Fighter Command 1936 - 1968: An Operational and Historical Record

Fighter Command

1936-1968

Fighter Command

1936-1968 A N OPERATIO NAL A ND HISTORICAL RECORD

KEN DELVE

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Pen & Sword AVIATION

First published in Great Britain in 2007 by PEN & SWORD AVIATION an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street Barnsley South York shire S702AS Copyright © Ken Delve, 2007 ISBN I 84415 613 9 The right of Ken Delve to be identified as Auth or of this Work has been asserted by him in accorda nce with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP cat alogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset by Concept, Huddersfield, West York shire Printed and bound in Gr eat Britain by CPI UK

Contents CHA PTE R O NE

D evel opmen t , R ol es an d History

CHA PTER T wo

Operations

CHAPTER T H REE

O pera tiona l Groups

183

CHAPT ER F OU R

Airc rew T rainin g . .

214

CHAPTER FI VE

O pera tio n al Ai rc ra ft

245

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ANN EX ES

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AO C -in- C Fighter Com mand . . . . . . . . . . Battle of Britain Squadrons Battle of Bri tain : Galland 's View Order of Battle Jul y 193 6 Order of Battle September 1939 Order of Battle Au gu st 194 0 . . Order of Battle February 1941 Order of Battle Apri l 1942 Order of Battle April 194 3 Order of Battle July 1944 Order o f Battle J uly 1945 O rde r of Battle Apri l 1953 Order of Battle Janu ary 1961 Order o f Battle January 1968 C laims W orld W ar T wo . . . . . . . . . . . D efiniti o ns of Operation T ypes Fighter Com mand Battle Honou rs G erm an Night Attacks on C ities . . . . . . . . .

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313 316 322 323 325 327 329 332 . 335 . 337 . 339 341 . 343 . 344 . . .

348

351 356

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Fighter Command Badge

P

ER ONE

Development, Roles and History ~,

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'In front of a Portcullis a sword erect' (elements of the Badge were subseq uently used by Strike Command) . The sword is indicative of the Command's offensive operations and the Portcullis symbo lises its defensive role; this duality it also shown in the motto of 'Offence Defence' . The Badge was approved by in March 1945.

or a few short months in late 1940, Fighter Co mmand of the Royal Air Force was pitted against the might of the German Luft waff e in a struggle that wou ld help determ ine the course of the Second World War. The Battle of Britain will always remain the Co mma nd's ' Finest Hour ' but it comprised only a few months of a war that lasted nearly six year s - and Fight er Co mma nd was involved in active operations for muc h of that time. As with all history the benefits of hind sight and access to previousl y classified doc umenta ry so urces has to be balanced by the researcher's removal in time and conte xt from the period under study. To trul y under stand decision s, policies, actions and att itudes is all but impossible. This book covers the entire period of Fighte r Comma nd from its origin in 1936 to its demise - into Strik e Command - in 1968. Whilst all periods of the Co mmand a re covered it is inevita ble that the major focus is on the period of World War Two. The book has been divided into five main sections: an Introduction and Overview, which sets the fra mework for the development of Fighter Co mmand and includes both policy and politics; an Operati ons chapter, which focuses on the combat operations of the Co mma nd; a brief look a t each of the opera tiona l Gr oup s; an overview of aircrew tra ining: a nd, finally, an Aircraft cha pter, lookin g in chronological sequence at all operational aircraft types. The a nnexes provide a variety of historical data . The chapters frequen tly qu ote extracts fro m the Operati on al Record Book s (O R B) of va rious squadro ns; these have been selected as typical of the type of mission s being flown. It would be impossible in a book of thi s sort to research every squadro n record for Fighter Co mma nd and there a re similar accounts, and perh aps better ones, in man y of the ot her ORB s - if a reader believes ' his' squadron has been ignored I can assure him that that was not the intent ! Origins a nd doctr ine Fighter Co mma nd was form ed on 14 Jul y 1936, und er the comm and of Air Mar shal Sir Hugh Dowding, as part of a general reorganisation of the RAF, a nd headqua rtered at Bentley Priory, Middlesex. Th is reorgan isat ion saw the Met rop olitan Air Force split into thr ee operat ional Com man ds (Fig hter , Bomber and Train ing). At the time of its forma tion Fighter Co mma nd's equ ipment comprised a var iety of biplane fighters, the mos t modern of which was the Gloster Gl ad iator. As the first RA F fighter with eight machine-guns a nd an enclosed cockpit, the G ladiato r rep resent ed a major adva nce on previous types and despite its obvious limitati on s was a ble to distinguish itself during the Battle of Britain. Since the early 1930s two key issues had plagued RAF plann ers - the percentage of bomber to fighters in the overall strength of the RA F and the types of weapo ns they sho uld car ry. There had been a glimmer of hope in the early I920s, a period of doldrums for the RAF when its very existence as an independ ent service was und er

2

DEVELOPME

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

T, ROLES AND HISTORY

The Siskin lI'as one of the inter-war agile bill poorly-armed fighters equipping the RAFs fighter fo rce. Fighter doctrine and tactics IIwe developed in the latt er part of World War One. with aircraft such as the Sopwith Cam el.

question and its main 'strength' was in remote parts of the Empire such as Mesopotamia. In April 1923 the Steel-Bartholomew Committee on the Air Defence of Great Britain led to Government approval in June of a plan for a Home Defence air strength of 52 squadrons, to include 17 fighter squadrons 'with as little delay as possible'. As a percentage of the total strength the fighter element was poor - but this was the period when air strategists were con vinced that bombers were the way to win war s. In December Map of the /923 Air Def ence Plan.

When the Gladiator entered service it lI'as a major improvement on the previous biplanes but lI'as still f or from being a modern fighter, alth ough it remain ed in fro nt- line service with the RA F in the early part of the lI'ar. I II

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1925 the Government's interpretation of 'as soon as possible' changed to 'by 1935-1936. Air Marshal Sir John Salmond had taken over as Air-Officer-Command ing Air Defence of Great Britain in January that year and he had firm views on air defence, which in his view - and his experience from World War One - included searchlights and anti -aircraft guns. In this study of Fighter Command only occasional reference is made to the other elements that made up the UK' s air defence network. primarily because they were independent Comm and s. It is worth noting that the 'a ctive defence' planned for the UK. and to be in place by 1939. comprised 2.232 heavy anti-aircraft guns, 4,700 searchlights

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

and 50 squadro ns of fighter aircraft . However, on the outbreak of war there were only 695 heavy and 253 light anti-aircraft guns and 2,700 searchlights. In December 1929 and agai n in May 1933 the Government slipped the programme back, the latt er revision takin g it to 1939-1 940. Thi s reluctance did not change until 1934, a year after Hitler had come to power in Germany and there was a realisation that peace in Euro pe was by no mean s a cert aint y. Th e next few years saw a change of atti tude and a series of Expansion Plan s, albeit still dominated by strategic bombin g. Th e 'bo mber first' mentality that had dominated the Expansion Plans of the early 1930s did not change unt il Scheme M, which was approved in November 1938 (after the Muni ch Crisis), with an effective date for completion of March 1942. Th is scheme envisaged 163 squad rons to be based in the UK, of which 64 were to be fighter squadro ns (14 of these being Auxiliar y Air Fo rce), each with an establishment of 16 airc raft. Th e table below presents the deta ils for the Plans put forward between 1934 and 1938.

RAF Expansion Sc hemes, t934-1938

Fighter

UEfighter

Scheme

Appro ved

Effecti ve

Squadrons

squadrons

squadron

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18 J ul 1934 21 May 1935 25 Feb 1936 14 Jan 1937 22 Dec 1937 14 Mar 1938 27 Ap r 1938 7 Nov 1938

31 Mar 1939 31 Mar 1937 31 Mar 1939 31 Mar 1939 Summer 194 1 31 Mar 1941 31 Mar 1940 31 Mar 1942

84 123 124 145 154 145 141 163

28+5 35+5 30+5 34+9 38+9 38+9 38+9 50+ 14

12 12 14 14 14 14 16 16

C F H J K

L M

Note: Approved - Date the scheme was approved by the Cabinet; Effective - Date at which the scheme should be com plete; Squadrons - Total home-based squadrons; Fighter squadrons - Regular squadrons + auxiliary squadrons: UE fighter squadron - Aircraft establishment.

Th is was of course only a paper air force; the desire to have 64 squadrons, each with 16 aircraft - and with the requisite pilots, gro und staff, equip ment and airfields - had to be transferred into reality. Tha t mean t takin g short cuts with the aircraft types, 'form a squadro n with whatever was 10 hand and re-equip it later' and pressure to find pilots, and train them in the minimum period of time. Both of these aspects would cause the Command pro blems. Role of the Fighter Th e concept of the fighter aircraft had been born in World War One, when manoeuvrab ility was one of the key perfor mance criteria; for the Royal Flying Corps! Royal Air Fo rce, the experience with monoplanes had been an unh appy one and the war ended with small, single-seat highly-agile biplanes, armed with two 0.303 in guns, as the sta nda rd day fighter. The situation did not change over the next 20 years and the RA F's fighter squadrons conti nued to fly a range of delight ful little fighters that by the late 1920s had all but lost to uch with the realities of a future air war - but the RA F' s doctrine, tactics and training had also not changed. It was not until the ear ly 1930s that a more realistic specification for a futur e fighter was issued. However, Specification FIO/35 still enca psulated the 1930's fighter doctr ine; the following extracts illustrate the major points.

S pecification FlO/35. Requir ements for Si ngle-Engine S ingle-Se ater Day and Night Fighte r General. Th e Air Staff require a single-engine single-seater day and night fighter which can fulfil the following conditions: a. Have a speed in excess of the contemporary bomber of at least 40 mph at 15,000 ft. b. Have a number of forward firing mach ine guns that can produce the maximum hittin g power possible in the short space of time ava ilable for one attack. Performance. a. Speed. The maximum possible and not less than 310mph at 15,000 ft at maximum power with the highest possible between 5,000 and 15,000 ft. b. Climb. Th e best possible to 20,000 ft but secondary to speed and hitt ing power. c. Service ceiling. ot less than 30,000 ft is desirab le. d. Endurance. Y. hour at maximum power at sea level, plus one hour at maximum power at which engine can be run cont inuously at 15,000 ft. Thi s sho uld provide \I, hour at maximum power at which engine can be run continuously (for climb, etc), plus one hour at the most economica l speed at 15,000 ft (for patrol), plus Y. hour at maximum power at 15,000 ft (for atta ck). Armament. Not less than 6 guns, but 8 guns are desirable . T hese should be located outside the airscrew disc. Reloading in the air is not required and the guns should be fired by electrical or mean s other than Bowden wire. It is contemplated that some or all of these guns should be mounted to permit a degree of elevat ion and traverse with some for m of control fro m the pilot's seat. Ammunition. 300 rounds per gun if 8 guns are pro vided and 400 rounds per gun if only 6 guns are installed. View. a. The upper hemisphere must be so far as possible unobstructed to the view of the pilot to facilitate search and attack . A good view for formation flying is required. b. A field of view of about 10 degrees downward s from the horizont al line of sight over the nose is requ ired for locat ing the tar get. Handling. a. A high degree of man oeuvrabilit y at high speeds is not required but good control at low speeds is essential. b. The aircraft must be a steady firing platform . It is interesting to look at how the fighter requirement had changed during the 1930s as this explains the developmen t of both the aircra ft's cap abilit ies and the tactical doctrine. During the 1930s the basic concepts were still tho se that had been developed in the latter years of World War One; with no significant combat experience in the 1920s

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

and in the absence of conflict (and funding) no appreciable development of techn ology or tactics this was not really surprising. The main fighter specification that eventu ally led to the new generation of fighter s was F7/30 for a 'Single-Seater Da y and Night Fighter.' Thi s Specificati on was dated Oct ober 1931 and the General Requirements paragraph included sta tements such as 'a satisfactory fighting view is essenti al and designers sho uld consider the ad vantages offered in this respect by the low-wing mon oplan e o r pusher. The main requirements for the aircraft are : a. b. c. d. e.

Highest possible rat e of climb. Highest possible speed at 15,000 ft. Fighting view. Capability of easy and rapid production in quantity. Ease of maintenance.

This was a lengthy document and am ongst the key provi sion s was that the 'a ircraft must have a high degree of man oeu vrability.' By the time ofFI0/35 this requirement had been toned down as being ' not required '. The aircraft was to have provision for four 0.303 in Vickers guns and a total of 2,000 rounds of ammunition, with a minimum suppl y of 400 rounds per gun, as well as being able to carry four 20lb bombs. It sta ted that two of the guns were to be in the cockpit, with interrupter gear if required, and the other two in cockpit or wing. There was no requiremen t for an enclosed cockpit and the pilot's view was a prime concern: ' the pilot 's view is to conform as closely as po ssible to that obtainable in 'pusher' aircraft .' Virtually all of these requirements could be said to a pply to an aircraft that suited the latter part of World War One , such as the Sopwith Camel or Bristol Fighter but with (slightly) improved performance. If the manufacturers had followed these requirements to the letter then the Spitfire and Hurricane might never ha ve been born . In term s of overall air doctrine the emphasis was on the bomber - the 'wa r-winning' weapon that will always get th rough no matter what the defenders try and do, but it was not until the mid 1930s that a fighter specification add ressed the problem of shoo ting down these 'wa r winners'. Whilst the basic pro vision s of F7/30 could be said to describe an agile, man oeuvrable fighter, th ose of F5/34 (da ted 16 November 1934) tipped the balance to what is best described as a bomber destroyer. Th e intr oduction to this specificati on sta ted that : 'the speed excess of a modern fighter over that of a co ntempo rary bomber has so reduced the chance of repeated attacks by the same fighters(s) th at it becomes essential to obtain decisive results in the short space of time offered for one attack only . Thi s No t only the aircraft but also the tactics remained out-of-date ill/a the 1930s; Hawker Demons of 23 Squadron; the Squadr on did 1I0t re-equip f rom Demons until December 1938.

Hurricane prototyp e K5083 flew ill November 1935 - the modern age had arrived and 600 had alread y been ordered 'off the drawing board'.

specification is issued to govern the production of a day fighter in which speed in overta king the enemy at 15,000 ft, combined with rapid climb to this height , is of primary import ance . In conjunction with this performance the maximum hitting power must be aimed at, and 8 machine guns are con sidered adv isable.' No menti on here of man oeu vrability; what is needed is to catch the enemy (bomber) and hit him hard in a single atta ck. All of this was encap sulated in FI0/35 but with the added provision s under ' Ha ndling' that emphasised the requirement for the fighter to be 'a steady gun platform ' in which a 'high degree of man oeuvrabilit y at high speeds is not required.' Of course, the British were not alone in th is fighter theory and in Germany the Bf 110 came from a similar bomber-destroyer requ irement. The latter proved a disaster in day fighting and if the RAF's new da y fighter had been of a similar ilk then the Battle of Britain would have been sho rt-lived - and lost. Rather than entering the ann als as one of the great fighters, a Spitfire to this requirement would have followed the Defiant into the records as a glorio us failure (as a da y fighter). From its first flight on 6 November 1935 the Hawker Hurricane showed every indication of being a winne r; tru e it did not have the agility, a nd some would argue bea uty, of the older biplanes bu t it look ed the part of a modern fighter - and it had eight guns. An order for 600 was promptly placed and two yea rs later the first Hurricane s entered squadron service, going to III Squ adron at ortholt to replace G auntlets; by summer 1939 the number of sq uadrons had increased to 12 and the Hurricane was the mos t significant fighter in the Order o f Battle. By th at time it had been joined by the Supermarin e Spitfire , which had first flown five months after the Hurricane but had been slightly slower in production development , the first machines not joining 19 Squ adron at Duxford until August 1938. The Spitfire too was an immedi ate hit with those who saw it and cert ainly with th ose who flew it; true , both types had teeth ing troubles and both were lacking wha t would soon be con sidered as essent ial operational equipment, but they were nevertheless an indication of massive progress. Two other aircraft types entered service with the Command in respon se to doctrine that called for a 'turret fighter ', as a bomber-destroyer, and long-range fighter. It must be remembered too that at this time the threat was perceived as bombers from Germ any bombers th at would have to fly such a dist ance that single-sea t fighter escort was not an option. The Boulton Paul Defian t was the turret fighter with its four Brownings in a rear;

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6 - 19 6 8

DEVELOPMENT. ROLES AND HISTORY

bomber. wou ld fly straight and level while the fighters que ued up to att ack it! The three main attacks. as directed in 1938. were: No. 1 Att ack was a succession of single aircraft attacking a single bomber from astern. with Sections stepped down in line astern behind the target. The Section Leader opens fire at 400 yards and maintains his fire on the target at this range until he decides to break away. with the procedure then followed by his umber 2 and umber 3. o. 2 Attack was pretty much the same except that the Sections were not stepped down but fanned o ut to rear and flanks of the bomber. o. 3 Attack was an attack by a vic Section of 3 against a vic of three bombers. with the normal plan being for two Sections ab reast to engage two groups of bombers. one Section breaking left after completing the attack and the othe r breaking right.

The Spitfire prototype flew in early 1936 but did not enter squadron service until August 1938 - only a year before the war.

the pro tot ype flew in August 1937 and the type entered service with 264 Squadron in December 1939. by which time the concept was already being questioned. The Bristol Blenheim was the long-range fighter and sta rtled the RAF when it flew in 1936. as this privat e venture for a bomber had far better perfo rma nce tha n any of the fighters in service. Fighter Command was d uly impressed and an order for 150 Blenheim fighters was placed. the main role being long-range bom ber-destroyer. for which a forward-fi ring four-gun armament pack was added. Hawkinge-based 25 Squadro n was first to equip with the Blenheim IF day fighter. December 1938. Despite the arrival of new aircraft . the basic tactics remained uncha nged and in 1938 doct rine was still based on a limited number of well-rehearsed - but unproven - Fighter Command Attacks. which seemed to be based on the premise that the target. a lumbe ring Blenheim of 600 Squadron at Manston mid 1940; the Blenheim entered service with Fighter Command as a long-range fig hter - in which role it would hare been a disaster.

There were numero us other set att acks for single-engine and turret fighters but these three encapsulate a number of the major problems the fighters were to encounter when the shooting war sta rted. Firstly. the determination that 400 yards was the optimum range to open fire and that the fighter sho uld maintain this range until out of ammunition (or shot down). Whilst there was some varia tion on this directive. they still involved an erro r of appreciation of the real optimum harmonisation and engagement range . Secondl y. the rigid nature of the tactics was totally unsuited to the fluid nature of 'modern' air combat. These lessons were soon to be learnt. War almost came in autumn 1938 with the so-called Mu nich Crisis; if it had done so then it would have foun d Fighter Com mand in a parlous state in terms of airc raft and its Control and Reporting (C&R) organisation. The Comman d needed the extra year that came following Prime Minister eville Chamberlain's meeting with Ado lf Hitler and the Catterick March 1940. Blenheim 219 Squadron; although the Blenheims saw some service as day fig hters it was in the night role that they became an important element of Fighter Command.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

now infamous 'peace in our time' agreeme nt. During that year more modern fighters entered service and their pilots gained experience , the C&R organisa tion grew in size and experience and the airfield building programme sta rted in earnest. Control and Repor ting - and integrated defence There is one line in the 1965 ' Battle of Britain' film where Dowding is asked if he is 'trusting in radar and praying to Go d' , to which he replied that he was 'trusting in Go d and praying for rada r' . It is a well-esta blished part of the Battle of Britain story that radar was the secret weapo n that saved the day. How tru e is this? Th e early 1930's British Air Defence Plan was based upon that employed during the First World War and comprised an Aircraft Fighting Zone 15 miles wide and 150 miles long, from Duxfor d and aro und London to Devizes in Wiltshire. Th is was divided into ten sections, each 15 miles wide and with one or more dedicated day fighter sq uadro ns, with associated searc hlights and anti-aircraft guns. Th ere was an additional ring of searchlights and guns aro und Lond on . Th e Aircraft Zone was positioned 35 miles from the coas t, a distance based upon the time it would ta ke the fighter to climb to 14,000 ft. Initial detection of raiders depended upon visual sighting by the Observer Co rps, plus a limited numb er of 'acoustic mirror devices'. Each HQ received informatio n from the observation units and displayed raids on a plottin g table, thus allowing the overall picture of the air situation to be seen by the contro ller. However, it was not until new radios, such as the TR .9, were intro d uced in 1932 that reasonable gro und-to air radio communicatio n, as opposed to wrr, was possible; even then the effective range was I only 35 miles. The weak link remained that of detection - it was a big sky so how did you find the enemy? If the enemy could not be accura tely located, it was almost impossible to effect an interception. This was borne out in the July 1934 annual air exercise, when at least half of the day bomber forma tions reached their targets without being intercepted by fighters. If the fighters could not find bomber forma tions in good weather by day, wha t cha nce would they have at night? ot that this was of any concern at the time. The radar stations around The coast were a vita! element in Fight er Command's COII/ro! and Reporting network.

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

At the first meeting of the Co mmittee for Scientific Survey of Air Defence, in Ja nua ry 1935, the problems highlighted by the previous yea r's exercise were discussed, as were the prospects of any scientific break-thro ugh that might provide an answer. Th e Committee members consulted Robert Watson-Watt , head of the radio research branch of the atio na l Physical Lab orat ory, as to the feasibility of using radio waves. A mon th later he presented his tho ughts on how to use such rad io waves to detect aircraft , the principle being to 'bou nce' the waves off the aircraft and pick up the echo. Within a matter of weeks an experiment had been arra nged using the BBC' s transmitter at Daventry. Th e idea was for an aircraft to fly thro ugh the centre of the tran smittin g beam while Watson-W att and his colleagues attempted to detect its presence on a cathoderay oscillogra ph. It worked as planned, the passage of the aircraft causing a blip on the equipment. All that was needed now was high-level support for development of the technique, and that came from Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, the Air Member for Research and Developm ent. The rad io research station at Orford ness became the experimental site for the development of RD F (the name was not changed to rad ar until 1941), and throughout the summer a numb er of trials were conducted. Trackin g ranges of 40 miles were soon being achieved, and it was obvious that here was the solution to the problem; all that was needed was time to develop and introduce the equipment, and integrate it into the Fighter Co mmand system. In September 1935 the Air Defence Sub-Committee acquired Treasury fundin g for a chain of RDF sta tions along the east coas t; a remarkable achievement so earl y in the development of the technique. The next three years saw a number of technical developments of the eq uipment, many individuals making invaluable contributions to the work, so that by mid-1938 the completed statio ns were functioning reasonably well Since the initial proving of the RDF principle in 1936, progress had been fairly rap id, although many problems still remained. By mid- 1937 thr ee stat ions were in operation, at Bawdsey, Canewdo n and Dover, along with an experimental filter station at Bawdsey. Th e developm ent of the last of these added a new dimension to the system by providing, as the term implied, a filtering of the mass of inform ation from the various so urces so that the cont rollers could be provided with a simpler, more accura te air picture on which to base their operat ions. Th e earlier problem of track discrimination had virtually been solved, but height prediction remained a significant problem . The system's first major test came in the 1938 Home Defence exercises, and in general terms it appeared to work well, some 75% of atte mpted interceptions (day and night) proving successful. New RD F stations (codenamed Cha in Home - CH, and Cha in Home Low - CH L) were constructed in a plan to create unbro ken coverage aro und the east and southern coasts of Britain . At the same time an extensive programm e for the const ruction of Comma nd, G roup and Sector operations roo ms was under way. The enemy could now be located by day or night; radar made no real distinction between the two. Defendin g fighters could be positioned so that by day they could acquire the bombers visually, but what about the night situatio n? Would the fighter be able to pick up its tar gets? Among his early prop osals, Wat son-Watt had included tho ughts on an air borne version of RD F to prevent reliance on searchlights or good visibility. However, becau se priority was given to the gro und stations, little work was carried out on developi ng equipment sma ll eno ugh to be carried by aircraft. June 1937 saw an experiment whereby the 'fighter' had a receiver that could pick up the transmissions (and echoes) of the CH sta tions. The principle appeared to work, but it was not a satisfacto ry solution and was aba ndo ned. Not until late that year was Airborn e

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Barrage ) Group within Fighter Command. With extension of the balloon barr age concept to other cities and important installati ons, three further G roup s were formed and brought under the control of Balloon Command. By the outbreak of war there were 624 balloons flying over the UK. The main aims of the balloon barrage were: I. Strengthen public morale. 2. Make att acking aircraft fly too high for accurate bomb ing and prevent a long run in to the target. The London Balloon Barrage ...as established in / 937 and the system II'OS rapidly ex tended 10 other key cities, ports and industrial installations; the Barrage Balloons, many of ...hich lI'ere 'manned' by WAAFs ...ere another important part of the air defence net...ork.

Fighter Ops room ...ith WAAF plott ers; ...hilst the fig hters ...ere the 'sharp end', it lI'as the ,..hole Control and Reporting system that made the air def ence effec tive.

Intercept (AI) equipment developed , using the technique of lobe switching to deter mine the azimuth of the target. Alth ough this worked , there were still probl ems to be overcome, mostly concerning the receiver part of the system, and it was mid-1939 before a successful airborne installation was under trial. By September 1939 twenty CH (Chain Home) stat ions were operational with detection ranges in excess of 100 miles, The additiona l system of CHL (Chain Home Low) was also well underway, A post-war Fighter Command report summarised the import ance of the nonaircraft elements: 'how valuable this system was to be, was proved in the Battl e of Britain, for without its help the courage and determin ation of the pilots and the devotion and hard work of the ground staff would have been to little avail. This system of radar allied with the reports by sight and sound of the Royal (from 1941 ) Observer Corp s developed rapidl y through the war.' It is also import ant to realise that radar was only one of the elements that made up the integrated defence network , which comprised a Reporting, cont rol and command chain , balloon barrages, searchlights and anti-aircraft guns, It was the combin ation of warn ing systems, including the Observer Corp s and grou nd intelligence, as well as radar. analysed by Filter Rooms and then acted upon by Sector Controllers that made the system successful and reasonably rob ust against attack. Another key factor was integration of command, with Dowding controlling the Observer Corp s, Balloon Command (from its format ion in ovember 1938) and units of Anti-Airc raft Command. The London Balloon Barrage was estab lished in 1937 and within a year had four Balloon Centre s and ten Balloon Squadrons under the command of No . 30 (Balloon

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

This total had increased by September 1940 and balloon barrages were flying over most key cities and installa tions. Shooting down runaway balloons became a routine task for Fighter Co mmand. Th e elements of an integrated but still unproven system of high-perform ance fighters with RDF direction and gro und cont rol were in place. The ultimate test was not long in coming. Outbreak of War In the last week of August 1939 the Auxiliary Air Fo rce squa drons had been embodied into the RA F - in other words they were called up to full-time service - and the role these VR (Volunteer Reserve) pilots were to play in the first years of the war was of great import ance. Fighter Command statistics for 4 September 1939 show 39 squadro ns of fighters, comprising: 30 single-engine squadro ns with 570 aircraft and 659 pilots 7 twin-engine sq uadro ns with 131 aircraft and 107 crews 2 squadro ns with Gauntlet/H ind. The aircra ft numbers relate to serviceable aircraft and not establishment and the pilot figures relate to 'available ' pilots; what is inter esting, especially in the light of subsequent events, is the pilot/crew to aircraft ratio. With only 89 'spare' pilots for the single-engine fighters the Command was ill-equipped to cope with expan sion or losses and with more aircraft than crews for the twin-engined types the position was even more desperate . The Auxiliary Air Force supplied a cad re of trained and motivated pilots who provided a majo r boost to the RAF's front-line capa bility. On 13 August 1939, the Spitfires of 6 11 Squad ron arri ved at Duxford for their annual training camp and it On 13 August 1939. the Spirjire.s of 611 Squadron arri ved at Duxford fo r their annual training camp and tt was here. their designat ed lrar sta tion. that they received notification on 26 A ugust of their call-up.

DEVE OPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

was here, their designated war station, that they received notification, on 26 August of their call-up. The Squad ron had 13 Spitfires available from a not ional establishment of 21 aircraft (16 IE [Initial Establishment] plus five CR [Command Reserve] aircraft); pilot esta blishment was eleven officers and ten airmen, with two officers and 140 airmen making up the gro undcrew com pone nt. Despite being a well-established station, Duxfo rd was short of accommoda tion and the airmen of 611 Squad ron had to live in tents, although in October they moved into newly-completed brick H-type barrack blocks. At this time. Fighter Comm and had three operatio nal groups - o. II Group (HQ Uxbridge) covering the South of England and the South Midlands , o. 12 Group (HQ Hucknall ) covering the North Midlands, W England and orth Wales, and No. 13 Group (HQ NewcastIe-upon-Tyne) covering NE England, Scotland and the Ork ney and Shetland Island s. The defensive organisation was oriented to counter the perceived thr eat posed by long-range bombers from Germ any, which would not be escorte d by single-engine fighters as these did not have the range. Squadron equipment remained a focus of concern during the first month s of the war. Although the focus was on gettin g as many Hurri cane s and Spitfires into service as qu ickly as possible it was still policy to form sq uadro ns with whatever equipment was ava ilable; for example, 263 Squadron formed at Filton in October 1939 with the Gloster Gladiato r, a type with which they were to achieve a measure of fame in spring 1940 over orway . The Squadron diari st was one of tho se who recorded useful snippets for later historia ns: 14

ovember 1939: 'The Squad ron re-equipped with Browning 303 on all aircraft; these are a great asset to the unit.' 25 ovember 1939: 'Owing to the outstanding success and capabilities of the Squad ron they have been o rdered to take-over the air safety of the western part of England . The y are the only squad ron detailed for this area . which speaks very highly of its sta nda rd considering that it was formed seven weeks ago and 18 of the pilots were straight from Flying Trainin g Schools.' Is this sarcasm or genuine pride? 22 January 1940: Summary of a report on gun harm onisation and air firing: 'Th e experiments conducted have shown concl usively that guns installed in Glad iat or aircraft have not the spread of bullets that have been previously calculated , and it is estimated that gun spread is approximately one foot per 100 yards up to a range of 300 yards. It is understood that experiments were conducted by the Air Fighting Development Unit in determ ining bullet spread by mean s of photograph ing tracer ammunition. It is suggested for consideration that the trajectory of tracer amm unit ion is not so accurat e as ball ammunition.• The interesting point s from these extracts are the fact that the Gladiator was still a front-line fighter - and that its arma ment was still not operationally fit - and that the Command was stretched thin and only able to pro vide a single squadron of biplane fighters to cover a large geographi c area . Th e situation would only slowly impro ve over the next few mon ths - imagine how it would have been if the war had sta rted with the Munich Crisis in late 1938.

15

16

DEVELOPMENT,

F IG H T E R COMMAND 1936-1968

Spitfire K9987 of66 Squadron, the Squadron had re-equipped with Spits ill October 1938 at Duxford.

In February 1940 a memo was issued stati ng the 'decision to rearm nine fighter squa drons from Blenheims, in the following orde r of priority: with Hurricanes (601, 229,245, 145 squadro ns), with Spitfires (64,222,92, 234 squadro ns) and with Defiants (141 squadron). This is to be complete as near to 31 March 1940 as possible.' (Sa M 109/40 dated 13 Feb 1940). Fra nce and Dunkirk Under the terms of the alliance with the French an expeditionary force was despatched to France, and this included an air element; the Fighter Command contribution being six Hurricane squad rons, altho ugh this was later raised to ten. On 7 July 1939 Dowding wrote to the Air Ministry complaining at this massive reduction in his fighter force, with ten squadrons equalling a sizeable chun k of his force. War came on 3 September 1939 and the Comm and du ly sent the first four Hur ricane squadro ns (I, 73, 85, and 87) to France. In Fra nce there was little to do except carry on training, patrol up and down the border and take in a spot of French culture, as well as attempt to co-operat e with their Allies. The first success came on 2 ovember but for Dowding the downside was the call for two more squadro ns that same month , altho ugh the Gladiat or-equipped 607 and 615 squadro ns were sent, bot h moving to Merville on 15 ovember - and both eventually re-equipping in France with Hurri canes (spring 1940). The so-called ' Phoney War ' tha t lasted for six months ended with the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in Apr il 1940, the rapid success of which was followed by the Blitzkrieg attac k on France via the Low Coun tries on 10 May 1940. Fighter Comma nd's involvement in the Scan dinavian cam paign had been the commitment of two squadrons, 46 and 263 to the Narvik region of orway; the heroics of Glad iator operat ions from frozen lakes and the tragic loss of pilots with the sinking of HMS Glorious are covered in the Oper ations chapter. From the perspective of the Fighter Command story the French experience is of more interest as it revealed both the good and the bad about aircraft, pilots and tactics.

OLES AND HISTORY

Hurricane of 73 Squadron being rearmed ill France; the dispatch ~f Hurric~/e squadrons 10 France lI'as a mixed blessing - it pro ..ided ..ital operational expenence bill 11 also cost a large num ber of aircraf t.

In the meantime , with the beginning of the campaign agai nst Holland , Belgium and France on the 10 May 1940, the L uf twaf f e became involved in a new sen es of attacks. The objects of these attacks, based on previous battle experience were: I. The destruction of the enemy's Air Fo rces and their sources of supply. 2. Indirect and direct support of the Army. 3. Attac ks on enemy harb ours and shipping.

These tasks were entrusted to Luftfiouen 2 and 3. Out of a streng th of 5:142 aircraft, the Luftwaffe had 3,824 serviceable aircraft availab le at tha~ urne, (Out of an average of 3,824 serviceable aircraft there were 591 reconnaI ssance aircraft, 1,1 20 bombers, 342 Stukas, 42 ground attack aircraft, 248 T. E. fighte.rs. 1,016 S.E. fighters, 401 tra nsport aircraft and 154 seaplanes) . Compar~d WIth this, the Allies (including the Belgian and Dutch-Air Forces) had 6,000 alrcr~ft, of which 3,000 were at contin ental bases. Right at the outset of the campaign the full weight of the German air offensive simultaneously hammered the ground organisations of the etherl ands , Belgium and No rthern Fra?~e. Th.e Dutch and Belgian Air Forces were destroyed and the Franco -British Air Forces were hard hit and forced to use bases in the rear. (Survey by 8th Abteilung September 1944) In addition to the units operating from France , the Command .sent dail.y reinforcemen ts that went out and returned to their home base at dusk. Typical of this effort was that by 253 Squadron, which had only been declared operational on .27 Apnl. The six aircraft of' B Flight' went to Fra nce on 16 May, with 'A Flight' and a Fhg~t fr~m I II Squadron forming a composite squadron the following day at Kenley. Their bnef was to move to Poix, patrol from there and return to Kenly at dusk . Over the next two

17

18

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPME

T, ROLES AND HISTO Y

Hurricane L1831 of 87 Squadron; the Squadron moved to France the day after the declaration of war and remained there until 22 May 1940 when the remnants arrived at Debden.

days the Squadron lost six aircraft, although all four pilots 'lost' on 18 May subsequently returned. On 16 May Dowding had sent a letter to the Under Secretary of State for Air expressing in unequivocal terms the dangers posed to the defence of the UK by the drain of fighters to France. This letter has been seen as one of the most significant in RAF history as it - may - have influenced Churchill , who saw it, to moderate his response to the endless calls for more aircraft from the French . The letter is shown in full at Annex A. Engagements with fighters and bombers, attempts to support Allied bombers, the effective German flak, all provided a series of lessons for commanders and pilots. Some of the pre-war breed stuck rigidly to the rules and tactics that had been drummed into them, others started to recognise that they were being outclassed, out-gunned and out numbered. Furthermore, it was discovered that the standard harmonisation on the guns of 400 yards was no good against the fighters and that 250 yards 'achieved far more lethal results'. But every lesson learned cost a few more aircraft and pilots, some caught on quicker than others, those that didn't usually were not around for very long. The Hurricanes certainly gave a good account of themselves and the Luftwaffe crews grew to respect the tenacity and skill of their latest opponents. Many of the RAF pilots involved believed that a few more squadrons would make all the difference and why didn 't ' they' send across more of the chaps - even a few Spitfires. This, however. was total anathema to Dowding who. by the middle of May. was fighting against a French request for ten more squadrons . .. 'the Hurricane tap is now full on and you will not be able to resist the pressure to send Hurricanes to France until I have been bled white .. .' he said. The period from 16 to 26 May saw ever more Fighter Command squadrons being dragged into the conflict in France. but on a rotational basis of up to three squadrons a day - a useful way to broaden the experience level, but unfortunately each squadron seemed to have to learn the lessons for itself and so the same mistakes and losses occurred .

Armourer work ing on the Brownings in a Hurricane Iring; standard armament of the Hurricane and Spitfire lI'as eight 0.303in Colt Browning machine-guns. four in each wing.

19

20

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Squadrons had begun to move back to the UK as ear ly as the 19 May but not until the French request for an Armistice on 17 June did the last ones leave. In the meantime the ' Battle' of Dunkirk had been fought - over a period of nine days the evacuation of Allied troops had been carrie d out in the face of intense air attack. Despite popular belief amongst the troops waiting on the beaches, the RA F were present and trying to hold off the waves of attacking German bombers. With an average of 300 sorties a day from the UK it was a great strain on Fighter Command and yet another source of concern for Dowding as just over 100 Spitfires and Hurricanes were lost - alo ng with another slice of experienced pre-war trained pilots . Th e net result of the campaign in Fra nce was loss of almost 1,000 aircraft , roug hly ha lf of which were fighters; it is now genera lly agreed that the period 10 May to 3 J une (the end of Dunkirk) cost 432 fighters , plus the losses over Dunkirk. On 4 Ju ne Dowding sent a short message to squadrons that had been involved in the fighting over France: lHy Dear Fighter Boys. I don 't send out many congratulatory lett ers and signals, but I f eel that I must take this occasion, when the intensive fighting in Northern France is for the lim e being Ol'ef, to tell yOIl how proud I am ofyOIl and the lI'ay in which yOIl havefo ught since the 'Blitzkrieg ' started. I wish I could have spent m), time visiting .1'011 and hearing YOllr accounts of the fi ghting, but I have occupied myselfin work ing fo r .1'011 in oth er .mys. l want .1'011 to kn oll' that m), thoughts are always with .1'011, and that it is .1'0 11 and )'ollr fighting spirit which lI'iII crack the morale of the German Air Force. and preserve our Country through the trials which ye t lie ahead. Good luck to )'011.

The RAF fighters could have taken some comfort from a later German assessment : 'Of all the enemy air forces ope rating in 1940, the British Air Force was the most formidable in battle. Encounters of German units with British Spitfire and Hurricane formations during the Western campaign, and above all along the Channel at the time of the British retreat to Dunkirk, had been the hardest so far. In supporting the BEF, and also their French Ally in France , the British had brought only parts of their Royal Air Force into operation.' (Lecture by Hptm. Otto Bechtle at Belin-Gatow, dated 2 February 1944, hereafter simply listed as Bechtle). How much of this was a true realisation of the new enemy and how much was a look-back from 1944 is of course debatable. The Germ an occupation of Norwa y, the Low Countries and France gave Fighter Command an increased front age to defend as the Luftwaffe now had add itional bases over a wider geographic area. Consequently the Comm and's existing o rganisation had to be modified to prov ide additional cover for the North-East and South -West of England to ' re-dispose and strengthen the country's defences as a matter of paramount import ance.' The AHB summary of this critical period continued 'the Fighter Command organisation was extended with the intenti on of protecting the West and South-West of England , and the number of sq uad rons in the Command was increased as quick ly as aircraft, pilots and ground facilities became available. G reater effort s were made to hurry the moment when No. 14 Group in the North of Scotland could assume an operational role, the area of No. 10 Group was extended as quickl y as possible to include Cornwall and No. 9 Group was formed to cover the West.' No. 10 Group had been formed on 31 Ma y 1940, becoming effective on 13 July. The Group HQ was at Rudl oe Man or , Wiltshire and most accommodation was in tent s pending the construction of hut s.

Northolt's camouflaged hangars with a Hurricane of 253 Squadron, spring 1940; the Squadron only received its Hurricanes in February.

No.9 Group formed on 9 August at Barton hall, Preston, when it became apparent that the geographic area assigned to No. 12 Group was too unwieldy, but did not assume operational control until I December. The final operational Group to form was No . 14 Group, which was announced in June 1940 to form at Inverness by I August , although it was actually 25 Augu st before Hornchurch Allgllst 1940. Defiant of 264 Squadron; the Defiant was the RAF' s 'turretfig hter', a concept intended as a bomber-destroyer when no fig hter opposition lI'as expected.

21

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DEVELOPME

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

the HQ was in place at Drummossie Hotel, Inverness. On I Sept ember the Group too k opera tio nal contro l of Castletown and Skeabrae as well as the Sector Stati on at Wick and Sector HQ at Dyce. ' But the orga nisatio n necessa ry for the exploitation of fighter defences takes time to prepare. Meanwhile, all defensive opera tions were carried out by the four fight er gro ups already esta blished.' The need for additional airfields - not to ment ion aircraft and pilot s - put a severe strain on the already limited resources.

Sq uadro n strength, 28 ;\ Ia)' 19-10 Operational sqns

Spitfire Hurricane Gladiator De fiant

Blenheim Totals

Sqns

IE

Streng th

19 19 1 1 6 46

3M 306 16 16 96 738

351 315 13 21 11 9 819

NO/ ~

Sq ns

IE

Str ength

Total

Sqns

IE

Str ength

352 400 16 32 154 954

396 334 13 37 154 934

3 6

48 96

45 59

22 25

I

16 32 192

16 35 155

2 8 58

I

2 12

Pilot strength UK

Aircraft strength in UK

Op sqns Non-op sqns Tot al

Non-operational sqns

IE

Strength

656 192 848

647 132 779

Pilot establishment UK Pi10l strength UK

1,268 932

Establishment based o n 25 pilots per squadron and 16 aircraft per squadron .

On 16 Jun e 1940 Fighter Co mman d strength was 549 aircraft immediately availa ble for opera tions, which comprised 260 Spitfires, 182 Hurricanes. 88 B1enheims and 19 Defiants. Th is was a significant decrease fro m the 730 that had been serviceable and ava ilable on 28 May a nd was an ind ica tion of the losses suffered in the France/Du nkirk operatio ns. A new type, the Westland Whirlwind, entered service with the Command in early Jul y bu t it was man y months before the type was opera tional. Th e forth com ing day light air battles for contro l of the skies over the Channel and Sout hern England wou ld primarily be fou ght by the Hurricane a nd Spitfire squadro ns in the No. II Gr oup area, a nd as Wellington said after the Battl e of Waterloo in 1815 it was 'a close run thin g'. When the Germ an switched their bomber effort to night bomb ing the RAF faced a second major challenge. Th e last six months of 1940 were amo ngst the most dramati c in history. In the words of that overused statement - ' the Battl e of France is over, the Battl e of Britain is abo ut to begin.' T he Battle of Britain In Jul y 1940 the Germans estima ted that Fighter Command strength stoo d at 50 squad rons equipped with 900 fighter s, of which 675 were serviceable - 40% of these being Spitfires and the rest Hurricanes, T his intelligence assessment was remarkably accurate, as on 10 Jul y the Comm and 's sta tistics were 54 squadro ns eq uipped with 864 aircraft, of which 656 were serviceable , a good recovery from the low point of the previou s month.

T, ROLES AND HISTORY

The percent ages of types was in error as Spitfires made up 35% of the tot al, Hurricanes 50% and the remainder comprised Blenheims and Defiant s, both types having been ignored in the German assessment. Th e impo rtance of the Germ an figures is their use by the Germans to assess the strength of Fighter Command in the light of Luftwaffe claims after each da y's combat. By combining this with an assessment of British fighter prod uction cap acity the planners could a rrive a t an opera tional ava ilability figure and thus work out the combat effectiveness of Fighter Com ma nd. However, as we shall see, it did no t work quite as simply as that ! The Initial Establ ishment (IE ) of a fighter sq uadro n at this period was 16 aircraft; this was the establishment to which the squad ron was entitled and at which it was supposed to be maint ained . However , the reality was often different and actu al strength, rat her than establi shment , could vary from 12 to 20, whilst the number of servicea ble aircra ft was even more variable. It is interesting to note that of the 54 Fighter Comm and squadro ns, 43 were equ ipped with Hurri canes (25) or Spitfires (18) in early Jul y, which would give a notion al IE of 688 aircraft. Ho wever, sta nda rd tactics involved a 12-aircraft forma tion, so in theory only 516 of th is 688 would be airbo rne for a full-strength sho w. An organ isati ona l memo dated II July outlined a temporary increa se in unit esta blishments: 'add four Hurricane s to IE of 30 squadro ns and four Spitfires to six squadro ns. Addi tional pilots will not be pro vided as the aircraft in question are to be regarded as an emergency force. Thi s is a temporary measure and aircraft will be withd rawn and formed into squad rons later' (SOM 655/40). The dates for the Batt le of Britain a re usually accepted as 10 July to 31 October 1940, a nd during these 15 weeks the course of the war took a major turn, with the Germa ns postp oning their plan s to invade the British Isles. As the Batt le inten sified a few hundred RA F fighters opera ting fro m 20 or so airfields in SE England were pitted agai nst a n air a rmada that had previou sly been unbeaten . The morale of the Lu ftw affe, boos ted by easy victo ries over Poland a nd France, was high, some might even say Pilots of 603 Squadron at rest; 1II0St personal accounts of the Bou le of Britain talk of long periods of doing nothing - sleeping. play ing cards. writing a diary and generally enj oying the hot summer of 1940.

23

24

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 verging on arrogance - certainly mo st of the German pilots believed that the RAF would soon be destroyed . On 16 July Hitler issued Directive o. 16, Operation Sealion, the invasion of England which came with the pr oviso that 'the British Air Force mu st be elimin ated to such an exten t that it will be inca pa ble of putting up any sustained oppos itio n to the invading troops. ' After a lmo st a year of war, the RAF was a very different organisation to that of September 1939, more fighter squad ro ns with modern aircraft (Spitfires and Hurricanes), but its control system, using rad ar and Sect or HQs, had yet to be put to the test. The Battle of Britain is usually split into four phases: - Earl y July to 12 August, attacks on coastal shipping and install at ion s, plu s limited attacks on radar sta tions and airfields. II - 13 August to 6 September, attack s on airfields and associated installation s. III - 7 September to late Sept ember, initial attacks on London . IV - Late September to 31 October, da ylight fighter sweep s and fighter-bomber raids, increased weight of night bombing on London . At this stage, the tactical advantage lay very much with the Germans as the Luftwaffe could choose the time, place a nd size of any attack. It was able, on paper, to mass overwhelming force at anyone point whilst mai ntain ing a threat to other areas that would prevent any attempt by the RA F to concentrate its force s. The German bomber force was capable of reaching over the entire UK land area and surrounding waters, a massive geographic are a for the defenders to cover. It was, of course, realised by both sides that the decisi ve conflict wou ld have to take place in SE England but the ability to stretch and weaken the British fighter force was a significant tact ical ca rd to pla y. The fact th at the Luftwaffe failed to take full ad vantage of this was, as we shall see, one of the main fact ors in the failure of the German ai r campaign.

Spitfire R6597 of 152 Squadron 1940; during the Battle of Britain the Squadron claimed 61 victoriesfor the loss of20 Spitfires.

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY Th e relative strength of the two air force s at the outbreak of the Battle ha s been a source of debate. An RA F estimate of GAF strength gave the following breakdown: Long-range bombers Dive-bombers Single-engine fighters Tw in-engine fighters Long-range reconnaissance Short-range reconnaissance

1.200 280+ 760 220 50 90

In addition to the se numbers for France a nd the Low Countries, were 190 aircraft orway ( 130 long-range bombers, 30 twin-engine fighters and 30 long-range in reco nnaissa nce types). Together this gave a total of 2,790 combat a ircra ft and it was estima ted that the bomber force had 69% serviceability whilst the fighter force had an impressive 95% serviceability. German records (fro m VI Abteilung] show that the estima tes were reasonably accurate in terms of the total but that the breakdown was in er ro r: Bombers Stukas Single-engine fighters Twin-engine fighters

981 336 839 282

These figures a re for serviceable ai rcraft. With its superiority of numbers, tactical disposition and greater experience: The Command hoped that it would not require more than fo ur days to smash the enemy fig hter def ences in South ern England. Once this goal was reached, the offensive I\'as to be extended northwards , secto r by sector across the line King 's Lynn to Leicest er until aI/ England was covered by dayattack. At the beginning of the daylight attack , the pr inciple of giving bomber forma tions the minimum necessary fighter escort so as to leave the maj ority offig hters f ree to pursue their real task of destr oy ing the enemy in open comba t was generally accepted. (Bechtle) On 8 Jul y 1940 the first maj or air battle took place when Fighter Command scra mbled five squad ro ns to intercept a large enem y force a tta cking a con voy: the fight eventually invo lved over 100 aircraft. Co nvoy attacks of thi s type , vary ing in intensity an d so metimes limited to sma ll numbers of unescorted raide rs using cloud cover, was the pa tte rn of the Battle for the first few weeks. Mo st activity centred on shipping off Dover. During Jul y the average number of defensive so rties was 5-600 a day, the highest rate occurring on 28 July when 794 so rties were flown, during which the RAF claimed ten air cra ft for the loss of five of their own. Da y-fighter strength grew during Jul y, enabling the Command to field 49 Hurricane and Spitfire squad ro ns by earl y August - the number o f Spitfire units remained at 18 but an additional four Hurricane unit s were now in the line. August 1940 August 13th 1940 saw the opening of the a ir offensive against England , carried out by Luftfionen 2, 3 and 5 from bases in France, Belgium, Holland and orway. Th e Luftwaff e had, a t th at date 4,632 a ircra ft, o f which 3,306 were serviceable.

2S

26

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

DEVELOPMENT , ROLES A

D HISTORY

(Of an average of 3306 serviceable aircraft there were 390 reconnaissance, 98 I bombers, 336 Stubs, 34 ground attack, 282 T .E. fighters, 839 S.E. fighters, 288 transport aircraft, and 156 seaplanes). The strength of the British air defences had remained unimpaired by the campaign in the West. The RAF had over 675 fighters, 860 bombers and 402 reconnaissance aircraft available in Jul y 1940. (8th Abt eilung survey) There was great vari at ion in the RAF's daily so rtie rates for Augu st, from as few as 288 to a high of 974. The latter took place on 15 Augu st as part of the Luf twaff e's concerted a ttacks on the RAF's airfield s under the so-called Adler Tag (Eagle Day). Thi s new strategy to destro y Fighter Command's combat potential consisted of a series of attacks on radar installations and fighter airfields and was launched on 12 August. The first raid s were on Hawkinge, Man ston and Lympne , the latter being hit twice with the result that by the end of the seco nd attack, the airfield was pockmarked with craters and there was barely a clear space o n which to land. Hawkinge was hit at a round 1700, with Ju 88s destroying two hangars, workshops a nd other buildings, as well as leaving the airfield sur face badl y damaged . Overn ight the craters were filled, the unexploded bombs dealt with and the airfield was declared operat ional again within 24-hours. It was a similar story at Mansi on. with 65 Squadron's Spitfires tak ing off as the bombs fell. This pattern of airfield attacks continued to the end of the first week of September but , with a few notable exceptions, there appears to have been little in the way of overall co-ordinati on of the strategy. Th at sa me da y Goering held a conference a t Karinhall in which he made a number of point s concerning the development of the Battle: 'The fighter escort defences of our Stuka form ation s must be readjusted, as the enemy is concentrating his fighters against our Stuk a opera tions. It appea rs necessary to allocate 3 fighter Gruppen to each Stuk a Hurricanes of 17 Squadron; the Squadron fl ew Hurricane Is fro m JUlie 1939 to February 1941 and claimed 42 victories during the Ball/e.

Spitfire I of 72 Squadron: the Squadron operated f rom Biggin Hill and Croydon during the Batt le of Britain. Gruppe, one of these fighter Gruppen remain s with the Stuk as, and dives with them to the atta ck; the second flies ahead over the target at medium altitude and engages the fighter defences: the third protects the whole atta ck from above. It will also be necessary (0 escort Stuk as returning from the attack over the Channel. . . . I have repeatedl y given orders that twin-engined fight ers a re only to be employed where the range of other fighters is inadeq uate, of where it is for the purpose of assisting our single-engined aircraft to break off combat. Our stocks of twin-engined fighters are not great, and we must use them as econ omically as possible. .. . It is doubtful whether there is any point in continuing the attacks 011 radar sites, in view of the fact that not one of those attacked has so far been put out of operation: In order to protect the vital airfields, Fighter Comm and had to use valuable assets on sta nding patrols a nd within a matter of weeks the damage to the airfields and associa ted facilities, plus fighter losses and the general strain of const ant opera tional flying, were having a n effect. It was a t this point that the Battle of Britain was most finely bala nced. However, the Luftwaffe was also having difficulties, morale was suffering and every aircraft lost over England also meant the loss of trained aircrew. Hpt Bechtle's 1944 lecture continued: 'in the first few day s of the air war it became a pparent that the numerous dogged British fighter pilots who were supplemented by forma tions of volunteers from nati on s co nquered by German y made o pera tions by bom bers and Stuk as so difficult that it was necessary to have a n esco rt of two or even th ree times the strength of the forma tion which was being escort ed: Du ring the critical period of 12-1 9 August the German Official War Communiques claimed that 624 RAF airc raft had been destroyed a nd admitted to a loss of 174 aircraft . At a con ference on 19 August Goering sta ted: To S lllll up: I r e ha ve reached the decisive period of the air war against England. The vital task is to tum all m eans at our disposal to the def eat of the enemy Air Force. Our firs t aim is the destruction of the enemy's fighters. If they 110 longer take 10 the air, Ir e shall at tack them 011 the gro und, or force them i1l10 battle by directing bomber attacks against targets within range ofour fighters. At the sam e

27

28

F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

DE

ELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Fighter combat; close. jire and get-away - keeping an eye out for the Hun sneaking up. time. and on a growing scale, we must continue our activities against the ground organisation of the enemy bomber units. Surprise atta cks on the aircraft industry must be made day and night. Once the enemy Air Force has been annihilated. our attacks lI'iII be directed as ordered against other vital targets.

Amongst the individual points he had made were: VII/il furth er notice, the main task of Luftllotten 2 and 3 lI·iII be to inflict the utmost damage possible on the enemyfighter for ces. With this are to be combined atta cks on the ground organisation of the enemy bombers, conducted however in such a manner as to a void all unnecessary losses. I will return later 10 the question of operations against the enemy aircraft industry. As long as the enemyfighter def ences retain their present strength, atta cks on aircraft fa ctories must be carried 0 11/ under the cover of weather conditions permitting surprise raids by solitary aircraft. Such operations demand the most meticulous preparations, but can achieve I'ery satisfactory results. The cloudy conditions likely to prevail over England in the next f ell' days must be exploited fo r such atta cks. We must succeed in seriously disrupting the mat erial supplies of the enemy Air Force, by the destruction ofthe relatively small number ofaircraft engine and aluminium plants. These atta cks on the enemy aircraft industry are of particular importance, and should also be carried 011/ by night. Should it however not be possible 10 locate an industrial target because of poor visibility or bad weather conditions, some other worthwhile target must be atta cked. It would appear desirable for the purpose of night operations 10 allocate to units particular areas, which they will come to knoll' well during each successive raid. Within this area a list of target priorities should be drawn up, so that each sortie will produce some valuable result and flights will not be wasted due 10 fa ilure of the aircraft 10 fi nd one particular target. There can no longer be any restriction on the choice oftargets. To my self I reserve only the right to order atta cks on London or Liverpool.

Bf 109 wreck; SOli/hem England lI'as littered with the remains of German aircraft, all of which lI'ere guarded and then removedfo r investigation and recol'ery of anything useful.

On 20 August 1940. Goering ordered his units to 'con tinue the fight against the British Air Force until furthe r no tice with the aim of weakening British fighter strength. The enemy is to be forced by ceaseless attacks to bring his fighter formatio ns into operation: This undoubted ly correct tactic was. unfortunately for the Germans. not followed through and whilst airfield attacks conti nued into early Septembe r. the bombing of London on 24/25 August and the British retaliatory raid on Berlin. changed the nature of the Battle. with Hitler declaring that he would destroy the British capital. For the next few weeks. London was to be the focus of numerous large-scale German attacks. and the Battle took on a new significance. Statistics for the last week of August 1940 (from the Figh ter Command Diary) show the intense nature of the Batt le at this period : Losses, 25 August- I August 1940 Da te

25 Aug 26 Aug 27 Aug 28 Aug 29 Aug 30 Aug 31 Aug Totals

German losses

55 47 5 28

RAF losses

13

RA F pilots saved

62 88

15 0 14 9 25 37

4 II 0 7 7 15 25

296

113

69

II

29

30

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

The column that shows RAF pilots saved is also very significant as the two factors in maintaining operationa l capa bility were aircraft and pilots; as we shall see, the former was never a probl em, whilst the latt er reached break ing point.

London and the final shifting of the main weight of atta ck f rom daylight to night raids. In September, these had been carried on simultaneously with daylight attacks. (Bechtle)

September 1940 The Battle reached its climax in September, with the Luftwaffe seeming to be on the verge of victo ry - at least by their accounting of RAF losses - and the RAF struggling in the early part of the month to maint ain the fighting strength of its squad rons. The rotation of sq uadrons between the main area of the Battle and quieter zones helped, as did throwin g in pilots when they were not truly combat ready (see below for comments of pilot shortage). New squadrons continued to form, but not all were thr own into the Battle . When the Luftwaffe launched its surge of offensive ops in the middle of the month it expected low levels of resistance; instead it was met by a determined RAF that had actuall y recovered somewhat from the hamme ring of the previous weeks. On 15 September, which is now marked as Battle of Britain Day, Fighter Command had 17 sq uadrons airb orne to meet the midday attack. This day's opera tions are covered in detail in the Operations Chapter. The first 'E agle' squadro n (71 Squadron) formed at Church Fenton on 19 September: 'pilots will be Amer ican citizens commissioned or enlisted in the RAFVR . Th e ground personnel will be RAF. Establishment will be 16 Brewster Buffalos' (Sa M 875/40). Th e choice of equipm ent must have come as shock for the keen volunteers from America but , fort una tely, Fighter Command's dalliance with this unsuitabl e fighter was short-lived and the Americans were flying Hurricane Is by November. The Germ an tactic of dr ainin g the strength of Fighter Command were beginning to pay off, although this does not appear to have been recognised by the German air planners and a decision was taken to switch the focus of the attack .

The night camp aign is covered late r.

The batt le against the British A ir Force lI'as continued on the lines ofthis directive without a decision being obtained. Recognising this fac t, the German High Command decided in Septe mber to switch the main ,..eight of the air offensive to London, the heart of the enemy pOl r er. Incomparably greater success than hitherto could be anticipated from this policy. For while the main objective of wearing down the British fig hter fo rces lI'as not abandoned. economic 'rar from the air could be embarked upon with fu ll fury. and the morale of the civilian population subjected at the same time to a heavy strain. The fell' daylight attacks by strong bomber forma tions (200-300 bombers of all types '..ere ol'er the target e,'ery time ) achie..ed good results against dock and supply installations along the Thames. Maj or conflagrations caused ex tensive devastation. These attacks lI'ere continued until the 27th September . Losses suffered by formations led thereaf ter to a reduction of the forces engaged on any single daylight attack to one Ju.88 G ruppe, and from the beginning of October to the use of fighter-bomber formations only ( Me 109's each carrying one Sc.250 (250 Kg) bomb. The individual bomber Gruppe as ,..ell as the fig hter-bomber for mations with a strength of up to 120 aircraft , lI'as escorted in its outward and return fligh ts by 2-3 fighter Geschwader. When the weather situation did not permit attacks by regular forma tions in the prescribed form, use lI'as made of cloud-cover for nuisance raids by single aircraft. The month of October sail' the continuation of the lI'ar of attrition against

Aircra ft and Pilots Great play has been made by some historian s of wastage rates and supply of fighters and whilst it is true that during the height of the Battle, the situa tion did deteri orate, it never became critical. The weekly situation in respect of wastage rates along with output fro m manufacturers and, a significant element in the equati on, Cat 2 aircraft repaired and ret urned to service, were highlighted in an RAF anal ysis. In RAF record s Cat 2 mean s repaira ble but not at unit level and Cat 3 is a write-off. The low point occurs in the first week of September when the wastage rate was 270 aircraft. 112 of which were Spitfires, against an ASU (Aircraft Storage Unit) stock of8 6 Hurri canes and 39 Spitfires. A 1945 Air Historical Branch (AHB) stud y summarised the position: 'wastage in aircra ft during the fighting in July and early Augu st was more than offset by output. Less than 300 aircraft were lost in the period 20 July to 10 Augu st whereas j ust over 500 were produced or repaired . But as soo n as heavy fighting began , wastage leapt ahead of output and remained practically twice as high until the second 56 Squadron pilots at North Weald September / 939; the Squadron lost 22 aircraft in combat and pilot turn-over to casualties and postings '..ere average.

31

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ORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

week in September. It is appa rent that the two weeks from 25 August to 7 September con stituted the crisis o f the battle as far as a ircraft suppl y was concerned. There is only one inference to be dr awn ; that despite the great labours of all th ose con cerned with the supply and production of aircra ft, a disastrous situation would sho rtly have been reached if the German s had maintained the scale of their atta cks:

Strength and serviceability. 10

Jul~'-25

September

Dat e

Squadrons

Torai lE

S erviceable

10 Jul 15 Jul 20 Jul 25 Jul 30 Jul 5 Aug 10 Aug 15 Aug 20 Aug 25 Aug 30 Aug 5 Sep 10 Sep 15 Sep 20 Sep 25 Sep

54 52 50 53 54 56 56 54 57 59 57 58 60 61 60 61

86-1 956 920 976 996 1.036 1.036 996 1.060 1.096 1.060 944 960 976 960

656 655 605 631 662 719 709 670 711 721 710 710 668 652 698 665

A class sq uadro ns o. II G roup plus the Du xford and Middl e Wallop secto rs. B class squa d rons - mainl y No. 10 and o. 12 G roups. C class squadrons - mainl y o. 13 Group. The idea was to keep the A class squa drons at 19-20 opera tiona l pilot s by dr awing on the C class squad rons. Th e B class units. and there were only five of the se when the scheme was introduced, were potent ial replacements for any A class unit that had to be withd rawn from the battle. 'The implicatio n [of this scheme) is that pilot casu alt ies so far exceeded output during this critical fortn ight th at almost half of the squadrons in Fighter Co mmand had to be reduced to a semi-operational state in order to devote their best energies to producing pilots for the sq uad rons that were actively engaging the enemy . Insofar as the battle was la rgely confined to south-east Eng land , the scheme was practicable and prudent. But it starkly reveals how dangerous was the pilot position ' (A HB). For the period 10 Jul y to 31 October the Command lost an average of four pilots a day Killed In Action (KIA), with an average o f 28.9 per week.

One th ing that is immediately apparent from the figures in this table is the con sistent level o f servicea ble aircraft - never less than 600 and often j ust over 700 aircraft, despite the inten sity of the conflict at various times during this period. On 6 Oct ober Churchill as ked the Secreta ry of State for Air for ' figures of total losses of Hurricane s and Spitfires during the months of Augu st a nd September: The following day he received this reply: Sept ember 1940

August 1940

With an establishment of 24 pilot s per sq uad ron, the Comm and sho uld have had 1.200 pilot s on strength a t the end o f August but it was 201 short of th is. Add ed to which a furt her 160 were classified as non- ope rati on al, the majorit y . . . 'becau se they had no t reached a sufficiently high sta nda rd of training. There was. therefore, an average deficiency of six or seven opera tional pilots in each sq uadro n.' It was this deficiency, plus the difficulty of replacing tired squadro ns by co mplete and rested squad rons - a policy that had been empl oyed earl ier in the battle - that led Dowding to introduce his Stabilisation Scheme. Under this squa d rons were ca tegorised A, B or C:

Reas on fo r loss

Hurricane

Spitfire

Total

H urricane

Spitfire

TotaJ

Enemy Action

Accidents

238 15

143 II

381 26

228 15

134 8

362 23

Total

253

154

407

243

142

385

Co nclusion The last o f the massed da ylight raid s took place on 30 September and was given a very rough handling by a Fighter Comm and th at was now much stronger th an it had been at a ny point in the Battle . From then until the end of the accepted Battle period (31 Oct ober) the main Luf twaffe effo rt comprised sma ll forma tions o r lone aircra ft (the latte r often fighter-bombers) - und ert akin g as man y as 1,000 so rties a day. Whilst the damage they inflicted was small they represented a majo r probl em for the defending fighters and the Comm and had to resort to sta nding pat rols. The end date for the Battle is somewha t a rbitrary as these types of raid continued well into 1941. The following sta tistics o n German losses were given in answer to a Parli amentary ques tion o n 14 May 1947: Luft.-affe I""ses Period

It is usually accepted th at Fighter Co mma nd's weak link was its supply of pilot s. Despite the fact that it was fightin g over home territory a nd therefore pilot s who were sho t-do wn could return to the frontline, there is much truth in thi s asserti on. The AHB summa ry concluded: 'During August 304 pilots had become casualties; during the fortnight 25 August to 7 September 125 pilots were killed and 133 wounded . Thi s casua lty rate, plus the small number of pilots posted to instructional work , repre sented wastage of some 400 pilots a month . Output from OTUs in August, however, was 260 pilots - the Comm and , in sho rt, was wasting away:

19 Ju l-7 Aug 8 Aug-23 Aug 24 Aug -6 Sep 7 Sep-30 Sep I OcI-31 Oct To tals

RAF estimate

German estimate

Admitted

188 755 6-13 846 260

192 403 378 435 325

63 213 243 243 134

2.692

1.733

896

Not e: Columns show: RAF claims: From Genn an records: and admi tted by Germans at the time in comm uniqu es.

33

34

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

The RAF post-war record of the Batt le admitted losses of 9 15 aircraft (Spitfires, Hurricanes and B1enheims) in aeria l combat , plus losses of othe r types such as Defiants. This total was broken down as: Hur ricanes Spitfires Blenheims

564 339 12

A further 42 aircraft of these three types were admitted as destroyed on the gro und by enemy action. Just fewer than 3,000 pilots, from 14 nationalities, fought on the RAF side in the Battle, and of these some 507 were killed. The RA F claimed to have shot down 2,692 German aircraft , although postwar research has reduced this figure to 1,733. The Luftwaff e claimed to have shot down 3,058 RAF aircraft , but subsequent analysis has reduced this to 915. 'The Few', as Churchill described them, had won a stunning victory . The airfields of southern Englan d and the aircraft that flew from them had replaced the wooden walls of the Royal Navy as 66 Squadron pilots; throughout the Battle Britain's main line of defence. Many in the Luftwaffe the main problem fo r Fighter Command was shortage ofpilots. were not convinced that they had been beaten: The struggle for mastery of the air, when discontinued by German y, had not been fough t through to a conclusion.' (Hpt Bechtle). In 1953 Adolf Ga lland wrote an appraisal of the Battle of Britain for the RAF's Air Historical Branch, extracts from this, and commenta ry on those extrac ts. is at Annex C.

Dowding - Architect of Victo ry The eldest of four children, Hugh Dowding was raised in the strict atmosphere of St Ninians's School, Moffat, which his father had founded in 1879. In 1895 he went on to Winchester Schoo l and after his four years there, entered the Royal Militar y Academy at Woolwich, destined for the Royal Engineers. Th e course at Woolwich had been halved to 12 months because of the pressure of the South African War and when Dowding graduated he was posted to the Garrison Artillery and assigned to Gibraltar. In the Hugh Dowding was quite rightly called the Architect of Victory in respect of the Battle of Britain. mainly because of his pre-war role in Research and Development and his determination to resist political pressure.

following year, 1901, the Co mpany moved to Colombo where the social life was somewha t improved - but to Dowd ing, the prospects seemed equally limited and so he applied for a tran sfer to the more active Mountain Artillery . His request was gra nted and he went to No. 7 Mountain Artillery Battery at Ra walpindi. He spent the next six years in India, tran sferring to a Nati ve Battery where he was in his element with an independent command, often working in remote area s with infantry units. In Janu ary 1912 he entered Staff College and it was at this point that his interest in aviatio n really began . One task he led involved the use of six aircraft in support of his ground forces, and it became ob vious to him that few people in the Arm y knew how to employ aircraft. Dowding considered it import ant to under stand this new element and so decided to learn to fly. He arranged his lesson s at the Vickers Flying School at Brooklands so that he could be back for college classes at 10am. After only one hour and 40 minutes of flying he was given his licence! Dowding followed this with a three-m onth course at the Cent ral Flying School after which he received his wings. Returning to the Mountain Artillery, he applied for a Royal Flying Corps (R FC) Reserve post. In 1914 he went back to the Garrison Artillery with a posting to coastal defence on the Isle of Wight, but only hour s after the outbreak of war, Dowding was called up as an RF C Reserve pilot. His first appointment was as Commandant of the Dover assembly point for squadrons en route to Fr ance. Within a matter of weeks, however, he went to Fa rn borough to join the newly-form ing 7 Squadron. He was eager to get to Fr ance and so pestered for a posting to an active squad ron. His wish was granted - but not quite as he desired - with a posting as an Observer to 6 Squadron at Ostend . This did not last long as heavy losses and a series of rapid moves led to a pilot shortage and he was soon back in the front seat. By the end of the year he had moved to 9 Squadron, a specialist 'wireless' unit. Because of his experience he was posted back to Farnborough to create a wireless experimental establishment. By the summer of 1915 he was back on the Continent as Commanding Officer of 16 Squadron . He was now aged 33 and a Major, but his career to date had not been parti cularly remark able. To improve sq uadron training and morale he introduced a bombing contest on the airfield. Thi s was brought to a hasty conclusion when the one and only bomb ended up in a canal next to the airfield! During his time as CO, the Squadron operated in the support roles of bomber, recce and artillery observation. Dowding was prom oted to Lieutenant Colonel and returned to Farnborough to work up a unit with Sopwith One-and-a-half Strutters, before taking command of 9th Wing, a unit attached to the Comm ander- in-Chief for reconnaissance duties . In Jun e 1916 Dowding arrived at Trenchard's HQ at Fienvillers for the Battle of the Somme. During this bloody battle his units carried out not only their recce duties but also played a part in trying to achieve local air superiority over parts of the battlefield. Anoth er prom oti on and back to England once more , this time to the Sout hern Tr aining Brigade at Salisbury. In spring 1918 Dowding heard that he had not been listed to join the small post-war permanent Royal Air Force and was to return to the artillery. Fortunately, his CO, a Vice-Admiral, disputed this decision and, with the added support of Tren chard, it was revoked. Dowding went to Kenley as Group Commander.

35

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Over the next ten years he had a number of staff and organisational posts in the UK and Middle East, eventually becoming Air Member for Supply and Research the post in which he first made his stamp on the forthcoming conflict. It was his job to shape the future RAF. He energetically threw his weight behind a number of projects du ring the critical period of the 1930s, when there was still cons iderable opposition to any expenditure on rearmament. Among his interests were the use of materials othe r tha n wood for aircraft construc tion, the development of a land-based design of the Schneider racing aircraft, and the development of radar. On balance this was perhaps his most crit ical period , as witho ut a strong stance being taken in the 1930s it is certa in that the RAF would have entered the Battle of Britain in a very poor state. In 1936he took the post for which he is best known - head of Fighter Command. His new HQ opened at Bentley Priory on 14Ju ly 1936, and his theoret ical Command consisted of 30 squadrons along with 600 guns, searchlights , and barrage balloons. He increased this to a planned 53 squadrons, but had to fight for every scrap of equipment. Dowding's previo us range of d uties fitted him well for these mammoth tasks and slowly but surely his air defence system took shape. At the time of the Mun ich Crisis in September 1938 there was still considerable disorder, the RAF was certai nly not ready for war; 12 months later Figh ter Command was very much a 'go ing concern'. Upon the ou tbreak of war he had 39 squadrons fit for duty and fought ha rd to preserve the bulk of these for the defence of the UK, despite pressure to send squadrons to ot her Commands and, more especially, to F rance. The Hu rricane fighter squadrons tha t deployed to France suffered heavy losses alt hough they also achieved a great deal. not least by gain ing valuable experience tha t cou ld be passed on to ot hers and which led to changes in tac tics and eq uipment. However, as Dowding rightly saw, the Batt le for Fra nce was being lost and to have con tinued to put fighter squa drons across the Cha nnel, especially his precious Spitfire units. would have courted disaster in the next round of the conflict. His foresight in preparing Fighter Com mand for the Battle was in large measure responsi ble for its success. although the dogmatic determined way in which he dealt with those who opposed his views, especially Churchill. undoubtedly led to his eventua l downfall. Perhaps the only criticism that can be levelled at his cond uct of the Battle of Britain is the failure to make the Group Commanders of No. I I and No . 12 Group work together. the con flict between Park and Leigh-Mallory could have had dire consequences. After fou r years of running Fighter Command. Dowding was moved out in November 1940. The Battle of Britain had been won and he was exha usted. but many have seen this move as a shamefu l political act motivated by Chu rchill. Given a number of 'special' assignments but no real jo b. Dowding resigned in 1942. His place as a great air commander cannot be denied. Big Wing s? One of the most acrimonious debates of the war was that which took place between AOC No . I I Group, AVM Keith Park, and his counterpart in No . 12 Group, AVM Trafford Leigh-Mallory. However. before briefly discussing that debate it is worth out lining No. I I Group's tactics as stated by Park to Hugh Dowding: The general plan adopt ed was to engage the enemy high-fighter screen with pairs of Spi tfire squadrons f rom Ho rnchurch and Biggin Hill half-way between London

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

and the coast, and so enable Hurricane squadrons f rom London S ectors to attack bomber fo rmations and their elose escort bef ore they reached the line offig hter aerodromes East and South of London. The remaining squadrons f rom London S ectors which could not be despatched in time to intercept the first Il'al'e of the atta ck by climbing in pairs, fo rmed a third and inner screen by patrolling along the lines of aerodromes East and South of London. The fight er squadrons from Debden, Tangm ere and some times Northolt, were employed in wings ofthree or in pairs 10 fo rm a screen S outh-East of London to intercept a third wal'e of the attack coming inland, also to mop up retreating fo rmations of the earlier Il'al'es. The Spitfire squadrons were re-disposed so as to concentrate three squadrons at both Homchurch and Biggin Hill. The primary role of these squadrons was to engage and drive back the enemy high-fighter screen, and so protect the Hurricane squadrons, whose task II'(JS to atta ck close escorts, and then the bomber fo rmations, all of which flew at much lower altitude.

The nature of the pro blem centred on' the support given by adjacent Groups to the hard -pressed o. I I Group. This came into particular ly sharp focus in August when the Luftwaffe offensive was at its most intense and when the Group's airfields were being attacked. Numero us documents issued by No . II Group duri ng this period show Keith Park's ire at what he perceived to be a lack of co-operation from his counterpa rt in o. 12 Group , whereas No . 10 Group, on the other hand, received nothing but praise. Typical of these is the 'No. II Group Instructions to Controllers' dated August 27,1940: 'T hanks to the friendly co-opera tion afforded by No. 10 G roup. they are always prepa red to detail two to four sq uadro ns to engage from the West mass attacks ap proaching the Portsmouth area . The AOC No . 10 Group has agreed that once his squadrons have been detailed to intercept a gro up of raids coming into Tangmere Sector . his controllers will not withdraw or divert them to some other task withou t firstly consu lting us.' 'Up to date, No . 12 Group, on the other han d, have not shown the same desire to co-operate by despatching their squadrons to the places requested. The result of this attitude has been that on two occasions recently when 12 Group offered assista nce and were reques ted by us to pat rol our aerodromes, their squadrons did not, in fact, patrol over our aerodromes. On bot h these occasions our aerodromes were heavily bombed, because our own patrols were not strong eno ugh to turn all the enemy back before they reached their objective.' Park and his supporters considered that whilst the ' Big Wing' of three of more squadrons put up by No. 12 Group might look impressive, its failure to arrive in time made it worse than useless. In an effort to clarify its own position, Fighter Command issued an instruction, dated 24 October, concerning the ' reinforcement of No. 11 Group by No. 12 G roup ': 'As a result of recent discussions the following principles are laid down . No . II Group must always give No. 12 Group the maximum possible notice of probable intention to call on him IAOC No . 12 Group] for assistance. It will be seldom that No. I I Gro up can diagnose from preliminary symptoms that the first attack will be on a scale so lar ge as to necessitate assistance being called from No . 12 Group. It may, however, often happen that the first raid has been met in strength by No. II Group and the assistance of No. 12 G roup is req uired when it is seen tha t further raids are building up over the Straits of Dover.' ' In any case No . II Group must remember 12 Group's requirements with regard to warning, and, even if it is dou btfu l whether assista nce will be req uired, warning should be given to ena ble 12 Group to bring units to readin ess and stan d-by. No . 12 Group should

37

38

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

not send less reinforcement than the amount asked for if it is in a position to meet the requirements, but he may send more at his discretion.' The tone of this is very much supportive of the stance taken by Leigh-Mallory, and it is perhaps equally indicative of where Dowding stood on the matter that Keith Park was replaced as AOC No . II Group in December 1940- by Trafford Leigh-Mallory. In his August 1941 report to the Air Ministry, Dowding stated : 'I am personally in favour of using fighter formations in the greatest strength of which circumstances permit .' However, he qualified this in respect of the Battle of Britain by adding: 'I think that, if the policy of big formations had been attempted at this time by No. II, Group, many more bombers would have reached their objectives without opposition.' Sholto Douglas replaced Dowding in November and made it clear where his support lay and by doing so dictated the Command's policy for 1941 : 'I have never been very much in favour of the idea of trying to interpose fighter squadrons between enemy bombers and their objective. The best, if not the only, way of achieving air superiority is to shoot down a large proportion of enemy bombers every time they come over . . . I would rather shoot down 50 of the enemy bombers after they have reached their objective than shoot down only 10 before they have done so.' Sentiments that would not have pleased many citizens of British cities and would perhaps have caused them to have a different view of the 'heroic Few' . This is one debate that will continue to rage as long as historians examine the Battle of Britain! However, as we shall see below, by early 1941 Big Wings were policy within No . II Group. Night Att acks As noted above in the statement by Hpt Bechtle, the main weight of Luftwaffe attacks, with London as the main target, had shifted to night by October, which gave the RAF a whole new set of problems. At the first meeting of the Night Interception Committee, 14 March 1940, Air Marshal Peirse had stated that: 'defence against night attacks was one of the biggest problems we had to face. Even if the enemy began by raiding in large numbers by day , our good defences would force him to adopt night bombing.' Recognition of the threat and the capability to do anything about it were two very different things. Fighter Command had realised in the late 1930s that night interception would be required and in November 1938 Air Fighting Committee Report No. 57 addressed this issue: 'A few recent experiments carried out at night have indicated that it should be possible to navigate fighters by means of D/F intercept techniques to within about 4 miles of an enemy - providing sufficient information regarding track and height of the enemy is available. The accuracy of interception by D/F at night will be such that fighters will usually be unable to sight the target unless the latter is illuminated by some means or unless further detection aids are provided.' The report went on to look at the options for such detection aids: Use of AI - it is suggested that at least one aircraft in the fighter formation should have AI equipment in order to determine whether this apparatus would enable the aircraft to make visual contact with a target which is not illuminated. Searchlights - on a clear night, the intersection of searchlight beams should be sufficient indication of the position of the target. Experiments should be made to determine, under various conditions of visibility and at various altitudes, the range at which the intersection of searchlight beams is visible and the range at

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

I

Blenheim of 23 Squadron at Witt ering, January 1940; this was the fir st squadron for £6730. which ,rent on to serve with No.54 Operational Training Unit and 256 Squadr on before fi nishing its career with No.12 Pilots Advanced Flying Unit.

which a target illuminated by searchlight beams is visible. Owing to the limited number of fighter units which can be operated by D/F techniques, it would seem desirable for fighters to fly in formation at night; therefore, aircraft will need to be equipped with station-keeping lights and IFF [identification friend or foe]. The trials did not take place until the following spring and summer. The first series were flown between 12 April and 4 May, with a 38 Squadron Wellington as the target and a III Squadron Hurricane as the fighter, the bomber being finished in the latest night camouflage scheme of matt black. After a number of sorties the general conclusion was that: 'the range at which pilots can see an unlit bomber whose position has been indicated, depends upon the experience of the pilot concerned. The upper limit appears to be about 600 yards astern and below, and 3,000 ft directly below. Aircraft engine exhaust can be seen up to one mile away. The average range for detecting searchlight intersection is 15-25 miles and 8-15 miles to distinguish an aircraft being held by searchlights.' So far, so good . The second phase was conducted between 8 May and 7 July , the same aircraft being involved: It is likely even under good conditions that searchlights will only help the fighter by 'flick-overs', to close with and attack a bomber in the dark. If, however, the lights continue to hold the bomber or make a series of 'flick-overs' without dropping behind it while the fighter closes until he can see the bomber itself, it is practically certain that the fighter will be able to deliver an attack. The approach to and attack on both a lit and unlit target should be made from behind and below, fire probably being opened at a maximum of 200 yards. Fighter patrols should be placed at least IO miles behind the front line of searchlights in order to avoid confusion and to allow the fighter to go forward to intercept when a pick-up has been made. Use of the aircraft landing light as a searchlight did not prove successful.

39

40

F IGHTER COMMAND 19 36 - 1968

During the trials 143 attempted interceptions were set up, of which 43 resulted in visual pick-up and 'combats'. An experimental A I set was fitted to a Fairey Batt le in May 1939 and trials with a Harro w as a target proved the concept of the system, despite it being difficult to use and subject to equipment failure. Air and ground-based radar was indeed the solution to the night war and the progress of the RA F in this respect over the next few years was truly remarkable - for which much credit must be given to the behind the-scenes 'boffins' and the RAF technicians who battled to keep the sets serviceable. The Chain Home stations (radar) were of course effective both day and night but vectoring an ai rcraft close enough to pick-up a single raider at night was different to putting a fighter in a position to pick-up a formation of enemy aircraft by day . The principles were the same, as indeed were the Filter Rooms and all the other elements of the system; what was needed was more practice and appropriate night-fighters , ideally with ai rborne rad ar (A I) - both were lacking in mid 1940. Experimen ts and trials con tin ued into 1940, with a number of the Command's Blenheim squadrons now involved a nd despite the comment that the 'Mark I equipment is of no operational value a nd is being used for training' prog ress was generally forward. With the formatio n of the Nigh t Interception Unit (soo n renam ed Fighte r Intercepti on Unit) at Tangmere in March 1940 the Com ma nd had a unit eq uipped with six AI Blenh eims and a remit to make it work. By the time AI Mk II1B was introd uced in May 1940, with a maximum ra nge of 9,000 ft and minimu m ra nge of 600 ft - along with grea ter relia bility - a practical set had at last arrive d. AI MK IV was unde r tria l the following mo nt h and was even bett er, with a min range of 400 ft a nd bett er a nti-clutter, although it was not in full produ ction until September. Mean while, the first night attack took place on 18/19 Ju ne, the German crews of KG .4 having been told that the RA F had no night-fighters; the main targets were the airfields of Honington and Mildenhall, with a diversionary raid on Sout hend. However, the RAF did have fighters ready, a mix of Blenheims and Spitfires and the night was to end with the loss of six German bombers and four RA F aircraft. A summary of this first night battle is included in the Ope rations chapter. Bot h sides appear to have forgotten this episode as attention turned to the day sphe re and the Batt le of Britain and it was August before matters became serious, statistics for the month showed 828 sort ies by Fighter Command on 26 nights, with claims for four enemy aircraft destroyed (only three were eventually credited); a further 20 aircraft fell to othe r causes, mainly the antiaircraft guns . The fighters were active, the tar gets were there - but there was a distinct lack of success. The first phase of the night blitz on London lasted from 7/8 September to 13/14 November and the Csin-C of Fighter Command was worried that the Germans would be 'able to bomb this country with sufficient accu racy for his purposes withou t even emergi ng from cloud s. The most depressing fact which has emerged from the past weeks is that the Germans can fly and bomb with consi derable accuracy in weat her in which our fighters canno t leave the ground. Their naviga tion is doub tless due to the excellence of their radio aids.' In pa rt it was also due to the German use of KG . I00 as a specialist and 'pathfinder' force. The rad io aids, Knick ebein beams, were a problem bu t the British knew of their existence and a co unter-measure was being developed to ja m the radio aids; this unit, o. 80 Wing was opera tio nal in a ut umn. With the AI Mk IV production und erway and a commitment to install these sets in Beaufighters (when the aircraft were avai lable) the future looked promising but in the mea ntime the Blenheims sold iered on and overa ll strength was increased by moving thre e Defiant squadrons (73, 85 and 151 ) a nd three Hurricane squadro ns to the night role,

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Charm)' DOlI'n, 87 Squadron pose with black-painted Hurricane; the Squadron became specialists in the night role.

although the la tter did not ta ke place unti l October. That same mon th Dowding wrote 'o ur task will not be finished unti l we can locate, pu rsue, and shoo t dow n the enemy in cloud by day and night , and AI must become like a gun sight .' The first true GC I station, at Durrington, became operational in October and added a vita l link in the chai n of engaging enemy aircraft at night (and by day). The second phase of the German night offensive saw a broadening to include other targets, which further st retched the defences. 'From the middle of ovember the massed night attacks were extended to the industrial cities and ports of the midlands. The central feature of the prosecution of the war remained the attack on London, however, attacks by day being continued as already described . The tactics of air war by night developed during the ensuing winter months. Only those details of tactics, which differ from those, now applied will be mentioned here. Concentration of attack in one place and at one time was not necessary because of the weak defences. The individual units proceeded to the targets along separate courses. To increase the strain on the morale of the population the duration of the attack was prolonged as much as possible . Only the weather rendered it necessary to concentrate the attack. On the other hand attacking those parts of the target area where the most important economic and industrial targets were allocated to units in each attack. To facilitate locating of targets and the individual objectives within the target areas themselves, the major attacks were carried out by moo nlight. London, offering a large target area, was attacked chiefly during moonless nights. . . . The month of November saw 23 major GAF attacks on vital British centres . In each attack 100-600 tons of bo mbs were dro pped on these targets. During the period of I-1 5th ovember 1940, 1,800 bombers dropped 1,900 tons of H.E.'s and 17,500 incendiary bom bs on Londo n alone. Of the tow ns attacked, Cove ntry, a centre of the British aircraft indus try, mus t be mentioned. Du ring the night of 14/15th Nove mber, 454 aircraft ra ided this town, dro pping 600 tons if H.E. and incendiary bombs. Coventry has become a by-word wherever operationa l air-war is discussed as a result of the extensive dam age caused by this raid.'

41

42

DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND HISTORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

The atta ck on Coventry on the night of- 14/15 November was indeed partic ularly effective - and worrying to the RAF. It was estimated that over 300 enemy aircraft took part and although the RAF flew 110 night patr ols there were no comb ats. Th is attack is examined in more detail in the Operations chapter. When Air Marshal Sholto Douglas took-over as C-in-C or Fighter Command in late November one of his first concern s was to address the problem of night defence. His report of 8 December also stated that: 'I am con vinced that the main obstacle to frequent intercepts by night is the lack of accurate tracking inland from the coast , and most important of all, lack of accurate information with regard to the height of the enemy bomber.' He summed up the requirements for a good night fighter, stating that : 1. There should be at least 20 night squadrons equipped with AI. They would

2. 3. 4. 5.

then provide a semi-circle of night-fighters from ewcastle to Devonshire, with a squadron each in the Birmingham and Coventry area. There should be night flying airfields wi th AI homing beacons, Loren z blind landing and other facilities. There should be at least one large regional cont rol airfield with a proper flying control sta ff to ensure the safety of night flying aircraft. Special train ing using the AI by day with crews wearing dark glasses should be carried out. Later practices by night could commence. Crews selected for night fighting should be specially tested for vision.

All of these point s were addres sed over the next few months; the training element led to the formation of a special night-fighter Operati onal Tr aining, with No. 54 OT U duly formed at the end of December. The selection of crews was also put in hand and many a pilot found himself destined for night-fighters because his vision was assessed as better than normal. It would be some while, however before any of these measures became effective. The first success for an AI Beaufighter came on 19120 ovember. falling to John Cunningham of 604 Squadron; there were still only 47 Beau fighters in the Order of Battle and re-equipment has only sta rted in October. However, the night war was starting to turn in favour of the defenders.

The 194I letter also stated that provision had to be made for 'early withdrawal of those of less robust constitution and for extension of the operational tour for fighter pilots from areas where enemy fighter opposition was weak or absent.' In November 1941 the 200 hours was confirmed but it was made clear that defensive sorties only ranked as 50% value when calculating the 200 hours. This remained the case to March 1943 when it was further stated that only half the flying hours spent on convoy protection and interception patrols beyond the range of enemy short range fighter cover would count towards the 200 hours . The tour length for night fighter pilots, including Intru ders, was set at 100 III March 1941 the Air Council issued a hours or a maximum of 18 months; the letter that laid down a general rule that tou r for Intr uder squadro ns was changed ·S O Jar as the general war situation in December 1943 to give a First To ur of permitted, personn el should be relieved from operational fiying after a maximum 35 sort ies and a Second To ur of 20 sorties, oj200 hours ill one tour oj operational which could be increased to 30 sorties at flying.' the discretion of the AOC. The RAF' s statisticians collected data on losses and came up with predicted survival rates for each ope ratio nal role; survival was an unfortunate choice of term and 'cha nce of completing a tour' would have been a better option! For the FighterCommand roles, all with 200-hours as the length of Operational Tour, the percentage chances of survival were:

Role

Loss Rat es and Tour Lengths In March 1941 the Air Council issued a letter that laid down a general rule that 'so far as the general war situation permitted, personnel shou ld be relieved from opera tional flying after a maximum of 200 hou rs in one tour of ope rational flying.' This decision had been made after a great deal of debate, which the AH B report summarised: The difficulties in establishing such a datum line were considerable because whatever factors were used, the question of degree of stress arose . For example 100 hours operational flying in one Group of Fighter Command cou ld easily be considered equal to 200 or more of similar flying in another Group of the same Command. It was evident that the datum line when estab lished should not be so low as to cause a rapid turnover, leading to a shortage of experienced pilots, not sho uld it be so high as to be impossible of attainment by the average pilot. At the same time it was plain that act ion cou ld be taken immediately by moving fighter pilots to quieter sectors or other pilots to opera tiona l tra ining units.'

After (%)

Da y Fighter AI Night Fighter Twin-engine Intruder

27Y2 51

Single-engine Intruder

2

13

0"''' tour

Af ter Iwo tours (%) 71,1:

26 I If:

oJa

Notes: I. Twin-engine intruder includes Fighter-Bomber and Bomber-Reece. 2. Single-engine Intruder includes Fighter-Bomber and F ight er-Reece.

The losses suggested by this survival statistic included prisoners of war and it was estimated that 20% of fighter pilots tha t were casualties became PoWs. A quick look at the table would suggest that AI night-fighte rs were the place to be! This RAF table is dated January 1943 and would therefo re be a reasonable reflection of what was hap pening, altho ugh the single-engine intruder figures look a little suspicious. Out of interest the highest survival rate prediction was for the Catalina flying-boat with 55Y,% in a tour of 800 hours .

43

44

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

It was clear from all the facts a t the Air Mi nistry's d isposal that the chances of compl eting two tours were not good in most classes of squadron . On the other hand it was difficult to see where Squ ad ron and Flight Comm and ers were to come from if the second tour was vetoed. Th is was a crucial factor as the sq uadrons needed expe rienced pilots in these key posts - and they could only come from those with ope ra tional experience. One suggestion was for a second tour of ha lf the sta nda rd length . but only for selected personnel in the same roles. altho ugh this restric tion was not placed on AI night -fighter squa drons.

post ings, some 1.300 pilot s, or rough ly equivalent to its enti re strengt h. Alt hough some of the casualt ies were newcomers. so that a back-bone o f vetera ns remained. these casualties included many of the most experienced pilot s in the Co mmand. Replacements were drawn almos t entirely from men who had been hurried th rough the OT Us in the a utumn a nd whose operat iona l training had been ha mpered by winte r weath er. It was hardly to be dou bted that th is han dicap would outweigh the extra exper ience gained since August of the few veterans who had gone right throu gh the fighting an d were still in the Co mma nd.'

4

~.:::;

tI't

1941 - Consolidation and new strategies Wh ilst defend ing the skies over Britain remained the primary task for Fig hte r Co mmand thro ughout the war , it was no t long before thought s turned to ways of ta king the war to the enem y. Unde r various code-names such as M osquito, Circus, Ram rod, Rodeo an d Rhubarb (see An nex P for definitions of code-na mes) the Command waged an increasingly o ffensive wa r. As we sha ll see, in its ea rly month s it was not witho ut its critics. Whilst the most interestin g as pects of the Comma nd 's work were increa singly connected with offensive operations, the defen sive element still occupied the majorit y of effort throu ghou t 1941 a nd into earl y 1942; for example. in Jul y the Com mand flew 6.200 offensive and 9,924 defensive sorties. It is also interesting that 6,475 of the defensive sorties were connected with protection of coastal shipping . Before looking at the offen sive aspect , we will review the defensive ro le and a number of general problems faced by the Co mma nd . One of these was the qu estion of pilot experience. a problem neatly summed-up by the AHB narrati ve. ' It was estimated th at nearl y half the opera tiona l pilot s in the squadro ns on August Ist. 1940 were seaso ned men , most of who m had fought successfully in May and Jun e. Between that dat e a nd March 31st, 1941 the Comm and lost, as a result of comba ts, accidents an d

.~

"" . ~

•.-. _ 1

.J/-

..

~;. .-:'

("" " aURCH)


".

Hurricane lIC of l Squadron; the cannon-armed Hurricanes became early exponents ofnight intruder ...ork.

" fop showing Fighter Command Sectors. / 94/

C'&r: '... ~

KIAKWAlL

45

46

Sholto Douglas was requesting an ' immediate' force of 80 da y and 20 night squad rons as the 'crisis would come in spring and summer (194 1) and that thereafter it would be unnecessary to increase the size of the fighter force and might even be possible to reduce it in order to build-up other Commands: However, 1941 was a time when everyone wan ted more - and immediate ly, and the emph asis was being firmly placed on Bomber Command . The Air Staff approved an increase to 81 squadrons, to be effective as near to Ap ril 1941 as possible; by Febru ar y the Comm and 's strength was 76 squadrons, with a further five in process of formation, not all of which were in place by the I Apri l date. In fact the C-in-C had n o;, sq uad rons for the comin g 'battle' and not the 100 he wanted. Th e Command was also cont inuing to reor gan ise, which included a new Sector for No. 9 Group, based on Valley and effective from I April. A summary also stated that ' the Hebrides, Western Highland s and the Minches remained outside the shelter of the Fighter Comm and umbrella, which now extended its protecti on to every other part of the UK: The C-in-C had also imposed a restructuring based on his belief in the Wing concept - he was a supporter of Leigh-Mallory's point of view, and Leigh-Mallory was now AOC of o. II G roup. Th e intenti on was for Spitfire Wings in the Hornchurch and Tangmere Sector s, a Hurricane Wing in the Kenley Sector and another North of London, and mixed Wings in Duxford, Middle Wallop and Wittering Sectors. Approval was also given for appointment of a Wing Commander at 15 of the principal stations to act as Wing Leader. These would pro ve a crucial role and the RAF employed some superb leaders in this role, many of whom had been junior pilots in the Battle of Britain. A memo was issued by o. II Group on 17 February 1941 detailing the 'employment and training of Wings and Circuses' and it is worth qu oting extracts from this as it encapsulates the defensive plan for 1941. Du ring the air battle in the autumn of 1940, the enemy employed mass formations of bombers and fighters with the object of destroying our fighter defence. and inflicting damage at vital points. It is probable that an even heavier scale of atta ck may have to be countered in the spring of 194 1. To meet these large enemy form ations it is inadeq uate to dispatch small form ations of fighters that are unlikely to succeed in sto pping the enemy bombers. It is therefore necessary to meet this type of attack with large formations, which are capable of providing protection aga inst the enemy fighte r screen for those fighters whose role it is to break up the enemy bomber formations and destro y the bombers. It has been decided to o rganise Wings thr ough out o. II Gr oup, which will be composed of two o r three sq uadro ns. These Wings will. on occasion, operate in Circu ses. which will be comp osed of two or more Wings. The object of employing Wings and Circuses in defence is to engage powerfu l enemy formatio ns with sufficient large numbers to: a. b. c. d.

Stop the enemy bombers reaching their objectives. Break up the enemy bomber formations. Annihil ate the enemy when the breakin g up process has been achieved. Have sufficient aircra ft to pro vide protection against enemy escorting fighters.

The object of emp loying Wings and Circuses in offensive operations is to pro vide the necessary number of fighters, work ing in co-operation and giving mutual support, to establ ish air superiority over the enemy in his own count ry.

IS""ORY

DE

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

April also bro ught a change of tactica l structure in the squadrons, with official ado ption of a Section of two aircraft as the smallest tactical unit: th ree such Sections made up each Flight and two Flight s made up a Squadron . There had been a long and drawn-out debate on such tact ical matt ers. with some preferring this more flexible tactic whilst o thers maintained that the existing tact ic was perfectly good, alth ough there was general agreement - as well as the Command directive. However, 'adopti on of the threesquadron Wing as a tactical unit was very different. It would be hard to think of a tactical measure in the whole field of air defence whose utility was more widely debated or which caused livelier controversy' (AHB arrative), In late Jun e the Air Ministry agreed to a furth er increase in Fighter Comm and strength to 94 day and 30 night squad rons - to be achieved by the end of the year. Progress on expansion was steady both in terms of numbers of units and equipm ent ; as the table below shows, the numbe r of Spitfire sq uadro ns had grown significantly between April and July, and this was now the dom inant type in the Com mand.

S umma r)' of squ adrons. April a nd J ul)' 194t I July 1941

8 April 1941 Op erational

Hurricane I Hurricane II Spitfire I Spitfire II Spitfire V

Defiant Tomahawk Blenheim Beaufighte r Bien/ Beau BIen/H avoc Whi rlwind

Havoc Boston Total

26% 12 4 18 I 7 I

Non-op It,

2

4

I I I I I 781/ 2

3%

To ttll

Ope rational

27 12 6 18 I 7 I I

II 18 5% 20 7 7

4 I

6

I I I I 82

2 I 3

801/ 2

Non-op

6% I

4

To/al 12 18 12 21 7 11

6 I 2 2 3 14'1',

93

Notes f or Jul y OR HAT: + Havoc only. .. Squadrons 96. 151. 255 and 256 also have four Hurricanes (N) and 92 Squadron has an additional two Spitfires (N) ( =stand ing fo r Night ).

Th e July figures are also interesting for the number of non-operational squadro ns, the bulk of which were newly-formed squadrons with Spitfires or Defiant s. It was also significant that the Spitfire V was sta rting to appear in larger numbers, with seven operational squad rons by July. Thi s new vari ant of the Spitfire gave the RAF pilots the edge over the majorit y of 109 variants - but that balance was to change later in the year when the Germans int roduced a fighter that was to cause the RAF major prob lems; the Fw 190 entered service in late summer and by the end of the year it was clear that the RAF' s fighters were being out-classed. The Fw 190A was being operated by JG26 and had the edge over the Spitfire V in a number of crucial performance areas.

47

48

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

D

D H STORY

Clipped-wing Sp itfire V; the M ark V ,\"Os sem as all interim measure bill served ill large numbers. 'A t present the Spitfire V has insuffic ient reserves ofpower 10 stay ill combat with the .If E 109 at 35.000ft. The latter definitely has greater speed at that height 0 11 the level, climb or dire. .

