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I.I Feminism and Posimodernism Magae Feguo i~~~~~~b lf1~r~I IIni'-I-
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Editorialcorrespondence PaulA. Bove, boundary2, University of Pittsburgh,526 Cathedralof Learning,FifthAvenue, PittsburghPA 15260. Submissionsshould be preparedfollowingThe Chicago Manual of Style, 13th edition,and should be submittedin triplicate,double-spaced throughout,and accompaniedby a stamped, self-addressedenvelope and, when possible, by an Apple-or disk. IBM-compatible
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Copyright? 1992 by DukeUniversity Press. US ISSN 0190-3659
Libraryexchanges and ordersfor them should be sent to Duke UniGiftand Exchange versityLibrary, Department,DurhamNC 27706.
a. 0
C Mil Special Issue Feminism and Postmodernism Coedited by MargaretFerguson JenniferWicke
boundary 2 an internationaljournal of literatureand culture Volume 19, Number2 Summer 1992
Duke University Press
I3
boundary 2 an internationaljournalof literatureand culture
Founding Editor WilliamV. Spanos Editor Paul A. Bove Review Editor Daniel O'Hara Managing Editor MargaretH. Sachse Editorial Collective Jonathan Arac, Universityof Pittsburgh Paul A. Bov6, Universityof Pittsburgh Joseph A. Buttigieg, Universityof Notre Dame MargaretFerguson, Universityof Colorado Nancy Fraser, NorthwesternUniversity Michael Hays, Cornell University Daniel O'Hara,Temple University Donald E. Pease, DartmouthCollege WilliamV. Spanos, SUNY at Binghamton Cornel West, Princeton University Editorial Board Wlad Godzich, Universityof Geneva, Switzerland Stuart Hall,Open University,U.K. FredricJameson, Duke University KarlKroeber,Columbia University Masao Miyoshi, Universityof California,San Diego EdwardW. Said, Columbia University GayatriSpivak, Columbia University Alan Wilde, Temple University Advisory Editors John Beverley, Universityof Pittsburgh TerryCochran, Wesleyan UniversityPress Carol Kay, Universityof Pittsburgh Jim Merod, National University Bruce Robbins, Rutgers University Hortense Spillers, Emory University
Contents Jennifer Wicke and MargaretFerguson / Introduction: Feminism and Postmodernism;or, The Way We Live Now / 1 Jennifer Wicke / Postmodern Identitiesand the Politics of the (Legal) Subject / 10 MaryPoovey / Feminism and Postmodernism-Another View / 34 Linda Nicholson / Feminism and the Politics of Postmodernism / 53 Anne McClintock/ Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law / 70 TorilMoi/ Ambiguityand Alienationin The Second Sex / 96 KathrynBond Stockton / Bodies and God: PoststructuralistFeminists Returnto the Fold of SpiritualMaterialism/ 113 Salwa Bakr/ "Inthe Golden ChariotThings WillBe Better"/ translated by Barbara Harlow / 150 Carla Freccero / Our Lady of MTV:Madonna's"Likea Prayer" / 163 Claire Detels / Soft Boundaries and Relatedness: Paradigmfor a Postmodern Feminist MusicalAesthetics / 184 Andrew Ross / Wet, Dark,and Low, Eco-ManEvolves from Eco-Woman / 205 MarjorieGarber/ "Greatness":Philologyand the Politics of Mimesis / 233
Laura E. Lyons / "Atthe End of the Day":An Interviewwith Mairead Keane, National Head of Sinn Fein Women's Department / 260 Books Received / 287 Contributors / 295
Introduction: Feminism and Postmodernism; or, The Way We Live Now
Jennifer Wicke MargaretFerguson It may seem odd to echo Trollope in the introductionto a collection whose domain appears to be at the farthest remove fromthe vanished certainties of the worldof the nineteenth-centuryrealistnovel. Yet, the boldness of Trollope's title can also serve to mark a strong boundary line for our own volume-in a quite simple sense, the awkwardpairingformed by linkingfeminism and postmodernismis a descriptionof our lives. The feminism practiced, theorized, and lived by many women (and men) today is set against, or arises within,the vicissitudes of a transformingpostmodernity-as a set of practices, an arena of theory, and a mode of life. This may not be a comfortable dwelling place, but it does make up a world, a form of life (shiftingthe echoes to those notions of Heidegger or Wittgenstein which are apt here), with which feminism necessarily conjures. The animating idea of this issue is that postmodernism is, indeed, a name for the way we live now, and it needs to be taken account of, put into practice, and even contested withinfeminist discourses as a way of coming to terms with our lived situations. This is not to say that postmodernityis to be boundary 2 19:2, 1992. Copyright? 1992 by Duke UniversityPress. CCC0190-3659/92/$1.50.
2 boundary2 / Summer1992 celebrated unquestioningly;if it trulyis a rubriccovering the conditions of theory and practice in our time, this demands resistance at least as much as an empowering embrace. How feminism willtransformpostmodernism, as well as how postmodernism alters feminism, are the pressing questions of this moment. The crossing-over of criticalterms impliedby the subterfuge of and, as in Feminism and Postmodernism, wherein the neutrality of the and covers a multitudeof criticalquestions and fierce debates, if not sins, can allow for cross-fertilization,and even forcrossing out or mutualcancellation. As theoretical discourses, both feminism and postmodernism are porous, capacious; equally, they are discourses on the move, ready to leap over borders and confound boundaries. Their intersection in this issue is meant both to provideactive and passive positions for each discourse vis-a-vis the other and to show that that binarydoes not begin to exhaust the positionalities it is possible to invent in the name of feminism and postmodernism. In seeking out and gathering essays for this issue, we, as editors, could not rest comfortablywith entirelyprovisionalmeanings for either term of the title. Tippingour hand to reveal the versions of postmodernism and feminism we held to in order to make our choices of texts is useful if only to underscore the multipleironies of such a linkage. For feminism, we read materialist feminism, feminist theory and practice-however divergentpremised on materialconditions, on the social constructionof gender, and on an understanding of the gender hierarchy as relational and multiple and never in itself simply exhaustive. This is not a matter of formulating an arena of female difference or differences; rather than articulating an essential "difference,"or a woman's "text"or "voice,"the emphasis falls on considering how feminist issues never arrive single-handedly-materialist feminism attempts to move beyond the additive logic of female differences to a grounded, but volatile, understandingof gender in relation to myriad other determinations. Such an understandingincludes the possibility that in given instances gender is not the bedrock oppression. Postmodernism is less easy to qualifyor pin down, but in this collection it does connote a historicalshift, not merely an immanentfeature of language, a moment that, for theory, might be regarded as the critical historicizingof poststructuralisms,in general, the acknowledgment that shifts in theory also are located historicallyand systemically. Postmodernism so conceived has a material situation, what David Harvey calls "the condition of postmodernity,"a situation, of course, open to debate and reconceptualization but still to be seen in relation to concrete phenomena of
Wickeand Ferguson/ Introduction3 material, social, economic, and culturallife.' This designation may be one that, retrospectively, is going to look confining or ill-advised, and, indeed, some theorists like Stuart Hall and even David Harvey are hedging their bets and using post-Fordism to characterizethis feature of our social world; post-Fordism, which refers to what comes after the capitalisteconomics of Fordism (Gramsci's name for the mode of productionhe found best characterized by Henry Ford's assembly-line techniques of rationalizinglabor), is conceptually inadequate-and not catchy enough-to cover phenomena like Madonna's iconic image or the photographicwork of Cindy Sherman, since the term is so exclusively economistic a notion. Postmodernism, in our view, still has some shelf life left as the best umbrellaterm for the cultural, social, and theoretical dimensions of our period. The attempt to think through the transformationsin "geoculture"(Isaiah Berlin'shelpful phrase for our new site)2 by dintof a historicallyspecific postmodernismwillsurely retain its usefulness. Feminist postmodernism once read as an oxymoron, and postmodern feminism still has an uncertain valence. Craig Owens wrote his nowclassic article "The Discourse of Others" precisely to complain of the absence of feminist theory per se withinpostmodernism,while feminist practices, in the form of art, mass culture, and politics, were so evident and prominent within it.3 Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson wrote a memorable essay framingthe "encounterbetween feminismand postmodernism," making it clear that feminism has many reasons to be wary of the encounter but also has many things to gain in a theoreticalsense.4 This present issue is impelled by the task of reading each discourse through the lens of the 1. The geographerDavidHarvey'scomprehensivesocioeconomicand culturaltreatment of postmodernismas a distincthistoricalphase appearsin his 1989 book The Condition of Postmodernity:An Enquiryintothe Originsof CulturalChange (Oxford:BasilBlackwell Ltd.,1989). 2. ImmanuelWallersteinhas an interestingdiscussion of the linkageof racism/sexism in the global worldsystem in his Geopoliticsand Geoculture:Essays on the Changing WorldSystem (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1991). 3. CraigOwens's articleappears in TheAnti-Aesthetic:Essays on PostmodernCulture (PortTownsend,Wash.:Bay Press, 1983),a now-standardcollectionon postmodernism, edited by Hal Foster. 4. See "SocialCriticismwithoutPhilosophy:An Encounterbetween Feminismand Postmodernism,"in Theory,Cultureand Society 5, nos. 2-3 (1988): 373-94. For further importantworkin this vein, consult Nancy Fraser'sbook UnrulyPractices (Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1989), and the collectionedited by LindaNicholson, Feminism/Postmodernism(New York:Routledge,1990). Teresa Ebert'sreview of this
4 boundary2 / Summer1992 other, putting each term under the pressure of a conjunctionacross disciplinary and political lines. Feminist theory and practice, in the materialist sense outlined above, now requirean understandingof the transformations of postmodernity,while a postmodernpolitics-and again, in the thoroughly politicized mode of it we have adopted-entails feminism as a cutting edge of its critique. The essays in this collection trace the mutually inflecting politics of feminism and postmodernism into the arenas of culturalproduction, legal discourse, and philosophicalgrounding,and suggest, as well, the global contours of their interaction.These essays take a variety of paths, turningthe prismof postmodernfeminismonto culturalobjects, focusing on the theoretical dimensions of politics or illuminatingthe politics of theory, and often reflecting back on the act of writinga feminist postmodernism. This issue of boundary 2 includes essays on a wide range of cultural productions originatingin and circulatingacross many differentgeopolitical sites. Fromthe women's prison in Egypt,whichformsthe setting of the story by Salwa Bakr, as translated by Barbara Harlow and published here in English for the firsttime, throughthe prostitutionlaws invoked in such countries as Austria, France, England, and South Africa,as analyzed by Anne McClintockin "Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law,"to a popular U.S. MTVvideo-Madonna's "Likea Prayer"-which reproduces a highlycharged image of Catholic Italian-Americanwomanhood, as examined by Carla Freccero-the phenomena studied in this collection cross, and even confound, boundaries among nations, languages, and media. The writersassess conjunctions and collisions between feminism and postmodernism without presupposing any stable definitionof either of these terms, because they are enacting the practices of feminist postmodernism and postmodern feminism. Defined, provisionally,in terms of the tasks it attempts, a postmodern feminism can analyze the gendering of representations into canonical and noncanonical divisions exemplifyingsexual difference,as ClaireDetels incisively shows: Categories of postmodern theory give feminism a foothold in the solidly masculinist terrainof music theory, where postmodernitymakes the case for the blurringof canon boundaries furtherinterrogatedby feminist questions of value and hierarchy.MarjorieGarberillustratesthe implicit hierarchizations of culturalmonumentalityfor a range of Western literary masterpieces in "'Greatness': Philologyand the Politics of Mimesis,"even in The Women'sReview of Books 8, no. 4 InfiniteVariety," collection,"Postmodernism's to the issue in its own right. introduction is an excellent (January1991):24-28,
WickeandFerguson/ Introduction5 in the instance of the sale of wisdom as a culturalcommodity in the Great Books Series. Here, postmodern feminism exhibits itself also as a style of commentary, an aesthetics of analysis capable of using postmodern theory as a feminist power tool. KathrynBond Stockton's essay provides a surprising postmodern encounter between Victoriantheories of the body and an Irigarayanmaterialistspirituality,wherein materialistfeminism is invigorated by taking to the dance floorwith postmoderndiscourses to provide a revivified (sexual, textual) body politics. Inall these instances, postmodernism is a strategic form for feminist writing,as well as for analysis. Postmodernism has entered the feminist legal realm of equality, rights, and politicalidentityin particularlycharged ways in recent years, as several essays in this issue propose. MaryPoovey investigates postmodern masculine subjectivities for their ramificationon the concrete political issue of abortion rights in "Feminismand Postmodernism-Another View"; she exhibits the postmodern technological basis underpinningour images of masculinity and femininityby investigatingthe film Terminator2 with its real female cyborg. Andrew Ross offers a postmodern spin on the cultural politics of male bonding and its unexpected bridge to the environmental movement's feminist wing, and the polyglot,and surprisingnature, of postmodern politics, legalisms, and theirstrange affinities.As AndrewRoss has argued elsewhere, along with Donna Haraway,Meaghan Morris,and other critics, postmodernism must be specifically confronted as a congeries of technological and informationalforms transformingboth the objects and the subjects of knowledge. A feminist postmodernism will understand the mediated nature of knowledge and representation, as well as the altered politicalsubject produced by these mediations. Both postmodern theory and feminist theory are rooted in longstanding philosophicaldebates, with importantpoliticalrepercussions. The philosophical categories Simone de Beauvoirdeployed as vital aspects of feminist praxis are disentangled by TorilMoi in "Ambiguityand Alienation in The Second Sex"; this salient feminist history is ready for a second, postmodern reading to highlight its relevance to contemporary debates. The turn back to Beauvoir by feminism needs to be accomplished with the same theoretical and politicalfinesse as has been shown in the returnto Benjamin, or Adorno, or Freud, for example. LindaNicholson engages the philosophical constraints of a feministpoliticaltheory in "Feminismand the Politics of Postmodernism,"taking up polemical questions within feminist practice as it engages the sometimes hostile discourse of postmodernity. In preparing this issue, we ourselves encountered the increasingly
6 boundary2 / Summer1992 fraught dimensions of feminist and postmodern politics. The primaryissue was the perceived urgency of identitypolitics, the felt need to line up contributors along a spectrum of identities-racial, gender, sexual, and regional-in order to cover what then becomes the "topic"with a multitude of representative voices. Not only was this a politics far removed from our own questioning of identities as the sole basis for political response, but supplying this "correctness"proved to be impossible, in any event, for the ironic reason that so many competing demands are made of those who fill identity slots that the perfect ensemble of identities proved elusive to muster. In this way, people are livingout many of the contradictions of an identity politics that invades theoretical realms (like special issues of journals, for example) with increasing fervor.Being forced to thinkthrough the consequences of a rainbowcoalitionof feminismand postmodernism,since it could not be provided, in any case, was salutary.A majoraspect of the way we live now is the haunting requirementto match up identities with putative experiences, to click invisibledesignations into place, to "have one or more of each." Whileour contributorsare widely and even wildlydiverse, what has emerged as salient on the politicalfront,too, is how imperative it is to resist identityas the sole criterionof either a feministor a postmodern politics. The triumphaldisplaying of Camille Paglia recently has interesting implications for feminism and postmodernism. Paglia has adopted something like a postmodern antifeminismwith strong individualistovertones; her success in gaining access to a huge variety of media and culturaloutlets is partiallya functionof the postmodernconditionitself, wherein Paglia can annex herself to star figures like Madonnaand extol her postmodernity as an antifeministstance. What Paglia foregrounds,often archlyand outrageously, is sexual difference, wielding it like a cleaver to separate the girls from the boys. Her emphasis on sexuality is perversely useful to the concerns of a feminist postmodernism, since it underscores not only the dangers of a postmodernism sans feminist concerns but also the greater peril of any feminism unable to accept representation,fantasy, and, ultimately, sexuality as a postmodern phenomenon. Carla Freccero, in writingabout an ethnic background she shares both with Madonna and with Paglia, is able to show a differenttrajectorythan Paglia does for feminist postmodernism in the intricacies of sex, race, and gender that Madonna flaunts, and even theorizes; Anne McClintockpushes our understandingof sexuality past easy determinations of oppression in her assessment of sex as
Wickeand Ferguson/ Introduction7 labor and its internationalscope. Camille Paglia is an admittedthorn in the side of feminism, but she can be, perhaps, a goad for a feminist postmodernism able to harness the flamboyant,and potentiallyliberatory,fantasies the imagistic world of the postmodern sets free. Finally,feminism and postmodernism urgentlyconverge in a need to theorize systemic relations and a global politics. In this light, Laura E. Lyons's interviewwith MaireadKeane, Irishfeminist and National Head of Sinn Fein's Women's Department,tests the parameters of feminist politics in a national and an internationalcontext. What feminism means pragmatically in a situationof politicalorganizingand ongoing conflictmust affect our notion of feminism and postmodernismas a practice, includingthe chance that the relations will become complex and even oppositional.The increasing fragmentation of the categories of gender, class, race, sexuality, ethnicity, and religionchallenge easy coalitions and the privilegingof singular politicalidentities, includingthat of 'woman'or even 'feminist'.5At the same time, such de-centering offers fresh possibilitiesfor politicalalignments and furthers a reconceptualizationof the multiplesites of feminism. This issue of boundary 2, as a whole, seeks to map the boundaries between postmodernism and feminism, while it envisions a new terrainfor their crossing in a materialistfeminist politics. Feminist materialistthought requires a geocultural reorientationas well, and it is to supply this that our particularadmixtureof feminism and postmodernism is shaken and bottled as a special issue of boundary 2. To point to a globalism is neither to gesture toward global unity nor to exhort that global differences be given theirdue-in short, this collection does not advocate a refurbishedpluralismor relativism,nor is itcallingfor a thousand flowers of feminist postmodernism to bloom. Globalism, in this theoretical construct, refers to the location of feministtheory as a lever in the ongoing global discursive relation, whose power dynamics, as we know, are not equal. There are reasons why feminism, as currentlyconstrued, emerges at particulartimes in the histories of Western and Europeanstates and why it is attached to particularformationswithincapitalistsocieties. Such a realization is not a questioning of the grounds of feministstruggle, and certainly 5. IntheirestimablevolumePostmodernTheory:CriticalInterrogations(New York:Guilford Press, 1991), authorsSteven Best and Douglas Kellnerconsign the discussion of feminismto a chapterentitled"Marxism,Feminismand PoliticalPostmodernism." This is acute in many ways-especially for materialistfeminism-but it also bringsout the tensions in the "practical" notionof feminismas primarily praxis.
8 boundary2 / Summer1992 not a disparagement of feminist theory as "Western"or taintedly capitalist. On the contrary.The universalityof women's oppression, however, has been theorized by a feminismthat has often thoughtof itself in universalizing terms withoutseeing the systematicity of the actual social relations obtaining in the movement from the local to the global plane of analysis, where the real location of (much) feminist theory is thereby effaced. A materialist feminism above all needs to situate itself, while seeing that situations change over time, needs to keep abreast of the dialectic within feminist theory between the local and the global, and needs to note unflinchingly the limitsof the discourse in order to make it better.A purelycelebratory or identitypolitics precludes the radicaldisidentificationsthat must be made in the global circumstances of feminist politics today and evades the multiple overdeterminations that forge an identity and its resulting politics. Postmodernism has also been a culpritin failingto consider its location. There has been a tendency to embrace its tenets, or at least its alluringcultural shapes, withoutthoughtforthe placement of postmodernismin a largersystem. This larger system entails not only the division of power, wealth, and labor across the globe, where the centralfeatures of postmodernity-information, technologization of knowledge, dependence on the image-carry out a fearfully inequitable hierarchy,but also the specific educational and publishing institutions,themselves partof largersocioeconomic systems. It is often postmodernity,in this sense, that exacts an enormous price from those who produce it or who experience its politicalfallout. Even dystopian postmodernists like Jean Baudrillardcan fail to critiquethe dissymmetries postmodernism, as a social form and as a theory, can create, while theorists as alert as Donna Harawayhave at times too readilyutopianized the cyborgean potential of the postmodern.6 Ultimately,the task for a feminist postmodernism or a postmodern feminism is to remain self-aware and self-critical-to be theory, in the strongest definition of the term. Theory, however, as we know, is notoriously susceptible to puttingon airs, to assuming master status, and, beyond The Perfumeof Infor6. This is arguedmorefullyby JenniferWickein "Postmodernism: mation,"YaleJournalof Criticism1, no. 2 (1989):145-60. ForDonnaHaraway'sfascinating and importantessay "ManifestoforCyborgs,"and an importantcritiqueof it by Joan Scott, see the anthologyComing to Terms:Feminism,Theory,Politics, ed. Elizabeth Weed (NewYorkand London:Routledge,1989).Thiscollectionalso containsan essay by MargaretFergusonsituatingthe problemsof a feministrhetoricof identityand difference withgreat relevanceto the assumptionsof this collection(see "Commentary: Postponing Politics,"34-44).
Wickeand Ferguson/ Introduction9 that, to erasing its own tenuous location. A global feminist theory is as yet unformed;it may look something like a combinationof feminism and postmodernism, or that may be simplya way station. Achievinga global feminist theory withouttotalizing,withoutmastery, is the possibilityever at the edge of our horizons. In the meantime, lodged in the productiveand conflictual uncertainties of feminism and postmodernism,this is the way we live now.
Postmodern Identities and the Politics of the (Legal) Subject
Jennifer Wicke Postmodernism has an alchemical sheen, the abilityto conjoin with disparate words and imparta heady gloss to them, a frisson of difference, a catalyzing agency, the torque of the new. Injust such a manner,the coming together of "postmodernism"and the Legal Subject, with the stern capital L of the Law intact, promises to be a dynamic coupling, postmodernism offering to put its delirious spin on the rigor,and fixity,of the body of law. Of course, in this scenario postmodernismcarries all the significationsof glamour and seduction, the law remainingan unwillingor at least staid partnerin the dalliance. Equallygalvanizing is the conjunctureof postmodernism with feminism, since feminism has a ratherdutifulmien these days in contrast to the potential exhilarationgiven off by postmodernity,however misleadingly. These intertwiningsgive off theoretical sparks but also real tensions in praxis, especially when the issue is how to adjudicate the problems of identity in the real world situation of feminist politics. In addressing postmodernism as it carves out the terrainof identity,as a conceptual term, and then following the collision of this logic with the formidabledominance of boundary 2 19:2, 1992. Copyright2c 1992 by Duke UniversityPress. CCC0190-3659/92/$1.50.
Wicke/ Postmodern Identities11 the (female)subjectof and underthe law,Iwillbe mappinga tensionthat and the politicsof idenmay signala misalliancebetweenpostmodernism tity,one withpoliticalconsequences.The two senses of a legal subjectas a subjectarea underthe headingof the law,and as the humansubject constitutedby legaldiscourse-both come intoplayinthistensionwith the importunities of postmodernidentity,thattermitselfcoveringboththe identityof the postmodernandwhatwe couldconsidera newlydetermined of legaldispostmodernidentitypolitics.The inevitable"postmodernizing" which have local to should not come in course, may many insights offer, the guise of depoliticizing the discursiveammunition thatthe law provides the legal subjectwithinthe nets of postmodernhegemonicforms.Inshort, whileembracingthe postmoderninsofaras itprovidesa critiqueof the selfevidentfieldof Law,I willsuggest also the ambivalencesinherentin this embrace.1 One of the most interesting,albeitappalling,featuresof contemporarylife in the UnitedStates is the extent to whichargumentsover the natureof femalesubjectivity arecrystallizedinan ongoingseries of trialsliteraland figurative,spectacularor less so-a series thatsets the subject of female identityin the seat of legaltestimony.These trials,whetherthey take place in an actualcourthouseor not, are culturalattemptsto assess or regulateor demarcateWomanwithina legalor politicaldiscourse.They are interrogations of the "feminine" enjoinedbythe spectaculartechniques of postmodernmedia.(Whilemen are puton spectaculartrialas well, as the cases of MikeTysonorWilliamKennedySmithor even JeffreyDahmer bear out, whatis at issue is nottheirstatus as men, or masculinebeings, but ratherthe natureof theiractionsand howthose are to be legallydefined.)As such, the trialshave a muchmorecomplexrole to play in the formationof the politicsof the femalesubjectthantheirsurfacetransparency wouldsuggest. Itis temptingto code themsimplyas outrageousand insidiousdemonizationsof women,givencredenceby the legal trappings thatsurroundthe event. Ina ratherspookyway,however,the proliferation of trialimages connectsto the issue of postmodernidentityformationas it intersectswithfeminism.The resultsof thisintersectionare notas clear-cut as mightbe anticipated-the results,as they say, are surprising. The primaryshibbolethof postmoderntheory,withoutany doubt, is its deprecationof "identity" in any form,whetherconceptualor logical 1. This essay is dedicatedto the late MaryJo Frug,for her pioneeringeffortstowarda postmodernlegal feminism.
2 / Summer 1992 12 boundary self-identity,referentialidentity,or the singularidentityof the subject.This is quite appropriate,since postmoderntheoryowes its inheritanceof the of the Derrideankind, questioningof identityto its rootsinpoststructuralism where it is takenas a giventhatidentitiesmustbe dissolved,unbound,or at least thoroughlysplicedand diced whereverthey appear.JudithButler gives a virtuallyclassic statementof this projectof postmodernphilosophical feministinquiry:"Thetask is to formulatewithinthis constitutedframe a critiqueof the categoriesof identitythatcontemporary juridicalstructures engender, naturalize,and immobilize."2 Commentingon the problemof identity,also underthe sign of a postmodernpoliticalphilosophicalinquiry, ErnestoLaclauwritesthat"the'essentialidentity'of the entityin question will always be transgressed and redefined .... [It]cannot be constituted as
an objectseparatefromthose conditionssince we knowthatthe conditions of existence of any contingentidentityare internalto the latter."3 Bothcapthe degreeto whicha feministand sule versionspresentedhere illuminate politicallyorientedpostmoderntheorytakes identityas its target. Yet we confrontthe very evidentparadoxthat identitypoliticshas never reignedmoresupremethan now,at whatpostmodernists,including Acrossthe boardof political myself,mightterm"thecurrentconjuncture." a politicspredicated andculturalagitation,the emphasisis fullyon delimiting of idention identities,celebratingidentities,callingforthe representation identitiesintocunninglystrategic ties, marketingidentities,andsubdividing politicalslices. Withinfeminism,the issue of identitypoliticsfoldsbackinto the ongoingdebates aboutessentialismversussocial constructionof gender identity.Itshouldbe clearsimplyfromlivedexperiencethatas muchas postmoderntheoryis squarelyand utterlyin the campof social construction-for genderidentitiesandanyandallidentities,as elucidatedaboveinfluential. Considera postmodernidentitypoliticsexists and is terrifically in this feminist and of the domain essay, I wantto theory practice ing only a authorizes how politicsof identity analyze postmodernismparadoxically simultaneouswithits critiqueof identity.Theterrainforthis analysiswillbe thatof the trialof the (legal)subject,the womanputativelyon trial,and the audienceforthatinquisition. Postmodernfeminismoperatesin a contradictory climate,one paras philosophers contradictions are While of its own inevitable, making. tially 2. JudithButler,Gender Trouble(New York:Routledge,1990), 5. 3. Ernesto Laclau,New Reflectionson the Revolutionof Our Time(New York:Verso, 1990), 24.
