the air museum at Bodo. The British venture was all but over and the main task of the fighter s in the first days of June air cover of the evacuation of British forces. On 8 Jun e both squadrons were aboard HMS Glorious for the return to the UK; it was a nightm are as the Germ ans now effectively controlled the sea and the carrier was sunk on 9 Ju ne. with 46 Squadron losing ten aircra ft. its Comm and ing Officer and seven pilots. Battle of France Under the terms of the Alliance with Fran ce. which along with the joint guarantee to Poland had effectively broug ht Britain into the war. the British were to dep loy forces to fight in France. Settling in to their airfields and to the delights of local towns. the RAF fighter pilots cont inued to train whilst providing patrol s and. from time to time, escort
5
101
Hurricanes of601 Squadron being refueled; the Squadron moved to France in February 1940 as part of the continued build-up (some would say, drain) of Fighter Command ill Fran ce.
for Battles on recce flights, It was all very quiet and serene and as such became known as the ' Phoney War '. The first confirmed success for the RAF fighters in France came on 2 ovember 1939 when Fit Lt Robert Voase-Jeff of 87 Squadron downed an He Ill. 0, I Squadr on was based at Vassincourt from 9 October. as part of 0. 67 Fighter Wing. and got their first victory early in ovember, as recorded by the author of 'Fighter Pilot - A personal record of the Battle of France' . It was a beautiful S W lIlY day, with 110 low clouds bill quite a lot of Cirrus and Cirrostratus, and a bit of Altocumulus. I \\'as on the aerodrome by my machine when Il'e heard the noise ofunfamiliar aircraft engines, After a lot ofneck-craning and squinting we sa\\' it - a Dornier 17 imm ediately above the aerodrome at about 20,000 ft. travelling Il'est and j ust visible in the thinner clouds. Like all German aircraft of the Luftwaffe it \\'as painted light-blue underneath, and was difficult to see. The French A.A. opened lip bill \\'ere nowhere near it. This \\'as the fi rst Hun we'd seen, and \\'e were pretty excited. Sgt. S and I took off in pursuit , but of course had to watch our take-off and lost him. At 3,Oooftll'e sail' him again, but lost him S OOIl after. Up and lip we clambered, turning gently f rom side to side and straining our eyes to fi nd him. We never sa\\' him again, and at 25,000 feet, with ollr sights alight and gun-buttons all 'Fire,' we cursed like hell and came down after some fifteen minutes ' search Aft er lunch we weill lip to the aerodrome again No t long afterwards a Hurricane dived across the fie ld rocking its wings, turned, came back, and repeated the performance in all obviously excited manner. It turned 0 111 to be 'Boy ', who had come to the Squadron ill June. He had apparently just finish ed refuelling aft er a patr ol ol'er the aerodrome when the same Dornier weill over. He took off immediately, without waiting fo r orders, pulled the 'plug ' ( boostoverride}, lost the Hun, clambered lip to abollll8,OOOft - and fo und him. He did
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS to be m ore or less 0 11I oj con tro l. ' Pussy ' then flew alongside the Germa n to make sure the p ilot was dead. H e sail' him slumped in his sea t, his head lolling to one side. Su ddenly , 110 wever, the Dornier throttled back, swerved on to ' Pussy's' tail, and put exactly 34 bullets thro ugh his aircraft. H earing them rip through ' Pussy ' duck ed - thereby saving his life, fo r a bullet penetrated the lock er behind his head, smashing the windscreen - and pushed his stick forward. Clouds of white smo ke ( which proved to be glycol) were pouring fro m his eng ine, which was stopped, and Pussy undid his straps and prepared to bale 011I. Th e 'smo ke ' stopped. however pres umably the glyco l was all gone - and so he did his st raps up again andforcedlanded safely with his undercarriage retracted. Meanwhile, Killy and S, the Nos 2 and 3 oj 'Pussy's' sec tion, attacked, and with bo th eng ines on fire the German forced-landed m ore or less safely. Killy and S circled round and sail' him lI'ave as they passed loll' overhead. Th ey then returned and landed. Th e Dornier lI'as fo und to ha ve at least 500 bullet-holes in it - not eno ugh, considering that three H urricanes had had a go at it. Apparently the pilot had had to lea ve his seat to lock the gun with which he had sho t ' Pussy ' do wn. We all felt that this German had pili up a damn ed good show, and as a tribute to the spirit that all pilots adm ire, we determ ined to hav e him to dine with us as our guest . Th e Fren ch authorities were ,'ery reluctant to part with him , bill eventua lly he lI'as allowed to come with Billy , whom lI'e had sent to fe tch him.
Pilots oj I Squadron pose outside oj the Mess. an ordinary s traight astern attack , and fired one longish burst with his sights s tarting abo ve the Dornier and m o ving slowly round the fuse lage. Th e Hun caught fi re immediat ely , went into a vertical spiral, and eventually made a large hole in th e French country-side. It exploded on strik ing the gro und. and there were no survivors.
24 November brought more acti on, with 1 Squadron claiming two Dorniers, with another three falling to 73 Squ adron, and the two squad rons sharing a Heinkel Ill . OJ our 11I'0 D orniers, one was intercept ed by th e ' Bull' and Hilly near M etz. Th ey att acked alt ernately and continually fro m ast ern until the Hun went into a steep spiral and crashed in flames near the lines. I rem ember talking to the CO over the RlT and hearing him sing 0 11I: 'It's all right, we 'l'e go t another one fo r the Squadron near . . . ' 'Near where?' I asked, 'S ay again , ' and he repeat ed ' Homburg, as in ha t!' Th e Heinkel III was also brought down near M etz , and was intercept ed by Blue Section. It was on fire, and losing height rapidly , when a bunch oj French M oranes came rushing in. all so eager to ha ve a bang that one oj them kn ock ed m ost ojSgt . C- 's tail oJ! H e put up a very goo d sho w by ge tt ing the ma chine back to the aerodrome, though he had to land at 120 mph to k eep cont rol, overshoo ting and turning over. I sml' him j ust aft er this little effort, and though he was laughin g, he was trem bling lik e a leaf and could hardly talk coherently. I sail' his aircraft, too: one elevator and half th e rudder were completely gone. A sect ion fro m I Squadron, led by ' Pussy', attack ed the other Dornier about 20 miles north oj the aerodrome. ' Pussy ' led the attack fro m dea d astern. By the time he had used all his ammunition the rear-gunner and na vigator had escaped by parachut e, one eng ine was on fire, and the Dorm er lI'as losing height and appeared
The main acti vity over the winter period was lone recce a ircra ft, usually at high level a nd pro vidin g little oppo rtunity for engagement as by the time they were spotted they were unreachable. The enemy fighters seemed reluct ant to cro ss the bord er but in mid April th at changed and German fighter sweeps to Metz and ancy ocurred, but at medium-high level and with no significant combat. Both sides a ppea red to be sizing each ot her up; what the Allies did not know was that there were only a few weeks to go before the Blit zkrieg commenced. On 10 May the Wing opera tions room reported ' plots all over the boa rd '. It was a hectic da y for the RAF fighters, with fighter patrols, escort to the Hurricanes at da wn, Vassinco urt. ' He took oJJ immediately , witho ut waiting Jor orders, pulled the 'plug' (boost-override), lost the Hun. clambered lip to about 18.000Jt - and found him. He did an ordinary straight astern attack, and fi red one longish burst with his sights start ing above the Dormer and moving slowly round the fuselage. '
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AASF - and being on the receiving end of Germ an bomb s. The 109s were o ut in strength and this was the first time the Hurricanes came up against their opposite numbers in major battles . The IIOs were also in action and pro ving no match for the Hurricanes, as recounted by a pilot of I Squadron: We went infa st in a tight bunch. each ojus picking an adversary and manoeuvring to get on his tail. I selected the rear one of two in line-astern who were turning tightly to the left. He broke (/Iray fro m his No. I when he had done a half-circle and steepened his 111m. bill I easily turned inside him. holding my fi re until I was within 50 yards and thenfi ring a shortish burst at three-quarters deflection. To my surprise a whole lot oj bits fl ew off him - bits oj engine cowling and bits oj his glass-house. and as I passed j ust over the top oj him. still in my left-hand 111m. I watched fa scinated as he went into a spin. smoke pouring from him. I remember saying. 'My God. hall' ghastly!' as his tail suddenly swivelled sideways and came right off. while flam es poured over the fuse lage. Then I sail'. with relief, a little white parachute open beside it. Good! I look ed quickly around me. Scar cely halfa minut e had passed. ye t as I looked I saw Jour other Huns going down - another with the tail off. a second in a spin. a third vertically in flam es. and a fo urth going up at 45 degrees in a lefthand stall-turn, with a little Hurricane on its tail and fir ing into its side. fro m which came a series ojfla shes and long. shooting, red flam es. I shall never fo rget it. All the I /Os at my level seemed to be hotly engaged, or about to be. so I looked around and above. Yes - those sods up there would be causing trouble soon! Three cunning lads were away fro m the fig ht, climbing ali-alii in line-astern to get over us and then pounce on the unwary. I had bags ojammunition left, so I imm ediately started clambering aft er them . with my 'plug' (boost-override) pulled. They lI'ere in a slight right-hand turn. and as I climbed I looked around. There lI'ere three others over on the right coming towards me. but they were belaII'. I reached the rear Hun oj the three above and shot him down in flam es in a couple of bursts. Then I dived at the three coming up from the right and fi red a quick burst at the leader head-on. I turned. but he lI'as still there; so lI'ere the other tll'O from above. In a moment I was in the centre OJII'llOt seemed a mass oj I l Os, although there lI'ere in fa ct onlyfive of them. I kne ll' I hadn 't the speed in my wooden-blader to dive all'ay and beat it, so I decided 10 fight them and make the best of it. Although I was more manoeuvrable at this height (6.000Jt) . than the Huns. l fo und it impossible to get an astern shot in, because whenever I got one almost lined up. tracers would come shooting past from another on my tail. So all I could do was to keep twisting and turning. and when a Hun got behind me, do as tight a turn as possible. almost spinning, with full engine. and fl y straight at him. firing a quick burst, and then pushing the stick forwa rd and going underneath him. Then I would pull up in a steep climbing 111m to meet the next comer. Natu rally they couldn't all attack at once without colliding. but several times I was at the apex of a cone formed by the cannons and machine guns oj three oj them. They used a lot of diving down and then climbing up and taking a full deflection shot. Their shoot ing was wild. and this manoeuvre was easily dealt with by turning towards them and going over their heads. causing them to steepen their climb until they were stalled and had toJail away. But don't imagineJar a moment that I was enjoying this perJormance. For from it. My mouth was becoming drier
OPERATIONS
and drier. and I was getting more and m ore tired and desperate. Would they TIIn out ojammunition? Would they push oJf? Would help come? I kn ew I couldn 't hold out much longer. Aft er what seemed an age (uctually it turned alii to befifteenminutes) , I was fly ing down head-on at a Hun who lI'as climbing towards me. We both fire d - and then I thought I had left it too late and that we IIw e going to collide. I pushed the stick fo rward violently and there lI'as a stunning explosion right inf ront ofme. For a moment my brain did not 1I'0rk. The aircraft seemed to beJailing. all limp on the controls. Then. as black smoke poured out of the nose and enveloped the hood. and as a hot blast and a flicker ojrefl ected flame came into the dark cockpit, I said to myself, 'Come on. out yo u get!' I pulled the pin out ofmy harness. wrenched open the hood, and hauled myself head fi rst out to the right. The wind pressed me tightly against the side oj the aircraft . my legs still inside. and I remember catching hold oj the trailing edge oj the wing and heaving myself out. As I came free and somersaulted, it fe lt as though I was being whirled round and round through the air on the end oj a piece ojstring by a giant. Then, as I Jumbled Jar and pulled the rip-cord. I was brought the right lI'ay up with a violent j erk that nearly knocked the breath fro m my body. M y head was pressed fo rward by the back pad that had slipped up behind it. and I couldn 't look up to see if my parachute lI'as all right. There was no sensation ojmovement - just a slight wind as I swung gently to and Jro and Jar ali i kn ell' the thing might be on fire or not open properly.
He landed safely and was soon back with the Squadron. The German ground offensive rolled on and the RAF fighters kept pulling back; the Germans had massive air superiority - although on paper the French Air Force should have made more of a contribution - and the RAF' s bombers were shot out of the sky by fighters and ground fire, whilst the Hurricanes man aged to give a good account of themselves. everthe less, the overall campaign was a disaste r and the Allies were pushed back to the sea - and the 'miracle' of Dunkirk.
Dunkirk Contrary to a widely-held belief at the time, especially in Arm y circles, and one perpetuated ever since, the RAF was present over the beaches of Dunkirk and a number of major air battles took place, which, for the first time, involved significant numbers of Spitfires. Fit Lt Bob Stanford Tuck as one of those pilots striving to pro tect the air space over the beaches and it was on one such pa tro l tha t he scored his first victory . '1 kept closing in on him and at about 1,000 yard s 1 had him square in my sights, then 1 decided not to fire but to close in. From ab out 500 yards 1 opened fire; nothing happened, although I could see my bullets striking home . Then suddenly there was a puff of blue smoke and a few pieces of metal came off the aircraft and flew towards me. The aircr aft was on fire now and it rose steeply before flicking to the left; it spun and went down through the clouds . 1 followed it, which was aga inst orders, and watched it crash into a field where it exploded .' As a Flight Commander on the Spitfire-eq uipped 92 Squadron, Bob Stanford Tuck was an excellent pilot and something of a marksman, the latter due largely to his having been taugh t at an early age how to shoot game birds. He claimed two more 109s a few days later and was soon made CO of 92 Squadron, following the loss of Roger Bushell.
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Spitfires of6IO Squadron on patrol.
David Crook was a pilot with 609 Squadro n, which was also involved in flying pro tective sor ties over the Dun kirk area: 'We shot a numb er of Huns down and lost four of ou r pilots. Desmond was also killed near Frinton-on-Sea; he lost his way back in bad weather and ran out of petrol, and was killed in trying to make a forced landing. [ think there is no do ubt that some of these losses were due to inexperience and lack of caution. Pi/ots of I Squadron inspect a German machine-gun - collecting trophies was standard in the early part of war.
OPERATIONS
one of us had ever been in action before, and everybody 's idea was to go all out for the first Hun that appeared. Th is policy does not pay when you are fightin g a cunn ing and crafty foe, and the Germ ans frequently used to send over a decoy aircraft with a number of fighters hoverin g in the sun some thousa nds of feet above, who would come down like a ton of bricks on anybody atta cking the decoy. Th is ruse almost certainly acco unted for one pilot , Presser, and possibly one or two others - the last anybody saw of Presser was when he was diving down to attack a Junkers 88, and there were definitely some Messerschmitts above' (from 'Spitfire Pilot' , Fit Lt David Croo k DFC, Gr eenhill Books). Thi s neatl y summarises one of the problems faced by the RAF pilots - they had no experience and were having to gain it 'on the job' and at no sma ll cost. The importa nt thi ng now was to learn the lessons and apply them; some of this hard-e arn ed wisdom was tra nsmitted thro ugh official and unofficial cha nnels and brought- about various changes, not least to the harm onisation of guns to 250 yards rath er than 400 yards. Oth er lessons of the ' Hun in the sun' and a host of others were applied by those with experience, passed on by Flight Commanders - and eventually at trai ning schoo ls - but many a new pilot in the forthcomin g Battl e of Britain still had to find out for himself; with luck the lesson came as a warning, witho ut luck it was a parachute trip or a final crash. The real battl e was about to begin. Th e overall histor y of the Battle of Britain is in Chapter One, and the focus here is on combat accounts from that period .
Battle of Britain Countless books and millions of word s have been written on the Battle of Britain, including numerous memories of pilots. Thi s part of the Operations chapter will therefore only give a few brief examples of comba t action du ring this period. It was a fi ne aft ernoon. We intercepted them over Brighton going out to sea. I did what my Flight Commander fwd said don't do ( i.e. fo llow an Al e 109 down - its partner would always be in the sun and would come aft er) . Two 109s were inf ront of me. One started to go down. The other started to turn right, climbing into the SUIl. With quick glances at the one climbing, I got the one going down in my sight. I let go a long burst, try ing hard to see if I had time before the other one came down. Blue-black smoke appeared. I then sail' the other just com ing alit of the sun on me and, if he was firin g, he lI'ent back claiming me, because I fl icked the Spit over and pulled back , diving to sea level fr om 20,000 feet vertically.
So recounted a pilot of 41 Squadron on an encounter during a scramble in September 1940, it was typical scene and one tha t would be told to squadro n intelligence officers by dozens of Fighter Com mand pilots as they returned to their bases on most days dur ing the period known as the Battl e of Britain, On the afte rnoo n of 8 July the British radar stations reported a build-up of enemy aircraft over Fra nce. A swarm of Do 17s with escorting Bf I lOs and 109s attacked a convoy near Dover and Dover harbou r. The Hurricanes of 32 Squadron tried to get thro ugh to the bombers but were swamped by the escorting fighters; 74 Squadron's Spitfires pitched into the melee and before long it had become every man for himself as the formations on both sides broke up and individua l combats took place. ' Pilot Offi cer Cobden, leading Yellow Section (of 74 Squadro n), followed Blue Section down. He picked out a straggling Do 17 and disabled its starboard engine. He then delivered a second att ack on the bomber, but as he was breaking away was set upon by a gro up of Bf 109s and his Spitfire was riddled with their fire, engaging emergency boost he bro ke
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NOTE: The ba\lsof this map i\ an AirMIOIstry pcbhcanon shoWing Fi"hter Command's layout In July \ 9.JO. we have ~dM other olI irfields appropriate to tilt' ORBATused in the GnK.lp
artidn.