Pilots of66 Squadron at Perranporth in 1941 - as with many squadron pictures there is. of course, a dog! The Squ adron was at Perranporthfrom April 1941 to the end of the yea r.

The Air Ministry's interrogat ors took every op por tunity to record the views of cap tured German aircrew and from time to time the results of such interroga tions were circulated . One such document was Tact ical Bulletin o. I issued in July 1941; this outlined the view of a Bf 109F pilot in respect of its comparative performance in respect of the Spitfire. 'This pilot believes the MelO9F is superior in every respect - except that the new Spitfire (the Mark V) might, when hand led by an equally good pilot, be superior to the 109F in steep turns at high speed. This difference, however, can be more tha n counter-bala nced if the German pilot is better.' The report also included other related commen ts. 'The outstan ding disadvantage of the Me lO9 is that the wings are not as stable as they might be. At least two German pilots have been killed within the last three weeks by tearing the wings off their 109s when trying to follow Spitfires in a snaking dive. After a fast dive pilots have to pull ou t fairly grad ually. The new arrangement of guns in the nose of the I09F enables pilots to fire very accurately whilst in a turn and to open fire at a greater range. This pilot, however, usually opens fire at 100 yards, closing to 50 yards.' One of the key tactical lessons from the Battle of Britain was that the fighters with height ad vantage at the start of a combat were well-placed; this was expressed by a senior pilot at Hornchurch in July 1941 : 'diving attacks are always the most effective as the element of surp rise is achieved' - but he also sta ted that the ab ility to get higher should not be at the expense of other performa nce elements. '. . . but turnin g radius and acceleration are equally impo rtant. At all heights a Spitfire can turn inside an Me 109, but the 109 appea rs to have quicker initial acceleration in a dive and also in climbing.. . . Reserve of power and manoeuvrability are the foremost requirements for efficient

fighting at great heights. The superiorit y in this respect of the Me 109, part icularly the Me 109F, must, to a large extent. be due to its light weight. At present the Spitfire V has insufficient reserves of power to stay in combat with the Me 109 at 35,000 ft. The latte r definitely has greater speed at that height on the level. climb or dive.' It appeared, therefore. that the Spitfire V was on a par with or even slightly better tha n its main opponent. the Bf 109E and 109F , with pilot experience and tactics of more importance than aircraft performance. The Spitfire V was not the only 'new boy' with the Comma nd in 1941; the Bell Airacob ra and Tomahawk. and the latest Hawker offering. the Typhoon, became operational during the year. The Airaco bra went to 60I Squa dron but despite some operational flying was a quickly rejected, whilst the highly promising Tiffie suffered development probl ems but eventually went to 56 Squad ron as the Typhoon IA in September 194 I. It was not the happ iest of introducti ons as problems with the Sabre engine and various other snags limited the initial employment of the type. By the end of the year the plan for 94 day and 30 night squadro ns had not been achieved. There were only 75 day squadrons and of the night units only 23 were true night-fighter units, along with 10 Turbinlite Flights and two night-intruder squadrons. Defensive Operations 1941 The main daylight war over England had almost come to an end by early 194I. The Luftwaffe fighter-bomber and fighter sweeps had more or less ended in mid December and did not resume until mid February, and even then on a relatively small scale. Between Feb ruary and the end of March the main day enemy activity was fighterbomber attacks on airfields in the o. II G roup area, such as Hawkinge, Lympne and Man ston . From I April to 29 May the RAF recorded 283 day and night attacks on airfields, raids that were referred to as ' pirate raids' and that were hard to counter. The AHB narrative neatly summa rises the problems these caused : 'the favourite objectives for such raids were airfields and aircraft factories and, during the winter of 1941, a number of successful enemy low-level, daylight attacks were car ried out. These showed evidence of careful plan ning and were norm ally carried out by aircraft operating either singly or in pairs. They were, moreo ver, difficult to intercept and. although special

49

50

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Spi tfire formation of 81 S quadron; the S quadron acquired Spi tfire Vs at the end of 1941 and operated the type to October 1942 when they departed for North Africa.

measures were taken to deal with single raiders - such as the use of AI fighters by da y when ~he weather was bad - the problems remained unsolved at the end of the year.' FIghter C~mman~ ~ad its ' Big Wing' tactic ready to counter any resumption of large -scale daylight activrty - but it never came. There were a number of fighter sweeps between February and May but they were small -scale and 'gave Fighter Command no chan.ce of using the large wing formations . .. and the problems of interception was thus, as WIth the long-range bombers, unsolved in July , when both the low-le vel attacks and fighte~ swee~s w~re d.iscontinued' . The main rea sons for the virtual ending of such ?ffen~lve acti on I.n mid 1941 were the reorganisation of German air power for the mvasion of Ru ssia and the increasing pressure of the Allied daylight air offensive. Indeed, a plan to rotate elements of JG2 and JG26 to Russia had to be cancelled as the Allied offe~sive grew in magnitude. The initiative had firmly passed to the RAF (and soon t.heJOint RAF-USAAF offensive) in terms of daylight operations, although there was stili a hard fight ahead . The main combat activity over the U K in 1941 was by night. Night Defence The problems of night defence had sta rted to becom e increasingly appa rent in the latter months. of 1940 - a nd there was little immediate improvement in the early months of 1941. FIghter Command ORS Report 0 .235 summarised the 'trend of air defence at night'. The following extracts of the report highlight its main points: 1.1. F.ighters had practically no success in intercepting enemy bombers by night from October 1940 until February 1941 inclusive.

DEVELOPME

T. ROLES AND HISTORY

1.2. The month of March saw the beginning of effecti ve operations by the GCI system, and the use of ' Fighter Nights' over target areas. The success of fighters rose month by month ; 24 enemy aircraft were destroyed in March, 52 in April, and 102 in May. In particular, on the night of 10/1 Ith May, over 8% of the enem y aircraft employed on an attack on London were destroyed by fighters. The tot al losses of the enemy were nearly 10% . 1.3. During the peri od M arch, April, May 1941, a bo ut 40% of fighter success was obtained with GCI/AI technique. Since then the enem y has made onl y slight, dispersed raids , ideally suited to the GCI/AI technique, and the percentage has risen considerabl y, so that at the present time AI machines carry out practicall y all the night interceptions of the se dispersed raids. 1.4. The present limitation of the GCI/A I technique lies in the difficulty of obtaining visual contact in the final stages of the ch ase. A significant difference exists between the mo onlit and mo onless hours of the night. With existing skill o f the average G CI sta tion a nd average AI squadron, it can be co nserva tively estima ted tllat during moonlit hours of the night one atte mpt in 8 will go to co mba t; and that during moonle ss hours o f the night one attempt in 20 will go to co mbat. These att em pts can be made by pre sent GCI stations at the rate of 4 to 5 per hour if sufficient night fighter s are av ailable. The combat s will result in 3 o ut of every 4 enem y aircraft being destroyed o r probably destroyed. 1.5. An improvement in the efficienc y of the GCI/AI technique has occur red, that may be a tt rib uted mainl y to incre ased skill of the flying per sonnel. 1.6. A not iceable co mponent of the rising success of night fighters is a much grea ter leth alit y of co mbats by Beaufighters. which is not likely to have been caused by the prol ongati on of twilight in he Summer. The report made a number of interesting point s, especi ally those relating to the ca pacity of the system - the number of targets that could be handled by the GCI system a nd the availability of fighters - and the increased leth alit y brought about by improved ski lls and the int roduction of the Beaufighter. The GCI network was rapidly expanding; by Janua ry 1941 six sites were operatio na l (Avebury, Durringt on , Orby, Sopley, Walding Field and Willesborough) and in the first six months it was estimated that 100 German aircra ft fell to int ercepts controlled in thi s way. The rep ort also 's peculated ' on a numbe r of othe r techniques; it pr op osed that AI fighters sho uld be allowed to free-lance rather than a lways bein g closely cont rolled by GC I, and it commented on Long Aerial Mines and a irbo rne searchlights. 3.3. Lon g Aerial Mines. They sho uld not be regarded as a competitor to GCI/AI or free-lance AI, but as a supplement. They will be useful in the ca se of very high den sity raids. They sho uld be used on long-durat ion aircra ft in o rde r th at the y may be used to overco me wea ther limita tion s tha t affec t norm al fighte rs. Th e sketchy evidence available a t the moment is qu ite insufficient to either damn or to pr a ise LAM s. 3.4. Sea rchl ight aircraft. A much better rati o of co mba ts to a tte mpts wo uld be obta ined if illumina tion of the tar get from the ai r ca n be obtai ned a fter clo sing in on AI. Thi s a ssumes, of course, that the enemy is un abl e to ado pt successful countermeasur es, a nd th at the 'forma tion flying' needed does not affect the overa ll efficiency by a great er amo un t than the sea rch light im proves it.

51

52

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Beaufighter of 255 S quadron at Honiley; the A l -equipped Beaufighter "'as the fi rst Indyeffective night-figh ter ill the Command; 255 Squadron operated Beaufighters fro m July 194/ , mo ving to Honiley ill JUlie 1942.

LAM s were to have little future - but the sea rchlight idea was persevered with. There was a steady increase in the number of night sq uadro ns in late 1940early 1941. albeit man y of these were initially eq uipped with Defiant s: for example. 255 Squadron. which formed a t Kirt on- in-Lind sey in ovember 1940 a nd becam e opera tional the first week in January . Fighter Command was better equipped to cope with the thr eat . having six AIeq uipped sq uadro ns. five with Beaufighters. The more capable AI Mk. V a nd improved training also helped to make the defences more efficient. However. there was still a shortage of aircraft a nd coverage of the UK was patchy. with gaps in coverage. The third phase of the German night offensive ran from the middle of Februa ry to the middle of May and was essentially an offensive on British ports. with 36 of the 61 a ttac ks being on port town s in the South-West. British cities were still on the target list: The heaviest night atta ck on Lond on was made in April. with a total of 711 aircraft over the target (the opera tion co nsisted of a double attack) dr opping a bomb load of 1.026 tons of H.E. and 150 ton s of incendiary bom bs. Also worthy of menti on a re the two heavy attacks on Glasgow in May 194 1.' (Bechtle) 'On 12th May. the day the great enemy night assa ult came to an end. the C-in-c' Fighter Comm and told the Night Air Defence Co mmittee that " AI with GCI was the most profitable means of night interception. not with standing the successes obtained by Cats Eye fighters" . He demand ed acceleratio n in the provision o f Bea ufighters. On 11th June he wro te "the expansion of the ight Fighter force is now in sight. and we expect the supply of GCI sets to come forwa rd at a qu icker rate in the future." Indeed. four mo re squad rons were formed in June ( 125. 409. 4 10. 456). although all initially had Defiant s. The German s had reduced their scale of effort in the summer as part of a reorganisa tion of air assets fro m West to East for the invasion of Ru ssia rath er than in respon se to any increase in the effectiveness of the British defences. However. the latter had been recognised and the L uf t waffe began to ado pt various tactics to co nfuse the

DE

ElOP"1ENT RO

defenders. such as low approach and erratic courses. Th e decrea sing scale of losses was no ted by Fighter Command and in a report of 19 Novembe~ was put down to 'vi.gorou s evasive action had become a ro utine measure with enemy pilot s when approachin g our coasts. and they flew low over the sea in the knowledge that by doing so the y could not be "seen" by our radar .' It was not only the GCI rad ar s and Chain Home that had problems of seeing low-level tar gets. as the AI rad ars were inva riably ineffective below 5.000 ft beca use of ground returns masking the target. It was intended to bring the C~ain ~ome Low stations into play to provide better cover and it was hoped that new tactic s With AI Mk. IV would improved performance down to at least 3.000 ft - and new radars under development would be even better. . . By the end of the yea r the Comm and had flown 11 .980 night defence sorties. WIth 4.967 being by Al-equipped aircra ft. The fighters had claimed 258 enem y aircraft out of the estimated 25.334 aircraft that had flown over the UK in thi s period. with a further 131 falling to anti-aircraft guns and 44 to 'other' cau ses. The busiest period had been March to June . both in term s of sortie s and successes. The Fighter ight operations were cons ta ntly under review as they seemed to 'produce few result s but occupied sq uadro ns that cou ld have been used for other purposes. A summary for the period Janu a ry to May 194 1 sho wed 17 Fighter Nights and claims for 41 aircraft. the most successful night being 10/1 1 May when the target was Lond on and 12 aircraft were claimed. The latter appeared to prove the belief that 'close protective patrols by Car 's Eye fighters was only profitable in good moonlight and in clear weather. . . . Thi s form of patrol was only profita ble in highly concentrated a reas of enem y activity.' Defiant crews of264 S quadron; after its disastrous day light career ( despite early promise ), the Defi ant was used by a significant number ofsquadrons for night-fi ghter ops, with 264 Squadron perf ormillg this role to July / 942.

53

54

FI G H T E R COMMAND 1936-1968 , The per formance of the a nt i-aircraft guns had stead ily im proved. and the figure of _0.000 ro unds to down an ai rcraft (Septem ber 1940) had fallen to 2.963 rounds by February 194 I. The guns had a lso been redistributed following the increase in attacks on target~ ot her than London ; by May 1941 AA Command was fieldi ng 1.691 Heavy and 940 LIgh t Guns. suppo rte d by 4.532 sea rchlights . Whenever Fig hter ight opera tions were.underway - the .b right moon light when day fighte rs were employed _ the guns were restnc~ed to burst height s 2.000 ft below the lowest level a t which the fighters would be opera ting.

ight-fi~hter streng t.h was increased with the decision to form specia list Flight s to opera te modl~ed Al-equipped Havocs. the modificat ion being the addi tio n of a highpower se~rchhght (The Helmor e sea rchlight). Each of the se Fight er Fl ight s was to have a.n esta ~hshment ? f 8 + I Turbinlit~ Havocs in wha t on paper look ed like the brillian tly simple Idea ~f taking a se~rc?hgh t mt o the air to help tum night int o day. In essence the system was ~1I~~le. a Turbinlite Ha voc would work as a pair with a sing le-seat fighter and both would initi ally be vecto red to the target by a ground controller. On ce the Havoc A[ ~perator h.ad acq uired the target he would home it. position the fight er and when the time was right , turn on the searchlight to allow the fighter to mak e his attack. . 0.93 Squ adron carried out initial development work. having virtua lly given-up its previ ou s ~ork with the LAM. but it was the formation of No . 1451 (Fighter) Flight at Hu.nsdon m May 1941 that really got the project underway. The Flight was tasked with training four other Turbinlite Flights and it was one of the se. No. 1452 Flight that developed the sta nda rd tacti c. On 6 ovem ber the CO . Sqn Ldr J E Marshall submitted a progress rep ort in which he detailed thi s tact ic; ' In this a ttack. the parasite. when given t~e wo.rd . di ves forwa rd so as to lose a bo ut 500 ft. The A[ opera to r keeps the Turbinlite pIlot.di rected on to the target. a nd gives the pilot the word to illumin at e when he ca n see by his tube s that th~ par~site is appro xima tely 300 yards behi nd the target. Th e para site then ~s the ta~get illuminat ed shghtly a bove him an d is able to make a well-timed and er:ecuve a tta ck. A follow-up rep ort sta ted : 'success in the scheme depe nd s amo ng o ther th ings on eac h member of the crew ta king the co rrec t actio n a t the appropria te moment. As orde rs are passed fro m one to anot her. and as the condition s of the intercept will Turbinlh e team - Ha voc and Hurricane; one of the less successful att empts 01 boosling the night def ences of Fig/lie, Commond

55 seldom be ident ical on two nights. it is clear th at a com plete understanding mu st exist between eac h member of the team . The sa tellite pilot sho uld a lways wo rk with the same Turbinlite pilot .. . it is pa rtic ular ly easy in the first few seco nds to miss an illum inated target .' The original concept was for the Flight to wo rk with single-sea t squad ro ns. alt ho ugh Marshall was con vinced that the fighter needed to be part of the Turbinlite unit. All ten Flights had formed by the end of the year (see ta ble) a nd a ll were eng aged with inte nsive train ing to try and make the system wo rk; it was 1942 befo re they were tr uly part of the night-defence Orde r of Battl e.

Turb inlite Flights Flight no.

Formed

Airfield

1451 FlI 1452 Fh 1453 FIt 145-1 FIt 1455 FIt 1456 FIt 1456 FIt 1458 Fh 1459 FIt 1460 Fit

22 May 1941 7 Jul 1941 to J u1 194 1 27 J un 1941 7 Ju 1 1941 24 Nov 194 1 15 Sep 1941 6 D
Hunsd on West Mailing Wiu ering Co lerne Tangm ere Hon iley Co leme Middle Wallop

Hunsdon Acklington

S hipping Protection After Jul y 1941 the main German da ylight offensive was aga inst shipping. with rou ghly two -thirds of the total effort dedicated to thi s. Before we look at the situa tio n in lat e 1941 it is worth reviewing the overa ll ro le to date of Fighter Co mma nd in the protection of shipping. In the early months of the war the Command had been mounting an average of 1.000 so rties a month in defence of shipping; thi s had risen to 2.000 so rties by earl y 1940 and ove r 3.000 sorties by Jul y. The basic po licy was one of pro vidin g fighter cover rather tha n sta ndi ng esco rt ; the policy was dictated by lack of ai rcra ft but there were occasio ns when sta nding escort was mad e ava ilable. The ea rly battles over the Cha nnel. that were precu rso rs to- the Battle of Brit ain . have been covered above. In ovember 194? the Luftwaffe once more mou nted heavy a ttacks on ship ping. with the.Ju 87s a lso m ~ km ~ a renewe d appearance. O n 6 March 1941 Figh ter Co mma nd received a new Direct ive stating th at the primary task was now de fence of the Clyde. Mersey and Bristol Channel a reas and was told to make 'such cha nges in deployment of his resources as was necessary.' . . T he German view was that the yea r had been pretty successfu l: 'Attacks on shipping targets were carried out making full use of the elemen t of surprise in d ~~time . at da~vn and du sk or d uring nights of good visibil ity acco rd ing to weather conditions. Bom bing a ttacks were made-at I~w-Ievel or in a shallow dive with bombs of 250 kg or 500 kg. The successes achieved in [94 1 with small losses to o urselves were good . As an example the results for the mo nth of overnber ma y be given : these were sunk - 82.100 gross register tons. probably sunk - 49.000 tons. and damaged - 66,000 ton s' (Bechtle) . T his must relate to the ea rly part of the year, before Fighter Command had increased its efforts to counter the threat; in March 18% (2, 103 sorties) of the Co mmand's defensive sorties were on shipping protection an d the enemy sank 21 ships within 40 miles of coast during day light an d a further two a t night. Th e following mon th - after the Directive.had taken effect - the effort was 49'% (7.876 so rties) a nd the losses were down to ten ships. Shol to Dou glas sent a mem o to the Chief of the Air Staff: 'you will be pleased to hear th at for once the Navy is pleased with Fight er Co mma nd.' In Jul y they would have been even more pleased as o nly one ship was sunk in the a rea covered by Fighter Comman? Th ere is one specific con voy pr ot ecti on act ivity that deserves sepa ra te men non the l\lerchant S hip Fighter Unit (M SFU). Debate had been und erway for so me time concerni ng a ship-bo rn e fighter. as the lack of ai rcra ft carriers meant that it was not

56

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

possible to provide this expensive type of air cover. The Chief of Air Staff submitted the following note to the March Chiefs of Staff Committee: ' I am con vinced that neither shore-based aircraft in the numbers that we can hope to provide in the next six to nine months nor gun arm ament can secure our shipping in the Atlantic against the scale and type of long-range air attack that we must now expect . . . the only method of protection likely to be effective is the ship-borne high performance fighter operating from specially con verted ships which must accomp any every convoy in the danger area. I urge that these ships . . . sho uld be given the highest possible priorit y.' The outcome of this was the MSF U, which formed in May 1941 as a 0.9 Group unit under the command of Wg Cdr E S Moult on-Barrett. In essence this called for a single-seat fighter to be mounted on a catapult rail such that it could be launched 'a t an appropriate moment ' to engage the enemy - and then ditch , the pilot being picked up out of the water. The Hurricane was the chosen type, for both its sturdiness and avai lability, and in May sixty aircraft were converted; the overa ll plan called for 200 aircraft, 50 of which would be stored in Dartmou th, ova Scoti a (the ot her end of the Atlantic convoy ro ute) for use on the return trip. . Pit Off H J Davidson made a trial laun ch from the SS Empire Rainbo w on 31 May, which was almost a disaster when his wing-tip touched the water. Further trials pro ved the basic concept and the first operational aircraft were at sea in early June aboard the SS Emp ire Rainbow (Pit Off Davidson) and SS Empire Mo on (Fg Off ARM Campbell) . On I ovember , some 6550 miles West of Achill Head, Fg Off G W Varley laun ched from SS Empire Foam to intercept an Fw 200 Kondor. However, the enemy aircraft man aged to hide in the cloud and Varley was unable to inter cept. After a 2-hour patrol at 3,000 ft, in which the Kondor stayed away , he ditched and was picked-up, after fou r Fighters at sea aircraft.

011

merchant ships; all emergency measure to counter German long range

STORY

minutes in the water, by a destroyer. The fact that the enemy was not engaged was less important than the fact that it had been chased away from the convoy. The avy was also engaged in similar activity with the Catapult Armed Merchantmen (CAM) but this is o utside of our story of Fighter Command. The first success for the MSF U did not come until 25 May 1942 when Fg Off John Kendal sho t down a Ju 88 inside the Arct ic Circle, but in poor weath er he baled o ut too low and was killed - the only fata l casualt y for the MSF U in actio n, although aircraft and personnel were lost when their ships were sunk. A number of combats were flown over the ensuing 15 months unt il the disbandment of the Unit on 7 September 1943, the fina l successful combats having taken place on 28 July. But we have now moved ahead of the Fighter Command stor y. Whilst the Germ an s had been reasonably pleased with the results in 194I, the change s made by the defenders soon altered this view: 'the position changed surp risingly at the beginning of the year 1942. AlA defence aboard the vessels and protecti on of the con voys by fighter aircraft had been strengthened considerably; for instance, K.G.2 lost du ring 5 weeks (FebruaryMarch 1942) 13 crews after scoring only slight successes.' (Bechtle) Offensive Op erations 1941 On 8 December 1940 a Fighter Comm and Order for 'Sector Offensive Sweeps' was issued: these were to made by three sq uadrons in the afternoons and flown above 20,000 ft, the intenti on being to : 'harass the Germans by daily " tip and run" operations, to make them feel flying over Northern France or Belgium is unsafe, and so force them to some system of readine ss in order to protect themselves.' Th is was not the only type of offensive o peration and was not actually the first flown: the first acknowledged offensive mission was flown on 20 December, when two Spitfires of 66 Squad ron attacked Le Touquet airfield, a ' Mo squito' (a code-name that was changed to ' Rhubarb' on 17 Janu ary 194I). The 0, II Group order for these operations sta ted: 'On suita ble days a selected Flight in one Sector is to be " Released" for Mosquito raids. Each Sector is allotted in rotation one day per week on which they are, when the weather is suitable, to Release a Flight for this purpose. Should it be impossible due to weather or any other reason for a Flight to operate on their selected day, their opportunity to do so will be lost for that week and the next named Sector will take over on the day following in accorda nce with he roster. ' Mosq uito raids are only to be undertaken when the weat her is suita ble, that is when cloud cover is ava ilable to enable our fighters to fly in or above clouds, dart out from cloud s to attack hostile aircraft and return immediately into the cloud s. These raids are not to be made when the cloud s base is below 2,000 ft. If conditi ons are found to be unsuitable on approaching the French coast, the task is to be aband oned and aircraft are to return to base. 'The Squad ron Comm and er of the Squadron which is to car ry out a raid is to decide on the number of aircra ft to be employed and on the detailed meth od of car rying out the operatio n. Only experienced pilots are to be detailed. They are not to take unnecessary risks and they are to be told that the object of these raids is to inflict the maximum casualties on the enemy withou t loss to themselves.' The order also gave the rotation of Sectors, starting with orth Weald for 22 December, the first official day of M osquito and then rotatin g through Tangmere, Horn church, North olt, Debden, Biggin Hill, Kenley and back to orth Weald. In the period fro m 22 December 1940 to Jun e 1941 the Command ordered 149 such missions, of which 45 were not completed, usually because of bad weather. Fighters

57

58

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

engaged in 18 combat s. claiming seven victo ries. and also attac ked 11 6 gro und targets. Thi s was a reasonable result for a loss of eight aircraft. The code-name Circus has cau sed some confu sion as it was app lied to fighter and bomber operation as well as a lar ge-scale fighter sweep. These Circus operations. during which a bomber force would attack target s in France. aimed to 'raise and engage that por tion of the Luftwaffe fighter strength based on the Western Front' (Figh ter Comman d operational memo) . The tactic was amplified in the ope ratio nal order of 24 December. which stated that the intent of these missions was to 'take offensive action which will harass the enemy. force him to adopt a defensive preparedness and enab le our patrols to meet him in the air with the tactical advantages of height and surprise.' It continued. ' norma lly not less than six fighter sq uad rons will be employed with o r without the co-operation of a sma ll bomber force. Periodically. to carry out offensive sweeps over occupied territor y with lar ge fighter forces. the fighters opera ting on occasions in company with one of more bom ber squadrons.' It also stated that should no enemy aircraft be encountered then the Hur ricane Wing 'may, on occasions . come down low to attack targets on the grou nd.' Interestingly. the same freedom of action was not permitted to the Spitfire Wings. The first of the fighter sweeps was flown on 9 Janu ary. with I Squad ron and 615 Sq uad ron pat rolling at 21.000ft from Ca p Gri z ez to near Ca lais. and three squadrons (65. 145.615) patroll ing at 22.000ft from Boulogne to St Omer. either formation saw any enemy aircraft. Th ere was a genera l belief that the Lu ftwaffe might prove relucta nt to engage the fighter sweeps. which was why the bombe r option had been included . The first of the Circus missions with bombe rs was flown on 10 Jan uary 194 1. with Bomber Command Blenheims to 'harass the enemy on the ground by bombing the Foret de G uisne, to destroy enemy aircraft in the air or. should insufficient or no enemy aircraft be seen. to ground strafe St Inglevert aerodrome. with pa rticular atten tion to aircraft gro unded and petrol ta nkers.' Th e second such mission was flown on 5 February the target being the airfield at St Omer/Longuenesse. but it was no more successful in provokin g the desired reaction . A few days later the Comman d reaffirmed the aim of these missions as being to 'bomb selected targe ts. and to take advantage of the enemy reaction to shoot -down his fighters under conditions favourable to our own fighters .' A Bomber Comm and an alysis Spitfire of306 Squadron; this Polish squadron fo rmed in August 1940 with Hurricanes but f rom July 1941 10 April 1944 it flew Spitfires.

DE

STORY

showed that alt hough bomber losses were low for this type of mission . at aro und 3%. the associated Fighter Command statistics were not so good. In 9.486 sorties Fighter Command claimed 118 enemy aircra ft - but for a loss of 166. Thi s should not really have come as any grea t surprise. as in essence the tactic was little different from that employed. without success. by the Luft waffe over Britain in 1940. A review of offensive ops to mid Feb rua ry suggested tha t all was not well; Sholto Douglas stated that. 'ou r idea was to fly over the othe r side and leap on the enemy from a great height in superio r numbers; instead of which it looks as though we ou rselves are being leapt on.' The main fighter op ponents were JG 2. with bases to the So uth of the Seine. and JG2 6. with bases in the Pas de Ca lais. both were equip ped with the latest Bf 109 variants and both continued to display skill and aggressiveness. As early as March the suggestion was being mooted that the fighters should carry small incendiary bomb s in makeshift contai ners fitted to the flare tubes as a way of addi ng to the 'offens ive firepower' . Th is was rejected as not being worth the effort. but the concept of giving the fighters a bomb-load was by no means forgotten . Arou nd the same time. approval was being sought for clearance to attack moving trains. which were still forbidden targets. Th is was rejected and it was not until October tha t such clearance was finally given for attacks on moving Goods trai ns; train-busting (Cha tanoogas to the Americans) became a major task for the roving fighters. especially in 1944. In the first six months of M osquito/Rhubarb the Command flew 336 such sorties. 45 of which were abortive. mainly because of weathe r. The most frequent tar get types attacked were ships. airfields. gun and searchlight posts. and road tra nspo rt. with 110 attacks on these types of ta rget. The fighters made claims for seven enemy aircraft shot down and the Command lost eight pilots. The number of Rhubarb sorties more than doubled in the second half of the year. with 886 sorties. October being the busiest month (246). Th e number of target types increased and 297 targets were attacked. with trains and the railway system top of the list (74). for the loss of 19 pilots. Claims were made for 14 enemy aircraft. On 8 October 1941 Fighter Command took over respon sibility for Channel Stop from o. 2 G ro up of Bomber Comma nd; these anti-shipping ope rations were designed The Bailie of Britain had cost the RA F 448 pilots. offensive ops in 1941 cost it 462 pilots. orer halfof these occurring during the Circus operations. Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 731 enemy aircraft. Spitfire BL479 of 316 Squadron.

59

60

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

to prevent German military and merchant shipping using the Channel. Two squadrons, 402 and 607 with Hurr icane bombers were allotted to this task. supported by other units of No. I I Group. The Battle of Britain had cost the RAF 448 pilots. offensive ops in 1941 cost it 462 pilots, over half of these occurring during the Circus operations. Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 731 enemy aircraft (540 of these during Circus ops) but postwar research in German records suggested the real total was only 135. As examples of the discrepancy, on 21 June the RAF claimed 27 victories. whereas German records show only seven. and on the following day the difference was even more marked - 31 claims against two actually lost. This is not to say that the RAF pilots were attempting to inflate their claims; the RAF had a very rigorous process for determining such things. but it was obviously going wrong somewhere, even allowing for some errors in the German reco rds. However, this is not to say that the offensive campaign was ineffective; indeed it was proving very effective both materially and for morale. The material effect was felt with shipping, evidenced by a red uction in coastal shipping activity and the allocation of greater resou rces for protection, ind ustrial production, and military capabil ity. Amo ngst the latter was a direct effect on the combat capability of the two main fighter units, JG 2 and JG26, as combat capabi lity involved more than j ust losses. At the height of the year's offensive, August. the two unit s had only 97 serviceable aircraft out of an estab lishment of 248 aircraft. Th e fact that this was at least in part due to the RAF offensive was proven by the way the units recovered after the scale of the offensive was reduced from mid August; by the end of September both were almost back to full strength. Night Offensive On 21 December 1940 the first night intruder miSSIOn was flown. Blenheims of 23 Squadron ope rating over enemy airfields. This was the start of a campaign that would eventually see Fighter Command notch -up over 11,000 such sorties and make claims for over 500 enemy aircraft destroyed . Fo r most of 1941 it was almost a lone war by 23 Squad ron, who flew 488 of the 559 Intruder sorties in the year. The Squadron acquired Havocs in March to replace the Blenheims and increase the offensive capability and flew the first mission with the new aircraft in April. The scale of the offensive increased with the employment of single-seat fighters; the Hur ricanes of 87 Squadron flew their first mission on 14/15 March, two aircraft 'visiting' the CaenlCarpiquet where they found 20 aircraft on the ground but due to poor weather only managed to claim one . Defiantsjoined in on 7/8 April with 141 Squadron flying their first Intruder. Other squadrons also took part during the year. In ovembe r 1941 the Fighter Command ORS produced a report into the 'relative effectiveness on intrusive efforts' with the conclusion drawn from statistics for January to June and J une to October. The figures were: Jan-J un. 180 sorties with 29 Y, enemy aircraft destroyed . Juri- Oct. 263 sorties with I I \I, enemy aircraft destroyed.

Th is may not at first sight look impressive but the report quite rightly pointed out that destruction of aircraft was not the main role of this type of mission, but rather it was the overall effect caused by the attacks on the airfields: '. . . the bombing of aerodro mes is not , however, the chief mission of Intruders, they car ry a very small bomb-load, and the bom bs they drop cause much greater morale than material damage; the bombing of o ur aerodromes by German intr uders substantiates this.' However, it also said that the 'o nly reliable measure of the utility of Intru ders is the num ber of enemy aircraft they claim to

The most unusual of Fighter Command's offen sive operations lras the deployment of tll'O Hurricane squadrons as No. J5 J ( Fighter) Wing to Murmansk, Russia ill August J94 J.

destroy.' With this it was pointed out that results were not always observed and that 'whatever the actual damage, the morale effect must be considerable. and some German aircraft may have become casualties by having to land on unfamiliar aero dromes after their home base had been attacked.' (ORS Report 0.267 da ted 8 November 1941). By the end of the year the total number of sorties had risen to 575, with 502 of those being flown by 23 Squadron, still the only dedicated night intruder squadron; the remainder were flown by Defiants and Hurricanes. Russian Interlude The most unusual of Fighter Command's offensive operations was the deployment of two Hurricane squadrons as No. 151 (Fighter) Wing to Murmansk, Russia in August 1941. The Wing was part of Force Benedict and formed at Leconfield on 26 July, comprising 81 and 134 squadrons, bot h with Hurricane IIBs. Moving to Hendon in August the Wing sailed for Russia on HM S Argus, landing at Archangel on 30 Augus t and moving to their main base at Vaenga on 7 September. The first missions were flown a few days later and brough t immedia te success, three Bf I09s and an HS 126 having been claimed by the end of the day for the loss of one Hurricane. The detachm ent rap idly added to its score, which soon stood at 15 claimed for one loss. Whilst opera tional sorties. including escort to Russian bombers, were an impo rtant par t of the task, equally impor tant was the training of Ru ssian perso nnel in the erection, maintenance and operation of Hurricanes, as Churchill had agreed to ship 240 cra ted Hur ricanes to Russia. By the time the Wing departed the Russians had three Hurricane squa d rons assembled and ready for action.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6 -1 9 6 8

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Operation s for the RAF terminated in mid No vember and the RAF personnel returned to the UK, handing the remaining aircraft to the Ru ssians . On their return to the UK both squadro ns re-equipped with Spitfires. Sgt ' Wag' Haw was the top scorer with the det achment, and as such was one of four recipients of the Order of Lenin , the highest Soviet decoration .

1942 - Losing the edge Circus opera tions remained a key element of the Co mmand 's work during 1942, but it is worth noting a special opera tion that to ok place in August that year. On the 19th a raid on Dieppe was supported by the largest array of RAF squad rons yet empl oyed on a single o pera tion, some 68 sq uadrons being airborne. For man y unit s it was their most hectic time since the Battl e of Britain, with up to three sorties being flown during the day. The air battles over and around Dieppe were by far the largest yet experienced, and losses on both sides were rou ghly equa l. Whilst the genera l pattern of o pera tions remain ed the sa me, the RAF's losses on offensive daylight ops increa sed, one of the main reason s being the increa sed numbers of Fw 190s with JG2 6. The Focke- Wulf was bett er allround th an the Spitfire V, with the exception of turning circle, but German tact ics meant that dog-fighting turns were increasingly rare ; the aircraft also had a grea ter ceiling a nd combat s now tended to sta rt a t higher levels. The problems had been fore seen by Fighter Comm and in earl y 1941: in a memo dated 20 April 1941 the C-in-C Fighter Co mmander (Air Mar shal Sir W Sholt o Douglas) expressed his views in answer to the deb ate s on future Spitfire production. ' It is ag reed that we ar e heading for specialisation in fighters and this is inevitable . Specialisati on mu st be between the pressurised and unpressurised fighter. In other words, the dividing line must come on the limit of altitude which ca n be tolerated by the hum an bod y unassisted by artificial pressur e. Let us put this line at 35,000 ft. Below this there can be no specialisation and our aim must be to provide all aircraft (unpressurised) with a per form ance to make them reasonable for fightin g machines up to 35,000 ft. An other class of fighte r for employment up to, say , 25,000 ft, would place qu ite intolerable Fighter Command Group boundar ies and radar corer, 1942.

.... .

FIGHTER Cl:lMMPN;) c;;op IllJl.roCAA£S AJo() OF ACTX:lN FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATtQNS 1942 -:.. ~

.....

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_

opera tional limitations on fighter o perations and could not be accepted as policy. Alth ough the Mk II has merged into the Mk V we mu st a nticipa te it being outclassed by 1942 when nothing below a maximum speed of 400 mph will be of much use to us.' Spitfires were the heart of Fighter Comm and and so the development of the type into specialisations - later designated by LF and HF for Low-Flying and High-Flying cha racteristics - was the direction the Command took , although 1942 was a year of problems and not solutions. In Jul y 1942 the AFDU was able to evaluate 'a Spitfire from an operational squadron' against an Fw 190 that had landed at Pembrey 'in error' the previous month , Acquiring a n intact operational enem y fighter stra ight from a war so rtie was a fant astic oppo rtunity - but it soon confirmed the superiority of the Fw 190 that Allied pilots had already discovered. The report concluded that: 'The man oeu vrabilit y of the Fw 190 is better th an th at of the Spit fire VB except in turning circles, when the Spitfire can quite easily out-turn it. The Fw 190 has better acceleration under all conditions of flight and this must obviously be most useful duringcombat. 'When the Fw 190 was in a turn and was attacked by the Spitfire , the superior rate of ro ll enabled it to flick into a diving turn in the opposite direction . The pilot of the Spitfire found great difficult y in following th is manoeuvre and even when prepared for it, was seldo m able to a llow the correct deflection. A dive from this man oeuvre enabled the Fw 190 to draw away from the Spitfire which was then forced to break off the attack . 'Severa l flights were carried out to ascerta in the best evasive man oeuvres to ado pt if " bo unced" . It was found that if the Spitfire was cruising at low speed and was " bounced" by the Fw 190. it was easily caught even if the Fw 190 was sighted when well out of range, and the Spitfire was then forced to take avoiding action by using its superiority in turning F\I' 190 'in service' with the RAF: 'S everal flig hts \\'ere carried 0 11/ to ascer tain the best evasive manoeuvres 10 adopt if "bo unced" . It \I'as fo und that if the Spi tfire \I'as cruising at low speed and \\'as "bounced " by the FW 190, it \I'as easily caught erel/ if the FW 190 \\'as sighted when well out of range, and the Sp itfire \I'as then fo rced to take avoiding action by using its superiority ill turning circles.'

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT,

OlES AND HISTORY

circles. If on the other han d the Spitfire was flying at maximu m cont inuous cru ising a nd was "bounced" under the same conditions. it had a reasonable chance of avoiding being caught by open ing the throttle and going into a shallow dive. providing the Fw 190 was seen in time. ' If the Spitfire VB is "bounced" it is thought unwise to evade by diving steep ly. as the Fw 190 will have litt le difficulty in catching up owing to its superiority in the dive. 'The above trials have shown that the Spitfire VB mus t cruise at high speed when in an area where enemy fighters can be expected. It will then, in ad dition to lessening the chances of being successfully "bounced", have a better cha nce of catching the Fw 190. particularly if it has the advantage of surprise.' Defensive Opera tions I 9~2 On the defensive front there were three main elements to counter: reconnaissance. ship ping attacks a nd night attacks. The Command flew a tota l of 49,793 interce ptio n sorties in the year , of which just over 14.000 were by night ; the busiest mon th was August, with j ust under to ta l 6,400 sorties. The basic day tactics ha d not changed for either side. a nd the rea lity was that the Luftwaff e was little more than a nuisance a nd co uld per form no real strategic task over land ot her than reconna issance, altho ugh the hit-and-run fight er-bom bers did occupy a grea t deal of Fighter Co mma nd resources, especially when sta nding patrols had to be inst itu ted. There was still the odd surprise, such as a lar ge(ish) a ttac k by Fw 190s and J U 88s on Ca nterbury and coasta l a reas in the evening of 31 October, with some 60-70 aircraft invo lved. Jamming of the British radar ca ugh t the defend ers unprepared a nd the attack was, by German standards for 1942. a success. Th e defe nding fighters claimed six dest royed. five of these to 91 Squadron. with a further five falling to the gun and balloon belt. The Spitfire VI was a specialized version (pressure cabin and a fe ll' other mods ) designed to COl/iller the high-flying reconnaissance aircraft.

Landing Ground at St Alary 's, Isles of Scilly - one of the most remote of the Command's operational airfields. Th e high-flying recce Ju 86Ps were a lmost imposs ible to cou nter and a specia list version of the Spitfire, the Mar k VI. entered service in April 1942 (with 616 Squadron). The entire squadron had re-equipped by early June a nd the comment made by the AFDU pilots on cockpit over -heating was supported by 616. who recorded that 'the major problem was that of excessive heating below 20.000 ft with the pilots gently frying and being unable to do an ything about it. As an interim solution a ban was placed on operational flying below 20,oooft' (616 Squadron O R B). The improved Mark VII entered service in September. The bread-and-butter routine became patrols a t 20.000 ft to 25,000 ft to prevent hit -and -run raids; this produced little result other than a signa l co mplementing ' the efficient patrols kept up by the Squadron which deterred an y enem y aircraft from reaching the SW coast.' Modified Spitfire IXs were also used in the attempt to get at the high-fliers, but the greater significance of the Mark IX was that it redres sed the balance with the Fw 190. The first aircraft went to 64 Squ adron in June but it was some months before it was ava ilable in significant numbers. and for most of 1942 the Spitfire V was the most numerous type with Fighter Command.

Night Defence A fundam ental change in the conduct ofair war look place from April 1942 when reprisals were called for as an answer 10 enemy terror attacks against the Reich which began at that time. Reprisal action opened with massed attacks on the cities of Exeter and Bath. For this all bomber units of Luftflotte 3 were called upon. Even training erell'S of the fourth Gruppen were unexp ectedly ordered 10 take pari. In the course of furth er raids. the latt er. which were still operating with

65

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

aircraft lik e the Do 17a and He III , sustained painful losses, Thus within a short time the train ing pr ogramme, the imp ortan ce of which lras constantly increasing, lost valuable training personnel instructors, Follo wing the tactics so successfu lly employe d by the enemy agains t Lubeck and Rostock, concentrated raids ofshort dura tion lI'ere carried 0 111 for the firs t tim e to minimise defensive act ion. Outward flights \I'ere made along a single appr ox imat ely com mo n course in stepped up fo rma tion. Incendiaries andflares lI'ere used to ligh t up the target as befo re. The raid on Bath had a really annihilating effect. During the night of the 25126th April, only 4 aircraft 0 111 ofa total of151 ( each aircraft making two flights ) lI'ere lost ( duration of raids 30 min each ) . In the period following. repris al raids Irere carried 0 111 on the lines of the Bath one while the m oon lI'asf ull. Amongst others, fo r ins tance Sunderland, Newcastle, York, No rwich, Bradf ord, Cant erbury and Weston-Super-Mare lI'ere bombed by an operational force of40- 70 aircraft. The enemy def ence, becoming increasingly effective with its single and twin- engin ed night fi ghters, made it necessary to reduce still f urther the duration of the raids ( to 10- 20 minutes by the end of 1942 ) , and each aircraft had in particularly dangerous zones 10 take continuous evasive action sudden changes of course and height smartly executed ). The lu 88 and Do 21 7 squadrons engaged exclusively in shallo w dive-bombing.

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(Bechtle) Despite the propaganda tone in much of the above, it was true that the offensive caught the defenders unaware s. Minor a nd ineffective raid s in late March and earl y April were followed by the first of the major atta cks, with Exeter being hit on 23 April and again the following night , alth ough accuracy was poor. The consecutive attacks on Bath (25 and 26 April) involved more bombers and were more accura te; with 246 bombers on the two nights dropping over 300 ton s of bombs and losing only five aircra ft to the defences . Annex R details the other urb an areas atta cked during this 1943 phase of a ttacks. The night-fighter force had reached a sta ble level by mid 1942, with an average of 25 sq uadro ns, the majority of which were AI-equipped twin-engined squadro ns, prima rily with Beaufighters but with the first Mosquit o unit s also opera tional. Th e Mossie had entered the night-fighter role in Janu a ry with 157 Squadron at Castle Camps, with 223 Squadron next to receive the type. The first opera tiona l sorties were flown on 27/28 Apri l and whilst the Beaufighter proved to be a reliable a nd effective night-fighter, the Mosquit o, especially with the cen timet ric radar (from ea rly 1943) was a tru e expo nent of the art. At the beginning of the yea r the Order of Battle still included six Defiant squad rons, but by the latter part of the year all had re-equ ipped . Better aircraft, the improved AI Mk . VII from spring 1942, better tra ining and a more effective GCI network and controllers all combined to make the night defence s increasingly potent. The Turbinlite Flight s were all operational by early 1942, which in theory boosted the night defence capability, a nd indeed all were upgraded to squad ron sta tus - as 530 to 539 squad rons - in September 1942. However, their operat ion al record was poor , with plenty of flying accidents but very few successes and in Janu ary 1943 they were all disbanded. Fighter Command flew over 16,000 night sorties in 1942, including intruder operations, and claims were made for the destruction of 182 enemy aircraft (43 of those by intruder ops), with a further 43 'Probables' and 137 'Damaged', The Comm and lost 40 aircraft destroyed in night ops over the UK. The Fighter Command Diary summa rised the night operati on s for 1942: 'the yea r was largely one of con solidati on

... Map of the German night offe nsive / 942 showing distribution of bomb tonnage. Note that most targets were close to the coast.

a nd unremitting patrol work. If there were no spectacular achievements, Fighter Command' s success must be measured not by the number of aircraft shot down but by the relatively few occasions on which British towns and industries were troubled by night air attack.'

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Offensive O perati ons At the end of January the Com mand had 55 squadro ns available for offensive operations, all but two of which had Spitfire VBs; most were now organised into Wings but there were questions as to the sta nda rds of training of some of the Wings. With the exception of the Kenley and or tholt Wings, which were considered well trained, and the Biggin Hill Wing, which was 'adequate'. the others were rated by the C-in-C as 'ha rdly fit for serious operations: Th is was qu ite a damnin g state ment and in part reflected problems of experience and morale, and during the year a number of Wing Leaders would be lost, including Bob Stan ford Tuck and Victor Beamish. Durin g the first three months of the year the main offensive operations were Rh ubarbs, with 46 being flown, and Rodeos. 17 flown. The RAF was seriously emba rrassed on 12 Febru ary when the Germ ans executed the 'Cha nnel Dash' when three major combat vessels (Gneisenau, Prinz Eugen and S charnhorst ) moved thr ough the English Channel in daylight. Bombers, torped o-bombers, fighter-bombers and fighter escort all went hunting and in most cases failed to find the ships; those that did find the ships failed to do any serious dam age. In strategic terms it meant little as the German Navy had by this time adopted a defensive strategy but it was a morale victory for the Germans. On 17 March Fighter Com mand informed Nos 10, I I and 12 Gro ups that Circus opera tions would recommence, but it was stressed that fighter losses had to be avoided and that target s must be carefully chosen . The targe ts must take account of the radius of action of the fighters. an average of 150 miles, as experience had shown that losses increased close to the limit of range. A tot al of 58 targets were listed by the Air Ministry. The attacks sta rted on 24 March, the targets being the Comi nes Power Station and the The Norwegian 331 Squadron at Catterick; the Squadron fo rmed here in summer 1941.

DEVELOPMENT. ROLES AND HISTORY

marshalling yards at Abbeville. German single-engined fighter strength in the West was aro und 350 aircraft, with a further 80 or so with Reserve Training Units; this relates to units able to oppose Allied operations over France and the Low Countries. For Rhubarbs it was decided that . as previously, the priorit y target s sho uld be tra nspo rtation. including rail, road and river/canal traffic. The o. I priorit y was the destruction of locomotives and interference with fuel distributi on . Electricity switching and tran sformer sta tions were listed as seconda ry objectives. The situation in the middle of 1942 was one of stalemate. Fighter Comm and had the adva ntage of numbers but the balance was redressed in favour of the enemy by the superiorit y of the Fw 190. Until the Typhoon and the Spitfire IX could take part in operations. Fighter Command was faced with two alternatives. It could either maintain the offensive at the level of the previous few month s and accept the possibility of comparatively heavy losses as the price of holding the enemy fighter force. or it cou ld reduce the scale of the offensive, engaging in combat only when its formations possessed some tactical advantage . In either case it was unlikely that the chief aim of the offensive to destroy German fighters - would be effectively realised. (AHB Narrative). However, a major air battl e - the first since the Battl e of Britain - was soon to be fought. Dieppe August 1942 The ' raid' on Dieppe was made by a Combine d Arm s task force dominated by the Canadians and centred on the 2nd Canadian Army; it had strict ly limited aims and was intended to demonstrate the Allies abi lity to land in Europe , conduct a quick operation and then withdraw, with air power playing a vital role in protecting and supporting the atta ck. The brunt of the air comb at was borne by the Spitfire squadrons of Fighter Command. some 48 of which were available for use, including four equipped with the new Spitfire IX. Whilst fighter cover prevented any substantial Luftwaffe interference with the operation, and certainly kept the enemy clear of the vulnerable shipping , in the air comb ats it was the Luftwaffe that ended the day with the higher score, the RAF losing 106 aircraft to all causes and the Germ ans losing 48. The RA F flew some 3.000 sorties in the space of 16 hours on 19 Augu st 1942. In response, the Luftwaffe flewjust under 1,000 sorties. The lessons of Dieppe were to prove invaluable nearly two years later on D-Day but for the Canadians they had been costly lessons. Night O ffensive The night intruder offensive increased in scale as more squadrons were tasked with this activity, especially in the optimum period of April to August. Whilst much of the effort remained targeted against airfields in the first half of the year, the emphasis switched from Ju ne to marshalling yards and trains. The first Mosquito sort ie (by 23 Squadr on) was flown on the night of 5/6 July. but num bers of M ossies remained limited. By the middle of September the Intruder force comprised three dedicated squadrons: 23 Squadro n (Mosquito) and 418 and 605 squadrons, both with Bostons. Added to this were the single-seat squadro ns allocated by the Command when considered appro priate; this force was increased in December with the decision to employ the Typhoons of 609

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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

Squ adron for part-time intruder work. During the week or the full moon, two aircra ft were at read iness a t Man ston for opera tions in the area Walcheren-Lille-Arras-Am iens. The chief task or these aircra ft was to a tta ck enemy aircraft and airfields bu t railways were given as alterna tive target s. If a train was dam aged and halted, the pilot s were to retu rn and report the position to No. 137 Squ adron. Subject to the Co ntro ller's a pprova l. this Squ ad ron would then send a Whirlibomber to a tta ck the sta tionary train with bombs. 'Thus by the end or the yea r the night offensive. altho ugh sma ll in compari son with daylight operat ions , was becomin g a ca refully planned, econ omic way o r using at least a part or the night fighter force' (A H B a rra tive). During December Fighter Comm and received a number or Mon ica sets, which picked up German rad ar tran smissions, and Gee sets, a radi o aid to navigat ion . The Comm and was also lookin g forwa rd to a significant increase in the number or Mosqu itoes with which to extent the night offensive. A tot al or 1,508 night intruder sorties were flown in 1942, during which 299 enem y aircraft were seen and 48 claimed as destroyed, with losses or 38 or the intruders during the year, nine or tho se in June, which was also the month with the highest number or sorties (336). The AHB narrative summa rised the overa ll effect or the Intruder campaign at this stage or the war: ' the effects or intruder acti vity on the German Air Force are not precisely known but prisoner or war reports showed that such activit y cau sed the diver sion or returning bombers eith er to waiting areas or alternative airfields, the adoption or special landing procedures and the use or illuminated deco ys and dummy airfields. Enemy crews were therefore forced to operate with restricted fac ilities and at a higher than normal nervous tension. It is probable that the enem y accident rate was increased: This was an example or o ffensive defence - reducin g the enemy bomber capa bility - but the Intruders were pr imar ily a imed at night fighter airfields in suppo rt or Bomber Command and the sa me comments would apply to these airfields, as well as the shoc k or having aircraft sho t-do wn at the airfield.

1943 - Putting on the Pressure The pace or offen sive o perations co ntinued to increase throughout 1943, whilst the corresponding need for 'H ome Defence' , co ntinued to decline , with little in the way or daytime threat s but still a requ irement for a robust night defence. Th is was a lso the yea r in which two major reorganisati ons or the Comm and took place, one in Jun e and the o ther in ovember. Spitfire IXs became ava ilable in numbers later in the yea r, a nd with more aircra ft a nd more experienced pilot s and leaders, the Command was able to take the initiative and begin the fight for air superiority that would be vital for the invasion or Europe. Morale improved and there was a gener al reeling th at the battle was being won . The tabular summary or sq uadro ns for Janu ary 1943 shows the dominan t role or the Spitfire with the da y squadron s, although there were now eight Typhoon squadro ns, and with the Beaufighter and Mosquito as the main night types. Total establi shed strength was 1,268 airc raft and the Command had just over 1,000 available with crews. The Typhoon had done some good work in countering the hit-and-run raiders but by early 1943 it was generally agreed that it was not an ideal fighter but that its participation in offensive ground-attack ops had shown promise and it was in this role, especially when later equipped with Rocket-Projectiles (RPs) that the Tiffie made a name for itself with 2nd Tactical Air Force.

'Cocky' Dundas and pilots of 56 Squadron with Typhoon; the Squadron lI'as the fi rst to equip with the potentially effective - but initially troublesome - Hawker Typhoon.

War Room S umma r)" of Fighter Comma nd Strength, .Ianu ary t 943 Aircraft

Sq uadrons

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Establishment 4 752 128 32 192 128 32 1.268

A vailable with crew

30 633 80 26 151 8-l 19 20 1.063

Th e disbandment or Arm y Co-ope rati on Comm and (ACC) and the form ati on or the Tactical Air Force (TA F) on I June 1943 were part o r the restructu ring or Allied air power in preparati on for th e invasion or Europe; both or these chan ges affected Fighter Co mma nd. When ACC disbanded its components were reassigned to Fighter Comm and and the TAF, with the except ion or No. 72 G roup which went to Technical Tr aining Co mma nd . The Tact ical Air Force (redesignated 2nd TAF from 15 November) comprised os 2, 83 and 84 Groups but to make matt ers more complex it was initially placed in Fighter Co mma nd and was 'under the gener al direction or the Air Officer Command ing-inChief, Fighter Command: 0.83 (Composite) Group had formed on 19 March in order to 'provide racilities for tra ining ground unit s and squadrons to work together under field conditions, and to provide a mean s or working out the full requirements and

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F IG HT E R COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

The Mark XII was the fi rst of the Griff on engine variants and entered service in February 1943 with 41 Squadron. The Typhoon entered service as fi ghter bill was nerer truly effec tive in this role; by the time teething troubles had been resolved it had started to take-on the ground-attack role at which it was to excel,

organisation of a Composite Formation ' (AHB Narrative). The Group had been created out of the 'Z' Composite Group that had been brought together for Exercise Spartan in March and initially comprised four da y-fighter sq uadro ns, four Arm y Support squadrons and two Tactic al Reconnaissance squ adrons. The Group was commanded by Air Vice-Marshal W F Dicks on and was initiall y non-operational, although it did become operational under Fighter Command for its earl y involvement in offensive op s. It was originally intended th at No. 84 Group would form from the existing resource s of No . 11 Group and be commanded by that Group's AOC ; however , this plan was changed a nd when the Group formed in Ju ly it had its own AOC and was part of the Tactical Air Force, a lbeit still initially under Fighter Command. On 12 June Leigh Mallory issued his first directive to the TAF and sta ted that: ' until the preparatory operati on s for the assault across the Ch annel began , the TAF must play its part together with the rest of Fighter Command in the battle for supremacy over the Channel. For the time being he himself would control these offensive operations which were directed by the sta tic fighter Group organisati on (No . II Group). At the same time the Composite Group commanders would be given oppo rtunities to exercise their form ati on s in actual operations.' The result of all thi s was that all tactical a ircra ft in the South-East of England, with the exception of night fighter s, ended up do ing much of the same work which can make it difficult to sort o ut units, missions and sta tistics for the different Command groupings within the overall organisat ion. The form ati on on 15 November 1943 of the Allied Expedition ar y Air Force under Air Marshal Sir Tr afford Leigh-M allory brought the next major change for Fighter Command , includ ing its change of name . The instruction forming the AEAF sta ted th at : ' Headqua rters , Air Defence of Great Britain , is to form in Allied Expediti onary Air Force with effect from 15th November 1943, on which date are to be transferred to its control all such form at ions, stat ion s and unit s in Fighter Comma nd as have not at th at

da te been tran sferred on Air Ministry instruction s, to the 2nd Tactical Air Force or, as independent form ati on , to the Allied Exped itionary Air Force . The squadrons in A DG B and the 2nd TAF will be interch anged and readju sted , as necessary , under the instruction s of the Air Co mma nder-in-Chief.' Air Mar shal R M Hill was appo inted to command ADGB, with his HQ at Bentley Priory. In November Air Marshal Hill was issued with a new dir ective by Leigh Mallory sett ing out his responsibilities: I. To be responsible for the air defence of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . 2. To command the followin g form at ions: Nos 9, 10, II , 12, 13 Fighter Groups, RA F Northern Ireland (operationa l control of fighters), No. 60 Signals G roup, and No. 70 (Tra ining) Group. 3. To control operational activities of AA Command, the Royal Observer Corps, Balloon Comm and and other sta tic elements of air defence controlled opera tiona lly by Fighter Comm and . 4. To conduct defen sive and offensive operati on s which invo lved the use of squad rons of both ADGB and TAF until fur ther notice . 5. To develop air interception meth od s and apparatus for eventual use on ADGB and other theatres.

The prim ary role of ADGB was 's ta nding patrols over coa stal areas and as far as 40-50 miles South of the Isle of Wight' (Fighter Comm and historic al summa ry). Thi s task was dir ectly connected with the invasion preparation s and was intended to deny reconnaissance to the enemy as well as prevent any attempt at offensive action. The final change in the Command structure came on 17 December 1943 with the form ati on of No. 85 Group, which formed using six day and six night fighter squadrons from No . II Group. Its task was the defence of the 'base and lines of communica tion' of the Allied Expeditionar y Fo rce when esta blished in Fr ance ; however , until the Group moved overseas the opera tional control of its aircraft was assigned to the AOC of No. II Group.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

The Spitfire IX was produced in large numbers [around 5.665) and was ..ital in clawing back the comba t advantage from the Fw 190.

Aerial photo of Biggin Hill, with rllmm y overlay, 1944; having been a key airfi eld in the Battle of Britain, by late 1941 Biggin Hill was on the offensive S ell ding its Wing ranging ol'er north ern France.

bomber units suffered heavy losses. A great number of opera tions had to be abando ned because of weather conditions. Fighter-bomber attacks which had been carried out fro m spring 1942 until May 1943on targets in South and South-East England and on shipping along these coas ts had also proved too costly in relation to the results achieved. Therefore nuisance raid s were carried out thereafter by night only by the two new highspeed bomber Gruppen, one being equipped with Fw 190s and the other with Me 410.'

Defensive Operations 1943 The expectation was that the established pattern of fighter-bomber hit-and-run raids would cont inue and tha t they would continue to be ineffective, other than on civilian mor ale. and would remain very difficult to counter. Fighter Command estimated that up to 200 fighters could be employed in this role, although the Joint Intelligence Committee believed that the scale of o peration wou ld be far less than this. The y both agreed that the Germans would operate in the same area as previously and with the same range of targets. Likewise, shipping would remain a primary target for the Germans. The RAF had resorted to the use of standing patrols to help counter these raids; this was never an ideal solution as it placed a strain on the defenders without providing an effective counter. The Typhoon sq uadro ns were tasked with much of this work as the Typh oon was believed to be the best fighter aircraft for intercepting the low level raider, but it had not yet pro ved altogether successful in this role and was under going teething troubles with its Sabre engine. Five Typhoon squadro ns - I. 257, 266. 486 and 609 - were allocated to this role by maint aining standing patrols or keeping aircraft at immediate readin ess. A number of Spitfire squad rons also held read iness - 122, 331, 332, 340, 4012 and 611- whilst the Spitfire Xll s of9 1 Squadron maint ained readine ss to deal with longrange bombers on day attac ks. and for con voy protection . The German conclusion for the year, as expressed by Hpt Bechtle in his lecture was that: 'The day-time nuisance raids were almost exclusively spread over the southern and south-east ern area of England, and from 1943 did not extend beyond the lat itude of London into the Midland s. In this type of operation. consisting of bombin g and strafing,

Night Defence 1943 The Germ an High Comm and was not impressed by progre ss of the night operations against the UK and in March 1943 a new sta ff organisation was created. Angriff afuehrer (England Att ack Comm and ) to control the bomb ing operations of Fliegerkorps IX. The total Germ an night effort against overland targets in 1943 was 2,055 sorties. flown on 133 nights. in which 1,985 tons of bombs were dropped . The greatest weight of bombs had fallen in the Lond on area. In the same period Bomber Comm and dr opped 136,000 tons of bomb s on Germ any. RAF defenders still compri sed a mix of AI-equipped and Cats Eye. although the latter only pro vided aro und 15% of the monthly effort and from June onwards this steadily decrea sed. RAF night-fighter claims for 1943 were 133 destroyed, 18 probab ies and 34 damaged, with the effectiveness of Al being shown by the fact that 131 of the 133 were by Al aircraft. The AHB arrative summary for the second half of 1943: 'After the raids on Hull and Grim sby in early July the character of the night bombing changed from one of occasional raids by heavy bombers to sporadic attacks by high-speed bombers such as the Fw 190 and Me 410; target s were found in southern and south-east England coastal towns rather than in the north-east. The British air defences were clearly more than a match for the enemy, for although the Do 217 was better equipped with defensive armament than other Germ an bombers. it could not. becau se of the greater weight, easily evade night fighters once they had marked it down . The two features of enemy night atta cks in the latter part of 1943 were attacks by intruder aircraft on air fields in the Midlands and East Anglia in retaliat ion for the increasingly powerful combined bomber

75

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

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offensive and , secondly, renewed a ttacks on London by fighter-bombers in the autumn, accompa nied by the dropping of " duppel" [the German equ ivalent of " window"]. From July to December 1943 the enemy flew some 818 long-range bomber, 165 fighter-bomber a nd seven reconnaissance sort ies overland - a total of 990. The RA F claimed the destruction of 66\1, and the gun s another 20\1,: On a major raid , Bomber Command would be putting nearly 800 bombers over a single target in one night. Offensive Operations 1943 The majority of offensive sorties were escort for bomber form ati ons , the majority of these being the American da ylight bombers. with Fighter Comm and providing cover in the immed iate area of the UK and to the enem y coast. The range and combat duration of the RAF's fighters were incre asingly cau se for concern a nd was one of the major Typhoons of609 S quadron at Mansion. / 943; by Sl/mmer / 943 the Command \l'as spending virtually all of its day effort on offensive missions, albeit at a rising cost in aircraft and pilots.

Map of German night offensive /943 showing distribution of bomb tonnage.

77

78

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

HISTORY

limitati on s of the Spitfire - it was a great aircraft but there was not room for more intern al fuel and the only alterna tive was drop-tank s. The fighters eventu ally used two main drop-tanks, the 45-gallon and the 90-gallon , the concept being to use that fuel first and then drop the tanks when combat had to be joined . The idea was sound but the tank s were problem atical. At a time when USAAF P-51 Mu stangs were starting trul y longrange escor ts, includ ing Berlin, the RAF's fighters were look ing distinctly short-legged. One possible solutio n was, of course, to eq uip with Mustan gs; this option was eventually taken-up but for now the priorit y for P-51s was with the USAAF. Typical of the new Fighter Comm and form ati on s cha rged with this work was o. 127 Wing, which formed a t Kenley in May 1943, with a n initial strength of two Canadian sq uad rons (403 and 416) equipped with Spitfire IXs. Wg Cdr 'Johnnie' Johnson was one of the most effective Wing Leaders a nd later wrote ; 'fighter leader ship con sists not in scoring person al victo ries but in the achievement of success with the whole Wing. My job would be to lead a nd to fight.' Nig ht Offensive Operations The pattern of night offensive ops followed that of 1942 with Intruder, Ranger, Rhuba rb and Mahm oud so rties target ing airfields a nd tran sportation, especially rail facilities. There was a n increase in the use of the Mosquit o a nd mor e squadro ns being tasked , although not permanently allocated to the night role; for example , in Maya total of 395 sorties were flown by 17 sq uad rons; of this total 225 were Intruders, 166 Rangers a nd four Rhubarbs. A new type of ope ratio n co mmenced on the night of 15/1 6 June when five Beaufigh ter Serrate ops were flown as part of the wa r against German night-fighters. The equipment was initially fitted to the Beau fighters of 141 Squadron and intensive trails were flown at Drem from May 1943. The eq uipment was able to det ect enemy Al transmissions at up to 100 miles and it was to play an increasing role in the anti-fighter war , especially with No . 100 Group (Special Duties ) Group from late 1943.

Mosquito of 23 Squadron; the Squadron had recei..ed Massies ill JUlie / 942 but it \I'as some time before the type came 10 dominate the night-fighter strength of Fighter Command.

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A Bf 11 0 was claimed on that first night a nd despite a high percent age (23%) of technical failures with equipment, the system was considered to be effective. Fighter Co mmand ORS report No . 494 examined the results of Serrate operations in the period to 617 September; on the 233 op s flown, 1,180 cont act s were establi shed of which 108 were con verted to AI pick-up; there were a total of 49 attempts at intercept, with 33 going to visual, which resulted in 20 combats a nd claims for 13enem y aircraft destroyed. The poor perfo rmance of the Beaufigh ter was co nsidered to be one of the main reasons for the low(ish) conversion rate; '. . . the classical curve of pur suit meth od of homing on to a Serrate contact irrespecti ve of its ran ge has had to be modified. The crews suggest that no intercept sho uld be attempted on Serrate cont acts more than 4-5 miles away, unless they are head on.' It was also commented that 'the Serr ate equ ipment is so sensitive in recording changes in azimuth and elevation of the target that the crews prefer to use it if possible for the whole of the intercept ion, using AI as little as possible for occas ionally checking the range .' The solutio n was to put the equ ipment in the Mosq uito. which took place in late 1943. The Comm and flew 3.278 night offens ive sorties in 1943, losing 60 aircra ft and maki ng claim s for 72 enem y destro yed, altho ugh it must be remembered that for man y sor ties destru ction of enemy aircraft was not the primary aim. The busiest, and most successful, month was August with 551 sorties claiming 12 aircra ft. This month included the first Mahmoud sortie (22/23 August); this type of mission was defined as: 'operations by night fighters against enemy night-fighters out side the radiu s of Bomber Comm and operations or on nights when Bomber Command was not opera ting.' By the end of the year 11 9 Mahmoud so rties had been flown.

1944-1945 - Invasion of Europe and the end of the war The command and control of squadrons, which had started to become confused with the crea tion of ADGB and the TAF continued to be confusing in the first half of 1944. It is ofte n difficult in the records to discern who a part icular unit was 'owned ' by. especially as aircraft types a nd roles often appear ident ical, So. we have ADG B sq uadro ns operating aga inst ground targe ts in France a nd we have AEAF sq uadro ns flying defensive ops in the UK! No. 85 (Base) Group, an AEAF organisation, still had all its squadro ns under the operational control of ADGB in the first half of 1944; this including os 141 , 142, 147, 148, 149 and 150 Wings. As we did for the latter part of 1943, the operations by fighter and fighter-bomber units are treated as a single organisation unless a defined difference can be made . At the start of Janu ary, ADGB's day squadro ns comprised ten ' long-range' Spitfires, nine Spitfire VB, two Spitfire VII, two Spitfire IXF, two Spitfire XII , ten Typh oon and three Mustang FR. In 2nd TAF's fighter element there were 15 Spitfire, nine Must ang and six Typhoon squadrons. Although ADGB flew 3,700 offensive so rties in Janu ary this was exceeded by the growing, and dedicated, fighter/ fighter-bomber strength of the TAF, who flew 5,430 such mission s. By March the ADGB contribution was down to 1,456 sorties - but even so this was still a significant figure a nd showed that the Command was not entirely defensive. Man y of the stati stical summa ries for this period include ADGB and 2nd TAF without splitting into the respective Commands; for example, in the period Janu ary to May 1944 the combined stati stics for offensive opera tions was a loss of 299 aircraft . with only four pilot s saved, and claims for 291 German aircraft destroyed. USAAF fighters claimed a further 1,226 for the loss

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

of 463 of their own. However. German records suggest a total loss of only 338 in air combat but with a significant number of aircraft being destroyed on the ground. for example . 124 in May alone. Interestingly, the Germans also had 407 non-operational losses in the same period, which is a reflection on the lower quality of pilots and training and the overall impact of the Allied assault on airfields. The latest. and in some opinions the best, Spitfire variant entered service in 1944. In January 1944 Spitfire Mk . XIV RBI4l was delivered to the Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford for tactical trials, although in the same month it was also issued to the first operational unit , 610 Squadron at Exeter. The general conclu sions from the AFD U were that : 'the Spitfire XIV is superior to the Spitfire IX in all respects. It has the best allround performance of any present-d ay fighter, apart from range.' One of the trials was flown against a Bf 109G. 'The Spitfire XIV is 40mph faster at all heights except near 16,000 ft where it is only 10mph faster. Climbing at full throttle it draws away from the Me 109G quite easily. The Spitfire XIV easily out-turns the Me 109G in either direction; it is superior to it in every respect.' The Fw 190 was more or a problem ; the trials involved flight against a 190 with a BMW 80 1D engine and concluded that : 'In defence, the Spitfire XIV should use its remarkable maximum climb and turning circle against any enemy aircraft. In the atta ck it can afford to "mix it" but should beware the quick roll and dive. If this manoeuvre is used by an Fw 190 and the spitfire XIV follows, it will probably not be able to close the range until the Fw 190 has pulled out of its dive.' Whilst escort and sweep remained a major task for the fighter squadrons, especially the Spitfires, there was an increasing call for ground-attack, a role performed by the Typho ons and Hurricane IVs. The Spitfires too began to take-on more of this role, Spitfire XI V RB146; 'the Spitfire XI V is superior 10 the Spitfire IX in all respects. It has the best all-round perf ormance ofany present-day fighter, apart fro m range.'

DEVELOP'1E

T

~OLES

ND HISTORY

81

initially with strafe but then as fighter-bombers with the additi on of under- fuselage and under-wing bombs - much to the disgust of some fighter pilots! .. A memo from General Arnold (Commander USAAF) to ACM Portal (British Chief of Air Stall) queried the Spitfire's combat ran ge and the British ' reluctance' to make best use of their substantial fighter force: Overlord hangs directly on the success of our combined aerial offensive and I am sure that our fa ilure 10 decisively cripple both sources of German air POIlW and the GAF itself is causing you and me concerti. I am afraid that Ive are not sufficiently alert to changes in the overall course of the air war. In particul~r I ref er 10 the f act that we are not employing our fo rces in adequate numbers aglll~,st the GAF in being, as well as his facilities and sources. On my part I am p ressing Eaker to get a mu ch higher proportion of his fo rces off the ground and put them where they will hurt the enemy. One of his main poin ts was the lack ,of fighter support for the daylight bombers: as presently employed it would appear that your thousands of fighter~ are not mak ing use of their f ull capabilities. Our transition fro m the defen sive 10 the offe nsive should surely carry with it the application ofyour largefi ghter fo rce offensively. Is it not true that we have a staggering air superiority over the Germans and we are not using it?

Arnold also made the point that the P-47's basic design had a shorter range than tha t of the Spitfire but when fitted with long-range tank s it was work ing well as an .escort. The implication was that the American daylight offensive could be far more effective and less costly if the RAF's fighters were used as escort s and emplo yed in an offensive ADG B Aircraft St re ngth, J une t 94-1 way. The RAF respon se was that attempts No. oj were being made to improve the range of Establishment squadrons Type the Spitfire but that an external tank only gave an extra 50 miles and besides, 'our 4+2 1 FIt Hurricane liB fighter force has been designed to obtain air 16+2 13 Spitfire LF.V 16+ 2 3 Spitfire VII superiority over northern France, for which 16+2 4 Spitfire tX it is eminentl y suitable .' 16+2 4 Spitfire LF.lX Between I April and 5 June ADGB flew 16+2 2 Spitfire HF.lX 18,639 sortie s in support of the Overlord 16+2 I Spitfire XII 16+2 3 Spitfire XIV plan, claiming II I victories for the loss of 16+2 2 Tem pest V 46 fighters. The total Allied air effort in this 16+ 2 1 Mustang III period was 195,255 sorties with 2,655 claims 16+2 2 T yphoon 6+0 and 1,987 losses - which put s the ADGB I FIl Typhoo n 16+2 1 Hurrican e li e effort into perspective! The June 1944Order 16+2 2 Beaufigbter of Battle for ADGB, including No. 85 16+2 9 Mosquito XI IIXIII Group, comprised 54 squadrons, as shown 16+2 4 Mosquito XVII 16+2 2 Mosquito VI (Intruder) in the table . By 10June fighters were operating from Noles airfields in France and increasingly from that I. Established for two Mosquito XXX squad rons (2 19 date the offensive was mounted from the and 456) but not yet re-equipped . 2. No t including three Seafire squadrons of Fleet Air Continent, as were defensive sorties over Ann under operational control. the area occupied by the Allies. Over the next few months the direct role of ADGB

82

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

continued to decline and its focus became much more a defensive one . By November, and the loss of No. 85 Group, the number of squad rons had decreased to 46Y:z, which still included five squadrons on loan from 2nd Tactical Air Force. Defensive Operati ons 1944 With the invasion of Europe all fighter assets were committed to suppo rt the invasion; for ADGB the role was two-fold - defending the home base and supp orting the offensive. Ensuring that the Germ an s were kept in the dark abo ut Allied dispositions the fighter force worked hard at keeping enemy recce aircraft at bay, as well as making sure that no bombers could att ack the cro wded marshalling and embark at ion areas. The offensive over Europe was so intense that the Germ an s had little o ppo rtunity to consider offensive action of their own, with the exception of some night activity. Night Defence 1944 A large part of the Germ an night effort was against airfields and followed the pattern of the night intruder raids flown by the RAF, with strafing and bombing of airfields and the attempt to shoo t-down aircraft in the circuit. These attacks were usually by loan Me 4 lOs or Ju 88s and between January and May 82 aircraft made attacks on airfields, with a further 33 attacks on dumm y airfields; April was the busiest month when 35 att ack s were recorded and the RAF had 13 aircraft destro yed. Att ack s were still being made on cities, with London receiving ab out one-th ird of the tot al tonn age, and the overall scale of effort was higher than in 1943; indeed the 1943 total had been exceeded by April. The first of the new att acks on Lond on took place on 21122 January with two waves of bombers, totalling 447 aircraft. A second major raid was mounted on 29/30 Januar y, with 285 aircraft. Both caused damage but losses were high at 57 aircraft (7.5% of the atta ck forces). Nuisance raids had been carried out on Lond on on six other nights in Map of German night offensive 1944 showing distribut ion of bomb tonnage. ~.'NC ON Gl'lEAT MtT.lN IN 1944

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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Janu ar y. The City was atta cked on seven nights in Febru ar y, by a tot al of 1,200 bombers with Germ an record s stating for the attack of 3/4 Februar y 'enemy night fighter defences were particul arly strong .' Alth ough Lond on remained the focus of attention in March, attacks were also made on Hull and Bristol The RAF's night-fighter force was now very effective and was almost entirel y Mosquito, with nine squadro ns of Mosquit o XII/X lii and four of Mosquito XVII, with the final two Beaufighter sq uadrons in the process or re-equ ipping. In addition the Command fielded two intruder squad rons with the Mosquito VI. Between January and June the Command flew 2,312 sorties and made claims for 145Y:z aircraft destro yed, plus 21 probables and 30 damaged . A further 70 bombers were shot-do wn by anti-aircraft fire. German records more o r less agree with this total of just over 200 losses. The RAF lost only three night- fighters in this period. The final night raid on the UK took place on 27/28 June, the targets being the USAAF airfields at Bungay and Seething. Thi s did not mean that Britain was safe from night att ack; the Germans o pened a second blitz - da y and night - using the V-I flying ' bomb. Second Blitz At 0418 in the morn ing on 13 June 1944, the peace at Swanscombe , near Gravesend, Kent , was shattered by a fierce explosion. The first of Hitler 's new ' terro r' weap ons had landed on English soil. Within an hour, three more of these V-I flying bomb s had come to earth - one crashing into a railway bridge at Grove Road, Bethnal Green , in Lond on , and causing six death s and a substantial amount of damage. Intelligence report s had been building since 1943 and it was evident that the weapon would eventu ally reach operational status, and that Lond on would be on the receiving end. Thu s, in December 1943 a series of studies were undertaken to determine the most effective air defence structure to protect the capit al. It was very much a return to the early days of air defence, with a plan for thr ee zones; fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns and balloons. However, the problem could not have arisen at a wor se time, as the planning staffs were devotin g time and resources to buildin g the invasion force, and were reluctant to commit any additi onal aircraft and guns to the defensive scheme. The revised Diver plan of February 1944 called for eight day-fighter squadrons, plus a number of night-fighter units, but for a lower total of anti- aircraft guns. In the 24-hour period from 2230 on 15 June to 16 Jun e 1944, British record s show 151 reported laun ches, with 144 V-I s crossing the English coast. Of those, 73 reached the Lond on area . Th e defences notched up only a modest score, seven falling to the fighters, 14 to the guns and one shared, whilst a further eleven were shot down by the guns of the Inner Artiller y Zone. Th e Hawker Tempe sts of No. 150 Wing at Newchurch had been at readine ss for defensive patrol since dawn on 15 June . Early the following day the Wing Leader, Wing Comm ander Roland Bearnont , and his No.2 were airborne on such a patrol when they sighted a V-I. Giving chase, the fighters were eventuall y able to carry out an attac k, and Beamont scored his first flying bomb 'kill', the missile crashing near Faversham. Overall. however, it was an inauspiciou s sta rt. Too man y bomb s had reached the Lond on area, but there was no simple solution to the problem . The V-I. spanning a little over 17 ft 6 in, made a very small tar get, and it flew fast (300-4 00 mph ) and low. One first had to find this small target; then came the challenge of actua lly shoo ting it down. The

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

official RAF account of the campaign summarised the speed problem: 'as for the fighters, the short time in which interception had to be made , demanded that they should be quickly and accurately directed on to the course of the bomb.' By the third week in June the defences had started to settle down with guns and balloons in place and with eight single-seat fighter squadrons and four Mosquito squadrons deployed on anti -Div er patrols. It was also planned to increase the gun belts to include 376 heavy and 540 light guns and for an increase in balloons from 480 to 1,000. The initial aim for the fighters was to intercept the flying bombs over the sea, but there were numerous difficulties with this. The technique was one of 'close control' where the fighter was vectored to its target by one of the radar stat ions involved in this ro le Fairl ight, Swingate and Beachy Head. However , even on a good day the best pick-up was a maximum of 50 miles from the coast, which gave the controller and fighter a maximum of six minutes to complete the interception. Overland the technique was different because of the problems of radar tracking of the ta rget; here the technique was 'ru nning commentary' with the position and course of the bomb being broadcast to all fighters worki ng that frequency , it was then up to the fighter to work out his own intercept. The tracking inform ation came from radar and from visual reports, mainly by the ROC. Mustangs joined in the defence following a request from ADGB to 2nd TAF, with initially one Flight of 316 Squadron being transferred to this role on I July . This proved successful and a few days later an entire Mustang Wing was allocated, flying their first sorties on 12 July. The day fighter defences had now increased to 13 squadrons: four Mustang, three Spitfire XIV, three Tempest, two Spitfire IX and one Spitfire XI I. It was important to dedicate aircraft to this role rather than mix roles as they were stripped of unnecessary equipment and external fittings and even had camouflage paint removed so that they could be polished - all in an attempt to gain a bit more speed. Engines were also tweaked and 150 Octane fuel used. The net result was an average improvement of 15-30 mph. Tempests of 501 Squadron joined the fray in August, having re-equipped with the type in late July around a core of experienced pilots from the F lU; the first sorties were flown on 5 August and a week late r the Squadron was re-designated as a Night Operational Squadron - an even trickier role. However , it was one in which they achieved notable success (see 'Opera tions' chapter). The first phase of the flying-bomb campaign ended on I September 1944, with the Allied capture of those V-I launching sites within range of London. By mid August the ADG B effort was at its height, with 15 day-fighter and 10 night -fighter squadrons tasked with the anti -Dilw campaign. Although the campaign never resumed with the same intensity, from September 4 to 14 January 1945, the city was subjected to attack by V-Is launched from He III 'mother' aircraft of I/KG.53, from over the orth Sea. Defensive patrols remained in force, but there was even less warning of attack , so the ideal solution was to destroy the parent aircraft before they launched their weapons. A Wellington was fitted with ASV VI to act as an airborne radar and fighter control station, entering service in January. In the overall campaign the Germans launched some 9,252 flying bombs, of which ju st under 5,900 crossed the English coast and 2,563 of those reached the London area. Around 4,000 flying-bombs were destroyed by the defences, the Fighter Command summary claiming that 1,847 were destroyed by its fighters, with 1,866 falling to AntiAircraft Command 's guns, 232 to balloons and a mere 12 to naval gunfire .

DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

Meteor of6I6 Squadron; the RAF entered the jet age ill July 1944 with 616 Squadron acquiring Meteor Is.

The V-2 ballistic missile was a weapon that was impossible to stop once it had been launched - so no air defence system was possib le and the only effective cou nter was to destroy the production, storage and launch facilities. The Allies expended a huge effort on this type of site for all the V-weapons; ADGB/Fighter Command's part comprised 4,300 sort ies (and 1,000 tons of bombs) hunting for the sites - with a rocket that was about to be launched being the prime (but rare) target. These Big Bell missions were flown by most Allied fighters and fighter-bomber types. O ffensive Oper ations 1944 Throughout 1943 and early 1944 much of the Allied air effort had been dedicated to preparing the way for the invasion of German-occupied Europe. By spring 1944 the intensity of operations was increasing as the date for D-Day, 6 June 1944, approached. The directive issued to the fighter forces stated: The intention of the British and American fighter forces is to attain and maintain an air situation which will assure freedom of action for our forces without effective intervention by the German Air Force, and to render maximum air protection to the land and naval forces in the common object of assaulting, securing and developing the bridgehead. A veritable air armada of P-5l Mustangs, P-47 Thunderbolts, P-38 Lightnings and various marks of Spitfire was ranged ready for batt le as RAF units of Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB) and the 2nd Tactical Air Force joined with the American VIIlth and 9th Fighter Commands. The overall plan was for the American units to provide the bulk of the escort and high-cover patrols, while the low cover , especially over the beaches , was provided by RAF Spitfires. The entire invasion area was to be given a layered screen of fighters - the first squadrons to be in position by 0425 on the morning of 6 June 1944.

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DEVELOPMENT, ROLES AND HISTORY

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

~ADlI or ACTION rOR OHENSIVE riGHTER OPERATIONS

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, A large number of Advanced Landing Grounds \I'ere constructed in southern England fo r the air build-up fo r the invasion of Europe; Merston, 1944.

The Allied fighter Order of Battle included the RAF pro viding 55 sq uadro ns of Spitfires, plus a number of Mustang and Mosquito units , out of an overall fighter strength of 2.000 aircraft. It was considered that the overcrowded airfields in England would make ideal target s for German tip-and-run fighter-bombers. so each airfield was required to maint ain a fighter flight on stand-by. The direct involvement of ADGB on D-Day comprised 91 Spitfires as part of the beachhe ad cover and a furt her 40 Spitfires on a sweep over airfields in Brittan y and atta cking any transport they found. In June ADGB and its associated form ations flew 8.474 offensive day sorti es. an increase of 1.000 on the previous month. This included 25 Circus and 21 Ram rod operations. with airfields, lines of communication and power stations being the main target types. The RAF claimed the destru ction of 61 aircraft during these offensive ops. for the loss of 36 pilots. It was also noted that the 'enemy had retaliated with such vigour tha t fewer aircraft were destro yed than in the previous month and losses were heavier'. In the period immediately after the D-D ay land ings. the ground forces were in danger of being bogged down , and in the absence of heavy weapons they had to rely on air power as ' flying artillery'. Th e Spitfire squadrons carried out a good deal of this type of work, and after a while became qu ite proficient. The 20 mm cann on pro ved to be a remark ably good air-t o-ground weapon against all manner of 'soft skinned' vehicles, alth ough it was unable to cause any serious damage to the average German tank. The night offensive throughout the year was still primarily aimed at supporting the operations of Bomber Comm and by disrupting night-fighter operations (intruder work) and engaging enemy night-fighters with RAF fighter s, with S errate playing an increased

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Map showing radius of Action for figh ter off ensive operations January 1943 to May 1944.

role. Alth ough the form ation of o. 100 Group in December 1943 provided a dedicated force for this work . ADGB units were still import ant and in February 1944 Air Marshal Harris stated that an increased effort was required to disrupt the main nigh-fighter bases such as Gilze-Rijen. Leeuward en and Venlo. By early July he was demanding a force of 100 night-fighters and the redoublin g of attac ks on airfields. The reply from the Chief of the Air Staff was that the UK's night defences could not be weakened; however. LeighMallory was informed that pro vided he did not neglect the air defence of the UK his squadro ns were to give full support to the bomber offensive. Th e majorit y of the night offensive effort in the earl y part of 1944 was against airfields. with the introduction (or more accurately renaming ) of the pat rolling of night fighter airfields as Flower ops. From Janu ary the Mosquito Vis of 0. 2 Group jo ined in the Flower ops and between January and May a total of 623 Flowers had been flown. 233 of these in May. However. May also brought an increase in atta cks on transport ation. including trains, barges. shipping and MT . Within the overall Allied strategy the invasion was of primary import ance in summer 1944 and both day and night missions were tasked with this in mind, the bulk of the night sorties being Intruders. It was not until November that direct support of night bomber operations was resumed . much of the Bomber Supp ort role becomin g the responsibility of a number of specialist Mosquito sq uadro ns with No. 100 Group of Bomber Command.

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August 1944-i\lay 1945 With the Allies ashore and established. further Command chan ges took place in the RAF with ADGB reverting to its Fighter Command title on 15 October 1944. still und er Air Marshal Sir Roderic Hill. The Command had been given a new Directive on 22 September that recognised the changed threat to the UK. recognising that there was no significant threat West of a line from the Humber to Southampton . Fighter defences supported by full radar and Royal Observer Corp s covers were to be maintained East of the line Cape Wrath- Falkirk-Leyburn-Tamworth -Brackley-Gloucester- Bourn emouth, including the Shetland s and Glasgow-Clyde area. Redu ced defences were to remain to the West of this line but those in orthern Ireland and in the Portree-Oban area could be withdra wn. Th is led to the disbandm ent of o. 9 Gr oup, which lost its opera tio nal commitments on 4 Augu st and the rest of its dutie s on 18 September. It also saw o. 10 Group become semi-operational. leading to disbandm ent in May 1945. A number of Sector HQs were also closed. At the end of December the Command fielded 31 day and nine night squad rons. The former included II units with the Mustang III whilst the latt er included a Tempest unit that specialised in night ops again st flying bombs. From autumn 1944 to the end of the Second Wor ld War the Comm and had four main roles: I. Offensive operations aga inst rocket s and flying-bombs; this primarily involved fighter-bomber attacks and armed reconnaiss ance against launch sites, storage sites and comm unications. 2. Defensive operations against attacks on bomber airfields and minelaying off East coast. 3. Long-range fighter to escort Bomber Command day o perations. 4. Night-fighter squadro ns for offensive ops in support of Bomber Command night operat ions. The final few mon ths of the war saw Fighter Command strength dr astically reduced from its high point in January 1943 of over 100 squadrons. In Janu ary 1945 it had 41 squad rons fiel ding a tota l esta blishment of 634 aircraft, which now included a large number of Mu stang Ills (234 aircraft) . Th is arrival of Mustangs was not always well received. in December 1943 Mustangs had arrived to re-equip 65 Squad ron: ' Men stoo d open mouthed with disbelief. This simply couldn't be true. Mustangs! P-5I s! American ju nk! To exchange our beloved Sp its for such rubbi sh! Had the blood y Air Ministry brass gone off their rockers? Th is was intol erable! How low could they sink? Th at evening the pilots gave vent to their anger in a drunk en brawl. resulting in fairly expensive repairs having to be carri ed out to the Mess.' (To ny Jonsson in Dancing in the Skies. Grub Street 1994) The last throw of the dice as far as German intruder operations over England was concern ed came on 3/4 March 1945 - Operat ion Gisella had been planned for some time and was intended as a mass attack on Bomber Comm and by following the bombers home and hittin g them over England and at their airfields. Over 140 Ju 88s took part and the first bomber shot down was probably a 214 Squadron Fortress. which crashed at Woodbridge in Suffolk. The operation lasted less than three hours and the RAF lost at least 24 bombers, but the defences were quick ly in action and eight of the att ackers were shot down. with three others flying into the ground and others being written- off to various causes.

DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND HISTORY

Day Fight er Operations Fighter Comm and remained heavily involved in air operations in the latt er part of 1944. initially still under the cont rol of HQ AEAF; this included suppo rt of the airborne assault on M ark et-Garden in September. However, when Bomber Com mand was released to return to its offensive camp aign. by day and night. the Comm and provided escort for the former and ' bomber support' for the latte r. The first of the daylight attac ks took place on 27 August when 243 bom bers attac ked the Rheinpreu ssen synthetic oil refinery at Meerbeck, near Homberg. Thi s was the first daylight atta ck on Germ an y since August 194 1 and it was escorted by nine sq uadro ns of Spitfire IXs - all of whom. had nothin g to do; the lone Bf 11 0 that was seen very sensibly made off in the opposite direction ! Despite intense flak over the tar get no bom bers were lost. Th is type of long-ran ge escort became a ro utine part of the Comm and 's work and up to 14 Mustan g and five Spitfire sq uadrons were eventua lly dedicated to this role. The Mustang was increasingly being used by Fighter Comm and for this role and by September there were seven squad rons of Mu stang Ill s. the four origina l squadrons. 129, 306.315.316 had been jo ined by 19. 65 and 122 sq uadro ns which had tran sferred from the 2nd TAF. Actu ally it had been an exchange deal in which Fighter Comm and also acquired four Spitfire IX squad rons. having given up five Tempe st and two Spitfire XIV squad rons. The number of Mustang units conti nued to increase as sq uadrons exchanged their beloved Spitfires for the American fighter. such that by the end of Apri l 1945 the Command included 16 Mu stang squad rons. Although the Mustangs had a better combat radius than the Spitfires they were still restricted as they had no fuselage overload tank s. The radiu s of action of these Mu stang s. after allowing 15 minutes at a fuel consumption of 60 gallons per hour for man oeuvring under combat conditi ons and a 10% fuel reserve. was not more 450 miles' (AHB Summary) . It was decided to fit extra tank s to the Mustang s and Spitfires despite fears Spitfire LFXV/ R 11'3 96 ill polished aluminium fini sh.

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FIGH TER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

that this wou ld affect combat performance, but the ideal solution according to Fighter Command was to have usable airfields for refuelling on the Continent. These restrictions do not appear to have concerned the USAAF to the same degree and their Musta ngs were regular visitors to the Berlin area. When airfields such as Ursel, Belgium. became avai lable the Command's Spitfires were ab le to provide escort 100 miles East of the Ruhr. In February 1943 the Air Fighting Developm ent Unit flew co mparative trials between a Spitfire IX and Mustang X. Th e Manoeuvrabilit y section had this to say: T he aircraft were compared a t varying height s for their powers of manoeuvrabil ity and it was found thro ugho ut tha t the Mu stang. as was expected, did not ha ve so good a tu rning circle as the Spitfire. By the time they were at 30.000 feet the Mu stang's cont rols were found to be rather mushy. while the Spitfire's were still very crisp and even in turns du ring which 15 degrees of fl ap were used on the Mustang. the Spitfire had no difficulty in out-turning it. In rate of roll. however. it found that while the Spitfire is superior in rolling qu ickly from one turn to another at speeds up to 300 mph. there is very little to chose between the two at 350 mph lAS and at 400 mph the Mustang is definitely superior. its con trols rema ining far lighter at high speeds than tho se of the Spitfire. When the Spitfire was flown with wings clipped , the rate of roll improved at 400 mph so as to be almost identical with the Mustang. The manoeuvra bility of the Mustang. however. is severely limited by the lack of directio nal sta bility which necessitates very heavy forces on the rudder to keep the aircraft steady.' (A FDU Report No. 64, Februa ry 1943). From mid October to the end of the year Fighter Co mma nd escorted 59 bomber raids. which amou nted to 6.794 fighter sorties. the majority of which were recorded as ar d uous but boring. In the few combats tha t occu rred claims were made for 15 enemy aircraft. for the loss of 20 RA F fighters to all causes. The escorts were largely successful and of the 124 bomber losses the vast majority were to fla k. During one escort mission of 5 December the escort s reported over 100 Ge rman fighte rs - by far the largest number seen for a long time a nd an indication. although the Allies did no t yet know it, of a reinforceme nt in preparation for the German offensive that was being planned (the Ardennes Offensive - the Batt le of the Bulge). From Janua ry 1945 to the end of the war Fighter Command flew a furthe r 102 bomber escort missions (8,878 sor ties) as well as 29 fighter sweeps over orth -West Ge rma ny. Th e level of bomber ops increased in March with the Allied prepar ations for the crossing of the Rhine a nd the fighters were kept busy - o r a t least they flew lon g so rties but usually with little to do except watc h the bom bing. T he table shows Fighter Com man d stre ngth had increased from 36 squadrons and 713 aircraft in 1939 to a high point of nearly 2.000 aircraft and 101 squa dro ns in 1943. The statistics in the latter part of this table are misleading a t first glance and suggest Fig hte r Command srreagt h, 1 939 -t 9~ 5 a massive and sudden decline after early 1943 but in reality this was prima rily a re-alloca tion OTU D a ll: Squadrons Strength s trength of squad rons following the formati on of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. with Fighter Jan \939 36 713 Command becoming ADG B and man y of Jan \9 40 51 888 85 Jan \941 73 210 1.362 its units being tran sferred to the new tactical 97+ 10 Fit s Jan \942 573 1.9\ 6 forma tions. Th is trend contin ued into early Jan \943 101+1 Fit 1.852 643 1945 with the decreasing thre at to the UK Jan 1944 70H Fits 1.365 899 and the movement of more squadro ns to the Jan 1945 4\ 815 637 Continent.

DE

ElOPMEN

ISTORY

1946-1968 - The Cold War As with all major wars there was a disba ndme nt process at the end of World War Two; indeed it had started in la te 1944 as the war a ppea red to be almost won. By 1946 the rundow n of RAF strength was in full swing and included saying farewell to man y of the Allied squadro ns tha t had form ed such a n impo rta nt part of the combat ca pability; many of these went home, with their aircraft, to build a peace-time air force. The re were also major changes in personnel as the RAF decided on its peacetim e structure and who it would keep and who it wou ld let go; some of those that stayed went down a number of ran ks in order to remain in uniform , By mid 1946 the Com ma nd had reached a low point in st rength with only around 500 opera tional aircraft. Late Mark Spitfires and Mu stangs were the major types bu t the num ber of jets was also on the increase as it was already recognised tha t the future lay with the jet. The concept remained that of dedicated day and night fighters. with the Mosquito continuing to shou lder responsibility for the night role. Fig hter Co mmand stre ng th, t 9~5- 1953

Totul with all units

Operat ional Sqns Dale

UE

Str ength

3\ 27 23 3\ 3\ 3\

929 6 12 496 533 603 712

1.032

May \945 Ju n 1945 May \946 Jan 1951 Jan 1953 Dec 1953

UE

Str ength

1.1 3\ 1.328 1.363

1.200

66\

496 59\ 605 585

1.339

1.277

Xote s I. The 'all units' column includes operational.communications. training and miscellaneous. The slats for December 1953 include 7121585 opera tional. 51182 comm un ication s. 5211523 training and 79/87 miscellaneous. 2. The slats for operational units 1951-1953 include squadrons of the RAuxAF. with an average of 160 UE and 158 strength o f aircraft in these units; the remaining aircraft were with the regular squadrons.

The first post-war Cvin-C, Air Marshal Sir James Robb (since May 1945). made it clear that all was not well and that his reduced force cou ld not defend the UK. especially as there was increasing realisation that peace meant peace with the defeated Axis powers but looming confrontation with an old ally. Russia. not that this directl y affected Fighter Co mmand (yet) as the Russia ns were unable to reach the UK and the immediate problem lay in mainland Europe. The Wing concept was still in use. with day-fighter Wings al Bentwa ters (56, 74 and 245 squadrons) and Boxted (222. 234 and 263 sq uadrons), both with Meteor F.3s. whilst the Odiham Wing (54 and 72 squadrons) had Vampires. The Command's final piston type, the Hornet, had entered service in 1946 but saw limited service. Auxiliar y sq uadro ns began to re-equ ip with jets and the M ossies too gave way to night-fighter variants of the Meteor a nd Vampi re as Fighter Co mma nd became a n all-jet force. Th e Wing concept was modified to have two day and o ne night squadro n. alt ho ugh this was not universally true. and the Control a nd Reporting system. including the a rrangement of Sector s. was changed.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

DEVELOPME

T, ROLES AND HISTORY

tra nspo rts and the tension was high: additional Allied fighters were deployed to the area and Fighte r Command came to a higher sta te of alert. Th e Airlift lasted a year. ending in May 1949 but its end led to a stand-off across Eastern Europe with the formation of ATO and the Warsaw Pact. Hencefort h, Fighter Comm and 's main enemy was the Warsaw Pact and the thr eat from Soviet long-range bombers. with the added requirement to support ATO in other areas and the RAF in its world-wide com mitments. Th e communist threat expan ded in 1950 with the outb reak of the Kor ean War.

Pair of Hornets of / 9 Squadron; the Hornet was the Command's filial piston type but only sail' limited service

(Peter Green Collect io n).

By early 1951 the situatio n was stabilising in terms of organisation and eq uipment and strength had started to rise - and by then it had become clear that conflict was always a possibility. Berlin Airlift Th e RAF and USAAF had placed sizeable air forces in Germ any at the end of the war and tensions continued to increase. culminating in the Russian closure of land access to Berlin. The Allies decided to suppo rt their part of the city by air and the Berlin Airlift was born , the first flights being made on 28 June 1948. Russian fighters buzzed the Meteors of6/6 Squadron with post-war RA IV code; Meteors become the mainstay of the Command ill the post-war period ill both day and night versions.