Wicke/ Postmodern Identities13 fromHegel to Marxto Nietzscheto Derridato de Beauvoirhave pointed are productiveand engendering,they can also styout, and contradictions mie thought.As an often unwilling,but at times enthusiastic,participant in the discourseof whatcouldbe calledpostmodernfeminismor feminist postmodernism,I nonethelesssee the need to arraignthe problemsof a postmodernpoliticsof identitymorethoroughlythan has been done, by of postmodern pushingpast the feintof identitybashingto the proliferation identityfixations. Postmodernism or postmodernity cannotbe takenas a givenin any culturaldiscourse,particularly wheredisciplinary and discursiveand even ontologicalboundariesare beingcrossed. Such difficultiesare rifein any inanycontextwhatever,because the postof postmodernity, foregrounding modernhas a highlyequivocalconceptualstatus,an uncertainprovenance, anda variableandoftenconflictual set of interlocutors. Thereare morethan of flavors and sortingout the indiciaand differthirty-one postmodernism, entia of these criticalbrandsentailsopeninga theoreticalPandora'sbox, especiallyaptforfeminism. It is necessary to elide a fragmentedhistoryand gloss over problems in formulatinga feministpostmodern;I do this not nonchalantlybut with concern for the occlusionsthat willfollowin my criticalwake. Any serious considerationof postmodernity wouldhave to stem both froma historicalperiodizationwhere the termpostmoderndescribeda genuine convergenceof historicalphenomenaat a specific,if looselychosen, time, and also froma recognitionthatpostmodernismrefersto a congeries of theoreticalsuppositionsaboutthe natureof language,texts, and human the majorarticulations subjectswithinthe lens of the social. Interestingly, of the postmodernhave arisenin campsthatconstruethese two assumptions as antithetical,and that has implicationsfor the politicsinherentin of feministdiscourse,especiallyinthe areaof identity any postmodernizing formation. FredricJameson'sessay "Postmodernism and ConsumerSociety" is a touchstonehere, for regardlessof whatflavorof postmodernismone is led to choose, one has to considerthis essay.4Jameson is the firstto state succinctlythatpostmodernism is a historicalmomentthatexpresses 4. FredricJameson's seminal essay has appearedin several forms,shorterand longer, over time, but one signal version of it appears in Postmodernismand Its Discontents, ed. E. Ann Kaplan(London:Verso Press, 1988), 13-29. See also the recentlycollected essays by FredricJameson on postmoderntopicsin Postmodernism,or the Logicof Late Capitalism(Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress, 1991).
14 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 "thelogicof the cultureof late capitalism." Jamesongets at postmodernity initiallythroughthe attemptto understandthe aestheticobjectspostmodernitynecessarilyproduces,since for himall art and culturewillstem from the materialconditionsof the society in whichit is producedand received. Postmodernistartwillbe a bricolage,a collectionof scrapsand fragments pasted together,hybridizing highart and mass culture,recyclingimages and narratives,determinedly unoriginal. are set up, the AfterJameson's informal"laws"of postmodernity methodand the objectof postmodernstudyare irretrievably altered;the forlegaldiscoursearealso clear,sincethe assumptionsabout ramifications the legal text shift accordingly.Not that the legal text now is shaped as eitherparodyor pastiche,butrather,the legaltextceases to emanatefrom an originpointof timeless authorityor as a singulartransmission.Beyond the considerationof discretelegaltextsas alteredtextualobjects,the "postmodern"wouldinvadean accountof the Lawtoutcourt,to putit punningly; postmoderncriticalattitudeswoulddirectattentionto the filteringof legal discourse throughelectronicmedia,as in televised courtroomtrialsand even phenomenalikethe much-watched congressionalqueryingof Judge Thomas. By the termslegal or the law here I mean somethingmore attenuated,what Foucaultreferredto as the juridicopolitical, perhaps-how subjectsareformedbythe state.Thishas keenrelevanceforthe moldingof female subjectsinthe spectacularpublicdiscoursesof lawand testimony. discursiveobThe ineluctablyhybridand multiplenatureof contemporary sacred of precincts legal thoughtand jects wouldinvadeeven the more action;since legal discourseis not by and largeself-consciouslyartistic, what is meantby this is the culturalframingby whichand throughwhich legal formsare perceivedand acted out. None of these changes can be consideredwithouttakingintoaccountthe material,historicalspecificityof a vast societalchangeundergoneinWesterncountries,at leastsince World WarII,and prescientvarietiesof postmodernthoughtarticulatethe politiand postindustrial cal effects of "latecapitalism" societyas these inflectall its and modern of subjects. society aspects Secondly,Jameson discerns a change in the affect the workof art evokes or evinces, fromthe anxietyor alienationof modernism'ssubject, nicely emblematizedfor Jameson in EdvardMunch'spaintingThe Scream, to what must be called the schizophrenicsubject of postmodis the emergentpsychicnormof the postmodern, ernism."Schizophrenia" intoa succession of instants, the consumerconsciousness disintegrating informaof mass imagesandcommodified condemnedthroughthe ubiquity
Wicke/ Postmodern Identities15 tionto livein a timeless nowratherthanthe centering,fulltimeof meaning and history.It is preciselythe genderingof this consumerconsciousness that Jameson's essay tends to veer away from,however,and that gap leaves us witha continuedfissurein our understanding: Howis it thatthe and of are celebrated multiplicity fragmentedness identity by postmodern theoryand also denigratedby it as a "female"consciousness? Jameson'spostmodernism tendsto homogenizeortotalizethe conat holdtoo manycontradictory times, cept makingpostmodernism phenomena. Whatis mostsalientfora feministpostmodernism tracingsome lineof descent fromJamesonis the absence of any specificityforfeminismwithin this totalization.Thisis notto makethe ratherdrearychargethatJameson is insufficiently awareof feminismbut,instead,to exhortus to lookat the that ways identitypoliticsemergesfromwithinthisversionof the postmodern. Jameson praises the strugglesof feministgroups,along withthose of gay activistsand people of color,as exemplaryof postmodernpolitics: Jameson'spostmodernism local, critical,and, yes, entirelyidentity-based. is hugelysystemic-that is at once its greatstrengthand its weakness, in thatitcan'tquitelocatethe local,althoughitknowsitmustbe there.(Iadmit to muchpreferring this flawover its opposite,the far morecommonproblemof seeing onlythe local,whiledenigrating systemicanalysisand global Feminism is for critiques.) present, Jameson,in the formof identitymovements or identityimages. Thattheoreticalmove has real consequences, because he sees theory(inthe formof cultural critique)as sidelinedbypostmodernism,paralyzedby its insidiousgrip.The nostalgicand despairing cast of Jamesonianpostmodernism has hadits effects,since ithas become in too it of to only easy light overemphasizethe impotenceof the subject, or person,caughtin itstoils,andto failto recognizethe manyopportunities forrefashioningand redesigningthe culturalcontoursof postmodernforms. Jameson confrontsthis emptinessand longsforthe lostsocial community that pre-datessuch amnesiaand exists nowonly in the glimpseof utopia conjuredup withinmass culture.Withoutdredgingup such longings,one does resituatethe culturalscene in all its may agree that postmodernity parametersandthatthe notionof the legalsubjectcan be stretchedbeyond recognitionby this new postmodernspace. A fairlyrecent and spectacularexampleof the implosionof postmodernityintothe legal subjectoccurredin the Wisconsintrialof a man for rape. The courtwas told that the rapedwomanwas sufferingfroma disorderandthatonlyone of the personalitieswas the multiple-personality rape victim. This rich scenario of the postmodernizingof legal subjectivity
2 / Summer 16 boundary 1992 unfoldedwithJamesonianmelancholiainthe nexusbetweenthe mediaand the courts,as the labile,fissuredidentityof a sort of folk-postmodernism, or postmodernismvia the NationalEnquirer(as sensationalized"multiplepersonalitydisorder"),encounteredthe legal normsof selfhoodand singularself-identity,as well as the legal subjectin the mode of truth-telling Thetrialtookplacewithgreatpublicattentionto the and self-incrimination. mediaevent of testimonybeingfunneledthrougha shape-shiftingidentity on the partof the plaintiff, onlyone of whose personalities,andthus bodies, had been raped,whilethe "others"remainedunmolestedby whatwould, had they been entirelypresentduringthe sex, in theircases have been of ascertaining consensual.Who"she"was, andthe apparentimpossibility a single, unifiedvictimfor the crimeof rape, since the offendedpersonalityhad agreedto sex butwas consideredto be too immatureor troubled to be genuinelyconsenting,opened a mise-en-abymein the notionof the legal subject,an abyss alltoo readilyfilledby the simulacralaspects of the televisionnews, trial.Playedout inthe tabloids,on tabloidTV,on "regular" and in a host of mediaformsincludingNationalPublicRadio,it produced a simulacraltheaterin whichthe publicat largewas asked to witness the implausiblefascinationsandconundrumsof this postmodernpredicament. The defendanthad to be triedsimultaneouslyas a moretraditionallegal subject,in otherwordsas a coherentpsychicidentityforwhomthe words understandingand truthhad some fixedrelevance.The spectaculardisplayof the multiplepersonalities,orthe literalized(iftechnicallyerroneous) on displayin the media-pervaded courtroom,showed the "schizophrenia" difficultiesinherentin introducinga postmodernidentitydefinitioninto a courtroomstilloperatingwithinanotherparadigmforthe legal subject,on the basis of whichthe defendantwas foundguilty. of thissort-kitschy,spurious,andthe prodA "postmodern identity" formof psychology-is not uct of an unholyalliancewitha self-promoting at allwhatpostmoderntheoreticiansseek to propose.Instead,a turbulence tossed in the zone of culture,not in feministpostmodernism, preemptively and feminine in a outa femalesubject pieces, fluctuating subjectivity, forced the trial forrapewas as much its apparitiononto the culturalscreen. Here a trialof this problematicnew culturalidentityas it was forthe assaultthat may or may not have happened;the discourseof the legal subject was asked, as it were, to confirmthe statusof an unprecedentedlegal identity. A boundaryline betweenthe settingof the trialand such collectiveinquishow was blurredthroughoutthe trial. sitionsites as the "OprahWinfrey" The guiltof the man in questionwas foundto inherein realizingthatthis
Wicke/ PostmodernIdentities 17 woman was mentally ill and still proposing sex with her-a violation of the protective law surroundingsuch dealings with those assumed not to be in a position to defend themselves or theirdesires. The neutralizationof identity into a quiverof self-inventoriedalternativepersonalities leaves the legal subject in pieces as well, on one side of this divide only, the side where an alliance between a performativeself and the multiplescreening images of radio,television, and printcan be effected. On the other side, the legal subject remains in full force, and the issue of "intention"is still rigidlyinvoked. The imbalance of this encounter leaves lop-sided the engagement of postmodern identity with the legal subject because it is so irresolvablybound up in a culturalstaging. Postmodern theorizing can helpfullypoint out the fluid borders of such a staging and the ways they overlap with legal norms; nonetheless, to efface or erase the legal subject, however much predicated on an illusoryunity,singularity,intentionality,would be an enormous political loss. One primaryfeminist take on the trial was to applaud the guilty verdict as an instance of a woman's voice, however fragmented and representationally obscure, being listened to; the dangers lie in attributingall the polymorphousness to only one side of the gender divide. Multipleidentities coalesce around a subsuming "female"identity.The difficultiesfor a feminist postmodernism in ridingthese rapids lie in too readily privileging the dissolving of identity,while in this case the woman's "truth"was equally elusive. At the other remove from Jameson's melancholy in the face of the postmodern is the influentialdiscussion of the postmodern conducted in the workof Jean-Frangois Lyotard,especially in the slim volume The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, where Lyotard'sclaims are entirely different. The crux of his book is that in postmodernity,the major narratives governing social experience since the Enlightenmenthave disappeared, and that the disappearance of these meta-narratives has left instead the liberatingpotentialof local, interlockinglanguage games, which replace the overall structures.5The monumental public narrativesof evolution, progress, class struggle, or even Enlightenmenthave all dissolved for Lyotardinto the play of atomized, technologicallyassisted subjects who don't connect with one another in any overarching way, for example, by being members of a proletariat.Constructingpoliticalresponses by way of 5. Jean-FrangoisLyotard,La Conditionpostmoderne(Paris:Minuit,1979),subsequently translatedas The PostmodernCondition(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1988).
2 / Summer 18 boundary 1992 referenceto the teleologicalor progressivescenariosof the past is doomed and frivolouslywrongheaded;there are no Manicheanrents in the social fabricbuta closely knitweave of intricateinterconnections. Boththe utopianism and the teleologyinherentin Jameson'shistoricistpostmodernism are avoidedby Lyotardinfavorof whatmightbe calledan avant-gardeutoversionof the postmodernhas piangesture.The adhesiveof the Lyotardian hadremarkable stickingpower,inthata typicalsummaryof postmodernism involvesrecountingthat it has made linearnarrativesof historyobsolete and has transfiguredthe relationshipof individualsubjectsto social and historicalnarrativesin correspondingly majorways. This is exceptionally trickyforfeministtheoryof a postmodernstripe,notbecause thereis one greatnarrativeof the feministrevolution-a ridiculousnotion-but because the abilityto narratethe discontinuousandfragmentary stages of feminism withinhistoryis stilla necessity,notan archaicrelicof a despised linearity. Muchof the debateaboutpostmodernism arises because postmodern theorymaysimplybe the attemptto historicizethe discoursesof postwhichhave been very resistantto this process fromwithin, structuralism, oftendenyingthe needforanycomplexhistoricalconsciousnessat all,as is Lyotard'spreference.Forhis thought,languagegames are allthatare left, and howeveragonisticthey maybe, no largeraccretionof collectiveidentities on the historicalterrainof struggleis to be expected.Thismarksa signal of the postmodern,leavingit witha blackhole of failurein the articulation a now-invisible site of the actual,concrete,conflictualstruggles analysis, against hegemony.Puttingit this way riskssoundingretrograde,butonly we woulddo withinthe canons of a rarefied,ahistoricalpostmodernism betterto abjure. To step backand considerthe problemsof "postmodern identity"is a to confrontan immediatecontradiction. logic Following poststructuralist wouldentailputtingthe conceptof identityunderheavy scrutiny,and, incan be construedas analogousto a stable, deed, insofaras "identity" univocalself, an innateor immanentnature,a fixedor self-evidentbeing, postmodernthoughthas scouredthose Augeanstablesandevacuatedany of its fragsuch stability.Postmodernidentitycomes withsuch certification discourses of its the social fractured nature, mented, fissuringby myriad whichconstructit, its elusiverelationto self-presence,its foregoneinconclusion,that to workone's way back to the relativelystable plane of an identityperse is perhapsinconceivableand undesirable. eschews Nonetheless,and at the same time,whilepostmodernism or authoritative center even fixed essence or pointof leverorigin,any any
Identities19 Wicke/ Postmodern age, identityhas come to be a more and more pressingconcernwithin formationsof the postmodern.Whilethe postmodernitself,as theory,canand remaininternallyconsistent,postnot buttressan identity-formation sociohistorical conditionsmakea demandforthe or modernity postmodern of civilsociety.Postmodstructuresof identityto contestthe fragmentation ernidentityis to thatextentan oxymoron;it is also a neologismforidentity, a new way of saying thatthere is an identitypeculiarto the postmodern, and peculiarlypostmodern. has realrepercussionsfor Thisnewcomposite"postmodern identity" whetherin terms the intersectionof the legal subjectand postmodernism, of legal matrixof the law,inthe confrontation of a change inthe interpretive of discoursewithchangedsocial circumstances,or inthe postmodernizing forthe collisionof postmodernismwith law itself,and it has ramifications feminismas well.The linkmustinitiallybe teased out throughthe relation of the two wordsidentityand subject. Subject has two valences for this discussion, one the moregeneralmeaningof a locus of subjectivity,the humansubject,andthe otherthe pinnedorfixedobjectof subjecindividual a tion, subjected identity.MichelFoucaultplayson these differencesin his essay "TheSubjectin Power,"wherehe hypothesizesa subjectformedout of its very subjections,become a subjectby virtueof being made subject (to).6Identitydoes not have the neat internalplayof ambiguityas a word, but the same doubleness holdsgood; an identitycould be said to be the adoptedagencyof one whohas been identifiedas the resultof some social process-for example,a gay identitypresupposinghavingbeen socially identifiedas gay, andthenadoptingthatdesignationas a placefromwhich of this sort is connectedto the "subto situateone's identity.An "identity" in is and usuallycommunalexpression the self-chosen that identity ject" a activeas a funcof a subject-position, subject-position making particular thatbothof these states take tioningsocial identity,withthe understanding place in the plural,notthe singular.A pendantto this discussionwouldreof the quirepointingoutthatFoucaultperhapsdevelopsthis understanding of of an after the subject impossibility discerning agent repeatedcritiques of change withinhis sociohistoricalschema,whichproposesthe dispersal of powerrelationsto such an attenuateddegree thatrevolutionor change or resistanceis difficult to hypothesizeor explain. 6. MichelFoucault'slateressays and interviewsturnon these questions;"TheSubject in Power"is translatedand anthologizedin ArtafterModernism,ed. BrianWallisand MarciaTucker(Boston:DavidR. Godine,1984).
20 boundary2 / Summer1992 The Lyotardianversion of postmodernism tunnels into this aspect of identity and subjects it to philosophicalcritique. In the most attenuated sense, the grounds for collective identity are swept away with the metanarratives, so that class no longer serves as an identity marker of any predictiveforce, for example, and subjects are instead bundles of activated discursive shards, where there is never to be any one exclusive or overpowering identity.Thus, for Lyotard,there is always room to maneuver on the speech-activated board of culture and never any entirely hegemonic counterforce to confront.The exception to this is what Lyotardhas come to see as the circumstances of the "ThirdWorld,"whose sad job it is simply to survive, while our FirstWorld,postmoderntask is to multiplycreatively the features of our worlds. The forces arrayedagainst ThirdWorldsurvival are not enumerated or explored in Lyotardianpostmodernism, presumably because these mightthreatento look remarkablylikerelics of the disintegrated meta-narratives, and even the split between the FirstWorldand the Third World,in Lyotard'sfuzzy terminology,would need to be theorized in some interlinkingfashion. Barringthis connection, the grounds on which identities form are murkyat best. The strength of Lyotard'spost-Enlightenment discourse has, however, trulyset an agenda withinpostmodernism, which reverberates to the perceived conceptual inadequacy in both political and philosophical categories of the subject. Local determination is the arresting catchphrase for a society configured as interlocking,often antagonistic, microidentities. Lyotarddoes turn attention, in Le Differend, to larger situations of injustice, and he postmodernlycharacterizes these in linguistic terms; proper names act as signifiers for differends, circumstances of injusticethat falloutside priorgenres of discourse and reduce theirsufferers to silence or to coded names. Auschwitzis Lyotard'smain example of such a differend; so enormous is the matterof the Holocaust that it makes the struggles of, say, feminism seem rather paltry in their formulation.Since these struggles are not paltry,it becomes difficultto establish the grounds on which recourse could be sought in specifically postmodern terms. This postmodern politicaldilemmaconnects withproblems in Critical where that discourse also seeks to "deconstruct"or dissolve Studies, Legal the language of rights, scrutinizingrights as innately unstable and indeterminant, and replacing the rights vocabularywith one of needs. Among the many resulting difficultiesis the status of needs, as identitygroups come under a protectionist shield of need where they remain victims in need of help.7 Critical Legal Studies has also implied that a rights discourse 7. RobertoMangabeiraUnger'sTheCriticalLegal Studies Movementis the best source
Identities21 Wicke/ Postmodern likethat of NativeAmericandemandsforthe upholdingof treatiespredicated on an identityas a tribesuccumbsto a self-defeatinglegitimation of governmentpowerin the firstplace.Alongthese linesone thinksof the the spearfishingrightsof the currentupheavalsin Wisconsinsurrounding Lacdu Flambeau-areaIndianswho are fightingforan enhancedand protected fishingdomainon the termsof the government'sinitialdealingswith theirtribe,on promisesmade in originaltreaties,and on the definitionof theirculturalidentityas land-based.Thesymbolicgesturesof the MexicanAmericanmovementof the 1960s and 1970s, coalescing in New Mexico in the TierraAmarillaarea and dedicatedto the returnof propertytraced back to landgrantshonoredby the Treatyof the Mexican-American War, had a similarthrust;the battlein the courtsrevolvedaroundthe honoring of these claims as the treatypromisedto upholdthem, despite the dubious historicalcircumstancesunderwhichthe treatywas signed.Toseek to dissolve these rightsaway underthe acid bathof postmodernmultiplicity whichcan onlybe coded simplyerases the groundsforself-determination, as an identity(collectiveorindividual) possessing rights.Self-determination wouldseem to entailthe embraceof legalsubject-hood,as the vocabulary of rightsmay still be the only viablemeans to securingthat selfhood.A postmodernismthat ignoresor deploresthis necessity reveals its suppositionthat rightsare alreadyadequatelysecured,and thatthe legal arena cannot be bent to a varietyof discursivepurposes.A relatedstruggleis ensuingin those localitieswheregay rightsactivistsare applyingpressure forthe rightto marry.Marriagecan be subjectedto a witheringcritiqueas a transparently butinthiscase, too,the importanceof ideologicalinstitution, reservinga vocabularyof rightsas a legalsubjecttranscendsthose objections,since the politicalobjectivesof securinggay marriagerightsforthose who wantthem outweighany hesitanceaboutthe identitiespresupposed by marriage.This becomes veryvexed politicallyin otherareas, however, as inthe abortionrightsbattle,forexample.Thenatureofthe rightsclaimed can open the doorto the refusalof abortionitself,as the ominousbumper stickerto be seen on some OperationRescue carsspells out:EqualRights for UnbornWomen. A paradoxof the postmodern,then, is the coincidentand vociferous rise of an identity-basedpoliticshardon the heels of a postmodernist, text (Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1983). Essays that tacklethe movementon its terms includeNancy Fraser,"Struggleover Needs,"in UnrulyPractices (Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1989), and RobertA. Williams,Jr., "TakingRights Aggressively,"in Lawand Inequality5 (1987):103.
22 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 or at least poststructuralist, consensus thatquestionsidentityat large as an essentialistcategory.Evenwherethere is some circumspectionabout of essentialism(andhere I'lladmitI concurwiththe makingthe "mistake" assessment thatit is a mistake),a separatistidentitypoliticscomes to the fore, and withit a kindof "serialidentity"politics,alongthe lines of serial monogamy,is especiallyrampant.Inthismode,identitiesareseen as additive or cumulative,withsmallerand smallersubdivisionsto markmoreand this serves as fodderfor morespecializedidentityformations.(Ultimately, about the claims of, say, disabledLatinalesbian special right-wingjokes of whatneeds to be bettertheomothers,a reactionarymisunderstanding rizedby feminism.I'llreturnto the possibilitiesforthis in concluding.)Part of the impetusfor this discursiveand politicalphenomenonarises out of culturaland historicalroots in the UnitedStates, where an individualizing rhetoricpermeatesall our majorsocial forms.The communityidentity models itselfon individualidentityand coheres aroundshared attributes thatare seen as defining,whilethe extentto whichthese communityidentities arise in relationto a social dominantbecomes obscured.Ontothis identitypoliticsa postmodernismof atomizingand even sentimentalizing with local determinationgets grafted, powerful,but often mixed, results. Even the brilliantly helpfultheoristsErnestoLaclauand ChantalMouffe seem to articulatethis impasse,intheircertifiably postmodernreconstruction of the social sphere, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.8 Grafting a
dizzyingpostmodernvocabularyto an incisivepoliticalarmature,the two forradicaldemocracywhichwouldmandatethat"the arriveat a formulation epistemologicalniche fromwhich'universal'classes and subjects spoke has been eradicated,and it has been replacedby a polyphonyof voices, discursiveidentity." each of whichconstructsitsownirreducible Theygo on on the "affirmation that this is founded to conclude politics shortlythereafter of every'essence,'andon the constitutive of the contingencyandambiguity characterof socialdivisionandantagonism." Irreducible, perhapsessential, identitiesin a polyphonicharmonyof voices? Thisis a soundthatcan also be heardas the raucous,antagonisticatonalityof the social.The one-note song of an irreducibleidentityis hardto fuse withthe dissolvinglogic of identity,the insistenceon internaldifferences.The laudablegoal of opening of approaches,a postmodernpost-Marxism, upsocialspace to a multiplicity of singularidentities.As longas the ends up dependingon the mobilization 8. Quotationsare frompp. 191 and 193 of ErnestoLaclauandChantalMouffe,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London:Verso Press, 1985).
