Feminism & Bioethics
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FEMINISM & BIOETHICS Beyond Reproduction
EDITED BY
Susan ...
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Feminism & Bioethics
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FEMINISM & BIOETHICS Beyond Reproduction
EDITED BY
Susan M. Wolf
New York Oxford OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1996
Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan
Copyright © 1996 by The Hastings Center Published by Oxford University Press, Inc., 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Feminism & bioethics : beyond reproduction / edited by Susan M. Wolf. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-19-508568-X; ISBN 0-19-509556-1 (pbk.) 1. Medical ethics. 2. Feminist ethics. 3. Feminism. I. Wolf, Susan M. [DNLM: 1. Bioethics. 2. Women's Rights. QH 332 F329 1995] R724.F395 1995 174'.2—DC20 DNLM/DLC 94-28186
135798642 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
To the memory of my great-grandmother Miriam— poet, suffragist
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Acknowledgments
This book was born of my interest in exploring what feminist work could bring to bioethics. It took shape through collaboration with the contributing authors whose work appears within and a host of others in bioethics, law, philosophy, and feminist theory. It was sustained by supportive colleagues at the three institutions that served as home during the book's preparation: The Hastings Center, Harvard, and the University of Minnesota. The book grew out of a desire to bring feminist perspectives to bear on problems in bioethics beyond human reproduction. The burgeoning literature on feminist ethics, jurisprudence, and psychology seemed to have much to say about the full range of issues in bioethics, from euthanasia to problems posed by the HIV epidemic, to research ethics, to resource allocation, and beyond. Yet there was virtually nothing investigating the relationship of feminist work to this broader range of problems. In 1990 I set to work, together with colleagues at The Hastings Center, to explore that terrain and help fill the gap. We convened a project group to meet for discussion and to generate papers. The group met twice, in November 1990 and again in November 1991, with much dialogue and exchange of manuscripts in between. Some of the chapters in this book were presented at our initial meeting; some took shape at the meeting that followed. A few grew out of exchanges afterward. All were reworked as our thinking evolved and new developments occurred.
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The project would not have flourished without the blessing and support of Daniel Callahan, Director of The Hastings Center. Indeed, Dan agreed to make this the first Hastings Center project I know to reimburse child care expenses that participants incurred in order to attend our meetings. He and Dr. Willard Gaylin, President of the Center, have managed to found a unique institution, in which free inquiry into the ethics of health care and the life sciences has continued for over twenty-five years. In my eight years there, first as a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow and then as Associate for Law, I found full freedom to investigate new ideas. This book bears witness. As on every issue, colleagues held differing views on what feminist perspectives could offer to bioethics. It is a glory of The Hastings Center that we were always free to disagree, and that the collegiality continued. Certain people at the Center were closely involved in this project from the start: James Lindemann Nelson, Hilde Lindemann Nelson, and Bette-Jane Crigger. Important additional participants at the Center included Bruce Jennings, Joseph Fins, Philip Boyle, Strachan Donnelley, and Julie Rothstein. Marna Howarth supplied critical research support. DeLona Norton provided administrative assistance. We were joined at project meetings by collaborators from other institutions who gave generously of their insights, talents, and energy. Many of these project members went on to write chapters for this book. Their hard work and commitment to this project are obvious in the pages that follow. Others who participated in our meetings and made substantial contributions include John Arras, Allison August, Sidney Callahan, James Childress, Ellen Wright Clayton, Irene Crowe, Margaret Farley, Elizabeth Gee, and Sara Swenson. Irene Crowe played a pivotal role. As a scholar, President of The Pettus-Crowe Foundation, and member of the Hastings Center Board of Directors, she nurtured this project from its inception. She attended the project meetings and conferred with us afterward. A grant from the foundation provided critical financial support. Most important, Irene has been a friend and advisor. Elizabeth Gee was another scholar and Hastings Center board member whose involvement was important to this project. Her death during the course of our work was a great loss. It is a comfort that she surely would have been gratified to see the project come to fruition. In addition to The Pettus-Crowe Foundation, two other sources provided essential financial support to this project at The Hastings Center. The Greenwall Foundation courageously provided funds for the risky and difficult task of breaking new ground. Greenwall has been in the forefront of foundations interested in bioethics and has supported my own work with great generosity. The foundation's faith in this project and the special interest of the foundation's President, William Stubing,
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has been a cornerstone of this effort. The Donnelley Trust, through funds donated to The Hastings Center to support intellectual investigation that otherwise might have difficulty finding adequate resources, also contributed critically to this project. This book aims to fulfill the trust's visionary mission. Midway through preparation of this book I moved to Harvard, having the good fortune to be awarded a 1992-93 Fellowship in the Program in Ethics and the Professions. As all who have held that fellowship know, and as their many publications attest, there are few environments as supportive of scholarly work. Professor Dennis Thompson, Director of the Program, responded to all of the work I inflicted upon him with the ideal mixture of encouragement and critique. Jean McVeigh, Helen Hawkins, and Ted Aaberg did everything possible to facilitate my labors. The other program fellows were a source of ready collegiality and intellectual aid. Larry Blum, Norman Daniels, Jorge Garcia, and Elizabeth Kiss were especially helpful. Rebecca Dresser served as both a contributor to this volume and a close colleague during the fellowship year; it was into her office that I bounded in celebration and crawled in frustration. Certain faculty members in the broader university also played a vital role, offering encouragement and suggestions. Martha Minow welcomed me into a Femcrits group in Cambridge as this book was just starting to take shape, urged me to consider the fellowship, and offered her insights at many junctures. Linda Emanuel was also instrumental in my coming to Harvard, opened the world of her research and the Medical School's Division of Medical Ethics, pondered the complexities of gender, and became a trusted co-author and friend. In 1993 my labors found a new home at the University of Minnesota. As Associate Professor of Law and Medicine in the Law School and a Faculty Associate in the Center for Biomedical Ethics, I found wellsprings of support on both sides of the Mississippi River. Dean Robert Stein in the Law School and Professor Arthur Caplan, Director of the Center, were unflagging in their enthusiasm. As a fellow laborer in the fields of bioethics, Arthur gave the special gift of complete confidence in the importance of this effort. Steven Miles and other colleagues at the Center also lent significant support. Professor Shirley Garner, Director of the University's Center for Advanced Feminist Studies, kindly asked me to present the project for discussion and helped build important intellectual connections for me in my new home. Law students Kent Spies and Terrence J. Dwyer provided able research assistance. Many people outside of the three institutions that have been my homes have aided this book along the way, reading drafts, talking through the issues, leading to the next source, and providing moral support. Each chapter acknowledges those who assisted in its prepara-
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tion. Others who helped with the book as a whole, some in large ways and some in small, include Lori Andrews, Tom Beauchamp, Allan Brandt, Claudia Card, Alta Charo, Larry Churchill, Annette Dula, Barry Hoffmaster, Helen Bequaert Holmes, Ruth Hubbard, Eric Juengst, Patricia King, Abby Lippman, Ruth Macklin, Kathleen Nolan, Patricia Peppin, Karen Rothenberg, and Zipporah Wiseman. Jay Katz demonstrated once again that he is the most gifted of mentors, as a generation of scholars in law and medicine knows. Alison Wetherfield offered a community of spirit even from half a globe away. Judy Shaw provided camaraderie and perspective as we wandered over Martha's Vineyard and points west. My father, William B. Wolf, Jr., remained true counselor and ally. I am most indebted, of course, to the fifteen scholars who contributed to this volume. They met my queries and concerns, more black ink than I think any expected, and the tyranny of the flow chart on my wall with creativity and determination. I kept waiting for armed revolt. It never came. Friendship flowered instead. The fifteen-minute phone call on footnotes became an hour on feminist theory, how the writing process was going, jobs, children, life. We have discussed chapters while playing with a daughter by the Charles River, on an expedition to a play on genetics at the Kennedy Center, at a meeting on women's health in Texas, by the conference center pool in Taos, at lunches, at dinners, and always on the phone. These are voices that will never again have to tell me who's calling. I am grateful for the chance to engage with them deeply on what we wrote, and fully on how we lived. At critical junctures in my work, presentations that I was invited to make at the Association of American Law Schools' Health Law Workshop, the American Public Health Association's annual meeting, the University of Texas Law School, and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, as well as The Hastings Center, Harvard, and the University of Minnesota, were immensely helpful. Participants in the workshop that Rosemarie Tong and I led on feminism and bioethics at the 1993 Bioethics Summer Retreat provided important impetus. Such opportunities for exchange and debate are only growing, as more and more people recognize the significance of work on feminism and bioethics. Now, as always, I am indebted as much to those who offer me challenge, as to those who agree.
Contents
CONTRIBUTORS,
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics, 3 Susan M. Wolf
I: The Relationship of Feminism and Bioethics 1. Feminism and Bioethics, 47 Susan Sherwin 2. Feminist Approaches to Bioethics, 67 Rosemarie Tong 3. On Treatment of Myopia: Feminist Standpoint Theory and Bioethics, 95 Mary B. Mahowald 4. Reconstructing the Patient: Starting with Women of Color, 116 Dorothy E. Roberts 5. What Bioethics Can Learn from the Women's Health Movement, 144 Rebecca Dresser
II: Feminist Perspectives on Specific Problems in Bioethics 6. A Feminist View of Health, 163 Laura M. Purdy 7. Communicative Ethics in Medicine: The Physician-Patient Relationship, 184 Janet Farrell Smith 8. Ethical Obstacles to the Participation of Women in Biomedical Research, 216 Vanessa Merton 9. Women as Vessels and Vectors: Lessons from the HIV Epidemic, 252 Ruth Faden, Nancy Kass, and Deven McGraw
xii 10. Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 282 Susan M. Wolf 11. Feminism, Bioethics, and Genetics, 318 Adrienne Asch and Gail Geller 12. Justice in the Allocation of Health Care Resources: A Feminist Account, 351 Hilde Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson INDEX, 371
Contents
Contributors
Adrienne Asch is the Henry R. Luce Professor in Biology, Ethics and the Politics of Human Reproduction at Wellesley College. She received her Ph.D. in social psychology from Columbia University. From 1987 to 1990 she served as Associate in Social Science and Policy with the New Jersey Bioethics Commission, and in 1993 was a member of the Bioethics Working Group of the federal Task Force on Health Care Reform. With Michelle Fine she coedited Women with Disabilities: Essays in Psychology, Culture, and Politics (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1988), which won the Distinguished Publication Award of the Association for Women in Psychology in 1989. Her publications also include "Reproductive Technology and Disability," in Sherrill Cohen and Nadine Taub, eds., Reproductive Laws for the 1990s (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1989), and "Surrogacy and the Family: Social and Value Considerations," in Dianne M. Bartels, Reinhard Priester, Dorothy E. Vawter, and Arthur L. Caplan, eds., Beyond Baby M: Ethical Issues in New Reproductive Techniques (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1990). Rebecca Dresser is a Professor at Case Western University School of Law, with a joint appointment at the Center for Biomedical Ethics in the School of Medicine. She received her J.D. from Harvard Law School. She was the legal consultant for the American Academy of Pediatrics Committee on Bioethics from 1987 to 1994, and has participated in numerous other national projects. Among her previous publications are "Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research," Hastings Center Report 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1992): 24-29, and "Feeding the Hunger Artists: Legal Issues in Treating Anorexia Nervosa," Wisconsin Law Review 1984: 297-374. Ruth R. Faden is the Philip Franklin Wagley Professor of Biomedical Ethics and the Director of the Bioethics Institute at Johns Hopkins University. She is also a Senior Research Scholar at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University, and Chair of the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments. She received her M.A. in the humanities from the University of Chicago, and her M.P.H. and Ph.D. in attitudes and behavior from the University of California, Berkeley. She is coeditor with Nancy Kass of the forthcoming book HIV, AIDS, and Childbearing: Public Policy, Private Lives (New
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Contributors
York, NY: Oxford University Press). Other publications include AIDS, Women, and the Next Generation: Towards a Morally Acceptable Public Policy for HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), which she coedited with Gail Geller and Madison Powers, and A History and Theory of Informed Consent (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), co-authored with Tom L. Beauchamp, with the collaboration of Nancy M. P. King. Gail Geller is an Assistant Professor in the School of Medicine at Johns Hopkins University, with a joint appointment in the School of Public Health. Her primary affiliation is with the Genetics and Public Policy Studies research unit. She received her Sc.D. from the Program in Law, Ethics, and Health at the School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University. She chaired the American Public Health Association Forum on Bioethics in 1989-90; served as consultant to the National Academy of Sciences, Institute of Medicine Committee on Prenatal and Newborn Screening for HIV Infection in 1990; and was a Chateaubriand Fellow in Paris in 1991. With Ruth Faden and Madison Powers she coedited AIDS, Women, and the Next Generation: Towards a Morally Acceptable Public Policy for HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991). Her other publications include "Incorporation of Genetics into Primary Care Practice: Will Physicians Do the Counseling and Will They Be Directive?" Archives of Family Medicine 2 (1993): 1119-25. Nancy E. Kass is an Assistant Professor in the Program in Law, Ethics, and Health in the School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University. She received her Sc.D. in health policy from Johns Hopkins and completed a postdoctoral fellowship in bioethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University. She served as consultant to the President's Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments in 199495. With Ruth Faden she is coeditor of the forthcoming book HIV, AIDS, and Childbearing: Public Policy, Private Lives (New York, NY: Oxford University Press). Other publications include "Policy Options for Prenatal Screening Programs for HIV: The Preferences of Inner-City Pregnant Women," AIDS and Public Policy Journal 7 (1992): 224-33, and "Counseling in the Context of Prenatal HIV Testing," in Ruth R. Faden, Gail Geller, and Madison Powers, eds., AIDS, Women, and the Next Generation: Towards a Morally Acceptable Public Policy for HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991). Mary B. Mahowald is a Professor in the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology and The College, and Assistant Director of the Center for
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Clinical Medical Ethics at the University of Chicago. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Marquette University. She is the principal investigator on projects supported by the National Center for Human Genome Research to examine the impact of the Human Genome Project on Women, and its implications for primary caregivers. She also serves on the Breast Cancer Research Integration Panel for the Department of Defense. Her books include Philosophy of Woman: An Anthology of Classic and Current Concepts, 3d ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1994), and Women and Children in Health Care: An Unequal Majority (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). Deven C. McGraw received her J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center and her M.P.H. from the School of Public Health at Johns Hopkins University in 1995. She served as Executive Editor of the Georgetown Law Journal. She has published "Financial Incentives to Limit Services: Should Physicians be Required to Disclose these to Patients?"Georgetown Law Journal 83: 1821-47 (1995), and "Trades, AIDS, and the Public's Health: The Limits of Economic Analysis," Georgetown Law Journal 83: 79-107 (1994) (reviewing Tomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, Private Choices and Public Health: The AIDS Epidemic in an Economic Perspective (1993)) with Ronald Bayer and Lawerence O. Gostin. Vanessa Merton is the Associate Dean for Clinical Education and a Professor at Pace University School of Law. She was the first Chairperson of the Institutional Review Board of the New York Community Research Initiative, the community-based research arm of the People with AIDS Coalition. She received her J.D. from New York University. Her previous articles include "The Exclusion of Pregnant, Pregnable, and Once-Pregnable People (a.k.a. Women) from Biomedical Reseach," American Journal of Law & Medicine 19 (1993): 369-451; "Communitybased AIDS Research," Evaluation Review 14 (1990): 502-37; and "Confidentiality and the 'Dangerous' Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers," Emory Law Journal 31 (1982): 263-343. Hilde Lindemann Nelson is the Director of the Center for Applied and Professional Ethics at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. From 1990 to 1995 she was a research associate at The Hastings Center and Associate Editor of the Hastings Center Report, having previously taught at Michigan State University and St. John's University in Minnesota. Among her publications are "Against Caring," Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (Spring 1992): 8-15; "The Architect and the Bee," Bioethics 8 (July 1994): 247-67; "Resistance and Insubordination," Hypatia 10 (Spring 1995): 23-40; and, with James Lindemann Nelson, The Patient in the Family (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995).
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James Lindemann Nelson is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Formerly Associate for Ethical Studies at The Hastings Center, he has also held faculty appointments at Vassar College, Michigan State University, and St. John's University in Minnesota, where he codirected a federally funded project to integrate feminist perspectives into the curriculum. His publications include "Making Peace in Gestational Conflicts," Theoretical Medicine 13 (1992): 319-28; and, with Hilde Lindemann Nelson, "Feminism, Social Policy, and Long-Acting Contraception," Hastings Center Report 25 (Jan.-Feb. 1995): S30-32; and The Patient in the Family (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995). Laura M. Purdy is a Professor of Philosophy at Wells College. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanford University. She is currently on the editorial boards of Hypatia and Bioethics. She was the Guest Editor of a special issue of Hypatia, "Ethics & Reproduction" (Fall 1989). A volume based on that issue and the prior one was subsequently published as Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992). Her book In Their Best Interest? The Case Against Equal Rights for Children was published in 1992 by Cornell University Press. Cornell will publish a collection of her essays, Reproducing Persons, in 1996. Dorothy E. Roberts is a Professor at Rutgers University Law School, Newark. She received her J.D. from Harvard Law School. She has served as a consultant to the Center for Women Policy Studies and the New Jersey Women and AIDS Network. Her previous publications include "The Genetic Tie," University of Chicago Law Review 62 (1995): 209-73, and "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy," Harvard Law Review 104 (1991): 1419-82. She is working on a book tentatively titled Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty. Susan Sherwin is Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Canada. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanford University. She is the author of No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992), and coeditor of Moral Problems in Medicine, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1983) with Samuel Gorovitz and others. Janet Farrell Smith is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. She earned her M.A. and Ph.D. in philosophy from Columbia University. She has received a number of fel-
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lowships and grants, including from the National Endowment for the Humanities, Harvard University, and the Mellon Foundation. Her previous publications include "A Critique of Adversarial Discourse: Gender as an Aspect of Cultural Diversity," in Lawrence Foster and Patricia Susan Herzog, eds., Defending Diversity: Philosophical Perspectives on Pluralism and Multiculturalism (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994); "Plato, Irony and Equality," reprinted in Nancy Tuana, ed., Re-Reading the Canon: Essays in Plato's Philosophy (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993); and "Rights-Conflict, Pregnancy and Abortion," in Carol C. Gould, ed., Beyond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1983). Rosemarie Tong is Thatcher Professor in Philosophy and Medical Humanities at Davidson College. She received her Ph.D. in philosophy from Temple University. Her publications include Feminine and Feminist Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993); Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); and Controlling Our Reproductive Destiny (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 1994), co-authored with Larry Kaplan. Susan M. Wolf is Associate Professor of Law and Medicine at the University of Minnesota Law School, and a Faculty Associate at the University's Center for Biomedical Ethics. She received her J.D. from Yale Law School. In 1992-93 she was a Fellow in the Program in Ethics and the Professions at Harvard University. Previously, she was a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellow and then Associate for Law at The Hastings Center, where she directed the project that produced Guidelines on the Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the Dying (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press & The Hastings Center, 1987). Her previous publications include "Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a New Pragmatism," American Journal of Law & Medicine 20 (1994): 395-415, and "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Caring," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858.
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Feminism & Bioethics
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics Susan M. Wolf
I was too young—I had never heard of Lou Gehrig's disease until my grandmother Ruth returned from Minnesota with the diagnosis. Her hand already cramped and frozen, she explained that "the Mayo" predicted the rest of her would follow, in a neuromuscular degeneration called amyotrophic lateral sclerosis. I remember thinking that a trip so far from Washington, D.C., must mean they were right. And so they were. The family watched for four more years as our matriarch, source of comfort, of Thanksgiving dinners, of calming words, became paralyzed and gradually slid toward death. I had never been part of this before and something triggered. I wrote her letters saying how much particular acts of love had mattered. I asked her whether in my generation she would have chosen a career instead of devoting all to the family. (No, she would not.) Near the end, as she lay fully paralyzed on a ventilator, unable to communicate, I voiced the rage I saw in her eyes, an emotion I'd never seen her express. I guess that is when the shift started, toward wondering about gender and death, woman-ness and all sorts of choices about illness and the body. No one elicited my grandmother's preferences about whether to use a ventilator. Once she became speechless, family members speculated about what she would want, but seemed to project their own feelings about what a woman of such "fastidiousness" (I remember the word) would choose.
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
My grandmother died in 1976. Just three weeks later the New Jersey Supreme Court brought these choices about life-sustaining treatment to national attention by issuing the Quinlan decision. Her disease would come to afflict many of the plaintiffs in subsequent court cases. At the time she died, I was just out of college. Nearly twenty years later I had found a career in bioethics. But I stood almost as helpless at my grandfather's deathbed. Emaciated from emphysema and multi-organ systems failure, he lay in a darkened room in Baltimore. Only this time the grandparent in the bed articulated his own preferences about treatment, his own rage and finally resignation. The connection and contrast were clear: his voice versus her silence; his efforts to control his care, while her care was guided by others' sense of her feminine "fastidiousness" and role. He was buried by her side. These stories are far from unique. All families (by which I mean not just traditional families, but people committed to sharing their lives) face death and more—choices about childbearing and often reproductive technologies, anxieties about genetic disorders (even in families without blood ties), efforts to cope with disability, and inevitably illnesses minor and devastating. At the same time, families are both shaping and learning each member's sense of what gender means. I suspect that the link I saw in my family between these two domains is commonplace. Both are arenas in which we face choices about the body, the deep structure of our lives, and what we value. Yet bioethics—a field devoted to analyzing choices about dying, reproduction, genetics, disability, and disease—has until recently ignored the link to gender and the illumination that feminist analyses might offer. This is a puzzle. Most of the quandaries that occupy modern bioethics, from reproductive technologies and genetic screening to the HIV epidemic and the allocation of health care resources, have distinct implications for women and for men.1 Studies indicate that when it comes to getting health care, women and men seem to be treated differently as well.2 Among health professionals and scientists, gender differences in treatment and research have thus become a significant concern. Even governmental efforts to combat gender bias have begun.3 Meanwhile, in the individual disciplines that contribute to form the interdisciplinary field of bioethics, feminist work is well under way. Feminist ethics and jurisprudence have both come of age; the literature in each is substantial.4 Feminist criticism and theory outside those domains have flourished as well. 5 Indeed, there has been considerable feminist work on science and medicine. 6 Against this background, it becomes truly perplexing why bioethics has paid so little attention to gender and feminist work. To be sure,
Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
5
in some areas such work was unavoidable, especially in the ethics of reproduction7 and nursing. 8 There have also been isolated feminist analyses of other topics.9 But until recently there have been few attempts to examine the full range of bioethical problems with systematic attention to gender and feminist work. 10 This book is an attempt to fill that gap, to explore what feminist perspectives can bring to bioethics. The five chapters in Part I investigate the relationship that can be forged between feminism and bioethics. As is now clear, no one theory or perspective constitutes feminism; there are a number of feminisms, which some feminist writers have classified. 11 Thus there is no one correct view on the relationship between feminism and bioethics. All five chapters argue for the necessity of feminist analysis in bioethics, but each in a different way. They urge the importance of liberal feminism, the advantages of feminist over feminine analysis, the use of feminist standpoint theory, analysis that starts with the experiences of women of color, and a bioethics that learns from the women's self-help health movement. The seven chapters in Part II then apply feminist perspectives to specific problems in bioethics: the definition of health, the patientphysician relationship, the exclusion of women from research, the HIV epidemic, physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia, genetics, and the allocation of scarce health care resources. These chapters add to the roster of feminist methodologies offered in Part I by presenting a feminist communicative ethics, an attempted reconciliation of the ethics of principle and of care, and feminist interpretations of the demands of justice, among others. These chapters demonstrate the advantages of paying attention to gender and feminism in bioethics. Yet before we make the case for this new turn in bioethics, we have to ask where bioethics has been. We must return to the puzzle: why has bioethics paid so little attention to gender and to feminist work? In this Introduction I want to argue that it is no accident that bioethics has largely ignored gender and feminism, long after the rest of the humanities and law have found such work to be important. Nor is the explanation to be found in the demography of modern bioethics, for women have played an important part in the field from the start. 12 Instead, the answer is to be found in the deep structure of bioethics— in its early embrace of a liberal individualism largely inattentive to social context; in its emphasis on deduction from ethical principles rather than induction from concrete cases; in its tendency to view ethical problems either dyadically as problems between individuals, or nationally as problems for the entire society, but rarely at an intermediate level attentive to the moral significance of groups; and in the failure of bioethics to be sufficiently self-critical by examining whom the field serves and how.