Korea n War The RAF 's participation in the Korean War was limited. although a number of pilots flew with units such as the Meteor-equ ipped 77 Squad ron of the RAAF. and with USAAF F-86 Sabre units. The real significance for Fighter Comm and was that Korea was the first true jet air-war and the perform ance of Western and Soviet types could be com pared. Th e Meteor was fo und to be wanting whilst the F-86 Sabre gave a good showing - as did the Soviet types such as the MiG-15 . The RAF had swept-wing fighters in development but the only immediat e solution to a perceived capabi lity gap was the acq uisition of Sabre s from the American s. 'When the Korean War broke out. no fighter able to cope with the foreseeable thr eats was fully developed and the decision was taken to press ahead with the pro duction of the Superm arine Swift, alth ough in normal times this would not have been do ne without more thorough preliminar y trails. Despite strenuous efforts to overcome its defects. the Swift proved in the end unacceptable to the Service except for certain specialised roles.' In ovember 1950 a development contract and production order for 100 Swifts was signed as ' the Swift represented the only possible way of getting an up-todate fighter in service in the time available .. . but then beset by problem s.' Th is summary appeared in the 'Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates (1956-19 57) the Supply of Military Aircraft' . Th e pro totype crashed after only 3-hours flying and the first produ ction airc raft did not fly until August 1952. However. the prog ramme was persevered with and there was no cancellation of orders until 1955. The Russians jo ined the military atomic age in 195 1 and the need to defend UK airspace against Russian bombers became even more important. and was to remain the rationale of Fight er Command for the rest of its existence. As the bombers would be unescorted the fighter task was back to where it was in the I930s - a bomber destroyer with no need to dog-fight. although the lessons of the late 1930s and Korea were not wholly forgo tten. Tactics were once more to find the enemy and get behind him to use guns to effect his destruc tion. Th ose guns were now of heavier calibre. with the 30 mm Aden can non as the sta nda rd weapon. Fighter Command had three swept-wing fighters enter service in 1954. the Swift only went to a single squadro n and the Sabre to two others. although both types also served with units in Germ any, Of greater significance was the arriva l of the Hawker Hunter with 43 Squadron in July and although the early F.l s had their problem s. it was not long before the first of the classic Hunters, the F.6, was in service. Nevertheless. this was still a day fighter with no radar and limited ar mament of four 20 mm cann on. A 1955 plan called for Fighter Command to have just over 900 aircraft. with 75% of those being day fighters, including the Auxiliar y Air Force contribution of 160 aircraft. The thr eat was now very firmly identified as Russian long-range bombers. potentially armed with nuclear weapons and able to attac k in bad weather and at night. Th ere was an increasing

93

NO HISTOR

Meteors of 141 Squadron ar Co/tis/mil. 1953; Meteor NF.II s entered service I ..ith the Squadron ill August 1951.

need. therefore. for a missile-armed all-weather fighter. In addition it was also generally agreed that fighters needed more speed. ideally supersonic (over Mach 1) and more range . requirements that did not really go hand -in-hand in this era before the ad vent of air-to -air refuelling. All of these elements were under development in the early 1950s. alth ough it would be the latter part of the decade before they entered service as operational aircraft. Vellom night-fighter at Waterbeach.

Ja velin XA 636 ill company with Hunter XF440; the Javelin I I'O S the RAF's fir st true AIIWeather fi ghter.

Problems and future plans The 'Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates (1956- 1957) - the Supply of Military Aircraft' state d that in its deliberatio ns it had taken evidence from a wide range of experts. including the aircraft industry and military. In his interview with the Committee on 6 March 1956. Captain F Hopkins. Director of the Nava l Air Warfare Division stated that 'if we had much more money and greate r resou rces we would prefer.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

in order to keep up to date, to introduce a new type of fighter, bomber and anti subm arine aircraft every two years . That would ensure that we always had pretty modern aircraft in service at any time. We obviously cannot afford to do that. and so we have to ma ke each aircraft as it comes into service last much longer in the front -line and in the latter half of its life it is obsolescent. ' Whilst this was a nava l comment it equally applied to the RA F and it was an economic factor that was to affect Fighter Command throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Shortly before this interview the Command's latest fighter had entered service, with 46 Squadron at Odiham receiving its Javelin FAW .ls. 'Colonia l Reinforcements' In addition to its primary role of defending UK airspace, Fighter Co mmand was also called on from time to time to contribute to reinforce ot her operational areas. This included involvement in the 1956 Suez conflict, with the Command deploying aircraft to Cyprus. However. the majority of such tasks. and they were fairly frequent were on a smalle r scale. Typical of the minor involvements was that of 65 Squadron in 1958 when they flew their Hunter F.6s to Cyprus to cover the withd rawal of British airborne forces from Jordan . Indeed, because of the troubled nature of the Midd le East , Cyprus became a regu lar detachment base . Later it was to become a routine destination for Fighter Command squadrons on Armament Practice Camp (A PC) to take advantage of the good weather factor for intensive aerial gunnery practice. Mi ssil e era The Select Committee report made depressing reading as it dealt with the problems of develop ing fighter aircraft and the 'suggestion' that manned aircraft may have a limited future . Some elements have been referred to above but the real pointer to future thinking stated tha t 'as aircraft become more expensive, complicated and difficult to maintain there would have to be fewer of them .. . moreover in modern warfare the stage was being reached when fighters wou ld no longer provide any pro tection, at any rate in the UK, and the place of conventio nal air weapons might be taken by ballist ic rockets.' All of Fighter Command 's re-equipment plans were thrown into confusion in the 1958 'Outline of Future Policy' statement by Defence Minister Duncan Sandys, which predicted a reduction in manned fighters in favour of surface-to- air missiles (SAMs). Decline of the operational fighter force had already set-in . with aircraft strength falling from 600 in 1956 to 326 in 1958; this decline accelerated over the next five years. reaching 272 in 1960 and a mere 140 in 1962. The SAM entered service in December 1958 with 264 Squadron setting up the first Surfa ce-to-Air Missiles became a central part of air def ence. with the main type in RAF service being Bloodhound.

DEVELOPMENT ROLES AND H STORY

Bloodhound site at orth Coates, pomting out into the North Sea ready to engage Soviet bombers day and night. Over the next two years expansion of the missile cover was rap id and by autumn 1960 there were ten squadrons deployed . However. the promised supersonic interceptor a lso entered service in June 1960. with the Lightning F.I going to 74 Squadron at Coltishal!. The Javel in force declined in the ear ly 1960s as the Lightning force expanded and Fighter Command's main operational strength for its last few years comprised Lightnings and Bloodhound SAMs. The growing threat of the Warsaw Pact in the la te 1950s led to reorganisation of NATO's air defences into a number of Air Defence Regions (ADRs). which included the U K AD R. Fighter Command now had a dual role of protecting the U K and protecting the UK ADR; however. the UK was seen as one of NATO's main air base locations for massive reinforcement from America and as such would become home to American fighters (and other aircraft) thus boosting the defence capability. Improvements in radar. the increased use of air-to-air refuelling to give the Lightnings a rea listic chance of engaging the enemy out over the sea, and better AAMs all helped improved the overall capability as the very real threat of a Co ld War turning into a nuclear war remained the prime co ncern . Fighter Command retained this posture to 1968 when a major reorganisation of the RA F took place and the old Command structure was scrapped in April that year. the four main operational commands being rolled -up into a new Strike Command. The first commander was the man who had undertaken the study a nd proposed the change, Air Ma rshal Sir Dennis Spotswood. Having been in existence since 1936, Fighter Command had made its name during the few months in 1940 when it fought the Ba ttle of Britain but that brief period carried with it a wealth of emotion and feeling. Strike Command cou ld never evoke the same feelings as Fighter Command. Lightnings of 56 Squadron at Wattisham, December 1963; the Lightning lI'as the last nell' aircraft to enter service with Fighter Command prior 10 its disappearance into Str ike Command in 1968.

97

OPERATIONS

CHAPTER

Two

Operations Ten Little Fighter Boys Ten lillie fighter boys Tak ing off ill line, aile lI'as ill coarse pitch, Theil there lI'ere nine. Nine lill ie fig hter boys Climbing through 'the gate' aile's petr ol wasn' t all, Theil there lI'ere eight.

Eight lillie fig hter boy s S cramb ling up to heaven aile "real'er' didn't, Theil there Irere sere ll. S even lillie fighter boys Up to all the tricks, aile had a hango ver, Theil there lI'ere six. Six lillie fighter boys Milling over Hythe. a ile's pressure wasn 't up, Theil there Irere fire.

Five lillie fighte r boys Over France's shores, a ile flew reciprocal, Theil there Irere four. Four lill ie fighter boys J oining ill the spree, aile's sight lI'asll't all, Theil there Irere thr ee. Three lillie fighter boy s High up ill the blue aile's rubber pipe lI'as loose, Theil there Irere tll'O. Tiro lill ie fighter boys Homing out of S UIl, FieII' st raight and level, Then there lras one. aile lillie fighter boy Happy to be home, Beat up dispersal, Theil there lI'as none. Tell lillie Spitfires nothing have achieved, A O C at Group is I'ery , I'ery

peeved. 'Fifty thousand smackers Thro wn down the drains 'Cos tell silly buggers Didn 't use their bra ills.

From its form ation in 1936 Fighter Command expected that in the event of war it would be combating slow. poorly-arm ed and unescort ed bombers over the UK in daylight. Its eq uipment and train ing were based on this threat premise. Four years later it was all to be very different. The outbreak of war in September 1939 put the Co mmand on high alert with the expectation that German bombers would appear within hours of the declarati on of war. Germ an aircraft did appear over the UK but the first significant

Formation of 85 Squadron Hurricanes out of Debden; the Squadron departed Debden fo r France 0 11 9 September 1939 and by N o vember had mo ved into LilleiSeclin, where it stayed until mid May - the Phoney War ha ving elided ill spectacular fashion with the German invasion 0 11 /0 May.

combat for the Comm and was from bases outside of the UK - on a small scale in orway and a larger. and more worrying. scale in France. The deployment of Hurricane squadro ns to France on the outbreak of war brought some cont act with the enemy in the remaining months of the year but all fairly small-scale. For the sake of ease, the April 1940 Norwegia n campaign is con sidered before the September 1939-June 1940 French campa ign. Norway Two sq uadro ns took part in operations from bases in orway in late spring 1940. It was Fighte r Comman d's oldest type, the Glad iator tha t first moved out to comb at the enemy in Norway; the Gladiat ors of 263 Squ adron left their base at Filton in late April and sailed to orway aboa rd HMS Glorious . Th ey were initially based at Lake Lesjeskog and Bardufoss but afte r a few days returned to the UK. only to come back again on 21 May aboard HMS Furious. along with a second carrier and a Hurricane squad ron. The Hurri cane Is of 46 Squ adron had been based at Digby since Janu ary 1940 with little to do other than train. and mount convoy patrols. On 9 May they moved to Abbotin sch to embark on HMS Glorious. three aircraft having been at Prestwick since 3 May for carri er-landing trials by Fleet Air Arm pilots. The carri er sailed on 14 May in com pany with HMS Furious (with 263 Squadron on their second venture to orway). An advanced part y was asho re at the Skaanland landin g gro und by 18 May and declared that it was not ready - so the carr ier sailed back to the U K. only to set-off once more on 24 May and eventu ally disembark the 18 Hurri canes on 26 May. Two aircraft of the first two Flights were damaged on landing so the rest were diverted to Bard ufoss. The first comba t pat rol was flown by a Flight of three Hurric anes from Skaanl and but the o rders were not to intercept unless their own airfield was thr eatened. A form ation of He II Is

99

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Wreck of 263 Squadron Gladiator at Lake Leskajog; the Norwegian expedition by t\\'o of Fighter Command's squadrons lI'as short-lived.

was spotted but as they were 'going the other way' no attempt was made to intercept. An uneventful sortie was followed by another landing accident so the Squadron reunited at Bardufoss on 27 May. The first patrol over Narvik, the main area of interest for the British, was flown that evening. again with no action, However, the following day the Hurric anes had their first success with Fg Off Lydall shooting-down a Ju88 and with two four-engined flying-boats being strafed on Rornbaksfjord. The following day brought six more kills for the loss of three Hurri canes with two of their pilots, The day also brought DF Cs for Fit Lt Jameson and Pit Off Drumm ond , The Glad iators of 263 Squadron had been flown aboa rd by FAA pilots on 12 May and having sailed in the convoy of 14 May the Squad ron was ashore at Bardufoss on 21 May, The main base was at Bardufoss but with a detachment at Bodo (where there is memoria l to the Squadron), On 22 May the Squadron mounted 54 sorties and reported three combats, one of which ended with the loss of Pit Off Craig-Adams , alth ough as an He III was found near the crash the conclusion was made that the two aircraft had collided in cloud . In its 13 days of operations the Squadron had flown 389 sort ies, had 72 combats and claimed 26 enemy aircraft , One of the Gladiators still survives; N5641 has been restored and is in the air museum at Bodo. The British venture was all but over and the main task of the fighter s in the first days of June air cover of the evacuation of British forces. On 8 Jun e both squadrons were aboard HMS Glorious for the return to the UK; it was a nightm are as the Germ ans now effectively controlled the sea and the carrier was sunk on 9 Ju ne. with 46 Squadron losing ten aircra ft. its Comm and ing Officer and seven pilots. Battle of France Under the terms of the Alliance with Fran ce. which along with the joint guarantee to Poland had effectively broug ht Britain into the war. the British were to dep loy forces to fight in France. Settling in to their airfields and to the delights of local towns. the RAF fighter pilots cont inued to train whilst providing patrol s and. from time to time, escort

5

101

Hurricanes of601 Squadron being refueled; the Squadron moved to France in February 1940 as part of the continued build-up (some would say, drain) of Fighter Command ill Fran ce.

for Battles on recce flights, It was all very quiet and serene and as such became known as the ' Phoney War '. The first confirmed success for the RAF fighters in France came on 2 ovember 1939 when Fit Lt Robert Voase-Jeff of 87 Squadron downed an He Ill. 0, I Squadr on was based at Vassincourt from 9 October. as part of 0. 67 Fighter Wing. and got their first victory early in ovember, as recorded by the author of 'Fighter Pilot - A personal record of the Battle of France' . It was a beautiful S W lIlY day, with 110 low clouds bill quite a lot of Cirrus and Cirrostratus, and a bit of Altocumulus. I \\'as on the aerodrome by my machine when Il'e heard the noise ofunfamiliar aircraft engines, After a lot ofneck-craning and squinting we sa\\' it - a Dornier 17 imm ediately above the aerodrome at about 20,000 ft. travelling Il'est and j ust visible in the thinner clouds. Like all German aircraft of the Luftwaffe it \\'as painted light-blue underneath, and was difficult to see. The French A.A. opened lip bill \\'ere nowhere near it. This \\'as the fi rst Hun we'd seen, and \\'e were pretty excited. Sgt. S and I took off in pursuit , but of course had to watch our take-off and lost him. At 3,Oooftll'e sail' him again, but lost him S OOIl after. Up and lip we clambered, turning gently f rom side to side and straining our eyes to fi nd him. We never sa\\' him again, and at 25,000 feet, with ollr sights alight and gun-buttons all 'Fire,' we cursed like hell and came down after some fifteen minutes ' search Aft er lunch we weill lip to the aerodrome again No t long afterwards a Hurricane dived across the fie ld rocking its wings, turned, came back, and repeated the performance in all obviously excited manner. It turned 0 111 to be 'Boy ', who had come to the Squadron ill June. He had apparently just finish ed refuelling aft er a patr ol ol'er the aerodrome when the same Dornier weill over. He took off immediately, without waiting fo r orders, pulled the 'plug ' ( boostoverride}, lost the Hun, clambered lip to abollll8,OOOft - and fo und him. He did

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS to be m ore or less 0 11I oj con tro l. ' Pussy ' then flew alongside the Germa n to make sure the p ilot was dead. H e sail' him slumped in his sea t, his head lolling to one side. Su ddenly , 110 wever, the Dornier throttled back, swerved on to ' Pussy's' tail, and put exactly 34 bullets thro ugh his aircraft. H earing them rip through ' Pussy ' duck ed - thereby saving his life, fo r a bullet penetrated the lock er behind his head, smashing the windscreen - and pushed his stick forward. Clouds of white smo ke ( which proved to be glycol) were pouring fro m his eng ine, which was stopped, and Pussy undid his straps and prepared to bale 011I. Th e 'smo ke ' stopped. however pres umably the glyco l was all gone - and so he did his st raps up again andforcedlanded safely with his undercarriage retracted. Meanwhile, Killy and S, the Nos 2 and 3 oj 'Pussy's' sec tion, attacked, and with bo th eng ines on fire the German forced-landed m ore or less safely. Killy and S circled round and sail' him lI'ave as they passed loll' overhead. Th ey then returned and landed. Th e Dornier lI'as fo und to ha ve at least 500 bullet-holes in it - not eno ugh, considering that three H urricanes had had a go at it. Apparently the pilot had had to lea ve his seat to lock the gun with which he had sho t ' Pussy ' do wn. We all felt that this German had pili up a damn ed good show, and as a tribute to the spirit that all pilots adm ire, we determ ined to hav e him to dine with us as our guest . Th e Fren ch authorities were ,'ery reluctant to part with him , bill eventua lly he lI'as allowed to come with Billy , whom lI'e had sent to fe tch him.

Pilots oj I Squadron pose outside oj the Mess. an ordinary s traight astern attack , and fired one longish burst with his sights s tarting abo ve the Dornier and m o ving slowly round the fuse lage. Th e Hun caught fi re immediat ely , went into a vertical spiral, and eventually made a large hole in th e French country-side. It exploded on strik ing the gro und. and there were no survivors.

24 November brought more acti on, with 1 Squadron claiming two Dorniers, with another three falling to 73 Squ adron, and the two squad rons sharing a Heinkel Ill . OJ our 11I'0 D orniers, one was intercept ed by th e ' Bull' and Hilly near M etz. Th ey att acked alt ernately and continually fro m ast ern until the Hun went into a steep spiral and crashed in flames near the lines. I rem ember talking to the CO over the RlT and hearing him sing 0 11I: 'It's all right, we 'l'e go t another one fo r the Squadron near . . . ' 'Near where?' I asked, 'S ay again , ' and he repeat ed ' Homburg, as in ha t!' Th e Heinkel III was also brought down near M etz , and was intercept ed by Blue Section. It was on fire, and losing height rapidly , when a bunch oj French M oranes came rushing in. all so eager to ha ve a bang that one oj them kn ock ed m ost ojSgt . C- 's tail oJ! H e put up a very goo d sho w by ge tt ing the ma chine back to the aerodrome, though he had to land at 120 mph to k eep cont rol, overshoo ting and turning over. I sml' him j ust aft er this little effort, and though he was laughin g, he was trem bling lik e a leaf and could hardly talk coherently. I sail' his aircraft, too: one elevator and half th e rudder were completely gone. A sect ion fro m I Squadron, led by ' Pussy', attack ed the other Dornier about 20 miles north oj the aerodrome. ' Pussy ' led the attack fro m dea d astern. By the time he had used all his ammunition the rear-gunner and na vigator had escaped by parachut e, one eng ine was on fire, and the Dorm er lI'as losing height and appeared

The main acti vity over the winter period was lone recce a ircra ft, usually at high level a nd pro vidin g little oppo rtunity for engagement as by the time they were spotted they were unreachable. The enemy fighters seemed reluct ant to cro ss the bord er but in mid April th at changed and German fighter sweeps to Metz and ancy ocurred, but at medium-high level and with no significant combat. Both sides a ppea red to be sizing each ot her up; what the Allies did not know was that there were only a few weeks to go before the Blit zkrieg commenced. On 10 May the Wing opera tions room reported ' plots all over the boa rd '. It was a hectic da y for the RAF fighters, with fighter patrols, escort to the Hurricanes at da wn, Vassinco urt. ' He took oJJ immediately , witho ut waiting Jor orders, pulled the 'plug' (boost-override), lost the Hun. clambered lip to about 18.000Jt - and found him. He did an ordinary straight astern attack, and fi red one longish burst with his sights start ing above the Dormer and moving slowly round the fuselage. '

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AASF - and being on the receiving end of Germ an bomb s. The 109s were o ut in strength and this was the first time the Hurricanes came up against their opposite numbers in major battles . The IIOs were also in action and pro ving no match for the Hurricanes, as recounted by a pilot of I Squadron: We went infa st in a tight bunch. each ojus picking an adversary and manoeuvring to get on his tail. I selected the rear one of two in line-astern who were turning tightly to the left. He broke (/Iray fro m his No. I when he had done a half-circle and steepened his 111m. bill I easily turned inside him. holding my fi re until I was within 50 yards and thenfi ring a shortish burst at three-quarters deflection. To my surprise a whole lot oj bits fl ew off him - bits oj engine cowling and bits oj his glass-house. and as I passed j ust over the top oj him. still in my left-hand 111m. I watched fa scinated as he went into a spin. smoke pouring from him. I remember saying. 'My God. hall' ghastly!' as his tail suddenly swivelled sideways and came right off. while flam es poured over the fuse lage. Then I sail'. with relief, a little white parachute open beside it. Good! I look ed quickly around me. Scar cely halfa minut e had passed. ye t as I looked I saw Jour other Huns going down - another with the tail off. a second in a spin. a third vertically in flam es. and a fo urth going up at 45 degrees in a lefthand stall-turn, with a little Hurricane on its tail and fir ing into its side. fro m which came a series ojfla shes and long. shooting, red flam es. I shall never fo rget it. All the I /Os at my level seemed to be hotly engaged, or about to be. so I looked around and above. Yes - those sods up there would be causing trouble soon! Three cunning lads were away fro m the fig ht, climbing ali-alii in line-astern to get over us and then pounce on the unwary. I had bags ojammunition left, so I imm ediately started clambering aft er them . with my 'plug' (boost-override) pulled. They lI'ere in a slight right-hand turn. and as I climbed I looked around. There lI'ere three others over on the right coming towards me. but they were belaII'. I reached the rear Hun oj the three above and shot him down in flam es in a couple of bursts. Then I dived at the three coming up from the right and fi red a quick burst at the leader head-on. I turned. but he lI'as still there; so lI'ere the other tll'O from above. In a moment I was in the centre OJII'llOt seemed a mass oj I l Os, although there lI'ere in fa ct onlyfive of them. I kne ll' I hadn 't the speed in my wooden-blader to dive all'ay and beat it, so I decided 10 fight them and make the best of it. Although I was more manoeuvrable at this height (6.000Jt) . than the Huns. l fo und it impossible to get an astern shot in, because whenever I got one almost lined up. tracers would come shooting past from another on my tail. So all I could do was to keep twisting and turning. and when a Hun got behind me, do as tight a turn as possible. almost spinning, with full engine. and fl y straight at him. firing a quick burst, and then pushing the stick forwa rd and going underneath him. Then I would pull up in a steep climbing 111m to meet the next comer. Natu rally they couldn't all attack at once without colliding. but several times I was at the apex of a cone formed by the cannons and machine guns oj three oj them. They used a lot of diving down and then climbing up and taking a full deflection shot. Their shoot ing was wild. and this manoeuvre was easily dealt with by turning towards them and going over their heads. causing them to steepen their climb until they were stalled and had toJail away. But don't imagineJar a moment that I was enjoying this perJormance. For from it. My mouth was becoming drier

OPERATIONS

and drier. and I was getting more and m ore tired and desperate. Would they TIIn out ojammunition? Would they push oJf? Would help come? I kn ew I couldn 't hold out much longer. Aft er what seemed an age (uctually it turned alii to befifteenminutes) , I was fly ing down head-on at a Hun who lI'as climbing towards me. We both fire d - and then I thought I had left it too late and that we IIw e going to collide. I pushed the stick fo rward violently and there lI'as a stunning explosion right inf ront ofme. For a moment my brain did not 1I'0rk. The aircraft seemed to beJailing. all limp on the controls. Then. as black smoke poured out of the nose and enveloped the hood. and as a hot blast and a flicker ojrefl ected flame came into the dark cockpit, I said to myself, 'Come on. out yo u get!' I pulled the pin out ofmy harness. wrenched open the hood, and hauled myself head fi rst out to the right. The wind pressed me tightly against the side oj the aircraft . my legs still inside. and I remember catching hold oj the trailing edge oj the wing and heaving myself out. As I came free and somersaulted, it fe lt as though I was being whirled round and round through the air on the end oj a piece ojstring by a giant. Then, as I Jumbled Jar and pulled the rip-cord. I was brought the right lI'ay up with a violent j erk that nearly knocked the breath fro m my body. M y head was pressed fo rward by the back pad that had slipped up behind it. and I couldn 't look up to see if my parachute lI'as all right. There was no sensation ojmovement - just a slight wind as I swung gently to and Jro and Jar ali i kn ell' the thing might be on fire or not open properly.

He landed safely and was soon back with the Squadron. The German ground offensive rolled on and the RAF fighters kept pulling back; the Germans had massive air superiority - although on paper the French Air Force should have made more of a contribution - and the RAF' s bombers were shot out of the sky by fighters and ground fire, whilst the Hurricanes man aged to give a good account of themselves. everthe less, the overall campaign was a disaste r and the Allies were pushed back to the sea - and the 'miracle' of Dunkirk.

Dunkirk Contrary to a widely-held belief at the time, especially in Arm y circles, and one perpetuated ever since, the RAF was present over the beaches of Dunkirk and a number of major air battles took place, which, for the first time, involved significant numbers of Spitfires. Fit Lt Bob Stanford Tuck as one of those pilots striving to pro tect the air space over the beaches and it was on one such pa tro l tha t he scored his first victory . '1 kept closing in on him and at about 1,000 yard s 1 had him square in my sights, then 1 decided not to fire but to close in. From ab out 500 yards 1 opened fire; nothing happened, although I could see my bullets striking home . Then suddenly there was a puff of blue smoke and a few pieces of metal came off the aircraft and flew towards me. The aircr aft was on fire now and it rose steeply before flicking to the left; it spun and went down through the clouds . 1 followed it, which was aga inst orders, and watched it crash into a field where it exploded .' As a Flight Commander on the Spitfire-eq uipped 92 Squadron, Bob Stanford Tuck was an excellent pilot and something of a marksman, the latter due largely to his having been taugh t at an early age how to shoot game birds. He claimed two more 109s a few days later and was soon made CO of 92 Squadron, following the loss of Roger Bushell.

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Spitfires of6IO Squadron on patrol.

David Crook was a pilot with 609 Squadro n, which was also involved in flying pro tective sor ties over the Dun kirk area: 'We shot a numb er of Huns down and lost four of ou r pilots. Desmond was also killed near Frinton-on-Sea; he lost his way back in bad weather and ran out of petrol, and was killed in trying to make a forced landing. [ think there is no do ubt that some of these losses were due to inexperience and lack of caution. Pi/ots of I Squadron inspect a German machine-gun - collecting trophies was standard in the early part of war.

OPERATIONS

one of us had ever been in action before, and everybody 's idea was to go all out for the first Hun that appeared. Th is policy does not pay when you are fightin g a cunn ing and crafty foe, and the Germ ans frequently used to send over a decoy aircraft with a number of fighters hoverin g in the sun some thousa nds of feet above, who would come down like a ton of bricks on anybody atta cking the decoy. Th is ruse almost certainly acco unted for one pilot , Presser, and possibly one or two others - the last anybody saw of Presser was when he was diving down to attack a Junkers 88, and there were definitely some Messerschmitts above' (from 'Spitfire Pilot' , Fit Lt David Croo k DFC, Gr eenhill Books). Thi s neatl y summarises one of the problems faced by the RAF pilots - they had no experience and were having to gain it 'on the job' and at no sma ll cost. The importa nt thi ng now was to learn the lessons and apply them; some of this hard-e arn ed wisdom was tra nsmitted thro ugh official and unofficial cha nnels and brought- about various changes, not least to the harm onisation of guns to 250 yards rath er than 400 yards. Oth er lessons of the ' Hun in the sun' and a host of others were applied by those with experience, passed on by Flight Commanders - and eventually at trai ning schoo ls - but many a new pilot in the forthcomin g Battl e of Britain still had to find out for himself; with luck the lesson came as a warning, witho ut luck it was a parachute trip or a final crash. The real battl e was about to begin. Th e overall histor y of the Battle of Britain is in Chapter One, and the focus here is on combat accounts from that period .

Battle of Britain Countless books and millions of word s have been written on the Battle of Britain, including numerous memories of pilots. Thi s part of the Operations chapter will therefore only give a few brief examples of comba t action du ring this period. It was a fi ne aft ernoon. We intercepted them over Brighton going out to sea. I did what my Flight Commander fwd said don't do ( i.e. fo llow an Al e 109 down - its partner would always be in the sun and would come aft er) . Two 109s were inf ront of me. One started to go down. The other started to turn right, climbing into the SUIl. With quick glances at the one climbing, I got the one going down in my sight. I let go a long burst, try ing hard to see if I had time before the other one came down. Blue-black smoke appeared. I then sail' the other just com ing alit of the sun on me and, if he was firin g, he lI'ent back claiming me, because I fl icked the Spit over and pulled back , diving to sea level fr om 20,000 feet vertically.

So recounted a pilot of 41 Squadron on an encounter during a scramble in September 1940, it was typical scene and one tha t would be told to squadro n intelligence officers by dozens of Fighter Com mand pilots as they returned to their bases on most days dur ing the period known as the Battl e of Britain, On the afte rnoo n of 8 July the British radar stations reported a build-up of enemy aircraft over Fra nce. A swarm of Do 17s with escorting Bf I lOs and 109s attacked a convoy near Dover and Dover harbou r. The Hurricanes of 32 Squadron tried to get thro ugh to the bombers but were swamped by the escorting fighters; 74 Squadron's Spitfires pitched into the melee and before long it had become every man for himself as the formations on both sides broke up and individua l combats took place. ' Pilot Offi cer Cobden, leading Yellow Section (of 74 Squadro n), followed Blue Section down. He picked out a straggling Do 17 and disabled its starboard engine. He then delivered a second att ack on the bomber, but as he was breaking away was set upon by a gro up of Bf 109s and his Spitfire was riddled with their fire, engaging emergency boost he bro ke

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NOTE: The ba\lsof this map i\ an AirMIOIstry pcbhcanon shoWing Fi"hter Command's layout In July \ 9.JO. we have ~dM other olI irfields appropriate to tilt' ORBATused in the GnK.lp

artidn.

The standard German bomber was the Heinkel III, a reasonably fas t and well-armed aircraft but one that was IWy vulnerable to fig hter attack as long as a critical component (engines or pilot fo r example) lI'as hit, No. 13 GROUP

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0

away from his att ackers in a steep climbing turn , It was a typical encounter , , . into the fray, identify a target .. . close, give it a burst or two . , . but keep looking around and don 't stay on a straight cour se for more than a few seconds. The need to keep the head moving continually was the main reason why most fighter pilots wore scarves, a way of " lubricating" the neck! Damage to the convoy was negligible and in this, the first "dogfight" involving over 100 aircraft , the RAF came out best.' July had not been a good month for 609 Squadron and after a series of losses David Crook noted in his book: ' I think Buck's death was very largely due to inexperience and faulty tactics. We had not yet learnt that it did not pay to go out to sea to meet the enemy, but to let them come to us. Also we did not realise the importance that height

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The Hurricane lI'as the most numerous - and most successful > of the RAFfig hters in the Battle but has always suffe red fro m the better reputation of the Spitfire.

A..B_ No . l 0 GROU P

The RAF in the Battle of Britain showing Sectors and airfi elds (Courtesy of FlyPast Magazine. www .keypublishin g.com) .

meant. Afterwards we used to get as high as possible before going into action. This is the whole secret of success in air fighting.' Buck was yet another pilot to end up in the water; in this instance the pilot was not found but in many cases pilots drowned or succumbed to their injuries as there was no rescue service in existence, other than naval

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

E

s

Hurricanes of 501 Squadron scramble from Gravesend on 15 August 1940 - Adler Tag ( Eagle Day ) on which the Luftwaffe planned massive attacks on Fighter Command airfields,

Pilots of 92 Squadron pose with trophy - part of the fir st Ju 88 the Squadron destroyed; quite a number ofsquadrons acquired German markin gs as their trophies,

launches. Th e Germans had a more efficient system with rescue rafts in fixed locations and dedicated pick-up aircraft. Th e RAF subseq uently developed a very etTective Air Sea Rescue service. The ab ility to recover pilots - from sea or land - was crucial to the survival of Fighter Com mand as lack of pilots was the real weakest point during the Battle of Britain . On 7 Augu st, convoy CW9 left Southend for Port smouth but overn ight it was attacked and scattered by E-boat s. The following day the Luftwaffe employed some 300 aircraft in a major etTort to destroy the scattered ships and bring the RAF to battle. The most notable engagement occurred when the Hurri canes of 145 Sqn pounced on a formation of Junk ers Ju 87s, claiming to have shot down 21 - altho ugh later analysis reduced this to less than ten. On 15 August , the day that Goering had determined for Adler Tag (Eagle Day) the Luftwaffe assumptio n was that the RAF was already on the ropes and tha t all its fighter strength had been concentrated in the South - leaving the Midland s and No rthern England virt ually und efended . The Staxton Wold radar station plotted a raid of 40+ aimed at the fighter sta tio ns of Church Fenton and Lecon field. A number of squad rons were scra mbled; fourteen Spitfires of 6 16 Squad ron scrambled and the Squadron was vectored to patrol over Flamb orough and at 1315 hours, it intercepted a formation of aro und 50 Ju 88s of KG 30. Squad ron pilots reported that the enemy was flying in a very poor form ation, with several stragglers. Fit Lt Denys Gillam, leading ' B Flight ', was the first to spot the enemy, at 19,000 ft , and immediately led Blue Section into the attack. PIt OtTMarpl es got in the first burst and as he broke away, Gillam took over; he kept up a continuous fire as the Ju 88 dived to 6,000 ft , jetti soning its bomb s. Part of the tail broke away and the aircraft turn ed onto its back, enveloped in flames, before crashing

into the sea. Meanwhile Marples, having pulled otT from his first attack, immediately pursued another bomber, getting in two bursts before it entered cloud with one en g~ ne smoking. He then saw two other bombers north of Scarb or ough and gave cha se, finng short bursts. One aircraft wheeled to port and dived to ground level, but Marple s could only harass the bomber as it flew at 100ft - he had run out of ammunition, Pit OtT Murray (Blue 2) saw two Ju 88s flying through broken cloud at 10,000 ft; they were in close form ation and one was smoking bad ly. He fired three long bursts and a second or two aft er the last bur st, bot h bombers cau ght fire. He did not see them crash but it is most unlikely that they were ab le to make it back to Denmark . Pit OtT Hugh Dundas, leading Gr een Section, saw Denys Gillam lead Blue Section into the attack and after Marple s broke away, having severely damaged his second aircraft, he closed in and fired a three-second burst, setting both engines on fire. Pit OtT Buck Casson (Green 2) had followed Dundas in, but being poorl y placed he broke away to intercept a lone bomber head ing out to sea at 5,000 ft. After two quarter atta cks, the enemy dived to 1,000 ft - with the rear gunner keeping up a steady fire. Casso n fired two more 'Buck ' Casson of 6 16 Squadron; PIt Off Buck Casson ( Green 2) had f ollowed Dundas in. but being poorly placed he broke away to intercept a lone bomber heading out to sea at 5.000ft. After t\1'O quarter attacks. the enemy dived to 1.000f t - with the rear gunner keeping up a steady fi re, Casson fi red tll'Omore bursts and the aircraft dived to sea lerei, at which point Dundas re-appeared and. with Casson olll of ammunition. took orer the attack.

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F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

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Spitfires of616 Squadron at Leconfield fro m where they engaged the German formation all 15 August with great success.

bursts and the aircraft dived to sea level, at which point Dundas reappeared and, with Casson out of ammunition, took over the attack. By now, there was no return fire and the enemy bomber was last seen at very low level with smoke pouring from its port engine. Red Section also attacked the main bomber force, with the CO . Sqn Ldr Robinson, damaging one bomber before he ran out of ammunition. Fit Lt Hellyer, accompanied by Pit Off Smith, dived astern a Ju 88, and fired all his ammunition into it; Smith then took over and fired a series of short burs ts until the bomber suddenly dived steeply into the sea. By now, the bombers were completely split up and a number of individ ual actio ns took place. Sgt Hopewell picked ou t a lone Ju 88 and hit it in both wings. The bomber took violent evasive action and turned inland ; Hopewell continued to fire into the engines and pieces started to break off. Shortly afterwards the bomber crashed three miles W of Bridlington. Sgt Westmo reland also attacked a lone bomber; firing two short bursts from 400 yards he set the port engine on fire. after which one of the crew baled out. Finally, Fg Off Moberley arrived on the scene afte r his late take -off. He had been listening on the radio and decided to head towards Flamborough, but before reaching the area he spotted a twin-engined airc raft low over the sea. He dived to 2,000 ft and identified a Ju 88 with smoke coming from one engine (probab ly the aircraft that had been attacked by Westmoreland). He made two or three attacks before the bomber's sta rboard engine stopped and the aircraft crashed into the sea. In just a few minutes , 616 Squadron claimed eight enemy bombe rs destroyed and six seriously dam aged - for no loss. Hugh 'Cocky' Dundas recorded the day in his excellent autobiography , Flying Sta rt: I set course and ramm ed the throttle 'through the gat e', to get the maximum power output, permissible for only a limited period of time. Some of the others lI'ere ahead ofme, some behind. We did 1I0t bother to wait for each other or try to f orm up into flights and section. We raced individually across the coast and out to sea. About 15 miles East of Bridlington I sail' them, to the left from and slightly

below - the thin. pencil shapes of German twin-engined bombe rs, flying in a loose, straggling, scattered forma tion toward the coast. I switch all my reflector sight, setting the range fo r 250 yards, turned the gun button to the 'fire' position. Wheeling down ill a diving 111m, I curved towards the nearest bomber, j udging my rate of 111m and dive to bring me astern. A light winkedf rom the rear-gunner's position and tracer bullets hosed lazily pas t. When I opened up with my eight Brownings the return fire stopped. The bomber 111mI'd and lost height. First a gush ofblack smo ke, then a steady stream pouredfro m its engine cowlings and it fell steeply towards the calm summer sea. Turning to look fo r a second target I sail' other Spi tfires fastening all to the German planes on all sides. Beneath me a damaged bomber 111mI'd back our to sea and I decided to go in and fi nish it off. It was a foolish decision, made in the heat of the moment, for I should have look ed fo r all undamaged plane still making fo r the coast. By the time I caught up with it and kn ocked it down I was several miles fur ther our to sea. The sky was empty and I judged that my ammunition was nearly ex hausted.

As the Squadron was soo n to discover, it was a different war to that being fought in the Sout h and 616 was to suffer a period of heavy losses. For 249 Squadron 15 August was their first day in No. 10 Group, having moved to Middle Wallop the previous day from the quiet of Church Fenton. The morning of the 15th was one of settling in to their tented accommodation but at 1300 'A Flight' was brought to ' readiness' and ' B Flight' to '15 minutes' , alth ough nothing happened. It was not until 1715 that the Squadron was ordered up to patrol Warmwell at I5,000 ft. The ORB recorded that ' B Flight' attacked a form ation of eleven Ju 88s and 50+ Me I lOs! Th e Flight claimed the destruction of three Me I lOs, whilst 'A Flight' reported nothing Roland Beamont ill cockpit of 87 Squadron Hurricane, August 1940.

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seen! Two further patrols were flown that day. The following day the Squadron was airborne at midday to patrol Ringwood to Poole; Red Section spotted a group of 109s and were ordered to investigate with the result that ' Red Section unfortunately bought it, being heavily attacked by fighters' (249 Squadron ORB ). Two of the Hurricanes were shot down - FIt Lt Nicolson (Red I) baling out OK but being shot-at by the Local Defence Volunteers as he came; Pit Off King got out of his Hurricane but his parachute had been damaged by a cannon shell and he was killed on impact with the ground as it did not slow him enough; Sqn Ldr King managed to make it back to base despite his aircraft having been hit numerous times. The Intelligence Officer of 611 Squadron summ arised the afternoon combat of II September thu s: At 1530 hours 611 Squadr on left GI Duxford and ' r ent into position as second squadron of the wing fo rmation which was ordered to patrol in a southerly direction towards the Thames estuary. At about 1550 when in the vicinity of SE London. 611 Squadron fo rmed up in three sections offo ur aircraf t in line astern. lOa plus enemy aircraf t lI'ere seen coming north in the direction of our fig hters. Our aircraft were then at 20.000 f t. The enemy formation consisted of Dornier 215s and a number ofHeink el IIIs at 18.000ft and a mass of M e lias stepped up behind at 20.000 ft. with a large number of M e 109s stepped up behind at 24.000ft. Our aircraft altered course. making a left tum. coming in to atta ck on the beam of the enemy fo rmation. 611 Squadr on attacked the M e I lOs. Pilots report that fr om the moment of contact with the enemy it was impossible to keep fo rmation. and a general melee ensued. FISgt Sadler. ,..ho was No. 4 of Yellow S ection. got separatedfrom his S ection and attack ed an M e 110. giving two long bursts closing f rom 500 yards to lOa y ards. and using nearly all his ammunition. The f uselage was seen to catch fire and the EA was last seen losing height. PIa Lund. No. 4 of Blue S ection. dived onto an Me 109 and fire d a short burst on a deflection aim without visible effec t. As another aircraft appeared in his mirror he climbed and sawfive M e lias. He selected the starboard aircraft and delivered an astern attack. closing to lOa yards. Black and white smoke was seen coming f rom the EA. which seemed to be losing height in relation to its fo rmation. No evasive tactics '..ere observed, and no enemy fi re experienced. Sgt Burt saw a single Heink el III fo llowing a fo rmation of Dornier 215s. Our aircraft manoeuvred to att ack the enemyfrom 3.000ft above. Sgt Burt dived and opened fire at abolll400 yards closing to 200 yards. giving a burst ofabout 5 seconds which apparently pili the enemy rear gunner out ofaction. as enemy tracer fire ceased. Squadr on landed at Duxford at approx. 1620 hours to refu el and rearm. and left fo r Digby where Squadr on arrived at dusk. Sgt FER Sh epherd and his Spi tfire P7298 are missing. Sgt S A Levenson fo rce-landed near Kenley and is returning 10 Digby by train.

At this stage the fate of Fred Sheph erd was unkn own - he may, like Levenson , have been forced to land elsewhere o r he may have been shot down but survived. Three days later the Squadron ORB recorded: ' We have now learnt that Sgt Shepherd died as a result of enemy action in the neighb ourh ood of Cro ydon but no further details are known'. Fred Shepherd had only joined the Squadron on I September and flown his first mission on 7 September; he only flew twice more before being killed in action. 15 Septemb er is the day now commemorated as Battle of Britain Day - so what was the significance of that date in 1940? The following extracts are taken from a later RAF account of the day's operations.

The Ju 87 Stuka fo rmations proved vulnerable to the RAFfi ghters and '..ere ,..ithdrawnfrom the battle.

'At dawn on Sunday the 15th the weather was fine and visibility was good; but as the morning wore on cloud steadily formed over SE England until by mid afternoon there was thick cloud (8/10 to 10/10 cover) at 4,000-6,000 ft .' The day started quietl y other than a noticeable increase in German patrols over the Straits of Dover but this was soon to change . 'By 1100 hours it was obvious from the forces that were massing near Calai s that a big attack was imminent ; and a large force of British squadrons was sent into the air in the next 25 minutes. It was a further half hour, however, before the first of the enemy forces crossed the coast of Kent ; and the success that our sq uadro ns later enjoyed was not least due to the unusually long inter val between the first warning of att ack and the enemy's ad vance. The controller at No. II Group not only had sufficient time to couple ten squad rons into Wings of two squad rons, he was able to also bring in reinforcements from the adjacent Groups before the first German force crossed the coasl. The squadrons ordered up at this stage were: 1035 72 Sqn, three aircraft from Biggin Hill to patrol Canterbury at 20,000 fl. 1103 72 Sqn (seven aircraft) and 92 Sqn (ten aircraft) from Biggin to patrol same area at 25,000 fl. 1115 229 Sqn and 303 Sqn from Northolt to patrol Biggin at 15,000 ft. 111 5 253 Sqn and 50I Sqn from Kenley to patrol Maid stone at 15.000fl. 1115 17 Sqn and 73 Sqn from Debden to patrol Chelmsford at 15,000 fl. 11 20 504 Sqn from Hend on and 257 Sqn from Martlesham to patrol North Weald to Maid stone at 15,000 ft 1120 603 Sqn from Horn church to patrol Dover at 25,000 fl. 11 20 609 Sqn from Middle Wallop to patrol Brooklands-Windsor at 15,000fl. 11 25 Duxford Wing (five squad rons - 19, 242. 302. 310, 611) to patrol Hornchurch at 25,000 ft: Fighter Co mmand thu s had 17 sq uadro ns in the air covering the SE approaches to Lond on . The bulk of the attacking force, in three columns, crossed the coast between Dover and Ramsgate between 1135 and 1140 and once inland spread out to

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Spitfire of 72 Sq uadron; 'I was Tennis Leader when ordered to patro l Canterbury angels 25 in company with 92 Sqn, 72 leading. I climbed to angels with the tll'Osquadrons. While I \l'as on patrol I \l'as ordered to atta ck fig hters. The main bomber forc e with fig hter escort \l'as about 2,000jr below with the fig hters about 3,OOOft below. '

Pilots of 17 Sq uadron, Debden September 1940; on Bailie of Britain day ( 15 S eptember) the Squadron \l'as airborne at 1115 to patrol Chelmsford at 15,OOOf t.

attack Lond on. Pat rolling the Can terb ury area the Biggin Hill Spitfires were first into action. with 72 Squad ron lead ing. Th e Comb at Report s from the formation leaders stated: 72 Squadron. I \l'as Tennis Leader when ordered to patrol Canterbury angels 25 in company with 92 Sqn, 72 leading. I climbed to ange ls with the t\l'O squadrons. While I \l'as On p atrol I lI'as ordere d to attack fight ers, The main bomber fo rce with fighter esco rt \l'as about 2,000ft below with the fighters about 3,OOOft bela \1'. I ordered the S quadron into line astern and dived down on the fighte rs from alii of the sun , as \l'e dived I ordered the S quadron into echelon starboard, thus a ttacking as many fighters ( M e 109s ) as po ssible. The M e 109 which I a ttacked halfrolled as I openedfi re and before he could dive a\l'ay he caught fire and ex ploded. I \l'as then at tack ed byfive other M e 109s. I did a steep turn to starboard and continued to turn until I ou t-turned one At e 109 which Il'as on my tail. I gave him t\l'O short burst s and he burst into flames. I th en spun down 10 ge t awayfrom m ore Ale 109s which dived down on m e. I returned to base and \l'as informed tha t enemy aircraft \l'ere o l'er base at angels 14. I clim bed up and sa\l' a f ormation of Dorniers in f ront of m e. I chased them and attacked the outside one on the s tarboard side. I gal'e him t\l'O short bursts from dead ast ern and his port engine s topped and he dropped alii of the formation losing height . I attack ed the Do 2 15 again and white vapour poured alii from his starboard engine. Five or six friendly fighters then came up and sta rted attacking him . He crashed into a wood and exploded. I returned to base and landed.

At the time these first comb ats were taking place the next wave of RAF fighters was being scrambled. and between 11 35 and 1142 the final six squadro ns were airborne : 1135 46 Sqn and 249 Sqn from North Weald to proceed toward s South Lond on . 1140 I (RC AF) Sqn from Northolt and 605 Sqn from Croydo n to pat rol over Kenley at 15.000 ft. 1140 41 Sqn from Horn church to pat rol Gravesend at 20.000 ft. 1142 66 Sqn from Gr avesend to intercept approaching enemy forma tion. In the meantime. two other Wings had engaged as 229/303 squadro ns and 253/50 I sq uad rons atta cked the enemy formations over Kent. These. along with engagements by 41 and 66 Squadron s. were in some respects preambles to the main events about to unfold nearer Lond on . Ju st after midday. the leader of the 257/504 Wing took his aircraft into comb at against 'a sq uare form ation of 25 Do 172 and Do 215s in five lines of aircraft in line abreast. all at 18.000 ft. with escortin g yellow-nosed Me 109s at 23.000 ft.' Th ey were soon jo ined by two more o. II G roup squadro ns. 46 and 249. and seven Dorniers were subsequently claimed for the loss of two Hurricanes. The five squadro ns of the Duxford Wing had also arrived on the scene but had to wait until the friendlies had cleared before they could engage the enemy. Whilst the thr ee Hurri cane squad rons engaged the bom bers. the two Spitfire units went after the fighters and by the end of the combat the Duxford Wing had claimed 19 bombers and seven fighters. Th e Air Ministr y's News Service issued a press release on the evening of 15 September: A Great Air Batt le: Today was the most costly day for the German Air Force for nearly a mon th . During the day. between 350 and 400 enemy aircraft were launched in two waves against Lond on and SE England . By 8pm it was known

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DOli Kingaby explains the controls of his 92 Squadron Spitfire; he \I'as unique ill being the recipient of a Distinguished Flying Medal ( DFM) and t\l'O Bars,

(111)'

that 165 of these had been shot down. 161 by fighters and 4 by AA fire, The great majority of those that escaped were chivvied and harried at all stages of their journey, Thirty of our own fighters are lost or missing. but ten of the pilots are safe, The press release continued with details of the two waves and 'combat reports' from Fighter Command pilots such as 'the whole formation was entirely broken up. They were flying west when we saw them . When we had finished. they were turning away fast towards home . As we broke off. a formation of Spitfires was just coming in to engage them .' Fighter Command's Diary recorded a communique from the Prime Minister addressed to Fighter Command via the Secretary of State for Air: 'yesterday eclipses all previous records of the Fighter Command. Aided by squadrons of their Czech and Polish comrades. using only a small proportion of their total strength. and under cloud conditions of some difficulty. they cut to rags and tatters three separate waves of murderous assault upon the civil population of their native land. inflicting a certain loss of 125 bombers and 53 fighters upon the enemy. to say nothing of probable and damaged. while themselves sustaining only a loss of 12 pilots and 25 machines . These results exceed all expectations and give just and sober confidence in the approaching struggle.' Good solid Churchillian stuff The Germans claimed to have shot down 79 RAF aircraft for the loss of 43 of their own. a total somewhat at variance with the RAF"s claims of 185enemy destroyed for the loss of 25 of their own number. At the same time that these critical combats were taking place. the Luftwaffe had begun to increase its nightly raids . 'Battle of Britain Day' did not bring an end to the German daylight offensive and there were a number of significant raids in late September and early October. On

Fight er COIIIIIW/l{I'S (111)' Victoria Cross winner - Fit Lt E J B Nicolson of249 Squadron, awarded fo r his actions 011 12 Augllstl940,

24 September the Hurricanes of 17 Squadron were airborne at 0830 to patrol their base. being joined by 73 Squadron: vectored towards 30+ bombers with fighter escort over the Thames. 17 Squadron 'acted as rear-guard to take on the fighters. Fg Off Bird-Wilson was shot-down and baled out: three other aircraft circled until they saw him picked-up by a boat. PIO Wissler was hit and injured but managed to crash -land at base. FlO Czernin claimed a probable on a 109 and PIO Pittman claimed a damaged 109.' Two of the named pilots had appeared in the ORB earlier that month with awards of DFCs. the citation of which read: Fg Off Harold Bird-Wilson 'has shot down six enemy aircraft and shared in the destruction of several others. He has shown fine fighting qualities and determination in his attacks'; Fg Off Count Manfred Czernin 'has displayed great keenness in his desire to engage the enemy. and has destroyed nine of their aircraft. In August 1940 he led his Section in a head-on attack on a large formation of enemy aircraft. destroying three of them.' A few days later. 27 September, the Squadron was in another pitched battle. again with 73 Squadron alongside . Airborne over base at 0905 they spotted 30-40 Me II Os over London at 18.000ft in three large circles. revolving inside each other in opposite directions. The rear section of the Squadron was attacked by 109s and Sgt Bartlett landed at Debden with part of his tail fin shot away and the rudder controls unserviceable. The Squadron climbed to attack the Me II0s and Fg Off Czernin claimed a 11 0. as did Sgt Griffiths, who also claimed a probable. with Sgt Steward also claiming a 110. PIt Off Leary joined a Hurricane of another squadron and got behind two I IOs. claiming one destroyed and one probable. Sgt Hogg got inside the I lOs and flew in the opposite direction and claimed one shot down. which crashed at

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Duxford , with Sgt Hogg landi ng at tha t airfield. When other Hurricanes and Spitfires joined in the enemy fled. with Manfred Czernin pursuing three I !Os to the coast of France. The Squadron flew four further pat rols that day. with a Bf 109 falling to Sgt Griffiths. and as an indication of the hectic pace for some pilots. Sgt Bart lett had flown on all four of the day's sorties. October brought o ne of the most successful days for 602 Squad ron o ut of Westharnpnett , with four patrols flown on the 29th : 'o ne of them being perhaps the most successful the Squad ron has yet fought. when at 27.000 ft the Squad ron . led by F/L Mount. saw two form ations of Me 109s. abo ut 25 in each . approac hing at 23.000 ft. With some adva ntage fro m the sun and the supreme asset of greater height. the Spitfires were ab le to inflict heavy casua lties with 7 Me 109s being destroyed. 2 probab ly destroyed and 3 damaged. One of o ur own Spitfires was very slightly damaged ' (602 Squadron ORB ). One of the most frequent comments made by fighter pilots involved in this, and indeed other. air battles. was the sudden change from a sky full of aircraft to being on your own. Bob 'Spud' Spurdle neatl y expresses this in his auto biogra phy 'The Blue Arena' I rechecked that Illy gun's safety catch was of! The gun-sight graticule glowed clearly and I lowered Illy seat a notch. M alan [Sqn Ldr A G Malan , CO of 74 Squadr on] curved to meet the HUllS head on and all at once we lI'ere into them. Yellowspinners, stiff square-tipped wings with spark les of light flickering. I tried to fo llow Illy leader around but, being fascinated by the enemy aircraft , somehow lost him. I couldn't fi nd a single Jerry. Twisting and turning, I couldn' t see a damned aircraft! No thing! The sky lI'as clean and bare. Far off. white contrails curved lazily this lI'as and that. But I couldn't watch them. Where had everyone Gravesend / 940, pi/aIs of 66 Squadron loiter in the crew-room.

A German bomber breaks-up under the impact of concentrated close-range fire; the hitting pOll'er of the 0.303 Browning lI'as often debated alit! the RAF eventually chose (later ill the war) cannon as the main fighter armament. gone? It was no use horsing around up here, twisting fro m side to side, look ing up, back and around, fra ntic with disappointment. I divedfor the deck - orders lI'ere 10 go straight back if separated and there was no fig ht in one's vicinity.

On the way back he latched o n to another Spitfire - Malan 's - and comp ou nded his erro r. He looked at me and shook his fist . Au toma tically I lowered my undercarriage, Malan just turned (/\ray and slowly shook his head.

The hand gesture norm ally mean s lower the undercarri age but in this case Malan was obvio usly j ust venting his feelings. as he did again back at Biggin Hill. 'Spud' Spurdle went on to have a fine comb at career. ending up as CO of 80 Squad ron and with a DF C and Bar. Some of the young men survived and learn t. but some did not. Despite the occasio nal intense day. the general pattern from mid September was one of ro utine patrols and little action as the Luftwaffe recogn ised that it would have to rethink an d re-gro up. As the daylight campaign began to wind down. the night campaign the Blitz - was starting in earnest. Night Blitz Th e German s had been taking advantage of the night skies from the sta rt of the campaign and it was frustra ting for the defenders, who still primarily had to rely on visual acq uisitio n. often aided by searchlight activity. The patrols had mixed results: Several patrols went up during the night. The weather was genera lly unfavourable. Thick cloud hamp ered the searchlights. and although enemy aircraft were in the vicinity of our patrols. the Special Equipment failed to pick anything up (29 Squad ron ORB for 9 August 1940).

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On the night of 28/29 Augu st Blenheim D of 600 Squadron was scra mbled: ' I was told to get off as soon as possible and patrol base at Angels 17. For the next hour we received a good number of vector s and investigated innumerable searchlight concentrations. We were sent to patrol a line across which a lot of enemy aircraft were making their way to the Midla nds. It was not long before [ saw the exhaust flames of an aircraft close in front and above, so turned and went flat out after him, to find we could ha rdly climb any higher , and all the controls were pretty sloppy. So having staggered into a line astern at approx 400 yards, let go a good bu rst. The enemy aircraft turned and dived , proving too fast for us to catch. A bit later [ saw exhaust flames below us and to starboa rd, so we d ived on them and was getting really close when we were illuminated from behind. One searchlight coming in from the front, flicked over the aircraft in front before fastening on to us. It was sufficient to show that we were very close, so opened fire before the searchlight blinded us entirely . Exhausted the remainder of my ammunition and again saw enemy aircraft dive away too fast fo r me to catc h.' The Blenheim landed at Hornchurch at 2320 with the crew uncertain as to if they had been successful. In a speech on 9 September, Adolf Hitler said : ' We are giving our reply night after night. If the British declare that they will att ack our cities heavily, then we will wipe out their cities.' The night blitz of London, and to a lesser extent other British cities, came as a major shock to the British peop le and became an abiding image of the war. Thi s night campaign did not really get underway until a utumn 1940 - but the first significant night raid on England had taken place on 18/19 June , the att acker s being He Ill s of KG .4. The bomber's targets were Mildenh all and Ho nington, two of Bomber Comm and 's airfields, plus a diversionary raid towards Southend. Four RAF sq uadro ns became involved in the night's acti vities - Blenheims of 23 and 29 Squadrons and Spitfires of 19 and 74 Squadron s. Two Heinkels on the Southend raid were first to fall on this clear night. both probably being shot -down by Fit Lt 'Sailo r' Malan of7 4 Squadron . His acco unt of his second combat that night sta ted: I ga ve it lira fi re-second bursts and observed bullets entering all ora the enemy aircraft. Enemy aircraft emitted heavy smoke and I observed one para chute open rery close . . . ( aircraft} crashed in flames near Chelmsf ord.

Malan had picked up the Heinkel because of searchlight acuvity in the a rea, spotting the bomber in a searchlight beam . Spitfires of 19 Squadron also had some success, o ne Heinkel falling to Fit Lt Clouston and Fg Off Petre being involved in the destruction of another. The latter incident involved a Heinkel, a Blenheim and a Spitfire - all of which were sho t-do wn! The Heinkel was picked up by the 23 Squadron Blenheim of Sqn Ldr O'Brien , Ju st as the Blenheim opened fire so too did Petre's Spitfire. As the la tter broke away to avoid the Blenheim it was sho t-do wn by the German bomber. Petre baling out. The Blenheim too took avo iding acti on and lost cont rol. with only the pilot surviving when the aircraft was aba ndoned. The bomber crew also had to bale out. Two 23 Squadron Blenheims took on ano ther Heinkel, with the bomber a nd one Blenheim falling. whilst in the final comba t of the night a 29 Squadron Blenheim damaged its target. which subsequently cra sh-landed on the beach near Calais. but then ended up in the Th ames. An interesting night all round with lesson s for both sides. There was little further night activity until Augu st a nd it was not until the night attacks on Lond on and other cities in the a utumn that great concern was cau sed to politician s and air plann ers. Having been withdrawn from the day battl e, the Defiants were proving to be effective night fighters. In the early hours of 16 Oct ober Defiant 1621 of 264 Squadron was on patrol and shot do wn a Heinkel of KGr.126, which crashed near Hult on a t 0200

ATIONS

Blenheim of 219 Squadron. 1940: the Squadron re-formed in October 1939 10 operate Blenheims and became ol/e of the Command's leading night-fighter squadrons.

with the loss of two of its crew. The pilot of the Defiant, Pit Off Desmond Hughes gave an account of the combat: . . . il was a bright moonlight night. Suddenly alii of the corner of my eye I sail' some thing more across the stars alii 10 my left . If.1'0 11 are scanning the n~g/~I sky it is normally completely still, so anything that moves attra cts the eye. This )IISI had 10 be another aircraft. I gal Fred ( Sgt Fred Gash ) 10 swing his turret around alit! lI'e both caught sight of a roll' of exhausts. I I ,ras a twin-engined aircraft. I slid alongside, be/ow 10 the right of him, and slowly edged in '1Il/de~ /~is armpi~' while Fred kept his guns trained on the aircraft. Then we sail' the dlslmc/I~'e ,rm~ ~I/d tail shape ofa Heink e/ - there was I/Omistaking it. l moved ill/a a fi ring POSl/lOI/. within about 50 vards of his wing lip and slightly below, so that Fred could align his glll/Sfo r aI/ ;,pward shot. Obviously the German crew had 1/01 seen liS. they continued straight ahead. Fred fi red straight into the starboard engine. One round in six was tracer, bill what laid us we were hittin g the Heink el was the glitter ofde Wilde rounds as they ignit ed on impact. Fred fire d, realigned, and fi red again. He gal .off 1'1'0 or three bursts. There was no relllrn fi re f romlhe bomber: indeed. I doubt if any guns could have been brought 10 bear 0 1/ our position 0 1/ its beam. The engine burst into fl ames then the Heinkel rolled on its back, went down steeply and crashed 0 11/0 a fie ld near Brentwo od.

Whilst Lond on was hit heaviest in term s of number of raids and bomb tonnage, the a ttack on Co ventry on the night of 14115 overnber was seen as i~portant. as it was the first use of massive air power against a small city with the mtent being to cause widespread destruction ; in essence virtually to obliterate the city. The weather was good and bright moonlight helped the bombers find the ta rget. although .the us~ of .radlodirect ed pathfinders (KG .IOO) was also a factor. The attack sta rted With a diversiona ry

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Real/fi ght er of 25 Squadr on lI/ Witt ering.

raid on London at 1915, with the attack on Coventry itself opening a t 2020 and carrying on to 0610, by which time some 304 bombers had unloaded HE , incendi ary a nd landmines over the city. The RAF had a d isma l night , mounting 110 patrols but with no report s of combats other th an an engagement near Swaffharn , orfolk when one bomber was claimed as damaged. The Fighter Comm and ' Fo rm Y' summa ry for the night sta ted th at . . . 'enem y operations have been on a lar ge sca le and it is estimated that a t least 350 EtA have opera ted, the major ity o f which flew at 12- 15,OOOft. Cove ntry was the main tar get and was heavily bombed from 1900 hours.' It then listed the night fighter patrols, by Group:

sa lient points in a ir fighting, which it is essential that they sho uld master before taking thei r places as opera tio na l pilots in Fighter Squadrons. The va rious points illustrated a re by no mean s comprehen sive, and it must be clearl y und erstood th at only the main point s which a new Fighter Pilot sho uld kn ow before going into action a re included. These have been compiled on the advice and guidance of man y well-known and proved Fighter Pilots, who have willingly co-operated in placing their knowledge and experience at the disposa l of their younger brother-pilot s. ' In selecting the motto of the Three Mu sketeers - " all for one a nd one for a ll" - to pu t at the head of this Forew ord, I have don e so becau se it expresses wha t sho uld be the creed of every Fighter Pilot. Never forg et that you are an essentia l cog in the wheel, a nd if you break or fail it will let down your brother pilots, and the grimness of war allows for no such weakness. 'Air fightin g is a combina tion of skill and courage, which, a llied with confidence and experience, makes the Fighter Pilot master of his trade.' The Westland Whirl wind was an interesting experiment for the Co mmand and after a year of teethin g troubles from its introduction in July 1940 it eventua lly sta rted to show pro mise. Th e first confirmed victory occurred on 8 Februa ry 194 1 - and was marked by the Squ ad ron being given a case of cha mpagne by Westland . T oday gave us our first confirmed victo ry . .. two aircra ft of Blue Section took -off from Exeter at 0840 on a local practice flight. At 0900 they were vecto red onto Raid 139. While orbiting 12 miles South of Start Point an Arad o 196 was seen by Sgt R udland, who cam e down on its tail. but seeing British roundels on the fuselage did not fire, a nd in fact form att ed on it. The enemy went into cloud and rea ppeared flying East 1,000 yards to Port of Fg Off Hughes, who carri ed out an att ack from the front quarter, end ing in a beam atta ck, opening at

No. 9 Gp - nil. No. 10 Gp - 34 patrols. No. II Gp - 49 pat rols; 26 Defiant , 10 Beaufighter, 7 Hurricane, 6 Blenheim; 5 EtA seen but no inte rcept s. No. 12 Gp - 24 pat rols; Blenh eim fro m Digby claim one dam aged near Swaffh am . No. 13 Gp - 10 pat rols. No. 14 Gp - 3 patrols.

1941 - Consolidation and new strategies Wh ilst maintainin g defensive cover for Britain, including coas ta l shipping, the Co mman d a lso went look ing fo r the enemy with offensive opera tions over France. It was to be a difficult year with a great deal of flying and little result , the Ge rma ns choosing not to ta ke the bait of Fighter Co mmand Wings a nd Circuses unless the conditions were j ust right. Some time in lat e 1940 or very ea rly 1941, o. 13 Group issued its pilots with a fascinat ing little advice booklet. Forget-me-n ots for fighters contained 'pea rls of wisdo m' from the experiences of the Battle of Britain a nd used cartoons to illustrate the point s made. Th e booklet was issued du ring AVM Sau l's tenure as AOC , a nd in his introduction he states: 'This book is the outcome of discussion amongst the T rain ing Staff on the best a nd simplest way to bring to the not ice o f new Fighter Pilot s certain

THE

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450 and closing at 200 yards . A 5 second burst was fired, but no results were observed . Mea nwhile FIt Lt Crooks and Pit OfT Graham had ta ken ofTfrom St Eval. At Dod man Point Pit Off Graham was o rdered to patro l below the cloud while Fit Lt Crooks pat rolled above . Fit Lt Crooks came back down through the clo uds. And j ust as he emerged, passed Pit Off Gr ah am who was going West. He did a gentle left hand turn , intending to call Pit Off Graham and tell him to format e on him, but to his surp rise Whirlwind of 263 Squadron ; The Westland Whirlwind was all interesting experiment fo r the Command and aft er a year of teething troubles from its introduction ill July 1940 it eventually started to show promise. The fi rst CO lifirmed victory occurred 0 11 8 February 1941 - and lras marked by the Squadron being given a case of champagne by Westland.

found that PIt Off Gr ah am had disappe ared. Sudd enly he saw an EIA come thr ough the cloud on his left going lower and lower until it hit the water. FIt Lt Crooks had difficulty in identifying the EtA, but he saw floats uppe rmost on the water and black crosses on a piece of wing wreckage. PIt Off Gr aham did not retu rn from the patrol. A Coastguard reported that two aircra ft had crashed into the sea at 0950 three miles ofT the shore in flames' (263 Squadron ORB ). There was also occasional action at the other end of Fighter Command's domain . On 2 March 1941 Hurri cane of 3 Squad ron was operat ing o ut of Sumburgh . . .'Two Hur ricanes of Red Section, " A Flight " , took-off from Sumburgh at 1427 on 2nd March to intercept Raid 252. When flying at 10 feet over sea at 1435, approximately 30 miles East of Sumburgh Red Section sighted a single Focke-Wulf 200 Co ndo r about 5 miles ahead. EtA was flying 10 feet over the sea at about 220 miles per hour on a course of 130 degrees. ' Red One, PtO Cra bb atta cked first, closing to 400 yards and firing two 4-second bursts, breaking away at 150 yards. It is believe rear gunner of EtA was killed during this attack as after first few seconds of return fire from MtG ceased abruptly and Red 2 experienced no return fire when carrying o ut his astern attack. EtA increased speed to 270 mph and Red I climbing away to right delivered a diving atta ck from 800 feet directly to sta rboa rd firing a 3-second bur st from 800 yards to 30 yards. Passing over and slightly behind EtA Red I delivered a similar attack fro m Port. No return fire from EtA experienced during either atta ck. Having run out of ammunition Red I made a dumm y attack from fron t star board to force EtA down on to sea. Heavy return fire experienced from front guns. Tracer seen to enter EtA on all three atta cks. Red I then broke away and returned to base. ' Red Two, PtO Robertson followed Red I into attac k flying astern and slightly above him. When Red I broke from his first attack Red 2 fired a 3-second burst from dead astern observing his tracer enterin g fuselage of EtA. Red 2 broke away as Red I delivered his sta rboa rd att ack and climbin g to the right delivered a diving beam from 200 feet above, firing a one-second burst. Red 2 had to break off his attack as Red I was firing from the opposite beam . He then delivered an other astern attack firing a 6-second burst from appro ximately 200 yards and aga in saw tracer enter EtA. No return fire was experienced by Red 2 durin g these attacks . Red 2 then brok e away and returned to base with Red I.' An interest ing combat and testimony to the rob ust nature of the Condo r, especially one that was flying only ten feet above the sea! Th is was one of the few ' highlights' for the Squadron ; despite the fact that the Condo r flew on, and a more usual rou tine was one of patrols and scrambles from Sumburgh and Castletown. Th ere had been four other scrambles on 2 March, with five the next day and a Dusk patro l, with two scrambles and a Dusk Patrol the following day; the Patrol was flown by six aircra ft fro m Cast letown and found nothi ng of interest. At the end of the mon th the Squadron reunited at Cast letown prior to a move south to Martl esham Heath and what all the pilots hoped would be more action . Initially, however, they were to be disapp oin ted as the Hurrican e li s were still stuck with convoy pat rols, altho ugh there was the odd comba t with lone Do 17s or Ju 88s. On 20 Jun e 194 1 White Section of66 Squad ron was ordered up to intercept a raid coming from the South . Th e two Spitfires, (piloted by FIt Allen and Sgt Large) climbed to 20.000 ft but were almost immediately ordered down to 6,000 ft by the con troller. About 30 miles Sout h of Bolt Head they spotted three He Ill s at approxi mately 6,000 ft, with five Bf 109s as escort weaving above them at 7.000 ft. The Squad ron ORB takes up

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ATIONS

Spitfire Vb of 129 Squadron at Debden in November 1941. ( Andy Thomas Collection).

it a quarter attack with three 2-sec bur sts at 150 yards. More white smo ke came out of the EtA and it crashed into the sea. Meantime White 1 saw another 109 com ing towards him from behind and by dint of graceful man oeu vring himself came down on the EtA's tail and gave it a 3-sec bur st in a qu arter atta ck fro m 75 ya rds, as a result of which black smoke belched from its engine and the mach ine glided down. White I saw the pilot bale o ut and the par achute open and White 2 saw it go down , but they them selves were rather occupied with other matters. White I a nd White 2 then took evasive acti on, were unable to find the band its again and returned to base.' Th e AOC of o. 10 G roup sent a congra tulato ry message the following day: '. . . there is no doubt that this fine effort successfully frustra ted a n intended atta ck on our shipping and gave the Hun a lesson he will not forget in a hurry. I look forwa rd with co nfidence to further successes by your Squadron.'

'Eagle' ( /21 Squadron) pilots; the Squadron form ed in May 1941 and initiallyflew Hurricanes prior to re-equipping with Spitfires in October ami becoming the 335th Fighter Squadron of the 4th Fighter Group in September 1942.

the sto ry: 'White I then warned by White 2, who is not experienced, to gain height and look after his tail and dived to gain speed for attack. White I saw a 109 com ing up at him, firing, but, altho ugh the sho ts were close, the aircraft was not hit, a nd in fact neither of our aircra ft was marked as a result of this co mbat. After the first 109 had fallen away, Whit e I fastened onto a pair of 109s rath er below him and delivered a sha rp qu arter atta ck (2-secs at 150 yards) from the port side of the rear one, the engine of the EtA emitted white smo ke and it slowed up and passed across the path of White 2 who gave

N ight Defence Am on gst the new sq uadro ns opera tional in 1941 was 255 Squadron, who entered the fray on 5 Januar y and had three crews on sta ndby each night. It was a frustrating first month with pat rols and the occas ional glimpse of the enemy but no success. However, 10 Februa ry was a very busy night and also brou ght the first successes. A number of patrols were flown in the Humber-Spurn Point are a and two of these found tar gets:

NI 770 (Ft L T rou sdaletSgt Chunn), pat rolled Humber, sighted EtA a t 2250 hou rs 200 yards to port, closed in a nd identified it as a He III . Got in thr ee bur sts of fire, EtA disappeared diving steeply a t 100ft. N3335 (ptO HalltSgt Fitzsimmo ns), pat rolled Humber, sighted EtA at approx 2315 flying a t right an gles to me and below, flying West, which proved to be a He III . Got in three bur sts, EtA descendin g all the time. Last a ttac k delivered at 3,500 ft. EtA last seen diving toward s the sea .

129

130

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

OPERATIO

5

Am ongst the lIew squadrons operational ill 1941 was 255 Squadron, who entered the fra y 011 5 January and had three erell's 011 standby each night. II lI'as a frustrating fi rst month with patrols and the occasional glimpse of the enem)' bUIIIO success.

Air Ministry subsequent ly confirmed them as ' Probably Destroyed: These first successful co mbats had a heartening effect on the who le Squadron. The major attack on Liverpool on 121 13 March involved over 300 bombers and Fighter Command flew 178 sorties during that night. with claims being made for four destroyed. The Fighter Command log record of claims is shown in the table below:

Cl a ims for t2l13 ;\tarch

1 9~t

Group

Sq uadron

Aircraft

Claim

Rema rk

, 0. 9 0 p

96 Sqn 307 Sqn 6().1 Sqn

Hurricane

He III destroyed He II I damaged Ju 88 destroyed ? Probable J u 88 dam aged He III damaged He I II dest royed He III destroyed J u 88 pro babl e He III pr oba ble J u 88 prob abl e

Crashed at Wychbo ld So uth coast Crashed at Wa rminster

No . 10 O p

De fiant Bea ufigh ter

No.1 1 Gp

264 Sqn

Defiant

No. 12 Gp

219 Sqn 255 Sq n 151 Sq n

Bea ufighter De fian t

Hurricane

Over sea South coast

South coast Cras hed in sea C ras hed Beachy Head Over sea Retfo rd

Over sea

The 96 Squadron victory had been scored by Sgt Me air in Hurricane V7752 and the Squadron also claimed a probable. although this does not appear in the Fighter Command log. The 96 Squadron O R B for the night also stated: ' 18 trips hunting for the enemy and the result - no la rge numbers of enemy aircraft blazing on the ground. but just a drawing of the enemy blood in "probables" , and a squadron with tails well up and a few gun sights a nd gun muzzles that had spat forth fire at the enemy machines. There was great enemy activity over Liverpool and several of our aircraft were in action for the first time. FlO Vesely was the first in action. having taken off in Defiant 1803 at2155

Ne ll' Z ealand air gunners of 255 Squadron at Kirton-in-Lindsey.

with Sgt Heycock to patrol Co tton East at 15.000ft. He saw an He II I above on the port side and told the air gunne r. but the guns failed to fire. He kept the Defiant in formation with the German aircraft and flew alongside and slightly below. expecting that the air gunner would get the guns to fire. Then the pilot of the Heinkel dived . followed by FlO Vesely. who man oeuvred to get on to the starboard side. He flew in formation again but

Defiant of 151 Squadron. Wittering; the Squadron operated Defi ants for 18-molllhs fr om December 1940.

13 1

132

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

OPERATIONS

the side gunner of the Heinkel got in two bursts. Pilot felt that he had been hit in the chest, shoulders and left arm . He lost consciousness and when he came round found the Defiant falling in a spin; however, he managed to recover and return to land despite his injuries.' German aircraft were ran ging far and wide at night and in the early hour s of 8 April Sqn Ldr Simpson , OC of 245 Squad ron , scrambled from Aldergrove, Northern Ireland: I was in the M ess when nell's came that the Germans were dropping bombs on a tall'll nearby. It seemed rath er strange. The war had not come so close to Ulster befo re. Incendiaries had been dropped and high ex plosive bomb s were on the way. I was next to parrol. It was about I. J5 in the morning, dark with a sick ly moon shining through a mist. I took offand climbed to about 9,000f t. passing above the clouds into anoth er world. where the moon, in its second quart er. shone alit of a blue-black sky. I was told that there were aircraf t near me. My eyes searched the blackn ess. There was no horizon: no object upon which to fix one 's eyes. And one had the illusion, travelling at 200 miles per hour, that e\wy one ofthose brilliant stars lI'as the taillight ofan aircraft. I searched am ong that moving pattern oflights and my eyes rested upon two black objects. I could see them because. as they moved. they obliterated the stars. They lI'ere quit e near when I recognised them as aircraft . . . whether enemy or not, I was unable to tell. So I flew nearer and learned soon enough. The rear gunners of both aircraft fired a shower of bullets at me. some with whitish-green light of tracer bullets, some glowing red. They missed me and for a minute I lost them. Then I saw them again. f arther apart, moving against the while floor of the clouds below me. They were black and quit e clear. The advantage was noll' mine fo r they were perf ectly pla ced as targets. I crept down to attack the rear-most of them. They were flying slowly. It was diffi cult fo r me to withhold my speed so that I would not overtake him. A t a distan ce of about 200 yards I opened fire from slightly below. Then come my next surprise . . . the blinding flas h ofmy guns. in the dark ness. In day lim e one does not see iI. At nigh t it is terrific and I II'as so blinded that I lost sight of my enemy. I brok e away and lost him fo r a few seconds. I next sail' him going into a gentle dive towa rds the clouds. The increase in speed made it easier fo r me to attack and I closed in to 80 ya rds. I opened fire once more. This time I was prepa red for the flash and k ept my ey es on the enemy. H is rear gunner returned my fi re. but only fo r a second. I had appa rently go t him fo r he was silent after that . I continued my fi re, closing in to abou t 50 y ards. Then I sail' a comforting red glow in his belly. I was still firing when the Heink el blew up, with a terrific explosion which blew me upwards and sideways. When I righted myself, I was delight ed to see showers of flam ing pieces . . . lik e confetti on fire . . . falling towards the sea. I was able to enjoy the sat isfaction of kn owing that I had brought him down before he had released his bombs.

The second bomber escaped but a month later (6 May) Simpson claimed a Ju 88. British cities were still vulnerable to night att acks and April witnessed a concentrated attack on Coventry. ight-fighters were still in short supply and Fighter Night s were a sta nda rd role for many of the day-fighter squadrons. With Coventry providing the

VIP visit to 245 Squadron at Aldergrove; the Squadron scored a number ofnight successes.

backgro und illumination, 266 Squa dron had four Spitfires over the City in the early ho urs of 9 April. The OR B reco rds the four sortie s: P8187, PIO Thomas: Ordered to vector 265 deg and reached Coventry in about IS mins at 16,000 ft. Climbed up to patrol height at 22,260 ft. Orb ited at this height and after a short while saw one E1A silhouetted against fires a long way benea th . Dived after it but lost it when it went o ut of glow of the fires. Returned to patrol height. After about an hour o rdered to return to base and land. P80lO, Sgt Cook : Vectored on 265 deg and after 15 mins arri ved over Coventry at 15,000 ft. Climbed to 21,240ft and orbited for an hour. No E/A seen. Ordered to return on vector 085 deg and to land . P7992, S/Ldr Jameson: At 0144 hrs at 18,OOOft saw one E1A with one of our fighters formatting on it and trai l of smoke from each engine. Turned to cha se it and join in when saw an He II I at about 17,000 ft. Made stern attack at 150 yds. T here appeared to be four streams of return fire, one of them green, probably from the top turret. Fired two short bursts, but dazzled by bullets when the hit the E1A and brok e away after first atta ck. Then carried out another stern attack and windscreen was obscured by oil from EIA. Great burning pieces came off the E/A which dived down th rough the clouds . No evasive action by the EIA. P8185, Fill Armitage: Patrolled Coventry above fires at 27,000-2 8,000 ft. Visibility bad from 26,OOOft upward s due to haze. No E/A plotted at this height and no E1A seen. T he following night the Squadron was over Birmingham; Fit Lt Armitage was again one of the four pilots, but this time he found and engaged a target: .. . aft er turning S outh saw a twin-engined aircraft about 200 ft beneath . travelling S W directly over the fir es. Was able to ident ify it imm ediat ely as an He II I. but attack ed too swiftly. partly through fear of losing it and partly in endeavour to get it before it dropped its bombs. As a result did not get sight on until 100 yds away with rath er high overtak ing speed. On ope ning fi re was immediat ely dazzled.

133

134

OPERATIONS

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

probably by effect of De Wilde strik ing 011 EIA fuselage. which "'as certainly hit. After a burst of 2Yz sec had to break-away violently. Made a thorough search ill direction ill which EIA had been going but could 1I0t find it again

S ummar)' of Fig hte r Co mma nd N ight-Fighter Defensi ve Operations, t9.1t

.lfonl h

On 3 May the Squad ron moved to Debden for night- fighter operations and a week later ( 10 May) the ORB recorded one of the most active nights: The Squad ron too k part on a Fighter Night operation durin g a heavy raid on Lond on . The Squad ron's allotted heights were from 22,000 ft upwards, and only four enemy aircraft were seen. Sqn Ldr Aitken gave a Ju 88 two short bursts of cannon fire, the second at extreme range, and saw explosive shells burst in its belly with a violent bluish-red flash. The Ju 88 took violent evasive actio n, mak ing otT East, and is claimed as damaged . Sgt Shaw, whilst makin g a starboa rd turn was confront ed with an He III at 50 yards range beam on. He raked it with 60 ro unds from his 12 machine-guns and saw incendiaries striking it am idships. The enemy aircra ft fell away rap idly sideways and is claimed as probably dama ged' (3 Squadron ORB ). May was to prove the busiest mon th of the year for Fight er Co mmand's night defences, with almost 2,000 sorties flown and 96 enemy aircr aft claimed as destroyed. Two-thirds of this etTort (1,345 sorties) was by the single-engine sq uadrons. One of the latt er, 255 Squadron, still at Kirt on, had it busiest and most successful month: 'This moonlight period (till 17/5141 ) was one of inten se enemy " blitzing" of target areas in E and Central England and in conseq uence a considerable strain was thrown on the Squadron. Each night o ne Flight was at "readiness" with the other "available", and on some occasio ns during the peak moonlight period as man y as 16 planes have been at " readiness" . From the assumption of this dusk state on 215/41 till the end of night sta te on 1715/41 (15 nights) a total of 132 ope rational pat rols were flown. In fact a total of 88 were flown in the 6 nights from midnight 4/5/41 till midnight 10/5/41 , an average of more than 14Yz patrol s per night. The Squad ron had it most successful night since formation. Th e most sat isfactory aspect of these combats is that the losses inflicted on the enemy were all achieved at the loss of only one Defiant, bot h the occupants of which landed safely by baling-ou t of their burning machine.' The victories recorded for this period we re:

5 May: S/Ldr Sm ith/PIO Farnes. Ju 88, Donna Nook. 7 May: Sgt Craigl Sgt Muir, He I I I da maged, near Goole. 8 May: Sgt Joh nsonlSgt Aitchison, He II I, near Kirton. 'This actually occurred within sight of the 'drorne, the pilots and N Gs assemb led at dispersal point having a grand-s tand view of the ElA catching fire at 10,000ft and coming down in flames.' PIO Dale (Hurr icane), Do 17 damaged, Hull. 9 May: S/Ldr Smith (Hurricane), He III , Hull. S/Ldr Smith (Hurricane) , He III damaged, Hull. PIO WyrilUSgt Maul , He III, Hull. PIO Wynne-Willson/Sgt Plant , He III, Hull. PIO WrightlS gt McChesney, Ju 88, Hull. FIll TrousdalelSgt Chunn, He III, Leconfield area. FIll TrousdalelSgt Chunn, He I I I, Leconfield area, crashed in sea. Th e OR B qu ite rightl y commented on the events of 9 May: 'This remark able achievement - 6 enemy bombers destroyed, and one damaged inside half an hour with no loss to the Squad ron 's personn el or planes, evoked a deluge of congra tulatio ns.'

Germa n sorties

Jan

2.295

Feb

1.820

Mar

.1.125

Apr

5.125

May

.1.625

J un

1.980

Jul

1.352

Aug

935

Sop

838

Oct

8.19

Nov

695

Dec

695

Tot als

25.3J.j

Typ e

TE Aircr aft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Aircr aft SE Aircr aft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Aircraft SE Aircraft T E Aircraft SE Airc raft T E Aircraft SE Aircraft TE Airc raft SE Aircraft TE Aircraft SE Airc raft

Sort ies

84 .102 1.17 .121 270 735 J.j2 842 6.13 1.J.j5 536 942 557 338 549 592 361 344 621 496 .117 345 440 211 11.980

Contacts

,

44 J.j 25 33 115 J.j 11 8 .15 217 154 94 2.1 80 25 83 5

Combats

2 9 .I

9 31 25 55 39 102 11 6 37 15 23 18 .I

7 11 6 10 8.1 8 .17 2

1 10 3 36 3 15 0 6 0

1..190

367

77

Claims

0 3 2 2 15 7 28 20 37 59 20 7 20 6 3 0 7

AAA or other

1.1 13 21 .II .II

15 7 7 3

I

9 2 7 0 3 0 258

3 4 6 175

Note: SE - Singfe-engined. TE - Twin-engined.

Offensive Operati ons 1941 Th is was the year in which Fighter Command started to take its war to the enemy, by day and by night. The Comma nd's first recorded - official - offensive mission too k place on 20 December 1940. Taking-o tT from Biggin Hill a pair of Spitfires from 66 Squa d ron (Fit Lt G P Christie and Pit OtTCA W Bodie) flew across the Channel jus t below a bank of cloud that had a base of only a few hundred feet. Th ey coasted in at Dieppe. turned inland near Criel and flew No rth at tree-to p height until they came to an airfield, which they took to be Berek or Le Touquet. They flew low over the airfield, firing at anyt hing that appea red to be a reasonable target , and were fired on by the airfield defences. Both aircraft returned safely. Only a few such Rhubarbs were flown each month and the first confirmed victory came on 9 April when Fit Lt O'M eara of 64 Squad ron downed an He 59 otT Dunkirk, and a Bf 109 falling to a 54 Squadron pilot later the same day. 10 Janu ar y saw the first bomber Circus, with fighters escortin g Blenhe ims to the Fore t de G uisnes. Th e summary for Circus No. I sta ted: 'at 1215 hours six Blenheim s of 114 Squadron , No.2 Group, Bomber Command, made rendezvous over Southend with six fighter squadro ns - 56, 242, 249, 41, 64 and 611. From Southend the Blenheims flew in a tight form ation at 12,000 ft to a point on the French coast ju st East of Cala is. Th e Hurricanes of 56 Squadron flew in various situations around and amidst the form ation of Blenheims; those of 242 and 249 squadrons about 1,000 ft below and to sta rboa rd,

135

136

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPER

Groundcrew working all Spitfire of 91 Squadr on; most pilots developed all exce llent relationship with their regular groundcrew, who took pride in keeping 'their' pilar's aircraft ill tip-top condition.

with the second of these squadrons a little a bove and to starboard of the first. Th e Officer Com ma nding RAF Stat ion orth Weald (Wg Cd r F V Beami sh) flew with 249 Squadron. The Spitfires of 41. 64 and 611 sq uadrons flew in a stepped-up formation above and to port of the Blenheims, with 64 Sq uad ron lead ing and 41 Squad ron in the rear at 16.000ft. Spitfires of611 Squadron ; the Squadr on fl ew as part of Circus No.1 acting as fi ghter for the attacking squadrons.

CO I'eT

s

' On crossing the French coas t the Blenheim s changed to a more open formatio n. which they retained while over France. Takin g gentle evasive act ion a nd comin g down to 6,800 ft, they made a sweep round the tar get so as to approach it from the South-East. All six Blenheims dropped their bombs from 6,800 ft at 1249 hours; most of the bomb s fell among the trees. where they seemed to sta rt two fires. ' While the bom bers were executing these manoeuvres. vario us th ings were hap pening to the fighters. The plan of the operatio n provided that 56 Squ ad ron sho uld stay with the Blenh eims: the othe r two Hu rricane squadrons were to engage the enemy's fighters. or , failing this. co me down low and attack an aerodrom e and landing gro und at St Inglevert. Th e three Spitfire squadro ns were to act as fighter-cover for the att acking squadro ns th rou ghout. Accordingly, 242 a nd 249 squadro ns (with Wg Cdr Beamish) described two circles over the a rea between St Inglevert and Calais a t 7.000 ft to 8.000 ft, but met no enemy fighters at this stage. Nevertheless, they refrained fro m makin g any concerted attac k on the aero dro me a nd land ing ground. both of which looked inactive. One pilot of 249 Squad ron (Sgt Maciejo}"ski) became separated fro m he rest of the forma tion a nd ope ned fire on five HS 126 aircraft sta nding on the edge of one of landing grounds beside the Foret de G uines. He then saw two Me 109s in the air. one of which he attacked and claims to have sho t down. During this man oeuvre his th rottl e ja mmed in the fully-open position a nd he was compelled to return in this condition to Hornchurch, where he land ed successfully by switching off his ignition . •At various point s the bomber and fighter squadron s were subjected to anti-aircraft fire, most of it inaccurat e. Exceptionally accura te fire came from four boats stand ing three or fou r miles off Cala is. On the homeward journey Wg Cdr Beami sh rake d their decks wi th machine-gun fire. and they sto pped firing. Over the Cha nnel a pilot of 249 Squadron (Pia McConn ell) was a ttacked by an Me 109, wound ed. and forced to bale out. Wg Cd r Beami sh cam e to his assista nce and ope ned fire on the Me 109. which was seen to fall into the sea.' The Spitfire squadrons had a pretty uneventful mission, alth ou gh '4 1 Squadron was approa ched from the rear by five Me I09s j ust as it was crossing the coa st. A pilot of the rearguard Section (Sgt Baker) attacked one of these aircraft and may have destroyed it.' The concl usions drawn from this first Circus stated that : This ope ra tion was generally co nsidered a success. In most respects the plan co nceived beforehand worked well: a nd the results . as far as they went, were satisfactory. A military objective had been bo mbed in dayl ight without the loss of a single bomber. At least two enemy aircraft were believed to have been destroyed; and our losses in com ba t a mounted to a single Hurricane. whose pilot was in hospital with a broken leg. Incident ally, it had been discovered that German flak ships could appa rently be silenced by rakin g their decks with machine-gun fire. On the other hand. as a test of superiority the opera tion had been inconclusive. since no major engagement had materialised. Moreover , there was a suspicion in some quarters that we had been lucky not to meet mor e energetic op position. which the tende ncy of our squadrons to break up and come down low might have rendered dangerous. It was co ncluded that for some time we would be wise to go slowly. and content ou rselves with attempts to surprise and con fuse the enemy, witho ut risking heavy losses.' The latt er comments were certainly valid and when Circus 2 was planned. the option of going down low after gro und tar gets was banned. Sqn Ldr A G 'Sailor' Malan led 74 Squadron on Circus o. 2; twelve aircra ft of the Squadr on were airbo rne at 1315 to be part of a la rge fighter escort for five B1enheims bom bing Boul ogne docks. Th e Blenheims

137

138

s

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Hurricane of312 Squadron at Kenley, JUlie 1941 where they had recently arrived 10 join the offe nsive operations ol'er Europe.

Douglas Bader {Znd fro m right) and pilots of616 Squadron; Bader lI'as effec tive air combat leader.

a ll

aggressive and

had an uneventful time and the Germ an s did make an appearance. with Malan and Sgt Payne each claiming a Bf 109 but with Sqn Ldr Michelmore failing to make it back. Douglas Bader was soon in on the offensive operations act; on the morning of 12 January he took Stan Tu rner of 242 Squadron on a Rhu barb, and they found two ships near Ca lais: . . . opened fire together at a height of 50ft and speed of 200 mph, sail' bullets strik e water ahead of Esboat and Then hitting Esboat. GOI one burst from front guns of Esboat - no damage. E-boaT ceasedfire. FII L t Turner, ha ving converged slightly on me, turned all'ay TOavoid slipstream as lI'e passe d over Esboat . Did not stop 10 observe dam age 10 boats bill Esboat must ha ve had a lOT as could see bullets from 16 guns hitting The boat.

Hitting the tar get and running away was definitely the best tactic and failure to ado pt this type of tactic was a common cau se for losses - having been over the targe t once you will have woken-up the defences! Indeed. the Squad ron flew two more similar missions tha t day. each with fou r aircraft and with one aircraft failing to return fro m each mission. The losses versus results stat istics for the offensive missions of this sort ofte n gave cause for concern - was the effort worth it - but it must be remembered that in part these missions were designed to give the fighters an aggressive. offensive spirit and to boost the mor ale of pilots who did not like sitting around in England waiting for something to happen . It was a definite case of taki ng the war to the enemy as par t of the overall strategy of seizing and maint ainin g the initiative. Wing Sweeps were mounted on a regular basis; a typical example being that of late afternoon (1600 take-off) 15 April by Spitfires of 65 and 266 squad rons and Hurricanes of 402 Squad ron. a total of 34 aircra ft. Th is was a Channel Sweep between Dungeness and Boulogne. ' WICd r Coope became separa ted due to minor engine tro uble

but followed to rendezvous at Dungeness. When at 20.000 ft. 33 mins afte r leaving base (Wittering) he was turning to the left when attacked from port quart er by Me 109. turned and went into steep dive to evade. but was hit by two cann on shells, one of which went through parachute. Port ailero n and petrol tank also hit. Came o ut of second dive at 5,000 ft and crash -landed at Manston . Pilot unhurt. Other nine aircraft (of 266 Squadro n) had swept to Boulogne at 23.000 ft - Hurricane s being at 20.000 ft and 65 Squad ron ju st above. 266 Squad ron were spread out widely in pairs and were at 10,000ft on return to coast and Hornchurch. When commencing to close in. four Me 109s dived on them from Sou th o ut of sun. P7544 badly damaged by cannon fire. pilot (Sgt Barraclough) landed at Horn chu rch unhu rt. P8014 also bad ly damaged and crash-landed at Hawkinge, pilot (Sgt Whewll) receiving slight superficial injuries. P8185 (P/O Holland ) fired 2 sec burst at Me I09 which suddenly dived beneat h on tail of Spitfire, but was full deflection shot. and thinking another Me 109 was on his own tail broke off with a steep climbing turn and did not again see EtA . Whilst this Me 109 is not claimed as damaged, three pilots saw an Me 109 dive past them at 300 mph at this time with wheels partially down. Seven Spitfires landed at Horn church to refuel and return to base.' (266 Squadron ORB). Thi s is a classic example of how quickly a peaceful piece of sky becomes a death trap for unwary fighter pilots - the 109s had set up a classic out-of-the-sun attack and in a quick pass had damaged at least two of the Spitfires. You could never relax when you were in the air as the famed ' Hun in the Sun' was always a threat. The main role for 263 Squad ron was convoy patrols. with a typical month (June 1941) involving 134 sorties of this type. However. the month also brought the first of wha t would become routine Ranger operat ions: 'This was a special operation known as " Warhead o. I Operation." Information had been received that there was a large concentratio n of Me 109s on the Cherbourg Peninsular; I and II JG2 and part of III JG 26 (about 70 machines in all) at Quarqerville. It was decided to attac k these machines on the gro und at first light on 14th Jun e.' Six Whirl winds moved to Ibsley the day before, to operate in two pairs and with two spares. the tar gets being Quarqerville and Maupertus. 'There had been a slight hitch on the Intelligence side. and photogr aph s of the target area had to be fetched by Spitfire from Middle Wallop. while a supply of French money was sent by dispatch rider from Fighter Command. All this kept us up rather late and we

139

140

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Cannon-armed Hurricane of 1 Squadron; these aircraft \I'ere used ground targets during offensive s\l'eeps.

OPERATIONS

10

great effect attacking

weren't in bed until about midnight. We got up about 0315 to find conditi ons very nearl y perfect. Th ere was a certain amount of cloud in the Sou th and a fairly clear moon. At 0445 Sqn Ldr Donaldson and Pit Off Rudl and took off, followed a minut e later by Fit Lt Pugh and Pit Off Mason . 'The form er found their target withou t much difficult y and delivered an attack on the dispersal pans in a sha llow dive fro m 1300 to 100 feet, Th ey saw their shells hitting and exploding in the pans, but unfortunately these were covered with tarpaulins, and they could not see whether there were any machines in them or not. Sqn Ldr Donaldson then put a burst into a barrack block and had a shot at an oil tank ; the latter he missed.. . . Fit Lt Pugh and Pit Off Mason were clean out of luck as their target was covered by a thick morning mist.' Th e initial attac k had stirred up a hornets nest and as the Whirlwinds land ed an air raid warning sounded as six 109s attempted to return the favour . . . 'but a sho rt brush with 234 Squadron rather damped their ardo ur and they returned home. After an early brea kfast we returned to Filton and made up for lost sleep.' On 17 July the four Hurricanes of 3 Sq uad ron took -off from Stapleford to attack E-boats - a popular target but a dangero us one. 'Blue and Green (one four-cannon and three 12 machine-gun aircraft) took-off to attack E-boats NE of Cap G riz Nez. Th ey attacked a 1,500-ton armed ship in tow with two ot hers, one a flak ship. Th e attack was made at zero feet out of the sun. Intense flak was experienced, but strikes were seen on the ships and some casualties on the flak ship. Blue Section then patrolled the coast and attacked an E-boat through intense flak , again seeing casualties on the boat.' All four aircraft returned safe and the ORB does not note any da mage. However, the Command was sta rting to suffer increasing cas ualties from this type of attack. The same day saw a number of Fighter Command sq uadrons on sweeps, including 308 (Polish) Squadron, led by Sqn Ldr Pisarak. His comba t report sta ted: 'North of St Orner we were attac ked from aste rn slightly on sta rboa rd side by about 15 Me 109s. I gave the order to circle to sta rboa rd - this sto pped their attac k. I then ordered the Squadron to resume formatio n with weavers and follow a zig-zag course towards the coast. Several times we had to re-form defensive circles owing to attempts by the numerous EJA to split up my sq uadro n. I was able to keep my men together and after

many times altering our direction and coun tering the enemy moves we approached Gravelines. I then heard P/O Blach call for assistance. I turn ed and saw several EJA behind him, one of which was about to dive on him. I delivered an attack on the EJA from below on the star boa rd side at 150/200 yds range, giving long bur sts. Th e German began to dive an d my No. 2, Sgt Schiele saw him going down with smoke pou ring from the engine and gave him two short bursts - after which flames were seen and the E/A dived to the gro und.' Th e Luftwaff e pilot had made the mistake of becomin g fixated o n his own ta rget and thu s fell victim to the sudden atta ck by Sqn Ldr Pisarak. A second 109 had been downed by Pit Off Retinger. At the height of the battle the Poles estimated tha t there were 50 enemy aircra ft in the vicinity. In July the Whirlwinds of 263 Squadron undertoo k weapon trials agai nst tank s, and it was increasingly in the strafing role that they were employed. At last, in August 1941, the diar ist was able to comment that : 'Au gust has been a mensis memor abilis. The Whirlwind has at long last been completely vindicat ed and j ustified, having shown that it is an admirable machine for gro und strafing, and also that it is a match for Me 109s. Many offensive sorties have been made during the mon th , mainly directed agai nst enemy aerodromes. As a result of these, three Me 109s have been destroyed in combat, and one damage d. Five Ju88s, at least 7 J U 87s and some Me 109s have been destroyed on the gro und, and others damaged. One E-boa t has been sunk and another damaged. In addition, two tankers at sea, gun posts, lorries, wireless stat ions and enemy troops have been attacke d and severe damage inflicted' (263 Squad ron ORB ). Following a Circus mission on 20 August, the 66 Squad ron ORB noted that the 'enemy aircraft were unusually aggressive.' The Squadron had sent eight aircraft to jo in similar numbers from 130 and 152 squadro ns in escorting six Blenheims; the Wing was led by Sqn Ldr Fo rbes who reported: 'I was lead ing the Squad ron. which was acting as high cover to six Blenheims. Some 20-30 miles from the coast I saw a Spitfire with a 109F on its tail at about 100 ft. I dived with my No. 2 from 600 ft and followed the 109, which had broken off its attac k and had turned South. I had great difficult y in catching up with the 109 and staying in position . Th ree 2-sec bur sts were fired and strikes obse rved. I then ran out of ammunition and broke away so that my No. 2 (Sgt G reen) could attack . Whilst he was attacking I covered his tail. After 3 or 4 bur sts from Sgt Gr een the 109 sta rted to pou r out black smoke, which turn ed white after a time. The 109 flew straight on for about half a mile and went into the sea nose first.' Pit Off Oliver was No. 2 in another Section on the sortie: Due 10 a dive after a 109 I had plenty of speed and \I'as able to climb and shoot while practically vertical at a 109 which commenced a head-on dive. It turned ((1m)' and m )' bullets entered its fuselage towards the tail . . . claim damaged. Another 109 atta cked No. 1 of the Section ( FIt Lt Allen) and myself head on. I \I'as about 150 yards behind Allen and \I'ebothfi red head on and as the 109 turned to starboard with a deflection shot. 109 continued 10 dive and shortly a lot of bluish smoke and oil started streaming 0 111 behind. Was unable 10 watch this ElA longer due to pressure of other £/A . . . claim probable.