The standard German bomber was the Heinkel III, a reasonably fas t and well-armed aircraft but one that was IWy vulnerable to fig hter attack as long as a critical component (engines or pilot fo r example) lI'as hit, No. 13 GROUP
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0
away from his att ackers in a steep climbing turn , It was a typical encounter , , . into the fray, identify a target .. . close, give it a burst or two . , . but keep looking around and don 't stay on a straight cour se for more than a few seconds. The need to keep the head moving continually was the main reason why most fighter pilots wore scarves, a way of " lubricating" the neck! Damage to the convoy was negligible and in this, the first "dogfight" involving over 100 aircraft , the RAF came out best.' July had not been a good month for 609 Squadron and after a series of losses David Crook noted in his book: ' I think Buck's death was very largely due to inexperience and faulty tactics. We had not yet learnt that it did not pay to go out to sea to meet the enemy, but to let them come to us. Also we did not realise the importance that height
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No . 12GROUP
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The Hurricane lI'as the most numerous - and most successful > of the RAFfig hters in the Battle but has always suffe red fro m the better reputation of the Spitfire.
A..B_ No . l 0 GROU P
The RAF in the Battle of Britain showing Sectors and airfi elds (Courtesy of FlyPast Magazine. www .keypublishin g.com) .
meant. Afterwards we used to get as high as possible before going into action. This is the whole secret of success in air fighting.' Buck was yet another pilot to end up in the water; in this instance the pilot was not found but in many cases pilots drowned or succumbed to their injuries as there was no rescue service in existence, other than naval
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
E
s
Hurricanes of 501 Squadron scramble from Gravesend on 15 August 1940 - Adler Tag ( Eagle Day ) on which the Luftwaffe planned massive attacks on Fighter Command airfields,
Pilots of 92 Squadron pose with trophy - part of the fir st Ju 88 the Squadron destroyed; quite a number ofsquadrons acquired German markin gs as their trophies,
launches. Th e Germans had a more efficient system with rescue rafts in fixed locations and dedicated pick-up aircraft. Th e RAF subseq uently developed a very etTective Air Sea Rescue service. The ab ility to recover pilots - from sea or land - was crucial to the survival of Fighter Com mand as lack of pilots was the real weakest point during the Battle of Britain . On 7 Augu st, convoy CW9 left Southend for Port smouth but overn ight it was attacked and scattered by E-boat s. The following day the Luftwaffe employed some 300 aircraft in a major etTort to destroy the scattered ships and bring the RAF to battle. The most notable engagement occurred when the Hurri canes of 145 Sqn pounced on a formation of Junk ers Ju 87s, claiming to have shot down 21 - altho ugh later analysis reduced this to less than ten. On 15 August , the day that Goering had determined for Adler Tag (Eagle Day) the Luftwaffe assumptio n was that the RAF was already on the ropes and tha t all its fighter strength had been concentrated in the South - leaving the Midland s and No rthern England virt ually und efended . The Staxton Wold radar station plotted a raid of 40+ aimed at the fighter sta tio ns of Church Fenton and Lecon field. A number of squad rons were scra mbled; fourteen Spitfires of 6 16 Squad ron scrambled and the Squadron was vectored to patrol over Flamb orough and at 1315 hours, it intercepted a formation of aro und 50 Ju 88s of KG 30. Squad ron pilots reported that the enemy was flying in a very poor form ation, with several stragglers. Fit Lt Denys Gillam, leading ' B Flight ', was the first to spot the enemy, at 19,000 ft , and immediately led Blue Section into the attack. PIt OtTMarpl es got in the first burst and as he broke away, Gillam took over; he kept up a continuous fire as the Ju 88 dived to 6,000 ft , jetti soning its bomb s. Part of the tail broke away and the aircraft turn ed onto its back, enveloped in flames, before crashing
into the sea. Meanwhile Marples, having pulled otT from his first attack, immediately pursued another bomber, getting in two bursts before it entered cloud with one en g~ ne smoking. He then saw two other bombers north of Scarb or ough and gave cha se, finng short bursts. One aircraft wheeled to port and dived to ground level, but Marple s could only harass the bomber as it flew at 100ft - he had run out of ammunition, Pit OtT Murray (Blue 2) saw two Ju 88s flying through broken cloud at 10,000 ft; they were in close form ation and one was smoking bad ly. He fired three long bursts and a second or two aft er the last bur st, bot h bombers cau ght fire. He did not see them crash but it is most unlikely that they were ab le to make it back to Denmark . Pit OtT Hugh Dundas, leading Gr een Section, saw Denys Gillam lead Blue Section into the attack and after Marple s broke away, having severely damaged his second aircraft, he closed in and fired a three-second burst, setting both engines on fire. Pit OtT Buck Casson (Green 2) had followed Dundas in, but being poorl y placed he broke away to intercept a lone bomber head ing out to sea at 5,000 ft. After two quarter atta cks, the enemy dived to 1,000 ft - with the rear gunner keeping up a steady fire. Casso n fired two more 'Buck ' Casson of 6 16 Squadron; PIt Off Buck Casson ( Green 2) had f ollowed Dundas in. but being poorly placed he broke away to intercept a lone bomber heading out to sea at 5.000ft. After t\1'O quarter attacks. the enemy dived to 1.000f t - with the rear gunner keeping up a steady fi re, Casson fi red tll'Omore bursts and the aircraft dived to sea lerei, at which point Dundas re-appeared and. with Casson olll of ammunition. took orer the attack.
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F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
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Spitfires of616 Squadron at Leconfield fro m where they engaged the German formation all 15 August with great success.
bursts and the aircraft dived to sea level, at which point Dundas reappeared and, with Casson out of ammunition, took over the attack. By now, there was no return fire and the enemy bomber was last seen at very low level with smoke pouring from its port engine. Red Section also attacked the main bomber force, with the CO . Sqn Ldr Robinson, damaging one bomber before he ran out of ammunition. Fit Lt Hellyer, accompanied by Pit Off Smith, dived astern a Ju 88, and fired all his ammunition into it; Smith then took over and fired a series of short burs ts until the bomber suddenly dived steeply into the sea. By now, the bombers were completely split up and a number of individ ual actio ns took place. Sgt Hopewell picked ou t a lone Ju 88 and hit it in both wings. The bomber took violent evasive action and turned inland ; Hopewell continued to fire into the engines and pieces started to break off. Shortly afterwards the bomber crashed three miles W of Bridlington. Sgt Westmo reland also attacked a lone bomber; firing two short bursts from 400 yards he set the port engine on fire. after which one of the crew baled out. Finally, Fg Off Moberley arrived on the scene afte r his late take -off. He had been listening on the radio and decided to head towards Flamborough, but before reaching the area he spotted a twin-engined airc raft low over the sea. He dived to 2,000 ft and identified a Ju 88 with smoke coming from one engine (probab ly the aircraft that had been attacked by Westmoreland). He made two or three attacks before the bomber's sta rboard engine stopped and the aircraft crashed into the sea. In just a few minutes , 616 Squadron claimed eight enemy bombe rs destroyed and six seriously dam aged - for no loss. Hugh 'Cocky' Dundas recorded the day in his excellent autobiography , Flying Sta rt: I set course and ramm ed the throttle 'through the gat e', to get the maximum power output, permissible for only a limited period of time. Some of the others lI'ere ahead ofme, some behind. We did 1I0t bother to wait for each other or try to f orm up into flights and section. We raced individually across the coast and out to sea. About 15 miles East of Bridlington I sail' them, to the left from and slightly
below - the thin. pencil shapes of German twin-engined bombe rs, flying in a loose, straggling, scattered forma tion toward the coast. I switch all my reflector sight, setting the range fo r 250 yards, turned the gun button to the 'fire' position. Wheeling down ill a diving 111m, I curved towards the nearest bomber, j udging my rate of 111m and dive to bring me astern. A light winkedf rom the rear-gunner's position and tracer bullets hosed lazily pas t. When I opened up with my eight Brownings the return fire stopped. The bomber 111mI'd and lost height. First a gush ofblack smo ke, then a steady stream pouredfro m its engine cowlings and it fell steeply towards the calm summer sea. Turning to look fo r a second target I sail' other Spi tfires fastening all to the German planes on all sides. Beneath me a damaged bomber 111mI'd back our to sea and I decided to go in and fi nish it off. It was a foolish decision, made in the heat of the moment, for I should have look ed fo r all undamaged plane still making fo r the coast. By the time I caught up with it and kn ocked it down I was several miles fur ther our to sea. The sky was empty and I judged that my ammunition was nearly ex hausted.
As the Squadron was soo n to discover, it was a different war to that being fought in the Sout h and 616 was to suffer a period of heavy losses. For 249 Squadron 15 August was their first day in No. 10 Group, having moved to Middle Wallop the previous day from the quiet of Church Fenton. The morning of the 15th was one of settling in to their tented accommodation but at 1300 'A Flight' was brought to ' readiness' and ' B Flight' to '15 minutes' , alth ough nothing happened. It was not until 1715 that the Squadron was ordered up to patrol Warmwell at I5,000 ft. The ORB recorded that ' B Flight' attacked a form ation of eleven Ju 88s and 50+ Me I lOs! Th e Flight claimed the destruction of three Me I lOs, whilst 'A Flight' reported nothing Roland Beamont ill cockpit of 87 Squadron Hurricane, August 1940.
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seen! Two further patrols were flown that day. The following day the Squadron was airborne at midday to patrol Ringwood to Poole; Red Section spotted a group of 109s and were ordered to investigate with the result that ' Red Section unfortunately bought it, being heavily attacked by fighters' (249 Squadron ORB ). Two of the Hurricanes were shot down - FIt Lt Nicolson (Red I) baling out OK but being shot-at by the Local Defence Volunteers as he came; Pit Off King got out of his Hurricane but his parachute had been damaged by a cannon shell and he was killed on impact with the ground as it did not slow him enough; Sqn Ldr King managed to make it back to base despite his aircraft having been hit numerous times. The Intelligence Officer of 611 Squadron summ arised the afternoon combat of II September thu s: At 1530 hours 611 Squadr on left GI Duxford and ' r ent into position as second squadron of the wing fo rmation which was ordered to patrol in a southerly direction towards the Thames estuary. At about 1550 when in the vicinity of SE London. 611 Squadron fo rmed up in three sections offo ur aircraf t in line astern. lOa plus enemy aircraf t lI'ere seen coming north in the direction of our fig hters. Our aircraft were then at 20.000 f t. The enemy formation consisted of Dornier 215s and a number ofHeink el IIIs at 18.000ft and a mass of M e lias stepped up behind at 20.000 ft. with a large number of M e 109s stepped up behind at 24.000ft. Our aircraft altered course. making a left tum. coming in to atta ck on the beam of the enemy fo rmation. 611 Squadr on attacked the M e I lOs. Pilots report that fr om the moment of contact with the enemy it was impossible to keep fo rmation. and a general melee ensued. FISgt Sadler. ,..ho was No. 4 of Yellow S ection. got separatedfrom his S ection and attack ed an M e 110. giving two long bursts closing f rom 500 yards to lOa y ards. and using nearly all his ammunition. The f uselage was seen to catch fire and the EA was last seen losing height. PIa Lund. No. 4 of Blue S ection. dived onto an Me 109 and fire d a short burst on a deflection aim without visible effec t. As another aircraft appeared in his mirror he climbed and sawfive M e lias. He selected the starboard aircraft and delivered an astern attack. closing to lOa yards. Black and white smoke was seen coming f rom the EA. which seemed to be losing height in relation to its fo rmation. No evasive tactics '..ere observed, and no enemy fi re experienced. Sgt Burt saw a single Heink el III fo llowing a fo rmation of Dornier 215s. Our aircraft manoeuvred to att ack the enemyfrom 3.000ft above. Sgt Burt dived and opened fire at abolll400 yards closing to 200 yards. giving a burst ofabout 5 seconds which apparently pili the enemy rear gunner out ofaction. as enemy tracer fire ceased. Squadr on landed at Duxford at approx. 1620 hours to refu el and rearm. and left fo r Digby where Squadr on arrived at dusk. Sgt FER Sh epherd and his Spi tfire P7298 are missing. Sgt S A Levenson fo rce-landed near Kenley and is returning 10 Digby by train.
At this stage the fate of Fred Sheph erd was unkn own - he may, like Levenson , have been forced to land elsewhere o r he may have been shot down but survived. Three days later the Squadron ORB recorded: ' We have now learnt that Sgt Shepherd died as a result of enemy action in the neighb ourh ood of Cro ydon but no further details are known'. Fred Shepherd had only joined the Squadron on I September and flown his first mission on 7 September; he only flew twice more before being killed in action. 15 Septemb er is the day now commemorated as Battle of Britain Day - so what was the significance of that date in 1940? The following extracts are taken from a later RAF account of the day's operations.
The Ju 87 Stuka fo rmations proved vulnerable to the RAFfi ghters and '..ere ,..ithdrawnfrom the battle.
'At dawn on Sunday the 15th the weather was fine and visibility was good; but as the morning wore on cloud steadily formed over SE England until by mid afternoon there was thick cloud (8/10 to 10/10 cover) at 4,000-6,000 ft .' The day started quietl y other than a noticeable increase in German patrols over the Straits of Dover but this was soon to change . 'By 1100 hours it was obvious from the forces that were massing near Calai s that a big attack was imminent ; and a large force of British squadrons was sent into the air in the next 25 minutes. It was a further half hour, however, before the first of the enemy forces crossed the coast of Kent ; and the success that our sq uadro ns later enjoyed was not least due to the unusually long inter val between the first warning of att ack and the enemy's ad vance. The controller at No. II Group not only had sufficient time to couple ten squad rons into Wings of two squad rons, he was able to also bring in reinforcements from the adjacent Groups before the first German force crossed the coasl. The squadrons ordered up at this stage were: 1035 72 Sqn, three aircraft from Biggin Hill to patrol Canterbury at 20,000 fl. 1103 72 Sqn (seven aircraft) and 92 Sqn (ten aircraft) from Biggin to patrol same area at 25,000 fl. 1115 229 Sqn and 303 Sqn from Northolt to patrol Biggin at 15,000 ft. 111 5 253 Sqn and 50I Sqn from Kenley to patrol Maid stone at 15.000fl. 1115 17 Sqn and 73 Sqn from Debden to patrol Chelmsford at 15,000 fl. 11 20 504 Sqn from Hend on and 257 Sqn from Martlesham to patrol North Weald to Maid stone at 15,000 ft 1120 603 Sqn from Horn church to patrol Dover at 25,000 fl. 11 20 609 Sqn from Middle Wallop to patrol Brooklands-Windsor at 15,000fl. 11 25 Duxford Wing (five squad rons - 19, 242. 302. 310, 611) to patrol Hornchurch at 25,000 ft: Fighter Co mmand thu s had 17 sq uadro ns in the air covering the SE approaches to Lond on . The bulk of the attacking force, in three columns, crossed the coast between Dover and Ramsgate between 1135 and 1140 and once inland spread out to
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Spitfire of 72 Sq uadron; 'I was Tennis Leader when ordered to patro l Canterbury angels 25 in company with 92 Sqn, 72 leading. I climbed to angels with the tll'Osquadrons. While I \l'as on patrol I \l'as ordered to atta ck fig hters. The main bomber forc e with fig hter escort \l'as about 2,000jr below with the fig hters about 3,OOOft below. '
Pilots of 17 Sq uadron, Debden September 1940; on Bailie of Britain day ( 15 S eptember) the Squadron \l'as airborne at 1115 to patrol Chelmsford at 15,OOOf t.
attack Lond on. Pat rolling the Can terb ury area the Biggin Hill Spitfires were first into action. with 72 Squad ron lead ing. Th e Comb at Report s from the formation leaders stated: 72 Squadron. I \l'as Tennis Leader when ordered to patrol Canterbury angels 25 in company with 92 Sqn, 72 leading. I climbed to ange ls with the t\l'O squadrons. While I \l'as On p atrol I lI'as ordere d to attack fight ers, The main bomber fo rce with fighter esco rt \l'as about 2,000ft below with the fighters about 3,OOOft bela \1'. I ordered the S quadron into line astern and dived down on the fighte rs from alii of the sun , as \l'e dived I ordered the S quadron into echelon starboard, thus a ttacking as many fighters ( M e 109s ) as po ssible. The M e 109 which I a ttacked halfrolled as I openedfi re and before he could dive a\l'ay he caught fire and ex ploded. I \l'as then at tack ed byfive other M e 109s. I did a steep turn to starboard and continued to turn until I ou t-turned one At e 109 which Il'as on my tail. I gave him t\l'O short burst s and he burst into flames. I th en spun down 10 ge t awayfrom m ore Ale 109s which dived down on m e. I returned to base and \l'as informed tha t enemy aircraft \l'ere o l'er base at angels 14. I clim bed up and sa\l' a f ormation of Dorniers in f ront of m e. I chased them and attacked the outside one on the s tarboard side. I gal'e him t\l'O short bursts from dead ast ern and his port engine s topped and he dropped alii of the formation losing height . I attack ed the Do 2 15 again and white vapour poured alii from his starboard engine. Five or six friendly fighters then came up and sta rted attacking him . He crashed into a wood and exploded. I returned to base and landed.