Wicke/ PostmodernIdentities 23 postmodern in practice involves such contradictions,the relation between postmodern identity and the legal subject will be in question, too-these confusions in practice willinfect the transferof postmodern elements to the legal sphere. Another legally informed narrativemay help to highlightthis shortcoming, by way of an excursion intoanother postmodernflavoror type crystallized in the work of Jean Baudrillard,who intersects with both Jameson and Lyotard,despite coming to some remarkablydifferentconclusions. Baudrillardis the coiner of the all-importantpostmodernist word simulacrum, his term for the substitutionof the screen for the "real"or even the "spectacle" that comprises modern culture. For Baudrillard,we are now, as a result of the technology of the image, so thoroughlyimbricatedin the image that even the human body is a kindof prosthetic screen. We now live our lives not as actors in psychic dramas on a stage or in a scene but as sites of the arbitrarycoupling of bits of information,images, termini,and so on floating past us in the hyperrealspace of the image-filled simulacrum, an "ob-scene" that has no accessible reverse side. There are echoes of Jameson here: Both theorists depend on an idea of the proliferationand takeover of the technologies of postmodern life, and on the schizophrenia that induces; Baudrillard,however, has no nostalgia for the realm of history or of concerted political action as does Jameson; Baudrillard'sthought is entirely eschatological and apocalyptic, pushed up to the very edge. There is no arena for action, no public discourse; we are seduced by the image and in fact live withinit, likethe boy in the bubble, tethered to the simulacral bubbles that surround us. Baudrillard'sapocalypticism also has affinities to Lyotard's apolitical postmodernism, because it questions any role for agency, any collectivity,any escape fromthe clutches of the image. Intothat divide I am insertingfeminism, or feminist theory more appropriately,and will be addressing both a culturalartifact, a kind of text put under the lens of critique, and engaging feminism as a cultural activity lodged in an interculturalspace. The culturaltext I want to take up to allow myself to follow these two paths simultaneously is a recent one, the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmationhearings before the Senate committee in their Anita Hillphase, the most engulfing national cultural event since the CNN-itisof the Gulf Warset in. The hearings duringthose several days amounted to what Alexander Cockburnhas called an "electronic Nurembergrally,"in the sense that forthe space of Fridayto Tuesday a tremendously high proportionof the U.S. populationwas galvanized in front of the same television spectacle and was entrancedly repeating its
24 boundary2 / Summer1992 script as conversation on the subway, newspaper editorial,family dinner table argument, or the subject of frantictelephone calls. The national consciousness had a laser-like focus, perhaps less in the acuity of its thought than in the pure intensity of its gaze at the unfolding hearings; the television set became our collective skull, our jointscreening room, our shared flickering site of Plato's cave. Enmeshed in a cathartic spasm, we, as a suddenly unified Nielsen group, ate, slept, and dreamed Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill;watched Tom Brokaw'ssunny midwesternforehead furrow; leafed through dog-eared copies of The Exorcist;sent telegrams to Washington with frenzied abandon; pored over the newspaper transcripts and caught the talk shows as if they were unofficialextensions of the Senate chambers. This culturalevent was like a spike driven very deep into the body politic,a moment in culturaltime pumped fullof culturaljuice. Iwant to use this collective text as a way of setting feministtheory in motion against the vectors of postmodern theory and identitypolitics, partlybecause one cannot let such a culturaltext simplyget away, and also because the strange spectacle of culturalimmersion in the Anita Hill/ClarenceThomas contretemps can illuminatethe politics of the (legal) subject and the postmodern locations of contemporaryfeminism. Why is this episode so perfect for such an appraisal? Although it was deplored variously as a spectacle, a circus, a nauseating panorama of pornography,or, in Clarence Thomas's words, "a high-tech lynching,"if one subtracts the judgmental perspective, all these definitions insisted on the mediated, the represented, status of the discursive battle. Because that is what it was, a battle of culturaldiscourses coming from many locations, imbricated in differentagendas and histories and vocabularies, on a collision course through the cathode ray tube of television. Whilethe hearings were not a trial, it was so easy to forget that, and essentially the treatment of Anita Hill'stestimony became wreathed in the legal trappingsof the "trials" of subjectivity that were to follow it-the use of the scenario of a trial setting to uncover some presumablycore truthabout female subjectivity.The hearings underscore the painfullyobvious fact that arguments in cultureare filtered through cultural representations, which have their own forms and genres and strategies. This impinges with particularstrength on issues of gender and feminism-here the gap between a feminism acknowledging the complex social formationswe can call "postmodernity"and a feminism that does not is evident. Second, the hearings, if they can be so called, hinge on the intersection of culturaldiscourses and culturallocales. Everythingoverlaps and
Wicke/ PostmodernIdentities 25 crisscrosses here: the sacred trioof race, class, and gender, above all, but also region, occupation, age, and the internationalismof a global audience, the legislative and executive branches of government, mass culture and high culture, education, entertainment,and religion.That hurly-burlyof the discourses, that promiscuityof culturalforms and nuances and levels, is grist for the millof thinkingabout feminism in a contradictory,multiple,and differentialway. One can read in those discourses, as in a glass darkly, some of the energizing and some of the problematicaspects of the feminisms being articulatedin our culturetoday.9 There willbe no way to go on productivelywithoutmakingit apparent that I consider Anita Hillto have described precisely, if reluctantly,exactly what occurred between herself and Clarence Thomas duringtheir time as colleagues-employee and boss, respectively-on the E.E.O.C. My reading has to depend on that as a kind of bedrock, against which to chart certain distortions and perturbationsthat ensue. Is this simply the feminist viewpoint of this culturalevent, or the feminist bias, as Senator Alan Simpson, for example, might have it? I would argue not, for there are many possible feminist angles on the Hill/Thomastangle; and some of those feminist angles are quite at variance with the feminist culturalcriticism I will try to elucidate. A veritable whirlpoolof misogynies, racisms, and reactionary theories emerged in the fetid wash of the hearings-not just a single kind of sexism, or one brand of racism, and so on-and correspondingly, there were many ways of framingthe results withinterms self-described as feminist. That may seem impossible, or counterintuitive-wasn't the symbolic march of the seven female lawmakers on Capitol Hillindicativeof a unitary,coherent, and singular feminist interpretationof the stakes of the hearings and the meaning of AnitaHill'sexperience of sexual harassment? Withoutat all discounting the importanceof that gesture and the interesting implications it had politically,the answer has to be no. A way to gauge just how differentfeministtheorizations of the event can be lies in the omnipresence of Catharine MacKinnonon many broadcasts of the hearings, as a commentator on the proceedings and as a jurist who herself generated the crucial legal terms of the debate itself; Catharine MacKinnontried the first sexual harassment case and was re9. The most salient discussion of the trials I have encounteredis, not surprisingly,bell hooks's "The FeministChallenge:Must EveryWomanBe a Sister?"(Zeta Magazine, December 1991). Myown accounthere had alreadybeen written,butthe importanceof her essay must be noted. Hooksmakes the wonderful,dead-on pointthat Hillherself is not (orwas not then) a feministand thatthatchanges everything.
26 boundary2 / Summer1992 sponsible for the legal language invokingsexual harassment as a specific form of discriminatorydamage. MacKinnon'splace on the networks and in the analysis of the unfolding phenomenon was absolutely earned by her groundbreakinglegal work and her pivotalfeminist position in the delineation of sexual harassment as a bona fide harm. Nothing in my discussion here is meant to question the tremendous achievement that MacKinnon, and others, it should be added, made by bringingsexual harassment to its embodiment in law. However, as a feminist theorist, what was MacKinnon's vision of what Clarence Thomas had done? As she stated repeatedly, and then elaborated, his sexual harassment of Hillwas merely a subset of something else-his use of pornography.Pornographywas, for MacKinnon, the root cause, the only cause, of the sexual harassment that was offensive and indeed illegal behavior. Anita Hillwas at the receiving end of a pornographicdischarge; she was violated, then, by exposure to pure pornography,in this instance pornographyin the workplace.Howdoes MacKinnonmake the leap froma specific patternof sexually harassing linguistic encounters to victimizationby pornography?Her definitionof women, and the resulting definitionof feminism, demands it: MacKinnonwishes to describe women as a class, as a single group, and she does this by analogy to class itself, in the Marxistsense, although her use of Marxistthought is stunningly reductive and untouched by the subtler branches of theory. It is fair to say that MacKinnonis indubitablynot a practitionerof anything to be remotely called feminist postmodernism or postmodern feminism.10 If work or labor fixes and articulates class, then, MacKinnonclaims, sex fixes gender, and she means sex in the literalsense-work is extracted or taken from you as a worker, and sex is extorted or taken from you if you are a woman. The mere existence of, let's say, a heterosexual pornographic text in an empty locked room is nonetheless a violation of women as a class. In MacKinnon'sview, pornographyis the name for,and the literal site of, the gender hierarchyobtaining between men and women in society. Clarence Thomas's statements to Anita Hillwere an epiphenomenon of pornography and pornographicdesire; it became of the utmost importance for MacKinnonto describe Thomas as a pornographyaddict, Anita 10. I have iton verygood authorityfroman auditorthatat a spring1992 series of lectures given at PrincetonUniversityMacKinnonrepliedto all questionsaboutthe possiblymore sophisticatedapproachesto representationthat exist witha referenceto such cavils as "deconstructioncrap.""Realis real,"she propounded.The recentchampioningof MacKinnonby the philosopherRichardRortyhas to be one of the most peculiarchaptersin contemporarycriticalthinking.
Wicke/ Postmodern Identities27 Hillthus becomingindistinguishable froma womandepictedin a pornooutright. graphicfilmor magazine,victimizedby the gaze of pornography Work,power,competition,allvanishfromthisscenario-what definesAnita Hillas a womanin MacKinnon's feminismis thatshe is this recipientof a pornographic barrage.Pornography belongsentirelyto men, pornography is the rootcause, the monolithic source,of the expresses men,pornography lackof equalitybetweenmenandwomen.CensoranderadicatepornographyandClarenceThomas'scommentsbecomeimpossible,forMacKinnon; the flipside is also true-until and unless all pornography is snuffedout, genderrelationsare doomedto takethe courseof sexual harassment.The whereverit onlyfeministresponse,on these terms?To espy pornography lurksandto devoteallone'sfeministenergiesto publicenemynumberone, pornography. Catharine MacKinnon'scommentaryon Hill's charges against Thomasemanatefromcultural feminism,thatfeminismwhichembracesthe notionof a univocalwoman'scultureandinnateexperience,whose defining characteristicis vulnerability to pornography andviolation.ForMacKinnon, Hill Anita was then, Everywoman, susceptibleto the depredationsof pornography.Such a positionon her partechoes whathappenedto a major strandof feminismin the 1980s-its energies were siphonedoff into a crusade againstpornography thatblurredthe distinctionbetweenfeminist and politics reactionaryrepressiverhetoric.Ithas been pointedout repeatand most feministcoalitioncentering edly, notablyby the anti-MacKinnon on FACT-FeministsAgainstCensorshipTaskforce-thatthe one constituency delightedto embracethe antipornography positionhas been the radical antifeministright.Thisamountsto a derailment of culturalfeminisminto the dead-endendeavorsof a purepoliticsof image.Sucha politicsinvolves a deep fear of representation,in the formof imageryor words,and supplants a mediatedunderstandingof humanculture.Boileddown to the brass tacks of pornography, this entailsassumingthatrepresentationsare what precisely they represent-there is no intermediatezone of fantasy, culturalplay,or even justframinggoingon. By this token,there is nothing moresalient,nothingmoreurgent,than removingpornography fromsociallwomenare ety's midst.Allwomenare equallyaffectedby pornography, allwomenare harmedby pornography equallyalienatedfrompornography, at all times-so muchfor racism,or lack of prenatalhealthcare, differforprofessionaladvancement,femalepoverty,etc. Allare ingopportunities it would traceable, seem, to pornography. This analysisis off the mark,but it is remarkably interestingfor re-
28 boundary2 / Summer1992 vealing how much a transmogrifiedsocial terrainof postmodernityaffects even those responses that try to eschew it. In the culturalspectacle I am detailing, this particularvoicing of a feministchallenge to events was loudly heard, but it certainlywas not the only feminist response. The prominence of MacKinnon,though, was in direct proportionto the irrelevance of what this ostensibly crucial legal feminist had to say about the hearings. Every other culturalvariable in the hearings had to drop away. The crucial element of Anita Hillas a black woman and Clarence Thomas as a black man was not part of the pornography/politicsof the image scene, nor was it any problem at all that the attackers of Anita Hilland her testimony all spoke in tones of anguish about pornography-another instance of the radical right finding it perfectly easy to adopt those criteriaon theirown behalf. One can bracket for now the terriblehypocrisy of this gesture on their part, in order to see what the pornographyaspect actually did to the culturalspectacle. Paradoxically,it undercutthe feminist politics of the hearings by making it appear both that Anita Hillwas readilydefinable as a woman wronged, if indeed she had been, by pornography,and that women are not outraged by the fact of sexual harassment as a means of making the workplace a disturbing space for them professionally but instead are to be protected from exposure to sexual talk and sexual overtures. The offense, then, lies in jeopardizing women's innocence or sexual vulnerability,not in channeling male discomfort about women in the workplace into a hostile parade of sexual overtures. That pictureof things should not be compatible with a feminist viewpoint, but the picture unfortunatelydovetailed with one prominentfeminist theorist's construction of the situation. This helped lead to another aspect of the culturaldrama then played out. If along one axis of culturalthought Anita Hill had to be seen as a victim in order to qualify as having been sexually harassed, then the corollaryto that for many people was the proof that she had been damaged, that she was indeed a victim.And here a new culturalslot opened up which AnitaHillcould not, and did not, fill. For her to have been a victim, by these lights, would have to mean that she had lost her job, lost her success, lost her prestige, lost her professional respect, lost her emotional center of gravity:Something along these lines needed to be fulfilled.Frustratingly,Anita Hillrefused to fit into the niche where an agesold narrative of female victimizationcould be intertwinedwith a feminist victimization.Victimwas simply the wrong category, but a powerfulcultural vocabulary on both the feminist and the antifeministsides of the discussion of women in our culture demands it. The litmus test for victim status
Wicke/ PostmodernIdentities 29 was how Anita Hill'sstory played on the female-dominatedtalk shows-by female dominated I mean that their audiences are 90 percent female, even if women are not always the "host."Anyone watching any of these shows as an adjunct to the hearings knows that Anita Hilldid not win over the female mass audience. The precise reason for this was the failure of her "story"-and it was turned into a narrativewith infinitetwists and turns-to cohere as a tale of victimage. Anita Hilldid not cry, one importantsign of victimizationin the Kabukitheater of the talk show, where any query must be met with welling tears. Clarence Thomas was lucky in having the background visuals of his wife's tears in looming and vicarious close-up; she was a victim in the liquidgarb of TV gender, and clearly her emotion resulted from the pain caused her by the tearless AnitaHill.Tears, or at least visible emotion, are the proof-textof having been hurtin the melodrama of our national life, and AnitaHilldisqualifiedherself in that arena. Itmight not have mattered, except that the hearings themselves became overriddenby a modern-day televisual version of the test for witches-thrown in water, the innocent non-witchwould prove it by drowning. I'mnot insinuatingfor a moment that AnitaHillshould have behaved an iota differentlythan she did;what I am tryingto indicate is the complexity of the cultural moment. One immediatelyvisible implicationis that there was no single woman's version of this event. Whilea vociferous reaction to confirmingClarence Thomas in the wake of these accusations was strongly articulatedby women, many of them definingthemselves as feminists, they were joined by men in this outcry,and both were in the distinct minorityifwe are to believe all the polls. If I have discarded the efficacy of a culturalfeminism based on the politics of the image, then what dimension of feminism accounts for the abandonment of the precepts of sexual harassment by so many-the majority-of women? Class and race have their day here. A large numberof women, and probablymen, seem to have been disaffected by AnitaHill'stestimony because itwas offeredby someone now identifiable as a middle-class professional, despite having had a background as materiallydeprived and as subject to racism as Clarence Thomas's. Race figured acutely in this equation. As the AfricanAmericanhistorianNell Painter wrote in a New YorkTimes op-ed piece after the hearings, when Clarence Thomas himself introducedthe history of lynching as a metaphor for the grueling hearings, an implicitscenario floated in the culturalunconsciouslynching suggested the punishment of a black man for the rape of a white woman, and there was no white woman involved. Consequently, the black woman voicing the complaintagainst Thomas was invisibleto most of the
30 boundary2 / Summer1992 white national audience, since her harassment occasioned no indignation in comparison to the rape of a white woman, and forthe black audience her accusation resonated uncomfortablywith a history of blaming black men and thus furtherweakening them vis-a-vis white men. The AfricanAmerican journalistSalim Muwakkilanalyzed the response of the black community in Chicago, in part through editorials in black-owned newspapers and so on, and found sympathies overwhelminglywith Thomas, on the grounds that Anita Hillwas jealous because Thomas had marrieda white woman and wished to penalize him after the fact for this. These responses are clearly not coming from the same direction that, say, Senator Strom Thurmond's were, althoughthey also lead to the supportof Thomas's confirmation.What can be glimpsed here is the way that feminism, or at least gender status, cannot be kept separate fromits instantiationin other divisions of culture. In all of these examples another variable has counted for more, has weighed more heavily, in a certain culturalequilibration. What that evacuation points to is the dead end-at least insofar as politics is concerned-represented by an exclusive politics of identity.The general repudiationof Anita Hill'ssexual harassment charges is symptomatic of, on the one hand, the undeniable grip of sexism still prevailing, but also of the weak response a politics of identitywill be able to make in the face of that sexism. The politics of image despises the image but also lives and dies for the image, since that comes to be the only grounds of political evaluation: Is that a good image or a bad image? is the question, not How do images workand how diversely?The politicsof identityembraces a similar contradiction. A group accepts its singularityas a social category-of race, or sex, or sexual persuasion, for example-as the basis for identifying a common struggle. That identity,though, as Denise Riley asserts in "AmI ThatName?" Feminism and the Category of 'Women'in History,"1 is comprised as much of what has been shunted off onto the category of that social identity-let's say in this case women-as of what can be imagined as an alternative social identity.The nets of identitypolitics can become too tight as rigorous tests are administeredto determine if a member truly belongs with the special identityof a group. What often happens is that all of the group politicalenergy becomes devoted to policingthe identityline, making determinations about when and how and whether it has been crossed over in certain instances, thus invalidatingthe identityof that individualmem11. Denise Riley,"AmI ThatName?"Feminismand the Categoryof 'Women'in History (Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1988), chap. 5, passim.
Wicke/ PostmodernIdentities 31 ber. As an initialstarting place, some invocationof identitywillinevitablybe made, but the danger, as Riley and many other feminists and theorists of other movements have pointed out, is that offering up the identity,honing it, and patrollingit are too likelyto come to constitute the sum total of the politics of the group if a freewheeling recognition of the instabilityof that identity is not builtin from the start. Let me circle back to the Thomas hearings after having passed through this critical interlude.Again and again we heard that in Thomas's indirect rebuttalto Hill'scharges, to which he did not listen, the race card had trumped the gender card in our national game of bridge. Thomas's portrayalof himself as subject to the indignitiesof a stereotyping discourse about black male sexual prowess effectivelysilenced the Democraticsenators, who did not want to risk looking like they believed those stereotypes, and empowered Republican senators, many of them with highly suspect backgrounds of bigotry and race-baiting, to "protect"Thomas by charging racism. Throughoutthis, it was very hard to have it be admitted that the woman bringingtestimony of sexual harassment was herself black. In a New York Times op-ed page editorial, Oscar Patterson, a CaribbeanAmerican historian of slavery, swept away this seeming incongruityby his analysis that Anita Hill had succumbed to white feminist puritanism, no doubt through having been educated at Yale Law School in proximityto so many white feminist puritans. Patterson simply asserted that the remarks attributedto Thomas were standardbadinage between black southern men and women; the interpretationof them as sexual harassment was a strange form of brainwashing undergone by Hill,who had, Patterson opined, forgotten her roots in black culture. So much for stereotypes, Patterson said; yes, Thomas had said these things, the fault lay in betraying one's racial culture and lining up with female sexual puritanson the other side of the color line.12Thomas's white senatorial supporters did not take this line at all;they professed horrorat remarksabout pubic hairand Long Dong Silver and were very far from attributingthese to friendlyinterculturalinteraction; no, by their lights Anita Hilllied, lied because she was in love with Thomas, or psychologically unstable, or a dupe of liberals,or a lesbian. These incongruities and irreconcilableattitudes all cluster aroundthe perceived need to 12. Patterson'sessay is reprintedin Reconstruction1, no. 4 (1992):64-77, and is followedby an extraordinarily thoughtfulexchange betweenPattersonand RhondaDatcher, and AfricanAmericangraduatestudent in mathematics.She offers brilliantand telling rejoindersto his ethnographicremarks,as he concedes in his finalstatement.
32 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 take one variable-be it genderor race or, in a veryfarfetchedlink,class: by those lightsAnitaHillwas jealousof Thomas'scareerprominenceand couldn'tbear his goingontothe SupremeCourt-as supreme,as primary, as the bottomline. Postmodernidentitywouldseem to have it alloverthe legal subject here. Inthe churningfrothof mobileandmultiplesexualidentities,of transof objectand subject,in the postmodernwash of gressive reformulations the whocame to the forewas an impossiblemonolith, subject identity, legal a femalemonster.Inproviding a critiqueof thismonstrousresult,one brand of postmodernismcould be seen as a utopiantheoryseeking to undermine all such binariesand divisions,installingthe play of differencesin theirstead. ThinkerslikeCraigOwensandothershavewantedto suggest that postmodernityitself is the "discourseof others,"of those who have fromthe culturalsystem,andinparticular he cites the been disenfranchised prominenceof sexual differencein postmodernartof the last fifteenyears in makingpostmodernism and of the female artistswho have participated whatitis-for him,a questioningof alldifferenceanda dissolvingof natural or essentializedhierarchies.13 A postmodernism of thisvarietyhas been giventhe nameresistance postmodernism,and to this I wouldregistera serious caveat-not to the possibilityof resistancebutto its linkagewiththe postmodern.Viewedin this light,postmodernismbecomes a criticaltool kit,a set of techniques to deployat will,generallyin the realmof textualculture.Thatvision renders postmodernismwithoverlybroadbrushstrokes,as providinginternal going optionsof a reactionaryor progressivekind.Whatthat is ordinarily to mean is an overinvestmentin discursivegestures,the oftenfatuousassumptionthat an alterationof textualstyle or nomenclatureor the decenteringof a discoursein some purelysymbolicway sends shock waves Thatverylocution,of course,is disavowed to the heartof socialdomination. no "heart"or core of hegemonycan be since anyway, by postmodernism of be tailoredto an understanding could This quiteprofitably posited. insight constructbutas a permethe law,of the legal subject,notas a monolithic sites of conflictand innumerable able membranewithinwhichinnumerable formsof strugglecan be seen to exist. The real problemis thatpostmodernfeministtheoryhas a different identitypoliticsfromthatof feminismin the domainof the (legal)subject, 13. See CraigOwens, "TheDiscourseof Others,"in TheAnti-Aesthetic,ed. Hal Foster (Portland,Oreg.:Bay Press, 1983), 57-77.
Identities33 Wicke/ Postmodern in the publicarenaof image,protest,the womanon trial.Itis fashionable to referslightinglyto an academicfeminismof theoryand writing,in contrastto a grass-rootsfeminismof marchingand politicalactionthat does the real workof feminism.Thatdivisionwillno longersuffice,but not on the groundsthattheoryand practicecan no longerbe distinguished."Academic feminism"is itselfsplinteredintomanydomains,as is feminismin the supposedlyreal worldoutsidethe academy.Postmodernfeminismis tryingto catch up to a realitywe barelyhave a name for,the postmodern situationof a theoryof identitythat seeks to overcomethe limitationsof fixed, immutable,and hierarchical identities,witha feminismstillinvolved in a straightforward identitypolitics.Postmodernfeminismis itselfcaughtin those same nets. A singularfeministmovementno longerexists, and postmoderntheoryembracesthe fragmentation of multiplelocales, sites, and dissolvedidentities.Tryingto negotiatethe new space forfeministtheory involvesseeing how muchwe stilloperatewithincongruentand incompatiblemodels.Whenidentitypoliticsis pushedupto the limitlineof its politics of image, there is a priceto pay politically. Thatpriceis the substitution of an identitypoliticsfor a relationalpolitics,a multiplepoliticaldynamic that can see itself at workin the worldin the back and forthof actual politicalengagement.Instead,an identitypoliticsthatbecomes entrenched willmoreand morefocus on the symbolicimageryof namingor of being named.Postmodernfeminismcan readilyfallintothatdiscursivetrapby its concentrationon symbolicimagery,so thatpointingto the insubstantiality of identitycan come backto hauntits owntheoreticalprecincts.We livein a momentof contradiction, wherefindingourway across a sophisticated theoreticalbridgeto a viable politicsbeyond identities,includingfemale identity,looks difficult.Female identitiesare now, as always,on trial,as in the case of AnitaHill.The mistakewouldbe to collapsethat postmodern spectacle intoone discernibleidentitywithone politicalresponse. Hill is a strong, bravewoman,and an articulatelaw professor;she is heroic butis nota feministheroine.Hertransformation intopreciselythat,through awardsand speeches in the feministmedia,is a retroactivecanonization, an indicationof how image-driven feministpoliticsis today.To see her as such is to identifytoo much,and in the wrongways-a symptomof the a postmodernfeminismneeds to outgrow. identi-fixations
Feminism and Postmodernism--Another View
MaryPoovey The summer of 1991 witnessed a spate of popular movies with a strikingly similar theme. Each of these movies features a more or less middle-aged white man who is moderately to wildly successful in a highpressure, high-prestige occupation. Suddenly, because of the vagaries of his own body tissue, random violence, or a desire to forestall the onset of age, these men find themselves humbled, frustrated,and, as a result, miraculously humanized. In Regarding Henry, an amoral lawyer needs a bullet in the brain to rediscover his own ethics; in The Doctor, a heartless surgeon recovers his abilityto care after a bout with a tumor;in Doc Hollywood, a cynical plastic surgeon finds love through mandatorycommunity service in a small South Carolinatown; and in City Slickers, a joyless New York professional delivers a calf and discovers the meaning of life. In the summer of 1991, the wilderness was located not in Wyoming but in corporate America;the enemy was not the "redman"butthe system, the rat race I would like to thank Cora Kaplan,EmilyMartin,and Joan Scott for discussions about various versions of this essay. I am especially gratefulto JudithButlerfor helping me clarifythe logicof my argument. Press.CCC0190-3659/92/$1.50. boundary2 19:2,1992.Copyright ? 1992byDukeUniversity
View 35 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another that has run even the most successful man ragged and stripped him of his abilityto feel. No doubt these movies about masculine resuscitationare more salutary than the body-count movies of the summer before. The fantasy nature of their happy endings, however, seems to me as surely a barometer of anxiety as was the testosterone rush of The Terminator,TotalRecall, and Die Hard. When you put the 1991 born-again movies alongside the biggest money-maker of the year, Terminator2: Judgment Day, the anxiety becomes clearer and, to my mind,more poignant.Likeits predecessor, Terminator 2 is about a cyborg, a cyberneticallyengineered, computer-driven, machine-man, who can break human limbs with a snap of his fingers and who can withstand blasts from an AK-47 at close range. Unlike his namesake predecessor, however, this Terminatoris a good guy. He takes orders from a little boy (with a knowingwink at KindergartenCop), he learns, he makes (clumsy) jokes, he even evokes (and almost expresses) feelings. This Terminator,in fact, is, in some ways, more human than the woman he is forced to workwith. Whereas Schwarzenegger's character has softened considerably in the sequel to the first Terminatormovie, Linda Hamilton's Sarah Connor has become as emotionally hard as her muscles. This machine can never be a man, but because he is so faithful,so reliable, and because he chooses at the end to sacrifice himself for the boy, this Terminator can stand in for the father the boy has never known and, in so doing, he can symbolicallyfather the human race, which, withouthim, would have ceased to exist. In this essay, I want to work from the complex of feelings of which the anxiety implicit in these movies is one expression to the structural contradictionthat underwritesit. Put most bluntly,the fear is about ceasing to be human-whether because a man is so successful that nothing but money comes to matteror because the impenetrable,inexorable workings of the multinational,computer-runmegacorporationhas reduced him to a machine-man. I do not think that this anxiety is limitedto white men with stethoscopes and expense accounts. I will argue, in fact, that it is another version of this same fear that is holding a certain definition of feminism in place, that is holding up feminism, in both senses of this phrase. I do think, however, that one defense against this fear-and therefore a telling articulationof it-is clearest in some (white) men's fantasies about women and minorities. This defense displaces the fear that the very nature of the human is at risk with the specific anxiety that some people-specifically, white men--are being denied the opportunityto realize themselves be-
36 boundary2 / Summer1992 cause other people--primarily women-have been given unfairaccess to the opportunitiesthat used to belong to men. I also want to argue, however, that behind the fear that is displaced by the blame is a structuralcontradiction withinthe liberal,democratic version of humanism, made visible by the changes we call postmodernism, that renders all psychological responses inadequate to the problem at hand. Indeed, I will argue that the fact that most responses to the changes that have begun to transformU.S. society are psychological signals a failure of the political. I will also propose that some kindof politicalresuscitationof feminism is necessary to analyze this contradictionand to define the changes that are now bringingit to light. First,let me followthe logic of the scapegoating defense against fear. To do so, I'lllook at an essay about one of the signs of the changes with which dehumanization is associated-the growing problem of homelessness. Writtenby Peter Martinand published in the Nation in July 1991, "The Prejudice against Men"argues that "the problemof chronic homelessness is essentially a problem of single adult men."1 "Outof all single homeless adults, 78 percent are men," Martinexplains; "outof all homeless adults, more than 64 percent are single men; and out of all homeless peopleadults or children-58 percent are single men." After one factors in programs intended to help get people off the streets, Martinconcludes, one is left with the "'chronicallyhomeless,' of whom four-fifthsare men. Seen that way, homelessness emerges as a probleminvolvingwhat happens to men without money, or men in trouble." The sex differentialamong the homeless, according to Martin, is partly a result of federal programs like AFDC, Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Because AFDC generally denies relief to a household that includes an adult male, this programsets up a situation of unequal competition that discriminates against men: "The regulations as they now stand actually force men to compete with the state for women."2 Part of the problem, however, as Martinelaborates his argument, is not that men must compete with the state but that the state establishes an inequalitybetween men and women, in which women retaina capacity that these men no longer have-the abilityto choose. The language of choice pervades Martin'srepresentations of women. In relationto the AFDC policy, for ex1. Peter Martin,"ThePrejudiceagainst Men,"Nation,8 July 1991, 46. Subsequentquotationsin this paragraphare cited fromthis page. 2. Martin,"Prejudice," 47, 46. Subsequent quotationsin this paragraphare cited from these pages.