The Luftwaffe was still active and the hunted could easily become the hunted. On 4 September 1941 Hurricanes of 302 Squadron were operating from Warmwell as highcover for a Blenheim attack on Cherbourg docks. The fighters were at 14,000 ft when Sqn Ldr Witorzenc saw a pair of 109s attac k the bombers; he closed on one, opening fire at 250 yards and closing at 80 yards, destro ying the Messerschmitt . Mean while, Pit Off

141

142

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

Sp orny went after ano ther pair th at he had seen mo ving in o n th e Wh irlwind esco rt. He mad e a three-quarter attack, firing sho rt bursts from 220 ya rds to 70 ya rds . The EIA turned o n its back pou ring smo ke. He followed it dow n to 1,000 ft but was th en bounced by two more enemy fight er s. He dived to 300 ft a nd had to fly 10 miles inland, j inking a nd dodging, before he was able to turn back - still pursued - unt il he finally man aged to get away. Fo r four successive months in late summer 1942, No . 452 (RA A F) Squ adron was the top -scoring unit in Fight er Co mma nd , in large part du e to the expl oit s of o ne of its Flight Commanders, Fit Lt Brendan Finucan e. The Squ adron claimed 40 a ircra ft de stroyed between Jul y and Oct ober, with Finuc ane sco ring 15 of these, br inging his persona l total to 20 and ea rn ing him two Bars to his DFC and a DSO. The citations read : Bar to DFC: G azetted 9 September This officer has led his flight with grea t dash. determinatio n and courage in the f ace of the enemy. Sin ce July . 1941. he has destr oyed three enemy aircraft and assisted in the destruction of a f urther tiro. Flight Lieut enant Finucane has been largely responsible fo r the fi ne fig hting spirit of the unit. Second Bar to DFC: G azett ed 23 September This officer has fo ught with marked success during recent operations orer Nor thern France and has destr oy ed a fu rther six enemy aircraft. Of these. three lI'ere destroyed ill aile day and tirO ill a single sort ie a ll another occasion. His ability and courage hare been reflected in the high standard ofmorale and fig hting spirit of his unit. Flight Lieutenant Finucane has personally destr oy ed fifteen hostile aircraf t. DSO: G azetted 17 Oct ober Recently, during tirO sort ies a ll consecutive days. Flight Lieutenant Finucane destroyed 5 Messerschmitt 109s bringing his to tal victories to at least 20. He has flown with this squadron since JUlie. 1941. during which time the squadron has destroyed 42 ellemy aircraft of which Flight Lieutenant Finucane has personally destr oyed 15. The successes achieved are undoubtedly due to this officer's brilliant leadership and examp le. Sadl y Brend an Finuc an e was killed in action o n 15 Jul y 1942 . One pilot of 92 Squadron made co mments in his log book th at reflected th e hazards of the se offensive mission s during thi s peri od of mid to lat e 1941: for example:

Bags offla k . horrible and twit chy. Heavily engaged by more 109s than Iras healthy : then caught the flak which Iras deadly . Hellish light flak . hit 36 times ill rail. We gar hammered. Blue Section Irere the lowest and Irere a little lower than ill/ended. We watched as a bunch of 109s dived past us and despite the shouted warnings Blue S ection rook 110 evasive action and Irere well and truly bounced. Fit Lt Lund. Sgt Edge and Sgt Port went straight down. Ano ther bad day - it Iras a shamb les and involved anoth er squadron being. as fa r as I was concerned, ill the lI'rollg place. A IlYlray lI'e got bounced and lost Sgts Cox and Wood-Scalrell. He summa rised what had been a bad peri od for 92 Squ adron. The Squ adron had been tak ing such a beating for a long time a nd o ur aircr aft were very tired de spite the best

Pair of Spirjires of306 Squadron getting airborne; mall)' of the offensive sorties Irere flown as pairs under the Ramrod or Rhubarb code-names. effo rts of the groundcrew. The tiredness of th e rernammg aircrew, the ove rworked gro undcrews and th e a ircraft th emselves made a mo ve nece ssary and on 20 Oc tober the Sq uad ro n moved to Digby and o . 12 Group.' N ight Intruders O n the night of 21 December 1940 six Blenhe ims of 23 Squ ad ron flew offensive pa tro ls having been 'o n stand by for nu isanc e raiding of aerod ro mes in French Occ up ied territory since the 16t h' . Eight aircraft had actua lly been stripped of A I equipment o n 10 December and placed o n sta nd by for 'spec ial m ission s over F rench terri tory but this was po stponed by G roup mowing to un su itable weather over France.' The six Blenheims took -off between 2020 and 0155 and patrolled the areas a ro und Abbeville, Amiens a nd Poix, three of the German night-fighter Sectors: acc ording to the O R B: 'the airfields were beaten -up at he ight s down to 1,000 ft.' Seven a ircra ft were ai rbo rne the following night to the sa me areas, but thi s time o ne of the Blenheims ran o ut of fuel and the crew had to ba le-out over the Channel. In thi s first intruder loss two of the crew drowned . The intruder role had been carried-out pri or to thi s by aircra ft of Bom ber Co mma nd's No.2 Group but fro m thi s date o nwa rds it became the responsibi lity of Fighter Command, a ltho ugh thi s was by no mean s exclu sive and Bomber Command con tinued to attack German airfields. Of the two aircra ft claimed as destroyed in September, o ne fell to Sqn Ldr Hoare of 23 Squ adron, the O R B recording: ' S/ L Hoare took -off for Melun, but seeing lights near Beauvais , turned aside to investigate and found the airfield lit up . He first chased an aircra ft with navigation lights that was landing but gave it up in favour o f an aircra ft seen o rbiting, and the ai r gunner put in a lon g bur st at 75 ya rds ran ge from underneath and to beam , but with out visible result and th e aircra ft was then lost. Then an other was seen and formatted o n and the air gunner put in a lo ng burst until blinded by a flash from his own gun . The EtA put o ut its lights and was lost. It was claimed as dam aged . Yet a th ird aircra ft was seen a nd followed as it turned in to land . The pilot opened fire at 100 yards ca using both engines to smo ke stro ngly as the EtA fell away to sta rboard in a vert ical dive at 600 ft. It is claimed as de stroyed.'

143

144

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

Intruder so rties and claims, 19-'" Nt s

Jan Feb Mar Apr

May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Totals

6 6 II

16 13 14 18 17

BIen.

23 8 49 33 I

10

12 8 10

141

114

H av.

16 56 48 87 61 35 28 21 22 374

Bost .

Hurr.

2 2 II

2 3

De/.

6 9

6 8 4 4 7 4 5 53

15

Tota l

23 8 51 57 77 54 95 65 39 35 27 28 559

EIA seen

Claim

II

19 51 33 128 4 14 27 13 13

Loss

13

3 2 II I

2 I

9 32 354

Ajfd at tack

3 28 17 38 19 56 37 17 23

2 I

2 I

II

21

15

I

277

8

Not e: Nts - Night s on which so rties flown: Bien - Blenheim: Hav - Havoc: Be st - Boston; Hurr Hurricane ; Def - Defiant; Afld attack - number of airfields claimed as attacked.

1942 - Losing the advantage One of the major threats faced by the RAF's pilots in 1942 was the increased use by their opponents, especially JG26, of the Fw 190- an aircraft that had the edge over the Spitfire V (the best of the RAF fighters at the time) in a number of crucial performance areas. Operating out of Bolt Head with 312 Squadron, Miroslav Liskutin recalled his first brush with the 190: We lI'ere directed to intercept f our Fock e Wulfs in the Torbayarea. . . . 1 spoiled three aircraft loll' o rer the sea. but already heading back towards France after a hit and run attack again st Torquay. We lI'ere some 5 miles from the enemy f ormation. After " cutting the comer" on them the distance lI'as quickly reduced to under one mile. My engine lI'as at full po wer with the boos t o ver-ride beyo nd the gate and the pr opeller set at maximum revolutions. Afy Spitfire lI'as gradually closing to about 700 yards when they spo iled us. Until then Ire had no idea how the Spitfire VB 1I'01l1d compare in a real-life race with all FII' 190. Our pilots kn ew that there lI'as no great difference ill the performance bet ween these tll'O aircraft. alth ough the FII' 190 1I'01lld hare to be regarded as a marginal fa vourite. This occasion ga ve liS proof that at sea level we lI'ere absolutely equal. .. , Despit e my earlier op timis m . my distan ce behind the N o.3 FI\' 190 becam e stabilised at about 650 y ards. Joe ( Pipa) tried some shots from this distan ce. It look ed lik e the 011/.1' effect of J oe 's firing lI'as a temp orary slight slowing down of his aircraft, due to the recoil of his cannons. I was still hoping to close to at least 100 ya rds. to ge t a better chalice with shoo ting.

Bot h formations were going all out , as evidenced by the black smoke from the German fighters. ' In these conditions my airspeed indicat or was showing a steady 330 mph. There is no doubt that this was the true maximum speed of the Spitfire VB and the Fw 190at sea level, in the summer of 1942.' The official RAF trials aga inst a captured 190 were detailed in the previous Chapter and confirmed that the RAF pilots had to adapt their tact ics when operating in areas prowled by 190s.

4

Combat fi lm sequence oj Spitfire V downing an FII' 190.

An August 1942 Air Tactics memo summarised the RAF' s attitude: 'At the present stage of the war, the enemy in France is equipped with the Fwl90, a fighter with an excellent rate of climb and good acceleration. To defeat this aircr aft and to avoid casualties on our side, o ur aircraft must fly as fast as possible whenever they are in the combat zone.'

145

146

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Spitfire V AA 937 of607 Squadron, November 1942; all August 1942 Air Tactics memo summarised the RAF's attitude: 'A t the present stage of the lI'ar, the ellemy ill France is equipped with the FII'1 90. a fighter with all excellent rate of climb and good acceleration. To def eat titis aircraft and to avoid casualties all our side. our aircraf t must fly as f ast as possible whenever they are ill the combat zone. '

The same document included 'Prune's Guide for Living': I. Don't loiter. When you can 't keep up don 't blame your leader ; pull your

finger out and cut the corners. 2. Low revs and high boost will bring yo u safely back to roost. 3. Don't wait until you see the Hun before you decide to get a move on. It will take a co uple of minutes for your Spitfire to respond after you open up, and by that time whatever yo u do will be irrelevant. When you are liab le to meet the enem y fly always at maximum crui sing speed. 4. If you want to live on the other side, you must move fast, but equ ally, if you want to come back again you must save petrol. You will find your engine happier at , say, +4 1b and 1700 r.p .I11, than at + l Ib and 2650 r.p .m. Both these adjustments give the same ASI but if you fly at +4 1b and 1700 r.p.m . you will save seven gallons of petrol an hour. It is possible to get full throttle and +41b above 10,000 ft by reducing the revs until the boost falls to +4Ib. Use full throttle a nd minimum revs ab ove full throttle height for any desired AS!. Thi s gives the best combination of fast crui sing and minimum consumption. 5. When you are tra velling at full throttle, and full power is sudden ly wanted, it is only necessary to push the constant speed lever fully forward to get full revs and boost. To return to high speed crui sing a t best econ omical conditions, reduce your rei's and not your boost. 6. When being briefed, always ask what revs and boost you should fly. Th is will naturally depend upon the length of the sweep, but don 't forget that : a. When hard pressed you can fly + 16 boost and 3,000 revs with out any danger of blowing up, but b. Your con sumption will be ISO gallons per hour. 7. Finally, when unlikely to be engaged always fly minimum revs and under 41b boost, but when in the vicinity of H uns, fly maximum everything and in good lime.

OPERATIONS

In addition to the so rties shown in the tab le, the Co mmand flew 37,478 shipping sorti es by da y and 2,709 by night. In Apri l 1942 'Spud ' Spurdle became 'A Flight' Co mma nder on 9 1 Squadron during what was a particula rly busy period for the Squadron; in addition to the 'Jim Crow' shipping recce missions in which it specialised it also undertook the full ra nge of Fighter Co mmand tasks. Between 9 April a nd 26 Ma y he flew 74 sorties; a few days later the first Spitfire VBs arri ved, That was all very well but all too often the main opponent was the Fw 190 and ' I wanted to savo ur in full measure this victory as our Spit Vs were vastl y inferior to the 190s and we'd been outnumbered 2 to I'. The combat he was referring to took place.on 26 July during a patrol intended to stop Germ an weatherrecce flights. Flying as Black Section with ' Knobby' Clarkson they spo tted and engaged four 190s .. .

147

Fighter Command Interception patrols. 1942 ,\!ofllh

Day

Nigh t

Totol

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

1,313 1,816 1,>18 2.863 3,482 3.929 3.558 4.350 3.136 4.419 2,742 2.484

68 1 580 586 1.569 1.123 1.725 1.899 2,035 1,534 1.028 746 647

1.9>1 2.396 2. 134 4.432 4.605 5,6>1 5,457 7.385 4.670 5.447 3.488 3.13 1

Total

35.640

14.153

49.793

Note: Table is based on Form Y reports.

AI)' HUll section 11'0 5 1I0t turning f ast and to avoid over-shooting 1 cltopped the throttle and went into full fi ne pitch. 1 could j ust gel a shot at the second Hull. 1 fo llowed him round. the dot f air on his cockpit, then I lightened the turn. For an instan t his black spinner hung steady against 'K's ' 1I0se. I pressed the gun-button and the machine-guns spluttered lI'a)' out on lite wings while the cannons thump ed and coughed. No t enough deflection. 'K' hea ved around tighter and lighter. My vision browned with partial blacko ut and my hands grew heavy on the stick. The 190 Ims some where below me bill I held the button down for a half-second then eased up. The second Hun whipped fro m under m)' nose and, chasing his leader, lI'as offand all'a)'. The)' Ifere going much 100 fas t and slid up above, stall-turtling for another attack. 1 couldn 't overtake them - so f ar I had been trying 10 gain height and f ace them head-on. Here they come again. I pressed the button and the cannon's Dill' of the classic (and well-known} shots of a Spitfire; fro ntal I'iell' of a 92 Squadron aircraft.

148

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

thudding drowned the machine-gun 's splutter. The leading Hun dipped, lifted. Suddenly a white cloud burst down its f uselage; his tail tore off and, dragging, whipped at the end of a tangle of cables. God! Hit his oxygen bottles! BIOIl'n his bloody tail off! (The Blue Arena. Bob Spurdle, William Kimber). Th e pilot pa rachu ted and was picked up by an RA F launch. with Bob Spurdle lat er meetin g him in hospital. Night Defence Th e Luft waffe had certainly not abando ned its night war ove r England. a ltho ugh the increasing effect iveness of the defences mean t tha t it was less effective - an d more hazardous. Th e attack on Liverpool on the night of I2I13 March was typical of man y flown by the Luftwaffe during this period . with 169 bo mbe rs tasked aga inst the city. of which 146 are recorded as having mad e atta cks. The tot al enemy act ivity th at night was just over 300 aircraft a nd the overall attacks lasted for abo ut six hours fro m 2040 hours. Figh ter Command flew 157 pat rol s (178 airc ra ft) as follows: o. No . No . No . No . No .

9 10 II 12 13 14

Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp Gp

-

24 patrols. 32 airc raft . 19 pat rols. 19 aircraft. 46 pat rols. 59 a ircraft. 48 pat rol s. 48 ai rcraft. 15 patrols. 15 aircra ft. 5 pa tro ls. 5 aircraft.

Th e major ity of so rties were by Ca ts Eye single-engine fighters. who flew 140 sorties and cla imed th ree destro yed. two probabi es a nd one dam aged . Two of the destr oyed were claim ed by Defiants of 264 Squ ad ron. Th e A I fighte rs claimed one destro yed . two prob ab les a nd two dam aged; the only confirmed success was by a 604 Squadron Beau fight er - the Squ ad ro n also claimed a probabl e and two dam aged . T he ra id had been qu ite successful: 't he Birkenhead and Wallasey areas suffe red most in this raid. a nd man y firms were affec ted by the loss o f electr icity supply. In Liverp ool itself dam age to hou se property was co nsiderable and widespread an d the probl em o f dealing with the numbers who had been rend ered hom eless was acu te' (A H B Narra tive). A major German cam paign was lau nched in Apri l - the so-called Baedeker raid s agai nst British cultura l centres, the first attack being on Exeter on 23/24 April. Th e Tu rbinlite-par asite team s were now part of the defence and on 29/30 Ap ril score d their only success of the campa ign, a Hurrican e of 253 Squ ad ron opera ting with a Turbinlite Havoc of No. 1459 Flight. T he ORB gave a brief acco unt: 'Given vecto rs of 110 and to ld to climb to Ange ls 14, at Angels 8 were orde red to vecto r 060. On reaching Ange ls 14 further vector of 030. ha nded over to Reclo. Afte r various vectors of a nort herly direction made con tact on 340 at a distance of 10,000 ft. Pilot Officer Scott brought them wit hin 500 ft of the ba ndit's port side and ident ified as He Ill. As Hu rrica ne had clear visual, T urb inlite not used . Bandit took evas ive action in a vert ica l dive. followed by Fit Lt Yap p, firing from approx 100 ya rds. Strikes obse rved as bandit dived an d spira led into clou d a t a pprox 400 mp h. Hu rrican e pulled out. Large fire seen below, lighting up the clo ud . He I II cla imed as destro yed .' By Apri l 255 Sq uad ro n was operating fro m High Erca ll and had completed its reequi pment with A I-equ ipped Beaufigh ter VIs; on the night of the 25th the first success with the new aircraft was made. ' FlO Wyrill (RIO Sgt Williams) on a non-operati onal

Beaufighter of 255 Squadron at Honiley; the Squadron operated Beaufighter Vis from this airfield for six months fro m June 1942 .prior to departing to North Africa.

pa tro l. at 2300 hours was taken ove r by Honil ey and passed to Combert on . After a series of vecto rs, a blip was obta ined in the vicinity of Hereford at 12.000 ft, E/A being slightly below. After a burst of 2 seconds fro m dead astern. the E/A took violent evasive action, and visua l was lost in the mist. Visual was regained and after a second burst of 4 seco nds, ElA was seen to burst into flames and to dive vertica lly. Th ere had been no return fire, A few seconds later, an open par achute was seen descending. a nd E/A was seen to hit the gro und and explode . Thi s success bro ught much encourage ment to all mem bers of the Squadron. as well as to the Stat ion . and congratulat or y messages cam fro m Group. Sector an d vario us sections of the Stat ion ' (255 Squad ron ORB). Th e victim was a Ju 88. On I May a Beau fighter of 141 Squ adro n depa rted Acklington at 0244 fo r a pa tro l a nd was soo n being vecto red towa rds a target. ' . . . obtain ed AI con tact. which disappeared out of ran ge. Further vector given at 12.500 ft. visua l and A I conta cts obta ined simultaneo usly a head of port side 300-400 yds away at same level; E/A a Dornier 217 took evasive action by turning to sta rboard and diving. Th e Beau fight er, piloted by W /Cdr Heycock with R.Obs P/O Brand on , tu rned thro ugh 180 degrees. holding visua l aga inst background of clou d. and dived afte r E/A . E/A took double turn but AI contact and visua l main tain ed and fight er opened fire at 3.000 ft. GCI co uld not help. After vario us vecto rs with figh ter gaining heigh t and tra velling South. AI contac t ob ta ined on E/A below and to sta rboard. followed a lmos t immediat ely by visual. E/A clea rly seen to be a Dornier 217. was now dead a head at 5.000 ft ran ge. Fighter turned in for deflection shot and ope ned fire afte r closing in. Firing steady burst end ing in line astern . strikes were seen all alo ng starboa rd in towa rds engine. fuselage and tail. Blue sparks came out of E/A. which immediately went into a righ t-ha nd turn which increased to nearl y vertic al. and dive was so steep it co uld not be followed and E/A looked as if to cras h. Figh ter lost height as soo n as possible. still keeping E/A in view. which was difficu lt as E/A was immedia tely below. E/A pulled o ut of dive a nd ano ther attack was made and strikes were seen on the fuselage and tai l. ret urn fire from E/A 's rear gun which burst to right and then hit nose of fight er. ElA was at that moment in a right- hand turn which was difficult to follow witho ut overshooting. Able however, to see E/A going into

149

150

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

cloud appa rently out of control, a pprox 25 East of Blythe. Beaufighter landed Ou ston 0405. Claim I Dorni er 217 dam aged .' Th is comb at highlights a number of inter esting points. The co-ordination between the G C I controller, the Al operator a nd the pilot was excellent , with the G C I controller man oeu vring the Bea ufighter to a position where it could make an A l or visual acq uisition. The A I opera to r was able to pick-up targets below the aircraft (not easy on the set fitted to the Beau fighter I f) and give direction s to the pilot, a ltho ugh in thi s case Wing Commander Heycock appears to be have been picking-up the Dorn ier - probab ly the same aircra ft - fairl y easily. The combat was recorded as indecisive, a claim being made for 'damaged ' wherea s in many other cases it wou ld no doubt ha ve gone down as a 'proba ble' because of the sta tements of ,steep dive' and 'apparently out of control'. Defensive sorties in period of Baedeker Raid s, April-August Month

April

Type

AI Cats-eye

Turbinlite May

Jun e

AI Cats-eye Turbinlite AI Cats-eye

July

Turbinlite Al Cats-eye

Turbinlite August

AI Cats-e ye

Turbinlite

Sorti es

1 9~ 2

Destroyed

Probable

Damaged

783 397 3

16 3

6 I

13 5

~7

I~

3

5

I

I

21 3

5

10

36

8

20

21

7

23

? ?

?

? ?

187 37 908 286 68 1.231

I

~2~

88

I think it is true to say that nobody liked being on Turbinlites. Basically all the DB7 variants I\'ere very pleasant to fly , bill they had never been intended to fl y all the time with a load of a ton ofbatteries and a large arc-light installation ill a l-ery un-aerodynamic 1I0se. 1 think part of the f rustration of Turbinlite operations came fro m the fac t that I\'e carried 110 armament and would be dependent on the Hurricane to do the shooting - added to this I\'as the knowledge that those German aircraft which did show their noses II-ere always served up to the straight night fig hters with their improved Al and much higher performance. The procedure of interception I\'as exactly the same as fo r 'straight' night fig hters including the drills for GCI and Searchlight Box . The diff erence came when approaching minimum range, when the light would be activated bill the doors in the nose kept closed and thefi ghter directed by the code word 'boiling' to dive ahead, whereupon the light was exposed with the target hopefully slightly to one side in theflat beam. This would have the dual effec t of putting it in front of the fig hter and conf using a gunner in the EIA, who would be more than startled at the sudden dazzling illumination. Certainly 'friendlies' who I\'ere entertained with this treatm ent reported that looking towards the light I\'as more blinding than a ground searchlight.

5

655 11 7 I.37~

The Turbinlites rema ined active throughout this period and Leslie Holland was one of the 'unfortunate souls' to have been posted to th is role, joining 534 Squadron at Ta ngmere.

June 1942 at High Ercall - with 25 7 Squadron posing with one of their Hurricanes.

O ffensive Operations Ha ving formed a t Warmwell at the beginning of March, 175 Squadron flew Hurricane II Bs on their first mission, a Roadstead, on 16 Apri l when the CO, Sqn Ldr J R Pennington -Smith, led six aircraft to att ack Maupertus airfield . One returned earl y with an engine problem and on e (F/Sgt Foreman) had to ditch becau se of a glycol leak ; sadly, the pilot was never found . More mission s followed over the next few days and on the 30th the Squadron O R B recorded a day that concluded with the comment 'we are now starting to make the history which 175 Squ adron wants to make.' The sortie that prompted th is was against shipping at Isle de Ba tz, which involved eight aircraft led by the CO : Three destroyers a nd one merchant ship were a ttacked with 250 GP 3-second delay bombs and machine-gun fire, one destroyer was damaged but no confirmation concern ing the others is to hand yet, at an y rate the attack was severe a nd many casua lties must have been inflicted on the crews. The lad s consider it was a highly successful a ttack, they all come home very pleased with their first low level a ttack, WIO Emberg had his aircraft damaged by flak but managed to land a t Portreath safely, otherwise, no casualties.' A few da ys later the OR B added: ' report from Group that one of the destroyers classed as casualty Category 3. As a first attempt a t a shipping target we feel that we ha ve made a good sta rt at th at kind of opera tion.' On 23 July four Spitfire s of 302 Squadron were airbo rne out o f Heston on a Rhubarb in two pairs. 'Fl ying below 500 ft cro ssed over Dungeness and off Le Touquet, Fg Off Gorzula and Pit Off Czarnecki made landfall at Plage St Gabriel. north of Le Touquet while Fg Off Gladyth and Pit Off owakiewicz crossed so uth of the town . Go rzula and Cza rnecki flew a long east side of ra ilway towards Etaples and near Lefaux saw a WIT Station consi sting of on e lar ge building and five aerial masts all cam ouflaged with nett ing, The y were unable to find tar get but a tta cked a large factory near Etap les. Bofors fire was seen from five point s ar ound the factory . Una ble to find any other target s . . .

15 1

152

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

made on another locomotive, hits being observed, causing damage.' Two other pilots were on similar Intruders that night but with no success. 28 July: 'At 0055 PIa R S Davidson took-off for patrol over Lille aerod rome where, however. no activity was observed; proceeding from the target area in direction of Orch ies pilot made three attac ks on a train, resulting in damage to the locomoti ve. PIa C Mehroftook-off at 0045 to pat rol Leon area . . . proceeded to Lens-Lou vais area where an atta ck on a train resulted in dam age to the locomotive. Cont inuing ort h of Lens pilot made an attack upon locomotive resultin g in dama ge.' Two more trains were atta cked by other pilots that night, with eight more being claimed as damaged the following night , Pit Off Davidson report ing that one of his had 'bl own up'. Sgt Dunn report ed 'large cloud s of steam and sparks' when he atta cked a loco in the earl y hour s of 31 July.

Spitfires oJ64 Squadron at Hornchurch, May / 942; Fighter Command flew 5,84/ day offensive ops this month.

these two pilots returned via Rye and landed at base at 0645. Weather over France was 10/1 0 cloud at times down to grou nd and raining in places. Gladych and Nowakiewicz found themselves nort h of the Foret de Boulogne; they struck an army camp on a platea u. A number of Nissen hut s camouflaged and a radio sta tion of one hut and four aerial masts. Intense bofo rs fire fro m all round camp. Gladych attacke d and silenced one gun post and after a wide turn attac ked gun posts followed by Nowa kiewiecz. Flashes and much dust and debris seen as results of hits. Flak con tinued all the time. After attac k Nowa kiewicz did not reply on Rff and Gladych flew south along railway line and found hutted camp at Eta ples. His first atta ck showed many hits on hut s but no AA was seen. After a left turn he came in again an d saw many soldiers in camp, which he attac ked and M IG fire opened up from west side of camp. His cockpit hood was hit near Fo ret de Boulogne. He made another wide turn followed by a third short attac k with MIG . Landed Hawkinge 0725 and repor ted to Heston later. PIa Nowakiewicz missing' (302 Squadron ORB ). By mid 1942 trains had become a favo urite target, the clearance for such attacks having been given in late 1941. For 32 Squad ron 's Hurri canes, late July was something of a tra in-busting month: 26 July: 'At 0115 Sgt R E Tickn er too k-off with instructions to search for trains in the Lens area. Pilot crossed Belgian coast near Ostend, and reached target area but no railway activity was obse rved. Pilot later proceeded North of target area and attac ked two trains, resulting in damage to both locomotives. At 0 115 PIa R S Davidson took-off for patrol in neighbour hood of Ypres, Bailleul and Lille; near Lille a train was observed. and after two attacks this appea red to be derailed and the engine damaged. Before returning to base an attack was

It was always difficult to assess the amount of damage done during such atta cks and the report s of locomotives being damaged could not indicate the extent of the damage; steam locos gave off a lot of steam at all times but should the boiler be hit by 20 mm cannon fire then cloud s of steam would often result - even then the damage may not have been too significant. As we will see late r, attac ks on trains were to become one of the main tasks in the D-D ay period . They were never easy tar gets and as the Germans became increasingly desperate to prevent the loss of locos, the defences increased and flak traps were set for Allied pilots.

Sqn Ldr Roberts in Typhoon oj 257 Squadron: the Squadron converted to the Typhoon in July /942 and fl ew the type Jor the rest oj the lI'ar.

153

154

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Fighter Command Offensive Ope rations. 19~2

M onth Ja n

Day

Nov

273 906 2.083 7.651 5.841 5.895 3.341 6.802 2.137 2.888 2.648

Dec

2.800

Feb

Mar Apr

May J un J ul Aug Sep Oct

Total

43 ,265

Nigh,

36 60

TOfal

207 198 366 376 227 102 78 115 107

309 966 2,155 7.858 6.039 6.26 1 3.717 7.029 2.239 2.966 2.763 2.907

1.944

45 .209

72

Th e source document for the offensive operatio ns table and the one for defensive ops also include a figure for 's pecial patrols' but does make clear if these were defensive or offensive. However, they need to be added to the total of opera tions for the year. giving an extra 11.937 day and 580 night sorties. Th e Co mman d's daytime total was therefore 128,420 sorties and 19.386 night sort ies. However. the sou rce document also states that from August 1942 sort ies by USAAF units are included; the first USAAF Fighter Group to commence operations was the Spitfire-equipped 31st Fighter Gr oup. which flew its initial missions with the RAF in late Jul y.

Dieppe - O pera tion Jubilee At 0445 on 19 August 1942 the first assault waves Note: Table is based on Form Y reports. of Ca nadian troo ps went asho re at Dieppe under Operat ion Ju bilee, a ' reconnaissance in force'. Air support was a vital element of Ju bilee and 48 Spitfire sq uadrons (42 with Mark Vs and four with Mark IXs) were involved either with Close Air Supp ort. 129 Squad ron for example strafed gro und tar gets in adva nce of the first land ings. fighter cover to prevent German aircraft interfering with the opera tion. and escort for Allied bombers. It was the busiest day for many squa dro ns since the height of the Battl e of Britain and some units flew four sorties durin g the day. The RAF flew some 3.000 sorties in the space of 16 hours on 19 August 1942. In response. the Luftwaff e flew j ust under 1.000 sorties. Don Morrison was operating with 401 Squad ron over Dieppe, Ju st as 11'1' in Yellow Sec tion arrived orer the Dieppe area. I spo tted a single 190 some 1.000-1 .500 fee t bela II' and heading in the same direction. 1 did a wide. slipping barre l roll to lose height and levelled out about 150 yards behind him. As 1 closed up I opened fire with a tll'O second burst of cannon fire. I sail' strikes all along the starboard side of the f uselage and several pieces blew offfrom around the cowling. Just as 11'1' bot h lI'elll into a rery thin lay er ofcloud he exploded with a terrific flash offla me and black smo ke .

Th e first patrol by 124 Squad ron was airborne at 0445; the ORB reporti ng that : 'The Horn church Wing were con tacted soon afte r leaving Beachy Head ; the pat rolling squadro ns were relieved at 0520 and the area of the ancho rage was patrolled for thir ty minutes at 3/500 ft. with Blue Section pat rolling to the West. Red to the East and White in the centre. Assault and TL C were seen to be still arriving at Orange Beach . It was fou nd impossible to contact Fighte r Contro l by RIT. A Ju 88 was seen by Red 3 and shot into sea 5 miles NE of Dieppe by the fire from a destroyer. the EIA having dr opped its bomb s near by. A ship of 6/800 tons was seen on fire 2 miles NE of Dieppe . Light flak was experienced from the Camp de Cesar and some heavy flak from the town. App roximately 3 EIA were seen in the vicinity. but no engagements eventu ated.' Th e Squadron was back on the gro und at 0622. but a second sortie. again of three Sections. was airborne at 1049 and was more producti ve: ' RV made with 616 Squadron in the Channel off Beachy Head. Squad ron flew for 10 minut es at zero feet then climbed 10

OPE

ATIONS

10.000 ft in the Dieppe area. Owing to great activity in that area the Squadron split into Sections to patrol the anchorage. App rox 20+ aircraft were seen. made up of Fw 190s. Do 217s and Ju 88s, some below and others at the same level. Comb at s took place as follows: 'F/L Gr egson . Red I with Red 2 turn ed to assist Red 3 and 4 who were being dived on by 2 Fw 190s. coming from the South. The first Fw was attacked by Red I fro m the beam with a two second bur st from 200 yards. which rapidl y increased. while the second aircraft dived into France. Strikes were seen. and a sma ll flash from underside of the enemy's por t wing root. A panel appeared to rip backwards. the port leg dropped and hung at about 45 deg. The EIA continued to turn . dived away and was lost to sight. It is claimed as damaged. A little later Red I saw an Fw 190 pulling up out of a dive in front of him. and climbed up quickly behind the EIA who did not apparently see him. and thu s too k no avoiding action. Red I fired a quick bur st with cann on and m.g. from astern at 300 yds for about I second. An explosion took place behind the EtA's cockpit. there was a lar ge fl ash. and bits flew off followed by smoke and flame. The EtA went into a dive. slowly starting to spin. leaving a trail of smoke behind. and then crashed ju st off the beach. East of Dieppe, after having practicall y disintegrated in the air. It is claimed as destroy ed. 'F/Sgt PEG Durnford DFM, White 3. attac ked an Fw 190. from 200 yds with a one second burst on the port side. The EIA straightened out. and sta rted diving. White 3 atta cked again with a three second bur st. from dead astern. The EtA started smokin g and then caught fire. The E/A 's pilot was not seen to bale out. or the EIA to crash. It is therefore claimed as probably destroyed but it is hoped that in view of the fact that the EIA caught fire it may be allowed as destroyed. Later. while flying at 5,000 ft over Dieppe, White 3 saw a Ju 88 flying at 2,000 ft, and closed to 300 yds . The EIA dived to tree-top level. and was atta cked by White 3 from 250 yards. with a one second burst; strikes were seen around the port engine nacelle. After firing the remainder of his cann on ammunition White 3 saw the Ju 88 drop its bomb s, and crash into a field with a dark smoke coming from its port engine. which had sto pped before impact. Thi s aircraft is claimed as destroyed ; later report s from camera films identify the aircraft as a Do 217 and not a Ju 88.' Pit Off Kilburn. Red 3. claimed a Fw 190 as probably destroyed and the Squad ron 's score for the action was three enemy aircraft but with Sgt Shank s failing to return. The day was far from over for 124 Squadron and two more sorties were flown; the third sort ie took-off at 1320. led by Sqn Ldr Balmforth, to patrol one of the convoys. During this sortie the Spitfires claimed an Fw 190 destroyed (P/O Hull), a Ju 88 probably destroyed (P/O Hull) and three Fw 190s dama ged. One Spitfire was damaged and had to crash-land at Lympne but the pilot (Sgt Mirsch) was OK . The final sort ie of the day was again led by Sqn Ldr Balmforth and was airborne at 171 9 to pat rol the same con voy. A gro up of 109s approached the con voy but turned away when the Spitfire moved towards them . The Squad ron was back on the ground at 1847 after a hectic but successful day . ' Needless to say, celebrat ions took place in various places during the evening.' Sqn Ldr Balmforth had been on all four sorties and had led three of them, the first sortie having been led by Wg Cdr Duke -Woolley. 'Sammy' Samp son saw action twice in the Dieppe area. On one sorti e he engaged a Dorn ier of KG2 : As 1 started to overhaul it I was comp letely pili-offby the rear-gunn er opening up on me and what look ed lik e red tomatoes passed by m e on either side. The result of

155

156

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

this lI'as that I opened-up far too earl)'. However, I sail' hits 011 the port wing and petrol started to pour out of the port wing tank . Theil Johnny warned me of tll'O 190s above and behind so I quickly broke off and rej oined him.

He attacked a second Dornier but with similar results and the exhaustion of his cannon ammunition, A sortie later in the day resulted in the destruction of an Fw 190 courtesy of the ideal set-up of sneak-up and shoot without being seen. I don't think the HUll pilot sail' me for I'er), conveniently he turned to starboard, which enabled me to give him a 3-secolld burst from 150 yards and he went d01l'1I 011 fir e into the sea,

Pit Off Bob Large was airborne in a Spitfire VI of 616 Squadron on 2 October 1942 when he claimed an Fw 190 over St Orner. His combat report stated: . . . as lI'e lI'ere leaving the target area I reported about a dozen FII' 190s about 6,000 ft below us, proceeding north-west, and as the Squadr on Commander had apparently not seen the EIA, I announced that I lI'as going dOIl'II. Whell about 800 y ards awayfrom the EIA the formation brok e up ill all directions and I closed ill 011 a straggler, who broke to starboard. I opened fir e at about 500 yards range, bill as he turned sharply I pulled the 1I0se of my aircraft ahead of him , blotting out the EIA from I'iell' and firin g one 5-secolld burst and then allowing the 1I0se of my aircraft to fall, to see the result s ofmy fire. The EIA lI'as diving I'ery steeply to the N E with his port undercarriage leg hanging d01l'1I and brown smoke pouring from him. Bright flash es lI'ere coming from the starboard side of his engine, which aft erwards developed into flames. I continued to tum as other EIA lI'ere threatening Cooper and myself. I fired the remainder of my ammunition ill a head-oil attack 011 an FII' 190. FS Cooper came into line abreast , up SUII, to my port wing and lI'e recrossed the French coast north of Cap Griz Nez , being attacked most of the lI'ay out. I warned FS Cooper of all attack from below and ordered him to break. FS Cooper lI'ashit ill the radiator bill did 1I0t realise it and 1 told him that glyco l lI'as pouring from the radiator, FS Cooper baled out off Sangatte about 5 miles 011I to sea, and aft er 2 FII' 190s had made a fi nal attack 0 11 me, they turned back to France. 1 remained with FS Cooper, giving Mayday s . until 1 had to leave him owing to shortage offu el, and returned to Hawkinge.

Bob Large had used 120 rounds of 20mm and 1,250 rounds of 0.303 in ammunition during his combats. November 1942 for 302 Squadron was typical of the routine of most of the Command's squadro ns during this period: 2 Nov 3 Nov 6 Nov 8 No v 9 Nov 10 Nov 16 Nov 17 Nov 19 Nov 22 Nov

Escort Bostons to Caen Pair on Rhubarb Escort to Caen Sweep Ypres-Cassel-Gravelines Escort to Le Havre Escort to Le Havre Two pair on Rhubarb, rail target s Amiens Sweep to Cherbourg Pair o n Rhubarb , rail targets Sweep and escort for Defiants.

OPERATIONS

The Rhubarb flown by Pilot Officers Wardz inski and Sniec on 3 November was prod uctive: 'Rhubarb operation to attack ground targets along the railway line Abbeville to Dieppe. Two factories attacked but results not seen. Aircraft continued and attacked large factory with four big camouflage con tainers about 30 ft high. One immediately exploded with smokeless flame and cover was blown off. Second attack made out of the sun and another container exploded ; the first was still burning. The other two were visibly hit but showed no results . One machine -gun post opened fire but was silenced by fire from our aircraft' (302 Squadron ORB). Night intrud ers The pace of the night offensive work for the Command continued to increase in early 1942and involved both single-engine and twin-engine fighters, the former could be provided by any squadron but were usually the Hurricane units that specialised in this task, and the latter were either AI-equ ipped or were acting as bombers. Typical of the Hurricane intruder ops were tho se flown by 3 Squadron on the night of 31 May 1942. 'PIa B H Hay took -off 'in Hurricane Long-Range machine from Manston at 0030 hours to patrol Venlo. Arri ving at Venlo PIa Hay orbited twice to port , wide of the town , changed orbit to starboard, and during this period he felt the slip stream of an aircraft but was unable to observe same. Whilst orbiting at 1500ft south of Venlo, PIa Hay observed slightly above him and to starboard a twin engined aircraft silhouetted again st the moon, at approximately 0 130hours . This twin engined aircraft was subsequently identified as a Ju 88. When on south side of Venlo, enemy aircraft opened fire with twin guns from the rear and above . PIa Hay closed to 80 yard s and enemy turned from port to starboard still firing short bursts, which passed above Hurricane. PIa Hay was now astern 70 yard s distance and he opened fire, strikes being observed along top side of fuselage. PIa Hay then lifted the nose of his mach ine and concentrated on the rear gunner, who ceased fire after one second. PIa Hay kept firing until long black smoke stream s were observed from both engines, and a red glow in the cockpit. Large Hurricane of 3 Squadron; .PIO B H Hay took-off ill Hurricane Long-Range machine from Manston at 0030 hours to patrol Venlo. Arriving at Venia PIO Hay orbited twice to port, wide of the IOll'n. changed orbit to starboard, and during this period he fe lt the slip stream of an aircraft bill lI'as unable 10 observe same. '

157

158

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

pieces were also observed breaking off the enemy aircraft. At this point the Ju 88 had gone into a shallow dive, and PIa Hay was forced to take violent evasive action as he was caught in a cone of six blue searchlights and light concentrated flak . He then set a Westerly course where he atta cked and extinguished six searchli ghts which endea voured to locate him. PIa Hay then set course for the coast, and on arriving orth of Antw erp he observed three barges all of which he attacked twice before empt ying his guns. He returned to base at 0340 hours. He claims one Ju 88 as damaged and would like this machine confirmed as destroyed. Although the enemy aircraft was not observed to cra sh, PIa Hay considers that it is must unlikely to have sustained the attack. ' P/O D J Scott took- off from Manston in a Long-Range Hurrican e at 2349 hours to patrol Deelen area . On arri ving at Deelen aerodrome PIa Scott orbited at 1500ft for 40 minutes . He then flew West and saw flarep ath and searchlights some miles distant , which he believed to be Soesterburg. Several enemy aircraft appeared in area with navigation lights on, one of which (a Ju 88) was attacked by PIa Scott from 1,000 yards. Several strikes were seen and a large piece, probably the port wing, broke away. Immediat ely, enemy aircr aft pulled up vert ically and disappeared over head as PIa Scott continued straight on course to intercept another enemy aircraft in front. Whilst chasing second enemy aircraft a furt her aircraft approached from starboard slightly below at 1,000 ft. which PIa Scott engaged giving it a 4-second bur st. The enemy aircraft evaded steeply to port followed by PIa Scott almost to ground level where visual cont act was lost. PIa Scott then climbed to 2,000 ft, where he o bserved after 3 minute s the flarepath was again lit and numerous enemy aircraft were qu ickly seen flashing navigation lights. PIa Scott again attempted to make interception but failed to make contact. He then returned to base at 0305.' The Squadron sent four other Hurricanes out the same night to hara ss a number of other night-fighter airfields but with little to report. These accoun ts illustra te the problems and potential for this type of 'airfield lurking ' intruder. Acquisition of targets relied on visibility conditions, especially moonlight , and The specialist night intruders of23 Squadron were I'ery active throughout 1943. operating a mix of Havoc Is and Boston Ills. although between June and August 1942 these IIwe replaced by M osquito lis.

OPERATIONS

, The most successf ul night II'as 819July when Sqn Ldr K Salisbury- Hughes II'as operating in a Mosquito and claimed an He 111 and Do 217; M osquito DZ238 of23 Squadron.

the use of lights by the airfield and the aircraft . Even when the sky seemed to be full of enemy aircraft it was difficult to get into a position to make a sat isfactor y attack, altho ugh if the por t wing had been the large piece of debri s it was a fine shot from 1,000 yards! Return fire from enemy gunners, and the searchlight and flak hazards certai nly made this type of mission dicey but even when the fighters came back without confirmed results the disruption of the Germ an night-fighter system was significant. What is never credited in this type of mission is the enemy aircraft that ran-out of fuel and crashed or was damaged and crashed or written -off on landing. The specialist night int ruders of 23 Squadron were very active throughout 1943, operating a mix of Havoc Is and Boston Ill s, although between June and August 1942 these were replaced by Mosquito li s. July was a typical month , with the following operations being flown: Intrud er ta rge ts, 23 Sq uadro n, Jut)'

1 9~2

Date

Aircraft

Targets

1/2 l ui 516 l ui 6/7 l ui 8/9 l ui 11112 l ui 12113 lui 14/15 l ui 19/20 lu i 21/22 l ui 23/24 l ui 25/26 l ui 26/27 l ui 27/28 l ui 28/29 l ui

4 5 I 4 2 6 2 I 5 6 2 I 6 8

30/31 l ui 31 l uUI Aug

9 6

Evreux, St Andre A miens, Caen . Evreux . SI Andre Avard. one 0 0 217 destroyed Chart res. Beauvais. Evreux , Orleans. One He I II and one Do 2 17 destroyed Evreux . Chartres Cacn. Rennes, Di nard . Evreux . Chartres Rennes, shipping Abbe ville. Amie ns Chartres. Orleans. Rouen. J uvinco urt , Criel Cha rtres. Orlean s. J uvincourt , To urs. Caen. Bretigny Chartres. Orleans. Tours. Rouen J uvinco urt Evreux . SI Andre. Dr eux. Cha rtres. Cricl . Beauvais. Orleans Chartres. Orleans. Amsterdam/Schiphol. G ilze- Rijen. Eindhoven. Soesterburg. One aircraft lost Orleans. Bretigny. Orleans. Avo rd. Serquex . One FJA destroyed Juvinco urt. St Trond

159

160

OPERATIONS

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

o

.~

O l U.Dt.

() t exu.

e_

• .

ntlH'lfu,,/ _1. III U ....W I,jl( /_U1L

O U f"(J

c""'o o nUOl

o . . I1.VtQUtll /~OOlllU Cr
o VPlNMll.lI

•

DU Lt N

Map showing airfields in Holland, including the major night -fighter airfields 'visited' by the intruders.

The most successful night was S/9 July when Sqn Ldr K Salisbury -Hughes was operating in a Mosquito and claimed an He III and Do 217. The busiest period was the end of the month. which corre sponded with three large raid s by Bomber Command. On the final night of July Bomber Command sent 630 aircraft to att ack Dusseldorf but as with the previous raids in this period losses were high. There was increasing concern over bomber losses and the scale of offensive oper ation against night fighter airfields was increased, with the Squadron concentrating on four of the main bases in Holland Deelen, Leeuwarden, Twenthe and Venlo - during October.

1943 - Putting on the Pressure By 1943 the Allied emphasis was very much an offensive one with the invasion of Europe a possibility that year, altho ugh it was soo n agreed by the Allied command that it would actually be in 1944. For Fighter Comm and the dual role of defending the homeland and supporting offensive operations remained throughout the year. In terms of defensive ops this was increasingly a night task, alth ough the Luft waffe att ack s on England were few and ineffective.

Spitfi re II in use with 276 Squadron fo r Air-Sea Rescue; Fighter Command had partial responsibility fo r the Air-Sea Rescue organisation.

Defensive Operations On 17 April 1943 six patrols and two scrambles were flown by 266 Squadron in what proved to be a mixed day . 'On the first patrol, j ust after dawn , Sgt Eastwood was shotdo wn by a 65 Squadron Spitfire off Bolt Head ; they had been escorting an MTB , and why on earth the Spitfire should break away from its formation and carry-out a long dr awn-out attack on a Typhoon at short range is difficult to understand . Sgt Eastwood managed to fly his aircraft over land and baled -out successfully. He would ob viously have cra shed if he had tried to force-land as his ailero n was shot-away. In the evening Sqn Ldr Green and Fg Off Deall were scrambled after two E/A at IS,OOO ft over Plymouth.' The ORB sortie detail takes up the sto ry, 'on arri val AA pointing South. Losing height flew due South for 12 mins, then vectored 220 deg and after 3 mins, saw 2 E/A going South on the " deck" . Turned starboard, and then port, to get on their tails, and started chasing. Overtaking speed very small so fired at 1000/S00 yards to make them weave. S/L Green seeing strikes claims one damaged, FlO Deall realised only one cann on was firing. S/L Green decided to attack the leading (fastest) E/A first so as to stand best cha nce of getting both, but in catching this one he overtook the other, which promptly attacked him. A general "dog-fight" ensued during which FlO Deall got strikes o n his E/A, but S/L green did not see more strikes on his E/A. After about 5 mins of dogfighting the E/A disappeared into the haze and Section returned to base.' Sqn Ldr C L Green DFC in EJ924 and Fg Off J H Deall in RS926. There are two interesting poin ts with this account; firstly, the continued problems of 'friendly fire' - and the RAF lost a fair number of aircraft to this throughout the war with the Typhoon often being mistaken for an Fw 190; secondly, the fact that the Typho ons actu ally managed to catch the 190s. The overall perform ance of the 190 was such that Spitfires seldo m had a chance of makin g up such ground in a tail-chase; the Typhoon may not have been the best dog-fighting aircraft but it did have some performa nce adva ntages.

161

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

The Luftwaffe was still active over Britain by night, albeit on a small-scale and in the face of what was now an effective defence equipped with Mosquitoes and with a pro ven and experienced Control and Reporting system . Bud Green of 410 Squadron had a successful engagement on 5 November: I lI'as flying a patrol line in the middle of the Channel, with other Mo squitoes flying on my right and on my left. Ground control could only handle a limited number of aircraft; it lI'as sited at Wardin g near Dungeness. I lI'as instructed: ' Bandits on a southerly headin g, heigh t unknown, considerable numbers. ' We lI'ere taken over by a controller 'rho steered liS towards them, th en round th em ( at I 8,000 f t) , until we pi ck ed them lip on Ollr oll'n radar. A classic interception. Once the navigator had pick ed lip an air craft on his AI, the ideal was fo r th e pilot to come in bela II' at a closing speed as slow as possible, but f as t enough fo r evasive action if fired all. Y OII had to match the spee d before yOIl got a visual Call/act, then open lip the throttles 10 close in by eye . I cam e in too loll', o vertak ing speed lI'as not high enough. I had to pull up at fullthrottle, bill lI'as s till too slow. Pointin g upwards at 200 yards, I fi red all fo ur cannon and the fo ur ma chine-gun s: We lI'ere so close, I didn 't need tracer or to allow for any deflection . H e never kn ell' what hit him . It lI'as totally devastating as he just blew lip. I thought it lI'as an M e 410 bill it turn ed alii to be a Do 21 7.

Spitfir e Vs of 130 Sq uadron at Ballyhalbert

On 11 Ju ne 1943 the Sergeants' Mess at Biggin Hill hosted a special dinner to 'celebrate the destruction of the one thousandth enemy aircraft from the Sector '. In addition to giving details of the menu (the main course being roast chicken), the menu card also gave a bit of background to the event: ' During this period , the number of enemy aircr aft destroyed from this Sector has mounted with such rapidity that on 15th May, the splendid tot al of One Thousand was reached . It has been a hard and bitter struggle for air and ground personnel to achieve this figure, and we feel that tonight we are entitled to relax and celebrate an event which has never happened before in the histor y of the Royal Air Force , and may never be equalled. 'O ut of our pride in this Thousandth Hun , let there be born the resolut ion that the lead which th is Sector has estab lished over all others shall not only be maint ained , but increased day by day until a victorious peace is gained .'

Offensive O perations Circus ops remained a sta ndard task for the Comm and into 1943. On 15 Feb ruary the Polish Wing (303,306,308,315 squadrons) was airborne on Circus 266: 'Crossed English coast at North Fo reland at 500 ft, climbed rapid ly and crossed French coast West of Dunk irk at 15,000ft, 303 leading . The bombers were already over Dunkirk, and dropped their bomb s. Con siderable ack ack was experienced . Squadrons recrossed French coast at 9,000 ft and flew along French coast to Cala is and set course for Deal. They were atta cked in mid-Channel by two groups of four Fws, Two pilots of 308 att acked these Fws and one was probably damaged , and one Spitfire was seen diving towards sea trailin g smoke . No casualties experienced and WIO Piatowski claimed one Fw probably T yphoon of609 Squadron at M ansi on, March 1943; the T yphoon had found its true niche and late 1943 became one of the main typ es with the Il ell' Tactical Air Force.

ill

Beaufighter of604 Squadron; by 1943 the Command 's night def ences .rere highly efficient and the scale of German att acks had reduced.

163

164

OPERATIONS

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

destroyed' (308 Squadron ORB ). A number of similar missions were flown in February, with some days, such as 26th , having two such missions. The majorit y had little to report - meet up with the other fighters. watch the bombers drop their loads, usually with heavy anti-aircraft fire, and then escort them back again . The table below shows the detail of the mission types, claims aga inst the enemy and Fighter Command losses for the year to 14 ovember, the date at which Fighter Command became Air Defence of Great Britain. Fighter Co mma nd/A DG B summa ry of day offensive opera tio ns, 1 J an 19.13-1.1

1'0\ '

Claim s

M ission

Escort Roads tead

Bo mbing Rhubarb Ranger Rodeo Instep Distil Haunch

F.Road'ilead TacR Ph ot o Reece Oth er Tot al

19.13 Losses

Ops

Sorties

Des l.

Prob.

Dam.

Lo s'

%

Dam.

180 110 II 187 98 101 158 22 I 234 12 130 15

596 173 II 773 184 188 294 22 I 512 117 1.091 21

53.9 14 3.3 15 90 1.825 291 7.211 1.295 120 23 4.318 233 I.l 79 296

486 14 0 26 15 61 29 0 0 7 0 0 7

124 2 0 4 I 21 5 0 0 6 0 0 0

372 8 0 10 I

0.64 0.69 5.56 5.10 3.09 0.43 0.62 1.67 0 0.79 1.29 1.19 1.69

103 17 8 57 6

18 0 0 12 2 0 0

346 23 5 93 9 31 8 2 0 34 3 14 5

1.259

3.983

74. 110

635

163

483

573

0.77

236

Days

60

II

5 0 0 20 I 4 4

Note: F.Roadstead - Fighter Roadstead and shipping recce; TacR - Tactical Reconnaissance; Bombing unescorted bombing raid; % - percentage of the to tal elTort (aircraft) lost o n o ps.

Spitfire of340 Squadron at Biggin Hill; Fighter Command fl ew over 74,000 offensive sorties between January 1943 and the change to Air Def ence Great Britain in November, with the majority of those being flown by Spitfires. Waiting fo r the next mission to Europe - 257 Squadron at Gravesend, August 1943.

An additional 6,693 were flown to the end of the year, with claims for a further 47 enemy aircraft destroyed and a loss of 27 aircraft. Escort remained the most frequent mission and Rhubarb remained the most dangerous in terms of loss rate . Airfields were amongst the most heavily-defended targets in Occupied Europe, bristling with quadruple 20 mm anti-aircraft guns. The gun position s were usually arranged to give murderous crossfire kill zones, and 'flak trap s' were set up on the most likely lines of attack. In the face of such opp osition it was very difficult for pilots to target aircraft on the ground, a fleeting pass with a burst or two being all that could be achieved. To stay in the area and make a second or third pass was to court disaster. 'Jo hnnie' Johnson recalled one such hair y occasion: / led a section of Spi tfires down to the deck to sweep the num erous airfields scattered around the circumference of the French capital. Aft er 20 m inutes at low level l was lost. although / kn elt' It'e It'ere a few miles south of Paris. / putthe map alt'ay and concell/rated on flying the various courses / had worked out bef ore leaving base. About another five minut es on this leg and then turn to the lI'est to avoid gelling too close to Paris. We crossed the complicated mass of railway lines which indicated that Ive It'ere close 10 Paris. We sped across a wide river and ahead of us It'as a heavily wooded slope, perhaps rising 200 ft above the river. We raced up this slope. only a

165

166

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

167 By late summer 1943 acti vity had incre a sed; 302 Squadron had a very bus y September: 302 Sq uadro n opera tions, Se ptember Date

A ircraft

M ission

2 Sep 3 Sep

12 12 13

Escort Marauders to Lille airfield Escort Marauders to Beauvais airfield Escort Venturas to Foret D' Eperlecq ues

1~

Escort Marauders to H azebro ucke. cancelled after 20 minutes

4 Sep

14 13 12 12 13 14 12

Escort Mitchells to Rouen

5 6 7 8

Sep Sep Sep Sep

II Sep 13 Sep 14 Sep 15 Sep 16 Sep 18 Sep 19 Sep 22 Sep 23 Sep 24 Sep 25 Sep 26 Sep

'Circus' ops - 98 Squadron bombing the airfield at CaentCarpiquet on 15 May 1943 10 'encourage' the Luftwaffe to come up and fight, fewfee t above the topmost branches, and fo und ourselves looking straight across a large grass airfield with several large hangars on the for side, The gunners \I'ere ready and waiting. The shot and shell came from all angles, fo r some of the gun positions lI'ere on the hangar roof s and they fi red down on us, / had never seen the like of this barrage, Enemy aircraft \I'ere parked here and there, but OUr only thought I\'{/S 10 get out of this inf erno, There lI'as no time fo r radio orders, /t \I'as el'ery man fo r himself /t seemed that all our ex its lI'ere blocked with a concentrat ed criss-cross pal/ern offi re fr om a hundred guns, My only hope ofa getaway lay in a small gap between tll'Ohangars, / pointed the Spitfire at this gap, hurtled through it and caught sight of the multiple barrels ofa light flak gun swinging on to m efro m one of the parapets. Beyond lay a long, straight road with tall poplars on either side and / belted the Spi tfire down the road with the trees fo rming some sort ofscreen. Tracer \I'as still bursting ol'er the cockpit. Half a dozen cyclists \I'ere making their lI'ay up the road towards the airfi eld. They fl ung themselves and their bicycles in all directions. / pulled up above the light fl ak and called the other pilots. Miraculously , they had all come through the barrage.

1 9~2

27 Sep

13 12

II 13 12 14 13 12 12 12 12 12 13 12 12 12 13 12

Escort Mitchells to Bo ulogne

Escort Marauders to Ha zebru cke airfield Escort Marauders to Ghent Escort Marauders to Am iens marsha lling yards

Escort Marauders to Arras Escort Marauders to Lille Escort Mi tchells to Boulogne Escor t Mit chells to Rouen Sweep Dou llery- A bbeville

Escort Marauders to Woensdrecht airfield Escort Marauders to M erville airfield Escort Mitchells to Serquex airfield Escort Marauders to Beauvais airfield Escort Marauders to Bea umont- le-R oger Escort Mitchells to Lievin ammonia works Sweep Amiens Sweep Amiens Sweep Amiens Sweep

Escort Escort Escort Escort Escort Escort

Mitchells to St Orner Mitchells to St Orner Mitchells to Rouen B-17s to near Beauvais Marauders to St Valery Marauders to Conches airfield

Groundcrew of 56 Squadron at Mat/ask. 1943.

168

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Pilots of616 Squadron at Ibsley in June 1943; the Squadron continued to specialize in highlevel ops with their Spitfire Vis. although in the absence of suitable targets were frequently employed as a normalfi ghter squadron

Night Intruders After a somewhat quiet but not uneventful tou r on T urbin lites, Jack Cheney converted to Mosquitoes with 25 Squadron at Church Fenton in early 1943, although shortage of aircraft and other problems meant it was March before his crew was operational. April saw the start of the Intruder season for 25 Squadron and Jack Cheney flew his first such op on the 20th . Manor 24 ( our callsign) became airbornefrom Coltishall in the bright moonlight. with no cloud and visibility of f our miles. We crossed the North Sea at 200ft and after pinpointing Vlieland to starboard \l'e climbed to 4. 500ft . . .. We fo llowed some railway lines to Papenburg and Leer. encountering moderate flak and searchlight activity on the \l'ay. A train \l'as spoiled entering Leer f rom the south and I turned to attack. Just as I did so. the aeroplane \l'as illuminated by the glare of three searchlights for about halfa minut e. Considerable light flak. again pretty accurate was thrown at us and I had to break off the attack with some violent evasive action. . . . West of Bremen a fa st-moving train \l'as spo iled. I gently pushed the stick fo rward and made a head-on pass at it. starting at 1.300ft and, with Mike shouting out the height . dOIl'/1 to about 400ft. Cannon strikes \l'ere observed on the locomotive and \l'e broke a\l'a)' and headed fo r Cloppenburg. I fo llowed the railway tracks south to Quackenbruck and Furstenau and soon I l' e came upon another train near Bippen. This time I attacked f rom astern and to starboard. opening up with a longfive -second burst. The slow-mo ving train \l'as hit in a concentrated strike and thefla shf rom the explosions lI'as blinding. The engine became enveloped in clouds ofsteam and smoke. grinding to a halt and lit up with a vivid red glow.

OPERATIONS

(From ' Night Fighter Pilot's Diary, Alastair Goodrum , FlyPast maga zine). Jack Cheney and ' Mike ' Mycock flew a number of operational sorties before they were listed as missing from an Instep mission over the Bay of Biscay on 13 Jun e. With Bomber Command having suffered heavily du ring its Battle of the Ruhr (Ma rch to July 1943) there were calls on Fighte r Command to increase its night intruder work. Having spent May and the earl y part of Ju ne training at Drem with its new AI Beaufighter VIs, 14 1 Squadron was at Witteri ng on I I June when it was visited by the AOC of No . 12 Group, Air-Vice Marshal Andrew, who wished them luck with their forthcoming operational period . The Squadron was led by one of the RA F's great nightfighter aces and leaders, Wg Cdr R D Braham and it was he who was to fly the first op and score the first victo ry. The ORB recorded for 14 June: ' First night of Squadron's Intruder operations. W/Cdr Braham with F/L Gregory as Na vigator Radio took-off at 2355 hours to patrol Deelen, which they did uneventfu lly, and at 0210 whilst returning to the Dutch coast saw an Me 110 coming up behind. A dog-fight in bright moon light ensued in which W/Cdr Braham wit,h the assistance of F/L Gregory completely outmanoeuvred the enemy aircraft , which received a 5-second burst of cannon and machine-gun fire. Strikes were observed on fuselage and port engine, which caught fire. The Me 110 dived vertically and crashed on the ground in flames North of Stavoren.' Four more of the Squad ron's aircraft were on similar missions but none foun d any ' trade'. Th e Bomber Command ta rget tha t night was Oberhausen and 17 of the 197 Lancasters failed to return, a loss rate of 8.4%, an indicat ion tha t the Command was continuing to suffer unsustainable loss rate s. The night intruder effort cont inued to increase and Braham and 141 Squadron were always in the thick of it. On I October 1943 . JIIICdr Braham with F1L Gregory as Navigator Radio took-off at 2355 hours to patrol Deelen, which they did uneventfully, and at 0210 whilst returning to the Dutch coast sail' an Me 110 coming up behind. A dog-fight in bright moonlight ensued in which JIIICdr Braham with the assistance of FIL Gregor)' completely outmanoeuvred the enem), aircraft .' One of the most successfu l night-fighter crews: JIIg Cdr Bob Braham and Fit Lt Gregor)'.

169

170

5

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

he was posted and the ORB noted the impact he had made : 'He joi ned the unit at a time when it was at its very lowest ebb . By his magnificent example and good organisation, and despite the fact that all the experienced crews were posted away, the morale and work of the Squadron started to improve immediately . He succeeded in communicating a fine offensive spirit, which showed itself to such an effect while the Squadron was at Predannack, that they were eventually chosen from all the ight Fighter squadrons of Fighter Command to undertake the present extremely important tasks. Du ring the nine months he has led the Squadron , he has succeeded in destroy ing eight enemy aircraft and damaging two others. While at Predannack he shot -up a Motor Torpedo Boat in a convoy, and on another occasion serious ly damaged a subma rine, both in the Bay of Biscay. Over France in Ranger Operations he seriously damaged a train, and a lorry. He has succeeded with his last victory in beating the score of WIC Cunningham and leaves the Squadron as the Ace Night Fighte r Pilot.' Fighter Co mma nd summa ry of

ni ~hl

offensi ve operatio ns, I Jan 194 3-14/15 No,' 1943

Losses

Claims M ission

Nig hts

Ops

Sort ies

Dest.

Prob.

Dam.

Lo st

%

Dam.

Intruder Serrate Mahmoud Night Ranger Nig ht Rhubarb Ship Reece Ocher

189 53 31 63 24 67 5

1.951 334 100 583 37 100 6

1,951 334 100 594 153 328 18

50 13 2 2 I I 0

5 1 I 0 0 0 0

32 8 0 0 0 0 0

28 4 2 16 3 6 I

1.+1 1.20 2.00 2.69 1.96 1.83 5.56

12 0 I 7 0 2 0

Tot al

432

3. 111

3,478

69

7

40

60

1.75

22

No les I. % - percentage o f the total effort (ai rcra ft) lost on ops . 2. Under its ADGB title the Co mma nd flew a fun her 234 sort ies to the end o f year, claim ing five aircra ft and losing five.

1944 - Year of the Invasion Once again it was offensive missions that occupied the bulk of Fighter Command (Air Defence of Great Britain) flying. although by this time it had lost a large pa rt of its strength to the 2nd Tactical Air Fo rce. The one exception to this was the sudden need from June onwards to provide an effective defence against the new German assault on London by the V-I ' pilotless aircraft' (flying bombs) . Defensive O perations - Second Blitz The first V-I Flying Bombs hit England on 13 June and the Fighter Command defence plan against these Divers swung into action - and immediately revealed the problems of catching and shooting-down these small, fast targets . Although 501 Squadron was the last of the Tempest units to enter the campaign, it became one of the most successful. By 29 July the Squadron had received its full comple ment of Tempest Vs, and was taken off operations to carry out intensive training in Dir er techniques, but was tasked to specialise in the night role. The squadron. under

the command of V-I ace Squadron Leader Joe Berry. moved to Manston on 2 August and two days later the ORB recorded that Sqn Ldr Ro ugetelle. a controller from Biggin Hill Sector, 'told us what was to be our function with the new aircraft with which we had been equipped; it was to chase flying-bombs between the coast and the North Downs, to keep a Section Patrol from Folkestone to Manston and to operate under Sandwich Control.' The first kill went to Flying Offi cer Bill Polley in Tempest EJ598 on 5 August, FISgt Ryman (EJ585) also downed a V-I as par t of the same engagement, Bill Polley later recalled some of the problems of attacking these weapons: Very of ten Il'e Il'ere 100 close to our targets bef ore Ire got the opportunity 10 fire. and the big danger Il'as gelling an airburst . On one occasion l was chasing a V-I 100 quickly and I kn ell' that I was overhauling the bomb 100 quickly and that I was rery close to the armoured balloons. I fired a long burst and pulled up steeply 10 starboard, almost above the V-I . just as it exploded. The blast caught my leftwing and tumbled the aircraft in a series of snap rol/s. After what seemed an eternity. the aircraft regained its stability. . . . A s my gyros had tumbled it was many ageing moments before I realised that I was upside down.

Th ere was a significant risk of self-damage when the bomb exploded. Joe Berry made his stance very clear. T he squadro n must cons ider itself expenda ble, and th us will take off and try to effect intercep tio n in every weather condition . .. even thoug h all ot her sq uadro ns are grounded.' The Tempest pilots flew along set patrol lines, the ends of which were marked by search lights. and each patrol lasted some two hours . The sector controller provided positions of target and fighter, with the aim of putting the latter in an advantageous position to achieve a kill. The first intense night for 50 I Squadron was 11112 August, with the first patrol airborne at 2215; by 0140 they had claimed eight Divers. three falling to Fit Lt Thornton and three to Fit Officer Miller (an American). By Tempest of 3 Squadron at Newchurch ill June 1944: the Tempests played a major role ill combating the V-I threat. with the Newchurch Willg claiming /lItmerous victories.

171

172

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONS

the end of the mont h the Squadron score was 38. four of these fell on the night of 26/27 August to Fit Lt G L Bonh am - ' three of them, having expend ed his ammunition on the first, by tipping them over with his wing' (501 Squadron ORB ). Sadly he was killed in a flying accident a month later. Mosquito units were also active during the night hours, using radar to locate their targets. Whilst the Allied gro und offensive gradually rolled over the V-I launch ing sites, putting many targets in England o ut of range, the German s had already started using air-launch from an He I ll. Th e air-launched V-I s were proving a problem and the ideal solution was to hunt down and destroy the launch aircraft. On 14 October the Mosquitoes of 25 Squadron, the unit primarily employed on this task, claimed the destruction of fou r He Ill s, with two more probables and two damaged. Th e V-I campaign also involved the RAF's first jet fighters, the Gloster Meteors of 616 Squad ron scoring a numb er of successes. Fit Lt Graves land ed off his 3rd August sort ie cursing a Mustang pilot who had got in his way j ust as he was setting up to finish off a 'bomb' . Success eventua lly came the next day with 616 destroying two of these weapons. Mid afte rnoon 'D ixie' Dean was airborne patrolling und er the contro l of Kingsley II (Biggin Hill) .. . at 1616 he spotted a bomb at 1,000 feet near Ton bridge and was cleared to give chase. Diving down from 4,500 feet and reaching 450 mph he soo n Fighter Com mand statistics - night operations b)' AI aircraft over U K and Dat e

Sort ies

Contacts

Visuals

N'" Europe

Destroy ed

Probable

8 13 16 16 24 12 24 13 8

10 7 21 6 II 9 II 16 10 14 II 4

0 2 5 0 I I 0 4 I I I 0

8 2 2 2 I 4 3 3 I 4 0 3

Combats

Damaged

Ja n 1943 Feb 1943 M a r 1943 Apr 1943 M ay 1943 J un 1943 J ul 1943 Au g 1943 Sep 1943 Oct 1943 Nov 1943 Dec 1943

562 554 767 552 687 690 6 12 860 865 799 866 495

79 25 158 50 79 74 63 82 56 145 62 41

27 II 60 17 24 27 23 27 17 46 27 II

Jan 1944 Feb 1944 M ar 1944 Apr 1944 M ay 1944 Jun 1944 Jul 1944 Au g 1944 Sep 1944 Oct 1944 Nov 1944 Dec 1944

755 1.102 1.402 1,519 1.922 2.545 2.314 757 577 8 13 1.360 263

78 256 259 208 150 262 155 162 44 82 99 38

31 81 91 75 60 155 89 97 16 31 38 6

25 47 58 47 37 112 59 75 14 22 25 4

16 26 44 32 24 90 44 58 12 20 18 2

3 3 3 4 6 7 3 3 2 I 2 0

4 10 5 4 6 14 6 9 0 I 3 I

Jan 1945 Feb 1945

101 153

8 I

I 0

I 0

I 0

0 0

0 0

20 II

34

Note: Table based on March 1949 Air Ministry record.

caught up with his quarry and positioned to attack it from astern . .. at which point his cannon failed . Determined that it shouldn' t get away he flewalongside and positioned his wingtip under the wing of the 'bomb' and then pulled up sharply; this sent the weap on out of cont rol and it crashed about 4 miles south of Ton bridge. Another historic event had been notch ed up - the first jet air-to-air victory. The second ' bomb' fell at 1640 in a more con ventional mode as the 20 mm cann on of Fg Off Rodgers delivered two 2 second bursts causing the weapon to explode. Dean added to his ' Diver' score by downing another on the 7th; three days later he shot down his thi rd. Success against ' Divers' continued to mount and by the end of the month the squadro n total stood at twelve and a half. Offe nsive Operati ons Musta ngs joined the fray in early 1944. The 19 Squad ron Operati onal Record Book recorded the unit 's first mission with the new type: ' We now have sufficient aircraft operational to put a squadro n in the air, and everyone was very keen to test out our new machines against the wily Hun . Unfortunately, the weather inter vened and the show did not come off'. However, the following da y, 15 February, it was different . .. 'Offensive fighter sweep of Holland/N orth ern France by three flights of four (White, Dick, Gr een) led by S/L N J Durrant. Take-off 0950 and climb to 26,500 ft and cross the coast near Flushing. To avoid smoke tr ails angels were reduced to 25 and the Squad ron swept the area Ant werp-Brussels-Cambrai without any enemy reaction and crossed out ju st south of Boulogne. Alth ough uneventful, everybody felt very happ y with their new kites and our cruising speed at altitude was very high (approx 250 lAS ).' The Squadron flew another unevent ful sweep in the afternoo n. Whilst the ant i-Diver operat ions referred to above were a vita l element in countering this threat, there was also an offensive element with the Nob all and Crossbow operations. There were two part s to this: the rou tine of fighter escort to bombers attac king these targets, which was the main effort , and the employment of fighters and fighter-bombers. Once aga in this is where the operations of the sq uadro ns belonging to Fighter Comman d Mustang of2 Squadron at Sawbridgeworth; this Army-Cooperation squadron lI'as atta ched to the A ir Spott ing Pool during the D-Day landings,

173

174

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Tactical air polI'er lI'as used to attack a wide range of targets in and around the invasion area. with radar sites being a fre quent target,

(or ADGB as it now was) and the AEAF become difficult to separate. The same type of escort and offensive ops were flown by both organisations, using the same types of aircraft, although by now most Typhoons were with the AEAF. Having spent some time with No. 85 Group of AEAF, 124Squadron was transferred to o. II Group, ADGB in mid Augu st 1944, but as the introductory comm ents to the ORB for that month show, this made no difference to the work being undertaken by the Spitfires. 'This month saw a great increase in the amount of operational work of the Squadron, and a corresponding increase in the enthusiasm of the pilots. At the beginning of the month with the Detling Wing we carried out a number of sweeps and close escorts to Lancasters and Halifaxes bombing Noball sites and in particular the large dumps in the caves at Creil, North of Paris . The Squadron's work was definitely now long-range; 90 Gallon tanks being invariably fitted, and needed. Chiefly escort work , such as Lancasters to Tours, and Blous (our deepest penetration), sweeps to Evreux, Nogent and the Lisieux Falaise pocket , and the Squadron strafing on return any suitable ground target - mainly MT vehicles and barges . On 15.8.44 we went to Coltishall to escort the heavies bombing all the airfields in Holland - the Squadron being allocated the GilzeRijen box, Some more escorts - heavies to Noball targets and mediums to strategic targets such as bridges on the Seine and one or two Rodeos , but with no luck . . . these were to Mezieres, Rheims , Beauvais and Criel areas . Squadron then concentrated on practice ground atta cks for a special target which had been allocated to us, but the actual att ack never came off. 'On 27th August we went to Man ston and then escorted the Lanca sters which bombed the synthetic oil plant at Homberg-Mierbeck in the Ruhr. It was on this sortie that we first saw the jet aircraft Me 163, which attacked one of the bombers, and also

OPERATIO

5

' We couldn't see much. The sky I\'OS f ull of American fig hters, in pairs. They lI'ere wandering about rather haphazard. and showed a tendency to come and sniff at us fro m ,-ery close to; when they seemed too aggressive lI'e showed our teeth and f aced them, , The Americanfig hters ,,'ere not always welcome!

our Wing Leader W/Cdr Checketts. On the last day of the month we did target cover for 1y, hours over oball areas near Arniens, and came o ut near Le Touquet at zero feet; F/L Melia being badl y shot-up, but he managed to make landfall, and crash land at Lydd , himself unhurt but his aircraft a write-off. During the same evening an Armed Reece with some good results on MT Barges.' The Squadron flew 675 operational hours in the month. The Command's contribution to the maritime war, or rather the protection of Allied shipping against German naval , primarily submarine and E-boat, activity was also stepped-up in earl y 1944. During the first week in January the Mosquitoes of 157 Squadron were operating out of Predannack on Box protection and patrols, one of which included escorting a Tsetse Mosquito (75 mm cannon) of 248 Squadron in an unsuccessful search for a damaged submarine. On 7 January the Squadron came across a pair of Ju 88s, the rear of which was engaged by Fg Off Huckin and F/Sgt Graham , . . strikes lI'ere seen and a fe ll' minutes later the Ju 88 crashed into the seas in flames, FlO Huckin called on R1T that he lI'as hit and lI'as making fo r base, and a f ell' minutes later called again say ing both engines hadf ailed and he \l'as dit ching, Mo squit o \l'as later seen in sea about I Y> miles from where Ju 88 had crashed, with what appeared to be a dinghy alongside it. with t\l'Ooccupants who waved. Dinghy \l'as late seen in position 4708N 0730 W at 1634.

It was standard practice for squadrons to mount search patrols for aircraft that had ditched like this and at 0720 the following day, 'B Flight ' was airborne. Having found

175

176

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

nothing they returned to base. 'A Flight ' was already airborne and heading for the same area and after a square search of the area found the dingh y at 1205. Warwick was given a rector and successfully dropped lifeboat within 50 yards of dinghy. FlO Huckin appeared quite cheerful. both he and Graham waving frantically to the Mosquit oes. Ne ws came through later fro m the Warwick crew that Huckin and Graham were ill lifeboat and had set course. A t 1434 51Ldr Chisholm. FIL Sm yth and FlO Whitlock were airborne to give corer to FlO Huck in ill case the Huns sent allY aircraft to interf ere with rescue operations. At 1614, 7 Ju 88s II-ere sighted and engaged. FlO Whitlock 's guns would not fi re and he sustained several strikes all the windscreen. Fll.t Sm yth 's guns also did not fi re due to a short ill the electrical sys tem. 51Ldr Chisholm closed ill and engaged, and received hits ill port engine and wing, he made a second atta ck during which his port engine seized, he made another attack and strikes were see all 88's f uselage and behind cockpit. He set coursefo r base, coming back all aile engine and made a good landing.

On the following day the ORB continued the story: ' othing further heard from Huckin, but no undue concern is felt as the lifeboat they are in has ample supplies of cloth ing and emergency rat ions.' No flying was possible because of bad weather. And on the 10th: 'S/Ld r Tappin and FIL Stevens located at 1515 FlO Huckin. They had set sail but did not appear to be moving ; they both appeared to be well and waved to the Mosquitoes. Coa stal Command had the Warwick out again but bad weather set in and it was recalled . Launc hes were known to be within 7 miles of last known position.' Attacks all locomotives Irere intensified as part oj the plan to shut-down German railway movement.

OPERATIONS

The following day the OR B noted that the crew had been picked-up by a naval launch 36 miles South-East of the Scillies. It was very reassuring to the aircrew to know that such effort s would be made to find and rescue them; sad ly, the happy outcome relayed here was by no mean s always the case. although by 1944 the Air-Sea Rescue service was very efficient. For 157 Squadron their time with Fighter Command was almost over as in March they went to Valley to re-equip with Mosquitoes and Al Mk. X prior to jo ining No. 100 Group. Much of the period from April onwards was spent in preparatory operations for the D-Day landings. with fighters and fighter-bombers of ADG B and 2nd TAF. A typical record of an RAF unit involved during the day was that of 602 Squadron. One of its pilots later recorded his impression s of the evening patrol: We flew along the Cotentin peninsula. There were fires all along the coast, and a destroyer surrounded by small boats was sink ing near a little island. Our patr ol zone I\'(/S the area between M ontebourg and Carentan. We were covering the IOlst and 82nd American Airborne Divisions while the 4th Division, which had j ust landed, marched on St e M ere Eglise. We couldn't see much. The sky was full of American fig hters, ill pairs. They were wandering about rather haphazard, and showed a tendency to come and sniff at us f rom I'ery close to; when they seemed too aggressive we showed our teeth and fa ced them. One Mustang coming out ofa cloud actually fi red a burst at Graham, whose shooting was as good as his temper was bad, who opened fire in return, but luckily fo r the Mustang, he missed.

Jerry Jarrold was flying with 80 Squadron: The Squadron fl ew two missions all D-Day ; the firs t involved tll'Ofli ghts of fo ur aircraft acting as corer fo r a callroy Ol-er Nor th Foreland, with the fi rst Pilots oj 80 Squadron at West Malting. July 1944; the Squadron Ims aile oj a number that returned f rom ol'erseas to boost the UK-based fighter strength ill the invasion period. (Jerry Jarrold)

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

fo ur airborne at 1100 and down at 1340, and the second fo ur, with me as No. 2, airborne at 1205 and down at 1355. It lI'as except ionally bad weather, and lI'e didn 't see much ofthe ships lI'e lI'ere supposed to be patrolling and our pat rol sail' no action, but the earlier one had spoiled a Ju 88 at tempting to attack the ships and Fg Off Anderson had given chase, but with I /O result. The Squadr on sent 12 Spi tfires up at 1950 as escort to Albemarles towing gliders to St Aubin , with the fig hters fl ying at 3-4,000ft; 1 lI'as not on this op. A similar shipping cO l'er operation lI'as carried out b)' the section l was in on Zth June, but this time it lI'as Ol'er the beachhead. We lI'ere able to observe the truly enormous number of ships of all sorts, assemb ling off the Normand)' coast. Man )' big ships - 1 recall the massive US Battleship 'M ight)' M o' ( the M issouri) with its huge guns belching OUI fl ame and smoke as it fi red rounds off in the direction of Normandy. It lI'as possible 10 see where the shells landed with large explosions well into France, which lI'as a truly memorable sight. We didn 't see an)' enem)' aircraft , but the massive number of Allied fig hters 0 1'Cr the beachhead, at their allocated levels, lI'as 1'Cr)' impressive. Our height lI'as 18.000 fee t. As usual, the Yanks wouldn' t keep to their 0110 lied altitude and lI'ere diving about all over the place and, at times. moving into our air space. I remember 'Spud' Spur dle fi ring warning shots in their direction whenever the)' came into our allotted air space.

During the next few weeks every available aircraft was thrown into the bridgehead area to help secure the area and assist the breakout ; the primary role of virtually very fighter type was to attack anything enemy that moved by land . sea or air - or an ything that looked remotely suspicious. Within days. Allied fighter types were operating from rough airstrips in the beach-head area. which provided a significant boost in capability as they could rearm and refuel in the front line rather than flog back acro ss the Channel. And so it cont inued for the next few months as the Allies gradu ally moved further inland and the role of Fighter Command in support reduced. Escort of medium and heavy Spitfire IX MK264 of 308 Squadron; black-and-white identification stripes lI'ere painted 0 11 all tactical aircraft ill the 48-llOurs preceding 6 June.

OPER

TlONS

Mosquito of 85 Squadron 0 1 Castle Camps, April 1945; this Cambridgeshire airfield spent its entire war as home 10 night-fighter units.

bombers remained import ant. and the advent of the Mustan g into the Comm and meant it at last had an aircra ft with a good combat range. On 7 October 1944 the North Weald Mustan g Wing (129. 306. 31 5 squadro ns) were tasked to escort the Lancasters of 617 Squadron d uring an att ack on the Kembs Dam. on the Rhine ju st orth of Basle. The first wave of bombers was to attack at 8.000 ft and the second at zero feet. No, 129 Squadron provided top cover. 315 Sq uadro n covered the low-flying force and 306 Squadron was detailed to silence flak positions defending the dam , Th e approach to the tar get was uneventful and enemy op position was not aro used until the first two Lancasters of the low-flying force went in to atta ck, The second bomber was hit by flak after crossing the dam . Meanwhile. 306 Squadron had temporar ily subdued the anti-aircraft gunfire enabling the remainder of the force to place their delayed action bomb s accurately. Th e fighters covering the target area did not turn for home until the last bomb was dropped and landed at dusk after being airbo rne for four and a half hou rs' (AHB Summar y). The Lancaster of the low force dropped 12.000 Ib Tallboy bomb s and these succeeded in breachin g the gates of the dam, Accordin g to Bomber Command record s two of the Lancasters were shot down. On 12 December the Germ an fighters made a concerted attempt to disrupt the bomb ing attack on Witten. Th e escort compri sed eight Mustang squad rons from Andre ws Field and North Weald and in the tar get area. at 1400 hou rs. the formations were attac ked by 40+ enemy fighters. a mix of lO9s and 190s. The enemy was more aggressive than they had been for a while and mana ged to shoo t down four Lancasters. Five of the atta ckers were shot down by the Mustangs and a furt her five by the bombers. T he final months V-Is continued to land on the UK in the early month s of 1945 and Dick Leggett . flying Mossies with 125 Squad ron. recalled the probl ems of engaging the air-launched weapons.

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Once the ram-jet of the fly ing bomb had ignit ed, the pilot [of the HeinkelJ would quickly descend to his original height and head for home, using loll' st ratus or sea fog to CO l'er his retreat. During the fe ll' minutes taken to launch the missile the enemy aircraft ll'as vulnerable to attack from the num erous night fig hters which would always be in the area due to the pr ior warning given to us from intelligence sources. Ho wever, as winter set in, the German pilots became more adept at cutting their expos ure tim e to a minimum, thereby avoiding interception during the launching period. It ll'as under these circumstances that Operation Vapour lI'as evolved, in early 1945, so that the Heinkels could be intercepted and destr oyed whilst at low altitude. Prior to this tactic, life had been more difficult as the Heinkel could happily cruise at a speed well belo w the stalling speed ofa M osquito X Vll. On one particular intercept, each time visual contact lI'as att emp ted the sel'ere turbulence from the slips tream of the Heinkel destabilised my aircraft and creat ed an incipient stall. Throughout the interception my Na vlRad. Egbert Midlane, mira culously held radar contact with the target and repeatedly guided me into his minimum Al range of 100 y ards, but cloud and darkn ess pre vented a visual sighting. We decided to wait fo r the greyness of dawn and ll'ere eventually rewarded by the destru ction ofthe Heinkel as it approached Den Helder. Some 55 minutes had elapsed from the first radar contact to firing the fo ur 20 nllll cannon. '

In the earl y hours of 26 March Fit Lt Jimmie Grottick of 501 Squ adron mad e the last V-I kill by a fighter: It ll'as a clear night , but without a moon. It ll'a sn 't long bef ore I could see the 'jet light' ofa V-I at about I,OOO ft and traveling locry. veryfast. It ll'as some distan ce ahead and about 2 miles off to the port side. I turned towards it and eventually ClIme in through a 180 degree app roach. I recollect that at the botto m of my dive and on the final approach I ll'as clock ing 580 mph! A llowing the distan ce to decrease. throttlin g back as I came tnto range. and then at about 300 y ards down to about 200 yards I opened fi re with a 3-4 second burst. There IIw e imm ediate strikes and then the flam e fea thered . . . it veered off course and dived into the ground near No rth Weald.

This brought to a close what had been a goo d record by 501 Squadron aga inst the V-I s, with almost 100 destro yed in the period Augu st to December 1944. The Tempe sts generally had proved them selves in this campaign , the thre e squad ron s of the Newchurch Wing (3, 56 a nd 486) in particular having played a major role, although of the Tempe st unit s 50 I served the longest in this role. German fighters could still be found in the latter weeks of the war even for squadro ns opera ting fro m Scotl and , and 19 Squadron, by this time opera ting Mu stan gs from Peterhead, record ed their 40th victo ry since D-D ay (to brin g the Squadron tot al to 143Y, ) on 12 March . 'Another show was laid on escorting 44 Mosquit oes to the Kattegat. Th e Mosqu itoes rende zvoused with us over base at 1320 and set course out to sea. Unfo rtunately there was a layer of 10/10 over the Katteg at and the Mosqu itoes chose to patrol above it, so there was no strike, no ships being seen. They turn ed a nd set course for base and as everyo ne was sett ling down to go home, F/L Butler leading Whit e Section, saw some aircraft passing him head on. The visibility was bad down on the sea, making it ha rd to identi fy the aircraft but they turned o ut to be abo ut lOMe 109s. A dog-fight started a t once, Green and Tonic Section s also being a tta cked by three others.

OPERATIONS

Unfortunately, White 2, S/L M R Hill, was sho t down in the melee. Also Green 2 (P/O Avery) was sho t up in the first bounce and got some shell splinters in the back , however, he got back safely and is now rapidly recovering. F/L Shirreff, Green I, was unlucky eno ugh to have his reflector-sight bulb fuse a t the critical moment. The Squadron destro yed one (the CO) and one Probable (F/L Butler)' (19 Squadron ORB) .

1946-1968 - The Cold War Unti l the introduction of a long-r ang e bomber cap abilit y by the new enemy, the Russiando minated War saw Pact, it could be a rgued that Fighter Command did not take part in any opera tions. Indeed , even with that threat established it did not actuall y take part in opera tions as such but was required to maint ain a 24 hours a day 365 days a yea r ca pability to protect the UK from air attack, the main concern from the late 1950s being air-launched nuclear weap ons. Thi s role became encapsulat ed in the maintenance of a QRA (Q uick Reacti on Alert ) force. As already menti oned , one of the major probl ems for Fighter Co mmand in the ea rly 1950s was the sho rt range of its jet fighters a nd the lack of an y real all-weather capabilit y, altho ugh in term s of the likely thre at - which un til the mid 1950s was seen as minimal in terms of the UK itself - this presented few problems. The fighters ' rehearsed' with the bombers and invariabl y managed to 'shoo t down' eno ugh to pro ve that the fighter defence was effective. What was effective was the ability of the defend ers to find their tar gets, as the contro l and reporting system was excellent. The situation looked a little less secu re when the RAF introduced a bomber, the Canberra that out-perfor med the fighters! In addition to its defensive role the Co mma nd was called on to deploy aircra ft in support of other operations, such as Suez, to provide base defence or area defence. Most of these depl oyments were fairly low key and whilst operational in one sense did not Meteor F8s of 56 Squadron at Waterbeach; the RAF undertook no combat ops with the Meteor but a number of Fighter Command pilots served with Australian Meteor squadrons in the Korean War.

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

HAPTER

HREE

Operational Groups

Javelins of23 Squadron 011/ of Coltishall with tank er 10 £1 Adem. November / 962; the ability rapidly deploy fighter aircraft to other theatres brought a lIell' capability - and commi tment - to Fighter Command. 10

involve act ual combat, with the exception of the pilots loaned for ops with the Australian and American sq uadro ns in Korea . Th e crea tion of Str ike Co mmand in 1968 did not bring the fighter mission to an end and for the next 20+ years the main role remained that of defendin g British airspace aga inst aggressors. On a rou tine basis this involved QR A (Q uick Reaction Alert) fighters scrambling to intercept and shadow long-range Russian bombers and reconn aissance aircraft. Th e primar y threat was from such bombers launching stand-off nuclear weapo ns (shades of the He III s launching V-Is in late 1945) an d the air defence network was op timized for this. The Lightning prototyp e lI'as a revolution ill terms of aircraft perfo rmance and the supersonic interceptor entered service with a lIell' Fighter doctrine of intercepting Soviet bombers some distance fr om the coast.

he RAF' s command structure is organised into Co mma nds. Group s. Wings and Squad ron s (with some opera tional units also being designated as Flights). All parts of this command str ucture ap plied to Figh ter Comma nd. Wings were employed by Fighter Comman d thro ughout the war. initially as named Wings that did not always carry a unified comm and responsibility but were ofte n only a geogra phic gro uping. and late r with numb ered Wings. Between 1940 and 1942 reference is made to named Wings such as the Duxford Wing and the Kenley Wing. whilst from 1943 onwards reference is made to the likes of No. 127 (F ighter) Wing. Th e latt er Wings were often a renamin g of the gro uping that had been designated as an Airfield for mobile operatio ns. so No. 127 Airfield became No. 127 Wing. and most were associated with the new Groups that became part of the Tactical Air Force. This chapter focuses on the Groups as they were the main opera tional comm and elements. With the formatio n of Fighter Comman d in May 1936 a new series of Groups was created from the old regional grou pings and was based on the perceived threat at the time and the number of airfields and squadro ns in each region. the inten tion being to create a logical and workable comma nd str ucture. When the Comma nd formed it had a single Group - No . II Group - but this was joi ned in April 1937 by o. 12 Group. Unlike Bomber Command where the Groups specialised in par ticular aircraft types. the Fighter Groups maint ained a mix of day and night fighters types in accordance with the stra tegic need. a policy tha t continued throughout the war as ot her operational Groups came and went. o. 13 Group was formed in September 1939 and the Com mand entered the war with the UK divided between the three Groups; however. three more were form ed in 1940 as the numb er of airfields and sq uadro ns continued to increase. By August 1940 the Command had six operat iona l G ro ups. although those in the SouthEast remained the lar gest in terms of numb ers of sq uadro ns. Each Group was commanded by an air-ra nking officer. usually of Air Commodo re or Air-Vice Marshal rank. altho ugh it tends to be only those of Battle of Britain 'vintage' in No. II and No. 12 Group whose names are well-known ; indeed only Par k (No . II Group) and LeighMallory (No . 12 Group) are well-known names. in part because of the disagreements over tactics employed in the Battl e of Britain . The G roup structure remained virtually unchanged. alt ho ugh actual strength of sq uadrons varied. until mid 1943. by which time the thr eat to the UK had diminished and the Command was increasingly offensive oriented. First to disba nd was No. 14 G roup. which was abso rbed into No . 13 Group in July 1943. No.9 Gr oup vanished the following year but the other four survived to the end of the war. althoug h o. 10 Group disbanded in May 1945 and No. 13 G rou p in May 1946. Th e latter re-form ed in the mid 1950s but for most of the post-war period Fighter Command had two operational Groups - No. II and No. 12. Th e latter disband ed in March 1963 as par t of a restr ucturing that gave it the new title of East Anglian Sector ; a similar renamin g took place throughout the Command - a poor decision as the ' names' did not carry the ethos

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

of the wartime history of the G roup s. When this decision was reversed the only G roup number to be resur rected was No . II Group and it d uly became par t of RAF Strike Com mand when Fighter Command disbanded in 1968.

No. 9 (Fighter) Group Badge: No badge was awa rded. No.9 (Fighter) Group began to form on 9 August 1940, when it became apparent that the geogra phic area assigned to o. 12 Grou p was too unwieldy. The new Gro up was given the operat iona l area of the Irish Sea, including the Isle of Man. and NW England/ N Wales. Th is area was divided into sectors based on Jurby, Millom, Speke, Ternhill , Baginton, Harlech and Rh osneigr (later known as Valley), each of which would be allocated two fighter squadrons. Thi s initial plan was put into effect, with the exception of the Millom and Harl ech sectors . AVM W A McCloughy was appointed as the first Air-Officer-Co mmanding and established his HQ at Bar ton Hall, near Preston. Th is site had been requisitioned in July as home to the North-West Filter Room and so its adop tion for the new Group was a logical move. Th e Group's first operational station was Speke (Liverpool), which opened on 24 September, with Baginton coming on line

Crews of No.1456 Flight. Honiley; the Flight was part of No.9 Group in 1942.

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

the following day. The Hurricane-equipped 308 (Polish) Squad ron had been at Speke since 12 September but moved to Baginton on the 25th as the first of o. 9 Group's operational units. One of the major tasks was the defence of Liverpool and its vital docks, as well as the convoys that came and went from this port. Th e city had become one of the major trans-shipment port s and the flow of war material into the UK via Liverpool was absolutely essential. Th e Group's first success came on 8 October when Hur ricanes of 312 (Czech) Squadron shot down a Ju 88 of KGr. 806, which crash-landed near Brombo rough Dock, three of its crew being taken prisoner. Although No.9 Group only became ope rational towards the end of the Battl e of Britain , its squa d rons scored a number of successes against German bombers. Liverpool was not the only importa nt city to be covered by the Group: Manchester and Birmingham were also afforded protection . Day and night patrols were flown by the Hu rricanes and by the limited numb er of Beaufighters tha t were available, and in late 1940 the Gr oup had an average daily ava ilability of 80 aircra ft. Th is pattern of activity, with an increased emphasis on night-fighter pat rols, continued throughou t 1941. A few successes were recorded by 68 Squadron operating out of High Ercall and 219 Sqn out of Valley, bot h eq uipped with AI Beau fighters and, from Jun e 1941, operating under GC I contro l. On 3 August 1941, the Sector names were changed with Jurby becoming Andreas, Speke changing to Wood vale, Ternh ill to Atcham , Baginton to Honiley, and Valley remaining unch anged. Following the form ation of the USAAF's 31st Pur suit Group at Atcham in June 1942, the Group was able to call on its aircraft from time, although this unit was not under RA F opera tional control. No .9 Gr oup was also the command authority for the strike-based Merch ant Ship Fighter Unit. Penrhos was one of the airfields under the operational control of the Group during 1941.

185

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

187

An impo rtant functional change came in Ap ril 1943 when the OTUs which had been part of o. 81 Gp were transferred on the disbandment of that Group. With 12 OTUs. numbered 51 to 62. this was an extensive training organisation. although a number of these units subsequently became Tactical Exercise Units (TEU) during 1944. First to form was o. 2 TEU. from No. 58 OTU. followed by o. 3 TEU. initially from No . 55 OTU. As there was little or no air threat to this pa rt of the U K. there was little need for a n operationa l network a nd with the depar tur e of 198 Squadron 's Typh oon s from Woodvale to Ludham on 13 May no operational day fighter squadrons were left withi n o. 9 Group. Thus the primary role became fighter training (OTU and TEU). as well as a continued commitment for Air-Sea Rescue. In November the number of Sectors was reduced to two. Honiley and Woodvale, the former also being home to o. 3 TEU. When the last night-fighter unit . 68 Squadron. was withdrawn in ovember 1944 the Group had no operational aircraft left and in the event of operational need it either used aircraft from the training units or borrowed aircraft from neighbouring Groups. All operational commitments were transferred to o. 12 Group on 4 August 1944. but it retai ned control of its OTUs and TEUs. However. this was short-lived an d o n 17 September the Group was d isbanded. the rema ining units also being transferred to o. 12 Group. During its period of operation . its squadrons had claimed 36 enemy airc ra ft destroyed. ten proba ble and 27 damaged . Air-O fficer-Comma nding No.9 Group Command from : 16 Sep 1940 26 Jun 1942 18 Oct 1942 2 ov 1942 10 ov 1942 6 Jul 1943 II Oct 1943 7 Dee 1943 15 Aug 1944

AVM W A McCiaughry DSO MC D FC Air Cdre W F Dickson CB DSO O BE AFC A VM W F Dickson C B DSO O BE AFC Air Cdre C R Steele D FC A VM J Whitwort h Jones C B A VM L Hollinghurst C B O BE D FC Air Cdre C A Stevens MC AVM D F Stevenson C BE DSO MC Air Cd re S D Macdonald

No. 9 Group Order of Ba ttle, August 1940-Seplember 19-1-1 Feb / 94/ Andreas

Baginton Cran age High Ereall

308 96

Honiley Jurby Pcnrhos

Spoke Squires Gate Ternhill Valley Woodv ale

Wrexham

258 312 229.312 307 306

Apr /9 42

Apr / 943

452 79 255 246. 1456 Fh

4 1. 247 96. 255. 285

MSFU 256

MSFU

131. 275. 456

256. 275. 456 195

96. 285

o. 10 (Fighter) Group Badge: A Sword Sable and a Sword Argent in saltire enfiled with an Astral Crown Or. Motto: Challenge The swords represent day and night activity and are in the sha pe of the Roman num eral X ( 10). Th ey a lso indica te the fighting spirit of the Group. The Astral Crow n a ppea rs to represen t the RA F and was also used by o. I I Group and No . 12 G roup: it also probably signifies the realm as part of the protectors of the country symbology. No. 10 Group had originally formed in April 1918 as a Marine Operational Group based al Calshot: it survived into the post -war period. disbanding in February 1932. In its role with Fighter Command No. 10 Group was formed - though with limited facilities - on 31 May 1940. at Rudloe Manor. Box (it did not become operational unti l 8 Ju ly). Accommodation was initially in tents - and just as the camp nea red completion. orders were issued for it to be moved into the cover of nea rby unde rgrow th . a task that took a no ther week. Th e G rou p's official histor y deta ils its esta blishment thus: 'Unus ual act ivity bega n to be seen in a disused ba rn in the gro unds of a n o ld ma nor hou se a few miles ou tside Bath. Covered and gua rded lorries delivered strange equipment . an d RA F officers and men busied themse lves around the old bu ilding. In the old barn the advance party improvised a Fighter Operations Room. with its intricate and secret apparatus for the control of aircraft. reception of warnings of approaching hostile raiders. and liaison with all the other services concerned with the defence of this country against any form of enemy attack. When o. 10 Group's skeleton organisation was established - this was done within a few hours of the arrival of the advance party - a handful of fighter squadro ns from Britain's small resources were transferred. together with their airfields . to the operational and administrative control of the new Group.' The Air-Officer-Commanding. AVM Sir Quintin Brand. was instructed to look for suitable airfields. and although Sector stations were under co nstruction a t Co lerne and Mid dle Wallop he had to ma ke temporary use of Exeter. Pembrey, St Eval and Warmwcll. T he Sector Operati o ns Room was loea ted at Filton . On formation. the Group had acquired four squadrons - 92 at Pembrey, 87 a nd 213 at Exeter. an d 234 at St Eval - all from o. II Group. The first success came on the Group's first operational day. 8 July . when Blue Section of 234 Squad ron shot down a Junkers Ju 88 orr Land's End. By mid-July there were seven squadrons in the Group - up from one the previous month. ew radar stations were also entering service and by late July four Chain Home stations. west of the Isle of Wight. had been linked to the filter room at Group headquarters. To complete the warning and reporting chain. an expansion of the Observer Corps saw the establishmen t of an Observer Group in Devon and a sub -Group in Cornwall. o. 10 G roup was tasked with defend ing the en tire Western and So uth-Western sectors of Eng land. a nd its a rea included a num ber of significant milita ry and indu strial targe ts. such as Plymou th. August was a hect ic mon th and acco rdi ng to the Group histo ry: 'on one day in mid-August the G roup flew more than 70 defens ive patrols. 508 enemy aircraft were encountered and 48 were destroyed. Fifty-six more Luftwaffe

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F IGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Hurricanes of 79 Squadron ; the Squadron .ras part of No. 10 Group ...hilst based at Pembrey in early 1941.

machines were destroyed in three weeks by one squadron alone; the cost was six of our pilots - four killed and two taken prisoner: The Group's ORB for August shows the intensity of ops in the last week of August : August 21: 41 patrols totalling 104 aircraft were flown during the period . 60 EA operated over the Group area . Enemy losses: 234 Sqn one Ju 88 destroyed, 152 Sqn - one Ju 88 destroyed, 238 Sqn - two Ju 88s destroyed. Our losses: 152 Sqn - one Spitfire badly damaged, 238 Sqn - one Hurricane damaged . August 22: 31 patrols totall ing 72 aircraft were flown during the previous 24 hours [note - the entry is timed at 2100 each day so it refers to the activity of the 24 hours preceding that time]. 40 EA operated over the Group's area. Enemy losses: 213 Sqn - one Ju 88 destroyed, 152 Sqn - one Ju 88 and one Do 17 destro yed. Our losses: 152 Sqn - one Spitfire damaged, pilot safe. There were no bombs dropped in the Group area during this period . August 23: 43 patrols totalling 93 aircraft were flown, Some 152 EA operated over the Group area. Enemy losses: 152 Sqn - one Ju 88 destroyed. Our losses: one Spitfire of 152 Sqn temporarily u/s. Bombs were dropped in the following area s: Filton , Bath, Bristol, Blandford , Gloucester, Cirencester and Barry. St Eval aerod rome received nearly 1,000 incendiary bomb s at 2100 hours August 22 but little damage was done . August 24: 48 patrols involving 145 aircraft were flown. 160 EA o perated in the Group area. Enemy losses: 234 Sqn - two Me 109s destroyed , one Me 109 probable. one Me 109 and one Me 110 damaged. 249 Sqn - one Me 109 destro yed. Our losses: 234 Sqn - one Spitfire Cat 3, pilot safe. 609 Sqn - one Spitfire Cat 1 and one Spitfire Cat 3.