At the time these first comb ats were taking place the next wave of RAF fighters was being scrambled. and between 11 35 and 1142 the final six squadro ns were airborne : 1135 46 Sqn and 249 Sqn from North Weald to proceed toward s South Lond on . 1140 I (RC AF) Sqn from Northolt and 605 Sqn from Croydo n to pat rol over Kenley at 15.000 ft. 1140 41 Sqn from Horn church to pat rol Gravesend at 20.000 ft. 1142 66 Sqn from Gr avesend to intercept approaching enemy forma tion. In the meantime. two other Wings had engaged as 229/303 squadro ns and 253/50 I sq uad rons atta cked the enemy formations over Kent. These. along with engagements by 41 and 66 Squadron s. were in some respects preambles to the main events about to unfold nearer Lond on . Ju st after midday. the leader of the 257/504 Wing took his aircraft into comb at against 'a sq uare form ation of 25 Do 172 and Do 215s in five lines of aircraft in line abreast. all at 18.000 ft. with escortin g yellow-nosed Me 109s at 23.000 ft.' Th ey were soon jo ined by two more o. II G roup squadro ns. 46 and 249. and seven Dorniers were subsequently claimed for the loss of two Hurricanes. The five squadro ns of the Duxford Wing had also arrived on the scene but had to wait until the friendlies had cleared before they could engage the enemy. Whilst the thr ee Hurri cane squad rons engaged the bom bers. the two Spitfire units went after the fighters and by the end of the combat the Duxford Wing had claimed 19 bombers and seven fighters. Th e Air Ministr y's News Service issued a press release on the evening of 15 September: A Great Air Batt le: Today was the most costly day for the German Air Force for nearly a mon th . During the day. between 350 and 400 enemy aircraft were launched in two waves against Lond on and SE England . By 8pm it was known
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DOli Kingaby explains the controls of his 92 Squadron Spitfire; he \I'as unique ill being the recipient of a Distinguished Flying Medal ( DFM) and t\l'O Bars,
(111)'
that 165 of these had been shot down. 161 by fighters and 4 by AA fire, The great majority of those that escaped were chivvied and harried at all stages of their journey, Thirty of our own fighters are lost or missing. but ten of the pilots are safe, The press release continued with details of the two waves and 'combat reports' from Fighter Command pilots such as 'the whole formation was entirely broken up. They were flying west when we saw them . When we had finished. they were turning away fast towards home . As we broke off. a formation of Spitfires was just coming in to engage them .' Fighter Command's Diary recorded a communique from the Prime Minister addressed to Fighter Command via the Secretary of State for Air: 'yesterday eclipses all previous records of the Fighter Command. Aided by squadrons of their Czech and Polish comrades. using only a small proportion of their total strength. and under cloud conditions of some difficulty. they cut to rags and tatters three separate waves of murderous assault upon the civil population of their native land. inflicting a certain loss of 125 bombers and 53 fighters upon the enemy. to say nothing of probable and damaged. while themselves sustaining only a loss of 12 pilots and 25 machines . These results exceed all expectations and give just and sober confidence in the approaching struggle.' Good solid Churchillian stuff The Germans claimed to have shot down 79 RAF aircraft for the loss of 43 of their own. a total somewhat at variance with the RAF"s claims of 185enemy destroyed for the loss of 25 of their own number. At the same time that these critical combats were taking place. the Luftwaffe had begun to increase its nightly raids . 'Battle of Britain Day' did not bring an end to the German daylight offensive and there were a number of significant raids in late September and early October. On
Fight er COIIIIIW/l{I'S (111)' Victoria Cross winner - Fit Lt E J B Nicolson of249 Squadron, awarded fo r his actions 011 12 Augllstl940,
24 September the Hurricanes of 17 Squadron were airborne at 0830 to patrol their base. being joined by 73 Squadron: vectored towards 30+ bombers with fighter escort over the Thames. 17 Squadron 'acted as rear-guard to take on the fighters. Fg Off Bird-Wilson was shot-down and baled out: three other aircraft circled until they saw him picked-up by a boat. PIO Wissler was hit and injured but managed to crash -land at base. FlO Czernin claimed a probable on a 109 and PIO Pittman claimed a damaged 109.' Two of the named pilots had appeared in the ORB earlier that month with awards of DFCs. the citation of which read: Fg Off Harold Bird-Wilson 'has shot down six enemy aircraft and shared in the destruction of several others. He has shown fine fighting qualities and determination in his attacks'; Fg Off Count Manfred Czernin 'has displayed great keenness in his desire to engage the enemy. and has destroyed nine of their aircraft. In August 1940 he led his Section in a head-on attack on a large formation of enemy aircraft. destroying three of them.' A few days later. 27 September, the Squadron was in another pitched battle. again with 73 Squadron alongside . Airborne over base at 0905 they spotted 30-40 Me II Os over London at 18.000ft in three large circles. revolving inside each other in opposite directions. The rear section of the Squadron was attacked by 109s and Sgt Bartlett landed at Debden with part of his tail fin shot away and the rudder controls unserviceable. The Squadron climbed to attack the Me II0s and Fg Off Czernin claimed a 11 0. as did Sgt Griffiths, who also claimed a probable. with Sgt Steward also claiming a 110. PIt Off Leary joined a Hurricane of another squadron and got behind two I IOs. claiming one destroyed and one probable. Sgt Hogg got inside the I lOs and flew in the opposite direction and claimed one shot down. which crashed at
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Duxford , with Sgt Hogg landi ng at tha t airfield. When other Hurricanes and Spitfires joined in the enemy fled. with Manfred Czernin pursuing three I !Os to the coast of France. The Squadron flew four further pat rols that day. with a Bf 109 falling to Sgt Griffiths. and as an indication of the hectic pace for some pilots. Sgt Bart lett had flown on all four of the day's sorties. October brought o ne of the most successful days for 602 Squad ron o ut of Westharnpnett , with four patrols flown on the 29th : 'o ne of them being perhaps the most successful the Squad ron has yet fought. when at 27.000 ft the Squad ron . led by F/L Mount. saw two form ations of Me 109s. abo ut 25 in each . approac hing at 23.000 ft. With some adva ntage fro m the sun and the supreme asset of greater height. the Spitfires were ab le to inflict heavy casua lties with 7 Me 109s being destroyed. 2 probab ly destroyed and 3 damaged. One of o ur own Spitfires was very slightly damaged ' (602 Squadron ORB ). One of the most frequent comments made by fighter pilots involved in this, and indeed other. air battles. was the sudden change from a sky full of aircraft to being on your own. Bob 'Spud' Spurdle neatl y expresses this in his auto biogra phy 'The Blue Arena' I rechecked that Illy gun's safety catch was of! The gun-sight graticule glowed clearly and I lowered Illy seat a notch. M alan [Sqn Ldr A G Malan , CO of 74 Squadr on] curved to meet the HUllS head on and all at once we lI'ere into them. Yellowspinners, stiff square-tipped wings with spark les of light flickering. I tried to fo llow Illy leader around but, being fascinated by the enemy aircraft , somehow lost him. I couldn't fi nd a single Jerry. Twisting and turning, I couldn' t see a damned aircraft! No thing! The sky lI'as clean and bare. Far off. white contrails curved lazily this lI'as and that. But I couldn't watch them. Where had everyone Gravesend / 940, pi/aIs of 66 Squadron loiter in the crew-room.
A German bomber breaks-up under the impact of concentrated close-range fire; the hitting pOll'er of the 0.303 Browning lI'as often debated alit! the RAF eventually chose (later ill the war) cannon as the main fighter armament. gone? It was no use horsing around up here, twisting fro m side to side, look ing up, back and around, fra ntic with disappointment. I divedfor the deck - orders lI'ere 10 go straight back if separated and there was no fig ht in one's vicinity.
On the way back he latched o n to another Spitfire - Malan 's - and comp ou nded his erro r. He looked at me and shook his fist . Au toma tically I lowered my undercarriage, Malan just turned (/\ray and slowly shook his head.
The hand gesture norm ally mean s lower the undercarri age but in this case Malan was obvio usly j ust venting his feelings. as he did again back at Biggin Hill. 'Spud' Spurdle went on to have a fine comb at career. ending up as CO of 80 Squad ron and with a DF C and Bar. Some of the young men survived and learn t. but some did not. Despite the occasio nal intense day. the general pattern from mid September was one of ro utine patrols and little action as the Luftwaffe recogn ised that it would have to rethink an d re-gro up. As the daylight campaign began to wind down. the night campaign the Blitz - was starting in earnest. Night Blitz Th e German s had been taking advantage of the night skies from the sta rt of the campaign and it was frustra ting for the defenders, who still primarily had to rely on visual acq uisitio n. often aided by searchlight activity. The patrols had mixed results: Several patrols went up during the night. The weather was genera lly unfavourable. Thick cloud hamp ered the searchlights. and although enemy aircraft were in the vicinity of our patrols. the Special Equipment failed to pick anything up (29 Squad ron ORB for 9 August 1940).
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On the night of 28/29 Augu st Blenheim D of 600 Squadron was scra mbled: ' I was told to get off as soon as possible and patrol base at Angels 17. For the next hour we received a good number of vector s and investigated innumerable searchlight concentrations. We were sent to patrol a line across which a lot of enemy aircraft were making their way to the Midla nds. It was not long before [ saw the exhaust flames of an aircraft close in front and above, so turned and went flat out after him, to find we could ha rdly climb any higher , and all the controls were pretty sloppy. So having staggered into a line astern at approx 400 yards, let go a good bu rst. The enemy aircraft turned and dived , proving too fast for us to catch. A bit later [ saw exhaust flames below us and to starboa rd, so we d ived on them and was getting really close when we were illuminated from behind. One searchlight coming in from the front, flicked over the aircraft in front before fastening on to us. It was sufficient to show that we were very close, so opened fire before the searchlight blinded us entirely . Exhausted the remainder of my ammunition and again saw enemy aircraft dive away too fast fo r me to catc h.' The Blenheim landed at Hornchurch at 2320 with the crew uncertain as to if they had been successful. In a speech on 9 September, Adolf Hitler said : ' We are giving our reply night after night. If the British declare that they will att ack our cities heavily, then we will wipe out their cities.' The night blitz of London, and to a lesser extent other British cities, came as a major shock to the British peop le and became an abiding image of the war. Thi s night campaign did not really get underway until a utumn 1940 - but the first significant night raid on England had taken place on 18/19 June , the att acker s being He Ill s of KG .4. The bomber's targets were Mildenh all and Ho nington, two of Bomber Comm and 's airfields, plus a diversionary raid towards Southend. Four RAF sq uadro ns became involved in the night's acti vities - Blenheims of 23 and 29 Squadrons and Spitfires of 19 and 74 Squadron s. Two Heinkels on the Southend raid were first to fall on this clear night. both probably being shot -down by Fit Lt 'Sailo r' Malan of7 4 Squadron . His acco unt of his second combat that night sta ted: I ga ve it lira fi re-second bursts and observed bullets entering all ora the enemy aircraft. Enemy aircraft emitted heavy smoke and I observed one para chute open rery close . . . ( aircraft} crashed in flames near Chelmsf ord.
Malan had picked up the Heinkel because of searchlight acuvity in the a rea, spotting the bomber in a searchlight beam . Spitfires of 19 Squadron also had some success, o ne Heinkel falling to Fit Lt Clouston and Fg Off Petre being involved in the destruction of another. The latter incident involved a Heinkel, a Blenheim and a Spitfire - all of which were sho t-do wn! The Heinkel was picked up by the 23 Squadron Blenheim of Sqn Ldr O'Brien , Ju st as the Blenheim opened fire so too did Petre's Spitfire. As the la tter broke away to avoid the Blenheim it was sho t-do wn by the German bomber. Petre baling out. The Blenheim too took avo iding acti on and lost cont rol. with only the pilot surviving when the aircraft was aba ndoned. The bomber crew also had to bale out. Two 23 Squadron Blenheims took on ano ther Heinkel, with the bomber a nd one Blenheim falling. whilst in the final comba t of the night a 29 Squadron Blenheim damaged its target. which subsequently cra sh-landed on the beach near Calais. but then ended up in the Th ames. An interesting night all round with lesson s for both sides. There was little further night activity until Augu st a nd it was not until the night attacks on Lond on and other cities in the a utumn that great concern was cau sed to politician s and air plann ers. Having been withdrawn from the day battl e, the Defiants were proving to be effective night fighters. In the early hours of 16 Oct ober Defiant 1621 of 264 Squadron was on patrol and shot do wn a Heinkel of KGr.126, which crashed near Hult on a t 0200
ATIONS
Blenheim of 219 Squadron. 1940: the Squadron re-formed in October 1939 10 operate Blenheims and became ol/e of the Command's leading night-fighter squadrons.
with the loss of two of its crew. The pilot of the Defiant, Pit Off Desmond Hughes gave an account of the combat: . . . il was a bright moonlight night. Suddenly alii of the corner of my eye I sail' some thing more across the stars alii 10 my left . If.1'0 11 are scanning the n~g/~I sky it is normally completely still, so anything that moves attra cts the eye. This )IISI had 10 be another aircraft. I gal Fred ( Sgt Fred Gash ) 10 swing his turret around alit! lI'e both caught sight of a roll' of exhausts. I I ,ras a twin-engined aircraft. I slid alongside, be/ow 10 the right of him, and slowly edged in '1Il/de~ /~is armpi~' while Fred kept his guns trained on the aircraft. Then we sail' the dlslmc/I~'e ,rm~ ~I/d tail shape ofa Heink e/ - there was I/Omistaking it. l moved ill/a a fi ring POSl/lOI/. within about 50 vards of his wing lip and slightly below, so that Fred could align his glll/Sfo r aI/ ;,pward shot. Obviously the German crew had 1/01 seen liS. they continued straight ahead. Fred fi red straight into the starboard engine. One round in six was tracer, bill what laid us we were hittin g the Heink el was the glitter ofde Wilde rounds as they ignit ed on impact. Fred fire d, realigned, and fi red again. He gal .off 1'1'0 or three bursts. There was no relllrn fi re f romlhe bomber: indeed. I doubt if any guns could have been brought 10 bear 0 1/ our position 0 1/ its beam. The engine burst into fl ames then the Heinkel rolled on its back, went down steeply and crashed 0 11/0 a fie ld near Brentwo od.
Whilst Lond on was hit heaviest in term s of number of raids and bomb tonnage, the a ttack on Co ventry on the night of 14115 overnber was seen as i~portant. as it was the first use of massive air power against a small city with the mtent being to cause widespread destruction ; in essence virtually to obliterate the city. The weather was good and bright moonlight helped the bombers find the ta rget. although .the us~ of .radlodirect ed pathfinders (KG .IOO) was also a factor. The attack sta rted With a diversiona ry
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Real/fi ght er of 25 Squadr on lI/ Witt ering.
raid on London at 1915, with the attack on Coventry itself opening a t 2020 and carrying on to 0610, by which time some 304 bombers had unloaded HE , incendi ary a nd landmines over the city. The RAF had a d isma l night , mounting 110 patrols but with no report s of combats other th an an engagement near Swaffharn , orfolk when one bomber was claimed as damaged. The Fighter Comm and ' Fo rm Y' summa ry for the night sta ted th at . . . 'enem y operations have been on a lar ge sca le and it is estimated that a t least 350 EtA have opera ted, the major ity o f which flew at 12- 15,OOOft. Cove ntry was the main tar get and was heavily bombed from 1900 hours.' It then listed the night fighter patrols, by Group:
sa lient points in a ir fighting, which it is essential that they sho uld master before taking thei r places as opera tio na l pilots in Fighter Squadrons. The va rious points illustrated a re by no mean s comprehen sive, and it must be clearl y und erstood th at only the main point s which a new Fighter Pilot sho uld kn ow before going into action a re included. These have been compiled on the advice and guidance of man y well-known and proved Fighter Pilots, who have willingly co-operated in placing their knowledge and experience at the disposa l of their younger brother-pilot s. ' In selecting the motto of the Three Mu sketeers - " all for one a nd one for a ll" - to pu t at the head of this Forew ord, I have don e so becau se it expresses wha t sho uld be the creed of every Fighter Pilot. Never forg et that you are an essentia l cog in the wheel, a nd if you break or fail it will let down your brother pilots, and the grimness of war allows for no such weakness. 'Air fightin g is a combina tion of skill and courage, which, a llied with confidence and experience, makes the Fighter Pilot master of his trade.' The Westland Whirl wind was an interesting experiment for the Co mmand and after a year of teethin g troubles from its introduction in July 1940 it eventua lly sta rted to show pro mise. Th e first confirmed victory occurred on 8 Februa ry 194 1 - and was marked by the Squ ad ron being given a case of cha mpagne by Westland . T oday gave us our first confirmed victo ry . .. two aircra ft of Blue Section took -off from Exeter at 0840 on a local practice flight. At 0900 they were vecto red onto Raid 139. While orbiting 12 miles South of Start Point an Arad o 196 was seen by Sgt R udland, who cam e down on its tail. but seeing British roundels on the fuselage did not fire, a nd in fact form att ed on it. The enemy went into cloud and rea ppeared flying East 1,000 yards to Port of Fg Off Hughes, who carri ed out an att ack from the front quarter, end ing in a beam atta ck, opening at
No. 9 Gp - nil. No. 10 Gp - 34 patrols. No. II Gp - 49 pat rols; 26 Defiant , 10 Beaufighter, 7 Hurricane, 6 Blenheim; 5 EtA seen but no inte rcept s. No. 12 Gp - 24 pat rols; Blenh eim fro m Digby claim one dam aged near Swaffh am . No. 13 Gp - 10 pat rols. No. 14 Gp - 3 patrols.