View 37 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another ample, he writes: "Giventhe choice between receiving aid for themselves and their childrenand livingwith men, what do you thinkmost women do?" In relation to work, Martindeclares that "women, especially when young, have one final option denied to men. They can take on the 'labor'of being wives and companions to men or bearing children, and in returnthey will often be supported or 'taken care of' by someone else." In ascribing choice to women, Martin is exploiting the feministhumanist vocabulary,turningback as an accusation that which, in another arena, some women are strugglingto retainas a right.The fact that he can do so should alert women to the danger for feminism of the assumptions that informan argument like Martin's.Such an argumentreveals the sexism inherent in the traditionof humanismthat has developed alongside, and as part of, the rationalistic,democratizing epistemology dominant during the last two and a half centuries. It also suggests that when feminism takes up the language of this humanism we carry over its sexism, too. This is the first hint of the structuralcontradictionI want to explore. Even though the humanist subject seems to be withoutgender, it is always already gendered as masculine, for, withinthis tradition,the self-determining,rational subject always stands opposed to the subject-in-nature,which is gendered feminine. Martin'scharge that women are, and ought to act like, humanist subjects, then, signals the contradictionthat women now suffer: On the one hand, since the late eighteenth century, women have been excluded from the humanist subject position and have been defined by their reproductive capacity; on the other hand, as the crisis of late capitalismbecomes more pressing in the West, the humanist subject position has opened to those who were previouslyexcluded fromit.As partof this profoundlymixed blessing, those who have enjoyed the benefits of humanism-largely white men-have begun to blame its increasinglyobvious liabilitieson those latecomers who have been admitted only because capitalism's demand for cheap and flexible labor knows, but does not respect, the "barrier"of sex. I will returnin a moment to explore this contradictionin more detail, but before I do so, let me stay with Martin'sdefense. Essentially, this defense is articulated in psychological and gendered terms. Martin'sanalysis, in other words, suggests that he experiences the dehumanizationthat accompanies the crisis of late capitalism as emasculation. In fact, as his argument draws to a close, Martindefines as the root of the problem of homelessness not a failingeconomy or inadequate safeguards for labor but a cultural denigration of men. "To put it simply,"Martinwrites, "men are neither supposed nor allowed to be dependent. They are expected to take
38 boundary2 / Summer1992 care of both others and themselves. And when they cannot do it, or 'will not' do it, the built-inassumption at the heart of the culture is that they are less than men and therefore not worthyof help."3 Martin'sanalysis reveals that he thinksthat the problemis who gets to be a humanist subject and that the gendering of the humanist subject is only a symptom of the currentcrisis. Accordingto Martin,when women acquire the rights associated with humanism and push men out, masculinity comes underthreat.Against Martin,Iargue that the problemis not who gets to be a humanist subject but that the Enlightenmentversion of humanism, with its vocabulary of rights and choice, feelings and equality,continues to be produced as a solution to the crisis at hand. The problemwith humanism is that the state apparatus that Martinaccuses of deprivingmen of choice actually constructs subject positions in such a way that choice seems to exist for some when, actually, it is available to no one. Gendered meanings obscure this contradiction:Up untilthe moment when infrastructural changes open the humanist subject position to those who were previously excluded, gender functions as a "natural"principleof inequality,makingthe relative freedom of men seem absolute by contrast to the "natural"dependence of women. Martin'scharge that women have brought about, or at least benefited from, a fundamentalchange in who is allowed to chooselike the charge leveled by the Rightthat "quotas"make equal opportunity impossible for white men-is naive and misplaced. The changes that the United States is experiencing are actuallymore far-reaching,and ultimately even more threatening, than Martinimagines. Martinis right, however, in thinking that these changes have something to do with gender. In order to extend Martin'sanalysis of the relationshipbetween these changes and gender, I shall look more closely at some of the other ways these changes are being conceptualized. Homelessness is only one symptom in the United States of what The changes for David Harvey has called "theconditionof postmodernity."4 47-48. 3. Martin,"Prejudice," 4. See David Harvey,The Conditionof Postmodernity:An Enquiryinto the Originsof CulturalChange (Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1980). Otherhelpfuldiscussionsof postmoderor the CulturalLogic of Late Capitalnity include:FredricJameson, "Postmodernism, 146 Review New Left ism," (July-August1984): 53-92; Andreas Huyssen, After the GreatDivide:Modernism,Mass Culture,Postmodernism(Bloomington:IndianaUniversity Press, 1986); and ChristopherNorris,What'sWrongwith Postmodernism:Critical Theoryand the Ends of Philosophy(Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUniversityPress, 1990). see DonnaHaraway,"ManiAmongthe manydiscussionsof feminismandpostmodernity,
View 39 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another which postmodernity stands include not just observable alterations in the U.S. economy and welfare system but transformationsin the global economy, as well: I have in mind both the creation of a part-time"homework" economy at the level of worldwideproductionand the forging of the corporate conglomerate at the level of global management. These changes also include technological innovations in the electronic storage, retrieval, and transmission of information;medical advances in genetic research and synthetic proteins; and the steady march of new diseases across the planet. Whilethey can be theorized at this macrolevel,the effects of these changes are also being registered more immediately,as challenges to the most basic units of humanist understanding-the individualityof the subject and the bodily integrityof the person. The changes occurring in people's perceptions of the body are being measured by anthropologistEmilyMartin,whose fieldwork finds people in Baltimore speaking of their bodies not as selfcontained entities bounded by a shield-likeskin but as systems that interact with the ecosystem that contains them. Here is one of the descriptions Emily Martinhas recorded: "Ithinkyour immune system, for me, [its] more that you have a whole networkof things that affect you, and you orderthose things to, to workthe most efficientway, and that you have to make choices in what you do with yourself and your life, and where you live and what you eat, for that to work.And it's all intertwined,so no one thing is going to save you from illness."5 It may seem paradoxical that this informantconceptualizes these radical transformations in terms derived from humanism: She simply extends efficiency, flexibility,and choice fromthe autonomous humanist sub-
festo for Cyborgs:Science, Technology,and Socialist Feminism,"Socialist Review 15 (March1985):65-107; Teresa L. Ebert,"The'Difference'of PostmodernFeminism,"College English53, no. 8 (1991):886-904; JudithButler,GenderTrouble:Feminismand the Subversionof Identity(New Yorkand London:Routledge,1990);JudithButler,"Contin"inFeministsTheorizethe Political, gent Feminismand the Questionof 'Postmodernism,' ed. JudithButlerand Joan W. Scott (New Yorkand London:Routledge, 1991), 3-21; and LindaSinger,"Feminismand Post-Modernism," in FeministsTheorizethe Political, 464-75. 5. This quotationis froma personalinterviewwithan unnamedperson. Quotedin Emily Martin,"ProducingNew People, Reproducinga New Society:Gender,Death,and Reproduction"(unpublishedessay, 1991), 6. My discussion of the changes in definitionsof the body and in conceptualizationsof the workplaceis indebtedto Martin'sessay and to Donna Haraway,"The Biopoliticsof PostmodernBodies: Determinationsof Self in ImmuneSystem Discourse,"differences1, no. 1 (Winter1989):3-43.
40
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ject to the molecules and tissues of her body. Yet, it should come as no surprise that as individualsstruggle to assimilate, to make sense of, the hitherto unimaginable changes that various theorists are describing, they use the images and systems of meaning that have provided order to the world as they have known it. Insofaras these changes are imagined at the level of the body, both humanismand gender providecrucialrubricsforconceptualizing new possibilities-just as these terms provide,for Peter Martin, a bulwarkagainst having to accept the implicationsof radicalchange. In a moment, I will suggest that the reason postmodern challenges to humanist commonplaces mobilize assumptions about gender is more complex than just some naturalbond between the body and sex, but in orderto get to that argument, I need to give a few more examples of the variety of ways that responses to the postmodern conditionare enlisting gendered meanings. The cybernetic superiorityof Terminator2's adaptations to the vicissitudes of his environment-his body's ability to close flesh over bullet wounds, or one arm's capacity to peel back synthetic skin from the other to perform electronic surgery-is a type of the trait that many analysts say will triumphin the postmodern world.As these analysts describe both the flexible, adaptive entity that will eventually emerge and the process by which the mass-production corporationwill become a "learningorganization,"they frequentlyuse images that carrygendered-or, more specifically, feminized-meanings. In Developing a 21st Century Mind, for example, Martha Sinetar describes the executives who will succeed in the transformed workplace as embodying traditionallyfeminine traits:They "enjoy, are easy with, the soft, shadowy underbellyof human existence, however illogical it may seem. Feelings, intuitivehunches, moods, dreams, personal "6 As preferences are their allies. They court the world of the 'irrational.' one "human resource management executive" describes the process by which the new corporate entitywillcome into existence, he pictures himself playing a feminized role: The old way of operating must end or die for the realizationof the new to emerge fromits remains.The Phoenix analogy is useful here. The transformedorganizationrises out of the ashes of its old formto take on a new direction,one that raises its performancecapabilityto a much greater level of functioning,sophistication and response. ... Empoweringthe humanspirit,managing emotions and changing beliefs about realityseem to be essential ingredientsto the process.... Transformationinvolves both birthand death. There can be profound 6. Martha Sinetar, Developing a 21st Century Mind (New York:Villard, 1991), 13.
View 41 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another pain in seeing the process through ... as change agents, we cannot walk into any organization and "do transformation."We can, however, ... assist by facilitatingthe conditions to help it along, much like a midwife assisting a naturalbirth. She supports, encourages and guides the process; she does not do the birthingfor the mother.7 The fantasies of rebirthin the films with which I began participate in this effortto forge new myths for success by appropriatingthe traitsassociated with femininity,as do spokesmen for the men's movement, like Robert Bly and Sam Keen. Thus, the hero of City Slickers plays midwife to a calf to heal himself, and Robert Bly encourages his would-be IronJohn to "overcome ...
his fear of wildness, irrationality, . . . intuition, emotion, the body,
and nature."8 It is by no means obvious that the corporate executives' appropriation of feminine traitsto negotiate the transitionto postmodernitywillbe any more beneficial to women than is the humanist defense against postmodernism. Indeed, Isuggest that both humanismand postmodernismhave the capacity to subordinate women-the former,in ways with which we are all too familiar;the latter,in ways we have yet to imagine. Because the potential for sex oppression demonstrated by humanismalso exists withinpostmodernism, and because gendered meanings are being used to ease this transition, it behooves feminists now to examine both the ways that feminized traits are being appropriatedto facilitate (or resist) material and conceptual changes and the consequences for women of these appropriations.In order to begin this project, I want to examine in some detail two recent legal cases that implicitlyquestion the adequacy of the humanist subject as a response to or as a defense against postmodernity.Because each of these cases also centrallyinvolves either sex or reproduction,they also illuminate both the complexities of the role gender plays in such responses and the underlying contradictionof humanism's construction of gender. While the legal negotiation about the humanistsubject is not occurringexclusively in cases having to do with women or even sex,9 I do think that such cases constitute the front line of defenses against change because of the particular position that women and reproductionoccupy in relationto 'truth'or 7. Quotedin Martin,"ProducingNew People,"23. 8. RobertBly,IronJohn:A BookaboutMen(Reading,Mass.:Addison-Wesley,1990), 14. 9. The case of Moorev. TheRegents of the Universityof California, forexample,focused on the questionof whetheran individualhas a proprietary rightoverthe tissues of his/her own body-whether, that is, tissues and organsare a partof the autonomous"self."The CaliforniaSupreme Courtruledin 1990 that John Mooredid not have proprietaryrights to his spleen, whichwas surgicallyremovedin 1976.
42 boundary2 / Summer1992 'nature'.While law is by no means the only arena where such negotiations are taking place-as my earlier examples should demonstrate-I do think that the law may be a criticalarena for feminists to examine. I say this for the following reasons: (1) As an institutiondedicated to maintainingcontinuity with the past, the law is particularlyresistant to change. (2) The law stages the dynamics of social negotiation specifically in the form of contests and, therefore, makes these negotiations available to the public in the familiar,hence easily consumable, formof melodrama.(3) As its linkto melodrama suggests, the law works not only by institutionalizingas regulations assumptions that elsewhere take the formof prejudicesor beliefs but also by psychologizing responsibility,by shoring up its structuralimposition of regulations with what feel like personal, private, unconscious feelings. My first example is intended both to demonstrate how certain legal institutionsfunction to reinforcethe humanistjuridicalsubject and to show how psychologized feelings reinforce the law's conservative tendencies. This case, which was widely publicized last summer, involved a charge that three male students at St. John's Universityhad raped, sodomized, and sexually degraded a female student at a fraternityhouse after forcing her to drinkvodka-laced orange soda. No one disputed that the sexual activityhad taken place; the question at issue was the woman's consent. The defendants asserted that the woman had gone to the fraternityhouse willingly, that she had consumed the vodka knowingly,and that-explicitly or implicitly-she had consented to having sex. By contrast, the woman argued that not only had she not consented to having sex but she had been only intermittentlyconscious duringthe event. InJuly,the three defendants were acquitted of all charges by the jury,who explained that, because the woman's testimony contained contradictionsand gaps, she must not have been telling the truth. One set of assumptions implicitin this verdict underwritesthe very institutionof trial by jury.This assumption is that true stories will be recognizable as true because they are coherent, comprehensive, and comprehensible. Behind this belief lies the furtherassumption that coherent, comprehensive narrativescan be generated by honest individualsbecause these persons are coherent, comprehending subjects. Even though these assumptions are basic to juridicalhumanism, however, they have, in the last few years and with increasing frequency, been set aside by juries who are persuaded by psychological research that asserts that victims of trauma often survive assault precisely by losing their coherence and their ability to comprehend-by falling brieflyunconscious, by becoming confused, or
View 43 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another even by repressing the memory of the event altogether.10Such juridicalaccommodation of what we might call a postmodern view of the subject has begun to erode the authorityof humanism in all kinds of cases involving violent crime, with the exception of sexual assault. Juries are often willing to believe that memory lapses occur in violent crimes, notes Ann Burgess, a recognized authorityon posttraumaticstress disorder, but they will not make the same allowance for sexual assault because they do not associate sex with violence and because they assume that women require"persuasion" before they consent to sex. "People tend to believe when people are robbed or held at gun point,"Burgess comments, "[b]utso many people still see rape as sex. They really don't see it as violence. But it's the violence that brings on the traumaticresponse."'1 This is exactly what happened in the St. John's verdict. Even though the prosecutor argued that his client had momentarilylost consciousness duringthe assault, the juryheld her to the standards of the humanistjuridical subject. This occurred not because the juryassumed that all humans are equal before the law but because a set of assumptions about the gendered nature of the sex reinforcedthe humanistassumptions inherent in the law. These assumptions have become the staple fare of virtuallyall rape trials: The facts that the woman went to the fraternityhouse willinglyand that she knew-even liked-her alleged assailants were used to argue that she willinglyconsented to having sex. Inother words, once a woman enters an environmentwhere sexual relationsoften occur, she is accepting-or even inviting-whatever sexual advances are made; she is renouncing the privileges of the humanist subject and accepting the subject position to which nature has assigned her. Here, then, is the painfulparadoxthat humanismimposes on women. On the one hand, because women are excluded from the humanist subject position in being associated with nature, they are not credited with full rationality;when a woman says "no" in relation to sex, she may as often mean "yes." On the other hand, because the law also assumes that the humanist subject exists apart from gendered meanings, the woman is held responsible for upholding the standards of rationality:She must tell a coherent story or tell no story at all. This unbearable contradiction also produces the psychological; that is, the double bind displaces what is really 10. See Bessel A. van der Kolk,PsychologicalTrauma(Washington:AmericanPsychiatricAssociationPress, 1987). 11. "BearingWitnessto the Unbearable," New YorkTimes,28 July1991.
44 boundary2 / Summer1992 a social contradictiononto the individualsubject as the split between consciousness (rationality)and the unconscious (nature). When we analyze, or respond to, this contradictionin psychological terms, we reinforce this displacement: We substitute an explanation about the nature of "human subjectivity"for what could be a politicalcritique. This double bind helps explain why women, like the accuser in the St. John's case, are so often held responsible for their own oppression. My second example, the 1989 Webster decision about abortion, shows that this double bind results not from some incidental conjunction of assumptions about women and humanism but from the constitutive role that gender plays in juridicalhumanism. To explain this, I need to examine the Webster decision in some detail. The originalcase that resulted in the United States Supreme Court's Webster decision involved a Missouri statute, enacted in June 1986, and the charge broughtby five health care professionals that this statute violated a woman's FourteenthAmendment rights.12 The Supreme Court upheld the original statute, arguing that the Court did not have to decide whether the controversialMissouripreamble, which declared that life begins at conception, is constitutionaland that the statute's injunctionagainst using publicfacilitiesto provideabortions places no obstacles in the path of a woman who wants an abortion.Inother words, the lack of public facilities does not interferewith due process because it does not curtaila woman's rightto choose. Behind the specific provisions of the Webster ruling was a more general objection on the part of some justices to the 1972 Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion. This objection became clear in the ancillary opinion submitted by Justices Rehnquist,White, and Kennedy,which used the fact that medical tests are not capable of determiningexact gestational age to attack Roe's "rigid"trimesterscheme. InRoe v. Wade, this trimester scheme, along with the associated concept of "potentialhuman life,"had been used to distinguish between the period in which a woman and the fer12. See WilliamL. Websterv. ReproductiveHealthServices, et al., 106 U.S. Supreme CourtReports (1989), 410-71. Forprovocativediscussions of the abortiondebate, see New YorkReview of Books, 28 Sept. 1989, Ronald Dworkin,"TheFutureof Abortion," 47-51; CatharineMacKinnon,"Privacyv. Equality:BeyondRoe v. Wade,"in Feminism Unmodified:Discourses on Lifeand Law (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress, 1987), 93-116; RosalindPollackPetchesky,Abortionand Woman'sChoice: The State, Sexuality,and ReproductiveFreedom (Boston:NortheasternUniversityPress, 1985); and LawrenceH. Tribe,Abortion:The Clash of Absolutes (New York:W.W. Norton& Co., 1990).
View 45 Poovey / FeminismandPostmodernism-Another tilized egg constitute a single legal "person"(the woman) and the moment at which this single legal entity is recognized as two legal "persons,"one of whom (the "potentiallife"of the fetus) deserves protectionby the state.13 In 1989, Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy objected to the "web of legal rules" by which Roe had attemptedto establish a distinctionbetween these periods, arguing instead that because there is no medical basis for certainty, the state has an interest in "potentialhuman life"throughout a woman's pregnancy. Inso doing, these justices implicitlyargued that a fetus is, from the moment of conception, a "person"with rights commensurate with those of a pregnantwoman. They argued, in other words, that the fetus is, from the moment of conception and before the differentiationof sex, a humanist subject. The reasoning set out in the Websterdecision demonstrates concluthat it was the intentionof the Supreme Courtto upholdconstitutional sively individualismand the humanistjuridicalsubject. Atthe same time, however, this reasoning also reveals both the strain that new medical technologies have placed on the humanistjuridicalsubject and the crucial role that gender has always played within it. The first sign of this strain emerges with the Court's argument that state legislators have the rightto decide when life begins. Inadvancing this opinion,the Webster decision essentially rendered the definitionof life apolitical, not a medicalor a theological, decision; that is, it opened what had previously been an area policed by "expert"-' even absolute-authority to publicdebate and the democratic process. (At the same time, of course, it also placed the judiciarywithin this political process, not outside it.) The second sign of stress has even more direct implications for the humanist subject, for in arguing that curtailingpublic funds for abortion leaves a pregnant woman "withthe same choices as if the State had decided not to operate any hospitals at all,"14the Webster rulingexposed the limitationsinherentin the concept that has become the centerpiece of the feminist agenda (and of the white male backlash, as well)-the notion of individualchoice. Ifthe state operates no public hospitals, after all, the individualwoman willonly be free to "choose" a private hospital, and this "choice"will be available only to women with sufficient money and then only if private doctors are trained and willingto perform abortions. The thirdsign that maintaininga humanist subject is becoming 13. For a more extensive developmentof this argument,see my essay "TheAbortion Questionand the Deathof Man,"in FeministsTheorizethe Political,239-56. 14. WilliamL. Websterv. ReproductiveHealthServices, et al., 106 U.S. Supreme Court Reports,419.
46 boundary2 / Summer1992 increasingly difficultis also the point at which space has begun to open for what might eventually become a postmodernjuridicalsubject. In adopting Roe's language of "potentialhuman life"butattackingthe trimesterscheme, the Webster decision implicitlyargued that the Constitution'slanguage of individualizedrights is not adequate to accommodate all of the guises in which so-called persons appear. Both the pregnant woman and the fetus (or "potentialhuman")challenge the legal entity of the "person"-the first because she is nonunitary;the second because, being neither autonomous nor embodied, it is incapable of self-determinationor even independent life. This, in turn, creates the possibilityfor a nonunitarydefinitionof the juridical subject, in which sex will be only intermittentlyacknowledged or tied to reproduction.15 The signs of stress evident in both of these cases have appeared, and have been foreclosed, in relationto female sexuality and reproduction because of the criticalrole gender-and women, in particular-plays in upholding the humanist subject. To explain this role more fully, let me return for a moment to the legal assumption that the St. John's case made clear: A legal "person"is an individualcapable of telling,knowing,and acting on a coherent, self-consistent representationof reality,or "truth."Theoretically, that is, an individualbecomes a "person"with legal rightswhen she or he is reasonable, coherent, and capable of moral discrimination.Also theoretically,this coherent person exists before she or he is recognized by the law and in spite of sex, color, or class; the law claims simply to reflect the reality that exists outside it. In actuality,however, the law does not reflect or recognize some preexisting reality;the law recognizes only those things and persons "thatcorrespond to the definitionsit constructs."16In practice, this means that what counts as reasonable, coherent, and moral is a function of the categories the law creates. It also means that what counts as a reasonable, coherent, and moralsubject-the individualupon whom the law confers personhood-is a function of the categories the law uses to define coherence. Among these categories, as Judith Butler has recently argued, the "regulatory"categories of gender are particularly(although not exclusively) influential:"The 'coherence' and 'continuity'of the 'person' are not logical or analyticalfeatures of personhood but, rather,socially instituted 15. For a more elaboratediscussion of these ideas, see my "TheAbortionQuestion," 239-56. 16. ParveenAdamsand Jeff Minson,"The'Subject'of Feminism," m/f 2 (1978):50.
View 47 Poovey / FeminismandPostmodernism-Another that are anchored by "'intelligible' and maintained norms of intelligibility" genders."'17 Gender functions as the bedrock of the humanist juridicalsubject, then, because an orderly system of gender differences seems to be the basis of our culturalsystems of meaning and, therefore,of the very notions of coherence and continuity.Itis also importantto note that gender is intelligible as an ordered (binary)system of meanings only because each gender is defined relationally,by its differencefroman Other.Furthermore,genders attain their appearance of internalcoherence and their definitivedifference from each other by a process that entails both (imperfectly)homogenizing each term of the binaryopposition (by marginalizingall other kinds of difference) and claiming a naturalrelationto the (supposedly binary) biological difference of sex. This is why I say that gender seems to be the basis of our culturalsystem of meaning: Gender, with its apparently natural, or biological, referent, masks the presence of other differences (among these, race) that are marginalizedin order to foregroundgender. Thus, the coherent, reasonable, moral "person,"the humanist juridicalsubject who is the possessor of rights, is not the basis of law but the effect of a set of social institutions-including the law-that differentiates between people on the basis of a binarysystem of coherent genders, which (falsely) claims to derive its coherence from biological sex. Women play a crucial role in upholdingthis system, because theirgender-the feminine-has been culturallyassigned the same side of the binaryopposition as nature. This link reveals that the system of gender is not only binaryand relational;it is also differentialand hierarchical(as each term of the binaryopposition of gender is also both differentialand hierarchical).That is, in the same sense that rights exist for some only when there are others fromwhom the entitled can claim those rights,so the propertiesof humanism,which include both rights and coherence, can obtain for some individualsonly so long as there are others whose exclusion from rights and choice guarantees humanism.18 The role that a differentialsystem of gender plays in humanism sets the cruel contradictionI have been examiningthroughoutthis essay: Beup cause women are human and because the law supposedly recognizes all 17. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York:
Routledge,1990), 16, 17. 18. Fora discussion of the differentialnatureof rights,see Wai-CheeDimock,"Rightful Subjectivity," Yale Journal of Criticism 4, no. 1 (1991): 25-51.