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

pilots safe. Bombs were reported from a number of places in S Wa les and Cornwall. St Eval aerodro me was agai n attacked at 2119 on August 23 but little or no damage . August 25: 44 pa tro ls involving 129 aircraft were flown. Some 360 EA opera ted over the Group area . Enemy losses: 609 Sqn : four Me 109s and two Me I lOs destroyed, five Me II Os probable; 92 Sqn - one Dornier type destroyed; 87 Sqn - two Ju 88s, four Me 109s and four Me I lOs destroyed, one Do 17 and two Me 109s probab le and three Me 109s damaged: 213 Sqn - three Me 109s. one Me 110 and one Ju 88 destroyed, two Me I lOs damaged; 152 Sqn - two Me 109s and one Me 110 destroyed, one Ju 88 pro bable. Our losses: 609 Sqn - one Spitfire Cat 3, one Spitfire Cat 2; 92 Sqn - one Spitfire Cat 3 (F it Lt Tuck wounded); 152 Sqn - two Spitfires missing (Pit Off Hogg, PIt Off Wildblood); 87 Sqn - one Hu rricane missing (Sgt Wake1ing); 213 Sqn - two Hurricanes missing (PIt Off Atkinson, Pit Off Phillipart), three Hurricanes damaged . Augu st 26: 46 patrols flown totalling 165 aircraft . Some 300 EA operated over the Group area . Bombs were dropped indiscriminately over a wide area . Enemy losses: 234 Sqn - six Me 109s destroyed . Our losses: one Spitfire force-landed (pilot safe). As with the ot her Fighter Comm and Groups the post Battle of Britain period bro ught two major task s - night defence and offensive operations. It is with the latter that the Group played a specific part, as its operational area was closely linked with naval activities and especially the campaign against the U'-boats. The Group history records that: 'the offensive area was on ly limited by the range of its aircraft: far out into the Bay Hurricane of 245 Squadron at M iddle Wallop, which lI'as one of the longest-serving stations in the Group.

189

190

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

of Biscay and over NW Europe . One of the Group's most valuable contributions to the war effort was to sweep the skies over the SW Approac hes clear of German long-range raiders intent on severing our shipping lanes.' Close co-opera tion was maint ained with Coas tal Command and many joi nt opera tions were flown. Whilst offensive sweeps and bomber escort had been part of the standa rd tas ks since mid 1941 it was with the pre D-Day 'softening up' cam paign that the Group's Spitfires and Typhoons jo ined other tactica l aircraft in attacking targets along the French coast. Radar sites, lines of communication, bridges and vehicles were hammered on an almost daily basis. In Ju ly 1944 the Group had a strength of 12 squadro ns, one of which specialised in Air Sea Rescue. With the Allies asho re and moving towards Germany the offensive role red uced and the main tas ks of the Group were protection of shipping - and attacks on enemy shipping - plus the continued, but lillie tested, defence of its area . No . 10 G roup was disband ed on 2 May 1945. Its wartime tally, according to its official histor y was 839 destroyed, 243 probable and 423 damaged. Air-O fficer-Co mmanding No. 10 Group Command from: Jun 1940 22 Jul 1941 4 Nov 1942 5 May 1943 10 Jul 1944 I Nov 1944

Air Cdre C J Q Brand KBE DSO MC DFC AVM A H Orlebar AF C AVM W F Dickson CB DSO OBE AFC AVM C R Steele DFC AVM B Cole-Ham ilton CB CBE Air Cd re A V Harvey CBE

Plan of Warmwell, 1944.

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

,,"0. 10 Group Order of Ba tt le, Septembe r t939-J u l~' 1944 A ug 1940 An gle Boll Head Boscombe Down Castle Camps Cha rmy Down Chilbo lton Church Stanton

256

Jul 1944

307. 310

263

87. 145-1 Fil 306 125.286

312.313 264 126. 131. 6 16

87. 213

263.504 50 1

307. 308

266

263.402. 6 15

125.4 12

32

267. 302 118.234.501

193. 276 129. 504. 6 16

238. 604. 609

93. 604

245. 604 . 1458 F it

164.406 174. 175

92

79.316 130. 3 10 66 247. 600. 1547 Fil

19. 130.602 1449 Flt 14 1

41. 610

I. 165

Predannack St Eva l St M a ry's Warmwell \Vesto n-S-Mare Wink leigh

Ap r 1943

68 87 238

Harrowbeer Ib sley Lympne M iddle Wallo p Odiham Pembrey Perranporth Portreath

1942 312

Colerne C ulmhead DelTord Exeter Filton Fairwood Co ram. Friston

Feb 1941

234

234. 247. 263

152

152. 609

1449 Flt 175

276 151. 1449 F il

257. 263 184.286 406

Notes I. Chain Home - Hawks Tor. Haycastle, w arren. Worth. 2. Chain Home Lo w - Ca maron. Dry tree. Rame Head. Strumble Head. St Twynells, West Prawle.

N o. 11 (Fighter) Group Badge: The clock tower of the Houses of Par liament proper enfiled with an Astral Crow n. Mo tto : Tutela Cordis The tower represents London, the heart of the Empire with whose safety the G roup was charged. Th e hands are at I I o'clock to symbolise the time of the armistice of the Grea t War and the Group's numbe r. No. II (Fighter) Gro up was formed on I May 1936. under the comma nd of AVM Sir Phillip Joubert de la Ferte. This was achieved by effectively renaming the old Fighting Area headquar tered at Uxbridge. Eight main fighter stat ions came under its command: Biggin Hill. Duxford , Horn chu rch, Kenley. Northolt, or th Weald, Tangmere and Hawkinge, each with two established squadro ns. Little was changed between this time and the outbreak of war ot her than the loss ofa numb er of airfields and squadrons to No. 12 G roup when that organisatio n was

191

192

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

Hurricanes of III Squadron at Northolt, with the pre-war 'code' system of having the squadron number on the aircraft.

formed in Ma y 1937. As tension increased following the Munich Crisis in September 1938, the G ro up was called on to increase its sta te of readine ss: the Operations Room was manned up on 20 March 1939, and the War Preparedness plan instituted . Th is lasted a week before the Group 'commenced to return quietly to norm al routine', though it did give the Group what turned out to be a final chance to refine its command and cont rol procedures. When Gene ral Mobil isation was ordered at 1630 hours on I September the G roup had 19 operational squadro ns, most of them eq uipped with Spitfires or Hurricanes, at eight main airfields, although satellite airfields were an import ant part of the Group 's deployment strategy and a num ber of these were avai lable. Fo ur squadro ns were scrambled on 4 September 1939 following report s that a large number of German aircraft were massing over Holland, but no enemy aircraft were found, an indication that the cont rol and reporting chain - and radar - were still in early days. Two days later there was furth er evidence that the reporting system was still not reliable. Twent y raids were plotted, based on inform at ion from RDF and the Observer Cor ps, indicating a major Luft waff e attac k up the Th ames Estua ry, aimed at Lond on . Fighters were sent to inter cept these aircraft, but agai n no German s were found. However, at least four of the fighter form at ions were fired at by anti-aircraft guns and one aircraft was hit. Even worse, two Hurric anes from No rth Weald were sho t down by Spitfires from Hornchurch, and Pit Off Hoult on-H arra was killed - the so-called Battl e of Bark ing Creek. A number of the Group's Hurricane sq uadro ns were deployed to France in support of the British Expeditio nary Force, where they gained very useful comb at experience. Alth ough units remained officially within No. II Group, they were passed to the operational control of the Air Officer Commanding the Air Co mponent of the British Expeditionary Force. However, the Lu ftwaff e seldo m appeared over England and by the end of 1939, only thre e com bat s had been record ed. Th is situation continued for the first

Sqn Ldr Leigh, 66 Squadron, Gravesend 1940; Gravesend was a fig hter base fro m, January 1940 but despite its key location was not attacked by the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain.

fo ur mon ths of 1940 and gave No. II Group valuable time to improve the reportin g system, train more pilots and expand its operational capabilit y. During the Phoney War the Group's main tasking compri sed standing pat rols and convoy patrols, the latter including protecti on for lightships and the fishing fleets, aircraft on the latter task being referred to as ' Kipper Kites'. With a continued requi rement for standing pat rols, con voy and other shipping tas ks, the strain on the limited resource s of No. II Group began to tell. At the same time the organisatio n of the G roup and of Fighter Comm and con tinued to evolve and by Augus t 1940, No. II Group was opera ting seven Sector s: Biggin Hill, Debden (added in early August), Horn church, Kenley, Northolt, No rth Weald and Tangmere. The geogra phic area of responsibility had been reduced in July with the creation of No. 10 Group to cover the South-West of England. although it was a few weeks before this Group was fully operationa l. By that time the RAF - and No. II Group - was facing their real test as the Luf twaff e at last appeared in strength to contend for air superiority. The Battle of Britain had commenced. Th roughou t the Battle of Britain, the bulk of the enemy air effort was made agai nst targe ts within the area covered by o. I I Group. At the sta rt of the Batt le, the Group fielded 21 operat ional squa dro ns, plus the Fighter Interception Unit, at 13 main stations, tho ugh on ly six of these sq uadro ns were equipped with Spitfires, and 12 had Hurri canes. The course of the Battle, the rotat ion of squadro ns to maintain the operatio nal effectiveness of No . 11 G roup, and the genera l management of Fighter Command were all covered in the intr odu ction and opera tions chapters. For those few mon ths in late summer and autumn 1940 the fate of the War, and in the opinion of many historians, of Western Euro pe, lay in the hands of a few hund red fighter pilots. Airfields such as Biggin

193

194

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Hill, Horn church, Kenley and No rth Weald became household names and thou sand s of civilians looked up over South- England to watch the air battl es a nd awai t the news bulletin s that would give the daily 'scores'. According to the Group's stat istical reco rds it claimed the destruction of2 ,033 enemy aircraft during the period of the Battl e, including 115 of the 178 that were claimed on ' Battle of Britain Day', 15 Sept ember. The G roup lost a number of aircraft that day but only eight pilots. The removal of Keith Par k in December 1940 and his replacement by Trafford Leigh-M allory is often seen as an expression of displeasure with the form er and agreement with the policies of the latter, and perh aps arose out of the Big Wing co ntrove rsy. Keith Park went on to a no ther seemingly hopeless case, the defence of Malt a, and once agai n proved his credentials. Leigh-M allory led Fighter Co mma nd onto the offensive and as the RAF's rising sta r he later beca me comma nder of the Allied Expeditiona ry Air Force, but that is moving a head of this story . The Wing concept was very much in evide nce once Leigh-M allor y was in comma nd and by February 1941 a policy had been devised whereby Wings of two or thr ee squadro ns, which also sometimes opera ted as two or mor e Wings (this larger grouping being referred to as a Circus), became the standard tactic to be employed whenever possible. A 17 February 1941 memorand um stated that : 'To make these operatio ns successful, it is essential that circuses and wings be able to form up in the sho rtes t possible time at the height required. It is intended that each Sector sho uld produ ce its own wing, but the following will norm ally supply the wings comp rising circuses: North WealdlD ebd en Hornchurch Kenley Tan gmere

Hu rricane Wing Spit fire Wing Hurricane Wing Spitfire Wing

For the purposes of training and operat ions, the Debden wing and or th Weald wing and the Horn church wing will be affiliated, and the Kenley a nd Tan gmere wing will be affiliated.' Thi s was very much the old Du xford 'B ig Wing' writ large. As the Germans did not reap pea r in force by day these arrangements saw no defensive employment, thou gh when the G roup turned its a tte ntion to offensive operations the Wing concept became the standa rd tactic. Defensive operat ions were still import an t in order to counter the not inconsiderable Germa n night bombing, which a t times involved hundreds of aircraft in a single night. By la te 1940 the G ro up had increase d its night strength to seven squa dro ns, some of which were 'cats eye' (no radar ) and some of which were eq uipped with Airborn e Intercepti on (A I). Day fighter sq uadro ns were also taske d to provide aircraft, especially when ' Fighter-nights' were called for, but in general terms these proved ineffectual, altho ugh there were a number of successes. With the night offensive co ntinuing well into 194 I. the effectiveness of the defenders gradua lly increased a nd during a lar ge-scale raid on the night of 3/4 May the fighters claimed 12 enemy aircraft. Introd uction of improved AI, better trai ning and the Beaufighter turn ed the tide of the night war and by late 1941 the Luftwaffe raids were on a much sma ller scale a nd incurred heavy losses in percentage terms. Offensive o perations, day and night, continued thr oughout the war a nd a numb er of new aircraft types (or variants) entered service, most notabl y the Spitfire IX as a co unter to the Fw 190, and the Hawker Typhoon. No . II Group was hea vily invo lved in the August 1942 Dieppe Raid, flying more than 2,000 sorties during which claims were made for 90 enemy aircraft destroyed. Throu ghout 1942 and 1943 the Group continued to grow and by late 1943 it comprised 57 squad rons, the bulk of which were employed

Meteor oj 500 Squadron at West Mulling.

on offensive opera tions, including the escort ofl ight and medium bombers. Indeed of the 739 enemy aircra ft claimed for 1943, offensive sorties acco unted for 581, of which 54 were at night. In mid-1944 the G roup was once more called on to repel a major Germ an offensive, this time in the form of unm anned flying bombs - the V-I s. Thi s new camp aign involved placing squadrons at airfields on the line of the approa ch of the V- Is, with pilot s developing tactics to destroy these small, fast - a nd very explosive - ta rgets. Griffonengined Spit fires, along with Mustan gs and Tempests, were all employed in the role, as was the RA F' s first Meteor jet squadro n, 616 Squadron . Th e invasion by the Allies in June 1944 brou ght to an end the main V-I th reat when the laun chin g sites were overrun. It is wort h notin g that during the immediate period of D-Day, No . II G roup had opera tio nal contro l of no fewer than 150 squadro ns, includin g USAAF unit s, alt ho ugh this number rapid ly declined as tactical aircraft moved to Euro pe with the 2nd TA F and IXth Air Fo rce. In respect of the V-I s, tactics were continua lly being refined to co pe with the thre at from air-launched wea po ns, and on 14 November the G roup issued Operatio nal Instru ction 42/1944 on the 'employment of night fighter sq uadro ns' in regard to anti-Diver sta nd ing pa trols Air-Vice Marshal Keith Park \I'as A GC oj No, 11 Groupfro m April 10 December 1940 - the most critical period fo r this Group and fo r Fighter Command.

195

196

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

and readiness. In part th is stated: The exact positioning of the out to sea patrols is left to the discretion of the orth Weald controller . . . it sho uld be borne in mind by all controllers a nd a ircrews th at the primary functi on of the out to sea pat rol s is the destruction of the enem y launch aircra ft; the shooting dow n of lIying bombs being left to the overla nd patrols and the a ntiaircraft gun s.' Alth ough the He III launch aircra ft were sma ll in number. the y were a nu isance that Fighter Comm and was determined to co unter. Th e latter months o f the war saw very little activity over England and no claims were mad e aga inst German aircraft; indeed, only 72 were cla imed during offensive patrols. In the peri od from September 1939 to February 1945, No . II Group aircraft claimed a n impressive number of enemy a ircra ft - 6,540 destroyed, 1,685 probable and 2,617 damaged . No . II Group remained at Uxbridge until August 1949 when it moved to Hillingdon, by which time it was organised in two Sectors - Southern and Metropolitan. Its primary task remained the home defence of Britain and jet fighter s rapidly rep laced the sta lwa rt pisto n types which had fought the war. In Jul y 1958 the Group HQ moved to Martlesham Heath where it remained until disbandment o n 31 December 1960; this was a ' pa per' disbandment, as the G roup numberA VM T G Pike look command plate was transferred to o . 13 Group a t Ou ston. of No. II Group in January Despite vario us moves a nd renaming/renumbering, 1950. th is historic G roup has continued to be at th e forefront of Britain's air defence. Th e o. II G roup title was eventu ally resurrected in April 1968 - but afte r the forma tion of Strike Command. It co ntinued to be the main figh ter comma nd for the RAF.

Air-O fficer-Commanding No . II Group Command fro m:

OPER

5 Jul 1951 AVM The Earl of Bandon CB DSO I ov 1953 AVM H L Patch CB CBE 16 Jan 1956 AVM V S Bowlin g CBE 12 Jan 1959 AVM A Foord-Kelcey CBE AFC I Jan 1961 AVM H J Maguire CB DSO OBE 12 Jan 1962 AVM G T B Clayton CB DFC As o. II ( orthern) Sector I Apr 1963 Air Cdre C J Mount CBE DSO DFC II Jan 1964 Air Cdre W T Brook s DSO OBE AFC I Apr 1965 Air Cdre R J P Prichard C B C BE DFC AFC As o. II G roup 30 Apr 1968 AVM R I Jones C B AFC (As part of Strike Command)

No, II Gro up Order of Battle, Aug 194 D-Jul 1944

Biggin 1Ii11 Bradwell Bay

AVM AVM A VM AVM A VM A VM AVM AVM AVM AVM A VM

P B Joubert de la Ferte CMG DSO E L Gossage DSO MC W L Welsh CB DSC AFC K R Park MC DFC T Leigh-Mallory C B DSO H W L Saunders CBE NC DFC MM J B Co le Hamilton C B C BE D A Boyle C B AFC S D Macdonald C BE D FC S F Vincent C B D FC AFC T G Pike CB CBE DFC

Aug 1940

Feb 1941

32. 610

66. 74. 264

Ap r 1942

Apr 1943

Jill 1944

72. 124

1.340. 611 23. 157 605

219. 278

418 157

Cas tle Ca mps

229

Co ltisha ll Croydon

Debden

III 17

605 85

287 65. Ill. 350

23

Fl U

350 418. 604. Fl U

14 1

401

277

91

91 24. 116 1422 Fit

91

Fairlop For d Friston

Gravesend

501

Hendon Heston H ornchurch

4 1. 65, 74

Hunsdon Hum Kenley Lee on Solent Lympne Mansion Mart lesham Heath

287

122.313 3. 85. 1451 Flt

303.515. 1422 Fl t 64.122 3.85

485. 602

402.403. 421

125 64.615

I. 615

600 25.85

92 17,242.605

56,15 1

303.601 56.259

Merston ortholt

23. 32. 174. 607 71 340 303.316.317 121. 222. 403

137,609 132. 182 485 308.315.316 124, 33 1. 332

Predannack

277, 345 453

65, 145.21 9

64 277 1, 23, 219

302. 6 10

29. 264. 1452 Fit 41. 129

29 165, 610

64

I. 266, 60 1. Fl U

129.486

Warmwell

West Mailing

\Vesthampnett

130. 303. 402

234

So uthend

Stapleford Tawney

26.63 33, 74. 127 137. 605

457

Redhill Shoreham

Tangmere

96. 456 350. 50 1 64.611

Harrowbeer Hawkinge

orth We-aId

6 Jun 1936 7 Sep 1936 I Feb 1940 20 Apr 1940 18 Dec 1940 28 No v 1942 I No v 1944 20 J ul 1945 24 Apr 1946 I Jun 1948 9 Jan 1950

197

145

275 80. 274

Radar S tations, 1940

Chain Home - Bawd sey. Bromley. Ca newd on , Dunkirk. High Street, Pevensey, Rye. Ventnor Chain Home Low - Beachy Head. Dover, Dunwich. Fairlight. Foren ess, Poling. Truleigh. Walton

/98

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPE

o. 12 (Fighter) Group

r>;o. II Group O rder of Bail ie. Jul 1945-J an 196t Jill 1945 A ndrews Field Bent waters Biggin Hill Breight on Carna by Castle Cam ps Chi lboh on Ch iveno r Coleme Dunholme Lod ge Duxford Filion Harr owbeer Leconfield Leeming

Apr 1953

Predannack Tangmere

Jan 1961

Badge: A Sword in pale point downwards Argent hihed Or enfiled with an Astral Crown Or. Motto: We Fight to Defend

112 247

The Crown represents the RA F. whilst the sword indicates the operational function of the Group. 0.12 (Fighter) Group was formed on I April 1937. at Uxbridge under the command of Air Commodore J H Tyssen, and in May the HQ staff moved to Hucknall . Initial establishment was five squadrons and the main Stations were Catterick, Church Fenton and Duxfo rd. In December, Trafford Leigh-Mallory arrived as Air-Officer-Commanding and was to lead the Group through the Bail ie of Britain - with no small amo unt of con troversy . Throughout 1938 the Group prac tised for its task of defending Central England and the East coast, with Sector Operations Rooms having been estab lished at Catte rick. Chu rch Fenton, Digby and Du xford. The main training effor t took place with the weekly Tactical Exercise during which Bomber Com mand prov ided a 'live' enemy. The scale of these exercises was increased at the end of the year with the introduction of the Fighter Command Minor Air Exercise. It was a similar pat tern into 1939 alt ho ugh on the outbreak of war the Group began to focus on its wartime tasks of patrols and scrambles . the former primarily involving convoy work . The Group HQ had moved to Watnall on 8 May 1940. and this remained its home throughout the war. With the retreat of the British Expeditionary Fo rce. the Group was amongst the Fighter Command organisations tasked to provide air cover in the Dunkirk area and on 2 June 1940. fivesquadrons were ordered to be over the beaches at 0700. The Group OR B recorded the da y's events: 'several Group squadrons were again in action over the Dunkirk area. with very satisfactory results. Squadrons 266. 32, 92, 611 and 66 were ordered to patrol the Dunkirk area at 0700 hours . Squadron 92 were in the main ordered to att ack the bombers and the other four squadrons were to act as an escort and deal with the enemy fighters. On arriving over their patrol area several formations of Ju 87s and He Ills escorted by Me 109s were sighted and in the battles that followed some of the squadrons became split and individual combats took place. It is estimated that at least 16 E1A were destroyed and a further 26 either probably destroyed or damaged severely. Eight of our aircraft are missing.' Over the next few days the Group forward-deployed squadrons. with four stationed at Martlesham in case further such patrols were required. Although the Luftwaffe was not yet attacking Britain by day it had opened its night offensive and the Group ORB for 19 June recorded that : 't here was considerable hostile activity over the East Coast especially in East Anglia du ring the night 18/ 19 June. Bombs were dropped near Scunthorpe. King's Lynn. Waddington and Lou th. However, the enemy suffered several casualties du ring these night operations, as there was very successful co-operation between the searchlights and o ur fighters. In all. five He I ll s were shot down and two more probably did not reach their home base.' The ORB recorded victories for Fit Lt Duke-Woolley (23 Sqn). Fg Off Barnwell and PIt Off Humphries (both 29 Sqn) and Fg Off Ball and Fg Off Petre (bo th 19 Sqn) .

306. 309. 315 6-1. 65. 118. 126 41/253. 600. 615 25 183 2290CU 74 141 6-1. 65 501

275. 329 19. 72 2280CU 29.43. 151

Leuchars Lland ow Manst on Middleton S, George Misson North Coates North Weald Odiham

614 29. 310.312.3 13 33. 92 94 264

72. 601. 604 54.247 151.406 I. 22/29 56.63 257. 263 25. 85. 500

\ Vaterbeach

\Vattisham West Mailing Woodhall Spa

Air photo of North Weald with ruml'Oys highlighted

5

222

10

showlayout

ill

late 1944,

199

200

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

FIGH TER COMMAND 193 6-1 9 6 8

Hurricane of l Sl Sq uadron at Digby ; the Squadron arrived here in Sep tember / 940.

During a conference at Fighter Command on 3 July 1940, Dowding proposed changes that would affect No. 12 Group; the minutes of the con ference state his view that : 'what was prop osed [in terms of area of responsibility] was too big ajob for No . 12 G roup, especially if there were heavy operations in the East and West simulta neously. He proposed that No . 13 Group should take contro l of Ch urch Fenton and Squires Gate and tha t No . 12 G roup be split down the middle so that it would cont rol a long nar row strip facing east [and a new Group - 0.9 Group - would take the area to the West].' No. 9 Group formed in July 1940 but its was some weeks before it took operational con tro l of all the airfields within its area, with responsibility remainin g with No . 12 Group until the AOC of the new organisation was happ y to assume control. Th is was par ticularl y importa nt in respect of key locations such as Liverp ool and Manchester. In a 27 September memo, Fighter Command sta ted that : '. . . attentio n is dr awn to the great import ance of impr oving the fighter defences of Liverpool without delay. AOC No . 12 Group is instructed to maintain a full fighter squadro n at Ringway or Ternhill . He sho uld support this with the equivalent of at least a Flight of Blenheims or Defiant s for night interception.' It was not until I December that No .9 Group finally took control of the Speke and Ternhill Sector s. Th e Battl e of Britain opened for No. 12 Group with a conti nuatio n of the wellesta blished. and invariably unp roduc tive, convoy patrols. Durin g Jul y the Group's sq uadro ns flew 1,100 such patrols, involving 2,668 operational flights. Activity increased du ring August as the Germans began a period of intense operations designed to cripple Fighter Comm and . The numb er of large-scale raids within the Group's area was limited, altho ugh on 15 August the ORB recorded: 'there was tremend ous enemy act ivity all aro und the coast of England today and for the first time they paid a mass daylight visit to the Group - a day they will probably remember. Raid 10 was first plotted as 20 plus, then as 30 plus airc raft. The object of this attac k was Driffield aero dro me. Squadr on 6 16 and 73 (" A" Flight) dealt with it. The enemy consisted of abo ut 40 Ju 88s escorted by Me II Os who apparently completely failed in their mission as only a few were seen by o ur pilots. Some of the enemy bombers reached their objective and in all ab out 80 bomb s fell on and around the aero dro me. Three hangars were fired and the Officers' Mess and

Defiant of 151 Squadron wrapped up against the

S IlO Il'

at Witt ering.

AA HQ were severely damaged. However, the losses inflicted on the enemy by these two squadro ns were tremendous - 15 Ju 88s were destroyed, 7 prob ably destroyed and 4 more badly damaged. In addition at least six more Ju 88s were shot down by the gro und defences.' Whilst, as usual, the actual number of losses was not as great as claimed, it was certa inly a decisive victory for the defenders, and the Luf twaff e's hope that the battles in the Sou th had dr awn away Fighter Command's squadrons was convincingly negated. Whilst Driffi eld might have suffered on this occasion , the threat to the airfields within No. II Group was far more serious and led to acrimony between the commanders of the two Gro ups, the essence of which has been previously o utlined. Typical of the ORB entries for No . 12 Group is that for 30 August: 'there was again intense activity in o. 11 Gro up and squadrons 242, 611, 310 and 19 were despatched to assist. Of these only 242 Squad ron contacted the enemy and this they did in no uncertain manner claiming 8 Me I lOs and 4 He III s destroyed plus 3 prob able He Ill s.' Th ere are very few references in No . 12 Group's document s to the relat ionship with its neighbour, and certa inly none (that the author found) that are as outspo ken as those issued by Keith Par k. Th e first entry in the ORB for the ' Big Wing' type of operat ion occurred on 7 September : 'a new and highly successful policy was begun when a No . 12 Group Wing was formed to assist No . I I G roup . This Wing consisted of three squadro ns based at Duxford.' And aga in a few weeks later, 9 September: 'during the day only one raid crossed the coast in the Group area but the Wing were agai n despatched to 11 G roup where they fought a most successful actio n.' Th e three squadro ns, led by Douglas Bader, were 19, 242 and 310 and they claimed 21 destroyed, five probable and two damaged for the loss of four aircraft. 'Th e method of attack was that 19 Squ adron should attac k the fighters, and squadro ns 310 and 242 should deal with the bombers.' Park argued that all too often the Wing was too late in getting airborne, did n't go where he asked and most times did not even make contact with the enemy. There is some

201

202

F IGH TER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

203

truth in this and the record s o f No. 12 Group sho w that on man y occasions no cont act was made. they also sho w high levels of claim s when contact was made. Alth ough o. 12 Group was the second busiest of Fighter Comm and's operational Groups its overall level of acti vity relat ive to its southerly neighbour is demon strated by the operational flying hours for August 1940 when o. II Group flew 12.853 hours and TO . 12 Group onl y a third of that at 4,076 hours. With the exception of the Wing operations, there was very little daylight activity over the Group area for 1940 or 1941, but it was a different story at night. The scale of the night attacks varied from a few isolated raiders to concentrated attacks again st a single target by 50 or more bombers. Countering the night attacks on Britain's indu str ial heartland became one of the Group's major tasks a nd one for which it was at first ill-equipped. Although the Battle of Britain officially ended on 31 October the night war continued well into 1941. The night of 15 overnber was recorded as: 'the enem y laun ched by far his biggest atta ck on the Group a rea during the night a nd Covent ry was the main objective. Wave after wave of bombers attac ked this city from abo ut 1915 hours till 0530 hours fro m height s vary ing fro m 10-20,000 ft. Our fighters were sent up but had no success, but the AA with a limited number of gun s put up as heavy a barrage as they could . Th e weather was perfect with a full moon and good visibility: Co nsidering the weather condition s and the number of enemy aircraft the poor performance of the defenders illustrates the limited capability. Indeed so desperate did the defence become that Bomber Command Hampdens were called on to fly defensive patrols over some cities in the Mid land s. From mid to late December Liverpo ol was the focu s of the attack but again the defenders achieved few successes. One of the problem s in this area was lack of RDF and a number of new sta tions became operationa l in earl y 1941 to try to fill in the blind spo ts. Heavy night a tta cks continued into 1941 and it was only the gradual imp rovement in GCI , along with better aircraft (Bea ufighters and Mosquitoes), th at the tables event ually turned and the night skies over England were mad e secure. Javelin of85 Squadron at St radishall; No.12 Group was disbanded was re-designated as East Anglian Sector.

Oil

31 March 1963. when it

Air photo of Kirton-in-L indsey. one of the Group's main airfields and home to a number of day and night squadrons.

Offensive opera tions by da y a nd night. the former primarily being Wing sweeps 'lookin g for trouble' became the routine. and whilst activity was never on the scale of that by o. II Group. the general principles were the same. In this way o. 12 Group saw out the rest of World War Two . providing aircraft for the major operations such as D-Day. During the 1950s. the Group's Sector s were reorganised to become Eastern Sector and Western Sector and its squ adrons re-equipped with the first gener ati on of jet fighter s. o. 12 Group was disbanded on 31 March 1963. when it was redesignated as o. 12 East Anglian Sector. It was based a t Horsham St Faith ( orwich) until 29 Ma y 1963 when it moved to Nea tishead, which also became one of the main Fighter Control sta tions in the RA F. The o. 12 designat ion was lost on I April 1968 when . on the form ati on of Stri ke Co mma nd. the Sector becam e part of o. II G roup as Sector orth: a sad and almos t unrema rka ble end to a fam ou s fighter G roup. Air-O fficer-Comma nding No. 12 Group Co mmand from : I Apr 1937 4 Dec 1937

Air Cdre J H S Tysson MC AVM T L Mall ory DSO

204

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

17 Dec 1940 AVM R B Saul CB DF C 29 ov 1942 AVM J a Andrews CB DSa MC 26 Jul 1943 AVM R M Hill CB MC AFC 22 ov 1943 AVM M Henderson CBE Cl E DSa I Jan 1945 AVM J W Baker CB MC DFC 5 May 1946 AVM T C T raill aB E DFC 17 ov 1948 AVM G Harcou rt-Smith CB CBE MVa 1 Jan 1951 AVM R L R Atcherley CB CBE AFC 13 Nov 1953 AVM W J Crisham CB CBE 25 Jun 1956 AVM H P Fraser CB CBE AFC 20 Jul 1959 AVM Sir Christo pher H Hartley CBE D FC AFC BA KCB 1 Jan 1961 AVM R N Bateson DSa CB DFC As No . 12 (East Anglian) Sector I Apr 1963 AVM F D S Scott-Malden DSa DFC* 25 Mar 1964 Air Cd re A C Deere DSa aBE DFC*

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

;'\0. 12 G ro up O rd er of Battle, Aug 1940 -Jul)' 1944

Aug / 940

Church Fenton Co llywesto n Co ltisha ll Dighy

23 66, 242 29,46, 611

2 RCAF, 29, 46 I RCA F 19. 310

Drilli eld Du xford Fo wlmere

19

Hibaldstow Hutt on C ranswick

KingsclilTe Kirton- in-Lindsey Ludh am Matl ask Sn ailwell

Wittering

Air- Vice Marshal Traff ord Leigh Ma llory lI'as A OC of No.12 Group from December 1937 10 December 1940 and lI'as an exponent of the 'Big Wing' tactic. He is seen here later in the lI'a r.

Feb / 94/

222. 264

71, 255.6 16

229

25, 151,266

Apr / 942

Apr / 943

Jul/ 944

885 FAA

25, 183

307

68, 154, 278 288,409,41 1,412, 609

56, 68, 118, 278 288,410,411

25 504

266.609 154 253, 1459 Fit 19 616 133, 486 6 10 137 56 151, 1453 Fit

306 302,3 17 167 181 151

Radar S tat ions, 1940 Cha in Home - Easingt on. Stenigot , Staxton Wold . Stoke Holy Cross, West Beckham Chain Home Low - Flamborough Head, Happisburgh. Ingoldmells

;'\0, 12 G ro up Order of Battle, July 194 5-Jan 1961

Jul/ 945

Alder grove Chilbo lto n

Church Fenton Co ltisha ll Dighy D yee

Duxford Finningley Honiley Hoot on Park

Horsh am St Faith Hutt on Cranswick

Leuchars Linton-on -Ouse Ludh am Marham Ou st o n

19 502 26 125 303, 307,3 16 441, 442

19/152, 609 23, 141

Str adi shall Th orn ab y Turnh ou se

64, 65 616

605 6 10, 611 74/ 34, 245 124 43/17, 151, 222 66, 92, 264, 275 I, 9 1 242

607 266 613 1,54

608 603

Warbo ys

257 25,46 4 1, 56, II I 263 85, C F E 62

Waterbeach Watt isham

Watton West Raynham

Woolfox Lod ge Wymeswo ld

23, 74, A F DS

612

Rattlesden Ringw ay

Jan / 96/

602

Abb ot sineh Ackli ngton

Apr / 953

504

205

206

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

o. 13 (Fighter) Group Badge: A Pomme pierced by an Arrow Or Motto: NOli cramben sed carnem - ot cabbage but meat. The badge symbolises the high standard or accuracy and marksmanship within the Group. comparable to that or William Tell (or Robin Hood ?). With the words prefaced by ' We want' the motto is intended to convey the same idea as the Russian Marsh al Budenny 's war cry or 'We are not vegetarians!' A strange choice and with no obvious reason. o. 13 (Fighter) Group was officially formed at Kenton Bar. ewcastle-upon-Tyne, on 24 July 1939. under the command or Air Vice Marshal R E Saul DFC, as part or the reorganisation or Fighter Command. The Group had existed in the latter part or World War One. having been formed in Birmingham in April 1918 and subsequently designated o. 13 (Training) Group before merging with No.3 (Training) Group in October 1919. When it re-formed in 1939 in the fighter role, the Group had responsibility for the air defence of the UK from North Yorkshire northwards. Initially it comprised four Sectors (M, 0 , P and S) with four main Stations - Catterick, Church Fenton, Turnhouse and Usworth - housing seven fighter squadrons, three or which were equipped with Spitfires. the others flying Gladiators (two squadrons), Blenheims or Hinds . Two AA Divisions were affiliated to the Group: 2nd AA Division covering the Tyne and Tees area and 3rd AA Division covering the Firth or Forth and Clyde area . With the outbreak or war the squadrons came to high readiness and a number or scrambles took place. most without a sight or the enemy. However. on 16 October 1939. aircraft or 602 and 603 Squadrons intercepted a German raid over the Firth or Forth and shot down two He Ill s - the first German aircraft destroyed over the UK since 191 8. The first German bomber fell to a combined attack by Fit Lt Gifford. Fg Off McDonald and Pit Off Robertson or603 Sqn: 15 minutes later the second one was shot down by the Hurricanes or 602 Sqn. The auxiliaries had scored the first aerial victories over Britain . Fears were expressed about the need for more co-ordination or friendly aircraft: 'm ovement or heavy bombers or No.4 Group caused many raise raid report s this day. resulting in many patrols being despatched' ( o. 13 Group ORB 24 ovember 1939). The Group sent up ten patrols. totalling 31 aircraft. with Turnhouse the most active station . despatching six patrols or three aircraft each. Patrol activity and convo y escort continued into 1940 and by Augu st the Group had 12 operational squadrons dispersed at eight main locations. covering a very large geographic area which included orthern Ireland (245 Squadron's Hurricanes were based at Aldergrove.) In addition to the huge area to be covered. the Group also encountered problems over the condition or many or its airfields and there is frequent reference in the records to an airfield being unserviceable for either day or night operations or being limited to certain aircraft types. Although patrol activit y, including shipping standing patrols, was maintained throughout the winter, it was generally a quiet period . In February a new patrol was instigated to protect the Grimsby fishing fleet, a day sweep by Blenheims being alternated between o. 13 Group and No. 12 Group. In the summer or 1940 the pace or activity increased, initially with more shipping patrols. The Luftwaffe attempted a number or raids into the Group area : a large raid

Hurricanes at Wick . all airfield initially allocated to No.13 Group but later transf erred to No./ 4 Group. (Andy Thomas Collection) .

or more than 100 bombers with an escort or over 50 fighters was intercepted west or the Firth or Forth on 15 August by Spitfires or 72 Squadron. four other squadrons subsequently joining in the combat. On this one day or intense activity. the Group's sq uadrons claimed to have destroyed 91 enemy aircraft, with a further 44 claimed as probably destroyed and 28 damaged. In the period 3 September 1939 to 10 October 1940. the Group's squadrons claimed 95 enemy aircraft destroyed and 46 damaged (there was no ' probable' category for most or this period .) With the ending or the Battle or Britain and the termination or large-scale daylight attacks. the main enemy activity comprised minelaying, both by day and night, and night bombing attacks on industrial centres . At times the latter could be on a significant scale, with over 100aircraft operating in a single night : one or the major changes in the Group's Order or Battle was an increase in night fighter units. In mid-1940 the night-fighter force comprised one squadron or Defiants (141 Sqn) and one squadron of Blenheims (219 Sqn) but by late 1941 this had been increased by a further three units. with the AI-equipped Beaufighter as the main type. The geographic area covered by No. 13 Gp was very large and in order to provide fighter cover it made use or a number or airfields that were not under its command. Typhoon of I Squadron at Ackl ington. 1942: the Squadron spent the last six months of 1942 at Acklington. ( Peter Green Collection}

208

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL GROUPS

or which were only under com mand for a short period of time. Usworth, for example, was used by the Hurric anes of 607 Squad ron between August 1939 and Janu ar y 1941, 43 Squadron takin g its place from September to December 1940. Other airfields, like Mont rose, were used for a brief period by one or more fighter detachments. With a general lowering of the threat d uring 1942, the number of squad rons was reduced. By Januar y 1943. the Group had nine squadrons, of which seven were Map showing airfields used by No 's. 13 and 14 Groups, plus destruction of enemy aircraft. MA' SHOW,lt6 AI'"lI.DS III ose " 0", TI M t TO 11/t1t , y". IJ 614

61. o", LO(ATIO.

"'N Tt ' S 6

"f

A ~ n OXINA Tl

tNINY A''''AfT "ltTlO'flA

ALSO. MAHI Al iAS Of Ilfun' &O","N6


• • f."IIDS tMt_ r ~ IIlS1Hrt,

•

•

AfiAS

"'"'''1'''.'''

AU'S llAm r II,,,t'

-~------Ir J

:

'AfLAN t

.

I

front-line opera tiona l units: four of these were in the night fighter role. However, in Jun e the Group was boosted by the acqu isition of No. 32 Wing with its Arm y Co-operation units. this Command having been absorbed by Fighter Command . Th is development included the acquisitio n of three new Stations - Macmerry, Kirkn ewton and Findo Gask . Two mon ths later o. 13 Group moved its HQ from Newcastle to Inverness. T he number of comba t opport unities had decreased from late 1940 onwards and whilst the Group claimed the destr uction of almost 100 enemy aircraft in the year to 14 October 1940, it only claimed 73 over the next three years. Statis tics for the period 1 October 1940 to 15 J uly 1943, were 73 destroyed, seven probable and 34 damaged. Th e general reduction in operational units continued as air assets were moved south in 1944 for D-D ay; by Jun e only two squadrons were still on strength. A new role was acq uired when these squa dro ns, soo n jo ined by a third . began opera ting in conjunctio n with Coastal Command on offensive operations. primari ly as escort to strike aircraft such as Beaufighters and Mosquitoes, against enemy shipping and U-boa ts in the North Sea and off Norway. Ground tar gets in No rway were also attac ked by the Mu stang III squad rons. These tasks continued to the end of the war - Wick, in E Scotland , having become the main operational base. Fo r the period from 15 July 1943 to VE Day (8 May 1945), the Gro up claimed 33 enemy aircraft destroyed, six probable and seven damaged. A move from Inverness to Dalcross was brought about by the return to peacetime considerations. The ORB states : 'L ike many HQ units No. 13 Group was entirely accommodated. both for office and domestic accommodat ion. in requ isitioned pro perty. On the cessation of hostilities and the reversion of the Country to normal peacetime conditio ns this HQ has of necessity to move to a fresh locat ion and RAF Dalcross has been selected .' There appeared to have been no hurry, however. and although the move was promul gated in August it was not due to take effect until 7 December. The move A ir photo of Skeabrae.

209

210

F IGH TER COMMAND 193 6-1 9 6 8

OPERATION

actually took place in November, by which time the Group had five squadrons at two Stati on s: Wick (9 1, 122 and 316 Sqn s) a nd Turnhou se (164 and 303 Sqn s). Th e Group disbanded on 20 May 1946. bu t was subsequently re-formed on 4 April 1955. at Watnall, aga in in the fight er role. On I Janua ry 1961. it was merged with No . II G ro up . Air -Offlcer-Commauding No. 13 Group Co mma nd from : 24 Jul 1939 4 Fe b 1941 27 ov 1942 15 Nov 1943 26 Jan 1944 3 May 1945 Apr 1955-J an 1961

No .

AVM R E Saul DFC AVM J 0 Andrews DSO MC AVM M Hend erson C B C IE DSO Air Cdre S F Vincent DFC AFC Air Cd re J A Bor et C BE MC A FC Air Cdre T B Prickman C BE CB No details ava ilable.

t3 Groop Order of Battle Aug 1940

Acklington Aldergrove Ayr

72. 79 245

Cas tleto wn

504. 808 FAA 54 73. 249 602. 605 263 616 219

Catterick Church Fenton Drem Grangemouth

Leconfield Leeming

Jul1 944

309

281. 410. 1423 Fit

Ou ston

Prestwick

141

281

602 118

Skeabrae

Sumburgh Turnhouse Usworth Wick

232 253. 603 607 3. 804 FAA

81. 289

289.341

Radar Stations. 1940

Chain Home - An struther. Bamburgh. Danb y Beacon. Doonues Hill. Drone Hill. Hillhead. Nether Burton. Ouercops Moss. Shouon . 51 Cyrus. Thrium ster Chain Home Law- Cockbumspath , Cresswell. Do uglas w ood. Fair Isle. Rosehearty, School Hill

No. 14 (Fighter) Group Badge: No ba dge was awa rded . Th e Group origina lly formed in April 1918 as a Marin e Opera tional G roup at Pemb rok e. a ltho ugh this was sho rt-lived as it disbanded in May 1919. It re-formed on 20 Jun e 1940 by renumberin g No . 60 Win g. However, with the collap se of the RA F's ope rations in Fra nce the G roup disbanded in May. It re-formed aga in on I August at the Drumossie Hot el, In verness.

On I September the Group took operationa l con trol o f Cas tletown and Skeab rea as well as the Sector Station at Wick and Secto r HQ at Dyce; however, it was not until Octo ber that a sq uadron in th is G roup mad e an opera tiona l flight. Th e first th ree operat iona l patrols in respon se to pIoiled raid s were mad e on 14 Octo ber: '3 opera tiona l pat rol s were ca rr ied o ut by 7 aircraft. Co mm unications with Wick was difficult . owing to the cha nging over of Service lines. o . 3 Squ adron moved fro m Wick to Cast leto wn and 232 Squad ron from Cas tletown to Skillen.' On 16 Oct ober the G roup ORB not ed the first bombs dr opped in its a rea. with a number of pat rols flown but no contact with the enemy. The Sector Operat ional Co ntro l moved from Wick to Kirkwall the same day. Raids were pioiled each day for the rest of October but despit e pat rol s and scrambles no contact was mad e. altho ugh the atta ck on Montrose airfield on 25 Octob er and tha t on Lossiemouth the following day ca used cas ua lties and dam age. It was a similar sto ry of day and night ra ids. a ll sma ll-scale, plus allacks on shipping, in early Nove mber but it was not until 13 Nove mber that the Group ORB claime d a success: 'A He III was int ercepted and sho t-dow n in the sea 40 miles SE of Aberdeen. Th e personn el engaged were PtO P J Simp son . Sgt Kucera and Sgt Man sfeld.' Th e next intercept took place on 25 Nove mber when Blue Section of 3 Squad ron engage d a Whitl ey. T here were suspicions th at it was a captured a ircraft and after wa rning had been ignore d the figh ters attacked a nd da mage d the port engine: 'No, I (fighter) opened his hood and pointed towards Wick. Th e Wh itley then turne d and went in that dir ection . At this point the Whitley fired the co rrect signa ls a nd flashed co rrect colour of the day. T he Whi tley made a cras h-land ing on Wick aerodrome; none of the crew were injured .' Interceptions of friendly but unidentified a ircra ft becam e ro utine for fight ers in the Group's a rea. as d id freq uent fru itless pat rollin g. On man y days there was no enemy activity record ed, on ot hers it was a 'routine' reconna issance flight observed passing through the a rea, a nd from Decemb er 1940 it was the increasing number at tac ks on shipping. On 22 Decemb er a convoy was a llacked off Oban and 24.000 tons of ship ping sunk - with no ap pa rent response fro m the defenders. However. it has to be rememb ered tha t this was a lar ge operatio na l a rea an d had few fighte r squadro ns. Th e usual 'c usto mers' were Ju 88s an d He III s, with bot h allacking a variety of targets. most often as a single a ircra ft hit-and-run attack . Thi s low level of activity co nti nued th rou ghou t 1941 with shipping as the most freque nt targets. altho ugh aircraft occasiona lly bombed airfie lds o r towns. It must have been very frustrating for o . 14 G roup's contro llers and pilots as pa tro ls were made but the re were very few recor ds of com bat - a nd even fewer notes of any success. By early 1942 ther e was very little aeria l ac tivity dir ected a t this area - perhaps 5 or 6 days a month when ' raids plotted ' and it was mor e usual for the ORB to note 'the Atlan tic an d orth Sea recce were plotted as usua l' . On 2 March 1942 one of the latter was 'inte rcepted by a Coastal Beau figh ter under Figh ter Co ntrol fro m Sum burgh . Th e Beaufighter opened fire but no results were observed an d the EtA escaped into cloud.' Th e ORB for October 1942 record ed : 'E nemy ac tivity in the Group area was mainl y co nfined to the 2 weat her recces which were plot ted on most days. Fro m 6th insta nt. Beaufighte rs of 125 Squ ad ron allached fro m No . 10 Group ope ra ted fro m Sumburgh with a main objective of intercepting these recces. Th ey were ar med with 4 ca nnon an d 6 MG s. Of a total of 8 inte rceptio ns a ffected d uring the month 5 were made by this squad ro n. T he results were 4 interception s without co mbat. 4 comba ts in one of which the EtA was probably destro yed . in 2 the EtA was damaged a nd in the ot her case no claim was made.' Th e Squ ad ro n co ntinued its success in Nove mber : ' During the month ,

211

2 12

s

F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

20 February. On the last day of the month the Group moved its HQ to Raigmo re. The next few months remained quiet and on 7 June a meeting was held with officers from o. 13 Group concerning the proposed amalgamation of the two Groups. A week later (15 March ) the ORB noted: ' Turnhouse Sector commenced operating under No. 14 Gro up from 0830 hours. The Group area now covers the whole of Scotland.' The fina l entry was for 15 July:' There was no evidence of enemy activity up till 0800 hour s at which time the amalgamation of 13 and 14 Groups took effect and 14 Group ceased to exist.' With the reducti on in the air threat to the UK, Fighter Command reorganised its structure in July 1943, part of which saw 0. 14 Group disband to be amalgamated with No. 13 Group, with effect from 15 July.

Spitfires of /23 Squadron at Castletown, December /941.

(Andy Th omas Co llection ).

4 intercep tions took place, 2 of which resulted in combats. The enemy North Sea Zenit was destroyed on these occasions by Beaufighters of 125 Squadron.' However, the mont h also saw a decrease in size of the Group when 'Sector Stations at Tain , Tiree and Stornoway were put on a care and maintenance basis at the end of the month ', althoug h Fordoun had become operational on 2 ovember (but was used by a training unit) . The ORB for February 1943 noted :' during the month there was slight increase in the number of hostile recces in the Group area and for the first time since 7.8.42 bom bs were dropped. For the first time Typhoon aircraft (245 Squadron) made their appearance in the Group area.' The bomb s were dropped on Fraserhead and Peterborough on Air photo of Castletown.

Air-O flicer-Commanding No, 14 Gro up Command from: AVM M Hender son C B CIE DSO 31 Jul 1940 28 Jan 1942 Air Cdre W H Dunn DSC 21 Mar 1942 AVM Collishaw CB DSC DSO DFC OBE ;\10. 14 Group Ord er of Battl e, 1940-1943 Feb 1941

Cas tleto wn

3.213

Dyce

III

Elgin

232

Montrose Peterhe ad Skarb rae Sumburgh

II I

253.260 3

Apr 1942

Apr 1943

131. 282

245 66. 234

213

AI

C

HAPTE

Fo

R

Aircrew Training That makes a fight er pilot? This q uestion was addressed by the majo r conference that too k place in early 1942 to discuss aircrew trainin g; the report opened with a series of sta tements as to what was requ ired of a fighter pilot. 'Exce pt for greater speed, higher ceiling, fire-powe r and armour, there is essentially little difference between aerial comba t to-day and tha t in the latt er par t of the last war. Speed has been gained a t the expense of manoeuvrabil ity, bu t the fleetin g instan ts in which targets present themselves a re compensate d for by grea tly-increase d fire-power. Th us, the first requ irement of a pilot who has learn ed to handle his aircraft is an ability to seize his limited oppor t unities, and, having done so, to shoot accura tely when an oppo rt unity is present ed. Such work calls for an instant respo nse fro m hand a nd eye, together with the ca pacity to endure a con siderabl e stra in concentrated into a sho rt but decisive period of time'. The repo rt went on to address a number of key elements , extracts of which ar e included below. Aircraft performa nce: 'A goo d fighter pilot must feel himself part of his airc raft. He must be well aware of its powers of manoeuvrabilit y at all altitudes a nd in every condition of weather, its offensive power, and its vulnerability to atta ck.' Gunnery: ' He sho uld have a ca pacity for taking infinite pains to perfect the tactical side of flying and most impo rta nt of all, gunnery. In the last war the most successful fighter pilot s spent much time on the gro und in perfecting their gunnery a nd in devising new meth od s of attack; and no system of trai ning can fully succeed if it does stimulate the same interest and enthusiasm.' Fuel awareness: ' While the speed of a fighter is great , its endura nce is small a nd the consta nt concern of a pilot is his petr ol consumptio n.... a pilot cann ot achieve an econo mical stan dard unless he is trained to understand the ca pabilities and limitations of his engine and can extract the best performance fro m it.' Aircraft recognition and look out : ' It is vital that a fighter pilot sho uld be trained to recognise friend fro m foe at the first glance and at maximum dis tance. Thi s entai ls co nsta nt practice, and intensive study of models and pho togra phs throu ghout the traini ng period. The importance of " rubbernec king" must be instilled into every pup il fro m the very beginning of his trai ning, so that the whole time he is flying he is studying the sky and makin g a menta l note of the type, position , cou rse and height of every aircra ft he sees. He must be made to realise that for every aircraft he doe see there is prob abl y ano ther he does not; and that he must be watchful a nd alert from the moment that he enters his aircraft.' Oxygen a nd Blacking-out: 'The rate of climb, ceiling a nd speed of fighter aircraft are respon sible for several prob lems, principal among them a re oxygen a nd blackin g-out. One object of training shou ld be to kill the fallacy tha t oxygen is necessar y for height only. It is, of course, essential at high altitudes, bu t it is also necessar y lon g before the need for it becomes ph ysically appa rent to the pilot if his ment al alertness is to be kept

CREW TRAIN

G

at concert pitch. Pilots must realise that oxygen has as its pr incipal function the improve ment of fightin g efficiency at all altitudes, and that the co rrect drill is vital to safety and success. In blacking-out it is not generally realised that man y successive tight turns or immod erat e weaving have acc umulative effect on the circulation, tending to ea rly fatigue a nd possible blackout. Training sho uld teach the pilot to realise instinctively what he ca n and cann ot do with out incu rring the risk of blackout .' (Extrac ts from SD349: Aircrew Trainin g: Report on the Co nference held in the United Kingdom Jan uary/ Februa ry 1942.) Man y of these point s were made with the benefit of two years of wartime hindsight and by the time they were written most were already being addressed in the tr ainin g of fighter pilots. It was a very different situa tion a t the sta rt of the war. Pre-war T ra ining The RAF's pre-war flying tra uu ng system was based on prin ciples that had been developed in the latter stages of World War ,One a nd in terms of produ cing a com petent pilot the system was goo d. Selection process was rigorou s a nd pupi l pilots went th rou gh a structured course of elementa ry and advanced flying, the latter usually being known as Service Flying, before being sent to squadro ns were they learnt to fly and opera te the squadron aircra ft type. In peacetime th is process was fine as the squad rons had time to provide the training, much of it centred on forma tion flying and , for fighters, what virtually amo unted to choreographed attac ks, the Fighter Attac ks ment ioned in a previous cha pter. However, this lack of an ope ratio nal element to the tr ain ing was to prove a major probl em when war finally came. Th is chapter on aircrew trai ning will on ly focus on the operational flying elements, the Operation al T rainin g Units and specialist tra ining unit s. However, before moving on to the operational side of tra ining it is appro priate to give a brief menti on to the The aim of fig hler training \l'as 10 shoot-down the ellemy - and 1101 gel shot-down y ourself; this 92 Squadron Sp itfire returned saf ely having been hit ill the propeller and windscreen.

2 15

216

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Elementary Flying Training School (EFTS) and Service Flying Training (SFTS) elements as these formed the foundation skills to which the operational elements were added . There was no short age of youn g men wanting to be pilots, and the RAF selection process was rigorous, weeding out some that would later reapply , succeed and go on to become aces. Having been selected and survived the Initial Training Wings with 'sq uare bashing' and academics, the first real flying training took place at the EFTS. The EFTS was where prospective pilots first took to the air and where a great man y of them ended their flying careers, either being 'washed out' (failing the course for one reason of another) or ending up as a statistic - KIFA (Killed in Flying Accident ). The EFTS underwent numerous change s during the war, especially in the first two years, with much of this flying moving overseas as part of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The length of the course and the syllabus changed a number of times, but these aspects are omitted from this chapter. Most pupil pilots wanted to be fighter pilots, although some were keen on bombers as a way of hitting back at the enemy. Personal choice was not the main basis for selection to role, although it was noted , and pilots were selected according to ability and the needs of the RAF for pilots in particular roles. As night fighters became more important those assessed as having excellent night vision often found themselves pointed in that direction. The course was hard and man y of the instructors , the majority being on rest tours, were even harder. It was a case of work hard, keep your nose clean and hope you were lucky with your instructor and Flight Commander. Jerry Jarrold underwent this stage of training in summer 1941 , by which time the syllabus was well establi shed and the RAF flying training system was turning out thousands of pilots. On 9th July 1941, a small number of us lI'ere posted to RAF Peterborough and No. 17 EFTS ( Elementary Flying Training S chool) and so started our fi rst insight into fly ing - in the world-famous DH82A , bett er known as the De Havilland Tiger Moth. The School had only moved to Peterborough that month f rom its original base at North Luffenham and as a Class A + I School it catered fo r 150 pupil pilots and had 90 Tiger Moth lis on strength. My firs t-ever experience offly ing lI'as as a passenger in Tiger Moth T5698 on 19th July 1941: Sergeant Reed lI'as my instructor and thefir st fl ight lI'as called Air Experience and Familiarity with cockpit layout, and lasted j ust 20 minutes. I had another 30-minute fli ght in the same aircraft , the same day, with the same instructor - 'Eff ect of Controls and Taxying'. All very exciting SIll}J I seem to remember. Nex t day lI'as in a different aircraft ( Tl026) but the same instructor and another 30-minute fli ght, this time 'Effec t of Controls and Straight and Loll' Level Flight'. On 21st July l flewwith Sgt. McDonald on 'Climbing, Side Slipping and Stall', which lasted 40 minIlles. I lI'as with Sgt. McDonald again the next day fo r another 40 minutes on 'Medium Turns and Taking-off into Wind'. This type of instruction continued fo r another eleven or twelve fli ghts, mostly with Sgt. Mclronald, although I fl ew with a Sgt. Spiers on 2nd August. The latter lI'as fo r me a big, big day, for aft er 9 hours ofinstruction I was given a 25-minllle test by Pilot Officer Roxburgh, who passed me fo r my fi rst solo fl ight. It lasted j ust 10 minut es in Tiger Moth T5840 - oh, what joy that I could 1II1ast fly on my 011'11. I landed without incident and lI'as passed OK. It .ms a great feeling to go solo bill a bit like treading water as you came in to land, halfa hiccup and you bounce all ol'er the place! I made t wo morefli ghts that day, with one solo of15 minutes, and

AIRCREW

RAINING

'If yOIl 101 think ,1'011 are good enough . . .. ' .Pep talk ' fo r nell' pupil pilots! one with Sgt Spiers with 35 minut es of loll' fly ing. Wonderf ill day , the 2nd of August 1941 - I fl ew 5 times: tll'O of which lI'ere solo. This carried on until 20th August, flyin g solo or instruction, mostly noll' with Sgt Spiers.

Jerry passed out as 'A verage' with 50 hour and 5 minutes flying time, of which 25 hours was dual. The SFTS stage of training also varied in terms of hours and syllabu s at various periods during the war but essentially was designed to pro vide a bridge between the simple aircraft and basic flying of the EFTS and the oper ational types and flying of the OT U. Those who reached this stage were by no means safe and the 'wash-outs' and fatalities continued. Jerry Jarrold went to No. 8 STFS at Montrose, For me, flying started on l Sth September in a Miles Master Mark I with Sgt Griffi ths as my instructor. After ninefli ghts illj ust six days I was tested and lI'ent solo (21st September). There fo llowed a fur ther 80 or so fly ing hours, including approximately 43 solo fli ghts, in Miles Master I and II aircraft under various instructors before completing the Course on 26th February 1942. Night flying lI'as the 1I'0rse time and lI'as the cause of many accidents - and deaths, I recall on one night solo trip I overshot to make another circuit, entered cloud and became disoriented. This Im s a very dangerous situation and lI'as often put down as the cause offa tal crashes. I don't remember how much I panicked or hall' I got out of it, bill somehow I cheated f ate and ended back on the rllll.my in one piece! The Master Il was an excellent training aircraft and aft er the Tiger Moth it seemed to li S to be like afighter, and had the same exhilaration when youflew it solo - which of course lI'as the whole point. It seemed a massive aircraft and f ar more solid aft er the Tiger and I'eryf ast, We always made 3-poilll landings and you had to

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21 8

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

to fire their guns in combat. Of all the comments made by pilot s in the ea rly part of the war the most frequent a nd hea rt felt is the lack of gunnery training: many com men ted that they never fired their guns until they were on a squa dron, and for man y tha t was days or hours before going into actual combat. On 27 April the Hurricane-equipped 253 Squad ron was declared opera tional day a nd night - and j ust over two weeks later was sending aircraft to France, The Squad ron had formed in Oct ober 1939 but far from having six months to 'get up to speed' its earl y period was not what one cou ld con sider tru ly appropriate for a front-line fighter squad ron. Extracts from the ORB illustrate the point and the problems faced by Fight er Co mma nd in eq uipping and training sq uadro ns: 30 Oct 1939:

Another Spitfire night landing ( and the sallie ill the background}: night flying' Oil type lI'as just olle of lIIallY skills that lIell' pilots had to learn when they arrived Oil their squadrons, as previous training had been minimal.

settle it ill. which lI'as good training for a Spitfire as tlte technique lI'as the same: by the end of my Spitfire period I could drop rite aircraft down all a spar. There Il'ere a fell' Hurricanes at tlte S chool and ill the latt er stages of rite Course some chaps got to fly these. which, as I l' e all thought Il'e lI'ereheading for fighters. would have been a nice end to the Course,

Having completed the SITS course the new RAF pilot - now proudly wearin g his wings - was sent to a n Operati onal Training Unit. Before lookin g at the role and development of the Fighter Co mmand OT Us, which is the main par t of this chapt er, it is impo rta nt to menti on the training role of the squadro ns themselves. T ra ining on the Squadron The ro le of the squadrons in providi ng training was crucial. especially in the first few years of the war before the forma l training system had become well estab lished. ew pilots a rrived on a squa d ron with little, if any, flying time on the operational type of the squadro n and certainly with no tactical or 'operational" train ing. It was the job of the squadro n to teach these elements and to bring each pilot, and the squa dro n in genera l to the appro priate level of com petence. In the mid 1930s this was a reason ably so und (o r a t least accepta ble) way of doing th ings, there was plent y of time on the sq uadro n for this and the trainin g schoo ls were not sta ffed with the right number o r type of instru ctor s for th is work. Where it sta rted to fall down was with the rapid expansion of the Co mmand a nd the con sequen t dilutin g of experience on each sq uadro n and the increasing co mplexity of aircra ft - plus the likelihood that these pilots would indeed have

Formed and given esta blishme nt of 16 Blenheirns, act ually had one Magister. 18 ov 1939: Told by Air Ministry tha t the Squad ron wo uld eq uip with Battl es a nd not Blenh eims - as a tempora ry measure: by 23 ovember had 15 Ba tt les on strength bu t 'during first fortn ight had great difficult y in maint ainin g aircra ft batteries owing to fact that no sta rter trolleys avai lable.' Jan 1940: Fighter tactics co-operati on with 79 Squadron: dummy sights painted on windscreens; plent y of formation practic e, Told on 15 Ja nua ry that to re-equip with Hurrica nes and 'all pilot s spent a short time in a Hurricane cockpit to learn the lay-out .' Fight er Command attacks rehea rsed. 14 Feb : ow ha ve 10 Hurricanes on st rength. 21 Mar : All guns harm onised to 250 ya rds: new type of microph one received a t end of mon th, two cine-camera gun s borrowed from 604 Squad ron . 3 Apr: Commence ope ratio nal flying. 14 Apr : Air-to-gro und firing at Dengie Flats. 27 Apr : Declared operational: ' repeated demand s for equ ipment a re slowly having desired effect: modi ficat ion s on aircraft are being gradually effected, most important being the arri val of variabl e pitch airscrews a nd reflector sights.' Over two da ys in May the Squadron lost six pilots in France. One of the classic scenes in the ' Batt le of Britain' film is when a Spitfire pilot makes a has h of his landin g - given a Very to wave him off because the underc arri age wasn't dow n, followed by a bouncing landing. When met by the CO with the question 'ho w ma ny hours do you have on Spitfires?' his answer was ' 10\1, sir' . 'Let's ma ke it II before Jerry has you for break fast.' As they walk to their aircraft the ot her pilot s make the comment 'spring chicken to shite hawk in one easy lesson' . The poin t is, however, a very valid one for 1940 a nd no t o nly were pilots a rriving with very little tactical train ing they were arrivi ng with very few flying hours on type, In Jul y 1940 the CO of 249 Squad ron received a signal from AOC 0 , 13 Group congra tulating the Squadron on flying over 1,000 hours of training in June : ' I do not remember a case where a Squadron has ever passed the 1,000 hour mark in a month, and th is intensive effort to become opera tional a t the earliest possible mome nt reflects great credit on all concerned.' The OR Bs of fighter sq uad rons sho w that a great deal of effort was expend ed on increasing or maint aining the skills of pilots, especially with formation flying a nd sq uadro n attacks, altho ugh 'cloud flying' was a regular activity for solo pilot s,

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F IGH TER COMMAND 1936- 1968

During the last few days a considerable amount of practice flying has been carried out and much attentio n paid to beam atta cks and dog-fighting practice (249 Squad ron ORB Augu st 1940) A general comment made by many fighter pilots is that they were given very little tact ical training, either in training or on the squadron. In 1940 Spitfires and Hurric anes were in short supply and were needed in the squad rons; there were very few to spare for the training units and pilots had to make do with whatever types were availab le. However, the policy of leaving such additional type experience and tactical training to the squadro ns was massively fl awed. It was workable in 1939 and even into earl y 1940 with the Phoney War , alth ough it very much depended on the attitude of the CO and his senior pilots, some of whom saw 's prog' pilots as more trouble then they were worth. In August 1940 Johnnie Joh nson was posted to 19 Squad ron at Duxford with a total of 205 hours in his logbook, of which 23 were on Spitfires. The promised extra training was not forthcomin g as the Squadron was having problems with its new cannon arma ment: ' I don 't know how we sha ll find time to train you chaps. We've simply got to get these things working first.' The concept of on-sq uadro n training was totally flawed. especially at a time when the squadro ns were hard-pressed to maint ain operational status. Most Flight and Squadron Commanders did the best they could and tried to shield new boys from ops unt il they had built-up a few more hours and had flown a few mock combats. Sadly, for many a bright young fighter pilot his first comba t experience was often his last. The situation varied from unit to unit and depended to a large degree on the attitude of the Squadron Comm ander, and to a lesser extent the Flight Commanders or even A great deal of stress lI'as placed on Flight and Squadron Commanders to bring nell' pilots up to speed; fan Gleed exchanges a joke with Wg Cdr Victor Beam ish?

G

senior (experienced) pilots. 'We had a great deal of respect for " Crash" Curry (Sqn Ldr Jo hn Harvey Curry DFC). He set abou t really putt ing us through our paces with "tailchasi ng". A small formation of say four aircraft went off and he would do all sorts of attac ks on us. " out of the sun", " up and unde r" and really gave us a hard time. He was a magnificent pilot, nobody could touch him - he had his own "Flying Circus" in Texa s before the war. He did not approve of the RAF gun-sight and had his own built into his aircraft. He was out "polishing" his Spitfire almost every day unti l it gleamed, and no airman was allowed to go near it.' (Jerry Jarrold, 80 Squadron) Without sk illed groundcrew the aircraft would not be fi t to fly or operationally ready and the groundcrew went through an equally rigorous selection and training process.

22 1

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FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

IRCREW

RAI

ING

Whilst the role of experienced pilot s. Flight Commanders and COs remained vita l throughout the war . from 1942 onwards the basic ' pro d uct' they received fro m the training system was far bett er trained . a ltho ugh the reduction in real combat opport unities meant th at for man y their exper ience was still too theoretical - there is nothing like a real dog-fight to ram home lesson s. everthel ess, the system of Operati on al Tr aining Units ado pted by all the RAF Command s was a n excellent one a nd produced good result s. With the specialist training units providing lead ership and tactical training the overa ll system was per hap s the best of any of the fighting air forces.

Operational T ra ining Units Bomber Command addressed the probl em of operationa l tra ining a nd the pro vision of a tra ined pool of aircrew throu gh the forma tio n of a number of Group Pool squad ro ns. each opera tional Group being pro vided with one such squadron. the squadrons themselves being 'opera tiona l' units that had been redesignated to the training role. Fighter Command a ppea red reluctant to follow this process a nd at the o utbrea k of war had only one such un it. the No. II Fighter G roup Pool. Thi s was formed on 14 January 1939 at And over a nd was equipped with I I Hurricanes and 22 Battles. the latter were not idea l but provided experience with the Merlin engine as well as providing valua ble flying time . Pilot s would jo in the Pool prior to being posted to a sq uadro n. a lthough this only applied to those pilots who were not found immed iate places on squ adrons and so the principle was one of maintaining flying currency rather than giving o pera tiona l training. Nevertheless. the Pool was seen as bein g able to supply pilots at sho rt notice to mak e good casualti es in front-line unit s: it wa s little sho rt of a recipe for d isaster but it was better than nothing. As an Air Historical Branch summary mak es clear. one of the problems was Dowding's pri or ity on the build-up of his opera tiona l sq uad ro ns. 'The Commanderin-Chief. Fighter Command. correctly appreciating the vital stru ggle which was abo ut to ta ke place. was conc ent rating on increasi ng at all co sts his first line stre ngth an d in "working up " to full operationa l pitch . He was therefore mos t reluctant owing to the time fact or and shortage of a ircra ft. to devot e any resources to operationa l training. For this reason he resisted prop osals to crea te a second Fighter G ro up Pool. and proposed instead that the aircra ft were needed to mak e two half-squ ad ron s of Blenh eim fighters. It was pointed out. however . by the Air Mini stry that lack of Fight er G rou p Pool would mean lack of cas ua lty repl acements when fighti ng became intense and that . in emergency. ope ra tio na l training aircraft co uld be used. Fighter Co mma nd therefor e reluctantly agreed to the formati on ofa second G ro up Pool (No . 12 G roup) on 25 Sept ember 1939. Both Pools were handicapped by lack of camera guns. reflector sights. a rmo ury and radi o teleph onic facilities. Th ere was a lso a sho rtage of fully-equipped a ircraft. This mad e them only cap able of producing half the planned out put of 1.1 00 pilots a year. In fact the y hardly met. in quality o r qu antity. the requirements of the fighter sq uadrons in Fr ance . At the end of April 1940. the Air Minist ry overru led Fight er Co mma nd' s objections to the diversion of resources int o the opera tiona l trai ning orga nisatio n. and two more fighter OTUs were formed and the entire establishm ent o f the four OTUs was increased .' Th e latter reference to Operational T raining Units moves beyond where we are in this overview. The o. 12 Group Pool formed at Ast on Down with I I Gladi at ors. seven Harvard s and three Blenheims - so with the exception of the latter. the C-in- C was cert ainl y not alloc ating front-line aircra ft.

Spitfire pilots await the nex t mission; a great deal of exper ience could be passed f rom pilot to pilot, although in some units this \I'as actively discouraged.

Th ose sq uadrons re-equipping with Blenheims were provided with an Oxford to help with co nversion to twin-engined flying and Bomber Command was reque sted to 'm a ke avai lable Blenheim pilot s to visit the unit s in or der that instruction in flying B1enheims may be given to the pilot s of these squad ro ns. A du al control set for a Blenheim will be allotted to each squa dro n' (Memo 2 December 1938 on re-equipment of Fighter Co mma nd). The Blenheim squadrons in qu estion were 600. 60 1 and 604 a t Hend on with a plan to re-equip them by mid February. With the assis ta nce of Blenheim Co nversio n Flight a t Hendon (sho rt-lived). the two G roup Pool were expected to supply the needs of whole of Fighter Command. including the squa drons depl oyed to the Co nti nent. Their estimated outp ut in ea rly 1940 was 44 pilot s a month. An organisatio na l memo of February 1940 gave det ails of the expa nsion of fighter Ope rationa l Training Units: 'Fighter G roup Pools will become Operati onal Training Units an d no longer be affiliated to a particular Group. Thi s will avo id the necessity of esta blishing a ll types of aircra ft at each OTU. 'Th e o. II Group Pool will move to Sutt on Bridge as o . 6 Operational Training Unit. with effect from 6 March 1940. Establi shment will be 48 Hurricanes. 4 Defiants, 2 Gladiators and 13 Harvards o r Batt les. The o. 12 Group Pool at Aston Down will becom e No .5 Operational Training Unit. Establishment will be 34 Spitfire s. 20 Blenheim s and 10 Har vards o r Battles.' (SOM 14 1/40) The entire aircrew training system was being reviewed at this time. not so much o ut of an y concern for Fighter Comm and but very much focused on the problems and needs of Bomber Comm and; however. it focused a ttention on all parts of the training

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system and led to specialisation at the Service Flying Training Schools, the output of which went to the OT Us. The problem had been exasperated by poor weather over the winter of 1939/40 and the generally poor conditi on of many of the trainin g airfields. A suggestion of reducing night flying for pilots destined for da y-fighter squadro ns was vetoed by Fighter Comm and but it was agreed tha t the SFTS course for fighter pilots should be differen t. It was decided that No. 12 SFTS at Mont rose would be the first to specialise in fighter pilot train ing, with a 12-week cour se, after which the pilot would go to an OT U. In Jun e 1940 the decision was taken to form four of these G roup Service Flying Trainin g Schools: By September 1940 the Montrose School had an establishment of 108 Masters and was using a number of satellite airfields, includin g Edzell and Stracathro . It remained one of the major fighter Schools for the next two years. Let's go back and look at the continued development of the OT Us, as these were the real key to pro viding squadro ns with 'operational' pilots. Th e Febru ary 1940 decision gave the Comman d two OT Us, formed o ut of the old Group Pools, with a third subsequently added . .. but the war was placing increasing demand s on the Co mma nd, especially with the commitment - and losses - in Fr ance. Th e AHB account neatl y summarises this difficult period on 1940: 'The problem of convert ing a hastily trained o utput so that it would be fit to take its place in the fighting line became urgent. By Jun e 1940 the vigorous efforts which had been made to com plete Fighter Comma nd's preparations now made it all the more imperat ive that the sq uadro ns sho uld be supported by a proper backing for operat iona l training, and it was agreed that every pilot sho uld go through an OT U on the same basis as that to which Bomb er Comman d had already been working. . .. Their back ing in opera tional training resou rces was extre mely slender. By that time they only had three OT Us behind them. Th ese OT Us were all under the direct contro l of one of the opera tiona l Groups (No . 10). The Battle of Britain was to show most clearly how essential was orga nised operationa l training. It was only by a most drastic short ening of courses that the flow of pilots to squadro ns was maintained, and had the Service Flying T raining School organisatio n been properly geared to the programme for first line expansion the Figh ter OT Us wou ld have formed a most severe bottl eneck. As it was it was necessary to resort to many expedien ts in order to give the pilots their conversion.' In October the numbering system of the OTUs was cha nged, with Aston Down becoming No. 55 OTU , Sutt on Bridge No. 56 OT U and Hawarden No. 57 OT U. By late 1940 the Fighter Command plan was to have one OT U for every ten fighter squa dro ns, with each OT U turni ng-o ut 34 pilots a month from a six-week course. The AHB summary sta ted: 'The average casua lty rate per ten squadrons was 26 a month over a year. On this basis the OT U outp ut would be eight pilots per mon th more tha n was likely to be required . Th e task of forming an adequa te OT U organ isation was considera ble, and the AMSO had been com pelled to suggest tha t the operational trai ning should to some extent be carried out in the squa drons themselves. It was impossible, therefore, at this stage to increase the ratio of fighter OT Us to squadrons to more than one to ten.' One of the impor tant elements of this equat ion was the loss rate in the squadro ns, which included both casualties and routine 'losses' through such things as postings. An intrinsic part of this was tou r lengths (the Operational Tou r Policy): this was covered in the Overview chap ter - but in essence Fighter Command averaged its tour lengths at 200 hours 'operational time' rat her than a numbe r of sorties. However, there was great variation on this and decisions were often take n at squadron level. Overall the anticipated loss rates for Fighter Command and therefore the replacement numbe rs requ ired seemed abo ut right and the Command did not suffer the same massive variations in losses tha t faced Bomber Command. In an effort to keep squad rons up to

CREW TRAINING

esta blished mann ing levels, the pilot estab lishment per squa dro n was reduced from 26 to 23 - a neat way of mak ing the numb ers work! However, the training system was still ha rd-pressed to meet the demand s and into the early part of 1941 the average pilot strength per sq uad ron was 21. It was hoped that the combined output of the four OT Us would be 60 pilots a week, which was almost five times that of j ust 10 month s previously - but it was still not enough as it was not just supplying Fighter Comma nd but was also supplying fighter squadro ns in the Middle East. Accord ing to the AHB summa ry, 'was tage from all causes, including postings to other Commands, averaged 58 a week in October 1940. During the first few weeks of ovember Fighter Command found itself called upon to supply more tha n 100 pilots to the Middle East alone, although its own strength was already below establishment. It was obvious that even the expanded organisation would not be able to make good such a dr ain as this. Shortly before leaving the Comma nd, therefore, Air Chief Marshal Dowding asked the Air Ministry to sanction the formatio n of two more OTUs. He also suggested that all Fighter OT Us sho uld be incorp orated into an operational Training Group within his Com mand.' At the end of December the OT Us joined the newly-form ed 0.8 1 (T raini ng) Grou p, which had formed on 16 December to contro l all Fighter Command's OT Us and was commanded by Air Commodore F J Vincent. The other cha nge at the end of the year was the formation of a night-fighter OTU, which was in response to a reorganisation of the night defences instit uted by the new C-in-C, Air Marshal Sholto Douglas. Th e new Unit formed , No. 54 OT U, at Church Fenton in late November with a lar ge and diverse aircraft esta blishment comprising Blenheims (17 + 6), dual-control Blenheims (6 + 2), Defiant s (18 + 6), Havocs (4 + 2), Masters (7 + 3), Oxford s (4 + 2) and four tar get-tow aircra ft. When No. 81 Grou p formed it had command of the six OT Us that were already functioning or in the process of formation, as shown in the table below: Fighter Command OTUs, No.81 Group, December

t 9~O

Unit

Parent airfield

Main type!s)

540TU 550TU 560TU 570TU 58 0 TU 59 0 TU

Church Fenton Aston Down Sulton Bridge Hawarden

Blenheim. Defiant Hurricane. Master Hurrica ne. Maste r Spitfire. Master

Grangemouth

Spitfire. Master

Turnhouse

Hurricane. Master

All pilots did some night flying but for those at Church Fento n's night fighter OT U this was a significant par t of the course. Harold Stone (later 4 18 Sqn) was one of those who had a frighte ning experience during his training: 1 was at Church Fell/Oil doing Ill)' OTU course. 1should point 0111 that at this time 1 had 0111)' 120 hours flying under m), belt and the Blenheims Ire nowflew ,rere so teased out that ifyou had to wait f or the rllnll'ay to clear f or tak e-off the ground erew had to put chocks under the wheels to allow us to rev the engines to preveil/ them from oiling lip. 1 had 6 hours dual before going solo and that was all an)' instructor was prepared to fly ill these bombers. Even the 2 hours dual night flying check done 'ms in an Oxford and single engined practice was also a solo effo rt!

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FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

AIRCREW TRAIN NG

Miles Master HN861; the Master was one of a series of Miles aircraft that played a vital role in fighter-pilot training. Blenheim of No.54 Operational Training Unit, the first of the specialist night-fighter training linits. Sa when it came to practicing use of oxygen I was told to fly as high as I could. I got to 21,000ft before the aircraft started to wallow and lose height elwy time I tried to gain extra altitude. To return to base I had to descend through a solid lay er ofcloud during which I lost the starboard engine and some instruments iced up. I broke cloud at approx . 2,OOOft but was able to ma intain height until I was in sight ofbase, Unfortunately befare I lI'as able to rejoin the circuit the port engine also decided enough was enough and g(l\'e up the struggle, I called to clear the 'drome fo r an emergency landing and was j ust able to reach the main Tllllway bill j ust as I lI'as about to touch down another aircraft took offacross my bows and I had to leap frog over it and land with a rather sicke ning thud. Believe it or not, when I reported in I lI'as given a rocket fo r landing on the II'TOng rWIII'ay. This then is an example ofa prolonged sta te ofanx iety. Despite the above - the CO - WIC ( Botchy} A tcherley lI'as kind enough to assess me as 'A good type of N. C. 0 pilot with enthusiasm and ability.

The Miles Master was the main train er within the Fighter Com mand OT Us and first entered service in May 1939 as a two-seat adva nced trainer. Three variants of the Master were used (I to III) and nearly 3.500 were produced - very few RAF single-seat pilots avo ided the Master. It was a rugged and reliable train er with a retr actable underc arri age and reasonable perform ance, mak ing it far better than ot her tr ainer types of the period. Miles aircraft played a major role in RAF training not only with the Master but also with the Magister, primar ily used at the EFT S stage but also as sq uad ron 'hacks' and comms aircraft. and the Mart inet tar get-tower. Pilots sent to fire at aerial d rogues were often aiming at a sleeve ta rget being d ragged around by a Mart inet.

1941 - More problems The expansion of the training system continued in 1941 . with a plan approved in Ma y to have eight day and three night Operational Training Units. By this time three more had already been added: No. 52 at Debden and No. 53 at Heston starting to form in mid February, and a second night unit , 0.60 starting to form in April at Leconfield. The aircraft establi shment of the training unit s also continued to be subject to modification through out this period ; for example, the establishment of No. 53 OTU changed in May to 51 + 17 Spitfires. 17 + 5 Ma sters and 4 + 2 target -tow types. There were frequent cha nges in the aircraft establi shment. in terms of types and numbe rs. throughout the war and it is not the intenti on of this chapter to track all such changes; menti on will only be made where it is considered significant. One such change in June saw the Defiants leave 0 , 54 OT U to join No. 60 OT U. leaving the Church Fenton unit to concentrate on twin-engine night-fighter training, although it was another year before the promised replacement of the Blenheims by Beaufighters commenced. Thi s expan sion of the training system did not solve the Command's problems as pilot o utput was still being dr ained away to various places. and. more tellingly, the supply of pilots from Flying Training Schools to No, 81 Group was drying up . Indeed, in the week to 14 April the Comm and received only 35 pilots from the FTS system whereas its requirem ent was 245 pilots , Th e C-in-C complained that his Comm and was not being given the priorit y it deserved - and was told tha t Fighter Command was 'quite all right'. It must be remembered that this was a period of massive expansion and heavy losses in Bomber Command and that the bombe r battl e was seen as the o. I priorit y, The average OT U course by mid 194 1 was 40 hour s on type - four times more than it had been in 1940. altho ugh tactics and gunnery were still not significant part s of the syllabus, A great deal of time was spent honing the skills of pilots to enable them to manoeuvre in attac k and defence. and it is strange that so little was done to ensure that

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AIRCREW TRAINING

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

they had a good standa rd of mark smanship. Less than three of the 40 hou rs were spent on actual firing, and cine-gun, whilst very useful, was of limited use in compariso n. Miroslav Liskutin, a Czech pilot, was on No. 10 Course at No . 58 OT U, Grangemou th in summer 1941. He was one of 30 pilots on the 6-week course - and six of them were killed in flying accidents, a higher than usual rate but a fact of life at training units such as this. In his biograph y 'C hallenge in the Air' (William Kimber, 1988) he recalled: the ground school instru ctors ga ve liS the principles for using ollr aircraft's guns for comba t. Th is wasfo llowed by lectures on local fi ring pra ctice and the air firing fo llowed in great haste. It is difficult to describe my pleasant surprise when, on my firs t att emp t at firing onto a flying target I achieved 16% of hit s. My result had turned out to be one of the best at Grangemouth at tha t tim e.

He was right to be pleased with that percentage as for most pilots an average score was nearer to 5%. By June 1941 the Command was operating nine OT Us, all being cont rolled by No. 81 (Training) Group, as shown in the table below. Fighter Co mma nd OTUs, No.81 Grou p, J une 19-1 1 Unit

Parent airfield

520T U 530TU 54 OT U 55 0 TU 560T U 57 0 TU 580T U 590T U 60 0 TU

Debden Heston Church Fenton Usworth Sutt on Bridge

H urricane

G rangemouth

Spitfire Blenheim. Defiant Hurricane. Defiant Hurricane Spitfire Spitfire

Crosby-an-Eden Leeonfield

Blenheim

Hawarden

H urrica ne

Jack Cheney arrived at Churc h Fenton in August 1941 to join No . 11 cour se at No. 54 OT U, having been selected during SFTS for trainin g as a night fighter pilot. He was teamed up with his Observer, Sgt James Mycock, the following month and the ro utine of day flying in Blenheims and night flying in Oxford s continued: 'blokes were killing themselves right , left and centre in those ropey Blenheims, which we had now also begun to fly by night. Together with our Observers we put in a tremendo us amount of both day and night flying in an effort to become an efficient team and yet agai n the end of the cou rse was rushed.' Just as the course was coming to an end in mid October his friend Tosh Bramely was killed in a flying accident - the fourteenth cas ualty in the space of thr ee mon ths. By the end of the year the Command had its full complement of eleven OT Us, the new additions being: No. 51 OT U, which sta rted to form at Debden in late July as a night unit and moved to its planned home at Cra nfield on 17 August; and No . 6 1 OT U, which formed out of o. 53 OT U at Heston in Jun e as a day unit. Thus by the end of the year the Comm and 's capacity to train pilots had been transformed: in 1941 the organisatio n flew 263,604 hours and trained 4,242 pilots - an averag e output of 350 a month. There were, perhaps, still questions to be asked as to the content of the training, although this too had been greatly improved since the dar k days of 1940.

Na vigators of No.2 Course of No.60 OTU; this night-fighter training linit re-f ormed in May 1943 at High Ercall. P9386 started life with 19 Squadron and served with a number ofsquadrons before being sent to training duties, where it served with three OTUs before crashing in " fay 1941 whilst with No.57 0 TU.

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230

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

AIRCREW TRAIN NG used against gro und targets; I can ani)' assum e that Ir e shot at drogues fo r air-toair. Groundfiring ( I think) was loll' level approach ( not diving ) all/a the target on fi ring ranges, and, of cOllrse air-to-air required allowing fo r deflec tion. M ost of the other firing - air-to-air - was cine camera. Again . if I remember correctly, most of liS were concerned that not enough lim e was devoted to the subject of firing and gunnery on the Course, which fo r potential fi ghter pilots was ex treme ly bad.

1942 - M ax imum Effort By 1942 the Command's had 12 unit s, three of which specialised in night fighters . It must be appreciated that in many cases these OTUs did not just supply Fighter Command but also served overseas commands and other commitments. Fighter Co mmand OT Us, No .81 Group,

1 9~2

Unit

Parent airfield

Main type(s)

120TU 52 0 TU 53 0TU 54 OT U 55 0 TU 56 0 TU 57 0 TU 58 0 TU 59 0 TU 60 0 TU 6 1 0 TU 62 0 TU

Cra nfield Aston Down L1andow Cha rter Hall

Beau figh ter, Havoc Spitfire Spitfire Bea ufighter. Blenheim Hurri can e Hu rricane Spitfire Spitfire Hurrican e Beaufighter, Blenheim Spitfire An son

A nnan

Teali ng Esbon G rangemou th

Milfie1d East Fortune Rednal Usworth

In Ju ly 1942 new estab lishments were promulgated for three of the OTUs: No .51 OT U 20 + 6 Havoc, 10 + 3 Blenheim (A I), 10 + 4 Blenh eim (Solo), 9 + 3 Blenheim (Du al), 3 + I Havoc I, 3 + I Oxford, 3 + I Target Tower. No. 54 OTU 20 + 6 Beaufight er (AI), 10 + 3 Blenheim (AI), 9 + 3 Blenheim (Du al), 10 + 4 Blenheim (Solo), 3 + I Beaufighter, 3 + I Oxford, 3 + I Target Tower. No. 60 OTU was given the same establishmen t as No . 54 OTU. Ralph 'Sammy' Sampson went through No. 53 OT U in earl y 1942 and init ially had a poor reception as his SFTS flying had been on Oxfords and under normal circumsta nces he would have been destined for night fighte rs and no t Spitfires. Ha ving had a check ride in the Mas ter he was let loose a few days later on a Spitfire II: Log-book extract fo r Jerry Jarrold during his time with No.55 OTU. March 1942.

Jerry Jarrold went to 0.55 OTU at Usworth; by the time he arrived at Usworth his log book showed a total of 126 hours and 35 minutes day flying, of which nearly 68 ho urs were solo, plus a mere 4 hours and 55 minutes of night flying, onl y 2 hours and 35 min utes of which were solo . Flyin g started on the 24 March, with a sector reconnaissance in a DH82A ( Tiger M oth ) piloted by a Fit Lt Ask ew. The next day was dual instru ction in a Miles Ma ster Mark I by Fit Lt Ripp on with so called 'dual landings' fo rj ust 25 minutes. Then it lras off 10 the Hurricane and in total (lir e of the aircraft when fi rst seen close lip; the fi rst thing being 10 sit in the cockpit and ge t used to the controls and layout. There was no dual-control Hur ricane, so .1'0 11 were on YOllr own from the fir st flight. This was f ollowed immediately by my first flight in Hawk er Hurricane Mark I (6622) fo r circuits and landings last ing one hour 10 minutes; later the same day I was lip again in the same Hurri cane Mk I f or 'experience on typ e and sector recce ', a trip that last ed one hour 35 minutes. Quit e a day! Once .1'0 11 opened the throttle it pushed .1'0 11 into the seal as )'011 roared off down the runway. As always, landing was the trickiest part and we tended to land rolling on main wheels. so it was important 10 k eep the nose lip and the brakes off, or an embarrassing lip-lip on the nose 1I'01l1d result ( and mayb e worse). It was also important to rem emb er 10 putthe undercarriage down. so .1'0 11 always k epi a look 0 11/ fo r a red Ver)' from the ground that 1I'01l1d 1I'(J\'e .1'011 off, usually because the gear was not down! Formation flyin g was tricky until .1'0 11 Irere experienced, and on early flights .1'0 11 tended 10 pump the throttle and see-saw linIii .1'0 11 sell led down. Looking back aft er all these years. it's noll'pretty hard to remember milch of the nature of the l-ery shari periods devoted 10 air-to-air and air-to-groundfiring. The old Hu rricane Is ' armament consisted of eight 0.303-in machine guns - fo ur m alinted in each wing and it was ani)' on a couple ofoccasions that live am mo was

(Jerry Jarrold )

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231

232

AIRCREW TRAINING

F IGH TER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8 Unlike the previous three types I had flown, the Spitfire was like a race horse once it lI'as airborne, gat hering terrific speed where the others lI'ere clambering into the air. As I lef t the ground, I selected wheels-lip and with my eyes glued to the horizon ahead but with an occasional glance at the instruments, gained height. When I reached I ,OOOf tl ll/m ed my head to look at the aerodrome and it was not in sight. This then was the difference between a fight er aerop lane and the training planes I had flown. Speed and power. I flew for 15 minutes, thankfully relocated the airfield and landed. It was a tremendous f eeling of achievement. 1 hadjinally made it. (Spitfire Offensive, R IV F Sampson, Grub Street ).

The East Fo rtune unit (No. 60 OT U) was disband ed in November 1942, its aircraft and personnel being transferred to No . 132 OT U of Coas tal Comman d, although some of the Beau fighters went to o. 51 OT U to fo rm a fourt h squadron at tha t Unit , which had only started to receive Beau s in August. Th e Unit was also taki ng an increasing role in the training on intruder crews. During 1942 the following statistics were record ed for the Comman d OT Us: Total hours flown No of accidents Fa tal accidents Pilot inta ke Pilot output Wastage rate

390,236 1,242 189 4,993 4,353 13%

Accidents were always a matter of great concern, especially if they were caused by flying indiscipline - and there are frequent entries in the record s of flying traini ng units of pilots being suspended, the comm onest offence being illicit low flying. Th is was more of a problem in the ear lier stages of train ing and by the OT U stage, where low flying was a ro utine par t of the course, the more frequent problems were those of airmans hip. As a typical mon th of accidents for a Spitfire OT U, the following incidents were record ed by No . 61 OT U at Rednal for December 1942, a month when the weather was only fit for flying for half the month. I Dec: Spitfire P7973 (Sgt Menuge), heavy land ing, undercar riage collapsed. Spitfire P7746 (P/O Rivett ), swung on take-off. 14 Dec: Spitfire ? (P/O Degail), flew into hill, pilot killed. 16 Dec: Spitfire X4776 (Sgt Crawley), taxiing too fast, und ercarri age collapsed. Spitfire R7125 (Sgt Veys), heavy landing, undercarriage collapsed. Lysander Tl 655 (F/ L Walker), on search for lost Spitfire, flew into hill, pilot killed. 19 Dec: Spitfire R7151 (Sgt Robson), took -off in coarse pitch, hit railway bank. Spitfire P8389 (Sgt Veys), pilot on air firing over range failed to appreciate how much fuel he was using, with only 25-gallons left pilot shou ld not have attempted a further 200 minutes flying, but should have landed at one of available dro mes. Accident att ributed to an error of judgement thro ugh inexperience. 27 Dec: Spitfire P8693 (Sgt Gir ard on), attem pted half-roll at 3,000 ft, failed to pull-up before hitting tree. Sent to Aircrew Refresher School at Brighton.

1943 - Reorganisation By 1943 the training machine for fighter pilots was running well and as there was not such a pan ic for pilots they were being allowed enough training time and flying hours, although there was still some concern over the amo unt of gun nery. On 15 April 1943 the training organisation passed to No .9 Group as part of a restructuring of Fighte r Comma nd. By Ju ne the traini ng orga nisation comprised 14 OT Us, as shown in the tab le below. Fighter Command OTUs, No. 9 Gro up, J une 1943 Unit

Parent airfield

Main tvpet s)

410TU 430TU 51 0 TU 52 0 TU 53 0 TU 540TU 55 0 TU 56 0 TU 570TU 58 0 TU 59 0 TU 60 OTU 61 0 TU 62 0 TU

Hawarden Old Sarum Cranfield Aston Do"'n '

Mu stang

Kirt on -in-Lindsey

Charterh all Annan

Tealing Eshott Grangem outh

Millfield High Ereall Rednal Us wo rth

Auster Beaufighter Spitfire Spitfire Beaufighter H urricaneffyphoon Hurrica ne

Spitfire Spitfire Hurricane Mosquito

Spitfire Anson

No . 60 Operational Training Unit re-formed at High Ercall on 5 May 1943 as directed by No .9 G rou p, the nucleus of the unit coming from No.2 (Intr uder) Training Squad ron of No . 51 OTU. Under the command of Wg Cd r Hoare DSO DFC* it was equipped with 24 Mosq uito li s and Ill s and two Ansons and was tasked with training Mo squito crews for intruder operations. The first intake of pup ils ar rived in mid May to go through two phases of training. The first was with No . I (Co nversion) Squadron, which gave a 4-week conversion to the Mosquito, plus formation flying and instrument flying. Th is was followed by 8-weeks with No .2 (Adva nced) Squadron when pupils crewed-up and flew 15 day and 25 night hou rs. To quote the ORB ' this was mainly crosscountry but considerable time would be devoted to camera-gun exercises, air- to-air firing and air -to-grou nd firing, as well as pract ice attacks and practice int ruders .' Course size varied, No . I Course had 12 crews whilst o thers had as few as three crews. Fa ilure rates were very low and on most courses all crews grad uated , although there are a few notes of 'suspended' or 'taken off course '. Likewise, casualty rates were low. T his was par t of a general reorganisati on of night-fighter training promulgated in early September 1943 'in order to overcome the present deficiency of night fighter Al crews and to meet futu re requirements of night fighter AI and Intruder crews, it has been decided to reorganise the night fighter OTUs in No.9 Group, Fighter Command, as follows: I. Increase the intake of the two night fighter (AI) OTUs - Nos 51 and 54 from 32 to 40 crews every four weeks, 2. Red uce No . 60 (Int rude r) OTU to approximately half size.

233

234

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

235 , o. 63 OTU will sta rt to form fort hwit h as a nig ht fighter (A I) OTU at Hon iley. Its training organisation will be:

,

#

,,\-.

a. b. c. d.

,-, ~

.. \

Length of course - 12 weeks . Int akes - 20 crews every fou r weeks . Po pulatio n - 60 crews. Outputs - 17 crews per four weeks .

' Its aircraft establishment will be 25 + 9 Bea ufighter II. 2 + 0 Blenheim V duals. 8 + 2 Beaufort duals. 2 + I M artinets. 2 + 0 M agister. . o . 62 OTU at O usto n will be expanded forthwith to train 100 avigatorslRadio per four weeks . Its training o rganisation will be: a. b. c. d.

" .-+.~.

Rednal \l'as home to No .61 Operational Training Unit, which formed 0 1 Heston ill JUlie 1941 train do)' fig hter pilots and moved 10 Rednal ill April 1942. 11 remained here 10 the end of the \l'ar. primarily equipped with Spitfires III/Iii Mu stangs look Ol'er ill late 1944.