1941 - Consolidation and new strategies Wh ilst maintainin g defensive cover for Britain, including coas ta l shipping, the Co mman d a lso went look ing fo r the enemy with offensive opera tions over France. It was to be a difficult year with a great deal of flying and little result , the Ge rma ns choosing not to ta ke the bait of Fighter Co mmand Wings a nd Circuses unless the conditions were j ust right. Some time in lat e 1940 or very ea rly 1941, o. 13 Group issued its pilots with a fascinat ing little advice booklet. Forget-me-n ots for fighters contained 'pea rls of wisdo m' from the experiences of the Battle of Britain a nd used cartoons to illustrate the point s made. Th e booklet was issued du ring AVM Sau l's tenure as AOC , a nd in his introduction he states: 'This book is the outcome of discussion amongst the T rain ing Staff on the best a nd simplest way to bring to the not ice o f new Fighter Pilot s certain
THE
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
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450 and closing at 200 yards . A 5 second burst was fired, but no results were observed . Mea nwhile FIt Lt Crooks and Pit OfT Graham had ta ken ofTfrom St Eval. At Dod man Point Pit Off Graham was o rdered to patro l below the cloud while Fit Lt Crooks pat rolled above . Fit Lt Crooks came back down through the clo uds. And j ust as he emerged, passed Pit Off Gr ah am who was going West. He did a gentle left hand turn , intending to call Pit Off Graham and tell him to format e on him, but to his surp rise Whirlwind of 263 Squadron ; The Westland Whirlwind was all interesting experiment fo r the Command and aft er a year of teething troubles from its introduction ill July 1940 it eventually started to show promise. The fi rst CO lifirmed victory occurred 0 11 8 February 1941 - and lras marked by the Squadron being given a case of champagne by Westland.
found that PIt Off Gr ah am had disappe ared. Sudd enly he saw an EIA come thr ough the cloud on his left going lower and lower until it hit the water. FIt Lt Crooks had difficulty in identifying the EtA, but he saw floats uppe rmost on the water and black crosses on a piece of wing wreckage. PIt Off Gr aham did not retu rn from the patrol. A Coastguard reported that two aircra ft had crashed into the sea at 0950 three miles ofT the shore in flames' (263 Squadron ORB ). There was also occasional action at the other end of Fighter Command's domain . On 2 March 1941 Hurri cane of 3 Squad ron was operat ing o ut of Sumburgh . . .'Two Hur ricanes of Red Section, " A Flight " , took-off from Sumburgh at 1427 on 2nd March to intercept Raid 252. When flying at 10 feet over sea at 1435, approximately 30 miles East of Sumburgh Red Section sighted a single Focke-Wulf 200 Co ndo r about 5 miles ahead. EtA was flying 10 feet over the sea at about 220 miles per hour on a course of 130 degrees. ' Red One, PtO Cra bb atta cked first, closing to 400 yards and firing two 4-second bursts, breaking away at 150 yards. It is believe rear gunner of EtA was killed during this attack as after first few seconds of return fire from MtG ceased abruptly and Red 2 experienced no return fire when carrying o ut his astern attack. EtA increased speed to 270 mph and Red I climbing away to right delivered a diving atta ck from 800 feet directly to sta rboa rd firing a 3-second bur st from 800 yards to 30 yards. Passing over and slightly behind EtA Red I delivered a similar attack fro m Port. No return fire from EtA experienced during either atta ck. Having run out of ammunition Red I made a dumm y attack from fron t star board to force EtA down on to sea. Heavy return fire experienced from front guns. Tracer seen to enter EtA on all three atta cks. Red I then broke away and returned to base. ' Red Two, PtO Robertson followed Red I into attac k flying astern and slightly above him. When Red I broke from his first attack Red 2 fired a 3-second burst from dead astern observing his tracer enterin g fuselage of EtA. Red 2 broke away as Red I delivered his sta rboa rd att ack and climbin g to the right delivered a diving beam from 200 feet above, firing a one-second burst. Red 2 had to break off his attack as Red I was firing from the opposite beam . He then delivered an other astern attack firing a 6-second burst from appro ximately 200 yards and aga in saw tracer enter EtA. No return fire was experienced by Red 2 durin g these attacks . Red 2 then brok e away and returned to base with Red I.' An interest ing combat and testimony to the rob ust nature of the Condo r, especially one that was flying only ten feet above the sea! Th is was one of the few ' highlights' for the Squadron ; despite the fact that the Condo r flew on, and a more usual rou tine was one of patrols and scrambles from Sumburgh and Castletown. Th ere had been four other scrambles on 2 March, with five the next day and a Dusk patro l, with two scrambles and a Dusk Patrol the following day; the Patrol was flown by six aircra ft fro m Cast letown and found nothi ng of interest. At the end of the mon th the Squadron reunited at Cast letown prior to a move south to Martl esham Heath and what all the pilots hoped would be more action . Initially, however, they were to be disapp oin ted as the Hurrican e li s were still stuck with convoy pat rols, altho ugh there was the odd comba t with lone Do 17s or Ju 88s. On 20 Jun e 194 1 White Section of66 Squad ron was ordered up to intercept a raid coming from the South . Th e two Spitfires, (piloted by FIt Allen and Sgt Large) climbed to 20.000 ft but were almost immediately ordered down to 6,000 ft by the con troller. About 30 miles Sout h of Bolt Head they spotted three He Ill s at approxi mately 6,000 ft, with five Bf 109s as escort weaving above them at 7.000 ft. The Squad ron ORB takes up
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
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ATIONS
Spitfire Vb of 129 Squadron at Debden in November 1941. ( Andy Thomas Collection).
it a quarter attack with three 2-sec bur sts at 150 yards. More white smo ke came out of the EtA and it crashed into the sea. Meantime White 1 saw another 109 com ing towards him from behind and by dint of graceful man oeu vring himself came down on the EtA's tail and gave it a 3-sec bur st in a qu arter atta ck fro m 75 ya rds, as a result of which black smoke belched from its engine and the mach ine glided down. White I saw the pilot bale o ut and the par achute open and White 2 saw it go down , but they them selves were rather occupied with other matters. White I a nd White 2 then took evasive acti on, were unable to find the band its again and returned to base.' Th e AOC of o. 10 G roup sent a congra tulato ry message the following day: '. . . there is no doubt that this fine effort successfully frustra ted a n intended atta ck on our shipping and gave the Hun a lesson he will not forget in a hurry. I look forwa rd with co nfidence to further successes by your Squadron.'
'Eagle' ( /21 Squadron) pilots; the Squadron form ed in May 1941 and initiallyflew Hurricanes prior to re-equipping with Spitfires in October ami becoming the 335th Fighter Squadron of the 4th Fighter Group in September 1942.
the sto ry: 'White I then warned by White 2, who is not experienced, to gain height and look after his tail and dived to gain speed for attack. White I saw a 109 com ing up at him, firing, but, altho ugh the sho ts were close, the aircraft was not hit, a nd in fact neither of our aircra ft was marked as a result of this co mbat. After the first 109 had fallen away, Whit e I fastened onto a pair of 109s rath er below him and delivered a sha rp qu arter atta ck (2-secs at 150 yards) from the port side of the rear one, the engine of the EtA emitted white smo ke and it slowed up and passed across the path of White 2 who gave
N ight Defence Am on gst the new sq uadro ns opera tional in 1941 was 255 Squadron, who entered the fray on 5 Januar y and had three crews on sta ndby each night. It was a frustrating first month with pat rols and the occas ional glimpse of the enemy but no success. However, 10 Februa ry was a very busy night and also brou ght the first successes. A number of patrols were flown in the Humber-Spurn Point are a and two of these found tar gets:
NI 770 (Ft L T rou sdaletSgt Chunn), pat rolled Humber, sighted EtA a t 2250 hou rs 200 yards to port, closed in a nd identified it as a He III . Got in thr ee bur sts of fire, EtA disappeared diving steeply a t 100ft. N3335 (ptO HalltSgt Fitzsimmo ns), pat rolled Humber, sighted EtA at approx 2315 flying a t right an gles to me and below, flying West, which proved to be a He III . Got in three bur sts, EtA descendin g all the time. Last a ttac k delivered at 3,500 ft. EtA last seen diving toward s the sea .
129
130
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
OPERATIO
5
Am ongst the lIew squadrons operational ill 1941 was 255 Squadron, who entered the fra y 011 5 January and had three erell's 011 standby each night. II lI'as a frustrating fi rst month with patrols and the occasional glimpse of the enem)' bUIIIO success.
Air Ministry subsequent ly confirmed them as ' Probably Destroyed: These first successful co mbats had a heartening effect on the who le Squadron. The major attack on Liverpool on 121 13 March involved over 300 bombers and Fighter Command flew 178 sorties during that night. with claims being made for four destroyed. The Fighter Command log record of claims is shown in the table below:
Cl a ims for t2l13 ;\tarch
1 9~t
Group
Sq uadron
Aircraft
Claim
Rema rk
, 0. 9 0 p
96 Sqn 307 Sqn 6().1 Sqn
Hurricane
He III destroyed He II I damaged Ju 88 destroyed ? Probable J u 88 dam aged He III damaged He I II dest royed He III destroyed J u 88 pro babl e He III pr oba ble J u 88 prob abl e
Crashed at Wychbo ld So uth coast Crashed at Wa rminster
No . 10 O p
De fiant Bea ufigh ter
No.1 1 Gp
264 Sqn
Defiant
No. 12 Gp
219 Sqn 255 Sq n 151 Sq n
Bea ufighter De fian t
Hurricane
Over sea South coast
South coast Cras hed in sea C ras hed Beachy Head Over sea Retfo rd
Over sea
The 96 Squadron victory had been scored by Sgt Me air in Hurricane V7752 and the Squadron also claimed a probable. although this does not appear in the Fighter Command log. The 96 Squadron O R B for the night also stated: ' 18 trips hunting for the enemy and the result - no la rge numbers of enemy aircraft blazing on the ground. but just a drawing of the enemy blood in "probables" , and a squadron with tails well up and a few gun sights a nd gun muzzles that had spat forth fire at the enemy machines. There was great enemy activity over Liverpool and several of our aircraft were in action for the first time. FlO Vesely was the first in action. having taken off in Defiant 1803 at2155
Ne ll' Z ealand air gunners of 255 Squadron at Kirton-in-Lindsey.
with Sgt Heycock to patrol Co tton East at 15.000ft. He saw an He II I above on the port side and told the air gunne r. but the guns failed to fire. He kept the Defiant in formation with the German aircraft and flew alongside and slightly below. expecting that the air gunner would get the guns to fire. Then the pilot of the Heinkel dived . followed by FlO Vesely. who man oeuvred to get on to the starboard side. He flew in formation again but
Defiant of 151 Squadron. Wittering; the Squadron operated Defi ants for 18-molllhs fr om December 1940.
13 1
132
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8
OPERATIONS
the side gunner of the Heinkel got in two bursts. Pilot felt that he had been hit in the chest, shoulders and left arm . He lost consciousness and when he came round found the Defiant falling in a spin; however, he managed to recover and return to land despite his injuries.' German aircraft were ran ging far and wide at night and in the early hour s of 8 April Sqn Ldr Simpson , OC of 245 Squad ron , scrambled from Aldergrove, Northern Ireland: I was in the M ess when nell's came that the Germans were dropping bombs on a tall'll nearby. It seemed rath er strange. The war had not come so close to Ulster befo re. Incendiaries had been dropped and high ex plosive bomb s were on the way. I was next to parrol. It was about I. J5 in the morning, dark with a sick ly moon shining through a mist. I took offand climbed to about 9,000f t. passing above the clouds into anoth er world. where the moon, in its second quart er. shone alit of a blue-black sky. I was told that there were aircraf t near me. My eyes searched the blackn ess. There was no horizon: no object upon which to fix one 's eyes. And one had the illusion, travelling at 200 miles per hour, that e\wy one ofthose brilliant stars lI'as the taillight ofan aircraft. I searched am ong that moving pattern oflights and my eyes rested upon two black objects. I could see them because. as they moved. they obliterated the stars. They lI'ere quit e near when I recognised them as aircraft . . . whether enemy or not, I was unable to tell. So I flew nearer and learned soon enough. The rear gunners of both aircraft fired a shower of bullets at me. some with whitish-green light of tracer bullets, some glowing red. They missed me and for a minute I lost them. Then I saw them again. f arther apart, moving against the while floor of the clouds below me. They were black and quit e clear. The advantage was noll' mine fo r they were perf ectly pla ced as targets. I crept down to attack the rear-most of them. They were flying slowly. It was diffi cult fo r me to withhold my speed so that I would not overtake him. A t a distan ce of about 200 yards I opened fire from slightly below. Then come my next surprise . . . the blinding flas h ofmy guns. in the dark ness. In day lim e one does not see iI. At nigh t it is terrific and I II'as so blinded that I lost sight of my enemy. I brok e away and lost him fo r a few seconds. I next sail' him going into a gentle dive towa rds the clouds. The increase in speed made it easier fo r me to attack and I closed in to 80 ya rds. I opened fire once more. This time I was prepa red for the flash and k ept my ey es on the enemy. H is rear gunner returned my fi re. but only fo r a second. I had appa rently go t him fo r he was silent after that . I continued my fi re, closing in to abou t 50 y ards. Then I sail' a comforting red glow in his belly. I was still firing when the Heink el blew up, with a terrific explosion which blew me upwards and sideways. When I righted myself, I was delight ed to see showers of flam ing pieces . . . lik e confetti on fire . . . falling towards the sea. I was able to enjoy the sat isfaction of kn owing that I had brought him down before he had released his bombs.
The second bomber escaped but a month later (6 May) Simpson claimed a Ju 88. British cities were still vulnerable to night att acks and April witnessed a concentrated attack on Coventry. ight-fighters were still in short supply and Fighter Night s were a sta nda rd role for many of the day-fighter squadrons. With Coventry providing the
VIP visit to 245 Squadron at Aldergrove; the Squadron scored a number ofnight successes.
backgro und illumination, 266 Squa dron had four Spitfires over the City in the early ho urs of 9 April. The OR B reco rds the four sortie s: P8187, PIO Thomas: Ordered to vector 265 deg and reached Coventry in about IS mins at 16,000 ft. Climbed up to patrol height at 22,260 ft. Orb ited at this height and after a short while saw one E1A silhouetted against fires a long way benea th . Dived after it but lost it when it went o ut of glow of the fires. Returned to patrol height. After about an hour o rdered to return to base and land. P80lO, Sgt Cook : Vectored on 265 deg and after 15 mins arri ved over Coventry at 15,000 ft. Climbed to 21,240ft and orbited for an hour. No E/A seen. Ordered to return on vector 085 deg and to land . P7992, S/Ldr Jameson: At 0144 hrs at 18,OOOft saw one E1A with one of our fighters formatting on it and trai l of smoke from each engine. Turned to cha se it and join in when saw an He II I at about 17,000 ft. Made stern attack at 150 yds. T here appeared to be four streams of return fire, one of them green, probably from the top turret. Fired two short bursts, but dazzled by bullets when the hit the E1A and brok e away after first atta ck. Then carried out another stern attack and windscreen was obscured by oil from EIA. Great burning pieces came off the E/A which dived down th rough the clouds . No evasive action by the EIA. P8185, Fill Armitage: Patrolled Coventry above fires at 27,000-2 8,000 ft. Visibility bad from 26,OOOft upward s due to haze. No E/A plotted at this height and no E1A seen. T he following night the Squadron was over Birmingham; Fit Lt Armitage was again one of the four pilots, but this time he found and engaged a target: .. . aft er turning S outh saw a twin-engined aircraft about 200 ft beneath . travelling S W directly over the fir es. Was able to ident ify it imm ediat ely as an He II I. but attack ed too swiftly. partly through fear of losing it and partly in endeavour to get it before it dropped its bombs. As a result did not get sight on until 100 yds away with rath er high overtak ing speed. On ope ning fi re was immediat ely dazzled.
133
134
OPERATIONS
FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
probably by effect of De Wilde strik ing 011 EIA fuselage. which "'as certainly hit. After a burst of 2Yz sec had to break-away violently. Made a thorough search ill direction ill which EIA had been going but could 1I0t find it again
S ummar)' of Fig hte r Co mma nd N ight-Fighter Defensi ve Operations, t9.1t
.lfonl h
On 3 May the Squad ron moved to Debden for night- fighter operations and a week later ( 10 May) the ORB recorded one of the most active nights: The Squad ron too k part on a Fighter Night operation durin g a heavy raid on Lond on . The Squad ron's allotted heights were from 22,000 ft upwards, and only four enemy aircraft were seen. Sqn Ldr Aitken gave a Ju 88 two short bursts of cannon fire, the second at extreme range, and saw explosive shells burst in its belly with a violent bluish-red flash. The Ju 88 took violent evasive actio n, mak ing otT East, and is claimed as damaged . Sgt Shaw, whilst makin g a starboa rd turn was confront ed with an He III at 50 yards range beam on. He raked it with 60 ro unds from his 12 machine-guns and saw incendiaries striking it am idships. The enemy aircra ft fell away rap idly sideways and is claimed as probably dama ged' (3 Squadron ORB ). May was to prove the busiest mon th of the year for Fight er Co mmand's night defences, with almost 2,000 sorties flown and 96 enemy aircr aft claimed as destroyed. Two-thirds of this etTort (1,345 sorties) was by the single-engine sq uadrons. One of the latt er, 255 Squadron, still at Kirt on, had it busiest and most successful month: 'This moonlight period (till 17/5141 ) was one of inten se enemy " blitzing" of target areas in E and Central England and in conseq uence a considerable strain was thrown on the Squadron. Each night o ne Flight was at "readiness" with the other "available", and on some occasio ns during the peak moonlight period as man y as 16 planes have been at " readiness" . From the assumption of this dusk state on 215/41 till the end of night sta te on 1715/41 (15 nights) a total of 132 ope rational pat rols were flown. In fact a total of 88 were flown in the 6 nights from midnight 4/5/41 till midnight 10/5/41 , an average of more than 14Yz patrol s per night. The Squad ron had it most successful night since formation. Th e most sat isfactory aspect of these combats is that the losses inflicted on the enemy were all achieved at the loss of only one Defiant, bot h the occupants of which landed safely by baling-ou t of their burning machine.' The victories recorded for this period we re:
5 May: S/Ldr Sm ith/PIO Farnes. Ju 88, Donna Nook. 7 May: Sgt Craigl Sgt Muir, He I I I da maged, near Goole. 8 May: Sgt Joh nsonlSgt Aitchison, He II I, near Kirton. 'This actually occurred within sight of the 'drorne, the pilots and N Gs assemb led at dispersal point having a grand-s tand view of the ElA catching fire at 10,000ft and coming down in flames.' PIO Dale (Hurr icane), Do 17 damaged, Hull. 9 May: S/Ldr Smith (Hurricane), He III , Hull. S/Ldr Smith (Hurricane) , He III damaged, Hull. PIO WyrilUSgt Maul , He III, Hull. PIO Wynne-Willson/Sgt Plant , He III, Hull. PIO WrightlS gt McChesney, Ju 88, Hull. FIll TrousdalelSgt Chunn, He III, Leconfield area. FIll TrousdalelSgt Chunn, He I I I, Leconfield area, crashed in sea. Th e OR B qu ite rightl y commented on the events of 9 May: 'This remark able achievement - 6 enemy bombers destroyed, and one damaged inside half an hour with no loss to the Squad ron 's personn el or planes, evoked a deluge of congra tulatio ns.'