48 boundary2 / Summer1992 humans as rationalsubjects, women are included in and held responsible as humanist subjects. This is the case especially now, as changes in the infrastructurehave forciblyopened the humanistsubject position to women as a group. Because, however, the humanistsubject and the laws that uphold it actually depend upon a binaryand differentialorganizationof gender (and, within gender, upon such differentialdeterminants as race), women are also excluded (albeit differently)fromthe humanistsubject position and (as a group) made the guardians of the entire culturalorder. The cultural logic that seems to tie a woman's gender to her sex makes womanlywomen the guarantors of the oppositions that the humanistjuridicalsubject institutionalizes. At the same time, this logic also makes the womanly woman the guardian of the stabilityof each term of the opposition. This explains why any alteration in the "natural"alignmentof women and childbearing-and, by extension, of women and the home-is so threatening to the basis of masculine identity,as we saw in Peter Martin'sessay. This logic also explains why any challenge to the definitionof woman ushers in fears about the definitionof life and mobilizes the threat of dehumanizationwith which I began. We see this fear again in two controversies that have sprung up alongside the abortiondebate. The firstconcerns the question of who will determine what counts as life. We have already seen the Webster decision politicize this determination,but this politicization remained relativelyuncontroversialon the Rightbecause the Missouri legislature was understood to have based its determinationthat life begins at conception on religious authority.More recently, in January 1991, Catholic ethicists began to dispute even this basis fordiscrimination,noting that, despite the decree of the Churchthat "fromfertilizationthe biological identity of a new human individualis already constituted,"new scientific evidence reveals that the pre-embryolacks the "determinateand irreversible individuality"that is "a necessary, if not sufficient,condition for it to be a human person."19The second of these controversies concerns the other extreme of "life."As early as July 1990 (and with increasing vehemence since the publication of the national bestseller Final Exit), the National Right to Life Committee began to argue that when Roe v. Wade extended the constitutional right to privacy to the realm of reproductionit set the stage for legalizing euthanasia. "Roe v. Wade was a precedent for killing people," one spokesperson recentlydeclared, "andits impact has gone far 19. "CatholicScholars,CitingNew Data,WidenDebateon WhenLifeBegins,"New York Times,15 Jan. 1991.
andPostmodernism-Another View 49 Poovey/ Feminism beyondabortion.We had warnedyears ago thateuthanasiawouldbe the next step."20 The emergence of such controversies-alongside,and as partof, the legal contests and the cinematicanxietiesI have been discussingindicatesthateven thoughwomenareassignedresponsibility underthe law, the feminineis also seen as the lastfrontierof nature,the lastguarantorof identity,masculinity,and life itself.Atthe same time, however,these controversiesand the anxietiesbehindmass-culturalfantasies also suggest that the contradictionI have been examiningis no longercapableof sustainingitself;in otherwords,the alignmentof (female)sex and (feminine) gendercan no longerbe takenforgranted.Thissuggests thatthe specter of dehumanizationI have associated withthe postmodernis massively overdetermined.At one level, it is a response to material,infrastructural changes.21 At anotherlevel, it is a response to the destabilizationof the imaginaryrelationbetweensex andgenderandto the imaginaryhomogenizationof sex thatis itselfa symptomof these infrastructural changes.One outcomeof this overdetermined causes logicof infra-and superstructural and effects is the otherphenomenonwithwhichI have been associating the appropriation of feminizedtraitsto maximizesuccess postmodernism: in a worldconceptualizedas an inhumanesystem. As the alignmentof (female)sex and (feminine)genderhas increasinglycome to seem likea culturalorganization, feminizedtraitshavefloatedfreefromtheirfemalereferent.These traitshave become availableforthe kindof appropriation we see in a movielikeCitySlickersor inthe managementexpert'sdescription of the process of corporatetransformation. Theyhavebecomeavailable,in otherwords,to helpusherinthe postmodernworld. Thus,we havethe paradoxof genderthatemerges fromthe fundamentalcontradiction withinhumanismthat I have been examining.On the one hand,because genderedmeanings(particularly those meaningscoded have historically been accordeda natural,biologicalrelationto "feminine") sex, gendercan be mobilizedto resistthe changesthatare bringinginthe postmoderncondition.On the otherhand,because the verychanges that 20. "Foes of AbortionView 'Rightto Die' as Second BattleOver Lifeand Death,"New YorkTimes,31 July 1990. 21. The entryof increasingnumbersof womenintothe workforce has been instrumental in disturbingthe relationshipbetween sex and gender as has the transformation of work itselfto accommodatebothwomenand changes in the globalrelationsof productionand consumption.Atthe same time,of course,developmentsin reproductive technologyhave problematizedthe relationshipbetweensex, conception,and "life."
50 boundary2 / Summer1992 people are resisting by invokingtraditionalgender definitions are altering perceptions of the relationshipbetween sex and gender, gendered meanings are also available to describe, even to facilitate,these changes. This paradox seems to me to unravelthe twisted skein of meanings contained in a film like Terminator2, in which a human woman is masculinized in order to fight alongside a cybernetic humanoid,whose hypermasculinityis underwrittenby feminine compassion. Italso seems to me to illuminatethe complex effects of the Webster decision, which is indisputablya setback for women who desire control over reproductionat the same time that, in theory at least, it provides an opening for a postmodern juridicalsubject that might be both heterogeneous and only intermittentlydefined by sex. Recently, the American publicwas subjected to an ugly demonstration of the contradiction I have been examining, and I want to conclude by discussing this very briefly. When law professor Anita Hill made the allegation that then nominee to the Supreme CourtClarence Thomas had made sexually insinuatingcomments that rendered her places of employment hostile environments for her as a woman, she was attemptingto use one forum constitutionallydesignated to adjudicatethe claims of humanist juridicalsubjects to make her story known. The responses her testimony provoked, however, especially from the Republicans on the Senate Judiciary Committee, mobilizedthe double bind I have been discussing. On the one hand, Hillwas cast out of the position of humanist subject by being hystericized: She was called "schizophrenic"and a "scorned woman," accused of fantasizing and of reading The Exorcistfor prurientsexual details. On the other hand, she was also held up to the standards of the rational subject: She had the choice, senators charged, to leave Thomas's employment when he went to the EEOC;she had the choice to tell. Inchoosing to move with him and in remainingsilent, they charged, Anita Hilleither acted irrationally(and, therefore, deserved what she got) or else proved that nothing was wrong (and, therefore, merited the blame they were assigning to her). Whatthe senators could not-or would not-see is that the responses Hilldescribed are those given by the structuralcontradictionI have been discussing: On the one hand, she became the nonrationalsubject to which gendered meanings assigned her (she did not tell);on the other hand, she acted rationally,as the humanistsubject should (she did not leave her job). If,as I have been suggesting, we are now witnessing the emergence of one of the fundamental contradictionsof humanism as a consequence and expression of the conditionof postmodernity,then Ithinkthat feminism must assist-not fight-this historicaltransformation.I thinkthat feminism
View 51 Poovey / Feminismand Postmodernism-Another must stop tryingto resuscitate the humanistsubject. We must move abortion out of the center of the feminist agenda and move choice away from the heart of our campaign for reproductiveoptions. I say this because all arguments that keep sex at the center of legal defenses and social meanings-even arguments that are explicitlydefenses of women-seem to me to support the humanist assumption that women should stand in for nature and to uphold the binaryorganizationof gender. They do so because they endorse the culturalassumption that is the ground of sexism-the notion that sex is the most importantdeterminantof difference. At the same time, I think that a feminism that elevates sex over all other determinants of difference inevitably,and inadvertently,participates in other forms of oppression, which invariablyarise in a culturallogic that privileges sex over other demarcations of identity. In privilegingsex, in other words, feminism, like humanism, marginalizes all other forms of differencethat would fracturethe gendered binary-differences like race, age, class, religion,or sexual preference. Indeed, the complexities of the Hill/Thomashearings, like those of the St. John's case (where the accuser was also black), need to be read more systematically through race than I have been able to do in this essay. Meaningfulanalysis of the role that race continues to play in reinforcingthe structuralcontradictions of gender was preempted in the Hill/Thomasdebate when Thomas alleged racism. Why a black man was believed when he alleged racism, while a black woman was discredited when she alleged sexual harassment, is a question that cries out for serious attention. What feminism needs now is some way to take account of the shifting meanings of sex that does not make sex the fixed, or the only, center of analysis. Feminists need to reconceptualize sex and gender, to see these as dynamic, relational categories-relational to each other and to other determinants of difference-not as the fundamentalbasis of the humanist subject. Such an account of sex might help render obsolete the gendered and race-specific meanings by which Anita Hillwas discredited. At the very least, it might expose the fact that these meanings are complicit with the politicalinterests that members of the JudiciaryCommitteewere advancing. Such an account might move us beyond a psychological account of Hill's behavior and a psychological response to it to some more fully politicized understanding and organized resistance. I suppose that, realistically,what I am calling for is a more flexible feminism, not a rejection of feminism altogether. At the same time, however, we need to guard against simply endorsing flexibilityfor its own sake, for to do so is to run the risk of reproducingthose images that are already
52 boundary2 / Summer1992 being co-opted by corporate analysts. Thus, there is the uncanny similarity between the call of feminist Chela Sandoval for a ThirdWorldfeminism, which combines "grace, flexibility,and strength,"and sociologist Rosabeth Moss Kantor'sdescriptionof the new megacorporation,which combines the "powerof a giant with the agilityof a dancer."22Inorderto avoid simply participating in the productionof such images, feminists must begin to analyze the paradox I have been discussing, by whichthe relationshipbetween gender and sex is currentlybeing used both to resist and support the arrivalof that rough beast, the condition of postmodernity.Perhaps as more people analyze this paradox, the contradictionthat it expresses will become more visible, and itwillthen not be so easy to hold women responsible for our own oppression. Of course, it still willnot be obvious what new configurationsof power postmodernism will usher in. I hope, in offeringthese observations, that feminists can begin to develop new terms that willhelp shape the articulations of power institutionalizedby, or alongside, postmodernity-instead of defending out of fear a humanist subject that is sexist to its very core.
consciousness requiresgrace, flexibility 22. Here is Sandoval'sdescription:"Differential and strength:enough strengthto confidentlycommitto a well-definedstructureof identity to self-consciouslytransformthat for one hour,day, week, month,year;enoughflexibility of another the to oppositionalideologicaltacticif readingsof requisites identityaccording power's formationrequireit;enough grace to recognizealliancewithothers committed to egalitariansocial relationsand race, gender, and class justice, when their readings of powercall for alternativeoppositionalstands"(from"U.S.ThirdWorldFeminism:The Theoryand Methodof OppositionalConsciousness in the PostmodernWorld,"Genders 10 [Spring1991]: 15). The Kantorquotationcomes from WhenGiantsLearnto Dance (New York:Simonand Schuster,1989),33. Ido wantto registermy agreementwithSandoval's basic point, however,that "whatU.S. ThirdWorldfeminismdemands is a new subjectivity,a politicalrevisionthat denies any one ideologyas the finalanswer, while instead positinga tacticalsubjectivitywiththe capacityto recenterdependingupon the kindsof oppressionto be confronted"(4).
Feminism and the Politics of Postmodernism
LindaNicholson The discussion of the relationbetween feminismand postmodhas generateda surprising ernism/poststructuralism degreeof intensefeeling amongfeminists.Inthe UnitedStates, the only recentdiscussionthat has exhibitedthe same degree of passionhas been the sexualitydebates, whereinthe natureof the subjectmattercouldaccountforat least partof the intensity.Whyhas this most academicof discussionsgeneratedso much intensityof feeling? Inthis essay, Ishalltryto uncoversome of the reasonsforthis passion, and I shall also attemptto resolvesome of the conflicts.My initial focus willbe on postmodernism,not poststructuralism, because the context of my own thinkingis philosophyand social theory,whereinthe term postmodernismis morefrequentlyemployed.The termpoststructuralism is morecommonlyused by those workinginthe contextof literarycriticism andtheory.Thereareotherreasons,however,formydesireat least initially to phrase the encounteras one betweenfeminismand postmodernism. As I shallarguelater,thereare certainproblemswithinthe historicallegacy of poststructuralism thathavecontributed to skewingthe discussionamong feministsin nonhelpfulways. boundary 2 19:2, 1992. Copyright? 1992 by Duke UniversityPress. CCC0190-3659/92/$1.50.
54 boundary2 / Summer1992 Let me begin by elucidating the meaning I give to postmodernism. The term has been used in such a diverse way by so many, working in a variety of contexts, that it is necessary to clarifymy own understanding of this term. I will also describe some of the reasons I found myself drawn to many of the positions that seemed to fall under this rubric. Part of my attractionto the term postmodernism followed from its abilityto bring together various positions I had adopted but had not previously perceived as connected. As a philosopher, I was attracted to JeanFrangois Lyotard'suse of the term to signify a critiqueof foundationalism. Such a critique was certainly emerging within contemporary British and North American philosophy, most notably in the writingsof Richard Rorty, but had not yet been given an identifyinglabel. Lyotard,in The Postmodern Condition, providedthat label.' Whilethe specific philosophers Lyotard chose to pick out as most clearly representing a foundationalperspective differedfromthose Rortypointedto, the types of argumentsbeing advanced seemed similar enough to warrantthe use of a common identifyingterm. Thus, both writers saw as centrallyproblematicthe requirementthat philosophical claims be grounded in basic, or foundational,truths. On the basis of such truths, systematic accounts could then be constructed, whether that meant, in the case of a philosopher such as Descartes, an accounting of the validityof sense perception, or, in the case of Marx,an accounting of the motor force of history. Lyotard,Rorty,and, in some respects, Foucault suggested that a mode of doing philosophy that sought to identify certain basic truths and to build up grand explanatorysystems around such truths was suspect. Part of what was problematic about this mode of doing philosophy was its commitment to identifyingthat which was universal. Thus, writerssuch as Rortyand Lyotardpointedto the localityand historicalspecificity of that which in previous philosophy had been described as universal and as universallyfoundational.This aspect of theirarguments greatly resonated with my own historicistleanings. These leanings-ironically, in regard to Lyotard'scritiqueof Marxism-derived from my own previous identification with Marxism.Itwas, after all, Marxwho so prominentlyrailed against bourgeois theorists for theirfalse claims to universalityand for their inability 1. Jean-FrangoisLyotard,ThePostmodernCondition,trans.GeoffBenningtonand Brian Massumi(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1984). Rorty'spositionemerges clearlyin manyof his essays collectedin TheConsequences of Pragmatism(Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1982).
Nicholson/ Feminismandthe Politicsof Postmodernism55 to understand the historicalspecificity of their own ideas. Marx'sinsistence that we understand the dominant ideas of a culture as rooted in the specific conditions of that culture had left a powerfulimpression upon my own thinkingabout the nature of philosophy and social theory. That impression related well to these more contemporary arguments about the locality of philosophical claims. While I recognized my own attractionto the idea of historicalspecificity in philosophy and social theory as rooted in prior attachments to Marxism, I also had come to understand,with writerssuch as Lyotardand Baudrillard,that Marx'sown theory was cruciallyambiguous in regardto upholdingthis position.2Marx'stheory endorsed the ideas of historicalchange and diversitywith respect to many aspects of human life:familialstructures, religious beliefs, economic organization, and the like. Framingthis theory of change, however, was also an implicitcommitmentto certain universals and to the idea that certain categories could cross-culturallyorganize such diversity.Thus, for example, the category of productionserved for Marxin such a way, being used as a means to explain and to organize social life across cultures and throughouthistory. Like many feminists, I had come to see that this focus on production within Marxismprovided a crucial obstacle in Marxism'sabilities to explain and to help remove many forms of women's oppression. Inmy book Gender and History, I noted how Marx,and many Marxists,equivocated in their use of the term production.3Whiletheoreticallythe term referredto any activity conducive to human reproduction,Marxistsmost frequentlyunderstood it in accord with its predominantmeaning in capitalistsocieties: as an activity taking place outside the home in the form of wage labor. Such a use situated oppression outside the home. Moreover,since the theory claimed to account for all aspects of social life, this use constructed Marxismas not only irrelevantto explaining importantaspects of women's oppression but, indeed, as an obstacle in the attemptto develop such explanations. What was interestingto me in this analysis of Marxism'sinadequacies for feminism was that it was as a consequence of Marxism'sreliance on a single category to explain social life across historyand diverse cultures that it had become so politicallyoppressive. As I elaborated in Gender and 2. Lyotard,ThePostmodernCondition;Jean Baudrillard, TheMirror of Production,trans. MarkPoster(St. Louis:Telos Press, 1975).See also LindaNicholson,Genderand History (New York:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1986),chap. 6, 167-200. 3. Nicholson,Genderand History,172-79.
56 boundary2 / Summer1992 History, it was Marxism'svery failureto appreciate the rootedness of many of its own explanatory categories-such as the categories of production, labor, economy, and class-within the hegemonic value system and belief structure of its times that also made it politicallyoppressive for feminists. Moreover,similararguments could be developed to describe the inadequacies of Marxismin relationto other social movements, such as movements against racism or movements of gays and lesbians. Here, too, the failureof Marxismto recognize the rootedness of many of its organizing categories in the context of a nineteenth-century,Western, European,industrialworldview could account for the limitationsof the theory in contributingto such struggles. This conclusion about the failuresof Marxismmeant that there might be something political involved in my allegiance to the idea that philosophy and social theory need to recognize the historical specificity of their own claims. And this suspicion became furtherconfirmedin thinkingabout liberaltheory in Western culturesince the Enlightenment. While it might be said that the nineteenth-centurywritings of Hegel and Marx represented an intensificationof the idea of the importance of history in social theory, a certain turningto history can also be identified in the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers of the Enlightenment. In the writings of Voltaireand Condorcet, for example, there was a strong notion of progress, of human ideas and social organization potentially changing so as to lead to greater happiness. Certainlythe ideas of potential human change and perfectabilityhad contributedto much of what might be described as emancipatory in liberaltheory, to, for example, its ideas about human betterment and equality. If, however, one can say that in a writersuch as Marx,a focus on historicalchange was mitigated by an implicitcommitment to certain universals, this was even more strongly the case with those who constructed liberalsocial theory. For many of these writers, the existence of such ideals as truthand beauty, which possessed universal meaning, and the human faculty of reason, which provided the means to achieve these ideals, made progress possible. Again, such liberal ideals certainly contributed to much of what I would today describe as emancipatory,as did Marx'scategories make their own importantcontributionsto goals I share. It is now possible, however, to identify some of the negative politicalconsequences that also followed from liberalismas a worldview. For one, because the meaning of such ideals as truth and beauty were conceptualized universally,that is ahistorically,history could be con-
Nicholson/ Feminismandthe Politicsof Postmodernism57 structed in evolutionaryterms, withsome societies being described as more "primitive"in their attainment of such ideals. Philosophical universalism contributedto the type of culturalarrogance that helped legitimizethe colonialismof eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-centuryEuropeand North America. Inthis context, the emergence of culturalrelativismwithinanthropological theory in the early twentiethcentury,as evidenced in the writings of such figures as Malinowskiand Mead, must be interpretedas at least in part a politicalreaction against such arrogance. Moreover, such arrogance was not confined to the ways in which Western Europeans and NorthAmericanstreated others outside their societies. Duringthe course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as science increasingly came to be viewed as the sole bearer of truth,those who spoke in the name of science came to possess the kindof power that permitted their own visions of the good life to become hegemonic. Thus, doctors could appeal to science in orderto legitimizethe eliminationof midwives and practitionersof herbal arts from the domain of medicine. Throughout that century, and into the twentieth century, certain legitimizationof social inequality rested upon the view that some, and not others, followed correct standards of morality,attained truththrough education, and employed the rightcriteriain makingaesthetic judgments. Inshort, the ideals of the good, the true, and the beautifulhad a lot to account for. Any accounting must, however, also include reference to that faculty that was attributedthe abilityto attain such ideals-specifically, reason. Enough has been writtenabout the uses and abuses of reason within modernityto make me wary of saying more here. It is sufficient in this context to underlinethe many battles feminists have had to engage in with the idea of this faculty during the course of feminism's history. Such battles include those struggles engaged in by eighteenth- and nineteenth-century women whose social class might otherwise have providedthem with education except for the description of reason as male. More relevant for contemporary feminists are the ways in which a more recent description of reason as without gender, race, class, or any culturalattributeprecludes recognitionof the ways in which contemporaryeducation stillserves distinct gendered, racial, class, and other dominantgroup aims. Thus, it is reason's accomplice, "objectivity,"that continues to serve as a principalweapon in the ongoing struggle to limitthe influenceof women's studies, black studies, gay and lesbian studies, and the like in the academy. Again, however, I saw the philosophicalwritings of many of those who could be described as postmodernadding to the discreditationof such
58 boundary2 / Summer1992 aspects of the heritage of liberalism.Some of the contributions replicate themes that have been partof much twentieth-centurycriticaltheory. Thus, Lyotard'sattack on the dominance of instrumentalreason replicated ideas put forthearlier in the century by writerssuch as Horkheimer,Marcuse, and the early Habermas. Similarly,Foucault'sanalyses of the powers of science in organizing and constructingbodies and theirpleasures duringthe course of modernityparalleledideas put forthby others in the twentiethcentury but also extended such ideas in new directions. What I identifiedas one of the distinctive contributionsof "the postmodern turn"was its direct assault on the idea of universal criteriaof judgment. This seemed to take historicism in new and importantdirections.4 The historicism I earlier identifiedas one of the importantlegacies of Marx'swritingshas received supportfrom many forms of intellectualdiscourse during the twentieth century:from KarlMannheim'sconstruction of "the sociology of knowledge" to later work by philosophers of science on the value- and theory-laden aspects of scientific inquiry.Some Britishand North American philosophers sought to prevent such claims from contesting the idea of universalityin regard to truth by insisting on a distinction between what was labeled "the context of discovery" and "the context of justification."While it had become increasinglydifficultto deny the importance of historicalcontext in affectingthe creationof hypotheses and ideas, surely historycould be judged irrelevantin assessing the truthof such ideas. For me, one powerful aspect of postmodernism in philosophy was the questioning of this distinction.The counterpositionhere was that history not only provides us with the context to understandthe emergence of specific claims to knowledge but also supplies us withthe context to understand the emergence of the criteria by which such claims are evaluated. Thus, both in Rorty'srejectionof Truthwitha capital Tfortruthwitha small t and in Lyotard'sinsistence on the locality,plurality,and immanence of procedures of legitimation,I perceived crucialmeans for underminingthe context of discovery/context of justificationdistinction.5 It had become increasingly apparent to me that the hope of attaining universal criteria of justification, 4. See Steven Seidman,"PostmodernSocial Theoryas Narrativewitha MoralIntent,"in Steven Seidmanand DavidWagner,eds., Postmodernismand Social Theory(NewYork: Basil Blackwell,1992), 47-81. 5. To be sure, these positionscan be linkedto earlierclaimsinthe philosophyof science, to those of Feyerabend,for example. Rortyand Lyotardseemed to representan importantextensionof Feyerabendby takingthe discussionbeyondthatof science to the more generaltopicof truth.
Nicholson/ Feminismandthe Politicsof Postmodernism59 whether that be in regard to truth, beauty, or standards of morality,was an unachievable goal. Those attempts that had been made in the history of philosophy to provide such criteria-for example, those of Kant-most often suffered from the liabilitiesnoteworthyin his theory of morality:Such criteriaeither were so general as to provideinadequate assistance in resolving particularconflicts or, by their specificity, they revealed an inadequacy as universal criteria. Rather, it seemed that the only function the belief in the possibilityof such criteriaserved was a politicalone, providingexisting claimants to truth,beauty, or justice withthe unwarrantedpremise that their assertions rested upon such a foundationalbase. Moreover,my perceptionof such politicalaspects of foundationalism seemed also strengthened through the explicit, postmodern identification of knowledge judgments with power.To be sure, this move had its antecedents in priorintellectual/theoreticalmovements. Thus, feminists, with other political activists, had begun to question not only the claims to objectivity made withinthe academy, the media, and the publishingindustrybut also the feasibility of objectivity as a normative ideal. Such activists had also come to extend the terrainof power fromthe state to all institutionsof ordinary life, including those involved in the productionof knowledge. These insights had led to the intuitionthat claims to knowledge represent a form of power. One of Foucault's contributionswas a theoretical elaboration for such intuitions. Insum, I saw the argumentsof postmoderniststo be politicallyuseful for feminists in a variety of ways. They enabled feminists to counteract the totalizing perspectives withinboth the hegemonic cultureof liberalismand within certain versions of Marxism.When liberals or Marxistsargued that their visions of the good life and models of explanationwere those around which feminists should subordinate their claims, feminists now had useful philosophical weapons with which to respond. Postmodernism undermined the theoretical arrogance of these two political perspectives by showing that the foundations upon which each rested were themselves without ultimate justificationand, like any other worldview,could be judged only within the context of historicallyspecific values. From the perspective of values integralto much of contemporaryfeminism, each could be judged useful in some respects, but each could also be shown to be limited. Itwas, however, not only the theoretical arrogance of liberalismand Marxismfor which I saw postmodernism as a useful antidote. Such arrogance seemed also to be present in certain aspects of feminist theory itself. The manifestations of such arrogance were more subtle than in other
60 boundary2 / Summer1992 political theories of modernity.Thus, only sometimes did feminists claim that their theories were about the nature of human society as a whole or about that which was true for all of human history. But, particularlyin the early days of feminist theory, many accounts that aimed for explanations of male/female relations across large sweeps of history were proposed.6 Moreover,and this is a tendency that continues, manyfeministwritingshave included statements containing terms such as man, woman, sex, sexism, rape, body, nature, mothering without any historicalor societal qualifiers attached. The claims containingsuch terms have often been meant to refer to large sweeps of history, and the terms themselves have been understood as possessing similar meanings throughoutthis history. Invariably, however, the meanings attached to such terms have reflected the meanings these terms possess in contemporaryWestern culture, particularlyamong dominant social groups. Thus, even when no explicittheory was being proposed, such writings often contained implicittheories. Both such explicit and implicittheories, by theirethnocentrismand by theirdisregardfordifferences across history and cultures, seemed to involve significantchunks of feminist writings in the kindof theoretical arrogance present in both liberal and Marxistsocial theory. Of course, such arrogance has also been strongly mitigated by the continual admonishments fromfeministanthropologists,feministhistorians, and socialist feminists to acknowledge historicaldiversity.It has also been strongly mitigated by those politicalcurrentswithinfeminism that have demanded the recognition of diversity among women with regard to race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, class, and so on. To all of these countertendencies, I saw postmodernist, philosophical writings as constituting one additional resource. In sum, postmodernism appeared to me an importantmovement for helping feminists uncover that which was theoretically problematic in much modern politicaland social theory. Postmodernismwas also useful in helping feminism eradicate those elements within itself that prevented an adequate theorizationof differences among women. This did not mean that feminists should accept everything written by those who were described as postmodern. As Nancy Fraser and I argue in "Social Criticismwithout Philosophy,"it was necessary for feminists to read such writings critically, 6. NancyFraserand LindaNicholson,"SocialCriticismwithoutPhilosophy:An Encounter in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. LindaNicholbetween Feminismand Postmodernism," son (New York:Routledge,1990), 19-38.
Nicholson/ Feminismandthe Politicsof Postmodernism61 to accept what was useful from a feminist perspective, and to reject that which was incompatiblewith feminist purposes.7 What I soon encountered, however, was a much greater lack of consensus among feminists on this issue than Iwould have guessed. Certainly, I found many who were thinkingalong similarlines as I was. On the other hand, I also found not only disagreement but disagreement with strong feelings attached. In the remainder of this essay, I would like to summarize some of what I regard as the most philosophicallysophisticated of these objections. I would also like to suggest ways to resolve some of the strains between postmodern feminists and their feminist critics.