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This analysis of the deeper reasons why there has been a wall between bioethics and feminism has implications. First, it means that the neglect of gender and feminism in bioethics has not been a product of an intent to harm. In fact, bioethicists have fought to protect vulnerable patients and research subjects from harm and to establish their moral and legal rights. But the analysis also means that forging a relationship between bioethics and feminism requires a critique of bioethics itself. Thus this book's message is more than "me too," more than a call to expand bioethical concerns and methods to include women and feminism. This book offers a critique of bioethics and calls for its reconstruction. The reconstruction we attempt to inaugurate here should, in fact, reach beyond gender and feminist work. Until quite recently, bioethics has been even less attentive to questions of race and ethnicity. This is at least peculiar, given the fact that the Nuremberg trials of Nazi physicians for atrocities committed against Jews and others, and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study performed by the U.S. Public Health Service on African Americans are foundational events for bioethics and scandals in which race and ethnicity played a large part. The demographics of bioethics may be important here—although some scholars of color have been quite important to the development of bioethics, U.S. bioethicists have overwhelmingly been white. Yet here again, a deeper dynamic seems at work. Some of the same features of bioethics that account for a reluctance to focus on gender and feminist perspectives—a failure to recognize the moral significance of groups, to pay attention to the particularity of experience, and to analyze differences among individuals—also come into play here. Although bioethicists have attempted something progressive, the unseating of traditional physician paternalism, we may have been slow to recognize the limits of our progressiveness and our perspective. We have seen ourselves as agents of change arguing for patients' and subjects' rights, rather than recognizing that in some respects we represented the status quo and the dominant culture. Bioethics is now challenged by an emerging literature on African American perspectives. 13 Other ethnic and racial groups may join the fray as well. 14 Thus after years in which modern bioethics seemed static, with little room for genuine breakthroughs, we now see a period of deep challenge and growth. This book aims to be part of that, by trying to show what a bioethics truly attentive to gender and feminism might look like. But twelve chapters cannot exhaust the possibilities. We hope to help engender a new discourse, not finish it. The task of this Introduction is to begin at the beginning. It is to explore why bioethics has largely ignored gender and feminism, what
Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
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steps are required to reconstruct bioethics, and how the individual chapters in this book can help.
Feminism and Bioethics: Definitions No work on feminism and bioethics can begin without defining both. Defining bioethics is the easier of the two tasks. It is the study and formulation of the ethics of health care and the biological sciences. I do not dwell on the distinction between ethics and morals; "bioethics" usually is used to encompass both. However, I prefer "bioethics" to "biomedical ethics." The dictionary defines "medical" as relating to physicians. But bioethics takes on ethical problems raised by health and health care, whether the relevant healer is a physician, nurse, or other person, and whether the individuals experiencing health problems are already patients in the health care system or not. Finally, ethical problems in the biological sciences include all problems relating to research on human subjects, as well as debates about more basic research in its future application to human beings. Some have begun to use the term "bioethics" even more broadly; we now see bioethical analysis of animal use and the environment.15 The focus of this book, however, is on human beings. That has been the heart of modern bioethics. That is where work on gender dynamics and feminist analysis of human problems will have its greatest implications. So far I have defined "bioethics" by specifying the objects of its concern. But it can also be described sociologically as the activity of a recognizable group of people. Modern bioethics is a collaboration of several disciplines, with their relative importance shifting over time. Philosophers, lawyers, physicians, and scientists have played major roles from the beginning. Theologians were significant players early, but more recently have worried about a loss of influence. 16 Meanwhile, nurses have come to play a larger role.17 Social scientists such as medical sociologists and anthropologists are increasingly important, both as critics and contributors. 18 A few economists, too, have joined in this interdisciplinary work. 19 There remain the ambiguities and disputes that plague most interdisciplinary fields. There are no hard rules about who may label herself or himself a "bioethicist." Like any academic field, however, participants are most recognizable by their contributions to a burgeoning bioethics literature. And in recent years bioethics has developed subdivisions. "Clinical ethics," for example, focuses on handling ethical problems in patient care. 20 Some participants in that (though by no means all) concentrate on clinical service rather than academic
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scholarship. This book speaks to bioethics both as an academic discipline and as an area of clinical practice and consultation. Defining "feminism" is considerably harder. Alison Jaggar traces the origins of the term from the French and from nineteenth century U.S. usage, concluding that it is "[n]ow . . . commonly used to refer to all who seek ... to end women's subordination." 21 Susan Sherwin, in a consistent but more epistemological vein, sees feminism as "the perception of the power relations that structure gender relations." 22 Yet many who seek to define "feminism" have noted the difficulty: there are different sorts of feminism, and conflicts between different orientations within the overall category.23 Attempting a short definition usually becomes a search for the broadest and most inclusive rubric. Thus it can be safely said that feminist work takes gender and sex as centrally important analytic categories, seeks to understand their operation in the world, and strives to change the distribution and use of power to stop the oppression of women. There are significant implications of this general description. First, not all work done by women is feminist. One can be female and yet ignore issues of gender and oppression; indeed, one can support the domination of women. Second, one need not be of the female gender to do feminist work. A number of men have published substantial contributions. A feminist bioethics is not a separate bioethics for women. It is a bioethics that sees oppression based on gender as a serious wrong and critically investigates the workings of power and gender. Moreover, a literature now challenges the notion that there are only two dichotomous genders, arguing that biologically, behaviorally, and culturally there is more fluidity. 24 People struggling with the very notion of gender may be well armed to do ground-breaking feminist work. Third, merely paying attention to the category of "women," as important as it is, does not make work feminist. One can attend to the category yet abstain from analyzing and challenging oppression. There is a difference between asking the "woman question"—Where are the women in this picture?—and going on to perform feminist analysis. Finally, feminist work is not synonymous with the ethics of care. The ethics of care has been developed starting with the work of Carol Gilligan.25 She challenged the notion that there was one superior way to think about moral problems, a way that emphasized abstract and general notions of justice and rights. She suggested that there was another way, which emphasized particularities, relationships, and continued connection. Gilligan did not claim that all men thought in the first way and all women in the second, but she did suggest that men and women tended in those directions. She also insisted that maturity was marked by the capacity to think in both ways and to inte-
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grate the two. Scholars since have debated different ways that integration might be forged.26 They have also pressed forward empirically to test the notion that these different ways of thinking have a correlation with gender.27 The ethics of care is an important domain of work to which I return below, but it is only one variety of feminist work. Indeed, its merits and demerits are hotly debated by feminists themselves. Some object to what they see as its valorization of negative traits born of subordination and the need to please. Others object that the ethics of care should not go so far as to jettison rights and justice. A further complaint is that the ethics of care offers too little analytic rigor in facing moral problems. Indeed, some classify the ethics of care as "feminine" ethics rather than "feminist." 28 My point here is not to attack the ethics of care. Instead, it is to debunk the notion that feminist ethics equals the ethics of care. The two are not synonymous. The shape and scope of feminist work vary by discipline. In law, central tasks of feminist work have been to uncover gender bias in the law as written and as applied; to show how gender bias is a means of domination; to debate the preferability of equal treatment versus special treatment for women; to discover the way gender and gender bias are manifested in the language and constructs of law; to challenge the traditional distinction between the public and private spheres and reconceptualize the role of the state; to critique the sufficiency and even the desirability of rights concepts; and to show how gender bias interlocks with other forms of bias and domination based on race, class, and sexual orientation. In moral philosophy there have been other tasks: to uncover gender bias in traditional philosophical approaches; to challenge some of the linchpins of those approaches, such as impartiality and universalizability; to question the adequacy of a morality built on deduction from abstract principles with too little attention to particulars, context, and relationships; to describe different ways of analyzing and responding to moral problems and debate their connection to gender; to articulate and debate an ethics of care specifically and show what relationship it might have to an ethics of justice or rights; to challenge the traditional centrality of a liberal individualism that prizes autonomy and devalues interdependency; and to revive attention to the role of the emotions and virtues in moral life. Finally, feminists who work in the philosophy of science have challenged the notion that science can be done neutrally, unaffected by one's standpoint; have scrutinized the language and constructs of science, uncovering gendered notions; have suggested there may be different ways of doing science and relating to one's subject, which in turn may be correlated with gender; have uncovered gender bias in the
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
observational sciences and the theories built on those observations; and have challenged the uses of science and technology. As should be clear, feminism is not some pre-set agenda imposed in a regimented way on each discipline that happens to land in its path. Feminists who work in the disciplines that have contributed to modern bioethics are scholars working to reconceptualize their disciplines' questions, answers, methods, and boundaries. They have found ample cause for concern in their home disciplines, including a legal tradition that has treated women as property and been exceedingly slow to condemn domestic violence, acquaintance rape, and sexual harassment; plus a long and famous history of explicitly misogynist statements from many of the great philosophers comprising the dominant Western moral tradition. One still sometimes hears the objection that feminist work is somehow not part of these disciplines, that it is fundamentally antiintellectual, "merely" an agenda for social change. In some ways this is a compliment. It acknowledges that feminists stand outside the old order in some sense, seek fundamental change, and usually care not just about theoretical shifts but real change for real people. Indeed, some feminists would be delighted to hear such an accusation, because of concern that their academic work may be too removed from worldly change. Yet in other ways the accusation is an attempt to marginalize feminist work, to treat it as outside the primary work of a discipline. Ultimately, that attempt fails on any serious reading of the important feminist literature, certainly in the disciplines that prominently contribute to bioethics. The texts themselves and the contributions they make, large and small, are the final answer. In fact, feminist work is so widely considered an important part of jurisprudence and philosophy, among other fields, that the complaint itself seems to be withering away.
Bioethics in Isolation from Feminism Modern bioethics is a creature of the late 1960s and early 1970s.29 It has concerned itself preeminently with the protection of vulnerable patients and research subjects, the relationship between medical and scientific fact and social meaning, and the ethics that should guide physicians and scientists. All of this should have led bioethics to an intimate engagement with feminist work. After all, feminist work has focused on historical patterns of dominance and subordination. It has also focused on the relationship between the biological fact of one's sex and the social meaning of gender. And feminism has offered a critique of social hierarchy and the power of professionals. Thus feminists have analyzed some of the same phenomena as bioethicists. Moreover, feminist work has offered intellectual tools and
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models that bioethicists might have found useful. Yet even this understates the reasons why one might have expected modern bioethics to pay close attention to feminist writing. Gender itself has cried out for analysis in bioethics. Women are more often patients in the United States and have more physician contacts.30 Even when women are not themselves patients, they frequently have to make the decisions about when others should go to a health professional.31 They have made those decisions as mothers, as wives, and in other intimate roles. If the users of medical care have mostly been women, the physicians providing care have mostly been men.32 Thus the paradigmatic medical encounter has involved a woman needing care going to a professional man. When bioethics has complained of physician "paternalism," the term could have been construed in its literal, gendered sense: the physician dominating and deciding as a father would. Of course, there were even more stories of gender lurking. Healers have not always been predominantly men. The male physicians who have dominated in modern times displaced female healers. Paul Starr writes, "In colonial America, . . . most medical care was routinely provided by women in the home. Women were also prominent as lay practitioners. . . . [M]edical practice in New Jersey as late as 1818 belonged almost entirely to women." 33 Those female healers, including midwives, practiced a very different kind of medicine. Their relationships with patients were less hierarchical and dominating. Their claims to knowledge also were based more on mastery of information accessible to lay people and less on assertions of esoteric insight available only to the professionally initiated.34 Here too, then, there was a historical gender dynamic behind the role carved out by physicians. Yet bioethics largely ignored it. Even the choice of bioethics to focus mainly on physicians in the health care arena was a choice to attend to men and ignore women. While men dominated among physicians, the idea that most caregivers were physicians was an illusion. In acute care settings such as hospitals, nurses have outnumbered physicians and delivered far more hands-on care.35 In long-term care settings such as nursing homes, nurses and nurses' aides have been the primary caregivers to an even greater extent, usually only punctuated by the occasional physician visit.36 In the home, caregiving has overwhelmingly been done by women.37 Yet bioethics has viewed all these women as marginal and the physician as central. Turning from the gender of the actors to the nature of the illness and disabilities that bioethics has analyzed, again gender seems to have been largely overlooked. Some of the largest controversies in bioethics have been about reproductive issues, issues in which women have a
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fundamentally different stake. To many people it now seems almost unimaginable that one could debate abortion, surrogate (or contract) motherhood, maternal-fetal relations, and the use of fetal tissue while ignoring the fact that the adult whose body is at stake is a woman. Ethical and legal rules on all of these problems will affect women first and most, and analysis of such rules must attend to the gender inequalities they may reinforce or create. Yet bioethics has largely ignored this. Even more profoundly, our societal definitions of what constitutes illness and thus merits medical attention have been influenced by gender. Historians have argued that defining women's psychological reactions as madness and women's usual physical functioning as pathological have reflected the biases and misogyny of the day. 38 Thus the medical sphere has been a major arena in which gender bias and conceptualizations of the female body as somehow defective have been played out. At the same time, women have indeed experienced a higher frequency of some illnesses and conditions. Clinical depression, migraine headaches, and osteoporosis, for example, do affect women more often than men.39 Investigating why demands attention to gender. Gender must also come to the fore when examining why some conditions affecting women have historically been ignored. For example, only recently has the medical community appreciated the incidence of cardiac illness among women. Instead, heart attacks and cardiac disease have inaccurately been viewed as predominantly men's problems.40 Again, understanding why some conditions wrongly come to be stereotyped by gender requires attention to gender's role. Until recently gender has played a large but unexamined role in the research sphere as well. Modern bioethics has differentiated research and treatment, creating distinct ethical rules with heightened consent requirements and greater restrictions when human beings are acting as research subjects rather than simply receiving treatment.41 But bioethics has not paid sufficient attention to the release of drugs without adequate testing for safety and efficacy in women. Nor has bioethics focused enough on the systematic exclusion of women, particularly women of childbearing age, from AIDS research protocols that may be the only means of access to a promising drug. Indeed, until recently there has been little attention to gender in the literature on research ethics. There has been little analysis of gender equity in the selection of subjects. And again, until recently, we see inadequate scrutiny of how research moneys are allocated, whether women's health problems are receiving adequate research support, and whether women and their health professionals are getting the data they need to make sound treatment choices. Gender has also been largely ignored in bioethical analysis of health
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policy. As bioethicists have debated the care of the poor and the aged, we have devoted too little attention to the fact that the poor are disproportionately women and children, and the aged disproportionately female.42 Thus any health policy differentially affecting the poor and the elderly cries out for analysis by gender. 43 When health care reimbursement schemes are debated that involve releasing patients from hospitals earlier and sicker, we need to acknowledge that the need for care does not vanish. The burden of care is shifted, usually to a woman in the home.44 Over and over, gender seems to be playing an important role, now and historically. And the fact is finally being acknowledged in high places. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) under the directorship of Dr. Bernadine Healy created an Office of Research on Women's Health in 1990. The NIH has also initiated and funded a multi-center study of women's health called the Women's Health Initiative. There have been calls for the establishment of a new medical specialty of women's health, born of frustration with the current disorganized approach.45 Yet almost none of this new attention to women's health issues is a product of work in bioethics. Bioethics has similarly failed to pay much attention to the women's movement's vigorous critique of medicine and health care. The women's movement has criticized medical inattention to incest, rape, and domestic violence; to women's health matters such as breast cancer and cystitis; and to the special effects in women of cardiac illness and other conditions affecting both men and women. It has challenged medical definitions of depression and other conditions, as well as medical responses to childbirth and menopause, arguing that the medical community has embraced sexist presumptions and medicalized normal parts of women's lives. It has decried harm caused to women by interventions such as diethylstilbestrol (DES), intrauterine devices (lUDs), and breast implants. It has objected to paternalistic and infantalizing patient-physician relations, and instead has sought new models of therapeutic relationships in the work of nurse-practitioners, midwives, feminist clinics, and the women's self-help health movement. It has focused attention on physician sexual abuse of patients, psychotherapists who engage in sexual behavior with their patients, and the question of whether sex with patients should also be forbidden after the termination of psychotherapy. Yet there has been surprisingly little bioethical response. So why has bioethics not embraced gender as analytically central and feminist critique as important? After all, modern bioethics has been a passionate plea for patients' and research subjects' moral and legal rights. It grew up alongside other rights movements—for civil rights and, in fact, women's rights. Many of the issues bioethics has deemed central should have thrust gender onto center stage: surrogate mother-
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
hood, abortion, the use of fetal tissue, maternal-fetal relations. The cases that have played a big role in the development of bioethics could have done the same, for we find Mrs. Schloendorff, Karen Ann Quinlan, Claire Conroy, Elizabeth Bouvia, Mary Beth Whitehead, Nancy Beth Cruzan, Debbie, Diane, Baby Fae, Baby Jane Doe, 46 and many others. There have surely been important cases featuring men; the point is not a statistical predominance of women's cases, but rather that a deep analysis of any of these cases might have provoked serious attention to gender. Finally, the experience of women health care professionals might have spurred concern with gender and feminist work. Nurses have long struggled with hierarchy and subordination, competing conceptions of their role, the question of how to handle unethical orders from physicians, and even abuse. We now discover that not only medical students but physicians at all levels, including the very senior, experience sexual harassment.47 Women also suffer from additional obstacles to their advancement in academic medicine and so remain underrepresented in the highest ranks.48 Yet bioethics until quite recently has largely failed to respond to any of this with attention to gender and feminist work. Explaining why is critical. Until we know why, the wall between bioethics and feminism is likely to remain. Moreover, the blocks of that wall may be built into the very structure of bioethics. If so, a full-scale reexamination of that structure is in order.
Explaining the Wall of Separation I have already rejected the demographic analysis that would explain inattention to feminism as a product of too few women in bioethics. Instead, the inattention seems grounded in the nature of the field itself. Four features in particular seem responsible: a historical preference for abstract rules and principles that disregarded individual differences and context; an embrace of liberal individualism that obscured the importance of groups; the structure of bioethics as a field frequently serving government, medical schools, hospitals, and health professionals in a way that may have discouraged attention to the views of people lacking power inside and outside those institutions; and the frequent isolation of bioethics from major trends within the academy, including feminism, Critical Race Theory, and postmodernism.
The Dominance of Principles The historical preference for reasoning from abstract rules and principles has recently become a target of widespread critique within the
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field of bioethics itself. Most of these critics have nothing to do with feminist work. They ground their rejection of a relatively top-down or deductivist approach on the view that a more bottom-up or inductive alternative is superior. Thus some advocate casuistry, others a rich ethnography as the starting point, and still others a specified principlism that involves increasing specification of norms as the moral judge travels between the particulars of cases and more global norms. Feminists, too, have struggled with these issues for quite a while. Feminist work contributes the specific concern that universal moral rules or principles posited for the abstract, generic person erase that person's gender (not to mention race, class, and other characteristics).49 This makes it difficult to query the significance of gender in the moral situation. It is only when a situation is appreciated in its particulars that the full moral problem and plausible tools for its resolution appear. Defenders of a top-down ethics driven by principles or rules might respond that this criticism requires merely a corrective attention to gender in applying the rules or principles. Thus justice, to cite one of the principles usually held central in bioethics, could be understood to require justice between genders. Yet this does not fully respond to the problem. Feminist standpoint theorists have shown that there is no neutral standpoint from which to impose the moral principles and rules, even if they include a requirement of gender justice. One's standpoint (including one's gender) can affect what is perceived as a problem in the first place, and then each step of the analysis. Is the exclusion of women of childbearing age from research protocols out of fear of adverse effects on a fetus morally wrong? It depends on one's standpoint. A mere insistence on justice between genders will not tell you. Feminist work adds yet another piece to this puzzle. Reasoning from abstract rules and principles governed by requirements of universality and impartiality overlooks the importance of partiality, context, and relational bonds in moral life. A substantial feminist literature argues the positive moral value of partiality and even its inescapability. 50 Another somewhat overlapping feminist literature argues the value of reasoning from a full or "thick" appreciation of context using what has come to be called an ethics of care. 51 Modern bioethics has been largely deaf to these feminist perspectives. An early commitment to the universals, impartiality, and systems building exemplified by Kant made hearing these different perspectives difficult. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress in the fourth edition of their Principles of Biomedical Ethics indicate as much: "The care ethic provides a needed corrective."52 The Principles book itself has been blamed by many of the nonfeminist inductivists for rigidifying an early deductivism in bioethics.
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As Beauchamp and Childress have rejoined, the indictment is not entirely warranted; they never proposed a completely deductive system whose principles were merely to be applied to specific cases. The fourth edition of their book goes further than before to demonstrate that moral reasoning is two-way—bottom-up as well as top-down. Thus we have an argument not over alternative models that are purely deductive or inductive, but alternative admixtures of deductivism and inductivism. Some might say this moots the debate, that we all now agree on some form of reflective equilibrium, as Rawls would call it, even if the admixtures vary from camp to camp. Yet as someone trained in the law, I find the debate not mooted, merely more realistic. Much debate in law and jurisprudence is precisely on the question of how to travel between cases and higher-order generalizations. The debate starts, not ends with the recognition that you must travel both ways; the question is exactly how.
Liberal Individualism In keeping with an early allegiance not only to Kant but to John Stuart Mill, bioethics has embraced a liberal individualism with more vigor than it has embraced anything else. The bioethics revolution to establish patients' and research subjects' rights has been an effort to unseat both traditional physician paternalism and a societal willingness to sacrifice the individual. The central tool has been the esteem of the individual as an end not a means and as someone entitled to self-rule or autonomy. This attempted shift in ethical perspective has provoked considerable ambivalence. The clinic has been the site of greatest reluctance as physicians manifest uncertainty, mixed feelings, and outright resistance. Even within bioethics itself, devotion to patient and subject autonomy has been criticized.53 Some have emphasized that it stands on par with, not above, principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice and must sometimes yield in the event of conflict. Others go further, insisting that communal interests take precedence. Still others offer an intermediate view that autonomy cannot become an obsession, lest we find ourselves with no guidance on how to use it. They complain that we risk holding such a thin theory of the good—one that merely values allowing whatever agents choose—that there is little good we can collectively celebrate. Feminists too have criticized liberal individualism on several scores. By depicting the moral community as a set of atomistic and self-serving individuals, it strips away relationships that are morally central. This not only is impoverished, but may also be harmful, because it encourages disregard of those bonds. It is also inaccurate; developing children as well as full-grown adults are profoundly interdependent. Indeed, we are
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so interdependent that we cannot even understand the terms of moral debate without some community process and shared understanding. In the face of this, feminists have been split on the utility of individual rights and rights rhetoric. Yet many would maintain that rights have played a vital historical role and remain necessary, though not sufficient. Rights of self-determination, bodily self-rule, and freedom from coercion remain critical, including in the clinical sphere. Thus there is some overlap between non-feminist communitarian critiques of autonomy in bioethics and feminist cautions against mistaking autonomy's sufficiency. Yet feminism would introduce a further distinct concern. Until recently, the key concerns in bioethics have been mainly dyadic—the relationship between a doctor and patient, between a researcher and subject, or between a nurse and the physician giving orders, for example. This has obscured the importance of groups to which actors may belong, including groups based on gender. Yes, bioethics has recognized that Jehovah's Witnesses or other religious groups have distinct views, because those groups have asserted them forcefully. But bioethics has rarely considered that a patient or subject or nurse may experience a problem because she is a woman or a person of color or a lesbian. There is need for caution here. I am not saying that all women or all people of color or all lesbians experience the same thing. That would fall into the trap of essentialism that many feminists, especially feminists of color, have decried.54 But one can remain alert to difference and seek to be schooled by the varieties of experience, and still investigate the significance of being identified with a certain group. Indeed, as data emerge showing correlations between health care and gender, as well as race and insurance status, it becomes all the more important to consider an individual's membership or perceived membership in a group. Moreover, there are some harms that only achieve the status of a moral wrong when one considers groups. An individual woman, for example, may have no right to participate in an experimental drug protocol. But if that protocol or all protocols systematically exclude a group of people on account of their gender, that may well be an ethical wrong. Bioethics has not been totally blind to the moral significance of groups. Part of the outrage precipitated by the Tuskegee debacle was due to the fact that the Public Health Service was preying on African American men, and men who were poor. Later concern over genetic screening for sickle-cell disease before a useful intervention was recognized was fueled in part by the fact that the population targeted was again African American. Bioethics has also worried about age groups such as the elderly and newborns, about people who share a medical
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
condition such as the persistent vegetative state, and about people of compromised decisional capacity. Yet what moral attention bioethics has devoted to groups has largely excluded women, at least until recent data made clear disparities in treatment and research by gender. Before that, the many studies and analyses from outside bioethics of how women were treated differently by doctors made little apparent impression within the bioethics community. Perhaps this was because gender was too often combined with other characteristics, such as having to decide whether to carry a fetus to term or whether to accept a cesarean section. Thus we could talk about the seemingly genderless person having to make these decisions without focusing on what importance gender itself might have. Perhaps, too, the salience of gender has been obscured by the fact that women have no lock on suffering as patients and research subjects. Plenty of men have suffered as well. The first order of business in bioethics was to champion "the patient" and "the research subject" apart from questions of gender. Yet that agenda has probably delayed attention to significant differences among patients and subjects—differences of gender, race, and insurance status. The safeguards and principles we have developed in bioethics do not seem to apply equally to all. We have developed a bioethics primarily for the person with access to health care and with a doctor likely to listen to, understand, and respect that person. It is a bioethics for the privileged. Feminism would insist we ask who has been left out of this enterprise. If bioethics assumes a patient of the dominant gender and race and a patient of resources in its writings and reasoning, feminists would object. If bioethics as applied in the clinic fails to achieve much for certain members of society, feminists would ask why.