Germa n sorties
Jan
2.295
Feb
1.820
Mar
.1.125
Apr
5.125
May
.1.625
J un
1.980
Jul
1.352
Aug
935
Sop
838
Oct
8.19
Nov
695
Dec
695
Tot als
25.3J.j
Typ e
TE Aircr aft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Aircr aft SE Aircr aft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft T E Aircraft SE Airc raft T E Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Airc raft SE Aircraft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft
Sort ies
84 .102 1.17 .121 270 735 J.j2 842 6.13 1.J.j5 536 942 557 338 549 592 361 344 621 496 .117 345 440 211 11.980
Contacts
,
44 J.j 25 33 115 J.j 11 8 .15 217 154 94 2.1 80 25 83 5
Combats
2 9 .I
9 31 25 55 39 102 11 6 37 15 23 18 .I
7 11 6 10 8.1 8 .17 2
1 10 3 36 3 15 0 6 0
1..190
367
77
Claims
0 3 2 2 15 7 28 20 37 59 20 7 20 6 3 0 7
AAA or other
1.1 13 21 .II .II
15 7 7 3
I
9 2 7 0 3 0 258
3 4 6 175
Note: SE - Singfe-engined. TE - Twin-engined.
Offensive Operati ons 1941 Th is was the year in which Fighter Command started to take its war to the enemy, by day and by night. The Comma nd's first recorded - official - offensive mission too k place on 20 December 1940. Taking-o tT from Biggin Hill a pair of Spitfires from 66 Squa d ron (Fit Lt G P Christie and Pit OtTCA W Bodie) flew across the Channel jus t below a bank of cloud that had a base of only a few hundred feet. Th ey coasted in at Dieppe. turned inland near Criel and flew No rth at tree-to p height until they came to an airfield, which they took to be Berek or Le Touquet. They flew low over the airfield, firing at anyt hing that appea red to be a reasonable target , and were fired on by the airfield defences. Both aircraft returned safely. Only a few such Rhubarbs were flown each month and the first confirmed victory came on 9 April when Fit Lt O'M eara of 64 Squad ron downed an He 59 otT Dunkirk, and a Bf 109 falling to a 54 Squadron pilot later the same day. 10 Janu ar y saw the first bomber Circus, with fighters escortin g Blenhe ims to the Fore t de G uisnes. Th e summary for Circus No. I sta ted: 'at 1215 hours six Blenheim s of 114 Squadron , No.2 Group, Bomber Command, made rendezvous over Southend with six fighter squadro ns - 56, 242, 249, 41, 64 and 611. From Southend the Blenheims flew in a tight form ation at 12,000 ft to a point on the French coast ju st East of Cala is. Th e Hurricanes of 56 Squadron flew in various situations around and amidst the form ation of Blenheims; those of 242 and 249 squadrons about 1,000 ft below and to sta rboa rd,
135
136
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPER
Groundcrew working all Spitfire of 91 Squadr on; most pilots developed all exce llent relationship with their regular groundcrew, who took pride in keeping 'their' pilar's aircraft ill tip-top condition.
with the second of these squadrons a little a bove and to starboard of the first. Th e Officer Com ma nding RAF Stat ion orth Weald (Wg Cd r F V Beami sh) flew with 249 Squadron. The Spitfires of 41. 64 and 611 sq uadrons flew in a stepped-up formation above and to port of the Blenheims, with 64 Sq uad ron lead ing and 41 Squad ron in the rear at 16.000ft. Spitfires of611 Squadron ; the Squadr on fl ew as part of Circus No.1 acting as fi ghter for the attacking squadrons.
CO I'eT
s
' On crossing the French coas t the Blenheim s changed to a more open formatio n. which they retained while over France. Takin g gentle evasive act ion a nd comin g down to 6,800 ft, they made a sweep round the tar get so as to approach it from the South-East. All six Blenheims dropped their bombs from 6,800 ft at 1249 hours; most of the bomb s fell among the trees. where they seemed to sta rt two fires. ' While the bom bers were executing these manoeuvres. vario us th ings were hap pening to the fighters. The plan of the operatio n provided that 56 Squ ad ron sho uld stay with the Blenh eims: the othe r two Hu rricane squadrons were to engage the enemy's fighters. or , failing this. co me down low and attack an aerodrom e and landing gro und at St Inglevert. Th e three Spitfire squadro ns were to act as fighter-cover for the att acking squadro ns th rou ghout. Accordingly, 242 a nd 249 squadro ns (with Wg Cdr Beamish) described two circles over the a rea between St Inglevert and Calais a t 7.000 ft to 8.000 ft, but met no enemy fighters at this stage. Nevertheless, they refrained fro m makin g any concerted attac k on the aero dro me a nd land ing ground. both of which looked inactive. One pilot of 249 Squad ron (Sgt Maciejo}"ski) became separated fro m he rest of the forma tion a nd ope ned fire on five HS 126 aircraft sta nding on the edge of one of landing grounds beside the Foret de G uines. He then saw two Me 109s in the air. one of which he attacked and claims to have sho t down. During this man oeuvre his th rottl e ja mmed in the fully-open position a nd he was compelled to return in this condition to Hornchurch, where he land ed successfully by switching off his ignition . •At various point s the bomber and fighter squadron s were subjected to anti-aircraft fire, most of it inaccurat e. Exceptionally accura te fire came from four boats stand ing three or fou r miles off Cala is. On the homeward journey Wg Cdr Beami sh rake d their decks wi th machine-gun fire. and they sto pped firing. Over the Cha nnel a pilot of 249 Squadron (Pia McConn ell) was a ttacked by an Me 109, wound ed. and forced to bale out. Wg Cd r Beami sh cam e to his assista nce and ope ned fire on the Me 109. which was seen to fall into the sea.' The Spitfire squadrons had a pretty uneventful mission, alth ou gh '4 1 Squadron was approa ched from the rear by five Me I09s j ust as it was crossing the coa st. A pilot of the rearguard Section (Sgt Baker) attacked one of these aircraft and may have destroyed it.' The concl usions drawn from this first Circus stated that : This ope ra tion was generally co nsidered a success. In most respects the plan co nceived beforehand worked well: a nd the results . as far as they went, were satisfactory. A military objective had been bo mbed in dayl ight without the loss of a single bomber. At least two enemy aircraft were believed to have been destroyed; and our losses in com ba t a mounted to a single Hurricane. whose pilot was in hospital with a broken leg. Incident ally, it had been discovered that German flak ships could appa rently be silenced by rakin g their decks with machine-gun fire. On the other hand. as a test of superiority the opera tion had been inconclusive. since no major engagement had materialised. Moreover , there was a suspicion in some quarters that we had been lucky not to meet mor e energetic op position. which the tende ncy of our squadrons to break up and come down low might have rendered dangerous. It was co ncluded that for some time we would be wise to go slowly. and content ou rselves with attempts to surprise and con fuse the enemy, witho ut risking heavy losses.' The latt er comments were certainly valid and when Circus 2 was planned. the option of going down low after gro und tar gets was banned. Sqn Ldr A G 'Sailor' Malan led 74 Squadron on Circus o. 2; twelve aircra ft of the Squadr on were airbo rne at 1315 to be part of a la rge fighter escort for five B1enheims bom bing Boul ogne docks. Th e Blenheims
137
138
s
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968
Hurricane of312 Squadron at Kenley, JUlie 1941 where they had recently arrived 10 join the offe nsive operations ol'er Europe.
Douglas Bader {Znd fro m right) and pilots of616 Squadron; Bader lI'as effec tive air combat leader.
a ll
aggressive and
had an uneventful time and the Germ an s did make an appearance. with Malan and Sgt Payne each claiming a Bf 109 but with Sqn Ldr Michelmore failing to make it back. Douglas Bader was soon in on the offensive operations act; on the morning of 12 January he took Stan Tu rner of 242 Squadron on a Rhu barb, and they found two ships near Ca lais: . . . opened fire together at a height of 50ft and speed of 200 mph, sail' bullets strik e water ahead of Esboat and Then hitting Esboat. GOI one burst from front guns of Esboat - no damage. E-boaT ceasedfire. FII L t Turner, ha ving converged slightly on me, turned all'ay TOavoid slipstream as lI'e passe d over Esboat . Did not stop 10 observe dam age 10 boats bill Esboat must ha ve had a lOT as could see bullets from 16 guns hitting The boat.
Hitting the tar get and running away was definitely the best tactic and failure to ado pt this type of tactic was a common cau se for losses - having been over the targe t once you will have woken-up the defences! Indeed. the Squad ron flew two more similar missions tha t day. each with fou r aircraft and with one aircraft failing to return fro m each mission. The losses versus results stat istics for the offensive missions of this sort ofte n gave cause for concern - was the effort worth it - but it must be remembered that in part these missions were designed to give the fighters an aggressive. offensive spirit and to boost the mor ale of pilots who did not like sitting around in England waiting for something to happen . It was a definite case of taki ng the war to the enemy as par t of the overall strategy of seizing and maint ainin g the initiative. Wing Sweeps were mounted on a regular basis; a typical example being that of late afternoon (1600 take-off) 15 April by Spitfires of 65 and 266 squad rons and Hurricanes of 402 Squad ron. a total of 34 aircra ft. Th is was a Channel Sweep between Dungeness and Boulogne. ' WICd r Coope became separa ted due to minor engine tro uble
but followed to rendezvous at Dungeness. When at 20.000 ft. 33 mins afte r leaving base (Wittering) he was turning to the left when attacked from port quart er by Me 109. turned and went into steep dive to evade. but was hit by two cann on shells, one of which went through parachute. Port ailero n and petrol tank also hit. Came o ut of second dive at 5,000 ft and crash -landed at Manston . Pilot unhurt. Other nine aircraft (of 266 Squadro n) had swept to Boulogne at 23.000 ft - Hurricane s being at 20.000 ft and 65 Squad ron ju st above. 266 Squad ron were spread out widely in pairs and were at 10,000ft on return to coast and Hornchurch. When commencing to close in. four Me 109s dived on them from Sou th o ut of sun. P7544 badly damaged by cannon fire. pilot (Sgt Barraclough) landed at Horn chu rch unhu rt. P8014 also bad ly damaged and crash-landed at Hawkinge, pilot (Sgt Whewll) receiving slight superficial injuries. P8185 (P/O Holland ) fired 2 sec burst at Me I09 which suddenly dived beneat h on tail of Spitfire, but was full deflection shot. and thinking another Me 109 was on his own tail broke off with a steep climbing turn and did not again see EtA . Whilst this Me 109 is not claimed as damaged, three pilots saw an Me 109 dive past them at 300 mph at this time with wheels partially down. Seven Spitfires landed at Horn church to refuel and return to base.' (266 Squadron ORB). Thi s is a classic example of how quickly a peaceful piece of sky becomes a death trap for unwary fighter pilots - the 109s had set up a classic out-of-the-sun attack and in a quick pass had damaged at least two of the Spitfires. You could never relax when you were in the air as the famed ' Hun in the Sun' was always a threat. The main role for 263 Squad ron was convoy patrols. with a typical month (June 1941) involving 134 sorties of this type. However. the month also brought the first of wha t would become routine Ranger operat ions: 'This was a special operation known as " Warhead o. I Operation." Information had been received that there was a large concentratio n of Me 109s on the Cherbourg Peninsular; I and II JG2 and part of III JG 26 (about 70 machines in all) at Quarqerville. It was decided to attac k these machines on the gro und at first light on 14th Jun e.' Six Whirl winds moved to Ibsley the day before, to operate in two pairs and with two spares. the tar gets being Quarqerville and Maupertus. 'There had been a slight hitch on the Intelligence side. and photogr aph s of the target area had to be fetched by Spitfire from Middle Wallop. while a supply of French money was sent by dispatch rider from Fighter Command. All this kept us up rather late and we
139
140
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Cannon-armed Hurricane of 1 Squadron; these aircraft \I'ere used ground targets during offensive s\l'eeps.
OPERATIONS
10
great effect attacking
weren't in bed until about midnight. We got up about 0315 to find conditi ons very nearl y perfect. Th ere was a certain amount of cloud in the Sou th and a fairly clear moon. At 0445 Sqn Ldr Donaldson and Pit Off Rudl and took off, followed a minut e later by Fit Lt Pugh and Pit Off Mason . 'The form er found their target withou t much difficult y and delivered an attack on the dispersal pans in a sha llow dive fro m 1300 to 100 feet, Th ey saw their shells hitting and exploding in the pans, but unfortunately these were covered with tarpaulins, and they could not see whether there were any machines in them or not. Sqn Ldr Donaldson then put a burst into a barrack block and had a shot at an oil tank ; the latter he missed.. . . Fit Lt Pugh and Pit Off Mason were clean out of luck as their target was covered by a thick morning mist.' Th e initial attac k had stirred up a hornets nest and as the Whirlwinds land ed an air raid warning sounded as six 109s attempted to return the favour . . . 'but a sho rt brush with 234 Squadron rather damped their ardo ur and they returned home. After an early brea kfast we returned to Filton and made up for lost sleep.' On 17 July the four Hurricanes of 3 Sq uad ron took -off from Stapleford to attack E-boats - a popular target but a dangero us one. 'Blue and Green (one four-cannon and three 12 machine-gun aircraft) took-off to attack E-boats NE of Cap G riz Nez. Th ey attacked a 1,500-ton armed ship in tow with two ot hers, one a flak ship. Th e attack was made at zero feet out of the sun. Intense flak was experienced, but strikes were seen on the ships and some casualties on the flak ship. Blue Section then patrolled the coast and attacked an E-boat through intense flak , again seeing casualties on the boat.' All four aircraft returned safe and the ORB does not note any da mage. However, the Command was sta rting to suffer increasing cas ualties from this type of attack. The same day saw a number of Fighter Command sq uadrons on sweeps, including 308 (Polish) Squadron, led by Sqn Ldr Pisarak. His comba t report sta ted: 'North of St Orner we were attac ked from aste rn slightly on sta rboa rd side by about 15 Me 109s. I gave the order to circle to sta rboa rd - this sto pped their attac k. I then ordered the Squadron to resume formatio n with weavers and follow a zig-zag course towards the coast. Several times we had to re-form defensive circles owing to attempts by the numerous EJA to split up my sq uadro n. I was able to keep my men together and after
many times altering our direction and coun tering the enemy moves we approached Gravelines. I then heard P/O Blach call for assistance. I turn ed and saw several EJA behind him, one of which was about to dive on him. I delivered an attack on the EJA from below on the star boa rd side at 150/200 yds range, giving long bur sts. Th e German began to dive an d my No. 2, Sgt Schiele saw him going down with smoke pou ring from the engine and gave him two short bursts - after which flames were seen and the E/A dived to the gro und.' Th e Luftwaff e pilot had made the mistake of becomin g fixated o n his own ta rget and thu s fell victim to the sudden atta ck by Sqn Ldr Pisarak. A second 109 had been downed by Pit Off Retinger. At the height of the battle the Poles estimated tha t there were 50 enemy aircra ft in the vicinity. In July the Whirlwinds of 263 Squadron undertoo k weapon trials agai nst tank s, and it was increasingly in the strafing role that they were employed. At last, in August 1941, the diar ist was able to comment that : 'Au gust has been a mensis memor abilis. The Whirlwind has at long last been completely vindicat ed and j ustified, having shown that it is an admirable machine for gro und strafing, and also that it is a match for Me 109s. Many offensive sorties have been made during the mon th , mainly directed agai nst enemy aerodromes. As a result of these, three Me 109s have been destroyed in combat, and one damage d. Five Ju88s, at least 7 J U 87s and some Me 109s have been destroyed on the gro und, and others damaged. One E-boa t has been sunk and another damaged. In addition, two tankers at sea, gun posts, lorries, wireless stat ions and enemy troops have been attacke d and severe damage inflicted' (263 Squad ron ORB ). Following a Circus mission on 20 August, the 66 Squad ron ORB noted that the 'enemy aircraft were unusually aggressive.' The Squadron had sent eight aircraft to jo in similar numbers from 130 and 152 squadro ns in escorting six Blenheims; the Wing was led by Sqn Ldr Fo rbes who reported: 'I was lead ing the Squad ron. which was acting as high cover to six Blenheims. Some 20-30 miles from the coast I saw a Spitfire with a 109F on its tail at about 100 ft. I dived with my No. 2 from 600 ft and followed the 109, which had broken off its attac k and had turned South. I had great difficult y in catching up with the 109 and staying in position . Th ree 2-sec bur sts were fired and strikes obse rved. I then ran out of ammunition and broke away so that my No. 2 (Sgt G reen) could attack . Whilst he was attacking I covered his tail. After 3 or 4 bur sts from Sgt Gr een the 109 sta rted to pou r out black smoke, which turn ed white after a time. The 109 flew straight on for about half a mile and went into the sea nose first.' Pit Off Oliver was No. 2 in another Section on the sortie: Due 10 a dive after a 109 I had plenty of speed and \I'as able to climb and shoot while practically vertical at a 109 which commenced a head-on dive. It turned ((1m)' and m )' bullets entered its fuselage towards the tail . . . claim damaged. Another 109 atta cked No. 1 of the Section ( FIt Lt Allen) and myself head on. I \I'as about 150 yards behind Allen and \I'ebothfi red head on and as the 109 turned to starboard with a deflection shot. 109 continued 10 dive and shortly a lot of bluish smoke and oil started streaming 0 111 behind. Was unable 10 watch this ElA longer due to pressure of other £/A . . . claim probable.