10

3. Fo rm o. 63 (A I) OTU wit h int a kes of 20 crews every four weeks. 4. Expa nd o. 62 (A I) OTU to train 100 avigatorslRadio per fou r weeks . 'The crew intak es at o. 51 OTU (Cranfield. wit h satellite at T winwood Farm) and o . 54 OTU (C harter Ha ll. with satellite a t Winfield ) will be increased from 32 to 40 every 4 weeks . The training o rganisation of each of these OTUs will be: a . Length of course - 12 weeks. b. Po pulation - 120 crews. c. Outputs - 34 crews every four weeks. 'The aircraft establishment of these OTUs will be amended as follows: 0.51 OTU: Bea ufighter IF inc reased from 40+ 14 to 50+ 18 and Bea ufo rt dual 9 + 3 to I I + 4. o. 54 OTU : Bea ufighter II increased from 40 + 14 to 50 + 18 and Bea ufo rt du al from 9 + 3 to II + 4. o. 60 OTU will now train Intr uder crews o nly. It will be red uced to half size and will rem ain at H igh Ercall, but Ho niley will become ho me fo r 0 .63 O TU. The training o rganisation of No. 60 OTU will be: a. b. c. d.

Length of co urse - 12 weeks . Int ak es - 18 crews every four weeks. Populati on - 54 crews. Outputs - 16 crews per fou r weeks .

Length of course - 6 weeks. In tak es - 53 every two weeks . Po pulation - 159. Ou tputs - 100 per fo ur weeks.'

A seco nd major reorganisati on took place in Oct ober. this time affecting the Fig hte r G unnery F lights ; these n umbered F lights were d isb anded an d a ser ies of A rmament Pract ice Ca mps we re esta blished. a ltho ugh this was esse ntially a re-d esignation of the old F lights. Th e effecti ve dat e fo r thi s cha nge was 18 October . with ten Flight s becoming eight APCs. as sho wn in th e tab le below. Forma tion of APCs. O ctober 1943

Fighte Gunnery Flighr

A Pe

Airfield

Group

1487 1498 1486 1492 1490 1491 1489 1488 1493

II APC

Fairwood Common

10 Gp

12APC 13 APC 14APC 15 APC 16APC 17 APC 18 APC

L1anbedr

9Gp

Ayr Peterhead Hutt on Cranswick Southend Gravesend

13 G p 13 Gp 12 Gp II Gp II Gp

Fit FIt Fit Fit FIt Fit Fit Fit Fit

The establishment for each of the A PC s was 6 + I ta rget-tow aircraft. usually Lysander or M a rt inet. and 3 + I M aster. It was intended that fighter squadrons would spend 14 days with the APC for intensive training. This is one rea so ns why airfie lds such as L1anbedr and Fairwood Common keep a ppea ring in squadron records as 'bases'; the Squadron was detached to the A PC for this short training pe riod .

1944 In Jan ua ry 1944 the M illfield unit (No. 59 OT U ) flew 1,435 ho urs an d its ai rcraft st rength was 77 H urri can es. 18 M aster s. 15 M a rt inets. six T yph oon s an d o ne eac h of th e Ti ger Moth and Dominie. Fl ying ceased o n 26th of the mon th as th e Unit was di sband ing a nd in early Fe bruary 1944 . the AOC of o. 9 Group sent the follo wing message: 'The clos ing down of o. 59 OTU has brought to an end the existence of an O per ation al

236

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

Training Unit with a very fine record of achievement. In the 34 months of its life, no less than 101 ,335 hou rs have been flown and 1,485 pup ils tra ined . This represents a con tributio n to the war effort of a considerable magnitude and it has only been mad e poss ible by the ha rd work a nd devotion to dut y, not only of the instructor s and staff of the OT U bu t of the entire strength of the Stat ion . 'At no time has life been easy , for the training commi tment has always been a little greater than the resources of the OT U cou ld normally meet, an d it has mea nt a sustained effort on the part of everybody to pro vide the training which has been required.' In was not act ually the end as far as Millfield, the aircraft or the staff were co ncerned, as the resources were used to form the Figh ter Lead ers School, which also absorbed the Specialised Low Attack School. With the use of fighters as fighter-bombers the art of bombing was int roduced to some of the OTUs, including No. 53 OT U a t Kirton -in-L indsey, which now had three phases to its co urse: I. 20-ho urs fami liarisation on Spit fire Vb. 2. 20-ho urs gunnery and bombing. 3. 20-hou rs formation, tactics and night flying. Peter Rivington recalled his time with the OT U: we now turned to armament training - air-to-air and air-to-ground firing . and dive-bomb ing with practice bombs. The ranges for air-to-ground firing were j ust off Spurn Head. while the air-to-air firing took place out to sea off the Point. We fired at drogues towed b)' a M artinet . . . quite a number of our ex ercises were carried out with camera gun ani)'. and one's films were then analysed and criticised b)' an instru ctor. We also practiced dive-bombi ng using an off- shore target. The Spitfire was not an ideal aircraft for this exer cise, as with its clean lines and absence of dive-brak es it picked up speed ver), quickly when going down hill! I see f rom m), Log Book that m)' best effort produced an average error of97 yards f or eight bombs. so I imagine that a feu' f ell quite a bit closer than that. With the armament phase of the course completed the final two or three weeks were spent once more at Kirton [th e armament phase was flown from Hibaldstow] in tactical training. fo rmation flying, in Flights and as a squadron. dog-fighting and ground-attack. Following the pattern of the air war being waged at that time. great stress was placed on the latt er. ( Adventures on the Infinite Highway. Peter Rivington, ed Rod Priddle, Woodfield. )

By June 1944 the Command had 13 training units under No .9 Group, as shown in the tab le on the right: With fighter -bombing now a sta ndard ro le for mos t fighte r units there was a requirement to increa se the training for this role.... No . 59 Operational Training Unit re-formed at Acklington, in No . 12 Group, for this task on 26 February 1945 as a halfstrength OTU to train Typhoon pilots in the fighter-bomber role, primarily for 2nd Tactical Air Force . No . I Co urse, of 22 pilots, assembled on 20 March and were briefed that they were to 'consider themselves as qualified pilots on a conversion course to fly and fight in Typhoons.' It was explained tha t 'absolute obedience was expecte d in the air and that breaches of flying discip line would not be to lerated.' Flying started on 23 March a nd was in phases but was somewhat disrupted by VE Day celebrations. By the end of

AIRCREW TRAINING

Fighter Command Trai ning Units, No .9 Group, Ju ne 194-4 Unil

13 OTU 410TU 510TU 53 0 TU 54 OTU 55 OTU/3 TE U 56 OTU/I TE U 57 0 TU 58 OTUl2 TEU 60 OTU 61 0 TU 62 0 TU FLS

Parent airfield

Main type(s )

Bice ster

Mitchell Mustang

Hawarden Cra nfield

Beaufighter, Mo squito

Kirt on-in- Lindsey

Spitfire

Charter Hall

Beaufighter, Mo squito Hurricane. Typhoon Hurricane

Annan . Honiley

Tealing Eshon Grangemouth High Ercall Rednal

Spitfire

Spitfire Mosquito

Spitfire

Ouston

An son

Milfield

Spitfire. Typh oon

Note : TEU - Tactical Exercise Unit; FLS - Fighter. Leaders School.

the course the average flying ho urs per pilot were 56 day a nd four night ; for the OT U it was a o ne-off course as it disband ed in Jun e. As th e war dr ew to a close there were 15 train ing uni ts, but as had been the case for some time they were not all directly related to the needs of Fighter Co mma nd a nd a grea t deal of the output was destined for the Tactical Air Force. Reorgani sation had seen No .9 G ro up disband in Sept ember 1944 and the training had been placed back und er command of the opera tional Groups. with No . 12 G roup in particular as most of the units were within its operat iona l area . The tra ining units are detailed in the table below. Fighter Command Training Units, May 1945 Unit

xe, II

Parent airfield

Main typei s}

Harwell Colerne

Mitchell. Mosquito. Boston Meteor

Chilbolton Cranfield Kirton Lindsey Charter Hall Aston Down Milfield

Spitfire. Hurricane Mosquito Spitfire Mosquito Typhoon. Hurricane Tempest. Typhoon Spitfire Spitfire Typh oon Spitfire. Mustang Wellington. Hurricane Spitfire various

Group

13 OTU 1335 CU No. 12 Group

410TU 510TU 530TU 540TU 550TU 56 0 T U 570TU 580TU 59 0 TU 610TU 62 0 TU 80 (French) OTU CFE

Eshott Hawarden Acklington Rednal Ouston Morpeth Tangmere

By Nov ember the tot al was down to six OT Us plus No. 1335 Co nversion Unit and the Centr al Fighter Establishm ent , with most com ing under No. 12 G roup.

237

238

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Specia list Sc hools Whil st the OTUs were witho ut doubt the most imp ort ant par t of the opera tio na l train ing for the Co mman d's pilot s, the role played by a number of specialist tra ining schools was highly significant, especia lly in the development of lead ership and tactical training. Th ese specia list schoo ls were sta ffed by expe rienced fighter pilot s on rest to urs fro m ope ra tiona l flying and 'new boys' rubbed sho ulders with man y of the grea t nam es of a ir comb at. not all of whom wanted to be there and not all of whom were suited to the training ro le. Nevertheless, as forums of excellence they pro ved invalu able and lesson s were distilled a nd passed on. Th is bri ef overview will not menti on a ll the schools of this type. Tactical development and instru ction in tactics becam e increasingly well-estab lished fro m 1943. In theo ry, those who attended a specialist course not only improved their own skills. especially in lead ership. but also impa rted the latest tactical wisdom to the rest o f the squadron. Th e theory was sou nd but it was by no mea ns always a pplied , Th e Centra l Gunnery School (CG S) was formed at Warmwell in November 1939 as the centre of excellence for all air gunnery matters in orde r to imp ro ve sta nda rds a nd pro vide specialist training. Th e School operated a ran ge of aircraft types fro m tra iners to front-line fighters. and selected pilot s went thro ugh the sho rt co urse. the intentio n being that they would pa ss on the wisdo m gai ned to other memb ers of thei r squadron. By 1944 Spit fires were the main figh ter type with CG S; by the following yea r the esta blishmen t included 20 Spitfire XVI s. altho ugh the ac tua l strength in term s of numbers and Marks varied. In Januar y 1943 the Fight er Lead ers School was formed at Chedwo rt h (o ut of o . 52 OTU); with an establishment of 36 Spitfires its role was to teach Flight a nd

Sf 109 in RA F 'service'; the use of captured aircraft for trials lI'as essential but thev also undertook tours of squadrons to give pi/ots a close-up riel\' of the enem),. .

AIRCREW TRAINING

Spitfire of the Central Gunner)' School at Catfoss . 1944.

Sq uadro n Co mmanders tactical employment of fighter air craft . for both air fighting a nd gro und-attack. The FLS was staffed by very experienced pilot s an d altho ugh it was a sho rt course it was intensive with theo ry. a great deal of discussion. and as much flying as co uld be packed in. Th e School continued to gro w a nd by October 1943 its official designation was No. 52 OTU (F ighter Command School of Tactics). It rever ted to th e FLS title in January 1944. by which time it was at Millfield and has gro wn both in size and diversity of aircra ft. with 69 Spitfires. 18 Typh oon s. II Hurrican es a nd 8 Ma ster s. In Decemb er 1944 the FLS became pa rt o f the Centra l Fighter Establ ishment 's (CFE) Day Fight er Wing at Witt erin g. The C F E gradually acq uired most of the Fighter Co mma nd specialist units that performed this type o f role , such as the Day Fighter Development Win g. which had origina lly formed a t Milfield in September with a Fighter Train ing Squad ron. a Fighter-Bomber Training Squadron a nd an Air Support Development Squ ad ron. It was a similar situa tio n with night fighter tr aining and by 1944 the CFE had abso rbed most other specia list unit s in th is sphere as well. Th e N ight Fighter Development Win g (N FD W) formed at Ford on 16 October 1944. incorpo ra ting the well-esta blished Fighter Interception Unit. It operated three main sub- units: Fight er Interception Development Squ ad ron (F IDS). Night Fighter Training Squad ron ( FrS) and the Naval Figh ter Interception Development Unit (N F IDU), The main type opera ted by the N FD W was the Mosquito, in a number of F varia nts. Moving to Ta ngmere in Jul y 1945 the Win g then moved to West Raynham that October to join the rest of the C FE a t its new home . With tha t move came a cha nge of designati on for the N FrS. becoming the Night Fight er Leaders School.

Cold War T here had been a major reorgan isat ion of OTUs during 1946 a nd by the end of the year Fighte r Co mma nd had four such units. altho ugh three of these were only cadres. plus the first Operation al Co nversio n Unit, o . 226, altho ugh th at too was only a cadre. Th e details a re shown in the following tabl e.

239

240

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

G

Fighler Co mmand T rai ning Units, December 19-16 Unit

Parent airfield

Jfain type t s]

Bemwaters

Various

~o. 1 1 G roup

2260CU ~o . 1 2

Group

13 OTU 430TU 540TU 610TU

Middleton 51 George

Mosquito

Andover

Auster

Leeming Keevil

Spitfire

Mosquito

The nomenclature applied to the main training units changed in the late I940s. with Operational Training Units becoming Operational Conversion Units and the primary role becoming conversion to type rather than simply a tactical or operational orientation to role. This carried with it a more focused training role on taking crews from advanced flying train ing. converting them to the specific aircraft type and providing weapon and tactical training. The first of the newly-designated units was o. 226 OCU at Molesworth. which formed within o. II Grou p on 15 Augus t 1946 to provide operat ional tra ining for fighter pilots. Its estab lishment was not wonderfully impressive and comprised three Tempest Il s, two Horn ets. two Meteor lI s and single examples of Vampire, Oxford and Harvard. It moved to Bentwaters in October. still with a mixed but limited airc raft collection, alt houg h it now had six Meteor Ill s. By August 1949 it was at Driffi eld but that same mon th it became o. 203 Adva nced Flying School. To confuse the issue. o. 203 AFS at Stradishall became No. 226 OCU! The Vampire element departed the following year to form o. 229 OCU at Leuchars . The Stradishall Unit disbanded in June 1955 bu t the OCU was resurrected on I June 1963 at Middleton St George from the Lightning Conversion Squadron. Having moved to Co ltishall in Apri l 1964 this designation survived into the period of Strike Command. June /949, Operation Foil; in the post -war period some of the most effective training took place during major Exercises and annual Operations ' such as Foil, as realistic combined training lras possible using multiple units and 'real' targets. t

"

The post war creation. movement and renumbering of training units was somewhat convoluted. as demonstrated above and I do not propose to go through each one in details; however, in summary: o. 228 OCU formed I May 1947 at Leeming to train night fighter crews, for which task it initially used Mosquitoes. The role changed to training all-weather crews and the equipment also changed. The OCU disbanded in Septembe r 1961 but re-form ed at Leuchars in May 1965 to train Javelin crews. altho ugh this lasted only j ust over a year with disbandment in December 1966. 0.229 OCU formed on 15 December 1950 at Leuchars to provide ope rational training for fighter pilots. for which it used Vampires as its main type. plus a few Meteors. Having moved to Chivenor in March 1951 its basic role survived into the Strike Command period. o. 233 OCU formed on I September 1952 at Pembrey to provide operational training for fighter pilots, with Vampires as the main type. The role continued to disbandment in September 1957. No. 238 OCU formed on 15 June 1952 at Colerne to train night fighter radar operators; it used Brigands and Meteors for this work , along with Valetta 'flying classrooms'. The OCU moved to ort h Luffenham in Januar y 1957 and disbanded in March 1958. Central Fighter Esta blishment The princip le of having specialist schools also survived into the post war period. with the Central Fighter Establishment retaining its pre-eminence. and with the sub-units carrying appropriate titles. which changed from time to time to better match the actual work being carried out. The CFE moved to West Raynham in October 1945and remained at the Norfolk base until a final moved to Binbroo k in October 1962. This incredible unit disbanded on I February 1966. Whilst units as the CFE had a training role, it is important to realise that their main function was evaluation of aircraft and weapons and the determination of tactics, which were then tra nsmitted to operat iona l units eithe r as doc uments. briefings or short courses. The following brief notes include an insight into, but not a histor y of, the post war CFE. On 15 March 1958 the DFLS became the Day Fighter Combat Squadron within the CFE and in the same year shadow squadron numbers were adopted, the origina l plan for this having been agreed in 1954. This was part of the concept of strengthening the frontline and the two squadrons would become operational. using instructors. as required. Elements of the CFE were therefore designated as 63 Squadron and 122 Squadron. although the policy was that these numbers could only be used when activated and that for routine duties the training designations were to be used. Fighter Command extended the overall plan in 1956 and designated eight such potential squadrons to form from its training units. although this was reduced to five the following year. There was debate as to the numbers to be used. the original sequence being 122, 124, 127. 129, 131, 137, 165 and 176, but those who favo ured the allocatio n of squad ron numbers with an 'appropriate history' won the case and 63, 145.2 19.234 and 253 were allocated . Over the next few years there were some changes to this but the generally policy of shadow squadron numbering has survived to the present day .

241

242

,..

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Fighler Co mmand use of S hadow Sq ua dro n num bers Squadron

,\lain unit

II 63

228 OC U CFE 2290CU 2290CU CFE A PS 2290CU 2330C U FWS 229 OC U 228 OC U 229 OC U 226 OC

79 122 124 127 129 131 137 145

165 176

238 OC U CFE

Sub unit

DF CS

DFLS

NF LS. AWFLS

A irfield

Aircraft

Dales

Leuchars West Raynham Chiven or Chivenor West Raynham

Javelin Hunter Hunter Hunter Hunter

II Jan 1966-2 3 Dec 1966 30 Nov 1958-1 Ju n 1963 I Jun 1963-{2 Sop 1974) 2 Jan 1967-{2 Sop 1974) I I Jan 1956-30 Nov 1958 II Jan 1956-27 May 1956 II Jan 1956-22 Oct 1958 I I Jan 1956-1 Sop 1957 II Jan 1956-15 Mar 1958 15 Mar 1958-22 Oct 1958 I I Jan 1956-15 Sop 1961 22 Oct 1958- 1 Jun 1963 I Jun 1963-13 Apr 1964 13 Apr 1964-1 Sop 1970 II Jan 1956-13 Mar 1958 II Jan 1956-22 Oct 1958

Ackl ingt on

Meteor

Chivenor Pembrey Leconfield . Dri llield Chiven o r Leeming Chivenor Middlet on St George Coltishall J ort h LufTenham West Raynham

Hunter Hunter Meteor Hunter

Javelin Hunter Lightnin g Lightning Meteo r Meteor. Venom .

Javelin 219 234

CFE 229 0 C U

AWFCS JOC U

West Raynham

Javelin

West Raynham Chivenor

Javelin Hunter

22 Oct 1958-1 Jul 1962 I Jul 1962-31 Oct 1962 22 Oct 1958-(2 Sop 1974)

Note: DFCS - Day Fighter Combat Squadron: D FLS - Day Fighter Leaders School: NF LS - Night Fighter Leaders Squadron : AWF LS - All-Weather Fighter Leade rs Squadron . AWFC - All-Weathe r Fighter Combat Squadron: JOCU - Javelin Operational Conversion Voir.

No.228 Operational Conversion Course - course J une-S ept ember /960.

, ~

-

The l ngpen Trophy lI'as awarded annua lly 10 the' night all- weath er squadron ill Figh ter Comma nd which is decla red to be the m ost projicient ill weapo ll training . . Competitions such as this II-ere mOllY and varied and played all important role ill the training cy cle of 'fighter squadrons.

243

244

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8

The All-weather (AW) designations started to be used in the 1950s as new concepts and aircraft types. such as the Javelin. were given this role title to reflect their day/night/ poor weather capability. First user within the CFE was the A-W Fighter Leaders Schoo l (AWFLS). which formed in July 1950 within the FLS. initially equipped with Meteor NF. l ls but with Javelins arriving in 1957. Th is became the March 1958 when the A-W Fighter Combat School in March 1958 as part of a general cha nge in nomenclature. Thi s sub-unit became the Javelin Operational Co nversion Squad ron in July 1962. Th e A-W Development Squad ron (AWDS) formed in February 1956 to evaluate the Javelin and determ ine tactical and operational procedures. In the post-war period. which has essentia lly been a period of peace. the wartime pressures of an operational squa dron were no longer a factor and far more routine training could be conducted at squa dron level. Essentially. every day and every sor tie increased the experience of individual pilots and crews and the Squadron as a whole. This was a structured process of building new skills and main taini ng and improving. through experience. existing skills.

E

Operational Aircraft he primary purpose of Fighter Comma nd for its 30 years of existence was to protect the UK airspace from enemy aircraft (and missiles) and when it form ed in 1936 the only experience of having to do this was back in World War One - when the bombers seemed to have the uppe r hand. The bombers in question were airshi ps and long-range bombing aircraft. both of which carried only light bomb loads and very little in the way of defensive armament, and appeared over Britain unescorted. with operatio ns taking place at night. main ly the airships. and by day. Although the defences eventually made the attacks unprofitable it had not been a comfo rtable period and air doctrine between the wars was based on the effectiveness of the bombe r but with little regard to providing an effective defence aga inst the bomber. and with no expecta tion of having to face enemy fighters with the bombers. By the time the Co mma nd form ed in 1936 this doctrin e had sta rted to cha nge but it would be some years before that change became effective; Fighter Co mmand entered the war with new and effective airc raft - but only j ust made it - and even then the aircraft had been primarily designed as bom ber destroyers. with the tactics based almost solely on this concept. During the six years of war the Com mand continued to defend Britain. playing a large part in staving off the threatened German invasion in 1940 and then turning to the offensive. The Spitfire ended the war as the darling of the RAF' s fighters and in terms of its employment by and significance for Fighter Command this is a very fair assessment: the capabilities of the aircraft increased as the war progressed but it remained limited in range. its major restrict ion. and fire-power. especially when adapted to the fighter-bomber role. although new types such as the Typhoon and new orga nisatio ns. such as the 2nd Tactical Air Force. took on tha t role. Jet fighters appea red in mid 1944 but the number of Meteors and their operational participation remained limited; however. in the immediate post-war period the Meteor in both day- and night-fighter varia nts became the mainstay of the Command thro ugh much of the 1950s. Perform ance contin ued to increase with the introd uction of the Hunter. the next 'mainstay' of the Command. ab ly supported in the night/all-weather role by the Javelin. The latter also saw the introduction of effective air-to-air missiles. the weapon that would become the main element in a fighter's arsenal. In the mid 1940s the average top speed of a fighter was 40G-450 mph. only 15 years later the RAF intro duced the supersonic Lightning with a notional speed of Mach 2 (twice the speed of sound) or well over 1.000 mile an hour. although the aircraft's thirsty engines and lack of fuel gave it speed but not range o r endurance. The introd uction of the Lightning in 1960 had been preceded by the introduction of the RA F' s first Surface -to-Air Missile (SAM). the Bloodhound. which to many heralded the future of air defence - missiles not manned airc raft. However. when Fighter Command became part of Strike Com mand in 1968 the manned aircraft was very much still part of the Ord er of Battle. as indeed it still is with the recent introdu ction of the Eurofighter Typhoon . This chapter is divided into the same three periods we have used throughou t the book: Pre 1939. the Second World War. and the Co ld War (1945-1968). All the

246

o

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

operati onal types. and the one SAM . are included but there is no mention of training types unless this was a secondary role of one of the operational types . This is not to decry the role of the trainers but is simply a questi on of space; trainer types a re referred to in the Aircrew Training chapter. Aircraft tables and the write-up s concentrate on the use with Fighter Command. although wider reference is occas ionally made . and the entries are not. therefore . mini-histories of each type . The table s do not show ind ivid ual Marks of aircraft: for example. a Spitfire is a Spitfire. S ummary of Ope ratio nal Types Aircraft

Pre 1939 Bulldog Fury Gau ntlet De mon G ladia to r

Second World War Hurricane Blenheim Spitfire Defiant Beaufi ghter

Whirlwind Havoc Airacobra Typhoon Mosquito

Tempest M ustang

Period

Sqns

(l929)- Jul 1937 (May 1931)-Jan 1939 (May 1935)- Dec 1939 (Jul 1932)-Auf 1939 Feb 1937-Feb 1941

6 19 12 19

Dec 1937-Mar 1944 Dec 1938-May 1941 Aug 1938-Nov 1951 Dec 1938-J un 1942 Sep 1940-Aug 1944 Jul 1940-Dec 1943 Feb 1941-Jan 1943 Aug 1941-Mar 1942 Sep 194I - Sep 1945 Jan 1942-May 1949 Jan 1944- Oct 1946 Dec 1943-May 1946

Met eo r Vam pire Venom

Sab re Swift H unter

Javelin Lightning Blood hound

J ul 1944- Ju n 1959 Feb 1946- Mar 1951 Apr 1946- Ma r 1957 0\' 19530\' 1957 Ja n 1954-Apr 1956 Feb 1954- Mar 1955 Jul 1954-Apr 1963 Feb 1956-Apr 1965 Jun 1960-tApr 1988) Dec 1958-(1994)

P re 1939 When Fighter Command formed in 1936 it was still a biplane force - in lerms of equipment. doctrine and training: three yea rs later it was comprised of high-speed monoplane fighters with double the fire-power. an amazing transformation. although doctrine and tactics had not kept pace with the technical developments. The I920s and I930s was the era of agile biplanes that were. usuall y. a delight 10 fly. looked good when painted in squad ron colours and a ppea red impressive at the various public displays: none of which had much value in opera tiona l terms . The era was dominated by Bristol, Hawker and Gloster and for the pilot s of the period il seemed an almost idyllic life. as the lumbering bombers were easy to 's hoo t down ' o n exercises and the threat of real combat was simply not there,

10

65 16 91 13

19 2 15 I 9 23

2

I

2 2 2 I

2 I I

2

II

16?

1945- 1968 Hornet

247

44 4 19 8 2

I or 2 I I or 2

2

I

Bristol BULLDOG The Bristol Bulldog entered service in June 1929 with 3 Squadron a t Upavon and its twin Vickers machine-guns provided the same firepower as carried by the types it was to replace. the Gamecock and the Siskin . The Bulldog was one of a number of design s for Specification F9/26 and the prototype flew on 17 May 1927. with the Mark II (the one that entered production) flying the following Janua ry. The RA F eventually acquired 301 Bulldogs. the majority of which served with fighter units in Britain. six of which were still equipped with the type in early 1936. The table of units shows all the Bulldog sq uadrons. a lthough as can be seen some had re-equipped pre 1936 and all but one had given up the type by the end of 1936 - so the Bulldog only just makes it into the Fighter Command list. In addition to its machine-guns the aircra fJ could carry four sma ll (20 lb) bombs and its Bristol Jupiter engine gave it a performance of 174mph (a t 10.000 ft) and a ceiling of j ust over 29.000 ft. Agility was its main attribute and it was cerlainly well-liked by its pilots. The Bulldog was declared obso lete in Sept ember 1937 bUI some. includ ing a number of the du al-control trainers, rema ined in second-line roles for a few more yea rs. The trainers were primarily used by the Service Flying Tr aining Schools. For most of the opera tiona l sq uadrons the replacement type was the Gloster Gauntlet.

16 II

2

7 14

SAM

I

Notes l. Only those units that were part of Fighter Command ace included in the lists. 2. Period of service refers to the numbered squadrons (the only exception being the Fighter Interceptio n Unit - FlU): in some cases aircraft entered RAF service before this date o r left after this date. The squadrons and dates are those which served with Fighter Comman d and the brackets show dates outside of 'h e Fighter Command date range of 1936- 1968. 3. The airfield details are in chronological order but each location is on ly listed once . so if a unit was. for example. at Biggin Hill. on more than one occasion the subsequent occasions are not listed - this is not intended as a detailed histo ry of the mo vements of each unit but as an indication of location and the frequency of movement. as well as being a pointer to further research so urces. ..t. In late 19..t3 and early 1944 the situation with the fighter and fighter-bomber types was confusing in respect to allocation o f squadrons to Comma nds and there is in the lists show n here. especially fo r the Spitfire and Typhoo n. inevitable cross-over between Fighter Command/ADGB and the AEAF and its tactical units.

Brist ol BULLD O G Prot ot ype, first flight: M k.1I J9480. 21 Ja nua ry 1928 Entry to service : 3 Sqn, June 1929

3 Sqn 17 Sqn 19 Sqn 23 Sqn 29 Sqn 32 Sqn 41 Sqn 54 Sqn 56 Sqn II I Sqn

Dates

Airfields

(June 1929)-J ul 1937 (Oct 1929)- Aug 1936 (Sep 1935)-(Jan 1935) (Jul 1931)- (Apr 1933) (Jun 1932)-(Apr 1935) (Jan 1931)-J ul 1936 (Oct 1931)- (Aug 1934) (Apr 1930)- Sep 1936 (Oct 1932)-May 1936 (Jan 1931)- Jun 1936

pavo n. Sudan. Kenley Upavo n. Kenley D uxford Kenley

North Weald Kenley Northolt Hornchurch

North Weald Ho mchurch. Northolt

248

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

249 only a pair of guns. The RAF acq uired 11 7 Fury Is and these served with three front -line squadro ns (I , 25 and 43) and a number of other units. Having been impressed with the early showing of the Fury the Air Ministry issued Specification 14/32 for the improved Fury II; the new variant had a more powerful kestrel engine and a few aero dyna mic tweaks, such as wheel spats. which gave an increase in speed to 223 mph and an impr oved rate of climb . . . but still only two guns. Th e first production Mk . II Fury (K7263) flew on 3 December 1936 in response to a produc tion order from Specification 6/35. Deliveries began immediately to 25 Squad ron and by the time production ceased some 11 2 Fu ry lI s had been built. 89 of these by General Aircraft. Five squa drons of Fighter Com mand used the Fu ry II but for all of them it was a fairly short association as the aircraft was definit ely obsolete by this date; nevertheless. it was early 1939 before the last ones had left front -line service. For most of the sq uadro ns the replacement type was the Gloster Gladiator. The Fury survived in support roles. mainly training. for a number of years.

The Bulldog entered service ill JUlie 1929 and served with tell squadrons, surviving j ust into the Fighter Command period.

Hawker FU RY Th e Fur y was one of a delightful family of aircraft to appear from Hawk ers in the 1920s. with the Hart and Hind light-b omb ers being the best-known but with the Fury definitely playing its part - it was. for example. the first RAF fighter with a speed of over 200 mph . The aircraft originated with a pro totype to Specification F20/27. which dul y became the Ho rnet and then the Fury when the name was cha nged. with the true prototype Fury (K I926) flying on 25 March 1931. By this time the type had been chosen as one of the RAF' s standard fighters and it entered service with 43 Squad ron in May 1931 at Tangmere. Other than its increase in speed. which of course was impo rtant. and came courtesy of good aerodynamics and the superb Kestrel engine. the Fury was still carrying aile of the delightful series of Hawker biplanes, the Fur)'. with service between 1931 and 1939.

/11"0 variants,

the I and 11 ill

Hawker FURY Prot ot ype. first flight: Prod uction. K 1926. 25 March 1931 Entry to service: 43 Sqn, Ma y 1931 Squadron

Dat es

Ai rfields

1 Sqn 25 Sqn 4 1 Sqn 43 Sqn 73 Sqn 87 Sqn

(Feb 1932)-Nov 1938 (Feb 1932)-Oct 1937 Oct 1937-Jan 1939 (May 1931)-Jan 1939 Mar 1937-Jul 1937 Mar 1937- Jun 1937

Tangmere Hawkinge

Catterick Tangm ere

Mildenhall, Debde n Tangmere . Debden

Gloster GA i''TLET G losters produced rugged aircraft but they did not prod uce attractive aircraft and their biplanes of this period did not have the same lines as those from Hawkers. However. it was Gloster product s - the Gauntlet and the Gladiator - that provided Fight er Command with its last biplane fighters and which. with the Gladiat or. saw operational service. Th e first production Gauntlet (K4801) flew on 17 December 1934 but it was the end product of a development line that had started some time before and had been ordered into production by the Air Ministry under Specification 24/33. In essence the Bristol Mercury-powe red aircraft had a similar performance to the Fury , with a top speed of 230 mph but its ceiling was better as was its range and endurance. It also was still limited to two Vickers machine -guns . However. it appeared at a time when the RA F's expansion was underway and hence gained significant orders for equipping new squadrons. The Gauntlet L of which only 25 were produced. was followed by the Gauntlet II. of which 204 were ordered . The type entered service with 19 Sq uadron in January 1935 and eventua lly equipped 19 squadrons in the U K within Fighter Command and the Auxiliary Air Force. Despite looking somewhat bulky the Gau ntlet kept the agility that was inherent in biplane fighters and it was liked by its pilots. altho ugh by this time some were looki ng at the monop lane fighters and reading accounts of BfI 09s in the Spanish Civil War and wondering how their aircraft would fare in combat. For Fighter Command that

250

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

CRAFT

Gauntlet """ The type entered service with /9 Squadron ill January /935 and eventually equipped /9 squadrons ill the UK I .. ithin Fighter Command and the Auxiliary Air Force"

problem never arose and the majority of Gauntlets had gone by the outbreak of war ; indeed only 616 Squadron had a few of the type still in use in late 1939. The Gauntlet did see some combat but that was in East Africa with o. 430 Flight. Gloster GA UNTLET Pro to type. first flight : J9 125: first producti on K480 1. 17 December 1934 Ent ry to se rvice : 19 Sqn, January 1935 Squadron

Da les

Airfields

17 Sqn 19 Sqn 32 Sqn 46 Sqn 54 Sqn 56 Sqn 65 Sqn 66 Sqn 74 Sqn 79 Sqn 80 Sqn III Sqn 151 Sqn 213 Sqn 504 Sqn 60\ Sqn 602 Sqn 615 Sqn 616 Sqn

Aug 1936- J un 1939 (Jan 1935)- Mar 1939 J ul 1936-OcI 1938 Sep 1936- Ma r 1939 Au g 1936-May 1937 May 1936-Jul 1937 J ul 1936-J un 1937 J ul 1936-Dec 1938 Mar 1937-Feb \939 Mar 1937- 'o\" 1938 Mar 1937- l ay 1937 Jun 1936- Jan 1938 Aug 1936-M ar 1939 Mar 1937- Ma r 1939 Nov 1938-Aug 1939 Dec 1938-Mar 1939 Jan 1939-M ay 1939 Dec 1938-Sep 1939 Jan 1939-Dec 1939

Kenley. Nort h Wea ld Duxford Biggin Hill Kenley. Digby Hornchurch No rth Weald Hornchurch Duxford Homch urch Biggin Hill Kenley. Henlow Northolt North Weald No rtholt. Church Fenton Hucknall H endon

Abbotsinch Kenley Doncaster

Ha n ker DEMON Whilst the Fury had a loose connection to the Hart , the Demon was a direct derivat ive of the highly-successful day-bomber; of particular significance was tha t fact that it remained a two-seater. the first inter -war two-seat fighter for the RAF, and included a variant with a gun turret. The Demon sta rted life as the Hart Fighter and prototype J9933 flew in March 1931 to Specificat ion 15/30. Renamed Demon in Ju ly 1932 the airc raft went to 23 Squad ron for evaluation . which appears to have been satisfactory. By the time production ended the RAF had received 234 airc raft, 106 of these from Boulton Paul at Wolverhamp to n. Stand ard arma ment was two forward-firi ng Vickers guns and a single Lewis for the gunner. with underwing bomb-racks for light bomb s, so in essence it was not real improve ment in terms of comb at effectiveness - especially as top speed had reduced to 182mph (at 16,400 It) and all other performance figures had also come down. evertheless, the type served with a number of Fighter Com mand squa dro ns from mid 1932 to mid 1939. with some of those squadrons tak ing the type on operational dep loyments overseas. The Turret-Demon was a develop ment that appeared in October 1936 when a number of aircraft served with 29 Squadron ; the modificati on involved a Frazer- ash hydra ulic turret in place of the standa rd rear cockpit. although this was not really a tur ret as such but rather an enhanced and powered shield for the gunner, who still only had a single gun. evertheless, it pointed the way for a series of aircraft that the RAF was keen to have - the tu rret fighter. The Demon lI"as still ill service I .. ith a number offi ghter squadrons ill /939.

251

252

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

H . .. ker DEMON Pr ot ot ype , first flight : J9993, M arch 1931 ; first production K2 842 , 10 Februa ry 1933 Entry to service: 23 Sqn , July 1932 Squat /ron

Dat es

Airfields

23 Sqn 25 Sqn 29 Sqn 41 Sqn 64 Sqn 65 Sqn 74 Sqn 600 Sqn 601 Sqn 604 Sqn 607 Sqn 608 Sqn

(luI 1932)-Dec 1938 Oct \937-Jun 1938 (Mar \935)-Dec 1938(Jul \934)-Oct \ 937(Mar \936)-Dec 1938(Aug 1934)-Jul 1936 (Sep \935)-Apr 1937Feb 1937-Apr \939 Aug \937-Dec \938 {Jun \935)-Jan 1939 Sep \936-Aug \939 Jan 1937-Mar 1939

Kenley, Biggin Hill. No rtho lt. Witte ring Hawkinge No rth Weald . Debden Ncrthclt. Catte rick Martl esham Heath. Church Fenton Homchurch Homchurch Hendon. Ken ley Hendon Hend on Uswo rth Th orn ab y

No te: 29 Sqn - Turret Demon Oct \ 93&-Dec \938: 4\ Sqn - in Aden Oct 1935-Sep \936; 64 Sqn - in Egypt to Sep \936; 74 Sqn - in Malia to Sep 1936.

Gloster GLA DIATO R The only RAF biplane fighter to see com bat in World War Two (with the exception of the limited use of the Ga untlet mentioned above) the Gloster Gladiator introdu ced a numbe r of firsts to Fighter Co mmand. The Gladiator was the first enclosed cockpit fighter and, mor e importantly, it had doub le the arma ment with four machine-guns, with the Browning having been chosen as the standa rd RAF rifle-calibre (0.303 in) weapo n. The Gladiator was a major type with Fighter Command ill the late 1930s and survived ill operational service into the early part of the Imr.

The prot ot ype (K5200) flew on 12 September 1934 an d was given a production order, under Specificati on 14/35, the following summer. By the time production ceased in early 1940 the RAF had received over 490 Gladiator Is and lI s, all powered by Mercury engines. The type entered service with 72 Squadron at Tangmere in Febru ar y 1937 and eventually eq uipped a lar ge number of Fighter Comman d squad rons, as well as serving with squad rons overseas . Despite its enclosed cockpit, four guns and top speed of 253 mph (at 14,500ft) the Gladiator was still an obsolete type by the time it entered service and as with its predecessor s the only thing it had going for it was agility. Most had left Fighter Comm and by the outbreak of war, giving way to Hurricanes and Spitfires but a number of the Command's squadro ns did take them into active service. Th e operations in Norway by 263 Squadron were a brief interlud e in which the aircraft had few combats but met with some success, whilst 247 Squadron used Gladiator s in the Battle of Britain to defend Plymouth and the naval dockyards, eventually being the last Fighter Comm and squad ron to re-equip from Gladiator s (Februa ry 1941). Th e type more famously saw action in Ma lta, the Western Desert and Greece. The Shuttleworth Collection, Bedfordshire operates the world 's only airwort hy Gla diator. Glos te r G LA DIATO R Prototype, first flight: K 5200 , 12 Sep tember 1934; first prod uction K 6129 En try to service: 72 Sqn, Feb ruary 1937 Squadron

Dares

A irfields

3 Sqn 25 Sqn 54 Sqn 56 Sqn 65 Sqn 72 Sqn 73 Sqn 80 Sqn 85 Sqn 87 Sqn \52 Sqn 247 Sqn 263 Sqn 603 Sqn 605 Sqn 607 Sqn 6 \5 Sqn

Mar 1937-Mar 1938 Ju n 1938-Feb \939 Apr 1937-Apr 1939 Jul \937-May \ 938 Jun \937-Apr \939 Mar \ 937-May 1939 Jun 1937- Ju l 1938 May \937- (N ov 1940)Jun 1938-Sep 1938 J un 1937-Aug 1938 Oct 1939-Jan \940Aug 194O-Feb \94 1 Oct \ 939- Jun \940 Mar 1939-Oct 1939 Apr \ 939-Nov 1939 Dec \938-May \940 Jun 1939- May 1940

Kenley Hawkinge, Northoh Hornchurch North Weald Hornchurch Tangmere. Church Fent on Debdcn . Digby Henlow, Debd en Debd en Debden Acklingt on Roborough, St Eval Fitton. No rway Tumhou se Cas tle Brornwi ch Uswonh Ken ley. Croydon. Fr an ce

No tes - 80 Sqn - Egypt from Apr 1938. • 152 Sqn - Plus det achments at Leconfield. Sum burgh.

WO R LD WAR TWO Like all major militar y conflicts, World War Two saw a tremendo us increase in military technology, especially in the sphere of military aviation. The review of Fighter Command's pre-war aircraft showed that most were biplanes of around 230 mph and carrying two machine-guns; by the end of the war the performance and fire-power of fighters had been transformed and the jet age had arrive d. Cannon, radar, g-suits and a

253

254

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

whole host of advances that were almost undreamt of when Fighter Command formed in 1936 were in service and the capability of fighters, or more accura tely the air defence network , had taken a quantum leap forward . That is not to say that the period was without its problems and for the first yea rs of the war the Command suffered from lack of equipment, or at least lack of the a ppropriate equipment as it continued a rapid expansion programme. By 1942 day-fighter environment was dominated by the Spitfire, with the Hurricane serving in other roles o r other theatres of war. The continued development of the Spitfire from the Mk I to the later Griffon-powered with four cannon was perhaps the best reason for the type to be called 'legendary' , an epithet certainly not ju stified ju st by its Battle of Britain performance. The night war was incredibly difficult for Fighter Command until AI (Airborne Intercept - radar) ca me of age, a development initiall y with the Blenheim but taken-over by the Beaufighter and then th at exponent of the art, the Mosquito . Am ongst the Command 's other types the Airacobra, Defiant, Ha voc and Whirlwind had mixed fortunes and were never trul y successful, a ltho ugh the Defiant in particular played a key ro le in the expansion of the night-fighter force. Jets arrived in 1944 but saw little operational service; nevertheless the y pointed to the pos twar future. Hawker H URRI CAN E The Hurricane has lived in the 's hadow' of the Spitfire throughout its career and all too often its imp ort ance has been overloo ked . The Hurricane was the most numerous fighter in the Battle of Britain, and it destroyed more enemy aircraft than all other defences combined. True, in some respects it was not so well able to deal with the Hurri cane P3428 only served with 245 Squadron and \l'as writt en-off after a flying accident in Jun e 1941.

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

Hurri cane B£485 carrying underwing bombs: althou gh Fight er Comm and made little lise of Hurri-bomb ers, this did become a maj or role of the aircraft in other theatres of .raT.

German escort fighter s as well as its partner but it was liked by its pilots for its sturdy construction and reliability. In the bigger picture of the aircraft's career, a lbeit outside of the Fighter Command period, it developed new roles and become a major contributor to the war effort in the M iddle East and Far East theatres. The aircraft's origins can be traced to October 1933, with the prototype (K5083) of Ca mm' s design taking to the air on 6 ovember 1935. It was an obvious success from the sta rt, bearing in mind that the RA F was still introducing biplanes of just over 200 mph and with two guns, and an order for 600 aircraft was placed - orders that by September 1944 had tota lled 12,950 in a variety of marks. The first squ adron to re-equip was III Squadron, which gave up its Gauntlets in December 1937. By late 1941 the main period of Hurr icane lise by Fight er Command \l'as over.

I

255

256

IONAL A

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

An lag e 7 a

D ie Krie gsflug zwge der Fe indm ichte

GroBbritannlen Hawker

" Hurricane I" Ja gdel nsin:er

CRAFT

By Jul y 1939 the Hurrica ne I was in service with twelve sq uadrons, and with six of the Au xiliar y Air Force sq uadrons sched uled to re-equ ip. Th e aircra ft was an eno rmo us adva nce in all respects on the biplan es it was replacin g - at over 100 mph faster (316mph a t 17,000 ft) and with eight Brownings, but neverth eless was inferio r in most key respects to its ma in Luftwaffe oppo nent, the Bf 109. Th e latt er co uld out-climb, out-run and outdive the Hurrican e but lost o ut in the turns, a significant facto r in co mba t term s. Thi s was O K if the aircraft joi ned comba t at the same a ltitude or if the Ge rman aircra ft stayed in to fight, especially at low lever, bu t the slashing, diving attac k fro m a position of adva ntage left the Hurrican e with few options. Lesson s were learnt during the months in France ; some were applied, for exam ple, new prop ellers, a rmour plat e, and a chan ge in gun ha rmo nisation. An other of the saving graces of the aircra ft was its con struction which enab led it to ta ke a tremend ou s a mount of puni shment and yet keep on flying. Th e Hurricane has been called a ' Bulldog', as against the 'greyho und' of the Spitfire, a nd a range of similar sobriquets that suggest it was somewhat less appealing than its 'ri val'; a Fighter Co mma nd study in 1941 simply ca lled it 't he versa tile Hurricane '. Ca pta in Eric Brown flew the Hurricane a nd told the autho r: the Hurricane had a better rate ofrole, a distinct manoeuvring asset. However. it had a somewhat nasty abrupt stall, which could spell trouble if it occurred while pulling a lot of'g' in combat. This might result in a spin, and spin recovery was not the Hurricane's strong point; indeed, deliberate spinning lI'as prohibited.

11#6. Browning K'<7I17mm

4NG. Browning 'lrol7,7mm

As a gun platform the Hurrican e was excellent and its roo mier cockpit mad e it more comforta ble for the pilot, altho ugh the 'iron work ' of the ca no py gave a restricted view, altho ugh th e forw ard view was better th an tha t of the Spitfire . As the dat a tabl e shows, a lar ge number of Fighter Co mmand squadrons used Hurricane s, most of these in the day-fighter ro le, alt hough some flew du al-ro le with day and night ops, with a few, such as 87 Squ ad ron specialising in the latt er and even painting their aircraft black. By lat e 1941 the main period of Fighter Co mma nd ope ra tio ns was over as more Spitfires became available and whilst some units continued to operate Hu rrica nes to as late as 1944 it was by then a minor element of the Co mma nd. The Hurrican e has not survived as well as other wartime fighters in term s of preservation in ai rwo rthy or museum co ndition a nd the world airwo rthy popul ati on is probably as low as six or seven, most of which a re in the UK. Th e best place to see the type in the air is a t one of the Du xford (Cambridgeshire) air shows.

Haw ker H URRI CANE Pro tot ype, first flight: K50 83, 6 November 1935: first production L1547 Entry to service: I I I Sqn, Decem ber 1937

~

arrc «If

01," rl' .I/f; .y J'!f) :.;f'1 p. J/ltllit;'n'&:.IJ/iillr , ",.,. t 4 jJ.. d. 1"1 • Jlii},r r,'/; "

14,"11 lfflnlll rI. J.

IIt,f.

flN-r- I • .

Squad ron

Dales

Airfi elds

I Sqn

Oct 1938-S ep 1942

3 Sqn

Mar 1938-Feb 1943

17 Sqn

Jun 1939-Nov 1941

Tangmere. France. North olt. Hawkinge , Wittering, Kenley, Cro ydo n. Redhill. Acklington Biggin Hill. Croydon. Manston, Kenley. Wick. Cas tletown. Tumh ouse. Skeabrae. Manlesham Heath. Stapleford Tawney, Hunsdon North Weald . Cr oydon. Debden . Manlesham Hea th. Hawkin ge, Kenley. France. Castletown . Elgin. Tain. Catterick. (Fa r East)

j("J,uw. "fall.

Hurricane 3-I'iell'; as with all the 3 -I'iell's in this chapter, this is a German document that highlights the armament. armour plate and f uel tanks of the aircraft - information ofgreat lisefor the attacker,

257

258

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

32 Sqn

Oct 1938- Nov 1942

43 Sqn

Dec 1938-Oct 1942

46 Sqn

M ar 1939-M ay 1941

56 Sqn

Apr 1938-M ar 1942

71 Sq n

Nov 1941l-Aug 194 1

73 Sq n 79 Sqn

J ul 1938- Nov 1940 Nov 1938-Mar 1942

8 1 Sqn' 85 Sq n

J ul 1941-Dec 1941 Sep 1938-Apr 1941

87 Sq n

Jul 1938- Nov 1942

96 Sqn III Sq n

Dec 1941l-M a y 1941 Dec 1937-Apr 1941

121 Sqn 133 Sqn 134 Sqn ' 136 Sqn 137 Sqn 145 Sqn 151 Sqn

May 194I - Nov 194 1 A ug 1941-Dec 1941 J ul 1941-Dec 1941 Au g 1941- Nov 1941 Ju n 1943-J an 1944 Mar 1941l-Feb 1941 Dec 1938-Jan 1942

164 Sqn

Feb 1943-Feb 1944

174 Sqn

Ma r 1942-Apr 1943

175 Sqn

Mar 1942-A pr 1943

182 Sq n 184 Sqn

Sep 1942-Oc1 1942 Dec 1942-(M a r 1944)

186 Sqn 213 Sqn

Aug 1943-J an 1944 Ja n 1939- May 1941

229 Sqn 225 Sqn 232 Sq n

Mar 1941l-Ma y 194 1 Ja n 1942- May 1942 J ul 194 1-Nov 1941

238 Sq n 239 Sq n 242 Sq n

J un 1941l-May 1941 Ja n 1942-M ay 1942 Feb 1941l-Nov 1941

245 Sq n

M ar 1941l-Ja n 1943

247 Sqn

Ja n 1941- Mar 1943

249 Sqn

Jun 1941l-May 1941

253 Sqn

Feb 1941l-Nov 1942

Biggin Hill, Mau ston . West Mailing. Frisian , Honiley, Bagin ton , (Midd le Eas t) Tangmere, Acklington, Wick. Uswo rth, D eem. Crail, Kirtonin- Lindsey. (Midd le East) Digby. Ack lington . Norway. Stapleford Tawney. No rth Weal d . Chu rch Fenton. Sher burn- in-Elmett, (Middle East) No rth Weald . Martlesh a m Heath . Fr an ce. Digby. Boscom be D ow n. M iddl e Wallo p. D uxford Church Fenton. Kir ton-in-Li ndsey. Martlesham Heath. Nor th Weald D igby. France. Chu rch Fenl on. Castle Cam ps. (M iddle Eas t) Biggio Hill, Manston. France . Digby. Hawkin ge, Sealan d. Acklington . Pembrey. Fairwood Common. Baginton. (Far Eas t) Leco nfield. Russia. Tu rnhou se De bden. A ldergrove. France. Croydo n. Castle Camps . Church Fenton. Kirton -in-L ind sey. Gravesend Debden , France. Chu rch Fento n. Exeter. Channy D own. Co leme. (M iddle Eas t) C ra nage . Wrexham No rt ho lt, Acklin gton. Dr em. Wick. Digby. No rth Weald . Croydo n. Dyce Kirton-in-L indsey. Digby Coltlsha ll. Du xford . Co llywesto n. Fow lme re, Eglinto n Leco nfield, Russia. Catterick Kirton-in-L indsey, (Far East) So uthend. Manston. Lympne, Co lerne Croydon. Filton . Tan gmere. Westhampnett. Drem. Dyce North Weald . Martlesham Hea th . France. Ma nston . Stapl eford Tawney. D igby. Bram cot e. \ Vittering Fairwood Common. Middle Wall op. Wa rm well, Manston. Fairlop. Twinwood Fann Mau ston. Fowlmere. Warm well. Od iham. Chilbo lton . Grove. Zeals. Gravese nd Wann well. Harrowbeer. Ga twick. Od iha m. Stoney Cross . Lasham Colerne Martlesham Heath Cclcme. Chilbol tcn . Grove. Zea ls. Eastchurch. Merston, Ma uston. Kingsno rth , Newc hu rch A yr Witte ring. Biggin Hill. Exeter. Tangmere. Leco nfield. Dr ifJield . Castletown. (Mi dd le East] Digb y. Witt ering. Ncrthol t. Speke. (Middle East) Thruxton Su mbur gh. Cas uctown . Skit ten. D rem. Elgin. Montrose. Abbotsinch, Ouston. (M iddle Eas t) M iddl e Wallop. St Eval. Chilbolton. Pem brey, (Middle East) Gatwick Church Fenton. Biggin Hill. France. Coltisha ll. D uxford, M artlesham Hea th. Stapleford Tawney. Ma uston. Valley. (Far Eas t) Dr em . T urnh ouse, Alde rgrove. Ballyhalbert, Chttbolron. Wa rm well. M iddle Wallo p Robo rough. St Eva" Portreat h. Predannack. Exeter. High Erca ll Church Fenton. Leco nfield, Boscom be Down. North Weald . (Ma lta) M a uston. Northolt, Kenley. France. Kirton-in-Lindsey. T urnhouse. Prestwick. Leco nfield. Skeabrae. Hibaldstow. Shoreham. Friston. (North Africa)

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

255 Sq n 257 Sqn

M ar 194 1-J ul 1941 J un 1941l-Sep 1942

263 Sq n 302 Sqn

J un 1941l-Nov 1940 J ul 1941l-Jul 1941

303 306 308 310 312

Sq n Sqn Sqn Sqn Sq n

Aug 1941l-Oct 194 1' Au g 1941l-J ul 1941 Oct 1941l-Apr 1941 Jul 1941l-Dec 1941 Aug 1941l-D ec 1941

315 316 317 331 401 402

Sqn Sq n Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn

Feb 1941-Jul 194 1 Feb 1941- Nov 1941 Feb 1941- Nov 1941 J ul 1941- Nov 1941 M ar 1941-Sep 1941 Ma r 194 1-M ar 1942

438 439 440 486 501

Sq n Sqn Sq n Sq n Sqn

Nov 1943-Jan 1944 Jan 19M- Feb 1944 Feb 19M-M ar 1944 M ar 1942- J ul 1942 M ar 1939-M ay 1941

504 Sqn

Ma y 1939- No v 194 1

60 ISqn

Feb 1941l-Jan 1942

605 Sqn

J un 1939- Nov 194 1

607 Sqn

M ar 1941l-M ar 1942

6 15 Sqn

Apr 1941l-M ar 1942

Kir ton -in-Lindsey. H ibaldstow He nd on . Nort holt . Debd en. Mart lesham Heath. Co ltisha ll, Honil ey. High Erca ll Drem. Grangemout h Leconfie ld, No rtholt. Westha mp nett , Kenl ey. Ju rby. Church Sta nt on. Wa rm well. Ibsley Northolt, Lecon field, Speke Chu rch Fento n. Tern hill, No rtholt Baginton Du xford. M ar tlesham Hea th. D yce Dux ford. Speke, Valley. J urby, Kenley. M a rtlesham Hea th. A yr Acklington . Spe ke, No rtho lt Pembrey, Co lerne, Church Stanton Acklington , Duston . Co lerne , Fairwood Co mmo n, Exeter Catterick. Castletow n, Skeabrae Digby Digby. Martlesham Hea th. Ayr. Sout hend. Wa rmwell, Co lerne Digby. Witt ering. Ayr Wellingor e. Ayr Ayr Kirton-in-Lindsey, \Vittering Filton . Tangmere. France. Croydon. M iddl e Wallop . G ravesend. Kenley, Co leme H uckn al l. Digby. Debd en, M artlesham Hea th . Fr an ce. Manston, Wick. Cas tletown, Ca ne rick. Hendon, Filton . Exete r. Fa irwood Common. Chi lbo lto n. Ballyhalbert Tan gmere. Middle Wallop. Ta ngmere. Debd en. Exeter. North olt. Mau ston, Matl ask Cast le Bro mwich. Tangmere, Leuchars. \Vick, Hawkinge, Dr ern, Croydo n. Ma rtl esham Hea th . Te m hill. Baginton , H onil ey. (Far East) France, Croydon. Uswo rth. Tan gmere, Tumh ou se, Dr em , Macmerry. Skinen. Martlesham Heath. Manston . (Fa r East) France , Kenley. Prestwick. No rtho lt, Kenley. Valley, Mau ston . An gle, Fa irwood Co mmo n. (Far East)

Notes I. Where a locat ion is shown in brackets (e.g, Far Eas tj .the seco nd date in the da le column is that o n which the squadron departed the U K fo r the ove rseas theatre and left Fighter Co mmand; in most cases they continued to ope ra te Hurricanes for some lime . 2. 8 1 and 134 Sqns formed No . ISI Wing for service in Russia. 3. 303 Sqn. no H ur rica nes on establishmen t Ja n-A ug 194 1. equipped with Spitfire.

Brewster BUFFALO In Seplember 1940 a dumpy new fighter appeared at Church Fen ton for trials with 71 Squadron - and was promptly rejected as unsu itable for the European war. The Brewster Buffalo was one of the few types that the RAF Purchasing Commission had been ab le to get hold of in the panic phase of buying almost anything and was a version of the US Navy F2A-2 that had been ordered by the Belgians but had not been delivered before the Germans overran Belgium, which meant that aircraft for available fo r the RAF. The RAF eventua lly placed orders for 170 aircraft but other than the brief (six weeks) flirtation with 71 Squadron the type played no role with Fighter Command. although it did have a less than successful career in the Far East.

259

260

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Bristol BLENHEIM The Blenheim stunned the aviation world when it first appeared in 1936 as it was superior in performance to the current front-line fighters of the RA F - and it was intended as a bomber. The Blenheim was under development in the early 1930s at a period when the RA F was desperate for new aircraft and it looked so impressive on paper that 150 were ordered 'off the drawing board' in August 1935, the prototype ( K7033) not making its first flight until 25 J une 1936. Destined to join Bombe r Command as a light bomber the first Blenheims went to 114 Squadron at Wyton in March 1937 and the type became sta nda rd equipment for o . 2 Group. Ho wever. its potential as a night-fighter had also been recognised and the Blenheim I F was developed into this role. the first of the type entering Fighter Command service with 25 Squadron at Hawkinge in December 1938. To be effective as a fighter the ai rcraft needed two things - better forward armament. for which it was given an under-fuse lage gun -pack with four 0.303 in Bro wnings. an d a n air intercept (A I) rad ar. Th e Blenheim played a sign ifican t ro le in the deve lopment of A I and nig ht -fighte r tactics and desp ite its poo r showing in the ea rly mo nths of the war this vita l link in the develo pment of what wo uld beco me effec tive eq uipment and tact ics mu st no t be ove rlooked; th at is no t to say tha t th e Blenh eim s were un successful. a number of night cla ims were mad e. the first A I 'kill' being recorded o n the night of 22/23 J uly 1940 . As the unit list sho ws. a significant number of the Co mma nd's night-fi ght er units used Blenheims befo re 'g ra d ua ting' to Beaufighters o r M osquitoes; th e main peri od of Blenheim ops was ove r by earl y 1941 . Th e list also includes the Fighte r Interception U nit.

Anlage 14a

Die Kriegsnulzeuge dee Fe lnd m i chte

GroBbritann ien Bristol

" Blenheim - Fight e r"

Jagdmehrs it u r (behelfsmi81a:er Zen t o re r) I)

Blenheim of 25 Squadron; the Squadron introduced the Blenheim into Fighter Command service in December 1938.

4

Ita", VIIgUi'nw7U JI G. , ,, I:1t1"" Ifou e .""0' dtf71 RMmp/. 1 bnrtrJliWI "10.

odtr !Joppa.JIG. ill 1wJba.../aArba,em.

Aydrallli«:A bd-iligtm lJrrM'm1t mit JIiO· IJrI'JJ."~·c~ XeuDdi"'9" r!,-«luUzle Kraft.wRbUtiiUv, 1) Soeohl in . .kunnuiger" aLt eucb in .. I.ulilnuil.:,·r· .-\ulIfuhrung.

26 1

262

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

a trials unit that also took part in operations. The majority of fighter Blenheims were Mark Is, although a number of Mark IVs for converted for the role. There is only one airworthy Blenheim, which operates out of Duxford and regularly changes its colour scheme and markings to reflect different users. Sad ly there are not too many Blenheims preserved in museums, although Canada has a reasonable collection of Bolingbroke versions. Brist ol BLENHEI;\I Proto type , first flight: K 703 3, 25 J un e 1936; Blen hei m IF L1424 Entry to se rvice: 25 Sqn, December 1938 Squadron

Dat es

Airfields

23 Sqn 25 Sqn 29 Sqn 64 Sqn 68 Sqn 92 Sqn 141 Sqn 145 Sqn 219 Sqn 222 Sqn 234 Sqn 242 Sqn 600 Sqn 601 Sqn 604 Sqn Fl U

Dec 1938- Apr 1941 Dec 1938- Jan 194 1 Dec 1938- Feb 1941 Dec 1938-Apr 1940 Jan 194I -May 1941 Oct 1939-Mar 1940 Nov 1939-May 1940 Oct 1939-M ay 1940 Oct 1939-Feb 1941 Oct 1939-Mar 1940 Nov 1939-Mar 1940 Dec 1939 Jan 1939- Oct 1941 Jan 1939- Fe b 1940 Jan 1939-May 1941 Apr 194O- ?

Wittering, Co llywesto n, Wittering. Fo rd Hawkinge. Northolt, Pilton, No rt h Weald. Martlesham Heat h Debden. Drem. Digby, \V ellingore Chu rch Fenton . Du xford Catterick. High Ercall Tangmere. Croydon Grangerno ut h, Prestwick Croy do n Catterick

Duxford Leconfield Church Fenton Hendon . Northolt, Homchurch. Roch ford . Manston Hendon . Biggin Hill. Tangmere Hend on . No rt h Weald Tangmere, Shore ham . Ford

Spitfire Vb October 194/; this Mark lI 'as produced in large numbers and a number ofsubvariants and was the mainstay of the Command fr om mid /94/ to mid /942. To man y people the Spitfire is the essence of the Battle of Britain, the sleek fighter with its throaty engine , against the masses of German bombers. Of course this is a very unrealistic picture but the appeal of the aircraft both a t the time and since has ensured the survival of the myth . The ' invincibility' of the Spitfire was part of the morale boo sting ethos current during the Battle - 'Spitfire' funds sprang up throughout the country with the news that fo r £5,000 you co uld 'buy' a Spitfire for one of the squ adrons. The classic lines of the Supermarinefighter as seen from underneath.

Vicke rs-S upermarine S PITFIRE In May 1940 A Spitfire I was evaluated against a captured Bf 109E-3, with Pit Off Adolf ' Sailor' Malan detached from 74 Squadron as the Spitfire pilot. The overall conclusi on of the evaluation was that the Spitfire was generall y superior in all areas; however, a similar eva luation by the Germans told a different story. The evaluation was conducted by one of the lead ing fighter exponents, Werner Molders who said that it handles well, is light on the controls, f aultless in turns, and has a performance approaching that ofthe M e 109. As a fig hting aircraft , however, it is miserable. A sudden push forward on the stick 1I·i11 cause the motor to cut, .. in a rapidly changing air combat sill/ation the lilator is either over-speeding or else is not being used to the full. The is without doubt a fair slice of bias in the assessments plus the important element of lack of expertise in the flying of the enemy type - and combat effectiveness is a result of train ing and experience as well as the actu al aircraft and weapon . The Spitfire is nevertheless the best-known British fighter of all time and has a unique place in the annals of aviation, and has often been called ' legenda ry'. Designed by R J Mitchell , the prototype Spitfire (K5054) first flew in March 1936 but ea rly production difficulties meant it was two years before deliveries began to the first squadron 19 Squ adron at Duxford in August 1938, By September 1939 only nine squ adrons had been re-equipped, a lthough this number had doubled by the sta rt of the Battle of Britain.

263

264

o

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

A nlal e 9 a

O le Krle l'snuguuge der Feindmi,hte

GroBbritannien Super marine

"Spitfire I"

Ja gd e ln sltz er

••

•

?lf4.Browning "A'ol /7171111

•

••

•

f l/f,fJrowr;icg i.7/ 7,7I71nl

8 IWrrt ."9t.~rt~ JI G. Jt JIG. 320 &.A"'fl. J/.,. itioJU:K/M Mt "9 duc4 ltr/allqll.rlt j" dn. FIMl rl " . A ,,'/fJUVlII die gro/k b',., · It' ll_rag der JIG. fIIlli drr LA "'1MKA 8~ AI4la ..J dM d.P~.Ht ,~nt JIG. t lf'}m iiuPc.lt" lillkeJl J[O. 1,8 "' . }'roll/«At iJ,., Jr. Fl-.g:ewg/Wltru N :u aM.t <
FT

A speed of around 350mph (at 19.000ft) and a ceiling of 34.000ft were by no mea ns startling and as with the Hurrican e. the Spitfire lost ou t to the Bf 109 in most perfo rmance crite ria. with the exception of the turn . An overa ll improve ment was made to the Spitfire Is by fitting of varia ble-pitch constant-speed propellers. Aircraft armament remained a vexed question with the a rgument over can no n or machine-guns . The sta ndard eight 0.303 inch Browning machine guns fitted to the Spitfire were certainly reliable but against the latest large bombers they lacked hitting power an d range . Can non had greater range but less accuracy an d a lower rate of fire. a ltho ugh they had greater hitting powe r - a single hit from a 20 mm shell being far more effective than numerous 0.303 strikes. Whilst the Spitfire IA kept the traditional armament. the IB was given 20 mm Hispan o cannon. It turned ou t to be a very tro ublesome arrangemen t• main ly d ue to problems with fitting the system into the Spitfires very thin wing. and was not liked by the crews sent to try it ou t because of this unr eliability. The on ly other mark to see service du ring the Battl e of Britain was the IIA which. with its Merlin XII engi ne. bro ught an overall improvement in performance. Whilst the Hur ricane had largely vanished from Fighter Co mma nd by ea rly 194 1. the Spit fire went fro m strength to strength. as ca n be seen from the unit list below. with doze ns of squad rons opera ting the type. Th e Spitfire was a fighter th rou gh a nd th rou gh altho ugh it undertook man y other roles as well. from gro und atta ck to its superlative role as a phot o-r ecce aircraft. Spitfir es were used as 'Cat s-Eye' night-fight ers during the Night Blitz. with occasio nal success but with many problems - it was not really suited to night o ps a nd landing accidents were frequent. With the Co mma nd turning to the offensive the Spitfire's limited rad ius of action became a pro blem - bu t there was litt le that could be do ne despite the use of externa l fuel tank s. With gro und-attac k - strafe and then bo mbing - an increas ing pa rt of the routine the aircraft also revealed another 'defect' ; it was prone to self-damage fro m bu llet ricochet or bo mb fra gments. as indeed was the P-51. Although main taining its bas ic form. the Spitfire went th ro ugh numerous transformations to keep it in line with what was required - a good example being the developme nt of the Mk. VIII/ IX to coun ter the Fw 190. Figh ter Command used various Merlin and G riffo n versions of the Spitfire du ring the ten yea rs the type operated with the Regula r squadrons comprising (but not including sub-variants); Merlin variants I. II. V. VI. VII. VIII . IX. XVI and Griffon variants - XII , XIV. XVIII . 21, 22. 24. Many of these came with LF (fo r low-altitude fighter) or H F (for high-altitude fighter) and this brief overview of the aircraft is not the place to go into details - that would req uire a com plete. an d very large, book. Total outp ut of Merl in-engined alone Spits was over 18.300! The Spitfire II was powered by a single 1,150 hp Merlin XII giving a max speed of 357 mph. A furt her 2.042 Griffon-engined Spits were built . of which the Mk. XIX had a to p speed of 460 mph. Spitfires remai ned in service with Fighte r Command in th e post-war period with the F.20 series equipping a nu mber of Auxiliary squadrons, a ltho ugh the Regular units were soo n re-equi pped with jets - often to the an noya nce of the pilots. A reason able number of airworthy Sp itfires have survived an d more a re being restored eac h year ; the 'ave rage ' number of airwo rthy examples worldwide is 50 and there are num erou s others in aviation museum s. In the U K you are never too far from a Spitfire and most air displays include a t least one Spit, often featuring the Battle of Britain Memorial. which has the finest co llectio n of the type.

265

266

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

CRAFT

An la ge 10.

D i. Kr leg ,fluluuge d er Fe indm i chte

GroBbritannien Supermarine

" Spitfire V"

Yickers-Supermarine S P ITFI RE Pr ot o type. first fligh t : K5 054. 5 M a rc h 1936 Entry to service: 19 Sqn, A ugust 1938 Squadron

Dales

A irfields

I Sqn

Apr 19-1-l -Oct 1946

19 Sqn

Aug 1938-Jan 19-1-l

19 Sqn 26 Sqn 41 Sqn

Mar 1946-Nov 1946 Aug 19-1-l-Dec 19-1-l J an 1939-Sep 1945'

54 Sqn

Apr 1946-A ug 1947 Mar 1939-Jun 1942

Nonh Wea ld. Ayr. Predannack , Harrowbeer, Detling. Lympne. Mansion. Coltishall. Ludham. H utton Cranswick. Tangmere, Acklington Duxford. Horsham St Faith. Ho m church. Fowlmere. Matlask, Ludham. H utton Cranswick. Perra npo n h, Middle Wallop. Fairlop. Digby. Gravesend. Kingsnon h. Weston Zoyland. Gatwick Moleswort h, Wittering. Biggin Hill Lee-on-Solent. Hawkinge, Tangmere, Mauston Catterick, Wick. Hornchurch. Merston. Mart lesham Hea th. Merston. Hawkinge. Debden. Longtown, Lla nbedr, High Ercall, Biggin Hill. Friston . Westhampnett . Southend, Lympne. Europe Wittering Hom church. Rochfo rd . Catrerick. So uthend . Mar tlesham Heath . Cast leto wn. Wellingore. (Aust ralia) Wood vale, Lee-on-So lent , North w eald. Man ston Middle Wallop. Thomey Islan d Church Fenton . Usworth. Kenley. Leconfield. Biggin Hill. Co ltisha ll. Hor nch urch, Southend , D rern, Tumhou se. Fa irlop , Predann ack. Ayr. Gravesend . West Mailing. Deanland , Harro wbeer, Bradwell Bay Hom ch urch. Northolt. Kirton- in-Li ndsey. T umhouse. Tangmere. Oulton. Debden. Great Sampford. Gravesend. Drem. Perr anpo rt h. Fairlop, Selsey, Kingsno rth. Ashford. Gatwick , G ravese nd Spilsby. Ho rsham SI Faith D uxfc rd. Hor sham St Fai th. Coltishall . Kenley. Gravesend. West Mailing. Biggin Hill. Exeter. Perr anpo rt h. Po rt rea tb. Ibsley. Zeals . Skaebrae. Church Sta nton. , ort h Wea ld. Hornchurch. Southend. Bogner. Castletown. Funtingdon . Ford. Europe D uxfo rd Nonh Weald . Mart lesham Heath. Debden. Gravesend Church Fenton. Leconfield . Drem. Acklington , Gravesend. Biggin Hill. Croydon . Coltishall. Matlask. Leuchars. Lympne. Mc rpe th. Ayr. Ous ton. (Middle East) Hornchurch. Roc hfo rd . Leconfield . watering. Kirton-inLindse y. Biggin Hill. Gravesend. Acklingt on. Llanbedr. Long Kesh. Atcham. (Middle East) North Wea ld. Lympne. Tangmere. Selsey. Southend. Tangrnere. Europe Sawbridgeworth, Hcrnchurcb. Delling. Merslo n. G atwick , West Malling Hawkinge. Lympne. Honiley. \Vittering. Westhampnett. Tangmere. Hutton Cranswi ck. Castle Camps. Drem. w est Mailing. Dea nland. Biggin Hill. Mansto n, Ludham. Fa irwood Common. Dyce, D uxfor d Croydon. Northolt. Hom church. Pembrey, Biggin Hill. Ma usto n. Gravesend. Digby. (M idd le East) Filion . Co lerne , Warm well, Ibsley, Tangmere. Zea ls. Witterin g. Co ltisha ll. Merston, Peterhead , Cas tlei ow n. Delling. Skaebrae. w esrhampnen . Mau ston. Bentwaters Kinon-in-L ind sey. North Wea ld . Southend. Debden

Ja gd e in5itzer

•

•

•

•

•

64 Sqn

May 19-1-l -J an 1945 Sep 1946-May 1948 Apr 1940- Nov 19-1-l

65 Sq n

Mar 1939-Jan 19-1-l

66 Sqn

Feb 1946-Oct 1946 Oct 1938-Apr 1945'

71 Sqn 72 Sqn

Sep 1946- Mar 1947 Aug 194I -Sep 1942' Apr 1939- ov 1942

74 Sqn

Feb 1939-Apr 1942

63 Sqn

Apr 19-1-l-May 1945

A6d..oclrp/ol1eIJuro/um/n .U m. :7 ItJmer tZSl71m

Ibnzerg/as JJmm

80 Sqn

Apr 19-1-l - Aug 19-1-l

91 Sqn

J an 194I -Oct 1946

92 Sqn

Mar 1940- Feb 1942

118 Sqn

Feb 194 1- Jan 1945

121 Sqn

Oc t 1941 - Sep 1942'

C>

Di, HrrNll1"

Hi) ,{,r

U lIIr ,.j A •• S pitfir.

1 . /0 ,.,.( " "" I' ,,,.. ,,.1

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I Jllit

267

268

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

122 Sqn

May 1941- Feb 1945

123 Sqn 124 Sqn

Aug 1945- Apr 1946 May 1941- Apr 1942 May 194J -Aug 1945

126 Sq n

Apr 1944-Mar 1946

127 Sq n

Ap r 1944- Ap r 1945

129 Sqn

J un 194 1-Apr 1944

May 1945-Sep 1946 130 Sqn

Ju n 194 1- Oct 1946

131 Sq n

Jun 1941- Nov 1944

132 Sqn

Jul 194I -Dec 1944

133 Sqn

Oct 194 1-Sep 1942'

152 Sqn

Dec 1939- Nov 1942

154 Sqn

Nov 194 1-Nov 1942

164 Sqn 165 Sqn

Nov 1944- Feb 1945 Apr 1942- Feb 1943 J un 1945-Aug 1946 Apr 1942- Jan 1945

May 1945-Sep 1946 167 Sqn

Apr 1942- J un 1943

186 Sqn 222 Sqn

Feb 1944-Apr 1944 Mar 194O- Dec 1944

234 Sqn

Mar 194O- Oct 1944

Au g 1945-Feb 1946

T urnh ouse, Ou ston , Ca tterick, Scort on , Hornchurch . Fairlop, Martlesham Hea th. Ea stchurch . Bognar. Kingsnor th, Ashford. Brenzeu . Weston Zoyland, Gravesend Dyce. Wick. Hawkinge. w ick. Dalcross T urnhouse, Drem. Castletown (M idd le East) Cas tleto wn , Biggin Hill. Gravesend. Eastchu rch. Martlesham Heath. Debden. Tangm ere. Westham pnett. N orth Weald. Drem. Crough ton. Duxfo rd. West Mailing. Sou thend. Church Fento n. Bradwell Bay. Manston. Co ltisha ll, Hutto n Crans wick, Molesworth Sawbrid geworth . Culmhead. Harrowbeer. Bradwell Bay. Hethel North Weald . Lyrn pne. Tan gmere. Sourhend. Funtingdo n. Ford. Europe Leco nfield. Westhamp nett. Debden . Ipswich. T homey Island . Grimsen er. Skaeb rae. Ibsley. Tangmere. Hornchurch. Peterhead, Heston Bentwaters, Dyce. Norway . Molesworth. Hutton Crans wick. Spilsby. Church Fent on Portreath. Harrowbeer , Warm well. Perr an port h. Wes t Freugh. Th ome y Island . Drem. Ballyhalbert , Honiley. West Mailing. Catterick, Scorton , Ayr. Ack lington , Lympne, Home. Westhampnett. Mersron . Europe. N orth Weald. Dyce. Norway . Manston, Charterhall. Odiham Ou sto n. Caue rick. Temhill, Atc ha m. Llanbed r. Valley. Mersto n. Tangmere, Ipswich. Thomey Island. Westh ampnett, Castletown. Exeter. Red hill, Church Stanton. Coleme. Harrowbeer. Culmhead. Fri ston . (Far East) Peterhead , Skaebrae. Grimsetter, Martlesham Heath. Homchurch. Zeals. Eastchurch. Perranporth. G ravesend . Newchurch, Detling. Cas tleto wn, Ford. Europe. (Far East) Eglint on, Kirton -in-Lind sey, Biggin Hill. Lymp ne. Gravesend. Mart lesham Heath. G reat Sampfo rd Acklingt on . Warm well, Port reat h, Snailwell. Swanton Morley. Coltl shall . Eglint on . Angle . Co llywesto n, Wittering, (No rth Africa) Fowlmere. Co ltishall. Church Stanton . Ho rnchurch. Fairlop . Ipswich. Wellingore, (N orth A frica ) Biggin Hill Peterhead . Skaebrae. Fairwood Co mmo n Turnhouse, Fairwood Com mo n. Tangmere . M iddle Wallop Ayr, Eastcburch. Gravesend. T angrnere, Martlesham Heath. Peterhead , Ibsley, Exeter. Kenley. Church Stanton . Co lem e. Cu lmhead. Predan nack. Harr owbee r. Detling. Lympne, Bentwaters Bentwat ers, Dyce. Norway . Cha rterhall. Duxford. M iddle Wallo p Scorton . Cas tletown, Ludham. Kidlington. Fowlme re. D igby. Hornchurch. Westham pnen . Wood vale Tain. Lympn e D uxford. D igby. Kirton-in-Lindsey. Hc rnchurch. Coltishall. Matlask. Mauston, So uth end . No rth Weald. Winfield. Drem. Biggin Hill. Ayr, Martlesham Heath. Woodvale. Ca tterick, Ack lington. Selsey. Coolham. Funtingdon . Europe. Predannack Leconfield. Ch urch Fen ton . St Eval. Midd le Wallop . \Varrnwell. Ibsley. Predannack. Portreath. Channy D o wn. Perranporth. Grimsetter. Skaebrae. Church Stanton. Honiley. \Vest Mailing. Southend. Hutton Cranswick. Church Fenton . Co ltisha ll. Bolt Head. Deanl and. North Weald Bentwaters. f\.loleswo rth

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

238 Sqn 242 Sqn

May 1940-Ju n 1940 Ap r 1942-Oct 1942

243 249 257 266

Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn

Jun 1942-Nov 1942 May 1940-Jun 1940 May 1940-Jun 1940 Jan 194O-Jul 1945

274 Sqn 302 Sqn Polish

Ap r 1944-Aug 1944 Oct 1941-Dec 1946'

303 Sqn Polish

Jan 1941-Apr 1945

306 Sqn Polish

Jun 194 I-Apr 1944

308 Sqn Polish

Mar 1941-Dec 1946'

310 Sqn Czech

Oct 1941-Aug 1945

312 Sqn Czech

Oct 1941-Aug 1945

313 Sqn Czech

May 1941-Aug 1945

315 Sqn Polish

Jul 1941-Apr 1944

316 Sqn Polish

Oct 1941-Apr 1944

317 Sqn Polish

Oct 1941-Dec 1946'

318 Sqn Polish 322 Sqn Dutch

Au g 1946-Dec 1946 Jun 1943-Oct 1945'

329 Sqn French

Feb 1944-Nov 1945'

331 Sqn Norw ay

Nov 1941-May 1945'

332 Sqn Norn'ay

Jan 1942-May 1945'

Tangmere. Middle Wallop Tu mh ouse. Ou ston . Deem. Nor th Weald. Manston . Digby. (No rth Afri ca ) Ou ston. Tumhouse. (No rth Africa) Lecon field Hend on Sutton Bridge. Martlesham Heath, Wittering. Eastch urch, Horn church. Co llywesto n, Kingcliffe. Duxford Hornc hurch, Detlin g. Merston . G atwic k. West Mailing Ibsley, Harrowbeer, Warmwe ll. Heston . Croydo n. Ipswich. Kirt on -in-Lind sey, Hutt on C ranswick, Perranporth. Fairlop, Tan gmere, No rtbo lt, Llanbedr, Deanl and , So uth end , Cbai ley, Appledram , Ford . Europe. Fairwood Co mmo n, Hethel Nort holt , Speke . Kirt on-in-Lind sey, Redhill , Heston . Debden, Martlesham Heath. Ballyhalbe rt , Hom e. w esthampneu , Co ltisha ll. Andrewsfield No rtholt, Spek e, Church Stanton. Kirton-in-Lind sey, Hutton Cra nswick. Ca tterick , Gravesend. Fri ston, Heston. L1anbedr. Coolha rn. Bagint on. Chilbolto n, w ood vale, Exeter. Hutton C ran swic k, Redh ill. Heston. Ipswich. Nort holt, Ch urch Fenton. Hutton Cra nswick, Llan bedr , Deanl and . Cha iley. Appledrarn, Ford. Europe, Hethel Montr ose. Perranporth . Predannack , Warmwell, Exeter, Redb ill, Castletown. Ibsley, Llanbedr, Mendle sharn. Southend , Appledram . Tangmere, Lympne , Digb y, North Weald . Bradw ell Bay. Man sto n, (Europe) Ayr, Fairwood Comm on . Angl e, w armw ell. Harrowbeer, Redhill, Church Stant on. Skaebrae. Llanbedr. Ibsley, Mendle sham , Soutbend. Appledram , Tangm ere. Lympne. Cohi shall . Nort h Weald . Bradwell Bay. (Europe) Ca ne rick. Leconfield, Portreath , Warrnwell. Homchurch, Southend , Fairlop, Church Stanton, Peterhead , Hawkinge, lb sley. Woodvale, Ayr, Mendle sham, Soutbend, Appl edram , Tangmere, Lyrnpne , Skaebrae, North Weald. Bradwell Bay. Mau ston, (Europe) Northolt , Woodvale. Hutton Cran swick, Ballybal bert . Heston . Llanbedr, Coolh am. Holm sley So ut h. Ford. Brenzeu. Andrewsfield. Co ltisha ll, Peterhead , Fairw ood Comm on Church Stanton, No rt holt, Heston . Hutt on C ranswick. Ackl ington , Woodvale. Co ltishall. West Mailin g. Fri ston . Andrew sfield, Fairwood Co mmo n. Wick. Hethel Exeter. No nholt , Croydon. Wood vale, Kirton -in-Lindsey, Martlesham Heath, Heston. Perranporth. Fairlop . Southend . Deanland, Cbailey, Appledram . Ford . Europe. Hethel Co ltisha ll Wood vale, Llanbedr. Ayr, Hawk inge. Ackl ington , Hartford Bridge. West Mailing. De anland , Fairwood Comm on . Biggin Hill. Eur ope Perranporth , Ayr , Merston . L1anbedr, Funt ingdon , Selsey, Tangmere, Europe. Turnhou se, Skaebrae, Harr owbeer , Fairwood Common. Exeter Skaebrae. N orth Weald. Manston. Ipswich. L1anbedr, South end, Bogn or. Tangm ere, Funtingdon . Ford. Europe, Dyce, Norway Catterick, N orth Weald. Manston. Martlesham Heath. L1anbed r, South end. Bogn or. Tangm ere, Ford, Europe, Dyce, Norway

269

270

OPERAT ONAL AIRCRAFT

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

340 Sqn French

Nov 1941 -Nov 1945'

34ISqn

Jan 1943-

ov 1945'

French

345Sqn

Mar 1944-Nov 1945

French 349 Sqn Belgian

J un 1943-OcI 1946

350 Sq n Belgian

Nov 194I -OcI 1946

401 Sqn RCA F

Sop 194I -Jun 1945

402 Sqn RCAF

Mar 1942- J ul 1945

403 Sqn RCAF

May 194 I-J ul 1945

411 Sqn RCA F

Ju n 1941-M ar 1946

412 Sqn RCAF

J un 194 1-Mar 1946

Turnhouse. D rem. Ayr. Red hill. Westhampnelt . Ipswi ch. Homchurch. Biggin Hill. Turnhouse, Drem. Mersto n. Llanbedr. Merston, Funtingdon. Selsey. Tangmere. Europe Turnhouse. Biggin Hill. Merston, Llanbedr, Funtingdon. Selsey. Tangmere, Europe Ayr. Shoreham. Deanland. Fairwood Common. Biggin Hill. Europe Wittering. Collyweston, Kingscliffe. Wellingore. Digby. Acklington. Friston. Southend. Homchurch. Llanbedr. Selsey, Coolham. Funtingdon. Tangmere. Europe Valley . Atcham. w arm well. Debden, Gravesend. Manlesham Hea th. Kenley. Redhill. Southend. Hc rncburch. Hesto n. Fairlop. Acklington. Ouston. Digby. West Mailing. Hawkinge, Llanbedr. Peterhead , Friston. Westhampnett, Lympne. Europe Digby. Biggin Hill. Gravesend. Eastchurch. Martlesham Heat h. Lym pne. Kenley. Catterick. Red hill, Staplehurst. Fairwood Common. Tan gmere. Europe Ccleme. Fairwood Common. Kenley. Redhill. Ipswi ch. Mart lesham Heath, Digby. Ay r. Wellingo re. Ho rne. Westhampn ett. Merst on, Hawkinge. Europe Baginto n. Temhill. Horn church. Debden . Martlesham Heath. No rt holt. Sout hend . Catterick. Manston. Kenley. Lashenden. Headc orn, Kenley. Hut ton Cranswick.

501 Sqn

A pr 1941-Apr 1944

Coleme. Chilbolton. l bsley. Tangmere. Warm weU. Midd le Wallop. Hawkinge. Ballyhalbert , Westhampnelt. Woodvale. Sou thend, Friston

Oct 1946 - May 1949 Oct 1941- Mar 1945

Filton

504 Sqn

Llanbedr, Digby. Lympne. Delling. Mansto n. Hawkinge,

Coleme 602 Sqn

May 1948- Mar 1950 May 194I - May 1945

603Sqn

Oct 1946-May 1951 Sop 1939- Apr 1942

604 Sqn 607 Sqn 609 Sqn

l an 1945- A ug 1945 Oct 1946-1ul 1951 Oct 1946-May 1950 Nov 1946-1un 1951 Au g 1939-May 1942

4 16 Sq n RCA F 417 Sqn RCA F 42 1 Sqn RCA F

Nov 1941- Mar 1946 Nov 194 I- A pr 1942 Apr 1942- Jul 1945

44 1 Sqn RCA F

Feb 1944- May 1945

442 Sqn RCAF 443 Sqn RCA F 451 Sqn RA A F 452 Sqn RAA F 453 Sqn RAA F

Feb 1944- Mar 1945

457 Sqn RAAF 485 Sqn RNZAF

Feb 1944 -Mar 1946

Dec 1944- Jan 1946 Ap r 194 1-J un 1942 J un 1942- 1an 1946

lun 194 1-1un 1942

Digby. Fairwood Common. Warm well, Exeter. Ibsley. Kenley. Angle. Zeals . Red hill. Lashenden. Headcom. Hult on Cranswick, Tangmere. Europe Digby. Holmsley South. westhampnen. Hutton Cranswick, Funtingdon, Ford. Europe . Hawkinge, Skeabrae. Hawkinge, Hunsdon Digby, Holmsley South. Westhampnen. Funtingdon. Hutton Cranswick. Ford. Europe. Hunsdon Digby. Holmsley South. H ut ton Cra nswick . Westhampneu, Funringdon, Ford. Europe Hawkinge. Mansion. Matlask. Swan nington, Lympne, Skeabrae, Lasham. Europ e Kirt on-in-Lind sey, Kenley. Redhill. Andreas. (Australia) Drem. Homchurch. Sou thend . Martlesham Heath. Westcott. Newmarket. lbstey, Perra nporth, Skeabrae. Delling. Hutton Crans\l,;ck. Peterhead. Ford. Europe. Coltishall. Matlask. Swannington. Lympne. Lasham. Germany Baginlon. Jurby. Andreas. Redhill. Kinon-in ndsey. 4Li

(Au .uralia)

Mar 1941-Aug 1945

Dri ffield. Leco nfield. Redhill. Kenley. KingsclifTe. West

Mailing. Kirkisto\l,n . Eglinton. \Vesthampnett. Merston. Biggin Hill. Homchurch. Drem. L1anbedr. Selsey. Coolham. Funtingdon. Tangmere. Europe. Predannack. Holland

H ucknall. Wymeswold Abbotsinch , Grangemouth. D rem. Dyce. w esthampnen . Prestwick. Ayr. Kenley. Redhill, Peterhead. Skeabrae, Perra npo rt h, Lasham. Fairlop, Bogner, Kingsnonh. ewchurch. Detfing. Llanbedr, Ford. Europe. Coltishall. Matlask, Swannington. Ludham Abbo tsinch, Leucha rs Tumhouse. Prestwi ck, D yce, Drem. Hornchurch. Southcnd. Fairlop. Peterhead . (Egypt) Coltishall. Ludham. Tumhouse. Drem. Skeabrae

Turnhouse Hendon. North Weald

Ouston Yeadon. Catterick, Acklington. Drern, Kinle ss. No rtholt. Middl e Wallop. Warmwell, Biggin Hill. G ravesend . Digby. D uxford

Europe

Digby. Hornch urch . Sou thend, Shawbury. Kidlington . Fowlrnere, Kenley. Redhi ll. Sta plefo rd, Biggin Hill. Peterhead . Fairw..ood Common. Europe Digby. Wellingore, Martl esh am Heath . North Weald. Merston. Ta ngme re, Redhill. Kenley. Angle. Fairwood Common. Hum. Od iham. Lasham. Perranpo rth, Friston, Staplehurst. Biggin Hill. Hutto n Cranswick, Europe Pete- head . Dyce. Mart lesharn Heath. Hawkinge. Red hill. Kenley. w ellingor e. Digby. Mersto n. Tangrnere. Europe Charmy Down. Coleme. Tain. (.\ fit/tlle East)

Ballyhalbert . Kirkistown. Middle Wallo p. l bsley. Church

Stanton. Red hill. Casrletown. Peterhead. Homchurch.

610 Sqn

A pr 1948-Feb 1951 Sep 1939-Mar 1945

611 Sqn

Nov 1946-Aug 1951 May 1939- Mar 1945

612 614 615 616

Nov I946-Nov 1951 ov 1946-1un 1951 Dec I946- Mar 1951 Oct I946-Oct 1950 Oct 1939-Aug 1944

Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn

Yeadon. Church Fenton Hooton Park. Wittering. Prestwi ck , Biggin Hill. G ravesen d , Acklington. we sthampnen. Leconfield. Hutton Cranswick. Ludh am , Cas tletow n. Perranpo rth, Bolt Head. Fairwood Common. Exeter. C ulm head . Harr owbee r, w est Mailing. Friston. Lymp ne. Europe. Warmwell Hooton Park Speke. Du xford . Digby. Sou th end . Ho m church. Drern. Kenley. Martlesh am Heath. Red hill. Ipswi ch. Biggin Hill. Mat lask. Ludham, Coltishall. Ma uston. Ford. Deanland. Harro wbeer, Predannack, Bolt Head. Bradwell Bay. Skeabrae. Hawkinge, Hunsdon w oodvale. Hooton Park Dyce Ringwa y Biggin Hill Leconfield. Rochfor d . Kenley. Coltishall. Kirto n-in-Lindsey. Tangmere, Westhampnett, KingsclifTe. west Mailing. Great Sampford. Ipswi ch, Ibsley. Harrowbee r, Exeter. Fairwood

Common. Culmhead Notes 4 1 Sqn, from Dec 1944 to Mar 1946 the Squadron was in Eu rope ( ot Fe). 66 Sqn. from Aug 1944 to Apr 1945 the Squadron was in Europe (Not Fe). 71 Sqn , beca me 334th Fighte r Squadron/4th Fighter Group USAAF. 74 Sq n. from Aug 1944 to May 1945 the Sq uadron was in Europe . 121 Sqn. became 335th Fight er Squadron/4t h Fig hte r Group USAAF. 133 Sqn. became 336lh Fight er Sq uadr o n/4th Fighler Group USAAF. 302 Sq n. from Aug 1944 to Oct 1946 the Sq uadr on was in Europe. 308 Sq n. from A ug 1944 to Oct 1946 the Sq uad ron was in Europe. 317 Sqn . from Aug 1944 to Oct 1946 the Squa dron was in Europe. 322 Sqn . from l an 1945 to Oct 1945 the Squ adron was in Europe. 33 1 Sqn. from Au g 1944 to Apr 1945 th e Squ adron was in Europe. 332 Sqn . from A ug 1944 to Apr 1945 the Squad ron was in Euro pe. 340 Sqn. from Au g 1944 to Nov 1944. Feb 1945 to Nov 1945 th e Squadr on was in Europe . 341 Sqn . from Au g 1944 to Nov 1945 the Squ adron was in Europe.

271

272

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

The Spitfire XIV had a top speed of around 450 mph and entered service, with 610 Squadron. in January 1944.

The Spitfire XXI I\'as only produced in small numbers ( 120) and entered service in January 1945 with 91 Squadron; it only served with eight squadrons.

273 Boulton-Paul DEFIANT In the mid 1930s the RAF expressed interest in a 'turret fighter' that could fly along side enemy bombers and use its 'hea vy' firepower offo ur mach ine-guns to destroy the enem y. Vari ous evalua tions suggested the concept was viable and required that as a bomberdestroyer the a ircra ft would prove invaluable; it was a concept that by the late 1930s was serio usly flawed. The only turret-fighter to enter service was the Boulton Paul Defiant a nd its comba t career was somewhat mixed . The Defiant was developed against Specificati on F9/35 and the prototype (K83 10) flew on I I August 1937; by the time the first a ircra ft joined 264 Squ ad ron in December 1939 the concept was a lready being called into que stion for a da y fighter. However, they dul y too k the a ircra ft to war in May 1940 - and it was an immediate success; it appear s that the enemy th ought they were sta nda rd fighters with only forw ard-firing guns , and by the end of May the Squ ad ron had made claims for over 60 aircraft. Losses had been reasonable and the aircra ft a ppea red to be j ustifying itself. Thi s optimism proved unfounded and in summer 1940 the Defiants were sho t out of the sky by Germ an fighter s, which led to their relegati on to the night-fighter role, in which they were to play a significant role. The 303 mph speed and 30,000 ft ceiling were adequate for night ops. On 16 June the CO o f 264 Squadron (Sqn Ldr Hunter) took a Defiant to Farnborough for eval uation against a Bf 109. His report was positive and concluded that: 's hould an Me 109 attack a Defiant, if the pilot of the latter goes into a really steep turn, he will prevent the pilot of the 109 bringing his guns to bear, and will eventually, if the pilot of the 109 follows him into the turn, be able to get into a suitable position to deliver his own atta ck. If conditions are the sa me for both aircraft , that is to say , if the Me 109 does not have a height ad vantage, the general manoeuvrabil ity of the Defiant compa res very favoura bly with that of the 109, the Defiant being a ble to turn in a much sma ller turning circle and still have full control. To conclude. it is th ought that the Defiant fitted with a con stant speed airscrew sho uld be able to deal with the Me 109 Defi ant Il, August 1941; a number of night-fighter squadrons formed in 1941 10 initially operate the Defi ant pending availability of more suitable types.

274

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

Die Krleg sflue :zeuge d e r Felndm lchte

An lage 12a

GroBbritannien Boulton & Paul

"Defiant"

Jagdzwe isltzer ( Na c htjage r)

very satisfactorily at all times.' Sadly this was to prove an over-estimation of the combat equation between the two types. The unit list shows a number of squadrons forming in 1940 and 1941 as part of the growing night-fighter force. Guided by ground controllers or free-lancing , and equipped with AI radar the Defiants scored a number of successes at night but more important was the experience gained by the crews in night operations, which they were able to put to good use when re-equipped with better aircraft. Although product ion totalled 1,064 aircraft (ceasing in February 1943), operationally the airc raft had a limited career; however, it served in a variety of other ro les, many in support of Fighter Command, including target-towing and Air-Sea Rescue. There are no airworthy Defiants and very few preserved in museums. Boulton -Pa ul DEFIANT Prot otype , first night: K 831O, II August 1937 Entry to service: 264 Sq n, D ecem ber 1939

11Ferroch ·/'10 n Dro wning " ,1"u/ 7,7mm

L

o

_

Squadron

Dat es

A irfields

85 Sqn 96 Sqn 125 Sqn 141 Sqn

Jan 1941-Feb 1941 Mar 1941-Jul 1942 Jun 1941 -May 1942 Apr 1940-Sep 1941

151 Sq n 153 Sqn 255 Sqn 256 Sqn 264 Sqn

Dec 194O-Jul 1942 Oct 1941 -Apr 1942 Nov 1940-Sep 1941 Nov 1940-Jun 1942 Dec 1939-Jul 1942

Debd en Cranage, Wrexham Co lerne. Cha rmy Down. Fai rwood Common Turnh ou se, Gran gemouth. Prestw ick . \Vest Mailing. Dyce. Dr em. Ga twick. G ravesend . Ayr Bramcot e. \Vitterin g. Co ltisha ll Ballyhalbe rt Kirt on-in-Lindsey, Hibald stow Catterick , Pembrey. Co leme . Squ ires G ate Martl csh am Hea th. D uxfor d . Fowlmere, Kirton-in-L indsey, Hor nchurch . Sou thend. Debden. Gravesend . Biggin Hill. West Mailing. Co leme Kirton-in-Lindsey. J urb y. Sq uires G ate. Coleme. Exeter Digby. Coleby Grange Ayrc Drem Valley

307 Sqn 409 Sqn 4 10 Sqn 456 Sqn

Polish RCAF RCAF RAAF

Sep 194O- Au g 194 1 J ul 194 1- Sep 1941 Jun 194 1-May 1942 J un 1941- Nov 1941

Bristol BEAUFI GHTER The Bristol Beaufighter took o n many roles during its wartime career and played a major role in each of them; however, in Fighter Command it was respon sible for honing the capabilities of the night-fighter squadro ns by providing them with the first trul y effective radar-based aircraft with performance and firepower. The Bristol Beaufighter was a private venture not developed to a milita ry specification but when the prototype (R2052) flew on 17 Jul y 1939 it was obvious that this was going to be a successful aircraft, and it had already been given a production Specification (FI7/39) by the Air Ministry as a longrange day-fighter. Production Beaufighter F.ls joined the Fighter Interception Unit (F lU) at Tangmere in mid Augu st 1940, with the first operational unit , 25 Squadron, receiving aircraft the following month. Whilst the type did serve in the long-range fighter ro le this was with other Commands and for Fighter Command its significa nce was as a night-fighter equipped with. initially, AI Mk . IV. Th e first success came on 19 November when a 604 Squadron Beaufighter shot-down a Ju 88. Improvements in equipment were steadily introduced. the Beaufighter IIF joinin g 600 Squadron in April 1941, to be followed in 1942 by the Mark VIF , one of the major

275

276

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL A RCRAFT

Anl. , e 11.

Die Krlel'ftull.eu e e de r Fe in dm i ch t e

GroBbritannien Bristol

"Beaufighter I"') 2 e rstore r

••

••••

I

III all the roles in which it lI'as emp loyed the Beaufight er lI'as a success; in conj unction with the COII/rol and Reporting system, the typ e lI'as responsible fo r bringing Fighter Command 's night def ences to a peak of efficiency,

Ii Sf. raooaen Ka/. 2(Jmm

l4iftelpanzet:

Yorderpanzer nicllt ~;ngezeiCl1flet (slelle Seitenansicl1f o: ProulSiend

variants in terms of production numbers and roles. The Beaufighter VIF had two Bristol Hercules engines, a top speed of 333 mph (at 15,600 ft) and a ceiling of 26,500 ft; it also had good endurance - and ten guns (four 20 mm cannon and six 0.303 in machine -gun s). The ability to hit a target hard was especially important at night when you might only get fleeting opportunities to find and engage the enemy . As different AI variants were introduced so the noses of the Beaufighter changed, from the simple 'feathered ar row' aerials of the earl y sets to the ' thimble' noses and radomes that hid the later sets. As the night war progre ssed, the sq uad rons were employed in an intruder role to hunt the enemy, in the air and on the ground, in his own territory. Thi s tactic met with considerable success both with material returns ('kills') and the disruption of the enemy air effort. With Fighter Command the Beau gradu ally gave way to the Mosquito and the type had vanished from the Command's front-line by mid 1944. Like other types it had Beaufight er VIII'i th Hercules engines . Janua ry / 942; tile introduction of the more powerful aircraft and the adoption of centim etric radar gave the RAF tile best night-fighter of the tim e.