Who Is the Client? Bioethics is not practiced in a vacuum. The field tends to serve certain clients. Thus we bioethicists respond to questions presented by physicians, other health professionals, administrators of health care institutions, and governmental bodies. When bioethicists sit on hospital ethics committees or Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), when we go on rounds through a hospital ward or deliver Grand Rounds, and when we sit on the ethics committees of medical professional societies, we are usually responding to concerns presented not by patients and families but by professionals.55 And when bioethicists sit on bodies such as the President's Commission on Biomedical Ethics,56 or state analogues such as the New York State Task Force on Life and the Law,57 we are responding to questions put by government on matters such as declaring death, protecting human subjects in research, and regulating surrogate motherhood.
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This raises the question of whom bioethics serves. The question is made all the more important when you consider the structural context within which bioethics is done. There are actually a variety of contexts, from free-standing research institutes, to medical schools and other university faculties, to health care institutions and systems, as well as governmental bodies. The overarching question is whether we bioethicists retain enough independence and distance from the very institutions that often employ and house us to do genuinely critical work. This is not a new concern in bioethics. It surfaces periodically. A lively debate has continued over whom hospital ethics committees serve, for example—patients or the institution.58 A related debate has persisted over whether IRBs housed in the very institution whose research they are reviewing have too great a conflict of interest and should be supplemented or replaced by more independent bodies or perhaps a national IRB.59 Individual bioethicists have also grappled with the question of whom they serve in consulting on clinical cases— the health care institution, the health professionals, or the patient and the patient's loved ones. 60 A few bioethicists have expressed more general fears that bioethics may have lost its critical capacity. They worry that bioethics has stopped asking the big questions; instead of debating whether a technology such as human cloning should be used at all, we end up debating merely how it should be used.61 The concern is that bioethics has become a facilitator of science and medicine rather than a genuine critic. This concern has been most pronounced in relation to the Human Genome Project. A portion of that project's enormous budget is earmarked for the study of ethical, legal, and social issues (the ELSI program).62 This represents the largest single pot of funds set aside for bioethics to date. But the question is whether we bioethicists can compete for and use this support while retaining a sufficiently independent and critical perspective on the project funding us. These questions on the structure of bioethics itself have not yet received adequate attention within bioethics. For the moment bioethics remains largely a discussion among those in power—experts, professionals, and governmental authorities.63 Thus it is not at all surprising that bioethics has mainly turned a deaf ear to feminist work. That work, after all, is a critique of current power arrangements and hierarchy. Bioethics itself has been a partial critique—a demand that physicians and scientists inform their patients and subjects, and then abide by the choices those laypeople make. As ambitious as this demand is, the demand of feminists is even more so. While bioethics has urged doctors and scientists to share information and respect patients' and subjects' decisions, feminists would seek more—that we ask whether non-physicians should be delivering more care, whether communities
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should be controlling the medical and scientific enterprises, whether women should be determining the degree to which normal life events such as childbirth and menopause should be medicalized, whether medicine and science should be held accountable for their historical effects on women, and so on. While bioethics has entered into collaborative relationships with the powers that be, feminists have criticized and sought to unseat the powers that be, because of practices that penalize and subordinate on the basis of gender. Feminists would claim that the powers that be in medicine, science, and government are likely to be those with the greatest stake in retaining some version of the status quo. When bioethics enters into partnership with those experts and authorities, it is allying itself with those least interested in feminist challenges to traditional hierarchies. Thus when bioethics focuses on hospitals, professional societies, and physician-patient relations and ignores feminist clinics, the Black Women's Health Project, and nurse-practitioner-patient relations, bioethics is ensuring its isolation from feminist thought.
Distance from Major Academic Developments Feminist work is only one of several intellectual currents widely valued and debated in the humanities and law, yet largely overlooked by bioethics. Critical theory generally, Critical Race Theory and other forms of race-attentive analysis, and postmodern scholarship, to name three more, have scarcely been found in bioethics to date. One might conclude that bioethics has managed a sort of isolation from major trends in the academy. But the picture is more complex. The upsurge of academic interest in narrative has spawned attention to narrative and narrative ethics in bioethics, 64 so the isolation seems selective. One clue to this pattern may lie in the relation of work ignored and work embraced to medicine and science. The appeal of narrative ethics is probably based on the traditional importance of cases in medicine and in the scientific study of human beings. Cases, after all, are mininarratives. Indeed, there is a substantial advocacy within bioethics for case-based casuistry as a mode of ethical reasoning.65 Bioethicists intrigued with narrative and narrative ethics have called for richer and more complete case narratives.66 Thus the enthusiasm for narrative among bioethicists meshes nicely with a long tradition in medicine and science. The ignored domains do not. Critical Race Theory and postmodernism, for instance, have no obvious correlates in the traditions of medicine and science. They should, of course. Analysis of the role of race in medicine could have taught us much. And Foucault's early Birth of the Clinic67 could have forged the way for a rich deconstructive and postmodern look at medical and scientific practices and texts. But bio-
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ethics, despite its claims to be a source of critique, may have been most ready to embrace those intellectual currents least threatening and foreign to medicine and science.
Feminist Possibilities in Bioethics Then what might a bioethics attentive to gender and feminist analysis look like? Others beginning to write about feminist bioethics have examined this question as well. We agree that a feminist bioethics would recognize that moral analysis requires attention to gender; there is too long a history of harm, inequality, and disadvantage based on gender to ignore the category. Indeed, ignoring it merely helps to keep such oppression invisible and alive. A feminist bioethics would do more than use gender as an analytic category; it would oppose harm to women. This claim is more complex than it might appear. It requires bioethics to take a moral and political stand, at least a broad one, opposing some kinds of harm. Requiring this is based on the insight that there is no such thing as a neutral bioethics, one that views problems from a vantage point unsituated in the moral and political universe. This claim is familiar to feminists, who recognize theorizing as an activity with consequences in the world.68 But it may be more unfamiliar to some bioethicists. Yet even traditional and mainstream bioethics takes a perspective that is situated. Modern bioethics is committed to protecting the patient and research subject from harms by the physician and researcher. The four a priori principles so common in bioethics are the statement of the vantage point from which bioethical analysis then proceeds. Those principles highlight certain harms: failures of patient autonomy, of caregiver beneficence and nonmaleficence, and of justice. They are less successful in highlighting others, including failures based specifically on gender, race, and insurance status. Although some have argued that the four principles, and particularly justice, can be reunderstood to condemn harm perpetrated on the basis of gender, 69 the principles have not yet been notably successful in accomplishing this shift of perspective. The principles leave out other things as well: the failure to delimit the proper boundaries of medicine and what should be medicalized, the failure to view the medical enterprise from the standpoint of patients, the failure to recognize the particular vantage point and needs of different individual patients. In other words, the principles overlook the importance of boundaries, standpoint, and particularity. The point is that bioethics is already situated, and unavoidably so. Even those who would show us how far the four principles and dominant analytic paradigm can be stretched to oppose harm based on gen-
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der are not disputing that bioethics has a vantage point. They are merely arguing that its vantage point should be further specified. Beyond attending to gender and opposing harm to women, in what way would a bioethics that took feminism seriously be different from what we have now? Its subjects, epistemology, and analysis would all be different.
Subjects Susan Sherwin has been articulate about the subjects that a feminist bioethics would discover.70 Women's experience of health care and science would give one set of problems a new prominence. For example, most bioethicists would surely regard physician sex with patients as a serious wrong, and psychotherapist sex with patients after termination of therapy at least problematic. Yet bioethics tends to regard sex with patients as a hideous aberration. A feminist bioethics would regard such events not so much as isolated transgressions, but as extreme events that tell us something fundamental about the problems that pervade patient-physician relations. By analogy, feminist analysis has seen father-daughter incest not in isolation, but as the furthest point along a spectrum of seductiveness and abuse of power, whose prevention lies in part in restructuring familial relations so that fathers share with mothers a real parenting role.71 Similarly, physician and scientist transgressions can lead to a thoroughgoing analysis of their relations with patients and subjects. Indeed, such analysis will suggest that comparisons with the family are more than analogies. When bioethics uses the familial language of "paternalism" to talk about physician behavior, we implicitly acknowledge a connection with the family. In fact, historians will tell us that most health care was traditionally provided within the family, only later yielding to health care delivered mostly by strangers.72 A psychoanalytic observer of the patient-physician relationship will tell us that patients still project on their physicians the sorts of wishes and expectations one has of a family member.73 Legal scholars will tell us that analysis of the patient-physician relationship has been hampered by mistaking it as something private (and thus on the traditionally domestic side of the private/public distinction74) rather than fully subject to the demands we place on something public. 75 A feminist bioethics will thus give new prominence and understanding to harmful behavior by physicians and scientists. It will also focus on specific medical and scientific practices that have harmed women. It will examine the problematic history of DES, lUDs, breast implants, unnecessary and forced cesareans, not to demonize medicine and science but for the broader lessons such events teach. Some of those lessons will be about the need to reexamine the role of medicine and
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science. The historical medicalization of childbirth, menstruation, and menopause; the debate over medical collaboration in cultural practices of female genital mutilation; and the question of what duties physicians have in responding to domestic violence are all matters that invite us to reshape that role. But it is a task that cannot be done without understanding what the role has been and what gender dynamics helped shape it in the first place. Certainly a feminist bioethics will analyze the practices of excluding women and women's health problems from research. In the treatment arena too, such a bioethics will analyze the data correlating gender with reduced access to cardiac, renal, and other forms of therapy. Both analyses will be complex. They will require distinguishing correlation from causation, evaluating justifications given for disparate treatment (such as differences in biology by gender, the possibility of harm to a fetus, or the lesser prevalence of a disease in women), and developing criteria for determining when differences - in research and treatment cannot be adequately justified and are morally wrong. A feminist bioethics will pay special attention to subjects that emerge from the experiences of women who bear added burdens in dealing with the health care and scientific enterprises. For example, poor, African American women have disproportionately been the targets of attempted criminal prosecutions of drug-using pregnant women.76 African American and Hispanic women are also disproportionately the women diagnosed with AIDS in this country. 77 A feminist bioethics would insist on concentrated analysis of these problems. Feminists have struggled among themselves to uproot assumptions that all women share the same experiences, exposing the arrogance and essentialism behind that assumption. Now built into feminist method is the insistence that analysis start with attention to the individual, particularity, and context. I say more about method in the discussion that follows. Here the claim is that a feminist bioethics would not group all females under the rubric "woman" and proceed with a monolithic analysis, but would deliberately attend to differences. In examining health care and science, a feminist bioethics should begin with attention to those historically least served and most harmed. A feminist bioethics will have much to say about disability. A hallmark of feminist work has been its differentiation of the biological fact of sex from the cultural construction of gender, and from an understanding of how gender operates as a category in the world.78 Thus feminists turn to the supposed biological fact of disability skeptically. Martha Minow, for example, shows how disability and its effects are a function of societal choice. 79 For example, a work place built to enable people of different abilities and limits to function will render fewer of them "disabled" than a work place built for only one nodal type. Thus
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the category of "disability" is plastic and reveals underlying social dynamics in ways analogous to sex and gender. A feminist bioethics would be able to apply some of these same analytic tools to other areas in bioethics as well. Genetics is an obvious domain. The explosion of genetic knowledge and an international commitment to the Human Genome Project raise again the risks of biological reductionism. There is danger of mistaking the biological fact of genotype to be the essence of a person and a justified occasion for differences in treatment. Non-feminists and feminists are worried about this already, but the latter bring a history of debunking notions that biological sex by itself determines gender, that culture matters little, and that biology alone is reason for different treatment. Feminists also bring special tools to debates about sexual orientation. Bioethics has paid attention to sexual orientation fitfully. The psychiatric profession's declassification of homosexuality as a disorder, debates on whether same-sex couples should have free access to reproductive technologies, and the early eruption of the HIV epidemic in the United States in part within the gay community have all occasioned some analysis by bioethicists.80 Yet for the most part sexual orientation has not been a focus. Feminist work would encourage more sustained analysis of the assumptions about sexual orientation underlying medical and scientific practices and policy. 81 A feminist bioethics would, of course, analyze the role of women not just as patients and research subjects, but also as family caregivers and as professional or lay healers. A feminist literature on women in medicine, nursing, and science has already emerged.82 In part it explores gender-related problems, such as sexual harassment in medical training and barriers to advancement. The feminist literature, however, also explores differences in method and outlook that may be associated with gender. This means not only asking whether women may sometimes think differently about health care and science, but also asking whether they may treat patients and research subjects differently. 83 Thus the role of gender in structuring the healing and research enterprises, and new possibilities produced by the influx of women, would both be important concerns for a feminist bioethics.
Epistemology It is not clear that bioethics has an explicit epistemology, a theory of how bioethical knowledge is produced. One widely held, although not universal, notion within bioethics is that generating bioethical insight does not require agreement at the level of fundamental theory. Thus Beauchamp and Childress reject the notion that one must choose a single theory from among the competitors. They claim that "[f ]ar more social consensus exists about principles and rules drawn from the common morality . . . than about theories." 84
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But if generating bioethics knowledge starts from "common morality" or is usually approached as a matter of achieving reasoned agreement, the relevant community and rules of agreement are rarely stated. Observing bioethics in action, however, sheds some light. As the discussion of whom bioethics tends to serve reveals, bioethics appears to be a conversation among experts, especially bioethicists, physicians, scientists, and governmental authorities. There has been great concern with patients' and research subjects' rights, but those people tend to be the objects of concern rather than full members of the ethical conversation. Feminists would find this immediately suspect. A number have developed feminist epistemologies.85 It is important to clarify that these are theories of the practices that produce knowledge (to paraphrase Helen Longino),86 not restatements of the idea first popularized by Carol Gilligan that women may tend to see moral problems differently. Feminist epistemologies investigate the relationship between power, gender, and the means of generating authoritative knowledge. Their general goal is "the expansion of democracy in the production of knowledge." 87 There are different proposals for how to achieve this goal. Longino emphasizes the importance of a diverse community including alternative viewpoints. There should be publicly recognized forums for exchange, change over time in response to critical discourse, publicly recognized standards of evaluation, and agreement produced by dialogue rather than the exercise of power or exclusion.88 Applying this to bioethics would highlight two problems. First, a "diverse community" might be construed simply to require diverse experts, not the inclusion of laypeople. But this suggests that bioethical expertise belongs only to experts. While surely training in bioethics confers some kind of expertise, few would argue that only bioethicists, medical and scientific experts, and governmental authorities should deliberate over questions such as whether a patient receives further lifesustaining treatment, who receives an organ transplant, whether physician-assisted suicide should be allowed, or how scarce medical resources should be allocated. There is also a strong moral argument for including in the deliberation those who will be most affected and potentially disadvantaged by its outcome. Consequently, in bioethics the "diverse community" ought to include laypeople, and specifically those laypeople at risk of disadvantage including women, people of color, and the uninsured. This epistemological view of how bioethics knowledge should be generated thus requires a restructuring of practices within the field to make them inclusive. The second issue Longino's standards raise is the lack of public standards for agreement in bioethics. Indeed, studies show substantial disagreement among IRBs considering whether to approve research
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics 89
proposals and among bioethics consultants who advise on cases.90 Yet if part of the task facing bioethics is to generate such standards, then the same people currently underrepresented in discussion of specific bioethics problems have even more reason to be involved in this meta-dialogue about standards. This, too, would mandate a restructuring of bioethics practice. Another prominent version of feminist epistemology is standpoint theory. This approach is born of a general skepticism that there is any such thing as insight and theory unaffected by standpoint. Sandra Harding, for example, has written on the application of standpoint theory to science.91 Feminist standpoint theorists have argued that the most disadvantaged in society have special insight into what is wrong and needs to be fixed in current arrangements. Gender has a substantial influence on who is advantaged and disadvantaged in our society and thus on standpoint. One need not decide between different feminist epistemologies to understand that bioethics would be changed by addressing the questions these epistemologists ask. It would not remain a dialogue of experts. Instead of persistently analyzing bioethics problems from the physician's or scientist's vantage point by asking what the doctor or scientist should do, we would at least as energetically view bioethics problems from the standpoint of the patient, subject, or citizenry. We would ensure their participation in the disciplinary dialogue. This would be a substantial change in bioethics. It would immediately bring to the fore problems that the traditional bioethics perspective—one that is physician- and scientist-centered—has made it difficult to highlight: how do patients get into the health care system in the first place; when is an alternative preferable; when should someone see a physician; how can scientists be induced to study a particular problem; and how can physicians and scientists be held accountable to patients, subjects, and citizens. It would render lay accounts and social science analyses at least as important as the professional medical and scientific accounts. It would force bioethics to take a close look at caregiving and research options outside of traditional medicine and science. This kind of bioethics would require us to learn from patients, subjects, families, and communities. All would have a place at the ethics committee table, the IRB meeting, and the ethics conference podium, to name only three forums. No longer would a token community member be sufficient.
Analytic Method I have already suggested that the extensive feminist literature on the importance of context and particularity in moral and legal reasoning, and the feminist challenge to universality and impartiality, would have
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much to say in the ongoing bioethics debates over method. Largely absent so far from the bioethics discussions of principlism, specified principlism, casuistry, ethnography, and other alternatives is serious attention to the feminist work that is directly relevant. Again, there is room for a variety of feminist viewpoints. Yet certain commonalities are likely. Feminist writers on analytic method in bioethics will demand a rich empiricism and attention to lived experience as the starting point for identifying those problems in need of analysis. They will recognize that even the process of identifying and then describing problems is driven by one's perspective and agenda. Thus here, too, they will require broad participation in this process, including by women and others actually experiencing these problems. The tools these writers will use in describing problems will be a larger set than usual. There is a substantial feminist literature on the role of partiality, empathy, relational caring, and affect in moral understanding. Bioethicists will have to pay greater attention to these dimensions of moral reasoning and the moral life. Yet the task will not stop there. As already noted, Carol Gilligan and others writing on the ethics of care have argued that partiality or caring will not suffice in moral decision making; Gilligan argues for both relational caring and reasoning from justice. Many have written since on how the two might be combined. The point is that feminist writers would insist on the importance of the ongoing debate in bioethics over how to travel back and forth between specific cases and higher-order normative generalizations, and over what tools are required for moral analysis. They would not dismiss the debate by claiming that there is already general agreement on an overarching coherentism or Rawls's reflective equilibrium. The trend in bioethics toward greater inductivism would undoubtedly be in line with much feminist writing. Feminist work on method would make far richer our sense of the "case" in bioethics, and force attention to power and disadvantage in every aspect of bioethics. But many feminists would simultaneously voice skepticism about even the richest ethnography or empiricism as a fully adequate source of norms. In addition to contributing to the debates about how we should travel between the case and normative generalizations, feminist writers would have much to say about the content of those generalizations. The most prominent set thus far in bioethics is the set of four principles explicated by Beauchamp and Childress: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Clearly all four of these could be applied in a way that ignored or a way that paid attention to gender. Recently, some authors have explored how these principles might attend to gender.92 Even more fundamentally, feminist work could be brought to bear on how these prin-
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
ciples might be revised. Work by Jennifer Nedelsky and Martha Minow on autonomy, for example, and by Iris Marion Young and Susan Moller Okin on justice could fuel just such a revision.93 Yet feminist work can go even further and challenge the adequacy of these four principles as criteria for moral evaluation. Missing from the list, for example, is attentiveness to the particularity of the moral situation, something a number of feminists see as fundamental to moral perception and analysis.94 One might also want to require attention to the impact of an action on relationships and the community, even if ultimately the impact on the individual most affected were given priority. And perhaps we should not pack into the single principle of justice our various concerns about the acceptability of societal structures for delivering health care; the distribution of benefits and harms within the framework of those structures; 95 the fairness of that distribution over time; 96 and how this all relates to gender, race, and other characteristics. We might be better served by disaggregating some of these elements and recognizing different types of justice concerns.
Moving Forward The contributors to this volume explore the many changes that feminist work can bring to bioethics—in subject matter, epistemology, and moral analysis. The chapters of Part I explore the relationship between feminism and bioethics. Susan Sherwin starts by observing that bioethics has been largely neutral toward oppression on the basis of gender. Feminist ethics offers tools for changing this. It recommends conducting moral deliberations not just by calculating utilities or applying principles, but by asking who is advantaged and what effect an action will have on those currently disadvantaged. Feminist challenges to central concepts in traditional ethics, such as autonomy, can also fruitfully be brought to bear in bioethics. Feminism both adds new topics for bioethics to examine and changes the analysis of familiar ones. Rosemarie Tong presents a feminist approach to the current bioethics ferment over principlism and its alternatives. She focuses on the potential of liberal, radical, and cultural feminist perspectives to orient a feminist bioethics. Each offers a specific critique of the autonomous self intent on maximizing self-interest, a concept of the self that is at the heart of traditional ethics. Tong then demonstrates how feminist perspectives can enrich bioethics, by analyzing a specific case. She concludes by defending feminist approaches from two possible lines of criticism: that they are not properly theoretical but instead sexist and relativist, or that they are too theoretical and ignore differences of race and class.
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Next, Mary Mahowald proposes feminist standpoint theory as a corrective in health care and in bioethics. She identifies a blindness in both fields to the ethical problems of racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism, and a simultaneous assumption that "point-ofviewlessness" and universals are possible. Mahowald finds untenable the notion of unsituated knowledge. Thus she turns to feminist standpoint theory and finds a recognition not only that knowledge is situated, but also that some perspectives are privileged—the perspective of those who are dominated. Mahowald then shows how the notion of standpoint can be reformulated so that it does not assume that all women have the same standpoint. After discussing an illustrative case, she proposes proportionate representation in health care and bioethics as a corrective strategy. Dorothy Roberts argues that medical ethics has neglected the experiences of women of color and the effects of receiving care in publicly supported institutions. Instead, it has discussed generic patients and doctors, and has mistakenly viewed medical care as something "private" and removed from the public context. Focusing on the experience of poor women of color shows the fallacies here. These women have endured a long history of dehumanizing treatment. Yet poor women of color do not experience the same problems as other patients in worsened form; they experience different problems that offer special insights into what is wrong with health care. Roberts explores in depth three problems affecting these women: the denial of confidentiality to those who use drugs during pregnancy, the suspension of the obligation of truth-telling condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Rust v. Sullivan, and the disregard for the autonomy of these women shown by cases in which medical treatment is compelled during pregnancy. These problems reveal that core requirements of medical ethics are discarded for these patients. But Roberts argues that remedying this will not just add to medical ethics and health care; it will transform them. She explains how reconstructing the patient as a woman of color changes the methods and goals of medical ethics, as well as its critique of the health care system. In the last chapter of Part I, Rebecca Dresser investigates the lessons of the women's self-help health movement for bioethics. Using the publications of the Boston Women's Health Book Collective as a guide, she discovers an important critique of medicine as well as new directions for bioethics. She finds great disaffection with U.S. health care, an identification of specific barriers to good care, and a call to reduce dependence on medical experts. Bioethics shares a number of goals with the women's health movement, yet has paid little attention to it. Dresser argues that the movement's most basic message to bioethics is that gender bias is an ethical problem. Taking this message seriously
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means changing the way bioethicists teach: using our authority in hospitals and medical schools progressively, challenging stereotypes and sexism in case consultations, speaking out on gender bias, and using women's health movement literature and participants. It also means changing our scholarship: paying attention to women's experiences and the particular before proceeding to generalizations, analyzing systemic problems in health care delivery, and resisting the temptation to claim the same kind of neutral and objective expertise we have challenged in physicians. Indeed, Dresser calls for a searching selfappraisal by bioethicists to examine the extent to which we have become part of the very medical system we criticize. Part II brings feminist perspectives to bear on specific problems in bioethics. Laura Purdy begins by examining a fundamental question in bioethics, the definition of health. This question has been much debated, yet not from a feminist perspective. Purdy argues for a broader definition of health that would require not only lack of physical ailments, but also positive well-being. But the evaluation of women's bodies as well or sick is usually conducted not by women themselves but by those in authority. Sexism and other abuses of power can infect the process. Stereotypes of femininity and beauty work their harm here, with eating disorders a common response. Women thus cannot rely on external social standards to tell them what well-being is. Yet women are only beginning to develop their own standards. Purdy argues that these standards must come from a sense of our bodies, but must also be schooled by scientific data through an approach such as reflective equilibrium to combine theory and intuition. Janet Farrell Smith then examines the physician—patient relationship, another central topic in bioethics. She applies a communicative ethics derived from the writings of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas's work is not itself feminist, but modification of that work, prominently by Seyla Benhabib, has made clear the feminist possibilities. Farrell Smith argues that the core insight of communicative ethics is that norms should be derived through a process of conversation that includes those most affected, rather than by the solitary reflection of individual thinkers. This view of the proper origin of norms forces us to consider what conditions must obtain for the conversation to do this work, especially conditions of communicative equality and attention to the specific circumstances of the concrete other. Farrell Smith then applies these insights to the physician-patient relationship. The result is a different view of how to derive norms than is usually seen in bioethics, which typically derives norms through detached reflection without discussion with patients. Using concrete cases Farrell Smith shows how physicianpatient communication should work, and derives "equality principles" and "substantive principles" to guide it.