The Luftwaffe was still active and the hunted could easily become the hunted. On 4 September 1941 Hurricanes of 302 Squadron were operating from Warmwell as highcover for a Blenheim attack on Cherbourg docks. The fighters were at 14,000 ft when Sqn Ldr Witorzenc saw a pair of 109s attac k the bombers; he closed on one, opening fire at 250 yards and closing at 80 yards, destro ying the Messerschmitt . Mean while, Pit Off
141
142
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
Sp orny went after ano ther pair th at he had seen mo ving in o n th e Wh irlwind esco rt. He mad e a three-quarter attack, firing sho rt bursts from 220 ya rds to 70 ya rds . The EIA turned o n its back pou ring smo ke. He followed it dow n to 1,000 ft but was th en bounced by two more enemy fight er s. He dived to 300 ft a nd had to fly 10 miles inland, j inking a nd dodging, before he was able to turn back - still pursued - unt il he finally man aged to get away. Fo r four successive months in late summer 1942, No . 452 (RA A F) Squ adron was the top -scoring unit in Fight er Co mma nd , in large part du e to the expl oit s of o ne of its Flight Commanders, Fit Lt Brendan Finucan e. The Squ adron claimed 40 a ircra ft de stroyed between Jul y and Oct ober, with Finuc ane sco ring 15 of these, br inging his persona l total to 20 and ea rn ing him two Bars to his DFC and a DSO. The citations read : Bar to DFC: G azetted 9 September This officer has led his flight with grea t dash. determinatio n and courage in the f ace of the enemy. Sin ce July . 1941. he has destr oyed three enemy aircraft and assisted in the destruction of a f urther tiro. Flight Lieut enant Finucane has been largely responsible fo r the fi ne fig hting spirit of the unit. Second Bar to DFC: G azett ed 23 September This officer has fo ught with marked success during recent operations orer Nor thern France and has destr oy ed a fu rther six enemy aircraft. Of these. three lI'ere destroyed ill aile day and tirO ill a single sort ie a ll another occasion. His ability and courage hare been reflected in the high standard ofmorale and fig hting spirit of his unit. Flight Lieutenant Finucane has personally destr oy ed fifteen hostile aircraf t. DSO: G azetted 17 Oct ober Recently, during tirO sort ies a ll consecutive days. Flight Lieutenant Finucane destroyed 5 Messerschmitt 109s bringing his to tal victories to at least 20. He has flown with this squadron since JUlie. 1941. during which time the squadron has destroyed 42 ellemy aircraft of which Flight Lieutenant Finucane has personally destr oyed 15. The successes achieved are undoubtedly due to this officer's brilliant leadership and examp le. Sadl y Brend an Finuc an e was killed in action o n 15 Jul y 1942 . One pilot of 92 Squadron made co mments in his log book th at reflected th e hazards of the se offensive mission s during thi s peri od of mid to lat e 1941: for example:
Bags offla k . horrible and twit chy. Heavily engaged by more 109s than Iras healthy : then caught the flak which Iras deadly . Hellish light flak . hit 36 times ill rail. We gar hammered. Blue Section Irere the lowest and Irere a little lower than ill/ended. We watched as a bunch of 109s dived past us and despite the shouted warnings Blue S ection rook 110 evasive action and Irere well and truly bounced. Fit Lt Lund. Sgt Edge and Sgt Port went straight down. Ano ther bad day - it Iras a shamb les and involved anoth er squadron being. as fa r as I was concerned, ill the lI'rollg place. A IlYlray lI'e got bounced and lost Sgts Cox and Wood-Scalrell. He summa rised what had been a bad peri od for 92 Squ adron. The Squ adron had been tak ing such a beating for a long time a nd o ur aircr aft were very tired de spite the best
Pair of Spirjires of306 Squadron getting airborne; mall)' of the offensive sorties Irere flown as pairs under the Ramrod or Rhubarb code-names. effo rts of the groundcrew. The tiredness of th e rernammg aircrew, the ove rworked gro undcrews and th e a ircraft th emselves made a mo ve nece ssary and on 20 Oc tober the Sq uad ro n moved to Digby and o . 12 Group.' N ight Intruders O n the night of 21 December 1940 six Blenhe ims of 23 Squ ad ron flew offensive pa tro ls having been 'o n stand by for nu isanc e raiding of aerod ro mes in French Occ up ied territory since the 16t h' . Eight aircraft had actua lly been stripped of A I equipment o n 10 December and placed o n sta nd by for 'spec ial m ission s over F rench terri tory but this was po stponed by G roup mowing to un su itable weather over France.' The six Blenheims took -off between 2020 and 0155 and patrolled the areas a ro und Abbeville, Amiens a nd Poix, three of the German night-fighter Sectors: acc ording to the O R B: 'the airfields were beaten -up at he ight s down to 1,000 ft.' Seven a ircra ft were ai rbo rne the following night to the sa me areas, but thi s time o ne of the Blenheims ran o ut of fuel and the crew had to ba le-out over the Channel. In thi s first intruder loss two of the crew drowned . The intruder role had been carried-out pri or to thi s by aircra ft of Bom ber Co mma nd's No.2 Group but fro m thi s date o nwa rds it became the responsibi lity of Fighter Command, a ltho ugh thi s was by no mean s exclu sive and Bomber Command con tinued to attack German airfields. Of the two aircra ft claimed as destroyed in September, o ne fell to Sqn Ldr Hoare of 23 Squ adron, the O R B recording: ' S/ L Hoare took -off for Melun, but seeing lights near Beauvais , turned aside to investigate and found the airfield lit up . He first chased an aircra ft with navigation lights that was landing but gave it up in favour o f an aircra ft seen o rbiting, and the ai r gunner put in a lon g bur st at 75 ya rds ran ge from underneath and to beam , but with out visible result and th e aircra ft was then lost. Then an other was seen and formatted o n and the air gunner put in a lo ng burst until blinded by a flash from his own gun . The EtA put o ut its lights and was lost. It was claimed as dam aged . Yet a th ird aircra ft was seen a nd followed as it turned in to land . The pilot opened fire at 100 yards ca using both engines to smo ke stro ngly as the EtA fell away to sta rboard in a vert ical dive at 600 ft. It is claimed as de stroyed.'
143
144
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
Intruder so rties and claims, 19-'" Nt s
Jan Feb Mar Apr
May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Totals
6 6 II
16 13 14 18 17
BIen.
23 8 49 33 I
10
12 8 10
141
114
H av.
16 56 48 87 61 35 28 21 22 374
Bost .
Hurr.
2 2 II
2 3
De/.
6 9
6 8 4 4 7 4 5 53
15
Tota l
23 8 51 57 77 54 95 65 39 35 27 28 559
EIA seen
Claim
II
19 51 33 128 4 14 27 13 13
Loss
13
3 2 II I
2 I
9 32 354
Ajfd at tack
3 28 17 38 19 56 37 17 23
2 I
2 I
II
21
15
I
277
8
Not e: Nts - Night s on which so rties flown: Bien - Blenheim: Hav - Havoc: Be st - Boston; Hurr Hurricane ; Def - Defiant; Afld attack - number of airfields claimed as attacked.
1942 - Losing the advantage One of the major threats faced by the RAF's pilots in 1942 was the increased use by their opponents, especially JG26, of the Fw 190- an aircraft that had the edge over the Spitfire V (the best of the RAF fighters at the time) in a number of crucial performance areas. Operating out of Bolt Head with 312 Squadron, Miroslav Liskutin recalled his first brush with the 190: We lI'ere directed to intercept f our Fock e Wulfs in the Torbayarea. . . . 1 spoiled three aircraft loll' o rer the sea. but already heading back towards France after a hit and run attack again st Torquay. We lI'ere some 5 miles from the enemy f ormation. After " cutting the comer" on them the distance lI'as quickly reduced to under one mile. My engine lI'as at full po wer with the boos t o ver-ride beyo nd the gate and the pr opeller set at maximum revolutions. Afy Spitfire lI'as gradually closing to about 700 yards when they spo iled us. Until then Ire had no idea how the Spitfire VB 1I'01l1d compare in a real-life race with all FII' 190. Our pilots kn ew that there lI'as no great difference ill the performance bet ween these tll'O aircraft. alth ough the FII' 190 1I'01lld hare to be regarded as a marginal fa vourite. This occasion ga ve liS proof that at sea level we lI'ere absolutely equal. .. , Despit e my earlier op timis m . my distan ce behind the N o.3 FI\' 190 becam e stabilised at about 650 y ards. Joe ( Pipa) tried some shots from this distan ce. It look ed lik e the 011/.1' effect of J oe 's firing lI'as a temp orary slight slowing down of his aircraft, due to the recoil of his cannons. I was still hoping to close to at least 100 ya rds. to ge t a better chalice with shoo ting.
Bot h formations were going all out , as evidenced by the black smoke from the German fighters. ' In these conditions my airspeed indicat or was showing a steady 330 mph. There is no doubt that this was the true maximum speed of the Spitfire VB and the Fw 190at sea level, in the summer of 1942.' The official RAF trials aga inst a captured 190 were detailed in the previous Chapter and confirmed that the RAF pilots had to adapt their tact ics when operating in areas prowled by 190s.
4
Combat fi lm sequence oj Spitfire V downing an FII' 190.
An August 1942 Air Tactics memo summarised the RAF' s attitude: 'At the present stage of the war, the enemy in France is equipped with the Fwl90, a fighter with an excellent rate of climb and good acceleration. To defeat this aircr aft and to avoid casualties on our side, o ur aircraft must fly as fast as possible whenever they are in the combat zone.'
145
146
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968
Spitfire V AA 937 of607 Squadron, November 1942; all August 1942 Air Tactics memo summarised the RAF's attitude: 'A t the present stage of the lI'ar, the ellemy ill France is equipped with the FII'1 90. a fighter with all excellent rate of climb and good acceleration. To def eat titis aircraft and to avoid casualties all our side. our aircraf t must fly as f ast as possible whenever they are ill the combat zone. '
The same document included 'Prune's Guide for Living': I. Don't loiter. When you can 't keep up don 't blame your leader ; pull your
finger out and cut the corners. 2. Low revs and high boost will bring yo u safely back to roost. 3. Don't wait until you see the Hun before you decide to get a move on. It will take a co uple of minutes for your Spitfire to respond after you open up, and by that time whatever yo u do will be irrelevant. When you are liab le to meet the enem y fly always at maximum crui sing speed. 4. If you want to live on the other side, you must move fast, but equ ally, if you want to come back again you must save petrol. You will find your engine happier at , say, +4 1b and 1700 r.p .I11, than at + l Ib and 2650 r.p .m. Both these adjustments give the same ASI but if you fly at +4 1b and 1700 r.p.m . you will save seven gallons of petrol an hour. It is possible to get full throttle and +41b above 10,000 ft by reducing the revs until the boost falls to +4Ib. Use full throttle a nd minimum revs ab ove full throttle height for any desired AS!. Thi s gives the best combination of fast crui sing and minimum consumption. 5. When you are tra velling at full throttle, and full power is sudden ly wanted, it is only necessary to push the constant speed lever fully forward to get full revs and boost. To return to high speed crui sing a t best econ omical conditions, reduce your rei's and not your boost. 6. When being briefed, always ask what revs and boost you should fly. Th is will naturally depend upon the length of the sweep, but don 't forget that : a. When hard pressed you can fly + 16 boost and 3,000 revs with out any danger of blowing up, but b. Your con sumption will be ISO gallons per hour. 7. Finally, when unlikely to be engaged always fly minimum revs and under 41b boost, but when in the vicinity of H uns, fly maximum everything and in good lime.
OPERATIONS
In addition to the so rties shown in the tab le, the Co mmand flew 37,478 shipping sorti es by da y and 2,709 by night. In Apri l 1942 'Spud ' Spurdle became 'A Flight' Co mma nder on 9 1 Squadron during what was a particula rly busy period for the Squadron; in addition to the 'Jim Crow' shipping recce missions in which it specialised it also undertook the full ra nge of Fighter Co mmand tasks. Between 9 April a nd 26 Ma y he flew 74 sorties; a few days later the first Spitfire VBs arri ved, That was all very well but all too often the main opponent was the Fw 190 and ' I wanted to savo ur in full measure this victory as our Spit Vs were vastl y inferior to the 190s and we'd been outnumbered 2 to I'. The combat he was referring to took place.on 26 July during a patrol intended to stop Germ an weatherrecce flights. Flying as Black Section with ' Knobby' Clarkson they spo tted and engaged four 190s .. .
147
Fighter Command Interception patrols. 1942 ,\!ofllh
Day
Nigh t
Totol
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
1,313 1,816 1,>18 2.863 3,482 3.929 3.558 4.350 3.136 4.419 2,742 2.484
68 1 580 586 1.569 1.123 1.725 1.899 2,035 1,534 1.028 746 647
1.9>1 2.396 2. 134 4.432 4.605 5,6>1 5,457 7.385 4.670 5.447 3.488 3.13 1
Total
35.640
14.153
49.793
Note: Table is based on Form Y reports.
AI)' HUll section 11'0 5 1I0t turning f ast and to avoid over-shooting 1 cltopped the throttle and went into full fi ne pitch. 1 could j ust gel a shot at the second Hull. 1 fo llowed him round. the dot f air on his cockpit, then I lightened the turn. For an instan t his black spinner hung steady against 'K's ' 1I0se. I pressed the gun-button and the machine-guns spluttered lI'a)' out on lite wings while the cannons thump ed and coughed. No t enough deflection. 'K' hea ved around tighter and lighter. My vision browned with partial blacko ut and my hands grew heavy on the stick. The 190 Ims some where below me bill I held the button down for a half-second then eased up. The second Hun whipped fro m under m)' nose and, chasing his leader, lI'as offand all'a)'. The)' Ifere going much 100 fas t and slid up above, stall-turtling for another attack. 1 couldn 't overtake them - so f ar I had been trying 10 gain height and f ace them head-on. Here they come again. I pressed the button and the cannon's Dill' of the classic (and well-known} shots of a Spitfire; fro ntal I'iell' of a 92 Squadron aircraft.
148
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
thudding drowned the machine-gun 's splutter. The leading Hun dipped, lifted. Suddenly a white cloud burst down its f uselage; his tail tore off and, dragging, whipped at the end of a tangle of cables. God! Hit his oxygen bottles! BIOIl'n his bloody tail off! (The Blue Arena. Bob Spurdle, William Kimber). Th e pilot pa rachu ted and was picked up by an RA F launch. with Bob Spurdle lat er meetin g him in hospital. Night Defence Th e Luft waffe had certainly not abando ned its night war ove r England. a ltho ugh the increasing effect iveness of the defences mean t tha t it was less effective - an d more hazardous. Th e attack on Liverpool on the night of I2I13 March was typical of man y flown by the Luftwaffe during this period . with 169 bo mbe rs tasked aga inst the city. of which 146 are recorded as having mad e atta cks. The tot al enemy act ivity th at night was just over 300 aircraft a nd the overall attacks lasted for abo ut six hours fro m 2040 hours. Figh ter Command flew 157 pat rol s (178 airc ra ft) as follows: o. No . No . No . No . No .
9 10 II 12 13 14
Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp
-
24 patrols. 32 airc raft . 19 pat rols. 19 aircraft. 46 pat rols. 59 a ircraft. 48 pat rol s. 48 ai rcraft. 15 patrols. 15 aircra ft. 5 pa tro ls. 5 aircraft.