2 sf146 Kat ?7mm

4 st.146.KaL7.7mm

!l,5mm Punze/'

l !i •

// ~~-~~-~~

",.t;

., Kawmnt. Kol , til rn>n. ' il" "N "':,It • ir U "1/'fuIlI rill v..J;j .11a. 1fl/1II ',.A_fJ (I im ,.uJi'", tim t: fl ,II I I,. Ii ~ I • I. ,I It '11" ft(j /.,. d II II< ,.1/1

r..

n

"n'.

277

278

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

also served the Command in a 'support' role in the training system. It also saw extensive and distinguished service with other Commands. especially Coast al. and in other theatres. There are no airworthy Beaufighters but one is under rebuild (to fly) at Duxford as part of the Fighter Collection. A number survive in museums. including the RAF Museum . Br istol BEA UFI G HT ER Protot ype. first flight: R 2052. 17 July 19 39 En try to service: 25 Sqn, September 1940

Squadron

Dat es

Ai rfields

25 Sqn

Sep 194O-Jan 1943

29 Sqn 68 Sqn

Sep 1940-M ay 1943 May 194 1- J ul 1944

96 Sqn 125 Sqn 141 Sqn

May 1942 - Nov 1943 Feb 1942-Mar 1944 Ju n 194 1-Jan 1944

153 Sq n 219 Sqn

J an 1942-0ec 1942 Sep 1940- May 1943

255 Sq n 256 Sq n 307 Sqn Polish 406 Sqn RCAF 409 Sqn RCAF 410 Sq n RCAF 456 Sqn RAAF 488 Sqn R NZAF 600 Sqn

J ul 194 1- Nov 1942 May 1942- May 1943 Au g 1941 -Jan 1943

No rth Weald . Debd en. Wittering, Ballyhal bert, Ch urch Fent on Wellingore, West Mailin g. Bradwell Bay High Erca ll. Co ltisha ll. Co leby G range. Fa irwood Co mmo n. Castle Camps wrexham. Honiley. Church Fenton, D rem Co lerne, Fairwood Common. Exeter. Valley Ayr. Ackl ington. Tangmere. Ford. Predann ack. Wiu erin g. West Raynham Ballyhalbert, Portre ath , (North Africa) Ca ue rick. Redhill. Tan gmere, Acklington , Scorton, (North Af rica ) Hibald stow, Coltishall, High Ercall . Hon iley, (Nor th Africa) Sq uires G at e. Wood vale. Ford . (Moira) Exete r. Pembrey

604 Sqn Fl U

Jun 1941-Aug 1944 Aug 194 1- Ap r 1944

Ack lingto n, A yr, Scorto n. Pred an nack, Middl e Wallop . Valley. Exete r. Wink leigh Co leby Grange. Acklington

A pr 1942 -Jan 1943

Drem, Ayr, Scorton . Acklington

Sep 1941-Jun 1943

Valley. Middle Wallop

J un 1942- Sep 1943

Church Fe nton . Ayr. Drem

Sep 194O- Nov 1942

Homchu rch. Redhill, Ca uerick, Dr em. Fairwood Common. Co leme. Predannack. (North Africa) Midd le Wallop. Warm well, Predannack. Fo rd. Sco rton Tan gmere, Shoreham. Ford. Witteri ng

Sep 1940- Ap r 1944 Aug 1940-

Westland WHIRLWI D Only two squadrons operated this most unusual of RAF fighters and by the time the aircraft's problems had been overcome it was deemed not worthy of further effort. The first aircraft arrived with 263 Squadron at Grangemouth on 6 July 1940 and there were three on strength by the end of the month - and 'a considerable amount of what the makers are pleased to call 'teething troubles ' had been encountered' (263 Squadron ORB ). It was a problematic period and by early September when the Squadron moved to Drem it still only had seven aircraft , all in 'A Flight': 'the engines have still not yet surm ounted their teething troubles. The guns. however. are now firing satisfactorily' (263 Squadron ORB) ,

The fi rst Whirlwinds arrived with 263 Squadron at Grangemouth on 6 July 1940 and there lI'ere three on strength by the end of the month - and 'a considerable amount of what the makers are pleased 10 call 'teething troubles had been encountered'

The Westland Whirlwind prototype (L6844) flew on II October 1938 to Specification F37/35 and a production order for 400 aircraft was placed in January. At this stage it all looked very promising; the two Rolls-Royce Peregrine engines and the sleek airframe promised a speed of 360 mph and the nose-mounted 20 mm cannon promi sed a mighty punch . whilst the pilot had a good all-round view from the canopy that sat on top of the fuselage. Sadly. development problems meant that the first aircraft did not reach 263 Squadron until July 1940 and even then the teething troubles had only just started. The Whirlwind never recovered from these problems . although in subsequent ORB entries the Squadron was to sing the praises of the type as 'having come of age' in the roving fighter-bomber role. Only 112 aircraft were built and only one other sq uadron used the type,

Westland WH IRLWIND Protot ype, first flight: L8644, II Octo ber 1938 Entry to serv ice: 263 Sqn, J uly 1940 Squadron

Dotes

137 Sqn

Feb 1941-J un 1943

Airfields

Charmy Down. Coltishall. Matlask. Deem. Snai lwell, Manston, Southend

263 Sq n

Jul 1940-0ec 1943

Grangemout h. Drem. Exeter. St Eval. Portreath. Fitton. Channy Down. Warm well. Harr owbeer. Zeals. Manston

279

280

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

An lilge 11 a

O le Kr iegsflugzeuge der Felndm i cht a

GroBbritannien

Westland

"Whirlwind"

Jagde lnslt ze r

Douglas HAVOC In summer 1940 the first Dougla s Boston s (D B-7s) arrive for the RAF, the intenti on being to employ the American type as a light-bomber to supplement/replace the Blenheim; this did not take place unt il the following year with the arrival of Boston lIs but the type did enter service in late 1940 as the Havoc for use as a night -fighter. Conversion to the fighter role, including an AI rada r and eight-gun nose fitting took place at Burton wood and the first Havoc Is went to 85 Squadron at Debden in Februa ry 1941 to replace Defiant s. Th e following month a number of Havoc II entered service, including a number tha t went to 23 Squad ron as fighter-bombe rs for night intruder work, the first such use taking place in April. From their entry to service in April 1941 to the end of the year the Havocs were the busiest of the night intruder types, flying 374 sorties, the majorit y of these being attacks on airfields. This latt er variant was sometimes referred to as the Moonfight er as it had no radar and carried only four forward guns and a small bomb-load . Again this was only produced in small numbers, as was the variant supplied to 93 Squadron for use with the Long Aerial Mine (LAM). Th e Turbinlite version was delivered in larger numbers (70) and was an inter esting concept in which the Havoc carri ed a Helmor e searchlight in the nose. with which it was intended to illuminate the enemy so that an accompanying fighter . usually a Hurric ane. could 'step forward ' and destroy the enemy. A numb er of specialist Flights were formed for this work from June 1941 but as discussed in the operations chapter it was never a success, altho ugh the Flights were raised to squad ron status before the idea was eventually abando ned in Janu ary 1943. The Havoc served in t\l'O roles with the Command - night intruder ( with 23 Squadron ) and airborne searchlight [ Turbinlite} .

281

282

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

Do uglas HA VOC Pro to type. first flight : 8J464 Entry to service: 85 Sq n, Feb 194 1

Die Kr iegsnu gze uge d ee Fei nd machte

Gr oBbritannien un d USA.

S quadron

Da les

Airfields

23 Sqn 25 Sqn 85 Sqn 93 Sqn 1451 Flt/530 Sqn 1452 Flt/531 Sqn 1453 Flt/532 Sqn 1454 Flt/533 Sqn 1455 FIt/534 Sqn 1456 FIt/535 Sqn 1457 FIt/536 Sqn 1458 Flt/537 Sqn 1459 Flt/538 Sqn 1460 Flt/539 Sqn 605 Sq n

Mar 1941- Aug 1942 J ul 1941-Aug 1941 Feb 1941- Sep 1942 Dec 1940-Nov 194 1 May 194 1- J. n 1943 Jul 1941-J. n 1943 Jul 194 1-J. n 1943 Jun 1941- J.n 1943 Jul 1941-J. n 1943 Nov 1941-J. n 1943 Sep 1941- J.n 1943 Dec 1941-J. n 1943 Sep 1941- J.n 1943 Dec 194 1- J.n 1943 Jul 1942-Aug 1942

Ford Wiu ering Debden, Hunsdon Midd le Wallop Hunsdon West Mailing. Debden Win ering. Hibaldstow Co leme . Charm y Down Tangmere Honiley. High Erc. 1I Cole me . Predannack. Fairwood Common Middle W.llo p Hunsdon. Hibaldstow Acklingt on Ford

No te: Thi s includes the Boston as in essence both were the same Cor Fighter Co mma nd as they o perated in the Int ruder role.

Bell AIRACOBRA Like the Buffalo, the Airacobra (Bell P-39) was an American aircraft seized on by the British Purch asing Commission in 1940, and like the Buffalo it was not a success, although it did at least enter (briefly) operational service with Fighter Command. The P-39 was, on paper, a promi sing type with a speed of 358 mph (at 15,000 ft), a range of over 1,000 miles (over twice that of the Hurricane and Spitfire) and good armament, compri sing a spinner-mounted 20mm cannon and six machine-gun s. The RAF eventually ordered 675 aircraft , initially benefiting from an undeliverable French order, and aircraft arrived with the Air Fighting Development Unit (AFDU) in Jul y 1941 and 60 1 Squadron, at Matlask, the following month. The Squadron was initially enthusiastic but soo n expressed concern over the unreliab ility of their aircraft, in part cau sed by the unusual rear engine arrangement and The Aira cobra I\'OS used Jar 0 shari period by rer)' Jell' operational sort ies,

Anl age tSa

0

single Fighter Comma nd squadron and flew

Be ll "Airacobra" (P 3 9)') Jagde ins it ze r

ee

.• e e

-g

Ufa,CoII' ,1'/7I7,omm

rsa ,Coil "I:ald/mm milj e 17tlJd>l/IJ 1l:1I1zer 13m//7 IiJl'l Ji:Jverslo/fhsc!len

283

284

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL

the tricycle undercarriage. Wor k-up took longer than expected and without pressure from the Squa dron Commander it is likely that the type would never have seen actio n. Having moved to Manston as a forward base in early October. the Squadron lIew its first Rhubarb three days later. This routine was followed for a few days and there appe ar to have been few problems and some action . with attacks on ground targets . However. it had already been decided that the teething troubles were more trouble than they were worth. a view enhanced by a series of accidents. some of them fat al. and the aircraft were taken out of service in March 1942. In fairness to the P-39 it did have a reasonable combat caree r with othe r users. including the USAAF and the Russians. Bell AI RACOB RA Pr ot otype . first flight Entry to service: 60 1 Sqn, Au gu st 1941 Squadron

Dales

Airfield,

601 Sqn

Au g 194 1- Ma r 1942

Matl ask, Duxford . Aca ster Malbi s

The Typhoon entered Fighter Command service with 56 Squadron in September / 94/.

Hawker TYPHOON Designed as a heavily-armed and fast day-fighter the Hawker Typhoo n was scheduled to enter service in summer 1940 and had it done so and had it met its specification it would have given a new perspective to the Bailie of Britain. In the event. develop ment was slower and performance less than predicted. Th e type had its origins in Specification F 18/37 for fighters equ ipped with the developmental engines predicted to yield 2.000hp. which in the case of the Typhoon was the Napier Sabre. Perhaps not surprisingly there were delays and problems with the engines; the prototype Typho on (P5212) lIew on 24 February 1940 but it was over a year before the first production aircraft took the air. with deliveries to the first unit . 56 Squadron at Duxfo rd, not taking place unti l September 194 I. It still looked promising with its 412mph speed - the first RAF fighter to exceed 400 - and four 20 mm cannon; by this time the RA F had settled on the 20 mm cannon as its standard fighter armament. However. other fighter performance elements were poor. including rate of climb and some elements of manoeuvrability . as well as a distinct dropoff in performance with height. evertheless. it was the reliability of the Sabre engine that caused 56 Squadron its majo r headaches and called the aircraft into question . Combat ops commenced with the Typhoon flying defensive missions against the hitand -run fighter-bombers. where its speed was a major advantage. and offensive missions with sweeps over Europe. All of this proved that the aircraft was viable. especially at lowlevel and especially with the addition of external weapo ns as the RAF turned its atte ntion to fighte r-bo mbing. Indeed. it was in the latter role with a steady increase in bomb-load to an impressive 2.000 lb and the filling or rails for Rocket Projectiles (RPs) that gave the Typhoon its tr ue place in the RAF as a gro und-attack machine. It was here that the bound aries with Fighter Command become somewhat blurred as new sq uad rons form ed primarily in this role; some initially operate d with the Comma nd whilst others were part of the tactica l Groups or 2nd Tactical Air Fo rce formed as par t of the build-up to D-Day.

Th e list of Typhoon opera tors shown below is limited to those with a known connection with Fighter Com mand. although the precise allocation of a unit in the period summer 1943 to summer 1944 can be con fusing. The tota l list of Typhoon units would be much longer as at least 23 squad rons operated with 2nd TAF - causing mayhem amongst German ground forces in Europe.

Ha wker TYP HOO:" Pr ot otype , first flight: P5212 . 24 Febru a ry 1940 Entry to service : 56 Sqn. September 1941 Squadron

Dates

Airfields

I Sqn

lui 1942-Apr 1944

3 Sqn 56 Sqn

Feb 1943- Apr 1944 Sep 194I -May 1944

175 Sqn

Apr 1943-Sep 1945

181 Sqn

Sep 1942-Sep 1945

182 Sqn

Sep 1942-Sep 1945

266 Sqn

Mar 1942-Aug 1945

486 Sqn RNZAF 609 Sqn

lui 1942-Apr 1944

Acklington . Biggin Hill. Lympne. Manlesham Heat h. North Weald Hunsdon . w est Malling. Man ston , Sw anto n Mor ley Duxford. Snailwell. Man ston . Matlask. Mau ston. Martlesham Heath. Bradwell Bay. Sco rto n. Acklin gton, A ye. Sco rton. Newchu rch Colerne, Lasham. Appl ed ram . Lydd . Westh ampneu . Holm sley So uth. Europe Duxford. Snailwell, G ra vesend . Lash am . Appledra m. New Romney. Odiham. Mer ston, Eastchurch, Hum. Europe Martl esham Heath. Sawbridgeworth. Middle Wallop . Fairlop. Lasham. Appledram. New Romney. Mer ston , Odih am . Eastchurcb. Hum. Europe Duxford . Matlask. Warmwell. Exeter. Harrowbeer, Bolt Head. Tangmere. Needs Oar Point. Eastchurch. Hum. Europe winering. North Weald. West Mailing, Tan gmere , Beaulieu. Drem. Castle Camps. Ayr Duxford . Bourn. Biggio Hill. Mausto n. Matlask . Lyrnpne , Fairwood Common. Tangmere. Acklington. Thomey Island. Llanbedr. Funtingdon. Europe

Apr 1942-Sep 1945

285

286

287

F IGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

De Havi lland MOSQ UITO The Mosquito was without doubt one of the great British aircraft of the war and it performed astoundingly well in a variety of roles with the three main opera~ional Commands - Bomber. Coastal and Fighter. The Mosquito was produced In an impressive number of Marks and served into the post war period ; .with Fighter Com mand it prima rily served as a night-fighter and from 1942 was the mam operationa l type in this role. although its intruder and fighter-bomber wor~ were also importa?t. The de Havilland Mosquito started life in late 1938 as a private venture for a highspeed. unarmed all-wooden bomber and there was little initial interest from an Air Staff that was looking towards a heavy bomber force. The prototype (W4050) flew on 25 ovember 1940 and its startling performance convinced any doubters that this aircraft had a future. and fighter and photo-reconnaissance variants prototypes were soon underwa y. Indeed. the original contract for 50 bombers was almost immediately changed to 30 fighters and 20 bombers. The fighter version was given the impressive armament of four 20 mm cannon and four 0.303 in machine guns. a mighty punch and one that meant that the nose of the aircraft had to be strengthened. as were the wing spars to make it suitable for fighter manoeuvres. The prototype night -fighter (W4052) The Mosquito F.II entered service with Fighter Command ill early 1942, 157 ~quadrollll/ . Castle Camps being the fir st unit; eventually some 466 of this variant .rere built, the majortty serving with Fighter Command.

flew on 15 May 1941 as the Mosquito II and it was also fitted with the Al Mk IV. one of the early series of air-to-air radars. Early trials proved promising and the F.I1 entered service with Fighter Command in early 1942. 157 Squadron at Castle Camps being the first unit; eventually some 466 of this variant were built. the majority serving with Fighter Command. Improvements in the radar increased the effectiveness of the aircraft. with the Mark XII being the first to have centimetr ic rada r (AI Mk Vlll); all were conversions from Mar k lIs and this also involved the removal of the machine guns to make way for the radar nose that would be the disting uishing feature of all subsequent NF varia nts. The Mosquito NF.X II entered service with 85 Squadron at Hunsdon in Feb ruary 1943 and over the next few years it was followed by a succession of night-fighter variants. The main differences between variants lay in the engines or radar. However. the success of the F.I1 in its offensive role as an intruder. pioneered by 23 Squadron from April 1942. led to the development of a true fighter-bomber. the Mosquito VI. This was used by Fighter Command for day and night offensive operations and carried an internal bomb-load as well as wing ha rd-points for bombs or fuel tanks. It was an undoubted success and was adopted by other operational Commands. Although not equipped as a night-fighter it also perfo rmed this role with some success. Night -fighters maintained offensive and defensive patro ls and in the former role the aircraft were ado pted by the specia list squadro ns of o. 100 G roup. with aircraft of this Bomber Comma nd Grou p and Fighter Command tasked with disrupting German nightfighter operations to support the bomber offensive. In terms of pure night-fighters the last variant to enter service during the war was the Mark XXX and by the latter months of the war this was the main version with Fighter Command. The wartime record of the M assie as a fighter included over 600 enemy aircraft and 600 flying-bombs. virtually all of these kills being at night. Two further night-fighter versions entered service with the Command in the postwar period. the NF .36 and the F.38. which were essentially the same except for the radar. The F.36 flew in May 1945 and the F.38 in ovember 1947; it was an example of the latter that was the last production Mosquito. VX916 being built at Chester in 111 Fighter Command service the NF.36 lI'as the final version and the filial fell' squadrons g(/\'e up their Mosquitoes ill the early 1950s, the last one being 23 Squadron at Coltishall, the Vampire NF.lO taking its place.

288

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

ovember 1950. However. in Fighter Command service the F.36 was the final version and the last few squ adrons gave up their Mosquitoes in the early 1950s. the final one being 23 Squadron at Coltishall, the Vampire F.IO taki ng its place. The Mosquito continued in RA F service into the mid 1950s and with overseas air forces even longer than thaI. A reasonable number of airframes have survived. with the collectio n at the Mosquito Aircraft Mu seum being particularly impressive. Sadly there is no airwort hy aircraft at present, or at least not one that act ually flies, although a number of restorations are underwa y.

289

Die KriecsftuCJ:eul e der Feindm ichte

A nlac e 28

GroBbritann ien De Havilland D. H. 98

"Mosquito"

H e hrz wec keflul z e uC (Aufklarer, leichtes K..mpfnug:z:eug un d Zerstorer)

De Havil land ;\IOSQ ITO Pr oto type . firs t fligh t: W4050. 25 Novem be r 1940 En try to servi ce: F.II; 157 Sqn, l anua ry 1942

Squadron

Dales

Airfields

23 Sq n

Ford. Mau ston. Bradwell Bay. .Malta w at ering. Co ltisha ll. Church Fenton . Ho rsham 51 Faith

25 Sqn

l un 1942-Dec 1942 Sep 1946 -1un 1952 Oct 1942 -Oct 1951

29 Sqn

May 1943-Aug 1951

68 Sqn 85 Sqn

l ui 1944 - A pr 1945 Au g 1942-Oct 1951

96 Sq n 125 Sqn 141 Sqn 151 Sqn

Oct 1943-Dec 1944 Feb 1944-Nov 1945 lun 1946- Dec 1951 Apr 1942-Oct 1946

157 Sqn

Jan 1942-(Aug 1945)

219 Sqn

Feb 1944 -Sep 1946

264 Sq n

May 1942-Aug 1945

No v 1945-1 an 1952 307 Sqn Polish 409 Sq n RCAF 4 10 Sqn RCA F 4 18 Sqn RCA F 456 Sq n RAA F 488 Sqn R ZAF 604 Sqn

Dec 1942- No v 1946 Mar 1944 -1un 194 5 Oct 1942- 1un 1945 Mar 1943-Sep 1945 Dec 1942-1un 1945

Church Fent on. Acklington , Collishall. Cas tle Camps. Boxted , West Mailing Bradwell Bay. Ford . Drem . West Mailing. Hunsdon , Co leme. Man ston , Spilsby, Ac klington . T angm ere Castle Camps. Coltisha ll, Winerin g. Church Fenton Hun sdon, West Mailing. Swann ington. Castle Camps. Tangmere. Acklin gton . Church Fenton Dr em, West Mailing. Ford. Odih am Valley. H um . Midd le Wallop . Co ltishall , Chu rch Fen ton Witt ering. Acklington . Cohishall. Church Fenton Witt erin g. Co leme . Middle Wallop . Predannack. Cas tle Camps. Hunsdon, Brad well Bay. Exeter. Weston Zoyland Castle Camps. Bradwell Bay. Hunsdon. Predannack. Valley. Swa nningto n, West Malling Wood vale. Hon iley. Coleme. Bradwell Bay. Hunsdon, Europe. Acklington . Sp ilsby, Witte rin g Coleme. Predann ack. Fairwood Common. Coleby Grange. Church Fenton. Hartford Bridge. Hunsdon . Europe. Ccle me. Od iham Church Fenlon. Spilsby, Liruon- on-Ouse. Ackling to n. Wittering, Co ltisha ll Exeter. Fairwood Common. Pred ann ack, Drem. Coleby Grange. Church Fenton. Castle Camps. Horsham St Faith Acklington, Hun sdon, West Mailing. Europe Acklington . Co leby G ran ge. West Mailin g. Hun sd on. Cas tle Camps. H unsdon. Zeals. Cole me. Europe Ford. Holm sley So uth. H um. Middl e Wallop. Hunsdon. Blackbushe. Europe Valley. M iddle Wallop . Co leme . Fa irwood Common. Ford.

Church Fenton. Bradwell Bay A ug 1943-Apr 1945

Drem . Bradwell Bay. Cole me. Zea ls. H unsdon, Europe

Feb 1944-Apr 1945

Sco rton, Church Fenton. Hum. Co lerne, Zeals. Europe. Pred annack. Odiham Fo rd. Cas tle Ca mps. Brad well Bay. Mau ston. Blackb ushe, Europe Honile y Th omaby

605 Sqn

Feb 1943-Aug 1945

608 Sqn 609 Sqn 616 Sqn

May 1947-Sep 1948 lui 1947-1un 1948 Apr 1947-Sep 1948 Sep 1947-M ay 1949

Yeadon Finningley

Au . h/l:1duJ' "lid ldeAlt.! KtI"" ,, /fwtj:, Ilf) o }, n_ IktDflff1t1l.1tI]. til. Z#'r~t"".cr l Krr rtOltni . Kul, 2fl """. wild I MJ'Te JIG., 1\al. 7.7 "'nt. i", Rw",l'/' Kd M /'"~gflt-Ju U,truRnIHtl} . (Iliffl J' d,. f'I"t,F"'?4 ,.....11 ..kAl ro,.4",tdnt.)

290

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Hawker TEMPEST Derived from the Typho on but with aerodynamic improvements. including a new wing. the Hawker Tempest was designed to have longer range and to operate as a pure fighter. The initial problems with the Sabre engine had been largely ironed-ou t by the time prototype HM 595 (a converted Typhoon V) flew on 2 September 1942 but it was still Jun e 1943 before the first prod uction example of the Tempest V flew - and this was the only Mark to see opera tiona l service in World War Two. With a top speed of 435 mph the Tempest was the fastest RAF fighter and its all-round performance was good, including a normal range of over 700 miles and an extended range of over 1,500 miles. Tempests entered service with 486 Squadr on in Janu ar y 1944 and within months there was a Tempest Wing of three sq uadrons. Th e aircraft's initial ope rat ions were the same as those of all the other fighters and fighter-bombers - attac king anything enemy tha t moved air and ground in Euro pe. However. with the launch of the V- I attacks on Britain the Tempests became par t of the anti Diver defences, the speed and firepower of the aircra ft proving effective. The aircraft also operate d offensively over Europe to the end of the war and even scored a number of jet 'kills' on Me262s. Th e post-war period saw Tempest li s and Vis in service with the RA F, the former in RA F Ge rmany and with Fighter Command and the latter primarily in the Midd le East and Africa. As with other fighter types the Tempest also served with a number of trainin g and support units. some in support of Fighter Command. and the last ones left No . 233 OCU (Pembrey) in Jul y 1955.

With a top speed of 435 mph the Temp est was the f astest RAF fig hter and its all-round performance was good. including a normal range of orer 700 miles and all extended range of orer 1.500 miles.

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

Ha wker TEMPEST Pro to type, first flight : LA 60 2. 28 J une 1943 En try to se rvice: 486 Sqn, Ja n ua ry 1944 Squadron

Dates

Airfields

3 Sqn 54 Sqn 56 Sqn 80 Sqn 183 Sqn 222 Sqn 247 Sqn 274 Sqn 349 Sqn 486 Sqn

Feb 1944- (Ap r 1948) Nov 1945- Ocl 1946 J un 1944- (Apr 1946) Au g 1944- (Feb 1948) Oct 1945- No v 1945 Jan 1945-Oct 1945 Sep 1945-May 1946 Aug 1944-Sep 1945 Feb 1945-Apr 1945 Jan 1944- Sep 1945

50 1 Sqn

J ul 1944- Apr 1945

Mauston. Bradwell Bay. Newchurch. Matlask, Europe Chilbol to n. Od iham Newchurch. Matlask. Europe Manston . Co ltisha ll. Europe Fairwood Common. Chilbo lton Predannack. Europe. w eston Zoyland . Moleswo rt h Chilbo lto n Mauston. Co ltisha ll. Europe Predannack. Europe Tan gmere, Beaulieu. Deem. Castle Camps. Newchu rch. Matlask, Europe ~esth arnpn ett . Manston . Bradwell Bay. Hunsdon

North America n MUSTANG The P-51 Mu stan g was another of the fighter types that truly deserved its wartime epithets; the combinat ion of a superb aerodyna mic airfra me and the Merlin engine create d a superlative fighter that was produced in large num bers for the USAAF but also saw service with the Allies. Figh ter Comma nd was late in acq uiring the Mu stang and by autumn 1944 had only four squadro ns of Mustang Ill s for the long-range escort role; however, the num bers continued to increase, partly through an exchange of units with 2nd TAF . and by April 1945 the Order of Battle included 16 Mu stang units.

The Mu stang 011/.1' became significant within Fight er Command from late 1944; 309 Squadron at Peterhead.

29 1

292

The RAF had ordered the Alison-powered M ustang in 1940, the first aircraft flying the following April, the original intention being that it would go to Fighter Command. However, performance deficiencies above 15,000 ft. the introd uction of better Spitfires and a lowering of the immediate German threat led to a rethink; the Mustang I entered service with Army Co-operation Command in the Tactical Recon naissance role in early 1942, the first unit being 26 Squadron . It performed well with this Command and the RA F eventuall y had 16 squadrons in this basic role. The USAAF also took an interest in the aircraft, which led to improvements in the aircraft and to a reluctance to let anyone else have any! The main part of the Mustang story was very much an American one and the large numbers of P-51s that served with the VIIlth and IXth Fighter Commands, but that is outside of the scope of this book . However, the success of the P-51 in longrange escort and the failings of the Spitfire in this regard led to a reappraisal by Fighter Com mand and a decision to acquire Mustangs. At the end of 1943 the RAF began to receive the Mu stang III. with o. 122 Wing at Gravesend the first to re-equip. A March 1944 report by the Air Fighti ng Develop ment Unit compared the Mustang III agains t vario us RA F and German fighters; the conclusions concerning tact ical comparison with the Bf 109G and Fw 190 were; ' In attack. the Mustan g can always catch the Me 109G, except in any sort of climb (unless there is a high overtaking speed). In defence, a steep turn sho uld be the first man oeuvre, followed, if necessar y, by a dive (below 20,000 ft). A high speed climb will unfortunately not increase the range. If above 25,000 feet keep above by climbing or all-out level. In the attack, a high speed shou ld be maint ained or regained in orde r to regain height initiative. An Fw 190 cou ld not evade by diving alone. In defence a steep turn followed by a full throttle dive should increase range before regaining height and course . Dog-fighting is not altogether recommended. Do not at tempt to climb away without at least 250 mph showing initia lly'. (AF DU Report o. 101, March 1944). Despite the type's success and popularity with the USAAF, the RAF' s fighter pilots were invariably reluctant to give-up their beloved Spitfires for the Must ang . Some ORBs and personal accounts make disparaging comments about their 'new mounts', although this usually changed after a few weeks of familiarity. whilst othe rs recorded the event and the problems in a more matter-of-fact way. The 234 Squadron ORB for 29 September 1944 stated: 'they 've come, the first batch of Mustangs, also a section of fillers etc from Air Ministry to give us the gen. F/L Conroy came to the Squadron for a few days to assist pilots in converting from Spitfires to the new type. Pilots spent all their time sitting in the Mustang cockpits gelling to know the man y new gadgets and instruments and also reading up Pilots otes. The CO. Flight Commanders and deputies were able to make one 30 minute trip each .' A few days later. 4 October: 'tons of snags seem to keep turning up. but the ground crews are responding famously and coping with everything that comes along.' Mustangs served in the fighter role with Fighter Command and 2nd TAF. and in the Armed Reconnaissance role, with increasing numbers of squadrons equipping with the type in late 1944 and early 1945. As previously mentioned, there is confusion during this period, in part the temporary allocatio n of units, between ADG B/Fighter Comma nd and the 2nd TAF/AEAF in terms of squadron 'ow nership' . It would seem that approximately 19 squadrons that served with ADGB/Fighter Com mand operated the Mu stang and these are shown in the table below. In Fighter Comman d service the type only lasted a year post -war, the final unit, 65 Squad ron at Linton- on-Ouse, re-equipped with Horn ets in May 1946.

293

OPERATIO

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6 - 19 6 8

Die Krlegsfluguuge der Fe i ndm i ch t e

A nl az:c 19i1.

GroBbritannien und USA,

North American

"Mustangl l (P·51)')

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•••

Zst /f(J. Ko/.lomm fstHOI0/. f4 7mm

1)

U~A ••\\ Crb

kuichnlUUt: North Amn ican NA.73.

...

294

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

No rth America n M USTANG Pro to type. first fligh t: M ustan g I (AG345). I M ay 1941 Entry to service: Must an g III . 65 Sqn, D ec 1943 Squadron

Dates

Airfields

19 Sqn

Jan 1944- Mar 1946

64 Sqn 65 Sqn

Nov 1944- May 1946 Dec 1943-May 1946

118 Sqn 122 Sqn

Jan 1945- Mar 1946 Jan 1944-Aug 1945

126 Sq n 129 Sqn

Dec 1944-Apr 1946 Mar 1944-May 1945

234 Sqn 306 Sqn

Sep 1944- Aug 1945 Ap r 1944- Dec 1946

315 Sqn

Mar 1944-Dec 1946

316 Sqn

Apr 1944- Nov 1946

441 Sqn 442 Sqn 611 Sqn

May 1945-Aug 1945 Mar 1945- Aug 1945 Mar 1945- Aug 1945

G ravesend , Fo rd. Southend. Funtingdo n, Europe. Matlask, Andrews Field. Peterh ead . Acklington. Bradwell Bay. Moleswort h Brad well Bay. Bent waters. Horsham St Faith Gravesend. Ford. Funtingdon. Ford. Southend, Europe. Matl ask. Peterhead . A nd rews Field . Bent waters. Banff Herbel. Spilsby. Horsham St Faith Bentwaters, Fairwood Common. Horsham 51 Faith Gravesend . Fo rd. Fu ntingdon, So uthend, Europe. Matlask, And rews Field. Peterhead , Dyce Bradwell Bay. Bentwa ters. Hethet Hes to n. Llanbed r, Coolham , Fo rd. Brenzett . Andrew s Field . Bentwaters North Weald. Bentwaters, Peterhead. Dyce. Hawkinge Cool ham . Holmsley South. Ford. Brenzett. Andrews Field. Colt isball . Fairwood Common Heston. Llanbedr, Coolham . Holmsley South. Ford. Brenzett, Andrews Field. Col tishall . Peterhead. Fairwood Common Woodvale, Co ltisha ll. \Vest Mailing. Friston . Andrews Field. Fairwood Common. Wick. Hethel Digby. Molesworth Hunsdon. Digby. Molesworth Hunsdon, Peterhead

The Cold War Fighter Command ended the war still largel y equ ipped with Spitfires and with an offensive rather than defensive posture, a lthough the Luftwaffe had continued to make some incursions in the latter months of the war , especially at night. In terms o f its post war doctrine the Comm and was left with no obvio us threat until the relati on s between East a nd West broke down in the late 1940s, after which the Cold War domin ated the military posture for the next 50+ year s. The prim ar y role remained as it always had been - to defend the U K again st air a tta ck a nd to depl oy fighters to other opera tio nal are as as required . Th e basic req uirement for equipment initi ally comprised a mix of day and night fighters, although the all-weather aircraft gradually replaced the latter and, argua bly, part of the role of the former. It was obvio usly going to be a jet forc e a nd although a number of piston types served int o the earl y 1950s it was the jets, Mete ors and Vampires, th at soon became the backbone of the Command. In essence all that changed over the next few years was the performance of the aircraft, culminating in the superso nic Lightning, a nd the weap on system - the combinat ion of radar and gun s, with air-to-air missiles (AA Ms) supplanting the latter. The only other significant 'ch ange' was the suggestion th at manned a ircra ft had not future a nd th at surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) wo uld dominat e future air defence strategy. Fighter Command opera ted the Bloodhound SAM batteries that were defending the RAF's nuclear assets.

OPERATIONA

AIRCRAFT

Gloste r METE O R By a ny sta nda rds the Gloster Mete or deserves to be classified as one of the grea t military aircra ft; it was the first opera tiona l jet in RAF service a nd it was produced in large numbers, in num erou s versions and was a major expo rt success. For Fighter Command it was the main day and night fighter int o the late 1950s with do zens of squadrons and hundreds of air craft; ind eed, one of the last period s when the RAF fielded an aircra ft type in significant numbers. The Meteor is included in the Co ld War section as it was in this peri od th at the type was the mainstay of Fighter Comm and - but it did of course make its first a ppea rance in the last year of World War Two . Ge stat ion of the Meteor was lon g and complicat ed and had its origins in Specification F9/40. First flight of a British jet air craft was the E28/39 experimental aircraft (W404 1) with its single sma ll turbojet on 15 May 1941. Th e first actua l Met eor to fly was DG206 on 5 Ma rch 1943 and production Mete or Mk. Is were given two Weiland engines, which gave a max speed of aro und 385 mph (at sea level). It was by no mean s sta rtling and reliabilit y was, not surprisingly, a probl em - but it was a lready recognised that development potent ial for piston s was limited but for jets had only j ust sta rted . Standa rd a rma ment was four 20 mm cannon in the nose and in Jul y 1944 the first few aircraft were handed to 616 Squ adron . Dennis Barry was one of the first of the Squ adron 's pilots to fly the Mete or: As I taxied out to the end ofthe Farnborough rullll'/lY in M eteor Mk I EE2141G. I ran through the drill as brief ed by the Group Captain and then I positioned the aircraft ready for tak e-off Throttles forwa rd, ma ximum P OII "Cr while holding on the brakes. then brakes released and slowly accelerate do wn the r/(/1\I'/IY. No swing, no drag, and hold the stick level IInti/ 80 mph indicated. then ease st ick back and lift off the runll'ay at 120mph. Wheels lip and climb all'ay. retrac ting the flaps. The rate of climb is originally poor, 500 feet a minute, but as the P OII"Cr builds lip the rate increases. Local flying noll', the aircraft is quiet with no noise from the engines, 0111,1' a 'whooshing ' sound from the air passing the cockpit. lik e a glider. The visibility is good with 0111.1' a shallow nose ill front and is similar to being ill a ll airship 's observation car. Landing successfu lly completed, I return to my colleagues sat isfied with the aircraft excep t for the power. White-painted Meteor 016 16 Squadron; the Squadron lI'as the first RAFje t unit,

295

296

OPE

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968 The Mete or's main contribution to o pera tio ns in World War T wo was in the ca mpaig n against th e V-I and pilot s claimed 260 of the flying bombs between J uly and September 1944, with 215 o f th ose bein g downed in August : the first jet 'kill' occ urred o n 4 August when Fg Off Dean used his wing-tip to flip-o ver a V-I. his guns ha vin g jammed . A further 23 were claimed in the mini V-I ca mpa ign of March 1945 . No . 616 Squ adron sent a det achment to the Continent in th e closing stages of the war but no jet v jet combat took place, the only targets being ground ones. Meteor I1Is and F.3s entered service with the Command and took the type into the post-war peri od , where from late 1947 they gave way to the FA variant. This latter had th e far better Derwent 5 engines and it equipped 21 sq ua d ro ns in Fighter Command, becom ing the first of the post- war sta lwa rts. The FA had a top speed of 585 mph a t sea level - an indication of j ust how rapidly th e je ts were devel oping. The next va ria nt to enter servi ce o nly gav e a 10 mph increase in speed but is generally con sidered to have been the best of the Meteo rs, in part becau se of its excellent bubble canopy and imp ro ved handling - as well as having a n ejecti on seal. The Meteor F .8 served with 30 sq ua d ro ns of Fighter Command, 10 of th ose bein g Au xiliary Air Force units; the first un it, 245 Squadron at Horsh am St Faith, received F.8s in June 1950 . It wa s an impressive force of many hund reds of ai rcra ft but it had a limited life: 245 Squadron was a lso the last user, giving up its Meatb oxes fo r Hunters in April 1957.

N ight-fighter The night-fighter va ria nt was given no pri ority, its de velopment being handed to Armst rong-Whitworth a nd the first NF.ll (W A54 6) not flying until 31 May 1950. Entry to service was with 29 Squ adron in Jul y 1951 when it repl aced Mosquito F.30s. The F . II was de veloped under Spec ificat ion F24/48 and in essence was a lengthened airfra me for two cre w a nd nose-mounted rad ar, with the four 20 mm cannon being in the wings. Three other va ria nts followed in quick successio n: the F.12 (improved radar), F .13 (tro pica lised for use in the Middle Ea st) and NF.14 (improv ed avio nics and a

Meteors 0/85 Squadron; the Squadr on operated N F Meteors / rom / 951 to 1958.

T

clear-vision bubble canop y). Fighter Command used the m a ll except the F.13 a nd so was, a long with sq ua drons in Germany, a major o pera to r of the 556 Meteor nightfighters del ivered to the RAF, the NF.II being the co mmo nest va riant (3 16). The NF Meteors were reasonably effective in peace-time exercises but for Fighter Command it was a br ief peri od as by the lat e 1950s most sq ua drons had re-equipped with Javelins o r been re-roled. A number of airwo rthy Meteors survi ve and can be seen at airshows in the UK, whilst the type is 'resident' in a large number of aviat ion museums. Gloster l\IETEOR P ro tot ype , first fligh t: D G 205. 5 M arch 1943 Entry to service: 616 Sq n, J uly 1944 Squadron

Dates

Airfi elds

I Sqn

Oct I946-Jun 1958

19 Sqn 25 Sqn 29 Sq n 33 Sq n 34 Sqn 41 Sqn 43 Sqn 46 Sqn 54 Sqn 56 Sqn

Jan 1951-Jan 1957 Mar 1954 - Apr 1959 Jul 1951-Dec 1957 Sep 1957-A ug 1958 A ug 1954- Dec 1955 Jan 1951-J ul 1955 Feb 1949- Sep 1954 A ug 1954- Feb 1946 Apr 1952- Mar 1955 Apr 1946-Jun 1955

Tangmere, Acklington . Stradishall. Waterbeach, w est Raynham. \Vittering Church Fenton \Vest Mailing. Tangmere. w a terbeacb Tangmere. Ac klington

63 64 65 66 72 74

Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn Sqn

Apr 1948-Jan 1957 Dec 1950-Sep 1958 Dec 1950-Feb 1957 Mar 1947- Apr 1954 Jul 1952- J un 1959 May 1945-Mar 1957

85 Sqn 91 Sqn 92 Sq n III Sqn 124 Sqn 125 Sq n 151 Sqn 152 Sqn 153 Sqn 222 Sqn

Sep 1951- No v 1958 Oct 1946- Ja n 1947 Jan 1947-Feb 1954 Dec 1953- Jun 1955 A ug 1945-Apr 1946 Mar 1955- Jan 1956 Mar 1953- Oct 1955 Jun 1954- Jul 1958 Feb 1955- Jun 1958 Oct 1945-Dec 1954

234 Sqn 245 Sqn

Feb I946-Sep 1946 A ug 1945- Ap r 1957

247 Sq n 257 Sq n

Apr 1952-J un 1955 Sep 1946- Ma r 1955

263 Sqn

Aug 1945- A pr 1955

264 Sqn

Nov 1951-Oct 1957

266 Sq n

Sep 1946- Feb 1949

Leeming Tangmere Chu rch Fent on . Biggin Hill Tangmere, Leuchars Odiham Odiham Bentwaters. Boxted . Acklington. Wattisham. D uxfo rd , Thomey Island. Waterbeach Midd le Wallop. Th omey Island . Waterbeach Lint on-on-Ouse, Duxford Lint on-on-O use. Duxford Duxford, Linton-on-O use North Weald . Church Fent on Coleme. Fairwood Common. Bent wa ters, Horsham St Faith. Acklington w est Mailing. Church Fenton D uxford

Acklington. Duxford. Linton-on-Ouse No rth Weald Molesworth. Bent wat ers, Fairwo od Common Strad ishall Leuchars Wau isham. 5tradishall West Mailing. Waterbeach Moleswo rth. Exeter, Spilsb y. Boxted, Westo n Zo yland . Tangmere, Thomey Island. Leuch ars Molesworth. Boxted Coleme. Fairwood Common. Bentwaters, Horsham St Faith. Stradishall Odiham Church Fenton. Acklington. Horsham St Faith. Wat tisham, Wymeswold Mauston. Acklington. Cha rterha ll. Church Fenton. Horsham St Faith . Wattisharn Lint on -on -O use. Leuchar s. Acklington , Middleton St George. Leeming Boxted . Acklington. Wattisham. Tangmere

297

298

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

500 Sqn 5 ~ Sq n

600 Sqn 601 Sqn 604 Sq n 609 Sqn 610 Sqn 6 1J Sqn 6 15 Sqn 6 16 Sq n

Jul 1948-Mar 1957 Oct 1949-Feb 1957 Mar 1950-Ma r 1957 Aug 1952-Mar 1957 Aug 1952-Mar 1957 Jan 1951- Mar 1957 Jul 1951-Mar 1957 May 1951-M ar 1957 Sep 1950-Mar 1957 Jul 1944-Aug 1945 Jan 1949- Ma r 1957

West Mailing Wym eswold Biggin Hill North Weald Nort h Weald Ch urch Fenton Hoo ton Park Wood vale. Hoo ton Park Biggin Hill Culmhead. Mauston. Co leme. Europe Finn ing ley, W ork sop

De Havilland HORN ET If it had appeared a few months earlier the Hornet may have become a significant aircraft as its long range (3.000 miles) and good all-ro und performance, includin g a max speed of aro und 480 mph would have made it a potent fighter in the latter stages of World War Two, Powered by two Merlin s the aircraft was developed by de Havilland as a longran ge fighter and was produced to Specification F12/43. the protot ype (RR9 15) flying on 28 July 1944, It was eventu ally produced in two fighter variants. the F.l and F,3. the forme r enter ing service with 64 Squadron at Horsham St Faith in Febru ary 1946. Standard arma ment was four 20 mm cann on but there was also pro vision for the fighterbomber role with bomb s or rocket s under the wings. The RAF too k delivery of j ust over 200 aircraft. with further orders cancelled with the end of the war and the run-down of strength. Church Fent on and Horsham St Faith had two squadro ns of Hornet s each as the day-fighter component of their Wings and the type remained in service with the Command to March 1951. when they were replaced by Meteors. Th at same month saw Hornets join the Far East Air Force. with whom they saw some operational service during the anti-terro rist campa ign in Malaya (Operation Firedog ). Hornet

0 11I of Linton -on-Ous

e, 1949; the type servedfor less than 5 years in Fighter Command.

OPERATIONAL AI

CRAFT

De Havilla nd HO RN ET Prot ot ype , first flight: RR915. 28 J uly 1944 Entry to service: 64 Sq n, Fe b 1946 Squadron

Da tes

Airfields

19 41 64 65

Oct Jun Feb Ju n

Wittering. Church Fenton Church Fenton

Sqn Sq n Sqn Sqn

1946- Jan 1951 1948-Mar 1951 1946- Ma r 1951 1946- Feb 1951

Horsham St Faith. Acklington, Linton-on-Ouse Horsham St Faith. Lint on-on -Ou se, Acklington

De Havilland VAM P IRE Th e de Havilland Vampire was the second British jet type to enter operational service. although this was just too late to see active service in World War Two. Design work. with a workin g name of Spider Crab. began in 1941 and under Specificati on E6 /41 the design crystallised into twin-boom. this being chosen in order to limit the length of the jet pipe. Prototype Vampire LZ548 first flew. from Hatfield. in September 1943. power being provided by a single DH Goblin of 2.700 Ib thrust. In May 1944 a production order was placed for 120 aircraft - to be built by English Electric at Preston as de Havilland was already committed to vita l progr ammes such as the Mosquito. The first EE-built producti on Vampire F. I (TG274 ). flew from Samlesbury on 20 April 1945 but it was not until the following April that the first unit. 247 Squad ron at Odih arn, re-equipped. The first batch of 40 aircraft had the origina l 2.7001b Goblin but subsequent F.l s had a 3.100 Ib version. whilst aircraft from o. 50 onwards were also given pressurised cockp its and a bubble hood . One of the major restr ictions on the aircra ft was tha t it only had a 202 gallon fuel tank - not much for a thirsty early generation jet engine! Th e follow-on aircraft. the F.3. had a 326-gallon tan k and provision for external fuel tank s, as well as a redesigned tail. The aircra ft continued to be developed and furth er operational mark s Vamp ire of 24 7 S quadron; the Squadron lras the first to opera te Vampires (f rom M arch 1946).

299

300

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

entered service - the FB.5, the first of the gro und-attack variants entered service in December 1948, and the FB.9, a tropi calised version for the RAF in the Middle East and Far East, in Janu ar y 1952. The only other operational variant in RAF service was the NF.IO, a two-seat side-by-side night fighter that first flew in Augu st 1949 and was aimed at the export mark et - the RA F having settled on the Meteor as its night fighter. The Egyptian order was subseq uently barred from delivery and so the RAF took over these, and more, NF.lOs. The first NF var iant s joined Fighter Command in July 1951, with 25 Squadron at West Mailing replacing its Mosqu ito NF.36s. Two further Fight er Command squadro ns (25 and 151 ) used the NF.I Obut it was a short-lived utilisation and within two years the squadro ns had re-equipped with Meteors or Venom night-fighters. The day-fighter variants had a longer career, with Vampires in the Command for over 10 years, alth ough much of this period was with the auxiliary units, the regular squadrons having reequipped in the early 1950s. The final Fighter Command Vampire squad rons vanished with the disbandment in March 1957 of the Auxiliary Air Force. Many museum collections house one or more Vampires and a numb er of airworthy examples can also be seen, mainly in the U K . De H..-illand VAMPtRE Pro totype, first flight : LZ548, Septe mber 1943 Entry to serv ice: 247 Sqn , April 1946 Squadron

Da tes

Airfields

23 Sqn 25 Sqn 54 Sqn 72 Sq n 130 Sqn 151 Sqn 247 Sqn

Sep 1951-Jan 1954 Jul 1951 -Feb 1954 Oct 1946- Apr 1952 Feb 1947- May 1953 Oct 1946- Jan 1947 Feb 1952- May 1953 Mar 1946-May 1952

Colt ishall. Horsham St Faith West Mailing Odiham, Acklington Odiham . Acklington . North Weald Odih am

501 Sqn 502 Sqn 601 Sqn 602 Sqn 603 Sqn 604 Sqn 605 Sqn 607 Sqn 608 Sqn 612 Sqn 613 Sqn 614 Sqn

Nov 1948-Feb 1957 Jan 1951 - Ma r 1957 Nov 1949-Sep 1952 Jan 1951 - Mar 1957 May 1951-Feb 1957 Nov 1949-Aug 1952 Jul 1948- Mar 1957 Mar 1951- Mar 1957 May 1950-Feb 1957 Jun 1951 - Mar 1957 Feb 1951 -Mar 1957 Jul 1950- Mar 1957

Leuch ars

Chilbolton, Fairwood Common. West Mailing. Odiha m. Acklington

Filton A ldergrove

North Weald Abbotsinch, Leucha rs. Renfrew T um house. Leuchars North Weald Honiley Ouston Thornaby Dyce. Leuchars. Edzell Ringway Llandow

De Hav illand VENOM Th e Venom entered RAF service as a fighter-bomber in 1952, primarily for service in RAF Germ any and it was the night fighter variant, the NF.2 that first served with Fighter Command. The NF .2 was based on a private venture (speculative and not contrac ted) night-fighter version that first flew in Augu st 1950, and it was primarily aimed at the export market. The basic concept for the two-seater was the same as that of

The Venom was always an interim solution to the Comma nd's desire fo r a purp ose-built allweather aircraft, which \I'as under developm ent as the Javelin, and alth ough eight Fight er Command squadrons used N F Venoms it \I'as only a fo ur-year period, the last of the squadrons re-quipping in Nove mber 1957.

the Vampire NF .1O and it was logical that the RAF ado pt the new aircraft. Despite some problems the NF .2 entered service with 23 Squadron at Coltishall in November 1953 and eventually some 90 of this version were built. Two years later (June 1955) the NF.3 joined 141 Squadron, with 129 of the improved version entering service. Stand ard arm ament was four 20 mm cann on under the nose. The Venom was always an interim solution to the Comm and 's desire for a purposebuilt all-weather aircraft. which was under development as the Javelin, and although eight Fighter Command squadrons used NF Venoms it was only a four -year period , the last of the squadrons re-quipping in No vember 1957. Like its cou sin the Vampire, the Venom has sur vived in reasonable numb ers in museums and with some airworthy aircraft. De H avilland VENO;\t Prot ot ype. first flight: N F.2. WP 227. 22 A ugust 1950 Entry to serv ice: 23 Squ ad ron , November 1953 Squadron

Da tes

Airfields

23 Sqn 33 Sqn 89 Sqn 125 Sqn 14 1 Sqn 151 Sqn 219 Sqn 253 Sqn

Nov 1953-M ay 1957 Dec 1955- Ju l 1957 Jan 1956- Nov 1957 Dec 1955-May 1957 Jun 1945- Mar 1957 Sep 1955- Jun 1957 Sep 1955- Jul 1957 Apr 1955-A ug 1957

Collishall. Horsham St Faith Driffield Stradishall Stradi shall Cc ltishal l. Hor sham St Fa ith Leuchars Driffield Wa terbeach

30 1

302

F IGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

303

North American F-86 SA BRE The Sabre established a reputation during the Korean War a an effective jet fighter. in combat with Chinese MiGs - by which time the RAF had already placed an order for the swept-wing American fighter. This was an interim measure to close a capability gap pending introduction of the Hunter and the majority of the RAF's 430 Sabres served with squad rons in Germany. with only two Fighter Command units operating the type from Linto n-on-Ouse . The pro totype XP-86 flew in October 1947 and it was the F-86E variant. in production from 1950and built by Canadair that the RAF acquired. Sabres started their career with the Wildenrath Wing in May 1953. and with 66 Squadron as the first Fighter Command user the following January. Two years later both UK squadrons had reequipped with Hunters. but the pilots had enjoyed their brief flirtation with the Sabre . As with most of the Cold War types the Sabre is a popular museum exhibit in the Western World and in the USA a significant number are airworthy in private collections . F-86 Sa bres of 66 Squadron at Lint on-on-Ouse; the Sabre served with Fighter Command.

/1 \"0

squadrons ill

Supermari ne SWIFT S uperma rine S W IFT The Swift had a 'bad reputation' and is an Prot ot ype. first flight : WJ 960. 1 Au gust 1951 aircraft that is often ignored, despite its Ent ry to service: 56 Sqn , February 195-1 limited success as a Fighter-Recce type. Squadr on Dares Airfi elds Only one Fighter Command unit used the Swift. and only for thirtee n mon ths. The 56 Sqn Feb 195-1-Mar 1955 \Vaterbeach aircraft was the first RAF swept-wing fighter and as such was trail-blazing certain technologies. although it was ordered as an insurance against possible problems with that other swept-wing design. the Hawker Hunter. The prototype flew in August 1951 and the aircraft entered service as the F.I with 56 Squadron at Waterbeach in February 1954. With an armament of only two Aden cannon and with limited performance. the F. l was not an impressive fighter - and it also suffered various technical problems . which led to the loss of three of the eight aircraft with 56 Squadron! The follow-on F.2 was little better and by early 1955 the decision had been taken to phase the type out of Fighter Command. The F.3 variant did not enter service and the only 'successful" variant was the F R.5. which served with two squadrons in Germany for a few years. The Swift was 1I0t a success and as a fighter only served with 56 Squadron.

North American F-86 SA BRE Prot otype. first flight: XP- 86. I Oct obe r 19-17 Entry to service: 3 Sqn , May 1953 Squadr on

Dates

Airfields

66 Sqn 92 Sqn

Jan 195-1-Mar 1956 Feb 195-1-Apr 1956

Linton-on-Ouse

Linton-on-Ouse

Hawker H UNTER Whenever the words 'classic fighter" and ' British' are put together the Hunter comes near the top of the list. and there is no doubt that this was one of the great post-war British designs, although it did suffer problems when first introduced. The Hunter served in a number of variants and in a number of roles, with the RAF and with overseas air arms . As far as Fighter Com mand was concerned its heyday was in the 1950s when the Order of Battle included 15 squadrons with Hun ters in the day-fighter role. The prototypes to Specification F.3/48 were orde red in June 1948 - anot her of the great late 1940s designs - and the first one flew in July 1951, with entry to service of the Hunter F.I with 43 Squadron at Leuchars in July 1954. This, like most Hunters, was

304

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

54 Sqn 56 Sqn 63 Sq n 66 Sqn 74 Sqn 92 Sqn III Sqn 222 Sq n 245 Sqn 247 Sq n 257 Sqn 263 Sq n

Hunt ers of the 43 Squadron fo rma tion team; Hunters served ill the Command's squadrons from July 1954 to April 1963.

essentially a day fighter whose pilot had a gun -pack of four cannons as his means of shooting-down the enemy . The guns were a problem with the F .I with gun-firing causing engine surge above a certain height (a problem suffered by many jet aircraft), although the problem was essentially overcome in the F.2. Variants came thick and fast; the FA, with more fuel and improved all-round performance, entered service in June 1955 with III Squadron and was also to be the first variant to serve overseas with the RAF (its major usage being in RAF Germany). The F.5 came a nd went and then the F .6 appeared - the first of the classic Hunters and the first produced in large numbers. This Avon-powered Hunter entered service in October 1956 and within two years had reequipped all the Fighter Command squadrons. The demise of the Hunter in the fighter role came in the early 1960s, in part with the introduction o f the Lightning but also with some squ adrons adopting an air support role (with the Hunter FGA.9). The Hunter is an increasingly popular 'warbird' with private flyers and the UK in particular has a healthy population of airworthy Hunters, whilst the type is a lso common in museums.

H aw ker HUi'o'T ER Protot ype, first flight: WB1 88, 20 July 1951 Ent ry to service: 43 Sqn, J ul y 1954 Sq uadron

Dat es

A irfields

I Sqn 19 Sqn 43 Sqn 45 Sqn

Sep 1955-Mar 1960 Oct 1956-Feb 1963 Jul 1954-Jun 1961 Aug 1972-Jul 1976

Tangmere Church Fent on , Leconfield Leuch ars, ( C)pr us) \Vest Raynham. Wine ring

Feb 1955-Mar 1960 May 1955-Jan 1961 Nov 1946-Oct 1958 Mar 1956-Sep 1960 Mar 1957- Nov 1960 Aug 1956-Apr 1963 J un 1955- Aug 1961 Dec 1954- Nov 1957 Apr 1957-Jun 1957 May 1955-Dec 1957 Sep 1954 - Mat 1957 Feb 1955-J ul 1958

Odiham , Str adi shall Waterbeach. Wattisham Waterbeach Linton- on -Ouse, Acklington Horsham St Faith, Co ltishall Linton- on -Ouse. Middleton St Geo rge, Lecon field. (Germany) N orth Weald. Nort h Luffenham . Wattisham Leuchars Strad ishall Odiham Watt isham, Wymeswold Wattisham. Wymeswold

G loster JAVELIN The Javelin was another of the late I940s designs that entered service in the late 1950s and was the only delta fighter to serve with the RAF. It was designed as an all-weather interceptor when wisdom said th at missiles were the weap on o f the future and fighters had to be able to find and destroy targe ts at night and in bad weather, all of which were perceived lessons of the latter part of World War Two, The Javelin was also designed for range and height to counter the new generation of Soviet bombers. Designed to Specification FA I48 the prototype flew on 26 ovember 1951, with the first production FAW.I (XA544) gelling airborne on 22 Jul y 1954. The basis of the weap on system was a radar, operated by a navig ator, and air-to-air missiles (although it was a few versions down the line before the effective Firestreak was being carried), plus four Aden ca nno n - a potent combination. Entry to service was with 46 Squadron a t Odiham in February 1956 but within two years Fighter Command had eleven Javel in sq uadro ns and there were others serving with the RAF oversea s. A number of variants entered service, some with American rad ar ; the FAW.2, FAW,3, FAWA, FAW.5 and FAW,6 all being produced in limited numbers. The FAW. 7 was the first to inte grate the Firestreak (fo ur missiles), and with more powerful engine s and more fuel thi s was the The Javelin served with eleven Fighter Command squadrons. entering service ill February 1956.

305

306

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATION

CRAFT

best of the bunch so far, entering service in Jul y 1958 with 33 Squ adron a t Leeming. With 142 aircra ft built this was the most numerous va riant. Thi s was followed by the FA W.8 a nd with the re-manufacture of 7s into what was to some the definitive Javelin , the FA W.9. The latter entered service with 25 Squ adron at Waterbeach in December 1959. Of the total of 429 Javelins most served with Fighter Comm and in the U K, but it was a sho rt-lived involvement as most sq uad rons had re-equipped by 1962 a nd the final UK Ja velins had gone by Ap ril 1965. Few Javelins have survived , a ltho ugh a number of UK mu seum s have examples a nd there is one in South Africa with the growing collecti on of airw orthy Cold War jets, altho ugh there are no immediat e plan s to restore it to fly.

Gloster JAVELIN Pro tot ype, first flight: WD 8().l. 26 ove mbe r 1951 Entry to service : 46 Sqn . Februa ry 1956 Squadron

Dates

Airfields

23 Sqn 25 Sqn 33 Sqn 41 Sqn 46 Sqn 64 Sqn 72 Sqn 85 Sqn 89 Sqn 141 Sqn 151 Sqn

Mar 1957-OcI 1964 Dec 1958-Dec 1962 Jul 1958-Nov 1962 Feb 1958- Dec 1963 Feb 1956- Oct 1958 Aug 1958- 1 Apr 1965 Apr 1959- Jun 1961 Nov 1958-Mar 1963 Sep 1957-Nov 1958 Feb 1957- Jan 1958 J un 1957-Sep 1961

Horsham St Faith. Coltishall. Leuchars w at erbe ach. Leuchars Leeming. Middleton 51 George Coltishall, Wan isham Odiham, w aterbeacb Duxford . Waterbeach. Binbrook, (Singapore) Church Fenton. Leconfield Stradi shall, w est Mailing, w est Raynham Stradishall Horsham 51 Faith . Coltishall T umho use. Leucha rs

English Electric LIGHTNING After the Spit fire there is perh ap s only one British fighter tha t has ga ined a reputati on as the ' pilot dream mach ine' an d o ne tha t th ousa nds of enthusiasts wo uld like to get the cha nce to experience - the English Electric Lightning. It was indeed an impressive mach ine, especially at air displays (sadly no longer to be seen unless you go to South Africa), but its operationa l life, a nd ca pa bility, was limited. The aircra ft was designed as a high-speed intercepto r rather th an a pure fighte r; hence the emphas is on speed rath er than manoeu vrabil ity or a rmam ent. Developm ent of wha t was a radical design for the late 1940s-earl y 1950s was complex but fina lly led to a first flight on 4 August 1954. Th e Lighting was soo n dem on stra ting its supersonic ca pa bility. the first British fighter to achieve level-flight superso nic per form an ce. It was not unti l 3 ovember 1959 that the first production Lightnin g F.I new. with the Central Fighter Establishment at Colti shall receiving a number of airc raft the following month a nd the first squadro n. 74 Squ ad ron a t the same base. re-equipping fro m Jun e 1960. The Tiger Squ adron ga ve up Hunter F.6s for the new mount - a nd immediat ely doubled the maximum speed to Mach 2+, altho ugh this was a notional speed the tru e opera tiona l speed of the Lightning was well in excess of Mach I. In terms of armament the concept was for an ' integra ted weap on system' based on radar (Ferra nti AI) and air-to -air missiles. As with most aircra ft weap on systems there were problems with the rad ar a nd

A classic shot of all AA M -a, med Lightning, albeit not a Figher Command squadron.

the missiles and it was some time before the plann ed operationa l cap abilit y was achieved. Indeed , the ca pa bility of the wea po n system was que stioned throughout much o f the a ircra ft's life with limited rada r perform an ce and a maximum of two AAM s a nd Aden cann on . By earl y 1961 Figh ter Comm and had thr ee Lightning squ adrons in service, two at Wat tisharn and one at Co ltishal l. The major limitat ion with the aircraft was its lack of ra nge; the engines were thirsty a nd the fuel limited . Th is is a probl em that never went away. The int roduction of air-to -air refuelling cap ab ility from the F. IA onwa rds certa inly helped , as did later additio ns to on -boa rd fuel with bigger tank s and co nforma l a rrangements. Th e main variant to serve with Fighter Comm and was the F.3, with its bett er Avon engines a nd additio na l missile option of Red Top ra ther th an Fire streak . Th is var iant entered service with 74 Squ ad ron at Leuchars in April 1964 and was followed in December 1965 by the final Lightning, the F.6. The last of 258 Lightnings. by then carrying the 'built by BAC' label, was completed in 1967, the same yea r that two of Fight er Comm and's sq uadrons moved overseas . Th e remaining squ adron s played a vita l role in the Cold War , providing the main respon se to the threat posed by Soviet longran ge nuclear bombers. By the mid I970s strength was down to two squad rons. both of which remained opera tiona l, a t Binbrook , into the late 1980s. However, for the last decade o f their ca reer they were out-classed and little more th an a ' ma nned missile', comments that will earn me a reprimand (at best) from the Lightning fraternity! Lightin gs survive in a number o f museums and as part of cockpit collection s but the most dr am atic survivors a re the airworthy aircraft with Thunder Cit y in South Africa with the oppo rtunity to bu y a ride in this awesome fighter.

307

308

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT

English Electric LI GHT NI NG Prot ot ype. first flight : WG76O, 4 Augu st 1954 Ent ry to serv ice: 74 Sqn, June 1960

Bloodhound (SA M) Entry to service: 264 S qn. Decem ber 1958

Sq uadro n

Dates

A irfields

5 Sq n II Sqn 23 Sqn 29 Sq n 56 Sq n 74 Sq n III Sqn

Dec 1965- (Sep 1987) Apr 1967- (Ap r 1988) Au g 1964 - (Oct 1975) May 1967- (Dec 1974) Dec 196O- A pr 1967 Jun 196O-Jun 1967 Apr 1961- (Sep 1974)

Binbrook Leuch ar s, Binb ro o k Leuchars Wattisham Watt isharn, ( C,.prus) Co ltisha ll. Leuch ar s. (Singapore) Watt isham

Bristol BLO OOHO U TO (SAM) The Bloodho und Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) has been left to last, although it was no t the last 'a ircra ft' to enter service with Fighter Command, having pre-dated the Lightn ing by a couple of years. At the height of Bloodhound deployment th ere were ten missile sites on the eastern side of England, all positioned to defend the RA F's nuclear asse ts - with the main focus being cover of the Thor IRBM S. T he Bloodh oun d was developed in the late 1940s by the Bristol Aeroplane Co and Ferranti, with the latter providing the radar and guidance elements. T hese were the early days of such weapons and development was slow. T he Bloodhou nd Mk I eventually entered service in Decem ber 1958, the first un it being 264 Squadron at North Coates. with four more squadrons beco ming operational the following year as a defen sive shield was esta blished along the East coast. The early missile only had a range of 40 miles and its radar was of limited perfo rmance, being susceptible to jamming and having limited low level performance because of ground clutter - but it was primarily designed to engage medi um to high targets. The improved Mk 2 entered service in 1964 and provided a far mo re effective radar and therefore overa ll capability; the system underwent subsequent upg rade s to maintain its front-line capability and the 'faithful' Bloodho und eventually served with the RA F to 1994, nearly 30 years after Fighter Command had become Strike Command.

Bloodhound served as the RAF's main surface-to-air missile ( S A M) for 40 years.

Squadron

Dates

Airfields

25 Sq n 41 Sqn 62 Sqn 85 Sqn 94 Sqn 112 Sqn 141 Sqn 222 Sqn 242 Sqn 247 Sqn 257 Sqn 263 Sqn 264 Sq n 266 Sqn

(Oct 1973-Oct 1989) Sep 1965-(1 ul 1970) Feb 196O-Sep 1964 (Dec 1975-1 994 ...) Oct 196O-Jun 1963 Nov 1964-Oct 1967 Apr 1959-Mar 1964 Ma y 196O-Jun 1964 Oc t 1959-Sep 1964 Jul 196O-Dec 1963 Jul 196O-Dec 1960 Jun 1959-Jun 1963 Dec 1958-Nov 1962 Dec 1959- Jun 1964

Fit s at: Bark ston Heath. North Coates. \Vattisham. \Vyton West Raynh am Woolrox Lod ge Fits at: Bawdsey, Nort h Coates. West Raynham

Misson Woodhall Spa. (C)pms) Dunholme Lod ge Woodhall Spa Marh am Ca ma by War bc ys Watt on North Coa tes Rattlesd en

Fighter Command Bloodhound missiles at 242 Squadron

'011 duty

' at Markham .

309

3 11

E

AOC-in-C Fighter Command Command from: 14 Jul 1936 ACM Sir Hugh C T Dowding GCVC KCB CMG 25 ov 1940 AM Sir W Sholto Douglas KCB MC DFC 28 ov 1942 AM Sir Trafford Leigh Mallory KCB DSO 15 ov 1943 AM Sir Roderic M Hill KCB MC AFC 14 May 1945 AM Sir James M Robb KBE CB DSO DFC AFC 17 ov 1947 AM Sir William Elliott KBE CB DFC 19 Apr 1949 AM Sir Basil Embry KBE CB DSO DFC AFC 7 Apr 1953 AM Sir Dermot A Boyle KBE CB AFC I Jan 1956 AM Sir H L Patch CB CBE 8 Aug 1956 AM Sir Th omas Pike KCB CBE D FC 30 Jul 1959 AM Sir Hector McG regor KCB CBE DSO 8 May 1962 AM Sir Douglas Morris KCB C BE DSO DF C 3 Mar 1966 AM Sir Frederick Rosier KCB CBE DSO Letter from ACM Dowding to Under-Secreta ry of S ta te for Air 17 May 19·10. Sir. I. I have the honour to refer to the very serious calls which ha ve recentl y been made upon the Home Defence Fighter Units in an attempt to stem the German invasion on the Continent. 2. I hope and believe that our Armies may yet be victorio us in France and Belgium. but we have to face the possibility that they may be defeated . 3. In this case I presume that there is no-one who will deny that England should fight on. even though the remainder of the Continent of Europe is dominated by the Germans. 4. Fo r this purpose it is necessary to retain some minim um fighter strength in this country and I must request that the Air Co uncil will inform me what they consider tha t minimum strength to be. in order that I may make my dispositions accor dingly. 5. I would remind the Air Counc il that the last estimate of strength which they made as to the fo rce necessary to defend this country was 52 squadrons. and my strength has now been reduced to the equivalent of 36 squadrons. 6. Once a decision has been reached as to the limit on which the Air Council and the Cabinet are prepared to stake the existence of this country. it should be made clear to the Allied Commanders on the Conti nent that not a single aeroplane from Fighter Command beyond that limit will be sent across the Channel. no matter how desperate the situation may become.

The impressive memorial at Kenley; most Fighter Comm and airfields are poorly served in respect oj memorials. This one recognizes the part played by aircrew, groundcrew and WAAFS.

312

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

7. It will. of course. be remembered that the estimate of 52 squadro ns was based on the assumption that the attac k wou ld come from the eastwards except in so far as the defences might be outflanked in flight. We have to face the possibility that the attac ks may come from Spain or even from the north coast of France. Th e result is that our line is very much extended at the same time as our resources are reduced. 8. I must point out that within the last few days the eq uivalent of 10 squadro ns have been sent to France. that the Hurri can e squadro ns remaining in this country are serio usly depleted and tha t the more squadrons which are sent to Fr ance the higher will be the wastage and the more insistent the demand s for reinforcement. 9. I must therefore req uest that as a matt er of paramount import ance the Air Ministry will consider and decide what level of strength is to be left to the Fighter Command for the defence of this country and will assure me that when this level has been reached. not one more fighter will be sent across the Channel however urgent and insistent the appe als for help may be. 10. I believe that. if an adeq uate fighter force is to be kept in this country. if the fleet remains in being and if Home Forces are suitably organised to resist invasion we should be able to carry-on the war single-handed for some time, if not indefinitely. But. if the Home Defence Force is drained away in desperate attempts to remedy the situation in France. defeat in France will involve the final. complete and irremediable defeat of this country.

NEX

B

Battle of Britain Squadrons Battle of Britain - Squadron 'scoreca rd' Sq uadr on no.

Aircraft

t Sqn 3 Sqn 17 Sqn 19 Sqn 23 Sqn 25 Sqn 29 Sqn 32 Sqn 4t Sq n 4 3 Sqn 4 6 Sqn

Hurricane Hurricane

54 Sqn 56 Sqn 64 Sqn 65 Sqn 66 Sqn 72 Sqn 73 Sqn 74 Sqn 79 Sqn 85 Sqn 87 Sqn 92 Sqn II I Sqn 141 Sqn 145 Sqn 151 Sqn 152 Sqn 213 Sqn 219 Sqn 222 Sqn 229 Sqn 232 Sqn 234 Sqn 235 Sqn 236 Sqn 238 Sqn 242 Sq n 245 Sqn 247 Sqn 248 Sqn 249 Sqn

Hurricane Spitfire Blenheim Blenheim. Beaufighter Blenheim. Beaufighter Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Defiant

Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Blenheim. Beaufighter Spitfire Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Blenheim Blenheim Hurricane

Hurricane Hurricane Gladiator

Blenheim Hurricane

Claims 29 t 42

60 0 4 2 48 89 67 26 52

50 39 31 53

66 19 45 25

60 41 78 51 3 28 27 61 83 0 53 14

Losses t8 2 9 7 t t 2 20 32 25 24 20 22 13 15 25 23 t7

II 10 12

II 32 18 6 26 17 20 23

I 15 12

I

I

69

17 5 6 28 9 3 0 6 24

12 4 69 69 0 0 2

72

314

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

253 Sqn 257 Sqn 263 Sqn 264 Sqn 266 Sqn 302Sqn 303 Sqn 310 Sqn 312 Sqn 501 Sqn 504 Sqn 600 Sqn 601 Sqn 602 Sqn 603 Sqn 604 Sqn 605 Sqn 607 Sqn 609 Sqn 610 Sq n 6 11 Sq n 6 15 Sq n 6 16 Sqn 804 Sqn 808 Sqn I (Can adi an ) Sqn "

Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane. Wh irlwi nd Defiant Spitfi re Hurrica ne

Hurricane Hurricane H urricane H urricane

Hurricane Blenheim. Beaufighter Hurrica ne

Spitfire Spitfire

Blenheim. Beaufighter H urrica ne H urrican e

Spitfi re S pitfire

Spi tfire Hurricane

Sp itfire Sea Gl adiator. Martlet

Fulmar Hurricane

NNEX B

31 19 0 15 14 25 130 43 1 100 20 I 68 84 67 I 53 18 97 58 18 33 28 0 0 26

22 17 0 10 II 10 16 II 4 43 7 2 16 15 30 2 20 15 14 20 2 13 14 0 0 10

Notes " Became 401 Sq n RCA F I. \ Vhilst the compa rative scores of units makes interesting reading it must be bo rne in mind that no t all units were ope ratio nal throughout the period of the Battle and eve n amo ngst those that were. some spent much of the time away from the air battles of SE England.

'Churchill' gets back at the Germans; nose-art on a 17 Squadron Hurricane at Debden. The Squadron claimed 42 aircraft in the Bail ie of Britain.

Pi/ots of 41 Squadron mark-up their scoreboard.

3 15

ANNEX C

ANNEX

C

Battle of Britain: Galland's View

I

n 1953 Adolf Galland, World War Two fighter ace, and Luf twaffe Inspector General of Fighters, compiled for the RAF's Air Histor ic Branch, his view of the Battl e of Britain .

The Luftwaffe had to be used ill a decisive way ill the Battle of Britain as a means of conducting total air war. Its size, technical equipment and the means at its disposal precluded the Luftwaffef rom fu ljillillg this mission. all the other hand, ill the absence of the necessary experience, the possibilities, limitations. requirements, methods and fo rces needed fo r carrying out strategic air operations were not ye t kilo II'//. Whatel'er may have been the importance of the tests of German arms in the Spanish Civil War fro m tactical, technical and operational points of view, they did not provide the experience that was needed Ilor led to the fo rmulation of sound strategic concepts. One of German y's greatest fighter pilot s, Adolf Galland had gained his initial experience in the Spanish Civil War a nd by the outbreak of World War Two was flying Bf 109s. His flair as a fighter pilot saw him quickly promoted to comma nd of JG 26 a nd subsequently to the post of Inspector of Fighters. Th is, however, brought him into co ntac t - and conflict - with Herm ann Goerin g and man y sto rmy scenes ensued. He was dismissed from this post in Janua ry 1945 and returned to combat flying leading the Me 262-equipped JV 44. Th e 1953 report was compil ed in the light of post-war knowledge - and anti pathy toward s the Germ an leadership in general and Goering in partic ular ; however, despite th is it is a useful document, the main elements of which a re par aphrased and discussed in thi s annex.

Luft waff e S trength Galland makes the point that the Luf twaff e was less than five years old when it was 'called upon to prove its mettle in the Second World War ' a nd that in that time the ' most powerful air force in the world at that time had been built up .' Th e effective strength of the Luftwaffe in late summer 1939 comprised 30 bomber Gruppen (He II I, Do 17, Ju 86) with 675 bo mbers, nine Ju 87 Stuk a Gruppen with 200 aircraft, ten long-range fighter Gruppen with 300 Bf I !Os, 13 single-engine fighter Gruppen with 400 Bf 109s, 21 lon g-ran ge reconn aissance Staffeln with 104 aircraft, primar ily Do 17s, and 30 close reconn aissance Staffeln with 200 ai rcraft, prim arily He I26s. Th e majorit y of these were invo lved in the Polish camp aign a nd the Polish Air Force was rapidl y overwhelmed. Several add itional Gruppen were form ed during the first year of the war a nd according to Germ an Qu a rtermaster General records total streng th had increased from less tha n 2,000 aircra ft to aro und 7,000 aircraft, including over 3,000 bombers and aro und 2,750 fighters. German estima tes gave British stre ngth as 5,500 warplanes, bu t with only 3.600

of these being based in the UK and with only 200 of the 620 fighters being 'o f the latest type. Thus the RAF was numerically superior to the Luf twaffe. However, a large prop orti on of the British aircraft were out of date and thi s ena bled the Luft waff e to maint ain air supremacy at this stage with abo ut 2,500 aircraft of later types.' He then commen ts that the balance of forces was not right - there were too few fighters, 'Th e reason for this is to be found in the basic conception on which the new Luft waffe had been built up; it was thou ght of as an attacking force. Thi s co nformed with the stra tegic co ncept much in favour at that time: that mastery of the air sho uld be obtained in the initial opera tions of a war th rou gh the destru ction, on the gro und, of the enemy's air power. I personally believe that German y would not have lost the war if the produ ction of fighters had been on the same scale in 1940 or 1941 as it was in 1944.' To some extent this is the fighter pilot spea king - there are never eno ugh fighters, but there is also a very valid point of air doctrin e in term s of air superiority being the prerequi site for air opera tions. Th e concept of dest roying an enemy's air power 'on the gro und' was a funda men tally flawed point of doctrin e but one tha t appeared valid in the light of the Polish campaign, and indeed in the June 1941 offensive aga inst Ru ssia. The inherent secondary nature of the fighter implied by this doctrine was to be one of the factors limiting the effectiveness of the fighter arm during the Battle of Britain . Fighter production in 1940 averaged only 200 aircraft a month and it was not until early 1942, as a reacti on to the Allied bomber offensive aga inst German y, that a significant increase in ra tes of production began. In common with most air a rms in the 1930s, the bomber was seen as the decisive weapo n and most atte ntion was paid to the developm ent of these offensive weapons. 'The air force is a strategic, offensive weapon ' and to this effect aircraft such as the Do 17 and He III were developed , bombers with performa nce superior to the cont empor ary He 51 and Ar 65 fighters: 'Thi s led to a completely erro neous concepti on; it was believed then , and for some time afterwa rds, tha t in daylight a ttacks, bombers would be able to master enemy fighters and would thu s not need to be escorted. In any case, fight ers would not be a ble to accompany bombers owing to their disparity of speed.' Thi s false premise led the RAF's bomber force into problems in late 1939 and the USAAF's B-1 7s to suffer heavy losses in 1942--43. Th e advent of high-perfo rmance fighters should have prompted changes in d octrin e. 'Th e con stru ction of the new Me 109 of completely revoluti on ary design put the problem back again in proper perspective. The sceptics asserted that the new Me 109 was not suita ble for service use becau se of its very high take-off and land ing speeds, which would give rise to insurm oun tabl e difficult ies in handling it. Time has corrected these false co nceptions and made one fact quite clear : the Me 109 not only possessed superior features, but it ca used a revolut ion in fighter design th rou ghout the wor ld.' Th e pr incipal drawb ack of the single-engine fighters such as the 109 was that of opera tional rad ius, aro und 200 km .. . 'this dr awb ack played a decisive par t in the outcome of the Battl e of Britain .' With the realisati on that the bombers would requ ire fighter escort in daylight the Luft waff e plann ers, a t Goering's insistence, had to devise a twin-engined long-ran ge fighter, the o utcome being the Bf 110. Th e form ati on of such unit s in 1938 saw the third time when the day fighter force was requ ired to give up a cadre of its best pilots, the previous two occasio ns being the expansion of the bomber force a nd the creation of the Stu ka dive-bomber force. 'Th e consequences of this redu ction on thr ee separate occasio ns of the effective stre ngth of fighter personn el were felt in the period between 1934 and 1939. For a lon g time fight er pilots were relegated to second place because they were not integrated into the ope rat iona l air force. At manoeuvres, in con form ity with regulati on s that had been d rawn up governing their use, fighters were

3 17

3 18

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

assigned the tas ks oflocal air defence and combat for the purpose of achieving mastery in the air over fron t-line zones . Thus they were not included - and this was the mistake - in the operational air forces. However, the pilots of the new long-ra nge fighters were, acco rding to Goe ring, to be the elite of the fighter personnel.' Once aga in the fault lay in doctrin e; the Lu ftwaffe had little upon which to base a strategic doctrin e and thu s it was constrained to operate in a more tactical sense. Whilst the Span ish and Polish experiences gave the Luftwaff e valuable combat experience they also provided what were to prove inappropriate lessons.

The Battl e of Britain 'In order to carry out the invasion, the primary need was to obtain air superiority, and, as far as this was possible, absolute mastery of the air. Hence the task of solving the cr ucial problem was assigned to the air force.' Th e Germ an Navy, rightly, insisted on air cover, a protective umbrella, during any invasio n operation - to achieve this the Luf twaffe would have to destroy the RA F; three stra tegic missions were given to the Luft waff e; I. The blockade of Britain, in conjunction with the Navy, by air attacks on

shipping and port s. 2. Softening-up for the invasion; offensive aimed at gaining air superiority. 3. Forcin g Britain to surrender by waging total air war aga inst her. ' Ma ny voices in Germany were raised in criticism of the idea of attac king the British on their own soil. Th e critics maintained tha t not even the military occupat ion of the British isles would be eno ugh to bring about the end of the war. Field Marshal Kesselring [Commander of Luftfloue 3), for example, headed a section of opinion that believed that an air offensive against Britain would demonstrate the limitati ons and weaknesses of the air force, and that it would result in our losing the most powerful instrument of political and military pressure we possessed. Hitler decided differently; once again it was principally Goe ring who goaded him into makin g his decision .' At this stage Ga lland was not party to the discussions of either the Lu ftwaffe hierarchy or tha t of the Nazi leadership; he no doubt subsequently discussed the Battle with some of those who had been part of the decision-makin g progress but the inclusion of hindsight perspective is inevitable , especially from such air leaders as Kesselring. Nevertheless, it was a confident Luf twaffe that commenced operat ions agai nst Britain ; its campaigns to date - Spain, Poland and Fra nce - seemed to vindica te bot h its eq uipment and it doctrine; true , the Luf twaffe had greate r respect for the RAF than for some of its previous op pone nts and there was the problem of comba t radius for the single-engine fighters, but overall the plann ers, and the aircrew, saw few major problems. 'The second phase of the German air offensive began on 24 July, 1940, the aim being to rout the British fighter defences in comb at with German fighters, and thu s obtain the superiority necessar y to ensure the effective employment of day bomb ers. To this end, Germa n fighters were sent over the Cha nnel on successive and inte rmittent sorties, first in Gro up strength and then by sq uadro ns. At first the British accepted the challenge and sent up Hurric anes and Spitfires to engage the German unit s. Th e Hurric anes were out of date and their performance was far inferior to that of the Messerschm itt fighter as regards both maximum speed in level flight and rate of climb. Th ough the Spitfire was more manoeuvrable in turning, its maximum speed was 20-30 km per hou r less. German ammunitio n and armament were man ifestly better than those of the British. The RAF lost the greater number of fighters. But even more impor tan t than these technical dr awbacks were the ou t-moded tactics used by the British fighters. Genera lly spea king,

ANNEX C

they flew in close form ation of sq uadro n strength in order to peel off immediately before making an attack. German fighters, on the other hand , flew in wide, open form ations, a tactic evolved and perfected in the Span ish Civil War. About 15 days after the beginning of this pha se of the Battle the British ado pted the German style of flying.' The question of comparative fighter perform ance is one that has occupied many thousand s of word s and is frequentl y clouded by partisan viewpo ints - did the rugged nature of the Hurri cane make it better able to survive being hit, was the armament of the Germ an fighters far superior, and so on. The qualitative nature of the pilots, and as Galland points out, the tactics being employed, have also to be taken into considerati on . The Luft waff e entered the Battle with a confident, verging on cocky, attitude and hence their morale was superb. Th e RAF fighter pilots were still, largely, untried and they faced what appeared to be an invincible war machine that had swept previous opponents away. ' Normally each unit made up to three sorties per day. The physical strain on pilots was very heavy; airframes and engines also suffered from these effort s. It soon became evident that Fighter Comma nd was not deceived by the German air atta cks for it did not send up its fighters on hasty missions according to the exigencies of the moment. Rad ar enabled the British to alert their defences in good time and to send up fighters at the right moment to intercept the German formatio ns and to engage them when and where they chose.' The failure of the fighter tact ic to dr aw the RAF to its destru ction led to a change of tactic: 'In order to compel British fighters to fight again - the British Command had undoubtedly forb idden them to do so owing to Germ an superiority - our fighters began to appear escor ting several bombers, which attac ked airfields, rail j unctions and any other similar targets. The bombers were called Lock vogel (decoy birds) and the aim was achieved; the struggle for air supremacy resumed its rhythm .' Thi s is the same tactic subseq uently employed by the RAF, und er the Circus operation, when offensive fighter sweeps over Occupied Euro pe in 1942 failed to produc e any Luftwaffe reaction and bomber forces were employed to force a response - a tact ic that met with mixed results. However, its employment by the Luft waffe in 1940 was not on the same scale and was tak ing place at the same time as an anti-shipping camp aign in English territ orial waters, these latt er attacks provokin g a numb er of significant air battles. However, it was with Phase Ill. the direct atta ck on RAF airfields, that the Battl e truly began . To the RAF these atta cks on its airfields, and associated installati ons such as radar sites, were critical and man y post-war commenta tors have conclud ed that if the atta cks had continued then the Battle may have taken a different cou rse. Galland , however, in his commentary put s forward a different view: 'The results obta ined were very poor, for when atta cks were made, practically all available British aircraft were in the air, engaged on defensive operatio ns. Generally speaking, damage caused to the gro und o rganisation was superficial. Better results would have been obtained if more small calibre bomb s had been used, but the bombers were not equipped with suita ble release appa ratus. The British withdrew their fighter sq uadro ns beyond Lond on and used airfields close to the coas t only for staging and emergency landin gs. Moreover, they had so many airfield that they had good chances of eludin g attac ks.' As with other part s of the Galland commentary, this smacks of post-war 'excuses' for the failure of the Luftwaffe campaign. Whilst it is true that the RAF had a reasonable number of airfields, the numb er within operating range of the comb at area was limited - and all were well known to the Luft waffe, RAF records show that a number of key airfields suffered significant damage, albeit repairs were ra pid and the airfield, if not all of its facilities, was back in operatio n quit e quickl y; however, a concerted and con tinued attac k on these key sites might have produced a different overall picture .

3 19

320

c

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

As the pace of operations increased the fighters were given four main missions: a. b. c. d.

Direct escort . Indirect or deployed escort. Free-lance patrols iFreie Jagd). Supplementary escorts to pick up and cover returning formatio ns and the protection of air-sea rescue services.

'Insofar as it can be said to have funct ioned at all. the system of escorting bombers yielded poor results. The re were neither special tactical rules nor uniformity of plan: each fighter squadro n carried o ut its missions as it thought best. Hence the quality of perform ance alla ined in these missions varied considerably. Some squadrons executed their missions in an extremely satisfactory manner. others failed miserably. It was not until late in the period of air battles that tactic s were stand ard ised: ot surp risingly. Gall and the fighter pilot was more in favo ur of the third type of mission. the freelance patrol. than any of the others 'it was difficult to make them [the bombe r unit commanders) understand that it is better for the Germ an fighters to stay out of sight and thu s make the enemy attack before they saw the German fighters than to remain "glued " to the formation they were escorting and thu s allow the enemy to take the initiati ve.' This is very much the cry of the fighter pilot and was repeated by RAF and American fighter pilots when faced with similar close escort tasks that restricted their freedom of action. T he T urning Point Goering had not been impressed with the performance of his fighter pilots in the Bailie to this point and he decided on the radical move of appointing younger men to command positions to 'increase the fighting spirit and the striking power of the German fighter force. With one or two exceptions. the physical condition of the older unit commanders was not equ al to the strain of modern aerial warfare : By earl y September the Bailie was reaching its crit ical phase. Phase IV in Galland 's commentary. with mass attacks aga inst Lond on. ' During these first large-scale att acks, Stuka squadro ns were also used. They suffered heavy losses. part icularl y at the hand s of British fighters. Goerin g blamed it o n the fighters and declared that the stand ard of escort and protection was deplorable. But there was not one pilot who did not know that the fault was to be found in the technical shortcomings of the Stuk a.' Th e bomber force usually comprised up to 500 bombe rs plus 200 Stukas, escorted by 500 singleengined and 200 twin-engined fighters. the attacking force formin g up over the Pas de Calais before sell ing course for their target. Germ an estimates that the RAF had only 200 fighters left were to prove wildly inaccura te. 'The ferocious and indo mita ble resistance of the British air defences. particul arl y RAF fighter pilots whose fighting qualities commanded the greatest admiration. umerically very inferior at this stage of the struggle. they fought desperatel y and without respite. and saved their country. The o rganisation and the direction of the British air defences. represented by Fighter Command. showed great drive and initiati ve. ' It was a great ad vantage to the British to be able to concentrate their fighter forces in a ring around Lond on : at this period they were not in a position effectively to protect a number of disper sed objectives simulta neously. But the Lu ftwaff e appeared to be ob sessed by one idea and continued to direct its attacks against the same centre of British air defence - London. On October 20 the daylight offensive was suspended. Luftwaffe losses were considerable. especially bomber losses. Its war potential was weakened : but it was not exhausted as subseq uent operations and later developments in the war showed:

Ga lland went o n to state that there were four reasons for the decision to aba ndo n the day light attacks: I. Weather. The unpred ictable autumn weather mitigated against large-scale daylight operations. 2. False evaluation of results. The RAF was still a potent force and Germ an bombers and twin-engine fighters were being lost faster tha n they could be replaced. 3. Technical limitati ons of Germ an aircraft. A number of considerat ions such as inadequate range of fighters and poor perform ance of Bf 110 and Ju 87. along with the inadeq uate defensive arma ment of the bombers. 4. Modification of the strategic plan . The German strategic shift toward s the Med iterranean and Russia. ' However. there can be no doubt that the Luftwaffe could have continued the day light offensive in spite of these constraints. The German Comm and could have given the orders for the offensive to be cont inued . and felt safe in doing so. if it had known the tr ue extent of the exhaustion of the British air defences: The Luftwaffe had lost a quarter of its effective strength in personnel in the three months of its all-out offensive again st Britain - but the campaign was not yet over. The fi nal phases of the Bailie of Britain were the fighter-bomber attacks and the switch to night bombing of London. In a rushed conversion programme around one third of the fighter force was equipped to carry bombs - much to the chagrin of the fighter pilots as this 'gave them a sense of inferiorit y: Alth ough they attempted to fulfil what they saw as a fruitless mission. they were soo n on the receiving end of criticism from the High Command: 'The C-in-C declared with profound bitterne ss that the fighter arm had failed in its task of escorting bombers: he objected to the manner in which the fighter-bomber operations were carried out and added this to the fighters' previous shortcomings. The young comm anders of fighter units. who were convinced that that had fulfilled their tasks during the air battles of the preceding weeks. and who had accepted severe losses without complaint. had once again to listen to grave cha rges being made against them .' Whilst there is a great deal of truth in what Galland says in respect of the attitude of the azi leadership. and Goering in part icular. it most be borne in mind that in the latter part of the war he had major disagreements with the azi leadership .

321

ANNEX

0

ANNEX E

Order of Battle July 1936 Squadron 1\;0. II

23 32 19 66 25

Airfield

Establishment

Order of Battle September 1939 Not es

Squadron

G roup (Ux bridge)

Sqn Sq n Sqn Sq n Sqn 6().1 Sqn 54 Sqn 65 Sq n 17 Sqn III Sqn 56 Sqn 1 Sq n 43 Sqn

Biggin H ill Biggin H ill Du xford

Duxford Hawkinge Hendon

Homchurch H ornchurch

Kenley Northolt North Wea ld

Tangmere Ta ngmere

Demon G aunt let Gaun tlet Gauntlet Fury Demon Gauntlet Gaun tlet Bulldog Gaunt let

Gauntlet Fury Fury

Not es

l. Data based on SDl6 1 unit location tables. 2. Three squadrons (3. 29. 4 1) had departed for the Abyssinian Crisis in late 1935 and were back with Fighter Command by September 1936.

Airfield

II Group (Ux bridge) Biggin H ill 32 Sqn 601 Sqn Biggin H ill Croydon 3 Sqn 145 Sqn' C roydo n 263 Sqn Filton 24 Sqn Hendon 248 Sqn" Hendon 54 Sqn Homchurch 74 Sqn Hornchurch 600 Sqn Homchurch 79 Sqn Mansto n Manston 235 Sqn' 253 Sqn Manston Martlesham Hea th 56 Sqn 236 Sqn" M a rtlesha m H ea th 264 Sq n' Martlesham Hea th 25 Sqn Northolt 65 Sqn Northolt North Wea ld 151 Sqn 6().1 Sqn North Weal d Tangmere 92 Sqn' 50 1 Sqn Tangmere Tangmere 605 Sqn Gp Pool St At han

Establishment

1\;0.

Hurrica ne Blenheim

Hurricane Blenheim Gladiator variou s

Blenheim Spitfire Spitfire

Blenheim Hurricane Batt le Ba tt le

Hurricane Blenheim De fiant

Blenheim Spitfire Defiant Blenheim

Blenheim Hurricane Hurricane Harvard.

Hurricane 1\;0. 12 Gro up (H ucknall)

17 Sqn 5Q.1 Sq n 29 Sqn 46 Sqn 229 Sqn ' 61 1 Sqn Civil Fit 19 Sqn 66 Sqn 222 Sqn" 254 Sqn' 266 Sqn' 23 Sqn 213 Sqn 610 Sqn

Debden

Debden Debd en D igby D igby D igby

Doncaster D uxfo rd D uxfo rd

Duxford Sutton Bridge Sutton Bridge Wittering Wittering Wittering

Hurricane Hurricane Blenheim Hurricane Blenheim Spitfire

various Spitfire Spitfire Battl e

Defiant Battl e

Blenheim Hurricane Spitfire

Note s

324

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Squadron

Airfield

No. 13 Group (Ne wcastle) 43 Sqn Ac kling ton III Sqn Acklington Acklington 152 Sqn 4 1 Sqn Catterick 219 Sqn" Ca tterick 64 Sqn Church Fen ton 242 Sqn" Church Fenton 602 Sqn D rem 609 Sqn Drem 72 Sqn Drem 14 1 Sqn" Gra ngemouth 616 Sq n Leconfield 234 Sqn" Leconfield Leconfield 245 Sqn" 603 Sqn Turnhouse Aston Down Gp Pool

Establishment

Hurricane Hurricane Gladiator Spitfire

Order of Battle

Blenheim Blenheim Blenheim

August 1940

Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire

Blenheim Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire various

No. 22 (Arm)' Co-o peration) Group (Fam borough) 225 Sqn " 614 Sqn" 613 Sqn" 16 Sqn SoAC Gp Pool

Odiham Odi ha m Odiham Old Sarum Old Sarum Old Sa rum

NOles Data based on SO161 unit location tables. • Non-operational squadron.