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Vanessa Merton shifts the focus to the world of biomedical research by considering obstacles that have prevented women from participating as research subjects. She finds a familiar problem—mistaking the male for the generic "human" while the female is ignored. Merton first rejects the notion that exclusion from research is no injustice, by showing that access to new drugs and high quality health care often depends on being included. Exclusion further results in harm to all women through the marketing of untested drugs, through inferior care especially for pregnant women, and through reinforcement of the notion that women are the "other." Merton then considers and rejects four rationales for excluding women: the need to produce supposedly good data by studying only men, the notion that governmental requirements mandate exclusion, concern over exposure to liability, and the idea that including women who may be pregnant is a moral wrong. She finally offers a proposal to ensure full participation and attention to women's health needs, by requiring that eligibility criteria not differentiate by gender and by evaluating all research to determine whether it will illuminate gender-based differences. Ruth Faden, Nancy Kass, and Deven McGraw then investigate the neglect of women in the U.S. response to the HIV epidemic. They argue that both bioethics and biomedical research have largely confined their interest to women's roles as vectors for the infection of others, mainly newborns or sexual partners. Little attention has been paid to women's own health concerns. In support of this they examine the research portfolio of the U.S. Public Health Service, the conduct of AIDS-related clinical trials, and the published literature. They find neglect of women's health concerns and then go on to show that this has caused women harm. Finally, they argue that this pattern constitutes an injustice to women. They do this by beginning with traditional definitions of distributive justice, but then proceeding to consider broader feminist definitions, including in the work of Iris Marion Young. While finding no malevolent intent, they find in the neglect of women's concerns a reflection of biases in biomedical science and in the society at large. My own chapter brings feminist analysis to bear on the debate about whether to legitimate physician-assisted suicide and active euthanasia. First, I examine the role of gender in these practices. Given the traditional condemnation of both practices in the United States, we lack good data. But established gender differences in health care (including the adequacy of pain relief), in health care insurance, in suicidal behavior, and in societal expectations about who should be self-sacrificing give reason to think that gender may play an important role. That role may be complex, and I explore the possibilities. Guided by these concerns about gender differences, I turn to the arguments in favor of
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
legitimating these practices. Using feminist approaches, I challenge the notions of autonomy, rights, and physician beneficence usually relied on in those arguments. Ultimately, I turn to the task of reconciling physician obligations to care for the individual patient with a necessary set of normative limits. I advance a notion of "principled caring," arguing that it militates against legitimating these practices. Adrienne Asch and Gail Geller examine what feminist analysis brings to ongoing debate over the Human Genome Project and the growing body of genetic knowledge. They argue that feminist analysis of the relationship between biological sex and the social construction of gender can act as a model for understanding the relationship between genes and the social understanding of inheritance, disease, and disability. Feminist exploration of the meaning of difference can similarly guide the exploration of genetic difference and our construal of what is meant by "normalcy." Third, feminist critiques of technology and science can help locate the limits of genetics as the answer to health and social problems. Asch and Geller detail feminist analyses particularly relevant to genetic testing and then apply these to specific topics: presymptomatic testing for breast cancer, prenatal diagnosis to determine sex among other possible traits, and lastly the role of gender in genetic counseling. Finally, Hilde Lindemann Nelson and James Lindemann Nelson take on a problem of immense concern, justice in the allocation of health care resources. Bioethicists, especially Daniel Callahan and Norman Daniels, have produced important analyses of what justice should require in allocation. Yet the Lindemann Nelsons argue that neither really grapples with gender or feminist analysis. Feminism helps illuminate otherwise hidden injustices toward women and other groups, highlighting, for example, the fact that women over forty are less likely than men to have health insurance, and that tying insurance to employment systematically disadvantages women. Feminism also contributes theoretically. Many feminists are working to reunderstand justice in a way that reconciles individual and communitarian approaches. The authors cite the work of Marilyn Friedman, Seyla Benhabib, and especially Iris Marion Young. Based on this work, the authors formulate guides for just allocation. They show how this can yield a theory of justice. They then proceed to offer concrete proposals for allocation. The chapters in this volume thus tackle not only central problems in bioethics, but the theoretical issues involved in trying to forge a relationship between bioethics and feminist work. They show that feminist critique can play an important part in reshaping the theory and practice of bioethics as we know it now. Bioethics cannot afford to overlook half the world, to ignore the pervasive effects of gender, and to avoid the feminist literature transforming the disciplines that make up this
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field. The task ahead is too great—to make health care, biomedical research, new genetic capabilities, the response to HIV, and decisionsisions about life and death fit for women and men.
Notes 1. Gender-attentive analyses of reproductive technologies include Karen H. Rothenberg and Elizabeth J. Thomson, eds., Women and Prenatal Testing: Facing the Challenges of Genetic Technology (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1994); Christine Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction: A Feminist Analysis (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987); Barbara Katz Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Prenatal Diagnosis and the Future of Motherhood (New York, NY: Viking, 1986); Gena Corea, The Mother Machine: Reproductive Technologies from Artificial Insemination to Artificial Wombs (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1985). Genderattentive analysis of allocation follows in chapter 12 in this volume. 2. On gender in patient-physician relations, see, for example, Alexandra Dundas Todd, Intimate Adversaries: Cultural Conflict between Doctors and Women Patients (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); Sue Fisher, In the Patient's Best Interest: Women and the Politics of Medical Decisions (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986). A number of studies have shown gender disparities in medical treatment. See, for example, Leslee J. Shaw et al., "Gender Differences in the Noninvasive Evaluation and Management of Patients with Suspected Coronary Artery Disease," Annals of Internal Medicine 120 (1994): 559-66; Nicole Lurie et al., "Preventive Care for Women: Does the Sex of the Physician Matter?" New England Journal of Medicine 329 (1993): 478-82; Nanette K. Wenger et al., "Cardiovascular Health and Disease in Women," New England Journal of Medicine 329 (1993): 247-56; Richard M. Steingart et al., "Sex Difference in the Management of Coronary Heart Disease," New England Journal of Medicine 325 (1991): 226-30; John Z. Ayanian and Arnold M. Epstein, "Differences in the Use of Procedures Between Women and Men Hospitalized for Coronary Heart Disease," New England Journal of Medicine 325 (1991): 221-25; Carl M. Kjellstrand, "Age, Sex, and Race Inequality in Renal Transplantation," Archives of Internal Medicine 148 (1988): 1305-09; Carolyn K. Wells and Alvan R. Feinstein, "Detection Bias in the Diagnostic Pursuit of Lung Cancer," American Journal of Epidemiology 128 (1988): 1016-26; Jonathan N. Tobin et al., "Sex Bias in Considering Coronary Bypass Surgery," Annals of Internal Medicine 107 (1987): 19-25; Carl M. Kjellstrand and George M. Logan, "Racial, Sexual and Age Inequalities in Chronic Dialysis," Nephron 45 (1987): 257-63; Stephen Colameco, Lome Becker, and Michael Simpson, "Sex Bias in the Assessment of Patient Complaints," Journal of Family Practice 16 (1983): 1117-21; Paul D. Cleary, David Mechanic, and James R. Greenley, "Sex Differences in Medical Care Utilization: An Empirical Investigation, Journal of Health and Social Behavior 23 (1982): 106-19; Lois M. Verbrugge and Richard P. Steiner, "Physician Treatment of Men and Women Patients: Sex Bias or Appropriate Care?" Medical Care 19 (1981): 609-32. See generally Eileen Nechas and Denise Foley, Unequal Treatment: What You Don't Know About How Women Are Mistreated by the Medical Community (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1994). Articles finding a lack of sex bias, however, include Daniel B. Mark et al., "Absence of Sex Bias in the Referral of Patients for Cardiac Catheterization," New England Journal of Medicine 330 (1994): 110106; Sherine E. Gabriel et al., "Lack of Evidence for Gender Bias in the Utiliza-
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
tion of Total Hip Arthroplasty Among Olmstead County, Minnesota Residents with Osteoarthritis," Arthritis and Rheumatology 37 (1994): 1171-76; Patricia K. McGann et al., "Absences of Sex Differences in the Evaluation of Patients Hospitalized for Transient Ischemic Attacks," Journal of Family Practice 39 (1994): 134-39. On the effect of different analytic models on conclusions about sex bias, see Lee A. Green and Mark T. Ruffin IV, "A Closer Examination of Sex Bias in the Treatment of Ischemic Cardiac Disease," Journal of Family Practice 39 (1994): 331-36. In light of the data, some have advocated treating women's health as a new specialty in medicine. See Andrew A. Skolnick, "Women's Health Specialty, Other Issues on Agenda of 'Refraining' Conference," Journal of the American Medical Association 268 (1992): 1813-14; Karen Johnson, "Women's Health: Developing a New Interdisciplinary Specialty," Journal of Women's Health 1 (1992): 95-99; Elisabeth Rosenthal, "Does Fragmented Medicine Harm the Health of Women?" New York Times, Oct. 13, 1993, Al. But see Michelle Harrison, "Women's Health as a Specialty: A Deceptive Solution," Journal of Women's Health 1 (1992): 102-05. In 1991 the American Medical Association's Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs published a report on "Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making," Journal of the American Medical Association 266 (1991): 559-62, discussing "data that suggest that a patient's gender plays an inappropriate role in medical decision making" (p. 561), though also noting the difficulty of designing a study to prove a connection between gender disparities and gender bias by controlling for all other factors that might affect clinical decisions. Accompanying that report, Dr. Bernadine Healy, the first woman director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), published an editorial proclaiming NIH's commitment to addressing women's health issues, and JAMA called for papers for a theme issue on women's health. Bernadine Healy, "Women's Health, Public Welfare," Journal of the American Medical Association 266 (1991): 566-68; Helene M. Cole, Annette F. Flanagin, and Anne Colston Wentz, "A JAMA Theme Issue on Women's Health: Call for Papers," Journal of the American Medical Association 266 (1991): 568. In 1992, both JAMA and the American Journal of Public Health published such theme issues, as have other journals since. Also in 1992 the Journal of Women's Health began publication. 3. In 1985 the U.S. Public Health Service's Task Force on Women's Health Issues bemoaned a lack of research on women. See U.S. Public Health Service, Women's Health: Report of the Public Health Service Task Force on Women's Health Issues (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1985). In 1989 the Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues began to consider remedies for the neglect of women's health and requested a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of NIH action on this score. The GAO study was not encouraging. The Caucus then introduced the Women's Health Equity Act (WHEA) of 1990, an omnibus package that was reintroduced in 1991. See Rep. Patricia Schroeder, "Women's Health: A Focus for the 1990s," WHI 2 (Spring 1992): 1-2. Portions were enacted. See Keelyn Friesen, "Non-Passage of the Women's Health Equity Act: Inaction May Lead to Cancerous Results," Hamline Journal of Public Law and Policy 14 (1993): 243-58. Significant provisions were included in the NIH Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107 Stat. 122 (1993). As Dr. Healy noted in her 1991 editorial cited above, the NIH established the Office of Research on Women's Health in 1990. See also Ruth L. Kirschstein, "Research on Women's Health," American Journal of Public Health 81 (1991): 291-93. The head of the Public Health Service (PHS) of the NIH
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announced a PHS Action Plan for Women's Health. James O. Mason, "From the Assistant Secretary of Health, US Public Health Service: A National Agenda for Women's Health," Journal of the American Medical Association 267 (1992): 482. In that same issue, JAMA noted that "[a]ttempts to redress inattention to women as subjects of medical research are shifting into high gear," with the beginning of a 10-year $500 million study called the "Women's Health Initiative." Paul Cotton, "Women's Health Initiative Leads Way as Research Begins to Fill Gender Gaps," Journal of the American Medical Association 267 (1992): 46970, 473, 469. The Women's Health Initiative has subsequently come under criticism. See Susan Thaul and Dana Hotra, eds., Institute of Medicine, An Assessment of the NIH Women's Health Initiative (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993). In response, the NIH will reassess the trial every three years and modify it if necessary. See Sarah Glazer, "Women's Health Initiative: Is it too ambitious?" CQ Researcher 4 (18) (1994): 416. 4. On feminist ethics, see, for example, Annette C. Baier, Moral Prejudices: Essays on Ethics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for An Ethic of Care (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993); Rosemarie Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993); Alison M. Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," in Lawrence Becker with Charlotte Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York, NY: Garland, 1992); Eve Browning Cole and Susan Coultrap-McQuin, eds., Exploration in Feminist Ethics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992); Claudia Card, ed., Feminist Ethics (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991); Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics (Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1989); Carol Gilligan, Janie Victoria Ward, and Jill McLean Taylor, eds., Mapping the Moral Domain: A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychologcal Theory and Education (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Lorraine Code, Sheila Mullett, and Christine Overall, eds., Feminist Perspectives: Philosophical Essays on Method and Morals (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Eva Feder Kittay and Diana Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). The journal Hypatia is devoted to feminist philosophy and publishes much on ethics. On feminist jurisprudence, see, for example, D. Kelly Weisberg, Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1993); Mary Joe Frug, Postmodern Legal Feminism (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992); Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy, Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991); Deborah L. Rhode, ed., Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Difference (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989); and numerous articles. Journals devoted to law and feminism include the Berkeley Women's Law Journal, the Harvard Women's Law Journal, the Wisconsin Women's Law Journal, the Women's Rights Law Reporter, and the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism. 5. Such works frequently cited within feminist ethics and jurisprudence include Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Linda J. Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990); Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989); Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (Boston, MA: Beacon
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Press, 1988); Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Mary Field Belenky et al., Women's Ways of Knowing: The Development of Self, Voice, and Mind (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1986); bell hooks, Feminist Theory: from margin to center (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1984); Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). A number of feminist journals cut across disciplinary lines, including Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society. 6. On science, see, for example, Helen E. Longino, "Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies of Science," in Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 101-20; Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from Women's Lives (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Sally Shuttleworth, Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of Science (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990); Ruth Hubbard, The Politics of Women's Biology (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Helen Longino, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Nancy Tuana, ed., Feminism & Science (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989); Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory (Calgary, Canada: University of Calgary Press, 1987); Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Ruth Bleier, ed., Feminist Approaches to Science (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1986); Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985); Ruth Bleier, Science and Gender: A Critique of Biology and Its Theories (New York, NY: Pergamon Press, 1984); Sandra Harding and Merrill B. Hintikka, eds., Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1983). On medicine, the other healing professions, and healing outside the professions, see, for example, The Boston Women's Health Book Collective, The New Our Bodies, Ourselves: A Book By and For Women (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Evelyn C. White, ed., The Black Women's Health Book: Speaking for Ourselves (Seattle, WA: Seal Press, 1990); Rima D. Apple, Women, Health, and Medicine in America: A Historical Handbook (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990); Charlotte F. Muller, Health Care and Gender (New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1990); Darlene Clark Hine, Black Women in White: Racial Conflict and Cooperation in the Nursing Profession, 1890-1950 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989); Sue V. Rosser, Feminism within the Science and Health Care Professions: Overcoming Resistance (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, 1988); Regina Markell Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science: Women Physicians in American Medicine (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1985); Gena Corea, The Hidden Malpractice: How American Medicine Mistreats Women (New York, NY: Harper Colophon Books, 1985); Diana Scully, Men Who Control Women's Health: The Miseducation of Obstetrician-Gynecologists (Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1980); Elizabeth Fee, ed., Women and Health: The Politics of Sex in Medicine (Farmingdale, NY: Baywood, 1983); Janice Raymond, "Medicine as Patriarchal Religion," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 7 (1982): 197-216; Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of Experts' Advice to Women (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1979). 7. See, for example, Janice Raymond, "Reproductive Gifts and Gift Giving: The Altruistic Woman," Hastings Center Report 20 (Nov./Dec. 1990): 7-11;
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Maura A. Ryan, "The Argument for Unlimited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique," Hastings Center Report 20 (July/Aug. 1990): 6-12; Overall, Ethics and Human Reproduction; Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy. The overlapping domain of genetics has also spawned some gender-attentive work. See, for example, Rothenberg and Thomson, eds., Women and Prenatal Testing; Dorothy C. Wertz, "Providers' Gender and Moral Reasoning: A Proposed Agenda for Research on Providers and Patients," Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy 8 (Supp. 1) (1993): 81-89 (on genetic counseling); R. Alta Charo, "Effect of the Human Genome Initiative on Women's Rights and Reproductive Decisions," Fetal Diagnosis and Therapy 8 (Supp. 1) (1993): 148-59. 8. See, for example, Joan Liaschenko, "Feminist ethics and cultural ethos: Revisiting a nursing debate," ANS: Advances in Nursing Science 15 (1993): 71-81; Sara T. Fry, "The Role of Caring in a Theory of Nursing Ethics," in Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), 93-106 and citations therein; Martin Benjamin and Joy Curtis, Ethics in Nursing, 3d ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992), 96-97 & n.25; Anne J. Davis and Mila A. Aroskar, Ethical Dilemmas and Nursing Practice, 2d ed. (Norwalk, CT: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1983). 9. See, for example, Jocelyn Downie and Susan Sherwin, "Feminist Health Care Ethics Consultation," H E C Forum 5 (1993): 165-75; Leslie Bender, "A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia," Tennessee Law Review 59 (1992): 519-46; Rebecca Dresser, "Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research," Hastings Center Report 22 (Jan.-Feb. 1992): 24-29; Dena S. Davis, "Rich Cases: The Ethics of Thick Description," Hastings Center Report 21 (July-Aug. 1991): 12-17; Steven H. Miles and Allison August, "Courts, Gender, and 'the Right to Die,' " Law, Medicine & Health Care 18 (1990): 85-95; Susan M. Wolf, "Nancy Beth Cruzan: In No Voice At All," Hastings Center Report 20 (Jan./Feb. 1990): 38-41; Daniel O. Dugan, "Masculine and Feminine Voices: Making Ethical Decisions in the Care of the Dying," Journal of Medical Humanities and Bioethics 8 (1987): 129-40. 10. The recent exceptions include Mary Briody Mahowald, Women and Children in Health Care: An Unequal Majority (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992); and Holmes and Purdy, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics. The last is based on two special issues of Hypatia in 1989, "Feminist Ethics & Medicine" (Summer) and "Ethics & Reproduction" (Fall). Shorter treatments include Rebecca J. Cook, "Feminism and the Four Principles," in Raanan Gillon and Ann Lloyd, eds., Principles of Health Care Ethics (New York, NY: Wiley, 1994), 193-206; Ruth Macklin, "Women's Health: An Ethical Perspective," Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 21 (1993): 23-29; and Karen Lebacqz, "Feminism and Bioethics: An Overview," Second Opinion 17 (Oct. 1991): 11-25. Published prior to these articles, however, is Margaret Farley, "Feminist Theology and Bioethics," in Earl E. Shelp, ed., Theology and Bioethics: Exploring the Foundation and Frontiers (Boston, MA: D. Reidel, 1985). The fourth edition of Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 4th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 85-92 incorporates attention to feminist work for the first time. 11. See Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Thought: A Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989) (liberal, Marxist, radical, psychoanalytic, socialist, existential, and postmodern feminism); Alison M. Jaggar, Feminist Poli-
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Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics
tics and Human Nature (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1988) (liberal, Marxist, radical, and socialist feminism). 12. For example, the first six years of the Hastings Center Report included articles by Sissela Bok, Lisa Cahill, Ren e C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, Angela R. Holder, Karen A. Lebacqz, Carol Levine, Ruth Macklin, Dorothy Nelkin, Tabitha Powledge, Ruth Sidel (with Victor Sidel), Margaret O'Brien Steinfels, and other women, although publications by men predominated. See Institute of Science, Ethics and the Life Sciences, the hastings center Report: Index for 19711976, and Hastings Center Studies 1973-74. 13. See, for example, Annette Dula and Sara Goering, eds., "It Just Ain't Fair:" The Ethics of Health Care for African Americans (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994); John Conyers, Jr., "Principles of Health Care Reform: An African-American Perspective," Journal of Health Care for the Poor and Underserved 4 (1993): 242-49; Harley E. Flack and Edmund D. Pellegrino, eds., African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992). 14. Certainly the data cry out for race- and ethnicity-attentive analysis. See, for example, Eli Ginzberg, "Access to Health Care for Hispanics," Journal of the American Medical Association 265 (1991): 238-41, part of a special issue on Hispanic health. 15. See, for example, Mark Sagoff, "Zuckerman's Dilemma: A Plea for Environmental Ethics," Hastings Center Report 21 (Sept.-Oct. 1991): 32-40; Strachan Donnelley, "Speculative Philosophy, the Troubled Middle, and the Ethics of Animal Experimentation," Hastings Center Report 19 (Mar./Apr. 1989): 15-21. Feminist writers have also tackled environmental ethics and issues in animal use. See, for example, Special Issue on Ecological Feminism, Hypatia 6 (Spring 1991), including articles on both topics. 16. See Daniel Callahan and Courtney S. Campbell, eds., Special Supplement on "Theology, Religious Traditions, and Bioethics," Hastings Center Report 20 (July/Aug. 1990): 1-24; Richard A. McCormick, "Theology and Bioethics," Hastings Center Report 19 (Mar./Apr. 1989): 5-10; Shelp, ed., Theology and Bioethics. 17. See citations in note 8 above. 18. See, for example, Renee C. Fox, Spare Parts: Organ Replacement in American Society (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992); Renee C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, "Medical Morality is Not Bioethics: Medical Ethics in China and the United States," in Renee C. Fox, ed., Essays in Medical Sociology (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988), 645-70; Barbara Koenig, "The Technological Imperative in Medical Practice: The Social Creation of 'Routine' Treatment," in Margaret Lock and Deborah R. Gordon, eds., Biomedicine Examined (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988). 19. See, for example, Anne A. Scitovsky and Alexander M. Capron, "Medical Care at the End of Life: The Interaction of Economics and Ethics," Annual Review of Public Health 7 (1986): 71-75. 20. See, for example, the Journal of Clinical Ethics. 21. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature, 5. 22. Sherwin, No Longer Patient, 19. 23. See, for example, note 11 supra; Marianne Hirsch and Evelyn Fox Keller, Conflicts in Feminism (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990). 24. See, for example, Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York, NY: Routledge, 1990). 25. See Gilligan, In a Different Voice. 26. See, for example, Lawrence Blum, "Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory," Ethics 98 (1988): 472-91.