Th e major ity of so rties were by Ca ts Eye single-engine fighters. who flew 140 sorties and cla imed th ree destro yed. two probabi es a nd one dam aged . Two of the destr oyed were claim ed by Defiants of 264 Squ ad ron. Th e A I fighte rs claimed one destro yed . two prob ab les a nd two dam aged; the only confirmed success was by a 604 Squadron Beau fight er - the Squ ad ro n also claimed a probabl e and two dam aged . T he ra id had been qu ite successful: 't he Birkenhead and Wallasey areas suffe red most in this raid. a nd man y firms were affec ted by the loss o f electr icity supply. In Liverp ool itself dam age to hou se property was co nsiderable and widespread an d the probl em o f dealing with the numbers who had been rend ered hom eless was acu te' (A H B Narra tive). A major German cam paign was lau nched in Apri l - the so-called Baedeker raid s agai nst British cultura l centres, the first attack being on Exeter on 23/24 April. Th e Tu rbinlite-par asite team s were now part of the defence and on 29/30 Ap ril score d their only success of the campa ign, a Hurrican e of 253 Squ ad ron opera ting with a Turbinlite Havoc of No. 1459 Flight. T he ORB gave a brief acco unt: 'Given vecto rs of 110 and to ld to climb to Ange ls 14, at Angels 8 were orde red to vecto r 060. On reaching Ange ls 14 further vector of 030. ha nded over to Reclo. Afte r various vectors of a nort herly direction made con tact on 340 at a distance of 10,000 ft. Pilot Officer Scott brought them wit hin 500 ft of the ba ndit's port side and ident ified as He Ill. As Hu rrica ne had clear visual, T urb inlite not used . Bandit took evas ive action in a vert ica l dive. followed by Fit Lt Yap p, firing from approx 100 ya rds. Strikes obse rved as bandit dived an d spira led into clou d a t a pprox 400 mp h. Hu rrican e pulled out. Large fire seen below, lighting up the clo ud . He I II cla imed as destro yed .' By Apri l 255 Sq uad ro n was operating fro m High Erca ll and had completed its reequi pment with A I-equ ipped Beaufigh ter VIs; on the night of the 25th the first success with the new aircraft was made. ' FlO Wyrill (RIO Sgt Williams) on a non-operati onal
Beaufighter of 255 Squadron at Honiley; the Squadron operated Beaufighter Vis from this airfield for six months fro m June 1942 .prior to departing to North Africa.
pa tro l. at 2300 hours was taken ove r by Honil ey and passed to Combert on . After a series of vecto rs, a blip was obta ined in the vicinity of Hereford at 12.000 ft, E/A being slightly below. After a burst of 2 seconds fro m dead astern. the E/A took violent evasive action, and visua l was lost in the mist. Visual was regained and after a second burst of 4 seco nds, ElA was seen to burst into flames and to dive vertica lly. Th ere had been no return fire, A few seconds later, an open par achute was seen descending. a nd E/A was seen to hit the gro und and explode . Thi s success bro ught much encourage ment to all mem bers of the Squadron. as well as to the Stat ion . and congratulat or y messages cam fro m Group. Sector an d vario us sections of the Stat ion ' (255 Squad ron ORB). Th e victim was a Ju 88. On I May a Beau fighter of 141 Squ adro n depa rted Acklington at 0244 fo r a pa tro l a nd was soo n being vecto red towa rds a target. ' . . . obtain ed AI con tact. which disappeared out of ran ge. Further vector given at 12.500 ft. visua l and A I conta cts obta ined simultaneo usly a head of port side 300-400 yds away at same level; E/A a Dornier 217 took evasive action by turning to sta rboard and diving. Th e Beau fight er, piloted by W /Cdr Heycock with R.Obs P/O Brand on , tu rned thro ugh 180 degrees. holding visua l aga inst background of clou d. and dived afte r E/A . E/A took double turn but AI contact and visua l main tain ed and fight er opened fire at 3.000 ft. GCI co uld not help. After vario us vecto rs with figh ter gaining heigh t and tra velling South. AI contac t ob ta ined on E/A below and to sta rboard. followed a lmos t immediat ely by visual. E/A clea rly seen to be a Dornier 217. was now dead a head at 5.000 ft ran ge. Fighter turned in for deflection shot and ope ned fire afte r closing in. Firing steady burst end ing in line astern . strikes were seen all alo ng starboa rd in towa rds engine. fuselage and tail. Blue sparks came out of E/A. which immediately went into a righ t-ha nd turn which increased to nearl y vertic al. and dive was so steep it co uld not be followed and E/A looked as if to cras h. Figh ter lost height as soo n as possible. still keeping E/A in view. which was difficu lt as E/A was immedia tely below. E/A pulled o ut of dive a nd ano ther attack was made and strikes were seen on the fuselage and tai l. ret urn fire from E/A 's rear gun which burst to right and then hit nose of fight er. ElA was at that moment in a right- hand turn which was difficult to follow witho ut overshooting. Able however, to see E/A going into
149
150
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
cloud appa rently out of control, a pprox 25 East of Blythe. Beaufighter landed Ou ston 0405. Claim I Dorni er 217 dam aged .' Th is comb at highlights a number of inter esting points. The co-ordination between the G C I controller, the Al operator a nd the pilot was excellent , with the G C I controller man oeu vring the Bea ufighter to a position where it could make an A l or visual acq uisition. The A I opera to r was able to pick-up targets below the aircraft (not easy on the set fitted to the Beau fighter I f) and give direction s to the pilot, a ltho ugh in thi s case Wing Commander Heycock appears to be have been picking-up the Dorn ier - probab ly the same aircra ft - fairl y easily. The combat was recorded as indecisive, a claim being made for 'damaged ' wherea s in many other cases it wou ld no doubt ha ve gone down as a 'proba ble' because of the sta tements of ,steep dive' and 'apparently out of control'. Defensive sorties in period of Baedeker Raid s, April-August Month
April
Type
AI Cats-eye
Turbinlite May
Jun e
AI Cats-eye Turbinlite AI Cats-eye
July
Turbinlite Al Cats-eye
Turbinlite August
AI Cats-e ye
Turbinlite
Sorti es
1 9~ 2
Destroyed
Probable
Damaged
783 397 3
16 3
6 I
13 5
~7
I~
3
5
I
I
21 3
5
10
36
8
20
21
7
23
? ?
?
? ?
187 37 908 286 68 1.231
I
~2~
88
I think it is true to say that nobody liked being on Turbinlites. Basically all the DB7 variants I\'ere very pleasant to fly , bill they had never been intended to fl y all the time with a load of a ton ofbatteries and a large arc-light installation ill a l-ery un-aerodynamic 1I0se. 1 think part of the f rustration of Turbinlite operations came fro m the fac t that I\'e carried 110 armament and would be dependent on the Hurricane to do the shooting - added to this I\'as the knowledge that those German aircraft which did show their noses II-ere always served up to the straight night fig hters with their improved Al and much higher performance. The procedure of interception I\'as exactly the same as fo r 'straight' night fig hters including the drills for GCI and Searchlight Box . The diff erence came when approaching minimum range, when the light would be activated bill the doors in the nose kept closed and thefi ghter directed by the code word 'boiling' to dive ahead, whereupon the light was exposed with the target hopefully slightly to one side in theflat beam. This would have the dual effec t of putting it in front of the fig hter and conf using a gunner in the EIA, who would be more than startled at the sudden dazzling illumination. Certainly 'friendlies' who I\'ere entertained with this treatm ent reported that looking towards the light I\'as more blinding than a ground searchlight.
5
655 11 7 I.37~
The Turbinlites rema ined active throughout this period and Leslie Holland was one of the 'unfortunate souls' to have been posted to th is role, joining 534 Squadron at Ta ngmere.
June 1942 at High Ercall - with 25 7 Squadron posing with one of their Hurricanes.
O ffensive Operations Ha ving formed a t Warmwell at the beginning of March, 175 Squadron flew Hurricane II Bs on their first mission, a Roadstead, on 16 Apri l when the CO, Sqn Ldr J R Pennington -Smith, led six aircraft to att ack Maupertus airfield . One returned earl y with an engine problem and on e (F/Sgt Foreman) had to ditch becau se of a glycol leak ; sadly, the pilot was never found . More mission s followed over the next few days and on the 30th the Squadron O R B recorded a day that concluded with the comment 'we are now starting to make the history which 175 Squ adron wants to make.' The sortie that prompted th is was against shipping at Isle de Ba tz, which involved eight aircraft led by the CO : Three destroyers a nd one merchant ship were a ttacked with 250 GP 3-second delay bombs and machine-gun fire, one destroyer was damaged but no confirmation concern ing the others is to hand yet, at an y rate the attack was severe a nd many casua lties must have been inflicted on the crews. The lad s consider it was a highly successful a ttack, they all come home very pleased with their first low level a ttack, WIO Emberg had his aircraft damaged by flak but managed to land a t Portreath safely, otherwise, no casualties.' A few da ys later the OR B added: ' report from Group that one of the destroyers classed as casualty Category 3. As a first attempt a t a shipping target we feel that we ha ve made a good sta rt at th at kind of opera tion.' On 23 July four Spitfire s of 302 Squadron were airbo rne out o f Heston on a Rhubarb in two pairs. 'Fl ying below 500 ft cro ssed over Dungeness and off Le Touquet, Fg Off Gorzula and Pit Off Czarnecki made landfall at Plage St Gabriel. north of Le Touquet while Fg Off Gladyth and Pit Off owakiewicz crossed so uth of the town . Go rzula and Cza rnecki flew a long east side of ra ilway towards Etaples and near Lefaux saw a WIT Station consi sting of on e lar ge building and five aerial masts all cam ouflaged with nett ing, The y were unable to find tar get but a tta cked a large factory near Etap les. Bofors fire was seen from five point s ar ound the factory . Una ble to find any other target s . . .
15 1
152
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
made on another locomotive, hits being observed, causing damage.' Two other pilots were on similar Intruders that night but with no success. 28 July: 'At 0055 PIa R S Davidson took-off for patrol over Lille aerod rome where, however. no activity was observed; proceeding from the target area in direction of Orch ies pilot made three attac ks on a train, resulting in damage to the locomoti ve. PIa C Mehroftook-off at 0045 to pat rol Leon area . . . proceeded to Lens-Lou vais area where an atta ck on a train resulted in dam age to the locomotive. Cont inuing ort h of Lens pilot made an attack upon locomotive resultin g in dama ge.' Two more trains were atta cked by other pilots that night, with eight more being claimed as damaged the following night , Pit Off Davidson report ing that one of his had 'bl own up'. Sgt Dunn report ed 'large cloud s of steam and sparks' when he atta cked a loco in the earl y hour s of 31 July.
Spitfires oJ64 Squadron at Hornchurch, May / 942; Fighter Command flew 5,84/ day offensive ops this month.
these two pilots returned via Rye and landed at base at 0645. Weather over France was 10/1 0 cloud at times down to grou nd and raining in places. Gladych and Nowakiewicz found themselves nort h of the Foret de Boulogne; they struck an army camp on a platea u. A number of Nissen hut s camouflaged and a radio sta tion of one hut and four aerial masts. Intense bofo rs fire fro m all round camp. Gladych attacke d and silenced one gun post and after a wide turn attac ked gun posts followed by Nowa kiewiecz. Flashes and much dust and debris seen as results of hits. Flak con tinued all the time. After attac k Nowa kiewicz did not reply on Rff and Gladych flew south along railway line and found hutted camp at Eta ples. His first atta ck showed many hits on hut s but no AA was seen. After a left turn he came in again an d saw many soldiers in camp, which he attac ked and M IG fire opened up from west side of camp. His cockpit hood was hit near Fo ret de Boulogne. He made another wide turn followed by a third short attac k with MIG . Landed Hawkinge 0725 and repor ted to Heston later. PIa Nowakiewicz missing' (302 Squadron ORB ). By mid 1942 trains had become a favo urite target, the clearance for such attacks having been given in late 1941. For 32 Squad ron 's Hurri canes, late July was something of a tra in-busting month: 26 July: 'At 0115 Sgt R E Tickn er too k-off with instructions to search for trains in the Lens area. Pilot crossed Belgian coast near Ostend, and reached target area but no railway activity was obse rved. Pilot later proceeded North of target area and attac ked two trains, resulting in damage to both locomotives. At 0 115 PIa R S Davidson took-off for patrol in neighbour hood of Ypres, Bailleul and Lille; near Lille a train was observed. and after two attacks this appea red to be derailed and the engine damaged. Before returning to base an attack was
It was always difficult to assess the amount of damage done during such atta cks and the report s of locomotives being damaged could not indicate the extent of the damage; steam locos gave off a lot of steam at all times but should the boiler be hit by 20 mm cannon fire then cloud s of steam would often result - even then the damage may not have been too significant. As we will see late r, attac ks on trains were to become one of the main tasks in the D-D ay period . They were never easy tar gets and as the Germans became increasingly desperate to prevent the loss of locos, the defences increased and flak traps were set for Allied pilots.
Sqn Ldr Roberts in Typhoon oj 257 Squadron: the Squadron converted to the Typhoon in July /942 and fl ew the type Jor the rest oj the lI'ar.
153
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
Fighter Command Offensive Ope rations. 19~2
M onth Ja n
Day
Nov
273 906 2.083 7.651 5.841 5.895 3.341 6.802 2.137 2.888 2.648
Dec
2.800
Feb
Mar Apr
May J un J ul Aug Sep Oct
Total
43 ,265
Nigh,
36 60
TOfal
207 198 366 376 227 102 78 115 107
309 966 2,155 7.858 6.039 6.26 1 3.717 7.029 2.239 2.966 2.763 2.907
1.944
45 .209
72
Th e source document for the offensive operatio ns table and the one for defensive ops also include a figure for 's pecial patrols' but does make clear if these were defensive or offensive. However, they need to be added to the total of opera tions for the year. giving an extra 11.937 day and 580 night sorties. Th e Co mman d's daytime total was therefore 128,420 sorties and 19.386 night sort ies. However. the sou rce document also states that from August 1942 sort ies by USAAF units are included; the first USAAF Fighter Group to commence operations was the Spitfire-equipped 31st Fighter Gr oup. which flew its initial missions with the RAF in late Jul y.
Dieppe - O pera tion Jubilee At 0445 on 19 August 1942 the first assault waves Note: Table is based on Form Y reports. of Ca nadian troo ps went asho re at Dieppe under Operat ion Ju bilee, a ' reconnaissance in force'. Air support was a vital element of Ju bilee and 48 Spitfire sq uadrons (42 with Mark Vs and four with Mark IXs) were involved either with Close Air Supp ort. 129 Squad ron for example strafed gro und tar gets in adva nce of the first land ings. fighter cover to prevent German aircraft interfering with the opera tion. and escort for Allied bombers. It was the busiest day for many squa dro ns since the height of the Battl e of Britain and some units flew four sorties durin g the day. The RAF flew some 3.000 sorties in the space of 16 hours on 19 August 1942. In response. the Luftwaff e flew j ust under 1.000 sorties. Don Morrison was operating with 401 Squad ron over Dieppe, Ju st as 11'1' in Yellow Sec tion arrived orer the Dieppe area. I spo tted a single 190 some 1.000-1 .500 fee t bela II' and heading in the same direction. 1 did a wide. slipping barre l roll to lose height and levelled out about 150 yards behind him. As 1 closed up I opened fire with a tll'O second burst of cannon fire. I sail' strikes all along the starboard side of the f uselage and several pieces blew offfrom around the cowling. Just as 11'1' bot h lI'elll into a rery thin lay er ofcloud he exploded with a terrific flash offla me and black smo ke .
Th e first patrol by 124 Squad ron was airborne at 0445; the ORB reporti ng that : 'The Horn church Wing were con tacted soon afte r leaving Beachy Head ; the pat rolling squadro ns were relieved at 0520 and the area of the ancho rage was patrolled for thir ty minutes at 3/500 ft. with Blue Section pat rolling to the West. Red to the East and White in the centre. Assault and TL C were seen to be still arriving at Orange Beach . It was fou nd impossible to contact Fighte r Contro l by RIT. A Ju 88 was seen by Red 3 and shot into sea 5 miles NE of Dieppe by the fire from a destroyer. the EIA having dr opped its bomb s near by. A ship of 6/800 tons was seen on fire 2 miles NE of Dieppe . Light flak was experienced from the Camp de Cesar and some heavy flak from the town. App roximately 3 EIA were seen in the vicinity. but no engagements eventu ated.' Th e Squadron was back on the gro und at 0622. but a second sortie. again of three Sections. was airborne at 1049 and was more producti ve: ' RV made with 616 Squadron in the Channel off Beachy Head. Squad ron flew for 10 minut es at zero feet then climbed 10
OPE
ATIONS
10.000 ft in the Dieppe area. Owing to great activity in that area the Squadron split into Sections to patrol the anchorage. App rox 20+ aircraft were seen. made up of Fw 190s. Do 217s and Ju 88s, some below and others at the same level. Comb at s took place as follows: 'F/L Gr egson . Red I with Red 2 turn ed to assist Red 3 and 4 who were being dived on by 2 Fw 190s. coming from the South. The first Fw was attacked by Red I fro m the beam with a two second bur st from 200 yards. which rapidl y increased. while the second aircraft dived into France. Strikes were seen. and a sma ll flash from underside of the enemy's por t wing root. A panel appeared to rip backwards. the port leg dropped and hung at about 45 deg. The EIA continued to turn . dived away and was lost to sight. It is claimed as damaged. A little later Red I saw an Fw 190 pulling up out of a dive in front of him. and climbed up quickly behind the EIA who did not apparently see him. and thu s too k no avoiding action. Red I fired a quick bur st with cann on and m.g. from astern at 300 yds for about I second. An explosion took place behind the EtA's cockpit. there was a lar ge fl ash. and bits flew off followed by smoke and flame. The EtA went into a dive. slowly starting to spin. leaving a trail of smoke behind. and then crashed ju st off the beach. East of Dieppe, after having practicall y disintegrated in the air. It is claimed as destroy ed. 'F/Sgt PEG Durnford DFM, White 3. attac ked an Fw 190. from 200 yds with a one second burst on the port side. The EIA straightened out. and sta rted diving. White 3 atta cked again with a three second bur st. from dead astern. The EtA started smokin g and then caught fire. The E/A 's pilot was not seen to bale out. or the EIA to crash. It is therefore claimed as probably destroyed but it is hoped that in view of the fact that the EIA caught fire it may be allowed as destroyed. Later. while flying at 5,000 ft over Dieppe, White 3 saw a Ju 88 flying at 2,000 ft, and closed to 300 yds . The EIA dived to tree-top level. and was atta cked by White 3 from 250 yards. with a one second burst; strikes were seen around the port engine nacelle. After firing the remainder of his cann on ammunition White 3 saw the Ju 88 drop its bomb s, and crash into a field with a dark smoke coming from its port engine. which had sto pped before impact. Thi s aircraft is claimed as destroyed ; later report s from camera films identify the aircraft as a Do 217 and not a Ju 88.' Pit Off Kilburn. Red 3. claimed a Fw 190 as probably destroyed and the Squad ron 's score for the action was three enemy aircraft but with Sgt Shank s failing to return. The day was far from over for 124 Squadron and two more sorties were flown; the third sort ie took-off at 1320. led by Sqn Ldr Balmforth, to patrol one of the convoys. During this sortie the Spitfires claimed an Fw 190 destroyed (P/O Hull), a Ju 88 probably destroyed (P/O Hull) and three Fw 190s dama ged. One Spitfire was damaged and had to crash-land at Lympne but the pilot (Sgt Mirsch) was OK . The final sort ie of the day was again led by Sqn Ldr Balmforth and was airborne at 171 9 to pat rol the same con voy. A gro up of 109s approached the con voy but turned away when the Spitfire moved towards them . The Squad ron was back on the ground at 1847 after a hectic but successful day . ' Needless to say, celebrat ions took place in various places during the evening.' Sqn Ldr Balmforth had been on all four sorties and had led three of them, the first sortie having been led by Wg Cdr Duke -Woolley. 'Sammy' Samp son saw action twice in the Dieppe area. On one sorti e he engaged a Dorn ier of KG2 : As 1 started to overhaul it I was comp letely pili-offby the rear-gunn er opening up on me and what look ed lik e red tomatoes passed by m e on either side. The result of
155
156
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
this lI'as that I opened-up far too earl)'. However, I sail' hits 011 the port wing and petrol started to pour out of the port wing tank . Theil Johnny warned me of tll'O 190s above and behind so I quickly broke off and rej oined him.