ANNEX F

NOles

Lysander Lysa nder Hector Lysander Blenheim

various

Squadron

Airfield

Xo. 10 Group (Rudloe :\ I.nor) 87 Sqn Exeter 213 Sqn Exeter 238 Sqn Middle Wallo p 604 Sqn Middle Wallop 609 Sqn Middle Wallop 92 Sqn Pembrey 234 Sq n St Eva l 152 Sqn W armwell ~o . II Group {Uxbridge] 32 Sqn 610 Sqn 501 Sqn III Sq n 17 Sqn 4 1 Sqn 65 Sqn 74 Sqn 615 Sqn 64 Sq n 600 Sqn 25 Sq n 85 Sqn 56 Sqn 151 Sqn I Sq n 60 1 Sqn 266 Sq n FlU 145 Sqn

Biggin Hill Biggin Hill Gravesend Croydon Debden Homchurch Homchurch Hom church Kenley Kenley Manston Martlesham Heath Martlesham Heath No rt h Weald North Weald T an gmere Tangmere Tan gmere Tangmere Westhamp nett

Establishment

Hurricane

Hurricane Hurricane

Blenheim Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire

Hurricane Spitfire

Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Hurricane Hurricane Blenheim Blenheim Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Spitfire Blenheim Hurricane

~o. 12 G roup

23 Sqn 66 Sqn 242 Sqn 29 Sqn 46 Sqn 611 Sqn 19 Sqn 222 Sqn 264 Sqn 229 Sqn

Co llywesto n Co ltisha ll Co ltisha ll Digb y Digby Digby Fowlmere Kirton-in-Lindsey Kirt on-in-L ind sey Wittering, Bircham Newton

Blenheim Spit fire Hurricane Blenheim Hurricane Spitfi re Spitfire Spitfire Defian t Hurricane

Noles

326

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Squadron 72 Sqn 79 Sqn 245 Sqn 504 Sqn 808 Sqn FAA 54 Sqn 73 Sqn 249 Sqn 602 Sqn 605 Sqn 263 Sqn 6 16 Sq n 219 Sqn 141 Sqn 232 Sq n 253 Sqn 603 Sqn 607 Sqn 3 Sqn 804 Sqn FAA

A irfield

Establishment

Acklington

Spitfire

Acklington A ldergrove

Hurricane Hurricane

Ca stlet own Ca stletown

Fulmar

Spitfire

D rem Grangemouth

Hurricane

Leconfield

Spitfire

EX

Order of Battle February 1941

H urrica ne

Catterick Church Fenton Church Fenton Drem

Leeming Prestwick Sumburgh Turnhouse Turnhouse Usworth Wick Wick

AN

Notes

Spitfire

Hurricane H urricane Hurrica ne

One Flighl

Blenheim Defia nt

Squadron

A irfi eld

Establishment

Notes

Hurrica ne

Hurricane Spitfire

Hurricane Hurricane Gladiator

~o . 9 Group (Barton Hall ) 229 Sqn Speke 3 12 Sq n Speke 258 Sqn J ur by 306 Sqn Ternhill 308 Sqn Baginto n 3 12 Sqn Penrh os 96 Sqn Cranage 307 Sq n Squi re s G ate

Hurricane

Hurricane

'h: squadron

H urricane

Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane

'h: squadron

H urricane

Defiant

No . to Group

79 Sqn 3 16 Sqn 501 Sqn 93 Sqn 604 Sqn 238 Sqn 32 Sqn 609 Sqn 152 Sqn 504 Sqn 263 Sqn 87 Sqn 234 Sqn 247 Sqn 263 Sqn 256 Sqn

Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Boston

Pembrey Pembrey Fillo" Middle Wallop M iddle Wallop Chilbolt on l bsley Warmwell Warmwell Exeter Exeter Cha rmy Down St Eval St Eval St Eval Colerne

Spitfire Spitfire

Debden M a rtl esham Hea th Martlesh am Heath Ma rtl esha m Hea th Northolt Northolt North Weald North Weald

Hurricane/Defiant Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane/Spitfire Hurricane Hurricane

Southend Gravesend Manston Hawkinge

Spitfire II Defiant Spitfi re Spitfire II Defiant Spitfire

Non-operational Non-operational

Blenheimi Bea ufighter

Hurricane Hurricane

Hurricane Whirlwind Hurricane Spitfire Hurricane Whirlwind Defiant

% squadron

'h: squadron Non-operational

No.l1 Group

85 Sqn 17 Sqn 242 Sqn 605 Sqn 601 Sqn 303 Sqn 259 Sqn 56 Sqn 64 Sqn 141 Sqn 92 Sqn 9 1 Sqn 264 Sqn 66 Sqn

Biggin Hill Biggin Hill

Y2 squadron

328

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

Squ adron

74 Sq n 605 Sqn I Sqn 615 Sq n 145 Sqn 65 Sqn 219 Sqn 302 Sqn 610 Sqn 23 Sqn No . 12 Group I Sqn RCA F 616 Sqn 7 1 Sqn 255 Sqn 2 Sqn RCA F 46 Sqn 29 Sqn 25 Sqn 266 Sqn 151 Sqn 222 Sqn 257 Sqn 19 Sqn 310 Sqn

Ai rfield

Establishment

Notes

Biggin Hill

Spitfire Hurricane II

Jh squadron

C roydon Kenley Kenley Tangmere

Tangmere Tangmere West hampnett Wes thampnett Ford

Hurricane Hurricane/Spitfire

Hurricane Spitfire Blenheim/Ha voc

Dr iffield

Hurricane Spitfi re

Kirto n-in-Lindsey Kirton-in-Lindsey Digby Digb y D igb y \Vittering

Hurricane

Wittering Coltis hall Coltishall

April 1942

Spitfire II B1enheimlBeaufi ghter

Kirton-in-Lindsey

\ Vittering

Defiant

Hurricane Hurricane

Squadron

Vi squadron Non-operational

Blenheiml Beaufighter Blenheiml Beaufighter Spitfire Defiant Spitfi re

Hurricane

Duxford

Spitfire II

D uxfo rd

Hurricane

1"'0.13 G roup

43 Sqn 603Sqn 602 Sqn 68 Sqn 54 Sqn 600 Sqn 245 Sqn 315 Sqn 72 Sqn

i'o. 14 Gro up 3 Sqn 213 Sqn 3 Sqn 260 Sqn 253 Sqn I II Sqn I II Sqn 232 Sqn

Drem Drem

Prestwick Catterick

Hurricane Sp itfire II Spitfire

Blenheim

Catteriek

Spitfire

Catterick Aldergrove

BlenheimlBeaufighter Hurricane

Ack lington

H urricane

Aekl ingt on

Spitfire

Sumburgh Cas rletown Ca stlet own Skaebrae Skaebrae Dyee

Order of Battle

H urricane

Hurricane

Montrose

Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane Hurricane

Elgin

Hurricane

A irfi eld

No.9 Group (Barton Hall) Andreas

452 Sqn 79 Sq n 255 Sqn 257 Sqn 1456 Fll MSF U 256 Sqn 456 Sqn 275 Sqn 131 Sqn 3 15 Sq n 285 Sqn 96 Sqn

Establishm ent

Spit fire

Bagint on High Ereall

Hurricane

Honiley

Hurricane Havoc Hurricane

Honiley Speke

Bea ufight er

Squire's Gate

Defiant

Valley Valle y Valle y

Beaufighter Lysanderl\Valrus

w ood vale Wre xham Wrex ham

Notes

Turbinlite

Air-Sea Rescue

Spitfire Spit fire Defian t

Defiant

;'\0.10 Group (Rudloe :\lanor) Non-operational

Non-operational

~

squadron

Y: squadron

Y: squadron Y: squadron

3 12 Sqn 87 Sqn 1454 Fit 306 Sqn 125 Sqn 286 Sqn 307 Sqn 308 Sqn 615 Sqn 402 Sqn 263 Sqn 267 Sqn 302 Sqn 118 Sqn 234 Sqn 50 1 Sqn 604 Sqn 245 Sqn 1458 FIt 310 Sqn 130 Sqn 66 Sqn 600 Sqn 247 Sqn 1457 Fit 1449 Fit 175 Sqn

Angle

Sp itfire

Charmy Down

Hurricane Havoc

Charmy Down

Church Stanton Cole rne Colerne

Exeter Exeter Fairwood Common Fai rwood Common F airwo od Common Harrowbeer Harrowbeer Ibsley Ib sley Ibsley Middle Wallop M iddl e Wallop M iddle Wallop

Perranporth Perranporth Portreath Predannack

Predannack Predannack St Ma ry' s Warmwell

Turbinlite

Spitfire Beaufi ghter

Hurricane/Defiant Beaufi ghter Spitfire

Hurricane Sp itfire Whirlwind

Lysand er/walrus

Air-Sea Rescue

Spitfi re Spitfire Spitfire Spi tfire Beaufight er

Hurricane Havoc

T ur binlite

Spit fire Sp itfire Spitfire Beaufighter

Hurricane Havoc Hurricane Hurricane

Turbinlite

330

33 1

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

Squadron

Ai rfield

:"0. II Group ( Uxbridge) 72 Sqn Biggin Hill 124 Sqn 418 Sqn 157 Sqn 287 Sqn 65 Sqn III Sqn 350 Sqn F lU -101 Sqn 9 1 Sq n 116 Sqn 24 Sq n 1422 Fit 122 Sqn 313 Sqn 85 Sqn 1451 FIt 3 Sqn 485 Sqn 602 Sq n 32 Sqn 174 Sqn 607 Sq n 23 Sqn 7 1 Sqn 340 Sqn 303 Sqn 316 Sqn 317 Sqn 121 Sqn 222 Sqn -103 Sqn 457 Sqn 64 Sqn 277 Sqn I Sqn 219 Sqn 23 Sqn 264 Sqn 29 Sqn 1452 FIt 41 Sqn 129 Sqn

Establishment

Spitfire

Biggin H ill Brad well Ba y Castle Camps

Spitfire

Croydon Debden

H urri ca ne/De fia nt Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire

Debden Debden Ford

Gravesend

Boston

Mosquito

Beaufighter

Hawk inge

Spitfire Spitfire

Hendon Hendon

Various

Hesto n

Havoc

Homchurch Homchurch Hunsd on Hunsdon

Sp itfire Sp itfire

Hunsdon Kenley

Kenley Manston Manston Ma usto n

Manston Manl esham Heath Mcrston

Nonholt N ortholl

Nonholt N orth Wea ld North Weald North Weald Redhill

Southend St apl eford Tawney

Tangmere Tangmere Tangmere West M ailing West M ailing

w est Mailing \Vesthampnett \Vesthampnett

No. 12 Group (Watna ll) Church Fenton 885 Sqn FAA 68 Sqn Co ltisha ll 278 Sqn Co ltisha ll Co llishall 154 Sq n 288 Sqn Digby 409 Sqn Digb y 411 Sqn Digby Digby 4 12 Sqn 266 Sqn Du xford 609 Sqn Duxford Fowlmere 154 Sqn

Notes

Lysander/H urricane

Havoc Havoc Hurricane Spitfire

Communications Turbinlite

Turbinlite

Spi tfire

lI urricane Hurricane Hurricane Havoc

One Flight

Sp itfire Sp itfire Spit fire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire

Spitfire

S quadron

Airfi eld

Establishment

Nol es

253 Sqn 1459 Fit 19 Sqn 616 Sqn 133 Sqn 486 Sqn 610 Sqn 137 Sqn 56 Sqn 151 Sqn 1453 FIt

Hibaldstow Hibaldstow

Hurricane Havoc

Turbinlite

Hutto n Cranswick

Spitfi re Spitfire Spitfire

Kingcliffe Kirto n-in-L indsey

Kirton-in-Lindsey

Hurricane

Ludham Mat lask

Sp itfire

\Vittering

whirlwind T yph oon Defiant

Wirtering

Havoc

Snailwell

No . 13 Group (Ne wcas tle] 43 Sqn Ack lington Acklington 141 Sqn Ackl ingt on 1460 Fit Ayr 406 Sqn Ayr 134 Sqn Catterick 332 Sqn 6 11 Sqn Drem Drem 410 Sqn Ouston 281 Sqn Ouston 4 10 Sqn Ou ston 1423 F il Tumhouse 289 Sqn Tumhouse 8 1 Sqn Ca stlet own 54 Sqn Ca stlerown 123 Sqn 416 Sqn Dyce Montrose 4 16 Sqn Peterhead 603 Sq n Skaebrae 132 Sqn Skaebrae 331 Sqn 4 17 Sqn Tain

Turbin lite

Hurricane Bcaufighter

Havoc

Turbinlite

Beaufighter Sp itfire Spitfire Sp itfire Defiant

Defiant Defiant

On e Flight

Hurricane Hurricane/Defiant Spitfire Sp itfire

Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire

One Flight

Spitfire Spitfire

Spitfire

Spitfire LysanderlWalrus Hurricane

Air-Sea Rescue

Beaufighter

Havoc

One Flight

Defiant

Beaufighter Havoc

Turbinlite

Spitfire

Spitfire

Hurricane Beaufighter LysanderlWalrus

Air-Sea Rescue

Sp itfire

One Fli gh t

HurricanelDefiant Beaufighter Spit fire Spitfire T yph oon Spitfire

Spitfire

One Fli ght

i'\o.8 1 Group (worcester) Details of this training Group are in the Aircrew Training chapter /1;0.82 Groop (Belfast) Ball yha lbert 25 Sqn Ballyhalbert 153 Sqn Eglinton 152 Sqn Kirkistown 504 Sqn Limavad y 153 Sqn 74 Sqn Lo ng Kesh Newt onards 1480 Fit

Beaufighter Bea ufighter

One Fligh t

Spitfire Spitfire Beaufighter Spitfire Spitfire

One Flight

A

A

EX

Order of Battle April 1943 Squadron

A irfi eld

1\'0 . 9 Group (Barton lI all) H igh Erca ll 247 Sqn H igh Erea ll 41 Sq n Ho niley 255 Sqn Honiley 96 Sqn Honiley 285 Sq n Speke MSFU Valley 275 Sqn Valle y 256 Sq n Valley 456 Sqn Woodvale 195 Sqn

1"0. to Group ( Rudloe l\lanor) Church Stanton 3 12 Sq n Church Stanton 313 Sqn 264 Sqn 286 Sqn 184 Sqn 266 Sqn 307 Sqn 310 Sqn 125 Sqn 412 Sqn 276 Sqn 193 Sqn 129 Sqn 504 Sqn 6 16 Sq n 406 Sqn 164 Sq n 175 Sqn 174 Sqn 1449 FIt 19 Sqn 130 Sqn 602 Sqn 14 1 Sqn 257 Sqn 263 Sq n

Coleme w eston-super-Mare

Weston-super-Mare Exeter Bolt Hea d Bolt Hea d Fairwood Comm on Fa irwood Common Harrowbeer Harro wbee r Ibsley lbsley Ibsley M idd le Wallo p M idd le Wa llo p Odiham Odiham Po rtreat h Perranpo rth Perranpo rth Perranpo rth Pred a nnack Warmwell Wa rm well

No. 11 Group (U x br i d~e) Biggin Hill I Sqn Biggin H ill 340 Sqn Biggin Hill 61 I Sqn Brad well Bay 23 Sqn

Establishment

Notes

T yph oon Spitfi re Beau figh ter Beau fight er Defia nt Hurrican e

AnsonIWalrus Mosquito Mosquito

Ai r-Sea Rescue

T yph oon

Sp itfire Spitfire

Mosquito Defiant/Hurricane Hurricane Typhoo n Mosq uito Sp itfire Bea ufighter Sp itfire Wa lru s/Spitfire T yphoon Sp itfire Sp itfire Spitfire Beaufight er

Hurricane Typhoon T yph oon

Hurricane Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Bea ufight er T yph oo n Whirlwind

T yph oon Spitfire Spitfire

Mosquito

Air-Sea Rescue

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

157 Sqn 605Sq n 287 Sqn 4 18 Sqn 604 Sq n FlU 277 Sq n 9 1 Sq n 303 Sqn 515 Sq n 1422 F it 64 Sq n 122 Sq n 350 Sq n 85 Sq n 3 Sq n 402 Sq n 403 Sq n 421 Sqn 137 Sqn 609 Sq n 132 Sqn 182 Sq n 308 Sqn 3 15 Sq n 3 16 Sqn 124 Sqn 331 Sqn 332 Sqn 416 Sqn 453 Sqn 129 Sqn 486 Sqn 485 Sqn 165 Sq n 610 Sqn 29 Sqn

Brad well Ba y Castle Ca mps C roy don Ford Ford Ford

Mosquito Mosquito Defiant/Hurricane Mosquito

Gravesend

Westhampnett West Mailing

Mosquito

Heston Hesto n

Hornchurch Hornchurch Fairlop H unsdon Hun sdon Ke nley K enley

Kenle y

Manston Manston Martlesham Heath Martlesham Heath N ortholt No rt ho lt N ortholt No rt h Wea ld No rth Weald No rt h Weald Redhill So uthend Tangm ere

Tangmere Merston Westha m pnett

1'0. 12 Group (Watna ll) Church Fenton 183 Sqn 25 Sq n Church Fenton 68 Sq n 278 Sqn 56 Sq n 118 Sqn 288 Sq n 410 Sqn 411 Sq n 306 Sq n 302 Sqn 317 Sqn 167 Sqn 181 Sqn 151 Sqn IS'o.13 Group 409 Sqn 198 Sqn

Beau figh ter

various Wal ru slSp itfire Spitfire Spitfire Defia nt Bosto n/M osquito Sp itfire Sp itfire Spitfire Mosquito T yph oo n Spit fire Spitfire Spitfire Wh irlwind T yph oon Sp itfire T yphoon Spitfire Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfi re Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Sp itfire Sp itfire T yph oon Sp itfire Sp itfire Sp itfire

Hawkinge Hesto n

Coltishall Co ltishall Co ltish all Co ltishall D igby Digby Digby Hutton Cra nswic k

T yph oo n M osq uito Beaufi ghte r Anson/Walrus T yph oon Sp itfire

various Mosquito

Ludham Snailwell

Sp itfire Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Spitfire T yp hoon

\Vittering

Mosquito

Kirton-in-Lindsey Kitte n-in-Lind sey

Notes

Aeklingt on

Beaufighter

Acklington

T yph oon

Air-Sea Rescue

Air -Sea Rescue

EX I

333

334

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

~88

A yr A yr Ca nerick Ca trerick D rem Drem

Bea uf ighter Sp itfire Sp itfire Beau fighter Spitfire T yp hoon Anson/Walrus De fiant/H urrican e Spitfire

Sqn

222 Sqn 40 1 Sq n 219 Sq n 65 Sqn 197 Sq n 28 1 Sq n 289 Sqn 34ISqn i'\o.l~ Group 282 Sq n I3I Sqn 2~5 Sq n 66 Sq n 234 Sqn

O uston

Tum house Tum house

Castletown Castle town Peterhead Skeab rae Skeabrae

Fighter Co mmand units in North ern Ireland 50 1 Sq n Kirkistown

Wa lru s/A nson Spitfire T yphoo n Sp itfire Sp itfire

Notes

Order of Battle

July 1944

Ai r-Sea Rescue

Air-Sea Rescue

Spitfire

!'in.SI Group Det ails o f this trainin g Group are included in the chapter o n aircrew trainin g.

Air Defence of Great Britain

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

No tes

~o. 9 Group (Barto n Hall) The G roup had taken o n a trainin g role; de tails in the ch ap ter on aircrew training .

1'\0.10 Group [Rudloe Manor) Bolt Hea d 263 Sqn 68 Sqn Castle Camps 126 Sqn Culmhead 131 Sqn C ulm head 6 16 Sqn C ulm hea d ~I Sqn Friston 610 Sq n Friston I Sq n Lymp ne Lympn e 165 Sqn Portreath 276 Sq n Predann ack 151 Sqn 1449 Fit Predannack W inkleigh 406 Sqn ~o .11 G roup {Uxbrjdge] Bradwell Bay 2 19 Sq n Brad well Bay 278 Sq n Coltishall 229 Sqn Ford 96 Sqn ~ 5 6 Sqn Ford 350 Sq n Friston 50 1 Sqn Frisian Harrowbeer ~Sq n Harrowbeer 6 11 Sq n ~ 1 8 Sqn Ho lmsley South 125 Sqn H um 26 Sqn Lee-on-Solem Lee-on-Solent 63 Sqn Lympne 33 Sqn 7~ Sqn Lympne 127 Sqn Lympne Mauston 137 Sqn 605 Sq n Mansio n Mersto n 130 Sqn 303 Sqn Merston 402 Sq n Mersto n 234 Sqn Predann ack

Wh irlwi nd Mosquito

Spitfire Spitfire Sp itfir e Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Sp itfire Warwick Mosquito

Air-Sea rescue

Hurricane Beau fighter

Mosquito Wa lru slSp itfire Spitfire Mosquito Mo sq uito Sp itfire Spitfire Spitfire Sp itfire Mosquito Rea ufigh ter Sp itfire Sp itfire Spitfire Sp itfire Spitfire Typh oon Mosquito Spitfire Spitfi re Spitfi re Spitfi re

Air-Sea Rescue

336

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

ANNEX K

Air Defence of Grea t Britain (continued) Squadron

Airfi eld

Establishme nt

345 Sqn 277 Sqn 275 Sqn 274 Sqn 80 Sqn

Shoreham

Shoreh am Warrnwell West Mailing West Mailing

Spitfire Walrus/Spitfire Walrus/Spitfire Spitfire

:-10. 12 Group (Watnall) 307 Sqn Church Fent on

25 Sqn 504 Sqn

Colt ishall Digby

NOles

Air-Sea Rescue

Skeabrae Drem

July 1945

Spitfir e

Mosquito Mo squito

Spitfire

No . 13 Group (loneness)

118 Sqn 309 Sqn

Order of Battle

Air-Sea Rescue

Squadron

Spitfire H urricane

(\0.70 Group (Farnborough) With the disbandment of Arm y Co-ope ration Comm and in May 194 3. the Group was transferred to Fighter Command/Air Defence of G reat Britain.

A irfi eld

Establishm ent

NOles

No. II Group (Uxbridge] The training elemen ts have been omi tted and are included in the chapter on aircrew training. Andrewsfield 306 Sqn Mustang Andrewsfield 309 Sqn Mustang

315 Sqn

Andrewsfield

64 Sqn

Bentwaters

118 Sqn 65 Sqn 126 Sqn 25 Sqn 183 Sqn 74 Sqn 329 Sqn 275 Sqn 29 Sqn 3 10 Sqn 312 Sqn 313 Sqn 151 Sqn 406 Sqn

Bentwaters Bentwatcrs Bentwat ers Castle Camps Chilbolton Coleme Harrowbeer Harrowbeer Manston Mansto n

Manston Manston Predannack Predannack

Mustang Mustang Mustang Spitfire Spitfire Mosquito Spitfire Meteor Spitfire Walrus/Sea Oller Mosquito Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Mosquito Mosquito

l"0. 12 Group (Wa lnall) The training elements have been omitted and are included in the chapter on aircrew training. 19 Sqn Acklington Spitfire 26 Sqn Chilbo lton Spitfire 125 Sqn Church Fent on Beaufighter 303 Sqn Co llishall Mustan g 316 Sqn Co ltishall Mustang 307 Sqn Co hishall Mosqu ito 441 Sqn Digby Mustang 442 Sqn Digby Mu stang 124 sqn H utto n C ra nswick Spitfire I Sqn Ludham Spitfire 9 1 Sqn Ludh am Spitfire 1'10. 13 Group (In....erness) 164 Sqn Drem 129 Sqn Dyce 165 Sqn Dyce 122 Sqn Peterhead 234 Sqn Peterhead 611 Sqn Peterhe ad 603 Sqn Skeab rae

Spitfire Spitfire Spitfire Mustang Mustang Mustang Spitfire

338

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

Soles

~o. 88

333 130 331 332

Group [Edinburgh] Sqn Ba nff Sqn D yce Sq n G ardem oe n Sq n Garde moen

Mosquito Spitfire Sp itfire

Norway 128 129 130 132

3J.ISqn

Wood ha ve n

Order of Battle

Sp itfire

April 1953

Wing Wing Wing Wing

MOSQuito

Squadron

Airfield

;110. II Group (H illingdon) So uthern Sec tor ( Box) SOl Sqn Pilt on 6 14 Sqn Lla nd ow 54 Sqn Odiham 247 Sq n Od iham I Sqn Tangmere 22129 Sqn Tan gm ere

:\Jetropolitan Sector ( Kehed on) 41/253 Sqn Biggin If ill 600 Sqn Biggin Il ill Biggin H ill 6 15 Sqn 64 Sqn D uxford 65 Sqn Duxford North Weald 72 Sqn North Weald 60 1 Sqn North Weald 604 Sqn \Vaterbeach 56 Sqn w a ter beach 63 Sqn Wattisham 257 Sqn Wattisham 263 Sqn West Mailing 25 Sqn West M a iling 85 Sqn West M alling 500 Sqn 7'0. 12 G roup (l'i'e "'lon) Xortbem Sec tor (S hipto n) 191152 Sqn Church Fenton 609 Sqn Chu rch Fenton Linton-on-O use 66 Sqn 92 Sqn Linton-on-Ouse Linto n-on-O use 264 Sq n Lint on -on-Ou se 275Sqn 607Sq n G usto n 608 Sqn Th o m ab y

Establishment

Vampire Vampire M eteor

Meteor

Meteor Meteo r

Meteo r

Meteor Meteor

Meteor Meteor

Meteor Meteor Meteor

Meteo r Meteor

Meteor Meteor

Vampire Meteor Meteor

Meteor

Meteor Meteo r

Meteor Meteor Syca mo re Vam pire Va m pire

Eas tern Sector [Ba wburgh)

23 Sqn 141 Sqn 6 16 Sq n 74/34 Sqn 245 Sqn

Co ltis ha ll Co ltisha ll Finningle y

Il orsham St Fa ith Ho rsham St Faith

Notes

Va m pire Mete o r Mete or Me te o r Mete o r

Sea rch-and-Rescue

340

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Establishment

S quadron

Airfield

613 Sqn 504 Sqn

Ringway

Vampire

WymeswoJd

Meteor

western Sector (Langley La ne) 605 Sqn Hon iley 610 Sqn Hoo ton Park 6 11 Sqn Hoo ton Par k

ANNEX

Not es

M

Order of Battle January 1961

Vampire Meteor Meteor

Ca ledonian Sector (Barnron Q uarry]

602 Sqn 502 Sqn 6 12 Sqn 43/17 Sqn 222 Sqn 151 Sqn 603 Sqn

Abbotsineh Aldergrove Dyee Leueha rs Leuchars Leueh ars Turnhou se

Vampire Vampire Vampire

Meteor Meteo r

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

Vampire Vam pire

FCCS

Bovingdon

Anson. Meteor

Chivenor Leconfield Leconfield Leeming Leuchars Leucb ar s Leuchars Lindholme

Hunter. Vampire Hunter Javelin Meteor. Javelin. Valetta Javelin Javelin Hunter HQ No .21 (ADM) Wing: Bomber Comm and Station Bloodhound Blood hound Bloodhound Javelin Hunter HQ No . 148 (A DM ) Wing Blood hound Blood hound Blood hound Meteor. Mosquito

:"0 .8 1 Gro up (Pembrey) Details o f this training Group are in the chapter on aircrew training.

l':o. 11 Group 2290CU 19 Sqn 72 Sqn 2280CU 29 Sqn 151 Sqn 43 Sqn 112 Sqn 247 Sqn 94 Sqn 33 Sqn 92 Sqn 264 Sqn 141 Sqn 222 Sqn 5 CAACU

Breighton Carnaby

Misson Middleto n St George Middleton St George North Coates North Coates

Dunholme Lod ge Woodhall Spa Wood vale

:"0 . 12 Groop (Hors ham S t Faith) Co ltishall 23 Sqn Colt ishall 74 Sqn Co ltishall AF DS Duxford 64 Sqn Duxford 65 Sqn 3/4 CAACU Exeter GpCF Ho rsham St Faith 242 Sqn M arh am North Luffenham \Varbo ys 257 Sqn Woolfox Lodge 62 Sqn So LAW Old Sarum Stradishall I Sqn 54 Sqn Stradi shall Valley I GWTS Waterbe aeh 25 Sqn \Vaterbeach 46 Sqn \Vattisham 4 1 Sqn \Vattisham 56 Sqn Watt isham III Sqn

Notes

Javelin Lightning various Javelin Hunter various Anson. Meteor Bloodhound Bomber Command Station HQ No .151 (A DM) Wing: Bomber Comm and Station Blood ho und Bloodh ound various Hunter Hunter Flying Training Command Station Hunter Javelin Javelin Javelin Hunter Hunter

342

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Squadron

Airfield

Establishment

watton

263 Sqn 266 Sqn 85 Sqn

w atton

IIQ No . 24 (AD M) Wing Bloodhou nd Blood ho und

CFE

Rattlesden

West Raynham we« Raynham

Notes

Order of Battle January 1968

Javelin various

Not e: Data from the 5D I6 1 Locatio n of Units .

The Javelins of 85 Squadron moved to West Raynham ill September 1960 f rom Strandishall. Squadron

Airfield

5 Sqn 85 Sqn 229 0CU 2260C U II Sqn 23 Sqn 25 Sqn 29 Sqn III Sqn 41 Sqn

Binbrook Binbroo k Cblve nor Coltishall Leu ch ars

Leuchars No rth Coa tes Wattisham

Watt isham \Vest Raynham

Establishment

Notes

Light ning Canberra

Hunter Lightning

Lightning Lightning Bloodhound Lightning Light ning Bloodh o und

Note: Data based on 501 61 Location of Units.

85 Squadron exchanged its Javelins for Canberras " lid moved to Binbrook ( April 19?3 ) to become a target facili ties unit.

.....

EX 0

EX

Fig hter Co mma nd Claims. 1939 Sight

Day

Claims World War Two ir comb at claims made for enemy aircraft destroyed are a contentious issue and whilst there is insufficient space here to discuss this topic it is worth explain ing the RA F's official categorisations, as used during the Battle of Britain . The following details are extra cted from a Fighter Comm and document dated ovember 1940. For the earl y part of the Battle the RAF was using a dual system of Confirmed and Unconfirmed: Enemy aircraft had to be seen on the ground or in the sea by a member of the crew or formation, o r confirmed as destroyed from other sources e.g. ships, Observer Corps, etc. Or the enemy aircraft had to be seen to descend with flames issuing - it was not sufficient if only smoke was seen, alternatively, the enemy aircraft must have been seen breaking up in the air. Unconfirmed : Enemy aircraft had to be seen to break off comb at in circumstances which led pilot or crew to believe it would be a loss.

Month

Destr oy ed

Probable

Damaged

Dest roy ed

Probable

Damaged

Sep Oct Nov Dec

0 10 4 2

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0

Total

16

0

0

0

0

0

Note: The source table o nly lists aircraft destroyed by day but claims for Probable and Damaged would have been made. There were no night claims.

Fig hte r Co mma nd Claims. 1940

Confirmed:

The system applied by the RAF in respect of claims changed at midnight on 13 August 1940, and from then on compri sed three categories: Cat I

- Destroyed: to cover all cases in which the enemy aircr aft was positively reported to have been seen to hit the ground o r sea, to break up in the air, or descend in flames, whether or not confirmation from a second source was available. This also covered enemy aircraft that landed and were cap tured. Cat II - Pro bably Destroyed: to be applied to those cases in which the enemy aircr aft was seen to break off comb at in circum stanc es which led to the conclusion that it must have been lost. Cat III - Damaged: to be applied in cases in which the enemy aircraft was considered damaged when under attack, such as an underc arriage dr opped or aircraft part s shot away. Despite the official use of Cat I, II and II I, record s and subseq uent histories have tended to simply use Destroyed, Probable and Dam aged . As with all statistics there is wide variation in published figures. Th e tables shown are from various Fighter Command and War Office documents.

Nighr

Day Jfomh

Jan Feb Mar A pr May J un J ul Au g Sep Oct TO \,

Dec

Tot al

Destroyed

Probable

Damaged

Destroy ed

Probable

Dam aged

3 10 3 6% 2 t 209 957 867 208 186'(, 36'(,

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 387 368 103 62 13

0 0 0 0 0 0 92 434 464 153 75 21

0 0 0 0 0 16 3 3 4 3 2 4

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 3

0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 4 3 3

2.489 '(,

933

1.239

35

8

19

Fighter C ommand C la ims, t 94 t

Night

Day .\ fontll

Jan Feb Mar Apr

May J un J ul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Total

Destroy ed

5% 15%

20 28 52 17 17 II I

7 5 5 184

Probable 5 3 7 7 16 8 5 3 2 2 2

Damaged

10 14 24 28

32

I

17 8 7 0 4 8 2

61

154

Destr oy ed

3 4 22 48%

96 27 26 3 8

Probable

4 2 7 16 22 4 3 I

7 3

0 3 0 0

258%

62

II

Dam aged

3 5 10 22 44

9 5 2 2 II

5 3 121

345

346

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8

0

Fight er Co mma nd C lai ms. 19-12

Fig hte r Co mma nd C laims. 19-15

Night

Day

M on th

Ja n Feb M ar Ap r Ma y J un Jul Aug Sep Ocl ov Dec TOlal

Fi~h ler

Destroyed

Probable

2~

Damaged

Destroyed

7 2 4 10 8 14 12 10 10 7 12

I 0 0 I 4 3 0 2 5 4 I 4

3 12 5 7 13 14 14 20 15 16 I 10

4 2 2 18 14 23 32 21% 10 6

98\1,

25

130

133\1,

M onth

Dest royed

Ja n Feb

21 II

Mar

22 ~

Apr

Probable

Damaged

Jun J ul A ug Sep Oct ov lA'C

12 12 II 7 5 2 9 2 2

12 9 15 7 4 3 0 2 I 2 2 I

Tot a l

11611,

14

58

Fi~ht er

Destroyed

10 7 21% 6 II 8 II 16 10 14% II 14 140

0 0 0 19 6 13 21 15 8 I 0 0

43 ~

83

Probable

8 2 2 2 I 4 3 3 I 4 0 3

16

33

Sight Damaged

J un J ul Au g Sep Oct Nov lA'C

0 5 0 I 'll 5 I 0 0 0 2 0 0

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

I I 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 I 0 0

16 26% 44 33 25 6 0 I 3 4 7 2

3 6 2 4 5 2 0 0 2 0 I 0

Tot al

14Yi

0

5

167\'1

25

May

Damaged

0 2 5 0 I I 0 4 I I I 0

Probable

Ja n Feb Ma r A pr

...

0 0 0 9Y2 4 4 13 8 4 I 0 0

Co mma nd C lal m s, 19-1-1 DaJ'

.\Imuh

Damaged

Night

2 3 I 3 I 0 2 0 0 I I 0

May

Probable

Co mma nd Claims, 1943 Day

Dest roy ed

Destroyed

Probable

Sight

Day

Damaged

4 10

6 4 6 0 0 0 0 I 0 I 32

Month

Destroy ed

Probable

Damaged

Dest roy ed

Probable

Damaged

Ja n Feb M ar Ap r Ma y

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

I 0 4 0 0

0 0 0 0 0

0 0 I 0 0

Totals

0

0

0

5

0

Fig hter Comma nd Cla ims S ummary, 1939-19-15 Probable

Damaged

}"t"a r

Destroye d

1939 1940 194 1 1942 1943 1944 1945

15 3. 10511, 1.21311, 694 927'1> 708 88

0 94 1 463 196 59 II

0 1.258 7 15 808 566 164 37

Totals

6.75 111,

1.963\1,

3.548

293\1,

Note: The table includes offensi ve and defensive sort ies.

Defensi ve sorties UK ,M onth

Jan Feb Mar Apr M ay J un Jul Au g Sep Oct Nov Dec

Totals

1939

1940

/ 941

1942

1943

1944

/ 945

2.350 3.339 4.995 8,369 8.575 5.7 13 3.506 2.375 1.955 2.790 2.024 1.681

1.994 2.396 2. 134 4.4 32 4.605 5.654 5.457 6.385 4.670 5.447 3.488 3.131

5.71 1 6,484 9.090 10.489 8.397 7.458 5.049 4.444 4.654 3. 153 2.68-1 1.801

1.121 1.510 2.25 1 2.458 4.542 5.793 10.356 10.622 1.401 1.261 884 42 1

2 11 250 1.006 178 43

47.672

49.793

69.414

42.620

1.688

Nore: Summary figures fo r 1939 and 1940 are not available.

347

ANNEX P

ANNEX

P

Definitions of Operation Types II as pects of RAF opera tions a re littered with acro nyms (abbreviations) and codena mes. which are used in official records, including man y of th ose used as source material for thi s book . An und ersta ndin g of these codenames is essential a nd the following list gives th ose used by Fighter Co mma nd and their meanings as defined by Fighter Co mma nd. No t all were in use at the same time and not all were actually applied in the exclusive way that th eir definition s imply - sometimes it depend ed on the compiler of the record , especially with sq uadron Operati onal Record Books. Circus, Escort. Ram rod and Rhubarb are by far the comm one st codenames to appear in the records.

A

Circus Large-scale combined fighter and bomber operatio n designed with the intention of brin ging the enemy fighte rs to actio n. In this type of opera tion powerful fighter force s are emp loyed. and the radius of act ion is corre spondingly limited . Th e comparati vely sma ll force of bombers is employed with the object of stinging the enemy fighters into actio n as well as doing mate rial dam age. COI'er Fighter COIW implies the maintenan ce of air superio rity in a given a rea for a given time in order to give freedom of actio n to a striking force. Distill Patrols against enemy minesweepin g a ircraft after RAF Bomber Co mma nd minelaying. Diversion A diversiona ry opera tion consisting of a sma ller force of fighters. and possibly bombers if avai lable. which is staged in conj unction with Circus opera tion. Escort Th e role of a n Escort is the direct prot ection of the bom bers. Th e term Close Escort may be int roduced to indicat e the forma tion allotte d to maintain position in the immed iat e vicinity of the bombers. Escort COI'er The cover of bombe rs a nd their escort from attack th rou ghou t a n operatio n. Feint A sma ll force of fighters, possibly acco mpan ied by bombers. which approaches the enemy coas t-line and withdraws before becoming engage d with enemy fighters. Th e purpose of

this opera tion is to maintain the enemy's defences at the highest possible state of preparedne ss. Flower Operati on s by night fighters in suppo rt o f Bomber Co mma nd, enemy night fight ers an d nigh t-fighter bases.

In

parti cular aga inst

Forward COI'CY Th e following-up of an operation a nd coveri ng of th e withdrawal of the bombers and their esco rt in the forward are a. Free L ance The role of a Free Lance is to seek out and destroy enemy aircraft in an allotted a rea of operations.

H aunch Offensive pat rols against enemy aircraft operating from the Brest a rea . Instep Offensive fighter sweeps to interce pt enemy seaplane or lon g-range land fighters interfering with th e opera tions of Coasta l Co mma nd aircra ft in the Bay of Biscay. Jim Cro ll' Shipping reconn aissance to find suita ble tar gets for a ttac k by fighters or fighter-bombers.

M ahmo ud Operation s by night fighters aga inst enemy night-fighters outside the radius of Bomber Co mma nd opera tions or on nights when Bomber Comm and was not opera ting. Mosquito Raids by single fighters or by a number of fighters in compan y up to Flight strength. (Cha nged to Rhub arb in January 1941). Popular Tactical reconnaissance of enem y-occupied territory to ob ta in inform ation for the Army. Ramrod Operati on s in which fighters escort bomb ers. the primary aim of the o pera tions being to destroy the tar get. Th ese opera tions may be to ext reme range , or provided for one reason or ano ther with compa rative ly sma ll fighter support. In such opera tions. owing to the limitati on s under which o ur fighters are working. the primar y task is direct prot ection of the bombers, and general engage ments with enemy fighters are not so ught. If the opera tion in below 5.000 ft the code wo rd sho uld be prefixed by the word ' Low'. Fighter Ra mrod Thi s is a similar opera tion to Ramrod except that th e fight ers a re escorti ng cann on fighters in lieu of bom bers, aga inst a selected ta rget. Ca nno n attac k only is empl oyed and no t bo mbs.

349

350

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936- 1968

Ranger OfTensive patrols by day or night involving deep penetration of hostile territory with the object of destroying enemy bomber, reconnaissance, training and communications aircraft in rear areas, or disorganising enemy low-flying training, and of attacking enemy transport targets in rear areas. Rear COI'er Cover the final phase of the withdrawal of the bombers and their escort to the United Kingdom. Rhubarb Small-scale harassing operations by day by fighters or fighter-bombers over enemy occup ied territory primarily directed against enemy low-flying aircraft or ground targets . Nig ht Rh ubarb Similar operation by night. Roadstead Operations in which fighters escort bombers (including Hurricane bombers, Typhoons and Whirlwinds) in atta cks on ships. whether at sea or in harb our. Fighter Roadstead A similar operatio n to a Roadstead except that fighters only are used witho ut bombs .

EX

Fighter Command Battle Honours Battle Honours In keeping with military tradition the RAF issued Stand ard s to its squadrons, altho ugh for a Standard to be awa rded a squadro n had to have been in existence for 25 years or to have 'ea rned the Sovereign's apprec iation for especially outstan ding operations.' The RAF also awar ded Battle Ho nours and for a squadron that had a Stand ard , nominated Battle Honours. origina lly to a maximum of eight, could be displayed (emblazoned) on the Standa rd.

43 Squadron Sta ndard showing a range of Battle Honours awarded whilst serving with Fight er Command.

R odeo Fighter ofTensive sweeps over enemy territory withou t bombers. S errate Equipment for the detection of enemy AI night fighters and the operations in which S errate-equipped fighters were used. Target COI'er The establishment of air superiority over the target area a few minutes before the bombers and their escort and escort cover are due to arrive and subsequently to cover their withdrawal.

'O'W[ :-

1~17

... ......

352

Q

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6-1 9 6 8 Cha nnel and No rth Sea 1939-1945 Ship attack. a nti-subma rine a nd min ing opera tions ove r the English Cha nnel a nd Sea from the out brea k of war to VE Day.

orth

No rwa y 1940 Operations over Norway during the German inva sion (9 April to 9 June 1940); applicable both to sq uadrons ba sed in Norway and to those operating from home bases . Biscay 1940-1945 Operation s over the Bay of Biscay by aircraft of Coa stal Command and Fighter Command. a nd Bomber Command aircra ft loaned to Coastal Command. between the Fall of Fr an ce a nd VE Day (25 Jun e 1940 to 8 May 1945). Dieppe Squ adrons which participated in the combined opera tions aga inst Dieppe on 19 August 1942. Norma ndy 1944 Operations supporting the Allied landings in orma ndy and the establishment of the lodge me nt area. an d the subseq uent breakthro ugh (Ju ne to August 1944).

The RAF Heraldry TTl/SI is crea ting a complete archive of all RAF Sq uadron badges. along with Battle Honour derails.

There are a number of these Batt le Honours th at relat e directly to the opera tions by Fight er Comm and . Th e list below includes the otli cial title of the Battl e Hon our and its par ameters. Ba tt le of Britain Interception operatio ns by fighter squadrons 1940 in the Battle of Britain (August to October 1940). Home Defence 1940-1945 Interception operations after the Battle of Britain . in defence of Great Brita in and Northern Ireland against enem y a ircraft a nd flying bombs. In addi tion to these two specific Battle Hon ou rs. Fighter Command squad ro ns were. o r may have been. entitled to some of the more 'general' Hon ours. includi ng: France and Low Co untries Operati on s in France and Low Countries between the outbrea k of war 1939-1 940 a nd the Fa ll of France (3 September 1939 to 25 June 1940). Appl icabl e both to squa drons based in Fr ance (the Air Component of the Ad vanced Air Striking Force ) and to sq uadro ns opera ting from home bases. Dunkirk Operat ion s covering the evacua tio n of the British Expeditionary Force and the Fren ch fro m Dunkirk 26 May to 4 June 1940.

Fra nce and Germany 1944--1945 Operation s over France. Belgium. Holland a nd G erm any during the liberation o f NorthWest Europe a nd the advan ce into the enemy's homeland. from the initiation of air action prep arat ory to the invas ion o f France to VE Day (April 1944 to 8 May 1945). It is possible that in certain circumstan ces Fighter Command sq uadro ns co uld have been awarded ot hers such as Atlantic 1939-1 945 and Biscay Port s 1940-1 945. The decision to award an Hon our was made on the advice o f the Air Historical Branch. which researched the record s of the Squad ron 's opera tions and made an appropriate recommendation.

Medals Fighter Comm and aircrew were eligible for the sta nda rd RAF gallan try and ot her medals. fro m the Victori a Cross to the British Empire Med al. and exa mples of a ll were indeed awa rded. altho ugh there was only one Victoria Cross - won by FIt Lt E J icolson du ring the Battle of Nicolson J'C: 'During an engagement with the enemy near Southampton on 161h August, 1940 Flight Lieutenant Nicolson's aircraft lI'as hit byfour cannon shells. 111'0 of which wounded him whilst ano ther set fire 10 the gravity lank. When about 10 abandon his aircraft owing 10 fla mes in the cockpit he sighled an enemy fighte r. This he attacked and S/10 1 down , altho ugh as a result he displayed exceptional ga llantry and disregard for the safely of his oll'n life.'

353

354

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

ANNEX Q

Britain (as recounted in the Operations chapter). The mo st frequent gallantry awa rds were the Distingu ished Flying Cross (for officers) and the Distinguished Flying Medal (for other ranks), everyone of which was well and trul y earned by its recipie nt. A number of citations for these medals, and for the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) have been included in the Operations chapter. A number of fighter pilots received multiple gallantry awards, including Bars for a second or even third award of the same medal. Adolph 'Sailor' Ma lan was one such pilot, receiving a DSO and A G 'Sailor' Malan was one of the Command's two D FCs (DFC and Bar , usuall y written as D FC*) during his service with 74 great fighter pilots and air leaders. Squ adron . He was subsequently awarded a bar to his DSO as well as other decorations . The cita tions for awards were issued in an Air Min istry Bulletin (AM B) and published in the London Gazette. The citations for Malan were:

DFC: AMB 865 dated 9 June 1940: 'During 1940 this officer has led his flight , and on certain occasions his squadron, on 10 offensive patrols in Northern France. He lUIS personally shot down 11I'0 enemy aircraft and possibly three others. Fit Lt Malan has displayed great sk ill, courage and relentless determination in his att acks on the enemy'. Bar to DFC: AMB 1301 dated 7 August 1940: 'S ince the end of May 1940 this officer has continued to lead his flight, and, on many occasions the squadron, in numerous successf ul engagements against the enemy. During the Dunkirk operation he shot down three enemy aircraft and assisted in destroying a f urther three. In June 1940 during a night atta ck by enemy aircraft he shot down tll'O He III s. His magnificent leadership. skill and courage have been largely responsible f or the many successes obtained by his squadron. ' DSO: AMB 2550 dated 19 December 1940. states: 'This officer has commanded his squadron with outstanding success orer an intensive period ofair operations and. by his brilliant leadership, skill and determination, has contributed largely to the successes obtained. Since early August 1940 the squadron has destroyed at least 84 enemy aircraft and damaged many more. Sqn Ldr Malan has himself destroyed at least 18 hostile aircraft and possibly another six .' Bar to DSO : The author has been unable to locate the details of this citation. Ca mpa ign S ta rs RA F personnel were also entitled to Campaign Star s and there was one Cla sp (a bar affixed to the ribbon of the medal) th at applied to Fighter Command. Th is bar - ' Batt le of Britain' - was worn on the 1939-1945 Star and was awarded to ' members of the crews of fighter ai rcraft who took part in the Batt le of Britain , between 10 July and 31 October 1940: Fighter Command personnel might a lso be entitled to three other Star s: the Air Crew Europe Star , the Atlantic Star and the Fr ance a nd G erm an y Star.

DFC to Sqn Ldr Barton of 85 Squadron.

355

357

E

Princip al raid s - b)' target, cities a nd po rts 1940-1 945 (continued]

German Night Attacks on Cities

Target

/ 940

/94 /

Liverpool

6

Manchester

2

5 I

M iddlesbro ugh Iewcastle Norwich I ottingham Plym outh Poole Po rtland

Date

A ug 19-10 Sep 19-10 Oc t 19-10 Nov 19-10 Dec 19-10 Jan 194 1 Feb 194 1 M a r 194 1 Apr 1941 M ay 194 1 J un 194 1 J ull 94 1

To tal

Raids

Tons liE

22 25 13 3 2

5.359 6.124 2.724 624 299

2 2 I

233 1.9 16 7 11

Industrial cities

Raids

Ports

Tons liE

Raids 3

70

Sheffield Southampton

Tons liE 360

5

I 7

4 4 I

1,038 1,099 II I

6 4 4

1,127 754 535

I 3 3 I

122 846 434 108

8 II 8 I I

1,826 1,911 1.746 136 174

17

46

Principal r aids - b)' target . citi es a nd ports 1940-1 94 5 Target

/940

/94/

London

62

8

4 2

2 6 4

Aberdeen Ba th Belfast

Birmingham Bristol Canterbury Ca rd iff Che lmsfo rd Clydesdale Colchester

Ipswich Kings Lynn L incoln

/943 5 I

2 4 4

I 3 5 2

Coventry Cowes Dover Exeter Grimsby H ull

/942

4

I I 3 I 2 2

4 I

I 4 4

2 3

I 4

I I

Sunderland Swansea

2 I I

West on S Mare

2

W eym outh

I

Yarmo uth York

/ 943

3

Port smouth

London

/ 942

I 2 I 0 I

DEX

Index Ind ividual page references are not always included: for example . the Hurrica ne is referenced on most pages of the Operations chapter (to page 135) and the Spitfire for most of that cha pter; indeed for all pa rts of this account referring to World War Two . the Spitfire is an almost page-by-page reference.

Aco ustic mirro rs 10 Air-to -air Missiles 97. 305. 307 Airb orn e Intercept (A I) rada r 12. 38-40. 51.52- 53, 66. 75. 78. 79. 146. 148. 150,157.1 77. 254,260, 275. 276. 287. 306 Aircraft Fighting Zon e 10 Aircraft. Luftwaffe: Ar 65 317 Arl 96 125 Bft 09 29. 30, 48-49. 6 I. 62. 80. 104. 105, 107. 116. 117. 11 9. 120, 127. 128. 137. 138. 139. 141 . 142, 180. 188. 189. 199. 238. 249. 257. 262. 273. 292. 316 Bft lO 7, 79. 89. 104. 107, 113. 11 9. 120. 169.1 88. 189.20 1. 316. 317. 32 1 Do l 7/215/217 66.75. 101. 102. 107. 116. 117. 127. 149. 155. 159. 163.3 16. 317 Fwl90 47. 62. 63. 65. 69. 75. 80. 144. 145. 146. 147. 154. 155. 156. 161. 163. 292 Fw20056. 127 He51 317 Helll 66. 84, 99. 100, 101. 102. 108, 122. 128. 130, 134, 148. 159, 172. 180. 182, 199.201, 206. 211. 316. 317 Hsl 26 61, 137.31 6 Ju 86P 65 Ju 87 Stuk a 26-27, 55. 110. 141 , 199. 317, 321

Ju 88 26. 30, 64, 66, 82. 88. 100. 107, 110. III , 112, 11 3. 130. 132, 134. 149. 154,155.1 57.1 58,1 75, 178. 188. 189.201 ,211 Mel63 174 Mel6231 6 Me410 75, 82, 163 V- I 83.84. 171 - 173. 180. 182. 194.296 V-2 85 Airc raft . RA F: Airacobra 49. 246. 282- 284 Anson 222. 230. 233. 237. 332. 333. 334. 34 1 Auste r 233. 240 Batt le 219. 222 Beaufighter40. 42. 47. 51, 52, 66, 70. 71. 78. 79. 81. 83. 124, 130. 148. 149-150. 162. 169. 185. 194.202. 207.209. 21 I. 212. 227. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 237. 246. 260. 275- 278, 313. 314. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335 Beau fort 234 Blenh eim 8. 9. 16. 22. 39.40.47. 58. 60. 122. 123, 124, 135. 136- 137, 138. 141 . 143. 144. 200. 206.2 19.222. 223. 225. 226. 227. 228. 230. 231. 235.246.260- 262. 281. 313, 314. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328 Bloodh ound SAM 96, 97, 246, 308- 309, 34 1. 342, 343 Boston (see Havoc) Brigand 241

Bristol Fighte r 6 Buffalo 30. 259 Bulldog 246. 247. 322 Camel 2. 6 Canberra 18 1. 343 Defiant 7-8. 16.22. 40. 47. 52. 60. 122. 123. 124. 129. 130--1 32. 134. 144. 148. 156. 200. 207. 222. 225. 227. 228. 246. 273-275. 313. 314. 323. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 33 I. 332. 333. 334 Demon 6. 246. 251-252. 322 Dominie 235 Fortress 88 Fulmar 314 Fury 246. 248- 249. 322 Gau ntlet 7. 14. 246. 249- 250. 322 Glad iat or I. 3. 15. 22. 99-100. 206. 222. 246. 249. 252- 253. 313. 314. 323, 324, 326 Halifax 174 Hampden 202 Ha rvard 222. 240, 323 Havoc 47. 54-55. 60. 69. 71. 144. 148. 158. 159. 225. 230. 23 I. 237. 246. 281-282.327.328.329.330.33 1. 333 Hind I. 4. 206 Ho rnet 9 I. 92. 240. 246. 292. 298-299 Hu nter 93. 95. 96. 242. 245, 246. 296. 303-305.306.34 1.343 Hu rrica ne 7. 15. 16. 18.22. 23.25.31. 32.37.39.40. 44. 46. 47.54.56.60. 61. 71. 80. 8 1. 99. 101. 103-105. 107-135. 185. 189. 192. 194.206. 207. 208. 218. 2 19. 222. 225. 228. 230. 233.235. 237.239.246.313. 314,323.324.325.326.327.328. 329. 330. 33 I. 332. 333. 334. 336 Javelin 95, 96. 97. 182, 202, 241 . 242. 244. 245. 246, 254-25 9. 297. 305-306. 341. 342 Lancaster 169. 174. 179 Lightning 97. 182. 242. 246. 306-3 08. 34 1.343 Lysand er 232. 324, 329. 330, 333 Magister 226, 235 Martinet 226. 235 Martl et 314

Master 217. 224. 225. 226, 227, 239 Meteor 85. 9 1, 92. 93. 94. 172-173. 181. 195. 240. 241. 242. 244. 245. 246. 295-298. 300. 337. 339. 340. 341 Mosq uito 66. 69. 70. 71. 78. 79. 81. 83. 84. 86.87.91 .159. 163.169-170. 175. 176.177. 180. 202. 209. 233. 237.239. 240. 241. 246. 260. 286-289. 300. 332. 333. 335. 336. 337. 338. 34 1 Musta ng 78. 79. 8 I. 84. 85. 86. 88. 89. 90.91. 172. 173, 175. 177, 179. 195. 209. 234. 237. 246. 29 1- 294. 337 Oxford 231. 240 Sab re 9. 246, 302 Seafire 81 Sea Ott er 337 Siskin 3 Spitfire 7. 15. 16. 18. 22.23. 25. 31. 32. 37, 40. 46. 47, 48-49,50.57.58.62. 63. 64.65. 68.69.70.7 1.73.74.75. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 84. 85. 86. 88. 89. 90.9 1. 105, 107-1 79, 190. 192. 194. 195.200.206.207.21 5. 218. 219. 222. 225. 2283. 229. 230. 23 I. 232. 233. 234. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 245. 246. 262-272. 292. 313, 314. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 33 I. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338 Swift 93. 246. 303 Sycamore 339 Tempest 81. 83. 84. 88. 89. 170--172. 180. 237. 240, 246. 290--291 Tiger Moth 216-2 17. 235 Tomahawk 47. 49 Typhoon 49. 69. 70. 71. 72, 74. 77. 79. 80. 16 1. 186. 190. 194. 195.207. 212.233. 235, 236. 237. 239. 246. 284-2 85. 330. 331, 332. 333, 334. 335 Typh oon (Eurofighter) 246 Valett a 241 Vampire 9 1. 240. 24 1. 246. 299-300, 339. 340 Venom 94. 246. 300--30 1 Walru s 329, 330. 333, 334, 335. 336. 337 Warwick 176 Wellington 39. 237

359

360

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Whirl wind 22. 47. 70. 71. 125. 139-14 1. 246. 278-280. 327. 329. 332. 335 Whitl ey 211 Aircr aft . other: B-17 Flying Fortress 167.31 7 B-25 Mitchell 167 B-26 Marauder 167 MiG-1 5 93 P-38 85 P-47 81. 85 Air-Sea Rescue 161 . 177, 190.275 Aircraft Storage Unit (ASU) 31 Air Defence of Great Britain 2, 3. 72, 73, 79, 82. 85. 88. 170. 174. 177. 246. 292 Air Defence Pla n 2. 10 Air Defence Sub-Committee II Air Fighting Co mmittee 38 Air Fight ing Developm ent Unit/Squadron 15, 80. 90. 205, 282, 292 Air Ministry 16,48, 68 Air Staff 5 Angriffafuehrer 75 Ant i-aircraft guns 3, 4, 10. 36. 54. 83. 84 Arma ment Practice Camp (A PC) 96. 235 Arm y Co -operatio n Comm a nd 71. 292. 336 Auxiliary Air Force 4. 14 Barrage Balloon s 12-13, 36, 73. 83. 84 Battle of Barking Creek 192 Battle of Britain I. 22--43. 107- 123, 193-1 94, 262- 263. 313-3 14. 316-32 1. 352. 354 Battle of the Bulge 90 BBC tran smitt er, Davent ry II Berlin Airlift 92 ' Big Wing' 36-38 Bomber Command 1. 46. 75, 86, 88, 89, 135, 160. 169, 183,202,222.223 British Comm onwealth Air Training Plan 216 Catapult-Armed Merchantmen (CA M) 57 'Ca ts-eye' fight ers 52-53, 75, 148. 150. 265 Central Fighter Establishment (CFE) 205. 237,239. 241, 242, 306, 342 Central Gunnery School (CGS) 238, 239 Cha in Hom e (see rad ar ) Chain Home Low (see rad ar )

X Cha nnel Dash 68 Coas ta l Comm and 176. 190. 211. 232 Code name s Cha nnel Stop/Sweep 59. 138 Cha la nooga 59 Circus 44, 46. 58-59. 60. 62, 68-69. 86, 135- 137. 14 1. 163-164. 166. 319. 348 Cover 348 Cross bow 173 Distil 164, 348 Diversion 348 Feint 348 Flower 87. 349 Haun ch 164. 349 Instep 164. 169. 349 Jim Crow 147. 349 Mahmoud 78. 79. 170. 349 Mosqu ito 44, 57. 59. 349 oball 173, 174 Popular 349 Ram rod 44. 86. 349 Ranger 78. 139. 164, 170, 350 Rhub arb 44. 57. 59. 68, 69. 78. 135, 138, 151, 156-1 57,164.1 70, 350 Road stead 151, 164, 350 Rod eo 44. 164. 174. 350 Serrate 78, 79, 86, 170. 350 Committee for Scientific Surve y of Air Defence II Co ntrol and Rep orting organisation 9, 12, 91 Day Fighter Lead ers Squ adron 241. 242 D-Day 81. 85-86. 175-178 , 190. 194.284. 353 Dieppe, Op Jubilee 62, 69, 154-157. 194. 353 Drop-t anks (overload tank s) 78. 81, 89 Dunkirk 20, 105, 199,352 Duppel 77 Eagle squadrons 30, 128 East Angli an Sector 183. 203 Element a ry Flying Tr ain ing School (E FT S) 216-217 Expan sion Schemes 4 Fighter armament 4-5. 6. 7. 18, 19 Fighter Comm and:

Attacks. tactics 8-9 Losses 18.29.3 1-32.34,60.66.8 1,86. 117. 11 8 Operat ion al Research Section 50 Origins I. 98 Strength 22, 23. 44--45. 47. 79. 81. 82. 90. 91,96 Fighter Intercep tion Unit (F l U) 40. 84. 193. 197. 246. 260. 275. 278. 325. 333 Figh ter Lead ers School 236. 238, 239 Fleet Air Arm 99 Fra nce. opera tions 1940 16-20. 22 Gee 70 G isella 88 Ground Cont rolled Interception (GC I) 4 1. 51. 151 G roups. RA F: No.2 Gp 59- 60. 71, 135, 143.260 No.3 Gp 206 0.9 Gp 20. 2 1. 46. 73. 124. 130. 148. 184-1 86. 233. 235. 237. 327. 329. 332. 335 0.10 G p 20. 33. 37, 68. 73. 124. 128. 130, 148. 187-191 .235. 325. 327. 329, 332, 335 No.1 1 Gp 15.22. 33, 36, 37, 38.46.49. 68. 72.73. 115, 124. 130. 148. 175. 183, 191-1 97.202, 203. 210. 222. 235. 322. 323. 325. 327-328, 330. 332-333. 335. 337. 339, 34 1 0. 12 G p 15.21.33,36.37.68.73. 124. 130. 148, 169. 183, 186. 199-205. 206. 222. 235. 237. 323. 325-325. 328. 330-33 1. 333. 335. 336. 337. 339. 34 1-342 No.13 Gp 15.33. 73.1 24.148.1 83.1 96. 206-210.2 13. 219,235.324,328. 331,333-334.335,336.337 0.14 Gp 20. 21-22. 122. 148. 207. 210-213. 328. 334 0.22 G p 324 0.30 G p 12-13 0.60 G p 73 No .70 Gp 73. 335 No.72 Gp 71 No .81 Gp 186.225.227, 331. 334, 340 No.8 2 Gp 331

No.83 G p 71 NO.84 Gp 71. 72 No.85 Gp 73. 82. 174 No.88 Gp 338 0.100 Gp 78, 87. 177 Z Gp 72 Helmore searc hligh t (and see T ur binlite) 54 Home Defence air strength 2 IFF 39 Ingpen Trophy 243 Javelin Opera tiona l Conversion Unit 242 Joint Intelligence Committee 74 ' Kippe r Kites' 193 Kn ickbein 40 Korean War 93, 181-1 82 London Balloon Bar rage 12, 13 Long Aerial Mines (LA M) 51. 52. 54. 281 Luftwaffe: 20 Airfields: Ab beville 143. 157. 159. 167 Amiens 143. 159 Ams terda m 157 Beau vais 143, 157. 167 Berek 135 CaeniCarpique t 166 Conches 167 Deelen 158. 160. 169 Evreux 159 Gilze-Rijen 87 Hazebrou cke 167 Ju vincourt 159 Leeuwa rden 87. 160 Le To uq uet 135 Lille 153. 167 Maupertus 139 Melun 143 Poix 143 Qu arq erville 139 Serquex 167 Soesterberg 158 Twenth e 160

361

362

FIGHTER COMMAND 19 3 6- 19 6 8 Venlo 87, 157, 160 Strength (and losses) 17, 23-26, 27-28, 30-31 ,32,53,60,70,75,77,79, 80, 81,82, 84, 86, 117, 118, 170, 172, 194, 209, 344-347 Units JG.2 50, 59, 60, 139 JG.2647, 50, 59, 60, 62,139,144,315 KG .257, 155 KG.4 40,122 KG .30 110 KG.53 84 KG .IOO 4, 123 KGr.126 122 Market-Garden 88 Merchant Ship Fighter Unit (MSFU) 55-56, 185, 329, 332 Metropolitan Air Force I Monica 70 Mosquito Aircraft Museum 288 Munich Cri sis 1938 15,36 Naval Air Warfare Division 95 Night Air Defence Committee 52 Night Interception Committee 38 Northern Sector 197 Norway, operations 1940 15,99-100, 353 Observer Corps 10, 12, 73 Operation Firedog (Malaya) 298 Operational Conversion Units No.226 239, 240, 242, 343 No .228 198,241 ,242 No .229 198,240,241 ,242,343 No .233 241, 242, 290 No.238 241, 242 Operational Training Units: 32, 186, 217, 223-239 No.6232 No .12230 No .13 237, 240 No.41 233, 237 No.43 233, 240 No .51 231, 232, 233, 234, 237 No.52 227, 228, 230, 233, 238, 239 No .53 227, 228, 230, 231, 233, 236, 237

INDEX No.54 39, 42, 225, 226, 227, 228, 230, 231, 233, 234, 237, 240 No.55 224, 225, 228, 230, 231, 233, 237 No.56 224, 225, 228, 230, 233, 237 NO.57 224, 225, 228, 229, 230, 233, 237 No .58 186, 225, 228, 230, 233, 237 No.59 228, 230, 233, 235-236 No .60 227, 228, 229, 230, 231,232, 233, 234, 237 No.61 230, 232, 233, 237, 240 No .62 230, 233, 234, 235, 237 No .63 234, 235 No .80 237 No.132232 Order of Lenin 62 Oxygen, problems 214-215 People: Aitcheson, Sgt 134 Aitken, S/L 134 Allen , F/L 127 Andrews, AVM 169, 204, 210 Armitage, F/L 133-134 Arnold, General 81 Askew , F/L 230 Atcherley, AVM 204 Atkinson, P/O 189 Bader, Douglas 138, 20 I Ball, FlO 199 Balmforth, S/L 155 Baker, Sgt 137 Baker, AVM 204 Barnwell , FlO 199 Barraclough, Sgt 139 Barry, Dennis 295 Bartlett, Sgt 119, 120 Barton, S/L 355 Bateson, AVM 204 Beamish, Victor 68, 136, 137,220 Beamont, R 83, 113 Berry, Joe 171 Bird-Wilson, FlO 119 Blach. P/O 141 Bodie, C A 135 Bonham, G L 172 Boret , A.Cdre 210 Bowling, A VM 197

Boyle, AVM 196, 310 Braham, R D 169-170 Brand, AVM 187, 190 Brandon, P/O 149 Brooks, A1Cdre 197 Brown , Eric 257 Burt , Sgt 114 Bushell, Roger 105 Butler, F/L 180, 181 Campbell, A R 56 Casson, 'Buck! III Chamberlain, Neville 9 Checketts, W/C 175 Cheney, Jack 168-169 Chisolm, S/L 176 Christie, G P 135 Chunn, Sgt 129, 134 Churchill, Winston 18,32,34,36,61, II Clayton, AVM 197 Clouston, F/L 122 Cobden, P/O 107 Cole-Hamilton, AVM 190, 196 Collishaw, A VM 213 Cook, Sgt 133 Coope. W/C 138 Cox , Sgt 142 Crabb, P/O 127 Craig, Sgt 134 Craig-Adams, P/O 100 Crawley, Sgt 232 Crisham, AVM 204 Crook, David 106-108 Crooks, F/L 126 Cunningham, John 42, 170 Curry, J H 221 Czarnecki, P/O 151 Czernin, FlO 119, 120 Davidson, Pit Off 56, 152-153 Deall, FlO 161 Dean , 'Dixie' 172-173 , 296 Deare , A VM 204 Degail , P/O 232 Dickson, W F 72, 186 Dickson, AVM 190 Donaldson, S/L 140 Douglas, Sholto 42, 46, 55, 62, 225, 310 Dowding, Hugh I, II, 12, 16, 18,33, 34--36, 222, 225, 310, 312

Drummond, P/O 100 Duke-Woolley, F/L (W/C) 155, 199 Dundas, Hugh III , 112-113 Dunn, Sgt 153 Dunn, A1Cdre 213 Durnford, P E 155 Durrant, N J 173 Eastwood , Sgt 161 Edge, Sgt 142 Elliott, AM 310 Ernberg, W/O 151 Embry, AM Basil 310 Farnes, P/O 134 Finucane, Brendan 142 Fitzsimmons, Sgt 129 Foord-Kelsey, AVM 197 Forbes, S/L 141 Foreman, F/Sgt 151 Fraser, AVM 204 Galland, Adolf 34,316-321 Gash, Fred 122 Cheney, J 228 Gifford, F/L 206 Gillam, Denys 110-111 Girardon, Sgt 232 Giadyth, FlO 151 -152 Gleed, I R 220 Goering, Herman 26-28, 29, 316 Gorzula, FlO 151 Graham, P/O 126-127 Graham, F/Sgt 175-176 Graves, F/L 172 Green, Sgt 141 Green, S/L 161 Green , 'Bud' 163 Gregory, F/L 169 Gregson, F/L 155 Griffiths, Sgt 119 Grottick, Jimmie 180 Hall , P/O 129 Harcourt-Smith, AVM 204 Harris, Arthur 87 Hartley, AVM 204 Harvey, A1Cdre 190 Haw, 'Wag' 62 Hay, B H 157-158 Hellyer , F/L 112 Henderson, AVM 204,210, 213 Heycock , W/C 149-150

363

364

F IGH TER COMMAND 1936- 1968 H ill. A VM 73. 204 H ill. M R 181 H ill. A M Rod eric 88. 310 H itler . Ado lf 4. 9. 24. 29. 122 H oare. W /C 233 H ogg, Sgt 119. 120 Ho gg. PIO 189 Ho lland. PIO 139 Ho llingh urst, A VM 186 Ho pewell. Sgt 112 Ho pk ins. F 95 Ho ult on-Harra . PIO 192 Hu ckin, Fl O 175-176 Hu ghes. Desm ond 123 H ughes. FlO 125 Hull . PIO 155 Humphries. PIO 199 Hunter . S/L 273 Jam eson . F/L 100 Jam eson. S/L 133 Jarrold , 'Je rry ' 177- 178.216. 218- 219. 221, 23-231 Johnso n. Johnnie 78 Johnson. Sgt 134 Jon es. AVM 197 Jon sson . T on y 88 Jou bert de la Ferte, AV M 19 1. 196 Kend al. J ohn 57 Kilburn . PIO 155 King. PIO 11 4 Kinga by. D on 118 K ucera . Sgt 2 11 Large. Sgt (P/O) 127. 156 Lea ry. PIO 119 Leggett . D ick 179- 180 Leigh -M allory. T rafford 36-38. 46. 72. 73.87. 183. 194. 196. 199. 203. 3 10 Leve nson. Sgt 114. 228 Liskutin. M iro slav 144 Lund. F/L 142 Lydall. FlO 100 M acd on ald. NCdre 186. 196 M acieje wski, Sgt 137 M aguire. A VM 197 M alan. 'Sai lor' 120-121 . 122. 137- 138. 262. 354 M an sfield. Sgt 211 M arples. Roy 110. III M ar shall. J E 54

INDEX M ason . PIO 140 M au l. Sgt 134 McChesn ey. Sgt 134 McCl au gh ry. A VM 184. 186 McC onnell. PIO 137 McDonald . FlO 206 McDonald . Sgt 2 16 M cGrego r. A M 310 M c air. Sgt 130 Meh rof, PIO 153 M en uge, Sgt 232 M ich elmore, S/L 138 M irsch , Sgt 155 M itchell. R J 262 Moberley, FlO 11 2 M old er s. Wern er 262 Morris. am 3 10 Morrison. Don 154 M oulton-Barrett. E S 56 Mount. F/L 120 M ount. NCdre 197 Muir. Sgt 134 Murray. PIO III M ycock , 'Mike' 169 ico lson, F/L (VC) 119.353 owakiewicz, PIO 151 -1 52 O'Brien, S/L 122 O'M eara, F/L 135 Ol iver . PIO 141 Or lebar, A VM 190 Park. Keith 36-38. 194. 196.201 Patch. AV M 197. 3 10 Payne. Sgt 138 Peirse, AM 38 Pennington-S mith. J R 151 Petr e. Fl O 122. 199 Piat o wski. WIO 163 Pike. A VM 196. 310 Pisara k, S/L 140-141 Pittman. PIO 11 9 Plan t. Sgt 134 Polley. Bill 171 Port. Sgt 142 Portal . A CM 80 Prickrn an , A /Cdre 210 Pritchard. A /Cdre 197 Pu gh. F/L 140 Retinger. PIO 141 Rippon. F/L 230

Rivett . PIO 232 R ivington, P 236 Robb. AM Jam es 9 1, 3 10 Robert s. S/L 153 Ro bert so n. PIO 127. 206 Robinson . S/L 112 Robson . Sgt 232 Rod gers. FlO 173 Rosier. AM 3 10 Rou getelle, S/L 171 Rexburg. PIO 21 6 Rudland, Sgt (P/O) 125. 140 Sadl er . F/Sgt 114 Sal isbu ry- Hughes. K 159-1 60 Salmond. John 3 Sampson. 'Sammy' 155-156.231- 231 Sandys, Duncan 96 Saul . AVM 124.204. 206. 210 Saunders. AVM 196 Schiele. Sgt 141 Scott. PIO 145. 158 Scott-M alden. NCdre 204 Shepherd. Fred 114 Shirreff, F/L 180 Simpson . P J 211 Simpson . S/L 132 Smith. PIO 112 Smith. S/L 134 Sm yth. F/L 176 Sniec, PIO 157 Spiers. Sgt 2 17 Sporny, PIO 142 Spurdle. 'Spud ' 120-121 . 147-148 Stan ford Tuck . Bob 68. 105, 189 Steele. C R 186 Steele, A VM 190 Steven s, F/L 176 Steven s. NCdre 186 Steven son, A VM 186 Steward, Sgt 119 St one , H 225-226 Tappin, S/L 176 Thomas, PIO 133 Thornton. F/L 171 T ickner, R E 152 Traill , A VM 204 Trenchard, Lord 35 Trousdale, F/L 129 Turner, Stan 138

T yrnan, F/Sgt 171 T yssen, N Cdre 199. 203 Varley. G W 57 Veseley, FlO 130-1 32 Veys, Sgt 232 Vincen t, AVM 196.2 10 Voase-Je ff, Ro bert 101 Wak eling, Sgt 189 Walker. F/L 232 Wardzinski, PIO 157 Wat son-Watt . Ro bert II Welsh. A VM 196 Westmorel and. Sgt 112 Williams, Sgt 148-149 Wissler . PIO 11 9 Witorzenc , S/L 141 Whitlock. FlO 176 Whitworth Jones. A VM 186 Wild blo od. PIO 189 Woods-Scawen, Sgt 142 Wright, PIO 134 Wyrill, PIO 134, 148-149 Yapp, F .L 148 Pilot los s rates 42--43 Prune's Guide for Living 146

Qui ck Reacti on Alert (Q RA) 181. 182 Rad ar 10. 11 -12. 27.40. 53. 64 Rad ar sta tions: A nstruther 2 10 A vebury 5 1 Bamburgh 210 Bawdsey II , 197 Beachy Head 84, 191 Bromley 197 Ca na wdo n II , 197 Carn aton 191 C ockburnspath 210 Cresswell 210 Danby Beac o n 210 Do onues Hill 210 Douglas Wood 210 Dover II . 191 Drone Hill 210 Drytree 191 D unkirk 197 Dunwich 191 Durrington 41, 51

365

366

DEX

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Fai r Isle 210 Fai rligh t 84. 197 Fore ness 197 Hawks Tor 191 Haycastle 191 High Street 19I Hillhead 210 eatishead 203 ethe r Burton 210 O rby 51 Ottercops Moss 210 Pevensey 19 I Poling 197 Ram e Head 191 Rosehearty 210 Rye 191 St Cyrus 210 St T wynells 191 School Hill 210 Sho tto n 2 10 Sopley 51 Staxton Wold 110 Strumble Head 191 Swingate 84 T hr iumster 210 Truleigh 197 Ventn or 191 Walding Field 51 Walton 197 Warren 191 West Prawle 191 WiIlesboro ugh 5 I Worth 191 Radio Direction Finding (see radar) I I RA F Flights: 0.430250 No.1 422 197. 333 0. 1423210 0.1449 191. 329. 332 No.1 451 54. 197.282 No .145255. 197.282 No .1453 55. 205. 282 No .145455. 191.282, 329 No .1455 55, 282 No .1456 55, 184. 186. 282. 329 No .1457 55, 282. 329 No .1458 55, 191,282, 329 No.1 459 55, 149. 205, 282 No .1460 55, 210. 282

RA F Squadrons: I Sqn 44. 74.10 1-103.104-105.106. 140. 19 1. 197. 198.205.207.249.257. 267.285. 297.304.313.322.325. 328. 330. 332. 337. 339. 341 2 Sqn 173 3 Sqn I. 27. 140. 157-158. 171. 180. 197. 210. 21 1.213. 247. 253. 257. 285. 29 I. 313. 323. 326. 328. 330. 333 5 Sqn 308. 343 6 Sqn 35 7 Sqn 35 9 Sqn 35 I I Sqn 242. 308. 343 16 Sqn 35, 324 17 Sqn 26,30. 115. 11 6. 119. 205. 247. 250. 257. 313. 322. 323, 325. 327, 340 19 Sqn 7, 92, 115. 122. 173. 180- 181. 191. 198. 199. 201. 205, 220, 229, 247. 249. 250, 262. 267, 294. 297, 299. 304, 313, 322. 323. 325. 328. 33 1.332.337.339.34 1 22 Sqn 198. 339 23 Sqn 6. 60. 61. 69. 78. 122. 246. 159. 182. 197. 199.205.247.251. 252. 262.281. 282. 287. 288. 300. 30 1. 306. 308. 313. 322. 323. 325. 330. 332. 339. 34 I. 343 24 Sqn 197. 323. 330 25 Sqn 8. 39. 124. 168. 172. 197. 198. 205. 249. 252. 253. 260. 262. 278. 282. 288. 297. 300. 306. 309. 313. 322. 323. 325. 328. 33 1. 333. 336. 337. 339. 34 1. 343 26 Sqn 197. 205. 267. 292. 335. 337 29 Sqn 121. 122. 197. 198. 199,205.247. 251.252.262,278.288. 296. 297. 308,3 13,325.328,330.333.337. 339, 34 1. 343 32 Sqn 107. 152. 191, 197. 199. 247. 250, 258, 313. 322. 323. 325. 327. 330 33 Sqn 197. 198. 297. 301, 306, 335,341 34 Sqn 205, 297, 339 38 Sqn 39 41 Sqn 73. 107. 11 7, 135. 136, 137, 186, 191. 197. 198,247. 249, 252. 267,

27 1. 297. 299. 306. 309. 313. 315. 324. 325. 330. 332. 335. 339. 34 1. 343 43 Sqn 93. 198. 205. 207. 210. 248. 249. 258. 297, 303. 304. 313. 322. 324. 328. 33 I, 340. 341 45 Sqn 304 46 Sqn 16.96.99-100. 11 7. 205. 250. 258. 297. 305. 306. 313. 323. 325. 328.341 54 Sqn 91. 135. 198. 205. 210. 247. 250.253. 267. 291. 297. 300. 305. 313.322.323.326,328.331. 339. 341 56 Sqn 31. 49. 91, 97.135.167.180. 181 , 197. 205. 247, 250. 253, 258, 284. 285.29 1.297. 303,305.308,3 13. 322.323.325.327, 331. 333. 339. 34 1 62 Sqn 205. 309. 341 63 Sqn 197. 198,24 1.242, 267. 297, 305. 335, 339 64 Sqn 65, 135. 136. 152. 197, 198.205. 252. 262. 267. 294, 297. 298. 299, 306. 313. 324, 325, 327. 330. 333. 335. 337. 339. 34 1 65 Sqn 26. 58. 88. 96. 138. 139. 16 1. 197. 198. 205. 210, 250. 252. 253. 267. 292. 294. 297. 299. 313. 322. 323. 325. 328. 330. 335, 337. 339 66 Sqn 16.34.48.57. 117. 120. 127, 135. 141. 191. 193. 197. 199. 205. 213. 250.267.271. 297. 302. 305. 313. 322. 323. 325. 327. 329. 335, 339. 341 68 Sqn 185. 19 I. 205. 210. 262. 278. 288. 328. 330. 333. 335 71 Sqn 30. 197,205.258.259. 267. 271. 328, 330 72 Sqn 27. 91. 115. 11 6. 197. 198. 207. 2 10, 253. 267. 297. 300. 306. 313. 324, 326. 328. 330, 339. 34 1 73 Sqn 17.40.1 02.115.1 99, 200. 210, 249. 253, 258. 313, 326 74 Sqn 9 1. 97. 107, 120, 122. 137. 197, 198. 205,250.252. 262,267, 271. 297. 305,306.307.308,3 13. 354, 323, 325. 328. 33 I, 335. 337. 339. 34 1

79 Sqn 186. 188. J9 I. 210. 2 I9. 242. 250. 258. 313. 323. 326. 327. 329 80 Sqn 121. 177-178. 197.221. 250. 253. 267. 291. 336 81 Sqn 50. 61. 210. 258. 331 85 Sqn 40. 99.179. 197.198.202.253. 258. 275, 28 I. 282. 287. 288. 297. 306,309.313.355.325.327.330. 333. 339. 342. 343 87 Sqn 18. 4 1. 60. 101. 113. 187. 189. 19 1. 249. 253. 258. 258. 313. 325. 327. 329 89 Sqn 301. 306 91 Sqn 136. 147. 197.267,272. 297. 327. 330. 333, 337 92Sqn 16. 105. 110. 115, 116. 142.147. 187. 189, 191, 197. 198. 199. 205. 215. 262. 267. 297. 302. 305. 313. 323. 325. 327. 339. 34 1 93 Sqn 191.281,282. 327 94 Sqn 309, 34 1 96 Sqn 47, 130-131. 186. 197. 198. 258. 275. 278. 288. 327. 329. 332. 335 98 Sqn 166 I I I Sqn 7. 39. 192. 197. 205,2 13. 247. 250. 255. 258. 297, 304. 305. 308. 3 I3. 322, 324. 325. 328. 330, 341. 343 112 Sqn 198.309,341 114 Sqn 135.260 116 Sqn 197.330 118 Sqn 198.205.210.267.294.329. 333. 336. 337 121 Sqn 128. 197.258.267.271. 330 122 Sqn 74. 197.241. 242. 267. 294. 330, 333. 337 123 Sqn 267. 331 124 Sqn 154-155. 174-175. 197.205. 24 1, 242. 267. 297. 330. 337 125 Sqn 52,179- 180. 191. 197. 205. 21I. 275.278. 288. 297.30 1.329,332. 335. 337 126 Sqn 191. 198. 267. 294, 335. 337 127 Sqn 197. 241. 242. 267. 335 129 Sqn 129. 154, 179. 191. 197. 242, 267, 294. 330. 332. 333, 337 130 Sqn 162. 191. 197,267. 300. 329, 332, 335. 338

367

368

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

131 Sqn 186, 191,213,241 ,242,267, 329, 335, 335 132 Sqn 197,267,271, 331, 333 133 Sqn 205, 258, 267, 331 134 Sqn 210, 258, 331 136 Sqn 258 137 Sqn 70, 197, 205, 24 1, 242, 258,279, 331, 333, 335 141 Sqn 16, 60. 78,94,149,169-170, 191 , 198,207.210,262,275,278, 288, 301, 306. 309, 313, 324, 326, 327, 33 1, 332, 339, 341 145 Sqn 16,58, 110,242,257.262,313, 323. 325, 328 151 Sqn 40, 47, 61, 130, 131, 191 . 197, 198, 205, 250, 258, 275, 288, 297, 300, 30 I, 306, 313, 323, 325, 328, 331, 333, 335, 337, 340, 341 152 Sqn 24.1 88,1 89,191 ,205,253,267, 313, 324, 327, 331, 339 153 Sqn 275, 278, 297, 331 154 Sqn 205, 267. 330 157 Sqn 66, 175- 177, 177, 197,287,288, 330, 333 164 Sqn 191,258,267,332,337 165 Sqn 191,241,242,267,333,335, 337 167 Sqn 205, 267, 333 174 Sqn 191, 197, 258, 330, 332 175 Sqn 151 , 191 ,258,285,329,332 176 Sqn 241, 242 181 Sqn 205, 285, 333 182 Sqn 258, 285, 333 183 Sqn 198,205,291 ,333,337 184 Sqn 191 .258, 332 186 Sqn 258, 267 193 Sqn 191,332 195 Sqn 186, 332 197 Sqn 210, 335 198 Sqn 210, 333 213 Sqn 187, 188, 189, 191,213,250, 258, 313, 323, 325. 328 214 Sqn 88 219 Sqn 9, 123, 130, 185, 197,210,242, 262, 278, 288, 30 I, 313, 324, 326, 328, 330, 335, 335 222 Sqn 16,91, 197, 198,205,210,262, 267,291 ,297, 305, 309, 313, 323, 325, 328, 330, 335, 340, 341

NDEX

223 Sqn 66 225 Sqn 257, 324 229 Sqn 16, 115, 117, 186, 205, 258, 313, 323, 325, 327, 335 232 Sqn 210, 211, 213, 258, 313, 326, 328 234 Sqn 16, 91, 187, 188, 189, 191, 197. 213, 242, 262, 267, 292, 294, 297, 313, 324, 325, 327, 329. 335, 335, 337 235 Sqn 313, 323 236 Sqn 313, 323 238 Sqn 188, 191 , 258, 267, 313, 325, 327 239 Sqn 258 242 Sqn 115, 135, 137, 197,201 ,205, 258, 262, 267, 309, 313, 324, 325, 327, 341 243 Sqn 267 245 Sqn 16, 91, 132, 133, 134,205,210, 213,254,258,296,297,305,313, 324. 326, 328, 329, 335, 339 246 Sqn 186 247 Sqn 186, 191, 198, 198,253,258, 291,297,300,305,309,313,327, 329, 332, 339, 341 248 Sqn 175,313,323 249 Sqn 113-114, 11 7, 119, 135, 137, 188,207,210,219-220,258,267, 299, 313, 326 253 Sqn 17-18,21 , 115, 117, 148, 198, 205,210,213,219,258,301,314, 323, 326, 328, 331, 339 254 Sqn 323 255 Sqn 52,129,130,131 ,134,148, 186, 205, 258, 275, 278, 328, 329, 332 256 Sqn 47,1 86,191 ,258,278,327,329, 332 257 Sqn 74, 115, 117, 150, 153, 165, 191, 198, 205, 258, 267, 297, 305, 309, 314, 328, 329, 332, 339, 341 258 Sqn 186, 327 259 Sqn 197, 327 260 Sqn 213, 328 263 Sqn 15, 16,91 ,99-100, 125-127, 139-140, 141 , 191 , 198,210,253, 258, 278, 279, 297, 305, 309, 314, 323, 326, 327, 329, 332, 335, 339, 342

264 Sqn 8, 21, 53, 96, 122, 130, 148, 191, 197, 198,205,273,275,288,297, 308, 309, 314, 323,325, 327,330, 332, 339, 34 1 266 Sqn 74, 133- 134, 138, 139, 161. 191, 197,266,205,267,285,297, 309, 314,323,325,328,330,332, 342 267 Sqn 191, 329 274 Sqn 197, 267, 336 275 Sqn 186, 197, 198,205, 329,332, 336, 337, 339 276 Sqn 161, 191 277 Sqn 197, 330, 333, 335, 336 278 Sqn 197, 205, 330, 333, 335 281 Sqn 2 10, 331, 335 282 Sqn 2 13, 335 285 Sqn 186. 329, 332 286 Sqn 191,329, 332 287 Sqn 197, 330, 333 288 Sqn 205, 330, 333 289 Sqn 210, 331. 335 302 Sqn 115, 141. 151-1 52, 156-1 57, 167, 191. 197.205,258,267, 271, 314, 328, 329, 333 303 Sqn 115, 11 7, 163, 197, 205, 258, 267, 314, 327, 330, 333, 335, 337 306 Sqn 58, 143,1 63,1 79,1 86,1 91,1 98, 205, 258, 267, 294, 327, 329, 333, 337 307 Sqn 130, 186, 191, 205, 275, 278, 288, 327, 329, 332, 336, 337 308 Sqn 140- 14 1. 163, 178, 185, 186, 191, 197, 258,267, 271. 327, 329, 333 309 Sqn 198,2 10, 336, 337 310 Sqn 115, 191, 198,201, 205, 258, 267, 314, 328, 329, 332, 337 312 Sqn 139, 144, 185, 186, 191, 198, 258,267, 314, 327, 329, 332, 337 313 Sqn 191, 197, 198,267, 330,332, 337 315 Sqn 163, 179, 197, 198,210,258, 267, 294, 328, 329, 333, 337 316 Sqn 59, 84, 191, 197,205,258,267, 294, 327, 330, 333, 337 317 Sqn 197,205,257,267, 271, 330, 333 318 Sqn 267 322 Sqn 267, 271 329 Sqn 198, 267, 337

331 Sqn 68, 74. 197,258,267,271,331. 333, 338 332 Sqn 74, 197,267,271, 331, 333, 338 333 Sqn 338 334 Sqn 338 340 Sqn 74, 165, 267, 271, 330, 332 34 1 Sqn 210, 267, 271, 335 345 Sqn 197,267, 336 349 Sqn 267, 291 350 Sqn 197, 267, 330, 333, 335 401 Sqn 154, 197,210, 258,267, 314, 330, 335 402 Sqn 60. 74, 138, 191, 197,258,267, 329, 333, 335 403 Sqn 78, 197, 267, 330, 333 406 Sqn 191, 198,210,278,331 ,332, 335, 337 409 Sqn 52, 210, 275, 278, 288, 330, 333 410 Sqn 52, 163,205, 210, 275,278,288. 331,333 411 Sqn 205, 267, 330, 333 412 Sqn 191. 267, 330, 332 416 Sqn 78, 267, 331. 333 417 Sqn 267, 331 418 Sqn 69, 197,225,288,330,333, 335 421 Sqn 197,267,333 438 Sqn 257 439 Sqn 257 440 Sqn 257 441 Sqn 205, 267, 294, 337 442 Sqn 205, 267, 294, 337 443 Sqn 267 451 Sqn 267 452 Sqn 142, 186,267, 329 453 Sqn 197,267, 333 456 Sqn 52, 186, 197, 275,278, 288,329, 332, 335 457 Sqn 197, 267, 330 485 Sqn 197, 267, 330, 333 486 Sqn 74, Ill , 180, 197, 205, 258. 285, 290,291, 331,333 488 Sqn 210, 278, 288, 335 500 Sqn 198,297, 339 501 Sqn 115, 11 7, 170-1 72, 180, 19 1. 197, 198,258,271,291, 300, 314, 323, 325, 327, 329, 335, 335, 339 502 Sqn 205, 300, 340

369

370

INDEX

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

504 Sqn 115. 117. 191.205.210.250. 258.27 1. 297.314.323.326.327. 331. 332. 336. 340 515 Sqn 197.333 530 Sqn 66. 282 531 Sqn 282 532 Sqn 282 533 Sqn 282 534 Sqn 151 535 Sqn 282 536 Sqn 282 537 Sqn 282 538 Sqn 282 539 Sqn 66 600 Sqn 8. 122. 191. 197. 198.210.223. 252. 262. 275. 278. 297. 314. 323. 325. 328. 329. 339 601 Sqn 16. 49. 101. 197. 198.223.250. 252.258. 262, 284. 297. 300. 314. 323, 327. 339 602 Sqn 120. 177. 191. 197. 205. 206. 210.250.27 1,300.3 14,324,326. 328. 330, 332, 340 603 Sqn 23.1 15.205.206.2 10,253.27 1. 297. 300, 314. 324, 326. 328. 331, 337. 340 604 Sqn 42.130.162.191 . 197.198.223. 252. 262. 271 . 275. 278. 288. 300. 314,323.325.327.329,333.339 605 Sqn 69,117.197.205.210.253.258. 282.288, 300. 314. 323. 326. 327. 328. 333. 335, 340 607 Sqn 16, 60, 197. 208. 210, 252. 253. 258,271, 300, 314, 326, 330. 339 608 Sqn 205. 252, 288, 300, 339 609 Sqn 69. 74. 77. 106, 108, 115. 188. 189. 191. 197.205.271 .275.285. 288.297,314.324,325.327,330. 333. 339 610 Sqn 106. 191, 197,205.271, 297. 314.323.325.328.331, 333. 335. 340 611 Sqn 14- 15. 74. 114. 115. 135. 136, 197. 199.201 .205.210.271, 294. 297,314,323,325.33 1,332.335. 337, 340 612 Sqn 205. 271. 300. 340 613 Sqn 205. 300, 324, 340 614 Sqn 198,27 1,300.314.324,339

615 Sqn 16. 58, 191, 197, 198. 250. 253, 258.271, 297. 325, 328, 329, 339 616 Sqn 65, 85. 92. 110-113. 138. 154, 156. 168. 172-173 , 191, 195.200. 205, 210. 250. 271, 288, 295. 296, 297. 314. 324. 326. 328. 331, 332. 335. 339 RAF Squadrons, other: I Sqn RCA F 117.205.31 4 2 Sqn RCA F 205 77 Sqn RAA F 93 804 Sqn FAA 210. 314 808 Sqn FAA 210. 314 885 Sqn FAA 205 RAF Stations. UK: Squadron location in the da ta-ta bles in the Operational Aircraft chap ter are not included in the index. Abbotsinch 99. 205. 340 Acklington 55. 149, 205. 207. 210. 236. 242, 324. 326. 328. 331, 333, 337 Aldergrove 132. 133. 205. 206, 210, 326. 328, 340 Andover 240 Andreas 185, 186, 329 Andrews Field 179, 197, 337 Angle 191. 329 Annan 230. 233233. 237 Aston Down 224. 225. 230. 233. 237. 324 Atcham 185 Ayr 210. 235. 331, 334 Baginton 184. 186.327. 329 Ballyhalbert 33I Banff 338 Barton Hall 21 Bentley Priory I. 36. 73 Bentwaters 91, 197,240. 337 Bicester 237 Biggin Hill 27. 37. 57. 68, 74, 115, 116. 121, 135. 162. 165, 172, 191, 193. 197. 197.322.323.325.327.328, 330. 332. 339 Binbrook 307. 343 Bircham Newton 325 Bolt Head 191, 332. 335 Boscomb e Down 191 Bovingdon 341

Boxted 91 Bradwell Bay 197. 330. 332. 333. 335 Breighton 197. 341 Carnaby 197. 341 Castle Cam ps 66. 179. 191, 197.287. 330, 333. 335. 337 Castletown 22. 127.210.211, 213. 326. 328. 331. 334 Catterick 9. 68. 199.206.210.324.326. 328. 331. 334 Charmy Down 191, 205. 327. 329 Charterhall 230, 233. 234. 237 Chedworth 238 Chilbolton 191. 197. 237. 327. 337 Chiveno r 197. 242. 34 1, 343 Churc h Fento n 30. 110. 11 3. 168. 199. 200. 205, 205. 206, 210. 225. 227. 228, 259, 298. 324. 326. 330. 333. 336. 337, 339 Church Stan ton 191, 332 Colerne 55. 191, 197, 237.24 1.327 .329. 332. 337 Collyweston 205, 325 ColtishaIl94.97. 168. 174. 197. 205. 242, 287.288.30 1.306.325.328.330, 333. 335. 336, 337. 339. 341, 343 Cranage 186. 327 Cranfield 229. 233. 234, 237 Crosby -on-Eden 228 Croydon 27. 197.323.325.328.330.333 Culmhead 191.335 Dalcross 209 Debden 18. 37. 57. 99. 115. 116. 119. 134. 193. 194. 197.227.228.281, 314. 323. 325. 327. 330 Defford 191 Detling 174 Digby 99. 114. 124. 143. 199. 200. 205. 205. 323. 325. 328. 330. 333. 336. 337 Doncaster 323 Drem 78. 169. 210. 324. 326. 328. 331, 334. 336. 337 Driffi eld 200, 20 I, 205. 240. 242. 328 Dunh olme Lodge 197. 341 Duxford 6. 10. 14-1 5. 16.46. 80. 114. 11 5.11 7.120.1 83.1 91, 194, 197. 199. 201, 205. 220. 257. 262. 278. 284. 322. 323. 328. 330. 341

Dyce 22. 205. 211, 213. 328, 331. 337. 338. 339. 340 East Fortune 230. 232 Edzell 224 Eglinton 331 Elgin 213. 328 Eshott 230. 233. 237 Exeter 187. 191.325.327.329.332.341 Fairlop 197. 333 Fairwood Common 191, 235. 329. 332 Farnborough 273. 295 Filion 15. 99. 140. 187. 191. 197.323. 327. 339 Findo Gas k 209 Finningley 205. 339 Ford 328. 330. 333. 335 Fordo un 212 Fowlmere 205. 325. 330 Friston 191. 197. 335 Grangemouth 210, 225. 228, 230. 233. 237. 278. 324. 326 Gravesend I II , 117. 120. 165. 193. 197. 235. 292. 325, 327. 330. 333 Harrowbeer 191, 197. 329. 332. 335. 337 Harwell 237 Hawarden 224. 225. 227. 233. 237 Hawkinge 8. 26.49. 139. 152. 191, 197. 260. 322. 327. 330. 333 Hendon 61, 11 5. 197. 223. 322. 323, 330 Heston 151, 197.227.228.234.330.333 Hibaldstow 205. 331. 332 High Ercall 150. 185. 186.229.233.234, 237. 329. 332 Holmsley South 335 Honiley 52. 55, 184. 185. 186. 205. 234. 235. 237. 329. 332. 340 Honington 40. 122 Hooton Park 205, 340 Hornchurch 21. 37. 46. 48. 57. 11 5. 117, 122. 139. 152. 154. 191, 192. 193. 194. 197.322.323.325.330.333 Horsham St Faith 203. 205. 296. 298. 339. 341 Hunsdon 55. 197. 287, 330. 333 Hurn 197. 335 Hutt on Cra nswick 205. 235. 331, 332. 333, 337 Ibsley 139. 168. 191, 327. 329. 332 Jurby 184. 186, 327

371

372

NDEX

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Keevil240 Kenley 17, 35, 46,57. 68, 78, 114,11 5. 139, 183. 191, 193. 194, 197. 31 I. 322, 325, 328, 330. 333 KingsclitTe 205. 331. 332 Kirkistown 331, 334 Kirkn ewton 209 Kirkwall 211 Kirton-in-Lindsey 52, 131 , 134,203, 205,233,236,237,325,328,331, 332, 333 Leconfield 61, 11 0, 112, 197, 210,227, 228, 242, 324, 326, 341 Leeming 197, 210, 240, 241,326, 341 Lee-on-Solent 197, 335 Leuchars 197. 205,241 ,242,303, 307. 340, 341, 343 Limavady 331 Lindh olme 341 Linton-on-O use 205, 292, 302, 339 L1anbedr 235 L1andow 197, 230, 339 Long Kesh 331 Ludh am 205, 331, 332, 333, 337 Lympne 26. 49, 191. 197,335 Macmerry 209 Man ston 8, 26. 49,77, 139, 157, 158, 171 ,174,1 97, 323, 325, 327,330, 333, 335, 337 Marh am 205, 341 Martl esham Heath 115, 137, 196, 197, 199, 323. 325. 327, 330, 333 Matlask 167, 205, 282, 331, 332 Merston 86. 197. 330, 333. 335 Middle Wallop 46, 55, 11 3, 11 5, 139. 189, 191. 325. 327. 329. 332 Middleton St Geo rge 197. 240. 242. 341 Mildenhall 40, 122 Milfield 230, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239 Misson 197, 341 Molesworth 240 Mont rose 211 , 213. 217, 224. 328, 331 Morpeth 237 ewchurch 83, 171 ewton ard 331 ort h Coates 97. 197. 308, 341, 343 ortholt 21. 37, 57, 68, 11 5, 117, 191, 192. 193. 197.322.323,327.330, 333

Nor th LutTenham 216, 241, 341 No rth Weald 31, 57,11 7,1 36,1 79,1 80, 191, 192, 194, 197, 197, 322. 323, 325, 327, 330. 333. 339 Oban 211 Odiham 9 1, 96, 191, 197. 299, 305, 324. 332, 339 Old Sarum 233. 324, 34 1 Ouston 150, 196. 205, 210. 235,237, 331 , 334 , 339 Pembrey 187, 188, 191,24 1, 242,290, 325, 327 Penrh os 185, 186, 327 Perranp orth 48, 191, 329,332 Peterborough 216 Peterhead 180,212, 213.235,331 , 334. 337 Portreath 151 . 191, 329. 332. 335 Predann ack 170. 175. 191. 197. 329. 332. 335. 337 Prestwick 99. 210, 326, 328 Rattl esden 205. 242 Redhill 197, 330. 333 Redn al 230, 232. 233. 234, 237 Ringway 200, 205, 340 Rudl oe Manor 187 St Athan 323 St Eval 187, 188, 189, 191, 325, 327 St Mary's 65, 191, 329 Sawbridgeworth 173 Shoreham 197. 336 Skeab rae 22. 209, 210. 211, 213. 328. 331,334. 336.337 Skitten 211 Snailwell 205. 331. 332, 333 Sou thend 197, 235, 327, 330 Speke 184, 185, 186, 200. 327, 329, 332 Squires Ga te 186, 200. 327, 329 Stapleford Tawney 140, 197,330 Storn oway 212 Stracath ro 224 Stradi shall 202. 205, 240, 34 1 Sumbu rgh 127. 210, 211. 213. 326 Sutt on Bridge 223, 224, 225, 288, 323 Tain 212, 331 Tangmere 37. 40. 46. 55. 57. 151. 191. 193, 194, 197. 197. 237. 239. 248, 253• . 275. 322. 323, 325. 328, 330, 333, 339

Tealing 230, 233, 237 Ternhill 184, 185, 186,200. 327 Th orn aby 205, 339 Tiree 212 Turnhouse 205. 206, 210. 225, 324. 326, 331, 334, 340 Twinwood Farm 234 Uxbridge 191. 195 Usworth 206, 208. 210. 228. 230. 233, 326 Valley 177, 184, 185, 186, 329, 332, 341 Wadd ington 199 Warb oys 205, 341 Warm well 11 3, 141 , 151, 187, 190, 191, 197.238,325,327, 329. 332. 336 Waterbeach 94, 181. 197,205.303. 306, 339 Watt isham 97, 197.205, 341, 343 Watt on 205. 342 Westhampn ett 120. 197, 325.328, 330, 333 Weston-Super-Mare 190, 332 West Malling 55, 177, 197, 197, 300, 330, 333, 336, 339 West Raynham 205, 239, 241, 242, 342, 343 Wick 22, 207, 209. 210, 211, 326 Winfield 234 Winkleigh 190. 335 Wittering 39, 46, 55. 124, 131. 139.201, 205,239, 323.325. 328, 331, 332, 333 Woodb ridge 88, 186 Woodhall Spa 197, 341 Woodh aven 338 Wood vale 185. 329, 332, 34 1 Woolfox Lodge 205, 341 Wrexham 186, 329 Wymeswold 205, 340 Wyton 260 RAF Stations. overseas: Bardufoss 99. 100 Bodo 100 Ga rdemoen 338 Lake Leskajog 100 Merville 16 Murman sk 61

Poix 17 Skaa nland 99 Vassincour t 101. 103 Wildenrath 302 Rocket projectile (R P) 70 Searchlights 3. 4. 10, 36, 39, 54 Select Committee on Estimates 95 Service Flying Tr aining School 216, 217-21 8, 224. 247 Ships: HMS Argus 6 1 HMS Furious 99 HMS Glorious 16. 99. 100 Gneisenau 68 Prill: Eugen 68 Scharnhors t 68

Shipp ing losses 55 Shuttleworth Collection 253 Spani sh Civil War 317, 318, 319 Specialist Low Att ack School 236 Specificat ion : F20/27 248 24/33 249 F7/30 6 15/30251 F5/34 6-7 6/35249 F IO/35 4-5. 7 14/35 253 F37/35 279 F18/37284 F17/39 275 F9/40 295 E6/41 299 F 12/43 298 F3/48 303 F24/48296 Spitfire Fund 263 Sta bilisation Scheme 33 Steel-Barth olomew Committee 2 Strike Command 97. 184, 196. 203 Tactical Air Fo rce 70, 71, 73, 79, 82, 84, 85, 170, 174, 177.183, 236,237, 246. 284, 285, 291 Tactical Exercise Unit (TEU) 186, 237 Ta llboy 179

373

374

FIGHTER COMMAND 1936-1968

Technical Training Command 71 Tour length s 43 Training Command I Turbinlite 49, 51, 54-55, 66. 148. 151 . 168. 281 Turret fighter concept 7-8

USAAF 85. 175. 195. 292 4 t h FG 128 31st FG 154, 195 WAAF 12. 13 Warsaw Pact 18 1