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27. See, for example, the five chapters presented under "Checking the Data" in Mary Jeanne Larrabee, ed., An Ethic of Care: Feminist and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (New York, NY: Routledge, 1993), 143-203. But see also Carol Gilligan's "Reply to Critics," in Larrabee, ed., An Ethic of Care, 207-14, reprinted from Signs. 28. For reservations about the ethics of care see, for example, Tronto, Moral Boundaries; Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics; Sherwin, No Longer Patient, 4257; Hilde Lindemann Nelson, "Against Caring," Journal of Clinical Ethics 3 (1992): 8-15. 29. David J. Rothman gives a history of modern bioethics in Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1991). 30. See Veronica Benson and Marie A. Marano, "Current Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey, 1993," Vital and Health Statistics, series 10 (190) (1994): 114,120; Jacqueline A. Horton, ed., The Women's Health Data Book: A Profile of Women's Health in the United States (Washington, DC: Elsevier, 1992), 93-94. 31. See Horton, ed., The Women's Health Data Book, 93, 136; Carol S. Weisman, "Communication Between Women and their Health Care Providers: Research Findings and Unanswered Questions," Public Health Reports 102 (1987 Supp.): 147-51, 147; Judith H. Hibbard and Clyde R. Pope, "Another Look at Sex Differences in the Use of Medical Care: Illness Orientation and the Types of Morbidities for which Services are Used," Women and Health 11 (Summer 1986): 21-36, 22. 32. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, 114th ed. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 121; Arnold S. Relman, "The Changing Demography of the Medical Profession," New England Journal of Medicine 321 (1989): 1540-42. 33. Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1982), 49 (footnote with citation to Joseph Kett omitted). 34. Ibid., 32-51. 35. In 1992 active nurses in the United States outnumbered active physicians by 1.85 million to 568,000 excluding federally employed persons. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, 122. 36. The majority of workers in long-term care are women. Marilyn Moon, "Women and Long-Term Care," The American Woman (1994-95): 223-50, 226. 37. See Dorothy Malone-Rising, "The Changing Face of Long-Term Care," Nursing Clinics of North America 29 (1994): 417-29, 423; Amanda S. Barusch and Wanda M. Spaid, "Gender Differences in Caregiving: Why Do Wives Report Greater Burden?" Gerontologist 29 (1989): 667-76. A survey of New York City home care workers found that 98 percent were women. Rebecca Donovan, " 'We Care for the Most Important People in Your Life:' Home Care Workers in New York City," Women's Studies Quarterly 17 (1-2) (1989): 56-65, 61. 38. See, for example, Judith M. Roy, "Surgical Gynecology," in Apple, ed., Women, Health, and Medicine in America, 173-95; Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture, 1830-1980 (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1985); Ehrenreich and English, For Her Own Good; Barbara Ehrenreich and Diedre English, Complaints and Disorders: The Sexual Politics of Sickness (Old Westbury, NY: Feminist Press, 1973). 39. See, for example, William Coryell, Jean Endicott, and Martin Keller, "Major Depression in a Nonclinical Sample: Demographic and Clinical Risk Factors for First Onset," Archives of General Psychiatry 49 (1992): 117-25; B. Lawrence Riggs, "Overview of Osteoporosis," Western Journal of Medicine 154 (1991):
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63-77, 63; James L. Bernat et al., "The Changing Picture in Migraine," Patient Care 22 (5) (1988): 39-48. See generally Horton, ed., The Women's Health Data Book, 56-58, 63-69. 40. See Anna C. Mastroianni, Ruth Faden, and Daniel Federman, eds., Institute of Medicine, Women and Health Research: Ethical and Legal Issues of Including Women in Clinical Studies, Vol. I (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1994), 64. 41. See Robert J. Levine, Ethics and Regulation of Clinical Research, 2d ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986). 42. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, 475-78; Mahowald, Women and Children in Health Care, 217-35; Robyn I. Stone, "The Feminization of Poverty Among the Elderly," Women's Studies Quarterly 17 (1-2) (1989): 20-34; National Center for Health Statistics, Health, United States, 1992 (Hyattsville, MD: Public Health Service, 1993), 42. 43. For such analysis see, for example, Nancy S. Jecker, "Age-Based Rationing and Women," Journal of the American Medical Association 266 (1991): 3012-15, and chapter 12 in this volume. 44. See Phyllis Moen, Julie Robinson, and Vivian Fields, "Women's Work and Caregiving Roles: A Life Course Approach," Journals of Gerontology 49 (1994): S176-86; Debbie H. Ward and Patricia A. Carney, "Caregiving Women and the U.S. Welfare State: The Case of Elder Kin Care by Low-Income Women," Holistic Nursing Practice 8 (1994): 44-58. See also Muller, Health Care and Gender, 126-27. 45. On each of these developments see notes 2 and 3 supra. 46. Many of these cases can be found in texts such as Barry R. Furrow et al., Health Law: Cases, Materials and Problems, 2d ed. (St. Paul, MN: West, 1991 & Supp. 1994). 47. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, "Gender Discrimination in the Medical Profession," Women's Health Issues 4 (Spring 1994): 1-11; Frances K. Conley, "Toward a More Perfect World— Eliminating Sexual Discrimination in Academic Medicine," New England Journal of Medicine 328 (1993): 351-52; Miriam Komaromy et al., "Sexual Harassment in Medical Training," New England Journal of Medicine 328 (1993): 322-26. 48. See Flora Johnson Skelly, "Poised for Flight: Women Are on the Threshold of Power in Medicine," American Medical News, September 19, 1994, pp. 14-18; Wendy Levinson, Susan W. Tolle, and Charles Lewis, "Women in Academic Medicine: Combining Career and Family," New England Journal of Medicine 321 (1989): 1511-17. 49. See, for example, Martha Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, "In Context," University of Southern California Law Review 63 (1990): 1597-652. 50. See, for example, Lawrence A. Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Marilyn Friedman, "The Social Self and the Partiality Debates," in Card, ed., Feminist Ethics, 161-79; Lawrence Blum, Friendship, Altruism, and Morality (London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980). 51. See, for example, Marilyn Friedman, "Care and Context in Moral Reasoning," in Kittay and Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory, 190-204. 52. Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 85-92. 53. See, for example, Roger B. Dworkin, "Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age," Indiana Law Journal 68 (1993): 727-42; Daniel Callahan, "Autonomy: A Moral Good, Not a Moral Obsession," Hastings Center Report 14 (Oct. 1984): 40-42.
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54. See, for example, Spelman, Inessential Woman. 55. I have written on this problem in the context of hospital ethics committees in Susan M. Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of Care," Maryland Law Review 50 (1991): 798-858. More broadly, I have written on this in Susan M. Wolf, "Toward a Theory of Process," Law, Medicine & Health Care 20 (1992): 278-90. 56. This is the usual short name for the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. An example of the commission's work is Making Health Care Decisions: The Ethical and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship, Vol. One: Report (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982). 57. Among the works of this body is New York State Task Force on Life and the Law, Surrogate Parenting: Analysis and Recommendations for Public Policy (1988). 58. See Wolf, "Ethics Committees and Due Process." 59. See, for example, Carol Levine and Arthur L. Caplan, "Beyond Localism: A Proposal for a National Research Review Board," IRB: A Review of Human Subjects Research 8 (Mar./Apr. 1986): 7-9. 60. See generally Robert M. Veatch, "Clinical Ethics, Applied Ethics, and Theory," in Barry Hoffmaster, Benjamin Freedman, and Gwen Fraser, eds., Clinical Ethics: Theory and Practice (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 1989), 7-25, 1620; Ruth Macklin, "Consultative Roles and Responsibilities," in Ronald E. Cranford and A. Edward Doudera, eds., Institutional Ethics Committees and Health Care Decision Making (Ann Arbor, MI: Health Administration Press, 1984), 157-68, 158-59. 61. See, for example, Leon R. Kass, "Practicing Ethics: Where's the Action?" Hastings Center Report 20 (Jan.-Feb. 1990): 5-12; Peter Steinfels, "Beliefs," New York Times, October 30, 1993, sec. 1, p. 9. 62. National Center for Human Genome Research, Progress Report: Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, NIH Pub. No. 93-3550, Mar. 1993), 37-49. 63. I am grateful to Helen Longino for suggesting the notion of a discourse of experts. 64. On narrative ethics see, for example, Howard Brody, Stories of Sickness (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987). 65. See Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); John Arras, "Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 29-51. 66. See, for example, Dena S. Davis, "Rich Cases: The Ethics of Thick Description," Hastings Center Report 21 (July-Aug. 1991): 12-17. 67. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1975). 68. See Maria C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman, "Have We Got a Theory for You! Feminist Theory, Cultural Imperialism and the Demand for 'The Woman's Voice,' " Women's Studies International Forum 6 (1983): 573-81. 69. See Cook, "Feminism and the Four Principles;" Macklin, "Women's Health." 70. Sherwin, No Longer Patient, 179-240. 71. See Judith Herman, Father-Daughter Incest (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
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72. See Starr, The Transformation of American Medicine, 32, 49-50; Charles E. Rosenberg, The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America's Hospital System (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1987), 342. 73. See, for example, Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient, 100-01. 74. The public/private distinction has been much criticized by feminists and others for insulating the private, domestic sphere from scrutiny and the requirements of justice. See, for example, Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family. 75. See Troyen Brennan, Just Doctoring: Medical Ethics in the Liberal State (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991). 76. See Dorothy E. Roberts, "Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy," Harvard Law Review 104 (1991): 1419-82, 1432-36. 77. Compare U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1994, 8, 20-21 with Centers for Disease Control, HIV / AIDS Surveillance Report (Oct. 1992): 12. 78. See Evelyn Fox Keller, Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender and Science (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), 17. 79. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). 80. See, for example, Daniel Wikler and Norma J. Wikler, "Turkey-baster Babies: The Demedicalization of Artificial Insemination," Milbank Quarterly 69 (Spring 1991): 5-40; Ronald Bayer, Private Acts, Social Consequences: AIDS and the Politics of Public Health (New York, NY: Free Press, 1989); Ronald Bayer, Homosexuality and American Psychiatry: The Politics of Diagnosis (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1981). 81. See, for example, the special issue of Hypatia on "Lesbian Ethics" edited by Claudia Card. It includes Claudia Card, "Bibliography of Lesbian Philosophy and Selected Related Works," Hypatia 7 (Fall 1992): 212-22. See also Tong, Feminine and Feminist Ethics, 188-219. 82. See, for example, Rosser, Biology and Feminism; Hine, Black Women in White; Rosser, Feminism within the Science and Health Care Professions; Carol Gilligan and Susan Pollak, "The Vulnerable and Invulnerable Physician," in Gilligan, Ward, and Taylor, eds., Mapping the Moral Domain, 245-62; Morantz-Sanchez, Sympathy and Science; Evelyn Fox Keller, A Feeling for the Organism: The Life and Work of Barbara McClintock (New York, NY: W. H. Freeman, 1983). 83. See, for example, Lurie et al., "Preventive Care for Women: Does the Sex of the Physician Matter?" answering yes. 84. See Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 102, 111. 85. See, for example, Alcoff and Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies. 86. Helen E. Longino, "Subjects, Power, and Knowledge: Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies of Science," in Alcoff and Potter, eds., Feminist Epistemologies, 101-20, 103. 87. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, "Introduction: When Feminisms Intersect Epistemology," in ibid., 1-14, 13. 88. Longino, "Subjects, Power, and Knowledge," 112-13. 89. See, for example, Jerry Goldman and Martin D. Katz, "Inconsistency and Institutional Review Boards," Journal of the American Medical Association 248 (1982): 197-202. 90. See Ellen Fox and Carol Stocking, "Ethics Consultants' Recommendations for Life-Prolonging Treatment of Patients in a Persistent Vegetative State," Journal of the American Medical Association 270 (1993): 2578-82. 91. See, for example, Harding, The Science Question in Feminism.
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43
92. See Cook, "Feminism and the Four Principles;" Macklin, "Women's Health." 93. See Jennifer Nedelsky, "Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities," Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 1 (1989): 7-36; Minow, Making All the Difference; Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference; Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family. 94. See, for example, Blum, Moral Perception and Particularity; Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992); Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty of the Good (London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970). 95. Iris Marion Young usefully separates these two in Justice and the Politics of Difference. 96. See Daniel Callahan, Setting Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987); Norman Daniels, Just Health Care (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
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I THE RELATIONSHIP OF FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS
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1 Feminism and Bioethics Susan Sherwin
About Feminism The class of people who consider themselves feminists is large and diverse, representing a broad range of different opinions and perspectives.1 Despite this rich multiplicity of views, it is possible to identify some common themes. Generally, feminists share a recognition that women are oppressed in our society and an understanding that their oppression takes many different forms, compounded often by other forms of oppression based on features such as race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and economic class. Because feminists believe that oppression is objectionable on both moral and political grounds, most are committed to transforming society in ways that will ensure the elimination of oppression in all its forms.2 Much of the harm of sexism is obvious and thus can be readily challenged. For example, the evidence is overwhelming that women are disproportionately subjected to domestic violence and sexual assault, resulting in undeniable physical and psychological damage to many women and a sense of insecurity and vulnerability in all women.3 In addition, the economic disadvantage women experience in the work place, where their average earnings are less than two-thirds of the average wages paid to men,4 is widely condemned as unjust. Further, the predominance of men, especially white, middle-class men, in positions of influence in virtually all segments of society (legal, political, financial, cultural, and military) is inescapable.
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Other dimensions of sexism are more subtle, however, and can easily be overlooked unless one makes a conscious effort to identify them. For example, the implicit male bias of ordinary language, such as the tendency to confuse explicitly gendered male forms of expression with supposedly gender-neutral generic forms (such as "chairman," "manpower," and even "mankind"), perpetuates culturally embedded notions of male-defined norms and assumptions of female deviance. The difference in adjectives customarily used to describe men and women (for instance, behavior that is called forceful or aggressive in men is likely to be described as strident or hysterical in women) reflects a rigid, dichotomized view of the world in which gender stereotyping is systematically reinforced. In a different dimension, the prevalence of sexual harassment of women by men and the fact that many people often have difficulty in distinguishing it from ordinary male sexual aggression are evidence of the unbalanced power relations in our society. As well, the degree to which the work and ideas of men dominate the curricula in our schools and universities reveals a culturally widespread dismissal of the accomplishments of women. Feminists have learned that women are devalued and endangered in many complex ways. They understand that unconscious sexism is at least as common and dangerous as the conscious variety. The roots of sexism are intertwined and deeply embedded in the fabric of our culture. Hence, sexism is unlikely to be eradicated without extensive investigation of the various institutions that shape society. Feminists pursue numerous strategies to identify and uproot the many forms of sexism, including the project of examining the effects of diverse social practices and institutions on the established patterns of oppression in society. They try to evaluate the overall influence of each social practice or institution to determine whether the practice in question helps to perpetuate the dominance of one group over another, is neutral with respect to oppression, or helps to undermine the existing oppressive forces. When feminists have approached the established academic disciplines with this question in mind, they have found that there are ways in which almost all have helped to maintain existing dominance structures. Most disciplines have/for example, largely ignored or silenced the voices of women and other oppressed groups and have pursued projects that are supportive of oppressive patterns. Feminist critiques of the life, physical, and social sciences find a pervasive anti-female bias in the conceptions and practices of each.5 In addition, feminist scholars who have examined the particular disciplines categorized under the heading of the "humanities" have found each to be maledominated and supportive of social structures that are oppressive to
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women.6 To date, though, bioethics has largely escaped such feminist scrutiny.7 For the most part, bioethicists proceed as if bioethics is simply neutral in its effects on oppression, pursuing questions that seem to be separate from those that occupy feminists. With the exception of a few topics that clearly affect women differently from men (particularly abortion and the new reproductive technologies), most bioethicists assume that their work has no impact on questions of gender oppression. Of course, many bioethicists personally oppose sexism and are motivated to try to reverse some of its effects; many make conscious efforts to use gender-neutral language and to challenge traditional gender stereotypes in their examples and case studies, such as by using female pronouns to refer to doctors. These bioethicists likely think of themselves as involved in an activity that helps to undermine some of the subtle effects of sexism. But even among these sympathetic bioethicists, gender is seldom raised as a relevant consideration in the topics explored, or viewed as significant in the contexts addressed. Feminists, however, are unlikely to be comforted by these omissions, having learned elsewhere that invisibility is no assurance of irrelevance in matters of oppression. The question of whether bioethics has a positive, negative, or neutral effect on existing patterns of oppression becomes especially troublesome when we recognize that philosophy, theology, medicine, and law—the disciplines from which bioethics draws most of its practices and practitioners—have all been shown to be deeply infected with patriarchal values and assumptions. Of particular concern to bioethicists is the fact that several recent feminist critiques suggest that rather than being an instrument for challenging oppression, ethics as it is usually pursued may actually be supportive of the oppressive status quo.8 Thus, when feminists approach the field of bioethics they have reason to consider carefully what role this newly defined discipline plays in the existing structures of oppression. In this essay, I shall outline some of my explicitly feminist concerns about bioethics and offer some suggestions as to how bioethical practices might be changed to be more compatible with the moral objectives of feminism.
Feminist Ethics Although many bioethicists balk at the label "applied ethics" and resist the suggestion that their work consists simply of some mechanical application of abstract ethical principles, virtually all believe that a clear understanding of the central principles, values, and debates within the field of philosophical or religious ethics is essential to adequate analysis
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of the issues that arise in the domain of bioethics. Also, despite the commonplace grumbling among bioethicists about the impracticality of theoretical ethics, most bioethical arguments reflect a belief that the insights of theoretical ethics can be effectively supplemented and modified in the light of actual experience and circumstances. In addition, many of the debates and disagreements that occupy theoretical ethicists carry over to bioethics. Bioethicists are divided, for instance, about whether the central criteria of ethical analysis are best captured by a finite set of principles or by a broader, more open-ended range of values. They also worry about such classical questions as whether moral claims can be said to be ultimately true or false in any meaningful sense, whether happiness or freedom should be seen as the more fundamental value, and whether ethics should focus on establishing norms for action or for character. Finally, most bioethicists are highly dependent on the work of their colleagues in the realm of theoretical ethics in spelling out the meaning of many key concepts they rely on, especially "autonomy," "welfare," and "justice." Thus, it is appropriate to begin a feminist evaluation of bioethics by reviewing some of the criticisms that feminist theorists have brought to bear on the dominant theories of traditional ethics. Several feminist critics take their lead from Carol Gilligan's proposal that there exist two distinct patterns of moral decision making.9 They note that most ethical theory reflects only one of the two important approaches to ethical deliberation that Gilligan found practiced in our culture. Traditional ethics is rooted in the approach Gilligan characterized as the ethic of justice, an ethic defined by its commitment to abstract, universal principles. The alternative approach, which she identified as an ethic of care or responsibility, involves a form of person-specific caring in which contextual details take prominence.10 The ethic of care differs from the ethic of justice in that it is particular and concrete and it directs agents to place a premium on the avoidance of hurting people. It does not pursue general rules independently of their specific effects, and it permits the modification of existing circumstances or rules when that is necessary to circumvent painful choices. While the ethic of justice focuses on persons only generically and abstractly, the ethic of care is occupied with actual persons and the particularities of their circumstances. An ethic of care is readily adaptable to bioethics, where the importance of considering the particular needs of patients and attending to health professionals' special relationship toward them is already well entrenched in moral deliberations. In her empirical studies, Gilligan found that women were far more likely than men to adopt an ethic of care, and men were more likely than women to adopt an ethic of justice, but she believed that moral agents should be skilled in pursuing both kinds of ethics, since each is
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appropriate to specific sorts of problems. Many feminists have observed that most male-defined ethical theories (including virtually all of traditional philosophical ethics) address only the concerns of an ethic of justice.11 Moreover, most of the familiar ethical theories either dismiss women from consideration altogether or assign to them a subordinate role. For obvious reasons, feminists consider it important to develop a moral theory that speaks to women in ways that do not reflect the dominant group's interests in perpetuating their subordination. Therefore, many feminists welcome the fact that Gilligan offers recognition and validity for the sort of moral reasoning that is commonly associated with women.12 Most feminists also appreciate her recognition that more than one legitimate approach to ethical reasoning is possible. There is no obvious justification for restricting the definition of "ethics" to the sort of deliberation that is most commonly practiced by men. Many feminists are, however, wary of uncritically valorizing apparently female approaches to moral reasoning and have expressed reservations about establishing too quickly a caring-based conception of feminist ethics. They recognize the dangers inherent in accepting or legitimating gender patterns that have been established within a sexist society. Therefore, some feminists have argued that if we are to recommend a place for caring in ethics, we do so only in conjunction with a political evaluation of the role of caring in our moral deliberations, and others have rejected caring outright as the central element of feminist ethics.13 In light of the dangers and complications that have been associated with attempts to endorse stereotypically feminine patterns as the basis of ethics, I do not believe it is appropriate to characterize the ethics of care as specifically feminist. It does not capture the dimensions that I regard as distinctively feminist. Nevertheless, 'I do share with many other feminist ethicists an appreciation of Gilligan's emphasis on the importance of attention to concrete narrative details in moral decision making.14 Interestingly, many bioethicists also agree about the value of the concrete. They understand that contextual details are morally relevant to ethical evaluation and that purely abstract considerations are often inadequate for resolving moral concerns.15 The question that must be considered, then, is what sorts of contextual details are to be deemed relevant for moral judgments; feminists and bioethicists often differ significantly on this point. I believe feminism's answer derives from its understanding that oppression is a pervasive and insidious moral wrong, and that conscious attention must be directed to its place in the practices that are being ethically evaluated. Therefore, from a feminist perspective, the relevant concrete details to be considered in our ethical deliberations include
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the political or power relations of the persons who are involved in or who are affected by the practice or policy being evaluated. Questions about dominance and oppression are essential dimensions of feminist ethical analysis. Thus, when approaching moral dilemmas in feminist ethics, and by extension in feminist bioethics, it is important to understand the actual particulars of the encompassing dominance structures. In other words, feminist ethics proposes that when we engage in moral deliberation, it is not sufficient just to calculate utilities or to follow a set of moral principles. We must also ask whose happiness is increased, or how the principles in question affect those who are now oppressed in the circumstances at hand. Practices that increase the happiness or protect the rights of the dominant group at the expense of an oppressed group cannot count as morally acceptable. Positive moral value attaches to actions or principles that help relieve oppression, and negative value attaches to those that fail to reduce oppression or actually help to strengthen it. Therefore, when we ethically evaluate a practice, whether it is contractual pregnancy or abortion, or even euthanasia or truth-telling, it is important that our analysis attend to the effects of the practice on existing patterns of oppression. There are further aspects of feminist ethics that should be carried over into bioethics, including feminist challenges to some of the key concepts of traditional ethics. For example, feminists have questioned the usefulness of the concept of the abstract individual as the fundamental social and moral unit. They have argued that this concept masks particular details about persons that are often relevant to ethical evaluations, such as each individual's actual social and political location.16 Feminism teaches that moral theories are partial and defective when they speak of the interests, values, and rational choices of individuals as abstract entities, as if the personal histories and social contexts of persons are irrelevant. Feminists are very aware that persons are not all situated so as to be independent and equal; many are disadvantaged, dependent, exploited, responsible for the care of others, or otherwise limited in their ability to assert their rights in competition with the claims of other persons. Feminists recognize that these characteristics are of moral significance. For related reasons, some feminists object to the privileging that is customarily afforded to the concept of autonomy.17 Although "autonomy" is a term whose meaning is notoriously hard to fix, it retains a place of prominence in most bioethical writings. In most autonomybased discussions, individuals are envisioned as being fundamentally independent and self-directed, at least ideally. They are seen as somehow prior to and independent of their social circumstances. Many feminists, however, are critical of moral theory's usual treatment of persons as autonomous self-asserters.18 As Annette Baier has stressed,
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persons do not emerge fully grown and complete into the world, ready to perform actions and form social contracts as autonomous, selfsufficient beings.19 Rather, she suggests, persons are better described as "second persons," the product of the physical and emotional labor of other persons who socialize them. In asserting the theoretical primacy of the individual, autonomybased theories characterize social and moral obligations as essentially secondary to considerations of self-interest. They treat communities and the ties that bind them as a problem that must be accounted for, while proceeding as if the concept of an individual apart from community were coherent. And they ignore the fact that our sense of ourselves and our preferences is very much a product of our social history and current circumstances. In addition, many feminists perceive that the concept of autonomy, rather than working to empower the oppressed and exploited among us, in practice often serves to protect the privileges of the most powerful.20 It is taken as an analytic truth among political theorists that individual autonomy cannot be fully reconciled with the needs of the community. Indeed, autonomy provides the most convincing rationale for resisting the intrusion of claims of equality on the privileges of advantaged individuals. Yet greater equality is a precondition for any meaningful exercise of autonomy by seriously disadvantaged members of society. Therefore, theories that place priority on autonomy—at least as the concept is commonly interpreted—must be understood as primarily protecting the autonomy of those who are already well situated, while sacrificing the necessary prerequisites for autonomy for others. The concept of autonomy is also exclusionary, in that it is generally ascribed only to those persons who are recognized as rational. As Genevieve Lloyd and others have shown, however, rationality has historically been constructed in ways that exclude not only children, but also women and members of other oppressed groups.21 Those who are declared or perceived to be nonrational are simply beyond the scope and protection of autonomy talk. Many feminists favor a more community-based conception of the self as the basis for moral value than what is assumed in traditional ethical theorizing. They seek a conception of self in which individuals strive to determine norms for themselves within their communities.22 In feminist theories, it is usually explicitly acknowledged and made a subject of direct moral interest that all persons do not have equal power or opportunity to do so. Feminist ethicists also raise problems about traditional treatments of the concept of justice. A basic idea of justice is fundamental to feminist arguments, but the actual definition of the concept requires careful feminist attention. Susan Moller Okin, for instance, has shown how
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Rawlsian proposals to develop the principles of justice in abstraction from the real details of political life are inadequate.23 She demonstrates that it has been all too easy for privileged white males to fail to account for the demands of child care in the hypothetical conception of Rawls's "original position." Thus, gender-based differences in the demands of reproduction are not even considered in most social contract theories. Philosophers have traditionally presumed that justice belongs wholly in the public realm, and have paid no attention at all to the injustice that characterizes the private lives of most families. Feminists are very much aware that domestic injustice is a serious problem, and indeed that this injustice is generally carried over into the public realm. Failure to acknowledge gender injustice in the family permits it to be perpetuated and extended. Pursuing a somewhat different tack, Iris Marion Young has argued persuasively that philosophical conceptions of justice have been too heavily preoccupied with the distributive model.24 They have ignored the question of whether the system within which goods are to be distributed is itself oppressive. She has proposed an alternate conception of justice in which considerations of dominance relations are made central to our investigations. Feminism suggests that any appeals to justice that are made in bioethics should rely on just such a conception of justice, that is, one explicitly sensitive to the injustice of oppression in its various concrete forms. Thus, feminist critiques of both the methodology and tools of ethics suggest that an underlying gender bias is implicit in the existing ethical theories. Insofar as bioethics is built on the foundations offered by various ethical theories, its own validity and credibility are also suspect. We must, then, be careful in developing bioethics to try to ensure that we do not build into our theoretical framework the sorts of assumptions that may foster continued oppression under the legitimizing label of "ethics."