He attacked a second Dornier but with similar results and the exhaustion of his cannon ammunition, A sortie later in the day resulted in the destruction of an Fw 190 courtesy of the ideal set-up of sneak-up and shoot without being seen. I don't think the HUll pilot sail' me for I'er), conveniently he turned to starboard, which enabled me to give him a 3-secolld burst from 150 yards and he went d01l'1I 011 fir e into the sea,
Pit Off Bob Large was airborne in a Spitfire VI of 616 Squadron on 2 October 1942 when he claimed an Fw 190 over St Orner. His combat report stated: . . . as lI'e lI'ere leaving the target area I reported about a dozen FII' 190s about 6,000 ft below us, proceeding north-west, and as the Squadr on Commander had apparently not seen the EIA, I announced that I lI'as going dOIl'II. Whell about 800 y ards awayfrom the EIA the formation brok e up ill all directions and I closed ill 011 a straggler, who broke to starboard. I opened fir e at about 500 yards range, bill as he turned sharply I pulled the 1I0se of my aircraft ahead of him , blotting out the EIA from I'iell' and firin g one 5-secolld burst and then allowing the 1I0se of my aircraft to fall, to see the result s ofmy fire. The EIA lI'as diving I'ery steeply to the N E with his port undercarriage leg hanging d01l'1I and brown smoke pouring from him. Bright flash es lI'ere coming from the starboard side of his engine, which aft erwards developed into flames. I continued to tum as other EIA lI'ere threatening Cooper and myself. I fired the remainder of my ammunition ill a head-oil attack 011 an FII' 190. FS Cooper came into line abreast , up SUII, to my port wing and lI'e recrossed the French coast north of Cap Griz Nez , being attacked most of the lI'ay out. I warned FS Cooper of all attack from below and ordered him to break. FS Cooper lI'ashit ill the radiator bill did 1I0t realise it and 1 told him that glyco l lI'as pouring from the radiator, FS Cooper baled out off Sangatte about 5 miles 011I to sea, and aft er 2 FII' 190s had made a fi nal attack 0 11 me, they turned back to France. 1 remained with FS Cooper, giving Mayday s . until 1 had to leave him owing to shortage offu el, and returned to Hawkinge.
Bob Large had used 120 rounds of 20mm and 1,250 rounds of 0.303 in ammunition during his combats. November 1942 for 302 Squadron was typical of the routine of most of the Command's squadro ns during this period: 2 Nov 3 Nov 6 Nov 8 No v 9 Nov 10 Nov 16 Nov 17 Nov 19 Nov 22 Nov
Escort Bostons to Caen Pair on Rhubarb Escort to Caen Sweep Ypres-Cassel-Gravelines Escort to Le Havre Escort to Le Havre Two pair on Rhubarb, rail target s Amiens Sweep to Cherbourg Pair o n Rhubarb , rail targets Sweep and escort for Defiants.
OPERATIONS
The Rhubarb flown by Pilot Officers Wardz inski and Sniec on 3 November was prod uctive: 'Rhubarb operation to attack ground targets along the railway line Abbeville to Dieppe. Two factories attacked but results not seen. Aircraft continued and attacked large factory with four big camouflage con tainers about 30 ft high. One immediately exploded with smokeless flame and cover was blown off. Second attack made out of the sun and another container exploded ; the first was still burning. The other two were visibly hit but showed no results . One machine -gun post opened fire but was silenced by fire from our aircraft' (302 Squadron ORB). Night intrud ers The pace of the night offensive work for the Command continued to increase in early 1942and involved both single-engine and twin-engine fighters, the former could be provided by any squadron but were usually the Hurricane units that specialised in this task, and the latter were either AI-equ ipped or were acting as bombers. Typical of the Hurricane intruder ops were tho se flown by 3 Squadron on the night of 31 May 1942. 'PIa B H Hay took -off 'in Hurricane Long-Range machine from Manston at 0030 hours to patrol Venlo. Arri ving at Venlo PIa Hay orbited twice to port , wide of the town , changed orbit to starboard, and during this period he felt the slip stream of an aircraft but was unable to observe same. Whilst orbiting at 1500ft south of Venlo, PIa Hay observed slightly above him and to starboard a twin engined aircraft silhouetted again st the moon, at approximately 0 130hours . This twin engined aircraft was subsequently identified as a Ju 88. When on south side of Venlo, enemy aircraft opened fire with twin guns from the rear and above . PIa Hay closed to 80 yard s and enemy turned from port to starboard still firing short bursts, which passed above Hurricane. PIa Hay was now astern 70 yard s distance and he opened fire, strikes being observed along top side of fuselage. PIa Hay then lifted the nose of his mach ine and concentrated on the rear gunner, who ceased fire after one second. PIa Hay kept firing until long black smoke stream s were observed from both engines, and a red glow in the cockpit. Large Hurricane of 3 Squadron; .PIO B H Hay took-off ill Hurricane Long-Range machine from Manston at 0030 hours to patrol Venlo. Arriving at Venia PIO Hay orbited twice to port, wide of the IOll'n. changed orbit to starboard, and during this period he fe lt the slip stream of an aircraft bill lI'as unable 10 observe same. '
157
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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8
pieces were also observed breaking off the enemy aircraft. At this point the Ju 88 had gone into a shallow dive, and PIa Hay was forced to take violent evasive action as he was caught in a cone of six blue searchlights and light concentrated flak . He then set a Westerly course where he atta cked and extinguished six searchli ghts which endea voured to locate him. PIa Hay then set course for the coast, and on arriving orth of Antw erp he observed three barges all of which he attacked twice before empt ying his guns. He returned to base at 0340 hours. He claims one Ju 88 as damaged and would like this machine confirmed as destroyed. Although the enemy aircraft was not observed to cra sh, PIa Hay considers that it is must unlikely to have sustained the attack. ' P/O D J Scott took- off from Manston in a Long-Range Hurrican e at 2349 hours to patrol Deelen area . On arri ving at Deelen aerodrome PIa Scott orbited at 1500ft for 40 minutes . He then flew West and saw flarep ath and searchlights some miles distant , which he believed to be Soesterburg. Several enemy aircraft appeared in area with navigation lights on, one of which (a Ju 88) was attacked by PIa Scott from 1,000 yards. Several strikes were seen and a large piece, probably the port wing, broke away. Immediat ely, enemy aircr aft pulled up vert ically and disappeared over head as PIa Scott continued straight on course to intercept another enemy aircraft in front. Whilst chasing second enemy aircraft a furt her aircraft approached from starboard slightly below at 1,000 ft. which PIa Scott engaged giving it a 4-second bur st. The enemy aircraft evaded steeply to port followed by PIa Scott almost to ground level where visual cont act was lost. PIa Scott then climbed to 2,000 ft, where he o bserved after 3 minute s the flarepath was again lit and numerous enemy aircraft were qu ickly seen flashing navigation lights. PIa Scott again attempted to make interception but failed to make contact. He then returned to base at 0305.' The Squadron sent four other Hurricanes out the same night to hara ss a number of other night-fighter airfields but with little to report. These accoun ts illustra te the problems and potential for this type of 'airfield lurking ' intruder. Acquisition of targets relied on visibility conditions, especially moonlight , and The specialist night intruders of23 Squadron were I'ery active throughout 1943. operating a mix of Havoc Is and Boston Ills. although between June and August 1942 these IIwe replaced by M osquito lis.
OPERATIONS
, The most successf ul night II'as 819July when Sqn Ldr K Salisbury- Hughes II'as operating in a Mosquito and claimed an He 111 and Do 217; M osquito DZ238 of23 Squadron.
the use of lights by the airfield and the aircraft . Even when the sky seemed to be full of enemy aircraft it was difficult to get into a position to make a sat isfactor y attack, altho ugh if the por t wing had been the large piece of debri s it was a fine shot from 1,000 yards! Return fire from enemy gunners, and the searchlight and flak hazards certai nly made this type of mission dicey but even when the fighters came back without confirmed results the disruption of the Germ an night-fighter system was significant. What is never credited in this type of mission is the enemy aircraft that ran-out of fuel and crashed or was damaged and crashed or written -off on landing. The specialist night int ruders of 23 Squadron were very active throughout 1943, operating a mix of Havoc Is and Boston Ill s, although between June and August 1942 these were replaced by Mosquito li s. July was a typical month , with the following operations being flown: Intrud er ta rge ts, 23 Sq uadro n, Jut)'
1 9~2
Date
Aircraft
Targets
1/2 l ui 516 l ui 6/7 l ui 8/9 l ui 11112 l ui 12113 lui 14/15 l ui 19/20 lu i 21/22 l ui 23/24 l ui 25/26 l ui 26/27 l ui 27/28 l ui 28/29 l ui
4 5 I 4 2 6 2 I 5 6 2 I 6 8
30/31 l ui 31 l uUI Aug
9 6
Evreux, St Andre A miens, Caen . Evreux . SI Andre Avard. one 0 0 217 destroyed Chart res. Beauvais. Evreux , Orleans. One He I II and one Do 2 17 destroyed Evreux . Chartres Cacn. Rennes, Di nard . Evreux . Chartres Rennes, shipping Abbe ville. Amie ns Chartres. Orleans. Rouen. J uvinco urt , Criel Cha rtres. Orlean s. J uvincourt , To urs. Caen. Bretigny Chartres. Orleans. Tours. Rouen J uvinco urt Evreux . SI Andre. Dr eux. Cha rtres. Cricl . Beauvais. Orleans Chartres. Orleans. Amsterdam/Schiphol. G ilze- Rijen. Eindhoven. Soesterburg. One aircraft lost Orleans. Bretigny. Orleans. Avo rd. Serquex . One FJA destroyed Juvinco urt. St Trond
159
160
OPERATIONS
FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
o
.~
O l U.Dt.
() t exu.
e_
• .
ntlH'lfu,,/ _1. III U ....W I,jl( /_U1L
O U f"(J
c""'o o nUOl
o . . I1.VtQUtll /~OOlllU Cr
o VPlNMll.lI
•
DU Lt N
Map showing airfields in Holland, including the major night -fighter airfields 'visited' by the intruders.
The most successful night was S/9 July when Sqn Ldr K Salisbury -Hughes was operating in a Mosquito and claimed an He III and Do 217. The busiest period was the end of the month. which corre sponded with three large raid s by Bomber Command. On the final night of July Bomber Command sent 630 aircraft to att ack Dusseldorf but as with the previous raids in this period losses were high. There was increasing concern over bomber losses and the scale of offensive oper ation against night fighter airfields was increased, with the Squadron concentrating on four of the main bases in Holland Deelen, Leeuwarden, Twenthe and Venlo - during October.
1943 - Putting on the Pressure By 1943 the Allied emphasis was very much an offensive one with the invasion of Europe a possibility that year, altho ugh it was soo n agreed by the Allied command that it would actually be in 1944. For Fighter Comm and the dual role of defending the homeland and supporting offensive operations remained throughout the year. In terms of defensive ops this was increasingly a night task, alth ough the Luft waffe att ack s on England were few and ineffective.
Spitfi re II in use with 276 Squadron fo r Air-Sea Rescue; Fighter Command had partial responsibility fo r the Air-Sea Rescue organisation.
Defensive Operations On 17 April 1943 six patrols and two scrambles were flown by 266 Squadron in what proved to be a mixed day . 'On the first patrol, j ust after dawn , Sgt Eastwood was shotdo wn by a 65 Squadron Spitfire off Bolt Head ; they had been escorting an MTB , and why on earth the Spitfire should break away from its formation and carry-out a long dr awn-out attack on a Typhoon at short range is difficult to understand . Sgt Eastwood managed to fly his aircraft over land and baled -out successfully. He would ob viously have cra shed if he had tried to force-land as his ailero n was shot-away. In the evening Sqn Ldr Green and Fg Off Deall were scrambled after two E/A at IS,OOO ft over Plymouth.' The ORB sortie detail takes up the sto ry, 'on arri val AA pointing South. Losing height flew due South for 12 mins, then vectored 220 deg and after 3 mins, saw 2 E/A going South on the " deck" . Turned starboard, and then port, to get on their tails, and started chasing. Overtaking speed very small so fired at 1000/S00 yards to make them weave. S/L Green seeing strikes claims one damaged, FlO Deall realised only one cann on was firing. S/L Green decided to attack the leading (fastest) E/A first so as to stand best cha nce of getting both, but in catching this one he overtook the other, which promptly attacked him. A general "dog-fight" ensued during which FlO Deall got strikes o n his E/A, but S/L green did not see more strikes on his E/A. After about 5 mins of dogfighting the E/A disappeared into the haze and Section returned to base.' Sqn Ldr C L Green DFC in EJ924 and Fg Off J H Deall in RS926. There are two interesting poin ts with this account; firstly, the continued problems of 'friendly fire' - and the RAF lost a fair number of aircraft to this throughout the war with the Typhoon often being mistaken for an Fw 190; secondly, the fact that the Typho ons actu ally managed to catch the 190s. The overall perform ance of the 190 was such that Spitfires seldo m had a chance of makin g up such ground in a tail-chase; the Typhoon may not have been the best dog-fighting aircraft but it did have some performa nce adva ntages.
161
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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
OPERATIONS
The Luftwaffe was still active over Britain by night, albeit on a small-scale and in the face of what was now an effective defence equipped with Mosquitoes and with a pro ven and experienced Control and Reporting system . Bud Green of 410 Squadron had a successful engagement on 5 November: I lI'as flying a patrol line in the middle of the Channel, with other Mo squitoes flying on my right and on my left. Ground control could only handle a limited number of aircraft; it lI'as sited at Wardin g near Dungeness. I lI'as instructed: ' Bandits on a southerly headin g, heigh t unknown, considerable numbers. ' We lI'ere taken over by a controller 'rho steered liS towards them, th en round th em ( at I 8,000 f t) , until we pi ck ed them lip on Ollr oll'n radar. A classic interception. Once the navigator had pick ed lip an air craft on his AI, the ideal was fo r th e pilot to come in bela II' at a closing speed as slow as possible, but f as t enough fo r evasive action if fired all. Y OII had to match the spee d before yOIl got a visual Call/act, then open lip the throttles 10 close in by eye . I cam e in too loll', o vertak ing speed lI'as not high enough. I had to pull up at fullthrottle, bill lI'as s till too slow. Pointin g upwards at 200 yards, I fi red all fo ur cannon and the fo ur ma chine-gun s: We lI'ere so close, I didn 't need tracer or to allow for any deflection . H e never kn ell' what hit him . It lI'as totally devastating as he just blew lip. I thought it lI'as an M e 410 bill it turn ed alii to be a Do 21 7.
Spitfir e Vs of 130 Sq uadron at Ballyhalbert
On 11 Ju ne 1943 the Sergeants' Mess at Biggin Hill hosted a special dinner to 'celebrate the destruction of the one thousandth enemy aircraft from the Sector '. In addition to giving details of the menu (the main course being roast chicken), the menu card also gave a bit of background to the event: ' During this period , the number of enemy aircr aft destroyed from this Sector has mounted with such rapidity that on 15th May, the splendid tot al of One Thousand was reached . It has been a hard and bitter struggle for air and ground personnel to achieve this figure, and we feel that tonight we are entitled to relax and celebrate an event which has never happened before in the histor y of the Royal Air Force , and may never be equalled. 'O ut of our pride in this Thousandth Hun , let there be born the resolut ion that the lead which th is Sector has estab lished over all others shall not only be maint ained , but increased day by day until a victorious peace is gained .'
Offensive O perations Circus ops remained a sta ndard task for the Comm and into 1943. On 15 Feb ruary the Polish Wing (303,306,308,315 squadrons) was airborne on Circus 266: 'Crossed English coast at North Fo reland at 500 ft, climbed rapid ly and crossed French coast West of Dunk irk at 15,000ft, 303 leading . The bombers were already over Dunkirk, and dropped their bomb s. Con siderable ack ack was experienced . Squadrons recrossed French coast at 9,000 ft and flew along French coast to Cala is and set course for Deal. They were atta cked in mid-Channel by two groups of four Fws, Two pilots of 308 att acked these Fws and one was probably damaged , and one Spitfire was seen diving towards sea trailin g smoke . No casualties experienced and WIO Piatowski claimed one Fw probably T yphoon of609 Squadron at M ansi on, March 1943; the T yphoon had found its true niche and late 1943 became one of the main typ es with the Il ell' Tactical Air Force.
ill
Beaufighter of604 Squadron; by 1943 the Command 's night def ences .rere highly efficient and the scale of German att acks had reduced.
163
164
OPERATIONS
F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968
destroyed' (308 Squadron ORB ). A number of similar missions were flown in February, with some days, such as 26th , having two such missions. The majorit y had little to report - meet up with the other fighters. watch the bombers drop their loads, usually with heavy anti-aircraft fire, and then escort them back again . The table below shows the detail of the mission types, claims aga inst the enemy and Fighter Command losses for the year to 14 ovember, the date at which Fighter Command became Air Defence of Great Britain. Fighter Co mma nd/A DG B summa ry of day offensive opera tio ns, 1 J an 19.13-1.1
1'0\ '
Claim s
M ission
Escort Roads tead
Bo mbing Rhubarb Ranger Rodeo Instep Distil Haunch
F.Road'ilead TacR Ph ot o Reece Oth er Tot al
19.13 Losses
Ops
Sorties
Des l.
Prob.
Dam.
Lo s'
%
Dam.
180 110 II 187 98 101 158 22 I 234 12 130 15
596 173 II 773 184 188 294 22 I 512 117 1.091 21
53.9 14 3.3 15 90 1.825 291 7.211 1.295 120 23 4.318 233 I.l 79 296
486 1