The Argumentagainst Feminismas Negativity and Feminismas Nominalism Withinfeminist discussions, the term postmodernism is often used interchangeably with poststructuralism.It is, however, more frequentlythe latterterm that is the specific focus of the feministattack. Thus, Iwould now like to examine some of the best of these attacks and raise questions about their applicabilityto postmodernismand, specifically,to the type of position I have elaborated above. One of the most interestingcritiquesof feminist poststructuralismis provided by LindaAlcoff.Alcoffargues that Derrida'sarticulationof deconstruction involves the uncoveringof what is most frequentlyunderstood as a binary opposition between such terms as man/woman, subject/object, and culture/nature, in which one side has been constituted as superior to the other. Underminingthe dominatingpower of the superior term involves rejecting the organizing system in which such oppositions are constituted: for Derrida, logocentrism. Inthis context, woman becomes constructed as the ruptureof, the absolute negation of, logocentrism. As Alcoffpoints out, however, this leaves feminism unable to articulateanythingpositive or substantive in the idea of woman and, thus, unable to assert itself as a political project with any positive meaning: For Derrida, women have always been defined as a subjugated difference within a binary opposition: man/woman, culture/nature, positive/negative, analytic/intuitive.To assert an essential gender difference as culturalfeminists do is to reinvoke this oppositional 7. Fraserand Nicholson,"SocialCriticismwithoutPhilosophy,"19-26.
2 / Summer 62 boundary 1992 structure.The onlyway to breakout of this structure,and in fact to subvertthe structureitself,is to assert totaldifference,to be that whichcannotbe pinneddownor subjugatedwithina dichotomous itis to be whatis not.Thusfeministscannot hierarchy.Paradoxically, withouteliminatingall demarcatea definitivecategoryof "woman" possibilityforthe defeatof logocentrismanditsoppressivepower.... FollowingFoucaultand Derrida,an effectivefeminismcouldonlybe a whollynegativefeminism,deconstructing everythingand refusing to constructanything.8 A variationof LindaAlcoff'sargumentis made by Susan Bordo. idealsof endless movement,of endBordoclaimsthatthe poststructuralist andperspective,leavethe feministreader less possibilitiesof interpretation or activistwithouta placeto stand: I have no disputewiththisepistemological critiqueor withthe metaas a of of the world-as-text means variousclaims undermining phor to authoritative, transcendentinsightintothe natureof reality.The questionremains,however,howthe humanknoweris to negotiate anthisinfinitely perspectival,destabilizedworld.Deconstructionism swers withconstantvigilantsuspicionof alldeterminatereadingsof cultureand a partneraestheticof ceaseless textualplayas an alternativeideal.Hereis wheredeconstruction mayslip intoits own fantasyof escape fromhumanlocatedness-by supposingthatthe critic can become whollyproteanby adoptingendlessly shifting,seeminglyinexhaustiblevantage points,none of whichare "owned"by eitherthe criticor the authorof a textunderexamination.9 turnsits focus to Moreover,accordingto Bordo,when deconstructionism the issue of differencesamongwomen,the consequence is a theoretical perspectivethat allows no roomfor generalizationsof any kind.We are leftwitha type of theoreticalnominalism,a methodological positionsurely needs. to feminism's political inadequate Howam I,as a feministwhosees the important philosophicalbeneto these importo answer fitsthe postmodernpositioncontributes feminism, tantand persuasivelyarticulatedarguments?Myresponseis to distinguish The IdentityCrisisin FemiFeminismversus Poststructuralism: 8. LindaAlcoff,"Cultural nist Theory,"Signs 13, no. 3 (1988):417-18. in Feminism/ 9. Susan Bordo, "Feminism,Postmodernism,and Gender-Skepticism," Postmodernism,142.
/ Feminism andthePolitics of Postmodernism Nicholson 63 frommanyof the positionsI have desuch a readingof poststructuralism scribedas postmodern.Oneofthe reasonsIamableto makethisdistinction is that the philosophicalpositionsI had describedearlieras postmodern are highlycompatiblewitha verydifferenttheoryof languagethanthe one attributedhere to poststructuralism.10 Rather,the theoryof languageI see as harmoniouswiththe typeof postmodernism previouslyarticulatedis one andthatis congruous, thatstems fromthe writingsof the laterWittgenstein in manyrespects,withthe Americanphilosophical traditionof pragmatism. Toelaboratethisposition,Iwouldliketo drawon an essay by Nancy Fraser,in whichshe makesa distinctionbetweentwo modelsof theorizing modelthatstudies languagethat have emergedin France:a structuralist language as a symbolicsystem, and a pragmaticmodelthat studies language as a set of historicallysituatedpractices.The formermodel lends itselfto whatshe describesas "symbolicism"-that is, the tendencyto homogenizeand reifythe diversityandhistoricalvarietyof languagepractices intoa monolithicand all-pervasivesymbolicorderand to set such an order apartfromhumanactionand context.Because such a modelabstractsthe issue of languagefrompracticeand context,it provesunableto satisfy a varietyof feministpoliticalneeds. As Fraserargues, a pragmaticmodel whose theoryof languageis focused on discourses,not structures,and that understandsthe latteras concrete,historicallysituatedpractices,is preferable.Such a model providesthe followingadvantagesfor feminist politics: First,ittreatsdiscoursesas contingent,positingthattheyarise,alter and disappearover time. Thus,the modellends itselfto historical and itallowsus to thematizechange.Second,the contextualization; as actionratherthan pragmaticapproachunderstandssignification as representation.Itis concernedwithhow people "dothingswith words."Thus, the model allows us to see speakingsubjects not simplyas effects of structuresand systems, but ratheras socially situatedagents. Third,the pragmaticmodeltreatsdiscoursesinthe of differplural.Itstartsfromthe assumptionthattherearea plurality ent discoursesinsociety,thereforea plurality of communicative sites fromwhichto speak. Because it positsthatindividualsassume differentdiscursivepositionsas they movefromone discursiveframe 10. And to Derrida,in particular.Even if the argumentis putforththat this representsa problematicreadingof Derrida,the issue remainsoverthe stance one shouldtaketoward such a position.
64 boundary2 / Summer1992 to another, this model lends itself to a theorization of social identities as non-monolithic.Next, the pragmatic approach rejects the assumption that the totality of social meanings in circulation constitutes a single, coherent, self-reproducing"symbolicsystem." Instead, it allows for conflicts among social schemas of interpretation and among the agents who deploy them. Finally,because it links the study of discourses to the study of society, the pragmaticapproach allows us to focus on power and inequality.1 Fraser claims that the problems of a structuralistmodel are not limited to structuralistsper se. Rather, they can be found in at least some of those writers who, while claiming a distance from structuralism,in many respects, embody it. For example, Fraser points to Lacan and argues that insofar as he posits a fixed, monolithicsymbolic system and differentiates identities in binary terms (i.e., in relationto the possession or lack of the phallus), the "symbolicism"that is a feature of structuralismis also a feature of his own writings. Fraser notes similartendencies in the writings of Kristeva. Itseems easy, however,to generalize many of Fraser's arguments to the above construction of poststructuralism.The concept of "logocentrism" so posited also construes language as a monolithicsymbolic system. In such a context, the operationof male dominationwithinlanguage becomes an all or nothing affair:One either participatesin it or one rebels against it in the limited,negative ways that Alcoffand Bordodescribe. In neither case is an opening providedfor the study of the very specific forms in which sexism is differentlyembodied in differentlanguages, for examinationof the historical shifts in sexism withinany one language over time, or for analysis of the relation between such specific manifestations of sexism within language and the operation of sexism in other practices. Because language itself is identifiedwith oppression, resistance to oppression can only be formulated as antilanguage. We are left with no cues on "howto do things with words" in the fight against sexism. The question thus becomes: What is a postmodern approach to language that avoids the essentialist arrogance of much modernist, and some feminist, discourse but that also does not reduce feminismto silence or to a purely negative stance? The answer, I claim, is a discourse that recognizes 11. NancyFraser,"TheUses andAbuses of FrenchDiscourseTheoriesforFeministPolitics,"in RevaluingFrenchFeminism,ed. NancyFraserand SandraBartky(Bloomington: IndianaUniversityPress, 1992), 177-94.
Nicholson / Feminism of Postmodernism andthePolitics 65 itself as historicallysituated,as motivatedby values and, thus, political interests,and as a humanpracticewithouttranscendentjustification. To elaboratethis position,let me beginby clarifyingwhatI mean by a discoursethat recognizesitselfas historicallysituated.In "SocialCriticism withoutPhilosophy," NancyFraserand I distinguishbetweenfeminist appeals to categories such as mothering, sexuality, and reproduction and feminist use of a category such as the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclearfamily.12Whereasthe lattercategoryexplicitlysituatesitselfwithina
timeperiod,the formercategories,because of theirimplicitassoparticular ciationswithbiologicalfunctions,conveythe possibilityof a transhistorical of a categorysuch as the modreference.Moreover,the explicithistoricity ern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear familysuggests furtherquestioning
aboutthe rangeof its applicability, about,forexample,the geographicalreit to which be can the gion applied, rangeof subgroupswithinthatregionto whichitis applicable,andso on. Onthe otherhand,withcategoriessuch as sexualityand mothering,we are muchless likelyto raise such questions, again because of widespreadassumptionsthatthese categoriesdescribe and, thus, endemicto humansociety per se. Insum, something"natural" because a category such as the modern, restricted, male-headed, nuclear
familyalreadypresents itselfas framedwithina certaintime period,it is easier to raise questionsaboutthe validityof this temporalframe,as well as aboutthe need to applyotherframes,thanwithcategoriesthatpresent themselves as withoutframesof anysort. Inresponse,itmightbe arguedthatthe distinctionFraserand Imake is too vague to provideadequatedirection.Whatdoes it mean to differentiate "correct" framingfromframingthatis stillsubjectto the chargeof essentialism?Whiletermssuch as motheringorsexualityaremoreliableto the dangersof transhistorical thanothers,termsthatcarryfewer projection biologicalassociations,such as domesticandpublic,have been accused of beingused in essentialistways.13Moreover, since the possibilityof overgeneralizationalwaysexists, a feministwhowishes to avoidthe chargeof essentialismwouldseem to be reducedto nominalism,to describingparticularevents at particular pointsintime.Thispointis madebySusan Bordo, who argues thatthis type of methodological demandthreatensto destroy the politicalorganizingcategoriesof race and class, as well as those of gender: 12. Fraserand Nicholson,"SocialCriticismwithoutPhilosophy," 34. 13. MichelleZimbalistRosaldo, "TheUse and Abuse of Anthropology:Reflectionson Feminismand Cross-Cultural Understanding," Signs 5, no. 3 (1980):389-417.
2 / Summer 66 boundary 1992 For(althoughrace,class, andgenderare privilegedby currentintellectualconvention),the inflectionsthat modifyexperienceare endless, and some item of differencecan always be producedwhich willshatterany proposedgeneralizations.If generalizationis only permittedinthe absence of multipleinflectionsor interpretive possibilities,then culturalgeneralizationsof any sort-about race, about class, about historicaleras-are ruledout. Whatremainsis a universe composedentirelyof counterexamples, inwhichthe way men andwomensee the worldis purelyas particularindividuals, shaped thatformthatparticularity.14 by the uniqueconfigurations Myresponseis to admitthat,certainly,thereare no rulesthatcan be invokedto diffusethe possibilityof essentialism.Thatdoes not, however, negate the importanceof an attitude,a sensitivity,a continualrecognition of the dangersof historicalprojection, andan awarenessthatsuch dangers the increase with of directly generality one's claims.Thus,such an attitude does not entaillimitingoneself to descriptionsof particular phenomenaat pointsintime;itentails,rather,continuously particular weighingthe political reasonsforspecificgeneralizations againstthe degreeto whichsuch generalizationsriskthese dangers.Moreover, as thereare no rulesforindicating wherequalification needs to stop,so also arethereno rulesto differentiate fromthose that are not. Here,too, the stoppingpointsthat are important needs of the historicallyspecificsituationmustset the framefor decision making.These last pointsinvokethe second of whatIdescribedas crucial elementsof a postmoderndiscourse:thatitrecognizeitselfas political.One of discourseis problemwithBordo'sobjectionis thatits conceptualization Eitherthere are rules for disstill embeddedin an objectivistframework: or fromthe unimportant qualification, qualification tinguishingthe important allqualificaare equallyimportant. Ofcourse,theoretically, allqualifications tionscan become important. If,however,we thinkof discourseas a human specificpurposes,then it practicecarriedout in the service of historically becomes easier to understandboththe necessityforbeingattentiveto the qualificationswe are making,or failingto make,and also that there can be no rulesfor guidingsuch attentiveness.As Fraserand I note, a major problemwithfeministuses of categoriessuch as mothering,sexuality,and reproductionis thatsuch uses projectthe meaningsthese activitiesholdfor Western,white,middle-classwomenontothe livesof women contemporary 150-51. 14. Bordo,"Feminism,Postmodernism,and Gender-Skepticism,"
andthePolitics of Postmodernism / Feminism Nicholson 67 of differentclasses, culturalbackgrounds,and historicalperiods.'"A point of ourargumentis to awakensensitivityto the ways inwhicheven feminist languagecan be implicatedin the processes of culturaldomination.This does not,however,meanthatonce such a sensitivityis awakenedthereare simplemeasuresavailableto preventsuch dominancefromreappearingin even a qualifieddiscourse.Ifwe recognizediscourseas guidedby historicallyandculturally specificpurposes,allcategorieswillbearsome marksof the needs of theircreators.Wecan onlymitigatethe politicaldangersof this featureof discourseby becomingawareof those formsinwhichits abilityto Finally,ourbest safeguard oppress is morelikelyto occurthanin others.16 may ultimatelylie notwiththe kindsof discoursewe ruleacceptableor not butwiththe morepracticalissue of who is ableto take partin discoursethat is, withthe questionof access "tothe meansof communication." 17 This modelof discourseis, however,also subjectto critiquefroma differentdirection.Indescribingdiscourseas politicalandas shapedbythe Ican imaginesome will specificneeds of itsdiverseparticipants, historically claimthatIhave reducedthe issue of truthto the issue of power.Discourse, as I have describedit, is merelya powerstruggle,withno criteriaavailable to ruleagainstoffensivepositions.Thus,such a modelof discourseallows for no distinctionbetween reason and powerand rests upon a theoryof truththatis thoroughlyrelativistic. Again,the force of this type of objectionlargelyfollowsfromthe continuedpowerof a representational modelto shape ourthinking.When one conceptualizesdiscoursenot as representational butas a process of humaninteraction,such objectionslose muchof theirstrength. For one, to say that the process of decidingwhichcategories to employor howthoroughlyqualifiedourcategoriesneed to be is a political decision,shaped by historically specificneeds andpurposes,is notto deny the simultaneouspresenceof rulesof discoursethatare, at least in some cases, also adheredto by those of opposingpurposesand needs. Such rules willvaryboth in termsof theirhistoricalspecificityand in relationto the rangeof discoursestheygovern.Thus,we mightdifferentiate the ruleof noncontradiction fromthe rulesgoverningmostacademicdiscoursesinthe late twentiethcentury,as wellas fromthose governingspecificdisciplines. 15. Fraserand Nicholson,"SocialCriticismwithoutPhilosophy," 31, 33. 16. Forfurtherelaborationof this point,see Steven Seidman,"TheEnd of Sociological Theory:The PostmodernHope,"SociologicalTheory9, no. 2 (1991):131-57. 17. Fora helpfuldiscussionof this issue, see NancyFraser,UnrulyPractices (Minneapolis: Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1989), chap. 8, 161-87.
68 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 Such rulesdo muchto organizediscoursein contextsof contestation.To be sure, such rules may themselvesbecome the subjectof contestation; discursiveconflict,theremaybe or,it maybe the case thatinanyparticular no rulereadilyavailableto arbitratethe conflict.The degree to whichsuch real-lifesituationspresentthemselves, however,seems unrelatedto any philosophicalpronouncement I,oranyoneelse, mightmake.Inotherwords, to say thatdiscursiveconflictmay,indeed,sometimesbe political-that is, not resolvablethroughappealto intersubjectively agreeduponrules-is to makea claimwhose validityappearsindependentof anythingphilosophers mightsay aboutthe strengthor weakness of relativismas a philosophical position. featuresof the This last pointunderlinesone of the most important modelof discourseI am here endorsing:thatdiscoursebe construedas a and notas a structuresusceptibleto abstract process of humaninteraction Itis onlybyconstruingdiscourseinstructural termsthatone is formalization. inclinedto speak of the existenceor nonexistenceof criteriaof legitimation or proceduralrulesthattranscendspecificlocalities.Anyclaim,however, thatrejectssuch criteria,or rules,seems also to implyrelativism.Butifone conceptualizesdiscoursenotas a structurebutas a processof interaction, the issue of relativismmusttake on a differentmeaning.Mostimportantly, if one perceivesdiscourseas a communicative process,then the absence breakdownemerges as a lifepossibility of rules mitigatingcommunicative ratherthan as a positionto be endorsedor not. As a life possibility,the questionof whetheritis resolvableinanygiveninstanceappearsobviously an open one-that is, nota questionforwhichone can providean absolute answer.Finally,then,to thinkaboutdiscourseas a communicative process is not to endorse or rejectrelativismbutto reconceptualizerelativismas communicativebreakdown,a real-lifepossibilitywhose outcomecan never be stipulatedin advance.
Ifthere are any commonthreadsin the above, they can be summarizedin my view that postmodernismrepresentsnot so mucha set of discursiverulesdifferentfromthose foundin modernismas a differenttype of approachto such issues as discourse,knowledge,truth,and validity. First,postmodernismcan be characterizedby the rejectionof epistemic entailsa Such humility arroganceforan endorsementof epistemichumility. contexts the the mediated of world are our that by ways viewing recognition
/ Feminism andthePolitics of Postmodernism 69 Nicholson out of whichwe operate.This means thatnot onlyare ourspecificbeliefs and emotionsaboutthe worlda productof ourhistoricalcircumstancesbut so are the means by whichwe come to those beliefs and emotionsand by whichwe resolveconflictwhen dissent is present.Thisdoes not entail the positionthatthereare no solutionsto epistemicdilemmas,merelythat there are no finalones. Moreover,the kindof postmodernismI am endorsinghere represents a reconceptualization of discoursefromthatof a structureto thatof a of interaction. Such a reconceptualization process bringswithit a blurring of the lines that have previouslydividedissues concerningthe criteriafor claimsof truthand falsityfromissues concerningthe contexts arbitrating which such criteriaare established.Thus,questionsconcerningaccess by to discourse,bothin relationto issues of substanceand in relationto how such issues get to be talkedabout,take theirplace beside questionsof truthand validity.Forme, then, whatpostmodernism adds to feminismis an expansionof the widelyheldfeministdictum"Thepersonalis political" to includethe dictum"Theepistemicis political," as well.
Screwing the System: Sexwork, Race, and the Law
Anne McClintock A prostitutetells me that a magistratewho pays her to beat him confessed that he gets an erectioneverytime he sentences a prostitute in court.This essay is aboutthe magistrate'ssentence, the magistrate's erection,and the prostitutewho spilledthe beans.
In 1760, a Frenchphilosophecoinedthe termfetichismefor "primitive"religion.Marxtookthe termcommodityfetishand the idea of "primiecontive"magic to expressthe centralsocialformof the modernindustrial In Freud transferred fetishism to the realm of and to omy. 1887, sexuality the domainof eroticperversions.'Religion(the orderingof time and the transcendent),sexuality(the orderingof the body),and money(the ordering of the economy)took shape aroundthe idea of fetishism,displacing 1. I am gratefully indebted to William Pietz's three excellent essays on fetishism: "The Problem of the Fetish I,"Res 9 (Spring 1985): 5-17; "The Problem of the Fetish II,"Res 13 (Spring 1987): 23-46; "The Problem of the Fetish III,"Res (Autumn 1988): 105-24. boundary 2 19:2, 1992. Copyright? 1992 by Duke UniversityPress. CCC0190-3659/92/$1.50.
/ Screwing theSystem 71 McClintock ontothe domain whatthe Enlightenment couldnotincorporate imagination of the "primitive," the zone of racialandsexual"degeneration." Imperialism returnedto inhabitthe liberalenterpriseas its concealed,butcentral,logic. "Theeroticdeviantis not the onlyfetishistfamiliarto us. Thinkof the primitive," says WilliamPietz.2Yet,this couldbe said in anotherway. the idea of erotic By thinkingof the "primitive" (inventingthe "primitive"), deviancewas constitutedin Europeto serve a specificallymodernformof social dominance.By the latterhalfof the nineteenthcentury,the analogy betweeneroticdevianceand racialdevianceemergedas a necessary element in the formationof the modernEuropeanimagination. The invention of racialfetishismbecame centralto the regimeof sexual surveillance, whilethe policingof "degeneratesexuality"becamecentralto the policing of the "dangerousclasses":the workingclass, the colonized,prostitutes, the Irish,Jews, gays and lesbians,criminals,alcoholics,and the insane. Erotic"deviants" werefiguredas racial"deviants," atavisticthrowbacksto a momentin humanprehistory, racially"primitive" survivingominouslyin the heartof the imperialmetropolis.Atthe same time,colonizedpeoples were erotic figuredas sexual deviants,the livingembodimentsof a primordial promiscuityand excess.3 ForFreud,the eroticfetishis akin"tothe fetishes in whichsavages believethattheirgods areembodied."4 Yet,Freudis the firstto definefetishism as a questionof male sexualityalone. As NaomiSchor has pointed out, "Itis an articleof faithwithFreudand Freudiansthatfetishismis the male perversion par excellence. The traditionalpsychoanalytical literature
on the subjectstates overandoveragainthatthereareno femalefetishists; femalefetishismis, inthe rhetoricof psychoanalysis,anoxymoron." 5 Lacan, after "the in absence women of fetishism."6 too, notes, Freud, By reducing 2. Pietz, "Fetish1,"3. 3. See SanderL.Gilman,Differenceand Pathology:Stereotypesof Sexuality,Race, and Madness (Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress, 1985). See also NancyStepan, The Idea of Race in Science (London:Macmillan,1982). 4. SigmundFreud,ThreeEssays on the Theoryof Sexuality,vol. 7 of TheStandardEdition of the Complete Psychological Worksof Sigmund Freud, trans. James Strachey (London:Hogarth,1953-1966). 5. NaomiSchor, "FemaleFetishism:The Case of George Sand,"in TheFemale Body in WesternCulture,ed. Susan R. Suleiman(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress, 1986), 365. 6. Jacques Lacan, "GuidingRemarksfor a Congress on FeminineSexuality,"in Feminine Sexuality:Jacques Lacanand Ecole Freudienne,ed. JulietMitchelland Jacqueline Rose, trans.JacquelineRose (New York:W.W. Norton,1982), 96.
72 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 fetishism,however,to a single, male poeticsof the flesh and a privileged, Westernnarrativeof origins,the traditional psychoanalytic theoryof fetishism does not admiteitherrace or class as formativecategoriescrucialto the etiologyof fetishism. Foucaultargues, in a differentvein,thatthe historicalnotionof sex "madeit possible to grouptogether,in an artificialunity,anatomicalelements, biologicalfunctions,conducts,sensations and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of this fictitiousunityas a causal principle,an omnipresentmeaning,a secretto be discoveredeverywhere:sex was thus able to functionas a universalsignifierand as a universalsignified."7By privilegingsex as the inventedprincipleof social unity,however,Foucault conceals the degree to which,in the nineteenthcentury,a racialfetishism in analogywithsexual fetishismbecamethe organizingprototypeforother social "deviations." Farfrombeinga purelysexualicon,fetishismis a memorialto contradictionsin social value that can take a numberof historicalguises. The fetishstands at the crossroadsof a crisisinhistorical value,as the symbolic codes insocial displacementandembodimentinone objectof incompatible which the individual cannot resolve a at level. Thefetish personal meaning, is thus destinedto recurwithritualistic repetition. Thefetishis hauntedby historicalmemory.As a compositesymbolic object,the fetishor fetishizedpersonembodiesthe traumaticcoincidence of historicalmemoriesheld in contradiction.In this article,I explorethe racialand sexual fetishizingof prostitutesand arguethatthe problemof social value embodiedin the whorestigmais the historicalcontradiction betweenwomen'spaidand unpaidwork. The momentof payinga female prostituteis structuredarounda paradox.The clienttouches the prostitute'shandin a fleetingmomentof physicalintimacyin the exchangeof cash, a ritualexchangethatconfirms and guaranteeseach timethe man'sapparenteconomicmasteryoverthe woman'ssexuality,work,andtime.Atthe same time,however,the moment of payingconfirmspreciselythe opposite:the man'sdependenceon the woman'ssexual powerand skill. Prostitutesstand at the flashpointsof marriageand market,taking sex intothe streets and moneyintothe bedroom.Flagrantlyand publicly demandingmoneyforsexual servicesthatmen expectforfree, prostitutes insist on exhibitingtheirsexworkas havingeconomicvalue. The whore 7. Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality; Volume 1: An Introduction (New York:Vintage, 1980), 154.