Global versus Local Critiques Distinctively feminist bioethics is just beginning to emerge as a defined approach. A principal characteristic of feminist bioethics is the critical interest it takes in the oppressive aspects of medical organization and practice. Feminist historians and sociologists of medicine have collected a great deal of data showing that medical authority has frequently been invoked to support discriminatory programs against women and to deny women's credibility in both medical and nonmedical contexts.25 In fact, a vast feminist literature exists on the role of medicine in the oppression of women and its contributions to the multiple oppression of minority and poor women.26 Nonfeminist bioethicists have, how-
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ever, shown little interest in this evidence and have not made it a matter for serious ethical evaluation. Feminist bioethicists have strong motivation to investigate and interpret these findings. Feminists object, for example, to the fact that over time physicians have succeeded in medicalizing and thereby seizing control over all aspects of women's reproductive lives, from menstruation and contraception, through pregnancy and delivery, to lactation and menopause.27 They recognize that the effect of this monopoly is to thwart woman-directed health services and to discredit and drive out alternative forms of care that women historically offered in their roles as midwives and homeopathic healers. Another effect is to alter women's attitudes toward their own bodies, transforming them into objects to be constantly monitored and regulated, rather than experienced directly as aspects of the self.28 Feminists also object to the gender stereotypes portraying women as immature, ignorant, nervous, and dependent that permeate medicine and influence physicians' unconscious attitudes in their dealings with women patients. Despite well-documented evidence of deeply entrenched patterns of questionable medical behavior, most bioethicists choose to define their role locally: they evaluate or criticize very specific aspects of health care practices and refrain from analyzing the overall social effects of the organization of health care in society. They present their examination of particular features of health practitioner behavior within an implicit acceptance of the basic organization of health services, avoiding the sorts of evaluations of the health care system as a whole that feminist and other social critics present.29 When we admit investigations of broad, structural questions into the domain of bioethics, as feminism encourages us to do, we can start to pursue such important concerns as the legitimacy of the hierarchical organization of the health care system. The existing structure concentrates power in the hands of a privileged white, male elite, while relying on the obedient service of a vast body of subordinate female (mostly white) nursing staff who, in turn, retain authority over a large, mostly minority, nonprofessional support staff.30 Not only is this structure and distribution of roles inherently unfair, it also bears on medicine's own contribution to existing oppressive social structures. For instance, the health problems that attain prominence within research and treatment are largely the sorts of health risks that threaten privileged white males.31 Medical research and resources are directed at treating and reducing the risks of diseases such as heart disease, cancer, and strokes, but are not so easily available for many of the conditions that sap the strength and energy from black and native populations.32 As well, many of the efforts in the area of new reproductive technologies have been directed at developing means that allow affluent men to
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father genetically related children by applying risky technology to women; fewer resources have been directed at identifying strategies that would protect women's reproductive health and reduce the incidence of infertility in people from all economic classes.33 Moreover, much of the discussion in bioethics on the allocation of health care resources has proceeded on the assumption that such resources are a good to be maximized. But feminists join with other social critics in questioning this premise. Health care often carries iatrogenic effects in its wake; clearly, it does not always benefit its recipients, and more is not always better. In addition, patients receiving health care are often encouraged to place more trust in health care providers than is merited. Further, if the goal is to improve the health of the population and to ensure that good health is more fairly distributed, concentration on the distribution of health care services is probably not the most effective means of achieving it. Health is a product not only of health care, but also of social and economic position, and protection from violent attack and environmental toxins. Homelessness, addictions, violence, and lack of adequate food and clothing are increasing problems in the United States and they carry with them extraordinary costs in terms of illness and death. Yet while highly expensive technological health care services are being expanded to meet the needs of the privileged, resources to meet basic human needs for the most disadvantaged segments of the population are being withdrawn. Even in Canada, which has a more equitable system than the United States for allocating health care resources, basic human needs for food, shelter, and safety—all of which are essential to health—may not be adequately met. While physicians, health administrators, and bioethicists occupy themselves with questions about who should get the last bed in the ICU or a new experimental drug for AIDS, they allow themselves to be distracted from the health pleas of those who have different, but equally urgent needs. Feminist bioethics identifies reasons to question the priorities of society in setting policies that view medical services as the measure of its responsibility to the health needs of its population. Feminism directs us to examine the role of medicine in our society and to ask why it has assumed dominance in health matters.
Rethinking Topics in Bioethics Although broadly based evaluations of the health care system are a major dimension of feminist bioethics, they are not the whole story. It is also important to evaluate specific health care practices and policies from a feminist perspective. Most of the work in bioethics to date has been carried out by nonfeminists who have failed to observe or object
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to the sexism that surrounds them. Hence, most have not explored the significance of gender in the practices they examine. They have assumed that they can investigate moral questions about patient care as if patients were interchangeable—as if the gender, race, and class of patients were irrelevant. Only in matters of reproduction has gender been acknowledged as a significant variable, and often, not even there. Feminist approaches to bioethics, in contrast, demand that we attend to the role that gender and other categories of oppression play in each of the various practices examined. When the traditional issues of bioethics are explored from the perspective of feminism, the familiar questions of bioethics are raised, but so too are additional questions. Feminist bioethics requires us to consider how each practice contributes to the existing power relations in society. Therefore, when we examine such practices as confidentiality, paternalism, or the termination of life-sustaining treatment, we should ask how this practice fits into the general patterns of oppression in our society.34 For example, feminism argues that we should not discuss abortion purely in terms of the interests or rights of fetuses without observing that fetuses are universally housed in women's bodies. Similarly, discussions of the institutionalization of patients diagnosed as mentally ill should take into account that women may be especially vulnerable to such policies, since they are diagnosed as mentally ill more often than men, perhaps because they are subject to incoherent standards of mental health.35 And debate about meeting the health needs of the poor should take into account that almost 80 percent of the poor in the United States are women and children, and a disproportionate number are members of racial minorities.36 Policies in all of these areas are likely to have serious effects on the lives and status of many women. Consider, too, the many discussions in the bioethics literature of the patient-physician relationship. Feminist discussions of this topic would surely share many of the oft-cited concerns about paternalism in medical contexts. Yet in addition, a feminist perspective would encourage us to analyze the social and political consequences of paternalism in light of the fact that the majority of physicians are male and the majority of patients are female.37 In that context, paternalism builds on and reinforces gender differentials in power and authority. Feminists might also point out that this problem arises within a culture that regularly grants authoritarian power on the basis of scientific expertise, while dismissing experiential, subjective knowledge; not coincidentally, scientific knowledge is generally considered "masculine," while subjective and experiential knowledge is often associated with the "feminine."38 Medicine actively encourages deferential respect to its own particular forms of knowledge and training, in a society that un-
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dermines the claims of many women to other forms of knowledge and authority. Further, many feminists are inclined to think of persons as beings in a community, rather than as entirely independent individuals. Such thinking encourages us to perceive both patient and practitioner as embedded in complex social and political contexts, instead of treating them as an isolated dyad. Although feminists will thus join many other bioethicists in opposing paternalism, they have some unique reasons for their position. Furthermore, in contrast to their nonfeminist colleagues in bioethics, feminists are less likely to turn to the traditional alternative of autonomy as the preferred solution. In addition to the problems with autonomy already cited, there is the further difficulty that people who are oppressed face systemic barriers to their freedom, so the choices they are offered in medical contexts are likely to be seriously restricted by the limited choices available to them in their lives generally. It is deceptive to suggest that we are protecting autonomy when we allow patients to choose between unhappy alternatives, and the choice is already severely limited. To speak of autonomy in the narrow context of individual decision making, within an alien environment that is unresponsive to the patient's basic values and interests, is to distort the reality of her dilemma. Although feminists challenge the dominance and paternalism that often structure patient-physician interactions and seek means to grant greater authority to patients, many see reason to reformulate the problem rather than simply accept a dichotomy that presents autonomy as the only alternative to paternalism. Richer conceptions and more careful analysis are required, instead of ritually translating objections to paternalism into the politically loaded terminology of autonomy theory. It is therefore important that we enrich our vision of possible ways to conceive of relationships, before choosing the norms for medical interactions. Feminist bioethicists might investigate some of the alternative models that feminist theorists have proposed for ethics, such as the relationship between mothers and their children, or the sort of relationship that exists between friends, as alternatives to the more common father—child model of paternalism.39 We might also explore the relationships that can occur between teachers and students or between midwives and their clients, rather than accepting the vendor-consumer model that is so often generated by autonomy metaphors. Other familiar topics in bioethics also take on new dimensions when evaluated from the perspective of feminism. Consideration of the treatment owed to the elderly and discussions about withholding some treatments by age to conserve limited resources should be sensitive to the facts that women make up a significant majority of the elderly and that women beyond childbearing age are consistently devalued in our
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society.40 Discussions that encourage controlling costs by caring for more patients at home rather than in the hospital must acknowledge that at-home care is almost always provided by women and generally imposes a very large burden on caregivers. And when bioethicists address the ethics of research with human subjects, they should keep in mind that in addition to illness, youth, mental incapacity, and institutionalization, oppression is a factor that makes people vulnerable to exploitation, abuse, or neglect in research protocols. Feminism also expands the agenda of topics to be addressed in bioethics. For example, cosmetic surgery is becoming an increasingly common surgical procedure; it constitutes a multibillion dollar industry and it is directed, overwhelmingly, at female clients.41 It is virtually unregulated, and often poses significant risk to clients who invest years of savings for these dangerous procedures, motivated by a culture that demands female bodies and faces to conform to a limited range of stereotypes. This practice clearly poses some substantial moral questions. Yet there is no mention of the ethical problems associated with this widespread practice in the nonfeminist bioethics literature. Feminists have begun to turn their attention to this topic and have discovered that the traditional bioethical categories and concerns do not begin to encompass the issues posed by this well-entrenched practice.42 Feminism also encourages us to investigate the now emerging evidence of significant patterns of sexual abuse and sexual harassment experienced by many female patients in their encounters with physicians. While most nonfeminist bioethicists are willing to condemn such practices as unethical, few have shared with feminists a sense of urgency in trying to determine what features of the patient-physician relationship make it especially vulnerable to such abuses of power.43 It seems that a feminist analysis of sexual harassment and abuse is necessary if we hope not only to condemn such features of medical encounters, but actually to eradicate them.
The Makeup of the Bioethics Field The prevailing silence about feminist concerns in much of the existing literature of bioethics may well be a product of the patterns of representation and influence within the field. So this, too, should be a subject for feminist examination. Clearly, bioethics is a discipline that includes women's voices; most of its leading journals and institutes include a significant female presence, even if women are often still in the minority.44 Nevertheless, most of the best known, most frequently cited (and invited) bioethicists are male. This indicates that here, too, the views of male contributors receive more attention and respect than do those of women. Also, participants and especially speakers at most
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bioethics conferences are almost exclusively white, middle-class, and (relatively) healthy.45 In other words, bioethics is a discipline that is structured much like most other academic and professional organizations; its agenda and methodology have been largely defined by a white, middle-class, male elite with minority input from their female counterparts (like myself). Although we cannot conclude from this fact alone that bioethics is biased, we ought to be suspicious about the fact that the population of bioethicists diverges so greatly from the makeup of the population at large. Such imbalance is potentially dangerous because it restricts the perspectives from which problems in the field are identified and analyzed. Bioethicists interested in resisting oppression should ask themselves why the field seems to be so inhospitable to the voices of people who experience oppression and what changes might bring a more representative group into the dialogue. Are oppressed people being consciously or unconsciously ignored, or do many oppressed people refrain from participation because they find the questions that bioethicists pursue to be largely irrelevant to their central concerns? Either reason would be grounds for concern and change. Homogeneity among participants in debates has consequences in any field. One important effect is that it allows most practitioners to remain oblivious to the significance of their own location and perspective for their work. As in other disciplines that are dominated by a well-educated, white, male elite, the fact that most of their colleagues share the same perspective makes it easy for bioethicists to lapse into false generalizations from their own experience. It is all too easy to mistake oneself for a neutral "ideal observer" when no one is present to point out the specificity of one's actual stance by countering with direct experience from a different vantage point. In exploring ethical dilemmas that arise in the area of health care, bioethicists most often assume the perspective of physicians in their analyses, focusing their work on the questions that arise in the course of practicing medicine. The moral deliberations of nurses and other health professionals, such as social workers, dieticians, and physiotherapists are also addressed, but not nearly as frequently. It is rare, however, to find bioethicists taking an interest in the moral dilemmas that confront patients and their family caregivers—for example, when and how to obtain reliable advice if they do not feel well served by their current providers, how to make their own treatment decisions, or how truthful to be to the physician. And there are virtually no discussions of the dilemmas that may confront nonprofessionals who work in the health care system. A principal reason for this bias in focus is that physicians retain most of the power and are responsible for much of the difficult decision making in health care. A second reason, how-
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ever, may be that bioethicists closely match physicians in their socioeconomic, educational, racial, and gender makeup and so identify most readily with physicians' concerns. Moreover, the relatively privileged social status of most bioethicists may distort the agenda of the discipline in additional ways. For example, it probably accounts for the centrality of questions of consent in the bioethics literature. As individuals, most bioethicists are accustomed to being treated with dignity and respect and having control over matters concerning their own lives and well-being. Because illness is likely to be perceived as posing a serious threat to the exercise of their usual control, maintaining that control under the unfamiliar and frightening condition of illness-induced vulnerability is seen as an important objective. From the perspective of less privileged health care consumers who normally have little control over their lives, however, maintaining control when ill may not be of paramount concern, since control is not theirs to lose. Patients who are not used to being cared for or respected in the rest of their lives may have a different ordering of values and different priorities in their dealings with health professionals than do those who now occupy center stage in the bioethics arena.46 Some severely oppressed and socially marginalized people have absorbed the social message that their devalued status is a reflection of their lack of worth, or at least they perceive that many of the people with power and authority believe as much. As a result, they may see no reason even to bring their problems to health professionals, who may too often respond with barely disguised contempt. For them, the fundamental question of when and how to risk seeking health care services at all may be an urgent question. Many of society's marginalized peoples distrust the medical establishment far more than do concerned bioethicists, and so their moral critiques would likely be far more radical than what is usually found in the literature. The moral demands of those speaking from the position of extreme oppression might begin with a requirement for more responsiveness on the part of health practitioners to the distinct health needs of oppressed groups.47 A more diverse population of bioethicists might also lead to a different and more intensive discussion of the question of how "health care services" should be defined. There might be greater interest in really grappling with prominent health concerns of the underclass. Those concerns would include poor nutrition, inadequate shelter, unsafe work and living conditions, abuse, addictions, and lack of prenatal services. Many feminists believe that the way ethics is done has a great deal to do with the context in which it is carried out, and that both context and method affect the results produced.48 Bioethicists need to keep in mind
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the important sociological truth that the ability to recognize certain moral problems, to understand the position of those holding divergent views, and to respond to conflicting values is inevitably influenced by one's own values and experiences. Carrying out discussions and analysis with a more heterogeneous collection of colleagues would enhance those abilities. It would also provide more opportunities to learn of the values and experiences of those with different perspectives.49
Further Directions Finally, it is important to stress that feminism is interested not solely in identifying and analyzing oppression. Its principal concern is finding ways of reducing and, ultimately, eliminating oppression. Toward this end, feminists seek greater understanding of how women and other oppressed persons can escape the harms of oppression and empower themselves despite the constraining structures they face. Thus feminists focus on ways in which patients and subordinate workers in the health care field can transform their positions of vulnerability, and become more engaged in the deliberations that shape their lives. Feminists are, therefore, especially eager to shift the focus of bioethics from the perspective of physicians to that of patients, to consider how patients can exercise agency in the circumstances of illness and institutionalization. Feminism encourages us to develop and investigate new models for restructuring the power relations associated with healing, such as by distributing specialized knowledge on health matters in ways that allow individuals greater control over their own health. Thus many feminists speak of the need to help patients educate themselves about health care decisions; they recognize the importance of developing supportive structures in which patients can investigate the consequences of their choices.50 More generally, feminism raises the question of how we might try to change society's organization and thinking about health and health care in order to allow patients a more active role in defining and pursuing their own conceptions of health. Any bioethics that shares in this agenda, and understands the barriers that oppressive practices and institutions create on the basis of gender and other categories, might well describe itself as feminist.
Notes 1. There are so many different definitions of feminism to choose from, each suggesting its own particular approach to theory and practice, that many writers have taken to speaking of feminisms in the plural to avoid the suggestion that their own view represents any monolithic, unified single theory. While it
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is often important to distinguish between different conceptions of feminism, I believe it is still possible and appropriate to speak, as I do here, of a generic version of feminism, loosely defined to incorporate as much as possible of the diverse work that has been produced under the heading "feminism." 2. Various feminist accounts of oppression exist. The one offered by Iris Marion Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990) is especially well spelled out and helpful. 3. Figures on the extent of domestic violence and sexual assault women experience in many countries are reported in Robin Morgan, ed., Sisterhood is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1984). See also Joni Seager and Ann Olson, Women in the World: An International Atlas (London, England: Pan Books, 1986), 3. 4. These figures apply in North America. In many other parts of the world the wage gap is even worse. See Seager and Olson, Women in the World, 19. 5. For a bibliography of this literature, see Alison Wylie, Kathleen Okruhlik, Sandra Morton, and Leslie Thielen-Wilson, "Philosophical Feminism: A Bibliographic Guide to Critiques of Science," Resources for Feminist Research/Documentation sur la Recherche Feministe (RFR/DRF) 19 (1990): 2-36. 6. See, for example, Susan Aiken, Karen Anderson, Myra Dinnerstein, Judy Note Lensink, and Patricia MacCorquodale, eds., Changing Our Minds: Feminist Transformations of Knowledge (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988). 7. Feminists have not entirely ignored bioethics, however. One notable example is the journal Hypatia, which devoted two issues to feminist ethics and medicine, Hypatia 4, nos. 2 and 3 (1989). These were subsequently published as Helen Bequaert Holmes and Laura M. Purdy, eds., Feminist Perspectives in Medical Ethics (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992). 8. For example, see Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, Canadian Journal of Philosophy supp. vol. 13 (1987); Eva Feder Kittay and Diana T. Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987); Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988); and Claudia Card, ed., Feminist Ethics (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991). 9. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Moral Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 10. An example of such an ethic is provided by Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). 11. See, for example, the Introduction in Kittay and Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory, 3-16. 12. Many male theorists, such as Aristotle and Freud, also observed women's inclination to pursue particularity when faced with moral problems, but, unlike Gilligan, they considered this tendency to be a serious moral deficiency in women. 13. See, for example, Barbara Houston, "Rescuing Womanly Virtues: Some Dangers of Moral Reclamation," in Hanen and Nielsen, eds., Science, Morality and Feminist Theory, 237-62; Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics; Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 1992). 14. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib, "The Generalized and The Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Gilligan Controversy and Moral Theory," in Kittay and Meyers, eds., Women and Moral Theory, 154-77.
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15. See, for example, Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988); Arthur Caplan, "Ethical Engineers Need Not Apply: The State of Applied Ethics Today," Science, Technology, and Human Values 6 (1980): 24-32; or H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1986). 16. See, for example, Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 17. See, for example, Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics, and Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 18. For example, Virginia Held, "Feminism and Moral Theory," in Kittay and Meters, eds., Women and Moral Theory, 111-28. 19. Annette C. Baier, Postures of the Mind: Essays on Mind and Morals (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985). 20. See, for example, Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, and Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics. 21. Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: "Male" and "Female" in Western Philosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 22. See, for example, Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics. Communitarians also oppose the primacy liberalism grants to individuals, but communitarians seem willing to value communities as such while feminists demand critical evaluation of them. Feminists perceive the need to weigh the injustices perpetuated by a community in their evaluations of it. See, for example, Marilyn Friedman, "Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community," Ethics 99 (1989): 275-90, and Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, ch. 8. 23. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1989). 24. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference. 25. See, for example, Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1979); Sue Fisher, In the Patient's Best Interest: Women and the Politics of Medical Decisions (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1986); Alexandra Dundas Todd, Intimate Adversaries: Cultural Conflict between Doctors and Women Patients (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989); and Evelyn C. White, ed., Black Women's Health Book: Speaking for Ourselves (Seattle, WA: Seal Press, 1990). 26. A good summary of materials addressing American medicine's treatment of women can be found in Rima D. Apple, ed., Women, Health, and Medicine in America: A Historical Handbook (New York, NY: Garland, 1990). For a historical picture of medicine's treatment of women in Canada, see Wendy Mitchinson, The Nature of Their Bodies: Women and Their Doctors in Victorian Canada (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1991). 27. See, for example, Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, Complaints and Disorders: The Sexual Politics of Sickness (Old Westbury, NY: Feminist Press, 1973), or Todd, Intimate Adversaries. 28. Women are encouraged to check constantly on the normality of their procreative system events—onset of menstruation, birth control, pregnancy, abortion and miscarriage, labor, childbirth, postpartum conditions, and so on. . . . We [women] are acutely aware that something might go wrong and typically feel we need medical expertise to assess normality and to accomplish care. Janet Carlisle Bogdon, "Childbirth in America 1650 to 1990," in Apple, ed., Women, Health, and Medicine, 101-20, 103.
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29. For a collection of some critiques that are not explicitly feminist, see John Ehrenreich, ed., The Cultural Crisis in Modern Medicine (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1978). 30. Changes are beginning to be felt in these demographic patterns, but 84.8 percent of physicians practicing in the United States were still male in 1986 (Todd, Intimate Adversaries), and until very recently, minorities faced systematic barriers to admission to medical practice (White, ed., Black Women's Health Book). The dominance of white nurses over racial minorities, both as nurses and as nurses' aides and support staff is documented by Darlene Clark Hine, Black Women in White: Racial Conflict and Cooperation in the Nursing Profession, 1890-1950 (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1989). 31. Sue V. Rosser, "Re-visioning Clinical Research: Gender and the Ethics of Experimental Design," Hypatia 4 (Summer 1989): 125-39. 32. See White, ed., Black Women's Health Book, and Edward H. Beardsley, "Race as a Factor in Health," in Apple, ed., Women, Health, and Medicine, 12140. 33. See Michelle Stanworth, ed., Reproductive Technologies: Gender, Motherhood and Medicine (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), and Renate D. Klein, ed., Infertility: Women Speak Out about Their Experiences of Reproductive Medicine (London, England: Pandora Press, 1989). 34. For an article bringing a feminist perspective to bear on the termination of life-sustaining treatments, see Steven H. Miles and Alison August, "Courts, Gender and 'the Right to Die,' " Law, Medicine & Health Care 18 (1990): 85-95. 35. Inge Broverman, Donald Broverman, Frank Clarkson, Paul Rosenkrantz, and Susan Vogel, "Sex-Role Stereotypes and Clinical Judgments of Mental Health," in Elizabeth Howell and Marjorie Bayes, eds., Women and Mental Health (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1981). 36. Seager and Olson, Women in the World, 28. 37. For an empirical and theoretical analysis of this imbalance and some of its effects, see Fisher, In the Patient's Best Interest. 38. See, for example, Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). 39. Despite many feminists' hope for more symmetrical parenting arrangements, different styles of interaction are still suggested by the concepts of "mothering" and "fathering." See Held, "Feminism and Moral Theory," and Sara Ruddick, "Maternal Thinking," Feminist Studies 6 (1980): 342-67, for discussion of the richness that the mother-child relationship offers to ethical discussion. See Code, What Can She Know? and Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics, for proposals of friendship as a model for human relationships. I have toyed with the prospect of developing a concept of "amicalism" as a preferable alternative to paternalistic decision making in medicine in Sherwin, No Longer Patient, 157. 40. See, for example, Nora K. Bell, "What Setting Limits May Mean: A Feminist Critique of Daniel Callahan's Setting Limits," Hypatia 4 (Summer 1989): 169-78. 41. See Kathryn Pauly Morgan, "Women and the Knife: Cosmetic Surgery and the Colonization of Women's Bodies," Hypatia 6 (Fall 1991): 25-53. 42. Ibid. 43. Kathryn Morgan has begun such an analysis in "Part III: The Gender Lens" of "Philosophical Analysis: Permissibility of Sexual Contact Between Physicians and Patients," presented to The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.
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44. For example, in early 1992, women constituted four out of nineteen members of the board of directors of The Hastings Center, and two out of six of its officers. These lists appear inside the cover of the Hastings Center Report. 45. We are beginning to see some change in this. Some recent conferences have addressed African American perspectives on bioethics and women's health issues, with speakers from the key groups. See Harley E. Flack and Edmund D. Pellegrino, eds., African-American Perspectives on Biomedical Ethics (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1992), and the Hastings Center Project that initiated this collection. 46. I have seen no data on this subject and hence am not making any strong empirical claim about established differences in concerns. Research may well establish that nonprivileged patients rank autonomy as highly as do most moral theorists, though I tend to doubt it. My point is that autonomy is important to a relatively privileged group in society whose members have benefited from a social system that customarily respects their autonomy. Those who have had little opportunity to exercise autonomy may assign it a different value. Until we find ways to include more diverse voices in the debates of bioethics, we have little reason to assume that the value rankings of other groups are the same as those of the group from which current practitioners in the field are drawn. 47. For example, aboriginal representatives might seek alternative community-centered health services, run by paraprofessionals from within their own communities who are able to wed traditional values and healing practices with some of the innovations of modern medicine. Such health workers would probably be far more understanding and respectful of traditional remedies than the average health care professional. 48. See, for example, Virginia L. Warren, "Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics," Hypatia 4 (Summer 1989): 73-87. 49. Some of the leading bioethics institutions and journals have made deliberate efforts to present international perspectives on bioethics; they have recognized the value of enriching American discussions with the insights of other cultures. It is important, though, that we seek out a diverse range of contributors from these nations as well as our own. Too often, the tendency is to rely on the articulate privileged classes to speak on behalf of their whole culture, without attending to the needs and values of more disadvantaged members of their/our societies. 50. See Rebecca Dresser, "What Bioethics Can Learn from the Women's Health Movement," in this volume.
2 Feminist Approaches to Bioethics Rosemarie Tong
Debate and dialogue, controversy and consensus, criticism and construction: these signal that bioethicists are in the process of reinterpreting the relationship between ethical theories, principles, rules, and particular moral judgments. In a thirty-year retrospective article for the Journal of the American Medical Association, Edmund Pellegrino claims that medical ethics is undergoing a transition equal to the one it made when it shifted from the "Hippocratic ethic" to so-called "principlism."1 As he sees it, medical ethics is now living through a period of "anti-principlism," the outcome of which is uncertain.2 Most of what Pellegrino notes about the "metamorphosis" 3 of medical ethics also applies to the evolution of broader bioethics. At present, the bioethics community is in ferment as representatives of various schools of thought engage in serious negotiations and accommodations with each other,4 aimed at shaping a bioethics resilient enough to meet the moral challenges of the twenty-first century. According to Pellegrino, principlism replaced the Hippocratic tradition's emphasis on duty, virtue, and gentlemanly conduct after the fragmentation of this ancient medical ethics' world view.5 The Hippocratic tradition flourished largely because it functioned in relatively homogeneous societies. Individuals held their values in common, rarely disagreeing about the application of such terms as "right" and "wrong" or "good" and "evil." As societies became more heterogeneous, the Hippocratic tradition no longer spoke to all individuals, since their notions about fundamental values grew increasingly incompatible. A new
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foundation for medical ethics was needed, one that would serve modern societies as well as the Hippocratic tradition had served ancient ones. This foundation emerged in the form of principlism, an approach to moral decision making increasingly adopted by bioethicists, as well as medical ethicists, beginning in the 1970s.6 Perhaps attempting to strike a mean between deductivism and inductivism, bioethicists such as Tom Beauchamp and James Childress offered moral agents four prima facie principles—autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice—applicable to cases of informed consent, experimentation on human subjects, euthanasia, abortion, assisted reproduction, genetic screening, the allocation of scarce medical resources, and so on. Beauchamp and Childress signaled that these principles would play the major role in achieving a reflective equilibrium between the abstract norms of ethical theory and particular cases involving particular people.7 Because these principles were presumably ones that any rational moral agent, irrespective of his/her individual background, would accept as morally binding, they were to be followed unless, as Pellegrino puts it, "some strong countervailing reasons existed to justify overruling them."8 Possible conflicts between these principles, as well as possible overrulings of all of them troubled Beauchamp and Childress;9 but like W. D. Ross, who had originally developed the idea of prima facie duties,10 they seemed to accept the "vague formula of taking the action that gives the best balance of right over wrong"11 in contested cases. Despite its enormous appeal as a possible compromise between deductivism and inductivism, principlism (which might better be termed "coherentism") has come under increasing attack. For the most part, principlism's critics have been of two sorts: (1) those who claim that its principles are not moored in a single, stabilizing, and universal moral theory; and (2) those who claim that its principles are too removed from the concrete particularities of everyday human existence. Since these two kinds of critics are likely to challenge any approach to bioethics that attempts to accommodate human differences without losing sight of human similarities, each of them merits more than a polite hearing. Principlism's first set of critics fault it for lacking a unified moral theory and subsequently failing to provide moral agents with adequate action guides. In particular, K. Danner Clouser and Bernard Gert have objected that principlism's four core principles are no more than a collection of "suggestions and observations"12 relating to moral issues. In their estimation, principlists borrow beneficence from Mill, autonomy from Kant, justice from Rawls, and nonmaleficence from Gert, presenting the resultant blend as an integrated and unified theory when
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nothing could be further from the truth.13 Worse, principlists encourage moral agents to mix and match these bioethical principles willy-nilly, "as if one could sometimes be a Kantian and sometimes a Utilitarian and sometimes something else, without worrying whether the theory one is using is adequate or not."14 In sum, principlism should be rejected because it cannot provide moral agents with "a single, clear, coherent, and comprehensive decision procedure for arriving at answers"15—a bulwark against relativism. Another set of critics, mostly casuists16 and communitarians,17 fault principlists not because they lack a unified moral theory, or even because they cannot rank order their principles in cases of conflict,18 but because the critics perceive principlists as wanting to ground their entire ethics externally—in some sort of domain that transcends the variabilities and vicissitudes of space and time (for example, in Kant's pure reason). Although Beauchamp and Childress have stated that nothing could be further from their intention,19 that they regard not some Archimedean point but life as the source of ethics, most casuists and communitarians remain unconvinced.20 They doubt that principlists are really coherentists who "move from general levels of theory to particular rules, judgments, and policies that are in close proximity to everyday decisions in the moral life."21 As these critics see it, principlism is what its name implies: a prescription for bioethical reasoning that favors "top-down" reasoning (from theories to principles to rules to particular moral judgments), even if it is also capable of "bottom-up" reasoning (from particular moral judgments to rules to principles to ethical theories).22 According to casuists such as Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, bioethical decision making is guided not by universal and abstract theories and principles, but by particular and concrete paradigms and analogies.23 Casuists search for paradigm cases that embody a society's general rules or maxims of right conduct (for example, Hippocrates's "first, do no harm").24 Armed with "common sense,"25 they then try to fit morally unsettled cases into the contours of these morally settled paradigm cases. New paradigms emerge when large numbers of new cases with many features in common fit none of the old paradigms. Communitarians also have a highly contextual and historical approach to bioethical decision making, but grounded not so much in cases as in traditions and virtues. For them, ethics is largely about establishing and honoring the social rules and cultural ideals that motivate and regulate a group's practices. As defined by Alasdair MacIntyre, a practice is any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are
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The Relationship of Feminism and Bioethics realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.26
Maclntyre claims that the range of human practices is very wide, including everything from the arts and sciences on the one hand, to games such as football and chess on the other. It certainly includes the major professions: law, education, business, and medicine. Thus, communitarians might argue that becoming a good physician, for example, is not a matter of improving the relation between one's actual decisions and some universal set of rules or principles, but a matter of submitting one's "own attitudes, choices, preferences, and tastes"27 to the historically situated standards that determine what counts as good medicine. Other critics of principlism (and, for that matter, deductivism) raise different concerns than casuists and communitarians. Instead of looking to the past—to settled cases or established practices—"conversationalists" (my generic term for proponents of communication, discourse, and narrative ethics)28 and pragmatists29 look to the future: to the creation of moral consensus through conversation and collaboration. Conversationalists argue that the ultimate aim of bioethical decision making is not to marshall the facts of a case around some grand theory, set of overarching principles, or even cluster of paradigm cases. Rather, the function of this process is to reveal to people the moral content and consequences of their family traditions, psychological characteristics, spiritual resources, socioeconomic status, personal experiences, and religious beliefs. Conversationalists maintain that if people listen to each other attentively, over time they will conclude their unique stories satisfactorily, that is, in a way that provides meaning to otherwise incomprehensible situations (after all, why is it that we human beings have to suffer and die?).30 Narratives are powerful action guides not because they rightly order principles, but because through them people with different moral perspectives can either achieve consensus or lapse into the kind of silence that invites others to join the conversation. Pragmatists are akin to conversationalists insofar as they affirm the validity of what Mary Mahowald refers to as the "classical pragmatist position that knowledge is perspectivally attained by individuals, whose collective perspective is improved through collaboration."31 In pragmatists' estimation, each moral agent's understanding of a case is partial; it is much more like belief than knowledge. Thus moral agents must bring their different perspectives together to achieve an under-
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standing that is less partial (in the sense both of less complete and less subjective). Through this type of collaborative or team effort, moral agents have the best chance of discerning what they ought to do in any given situation. Pessimists might view the present ferment in bioethics as a crisis and prepare to press the panic button. Admittedly, change is unsettling, uncomfortable, and unpredictable. Yet precisely because it is all of these things, change is full of opportunities for growth. There could not be a better time, then, for feminist approaches to bioethics to make their debut. My aim in this chapter is to discuss the overall value of these new approaches to bioethics. First, I distinguish among feminist approaches to bioethics, noting their diversity and their relationship to feminist approaches to ethics in general. Second, I show how a cluster of these feminist approaches—specifically, liberal, radical, and cultural ones—illuminate important issues of choice, control, and caring in bioethical decision making. Third, I use this cluster of feminist approaches to analyze and interpret a bioethical case that goes beyond women and reproduction. Fourth, I sketch some of the general criticisms that have been raised against feminist approaches to bioethics, arguing that they are largely answerable. Finally, I conclude that emerging feminist approaches to bioethics offer to traditional bioethics the opportunity not only to check its operating assumptions, methodologies, and goals for "sexist" assumptions (a project to which some critics might wrongly confine feminist bioethics), but also to reconsider what kind of moral guidance people actually want and need.
Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Their Characteristics and Commitments Although the scope of feminist bioethics is more limited than that of feminist ethics, so far feminist ethicists and bioethicists have developed compatible approaches to moral theory and practice. Since the close working relationship between these two groups of thinkers is likely to continue, one of the best ways to predict future developments in feminist bioethics may simply be to understand past developments in feminist ethics. Like several other feminist thinkers,32 I originally regarded as accurate Betty A. Sichel's distinction between feminine and feminist approaches to ethics: "Feminine" at present refers to the search for women's unique voice and most often, the advocacy of an ethics of care that includes nurturance, care, compassion, and networks of communications. "Feminist" refers to those theorists, whether liberal or radical or other orientation, who argue
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The Relationship of Feminism and Bioethics against patriarchal dominations, for equal rights, a just and fair distribution of scarce resources, etc.33
Although I still believe that approaches seeking to contrast careoriented ethics of relationships and responsibilities with justiceoriented ethics of rules and rights do differ in emphasis and style from those aiming to identify, explain, and eliminate patterns of male domination and female subordination, I no longer believe that just because an approach to ethics is care-oriented means that it is inattentive to instances of gender inequity. To be sure, any approach to ethics so naive as to celebrate the value of caring without worrying about who cares for whom is not feminist. Caring can and has served as a trap for women—as a "virtue" that turns women into masochists, living only to serve other people's interests (particularly, men's and children's) while steadfastly neglecting or ignoring their own.34 Yet as Rita C. Manning has effectively argued, a genuine ethics of relationships, responsibilities, and nurturance is not based on the view that because women can and have cared they should continue to care no matter the cost to themselves.35 On the contrary, it is driven by the desire to motivate all human beings to take care of each other. Valorizing and promulgating the traditionally female values of caring, compassion, and community as human values goes hand in hand with liberating women from the structures, systems, and attitudes that oppress them. To the degree that they are concerned with issues of gender inequity, then, those developing so-called "feminine" approaches to ethics and bioethics may simply be termed "cultural feminists,"36 thus correcting the impression that their work is inherently nonfeminist or even antifeminist.37 Liberal, Marxist, radical, psychoanalytic, and socialist feminists—to name only some of the other major schools of feminist thought38— are also developing distinctive approaches to ethics and bioethics.39 Although all these feminist thinkers are committed to eliminating patterns of male domination and female subordination, they neither explain nor propose to end these pernicious patterns in the same way. Liberal feminists maintain that female subordination is rooted in a set of customary and legal restraints that block women's entrance into and success in the so-called "public" world. Excluded from such places as the academy, the forum, the marketplace, and the operating room, the true potential of many women goes unfulfilled. Only when society grants women the same educational and occupational opportunities that it grants men will women become men's equals.40 Marxist feminists argue that capitalism itself, not just the larger social rules that privilege men over women, causes women's oppression. If all women, not just the relatively privileged or exceptional ones, are
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ever to be liberated, the capitalist system must be replaced by a socialist system under which everyone is economically independent. Women must be men's economic, as well as political, equals before they can enjoy the same opportunities that men have.41 Radical feminists insist that neither women's economic position nor women's lack of equal educational and occupational opportunities provides an adequate explanation for female subordination. Rather, women's reproductive roles and responsibilities, as well as the "institution of compulsory heterosexuality,"42 are the fundamental causes of women's oppression by men. Unless women are truly free to have or not have children, to love or not love men, women will remain men's subordinates. Like radical feminists, psychoanalytic feminists also focus on gender and sexuality, but in a markedly different way. According to standard psychoanalytic accounts, in the pre-Oedipal stage all infants are symbiotically attached to their mothers. During the Oedipal stage, the mother-son symbiosis usually breaks once and for all. The boy gives up his mother in order to escape castration at the hands of his father. As a result of submitting his desires (the id) to the laws of society (the superego), the boy fully integrates into culture. In contrast to the boy, the girl, who has no penis to lose, separates slowly from her mother. As a result, the girl's integration into culture is incomplete.43 Psychoanalytic feminists argue that society needs to create systems of dual parenting and dual careers so that children will no longer absorb at an early age the gender stereotypes of public man and private woman: the authoritarian, working father and the nurturant, at-home mother.44 One reaction to the rich diversity of feminist thought has been socialist feminists' attempt to weave these separate strands of thought into a coherent whole. In Woman's Estate, Juliet Mitchell argues that four structures overdetermine woman's condition: production, reproduction, sexuality, and the socialization of children.45 Woman's status and function in all of these structures must change if she is to be man's equal. Furthermore, as Mitchell adds in Psychoanalysis and Feminism, woman's interior world, her psyche, must also be transformed; unless a woman is convinced of her own value, no change in her exterior world can ultimately liberate her.46
Liberal, Radical, and Cultural Feminist Approaches to Bioethics: Some Perspectives on Choice, Control, and Caring in Bioethical Decision Making Each of the feminisms I have described above, as well as several of the ones I have not described, has oriented or could orient a feminist ap-
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proach to bioethics. Nevertheless, when I discuss feminist approaches to bioethics in this chapter, I plan to focus on liberal, radical, and cultural feminist perspectives. It is not that these perspectives are somehow better than other feminist perspectives. Rather, my decision to use here only the lenses of liberal, radical, and cultural feminists is quite pragmatic. In the first place, it is simply too unwieldy to try on every pair of feminist lenses available in an effort to get yet a better focus on a particular bioethical issue. Perhaps we should heed Virginia Held's advice that in order to make better moral decisions, we must decide which of several moral perspectives is most likely to provide us with the insights needed to answer a given moral question. Comments Held: We need, I think, a division of moral labor. Different persons in different roles in different domains of society ought to develop and to experiment with different moral approaches. These approaches will include some very general and abstract moral principles together with intermediatelevel principles appropriate to the domains in question, such as principles about the justifiability of enforcing respect for rights to speak freely, or principles about the responsibilities of one generation for the environment of a future generation. The danger of fragmentation with a division of moral labor is, I think, much less than the danger of stagnation in moral inquiry if we refuse to accept a measure of differentiation.47
In the same way that we learn which tools in our garage are most likely to "do the job," and which spices in our kitchen are likely to produce an edible meal, we may be able to learn which moral perspective or combination of moral perspectives is most likely to solve a moral dilemma. Second, and more importantly, liberal, radical, and cultural feminist approaches serve as excellent foils for one another. Their different perspectives on the nature, form (embodied or disembodied), and value of the self's relationship to others explain liberal feminists' emphasis on issues of choice, radical feminists' emphasis on issues of control, and cultural feminists' emphasis on issues of caring. That this is the case requires some explanation, however. For quite some time, a variety of theorists have argued that lurking within the deep structure of traditional ethics (and, I would add, traditional bioethics) is a creature known as the autonomous self, generally pictured as a biological male, intent on maximizing his self-interest.48 This autonomous self has had a particularly difficult existence, according to legal theorist Robin West. At times his separation has led him to fear annihilation by others. The interests of separate individuals collide, and when they do so, conflict ensues. At other times, however,
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the autonomous self's separateness has caused him to feel alienation from others. He has not been able to find friends to ease his loneliness. In sum, separation, whether it results in annihilation or alienation, whether it is experienced as freedom or isolation, would seem to be man's tragic origin.49 The separation thesis is not the exclusive possession of biological males, however. In their desire to secure for women the same opportunities, occupations, rights, and privileges men have had, many liberal feminists have adopted the "male" ontology of the self's separation from others.50 Indeed, in their drive for sameness with men, these liberal feminists have sometimes denied their sameness with women.51 They have cautioned women against emphasizing their differences from men, viewing these biologically produced and/or culturally shaped "othernesses" as traps that limit women to reproductive and domestic tasks. Supposedly, it is for women to maintain the species, while men push it on to even greater heights. In contrast, most radical and cultural feminists have rejected "male" ontology. West notes that the central insight of these thinkers is "that women are 'essentially connected,' not 'essentially separate,' from the rest of human life, both materially, through pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life."52 Yet as West also observes, cultural and radical feminists have reacted very differently to women's connectedness. Valorizing the traits and behaviors traditionally associated with women, cultural feminists have stressed the positive side of the connection thesis, praising women's capacities for sharing, giving, nurturing, sympathizing, empathizing, and above all, connecting. In their estimation, women value their relationships with others above everything else in life, viewing separation from others as the quintessential harm. Through their bodies women link one generation to the other. The fact that they menstruate, gestate, and lactate gives women a unique perspective on the meaning of human connection. For women, connection is not about separate individuals signing social contracts, but about life as most people experience it on a daily basis—within kinship groups in which they have nonvoluntary membership.53 Radical feminists have emphasized the negative side of the connection thesis, agreeing with cultural feminists that connection is women's fundamental reality, but lamenting this state of affairs. They believe connections set women up for exploitation and misery: "Invasion and intrusion, rather than intimacy, nurturance, and care, is the 'unofficial' story of women's subjective experience of connections."54 Women are connected to others, most especially through the experiences of heterosexual intercourse and pregnancy. But when the sugar-coating is licked off, these connecting experiences taste of women's violation. This harm
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is unique to women; men cannot understand. Women do not fear either annihilation by the other or alienation from the other, as much as they dread occupation by the other: the uninvited penis, the unwanted fetus.55 Provided with an explanation of the ontological differences and similarities that underlie liberal, radical, and cultural feminist thought, we can better appreciate how representatives of these various schools of thought have approached bioethical decision making in the past, and better predict how their lines of analysis may develop in the future. Where women's reproductive capacities are the focus of a bioethical analysis, liberal, radical, and cultural feminists have articulated distinctively different positions. Faced with a bioethical decision related to contraception, sterilization, abortion, in vitro fertilization, artificial insemination by donor, or maternal-fetal conflict, most liberal feminists ask questions about choice. Was the woman fully informed about her reproductive choices? Was she competent to assess them? If so, it is her own business to decide whether, with whom, or how she procreates, provided that she does not cause unjustifiable harm to others. In contrast, most radical feminists focus on issues of control. They observe that men—be they fathers, husbands, lovers, employers, or judges— often cause women to make reproductive "choices" they would not otherwise make. Finally, faced with the same kind of reproductive concerns, most cultural feminists suggest ways in which women can maintain their connections to others without being misused or abused. Not every pregnancy is an occupation, nor are all abortions liberations. Not every surrogate mother is a slave, nor are all contracting couples masters. In cultural feminists' estimation, throughout history a remarkable number of women have worked together (and with men and children also) to create and maintain caring communities under conditions of oppression, including that of male domination and female subordination.56 Clearly, when it comes to moral concerns about women and reproduction, liberal, radical, and cultural feminists offer traditional bioethics some new perspectives. Yet these same perspectives may also be applied to cases beyond women and reproduction, because issues of choice, control, and caring are omnipresent in bioethical decision making. Moreover, I believe that these (and other) feminist perspectives not only can but should be brought to traditional bioethics, because what feminists see about human relationships, especially malefemale relationships, others cannot easily see. This claim is a large one, and although I cannot thoroughly defend it here, I will try to illustrate it by interpreting a case voluntarily reported to Lisa Belkin by the involved parties and subsequently published in the New York Times Magazine.57 Entitled "The High Cost of Living," Belkin's case shows how
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male as well as female patients can lose their powers of choice, control, and caring before the power of authority, and suggests why a feminist analysis may be better suited than a traditional one to explore such issues of domination and subordination.