/ Screwing McClintock theSystem 73 stigma reflects deeply felt anxieties about women trespassingthe dandisplaytheir gerous boundariesbetweenprivateand public.Streetwalkers sexual andeconomicvaluesinthe crowd-that socialelementpermanently on the edge of breakdown-andtherebygive the lie to the rationalcontrol of "deviance"and disorder.Hencethe fetishisticinvestmentof the law in violentlypolicingthe prostitute'sbody. The Law and the Whore
In 1981, in Britain,PeterSutcliffe(or,the YorkshireRipper,as the tabloidpress dubbedhim)was broughtto trialforthe mutilationand murder over a six-yearperiodof at least thirteenwomen,some of whomwere prostitutes.Sutcliffefirstclaimedthathe had killedbecause he wantedto "killa woman,any woman.""Later,he claimedthat God had graced him witha "divinemission"9 "scumwhocannot to purgethe earthof prostitutes: Sutcliffe'sdefense restedon the constructionof justifytheirexistence."10 prostitutesas inherentlyunlikeall otherwomenand as culpablycomplicit in theirown murder.He claimedhe was able to tell that his victimswere prostitutes"bythe way they walked.He knewthey were not innocent."11 ForSutcliffe,the prostitutes'guiltcouldbe readofftheirbodiesas a stigma of the flesh, theirculpabilityrevealedunambiguously in the lineamentsof theirlimbs,an anatomicalallegorysignifyingsin. Mosttroubling,however,was the systematiccontinuity betweenSutcliffe'smissionto exterminateprostitutesand the publicsentimentvoiced by the tabloids,the policestatements,andthe judiciaryitselfthatthe prostituteswere, indeed,somehownot innocent.Duringthe extraordinary trial thatfollowed,a legal discourse,a psychiatricdiscourse,and a journalistic discoursetookshape aroundthe preordained verdictof the murderedprostitutes'guiltin the eyes of the law.Throughout the trial,distinctionswere victims(nonprostitutes) and "disreprepeatedlymade between"innocent" victims(prostitutes).12 utable,"or "blemished," Indeed,the policeinvestigationintothe murdersbegan in earnestonlywhenthe fifthvictimwas killed, 8. See WendyHolloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?The Ripperand Male Sexuality,"FeministReview 9 (October1981):33-40. 9. The Guardian(London),19 May 1981. Quotedin Holloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?"36. 10. Quotedin Holloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?"38. 11. The Guardian(London),7 May1981. Quotedin Holloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?"39. 12. Holloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?"39. See also AndrewRoss, "Dem-
74 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 and she turnedout not to be a prostitute.A policeposterread:"Thenext victimmaybe innocent."13 Thejudge,moreover,offeredthe jurythe followadvice.IfSutcliffewas deludedintobelievingthathe had ingextraordinary killedonly prostitutes,"thenthe correctverdictwas probablymanslaughThedistinctionbetweenprostitutesandotherwomenwas ter,"notmurder.14 summed up inAttorneyGeneralSirMichaelHavers'snotoriouscomfinally ment:"Somewere prostitutes,butperhapsthe saddest partof this case is thatsome were not."'5 On28 January1987,at the heightof the celebratedtrialof Madame Cyn Payne (chargedwithexercisingcontrolover prostitutesfor the purpose of gain), SergeantDavidBroadwelldraggedintocourta large,clear, the tabooparaphernalia plasticbag and exposed to the titillatedcourtroom of S/M:whips,belts, chains,a dog collar,and assortedsticks and leather items.16Fordays, police and witnesses had been describingthe "naughtinesses" at Payne's party:spankings;lesbianshows; elderlygentlemen cross-dressedinwomen'seveningclothes;policemenindrag;and lawyers, businessmen,andeven a Peerof the Realmwaitinginqueues on the stairs forsex. The prostitution trial,conductedin a blaze of publicity,exposes its own structuringparadox,staging in public,as a vicariousspectacle, that which it renderscriminallydeviantoutsidethe juridicaldomain.Through in the distribution of the mechanismof the prostitution trial,contradictions and are then and are isolated as crimes performed money,pleasure, power againinthe theatricalceremonyof the trialas confession.Thejudiciaryis a of "truth" (facts,verdicts, system of orderedproceduresforthe production the rationalsentence).Thejudge'swig (likethe prostitute's wig)signifiesa separationbetweensubjectiveidentityand body,and therebyguarantees of the trial. the impartiality inMenin Feminism,ed. AliceJardineand PaulSmith(New onstratingSexual Difference," York:Methuen,1987), 49. 49. Sexual Difference," 13. Quotedin Ross, "Demonstrating 14. The Guardian(London),21 May1981. Quotedin Holloway,"'IJust WantedTo Killa Woman.'Why?"34. 15. WestIndianWorld,6 June 1981.QuotedinHolloway,"'IJustWantedToKilla Woman.' Why?"39. As Ross notes, Sutcliffe'smission"tokillallprostituteswas recognized, notorifromthatof the popularpress to thatof the professional ously,at all levels of interpretation, lawyer,as a moralmission,and was thereforeless culpablethanthe asocial desire to kill Sexual Difference," all women"(see "Demonstrating 48). 16. See GloriaWalkerand LynnDaly,SexplicitlyYours:TheTrialof CynthiaPayne (London: Penguin,1987).
/ Screwing theSystem 75 McClintock alternativediscourses:the The lawis also a regimefordisqualifying disenfranchised,feminists,and prostituteswho mightspillthe beans.'7The moreprostitutesareobligedto speakoftheiractionsinpublic,the morethey incriminate themselves.By orderingthe unspeakableto be spoken in public, however,and by obsessivelydisplayingdirtypictures,filmedevidence, trialrevealsitselfas structured confessions, and exhibits,the prostitution aroundthe veryfetishismitsets itselfto isolateandpunish.Underhisscarlet robe,the judgehas an erection. The prostitution trialis notonlya regimeof truthfordemonstrating the propercirculationof moneyand propertybutalso a technologyof violence, settingin motionthe violentconstraintof women'sbodies:floggings, of the fine serves the purpose dunkings,jailings,and exile. The institution of restoringthe economicexchangesubvertedbythe prostitute.Ifthe prostitutemakesthe judgepayforsexualservicesthatshe shouldofferforfree, then by finingthe prostitutethe judgereturnsillicitfemalemoneybackinto male circulation. Atthe outset,the "sciencesof man"-philosophy,Marxism,psychoanalysis,anthropology-soughtto containthe "primitive" possibilityof the a in backward time to the of racial "perversions" by projection "prehistory" CommercialS/M (the collaborative "degeneration." organizationof fetishism)does the opposite:Itinsistson playingthe roleof the "primitive" (slave, female, baby)as a characterinthe historicaltimeof modernity.Ifthe prostitutiontrialisolatesandorganizesdeviantsexualpleasureforpunishment, commercialS/M is the dialecticaloppositeof the trial,organizingthe punishmentof sexual devianceforpleasure.'8 S/M performsthe social idea of the primitiveirrational as a dramaticscript,a theatrical,publicperformance in the heartof Westernreason.The paraphernalia of S/M (boots, whips, are the state of chains, uniforms) paraphernalia power,publicpunishment convertedto privatepleasure.S/M playsimperialism backward,visiblyand outrageouslystagingracialand genderdifferences,ecstasy, the irrational, and the alienationof the body as at the centerof Westernindividualism. CommercialS/M revealsthe logicof liberalindividualism and refuses it as 17. See Susan Edwards,Female Sexualityand the Law (Oxford:MartinRobertson, 1981), and CarolSmart,Feminismand the Powerof the Law(London:Routledge,1989). 18. Let me emphasize that I referhere to the specific phenomenonof ritualized,commercialS/M, whereinthe exchange of cash takes place in the contextof a consensual agreement. Itis crucialto distinguishbetween consensual S/M and nonconsensualviolence and sexual sadism. These marka continuumratherthan two exclusive poles, and there are relationshipsthatwaverperilouslyacross the twilightmiddle.
76 boundary2 / Summer 1992
fate but does so withoutsteppingoutsidethe enchantmentof its magic circle. Ifthe prostitution trialredistributes illicitfemalemoneybackintolicit male circulation,commercialS/M performedby a womanenacts the reverse: stagingthe contradictions of women'sunpaidsexual and domestic workas unnatural-as theater-and insisting(strictly)on payment.The paradoxand scandalof S/M is its flagrantexposurein the formof a spectacle of the conceptualand politicallimitsof the liberalidealof the autonoThe outrageof S/M is its provocativeconfessionthatthe mous individual. of dynamics powerare reversible. The act of payinga female prostituteflagrantlyannouncesthe unnaturalnessand fictiveinventivenessof the ancestraledictthatwomendo notownpropertyintheirownpersons.Historically, malelawhas attempted, withgreat vigilanceand inclemency,to policethe contradictionbetween male dependenceon femalesexual powerand malejuridicaldefinitionsof the propertyof men. womenas naturallyand universally In 1855, in New York,the TrinityChurchvestryman,George TempletonStrong,confidedto his diarythat "whatthe Mayorseeks to abolish ... butsimplythe scandal and abate is not the terribleevilof prostitution and the offense of the peripateticwhorearchy."19 Indeed,states have seldomsoughtto abolishprostitution rather,they havesoughtto curb outright; sexworkers'controlof the trade. Of whatsin are prostitutesguilty?What,precisely,is the scandalof the whorearchy? The Scandal of the Whorearchy:Prostitutionand Property In1986, PasadenaSuperiorCourtJudgeGilbertC. Alstonpresided overthe trialof DanielZabuski,whowas chargedwiththe violentrapeand sodomy of RhodaDacosta,a prostitute.Alstondismissedthe charges on the groundsthat a whorecannotbe raped.He based his judgmentnot on standardproceduralgroundsof legallyrelevantevidence,noron the consoundcase, buton the groundsthat,as he structionof a credible,juridically whore is a whore."20 ForAlston,all prostitutesshare a whore is a put it, "a commonidentitythatmakesthemessentiallyand universallyunrapeable. 19. Quoted in ArleneCarmenand HowardMoody,WorkingWomen:The Subterranean Worldof Street Prostitution(New York:Harperand Row,1985), 6. 20. "JudgeRules ProstitutesCan'tBe Raped,"Whisper1, no. 2 (Spring1986): 1. See also Sex Work:Writingsby Womenin the Sex Industry,ed. FrederiqueDelacoste and Cleis Press, 1987), 185. PriscillaAlexander(Pittsburgh:
/ Screwing McClintock theSystem 77 InSan Franciscorecently,the Oaklandpolicechiefadmittedto closing rape cases of prostituteswithoutproperinvestigationsimplybecause the victimswere prostitutes.DavidP. Lambkin,a detectivewiththe Los Angeles police,admittedthatrapeof prostitutesis on the increase,buthe added: "It'shardenoughto make a rapecase witha legitimatevictim."21 "Sure,"said LieutenantVitoSpano, head of the sex crimesunitin Brooklyn, "surethey get victimized,but they are theirown worst enemies."22 Whatdoes the malejudiciarysee in prostitutesthatputsthemoutsidethe protectionof the law? Untilvery recently,two categoriesof women have been deemed unrapeableby law:wivesandprostitutes.Indeed,Friedrich Engelsfirstsugandmarriagefindtheirsocialmeaningindialectical gested thatprostitution relationto each other.23Rape is not illegal,it is regulated.Judge Alston's notionthat a whorecannotbe rapedfindsits logic in an ancienttradition thatdefines rapenotas an affrontto womenbutas an affrontto malepropfemalechastityhas had propertyvalue formen. In erty rights.Historically, law the codes of surviving Mesopotamian valley,forexample,womenwere as the of legislated property fathers,husbands,brothers,or sons, so that of male rapewas figurednotas the violationof womenbutas the ruination propertyvalue.24Untillate in the nineteenthcentury,underthe commonlaw doctrineof coverture,a woman'ssexual propertypassed intoa man's handsat marriage;so didherlabor,herinheritance, andherchildren.Under a like a was In dead. the coverture, wife, slave, civilly eighteenthcentury, in Britain,Sir M. Hale'snotoriousinjunction gave a husbandde juresanctionto rapehis wifeby the legalcategoryof conjugalrights.25UntilOctober 21. Jane Gross, "Prostitutesand Addicts:Special Victimsof Rape,"New YorkTimes, 12 Oct. 1990, 14. 22. Gross, "Prostitutesand Addicts,"14. 23. FriedrichEngels, TheOriginof the Family,PrivateProperty,and the State (NewYork: International Publishers,1972), 129-30, 138-39. 24. VernBulloughand BonnieBullough,Womenand Prostitution: A Social History(Buffalo: Prometheus,1987), 16. InmedievalEurope,likewise,customarylaw gave the husband the rightto execute his wife if she committedadultery,and rape was seen as the tarnishingof male propertyvalue (115).See also GerdaLerner,"TheOriginof Prostitution in AncientMesopotamia,"Signs 1, no. 2 (1986):236-54. 25. Hale laid down that "the husbandcannot be guiltyof a rape committedby himself consent and contractthe wife hath upon his lawfulwife, for by theirmutualmatrimonial given up herself in this kindunto her husband,whichshe cannot retract"(Sir M. Hale, The Historyof the Pleas of the Crown[London:Sollom Emlyn,1778], vol. 1, chap. 58, 628). Until1884, in Britain,a wife could be forciblyincarceratedin a state prisonfor re-
78 boundary2 / Summer1992 1991, it was legal for a man to rape his wife in Britain,except in Scotland. It is still legal in many states in the United States and in most countries around the world. The rape trial serves to police contradictions inherent in the judiciary's own laws, isolating points of conflictin the distributionof male property rights over the bodies of women. Central to the idea of the modern, universal citizen is John Locke's famous formulation:"Every Man has a Property in his own Person."26 Yet, the principlethat individualsown property in theirown persons is immediatelycontradictedby the fact that women do not, whereupon a fissure opens in the ideology of individualism.The rape trial serves to isolate and close the fissure, which is identified as a crime: a rape, a theft, adultery,prostitution. "Awoman,"Judge Alston explains, "whogoes out on the street and makes a whore out of herself opens herself up to anybody.""27 The logic of law as is a is follows: Since crime a rape rape against man's property in the woman, a wife cannot be raped by her husband, for a man cannot rob himself of his own property.Similarly,since rape is a crime against a man's property,and since the prostituteis a common prostitute, the prostituteno longer has private propertyvalue for men. By "opening herself up" to any man, the prostituteruins her potentialvalue as privatepropertyfor a single man and becomes, by definition,unrapeable. A prostitute who removes her body from the stock of male propand claims it for her own, removes her body from the sphere of male erty, which exists to negotiate the distributionand circulationbetween men law, of property and power. Historically,most regimes have legislated that a woman's relationto the rightsand resources of the state are indirect,mediated through a social relationto a man (father, husband, or nearest male kin). By publiclyselling sexual services that men expect for free, prostitutes transgress the fundamental structureof the male trafficin women. Therefore, as Judge Alston put it, a prostitute"steps outside the protectionof the law."28As a result, she is also disqualifiedfrom speaking for herself before the law. Alston adds: "Whothe hell would believe a prostitutein the witness fusing conjugalrights(see CarolePateman,TheSexual Contract[Oxford:PolityPress, 1988], 123). 26. John Locke, Two Treatisesof Government,ed. P. Laslett(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress, 1967), vol. 2, 183, 81-82. 27. "JudgeRules ProstitutesCan'tBe Raped,"1. 28. "JudgeRules ProstitutesCan'tBe Raped,"1.
/ Screwingthe System 79 McClintock stand anyway?"29 Marx'sinjunctioncould hardlybe more apposite: "They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented."30 A standard Latin term for prostitute, meretrix means "she who earns."31Since prostitution,in European history, is theft by a woman of sexual propertythat rightfullybelongs to a man, some of the earliest laws against prostitution were laws to curb the kind of money and property women could accumulate.32 Hence the analogy between the terms common land and common prostitute. Untilvery recently,maritallaw enclosed a woman's "privateparts"and transferredthem fromthe father to the husband. The wife, by law,did not possess the titledeeds to her sexual property but served only as custodian and gatekeeper to ensure that the grounds remained private. Inthe sexual commonage of the prostitute,however, the body fluids and liquidassets of men from differentclasses and races mix promiscuously. It is, therefore, not surprisingthat prostitutes are traditionallyassociated with challenges to rule, with figures of rebellion,revolt, insurrection, and the criminalappropriationof property.The scandal of the whorearchy amounts to flagrantfemale interferencein male contests over propertyand power. Not for nothing did Parisian public health officialParent-Duchatelet call prostitutes "the most dangerous people in society."33
29. "JudgeRules ProstitutesCan'tBe Raped,"1. 30. KarlMarx,"TheEighteenthBrumaireof LouisBonaparte,"in Selected Works(New York:International Publishers,1973), 417. 48. 31. Bulloughand Bullough,Womenand Prostitution, 32. Atthe end of the firstcenturyA.D., EmperorDomitiantriedto ruleagainstprostitutes receivinginheritancesand legacies. In Romanlaw, a prostitutewas canonicallybarred fromaccusing others of crime,was forbiddento inheritproperty,and couldnot represent herself in court.MedievalByzantinechurchlegislationforbadea prostitutefromowning property.In the Visigothickingdomin Spain, prostituteswho persistedin theirtrade received three hundredlashes. In 1254, Louis IXdecreed that all prostitutesbe placed beyond the protectionof the king'slaw and that all theirpersonalgoods, clothing,furs, tunics, and linenchemises be seized (Bulloughand Bullough,Womenand Prostitution, 48, 55, 116, 120, 122). 33. Alexandre-Jean-BaptisteParent-Duchatelet,De la prostitutionde la ville de Paris (Paris:J. B. Bailliere,1836), quotedin LouiseWhite,TheComfortsof Home:Prostitution in ColonialNairobi(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress, 1990), 2.
80 boundary2 / Summer1992
Black Markets:Prostitutionand Race In late VictorianBritain,the imagery for representing sexuality was drawnfromthe sphere of economic activity.34 Sexual problems were figured as fiscal problems and were imaged by metaphorsof accumulation,production, and excessive expenditure.35 As Foucault has suggested, the middle class lacked the means, and therefore had to inventthe means, for defining itself as a class. Sexual reproductionand economic production became deeply symbolicallylinked.Sexuality (one's relationto one's body and to the bodies of others) became the language forexpressing one's relationto class (one's relationto labor and to the laborof others). The middle class figured itself as differentfromboth the aristocracyand the workingclass by virtue of its sexual restraint(its monogamy) and its economic moderation(its thrift). The bank, as the economic institutionfor managing the accumulation and distributionof capital,found its accomplice in monogamous marriageas the social institutionfor managing the accumulation and distributionof reproductive power and property.A contradictionin the formof gender, however, opened in the formation of class identity,for monogamy was monogamy for women only, and saving and accumulatingpropertywere for men only. In order to foreclose the contradiction,nature was reinventedto guarantee gender difference withinclass identity.The primarysymbolic means for the reinventionof nature was the idea of race, and the primaryarena was empire. The invention of imperial nature, moreover,would guarantee that the "universal"quintessence of Enlightenmentindividualismwould belong only to propertiedmen of European descent. The relationbetween the "normal"male controlof reproductionand sexual pleasure in marriage, and the "normal"bourgeois control of capital was legitimized and made naturalby reference to a thirdterm: the "abnormal" zone of racial "degeneration."Illicitmoney and illicitsexuality were seen to relate to each other by negative analogy to race. The internal, historicalcontradictionwithinthe modern social formationwas thereby displaced and represented as a naturaldifference across the time and space A Studyof Sexualityand Pornographyin 34. See Steven Marcus,TheOtherVictorians: Mid-NineteenthCenturyEngland(NewYork:New AmericanLibrary,1974),xiii. 35. Women "saved"themselves for marriage,or "cheapened"themselves in promisor homosexuality.See Sander cuity;men "wasted"or "spent"themselvesin masturbation Gilman,Differenceand Pathology:Stereotypes of Sexuality,Race, and Madness. See also Gilmanin TheAnatomyof Racism, ed. DavidGoldberg(Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress, 1990).
/ Screwing theSystem 81 McClintock of empire:the differencebetweenthe "enlightened" presentandthe "primiThe movement the of across tive"past. space empirewas thus figuredas a movementbackwardintime. Prostitutesbecame associated with black and colonizedpeoples withina discourseon racialdegenerationthatfiguredthemas transgressof money,sexual power,and property,and as ing the naturaldistributions therebyfatallythreateningthe fiscaland libidinaleconomyof the imperial state. Prostitutes,whosteppedbeyondthe edictsof heterosexualmarriage and the doctrinethat womendid not workfor profit,were figuredas atavisticthrowbacksto a primordial phase of racialdevelopment,their"racial deviance"writtenvisiblyon the bodyinthe stigmataof femalesexual deviance: exaggeratedposteriors,mutantgenitalsand ears, excessive sexual appetites,disheveledhair,andothersundry"racial" stigmata. Gambling,likewise,as SanderGilmanpointsout, took its place in a vocabularythat metaphorically intertwinedmoney,sexuality,and race. If commercialS/M was the dialecticaltwinof the sex trial,the gambling hall was the dialecticaltwinof the bank.Gamblingwas the institutional display of organizedcommodityfetishism:the flagrantexhibitionof the without capitalistsuperstitionthatmoneycan breeditselfautochthonously labor.The organizeddreamof gamblingwas the orgasmicexcess of pure masturbaexchange valuefromwhichall laborhas been voided.Similarly, tion (autoeroticand outsidethe heterosexualreproductive economy)was in condemned sexual treatisesas interfering witha man'sabilityto widely workandaccumulatecapital.Homosexuality andclitoraleroticism,similarly, stood outsidethe reproductive economyandoutsidethe narrative teleology of racialevolution,and were bothfiguredas precipitating a steady decline into"racial" degeneration,visiblyexpressedinthe stigmataof hairyhands, shamblinggait, mentaldeficiency,and irrationality. Inthe symbolictriangleof deviantmoney,deviantsexuality,anddeviantrace, the so-calleddegenerateclasses-the militantworkingclass, the colonized,prostitutes,gays and lesbians,gamblers,the Irish,and the Jews (particularly those who livedinthe East Endof London,on the cusp of empire)-were metaphorically boundin a regimeof surveillancefigured by images of sexual pathologyand racialaberration. InVictorianiconography, the fetishemblemof dirtwas compulsively drawnon to police the boundariesbetween"normal" sexualityand "normal"marketrelations."Dirty" lesbianand sex-masturbation,prostitution, the gay sexuality,and the host of Victorian"perversions"-transgressed libidinal economy of heterosexual reproductionwithin the monogamous
82 boundary2 / Summer1992 maritalrelation ("clean"sex, which has value). Likewise, "dirty"moneyassociated withprostitutes,Jews, gamblers, and thieves-transgressed the fiscal economy of the male-dominated, marketexchange ("clean"money, which has value). The bodily relationto dirtexpressed a social relation to labor. Because it was the surplus evidence of human work, dirtwas a Victorian scandal. Dirtwas the visible residue that stubbornlyremained after the process of industrialrationalityhad done its work.Smeared on clothes, hands, and faces, dirtwas the memory trace of human labor,the evidence that the production of industrialwealth, and the creation of liberal rationality, lay in the hands and bodies of the workingclass and the colonized. For this reason, Victoriandirtentered the symbolic realm of fetishism with great force, and the body of the prostitute,standing on the street corner of marriage and market, became subject to vigilantand violent policing. In late Victorian Britain,the infamous Contagious Diseases Acts British police the right to forcibly impose physical examinations on gave women suspected of workingas prostitutes in designated garrison towns in Britainand its colonies. The initialimpetus for the Acts came from blows to male self-esteem in the arena of empire, in resurgent militancyin India, South Africa, Ireland,and elsewhere. The argument ran that the real threat to the potency of the imperialarmy lay in the sexual bodies of transgressive women. If working women could be cordoned off, the purityof the army and the imperialbody politiccould be assured. Withthe Acts, the policing of female sexuality became both metaphor and means for policing unruly working-class and colonized peoples at large. If the Western discourse on degeneration sees the white prostitute as a racialdeviant, and colonized people as inherentlysexually degenerate, the prostitute in the colonies brings the discourse on deviance to its conceptual limit. If all colonized people are the embodiment of degeneration, there is no way to represent the special case of the prostitute.How can she be defined as sexually abnormalif all colonized people are already quintessentially abnormal? In the colonies, the relation between prostitutionand female property,between paid and unpaidfemale work, comes criticallyto the fore. In colonial Kenya, for example, prostitutionemerged from the collision of naturalcatastrophe and colonialism,fromthe disruptionsof African agricultureand African resistance to colonial wage labor.36Yet, as Louise 36. See LouiseWhite,TheComfortsof Home.Iam gratefullyindebtedto White'sgroundbreakingbook. For a fullerdiscussion of White'sbook, see my review"TheScandal of 52 (1991):92-99. the Whorearchy," Transition
/ Screwing theSystem 83 McClintock was nota litanyof victims. Whiteshows, the historyof colonialprostitution Workingprostituteswere Kenya's"urbanpioneers,"some of the firstresidents to liveyear-roundin Nairobi.Kenyanprostitutesthemselvesdefined sexworkas a defiantformof labor.Dodgingcolonialwage labor,manyof the women used the cash they earnedfrom"diggingwiththeirbacks"to buy notion"that cattleand buildhouses and to foundthe "nearlyrevolutionary womencan controltheirown moneyand propertyas independentheads of households.37
mimickedmarriage,the radical As Whiteshows, malayaprostitution differencebeingthatwomenexchangedformoneythedomestic,emotional, and sexual services that wives performedunpaid.38Fosteringvalues of femaleand communityloyalty,the prostituteshelpedmaintainAfricancommunitiesand struggledto shape the colonialurbanscene to meet African women'sneeds. Inprecolonialsociety,the daughter'smarriagewas the sourceof the father'saccumulationof propertyand power.Since womendidthe bulkof of lifeandlabor,theirworkwas the the workandwerethe chiefreproducers single most valuableresourceapartfromthe landitself.Incattle-marriage societies, livestockwere the symboliccoinage of women's laborpower. Morewives meantgreaterwealthand morecattleformen, and cattlemarby whichwomen'slaborpowerwas riage was the fundamentalinstitution metamorphosedintomale politicalpower.Throughmalecontrolof female sexualityand marriage,cattle and cash were redistributed throughmale familialnetworks. however,womenbeganto buytheirown propThroughprostitution, erty.Manyof the malayaprostituteswere runawaywiveswho came to the cityto escape forcedmarriages.Insteadof sendingtheirmoneybackto the male-headedhomestead,womenboughtlivestockandhouses andbecame independentheads of households,movinga whole cycle of new, female familyformationintothe new urbancenters. If marriagewas a source of fathers'accumulation,prostitution becamethe sourceof daughters'accumulation.As KayayaThababuputit:"Athome,whatcouldIdo? Growcrops for my husbandor my father.In NairobiI can earn my own money,for myself."39By the early 1930s, halfof the landlordsin Pumwani,Nairobi's blacktownship,werewomen.40 37. White,TheComfortsof Home,34. 38. Unlikethe watambezi,or streetwalkingprostitutes,malaya prostitutesworkedfrom theirhomes, exchangingbothdomesticand sexual services forcash. 39. White,TheComfortsof Home,51. 40. White,TheComfortsof Home,64.