The Armando Dimas Case: Moving Beyond Women and Reproduction As told by Belkin, the night that twenty-four-year-old Armando Dimas was shot, the emergency room of Houston's Hermann Hospital was crowded to capacity, a fact that caused some of the hospital staff to speculate that Dimas was admitted largely because hospital authorities viewed him as a potential organ donor. After a preliminary examination of Dimas, David MacDougall, the neurosurgeon on call, concluded that "This guy should be dead."58 But he was not dead. The patient had been resuscitated, returned to consciousness, and put on a ventilator for life support. Gathered around his bed were his immediate family: a fourteen-member group of illegal Mexican immigrants who had recently applied for residency in the United States under a new amnesty law. Although most of the hospital staff believed that Dimas would want to die if he knew his actual condition, his mother, Victoria Dimas, refused to let anyone tell her son that he would never walk again. MacDougall finally broke the gridlock. He asked social worker Cindy Walker to convene a meeting between Dimas's major hospital caregivers and his family. Directing his attention primarily to Mrs. Dimas, and speaking through an interpreter, MacDougall told her that it was time to face reality: no one was going to perform a miracle on her son. Mrs. Dimas responded angrily to MacDougall, exploding in Spanish that it was wrong to lie to her son: "He can walk, he will walk. He can breathe; he will not need that machine."59 The meeting, to which the patient had not been invited, ended as abruptly as it had been convened. Informed about the unsuccessful confrontation, hospital authorities decided it was best to tell Dimas about his condition, his mother's protests notwithstanding. They selected nurse Norma McNair to tell him the awful truth. To everyone's surprise, Dimas did not opt for a donot-resuscitate order. Using two blinks of his eyes for "yes" and one for "no," he communicated a desire for full treatment. He wanted it all—cardiopulmonary resuscitation, antibiotics, ventilators, feeding tubes. The staff was speechless. Since patients in Dimas's condition should not want to live, they did not know what to do. As Dimas's drama unfolded, he became a problem for the hospital's cost controller, former nurse Hazel Mitchell. Because Dimas lacked insurance and his family was too poor to pay even a fraction of his bill,
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the hospital had to absorb the total cost. Dimas also became a major challenge for occupational therapist Mary Coffey. She soon realized that besides teaching Dimas how to speak and eat, she could accomplish little else for him until he had a custom-made wheelchair to support his back and head, thereby enabling him to use a "mouthstick." With this device, Dimas would have an opportunity to learn the kind of skills that could secure him future employment. Although Mitchell initially refused to pour more hospital resources into Dimas, she later relented and ordered the special chair (which turned out not to fit him). However, she also decided to move Dimas to Hermina Bartkowski's Total Life Care Center ("Bart's," for short). There the bills would be $300 a day instead of $890, largely because the staff consisted of Polish immigrant physicians plus nurses willing to work as nurses' aides for very low salaries. Dimas liked Bart's, where the standard of care was amazingly high due to the efforts of director Bartkowski, widely revered as a saint. Compared to the rough-and-tumble life in the streets Dimas once walked, Bart's was a safe and comfortable haven: "I see my family . . . my sister brings me food . . . . It's nice here . . . . In a lot of ways things are good . . . . If I hadn't been shot, I would have died."60 However, after four and one-half years and approximately $750,000 worth of treatment, Hermann Hospital was tired of paying Dimas's bills at Bart's and gave his family one month to learn how to care for him at home. Although the Dimas family objected to this turn of events, Dimas was sent home at the end of the thirty days, still without an adequate wheelchair. There he remains, with round-the-clock care provided by his family, but primarily by his ailing mother. Dimas seems to be happy, however, spending much time with his elementary-school-aged, illegitimate son, who visits frequently. He no longer complains that he was sent home, stating matter-of-factly, "Things changed. This is the way it is. That's all."61 But is that all? Is this the way it should be? Why did things change? Focusing on issues of choice, liberal feminists might initially be persuaded that Dimas's case was handled in an ethically appropriate manner. The principle of autonomy (liberalism's major playing card) seemed to appropriately trump the principle of beneficence. After all, the hospital staff honored Dimas's decision to go on living, despite their overall belief that he would be better off dead. What is more, the principle of justice seemed correctly to counter the principle of beneficence. Only after the hospital authorities weighed their general responsibilities to all their patients against their particular responsibilities to Dimas, did they decide it was time for Dimas to return home, where he could be cared for in a relatively inexpensive manner. On further reflection, however, liberal feminists might wonder just
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how autonomous Dimas's choices had really been. Communication gaps were numerous in his case, and since any lack of communication tends to empty the meaning of informed consent, it is more than conceivable that Dimas did not always understand his treatment options. To be sure, the staff eventually gave him the information he needed to decide to refuse a do-not-resuscitate order, but they may not have also given him enough information to decide to participate (or not participate) in his own rehabilitation program. The fact that Dimas never protested his not learning the mouthstick skills Coffey regarded as essential to his rehabilitation might signal to liberal feminists that he either did not want to learn these skills, deeming them a paternalistic intrusion into his life, or that he did not understand how limited his life opportunities would be without them. Similarly, liberal feminists might come to doubt that hospital authorities really treated Dimas as fairly as they should have. Had Dimas been insured, a properly-fitting wheelchair would probably have been found for him quickly, and every effort would have been made to teach him any learnable skills he wanted to acquire. Negative rights—the right to refuse unwanted treatment—are only half the story. Positive rights— the right to demand wanted treatment—may be the other.62 If the only choice poor patients have is the choice to say "no," their range of treatment options is limited indeed. Instead of focusing on what they perceive as beside-the-point issues of choice, most radical feminists would examine issues of control. They would emphasize how powerless patients are relative to the physicians, other health care professionals, and hospital administrators in charge of their treatment. Specifically, they might view as inappropriate the hospital staff's eagerness to get Dimas's consent to a do-notresuscitate order. In comparison to most of the people in charge of his fate—that is, the socially and economically privileged hospital physicians and administrators—Dimas, a poor, uneducated, Mexican American day laborer was always relatively powerless. His powerlessness became nearly absolute when MacDougall pronounced him "a head in a bed,"63 a thing to run from as quickly as possible. Articulating a variation on this same theme, radical feminists might also note that, like Dimas, his relatives were relatively powerless within the health care system and its structures. The Dimas family panicked when hospital authorities gave them one month to learn how to care for Dimas at home (home being a five-room trailer with an onagain, off-again electrical system, a dysfunctional heating system, and three times as many occupants as rooms). Indeed, Mrs. Dimas exclaimed, "We aren't educated enough to run that machine. Something will happen to him and we won't know what to do. We aren't educated, and it's too late for us to become educated. This is all we are."64
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In the end, the Dimas family adjusted to the rigors of home care for a quadriplegic. They had no other option, not if they wanted Dimas to go on living. In a similar vein, the nurses aides at Bart's adjusted to their new life in the United States. Lacking significant opportunities for meaningful work, these Polish-immigrant physicians and nurses chose to work at Bart's in an attempt to maintain their dignity. Made under conditions of severe constraint, such "choices" are not, in the view of radical feminists, true expressions of one's will. Rather they are coping mechanisms: strategies to make the best out of situations one has little or no power to change. Interested in all the uses, misuses, and abuses of power in Dimas's case, most radical feminists would be particularly interested in gender inequities. They might be quick to observe that the people with the least power in Dimas's case (the nurses, nurses' aides, occupational therapists, and social workers) occupy traditionally female-dominated positions. Indeed, almost all of the people doing the hard work in Dimas's case—cleaning his body, sticking him with needles, teaching him how to eat and talk, bearing the brunt of his home care—are women. In their concern that women sometimes care too much for others and not enough for themselves,65 radical feminists might even dare to ask some troubling questions about Dimas. He may be powerless relative to white men, educated men, propertied men, men who are United States citizens, able-bodied men, and even "exceptional women" such as Mitchell, the former nurse turned cost controller who succeeds in a male-dominated occupation. Yet Dimas is not powerless relative to most women, especially the women in his family who, like him, belong to an ethnic group in which the man rules the roost.66 Radical feminists might wonder how caring Dimas would be if his mother had been the injured one. They might also wonder whether Mrs. Dimas, knowing how difficult it is to care for a severely disabled person at home, would either expect or want her family to devote themselves totally to her care. Indeed, in reference to women who almost single-handedly provide home care for their family members, Barbara Logue has already asked: Will women who have done all this for others—voluntarily or not—want another woman (their daughter or daughter-in-law, perhaps) to do the same for them? Will memories of their own negative or ambivalent feelings, role conflict, or even a sense of altruism, increase their desire not to be a burden to others? . . . Will such considerations enhance their willingness to choose death instead?67
Responding to Logue's query, radical feminists would probably speculate that an injured Mrs. Dimas, not wishing to be a burden on her
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family, especially her daughters, would willingly refuse further medical treatment for herself. In contrast to radical feminists, cultural feminists would focus on issues of caring and connection rather than control and occupation. They would probably comment on the kind of relationships established between Dimas and the health care professionals assigned to his case. They might speculate that Mitchell and Walker, for example, really wanted to do more for Dimas, but could not. When Mitchell refers to an ancient Chinese saying—"if you save a life, you are responsible for it" 68— cultural feminists might hear Mitchell expressing a desire to do everything possible for Dimas, a desire frustrated by the nature of her job which requires her to view Dimas and all the patients at Hermann as statistics and costs. Similarly, in Walker's words, "We can't just buy him a custom-made wheelchair. . . . We have to face the fact that we can't afford him as it is,"69 cultural feminists might hear not the voice of a hardened social worker, fixed on the financial bottom line, but of a caring social worker, painfully aware of the scarce nature of medical resources. An ethics of justice was the only morality Walker's and Mitchell's jobs really permitted them, and within its constraints, they cared for Dimas and their other patients as best they could. In addition to interpreting Mitchell's and Walker's actions sympathetically, cultural feminists would probably single out Mary Coffey, Hermina Bartkowski, and Victoria Dimas for special praise, emphasizing their apparent decisions to move beyond the impartiality of an ethics of justice to the partiality of an ethics of care.70 They might note that Coffey fought to get Dimas connected to the world beyond his family, realizing full well that unless he could learn how to use a mouthstick, he would always remain the one cared for. Since he had no chance to acquire this skill without a properly-fitted wheelchair, Coffey made securing that wheelchair her main priority. Similarly, cultural feminists might observe that for Bartkowski each one of her patients was a unique individual, deserving of special attention. She viewed none of them as just a body. On the contrary, Bartkowski spoke to each of her patients, even the unresponsive ones, as if they understood her every word. Offensive phrases such as "headin-a-bed" never crossed her consciousness. Finally, cultural feminists might note that while the bulk of the hospital staff worried about getting a do-not-resuscitate order from Dimas and closing the "case," Mrs. Dimas felt what her son probably felt: fear and anger. Indeed, when MacDougall informed her "that this is all there will ever be"71 for a "head in a bed," Mrs. Dimas reacted with rage against what she probably perceived as an arrogant universalization. How could MacDougall possibly know the things she knew about her son—his singular strengths as well as hidden weaknesses? Indeed,
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how could anyone on the hospital staff know better than she what her son really needed? The whole time the staff was preoccupied with getting Dimas to consent to a do-not-resuscitate order, it never occurred to Mrs. Dimas or, for that matter, to anyone else in the Dimas family, to think that they could disconnect from Armando at will. Instead of viewing Mrs. Dimas as an irrational woman who made excessive demands on the health care system, cultural feminists would probably see her as a caring mother who in seeking treatment for her son relied on her "feelings, needs, impressions, and . . . sense of personal ideal"72 rather than on some set of moral axioms, theorems, or principles.
Critique of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics Liberal, radical, and cultural feminist approaches to cases like that of Armando Dimas are open to at least two kinds of criticism.73 Some critics might accuse them of not being properly theoretical. They might allege that choice, control, and caring are simply autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice dressed in women's garb. They might complain, in other words, that like Beauchamp and Childress's principles, feminists' concerns lack mooring in a bona fide ethical theory. In contrast, other critics might fault feminist approaches for being too theoretical; that is, for clinging to the category of gender as the ultimate reference point or foundation for women's diverse experiences, as if gender always mattered to each woman more than her race or class, for example.74 Feminist bioethicists might simply deny the first charge—that choice, control, and caring are an unfocused hodgepodge of moral concerns— noting that, on the contrary, these concerns are all grounded in one or more of the feminist theories discussed above. Additionally, feminist bioethicists might respond that, in what is still a "man's world," women's ability to make choices, to exercise control over their destinies, and to care in ways they find meaningful are more limited than men's. So long as gender inequities remain, there will be a need for feminist approaches to bioethics that emphasize women's ways of perceiving, thinking, and acting. If feminist bioethicists were to formulate such a response, however, their critics would probably accuse them of confusing political ideology with ethical theory and of substituting sexist and relativistic rhetoric for moral reasoning.75 Some feminists have already addressed versions of these possible allegations of "sexism" and "relativism." For example, Alison M. Jaggar has defended feminist ethics against the charge of sexism in ways that could be used to defend feminist bioethics from similar accusation. She has cautioned that it is a misrepresentation to believe feminist eth-
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ics is just a "simple inversion" of the five most frequently raised feminist challenges to traditional ethics: lack of concern for women's interests; neglect of "women's issues;" denial of women's moral agency; deprecation of "feminine" values; and devaluation of women's moral experience."77 Those developing feminist approaches to ethics, and I would add bioethics, do not intend to ignore men's concerns so that they can "get even" for what they regard as the tradition's past neglect of women's concerns. On the contrary, most feminists believe that morality is for and about everyone; 78 that if "male" interests, issues, agency, values, and experiences do not exhaust the full range of human values, neither do "female" ones. Nevertheless, just because most feminists wish to forge an inclusionary bioethics, for instance, does not mean that they lack a particular point of view. Indeed, Virginia L. Warren has observed that far from denying their "bias," feminists voluntarily open themselves to challenges by naming their bioethics "feminist." Feminists do not try to stonewall criticism by pretending to be disinterested, objective, impartial spectators whose very lack of interests, subjectivity, and partiality stops conversation before it can begin.79 Just because an approach to bioethics is gendered does not mean it is sexist. If feminists were intent on shaping a sexist bioethics, they would have to do more than proceed from a gynocentric perspective. They would also have to mask that gendered perspective as "human," doggedly excluding the interests, identities, issues, and values of men. Like the charge of sexism, the accusation of relativism is one that feminists have already attempted to address. For example, in her analysis of feminist positions on relativism versus absolutism, Susan Sherwin notes that feminists tend toward relativism—understood as the theory that moral judgments must be made relative to the existing "moral standards of a community."80 Because feminists are increasingly aware of the differences that exist among women (and men also), relativism seems more congenial to their ways of thinking than absolutism—understood as the theory that moral judgments must accord with universal standards that are applicable to all times and places. Nevertheless, Sherwin points out that feminists may also be accused of being absolutists. Feminists assert that gender oppression is wrong. They do not believe that the mere fact that a community happens to oppress women (or poor people, or people of color) necessarily morally justifies that oppression. 81 In her attempt to elucidate just how difficult it is for feminists to steer a course somewhere between absolutism and relativism, Sherwin discusses the widespread practice of female genital mutilation in many African and Middle Eastern countries. She considers that more than eighty-four million women now living have undergone this painful,
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frequently unsanitary, often harmful surgical procedure. Among the justifications for genital mutilation are "custom, religion, family honor, cleanliness, esthetics, initiation, assurance of virginity, promotion of social and political cohesion, enhancement of fertility, improvement of male sexual pleasure, and prevention of female promiscuity." 82 Despite the fact that large numbers of women as well as men endorse this practice, Sherwin still condemns it. In her estimation, some actions are so egregiously wrong—that is, so oppressive—that feminists must say with conviction "This action is wrong," even if some culture or another endorses it. Willing to name female genital mutilation wrong, but not wanting to be labeled a cultural chauvinist or imperialist, Sherwin struggles to distinguish what she terms "traditional relativism" from "feminist relativism." 83 Whereas traditional relativists are prepared to justify a practice such as genital mutilation if the majority of a population accepts it, feminist relativists are not. Sherwin agrees with traditional relativists "that we do not have access to anything more foundational than community standards in ethics,"84 but she also insists that some communities are morally worse than other communities. A community that structures its relations in terms of patterns of domination and subordination is simply morally worse than one that does not. In Sherwin's estimation, feminists are under no obligation to tolerate, let alone respect, a community that systematically exploits, manipulates, dominates, and otherwise harms women or any other group of human beings.85 As difficult as it is for feminists to answer the criticism that their approaches to bioethics are just forms of sexism and relativism hidden under appealing words such as "choice," "control," and "caring," it is even more challenging for them to respond to the charge that their perspectives on bioethical decision making remain beholden to the tradition from which they supposedly seek release. Postmodernist critics claim that in developing explanatory theories for women's status in society, feminists have often mimicked the kind of universalistic, absolutistic, deductivist "male thinking" that insists on telling as absolute truth one and only one story about reality. Because thinkers such as Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, and Julia Kristeva, for example, reject foundationalism in any of its forms,86 they guard against any reinstantiations of "phallogocentric" thought in their writing; for them, any thinking that is ordered (centric) around an absolute word (logos) that is "male" in style (phallic) is better not thought at all.87 Thus, Cixous has publicly stated that women seeking liberation from all types of oppression, including the oppression of binary or oppositional thought (such as man/woman, self/other, good/evil, reason/emotion, theory/ practice),88 should not deceive themselves. Just because a theory is la-
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beled a "feminist approach" does not mean it is not a theory akin to all other preceding theories. Indeed, as Cixous sees it, women should reject the label "feminist" as an "oppositional" one that connotes "deviation from a norm [that is, 'maleness']89 instead of a free sexual option or a place of solidarity with women."90 In response to Cixous's and other postmoderns' objections, feminists have pointed to their increasing rejection of "female" essentialism91 as a sign that they have abandoned the kind of theory that postmoderns decry, that is, theory meant to "discipline" difference, to keep "otherness" at bay, to privilege a particular point of view over other particular points of view, and to command most everyone to obey it. In other words, most feminists have rejected the notion that ethics is science, and the assumption that "morality is essentially knowledge; that moral knowledge is essentially 'theoretical,' of an explicitly statable, highly general, and systematically unified type; and that this pure, properly moral knowledge, when brought to bear on incidental 'nonmoral' information about a situation at hand, serves to tell us what to do." 92 In rejecting the notion that ethics is science, most feminists have also rejected the notion that ethics is power. Among other feminists,93 Marilyn Frye has noted the connections between foundationalism and authoritarianism in ethics. She claims that the need for the kind of ethics that has the same right answer for everyone tends to arise "among people occupying certain positions in certain social orders."94 She suggests that judges, teachers, preachers, directors, administrators, managers, and the like—people who make decisions about and for others—require ethics to reassure themselves and others that they actually know what is right.95 Ethics—in particular, the making of moral theory—becomes one of the best ways for those in power to control those without power, to bully and badger the latter into seeing things their way. Yet if feminist ethicists and bioethicists should refrain from moral theorizing for fear of becoming as oppressive as their former oppressors, what other function can and should they serve? Margaret Urban Walker offers feminist theorists what may be one of the best ways for them to escape presiding at their own funeral. She usefully distinguishes between a "theoretical-juridical" mode of theory on the one hand, and an "expressive-collaborative" one on the other.96 In contrast to the former mode of theory that pictures morality "as a compact, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent,"97 the latter one pictures morality "as a socially embodied medium of mutual understanding and adjustment between persons in certain terms, particularly those that define those persons' identities, relationships, and values." 98 Thus ethics changes from an abstract intellectual enterprise conducted in one's mind to a set of concrete cultural practices experi-
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enced in one's everyday existence. "Because persons and their relationships are not uniform and situations are not necessarily repeatable,"99 there is no final, universal answer to a question such as "What is in this patient's best interest?" Instead, there is just collaborative, changing exploration and understanding. Constructing a moral community, in which a wide variety of people can cooperate together even as they maintain their differences, requires much more than the abstract, analytical skills of traditional moral theorizing. It requires a highly developed set of emotional skills and exceptional powers of communication. Walker's description of "expressive-collaborative" theory should appeal to a wide variety of communitarians, conversationalists, and pragmatists as well as feminists. I myself find it enormously persuasive. Yet I worry that in highlighting what feminist thought may have in common with communitarian, conversationalist, and pragmatic thought, Walker may have downplayed what, in my estimation, remains unique to feminist thought, including feminist approaches to bioethics—some kind of feminist standpoint that credits women with being able to see things about reality that men do not typically see. Because the "master's position" in any set of dominating social relations—the general position of men vis-a-vis women—"tends to produce distorted visions of the real regularities and underlying causal tendencies in social relations,"100 men experience their power over women as normal, even beneficial. This is not women's experience, however. They see systems of male domination and female subordination for what they really are: abnormal, indeed harmful ways for men and women to relate. As I have just interpreted feminist standpoint theory, its proponents are subject to at least two lines of criticism. The first complaint is that feminist standpoint theorists make essentialistic claims about woman's nature, according to which all women are the same.101 Responding to this objection, my kind of feminist standpoint theorist might argue that just because she is committed to the view that women are like each other by virtue of their sex does not mean that she is inattentive to the many differences among women (class, race, ethnicity, sexual identity, and age), or to the fact that rich, educated, white women, for example, are more like their male counterparts than poor, uneducated, women of color. 102 On the contrary, my kind of feminist standpoint theorist might argue that not she, but the Tradition, created a unitary vision of "Woman" to serve as a foil for "Man"—a mirror to reflect him in his power and glory.103 Far from wanting to make essentialist claims about "Woman's" nature, my kind of feminist standpoint theorist wishes to deconstruct this abstraction. She thus seeks to free all sorts of women to articulate what they actually think, as opposed to what an androcentric tradition has told them to think about ethics and bioethics, for in-
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stance. As Mary Mahowald has suggested, feminist standpoint theory need not rely on the idea of women understood as a "collectivity" (who all think the same thought), but instead on the idea of women understood as a "plurality" (who think different thoughts).104 The second charge is that feminist standpoint theory is not a preferable vantage point from which to perceive reality, for it wrongly sees women's "oppression" everywhere. Whereas the Tradition offered objective truth and impartial knowledge, feminist standpoint theory offers women an opportunity to complain about "injustices" that exist only in their minds. To this objection, my kind of feminist standpoint theorist might respond, and has already responded, that what traditional theory passed off as objective and impartial knowledge was nothing of the sort. Like all knowledge, the Tradition's knowledge was the product of a set of experiences—in its case, the experiences of mostly white, privileged men. Because women's experiences were not encoded in traditional theory, that theory constituted itself in a very subjective, partial, "male" manner.105 Specifically, Alison Jaggar has argued that what one experiences is mediated through one's body; and what one experiences affects what one thinks and writes. Since women's bodily experiences (in production as well as reproduction) are quite different from those of men, women will tend to see, hear, and feel different things than men see, hear, and feel. 106 To be sure, to the extent that men are involved in women's work, they can see, hear, and feel what women typically do. Yet even then men cannot experience the meaning of having a female body. Both nature and culture burden and empower this female body in ways that they do not burden and empower the male body. Since the kind of feminist standpoint theory I have in mind is constituted through women's experiences, its analysis of gender oppression appears to be intimately related to the experience and meaning of having a female body.107 Thus, feminist approaches to ethics and bioethics, for example, do see, hear, and feel some things about reality that remain largely invisible, inaudible, and imperceptible in any ethics or bioethics constituted through men's experiences. Yet just because my kind of feminist standpoint theorists fault the Tradition for excluding women's experiences does not mean that they believe gender oppression is the worst form of oppression imaginable. On the contrary, they seek to identify and eliminate the kind of oppression that women have traditionally experienced, whether this oppression is directed against all women as women, or against some women and some men on account of their race, class, culture, sexual orientation or preference, or physical or mental challenges. 108 Whatever one thinks of Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin's definition of pornography, for example, it invites feminists to broaden and
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deepen their analysis of gender oppression. Pornography, they say, is "the graphic sexually explicit subordination" not only of women but also of men, children, or transsexuals, who are used "in the place of women." 109 Thus, depictions of homosexual rape as well as heterosexual rape are pornographic. In broadening and deepening analyses of gender oppression, however, feminists should be careful not to forget what was stated above, namely, that women's experiences, and therefore their thoughts, are mediated through their female bodies. By focusing on the female body both as the foundation of human community and as the recipient of much abuse, feminists can learn and have learned much about bodies in general: their power to create, their will to live, their vulnerability, their limits. Since the practice of medicine is not about disembodied selves but about embodied selves with pressing physical and psychological needs that only other embodied selves can meet, what many feminist bioethicists (especially, though not exclusively radical and cultural feminists) may have to offer the practice of medicine is an ontology that actually illuminates that practice. It is an ontology not of separateness but of connectedness, understood both in its negative and positive senses. Thus, for example, from a radical feminist viewpoint, Dimas's case is about pornography—about some people trying to reduce a human person into a "head in a bed" 110—and from a cultural feminist viewpoint, it is about reconstitution—about other people trying to restore a twenty-four-year-old man to a meaningful life by reconnecting him with his family and the outside world. In addition to offering medicine an ontology of connectedness and embodiment revealing medicine's acts of occupation as well as connection, feminist bioethicists challenge traditional bioethicists to consider whether they contribute to the malfunction of their own theories and principles by interpreting them through lenses smeared with the grime of sexism, racism, and classism. Trapped within conceptual as well as institutional structures of domination and subordination, autonomy can become the exercise of unreasonable demands in the name of exaggerated and egocentric "needs," 111 nonmaleficence the undertreatment of patients in the name of "futility," 112 beneficence the overtreatment of patients in the name of scientific expertise, 113 and justice the disguise for undemocratic modes of rationing in the name of the greater good.114 Unless bioethicists work toward eliminating their own as well as others' abuses of power, they risk losing their ability to see what is right and good. Worse, bioethicists risk becoming merely hired brains the powerful use to justify whatever policies or procedures suit them or the institutions they control. In bioethics there is always more than meets any one set of eyes or any one moral perspective. If bioethicists insist on ord