2 / Summer 84 boundary 1992 Manyof the women, moreover,consciouslyrefusedto pass their fathersand brothers propertybackthroughthe male system, disinheriting and keepingtheirmoneyand theirbodies forthemselves.Malayaprostitutionexpressed a clear rejectionof traditional malefamilyties. Windfalls went intohelpingwomenfriends,and the womendesignatedfemale heirs to ensurethattheirpropertydidnotpass backintothe patrilineage,thereby many men took creatingnew, explicitlyfemale lineages. Not surprisingly, at the women's and the had to umbrage temerity, prostitutes negotiateconstantlyto keep theirpropertyout of the hands of iratefathers,brothers, ex-husbands,and the state. was riven Indeed,the colonialstate'sresponseto Nairobiprostitution withparadox.On the one hand,prostitution was essential to the smooth runningof a migrantlaboreconomy,savingthe state the cost of servicing Africanmen,as wellas forestalling the perilsof settledAfricancommunities takingrootinthe urbanareas. Onthe otherhand,the earningsof the prostitutesalso allowedwomenand men to elude the depredationsof colonial wage labor.Settlersconstantlycarpedat Africanscoundrelsand slothful layaboutswho livedoffwomen'searningsandweretherebyable to refuse to workforwhites. In colonialKenya,as elsewhere,the state objectedless to prostitutionitselfthan to the women'sscandalousaccumulationof money and Ina worldwherecolonialssoughtconstantlyto controlthe livesof property.41 Africansthroughhousing,marriage,and migrantlabor,prostitutesowning self-respect,andgender propertyand passingon the valuesof community, a affront to white were constant the male managementof power. loyalty Inmanypartsof Africa,the state'sambiguousrelationto prostitution has enduredafterindependence.Inthe 1970s and 1980s, in Zimbabwe, Gabon,Zambia,Tanzania,Mozambique,and BurkinaFaso, for example, workingwomen policelaunchedmassiveassaultson single,independently the inputativeattemptsto "clean"the citiesof prostitution. Yet, realthreatto butthe generalspecterof economicallyindethe state was notprostitution pendentwomen,who werefetishizedand demonizedby the whorestigma of women inorderto licensestate violence.As PaolaTabetputsit,"Control in marriageand exploitationof theirlaboris based on male monopolyof resources and means of production.Whenwomenhave access to other forms of income, marriageand directmale controlare threatened."42 In 41. White,TheComfortsof Home,219. 42. See Paola Tabet, "I'mthe Meat, I'mthe Knife.Sexual Service, Migration,and Re-
/ Screwing theSystem 85 McClintock 1983, inZimbabwe,forexample,the Mugabegovernmentorderedmassive roundupsof womenwho couldnotdemonstratean immediaterelationto a man. Womenwalkingalone on the streets, livingalone in flats in Harare, or raisingchildrenindependently as single motherswerearrestedas prostitutesand sent to camps, wherethey were subjectedto appallingabuse. The roundupswere repeatedduringthe recentCommonwealth Summit. Prostitutionis a realmof contradiction. Inthe colonies, prostitution may very well have confirmedcolonialfantasiesaboutwhitemen's privialso confused leged access to the bodiesof blackwomen,butprostitution racialsegregationandthe racialandgendereddistributions of money.The fact thatmen had access to prostitution didnotmeanthatthey hadcontrol over prostitutes.Prostitutesobligedwhitemento payfarbetterthan usual for Africanwomen'sworkand, at least temporarily, subjectedwhite men to Africanwomen'scontrol.Prostitutesdictatedthe times and termsof the exchange,whatservicestheyoffered,and howmuchthey charged.43 In contemporaryBritain,Europe,and the UnitedStates, the policof ing prostitutesas racialdegenerates persists in at least three ways. Prostitutescontinueto be figuredas atavisticthrowbacksto racial"degeneracy."In 1969, a Britishpamphlet,forexample,widelyreadby probation as "a primitiveand regressivemanifesofficers,condemnedprostitution and migrantprostitutesare subjectedto tation."44 Poor,black,immigrant, systematic,and especiallyviolent,harassment.The police,moreover,use the controlof prostitutesas a coverforpolicingblack,minority, immigrant, and working-classcommunities,bothmale and female. Definingzones of the cityas sexuallydeviant,the policeattemptto penetrateandsubduethe blackbodypolitic.As a statementfromthe EnglishCollectiveof Prostitutes protested,"Womenare pushedfromarea to area, and even fromcity to city,butthe policeremaininthe area afterthe womenhave left."45 andentersthe realm laws,space is criminalized Throughprostitution of law. In Britain,the recent,notoriousKerbCrawlingBillis no exception. In 1985, underthe guise of protectingwomen,it became a crimefor men to engage in "persistentkerbcrawling" (solicitingwomenforsex). In1990, pression in Some AfricanSocieties,"in TheVindicationof the Rightsof Whores,ed. Gail Pheterson, Preface by MargoSt. James (Seattle:Seal Press, 1989), 204-23. 43. As Whitepoints out, women controlledthe price,the type, the time, and the length and intensityof the services they preferredto exchange. 44. Quotedin Pateman,TheSexual Contract,194. 45. EnglishCollectiveof Prostitutes'Statement,KingsCross, London,10 July 1987.
86 boundary2 / Summer1992 under the Sexual Offenses Bill,Sir WilliamShelton proposed the removal of the termpersistent, in orderto make it possible for a single officerwithouta witness to charge any man simplysuspected of talkingto a prostitute(hence the term sus law). Prostitutes argue that the new bill, far from protecting women from violent clients, only deepens the dangers. Nervous johns do not have time to dawdle, so women do not have time to check them out or negotiate for safe sex. As a result, some women have been badly battered and murdered.As a Kings Cross prostitutecomplained:"Ifthe law can nick them straight away, everything will be done so fast you won't have a chance, especially at night. Withsome of the nuts you get around here, it's a frightening prospect."46 At the same time, the bill has been widely used as a "sus" law to arrest and harass black, immigrant,and minoritymen for unrelated reasons. In London, many black and immigrantmen have been stopped, arrested, charged with stealing their own bicycles, or harassed and beaten up simply for talkingto a woman who is "suspected" of being a prostitute.White, middle-class men, like Prosecutor Allan Green, however, are let off with a fraternalslap on the wrist.47 Prostitutes who are poor and black bear the most vicious bruntof the law. In 1982, in London,police abuse of black, immigrant,and minorityprostitutes became so widespread that women occupied the Churchof the Holy Cross to draw publicattentionto theirplight.Inthe UnitedStates, while only 40 percent of streetwalkers are women of color, they make up 55 percent of those sentenced to jail.48In New York,police hold "tricktournaments," lining black and white prostituteson either side of a road and forcing them to run races against each other. Those who lose go to jail.49 Generally speaking, in Britain,Europe, and the United States, black and white prostitutes experience the metropolis in differentways. A racial geography of sex maps the city and divides the sex industry. In the exchange of commercial sex, the private(white)spaces of escort services and 46. See Jo Grant,"StreetsApart,"TheGuardian(London),3 July 1990, 14. 47. Chief ProsecutorAllanGreen was arrestedfor kerbcrawlingnear the KingsCross Stationin 1991. In 1985, the Campaignagainst KerbCrawlingLegislationwas launched by a coalitionof sexworkers,anti-rape,black,and civilrightsgroupsto lobbymembersof Parliamentand maketheirobjectionsknownto the press. On Friday,11 May1990, aftera rowdyand acrimoniousdebate, Memberof ParliamentKenLivingstontalkedthe Sexual Offenses Billdown.The bill,however,comes up every Friday,and willbe passed unless one MPopposes it. 48. Delacoste and Alexander,Sex Work,197. 49. Arlene Carmenand HowardMoody,WorkingWomen:The SubterraneanWorldof Street Prostitution(New York:Harperand Row,1985), 146.
/ Screwingthe System 87 McClintock clubs are tacitlycondoned, while the public(black) spaces of streetwalking and car sex are more violent, more heavily policed, and more profoundly stigmatized. In the 1970s, in New York,massage parlorson the East Side were run by white men who overwhelminglyemployed white women and were comparativelysafer and more comfortablethan the less opulent black parlors on the West Side. Black and Asian women in the United States find it harder to get work as go-go dancers and escort women than white and Latina women do. In Nevada, until the 1960s, black women could not enter casinos. Today, many bar owners, hotel keepers, and landlords either do not allow black prostitutes to use their premises or they charge them punitivelyinflatedrents. Police are far more tolerantof less overt sexwork, largely because the customers are drawnfromthe white, middle, and professional classes. By licensing indoorwork, and harassing street work, police isolate the poorest women, who cannot affordto pay high rents and who have the least access to health care, social resources, and legal aid. The police thereby ensure that poor, black women pay the heaviest price for the criminalizationof sexwork. The whore stigma polices the racial divide, stigmatizing and endangering the lives of women of color, as well as perpetuatingracism within the sex industry and among some white prostitutes. At the same time, in Britain, Europe, and the United States, clients are overwhelminglywhite, married,and middleclass, while most of the men arrested are men of color, are gay, or are transvestite.
"It'sa Business Doing Pleasure with You": ProstitutionIs Work Prostitutes around the world are now becoming their own media advocates and politicalactivists, radicallychallenging the stigma of sexual and racial deviance.50 Since the 1970s, hundreds of prostitutionorganizations have burgeoned worldwide,from Hawaiito Austria, from Canada to the Philippines, from Zimbabwe to the Netherlands. In 1986, prostitutes from around the world met in Brussels at an extraordinarysession of the European Parliament, where they launched the Second World Whores' Congress. Drawnfrom over sixteen countries and representing millionsof 50. See Delacoste and Alexander,Sex Work.See also DoloresFrench,Working:MyLife as a Prostitute(New York:E. P. Dutton,1988), and Good Girls/BadGirls:Feministsand Sex TradeWorkersFace to Face, ed. LaurieBell(Toronto:Seal Press, 1987).
2 / Summer 88 boundary 1992 sexworkersworldwide,the prostitutesdrewup a Whores'Charter,calling of sexworkandan endto allviolationsof sexworker forthe decriminalization rights.51
InOctober1991,sexworkersfromsixteencountriesmetin Frankfurt at the FirstEuropeanProstitutes'Congressto call for the recognitionof as a professionin the EuropeanCharterand for full voluntaryprostitution Tothe consternationof many rightsas workersunderEuropeanlaborlaw.52 some callednotforthe abolitionof and feminists, prostitutes governments, but for the redistribution of sexual pleasure,power,and profit; prostitution of landandpropertyrights;forthe removalof foreign forthe transformation in the sex armies;and forthe rightof womenand men to workvoluntarily tradeundersafe, unregulated,and respectedconditions.53 Manymen, however,preferto findwhoresin theirbeds thanin their parliaments,and attemptsby sexworkersto organizehave met with unswervingviolence. An Irishorganizerwas burntto death, and Thaiorganizers have been murdered.Ecuadoranbrothelowners rotateprostitutes regularlyto preventthem fromorganizing.54Yetby and large,the international Lefthas been largelyindifferent to the issue, whilethe abolitionist feminists some has been tendencyamong nothingshortof calamitousfor workingprostitutes. Mostprostitutesinsistthatthe firsttargetof theirinternational orgathe law. Prostitutes that the laws rather is the state and punish, argue nizing thanprotect,women,especiallywomenof color.Wheresexworkis a crime, Murderers knowthe clientscan rape,rob,and batterwomenwithimpunity. weightof a prostitute'slife in the scales of the law.As DallasJudge Jack Hamptonadmitted,"I'dbe hardputto give somebodylifeforkillinga prostimoreprostitutesare murderedinthe UnitedStates, tute." 55Notsurprisingly, is stilla crime,thananywhereelse in the world. where prostitution Prostitutesdenouncethe lawsthatshuntthemintodangerous,desolatedocklands,meatpacking districts,andrailwayyards,unableto organize is a crime, for decent conditionsor againstcoercion.Whereprostitution womencannotdemandpoliceprotectionorclaimlegalrecourseforrobbery of the Rightsof Whores. 51. Fora fullaccountof the congress, see Pheterson,Vindication 52. See Anne McClintock,"Downby Law,"TheGuardian(London),23 Oct. 1991, 20. 53. See Anne McClintock, "MeanwhileBackat the ChickenRanch,"The Guardian(London), 12 May1992, 36. 54. Pheterson,Vindicationof the Rightsof Whores,7. 55. Lisa Belkin,"ReportClears Judge of Bias in Remarksabout Homosexuals,"New YorkTimes,2 Nov. 1989, A25.
/ Screwing theSystem 89 McClintock or coercion,forthey therebyexpose themselvesas implicatedin a criminalizedtrade.Wheresexworkis a crime,prostitutesareforcedby landlords to pay exorbitantrentsor are drivento workthe freezingand dangerous streets. Prostitutescannotclaimsocialwelfareor lifeinsurance,healthcare or maternitybenefits,childcareor pensions.Whereprostitution is a crime, migrantwomenare evictedfromtheirhomes,are deniedworkpapers,and are detainedand deported.Everycent of a prostitute'searningsis criminallycontaminated.The propertyand possessions of prostitutesare often forfeited,and mothers,brothers,friends,andloverscan be flungintoprison for livingoff immoralearnings.Mostcruelly,a prostitutecannotkeep her children.Mostprostitutesare mothers,and most are in the game fortheir children.In many countries,however,social workershave the powerto take a prostitute'schildrenoutof "moraldanger"into"care."Inthese ways, the state curtailswomen'spower,divertingillicitfemale money back into the coffersof malecirculation andcurtailing the emergenceof independent female heads of family. Sexworkthat benefitsthe malestate, however,is toleratedand administeredby a system of international euphemisms:massage parlors, escort agencies, bars, rest and recreationresorts,and so on, whichare runnot by hookersbutby male"entertainment managers."InThailand,for inhabitsa twilightrealmof legal ambiguity.The law example, prostitution makes prostitution a crime,butthe green lightis givento male"touroperators"and "entertainment managers,"whose operationsaresanctionedand definedas the "personalservicesector." Most prostitutesregardlegalizedprostitution as legalizedabuse. undercriminallaw Despite its benignring,legalizationplaces prostitution insteadof commerciallaw,whereit is tightlycurbedby the state and administeredby the police. Instead,prostituteswantthe law off theirbodies and are callingforthe decriminalization of the professionand the repealof all legislationnotordinarily applicableto a businessor trade. Legalizationputswomen'sbodiesfirmlyin men'shands.Inthe aptly namedChickenRanch,a legalizedbrothelinNevada,prostitutesareforced to workthreeweeks at a stretch,servicingany manwho picksthem,at any timeof the dayornight,a dizzyinganddispiriting carouselof faceless tricks. In manyof the legalizedbrothelsand clubs in Europe,Lisbet,a German prostitute,toldme, "Womenhave no rightto refusemen andoftenno right to use a condom." Underlegalization,the profitsof women'sworkclatterinto men's pockets. The state becomes a licit pimp, penning prostitutes in brothels
2 / Summer 90 boundary 1992 and levyingpunitivetaxes at rateshigherthanotherworkers.InGermany, legalizedprostitutespay 56 percentof theirearningsin taxes, but, unlike other taxpayers,they are not eligiblefor any social benefitswhatsoever. Underlegalization,the state controlsprostitutes' workand leisure,preventit and often themto leave the tradeif hard for ingorganization making very wish. Most to work they prostitutesprefer illegallyratherthansubmitto the abusiveand humiliating ordealsof state-controlled brothels. Frenchprostitutescannotlivewitha husband,wife,lover,orchild,as Italianprostianyone undertheirroofcan be chargedwith"cohabitation." tutes cannothelptheirhusbandsorwivespaythe rentorgive theirparents money,as they can be chargedwithlivingoff "immoral earnings."In Britain, engaging in prostitutionis not a crime (whichlets the johns off the workis criminalized. Two hook),butvirtuallyeveryaspect of a prostitute's womenworkingtogetherforsafetycan be chargedwithkeepinga brothel. InSwitzerland,if a womandecides to leavethe tradeandseek otherwork, she firsthas to get a "goodgirl"letterfromthe policeto proveher good conduct.To get the letter,she has to waitthreeyears withoutworkingas a prostituteto proveher good conduct.Untilthen, she cannotlegallyfind otherwork.InFrankfurt, zoninglawsforcewomento workthe desertedharborarea,wheretheycan be torturedanddumpedinthe waterwithouta stir. InCanada,prostitution is nota crime,but"communicating forthe purposes is. Prostitutescan be penalizedfororganizingand informing of prostitution" each otherof dangeroustricksor corruptpolice.Austrianprostituteshave to reportto the policesimplyto go on holiday.Some of the most appalling conditionsprevailin India.Between1980 and 1984, not a single landlord was arrestedfor illegallypanderingto prostitutes,but 44,633 prostitutes were arrestedforsolicitingin Bombayalone. As DoloresFrench,author,activist,and prostitute,toldme in a prisees women as a controlledsubvate interview,"Legalizingprostitution men." The international stance-controlled by prostitutes'movementthus calls for the decriminalization,not the legalization, of theirwork. Prostitutes
demandthattheirworkbe respectedas a social serviceforbothmen and womenand thatit be broughtundercommerciallawlikeotherprofessions. Why,they ask, can masseurscommandrespectandgratitudeforservicing naked clients in comfortablerooms,whileprostitutesare criminalized?If theirworkweredecriminalized, prostitutescouldplytheirtradeinsafetyand respect,payingnormalrentandtaxes, in houses as clean and comfortable as those of the averagetherapistor chiropractor. Prostitutesinsistitis notthe exchangeof moneythatdemeansthem but the conditions under which the exchange is made. They demand, as
/ Screwing McClintock theSystem 91 a priority, the rightto choose and refusetheirclients,rejectingmenwhoare inanywaydisrespectfuloroffensive,drunk,orsimplyunsavory.No respect, they say, no sex. Prostitutesalso wantthe rightto stipulatewhatservices they offer.Some preferto give handshandies,others prefervanillasex. Some preferto workwiththeirmouths,otherswitha whip.Some refuseto undress.Mostrefuse anal sex. Manyrefuseto kiss. Alldemandthatthey be free to negotiatethese preferencessafely and professionallywiththeir clientsand thatthe prostituteshavethe finalsay on the terms. Some clientsare expertsat anger,ventingon whorestheirmisogyny and sexual despair.Ifsexworkweredecriminalized, prostitutescouldwork inconjunctionwithtrainedtherapists,offeringcounselingreferralforclients in need. Prostitutescouldalso organizecollectively,educatingeach other, theirclients,and the publicaboutsexualpleasureand sexual health. Prostitutesscoffat the notionthatthe criminallawsarethereto protect them. Why,they ask, are men arrestedfor payingprostitutesbut not arrestedforrapingthem?Prostitution catchesthe lawwithitspantsdown.In the eyes of the prostitute,the emperorhas no clothes:Thosewho makethe laws areoftenthe ones whobreakthe laws.Policeareambiguprostitution ous exterminating angels, curbingand harassinga tradethey don'treally wantto destroy.Prostitutesinsistthatthe policearetheirgreatestscourge, demandingfreebies,rapingthem in vans and in precincts,and interfering withsafe sex practicesby puncturingholes in condomsand confiscating bleach. Inthe states of Washingtonand Arizona,cops are legallyallowed to have sex withprostitutesinorderto entrapthem.InNewYork,policeare on recordforconfiscatingwomen'sshoes inthe winterandforcingthemto walkhome barefootthroughthe icy streets. Prostitutesare callinginternationally forthe end to allpoliceharassmentandto the forcedtestingof prostitutesforHIV.56 Inthe currentclimate of sexualparanoia,prostitutesarebeingdemonizedas deadlynightshades, fatallyinfectinggood familymen. A hue and cry has gone up aroundthe world,with publicofficialsclamoringfor prostitutesto be force-testedfor HIVand corralledintoquarantine.Officials,however,have been far less gung ho aboutthrowinga cordonsanitaireof arrests,tests, andquarantine aroundjohns,perhapsbecause so manyof these good publicservantsare johnsthemselves. Since mostjohnsarehusbands,the currentcallforlegalizationstems 56. See Delacoste and Alexander,"ProstitutesAreBeingScapegoatedfor Heterosexual AIDS,"in Sex Work,248-63. See also Anne McClintock,"Safe Sluts,"Village Voice, 20 Aug. 1991.
2 / Summer 92 boundary 1992 less fromrecognitionof prostitutes'rightsthanfromthe illusionthat herdingprostitutesintobrothelsandforce-testingthemforHIVwillprotectgood familymen frominfection.Force-testingprostitutes,however,onlyfosters the illusionthateitherpartneris then safe withouta condom. As prostitutestirelesslypointout, it is notthe exchangeof cash but high-riskbehaviorsthattransmitdisease. Moreover,safe sex, not testing, preventsHIV.As Jasmin,a Germanprostitute,told me in a privateinterview, "Testingis always too late."Mostsexworkers,except, perhaps,for the veryyoung,the verydesperate,andthose deniedaccess to condoms, insistthat men use condomsforall services, includinghandshandiesand oralsex. As a result,studiesshowthat,contraryto popularstigma,cases of HIVforprostituteswho are notalso IVdrugusers remainconsistentlylow. Of greaterconcernthan a safe sex slut is a clientwho refuses a condom. For prostitutes,the onus is on the womanto get the rubberon the man.As Jasmintoldme, "Somemen ask me: 'Iwantit withouta condom.' I say: 'Youcan't pay me what my life is worth.Get out of here.'" Thus, the EuropeanCongress reporton AIDSdemandedthat managers of clubs, brothels,and ErosCenterswho forciblypreventprostitutesfrom usingcondomsshouldbe punishedbycriminallawforattemptedhomicide. Speakersat the EuropeanCongressvoicedgreatestconcernforthe plightof migrantworkersin the new Europe.In 1992, borderswithinthe "EuropeanFortress"willbe opened to all workersbut not to prostitutes. Unless prostitutesare recognizedas workerslikeeveryoneelse, migrant willsufferthe increasingindignitiesof arrests,deprostitutes,in particular, portation,and racistassaults.Prostitutesare moreawarethananyoneelse volunof the ordealsof forcedprostitution. Theyinsistthatdecriminalizing will forced make it far easier to detect and sexwork prostitution. destroy tary The UnitedNationshas estimatedthatby the year2000 tourismwill The international the most importanteconomicactivityin the world.57 be pursuitof commercialsex politicsof ThirdWorlddebtandthe international have become deeply entwined,turningsex tourisminto a surefire,coinspinningventure-with mostof the profitsclatteringintothe coffersof the Sex tourismis creatingbotha new kindof economicdepenmultinationals. refusal.In manycountries,tourism dence and a new kindof international has replacedproducts,such as bauxiteand sugar,as the leadingearner 57. See Thanh-DamTruong,Sex, Money, and Morality:Prostitutionand Tourismin SoutheastAsia (London:Zed, 1990). Fora moredetaileddiscussionof this book,see my reviewin the TimesLiterarySupplement,16 Aug. 1991, 10.
/ Screwing McClintock theSystem 93 of sexualityandthe sexualizationof of foreignexchange.The militarization as well.Millionsof women the militaryhave deep international implications, and menworkincountriesofficially designatedas R andR sites forthe U.S. military,in the burgeoningcruiseship industry,and in touristhotels,clubs, and resorts.Sex tourismdepends on powerfulconstructionsof race and of masculinity, on foreignbusinessmenwilling gender:on the militarization to investin sexual travel,and on a racialgeographyof sex thatpersuades privilegedmenthatwomenineconomicallydisempoweredcountrieswillbe more sexuallyavailableand pliant.58 As LifeTravelassured male adventurersinThailand,"Taking a womanhereis as easy as buyinga packageof 59Sex tourismdependson womenandmenavailableto selltheir cigarettes." services and on a networkof international companieswillingto fosterlocal bureaucraticstructures,to organizesex tours,and to preventsexworkers fromorganizing. The boy's-ownadventureof sex travelis as muchaboutempireas it is about sun, sex, and souvenirs.Foreignsunseekers fly to Southeast Asiawithairlinesthatpromiseto embodythefemininequintessenceof their nation:"Singaporegirl,you'rea greatwayto fly."As ThaiAirlineadvertised, "Somesay it'sourbeautifulwide-bodiedDC-10sthatcause so manyheads to turn. . . . We think our beautifulslim-bodied hostesses have a lot to do
withit."60Multinationals, the R and R ideafromthe U.S. military, borrowing regularlysend male employeeson packagetoursto be sexuallyserviced 61As yet, there by womenbilledas "littleslaves whogive realThaiwarmth." are no packagetoursforfemaleexecutivesfromTokyo,Dallas,and Ryad; and companywives chafingunderthe sexualennuiof marriagedo notlight out in drovesfora "taste"of the Orient. The currentsocial contextof most prostitution-pleasurefor men and workfor women-well-nigh guaranteesits sexism. Men enjoy privinotto mention leged access to sexualpleasure,to porn,andto prostitution, that hardyperennial,the doublestandard.Women'sdesire, by contrast, has been crimpedand confinedto history'ssad museumof corsets, chastity belts, and the virginitycult.Contexts,however,can be changed, and empoweringprostitutesempowersall women. DeloresFrenchsuggested 58. CynthiaEnloe, Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: MakingFeministSense of InternationalPolitics (Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1990). 59. Quotedin Thanh-DamTruong,Sex, Money,and Morality,178. 60. Quoted in Thanh-DamTruong,Sex, Money,and Morality,179. 61. Quoted in Thanh-DamTruong,Sex, Money,and Morality,178.
94 boundary 2 / Summer 1992 to me ina privateinterviewthatmanywomenfearprostitutesbecause they makewomenfeel tricked.Prostitutescall men'sbluff,challengingthe genof powerand profitby flagrantlydemandingmoneyfor dered distribution sex that nonreciprocal manywomengive forfree. Historychanges the meaningof the sexual body.There is no one nor is there any one politicallycorrect privilegednarrativeof prostitution, Some sexworkersplytheirtradein opulenthotels, politicsof prostitution. some in parkedcars, some in bars and caf6s, some in agricultural plantationsand migrantworkerhostels, some on cruiseliners,some at R and R sites for the U.S. military.Sexworkersdo not share the same reasons for enteringthe trade,nordo they experiencethe workin the same way. Not all sexworkersare women;not all customersare men. The enormous trade in gay commercialsex complicatesthe notionthatprostitution is no morethanthe embodimentof femalebondage.By some men'saccounts, commercialsex forwomen-arguablyone of the deepest taboos of allis on the increase.Whatis crucial,however,is thatprostitutesthemselves definethe conditionsfororganizingtheirworkto suittheirown localneeds and contexts. Perpetuatingthe image of prostitutesas eitherbrokenbaby dolls serves only to heightenthe climateof violence or fatal Frankenhookers and hypocrisyunderwhichso manywomenlive. Indeed,the feministcritiqueof prostitutesis to mymindtheoretically misbegottenandstrategically sexworkers'efforts(manyof whomare feminists unsound,short-circuiting the tradeto meettheirownneeds. Whateverelse it themselves)to transform is the female erasureof a woman'ssexualdesireinexchange is, prostitution for cash. Itis, however,no differentin that respectfrommost otherforms of women'swork.Prostitution that is not tightlycontrolledby men differs frommost women'sworkin that it is far betterpaid,has flexibleworking hours,and gives womenconsiderableeconomicindependencefrommen. As a result,working-classwomenandwomenof colorare able to educate and raisetheirchildrenin the comfortand themselves,findsocial mobility, securityusuallygivento onlygood whitegirls. Itseems crucial,therefore,to remainalertto the nuancesand pararatherthanto patronizeprostitutesas embodimentsof doxes of prostitution female sexual degradationor to glamorizethemas unambiguousheroines of female revolt.Sexworkis a genderedformof workthattakes its myriad meaningsfromthe differentsocieties inwhichit emerges. Wouldfeministswho condemnprostitutesforbecomingcomplicitin commodityfetishism,forexample,makethe same criticismof blackSouth
/ Screwing theSystem 95 McClintock Africanmineworkerswho dragfromthe earththe verystuffof commodity fetishism?Doesn'tthe argumentthat prostitutessell themselves bear an uncannyand perilousresemblanceto the sanctionedmale view that a woman'sidentityis equivalentto hersexuality?Prostitutesdo notsell themselves; rather,likeallworkers(including feminists),they exchangespecific services for cash and carefullynegotiatewiththeirclients what services they provide,at whatrate,andforhowlong. The whorestigmadisciplinesall women.As one prostitutetold me in a privateconversation,"It'sthe stigmathathurts,not the sex. The sex is easy. Facingthe world'shate is whatbreaksme down."The license to despise a prostituteis a license to despise any womanwho takes sex, money,and mobilityintoherhands.Iftricksare at libertyto abuse whores, chances are they willabuse otherwomen.Empowering whores